Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-02761/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-02761-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eric and Cheryl Eberhard, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Town of Camp Verde, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-2761-PCT-NVW

ORDER

[Not for Publication]

The court has before it Defendant Town of Camp Verde's ("Camp Verde") Motion to

Dismiss, Doc. #22, Plaintiffs' Response to the Camp Verde's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. #23,

Camp Verde's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response Motion, Doc. #26, and Plaintiffs' Complaint,

Doc. #1. 

This action arises generally out of "Camp Verde's grant of a use permit to the

Yavapai-Apache Nation ("Nation") to conduct mining operations on non-reservation feeowned land within the municipal limits of the Town of Camp Verde. The core claim

contained in the Complaint is Count Six, which alleges that Camp Verde's grant of the use

permit to the Nation violated the Arizona Zoning Enabling Act, A.R.S. 9-461, et seq. The

Complaint also alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause

and Due Process Clause and a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 

Based on these federal claims, the defendants removed the case to this court.

However, because the federal claims appeared conclusory, the court ordered, Doc. #20, the

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1

Plaintiffs also bring suit against the members of the Town Council in their individual

capacities but make no allegations that would subject them to liability under federal law. Nor

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parties to submit briefing on the issue of whether the federal causes of action should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim and the action remanded to Superior Court. This court

has an independent duty to inquire into its subject matter jurisdiction. See Valdez v. Allstate

Ins. Co. , 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, in this Order, the court

addresses whether Plaintiffs' federal causes of action state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. The non-tribal Defendants then filed their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP

12(b)(6) (doc. #22). The court has also considered the Response (doc. # 24) and the Reply

(doc. # 26).

I. Statement of Facts 

On October 10, 2002, in an action commenced by the Nation itself, the Yavapai

County Superior Court enjoined the Nation from conducting mining operations on its

land—which is located within the Town of Camp Verde. Complaint, ¶ 25. That injunction

was granted on Camp Verde's counterclaim.

The parties then settled the Superior Court action, with the Nation agreeing to submit

an application to Camp Verde for a use permit and the parties agreeing to dismiss the action.

The Town Council held a Planning and Zoning Commission Hearing on July 3, 2003, at

which the Nation's use permit application was discussed. Complaint, ¶ 41. Several speakers

urged the Town Council not to approve the Nation's use permit request. Complaint, ¶ 43.

Their reasons included the illegality of awarding the use permit, damage to the public's

health, and damage to neighboring property. Complaint, ¶ 43. Concerns about the use

permit were again raised on July 30, 2003, immediately before the Town Council voted to

approve the Nation's use permit. Complaint, ¶ 51. In response, Plaintiffs, who own property

near the Nation's mine, sued Camp Verde and the Nation under federal and state law for

declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the use permit and abate the mining operation

and for damages done to their property and their health as a result of the Nation's mining

activities. Plaintiffs first seven claims run solely against Camp Verde,1

 except for

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does Plaintiffs' brief address any basis for personal liability on the federal claims. The failure

of all federal claims to state a claim upon which relief can be granted makes it unnecessary

to discuss separately the pleading deficiencies in the personal liability claims.

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Plaintiffs' claim that Camp Verde violated the Arizona Zoning Enabling Act, which requires

that Plaintiffs also name the Nation. In their first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Camp

Verde's decision to approve the use permit amounts to unlawful "spot zoning" in violation

of Arizona's Zoning Enabling Act, the Arizona Constitution, and the United States

Constitution. In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Camp Verde violated

Plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983

because Camp Verde failed to evaluate "comparable projects" under the same standards that

were applied to the Nation's application. In Count Three, Plaintiffs allege that Camp Verde

violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process and 42 U.S.C. §1983

by approving the Nation's use permit without abiding by state-law zoning regulations. In

Count Four, Plaintiffs allege that Camp Verde's approval of the Nation's use permit violated

their equal protection rights under the Arizona Constitution. In Count Five, Plaintiffs allege

that Camp Verde violated their due process rights under the Arizona Constitution by failing

to abide by state-law zoning regulations. In Count Six, Plaintiffs allege that Camp Verde

violated the Arizona Zoning Enabling Act, A.R.S. §9-462 et seq., which establishes

procedures that must be followed to rezone property, amend a zoning ordinance, or create

new zoning restrictions. In Count Seven, Plaintiffs allege that Camp Verde violated the

Takings Clause of both the federal and state constitutions when it approved the Nation's use

permit because this conduct took Plaintiffs' land without just compensation. In their Eighth

and Ninth Causes of Action, which are solely against the Nation and its enterprise, referred

to as Yavapai-Apache Sand and Rock and Yavapai Sand and Gravel, Plaintiffs allege that

the Nation's mining caused dust and noise to trespass on Plaintiffs' property and that the

Nations' mining activities constitute a nuisance. 

