Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05107/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05107-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 14, 1997 Decided July 1, 1997 

No. 96-5089

TWELVE JOHN DOES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES

NATHANIEL MCQUEEN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

Consolidated with

Nos. 96-5106, 96-5107

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 80cv02136)

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued 

the cause for the District of Columbia, et al. With her on the 

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briefs were Jo Anne Robinson, Acting Principal Deputy, 

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Richard Love, Counsel.

Kemi Morten argued the cause for appellants Nathaniel 

McQueen, et al. With her on the brief was Brian Lederer.

Alan A. Pemberton argued the cause for appellees Twelve 

John Does. With him on the brief were Peter J. Nickles and 

Michael S. Labson.

Before: WILLIAMS, GINSBURG and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: These appeals all arise out of a 

consent decree entered in 1982 and intended to resolve a suit 

initially filed in 1979 and refiled later as a class action. The 

suit sought broad changes in living conditions at the Central 

Facility at the District of Columbia's prison in Lorton, Virginia. It was one of a number of class actions brought on 

behalf of prisoners at different Lorton facilities. For a brief 

description, see Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia,

841 F.2d 1133, 1134-36 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

After the District was exposed to the risk of heavy contempt fines for alleged violations of the 1982 decree, it and 

the lawyers for the plaintiff class negotiated a settlement 

under which some of the fines would be held in abeyance and 

ultimately returned if the District met certain staffing levels 

at Central. After learning of the proposed settlement, six 

prisoners at Central filed pro se motions in district court, 

styled motions for a temporary restraining order and a 

preliminary injunction. Specifically, the motions asked the 

court to oust class counsel and to substitute therefor Kemi 

Morten (who later entered an appearance for the dissident 

inmates), to appoint a receiver to run Central, and to grant a 

protective order against retaliation. Besides being a lawyer, 

Morten is executive director of a substance abuse treatment 

program known as Unfoldment, which once operated at Central.

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The court denied the T.R.O. On December 5, 1995 it held 

a hearing on the preliminary injunction, and Morten represented to the district court that her clients were supported by 

1,100 of 1,300 inmates at Central, as evidenced by petitions 

circulated and signed by the inmates during the month of 

November after the filing of the motions. The petitions 

identified the six movant prisoners as representatives of the 

"Blacktop Coalition," and asked for relief akin to that sought 

in the motions, plus restoration of the Unfoldment program. 

Together with some of the dissident inmates themselves, 

Morten argued for the self-styled motion for a preliminary 

injunction, proposing broad changes in conditions at Central, 

some with only limited reference to the Twelve John Does

consent decree. She also asked that the dissidents' motion be 

considered one to intervene in the class action as a subclass, 

arguing that class counsel and the plaintiffs' committee, the 

Twelve John Does, no longer adequately represented the 

inmates' interests.

At the end of the hearing the district court observed that 

class counsel had said that the Blacktop representatives "will 

be added to the group who customarily meet with [class 

counsel], and that is what the court is granting today, and 

that is all the court is granting today." Asked by Morten 

about the motion to intervene as a subclass, the court said, 

"No, denied." In an order filed the next day, the district 

court formalized its disposition of the motions. Noting that 

the "motion for a preliminary injunction" was in reality a 

motion for substitution of counsel and appointment of a 

receiver, the court denied it, expressing doubt that the signers of the petition were fully informed of the limited nature of 

the pending case and stating, "In the 15 years since this case 

began, the Court has had the opportunity to observe the level 

of representation provided by [class counsel] and is satisfied 

that the class is receiving legal representation of the highest 

quality." Order, Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 

Civ. Action No. 80-2136 (D.D.C. December 6, 1995) ("December 6, 1995 Order") at 3. The court also reiterated its oral 

denial of the six dissidents' motion to intervene as a subclass, 

finding that the "class is receiving quality representation; 

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that class counsel listens to and communicates with members 

of the class and advocates zealously for the class." Id. at 4. 

The court rejected the notion that class counsel had in any 

way slacked in pursuit of contempt findings where appropriate, and also said, apropos the dissident inmates' substantive 

claims, "While inmates have been important to enforcement 

of the consent decree through reporting to the special officer 

and to class counsel, many of the concerns stated by the 

petitioners at the hearing on this matter are not properly a 

part of the consent decree." Id.

