Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01130/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01130-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY BUCHANAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, WAYNE TUCKER,

individually and in his capacity as

Chief Probation Officer for the

County of Alameda, and TABULA RASA

TREATMENT HOMES, INC.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-1130 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Tabula Rasa Treatment Homes, Inc., (Tabula Rasa)

moves for summary judgment in its favor, or in the alternative

for summary adjudication of the claims against it. Plaintiff

Jeffrey Buchanan opposes the motion. Defendants County of

Alameda (the County) and Wayne Tucker also move for summary

judgment in their favor, or in the alternative for summary

adjudication of the claims against them. Plaintiff opposes the

motion with respect to his claims against the County, but does

not oppose dismissal of his claims against Defendant Tucker. 

The matter was heard on July 8, 2005. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties and oral argument on the

motions, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motions for summary

judgment. 

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1The Court grants Defendant Tabula Rasa's request for

judicial notice of the Alameda County Superior Court's two

October 10, 2001 Orders placing Plaintiff under the care of the

Probation Department and setting forth the terms and conditions

of Plaintiff's probation, as well as the Superior Court's

September 13, 2002 Ex Parte Order allowing Plaintiff to take

Paxil. 

2

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiff's attempted suicide while

he resided at a treatment facility for juvenile sex offenders

owned and operated by Tabula Rasa. The facts are undisputed and

drawn from the contemporaneous records of the State court and

the Alameda County Probation Department, unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was born in 1985. On October 10, 2001, he was

convicted of sexually molesting a step-sibling in violation of

California Penal Code § 288.5(a) and placed on probation. At

that time, the Alameda County Juvenile Court determined that

Plaintiff's continued residence in his family home would be

contrary to his welfare, and he was adjudged a ward of the court

and committed to the care and custody of the Probation

Department.1 Upon consideration of the Probation Department's

report, including the clinical evaluation of a Psychiatric

Social Worker, the State court ordered as a probation condition

that Plaintiff be placed in a licensed residential sex offender

treatment program. On December 11, 2001, Plaintiff was placed

in a Tabula Rasa group home, pursuant to a contract executed

between Tabula Rasa and the County for his treatment. The State

court approved the placement. 

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Tabula Rasa is a private, non-profit organization licensed

by the State of California's Department of Social Services. 

Mandery Decl. ¶ 2. It accepts juvenile sex offenders from the

County and other counties in Northern California. Id. ¶ 4. It

does not provide treatment for all of the County's juvenile sex

offenders and may reject any applicant; an individual's

acceptance into the program is "contingent upon a thorough

review of the documents provided by the County concerning the

minor as well as an interview to determine whether they are

suitable for placement into the program." Id. ¶ 3. According

to Michael Cholerton, Director of Juvenile Services for the

Probation Department at the time of Plaintiff's placement,

Tabula Rasa enjoyed a good reputation and a long-term

relationship with the Probation Department. Cholerton Decl. ¶

15. 

The Probation Department supervises and monitors the

children it sends to Tabula Rasa. However, the Probation

Department does not provide input or recommendations regarding

the day-to-day operation of the group home, nor does it have any

control over treatment plans or therapy. Mandery Decl. ¶ 6. 

Beginning in December, 2001, Plaintiff's treatment was

supervised by Tabula Rasa employee Kathy Steenberg, a licensed

clinical social worker, and included at least one individual and

one group therapy session per week. Deputy Probation Officer

Heather Rogers became Plaintiff's probation officer in March,

2002, at which point she became aware of his suicidal

tendencies. Rogers Decl. ¶ 8. However, she did not at that

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2Plaintiff objects to the Appraisal, Needs and Services Plan

and the Quarterly Reports on the grounds of hearsay. 

Plaintiff's objections are overruled as moot; the Court does not

rely on these documents for truths about Plaintiff's condition,

but as evidence of Officer Rogers' record-keeping and the

parties' understanding at the time. 

4

time raise the issue with her supervisors or anyone at the

Probation Department, assuming that Tabula Rasa was dealing with

the issue by "making sure he went to his medical appointments,

his psychiatric appointments, by communicating." Rogers Dep.

