Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01321/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01321-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KENNETH CRAIG DUNCAN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-01321 PHX NVW (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On or about July 17, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Petitioner filed an amended petition on September 3,

2008. See Docket No. 10. Respondents filed an answer

(“Answer”) (Docket No. 19) to the petition on January 20, 2009.

Petitioner filed a reply (Docket No. 29) to the answer on April

30, 2009.

I Procedural History

In 2000 a jury found Petitioner guilty on 32 felony

counts comprised of sexual activity with a minor younger than 15

years of age and possession of child pornography. See Answer,

Exh. A. The charges involved four separate victims. Id., Exh.

A. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent and consecutive

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prison terms for these offenses totaling in excess of his

natural life. Id., Exh. A. These convictions and sentences

were reversed on direct appeal in a decision issued November 19,

2002. Id., Exh. A. The state appellate court remanded the case

for a new trial on the charges. Id., Exh. D. 

Prior to the occurrence of the second trial, the

parties requested a settlement conference pursuant to Rule 17.4,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which request was granted

by the trial court. Id., Exh. B & Exh. C. At the request of

the parties, the trial judge, Judge O’Toole, participated in the

settlement conference. See id., Exh. C. 

Petitioner entered into a written plea agreement with

the state on July 8, 2004. Id., Exh. B. The plea agreement

required Petitioner to plead guilty to four counts of attempted

child molestation. Id., Exh. B. The plea agreement provided

Petitioner would be sentenced pursuant to the Arizona statute

regarding dangerous crimes against children. The written plea

agreement stipulated Petitioner would receive the presumptive

sentence of ten years imprisonment on one of the convictions and

that he would receive a sentence of lifetime probation on the

other three convictions. See id., Exh. B & Exh. C & Exh. D.

At a consolidated change-of-plea and sentencing hearing

conducted July 8, 2004, the trial court questioned Petitioner

regarding his understanding of the written plea agreement. Id.,

Exh. B at 4–14. Petitioner affirmed he fully understood the

plea agreement. Id., Exh. B at 4-7. Petitioner indicated he

was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. Id., Exh. B at

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1

 Rule 17.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:

... The parties shall file the agreement with the

court, which shall address the defendant

personally and determine that he or she

understands and agrees to its terms, that the

written document contains all the terms of the

agreement, and that the plea is entered in

conformance with Rules 17.2 and 17.3.

... After making such determinations ... the

court shall either accept or reject the tendered

negotiated plea. The court shall not be bound by

any provision in the plea agreement regarding the

sentence or the term and conditions of probation

to be imposed, if, after accepting the agreement

and reviewing a presentence report, it rejects

the provision as inappropriate.

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6-7. Petitioner indicated he understood the rights he was

waiving, including his right to a jury trial, and confirmed that

he had two prior felony convictions. Id., Exh. B at 5-7. 

At that time, Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of

attempted child molestation. Petitioner waived his right to the

preparation of a new presentence report and the trial court

proceeded to sentencing. Id., Exh. B at 15-16. Noting the

convictions for which Petitioner was being sentenced were

attempted child molestation convictions and “Class 3 felonies,

dangerous crimes against children”, the state trial court

sentenced Petitioner to one term of ten years imprisonment and

to three terms of lifetime probation as specified in the plea

agreement. Id., Exh. B at 17–18.1

On October 19, 2004, Petitioner initiated a timely

action for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id., Exh. E.

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2

Plea Negotiations. The parties may negotiate

concerning, and reach an agreement on, any aspect

of the case. At the request of either party, or

sua sponte, the court may, in its sole

discretion, participate in settlement discussions

by directing counsel having the authority to

settle to participate in a good faith discussion

with the court regarding a non-trial or non-jury

trial resolution which conforms to the interests

of justice. ... The trial judge shall only

participate in settlement discussions with the

consent of the parties. In all other cases, the

discussions shall be before another judge or a

settlement division. If settlement discussions do

not result in an agreement, the case shall be

returned to the trial judge.

Rule 17.4(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P. (emphasis added).

The Rule was amended in 1999 to allow judges to participate

in settlement conferences with the understanding that “all

lawyers--prosecutors and defense counsel alike--will cooperate in the

use of this rule, and that judges will avoid coercive behavior of any

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Petitioner asserted he was entitled to post-conviction relief

because his trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective.

Id., Exh. F. Petitioner also asserted he was denied his right

to have a jury determine the “dangerous” nature of his offenses.

