Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_16-cv-00446/USCOURTS-almd-1_16-cv-00446-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SCOTTIE JEFFERY JOHNSON, )

AIS #182168 )

 )

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-446-WKW

)

DETECTIVE TAIWAN TRUITT, et al., )

 )

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Scottie Jeffery Johnson (“Johnson”), a state inmate, 

challenges the constitutionality of his confinement in the state prison system due to the 

revocation of his parole based on criminal charges pending against him before the Circuit 

Court of Houston County, Alabama with respect to vehicle burglaries. Compl. - Doc. No. 

1 at 3; Amendment to Compl. - Doc. No. 5 at 1-2. Specifically, Johnson maintains Detective 

Taiwan Truitt, an officer with the Dothan Police Department, provided false testimony at 

the parole revocation hearing that “Johnson admitted . . . he broke into vehicles but could 

not remember what he had stolen.” Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 3. Johnson seeks dismissal of 

the pending charges, release from incarceration via reinstatement to parole and lost wages 

suffered due to the revocation of parole. Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 4. 

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Upon review of the complaint and amendment thereto, the court concludes that this

case is subject to dismissal prior to service of process in accordance with the directives of 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1

II. DISCUSSION

A. Perjury 

Johnson contends that defendant Truitt committed perjury at his parole revocation 

hearing which resulted in the revocation of his parole. Johnson seeks monetary damages 

for this alleged violation of his constitutional rights. 

It is well established that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not authorize the assertion of a 

claim for damages for alleged acts of perjury during criminal or administrative 

proceedings. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-336, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1115-1116 (1983) 

(all witnesses, including government officials, are entitled to absolute immunity from 

damages liability for their testimony in state proceedings); Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 

174 (5th Cir. 1988); Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356, 1359 (5th Cir. 1987). Thus, within 

the context of this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Johnson is entitled to no relief with respect to 

alleged perjured testimony and this claim is subject to dismissal in accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii). 

 

1

The court granted Johnson leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Order of June 17, 2016 - Doc. No. 3. Thus, this court 

must screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) which requires dismissal of a prisoner’s civil action prior 

to service of process if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from monetary relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

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B. Constitutionality of Confinement

Johnson alleges that he is improperly confined on a parole revocation decision and 

requests his immediate release from confinement, reinstatement to parole and monetary 

damages. The claims presented to this court seeking relief from the revocation of parole 

are not cognizable in this cause of action. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997);

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that claims challenging the legality of a prisoner’s 

confinement are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action “unless and until the 

conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a 

writ of habeas corpus” and complaints containing such claims must therefore be dismissed. 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. The relevant inquiry is “whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of” the fact or duration of his confinement. Heck, 

512 U. S. at 487; Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648 (inmate’s claims for declaratory relief, injunctive 

relief or monetary damages which “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment 

imposed, [are] not cognizable under § 1983.”). The rule of Heck is therefore not limited to 

a request for damages but is equally applicable to an inmate’s request for declaratory 

judgment or injunctive relief. Balisok, supra. “It is irrelevant that [the plaintiff] disclaims 

any intention of challenging his conviction [or other basis for his incarceration]; if he 

makes allegations that are inconsistent with the [action] having been valid, Heck kicks in 

and bars his civil suit.” Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003), citing 

Balisok, 520 U.S. at 646-648. The principles espoused in Heck and Balisok apply to 

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revocations and denials of parole. Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial 

of parole); Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir.1995) 

(revocation of parole); Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 44-45 (8th Cir.1995) (denial of 

parole). 

The law is well settled that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a . . . prisoner 

who challenges” the basis for or duration of his incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481; 

Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645 (The “sole remedy in federal court” for a state prisoner challenging 

the constitutionality of his incarceration is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.); Okoro, 

324 F.3d at 490 (Heck directs that a state inmate “making a collateral attack on [the basis 

for his incarceration] . . . may not do that in a civil suit, other than a suit under the habeas 

corpus statute.”). An inmate “cannot seek to accomplish by a section 1983 declaratory 

judgment what he must accomplish solely through a writ of habeas corpus.” Jones v. 

Watkins, 945 F.Supp. 1143, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Johnson v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 

75 F.3d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1996) (Under Heck, “[t]he [determinative] issue . . . is not the 

relief sought, but the ground of the challenge.”); Cook v. Baker, et al., 139 F. App’x 167, 

169 (11th Cir. 2005) (The “exclusive remedy” for a state inmate’s claim challenging the 

basis for or validity of his incarceration “is to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254[.]”). In Balisok, the Supreme Court emphasized “that a claim either is 

cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and 

should be dismissed.” Id. at 649.

