Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07872/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07872-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSICA PENG,

Plaintiff,

v.

EMILIO T. GONZALES, ET AL.,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

No. C-06-07872 JCS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT AND

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE OF

THE COURT TO FILE AN AMENDED

COMPLAINT

[Docket Nos. 24 & 27]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Jessica Peng, applied to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”) in 1998 to adjust her status to that of Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”). After eight

years, during which USCIS did not make a decision on her application, Plaintiff filed this action for

a writ of mandamus to compel USCIS to complete the adjudication process. On April 20 and May 3

of 2007, USCIS issued conflicting notifications, the first approving and the second denying

Plaintiff’s adjustment of status application. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Leave of the Court to

Amend the Complaint (“the Motion to Amend”), seeking to add a claim for declaratory relief in the

form of this Court’s determination that Plaintiff’s adjustment of status application was completed at

the time she received the first notification from USCIS, and, therefore, Defendants could not revoke

Plaintiff’s LPR status without adhering to the procedural requirements enumerated in the Code of

Federal Regulations for rescinding permanent residence. Defendants concurrently filed a Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint as Moot (“the Motion to Dismiss”). 

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1

 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

2

 The statute in question in ANA Int’l was 8 U.S.C. § 1155, which has since been amended,

replacing the reference to the Attorney General with a reference to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Pub. L. 108-458 § 5304(c).

2

A hearing on the Motions occurred on Friday, June 29, 2007, at 9:30 a.m. For the reasons

stated below, both motions are GRANTED.1

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework Governing Adjustment of Status

Adjustment of status is governed by section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Section 1255(a) states that: 

[t]he status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into

the United States. . . may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his

discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an

alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes

an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive

an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent

residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at

the time his application is filed.

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Although the text of section 1255 expressly authorizes the Attorney General to

adjust status, that authority is now vested in the Secretary of Homeland Security by virtue of the

Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. 6 U.S.C. § 271(b); see also Clark v.

Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 375 n5 (2005) (noting that under similar provision of the INA, authority

formerly exercised by the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)

was transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security and divisions of that Department [such as

USCIS] by the Homeland Security Act); ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 889 n2 (9th Cir.

2004) (noting that although a statute referred to the Attorney General as the individual with

authority to revoke a visa, such authority now properly resides with the Secretary of Homeland

Security).2

 

Under the Homeland Security Act, the INS, which was a division of the Department of

Justice, was abolished as of March 1, 2003. 6 U.S.C. § 291(a). Many of the INS’s functions,

including the adjudication of adjustment of status applications, were then transferred to USCIS, a

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division of the newly created Department of Homeland Security. 6 U.S.C. § 271(b). As a result of

this transfer, the authority to adjudicate adjustment of status applications is now vested in the

Director of USCIS. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a) (granting USCIS jurisdiction to adjudicate adjustment

of status applications). For convenience, this order refers to the decision-making authority under

section 1255(a) by a blanket reference to USCIS.

The application for adjustment of status to that of lawful permanent resident is USCIS Form

I-485. 8 C.F.R. § 299.1. To be eligible for adjustment of status to LPR on the basis of a family

relationship to a citizen or a lawful permanent resident, an applicant must have an approved

immigrant visa petition, the Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8

C.F.R. §§ 204.1(a)(1), 245(a)(2), 299.1. 

The Code of Federal Regulations specifies the requirements for adjudication of an

application submitted to USCIS. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b). An applicant must demonstrate that “she

is eligible for the requested benefit at the time of filing the application;” that is, she must (1) submit

an application, (2) she must be eligible for an immigrant visa and (3) a visa number must be

immediately available to her at the time the application is submitted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8

C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2). Additionally, all forms must be properly completed and all fees paid before an

application may be adjudicated. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b). 

An applicant for adjustment of status under section 1255(a) may be approved only if the

applicant demonstrates eligibility by fulfilling the three statutory requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)

listed above, and it is determined that the applicant warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. 8

U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(8)(i).

When USCIS reaches a decision on a particular case, the applicant “shall be notified of the

decision of the director.” 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(5)(i). The Code of Federal Regulations refers to a

notification of the decision on an adjustment of status application as a “written decision.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 103.2(b)(19) (“An applicant or petitioner shall be sent a written decision of his or her

application. . . . Where the applicant or petitioner has authorized representation . . . that

representative shall also be notified”). 

