Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05150/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05150-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment by the

Court in an order filed on October 20, 2004. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). (Doc. 14.)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY T. CRIADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-CV-5150-AWI-SMS-P

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

REFERRING MATTER BACK TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO BE SET FOR

TRIAL

(Doc. 31)

I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Jerry T. Criado (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

Plaintiff’s complaint, filed January 22, 2004, against Defendants Chapman, Lopez, Todd, and

Sullivan (“Defendants”) on Plaintiff’s claim that they violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to

provide him with adequate outdoor exercise for approximately one year. (Doc. 16.) On August 5,

2005, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 31, 32.) Plaintiff filed an opposition

on January 11, 2006.1 (Doc. 37.)

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B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56©. Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56©, is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56©.

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the Court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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2

 Verified complaints and oppositions constitute opposing affidavits for purposes of the summary judgment

rule if they are based on facts within the pleader’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-

1400 (9th Cir. 1998). 

3

 Plaintiff’s contention that this fact is incorrect because the RVR was approximately ten years old is

insufficient to bring the fact into dispute. The RVR documents that prior RVRs were considered despite being more

than five years old, and resulted in the imposition of an aggravated SHU term. (Doc. 32, Exhibit A, Sullivan Dec.,

p.11.)

4

C. Undisputed Facts2

1. Plaintiff Jerry T. Criado was incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution (CCI) in

Tehachapi, California, and housed exclusively in the Security Housing Unit (SHU), from

June 14, 2002, until his transfer to Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) on September 3, 2003.

2. All of the Defendants were employed by California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation at CCI during the relevant time frame. Defendant Chapman was a

Correctional Counselor II; Defendant Lopez was a Facility Captain; Defendant Todd was

Associate Warden; and Defendant Sullivan was Chief Deputy Warden. 

3. Prior to his transfer to CCI, Plaintiff was housed at the California Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility and State Prison (SATF) in Corcoran, California.

4. On March 14, 2002, Plaintiff was placed in SATF’s administrative segregation (ad-seg) after

receiving a rules violation report (RVR) for possession of an inmate-manufactured stabbing

weapon. 

5. Plaintiff was found guilty of the offense and referred to the institutional classification

committee (ICC) for a SHU term assessment. 

6. On May 16, 2002, Plaintiff appeared before the SATF ICC for a special review. The

committee elected to retain Plaintiff in ad-seg pending his transfer. The committee assessed

and imposed a 15 month aggravated SHU term. Plaintiff’s SHU term was aggravated due

to a prior RVR for the same offense,3 and the committee finding that Plaintiff had established

a continued pattern of manufacturing slashing type weapons. The ICC then referred Plaintiff

for a SHU audit and transfer to the SHU at either California State Prison Corcoran or CCI.

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7. On May 23, 2002, Plaintiff was endorsed to the CCI-SHU to complete a determinate SHU

term with a release date of March 22, 2003.

8. On June 20, 2002, Plaintiff appeared in person before the CCI ICC for his initial SHU

review. Exercise yards were discussed with Plaintiff, and the committee elected to place

Plaintiff on the sensitive needs yard (SNY) #7. The committee noted that Plaintiff was a

drop-out of the Northern Structure prison inmate gang. The committee also noted that

Plaintiff had a past disciplinary history consisting of notable RVRs for possession of inmate

weapon, battery on inmate, mutual combat, possession of slashing weapon, possession of

sharpened instrument, and possession of razor blades. 

9. On July 16, 2002, Plaintiff received an RVR for delaying a peace officer in the performance

of his duties. He was found guilty of the offense and assessed a 90 day credit forfeiture. 

10. On August 30, 2002, Plaintiff received another RVR for battery on an inmate requiring the

use of force. Plaintiff was found guilty of the offense, assessed another 90 day credit

forfeiture and a 90 day loss of certain privileges, and referred to the ICC for program review.

11. On September 11, 2002, Plaintiff appeared before the ICC for a yard/program review.

Plaintiff’s regularly scheduled yard status had been suspended August 30, 2002, because of

the battery on another inmate while on the sensitive needs yard #7. The ICC elected to

change Plaintiff from SNY #7 to walk-alone status based on the then pending RVR for

battery.

12. Prior to being placed on walk-alone status, Plaintiff had been receiving 10 hours per week

of outdoor exercise on the sensitive needs yard. 

