Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00191/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

_________________________________________ 

 ) 

Gulf Restoration Network, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil No. 14-cv-01773 (APM) 

 ) 

Sally Jewell ) 

Secretary of the Interior, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

_________________________________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Gulf Restoration Network brought this action under the Administrative Procedure 

Act challenging the decision of various federal agencies to approve the Gulf State Park 

Enhancement Project for inclusion in early restoration efforts responsive to the 2010 Deepwater 

Horizon oil spill. Plaintiff alleges that the decision to approve the project, which is to be located 

in the State of Alabama’s Gulf State Park, violated the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 

Before the court is Defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Alabama. After considering the parties’ submissions and the 

relevant law, the court concludes that in the interest of justice, particularly the interest of 

Alabama’s citizens in deciding this controversy at home, this matter shall be transferred. 

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II. BACKGROUND 

A. The Parties 

Plaintiff Gulf Restoration Network (“Gulf Restoration”) is a non-profit organization, based 

in New Orleans, Louisiana, and incorporated under the laws of the State of Louisiana. 

Gulf Restoration endeavors “to unite and empower people in protecting and restoring the Gulf [of 

Mexico]’s natural resources.” Amended Complaint, ECF No. 12, ¶ 13 [hereinafter Am. Compl.]. 

Plaintiff maintains satellite offices in Madison, Mississippi, and St. Petersburg, Florida. It does 

not have an office in the District of Columbia. Gulf Restoration “has members throughout the 

states bordering the Gulf of Mexico and nationwide,” including “numerous members who live, 

work, and take advantage of the tremendous outdoor recreation opportunities in and around Gulf 

State Park and otherwise in the vicinity of the” Gulf State Park Enhancement Project (the 

“Project”). Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Gulf Restoration alleges that the Project will harm its members’ 

enjoyment of the Park. Id. ¶ 14. 

Defendants the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”), the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and 

the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) (collectively, the “Defendant Agencies”) 

serve as “Federal trustees” under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) with respect to the 2010 

Deepwater Horizon oil spill (the “Spill”). Id. ¶ 4. Defendants Sally Jewell, Kathryn Sullivan, 

Gina McCarthy, and Tom Vilsack are sued by Plaintiff in their official capacities as leaders of the 

Defendant Agencies—Defendant Jewell is Secretary of the Interior, Defendant Sullivan is 

Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and the NOAA Administrator, 

Defendant McCarthy is the Administrator of the EPA, and Defendant Vilsack is Secretary of 

Agriculture. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. All Defendants are based in the District of Columbia. Id. ¶ 12. 

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated both OPA and the National Environmental Policy 

Act of 1969 (“NEPA”) by approving the Project without adequately considering alternative early 

restoration projects. See id. ¶¶ 76-84. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants violated OPA by 

failing to document how the Project will help make Alabama whole from the Spill, see id. ¶¶ 

95-106, and violated NEPA by failing to justify the need for, or the benefits anticipated from, the 

Project, as well as insufficiently assessing its environmental impacts, see id. ¶¶ 85-94, 107-14. 

B. The Decisions at Issue 

The process that led to the selection and approval of the Project took place over a threeand-half-year period and involved multiple federal and state actors, as well as multiple public 

comment periods. The complex and diffuse nature of the decision-making process requires the 

court to go into some detail about how the Project came to be. The facts set forth below are derived 

from the parties’ pleadings, representations made at the hearing on Defendants’ motion to transfer, 

and post-hearing submissions ordered by the court. 

1. The Spill and Early Restoration Efforts 

On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, an offshore drilling rig operated by British 

Petroleum (“BP”), caught fire, exploded, and sank in the Gulf of Mexico. See Defs.’ Mot. to 

Transfer Venue, ECF No. 7 [hereinafter Mot.], Ex. 1, Record of Decision for the Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill: Final Programmatic and Phase III Early Restoration Plan and Early Restoration 

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Phase III ERP/PEIS), at 3 [hereinafter ROD]. 

Over the next 87 days, approximately five million barrels of oil and an undetermined amount of 

natural gas discharged into the Gulf of Mexico. Id. The Spill was “one of the largest . . . in U.S. 

history,” id., and, according to Plaintiff, “caused environmental damage on a scale and of a 

complexity never before witnessed in the history of American oil production,” Am. Compl. ¶ 1. It 

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affected natural resources located throughout the Gulf of Mexico and in coastal areas of Florida, 

Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and most pertinent to this action, Alabama (collectively, the 

“Affected States”). ROD at 3. 

The Spill and its environmental impacts produced a sweeping response involving a 

multitude of federal- and state-level actors located in several states and the District of Columbia. 

