Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02407/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02407-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SERGIO SANCHEZ, 

 Plaintiff,

v. 

AMY MILLER, et al., 

 Defendants.

Case No.: 14cv2407-LAB-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[ECF No. 14] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Larry A. Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and that Defendants’ 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be GRANTED. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff Sergio Sanchez is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. 

(ECF Nos. 1, 2, 4). On October 2, 2014, the date of his signature on the 

proof of service, Plaintiff constructively filed a Complaint under 42 

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U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at 9). Plaintiff claims that his constitutional 

rights were violated when prison staff disciplined him for refusing 

medical treatment and denied him the right to present witnesses during 

the disciplinary hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 3-6). 

In his First Claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Miller, Madden, 

Greenwood and Telles1 violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process 

rights when Defendant Telles denied Plaintiff’s request to present 

witnesses during the hearing on the Rules Violation Report. (Id. at 5-

6). In his Second Claim, Plaintiff alleges all five Defendants (Miller, 

Madden, Greenwood, Telles and Martin) violated his First Amendment 

rights when Defendant Martin issued a Rules Violation Report in 

retaliation for his refusal of medical treatment. (Id. at 6). In his Third 

Claim, Plaintiff alleges all five Defendants violated his Eighth 

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when 

prison staff tried to force him to accept medical treatment and then 

punished him with “C status” when he refused. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff sues 

each Defendant in their individual capacity. (Id. at 2:22). 

On August 10, 2015, Defendants filed a combined Motion to 

Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, along with a Rand

Notice. (ECF No. 14). Defendants move for partial summary judgment 

on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies for 

all three claims against all of the Defendants, except for the due process 

 

1 Defendants mistakenly state that Plaintiff brings his First Claim 

against all five Defendants. (ECF No. 14-1 at 2:3). Defendant Martin is 

not named in the First Claim. (ECF No. 1 at 5:28-6:1). 

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claim against Defendant Telles. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

contends Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim because (1) the 

Rules Violation Report incorporated into the Complaint by reference 

shows that Plaintiff was disciplined for lying and disrupting the yard—

not for refusing medical treatment, (2) Plaintiff fails to allege a liberty 

interest, (3) the alleged mistreatment does “not come close” to an Eighth 

Amendment violation, and (4) Plaintiff fails to allege direct personal 

involvement by any Defendant other than Telles as to the First and 

Third Claims and other than Defendant Martin as to the Second Claim. 

On August 12, 2015, this Court issued a Klingele Notice and a 

Scheduling Order on the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary 

Judgment. (ECF No. 16). The Scheduling Order required Plaintiff to 

file his opposition on or before September 14, 2015. (Id.). On 

September 13, 2015, Plaintiff constructively filed a motion for extension 

of his time to file the opposition. (ECF No. 17). This Court granted the 

motion, and issued a new Scheduling Order requiring Plaintiff to file 

his opposition on or before October 29, 2015, and requiring Defendants 

to file their reply by November 13, 2015. (ECF No. 18). Plaintiff did 

not file his opposition, and Defendants did not file a reply. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

A. Statement of Facts 

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff submitted a CDCR-1362 

Medical form complaining of “Bad Chest Pain, Cough and headaches to 

facility C yard medical staff” on September 27, 2013. (ECF No. 1 at 4). 

In response to the form, medical staff informed Correctional Officer O. 

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Martin to press her medical emergency alarm to request “an Institution 

Emergency Transport Vehicle” (IETV) for Plaintiff. 

When the IETV arrived, Plaintiff informed Defendant Martin that 

he did not need to be transported “to CTC medical triage.” Defendant 

Martin told Plaintiff she would issue him a written “RVR-115,” or Rules 

Violation Report, for “Willfully delaying a Peace Officer in the 

performance of their duties.” The RVR-115 was issued to Plaintiff on 

October 7, 2013. Plaintiff alleges Defendant issued the RVR-115 in 

retaliation for exercising his right to refuse medical treatment. 

