Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02389/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02389-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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1 Plaintiff filed this action on October 11, 2005 in

Solano County Superior Court; defendant removed the action to

this court on November 28, 2005 on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DONNA GRANT, as Executrix of 

the Estate of George Grant,

NO. CIV. S-05-2389 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Donna Grant as Executrix of the Estate of George

Grant (“plaintiff” or the “Estate”) brings this diversity action1

against defendant State Farm Life Insurance Company

(“defendant”), alleging state law claims of breach of contract,

tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing (“bad faith” claim), intentional and negligent infliction

of emotional distress, and fraud and negligent

Case 2:05-cv-02389-FCD-KJM Document 54 Filed 10/23/07 Page 1 of 18
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2 Plaintiff also alleged as its ninth cause of action a

claim for “coverage by estoppel,” asserting that based on certain

representations made by defendant to plaintiff, defendant is

precluded from denying coverage herein. Plaintiff did not

respond to defendant’s motion on this claim, and as such, the

court construes plaintiff’s silence as a non-opposition to the

motion (E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(c)). The court therefore grants

defendant’s motion with respect to this claim. Nevertheless, the

court notes that, on the merits, this claim would fail as it is

undisputed that defendant did not deny coverage in this case;

rather, as set forth below, it has paid the policy’s proceeds to

the Estate (with the appropriate interest).

3 Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, a declaration that

defendant’s delay in paying benefits due under the insurance

policy was “deliberate, intentional, and in bad faith” (Compl. at

¶ 35) and attorney fees under Brandt v. Sup. Ct., 37 Cal. 3d 813

(1985) (holding that when an insurer tortiously withholds

benefits, attorney fees reasonably incurred to compel payment of

the policy benefits are recoverable as an element of the damages

resulting from the tortious conduct). Plaintiff pled these

requests for relief as separate causes of action, namely its

“first cause of action” for “declaratory relief” and its “fourth

cause of action” for “Brandt fees.” (Compl. at ¶s 33-35, 46-47.) 

However, said claims are more properly considered as part of

plaintiff’s request for relief pursuant to her causes of action

above, rather than as substantive claims in and of themselves. 

4 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

misrepresentation,2

 arising from defendant’s delay in paying the

proceeds of George Grant’s life insurance policy to the Estate.3

This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, or alternatively, partial summary judgment.4

Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing triable issues of fact

remain as to each of its claims. For the reasons set forth

below, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion in its entirety. 

Plaintiff has failed to establish any cognizable damage to the

Estate, the sole plaintiff in this action, and thus, all of the

Estate’s claims must fail. Alternatively, even were the court to

find a triable issue with respect to plaintiff’s damages,

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5 Unless otherwise noted, the court finds the following

facts undisputed. While plaintiff attempts to dispute some of

the facts recited below, it does so citing inadmissible or

immaterial evidence, and as such, the court treats the subject

fact as undisputed. In other respects, the court finds the

parties’ dispute with regard to a particular fact not material to

resolution of the motion, and thus, while the fact may be

included herein to provide context to the issues, the evidence is

not considered by the court. (Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Stmt. of

Undisputed Facts [Docket #47], filed Sept. 18, 2007 [“RUF”].) 

With its reply, defendant filed evidentiary objections

to plaintiff’s declaration and the declaration of plaintiff’s

counsel Tim Pori (Docket #50); the court declines to rule on said

objections because even considering the proffered evidence, it

fails to raise a triable issue of fact sufficient for plaintiff

to withstand summary judgment.

6 Mr. Grant was killed in the bedroom of the home he

shared with his wife, Donna Grant. To date, no one has been

arrested or prosecuted for his murder. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s

Sep. Stmt. of Undisputed Facts [Docket #49], filed Sept. 24, 2007

[“PUF”], ¶s 3-4.)

3

plaintiff cannot establish a triable issue as to one or more of

the other requisite elements of its claims.

BACKGROUND5

On November 18, 1994, defendant issued a life insurance

policy to insure the life of George Grant in the amount of

$250,000.00 (the “Policy”). (RUF ¶ 1.) Mr. Grant died as a

result of a homicide on May 30, 2004.6 (RUF ¶s 3, 17.) At the

time, the Policy named Mr. Grant’s former business partner,

William D. Anderson, as the beneficiary of the Policy. (RUF 

¶ 4.) However, Mr. Anderson had died eight years earlier. (RUF

¶ 5.) The Policy provides that if no beneficiary is living at

the time of the insured’s death, the proceeds shall be paid,

pursuant to the terms of the Policy, to the estate of the

insured. (RUF ¶s 4, 6, 7.)

