Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01204/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01204-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1446pr Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVAN PARENT, an individual on

behalf of himself, a class of persons

similarly situated, and the general

public,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

MILLERCOORS LLC’S MOTION

TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[ECF No. 22]

v.

MILLERCOORS LLC, a Delaware

Limited Liability Company authorized

to do business in California, and

DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendant.

Before the Court is Defendant MillerCoors LLC’s (“Defendant” or

“MillerCoors”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Def. Mot.

Dismiss (“Def. Mot.”), ECF No. 22. The motion has been fully briefed. Pl. Resp., ECF

No. 23; Def. Reply, ECF No. 24. Upon consideration of the moving papers and the

applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s

motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case concern “Blue Moon,” a popular brand of Belgian-style

wheat beer owned byDefendant MillerCoors. MillerCoors is a major beer manufacturer

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with many well-known beer brands, including Coors Light, Miller Genuine Draft,

Miller High Life, Ice house, Milwaukee’s Best, Keystone, and Olde English. First

Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) 3, ECF No. 19. Plaintiff Evan Parent

(“Plaintiff”), a “beer aficionado and home brewer,” alleges that from 2011 until mid2012, he regularly paid a price premium purchasing Blue Moon beer from San Diegoarea retailers for personal and family consumption because MillerCoors created the

deceptive and misleading impression that Blue Moon is a “craft beer.” Id. at 9. 

I. Initial Complaint and First Motion to Dismiss

On April 24, 2015, Plaintiff, a resident of California, brought suit on behalf of

himself and others similarly situated against Defendant, a limited liability company

incorporated in Delaware and with its principal place of business in Illinois, in San

Diego Superior Court. Compl. 1, ECF No 1. Plaintiff pled three causes of action for (1)

deceptive practices and misrepresentation in violation ofCalifornia’s Consumers Legal

Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.; (2) untrue and misleading

advertising in violation of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 17500 et seq.; and (3) unlawful, fraudulent and unfair business practices

in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200 et seq. 

In the initial Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Blue Moon does not qualify as a

“craft beer” because such beers are produced by “small, independent and traditional”

craft breweries as defined by the Brewers Association, a trade organization for

American craft brewers, and MillerCoors is not such a brewery. Id. at 4. More

specifically, according to the Brewers Association, “[t]o qualify as an American craft

brewer, a brewery must: (a) Produce lessthan 6 million barrels of beer annually; (b) Be

less than 25 percent owned or controlled by a non-craft brewer; and (c) Make beer

using only traditional or innovative brewing ingredients.” Id. Plaintiff alleged that

MillerCoors produces more than 76 million barrels of beer on an annual basis. Id.

Plaintiff alleged that even though Blue Moon is not really a craft beer,

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MillerCoors engages in deceptive and misleading business practices to misrepresent

it as a craft beer in order to capture a slice of the burgeoning craft beer market and

“charge up to 50% more for Blue Moon beer than it charges for other MillerCoors

products.” Id. at 4–5.

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First, Plaintiff alleged that “Defendant goesto great lengths to disassociate Blue

Moon beer from the MillerCoors name.” Id. at 4. Even though Blue Moon is owned by

MillerCoors, MillerCoors’ ownership of Blue Moon is not disclosed on the bottle or

the outer packaging of Blue Moon beers, which instead states that the product is

manufactured by “Blue Moon Brewing Co.” Id. In fact, Blue Moon is brewed by

MillerCoors at its Golden, Colorado, and Eden, North Carolina breweries, which also

produce all of MillerCoors’ other beers. Id. The Blue Moon Brewing Company

(“BMBC”) website also contains no reference to MillerCoors’ ownership of the brand,

although MillerCoors’ own website lists Blue Moon among its “craft beer” brands. Id.

Second, Plaintiff argued that Defendant’s use of the registered trademark “Artfully

Crafted” in the labeling and advertising for Blue Moon beer misleads consumers into

thinking Blue Moon is a craft beer. Id. at 5. Third, Plaintiff argued that Blue Moon’s

“premium price,” in line with other craft beers, as well as its “placement among other

craft beers” in San Diego-area retailers, misled him into believing Blue Moon was a

craft beer. Id.

