Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05472/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05472-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK R. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF 

CONTRA COSTA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05472-VC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Re: Dkt. No. 22

Smith’s motion to enjoin the defendants from continuing to deduct membership dues

from his paychecks is denied. Smith does not carry his burden under either variant of the 

preliminary injunction standard: He does not show he “is likely to succeed on the merits” or even 

that there are “serious questions going to the merits.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 

F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Winter v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) and Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 

2013)). On January 4, 2016 Smith voluntarily became a member of the AFSCME Local 2700. 

He formed a contract with Local 2700 in which he agreed to pay dues for a year. Cf. NLRB v. 

U.S. Postal Service, 827 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing a dues-deduction

authorization is a contract). The agreement to pay was not revocable except at the end of that 

year or at the next termination date of the memorandum of understanding between the Superior 

Court and the Union. Smith specifically consented for the dues deduction to continue for the full 

contractual period even if he resigned from the Union.1 Smith cannot now invoke the First 

 

1 Smith does not appear to contest these facts, though he failed to disclose them in his application 

for a temporary restraining order or his renewed motion for a preliminary injunction.

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Amendment to wriggle out of his contractual duties. “[T]he First Amendment does not confer . . . 

a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law.” 

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991). 

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 

(2018), also does not give Smith license to evade his contract. In Janus, the Supreme Court 

clarified the First Amendment rights of non-members, who now cannot be forced to pay agency 

fees to a union. Id. at 2486. The Janus plaintiffs had opted out of union membership prior to the 

case; by contrast, Smith had opted in to union membership until Janus was decided. Smith wants 

Janus to stand for the proposition that any union member can change his mind at the drop of a 

hat, invoke the First Amendment, and renege on his contractual obligation to pay dues. Far from 

standing for that proposition, Janus actually acknowledges in its concluding paragraph that 

employees can waive their First Amendment rights by affirmatively consenting to pay union 

dues. Id. That’s what Smith did, and he is likely on the hook to pay dues through the end of the 

contractual period (November 30, 2018). Smith argues his consent to pay wasn’t “knowing”

before Janus because he couldn’t yet have known or understood the rights the case would clarify 

he had. But it’s not the rights clarified in Janus that are relevant to Smith – Smith’s First 

Amendment right to opt out of union membership was clarified in 1977, and yet he waived that 

right by affirmatively consenting to be a member of Local 2700. See Abood v. Detroit Board of 

Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.

Smith also cannot show he will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. For one, 

the Union has placed all of Smith’s dues since he resigned in an interest-bearing escrow account. 

Thus, were Smith to ultimately prevail in this lawsuit, there is no concern that his money will be

used in the meantime for activities he disfavors. After all, it’s “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize

the speech of other private speakers” that raises First Amendment concerns. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 

2464 (emphasis in original). Moreover, as with his application for a temporary restraining order, 

Smith still has not shown why the Union’s opt-out form fails to provide an avenue by which he 

himself could stop the deduction of dues, and with that, any risk of First Amendment harm. He 

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calls the form “coercive” and “self-serving,” but in fact it is a discretionary offer by Local 2700

to amend the terms of the dues-deduction agreement before the contract requires the Union to do 

so.

Because Smith does not show there are even serious questions on the merits of his First 

Amendment claim or that he will suffer irreparable harm, the Court need not reach the remaining 

preliminary injunction factors.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2018

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

Case 3:18-cv-05472-VC Document 36 Filed 11/16/18 Page 3 of 3