Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05805/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05805-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

—o0o—

ROBERT AGUILERA MORENO, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

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R.D. RUNNELS, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:03-CV-05805 LJO JMD (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc #1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action has been referred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant

to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus, Case No. 205252.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder. The jury found

true allegations that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury, personally used a firearm

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and committed the offense to further the activities of a criminal street gang. Petitioner was

sentenced to a term of fifty-two years to life in state prison.

Petitioner timely appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

(“Fifth DCA”), case number F036130, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to establish

the allegation that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and that

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the expert testimony of a detective. See

Answer to Petition, Exh. A (Petitioner’s opening brief); Exh. B (The People’s responsive brief);

Ex. C (Petitioner’s reply). On January 14, 2002, the Fifth DCA affirmed Petitioner’s conviction 1

and sentence. Exh. D.

Petitioner timely petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, case number

S104342. Exh. E. Review was denied without comment on March 20, 2003. Exh. F.

On June 2, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant petition, renewing the claims raised in

Petitioner’s appeal to the Fifth DCA. On February 9, 2004, Respondent filed an Answer to the

instant Petition. Petitioner did not file a traverse.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the facts as recited by the Fifth DCA in its opinion dated January 14, 2002:

On the evening of March 4, 1999, Hugo A., his friends Timoteo G. And

Felicano “Muto,” his brother Victor, his uncle Victor Gonzales (Gonzales), and

Moreno, were in the front yard of Hugo’s home when a car drove by. The people

in the car yelled “scraps” and “north side.” Scraps is a derogatory term for

members of the Sureno gang; north side is a term indicating those in the car were

Norteno gang members. Gang signs and threats were exchanged. As the car

passed by, the occupants threw bottles and rocks at Hugo’s house. Moreno

grabbed a bat and walked toward the car. When the occupants climbed out,

Moreno threw the bat and broke the windshield.

The police were notified of the incident. When the police arrived, Hugo

and the others told officers that they were Surenos and the occupants of the car

were Nortenos. After the police left, Moreno went home and returned a few

minutes later with a rifle. Moreno indicated there were some people near his

house who looked like the occupants of the car. Moreno thought they might do

something to his family and he wanted to “shoot their asses.” Moreno left, and a

short while later Hugo and the others headed to Nino’s Market. As they walked

toward the store, Hugo heard gunshots. When he rounded the corner, he saw

Moreno with a rifle in his hand and the victim on the ground. Moreno instructed

Hugo and his friends to break the windows on the victim’s car and they did so.

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Between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m., on March 4, 1999, Juan Pinon (Pinon) was

shot and killed outside Golden West Grocery, also known as Nino’s Market, in

Turlock. Accompanying Pinon at the time of his death were his brother Fidel,

brother-in-law Jesus, and Jesus’s brother, Juan. Pinon was wearing a red belt and

red bandanna; there was a red bandanna wrapped around the steering wheel of the

car. Red is a color identified with the Nortenos, although Fidel denied he and the

others were looking for trouble with the Surenos. Pinon’s hair was styled in a

fashion typical for members of the Nortenos in Turlock.

Pinon and his companions had driven from Delhi to Turlock, where they

stopped at the market to buy sodas. Blanca and her cousin, Liliana, watched

Pinon and his three friends get out of the car. They previously had seen the four

in the neighborhood, and knew from past experience to expect a fight when these

four showed up at Nino’s Market.

After entering the store, Pinon realized he had left his wallet in the car. 

The companions returned to the car, but a group of 10 or 12 people followed

them. Among the group that followed was Moreno, who was carrying a rifle. The

other members of the group were carrying “bats and sticks or whatever.” Moreno

pointed the rifle directly at Pinon, Fidel began running back to the store, and

Moreno fired two shots.

At that point, Hugo and his companions came around the front of the store. 

One of them pointed a rifle at Fidel and his companions. Fidel then heard more

shots come from where Moreno was located. Fidel and his two companions ran

into the store to hide. 

Victor saw Moreno shoot Pinon and then chase Fidel and the others into

the store. Moreno was attempting to operate the bolt on the rifle while chasing

Fidel. Muto went to the front of the store, but Moreno called him back. Moreno

told all his friends not to talk to the police.

Nino, the owner of the market, heard popping sounds and then the door to

his store opened. Nino saw a neighborhood kid known as “Muto” standing

outside the door with his hand behind his back. Nino then realized three men

were hiding inside the store. When one of the men said his brother had been shot,

Nino called 911.

