Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00470/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00470-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Seth Allen Aikens, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 07-470-PHX-SRB (GEE)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On March 2, 2007, Seth Allen Aikens, an inmate currently confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex in Buckeye, AZ, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. [doc. #1] Before the court are the petition and the

respondents’ answer.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Edmonds for report and recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends the District

Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order dismissing the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus. It is time-barred.

Summary of the Case

On June 10, 2003, Aikens pleaded guilty in Yavapai County Superior Court to one count

of armed robbery, one count of burglary in the first degree, one count of unlawful flight, one

count of aggravated assault, and one count of weapons misconduct. (Respondents’ answer, p.

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2.) On July 8, 2003, the trial court imposed the following sentences respectively: an aggravated

term of 10 years’ imprisonment, an aggravated term of 10 years’ imprisonment, an aggravated

term of 2 years’ imprisonment, an aggravated term of 10 years’ imprisonment, and an

aggravated term of 3 years imprisonment. Id. The sentences were to run concurrently. Id.

On September 30, 2003, Aikens filed in state court a notice of post-conviction relief. Id.,

p. 2-3. On March 3, 2004, he filed his petition in which he argued he should be resentenced

because his burglary sentence was erroneously designated a class 2 felony rather than a class

3 felony. Id., p. 3. The state agreed, and on April 30, 2004, the trial court resentenced Aikens

to an aggravated term of 7 years’ imprisonment for burglary in the first degree. Id. 

On September 8, 2004, Aikens filed in state court a second notice of post-conviction

relief claiming his sentencing violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Id. The

trial court dismissed the petition on September 21, 2004, because Blakely did not apply

retroactively. Id. Aikens filed a petition for review on October 1, 2004, which was denied by

the Arizona Court of Appeals on July 19, 2005. Id., pp. 3-4. Aikens petitioned the Arizona

Supreme Court, but it denied review on March 9, 2006. Id., p. 4.

 Previously, on August 5, 2005, Aikens filed in state court a third notice of postconviction relief claiming the trial court failed to inform him of his right to appeal at the

resentencing. Id. The trial court dismissed the petition on August 16, 2005. Id. Aikens filed

a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals which was denied on May 26, 2006.

Id. 

On March 2, 2007, Aikens filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in U.S.

District Court. He claims his sentence was imposed in violation of his constitutional rights

because the facts that increased his sentencing range were not proven to a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

In their answer, the respondents argue the petition is time-barred. In the alternative, they

argue the petition should be denied on the merits because Blakely does not apply retroactively.

 

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Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A one-year limitations

period applies to persons in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:

 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

 * * *

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review;

 * * *

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In this case, the limitations period began when Aikens’ judgment became final. Blakely

has not been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, so section

2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply. See Cook v. United States, 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004).

The trial court resentenced Aikens on April 30, 2004. Aikens had 90 days to file notice

of his Rule 32 of-right petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a). He did not file a timely notice, so his

judgment became final when the deadline expired – July 29, 2004. The limitations period began

to run the next day and expired one year later on July 29, 2005. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (“AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until

the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”). The instant petition was filed

on March 2, 2007. It is time-barred and should be dismissed. 

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The second notice of post-conviction relief, filed on September 8, 2004, was filed outside

the 90-day deadline. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a). It was therefore untimely and did not toll the

limitations period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005)

(An untimely petition for post-conviction relief is not “properly filed” and does not toll the

limitations period under § 2244(d)(2).) The trial court did not explicitly find this petition was

untimely, but that does not resolve the issue. In the absence of clear direction from the state

court, the federal court must determine if the petition was timely under state law. See Evans v.

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198, 126 S.Ct. 846, 852 (2006); Lewis v. Norris, 454 F.3d 778, 780-81

(8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 515 (2006) (applying the rule of Chavis to Ark.R.Crim.P.

37.2(c)). It was not.

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DISMISSING the petition as time-barred. [doc. #1]

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, the right to de novo review may be deemed waived. 

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this report and recommendation to the petitioner

and the respondents.

DATED this 2nd day of November, 2007.

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