13. On September 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal complaining that while on walkalone status he was not receiving enough yard, and requested that he receive one hour

minimum yard daily, with a total of 10 hours weekly, or be taken off of walk-alone status.

14. Defendants Chapman and Lopez responded at the first level and explained in their written

appeal response that Plaintiff’s yard had been changed from sensitive needs to walk-alone

based on his RVR for battery on an inmate on the sensitive needs yard, and that he would

remain on walk-alone status pending the adjudication of the RVR and ICC review. Plaintiff

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was then advised in the written response that changing his yard back to sensitive needs would

not be possible at that time based on the safety and security of Plaintiff and others. Plaintiff

was further advised in the response that while it is a priority to grant walk-alone inmates 10

hours a week on the yard, due to walk-alone yard construction delays and the unit’s inability

to reasonably accommodate 10 hours minimally, the unit was unable to fully comply with

the 10 full hours of yard for all of the walk-alone inmates. Finally, Plaintiff was advised in

the response that because of his safety concerns and the concerns of others, he would have

to remain on walk-alone.

15. At the second level of appeal, Defendants Sullivan and Todd responded in writing by noting

that Plaintiff had been reassigned to the walk-alone exercise yard on September 11, 2002,

because of his behavior, and in accordance with established unit policies. Plaintiff was

advised in the inmate appeal response that his yard program would be reevaluated upon

completion of the disciplinary process and a unit inquiry into the circumstances of the assault

that Plaintiff had committed on the sensitive needs yard. Plaintiff was further advised in the

response that this procedure was consistent with the safe and orderly operation of the

exercise yard programs in the ad-seg unit, and the unit’s precautionary and temporary

reassignment of inmates with similar circumstances. Defendants noted in the response that

Plaintiff was found guilty of battery on an inmate which had occurred on the exercise yard

and that he was scheduled to appear before the ICC for a program review consisting of a yard

and housing evaluation. This evaluation would include a consideration of reassignment to

the reintegrated mix-sensitive needs exercise yard in accordance with departmental and

institutional procedures. Defendants also advised Plaintiff in the response that unit staff was

making every effort to ensure that segregated inmates are allowed as much access to exercise

programs as possible. However, because of the physical design limitations and the large

numbers of inmates then assigned to walk-alone exercise yards, inmates were not able to

obtain the required amount of out-of-cell access to physical activities. Inmates assigned to

the walk-alone exercise yard were being allotted as many hours per week as was then

possible and the time was supplemented with out-of-cell activities such as showers and legal

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library access. Finally, Defendants noted in the response that Plaintiff had been allowed yard

access on October 5 and 19, 2002; and that on October 26, 2002, Plaintiff declined to

participate in his scheduled exercise program.

16. Plaintiff then appealed to the Director’s level of review. The written response again

acknowledged that Plaintiff was not receiving the authorized 10 hours of outside exercise a

week. Plaintiff was advised that California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 3343(h)

states that an inmate will be permitted 10 hours of exercise a week unless security and safety

consideration preclude such activity. The third level reviewer noted that Plaintiff was a

walk-alone inmate, which reflected that he had enemy and safety concerns based on his past

behavior. If Plaintiff had not had these safety concerns he could have received the required

hours by exercising with the regular SHU inmates. Because of the need to separate Plaintiff

from the other inmates for his safety, and the safety of others, Plaintiff’s access to exercise

was only on the limited walk-alone facilities. Additional facilities were under construction

and upon completion, Plaintiff would have the required outside exercise time.

17. Low and non-impact aerobic exercise could be done in Plaintiff’s cell. 

18. Plaintiff’s third level appeal was denied because CCI was taking steps in an attempt to

provide adequate exercise time; Plaintiff had placed himself in the position of needing a

sensitive needs environment; Plaintiff’s actions had placed him in the SHU; and while on the

sensitive needs yard, Plaintiff had become involved in an incident in which he was charged

with battery. The third level reviewer then determined that any difficulty Plaintiff was

having in receiving outside exercise was due to his own actions; and that while CDC will do

what is possible to provide Plaintiff with exercise, it would not do so at the expense of the

safety of inmates and staff.

19. The ICC reviewed Plaintiff’s SHU and yard assignment on November 7, 2002, elected to

retain Plaintiff in the CCI-SHU, and extended his expected release date to August 22, 2003.