Id., Exh. F. Petitioner further argued that his sentences

violated state law. Id., Exh. F. Additionally, Petitioner

alleged the trial judge erred by not specifically referring to

Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 13–604.01, the statute

defining dangerous crimes against children and the presumptive

sentencing for such convictions, during the change-of-plea

colloquy. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner also argued that his

convictions should be reversed because the trial judge’s

participation in the settlement conference was prohibited by

Arizona law, i.e., Rule 17.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure and the judicial code of ethics. See id., Exh. F.2

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kind”. Court comment to 1999 Amendment to Rule 17.4, Ariz. R. Crim.

P.

3

 The Maricopa County Superior Court judge issuing the

opinion was the Honorable A. Craig Blakey II.

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The state trial court denied relief in Petitioner’s

Rule 32 action in a summary decision issued May 8, 2006. Id.,

Exh. C. The court noted Petitioner had ceded his nonmeritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his

reply to the state’s response to his Rule 32 petition. Id.,

Exh. C. With regard to Petitioner’s objection to the trial

judge’s participation in the settlement conference, the state

court concluded: “Based on the Defendant’s own counsel

requesting that Judge O’Toole conduct the settlement conference

and the fact that no trial subsequently occurred, The Court

finds that Defendant’s argument Rule 17.4(a), Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, is misplaced.” Id., Exh. C at 1.3

Citing Blakely v. Washington, the trial court concluded

Petitioner had waived any right to a jury trial regarding the

“dangerous” nature of his crimes by pleading guilty and that

Petitioner was given the presumptive sentence. The trial court

also concluded Petitioner’s other sentencing claims were without

merit. Id., Exh. C.

The Arizona Court of Appeals declined review of the

trial court’s denial of Rule 32 relief on May 24, 2007. Id.,

Exh. I. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review in a

decision issued October 11, 2007. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on July

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4

 Petitioner asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege to be

free of self-incrimination was violated during his arrest.

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17, 2008. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief because

the trial judge erred by participating in the settlement

conference. Petitioner maintains he is entitled to relief

because his sentences are unlawful under Arizona law, i.e.,

because a jury, rather than a judge, was required to find that

his crimes were “dangerous crimes against children”. Petitioner

also contends the trial court erred in failing to expressly

refer to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 13–604.01 during

the colloquy regarding his entry of a guilty plea. 

The amended habeas petition cites the Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination, the right to due process

of law pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a

purported Sixth Amendment “right to the adversarial process,”

and the right to equal protection. Petitioner alleges the trial

court made errors of law violating state statutes and the state

and federal rules of criminal procedure.4 Petitioner contends

he was pressured by his attorney into signing what he believed

would be an “Alford plea.” Petitioner further asserts the State

of Arizona’s sentencing scheme regarding dangerous crimes

against children is unconstitutional. In his amended petition,

Petitioner states: “Duncan does not challenge his guilty plea

(conviction) with this petition ... Duncan will challenge his

conviction and repudiate his illegally conceived guilty plea in

a second Rule 32 [action] to be filed after his July 23, 2008,

release from prison.” Docket No. 10 at 4.

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5

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2008). 

-7-

Respondents allow that the petition is timely filed.

Respondents assert that Petitioner did not properly exhaust his

federal habeas claims in the state courts. Respondents argue

Petitioner’s claims regarding the judge’s participation in the

settlement conference and the court’s finding of the “dangerous”

elements of his crimes were waived in the state courts and,

accordingly, that the claims are procedurally defaulted.

Respondents also maintain that Petitioner’s other claims fail to

state a violation of a federal constitutional right cognizable

in a section 2254 action.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).5 

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence). 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2008). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92-93, 126 S. Ct.

at 2387. Procedural default of a federal habeas claim often

occurs when a petitioner waived a claim under state rules by

failing to present the claim at an earlier opportunity. See

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Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1417 (9th Cir. 1998); Miranda

v. Leibach, 394 F.3d 984, 991-92 (7th Cir. 2005). A state

court’s application of a procedural rule is not undermined where

the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.

See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10, 109 S. Ct.

1038, 1044 n.10 (1989).

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in the state courts and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

state rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632

(9th Cir. 2000); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating

a state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and

independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may not raise

the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and

prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis, 222 F.3d at 632,

quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994). See

also Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580-81 (9th Cir. 2003);

Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 2004)

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(citations omitted). 

The District Courts are not to review habeas claims

presented to a state court if the decision of that state court

denying relief rests on a state ground that is both independent

of the federal claim and adequate to support that judgment.

See, e.g., Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1995). The

procedural bar doctrine proscribes federal habeas review of a

claim when the state court declined to address the petitioner’s

federal constitutional claim because the petitioner failed to

meet a state procedural requirement with regard to the proper

exhaustion of the claim in the state courts. See Coleman, 501

U.S. at 729-30, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-54; Pitts v. Anderson, 122

F.3d 275, 278 (5th Cir. 1997). If the Court finds an

independent and adequate state procedural ground precluded

relief, “federal habeas review is barred unless the prisoner can

demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual

prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1993).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona courts. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.