29:10-21. Every month, Officer Rogers met with Plaintiff and

visited with Tabula Rasa staff. See Rogers Decl., Ex. 2,

Monthly Visit Documentation Forms, March 20, April 25, May 22,

June 29, July 18, August 29, September 16, October 29, November

21 and December 19, 2002; January 23, February 27, March 31 and

April 30, 2003. She also reviewed Tabula Rasa's initial report

and subsequent quarterly reports concerning Plaintiff's

condition, treatment, needs and goals. Id., Ex. 1, January 25,

2002, Appraisal/Needs and Services Plan; Ex. 3, Quarterly

Reports, June 18, 2002, November 11, 2002, and March 4, 2003.2

According to Michelle Mandery, executive director of Tabula

Rasa, the group home also uses a daily log to track medications

administered, but this daily log is not saved, and Plaintiff's

has been destroyed. Davis Decl. Ex. A, Mandery Dep. 44-46. 

In her June 18, 2002 report, Ms. Steenberg recommended that

Plaintiff be evaluated for depression, based in part on his own

self-reporting of chronic and episodic depression, including

weight loss, suicidal ideation, and social impairment. Id., Ex.

3, at D-88. Based on Ms. Steenberg's recommendation, Officer

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3Plaintiff filed his complaint against Dr. Gill as well. 

However, he did not oppose Dr. Gill's motion to dismiss the

claims against her for failure to state a claim and lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. The Court granted that motion on

February 2, 2005. 

5

Rogers obtained a referral for Plaintiff be evaluated by a

psychiatrist. However, Officer Rogers testified at her

deposition that she would have referred Plaintiff to a

psychiatrist, even if the Tabula Rasa staff had not recommended

that she do so, because she is "not an expert when it comes to

mental health issues." Rogers Dep. 26:4-12. 

Dr. Sukhmani Kaur Gill, a psychiatrist at Pathways to

Wellness, a clinic with a contract with the County, examined

Plaintiff in August, 2002 and diagnosed him with major

depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder and anxiety disorder. 

She prescribed the anti-depressant drug Paxil.3 This medication

was not approved for pediatric use. On September 13, 2002, the

Alameda County Juvenile court granted an ex parte request by

Officer Rogers to allow Plaintiff to take Paxil in dosages of up

to 40 milligrams. Officer Rogers was aware that Paxil was not

approved for pediatric use, but was not concerned because she

knew that not every medication taken by children had been tested

and approved for them, and she deferred to the judgment of the

treating psychiatrist. Rogers Dep. 37:6-20, 39:1-15. According

to Officer Rogers' request to the court, Plaintiff's last

attorney of record was not contacted because she no longer

handled juvenile matters, but Plaintiff's mother, Cynthia

Ramirez, "was most definitely in agreement with the

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prescription," had "noticed that his behavior was extremely

manic," and was "fearful that he would commit suicide." Ms.

Ramirez now states that had she been informed that Paxil was not

recommended for pediatric use, she would not have supported the

ex parte request, and would have taken efforts to have an

attorney appointed for her son. Ramirez Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. 

On October 7, 2002, Dr. Gill or another psychiatrist at

Pathways to Wellness reissued Plaintiff a prescription for Paxil

in 10 milligram dosages. On November 1, 2002, the dosage was

increased to 20 milligrams, a prescription which was reissued

following evaluations performed on December 6, 2002, January 10,

2003 and February 6, 2003. Ms. Steenberg's November 11, 2002

report noted, 

Monitoring and follow-up appointments will occur to ensure

the medications [sic] effectiveness. Also long-term

psychoanalytic therapy is concurrently the treatment

modality for his depressive symptoms. . . .

Over the last three weeks, Jeff's highs (manic

symptoms) and lows (depressive symptoms) appear to be less

intrusive. His affect appears to be more age appropriate

and his social timing less intrusive and less

inappropriate. These recent changes can presumably be

attributed to the psychotropic medication. 

Nov. 11, 2002 Report at D-83, D-85. 

On February 18, 2003, Plaintiff disclosed to Ms. Steenberg

that he had devised a method for attempting suicide. As part of

her response, Plaintiff and Tabula Rasa staff wrote a "nosuicide plan" in which he committed "to not harm himself and to

immediately inform any staff on duty whenever he ha[d] such

thoughts." Rogers Decl., Ex. 8, February 18, 2003 Tabula Rasa

Incident Report. Tabula Rasa expert witness Dr. James R.

