Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00838/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00838-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 On May 1, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). (Dkt. #6) Because Petitioner failed to allege any

“violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” as required under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, this Court dismissed said petition without prejudice, allowing Petitioner leave

to amend. (Dkt. #3)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luther Jernigan, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-838-PHX-MHM (LOA)

ORDER

On July 18, 2008, Luther Jernigan ("Petitioner") filed an Amended Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus.1

 (Dkt. #6) Respondents subsequently filed an Answer on October 22,

2008. (Dkt. #13) This matter was referred to United States Judge Magistrate Lawrence O.

Anderson, who issued a Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #18) recommending that

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed. 

Petitioner filed a written Objection to the Report (Dkt. #21) and a Motion for Leave to Take

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 1 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

 Depositions. (Dkt. #23) Respondents filed a Response to the Request for Depositions.

(Dkt. #22)

I. BACKGROUND 

The relevant facts, as stated in Magistrate Judge Anderson’s Report and

Recommendation, are as follows. 

A. Trial Court Proceedings and Guilty Plea

On August 3, 2005, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner by indictment of one count

of fraud, a class two felony, one count of theft, also a class two felony, three counts of taking

the identity of another, class 4 felonies, and three counts of forgery, also class 4 felonies.

(Dkt. #13, Exh. A) The State subsequently amended the indictment to allege four historical

prior felony convictions for attempt to commit theft, dealing in counterfeit obligations,

conspiracy to possess cocaine for distribution, and unlawful possession of a firearm. (Dkt.

#13, Exh. C) The State further alleged that Petitioner committed his current offenses while

on release from confinement from a conviction in Federal Court. (Dkt. #13, Exh. D) 

Petitioner accepted and signed a plea agreement from the State on December 7, 2005.

(Dkt. #13, Exh. E) Under the terms of the written plea agreement, Petitioner would plead

guilty to Amended Count 1, Attempt to Commit Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, a class

3 felony, with one prior felony conviction, and Amended Count 2, Theft. (Id.) In return, the

remaining counts, the allegation of Petitioner’s additional prior convictions, and the

allegation that he was on parole at the time of the present offense would be dismissed. (Id.

at 2) The plea agreement explained that the presumptive term for Count 1 was 6.5 years,

with a super-mitigated term of 3.5 years, and a super-aggravated term of 16.5 years. (Id.)

The agreement stipulated that the sentence for Count 2 would run consecutively to Count 1,

but that probation was available. (Id.)

The same day, Petitioner had a change of plea hearing in Maricopa County Superior

Court, (Dkt. #13, Exh. F) during which the court confirmed the terms of the plea agreement

and accepted the guilty plea. (Id. at 3-4) The court specifically asked Petitioner if he

understood all the terms of the plea agreement, had been forced of threatened in any manner,

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 2 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

was entering into the plea voluntarily, understood the range of sentences, and understood the

constitutional rights he was giving up by entering such a plea. (Id. at 5-10) Petitioner

assured the court that he was entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily, without force or

threat, and with an understanding of the range of sentences he could receive and the

constitutional rights he was waiving. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s attorney, Susan Maga, gave the following factual basis for the plea. As

to Amended Count 1, between August and November of 2004, Petitioner, along with a

woman named Tina Ricketts, worked together to take out a mortgage on the home of Lucinda

Maxfield without her knowledge. (Id. at 11) Petitioner requested that Ricketts pretend to

be Lucinda Maxfield to complete the mortgage paperwork, and provided her with a blond

wig to do so. (Id.) After the money was received for the mortgage on Maxfield’s home,

Ricketts, again pretending to be Lucinda Maxfield, wired $125,000 of the mortgage proceeds

to a bank account Petitioner had opened under the false name Richard Self, at the request of

Petitioner, knowing it as an account opened up under a false name. (Id.) Lastly, Petitioner,

along with Ricketts, was aware that a man named David Robinson was paid with the

mortgage proceeds, in exchange for not telling Lucinda Maxwell about the mortgage. (Id.

at 11-12) After the recitation of the factual basis, the court asked Petitioner if the facts

recited were in fact true, and Petitioner answered affirmatively. (Id. at 12) 

As to Amended Count 2, Ms. Maga provided the factual basis that Petitioner had

committed theft by, “without lawful authority, knowingly controlling CSI Mortgage’s cash

with intent to permanently deprive them of the money,” and opening up a fraudulent account

to that end. (Id. at 13) Petitioner also attested to the truth of these facts. (Id.)