On May 30, 2015, Defendant removed the case to federal court pursuant to the

Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Notice of Removal 3, ECF No. 1. On

July 13, 2015, Defendant filed their first motion to dismiss. ECF No. 6. On October 26,

2015, the Court granted the first motion to dismiss. Order Granting Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss (“Dismissal Order”), ECF No. 17.

First, the Court found that the safe harbor exception to California’s consumer

protection laws applied to the Plaintiff’s UCL, CRLA, and FAL claims to the extent

“On average, a six pack of craft beer typically costs $2.00 to $3.00 more than 1

a six pack of macrobrewed, or mass produced beer.” Compl. 3. 

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that those claims relied on MillerCoors’ omission of their ownership interest, or their

designation of BMBC asthe brewer, on the label or packaging of Blue Moon beers. Id.

at 12.

Second, the Court found that, based on the facts as pled in the initial Complaint,

a reasonable consumer was not likely to be deceived by the Defendant’s

representations. The Court found that: (1) based solely on the facts pled that “there is

not a single reference to MillerCoors on the Blue Moon Brewing Company website,”

while “Blue Moon is prominently displayed on the MillerCoors website,” the Court

could not conclude that the reasonable consumer could be misled by Blue Moon’s

internet presence; (2) standing alone, MillerCoors’ use of the “Artfully Crafted”

trademark was non-actionable puffery; (3) Plaintiff could not argue that other features

of Blue Moon’s advertising were deceptive because he had pled no other features of

Blue Moon’s advertising; (4) Plaintiff could not argue that Blue Moon’s “placement

among other craft beers” in retail stores was deceptive because Plaintiff did not allege,

and provided no factual allegations from which the Court could reasonably infer, that

MillerCoors has any control over where retailers place Blue Moon on their shelves; and

(5) Plaintiff provided no authority supporting the proposition that the price of a product

constitutes a representation or statement about the product. Id. at 12–16.

The Court then found that Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficiently particular to

satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements for fraud cases, id. at

17, but that Plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief, id. at 19. The Court

permitted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, but cautioned that Plaintiff could not

rely on MillerCoors’ use of the BMBC trade name in Blue Moon’s label or packaging

or, standing alone, the “Artfully Crafted” trademark to support his consumer protection

claims. Id. at 20.

II. Amended Complaint and Second Motion to Dismiss

On November 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. ECF No. 19.

The amended complaint makes the same legal claims as the original complaint, id. at

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11–20, but adds a number of new factual allegations. 

First, the amended complaint alleges that in addition to the Brewers Association

definition, Blue Moon also does not meet the dictionary definition of a craft beer. The

term “craft beer” is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as a “specialty beer

produced in limited quantities,” by Cambridge Dictionary as “beer made using

traditional methods in small, independent breweries,” and by the Oxford English

Dictionary as “a beer made in a traditional or non-mechanized way by a small

brewery.” Id. at 4.

Second, the amended complaint alleges that MillerCoors engages in a number

of practicesto produce the “wholesale fiction” that Blue Moon is a craft beer produced

by a small, independent brewery, including: (a) portraying Blue Moon as having being

invented independently by Dr. Keith Villa on the BMBC website, when in fact Dr.

Villa was a MillerCoors employee who developed Blue Moon at the direction of

MillerCoors executives; (b) portraying Blue Moon as being brewed at a “small, limited

capacity brewpub known as ‘The SandLot Brewery’” on the BMBC website and

YouTube channel, when in fact Blue Moon is brewed at MillerCoors’ Golden,

Colorado and Eden, North Carolina brewing facilities; (c) directing retail

establishments, through MillerCoors’ network of distributors, to stock Blue Moon in

the craft beer section in retail establishments; (d) endorsing retailers’ misrepresentation

of Blue Moon as a craft beer by permitting such retailersto use Blue Moon’s trademark

protected logo in advertisementsidentifying Blue Moon as a craft beer; (e) advertising

Blue Moon as a craft beer at concert venues through MillerCoors’ sponsorship and

distribution agreements; (f) selling Blue Moon as a craft beer in non-retail venues, such

as national restaurant chains; and (g) directing Blue Moon to be priced as a craft beer,

“[t]hat is, $2.00 to $3.00, or up to 50 percent more per six pack than the average

macrobrew,” and thereby engaging in a practice of “falsely representing that a product

has characteristics that command a premium price, and then actually charging a

premium price for the product.” Id. at 5–8. 

