Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02047/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02047-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ADAM G. KELLY, by and through

his Guardian Ad Litem PAULETTE

M. GRANDINETTI; RAPHELIA B.

GRANDINETTI,

NO. CIV. S-05-02047 FCD KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NORTH HIGHLANDS RECREATION &

PARK DISTRICT; CHRISTINE

BAGLEY; MARY WALL; HEATHER

HORNBACK; CHUCK BERNARDI; KAY

F. DAHILL; TRAVIS BILL; JOANNA

MCVAY; DIANE RICHARDS; ROBERT

LITTLE; ALAN MATRE; DOES 1

through 20,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants’ North

Highland Recreation & Park District (“District”), Joanna McVay

(“McVay”), Diane Richards (“Richards”), Robert Little (“Little”),

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1 Defendants Christine Bagley, Mary Wall, Heather

Hornback, Chuck Bernardi, and Travis Bill have not been served

with plaintiffs’ complaint and are therefore, not a part of the

motion. Due to the exclusion of defendant Bill in a footnote to

defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed Oct. 31, 2005 (Defs.’ Mot.

at 2 n.2), the court inadvertently included defendant Bill in its

prior order. However, there is no record that defendant Bill has

been properly served, and, as such, the court’s prior inclusion

of Bill as one of the moving defendants was in error. Defendants

Bagley, Wall, Hornback, Bernardi, and Bill are collectively

referenced herein as “Employee defendants.” 

2 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

3 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

4 The facts are taken from the allegations in plaintiffs’

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed Feb. 2, 2006.

2

Alan Matre (“Matre”) and Kay Dahill’s1 (“Dahill”) (collectively

“defendants”) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ seventh claim for

relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.2 For the reasons set forth below,3 defendants’ motion

is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff Adam G. Kelly was thirteen years old at the time

of the events in question. (Pls.’ 1st Am. Compl. (“FAC”), filed

Feb. 02, 2006, ¶ 7). Plaintiff Ralphelia B. Grandinetti is

Adam’s foster mother and legal guardian. (Id. ¶ 8). Adam is a

“special needs” foster child who has the mentality of a child of

six to eight years of age and who also has epilepsy and some

physical abnormalities. (Id. ¶ 7). Adam was a member of

defendant North Highlands Recreation & Park District’s

(“District”) swim team, the “Highlander Dolphins Swim Team.” 

(Id.) Defendants McVay, Richards, Little, Matre, and Dahill

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3

(collectively, “Board defendants”) are members of the North

Highlands Recreation and Park District Board. (Id. ¶ 16). 

On June 14, 2004, Adam was participating in his scheduled

swimming practice. (Id. ¶ 21). Plaintiffs allege that defendant

Christine Bagley (“Bagley”), a swim coach for the team, placed or

forced Adam to sit on a hot metal folding chair in direct sun in

approximately 100 degree weather as some sort of discipline. 

(Id.) Adam was forced to remain on the hot metal chair for

approximately 35-45 minutes while Bagley yelled at Adam only

inches from his face. (Id.) When Adam complained that the hot

metal chair was hurting him and got up from the chair, Bagley

yelled at Adam that he had to remain in the chair or physically

forced Adam back into the chair. (Id.) Defendants Mary Wall and

Heather Hornback both witnessed the interaction between Bagley

and Adam, but took no action. (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiffs allege

that, as a result of these events, Adam became seriously ill and

was treated at the Mercy San Juan Hospital Emergency Room that

evening and into the next morning. (Id. ¶ 24). 

Plaintiffs allege that Bagley had been terminated from her

previous job at the McKinley Park Pool for “abuse” or other

improper conduct and that the individual defendants were aware of

this fact prior to or after hiring Bagley. (Id. ¶ 61). 

Plaintiffs also allege that “the acts of the defendants, and each

of them, were done at the direction and with the knowledge,

approval, and/or ratification, of the remaining defendants.” 

(Id. ¶ 18).

Plaintiffs further allege that defendants did not make

reasonable accommodations or modifications in their policies,

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4

practices, or procedures to avoid discrimination on the basis of

disability, but instead, imposed corporeal punishment upon Adam. 

(Id. ¶¶ 39-40). As a result, Adam was ostracized, harassed,

threatened, and/or retaliated against for publicizing,

complaining about, and seeking disciplinary action for the June

14 events. (Id. ¶¶ 42-44). Plaintiffs allege that the conduct

of defendants was motivated, at least in part, by the race,

ethnicity, and/or national origin of Adam’s foster mother,

Ralphelia Grandinetti, who is Mexican/Hispanic-Italian. (Id. ¶

48).

Plaintiffs brought this action in Sacramento County Superior

Court against the District and the individual defendants for

assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence under California state law. 

Plaintiffs allege disability discrimination under state and

federal law and racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination

under state and federal law. Plaintiffs request both

compensatory and punitive damages. 

