Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-05817/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-05817-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSH THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

D.L. STEPHENS, et. al. ,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 00-5817 AWI SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (Doc. 130.) 

Plaintiff Josh Thomas (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 31, 2000. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint, filed October 30, 2000. On March 29, 2002, Defendants filed a

Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The Court issued Findings and

Recommendations on June 24, 2002, that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be denied. The

Recommendations were adopted in full by the District Judge on August 13, 2002. On March 17,

2003, Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint. On April 15, 2003, Defendants filed

a Motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status. On August 19, 2003, the Court issued

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1

 The Court notes for the record that Plaintiff also filed a cross motion for summary judgment in addition to

his Opposition on April 12, 2004. On April 20, 2004, Magistrate Judge Theresa A. Goldner issued Findings and

Recommendations recommending that Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment be denied as untimely. 

(Court Doc. 112.) 

2

Findings and Recommendations recommending that Defendants’ Motion be denied. The

Recommendation was adopted in full by the District Judge on November 5, 2003. 

On December 23, 2003, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff

filed his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on January 22, 2004.1 This Court

issued Findings and Recommendations that the Motion for Summary Judgment be denied with

respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim and granted with respect to the remaining claims. 

(Doc. 120.) The Court also recommended that Plaintiff’s American’s with Disabilities (“ADA”)

claim be dismissed for failing to state a claim and that Defendants Harlow and Seeley be

dismissed from the action on the same basis. Id.

On September 10, 2004, the District Court Adopted the Recommendation with the

exception of the Recommendation regarding the ADA claim. (Doc. 127.) The Court then

granted Defendants leave to file a Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendants Seeley, and Harlow based on the fact that he was

excluded from his work position. Id. 

On October 13, 2004, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ADA

claim only. (Doc. 130.) Plaintiff filed his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on

November 15, 2004. (Doc. 137.) 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at

trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

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28 2The following facts are undisputed for the purpose of this Motion. 

4

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.

Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine

issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. UNDISPUTED FACTS2

1. On February 13, 1998, Plaintiff was transferred from Avenal State Prison to the

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (SATF), in Corcoran California. 

2. On August 28, 1998, Dr. Donald Deering, then Acting Chief Medical Officer at SATF,

signed a medical chrono for Plaintiff which restricted him from work assignments

requiring lifting more than 25 pounds, prolonged standing, and repetitive bending or

stooping. 

3. The restrictions imposed by Dr. Deering were similar to those specified in a subsequent

chrono signed by Dr. Balikian, a staff physician at SATF, on March 24, 1999. 

4. The restrictions imposed on Plaintiff’s work assignments by Dr. Deering and Dr. 

Balikian did not preclude Plaintiff from being assigned to prison jobs that did not require

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3Although Plaintiff says he “disputes” these facts, his explanation is merely that he could perform anything

that did not require him to lift more than 25 pounds, stand for prolonged periods or bend or stoop repetitively. Thus,

this fact is undisputed. 

4

Plaintiff “disputes” these facts, however, he provides no evidence that he had difficulty with any of these

functions. That the chrono restricted him from prolonged standing, bending or stooping is not evidence that Plaintiff

could not breathe, walk or perform any other work that did not involve the restrictions. Accordingly, this fact is

undisputed. 

5

Plaintiff says he disputes these facts but he provides no evidence that the tasks assigned to the Yard B crew

were anything other than what Defendant has described by way of Declaration. Accordingly, the fact is undisputed. 

6Again, Plaintiff disputes this fact but provides no evidence contrary to the facts as set forth by Defendants

regarding the time frame it took inmates to complete the tasks. 

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the activities prohibited in the chronos. 

5. Plaintiff remained eligible for any assignments that did not require Plaintiff perform

contrary to the restrictions outlined in the chrono. 

6. Plaintiff was capable of working in the kitchen or doing yard work so long as the

restrictions were observed.3

7. At the time Dr. Deering and Dr. Balikian signed the chronos, Plaintiff’s physical

condition did not interfere with his ability to care for himself or perform manual tasks or

with walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.4

8. From January 1999 to January 2000, Defendant Caetana was the inmate work crew

supervisor in B Yard at SATF. 

9. Approximately 20 inmates were in the work crew that Defendant Caetana supervised. 

10. The work crew in Yard B generally performed light maintenance in the yard including

sweeping the sidewalk and blacktop, picking up trash, hoeing and raking weeds, and

washing windows.5

11. The maintenance work was generally performed at the same time by all inmates in the

work crew and so each job was completed within a half hour or so.6

12. When Defendant Caetana began his term as work crew supervisor in Yard B, Plaintiff

held the job position YDW-B-304 and was one of the inmates in Caetana’s crew. 

