Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00791/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00791-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO DONTA GAULDIN,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, SECRETARY,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 12cv791 LAB (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DISMISSING CLAIMS TWO, FOUR,

AND SPECIFIED SUBCLAIMS IN

CLAIM THREE [ECF NO. 20] AND

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 1]

Petitioner Mario Donta Gauldin, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on March 29, 2012 [ECF No. 1], challenging a San Diego

Superior Court judgment entered after the trial court found him

guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm and a jury found

him guilty of burglary, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon,

grand theft of a firearm, making a criminal threat and evading an

officer. (Pet. 2,1 ECF No. 1; Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1,

299, Nov. 28, 2007 (abstract of judgment).) Gauldin’s Petition was

based on four claims: (1) violation of the right to confront

1

 Because Gauldin’s Petition is not consecutively paginated,

the Court will cite to it using the page numbers assigned by the

electronic case filing system.

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witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; (2) violation of the

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on the use of a prior

juvenile conviction in sentencing; (3) ineffective assistance of

counsel at trial; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel on

appeal. (See Pet. 4-10, ECF No. 1.) 

Respondent Matthew Cate filed an Answer to the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus asserting that claims one and four of

Gauldin’s Petition are procedurally barred by the state court’s

rejection of those claims on an independent and adequate state law

ground. (Answer Pet. 2, ECF No. 10.) Respondent alleges that

ground three is also procedurally barred except for the claim that

trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object to accomplice

identification in court. (Id.) Finally, Respondent contends that

state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s remaining claims did not

contradict or unreasonably apply established federal law, and did

not rely on unreasonable factual determinations of evidence. (Id.) 

On October 9, 2012, Gauldin filed a Traverse to his Petition

[ECF No. 18]. Gauldin subsequently filed an Application for Leave

to Amend Petitioner’s Traverse [ECF No. 20], seeking to withdraw

ground two (violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial

on the use of prior juvenile conviction in sentencing) and ground

four (ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal), and also

withdrawing all but one subclaim in ground three (ineffective

assistance at trial). (Pet’r’s Appl. Leave Amend Pet’r’s Traverse

3, 6-7, ECF No. 20.) In his Amended Traverse, Gauldin addresses

his Confrontation Clause claim (ground one in his Petition) and the

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

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the exhibition of two charged codefendants to the jury in jail

attire and shackles (subclaim in ground three). (Id. at 9, 21.) 

In an analogous setting, a habeas petitioner sought to

withdraw habeas claims that had not been exhausted in state court. 

See Casner v. Valenzuela, Case No. 1:10-cv-01081-SKO-HC, 2013 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 156238, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013). The court

treated the request to withdraw as a motion to dismiss, and the

specified claims were dismissed without prejudice. The petitioner

proceeded on the remaining claims. The same procedure is

appropriate here. 

The Court recommends that Gauldin’s claims two, four, and

three (except the subclaim in ground three that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the appearance of two charged

individuals in prison attire) be dismissed without prejudice. The

Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, the Amended

Traverse, and the lodgments. For the reasons discussed below, it

is recommended that the Petition be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption

of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2012); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from these facts, are entitled

to statutory presumption of correctness). Petitioner has not

objected to the state court’s determination of facts and has

incorporated them in his Amended Traverse. (See Pet’r’s Appl.

Leave Amend Pet’r’s Traverse 10, ECF No. 20.) The following facts

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are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion denying

Gauldin’s consolidated direct appeal of his conviction and his

state habeas corpus petition:

a. People's Case

. . . .

On December 11, 2006, Jarrod Buchanan was cleaning

his handgun when he heard someone at the front door of

his Rancho Penasquitos home. He set the gun, which had a

fake round in the chamber and no magazine, on the counter

to answer the door. Gauldin and Kimberlee Snowden were

at the door dressed in uniforms from The Cleaning

Authority, a company he had hired to clean his home.

Buchanan invited them inside after they told him they

were there to conduct a customer satisfaction survey.

While Snowden interviewed Buchanan, Gauldin asked to

use the bathroom. Buchanan became suspicious when he saw

that the bathroom door was open and Snowden stumbled over

her words as if she were stalling for time. Buchanan

then saw Gauldin come towards him holding a red box

cutter knife. Gauldin waved the knife as he grabbed

Buchanan by the sleeve and pushed him into the bathroom.

When Buchanan saw Gauldin temporarily block the knife

blade with his own body, Buchanan leapt at him and ran to

grab his gun. Gauldin yelled “gun” and jumped on

Buchanan, slashing Buchanan's hand several times with the

knife. After Gauldin bit him in the forearm, Buchanan

let go of the gun.

Gauldin pointed the gun at Buchanan and ordered him

into the bathroom. Gauldin repeatedly told Buchanan to

not look at him; he also pulled the slide back on the gun

and looked into the chamber. While Buchanan was in the

bathroom, Gauldin put on a pair of rubber gloves and

started to wipe off the surfaces he had touched.

Gauldin looked into the hallway and spoke to his

cohort, Eric Carter, a person who had previously cleaned

Buchanan's house. After Carter told Gauldin to have

Buchanan open the safe, Gauldin lead Buchanan to the

safe, which was already open. Gauldin then lead Buchanan

back to the bathroom and saw Buchanan's old safe on the

ground. Gauldin threatened to kill Buchanan if he did

not open the second safe, but Buchanan was unable to open

it after multiple attempts.

Gauldin returned Buchanan to the bathroom and closed

the door. Ultimately, Buchanan armed himself with the

shower curtain rod and opened the door, but his

assailants had already left. Buchanan ran outside

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yelling for someone to call “911” and the police arrived

about five minutes later.

