Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07066/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 8, 1996 Decided March 4, 1997

No. 96-7066

WASHINGTON LEGAL CLINIC FOR THE HOMELESS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

MARION S. BARRY, JR., MAYOR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv00691)

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the

brief were Charles F.C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation

Counsel. Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered an appearance.

Katherine D. McManus argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Peder A. Garske

and Martin F. Cunniff. Mark D. Wegener entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: The central question in this case is whether District of Columbia law

creates a constitutionally protected entitlement to emergency family shelter. Although D.C. law

establishes objective eligibility criteria for homeless families seeking shelter, for a combination of

reasons we hold that homeless families lack an expectation of shelter sufficient to create a property

right: the city does not provide enough shelter to meet the needs of all eligible families, it leaves

allocation of limited shelter space among eligible families to the unfettered discretion of city

administrators, and nothing in District law prohibits administrators from allocating space in such a

way that not all eligible families receive shelter. Indeed, the city administered the family shelter

program just that way at the time thissuit was filed. We thus reverse the district court's due process

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 1 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ruling. We agree with the district court, however, that the city's policy allowing certain advocates

for the homeless to visit the Shelter Office waiting room only on Wednesday mornings and Tuesday

and Friday afternoons violates the First Amendment.

I

In 1984, District ofColumbia voters approved an initiative known asthe District ofColumbia

Right to Overnight Shelter Act, guaranteeing to "all persons in the District ... the right to adequate

overnight shelter." D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-601 (1988 Repl.). Three years later, the City Council

enacted the Emergency Shelter Services for Families Reform Amendment Act, authorizing creation

of a temporary shelter program for eligible homeless families. Id. § 3-206.3 (1988 Repl.) Known as

the Family Shelter Act, it required the Mayor to "claim federal financial participation to the extent

allowable by law for housing assistance and services to homeless families with minor children." Id.

§ 3-206.3(a).

After several lawsuits against the city for failing properly to administer its emergency shelter

programs produced huge contempt fines, see Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 151

(D.C. 1991), the CityCouncil, citing an "explosion" in costs associated with shelter programs, moved

to "limit specifically and define clearly the obligation ofthe District ofColumbia" under the Overnight

Shelter and Family Shelter Acts. Council of the District of Columbia, Comm. Report on Bill 8-156,

at 2, 14 (May 10, 1990). To accomplish this goal, the City Council amended both Acts to provide

that nothing in either "shall be construed to create an entitlement in any homeless person or family

to overnight shelter." District of Columbia Emergency Overnight Shelter Amendment Act of 1990,

D.C. Law 8-197, 37 DCR 4815 (1990) (codified as D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-206.9(a) (1994 Repl.);

D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-609 (1994 Repl.)). 

Under the District's family shelter program, families are eligible for shelter if they are

homeless; if they can pay for shelter, or if not, if they receive vocational training or perform

community service in exchange for shelter; and if they have not occupied emergency family shelter

within the previous twelve months. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-601 (1994 Repl.). Section 3-605 of the

Overnight Shelter Act and District of Columbia Department of Human Services implementing

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 2 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

regulations establish additional eligibilitycriteria for familiesseeking shelter, including that applicants

must be current on city taxes, must not have been evicted or expelled from temporary family housing

or emergency shelter for drug-related reasons, and must not have been evicted from public housing

for failing to accept employment or training or for nonpayment of rent. Id. § 3-605(b); D.C. Mun.

Regs. tit. 29, § 2502 (1992). Shelter applicants must "provide any information requested by the

intake worker that is necessary to establish" their eligibility for emergency shelter, unless the

information is not "reasonably available." D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2503. Requested information

may include eviction or foreclosure notices, income statements, social security numbers for each

family member seeking shelter, and a statement of the reasons the family needs shelter, itself

encompassing eighteen subcategories of information. Id.

UntilMay1995, the cityoperated its emergencyfamilyshelter programthroughDHS's Office

of Emergency Shelter and Support Services. Although the District has since transferred the family

shelter program to the Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness, DHS retains

authority over the program. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the office administering the shelter

program as the "Shelter Office."

Because the city lacksspace to accommodate allfamiliesseeking shelter, and because neither

the Overnight Shelter Act nor itsimplementing regulations directs the Shelter Office how to allocate

available shelter, the Office has developed its own system for allocating shelter space among eligible

families. Under current procedures, when a homeless family first applies for shelter, the Shelter

Office screensthe familyto determine preliminarilywhether the familymeetsthe three basic statutory

eligibility requirements. If no eligibility problems appear, the family is placed on a waiting list,

assigned a number, and given a "document checklist" identifying the documents needed to verify

eligibility. The family is instructed to call the Shelter Office each day to learn whether its number has

been reached. Wait-list numbers are usually reached one to two months after families file their initial

applicationsfor "emergency" shelter. During this waiting period, about half of the applicant families

drop out of the process. When a family's wait-list number is reached, the Shelter Office reviews any

additional documentation supplied by the family and makes a final eligibility determination. Families

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 3 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

declared eligible then receive shelter.

Homeless families ruled ineligible for emergency shelter may obtain administrative review

within the Shelter Office, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2512.1, or a hearing before the District's Office

of Fair Hearings. D.C. CODEANN. § 3-606(a), (c) (1994 Repl.); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2511.5.

Almost all families appealing adverse eligibility determinations are represented by counsel, and the

great majority of cases appealed to the Office of Fair Hearings are resolved informally and quickly.

Trial Tr. Vol. IV (May 25, 1995) at 564-65. Unsuccessful applicants may appeal to the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2513.1.

The Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, a nonprofit organization providing services

to the District's homeless population, assistsfamiliesin the shelter application process. Joined by staff

members, a privately run shelter, and several homeless or recently homeless mothers, the Clinic filed

this suit in 1993, alleging that the city was violating federal and D.C. law and the Fifth Amendment's

due process and equal protection guarantees by imposing upon applicants unnecessary and

burdensome documentation requirements and by failing to afford disappointed applicants timely

hearings.

Relying on the First Amendment, the complaint also challenged District policy limiting Clinic

staff access to the Shelter Office waiting room. Although the policy allows advocates having

pre-existing relationships with shelter applicantsto be in the waiting room whenever open, the policy

limits advocates without clients, i.e., "unsolicited advocates," to one at a time and onlyonWednesday

mornings and Tuesday and Friday afternoons. Letter from Jesse P. Goode, Senior Attorney, District

ofColumbia Department of Human Services, to Katherine D. McManus, Howrey&Simon 1-2 (Mar.

18, 1993).

Shortly after the suit wasfiled, the district court scheduled a hearing on plaintiffs' request for

a preliminary injunction to halt alleged violations of a federal emergency assistance programin which

the District participated. See Compl. at 43-44. On the eve of the hearing, the city withdrew from the

program. When the district court then denied preliminary injunctive relief as moot, Washington Legal

Clinic for the Homeless, Inc. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 93-0691, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. July 30, 1993),

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 4 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding a request for a declaratory judgment that by opting out of

federal assistance for the family shelter program, the District had violated D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-

206.3(a), which requiresthe Mayor to seek federalfinancial assistance for housing and supplemental

services to homeless families. See supra p. 3.

Over the next three years, the district court rendered the decisions at issue in this appeal.

First, declaring the Shelter Office waiting room a nonpublic forum and finding that the city had

offered no reasonable grounds for restricting access to the waiting room to only three periods per

week, the court ruled that this portion of the District's access policy violated the First Amendment.

Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, Inc. v. Barry, Civ. No. 93-0691, slip op. at 20, 23

(D.D.C. Mar. 27, 1995) ("WLCH I"). However, concluding that the District "reasonably determined

that it cannot accommodate innumerable additional individualsin [the Shelter Office waiting room],"

the court sustained the limit to one unsolicited advocate at a time. Id. at 22.

Next, the district court ruled that by opting out of federal funding for the city's emergency

shelter services, the Mayor had violated D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-206.3(a). Washington Legal Clinic

for the Homeless, Inc. v. Barry, Civ. No. 93-0691 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1995) ("WLCH II"). The court

reached this result even though, again acting through emergency legislation, the District amended

section 3-206.3(a) and related code provisions to make the city's participation in federal emergency

assistance programs discretionary, rather than mandatory. Id. at 1-2. "The fact remains," the district

court concluded, "that from July 1, 1993 [when the city opted out of the federal program] until April

11, 1995 [when the city changed the statute], defendant was in violation of § 3-206.3(a) of the

District of Columbia Code." Id. at 2.

Third, the district courtruled that plaintiffs had a constitutionallyprotected right to emergency

shelter. WLCH I at 16-17. Following a bench trial, the court held that two aspects of the District's

documentation requirementsthe city's failure to define "reasonably available" documentation and

to coordinate with other DHS offices to assemble documentationviolated plaintiffs' due process

rights. Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, Inc. v. Barry, 918 F. Supp. 440, 457 (D.D.C.

1996) ("WLCH III"). The court also ordered the city to develop swifter appeal procedures. Id. at

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 5 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

459. Finally, finding no discrimination in the wait-list system for allocating emergency shelter, the

court entered judgment for the District on plaintiffs' equal protection claim. Id. at 461.

Only the city, challenging the district court's due process and First Amendment rulings, has

appealed. Because the district court's rulings are either conclusions reached on summary judgment

or conclusions of law following trial, our review is de novo. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536,

541 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (questions of law reviewed de novo ); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (de novo review on summary judgment).

II

Before addressing the district court's due processruling, we emphasize what is at stake in this

case and what is not. The quantity of emergency shelter available to homeless families is not at issue.

The District does not attempt to supply shelter to all eligible families, nor does the Clinic seek the

creation of additionalshelterspace. Because the city's emergency family shelters operate at capacity,

a fact counsel for the District confirmed at oral argument, this case is not about available beds going

empty while homeless families pursue Kafkaesque application procedures. Nor is this case about

discrimination in the shelter allocation process; the district court found that the city's current

procedures satisfy the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, a decision the Clinic does not

appeal. The sole question before us is whether D.C. laws and regulations governing the city's

emergency family shelter program create a constitutionally protected property interest in shelter,

which in turn would require that the District's allocation and appeal procedures satisfy due process

standards.

We begin with familiar principles. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits the

District ofColumbia from depriving persons of "property, without due process oflaw." U.S.CONST.

amend. V. Individuals are entitled to due process, however, only if they have a constitutionally

protected property interest. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 260 (1987); Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). To have a property interest in a government benefit, "a

person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for [the benefit]. He must have more

than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 6 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Entitlements derive from "an independent source such as state law," i.e.,

statutes or regulations "that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those

benefits." Id.

To determine whether a particular statute creates a constitutionally protected property

interest, we ask whether the statute or implementing regulations place "substantive limitations on

official discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Tarpeh-Doe v. United States,

904 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Statutes or regulations limit official discretion if they contain

" "explicitly mandatory language,' i.e., specific directivesto the decisionmaker that if the regulations'

substantive predicates are present, a particular outcomemustfollow." Kentucky Dep't of Corrections

v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983)).