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This motion to dismiss followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’”

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claimhas facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Threadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting

that on a motion to dismiss the court is“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation”). “The pleading standard . . . does not require ‘detailed

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations

omitted). “Review islimited to the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint

by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” See MetlzerInv.

GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In analyzing a pleading, the Court sets conclusory factual allegations aside,

accepts all non-conclusory factual allegations as true, and determines whether those

nonconclusory factual allegations accepted as true state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–84; Turner v. City & Cty. of San

Francisco, 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “conclusory allegations

of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And while “[t]he plausibility standard

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is not akin to a probability requirement,” it does “ask[] for more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). In determining plausibility, the Court is permitted “to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

DISCUSSION

I. Judicial Notice

“Although generally the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim is limited to the Complaint, a court may consider evidence on which the

complaint necessarily relies if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the

document is central to the plaintiff[’s] claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity

of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Daniels–Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629

F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(b) permits judicial notice of a fact when it is “not subject to reasonable

dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court'sterritorial jurisdiction;

or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” The court may take notice of such facts on its own, and

“must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the

necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). 

MillerCoors seeks judicial notice of (a) a November 16, 2015 article from The

San Diego Union-Tribune entitled “Ballast Point to be Sold to N.Y. corporation for

$1B,” and (b) a press release fromNasdaq entitled “LeadingCraft BrewerBallast Point

Joins Constellation Brands.” ECF No. 22-4. Facts that become widely known through

news or other announcements, including on websites, are subject to judicial notice.

Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454, 458–59 (9th Cir. 1995) (taking judicial

notice of newspaper article regarding widespread layoffs because the layoffs were “a

fact which would be generally known in Southern California and which would be

capable ofsufficiently accurate and ready determination”). Neither party questions the

authenticity of these documents. The Court finds that these documents are appropriate

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for judicial notice because the acquisition of Ballast Point by Constellation Brands is

a fact which is generally known in San Diego and capable of sufficiently accurate and

ready determination.

Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of the Written Testimony of Bob Pease, Chief

Executive Officer of the Brewers Association, before the Senate Committee on the

Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights on

December 8, 2015, concerning the pending merger between Anheuser-Busch Inbev

(“ABI”) and MillerCoors. ECF No. 23-1. Information contained in official documents,

including documents appearing on a governmental website,is judiciallynoticeable. See

Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (judicial

notice ofinformation displayed on school district website); Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n

v. City of Simi Valley, 864 F.2d 1475, 1479–80 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We take judicial

notice of these figures, contained in the reports of a public body, pursuant to Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b)(2).”). However, MillerCoors objects to the use of Mr. Pease’s testimony

to establish the truth of the matters stated therein, arguing that the Court should only

take judicial notice of the limited fact that Mr. Pease made the statements contained in

his written testimony. ECF No. 25 at 1–2. “[A] court may not take judicial notice of a

fact that is ‘subject to reasonable dispute.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). Thus, while the Court takes judicial

notice of the limited fact that Mr. Pease made the statements contained in his written

testimony, the Court declines to rely on Mr. Pease’s testimony to establish the truth of

the matters stated therein. 

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant argues that the case should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to

allege an actionable misrepresentation, since (1) a reasonable consumer would not be

misled by MillerCoors’ advertising; (2) MillerCoors is not liable for third-party

representations; and (3) MillerCoors’ alleged pricing of Blue Moon is not a

representation. Def. Mot. 6–16. Because the Court agrees, the Court GRANTS

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss.2

A. Legal Standard

Claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA that representations are misleading are

governed by the “reasonable consumer” test, which asks whether “members of the

public are likely to be deceived.” Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938

(9thCir. 2008) (“TheCalifornia Supreme Court has recognized that these laws prohibit

not only advertising which isfalse, but also advertising which[,] although true, is either

actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or

confuse the public.”). A likelihood of deception means that “it is probable that a

significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting

reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” Lavie v. Procter &GambleCo., 105

Cal. App. 4th 496, 508 (2003). Whether a business practice is deceptive generally

presents a question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. See

Williams, 552 F.3d at 938. In rare circumstances, however, courts can conclude as a

matter of law that members of the public are not likely to be deceived. See id. at 939.

