Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-17-56006/USCOURTS-ca9-17-56006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA, LLC, an 

Arizona limited liability company,

Plaintiff-Appellant/Appellee,

v.

BURBANK HIGH SCHOOL VOCAL 

MUSIC ASSOCIATION; BRETT 

CARROLL; JOHN DOE CARROLL, a 

married couple; ELLIE STOCKWELL;

JOHN DOE STOCKWELL, a married 

couple; MARIANNE WINTERS; JOHN 

DOE WINTERS, a married couple; 

GENEVA TARANDEK; JOHN DOE 

TARANDEK, a married couple; 

LORNA CONSOLI; JOHN DOE 

CONSOLI, a married couple; 

CHARLES RODRIGUEZ; JOHN DOE 

RODRIGUEZ, a married couple,

Defendants-Appellees/Appellants.

Nos. 17-56006

17-56417

17-56419

D.C. No.

2:16-cv-04781-

SVW-FFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 13, 2019

Pasadena, California

Filed March 24, 2020

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2 TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Andrew D. Hurwitz, 

Circuit Judges, and Edward R. Korman,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

SUMMARY**

Copyright

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the vocal music director at Burbank 

High School and other defendants in a copyright suit and 

reversed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees to 

defendants.

Tresóna Multimedia, LLC, a licensing company, 

claimed that the Burbank High School student show choirs 

failed to obtain licenses for their use of copyrighted sheet 

music in arranging a show choir performance. The panel

concluded that Tresóna lacked standing under 17 U.S.C. 

§ 501(b) to sue as to three of the four musical works at issue

because it received its interests in those songs from 

individual co-owners of copyright, without the consent of 

the other co-owners, and therefore held only non-exclusive 

licenses in those works.

* The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge 

for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N 3

Affirming in part on different grounds from the district 

court, the panel held that the defense of fair use rendered the 

use of the fourth musical work noninfringing. The panel 

concluded that the educational purpose of the use was an 

enumerated fair use purpose under 17 U.S.C. § 107. In 

addition, the purpose and character of the use, which was 

transformative, weighed strongly in favor of a finding of fair 

use. The nature of the copyrighted work weighed against 

fair use because the original arrangement of the song was 

creative. Neither (1) the amount and substantiality of the 

portion used nor (2) the effect upon the potential market for 

or value of the copyrighted work weighed against fair use. 

The panel stated that it was especially swayed by the limited 

and transformative nature of the use and the work’s 

nonprofit educational purposes in enhancing the educational 

experience of high school students. The panel concluded

that the music director’s use of a small portion of the song,

along with portions of other songs, to create sheet music for 

a new and different high school choir showpiece 

performance was a fair use.

Reversing in part, the panel held that the district court 

abused its discretion in denying defendants attorneys’ fees 

under 17 U.S.C. § 505 because defendants prevailed across 

the board in this action in the district court and won a ruling 

on their fair use defense on appeal, Tresóna’s arguments 

were objectively unreasonable, and an award of fees would 

further the purposes of the Copyright Act. The panel

therefore awarded defendants’ attorneys’ fees and remanded

to the district court for the calculation of the award.

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4 TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N

COUNSEL

Brad A. Denton (argued), Denton Peterson P.C., Mesa, 

Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellant/Appellee.

Scott D. Danforth (argued) and Marlon C. Wadlington,

Atkinson Andelson Loya Ruud & Romo, Cerritos, 

California, for Defendants-Appellees/Appellants Brett 

Carroll and John Doe Carroll.

A. Eric Bjorgum (argued), Marc Karish, and Vincent 

Pollmeier, Karish & Bjorgum PC, Pasadena, California, for 

Defendants-Appellees/Appellants Burbank High School 

Vocal Music Association, Ellie Stockwell, John Doe 

Stockwell, Marianne Winters, John Doe Winters, Geneva 

Tarandek, John Doe Tarandek, Lorna Consoli, John Doe 

Consoli, Charles Rodriguez, and John Doe Rodriguez.

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

In this copyright infringement action against Brett 

Carroll, the vocal music director at Burbank High School, 

the Burbank High School Vocal Music Association Boosters 

Club, and several individual Boosters Club parents, Tresóna 

Multimedia, LLC claims that the Burbank High School 

student show choirs failed to obtain licenses for their use of 

copyrighted sheet music in arranging a show choir 

performance. We conclude that Tresóna lacks standing to 

sue as to three of the four musical works at issue, and that 

the defense of fair use renders the use of the fourth 

noninfringing. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant 

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TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N 5

of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, but reverse its 

denial of attorneys’ fees to Carroll and the Boosters Club.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Burbank High School Performances

Giving Rise to this Suit

Burbank High School’s music education program 

includes instructional classes and five competitive show 

choirs. The competitive show choirs—Out Of The Blue, 

Sapphire, Impressions, Sound Dogs, and In Sync—are 

“nationally recognized as top competitors in their respective 

divisions,” and reportedly inspired the television series 

“Glee.” To participate in the show choirs, students “must be 

enrolled in one of the four music classes offered [by Burbank 

High School] during the instructional day,” and must also 

make financial contributions to defray expenses, including 

those for costume rentals, competition entry fees, 

transportation, choreographers, and professional music 

arrangers.