In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), for example, the Supreme Court held that because

persons meeting state AFDC eligibility standards automatically qualified for benefits, eligible

individuals had a protected property interest in the receipt of the benefits. Where, however, the

legislature leaves final determination of which eligible individuals receive benefits to the "unfettered

discretion" of administrators, no constitutionally protected property interest exists. Roth, 408 U.S.

at 567; see Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 462 (7th Cir. 1984) (where landlord participating in

federal housing subsidy program has discretion to judge whether an eligible applicant is "otherwise

acceptable," no property interest in housing subsidy).

Applying these principles, we ask whether homeless families meeting the statutory

qualifications for shelter are entitled to receive it. If so, as in Goldberg, eligible families would have

a constitutionally protected property interest in shelter. 397 U.S. at 262. But if not entitled to shelter

because administrators have discretion to choose among otherwise eligible families, they would have

no constitutionally protected interest. See Eidson, 745 F.2d at 464.

As the Clinic observes, the eligibility standards set forth in the Overnight Shelter Act and its

regulations are "fact based, objective criteria .... [which] do not involve intangible assessments or

discretionary factors." Appellees' Br. at 20. If all families meeting these criteria received shelter, we

would agree with the district court and our dissenting colleague that applicants have a constitutionally

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 7 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

protected entitlement to shelter. But that is not this case.

All parties agree and the City Council has recognized that the District has insufficient

resources to provide shelter for all eligible families. Indeed, the supply of emergency shelter has

dropped precipitously, from 495 spaces in late 1994 to only 139 in May 1995. WLCH III, 918 F.

Supp. at 447. Moreover, neither District statutes nor implementing regulations set forth standards

or proceduresfor allocating scarce shelterspace among eligible families. The city has left that matter

to the discretion of the Shelter Office. When appellants filed this lawsuit, for example, the Shelter

Office used a first-come, first-served system for allocating emergency shelter. Homeless families

camped out overnight outside the Shelter Office attempting, often fruitlessly, to secure priority in the

application process. WLCH III, 918 F. Supp. at 446. Families found eligible for shelter on one day

but turned away for lack of space returned to square one the next morning, competing for priority

with other rejected families as well as with families entirelynew to the process. Id. Under thissystem,

not all eligible families received shelter. As in Thompson, although the "substantive predicates"

conferring eligibility might be present, a "particular outcome" might not follow. 490 U.S. at 463.

In early 1994, the Shelter Office abandoned the first-come, first-served system, replacing it

with the wait-list procedures currently in effect. Now, all eligible families remaining on the waiting

list eventually receive shelter. If this procedure were mandated by statute or regulation, eligible

homeless families might well have a constitutionally protected entitlement to shelter, even though

delay between application and shelter would almost always occur.

But D.C. law does not mandate the wait-list system. Like the pre-1994, first-come,

first-served system, the wait-list procedures are informaloffice policy, WLCH III, 918 F. Supp. at 445

& n.13, and nothing in governing statutes or regulations prohibits the Shelter Office from again

changing its allocation procedures. The Shelter Office could return to the first-come, first-served

daily system; it could give priority to families with infants or disabled children; or it could select

applicant families at random from a rolling eligibility list. See Appellant's ReplyBr. at 13-14. Under

the first and third options,some eligible familiesthose whose names were not calledwould never

receive shelter, at least as long as shelter supplies remain limited. Under the second option, families

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 8 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

having neither infant nor disabled children might or might not receive shelter. As these examples

illustrate, the Shelter Office is free to adopt an allocation system under which not all eligible families

receive emergency shelter. Indeed, the District candidly acknowledges its "indifferen[ce] to which

families, among those eligible for shelter, actually receive it." Appellant's Br. at 35. Under these

circumstances, we hold that eligible homeless families lack the "legitimate claim of entitlement"

necessary to create a constitutionally protected property right. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

Relying on traditional property law and citing contingent remainders, vested remainders

subject to defeasance, and executory interestsfor illustration, the dissent arguesthat a property right

can exist even though eligible families might not receive shelter. Dissent at 2-4. In the realm of real

property law, it is certainly true that improbability of vesting will not defeat a contingent future

interest in property. See id. at 3 nn.2-4. The question in this case, however, is not whether eligible

families have a legally enforceable future interest in emergency shelter, but whether they have a

constitutionally enforceable property right to emergency shelter. The common law of real property,

where uncertainty of future vesting merely reduces the value of property, does not answer that

question. Instead, we must look to principles of due process, where the uncertainty of shelter due

to the exercise of administrative discretion prevents the creation of a constitutionally protected

entitlement. The Supreme Court recognized a constitutionally protected property right in Goldberg

because administrators had no discretion in the allocation of AFDC benefitsall statutorily eligible

individuals automatically received benefits. 397 U.S. at 262. By comparison, relying on Olim, 461

U.S. at 249, we held in Tarpeh-Doe that the regulations at issue there "fail[ed] to restrict sufficiently

the decisionmaker's discretion to generate a protected [liberty or property] interest implicating the

due process clause." 904 F.2d at 723.

Pointing to procedures available to eligible families denied shelter, the dissent arguesthat the

Shelter Office hasinsufficient discretion to defeat a constitutionally protected property right. Dissent

at 5-6. Acting on behalf of its clients, the Clinic regularly uses those procedures, often successfully,

to challenge administrative determinations ofineligibility. See supra p. 5. Such procedures, however,

do not restrict the discretion the City Council has left to administrators to select the method of

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 9 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

allocating scarce shelter space among eligible families, and it isthe presence of that discretion which

precludes a finding of an entitlement to emergency shelter. That eligible families reaching the top of

the wait-list now receive shelter is of no constitutional significance because the Shelter Office can

change its procedurestomorrow. See White v. Office of Personnel Management, 787 F.2d 660, 666

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (disappointed applicant for administrative law judge position had no property

interest in spot at top of selection register; government could change its procedures without prior

notice and hearing). The dissent views this as an "extreme notion," Dissent at 13, but the notion is

not ours. The District has chosen to leave just this kind of discretion in the hands of its

administrators.