Thus, the court found that Petitioner had made the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently and that there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea. (Id. at 14) 

Differences arose between Petitioner and attorney Susan Maga, and the court allowed

her to withdraw and replaced her with attorney Terri Capozzi. (Dkt. #13, Exh. G, H)

Petitioner then filed a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement, which the court

addressed at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing on May 12, 2006. (Dkt. #13, Exh. I) Petitioner

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 3 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

requested a continuance to call several witnesses, but the court denied the request for a

continuance because the hearing had already been continued for an extensive period of time.

(Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 4) Petitioner also requested that he be permitted to testify himself, but

the court also denied this request because the time was set “for oral arguments” on the

motion to withdraw, and thus the court would not take testimony. (Id. at 4) 

During oral argument, Petitioner’s new counsel, Ms. Capozzi, argued that because of

Petitioner’s poor relationship with Ms. Maga, he felt compelled to accept a plea to a longer

sentence than he was comfortable with, and with a factual basis that he did not support. (Id.

at 5) Petitioner’s position was that he contested the factual basis for Amended Count 1 on

the grounds that he had never supplied a wig or disguise to Tina Ricketts to pose as Lucinda

Maxwell. (Id. at 6) Petitioner claimed that he told his former counsel, Ms. Maga, this, but

that “his will was overborn” due to sleep deprivation. (Id. at 7) The State argued that

Petitioner had been repeatedly asked by the court if the factual basis was correct, and he in

each instance answered that it was. (Id. at 8) The State also made the point that even if the

specific fact that Petitioner claimed was incorrect—that he provided the wig and disguise to

Rickets—was untrue, sufficient evidence still existed for Amended Count 1, such as

Petitioner’s opening the fraudulent bank account and having a portion of the mortgage

proceeds wired to it. (Id. at 9) The court then ruled denying the motion to withdraw from

the plea because Petitioner had not met the burden of showing manifest injustice and

proceeded to sentencing. (Id. at 12) 

After both sides and the lead detective on the case, Det. Paul Arnold, spoke, Petitioner

was allowed to speak. (Id. at 12-19) Petitioner said something to the effect of it being a

shame that no one was “interested in the truth.” (Id. at 19) The court then found that for

Amended Count 1, the presumptive term was not appropriate because of the circumstances

of the crime and three aggravating factors: Petitioner’s priors admitted in the plea agreement,

presence of an accomplice, and the crime being committed for monetary gain. (Id. at 22)

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 4 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The plea agreement states that the presumptive sentence is 6.5 years and the

maximum sentence is 13.0 years, but that 16.25 years is available if the trial court makes an

“exceptional circumstances finding.” (Dkt. #13, Exh. E) 

- 5 -

As a result, the court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 16.252

 years. (Id. at 23)

On Amended Count 2, the court suspended the sentence and placed Petitioner on

supervised probation for 5 years, to run consecutively with Petitioner’s sentence on Count

1. (Id. at 25) 

B. First Post-Conviction Proceeding

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on June 16, 2006. (Dkt. #13, Exh.

J) The court granted Petitioner’s request for appointed counsel, and a petition for postconviction relief was filed on December 20, 2006. (Dkt. #13, Exh. K) The court denied

relief. 

Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals on May

31, 2007. (Dkt. #13, Exh. M) The Court of Appeals denied review, (Dkt. #13, Exh. N) and

Petitioner did not seek review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Dkt. #6 at 6-9) 

C. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding

Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief on August 27, 2007. (Dkt.

#13, Exh. O) The trial court found that pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), Petitioner’s

claims were precluded. (Dkt. #13, Exh. P) The court rejected Petitioner’s claim that he was

entitled to relief because of “newly-discovered” evidence, because the evidence in question

was available to Petitioner before pleading guilty, and because when he pled guilty,

Petitioner waived his right to contest evidence against him. (Id.) The court also found that

Petitioner had failed to show actual innocence. (Id.) 

