Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00233/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00233-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRACIE DARLENE McCUE, )

LAWRENCE GENE McCUE, and )

P.M., by and through his )

guardian ad litem, GRACIE )

DARLENE McCUE, )

)

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

)

SOUTH FORK UNION SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

NO. CV-F-10-233 OWW/DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER GRANTING IN PART WITH

PREJUDICE, GRANTING IN PART

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

(Doc.7) 

On January 13, 2010, Plaintiffs Gracie Darlene McCue,

Lawrence Gene McCue, and P.M., through his guardian ad litem,

Gracie Darlene McCue (“Plaintiffs”) filed a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) in the Kern County Superior Court against South

Fork Union School District, Robin Shive, Shannon Damron, Karen

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Zurin, Sabine Mixion (collectively “District Defendants”), Kern

County, Child Protective Services aka Kern County Child

Protective Services aka Kern County Department of Human Services,

Linda Lopez, Gabriela Johnson, Kern County Sheriff’s Department,

James D. Stratton (collectively “County Defendants”), Rick

Koernke, Sandy Koernke, and Does 1-100. The action was removed

to this Court on February 11, 2010.

Before the Court is the District Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress, the Seventh Cause of Action for Violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1985, the Ninth Cause of Action for Violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1986, the Eleventh Cause of Action for Violation of

California Civil Code §§ 43, 49, 51 and 52.1, the Twelfth Cause

of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and

Fourteenth Cause of Action for slander, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion to dismiss is

joined by the County Defendants as to the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth

Causes of Action. Alternatively, the District Defendants move

for a more definite statement as to the Eleventh and Twelfth

Causes of Action.

I. ALLEGATIONS OF FAC.

The FAC alleges that Gracie McCue is the mother of the

minor, P.M., and that Lawrence McCue is P.M.’s adopted father.

Rick and Sandy Koernke are alleged to be P.M.’s foster parents. 

As “Common Allegations,” the FAC alleges:

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22. Plaintiff P.M. is allergic to nuts. On

December 9, 2006, P.M. had a near fatal

reaction to nuts. After he was treated and

released from Eisenhower Medical Center,

Plaintiffs made appointments with Dr. Patrick

Leung, M.D., in Bakersfield, California, to

assess P.M.’s allergies. Dr. Leung ran

various tests and confirmed P.M. was very

allergic to nuts and all nut products. 

23. On December 22, 2006, P.M.’s parents,

DARLENE and LAWRENCE, personally hand carried

all information in reference to P.M.’s newly

discovered nut allergy to his school, South

Fork Elementary School (‘School’), which is

part of the SOUTH FORK UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT

(‘DISTRICT’) and had a meeting with the

Principal of South Fork Elementary School,

Ms. SHIVE, to discuss the accommodations that

P.M. would need to keep him safe and

accommodate his severe allergies and/or

disabilities. At this meeting, SHIVE refused

to make reasonable accommodations, and

instead stated that all she could do by way

of accommodation is sit P.M. at a nut free

table in the cafeteria for lunch. She

further insisted that South Fork Elementary

School and the DISTRICT would not stop

serving nuts or nut products.

24. During the remainder of the 2006-2007

school year there were several meetings with

the DISTRICT and its employees at which

Plaintiffs requested the DISTRICT consider

stop serving nut products, nuts, or food

items containing nut products at the School

to protect P.M. from any adverse reactions. 

At those meetings, SHIVE repeatedly stated

that the DISTRICT and the School, and the

staff at those locations where P.M. received

his education could not, and would not, stop

serving nuts as requested by the McCues. As

a result, the DISTRICT, School, SHIVE,

SHANNON DAMRON (‘DAMRON,’ the Second Grade

Teacher at South Fork), KAREN ZURIN (‘ZURIN,’

the Office Assistant at South Fork), and

SABINE Mixion (‘MIXION’), and each of them

personally refused to make any reasonable

accommodations for P.M. or under his

Individualized Education Plan as provided

under the Individuals with Disabilities

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Education Act, Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, and/or the Americans with

Disabilities Act.

25. P.M. started his second grade year on

August 21, 2007. At the beginning of P.M.’s

2007-2007 school year, the McCues held

another meeting with SHIVE. The McCues again

requested accommodations for P.M. to keep him

safe. At this time, SHIVE allegedly stated

to Plaintiffs, ‘We had a nut free table for

[P.M.] last year but we cannot do that this

year, all we can do to accommodate [P.M.] is

to make him eat his lunch in the office away

from all other children and this will keep

him safe.’ The McCues were dissatisfied with

this response and voiced their

dissatisfaction. Several meetings after this

change in circumstance, the McCues requested

accommodations to allow P.M. to eat his lunch

in the lunchroom with all his friends. 

However, SHIVE continued to insist that

eating in the office is all she, the

DISTRICT, and the School would do to

accommodate him during his lunch hour.

26. Meanwhile, from September of 2007 to

February of 2008, P.M. was very ill and

missed a lot of school. During P.M.’s

illnesses, the McCues continued to ask the

School and the DISTRICT for accommodations

for P.M. regarding his severe allergies and

sought help from the DISTRICT regarding his

other illnesses.

27. In September of 2007, a licensed medical

doctor diagnosed P.M. with an ear infection. 

In October 0f 227, a licensed medical doctor

diagnosed P.M. with Gastroenteritis. In

November of 2007, a licensed medical doctor

diagnosed P.M. with Streptococci Strep

Throat. In December of 2007, a licensed

medical doctor diagnosed P.M. with Viral

Meningitis. In January of 2008, a licensed

medical doctor diagnosed P.M. with a

Bacterial Blood Infection. In February of

2008, [a] licensed medical doctor diagnosed

P.M. with Influenza B, a Sinus Infection, and

an Upper Respiratory Infection. From

September of 2007, to December of 2007, P.M.

seemed to be getting much worse each month so

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on January 7, 2008, the McCues contacted UCLA

and set two appointments with their Doctors. 

The McCues scheduled an appointment with an

immune specialist, and another appointment

with a pain specialist, both on January 14,

2008, to examine P.M.

28. At the appointments, the Doctors and

UCLA ran several tests and drew blood from

P.M. Based upon those tests, Dr. Stiehm, Dr.

Tachdijian, and UCLA diagnosed P.M. with

Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS). 

Thereafter, STIEHM requested that P.M. be

admitted to Mattel Children’s Hospital at

UCLA and told the McCues that if P.M. should

get sick before the admission date (within a

couple of weeks) that the McCues should

immediately take him to the Mattel Children’s

Hospital at UCLA.

29. On January 27, 2008, P.M. began to run

[a] fever of 104 degrees Fahrenheit. 

Plaintiff DARLENE gave P.M. some Tylenol and

the fever went down to 101 degrees

Fahrenheit. However, by the next day, P.M.’s

fever was 105 degrees Fahrenheit. Again,

DARLENE gave P.M. Tylenol, but this time the

fever was not reduced and the McCues

proceeded to Kern Valley Hospital for

immediate medical treatment. At Kern Valley

Hospital a Dr. Martin treated P.M. Dr.

Martin explained to the McCues that because

P.M. had Viral Meningitis in December of

2007, P.M. may have Bacterial Meningitis this

time. Dr. Martin immediately suggested a

lumbar puncture. He explained to the McCues

that if P.M. had bacterial meningitis it

could cause death and that bacterial

meningitis can be fatal for children. Given

the information provided by Dr. Martin, [the]

McCues refused a lumbar puncture and

requested Dr. Martin contact Stiehm at Mattel

Children’s Hospital at UCLA for immediate

admission so that the McCues could

immediately drive to Mattel Children’s

Hospital at UCLA by car and enter P.M. into

the Hospital through the emergency room. Dr.

Martin then contacted Robert Roberts, M.D. 

Dr. Roberts confirmed to Dr. Martin that Dr.

Stiehm had arranged to admit P.M. to Mattel

Children’s Hospital at UCLA in seven days. 

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Dr. Martin then gave P.M. antibiotics and a

fever reducer and allowed P.M. to leave Kern

Valley Hospital with the promise from the

McCues that they would take P.M. immediately

to Mattel Children’s Hospital at UCLA.

30. The McCues then drove directly to the

emergency room at Mattel Children’s Hospital

at UCLA at about 5:30 a.m. Upon arrival, Dr.

Roberts was called to attend to P.M. The

McCues explained to Dr. Roberts that P.M. had

been sick from September 2007 through January

2008, and they needed help to get their child

well and keep him well. At the request of

Dr. Roberts and the Mattel Children’s

Hospital at UCLA, DARLENE signed several

release forms so Mattel Children’s Hospital

at UCLA could get P.M.’s past medical records

as part of the patient review process. The

McCues explained to Dr. Roberts that P.M. had

a high fever for two days, the fever had not

subsided with over-the-counter medication,

that they had taken P.M. to Kern Valley

Hospital due to the fever, and that Dr.

Martin had seen P.M. at Kern Valley Hospital. 

The McCues further explained to Dr. Roberts

that Dr. Martin insisted that P.M. needed an

emergency lumbar puncture and the McCues had

refused and requested to be released to get a

second opinion from Mattel Children’s

Hospital at UCLA. At this time Dr. Roberts

explained to the parents that getting a

second opinion was a great thing to do

because he found no signs that told him that

P.M. needed a lumbar puncture. After Dr.