The early restoration process was governed by OPA, which provides a mechanism for assigning 

liability for removal costs and damages caused by oil spills. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). Under OPA, 

President Obama designated the Defendant Agencies as “Federal trustees,” and the Affected 

States’ governors designated a total of 13 state agencies as “State trustees” (collectively, the 

Trustees”).1

 ROD at 1-2. The Trustees were responsible for “assess[ing] natural resource 

damages” and “develop[ing], and implement[ing] a plan for the restoration, rehabilitation, 

replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent, of the natural resource” harmed by the Spill. 

33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(1). The State trustees included the Alabama Department of Conservation and 

Natural Resources and the Geological Survey of Alabama (collectively, the “Alabama Trustees”).2 

On April 19 and 20, 2011, representatives from DOI, NOAA, 12 State trustees, the United 

States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and BP executed a “Framework for Early Restoration 

Addressing Injuries Resulting from the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.” See Mot., Ex. 2, ¶ 1 

[hereinafter Framework Agreement]. The Framework Agreement stipulated that the Trustees and 

BP will “work together to complete identification” and “implementation of early restoration 

                                                            

1

 EPA, USDA, and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission were not initially designated as Trustees, 

but were added thereafter. See Mot. at 3 n.1. 2

 The “State trustees” also include five Louisiana agencies (The State of Louisiana’s Coastal Protection and 

Restoration Authority; Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office; Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality; 

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries; Louisiana Department of Natural Resources), three Texas agencies 

(Texas Parks and Wildlife Department; Texas General Land Office; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality), 

two Florida agencies (Florida Department of Environmental Protection; Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation 

Commission), and one Mississippi agency (Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality). ROD at 1-2. 

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projects that will provide meaningful benefits to accelerate restoration in the Gulf as quickly as 

practicable, with the goal of beginning projects in 2011 and 2012.” Id. ¶ 2. BP agreed to provide 

$1 billion to fund the early restoration projects. Id. ¶ 4.3

2. The Project’s Selection 

After the Framework Agreement’s execution, the Alabama Trustees commenced an “initial 

screening process” in which they solicited input from the public and considered several hundred 

potential early restoration projects. See Mot., Ex. 3, Programmatic and Phase III Early Restoration 

Plan and Early Restoration Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, at 1, 55 [hereinafter 

EIS]; see also Mot. Hr’g Tr. 8:22-9:4, Mar. 3, 2015. The “Alabama Trustees considered a range 

of project types to determine how best to proceed with Early Restoration projects aimed at 

restoring lost recreational use,” including “land acquisition, smaller scale beach and boating access 

improvements, and development of nearshore artificial diving and fishing reefs.” EIS at 57. The 

Gulf State Park Enhancement Project was among the projects that the Alabama Trustees identified. 

The Project contemplated the construction of a hotel, a convention center, and facilities for 

environmental research and education, along with various recreational and ecological 

enhancements. Id. at 55-56. All aspects of the Project were to be located in Gulf State Park, which 

is located on state-owned land in southern Alabama on the coast bordering the Gulf of Mexico. 

Id.

                                                            

3

 In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff asserts that the Framework Agreement, and the fact that three of its 

signatories—Kenneth L. Salazar (DOI), Jane Lubchenco (NOAA), and Thomas J. Perrelli (DOJ)—are based in the 

District of Columbia, evidences a connection between the District of Columbia and the decision to approve the Project. 

See Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 9, at 7 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n]. The 

court is not persuaded by this argument. Plaintiff challenges the decision to approve the Project; it does not challenge 

the decision to execute the Framework Agreement. The Framework Agreement provides necessary context for the 

decision at issue and thus is relevant to this discussion, but the physical location of its signatories does not bear on the 

court’s decision regarding Defendants’ motion. 

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The Alabama Trustees then presented the Project to the “Trustee Council.” EIS at 1; see 

also Hr’g Tr. 9:2-4. The Trustee Council consisted of representatives from each federal and state 

Trustee. Hr’g Tr. 6:24-7:2. Its “day-to-day” work was undertaken by an Executive Committee, 

id. at 7:2-4, the members of which performed “some technical screening” of proposed early 

restoration projects, negotiated with BP regarding each project, and “at the end of the day decided 

to include projects” in early restoration efforts, id. at 9:8-11. Each Federal trustee and each 

Affected State appointed a primary and an alternate representative to the Executive Committee. 

Id. at 7:2-7. Fourteen individuals served as either a primary or alternate representative of one of 

the Federal Agencies during the period when the Trustee Council likely discussed the Project. See 

Notice of Filing Agency Designations & Meeting Mins., ECF No. 14, at 1-2 [hereinafter Defs.’ 