Because student contributions do not cover the full costs 

of the competitive show choirs, and many students at 

Burbank High School cannot afford to make any financial 

contributions, the Boosters Club, a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, holds several annual fundraisers at 

Burbank High School to help cover the show choirs’ 

expenses. These annual fundraisers include the “Burbank 

Blast,” a show choir competition that features performances 

by 40 show choirs, as well as the spring “Pop” show, during 

which the Burbank High School competitive show choirs 

perform their competition sets. To generate revenue from 

these events, the Boosters Club sells entry tickets, as well as 

advertisements in the event programs.

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6 TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N

Brett Carroll is the music director at Burbank High 

School, where he teaches an instructional day class and 

directs the show choirs. Carroll also acts as a “teacher 

liaison/coach” to the Boosters Club. In this capacity, Carroll 

decides how the funds raised by the Boosters Club are spent 

and selects the show choirs’ choreographers, arrangers, and 

accompanists. Carroll also decides, with input from parents, 

which competitions the show choirs will attend during the 

school year.

Carroll commissioned music arranger Josh Greene, who 

is not a party to this action, to create custom sheet music for 

two shows: “Rainmaker” and “80’s Movie Montage,” 

performed by the group In Sync. “Rainmaker” is an 

approximately eighteen-minute performance of stanzas from 

many musical works, including a rearranged segment of 

“Magic,” a song originally performed by Olivia NewtonJohn. The “Magic” segment used by In Sync to close out the 

last two minutes of “Rainmaker” includes a rearranged 

chorus and small segments from another verse of the song. 

“80’s Movie Montage” is an approximately twenty-minute 

performance, and incorporates a segment of the song “(I’ve 

Had) The Time of My Life” by Bill Medley and Jennifer 

Warnes. That segment is approximately sixteen seconds of 

the song’s chorus, out of the song’s four-minute and twentytwo-second runtime, and is used only once in “80’s Move 

Montage” to transition between other songs. Each show also 

incorporates small segments of several other musical works, 

none of which is at issue in this case. In Sync performed 

these shows on several occasions, including at the Burbank 

Blast fundraiser and during several student competitions.

After In Sync’s performances of “Rainmaker” and “80’s 

Movie Montage,” Tresóna, an Arizona-based licensing 

company, brought copyright infringement claims against 

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TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N 7

Carroll, the Boosters Club, and parent members of the 

Boosters Club, alleging infringement of Tresóna’s copyright 

interests in “Magic” and “(I’ve Had) The Time of My Life.” 

Tresóna also alleged that performances by the Jon Burroughs 

High School show choirs at the Burbank Blast, which 

incorporated segments of the songs “Hotel California” and 

“Don’t Phunk With My Heart” violated its copyright 

interests in those songs. Tresóna alleged that it was “the only 

authorized issuer in the United States and Canada for the . . .

infringed songs,” and that Carroll, the Boosters Club, and the 

parents’ use of the songs without obtaining a “custom 

arrangement license, grand right license, synchronization 

license, or mechanical license” for them infringed its 

copyright interests under 17 U.S.C. § 501.

B. Tresóna’s Copyright Interests

Tresóna acquired its copyright interests in the songs 

through a series of assignments of those rights. PEN Music 

Group (PEN), which is not a party to this action, had 

“grant[ed] to Tresóna the exclusive, non-transferable right 

. . . to (i) issue Copyright Use Licenses” for “Magic,” “(I’ve 

Had) The Time of My Life,” and “Hotel California.” The 

relevant contract defines “Copyright Use Licenses” as 

“Synchronization Licenses, Custom Arrangement Licenses, 

Grand Rights Licenses, [and] Dramatic Rights Licenses[.]”

PEN, in turn, had been assigned its rights to “Magic” by 

John Farrar Music (BMI). The contract between PEN and 

John Farrar Music (BMI) states that PEN “shall solely own 

each and all of [John Farrar Music (BMI)’s] interest in the 

musical compositions to the extent that they are written, 

composed, co-written or co-composed by John Farrar.” John 

Farrar composed the words and music to “Magic,” and John 

Farrar Music is the sole copyright claimant of “Magic,” 

according to the Copyright Office’s online public catalog of 

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8 TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N

registration. Despite this chain of title, however, it is 

undisputed that Tresóna does not own the public 

performance rights to “Magic”; rather, John Farrar Music 

(BMI) has retained those rights, as to which it is the sole 

owner.