On October 19, 2013, Defendant Telles held the rules violation 

hearing. Plaintiff pled not guilty and requested that Defendant Telles 

“call his adverse and non-adverse witnesses.” The Complaint alleges 

Defendant Telles denied the request. Plaintiff alleges this violated his 

due process rights and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 

Plaintiff was found guilty of willfully delaying Defendant Martin 

in the performance of her duties. Plaintiff alleges this finding resulted 

in him being placed on “C-status,” which meant the “loss of his T.V., 

C.D. player, [and] regular yard access.” Plaintiff alleges these 

consequences are harsher and more severe than the restrictions placed 

on inmates housed in Security Housing Units (SHU) and 

Administrative Segregation Unites (ASU), because those inmates are 

allowed T.V.’s and radios. Plaintiff alleges this treatment constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment. 

Defendants acknowledge the facts are limited by the pleadings for 

purposes of their Motion to Dismiss, but argue that this Court may also 

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consider the actual contents of the Rules Violation Report as 

incorporated by reference into the Complaint. (ECF No. 14-1 at 13). 

Defendants attach a copy of the Rules Violation Report. (ECF No. 14-2 

(Exh. A) at 12). The Rules Violation Report describes the events of 

September 27, 2013, as follows: 

On 09/27/13, at approximately 1038 hours, while 

performing my duties as Facility “C” Clinic Officer, 

L.V.N. Tomas asked me to let Inmate Sanchez, J07661, 

C5-124, in so Tomas could conduct a medical evaluation 

because Inmate Sanchez stated on a CDCR-1362 “Bad 

Chest Pain, Cough, and Headaches.” R.M. Manaig 

instructed me to press the alarm for a medical 

emergency response, IETV requested. I pressed my 

alarm and announced a Code-1 Medical Emergency 

requesting IETV to C-Yard via radio. When the IETV 

responded to C-Clinic, Inmate Sanchez stated, “I’m fine, 

I only have a cough. I just wanted to be seen right away 

and not be charged the $5.00 dollars.” The IETV was 

sent back to Central Health with no emergency. I 

informed Inmate Sanchez that he would be receiving a 

CDCR-115 for Willfully Delaying a Peace Officer in the 

Performance of Duties. The yard had to be put down for 

approximately 15 minutes while the IETV was on the 

yard. 

(Id.).

B. Legal Standard 

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (internal 

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quotations omitted). The pleader must provide the Court with “more 

than an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements will not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] 

must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [a court 

is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a pro se

pleading is construed liberally. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cty. Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 

807 (9th Cir. 1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in his 

complaint that bring his claims “across the line from conceivable to 

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A court may not “supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. 

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

C. Analysis 

1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim 

The First Claim alleges Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated 

when Defendant Telles denied Plaintiff’s request for witnesses at the 

rules violation hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6). Plaintiff alleges that, as a 

result of the denial of due process, “he had to postpone his scheduled 

appearance before the Board of Parole hearings for fear of being denied 

up to 5 years....” (Id. at 3:24-25). In addition, Plaintiff was placed “on 

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C-status program resulting in the loss of his T.V., C.D. player, [and] 

regular yard access.” (Id. at 4:26-27; see also id. at 3:26-28 (“Also phone 

calls to family members...”)). Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]his 

punishment is harsher and [more] severe than inmates placed in SHU 

programs and Administrative Segregation Units, who are allowed their 

T.V.’s, radios etc.” (Id. at 5:1-3). 

Defendants assert that the Complaint does not allege facts 

implicating a liberty interest, as required to state a due process claim. 

(ECF No. 14-2 at 15-17). Specifically, Defendants contend that 

Plaintiff’s choice to postpone his Board of Parole hearing does not 

implicate a liberty interest because Supreme Court precedent forecloses 

prisoners with indeterminate life sentences, like Plaintiff, from proving 

that any particular rules violation will inevitably affect the duration of 

his term. (Id. at 16 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 

(1995)). Defendants further contend that prisoners do not have a 

liberty interest in avoiding placement on C-status because the limited 

loss of privileges does not impose an atypical and significant hardship. 

(ECF No. 14-2 at 15-17). In addition, Defendants assert that the First 

Claim fails as to all Defendants besides Telles because Plaintiff did not 

include factual allegations showing direct personal involvement by 

Defendants Miller, Madden, Greenwood and Martin. (Id. at 17). 

i. Liberty Interest 

Under the Due Process Clause, a prisoner charged with a 

disciplinary violation is entitled to certain due process protections. 

