Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-02367/USCOURTS-alnd-5_15-cv-02367-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

LAUREN BURRUSS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:15-cv-2367-CLS

)

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF )

PUBLIC HEALTH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

amended complaint.1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move

to dismiss a complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with

Rule 8(a), which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

While that pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

1

 Doc. no. 27. 

FILED

 2016 Nov-17 PM 02:02

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 1 of 14
A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly,

550 U.S., at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked

assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at

557 (brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint astrue, we “are not bound to accept astrue a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8marks a notable and generous departure fromthe hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will, asthe Court of Appeals observed,

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on

its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

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has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis supplied, second and fourth alterations in

original, other alterations supplied). 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this case on December 31, 2015, asserting claims for race

discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”).2 The

defendants to plaintiff’s claims included: her former employer, the Alabama

Department of Public Health (“the Department”); Sherry Ford, her former supervisor;

Lawrence Robey, M.D., the County Health Officer; Karen Butler, the Department’s

Area Nursing Supervisor; and Meshonda Purdue, the Department’s Clerical

Supervisor.3 Defendants jointly answered the complaint on January 25, 2016.

4 This

2

See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at ¶¶ 57-83. 

3

Id. at ¶¶ 7-11. 

4

 Doc. no. 10 (Answer). 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 3 of 14
court entered a Scheduling Order on June 24, 2016,stating that “[n]o causes of action,

defenses, or parties may be added,” and establishing deadlines of November 4, 2016,

and December 5, 2016, for the completion of discovery and the filing of dispositive

motions, respectively.

5

 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for judgment

on the pleadings on September 29, 2016, asserting that plaintiff’s claims against the

individual defendants were not cognizable under Title VII.6 Plaintiff requested

permission to file an amended complaint in order to “clarify the claims against the four

individual Defendants in their individual capacity.”7 Plaintiff attached a copy of her

proposed amended complaint to her motion for leave, but the text of the attachment

was blurry.

8 Accordingly, this court entered an order on October 4, 2016, granting

plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, and ordering plaintiff to “file a clear copy of the

amended complaint appended to her motion for leave” by October 7.9 The court also

denied defendants’ motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, but without

prejudice to defendants’ right to refile the motion or another appropriate pleading in

5

 Doc. no. 14 (Scheduling Order), at ¶¶ 1-3 (alteration supplied). 

6

 Doc. no. 20. 

7

See doc. no. 22 (Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint), at ¶ 3. 

8

See doc. no. 22-1 (Proposed Amended Complaint). 

9

 Doc. no. 24 (October 4, 2016 Order), at 1.

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 4 of 14
response to the amended complaint.

10 Plaintiff filed a clear copy of the amended

complaint on October 5, 2016. The amended complaint named the same defendants

as the original complaint, but added a claim for “deprivation of rights” under 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

11

II. ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, an African-American female, holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Nursing

and is pursuing a Master’s Degree in the same field.

12 She began working for the

Madison County Health Department as a Staff Nurse in 1991.

13 During the early part

of 2015, she worked in the Madison County Health Department’s Women, Infant and

Children Program office.14

Plaintiff was away from work and out of town on February 27, 2015, when

someone at the Department’sCentral Office requested a patient chart that plaintiff had

been working upon. Plaintiff had placed the chart in a locked cabinet, as opposed to

its usual location, because the office closed early due to inclement weather the day

before she left town.

15 No one contacted plaintiff to ask her about the location of the

10

Id.

11

See doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint). 

12

Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. 

13

Id. at ¶ 17. 

14

Id. at ¶ 21. 

15

Id. at ¶ 18. 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 5 of 14
chart, even though the Department had her cell phone number, and she had been

contacted on her cell phone for work-related issues in the past.

16 As other employees

“searched for the chart, allegedly, they found paperwork in disarray in an old cubicle

that [plaintiff] previously used,” but no one gave plaintiff an opportunity to explain

any of the paperwork that was found.

17

 

As a result of the incident involving the patient file, plaintiff was reassigned to

an “open area information booth for the Madison County Health Department where

she would answer questions from the public and direct patients.”

18 Plaintiff believed

that assignment was intended to “demean and embarrass” her because “she was a

licensed RN delegated to menial duties.”19 She “voiced her concerns” about the

assignment to her supervisor, defendant Sherry Ford, who responded by reassigning

plaintiff “to the environmental health department where [plaintiff] was designated as

a file clerk and custodian, as her dutiesincluded filing records and cleaning offices.”20

Ford and defendant Karen Butler asked plaintiff to prepare a statement

regarding the circumstances that led to her reassignment on March 15, 2015.

21

In that

16

Id. at ¶ 19.