Tresóna failed to provide evidence of its chain of title to 

“Hotel California.” It is undisputed, however, that PEN 

controlled only co-owner Don Felder’s interest in “Hotel 

California,” the rights to which are jointly owned, and only 

a 25 percent interest in “(I’ve Had) The Time of My Life.” 

Accordingly, neither PEN nor Tresóna is the sole copyright 

owner of its purported interests in either song.

As for “Don’t Phunk With My Heart,” Tresóna was 

assigned interests from a separate music publisher, The 

Royalty Network, which is also not a party to this action. 

The contract between The Royalty Network and Tresóna 

provides that The Royalty Network “grants to Tresóna the 

exclusive, non-transferable right . . . to . . . issue Copyright 

Use Licenses” for “Don’t Phunk With My Heart.” However, 

the record evidence shows that “The Royalty Network 

controls only Kalyanji [Anandji] and Indivar Anandji’s 

interest[s] in ‘Don’t Phunk With My Heart,’” a work that is 

jointly owned with six other entities. Therefore, neither The 

Royalty Network nor Tresóna is the sole copyright owner of 

its purported interests in “Don’t Phunk With My Heart.”

C. District Court Proceedings

Despite the minimal evidence of Tresóna’s claim to 

exclusive rights in these four musical works, Tresóna 

brought this action against Carroll, the Boosters Club, and 

the parents, claiming it held exclusive rights in 79 songs, 

including “Magic,” “(I’ve Had) The Time of My Life,” 

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TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N 9

“Hotel California,” and “Don’t Phunk With My Heart.”1 

Carroll, the Boosters Club, the parents, and Tresóna crossmoved for summary judgment. The district court granted in 

part Carroll’s motion for summary judgment, holding that 

Tresóna lacked standing to sue under the Copyright Act for 

infringement of the songs “(I’ve Had) The Time of My 

Life,” “Hotel California,” and “Don’t Phunk With My 

Heart,” because Tresóna held only non-exclusive rights to 

these works. For Tresóna’s claims based on the song 

“Magic,” the district court concluded that Carroll was 

entitled to qualified immunity from suit, and that the 

Boosters Club and Boosters Club parents could not be held 

liable for direct or secondary copyright infringement.

After successfully defending against Tresóna’s claims 

on summary judgment, Carroll and the Boosters Club moved 

to recover their attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505. The 

district court denied the motions, concluding that Carroll and 

the Boosters Club had achieved only a minimal level of 

success on the merits, and that an award of attorneys’ fees

would not otherwise further the purposes of the Copyright 

Act.

Tresóna timely appeals the district court’s summary 

judgment orders. Carroll and the Boosters Club appeal the 

denial of their motions for attorneys’ fees.

1 Although Tresóna claimed exclusive rights in its complaint to 

79 songs used by the show choirs, Tresóna did not allege copyright 

infringement as to the remaining 75 songs. Nor did it produce any 

evidence in the course of the litigation to support its claim of exclusive 

rights in any of the remaining 75 songs.

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10 TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 

676 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2012). “Summary judgment is 

appropriate if, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

We review the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees 

under the Copyright Act for an abuse of discretion. Shame 

On You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 893 F.3d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 

2018). “A district court abuses its discretion when its 

decision is based on an inaccurate view of the law or a 

clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Cadkin v. Loose, 569 F.3d 

1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Traditional Cat Ass’n v. 

Gilbreath, 340 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2003)).

III. STANDING

The district court correctly granted summary judgment 

on Tresóna’s claims of infringement of its rights in the songs 

“(I’ve Had) The Time of My Life,” “Hotel California,” and 

“Don’t Phunk With My Heart” for lack of standing to sue 

under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).

Under the Copyright Act of 1976, only “[t]he legal or 

beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is 

entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that 

particular right committed while he or she is the owner of 

it.” Id.; see also Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 

402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Although 

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TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N 11

“copyrights are divisible,” and can be freely transferred, 

Corbello v. DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015), the 

question of standing to sue depends on the nature of the 

interest transferred. In the case of joint ownership of 

exclusive rights in copyright, for example, “when one coowner independently attempts to grant an exclusive license 

of a particular copyright interest, that licensee . . . does not 

have standing to sue alleged third-party infringers.” Id. 

(citing Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 

1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Corbello court reasoned:

After all, one co-owner, acting 

independently, “may not limit the other coowners’ independent rights to exploit the 

copyright.” . . . Such a conclusion stems from 

the self-evident principle that a joint-owner 

cannot transfer more than he himself holds; 

thus, an assignment or exclusive license from 

one joint-owner to a third party cannot bind 

the other joint-owners or limit their rights in 

the copyright without their consent. In other 

words, the third party’s right is “exclusive” as 

to the assigning or licensing co-owner, but 

not as to the other co-owners and their 

assignees or licensees. As such, a third-party 

assignee or licensee lacks standing to 

challenge the attempted assignments or 

licenses of other copyright owners.