Suppl.]. During the relevant time period, nine of those individuals were based in the District of 

Columbia, four were based outside the District of Columbia,4

 and one was based both inside and 

outside the District of Columbia.5

 The parties did not present evidence as to the location of each 

state’s primary and alternate representative, but the court assumes each was based in the state that 

he or she represented. The Executive Committee did not have a permanent location; it often 

operated “virtually.” Hr’g Tr. 7:8-14. It met on 12 occasions during the relevant period; none of 

the meetings were held in the District of Columbia.6 Id. at 9:13-15. 

The Trustee Council approved early restoration projects in several phases. See ROD at 4. 

After approving Phase I and Phase II, the Trustee Council announced in May 2013 its intent to 

                                                            

4

 Cythina Dohner (DOI) was based in Atlanta, Georgia; Craig O’Connor (NOAA) was based in Seattle, Washington; 

Ben Scaggs (EPA) was based in Stennis Space Center, Mississippi; and, Homer Wilkes (USDA) was based in 

Madison, Mississippi. Defs.’ Suppl. at 1-2. 5

 Michele Laur (USDA) was based in the District of Columbia from December 2012 to May 2013, and in Madison, 

Mississippi, and Tampa, Florida, thereafter. Id. 6

 Defendant submitted the minutes of seven Executive Committee meetings at which the Project was discussed. See

Defs.’ Suppl., Ex. 2. Two of the minutes note the meeting’s physical location—Shepherdstown, West Virginia, and 

San Antonio, Texas—while the other five do not. Id.

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move forward with Phase III, which included the Project and 43 other early restoration projects. 

Hr’g Tr. 7:14-21. The document announcing the Project’s inclusion in Phase III explained that, 

“[w]hile all projects proposed to be implemented in Alabama are being put forth by [all] Trustees, 

the specifics of each project in this region were developed and brought to the Trustees for approval 

by ‘implementing trustees.’” EIS at 1. The “implementing trustee” for the Project was the State 

of Alabama, id., specifically the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. 

Mot., Ex. 4, Stipulation Regarding Early Restoration Project for the Deepwater Horizon Oil 

Spill—Gulf State Park Enhancement Project, at 2 [hereinafter Stipulation]. 

On May 2, 2013, the Alabama legislature passed SB 231, a bill “that authorize[d] the 

Alabama Convention Center Project.” Am. Compl. ¶ 50 (citing S.B. 231, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. 

(Ala. 2013)).

3. The Project’s Environmental Impact Statement 

Selection and approval of the Project also involved the preparation of an “environmental 

impact statement,”7

 as required by NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 

 On June 4, 2013, in accordance with OPA and NEPA guidelines, the Trustees “published 

a Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for an Early 

Restoration Plan and Early Restoration Project Types, and to Conduct Scoping Meetings.” ROD 

at 4. The publication of that notice began an 18-month “environmental review” period, which 

culminated in October 2014. Hr’g 16:12-17. 

                                                            

7 An environmental impact statement, which “all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . include in every 

recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 

quality of the human environment,” must address the following: “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives 

to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance 

and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which 

would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 

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The first stage of a NEPA-mandated environmental review is a “scoping period.” During 

that stage, the Trustees held public meetings with the aim of identifying “public and stakeholder 

issues of concern . . . .” Id. at 16:18-20. The scoping period for the Phase III early restoration 

projects, including the Project, involved six public meetings—five in the Affected States and one 

in the District of Columbia. See ROD at 4; see also Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Transfer 

Venue, ECF No. 10, at 4 [hereinafter Defs.’ Reply]. The scoping period ended on August 2, 2013. 

ROD at 4. On December 6, 2013, the Trustees released a draft version of the Project’s 

Environmental Impact Statement (the “EIS”). Id. The draft EIS set forth, among other things, 

information about the Trustees’ compliance with NEPA and OPA. The draft’s release initiated a 

second public comment period, which closed on February 19, 2014. Id. During that period, nine 

public meetings were held concerning the draft EIS in Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Florida, and 

Alabama. Id.; see also Defs.’ Reply at 4. In June 2014, the Trustees released the final EIS. See 

generally EIS. 

The DOI prepared the draft and final EIS in cooperation with “NOAA, EPA, and USDA, 

and Trustees from Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas . . . .” ROD at 2. The 

United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), an agency within DOI, and specifically FWS’ 

Region 4 office in Atlanta, Georgia, supervised the preparation of the EIS. Hr’g Tr. 17:19-21. 

Nanciann Regaldo of FWS’s Atlanta office was designated as the point of contact for “information 

concerning” the EIS. ROD at 258. FWS did not act alone, however. The EIS’ preparation 

involved 17 “cooperating agencies” and 189 individual “preparers,” located throughout the United 

States. See Hr’g Tr. 17:23-18:5, 18:16-18. 

