Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01592/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01592-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DEREK ANDREW NORMAN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-01592 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

CHARLES L. RYAN and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On or about August 23, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 11) on February 26,

2009. Respondents argue Petitioner’s habeas petition was not

timely filed. Additionally, Respondents contend Petitioner

procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims by failing to

properly exhaust them in the state courts. 

I Procedural History

In January of 2004 Petitioner was charged with one

count of sexual conduct with a minor and two counts of

molestation of a child (Docket No. CR2004-006012). See Answer,

Exh. A. In January of 2005 Petitioner was charged with one

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count of sexual exploitation of a minor, in Docket No. CR2005-

006127. Id., Exh. B. The later charge involved the possession

of child pornography. Id., Exh. B. 

Pursuant to written plea agreements, Petitioner pled

guilty in both cases on January 12, 2005. Id., Exh. C & Exh. D.

With regard to the charges stated in Docket No. CR2004-006012,

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of attempted sexual conduct

with a minor. Id., Exh. D. The written plea agreement noted

the presumptive sentence of 10 years incarceration and a minimum

sentence of 5 years incarceration and stated Petitioner’s

sentence would fall within that range. Id., Exh. D. The plea

agreement states it is “dependent upon a guilty plea to Count

One in CR2005-006127.” Id., Exh. D.

With regard to Docket No. CR2005-006127, Petitioner

pled guilty to attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. Id.,

Exh. C. The written plea agreement noted a minimum sentence of

10 years, a presumptive sentence of 17 years, and a maximum

sentence of 24 years incarceration. Id., Exh. C. The plea

agreement stated Petitioner was to be placed on lifetime

supervised probation “subsequent to any prison sentence imposed

in CR2004-006012.... This plea is dependent upon a guilty plea

to Count One in CR2004-006012.” Id., Exh. C. The plea

agreement also provided Petitioner would register as a sex

offender and provide a DNA sample to law enforcement. 

Both plea agreements also waived Petitioner’s right to

appeal his convictions or the imposition of any sentence which

was consistent with the written agreements. Id., Exh. C & Exh.

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D. The Maricopa County Superior Court reviewed the written plea

agreements with Petitioner on January 12, 2005, and accepted his

guilty pleas in both cases at that time. Id., Exh. E & Exh. F.

 On April 15, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to a term

of 7 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction in CR2004-

006012. Id., Exh. G & Exh. H. At that time Petitioner was

sentenced to a consecutive term of lifetime probation pursuant

to his conviction in CR2005-006127. Id., Exh. G & Exh. H. 

Petitioner did not timely file his first appeal “as of

right,” i.e. an action for state post-conviction relief pursuant

to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, within ninety

days of being sentenced. Petitioner did file a notice of postconviction relief with regard to his conviction and sentence in

the 2005 case on July 20, 2007. Id., Exh. I & Exh. J. In that

Rule 32 action Petitioner asserted his sentence of lifetime

probation constituted cruel and unusual punishment and also

violated his right to equal protection. Petitioner also argued

his right to due process of law was violated by the plea

bargaining process. Id., Exh. I & Exh. J.

The state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32

action on August 15, 2007, noting it was not timely. Id., Exh.

K. The state trial court also concluded Petitioner’s sentence

did not violate the United States’ constitution’s prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment and that Petitioner’s

rights to due process and equal protection were not violated.

Id., Exh. K. Petitioner appealed this decision to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, id., Exh. L, which denied review on April 23,

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2008. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner sought review of his claims by

the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on July 28, 2008.

Id., Exh. O. 

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because his sentence of lifetime probation

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also

contends the sentence of lifetime probation violates his right

to equal protection under the Fifth and Fourth Amendments.

Additionally, Petitioner argues the imposition of lifetime

probation rendered the plea bargaining process fundamentally

unfair in violation of the due process protections of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments.

II Analysis

The petition is barred by the statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th

Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2008). See also

Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000);

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Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final at the expiration of the time allowed for filing an

action for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., on July 15, 2005.

See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007)

(holding that, in Arizona, the statute of limitations began to

run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and

review of that proceeding, or [upon] the expiration of the time

for seeking such proceeding or review.”). Accordingly,

Petitioner had one year from July 15, 2005, i.e., until July 15,

2006, to seek federal habeas relief, not counting any time

during which the statute of limitations was statutorily tolled

by the pendency of any properly-filed state action for postconviction relief. See Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner did not file a timely Rule 32 action in the

state courts which would have tolled the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. Petitioner did file a notice of post-conviction

relief with regard to his conviction and sentence in the 2005

case on July 20, 2007, more than one year after the statute of

limitations with regard to a federal habeas action challenging

the conviction and sentence expired. That state Rule 32 action

could not and did not restart the already-expired statute of

limitations for filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing

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Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston

v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). A state-court

petition that is filed after the expiration of the statute of

limitations under the AEDPA does not revive the running of the

limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th

Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.

2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001). 

Petitioner’s untimely Rule 32 action also could not

toll the statute of limitations because it was not a “properly

filed” action for state post-conviction relief. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12 (2005)

(holding that a state petition that is not filed within the

state’s required time limit is not “properly filed.”). 

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 397 (2008); Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

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grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See Jones

v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219

F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is

“typically applied sparingly”). The petitioner must establish

a causal connection between the alleged roadblock to their

timely filing of their federal habeas petition and the actual

failure to file the petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at

1034; Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir.

2005). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.”

See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969

(9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.

1999). 

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Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Brown

v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding the

petitioner has a strong burden to plead specific facts

supporting their claim of extraordinary circumstances). See

also Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19, 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding

that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling

because he was not misled or confused about the exhaustion of

his state remedies and filing his federal habeas petition).

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that there

were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made

it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition.

Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir.

2005). Additionally, Petitioner did not act with reasonable

diligence throughout the time period he seeks to toll. See

Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a

claim to equitable tolling where the petitioner “provided no

specificity regarding the alleged lack of access and the steps

he took to diligently pursue his federal claims”). Compare Roy,

465 F.3d at 969-72.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition

within the time specified by the AEDPA. Petitioner does not

offer a basis for the equitable tolling of the statute of

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limitations applicable to his habeas petition.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Norman’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

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appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 1st day of April, 2009.

 

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