Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05103/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05103-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 12, 2001 Decided July 10, 2001

No. 00-5103

Louis Jackson, on behalf of himself and

others similarly situated, et al.,

Appellants

v.

District of Columbia, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv03276)

E. Desmond Hogan argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs were Jonathan L. Abram, William S. Haft

and Arthur B. Spitzer.

Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for appellee District of Columbia. With him on the

brief were Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, Charles L.

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Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Lutz Alexander

Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel.

Michael A. Humphreys, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee Bureau of Prisons. With him on the

brief were Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: Henderson, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Rastafarian and Sunni Muslim prisoners challenge a prison grooming policy that forbids beards

and long hair, arguing that the policy violates the Free

Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act. Although the district court found

that the prisoners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the

court went on to hold that the policy violated neither the

First Amendment nor the Religious Freedom Restoration

Act. The prisoners appeal, arguing that for statutory, procedural, and constitutional reasons, the exhaustion requirement

does not apply to them. Agreeing with the district court that

the prisoners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies,

we remand with instructions to vacate in part and dismiss the

complaint without prejudice.

I

The National Capital Revitalization and Government Improvement Act of 1997 requires the District of Columbia to

close the Lorton Correctional Complex by December 31, 2001.

D.C. Code s 24-1201(b). The Act instructs the District to

transfer its prisoners to facilities operated by the Federal

Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). Id. Because BOP has insufficient space to accommodate all D.C. prisoners, the District

contracted to transfer over 1000 prisoners to Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC") facilities. BOP also transferred an additional 900 District inmates in its custody to

VDOC prisons.

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On November 15, 1999, VDOC announced new grooming

standards for all inmates in its prisons. For male inmates,

the policy prohibits beards and goatees, requires hair to be

cut above the shirt collar, and bans hairstyles "such as braids,

plaits, dreadlocks, cornrows, ponytails, buns, mohawks, partially shaved heads, [or] designs cut into the hair." Inmate

Grooming Standards, Va. Dep't of Corr., Procedure No. DOP

864, at 2 (Nov. 15, 1999). The policy also imposes grooming

requirements on female prisoners, but permits their hair to

be shoulder-length. Penalties for violating the policy include

assignment to special housing; termination of most visitation,

telephone, and commissary privileges; and suspension from

work and other activities. Id. at 3. If on arrival a new

prisoner "refuses to cooperate, use of ... force/restraints is

authorized in order to bring the inmate into compliance with

grooming standards." Id.

Louis Jackson, Isadore Gartrell, Carl Wolfe, and Roddy

McDowell, appellants, are serving D.C. sentences at the

VDOC Sussex II prison in Waverly, Virginia. They brought

this action in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia on behalf of themselves and other D.C. prisoners,

principally Sunni Muslims and Rastafarians, who are housed

in Virginia facilities and who believe their religious faiths

forbid them from cutting their hair, shaving their beards, or

both. In their complaint, the prisoners alleged that the

grooming policy violates the Free Exercise Clause of the

First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration

Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. s 2000bb to 2000bb-4. RFRA

forbids the government from "substantially burden[ing] a

person's exercise of religion" unless the government can

"demonstrate[ ] that application of the burden to the person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest." Id. s 2000bb-1(b). Congress enacted RFRA to protect one of "the most treasured

birthrights of every American"--"the right to observe one's

faith, free from Government interference." S. Rep. No. 103-

111, at 4 (1993). Although the Supreme Court has declared

RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states, City of

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Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), we have assumed,

without deciding, that "RFRA applies to the federal government, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in ...

Boerne." Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366, 1368 (D.C. Cir.

1998); cf. Henderson v. Kennedy, No. 00-5070, slip op. at 5-6

(D.C. Cir. June 26, 2001). We shall continue that assumption

here.

The prisoners made two basic claims in the district court.

First, they contended that VDOC lacked a compelling interest

in the grooming policy and that the policy was not the least

restrictive means of achieving whatever interests VDOC had.

Alternatively, they argued that BOP and the District had a

less restrictive means of housing prisoners who believed that

the grooming policy required them to violate fundamental

religious tenets: transferring them to non-Virginia prison

facilities without such grooming policies.

