Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05236/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05236-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 8, 2009 Decided January 8, 2010

Reissued October 6, 2010

Reissued October 5, 2012

No. 09-5236

DJAMEL AMEZIANE, DETAINEE, GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL 

STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY CUBA,

APPELLEE

v.

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-00392-UNA)

August E. Flentje, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were 

Douglas N. Letter and Robert M. Loeb, Attorneys.

J. Wells Dixon argued the cause for appellee. With him 

on the brief were Shayana D. Kadidal and Pardiss Kebriaei.

Before: GINSBURG, BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit 

Judges.

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Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: This case presents another 

variation on the detainee theme, raising questions about what 

information concerning a detainee’s status can be protected 

from public disclosure when the detainee is anxious to reveal 

it. These questions arise because the government, having 

decided that Djamel Ameziane may be released from

detention at Guantanamo Bay, has sought to designate the 

decision of the Guantanamo Review Task Force as 

“protected” information under the governing protective order. 

The government wants to send Ameziane back to his native

country, Algeria. Ameziane does not want to go. He wants 

to use his Task Force transfer decision to aid him in

petitioning venues he deems more attractive, like Canada or 

France, for resettlement. The government—fearing that 

dozens of detainees going into business for themselves,

utilizing Task Force transfer decisions to make their own best 

deals, would interfere with sensitive diplomatic efforts to 

relocate large numbers of detainees—moved to protect all 

Task Force transfer decisions from premature public 

disclosure. The district court sided with Ameziane and the 

government appealed. We reverse.

I

Ameziane, an Algerian citizen, has been held at the U.S. 

Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba since 2002. In 2005, 

he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241. This action was subject to a protective order

governing common procedural issues in all Guantanamo 

habeas cases. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 577 

F. Supp. 2d 143 (D.D.C. 2008) (Protective Order). Under the 

Protective Order, “protected” information may not be 

disclosed to anyone other than the petitioner’s counsel and the 

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court, unless the government authorizes wider disclosure. Id.

at 151 (¶ 35). To designate information as protected, the 

government must attempt to reach an agreement with the 

petitioner’s counsel, and if that fails, file a motion with the 

court. Id. (¶ 34).

On January 22, 2009, the President issued an Executive 

Order directing the closure of the Guantanamo detention 

facility “as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from 

the date of this order,” and requiring “[t]he Secretary of State 

[to] expeditiously pursue and direct such negotiations and 

diplomatic efforts with foreign governments as are necessary 

and appropriate to implement this order.” Exec. Order No. 

13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898–99 (Jan. 22, 2009). The 

Executive Order also established the Guantanamo Review 

Task Force (Task Force) and mandated immediate review of 

all detainees to “determine, on a rolling basis and as promptly 

as possible . . . whether it is possible to transfer or release the 

individuals consistent with the national security and foreign 

policy interests of the United States.” Id. at 4899.

Although Ameziane had twice been deemed ineligible for 

release, on May 8, 2009, the Task Force issued a decision 

approving him for transfer. On June 15, the government filed 

a coordinated motion in the subset of Guantanamo habeas 

cases involving petitioners who had been issued transfer 

decisions, seeking to designate those decisions as “protected” 

information. In support of the motion, the government 

submitted a declaration by Ambassador Daniel Fried, the 

Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay 

Detention Facility. Ambassador Fried explained that if these 

petitioners, in an effort to be resettled in European countries

of their choice, all “approach the same small group of

governments at the same time, particularly if they relay 

information about formal U.S. government decisions resulting 

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from review by the . . . Task Force, it could confuse, 

undermine, or jeopardize our diplomatic efforts with those 

countries and could put at risk our ability to move as many 

[detainees] to safe and responsible locations as might 

otherwise be the case.” Fried Decl. ¶ 5.

At a hearing on June 30, the district court denied the 

government’s motion to protect Ameziane’s Task Force 

transfer decision. The court concluded the government had 

failed to make a “particularized showing” because the Fried 

Declaration had “nothing . . . to do with this case in 

particular,” and protested that allowing Ameziane to disclose

“this one piece of information” to foreign governments would 

not “interfere in anything.” Transcript of Motion Hearing at 

29, Ameziane v. Obama, No. 05-cv-392 (D.D.C. June 30, 

2009) (June 30 Tr.). The court accused the government of

“stand[ing] in the way of any possible, possible hope of 

something better for [Ameziane]” by seeking to repatriate him 

to Algeria rather than allowing him to use his Task Force 

transfer decision to advocate for resettlement in Canada or 

France. Id. at 30. The court issued a written order including 

a one-week stay. Order, Ameziane v. Obama, No. 05-cv-392

(D.D.C. June 30, 2009) (June 30 Order).