We agree with the dissent that in certain circumstances property rights may arise from

administrative "rules or understandings." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.

593, 599-601 (1972); see Dissent at 9-11. Equally clear, however, administrative actions may not

create property rights where that result would "contravene the intent of the legislature." Carducci

v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Here, the City Council's intent is plain: "Nothing in

this chaptershall be construed to create an entitlement in any homeless person or family to emergency

shelter...." D.C. Code § 3-206.9(a); see also id. § 3-609 (same). While we doubt that blanket

"no-entitlement" disclaimers can by themselves strip entitlements from individuals in the face of

statutes or regulations unequivocally conferring them, the District's "no-entitlement" disclaimer

reinforces our conclusion that District ofColumbia law, byleaving allocation oflimited shelter among

eligible families to administrative discretion, creates no constitutionally protected entitlement to

emergency shelter. Moreover, outside the employment context, we have found no decision of the

Supreme Court or of this Circuit holding that administrative rules or understandings existing wholly

apart from legislation or regulations may create a property interest. We are not surprised by the lack

of such decisions. In the absence of special circumstances neither alleged nor present in this case,

such as where reliance on administrative action creates contractual responsibilities, obligations

enforceable against the public fisc, i.e., entitlements, may arise only from the people acting through

their legislators, not from administrative fiat. See Carducci, 714 F.2d at 176-77.

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 10 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

III

We turn next to the district court's ruling invalidating the city's policy allowing unsolicited

advocates to visit the Shelter Office waiting room only during certain hours of the week. The Clinic

does not challenge the district court's finding that the Shelter Office is a nonpublic forum, nor its

ruling sustaining the limit to one unsolicited volunteer at a time.

In a non-public forum, restrictions on First Amendment activity "need only be reasonable."

United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)); Perry Educ.

Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). According to the District, limiting

unsolicited advocates' accessto the Shelter Office waiting roomprevents overcrowding in the waiting

roomand protects vulnerable familiesfromdisruptive solicitation by advocatesfor the homeless. We

think neither rationale supports the policy. Sustained by the district court and unappealed by the

Clinic, the policy limiting unsolicited volunteers to one at a time in the waiting room completely

guards against overcrowding. And unless applicants for shelter are somehow less vulnerable on

Wednesday mornings and Tuesday and Friday afternoons, we fail to see how barring access during

the rest of the week enhances client protection. If the Shelter Office is so concerned about

overcrowding and client vulnerability, moreover, we do not understand why it does not enforce the

challenged policy; according to the record, the Office currently allows unsolicited advocates in the

waiting roomwhenever the Office is open. Appellant's Br. at 28 n.7. Because the District has offered

no tenable reasons for restricting access to the Shelter Office waiting room to only three periods per

week, we agree with the district court that the restriction violates the First Amendment.

As an alternative justification for its policy, the District argues that because the Supreme

Court has sustained total bans on financial solicitation in airports and outside post offices, see

International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683-84 (1992);

Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 734, its partial ban on access to the waiting room likewise satisfies

constitutionalstandards. Although we doubt the validity of this argumentit disregards the obvious

difference between soliciting money and offering assistance to homeless familieswe need not

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 11 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

address it. Whether partial or total, limitations on First Amendment activity in a nonpublic forum

must be reasonable. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. The District offers no justification at all for a total

ban and, as we have held, its reasons for the partial ban are unconvincing.

IV

In a footnote to the "Conclusion" section ofits brief, the District makes one finalrequest: that

we vacate the district court's declaratory judgment that the city violated D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-

206.3(a), requiring it to "claim federal financial participation to the extent allowable by law for

housing assistance and services," from July 1, 1993, until April 11, 1995. Contrary to FED. R. CIV.

P. 28(a)(3) and D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1)(B), however, the District did not include this argument in its

statement ofissues under review. Appellant's Br. at 2. Moreover, the District offers only bare-bones

arguments to support its request. Id. at 40-41 n.10. Appellees responded to the District's footnote

with a terse footnote of their own on the last page of their brief. Appellees' Br. at 38 n.11. The

District's reply brief is silent on the issue. Because the District raises this issue in "such a cursory

fashion," we decline to resolve it. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685,

697 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (when appellant "content[s] itself with conclusory assertions" and appellees

"d[o] not address the merits of the claim at all," court normally will not address claim); see also

Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 749 F.2d 856, 859 n.6 (D.C.

Cir. 1984) (declining to resolve issue "on the basis of briefing which consisted of only three sentences

... and no discussion of the relevant statutory text, legislative history, or relevant case law").

V

We reverse the district court'sruling that District law creates a property interest in emergency

family shelter and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We affirm the

district court's conclusion that the policy limiting unsolicited advocates' access to the Shelter Office

waiting room to certain times of the week violates the First Amendment.

So ordered.

WALD, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: I part from the majority on the issue of whether

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 12 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1After articulating these principles, the Court applied them to deny a professor at a state

university any "property" interest in continued employment at the university, because the terms of

his appointment specifically provided that his employment would terminate on a fixed date, and

made no mention of renewal. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. 

families eligible for emergency shelter under the District's laws and regulations have a "property

interest" which triggerssome formof procedural protection under the FifthAmendment Due Process

Clause. I agree with the district court that families who meet the threshold eligibility requirements

of the statute and whose place on the waiting list has been reached are entitled to some modicum of

procedural due process by virtue of the statutory mandate of the program, and the Shelter Office's

policyand practice in the administration ofthe program. Thus I respectfully dissent from that portion

of the majority opinion finding no entitlement worthy of procedural protection.