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7 Ms. Grant contends that on this day she made a formal

“notice of claim” to defendant to collect the proceeds of the

Policy. (PUF ¶ 9.) She maintains that defendant did not

formally acknowledge receipt of the claim until September 13,

2004, when defendant’s claims agent told Ms. Grant that defendant

would make every effort to handle the claim for benefits in a

timely manner and that the claim could be processed in as little

as three weeks. (PUF ¶ 15.) Defendant disputes these facts. 

However, as set forth below, the parties’ dispute is not material

to resolution of the motion.

4

Defendant was notified of George Grant’s death on August 5,

2004. (RUF ¶ 15.)7 On August 19, 2004, defendant learned that

Mr. Grant’s will nominated Donna Grant, his wife, as the

executrix of his estate. (RUF ¶ 20.) That same day, defendant

informed Donna Grant’s representative, John Hall, that defendant

could not pay the proceeds of the Policy without a court order

appointing a representative of the estate. (RUF ¶s 20-21.)

Anticipating that Ms. Grant eventually would make a claim

for benefits on behalf of the estate, defendant began assembling

information about Mr. Grant’s death. (RUF ¶s 16, 18-19, 23-24,

26-27, 29-35, 37-38, 41-46, 49-50, 52-96, 98-106, 108-116, 118-

124, 126, 134-135.) Among other things, defendant contacted the

law enforcement agency investigating Mr. Grant’s death and

learned that Ms. Grant had not been eliminated as a suspect in

Mr. Grant’s murder. (RUF ¶s 23, 31, 46, 58, 71, 107, 135.) 

Defendant also communicated with one of Mr. Grant’s brothers, who

told defendant that he believed Ms. Grant had been involved in

Mr. Grant’s murder, and that he did not want her to serve as

executrix of Mr. Grant’s estate. (RUF ¶s 75-76, 81-82.)

On February 9, 2005, the Solano County Superior Court

appointed Ms. Grant as the Executrix of the Estate of George

Grant. (RUF ¶ 97.) However, plaintiff did not inform defendant

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8 Plaintiff asserts that from September 13, 2004 through

May 9, 2005, defendant did not regularly communicate with her or

provide her a firm estimate of the amount of time needed to

process the claim for benefits. (PUF ¶s 17-24, 27-33, 35.) 

Defendant, plaintiff contends, only requested documents of Ms.

Grant, including a claimant’s statement, a W-9 form and a copy of

the court order appointing her executrix of the Estate; plaintiff

contends that defendant often made duplicate requests asking

plaintiff to complete substantially similar dcouments. (PUF ¶

13, 17, 27.) Defendant disputes these facts, arguing that it

regularly communicated with plaintiff and that it could not

process any claim for benefits by plaintiff until a legal

representative of the Estate was appointed (which did not occur

until February 9, 2005 and which defendant was not informed of

until April 8, 2005). For the reasons set forth below, the

parties’ dispute in this regard nevertheless does not preclude an

award of summary judgment to defendant.

5

of Ms. Grant’s appointment until April 8, 2005. (RUF ¶ 116.) 

Defendant thereafter, on April 14, 2005, sent plaintiff, through

plaintiff’s attorney at the time, Kendall Hillman, a request that

Ms. Grant complete, sign and date an IRS Form W-9 on behalf of

the Estate. (RUF ¶ 118.) Defendant received the form from

plaintiff, signed by Ms. Grant on May 4, 2005, on May 9, 2005. 

(RUF ¶s 124.)8

To process plaintiff’s claim, defendant thereafter took

action to confirm the validity of the order appointing Ms. Grant

as executrix of the Estate. (RUF ¶s 126, 134-135, 139-140.) On

June 9, 2005, defendant wrote to plaintiff’s attorney, Tim Pori,

informing him that defendant had received all necessary paperwork

from plaintiff for the claim but that defendant could not pay

benefits to Ms. Grant, either as an individual or as executrix of

the Estate, while she remained a suspect in the ongoing homicide

investigation of Mr. Grant’s death; defendant indicated that once

the police and prosecutor either charge Ms. Grant or exonerate

her from being a suspect, defendant would be able to finalize the

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9 The check was made payable to “Donna Grant, as

Executrix of the Estate of George Grant.” (RUF ¶ 142.)