On July 7, the government sought to extend the stay for

an additional week; the district court rejected the request, see

Transcript of Motion Hearing at 28–29, Ameziane v. Obama, 

No. 05-cv-392 (D.D.C. July 7, 2009); and the government 

filed an interlocutory appeal and moved this court for an 

emergency stay of the district court’s order.

The district court issued a written opinion explaining the

refusal to extend its stay. Mem. Op. & Order, Ameziane v. 

Obama, No. 05-cv-392 (D.D.C July 8, 2009) (July 8 Op.). 

The court stated “[t]he government’s rationale for protecting 

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[Ameziane’s] clearance status [was] riddled with 

contradictions.” Id. at 5. It disregarded the Fried Declaration 

because it “provide[d] no specificity as to why Ameziane’s 

cleared status must be protected or why his counsel should be 

prohibited from using the information to advocate for his 

resettlement to other countries.” Id. at 6. The court was not 

“convinced” by the government’s “speculative and

conclusory” national security concerns. Id. at 7. “Most 

importantly,” the court determined, “the record demonstrates 

that protecting [Ameziane’s] clearance status would serve 

little purpose” because “both the Red Cross and [his] brother 

in Canada are already aware that [he] has been cleared for 

transfer.” Id.

On July 16, we granted a stay pending appeal.

II

We first consider whether we lack subject-matter 

jurisdiction because the dispute is moot or, alternatively,

because the district court’s order was not a final decision from 

which the government could immediately appeal.

A

Ameziane argues this appeal is moot because the Red 

Cross and his brother in Canada already know he has been 

cleared for transfer. “‘Federal courts lack jurisdiction to 

decide moot cases because their constitutional authority 

extends only to actual cases or controversies.’” Larsen v. 

U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Iron 

Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983)). “[A] 

case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or 

the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” 

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). However, 

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a case is not moot unless it is “‘impossible for the court to 

grant any effectual relief whatever.’” Cody v. Cox, 509 F.3d 

606, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Church of Scientology of 

Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

Although the Red Cross and Ameziane’s brother may 

claim to know that Ameziane has been cleared for transfer, 

the government has not officially acknowledged his cleared 

status. “[I]n the arena of . . . foreign relations there can be a 

critical difference between official and unofficial 

disclosures.” Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 

1990); see also Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[E]ven if a fact . . . is the subject of 

widespread media and public speculation, its official 

acknowledgment by an authoritative source might well be 

new information that could cause damage to the national 

security.”). Presumably, nothing prevents the Red Cross or 

Ameziane’s brother—or any other third party not bound by 

the Protective Order—from telling foreign governments that 

Ameziane has been cleared for transfer by the U.S. 

government. However, in the absence of any official 

acknowledgement, these foreign governments would be left 

guessing as to whether such information is true. See Military 

Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 743–45 (D.C. Cir. 

1981). Whereas third-party hearsay is likely to be dismissed 

as mere rumor or self-serving speculation, foreign 

governments are substantially more likely to rely on an 

official statement by the U.S. government. 

Thus, this appeal is not moot if the district court’s order 

would result in an official acknowledgement of Ameziane’s 

cleared status. It would. The district court ordered, first, 

“that petitioner’s motion to unseal” the “government’s 

approval of petitioner[] for transfer and all related or 

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derivative documents” would be granted; second, “that the 

government’s motion to designate petitioner’s clearance for 

transfer . . . as ‘protected’ information” would be denied; and 

third, that “petitioner and his counsel may publicly disclose 

that he has been approved for transfer from Guantanamo by 

the . . . Task Force.” June 30 Order at 1–2.

As an initial matter, in this court, Ameziane has decided 

not to defend much of the district court’s order: “[Ameziane] 

does not seek to disclose the District Court pleadings or 

transcripts regarding this issue, or the parties’ appellate briefs, 

or any information regarding the government’s attempts to 

repatriate him to Algeria. . . . [A]ll that is at issue in this 

appeal, is whether Ameziane ‘may publicly disclose that he 

has been approved for transfer from Guantanamo by the . . . 

