Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01782/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01782-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROGER BONILLA MAYORGA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-1782 PHX SRB (JRI)

)

JOSEPH ARPAIO, ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

)

 Defendant. )

_________________________________)

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 9).

Background

Plaintiff, filed a pro se civil rights complaint (Doc.

1) on June 13, 2005, alleging violation of his civil rights by

Defendant while Plaintiff was detained at a Maricopa County

jail. On July 27, 2005, the Court ordered Defendant to answer

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment rights. Doc. 3.

 Defendant waived service and filed a motion to dismiss

on November 23, 2005. Doc. 9. Defendant asserts that the

complaint must be dismissed, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e,

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

by pursuing his claims through the Maricopa County jail

grievance process prior to filing his section 1983 suit. On

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December 7, 2005, Plaintiff was ordered to answer the motion to

dismiss. Doc. 10. Plaintiff was warned by the Court that his

failure to respond to Defendant’s motion within thirty days

could be deemed consent to the entry of judgment against

Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 7.2, United States District Court

for the District of Arizona Local Rules of Civil Procedure. On

January 9, 2006, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the

motion to dismiss within ten days of the date that order was

issued. Doc. 11. Plaintiff has not, as of the date of the

order, responded to Defendant’s motion to dismiss his complaint.

Discussion

A. Standard for granting a motion to dismiss

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must take the

factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Galbraith v.

County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002);

Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.

1996). Additionally, pro se complaints are held to a less

strict standard than those drafted by counsel. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976). It is not

appropriate to dismiss a pro se prisoner’s civil rights action

unless it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Id. See also Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119, 120 (9th

Cir. 1987).

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B. Exhaustion

Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) is governed by 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). This statute provides that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2003 & Supp. 2005). An inmate must exhaust

available remedies “irrespective of the forms of relief sought

and offered through administrative avenues.” Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 741, n.6 (2001). The exhaustion requirement

“applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they

involve general circumstances or particular episodes.” Porter

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

A plaintiff must fully exhaust his administrative

remedies before filing a section 1983 complaint. McKinney v.

Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002). To fully

exhaust a section 1983 claim, a prisoner must pursue his

grievance to the highest administrative level available to him.

See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 2003); Harper

v. Jenkin, 179 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999); Morgan v.

Maricopa County, 259 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990-91 & n.13 (D. Ariz.

2003).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense; establishing

exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is not a

pleading requirement or a jurisdictional prerequisite. See

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

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124 S. Ct. 50 (2003); Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 675 (2d Cir.

2004). Therefore, Defendant has “the burden of raising and

proving the absence of exhaustion.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is

treated as a matter in abatement and is properly raised in an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. Id. “In deciding a motion to

dismiss for a failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court

may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of

fact.” Id. at 1119-20. “If the district court concludes that

the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper

remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Id. at

1120.

It is Defendant’s burden to prove an absence of

exhaustion regarding Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant presents

evidence that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to filing his complaint. Doc. #9, Exh. 1.

Defendant also notes that Plaintiff admits in his complaint that

he did not exhaust his available administrative remedies with

regard to any of the claims stated in his complaint. 

Additionally, Rule 7.2, United States District Court

for the District of Arizona Local Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that a party’s failure to respond to a motion may, in

the Court’s discretion, be deemed a consent to the Court’s

granting of judgment in favor of the movant. See Brydges v.

Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1994). When the Court has

warned the non-moving part that their failure to respond “‘shall

constitute a consent’” to the granting of the motion, the Court

may properly exercise its discretion to a motion based on the

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non-moving party’s construed consent. Id. See also Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the

district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily

granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to a local

rule where the pro se plaintiff had time to respond to the

motion but failed to do so). 

Conclusion

Defendant has presented evidence to the Court that

administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff and that

Plaintiff did not pursue an administrative remedy with regard to

any of the claims stated in the complaint. Plaintiff makes no

response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s complaint must

be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to section 1997e because

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

regarding his claims prior to filing his section 1983 suit.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby

dismissed without prejudice. 

DATED this 10th day of February, 2006.

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