Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02266/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02266-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY Y. HUEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C-07-02266 EDL

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS; STAYING ACTION AND

SETTING CASE MANAGEMENT

CONFERENCE

On April 25, 2007, Plaintiff Terry Huey brought this action for damages pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City and County of San Francisco, Police Chief Heather Fong and

Deputy Chief Charles Keohane, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by

depriving him, without due process of law, of his property interest in his employment by failing to

acknowledge the rescission of his resignation. On August 7, 2007, Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss arguing that: (1) Plaintiff’s due process claim is barred by res judicata; (2) Plaintiff’s due

process claim is barred by issue preclusion; (3) Plaintiff cannot state a claim for violation of due

process because he had no constitutionally protected property right in his employment after he

resigned; and (4) Plaintiff cannot state a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436

U.S. 658 (1978). This motion was fully briefed and was argued before the Court on September 11,

2007. The Court gave the parties leave to file supplemental briefs, which Defendants did on

September 14, 2007 and Plaintiff did on September 18, 2007. 

FACTS

According to the complaint, on April 27, 2005 at approximately 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff reported

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1 Judicial notice of court documents and official police department or city policies is

appropriate. The Court generally may not consider matters outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). However, the Court may take judicial notice of, and properly consider,

matters of public record outside the pleadings. MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504

(9th Cir. 1986); Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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to the San Francisco Police Department’s Personnel Division where he met with Captain Gonzalez

and executed a Separation Report to resign his position as a police officer. See Compl. ¶ 6. Captain

Gonzalez recommended that Plaintiff also submit a Memorandum to his superior officer concerning

his resignation. See id. ¶ 7. 

At approximately noon that day, Plaintiff submitted a Memorandum to Captain Sanford,

Plaintiff’ superior officer. See id. ¶ 8. Captain Sanford was surprised by Plaintiff’s resignation, and

after some discussion, Plaintiff was dissuaded from resigning. See id. ¶ 9. At that meeting, Plaintiff

orally advised Captain Sanford that he would like to rescind his resignation. See id. At

approximately 2:00 p.m., Captain Sanford informed Captain Gonzalez by telephone that Plaintiff did

not wish to resign. See id. ¶ 10. 

At approximately 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., Plaintiff presented a Rescinding Resignation

Memorandum, which Captain Sanford stamped and signed. See id. ¶ 11. At approximately 5:30

p.m., Captain Sanford faxed the Rescinding Resignation Memorandum to Captain Gonzalez,

Captain Keohane and Sergeant Joseph Reilly. See id. ¶ 12. Captain Sanford submitted the

Rescinding Memorandum up the chain of command where it was approved by Deputy Chief Suhr. 

See id. ¶ 13. 

The police department did not acknowledge Plaintiff’s rescission. See id. ¶ 14. On

September 27, 2005, Plaintiff filed a first amended writ of mandate with the superior court seeking

reinstatement and damages. See id. ¶ 15; Request for Judicial Notice Ex. A.1

 On May 3, 2007, the

superior court denied the writ, finding, inter alia, that Plaintiff had not submitted his written

rescission of resignation before the close of business on April 27, 2005 when his resignation became

effective. See Request for Judicial Notice Ex. B. On May 21, 2007, Plaintiff appealed the order

denying the writ. See id. Ex. C. That appeal is pending. 

DISCUSSION

Under certain circumstances, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar

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litigation of claims or issues that have been previously litigated. See Blonder Tongue Laboratories

v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-324 (1971) (doctrine of res judicata bars federal action

where earlier lawsuit involving the same claims and the same parties or their privies reached a final

judgment on the merits); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970) (collateral estoppel means that

“when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue

cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”). “A federal court must

give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the

law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of

Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Accordingly, federal courts apply state preclusion law to determine

whether res judicata or collateral estoppel apply. 

A key component of California preclusion law, which the parties did not raise in their motion

papers, is finality of the underlying judgment. See Federation of Hillside & Canyon Ass’ns v. City

of Los Angeles, 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202 (2005) (res judicata applies if, inter alia, the decision

in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits); Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335,

341(1990) (a number of factors must be met before issue preclusion can apply, including that “the

decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits.”). The Court gave the parties

leave to supplement their briefing to address this issue, but only Plaintiff addressed the finality issue

in his supplemental brief. 

Under California law, the pendency of an appeal precludes finality. See Sosa v. DirecTV,

437 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2006) (“California and federal law differ, however, with respect to when

a judgment rendered by a trial court becomes a ‘final judgment’ for res judicata purposes. ‘Under

California law, . . . a judgment is not final for purposes of res judicata during the pendency of and

until resolution of an appeal.’”) (quoting Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir.

