Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55971/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55971-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STARLA ROLLINS, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF SAN

BERNARDINO, erroneously sued

as Dignity Health, DBA Dignity

Health Catholic Healthcare

West,

Defendant,

and

SERVICE EMPLOYEES

INTERNATIONAL UNION-UNITED

HEALTHCARE WORKERS WEST

(SEIU-UHW), a California

union,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-55971

D.C. No.

5:13-cv-01312-R-OP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Argued May 2, 2016

Submitted October 26, 2016

Pasadena, California

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2 ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW

Filed October 26, 2016

Before: William A. Fletcher, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit

Judges, and Ivan L.R. Lemelle,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher;

Concurrence by Judge Lemelle

SUMMARY**

Labor Law

The panel reversed the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to defendant union on a claim under

§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

During a reduction in force, the plaintiff was laid off from

her position as a billing coordinator at a hospital. To prevail

on her claim against the union in this hybrid fair

representation/§ 301 suit, the plaintiff was required to show

both that the hospital breached a collective bargaining

agreement (“CBA”) and that the union breached its duty of

fair representation by failing to pursue her grievance

regarding the hospital’s failure to allow her to “bump” back

to her prior ward clerk position, rather than be laid off. The

plaintiff asserted that this failure violated both a 2008 CBA

* The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW 3

and a 2007 side agreement, known as the Seniority

Agreement, which had been negotiated on her behalf by a

union representative.

The panel held that the Seniority Agreement was neither

inadmissible under the parol evidence rule nor superseded by

the 2008 CBA. The panel concluded that the Seniority

Agreement did not conflict with either the 2008 CBA or a

2012 memorandumof understanding through which the union

and the hospital implemented the reduction in force. The

panel held that the hospital breached both the Seniority

Agreement and the CBA.

The panel held that the plaintiff also established a triable

issue whether the union breached its duty of fair

representation by processing her grievance in a perfunctory

manner. The plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence that the

union never seriously considered her rights under the

SeniorityAgreement; improperlylumped her with other, nonsimilarly situated employees; and provided factually

contested reasons for rejecting her grievance.

The panel remanded the case for further proceedings.

Concurring, District Judge Lemelle wrote that in addition

to the question whether the union breached its duty of fair

representation, the question whether the SeniorityAgreement

remained in effect after the negotiation of the CBA should

also be left to the jury.

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4 ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW

COUNSEL

Douglas N. Silverstein (argued) and Michael Gregory Jacob,

Kesluk Silverstein & Jacob P.C., Los Angeles, California;

Janet Gusdorff, Gusdorff Law P.C., Westlake Village,

California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Monica Guizar (argued), Jacob J. White, and Bruce A.

Harland, Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Starla Rollins appeals the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant SEIUUHW, Rollins’s former union, on Rollins’s § 301 claim under

the Labor Management Relations Act. We agree with Rollins

that summary judgment was improperly granted, reverse the

district court’s order, and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this decision.

I. Background

Plaintiff Rollins worked for the Community Hospital of

San Bernardino (“Hospital”) for over twenty years. In 2002,

Rollins became a member of the Hospital’s union, Defendant

SEIU-UHW (“Union”). Rollins was active in the Union,

serving as a member of the bargaining team and as a union

steward.

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ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW 5

In 2007, Rollins was working as a “Ward Clerk” for the

Hospital when she was offered a promotion to become the

Maternal Child Health (“MCH”) BillingCoordinator. Rollins

was worried that, if she switched jobs and accepted the

position, she would lose the seniority she had accrued. 

Rollins therefore had a union representative negotiate a side

agreement (the “Seniority Agreement”) with the Hospital. 

The 2007 SeniorityAgreement provided that, in the event that

the MCH Billing Coordinator position was eliminated

pursuant to a reduction in force (“RIF”), Rollins would be

permitted to “bump” back to her old position as a Ward

Clerk. The Seniority Agreement was memorialized in emails

between the Hospital’s Director of Human Resources,

Elizabeth Sanchez, and Union Representative Jill King.