Task Force.’” Appellee’s Br. 17 (quoting June 30 Order at 2). 

Accordingly, since both parties agree “the District Court 

pleadings [and] transcripts regarding this issue,” “the parties’ 

appellate briefs,” and “any information regarding the 

government’s attempts to repatriate him to Algeria” should be 

protected, id., the district court’s order is reversed to the 

extent it unsealed and declined to protect such material.

There remains one key document that, if unsealed, would 

clearly constitute an official acknowledgement of Ameziane’s 

cleared status: the district court order itself. However, there is 

some ambiguity whether Ameziane seeks to unseal this order. 

He quotes from the order in arguing his entitlement to 

“‘publicly disclose that he has been approved for transfer,’” 

Appellee’s Br. 17 (quoting June 30 Order at 2), thus 

suggesting Ameziane’s counsel intends to point to the order 

itself in negotiations with foreign governments, perhaps to 

corroborate his claim that Ameziane has been cleared for 

transfer.

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Yet, at oral argument, Ameziane’s counsel stated he was 

“not seeking the unsealing of records.” Transcript of Oral 

Argument at 15:13–16. It is not clear whether this reference 

to “records” included the district court order, or whether it 

referred only to the documents listed in Ameziane’s brief and 

discussed above. But even assuming the district court order 

will remain sealed, this appeal is not moot. Counsel stated 

unambiguously that he sought “to be able to say that Mr. 

Ameziane has been approved for transfer by the Task Force.” 

Id. at 15:22–25, 16:1–3. Ameziane’s counsel is an officer of 

the court, subject to the serious ethical obligations inherent in 

that position. Although foreign governments would be 

unlikely to rely on a claim by a third party—or even by 

Ameziane himself—that Ameziane has been cleared for 

transfer, the same is not true with respect to a similar 

representation made by counsel. As an officer of the court, 

any statement by counsel that the Task Force has cleared 

Ameziane for transfer would be tantamount to, and a 

sufficient substitute for, official acknowledgement by the U.S. 

government. Accordingly, this appeal is not moot because we 

can grant “effectual relief” by reversing the district court and 

thereby preventing official acknowledgement of Ameziane’s 

cleared status—either from the order itself, or from 

disclosures by counsel that the order permits him to make.

B

Nor do we lack jurisdiction because the district court’s 

order was not “final.” Courts of appeals have jurisdiction of 

appeals from “all final decisions” of district courts. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, an 

interlocutory order qualifies as “final” under § 1291 if it (1) 

conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an 

important issue completely separate from the merits of the 

action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 

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final judgment. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 

(2006).

These conditions, though “stringent,” see id., are satisfied

in this case. As Ameziane concedes, the first requirement is 

satisfied because the district court’s order conclusively 

determined that his Task Force transfer decision would not be 

protected under the Protective Order. Second, this issue is

entirely separate from the merits of Ameziane’s habeas

action. The public disclosure of Ameziane’s Task Force 

transfer decision has no relevance to the underlying question 

on the merits, i.e., whether he has been lawfully detained. 

And given the foreign relations and national security concerns 

raised in the Fried Declaration, we have no difficulty finding 

this issue sufficiently “important” to warrant immediate

appellate review. See Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 

543–44 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that order mandating 

disclosure of classified information to habeas petitioners’

counsel was “an important issue entirely separate from the 

merits of this case”). Finally, the district court’s order would 

be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment 

because once the government’s official acknowledgement of 

Ameziane’s cleared status is revealed publicly, the disclosure 

cannot be undone. See id. at 544. Thus, we have subjectmatter jurisdiction.

III

While we review a district court’s decision to seal or 

unseal documents, or to issue or refuse to issue a protective 

order, for abuse of discretion, we review de novo any errors 

of law upon which the court relied in exercising its discretion. 

See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456–57 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo 

rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied 

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incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 

F.3d 158, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reviewing decision to unseal 

guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because 

court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon 

v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by 

definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 

law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de 

novo review is appropriate.

A

It is “our customary policy” to accord “deference to the 

President in matters of foreign affairs.” Jama v. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005). And 

“consistent with our rule of deference, it is within the role of 

the executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of 

protecting national security. It is not within the role of the 

courts to second-guess executive judgments made in 

furtherance of that branch’s proper role.” Bismullah v. Gates,

501 F.3d 178, 187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), vacated on other grounds, Gates v. 

Bismullah, 128 S. Ct. 2960 (2008).