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564–571 (1974). Such protections 

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include the right to call witnesses. Id. “These healthy procedural 

protections, however, adhere only when the disciplinary action 

implicates a protected liberty interest.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 

1071, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Not every “state action taken for a punitive reason encroaches 

upon a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). “[The] range of interests protected by 

procedural due process is not infinite. . . .” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 

U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (citation omitted)). “[F]ederal courts ought to 

afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to 

manage a volatile environment.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 (citations 

omitted). “Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of 

misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence 

imposed by a court of law.” Id. at 485. 

The Complaint does not allege facts showing a liberty interest 

with respect to the Board of Parole hearing or the C-status restrictions. 

As for the Board of Parole hearing, 

The decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of 

considerations. And, the prisoner is afforded procedural 

protection at his parole hearing in order to explain the 

circumstances behind his misconduct record. 

Haw.Admin.Rule §§ 23–700–31(a), 23–700–35(c), 23–

700–36 (1983). The chance that a finding of misconduct 

will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke 

the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause. 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. California affords prisoners procedural 

protections at parole hearings similar to the Hawaiian regulations 

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discussed in Sandin. See e.g., Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, div. 2, ch. 2., art. 

3 (“Prisoner’s Rights” with respect to Parole Board Hearings). Here, as 

in Sandin, Plaintiff has not shown that this particular disciplinary 

finding will inevitably result in denial of parole. Plaintiff’s alleged 

decision to delay his Board of Parole hearing because of this disciplinary 

violation does not establish the requisite liberty interest. 

Plaintiff’s C-status designation also does not implicate a liberty 

interest. Prison restrictions only create a liberty interest where they 

impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (no 

liberty interest at stake in 30 day SHU placement). 

The restrictions imposed on Plaintiff do not constitute an atypical 

and significant hardship when compared to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life. First, Plaintiff conclusorily alleges that these hardships are 

atypical and significant when compared to restrictions on SHU inmates. 

(ECF No. 1 at 5:1-3). The Court declines to accept this legal conclusion 

as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (courts are not bound to accept legal 

conclusions as true on motion to dismiss). 

Second, Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of his T.V., C.D. player, 

some yard access, and some telephone calls with family. Defendants 

point to the Rules Violation Report,2 which includes a description of the 

 

2 The Court treats the Rules Violation Report as part of the Complaint.

Although the Report was not attached to the Complaint, the Complaint 

heavily references the Report and the Report forms the basis of the 

Complaint. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 11, 12, 19, 25, 29, 30). Courts may treat 

documents that are referenced extensively or integral to the complaint 

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discipline imposed, to show that Plaintiff was only on C-status for 30 

days, and was only denied some (not all) day room and yard activities in 

that 30 day period. (ECF No. 14-1 at 16:16-25). 

Here, as in the cases Defendants rely on, the C-status 

deprivations were limited in duration and type, and these limited 

deprivations do not constitute a hardship that is atypical and 

significant “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 

515 U.S. at 484; Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 

1987) (“a prisoner has no constitutional right to a particular 

classification status”); Wyatt v. Swearingen, No. C 06-4228 RMW (PR) 

2010 WL 135322, *8-*9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2010) (no liberty interest in 

prisoner’s year-long C-status placement); Washington v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corrs. & Rehab., No. CIVS-09-0735 LKK DAD P, 2010 WL 729935, *1 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2010) (no liberty interest in delayed release from Cstatus). Plaintiff only alleges one difference that makes his restrictions 

atypical when compared to prisoners in segregated confinement: that 

those inmates are allowed T.V. and radio privileges. Even accepting 

this allegation as true, the T.V./C.D. player restriction does not impose 

a significant hardship. 

 

as part of the complaint, “and thus may assume that its contents are 

true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” U.S. v. 

Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (2003). Furthermore, Plaintiff has not 

objected to Defendants’ request that the Court consider the Report as 

incorporated by reference into the Complaint, and the discipline 

described in the report is consistent with the discipline Plaintiff alleges 

in the body of the Complaint.

