Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-01369/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-01369-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The footnotes from the opinion have been renumbered.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES CARR,

Petitioner,

 v.

D.L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-1369 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. In response to the court’s Order to Show Cause respondent has filed an answer and

a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and has lodged supporting

exhibits. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. The case is ready for decision. 

BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the underlying facts as follows:1

On June 17, 1997, two passersby assisted Tommie Cain after his car jumped

the median in the area of Seminary Avenue in Oakland. Cain fell out of the

car holding his side, and said he had been shot at a nearby gas station. Cain

also told a police officer who arrived on the scene that he had been shot by

two black men. Cain died of his wounds.

Three weeks later, an Oakland police officer stopped a vehicle with expired

registration tags. Appellant, who was the driver, was arrested for possession

of rock cocaine, and Jovan Reynolds was arrested for possession of a .38

caliber revolver. The gun was test fired at the police crime lab, and the

bullets and casings were saved. In September 1998, a firearms identification

expert matched them to a bullet taken from Cain’s body.

Upon learning of the match, Sergeant Longmire put out a bulletin to have

appellant arrested on an outstanding misdemeanor warrant. Appellant was

arrested and was interviewed at the police station on October 23, 1998, at

approximately 3:00 a.m. After waiving his Miranda rights, appellant stated

that he, Jovan Reynolds, and Carlos Vincent were driving around East

Oakland looking for people to rob the night Cain was killed. Appellant held

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2 When Reynolds was interviewed he said that he was the one who

drove them away from the scene.

3 According to Sergeant Longmire’s notes, appellant told him that

Reynolds tried to get appellant to take the blame for everything

found in the car.

4

 All referenced exhibits are those lodged by respondent in support of the answer to the

petition, unless otherwise noted.

2

the first victim at gunpoint, while Vincent took his money and property. Later,

they saw Cain talking on the telephone at a gas station. Vincent and

Reynolds got out of the car to rob Cain, and appellant stayed in the car. 

Appellant heard a gun shot. When Vincent and Reynolds ran back to the car,

appellant drove it away.2

 At 9:30 the next morning appellant repeated to a

representative of the district attorney’s office that he knew Reynolds and

Vincent were going to rob Cain, but denied that he intended to play any part

in the crime. Appellant did admit that he drove the car away from the scene. 

The prosecution also submitted a letter found by Jovan Reynolds’s father in

Reynolds’s bedroom, which a handwriting expert testified bore appellant’s

signature. The author of the letter claimed that the gun found in the July 1997

vehicle stop of appellant and Reynolds belonged to appellant.3

Respondent's Ex. G (Unpublished Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate

District, People v. Carr, No. A094332 (June 10, 2002)) at 1-2 (hereinafter “Opinion”).4

In 2000, an Alameda County jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder. He was

sentenced to twenty-five years to life in state prison, with an additional one year

consecutive term for gun use. On appeal, petitioner challenged the trial court’s denial of his

suppression motion. Concurrently, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

raising the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the suppression

motion. The appellate court affirmed the judgment and denied the writ on June 7, 2002. 

Petitions for review to the California Supreme Court were denied on August 28, 2002. 

In the present federal habeas corpus petition petitioner claims that the trial court

wrongly denied his motion to suppress, that the suppression hearing was constitutionally

infirm because of alleged perjured testimony by the arresting police officer, and that

counsel was ineffective for conceding that the entry of police into petitioner's home was

lawful and for failing to investigate and discover inconsistent testimony by the arresting

police officer. 

//

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(d)(2) applies

to intrinsic review of a state court’s process, or situations in which the petitioner challenges

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the state court’s findings based entirely on the state court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant question under § 2254(d)(2) is whether

an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably

conclude that the state court findings are supported by the record. Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Section 2254(e)(1) applies to challenges based on extrinsic evidence. Taylor, 366

F.3d at 1000. Under this section, a district court must presume correct any determination

of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Conclusory

assertions will not do. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court, see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the

highest state court to consider the petitioner’s claims, a federal court looks to the last

reasoned opinion, in this case the opinion of the California Court of Appeal on appeal. See

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801–06. 

