Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02077/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02077-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LILIYA WALSH, an individual, PETER 

WALSH, an individual, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE; 

SUTTER ROSEVILLE MEDICAL 

CENTER; TELECARE PLACER 

PSYCHIATRIC HEALTH FACILITY; 

ROCKLIN POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

PLACER COUNTY; and DOES 1-10, 

inclusive, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-2077-MCE-KJN-PS 

ORDER 

Through the present action, Plaintiffs Liliya and Peter Walsh (“Plaintiffs”), 

proceeding pro se, seek damages stemming from Defendants’ response to a medical 

emergency that occurred on or about October 5, 2012. Liliya Walsh was taken by 

paramedic employees of Defendant American Medical Response to Defendant Sutter 

Roseville Medical Center, where she was hospitalized. Officers from Defendant Rocklin 

Police Department undertook a welfare check, and Officer Jeff Paxton authorized an 

application to place Liliya on an involuntary 72-hour detention hold for evaluation and 

treatment pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150. Liliya was 

ultimately taken to Defendant Telecare Placer Psychiatric facility and was later released. 

Case 2:13-cv-02077-MCE-KJN Document 100 Filed 04/24/15 Page 1 of 5
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On September 11, 2014, the assigned Magistrate Judge issued findings 

recommending that this matter be dismissed. On December 29, 2014, the undersigned 

adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations in full and dismissed 

the case. Plaintiffs thereafter, on January 12, 2015, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 

Then, on March 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed the Amended Motion for Reconsideration 

presently before the Court. Defendants have opposed that Amended Motion. 

A motion for reconsideration is properly brought under either Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1989). A 

motion for reconsideration is treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if, like Relators’ motion 

presently before the Court, it is filed within twenty-eight days of entry of judgment. See 

Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 

2001). A motion may be construed as a Rule 59 motion even though it is not labeled as 

such, or not labeled at all. Taylor, 871 F.2d at 805. 

 A court should be loathe to revisit its own decisions unless extraordinary 

circumstances show that its prior decision was clearly erroneous or would work a 

manifest injustice. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 

(1988). This principle is embodied in the law of the case doctrine, under which “a court 

is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the 

same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” United States v. Alexander, 

106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 

1993)). Nonetheless, in certain limited circumstances, a court has discretion to 

reconsider its prior decisions. 

 While Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous 

order, “the rule offers an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 

finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 

229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 12 James William Moore, et al., Moore’s 

Federal Practice § 59.30(4) (3d ed. 2000)). Indeed, a district court should not grant a 

motion for reconsideration “absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court 

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is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 

intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 

656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 

(9th Cir. 1993)). Mere dissatisfaction with the court’s order, or belief that the court is 

wrong in its decision, is not grounds for relief under Rule 59(e). Twentieth Century-Fox 

Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Additionally, Local Rule 230(j)(3) requires a party filing a motion for 

reconsideration to show the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist 

which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds 

exist for the motion.” Finally, motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) are 

addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe 

R.R., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 In order to succeed, a party making a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 

59(e) must “set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to 

reverse its prior decision.” Pritchen v. McEwen, No. 1:10-cv-02008-JLT HC, 2011 WL 

2115647, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (citing Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of 

Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on 

other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987)). A motion for reconsideration should not be 

used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when the arguments or 

evidence could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation. 389 Orange 

St. Partners, 179 F.3d at 665. 

 Furthermore, “courts avoid considering Rule 59(e) motions where the grounds for 

amendment are restricted to either repetitive contentions of matters which were before 

the court on its prior consideration or contentions which might have been raised prior to 

the challenged judgment.” Costello v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 

1991); see also Taylor, 871 F.2d at 805. This position stems from the district courts’ 

“concerns for preserving dwindling resources and promoting judicial efficiency.” 

Costello, 765 F. Supp. at 1009 (internal citations omitted). Rule 59(e) motions for 

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reconsideration are therefore not intended to “give an unhappy litigant one additional 

change to sway the judge.” Frito-Lay of P.R., Inc. v. Canas, 92 F.R.D. 384, 390 (D.P.R. 

1981) (quoting Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 226, 233 (N.D. Ohio 1967)). 

 The sole federal claim set forth in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is for 

violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in 

contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That federal claim purports to be made against 

Defendants Sutter General Hospital, Telecare Placer Psychiatric, Jeff Paxton and Placer 

County. As the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations note, because there 

were no cognizable allegations that either Sutter Roseville Hospital or Telecare Placer 

Psychiatric were acting under color of state law so as to come within the purview of 

Section 1983, no federal claim has against them was stated. With respect to Officer Jeff 

Paxton, he was never substituted in as a defendant, and because the original complaint 

and its attachments refer to Paxton by name, Plaintiffs cannot claim ignorance as to his 

identity and therefore cannot substitute Paxton as a “Doe” defendant on that basis. 

Finally, with regard to Placer County, Plaintiffs made no showing that any official policy 

or custom on the County’s part was responsible for Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries so as to 

subject Placer County to Section 1983 liability. Consequently, the Magistrate Judge 

properly determined that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint stated no viable federal 

claim. 

 In the absence of a viable federal claim, the Magistrate Judge recommended that 

the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law 

claims for false imprisonment, battery, assault, negligence, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation, medical 

malpractice, and violation of California Welfare & Institutions Code sections 5325 and 

5326.2 The Court agreed with that recommendation and consequently dismissed 

Plaintiffs’ lawsuit in its entirety. 

 In urging the Court to reconsider its dismissal, Plaintiffs fail to meet the rigorous 

standards required to warrant such an extraordinary remedy. Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion 

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itself concedes that they “request the court to reevaluate the evidence.” Pls.’ Am. Mot., 

4L27-28. Without identifying new facts or a change in law to warrant such reevaluation, 

Plaintiffs’ reconsideration request is plainly improper. Plaintiffs make no effort to bolster 

their sole federal claim, for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, other than to reassert the same 

arguments they have already advanced.1 Plaintiffs provide no new or different facts, that 

they could not previously have asserted, indicating that reconsideration is appropriate. 

Nor do they identify any intervening change in the controlling law warranting a result 

different than that already reached. Given those shortcomings, Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Reconsideration (ECF No. 93) is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 23, 2015 

 1

 Indeed, Plaintiffs appear to spend the bulk of their reconsideration request arguing the merits of 

Liliya’s detention under California law and whether there was probable cause to support that detention. 

Those arguments go to Plaintiff’s state law claims, over which the Court has declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction. 

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