Yvonne Warrick, who lived across the street from

Buchanan, noticed a red car parked in front of her house

on the day of the crime. She wrote down the license

plate number because the doors were ajar and the driver,

a Black woman, was putting the car back and forth into

gear. She saw a tall Black man put something in the

trunk of the car and then walk into Buchanan's home. She

was not suspicious until she heard the red car leave and

Buchanan yell that he had been robbed. Warrick later

identified Snowden as the woman inside the car and Carter

as the tall man who put items inside the trunk of the

car; however, she never saw the third individual.

Police quickly located and pursued the car, which

was registered to Snowden. After evading police, the car

got trapped behind stopped traffic. Gauldin and Carter

fled, but Snowden stayed inside the car. Police pursued

Gauldin in their patrol cars and then on foot and

captured him as he pulled a handgun from his pants

pocket. Police recovered the gun, which had been stolen

from Buchanan, and found a red box cutter knife and a

pair of blue latex gloves when they searched Gauldin.

On the day of the incident, Buchanan viewed three

photographic lineups containing photos of Gauldin, Carter

and Snowden, but was unable to identify the three

suspects. During the incident, Buchanan distinctly

remembered that Gauldin wore his hair in braided corn

rows. However, when the police photographed Gauldin

later in the day, his hair was frizzy as if recently

taken out of braids, but in the lineup photograph showed

to Buchanan, Gauldin had his head shaved and a light

mustache. Carter had a shaved head on the day of the

crime, but the photograph used in the lineup depicted him

with hair down to his collar. Snowden also looked

younger in her lineup photograph than on the day of the

crime. During trial, however, Buchanan had no doubt in

his mind that Gauldin was the individual involved in the

incident that had cut him with the box cutter.

DNA testing revealed Buchanan's blood on Gauldin's

pants, the cutting edge of the box cutter knife and the

outside of the gloves recovered from Gauldin's pocket.

Gauldin's DNA was also found inside the gloves and he

could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA found

on the handle of the box cutter. Carter and Snowden's

DNA were not found on gloves or the box cutter.

b. Defense Case

At trial, Gauldin denied accompanying Carter and

Snowden to Buchanan's house. He claimed that early that

morning, he was with Carter and Snowden at a park and

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told them that he wanted to buy a gun. Carter knew

someone who could sell him a gun and the prospective

seller “Jayski” arrived at the park a short time later.

Jayski did not trust and refused to do business with

Gauldin and Carter then dropped Gauldin off at Gauldin's

girlfriend's home.

Several hours later, Carter returned to the park in a car

driven by Snowden and showed Gauldin a gun missing its

magazine. Gauldin had the pair drive him home, but on

the way there police cars got behind them and attempted

to pull them over. At some point, Gauldin told Snowden

to let him out of the car. As he jumped out of the car,

Carter gave him the handgun and told him to throw it

away. Gauldin claimed that he ran because he was on

parole and with a convicted felon who had a gun.

Gauldin denied having the box cutter knife or gloves in

his pocket, claimed he never touched the knife and that

he had never seen the knife or gloves before. However,

he also claimed that the gloves were on the backseat when

he got to Snowden's car the second time and that he threw

them on the floor of the car. Gauldin admitted that he

had taken the braids out of his hair after he was

arrested, but claimed he did not do so to frustrate

witness identification.

(Lodgment No. 11, People v. Gauldin, No. D052093, slip op. at 2-6

(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2009).)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A second amended information filed in San Diego Superior Court

on September 17, 2007, charged Gauldin with first degree

residential burglary (count one), first degree residential robbery

(count two), assault with a deadly weapon (count three), grand

theft of a firearm (count four), making a criminal threat (count

five), recklessly evading an officer (count six), and possession of

a firearm as a felon (count eight). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

vol. 2, 84-89, Sept. 17, 2007 (second amended information).) On

September 24, 2007, following a jury trial,2

 Petitioner Gauldin was

2

 Petitioner was represented by attorney Charles Guthrie

during the pretrial proceedings and at trial. (See Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 240; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 1.)

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found guilty of first-degree residential burglary, first-degree

residential robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, grand theft of a

firearm, making a criminal threat, and recklessly evading an

officer. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 321-28, Sept. 24,

2007 (verdict forms).) The trial court found Gauldin guilty of

being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Id. at 299 (abstract of

judgment); id. at 316-17, Sept. 21, 2007 (minutes).) Petitioner

also admitted two prior serious or violent felony convictions

within the meaning of California’s Three Strikes Law and two prior

prison terms. (Id. at 320, Sept. 24, 2007 (minutes).) The trial

court dismissed one of Gauldin’s convictions and sentenced him to

state prison for a term of twenty-seven years and eight months. 

(Id. at 299 (abstract of judgment); id. at 329-30, Nov. 21, 2007

(minutes).) 

Gauldin timely appealed. (Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening

Brief at 12, People v. Gauldin, No. D052093 (Cal. Ct. App. March 5,

2009).)3 Along with the appeal, Gauldin, through his appellate

counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to his

accomplices appearing in front of the jury dressed in jail clothing

and shackles. (Lodgment No. 4, Gauldin v. Cate, No. [D053283]

(Cal. Ct. App. filed June 25, 2008) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus).) Subsequently, Petitioner’s appellate attorney attempted

to submit a supplemental brief arguing that the trial court

violated Gauldin’s constitutional right to confront witnesses by

admitting the contents of a DNA report without allowing him the

3

 Attorney David L. Polsky represented Gauldin on appeal. 