Roberts completed his examination of P.M.,

Dr. Roberts explained to the McCues that he

and Dr. Stiehm decided to go ahead and admit

P.M. for a complete work up to find out why

P.M. was getting sick.

31. On January 29, 2008, P.M. was admitted

to Mattel Children’s Hospital at UCLA. On

January 30, 2008 at 8:00 a.m., South Fork

School and the DISTRICT were notified that

P.M. had been admitted to Mattel Children’s

Hospital at UCLA. On February 2, 2008, the

nurse at Mattel Children’s Hospital at UCLA

came into P.M.’s hospital room and told the

McCues that P.M. had Influenza B, a Sinus

Infection, and an Upper Respiratory

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Infection. Other tests were run by Dr.

Stiehm to check P.M.’s immune system. Those

tests showed that P.M. had a strong immune

system. After a ten (10) day stay at Mattel

Children’s Hospital at UCLA, Mattel

Children’s Hospital at UCLA, UCLA, and its

Doctors determined that P.M. had severe

allergies and that those allergies could have

been the reason he was getting sick so often. 

Mattel Children’s Hospital at UCLA, UCLA, and

its Doctors explained to the McCues that

because P.M. was having small reactions to

food and other things each day that P.M.’s

‘system’ was run down so that he would easily

become ill when exposed to germs, bacteria,

or viruses that would not normally make

others ill.

32. On January 31, 2008, Ms. Borelli came to

P.M.’s hospital room at Mattel Children’s

Hospital at UCLA and explained to the McCues

that she had to run through some tests as per

the Doctors’ request at Mattel Children’s

Hospital at UCLA and UCLA.

33. On February 28, 2008, South Fork

Elementary School had an event so the middle

school and elementary school children were

present and all on the play ground all at

once. During that event, South Fork

Elementary School served peanut butter

cookies to all of the students with full

knowledge that P.M. was allergic to peanuts. 

Plaintiff DARLENE was at the School to help

out and noticed P.M. began to have a severe

rash starting to form over his body. 

Plaintiff DARLENE asked Sherry Web, the

lunch-room manager at the School, what was in

the cookies and Ms. Web responded ‘peanut

butter.’ Plaintiff DARLENE realized at that

point that P.M. was having a reaction to the

peanut butter cookies and that this caused

the rash. Plaintiff DARLENE immediately

removed P.M. from the School and took P.M.

home. Upon arriving home, P.M. began having

trouble breathing. Plaintiff DARLENE then

telephoned P.M.’s allergist, Dr. Leung, and

Dr. Leung instructed DARLENE to get P.M.’s

Epi-pen and transport P.M. to Dr. Leung’s

office right away. Plaintiff DARLENE then

drove P.M. immediately to Dr. Leung’s office

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for medical treatment for the exposure to

nuts and nut products.

34. After this incident, Plaintiff DARLENE

telephoned the State Board of Education to

see what could be done to get the DISTRICT to

accommodate P.M.’s allergies.

35. The School [sic] Board of Education

informed Plaintiff DARLENE that SHIVE and the

DISTRICT were breaking the law and they would

call SHIVE right away and let her know that

she must make the appropriate accommodations

for P.M. under the educational laws.

36. Plaintiff [sic] is informed and believes

and on such basis alleges that the school

staff, i.e., SHIVE, DAMRON, ZURIN, MIXION,

and the DISTRICT were reprimanded by the

State Board of Education. And, thereafter

became angry toward the McCues, and acted

toward them with malice in doing the things

alleged herein below.

37. The McCues believe and, therefore,

allege that SHIVE, DAMRON, ZURIN, MIXION, and

the DISTRICT and its staff elected,

intentionally, to disregard their obligations

to P.M. under state and federal law, and to

work toward removing P.M. from the DISTRICT,

or otherwise intimidating the McCues so that

they would not pursue their rights to

accommodations for their child. Plaintiffs

are further informed and believe and on such

basis allege that the DISTRICT sought to

avoid, and did avoid, its obligations to make

reasonable accommodations for P.M.’s

condition, and did so maliciously.

38. After receiving a referral for potential

child endangerment from Dr. Bekmezian at UCLA

in early February 2008, the KERN COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPT., unbeknowst to Plaintiffs,

initiated an investigation into the medical

condition of P.M. This investigation

included the review of most medical records

of P.M. and took several weeks. Before the

investigation was complete, CPS and JAMES D.

STRATTON (‘STRATTON’) made the decision to

remove P.M. from the custody of his parents,

in the absence of exigent circumstances and

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without a reasonable belief that the child

was in imminent danger of serious bodily

injury. On or about March 6, 2008, CPS and

the KERN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT and

STRATTON arrived at South Fork Elementary

School, without any notice to the McCues, and

removed P.M. from School around 11:30 a.m.

without first obtaining a warrant to do so. 

No one notified P.M.’s Parents (the McCues)

until 2:30 p.m., at which time STRATTON met

with the McCues at their home. STRATTON told

the McCues that P.M. had been taken away

because Plaintiff DARLENE took too good a

care of P.M. and was at school with P.M. too

much and that they had received a complaint

that maybe P.M. had received way too much

medical attention.

39. At no time prior to P.M.’s removal and

detention did any Defendant attempt to obtain

a warrant or other court order authorizing

the removal of P.M. Plaintiffs are informed

and believe, and on that basis allege that

the removal was done in secret, without a

warrant, in the absence of exigent

circumstances, and in the absence of any

imminent danger of serious bodily injury in

accordance with the general policies,

practices and customs of KERN COUNTY and its

SHERIFFS.

40. After CPS removed P.M. from the McCues’

home, P.M. was transferred out of the

DISTRICT to a school located in Bakersfield,

California. SHIVE remained in contact and

continued to disclose confidential

information to Mattel Children’s Hospital at

UCLA, UCLA, its Doctors, and Ms. Borelli

without any legal basis to do so.

41. Defendant SHIVE called Plaintiff DARLENE

on the telephone on March 7, 2009 [sic], the

morning after P.M. was taken away from the

McCues by CPS. She already knew P.M. had

been removed and detained. During the

telephone conversation she sarcastically

asked DARLENE ‘How is [P.M.]?’ When

Plaintiff DARLENE responded, SHIVE, in a

retaliatory and threatening manner,

responded: ‘Well, when you have a problem

with me, you don’t call the School [sic]

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Board of Education. You deal with me only.’ 

SHIVE intimated that she was in fact the

driving force behind P.M.’s removal and

detention, and that said removal was in

retaliation for DARLENE’s efforts to lawfully

obtain reasonable accommodations for her son.

42. On March 10, 2008, without Plaintiffs’

knowledge or consent, Ms. DAMRON, P.M.’s

teacher at the DISTRICT, announced to P.M.’s

whole class with all classmates present that

‘P.M. had been taken away from his parents

and put in a foster home and now he will be

safe and he would not be coming back.’ In

the afternoon on March 10, 2008, the McCues

began receiving telephone calls from parents

of children in P.M.’s class asking if it was

true that P.M. had been taken away. The

McCues told the parents it was true and asked

how they found this out. The parents of

P.M.’s classmates stated that their children

came home telling them that Ms. Damron

announced to the class after lunch that P.M.

had been taken away from his parents and put

in a foster home and that he would now be

safe and would not be coming back to school

in violation of the McCue’s [sic]

constitutional right to privacy arising under

Article 1, Section 1 of the California

Constitution. The McCues then received

letters from several children and their

families describing what Ms. DAMRON had

stated.

43. After P.M. was taken away on March 6,

2008, the McCues were not allowed to see or

speak to P.M. for four (4) days. P.M.

suffered emotionally and physically due to

his removal from the McCues. CPS placed P.M.

in a foster home in Bakersfield, California. 

After being placed in the foster home, P.M.

was not allowed to attend school for a month. 

P.M. was not allowed to take his medications

for three (3) weeks. P.M. was not allowed to

have his epi-pen with him for a month even

though P.M.’s doctors had ordered that P.M.

have the epi-pen with him at all times. The

temporary foster parents, Mr. and Mrs.

Slatton, eventually told the McCues that CPS

would not give them any of P.M.’s medical

information so the foster parents could not

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enroll P.M. in school.

CPS also did not give Mr. and Mrs. Slatton

the proper information on P.M.’s allergies

and what to do if P.M. had a reaction. While

with Mr. and Mrs. Slatton, the social worker,

MS. LOPEZ told Plaintiff DARLENE that CPS did

not believe had nut allergies and that the

foster family would feed P.M. whatever they

wanted and there was nothing Plaintiff

DARLENE could do about it. Also, MS. LOPEZ

told the McCues that CPS told the foster

parents to feed the other children nut

products and make P.M. play with these kids

so that CPS could find out if P.M. really had

a nut allergy. At this point, the McCues

asked MS. LOPEZ if P.M. were to have a

reaction and die in CPS’s care would they

tell the parents and MS. LOPEZ said

‘sometimes’ and proceeded to smile

maliciously at the McCues.