DISCUSSION

A. Violation of the Fourth Amendment

1. Background

Following his arrest on October 23, 1998, petitioner waived his Miranda rights and

made inculpatory statements. At his preliminary hearing, he argued that the statements

should not be admitted because they were the fruit of an unlawful arrest. Specifically, he

claimed that his nighttime arrest on a misdemeanor bench warrant was illegal both on

statutory and Fourth Amendment grounds, because the warrant was not endorsed for

nighttime service. The magistrate at the preliminary hearing denied the motion to

suppress, finding that while there had been a statutory violation of California Penal Code

section 840 pertaining to the proper time of arrest for a misdemeanor, the warrant was valid

and petitioner's arrest did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the

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The last two pages of the appellate court's opinion, pages eight and nine, are missing

from respondent's Exhibit G. However, the section of the opinion pertaining to the court's

Fourth Amendment analysis is reproduced in full in respondent's memorandum of points

and authorities in support of the answer to the petition. 

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statements need not be excluded. Ex. A at 225-26.

Petitioner then moved to dismiss the indictment against him on the ground that his

statements were the product of a Fourth Amendment violation, and without the statements

there was insufficient evidence to hold him to answer to the charge. The presiding superior

court judge denied the motion, finding that the statutory violation did not reach

constitutional dimensions. Ex. B at 23, 26 (Feb. 25, 2000). 

During in limine proceedings petitioner moved to exclude admission of the

statements at trial on Fourth Amendment grounds. The trial court denied the motion,

finding that there was no constitutional violation. Ex. B at 17 (Aug. 10, 2000).

On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to grant

the motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds. In a reasoned opinion, the court of

appeal held that the statutory violation of Penal Code section 840 did not, by itself,

establish that the arrest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that, under

the totality of the circumstances, the arrest was not unreasonable within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment. Ex. G at 3-8.5

 Petitioner again raised his Fourth Amendment claim in

his petition for review in the California Supreme Court. That court denied the petition

summarily, without citation or comment.

Simultaneously with his appeal, petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition, in

which he claimed that his trial attorney was ineffective for having conceded that the initial

entry of police into the house where they arrested petitioner was lawful because of "hot

pursuit" or exigent circumstances. Petitioner claimed that he now had new evidence which

showed that the arresting police officer, Officer Midyett, had lied at the preliminary hearing

about the circumstances which led him to enter the house. The court of appeal found that

petitioner's allegations failed to state a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,

and denied the petition. Ex. G at 4 n.5, Ex. J (appendix A). 

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In this federal habeas corpus petition, petitioner claims that the trial court's denial of

his motion to suppress violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and also claims that Officer

Midyett's alleged perjured testimony rendered the suppression hearing constitutionally

infirm. In its Order to Show Cause, the Court noted that although petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment claim might be barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (discussed in

detail below), "his contention that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate

the issue arguably may take that claim outside the scope of Powell." Accordingly, the Court

directed respondent to answer the claim. 

2. Applicable Federal Law

Stone v. Powell bars federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims unless the

state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of those claims. 428 U.S. at

481-82, 494. Even if the state courts' determination of the Fourth Amendment issues is

improper, it will not be remedied in federal habeas corpus actions so long as the petitioner

was provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. See Locks v. Sumner, 703

F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983). All Stone v. Powell requires is

the initial opportunity for a fair hearing. Such an opportunity for a fair hearing forecloses

this court's inquiry upon habeas petition into the trial court's subsequent course of action. 

See Caldwell v. Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986). The existence of a state

procedure allowing an opportunity for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims,

rather than a defendant's actual use of those procedures, bars federal habeas

consideration of those claims. See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Although the Stone Court did not specify a test for determining whether a state has

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a claim, the Ninth Circuit has held that

where a habeas petitioner challenges the state courts' application of the law, the reviewing

federal court should consider the extent to which the claims were briefed before, and

considered by, the state trial and appellate courts. See Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d

1176, 1178 -1179 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th

Cir.1981)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 979 (1991). 