6

claim. (PUF ¶ 32.) In response, Mr. Pori sent defendant a

letter on June 20, 2005, summarizing his investigation into the

murder of Mr. Grant, which included reports of interviews of

various witnesses, conducted by a private investigator Mr. Pori

retained. (PUF ¶ 34.) Ms. Grant asserted these interviews

confirmed that she and George Grant had a loving relationship,

and that she had no motive to kill her husband. (Id.) Defendant

responded to Mr. Pori’s letter on June 27, 2005, informing him

that defendant was in the process of reviewing the documents Mr.

Pori submitted with his letter. (RUF ¶ 131.)

On June 29, 2005, defendant was informed by the Solano

County Sheriff’s Office that Ms. Grant had not been eliminated as

a suspect in the homicide of Mr. Grant. (RUF ¶ 135.) 

Nevertheless, defendant continued to review plaintiff’s claim; on

August 12, 2005, Bill Dolk, of State Farm’s Life General Claims

Department, recommended that defendant pay the proceeds to Ms.

Grant as Executrix of the Estate. (RUF ¶s 136-137.) On August

17, 2005, defendant telephoned the Solano County Sheriff’s

Department and Mr. Grant’s brother to inform them that defendant

was getting ready to pay the proceeds of the Policy to the

Estate. (RUF ¶s 139-140.) Defendant informed Mr. Pori of the

same on August 17, 2005. (RUF ¶ 141.)

On August 18, 2005, defendant paid the proceeds of the

Policy, plus applicable interest, to plaintiff in the amount of

$260,825.72.9

 (RUF ¶s 142, 143.)

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7

Ms. Grant contends that in reliance on representations made

by defendant in September 2004 regarding the prompt payment of

the Policy proceeds (see n. 7 supra), she decided to continue to

run the family business and to sell the family home; she asserts

that these decisions ultimately resulted in financial losses to

her and/or the Grant Family Trust as a result of defendant’s

delay in payment of the proceeds. (PUF ¶s 16, 26, 39.) For

example, Ms. Grant declares that she decided to sell the home

where Mr. Grant was murdered and move back to a previous home she

had lived in with Mr. Grant; while that previous home was more

expensive than she could afford based on the income from the

Grant Family Trust, she believed with the proceeds from the

Policy she could afford to live in that home with her daughter. 

(Pl.’s Decl., filed Sept. 7, 2007, ¶ 34.) Ms. Grant contends

that defendant’s delay in paying the Policy proceeds caused her

to lose $50,000.00 in conjunction with the home sell and

purchase. (Id.) Ms. Grant also maintains that she believed the

prompt receipt of the Policy proceeds would enable her to

continue to operate her husband’s glass business. (Id. at ¶ 35.)

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see California v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

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8

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, "the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show "that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party

"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

ANALYSIS

1. Standing

Before the court addresses plaintiff’s claims for relief, it

must preliminarily resolve the parties’ dispute over whether Ms.

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9

Grant has standing in her individual capacity to bring the

instant claims against defendant. Resolution of this question is

critical to the motion, as the issue of damages to the Estate

versus Ms. Grant, individually, is ultimately determinative of

the motion.

Only parties in privity of contract have standing to sue

under a contract. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insur. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,

576-78 (1973). Accordingly, only insureds and their

beneficiaries have standing to sue for damages resulting from an

insurer’s withholding of policy benefits from an insured. 

Austero v. Nat’l Casualty Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 511, 515-16 (1978)

(citing Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 576-78); Seretti v. Superior

Nat’l Insur. Co., 71 Cal. App. 4th 920, 929 (1999) (holding that

non-parties to the contract lack standing to enforce the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing or to recover extracontractual damages for its breach).

Here, defendant issued the Policy to Mr. Grant, and Mr.

Grant named William Anderson, his business partner, as the

beneficiary of his coverage. (RUF ¶s 1, 4.) Because Mr.

Anderson predeceased Mr. Grant, the terms of the Policy directed

that the proceeds be paid to Mr. Grant’s estate. (RUF ¶s 1, 4.) 

Thus, the only party with standing to sue for damages under the

Policy is Mr. Grant’s estate. Id.

Plaintiff argues, nonetheless, that as a beneficiary of Mr.

Grant’s estate, she has standing to sue in her individual

capacity. Plaintiff contends: “By virtue of the Last Will and

Testament of George Grant, the only named beneficiaries who would

inherit the proceeds of the [Policy] [are] Donna Grant and her

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10

daughter, Nicole Grant.” (Opp’n, filed Sept. 9, 2007, 1:27-2:1.) 