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Plaintiff has not pled facts showing that he has a liberty interest 

in not being placed on C-status. In the absence of a liberty interest, 

Plaintiff cannot state a due process claim. As a result, this Court 

RECOMMENDS dismissing Plaintiff’s First Claim alleging violation of 

his due process rights without leave to amend. In the event the District 

Court declines to adopt this recommendation, the Court now turns to 

Defendants’ alternative basis for dismissal. 

ii. Direct Involvement Not Alleged 

The Court further agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s due 

process claim fails against Defendants Miller, Madden and Greenwood 

because Plaintiff did not allege that any of these individuals were 

personally involved in denying his request for witnesses at the hearing. 

An official or staff member may be held liable for his or her own 

conduct when sued in their individual capacity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 

21, 30 (1991). But there is no respondeat superior liability under § 

1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendants 

may be liable under § 1983 only if they were personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation. Dennis v. Thurman, 959 F. Supp. 1253, 

1261 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 

1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991)). A pleading must allege facts sufficient to 

show the constitutional deprivation resulted from the failure of the 

supervisor to train or supervise personnel, or from a policy or custom 

that the supervisor knew or should have known would cause the 

deprivation, or facts that show that the supervisor set in motion a series 

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of acts by others that the supervisor knew or should have known would 

cause the deprivation. Id. 

Plaintiff did not make any allegations suggesting personal 

responsibility by Defendants Miller, Madden or Greenwood. The 

Complaint does not make even conclusory allegations that any of these 

Defendants knew about the underlying circumstances, that any of these 

Defendants participated in or directed the denial of witnesses at the 

hearing, or that these Defendants were responsible for a custom or 

policy resulting in the alleged deprivation. 

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS dismissal of the First 

Claim against Defendants Miller, Madden and Greenwood on this 

ground, even if the District Judge declines to adopt the recommendation 

to dismiss the claim due to the absence of a liberty interest. 

2. Retaliation Claim 

Defendants contend the Second Claim for retaliation for exercising 

a First Amendment right to refuse medical treatment fails for three 

reasons: (1) the Rules Violation Report incorporated by reference into 

the Complaint shows that Plaintiff was disciplined for lying—not for 

refusing medical treatment; (2) the First Amendment is not implicated 

even if Plaintiff was disciplined for refusing medical treatment because 

his refusal of medical treatment was not based on a religious belief nor 

does it constitute protected speech activity; and (3) the Complaint fails 

to allege facts showing personal involvement by any of the individuals, 

except Defendant Martin. (Id. at 11-15). 

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i. Disciplined For Reasons Not Related to 

Protected Speech Activity 

Defendants argue that the Court should rely on the contents of the 

Rules Violation Report, which contradicts Plaintiff’s allegation that the 

Report was issued because he refused medical treatment. 

Courts may treat documents that are referenced extensively or 

integral to the complaint as part of the complaint, “and thus may 

assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6).” U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (2003). 

“Specifically, courts may take into account ‘documents whose contents 

are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, 

but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff's] pleading.’” 

Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 

(9th Cir. 2005)). Courts may consider the contents of documents even 

when they directly contradict allegations in the complaint. Lazy Y 

Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint extensively references the Report, and the 

Report is central to his claims. Plaintiff did not challenge the 

authenticity of the Report, either in this proceeding or in the 

administrative grievance proceeding. Indeed, Plaintiff attached the 

Report in support of his grievance. Accordingly, the Court will treat the 

contents of the Report as true without converting this motion to dismiss 

to a Rule 56 summary judgment motion. 

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The Report states that Plaintiff was disciplined because he stated 

on a CDCR-1362 “Bad Chest Pain, Cough, and Headaches,” even though 

he later admitted, “I’m fine, I only have a cough. I just wanted to be 

seen right away and not be charged the $5.00 dollars,” resulting in a 15 

minute disruption of the yard and the prison staff’s duties. (ECF No. 

14-2 at 12). The contents of the Report show Plaintiff was not 

disciplined for refusing medical treatment, but because he lied about 

the severity of his medical complaint in order to be seen ahead of other 

inmates and avoid a $5 fee. There is nothing in the Report to suggest 

Plaintiff was disciplined for refusing medical treatment or otherwise 

exercising his First Amendment rights. The First Amendment does not 

protect a prisoner who makes false statements calculated to circumvent 

reasonable prison policies for his own nominal personal benefit. 

