Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02107/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02107-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

RICKEY DALE NEWMAN PETITIONER

v. CASE NO. 05-2107

LARRY NORRIS, Director,

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

ORDER

Evidentiary hearings were held on November 8 and November 27,

2007, on the issue of whether the habeas corpus statute of limitations

should be equitably tolled due to Petitioner’s mental incompetence at

the time he waived his post-conviction appeal. Respondent contends

that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely and should not be

considered. (See Doc. 20, Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, at 9-12.) Petitioner contends that some days included in the

statutory period by Respondent are statutorily tolled and that the

entire time between the day the statute of limitations began to run

up to the day the federal habeas petition was filed should be

statutorily and/or equitably tolled. (See Doc. 48, Reply to Response

to Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.)

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was charged with Capital murder in the Circuit Court

of Crawford County, Arkansas for the violent murder of Marie Cholette.

After a capital murder trial that lasted one day, June 10, 2002,

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Other than a video tape taken by a surveillance camera at a liquor 1

store in Fort Smith, Arkansas, that showed Petitioner with the victim

several days before the murder, the only evidence against him were his own

statements. There was little to no evidence at the crime scene and no

evidence derived from the DNA analysis of the scene that connected

Petitioner to the crime. Many of the important details revealed by

Petitioner of the crime were contradicted by findings and conclusions of

the investigators. Petitioner was found guilty by a jury that had to

operate on facts related to them by Petitioner. Whether Petitioner

actually committed the crime is not the issue, for the sole issue before

this Court is the lapse of time for Petitioner to file for relief in this

Court.

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Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death. Petitioner 1

represented himself throughout the guilt and penalty phases of the

trial, although stand-by counsel was appointed. 

Following the verdict, Petitioner attempted to waive his direct

appeal, but this was denied by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Petitioner

then attempted to have the mandatory direct appeal dismissed while it

was pending and this was denied on January 30, 2003 (Counsel was

appointed and a 7-page brief filed). On May 22, 2003, the Arkansas

Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and death sentence. 

On July 30, 2003, Petitioner requested to waive the appointment

of post-conviction counsel and to abandon all post-conviction

remedies. He further requested that an execution date be set as soon

as possible. Crawford County Circuit Court found that Petitioner had

entered a valid waiver of his rights to counsel and to seek postconviction relief. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the

order as it appeared that Petitioner could have been on psychotropic

medication during the time he requested the waivers. The case was

remanded to the circuit court and a mental health evaluation was

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ordered.

After receiving a report from Dr. Charles Mallory, a psychologist

with the Arkansas State Hospital, the Crawford County Circuit Court

accepted Petitioner’s waivers once again and found him competent to

waive his rights. On April 15, 2004, the Arkansas Supreme Court

affirmed the competency finding.

On September 20, 2004, federal public defenders filed a motion

in Crawford County Circuit Court requesting forensic DNA testing. On

February 3, 2005, the Crawford County Circuit Court held an Inquiry

Hearing as to legal representation of Petitioner and concluded that

the federal public defenders, Mr. Bruce Eddy and Ms. Julie Brain, had

not been appointed to represent Petitioner. Therefore, the court

terminated Mr. Eddy and Ms. Brain from further representation of

Petitioner and dismissed all pending motions (specifically the request

for DNA testing) filed in that court on behalf of Petitioner. The

federal public defenders then filed a reconsideration motion regarding

the request for forensic DNA testing and a request to proceed through

Next-Friend Betty Moore. These were denied on May 2, 2005. 

In the Arkansas Supreme Court, on September 21, 2004, the federal

public defenders filed a Motion to Recall the Mandate and For a Stay

of Execution. The Arkansas Supreme Court issued a stay and a briefing

schedule to assist with the decision to recall the mandate.

Petitioner then requested that the Arkansas Supreme Court vacate its

briefing schedule to allow him to proceed with his post-conviction

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appeal in Crawford County Circuit Court. The Arkansas Supreme Court

granted the request to vacate the briefing schedule on December 9,

2004. On June 2, 2005, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted a pro se

motion to dissolve Petitioner’s stay of execution. On September 8,

2005, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared the Motion to Recall the

Mandate to be moot in a one-line letter order.

B. DISCUSSION

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) reflects that a state prisoner must file his

or her habeas corpus petition within one year after the completion of

the state court proceedings.