However, the documentary evidence submitted by plaintiff in

opposition to the motion proves otherwise. Specifically, Mr.

Grant’s will directs that his son receive a specific automobile

and that Ms. Grant receive any “remaining tangible personal

property.” (Grant Decl., filed Sept. 9, 2007, Ex. 4 [§ 2.1].) 

The proceeds of the subject Policy are not such “tangible

property.” See e.g. Fairbanks v. Sup. Ct., 154 Cal. App. 4th

435, 442-43 (2007) (explaining that insurance is not a tangible

item). Instead, the Policy proceeds pass via the residuary

provision of Mr. Grant’s will which directs that the proceeds of

the Policy be added to the principal of the Grant Revocable

Family Trust and distributed “in accordance with the provisions

of that declaration of trust.” (Grant Decl., Ex. 4 [§ 3.1].) 

Thus, it is only the Grant Revocable Family Trust that could

legitimately claim “beneficiary” status under the Policy. The

Trust, however, is not a named party to this action.

Moreover, while Ms. Grant claims she is a beneficiary of the

Grant Revocable Family Trust, she has not offered any competent

evidence to support that claim. Indeed, plaintiff has not

produced the trust documents; instead, she simply asserts in her

declaration that she and her daughter “were the sole named

beneficiaries of all of the residual assets of the estate of

George Grant.” (Grant Decl., ¶ 26.) Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated

assertion is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to

her individual standing to sue under the Policy.

Even if plaintiff had proffered sufficient evidence of her

status as a beneficiary of the Trust, that status is too remote

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to grant her standing to sue for the Policy proceeds. As set

forth above, only parties to the insurance contract or named

beneficiaries have standing to enforce the contract or to recover

extra-contractual damages for wrongful withholding of benefits. 

See e.g. Hatchwell v. Blue Shield of Cal., 198 Cal. App. 3d 1027,

1034 (1998). Courts have thus recognized that “incidental

beneficiaries” do not have standing to sue under an insurance

contract. See e.g. Jones v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 26 Cal.

App. 4th 1717, 1725 (1994) (fact that lessee “would have received

some benefit in the event Aetna indemnified the lessor . . . only

makes him an incidental beneficiary under the policy,” lacking

standing to sue); Gantman v. United Pacific Insur. Co., 232 Cal.

App. 3d 1560, 1568 (1991) (“although [homeowners] stand to gain

when Association gains, the benefits [they] seek belong to the

Association by the insurance contracts sued upon . . . [the

homeowners] are simply not claimants whose benefits were

wrongfully withheld.”) 

In a final attempt to establish standing in her individual

capacity, Ms. Grant argues that California courts have recognized

a spouse’s standing to sue under an insurance contract, if the

insurance premiums were paid with community property assets. 

(Opp’n at 5:6-9.) The lone case cited by Ms. Grant, however,

actually establishes the contrary. In Seretti, the California

court of appeal held that an insured’s spouse is at most “an

incidental or remote beneficiary and, as such, can state no cause

of action against [the insurer] for breach of a duty, express or

implied, arising from the contractual relationship.” Seretti, 71

Cal. App. 4th at 929-30 (emphasis added). Moreover, even if case

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law supported Ms. Grant’s argument, she offers no evidence that

any of the premiums for the subject Policy were paid with

community property assets. Thus, the factual premise for Ms.

Grant’s assertion is wholly unsupported. 

Finally, while Ms. Grant could have certain rights to the

Policy proceeds if Mr. Grant used community property assets to

pay the premiums for the Policy, those rights would not include a

claim against defendant. Rather, Ms. Grant would simply be a

creditor of Mr. Grant’s estate and could pursue a claim against

Mr. Grant’s estate; this fact does not, however, provide her

standing to bring a claim against defendant. See Cal. Fam. Code

§ 1100(a); see Burch v. George, 7 Cal. 4th 246, 264, 285 (1994).

Thus, for all these reasons, only the Estate, through its

Executrix Ms. Grant, has standing to pursue the instant claims

against defendant.

2. Damages to the Estate

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to each of

plaintiff’s claims arguing the Estate, the sole plaintiff in this

action as set forth above, has not suffered any damage, and thus,

each of its claims must fail. Defendant is correct that absent

evidence of damage to plaintiff as a result of defendant’s delay

in payment of the Policy proceeds, plaintiff does not have a

cognizable claim against defendant, and defendant is entitled to

summary judgment. The court thus considers the issue of damages

in the first instance as it obviates the need for a full analysis

of the other elements of plaintiff’s claims.

