Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-08-04070/USCOURTS-ca7-08-04070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 3, 2010*

Decided February 4, 2010

Before

  KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

  TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

  DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐4070

LIONEL P. TREPANIER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF BLUE ISLAND, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 03 C 7433

David H. Coar,

Judge.

O R D E R

Lionel Trepanier was arrested after police officers in Blue Island, Illinois,

encountered him on a city sidewalk pulling his two‐year‐old daughter in a wagon.  The

officers reported that the girl was naked and protected against the 53‐degree October

evening only by urine‐soaked blankets.  Trepanier was charged with contributing to the

neglect of a child but eventually acquitted.  He sued the arresting officers, the city, and

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 08‐4070 Page 2

1

Trepanier’s daughter was a plaintiff in the district court, where she and her father

were represented by an attorney.  Trepanier is proceeding pro se on appeal, and because a

nonlawyer parent may not represent a child, Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1147,

1149 (7th Cir. 2001), we dismissed the daughter’s appeal after Trepanier failed to hire a

lawyer to represent her.  Accordingly, we discuss only Trepanier’s claims in this order.

others for alleged violations of his constitutional rights.1

  In granting summary judgment for

the defendants, the district court reasoned that Trepanier’s federal claims were precluded

by a ruling in his criminal case that the officers had probable cause to stop and arrest him.

Trepanier filed a postjudgment motion challenging the district court’s decision, and after

that motion was denied, he filed a notice of appeal.  In this court he argues that the grant of

summary judgment was erroneous, but the defendants contend that the appeal is limited to

the denial of Trepanier’s postjudgment motion.  We agree with the defendants, and because

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion, we affirm the

judgment.

The district court entered final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 on

September 29, 2008.  On October 17 the court received from Trepanier a pro se submission

entitled “Motion for Reconsideration and for Leave To File a Brief and Memorandum in

Support Within 21 Days.”  That motion purports to rest on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59.  The defendants had not filed a response when the court denied the motion without

comment on October 27.  Trepanier filed on November 26 a notice of appeal referencing the

October 27 decision and the earlier grant of summary judgment.

The defendants argue that Trepanier’s postjudgment motion was filed too late to toll

the time for appealing the underlying grant of summary judgment.  A motion under Rule

59(e) to reconsider a judgment, if timely, causes the clock for appealing the underlying

decision to reset if the postjudgment motion is denied.  FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(v); Borrero

v. City of Chi., 456 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2006).  Although Trepanier repeatedly states that he

“filed” the motion on October 14, 2008, the tenth business day after entry of judgment, that

was when he mailed his motion to the clerk of the district court.  The “mailbox rule” that

deems a Rule 59(e) motion filed upon its deposit in the mail applies only to prisoners reliant

on the institution to mail court papers. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Edwards v.

United States, 266 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2001).  For all other litigants a paper is filed on the

date it is delivered to the clerk of the court.  FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(2)(A); Raymond v. Ameritech

Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 604‐05 (7th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 589 (7th Cir.

2004).  Trepanier filed his motion thirteen days after the district court entered judgment (not

including weekends and federal holidays), which made his motion untimely under the ten‐

day limit then applicable.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(2), 59(e) (2006 & Supp. I 2007) (revised

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No. 08‐4070 Page 3

Dec. 1, 2009).  (On December 1, 2009, the time allotted for filing a Rule 59(e) motion was

increased from ten business days to 28 calendar days.  FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), 6(a)(1).)

Accordingly, the defendants argue, the time for Trepanier to appeal the grant of summary

judgment was not tolled by the postjudgment motion and expired on October 30, 2008.  See

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Trepanier did not file his notice of appeal until November 26, and

thus the defendants contend that this appeal is untimely as to the underlying judgment and

valid only as to the denial of the postjudgment motion.  And that ruling, the defendants

insist, was not an abuse of discretion.