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking review;. . . or

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.

Id.

Petitioner is in custody pursuant to the judgment of an Arkansas

Court and contends that his several state filings (Request to Waive

Rights to Post-Conviction Relief and to Counsel, Motion for DNA

Testing and resulting Motion for Reconsideration, Motion to Recall the

Mandate, and Motion For a Stay of Execution) constitute “properly

filed application[s] for State post-conviction or other collateral

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review....” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). 

1. Statutory Tolling of the Statute of Limitations.

On July 30, 2003, Petitioner requested to waive his rights to

pursue post-conviction relief and to counsel. Following the requests,

there were several state court proceedings, to include the remand for

mental health evaluation, the mental health evaluation and the second

hearing to address Petitioner’s requests. Petitioner’s requests to

waive representation of counsel and for further review were properly

filed applications submitted according to Arkansas’ procedural

requirements. A petitioner would not begin preparation of his only

federal habeas petition until it is known if the state reviews are

concluded. In our case, Petitioner’s state review process continued

until the state courts accepted his requests to waive further review

and to proceed without counsel. Therefore, the time Petitioner was

awaiting decision on his waiver requests, the statute of limitation

should be statutorily tolled. The time (238 days) between the date

the judgment became final, August 20, 2003, and the ruling on

Petitioner’s waiver of counsel and post-conviction review, April 15,

2004, is statutorily tolled. 

The other time periods Petitioner contends should be statutorily

tolled involve motions that were not properly filed applications for

state post-conviction or other collateral review, and must be counted

as days the statute of limitations continued to run. Petitioner

contends the Motion for Forensic DNA Testing in Crawford County

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The Crawford County Circuit Court dismissed the Act 1780 petition, 2

seeking forensic DNA testing and the Rule 37.5 petition seeking to have the

mandate recalled, finding that Petitioner did not want to pursue these matters

and that he was proceeding pro se. Specifically, the state court found that

the federal public defenders did not represent Petitioner in state court. (Doc.

20 at 6 (citing the transcript of the post-conviction proceedings in Arkansas

v. Newman, Crawford Country Circuit Court No CR2001-109, Arkansas Supreme Court

No. CR05-701 at 345-46.))

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Circuit Court and the Motion to Recall the Mandate in the Arkansas

Supreme Court were properly filed applications and the time between

those filings and the rulings on them should be statutorily tolled.

(See Doc. 48, Reply to Response to Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, at

11-14.) Petitioner specifically contends that the Motion to Recall

the Mandate was properly filed as the motion was permitted by state

law, was accepted by the court and assigned the same case number as

the State’s Petition. He further supported his contention by stating

the state court granted a stay of execution and ordered a briefing

schedule on the motion. (Doc. 48 at 12, Reply to Response to Motion

for Evidentiary Hearing (citing Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 316 (3rd

Cir. 2001) (finding that petitioner’s motion to withdraw guilty plea

nunc pro tunc tolled AEDPA’s limitations period because, inter alia,

the state court accepted it, allowed parties to brief issues and make

full consideration of record before denying it.))) The state court

determined the federal public defenders who presented the motion for

forensic DNA testing were not properly before the court, nor were they

recognized as being parties or representatives of parties before the

court. The motion to recall was declared moot by the Arkansas 2

Supreme Court.

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Petitioner’s reliance on Nara is not warranted, as the facts in

the current case are not similar to the facts in Nara. In Nara, the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the motion in question

tolled the statute of limitations as a properly filed application for

relief because the state court accepted the motion, allowed the issues

to be briefed, and made a full consideration of the record before

denying the motion. However, in the case sub judice, although the

Motions to Recall and for Forensic DNA Testing were accepted by the

state courts and issues were allowed to be briefed, the motions were

not considered on their merits before the state courts ruled upon them

(one was dismissed as it was filed by a person not properly before the

court, while the other was dismissed as moot). We agree that the

federal public defenders were not proper persons to file applications

on behalf of Petitioner before the state court. Consequently, the

motions were not properly filed. Therefore, the time between the

filing of these motions and the filing of the federal petition for

habeas relief is not statutorily tolled. 

2. Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations.

