Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02829/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02829-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 49:40105 Warsaw Convention

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEYVAN NASSIRI MOTLAGH,

Plaintiff,

v.

QATAR AIRWAYS, Q.C.S.C, a 

foreign business corporation d/b/a 

QATAR AIRWAYS; and DOES 1-

25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-2829-BTM-AHG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION

[ECF NO. 4]

Before the Court is Defendant Qatar Airways, Q.C.S.C.’s (“Defendant”)

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on matters collateral 

to the merits of this case. (ECF No. 4.) “A jurisdictional challenge under Rule 

12(b)(1) may be made either on the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic 

evidence.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citations omitted). “Where the jurisdictional issue is separable from the 

merits of the case, the judge may consider the evidence presented with respect to 

the jurisdictional issue and rule on that issue, resolving factual disputes if 

necessary.” Thornhill Pub. Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th 

Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). “No presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] 

plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude 

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the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.”1 Id. 

(quotations, citations, and alterations omitted)). As always, the burden rests upon 

the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction to demonstrate its existence. Id.; see 

also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“It is to 

be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Federal courts’] limited jurisdiction, and 

the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” 

(internal citations omitted)).

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges she suffered injury when she was struck by 

a runaway food and beverage cart aboard a flight operated by Defendant traveling 

from Tehran, Iran to Los Angeles, California, United States via Doha, Qatar on 

January 1, 2017. (ECF No. 1, §§ 7-8.) Plaintiff asserts that this January 1, 2017 

flight was the inbound leg of roundtrip air travel from/to Los Angeles (with 

intervening stops in Doha and Tehran) and that she purchased her ticket while 

living in Oceanside, California from a travel agent located in Tehran. She argues 

that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this personal injury action under

28 U.S.C. § 1331 based upon the Montreal Convention,

2 which provides that a 

passenger injured on an international flight may bring an action for damages: (1) 

where the carrier has its “domicile”; (2) where the carrier has its “principal place of 

business”; (3) “where [the carrier] has a place of business through which the 

contract has been made”; (4) “at the place of destination”; or (5) “in the territory of 

 

1 “[W]here the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that 

the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going 

to the merits, the jurisdictional determination should await a determination of the 

relevant facts on either a motion going to the merits or at trial.” Augustine v. United 

States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).

2 i.e., Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 

Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106–45, 1999 WL 33292734 

(the “Montreal Convention”). 

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a State Party in which at the time of the accident the passenger has his or her 

principal and permanent residence” (so long as the carrier operates services

to/from – and conducts business from leased or owned premises in – such 

territory). Montreal Convention, art. 33(1)–(3).3 Plaintiff argues that this Court 

qualifies under the third, fourth, and fifth of the preceding categories with regard to 

this action.4

Defendant, however, asserts that Plaintiff’s January 1, 2017 flight was 

actually the outbound leg of roundtrip air travel from/to Tehran (with intervening 

 

3 “(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the 

territory of one of the States Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the 

carrier or of its principal place of business, or where it has a place of business 

through which the contract has been made or before the court at the place of 

destination. (2) In respect of damage resulting from the death or injury of a 

passenger, an action may be brought before one of the courts mentioned in 

paragraph 1 of this Article, or in the territory of a State Party in which at the time of 

the accident the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence and 

to or from which the carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers by air, 

either on its own aircraft, or on another carrier's aircraft pursuant to a commercial 

agreement, and in which that carrier conducts its business of carriage of 

passengers by air from premises leased or owned by the carrier itself or by another 

carrier with which it has a commercial agreement. (3) For the purposes of 

paragraph 2, (a) ‘commercial agreement’ means an agreement, other than an 

agency agreement, made between carriers and relating to the provision of their 

joint services for carriage of passengers by air; (b) ‘principal and permanent 

residence’ means the one fixed and permanent abode of the passenger at the time 

of the accident. The nationality of the passenger shall not be the determining factor 

in this regard.” Montreal Convention, art. 33(1)–(3).