But detainee cases are unique. Because of the 

independent role carved out for the judiciary, and our

concomitant obligation to balance the needs of the 

government against the rights of the detainee, and also to 

preserve to the extent feasible the traditional right of public 

access to judicial records grounded in the First Amendment, 

we exercise greater caution in deciding to defer. See, e.g., 

Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276–77 (2008). In the 

context of requests by the government to protect sensitive 

information, we have explained the showing the government 

must make to trigger judicial deference.

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In Bismullah v. Gates, we rejected the government’s 

assertion of unilateral authority to designate information as 

“protected” and held “the Government must give the court a 

basis for withholding . . . from public view” nonclassified 

information it seeks to protect. 501 F.3d at 188. In Parhat v. 

Gates, we explained that a valid “basis for withholding” 

would include, at a minimum, a “specific,” “tailored”

rationale for protecting a general category of information, and 

a precise designation of each particular item of information 

that purportedly “falls within the categor[y] . . . described.” 

532 F.3d 834, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In other words, the 

government first must demonstrate what kind of information 

requires protection and why, and then must show exactly what

information in the case at hand it seeks to protect.

In Parhat, the government failed to satisfy this twofold 

showing. The government began by describing two broad 

categories—“(1) any names and/or identifying information of 

United States Government personnel, and (2) any sensitive 

law enforcement information”—and provided a “rationale for 

protection [that was] brief” and “relie[d] solely on spare, 

generic assertions of the need to protect information in the 

two categories.” Id. at 852–53 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). For instance, the government merely asserted in 

conclusory fashion that disclosing information in the first 

category would “heighten[]” the risks to the safety of U.S. 

government personnel, and that disclosing information in the 

second category would “harm the Government’s ongoing law 

enforcement activities related to the global war against al 

Qaeda and its supporters.” Id. at 852. These “generic claims” 

failed to satisfy the government’s burden of providing “an 

explanation tailored to the specific information at issue.” Id.

at 853.

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Second, the government consigned all government 

personnel mentioned in the record to the first category, and 

simply marked documents “Law Enforcement Sensitive” or 

“LES” to designate the second category. Id. at 852–53. We 

found both sets of designations imprecise and overinclusive. 

For instance, “some ‘U.S. Government personnel’ . . . [were] 

so publicly associated with Guantanamo that protected status 

would plainly be unwarranted.” Id. at 853. And we noted 

that the term “Law Enforcement Sensitive” was so vague that 

“at least seven different federal agencies define[d] it 

differently.” Id. Thus, even if the government had provided 

sufficient rationales for protecting information in the two 

categories, it nonetheless failed to make its designations with 

sufficient precision to allow the court to “determine whether 

the information it ha[d] designated properly f[ell] within the 

categories it ha[d] described.” Id.

Here, the district court failed properly to apply Parhat’s 

two-part standard. Rather than evaluating the government’s 

proposed category and proffered rationale, and then 

determining whether Ameziane’s Task Force transfer decision 

fell into that category, the court faulted Ambassador Fried for 

“provid[ing] no specificity as to why Ameziane’s cleared 

status must be protected or why his counsel should be 

prohibited from using the information to advocate for his 

resettlement in other countries.” July 8 Op. at 6 (emphasis 

added). Similarly, in its oral ruling, the court found the 

government had failed to make a “particularized showing” 

because the Fried Declaration had “nothing . . . to do with this 

case in particular.” June 30 Tr. at 29. However, Parhat did 

not require the government to provide a rationale for 

protection that was so specific as to preclude any generalized 

categorization. Rather, Parhat left room for categorized 

requests in appropriate circumstances. Of course, the 

narrower the category for which the government seeks 

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protection, the more likely the government’s rationale will be 

sufficiently tailored. But the district court erred by construing 

Parhat to require a specific and distinct rationale addressed to 

each detainee’s situation.

There is a sharp contrast between the government’s 

showing in this case and its showing in Parhat. Unlike the

two broad categories outlined in Parhat, here the government 

requested protection for a single, limited category: Task Force 

transfer decisions and all related or derivative documents. 

See July 8 Op. at 2. And unlike the “spare, generic 

assertions” with which the government justified its request in 

Parhat, 532 F.3d at 853, here the government provided a 

detailed rationale tailored specifically to the information in 

the narrow category.

The Fried Declaration logically explained why failing to 

protect Task Force transfer decisions was likely to harm the 

government’s foreign relations and national security interests. 