It should be noted at the outset that this case involves a

delay in payment of policy proceeds (for at most, approximately 

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10 Defendant may only properly be charged with any delay

from the time it received notice of Ms. Grant’s appointment as

Executrix of the Estate, April 8, 2005, to the date it paid the

policy proceeds, August 18, 2005. Prior to April 8, 2005,

defendant had no obligation to process a claim for the Policy

proceeds pursuant to the express terms of the Policy. (RUF ¶s 4,

6, 7, 20-21.) 

11 Plaintiff “denied” this latter fact in its response to

defendant’s statement of undisputed facts (RUF ¶ 14) but it cited

no contrary evidence and, indeed, also conceded that the Estate

was affected if, at all, only positively in that the Policy

proceeds ultimately “increased” the value of the Estate. 

Plaintiff’s response does not raise a triable issue of fact that

the Estate was harmed in any way by the delay in payment of the

proceeds.

12 Since there is no entity known as the “Grant Family

Estate,” the court assumes plaintiff is referring to the Grant

Revocable Family Trust mentioned in Mr. Grant’s will.

13

41⁄2 months),10 not a denial of payment. At times, plaintiff cites

cases involving denial of coverage or payments; that situation is

clearly not present here. It is undisputed that defendant has

paid the Policy proceeds, with applicable interest, to plaintiff

in the amount of $260,825.72. (RUF ¶s 142, 143.) Thus, for

plaintiff to establish damages, at all, the Estate must tie its

purported damages to the delay in payment by defendant.

In support of its motion, defendant proffers evidence of its

payment of the Policy proceeds to the Estate and evidence that

the value of the Estate did not change between the date of Mr.

Grant’s death and the date on which defendant paid the proceeds,

with interest. (RUF ¶s 142, 143; Pohls Decl., Ex. 7 [Grant Dep.

106:5-18 and Ex. 19].) Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. 

(RUF ¶ 10, 14.)11 Instead, plaintiff asserts in its opposition

that:

[T]he Grant Family Estate [sic]12 suffered a loss of

earnings, various special damages, the costs of attorney 

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13 To prevail on a claim for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiff must prove

that defendant withheld a benefit that was payable under the

policy, unreasonably and without proper cause. See e.g.

Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 575.

14

fees and Ms. Grant herself suffered severe emotional

upset and distress. [citing PUF ¶s 16, 26, 37, 39.]

(Opp’n at 15:18-21.) (Emphasis added.) However, as set forth

above, only the Estate may assert the instant claims against

defendant; any damage to the Grant Revocable Family Trust, a nonparty to the action, or Ms. Grant individually, or even

ostensibly as the legal representative of the Trust, is

irrelevant. 

Plaintiff does not offer any evidence to rebut defendant’s

showing that (1) the Estate was not harmed in any way as the

Policy proceeds were paid to the Estate with the appropriate

interest and (2) any delay in payment of the Policy proceeds,

even assuming such delay was “unreasonable,”13 did not cause any

cognizable harm to the value of the Estate. Therefore, defendant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to each of

plaintiff’s claims.

3. Plaintiff’s Claims for Relief

While not necessary to resolution of the motion in light of

the above findings, the court nonetheless briefly discusses below

its findings regarding other elements of plaintiff’s claims. 

There are further, alternative reasons to grant defendant’s

motion.

Regarding plaintiff’s breach of contract and bad faith

claims, plaintiff argues defendant unreasonably delayed paying

the Policy proceeds for over a year. Plaintiff maintains said

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14 Both parties spend a large portion of their briefing

discussing conduct by Ms. Grant and defendant prior to April 8,

2005. However, this conduct is irrelevant to the instant motion

as the period of any delay with which defendant may be charged

occurred between April 8 and August 18, 2005.

15 Defendant preliminarily began this investigation in

late-2004.

15

monies were due upon “proof of the Insured’s death” which

defendant received in August 2004. (Opp’n at 6:17.) Plaintiff’s

argument wholly ignores the other terms of the Policy, providing

that the Estate is the applicable beneficiary and requiring

appointment of a representative for the Estate in order to make a

claim to the Policy proceeds. (RUF ¶s 4, 6, 7, 20-21.) Any

obligation of defendant to “process” plaintiff’s claim for

benefits did not arise, as set forth above, until April 8, 2005,

when defendant received copies of the letters of administration

identifying Ms. Grant as the Executrix of the Estate. See e.g.

10 C.C.R. § 2695.5(e). Thus, any delay at issue is from April 8

to August 18, 2005, the date defendant paid the Policy proceeds

plus applicable interest. 

