Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02448/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02448-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE ALEXANIAN

Plaintiff,

v.

FCA US, LLC, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv2448-LAB (AHG)

ORDER OF REMAND

Defendant FCA US, LLC removed this case from state court, citing diversity 

jurisdiction. After Plaintiff Andre Alexanian moved to remand, defects in diversity 

jurisdiction became apparent and the Court ordered FCA to address them. In 

particular, FCA’s and Alexanian’s citizenship had not been properly alleged. The 

Court ordered FCA to address these concerns in its opposition to the motion for 

remand.

The notice of removal inaccurately claimed FCA was a Delaware corporation 

with its principal place of business in Michigan. But FCA is an LLC, not a 

corporation. For purposes of ordinary diversity jurisdiction, it is a citizen of every

state of which its owners/members are citizens. See Johnson v. Columbia 

Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006).

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The Court ordered FCA to identify its own citizenship. And because FCA has 

been found in other cases to be a foreign citizen, the Court also ordered FCA to 

identify Alexanian’s national citizenship. The Court pointed out that if, for example, 

Alexanian were a non-U.S. citizen domiciled in California and FCA were a citizen 

of a foreign country, jurisdiction would probably be lacking, and cited Van Der 

Steen v. Sygen Int’l, PLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d 931, 936–37 (N.D. Cal., 2006).

The party invoking its subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., FCA) bears the burden 

of establishing it and, until then, jurisdiction is presumed to be lacking. See Abrego 

Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court is obligated 

to raise jurisdictional issues, sua sponte if necessary, and to confirm its own 

jurisdiction. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 

278 (1977). In ordinary removal cases, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if 

there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, 

Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court cautioned FCA that if it failed to 

meet its burden of establishing jurisdiction, the action would be remanded.

The Court’s expectation that FCA might prove to be a non-U.S. citizen 

proved correct. In its opposition, FCA asserts it is a citizen of both the U.K. and the 

Netherlands. But it fails to identify or allege Alexanian’s national citizenship. 

Instead, it asserts that Alexanian is presumed to be a California citizen because 

he resides here. The case it cites in support of this principle, Ervin v. Ballard Marine 

Constr., Inc., 2016 WL 4239710 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 2016), is inapposite. Ervin 

says nothing at all about a presumption of national citizenship. Instead, it 

addresses the issue of whether residence is prima facie evidence of domicile for 

purposes of determining state citizenship. Id. at *3. 

The problem the Court’s order identified and ordered FCA to address is that 

the Court probably cannot exercise either diversity or alienage jurisdiction over a 

dispute between a foreign national domiciled in California on the one hand and a 

non-U.S. corporation on the other. 

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The parties dispute whether Defendant Jack Powell Chrysler Jeep Dodge, a 

California citizen, is a sham defendant. But that dispute does not change the 

outcome here. Unless Alexanian is a U.S. citizen, the Court lacks jurisdiction 

regardless of whether the dealership is included or excluded as a Defendant. If 

the dealership is included, Alexanian is deemed a California citizen for purposes 

of destroying diversity, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) deprives the Court of 

jurisdiction. If the dealership is excluded, this action involves one alien suing 

another alien. Although an argument could be made that § 1332(a)(2) authorizes 

either alienage or diversity jurisdiction when one of the aliens is domiciled in a U.S. 

state, for the reasons below the Court rejects that construction.

The holding of Van Der Steen, with which this Court agrees, is that alienage 

or diversity jurisdiction does not extend to cases involving one alien suing another 

alien, even if one of them is domiciled in the U.S. See 464 F. Supp. 2d at 936–37. 

Construing § 1332(a)(2) as permitting federal courts to exercise diversity or 

alienage jurisdiction in suits solely between aliens raises serious questions about 

whether Congress acted unconstitutionally in enacting it, and whether the courts 

would be acting unconstitutionally in relying on it as a source of jurisdiction. 

Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 

9 U.S. 303 (1809)). Furthermore, it appears Congress’ intent in enacting this 

provision was to limit jurisdiction, not to expand it. See id. at 58–61 (discussing 

legislative history and Congressional intent). The Court therefore reads 

§ 1332(a)(2) as treating a foreign citizen permanently admitted for residency in the 

U.S. as a citizen for purposes of destroying jurisdiction, but not creating it. Such a 

construction avoids what is otherwise probably an unconstitutional result, and one 

which Congress did not intend. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 

Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (discussing the 

avoidance doctrine). This holding is consistent with similar though not identical 

Ninth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 

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1088, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that a non-U.S. citizen 

domiciled in New York was a citizen of New York for diversity jurisdiction 

purposes).

FCA’s notice of removal does not plead facts showing that the parties are

diverse or that the Court can exercise alienage jurisdiction. When directed to 

correct this defect, FCA did not do so. While Alexanian could likely supply 

information to settle this, it is not his burden to plead his opponent’s claims. 

Furthermore, at this stage all FCA had to do is allege that Alexanian is a U.S. 

citizen. Although FCA has asked for jurisdictional discovery, its request was aimed 

at confirming that the dealership is a sham Defendant. FCA has not shown why it 

could not have conducted enough of an inquiry to permit it to allege Alexanian’s 

national citizenship consistently with its obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

The Court need not and does not reach the issue whether the dealership is 

a sham defendant. FCA responded only partially to the Court’s order to show 

cause and has therefore failed to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. The motion to 

remand is GRANTED, and this action is ORDERED REMANDED to the Superior 

Court of California for the County of San Diego.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2020

Honorable Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

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