The district court also granted the six dissidents' request 

for a protective order, of which there had been no mention at 

the oral hearing. See id. at 5.

Both the dissidents and the District moved for reconsideration of the December 6, 1995 Order. The dissidents renewed 

their request for the relief they had sought but not attained, 

and the District sought to overturn the one item the dissidents had secured, the protective order. The court denied 

both motions in an order filed March 4, 1996. Twelve John 

Does v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 80-2136 (D.D.C. 

March 4, 1996) ("March 4, 1996 Order").

In the meantime, class counsel and the District worked out 

their resolution of the looming contempt issues, and on February 26, 1996 the court entered a consent order reflecting 

that agreement. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 

Civ. Action No. 80-2136 (D.D.C. February 26, 1996) ("February 26, 1996 Consent Order"). The dissident prisoners filed a 

notice of appeal from the entry of the order, which the 

district court struck on the grounds that they were not 

parties.

From this tangle of events we have before us three appeals. 

(1) In No. 96-5106, the dissident prisoners challenge the 

district court's denial of their motion for reconsideration of its 

earlier denial of the bulk of the relief they had sought. (2) In 

No. 96-5107, the dissident prisoners appeal the district 

court's order striking their notice of appeal of the February 

26, 1996 Consent Order. (3) In No. 96-5089, the District of 

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Columbia appeals the court's grant of the protective order 

and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.

We affirm in Nos. 96-5106 and 96-5107 and reverse in No. 

96-5089.

I. The Prisoner Appeals, Nos. 96-5106 and 96-5107

Class counsel argue that these appeals are barred by a 

prior decision of this court and are in any event moot. The 

claim of bar arises from our disposition of an appeal from the 

court's initial order denying the moving prisoners' motions

recall that in No. 96-5106 they appeal from the district 

court's denial of the motion for reconsideration of that order. 

In the earlier appeal the prisoners obscurely raised the issue 

of the denial of their motion to intervene, and in an unpublished order, Nathaniel El McQueen v. District of Columbia, 

No. 96-5003 (D.C. Cir. July 18, 1996), reh'g denied, (D.C. Cir. 

Sept. 6, 1996), which focussed on the challenge to class 

counsel and did not mention the intervention issue, we dismissed the appeal for want of a final judgment. The direct 

appeal from the district court's order denying the prisoners' 

motion having been ruled interlocutory, class counsel say that 

this disposes of both appeals. It eliminates No. 96-5106 

because that appeal at best replicates the dismissed appeal 

from the initial order; it eliminates No. 96-5107 because if 

the dissident prisoners are without party status, the district 

court was clearly right to strike their notice of appeal.

We need not examine whether the case might fall within 

one of the exceptions to the doctrine of the law of the case. 

See LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(noting limited character of exceptions). Compare Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. B & O R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 

524-25, 531-32 (1947) (denial of intervention immediately 

appealable where intervention as of right is sought). The 

Sixth Circuit has held that where members of a class have 

unsuccessfully sought to intervene separately but have not 

appealed the denial, and later seek to appeal a final order, 

they are entitled to raise the intervention issue on appeal 

from the final order (even though, by hypothesis, they have 

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not yet acquired party status). Shults v. Champion International Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1059-61 (6th Cir. 1994). See also 

Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (non-parties adversely affected by consent decree approving settlement 

should "seek intervention for purposes of appeal; denials of 

such motions are, of course, appealable"). We need not 

consider whether we would adopt the Shults approach for a 

would-be intervenor that had failed to avail itself of an 

available opportunity for appeal. Where, as here, the wouldbe intervenors had no earlier opportunity for appeal, they 

should be able to raise the supposed error in the denial of 

intervention simultaneously with their appeal of the later 

appealable order whose imminent entry was precisely the 

occasion for their intervention effort. Thus, assuming that 

the movants' appeal in No. 96-5106 is barred by law of the 

case as to the interlocutory character of the denial of intervention, they remain free to press the intervention issue in 

their appeal in No. 96-5107, seeking relief from the February 

26, 1996 Consent Order.