On December 14, 1999, one day before the grooming policy's effective date, the district court issued a temporary

restraining order preventing the policy from being applied to

any District inmate with "sincerely held religious beliefs the

new grooming policy would compromise." Order Granting

T.R.O., Jackson v. District of Columbia, No. 99-03276

(D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1999). Shortly thereafter, BOP filed a

motion to intervene as a defendant, explaining that it has a

contract with VDOC to house former Lorton inmates now in

BOP's care. The district court granted BOP's motion, and

the prisoners filed an amended complaint to include BOP

prisoners in the class.

To comply with the TRO, BOP implemented a screening

procedure to identify prisoners' religious preferences before

assigning them to VDOC facilities. Sunni Muslim and Rastafarian prisoners were sent to facilities outside Virginia that

did not require them to cut their hair or shave their beards.

Following discovery and trial, the district court ruled that

the prisoners had failed to exhaust VDOC's grievance procedures and had thus not complied with the Prison Litigation

Reform Act's ("PLRA") requirement that "[n]o action ... be

brought with respect to prison conditions under ... any ...

Federal law[ ] by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

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other correctional facility until such administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted," 42 U.S.C. s 1997e(a). See

Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48, 63

(D.D.C. 2000). Explaining, however, that "considerable resources [had been] devoted to the presentation of evidence,"

and that appellate review was "certain," id. at 64, the court

went on to consider the merits of the case. Ruling against

the prisoners, the court concluded that although the prisoners' belief that they could not cut their hair was "heartfelt

and sincere," id. at 65, and although they had demonstrated

that the grooming policy "substantially burdens their exercise

of religion," id., the prison interests served by the policy were

compelling, and VDOC had no less restrictive alternatives, id.

at 66-69. The district court entered "judgment for defendants." Id. at 50. In doing so, the court "decline[d] to

evaluate" the issue raised by the prisoners' alternative claim:

"whether defendants have compelling interests in keeping

plaintiffs incarcerated in Virginia Corrections facilities." Id.

at 66.

The prisoners appeal, arguing that: (1) the PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not apply to them; (2) the district

court erred in failing to read an irreparable harm exception

into the exhaustion requirement; and (3) in any event, two

class members successfully exhausted available administrative

remedies. On the merits, they press only their alternative

argument that BOP and the District could assign them to

prisons without grooming policies, as BOP did to comply with

the TRO.

II

In support of their claim that the district court erred in

applying the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to them, the

prisoners argue that the PLRA does not apply to RFRA

actions and that the District and BOP waived the exhaustion

defense by failing to include it in their answers. We address

each argument in turn.

The prisoners' first argument rests on two provisions of

RFRA. Entitled "Judicial relief," one provision establishes

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that "[s]tanding to assert a claim or defense under this

section shall be governed by the general rules of standing

under Article III of the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. s 2000bb1(c). The second provision, entitled "Rule of construction,"

states that "[f]ederal statutory law adopted after November

16, 1993 is subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly

excludes such application by reference to this chapter." Id.

s 2000bb-3(b). According to the prisoners, these two provisions allow them to pursue their RFRA action without first

complying with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. They

argue that because nothing in the PLRA--a "Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993"--"explicitly excludes ... application" of RFRA's "Judicial relief" provision,

courts may condition the filing of RFRA actions on nothing

more than "the general rules of standing under Article III of

the Constitution."

We disagree. The prisoners read the statute as if it said

"Article III standing is the only requirement for RFRA

suits." The statute actually says only that "[s]tanding ...

shall be governed by the general rules of standing under

Article III of the Constitution." Id. s 2000bb-1(c) (emphasis

added). Describing the purpose of the "Judicial relief" provision, the Senate Report on the bill refers only to standing,

saying nothing at all about other requirements for suit.

S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 13 ("Ordinary article III rules are to

be applied in determining whether a party has standing to

bring a claim pursuant to this act."). If the prisoners'

reading of the statute were correct, courts would have to

disregard not only the PLRA exhaustion requirement, but

also such basic matters as personal jurisdiction, venue, and

statutes of limitations. Neither the statute nor its legislative

history suggests that Congress intended such an astonishing

result.

The prisoners argue that because all federal court plaintiffs

must satisfy Article III standing, see Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490, 498 (1975), limiting the "Judicial relief" section to

standing would leave the section "utterly without effect[,]

contravening an elementary principle of statutory construction." Appellants' Reply Br. at 3 (internal quotation omitted).