Federal courts have recognized that mental incompetence can lead

to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See e.g., Nara,

264 F.3d 310. However, “the alleged mental incompetence must somehow

have affected the petitioner’s ability to file a timely habeas

petition.” Id. at 320. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has

stated that “mental impairment can be an extraordinary circumstance

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interrupting the limitation period....” Nichols v. Dormire, 11 Fed.

Appx. 633, 634 (8 Cir. 2001) (holding that mental impairment can th

warrant equitable tolling. However, Nichols’ impairment did not

interfere with the running of the statute of limitations). “Equitable

tolling is proper only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Id. at 633 (quoting Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 R.3d 460, 463 (8 Cir. th

2000) (additional citation omitted)).

The test for competency is “whether [petitioner] has capacity to

appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to

continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand

whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect

which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.” Smith

v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1056 (8 Cir. 1987)(quoting Rees v. th

Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966)). 

Petitioner was found competent by the Arkansas courts on more

than one occasion. In February 2002, Petitioner was examined by the

state to determine his fitness to stand trial and to determine his

criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged conduct. Dr.

Charles Mallory, a forensic psychologist employed by the Department

of Human Services, Arkansas State Hospital, examined Petitioner

pursuant to the state court’s order. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 59, 61.)

After examining Petitioner for three hours over the course of seven

days, Dr. Mallory found Petitioner fit to proceed and to be without

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During the 2002 examination, Dr. Mallory diagnosed Petitioner with 3

polysubstance dependence and anti-social personality disorder, stating that

neither diagnosis equated to a mental disease or defect. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at

61-2.)

Dr. Mallory testified that he used the Abbreviated Scale test to 4

save time. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 64.)

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mental disease or mental defect. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 84, 61.) 3

During the examination, Dr. Mallory conducted various tests, to

include the MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool, Wechsler Abbreviated

Scale of Intelligence test, the Folstein Mini-mental State Exam, and

the Kent test. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 63, 68, 69.) 

During the hearing in this Court on November 27, 2007, Dr.

Mallory was cross-examined regarding the tests administered.

Specifically, Dr. Mallory was questioned regarding the Wechsler

Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Abbreviated Scale) test. He agreed

that the manual for this test specifically states that the test is not

to be used as a diagnostic tool, nor is it appropriate to use for

legal/forensic needs, but rather the test is to be used as a screening

tool for large groups of people, such as schools and the military.4

(Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 88-90; Respondent’s Ex. 28.) Dr. Mallory stated

the Abbreviated Scale test has a higher error rate and that the full

range IQ test is more reliable. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 66-7, 126.) He

also testified that if a person scored below a certain level on the

Abbreviated Scale test, he would then administer the full scale IQ

test. In response to a question by the Court, Dr. Mallory said that

he “would want to do a full evaluation” if a person scored in the “low

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After Dr. Mallory realized during the hearing that he had 5

incorrectly scored Petitioner’s Abbreviated Scale test, Petitioner’s counsel

asked him “Seventy-five would be right at mid to low seventies, is that right?” 

Which Dr. Mallory responded, “That’s right.” Counsel then asked “Right at the

point where you said that even you would want to do a much further

investigation of Mr. Newman’s cognitive function?” Dr. Mallory responded

“You’re right. I certainly made a big error.” (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 95.) 

10

to mid seventies” on the verbal portion of the short form IQ test.

(Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 79.) 

It was determined during the hearing, that Dr. Mallory

miscalculated the raw scores of Petitioner’s Abbreviated Scale test

(the error was in miscalculating Petitioner’s age as 46 versus

Petitioner’s actual age of 44, which then caused the incorrect scale

to be used to determine the score). (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 93.)

Petitioner was found to have an IQ score of 84 in verbal instead of

the corrected score of 80, and a full IQ score of 78 instead of the

stated correct score of 75. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 95.) Although Dr.

Mallory’s response of a score of “low to mid seventies” was to the

Court’s question regarding what verbal IQ score would trigger the need

for a full evaluation, it appears that Dr. Mallory would also view a

low to mid seventies full scale score as necessitating further

investigation of Petitioner’s cognitive function. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 5

at 79, 95). This is important as Petitioner’s corrected IQ score was

75 but no further investigation of Petitioner’s cognitive function

occurred; i.e., the administration of a full-scale IQ test. 

