Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00823/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00823-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY MEAS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv0823 JM(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Ct. Dkt. 9

vs.

CVS PHARMACY, INC.,

Defendant.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), Plaintiff Roy Meas (“Meas”) moves to strike 18

of the 28 affirmative defenses asserted by Defendant CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (“CVS”).

CVS partially opposes the motion. Pursuant to L.R. 7.1(d)(1), this matter is appropriate

for decision without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to strike

is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

On April 19, 2011 CVS removed this diversity action from the Superior Court

of the State of California, County of San Diego. (Ct. Dkt. 1). Plaintiff was employed

by Longs Drug Stores, Inc. (“Longs”) as a full-time pharmacy technician from February

2007 until the acquisition of Longs by CVS. (Comp. ¶¶7, 8). As a pharmacy technician

his primary duties included entering information from a patient’s prescription into a

computer system and scanning the actual prescription. The computer system then

creates a label showing, among other things, the quantity of the drug to be given to the

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patient, based upon the doctor’s prescription and the quantity of the drug “for which the

patient’s insurance will pay at one time.” (Compl. ¶6). After the pharmacy technician

completes these tasks, the pharmacist reviews the prescription, places the proper amount

of the medication in the container, and the pharmacist places the filled prescription in

an area to be picked up by the consumer. Id. While employed at Longs, “Plaintiff was

not assigned to a particular store but worked short stints at various stores primarily

filling in for other technicians who were ill or on vacation.” (Compl. ¶7). Longs

employed a scheduler to assign Plaintiff to his different work locations. (Compl. ¶10).

CVS acquired Longs in early 2009. (Compl. ¶8). Initially, Plaintiff worked

fewer days with CVS but he “was back to full time in 2010 earning over $30,000 for

that year.” (Compl. ¶10). Unlike the procedures at Longs, Plaintiff “was required to

call around to various stores and/or wait to be called by an individual store’s

management to get his assignments.” Id.

Beginning in November 2010, Plaintiff noticed that he had not been compensated

for all hours worked. Despite CVS’s alleged policy of paying overtime to employees

on holidays, Plaintiff worked Veterans Day and Christmas Day 2010 without being paid

overtime. (Compl. ¶¶1 15,17). On several other occasions, Plaintiff alleges that he was

not fully compensated for all hours worked. (Compl. ¶¶11-13). When Plaintiff

complained to management about the underpayment of wages, CVS explained that it

considered Plaintiff a part-time worker and that only full-time employees were paid

holiday overtime. (Compl. ¶15).

“In early January 2011, Plaintiff received a prescription from a patient for five

pills of a particular antibiotic.” (Compl. ¶22). The patient’s insurance would only pay

for three pills and the computer system produced a label for only three pills. “The

pharmacist counted out three pills and bagged the medication to be picked up by the

patient.” The patient called to complain about receiving only three pills. Plaintiff

explained to the individual that the insurance would only pay for three pills. “The

patient was not satisfied with Plaintiff’s explanation and complained to CVS

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management.” (Compl. ¶25). 

On January 12, 2011, the CVS district manager, Elizabeth Perles, called Plaintiff

and “told him that he was suspended and should not come in to work on January 14th

as he had been rescheduled.” (Compl. ¶27). The next day, Plaintiff was asked to come

to the office to talk with Ms. Perles. At that meeting he was informed that “his

employment was terminated and he was given $300 in cash which he was told was a

portion of his final wages.” (Compl. ¶28). The reason given for his termination “was

his alleged gross negligence in failing to properly fill the above mentioned patient’s

prescription.” Id.

Based upon the above generally described conduct, Plaintiff alleges four claims

for (1) failure to pay wages due, (2) improper deductions from earned wages, (3)

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and (4) violations of Cal. Labor Code

§201 (for failure to pay overtime wages for working on Veterans Day and Christmas

Day). On April 15, 2011, CVS filed an answer to the complaint in the San Diego

Superior Court asserting, among other things, 28 affirmative defenses. Plaintiff now

moves to strike 18 of those affirmative defenses.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that the court “may strike from

a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the

expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by

dispensing with those issues prior to trial. . . .” Whittlestone, Inc. V. Handi-Craft Co.,

618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F2d. 1524,

1527 (9th Cir. 1993, rev’d on other grounds 510 U.S. 517 (1994)). “The key to

determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives

plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 924, 827 (9th

Cir. 1979).

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Plaintiff contends that the heightened pleading standards enunciated in Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. __, 129

S.Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009) apply equally to pleading affirmative defenses. In these

authorities, the Supreme Court held that a claim may not contain wholly conclusory

allegations but must allege “sufficient factual material” to state a claim which is

plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940. 