As to that specific time frame,14 plaintiff fails to proffer

any evidence from which a jury could find unreasonable

withholding of benefits. To the contrary, defendant submits

evidence that during this time, it investigated, in light of Ms.

Grant’s suspected role in Mr. Grant’s death,15 the validity of

the order appointing her Executrix. (RUF ¶s 126, 134-135, 139-

140.) This investigation included making contact with

plaintiff’s counsel, the Solano County Sheriff’s Department and

defendant’s own legal department; defendant consulted its legal

department specifically for an opinion as to the effect, if any,

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that Ms. Grant’s possible involvement in Mr. Grant’s homicide

would have on her authority to act as the legal representative of

his estate. (RUF ¶s 131, 135; PUF ¶s 32, 34.) These contacts

occurred in May and June 2005. Defendant’s legal department

responded to the last inquiry, made on June 28, 2005, on August

8, 2005. On August 12, 2005, Bill Dolk of defendant’s General

Claims Department recommended payment of the proceeds to Ms.

Grant as Executrix of the Estate; the monies were thereafter paid

on August 18, 2005. (RUF ¶s 136-137, 142-143.) 

The only evidence plaintiff submits is its counsel’s letter

of June 20, 2005 to defendant, informing defendant of plaintiff’s

counsel’s investigation into Mr. Grant’s murder (which

plaintiff’s counsel asserted established that Ms. Grant was not

involved). (PUF ¶ 34.) Defendant, however, promptly responded

to this letter on June 27, 2005. (RUF ¶ 131.) Defendant

continued investigating the situation in July and early-August

2005, and ultimately paid the proceeds less than two months after

plaintiff’s counsel’s June 20 letter. 

Under these facts, no reasonable juror could find that

defendant withheld benefits payable under the Policy

“unreasonably and without proper cause.” Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at

575; see also Fraley v. Allstate Insur. Co., 81 Cal. App. 4th

1282 (2000) (summary judgment proper when payment delayed to

investigate genuine issue regarding coverage); see Lunsford v.

American Guarantee & Liability Insur. Co., 18 F.3d 653, 656 (9th

Cir. 1994) (“[a] court can conclude as a matter of law that an

insurer’s denial of a claim is not unreasonable, so long as there

existed a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability”).

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16 Michaelian v. State Compenstation Insur. Fund, 50 Cal.

App. 4th 1093, 1113-14 (1996) (setting forth elements of claim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Bogard v.

Employers Casualty Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 618 (1985) (setting

forth elements of claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress).

17

Because plaintiff cannot sustain its bad faith claim, it

likewise cannot maintain a claim for attorney fees and costs

pursuant to Brandt. 37 Cal. 3d at 813 (a viable bad faith claim

is a prerequisite to seeking fees and costs based thereupon).

As to plaintiff’s intentional and negligent infliction of

emotional distress claims, these claims fail since the Estate, as

a legal entity, cannot suffer emotional distress. See e.g.

Diamond View Limited v. Herz, 180 Cal. App. 3d 612, 618-19 (1986)

(emotional states are exhibited by natural persons, not legal

entities). Because the Estate cannot establish this requisite

element of its claims, that it suffered “severe emotional

distress,”16 defendant’s motion on these claims is properly

granted on this alternative basis. 

Finally, as to plaintiff’s fraud and negligent

misrepresentation claims, both claims require proof that the

Estate relied on certain, specific representations by defendant

regarding the payment of the Policy proceeds. Fed. R. Civ. P.

9(b). However, plaintiff proffers no evidence of the Estate’s

reliance on any representations by defendant. At most, plaintiff

offers evidence of Ms. Grant’s reliance on a purported

representation by defendant on September 13, 2004, indicating,

Ms. Grant contends, that defendant would promptly pay the Policy

proceeds within as little as three weeks. (See n. 7 supra.) 

Even assuming defendant made this representation (which defendant

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disputes and offers evidence to the contrary [see Reply, filed

Sept. 24, 2007, at 12]), plaintiff only proffers evidence that

Ms. Grant relied on the representation not the Estate. Indeed,

at that time, no representative of the Estate had been appointed;

Ms. Grant was not authorized to act on behalf of the Estate until

February 9, 2005. Plaintiff fails to identify any

misrepresentation by defendant after that date, upon which the

Estate relied to its detriment, and thus, defendant’s motion as

to these claims is also properly granted for this further reason.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court is

directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: October 23, 2007

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