Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-22-05273/USCOURTS-caDC-22-05273-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 2024 Decided July 23, 2024 

No. 22-5273 

JO SPENCE, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND 

DENIS MCDONOUGH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:19-cv-01947) 

Jo Spence, pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Bradley G. Silverman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Brian P. Hudak

and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: MILLETT, KATSAS, and RAO, Circuit Judges. 

USCA Case #22-5273 Document #2065943 Filed: 07/23/2024 Page 1 of 16
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO. 

RAO, Circuit Judge: Does the pleading leniency we 

afford pro se litigants apply when the litigant is a licensed 

attorney? We conclude it does not. Trained lawyers are 

generally not unsophisticated litigants in need of special 

protections, and any leniency afforded is left to the discretion 

of the district court. 

In this case, Jo Spence was fired after more than a decade 

working as an attorney at the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(“VA”). She alleged the termination was in retaliation for filing 

internal discrimination complaints. But Spence failed to plead 

sufficient facts in her complaint to state all but one of her 

claims. Because of her legal training, the district court was not 

required to grant Spence the leniency afforded a typical pro se 

litigant, nor did the district court abuse its discretion in 

declining to do so. Spence’s surviving claim fails on summary 

judgment. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I.

Spence worked as a senior attorney at the VA for eleven 

years. In 2017, she filed a complaint with the VA’s Equal 

Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Office alleging 

discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and age. She separately 

filed whistleblower disclosures with the Office of 

Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (“OAWP”), 

alleging the VA engaged in illegal preferential hiring of Army 

attorneys. The VA terminated Spence in 2018 for 

“unacceptable performance.” 

Claiming the action was retaliatory, Spence challenged her 

termination before the Merit Systems Protection Board 

(“MSPB”). The MSPB affirmed Spence’s termination and 

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relied on examples of Spence making errors in cases, protesting 

work assignments, and refusing to communicate with clients as 

substantial evidence she was terminated for poor performance. 

Spence then filed a complaint in district court alleging 

discrimination and retaliation by the VA. She first filed a 98-

page complaint asserting five counts: Count I, discrimination 

and retaliation based on her EEO complaint; Count II, 

retaliation based on her OAWP complaint; Count III, hostile 

work environment; Count IV, unlawful hiring practices; and 

Count V, termination in violation of statutory process. After the 

VA moved for summary judgment, Spence moved to amend 

her complaint to add Count VI, a challenge to the MSPB’s 

decision, attaching a 234-page complaint. The district court 

denied Spence’s motion and imposed a 50-page limit on any 

subsequent amended complaints. 

Spence again moved to amend, proposing a 148-page 

complaint that contained the original 98-page complaint as well 

as an additional 50 pages for the MSPB claim. The district 

court denied the motion and clarified that the cap was 50 pages 

total, not 50 pages for the additional count. Spence moved to 

amend a third time, attaching a 50-page complaint and three 

extensive exhibits containing her submissions in the MSPB 

proceeding. The district court granted the motion to amend. 

In response, the VA moved to dismiss the amended 

complaint for repeated violations of the court’s filing 

requirements. It argued Spence’s exhibits were merely another 

attempt to skirt the page limit. For example, Exhibit A of the 

amended complaint was a 57-page statement of facts that 

Spence incorporated by reference, making her 50-page 

complaint really 107 pages. The VA also argued Spence failed 

to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because her MSPB 

claim was “rambling” and included “wholly irrelevant or 

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unnecessary” material. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a 

complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 

The district court reversed course, dismissing Spence’s 

amended complaint because it incorporated the statement of 

facts and so violated the page limit. The court explained it was 

“troubled by [Spence’s] flagrant disregard for the limits the 

Court has imposed” but dismissed the complaint without 

prejudice, giving Spence one last chance to meet the length 

requirement. 

Finally, on her fourth attempt, Spence filed an amended 

complaint that complied with the court’s page limit. The VA 

again moved to dismiss—for failure to state a claim and for 

violating Rule 8—and, alternatively, for summary judgment. 