There remains, of course, the question whether the 1996 

consent decree itself is a final order or among the exceptional 

class of interlocutory orders over which we have jurisdiction. 

The decree mandates certain primary conduct (i.e., conduct in 

the real world, outside the litigation itself) and in addition 

modifies the terms of a prior consent decree controlling the 

defendant's primary conduct. Thus, whether or not final, it 

qualifies as an order "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions ...," for which 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(a)(1) provides appellate jurisdiction. See United 

States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 

1995).

In exercising jurisdiction over the movants' appeal in No. 

96-5107 (attacking the district court's striking of their notice 

of appeal from the consent decree), of course we have jurisdiction to review the prior rejection of their motion to intervene as a subclass, on which that appeal inextricably depends. 

This is so regardless of whether we classify the intervention 

issue as denial of intervention as of right, which is appealable 

in itself, see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 331 U.S. at 

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524-25, 531-32, or as denial of permissive intervention or 

denial of certification as a subclass, which normally would not 

be. See id.; McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 562 F.2d 1269, 1276 

(D.C. Cir. 1977) (denial of class certification normally not 

immediately appealable). As Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood 

Exercise, Inc., 85 F.3d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1996), illustrates, our 

pendent appellant jurisdiction encompasses at least determinations that are inextricably intertwined with ones over which 

we have direct jurisdiction.

Class counsel argues that the movants' appeals are moot 

because they have been transferred from Central to other 

facilities. The movants have not legally sought retransfer 

back to Central, as Morten conceded at oral argument, so it 

would appear that they no longer have individual interests in 

conditions at Central.

But the movants have not sought to vindicate only their 

individual concerns. They also sought to intervene as a 

subclass. A party certified as class representative may pursue the class claim even after his purely individual claim 

becomes moot, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), and a 

named plaintiff who has merely asked for class certification 

may appeal the denial of class certification even after his 

individual claim becomes moot, United States Parole Comm'n 

v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397-404 (1980). The Court reasoned in Geraghty that the proposed class representative's 

interest was akin to that of a private attorney general, a right 

deliberately created in order to make it possible to realize the 

benefits of the class action form. Id. at 403. Geraghty's 

logic, in finding that that interest was significant enough to 

preserve the case from mootness, appears to apply to the 

interest of a party that has sought to intervene as representative of a subclass. Superficially, it may not seem within the 

stated purpose of Geraghty to allow the representative interest of persons seeking to splinter a class to save that splintering effort from mootness. But the use of a subclass makes it 

possible to preserve the class action form where the named 

representative cannot be found to adequately represent all 

the interests in the class, see 7B Charles A. Wright et al., 

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1790 at 276-84 (2d 

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ed. 1986); see also Fink v. National Savings and Trust Co., 

772 F.2d 951, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that district 

judge ought to have considered possibility of subclasses before denying class certification and citing Geraghty), so application of Geraghty to subclass claims seems within its spirit. 

Thus at last we turn to the issue of whether the district court 

correctly denied the dissidents' motion to intervene as a 

subclass.

We review the decision for abuse of discretion. Because 

the balance between keeping class litigation manageable and 

allowing affected parties to be adequately heard turns on a 

myriad of case-specific facts, the abuse-of-discretion standard 

governs most of the related issuesthe decisions to certify a 

class, see Fink, 772 F.2d at 960, to allow permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b), Hodgson v. United Mine 

Workers, 473 F.2d 118, 125 & n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and to 

allow intervention as of right to the extent that it turns on the 

adequacy of representation by existing parties, id. As Fed. 

R. Civ. Pro. 23(c)(4)(B) authorizes the district court to create 

subclasses "when appropriate," it implies the same need for 

reasonable discretion, even recognizing that any subclass 

must independently meet the standards for class certification. 

See 7B Wright et al. § 1790 at 276-85. Particularly as the 

parties agree that the district court correctly framed the 

issue as whether the would-be intervenors were adequately 

represented, cf. id. § 1799 at 440-41 ("if the court determines 

that the nonparty class members are adequately represented, 

intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) should be unavailable"), the abuse of discretion standard appropriately controls.