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 USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual directs the adjudicator to stamp the I-485 application’s

“action block” with security ink to denote approval. The Manual indicates that, depending on local

procedures, “a work sheet for clerical action may be completed, or the adjudicator may update the

CLAIMS system to initiate generation of an approval notice to the applicant” or the adjudicator may

“manually complete processing.” See USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual at § 10.3(g).

4

An approval is noted on Form I-181, Memorandum of Creation of Record of Lawful

Permanent Residence. 8 C.F.R. § 299.1. The notification of USCIS’s decision is issued to the

applicant as Form I-291. Id. The date of the applicant’s adjustment to permanent residence status

“shall be recorded as of the date of the order approving the adjustment of status.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 245.2(5)(ii).3

 If a decision is to be adverse to the applicant and is based on derogatory information

unknown to the applicant, she must be notified of the intent to deny the application and be provided

with an opportunity to present evidence rebutting the agency’s information. 8 C.F.R.

§ 103.2(b)(16)(i). 

A permanent resident card, Form I-551 (popularly known as a “Green Card”) is eventually

issued to the individual whose status has been adjusted. See Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law

and Procedure § 51.06(e) (2006). As it may take several months for the permanent resident card to

arrive, the immigration agency will place a temporary I-551 stamp in the permanent resident’s

passport to facilitate travel outside the United States. Id. Both the temporary I-551 passport stamp

and the I-551 “Green Card” are deemed evidence of permanent resident status by federal

regulations, as are other official agency records that have been “issued or endorsed to show

admission for permanent residence.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(17). “[I]n the absence of countervailing

evidence, such official records will be regarded as establishing lawful admission for permanent

residence.” Id.

 The Code of Federal Regulations provides that if it appears to a District Director of USCIS

that an applicant who was granted permanent residence was in fact ineligible for adjustment of

status, “a proceeding shall be commenced by the personal service upon such a person of a notice of

intent to rescind, which shall inform him or her of the allegations upon which it is intended to

rescind the adjustment . . . of status.” 8 C.F.R. § 246.1. The notice also must inform the individual

that: (1) she has 30 days in which to answer the allegations and (2) she may request a hearing before

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an immigration judge, at which she may be assisted by counsel or the representative of her choice. 

Id.

B. Facts

Plaintiff Jessica Peng is an 18-year-old woman who was lawfully admitted into the United

States. (Complaint ¶ 1.) Plaintiff is currently in the United States on a student visa. Id. On

November 18, 1998, Plaintiff, along with her two sisters, submitted I-485 applications to the San

Francisco District Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) for adjustment of

status to that of Lawful Permanent Resident under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality

Act (“INA”). Id. ¶ 2; see (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1). Plaintiff’s father, a U.S. citizen, concurrently filed a

Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) to obtain an immigrant visa for Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 2;

Ex. 1.) 

On April 20, 2007, USCIS approved the Petition for Alien Relative (I-130). (Proposed

Amended Complaint ¶ 4; Ex. 2.) On the same day, USCIS issued a letter addressed to Plaintiff and

bearing the stamped signature of the Field Office Director, Robin Barrett, informing Plaintiff that

her adjustment of status had been granted. (Proposed Amended Complaint ¶ 5; Ex. 3.) Also on

April 20, Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Ila Deiss spoke to Plaintiff’s attorney, David

Sun, on the telephone, informing him that Plaintiff’s I-485 application had been approved. (Sun

Declaration, filed in support of Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Amending the

Complaint (“Sun Reply Decl.”) ¶ 2.) AUSA Deiss then faxed the approval notice to Plaintiff’s

attorney. Id. ¶ 4.

USCIS subsequently contacted AUSA Deiss by e-mail, saying that “they were considering

denying Plaintiff’s application in light of further information they had received and had not formally

issued the approval letter that had been sent to [AUSA Deiss] by facsimile on April 20, 2007.” 