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II. Standard of Review

"A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond

a doubt that the non-moving party can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which

would entitle it to relief." AlliedSignal, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 182 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir.

1999) (citation omitted). In addition, "all factual allegations set forth in the complaint are

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs." Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court should provide leave to amend unless

it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See Gompper v. VISX,

Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. Analysis

A. "Spot Zoning"

Plaintiffs allege that Camp Verde violated their constitutional rights by engaging in

"arbitrary and unreasonable spot zoning bearing no substantial relationship to or

consideration for the public health, safety, and welfare . . . ." Complaint, ¶¶ 66, 69. Spot

zoning, in the parlance of Arizona courts, is the use of a zoning ordinance that is not "in

accordance with the general or comprehensive plan designed to promote general welfare."

Haines v. City of Phoenix, 151 Ariz. 286, 291, 727 P.2d 339, 344 (1986) (citation omitted).

However, Plaintiffs have identified no case or authority creating a federal constitutional

claim to challenge spot zoning. See Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir.

1999) (analyzing the facts for a claim of illegal spot zoning as facts supporting Buckles' Fifth

Amendment takings claim). Therefore, this court will view the facts alleged under Plaintiffs'

"spot zoning" cause of action as facts supporting their takings and equal protection claims.

In addition, at oral argument, Plaintiffs conceded that there is no federal spot zoning claim.

Count I is therefore dismissed to the extent that it seeks to assert a separate federal

cause of action. 

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B. Equal Protection

Plaintiffs allege that Camp Verde's approval of the Nation's use permit violated the

Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that

"Defendant Town has violated the Plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution by their failure to apply the same standards to

their approval of UP 2003-02 as they had applied to other comparable projects, and by their

arbitrary, capricious and inconsistent application of the Zoning Ordinance to the subject

property." Complaint, ¶ 75. 

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause forbids the government's

unequal or discriminatory application of the law. To succeed on an equal protection

challenge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the government action involved a suspect

classification or implicated a fundamental right. Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 875 (9th

Cir. 1996). Without such a showing, an equal protection claim will fail if the action is

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. Plaintiffs' claim fails because they do not

allege sufficient facts to make out an equal protection violation. Plaintiffs do not identify a

discriminatory classification, and even if they did provide the necessary facts, Plaintiffs

would lack standing to assert such a claim.

1. Conclusory Allegation

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges a bare legal conclusion without any factual basis.

Conclusory allegations of law are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim. United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiffs' only mention a classification when they allege that Camp Verde did not award use

permits to comparable projects, but they do not allege the nature or circumstances of any

comparable projects or how Camp Verde treated the applicants of those projects differently

or in a discriminatory manner. In addition, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts explaining why

Camp Verde's failure to issue use permits to other comparable projects was discriminatory

as to the Plaintiffs. In short, Plaintiffs' equal protection claim is a conclusory allegation

without supporting facts. This is insufficient to state a claim.

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2. Standing

If insufficient facts were the only pleading deficiency, then Plaintiffs could amend

their complaint. But in this case, amendment could not cure a further defect because

Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert an equal protection violation on behalf of the

applicants of comparable projects. "The federal courts are under an independent obligation

to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing is perhaps the most important of the

jurisdictional doctrines." FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). To

satisfy Article III's standing requirement, a plaintiff must have a "distinct and palpable

injury" that "must be fairly traceable to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must

be 'likely' to follow a favorable decision." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 

Plaintiffs attempt to assert third-party standing on behalf of other applicants who were

not awarded mining permits. There is a two-part test for evaluating third-party standing. The

first step is to determine whether the plaintiff has suffered an "injury-in-fact" sufficient to

satisfy Article III's case and controversy requirement. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.

United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989). The second step is to examine three prudential

factors: "the relationship of the litigant to the person whose rights are being asserted; the

ability of the person to advance his own rights; and the impact of the litigation on third-party

interests." Id.

Assuming that Plaintiffs' have suffered an injury-in-fact—damage to their property

and health—they have not alleged that they share the sort of close relationship with the

unsuccessful applicants that is necessary to support a third-party standing claim. See, e.g.,

Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (recognizing the doctor's standing to challenge

a law as unconstitutional on behalf of his patients); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413

(1991)(upholding a criminal defendant's standing to assert constitutional claims on behalf of

prospective jurors because the juror-defendant relationship "continue[s] throughout the entire

trial and may in some cases extend to the sentencing as well"); Caplin, 491 U.S. at 624

(recognizing the attorney-client relationship as "one of special consequence"). Plaintiffs

have failed to allege any type of relationship.