On June 7, 1999, Moreno was charged with Pinon’s murder (count 1),

participation in a criminal street gang (count 2), and felony vandalism (count 3). 

With respect to count 1, it was alleged that Moreno personally inflicted great

bodily injury, personally used a firearm, and committed the offense to further the

activities of a criminal street gang. Gonzales also was charged in count 3,

however, he was deported prior to trial.

On three occasions, including March 11, 1999, when booked into the

Stanislaus County jail, Moreno told jail officials that he was Sureno and that

Nortenos were his enemies. When Moreno’s girlfriend visited him in jail, their

conversation was recorded. During the conversation, Moreno admitted being at

the scene of the shooting and firing his gun once or twice. Moreno also referred

to the “fucking Nortenos” during these conversations and opined that the

prosecution would never be able to prove that he, Moreno, was a gang member.

Victor, Hugo, and Timoteo testified pursuant to plea agreements. 

According to Victor, Nortenos had been coming by for about three weeks and

making threats. Moreno had told both Victor and Hugo that he, Moreno, was a

Sureno. Moreno showed them his tattoos, including the number “13,” which

symbolizes Surenos. Victor had seen Moreno put gang graffiti on various places,

including the side of Nino’s Market.

Hugo confirmed at trial that he, Moreno, Muto, Gonzales, and Timoteo

were Surenos. Timoteo also admitted being a Sureno and acknowledged the

Nortenos were their enemy. Victor claimed he used to be a Sureno, but was no

longer associated with the gang. Victor received a telephone death threat warning

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him not to testify from a member of a local faction of the Surenos known as Brick

City.

Timoteo claimed that Pinon had been his enemy for at least two years prior

to the shooting. According to Timoteo, Pinon and some other “enemies” showed

up at his house the day before the shooting looking for a fight. They were driving

the same car Pinon was driving the day of the shooting.

Jose P., a Norteno and a friend of Pinon, acknowledged that the area

around Nino’s Market was Sureno territory and that there had been hostilities

between the Surenos and Nortenos for about three weeks prior to the shooting.

Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Detective William Heyne testified that the

Hispanic gangs were divided between the north, Norteno, and the south, Sureno. 

The Norteno’s claimed the color red and the number 14. Sureno’s claimed the

color blue and the number 13. There was a great deal of graffiti from these gangs

in the area around Nino’s Market. Some of the graffiti contained explicit

challenges.

City of Corona Police Officer Thomas Weeks testified as an expert on

Southern California criminal street gangs. Officer Weeks stated that Corona

Varrio Locos (CVL) was a criminal street gang: one of its factions was

“Acesinos,” which is Spanish for assassin. When Moreno lived in Corona,

Moreno was an admitted member of CVL and of the faction known as Acesinos. 

Moreno’s writings, tattoos, and gang graffiti corroborated his gang membership. 

At least two members of the Acesinos had prior convictions for crimes listed in

section 186.22, subdivision (e). In 1994 Moreno was served with a notice that he

was considered to be a member of the Acesinos street gang, a criminal street gang

within the meaning of section 186.22.

Officer Weeks explained that as members of various gangs in Corona

travel outside Corona, they claim CVL membership instead of one of its factions. 

As CVL members travel north and cross into Tulare or Fresno County, they claim

Sureno membership, because they are from Southern California. Officer Weeks

opined that Surenos were a criminal street gang.

City of Turlock Detective Kevin Davis testified as an expert on criminal

street gangs. He explained that Hispanic gang members who move to the Turlock

area from greater Los Angeles usually claim Sureno gang membership. 

According to Detective Davis, any hostilities that may have been present among

the various Sureno factions in Southern California are set aside when they come to

Stanislaus County because they need to band together to achieve “strength in

numbers” in Northern California. Detective Davis opined that the Surenos are a

criminal street gang whose members have committed numerous crimes in

Stanislaus County, including murder, attempted murder, robbery, and burglary. 

Timoteo, who law enforcement classified as a Sureno, was convicted of assault

with a deadly weapon on February 25, 1998. Detective Davis opined that by

wearing a red belt and red bandanna, Pinon was advertising his Norteno

affiliation. The shooting of Pinon was committed for the benefit of the Sureno

gang as a demonstration of Sureno strength in the area.