(Deiss Declaration filed in Opposition to Amending the Complaint (“Deiss Reply Decl.”) ¶ 4.) On

May 3, 2007, USCIS issued a letter, addressed to Plaintiff and signed by an individual who

apparently signed on behalf of the same USCIS Field Office Director who signed the April 20 letter,

Robin Barrett, informing Plaintiff that her I-485 application had been denied. (Proposed Amended

Complaint ¶ 6; Ex. 4.) 

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Defendants then issued a letter of clarification on June 8, 2007, again signed by Robin

Barrett, informing Plaintiff that the April 20 approval letter was “not officially issued by [USCIS]”

and “did not represent the final decision” on her application for permanent residence. (Sun Reply

Decl., Ex. C) Rather, the letter was “part of an internal communication with the US Attorney’s

Office and was prematurely issued” to Plaintiff’s attorney. Id. The letter stated further that the San

Francisco Field Office did not directly notify Plaintiff or her attorney that her I-485 application was

approved. Id. Finally, the June 8 letter stated that no USCIS databases were updated, nor did

USCIS commence production of Form I-551 (“Green Card”). Id. 

C. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Nature of Mandamus to Compel

Administrative Action by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“the Complaint”) on

December 26, 2006, seeking the Court’s assistance in compelling adjudication of her adjustment of

status application. Plaintiff also sought attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. On the same day, Plaintiff’s sisters filed similar actions, which were related

to this case in an order dated January 30, 2007. 

On May 8, 2007, the related cases brought by Plaintiff’s sisters, Joanna and Joy Peng, were

dismissed by stipulation of the parties after their I-485 applications were adjudicated, granting them

permanent residence. At that time, the parties stipulated to the continuance of the May 18 case

management conference to June 29, 2007. The parties stipulated further that by May 11, 2007,

Plaintiff would file a motion for leave of the court to amend the complaint, and Defendants would

file a motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend on May 11, 2007, seeking leave to amend her Complaint

to address the new issues arising as a result of USCIS’s issuance of contradictory notifications of the

decision made on her I-485 application. (Sun Declaration, filed as an attachment to Plaintiff’s

Motion to Amend (“Sun Motion Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-9.) In particular, Plaintiff seeks to add a claim for

declaratory relief in the form of the Court’s judgment that Plaintiff is a lawful permanent resident

based on USCIS’s April 20 approval notice. (Proposed Amended Complaint ¶ 22.)

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Defendants concurrently filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff’s application

has been adjudicated and, therefore, the Court can grant no further relief. (Motion to Dismiss at 3-

4.) In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants refer only to the May 3 denial of the I-485 application,

asserting that Plaintiff’s application has been conclusively adjudicated and thus, her case is moot.

Id.

In the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (“Plaintiff’s Opposition”), Plaintiff disputes

Defendants’ assertion that her application has been decisively adjudicated, averring that “there is no

clear or intelligible adjudication” because Defendants issued notices both approving and denying her

application. (Plaintiff’s Opposition at 2.) Plaintiff avers that this Court can provide effective relief

by rendering a declaratory judgment on the basis of the April 20 approval notice. Id. At oral

argument, the Court confirmed that Plaintiff’s claim is still a mandamus action, but Plaintiff now

seeks declaratory relief in the form of a judgment that Plaintiff is a lawful permanent resident rather

than relief compelling adjudication.

On June 8, 2007, Defendants filed a Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss and

Opposing the Motion to Amend (“Defendants’ Reply”). Defendants argue that USCIS has

conclusively adjudicated Plaintiff’s application and provided any necessary clarification of her

status by issuing a letter on June 8, 2007, reiterating USCIS’s denial of Plaintiff’s adjustment of

status application. (Defendants’ Reply at 2.) Defendants state further that USCIS’s decision is not

appealable in this Court. Id.

In her Reply in Support of the Motion to Amend (“Plaintiff’s Reply”), Plaintiff’s position

seems to have changed somewhat from the position stated in her Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss. Rather than arguing that there has been no “clear and intelligible adjudication,” Plaintiff

now asserts that the application was adjudicated and that the April 20 letter demonstrates that

USCIS granted her LPR status. (Plaintiff’s Reply at 2.) She rejects Defendants’ argument that her

claim is a challenge of a discretionary denial by USCIS that may not be appealed. Id. 

