Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00564/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00564-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GREGORY L. FLETCHER, 

 Plaintiff,

v. 

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 

MARQUEZ, et al., 

 Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv564-JLS-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[ECF No. 15] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and 

Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. For the following reasons, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be 

GRANTED. 

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Gregory L. Fletcher (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se and in forma pauperis, with a civil complaint filed pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 3). In his Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth 

three claims alleging that his First Amendment rights of access to 

courts were violated when prison personnel retaliated against him for 

making a complaint against a correctional officer; by using racial slurs, 

threatening him with a “mini 14 gun,” and falsifying documents 

accusing him of extortion and blackmail of the medically disabled 

inmates he worked with; and by intentionally misplacing or destroying 

the tape recording of his interview about the retaliation with the 

Captain. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff served Correctional Officer Edrozo 

(mistakenly sued as “Odroszo”), Sergeant Whiting, and Lieutenant 

Davis, but the summons was returned unexecuted as to Correctional 

Officer Marquez. (ECF No. 7). 

On March 17, 2017, Defendants Edrozo, Whiting, and Davis filed 

a motion for summary judgment, and served a Rand notice on Plaintiff. 

(ECF No. 15). In their motion, Defendants move for summary judgment 

regarding all claims asserted in the complaint. (Id.). In response, on 

April 05, 2017, Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. (ECF No. 19). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the 

granting of summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

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any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The 

standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is essentially the 

same as for the granting of a directed verdict. Judgment must be 

entered, “if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable 

conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 250-51 (1986). “If reasonable minds could differ,” however, 

judgment should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id. 

 The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as would 

apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden to establish 

any element essential to his case. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252; 

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The moving party bears the initial burden 

of identifying the elements of the claim in the pleadings, or other 

evidence, which the moving party “believes demonstrates the absence of 

a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Adickes v. 

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 

693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). “A material issue of fact is one that 

affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the 

parties’ differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 

F.2d 1301, 1305-1306 (9th Cir. 1982). More than a “metaphysical 

doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986). 

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 The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish, 

beyond the pleadings, there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly supported motion for 

summary judgment, the non-moving party “must point to some facts in 

the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with 

all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[’s] favor, could convince a 

reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School 

Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.

56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249). 

 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court need not 

accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). “No 

valid interest is served by withholding summary judgment on a 

complaint that wraps nonactionable conduct in a jacket woven of legal 

conclusions and hyperbole.” Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th 

Cir. 1989). 

Moreover, “[a] conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed 

facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine 

issue of material fact.” F.T.C. v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 

1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997). But, “the district court may not disregard a 

piece of evidence at the summary stage solely based on its self-serving 

nature.” Nigro, supra, 784 F.3d at 497-498 (finding plaintiff’s 

“uncorroborated and self-serving” declaration sufficient to establish a 

genuine issue of material fact because the “testimony was based on 

personal knowledge, legally relevant, and internally consistent.”). 

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III. PARTIES’ ALLEGATIONS AND CONTENTIONS 

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges three interwoven claims of denial of 

access to the courts arising from incidents of alleged retaliation by 

Defendants in early 2014. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s first claim alleges 

that Officer Marquez retaliated against him and violated his First 

Amendment right of access to courts by “pulling his mini 14 gun out” 

and pointing it to his head, stating that he can “get [him] at any time.” 

(Id. at 3). During this incident, Officer Marquez used racial slurs, 

referring to plaintiff as a “monkey.” (Id.).1

The second claim alleges Defendant Edrozo violated Plaintiff’s 

First Amendment right of access to courts when he conspired with a 

“snitch name[d] Doc,” who gave Defendant Edrozo deceitful information 

that was used in retaliation against Plaintiff. (Id. at 4). Defendant 

Edrozo retaliated against Plaintiff when he wrote a “letter stating, that, 

[Plaintiff] was blackmailing and extorting inmates,” which prevented 

him from writing to the courts. (Id.). 

The third claim alleges Defendants Whiting and Davis violated 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment right of access to courts by intentionally 

destroying and/or hiding a tape recorded interview about the 

threatening incident with Officer Marquez, summarized above. (Id. at 

5). Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants were attempting to “cover it 

 

1 This claim is being summarized despite the fact that Officer Marquez 

has never been served because it relates to Plaintiff’s third claim 

against Defendants. 

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all up” when the “[r]ecorded [t]ape, [] came up missing” while stating 

that “somebody broke into their security locker where no inmate can go” 

and stole it. (Id.). 

Plaintiff attached several CDRC Form 22s to his Complaint. 