Even if Plaintiff’s false statement were entitled to some degree of 

First Amendment protection, his interests are outweighed by the 

importance of the prison policies designed to ensure inmates with 

health concerns are treated in an orderly manner, with serious 

complaints receiving priority. False medical alarms like Plaintiff’s 

could cause seriously ill inmates to suffer critical delays in treatment. 

Prisons must be permitted to discipline prisoners who abuse policies 

designed to prioritize inmates experiencing chest pain. 

Consequently, this Court RECOMMENDS the Second Claim for 

Retaliation be DISMISSED as to all Defendants. Further, because the 

Report incorporated into the Complaint establishes that Plaintiff cannot 

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cure the defect by amending the pleading, this Court RECOMMENDS

that the claim be dismissed without leave to amend. 

ii. Direct Involvement Not Alleged 

Defendants also contend, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim fails against Defendants Miller, Madden, Greenwood 

and Telles because Plaintiff did not allege these Defendants were 

personally involved in Defendant Martin’s issuance of the Rules 

Violation Report. “A supervisory official may be liable under Section 

1983 only if he was personally involved in the constitutional 

deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Dennis, 

959 F. Supp. at 1261; and see discussion in Section II.C.1.ii, supra. 

There are no allegations in the Complaint to suggest that any of these 

Defendants were present when Defendant Martin issued the Rules 

Violation Report, that any of these Defendants instructed her to do so, 

nor that any of them were responsible for a policy or custom that they 

knew would result in Defendant Martin issuing an allegedly retaliatory 

Report. Plaintiff fails to show how any of these four Defendants are 

responsible for Defendant Martin’s decision to issue the Report. 

Accordingly, this Court further RECOMMENDS that this claim 

be DISMISSED as to Defendants Miller, Madden, Greenwood and 

Telles for failure to allege direct involvement. 

3. Eighth Amendment Claim 

Defendants contend the Third Claim for cruel and unusual 

punishment fails because the restrictions imposed by C-Status 

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placement did not deprive Plaintiff of any basic human need, as would 

be required to meet the objective element of the claim. (Id. at 18). 

Defendants further assert that this claim fails as to Defendants Miller, 

Madden, Martin and Greenwood because Plaintiff did not allege any of 

these Defendants were directly involved in the alleged misconduct. (Id. 

at 19). The Court agrees with both points. 

“The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’” but 

prisons “must provide humane conditions of confinement.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 42 

U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). Farmer specifies that prisons “must ensure that 

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and 

must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” 

Id. (citations omitted) (also stating “[p]risons conditions may be 

restrictive and even harsh.”). “An Eighth Amendment claim that a 

prison official has deprived inmates of humane conditions of 

confinement must meet two requirements, one objective and one 

subjective.” Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Under the objective requirement, the alleged 

deprivation “must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, ... ; a prison 

official’s acts or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 

(citations omitted) (quoting Rhodes, 42 U.S. at 347). 

The 30 day deprivation of a personal television, C.D. player, phone 

calls with family and some of his day room and yard privileges does not 

equate to a deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s 

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necessities.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Moore v. Lamarque, 242 Fed. 

Appx. 458, 460 (9th Cir. 2007) (limitations on day room and yard 

privileges imposed on C-status inmate were not sufficient to state 

Eighth Amendment violation); McLaughlin v. Diaz, No. 1:14-CV-00784-

AWI-JLT(PC), 2015 WL 1746556, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (report 

and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-CV-00784-AWI-JLT(PC), 2015 

WL 3545674 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2015)) (appeal pending) (Eighth 

Amendment claim based on C-status placement dismissed as 

insufficiently serious under the objective prong); Washington v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., No. CIV-09-0735 LKK DAD P, 2010 WL 

729935, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2010) (same). The Complaint does not 

allege an objectively, sufficiently serious deprivation of life’s necessities. 