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3. Analysis

The court finds that petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim is barred by Stone v.

Powell. The record shows that the relevant issues were thoroughly briefed twice at the trial

court level, Ex. B at 34-56, 357-67, 516-31, 543-50, and twice rejected following oral

argument, Ex. A at 15-26 (Feb. 25, 2000), 6-17 (Aug. 10, 2000). The briefs on appeal on

the Fourth Amendment issue are thorough and substantial. Exs. C, H, J. The opinion of

the state appellate court rejecting petitioner's claim is carefully considered and wellreasoned. Ex. G at 3-8. Petitioner's petition for review to the California Supreme Court

extensively and thoroughly addresses the claim, Ex. H, and that court rejected the claim on

the merits (although without a reasoned opinion), Ex. I. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803 (where

the last reasoned opinion on the claim fairly appears to rest primarily upon federal law, it

should be presumed that no procedural default has been invoked by a later unexplained

order). On this record, it is clear that petitioner was provided an opportunity for full and fair

litigation of his claim in state court.

Petitioner's allegation that perjured testimony was offered by the state at his

preliminary hearing does not change this conclusion. Such a claim does not call into

question the adequacy of the state hearing procedures with which petitioner was provided. 

Rather, the use of perjured testimony states an independent claim for a violation of due

process. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Accordingly, the Court

reviews that claim separately, below.

For these reasons, petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim is DENIED.

B. The Use of Perjured Testimony at the Suppression Hearing

1. Background

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts relevant to the suppression

hearing as follows:

At the preliminary hearing, Officer Midyett testified that, at night, on October

22, 1998, he entered a residence in the 2200 block of 83rd Avenue, in pursuit

of a person who had fled into the apartment. Officer Midyett "believed [the

person] was a male by the name of Brian Robinson also known as Beehive

who had a parole violation warrant." Officer Midyett did not find Robinson, but

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he recognized appellant, who he knew from other contacts, sitting on a couch. 

Sergeant Longmire had informed Midyett that appellant had an outstanding

misdemeanor warrant, and he should arrest appellant when he saw him. 

Midyett did not recall what time it was when he made the arrest, but appellant

was brought to the homicide section of the police department, and Sergeant

Longmire was alerted at 12:30 a.m. Appellant's taped interview with Sergeant

Longmire began at 4:56 a.m.

Appellant's counsel initially contended that his arrest was illegal under Payton

v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573 [absent exigent circumstances, entry into a

private residence to make a warrantless arrest violates the Fourth

Amendment]; People v. Ramsey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263 [same rule applies

under the California constitution]; and Steagald v. United States (1981) 451

U.S. 204 [police must have search warrant to enter third party residence to

make an arrest]. Yet, when Midyett testified that he entered the residence in

pursuit of a person he believed to be Brian Robinson, a parolee with an

outstanding warrant, appellant's counsel stated he had no reason to

disbelieve Midyett and conceded that there was "no issue" regarding the

lawfulness of the initial entry.

Ex. G at 3-4. 

In a petition for state habeas corpus relief filed in conjunction with his appeal,

petitioner claimed that he had discovered new evidence which showed that Officer Midyett

had lied regarding the circumstances under which he entered the apartment. He referred

to testimony given by Midyett in November 1998 at the preliminary hearing of Brian

Robinson, the person Midyett had stated he was pursuing when he entered the apartment

in which he found, and arrested, petitioner. Petitioner claimed this testimony was

inconsistent with Midyett's testimony at petitioner's preliminary hearing in September 1999. 