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4. The Project’s Final Approval 

The Project received its final approval on October 2, 2014, when the Trustees (1) issued 

the Record of Decision (the “ROD”)—the final administrative record—and (2) executed an 

agreement with BP titled “Stipulation Regarding Early Restoration Project for the Deepwater 

Horizon Oil Spill—Gulf State Park Enhancement Project” (the “Stipulation”). The Stipulation set 

forth the logistics of BP’s funding of the Project as well as the Project’s terms and conditions. See 

generally Stipulation. Cythina Dohner (DOI), Craig O’Connor (NOAA), Kenneth Kopocis (EPA), 

and Ann C. Mills (USDA) signed both the ROD and the Stipulation on behalf of the Federal 

trustees. See ROD 259-62; Stipulation at 9. These signatories were, at the time, based in Atlanta, 

Georgia, see Mot., Ex. 5, Aff. of Kevin Reynolds (Nov. 21, 2014); Seattle, Washington, see Mot., 

Ex. 6, Aff. of Craig R. O’Connor (Nov. 18, 2014); the District of Columbia; and the District of 

Columbia, respectively. Silver Spring, Maryland-based David Westerholm and Eileen Sobeck of 

NOAA, see Mot., Ex. 6, Aff. of David Westerholm (Nov. 19, 2014), Ex. 7, Aff. of Eileen Sobeck 

(Nov. 18, 2014), both signed the ROD, but not the Stipulation, see ROD at 261. District of 

Columbia-based Sam Hirsch (DOJ) and two representatives of BP signed the Stipulation, see

Stipulation at 9, 15, but not the ROD. Each document was also signed by officials from the 

Affected States. See ROD at 263-67; Stipulation at 10-14. On behalf of Alabama, N. Gunter Guy, 

Jr. (Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources) and Berry H. Tew, Jr. 

(Geological Survey of Alabama) signed the Stipulation, see Stipulation at 10, and Mr. Guy signed 

the ROD, see ROD at 263. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Defendants have moved to transfer this case to the Southern District of Alabama under 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Mot. at 5. Section 1404(a) authorizes a court to transfer a civil action to any 

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other district where it could have been brought “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 

the interest of justice . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Transfer may be appropriate “[e]ven where a 

plaintiff has brought its case in a proper venue.” Preservation Soc’y of Charleston v. U.S. Army 

Corps of Eng’rs, 893 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2012). A case should not be transferred, however, 

“simply because another forum, in the court’s view, may be superior to that chosen by the 

plaintiff.” The Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2000) (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). District courts have “discretion . . . to adjudicate 

motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience 

and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. 

Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). 

Under Section 1404(a), the moving party bears the burden of establishing that transfer is 

proper. Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996) (citations 

omitted). This burden encompasses two distinct steps. First, a movant must establish that the 

plaintiff originally could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district. See Van 

Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622. Second, a movant must show that “considerations of convenience and the 

interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer” to the transferee court. Schmidt v. Am. Physics Inst., 

322 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2004) (citation omitted). The second inquiry “calls on the district 

court to weigh in the balance a number of case-specific factors,” which reflect the public and 

private interests at stake. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29. These factors are not statutory; rather, 

“they are intended to elucidate the concerns implied by the phrase ‘in the interest of justice.’” 

Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 919 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 

Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29). 

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The private-interest factors that courts typically consider, and that this court will consider 

here, include: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the defendants’ choice of forum; (3) where 

the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the 

ease of access to sources of proof. Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16. The public-interest factors 

include: (1) the transferee court’s familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion 

of the dockets of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding 

local controversies at home. Id. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

This case could have been brought in the Southern District of Alabama, and the court has 

considered the relevant private- and public-interest factors. Ultimately, the localized interest of 

Alabama’s citizens in having this controversy decided in Alabama tips the scales in favor of 

transfer. 

A. Original Venue

Both parties agree that this case originally could have been brought in the Southern District 

of Alabama. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue in a suit against the federal government is proper in 

any district in which “a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated . . 

. .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B). Here, venue is proper in the Southern District of Alabama because 

the Project is located there. 

