Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00591/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00591-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY SIMPSON, No. 2:03-CV-00591-MCE-GGH 

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

SERGEANT THOMAS,

Defendant.

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On March 5, 2007, this Court entered judgment in Defendant’s

favor following a defense verdict returned by the jury following

trial on March 2, 2007. On March 19, 2007, Plaintiff moved for a

new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and 1

Local Rule 59-291. As set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for

New Trial (“Motion”) is denied.

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2

Plaintiff’s new trial request is premised on the assertion

that this Court committed legal error in two respects, and that

those purported errors substantially prejudiced Plaintiff’s case,

thereby entitling him to relief under Rule 59. First, Plaintiff

alleges that the Court made an erroneous evidentiary ruling by

excluding evidence pertaining to the propriety of disciplinary

proceedings instituted against him for assault as a result of the

prison altercation underlying this litigation. Second, Plaintiff

contends that the Court improperly denied Plaintiff’s so-called

Batson/Edmondson challenge to Defendant’s peremptory removal of

the sole African-American individual from the jury.

In opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendant makes a

preliminary procedural argument that the Motion is untimely on

grounds that it was filed on March 19, 2007, more than ten days

following the March 5, 2007 entry of judgment, in contravention

of Rule 59(b). Although Defendant is correct that the Court

cannot extend the ten-day window for bringing a Motion for New

Trial under Rule 59(b), and that said time limitation is akin to

a jurisdictional limitation (See Rule 6(b); Tillman v. Ass’n of

Apartment Owners of Ewa Apartments, 234 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir.

2000)), Defendant neglects to point out that Rule 6(a) expressly

provides that where the prescribed time for taking action under

the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is eleven days or less,

“intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be

excluded in the computation.” Plaintiff’s Motion is in fact

timely when that exclusion from counting the requisite ten days

is considered.

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3

Plaintiff’s arguments do not, however, fare as well on a

substantive basis. With respect to the Court’s allegedly

erroneous evidentiary ruling, it granted Defendant’s pre-trial

Motion in Limine to exclude evidence undermining the propriety of

Defendant’s prison disciplinary proceedings, on grounds that such

evidence would run afoul of the strictures of Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a

prisoner in state custody (like Plaintiff herein) cannot use a

Section 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his

confinement. Id. at 481. Unless the prisoner has first directly

invalidated his conviction/sentence through relief sounding in

habeas corpus, Heck bars damages sought in a Section 1983 action

based on theories that “necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a

(not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” Wilkinson

v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); see also Muhammad v. Close, 54

U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (where “success in a ... [§] 1983 damages

action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or

the duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve

favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas,

opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or

sentence.”).

Plaintiff argues that he is not pursuing the Heck-proscribed

avenue of challenging the additional 150-day sentence he received

as a result of the altercation at issue. While he instead 

claims he is seeking only damages, his case nonetheless falls

squarely within the purview of Heck because he has not directly

invalidated the result of the disciplinary proceedings instituted

against him. The Court’s ruling on the Motion in Limine at issue

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4

barred introduction of evidence showing that Plaintiff acted in

self-defense during the course of the altercation. Such evidence

runs afoul of Heck since, if Plaintiff did act in self-defense,

the punishment he received for the incident would be presumably

invalid. Unlike Wilkinson, where the prisoners sought relief

that would only render invalid the procedures used to suitability

or eligibility for parole, and would not go to the substance of

the prisoners’ case, here introduction of evidence going to the

substantive offense itself would operate to impermissibly nullify

the proceedings resulting in Plaintiff’s increased sentence.

In the present case, the only legitimate inquiry for section 1983

purposes was whether Defendant used excessive force in response

to the assault Plaintiff was found to have perpetrated. Evidence

as to excessive force was permitted because it did not operate to

necessarily invalidate the result of the disciplinary proceedings

otherwise unchallenged by Plaintiff through habeas corpus. See

Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2001) (a

successful section 1983 suit based on excessive force would not

necessarily imply the validity of conviction because the

officer’s use of excessive force occurred subsequent to the

conduct for which plaintiff was convicted.).

Plaintiff’s second challenge concerns the propriety of jury

selection in this matter. After Defendant exercised a peremptory

challenge removing the only black juror from the jury panel,

Plaintiff made a Batson/Edmondson challenge. Plaintiff claims

the Court’s denial of that challenge constituted legal error.

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5

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court

held that a black criminal defendant’s equal protection rights

are abridged if the prosecutor utilized peremptory challenges, in

a purposefully discriminatory, systematic manner, so as to

purposefully remove from a jury members of the defendant’s own

race. The rationale of Batson was extended to peremptory

challenges in civil actions by Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete

Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).

Batson/Edmondson claims are analyzed using a three-prong

standard. First, a prima facie showing must be made that a juror

or jurors have been challenged on the basis of race. Secondly,

once this prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to

the opposing party to articulate a neutral, nondiscriminatory

reason for the peremptory challenge. Finally, the Court must

then weigh whether purposeful discrimination has been shown on

the basis of the evidence before it. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 328-29 (2003). The facts and circumstances surrounding

the exercise of the peremptory challenge must raise an inference

of discrimination. Cooperwood v. Cambria, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46

(9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 900 (2001).

The black juror challenged by Defendant in this case was the

only African-American individual in the jury panel. Defendant’s

first two challenges, however, were to remove Caucasian

candidates. Given the fact that there was necessarily no pattern

of excluding black jurors under these circumstances, it appears

questionable whether Plaintiff can even make a prima facie case

of exclusion based on race. 

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As delineated in the Declaration of Misha D. Igra filed in 2

Opposition to this Motion, Price possessed military service, had

a child employed at Folsom State Prison, and had two sons-in-law

that either were or had been incarcerated. Ms. McReynolds, on

the other hand, had no such background. Igra Decl., ¶ 8. The

trial transcript supports Ms. Igra’s claims in this regard in

indicating that she indeed voiced the opinion, at the time the

Batson/Edmondson challenge was made, that Price’s life experience

mad his a more favorable defense juror because of his background

and that of his family members. 

6

Even if one assumes that Plaintiff can surpass that initial

hurdle, however, Defendant articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for challenging the juror in question by

arguing that she lacked the life experiences that Defendant’s

counsel sought in selecting a jury favorable to the defense. 

Defendant’s counsel explained, at the time Plaintiff made his

oral challenge during the voir dire process, that Price, the

juror ultimately chosen over the challenged black candidate

(McReynolds) had family members possessing both law enforcement

and prison-related experience. McReynolds’ background, on the

other hand, matched none of the criteria included within

Defendant’s preferred juror profile, according to defense

counsel. While Plaintiff argues that the Court should have 2

engaged in a detailed side-by-side comparison of all retained

jurors to the rejected black panelist, the Court disagrees. 

There were no multiple challenges to black jurors in this case. 

Moreover, defense counsel did identify a non-discriminatory

reason for rejecting the particular juror in question. There is

no requirement that any more stringent showing be made. There

simply was no inference of discrimination under these

circumstances pursuant to which a valid Batson-Edmondson

challenge should have been sustained.

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 3

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

7

Because the Court does not find that legal error was

committed as to either of the proffered grounds for seeking a new

trial under Rule 59(b), Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial is

DENIED.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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