44. MS. LOPEZ and MS. JOHNSON investigated

and prepared reports for filing with the Kern

County Superior Court, which accused the

McCues of causing or potentially causing

serious physical harm to P.M., failing to

protect P.M., causing serious emotional

damage to P.M., committing acts of cruelty

against P.M., and failing to protect P.M.

against acts of cruelty. Based upon the

inaccurate, false and uninvestigated

statements in those reports by MS. LOPEZ and

MS. JOHNSON, CPS supported the complaint

against the McCues without further

investigation and with the knowledge that its

claims were false and unsupported by any

evidence.

45. On March 7, 2008, the McCues met OFFICER

JAMES D. STRATTON at the KERN COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT in Lake Isabella,

California, and presented all medical records

and documents in their possession to prove

P.M. needed the medical treatment he had

received in the past seven (7) years. 

OFFICER STRATTON stated that the McCues had

proven their innocence to him and he agreed

P.M. should not have been taken.

46. Notwithstanding the foregoing, SHERIFF

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DEFENDANTS and CPS prepared a Juvenile

Dependency Petition filed in the Superior

Court, County of Kern, Metropolitan Division

- Juvenile Justice Center that contained

knowingly false information and purposely

suppressed, and failed to include,

exculpatory evidence. Said defendants, and

each of them, participated in the fabrication

of evidence with the intent to submit that

false evidence to the Court. Thereafter, on

July 15, 2008 and September 26, 2008, Social

Studies and Supplemental Reports that related

to the McCues contained knowingly false

information and purposely suppressed

exculpatory evidence.

47. In submitting such documentation,

DEFENDANTS, including Defendant LOPEZ

intentionally and knowingly did so with a

conscious disregard for the rights and well

being of the McCUE family, and in fact did so

with actual malicious intent in that she

desired to punish the McCues.

48. On April 4, 2008 P.M. was moved to a

second foster home in Lake Isabella,

California. The new foster parents were the

KOERNKES. While residing with and under the

care of the KOERNKES, the KOERNKES allegedly

abused P.M. and treated him cruelly. 

Specifically, P.M. was not allowed by the

KOERNKES to say when he was in pain. P.M.

was told by the KOERNKES that if he showed

any signs of being in pain he would not get

to eat. The KOERNKES then withheld food from

P.M. as punishment for saying he was having

any pain. The KOERNKES coerced and forced

P.M. to sit in the car unattended while the

KOERNKES went inside various stores to buy

food. The KOERNKES would offer money to P.M.

not to tell the social worker and the McCues

how the KOERNKES treated him. The KOERNKES

also withheld food from P.M. and told him

that it he did not tell the social worker and

the McCues what they told him to say, that he

would not get food and would not see his

parents again. On those occasions when SANDY

KOERNKE believed that P.M. had said something

she had not approved, he was sent to bed

hungry and without dinner. The KOERNKES also

made P.M. do chores to earn food. If P.M.

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did not complete the chores, the KOERNKES

limited food to P.M. to small portions to

control him. This continued to occur even

though the McCues paid the KOERNKES

additional money per month for P.M. above and

beyond what they were required to pay and

what the KOERNKES received through CPS and

the foster care system (approximately

$485.00). SANDY KOERNKE also during this

time told P.M. she could not afford food for

him, they needed money to take care of P.M.,

and failed to reveal and suppressed the fact

that they would be and/or were already

getting money in the approximate amount of

$485.00 from CPS and/or the foster care

system, a fact which was known to the KOERNKE

DEFENDANTS at all times herein mentioned. 

These statements that they could not afford

food and needed money to take care of P.M.,

coupled with the suppression of the fact that

they were receiving money from CPS and/or the

foster care system lead the McCues to believe

that the KOERNKE’s [sic] did not have the

funds to take care of P.M. and that it was

the McCues responsibility to provide money

for his case to the KOERNKE’s [sic]. 

Thereafore, the McCues gave the KOERNKE’s

[sic] additional monies each month so that

the KOERNKE’s [sic] could take care of their

son. At the time the McCues were giving the

KOERNKE’s [sic] the additional funds they did

not know that CPS and/or the foster care

system was also providing the KOERNKE’s [sic]

with $485.00 per month to take care of P.M. 

The McCues relied on the representations of

the KOERNKE DEFENDANTS to their detriment. 

Had they known the KOERNKE’s [sic] were

receiving money from CPS and/or the foster

care system, they would never have given the

KOERNKE’s [sic] money to take care of P.M.

49. In addition, while P.M. was at the

KOERNKES’ home, CPS insisted P.M. attend

school again in the DISTRICT as the School

(South Fork Elementary School).

50. During the time P.M. was in the home of

the KOERNKE DEFENDANTS, the CPS DEFENDANTS

did not conduct any visits with P.M. at the

home of the KOERNKE’s [SIC] in order to

monitor the placement of P.M., a mandatory

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statutory duty under the law.

51. Due to P.M.’s removal from his Parents,

missing school and abuse at the second foster

home, he developed extreme anxiety and became

afraid to eat the food at school given the

incident with the peanut butter cookies at

the School. He has been diagnosed with Post

Traumatic Stress Disorder. To complicate

this, after the DISTRICT and MS. SHIVE stated

the School was ‘nut free,’ on April 16, 2008,

the DISTRICT passed out a snack to the

students in the classroom and this snack

contained nuts and/or nut products. P.M.

refused to eat this snack and was given

another snack. This only increased P.M.’s

fear of school.

52. After returning home on July 15, 2008,

P.M. is not the same child that CPS removed,

now cries very easily, he hides behind his

parents if a car drives by, he wets his

pants, talks like a baby, will not sleep

alone, sleeps with a teddy bear, hides food,

takes more food than he can eat, cries if he

thinks he may not get food when it is meal

time, does not want to be alone, even for a

minute. He panics if his parents leave the

room. He has panic attacks if someone talks

about school or going to school, says he

hates school, and does not trust any

teachers. He believes he will be taken away

again if he leaves his Parents’ side. He is

in therapy and on medication to cope with

what has happened to him. He suffered

emotionally and physically in the second

foster home run by the KOERNKES. He suffered

emotionally and physically when MS. LOPEZ

told him when he was first taken that ‘if he

did not stop crying he would never see his

parents again.’

53. The McCues and each of them have had to

go seek medical and psychological counseling

and services due to the conduct of

Defendants, and each of them. They too

suffered as a result of comments by MS. LOPEZ

who stated that if they said the wrong thing

while they were visiting P.M. that they would

never get to see him again.

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54. On or about September 3, 2008,

plaintiffs presented a written claim for

damages to Defendants (hereinafter ‘the

public entity defendants’) for the acts

described in this complaint. On or about

October 23, 2008 (pursuant to an extension

entered into between the Defendant DISTRICT

and the plaintiffs) plaintiffs presented a

written amended claim for damages to the

defendants intended to address the

insufficiencies alleged by the South Fork

Union School DISTRICT) in response to the

initial claim filed by Claimants on or about

September 3, 2008. Plaintiffs’ claims were

all rejected.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS.

A. Governing Standards.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) th

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the

complaint presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead

essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a th

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences

from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). “A district court th

should grant a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs have not pled

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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face.’” Williams ex rel. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 F.3d

934, 938 (9 Cir.2008), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley,

th

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “‘Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Bell Atlantic, id. at 555. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully, Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that

are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___

U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court explained:

Two working principles underlie our decision

in Twombley. First, the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitations of

the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice

... Rule 8 marks a notable and generous

departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does

not unlock the doors of discovery for a

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plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that

states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss ... Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief

will ... be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense ... But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ....

In keeping with these principles, a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to

begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While

legal conclusions can provide the framework

of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.

 Immunities and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on

a motion to dismiss only when they are established on the face of

the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th

Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

Cir. 1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached

to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc, 146

F.3d 699, 705-706 (9 Cir.1988). th

B. Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress.

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District Defendants and County Defendants move to dismiss

the Fifth Cause of Action for negligent infliction of emotional

distress on the ground that California case law does not

recognize an independent tort of negligent infliction of

emotional distress; rather, the claim is a type of negligence.

See Lawson v. Management Activities, Inc., 69 Cal.App.4th 652,

656 (1999). It is well settled that negligent infliction of

emotional distress is not an independent tort; rather it is the

tort of negligence to which the duty of care, breach of duty,

causation and damage elements apply. See Marlene F. v.

Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.3d 583, 588

(1989); see also Friedman v. Merck & Co., 107 Cal.App.4th 454

(2003)(no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to

another, a duty must arise (1) independently by law and (2) be

assumed by defendant or found through some special relationship

between the parties). 

Plaintiffs do not respond to this ground for dismissal and

by lack of response concede that dismissal with prejudice of the

Fifth Cause of Action is appropriate. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action with

prejudice is GRANTED.1

C. Seventh Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

The Fourth Cause of Action for Negligence is brought by P.M. 1

against the County Defendants and the Koernke Defendants only; it

is not alleged against the District Defendants.

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The District Defendants move to dismiss Count Three of the

Seventh Cause of Action for denial of reasonable accommodations

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the ground that Plaintiffs

have failed to comply with the IDEA. 