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Missett describes a no-suicide plan or contract as "a therapy

tool widely used in the psychiatric community to enlist the

assistance of the patient into the treatment protocol." Missett

Decl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff was reportedly placed on "one-on-one

supervision." Incident Report at D-76. 

Officer Rogers was informed of Plaintiff's suicidal

ideation and the no-suicide plan. She testified that this was

something that should have been brought to the attention of her

supervisors; however, she does not recall having any

conversations with anyone at her office about the incident

report. Rogers Dep. 55:13-18. 

In her March 3, 2003 report, Ms. Steenberg noted that

Plaintiff's depressive and manic symptoms had increased that

quarter; she attributed this to an "increased sensitivity to

rejection and self-loathing" due to his disclosure in therapy of

his own past sexual abuse. Mar. 3, 2003 Quarterly Report at D72. Also on March 3, 2003, Plaintiff's prescription dosage was

increased to 30 milligrams and remained elevated after an April

10, 2003 evaluation. In addition to the medication, Tabula Rasa

placed Plaintiff 

on a special program to elevate his depressed mood. He is

to do physical activity two times a day along with using

positive self-talk to combat his defeatist and selfloathing attitudes. He is also to talk to staff

immediately when he is feeling depressed or having suicidal

thoughts. He is on close supervision to further maintain

his safety. 

Mar. 3, 2003 Quarterly Report at D-73. 

On the evening of May 7, 2003, Plaintiff was in his room,

"crying, upset and depressed." Buchanan Dep. 80:5-6. His

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4Plaintiff objects to Dr. Missett's Declaration on the

grounds that he failed to review Plaintiff's psychiatric

records; he relies on hearsay comments contained within Ms.

Steenberg's Quarterly Reports; and his opinion relies on an

8

roommate found him and informed Anthony Page, a Tabula Rasa

employee. Plaintiff informed Mr. Page that he wanted to kill

himself; Mr. Page successfully got Plaintiff to calm down "a

little bit," and then told him to go back to bed. Id. 82:1-11. 

The next day, Plaintiff was woken up by Tabula Rasa staff

between 6:30 and 7:00, ate breakfast, and left for his

continuation school. Although Plaintiff was seen at school, he

did not go to class, and instead walked into an oncoming traffic

lane of United States Highway 50. Plaintiff was struck by a

vehicle and sustained significant bodily injuries. Tabula Rasa

executive Michelle Mandrey informed Officer Rogers of

Plaintiff's suicide attempt that day. Tabula Rasa employees

later discovered multiple suicide notes written by Plaintiff. 

Tabula Rasa's expert, Dr. Missett, has reviewed the

relevant documents in this case. He opines that the County's

placement of Plaintiff at Tabula Rasa was appropriate; that

Tabula Rasa's provision of Paxil to Plaintiff was in accordance

with the recommendation of his treating psychiatrists and the

State court's order and within the applicable standard of care;

that Tabula Rasa staff at all times provided Plaintiff with the

care and treatment that was reasonable and appropriate and

within the applicable standard of care for a group home; and

that no act or omission by Tabula Rasa staff was a substantial

factor in causing Plaintiff's injuries.4 ¶¶ 5, 9, 13-17. 

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"incomplete (and possibly erroneous) set of facts." 

Plaintiff's objections are overruled. Dr. Missett clearly

states that he reviewed Plaintiff's "medical records" and "all

documents produced by Plaintiff," and in a supplemental

declaration he states that, assuming all of the additional facts

identified by Plaintiff are true, his opinions would remain the

same. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, Dr. Missett may rely

for his opinion on otherwise inadmissible facts or data. 

Plaintiff makes no claim that Ms. Steenberg's Quarterly Reports

are not of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the

field, nor does Plaintiff suggest that Ms. Steenberg's Reports

would not generally be admissible if properly authenticated. 