B. Private-Interest Factors

1. Plaintiff’s choice of forum 

Plaintiff’s opposition to transfer focuses greatly on the deference its choice of forum is 

owed. A plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally afforded “substantial deference,” Greater 

Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth, 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 128 (D.D.C. 2001), but that deference is not 

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unyielding. The amount of deference is diminished “where the plaintiff’s choice of forum has no 

meaningful ties to the controversy and no particular interest in the parties or subject matter.” Trout 

Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 17 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d. at 13 (“The degree of deference accorded to [a 

plaintiff’s] choice of forum therefore depends upon the nexus between [a plaintiff’s] chosen forum 

. . . and the dispute over the [action at issue].”). The amount of deference also is diminished where 

a plaintiff is not a resident of its chosen forum. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 

256 (1981) (“When the plaintiff has chosen the home forum, it is reasonable to assume that the 

choice is convenient; but when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign, this assumption 

is much less reasonable and the plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.”).8

Here, Gulf Restoration’s choice of forum is afforded some deference because of the District 

of Columbia’s meaningful ties to the Project, but not “substantial deference” because Gulf 

Restoration is not a resident in this forum. The District of Columbia’s factual connection to the 

dispute cannot be doubted. The Defendant Agencies, all of which are based in the District of 

Columbia, served as Trustees with respect to the Project; nine District of Columbia-based officials 

served as primary or alternate representatives of Defendant Agencies on the Trustee Council’s 

Executive Committee; one public meeting during the scoping period occurred in the District of 

Columbia; Defendant Jewell was directly and personally involved in “announc[ing] the selection 

of the Phase III early-restoration projects at a press conference in Louisiana”; and five District of 

                                                            

8

 In Piper Aircraft, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the doctrine of forum non conveniens, not statutory venue transfer 

under section 1404. Piper Aircraft is nevertheless binding on this court’s transfer analysis because “Section 1404(a) 

finds its origins in the doctrine of [f]orum non conveniens.” SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 

1978) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that section 1404(a) is a revision as well as a codification 

of the forum non conveniens doctrine, which requires a “lesser showing of inconvenience” to transfer than that 

required for a forum non conveniens dismissal. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); see also Savoy 

Indus., 587 F.2d at 1154. 

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Columbia-based officials9

 provided necessary final approval10 of the Project by signing the ROD, 

the Stipulation, or both.

But Plaintiff is not a District of Columbia resident. It is headquartered in Louisiana and 

maintains satellite offices in Mississippi and Florida only. This court consistently has shown less 

deference to entities that chose this forum but did not reside here. See, e.g., Pres. Soc’y, 893 

F. Supp. 2d at 54 (limiting the deference afforded to plaintiffs “based in Charleston” that did not 

allege to have “offices in the District of Columbia or members who live here”); Shawnee Tribe 

v. U.S., 298 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (giving diminished deference to plaintiff Shawnee 

Tribe’s choice of forum because, “despite the Tribe’s assertion that its individual members live 

across the United States, the Tribe’s reservation is, in fact, located in Kansas”); cf. Sierra Club 

v. Van Antwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2007) (granting “a strong presumption in favor of 

the chosen forum” where “[o]f the five plaintiffs that filed suit . . . at least one . . . has its 

headquarters in the District of Columbia, and is thus clearly a resident of this District”); Wilderness 

Soc’y, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (affording substantial deference where “[f]our of the [eight] plaintiffs 

are headquartered in Washington, D.C. and two others have offices here”). Notably, in another 

case, a member of this court decided that Gulf Restoration was “not entitled to this Court’s 

deference” because it “is headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and maintains only one 

satellite office, which is located in the Middle District of Florida.” Van Antwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 

at 11 n.3. 

                                                            

9

 The number of District of Columbia-based officials includes Mr. Westerholm and Ms. Soebeck of NOAA, both of 

whom were based in Silver Spring, Maryland. Other courts in this district have considered a party’s contacts to the 

District of Columbia to include residence in a nearby suburb. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 17 (finding 

one of the plaintiff’s Northern Virginia residence to be “the only [relationship] this suit bears to the District of 

Columbia”). 10 At oral argument, Defendants’ counsel conceded that “at the end of the day, I think you would need all trustees to 

say yes for a project” in order for it to go forward. Hr’g Tr. 42:6-7. 

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Gulf Restoration argues that a “[p]laintiff’s choice of forum is usually accorded great 

deference, unless the plaintiff chooses a forum that is not his home and [the forum] has no 

substantial connection to the subject matter of the action,” contending that the standard is 

“typically conjunctive.” Hr’g Tr. 34:2-6 (emphasis added). The court disagrees. Although there 

are cases that use the conjunctive “and” when discussing deference owed to a plaintiff’s chosen 

forum, see Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 675 F. Supp. 2d 173, 179-80 (D.D.C. 2009) 

(“When there is only an ‘attenuated’ connection between the controversy and the plaintiff’s chosen 

forum and . . . that forum is not the plaintiff’s home forum, the deference afforded to the plaintiff’s 

choice is diminished.”) (citations omitted), to the extent that those cases establish a conjunctive 

standard—and it is not at all clear that is what they do—they cannot be squared with Piper Aircraft. 