2

Count Three “re-alleges, and to the extent applicable,

incorporates by reference ... all paragraphs from the Common

Allegations.” Count Three further alleges in pertinent part:

147. The Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (IDEA) is a federal education

law that forms the foundation for special

education throughout the country. It helps

guarantee that students with disabilities

from birth through age 21 receive a ‘free

appropriate public education’ so that they

can go to school every day, learn what other

students learn, but in different ways, and

have their individual educational needs

determined and addressed. The obligations

arising under the IDEA are mandatory

statutory obligations which rise to the level

of a constitutional rights [sic] in favor of

the beneficiaries of said Statutory [sic]

construct. See e.g. Carlo v. City of Chino,

105 F.3d 493, 502 (9 Cir.1997). th

148. Plaintiff P.M. is a member of the class

protected by the aforementioned statute, and

others.

149. As set forth in some measure of detail

above, the District Defendants were obligated

to make reasonable accommodations in light of

P.M.’s condition and refused to do so. In so

refusing, the District Defendants, and each

of them, violated P.M.’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

150. Plaintiff [sic] is informed and

Count One is brought by Plaintiff P.M. against the County 2

Defendants for unlawful seizure. Count Two is brought by all

Plaintiffs against the County Defendants for deprivation of

familial association.

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believes and on such basis alleges that the

aforementioned duties are ‘clearly

established’ such that a reasonable school

official in Defendants’ situation would know

it is unlawful to do the things herein

alleged without due process of law.

151. In addition, there is a Constitutional

privacy interest in maintaining the

confidentiality of ones [sic] private affairs

which may not be impinged upon by the

government, or its actors. Plaintiffs are

informed and believe and on such basis allege

that said privacy interest is so clearly

established that any reasonable school

official faced with similar circumstances

would know it is unlawful to publish to the

entire class room, the private affairs of

P.M. and his parents, as alleged herein.

152. Defendants, without privilege to do so,

knowingly, willfully, and intentionally

violated the rights of P.M. when they refused

to make reasonable accommodations for his

illness, and further violated the privacy

interests of all Plaintiff’s when Defendants

announced to P.M.’s entire class that P.M.

had been removed for DARLENE and LAWRENCE,

and the purported reasons why.

The IDEA is a comprehensive educational scheme that confers

on students with disabilities a substantive right to public

education. See Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 481 F.3d 770,

776 (9 Cir.2007); Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.3d th

1298, 1300 (9 Cir.1992). The IDEA provides financial th

assistance to enable states to meet their educational needs, but

conditions funding on the effectuation of a policy that assures

all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate

public education (“FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). To that end,

the IDEA requires that school districts develop an IEP for each

child with a disability. See Winkleman ex rel. Winkleman v.

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Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 518 (2007). When a party is

dissatisfied with “the adequacy of the education provided, the

construction of the IEP, or some related matter,” Winkleman, id.

at 525, the IDEA provides a procedural recourse. Participating

states are required to establish procedures giving an opportunity

for any party to present a complaint concerning an IEP. 20

U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). California has adopted legislation to

comply with these procedures. See California Education Code §

56500-56507; 5 California Code of Regulations §§ 3040-3054. 20

U.S.C. § 1415(l) provides:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to

restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and

remedies available under the Constitution,

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,

title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or

other Federal laws protecting the rights of

children with disabilities, except that

before the filing of a civil action under

such laws seeking relief that is also

available under this subchapter, the

procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of

this section shall be exhausted to the same

extent was would be required had the action

been brought under this subchapter.

“The IDEA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his or her

administrative remedies before commencing suit if that person is

‘seeking relief that is also available under’ the IDEA.” Robb v.

Bethel School Dist. # 403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9 Cir.2002). th

Robb explains:

[A] plaintiff cannot avoid the IDEA’s

exhaustion requirement merely by limiting a

prayer for relief to money damages. We

understand ‘available’ relief to mean relief

suitable to remedy the wrong done the

plaintiff, which may not always be relief in

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the precise form the plaintiff prefers ...

Our primary concern in determining whether a

plaintiff must use the IDEA’s administrative

procedures relates to the source and nature

of the alleged injuries for which he or she

seeks a remedy, not the specific remedy

requested. The dispositive question

generally is whether the plaintiff has

alleged injuries that could be redressed to

any degree by the IDEA’s administrative

procedures and remedies. If so, exhaustion

of those remedies is required. If not, the

claim necessarily falls outside the IDEA’s

scope, and exhaustion is unnecessary. Where

the IDEA’s ability to remedy a particular

injury is unclear, exhaustion should be

required to give educational agencies an

initial opportunity to ascertain and

alleviate the alleged problem.

Id. at 1049-1050.

The District Defendants assert that Count Three of the

Seventh Cause of Action clearly and unquestionably falls under

the IDEA, contending that Count Three attempts to assert that

they violated the IDEA by denying reasonable accommodations for

P.M.’s peanut allergy. Plaintiffs do not allege that they made

any formal complaint or exhausted the procedural requirements of

the IDEA prior to filing this action. Therefore, Plaintiffs have

failed to comply with these requirements and Plaintiffs’ claim

fails as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs respond that Count Three alleges more than a

violation of the IDEA by denying reasonable accommodations. 

Plaintiffs refer to the allegations concerning the alleged

invasion of privacy set forth in Paragraphs 151 and 152. 

Plaintiffs also refer to the allegations in Paragraphs 33-44,

incorporated by reference in Count Three, asserting that

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Plaintiffs have alleged “that an employee of the District became

upset with Plaintiff for ‘going over her head’ and decided, in

conspiracy with others in positions of authority, to retaliate

against Plaintiffs by orchestrating the events complained of

herein, including having Plaintiff P.M. removed from his parents

by reports that were not true” and further asserting that, at the

date of the alleged invasion of privacy, P.M. had already been

removed from the school and the custody of his parents.

Plaintiffs contend that the District Defendants failed to

address these allegations in their opening brief and should not

be given the opportunity to address these allegations for the

first time in their reply brief, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of

the opportunity to respond. Generally, issues raised for the

first time in a reply brief are considered waived. See Eberle v.

City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9 Cir.1990). th

However, the Court has discretion to consider arguments made

in response to an opposition brief. In addition, the issue

presented is whether, in the context of IDEA cases, the Ninth

Circuit recognizes the requirement of exhaustion of

administrative remedies as jurisdictional in nature. See Robb v.

Bethel Sch. Dist. # 403, 308 F.3d 1047 (9 Cir.2002), Dreher v. th

Amphitheater Unif. Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228, 221 (9 Cir.1994). th

The District Defendants’ arguments in reply to Plaintiffs’

opposition will be considered. Any prejudice to Plaintiffs was 

negated by oral argument.

In any event, Plaintiffs argue that “the flaw in Defendants’

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motion is that the aforementioned claims of P.M. and his parents

are not ‘also available under this part’ under 20 U.S.C. §

1451(l).” Plaintiffs contend there was no administrative

exhaustion requirement “for such allegations.” Plaintiffs argue

that “the contentions are that the disclosure made in the class

room was part and parcel of a conspiracy to retaliate against

Plaintiffs, including setting in motion the wrongful removal of

the child from the parents based on falsehoods.” 

The District Defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ attempt to

focus on the allegations in Paragraphs 151-152, ignores that the

caption of Count Three is “denial of reasonable accommodations”

pursuant to the IDEA and belies that Plaintiffs are actually

attempting to allege a conspiracy to retaliate or an allegation

of slander in Count Three. The District Defendants assert:

Even if this were not the case ..., the

application of Plaintiffs’ arguments would

result in the failure of Plaintiffs’ claims

for violation of the IDEA, as a matter of

law. This is because the IDEA was enacted to

insure that all handicapped children have

appropriate, free public education and

associated services available to them, and an

allegation of conspiracy to retaliate and/or

slander regarding P.M. [sic] placement in

foster care in no way supports a claim for

violation of the IDEA and/or the failure to

provide a reasonable accommodation. 

The District Defendants assert that the crux of Count Three is a

claim that the District Defendants violated the IDEA by denying

reasonable accommodation for P.M.’s peanut allergy, which

included retaliation and invasion of privacy.

Plaintiffs further argue that, even if administrative relief

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were applicable, such relief would have been futile. Plaintiffs

cite Witte v. Clark County School Dist., 197 F.3d 1271 (9th

Cir.1999), and Blanchard v. Morton School Dist., 420 F.3d 918

(9 Cir.2005). th

In Witte, a student with Tourette’s Syndrome filed a civil

action seeking damages for past physical and emotional abuse

after he was allegedly force-fed food to which he was allergic,

strangled, subjected to “take downs,” forced to walk and run

despite hindering deformities, and deprived of food. 197 F.3d at

1271. The Witte Court decided exhaustion was not necessary

because the parties (1) had resolved all educational issues

through the IEP process, (2) sought only retrospective damages,

and (3) had claims centering around physical abuse and injuries. 

197 F.3d at 1276-1276.

In Blanchard, the mother of an autistic child brought a

Section 1983 action for damages for alleged emotional distress to

her caused by the conduct of the defendants in providing special

education services to her son under the IDEA and for

reimbursement for the income she lost while pursuing her son’s

remedies under the IDEA. The District Court granted the

defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that Blanchard had

failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA. The

Ninth Circuit reversed:

The remedies available under the IDEA include

educational services for disabled children

... They do not provide an adequate remedy

for Blanchard. 