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 To the extent that Defendants seem to suggest in their briefs that their mootness argument

extends to the new claim Plaintiff proposes to add to the complaint, the Court declines to consider this

argument. Defendants’ motion was filed with respect to the original Complaint, and is properly

considered only in connection with that Complaint. Nonetheless, any arguments raised by Defendants

with respect to the Proposed Amended Complaint will be considered below in determining whether

Plaintiff should be permitted to amend her Complaint.

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III. ANALYSIS

A. The Motion to Dismiss

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim seeking adjudication of her application is moot

because they have now adjudicated her claim. The Court agrees.4

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal court’s jurisdiction depends on

the existence of a “case or controversy.” See Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n. 3 (1964).

When the issues in a case are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome, the case becomes moot. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). To maintain

her claim, a party must continue to have “a personal stake in the outcome of the suit.” Abdala v.

INS, No. 06-55774, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12867 at *5 (9th Cir. May 8, 2007) (citing United States

v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001)). In determining whether a case is moot, “the

question is not whether the precise relief sought at the time the application for an injunction was

filed is still available [but rather] whether there can be any effective relief.” Northwest Envtl. Def.

Ctr. v. Gorden, 849 F.2d 1241, 1245-1246 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 

Although a court must dismiss a petition for writ of mandamus that has been rendered moot

by subsequent events, the party asserting mootness bears “the heavy burden of establishing that there

is no effective relief remaining for a court to provide.” GATX/Airlog Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 192

F.3d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1999). A case is moot “only if interim events have completely and

irrevocably eradicated the effects of alleged improper conduct raised in the petition for writ of

mandamus.” Ordonez-Garay v. Chertoff, No. CV F 06-1835, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40589 (E.D.

Cal. May 25, 2007) (citing GATX, 192 F.3d at 1306). In the immigration context, a claim for

mandamus relief compelling adjudication of an adjustment of status application is moot if the

application has been adjudicated. See Kaddoura v. Gonzales, No. 06-1402, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

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37211 at **4-5 (W.D. Wash. May 21, 2007) (holding that USCIS’s adjudication of plaintiff’s I-485

application mooted claim for relief in the form of mandamus to adjudicate). 

At oral argument, Plaintiff conceded that her application has been adjudicated, and thus the

original claim seeking adjudication of her application is moot. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

1. Rule 15 Standard

 Because Defendants have already filed a responsive pleading in this action, Plaintiff must

obtain leave of the court to amend her complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a) provides that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Id. In

determining whether to grant leave to amend, a court must consider the following factors: “1) bad

faith, 2) undue delay, 3) prejudice to the opposing party, 4) futility of amendment, and 5) whether

plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373

(9th Cir. 1990). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“the Ninth Circuit”) has

observed that it is “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest

weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). In the

absence of prejudice, or a “strong showing” of any of the remaining factors, “there exists a

presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. The party opposing

amendment bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. DCD Progs., Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.3d

183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987).

2. The Motion to Amend Was Brought in Good Faith

Here, there is no apparent bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. Plaintiff’s original Complaint

sought resolution of her immigration status; Defendants’ recent actions have not conclusively

resolved that issue. (Motion to Amend at 2.) 

3. The Motion to Amend is Timely

In evaluating “undue delay,” a court must inquire as to whether the plaintiff knew or should

have known the facts and theories raised in the amendment at the time of the original complaint. 

Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff learned of the facts

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that gave rise to the claim she seeks to add on May 3, 2007. (Motion to Amend at 2.) She brought

the Motion to Amend eight days later. Id. Accordingly, there is no undue delay. See Jackson, 902

F.3d at 1388. 

4. The Motion to Amend Does not Unduly Prejudice Defendants

Defendants will not be unduly burdened by Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. See id. (finding

amendment improper because it would result in impermissible prejudice in the form of (1)

nullification of prior discovery; (2) requiring unduly burdensome future discovery and (3) requiring

relitigation of a secondary issue). Here, no discovery has taken place. Unlike the motion to amend

at issue in Jackson, which sought to add a claim based on a new legal theory applied to the same

factual circumstances, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is based on the development of new facts. See

id. at 1387; (Sun Motion Decl. ¶ 7). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend will not unduly

prejudice Defendants at this early stage of the proceedings.