Id. (citing Sybersound, 517 F.3d at 1146).2

2 Looking to the circumstances of that case, we held that the 

transferred interest there “constituted a transfer of [a co-owner’s] 

derivative-work interest in the copyright, rather than a license.” 

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12 TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N

Tresóna received its copyright interests in the songs 

“(I’ve Had) The Time of My Life,” “Hotel California,” and 

“Don’t Phunk With My Heart,” as a license from an 

individual co-owner of those interests without the consent of 

the other co-owners. Under Corbello and Sybersound, 

therefore, Tresóna lacks standing to sue for infringement of 

its non-exclusive rights. Tresóna does not contend 

otherwise, but argues that a later panel decision, Minden 

Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997 (9th 

Cir. 2015), abrogated the holdings in Corbello and 

Sybersound that a licensee of only one co-owner’s interests 

lacks standing to bring claims for infringement under the 

Copyright Act.

Of course, even if Minden Pictures purported to overrule 

Sybersound and Corbello, it could not do so, for “[o]nce a 

panel resolves an issue in a precedential opinion, the matter 

is deemed resolved, unless overruled by the court itself 

sitting en banc, or by the Supreme Court.” Hart v. 

Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] later 

three-judge panel considering a case that is controlled by the 

rule announced in an earlier panel’s opinion has no choice 

but to apply the earlier-adopted rule; it may not any more 

disregard the earlier panel’s opinion than it may disregard a 

ruling of the Supreme Court.” Id. Therefore, the three-judge 

panel in Minden could not have overruled Sybersound and 

Corbello’s holdings even if it wanted to.

But Minden Pictures did not purport to overrule 

Sybersound or Corbello. It did not even address the issue 

Corbello, 777 F.3d at 1066. We made clear that a co-owner of a 

copyright is free to transfer that ownership interest to another, as long as 

the transfer was only of “exclusive copyright interests that [the co-owner 

itself] possesses.” Id.

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TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N 13

presented in both cases: whether a co-owner of a copyright 

interest can unilaterally grant an exclusive license to that 

interest to a third party. In Minden Pictures, “a stock 

photography company that serves as [a] licensing agent for 

dozens of photographers” granted rights to third parties to 

use copyrighted photographs. 795 F.3d at 999–1000. 

Although Minden Pictures had the exclusive right to act as 

their licensing agent, the photographers had retained the 

rights both to “use the photographs themselves and to license 

them to others.” Id. at 999. Minden Pictures sued its 

licensee, a textbook publisher, for copyright infringement, 

claiming that the publisher exceeded the terms of its licensed 

use of the photographic works. Id. at 1000–01. The question 

before us was whether Minden Pictures had statutory 

standing to sue the publisher. Despite the fact that Minden 

Pictures had received licenses from the sole owners of the 

copyright interests, rather than from co-owners of those 

interests, the publisher argued that Minden Pictures did not 

receive exclusive licenses from the photographers, as the 

photographers retained the right to issue licenses 

themselves. Id. at 1004. But, as we pointed out, Minden 

Pictures had received an exclusive right to act as the 

licensing agent for each of the individual photographers, 

which was a grant of rights vis-à-vis the world. Even if that 

exclusive right was shared with the photographers, Minden 

Pictures would still have standing to sue over infringement 

of its license. As we there reasoned:

The reason the [Copyright] Act prevents a 

holder of a “nonexclusive license” to use a 

copyrighted photograph from bringing an 

infringement action against others who use 

the same photograph is that such a licensee 

has no more than “a privilege that protects 

him from a claim of infringement by the 

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14 TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N

owner” of the copyright. That is, because 

such a licensee has been granted rights only 

vis-à-vis the licensor, not vis-à-vis the world, 

he or she has no legal right to exclude others 

from using the copyrighted work, and thus no 

standing to bring an infringement suit. But 

when a licensee has been granted rights visà-vis the world—even if he or she shares 

those rights with another party, including the 

owner of the copyright—we see nothing in 

the Copyright Act that requires us to deem 

such an arrangement a mere “nonexclusive 

license” insufficient to give rise to standing 

to sue.

Id. (citations omitted).

We accordingly saw “no reason why, having appointed 

Minden [Pictures] to manage the commercial use of their 

photographs in the first instance as their licensing agent, the 

photographers should not also be able to rely on Minden 

[Pictures] to protect and defend the licenses that it has issued 

on their behalf.” Id. at 1005. In other words, even if an 

exclusive right is shared between two entities, a sole owner 

can promise exclusivity to just those two, while a co-owner 

cannot make that same promise unilaterally. Because the 

issue of whether a co-owner of a copyright interest can 

unilaterally grant an exclusive license to that interest was not 

present in Minden Pictures, Tresóna’s reliance on Minden 

Pictures is misplaced.