13. Plaintiff did not perform the general work of the Defendant Caetana’s Yard B crew

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7Here, Plaintiff indicates he disputes these facts because Caetana did not insist he perform these tasks. He

does not dispute that he did not perform these tasks and thus, the fact as stated is undisputed. 

8Although Plaintiff disputes this fact, he provides no evidence that he was ever assigned to this position. 

Defendants, however, have provided a work history indicating that Plaintiff was never assigned to this position. See,

Defendant’s Exh.6. Accordingly, this fact is undisputed. 

9

Plaintiff disputes this fact arguing that he was unemployed “until 6/1/98" and cites to Exhibit X. However,

Exhibit X shows Plaintiff’s custody classification and not his work history. Defendants Exhibit 6 demonstrates that

Plaintiff was employed almost continuously throughout the time frame stated. 

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because of the restrictions imposed by the medical chronos.

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14. Defendant Caetana did not insist that Plaintiff work with the crew. 

15. In and around January 1999, correctional officers at SATF used an office in the B Yard to

do paperwork, maintain files, make and receive telephone calls, and keep personal

property

16. Because correctional staff used the B Yard office to conduct prison work and kept items

of personal property such as purses and car keys there, the office was off limits to inmates

without supervision. 

16. Plaintiff was never assigned to the position of “Recreation Coordinator Clerk.”8

17. On February 27, 1999, Plaintiff was reassigned from the yard crew to a Teacher’s Aide

position (ESL-B-202), which had a higher pay grade and required no physical labor. 

18. On March 5, 1999, Plaintiff was transferred to a different Teacher’s Aide position (TEAB-160). 

19. On March 5, 1999, Plaintiff was transferred back to a position with a yard crew in Yard B

(YDW-B-205), similar to the position he previously held under Caetana, but with

different hours. 

20. Almost continuously from March 31, 1998, through April 2000, Plaintiff held a prison

job.9

21. As correctional officers, Lyman and Caetana had no responsibility or authority to place

Plaintiff or any other inmate in a job. 

22. The placement of inmates in jobs was the responsibility of the Classification Committee

and the Inmate Assignments Office. 

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23. Neither Defendant Caetana or Lyman have ever served on the Classification Committee

or the Inmate Assignment’s office. 

24. On January 5, 2000, Plaintiff went to the medical clinic with complaints of aches in his

back and legs after “refereeing basketball games all week,” and he was encouraged to rest

and decrease daily exercise. 

IV. ANALYSIS

Under Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42

U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a

plaintiff must allege four elements: 1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; 2) the

plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's

services, programs, or activities; 3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise

discriminated against by the public entity; and 4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or

discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. Weinreich v. L.A. County Metro.

Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997).

A. Disability

In order to qualify for protection under the ADA, Plaintiff must first establish that he is

“disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534

U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002). Merely having an impairment, however, does not make one

disabled for purposes of the ADA. Id. at 690. Claimants also need to demonstrate that the

impairment limits a major life activity. See, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). “‘Major life activities’

refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life." Toyota, 534 U.S. at 691. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held, for performing manual tasks to fit into this category along

with basic abilities such as walking, seeing and hearing, the tasks must be central to daily life. 

This being so, "to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have

an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of

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central importance to most people's daily lives." Id. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA and further

that even assuming he is disabled, he was not discriminated against on the basis of his alleged

disability. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s conditions do not interfere with one

or more of the “major life activities” as required under the ADA. In addition, Defendants argue

that Plaintiff has not been deprived of participating in any service, program or activity or was

discriminated against solely on account of his physical condition. 

Defendants have presented evidence in the form of declarations that Plaintiff’s conditions

did not preclude him from being assigned to various prison jobs and that he was perfectly capable

of working in the kitchen or doing yard work so long as the restrictions against lifting more than

25 pounds, prolonged standing and repetitive bending or stopping were observed. (Deering Decl. 

at 2.) In addition, Defendants present evidence that although Plaintiff’s conditions required

some restrictions in performing certain work related tasks, his condition did not prevent him

from walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing and learning. Id. Defendant’s declarations

also provide that Plaintiff’s medical records contain no complaints of injury resulting from

performing any job assignment. However, on January 5, 2000, Plaintiff complained to the clinic

of back and leg pain stemming from “refereeing basketball games all week.” Accordingly, based

on the above, Defendants assert that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 