Additionally, the evidence showed Dr. Mallory administered the

Folstein Mini-mental State Exam (Folstein). During cross-examination,

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Although Dr. Mallory admitted that the Folstein Mini-mental State 6

Exam’s manual did not permit flexibility in scoring or in questioning, he

stated that the manual came along after he began using the test. (Hr’g Tr.

Vol. 2 at 102.) 

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Dr. Mallory admitted he substituted his own scoring for some of the

answers (i.e., awarding Petitioner a point for the date, although he

answered 27 or 28 when it was the 25 , awarding a point for the th th th

county when he had guessed two incorrect counties prior to giving the

correct answer) and alterations to some of the questions (i.e.,

subtracting 3 from 20 in a serial fashion instead of subtracting 7

from 100 in a serial fashion because Petitioner had difficulty

correctly subtracting 7 from 100 in a serial fashion). (Hr’g Tr. Vol.

2 at 97-8, 99-100, 101) The manual for the Folstein exam does not

permit substitute questions or flexibility in scoring. (Hr’g Tr. 6

Vol. 2 at 98, 100, 101; Respondent’s Ex. 31.) Dr. Mallory testified

that the manual was published after he began using the Folstein exam

and that he was trained to take into account a person’s actual

situation, such as incarceration, when scoring the exam. (Hr’g Tr.

Vol. 2 at 102.) Dr. Mallory admitted that he should not have awarded

Petitioner a point for the sentence task as the sentence written by

Petitioner was not comprehensible. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 104.) Dr.

Mallory also admitted he erred in awarding Petitioner a point for the

diagram he drew, as Petitioner’s diagram was virtually identical to

the test manual’s example of an incorrect diagram. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2

at 106.) In addition to awarding points that should not have been

given, Dr. Mallory also miscalculated the points awarded Petitioner,

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Dr. Mallory testified that he uses a score of 23 to 24 as the cutoff 7

for cognitive impairment when testing people without much grade school without

much grade school education. He went on to state “nonetheless, an 18 is

significantly below normal. Now, this is no surprise. He does have

significantly below normal intelligence level.” (Hrg. Tr. at 106-7.) 

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recording that Petitioner scored 29 points instead of the 24 points

Dr. Mallory actually awarded. (Hr’g, Tr. Vol. 2 at 96.) Without

improper flexibility and substitution, it appears Petitioner actually

scored an 18 out of 30. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 106.) The Folstein exam

manual places the score of 26 as the cutoff for cognitive impairment.7

(Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 107, Respondent’s Ex. 31.) Therefore, Dr.

Mallory’s scoring of 29 out of 30 is not an accurate measure of

Petitioner’s mental ability at the time of examination. 

Dr. Mallory also administered the Kent test, a test that has

neither been published, nor shown to have any kind of reliability or

validity. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 86-7.) Dr. Mallory gave Petitioner a

score of 30 out of 36 on the this test, which Dr. Mallory interpreted

as “a pretty good score that would tell you that he’s not likely to

come out in the range of mental retardation.” (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at

69.) Dr. Mallory also administered the MacArthur Competency Tool,

which resulted in Petitioner scoring in the impaired range. (Hr’g Tr.

Vol. 2 at 107-8.)

Dr. Mallory testified in the hearing on November 27, 2007, that

he evaluated Petitioner again in January 2004 to determine whether

Petitioner was competent to waive his right to counsel and his right

to post-conviction appeals. Dr. Mallory examined Petitioner at the

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prison where he was housed for one hour. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 111-12.)

He re-administered the Folstein Mini-mental State Exam and the Kent

Test. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 112.) Dr. Mallory did not re-administer

an IQ test, but relied on the IQ score Petitioner received on the

Abbreviated Scale test administered in February 2002. (Hr’g Tr. Vol.

2 at 76.) Dr. Mallory again concluded Petitioner was competent to

waive his rights. (Respondent’s Ex. 3 at 8.) 

Dr. Mallory testified that during the second evaluation in 2004,

Petitioner stated he wanted to be executed. Dr. Mallory stated that

Petitioner, “during the evaluation, was using [Dr. Mallory] as a tool

in an attempt to bring about his own death....” (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at

113-14.) Dr. Mallory testified “If the fact of the matter was that

Mr. Newman had a very realistic possibility of securing release from

prison as the result of an appeal, and he was aware that he had that

realistic possibility, and nevertheless decided I want to be executed

anyway, his competency to make that decision would be in serious

doubt....” (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 115.) Dr. Mallory also testified that

“[i]t would be irrational” if Petitioner was innocent of the crime and

chose to be executed. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 115-16.) 