The district court correctly held that Tresóna lacked 

standing under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) to bring copyright 

infringement claims based on the songs “(I’ve Had) The 

Time of My Life,” “Hotel California,” and “Don’t Phunk 

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TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N 15

With My Heart,” as Tresóna received its interests in those 

songs from individual co-owners of copyright, without the 

consent of the other co-owners, and therefore held only nonexclusive licenses in those works.

IV. FAIR USE

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment against Tresóna on its claim of infringement of 

“Magic,” but not on the ground of qualified immunity. From 

the outset of this litigation, Carroll asserted the defense of 

fair use, and on cross-motions for summary judgment 

Tresóna sought a ruling that there was no fair use.3 The 

district court, however, ruled in favor of Carroll on qualified 

immunity grounds, holding that “since teaching is explicitly

listed as fair use [in the Copyright Act], a public school 

teacher acting in his teaching capacity would be reasonable 

in believing the fair use defense applies.” It thus elided the 

question of whether Carroll’s use of a rearranged segment of 

a copyrighted musical work in the arranged show music was 

an infringement. But that question begs to be answered, for 

show choirs and the arrangements they perform are not 

limited to public schools where the defense of qualified 

immunity might be invoked by public school teachers. And 

the defense of fair use, if applicable, should cover “teaching” 

whether in a private or public setting. Moreover, the fair use 

defense renders a use noninfringing, and has long served as 

an important defense in copyright law, unlike the qualified 

immunity defense which has never been used in our circuit 

3 The Booster’s Club also asserted the defense of fair use.

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or by the Supreme Court to shield a public official from a 

copyright infringement action.4

First recognized by United States courts in 1841, see 

Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 

(No. 4901), the fair use doctrine is an “equitable rule of 

reason,” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 

464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984), that “permits courts to avoid rigid 

application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it 

would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to 

foster,” Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting 

Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 

621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)). In Folsom, Justice Story 

formulated the issue of fair use as a question of “whether this 

is a justifiable use of the original materials, such as the law 

recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the 

plaintiffs,” 9 F. Cas. at 348, and he identified many of the 

factors that continue to guide our analysis today: “the nature 

and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of 

the materials used, and the degree in which the use may 

prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the 

objects, of the original work.” Id. Although Congress has 

amended federal copyright law numerous times in our 

history since the original statute was enacted in 1790, it first 

codified the fair use doctrine in section 107 of the Copyright 

Act of 1976. In so doing, Congress sought to restate the 

judicial doctrine of fair use in section 107, “not to change, 

narrow, or enlarge it in any way.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 

at 66 (1976). Congress, however, acknowledged that “courts 

4 Professor Nimmer has recognized that “[s]ome courts have applied 

[the qualified immunity] doctrine in the copyright context, [while] others 

on occasion have denied it,” without endorsing either approach. See

3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 

§ 12.01[E][2][b] (2019).

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TRESÓNA MULTIMEDIA V. BURBANK HIGH SCH. VOCAL MUSIC ASS’N 17

must be free to adapt the [fair use] doctrine to particular 

situations on a case-by-case basis.” Id.

In section 107, Congress first provides examples of 

traditionally noninfringing uses of copyright:

[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 

106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted 

work, including such use by reproduction in 

copies or phonorecords or by any other 

means specified by that section, for purposes 

such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 

teaching (including multiple copies for 

classroom use), scholarship, or research, is 

not an infringement of copyright.

Congress then lists four nonexclusive “factors to be 

considered” in determining whether an unauthorized use is 

infringing:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, 

including whether such use is of a 

commercial nature or is for nonprofit 

educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the 

portion used in relation to the copyrighted 

work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential 

market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Id.

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We first look to whether the allegedly infringing use falls 

into the categories of uses given by Congress as examples of 

noninfringing uses. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music 

Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008); 4 Nimmer 

§ 13.05[A][1][a] (explaining the importance of the preamble 

examples to the fair use analysis). We then turn to the 

nonexclusive list of factors, looking not only to the statutory 

language of section 107 but also to prior judicial decisions 

addressing the contours of fair use. See Campbell v. Acuff 

Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“Congress meant 

§ 107 to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not 

to change, narrow, or enlarge it any way.” (quotation 

omitted)). We analyze these factors together in light of the 

purpose of copyright law, see id. at 578, keeping in mind that 

copyright’s limited grant of monopoly privileges ultimately 

furthers the public good by “promot[ing] the Progress of 

Science and useful Arts,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see 

also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 

471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985). We also closely examine the 

particular facts presented by this case because the fair use 

analysis is a factually driven one.

Carroll’s use of the musical work was in his capacity as 

a teacher in the music education program at Burbank High 

School. Such an educational use weighs in favor of fair use. 

But that does not end our inquiry because the preamble’s 

“text employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ . . . to 

indicate the ‘illustrative and not limitative’ function of the 

examples given.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting 

17 U.S.C. § 101). We next analyze and weigh the listed 

factors.