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opportunity to cross-examine the criminalist who prepared it,4 but

the court of appeal rejected the filing. (Lodgment No. 9, People

v. Gauldin, No. D052093 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2009) (order denying

leave to file supplemental brief).) 

Gauldin’s appeal was consolidated with his habeas petition for

disposition by the appellate court. (Lodgment No. 10, People v.

Gauldin, No. D052093 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2009) (order

consolidating appeal and petition for writ of habeas corpus).) On

March 5, 2009, the court of appeal affirmed the judgment in

Gauldin’s criminal case and denied his petition for writ of habeas

corpus. (Lodgment No. 11, People v. Gauldin, No. D052093, slip op.

at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2009).) The court of appeal denied on

the merits Gauldin’s claim challenging the use of his juvenile

convictions as strikes. (Id. at 9-10.) Additionally, it rejected

on the merits Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel for failure to object to Gauldin’s accomplices being

identified in court while dressed in prison clothing. (Id. at 11-

12.) 

Gauldin, through appellate counsel, filed a petition for

review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 12,

Petition for Review, People v. Gauldin, [No. S172140] (Cal. May 20,

2009).) Petitioner challenged the admission of testimony about the

DNA report in the absence of the criminologist who prepared it, and

Gauldin claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

because he failed to object to Petitioner’s accomplices appearing

in court dressed in jail clothing and shackles. (Id. at 18-29.) 

4 This claim is now being raised in ground one of the current

Petition. (See Pet. 4, ECF No. 1.)

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The California Supreme Court denied review. (Lodgment No. 13,

People v. Gauldin, No. S172140, order at 1 (Cal. May 20, 2009).) 

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, then filed a habeas corpus

petition in the San Diego County Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 14,

Gauldin v. Warden Adams, [No. HC 19711] (Cal. Super. Ct. filed

[Aug. 28, 2009]) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) Gauldin

challenged the admission of the DNA report at trial. (Id. at 23-

27.) On October 26, 2009, the superior court denied Gauldin’s

petition on the merits. (Lodgment No. 15, In re Gauldin, No. HC

19711, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2009).) 

It appears that in January 2010, Petitioner filed a petition

for review with the California Supreme Court.5 The California

Supreme Court denied the petition without prejudice to Gauldin’s

ability to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial

court after the California Supreme Court decided People v. Dungo,

S176886; People v. Gutierrez, S176620; People v. Lopez, S177046;

and People v. Rutterschmidt, S176213. (Lodgment No. 22, People v.

Gauldin, S179822, order at 1 (Cal. Mar. 10, 2010).) 

Gauldin also filed a pro se habeas petition in the court of

appeal. (Lodgment No. 16, Gauldin v. Harrington, Warden, No.

D056779 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Feb. 16, 2010) (petition for writ of

habeas corpus).) Petitioner alleged eight claims, including

ineffectiveness of trial counsel and violation of Gauldin’s right

to confront witnesses because the contents of a DNA report were

admitted into evidence in the absence of the criminalist who

5

 The Court is unaware of Gauldin’s claims there because that

petition was not included in the lodgment filed with the Court. See

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist

=0&doc_id=1932587&doc_no=S179822

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prepared it. (Id. at 3-19.) The appellate court appointed

counsel for Petitioner and ordered supplemental briefing. 

(Lodgment No. 17, In re Gauldin, No. D056779 (Cal. Ct. App. filed

Sept. 8, 2010) (supplemental petition for writ of habeas corpus).) 

The court of appeal rejected all but one of the grounds in

Gauldin’s habeas petition and modified the judgment so “that the

sentence on the count one enhancement alleging box cutter use is

stayed.” (Lodgment No. 20, In re Gauldin, D056779, slip op. at 4,

6 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Feb. 22, 2011).) The court denied the

petition in all other respects and rejected the other claims as

successive collateral attacks on the final judgment or as claims

that could have been but were not presented in Gauldin’s previous

appeal and writ petition. (Id. at 4.) 

Gauldin, through his appointed counsel, filed a petition for

review and a petition to exhaust state remedies with the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 21, Petition for Review at 2, In re

Gauldin, S190983 (Cal. Apr. 20, 2011).) He sought review of the

unpublished decision denying in part writ of habeas corpus and

petitioned to exhaust state remedies. The California Supreme Court

denied the petition on April 20, 2011. (Lodgment No. 23, In re

Gauldin, S190983, order at 1 (Cal. Apr. 20, 2011).) 

Gauldin filed his federal habeas petition on March 29, 2012

[ECF No. 1]. Currently remaining in the Petition are Gauldin’s

Sixth Amendment Confrontation clause claim and ineffective

assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to codefendants

appearing in jail clothes and shackles in front of the jury. (Pet.

4, 7-8, ECF No. 1.)

// 

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347

(1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Because Gauldin’s Petition was filed on March 29, 2012, AEDPA

applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204.

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

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of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to level of a constitutional violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

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Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

“explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court decision may

not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for example, because of

a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. 

“[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is ‘contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative

decision of the Supreme Court.” Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson,

103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d

1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325

(9th Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Testimony Regarding the DNA Tests

In his first claim for relief, Gauldin alleges that the trial

court violated his right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment because it admitted into evidence the contents of a

DNA report in the absence of testimony from the criminalist who

prepared it. (See Pet. 4, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner argues that the

results of the DNA report were testimonial and could not be

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admitted without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine the

report’s author pursuant to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557

U.S. 305 (2009). (Id. at 15.) Respondent contends that Gauldin’s

first claim is procedurally barred because it was forfeited in

state court. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 14,6 ECF No.