9

In its December 6, 2004 Order Granting in Part and Denying

in Part Defendant Tabula Rasa's Motion to Dismiss, the Court

dismissed Plaintiff's claim for negligence against Tabula Rasa

on the grounds that it was immune from liability under

California Government Code § 845.8. Plaintiff pursues claims

against Tabula Rasa under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his

constitutional rights, including violation of his right to

personal security under the Fifth Amendment; deliberate

indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eight

Amendment; and failure to provide medical care in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also brings a State law

claim for battery against Tabula Rasa. In addition, Plaintiff

brings a claim against the County for the maintenance of

policies or customs exhibiting a deliberate indifference to the

constitutional rights of a person with whom it had a special

relationship. Plaintiff has dismissed his previous claims

against Dr. Gill, and does not oppose dismissal of his claims

against Mr. Tucker. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

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disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th

Cir. 1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is

no material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard

as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by

affidavits or other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford

Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary

judgment are those which, under applicable substantive law, may

affect the outcome of the case. The substantive law will

identify which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The

moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the

absence of a material fact on such issues, nor must the moving

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party support its motion with evidence negating the non-moving

party's claim. Id.; see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497

U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404,

1409 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or

admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." 

Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Constitutional Claims Against Tabula Rasa

Tabula Rasa moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's

constitutional claims against it on the grounds inter alia that

there is an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's

contention Tabula Rasa acted with deliberate indifference. 

Both parties agree that the standard of "deliberate

indifference" applies to all of Plaintiff's constitutional

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (holding that due process clause not

implicated by negligent State act causing unintended loss of

life). 

It is not clear what Plaintiff believes constitutes

evidence of Tabula Rasa's deliberate indifference to him. In

his opposition, Plaintiff suggests that the issue is "whether it

knew of Plaintiff's suicidal tendencies." Am. Opp. at 14. The

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record clearly shows that Tabula Rasa staff were indeed aware of

Plaintiff's suicidal tendencies, and that they took what they

believed to be appropriate steps in response. As part of that

response, they administered to Plaintiff the medication that was

prescribed by his treating psychiatrists, who evaluated him

monthly. This medication was also approved by the State court. 

Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to raise a

triable issue of material fact regarding Tabula Rasa's

deliberate indifference to him. Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to

rebut Dr. Missett's expert opinion that Tabula Rasa was not

negligent.

Plaintiff accuses Tabula Rasa of deliberate spoliation of

the evidence, based on its failure to keep Plaintiff's daily

medication logs. Plaintiff claims that this creates an adverse

inference that Tabula Rasa was in fact deliberately indifferent

to his medical needs. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Akiona

v. United States, courts may draw adverse inferences from the

destruction of evidence relevant to a case, 

based on two rationales, one evidentiary and one not. The

evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common sense

observation that a party who has notice that a document is

relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the

document is more likely to have been threatened by the

document than is a party in the same position who does not

destroy the document. . . . 

The other rationale for the inference has to do with

its prophylactic and punitive effects. Allowing the trier

of fact to draw the inference presumably deters parties

from destroying relevant evidence before it can be

introduced at trial. 

938 F.2d 158, 161 (1991). Here, however, these rationales are

inapplicable and insufficient. Nothing in the record shows that

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Tabula Rasa destroyed Plaintiff's records in response to this

litigation. Furthermore, Plaintiff's primary theory is that

Tabula Rasa's administration of Paxil caused him harm. The

Court will infer, in the absence of the daily medical logs, that

Tabula Rasa did indeed administer Paxil to Plaintiff, but this

fact, in itself, does not constitute evidence of deliberate

indifference. 

Therefore, the Court grants Tabula Rasa's motion for

summary adjudication of Plaintiff's federal constitutional

claims against it. It need not reach Tabula Rasa's arguments

that these claims are prohibited because it is not a State

actor, or, in the alternative, that the claims are prohibited

under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 43 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) and

that Tabula Rasa is entitled to qualified immunity. 

II. Battery Claim

Tabula Rasa moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's

State law claim against it for battery, on the grounds that it

is unsupported by the evidence. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)

authorizes a federal district court to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over State law claims even after it has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 

In order to establish this claim, Plaintiff must show

evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact

regarding the elements of battery. A California Court of Appeal

set forth those elements in the context of medical treatment as

follows,

A battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful contact

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by one person with the person of another. A harmful

contact, intentionally done is the essence of a battery. A

contact is "unlawful" if it is unconsented to. The

elements of a civil battery are: 1. Defendant

intentionally did an act which resulted in a harmful or

offensive contact with the plaintiff's person; 2. Plaintiff

did not consent to the contact; and 3. The harmful or

offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to

the plaintiff.

Piedra v. Dugan, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1495 (2004) (internal

quotation marks, ellipses and citations omitted). 

