Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02247/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02247-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY BOLGER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social 

Security,

1

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-2247 DB

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.2

 

Plaintiff’s motion argues that the Administrative Law Judge improperly found plaintiff did not 

meet a listing impairment, erred in making a residual functional capacity determination, and 

improperly rejected medical opinion evidence. 

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1 Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on June 17, 2019. 

See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited by the court on July 30, 2019). 

Accordingly, Andrew Saul is substituted in as the defendant in this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding 

the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”).

2 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See ECF Nos. 7 & 11.)

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For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June of 2014, plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) 

under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) and for Supplemental Security Income 

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act alleging disability beginning on June 22, 2012. (Transcript 

(“Tr.”) at 15, 265-73.) Plaintiff’s alleged impairments include major depressive disorder, bipolar 

disorder and a broken left tibia. (Id. at 113.) Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially, (id. at 

180-88), and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 193-98.) 

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing and a hearing was held before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on October 11, 2016. (Id. at 35-69.) Plaintiff was 

represented by an attorney and testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 35-37.) In a 

decision issued on July 6, 2017, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 26.) The 

ALJ entered the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2013. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since June 22, 2012, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et 

seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: major 

depressive disorder; bipolar disorder; nonunion of the left tibial 

fracture resulting in intramedullary rod placement (20 CFR 

404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 

and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work 

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he is 

limited to standing and walking 4 hours total, sitting 6 hours total; no 

ladders; only occasional kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing 

stairs; frequent balance and stooping. He must avoid hazards such 

as unprotected heights and moving machinery; no more than 

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occasional changes to the routine work setting, no more than 

occasional interactions with members of the public, coworkers and 

supervisors; limited to routine, repetitive work in a stable 

environment.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20

CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant was born [in] 1976 and was 35 years old, which is 

defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability 

onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of 

disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 

framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” 

whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-

41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 

CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from June 22, 2012, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

(Id. at 17-26.)

On June 26, 2018, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s

July 6, 2017 decision. (Id. at 1-5.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on August 17, 2018. (ECF. No. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

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466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step

process has been summarized as follows:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If 

so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 

disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to 

perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 

the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

APPLICATION

Plaintiff’s pending motion asserts the following four principal claims: (1) the ALJ’s 

treatment of the medical opinion evidence constituted error; (2) the ALJ erred by finding plaintiff 

did not meet or equal Listing 1.06; (3) the ALJ failed to consider whether plaintiff needed a hand-

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held assistive device; and (4) the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination was 

unexplained.3 (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 6-12.

4

) 

I. Medical Opinion Evidence

The weight to be given to medical opinions in Social Security disability cases depends in 

part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or nonexamining health 

professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). “As a 

general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion 

of doctors who do not treat the claimant . . . .” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This is so because a 

treating doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 

as an individual. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Bates v. Sullivan, 894 

F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be rejected only for 

clear and convincing reasons, while the opinion of a treating or examining physician that is 

controverted by another doctor may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. “The opinion of a nonexamining 

physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion 

of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” (Id. at 831.) Finally, although a 

treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to significant weight, “‘[t]he ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.’” Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 

671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 

2009)).

Here, plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion offered by treating physician 

Dr. Paul Gregory. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 9-10.) The ALJ discussed Dr. Gregory’s opinion 

as follows: 

3 The court has reordered plaintiff’s arguments for purposes of clarity and efficiency.

4 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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Paul Gregory, M.D., the claimant’s orthopedist5, opined that the 

claimant can occasionally lift and/or carry less than 10 pounds;

frequently lift and/or carry less than 10 pounds; stand and/or walk for 

less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday with crutches; sit for 6 hours 

in an 8-hour workday; needs to alternate standing and sitting; never 

climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and has restrictions 

with heights, moving machinery, temperature extremes, chemicals, 

and dust. I accord little weight to this opinion because it is not 

consistent with the record as a whole, e.g., generally unremarkable 

physical examinations (excellent range of motion, no neurological 

deficits) as discussed above. Moreover, the opinion expressed is 

quite conclusory, providing very little explanation of the evidence 

relied on in forming that opinion.