Among the many factors governing the district court's 

decision that the prisoners are adequately represented are 

the quality of class counsel, any disparity in interest between 

class representatives and members of a would-be subclass, 

communication between class counsel and the class, and the 

overall context of the litigation. 7A Wright et al. § 1766 at 

297-98, § 1768 at 326. Or, as this court once put it: "Two 

criteria for determining the adequacy of representation are 

generally recognized: 1) the named representative must not 

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have antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed 

members of the class, and 2) the representative must appear 

able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through 

qualified counsel." National Association of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 345 (D.C. Cir. 

1976).

In this case, we see no reason not to accept the district 

court's finding that the members of the class are receiving 

adequate representation. The dissidents make no real challenge to the general finding of the district judge that class 

counsel has performed at the highest level. Nor do they 

argue that their interests are in some fundamental, structural 

way different from those of the members of the Twelve John 

Does committee. Cf. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 600 

F.2d 470, 472 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding denial of 

intervention in school desegregation suit by persons seeking 

to represent black professional employees as a subclass in 

larger class action). In fact, then, the dissidents' claim that 

they are inadequately represented depends solely on their 

claims that class counsel have failed to maintain adequate 

communication with, and to be sufficiently responsive to, 

members of the class.

Here, of course, the district court's experience overseeing 

the case for nearly two decades has given it a unique familiarity with the issues and the performance of class counsel. See 

McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) 

(noting that district court directly familiar with adequacy of 

class counsel's representation need not hold hearing on challenges to adequacy). To the extent that the would-be intervenors' point to the dispute over the scope of the February 26, 

1996 Consent Order as evidence of unresponsiveness, the 

claim is weak. The district court observed:

At the hearing held on this motion on December 5, 

1995, it became apparent to the Court that petitioners 

believed they could achieve concessions not contained in 

the consent decree including: preventing the out of state 

transfer of inmates; inmate participation in the Central 

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Facility's food preparation and service; and, greater 

educational and vocational programs.

December 6, 1995 Order at 3 n.2. Although the movants 

point to general language in the Consent Decree calling for 

an "effort to develop and to expand the institutionallyoperated programs at Central," see "Memorandum of Points 

and Authorities in Support of Motion to Reconsider December 6, 1995 Order," at 19 n.6 (quoting Consent Decree at 32), 

they appear to recognize that a ban on out-of-state transfers 

is no more than a possible subject for negotiations to modify 

the Consent Decree, which could be said of any issue. They 

see the food preparation proposal as pertinent to the decree 

only in the sense of lying within its general language on 

program development. Furthermore, the original lawsuit 

itself focussed on security issues, chiefly the prevention of 

inmate-on-inmate violence. See Complaint at 3, 26-28, ¶¶ 1, 

84-92, Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action 

No. 80-2136 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 1980). Although the complaint 

described inadequate living conditions, including inadequate 

and unhygenic food facilities, it did so in the context of the 

anger that such conditions are likely to engender, with a 

resulting increase in the risk of violence. See Complaint at 

23, ¶ 75. Given class counsel's continuing efforts to secure 

the District's compliance with specific, numerical criteria provided in the Consent Decree that are directly linked to the 

original lawsuit, its failure to embrace the dissidents' agendaeven the portions technically within the scope of the 

original complaint and the 1982 decreehardly undermines 

the district court's findings as to adequacy of representation. 

This is especially true for the first item in the dissidents' 

proposed consent order, that the court require the District to 

set aside money specifically for Kemi Morten's Unfoldment 

program. Joint Appendix at 196-97. It is also true for the 

second, a food preparation or "culinary arts" program under 

which prisoners would be paid the minimum wage and the 

prison members of the Blacktop Coalition would choose the 

prison guards with whom inmates would work. Id. at 197. 

The movants have by no means shown that counsel's advocacy 

of the February 26, 1996 Consent Order in preference to the 

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Coalition's agenda was not in the best interests of the class. 

Cf. Kincade v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 

508 (5th Cir. 1981).