The ICC also elected to reaffirm Plaintiff’s walk-alone exercise yard status based on his

battery of an inmate on the sensitive needs exercise yard. 

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20. The ICC reviewed Plaintiff’s SHU and yard assignment on March 6, 2003, and elected to

retain Plaintiff in the CCI-SHU pending his expected release date to August 22, 2003. The

ICC also elected to reaffirm Plaintiff’s walk-alone exercise yard status. In addition,

Plaintiff’s double-cell status was changed to single-cell status based on discussion and input

from the mental health committee which stated that Plaintiff had an undifferentiated urge to

harm others.

21. The ICC reviewed Plaintiff’s SHU and yard assignment on June 19, 2003, elected to retain

Plaintiff in the CCI-SHU pending his expected release date to August 22, 2003, and noted

that Plaintiff is a drop out of the Northern Structure prison gang. The ICC also elected to

change Plaintiff’s walk-alone exercise yard to sensitive needs yard #7 based on Plaintiff’s

request and a review of his central file. In addition, Plaintiff’s single-cell status was retained

subject to reevaluation after programing on the sensitive needs exercise yard, based on a

change in Plaintiff’s medication which had left him feeling stable enough for a cell mate. 

22. On July 7, 2003, Plaintiff was endorsed for the SVSP level IV sensitive needs yard upon the

expiration of his SHU term on August 22, 2003. However, Plaintiff was to remain in ad-seg

pending his transfer. 

23. On August 13, 2003, Plaintiff was advised that due to an unavailability of space at SVSP

sensitive needs yard, he would be retained at CCI ad seg, based on institutional safety and

security concerns, pending his transfer.

24. On August 20, 2003, the ICC elected to retain Plaintiff in CCI-SHU on ad-seg status pending

transfer to SVSP-SNY. The ICC also elected to change Plaintiff’s single-cell status to

double-cell and reaffirmed sensitive needs yard #7 based on Plaintiff’s request and a review

of his central file. 

25. Plaintiff was transferred to SVSP on September 3, 2003. 

D. Eighth Amendment Conditions-of-Confinement Claim

On March 14, 2002, while housed at SATF, Plaintiff was placed in ad-seg after receiving an

RVR for possession of an inmate manufactured stabbing weapon. (Undisputed Fact 4.) Plaintiff was

found guilty and assessed a 15 month aggravated SHU term. (U.F. 5, 6 .) The term was aggravated

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4

 Plaintiff refused to give up his morning meal tray because he wanted to see a sergeant. (Sullivan Dec.,

Attachment p. 14.)

9

because Plaintiff had a prior RVR for the same offense and was found by the committee to have

established a continued pattern of manufacturing slashing type weapons. (U.F. 6.) After being

transferred to CCI to serve his SHU term, Plaintiff, who was a drop out from the Northern Structure,

a prison gang, received a review on June 20, 2002, and was placed on SNY #7. (U.F. 7, 8.) In

reviewing Plaintiff for placement, the committee noted Plaintiff had a past disciplinary history

consisting of RVRs for possession of inmate weapon, battery on inmate, mutual combat, possession

of slashing weapon, possession of sharpened instrument, and possession of razor blades. (U.F. 8.)

On July 16, 2002, Plaintiff received an RVR for delaying a peace officer in his duties, was

found guilty, and was assessed a ninety-day credit forfeiture.4 (U.F. 9.) On August 30, 2002,

Plaintiff received another RVR for battery on an inmate requiring the use of force. (U.F. 10.)

Plaintiff was found guilty, assessed a ninety-day credit forfeiture and a ninety-day loss of certain

privileges, and referred to the ICC for review. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s regularly scheduled yard had been suspended on August 30, 2002, due to the RVR

for battery on an inmate. (U.F. 11.) On September 11, 2002, Plaintiff appeared before the ICC,

which changed Plaintiff from SAY #7 to walk-alone status due to the pending R.R. (Id.) Prior to

being placed on walk-alone status, Plaintiff had been receiving ten hours per week of outdoor

exercise. (U.F. 12.)