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856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state

rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims

raised in attacks on criminal convictions are adequate and

independent state grounds for affirming a conviction and denying

federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz

v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is precluded unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the Court does

not consider the merits of the claim, or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse the petitioner’s default of the claim. See

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 535-36, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076

(2006); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93, 124 S. Ct. 1827,

1852 (2004). 

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate

cause, a petitioner must show the existence of some external

factor which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305

(9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must

show that the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

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Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct.

at 1852; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861

(1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 106 S. Ct.

2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs

only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray,

477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979

F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual innocence is

necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable

fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses charged.

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See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v.

Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner does not challenge his convictions in this

habeas action, but instead challenges the sentences imposed by

the state court. Accordingly, Petitioner has not asserted a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent review of

the merits of his claims for relief.

D. Fair presentment

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state constitutional right or state law, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351; Castillo v. McFadden,

399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Lopez v. Schriro,

491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a petitioner may provide

further facts to support a claim in federal district court, so

long as those facts do not fundamentally alter the legal claim

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already considered by the state courts”), cert. denied, 128 S.

Ct. 1227 (2008). 

For a habeas claim to be considered fairly presented to

the state courts as a federal claim, the petitioner must have

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory

on which the claim is based to the state courts. See Lounsbury

v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2004); Kelly, 315 F.3d

at 1066. Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and

verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to

the state courts, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78, 92 S.

Ct. 509, 512-13 (1971), they must do more than present the facts

necessary to support the federal claim. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

E. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief because

the trial judge erred by participating in the settlement

conference. 

In his amended habeas petition Petitioner asserts that

the trial judge’s participation in the settlement conference

violated the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the ABA code

of judicial ethics, and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Petitioner challenges the “appropriateness” of

judicial participation in settlement conferences. With regard

to how this participation might have violated his federal

constitutional rights, Petitioner implies his right to due

process of law was violated because the trial judge’s presence

at the negotiations was coercive and necessarily rendered his

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plea involuntary. Petitioner contends that the trial judge’s

participation in the settlement conference violated the state

and federal rules of criminal procedure, thereby depriving him

of his right to due process of law. 

In his state Rule 32 action Petitioner argued the state

trial court’s participation in the plea negotiations violated

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the ABA code governing

judicial ethics, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner did not expressly present this claim as one alleging

a violation of his federal constitutional right to due process

of law. The state trial court determined the claim was

precluded as waived because the defense had expressly requested

the trial judge’s participation in the settlement conference.

See Answer, Exh. C. The state court also determined the claim

was not colorable because the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure were not violated, i.e., the trial judge had not

participated in both a settlement negotiation and a trial on the

merits. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner did not fairly present a claim in the state

courts that his federal constitutional right to due process of

law was violated and his plea rendered involuntary because the

trial judge participated in the settlement conference. See

Galvan v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir.

2005). General and conclusory references to “due process” in a

state court pleading do not suffice to exhaust a claim that the

petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were violated. See

Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006)

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(holding that “general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process... and the right to a fair

trial” do not constitute fair presentation of a federal claim);

Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1000-02 (concluding it is not sufficient

to engage in “scattershot citation of federal constitutional

provisions” without developing “any articulated federal legal

theory...”). Because Petitioner did not fairly present the

claim, it is procedurally defaulted. As explained, infra,

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from

his procedural default of the claim and, accordingly, relief on

the merits of the claim is precluded.

Additionally, to the extent this habeas claim is

predicated on the assertion that Petitioner’s right to due

process was violated because the trial court violated a state

rule of criminal procedure the claim is not a cognizable basis

for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991) (holding federal habeas relief

is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or

application of state law); Floyd v. Alexander, 148 F.3d 615, 619

(6th Cir. 1998). The undersigned also notes that the state rule

was not violated because it provides the trial judge may

participate in settlement negotiations at the request of the

parties and Petitioner’s counsel requested Judge O’Toole’s

participation. 

Furthermore, Petitioner’s right to due process could

not be violated by a state judge’s violation of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., McMahon v. Hodges, 382

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6 A similar argument was rejected by the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona and the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals, in an unpublished decision.

Moore further asserts that the transcript at

issue documents the trial judge’s allegedly

improper participation in plea negotiations and

thus reveals the judge’s bias and prejudice

towards him. To the extent that Moore’s judicial

bias and prejudice contention is cognizable in

federal habeas, see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 68-69 (1991) (reemphasizing that “it is not

the province of a federal habeas court to

reexamine state court determinations on state law

questions”), it reflects nothing more than his

dissatisfaction with the trial court judge’s

adverse rulings and findings, see Liteky v.