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In addition, there is no indication that the other applicants cannot protect their interests

or that there is an impediment to their being able to do so. In Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.

106, 117 (1976), the Court upheld the doctor's third-party standing to challenge an abortion

law and determined that two obstacles prevented other potential litigants from asserting such

a challenge: first, a woman's desire to keep her decision to have an abortion private, and

second, potential mootness. Unlike in Singleton, there are no apparent obstacles preventing

the applicants who were denied use permits from challenging Camp Verde's decision to issue

a permit to the Nation. 

Plaintiffs do not satisfy the first or second elements under Caplin, and therefore they

do not have standing to assert constitutional claims on behalf of applicants who were unable

to secure use permits.

3. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to establish an equal protection

claim and because they would not have standing to assert such a claim, this court dismisses

Plaintiffs' claim that the Camp Verde violated their right to equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment. "If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to

amend should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts

consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." DeSoto v.

Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). At oral argument, Plaintiffs could not assert any more facts supporting an

equal protection claim and did not say they could allege facts sufficient to survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim if the court did grant them leave to amend their

complaint. Plaintiffs' federal equal protection claim is therefore dismissed without leave to

amend. 

C. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiffs allege that they have a "constitutional right to due process, and to a

meaningful and fair hearing before the Town Council on the matter of mining operations

conducted in a residential/agricultural use zone." Complaint, ¶ 13. In addition, they allege

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that "Defendant Town violated the Plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution by arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably

approving UP 2003-02 as described above, without abiding by the procedures for legislative

rezoning and general plan amendment as required by the laws of the State of Arizona."

Complaint, ¶ 13.

"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to government deprivation

of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property."

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). A procedural due process claim has two

elements: "(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and

(2) a denial of adequate procedural protections." Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood

Unified, 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). When considering a procedural due process

challenge to a government decision, a court must first decide whether the decision "was the

type of government action to which due process applies," and must then decide whether the

government's decision deprived the plaintiffs of a protected property interest. Harris v.

County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiffs have not identified or alleged a property interest that is protected by

procedural due process. Plaintiffs' allegation, at bottom, is that they have a constitutional

right to due process and to a meaningful and fair hearing. But the general rule is that there

is no procedural due process right to a hearing when a State passes a general zoning statute.

See Bi-Metallic Inc. Co., 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) ("The Constitution does not require all

public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within

the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the

point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard"). While exceptions to Bi-Metallic's

broad rule are recognized, see Harris, 904 F.2d at 497, Plaintiffs have not cited any cases

holding that a neighbor has a property right protected by procedural due process when a

municipality grants a land use permit for the property of another. Plaintiffs' assertion of a

protected property right is one step removed from Harris because Camp Verde did not

rezone Plaintiffs' property. 

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2

At oral argument Plaintiffs stated that they received notice that the hearing would be

conducted in a legislative manner but instead the hearing was conducted in an administrative

manner, and therefore the notice was insufficient to satisfy procedural due process

requirements. Even if Plaintiffs are correct and the meeting was conducted in an

administrative rather than a legislative manner, Plaintiffs received notice of the hearing

where the use permit was discussed, and they had the opportunity to be heard. No cases

suggest that mislabeling a hearing constitutes a procedural due process violation when the

plaintiff received notice and attended the hearing. 

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Moreover, even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiffs have a property right

protected by procedural due process, they have failed to allege facts showing that the hearing

was conducted in an unfair manner or that they somehow did not receive process that was

due. The fact that the Town Council voted to approve the use permit after speakers urged

the Town Council not to do so does not demonstrate unfairness. A conclusory allegation that

the Town Council failed to act in an impartial manner does not establish a procedural due

process claim. See Buckles , 191 F.3d at 1137 ("The Buckles' briefs do not address the merits

of their procedural due process claim, nor do they point to any evidence in the record that

supports the complaint's conclusory assertion of impartiality."). 

Likewise, Plaintiffs have failed to allege what process they were entitled to above and

beyond what they received. In Harris, the court held that Harris had a property right

protected by procedural due process when the government specifically targeted his property

and rezoned it in a manner that affected Harris's ability to use his property. 904 F.2d at 502-

03. The court concluded that procedural due process required that Harris receive

individualized notice of the hearing where the rezoning of his property was discussed. Id.

at 503-04. Unlike in Harris, there is no allegation here that Plaintiffs failed to receive notice

of the hearing.2

 Plaintiffs' Complaint demonstrates that there was a Planning and Zoning

Commission Hearing on July 3, 2003, and that Plaintiffs' concerns were raised at that

hearing. Complaint, ¶ 8 ("Commissioner Whitmire also expressed concern on the record that

granting the use permit conflicted with provisions in the adopted General Plan regarding

preserving the integrity of the Plaintiff's neighborhood in accordance with Arizona statutory

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law."). Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts suggesting that they did not receive adequate

procedural due process. 