In addition to the tests administered and the scoring of those

tests, Dr. Mallory was cross-examined on the social history he

obtained regarding Petitioner. On direct examination, Dr. Mallory

testified that he had no evidence that Petitioner had difficulty

holding a job, specifically citing Petitioner’s Marine Corps

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experience and that he held a position in California for approximately

six months. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 116-17.) Dr. Mallory admitted that

Dr. Stewart had “considerably more information about Mr. Newman’s

history and functioning than was provided to [him] at the time of

[his] evaluations either in 2002 or in 2004.” (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at

80.) Although Petitioner told Dr. Mallory that death means peace, Dr.

Mallory testified that he did not inquire as to whether Petitioner had

a history of suicidal ideations and did not recall asking Petitioner

about suicidal feelings when Petitioner was feeling suicidal during

the 2004 evaluation. (Hr’g Tr. at Vol. 2 118-19.)

Petitioner’s competency hearing in February 2004 before the

Circuit Court of Crawford County, Arkansas, consisted of Dr. Mallory’s

report and testimony that Petitioner was fit to proceed in his

requests to waive further appeals and his right to counsel. (See Hr’g

Tr. Vol. 2 at 125 (there is no indication that any other evidence was

considered by the state court.)) Dr. Mallory’s reliance on the

previous examination of Petitioner that was based in part upon

incorrectly scored tests was accepted without question. There was no

cross-examination of Dr. Mallory, nor was there any presentation of

evidence or argument that Petitioner was incompetent. At no time did

the hearing become adversarial in nature.

During the hearings of November 8 and November 27, 2007,

Petitioner presented testimony by two experts: Dr. Ricardo Weinstein,

a psychologist specializing in neuropsychology, and Dr. Pablo Stewart,

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Dr. Mallory considers an IQ score of 69 or lower to be indicative of 8

mental retardation. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 75.) Dr. Mallory agreed that Dr.

Weinstein and Dr. Stewart conducted “extremely thorough and competent

evaluations of Mr. Newman.” Id. at 80. Dr. Mallory also stated “I think the

issue of his intellectual functioning is a valid one in that the WASI is a more

reliable measure, and Dr. Weinstein did obtain a score in the range of mental

retardation....” Id. at 126.

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a psychiatrist. Dr. Weinstein evaluated Petitioner for approximately

eight to ten hours over two days (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 1 at 10) and

administered ten neuropsychological tests (Petitioner’s Ex. 6 at 1).

One test administered was the full range IQ test, the Wechsler Adult

Intelligence Scale-III, where Petitioner scored a verbal IQ of 70,

performance IQ of 69, and a full scale IQ of 67. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 1 8

at 13.) After reviewing Petitioner’s performance on all of the tests,

along with declarations of persons with information regarding

Petitioner and Petitioner’s social history, Dr. Weinstein concluded

to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Petitioner

suffered from significantly impaired intellectual functioning as he

was more than two standard deviations below the mean, and that

Petitioner suffered from significantly impaired frontal lobe

functioning. (Respondent’s Ex. 6 at 11.) Dr. Weinstein testified

that Petitioner was unable to make rational decisions at the time he

waived his state appeals and was not competent during that same time

period. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 1 at 27.) Dr. Weinstein found that: 

[t]he neuropsychological battery administered to

[Petitioner] over two days demonstrates significant and

consistent deficits that are manifested in his inability to

plan and organize behaviors in a goal directed manner and

to understand social interactions and act accordingly.

[Petitioner] exhibits poor judgment, lack of impulse

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control, his abstract reasoning abilities are very limited

and he acts without true understanding of the potential

consequences of his actions.

(Petitioner’s Ex. 6 at 11.)

Dr. Pablo Stewart examined Petitioner for approximately six hours

over three days. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 20.). He outlined the abuse and

neglect that Petitioner suffered as a child. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 23-

25.) Dr. Stewart diagnosed Petitioner with post traumatic stress

disorder, chronic type, with resultant major depressive disorder;

polysubstance dependence; and significant cognitive impairments with

prominent difficulties in his frontal lobe which have resulted in

difficulty with executive functioning. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 20.) Dr.