In Piedra, which also involved allegedly harmful medical

treatment to a minor, it was the parents' consent to treatment

that was in dispute. For wards of the court, however,

California law provides that "only a juvenile court judicial

officer shall have authority to make orders regarding the

administration of psychotropic medications for that child." 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 369.5(a). Tabula Rasa argues that the

administration of Paxil to Plaintiff was not "unlawful" because

it was duly authorized by the Alameda County Superior Court's

September 13, 2002 Order. 

Plaintiff counters that the order is void because, as

stated on its face, it was issued ex parte without contacting an

attorney for Plaintiff. Yet Plaintiff cites no legal authority

that supports this position. Indeed, § 369.5(a) requires only

that an order regarding administration of psychotropic

medication be based on "a request from a physician, indicating

the reasons for the request, a description of the child's

diagnosis and behavior, the expected results of the medication,

and a description of any side effects of the medication." 

Plaintiff does not dispute that these requirements were met. 

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The legal authority cited by Plaintiff is inapposite and does

not suggest that the order was invalid simply because it was

issued ex parte. See Becker v. S.P.V. Construction, 27 Cal. 3d

489, 493-496 (1980) (reversing a trial court order vacating

default judgment in construction contract case); Burtnett v.

King, 33 Cal. 2d 805, 807-808 (1949) (setting forth California

law requirements for default judgment). There is no evidence

that Tabula Rasa was aware that the order had been issued

without contacting a lawyer, or that that was improper, if it

was. 

In light of the State court order authorizing the

administration of Paxil in dosages of up to 40 milligrams,

Tabula Rasa's dispensation of the medicine to Plaintiff cannot

be the kind of "intentional, unlawful and harmful contact" that

constitutes battery. Therefore, the Court grants Tabula Rasa's

motion for summary adjudication of the battery claim. 

III. Monell Claim Against County

The County moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's

claim, pursuant to Monell, that it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by

developing and maintaining policies or customs exhibiting a

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons

with whom it had a special relationship, including Plaintiff. 

"To impose liability on a government entity for failing to act t

preserve constitutional rights, a section 1983 plaintiff must

establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he w

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this polic

'amounts to deliberate indifference' to the plaintiff's constitutiona

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right; and (4) that the policy is the 'moving force behind the

constitutional violation.'" Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9

Cir. 1992) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). Whi

the liability of municipalities does not depend upon the liability of

individual officers, it is contingent on a violation of constitutiona

rights. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995). At the hearing, Plaintiff identified

Officer Rogers as the individual who violated his constitutional

rights. 

Plaintiff identifies as "the crux" of his claim against the Coun

an alleged violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment because

he was "confined under conditions posing a risk of 'objectively,

sufficiently serious' harm and that the officials had a 'sufficiently

culpable state of mind' in denying the proper medical care." Clement

v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wallis v. Baldwi

70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, Plaintiff does not

specifically identify any evidence showing that he was confined under

conditions posing a risk of objectively, sufficiently serious harm. 

Even assuming arguendo that the Paxil prescription was a "condition"

posing a risk of such harm, Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest

that Officer Rogers or any other County employee had a "sufficiently

culpable state of mind" in creating this condition. 

Plaintiff notes numerous alleged discrepancies or gaps in

the record which he implies indicate deficiencies in Officer

Rogers' supervision, e.g., her failure to recall whether she

brought the February 18, 2003 incident report to the attention

of her Probation Department supervisors. However, Plaintiff

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never explains how these alleged deficiencies support his claim

that the County confined him under conditions of sufficiently

serious harm or that doing so amounted to deliberate

indifference to his rights. The record before the Court shows only

that Officer Rogers relied on Tabula Rasa and Plaintiff's treating

psychiatrists in order to determine what course of treatment was in h

best interest. Despite Plaintiff's suffering, there is no

evidence that Officer Rogers' trust was misplaced or

inappropriate, much less that it represented a policy of

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights. 

Therefore, the Court grants the County's motion for summary

adjudication of the Monell claim against it. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants

Tabula Rasa and the County's motions for summary judgment

(Docket Nos. 71 and 60, respectively). Tabula Rasa's request

for judicial notice is GRANTED (Docket No. 73). Plaintiff's

claims against Wayne Tucker are dismissed with prejudice. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. Each party

shall bear its own costs of the action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/21/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-01130-CW Document 98 Filed 07/21/05 Page 17 of 17