Subsequently Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review with the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Dkt. #13, Exh. Q) The Court of Appeals again denied review (Dkt. #13, Exh. R)

and Petitioner did not seek review from the Arizona Supreme Court. (Dkt. #6 at 6-9) 

/ / / 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 5 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

On August 15, 2008, Petitioner filed a timely Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in this court. (Dkt. #6, Dkt. #13 at 6) In the petition, the following claims are raised:

(1) “Violation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Petitioner can show manifest injustice has occurred and trial court refused to

hold an evidentiary hearing to allow Petitioner to withdraw from plea;” (2) Petitioner

received ineffective assistance of counsel and suffered a “manifest injustice” because counsel

provided an incorrect factual basis for his guilty plea; and (3) Petitioner received ineffective

assistance of counsel because counsel (a) failed to subpoena witnesses to testify in support

of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and (b) failed to object to the aggravated sentence.

(Dkt. #6) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A person in custody under a state-court judgment may petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in a United States district court when seeking a determination that his or her custody

violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1).

However, before granting a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition, the petitioner must have

exhausted the remedies available in the state courts. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Otherwise, the claims may be procedurally

defaulted. If the petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement, habeas relief may be granted

on any claim “adjudicated on the merits” by the state court only if the adjudication resulted

in a decision contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States, or “a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Court must review the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation de

novo for those facts to which Objections are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Objection was timely made

by Petitioner. (Dkt. #22). A district court has authority to accept, reject, or modify the

magistrate judge report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Petitioner has also

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 6 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

requested leave to take depositions (Dkt. #23) and Respondent has filed a Response. (Dkt.

#22) Unlike a traditional civil litigant, a habeas petitioner “is not entitled to discovery as a

matter of ordinary course.” Bracy v. Gramley, 530 U.S. 899, 904 (1997); see also Bittaker

v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, the decision to grant discovery is

left to the discretion of the court, discretion to be exercised where there is a showing of good

cause why discovery should be allowed. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts, Rule 6(a). 

III. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents assert that Petitioner procedurally defaulted Ground Two and part of

Ground Three, and thus those claims are barred from review. For the reasons stated below,

the Court agrees. 

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

To petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, a state prisoner must first

exhaust his remedies in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. 2254(b); see also Duckworth v. Serrano,

454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam). The burden is on the Petitioner to show that he has

properly exhausted. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam),

cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982). 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement under Arizona state law, a petitioner must either

raise his claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief (“PCR”) pursuant to Arizona Criminal Procedure Rule 32. See Roettgen

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of those avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. “In cases not carrying a life

sentence or the death penalty, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes

of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.” Castillo v.

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 7 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Respondents, citing among other cases Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004),

assert that in subsequent rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have

implicitly overruled Swoopes, and thus federal habeas petitioners must present their claims

to the Arizona Supreme Court to meet the exhaustion requirement. (Dkt. #13 at 7, n.1) This

court disagrees with that interpretation of Baldwin and continues to hold that the exhaustion

requirement is met when petitioners present their federal claim to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. See Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925, 931-33 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

- 8 -

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999).3

Claims must not only be raised in the proper forum, but must be “fairly presented.”

That is, Petitioner must provide the state court with a fair opportunity to apply controlling

legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1971). To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong, Petitioner

must present both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based

to the state’s highest court. See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003)

(overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)). It is

important to note that a petitioner’s allusion to “broad constitutional principles, such as due

process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial” in their state court pleadings is not

sufficient to establish that a federal constitutional claim was fairly presented to the state

courts. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999 (internal citations omitted). However, “state and federal

courts are jointly responsible for the enforcement of federal constitutional guarantees,” and

“for purposes of exhaustion, a citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue

serves the same purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue.” Peterson v.

Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).

The SupremeCourt has emphasized that the purpose of exhaustion isto give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged federal constitutional errors. See Baldwin

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). If a petitioner fails to present a claim based on a violation

of a specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to the violation of a state constitutional

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 8 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

right, state rule, or state law, it has not been “fairly presented” to the state court. See id. at

33. In essence, a federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies if he still has

the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

Procedural default may occur when a petitioner has never presented a federal claim

in state court and is now barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules. See id. at

351-52; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural default may

also occur when a petitioner presents a claim to a state court, but the state court did not

addressthe merits ofthe claimbecause Petitionerfailed to follow a state proceduralrule. See

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

2002). 

A petitioner who has procedurally defaulted in state proceedings may not raise the

claim in federal habeas unless the petitioner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, show

cause and prejudice, or show actual innocence that would excuse the default. See Coleman,

501 U.S. at 750-51; Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wells

v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994)). The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one

of discretion; it is intended to be flexible, yielding to exceptional circumstances only. See

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Although both

cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982); and Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. However, failure

to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation

has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” See Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). 