In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Supreme Court defined the parameters

of Fifth Amendment "property interests" to incorporate the fundamental tenets of the "ancient

institution of property." Id. at 577. According to these enduring principles, a person has no

"property" interest in a thing simply because he has an "abstract need or desire for it," or a "unilateral

expectation of it." Id. Rather, he must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement to it," id. at 577; a

claim based on some "rule[ ] or understanding[ ]" that "secure[s]" the benefit for the claimant and

supports his claim of entitlement. Id. Thus it is common ground that a statute declaring that people

meeting certain eligibility criteria will receive a government benefit secures the benefit for those

people, just as a blanket of common law rules secures more traditional forms of private property for

individuals. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). And correlatively the fact that only

those who meet specified criteria are entitled to the benefit does not mean that due process doesn't

enter the picture until eligibility has been conclusively proved, since this approach would deny the

very procedures needed to demonstrate that a property interest exists in the first place. See id.

("[T]he welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly ... had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within

the statutory terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a right to a hearing at which they might

attempt to do so."); see also Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1979) (applicantsfor public

assistance have a property interest in the benefit).1

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 13 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2Contingent remainders are remainders (future interests in someone other than the transferor

or his successor in interest that take effect at the termination of a prior estate) that are subject to

some condition precedent other than the termination of all prior estates. See AMERICAN LAW OF

PROPERTY §§ 4.25, 4.36. Thus if A conveys property "to B for life, and if C survives B and lives

to attain the age of twenty-one, then to C and his heirs," C has a contingent remainder. See id. at

§ 4.36. 

The Roth Court's distinction between "abstract need[s] or desire[s]" or "unilateral

expectation[s]," on the one hand, and "legitimate claim[s] of entitlement" on the other, mirrors the

old common law distinction between "bare expectancies," which are not recognized as legitimate

property, and future interests, which are. See LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF

FUTURE INTERESTS § 391 (2d ed. 1956) (distinguishing future interests from "bare expectancies");

1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.1 (A. James Casner ed., 1st ed. 1952) (same); see also Gregory

S. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional Law: The Ideology of the

Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1570-71 (1982). The clearest example

of the former is an apparent or presumptive heir who has a "unilateral expectation" of inheriting; this

bare expectancy is like a fish that one hopes to catch, or a bird in the bushit is not property. The

concept of property exists to "protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives," Roth,

408 U.S. at 577, not to enable people to claim "ownership" of whatever they think they deserve. On

the other hand traditional property law readily acknowledges that, if there is some formal statement

or understanding establishing that a person can expect a benefit in the future provided that specified

contingencies are satisfied, that person does have a property interestspecifically, a future

interestin the benefit, even if the specified contingencies may never occur. Although the privilege

of possession or enjoyment is deferred for the holder of a future interest, it is "of the essence" that

such an interest "is property which now exists." See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.1, at 405.

Examples ofsuch future interests are contingent remainders,2vested remainders subject to complete

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 14 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

3Vested remainders subject to complete defeasance are remainders that are vested (i.e., that

become a present estate whenever and however the preceding estates terminate) and that are

subject to termination on conditions that may occur before, at, or after the termination of the prior

estates. See id. § 4.35. If O conveys property "to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs, but if B

die without leaving any children him surviving, then to C and his heirs," B has a vested remainder

subject to complete defeasance. See id.

4Executory interests are future interests in a transferee that cut off another's vested interest

immediately upon the occurrence of a specified condition or event. See id. § 4.53. If A conveys

property "to B and his heirs, but if B die without leaving children him surviving, then to C and his

heirs," C has an executory interest. See id. § 4.55. 

5The majority makes the unsupported assertion that these principles, however forceful they

may be "[i]n the realm of real property law," have no place in the inquiry into whether a "property

interest" protected by the Constitution exits. Majority opinion at 10. But the Constitution

extends due process protection to deprivations of "property," an institution which is, and always

has been, defined and given substance by real property law. The Supreme Court recognized this

in Roth, explicitly incorporating "the ancient institution of property" into its discussion of the

parameters of protected "property" interests. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 

6To be eligible under the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions, families must be

homeless, must be willing to pay for shelter if able or to accept vocational training or perform

community services in exchange for shelter if unable, must not have occupied emergency family

shelter within the previous twelve months, must be current on city taxes, must not have been

evicted or expelled from temporary family housing or emergency shelter for drug-related reasons,

and must not have been evicted from public housing for failing to accept employment or training

without good cause, or for nonpayment of rent. See majority opinion at 3-4. 

defeasance,3and most executory interests4 where the right of actual possession is subject to

conditions which may or may not occur. See id. Although the holder of such a future interest may

realistically have a smaller probability of ever gaining possession of the benefit than the holder of a

"bare expectancy," the former's interest receives higher priority in the eyes of the law because unlike

the latter's it is not merely subjective or "unilateral," but the product of a joint agreement with the

present owner.

Applying these bedrock principles of property law to the facts of this dispute,5I find myself

in disagreement with the majority's unequivocal statement that "eligible homeless families lack the

"legitimate claim of entitlement' necessary to create a constitutionally protected property right."

