Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00760/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00760-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dwayne E. McIntosh, a single man, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa Community College District, 

et al., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-0760-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants have filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the Court to reconsider its

denial of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s race discrimination claims. Dkt. #68. At the

Court’s request, Plaintiff has filed a response. Dkt. #71. For the reasons that follow, the

Court will grant Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and grant summary judgment on the

race discrimination claims. 

I. Background.

Plaintiff is an African-American man who has been employed with the Maricopa

Community College District since 1996. Plaintiff originally worked as a program advisor

in the Disability Resources and Services (DRS) office at Mesa Community College (MCC).

In 2001, Plaintiff became a Student Services Enrollment Specialist at the Red Mountain

Campus of MCC, where he is currently employed. 

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In February of 2006, MCC posted a job opening for Manager of the DRS office.

Dkt. #47-4 at 3. The job posting listed three minimum qualifications: (1) experience in

supervision and management of an office serving students with disabilities, (2) knowledge

of federal laws on access and accommodation for persons with disabilities, and

(3) experience in academic advisement. Id. Plaintiff applied for the position, but was not

granted an interview. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff was denied an interview because

he was not qualified for the position. Plaintiff contends that he was qualified and was denied

an interview because of his race.

In an order dated February 12, 2009, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the basis of the Nina Robinson affidavit. On March 12, 2009, the

Court granted the parties’ joint motion to re-open discovery for the limited purpose of taking

Ms. Robinson’s deposition. Dkt. #64. Defendants seek reconsideration on the basis of

information obtained in the deposition.

II. Motion for reconsideration analysis.

Courts in this district have identified four circumstances where a motion for

reconsideration will be granted: (1) the moving party has discovered material differences in

fact or law from those presented to the Court at the time of its initial decision, and the party

could not previously have known of the factual or legal differences through the exercise of

reasonable diligence, (2) material factual events have occurred since the Court’s initial

decision, (3) there has been a material change in the law since the Court’s initial decision,

or (4) the moving party makes a convincing showing that the Court failed to consider

material facts that were presented to the Court at the time of its initial decision. See, e.g.,

Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003).

Defendants argue that they satisfy the first basis for reconsideration – newly discovered

evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered before. 

Nina Robinson’s testimony in the April 2009 deposition significantly undermines her

affidavit submitted in response to the motion for summary judgment. Defendants note that

they interviewed Ms. Robinson in April of 2008, but assert she never alleged there was a

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secret meeting to deny Plaintiff an interview, nor did she allege that Plaintiff’s race had

anything to do with the DRS Manager selection process. Id. at 6. Defendants contend that

they could not have discovered these factual differences earlier because they could not have

anticipated that Ms. Robinson would change her testimony and provide Plaintiff with an

affidavit. 

Plaintiff does not dispute these assertions. He instead argues that because the April

2008 interview occurred, Defendants had the ability to file their motion for reconsideration

within 10 days of the Court’s prior ruling and their failure to do so violates Local Rule

7.2(g). The new information on which the motion for reconsideration is based, however, was

established at the April 2009 deposition. Defendants were provided a final draft of the

deposition transcript on April 13, 2009, and filed the motion for reconsideration four days

later. Defendants have demonstrated both that reconsideration of the February 12, 2009

order is justified and that there was good cause to file the motion for reconsideration more

than 10 days after the Court’s order denying summary judgment.

III. Motion for summary judgment.

The Court’s February 12, 2009 noted that Defendants’ motion presented a close

question, but ultimately found that the Robinson affidavit raised a factual question regarding

pretext:

Although this is a close question, the Court concludes that the Robinson

affidavit is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. . . . The affidavit asserts

that she has knowledge of a secret meeting held to exclude Plaintiff from the

hiring process on the basis of his race, and that she has knowledge that the

hiring process was racially motivated to discriminate against Plaintiff.

Although the basis for this knowledge is not specified and the affidavit

generally lacks factual detail, the Court concludes that an affidavit asserting

knowledge of such racial discrimination, by a person who is a long-time

employee and manager at MCC and a member of the hiring committee, creates

a question of fact that must be resolved by the jury. Defendants contend that

Robinson was eventually removed from the hiring committee and therefore

cannot have personal knowledge of her statements. But Defendants have

failed to establish that she was removed from the hiring committee before she

had a chance to evaluate Plaintiff’s qualifications and acquire the information

asserted in her affidavit. 

Dkt. #56 at 6 (citation omitted).

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In her deposition, Ms. Robinson testified about the meeting allegedly held to exclude

Plaintiff from the interview process. She was told the meeting would consider whether to

grant Plaintiff an interview, and she concluded that Ms. Taussig was trying to find a reason

not to interview Plaintiff because Ms. Taussig had said in the past that she didn’t want

Plaintiff to work on her campus. Dkt. #71 at 29-30. Ms. Robinson testified that she had a

“gut feeling” that the meeting was secretive because the committee members arriving for the

meeting appeared awkward when they saw her. Id. at 32. With respect to her affidavit

statement that the hiring process was racially motivated, Ms. Robinson testified that this

assertion was based on her belief that Ms. Taussig did not care for black males; it was not

based on any racially discriminatory statements made by Ms. Taussig. Id. at 34-35. Finally,

Ms. Robinson clarified that she asked to be removed from the hiring committee and never

attended a meeting concerning the DRS Manager position. Id. at 40. 

“When the plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as

to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial.”

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998). To establish pretext the

plaintiff may also offer “circumstantial evidence that tends to show that the employer’s

proffered motives were not the actual motives because they are inconsistent or otherwise not

believable.” Id. at 1222. Such indirect evidence of pretext, however, “must be both

‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ in order to create a triable issue with respect to whether the

employer intended to discriminate.” Id. (citations omitted).

 In the February 12, 2009 order, the Court found that there was a triable issue of fact

on the basis of Robinson’s statements that there was a secret meeting held to find a way not

to offer Plaintiff an interview and that Robinson had knowledge that the hiring process was

racially motivated to discriminate against Plaintiff. Dkt. #56. The Court viewed this as

direct evidence of a discriminatory motive that need not be substantial under Godwin. Ms.

Robinson’s deposition makes clear, however, that her affidavit assertions were made on the

basis of a “gut feeling,” and that she had no personal knowledge of what occurred in the

hiring committee meetings. This does not constitute direct evidence of a discriminatory

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motive, and the circumstantial evidence provided by Ms. Robinson is neither specific nor

substantial. 

Plaintiff contends that he was the best candidate for the DRS Manager position. This

contention is also based on the affidavit of Ms. Robinson. Dkt. #50 ¶ 8. As clarified in the

deposition testimony, however, Ms. Robinson never attended a meeting of the hiring

committee where Plaintiff’s qualifications were addressed, never saw any of the applications

or resumes, and knew only three of the 30 applicants who applied. Dkt. #71 at 40, 42. 

Plaintiff asserts that the application of the successful applicant, Wink Harner, did not

specifically state that she had supervisory skills. Dkt. #49 at 3. This is not correct. Ms.

Harner’s application stated that she was the Manager of Disability Resources at South

Mountain Community College (the same position for which she was applying at MCC) and

that she hired and trained staff and managed a budget. Dkt. #50, Ex. 5. 

The circumstantial evidence provided by Plaintiff is not sufficiently specific and

substantial to create a triable issue of fact on the issue of pretext. The Court will therefore

grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for reconsideration (Dkt. #68) is granted.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #47) is granted.

3. The clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

DATED this 8th day of May, 2009.

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