B. Exhaustion of Petitioner’s Claims

1. Ground One

Petitioner’s first claim is that he was deprived of the due process accorded to him by

the Fourteenth Amendment when his counsel allegedly provided an incorrect factual basis

at his change of plea hearing and when the trial court refused to conduct an evidentiary

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 9 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

hearing on Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Dkt. #6 at 6) Petitioner

presented this claim in his first petition for post-conviction relief. (Dkt. #13, Exh. K at 6)

The trial court rejected these claims. (Dkt. #13, Exh. L) Petitioner then raised this same

claim before the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Dkt. #13, Exh. M at 3,6) Thus, Petitioner

properly exhausted Ground One. 

2. Ground Two

Petitioner’s second claim is that his counsel was ineffective in providing an incorrect

factual basis for his guilty plea. (Dkt. #6 at 7, 12) In his first petition for post-conviction

relief, Petitioner asserted that his counsel was ineffective because she provided “an incorrect

factual basis.” (Dkt. #13, Exh.K at 6-7) However, Petitioner failed to raise this claim in his

petition before the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Dkt. #13, Exh M at 3, 6-7) Thus, with

respect to this claim, Petitioner did not exhaust his remedies in Arizona state court, and it is

procedurally defaulted. 

3. Ground Three

Petitioner’s third claim is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his

counsel (a) failed to subpoena witnesses for the motion-to-withdraw/sentencing hearing and

(b) did not object to the trial court’s failure to give advance notice that it intended to impose

a super-aggravated sentence. (Dkt. #6 at 8) In his first petition for post conviction relief,

Petitioner raised both these claims. (Dkt. #13, Exh. K at 8) In his petition for review before

the Arizona Court of Appeals, however, Petitioner raised the issue of subpoenaing witnesses

but not of failing to object to the lack of notice of a super-aggravated sentence. (Dkt. #13,

Exh. M at 3,7) Petitioner properly exhausted Claim 3(a), that his counsel was ineffective for

not subpoenaing witnesses. However, Claim 3(b), that counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to the super-aggravated sentence was not properly presented before Arizona courts,

and is thus procedurally defaulted. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not presented evidence in either his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus or in his Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

that shows a miscarriage of justice, cause and prejudice, or actual innocence that would

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 10 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

In addition to being procedurally defaulted, Grounds 2 and 3(b) are also meritless.

Having concluded they are procedurally defaulted, we decline to address the merits of these

defaulted claims here. However, the merits of both claims are addressed extensively in

Magistrate Judge Anderson’s Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. #18 at 22-28)

- 11 -

permit the Court to overlook the fact that Claim 2 and Claim 3(b) were not properly

exhausted. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss these claims with prejudice.4 

IV. Merits of Petitioners Non-Exhausted Claims 

A. Ground One - Due Process Violation

Petitioner’s first non-procedurally defaulted claim is that his due process rights were

violated when the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw

from the plea agreement (Dkt. #6 at 6) Petitioner’s attorney requested a continuance to

subpoena several individuals who Petitioner hoped to have testify and requested that

Petitioner be permitted to testify; the court denied both requests, but did permit “oral

arguments” on the motion. (Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 4) Petitioner asserted in his motion to

withdraw that the court should allow the withdrawal of the guilty plea because the factual

basis was incorrect. (Dkt. #13, Exh. V) Specifically, he contests the inclusion in the factual

basis that he provided Tina Rickets with a wig and disguise to impersonate Lucinda Maxwell.

(Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 5-7) 

In response to Petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction review, the court

summarily denied this claim, stating that Petitioner’s “motion stated the general facts to

which he expected the witnesses to testify and the defendant’s position” and also included

a “deposition transcript” and “documentation from a forensic laboratory.” (Dkt. #13. Exh.

L at 2) At trial, the court reviewed the motion and “heard argument from counsel.” (Id.)

Citing State v. Valenzuela, 98 Ariz. 189, 403 P.2d 286 (1965), the court found that the trial

court determined that Petitioner “knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement,”

and thus did not abuse its discretion. (Dkt. #13, Exh. L at 2-3) 

Magistrate Judge Anderson’s Report and Recommendation concluded that Petitioner

failed to establish that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 11 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

application of federal law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court agrees. “[W]hen the

judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen

the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both

counseled and voluntary.” U.S. v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); see also Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)

(“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of

the offense with which he is charged . . . [h]e may only attack the voluntary and intelligent

character of the guilty plea.”) 