Nor have the prisoners made out the other aspects of the 

claim that there is a failure to communicate, namely, that the 

named representatives and class counsel have lost touch with 

the class members and are proceeding without appropriate 

consultations, and that the class members' views are more 

accurately reflected by the Blacktop Coalition. What 

sparked the Blacktop Coalition's intervention effort was news 

of an October 11, 1995 agreement in principle to resolve the 

dispute over the District's failure to comply with the 1982 

decree, as amended. Apart from their attack on its substantive terms (already reviewed), the Coalition complains about 

inadequate advance consultation over the agreement. But 

class counsel explained that since the agreement was initially 

reached at a court hearing, it did not have an opportunity to 

present it to the class earlier.

There is little information before us about the role of the 

named representatives. We know that their names were 

placed under seal by court orderhence the eponymous 

Twelve John Does Committeeand that the Committee (like 

the Blacktop Coalition) is a self-constituted body whose membership has evidently changed over the years. But its constitution, however informal, has not sharply constrained class 

counsel's access to the prison population. Counsel meets as 

well with other inmates who prove to be reliable sources of 

information, and has offered to meet with members of the 

Blacktop Coalition. In addition, class counsel accepts all 

collect phone calls from Central. There is also a courtappointed special officer overseeing implementation of the 

Consent Decree, who can report any problems in communication either to the court or to class counsel. Thus the movants 

have not successfully made out a claim of systemic failure of 

communication.

At the most, the prisoner movants demonstrated that they 

feel left out of what is clearly a very important matter in their 

lives; and, of course, the petitions signed by 1100 inmates 

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suggest that the feeling is widespread. But a class action of 

this sort in any case risks becoming "in ways more akin to 

congressional hearings than judicial proceedings," Jones v. 

Caddo Parish School Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 938 (5th Cir. 1984) 

(en banc) (Higginbotham, J., concurring), with every possible 

issue on the table. As class counsel is pursuing the interests 

of the class energetically and skillfully, and much of the 

Blacktop Coalition's alternative program is outside or marginal to the 1982 consent decree (so that its pursuit would 

further aggravate the formlessness of the suit), we have no 

grounds to reject the district court's decision to deny intervention.

II. The District's Appeal, No. 96-5089.

The District objects to the district court's prohibition, in its 

December 6, 1995 Order, of retaliation against any of the six 

movants or the 1100 or so inmates who signed the supporting 

petition. The District's primary claim is (as it was in their 

motion for reconsideration) that the order was entered without any factual basis, such as evidence of prior retaliatory 

action, in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis 

v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2179, 2183 (1996), as well as of our 

own decision in Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413 

(D.C. Cir. 1996), antedating Lewis, which makes clear that, at 

least where judicial action aimed at protecting constitutional 

claims would involve broad control over a local government's 

management of its affairs, injunctive relief can be granted 

only if there is "a pervasive pattern ... flowing from a 

deliberate plan by the named defendants." Id. at 1424 (internal quotations omitted).

Class counsel, defending the protective order, relies in 

large part on the ground that until its motion for reconsideration the District did not oppose the movants' request for such 

an order, either in writing or at the December 5, 1995 

hearing. The District retorts that the movants' failure to 

present any support (or even argument) for the motion led it 

to believe that the request had been abandoned.

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In fact, Local Rule 108(b) of the district court requires that 

a party respond to a motion within 11 days. If not, "the court 

may treat the motion as conceded." D.C. District Court 

Local Rule 108(b) (emphasis added). Where the district 

court relies on the absence of a response as a basis for 

treating the motion as conceded, we honor its enforcement of 

the rule. See Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300, 1304-05 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994). Here, however, the district court did not exercise 

its discretion to treat the motion as conceded, but acted on 

the merits. Rule 108(b) thus does not appear to be a bar. 

Cf. Moy v. Howard University, 843 F.2d 1504, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 

1988).

Class counsel makes the related point, however, that the 

District's failure to object to the lack of fact-finding until the 

motion for reconsideration waives the argument for appeal. 

But Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from a judgment on 

grounds of "mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable 

neglect." In fact, we have construed Rule 60(b)(6)'s catchall 

provision, allowing correction for "any other reason justifying 

relief," as calling for relief in extreme cases even where the 

moving party has been guilty of inexcusable neglect:

When a party timely presents a previously undisclosed 

fact so central to the litigation that it shows the initial 

judgment to have been manifestly unjust, reconsideration 

under rule 60(b)(6) is proper even though the original 

failure to present that information was inexcusable.

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility v. United 

States Secret Service, 72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(quoting and following Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. 

Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Here the circumstances call for a finding that the District's neglect was 

excusable.

The primary issue at the December 5, 1995 hearing was the 

one we have already addressedwhether the movants' claims 

about adequacy of representation justified either the grant of 

their motion to intervene as a subclass or any other relief 

altering the system of representation. No one said a word to 

support the motion for a protective order. As the hearing 

drew to a close, the court said that the six dissidents would 

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"be added to the group who customarily meet with [class 

counsel], and that is what the court is granting today, and 

that is all the court is granting today"; it also said explicitly 

that the motion to intervene as a subclass was "denied." 

Although the motion for a protective order was in a formal 

sense on the table during the hearing, its proponents never 

advanced it, and the court unequivocally rejected the idea 

that its proponents should have any formal status in the 

lawsuit. While class counsel had said that it did not object to 

the motion, see Opposition on Behalf of Plaintiff Class to 

Motion of Pro Se Movants for a Preliminary Injunction, at 

1-2, Joint Appendix 100-01, it never offered affirmative support. Thus the motion appeared to be a complete orphan. 

Indeed, later, in denying the District's motion for reconsideration, the district court relied on its "inherent authority" to 

issue the order. March 4, 1996 Order at 2. In the circumstances the District's silence on the subject was excusable. 

Finally, once the issue was raised the district court justified 

its decision issuing the order without factual support by 

saying it was doing so "prophylactically," id., which suggests 

that no earlier objection on that ground would have made any 

difference.

On the merits, class counsel's answer to Lewis v. Casey and 

Ellis v. District of Columbia is twofold. First, it points to 

Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 

where we upheld an anti-retaliation order based on evidence 

that women "who had filed complaints ... were occasionally 

the victims of retaliation." Id. at 931. It is unclear why class 

counsel believes that this supports issuance of an order in the 

absence of any such evidence. Further, although class counsel argues that in Women Prisoners the District sought 

reversal on the theory that there was no evidence of systemwide retaliation, the relevant passage of the opinion says 

nothing of such a claim, or of Lewis or Ellis (though Lewis is 

noted earlier in the opinion, id. at 920, 923).

Second, class counsel argues that a ban on retaliation is 

free of the demands of Lewis because, unlike the order there, 

it has nothing to do with the management of the prison; it 

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bars only retaliatory conduct that would be illegal in any 

event. Counsel also points to our decision in Wagner v. 

Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in which we upheld 

the district court's jurisdiction to enjoin retaliation by the 

Interstate Commerce Commission against a Title VII plaintiff 

who asserted that he might be subject to reprisals pending 

administrative adjudication of his claim. But a ban on retaliation plainly does impact the management of the prison. 

Every act adverse to one of the protected parties (here, 

almost the entire prison population) creates at least a risk of 

contempt proceedings whose outcome would turn on elusive 

questions of motivation. As for Wagner v. Taylor, it yields 

no support for the order. Having found district court jurisdiction to provide such relief, 836 F.2d at 570-75, we noted 

that any decision to actually grant the relief depended on 

satisfying the usual criteria for injunctions, and affirmed the 

district court's denial of one, in large part because the plaintiff "offered no supporting evidence" that retaliation was 

imminent, other than copies of his own complaints, id. at 576. 

Thus the complete absence of factual support for the ban in 

the record is a fatal deficiency. In these circumstances it was 

an abuse of discretion for the court to deny the motion for 

reconsideration. See Lepkowski v. United States Dept. of 

Treasury, 804 F.2d 1310, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (review of 

Rule 60(b)(1) rulings is for abuse of discretion).

* * *

The district court order against retaliatory action is vacated 

and the case remanded for further proceedings on that issue; 

the orders under review are in every other respect affirmed.

So ordered.

USCA Case #96-5107 Document #282173 Filed: 07/01/1997 Page 15 of 15