In reply Trepanier argues that the time limit in Rule 59(e) is a claims‐processing rule,

not a jurisdictional one.  Thus, he continues, the defendants waived any objection to the

untimeliness of his postjudgment motion by failing to object in the district court.  He relies

on a Sixth Circuit opinion, National Ecological Foundation v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 473‐76

(6th Cir. 2007), which holds that the time limit in Rule 59(e) is indeed a claims‐processing

rule, and if the party opposing the motion waives an untimeliness objection, the motion is

considered “timely” for purposes of tolling the time to appeal under Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(v).  See also First Avenue West Building, LLC v. James (In re

OneCast Media, Inc.), 439 F.3d 558, 562‐63 (9th Cir. 2006).

The Supreme Court recently iterated that many rules once thought to be

jurisdictional are actually claims‐processing rules that do not affect a federal court’s power

to hear a case.  Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208‐213 (2007).  And a claims‐processing rule,

unlike a jurisdictional provision, may be waived by a litigant who does not assert its

protection.  See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213; Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005);

Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447, 456 (2004).  But we need not decide whether Rule 59(e) is

a jurisdictional rule or a claims‐processing rule because, either way, the defendants did not

waive the protection of the rule.

Taking his lead from National Ecological Foundation, Trepanier contends that the

defendants waived the protection of the time limit for Rule 59(e) motions by not filing a

response to his postjudgment motion.  We disagree.  In National Ecological Foundation the

defendants had agreed not to contest the movants’ request for more time to file a Rule 59(e)

motion and then, consistent with that agreement, opposed the motion on the merits, not as

untimely.  496 F.3d at 473, 476; see also Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 13‐14 (“Rather than arguing,

however, that the untimeliness of the supplemental memorandum [to the defendant’s

posttrial motion in a criminal case] barred the District Court from considering the issues it

raised, the Government opposed it on the merits.”).  Here, it is not clear that the defendants

were even required to file a response because Trepanier did not follow the local rules of the

district court and include with the motion a notice of presentment specifying when the

motion will be presented.  N.D. ILL. LOC. R. 5.3(b), 78.2.  And under those same rules the

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No. 08‐4070 Page 4

absence of a response is not deemed to waive any objection to a postjudgment motion.  N.D.

ILL. LOC. R. 78.3; Garcia v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 09‐CV‐1369, 2009 WL 4730961, at *2 n.1

(N.D. Ill. 2009); see also Bolt v. Loy, 227 F.3d 854, 856 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that, if “the

party opposing the motion thinks the motion’s lack of merit so patent that no response is

required,” the district court “either orders the party to respond or decides the motion

without the benefit of a response”).  The defendants asserted the untimeliness defense

before ever addressing the merits of Trepanier’s postjudgment motion either in this court or

in the district court and therefore have not waived the defense, whether or not the time limit

is a claims‐processing rule.  See United States v. Singletary, 471 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(holding that government preserved untimeliness argument under Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(b) by asserting contention before addressing merits of defendant’s

appeal).  Cf. Nat’l Ecological Found., 496 F.3d at 481 (Sutton, J., concurring) (asserting that

panel should decline to decide whether Rule 59(e) is a claims‐processing rule and instead

“adhere to the straightforward practice we have long employed” and construe untimely

Rule 59(e) motion as timely Rule 60(b) motion).

Accordingly, we conclude that Trepanier’s postjudgment motion, filed more than ten

business days after entry of the underlying judgment, did not toll the time to appeal that

decision.  The notice of appeal covers only whether the district court properly denied

Trepanier’s postjudgment motion.  In the motion Trepanier set forth numerous purported

errors in the court’s reasons for granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Because the defendants did not waive the time limit in Rule 59(e), the postjudgment

motion must be construed as one under Rule 60(b).  See Talano v. Nw. Med. Faculty Found.,

273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001).  We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion only for an

abuse of discretion. Harrington v. City of Chi., 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006).  A litigant

may not use Rule 60(b) to challenge errors that could have been brought in an appeal from

the underlying judgment.  Kiswani v. Phoenix Sec. Agency, Inc., 584 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir.

2009); Stoller v. Pure Fishing Inc., 528 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 609 (2008).

Trepanier challenged only the district court’s reasoning in the underlying judgment, errors

that could have been raised in a timely appeal, and therefore the court properly denied the

motion.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Trepanier’s postjudgment

motion.

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