Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01955/USCOURTS-ca3-14-01955-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 14-1955

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IN RE: ROBERT G. BURCHILL,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(No. 5-13-cv-03548)

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 15, 2015

Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: February 4, 2015)

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OPINION*

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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:

Robert Burchill appeals the District Court’s affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court’s 

order discharging the bankruptcy trustee and closing his case. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm. 

I.

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

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Through a sheriff’s sale, Wells Fargo Bank became the title owner of Burchill’s 

property at 2120 Latta Street in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Wells Fargo thereafter filed a 

complaint for ejectment, and the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County entered 

judgment in its favor on May 4, 2012. The Pennsylvania Superior Court dismissed 

Burchill’s appeal on August 22, 2012, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later denied 

his petition for allowance of an appeal. 

On October 26, 2012, Burchill, a trained attorney acting pro se, filed for 

bankruptcy. On November 19, Wells Fargo moved for relief from the automatic stay of 11 

U.S.C. § 362 so that it could press forward with eviction. Wells Fargo’s motion identified 

the address of the subject property as “2120 Latta Street,” but mistakenly referred to the 

debtor as “Richard Simononis.” App. 18. Following receipt of the motion, Burchill filed a 

handwritten memorandum with the Bankruptcy Court explaining that Wells Fargo’s 

motion was “confusing” and “constitutionally wrong,” rendering a “formal response . . . 

unwarranted.” Burchill Mem., No. 12-20061 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2012). After 

Burchill failed to appear at a hearing on the motion scheduled for December 11, the 

Bankruptcy Court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to lift the automatic stay. Burchill filed a 

notice of appeal to the District Court on December 28.

On January 4, 2013, Wells Fargo filed an amended motion for relief from the 

automatic stay, which correctly identified Burchill, and a separate motion to vacate the 

Bankruptcy Court’s December 11 order. The purpose of these motions was to correct the 

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typographical error in the November 19 motion and preclude Burchill from arguing that 

the December 11 order was void.

Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 8001-1(b), which permits bankruptcy judges to 

file a written opinion in support of an order that is the subject of appeal, the Bankruptcy 

Court, on January 11, 2013, issued a statement supporting its December 11 order.1 The 

Bankruptcy Court first explained that Burchill’s December 28 notice of appeal was 

untimely under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a), which requires that an 

appeal be filed within 14 days of the order or judgment. The Bankruptcy Court further 

found that, as a licensed attorney, Burchill must have known that his failure and refusal to 

respond to the substantive allegations made by Wells Fargo in its motion for relief 

constituted admissions. Moreover, even if Burchill was confused by Wells Fargo’s 

motion, he still should have attended the December hearing because the motion clearly 

identified his property on 2120 Latta Street as being subject to eviction proceedings.

On January 24, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court convened a hearing on Wells Fargo’s 

January 4 amended motion for relief from the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Court 

granted Wells Fargo’s amended motion that same day, and on February 6 issued an 

opinion in support of its order that reaffirmed the findings from its January 11 opinion 

and further explained that Burchill was trying to collaterally attack state-court judgments 

in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

 

1 The Bankrtupcty Court filed an amended statement on January 24 to correct the title of 

its January 11 statement, which incorrectly identified the December 11 order. 

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After the bankruptcy trustee filed a report indicating that Burchill’s estate had been 

fully administrated, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order on May 10, 2013 discharging 

the trustee and closing the case. Burchill timely appealed.

On appeal, the District Court found that Burchill identified no specific error of fact 

or law committed by the Bankruptcy Court. He provided no argument as to why the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not bar his request for the federal courts effectively to 

exercise appellate review over past state-court judgments. In addition, Burchill’s due 

process argument was without merit because he was given ample opportunity to persuade 

the Bankruptcy Court that the 2120 Latta Street property should have been brought into 

the bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, the District Court affirmed.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have 

jurisdiction over the District Court’s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).

Because the District Court sat as an appellate court reviewing an order of the 

Bankruptcy Court, our review of the District Court’s disposition is plenary. In re Heritage 

Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2012). With respect to the Bankruptcy Court’s 

determinations, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. 

Id.

III.

Like his arguments to the District Court, Burchill’s appellate brief does not 

articulate any specific basis for reversing the Bankruptcy Court. He does not even provide 

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us with a clear statement of what relief he seeks; instead, Burchill requests that this Court 

“[c]ompletely consider the matter and order appropriate relief, in the interests of freedom, 

civil jurisprudence and justice.” Burchill Br. at 2.

Burchill argues, first, that “due process has been denied” because the Bankruptcy 

Court “apparently deleted or overlooked” his claims. Id. at 1. Moreover, Wells Fargo 

foreclosed on his property in September 2013 “despite full notice that State and Federal 

consideration was in place,” Burchill Reply at 1, which resulted in the “unfair denial of 

ordinary Court participation,” Burchill Br. at 1. These vague contentions regarding due 

process are belied by the history of this case, which demonstrates that Burchill has had 

numerous opportunities to be heard in both state and federal court. Upon receipt of Wells 

Fargo’s initial motion for relief from the automatic stay, which followed adverse statecourt proceedings in which he participated, Burchill unilaterally decided that a “formal 

response [was] unwarranted” and chose not to attend the December hearing on the 

motion. Even after Burchill filed an untimely appeal of the December 11 order, the 

Bankruptcy Court provided Burchill with another opportunity to present his arguments at 

the January 24 hearing. Burchill’s lack of success before the state courts and the 

Bankruptcy Court does not translate into a denial of due process.

Second, Burchill makes an oblique reference to 11 U.S.C. § 541, which he 

contends is broad and equitable, and requires that all interests be considered relevant to a 

bankruptcy estate, including causes of action and mortgage interests. He offers no specific

explanation as to how this section advances his case, and we see none. 

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Third, Burchill takes issue with the Bankruptcy Court’s statements concerning the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which, according to Burchill, does not apply because his 

“claims were never presented previously.” Burchill Br. at 2. To what “claims” Burchill 

refers is unclear, but, in any event, he cites no caselaw to support the proposition that the 

same claims or arguments must be presented to the state courts for the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine to apply. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents the lower federal courts from 

exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers challenging state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Lance v. Dennis, 

546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The doctrine 

applies when (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of 

injuries caused by the state-court judgments, (3) those judgments were rendered before 

the federal suit was filed, and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and 

reject the state-court judgments. Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 

F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010). Burchill’s attempt to thwart the foreclosure and eviction 

process by having the federal courts review adverse state-court judgments is improper. 

Finally, Burchill requests that this Court certify the following question to the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court: “Was a 9/12/13 Superior Court Appeal filing made 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. § 1701 (which requires immediate status quo handling of further 

lower court activity), wrongfully ignored, when a 9/19/14 eviction2 was carried out?” 

Burchill Br. at 7. We decline Burchill’s invitation, as he fails to describe how the answer 

 

2 Presumably Burchill meant to write “9/19/13 eviction” because that is the date he uses 

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to the question affects our disposition of this case let alone explain the requisite “special 

and important reasons” for certifying this purported question of Pennsylvania law (e.g., an 

issue of “first impression . . . [that is of] substantial public importance”). See 210 Pa. 

Code 3341(c). 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s order. 

 

elsewhere in his opening brief and reply. 

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