Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02577/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02577-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-2577

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Johnnie Jones Jr.,

Appellant,

v.

Arkansas Game & Fish

Commission; Dale Oldham, In his

official and individual capacity as

Shirey Bay/Rainey Brake Area

Manager,

Appellees,

Robert Zachary, In his official and

individual capacity as Region I

Supervisor for AGFC,

Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

[UNPUBLISHED]

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Submitted: March 14, 2007

 Filed: June 26, 2007

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Before COLLOTON, HANSEN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

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The Honorable William R. Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

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Johnnie Jones, Jr., began working at the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission

(“the AGFC”) in February 1998. The AGFC reassigned him from the Shirey Bay

Wildlife Management Area (“Shirey Bay”) to the Black River Wildlife Management

Area (“Black River”) in 2003 because Black River was understaffed. Jones brought

suit in 2004 against the AGFC and his supervisors, Dale Oldham and Robert Zachary,

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993

and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging that he was reassigned from Shirey Bay to

Black River in retaliation for filing a previous racial discrimination grievance and that

he was subjected to a hostile work environment.

At trial, the district court1

 excluded certain evidence that Jones sought to present

to the jury concerning conduct within the AGFC but outside of the region where Jones

worked. The district court did not allow AGFC employees to testify about hearing

isolated, racial statements because the statements did not involve Jones’s work region

or any decision made regarding Jones, Jones was not present when the statements

were made, and the employees were unable to recollect either who spoke the

statements or when exactly they heard the statements. The district court also excluded

evidence of racial animus that occurred within the general community surrounding

Black River but not involving the AGFC, including evidence that two mayors of

towns near Black River used the word “nigger” on separate occasions, that a woman

told Jones an African-American family was forced to leave the area surrounding Black

River, and that a hate crime against an African-American occurred prior to trial. The

district court did permit Jones to submit other evidence of alleged discriminatory

conduct within the AGFC, including evidence that Zachary and Oldham used the word

“nigger” in talking with or referring to Jones and that other employees used the word

“nigger.”

Appellate Case: 06-2577 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/26/2007 Entry ID: 3322666
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The jury pool selected for this trial did not contain any African-Americans, and

the resulting jury consisted of twelve Caucasians. During trial, the district court

excused one juror after she had a fainting spell. Before the juror fainted, Jones’s

attorney had sought a hearing to determine whether that juror had spoken with

Zachary’s wife at trial. Since the juror was excused before the hearing, the district

court determined that the issue was moot and the hearing unnecessary. Jones’s

attorney did not object to the district court’s determination. The remaining eleven

jurors rejected Jones’s claims and returned a verdict in favor of the AGFC, Oldham

and Zachary. Jones then filed a motion for a new trial which the district court denied.

On appeal, Jones argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for

a new trial. “We review a district court’s denial of a motion for new trial with great

deference, reversing only if the district court clearly abused its discretion.” Wilson v.

City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 2006). Jones’s arguments to this

court include both preserved and unpreserved issues. By lodging timely objections

during the trial, he has preserved his claims that the district court made incorrect

evidentiary rulings. However, after failing to object timely, Jones argues on appeal

that the jury pool and jury improperly lacked African-Americans, that the district court

erred in handling possible juror misconduct and that the district court failed to take

judicial notice that the community surrounding Black River was more racially hostile

than the community surrounding Shirey Bay. 

Jones argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence

of racially discriminatory statements made within the AGFC but outside of Jones’s

region and racially discriminatory conduct within the general community surrounding

Black River because the evidence was relevant to his claims of retaliation and hostile

work environment. “When a motion for new trial is based on rulings regarding the

admissibility of evidence, the district court will not be reversed absent a clear and

prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Wilson, 442 F.3d at 640-41 (quotation omitted). We

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Jones cites Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2004),

without any meaningful argument. We find that the evidence excluded in this case is

not of the same character and magnitude as the evidence deemed not to have been an

abuse of discretion for the district court to have admitted in Williams.

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“will grant a new trial on the basis of incorrect [evidentiary] rulings only if a different

outcome is likely.” Jones v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 723, 735 (8th Cir. 2003).

We conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in

excluding either the evidence of statements within the AGFC but outside of the region

where Jones worked or the evidence concerning statements within the general

community surrounding Black River because any probative value of the excluded

evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R.

Evid. 403; Jones, 341 F.3d at 735 (finding that any probative value of evidence that

“may have been remotely relevant” was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial

effect). The excluded evidence concerned vague, isolated incidents that occurred over

an imprecise time frame, not involving Jones’s workplace or any decision made

regarding Jones. Even if this evidence were “remotely relevant” to Jones’s claims,

any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

and confusion of the issues likely to result from the vagueness of the proffered

evidence and the lack of its connection to Jones or his supervisors.

Furthermore, since the jury heard Jones’s remaining evidence, including the

clearly relevant evidence that Oldham, Zachary and other AGFC employees used the

word “nigger,” and nonetheless rejected Jones’s claims, we find that a different

outcome resulting from a new trial including this vague and, at best, remotely relevant

evidence is unlikely. See Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dept. of Fire & Safety Servs., 327

F.3d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in excluding certain

evidence and, that even assuming error, the evidence would not have altered the

outcome of the jury verdict). Therefore, the district court did not clearly abuse its

discretion in excluding this evidence.2

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We review Jones’s remaining, unpreserved arguments for plain error. See

Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 75 F.3d 1298, 1304 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding

that a party failed to object timely to jury issues when he waited until the end of the

case to object); Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901, 917

(8th Cir. 2005). Under plain error review, Jones has the burden “to show an obvious

error affected [his] substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Diesel Mach., Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc.,

418 F.3d 820, 835 (8th Cir. 2005).

We find no plain error with respect to the jury pool and jury in this trial because

Jones does not provide any evidence or argument to support a finding of a systematic

exclusion of African-Americans in the jury selection process. See Roberson v. Hayti

Police Dept., 241 F.3d 992, 996-97 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that the absence of any

African-Americans in the jury pool without further evidence by the plaintiff was not

a systematic exclusion of African-Americans). 

We also find no plain error in the district court’s decision to excuse the juror,

who allegedly had contact with Zachary’s wife, because of her fainting spell. See

United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1402 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the

district court did not abuse its discretion because it had a legitimate basis for its

decision to dismiss an ill juror). Here, Jones does not dispute that the juror fainted.

Moreover, the record does not include any evidence that the juror talked with

Zachary’s wife or relayed any information to other jurors before the district court

excused her, and we refuse to speculate as to whether Jones could have developed

such evidence had he continued to press for a hearing. Without such evidence and

because the district court had a legitimate basis for its decision, we cannot find plain

error in the district court’s decision to excuse an ill juror.

Finally, we find no plain error in the district court’s failure to take judicial

notice that the area surrounding Black River was more racially hostile than the area

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surrounding Shirey Bay. Jones did not ask the district court to take judicial notice of

this fact during trial, and the district court itself noted in a post-trial order that “[t]he

facts surrounding this case come nowhere near the requirements of F.R.E. 201

[regarding judicial notice].” See Fed R. Evid. 201(b); Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d

874, 879 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that judicial notice is not appropriate when a fact can

only be determined by “evaluating the testimony and credibility of various

witnesses”). We agree and conclude that the district court did not plainly err in its

decision not to take judicial notice of this alleged fact.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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