Those mainly pertain to an event in which Defendant Whiting and 

another employee took Plaintiff’s property from his cell without 

returning them or leaving a receipt. (Id.). 

B. Defendants’ Contentions 

According to their motion, Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment because “[Plaintiff] did not exhaust all administrative 

remedies.” (ECF No. 15-1 at 702). Defendants stress Plaintiff withdrew 

his appeal at the First Level, thus abandoning his claims without 

exhausting the three required levels of review. (Id. at 71). 

In the alternative, Defendants also contend that the retaliation 

claim against Defendant Edrozo is Heck barred since Plaintiff 

challenges the validity of his conviction for extorting coffee which 

resulted in the loss of good-time credits. (ECF No. 15-1 at 73). 

Defendants further contend that even if the claim against Defendant 

Edrozo is not Heck barred, the “undisputed facts show . . . no 

retaliation” because Defendant Edrozo wrote the rules violation report 

in response to a prior related investigation and several inmate 

informants in an effort to advance penological goals. (Id.). 

 

2All references to page numbers in this Report and Recommendation 

refer to the CM/ECF electronically-assigned pagination unless 

otherwise noted.

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Finally, Defendants Davis and Whiting contend that they are 

entitled to summary judgment because the retaliation claim against 

them is based entirely on “illogical speculation,” for which there is no 

supporting evidence showing that they hid or destroyed the tape. (Id. at 

75). Defendants Davis and Whiting additionally contend that even if it 

was found that they hid or destroyed the tape, Plaintiff was not harmed 

by any adverse action since the interview was also logged in writing. 

(Id. at 77). 

C. Plaintiff’s Contentions 

In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff asserts that “there is 

[]no[] illogical speculation” and it “is as a fact and true” by all evidence 

and proof that Defendants retaliated against him. (ECF No. 19 at 171). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Whiting and Davis intentionally 

destroyed the tape recorded evidence. (Id. at 175, 177). Plaintiff 

further contends that Defendant Edrozo “lied, made false statements 

and perjur[ed] himself” because his witnesses stated that he did nothing 

wrong and willingly gave him coffee. (Id. at 176-177). Additionally, 

Plaintiff contends that the rules violation report on January 14, 2014, 

where Officer R. Bedolla found two 16oz jars of Folgers coffee without a 

receipt, could not have been a violation since items were freely passed 

between officers and inmates. (Id. at 176). 

Plaintiff provides three exhibits (A, B and C) in support of his 

opposition. (Id. at 179). Plaintiff does not mention nor produce any 

evidence that he exhausted the prison’s grievance process. (Id. at 176). 

Exhibit A, labeled “My Witness,” includes the rules violation report 

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from the hearing on his coffee extortion charge. (Id. at 180-182). This 

attachment includes the testimony from all three witnesses questioned 

in this hearing. (Id.). Exhibit B consists of a “Confidential Information 

Disclosure Form,” which states that Defendant Edrozo used confidential 

information in his report. (Id. at 184). Exhibit C includes a report from 

Officer R. Bedolla, detailing the coffee finding and violation for 

“Possession and Exchange.” (Id. at 186-191). Exhibit C further 

includes several property receipts and a list of what items Plaintiff 

claims were damaged or destroyed in a separate incident. (Id.). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

Defendants seek summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff 

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to all claims 

alleged in the Complaint. (ECF No.15-1 at 70-71). In his opposition, 

Plaintiff does not address whether he exhausted the available 

administrative remedies. (ECF No. 19). 

1. Standard 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o action shall 

be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . [42 U.S.C. § 

1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, 

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies 

as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (West 2014); see 

also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001); Morton v. Hall, 599 

F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2010). “[A] prisoner must complete the 

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable 

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procedural rules . . . as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006). 

Prisoners must exhaust prison administrative procedures 

regardless of whether the type of relief they seek matches the type of 

relief available through administrative procedures. See Booth, 532 U.S. 

at 741; see also Morton, 599 F.3d at 945. But the PLRA requires 

exhaustion only of those administrative remedies “as are available,” and 

the PLRA does not require exhaustion when circumstances render 

administrative remedies “effectively unavailable.” Nunez v. Duncan, 

591 F.3d 1217, 1223-1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff’s failure to exhaust 

was excused because he took reasonable steps and was precluded from 

exhausting by the warden’s mistake). 

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative 

defense that defendants must raise and prove. See Jones v. Bock, 549 

U.S. 199, 212-217 (2007) (explaining that inmates are not required to 

specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints). 