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We held in Witte that a plaintiff seeking

monetary relief for alleged past physical and

emotional abuse by school staff was not

required to exhaust administrative remedies

under the IDEA ... We emphasized that ‘all

educational issues already had been resolved

to the parties’ mutual satisfaction through

the [administrative] process.’ ... That is

true here, as well. Following Witte, we hold

that Blanchard had no remedies under the IDEA

to exhaust. Blanchard had resolved the

educational issues implicated by her son’s

disability and had obtained the educational

relief available under the IDEA on behalf of

her son. 

The District relies on Robb. In that case, a

student with cerebral palsy and her parents

sought damages for lost educational

opportunities, emotional distress,

humiliation, embarrassment, and psychological

injury after the student was removed from the

classroom for extended tutoring. Robb, 308

F.3d at 1048. We held that because these

injuries could be remedied to some degree by

the IDEA’s administrative procedures and

remedies, the plaintiffs must exhaust those

administrative remedies before filing suit. 

Id. at 1054. We stated: ‘Where, as here, a

plaintiff’s injuries are part and parcel of

the educational process, we must give the

local administrators the first opportunity to

remedy them.’ Id. at 1053 n.4. In this

case, however, Blanchard’s emotional distress

injuries and lost income could not be

remedied through the educational remedies

available under the IDEA. See Witte, 197

F.3d at 1275.

The District also stresses that the IDEA

requires school to provide ‘related services’

to education, including ‘psychological

services, ... social work services [and]

counseling services, ... as may be required

to assist a child with a disability to

benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. §

1402(26)(A) ... The regulations implementing

the statute provide that the required

psychological services may include

‘[p]lanning and managing a program of

psychological services, including

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psychological counseling for children and

parents.’ ... The act thus has some provision

for counseling parents, but only with respect

to assisting the child ... The psychological

services available under the IDEA would not

provide a remedy for Blanchard’s own claims

of emotional injury.

420 F.3d at 921-922.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit in Robb v.

Bethel School Dist., supra, and Kutasi v. Las Virgenes Unified

School Dist., “somewhat circumscribe[] the foregoing

authorities.” Plaintiffs assert, however, that even under Robb

and Kutasi, Plaintiffs would not be required to exhaust

administrative remedies:

In the case at bar, the educational issues

are merely the background for an alleged

conspiracy - as alleged in more detail for

example in Counts One and Two of the Seventh

Cause of Action. They are not at issue by

the claim. The horrible and damaging 3

disclosure directly related to, and was in

support of, such unlawful conduct. The child

had already been removed from the home by CPS

and was in its custody, thus precluding

Plaintiffs DARLENE and LAWRENCE MCCUE from

bringing any administrative claim. The

administrative process could neither correct

that problem nor award compensation for the

act complained of herein. As such,

exhaustion was not required.

To the extent this claim may, in part, be 3

read otherwise, Plaintiffs recognize that

those allegations, and not the allegations in

paragraphs 151 and 152, likely would be

subject to exhaustion.

The District Defendants reply that Plaintiffs are not exempt

from the exhaustion requirement based on their contention that

P.M. had already been removed by CPS. Citing 20 U.S.C. §

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1415(b)(7)(B) and (c), the District Defendants contend that the

IDEA requires that a request for an impartial due process hearing

be brought within two years of the date the parent or agency knew

or should have known about the alleged action that forms the

basis of the complaint.

There is nothing in the statutes cited by the District

Defendants that sets forth a two year limitations period to

request an impartial due process hearing. However, 20 U.S.C. §

1415(f)(3)(C) provides:

A parent or agency shall request an impartial

due process hearing within 2 years of the

date the parent or agency knew or should have

known about the alleged action that forms the

basis of the complaint, or, if the State has

an explicit time limitation for requesting

such a hearing under this subchapter, in such

time as the State allows.

California Education Code § 56505(l) provides: 

A request for a due process hearing arising

under subdivision (a) of Section 56501 shall

be filed within two years from the date the

party initiating the request knew or had

reason to know of the facts underlying the

basis for the request. In accordance with

Section 1415(f)(3)(D) of Title 20 of the

United States Code, the time period specified

in this subdivision does not apply to a

parent if the parent was prevented from

requesting the due process hearing to either

of the following:

(1) Specific misrepresentations by the local

educational agency that it has solved the

problem forming the basis of the due process

hearing request.

(2) The withholding of information by the

local educational agency from the parent that

was required under this part to be provided

to the parent.

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The District Defendants argue:

Here, Plaintiffs contend that District

Defendants first failed to make a reasonable

accommodation in December of 2006, and

according to the FAC, P.M. was not removed

from his parents home until March 6, 2008. 

Additionally, P.M. was subsequently returned

home on July 15, 2008, and the FAC was not

filed until January 2010. As such,

Plaintiffs had ample time to file an

administrative complaint and exhaust

administrative remedies prior to the filing

of the instant action.

The District Defendants further note that Witte and

Blanchard are distinguishable from the allegations in the FAC;

Plaintiffs do not allege, as iin Witte and Blanchard, that the

educational issues had been settled to the parties’ mutual

satisfaction prior to the filing of the civil action. 

To the extent that Count Three of the Seventh Cause of

Action alleges a violation of the IDEA, the motion to dismiss is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to comply with the IDEA’s

procedural requirements. Plaintiffs’ allegations that the

District Defendants failed to provide a reasonable accommodation

for P.M.’s peanut allergy is an injury that could be redressed to

any degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures. In fact,

Plaintiffs allege that Darlene called the State Board of

Education to complain about the actions of school personnel

regarding P.M.’s allergy. Plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent

these requirements by focusing on the allegations of invasion of

privacy through the statement of Defendant Damron and by

asserting a conspiracy to obtain P.M.’s removal from the school,

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ignores the actual allegations of the FAC and of Count Three. 

However, the allegations in Paragraphs 151-152 may be stand alone

if stated as separate claims independent of the IDEA and its

procedural requirements. Because the pleadings are obscure, the

motion to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND.3

D. Eighth Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1985.

District Defendants and County Defendants move to dismiss

the Eighth Cause of Action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

The Eighth Cause of Action is brought by all Plaintiffs

against all Defendants. The Eighth Cause of Action “re-alleges,

and to the extent applicable, incorporates by reference herein as

if set forth in full, all paragraphs from the Common Allegations

above, and the First through Seventh Causes of Action.” The

Eighth Cause of Action then alleges:

160. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, acting

under color of state law, conspired to

deprive, and did deprive, PLAINTIFFS of their

rights under the laws of the United States.

161. Specifically, DEFENDANTS conspired to,

and did: unlawfully seize and remove the

minor Plaintiff from the care of his parents,

For clarity and fairness to Defendants and the Court, 3

Plaintiffs must incorporate by reference the specific preceding

paragraphs upon which they rely in stating a claim. Wholesale

incorporation of all preceding allegations, no matter how relevant

or against which Defendant, is not helpful to the determination

whether a claim has been stated, especially with allegations of

this complexity. Further, the Court expresses no opinion whether

or not the Amended Complaint will be subject to the administrative

exhaustion requirements of the IDEA.

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without a warrant, court order, consent,

probable cause, or exigent circumstances; on

information and belief denied PLAINTIFFS

their right to a hearing on said detention

within 72 hours of the removal; and continued

to detain minor Plaintiff P.M. for an

unreasonable period after any alleged basis

for detention had been negated.

162. In addition, DEFENDANTS, and each of

them, conspired to use trickery, duress,

fabrication and/or false testimony or

evidence, and failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence in preparing and presenting reports

and court documents to the Court. The

conduct of DEFENDANTS, and each of them,

interfered with Plaintiffs’ rights, including

minor Plaintiff’s right to be protected

against unlawful seizure under the Fourth

Amendment of the Constitution of the United

States, and the right to familial association

free from government interference as

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment ....

163. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, engaged

in said conspiracies for the purpose of

depriving Plaintiffs equal protection of the

laws of the State of California and of the

United States, and depriving them of their

rights under the Constitutions of the United

States and the State of California. (Need

allegations of protected class here).

164. COUNTY DEFENDANTS, and each of them,

took several acts in furtherance of the

conspiracy, including but not limited to:

unlawfully removing and detaining minor

Plaintiff P.M. from the care of his parents

without a warrant, court order, consent,

probable cause, or exigent circumstances;

continuing to detain P.M. for an unreasonable

period after any alleged basis for detention

had been negated; and by procuring false

testimony, fabricating evidence, and failing

to disclose exculpatory evidence in preparing

and presenting reports and court documents to

the Court in relation to P.M.’s dependency

proceedings.

The Eighth Cause of Action does not specify which clause of

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Section 1985 it invokes. Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing that

Section 1985(2), which makes unlawful a conspiracy to deter any

party or witness from attending federal court or testifying in

federal court or a conspiracy to obstruct justice in any state

court with the intent of depriving any citizen of the equal

protection of the laws, has no application to this action. 