Spence filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion that 

alleged additional facts supporting her claims. The district 

court construed the allegations in Spence’s complaint liberally 

because she was proceeding pro se, but it declined to consider 

the additional allegations in her opposition memorandum 

because Spence was an attorney and so was a “poor candidate 

for [the] special treatment” afforded pro se plaintiffs. The 

district court dismissed Counts I–IV and VI for failure to state 

a claim and granted summary judgment on Count V. The 

district court also dismissed Spence’s claims with prejudice 

because Spence had disregarded the court’s repeated warnings 

about pleading requirements and was imposing on the “finite 

resources” of the VA and the courts. Spence timely appealed. 

II. 

We begin with the threshold issue of whether the district 

court was required to consider the facts Spence alleged in her 

opposition memorandum. The district court limited its analysis 

to the factual allegations in Spence’s amended complaint. 

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Spence contends the district court erred by failing to consider 

her other filings because, under our precedent, courts must 

“consider a pro se litigant’s complaint in light of all filings.” 

Appellant Br. 10 (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., 

Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (cleaned 

up)). 

In considering whether leniency is required for pro se 

attorneys, we briefly note the evolution of our pleading 

standards. Pleadings at common law required “technical 

exactness in stating a claim for relief or a defense,” and courts 

construed all allegations against the pleader. 5 CHARLES ALAN 

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & A. BENJAMIN SPENCER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1286 (4th ed. 2021). 

With the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

our system moved away from that harsh standard. Today, 

plaintiffs must put forth only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim” and “a demand for the relief sought,” and courts must 

construe pleadings “so as to do justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 

(e); accord WRIGHT, MILLER & SPENCER, supra, § 1286 

(explaining district courts must “make a determined effort to 

understand what the pleader is attempting to set forth and to 

construe the pleading in his or her favor, whenever the interest 

of justice so requires”). 

Courts have extended this liberal pleading standard even 

further for plaintiffs proceeding pro se. Beginning in the 1970s, 

the Supreme Court held that a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must 

be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972) (per curiam); accord Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

106 (1976). Thus, when weighing whether a pro se plaintiff has 

stated a claim, courts must treat “technical deficiencies in the 

complaint ... leniently” and “scrutinize[]” the “entire 

pleading ... to determine if any legally cognizable claim can be 

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found.” WRIGHT, MILLER & SPENCER, supra, § 1286. This 

court has explained the liberal standard extends to 

“consider[ing] supplemental material filed by a pro se litigant 

in order to clarify the precise claims being urged”—including 

facts set forth in a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss. 

Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see 

also Brown, 789 F.3d at 152. 

We have never decided whether this liberal pleading 

standard applies when a pro se litigant is a licensed lawyer. See

Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(declining to answer whether the liberal pleading standard 

applies to pro se lawyers). But we have recognized in similar 

circumstances that the typical leniency afforded pro se litigants 

does not necessarily follow for pro se lawyers. In Mann v. 

Castiel, for example, we cited approvingly a district court’s 

finding that “the additional latitude [the court] typically affords 

pro se litigants to correct defects in service of process” is 

“unwarranted” when the litigants are not “typical, 

unsophisticated pro se litigants,” but instead are people with 

“extensive litigation experience ... [or] formal legal training.” 

681 F.3d 368, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); see also

Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 

1990) (explaining, in the context of a failure to enter an 

appearance, that “a law-trained individual, unlike the 

unsophisticated pro se litigant, can be presumed to have some 

acquaintance with the rules of the judicial process and the 

consequences risked by their infringement”). 

We now hold that the liberal pleading standard for pro se 

litigants does not invariably apply when the litigant is a 

licensed attorney. In reaching this conclusion, we join the 

unanimous consensus of the other circuits that have addressed 

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this question.1

 As the Supreme Court has recognized, pro se 

pleadings are different from “formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added). The 

requirement that courts construe pro se pleadings liberally does 

not ordinarily apply to pro se lawyers. Of course, district courts 

“must” construe complaints “so as to do justice.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(e). In discharging that duty, courts retain discretion to 

consider supplemental materials submitted by a pro se attorney, 

but they need not. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion when 

declining to consider Spence’s additional submissions. Spence 

is a licensed attorney, not the typical pro se litigant. She has 

formal legal training and 36 years of legal work experience, 

including serving as a senior attorney at the VA for over a 

decade. Her division at the VA handles contract procurement 

1 See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] 

lawyer representing himself ordinarily receives no such solicitude at 

all.”); Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977) 