On September 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal grieving the lack of yard time and

requesting he receive at least one hour per day with a minimum of ten hours per week, or be taken

off walk-alone status. (U.F. 13.) Defendants Chapman and Lopez responded to the appeal at the

first level of review and informed Plaintiff via the written inmate appeal response that he had been

placed on walk-alone status due to the R.R. and would remain on that status pending adjudication

of the R.R. (U.F. 14.) Defendants stated that due to the safety and security of Plaintiff and others,

Plaintiff would have to remain on walk-alone status and his status could not be changed back to the

sensitive needs yard at that time. (Id.) Plaintiff was informed in the appeal response that the unit

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was unable to comply fully with providing ten hours a week for all of the walk-alone inmates, due

to walk-alone yard construction delays and the unit’s inability to do so. (Id.)

Defendants Sullivan and Todd responded to Plaintiff’s inmate appeal at the second level of

review, reiterating the response given to Plaintiff by Defendants Chapman and Lopez, and stating

that Plaintiff had been found guilty of battery on an inmate and was scheduled to appear before the

ICC for a program review at which time he would have a yard and housing evaluation. (U.F. 15.)

Defendants stated in the response that due to physical design limitations and the large number of

walk-alone inmates, inmates were unable to obtain the required amount of out-of-cell physical

activities. (Id.) Defendants stated that the time was being supplemented with out-of-cell activities

such as showers and law library access. (Id.) In their response, Defendants stated that Plaintiff had

been allowed yard access on October 5 and 19, 2002, and had declined to participate in his scheduled

exercise program on October 26, 2002. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to the third and final level of review,

and was informed, in part, that additional facilities were under construction and upon completion,

he would have the required number of hours of outdoor exercise. (U.F. 16.)

On November 7, 2002, Plaintiff received his review. (U.F. 19.) The committee retained

Plaintiff in the SHU, extended his release date to August 22, 2003, and retained him on walk-alone

status based on his battery of an inmate while on the sensitive needs yard. (Id.) Plaintiff received

another review on March 6, 2003, and was retained in the SHU on walk-alone status. (U.F. 20.) In

addition, Plaintiff was changed from double-cell status to single-cell status based on input from the

mental health committee that Plaintiff had an urge to harm others. (Id.) On June 19, 2003, Plaintiff

received another review. (U.F. 21.) The committee elected to retain Plaintiff in ths SHU until his

release date of August 22, 2003, but changed Plaintiff from walk-alone status back to SAY #7 based

on Plaintiff’s request and a review of his file. (Id.) Plaintiff’s single-cell status was retained pending

review following the yard change and a change in Plaintiff’s medication. (Id.)

On July 7, 2003, Plaintiff was endorsed to SVSP level IV sensitive needs yard following the

expiration of his SHU term on August 22, 2003, but was to remain in ad-seg pending transfer. (U.F.

22.) On August 20, 2003, the ICC retained Plaintiff in ad-seg pending transfer, changed Plaintiff 

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from single-cell status to double-cell status, and reaffirmed his placement on SAY #7. (U.F. 24.)

Plaintiff was transferred to SVSP on September 3, 2003. (U.F. 25.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff received the requisite number of hours of outdoor exercise

while he was on the sensitive needs yard, but concede that between August 30, 2002 and June 19,

2003, while on walk-alone status, Plaintiff received limited outdoor exercise. (U.F. 12; Doc. 31, Ds’

Memo., 11:19-22.) Defendants contend that the unusual circumstances of limited physical plant for

walk-alone inmates and the large number of walk-alone inmates made outdoor exercise impossible.

(Ds’ Memo., 11:22-27; Sullivan Dec., ¶¶16-18.) In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s

safetyconcerns,which required placement on a sensitive needs yard, Plaintiff’s own actions resulting

in the imposition of a SHU term, and Plaintiff’s disruptive and assaultive behavior while on the

sensitive needs yard led to his inability to receive the requisite number of hours of outdoor exercise.

(Id.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s difficulty in receiving outdoor exercise was due to his own

actions, and that staff could not accommodate Plaintiff at the expense of the safety of other inmates

and staff. (Memo., 11:27-12:2; Sullivan Dec., ¶¶16, 18, 19, 21.) Further, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff was still able to exercise within his own cell. (Memo., 12:2-3; Sullivan Dec., ¶20.)