In sum, Plaintiffs have identified no property interest protected by procedural due

process, conceded that they received notice of the town hearing and attended the hearing, and

allege nothing beyond a conclusory assertion that they did not receive adequate procedural

due process. For these reasons, Plaintiffs' federal due process claim is dismissed without

leave to amend for failure to state a claim. At oral argument, Plaintiffs' offered no additional

facts to support their procedural due process claim. Therefore, amendment could not cure

their defective procedural due process allegations. 

D. Substantive Due Process

Plaintiffs also appear to be invoking the substantive protections of the Fourteenth

Amendment's Due Process Clause. Specifically, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that "Defendant

Town violated the Plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution by arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably approving UP 2003-

02 as described above, without abiding by the procedures for legislative rezoning and general

plan amendment as required by the laws of the State of Arizona." 

In Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1127-31 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit

affirmed dismissal of the substantive due process claim joined with takings claims. The court

explained that "when an explicit textual provision of the Constitution protects against the

challenged government action, the claim must be analyzed under the specific provision alone

and not under the more general guarantee of substantive due process." Id. at 1128.

Therefore, Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim adds nothing to the taking claim and must

be dismissed. 

E. Federal Takings Claim

Plaintiffs allege that Camp Verde took their property in violation of the Fifth

Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, "[a] federal takings

claim is not ripe until a litigant has 'sought compensation through the procedures the State

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has provided for doing so.'" Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank , 473 U.S. 172 (1985))

(alterations omitted). See also Macri, 126 F.3d at 1129 ("[A] Fifth Amendment takings claim

is not ripe until the plaintiff has been denied compensation by the state."); San Remo Hotel,

L.P. v. City and County of S.F., 125 S.Ct. 2491, 2501-07 (2005) (holding that even though

a plaintiff must first pursue all available remedies under state law, issue preclusion bars a

plaintiff from bringing a federal takings claim in federal court after the state court decided

the state takings claim and state takings law is coextensive with federal takings law).

Because Arizona law provides a remedy for takings, see Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17, Plaintiffs

must pursue that claim before a taking claim under the Fifth Amendment can be ripe. See

also Wonders v. Pima County, 207 Ariz. 576, 580, 89 P.3d 810, 814 (Ariz. 2004) (referring

to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and stating that "Article II, § 17 provides like

protection"); State ex rel. Miller v. Superior Court, 189 Ariz. 228, 231, 941 P.2d 240, 244

(Ariz. 1997)(citing Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17 for the proposition that "[t]he Arizona

constitution requires 'just compensation' be paid to property owners prior to a taking)

(citation omitted). Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment takings claim is therefore not ripe for

adjudication. 

The proper disposition for an unripe federal takings claim is dismissal without

prejudice. See Macri, 126 F.3d at 1129 (9th Cir. 1997)(stating that a federal takings claim

is properly dismissed without prejudice on ripeness grounds); Schnuck v. City of Santa

Monica, 935 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1991)("The district court was consequently correct in

dismissing her takings claim as unripe."); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los

Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 508 (9th Cir. 1990)("[A]ppellants' takings and as-applied due process

and equal protection challenges are unripe[, and] . . . when claims are unripe the correct

disposition is dismissal . . . ."). Plaintiffs' federal takings claim is therefore dismissed without

prejudice.

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IV. Conclusion

As discussed above, all of Plaintiffs' federal claims are dismissed. Plaintiffs' federal

spot zoning claim is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim because no such

federal claim exists. Plaintiffs' equal protection, procedural due process, and substantive due

process claims are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs' federal

takings claim is dismissed without prejudice on ripeness grounds. 

The court determines pursuant to Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., that there is no just

reason for delay in entering final judgment dismissing the federal equal protection, federal

due process, and federal taking claims and expressly directs the clerk to enter such judgment

immediately. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, Doc. # 22, is granted as to the federal spot zoning claim (part of the first cause of

action), the federal equal protection claim (second cause of action), the federal due process

claim (third cause of action), and the federal takings claim (part of the seventh cause of

action). In addition, the court determines pursuant to Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., that there

is no just reason for delay in entering final judgment dismissing these four claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk enter immediate judgment dismissing with

prejudice the federal spot zoning claim (part of the first cause of action), the federal equal

protection claim (second cause of action), and the federal due process claim (third cause of

action).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk enter immediate judgment dismissing

without prejudice the portion of Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action that alleges a federal

takings claim. 

DATED this 2nd day of March 2006.

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