Defendants removed the action to this court on October 11,

2005. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss all of

plaintiffs’ state and federal claims and a motion to strike all

claims for punitive damages. In its order filed January 18,

2006, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants’

motions. Plaintiffs were given leave to amend the complaint to

cure certain deficiencies. 

On February 2, 2006, plaintiffs filed their first amended

complaint. On February 16, 2006, defendants filed a motion to

dismiss the first amended complaint and for sanctions. On May

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5

11, 2006, the parties submitted to the court a stipulation and

proposed order regarding defendants’ motion. The court entered

the order on May 12, 2006. The stipulation and order provides

that the only remaining claims against defendants are as follows: 

(1) Assault; (2) Battery; (3) False Imprisonment (inadvertently

labeled “Battery”); (4) Disability Discrimination and Retaliation

against defendant District and Board defendants in their official

capacities only; (5) Race/Ethnic/National Origin Discrimination

against defendant District and Board defendants in their official

capacities only; (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress; and (7) Negligence against defendant District and Board

defendants, with the exception of any state tort claims against

Board defendants arising out of allegations regarding: (a)

failure or refusal to terminate or otherwise punish or discipline

the employee defendants; (b) negligent hiring of Bagley; and (c)

failure to prevent or stop the June 14, 2004 incident. 

(Stipulation and Order, filed May 12, 2006, ¶ 8). The parties

disagree regarding whether a negligence cause of action may be

stated against the Board defendants for the negligent hiring,

training, and supervision of the Employee defendants other than

Bagley. (Id. ¶ 9). 

On May 25, 2006, defendants filed a motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s seventh claim for relief arising out of the

allegation that Board defendants were negligent in the hiring,

training, or supervision of Employee defendants. Plaintiffs

oppose the motion. 

/////

///// 

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STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

 Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant[]

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs’ seventh claim for relief is a claim of

negligence against defendant District and Board defendants. In

its January 18 order, the court dismissed with prejudice

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plaintiff’s claims arising out of allegations that defendants

McVay, Richards, Little, Matre, and Dahill negligently hired,

trained, or supervised defendant Bagley and other Employee

defendants. The court based its ruling on the fact that these

decisions were considered policy decisions by Board defendants. 

Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 981-84 (1995); Kemmerer v.

County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1438 (1988).

Defendants bring this motion on the grounds that the January

18 Order dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ claim that Board

defendants were negligent in hiring, training, and supervising

all of the Employee defendants. Plaintiff does not dispute that

the court previously ruled that Board defendants have statutory

immunity for these discretionary decisions. (Pls.’ Opp’n, filed

June 5, 2006, at 9-10). As such, the court cannot discern the

basis for plaintiffs’ opposition to defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Therefore, because the court has previously ruled

against plaintiffs on this issue, defendants’ motion to dismiss

is GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs argue that the allegations of negligence in the

First Amended Complaint need not be stricken because such

allegations have independent and significant value relating to

plaintiffs’ ratification arguments. However, defendants are not

moving to strike any allegations. Therefore, such arguments are

of no moment. Plaintiffs also vigorously defend the allegations

regarding violations of mandatory duties. However, such defense

is unwarranted as defendants’ motion to dismiss addresses only

plaintiffs’ claims arising from Board defendants’ hiring,

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5 In a footnote in their opposition, plaintiffs also

request reconsideration of the court’s January 18, 2006 Order,

granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ ADA

retaliation claims against defendants in their personal

capacities. This is also not a properly noticed motion. 

Further, for the reasons set forth in the court’s January 18

Order, plaintiffs’ argument is without merit.

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training, and supervision of employees. Therefore, the court

does not address issues not before it.

In their opposition, plaintiffs also seek leave to amend the

complaint to add claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However,

plaintiffs have not filed a properly noticed motion for leave to

amend. As such, the court will not consider plaintiffs’

improperly-raised request. 

Finally, plaintiffs request the court to reconsider its

prior rulings pertaining to plaintiffs’ negligence claim.5 As an

initial matter, this is not a properly noticed motion. Further,

plaintiffs offer no substantive basis for the court to reconsider

its prior rulings. Rather, plaintiff cites to cases involving

the Federal Tort Claims Act and claims brought under § 1983, none

of which apply to plaintiffs’ claims of negligence. Plaintiffs

argue that the court’s ruling is “contrary to established law

pertaining to violations of federal constitutional rights.” 

(Pls.’ Opp’n at 15). However, plaintiffs have not alleged, and

the court has not addressed, any claims relating to violations of

federal constitutional rights. Rather, the court has addressed

plaintiffs’ alleged state law negligence claims, which are

separate and apart from any federal claims, and which have been

dismissed because state statutory provisions confer immunity on

defendants. Any implication that the court has ruled on federal

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constitutional claims or that such claims are somehow

intrinsically intertwined with plaintiffs’ state law claims for

negligence is patently erroneous. Because plaintiffs’ request is

improperly before this court, without legal support, and without

merit, plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 13, 2006 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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