In 2008, the Hospital and Union agreed to a new

Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). Negotiations for

the 2008 CBA were already underway when Sanchez, acting

for the hospital, and King, acting for Rollins, entered into the

Seniority Agreement. Article 3 of the 2008 CBA provided: 

“No employee shall suffer any reduction in wages, benefits or

other terms and conditions of employment, economic or

otherwise, as a result of coverage under this Agreement.” 

The CBA provided, further, that “[u]pon mutual agreement,

the Union and the Employer may agree to an alternative

arrangement regarding reduction in force.”

In 2012, the Hospital implemented a reduction in force. 

The Hospital and the Union entered into a “Memorandum of

Understanding” (“MOU”) in order to implement this

reduction. The 2012 MOU stated that several positions,

including the MCH Billing Coordinator position, were being

eliminated pursuant to the RIF. The MOU provided several

rights to affected employees, including severance, training

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6 ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW

opportunities, and an opportunity to bid for other open

positions at the Hospital. Importantly for purposes of this

case, the MOU neither prohibited “bumping” nor eliminated

the “Ward Clerk” position to which Rollins was allowed to

“bump” back pursuant to the Seniority Agreement.

In October 2012, Rollins was informed that she was being

laid off under the RIF. Rollins raised with the Union her

2007 Seniority Agreement and right to “bump” back to her

old Ward Clerk position. Union Representative Susan

(Trockel) Lucio responded “that the email was not an

enforceable agreement and that the Union could not rely on

the email to challenge the reduction in force.” Rollins was

then terminated without being allowed to “bump” back to her

old position. A subsequent class action grievance objecting

to the RIF, submitted on behalf of Rollins and several other

employees, was rejected by the Union.

Rollins sued both the Hospital and the Union under § 301

of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185. 

Rollins alleged that the Hospital’s failure to allow her to

“bump” back to her prior Ward Clerk position violated the

2007 Seniority Agreement and the 2008 CBA. She also

contended that the Union breached its duty of fair

representation by failing to pursue her grievance on this issue. 

Rollins subsequently settled her suit against the Hospital.

The district court granted summary judgment to the

Union. The court concluded that the 2007 Seniority

Agreement had once been an enforceable agreement. It

nonetheless granted summaryjudgment to the Union, holding

that the agreement was no longer enforceable. According to

the district court, the Security Agreement either was

inadmissible under the parol evidence rule or was superseded

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ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW 7

by the 2008 CBA. Alternatively, the district court held

summary judgment appropriate because “the Union did not

breach its duty of fair representation.” Rollins appeals.

II. Discussion

Rollins has brought a “hybrid fair representation/ § 301

suit” against the Union. Bliesner v. Comm’n Workers of Am.,

464 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 2006); see generally 29 U.S.C.

§ 185. A § 301 claim formally “comprises two causes of

action”: (1) a cause of action against the employer for breach

of the collective bargaining agreement, and (2) a suit against

the union for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation. 

DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164

(1983). A § 301 claim may be brought “against the union, the

employer, or both.” Bliesner, 464 F.3d at 913. This appeal

involves only Rollins’s claim against the Union, as the

Hospital has already settled. To prevail Rollins must show

both that (1) the Hospital breached the CBA, and (2) the

Union breached its duty of fair representation. See

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164–65.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. We construe the disputed facts in favor of Rollins,

the nonmoving party. Bliesner, 464 F.3d at 913; Frost v.

Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). We conclude

that the Seniority Agreement is consistent with the CBA and

the MOU, that the Hospital has breached the Seniority

Agreement and the CBA, and that triable issues of fact exist

as to whether the Union breached its duty of fair

representation.

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8 ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW

A. Hospital’s Breach of the Seniority Agreement and the

CBA

To decide whether the Hospital breached a duty it owed

to Rollins, we analyze the interaction of three different

documents: (1) the 2007 Seniority Agreement granting

Rollins the right to “bump” back to her old position as Ward

Clerk, (2) the 2008 CBA between the Hospital and the Union,

and (3) the 2012 MOU implementing the RIF.