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Under the circumstances of this case, Heck and its progeny bar Johnson’s use of any 

federal civil action, other than a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

to mount a collateral attack on the validity of his current incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 

489 (“We do not graft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence 

of a cause of action. Even a prisoner who has fully exhausted [all] available state remedies 

has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the [basis for incarceration] is reversed, 

expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus [or other 

appropriate action].”); Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Heck

clarifies that Preiser is a rule of cognizability, not exhaustion.”). Consequently, Johnson’s 

challenges to the revocation of parole and his resulting confinement are not cognizable in 

this cause of action and are therefore subject to summary dismissal in accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).2

C. Pending Criminal Charges

Johnson alleges that there is “insufficient evidence” to support the charges lodged 

against him for breaking and entering into vehicles. Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 3. Based on 

the foregoing, Johnson requests that this court intervene and dismiss the charges. With 

respect to Johnson’s request for declaratory or injunctive relief which would require 

intervention by this court into criminal proceedings ongoing before the Circuit Court of 

 

2

The plaintiff is advised that the habeas statute requires exhaustion of available state court remedies prior to seeking 

federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Thus, before filing a federal habeas petition challenging the 

revocation of parole, the plaintiff must first exhaust all available state court remedies, including submission of a 

petition for writ of certiorari in the appropriate state circuit court challenging the decision of the Parole Board to 

revoke parole and appellate review of any adverse decision. 

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Houston County, Alabama, well settled federal law requires that this court refrain from 

issuing such relief.

 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts 

should abstain from entertaining civil actions by individuals seeking to enjoin criminal 

prosecutions against them in state court. Id. at 44-45. “Attentive to the principles of equity, 

comity, and federalism, the Supreme Court has recognized that federal courts should 

abstain from exercising jurisdiction in suits aimed at restraining pending state criminal 

prosecutions.” Jackson v. Georgia, 273 Fed. App’x 812, 813 (11th Cir. 2008 (citing 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 37). Younger therefore directs federal courts to abstain from granting 

injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings 

except under very limited circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45. The Younger

abstention doctrine is premised upon a fundamental “public policy against federal 

interference with state criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 43. 

“In order to decide whether the federal proceeding would interfere with the state 

proceeding, [the court] look[s] to the relief requested and the effect it would have on the 

state proceedings. The relief sought need not directly interfere with an ongoing proceeding 

or terminate an ongoing proceeding in order for Younger abstention to be required.” 31 

Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

Abstention is required under Younger when a state judicial proceeding is pending, the 

proceedings implicate important state interests and the state proceedings provide an 

adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Middlesex County Ethics 

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Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); 31 Foster Children, 

329 F.3d at 1274. 

It is clear from the pleadings filed by the plaintiff that each of the requisite elements 

for Younger abstention are present in this case. First, according to the amendment to the 

complaint, Johnson is awaiting trial before the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama

on the challenged criminal charges. Secondly, enforcement of criminal law is an important 

state interest. Finally, Johnson may raise his insufficient evidence claim in the pending 

state court proceedings by filing appropriate motions with the trial court. In addition, if 

Johnson is convicted of the charges pending against him, he may present his claim of 

insufficient evidence on direct appeal before the state appellate courts. Although 

exceptions to Younger abstention are permitted where (1) irreparable injury as a result of 

the prosecution is both “great and immediate”; (2) the state law flagrantly and patently 

violates the Constitution of the United States; (3) there is a showing of bad faith or 

harassment; or (4) other unusual circumstances exist that require issuance of the requested 

relief, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972), Johnson has not presented any credible 

basis to warrant application of these exceptions. 

Initially, the court finds that the mere fact Johnson must defend himself in state 

criminal proceedings does not demonstrate irreparable harm. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 

(“[T]he cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against . . . criminal 

prosecution, [is not] considered ‘irreparable’ in the special legal sense of that term.”). Next, 

the complaint fails to establish the type of bad faith or harassment that would justify 

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interference by this court in the state criminal proceedings. Finally, there is no evidence 

that the state law(s) under which Johnson has been charged violate the Constitution nor has 

he set forth any extraordinary circumstance entitling him to the requested relief. 

In light of the foregoing, this court is compelled to abstain from considering the 

merits of Johnson’s claim of insufficient evidence as such claim is not cognizable in a 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 action at this time. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Consequently, to the extent 

Johnson requests declaratory or injunctive relief requiring this court’s interference with 

pending state criminal proceedings, equity, comity and federalism concerns require the 

court to abstain from considering the sufficiency claim presented by Johnson and his 

attendant request for dismissal of the state criminal charges. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case 

be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

and (iii).

It is further

ORDERED that on or before July 22, 2016 the plaintiff may file objections to the 

Recommendation. The plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or 

general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and 

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factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the plaintiff to 

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error 

or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th CIR. R. 3-

1. See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. 

City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 

DONE this 7th day of July, 2016.

 /s/Terry F. Moorer 

 TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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