4 Plaintiff does not argue that this Court qualifies under the carrier’s principal place 

of business or domicile/residence) categories of either the Montreal Convention or 

the Warsaw Convention. (See ECF No. 5, at 4-6; see also ECF No. 1, ¶ 2 

(Defendant “is a foreign business corporation organized under the laws of Doha, 

Qatar.”); ECF No. 4-3, at 3 (“[Defendant] is a corporation duly organized and 

existing under the laws of Qatar and maintains its principal place of business and 

headquarters in Doha, Qatar.”).)

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stops in Doha and Los Angeles). Further, Defendant asserts that Iran is not a party 

to the Montreal Convention.

5 Based thereon, Defendant argues that “the place of 

departure and the place of destination” for Plaintiff’s relevant roundtrip travel were

not situated within the territory of a party to the Montreal Convention and therefore

this action is governed by the Montreal Convention’s predecessor, the Warsaw 

Convention (as amended by the Hague Protocol).

6 See Montreal Convention, art. 

1(2);

7 see also Alemi v. Qatar Airways, 842 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 n.2 (D. Md. 2012) 

 

5 (ECF No.4-4, at 15-23; see also ECF No. 4-2, at 3.) Plaintiff does not contest 

Defendant’s assertion that Iran is not a party to the Montreal Convention. 

6 i.e., Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 

Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014, T.S. No. 876 (1934), note 

following 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (the “Warsaw Convention”), as amended by the 

Protocol to Amend the Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 

International Carriage by Air, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107–14, 1955 WL 45606 (the 

“Hague Protocol”). The United States, Iran, and Qatar are all parties to the Warsaw 

Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol. (See ECF No. 4-4, at 3-13; see 

also ECF No. 4-2, at 2-3.).)

7 “For the purposes of this Convention, the expression international carriage 

means any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the parties, the 

place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in 

the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two 

States Parties, or within the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed 

stopping place within the territory of another State, even if that State is not a State 

Party.” Montreal Convention, art. 1(2); see also id. at art. 1(1) (“This Convention 

applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by 

aircraft for reward.”); Warsaw Convention, art. 1(2) (“For the purposes of this 

Convention, the expression international carriage means any carriage in which, 

according to the agreement between the parties, the place of departure and the 

place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a 

transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting 

Parties or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed 

stopping place within the territory of another State, even if that State is not a High 

Contracting Party.”), as amended by Hague Protocol, art. 1(1). (See also ECF No. 

5, at 3 (“[T]he Montreal Convention applies to the following types of flights: (1) oneCase 3:18-cv-02829-BTM-AHG Document 11 Filed 04/03/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 11
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(concluding Montreal Convention inapplicable to roundtrip travel from/to Iran 

because Iran is not a signatory thereto); Sajajed v. Emirates Airlines, 2017 WL 

1150403, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2017) (same). Notably, the Warsaw Convention

provides that a passenger injured on an international flight may only bring an action 

for damages: (1) “where the carrier is ordinarily a resident”; (2) “where the carrier 

. . . has his principal place of business”; (3) “where the carrier . . . has an 

establishment by which the contract has been made”; or (4) “at the place of 

destination.” Warsaw Convention, art. 28(1);

8 Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia, 363 

F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[U]nless one of these enumerated places is within 

the United States, no American court can take cognizance of a suit predicated on 

the Warsaw Convention.” (citations omitted)). Defendant argues that this Court 

does not satisfy any of the foregoing categories and therefore lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over this action. See Warsaw Convention, art. 17, 24;9 El Al Israel 

 

way international flights when both countries (departure and destination) have 

ratified the Convention, and (2) roundtrip international travel that begins and ends 

in a country that has ratified the Convention.”).)

8 “An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the 

territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the Court having 

jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of 

business, or has an establishment by which the contract has been made or before 

the Court having jurisdiction at the place of destination.” Warsaw Convention, art. 

28(1).