The ALJ’s analysis is erroneous, 

[t]o say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient 

objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions 

mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of 

specificity our prior cases have required, even when the objective 

factors are listed seriatim. The ALJ must do more than offer his 

conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain 

why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 

1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The ALJ must set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary 

support for his interpretation of the medical evidence.”); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

602 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Broad and vague” reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion do 

not suffice). 

Moreover, Dr. Gregory’s opinion is no less conclusory than the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. 

Gregory’s opinion. In this regard, Dr. Gregory’s Medical Source Statement repeatedly cited to 

plaintiff’s chronic infection and nonunion of the left tibia in support of the limitations assessed. 

(Tr. at 1021-25.) That is consistent with Dr. Gregory’s treatment notes. 

While it is true that Dr. Gregory found plaintiff had “excellent range of motion,”—as 

vaguely referenced by the ALJ’s decision—that is at best an incomplete picture of Dr. Gregory’s

findings and opinion. In this regard, following an examination Dr. Gregory spoke to plaintiff 

5 The opinions of medical specialists regarding the specialist’s area of expertise “are given more 

weight than the opinions of a nonspecialist.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir.

1996); see also Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Each rheumatologist’s 

opinion is given greater weight than those of the other physicians because it is an opinion of a 

specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty.”).

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about “the complex nature of a chronic infected nonunion with retained hardware.” (Id. at 895.) 

Dr. Gregory explained that it would be “difficult to solve both of [plaintiff’s] problems 

simultaneously.” (Id.) 

Instead, Dr. Gregory recommended first addressing the chronic infection, through “6 

weeks of IV intravenous antibiotics” followed by a “surgical procedure for intramedullary nail 

removal and intramedullary local debridement of the infected site[.]” (Id.) Dr. Gregory stressed 

against the use of “any replacement hardware until [plaintiff’s] infection” was “eradicated.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was also advised to “obtain a fracture walking Aircast” in anticipation of “gradual 

increase weightbearing postoperatively.” (Id.) 

Additionally, when an ALJ elects to afford the opinion of a treating physician less than 

controlling weight, the opinion must be “weighted according to factors such as the length of the 

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization of the physician.” 

Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6)). 

The ALJ’s failure to discuss these factors “alone constitutes reversible legal error.” (Id. at 676.)

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court finds that the ALJ failed to offer a 

specific and legitimate, let alone clear and convincing, reason for rejecting Dr. Gregory’s opinion. 

Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on the claim that the ALJ’s treatment of the 

medical opinion evidence constituted error. 

II. Listing Error

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that plaintiff’s impairments met 

or equaled Listing 1.06. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 6-8.) At step three of the sequential 

evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s impairment or impairments meet or 

equal one of the specific impairments set forth in the Listings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 

416.920(a)(4)(iii). The physical and mental conditions contained in the Listings are considered so 

severe that “they are irrebuttably presumed disabling, without any specific finding as to the 

claimant’s ability to perform his past relevant work or any other jobs.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 

821, 828 (9th Cir. 1995). The Listings were “designed to operate as a presumption of disability 

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that makes further inquiry unnecessary.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990); see also

Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). If a claimant shows that her impairments meet 

or equal a Listing, she will be found presumptively disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525-404.1526, 

416.925-416.926.

Listing 1.06 is applicable where there is a “[f]racture of the tibia . . . . [w]ith . . . [i]nability 

to ambulate effectively, as defined in 1.00B2b, and return to effective ambulation did not occur or 

is not expected to occur within 12 months of onset.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.06. 

“Inability to ambulate effectively means an extreme limitation of the ability to walk; i.e., an 

impairment(s) that interferes very seriously with the individual’s ability to independently initiate, 

sustain, or complete activities.” Id. at § 1.00B2b(1). 

Here, the ALJ addressed Listing 1.06 as follows:

After consideration of the evidence, detailed below, I conclude that 

the severity of the claimant’s physical impairments, either singly or 

in combination, does not meet the specific criteria of section[] . . . 