Further, Plaintiff did not allege that any of the Defendants except 

Telles were directly involved in the alleged misconduct. “A supervisory 

official may be liable under Section 1983 only if he was personally 

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a sufficient 

causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.” Dennis, 959 F. Supp. at 1261; and see

discussion in Section II.C.1.ii, supra. Plaintiff’s failure to allege facts 

showing how Defendants Miller, Madden, Greenwood and Martin were 

each personally responsible for the C-status deprivations compels 

dismissal of this claim against those Defendants, even if Plaintiff had 

alleged an objectively serious deprivation. Accordingly, this Court 

RECOMMENDS that the Third Claim be DISMISSED without leave 

to amend. 

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D. Conclusion 

Because Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claim, this Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED 

and Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED without leave to amend. In 

the event the District Judge declines to adopt this recommendation, the 

Court now turns to Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. 

III. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Defendants seek partial summary judgment on the ground that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to all 

Defendants and claims except the First Claim for due process violations 

as to Defendant Telles. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(PLRA), “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 

under . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a) (West 2014); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 

(2001) (requiring exhaustion even though the specific relief sought by 

prisoner cannot be granted by administrative process); Morton v. Hall, 

599 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2010). “[A] prisoner must complete the 

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable 

procedural rules . . . as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006). 

A. Statement of Facts 

Plaintiff alleges that he “has exhausted all available 

administrative remedies,” a statement verified by his signed statement 

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under penalty of perjury. (ECF No. 1 at 5:22 (allegation), 8 

(verification)). But Plaintiff does not provide supporting factual 

allegations in the Complaint, nor does he attach administrative 

grievances to the pleading. Plaintiff also did not provide a declaration 

or other evidence as permitted by this Court’s Klingele Notice and 

Scheduling Order. 

Defendants provide the Declaration of R. Gibson, Appeals 

Coordinator. (ECF No. 14-2). The Gibson Declaration details the 

administrative grievance process. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3). According to the Gibson 

Declaration, Plaintiff only filed one grievance relevant to this case. (Id. 

¶ 5). The grievance, received by Centinela State Prison on November 

25, 2013, is attached to and authenticated by the Gibson Declaration. 

(Id. ¶ 5, Exh. A). 

In that grievance, Plaintiff complained that Defendant Telles 

should not have found Plaintiff guilty of willfully disobeying a peace 

officer because Plaintiff has a Constitutional right, recognized by Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3351(a), to refuse medical treatment. (ECF No. 14-

2 at 8, 10). The initial grievance does not name the other four 

Defendants, does not complain the alleged denial of witnesses violated 

his due process rights, and does not complain that the resulting 

discipline violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.). 

Plaintiff did not mention Defendant Martin in the initial appeal, 

but he did mention her name on January 28, 2014, when appealing the 

second level decision to the third level of review. (Id. at 9, 11 (“The 

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SHO relied on statements made by c/o Martin (R.E.) and L.V.N. 

Tomas.... [h]owever neither c/o Martin nor L.V.N. Tomas3 are 

authorized facility employed health care staff licensed to diagnose 

illness or, prescribe medication and health care treatment for 

inmates.”). 

Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies as to this 

grievance, as noted in the April 17, 2014, Third Level Decision denying 

Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id. at 21-22). 

B. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes the granting of 

summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The 

standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is essentially the 

same as for the granting of a directed verdict. Judgment must be 

entered, “if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable 

conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 250-251 (1986). 

A defendant may move for summary judgment on the basis that 

the plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Albino v. 

Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). A defendant moving for 

summary judgment on exhaustion grounds carries an initial burden of 

 

3 L.V.N. Tomas is not named as a Defendant in the Complaint. 

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showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact that an available 

administrative remedy existed and that the prisoner did not exhaust 

that remedy. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. “A material issue of fact is one 

that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve 

the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 

677 F.2d 1301, 1305-1306 (9th Cir. 1982). More than a “metaphysical 

doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986). 

Once the defendant has carried that burden, the plaintiff must 

come forward with evidence “showing that there is something in his 

particular case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 

F.3d at 1172 (citation omitted). The nonmoving party “must point to 

some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material 

fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[’s] favor, 

could convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[].” Reese v. 

Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Liberty 

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249). 