10.) In the alternative, Respondent argues that Gauldin’s

Confrontation Clause claim fails on the merits. (Id. at 18-19.)

1. Procedural default

State courts may decline to review a claim based on a

procedural default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83-87

(1977). "Just as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails to

exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner who has failed to meet

the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal

claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address

those claims in the first instance." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 731-32 (1991). A petitioner who has defaulted his federal

claims in state court by not complying with procedural rules

technically meets the requirements for exhaustion because state

remedies are no longer available. Id. at 732 (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b); Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26, n.28 (1982)). But

federal habeas petitioners cannot "avoid the exhaustion requirement

by defaulting their federal claims in state court[,]" provided the

procedural default is based on an independent and adequate state

ground. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732.

//

6

 Because Respondent’s Answer is not consecutively paginated,

the Court will cite to to it using the page numbers assigned by the

electronic case filing system.

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A state-court procedural default may be excused only if a

habeas petitioner can demonstrate both “cause” for the default and

resulting “prejudice” under Coleman v. Thompson. 

“[C]ause” under the cause and prejudice test must be

something external to the petitioner, something that

cannot fairly be attributed to him: [W]e think that the

existence of cause for a procedural default must

ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded

counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural

rule.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate prejudice under Coleman,

the “habeas petitioner must show ‘not merely that the errors at . .

. trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to

his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial

with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 494 (1986) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

170 (1982)) (omission and emphasis in original). 

"A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a

state court 'if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state

law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate

to support the judgment.'" Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55

(2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729). 

"In order to constitute adequate and independent grounds sufficient

to support a finding of procedural default, a state rule must be

clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of

the petitioner's purported default." Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005,

1010 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

Even if a basis for a state procedural bar exists, it “does

not prevent a federal court from resolving a federal claim unless

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the state court actually relied on the state procedural bar ‘as an

independent basis for its disposition of the case.’” Evans v.

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 206 (2006) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 261-62 (1989)). “[A] procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim on . . . habeas review unless the

last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘clearly and

expressly’ states that its judgment rests on a state procedural

bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. at 263 (quoting Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985)). At the same time, “a state

court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an

alternative holding.” Id. at 264 n.10. Thus, as long as the state

court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar as a separate basis

for its decision, the federal court in a habeas case is required to

“honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state

court's judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal

law.” Id. (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210

(1935)). 

The respondent has the initial burden of pleading an adequate

and independent procedural bar as an affirmative defense in a

habeas case. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665-66 (9th

Cir. 2005); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The burden then shifts to the petitioner to place that defense in

issue. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. The petitioner may

accomplish this with factual allegations and case authority that

demonstrate inconsistent applications of the procedural rule. Id.

At this point, the burden shifts back to the respondent to prove

the bar is applicable. Id. "[I]t is the law of this circuit that

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the ultimate burden is on the State, not the petitioner, to show

that a procedural state bar was clear, consistently applied, and

well-established at the time the party contesting its use failed to

comply with the rule in question." Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 666.

Even if the state rule is independent and adequate, a petitioner

can overcome the procedural bar by showing (1) cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of alleged violations of

federal law or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-

50.

To determine whether a claim is procedurally barred, the Court

reviews the last reasoned state court opinion. Vansickel v. White,

166 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court presumes that

“[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or

rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

Respondent argues that the last reasoned state court ruling on

Gauldin’s first claim was by the court of appeal on February 22,

2011. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF No. 10.) 

That order stated: 

Based on In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal. 4th at pp. 765-

769, we reject all but one of Gauldin’s contentions

because they are successive collateral attacks on the

final judgment, or could have been but were not presented

in his previous appeal and writ petition. However, we

agree he received ineffective assistance from his trial

and appellate attorneys, who did not contest the

imposition of the two enhancements on the robbery

conviction for the gun use under section 12022.53, subd.

(b), and box cutter use under section 12022, subd.

(b)(1). 

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(Lodgment No. 20, In re Gauldin, D056779, slip op. at 4.) 

Respondent claims that the appellate court rejected Petitioner’s

Confrontation Clause claim “on the independent state law procedural

ground that [it] could have been, but was not, presented in the

previous consolidated appeal and habeas corpus petition . . . .” 

(Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF No. 10.) 

Petitioner’s supplemental brief raising this claim before the

appellate court was returned unfiled in March 2009. (Lodgment No.

9, People v. Gauldin, No. D052093 (order denying leave to file

supplemental brief).) Gauldin’s claim was later denied on the

merits by the San Diego Superior Court in October of 2009. 

(Lodgment No. 15, In re Gauldin, No. HC 19711, slip op. at 3.) On

March 22, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied this claim

without prejudice. (Lodgment No. 22, People v. Gauldin, No.

S179822, order at 1.) Gauldin returned to the California Court of

Appeal; that court denied his Confrontation Clause claim, along

with several others, as successive collateral attacks on the final

judgment, or because they could have been but were not presented in

Gauldin’s previous appeal and writ petition. (Lodgment No. 20, In

re Gauldin, D056779, slip op. at 4.) 

Respondent contends that the court of appeal’s denial was on

procedural grounds. The opinion, however, did not clarify the

specific reason barring Gauldin’s Confrontation Clause claim. This

type of ambiguity has occurred in other cases. For example, in 

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774 (9th Cir. 2002), the Nevada

Supreme Court did not specify “which claims had previously been

presented to the state court and could not be relitigated, and

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which had never been presented to state court and had been waived.” 

The Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred in applying a

procedural bar based on a ruling by the Nevada Supreme Court that

“fail[ed] to specify which claims were barred for which reasons.” 

Id. at 774-75. Because the state court decision was ambiguous,

“the Nevada Supreme Court ‘did not clearly and expressly rely on an

independent and adequate state ground.’” Id. (citing Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. at 735). As in Valerio, it is impossible to

tell from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion whether it

rejected the Confrontation Clause claim as a successive collateral

attack or as a claim that could have been but was not presented in

Gauldin’s previous appeal and habeas petition. 

If the state court order is ambiguous, the federal court may

proceed to the merits of the claims. Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d

1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the California Court of Appeal

did not clearly state that Gauldin’s confrontation claim was barred

as procedurally defaulted, its ruling did not constitute

independent and adequate state grounds with respect to this claim. 

Respondent has not met his burden of showing that the state court

decision “clearly and expressly” rested on a state procedural bar. 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. at 263. 

2. Gauldin’s Confrontation Clause claim

Respondent argues, in the alternative, that if Gauldin’s

Confrontation Clause claim is not procedurally defaulted, it still

fails. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 18-19, ECF No.

10.) Respondent contends that to the extent the California Supreme

Court’s order in People v. Gauldin, Case No. S179822 [Lodgment No.

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22], can be construed as a merits denial of Petitioner’s claim, the

decision did not contradict or unreasonably apply established

federal law. (Id. at 18.) Gauldin argues that pursuant to

Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), the contents

of Cornacchia’s report were testimonial in nature, and thus

Petitioner was entitled to cross-examine Cornacchia before his DNA

test results could be admitted at trial. (Pet’r’s Appl. Leave

Amend Pet’r’s Traverse 16-18, ECF No. 20.) Respondent points out

that the DNA report was not admitted at trial, but instead was

merely described by the testifying criminologist to explain how the

expert reached his opinion. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 18, ECF No. 10.) Thus, Respondent argues that the facts in this

case are distinguishable from Melendez-Diaz, where the hearsay

report was offered into evidence. (Id. at 19.) 

In this case, David Cornacchia, a DNA analyst with the San

Diego Police Department, examined the evidence and prepared a

report, but was not available to testify at trial. (Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 346, 348-49, 352, Sept. 20, 2007.) Patrick

O’Donnell, a supervising criminalist with the DNA laboratory of the

San Diego Police Department, testified at Petitioner’s trial using

the report generated by Cornacchia. (Id. at 344-45.) 

Q. Was it important or why does a criminalist like Mr.

Cornacchia take pictures as he’s doing work?

A. It’s our philosophy in the laboratory to create a

written and pictorial record such that if an individual

is not available to testi[fy] or goes on to be employed

by another agency that we can re-create the entire

testing process and evidence, evaluation process, in a

particular case.

Q. If someone if not available, you are able or another

person that’s a reviewer is able to step in, review the

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work and see it and testify in court?

A. Correct.

Q. Mr. Cornacchia is not available, to your knowledge,

this week; is that right?

A. Yes.

(Id. at 352.) 

O’Donnell’s job responsibilities as a supervising criminalist

included “perform[ing] what’s termed an administrative review of

every case that’s issued by the DNA laboratory.” (Id. at 348.) 

O’Donnell testified that analyst Cornacchia concluded that DNA

testing revealed the victim’s blood on Gauldin’s pants, the cutting

edge of the box-cutter knife, and the exterior of the gloves

recovered from Petitioner. (Id. at 361-62.) Petitioner was the

“predominant contributor” of DNA found inside the rubber gloves. 

(Id. at 364.) “Gauldin could not be excluded as a contributor to

the DNA on that knife . . . .” (Id. at 365.) Defense counsel was

able to cross-examine O’Donnell regarding his testimony about DNA

evidence in the case. (Id. at 366-87, 389-90.) Cornacchia’s

report was not admitted into evidence in the criminal case. 

The Court “must first decide what constitutes ‘clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States,’ for purposes of [Gauldin’s] Confrontation Clause

claim.” Meras v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003)). At the time

of Gauldin’s trial in 2007, the established federal law governing

the Confrontation Clause prohibited the admission of “testimonial

statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was

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unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior

opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). The Supreme Court in Crawford noted

that “[v]arious formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’

statements exist . . . .” Id. at 52. The California Supreme

Court, applying Crawford, subsequently held that a report of DNA

test results was not testimonial, and testimony about the report by

an expert who did not perform the test was admissible at trial

without violating Confrontation Clause. People v. Geier, 41 Cal.

4th 555, 605-06, 161 P.3d 104, 138-39, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 580, 620-21

(2007). 

In 2009, the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz

clarified the Crawford definition of “testimonial” evidence. 

Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. at 310-11. The Court

considered whether the state may introduce certificates of a

forensic laboratory showing the results of its analysis without the

testimony of the analyst who performed the analysis. Id. at 308-

09. The certificates in Melendez-Diaz indicated the weight of the

seized plastic bags and stated that the bags “‘[h]a[ve] been

examined with the following results: The substance was found to

contain: Cocaine.’” Id. at 308. The certificates were sworn to

before a notary. Id. The Court found that “certificates of

analysis” were, in effect, testimonial statements by the state

laboratory analysts as to the nature of a substance. Id. at 310-

11. The Supreme Court held that the admission of certificates

reporting the results of forensic analysis in a defendant's drug

trial, which showed that material seized by police and connected to

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the defendant was cocaine, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment

right to confront the witnesses against him. Id. at 329. 