(“We cannot accord [the plaintiff] the advantage of the liberal 

construction of his complaint normally given pro se litigants because 

he is a licensed attorney.” (cleaned up)); Andrews v. Columbia Gas 

Transmission Corp., 544 F.3d 618, 633 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding 

it was not an abuse of discretion to deny pro se practicing attorneys 

special consideration); Godlove v. Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald, & 

Hahn, 903 F.2d 1145, 1148 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Ordinarily, we treat the 

efforts of pro se applicants gently, but a pro se lawyer is entitled to 

no special consideration.”); Huffman v. Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016, 

1021 (9th Cir. 2023) (“There is a good reason that we afford leeway 

to pro se parties, who appear without counsel and without the benefit 

of sophisticated representation ... . That logic does not apply to 

practicing attorneys, nor should the grace extend to them.”); Smith v. 

Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001) (“While we are generally 

obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, we decline to do so 

here because [the plaintiff] is a licensed attorney.” (cleaned up)). 

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litigation, and she was specifically given “litigation-related 

work assignments and those that required coordination with the 

Litigation Team.” In these circumstances, the district court was 

not required to consider the facts introduced in Spence’s 

opposition memorandum, nor was it an abuse of discretion to 

limit review to Spence’s complaint.2

III.

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of Counts 

I, II, IV, and VI, and grant of summary judgment for Count V.3

We consider only the facts in Spence’s complaint with respect 

to the dismissed counts. 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). “[W]e accept the well-pleaded 

factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences 

from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” Air Excursions 

LLC v. Yellen, 66 F.4th 272, 277–78 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned 

up). 

2

 Spence also argues the district court’s failure to take judicial notice 

of her opposition memorandum’s exhibits violates Federal Rule of 

Evidence 201. District courts may take judicial notice in ruling on a 

motion to dismiss. See Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 

1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But Rule 201 requires a district court to take 

judicial notice only of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable 

dispute.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). The facts Spence alleged in her 

opposition memorandum’s exhibits are disputed, so the district court 

properly declined to take judicial notice of them. 

3

 Spence does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of Count III, 

her hostile work environment claim. 

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A. 

In Count I, Spence alleged the VA terminated her 

employment in retaliation for her EEO complaint,4 in violation 

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). To state a 

claim for retaliation under Title VII or the ADEA, a plaintiff 

must plausibly allege that (1) she “engaged in statutorily 

protected activity,” (2) she “suffered a materially adverse 

action by [her] employer,” and (3) the two are causally 

connected. Howard R.L. Cook & Tommy Shaw Found. ex rel. 

Black Emps. of the Libr. of Cong., Inc. v. Billington, 737 F.3d 

767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Title VII); see Paquin v. Fed. Nat’l 

Mortg. Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (ADEA). An 

act is materially adverse if it objectively “would have 

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 

charge of discrimination.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 

1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). To be actionable 

under Title VII or the ADEA, in other words, the act must also 

have “produce[d] an injury or harm.” Burlington N. & Santa 

Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (Title VII); see also

Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1198 n.4 (ADEA).

The district court dismissed Count I for failing to state a 

claim. It held that Spence did not plead facts showing any 

materially adverse actions except her termination, and that she 

did not adequately plead a causal connection between her 

termination and her protected activity, filing the EEO 

complaint.

4

 Spence does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her Count 

I discrimination claim, so she has forfeited any challenge to it on 

appeal. 

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Spence alleged the VA retaliated against her by sending 

letters of counseling and reprimand, reducing her performance 

rating to unsatisfactory, and proposing to suspend her. But, on 

this record, none of these allegations, taken as true, amounts to 

a materially adverse action. Letters of counseling or reprimand 

are not adverse actions when they “contain[] no abusive 

language, but rather job-related constructive criticism,” nor 

when they fail to affect the plaintiff’s salary, bonus, or other 

benefits. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; see also Weber v. 

Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Similarly, 

“performance reviews typically constitute adverse actions only 

when attached to financial harms” or other identified adverse 

employment consequences. Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199. Spence 

did not allege in her complaint that the letters contained abusive 

language or that the letters or change in performance rating 

resulted in any financial or other adverse employment harm. 

And Spence never served her proposed suspension, so that is 

not a materially adverse action either. See id. Ordinary 

employer evaluations and feedback do not constitute materially 

adverse actions. 