Section 1985(2) contains two clauses that give rise to separate

causes of action. To state a claim under the first clause of

Section 1985(2), plaintiffs must allege the following elements:

(1) a conspiracy by the defendants; (2) to injure a party or

witness in his person or property; (3) because he attended

federal court or testified in any matter pending in federal

court; (4) resulting in injury or damages to the plaintiff. 

There is no requirement of class-based animus to state a claim

under the first clause of Section 1985(2). See Portman v. County

of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9 Cir. 1993). To state a th

claim under the second clause of Section 1985(2), the plaintiff

must allege (1) a conspiracy by the defendants; (2) to impede,

hinder, obstruct, or defeat the due course of justice in a state

court; intending to deprive any citizen of the equal protection

of the laws, i.e., that defendants acted with class-based animus. 

Portman, id.; Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1029 (9 Cir. th

1985).

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

under Section 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege the following four

elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving,

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either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of

the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and

immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of this

conspiracy; and (4) whereby a person is either injured in his

person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a

citizen of the United States. United Bhd. of Carpenters v.

Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-829 (1983). The second of these four

elements requires that in addition to identifying a legally

protected right, that the complaint allege that the conspiracy

was motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,

invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’

action. Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9 Cir.1985). th

“To prove a violation of § 1985(3), [Plaintiff] must show ‘some

racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously

discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action. The

conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the

equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.’” Orin v.

Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9 Cir.2001), quoting Griffin v. th

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). “A claim under [Section

1985(3)] must allege facts to support the allegation that

defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy

without factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v.

Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9 Cir.1988). In th

Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9 Cir.2005), the Ninth th

Circuit explained:

The complaint also failed to allege evidence

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of a conspiracy and an act in furtherance of

that conspiracy, which are required elements

of a § 1985(3) action ... It is alleged that

Newell and others conspired to violate the

Holgate’s civil rights, but it did not allege

that a specific act was committed in

furtherance of this conspiracy ... While Rule

8(a)(2) does not require plaintiffs to law

out in detail the facts upon which their

claims are based, it does require plaintiffs

to provide a ‘short and plain statement of

the claim’ to give the defendants fair notice

of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it is based.

Here, Defendants argue, the FAC has no allegation of racial

or class-based discriminatory animus, pointing to Paragraph 163

of the TAC: “(Need allegations of protected class here).”

Plaintiffs cite Holgate v. Baldwin, supra, 425 F.3d at 676

(9 Cir.2005), wherein the Ninth Circuit, quoting Sever v. th

Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9 Cir.1992), stated: th

We have extended § 1985(3) to protect nonracial groups only if ‘the courts have

designated the class in question a suspect or

quasi-suspect classification requiring more

exacting scrutiny or ... Congress has

indicated through legislation that the class

require[s] special protection.’ ...

Plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint

that they belong to a racial group or

otherwise protected class, nor did they

allege that the defendants intentionally

discriminated against them on such grounds. 

Plaintiffs contend that “[i]t is clear that Congress’ intent in

passing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act was to

indicate that the class of disabled individuals of which

Plaintiff P.M. is a member requires special protection.” 

Plaintiffs state that they have found no reported Ninth Circuit

case which has specifically extended the protection of Section

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1985(3), “on these facts,” but “logic dictates that such

protection is to be extended to such persons.” 

Defendants, referring to the allegations in the Eighth Cause

of Action pertaining to the removal of P.M. from his home without

a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, and to the

allegations of fabrication of evidence and nondisclosure of

exculpatory evidence in judicial proceedings pertaining to P.M.’s

removal from his home, argue that the provisions of the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and cases construing

it do not suggest that the IDEA was intended to provide children

with disabilities or their parents special protections against

the child being detained by law enforcement or being subjected to

the processes of juvenile court beyond the protections that exist

for the public in general. The IDEA is a comprehensive

educational scheme that confers on students with disabilities a

substantive right to public education. See discussion supra.

Here, the FAC does not allege that Defendants conspired to

deprive P.M. of a free, appropriate public education because of

his disability. Further, as quoted above, the Eighth Cause of

Action does not allege that P.M. or either of his parents are

members of a protected class within the meaning of Section 1985.

Even if P.M. can allege that he is a member of a protected

class, an issue is presented whether his parents can, given the

specific allegations of the Eighth Cause of Action.

Defendants further argue that the allegations of conspiracy

are insufficiently pleaded. 

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Plaintiffs respond that the TAC alleges both the conspiracy

between the District Defendants and others and acts in

furtherance of that conspiracy in Paragraphs 37, 40, 121, 122,

161, and 162. 

Paragraphs 37 and 40 are set forth in the Common

Allegations:

37. The McCues believe and, therefore,

allege that SHIVE, DAMRON, ZURIN, MIXION, and

the DISTRICT and its staff elected,

intentionally, to disregard their obligations

to P.M. under state and federal law, and to

work toward removing P.M. from the DISTRICT,

or otherwise intimidating the McCues so that

they would not pursue their rights to

accommodations for their child. Plaintiffs

are further informed and believe and on such

basis allege that the DISTRICT sought to

avoid, and did avoid, its obligations to make

reasonable accommodations for P.M.’s

condition, and did so maliciously.

...

40. After CPS removed P.M. from the McCues’

home, P.M. was transferred out of the

DISTRICT to a school located in Bakersfield,

California. SHIVE remained in contact and

continued to disclose confidential

information to Mattel Children’s Hospital at

UCLA, UCLA, its Doctors, and Ms. Borelli

without any legal basis to do so.

Paragraphs 121 and 122 are set forth in Count Two of the Fifth

Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

brought by all Plaintiffs against the County Defendants and the

District Defendants (a cause of action which must be dismissed

for reasons stated above):

121. As detailed above, despite the fact

that Plaintiff P.M. is allergic to nuts, had

a near fatal reaction to nuts, and was

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advised by P.M.’s parents of same, the

DISTRICT DEFENDANTS refused to make

reasonable accommodations for P.M. or under

his Individualized Education Plan as provided

under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act, Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, and/or the Americans with

Disabilities Act, and in fact, on February

28, 2008, South Fork Elementary School had an

event so the middle school and elementary

school children were present and all on the

play ground all at once, wherein South Fork

Elementary School served peanut butter

cookies to all of the students with full

knowledge that P.M. was allergic to peanuts.

122. In addition, as detailed above, after

the DISTRICT and MS. SHIVE stated the School

was ‘nut free,’ on April 16, 2008, the

DISTRICT passed out a snack to the students

in the classroom including P.M. and this

snack contained nuts and/or nut products. 

P.M. refused to eat this snack and was given

another snack. This only increased P.M.’s

fear of school. 

Paragraphs 161 and 162 are alleged in the Eighth Cause of Action

for violation of Section 1985:

161. Specifically, DEFENDANTS conspired to,

and did: unlawfully seize and remove the

minor Plaintiff from the care of his parents,

without a warrant, court order, consent,

probable cause, or exigent circumstances; on

information and belief denied PLAINTIFFS

their right to a hearing on said detention

within 72 hours of the removal; and continued

to detain minor Plaintiff P.M. for an

unreasonable period after any alleged basis

for detention had been negated.

162. In addition, DEFENDANTS, and each of

them, conspired to use trickery, duress,

fabrication and/or false testimony or

evidence, and failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence in preparing and presenting reports

and court documents to the Court. The

conduct of DEFENDANTS, and each of them,

interfered with Plaintiffs’ rights, including

minor Plaintiff’s right to be protected

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against unlawful seizure under the Fourth

Amendment of the Constitution of the United

States, and the right to familial association

free from government interference as

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment ....

This mish-mash of allegations does not suffice to allege a

conspiracy under Section 1985(2) or (3). There are no factual

allegations that the District Defendants had any involvement in

the child endangerment investigation, which the TAC alleges in

Paragraph 38 was instituted by the Kern County Sheriff’s

Department in early February 2008, after the Sheriff’s Department

received a referral from Dr. Bekmezian at UCLA, or in the

decision to remove P.M. from his home. There are no allegations

that the County Defendants had any involvement in the District

Defendants’ actions or inactions with regard to P.M.’s allergy.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs are referred to the

provisions of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

E. Ninth Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1986.

The Ninth Cause of Action is brought by all Plaintiffs

against all Defendants for violation of Section 1986. The Ninth

Cause of Action “re-alleges, and to the extent applicable,

incorporates by reference ... all paragraphs from the Common

Allegations ... and the First through Eighth Causes of Action.” 

The Ninth Cause of Action then alleges in pertinent part:

172. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, maintain,

and at all times relevant to this Complaint

maintained, customs and practices which were

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the driving force behind their conspiracy to

interfere with Plaintiffs’ civil rights in

violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1985, as

alleged above. Such customs and practices

include unreasonable seizures in violation of

the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution; unlawful removal and detention

of minor children; denial of the right to a

hearing on said detention within 72 hours of

removal; continued detention after any

alleged basis for detention had been negated

and the procuring of false testimony,

fabrication of evidence, and refusal to

disclose exculpatory evidence in preparing

and presenting reports and documents to the

Court in relation to dependency proceedings,

all in violation of the right to familial

association under the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.

173. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, have, and

at all times relevant to this complaint had,

knowledge of the customs and practices that

led to the conspiracy to interfere with

Plaintiffs’ civil rights. ALL DEFENDANTS,

and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, knew that

the other individual defendants were

conspiring to commit the wrongs noted above,

and were going to commit them.

174. DEFENDANTS, and each of them, had the

power to prevent the commission of these

wrongs, through the notification of the

proper superiors and authorities, and/or

through the implementation of policies,

procedures, and training programs that would

educate and enlighten employees as to the

civil rights of the citizens of the United

States and the State of California.

175. Despite their knowledge, DEFENDANTS,

and each of them, refused or neglected to

prevent the remaining DEFENDANTS from

committing these wrongs in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiffs did in fact suffer

the deprivation of numerous rights granted to

citizens of the United States, including

those under the Fourth Amendment that protect

against the unlawful seizure of one’s person,

and those under the Fourteenth Amendment that

protect the right of familial association. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides:

Every person who, having knowledge that any

of the wrongs conspired to be done, and

mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are

about to be committed, and having power to

prevent or aid in preventing the commission

of the same, neglects or refused so to do, is

such wrongful act be committed, shall be

liable to the party injured ... for all

damages caused by such wrongful act, which

such person by reasonable diligence could

have prevented ....

A claim can be stated under Section 1986 only if the

complaint contains a valid claim under Section 1985. KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9 Cir. th

1988). 

Because the motion to dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action is

granted with leave to amend, the motion to dismiss the Ninth

Cause of Action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, with the same

Rule 11 admonition. 

F. Eleventh Cause of Action for Violation of State

Civil Rights.

The District Defendants move to dismiss the Eleventh Cause

of Action. Plaintiffs do not respond to this ground for

dismissal of the FAC.

The Eleventh Cause of Action is brought by all Plaintiffs

against all Defendants. The Eleventh Cause of Action “realleges, and to the extent applicable, incorporates by reference

... all paragraphs from the Common Allegations ... and the First

through Tenth Causes of Action.” The Eleventh Cause of Action

then alleges in pertinent part:

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202. As a result of DEFENDANTS’ conduct,

DEFENDANTS, and each of them, by the use of

threats, intimidation, and coercion, (or

attempts to threaten, intimidate, or coerce),

interfered with Plaintiffs’ exercise and

enjoyment of the rights secured by the United

States Constitution and other Federal laws,

the Constitution and laws of the State of

California, and their rights under California

law, including but not limited to California

Civil Code sections 43, 49, 51, 52 (The Unruh

Civil Rights Act), and 52.1.

...

204. As to all District Defendants, such

conduct includes the refusal to provide

reasonable accommodations for P.M. conditions

[sic], invasion of privacy, publication of

private facts to the other family [sic] at

School, among other things.

District Defendants argue that the allegations of the 

Eleventh Cause of Action leave them “without a reasonable

understanding of that for which they are being sued, as District

Defendants cannot, with reasonable confidence, ascertain the

nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, as alleged against District

Defendants.”

California Civil Code § 43 provides:

Besides the personal rights mentioned or

recognized by the Government Code, every

person has, subject to the qualifications and

restrictions provided by law, the right of

protection from bodily restraint or harm,

from personal insult, from defamation, and

from injury to his personal relations.

California Civil Code § 49 provides in pertinent part:

The rights of personal relations forbids:

(a) The abduction or enticement of a child

from a parent, or from a guardian entitled to

its custody ....

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District Defendants further argue that the Eleventh Cause of

Action fails to state a claim for violation of California Civil

Code § 51. California Civil Code § 51(b) provides:

All persons within the jurisdiction of this

state are free and equal, and no matter what

their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry,

national origin, disability, medical

condition, marital status, or sexual

orientation are entitled to the full and

equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,

privileges, or services in all business

establishments of every kind whatsoever.

California Civil Code § 52 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial,

or makes any discrimination or distinction

contrary to Section 51 ... is liable for each

and every offense ....

California Civil Code § 52.1(b) provides that “[a]ny individual

whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or

attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision (b),

may institute and prosecute ... a civil action for damages,

including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52,

injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to

protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or

rights secured.” Section 52.1(a) provides for an action by the

Attorney General, district attorney or city attorney “[i]f a

person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law,

interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to

interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the

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exercise or enjoyment by any individual ... of rights secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the rights

secured by the Constitution or laws of this state ....”

Research discloses case authority that the term “business

establishment” in Section 51 includes public schools. See

Annamarie M. v. Napa Valley Unified School Dist., 2006 WL 1525733

at *12 (N.D.Cal., May 30, 2006); Michelle M. v. Dunsmuir Joint

Union School Dist., 2006 WL 2927485 at *7 (E.D.Cal., Oct. 12,

2006) and cases cited therein. 

The District Defendants refer to CACI 3020 that the

essential elements of a violation of California Civil Code §§ 51

and 52 are (1) that a defendant denied, aided, or incited denial

of, discriminated or made a distinction that denied, full and

equal privileges to the plaintiff; (2) that a motivating reason

for the defendant’s conduct was plaintiff’s sex, race, color,

religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical

condition or other actionable characteristic; (3) that the

plaintiff was harmed; and (4) that Defendant’s conduct was a

substantial factor in causing a plaintiff’s harm. The District

Defendants contend that the FAC fails to properly plead all of

these required elements:

Rather, Plaintiffs merely allege broad

sweeping statements that ‘DEFENDANTS, and

each of them, by the use of threats,

intimidation, and coercion, (or attempts to

threaten, intimidate, or coerce), interfered

with Plaintiffs’ exercise and enjoyment of

the rights secured by the United States

Constitution and other Federal laws,

including but not limited to the California

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Civil Code sections 43, 49, 51, 52 (The Unruh

Civil Rights Act), and 52.1 ... Moreover,

Plaintiffs utterly fail to allege that the

motivating reason for the conduct of District

Defendants was Plaintiffs’ sex, race, color,

religion, ancestry, national origin,

disability, medical condition or other

actionable characteristic, as required.

The FAC groups all of the Plaintiffs and all of the District

Defendants together with respect to rights and alleged

violations. It is apparent, moreover, from the allegations of

the TAC that the alleged violations of Sections 43 and 49 pertain

to the County Defendants; there are no allegations that the

District Defendants were involved in the investigation of the

child endangerment referral or in the decision to remove P.M.

from his home.

The motion to dismiss the Eleventh Cause of Action is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

G. Twelfth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress.

The District Defendants move to dismiss the Twelfth Cause of

Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

The Twelfth Cause of Action is brought by all Plaintiffs

against all Defendants. The Twelfth Cause of Action “re-alleges,

and to the extent applicable, incorporates by reference ... all

paragraphs from the Common Allegations ... and the First through 

Eleven [sic] Causes of Action.” The Twelfth Cause of Action

alleges in pertinent part:

213. DEFENDANTS, and DOES 1 through 100, and

each of them, engaged in the above-mentioned

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extreme, outrageous, unlawful and

unprivileged conduct, including, but not

limited to, removing and detaining minor

Plaintiff P.M. from the love and care of

DARLENE and LAWRENCE without court order or

exigent circumstances; continuing to detain

Plaintiff P.M. for an unreasonable period

after any alleged basis for detention had

been negated; presenting perjured testimony

and fabricating evidence to support their

false and malicious allegations that minor

Plaintiff P.M. were [sic] being abused and/or

neglected by their parents; failing to

disclose exculpatory evidence; questioning

and obtaining information from Plaintiffs

through the use of undue influence, coercion,

and duress; and continuing to harass, annoy,

and lie to Plaintiffs, and otherwise

interfere with Plaintiffs [sic] lives.

214. Each of the individual DEFENDANTS, and

DOES 1 through 100, participated in,

conspired with, approved of, and/or aided and

abetted the conduct of the remaining

DEFENDANTS.

Under California law, the elements of a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous

conduct. Hergenroeder v. Travelers Property Cas. Ins. Co., 249

F.R.D. 595, 620 (E.D.Cal.2008). Conduct to be outrageous must be

so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a

civilized community. Id.

The District Defendants argue that the allegations of the

Twelfth Cause of Action are conclusory and appear to be based on

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conduct by the County Defendants.

Plaintiffs respond that the allegations in Paragraphs 24,

25, 37, 41, 42 and 51 of the FAC suffice to allege that the

individual District Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous

conduct directed at Plaintiffs:

24. During the remainder of the 2006-2007

school year there were several meetings with

the DISTRICT and its employees at which

Plaintiffs requested the DISTRICT consider

stop serving nut products, nuts, or food

items containing nut products at the School

to protect P.M. from any adverse reactions. 

At those meetings, SHIVE repeatedly stated

that the DISTRICT and the School, and the

staff at those locations where P.M. received

his education could not, and would not, stop

serving nuts as requested by the McCues. As

a result, the DISTRICT, School, SHIVE,

SHANNON DAMRON (‘DAMRON,’ the Second Grade

Teacher at South Fork), KAREN ZURIN (‘ZURIN,’

the Office Assistant at South Fork), and

SABINE Mixion (‘MIXION’), and each of them

personally refused to make any reasonable

accommodations for P.M. or under his

Individualized Education Plan as provided

under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act, Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, and/or the Americans with

Disabilities Act.