5. The Motion to Amend is not Futile

Plaintiff’s proposed claim for declaratory relief is a new claim based on a new set of facts. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to declare, as a matter of law, that she assumed LPR status on April 20,

2007. (Plaintiff’s Reply at 2.) 

Defendants’ pleadings state that allowing amendment of the Complaint is “a waste of judicial

resources” because the April 20 letter was not “issued” and USCIS denied Plaintiff’s application in

the May 3 letter. (Defendants’ Reply at 2.) Defendants further assert that USCIS’s decision “is not

appealable in this Court.” Id. In addition, Defendants assert that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim because the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review decisions

denying adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). In other words, Defendants assert that: 

(1) this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim, and (2) even if

subject matter jurisdiction were proper, the April 20 approval notification, as a matter of law, cannot

constitute an adjustment of status and, therefore, the claim fails. For the reasons stated below, the

Court rejects both arguments.

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a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Proper

IIRIRA strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear some immigration claims. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2); Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 845 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that IIRIRA bars a

district court’s review of the discretionary aspect of a decision to deny an individual application for

adjustment of status). However, the Court concludes that IIRIRA does not deprive it of subjectmatter jurisdiction in this case because Plaintiff’s claim challenges USCIS’s ministerial duty to

abide by administrative procedures governed by statute.

 “In the absence of a specific statutory provision to the contrary, district courts have

jurisdiction to review agency action as part of their general federal question jurisdiction.” Proyecto

San Pablo, 189 F.3d at 1136 n5 (finding that essentially identical statutory language in the

Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) prevented a district court’s substantive review of the

denial of an individual application, but did not preclude collateral challenges to administrative

practices employed by the INS in processing applications). “This general rule applies even in the

post-IIRIRA immigration context.” ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 890. The question becomes, therefore,

whether IIRIRA specifically prohibits this Court’s review of a challenge to USCIS’s procedures that

effectuate adjustment of status. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes it does not.

Section 1252 of IIRIRA provides, in relevant part:

Judicial Review of Orders of Removal

(a) Applicable provisions

[ . . . ]

(2) Matters not subject to judicial review

[ . . . ]

(B) Denials of discretionary relief. Notwithstanding any other

provision of law . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to review –

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [various

provisions of the INA, including section 245], or 

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority

for which is specified under this title to be in the discretion of the

Attorney General. . . .

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (as amended by the Real ID Act, Pub. L. 109-13 (2005)). Thus, IIRIRA revokes

a federal court’s jurisdiction to review actions that are specified by the statute as being within the

discretion of USCIS. However, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that, because there is a strong

presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative actions, the jurisdiction-stripping

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provisions of IIRIRA are to be interpreted narrowly. ANA Int’l, 393 F.3d at 891 (citing INS v. St.

Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001)); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.

471, 482 (1999) (criticizing broad reading of provision and requiring “much narrower”

interpretation). 

Any purely legal, non-discretionary question that is a factor in the immigration agency’s

decision may be reviewed by a district court, whether or not the decision as a whole is discretionary. 

Id. at 895. For example, if a decision is governed by a legal standard expressed in a statute, the

decision is reviewable for clarification of the legal standard. Id. at 891. Similarly, if a statutory

provision granting decision-making authority to USCIS sets out standards circumscribing the

decision, the decision is not wholly in the discretion of USCIS and thus is not shielded from review

by section 1252(a)(2)(B). Id.; see Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 845-46 (holding that because Board of

Immigration Appeals’ decision was contrary authority specified by regulations it was not a

discretionary action, and noting that a determination of eligibility for adjustment of status is clearly

reviewable because it is governed by standards expressed in a statute). Even if a statute gives

USCIS discretion, a court retains jurisdiction to review whether a particular exercise of discretion

exceeds the discretionary authority specified by the statute in question. Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 847

(citing Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“When [USCIS]

acts where it has no authority to do so, it does not make a discretionary decision”). Finally, USCIS

has no discretion to make a decision that is contrary to law. Id. at 846 (citing Mejia v. Ashcroft, 298

F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Plaintiff does not challenge a discretionary decision to deny her adjustment of status

application. Rather, Plaintiff challenges USCIS’s authority to issue such a denial after her I-485

application had apparently been approved two weeks earlier. (Plaintiff’s Reply at 1-2.) Like the

plaintiffs in Proyecto San Pablo, whose claims were not barred by the jurisdiction-stripping

provisions of IRCA because their claims were procedural challenges that were collateral to any

decision on the merits, the Plaintiff in the instant case challenges the procedures for granting and

rescinding status, not the discretionary decision to grant or deny her application. See Proyecto San

Pablo, 189 F.3d at 1137, 1140. 