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A. The Purpose and Character of the Use, Including 

Whether Such Use Is of a Commercial Nature or Is for 

Nonprofit Educational Purposes

We first look to “the purpose and character of the use.” 

17 U.S.C. § 107(1). Josh Greene’s arrangement of segments 

from several musical works, including the chorus from 

“Magic,” was for “nonprofit educational purposes,” id., and 

the resulting work was transformative. Greene’s new 

arrangement became an eighteen-minute-long competitive 

choir show, “Rainmaker,” that included the rearranged 

chorus of “Magic.” It was performed by students as part of 

Burbank’s music education program. Part of the proceeds 

went to the nonprofit Boosters Club to support other aspects 

of the music education program and the work of the show 

choir. This use was not of a traditional commercial nature, 

but rather for the nonprofit education of the students in the 

music program.5 Carroll distributed the sheet music 

arranged by Greene at no charge to the students. See Marcus 

v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding a 

nonprofit educational purpose in a teacher’s copying of a 

5 This case is thus far removed from those circumstances previously 

held to have a commercial purpose. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. 

at 582–83 (rap song parody sold to the public); Disney Enters., Inc. v. 

VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 861 (9th Cir. 2017) (paid streaming service 

that filtered objectionable content from movies and television shows); 

Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) (use of 

an image in the video backdrop of Green Day’s musical tour); SOFA 

Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., 709 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(use of a television clip in the stage musical Jersey Boys); Leadsinger, 

512 F.3d at 530 (explaining the plaintiffs’ “commercial [purpose] . . . to 

sell its karaoke device for profit”).

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cake decorating booklet and distribution to students at no 

charge).

However, “the mere fact that a use is educational and not 

for profit does not insulate it from a finding of 

infringement.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584; Marcus, 

695 F.2d at 1175. “The central purpose of this investigation 

is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new work 

merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation or 

instead adds something new, with a further purpose or 

different character, altering the first with new expression, 

meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to 

what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’” Campbell, 

510 U.S. at 579 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 

Works are transformative when “new expressive content or 

message is apparent,” even if “the allegedly infringing work 

makes few physical changes to the original or fails to 

comment on the original.” Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 

725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). “[T]he more 

transformative the new work, the less will be the significance 

of other factors . . . .” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.

“Magic” was an original song in the 1980 musical movie 

fantasy “Xanadu.” Olivia Newton-John played Kira, a muse 

descended from Mount Olympus, who encourages and 

inspires the male protagonist, Sonny, to pursue his dream of 

opening a fantastical nightclub, Xanadu. “Magic” plays 

during their first encounter, reprises first when Kira must 

return to Olympus, and then again when Kira seemingly 

reappears as a Xanadu waitress. It is thus used as a vehicle 

of inspiration for pursuit of one’s dreams and love.

“Rainmaker” is an entirely different theatrical work—a 

show piece for the high school choir that reworks pieces 

from multiple songs to tell a story with new expressive 

content and meaning. “Rainmaker” tells the story of a local 

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Dust Bowl-era community ravaged by drought. After a 

stranger visits the town, he promises rain in return for faith 

in his magical powers and performs several miracles to 

encourage the townspeople to believe in him. When the 

town’s last holdout, the Sheriff, drops to his knees to 

proclaim his faith, lifesaving rain finally arrives. The 

townspeople celebrate the newfound rain, singing the 

rearranged chorus of “Magic,” including additional, new 

lyrics.

This rearrangement of “Magic” along with other musical 

works was thus transformative. Greene did not “simply 

omit[] portions” of the original work while retaining the 

“same intrinsic entertainment value.” Disney Enters., Inc. v. 

VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 861 (9th Cir. 2017). Rather, 

“Rainmaker” uses a portion of “Magic” by adding “new 

expression, meaning, [and] message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. 

at 579; see also Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1176–77 (finding the use 

of a street art image transformative when it is used in a fourminute video to comment on religion); Cariou v. Prince, 

714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding the use of 

photographs in a series of paintings was transformative 

because the changes resulted in a “fundamentally different 

aesthetic”); SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., 709 F.3d 

1273, 1278 (9th Cir. 2013) (“By using [a TV clip] as a 

biographical anchor, [Defendant] put the clip to its own 

transformative ends.”); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 

305 F.3d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding transformative 

the inclusion of a video clip within a longer montage and 

edited for dramatic effect). Because Greene’s rearrangement 

of a portion of “Magic” created a new work with new 

meaning, it was a transformative use. Seltzer, 725 F.3d 

at 1177.

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The “purpose and character” factor of the use of “Magic” 

weighs strongly in favor of a finding of fair use.

B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work

In analyzing the second factor, “the nature of the 

copyrighted work,” we examine “whether the work is 

informational or creative.” Worldwide Church of God v. 

Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 

2000). We keep in mind “that creative works are ‘closer to 

the core of intended copyright protection’ than informational 

and functional works.” Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books 

USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586). Because the original 

arrangement of the song “Magic” is undoubtedly creative, 

this factor weighs against a finding of fair use. See 

Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 531 (recognizing that “[o]riginal 

song lyrics are a work of creative expression”).

C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in 

Relation to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole

The third factor examines whether “the amount and 

substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 

copyrighted work as a whole . . . [is] reasonable in relation 

to the purpose of the copying.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 

“[W]e recognize that the extent of permissible copying 

varies with the purpose and character of the use.” Id. at 586–

87; see 4 Nimmer § 13.05[A][3] (“The proper analysis here 

includes a determination of not just quantitative, but also

qualitative substantiality.”). As a result, “this factor 

necessarily overlaps somewhat with the first factor.” Seltzer, 

725 F.3d at 1178. “If the secondary user only copies as much 

as is necessary for his or her intended use, then this factor 

will not weigh against” fair use. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 

336 F.3d 811, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Here, the segment taken from the song “Magic” is 

approximately twenty seconds of a four-minute and twentytwo second song. The portion that was used, however, 

incorporates the song’s principle chorus, which is the central 

element of the musical work, and is repeated more than once. 

Thus, the copied portion is undoubtedly a qualitatively 

significant portion of “Magic.” See Campbell, 510 U.S. 

at 587–89. However, as the Supreme Court has explained in 

discussing both parody and news reporting, “context is 

everything, and the question of fairness asks what else the 

[copier] did besides go to the heart of the original.” Id.

at 589. Even “entire verbatim reproductions are justifiable 

where the purpose of the work differs [enough] from the 

original.” Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 

792, 803 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821).

In this case, Greene’s rearrangement did not simply copy 

several lines from one chorus of the song and repeat it, but 

embedded that portion into a larger, transformative choir 

showpiece that incorporated many other works, and imbued 

that entire piece with new expression and meaning not 

contained within any of the individual works. Carroll thus 

“departed markedly from” the original lyrics, Campbell, 

510 U.S. at 589, incorporating the chorus of “Magic” into a 

new and different story that also furthered high school 

students’ musical learning and development. The new work 

is not a verbatim copy, nor one in which the transformative 

use “is so insubstantial, as compared to the copying, that the 

third factor must be resolved as a matter of law against the 

[Defendants].” Id.

In light of Carroll’s non-profit educational and 

transformative use of “Magic,” the amount and substantiality 

of the portion used does not weigh against of fair use.

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D. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or 

Value of the Copyrighted Work

The fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon the 

potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 

17 U.S.C. § 107(4), requires us “to consider not only the 

extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the 

alleged infringer, but also whether unrestricted and 

widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant 

would result in a substantially adverse impact on the 

potential market for the original,” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 

(alterations and quotations omitted). “This inquiry must take 

account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to 

the market for derivative works.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 

at 568. When, as here, a use is plainly transformative, 

“market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm 

may not be so readily inferred.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.

Carroll and the Boosters Club submitted uncontroverted 

evidence that the sheet music incorporating twenty seconds 

of “Magic” was used only by students and their 

accompanists during the show choir’s extracurricular 

activities as part of their performance of a new work. 

Although the creation of sheet music incorporating the 

copyrighted work is a derivative use, the twenty seconds 

used in the “Rainmaker” choir piece is not a substitute for 

the song “Magic.” See SOFA Entm’t, 709 F.3d at 1280 

(“Where the secondary use is not a substitute for the original 

and does not deprive the copyright holder of a derivative use, 

the fourth factor weighs in favor of fair use.”).

As Professor Nimmer explains, “if, regardless of 

medium, defendant’s work performs a different function 

from plaintiff’s, then notwithstanding its use of substantially 

similar material, the defense of fair use may prevail.” 4 

Nimmer § 13.05[B][1]. Fair use exists when “[t]hose 

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interested in obtaining plaintiff’s music for musical purposes 

would not find their need fulfilled by purchasing” the 

defendant’s allegedly infringing work. Id.; cf. Campbell, 

510 U.S. at 591 (explaining that parody is not likely to 

substitute for an original work because the two “usually 

serve different market functions”). A consumer interested in 

acquiring sheet music for “Magic” would not purchase the 

sheet music for “Rainmaker,” as it omits much of the song 

except the chorus, and even the portions that are included are 

substantially rearranged. Similarly, a person wishing to 

purchase the sheet music for “Magic” in order to play or 

perform that song would necessarily purchase the sheet 

music for the song itself from the owner of the performance 

rights—not the sheet music for “Rainmaker.” See Kelly, 336 

F.3d at 821–22 (finding no market harm where a person 

could not use the allegedly infringing work, a thumbnail 

photograph, as a substitute for the copyrighted highresolution photograph); L.A. News Serv., 305 F.3d at 941 

(finding a transformative use of a news clip on Court TV 

“quite unlikely to affect the relevant market”). Thus, the use 

of “Magic” in “Rainmaker” does not affect the consumer 

market for the sheet music in the song at all. It is difficult to 

see how even widespread and unrestricted use of the chorus, 

in the context of nonprofit show choir performances, could 

displace the market for sheet music for the entire song.