In a later decision, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. __,

__, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011), the Supreme Court considered the

admission of a forensic laboratory report signed by an analyst who

certified that the defendant's blood-alcohol concentration was “.21

grams per hundred milliliters,” above the threshold necessary to

convict the defendant on a charge of aggravated driving while

intoxicated. Id. at 2709-10. In the same document, the analyst

also certified that he received the sealed blood sample intact and

followed certain laboratory procedures. Id. at 2710. Because the

analyst was unavailable at trial, the prosecution called another

expert who had not observed nor reviewed the analyst’s work but was

familiar with the laboratory’s testing procedures. Id. at 2711-12. 

The report certifying blood-alcohol level was admitted as a

business record. Id. at 2712. 

The question before the Court in Bullcoming was “whether the

Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a

forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification--

made for the purpose of proving a particular fact--through the

in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the

certification or perform or observe the test reported in the

certification.” Id. at 2710. A majority of the Court agreed that

the analyst's signed certificate was testimonial and “may not be

introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made

the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior

opportunity to confront that witness.” Id. at 2713. Accordingly,

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the Confrontation Clause did not permit the admission of laboratory

reports through the testimony of an analyst who did not sign the

report or "perform or observe the test reported in the

certification." Id. at 2710, 2713.

The holding in Bullcoming was limited to circumstances where

the lab report signed by one criminologist is admitted through the

testimony of a different expert who had no involvement in the

testing or preparing of the report. See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at

__, __, 131 S. Ct. at 2719, 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)

(explaining that the holding had a "limited reach," and was “not a

case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent

opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not

themselves admitted into evidence,” and "not a case in which the

person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a

personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at

issue."). 

For Gauldin, the issue is whether O’Donnell’s testimony to the

contents of Cornacchia’s report violated the Confrontation Clause

at the time the state court denied Petitioner’s claim. For

purposes of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court

has identified clearly established federal law as “this Court's

precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision.” 

Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. __, __, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011)

(quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1399 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Respondent argues

that the relevant state court decision was that of the California

Supreme Court on March 15, 2010. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem.

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P. & A. 18-19, ECF No. 10.) The California Supreme Court denied

Gauldin’s petition for review without prejudice to his ability to

file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court after

the California Supreme Court decided People v. Dungo, S176886;

People v. Gutierrez, S176620; People v. Lopez, S177046; and People

v. Rutterschmidt, S176213.7 (Lodgment No. 22, People v. Gauldin,

S179822, order at 1.) After that order, Gauldin raised his

Confrontation Clause claim with the California Supreme Court. (See

Lodgment No. 21, Petition for Review at 2, In re Gauldin, S190983.) 

The state court summarily denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 23,

In re Gauldin, S190983, order at 1.) 

Where the California Supreme Court denies a petitioner's

claims without comment, the “silent” denial is considered “on the

merits” and rests on the last reasoned decision on the claims. See

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803–06; Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d

911, 917 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003); Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344,

347–48 (9th Cir. 1992). According to the record before this Court,

the last decision on the merits of Gauldin’s Confrontation Clause

claim was issued by the San Diego Superior Court in October of

2009. (Lodgment No. 15, In re Gauldin, No. HC 19711, slip op. at

7

 The line of cases cited in the California Supreme Court's

order addressed the effect the United States Supreme Court decision

in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, on People v.

Geier, 41 Cal. 4th 555, 161 P.3d 104, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 580 (2007),

and dealt with the Confrontation Clause claims in the context of

forensic reports. People v. Gutierrez, 300 P.3d 896, 156 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 743 (2013); People v. Dungo, 55 Cal. 4th 608, 286 P.3d

442, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527 (2012); People v. Lopez, 55 Cal. 4th

569, 286 P.3d 469, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559 (2012); and People v.

Rutterschmidt, 55 Cal. 4th 650, 286 P.3d 435, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518

(2012). 

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3.) Denying the claim, the court stated that Gauldin failed to

submit “any evidence to support his claim that DNA testimony was

admitted through the use of affidavit testimony and that he was

denied the right to properly cross exam[ine] on this issue.” (Id.)

At the time of the superior court’s decision on October 26,

2009, the United States Supreme Court had already decided MelendezDiaz, which prohibited admission into evidence of sworn affidavits

of unavailable witnesses.8 557 U.S. at 308-09. Melendez–Diaz

involved the introduction of affidavits detailing the results of

forensic laboratory analysis, without testimony in support of the

affidavits. In Petitioner’s case, the DNA report was not admitted

into evidence. Instead, its contents were discussed by the

testifying witness, O’Donnell. O’Donnell was the lab director who

had direct supervision of Cornacchia, the analyst who prepared the

report, as well as all his work. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

2, 366.) O’Donnell testified that he had a duty, as a supervising

criminalist, to conduct an administrative review of every case for

which a report is issued by the DNA lab. (Id. at 348.) Even under

the later-decided Bullcoming standard, such supervisory testimony

may be permissible.9 Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at

2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (noting that Bullcoming

was “not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor,

8

 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, was decided on

June 25, 2009. 

9

 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2705, was

not decided until June 23, 2011, after the last denial of Gauldin’s

petition by the California Supreme Court on April 20, 2011. (See

Lodgment No. 23, In re Gauldin, S190983, order at 1.) 

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reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited,

connection to the scientific test at issue.”). 

In this case, the state court reasonably believed that

O’Donnell's testimony satisfied the Confrontation Clause because

O’Donnell was the “supervising criminalist” and director of the

laboratory where the other analysts worked, and he testified that

Cornacchia followed the protocols and properly performed the DNA

analysis in this case:

Q. [Cornacchia’s] report and all the documentation was

done in the normal course of his duties at the lab?