Specifically, at Robinson's preliminary hearing, Midyett testified to the following: 

(1) on October 24, 1998, the day following petitioner's arrest, Midyett pursued Robinson

into the same apartment complex where petitioner had been arrested, on the basis of a

parole warrant; (2) Midyett had not had any contact with Robinson for several months prior

to Robinson's arrest. Petitioner reasoned that Midyett's testimony that he had had no

contact with Robinson for several months prior to his arrest on October 24, 1998 made it

impossible for Midyett to have been pursuing Robinson the day earlier, as he testified at

petitioner's preliminary hearing. Thus, petitioner argued, in order to justify his "hot pursuit"

theory of entry into the apartment where petitioner was arrested, Midyett perjured himself at

petitioner's preliminary hearing. Petitioner claimed that Midyett's perjury violated his right to

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due process, and that counsel's concession to Midyett's assertion of "hot pursuit," and

counsel's failure to further investigate the veracity of Midyett's testimony, constituted the

ineffective assistance of counsel.

The state court of appeal rejected petitioner's contention that the new evidence

supported a finding that Midyett's testimony was inconsistent:

Appellant has filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that this

concession constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that

Midyett's testimony did not support a finding of hot pursuit or exigent

circumstances, and an adequate investigation would have disclosed that

Midyett testified at Brian Robinson's preliminary hearing that the last time he

had contact with Robinson, prior to Robinson's arrest on October 24, 1998,

was when Robinson fled from Midyett several months earlier. Appellant

contends Midyett's testimony at Robinson's hearing contradicts his testimony

in appellant's case. We find no inherent inconsistency, because Midyett

testified that he was chasing a person he believed to be Robinson.

Ex. G at 4 n.5.

2. Applicable Federal Law

"[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally

unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony

could have affected the judgment of the jury." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103. Even if the state 

unwittingly presents perjured testimony, a reviewing court must determine whether 

"'there is a reasonable probability that [without all the perjury] the result of the proceeding

would have been different.'" Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal

citations omitted). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision "based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.2000). "Factual determinations by state

courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." MillerEl, 537 U.S. at 340; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). This

presumption is not altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeal,

rather than by a state trial court. Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.),

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amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.2001). If there is more than one way to interpret the

evidence presented in state court, the state court's interpretation of the evidence need not

be the most plausible one to survive scrutiny under § 2254(d)(2). See Anderson v.

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006).

3. Analysis

The state court of appeal determined that the newly discovered facts presented by

petitioner did not evidence an inherent inconsistency in Officer Midyett's testimony. At

Robinson's preliminary hearing, Midyett testified that he had not seen Robinson for several

months, but on October 24, 1998, the day after petitioner's arrest, he recognized Robinson

standing on the sidewalk in the same block where petitioner had been arrested. Robinson

ran, then entered an apartment in the same apartment complex where petitioner had been

arrested. Midyett followed and apprehended him. At petitioner's preliminary hearing,

Midyett testified that the previous day, on October 23, 1998, he believed that the man he

saw run into an apartment was Robinson, but when he entered the apartment it turned out

the man he saw sitting with petitioner was not Robinson, and Robinson was not in the

apartment. The state court determined that Midyett's testimony that on the day of

petitioner's arrest he believed he was chasing Robinson, while the next day he recognized

Robinson, could be reconciled and was not inherently inconsistent. This determination was

not objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence before the court. 

Because the state court reasonably concluded that Officer Midyett's testimony at

petitioner's preliminary hearing was not inconsistent, and therefore was not perjured,

petitioner's claim that his preliminary hearing was constitutionally infirm because of perjured

testimony is without merit. Accordingly, this claim for relief is DENIED. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Background

In his state habeas corpus petition, petitioner claimed that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate and discover Officer Midyett's alleged inconsistent

testimony, and for conceding that Midyett's testimony at the suppression hearing was

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Petitioner also argues in the instant petition that counsel was ineffective because he

"failed to contest or present any defense against the charge of first degree murder." 

Petition at 2. And in his traverse he argues that counsel was ineffective because he made

no objections to the prosecution’s arguments regarding robbery and felony-murder. 

