Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00463/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Olga Clarissa Ortega, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-463-TUC-JMR (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22). For the

following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, grant

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2007, Petitioner Olga Clarissa Ortega, through counsel, filed an

“Original Complaint for Writ in the Nature of Mandamus.” (Doc. No. 1) Petitioner seeks an

order from this Court directing the Social Security Administration to issue her a Social

Security card. 

In November 2007, Petitioner’s counsel moved to withdraw citing “irreconcilable

differences.” (Doc. No. 6) Attached to the Amended Motion to Withdraw was Petitioner’s

signed “Consent for Withdrawal” wherein she indicated that she would seek alternative

Case 4:07-cv-00463-JMR Document 24 Filed 09/19/08 Page 1 of 6
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counsel or represent herself. (Doc. No. 6-2) On November 7, 2007, the Court granted the

Amended Motion to Withdraw. (Doc. No. 8) 

On February 20, 2008, Petitioner appeared pro se for a scheduling conference and

requested an extension in order to obtain counsel. (See Doc. No. 17) The Court granted

Petitioner’s request, stayed the matter until June 2, 2008, and set a status hearing for June 2,

2008. (Id.) The Court provided that if Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice of appearance prior

to June 2, 2008, then the status hearing would be vacated. (Id.) Petitioner was also advised

that pro se litigants must abide by the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants and

failure to do so may result in dismissal of her case. (Id. at p.2) 

On June 2, 2008, Petitioner, acting pro se, and counsel for Respondents appeared at

the status hearing. Petitioner informed the Court that she had been unable to obtain counsel.

The Court stayed the matter until July 2, 2008 and set another status hearing for that date.

(Doc. No. 19)

On July 2, 2008, prior to the time set for the status hearing, Petitioner telephoned the

Court to state that she was unable to appear for the hearing due to a family medical

emergency and waived her appearance. (See Doc. No. 21) Respondents indicated that they

intended to a file Motion to Dismiss within the next thirty days. (Id.) The Court lifted the

previously entered stay. (Id.)

On July 25, 2008, Respondents filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 22)

Respondents argue that there is no case or controversy before the Court and that the

Complaint sets forth no grounds upon which the Court can exercise subject matter

jurisdiction. (Id.)

On July 28, 2008, the Court entered an Order informing Petitioner that, inter alia,

pursuant to L.R.Civ. 7.2(i) of the Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District

of Arizona, her failure to file a response to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss on or before

August 25, 2008 may be deemed as her consent to the granting of that Motion and that this

action may be dismissed without further notice. (Doc. No. 23)

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The time for Petitioner to respond to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss has passed and

Petitioner has not filed a response. Nor has she made any filing with the Court since

Respondents’ Motion was filed.

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to L.R.Civ. 7.2(i), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District

of Arizona, a party’s failure “to serve and file the required answering memoranda [to a

motion]...may be deemed a consent to the...granting of the motion and the Court may dispose

of the matter summarily.” L.R.Civ. 7.2(i). The Ninth Circuit has held that “failure to follow

a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52,

53 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 516 U.S. 838 (1995). In Ghazali, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

Nevada district court’s dismissal of an action pursuant to a local rule similar to L.R.Civ.

7.2(i) where the pro se plaintiff failed to file an opposition to the defendant’s motion to

dismiss. Id. The Ghazali court noted that the trial court, in exercising its discretion to

dismiss the action, is “required to weigh several factors: `(1) the public’s interest in

expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of

prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.’” Id. (quoting See Henderson v.

Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit “may affirm a dismissal

where at least four factors support dismissal...or where at least three factors ‘strongly’

support dismissal.’” Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998)).

A. Interest in expeditious resolution of litigation

“[T]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors

dismissal.” Id. 

B. Docket management

The trial court is in the best position to decide when delay in a particular case

interferes with docket management and the public interest. Id.; Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291

F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). “It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without

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being subject to routine noncompliance of litigants such as [Petitioner.]” Pagtalunan, 291

F.3d at 642. 

Petitioner’s failure to timely respond results in Petitioner controlling the pace of the

docket rather than the Court. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990 (court’s need to manage its

docket “strongly favor[ed] dismissal” where the plaintiff’s noncompliance “caused the action

to come to a complete halt” thus resulting in the plaintiff “controlling the pace of the docket

rather than the [c]ourt.”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (the court’s

interest in docket control “strongly support[ed]” dismissal where, inter alia, the plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the court’s order “consumed large amounts of the court’s valuable

time that it could have devoted to other major and serious criminal and civil cases on its

docket.”) This factor strongly favors dismissal.

C. Risk of prejudice to Defendant

“[T]he risk of prejudice to the [respondent] is related” to the strength of the

petitioner’s excuse for the default. Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991. See also Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d

at 643 (same). The Ninth Circuit has found that a “paltry excuse for” the petitioner’s noncompliance constitutes sufficient evidence to weigh strongly in favor of dismissal. Yourish,

191 F.3d at 991. 

Petitioner has not offered a reason for her failure to respond to Respondents’ Motion.

Like the plaintiff in Ghazali, Petitioner herein “was given ample time to respond to the

motion dismiss.” Ghazali, 46 F.3d. at 54. She has failed to provide any reason whatsoever

for her failure to respond to Respondents’ arguments that her case should be dismissed. On

the this record, the issue of prejudice tips the balance in favor of dismissal.

D. Public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits

“Public policy favors disposition of cases on the merits. Thus, this factor weighs

against dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643 (citing Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399). 

E. Availability of less drastic alternatives

“The district court need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally

dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson, 779

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F.2d at 1424 (citation omitted). The Court has warned Petitioner on more than one occasion

that pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure and that her failure to comply with

the rules or the Court’s orders may result in dismissal. (See Doc. Nos. 11 at p.5, 17 at pp.1-2)

Additionally, the Court specifically warned Petitioner of the consequences of her failure to

respond to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 23) Petitioner’s failure to respond

despite the Court’s express warning of the consequences supports the conclusion that

imposition of less drastic sanctions would not be beneficial. See Henderson, 779 F.2d

1421(affirming dismissal where plaintiff failed to meet scheduling deadlines despite court’s

express warning of consequences); Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 (“Moreover, our decisions also

suggest that a district court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will

result in dismissal can satisfy the `consideration of [less drastic sanctions]’requirement.”).

 Indeed, in such a case as this, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed dismissal. Ghazali, 46 F.3d 52.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court is not unsympathetic to Petitioner’s pro se status. Nonetheless, it is wellsettled that "[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other

litigants." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 54

(recognizing that "pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure" when affirming

dismissal of case for failure to comply with local rule under same factors considered herein).

Like the plaintiff in Ghazali, Petitioner herein “did not follow” the rules of procedure and,

thus, granting Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to L.R.Civ. 7.2(i) is appropriate.

See Ghazali, 46 F.3d 52. (“Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se

litigants are bound by the rules of procedure ...Ghazali did not follow them, and his case was

properly dismissed.”).

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

grant Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22) pursuant to L.R.Civ. 7.2(i), Rules of

Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona and dismiss this action.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 07-463-TUC-JMR.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 19th day of September, 2008.

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