A. Yes.

Q. He was under a duty to make these notes and generate these

results at or about the time of his work on the case?

A. Yes.

Q. You are one of the custodians of these reports in that you

are the lab director and have direct supervision of both Mr.

Cornacchia and his work?

A. Yes. 

Q. And it appears from your review of all this information

that there was proper protocols followed and the report was

properly generated as a result of his analysis?

A. Yes.

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 366.) 

Unlike Melendez–Diaz and Bullcoming, the prosecutor in

Gauldin’s trial did not introduce the laboratory report into

evidence; the only evidence of the DNA testing was the testimony of

O’Donnell, who Petitioner was able to cross-examine. Melendez–Diaz

dealt with the use of affidavits instead of testimony, while

Gauldin’s case involved in-court testimony of a DNA expert, a

supervisor who did not reach an independent conclusion about the

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DNA tests. To the extent Melendez–Diaz clearly established the

rule prohibiting the admission of sworn affidavits regarding

scientific evidence without testimony, it did not expressly

preclude a supervising expert's testimony about test results

prepared by someone other than the testifying expert. 

The Ninth Circuit and several lower courts faced with similar

habeas claims have agreed that Melendez-Diaz did not clearly

establish that testimony by a supervisor about the results of a

scientific test violated the Confrontation Clause. In Meras, the

court observed that “Melendez–Diaz involved a lab report submitted

without live testimony, whereas Meras's case has the added

complication that the report was introduced through the testimony

of the author's supervisor. 676 F.3d at 1190. The state court

decision denying Meras’s petition for review in 2005 did not

violate clearly established supreme court law because “[t]he Court

did not decide until 2011, in Bullcoming, that the right to

confrontation could be satisfied only by live testimony of a

declarant.” Id.; accord Graham v. Cash, No. CV 11–5723–DDP (OP),

2013 WL 3982271, at *15-17 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2013) (noting that

supervisor testified and gave her opinion based on DNA tests

performed by another); Talamantes v. Allison, No. CV 11–1394–DSF

(DTB), 2012 WL 3206052, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2012) (“[T]he

specific claim raised in [Meras]--a Confrontation Clause claim

based upon a lab report introduced through the testimony of

author's colleague--was not decided by the Supreme Court until 2011

in its decision in Bullcoming.”) (citing Meras v. Sisto, 676 F.3d

at 1190); Wise v. Neotti, No. CV 11-6303-MMM (AJW), 2012 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS 160684, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) (“[F]airminded

jurists could disagree about whether Melendez-Diaz precluded the

live testimony of a laboratory supervisor who reviewed and signed a

report prepared by another analyst. Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to relief.”). 

The California court's rejection of Petitioner's claim was

neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States

Supreme Court. Thus, the state court's opinion is not a basis for

habeas relief. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

For all these reasons, Gauldin’s Confrontation Clause claim should

be DENIED. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for

federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy the two-part test

from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First,

Gauldin must show that his counsel's performance was deficient. 

Id. Second, he must establish that counsel's deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong,

Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the

result of the proceeding would have been different absent the

error. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000); Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability in this context is “a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, Gauldin must establish

both deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 687. A court need not,

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however, determine whether counsel's performance was deficient

before addressing the prejudice prong; it is often easier to

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of

sufficient prejudice. Id. at 697. 

The United States Supreme Court noted that “[s]urmounting

Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky,

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). In the context of federal habeas review,

“[t]he standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are both

‘highly deferential.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at __, 131

S. Ct. at 788. Trial counsel is presumed to be competent. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "To rebut this presumption,

[Petitioner] must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and was not the

product of sound strategy." Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 815

(9th Cir. 2008). Counsel's representation is deficient if "it

falls outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases." Id.

As noted above, Gauldin initially raised, as ground three in

his Petition, several subclaims regarding his trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness. (See Pet. 8-9, ECF No. 1.) Respondent argued

that all but one of the subclaims were procedurally barred because

they could have been, but were not, presented in the previous

consolidated appeal and habeas petition. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF No. 10.) Respondent’s Answer did not

address whether under the exception to the procedural bar doctrine

articulated by the Supreme Court on March 20, 2012, in Martinez v.

Ryan, __ U.S. __, __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), attorney error

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in initial-review collateral proceedings would qualify as cause for

excusing procedural default in this case. 

This Court need not consider whether the equitable exception

to procedural bar applied because Gauldin has abandoned all but one

of the subclaims regarding his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

(Pet’r’s Appl. Leave Amend Pet’r’s Traverse 6-7, ECF No. 20.) 

Petitioner currently contends that his trial attorney provided

ineffective assistance by failing to object to Gauldin’s

codefendants being identified in court while dressed in prison

clothing. (See Pet. 7, ECF No. 1; Pet’r’s Appl. Leave Amend

Pet’r’s Traverse 21, ECF No. 20.) Respondent argues that this

claim fails because Gauldin cannot establish that no fair-minded

jurist would agree with the state court’s opinion rejecting

Petitioner’s claim. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 17,

ECF No. 10.) 

When reviewing a state court decision, federal courts must

look to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the

judgment. Polk v. Sandoval, 503 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 880 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The last state court to address the merits of Petitioner's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was the California Court of

Appeal. (See Lodgment No. 11, People v. Gauldin, No. D052093, slip

op. at 11-12.) This Court reviews that decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 806. 

The court of appeal rejected Gauldin’s ineffective assistance

claim for failure to object to in-court identification of

codefendants while they wore prison garb and shackles, concluding

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that his lawyer was not deficient. (Lodgment No. 11, People v.