1.06 (fracture of a lower limb). No treating or examining physician 

has mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any 

listed impairment, nor does the evidence show medical findings that 

are the same or equivalent to those of any listed impairment of the 

Listing of Impairments.

(Tr. at 18.) That is the entirety of the ALJ’s analysis. 

“An ALJ must evaluate the relevant evidence before concluding that a claimant’s 

impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment.” Lewis, 236 F.3d at 512 (citing Marcia v. 

Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We hold that, in determining whether a claimant 

equals a listing under step three of the Secretary’s disability evaluation process, the ALJ must 

explain adequately his evaluation of alternative tests and the combined effects of the 

impairments.”)). 

Moreover, an “ALJ must provide a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of 

reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review.” Diaz v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3rd Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also

Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The ALJ’s decision regarding the 

applicability of Listing 1.04A is devoid of reasoning. . . . This insufficient legal analysis makes it 

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impossible for a reviewing court to evaluate whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

findings.”). 

Here, the ALJ’s vague and conclusory reasoning is inadequate. Accordingly, the court 

finds that plaintiff is also entitled to summary judgment with respect to the claim that the ALJ 

erred at step three of the sequential evaluation by failing to consider Listing 1.06.

III. Hand-Held Assistive Device

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s decision “fails to say anything about [plaintiff’s] need 

for an assistive device,” that such a limitation should have been included in the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) determination, and in the hypothetical question to the Vocational 

Expert (“VE”). (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 8-9.) 

At step five of the sequential evaluation, “the Commissioner has the burden ‘to identify 

specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that a claimant can perform 

despite his identified limitations.’” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)) (alterations omitted). The ALJ can meet 

her burden by either taking the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”) or by referring to the 

grids. See Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, the ALJ relied 

on the testimony of a VE. (Tr. at 25.) 

While an ALJ may pose a range of hypothetical questions to a VE based on alternate 

interpretations of the evidence, the hypothetical question that ultimately serves as the basis for the 

ALJ’s determination, i.e., the hypothetical question that is predicated on the ALJ’s final residual 

functional capacity assessment, must account for all of the limitations and restrictions of the 

particular claimant. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228. “If an ALJ’s hypothetical does not reflect all of the 

claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding 

that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); see also Taylor, 659 F.3d at 1235 (“Because neither the hypothetical nor the answer 

properly set forth all of Taylor’s impairments, the vocational expert’s testimony cannot constitute 

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings.”).

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Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Gregory, opined that plaintiff required a hand-held 

assistive device. (Tr. at 1024.) Presumably because the ALJ rejected Dr. Gregory’s opinion, the 

ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE did not account for the need for a hand-held assistive 

device. (Tr. at 60-67.) Accordingly, plaintiff is also entitled to summary judgment on the claim 

that the ALJ committed an error at step five of the sequential evaluation. 

CONCLUSION

With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 

benefits.6 McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 

under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met, 

the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates 

serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act.” Id. at 1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative proceedings would serve no 

useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide benefits.”); Treichler v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ 

makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand 

the case to the agency.”).

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6 Having identified errors requiring remand, upon review of the record, and in light of plaintiff’s 

argument that simply “the decision should be reversed,” the court finds it unnecessary to reach 

plaintiff’s remaining claim. (Pl.’s MSJ (ECF No. 14) at 12). See Janovich v. Colvin, No. 2:13-

cv-0096 DAD, 2014 WL 4370673, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (“In light of the analysis and 

conclusions set forth above, the court need not address plaintiff’s remaining claims of error.”); 

Manning v. Colvin, No. CV 13-4853 DFM, 2014 WL 2002213, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2014) 

(“Because the Court finds that the decision of the ALJ must be reversed on the basis of the 

stooping limitation, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s remaining contentions.”).

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Here, the court cannot find that further proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Thus, 

this matter must be remanded for further proceedings. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is granted;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is denied;

3. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed; and

4. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Dated: March 24, 2020

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.soc sec\bolger2247.ord

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