Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05106/USCOURTS-ca10-92-05106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L ~ . .J 

TENTH CIRCUIT Uni~ States Cou.:-t of Appea!P 

DAVID LEE SACK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v . 

ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL, 

BENJAMIN G. BENNER, KARL N. 

DETWILER, HAROLD DUNLAP, 

CHRYS W. CORCORAN, JOHN C. 

SACRA, UNKNOWN SECURITY 

GUARD, UNKNOWN MEDICAL 

PERSON, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Tenth Circuit 

MARO 1 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-5106 

(D.C. No. 91-C-79-E) 

(N.D. Okla . ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SETH and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument woul d not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P. 

34 (a ) ; Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submi tted without oral argument . 

The Plaintiff David Lee Sack appeal s the dismissal of his 42 

U.S . C. § 1983 civil rights complaint in which he alleged that the 

Defendants St. Francis Hospital and various hospital employees 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and s hall not 

b e cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the d octrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-5106 Document: 010110176486 Date Filed: 03/01/1993 Page: 1 
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment by taking his blood 

without his consent, and that the Defendants were negligent by 

treating him with indifference while he was confined to the 

hospital . The Defendants sought dismissal for the reasons that 

they were not state actors and no Constitutional violations 

occurred. After a United States Magistrate Judge recommended that 

the Motion to Dismiss be granted, the parties filed numerous 

motions and briefs which initially resulted in the dismissal of 

the action. However, the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma later vacated the dismissal and 

rescheduled for oral argument. Prior to the oral argument, the 

district court was informed that a related case filed by Mr. Sack 

had been adjudicated in a different venue. Consequently, the 

district court dismissed Mr. Sack's§ 1983 claims based on res 

judicata and collateral estoppel and refused to consider the 

remaining state law negligence claim pursuant to the Supplemental 

Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 . We affirm. 

Mr. Sack was involved in an automobile accident that resulted 

in the death of the driver of the other vehicle. Mr. Sack was 

injured in the accident and was thereafter transported to the 

Defendant St. Francis Hospital. While at the hospital, a police 

officer instructed a nurse to take blood from Mr. Sack as he had 

probable cause to believe that Mr. Sack was intoxicated. The 

nurse extracted the blood despite apparent protestations by 

Mr. Sack. Subsequently, Mr. Sack pleaded guilty to second degree 

murder and knowingly possessing an Oklahoma driver's license with 

a photograph of a person other than the named person. 

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Because Mr. Sack has appealed prose, we construe his claims 

liberally. Hall v. Bellmen, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.). In 

so doing, we have determined that the primary thrust of his appeal 

is that his Constitutional rights were violated because his blood 

was removed prior to his arrest in contravention of Oklahoma state 

law. We find that this issue is precluded from review by this 

panel pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "once a court has 

decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that 

decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a 

different cause of action involving a party to the first case." 

Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 975 

F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir.) (quoting Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 

94 (citation and footnote omitted)). In the Tenth Circuit 

collateral estoppel requires that the following four criteria be 

met: 

"(l) the issue previously decided is identical 

with the one presented in the action in 

question, (2) the prior action has been 

finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the 

party against whom the doctrine is invoked was 

a party or in privity with a party to the 

prior adjudication, and (4) the party against 

whom the doctrine is raised had a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the 

prior action." 

Id. at 687 (citations omitted). 

Prior to commencing the action that is the subject of this 

appeal, Mr. Sack filed a similar§ 1983 complaint in the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

alleging that his civil rights were violated by numerous police 

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officers. In particular Mr. Sack claimed that Officer Lowder 

violated his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches and 

seizures when the officer directed the St. Francis Hospital nurse 

to take his blood sample. 

The district court dismissed Mr. Sack's complaint, finding 

that Officer Lowder was entitled to qualified immunity: 

"[I]t cannot be said that defendant Lowder 

violated the clearly established rights of 

plaintiff. Following the automobile accident, 

plaintiff was arrested for, among other 

reasons, driving under the influence. 

Oklahoma law allows for the taking of an 

arrested individual's blood test, over his 

objection, in such circumstances as are 

present here." 

Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed July 10, 1991. 

See Okla. Stat. tit. 47, §§ 751(A) and 753 (1988) (allowing the 

taking of blood, without consent, after an arrest for among other 

things driving under the influence). In Sack v. Lowder, 951 F.2d 

1260 (10th Cir.), we affirmed for substantially the same reasons 

as set forth in the district court's disposition of the matter, 

noting that the district judge's rationale was documented in two 

commendably thorough orders. 

We now turn to the four elements of collateral estoppel, 

which we find are squarely met in this case. First, the issue 

presented, whether Mr. Sack's blood was removed after his arrest 

as required by Oklahoma law, is identical in both actions. 

Second, this issue has been finally adjudicated on the merits 

because the district court's finding in the prior action that 

Mr. Sack's blood was taken after he was arrested was necessary to 

the court's ultimate holding that the Defendant officer had not 

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violated Mr. Sack's clearly established statutory or 

Constitutional rights and was therefore entitled to qualified 

immunity. See Murdock, 975 F.2d at 687 (adjudication on the 

merits requires the adjudication to be necessary to the judgment) . 

In addition, we affirmed the district court's dismissal of the 

prior action. See Okusami v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, 

959 F.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C . Cir. ) (Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal is 

resolution on the merits). Third, Mr. Sack is the same party in 

both actions. Fourth, there are no allegations nor any facts 

indicating that Mr. Sack was deprived a full and fair opportunity 

to litigate this issue . Consequently, we hold that collateral 

estoppel precludes our review of the underlying issue supporting 

Mr. Sack's§ 1983 claim. 

On appeal, Mr. Sack has also raised several miscellaneous 

claims concerning the district court's refusal to consider the 

pendent state claim of negligent medical treatment and the failure 

of the district court to consolidate this case with the prior 

action in the Eastern District of Oklahoma or alternatively to 

reopen the prior case. After carefully reviewing the record, we 

must conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by refusing jurisdiction over the negligence claim and that 

Mr . Sack's other allegations are meritless. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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