Prior to coming to Stanislaus County, Victor, Hugo, Timoteo, and

Gonzales all claimed membership in a Los Angeles based gang that was Sureno

affiliated. Detective Davis noted that in February 1998, Moreno and Muto were

involved in an assault with a deadly weapon.

Detective Davis opined that Moreno was an active gang member at the

time of the shooting. This opinion was based on Moreno’s use of a gang moniker,

his gang-related tattoos, admissions to jail personnel, regular association with

other known gang members and associates such as Timoteo, Muto, and Gonzales,

along with the fact that the targets of Moreno’s actions were rival gang members.

Moreno admitted he had been a member of CVL and specifically a faction

called Acesinos in Corona, where he previously resided prior to moving to

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Turlock two years before the shooting. Moreno acknowledged knowing that CVL

was involved in committing crimes. Moreno testified he first met Victor, Hugo,

and Timoteo when he moved to Turlock after being released from jail. Although

he claimed the color blue, and associated with these three, Moreno denied being

part of their gang. Moreno acknowledged having a rifle the day of the shooting,

but claimed to have traded the rifle to Victor for a speaker and amplifiers prior to

the shooting.

At the close of trial, the count 3 offense, felony vandalism, was not

presented to the jury. On March 15, 2000, the jury returned its verdict of guilty of

first-degree murder, not guilty of the section 186.22, subdivision (a) offense, and

true findings on all enhancements appended to the murder charge.

On May 26, 2000, Moreno’s motion for a new trial was denied. He was

sentenced to a total term of 52 years to life based upon a term of 25 years to life

on the first degree murder conviction, a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the

personal infliction of great bodily injury, and a consecutive 2-year term for the

section186.22, subdivision (b) enhancement. The four-year term for personal use

of a firearm was stayed pursuant to section 6534.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375 fn. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as

guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the

Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly the Court has jurisdiction over this action.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) th, quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after its enactment). The

instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its

provisions.

II. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C . § 2254(a).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the AEDPA. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, a petition for habeas corpus will not be

granted unless the adjudication in question “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes ‘clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining “clearly established Federal law,” the Court

looks to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions as of the time of the

relevant state-court decision.” Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. “In other words, ‘clearly

established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth

by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413.

This Court may not issue the writ simply because in its independent judgment the state

court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly; for a writ to

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issue, ‘that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making

the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9 Cir. 1996) th . Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, ninth circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. DuCharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-

01 (9 cir. 1999) th.

AEDPA requires that this court give considerable deference to state court decisions. The

state court’s factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Moreover, we are

bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9 Cir. th

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Claim One: Insufficient Evidence to Support the section 186.22(b) Gang

Benefit Enhancement

1. Factual Background

Petitioner’s conviction was enhanced pursuant to California Penal Code Section 186.22.

Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) provides, in relevant part:

“any person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the

direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific

intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members,

shall, upon conviction of that felony or attempted felony, in addition and

consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony of which he or she has

been convicted, be punished by an additional term of one, two, or three years at

the court’s discretion.”

The term “criminal street gang” is defined as:

“Any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons,

whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission

of one or more of the ...enumerated [offenses]..., having a common name or

common identifying symbol, and whose members individually or collectively

engage or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” Id., § 186.22,

subd. (f).

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In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to establish

that the killing was for the benefit of a criminal street gang, because his friends in Turlock do not

constitute a criminal street gang. In the alternative, Petitioner contends that if the evidence does

establish the existence of a criminal street gang, the evidence is nonetheless insufficient to

establish that a primary activity of the gang was the commission of one or more of the

enumerated offenses listed in section 186.22(e).

2. Clearly Settled Supreme Court Law

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, California courts expressly follow the

standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See People v. Johnson, 26

Cal.3d 557, 575-578 (1980); see also People v. Thomas, 2 Cal.4th 489, 513 (1992). Pursuant to

the Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson, the test in determining whether a factual finding is

fairly supported by the record is as follows:

“[W]hether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Lewis

v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990).

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 324 n. 16. This Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986). This presumption of

correctness applies to state appellate determinations of fact as well as to those of the state trial

courts. Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9 Cir. 1990) th . Although the presumption of

correctness does not apply to state court determinations of legal questions or mixed questions of

law and fact, the facts as found by the state court underlying those determinations are entitled to

the presumption. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 539, 597 (1981).