Stewart’s opinion was that Petitioner’s “decisions to waive his

appeals and seek his own execution was a direct result of his mental

illnesses, the suicidal impulses and impaired thinking that are []

symptoms of his illnesses.” (Petitioner’s Ex. 5 at 42.) Dr. Stewart

noted that Petitioner had severe cognitive impairments, which made him

“extremely less likely to address these symptoms.” (Petitioner’s Ex.

5 at 42.) Dr. Stewart found that Petitioner: 

had the capacity . . . to appreciate his position, i.e.

that he was incarcerated under a sentence of death and

would be executed if he waived his appeals. As a result of

his mental illness, however he did not have the capacity to

make a rational choice to abandon further litigation.

Rather, his decisions were driven by his traumatic history,

depression and his overwhelming impulse to end his life.

(Petitioner’s Ex. 5 at 42.)

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Dr. Stewart testified that although Petitioner is not taking

steps to dismiss his federal petition, he desires to be executed, and

has “only allow[ed] Ms. Brain [federal public defender] to proceed

with his case out of respect for her.” (Petitioner’s Ex. 5 at 42-43

; Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 44.) Dr. Stewart’s opinion was that Petitioner’s

“desire to die [was] the irrational product of a severely mentally ill

mind....” (Petitioner’s Ex. 5 at 43.) Dr. Stewart also gave the

opinion to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that

Petitioner suffered from the before described deficits, was

incompetent when making the decision to waive his State postconviction review rights, and the waiver decision was an involuntary

product of his mental condition. (Hr’g Tr. Vol. 2 at 42-44;

Petitioner’s Ex. 5 at 43-44.) 

A state’s factual determination of competency following a hearing

“evidenced by a ... reliable and adequate written indicia” generally

is entitled to a presumption of correctness by the federal habeas

court. O’Rourke v. Endell, 153 F.3d 560, 567 (8 Cir. 1998) (quoting th

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d))). In O’Rourke, a competency hearing was held to

determine if the petitioner was competent to waive his right to appeal

his state conviction. The state court appointed an attorney to

represent the petitioner, but ordered the attorney to take the

position that the petitioner was competent. 153 F.3d at 565. The

state doctor testified that the petitioner was competent. Id. at 566.

Cross-examination did not challenge the doctor’s opinion, but rather

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appeared to bolster the doctor’s opinion. Id. The court questioned

petitioner, with petitioner clearly stating he wished to be executed,

to abandon his appeal and to proceed without representation. Id. at

568. The state court found the petitioner competent. Id. The Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals found that the state court’s questioning of

the petitioner failed to “‘demonstrate that [O’Rourke] appreciated the

consequences of [his] decision’ to waive his Rule 37 appeal.” Id. at

568 (alterations in original)(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.

149, 165 ((1990)). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the

hearing was not full and fair and failed to afford petitioner the

process he was due. O’Rourke. At 569.

In the case sub judice, Petitioner’s competency hearing held on

February 25, 2004 in the Crawford County Circuit Court cannot be said

under the circumstances to have been full and fair, nor did it comport

with due process. See id. To an even greater extent than in

O’Rourke, the record as a whole demonstrates that Petitioner’s waiver

of counsel and waiver of his post-conviction appeal were not knowing

and voluntary. The finding of Petitioner’s competency was premised

on improperly administered and scored psychological tests, with no

checks and balances in place, such as an adversarial process. The

record reflects no basis for a reliable finding that Petitioner was

mentally competent to waive his rights to counsel and the postconviction appeal. 

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If an adversarial competency hearing had been conducted at state 9

court, Dr. Mallory’s calculations would have been challenged and errors

revealed. Very likely the errors would have been corrected and Petitioner

would have received a full and fair competency hearing. No criticism of Dr.

Mallory is intended. He is a well trained and competent psychologist who made 

scoring mistakes that he readily admitted. 