The record reveals that Petitioner’s guilty plea was in every respect voluntary and

intelligent. Petitioner specifically attested that he understood the plea and entered into the

plea free of any external promises, force, or threats, voluntarily and on his own free will.

(Dkt. #13, Exh. F at 6) The trail court explained at length the constitutional rights Petitioner

would be giving up if he pled guilty, and Petitioner agreed to give them up. (Id. at 9-10)

Furthermore, after Petitioner’s counsel recited the factual basis disputed in this petition, the

court specifically asked Petitioner: “You have heard your counsel provide us the factual basis

for this plea, and you heard her recite those facts. Do you agree the facts she recited are, in

fact, true?” (Id. at 12, ln. 9-12) To this Petitioner answered, “Yes.” (Id. at 12, ln. 13)

“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” U.S. v. Rubalcaba,

811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310, 314 (9th Cir.

1979)). 

Petitioner has also failed to show that the state post-conviction court’s decision to

deny his claim that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea based on the

allegedly inaccurate factual basis was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1). Though the state postconviction court did not directly explain its decision or cite any Federal law, neither citation

of Federal cases or even “awareness” of Federal precedent is required, “so long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts” federal law. Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 12 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

First, even assuming arguendo that the factual basis was flawed, it would nonetheless

not give rise to a Constitutional violation. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and

Arizona Rule 17.3 require that there be a factual basis for the plea. However, neither rule of

procedure is “constitutionally mandated.” McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969)

(citing Waddy v. Heer, 383 F.2d 789 (C.A.6th Cir. 1967)). If a plea is otherwise intelligent

and voluntary, a state court is not required by the Constitution to establish a factual basis.

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (“Thus, while most pleas of guilty

consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the later element is not a

constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime

may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison

sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting

the crime.”) Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 777 F.2d 527, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)

(rejecting petitioner’s claim that he should be granted habeas corpus relief because his guilty

plea was not supported by a factual basis on the grounds that, although a factual basis is

required under Arizona law, “relief under section 2254(a) can be granted only for a violation

of the United States Constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty” and “the due process clause

does not impose on a state court the duty to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea absent

special circumstances.”) Thus, Petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were violated

when he was not permitted to withdraw his guilty plea based on the allegedly inaccurate

factual basis is not a valid Constitutional claim, because no such right to a correct factual

basis exists under the United States Constitution. As a result, Petitioner’s claim is based only

on the state court’s failure to comply with Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.3, which,

as a state law claim, is not subject to habeas corpus review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 67-68 (1991) (emphasizing that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to

reexamine state-court decisions on state-law questions”). 

Second, Petitioner has not established that in rejecting his motion to withdraw his

plea, the trial court unreasonably applied federal law through an unreasonable interpretation

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 13 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

of the facts before it. As stated earlier, after Petitioner’s counsel recited the factual basis

disputed in this petition, the court specifically asked Petitioner: “You have heard your

counsel provide us the factual basis for this plea, and you heard her recite those facts. Do

you agree the facts she recited are, in fact, true?” (Id. at 12, ln. 9-12) To this Petitioner

answered, “Yes.” (Id. at 12, ln. 13) Based on this, the trial court had a reasonable basis for

accepting Petitioner’s guilty plea. Though they are not “insurmountable,” “solemn

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431

U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see also Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986)

(“[S]tatements made by a criminal defendant contemporaneously with his plea should be

accorded great weight.”). 

Had the trial court decided to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion

to withdraw based on the contention that the factual basis was incorrect, Petitioner would

have been compelled to testify that in the above-mentioned exchange with the court, he lied

in open court when he stated that the factual basis was correct. It is very likely that the trial

court would have found this testimony unreliable. Petitioner’s credibility is further

impeached by the fact that immediately following the hearing on the motion to withdraw,

during his sentencing hearing, he had the opportunity to speak and state on the record any

factual inaccuracies in the factual basis, but rather choose to say the following: “I really don’t

have nothing to say. It’s a shame people is not interested in the truth, you know. We make

up all these little stories but nobody knows the truth. It’s really sad. But I see no other

thing.” (Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 19) 

Third, even aside from Petitioner’s statements before the court during his change of

plea hearing, the record before the court supported Petitioner’s guilty pleas. Under Arizona

law, “the factual basis may be ascertained from the record including presentence reports,

preliminary hearing reports, admissions of the defendant, and other sources.” State v.