The parties agree that the Hospital did not permit Rollins

to “bump” back to her previous Ward Clerk position. The

parties also agree that the Seniority Agreement was, at one

point, a valid and enforceable agreement. They dispute only

whether the Seniority Agreement continued to be valid and

enforceable after the adoption of the 2008 CBA. The Union

argues that the Seniority Agreement (1) is inadmissible under

the parol evidence rule or (2) was superseded by the 2008

CBA. We disagree.

To prevail on either argument, the Union must show that

the Seniority Agreement conflicts with the 2008 CBA or the

2012 MOU. See Pace v. Honolulu Disposal Serv., Inc.,

227 F.3d 1150, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the parol

evidence rule “operates to bar extrinsic evidence of an

agreement inconsistent with an unambiguous writing”

(emphasis added)); Espinal v. Nw. Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452,

1458–59 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n individual contract that

conflicts with a CBA must be superseded by that CBA.”

(emphasis added)); Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

931 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1991). The Seniority Agreement

conflicts with neither.

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ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW 9

First, the Seniority Agreement does not conflict with the

2008 CBA. Indeed, the CBA contemplates and approves of

side agreements dealing with RIFs. Article 14, Section E, of

theCBAspecificallyprovides that “[u]pon mutual agreement,

the Union and the Employer may agree to an alternative

arrangement regarding reduction in force.” The Seniority

Agreement is such an “alternative arrangement regarding

reduction in force,” providing that Rollins will be “allow[ed]

. . . to bump into the Ward Clerk position in the MCH cluster

in the event of a RIF.”

Second, the Seniority Agreement does not conflict with

the 2012 MOU. The MOU states that, pursuant to a RIF, the

“Billing Coordinator” position in the Maternal Child Health

Department was eliminated. Rather than conflicting with the

MOU, the Seniority Agreement contemplates the possibility

of such an MOU. That is, the Seniority Agreement

contemplates the possibility of the MCH Billing Coordinator

position being eliminated in a RIF, and it provides what

should happen in that event. The Seniority Agreement

specificallyprovides that “[i]n [the] event this position [MCH

Billing Coordinator] is eliminated it will be able [to] bump to

a Ward Clerk (Clerk II) in the MCH Cluster.” Far from being

inconsistent with the Seniority Agreement, the MOU is the

condition precedent (elimination of the MCH Billing

Coordinator position) that triggers the operation of the

Seniority Agreement.

Finally, the Union also appears to argue that Rollins

cannot prevail because, even if she can show a breach of the

SeniorityAgreement, she has not shown a breach of the CBA. 

Rollins has shown a breach of both. The Labor Management

Relations Act applies broadly to “contracts between an

employer and a labor organization representing employees,”

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10 ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW

not exclusively to collective bargaining agreements. 

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Seniority Agreement falls within

§ 185(a) as a contract negotiated between the Hospital (an

employer) and the Union (a labor organization). The

Seniority Agreement is also a part of the CBA. See

Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d

1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (en

banc) (“[A] collective bargaining agreement is not limited

solely to the specific provisions of the basic labor contract

formally executed by the parties, but it may also include,

among other things, written side agreements and oral

understandings entered into by the parties to the collective

bargaining relationship.”).

B. Union’s Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation

While Rollins has demonstrated a violation of a

“contract[] between an employer and a labor organization

representing employees,” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), her § 301 claim

against the Union can prevail only if she also shows a “breach

of the union’s duty of fair representation.” DelCostello,

462 U.S. at 164; see Bliesner, 464 F.3d at 913–14. “A union

breaches its duty of fair representation when its ‘conduct

toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is

arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.’” Beck v. United

Food &Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874,

879 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190

(1967)). Rollins contends that the Union’s handling of her

Seniority Agreement grievance was “arbitrary” because it

failed to investigate adequately. “A union acts ‘arbitrarily’

when it simply ignores a meritorious grievance or handles it

in a perfunctory manner.” Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d

1244, 1253–54 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191). 

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ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW 11

In order to avoid breaching the duty of fair representation, a

Union must “conduct a ‘minimal investigation’ of a grievance

that is brought to its attention.” Id. at 1254 (citing Tenorio v.

