Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00116/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEMMA RAMSOUR,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv116-WQH-BLM

ORDER

vs.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK; CHASE

HOME FINANCE, LLC,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint,

filed by Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank and Chase Home Finance, LLC (collectively,

“Chase”). (ECF No. 11).

I. Background

On May 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative

pleading. (ECF No. 9).

A. Allegations of the Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff is 76 years old, and “Defendants know or should have known of Plaintiff’s

status as a senior citizen based on Defendants’ prior dealings with Plaintiff and Defendants’

access to Plaintiff’s credit reports and other documentation.” Id. ¶ 24.

“In the early 2000’s Plaintiff’s then investment planner encouraged Plaintiff to invest

in the conversion of an apartment complex into a condominium development.” Id. ¶ 25.

“Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, her [investment planner] used Plaintiff’s financial information

Case 3:11-cv-00116-WQH-BLM Document 14 Filed 08/23/11 Page 1 of 8
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to obtain mortgages and financing on various individual condominiums within the

development.” Id. ¶ 27. “Plaintiff was taken to Las Vegas by her investor to sign what she

thought were loan documents relating to her finance portion of the condominium project.

Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the documents she signed were loan documents for individual

condominium units. These documents include the initial loan documents for the alleged debt

in the instant case, a delinquent mortgage for an individual condominium unit.” Id. ¶ 28. In

August 2007, Plaintiff’s investment planner “was charged with a criminal information in the

United States District Court, Southern District of California Court (Case No. 07CR2260H)

alleging mail fraud for his condominium investment scheme.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff’s investment

advisor “pleaded guilty to mail fraud in the criminal case.” Id. ¶ 30.

On February 7, 2007, “Defendants’ predecessor Washington Mutual Bank filed a

complaint against Plaintiff in the San Diego Superior Court ... alleging unjust enrichment and

conversion against Plaintiff in regards to the alleged debt.” Id. ¶ 31. On March 27, 2008,

“Washington Mutual Bank filed a case management statement in the state court case stating

‘WAMU is contemplating dismissing the suit against [Plaintiff] and filing against those she

claims are responsible.’” Id. ¶ 32. In April 2008, “Defendants’ predecessor, Washington

Mutual Bank, determined that Plaintiff was a victim of identity theft and fraud and therefore

not responsible for the alleged underlying debt giving rise to the state court action.

Accordingly, Washington Mutual Bank dismissed the state court action against Plaintiff with

prejudice.” Id. ¶ 33.

On December 31, 2008, Washington Mutual Bank sent Plaintiff a letter “informing her

that Defendant JP Morgan Chase had acquired the alleged debt on September 25, 2008.” Id.

¶ 34. “Washington Mutual Bank’s December 31, 2008 letter further stated that the underlying

loan was in default on September 25, 2008. This was false as the case against Plaintiff had

already been dismissed with prejudice.” Id. ¶ 35.

“On or about early 2010, Defendants telephoned Plaintiff and demanded payment of

the alleged debt.” Id. ¶ 41. On November 2, 2010 and November 10, 2010, Plaintiff’s counsel

telephoned Defendants’ Quality Assurance Department and left voice-mail messages

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identifying counsel and counsel’s telephone number, “requesting that Defendants cease calling

Plaintiff,” and “request[ing] that all communications be directed to counsel’s office.” Id. ¶¶

44-45.

“Over the course of approximately one year, Plaintiff received daily telephone calls

from Defendant[s]. At a minimum Plaintiff would receive one call per day, but often times she

would receive two or three times in a single day.” Id. ¶ 65. “From approximately October

2010 to January 2011, Plaintiff received two to three telephone calls from Defendants on a

daily basis. Plaintiff would answer the calls and tell Defendants’ representative that she was

represented by current counsel and not to contact her again.” Id. ¶ 66. “Despite having

knowledge that Plaintiff was represented by counsel and that Plaintiff does not legally owe the

alleged debt, Defendants continued to place telephone calls to Plaintiff with the purpose to

harass or annoy her.” Id. “Plaintiff estimates that hundreds of calls took place between

October 2010 and January 2011 alone.” Id. ¶ 67.

“Defendants’ multiple communications to Plaintiff have caused Plaintiff unnecessary

stress and anxiety, fear of answering the phone.” Id. ¶ 76.