Varela, 120 Ariz. 596, 598, 587 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Ariz. 1978). Not only did Petitioner state

on the record at his change of plea hearing that the factual basis was accurate, but other parts

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 14 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

of the record contradict Petitioner’s after-the-fact assertions that he did not provide Ricketts

with a wig and a disguise to impersonate Maxfield, and that Maxfield was involved in the

scam. At sentencing, Scottsdale detective Paul Arnold, who conducted the “entire

investigation,” testified that based on the evidence uncovered during the investigation, he

believed that Lucinda Maxfield was not involved, and that Petitioner was the “master mind”

behind the scheme. (Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 15-17) The court also had the opportunity learn the

contents of the police reports pertaining to the investigation that were referenced in the

presentence report that detailed Petitioner’s involvement in committing the crimes with codefendant Ricketts. (Dkt. #13, Exh. S at 1) 

Nor has Petitioner established that, had an evidentiary hearing been held, evidence not

before the trial court during the sentencing would have been presented to combat the factual

basis given by Petitioner’s counsel at the change of plea hearing. On the contrary, the trial

court had for its review, attached as an addendum to the state’s response to the motion to

withdraw, Tina Ricketts’ plea agreement. (Dkt. #13, Exh. T) The plea agreement stated in

its factual basis that the crime was committed “without the permission or knowledge of

Lucinda Maxfield,” and that “Luther Jernigan did request that Tina Ricketts dress as and

pretend to be Lucinda Maxfield and did provide the blond wig Rickets wore while

completing mortgage paperwork.” (Id.) Had Tina Ricketts testified at such an evidentiary

hearing, she likely would have testified to the same facts contained in the factual basis for

her plea. 

Lastly, even if the factual basis did not contain the information that Petitioner

disputes, there would still be sufficient information to sustain Petitioner’s guilty plea.

Defendant pled guilty to Amended Count 1, Attempt to Commit Fraudulent Schemes and

Artifices (Dkt. #13, Exh. E at 1), requiring that (1) pursuant to a scheme or artifice to

defraud, a person (2) knowingly obtains any benefit (3) by means of false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations promises or material omissions. Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 13-

2310(A) (2001). The factual basis states that Petitioner and Tina Ricketts “worked together”

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 15 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Petitioner’s objections to the Report and Recommendation do not address the

procedural default of Ground Two. (Dkt. #21 at 9-11) Therefore, this court does not address

Petitioner’s objections to Ground Two here. 

- 16 -

to complete a fraudulent mortgage without the knowledge or permission of Lucinda

Maxfield. (Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 11) It also stated that Petitioner opened a fraudulent account

in the name of Richard Self, and that $125,000 of the mortgage proceeds were wired to that

account by Tina Ricketts pretending to be Lucinda Maxfield. (Id.) Petitioner was also aware

that another man by the name of David Robinson was paid money from the mortgage

proceeds in exchange for not telling Lucinda Maxfield about the mortgage scheme. (Id. at

12) This information alone, without the disputed facts, would be enough to make the factual

basis for the elements of the offense to which Petitioner pled guilty.

In his objections to the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #21), Petitioner, in sum,

argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea or at least have an

evidentiary hearing based on his failure to admit an “element of [the] crime” and his

“maintaining his innocence.” (Id. at 5, 8) As described above, Petitioner has done neither.

The facts that Petitioner dispute do not constitute an element of the crime, nor has he at any

point asserted actual innocence, only that he disputes certain parts of the factual basis. 

For these reasons, the Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation that the

state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law.

(Dkt. #18)

B. Ground Two

Petitioner’s second asserted ground for relief is that trial counsel, Susan Maga, was

ineffective at the change of plea hearing because she “provided an incorrect factual basis for

the plea.” (Dkt. #6 at 7) While this court declines to address the merits of this claim

because it has been procedurally defaulted,5

 they are addressed at length in Magistrate Judge

Anderson’s Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. #18 at 22-26) The Report and

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 16 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

Recommendation concludes that “Petitioner fails to establish that counsel was ineffective

with respect to the factual bases for his guilty pleas or for leading the court to believe that

Petitioner was the mastermind behind the mortgage scheme.” (Dkt. #18 at 26) The Court

agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. 