B. Whether a Reasonable Consumer Could Be Misled By

MillerCoors’ Advertising

Defendant overstates the scope of the Court’s previous findings when it argues

that “[t]he Court has already found that no reasonable consumer could be misled by

Blue Moon’s internet presence.” Def. Mot. 6. What the Court found was that, “[b]ased

on those facts standing alone” that “‘there is not a single reference to MillerCoors on

the Blue Moon Brewing Company website’” while “Blue Moon is prominently

displayed on the MillerCoors web site,” the Court could not conclude that a reasonable

consumer could be misled by Blue Moon’s internet presence. Dismissal Order 13.

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege an actionable 2

misrepresentation, the Court need not address Defendant’s additional arguments that

(1) Plaintifffailed to plead his claims with the requisite particularity; (2) Plaintifffailed

to allege reliance; (3) Plaintiff failed to allege materiality; and (4) Plaintiff lacks

standing to pursue injunctive relief because he has no intent to purchase Blue Moon

beer in the future. See Def. Mot. 16–24.

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Plaintiff has now alleged additional features of MillerCoors’ internet advertising of

Blue Moon on both the BMBC website and YouTube channel that must be considered

by the Court. Am. Compl. 5–6.

That said, the Court agrees with Defendant that the three internet advertisements

identified by Plaintiff and featured on the BMBC website

(bluemoonbrewingcompany.com) and YouTube channel, “The Story of Blue Moon,”

“The SandLot Guys,” and “Our Approach to Brewing,” constitute non-actionable

puffery.

“[T]o be actionable as an affirmative misrepresentation, a statement must make

a specific and measurable claim, capable of being proved false or of being reasonably

interpreted as a statement of objective fact.” Vitt v. Apple Computer, Inc., 469 Fed.

Appx. 605, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (affirming finding

that descriptors “mobile,” “durable,” “portable,” “rugged,” “built to withstand

reasonable shock,” “reliable,” “high performance,” “high value,” an “affordable

choice,” and an “ideal student laptop” were “generalized, non-actionable puffery

because they are ‘inherently vague and generalized terms’ and ‘not factual

representations that a given standard has been met’”); see also McKinney v. Google,

Inc., 2011 WL 3862120, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2011) (“Although misdescriptions

[sic] of specific or absolute characteristics of a product are actionable, generalized,

vague, and unspecified assertions constitute mere puffery upon which a reasonable

consumer could not rely.” (internal punctuation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).

Upon review of the three advertisements, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not

identified any affirmative misrepresentations made therein. The contents of the

advertisements are as follows: “The Story of Blue Moon” is a 1 minute, 40 second

video on YouTube wherein Keith Villa describes his background as a brewer, the

influence of Belgium himself and his development of Blue Moon, and the ingredients

and flavor profile of Blue Moon beer. See Def. Mot., Ex. B. “Our Approach to

Brewing” is a 2 minute, 9 second video on the BMBC website which depicts Keith

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Villa and a number of other brewers at the “Sandlot” brewery discussing the

development of seasonal varietals of Blue Moon featuring ingredients such as

spearmint and frankincense. See id. Finally, “Meet the Brewers” is a webpage on the

BMBC website which offers biographies of Keith Villa and four other BMBC

employees, including the three “SandLot Guys.” See id., Ex. G. 

Plaintiff alleges that the three advertisements “falsely represent that Blue Moon

is brewed by a small, independent craft brewery, rather than the second largest brewing

company in the United States” by (1) depicting Blue Moon as being brewed in 10-

barrel, or 310 gallon brew tanks, when Blue Moon is generally brewed in 60,000 to

80,000 gallon tanks; (2) depicting MillerCoors employee Keith Villa as “founder” and

brew master; (3) depicting a small, brick building with a sign that reads “Blue Moon

Brewing Company at The SandLot” asthe brewery that produces Blue Moon beer; and

(4) suggesting that Blue Moon is brewed at “The SandLot” by referring to the Blue

Moon brewers as “The SandLot Guys.” Am. Compl. 5–6; Pl. Mot. 15–16. Finally,

Plaintiff argues that although the BMBC website and YouTube channel “stop short of

calling Blue Moon a craft beer, they feature all of the elements necessary to depict a

craft beer.” Pl. Mot. 16.