Majority opinion at 10 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577) (citation omitted). I believe that under the

Family Shelter Act as implemented by the Shelter Office, eligible homeless families6have precisely

the sort of future interest in emergency shelter that our legal traditions have long regarded as a

legitimate property interest. The statute and regulations defining the program and specifying the

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 15 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

criteria for eligibility secure the benefit for eligible families, even though they include a contingency

which is not certain to occur in the case of any individual eligible familythe availability of

emergency shelter to meet their need. To pursue the analysis a bit further: If, in a given year, the

District were to fund the emergency shelter program fully enough to reach all eligible families, then

no one suggeststhat each eligible familywould not receive emergencyshelterregardless ofthe degree

of discretion accorded to the Shelter Office over the intake procedure. In short, the administering

agency does not have discretion to deny emergency shelter to eligible families. If, as is the case now,

the amount ofshelter available regularly fallsshort ofthe need, manystatutorily-eligible families must

wait untiltheir interestsripen into rights of present possession, just as holders of other future interests

wait forspecified contingenciesto occursuch that theymaytake possession ofmore traditionalforms

of property. As with almost any government largesse or "new property," see Goldberg, 397 U.S. at

262 n.8, there is the additional understanding that the government may by legislation eliminate the

benefit programentirely in the interim. In Goldberg, however, the SupremeCourt implicitly held that

this inherent power of government to repeal or modify legislative programs does not preclude a

potential government benefit from constituting an entitlement that triggers due process protections

while the program is in effect. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 ("[welfare benefits] are a matter of

statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.") (citing Charles A. Reich, The New

Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)).

It is extremely important, then, in any due process entitlement analysisto distinguish between

the uncertainty of public shelter stock, which makes the eligible families' interest in the shelter a

contingent future interest, and whatever discretion has been delegated to the Shelter Office to decide

the priority in which individual eligible families will be assigned available shelter. The majority

suggests that the Shelter Office's discretion in determining the intake priority for eligible families is

utterly unconstrained, such that intake workers may simply choose their favorite eligible family

whenever a unit becomes available. But the majority's premise that the Shelter Office enjoys such

"unfettered discretion," majority opinion at 2, is in fact impossible to reconcile with the regulations

governing the administration of the shelter program. These regulations set out in detail the eligibility

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 16 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

7The procedures articulated by these regulations are fundamentally unlike those that this court

found insufficiently constraining to create a protected interest in Tarpeh-Doe v. United States,

904 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Cf. majority opinion at 11. In Tarpeh-Doe we reviewed the

denial of a claim brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which authorized but did not require

the heads of federal agencies to adjudicate the relevant claims. See id. at 721-22. The agency had

in fact issued regulations providing for the adjudication of such claims, but had incorporated

neither substantive criteria nor a requirement of any explanation or statement of reasons for

denialsa fact which this court singled out as "[s]ignificant[ ]." Id. at 722. In this case, the

regulations require a written decision based on evidence and conclusions of law supported by

citations, and specify only the eligibility criteria listed in the statute and regulations as reasons for

denial. In rejecting the claim to a protected interest made in Tarpeh-Doe, this court moreover

explicitly noted that no evidence regarding the agency's "past practice" in dealing with such claims

had been presented, and strongly suggested that such evidence might have required a contrary

holding. Id. at 724 ("It bears emphasis that we hold only that the language of the statutes and

regulations at issue does not, without more, support the district court's ruling [that a protected

interest existed].... It is possible, of course, for a legitimate expectation to arise based upon the

consistent practice of a decisional bodyeven in the absence of express regulatory language or in

the face of ostensibly contradictory agency policy statements.") (emphasis in original) (citing

Perry, 408 U.S. at 601-03). There is, of course, extensive record evidence in this case regarding

the Shelter Office's recent "consistent practice" of distributing shelter according to a "waiting list"

system. 

criteria, see D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2502, and specify that these criteria shall constitute the

grounds for the denial of shelter. See id. § 2510.1. Other than those denied shelter based on the

unavailability of housing resulting from funding limitations, see id. § 2511.2, any applicant family

denied shelter is entitled to notice, "both oral[ ] and in writing," of the reasons for the

denial"including reference to the law or regulations supporting the action." Id. § 2511.4. The

applicant family may request a "Fair Hearing," and may include in the request information that may

be pertinent to the denial. See id. § 2511.7. At the hearing, the applicant family is entitled to present

testimony, witnesses or other evidence, to cross-examine the District's witnesses, and to be

represented by counsel. See id. § 2511.10. When the hearing examiner issues a decision, she must

put it in writing, being careful to include findings of fact "based exclusively on evidence presented at

the hearing," and conclusions of law supported by appropriate citations. Id. § 2511.11. Familiesthat

fail to secure a favorable result from the Fair Hearing may appeal the final adverse decision to the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See id. § 2513.1.7If, as the majority postulates, an eligible

family that reached the top of the waitlist could be passed over for the next available unit pursuant

to the Shelter Office's inscrutable whim or "unfettered discretion," this extensive set of procedures

would be the cruellest of shams. If the Shelter Office had no "law or regulations" to cite in support

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 17 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

8Thus I obviously disagree with the majority's assertion that the intake procedures which the

Shelter Office institutes exist "wholly apart" from any law or regulation. Majority opinion at 12. 

Far from being "wholly apart" from the regulations, the implementation of an intake procedure

constraining "unfettered discretion" is the linchpin without which these regulations would be

rendered completely ineffectual. 

of its decision to deny them shelter, what earthly purpose would the "Fair Hearing" procedures and

review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals serve? In short, it is beyond my ken that the

District painstakingly drafted the blueprints for such an intricate structure of procedural protections

built atop the quicksand of "unfettered discretion."8

Even if the Shelter Office does have some degree of discretion to determine what system of

intake priorities it will use, that sort of administrative discretion is fundamentally and qualitatively

different from "unfettered discretion" to determine whether eligible families will receive shelter

regardless of its availability. I do not read the statute and regulations to accord the Shelter Office

any, let alone "unfettered," discretion of the latter type. Other courts have identified this distinction

as relevant in determining the existence of entitlements to due process procedures. In Eidson v.