C. Ground Three

Petitioner’s third claim is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his

counsel (a) failed to subpoena witnesses for the motion-to-withdraw/sentencing hearing and

(b) did not object to the trial court’s failure to give advance notice that it intended to impose

a super-aggravated sentence. (Dkt. #6 at 8) Petitioner properly exhausted Claim 3(a), that

his counsel was ineffective for not subpoenaing witnesses. However, Claim 3(b), that

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the super-aggravated sentence was not

properly presented before Arizona courts, and is thus procedurally defaulted. Thus, this court

declines to address the merits of defaulted Claim 3(b) here, although they are addressed at

length in the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. #18 at 26-28) Again, the Court agrees with

the Magistrate Judge’s analysis.

Petitioner’s non-defaulted claim is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

when his counsel failed to subpoena witnesses for the motion-to-withdraw/sentencing

hearing. (Dkt. #6 at 8) In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the U.S. Supreme

Court described the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, counsel’s

performance must be deficient, and second, the defendant must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. Id. 

To prevail on the first prong of the Strickland test, Petitioner must show that counsel

did not provide “reasonably effective assistance” and that counsel’s performance “fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88. A reviewing court will give a high

level of deference when reviewing counsel’s performance. Id. at 689. The standard that

counsel’s conduct must meet is “reasonably effective assistance,” Id. at 687, and a reviewing

court will “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 17 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial

strategy.” Id. at 689. 

Second, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the error must

prejudice the defense. Id. at 692. To show that the alleged deficiency prejudiced the

defense, Petitioner must show that there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s

alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A

“reasonable probability” is defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Id.; Oritiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Petitioner’s attorney’s failure to subpoena the witnesses in question does not fall

below the standard of reasonably effective assistance. Petitioner challenges counsel’s failure

to subpoena four individuals, Lucinda Maxfield, David Robinson, William Flynn, and Stacey

Scaife, in support of his motion to withdraw. (Dkt. #6 at 9) The decision whether or not to

subpoena certain witnesses is within “the sound professional judgment of the trial lawyer.”

Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). Petitioner’s attorney attempted

to get in contact with the four individuals in questions, but was “unable to get return of

service on those individuals.” (Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 4) Moreover, she asked for a continuance

to attempt to have them at the hearing, but the court denied the request because the matter

had already been continued several times. (Id.) Though she was not able to have any of

those individuals present at the hearing, counsel supported her motion to withdraw with

forensic documentation and excerpts from Scaife’s deposition in a related civil case. (Dkt.

#13, Exh. V) 

Next, counsel’s allegedly deficient performance did not prejudice Petitioner. The

court had before it the motion to withdraw from the guilty plea, had reviewed the motion, and

clearly believed it had enough information to proceed based on the pleadings before it and

oral argument from the attorneys. (Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 3-4) The motion itself contained “the

general facts to which [Petitioner] expected the witnesses to testify,” and still the court

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 18 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

believed it could proceed without the witnesses’s testimony. (Dkt. #13, Exh. L, Exh. I at 3-

4) Essentially, Petitioner “failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different had counsel secured the attendance of the witnesses

at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea agreement.” (Dkt. #13, Exh. L. at 3)

Additionally, there is no basis to believe that the witnesses’s testimony would have

shown the factual basis was incorrect. Petitioner did not present any evidence that Maxwell

would have testified she was involved in the scheme, and in fact Detective Arnold’s

testimony directly contradicts this proposition. (Dkt. #13, Exh. I at 15-17) Scaife’s

testimony was before the court for its consideration, as portions of her testimony in a

deposition for the civil case were attached to the motion to withdraw. (Dkt. #13, Exh. V)

Robinson had already admitted to police that Petitioner paid him to keep the scheme hidden

from Maxfield. (Dkt. #13, Exh. S at 1) As for William Flynn, Petitioner has not explained

his relationship to the case, nor has he shown how his testimony would have supported the

motion to withdraw. 

Lastly, as mentioned above, without the part of the factual basis that Petitioner

disputes, adequate facts still would exist to serve as a factual basis for Petitioner’s plea. Even

assuming arguendo that these witnesses had testified, and supported Petitioner’s version of

the facts, the trial court would still have had good cause to deny the motion to withdraw.