Again, we disagree. The Senate Report makes clear that

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Congress included the provision in order to emphasize that

RFRA should not "have [the] unintended consequence[ ]" of

"unsettl[ing]" standing law. S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 12-13.

"The committee intends that [standing] issues continue to be

resolved under Article III standing rules and establishment

clause jurisprudence. The Act would not provide a basis for

standing in situations where standing to bring a free exercise

claim is absent." Id. at 13 (emphasis added). Although it

may be unusual for Congress to include language in a statute

merely to emphasize its intention not to change a particular

aspect of existing law, that appears to be precisely what

Congress did here.

The prisoners' second argument is that even if the PLRA's

exhaustion requirement applies to RFRA suits, BOP and the

District waived the defense by failing to include it in their

answers to the original complaint. BOP did not raise its

exhaustion defense until it answered the first amended complaint; the District raised the defense in a "notice" that it was

joining BOP's exhaustion defense. See Jackson, 89 F. Supp.

2d at 58 n.46. Treating the District's notice as a motion to

amend its answer to plaintiffs' first amended complaint, the

district court concluded that granting the motion would not

prejudice the prisoners because they had learned of the

defense two weeks earlier when BOP identified two witnesses

who would testify on the subject of exhaustion. Id.

Challenging the district court's decision, the prisoners cite

Harris v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339

(D.C. Cir. 1997), for the principle that "affirmative defenses

must be raised in a responsive pleading." Id. at 341. But

Harris also emphasizes that district courts retain discretion

to grant leave to amend pleadings to include new defenses, id.

at 344-45, just as the district court did here. We review

district court decisions regarding amendments of pleadings

for abuse of discretion, see Material Supply Int'l, Inc. v.

Sunmatch Indus. Co., 146 F.3d 983, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

recognizing that leave to amend should be "freely given when

justice so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), absent "any apparent or declared reason--such as undue delay, bad faith[,] ...

[or] undue prejudice to the opposing party," Foman v. Davis,

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371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Not until their reply brief did the

prisoners argue that any such reason existed in this case.

This argument came too late. See Corson & Gruman Co. v.

NLRB, 899 F.2d 47, 50 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("We require

petitioners and appellants to raise all of their arguments in

the opening brief to prevent 'sandbagging' of appellees and

respondents and to provide opposing counsel the chance to

respond.").

III

The prisoners argue that the district court erred by refusing to recognize an irreparable injury exception to the

PLRA's exhaustion requirement. "Under the district court's

interpretation [that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement lacks

an irreparable harm exception], the PLRA prevents a prisoner who is subject to daily torture from seeking an injunction

until he exhausts a six-month (or longer) prison grievance

procedure." Appellants' Opening Br. at 15 n.3. Such an

exception is necessary, the prisoners argue, "in order to avoid

... serious constitutional questions." Id.

We think an irreparable injury exception is unnecessary.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that federal courts

possess a "traditional power to issue injunctions to preserve

the status quo while administrative proceedings are in progress and prevent impairment of the effective exercise of

appellate jurisdiction." FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597,

604 (1966). As we explained in Wagner v. Taylor, "[i]f [a]

court may eventually have jurisdiction of the substantive

claim, the court's incidental equitable jurisdiction, despite the

agency's primary jurisdiction, gives the court authority to

impose a temporary restraint in order to preserve the status

quo pending ripening of the claim for judicial review." 836

F.2d 566, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Wagner, we found that

although Title VII complainants must ordinarily exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief, id. at 570

n.34, because Title VII does not expressly foreclose courts'

"inherent equitable power to issue ... injunctions to preserve

the status quo," id. at 572, district courts retain jurisdiction to

grant interim injunctive relief where plaintiffs face either

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irreparable injury or imminent retaliation. Id. at 574-76; see

also Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. King, 961 F.2d 240

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (responding to the union's argument that it

would suffer irreparable injury to its First Amendment rights

during the time that the Federal Labor Relations Authority

considered its unfair labor practice claim by ordering the

district court to hold the case in abeyance for three months or

until the FLRA decided the union's claim, and instructing the

district court, in order to prevent the union from suffering

irreparable injury, to hear the claim at the end of that period

if the FLRA had not acted on the claim); cf. Sampson v.

Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 84 (1974) (explaining that a showing of

irreparable injury would be necessary to justify preliminary

injunctive relief staying agency action during the agency's

appeals process).

Like Title VII, the PLRA contains nothing expressly foreclosing courts from exercising their traditional equitable power to issue injunctions to prevent irreparable injury pending

exhaustion of administrative remedies. The district court

therefore had no need to recognize an irreparable injury

exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement; the court

had inherent power to protect the prisoners while they exhausted prison grievance procedures. Of course, the district

court had no need to exercise that authority in this case, for

by the time BOP raised its exhaustion defense, the court had

issued a temporary restraining order that, by agreement of

the parties, remained in effect until the court ruled on the

merits.

IV

This brings us to the question of whether the prisoners

exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the

PLRA. VDOC's grievance procedures have four stages, but

only the first two relate to this case. A prisoner begins by

filing an informal complaint with prison staff. The staff must

respond in writing within fifteen days. If unsatisfied with the

response, the prisoner may file a Level I formal grievance

within thirty days of the occurrence, to which the prison must

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respond within thirty days (or sixty days if the prison issues a

"continuance"). Inmates are notified of the grievance procedures "during orientation at all reception centers and all

parole violator units," and copies are made available "in

locations accessible to both employees and inmates." Inmate

Grievance Procedure, Va. Dep't of Corr., Procedure No. DOP

866, at 3-4 (Nov. 20, 1998).

The prisoners argue that class members Louis Jackson and

Carl Wolfe exhausted their administrative remedies. See

Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

(explaining that each individual plaintiff in a class-action suit

need not have pursued the available administrative remedies

"if at least one member of the plaintiff class has met the filing

prerequisite"). Jackson filed an informal complaint on December 1, 1999, but never received a response. Relying on

their understanding that the response to an informal complaint must be attached to a Level I grievance, the prisoners

argue that Jackson could not file a Level I formal grievance

since he had no response to attach. According to the district

court, however, even if the filing of an informal complaint to

which prison officials fail to respond satisfies the PLRA,

Jackson's filing did not. As the district court observed,

because prison officials have fifteen days to respond to an

informal complaint, Jackson's December 1 complaint was still

pending when the prisoners filed suit on December 10, 1999.

See Jackson, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60.

In so ruling, the district court rejected the prisoners'

argument that the PLRA permits suit to be filed so long as

administrative remedies are exhausted before trial. "[T]he

statute means what it plainly says," the district court held;

"prisoners may only file actions under federal law concerning

their conditions of confinement after they have exhausted

their prison's administrative remedies." Id. at 59. We agree,

as do three other circuits. See Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d

641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999); Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d

532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263,

1265 (10th Cir. 1997). But see Williams v. Norris, 176 F.3d

1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that it is sufficient for

prisoners to exhaust their remedies before trial). The PLRA

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says that no action shall be "brought ... until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted," not that no

action shall be tried until administrative remedies are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. s 1997e(a) (emphasis added).

The prisoners next argue that Jackson satisfied their

PLRA exhaustion obligation because, by the date they filed

their amended complaint (January 18, 2000), the deadline for

the prison's response to Jackson's informal complaint had

passed. But if the PLRA meant only that prisoners had to

exhaust administrative remedies before filing an amended

complaint, they would have no incentive to exhaust those

remedies prior to filing suit. The prisoners could complete

the grievance process while suit was pending, avoiding dismissal by later amending their complaint. This would defeat

the very purpose of the PLRA exhaustion requirement: relieving courts of the burden of lawsuits filed before prison

officials have had an opportunity to resolve prisoner grievances on their own. See Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321,

1326 n.11 (11th Cir. 1998).

Class member Carl Wolfe's argument that he exhausted his

administrative remedies rests on his claim that he complained

about the grooming policy to three prison officials, one of

whom--the warden--told him "to file in the court." Trial Tr.

2/29/2000 at 62. Relying on Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190

(11th Cir. 1999), the prisoners argue that "[t]he PLRA's

exhaustion requirement does not require a prisoner to pursue

an administrative procedure that prison officials have expressly told him is not available to cure the inmate's complaint." Appellants' Opening Br. at 25.