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The Code of Federal Regulations specifies that upon approval, the applicant’s permanent

residence shall be recorded; thus, recording the approval of the I-485 is not discretionary. See 8

C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5); Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 847-49. Additionally, the procedures to be used in

connection with rescission of an adjustment of status application are governed by federal statutes

and regulations, and therefore are not within the discretionary authority of USCIS. See 8 U.S.C. §

1256; 8 C.F.R. § 246.1 (mandating procedures to be followed in rescission actions). Therefore, just

as in Hernandez, where the court found that it had jurisdiction to consider whether the INS acted in

conformity with the federal statute in determining an applicant’s eligibility for adjustment of status,

whether USCIS allegedly contravened federal statutes and regulations in the instant case by issuing

a “denial” after an adjustment had been granted is not barred from review by section 1252(a)(2)(B). 

See Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 847-49.

Although the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction does not extend to discretionary decisions to

grant or deny an adjustment of status, the Court does have jurisdiction to review non-discretionary

aspects of that decision. Plaintiff’s new claim turns on a non-discretionary duty to give effect to a

completed adjudication and therefore may be reviewed by this Court.

b. Whether Plaintiff’s Adjustment of Status Was Granted on April

20 Is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact That Cannot be Resolved

at This Stage of the Proceedings

Defendants assert that even if the Court does have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

proposed new claim, the claim fails as a matter of law because USCIS could not have conferred

lawful permanent resident status upon Plaintiff prior to the May 3 denial of adjustment of status. 

The Court disagrees.

First, Defendants do not cite any authority compelling the conclusion that the April 20

approval notice could not have constituted an adjustment of Plaintiff’s status. Moreover, the Court’s

own review of the case law has not revealed any cases that would support that contention. 

Additionally, neither the statutes nor the regulations governing adjustment of status specify when an

adjustment of status becomes effective. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b); 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii); see also

Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, “The INS Notice of Approval: When It Can’t Be Trusted,”

8 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 373, 374 (noting that even INS internal manuals do not require

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endorsement of any forms before the decision to adjust status becomes effective). Instead, the

standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit for determining whether an applicant’s status has been

adjusted suggests that Plaintiff’s status will turn on questions of fact that are not appropriately

addressed at this stage of the case. See Berahmand v. INS, 549 F.2d 1343, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1977). 

In Berahmand, the plaintiff, Mr. Berahmand, applied for permanent residence on the basis of

his marriage to a United States citizen. Id. at 1344. Mr. Berahmand’s application for permanent

residence was apparently approved, as evidenced by an approval stamp on an I-181 form, although

there were “marks” “drawn through” the stamp. Id. Mr. Berahmand did not receive any written

notice of approval, but he testified that the Immigration Examiner who interviewed him told him his

application was approved. Id. at 1344-45. 

During subsequent divorce proceedings, Mr. Berahmand’s wife withdrew the visa petition

she had filed on her husband’s behalf. Id. at 1344. At that point, the INS sent the applicant a

“decision” denying his application for adjustment of status and instituted deportation proceedings.

Id. 

Mr. Berahmand initially appealed the decision to an Immigration Judge, who found that Mr.

Berahmand was deportable because he had overstayed his visa and had not been granted LPR status. 

Id. at 1345. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Id. Mr. Berahmand then

appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit set forth a two-part burden-shifting framework for

establishing that an adjustment of status had occurred. Id. at 1345-46. First, the plaintiff must

make a prima facie case for her adjustment of status. Id. In Berahmand, the court held that the

approved I-181 form was prima facie evidence that Mr. Berahmand had been granted permanent

residence. Id. at 1345-46. The burden then shifts to the agency to rebut the prima facie showing

with clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. Id. (citing Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366,

368 (9th Cir. 1975)).