The parties agree that no circuit court has addressed whether a heightened

pleading standard applies to affirmative defenses and that district courts are split on the

issue. In support of application of the heightened pleading standard to affirmative

defenses, courts have reasoned that the “same logic holds true for pleading affirmative

defenses [as for pleading a complaint] - without alleging facts as part of the affirmative

defenses, [a] [p]laintiff cannot prepare adequately to respond to those defenses.”

Francisco v. Verizon South, Inc., 2010 WL 2990159 (E.D. VA July 29, 2010) (quoting

Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 2008 WL 2225668 (S.D. Fla. 2008)) (noting that the

majority of district courts to have reached this issue have held that Twombly applies to

affirmative defenses); Anticancer Inc. V. Xenogen Corp., 248 F.R.D. 278, 282 (S.D. al.

2007) (Judge Rudi Brewster holding that Twombly applies to affirmative defenses

because “claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims, affirmative defenses also make

claims to relief”).

On the other hand, courts have held that heightened pleading is not required

under Rule 8(c). 

[While plaintiff contends that the pleading standard of Twombly]should also apply to affirmative defenses, he acknowledges that the Supreme Court has never so held. ( See Reply at 6–7.) To be sure, there is some

lower court authority holding that Twombly does apply to affirmative defenses. However, the Ninth Circuit has yet to so hold, and this Court is not convinced that Twombly should also apply to affirmative defenses.

Twombly addressed only Rule 8(a)(2), which provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court reasoned that “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but has not ‘shown' - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In contrast to the language of Rule 8(a) governing claims, the

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pertinent language of Rule 8(b) governing defenses generally provides that “in responding to a pleading, a party must ... state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b)(1)(A). Further, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1) governing affirmative defenses in particular provides that “[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must

affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense,” including the various listed defenses. Neither Rule 8(b) nor Rule 8(c) contains language that precisely corresponds to Rule 8(a)'s language requiring that the pleader “show” that he is entitled to relief. Whether any of defendants' affirmative defenses have been asserted in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P.

11(b)(4) is an issue that simply is not appropriate for adjudication at this

early stage of the proceedings, prior to plaintiff's propounding of

discovery directed to those affirmative defenses.

Garber v. Mohammadi, 2011 WL 2076341 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011). 

Although a close issue, the court concludes that affirmative defenses are not

subject to a heightened pleading standard. In addition to the technical Rule 8 argument

addressed in Garber, practical and judicial economy considerations further support

application of the traditional pleading standard for affirmative defenses. From a

practical point of view, a plaintiff may investigate a potential claim for weeks, months,

or even years before filing a complaint. To expect a defendant to investigate and to

adequately prepare an answer containing all relevant affirmative defenses within 21

days of service of the complaint, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(1), would seem to be unrealistic

in most cases, subject to the nature and complexities of each case. See Falley v. Friends

Univ., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40921 at *9 (D.Kan April 14, 2011). Further, a

heightened pleading standard may require the court to address multiple motions to

amend the answer as discovery reveals additional defenses. See Ameristar Fence Prod.,

Inc v. Phx. Fence Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81468 at *1 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010).

These considerations, in conjunction with the disfavored nature of Rule 12(f) motions

and the limited role of pleadings in federal court, see Stanbury Law Firm v. I.R.S., 221

F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000), caution against the application of the heightened

pleading standard to affirmative defenses.

The Motion to Strike

The court grants the unopposed motion to strike the fourth (res judicata and/or

collateral estoppel), sixth (the exercise of managerial discretion and supported by

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substantial business reasons), seventh (good faith), eighteenth (alleged conduct did not

exceed the inherent risks of employment), twenty-second (all wages timely paid), and

twenty-fifth (de minimis claim) affirmative defenses.

The court denies without prejudice the motion to dismiss the third (waiver and

estoppel), fifth (statute of limitations), eighth (legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for the

employment practices), ninth (unauthorized acts), tenth (plaintiff’s negligence),

eleventh (failure to exhaust), twelfth (doctrine of avoidable consequences), thirteenth

(causation), fourteenth (failure to mitigate), twenty-first (after-acquired evidence),

twenty-sixth (accord and satisfaction), and twenty-seventh (violation of Cal. Labor

Code §2850) affirmative defenses. In light of the disfavored nature of Rule 12(f)

motions and the present inability of the court to determine whether the challenged

allegations are “so unrelated to the plaintiff's claims as to be unworthy of any

consideration as a defense and that their presence in the pleading throughout the

proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving party,” 5C Wright & Miller § 1380 (3d

ed.2004), the court denies the motion to strike these defenses, without prejudice.

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss the fourth, sixth, eighteenth,

twenty-second, and twenty-fifth affirmative defenses, without prejudice, and denies the

motion to dismiss the third, fifth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth,

fourteenth, twenty-first, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh affirmative defenses without

prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 14, 2011

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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