The Court finds Defendants have met their initial burden of informing the Court of the

basis of the motion and identifying those portions of the record believed to demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See, Matsushita Elec. Indus.Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

The evidence submitted by Plaintiff does not support his contention that he is disabled

within the meaning of the ADA. Although Plaintiff provides evidence that he has flat feet, is

diabetic and has an old back injury that restricts his ability to perform certain work tasks, he

provides no evidence that any of these conditions interfere with the “major life activities” as set

forth in Toyota v. Williams. As noted above, to be substantially limited in performing manual

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tasks, an individual “must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual

from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives.” Here, although

Plaintiff cannot stand for prolonged periods, bend or stoop repeatedly or lift more than 25

pounds, daily life does not require Plaintiff him to do so. The chrono issued merely prohibits

him from being required to do so. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff cannot bend or

stoop, cannot lift anything under 25 pounds and cannot stand at all. The restrictions serve only to

prevent him from aggravating his condition. However, they are not of the nature required to be

considered “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. 

In addition, that Plaintiff has flat feet and is diabetic do not render him disabled. While it

is true that Plaintiff must wear arch supports and must take medication on a daily basis to control

his diabetes, his conditions do not interfere with his ability to care for himself or perform any

other major life activities. That Plaintiff can perform these tasks without difficulty is supported

by Plaintiff’s ability to “referee basketball games all week.” (Undisputed Fact # 2.) 

Finally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s many medical documents concerning the worsening of

his conditions unhelpful in determining whether a disputed issue of facts exists. Plaintiff’s

allegation is that he was discriminated against on the basis of his disability when he was removed

from his position on the B Yard crew in February 1999. Thus, the Court looks to Plaintiff’s

medical condition during this time frame to resolve the instant issue and not to his condition

months and years later. That Plaintiff’s conditions have worsened is unfortunate for him but

does not support his contention that he was disabled at the time of the his job change. 

Accordingly, based on the above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s conditions did not

render him “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534

U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002). 

B. Discrimination

Even were the Court to assume, without deciding, that Plaintiff was disabled within the

meaning of the ADA, the Court finds no evidence to support Plaintiff’s assertion that he was

discriminated against on the basis of his physical condition. Plaintiff’s allegation is that he was

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10Plaintiff alleges repeatedly that he was the “Recreation Coordinator Clerk.” However, the undisputed

evidence show that Plaintiff was never placed in such a position. See, Defendant’s Exhibit 6. 

10

removed from his position on the Yard B crew on account of his back injury.10 However,

Plaintiff concedes that he could not perform the work required for employment on the Yard B

crew because “sweeping the blacktop, picking up trash, hoeing and raking weeds and washing

windows all require lifting, prolonged standing, bending and stooping.” (Plaintiff’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts at ¶ 15.) It is undisputed that Defendant Caetana, the work crew supervisor,

did not require Plaintiff to perform these tasks due to his physical limitations. (Undisputed Fact

#’s 13, 14.) Plaintiff’s inability and/or refusal to perform the assigned tasks of the Yard B crew

is evidence that Plaintiff was unqualified to function in the position of Yard B crew member. 

This is an essential element of demonstrating that one qualifies for protection under the ADA. 

However, when Plaintiff was moved to a position requiring no physical labor from the position

for which he was unqualified because he could not perform the necessary tasks, he complained

that he was discriminated against. Plaintiff appears to be under the mistaken impression that the

ADA guarantees individuals with physical limitations placement in jobs that they cannot perform

but it does not. The ADA prevents individuals with disabilities from being denied participation

in a program or benefit for which he qualifies on the basis of their disabilities. Weinreich v. L.A.

County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997). Plaintiff does not allege and

there is no evidence to support that he was denied participation in any benefit, service, program

or activity on the basis of his physical condition. 

It is further undisputed that the Defendants have no authority to place inmates in any

particular jobs and that such decisions are made by the classification committee, none of whom

are named as Defendants in this case. (Undisputed Fact #’s 21, 22, 23.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

assertion that Defendants removed him from his job.

Based on the above, the Court finds Plaintiff presents no evidence to demonstrate a

genuine material issue of fact warranting trial and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on his allegation that Defendants removed him from his position on the Yard B

crew on the basis of his physical condition. 

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendants Caetana, Lyman (formerly Stephens), Seeley and

Harlow be GRANTED in favor of Defendants and the case proceed on the remaining Eighth

Amendment Claim.

The Court ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District

Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with a copy

of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed

within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time may waive the

right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 24, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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