Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-01351/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-01351-225/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs certain attorneys’ fees and costs for work during

these periods, and the Court signed stipulations and proposed orders regarding these

undisputed fees and costs on April 30, July 24, August 29, and November 3, 2008.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCIANO PLATA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C01-1351 TEH

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND

COSTS FOR THIRD AND

FOURTH QUARTERS OF 2007

AND FIRST QUARTER OF 2008

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for disputed attorneys’ fees

and costs for the third and fourth quarters of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008.1

 Defendants

dispute Plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees and costs incurred for two categories of tasks: (1) work

before the three-judge court considering whether to issue a prisoner release order and

(2) work opposing the Receiver’s May 10, 2007 motion to modify the injunctive relief in this

case. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to fees and costs incurred on the two disputed

categories of work and orders the parties to meet and confer as to the reasonableness of the

amounts claimed.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees and costs in this matter stems from the stipulation and

order entered by the Court on June 13, 2002, which provides that:

Case 3:01-cv-01351-JST Document 2210 Filed 08/26/09 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants assert that “Plaintiffs’ success at the Stipulated Injunction [seven] years

ago does not equate to a circumstance, where, no matter how much time and money is

expended, and regardless of whether the effort benefits the Plata class, any post-judgment

fees and costs claimed in this action should be paid by the government.” Opp’n at 13. This

is, of course, correct, as Plaintiffs may request only “reasonable attorneys’ fees” for work

performed “in connection with” the stipulation and order. June 13, 2002 Stip. & Order ¶ 32

(emphasis added). 

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Plaintiffs may apply for reasonable attorney’s fees to which they

are entitled. Defendants shall pay plaintiffs for 90% of the work

performed in connection with this Stipulation at hourly rates set

forth under the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act], 42 USC

§ 1997e(d). Defendants shall pay plaintiffs for 10% of the work

performed in connection with this Stipulation at hourly rates set

forth under the ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] and § 504

of the Rehabilitation Act.

June 13, 2002 Stip. & Order ¶ 32. Notably, the parties’ stipulation does not require Plaintiffs

to re-establish prevailing party status at each stage of litigation or to obtain a separate

cognizable and successful result prior to being awarded fees. Instead, the agreement requires

only that Plaintiffs’ work be “in connection with” the stipulation and that the claimed

attorneys’ fees be reasonable.2

Plaintiffs’ Work Before the Three-Judge Court

Defendants first argue that the three-judge court, and not this Court, must decide

Plaintiffs’ request for fees and costs for work before the three-judge court. However, the

single case cited by Defendants in support of their argument stands only for the

unremarkable proposition that a court must have subject matter jurisdiction before it can

award fees. See Zambrano v. I.N.S., 282 F.3d 1145, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no

dispute that this Court has retained jurisdiction even after the three-judge court was

convened. Defendants have also failed to cite any authority for the proposition that the threejudge court is a separate tribunal from this Court. See Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611, 614

(4th Cir. 1957) (“The court of three judges is not a different court from the District Court, but

is the District Court composed of two additional judges sitting with the single District Judge

. . . .”). Moreover, even if Defendants were correct that the three-judge court must decide

Plaintiffs’ request for fees, this Court, as a single judge sitting on the three-judge court, could

nonetheless resolve Plaintiffs’ request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3).

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Court understands that similar motions for attorneys’ fees and costs are pending

before the district court in Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Case No. Civ. S-90-0520 LKK JFM

(E.D. Cal.). Defendants in both cases raise the possibility of inconsistent rulings by the

Coleman court and this Court, and they also suggest that separate rulings on requests for

attorneys’ fees for work before the three-judge court may result in a windfall for Plaintiffs’

counsel. If the Coleman court subsequently issues a ruling inconsistent with this order, or if

Defendants can demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ counsel inappropriately claimed duplicative fees

from both courts, then this Court will entertain a motion for leave to file a motion for

reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9 and may reconsider its ruling.

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In addition, as the three-judge court explained when rejecting Defendants’ exhaustion

arguments, “[t]he PLRA provisions governing three-judge court proceedings clearly

demonstrate that these [three-judge court] proceedings are part of preexisting civil actions,

not a new action.” Nov. 3, 2008 Order Denying Defs.’ Mot. for Dismissal or, Alternatively,

Summ. J. at 3. Plaintiffs’ work before the three-judge court is simply a continuation of their

work before this Court. Indeed, the PLRA precludes a single district judge from entering a

prisoner release order, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B); thus, given Plaintiffs’ contention that

crowded prison conditions prevent the development of a constitutionally adequate system of

delivering medical care, Plaintiffs had no option but to proceed before a three-judge court.