NLRB, 680 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Rollins has submitted enough evidence that the Union

processed her grievance “in a perfunctory manner” to allow

her to survive the Union’s motion for summary judgment. 

Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1254. Considering the evidence in the

light most favorable to Rollins, we reach this conclusion for

three reasons.

First, the Union never seriously considered Rollins’s

rights under the Seniority Agreement. A class action

grievance was filed by Union Representative Ozier on behalf

of Rollins and several other Hospital employees, but it was a

general challenge to the RIF. It did not specifically challenge

the Hospital’s failure to honor Rollins’s SeniorityAgreement. 

The Union Appeal Panel, the appellate body that reviewed the

denial of the class action grievance, does not appear to have

“deliberated” the Security Agreement. Cf. Slevira v. Western

Sugar Co., 200 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2000). The record

suggests that the documents sent to the panel did not include

the Seniority Agreement. Rollins was present at the Union

Appeal Panel’s hearing, but she stated that she did not present

the Security Agreement or make any arguments related to it. 

Although Ozier testified in her deposition that she thought the

Seniority Agreement was provided to the panel, she stated

that she could not recall for sure.

Second, the Union improperly lumped Rollins with other,

non-similarly situated employees. Because Rollins was the

beneficiary of a Seniority Agreement providing her an

additional right (the right to “bump” back to her old position),

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12 ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW

she was differently situated from other employees terminated

during the RIF. The class action grievance does not appear

to have raised the issue of Rollins’s Seniority Agreement. 

We have previously recognized that a union has “acted

arbitrarily where it failed to . . . consider individually the

grievances of particular employees where the factual and

legal differences among them were significant.” Peterson,

771 F.2d at 1254 (citing Gregg v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters &

Helpers Union Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir.

1983)).

Third, the Union provided factually contested reasons for

rejectingRollins’s grievance. Although we will “not question

whether the [Union’s] reasoning” for rejecting a grievance

“was faulty or not,” Peters v. Burlington N. R. Co., 931 F.2d

534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990), when a grievance is “important and

meritorious” a union must provide a “more substantial [ ]

reason” for abandoning it. Gregg, 699 F.2d at 1016 (noting

that the “merits of the grievance” are “relevant to the

sufficiency of the union’s representation”); see also Peters,

931 F.2d at 540 (noting that, when evaluating whether a

union acted arbitrarily, a court must “evaluate the strength of

the employee’s grievance”). As explained above, Rollins has

shown a breach of the Seniority Agreement and the CBA by

the Hospital, thereby demonstrating that she had an important

and meritorious grievance. The Union therefore needed to

provide a “more substantial” reason for failing to pursue her

claim.

Union Representative Lucio stated during an October

2012 meeting that the Seniority Agreement “was not an

enforceable agreement.” Lucio, however, did not explain

why she believed that this was so. The Union’s Director of

Representational Excellence, Marcus Hatcher, claimed to

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ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW 13

have reviewed the Seniority Agreement. But he asserted that

the Seniority Agreement was “not relevant to the MOU” and

unenforceable because “it can’t supersede a contract.” There

are two problems with Hatcher’s reasoning. First, as

explained above, the Seniority Agreement was neither

inconsistent with, nor superseded by, the 2008 CBA. See

Espinal, 90 F.3d at 1458–59; Melanson, 931 F.2d at 561. 

Second, Hatcher’s statement conflicts with the Union’s

longstanding practice of negotiating individual side

agreements for employees, consistent with the CBA. 

According to the Director of Human Resources Elizabeth

Sanchez (who negotiated the Seniority Agreement on behalf

of the Hospital), the Hospital “typically reached agreements

pertaining to single employees that were not expressly

referenced in the CBA.” An employee of the Union, John

Borsos, confirmed that the Union “regularly [entered into]

side letters or agreements that were not expressly referenced

in the CBA.” According to Borsos, it was the Union’s

“standard practice” to enter into these side agreements.