The Court must grant the motion for summary judgment if the 

evidence produced by the party opposing summary judgment is “merely 

colorable” or is “not significantly probative.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 

249. The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of 

factual allegations.” “No valid interest is served by withholding 

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summary judgment on a complaint that wraps nonactionable conduct in 

a jacket woven of legal conclusions and hyperbole.” Vigliotto v. Terry, 

873 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Moreover, “A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed 

facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine 

issue of material fact.” F.T.C. v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 

1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997). However, “the district court may not 

disregard a piece of evidence at the summary stage solely based on its 

self-serving nature.” Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 784 F.3d 495, 

487 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding plaintiff’s “uncorroborated and self-serving” 

declaration sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact 

because the “testimony was based on personal knowledge, legally 

relevant, and internally consistent.”).

C. Analysis 

Defendants have met their burden to show that a grievance 

procedure existed, and that Plaintiff was aware of and capable of using 

the procedure. (ECF No. 14-2 ¶¶ 2-3 (Gibson Declaration describing 

administrative exhaustion process with reference to specific sections of 

the California Code of Regulations), ¶ 10, Exh. B (Record showing 

Plaintiff’s grievance history from 2006 to the present)). 

Defendants also have met their burden to show that Plaintiff did 

not exhaust the available administrative process as to any Defendant or 

claim, except for the Second Claim as to Defendant Telles for retaliating 

against Plaintiff for refusing medical treatment. As explained further 

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below, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff’s 

grievance exhausted his First Claim for due process violation. 

Defendants submitted unrebutted evidence that Plaintiff filed 

only one pertinent grievance. (ECF No. 14-2 ¶¶ 4-5 and Exh. A). In 

that grievance, Plaintiff complained that Defendant Telles should not 

have found Plaintiff guilty of willfully disobeying a peace officer because 

Plaintiff has a Constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. (ECF 

No. 14-2 at 8, 10). 

Section 3084.2(a)(3) of Title 15 of the California Code of 

Regulations requires an inmate filing a grievance to identify, by name 

and title or position, any staff member alleged to be involved in the 

action or decision being appealed, along with the dates each staff 

member was involved in the issue being appealed. If the inmate does 

not have those details, he must provide any other available information 

that would assist the appeals coordinator in identifying the staff 

member or supervisor involved. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). 

In the initial grievance received by Centinela State Prison on 

November 25, 2013, Plaintiff named Defendant Telles, but he did not 

name Defendants Miller, Madden, Martin or Greenwood. (ECF No. 14-

2 ¶¶ 5-7 and Exh. A). Plaintiff also did not suggest that any other staff 

members or supervisors were the focus of his complaint. (Id.). 

Plaintiff’s passing reference to Defendant Martin after the second level 

decision is not sufficient, because the regulations specify that 

defendants must be named in the initial filing and that identifying a 

defendant in a subsequent administrative appeal of the grievance does 

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not exhaust the claim as to that defendant. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

3084.1(b). Plaintiff only exhausted his claim of retaliation as to 

Defendant Telles, because Plaintiff only identifies Defendant Telles in 

the initial grievance. 

Plaintiff’s initial grievance also did not complain that he was 

denied the right to present witnesses or otherwise was denied due 

process, and did not complain about the conditions of his confinement or 

that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated. (ECF No. 14-2 at 

8, 10). To exhaust those claims, Plaintiff was required to raise those 

issues in his initial grievance. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(1). 

Plaintiff’s failure to do so compels dismissal of the Fourteenth and 

Eighth Amendment claims as to all Defendants, including Telles. 

D. Conclusion 

Plaintiff exhausted his Second Claim for retaliation against 

Defendant Telles only. Plaintiff did not exhaust this claim as to 

Defendants Miller, Madden, Martin or Greenwood. Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims against any 

Defendant. Consequently, this Court RECOMMENDS that 

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be GRANTED. If 

this recommendation is adopted by the District Judge and the motion to 

dismiss is denied, the Second Claim against Defendant Telles would be 

the only remaining claim following summary judgment. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this 

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Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss without leave to amend; (3) GRANTING Defendants’ 

Summary Judgment Motion; and (4) DISMISSING the case with 

prejudice. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than January 26, 2016. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

February 2, 2016. The parties are advised that the failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Date: January 5, 2016 

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