However, Plaintiff fails to point to any “specific and measurable claim[s],

capable of being proved false or of being reasonably interpreted as a statement of

objective fact” made in the advertisements. First, while “The Story ofBlue Moon” does

contain brief images of a Blue Moon brewery with comparatively small brewing tanks,

nowhere in the video is it stated that the brewery depicted is the only place in which

Blue Moon is produced. See Def. Mot., Ex. B.

Second, while the video does depict Keith Villa as the “brewmaster” and the

formulator of Blue Moon’s original recipe, “Belgian White,” MillerCoors claims, and

Plaintiff does not dispute, that Keith Villa did create Blue Moon Belgian White in

1995. See Def. Mot. 8. More importantly, nowhere in either “The Story of Blue Moon”

or “Our Approach to Brewing” videos is it stated that Blue Moon originated from an

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independent brewery.

Third, MillerCoors claims, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that “the SandLot”

brewery wasindeed where Blue Moon Belgian White wasfirst produced in 1996. Def.

Mot. 10. And again, nowhere in the “Our Approach to Brewing” video isit represented

that Blue Moon is currently produced only out of the SandLot brewery. See Def. Mot.,

Ex. B.

Fourth, the biographies of the “SandLot Guys” brewers on the BMBC website

do not contain any affirmative representations that Blue Moon is brewed by a small,

independent brewery. See Def. Mot., Ex. G.

Finally, as Plaintiff acknowledges, nowhere in these advertisements is Blue

Moon described as or stated to be a craft beer.

Thus, the Court agrees with Defendant that at best, these advertisements contain

“generalized, vague, and unspecified assertions” that amount to “mere puffery upon

which a reasonable consumer could not rely.”3

C. Whether Defendant is Liable for Third-Party Representations

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed to the extent that they

are premised on third-party conduct. The Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges that

MillerCoors “requires that retail establishments stock Blue Moon among the craft

beers,” “endorses third-party representations that misidentify[] Blue Moon as a craft

beer,” “[t]hrough its sponsorship and distribution agreements . . . falsely advertises

Blue Moon as a craft beer at various concert and sporting venues,” and either directs

or consentsto the selling of blue Moon as a craft beer in non-retail establishments, such

Defendant also argues that the terms “craft” and “craft beer” are not actionable

3

statements. Def. Mot. 12. However, the Court need not decide the issue of whether

“craft” or “craft beer” can ever be an actionable statement, because as Defendant points

out, id., Plaintiff nowhere alleges that MillerCoors refers to Blue Moon as a craft beer

in its advertising, see Am. Compl. 5–6. Plaintiff did previously allege that MillerCoors

referred to Blue Moon as a craft beer on its own corporate website, but as the Court

previously observed, “the Court cannot conclude that the reasonable consumer,

viewing Blue Moon’s identification as a craft beer on MillerCoors’ company website,

could be misled into believing that Blue Moon is an ‘independently brewed, handcrafted beer’ not owned by Miller Coors.” Dismissal Order 14. 

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as “national restaurant chains such as Applebee’s and TGI Friday’s.” Def. Mot. 5–8. 

However, as Defendant correctly points out, unfair competition claims cannot

be predicated on vicarious liability. Emery v. Visa Internat. Serv. Ass’n, 95 Cal. App.

4th 952, 960 (2002) (“The concept of vicarious liability has no application to actions

brought under the unfair business practices act.” (quoting People v. Toomey, 157 Cal.

App. 3d 1, 14 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the context of false

advertising, there is no duty to investigate the truth of statements made by others. Id.

at 964 (citing McCulloch v. Ford Dealers Advertising Assn., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1385,

1391 (1991); Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1122 (1987)). 

“A defendant’s liability must be based on his personal ‘participation in the unlawful

practices’ and ‘unbridled control’ over the practices that are found to violate section

17200 or 17500.” Id. (citing Toomey, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 15).

Plaintiff does not allege such “personal participation” or “unbridled control”

here. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the way Defendant “requires that retail

establishments stock Blue Moon among the craft beers” is that Defendant “contracts

with a network of distributors, who in turn contract with retailers based on Defendant’s

requirements, to ensure that Blue Moon is stocked and sold in the retailer’s craft beer

section.” Am. Compl. 6. Plaintiff does not plead any specific features of the alleged

agreements between MillerCoors and the distributors that would enable MillerCoors

to be able to exercise “unbridled control” by proxy over the retailers, who are alleged

to contract with the distributors, not MillerCoors. And indeed, in the next sentence of

the amended complaint, Plaintiff retreats from the claim that Defendant actually

“requires” retailers to stock Blue Moon in the craft beer section, continuing,

“[a]ccordingly, Defendant is not only aware that this practice occurs, but encourages

it, and whenever possible, requires it.” Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s allegations in

this regard thus appear to be conclusory, and lacking in the factual content that would

allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged. 