In Piper Aircraft, the Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s ruling that the presumption in favor 

of a plaintiff’s chosen forum “applies with less force when the plaintiff or real parties in interest 

are foreign.” 454 U.S. at 266. The Court did not limit the diminished presumption only to those 

cases where there was also little or no factual nexus to the chosen forum. Thus, even though 

Plaintiff has shown meaningful ties between the District of Columbia and the decision to approve 

the Project, because Plaintiff does not reside here, the court treats Plaintiff’s choice of forum with 

some but not substantial deference. 

2. Defendants’ choice of forum 

Defendants’ choice of forum supports transfer in this case and to some degree 

counterbalances the diminished deference owed to Plaintiff’s choice of forum. A defendant’s 

“choice of forum must be accorded some weight” if the defendant presents legitimate reasons for 

preferring to litigate the case in the transferee district. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey, 437 

F. Supp. 2d 42, 48 (D.D.C. 2006). In Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) cases, a defendant’s 

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choice of forum deserves “some weight” where the harm from a federal agency’s decision is felt 

most directly in the transferee district. See id. at 46-47. Here, as the court discusses below, see 

infra Part IV.C., the economic and environmental impacts of the Project will be felt most acutely 

in the Southern District of Alabama. Defendants’ choice of forum is therefore afforded some 

weight. 

3. Where the claim arose 

 The third private-interest factor—where the claim arose—does not support transfer or 

weigh against it. In APA cases, “courts generally focus on where the decisionmaking process 

occurred to determine where the claims arose.” Home Builders, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 179 (citations 

omitted). Where the decision-making process was concentrated in a particular city or state, courts 

have found this factor to weigh heavily in the transfer analysis. See, e.g., Preservation Soc’y, 893 

F. Supp. 2d 49 at 56 (finding that the third-factor supports transfer where all decision-making 

occurred in Charleston, South Carolina, “the Complaint alleges no involvement by Corps staff 

based in Washington . . . . [and] the potential effects Plaintiffs have alleged will all be felt in 

Charleston, not in Washington”); Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 502 F. Supp. 2d 

64, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2007) (denying transfer where the “national rulemaking process DOI engaged 

in when formulating the regulation [at issue] took place in the district, and public discussions of 

the proposed regulation took place here”). On the other hand, where the decision-making process 

was diffuse courts have found this factor to be neutral. See Wilderness Soc’y, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 

15 (finding the third private-interest factor “inconclusive” where research was conducted and 

documents were drafted in Alaska, the Record of Decision and some policy review occurred in the 

District of Columbia, and “the entire rulemaking process had a national dimension as comments 

were received from all 50 states and public meetings were held both inside and outside of Alaska”); 

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see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, No. 12-1833, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2013) (finding 

the third private-interest factor “essentially neutral” where the final rule “was promulgated by FWS 

from Washington, D.C., [but] significant decision making also took place in Wyoming”). 

Though the District of Columbia’s ties to the decision-making process are significant, see 

supra Part IV.B.1., those ties are but a part of the nationwide, federal and state decision-making 

mechanism that resulted in the Project’s selection and approval. Defendant Agencies were joined as 

Trustees by 13 state agencies, including two from Alabama; the Alabama Trustees oversaw the 

initial screening process that resulted in the selection of the Project, which was one of several 

hundred that they reviewed; representatives of each of the Affected States, along with four 

representatives of Defendant Agencies based outside the District of Columbia, served on the 

Trustee Council’s Executive Committee; the preparation of the EIS was overseen by FWS’s office 

in Atlanta, Georgia; 14 of the 15 public meetings regarding Phase III early restoration projects 

were held outside of this forum; the Alabama state legislature passed a bill authorizing the Project; 

representatives of each state agency signed the Stipulation; representatives of each Affected State 

signed the ROD; and two representatives of the Federal Agencies based outside the District of 

Columbia signed both the ROD and the Stipulation. 

In opposing transfer, Plaintiffs have emphasized that “Defendants point to no relevant 

federal decisions made in Alabama, let alone in the Southern District of Alabama, that would 

indicate that the Southern District of Alabama was the source of Gulf Restoration Network’s 

claims.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13; id. at 2 (“Defendants point to no federal official in Alabama, and no 

official of any stripe in the Southern District of Alabama, who played a role in approving the use 

of public funds for the Convention Center Project.”); see also id. at 10 (“It is more telling that 

Defendants have identified no such person residing in the Southern District of Alabama, or indeed 

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anywhere in the State of Alabama.”); Hr’g Tr. at 29:2-3 (“There wasn’t a decision-making process 

in the Southern District of Alabama . . . .”). Plaintiff’s argument unfairly discounts the role that 

Alabama-based actors, particularly Alabama state officials, played in the Project’s selection and 

approval process. The Alabama Trustees selected the Project, recommended it to the Executive 

Committee, and presumably voted for its approval; public meetings were held in Alabama; and an 

Alabama-state trustee was designated as responsible for the Project’s implementation. Thus, the 

transferee district was not, as Plaintiff claims, completely divorced from the decision-making 

process. See generally, e.g., Oceana v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 962 F. Supp. 2d 70 

(D.D.C. 2013) (discussing connections to the state of Alabama in denying transfer to the Southern 

District of Alabama).