Pierce, 745 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit ruled that holders of federal housing

subsidies had no propertyinterest in particular private housing units because the owners ofthose units

had complete discretion to turn away individual subsidy-holders for any reason or for no reason at

all, even when the subsidy-holders had stellar credit and references and an apartment stood empty.

See Eidson, 745 F.2d at 461. The Shelter Office, in our case, has no such absolute power to turn

away eligible applicants. While the Office presumably could change (and has in fact changed) from

a first-come-first-served to a waitlist system, and perhaps could change again to give priority to

different specific characteristics of needy families, the fact remains that if at any point in time there

is an available unit for an eligible family, the Shelter Office is without authority to turn that family

away. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2503 (1992) ("At the time ofinitial application for ... temporary

family housing services ... the Department shall inform the applicant that he or she is required to

provide documentation of eligibility ... The Department shall verify that an applicant is homeless ...

The Department shall provide an applicant family determined eligible for temporary family housing

a written referral to a designated temporary family housing facility.").

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 18 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Indeed, Eidson specifically noted the quintessential difference between programs that

distribute scarce benefits according to unfettered discretion and programs whereunder such benefits

are distributed according to preset eligibility criteria. Referring to their earlier decision in Davis v.

Ball Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 640 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1980), the Eidson court distinguished the

indigent hospital care program at issue in Davis by observing that "[i]f the patient established facts

showing his or her eligibility, and if the hospital had not yet met itsfinancial obligationsforthe year,

then the patient was entitled to the benefits" under the hospital'sfirst-come-first-served intake system.

Eidson, 745 F.2d at 462 (emphasis added). Thus "a hearing in Davis could establish entitlement,"

while a hearing for subsidy-holders turned away by private landlords could not. See id. Similarly in

our case, if shelter is available and under the existing allocation system no other eligible applicant

family has a higher priority, some form of due process procedure would have the practical

consequence of ensuring that an eligible applicant family would receive the shelter.

The unfortunate reality that the number of eligible families currently exceeds the number of

available shelter units does indeed prevent many eligible families from receiving shelter, but by itself

the improbability that a future interest in property will ever vest has never turned cognizable property

interests into noncognizable "bare expectations." For example, the holder of a future interest which

trails behind a series of prior life interests may, as a practical matter, have scant chance of ever

coming into possession of the property, but he nonetheless holds a legally recognizable interest in the

property. Similarly, individual eligible families may have little chance of receiving shelter, but this is

essentially a function of the project's limited funding. One need only conjure up a situation in which

available shelter units outnumber eligible applicants to realize that the Shelter Office's discretionary

allocative power is not of the sort that removes the applicants' claims from the realm of property

interests. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text; see also Eidson, 745 F.2d at 462; cf. Ressler

v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982) (persons within the "class ofindividuals" intended to benefit

from a rent subsidy program have a property interest in the subsidy); Vandermark v. Housing Auth.

of York, 663 F.2d 436 (3rd Cir. 1981) (applicants for housing subsidy "certificates" have a property

interest in the certificates); Baker v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1982)

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 19 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

(same).

Accordingly, because the interests of eligible familiesfallsquarelywithin the realmofinterests

traditionally recognized under the common law of property, families have a right to some due process

protection in the intake procedure which determines their eligibility; that right is "triggered" by the

nature of the District's shelter program itself, and by the regulations implementing the program.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972),

overruled on other grounds by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), that traditional notions of

propertydo not, byexcluding "mere subjective "expectanc[ies]'," id. at 603, preclude individualsfrom

claiming a property interest in a benefit based on the "policies and practices" of the institution

controlling the distribution of the benefit. Id.; see also Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 904 F.2d 719,

724 (1990); Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 131 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Institutional "policies and

practices" that may create procedural entitlements need not be enshrined in any statute, rule, or

regulation; in fact they need not even be written down. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 ("[T]here may

be an unwritten "common law' in a particular university that certain employees shall have the

equivalent of tenure."). But in fact, the Waiting List policy is "written down"; it is incorporated into

a form that the Shelter Office distributes to all applicant families who have passed a preliminary

eligibility determination, that tells them where they are on the waiting list. See Exhibits Volume 1 at

3065 (form bearing the heading "FAMILY SHELTER WAITING LIST IDENTIFICATION

FORM," with a space for the applicant family's "Waiting List number"). What a travesty it would be

if the Shelter Office could distribute such Waiting List placements and then blatantly ignore them in

handing out shelter to the most impoverished segment of our community. No one has suggested that

such a practice would comply with the statute and regulations governing the administration of the

shelter program.

Nor can I agree that the Shelter Office's current Waitlist Policy is incapable of giving rise to

an entitlement because "the Shelter Office can change its procedures tomorrow." Majority opinion

at 11. The same of course could have been said of the alleged "common law" tenure system at issue

in Perry, which theCourt thought might wellbe entrenched enough to create reasonable expectations

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 20 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

9The Court affirmed the appeals court's remand, to give the respondent "an opportunity to

prove the legitimacy of his claim of such entitlement in light of "the policies and practices of the

institution.' " Perry, 408 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted). 