Finally, Ozier testified that, during a December 2012

meeting between the Hospital and Union, an unidentified

person told her that the Seniority Agreement emails

“appeared [to be] cut-and-paste and therefore [were] not

going to be acknowledged.” If the Union had doubts about

the authenticity of the emails that constituted the Seniority

Agreement, it could easily have investigated and determined

the truth of the matter. Union Representative Jill King, who

negotiated the agreement on Rollins’s behalf, stated that the

agreement was “appropriately maintained and preserved” in

the Union’s own files, and the Agreement was negotiated

using official Union and Hospital email addresses. Further,

the two people who negotiated the Seniority Agreement —

King and Sanchez — submitted declarations stating that, if

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14 ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW

asked, they would have confirmed the authenticity of the

Seniority Agreement. Although a union can legitimately

decline to pursue a grievance on authenticity grounds, the

Union’s decision to dismiss the Seniority Agreement on that

ground without any investigation, if proven at trial, would

support Rollins’s argument that the Union acted arbitrarily. 

See Tenorio, 680 F.2d at 601 (“To comply with its duty, a

union must conductsomeminimal investigation of grievances

brought to its attention.”).

We recognize that Rollins has the heavy burden of

showing that the Union’s handling of her claim under the

Seniority Agreement was arbitrary. See Beck, 506 F.3d at

879. Unions maintain “wide discretion to act in what they

perceive to be their members’ best interests,” and we “accord

substantial deference” to the Union’s decision not to pursue

Rollins’s Seniority Agreement claim. Peterson, 771 F.2d at

1253 (citation omitted). At the same time, there is ample

evidence to support a contrary conclusion — that the Union

acted improperly by (1) failing to put Rollins’s claim through

the Union’s own formal mechanisms for reviewing the merits

of grievances, (2) improperly including Rollins in a class

action grievance that did not raise her specific claim, and

(3) providing weak or invalid justifications for rejecting

Rollins’s claim. A jury that resolves the factual disputes in

Rollins’s favor could find that the Union’s treatment of

Rollins’s rights under the Seniority Agreement was

“perfunctory” at best, and therefore “arbitrary.” Peterson,

771 F.2d at 1254.

Conclusion

We conclude that Rollins presented sufficient evidence to

counter the Union’s motion for summary judgment on her

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ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW 15

hybrid claim. We conclude that Rollins has shown a

violation of the Security Agreement and the CBA. We also

conclude that, if Rollins’s evidence is believed, she has

shown a violation of the Union’s duty of fair representation. 

We therefore reverse the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to the Union and remand for further

proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

LEMELLE, Senior District Judge, concurring:

I concur with the majority opinion to reverse the decision

granting defendant’s motion for summary judgement.

Nonetheless, it is the role of the factfinder and not this Court

to decide the relationship between Rollins’s Seniority

Agreement (“SA”) and the Collective Bargaining Agreement

(“CBA”). The majority opinion only leaves to the jury the

question of whether the Union breached its duty of

representation. The factfinder should also be tasked with

determining whether or not the SA should remain in effect

after the negotiation of the CBA.

The relationship between the SA and CBA is less clear

than the majority conveys. A jury could determine whether

Rollins, who was present for negotiations of the CBA, would

be entitled to have the benefits of a previous agreement

considered at all without explicitly incorporating them in the

subsequent agreement. The SA should be interpreted through

the introduction of parol evidence, weighed by the jury in

order to resolve this factual inquiry.

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16 ROLLINS V. SEIU-UHW

When reviewing similar contracts in the past, this Court

has permitted the use of parol evidence. In Cappa, this Court

explained a CBA that was not fully integrated and recognized

the existence of other agreements, like the one at issue in the

present matter, was “far from being an unambiguous

instrument” and therefore allowed parol evidence of an oral

agreement to vary the terms of the CBA. Cappa v. Wiseman,

469 F. Supp. 437, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 957

(9th Cir. 1981) (“In light of these principles, and because the

Agreement is far from being an unambiguous instrument, the

terms of which are sufficient unto themselves, it is

appropriate to consider parol evidence to determine the

parties’ intent and interpretation of the contract terms.”).

Respectfully, this Court should not summarily decide the

relationship between the SA and the CBA. The parties who

entered into the SA and the CBA should be given a chance to

litigate the intended relationship between the two contracts

using parol evidence.

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