4. Remaining private-interest factors 

The remaining private-interest factors do not weigh for or against transfer. As to the fourth 

private-interest factor, the District of Columbia is not more or less convenient to either of the 

parties. Plaintiff is based in New Orleans, Louisiana, which is geographically closer to the 

proposed transferee district than to the District of Columbia. Defendants correctly assert, and 

Plaintiff does not contest, “that the Southern District of Alabama would be no less convenient for 

New Orleans-based GRN than the District of Columbia.” Mot. at 10. With regard to Defendants, 

the District of Columbia obviously is not an inconvenient forum. But nor is the Southern District 

of Alabama, where they have asked to litigate this matter. 

The final two private-interest factors—the convenience of the witnesses and the ease of 

access to sources of proof—are also neutral with respect to transfer. APA cases are likely to be 

decided on the basis of the administrative record, without discovery or witness testimony. See

5 U.S.C. § 706 (in reviewing an agency action “the court shall review the whole record”); see also

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Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“In applying [the Section 706(2)] standard, the focal 

point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new 

record made initially in the reviewing court.”). As this is an APA case in which the administrative 

record is “all digital,” Hr’g Tr. 24:17, the final two factors do not bear on this court’s decision 

regarding transfer. 

C. Public-Interest Factors 

The first two public-interest factors—the transferee court’s familiarity with the governing 

law and the relative congestion of the courts’ dockets—are neutral with regard to transfer. The 

third and final public-interest factor—the local interest in deciding local controversies at home— 

however, weighs heavily in the court’s assessment. 

As to the first public-interest factor—the transferee court’s familiarity with the governing 

law—the Court sees no need to deviate from “the principle that the transferee federal court is 

competent to decide federal issues correctly . . . .” In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 

1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Neither party questions the Southern District of Alabama’s competence to adjudicate the claims at 

issue. Because both this court and the transferee court are competent to interpret OPA, NEPA, 

and the APA “there is no reason to transfer or not transfer based on this factor.” See Nat’l Wildlife 

Fed’n, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 49. 

The second public-interest factor—the relative congestion of this court and the Southern 

District of Alabama—similarly offers no reason to transfer or not transfer this case. Absent a 

showing that the docket of either court is “substantially more congested” than the other, this factor 

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is neutral. Home Builders, 675 F. Supp. at 178. Statistics show and the parties agree that the 

congestion of the two dockets is comparable.11 See Pl.’s Opp’n at 16. 

The third public-interest factor—the local interest in having local controversies decided at 

home—presents a substantial reason for transfer. “In cases which touch the affairs of many 

persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of 

the country where they can learn of it by report only.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 

509 (1947). The D.C. Circuit has recognized that “in complex suits . . . [venue] policies must 

protect not only the interests of the technical defendants . . . but, more importantly, those whose 

rights and interests are in fact most vitally affected by the suit . . . .” Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 

167 n. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1983). A trial held “in the locality of the policies or transactions at issue” 

respects those localized interests and “serves to further public participation in and the 

accountability of a judicial process that will result in decisions directly and vitally affecting large 

numbers of citizens.” Id. The importance of respecting localized interests is equally applicable 

“to the judicial review of an administrative decision which will be limited to the administrative 

record.” Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 19 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that the Spill and the related restoration efforts are of “national 

significance,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 16, that there is a “profound national interest” in how Defendants 

fulfill their obligations pursuant to OPA and NEPA, id. at 18, and that the judgment in this case 

could affect “the conduct of the broader Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource Damage 

                                                            

11 Though Plaintiff does not contest the similarity of the two relevant district court dockets, it argues that the “marked 

contrast between the relative docket congestion” of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which has 

jurisdiction over appeals from the Southern District of Alabama, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia, which has jurisdiction over appeals from this court, weighs in opposition to transfer. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 16 

n. 3. In analyzing the relative congestion of transferor and transferee court’s dockets, courts in this district focus on 

the dockets of the district courts that may hear the case. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 19 (analyzing the 

relative docket congestion of this district and the Northern District of Colorado). The court finds no reason to deviate 

from the well-settled framework of analysis here. 

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Assessment and future natural resource damage assessments in any part of the nation,” id. at 19. 