9 Warsaw Convention, art. 17 (“The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in 

the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury 

suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained 

took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 

embarking or disembarking.”); id. at art. 24 (“(1) In the cases covered by articles 

18 and 19 any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject 

to the conditions and limits set out in this convention. (2) In the cases covered by 

article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply, without 

prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the right to bring 

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Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161, 175 (1999) (“[R]ecovery for 

a personal injury suffered on board an aircraft or in the course of any of the 

operations of embarking or disembarking [international air travel], if not allowed 

under the [Warsaw] Convention, is not available at all. . . . The treaty precludes 

passengers from bringing actions under local law when they cannot establish air 

carrier liability under the treaty.” (internal quotations, citations, and alterations 

omitted)).

Thus, the Court must determine the “place of departure” and “place of 

destination” for Plaintiff’s roundtrip air travel of which the subject January 1, 2017 

flight was a part. The parties agree that “[w]hen a passenger purchases a round 

trip ticket, the destination is the place where the trip began.” (ECF No. 5, at 5 

(citing Polanski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (S.D. Cal. 

2005)).) See also Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia, 363 F.3d 979, 991 (9th Cir. 

2004) (“[T]here can only be one ‘destination’ for Warsaw Convention purposes for 

each passenger and . . . intermediate stops on trips are to be construed as ‘agreed 

stopping places’ that do not disturb that final destination.” (citing In re Alleged Food 

Poisoning Incident, Mar., 1984, 770 F.2d 3, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1985)); Swaminathan v. 

Swiss Air Transp. Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 1992) (“When a person 

purchases a roundtrip ticket, there can be but one destination, where the trip 

originated. This is true even when the flight number, time, and date on a return 

trip are left open.” (citations omitted)). “[T]he intention of the parties as expressed 

in the contract of transportation, i.e., the ticket or other instrument, determines the 

 

suit and what are their respective rights.”); see also Montreal Convention, art. 29 

(“In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, 

however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or 

otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability 

as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are 

the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.”).

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final destination. Such contracts should be interpreted according to the objective, 

rather than the subjective, intent of the parties.” Sopcak v. N. Mountain Helicopter 

Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1995); Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 167 (2nd 

Cir. 1997) (“[T]he place of final destination for purposes of jurisdiction under the 

Warsaw Convention is the return city appearing on a round-trip ticket.”). See, e.g., 

Swaminathan, 962 F.2d at 388-89 (where passenger “purchased a roundtrip ticket 

. . . which routed him from Dakar, Senegal to Geneva to New York to Geneva and 

back to Dakar[,]” . . . New York City [was] merely an intermediate stopping point . 

. . [and] Dakar, Senegal [was] the final destination”); In re Alleged Food Poisoning 

Incident, 770 F.2d at 6 (where passenger “purchased one ticket, in two booklets, 

for a round-trip journey” that “listed Riyadh as both the origin and destination of the 

voyage[,] . . . the ultimate destination of th[e] journey was Riyadh, and not any 

point within the United States. The stops in the United States were no more than 

‘agreed stopping places.’” (quoting Warsaw Convention, art. 1(2)) (citations 

omitted)); Lee v. China Airlines Ltd., 669 F. Supp. 979, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (where 

“[t]he ticket . . . provided for transportation from Hong Kong to Taipei to San 

Francisco to Hong Kong. . . . the departure point and the destination . . . must 

officially be considered Hong Kong”); Sajajed v. Emirates Airlines, 2017 WL 

1150403, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2017) (where ticket “provided roundtrip 

transportation from and to Tehran, Iran, with intermediate stops in Dubai and San 

Francisco[,] . . . [the] destination under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention was 

Iran.” (citations omitted)). “This focus on the tickets for passenger air 

transportation does not, of course, necessarily mean that a court may not call upon 

extrinsic evidence in order to make sense of the objective indicia presented by 

those tickets—for instance, in deciphering an industry code affixed to a particular 

flight coupon (by referring to trade usage); translating a foreign phrase or 

expression (by referring to a dictionary); or observing that the record numbers 

revealed on a particular flight coupon do not correspond to those on its asserted 

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companions (by, of course, referring to those asserted companions).” Coyle 363 

F.3d at 988–89 (citations omitted). Indeed, “certain objective extrinsic evidence 

may connect flights together as, or rule out the possibility that certain flights were, 

part of an undivided transportation even when the flight coupons do not themselves 

evince such a connection (or its absence).” Id.