3. Review of Claim by State Courts

This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. The Fifth DCA denied

the claim on May 28, 2003, in a reasoned opinion. See Exh. D. The claim was then presented to

the California Supreme Court in a petition for review; however, the petition was summarily

denied on August 13, 2003. See Exh. F. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order”

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denying review of the Fifth DCA’s decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for

the same reasons stated in the opinion of the Fifth DCA. Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

803 (1991).

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Fifth DCA found the evidence fully supported the

jury’s finding that the crime was committed for the purpose of promoting the criminal conduct of

a street gang. The Fifth DCA found the evidence sufficient to establish: (1) an ongoing

association of three or more persons with a common name and shared identifying symbols; (2) a

patter of criminal gang activity; (3) the enumerated offense was a primary activity of the gang;

and (4) that the killing was “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with” the

gang. See Exh. D at 9.

4. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

The appellate court’s conclusion was not unreasonable as there was substantial evidence

of each of the elements necessary to sustain an enhancement under California Penal Code section

186.22(b). With respect to the ongoing association element, sufficient evidence was presented

upon which a reasonable jury could make such a finding. Witness Hugo A. testified that he, his

brother Victor, Muto, Gonzales, Timoteo and Petitioner were all Surenos. Exh. D at 9. Evidence

was presented that prior to moving to Stanislaus County Petitioner, Hugo, Victor Gonzalez and

Timoteo all claimed membership in factions of the Surenos gang. Id. Officer Weeks and

Detective Davis testified that gang members moving from the Los Angeles are northward cease

identifying with a specific faction of the Surenos, but instead claim Surenos membership and

band together in Northern California to achieve strength in numbers. Id. And there was

testimony that Petitioner and the other Surenos in the area claimed the color blue and number 13. 

Id. This Court agrees with the conclusion of the Fifth DCA that a reasonable jury could find

based on this evidence that there existed an ongoing association of three or more persons

(Petitioner, Timoteo, Hugo, Muto, Victor and Gonzales) with a common name (Surenos) and

shared identifying symbols (the color blue and the number 13).

The evidence of a pattern of criminal gang activity (Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(f)) is

likewise sufficient. The Fifth DCA noted that such a pattern can be established by the current

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offense and one prior offense. Exh. D at 9. Detective Davis testified that in February of 1998,

both Petitioner and Muto were involved in an assault with a deadly weapon, a listed offense

under Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(e). This testimony in conjunction with the evidence presented

regarding the current offense sufficiently established a pattern of activity.

This Court likewise agrees with the Fifth DCA that the evidence was sufficient to sustain

a finding on the “primary activity” element of the enhancement. Detective Davis testified that

members or associates of the Sureno gang were involved in numerous other incidents of

specified criminal acts in the county. There was further testimony identifying specific incidents

involving Petitioner, Muto, Gonzales and Timoteo. This evidence was sufficient to establish the

primary activity element of the offense.

Lastly, the record supports the jury’s finding that the killing was “for the benefit of, at the

direction of, or in association with” a criminal street gang. Exh D. at 10. Detective Davis opined

that the shooting was “a demonstration of strength and dominance in the area” of the Surenos

gang. Davis further testified that the shooting was intended to enhance the reputation of the

Surenos and to forestall encroachment by the Nortenos. Evidence was presented that in three jail

bookings Petitioner claimed Sureno membership and identified Nortenos as his enemies. The

victim was identified as a Norteno by his red belt and bandanna, his haircut, and his past

altercations with Timoteo, a Sureno. Testimony established that Petitioner, Timoteo, Victor,

Hugo, Muto, and Gonzales all lived in the area near Nino’s Market, generally considered Surenos

territory. The victim and his companions were from outside the neighborhood, and according to

the testimony of two independent witnesses, fighting ensued whenever the victim and other

Nortenos came into the neighborhood. As the Fifth DCA notes, the evidence established that

there was “virtually no explanation or motive for the shooting except gang hostilities between the

Sureno and Norteno.” Exh. D at 11.

The Fifth DCA reasonably applied the Jackson standard in reviewing the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting Petitioner’s sentence enhancement under California Penal Code section

186.22(b). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim should be denied.

B. Claim Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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1. Factual Background

In his second ground for relief, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to object at trial to the testimony of Officer Weeks. Petitioner asserts that

Officer Weeks’ testimony was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and trial counsel’s failure

to object thereto resulted in the effective denial of assistance of counsel in violation of

Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.