The parties’ stipulation and order provided that “[t]he Court shall have the power to

enforce the Stipulation through specific performance and all other remedies permitted by

law.” June 13, 2002 Stip. & Order ¶ 29 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ work before the threejudge court was both permitted by law – specifically, by the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) –

and in furtherance of enforcing the stipulation for injunctive relief, which was intended “to

require defendants to provide . . . the minimum level of medical care required under the

Eighth Amendment,” June 13, 2002 Stip. & Order ¶ 4; see, e.g., July 23, 2007 Order

Granting Pls.’ Mot. to Convene Three-Judge Court at 5-10 (discussing propriety of the

consideration of a prisoner release order by a three-judge court to ensure constitutionally

adequate delivery of medical care to inmates). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ work before the

three-judge court was squarely “in connection with” the June 13, 2002 stipulation and order,

June 13, 2002 Stip & Order ¶ 32, and is therefore compensable.3

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Receiver’s May 10, 2007 Motion

Plaintiffs’ work opposing the Receiver’s May 10, 2007 motion to modify the June 13,

2002 and September 17, 2004 stipulated orders for injunctive relief and the December 1,

2005 order regarding clinical staffing was also firmly “in connection with” the June 13, 2002

stipulation and order. Id. In opposing the Receiver’s motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel reasonably

represented the interests of the class, and it is difficult to imagine how opposing a motion to

modify a stipulation and order would not be considered work “in connection with” that same

stipulation and order. Defendants argue that fees should not be awarded for this work

because Plaintiffs’ opposition failed to prove any constitutional violation. However, the

Ninth Circuit has already rejected that argument. Webb v. Ada County, 285 F.3d 829, 834-35

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the PLRA allows an award of fees “incurred in enforcing and

monitoring the court’s judgment and the consent decree,” and that an attorney seeking such

an award need not “demonstrate that the postjudgment fees were incurred in proving an

actual violation of the Constitution”). Defendants are similarly mistaken when they argue

that Plaintiffs’ opposition conferred no benefit on the class. Not only does the parties’

stipulation not require Plaintiffs to be successful before fees are awarded, but, even if such a

requirement were imposed, Plaintiffs’ opposition helped to ensure Plaintiffs’ counsel’s

“important role in monitoring progress toward achieving minimum constitutional standards,”

Sept. 6, 2007 Order at 9, as well as persuading the Court to reject several of the Receiver’s

requests for modification, id. at 7-14 – results that benefit the class.

Adequacy of Plaintiffs’ Billing Statements

Finally, Defendants raise a conclusory objection that Plaintiffs’ billing statements are

inadequate to allow Defendants to evaluate the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ request. 

However, a review of the correspondence submitted by Defendants indicates only that

Defendants complained of being unable to determine whether certain entries were associated

with the three-judge court proceedings. See Mar. 26, 2008 Letter from Thomas Gilevich to

Alison Hardy (Ex. A to Nov. 21, 2008 Gilevich Decl.). Now that the Court has ruled that

Plaintiffs are entitled to fees for work on those proceedings, it is unnecessary to distinguish

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whether any of the work claimed by Plaintiffs related to the three-judge court proceedings or

proceedings before the individual Plata court. While the Court might, in the absence of

objections to specific billing entries, grant Plaintiffs’ request for fees and costs in its entirety,

it will instead order the parties to meet and confer in light of the Court’s rulings in this order.

CONCLUSION

With good cause appearing for the above reasons, the Court now GRANTS IN PART

Plaintiffs’ request for disputed attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the third and fourth

quarters of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008. The Court finds, as a general matter and in the

absence of objections by Defendants to any specific billing entries, that Plaintiffs’ efforts in

opposition to the Receiver’s May 10, 2007 motion and before the three-judge court were

reasonable and “in connection with” the June 13, 2002 stipulated order for injunctive relief. 

Plaintiffs’ are therefore entitled to compensation for such work under the parties’ agreement. 

June 13, 2002 Stip. & Order ¶ 32. The parties shall meet and confer regarding the specific

amounts due to Plaintiffs pursuant to that agreement and this order establishing Plaintiffs’

entitlement to fees and costs for the disputed categories of work.

The Court will not re-visit Plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees for work before the threejudge court – an issue that the parties have already fully briefed in the context of the motion

decided today – and the parties shall therefore also meet and confer to discuss the impact of

this order on the motions filed by Plaintiffs on July 31 and August 18, 2009. It appears to the

Court that the issues remaining to be decided on those motions can be significantly narrowed

following this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 08/26/09 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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