 The INS attempted to rebut Mr. Berahmand’s prima facie case by pointing to evidence that:

(1) marks on the I-181 approval stamp demonstrated an intention to void approval; (2) the INS

continued investigating the applicant’s admissibility after the I-181 was stamped, implying that

adjustment had not been granted and (3) the applicant had not received the required notification that

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his application had been approved. Id. at 1345. The court found this evidence insufficient to

overcome the Mr. Berahmand’s prima facie showing that his status had been adjusted, and remanded

the case to the BIA. Id. at 1345-46. The court also noted, in dicta, that the INS failed to call its own

examiner to testify about his actions and intentions and therefore the INS’s arguments were

“speculation.” Id. at 1345. 

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations, which the court assumes to be true for purposes of this motion,

are sufficient to establish a prima facie case that her status has been adjusted; she received a letter,

stamped with the signature of the Field Office Director of USCIS and addressed to Plaintiff,

informing her that her adjustment of status application has been approved. See 8 C.F.R. §

103.2(b)(17); (Sun Motion Decl., Ex. 3). Defendants have not yet rebutted Plaintiff’s prima facie

case with clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. 

The Court notes that it has found only one case in this district that addresses an issue similar

to the one in the instant case. See Bassey v. INS, No. 01-4035, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19726 (Oct.

9, 2002). In that case, the court held that a letter notifying an applicant of the approval of his

adjustment of status application could not have conferred LPR status because the applicant was

statutorily ineligible for adjustment. Id. at *17-18. That case does not, however, persuade the Court

that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend should be denied.

The plaintiff in Bassey first attempted to obtain permanent resident status by marriage to a

United States citizen in 1992. Id. at *2. After an investigation, the INS determined that at the time

Mr. Bassey married his citizen-wife in the United States, he was already married to a non-citizen. 

Id. In 1997, the INS denied Mr. Bassey’s application for permanent residence, concluding that his

marriage to a United States citizen was a fraudulent attempt to secure immigration benefits. Id.

In 1999, having divorced both previous wives, Mr. Bassey again applied for permanent

residence after marrying another United States citizen. Id. at *3. The issue before the court in

Bassey arose from this second application. In June, 2000, the INS sent Mr. Bassey a letter informing

him that his adjustment of status application had been approved and, the following day, stamped his

passport with a temporary I-551 stamp. Id. However, the I-130 immigrant visa filed on Mr.

Bassey’s behalf had not been approved prior to issuing the notification of approval of the adjustment

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5 The Marriage Fraud Act prohibits the adjustment of status on the basis of marriage to a citizen

or permanent resident if the applicant has previously entered a fraudulent marriage for the purpose of

securing immigration benefits. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).

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of status application. Id. at *15. The INS “formally denied” Mr. Bassey’s adjustment of status

application in September, 2001. Id. at *13.

Mr. Bassey filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the INS failed to provide

proof of LPR status as required by federal regulations, and also claiming that his due process rights

were violated because he was not afforded the procedural protections of the regulations governing

rescission of status. Id. at **4-5. The INS argued that Mr. Bassey’s status had never been adjusted

and that the denial was mandated by federal statute.5

 Id. at **13-14. The court agreed with the INS. 

Id. at *18. 

Bassey is distinguishable. First, Bassey was decided on summary judgment based on a full

record. See id. at **17-18. Second, it was undisputed that, unlike the instant case, the I-130 visa

petition for Mr. Bassey had been denied and therefore the INS lacked the authority to adjust his

status. Id. at **15-16. At a minimum, therefore, Plaintiff should be permitted to amend her

complaint so that she has an opportunity for discovery regarding these factual questions.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that amendment of the complaint is not futile and GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s original claim for

mandamus relief in the Complaint is dismissed as moot. Plaintiff shall be permitted to file an

amended complaint based on the conflicting notifications issued by Defendants. As stated at oral

argument, Defendants will produce to Plaintiff the complete administrative file relating to Plaintiff’s

adjustment of status application within thirty (30) days of the June 29, 2007 hearing. A further Case

Management Conference is scheduled for August 10, 2007, at 1:30 p.m. A Joint Case Management

Statement shall be filed seven (7) calendar days before the Case Management Conference.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2007

__________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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