Traverse at 16. None of these claims was presented to the state courts for review;

accordingly, they are unexhausted. Moreover, petitioner's conclusory allegations fail to

state a colorable federal claim for relief. Accordingly, these claims are DISMISSED. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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sufficient to establish "hot pursuit." Petitioner attached to his petition a declaration in which

his trial counsel declared that he had no information outside the record or tactical

considerations for not investigating or challenging the prosecution's hot pursuit theory. See

Ex. J at 12. 

The California Court of Appeal found that petitioner failed to state a prima facie case

of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, as discussed above, it determined that Midyett's

testimony was not inherently inconsistent. And with respect to petitioner's objection to

counsel's concession, it found as follows: 

Nor, was it ineffective assistance to concede that the initial entry did not

violate the Fourth Amendment. Midyett, who knew that there was an

outstanding warrant for Robinson, first contacted him on a public street and

pursued him when he retreated into a residence in an apparent attempt to

escape and avoid arrest. When an arrest, or in this case an attempted arrest,

is set in motion in a public place, the police may pursue a retreating suspect

into a private residence, even if the offense is a mere misdemeanor. (United

States v. Santana (1976) 427 U.S. 38, 42-43; People v. Lloyd, [(1989)], 216

Cal.App.3d 1425, 1429.) The primary case upon which appellant relies,

Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 749-750, is distinguishable because

in that case the police did not initially contact the defendant in a public place. 

Instead, after identifying the defendant as the driver of a vehicle, who a

witness described as possibly intoxicated, the police went to the driver's

house, entered and found him lying in bed.

We conclude that appellant has failed to make a prima facie case of

ineffective assistance of counsel. We deny his petition for habeas corpus by

separate order.

Ex. G at 4 n.5.6

2. Applicable Federal Law

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). A claim that

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defense counsel failed to litigate (or properly litigate) a Fourth Amendment claim is not

barred by Stone v. Powell. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-83 (1986).

The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial

cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In

order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a petitioner must

make two separate showings. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was

deficient, that is, that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance

must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. It is

unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas ineffective assistance claim to

address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot even establish

incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.

1998). 

 Second, the petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance, that is, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Id. Where the petitioner is challenging his conviction, the

appropriate question is "'whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,

the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.'" Luna v. Cambra, 306

F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). A court need not

determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice

suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697. 

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

considered to be "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

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the United States" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams (Terry)

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2001).

3. Analysis

a. Counsel's concession of "hot pursuit"

In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s

failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment issue, petitioner must show that: (1) the overlooked

motion to suppress would have been meritorious, and (2) there is a reasonable probability

that the jury would have reached a different verdict absent the introduction of the unlawful

evidence. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375). 

Thus, to prevail, petitioner first must show that a motion to suppress based on

warrantless entry would have been meritorious if brought in the first instance by trial

counsel. See id. The state court concluded that such a motion would have been denied

because the warrantless entry was justified by the exigent circumstances of “hot pursuit.” 

The court relied upon United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976), for the

proposition that "when an arrest, or in this case an attempted arrest, is set in motion in a

public place, the police may pursue a retreating suspect into a private residence, even if the

offense is a mere misdemeanor." Ex. G at 4 n.5. 

Petitioner acknowledges that the doctrine of "hot pursuit" is one recognized exigent

circumstance to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See Welsh v. Wisconsin,

466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984). However, he argues that under clearly established Supreme

Court precedent, exigent circumstances did not exist here to pursue the man Midyett

believed was Robinson into the apartment. This is because Robinson was being pursued

on a parole violator warrant – not after the commission of a crime, and no emergency

situation existed requiring police to act quickly. 

