Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00831/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00831-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Petitioner originally filed this habeas petition against Dora Schriro, then director of

the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), and against the Attorney General of

Arizona. Dkt. #1 at 1. On January 30, 2009, Charles Ryan became interim director of the

ADOC, succeeding Ms. Schriro. Mr. Ryan has been automatically substituted as a

Respondent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leon Allen Bryant, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles J. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-08-831-PHX-DGC (JJM)

ORDER

On April 10, 2003, Petitioner Bryant pled guilty in Maricopa County Superior Court

to two counts of armed robbery, both class 2 dangerous felonies. Dkt. #10-2 at Ex. C. The

court accepted the guilty plea and, on June 13, 2003, sentenced Petitioner to 14 years’

imprisonment. Id. at Ex. D-E. Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 30, 2003, at

the latest, after time expired for him to appeal the dismissal of his first state petition for postconviction relief (“PCR”). Dkt. #1 at 4; Dkt. #12 at 6.

On May 2, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. #1.1

 Petitioner’s habeas claim alleges that the sentencing procedures

and the sentence imposed by the Maricopa County Superior Court violated the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine

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aggravation factors, and the Fifth Amendment right of confrontation. Dkt. #1 at 5-8. United

States Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Marshall issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”)

recommending that the Court dismiss the petition with prejudice. Dkt. #12. Petitioner has

filed objections to the R&R (Dkt. #15) and Respondents have filed a response (Dkt. #16).

For the following reasons, the Court will accept the R&R and deny the habeas petition.

I. Petitioner’s General Objection.

Petitioner first objects generally to “all factual and legal determinations . . . and

findings of fact, and conclusion[s] of law” in the R&R. Dkt. #15 at 2. He also restates the

grounds for relief asserted in his habeas petition as an “objection” to the R&R. Id. at 3.

Merely reasserting the grounds of the petition as an objection provides this Court with no

guidance as to what portions of the R&R Petitioner considers to be incorrect.

The Court will deem Petitioner’s general objection ineffective. This ruling comports

with the clear language of Rule 72(b) that a district judge “shall make a de novo

determination . . . of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific

written objection has been made[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (emphasis added); see Sullivan

v. Schriro, No. CV-04-1517, 2006 WL 1516005 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2006). The Court is

relieved of any obligation to review a general objection to the R&R. See Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (stating that no review at all is required for “any issue that is not

the subject of an objection.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2003) (same).

II. Petitioner’s Specific Objections.

The federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C. § 2244 et seq., applies to this case because Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was

filed after the AEDPA’s effective date. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149

(9th Cir. 2003). The “AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitation on habeas corpus

petitions filed by state prisoners in federal court.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). The

limitation period generally begins to run when the state conviction becomes final “by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review[.]”

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“Under the AEDPA . . . a state prisoner must file his federal habeas corpus petition within

one year of the date his state conviction became final.”). The Ninth Circuit has found that,

for criminal defendants who plead guilty in Arizona state courts, of-right state PCR

proceedings under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure are “direct review.”

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). A conviction based on such a guilty

plea therefore becomes final at “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review

. . . or [at] the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Id. 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 30, 2003. Dkt. #12 at 6. Petitioner

filed his habeas petition on May 2, 2008, some three and one-half years late. The petition

is untimely unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s oneyear limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200,

1204-05 (9th Cir. 2009). The R&R found that Petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling

of the limitation period and that Petitioner “ha[d] not identified any potential basis of

equitable tolling.” Doc. #12 at 5-8. Petitioner’s objections allege that both statutory and

equitable tolling are appropriate. Dkt. #15. Since Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court

will construe his objections liberally. See Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.

2005) (stating that courts must “construe pro se habeas filings liberally”); Belgarde v.

Montana, 123 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We construe a pro se litigant’s habeas

petition with deference.”) (citing Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 493 (1989)).