Defendants acknowledge that the Spill and the subsequent restoration efforts are “issues of interest 

to the entire Gulf region and the Nation as a whole,” Mot. at 11, but argue that the Project is located 

entirely in Alabama, is “aimed at compensating for the lost recreational use of natural resources 

exclusively in Alabama,” id. at 11, and that the outcome of the case “will likely be felt most directly 

and acutely in Alabama,” Defs’ Reply at 8-9. 

The court agrees with Defendants that this case should be litigated within the “view and 

reach” of the people who will be “most vitally affected” by its outcome. Although the Spill and 

subsequent restoration efforts are significant to individuals and communities nationwide, 

particularly those who reside in the other Affected States, Alabama’s superior interest in this 

controversy is undeniable. The judgment in this case will bear directly on whether or not the 

Project will be constructed using funds provided under OPA. It may well determine whether or 

not the Project will be constructed at all.12 A decision regarding the development of Alabamaowned and controlled land directly and “necessarily implicates considerable local economic, 

political, and environmental interests.” Shawnee Tribe, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (finding “the most 

persuasive factor favoring transfer of this litigation to Kansas [to be] the local interest in deciding 

a sizeable local controversy at home,” and transferring the case to the District of Kansas); cf. Home 

Builders, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (denying transfer where “[t]here is no indication . . . that the 

designation of the relevant reaches of the Santa Cruz River as traditional navigable waters will 

have a major impact on local economic, political and environmental interests”). For that reason, 

it is not surprising that Alabama officials and citizens were integrally involved in the selection and 

approval of the Project. See supra Part IV.B.3.; see also Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 19-20 

                                                            

12 The Amended Complaint notes that, thus far, six Alabama governors have tried and failed to complete the Project, 

which has now been approved. See Am. Compl. ¶ 48.  

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(characterizing the controversy at issue as “localized” in part due to the decision-making that 

occurred in Colorado, and transferring the case to the District of Colorado). Though the 

involvement of federal and state officials outside of Alabama illustrates the enormity of the Spill’s 

impact, that fact does not eclipse the substantial interest of Alabama’s citizens in having litigation 

about a development project on state-owned land, whose impact will primarily be felt by 

Alabamans, decided in a local forum. 

The instant case is distinguishable from the cases cited by Plaintiff in support of its 

argument that the controversy at issue is not localized. In both Oceana and Wilderness Society, 

the plaintiffs challenged decisions that affected the use of national resources managed by federal 

officials. 962 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (denying transfer where the challenged decision “re-opened a vital 

national resource reserve held by the Federal Government for the public”) (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); 104 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (“[T]he land at issue has consistently 

been treated as a national resource despite the special interest of the Alaskan people. For instance, 

when Congress transferred management of the [National Petroleum Reserve planning area in 

Alaska] to the Secretary of the Interior in 1976, it was to ensure that the reserve would be regulated 

in a manner consistent with the total energy needs of the Nation.”) (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Further differentiating Oceana is the fact that the national resource at 

issue in that case was located “on the outer continental shelf, beyond the bounds of any state.” 962 

F. Supp. 2d at 77. And the subject of the decision at issue in Defenders of Wildlife, another case 

relied upon by Plaintiff, was similarly not located in a single state. No. 12-1833, slip op. at 10 

(stating that the challenged decision “impact[ed] a wolf population that spans the entire northern 

Rocky Mountains, encompassing not only Wyoming but also Montana, Idaho, and parts of 

Washington, Oregon, and Utah”).

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The facts in Otay Mesa Property L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior and Stand Up are also 

distinguishable from those of the instant case, because in neither case was there an interested “local 

population,” like the people of Alabama. In Otay Mesa, the litigation regarded “private property 

that is not accessible by the public” and therefore “directly affect[ed] only the [p]laintiffs.” 584 

F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (D.D.C. 2008). The court explicitly distinguished the facts of its case from 

that of cases, such as this one, where, “the local population faced specific injury of a particularly 

local nature either as a result of, or upon enjoinment of, a challenged action.” Id. at 127. In Stand 

Up, the local population directly affected by the disputed decision was expressly not interested in 

having the case decided in its home forum. There, the affected community—the North Folk 

Rancheria of Mono Indians—intervened, and opposed transfer. See 919 F. Supp. 2d at 65. 

V. CONCLUSION 

In summary, the question whether to transfer is a close one. The Plaintiff’s choice of forum 

is entitled only to some deference because the District of Columbia is not its home forum. 

Defendants’ choice of forum is afforded some countervailing weight. The remaining private- and 

public-interest factors, save one, are neutral. What then tips the balance in favor of transfer is the 

substantial local interest in deciding local controversies at home. Defendants’ motion to transfer 

this case to the Southern District of Alabama is therefore granted. A separate Order accompanies 

this Memorandum Opinion. 

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