Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06088/USCOURTS-arwd-6_05-cv-06088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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(Rev. 8/82)

 Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been

substituted for acting commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

 Because the Court finds substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision 2

and the Administrative Law Judge applied the correct standard of law, the Court adopts much

of Defendant’s brief without quotation or citation. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION 

DEBORAH BROCK PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-6088

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Deborah Brock (“Plaintiff”), brings this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for

disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the provisions of

Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.

After reviewing the record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the

decision of the Commissioner.2

Background.

The complete facts and arguments are presented in the

briefs and will be repeated only to the extent necessary.

Additionally, the Commissioner’s decision within the

administrative record sets forth the findings and such will

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not be repeated herein, except to the extent necessary to

address Plaintiff’s arguments. 

Applicable Law.

This Court's role is to determine whether the

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence

on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576,

583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind would

find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. Id.

The ALJ's decision must be affirmed if the record contains

substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314

F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is

substantial evidence in the record that supports the

Commissioner's decision, the court may not reverse it simply

because substantial evidence exists in the record that would

have supported a contrary outcome, or because the court would

have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258

F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words, if after

reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent

positions from the evidence and one of those positions

represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ

must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th

Cir. 2000). 

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It is well-established that a claimant for Social

Security disability benefits has the burden of proving her

disability by establishing a physical or mental disability

that has lasted at least one year and that prevents her from

engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.

Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42

U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results

from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities

which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3),

1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that her disability, not

simply her impairment, lasted for at least twelve consecutive

months.

The regulations require the Commissioner to apply a

five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for

disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in

substantial gainful activity since filing her claim; (2)

whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the

impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings; (4)

whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to perform

other work in the national economy given her age, education,

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and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Only if

the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the

plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in light of

her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683

F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920.

Discussion.

Plaintiff alleges two points of error by the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). First, the ALJ erred in

finding Plaintiff’s claims of medical impairment were not

credible. Second, the ALJ inaccurately determined Plaintiff

had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full

range of light duty work. 

When considering the credibility of her complaints, the

ALJ is to consider the following factors: the claimant’s daily

activities; the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

precipitating and aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness

and side effects of medication; and functional restrictions.

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-1322 (8th Cir. 1984).

The testimony provided at the hearing was contradictory to the

initial information Plaintiff provided in her application for

benefits. (Tr. 16). Where there are inconsistencies in the

evidence as a whole, the ALJ may discount subjective

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complaints. Stephens v. Shalala, 46 F.3d 37, 39 (8th Cir.

1995) (per curiam). 

When Plaintiff filed her application for benefits, she

noted that she cared for herself and was able to maintain her

daily duties around the house. These consisted of bathing,

laundry, dishes, ironing, mowing the lawn, garden work, as

well as taking care of her own finances. (Tr. 88). Her

ability to perform these duties was not consistent with her

testimony before the ALJ. At the hearing, Plaintiff stated

she “laid around all the time” and that she stays in bed

“sometimes for weeks.” (Tr. 189-190). Plaintiff’s initial

application for benefits also lacked any mention of physical

disabilities. When testifying before the ALJ, Plaintiff

claimed that her arthritis is partially what keeps her from

working, even though she has not tried to work since her

condition has worsened. (Tr. 191). After reviewing the

record, the Court finds that it contains numerous inconsistent

statements by Plaintiff sufficient to support the ALJ’s

decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints based

upon a lack of credibility. 

Next, Plaintiff claims the ALJ inaccurately determined

that she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform

light duty work. Before determining a claimant's RFC, the ALJ

must first evaluate the claimant's credibility. Pearsall v.

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Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir. 2001). The ALJ

determined Plaintiff’s subjective claims were not credible

based on her prior descriptions of her abilities and

Plaintiff’s testimony.

Included in the evidence was a history of substance

abuse. (Tr. 21). The substance abuse was material to the

disability because if Plaintiff were to cease such use, she

would no longer be disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1536(b)(1). 

The ALJ found Plaintiff to be disabled, but only because of

mental limitations created by the use of alcohol and drugs.

(Tr. 12). After finding Plaintiff’s drug use and alcoholism

“a material factor” in the disability, the ALJ found

Plaintiff’s mental impairments severe, but not severe enough

to meet or medically equal any impairment listed in the

Regulations. (Tr. 13). The Vocational Expert (“VE”)

testified that a person of claimant’s age, education, and work

background who had no exertional limitations would be capable

of performing past relevant work such as lumber yard cleanup

laborer and scribe machine worker. (Tr. 194). The ALJ relied

on the VE’s statement that if Plaintiff stopped using drugs

and alcohol, she could return to her past work. (Tr. 20). 

Based on Plaintiff’s testimony, limited objective medical

findings, medical treatment and use of prescription

medications, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained a capacity for

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a wide range of unskilled work. (Tr. 18). The Court agrees

that with proper treatment and instruction, Plaintiff is

capable of substantial gainful activity. 

Conclusion.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds the

decision of the Commissioner should be and is hereby AFFIRMED.

A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this

opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 13 day of March, 2007. th

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

Honorable Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge 

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