Gauldin, No. D052093, slip op. at 11-12.) The court explained:

In connection with the habeas petition, Gauldin's

trial counsel submitted a declaration stating that he had

a tactical reason for not objecting, namely, that the

defense at trial was that Carter, Snowden and a third

person committed the crimes and that minimizing the

prejudicial look of Carter and Snowden would have been

contrary to that defense. In light of a credible

tactical reason for defense counsel's conduct, we cannot

say his legal representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.

(Id. at 11.) In addition, the appellate court noted that “even if

trial counsel's conduct could be viewed as deficient, Gauldin has

not demonstrated a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial

would have been different had his counsel objected because the

evidence against him was strong and his story lacked credibility.” 

(Id. at 11-12.) 

Petitioner argues that “the appearance of Carter and Snowden

in jail clothes and shackles would lead the jury to believe that

Warrick and Buchanan accurately identified them, even if they had

not. That belief would almost certainly carry over to Buchanan’s

identification of petitioner.” (Pet’r’s Appl. Leave Amend Pet’r’s

Traverse 25, ECF No. 20.) Gauldin contends that the in-court

identification procedure of his codefendants impaired the

presumption of innocence, because the “suggestion of petitioner’s

guilt by association with Carter and Snowden was vivid.” (Id.) 

“The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by

the Fourteenth Amendment. The presumption of innocence, although

not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair

trial under our system of criminal justice.” Estelle v. Williams,

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425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). In Estelle, the Supreme Court found that

due process was compromised by “the constant reminder of the

accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable

attire.” Id. at 504–05. “[A]n accused should not be compelled to

go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible

impairment of the presumption [of innocence] so basic to the

adversary system.” Id. at 504. 

Here, it was Gauldin’s codefendants, not the Petitioner, who

appeared in prison clothing before the jury. Estelle does not

extend to codefendants wearing prison attire, and Gauldin does not

cite to any federal authority supporting his ineffective assistance

claim on this point. United States v. Portillo-Quezada, Nos.

03–20051, 08–2295, 2010 WL 2952353, at *3 (D. Kan. July 26, 2010)

(denying motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 where petitioner’s

codefendants appeared in prison clothing at trial). 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief based on the

analysis in the California appellate decision in People v.

Williams, 93 Cal. App. 3d 40, 67, 155 Cal. Rptr. 414, 429 (1979). 

(See Pet. 28-29, ECF No. 1.) The state court, id., relied on

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, and concluded that Williams’s

constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by exhibiting his

former codefendants to the jury while wearing their jail clothing. 

This Court may grant habeas relief only to correct errors of

federal constitutional magnitude. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d

1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts are not

concerned with errors of state law unless they rise to level of a

constitutional violation). Here, trial counsel’s failure to object

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to the in-court identification of the codefendants did not violate

Gauldin’s constitutional rights because its effect on the jury did

not compromise the defense theory chosen by Petitioner at trial. 

See Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504 (“The actual impact of a particular

practice on the judgment of jurors cannot always be fully

determined. . . . . Courts must do the best they can to evaluate

the likely effects of a particular procedure, based on reason,

principle, and common human experience.”) 

Gauldin’s defense theory at trial was that Eric Carter and

Kimberlee Snowden perpetrated the crime with another individual

named Jayski. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 464, 479-80,

518-20.) Gauldin’s trial counsel argued in his closing argument

that Snowden and Carter committed the crime. (Id. at 598, 601,

608.) Petitioner’s testimony implicated Snowden and Carter. 

Gauldin stated that Snowden sped up when police tried to pull her

over. (Id. at 444-46.) He also claimed that Carter handed him

Buchanan’s gun and said to throw it in the bushes after Gauldin

asked Snowden to let him out of the car. (Id. at 446-48, 470.)

The court of appeal explained that Gauldin’s lawyer had a

tactical reason for not objecting to the codefendants’ attire, and

concluded that it was reasonable defense strategy. (Lodgment No.

11, People v. Gauldin, No. D052093, slip op. at 11-12.) The court

noted that “minimizing the prejudicial look of Carter and Snowden

would have been contrary to that defense.” (Id. at 11.) Gauldin

has not shown that the California Court of Appeal’s decision that

he could not demonstrate deficient performance by his trial counsel

was an unreasonable application of federal law. 

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Gauldin’s claim of ineffective assistance also fails because

Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish

prejudice, Petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Id. at 694; Beardslee v. Woodford, 327 F.3d 799,

807–08 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner cannot establish any

prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to object to the

codefendants’ clothing. 

Recognizing the “tempt[ation] for a defendant to second-guess

counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,”

Petitioner has not shown that his trial counsel’s performance was

deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Counsel chose to defend

Gauldin on the theory that Snowden and Carter committed the crime

with another individual, Jayski. The Supreme Court acknowledged

that “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in

any given case,” and that “[e]ven the best criminal defense

attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” 

Id. 

The California Court of Appeal properly concluded that

Petitioner did not demonstrate that his trial counsel's

representation was below an objective standard of reasonableness or

that the jury’s verdict would have been different if counsel had

objected because “the evidence against him was strong and his story

lacked credibility.” (Lodgment No. 11, People v. Gauldin, No.

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D052093, slip op. at 11-12.) This decision was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor was the decision based

upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2).

For all these reasons, Gauldin’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel at trial does not entitle him to relief and

should be DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge Larry Alan Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined

above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the district court issue an

Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and

(2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 28, 2014, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

//

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//

//

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//

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

April 11, 2014. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 4, 2014 __________________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Burns

All parties

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