25. P.M. started his second grade year on

August 21, 2007. At the beginning of P.M.’s

2007-2007 school year, the McCues held

another meeting with SHIVE. The McCues again

requested accommodations for P.M. to keep him

safe. At this time, SHIVE allegedly stated

to Plaintiffs, ‘We had a nut free table for

[P.M.] last year but we cannot do that this

year, all we can do to accommodate [P.M.] is

to make him eat his lunch in the office away

from all other children and this will keep

him safe.’ The McCues were dissatisfied with

this response and voiced their

dissatisfaction. Several meetings after this

change in circumstance, the McCues requested

accommodations to allow P.M. to eat his lunch

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in the lunchroom with all his friends. 

However, SHIVE continued to insist that

eating in the office is all she, the

DISTRICT, and the School would do to

accommodate him during his lunch hour.

...

37. The McCues believe and, therefore,

allege that SHIVE, DAMRON, ZURIN, MIXION, and

the DISTRICT and its staff elected,

intentionally, to disregard their obligations

to P.M. under state and federal law, and to

work toward removing P.M. from the DISTRICT,

or otherwise intimidating the McCues so that

they would not pursue their rights to

accommodations for their child. Plaintiffs

are further informed and believe and on such

basis allege that the DISTRICT sought to

avoid, and did avoid, its obligations to make

reasonable accommodations for P.M.’s

condition, and did so maliciously.

...

41. Defendant SHIVE called Plaintiff DARLENE

on the telephone on March 7, 2009 [sic], the

morning after P.M. was taken away from the

McCues by CPS. She already knew P.M. had

been removed and detained. During the

telephone conversation she sarcastically

asked DARLENE ‘How is [P.M.]?’ When

Plaintiff DARLENE responded, SHIVE, in a

retaliatory and threatening manner,

responded: ‘Well, when you have a problem

with me, you don’t call the School [sic]

Board of Education. You deal with me only.’ 

SHIVE intimated that she was in fact the

driving force behind P.M.’s removal and

detention, and that said removal was in

retaliation for DARLENE’s efforts to lawfully

obtain reasonable accommodations for her son.

42. On March 10, 2008, without Plaintiffs’

knowledge or consent, Ms. DAMRON, P.M.’s

teacher at the DISTRICT, announced to P.M.’s

whole class with all classmates present that

‘P.M. had been taken away from his parents

and put in a foster home and now he will be

safe and he would not be coming back.’ In

the afternoon on March 10, 2008, the McCues

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began receiving telephone calls from parents

of children in P.M.’s class asking if it was

true that P.M. had been taken away. The

McCues told the parents it was true and asked

how they found this out. The parents of

P.M.’s classmates stated that their children

came home telling them that Ms. Damron

announced to the class after lunch that P.M.

had been taken away from his parents and put

in a foster home and that he would now be

safe and would not be coming back to school

in violation of the McCue’s [sic]

constitutional right to privacy arising under

Article 1, Section 1 of the California

Constitution. The McCues then received

letters from several children and their

families describing what Ms. DAMRON had

stated.

...

51. Due to P.M.’s removal from his Parents,

missing school and abuse at the second foster

home, he developed extreme anxiety and became

afraid to eat the food at school given the

incident with the peanut butter cookies at

the School. He has been diagnosed with Post

Traumatic Stress Disorder. To complicate

this, after the DISTRICT and MS. SHIVE stated

the School was ‘nut free,’ on April 16, 2008,

the DISTRICT passed out a snack to the

students in the classroom and this snack

contained nuts and/or nut products. P.M.

refused to eat this snack and was given

another snack. This only increased P.M.’s

fear of school.

The motion to dismiss the Twelfth Cause of Action is GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs shall allege concise and

succinct facts from which it may be inferred that each Defendant

is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress as to

each Plaintiff.

H. Fourteenth Cause of Action for Slander.

The District Defendants move to dismiss the Fourteenth Cause

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of Action for Slander.

The Fourteenth Cause of Action is brought by Plaintiff

Darlene and Lawrence McCue against the District Defendants and

Does 1 - 100. The Fourteenth Cause of Action “re-alleges, and to

the extent applicable, incorporates by reference ... all

paragraphs from the Common Allegations.” The Fourteenth Cause of

Action then alleges in pertinent part:

240. Defendant Damron published false

statements to all of P.M.’s class mates

[sic], after P.M.’s removal and detention

from his family home. Said statements were

false at the time Damron made them. Said

false statements were of and concerning

DARLENE, LAWRENCE, and P.M.

241. The aforementioned false statements

were made to the children without privilege,

and with knowledge of their falsity. 

242. The false statements were injurious to

the reputations of DARLENE, LAWRENCE, and

P.M. in the community, in that they tended to

subject DARLENE, LAWRENCE, and P.M. to

hatred, ridicule, or contempt. Moreover, the

statements implied that DARLENE and LAWRENCE

were guilty of child abuse, when in fact they

were not.

The District Defendants move to dismiss the Fourteenth Cause

of Action on the ground that the truth of the alleged slanderous

statement is a complete defense to slander, a contention not

challenged by Plaintiffs. See Conkle v. Jeong, 73 F.3d 909, 917

(9 Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 811 (1996)(“Truth is a th

complete defense to slander, ‘regardless of the bad faith or

malicious purpose of the publisher of the material.’). 

The only allegations pertaining to Defendant Damron’s

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allegedly slanderous statement are set forth in Paragraphs 42:

42. On March 10, 2008, without Plaintiffs’

knowledge or consent, Ms. DAMRON, P.M.’s

teacher at the DISTRICT, announced to P.M.’s

whole class with all classmates present that

‘P.M. had been taken away from his parents

and put in a foster home and now he will be

safe and he would not be coming back.’ In

the afternoon on March 10, 2008, the McCues

began receiving telephone calls from parents

of children in P.M.’s class asking if it was

true that P.M. had been taken away. The

McCues told the parents it was true and asked

how they found this out. The parents of

P.M.’s classmates stated that their children

came home telling them that Ms. Damron

announced to the class after lunch that P.M.

had been taken away from his parents and put

in a foster home and that he would now be

safe and would not be coming back to school

in violation of the McCue’s [sic]

constitutional right to privacy arising under

Article 1, Section 1 of the California

Constitution. The McCues then received

letters from several children and their

families describing what Ms. DAMRON had

stated.

Plaintiffs respond that the alleged statement by Defendant

Damron that ‘P.M. had been taken away from his parents and put in

a foster home and now he will be safe ...” implies that P.M. was

not safe with his parents:

This portion of DAMRON’S statement was

utterly false; P.M. was never at risk with

his parents nor had his parents ever harmed

him. In fact, on the October 28, 2009 [sic],

the Juvenile Court dismissed the petition

against Plaintiffs GRACIE [sic] and LAWRENCE

and returned their child P.M. to their care,

custody and control. No allegations of abuse

or neglect were ever sustained. 

In their reply brief, the District Defendants note that the

only allegedly false statement attributed to Defendant Damron is

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“now he will be safe.” The District Defendants refer to cases

involving the gist or sting of the allegedly slanderous

statement. As explained in Ringler Associates, Inc. v. Maryland

Cas. Co., 80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1180-1181 (2000):

It is the defendant’s burden to ‘justify,’ or

show the truth of the statements ...

Significantly, however, the defendant need

not justify the literal truth of every word

of the allegedly defamatory matter. It is

sufficient if the substance of the charge is

proven true, irrespective of slight

inaccuracies in the details, ‘so long as the

imputation is substantially true so as to

justify the “gist or sting” of the remark.’

.... 

The District Defendants argue that the allegations in the FAC

establish that the Fourteenth Cause of Action satisfies this

test, referring to the allegations in Paragraph 43 that CPS

placed P.M. in a foster home in Bakersfield, and to the

allegations in Paragraph 42 that when asked by other parents if

it was true that P.M. had been taken away, the McCues stated that

it was true:

[T]he allegations of the FAC and Plaintiffs’

Opposition clearly show that Ms. Damron’s

allegedly slanderous statement and any

imputation therefrom was substantial [sic]

true so as to justify the ‘gist’ or ‘sting’

of the remark. This is because the

gist/primary message of the alleged statement

was that P.M. has been placed in a foster

home.

Obviously, children are not normally removed to a foster

home unless there is concern for their safety and it is

absolutely true that P.M. was removed from his parents and placed

in a foster home. However, whether the contested statement was

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slanderous presents a question of fact for summary judgment or

trial.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Cause of Action

is DENIED. 

4

 CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART WITH

PREJUDICE, GRANTED IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, AND DENIED IN

PART;

2. Plaintiffs shall file a First Amended Complaint in

accordance with the rulings herein within thirty (30) days of the

filing date of this Memorandum Decision and Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 20, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The Fourteenth Cause of Action prays for punitive damages. 4

To the extent that this prayer for relief is directed to South Fork

Union School District, California Government Code § 818 provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a

public entity is not liable for damages

awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code

or other damages imposed primarily for the

sake of example and by way of punishing the

defendant.

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