 In Santana, the Supreme Court considered whether exigent circumstances were

present with respect to the warrantless arrest of a suspect who was first spotted by police

in a public place, but then ran into her home. The Court first made clear that where police

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have probable cause to arrest a suspect, they may do so without a warrant in a public

place. 427 U.S. at 42. The Court then asked whether the fact of the suspect's retreat into

her house "could thwart an otherwise proper arrest." Id. It held it could not. Id. Rather, an

arrest that begins in a public place will not be defeated because the suspect attempts to

flee into a private residence. Id. at 42-43. In order to satisfy the exigent circumstance of

"hot pursuit" the flight of the suspect "need not be an extended hue and cry 'in and about

(the) public streets'" Id. at 43. It need only involve "some element of a chase." Id. at 43

n.3. The Court held that the fact of the suspect's flight, along with the likelihood that she

would destroy evidence of the crime she had just committed, justified the warrantless entry

and arrest. Id. 

Although, as noted by petitioner, in Santana a crime had just been committed and

the need to act quickly involved the potential destruction of evidence, the Supreme Court

did not hold that it was limiting the definition of hot pursuit to such circumstances. In its

application of the doctrine, the Ninth Circuit has held that the pursuit of a "fleeing suspect"

will satisfy the exigent circumstances or "hot pursuit" requirement where the pursuit is

continuous, and the underlying crime is a felony. See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d

895, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 

Here, it is not disputed that police had probable cause to arrest Robinson on a

parole violation warrant, that they first spotted the individual they believed was Robinson in

a public place, and that when Robinson spotted them, he fled. There also is no dispute as

to whether the pursuit of Robinson was continuous, or whether he was a fleeing felon. 

Under these circumstances, it is likely that the trial court would have found that Officer

Midyett's warrantless entry into petitioner's apartment was lawful, and that it would have

denied the motion to suppress even if counsel had not conceded the issue of "hot pursuit." 

 The state appellate court's determination that Officer Midyett's entry into the

apartment where petitioner was arrested was justified by exigent circumstances, and that

counsel was not ineffective for conceding this point, was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly,

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this claim for relief is DENIED.

b. Counsel's failure to investigate

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the

factual basis for Officer Midyett's assertion that he was in "hot pursuit" of Robinson when

he entered the apartment where petitioner was arrested. He claims that the fact that the

pursuit of Robinson was not in any of the police reports or discovery provided to counsel,

and that it surfaced as a justification for the entry almost a year after the arrest, should

have caused counsel to question its accuracy and do some investigation. He maintains

that, at a minimum, counsel should have looked to see if there were any police reports or

records regarding Robinson's parole violation warrant to see if it really existed. He

surmises that if counsel had done so, he would have found court records which showed

that Robinson was arrested the day after petitioner and was convicted, he would have

discovered the inconsistent testimony given by Officer Midyett at Robinson's preliminary

hearing, and he would have used that testimony to impeach Midyett at petitioner's

preliminary hearing. 

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable investigations or to make

a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. See Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691. "[A] particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to

counsel's judgments." Id. 

Here, the California Court of Appeal found that counsel was not ineffective for failing

to investigate Officer Midyett's preliminary hearing testimony further because the facts

alleged by petitioner did not support the conclusion that his testimony was inconsistent. 

This court already has concluded that the state court's decision that there was no inherent

inconsistency in Officer Midyett's testimony was not an objectively unreasonable

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Therefore, counsel's failure to uncover

those facts cannot have constituted ineffective assistance, because there is no reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

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Petitioner argues that this court should not defer to the state court's factual and legal

findings because that court failed to fully develop the facts underlying his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. However, there is no indication from the record that the facts

underlying these claims were in dispute or required further development. The state court

accepted petitioner's factual allegations as true, and found his claims to be without legal

merit. In a similar vein, petitioner asks the court to grant him discovery and require

respondent to provide a copy of the state habeas petition filed by his appellate counsel,

which contains his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and supporting documentation. 

Again, however, the pertinent portions of Officer Midyett's testimony at petitioner's and

Robinson's preliminary hearings is not disputed, and the legal argument in support of

petitioner's claims is aptly addressed in the other pleadings lodged with the record. 

Accordingly, the court finds no need to expand the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

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have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, the court finds that the state

court's rejection of petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), and this claim for relief is DENIED.7

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk of the court shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2007 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.03\Carr1369.HabeasOrder.ECK

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