2. Clearly Settled Supreme Court Law

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe,

151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998) th . In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994) th . First, the petitioner must

show that counsel’s performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so

serious that he or she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that

were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at

688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9 Cir. 1995) th . Judicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir. 1994) th.

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result...would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694. 

Petitioner must show that counsel’s errors were so egregious as to deprive petitioner of a fair

trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate whether

the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.;

Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9 Cir. 1994) th.

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examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 688, 697 (1984). Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice,

any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are certain

instances which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual

or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel or where the State has interfered with

counsel’s assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659,

n. 25 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d

1058, 1062 (2000).

3. Review of Claim by State Courts

Petitioner’s claim was rejected by the Fifth DCA in a reasoned opinion on March 22,

2004. The Fifth DCA first rejected Petitioner’s claim that the testimony of Officer Weeks was

not relevant to the issues at trial. Exh. D at 12. Because Moreno was charged both with a felony

offense and a gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivisions (a) and (b), “his history of

gang involvement and activity, as well as the activities of fellow gang members, was highly

relevant and necessary to prove the requisite elements of the offense and the enhancement.” Id.

The Fifth DCA further noted that when used to establish motive, intent, or identity, as it was in

Petitioner’s trial, a history of gang activity is both relevant and admissible. Id. at 12-13.

The Fifth DCA also rejected Petitioner’s claim that the testimony was improper character

evidence under Cal. Evid. Code § 1101. The court noted that the evidence was not presented to

show criminal disposition, but rather to prove motive and intent as well as to establish the

elements of the gang enhancement and offense. As such, it was not inadmissible character

evidence.

Finally, the Fifth DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim that the evidence was more prejudicial

than it was probative under Cal. Evid. Code § 352. The court noted the trial court’s broad

discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and that section 352 exists to exclude

evidence “that has little or no effect on the issues but tends to evoke an emotional bias.” Id. at

13. The Fifth DCA found that it was not enough that the evidence was damaging to Petitioner’s

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defense – Officer Weeks’ testimony was relevant to the issues, and therefore within the bounds

of the trial court’s discretion to admit. Id. It noted that Petitioner’s acquittal on the section

186.22(a) gang offense was further evidence that the evidence did not have an unduly

inflammatory impact on the jury.

Given its determination of these issues, the Fifth DCA found that no objection to Officer

Weeks’ testimony at trial would have been sustained. Therefore it concluded that Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not be sustained. Id.

4. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner fails to demonstrate either that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, or

that Petitioner was in any way prejudiced by the failure of counsel to object at trial to the

testimony of Officer Weeks. First, trial counsel’s lack of objection to the testimony of Officer

Weeks was not “outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir. 1994) th . Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel argument rests on the premise that the testimony of Officer Weeks was

irrelevant to the issues at trial. But as the Fifth DCA notes, Officer Weeks’ testimony was highly

relevant to the section 186.22 offense and gang enhancement. Officer Weeks’ testimony was not

offered merely to show a criminal disposition, but went to establish issues of motive, intent, or

identity. And, while harmful to Petitioner’s case, this Court agrees with the findings of the Fifth

DCA that the testimony as to Petitioner’s past and present gang affiliations and activities was not

so prejudicial as to tip the balance in favor of exclusion, particularly given its high degree of

relevance. Regardless of any objection, the evidence would have been admitted. As such, his

failure to object cannot be considered ineffective or prejudicial. United States v. Aguon, 851

F.2d 1158, 1172 (9 Cir. 1988) (en banc) th.

Moreover, even if trial counsel’s failure to object was error, Petitioner has not

demonstrated the requisite prejudice necessary to support an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. Petitioner claims that the jury found the gang enhancement to be true “because of the

volume of gang evidence provided by Detective Weeks.” Pet. at 13, 29. However, the testimony

of Officer Weeks aside, there was substantial evidence establishing the necessary elements for

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the section 186.22(b) gang enhancement. See Supra, pp. 9-10. Thus the inclusion of Officer

Weeks’ testimony cannot have been prejudicial to Petitioner’s defense.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate either that trial counsel erred in not objecting to the

testimony of Officer Weeks, or that any prejudice resulted from the inclusion of the testimony in

question. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

The Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED and the Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J.

O’Neill, United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636

(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California.

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)©. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Y1st, 951

F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991) th.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2007 /s/ John M. Dixon 

0c08b7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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