To close down Guantanamo, as Executive Order 13,492 

commands, the government faces not just the task of deciding

which detainees may be released, but also the formidable 

hurdle of determining where to send those who are cleared for 

transfer. Fried Decl. ¶¶ 1–4. Because of U.S. policies barring 

the transfer of detainees to countries where they face torture, 

“there are certain individuals who have been (or will be) 

approved for transfer out of U.S. custody but who . . . cannot 

be safely and/or responsibly returned to their home 

countries.” Id. ¶ 3. At the same time, since our foreign 

allies—particularly in Europe, where many detainees wish to 

be sent—have limited “capacity to absorb detainees . . ., it is 

important to the U.S. goal of closing Guantanamo to be able 

to focus diplomatic discussions with those countries on 

detainees for whom there is a compelling reason not to return 

them to their home countries.” Id. ¶ 5. This goal would be 

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frustrated if “dozens of detainees approach the same small 

group of governments at the same time, . . . relay[ing] 

information about formal U.S. government decisions resulting 

from review by the . . . Task Force.” Id. A “coherent 

diplomatic strategy”—a necessity if the government is going 

to “move as many [detainees] to safe and responsible 

locations” as possible—requires that the government “retain 

the prerogative to ‘speak with one voice.’” Id. ¶¶ 4–6. But 

permitting persons not authorized to speak on behalf of the 

government to “convey[] official U.S. Government 

information to a foreign country regarding the transfer status 

of a particular petitioner . . . has the potential to create 

confusion and mixed messages.” Id. ¶ 6. Because this 

detailed rationale was tailored specifically to the narrow 

category of information for which the government requested 

protection, the government satisfied the first showing required 

by Parhat.

The government also satisfied the second part of the

Parhat standard because we face no difficulty “determin[ing] 

whether the information [the government] has designated 

properly falls within the categor[y] it has described.” Parhat, 

532 F.3d at 853. The government designated for protection a 

precise item of information—Ameziane’s transfer decision—

that indisputably falls into the narrow category of Task Force 

transfer decisions. Indeed, this case fits squarely within the 

government’s rationale for protection. Although the 

government has determined Ameziane can safely be 

repatriated to Algeria, he is seeking to obtain resettlement in 

Canada or France, and wishes to utilize his Task Force 

transfer decision to aid him in petitioning these foreign 

governments. As the Fried Declaration explains, permitting 

Ameziane to make such use of the government’s official 

information would interfere with the Secretary of State’s 

efforts to focus the Canadian and French governments on 

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accepting detainees who, unlike Ameziane, cannot safely be 

repatriated to their home countries. Thus, the government 

met its burden for protection under Parhat.

B

Because the government satisfied Parhat, the district 

court was required to defer to the government’s assessment of 

the harm to foreign relations and national security that would 

result from officially disclosing Ameziane’s Task Force 

transfer decision. As we explained in Fitzgibbon, the failure 

to give deference when it is due is error. 911 F.2d at 755. 

There, pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request, the 

district court ordered the CIA to disclose information about a 

former CIA station location, over the CIA’s objection that 

such disclosure would cause harm to national security. Id. at 

758–59. We faulted the district court for “essentially 

perform[ing] its own calculus as to whether or not harm to the 

national security . . . would result from disclosure” of the 

information, and held it should have “accord[ed] substantial 

weight and deference” to the Executive Branch’s 

“determination of possible harm.” Id. at 766. Thus, 

“declin[ing] to adopt the abuse-of-discretion review that [the 

plaintiff] urge[d] upon us,” we reversed. Id.

Here, the district court simply declared: 

I don’t understand how [declining to protect 

Ameziane’s Task Force transfer decision] will 

interfere in anything. . . . I don’t know why in the 

world the only thing that the government can see is 

Algeria here. . . . But if [Ameziane] is able to do 

better than what the government is doing, I say fine. 

He has now been there seven years thanks to the 

United States government. Why they want to stand 

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in the way of any possible, possible hope of 

something better for him baffles me. . . . This 

gentleman has the perhaps glimmer of hope that 

something could get slightly better and he won’t be 

prosecuted again in Canada. Why should we stand in 

the way after the way we’ve treated him for these 

seven years? 