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Next, Plaintiff alleges,without anyfactual support, that Defendant endorsesthird

party advertisements for craft beer sales, which include Blue Moon, based on the

advertisementsfeaturing Defendant’s trademark. At best, Plaintiff alleges that because

advertisements created bythird parties “feature Defendant’s trademark protected logo,”

such advertisements “were created with Defendant’s knowledge and consent, if not at

Defendant’s direction.” See, e.g., Am. Compl. 7. However, “the law is clear and

dispositive [that a] trademark owner’s grant of permission to another to use the owner’s

mark, combined with efforts to ‘police’ such use, do not make the user the agent or

intermediary of the owner. The owner may retain sufficient control to protect and

maintain its interest in the mark without establishing an agency relationship.” Emery,

95 Cal. App. 4th at 961 (citation omitted). Put another way, “[t]he use of such a mark

does not constitute an endorsement.” Id. at 964 (citing New Kids on the Block v. New

America Pub., Inc., 971 F. 2d 302, 308–309 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

Similarly, the claims regarding false advertising at concert and sporting venues

are based on unspecified sponsorship agreements and a concession stand which

features the Blue Moon logo and reads “craft beer,” while the claims regarding false

advertising at non-retail venues are based on the control allegedly exercised by

MillerCoors by proxy through its distributors and the menus and print advertisements

of national restaurant chains such as Applebee’s and TGI Friday’s. Am. Compl. 7.

Again, a third party’s use of a trademark does not constitute an endorsement by the

trademark owner.4

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is not liable for the third party

representations of Blue Moon as a craft beer alleged by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff also argues that MillerCoors might be liable for the actions of third

4

parties under an “aiding and abetting” theory. Pl. Resp. 20. Again, however, Plaintiff

does not plead a conspiracy to defraud between MillerCoors and third parties. See

People v. Bestline Products, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 3d 879, 918 (1976). Similarly, in his

response, Plaintiff for the first time alleges that “[b]ecause MillerCoors owns many of

its distributors in the state of California, the trier of fact could reasonably find that an

agency relationship exists.” Pl. Resp. 20. However, Plaintiff did not allege that

MillerCoors owned any of its distributors anywhere in the amended complaint.

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D. Whether Defendant’s Pricing of Blue Moon Constitutes a

Representation

Finally, Defendant argues that MillerCoors’ pricing of Blue Moon cannot

constitute a misrepresentation. The Court agrees. The Court previously found that

Plaintiff had failed to point to any case “supporting the proposition that the price of a

product can constitute a representation or statement about the product.” Dismissal

Order 16 (citing Boris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1169 (C.D. Cal.

2014) (finding that the price of a migraine medication did not constitute a

representation or statement about the product that could support consumer claims

against retailer under the UCL, CLRA, or FAL)). Plaintiff has again failed to do so

here. See Pl. Resp. 11 (acknowledging that courts “generally” only “consider product

pricing in consumer protection litigation . . . in the context of calculating damages”).

III. Leave to Amend

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 provides that courts should freely grant leave to amend when

justice requires it. Accordingly, when a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state

a claim, “leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that the

allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possiblycure

the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992)

(internal quotationmarks omitted).Amendment may be denied, however, if amendment

would be futile. See id.

The Court already granted Plaintiff leave to amend once before in order to cure

the deficiencies identified in the original complaint. See Dismissal Order 20. In that

Order, the Court stated that it “d[id] not find it impossible that the Plaintiff could allege

other facts as to MillerCoors’ advertising or sales practices that would support their

claim that MillerCoors deceptively or misleadingly represents Blue Moon as a craft

beer.” Id. Having already given Plaintiff a second opportunity to plead his case, and

having found the meritslacking, the Court findsthat at thisjuncture, amendment would

be futile. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant MillerCoors’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint, ECF No. 22, is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff is DENIED leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 16, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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