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553-56 (1994). Mere

dissatisfaction, without any attempt to

reconstruct the alleged collusive dialogue, does

not transform Moore’s claim into a constitutional

violation, and the district court properly denied

relief on these issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 553-56.

Moore v. Gonzalez, 2000 WL 125846, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000).

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F.3d 284, 289 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004); Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459,

1466 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that Rule 11, Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure does not apply to state courts and “does not

necessarily establish a constitutional prohibition”).6

To the extent Petitioner might have presented the claim

as a claim of the violation of a constitutional right, because

the state court found the claim procedurally barred, i.e.,

precluded as waived pursuant to Arizona state law, the District

Court may not grant relief on the claim because the state

court’s decision declining review of the merits of the due

process claim was predicated on an adequate and independent

state procedural bar. Any cognizable due process claim would be

exhausted but procedurally defaulted based on the independent

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state-ground doctrine. See Correll, 137 F.3d at 1417–18.

In his response to the answer to his habeas petition

asserting he has procedurally defaulted his claims, Petitioner

does not offer the Court a reason for finding cause and

prejudice regarding the default of his claims. Instead,

Petitioner again asserts that the trial judge’s participation in

settlement discussions violated Rule 17.4(a), Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure and that “ABA Standards, state and federal

rules of criminal procedure, and state and federal judicial

procedure.” 

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his claim regarding the

trial judge’s participation in the settlement negotiations.

Petitioner has not alleged that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice will occur absent review of the merits of this claim.

Accordingly, the District Court need not consider the merits of

this claim. 

2. Petitioner maintains the trial court erred by

failing to expressly refer to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated

§ 13–604.01 during the plea colloquy.

A state prisoner may obtain a writ of habeas corpus

only upon a showing that he is being held in violation of the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. 2008); Engle, 456 U.S. at 119,

102 S. Ct. at 1567. Federal habeas relief is not available for

alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state

law, including a state’s statutes regarding the imposition of

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sentence. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 112 S. Ct. at 480;

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). 

To the extent that Petitioner asserts his sentence

violated his right to due process because it was improper

pursuant to Arizona statutory law or the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, Petitioner has not stated a claim for

federal habeas relief. See Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623

(9th Cir. 2002). Although Petitioner asserts that his right to

due process was violated because the state allegedly did not

follow its sentencing statutes, the characterization of this

claim in this fashion does not render it cognizable on federal

habeas review. See Cacoperdo v. Demonsthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507

(9th Cir. 1994); Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir.

2002). Because this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas

review, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

3. Petitioner maintains he is entitled to relief

because his sentences are unlawful under Arizona law, i.e.,

because a jury, rather than a judge, was required to find that

his crimes were “dangerous crimes against children”. 

Petitioner asserts that his sentence was enhanced based

on elements essential to the offense of conviction, i.e., the

fact that his victims were under the age of 15, in violation of

his constitutional right to an “adversarial process,” and his

rights to due process and equal protection. 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust a federal habeas

claim that his sentences violated his right to due process or

equal protection in the state courts. Petitioner asserted in

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the state courts that his right to have a jury determine the

“dangerous” nature of his offenses was violated. The state

court determined this claim was procedurally barred, i.e.,

precluded as waived, because Petitioner expressly waived his

right to a jury trial in the plea agreement. The state trial

court also concluded Blakely did not apply to Petitioner’s

claims regarding the “aggravation” of his sentences because

Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive statutory term. 

To the extent Petitioner might have presented his third

claim for federal habeas relief to the state courts as a claim

of the violation of a constitutional right, because the state

court found the claim procedurally barred, i.e., precluded as

waived pursuant to Arizona state law, the District Court may not

grant relief on the claim because the state court’s decision

declining review of the merits of the due process claim was

predicated on an adequate and independent state procedural bar.

Additionally, because Petitioner admitted to the facts

necessary to establish the predicate for his sentence, and

because he was sentenced to the stipulated presumptive term of

imprisonment, and because Petitioner admitted to prior

convictions, Petitioner’s case falls outside the requirements

for relief established by Blakely. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his federal habeas

claims by fairly presenting them to the state courts as federal

constitutional claims in a procedurally correct manner.

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the claims and has not

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shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from, his procedural

default of these claims. Because Petitioner has not shown cause

for, nor prejudice arising from, his procedural default of these

claims, the claims must be denied. Additionally, Petitioner

asserts claims which are not cognizable on habeas review because

he asserts violations of state procedural law in the context of

his plea and sentencing proceedings. Furthermore, the state

court’s decision denying post-conviction relief rested upon

adequate and independent state grounds for denying Petitioner’s

claims of constitutional violations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Duncan’s Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

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of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 20th day of May, 2009.

 

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