Specifically, “the defendant's burden is to prove that there was an 

available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust 

that available remedy.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 

2014) cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014). After 

the defendant has met that burden, the prisoner has the burden of 

production. Id. “That is, the burden shifts to the prisoner to come 

forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular 

case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The plaintiff may rebut 

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“by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, 

unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.” Id. (quoting Hilao v. 

Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

“The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as 

some remedy remains ‘available.’” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 

(9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); Booth, 532 U.S. at 738. A withdrawn 

appeal “is to abandon one’s claim, to fail to exhaust one’s remedies.” 

Rivera v. United States Postal Service, 830 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1987) (applying the general rule in employment civil rights context); 

and see, e.g., Cruz v. Tilton, Case No. 1:06cv883-DLB-PC, 2009 WL 

3126518, *14 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2009) (applying this holding from 

Rivera in a prisoner §1983 context and finding plaintiff failed to 

exhaust claims because he withdrew the grievances); Rio v. Morgado, 

Case No. 10cv8955-CJC-PR, 2012 WL 209401, *4-*5 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 

2012) (no exhaustion where prisoner plaintiff voluntarily withdrew 

grievance concerning the use of fans to cause pain once he was seen by a 

doctor). 

Where a plaintiff has not obtained all of the available remedies, 

“[a] withdrawn inmate grievance cannot be used to demonstrate 

exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Cruz, 2009 WL 3126518, at *5; 

Rio, 2012 WL 209401; but cf. Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 

2010) (exhaustion found despite early termination where prisoner 

plaintiff’s request to access a videotape—the only remedy available 

through the grievance system—was granted); Hallford v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corr., 343 Fed. Appx. 176 (9th Cir. 2009) (exhaustion found despite 

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early termination where prisoner plaintiff’s request for a vegetarian 

meal card—the only remedy available to him through the grievance 

system—was granted). 

2. Analysis 

i. Administrative remedies exist 

Defendants have met their burden of showing that a grievance 

procedure existed. (ECF No. 15-1 at 70-71); Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15 §§ 

3084.1(a), 3084.1(b), 3084.2(a), 3084.7(b) and 3084.7(d)(3). 

Under Title 15, inmates may challenge any condition or action 

that adversely affects their welfare. (Id.). To challenge these conditions 

and seek relief, an inmate must submit a CDC Form 602 inmate appeal 

at the First Level of review. (Id.). If an inmate is dissatisfied with the 

First Level of review then he must appeal to the Second Level of review. 

(Id.). If the inmate is still dissatisfied after the Second Level of review, 

then he must appeal to the Third Level. (Id.). Unless there is a 

regulatory exception, all claims must be brought to the Third Level to 

be considered exhausted. (Id.). 

Plaintiff had knowledge that this grievance process was available 

to him. Plaintiff has filed both Form 22s and a 602 for their respective 

purposes, showing his understanding of the system. 

ii. Exhaustion 

Defendants met their burden of showing that Plaintiff did not 

exhaust the available administrative grievance process. (ECF No. 15-1 

at 70-71). Specifically, Defendants provide Plaintiff’s 602 inmate 

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appeal, Log No. RJD-D-14-01234, directed towards Defendant Edrozo 

for retaliation. (ECF No. 15-5 at 138-141). 

On March 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed his 602 claiming retaliation. 

(Id. at 138). On May 02, 2014, his 602 was accepted at the First Level 

of review. (Id.). On June 05, 2016, Plaintiff withdrew his 602 at the 

First Level. (Id.). He noted that he received some but not all of the 

requested property. (Id.). Plaintiff’s 602 was not “granted” nor 

“partially granted.” Plaintiff did not receive all of the requested relief 

available to him through this grievance process. 

Plaintiff was required to appeal through all available 

administrative remedies before filing his Complaint. Booth, 532 U.S. 

731; Brown, 422 F.3d 926; Cruz, 2009 WL 3126518; Rio, 2012 WL 

209401. By withdrawing his 602 inmate appeal at the First Level after 

receiving only some of the requested relief available, Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his claims. Id. 

iii. Production 

Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of production. In his opposition, 

Plaintiff did not identify any evidence to show that the grievance 

procedure was effectively unavailable to him or that he had exhausted 

the procedure. 

In sum, the Court RECOMMENDS finding that all claims were 

not exhausted through the administrative process, and that summary 

judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendants Edrozo, Whiting and 

Davis. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United 

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may filed written objections with the 

court and serve a copy on all parties by August 21, 2017. The 

document shall be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

by August 28, 2017. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of 

the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 3, 2017 

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