17

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 20 (alteration supplied). 

18

Id. at ¶ 21. 

19

Id. at ¶ 22. 

20

Id. at ¶ 23 (alteration supplied). 

21

Id. at ¶ 24. 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 6 of 14
statement, plaintiff “addressed how the shortage of nurses at the Madison County

Health Department lead [sic] to the loss of designated patient follow-up time which

decreased the quality of care and attention to patients.”

22 She also “addressed her

work load, and work history with the Madison County Health Department.”23

Thereafter, Butler initiated an investigation. Butler revealed to plaintiff “that she had

never come across a situation such as hers and was not sure how to investigate it.”24

Butler initially indicated that the investigation would be concluded by the end of that

week, but the investigation period was extended because Ford wasscheduled to be out

of the office on Thursday and Friday of that week.

25 Butler then turned the

investigation over to defendant Lawrence Robey, who, “without independent

investigation and with information from other nurses saying they had no experience

investigating this type of case, . . . communicated to [plaintiff] that she would likely

be terminated.”

26

 

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on April 3, 2015, alleging discrimination on the

22

Id. at ¶ 25. 

23

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 26. 

24

Id. at ¶ 27. 

25

Id. 

26

Id. at ¶ 28 (alteration supplied). 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 7 of 14
basis of race.27 After that, she “repeatedly asked her supervisors and others for a copy

of her evaluations, as well as the human resources procedure manual used by the

Madison County Health Department. Eventually, she was given a copy of the

employee handbook, but the entire section on disciplinary procedures had been

removed.”28

Ford and Robey met with plaintiff “in a dark environmental health employee

office” at the end of the workday on April 9, 2015.

29 They handed plaintiff a letter

informing her that she was being placed on mandatory annual leave for a period of ten

days pending an investigation into her workplace behavior.30 That initial mandatory

leave period was extended by an additional ten days on April 22, 2015. Plaintiff was

informed of the extension of her mandatory leave both by letter, and by a telephone

call from Ford and defendant Meshonda Purdue.31 Plaintiff now asserts that the

decision to place her on mandatory annual leave was not in accordance with the

Department’s Human Resources Procedures Manual.

32 Soon after the investigation

27

Id. at ¶ 29. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 8-9 (April 3, 2015 EEOC Charge). 

28

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 30. 

29

Id. at ¶ 31.

30

Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 10 (April 9, 2015 letter). 

31

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶¶ 33-34. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 11 (April

22, 2015 letter). 

32 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 47 (erroneously typed as 487). See also doc. no.

1-1, at ECF 22-31 (Human Resources Procedure Manual). 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 8 of 14
began, Ford packed up plaintiff’s personal belongings and informed off-site associates

that plaintiff had retired, even though she knew that was not true.33

Plaintiff received a “Notice of Pre-termination Conference” from Robey on

April 29, 2015. Robey informed plaintiff that the termination of her employment had

been recommended due to her violation of patient care protocols, and that a pretermination conference would be held to give her the opportunity to tell her side of the

story.34 The pre-termination conference was conducted on May 6, 2015, in

Montgomery, Alabama. Plaintiff and her attorney attended the conference, along with

Harrison Wallace, the Pre-Termination Conference Chairman, and the Department’s

General Counsel.

35

Plaintiff received a letter from Robey on May 8, 2015, informing her that her

employment was being terminated, and thatshe would not be recommended for rehire

with the Department.36

 She filed a second EEOC charge on May 20, 2015, alleging

both race discrimination and retaliation.

37

Plaintiff applied for a position as a Rehabilitation Staff Nurse for the

33

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 46. 

34

Id. at ¶ 35. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 12-15 (April 29, 2015 Notice of Pre-termination

Conference). 

35

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 36. 

36

Id. at ¶ 37. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 16 (May 8, 2015 Notice of Termination). 

37 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 38. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 3-5 (May 20,

2015 EEOC Charge). 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 9 of 14
Department, but she received a notice on June 23, 2015, stating that she was not

eligible for that position because she had been classified as not being recommended

for re-employment after losing her former position.

38

 

Plaintiff received a letter from the Alabama Board of Nursing on June 29, 2015,

informing her that the Board had received a complaint against her nursing license.39

Plaintiff’s attorney submitted responses to that notice on September 15, 2015, and

again on October 13, 2015.

40 Plaintiff learned on December 28, 2015 that the

investigation was still ongoing and had been turned over to a Nursing Consultant for

review.41

Plaintiff asserts that, while she still was employed by the Department, Ford

“created a hostile work environment by communicating with her staff in a demeaning

manner and by threatening staff, as well.”42 She also asserts that African-American

employees were treated differently than Caucasian employees.