Thus, Petitioner has not shown that had these witnesses been subpoenaed, there is a

“reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been different. 

In his objections, Petitioner claims that his right to effective assistance of counsel was

denied because his trial counsel failed to “properly prepare a defense” for the hearing on the

motion to withdraw. (Dkt. #21 at 12) On the contrary, as detailed above, the record shows

that Petitioner’s counsel attempted to contact the four individuals in question, (Dkt. #13, Exh.

I at 4), prepared and filed a Motion to Withdraw from the Plea Agreement over a month in

advance of the hearing that contained thorough legal and factual research and was supported

by exhibits, (Dkt. #13, Exh. V), and argued the motion vigorously before the court. (Dkt.

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 19 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

#13, Exh. I at 4-8) Petitioner therefore fails to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

V. REQUEST FOR DEPOSITIONS

On July 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a request for depositions, asking that the court order

the deposition of four witnesses: Chris Jernigan, Catherine Richard, Elizabeth Payne, and

Tina Ricketts. (Dkt. #23) The sum of Petitioner’s reasons for filing the request is that “[t]he

four witnesses can provide supporting facts to prove Petitioner’s claims of constitutional

violations and actual innocence.” (Id.) 

Petitioner’s request is denied because (1) it is untimely, (2) it is too vague to show

good cause and (3) Petitioner was not diligent in present these allegations of new discovery

in state court. 

A. Petitioner’s Request is Untimely 

Petitioner has filed his initial petition for habeas corpus, received Respondents’

answer, reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, and filed objections

himself. (Dkt. #6, #13, #18, #21) Yet at no point up until this request has he requested leave

to take depositions, nor has he mentioned in any previous filing three of the four names on

the list. Parties are not permitted to “fully litigate their case before the magistrate, and if

unsuccessful, to change their strategy and present a different theory to the district court.”

Greenhow v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 863 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1988)

(overturned on other grounds by U.S. v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1992)). Thus,

Petitioner’s request is not timely. 

B. Petitioner’s Request is Too Vague to Show Good Cause 

Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows that, “[a] judge may, for

good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery.” Rule 6(a). However, “[a] party

requesting discovery must provide reasons for the request.” Rule 6(b). In his request,

Petitioner provides no reasons why the four specific individuals mentioned should be

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 20 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

deposed. (Dkt. #23) Federal habeas corpus is not designed to be a “fishing expedition for

habeas petitioners to explore their case in search of its existence.” Rich v. Calderon, 187

F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). Aside from general claims that

the four witnesses will support Petitioner’s claim of constitutional violations and actual

innocence, Petitioner does not provide reasons to lead the court to believe there is good cause

to authorize the discovery request. Petitioner fails to explain what facts he hopes to develop

with these depositions, and how they are related to his claims. 

C. Petitioner Was Not Diligent In Pursuing These New Facts In State Court 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) requires: “If [a Petitioner] has failed to develop the factual

basis of a clam in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on

the claim unless the applicant shows . . . a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” The U.S. Supreme Court has

held that this provision applies to “Petitioners seeking relief based on new evidence, even

when they do not seek an evidentiary hearing.” Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236,

1241 (9th Cir. 2005) (referencing the Supreme Court’s holding in Holland v. Jackson, 542

U.S. 649, 653 (2004)). 

Petitioner was required by Arizona law to include in his petition for post-conviction

relief, “[a]ffidavits, records, or other evidence currently available to the defendant supporting

his allegations of the petition.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5. Since Petitioner at no time during his

post-conviction proceedings attempted to establish, through an affidavit or otherwise, the

need to develop the record regard these four persons, it cannot be said that any of these

witnesses can provide “a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due diligence” during state court proceedings. “Diligence for

purposes of the opening clause [of § 2254(e)(2)] depends on whether [Petitioner] made a

reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue

claims in state court.” Cooper-Smith, 387 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 420, 435 (2000)). 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 21 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

Because Petitioner did not make a diligent effort in state court proceedings to create

a record regarding these four persons, his request to depose them during the course of federal

habeas corpus review is denied. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting the Report and Recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge in its entirety as order of this Court. (Dkt. #18) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying and dismissing the Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice. (Dkt. #6) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Request for Depositions. (Dkt. #23) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment

accordingly. 

DATED this 23rd day of November, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 24 Filed 11/25/09 Page 22 of 22