A. Statutory Tolling.

The one-year limitation period is statutorily tolled during any time in which a

“properly filed” state petition for post-conviction relief is pending before the state court.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[B]y its

plain terms § 2244(d)(2) requires tolling during the pendency of a properly-filed [sic] state

petition.”). A state petition “is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings” in state court.

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (emphasis in original). In Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

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It is worth noting that even under the Ninth Circuit’s pre-Pace standard for statutory

tolling as described in Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001), the

AEDPA’s limitations period would have expired well before Petitioner’s federal habeas

filing. Under the Dictado rule, a state PCR petition was “properly filed” and tolled the

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544 U.S. 408 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that “time limits, no matter their

form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” so a state PCR petition rejected as untimely is not “properly

filed” for purposes of statutory tolling under Section 2244(d)(2). Id. at 417; see Allen v.

Siebert, 128 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2007) (reaffirming that untimely state PCR petitions are not properly

filed); accord Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that a state

PCR petition dismissed as untimely was not “properly filed,” despite statutory exceptions to

the state’s timely filing requirement and despite the dismissing court’s alternative rationale

for dismissal on the merits).

Petitioner’s objection states that it is “illogical for a state to permit late filings for

post[-]conviction relief, such as that filed by Petitioner, without the due process protection

of appellate review in the event that the trial court or state appellate courts render an

improper ruling.” Dkt. #15 at 5. Construed liberally, this seems to be an objection to the

R&R’s denial of statutory tolling for Petitioner’s second, third, and fourth state PCR

petitions. Petitioner does not argue that these PCR petitions were timely filed; instead, he

seems to argue that the AEDPA statute of limitations should be tolled even though the state

petitions were dismissed as untimely. Id. Under Pace and Bonner, however, state petitions

dismissed as untimely are not “properly filed” so as to merit statutory tolling. Pace, 544 U.S.

at 417; Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1149. This is so even if a state allows certain exceptions to the

timely filing requirement. See Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148 (“The fact that [a state] provides

exceptions to its timely filing requirement does not ‘prevent a late application from being

considered improperly filed.’”) (citing Pace, 544 U.S. at 413). Petitioner’s second, third, and

fourth state PCR petitions were dismissed as untimely. Dkt. #10-2 at Ex. J; Dkt. #10-3

at Ex. N, T. As such, they are not “properly filed” for purposes of Section 2244(d)(2) and

will not operate to toll the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.2

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AEDPA limitation period while the petition was pending in state courts, even if the state

court later dismissed the PCR petition as untimely. See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051,

1053 (9th Cir. 2008). In Petitioner’s case, his second PCR petition was filed within the

AEDPA’s one-year limitation period, but was dismissed the following day. Dkt. #10-2

at Ex. I-J. There is no evidence suggesting that Petitioner appealed this dismissal. See

Dkt. #12 at 3. Tolling the statute of limitations during the two-day period the petition was

pending before the trial court and during the thirty-day period during which Petitioner could

have appealed the decision (pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)) would result in expiration

of the one-year limitation on December 1, 2004, instead of October 30, 2004. In either case,

the AEDPA period of limitations had expired almost a year before Petitioner filed his third

state PCR petition on October 20, 2005, and over three years before Petitioner filed the

instant habeas petition. Dkt. #10-2 at Ex. K; Dkt. 1.

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Respondents’ Answer to the habeas petition asserts that, under Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. ---, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007), the AEDPA statute of limitations is not subject to

equitable tolling. Dkt. #10 at 9. The Supreme Court held in Bowles “that the timely filing

of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement” and that courts have “no

authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.” 127 S.Ct. at 2366.

Bowles did not, however, address whether the AEDPA limitation period under

28 U.S.C. § 2244 is jurisdictional or whether that time limit is subject to equitable tolling.

Id. at 2361-67. The Ninth Circuit has continued to apply equitable tolling to the AEDPA’s

one-year limitation period after Bowles. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2008);

accord Coker v. Quarterman, 270 F. App’x 305, 308 n. 1 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2008) (expressly

holding that equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s limitation period survives Bowles); Diaz v.

Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2008) (same). The Court will accordingly assume that

equitable tolling is possible and will address Petitioner’s objections.

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B. Equitable Tolling. 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the AEDPA’s limitation period may be subject

to equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998). However,

equitable tolling is not available in most cases. “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro,

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and alteration omitted). To justify equitable

tolling, Petitioner bears the burden of showing that “despite diligently pursuing his rights,

some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing.” Townsend, 562 F.3d

at 1205; see Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).3

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Petitioner’s objection raises three possible grounds for equitable tolling: (1) lack of

a law library and legal resources in the ADOC, (2) Petitioner’s lack of counsel, and (3) the

prison’s lack of reference materials concerning the AEDPA until 2002. Dkt. #15 at 2, 5. The

R&R found that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because Petitioner “ha[d] not

identified any potential basis of equitable tolling.” Dkt. #12 at 7. Indeed, Petitioner presents

these arguments for the first time in his objection, despite having had a prior opportunity to

do so in the habeas petition itself. See Dkt. #1 at 11. The Ninth Circuit has held

“‘categorically that an unsuccessful party is not entitled as of right to de novo review by the

[district] judge of an argument never seasonably raised before the magistrate.’”

United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Rather, the

district judge has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence and arguments raised

for the first time in an objection to the magistrate’s R&R. Id. at 621-22. The Court could

decline to consider these objections because Petitioner had a previous opportunity to raise

the arguments but failed to do so. Nevertheless, Petitioner’s equitable tolling arguments fail

on their merits for the following reasons.

1. Lack of law library.

Petitioner contends that “in the [ADOC] there is no longer a law library in order to

adequately research and prepare” a habeas petition and that this absence merits equitable

tolling. Dkt. #15 at 2. The R&R correctly points out that Petitioner’s habeas petition did

“not identif[y] any potential basis of equitable tolling.” Dkt. #12 at 7. Petitioner raises this

argument for the first time in his objections and presents no evidence, only the bare assertion

that the ADOC has no law library. Dkt. #1; Dkt. #15 at 2. As Respondents correctly note,

Petitioner’s own state PCR filings belie the claim that lack of adequate legal materials

prevented the timely filing of his habeas petition: in a motion seeking leave to file his third

PCR petition late, Petitioner refers to a two-week closure of the prison library in November

and December 2005, and cites this two-week closure – not an utter lack of any library – as

an impediment to timely filing. Dkt. #16 at 3-4; Dkt. #10-3 at Ex. O. Moreover, even if

Petitioner’s assertion is assumed to be true – that “there is no longer a law library,” Dkt. #15

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at 2 (emphasis added) – the fact that the ADOC presently provides inadequate access to legal

materials does not support the proposition that a lack of legal resources during the AEDPA

limitation period was an extraordinary circumstance that prevented the timely filing of his

habeas petition.

2. Pro se status.

Petitioner advances his pro se status and the Court’s failure to appoint counsel as a

secondary basis for equitable tolling. Dkt. #15 at 2. “[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”

Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964,

970 (9th Cir. 2006) (pro se status alone is insufficient to trigger equitable tolling) (citing

Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005)). Petitioner is not entitled to equitable

tolling merely because he is proceeding pro se.

3. Lack of AEDPA reference materials.

Petitioner also asserts that the prison’s failure to acquire reference materials

concerning the AEDPA until January 2002 is an extraordinary circumstance warranting

equitable tolling. Dkt. #15 at 5. Petitioner’s 2003 conviction, however, occurred over a year

after the time at which Petitioner concedes the prison acquired AEDPA reference materials.

Dkt. #15 at 5. Petitioner has made no claim and has presented no evidence that the prison

lacked AEDPA reference materials after his conviction. See Dkt. #15. The prison’s lack of

a copy of the AEDPA a year prior to Petitioner’s conviction is not an extraordinary

circumstance impeding the timely filing of Petitioner’s federal habeas petition.

 IT IS ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Marshall’s R&R (Dkt. #12) is accepted.

2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is denied.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2009.

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