10Although the factual scenario in White v. Office of Personnel Management, 787 F.2d 660

(D.C. Cir. 1986), was somewhat similar to this case, I do not think the White decision's cursory

rejection of a due process claim which the plaintiff raised only in his reply brief bars us from

finding a property interest in this case. Cf. majority opinion at 11 (citing White). In White, the

plaintiff's last-ditch argument apparently was based on his allegation that the elimination of a

selection register on which his name had been entered deprived him of his property interest in his

place on the selection register. See White, 787 F.2d at 665 ("In his reply brief and at oral

argument, White changed his strategy somewhat and asserted that he had been deprived of a

protected property interest. He argues that his spot on the selection register constituted such an

interest.") (emphasis added). Here eligible homeless families are not asserting a property interest

in their places on the waiting list, but rather a defeasible interest in the shelter itself. As I pointed

out earlier, this interest is capable of vesting as long as the allocation system remains in place. No

one suggests the agency cannot change that system through regularized procedures, just as OPM

did in the White case. But no such system change has taken place here, and the mere possibility

that it could does not divest the applicant family at the top of the list of its property interest. 

deserving of due process protection.9Institutional policies or patterns of official action may spawn

entitlements while they are in effect; it is their pervasive penetration into the day-to-day practice of

an institution and the expectations these practices raise in affected constituencies which is

determinative.10

When an alleged property interest is based in an institution's policy or practice, rather than in

a statute or regulation, a claim of entitlement may sometimes depend on the individual's own status

with regard to the relevant policy or practice. For example, the teacher claiming an entitlement to

tenure in Perry premised his claim both on the "common law" tenure system that he alleged had been

followed by the university and on the fact that he had been teaching in the institution long enough for

his tenure interest to have "vested" under that unwritten system. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 ("A

teacher, like the respondent, who has held his position for a number of years, might be able to show

fromthe circumstances of thisserviceand from other relevant factsthat he has a legitimate claim

of entitlement to job tenure.") (emphasis added). Similarly, it might be argued that any entitlement

created by the waitlist policy currently in effect does not "vest" until a family has reached a certain

status vis-a-vis the waitlist such that specific shelter is available to them if they meet eligibility

requirements. But even if that were true, eligible families would minimally have a property interest

of the Perry variety which "vests" at the point that they reach the top of the waitlist and a unit

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 21 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

11I do agree with the majority that the statute's disclaimer, "[n]othing in this chapter shall be

construed to create an entitlement in any homeless person or family to emergency shelter...." 

D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-609, does not by itself control the due process determination. See majority

opinion at 12. To the extent that this provision could be read as the City Council's attempt to

require this court to construe the Fifth Amendment in a particular way, it is of course without

effect. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the

province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Rather, the disclaimer is

more naturally read as the District's answer to an applicant family's argument that the failure to

provide enough shelter to reach all eligible families violates the terms of the statute. This is the

construction that the District itself has placed upon this provision, by implementing it in the form

of a regulation stating that "[e]ligibility for temporary housing ... does not entitle a homeless

person to shelter...." D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2500.3 (1992). (Because I concede that the

statute does not require the District to provide a quantity of shelter sufficient to reach all eligible

families, I am certainly not suggesting that eligible families hold an "obligation[ ] enforceable

against the public fisc." Majority opinion at 12.) Furthermore, a Perry-type entitlement would

not violate the terms of the statutory disclaimer, because such entitlements spring from

institutional policies and practices, rather than from the statute alone. The disclaimer only seeks

to prevent anything "in th[e] chapter" from being construed as creating an entitlement to shelter. 

becomes available for their occupancy. Because the Shelter Office's current policy and practice is to

conduct a final eligibility determination for a family only when a unit becomes available and that

family is at the top of the waitlist, see majority opinion at 4, families that have ascended to that

pinnacle and can demonstrate their eligibility clearly have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the

available unit. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 602. Indeed the existence of an appeal procedure to control

denials of shelter following such determinations attests to the District's acknowledgment that such

families have a reasonable expectation ofshelter. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2511.1 (1992) ("Any

applicant ... who is aggrieved by the Department's decision to deny ... temporary family housing ...

has a right to a fair hearing from the Department's Office of Fair Hearings, except [if the denial is

based on the unavailability of shelter resulting from funding limitations].").11

Finally, it is useful to reiterate that the "entitlement" we are debating here is a far cry fromany

right to emergency shelter "on demand"; it is nothing more than an interest in shelter which I find

sufficiently substantial to implicate the constitutional requirement of regularized procedures in the

allocation of what shelter is available to eligible families. The majority seems peculiarly taken with

what I regard as an extreme notionthat the statute and implementing regulations permit the Shelter

Office on a whimor caprice to disclaimallstatementsit has made to applicant familiesregarding their

priority for receiving shelter pursuant to an intake system that has been in place for months, and

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 22 of 23
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

12In brief, I would affirm the district court's holding that the failure to define criteria

establishing which documents are to be considered "reasonably available," and the essentially

arbitrary nature of the appeals process, violate the requirements of due process. See Washington

Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 918 F. Supp. 440, 456-59 (D.D.C. 1996). 

perhaps even years, and either announce with no notice or formalprocedure a new "allocation scheme

for the day" or just choose their favorite families to receive the available shelter units. Nothing I can

find in the relevant legislation, regulations, or public statements put out bythe Shelter Office suggests

the existence of any such "unfettered discretion." In fact, the regulations mandate the opposite

conclusion, explicitly requiring the Shelter Office to deny shelter only to those found ineligible under

the law or those for whom no shelter is available.

Because I believe that families at the head of the waiting list who are found eligible for

emergency shelter have a constitutionally-protected property interest in available shelter which is

deserving of procedural due process protection, I would proceed to the issue ofwhether the District's

present intake procedures satisfy these strictures.12 On this due process issue, I respectfully dissent

from the majority opinion.

USCA Case #96-7066 Document #256421 Filed: 03/04/1997 Page 23 of 23