1985)); Nathanson v. Hecker, 99 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1163, n. 1 (2002) (“‘California and federal law

differ in their definition of finality for purposes of res judicata. The pendency of an appeal precludes

finality under California law, but, under federal law and the law of many other states, the pendency

of an appeal does not alter the res judicata effect of an otherwise final judgment.’” [citations

omitted]); People v. Sims, 32 Cal.3d 468, 486 (1982) (“However, it is a well established rule that

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only judgments which are free from direct attack are final and may not be relitigated.”), superceded

by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Preston, 43 Cal.App.4th 450 (1996); see also Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 1049 (“An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement

until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment

is sooner satisfied.”). On May 21, 2007, Plaintiff appealed the state trial court’s denial of his writ of

mandate, and at the September 11, 2007 hearing in this case, the parties informed the Court that

briefing is not yet complete for the state court appeal. Because Plaintiff’s appeal is pending,

preclusion under res judicata or collateral estoppel is premature. 

In their supplemental brief, Defendants, for the first time in this proceeding, raised the issue

of abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention is appropriate

when: (1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) that implicate important state interests;

and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise federal questions. See

Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982);

AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2296775, * 4 (9th Cir. 2007) The Ninth

Circuit in AmerisourceBergen clarified that there is a “vital and indispensable fourth element,” that

is, “. . . if the court’s action would enjoin, or have the practical effect of enjoining, ongoing state

court proceedings.” Id. at *5 (stating that abstention under Younger is not proper unless all four

elements are strictly satisfied). Abstention is not warranted in this case because this vital fourth

element is not satisfied. In this case, a ruling on the issue of damages, which is the relief Plaintiff

seeks here, would not enjoin or have the effect of enjoining the state court action, in which Plaintiff

seeks reinstatement. 

This case also does not appear to implicate an important state interest. Defendants argue that

the important state interest here is an employer’s right to require an employee to reduce a purported

rescission request to writing. That interest, which involves an individual case and does not have

broad application, does not appear to rise to the level required for abstention. See Harper v. Public

Serv. Comm’n, 396 F.3d 348, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that important state interests include

enforcing state judgments, education, family relations, land use and zoning, probate, trusts and

estates, public health, regulation and licensing of health care professionals, charitable trusts, and

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business interests that have historically been subject to state oversight); Fresh International Corp. v.

Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1358-60 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that

California’s interest in protecting the collective bargaining process in the agricultural arena through

enforcement of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act is substantial for purposes of abstention; also

stating that elimination of prohibited sex discrimination was also an important state interest) (citing

Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986)); see also

AmerisourceBergen, 2007 WL 2296775, * 5-6 (“But we have made it clear that ‘[t]he importance of

the [state’s] interest is measured by considering its significance broadly, rather than by focusing on

the state’s interest in the resolution of an individual case.’ [citation omitted]; see also Champion

Int’l, 731 F.2d at 1408 (“[A] challenge [] [to] only one . . . order, not the whole procedure is not a

substantial enough interference with [a state’s] administrative and judicial processes to justify

abstention.”).”). 

At the hearing, Plaintiff suggested that, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court should

stay this proceeding in favor of the pending state court appeal. Plaintiff stated that if he ultimately

prevails in his state court proceeding, he would obtain the relief he seeks and would dismiss this

case. Defendants did not oppose a stay. Therefore, in the interest of judicial and party economy, the

Court stays this action pending resolution of the state court proceedings. Moreover, even if the

Court were to abstain pursuant to Younger, a stay, rather than dismissal, of this case is the

appropriate relief because Plaintiff seeks damages. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517

U.S. 706, 730-31 (1996) (holding that abstention doctrines do not permit a court to dismiss an action

for damages; rather, if abstention is appropriate, a court may stay an action for damages, but may not

dismiss it); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 2007 WL 2296775, * 4 (9th Cir. 2007) (“However,

when a federal plaintiff seeks monetary damages (rather than injunctive or declaratory relief) in a

case requiring abstention under Younger, dismissal is not the appropriate procedural remedy.”)

(emphasis in original); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (“However, federal

courts should not dismiss actions where damages are at issue; rather, damages actions should be

stayed until the state proceedings are completed.”). 

CONCLUSION

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice and this action is stayed pending

resolution of the state court proceeding. A case management conference is scheduled for June 3,

2008, and a joint case management conference statement shall be filed no later than May 27, 2008. 

If the state court proceeding is not complete by May 27, 2008, the parties may seek a continuance of

the case management conference and shall provide the Court with their best estimate of the length of

the continuance based on the status of the state court proceeding. If the state court proceeding is

completed before May 27, 2008, the parties shall inform the Court via joint letter not more than one

week after completion of the proceeding and the Court may advance the date of the case

management conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2007 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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