43 Specifically,

“Caucasian staff had experienced errors and omissions concerning patient charts, but

38 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 39. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 17 (June 23,

2015 letter). 

39 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 40. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 18 (June 29,

2015 letter).

40 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶¶ 41-42. See also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 19-21

(September 15, 2015 and October 13, 2015 letters).

41

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 43. 

42

Id. at ¶ 45. 

43

Id. at ¶ 44. 

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their acts were not deemed to put patients at risk or in danger and were not placed on

mandatory annual leave nor terminated.”44 Additionally, “Caucasian staff with

substance abuse problems repeatedly put patient[s] at risk and in danger, but were not

faced with mandatory annual leave and/or termination.”45 Finally, while the

Department failed to post job openings for supervisory positions, plaintiff, who was

the most senior RN in her office, was forced to train a Caucasian staff nurse who

received positions as assistant supervisor and supervisor less than a year later.46

Plaintiff claims that she suffered: “financial loss and mental anguish due to her

lost wages and loss of health insurance while on Mandatory Annual Leave”;47

“financial loss because of [the Department’s] failure to post supervisory job

openings”;48and “great mental and emotional anguish . . . .”49 Her amended complaint

asserts claims for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation

pursuant to Title VII (Counts I-III), as well as “deprivation of rights” pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV). 

44

Id. at ¶ 49. 

45

Id. at ¶ 50 (alteration supplied). Plaintiff also more generally alleges that “other staff have

engaged in conduct that put patients at risk and in danger, but they were not subject to mandatory

annual leave and/or termination.” Id. at ¶ 51. 

46

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 52. 

47

Id. at ¶ 53.

48

Id. at ¶ 54 (alteration supplied).

49

Id. at ¶ 55 (ellipsis supplied). 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 11 of 14
III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII Claims Against Individual Defendants

Defendants move to dismiss all of plaintiff’s Title VII claims against individual

defendants Sherry Ford, Lawrence Robey, Karen Butler, and Meshonda Perdue

because “Title VII relief may be imposed only against an employer.”50 Plaintiff did

not dispute that point in her response brief,51

nor could she. It is well established that

“[t]he relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not [against] individual

employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.” Dearth v. Collins,

441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Hinson v. Clinch County Bd. of Education,

231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th

Cir. 1991)) (alterationsin Dearth, internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, all

of plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the individual defendants will be dismissed.

B. Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

As an initial matter, the court rejects defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s claim

for “deprivation of rights” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed as untimely. 

Even though the Scheduling Order deadline for adding parties and causes of action

50

 Doc. no. 27 (Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint), at 3. 

51

 Indeed, plaintiff explicitly acknowledged, albeit in a section heading, that the individual

defendants “may not be held personally liable pursuant to Title VII for acts done while operating in

their official capacities.” Doc. no. 29 (Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Amended Complaint), at 5 (boldface emphasis removed from original). 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 12 of 14
expired before plaintiff filed her amended complaint, the court granted plaintiff leave

to amend her pleading and directed her to file an amended complaint. Because the

amended complaint was filed pursuant to a court order, it was not untimely.

Even so, the § 1983 claimcannotsurvive defendants’motion to dismiss because

the amended complaint does not contain sufficient detail to determine the basisfor the

claim. The EleventhCircuit has clearly held that “an allegation of a Title VII violation

cannot provide the sole basisfor a § 1983 claim.” Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d

865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Allen v. Denver Public School Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 982

(10th Cir. 1991); Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1233 (8th Cir. 1986)).

Instead, “[t]o prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate both (1)

that the defendant deprived her of a rightsecured under the Constitution or federal law

and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state law.” Arrington, 139

F.3d at 872 (citing Willis v. University Health Services, Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th

Cir. 1993)) (alteration supplied). Here, plaintiff allegesthat defendants subjected her

to “the deprivation of her rights secured by the Constitution,”52but, other than by

referencing her Title VII claims, she does not state which rights have been violated. 

Plaintiff’s vague reference to violated “rights” is notsufficiently detailed to satisfy the

applicable pleading standards. Accordingly, her § 1983 claim will be dismissed. 

52

 Doc. no. 25 (Amended Complaint), at ¶ 84. 

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Case 5:15-cv-02367-CLS Document 33 Filed 11/17/16 Page 13 of 14
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and her Title

VII claims against the individual defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice. Assuch,

all claims against defendants Sherry Ford, Lawrence Robey, Karen Butler, and

Meshonda Perdue are DISMISSED with prejudice. The only claim that remains

pending is plaintiff’s Title VII claim against defendant State of Alabama Department

of Public Health.

 DONE this 17th day of November, 2016.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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