June 30 Tr. at 29–30; see also July 8 Op. at 7 (rejecting as 

“speculative and conclusory” government’s “arguments that 

the release of [Ameziane’s] clearance status would cause 

significant harm to the interests of the government”). It is not 

entirely clear why the district court found the Fried 

Declaration so baffling. As discussed above, it provided a 

detailed and logical explanation of the impact of premature 

disclosure on the government’s foreign relations and national 

security interests. Parhat did not free courts to substitute 

their own policy judgments for those of the executive. The 

district court was not entitled to toss the Fried Declaration 

aside merely because it disagreed with its premise. Deference 

required acknowledging that the State Department, not the 

judiciary, is tasked with undertaking the diplomatic 

negotiations necessary to close down Guantanamo, and that 

the Executive Branch officials bearing this responsibility 

possess far greater resources and aptitude than the judiciary 

for determining what will aid, and what will undermine, their 

mission. The district court’s inability to “understand” how

permitting Ameziane to disclose his Task Force transfer 

decision to foreign governments “will interfere in anything,”

June 30 Tr. at 29, did not license the court to “perform[] its 

own calculus as to whether or not harm to the national 

security . . . would result from [the] disclosure,” Fitzgibbon, 

911 F.2d at 766.

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In particular, the district court erred by elevating

Ameziane’s interest in being resettled in a country of his 

choice over the government’s interest in repatriating or 

resettling as many detainees as possible as quickly as 

practicable in order to close Guantanamo as the President

directed. Such prioritizing was an executive prerogative, and 

it was “not within the role of the [district] court[] to secondguess executive judgments made in furtherance of that 

branch’s proper role.” Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 187–88

(internal quotation marks omitted). Crucially, this does not 

mean Ameziane never will have the opportunity to share his 

Task Force transfer decision with Canada, France, or other 

countries he wishes to petition for resettlement. Rather, it 

means only that those foreign governments must contact the 

U.S. government and obtain the information through official 

channels. In this way, Ameziane’s eagerness to be sent to a 

country of his choice will not undermine the Executive 

Branch’s prerogative to “speak with one voice” in diplomatic 

affairs. See Fried Decl. ¶ 6. The failure to accord 

“substantial weight and deference,” Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 

766, to the government’s assessment of its foreign relations 

and national security interests was error.

C

Finally, the district court erred by basing its ruling on an 

inappropriate factor. The court held that the “[m]ost 

important[]” factor weighing against the government’s 

request for protection was that “protecting [Ameziane’s]

clearance status would serve little purpose” because “both the 

Red Cross and [his] brother in Canada are already aware that 

[he] has been cleared for transfer.” July 8 Op. at 7. The first 

problem with the district court’s approach is the incentive it 

gives detainees to violate the Protective Order. Why honor

confidentiality restrictions imposed by the court if ignoring 

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them will be rewarded? Moreover, as discussed above, there 

is a distinction between third parties claiming to have 

knowledge of certain information, and an official 

acknowledgement of the truth of that information by the U.S. 

government. See Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765 (observing the 

“critical difference between official and unofficial 

disclosures” in the “arena of . . . foreign relations”); Afshar, 

702 F.2d at 1130 (noting that “official acknowledgment by an 

authoritative source” of a fact that “is the subject of 

widespread media and public speculation” may “be new 

information that could cause damage to the national 

security”). For the same reason that a “public record” is

generally admissible as evidence, see FED. R. EVID. 803(8),

while other hearsay is not, see FED. R. EVID. 802, an official 

acknowledgment of a fact is far more reliable than a third

party’s statement of the same fact. This is doubly true in the 

world of diplomatic relations.

Indeed, any suggestion the government’s official 

acknowledgment—either from the district court’s order itself 

or from Ameziane’s counsel in his capacity as an officer of 

the court—would not produce a material change in 

circumstances is belied by Ameziane’s vigorous defense of 

the district court’s ruling. It is evident that while the 

Canadian and French governments would pay scant attention 

to Ameziane’s brother’s claim that Ameziane has been 

cleared for transfer, they would be substantially more 

interested in hearing this same news from a person or entity 

speaking on behalf of the U.S. government. Thus, while it 

would have been proper to consider whether the government 

already had publicly acknowledged Ameziane’s clearance for 

transfer, it was error to rely on third parties’ purported

knowledge of his cleared status.

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IV

For the foregoing reasons, the government’s motion to 

designate Ameziane’s Task Force transfer decision as 

“protected” information under the Protective Order should 

have been granted. Thus, the order of the district court is

Reversed.

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