Plaintiff contends that there were two sensitive needs yards in the building in which he was

housed where he could have participated in outdoor exercise. (Doc. 37, Opp., 6:17-23.) Plaintiff

further contends that other buildings in the SHU had sensitive needs yards, and Defendants could

have accommodated him through a cell move to another building where he could have enjoyed

outdoor exercise. (Id., 6:20-7:3.) Plaintiff contends that every inmate on walk-alone status in

building 6 except for him was receiving yard, and disputes that there was an unusually large number

of inmates on walk-alone status. (Id., 8:22-25.) With respect to yard time offered on the dates in

October 2002, Plaintiff contends that during that time the yard was covered in snow and he did not

have appropriate winter clothing. (Id., 9:24-10:2.) 

Plaintiff contends that the only alleged enemy he had was on SAY #7 and that he could have

been accommodated by placement in another building. (Id., 10:10-12.) Plaintiff contends that the

incident was nothing more than a fist fight and Plaintiff could have resolved it if he had been given

the chance. (Id., 11:21-26.) Plaintiff contends that while on walk-alone status at CCI, he never

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received yard time, thus belying Defendants’ claim that staff attempted to provide yard time. (Id.,

10:21-25.)

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials

may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting

evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45.

“‘[S]ome form of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and

physical well being of the inmates.’” Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979)). Thus, “[the] deprivation of outdoor exercise

[can] constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. While the temporary denial

of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial deprivation, May v. Baldwin, 109

F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997), in this Circuit, the deprivation of regular outdoor exercise for a period

of almost ten months is unquestionably sufficient to meet the objective requirement of the Eighth

Amendment analysis. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000) (denial of all outdoor

exercise for six weeks meets objective Eighth Amendment requirement); Allen, 48 F.3d at 1086-88

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(forty-five minutes of outdoor exercise per week for six weeks meets objective Eighth Amendment

requirement). 

Turning to the subjective requirement, Plaintiff was placed on walk-alone status following

his receipt of an R.R. for battery on an inmate while housed on a sensitive needs yard. Plaintiff was

retained on walk-alone status pending adjudication of the R.R. and thereafter was retained on walkalone status until June 19, 2003. Defendants’ proffered reason for being unable to provide Plaintiff

with a minimum of ten hours per week of outdoor exercise while on walk-alone status is that the

institution had limited physical plant for walk-alone inmates and there was an unusually large

number of walk-alone inmates. 

Defendants unquestionably have a need to preserve the safety and security of the institution,

which includes protecting staff and inmates. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979). In the

discharge of this duty, Plaintiff was placed on walk-alone status after demonstrating his inability to

get along with another inmate while on the sensitive needs yard. (U.F. 10, 11, 19.) In addition,

Plaintiff has a disciplinary history including another battery on an inmate, mutual combat, and

possession of weapons. (U.F. 8.)

Where Defendants run afoul of the Eighth Amendment is their inability to provide Plaintiff

with adequate outdoor exercise once he was placed on walk-alone status for ten months. Although

safety and security concerns justify the need to separate Plaintiff from other inmates following his

demonstrated inability to get along on the sensitive needs yard, these concerns “do not explain why

other exercise arrangements were not made.” Spain, 600 F.2d at 200. “The cost or inconvenience

of providing adequate facilities is not a defense to the imposition of a cruel punishment.” Id. While

acknowledging the practical difficulties that arise in administering a prison, the Ninth Circuit has

rejected attempts byprison officials to justify a deprivation of adequate outdoor exercise as necessary

due to logistical problems. Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088. This is not the case where Plaintiff is alleging

he should have received 10 hours of outside exercise a week, but because of administration

problems, Plaintiff received fewer hours than the regulations require. Plaintiff offers undisputed

evidence that Plaintiff received no outside exercise for 10 months. The undisputed evidence

separates this situation from the situation where an inmate receives outside exercise but because of

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the vast number of inmates on walk along status, the inmate receives fewer hours than the

regulations require. 

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s situation is indistinguishable from

that of inmate Samuel LeMaire in LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993), a case in which

the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the deprivation of outside exercise for most

of a five-year period violated the Eighth Amendment. This Court does not minimize the risk to the

safety and security of the institution posed by Plaintiff on August 30, 2002, as a result of the fight

he was involved in. Although Plaintiff characterizes it as a mere fist fight, Plaintiff does not dispute

the description in the R.R., which documents a fight during which Plaintiff and another inmate

remained determined to pursue the fight despite four rounds fired from a XM-1006 launcher and

three wood baton rounds. (Sullivan Dec., Attach. p.19.) The fight was finally quelled through the

use of pepper spray. (Id., p.20.) 

However, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s conduct and level of

dangerousness was comparable to that exhibited by inmate LeMaire, who was a most violent and

difficult to manage prisoner, extremely dangerous to both staff and other inmates. LeMaire, 12F.3d

at 1447-54. LeMaire posed “a grave security risk when outside his cell,” id. at 1458, and the Ninth

Circuit found that “[t]he record amply demonstrates that . . . LeMaire is a violent and dangerous

person with no regard for other human beings,” and was diagnosed with “antisocial personality

disorder complicated by intermittent explosive disorder.” Id. at 1449. In short, the record in

LeMaire demonstrates that LeMaire was the worst of the worst, capable of extremely violent attacks

on inmates and staff alike, and clearly a danger to anyone and everyone around him. Unlike in

LeMaire, Defendants present no evidence that Plaintiff was denied regular outdoor exercise for

approximately ten months while on walk-alone status was because he presented such a grave risk

that he could not be accommodated or that while on this status, his own behavior caused him to lose

his exercise privileges. See Lopez, 48 F.3d at 1087-88. Rather, although Plaintiff’s own behavior

landed him on walk-alone status, the reason given for the inability to accommodate Plaintiff while

on this status was because of physical plant limitations and an unusually large number of walk-alone

inmates who had to be accommodated. This justification is insufficient to entitle Defendants to

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judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against them. Allen, 48 F.3d

at 1088. 

With respect to Defendants’ conclusory argument that they had no control over the physical

plant limitations or the number of inmates on walk-alone status, Defendants have submitted no

evidence that they took any steps to provide Plaintiff with some other opportunity for outdoor

exercise. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133. Defendants merely explained to Plaintiff, via their inmate

appeal responses, why he was on walk-alone status and why they could not provide him with the

minimum ten hours of outdoor exercise while on that status. This is insufficient to entitle

Defendants to summary judgment on the basis that they were not involved with and could not have

prevented the violation of Plaintiff’s rights. See Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th

Cir. 2000) (an officer can be held liable for failing to intercede if he had a “realistic opportunity”

to do so). Here, Defendants offer no evidence that they offered Plaintiff any outdoor exercise during

a ten month period. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the merits of

Plaintiff’s claim must be denied.

E. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, which shields government

officials from civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is whether,

taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the

defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If,

and only if, a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established. Id. In determining whether the right was clearly established, the inquiry “must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” Id.

“[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more

particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202

(internal quotations and citation omitted). In resolving these issues, the Court must view the

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evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of

Plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

As set forth in the preceding section of this order, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was deprived

of outdoor exercise for almost a year unquestionably shows that the conduct complained of violated

the Eighth Amendment. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1132-33; Allen, 48 F.3d at 1086-88. Further, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants were notified of the violation and

did not take any steps to prevent it. 

Turning to the second step in the analysis, in 2002, when the deprivation at issue began, the

law was clearly established that (1) inmates have a protected right to receive adequate outdoor

exercise under the Eighth Amendment, (2) a deprivation of even six weeks meets the objective prong

of the Eighth Amendment analysis, and (3) neither the practical difficulties encountered in providing

outdoor exercise nor the denial of yard for the inmate’s own protection can justify the deprivation.

Lopez at 1132-33; Allen at 1086-88; Spain, 600 F.2d at 199-200. As previously set forth, although

Plaintiff was placed on walk-alone status as a disciplinary sanction, there is no evidence that he was

deprived of outdoor exercise while on this status due to disciplinary or safety issues. See Allen at

1088. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that it was not clearly established that prison officials

could not curtail outdoor exercise for extended periods of time due to disciplinary or safety reasons

is rejected. Further, even if Plaintiff had been denied yard for safety reasons, this reason would have

been an insufficient justification for the deprivation. Lopez at 1133. Finally, it was clearly

established in 2002 that if Defendants knew of the violation and failed to take steps to prevent it,

they could be held liable for the violation. Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In conclusion, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). By 2002, failing to provide

an inmate with regular outdoor exercise for a period of ten months due to the lack of adequate

facilities to accommodate the inmate constituted a knowing violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Lopez at 1133; Allen at 1088. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of

law based on qualified immunity.

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///

F. Conclusion and ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, filed August 5, 2005, is DENIED in its entirety, and this matter is referred back to the

Magistrate Judge to be set for jury trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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