19

The position that Petitioner was not competent to waive his

rights to counsel and to seek post-conviction relief should have been

advanced by an attorney, either a counsel of record or a “next

friend.” The court’s failure to appoint such a representative

resulted in an evidentiary hearing that failed to adequately develop

all material facts and failed to afford Petitioner the process he was

due, resulting in a hearing that was neither full nor fair. Although

an adversarial competency proceeding is not mandatory, it would have

afforded an opportunity for the court to discover discrepancies in the

evidence presented to support a finding of competence. In a case 9

such as this, where there are problems in the one and only examining

doctor’s administration and scoring of psychological examinations that

go undisclosed during the state appellate process, the need for an

adversarial process escalates. This is especially true in a death

penalty case, where there are no advocates for the position that

Petitioner is incompetent. Therefore, the state court’s finding of

competence is not entitled to a presumption of correctness. 

Although, on the bases of the record before us and the difficulty

in looking back to a specific time over three years ago, we cannot say

with complete certainty that Petitioner was in fact incompetent at the

times in question, we find that the circumstances of the 2004

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competency hearing resulted in a hearing that was neither full nor

fair. The evidence before this Court shows sufficient indicia that

Petitioner was not competent at the time he waived his state postconviction appeals and his right to counsel to warrant equitable

tolling of the habeas statute of limitations. Furthermore, the

evidence shows that Petitioner’s probable incompetence continued to

interfere with his pursuit of habeas relief after the 2004 competency

hearing and continued for a large part, if not all of the time

following his hearing up to the present time. The evidence shows that

Petitioner continues to focus on his desire to end his life,

regardless of any possibility of having his conviction overturned on

review, although he has allowed his attorneys to proceed with his

habeas petition based upon his relationship with one of his attorneys.

Additionally, a motion is currently pending regarding the

admissibility of several declarations presented by Petitioner during

the evidentiary hearing. During the first day of the hearing,

Petitioner offered a declaration, Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 for

identification, which was used by the experts in formulating their

opinions. Respondent objected to the declaration on the basis of

authentication. The Court conditionally admitted the declaration and

instructed Petitioner to have the declaration authenticated.

Petitioner instead filed a lengthy memorandum of points and

authorities (Doc. 76) requesting that the declaration be admitted

without authentication, as it is admissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1746

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(signed documents dated and under penalty of perjury are treated as

verified and satisfy affidavit requirements in federal proceedings)

and Fed. R. Evid. 703 (which allows an expert to “rely on otherwise

inadmissible hearsay evidence in forming his opinion if the facts and

data upon which he relies are a type reasonably relied upon by experts

in his field.”) During the second day of the hearing, Petitioner

offered several additional declarations similar to Petitioner’s

Exhibit 4 for identification. These additional declarations were

marked Petitioner’s Exhibits 7-19 for identification. Respondent

again objected on the basis of authentication. The Court

conditionally admitted the declarations and invited Respondent to

respond to Petitioner’s motion. Respondent filed a Response (Doc. 77)

contending the declarations are hearsay and Fed. R. Evid. 703 does not

permit the admittance of inadmissible hearsay merely because an expert

relied upon the inadmissible hearsay. Although Petitioner presented

adequate support for the experts’ permissible use of the declarations

to form their opinions, he failed to present adequate support for the

admission of the actual declarations. Therefore, we find Petitioner’s

Exhibits 4 and 7-19 are inadmissible hearsay evidence. We have not

considered these declarations during the course of our review of the

issues currently before this Court. 

B. CONCLUSION

We find that the time between August 20, 2003 and April 15, 2004

to be statutorily tolled. We further find that the time between the

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date the statute of limitations began to run, whether that date is

August 20, 2003 (if the time between August 20, 2003 and April 15,

2004 is found not to have been statutorily excludable) or April 15,

2004, and the filing of the Petition for habeas relief on December 30,

2005 to be equitably tolled. Petitioner was not afforded a full and

fair hearing regarding his mental competency, and in all likelihood

he was mentally incompetent for a large part, if not all, of the time

preceding the filing of his Petition for habeas relief. Petitioner’s

mental impairment is an extraordinary circumstance that has

interrupted the limitation period, and therefore we find Petitioner’s

federal habeas petition (Doc. 13) is timely. 

The evidence received on the issue of timeliness of Petitioner’s

federal habeas petition will be considered during the review of the

merits of the Petition (Doc. 13). Parties have thirty (30) days from

the date of this order to present additional matters to be considered

in the Court’s review of Petitioner’s federal habeas petition.

Responses must be filed within fifteen (15) days of the filing of

additional matters. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 24 day of January 2008. th

 /S/ Robert T. Dawson 

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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