While Plaintiff’s complaint is light on relevant details, she attests that her 

roundtrip travel began with outbound air travel from Los Angeles to Tehran on 

December 6, 2016 and ended with inbound air travel from Tehran to Los Angeles 

on January 1, 2017. (ECF No. 6, at 2.) She further attests she ”booked [the] 

round-trip ticket from Los Angeles . . . to Tehran . . . from a travel agency named 

Setareh Elahiyeh in Tehran” while living in Oceanside, California. (Id.) Plaintiff 

further attests that while she “had reserved a departure flight from [Los Angeles] 

to Iran on April 4, 2017, [she] did not depart to Iran until July 4, 2017, which [she] 

reserved on June 6, 2017 from . . . Setareh Elahiyeh” while living in Oceanside. 

(Id.) Plaintiff provides an electronic ticket/itinerary for the December 6, 2016 air 

travel from Los Angeles to Tehran (ECF No. 6-1, at 3-4 (the “12/06/2016 Ticket”)) 

as well as the July 4, 2017 air travel from Los Angeles to Tehran (ECF No. 6-1, at 

9-10 (the “07/04/2017 Ticket”)), but fails to provide any documentation for the 

January 1, 2017 flight that is the subject of this action. (See ECF No. 6, at 2.)

In support of its arguments, Defendant submits two “Passenger Name 

Records” associated with Plaintiff bearing booking reference numbers 7XMTZU

(ECF No. 8-1, at 5 (the “7XMTZU PNR”)) and 6VVPYP (ECF No. 4-4, at 25 (the 

“6VVPYP PNR”), respectively.

10 (See also ECF No. 4-3 (supporting affidavit of 

 

10 “[W]here there is no individual passenger ticket for a court to examine at all[,] 

attention to an ‘other instrument’ in determining the jurisdiction of this court for 

Warsaw Convention purposes is appropriate. In fact, it is quite necessary.” Coyle 

v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia, 363 F.3d 979, 987 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Odete M. Costeira); ECF No. 8-1, at 1-3 (supplemental supporting affidavit)). The 

7XMTZU PNR reflects roundtrip travel departing from Tehran to Los Angeles on 

September 4, 2016 and returning to Tehran on December 6, 2016. (ECF No. 8-1 

at 2-3, 5.) The 6VVPYP PNR reflects roundtrip travel departing from Tehran to 

Los Angeles on January 1, 2017 and returning to Tehran on April 4, 2017. (ECF 

No. 4-3, at 2; ECF No. 4-4, at 25; see also ECF No. 8-1, at 3.) Notably, the 

12/06/2016 Ticket has the same reference number, ticket number, and “original”

ticket number as the 7ZMTZU PNR. (Compare ECF No. 6-1 at 3; with ECF No. 8-

1, at 5.) While the 07/04/2017 Ticket’s reference number and original ticket 

number match those on the 6VVPYP PNR, it has a different flight date (4/4/2017 

versus 7/4/2017) and a ticket number that does not appear on the 6VVPYP PNR. 

(Compare ECF No. 6-1, at 9; with ECF No. 4-4, at 25.) A Customer Relations 

Officer for Defendant attests that the 6VVPYP PNR indicates that Plaintiff

“travelled on the outbound leg of her roundtrip ticket” from Tehran to Los Angeles 

on January 1, 2017 but did not travel “on the original dates for [her] return flight 

from Los Angeles to Tehran” on April 4, 2017. (ECF No. 8-1, at 3 (citing ECF No. 

4-4, at 25).) They further attest that all relevant tickets were “purchased in Iranian 

Rial and . . . issued by Setareh Elahiyeh in Tehran.” (Id. at 2-3; see also ECF No. 

4-3, at 3 (“As Setareh Elahiyeh is an IATA-accredited agency, it is permitted to sell 

certain tickets for travel on behalf of IATA member airlines, including

[Defendant].”).) 