The only adverse action Spence plausibly pleaded was her 

termination. But even then, Spence failed to plead facts 

showing the causal link between her termination and her 

protected activity. Spence asks us to infer her termination must 

have been retaliatory because she was terminated after she 

submitted her EEO complaint. But we do not “accept 

inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the 

complaint.” Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 

728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007). When “mere temporal proximity” is 

the only “evidence of causality,” the Court has held that “the 

temporal proximity must be very close.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. 

v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (cleaned 

up). We sometimes accept an adverse employment action 

occurring within three to four months of the protected activity 

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as sufficient to allow an inference of causation. See id. at 273–

74 (collecting cases). In Spence’s case, however, ten months 

had passed between the filing of her EEO complaint and her 

supervisor proposing her termination. Spence maintains that 

the continuous chain of allegedly retaliatory actions bridges the 

gap between her complaint and termination. But even the latest 

action in this purported chain, Spence’s proposed suspension, 

is not an adverse action and was separated from the proposal of 

her termination by four months. We are unable to infer the 

necessary element of causation from these facts. 

Spence failed to plead facts sufficient to state a claim for 

retaliation under Title VII or the ADEA, and so we affirm the 

dismissal of Count I. 

B. 

In Count II, Spence alleged the VA unlawfully retaliated 

against her for filing complaints about the VA’s hiring 

practices. Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, the 

employee bears the burden to show her protected disclosures 

were a “contributing factor in the personnel action,” which can 

be accomplished by showing the adverse action “occurred 

within a period of time” that reasonably shows causation. 5 

U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). The district court dismissed this claim for 

the same reasons as Count I: Spence failed to allege an adverse 

action except termination, and she failed to show a causal link 

between her termination and her OAWP complaint.

Based on the facts in her complaint, Spence failed to plead 

a link between her disclosures and any adverse personnel 

action. She alleged the VA retaliated against her because she 

“made whistleblower disclosures in complaints in 2017 and 

2018.” But Spence did not plead facts that plausibly suggest 

her complaints were a contributing factor in her termination. 

We cannot infer from Spence’s allegations the type of 

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causation required to state a claim under the Whistleblower 

Protection Act, and therefore we affirm the dismissal of Count 

II.

C. 

In Count IV, Spence alleged the VA violated the 

Whistleblower Protection Act’s “prohibited personnel 

practices.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302. That provision makes it unlawful 

to deceive job applicants as to their “right to compete for 

employment,” or to afford unlawful “preference or advantage” 

to applicants. Id. § 2302(b)(4), (6). The district court dismissed 

this claim for failing to plead facts sufficient to infer a 

prohibited personnel practice.

In her complaint, Spence set forth only conclusory 

statements about the VA’s hiring practices. Her claim, in full, 

is that “she was deceived with respect to her right to compete 

for employment when Army attorneys were hired at the GS-15 

level to perform the same work as [Spence] under [an operating 

agreement] intended for VA attorneys which resulted in the 

attorneys being granted preferences or advantages not 

authorized by law, rule or regulation to improve their prospect 

of employment.” Spence’s statement does not include any 

necessary factual allegations. For example, Spence did not 

plead facts showing that Army applicants were given favorable 

treatment in the application process or that the job posting 

deceived her about her ability to compete. Further, Spence did 

not allege she applied for and was denied a job, as required by 

the Act. See id. § 1221(e)(1). Because Spence failed to state a 

prohibited personnel practices claim, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of Count IV. 

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D. 

In Count V, Spence alleged the VA unlawfully terminated 

her employment without first receiving approval from the 

Office of Special Counsel. The district court granted the 

government summary judgment on this claim, so we consider 

whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact and whether 

the VA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). We “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 

530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 

The VA Secretary may use an expedited procedure to 

discipline employees for misconduct or substandard 

performance. See Department of Veterans Affairs 

Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, 

Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862 (codified in scattered 

sections of 38 U.S.C.). For an employee seeking corrective 

action from the Office of Special Counsel, however, the Act 

requires “the approval of the Special Counsel” before the 

employee may be removed.5 38 U.S.C. § 714(e)(1). 