The Second Amended Complaint contains four counts: (1) violations of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq.; (2) violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt

Collections Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.32; (3) “Invasion of Privacy ...

Intrusion into Private Affairs”; and (4) “Treble Damages ... Deceptive Acts Against a Senior

Citizen.” Id. at 13. The Prayer for Relief requests statutory damages, “actual damages,”

“compensatory and punitive damages,” and “[t]reble damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §

3345.” Id. at 14.

B. Motion to Dismiss

On May 23, 2011, Chase filed the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 11). Chase contends:

[Plaintiff’s] third claim, for Invasion of Privacy, ... fails because that claim

requires an allegation of conduct that is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’

and the [Second Amended Complaint] fails to allege such conduct. [Plaintiff’s]

fourth claim, for Deceptive Acts Against a Senior Citizen ... fails because no

such claim exists. [Plaintiff’s] prayer for punitive damages ... fails because the

only claim that authorizes such damages, the invasion of privacy claim, is not

supported by her allegations. Finally, [Plaintiff’s] prayer for actual damages

under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ... and the Rosenthal Act ... fails

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because the [Second Amended Complaint] ... fails to allege facts supporting

such an allegation.

Therefore, Chase asks that Plaintiff’s third and fourth claims, for Invasion of

Privacy and Deceptive Acts Against a Senior, be dismissed and that her requests

for actual damages (special, general and compensatory damages) and for

punitive damages also be dismissed. Furthermore, since Plaintiff has had an

opportunity to address these deficiencies (by filing the [Second Amended

Complaint]) and has shown that she is unable to correct them, Chase asks that

this Motion be granted without leave to amend.

(ECF No. 11-1 at 3-4 (citations omitted)).

On June 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 12).

Plaintiff contends that “All of [Chase’s] arguments lack support in both law and fact, and

should be summarily rejected.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff contends:

Defendants placed hundreds of calls to Plaintiff despite her repeated

admonitions that she was represented by counsel and that she was not to be

contacted directly. Here, the facts differ from all authority cited in Defendants’

moving papers. Plaintiff is not the proper debtor in this case. Plaintiff’s name

and financial information was fraudulently obtained to acquire the underlying

home equity loan which is the basis for the alleged debt. Defendants ignored

both Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsels’ requests that Defendants cease contact to

Plaintiff. Whether or not Defendants purposeful and repeated collection calls

to Plaintiff constitute either harassment and abuse or intentional invasion of

privacy remain triable issues of fact to be presented to a jury.

Id. at 14-15. Plaintiff contends that “treble damages are properly [pled] in Plaintiff’s [Second

Amended Complaint] as an enhancement of Plaintiff’s causes of action”; “punitive damages

are appropriately pled in connection with Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim”; and

“Plaintiff’s [Second Amended Complaint] has adequately pled facts sufficient to establish

actual damages.” Id. at 15, 16, 17. Plaintiff alternatively requests leave to amend the Second

Amended Complaint.

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)

is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient factual

allegations to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as

true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

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1950 (2009). “[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual

content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Invasion of Privacy

“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion

of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of

his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Deteresa v.

Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying California law). To

determine whether conduct is “offensive” within the meaning of the law, courts consider “the

degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as

well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the

expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.” Id. (quoting Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 26 (1994)). “Courts have held that repeated and continuous calls in an

attempt to collect a debt give rise to a claim for intrusion upon seclusion.” Fausto v. Credigy

Servs. Corp., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also

Panahiasl v. Gurney, No. 04-04479, 2007 WL 738642, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007)

(collecting cases).

Plaintiff alleges that, despite Chase knowing that Plaintiff was elderly, Plaintiff had

retained counsel, and “Defendants’ predecessor ... [having] determined that Plaintiff was a

victim of identity theft and fraud and therefore not responsible for the alleged underlying

debt,” Chase nonetheless called Plaintiff at least once daily for a year, and two or three times

daily during a four-month period, “with the purpose to harass or annoy [Plaintiff].” (ECF No.

9 ¶¶ 33, 66). The Court finds these allegations to be materially distinguishable from the

district court cases relied upon by Chase in the Motion to Dismiss. Cf., e.g, Castellanos v.

JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 09cv969, 2009 WL 1833981, at *10 (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2009)

(“Allegations of a lender calling a debtor concerning a home equity loan extended to the

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debtor, especially given the current economic climate, without more is not enough to state a

claim for invasion of privacy above a speculative level.”) (emphasis added). After considering

the “the degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the

intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes,

and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded,” the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

allegations are sufficient to allege that Chase’s behavior “would be highly offensive to a

reasonable person.” Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 465. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

invasion of privacy is denied.

B. Count Four: Treble Damages/Deceptive Acts Against a Senior Citizen

Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint alleges, in its entirety: 

89. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all other

paragraphs.

90. Plaintiff is a senior citizen.

91. Defendants knew or should have known that its conduct was directed

towards a senior citizen.

(ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 89-91). The Prayer for Relief requests, inter alia, “[t]reble damages pursuant

to Cal. Civ. Code § 3345.” Id. at 14.

California Civil Code § 3345 is a treble-damages provision, which applies “in actions

brought by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of senior citizens or disabled persons ... to redress

unfair or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition.” Cal. Civ. Code §

3345(a).

Chase contends that “Chase is not challenging her decision to seek treble damages in

her prayer for relief; Chase is merely challenging Plaintiff’s decision to try to convert her

prayer for treble damages into an independent claim.” (ECF No. 13 at 5). In opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff does not assert that Count Four constitutes an independent claim;

Plaintiff contends that “treble damages are properly [pled] in Plaintiff’s [Second Amended

Complaint] as an enhancement of Plaintiff’s causes of action.” (ECF No. 12).

The Court finds that “California Civil Code § 3345 ... is not an independent cause of

action and will only apply if Plaintiff[] successfully prove[s] liability under [another] claim.”

Gwin v. Pac. Coast Fin. Servs., No. 09cv2734-BTM; 2010 WL 1691567, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr.

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1

 Because the issue was not raised in the Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not decide

whether California Civil Code § 3345 may be applied to any of the remaining three counts of

the Second Amended Complaint. Cf. Clark v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 4th 605, 612 (2010)

(holding that “Civil Code section 3345 is not limited to actions under the Consumers Legal

Remedies Act”).

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23, 2010). The Motion to Dismiss Count Four is granted. However, Plaintiff’s request for

treble damages pursuant to California Civil Code § 3345 in the Prayer for Relief is not

dismissed or stricken.1

C. Punitive Damages

Chase contends: 

Both parties agree that Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages relates to her

claim for invasion of privacy and her prayer for punitive damages rises and falls

with that claim. Plaintiff’s other two claims (for FDCPA and Rosenthal Act

violations) do not authorize punitive damages and Plaintiff does not dispute this

fact. Therefore, since Plaintiff has failed to plead the highly offensive conduct

necessary to sustain a claim for invasion of privacy, her prayer for punitive

damages should be dismissed along with that claim.

(ECF No. 13 at 5-6 (quotation and citations omitted)). 

As discussed above, the Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint adequately

states a claim for invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the prayer for

punitive damages is denied.

D. Actual Damages

Chase contends:

Plaintiff[] alleges no hospitalizations or concrete symptoms and her simple

allegation of ‘unnecessary stress and anxiety [and] fear of answering the phone’

([Second Amended Complaint] ¶ 76) simply fails to show facts supporting a

claim for actual damages. Her threadbare allegation consists of nothing more

than ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’ and therefore

fails to plead facts supporting her claim for actual damages. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Therefore, since Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege

actual damages, Chase respectfully requests that this Court strike Plaintiff’s

prayer for actual damages and her related request for ‘special, general,

compensatory and punitive damages’ without leave to amend.

(ECF No. 11-1 at 10).

“The [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act] provides for the award of actual damages.”

McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)). In McCollough, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

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held that a jury’s $250,000 award for actual damages due to emotional distress was supported

by the record. In so holding, McCollough relied upon Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods, Inc.,

339 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2006), wherein the court stated that emotional distress damages may

be based solely upon a plaintiff’s testimony, and “it is not the law of this circuit” that “‘the

evidence of the emotional distress must be demonstrable, genuine, and adequately explained.’”

Id. at 1040 (quoting Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1251 (4th Cir. 1996)).

The Court finds that Plaintiff adequately alleges an entitlement to actual damages

pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Motion to Dismiss or strike the request

for actual damages is denied.

IV. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (ECF No. 11). Count Four of

the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed. In all other respects, the Motion to Dismiss is

denied.

DATED: August 23, 2011

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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