Upon due consideration of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the 

January 1, 2017 flight that is the subject of this action was part of the outbound leg 

of roundtrip travel from/to Tehran. While Plaintiff attests that her understanding 

was to the contrary, all of the objective evidence she presents to the Court is 

consistent with roundtrip airfare from/to Tehran. Indeed, a comparison of the 

tickets submitted by Plaintiff with the PNRs submitted by Defendant conclusively 

demonstrate that the January 1, 2017 flight was part of roundtrip air travel 

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departing from Tehran on January 1, 2017 and returning to Tehran on April 4, 2017 

(which Plaintiff subsequently rescheduled to return on July 4, 2017). Because 

Tehran was therefore both “the “place of departure and place of destination” of the

roundtrip air travel upon which Plaintiff was injured and Iran is not a party to the 

Montreal Convention, the Court concludes that the Warsaw Convention (as 

amended by the Hague Protocol) governs this action and the Montreal Convention 

is inapposite. Further, because Tehran was “the place of destination” – and Los 

Angeles simply an “agreed stopping place” – for the relevant air travel, Plaintiff 

may not rely upon “the place of destination” category of Article 28 of the Warsaw 

Convention in bringing suit in this Court. See Warsaw Convention, art. 28(1); 

Coyle, 363 F.3d at 991. 

Thus, the only remaining basis upon which this Court would be a suitable 

forum, and therefore have jurisdiction over this action, is if Plaintiff can 

demonstrate the “where the carrier . . . has an establishment by which the contract 

has been made” category of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention is satisfied in 

this forum. Plaintiff fails to make such a showing. As an initial matter, while Plaintiff 

argues that she “purchased her ticket from her home in Oceanside” (ECF No. 5, 

at 5), she attests only that she “was living in Oceanside at the time that [she] 

booked” the relevant flights (ECF No.6, at 2). Nevertheless, even giving Plaintiff 

the most generous reading of such equivocal testimony, she ignores that the 

relevant standard is not where she “purchased” or “booked” her air travel (or even 

where the relevant ticket was issued), but rather “where the carrier . . . has an 

establishment by which the contract has been made.” Warsaw Convention, art. 

28(1). Given Plaintiff’s attestation that she booked her air travel through a travel 

agency located in Tehran and Defendant’s attestation that such travel agency had 

the authority to sell tickets on Defendant’s behalf, the Court concludes that Tehran 

is where Defendant “ha[d] an establishment by which the contract [with Plaintiff] 

was made” for purposes of the Warsaw Convention. See id. Moreover, because 

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Plaintiff fails to identify any “establishment” maintained by Defendant or the 

relevant travel agency that is located within the United States – let alone an 

establishment “by which the contract [was] made” that is located within the 

jurisdiction of this Court, this case is distinguishable from the only case Plaintiff

cites in support of her argument, Polanski. See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 

360 F.2d 804, 814 (2d Cir. 1966) (“The central purpose of Article 28(1)‘s third 

provision was to make venue always proper in the country where the ticket was 

purchased—assuming it is a High Contracting Party— if, but only if, the defendant 

has a place of business there.”); Polanski, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1229-31 (“Although 

KLM is domiciled and maintains its principal place of business in The Netherlands, 

it was registered as a foreign corporation in the State of Tennessee at the time of 

Andre Polanski's injury. Furthermore, as an alliance partner with Northwest, KLM

essentially has a place of business in the United States through which it can make 

contracts. Also, KLM admits that Northwest issues KLM tickets to United States 

residents, and refers to Northwest as KLM's ‘airline partner.’ Therefore, anywhere 

Northwest does business is a place of business in the United States through which 

KLM can make contracts.” (citations omitted)); see also Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 

(“[T]he burden of establishing [the existence of subject matter jurisdiction] rests 

upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”). Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any other 

basis for subject matter jurisdiction.

Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over the instant action, Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED FOR LACK 

OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2020 ______________________________

Honorable Barry Ted. Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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