When Spence’s supervisor first proposed her termination, 

an attorney in the VA’s Office of General Counsel asked a 

senior advisor in the OAWP whether Spence had a retaliation 

claim pending with the Office of Special Counsel. The senior 

advisor communicated that the investigation was complete: 

“Neither [the Special Counsel] nor [the] Office of 

Accountability and Whistleblower Protection will continue to 

5

 The Office of Special Counsel investigates and prosecutes 

Whistleblower Protection Act cases across the government. It is “a 

remedial mechanism independent of the civil service system to 

which [employees can] bring their grievances.” Barnhart v. Devine, 

771 F.2d 1515, 1520 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 

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hold the action proposed under [38 U.S.C. § 714(e)]. The 

proposal [to remove Spence] is clear to proceed.” Spence was 

removed the next day. 

Spence appealed her termination to the MSPB, claiming 

among other things that the VA erred by proceeding without 

receiving the Special Counsel’s approval directly. The MSPB 

concluded the VA adequately followed its procedures for 

termination. See id. § 714(d)(2)(A) (requiring an 

administrative judge to uphold the VA Secretary’s decision to 

terminate for cause if “supported by substantial evidence”). 

The district court affirmed the MSPB decision because the 

email exchange between the General Counsel’s office and the 

OAWP advisor was substantial evidence that Spence’s 

termination was processed with the Special Counsel’s approval 

and in accordance with the VA’s procedures. 

Spence does not raise any factual dispute about the email. 

She argues only that the email must come from the Office of 

Special Counsel directly, not the OAWP, to serve as evidence 

of the Special Counsel’s approval. But while the statute 

requires the Special Counsel’s approval, it does not impose a 

requirement on how that approval is conveyed. 

Like the district court, we consider whether the MSPB’s 

decision was supported by substantial evidence, which 

“requires such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Transp., 997 F.3d 1247, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2021) 

(cleaned up). We conclude that standard is easily met here. The 

email came from the OAWP, an office with frequent 

interactions with the Office of Special Counsel, and the OAWP 

explicitly stated it received approval from the Special Counsel 

to move ahead with Spence’s termination. Accordingly, we 

affirm the grant of summary judgment on Count V. 

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E. 

Finally, in Count VI, Spence alleged the MSPB decision 

was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial 

evidence. The district court dismissed this claim for violating 

Rule 8, which requires that a complaint include “a short and 

plain statement of the claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The 

district court held Spence’s MSPB claim was “too unwieldy” 

and did not “give fair notice” to the VA because of its length, 

redundancy, and disorganization. On appeal, Spence argues her 

approach was necessary to establish her challenge and that she 

presented the facts in as orderly a manner as possible. 

Enforcement of Rule 8 “is largely a matter for the trial 

court’s discretion.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004); accord WRIGHT, MILLER & SPENCER, supra,

§ 1217. The district court did not abuse that discretion here. 

Count VI totals 41 of the complaint’s 50 pages but includes 

little or no explanation of how the material is relevant to 

Spence’s claims. Because Spence’s complaint was neither 

short nor plain, we affirm the dismissal of Count VI. 

IV.

Finally, Spence claims the district court abused its 

discretion in dismissing her complaint with prejudice. When 

determining whether a district court abused its discretion, “we 

may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial 

court.” Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of 

Eng’rs, 985 F.3d 1032, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). 

“Abuse of discretion is a particularly high bar where the court 

is simply exercising its judgment about whether to relieve a 

party from an unexcused (i.e., no good cause) failure to comply 

with the Rules.” Morrissey v. Mayorkas, 17 F.4th 1150, 1157 

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). 

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Although dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction, 

it is permissible when a plaintiff has violated court rules or 

engaged in egregious conduct. See Cohen v. Bd. of Trs., 819 

F.3d 476, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The district court afforded 

Spence multiple opportunities to amend her complaint and 

specified the deficiency in her pleadings with each dismissal. 

After Spence’s fourth complaint failed to comport with the 

Federal Rules and the district court’s requirements, the court 

warned it would dismiss her claims with prejudice if she failed 

to comply on her next attempt. Notwithstanding this notice, 

Spence again disregarded the pleading requirements. 

In these circumstances, we hold the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Spence another bite at the apple. 

* * * 

We hold that the requirement to afford a liberal 

construction to a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings does not apply to 

pro se attorneys. Rather, we leave such questions to the sound 

discretion of the district court. The district court here neither 

erred nor abused its discretion by considering only the 

allegations in Spence’s complaint and disregarding her lengthy 

additional filings. For the reasons above, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of Counts I, II, IV, and VI, and summary 

judgment for the VA on Count V. 

So ordered.

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