In Miller, prison officials moved to dismiss a prisoner's

complaint for failure to comply with the PLRA's exhaustion

requirement because the prisoner did not appeal following the

rejection of his grievance. 196 F.3d at 1192, 1194. Yet the

letter the prisoner received from the grievance clerk denying

his grievance stated that "[w]hen any grievance is terminated

at the institutional level you do not have the right to appeal.

The above listed grievance[ ] is closed." Id. at 1192. The

Eleventh Circuit found that this letter "unambiguously told

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[the prisoner] that an appeal was futile, even prohibited." Id.

at 1194. Observing that "appealing might be treated as

insubordination and there might be harmful consequences for

disobeying the rules," the court concluded that "[the prisoner]

was not required, in order to exhaust his administrative

remedies, to file an appeal after being told unequivocally that

appeal of an institutional level denial was precluded." Id.

This case differs from Miller in two significant respects.

To begin with, the record in this case contains no "unambiguous" or "unequivocal" (the Eleventh Circuit's words) statement that Wolfe had exhausted the prison's grievance procedures. Indeed, we find nothing in the record to support the

prisoners' claim that Wolfe was told "that he had no recourse

through VDOC's grievance process," or that Wolfe's "only

option for challenging the policy was to file in court." Appellants' Opening Br. at 25. The warden never even mentioned

the grievance procedures; he said only "there [was] nothing

he [could] do" and that Wolfe had to "file in the court," Trial

Tr. 2/29/2000 at 62. And under the PLRA, a prisoner must

exhaust his administrative remedies before going to court.

Moreover, as we read Wolfe's entire description of the warden's statement, which the prisoners fail to quote in their

brief, the warden seems to have meant only that Wolfe had to

file suit if he wanted a transfer to a District facility:

I asked him first if he could get me transferred back to

the District of Columbia being that I'm a Rastafarian and

this policy is totally against Rastafarian as far as cutting

my hair, shaving my face. I explained my whole religious policy to him. He said there is nothing he can do

for me. The only thing I can do, I got to file in the

court.

Id. at 62-63.

Second, the prisoners in this case never allege that Wolfe

risked discipline if he pursued a grievance. Quite to the

contrary, despite the warden's statement that Wolfe had "to

file in the court," Wolfe filed an informal complaint with his

unit manager, and, after receiving a negative response, filed a

Level I formal grievance. Id. at 66; Trial Tr. 3/1/2000 at 300.

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When that grievance was rejected, he filed a Level II appeal.

He was still waiting for a response when trial in the district

court began. Trial Tr. 2/29/2000 at 66-67.

It is thus clear from the record that Wolfe had not exhausted his administrative remedies at the time of trial, let alone

when the prisoners filed their complaint. Mindful of the

Supreme Court's recent statement that Congress intended

the PLRA to broaden the exhaustion requirement for prisoner suits, see Booth v. Churner, No. 99-1964, 2001 WL 567712,

at *5 (U.S. May 29, 2001), we agree with the district court

that Wolfe failed to comply with the PLRA.

V

Because the prisoners failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies, the district court should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice, allowing the prisoners to refile once

they have completed the VDOC grievance procedures. See

Martini v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1348

(D.C. Cir. 1999). Because the merits of the RFRA claim have

been fully briefed in this appeal, however, and because the

district court might have to consider this claim on remand, we

close with one observation. See id. at 1349 (commenting on

the merits of one of the issues on appeal despite this court's

dismissal of the appellant's complaint because of the possibility that "this issue [would] arise again in a new trial"). In

evaluating the merits of the prisoners' RFRA claim, the

district court expressly "decline[d]" to consider the issue

presented by the prisoners' alternative contention, the one

they appeal here. Therefore, should the prisoners refile after

exhausting their administrative remedies, the district court

will need to consider whether BOP and the District can

demonstrate that alternative placement in non-Virginia prisons without grooming policies is infeasible. See, e.g., Jolly v.

Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 479 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring a prison

sued under RFRA to prove that its treatment of the plaintiff

was "the least restrictive means to further [its] asserted

compelling interest").

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The portions of the district court decision regarding the

merits (Sections IIE, IIF, and III) are vacated, and this

matter is remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint

without prejudice.

So ordered.

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