Of course, “it is a given in every fair use case that 

plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential market if that potential 

is defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use 

at bar.” 4 Nimmer § 13.05[A][4]; see also Pierre N. Leval, 

Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1124 

(1990) (“By definition every fair use involves some loss of 

royalty revenue because the secondary user has not paid 

royalties.”). However, “a copyright holder cannot prevent 

others from entering fair use markets merely ‘by developing 

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or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, 

educational, or other transformative uses of its own creative 

work.’” Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 

448 F.3d 605, 614–15 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Castle Rock 

Entm’t Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 145 n.11 (2d 

Cir. 1998)). Nor does the decision by secondary users to 

pay, or not pay, establish whether fair use exists. See 

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18. Because the use in this case 

“falls within a transformative market,” Tresóna was not 

harmed by the loss of any fees for the licensing of the song 

“Magic.” Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 615.

E. Conclusion

We weigh each of these factors in light of the Copyright 

Act’s purpose “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 

public good.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 

422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). The educational use of “Magic” 

falls into an enumerated fair use purpose and three of the 

four factors we consider are neutral or weigh in favor of 

finding that Defendants’ use of “Magic” was fair use. We 

are especially swayed here by the limited and transformative 

nature of the use and the work’s nonprofit educational 

purposes in enhancing the educational experience of high 

school students. We conclude that Carroll’s use of a small 

portion of the song “Magic,” along with portions of other 

songs, to create sheet music for a new and different high 

school choir showpiece performance was a fair use.6

6 Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

as to Carroll on the alternative ground of fair use, we also affirm the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment on Tresóna’s claim for 

vicarious copyright infringement against the Boosters Club and parents 

on this ground. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network, LLC, 747 F.3d 

1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Secondary liability for copyright 

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V. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

The district court denied attorneys’ fees to Defendants 

because it granted summary judgment on grounds of 

standing and qualified immunity, procedural issues it found 

unrelated to the purposes of copyright. Having declined to 

rule on the critical question of fair use, the district court 

found that Defendants’ status as the prevailing party did not 

weigh as heavily toward an award of attorneys’ fees. But 

Defendants’ fair use defense, upon which we rely in part 

today, goes to the heart of the copyright dispute in this case. 

Indeed, even in its qualified immunity ruling, the district 

court analyzed fair use to the extent that it found that it was 

reasonable for Carroll to believe that his use was 

noninfringing.

Under section 505 of the Copyright Act, a district court 

may award a “reasonable attorney’s fee” and costs to the 

prevailing party. See 17 U.S.C. § 505. “[D]efendants who 

seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses 

should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that 

plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of 

infringement.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 

(1994). The touchstone of the decision to award attorneys’ 

fees is whether the successful defense, and the circumstances 

surrounding it, further the Copyright Act’s “essential goals.” 

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1989 

(2016). Courts “may consider (but [are] not limited to) five 

factors in making an attorneys’ fees determination . . . (1) the 

degree of success obtained, (2) frivolousness, 

(3) motivation, (4) [objective] reasonableness of [the] losing 

infringement does not exist in the absence of direct infringement by a 

third party.” (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 

1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001))).

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party’s legal and factual arguments, and (5) the need to 

advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” 

Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769,

787 (9th Cir. 2006). Substantial weight should be accorded 

to the fourth factor. Shame On You, 893 F.3d at 666 (citing 

Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1985, 1989).

Defendants prevailed across the board in this action in 

the district court and won a ruling on their fair use defense 

on appeal. This complete success weighs in favor of an 

award of attorneys’ fees. See id. at 667; Glacier Films 

(USA), Inc. v. Turchin, 896 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Although the district court properly noted that a fee award is 

less justified when “copyright defendants do not . . . reach

the merits, prevailing instead on technical defenses,” 

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 560 (9th Cir. 1996), 

Defendants have now prevailed on their defense of fair use, 

a substantive defense at the heart of copyright law. As we 

have previously recognized, “[w]hen a fee award encourages 

a defendant to litigate a meritorious fair use claim against an 

unreasonable claim of infringement, the policies of the 

Copyright Act are served.” SOFA Entm’t, 709 F.3d at 1280.

We examine objective reasonableness next, because that 

factor is given “substantial” weight. Shame On You, 893 

F.3d at 666. While “a legal argument that loses is not 

necessarily unreasonable,” id., this is not “a close and 

difficult case,” Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1181. Rather, Tresóna’s 

arguments are objectively unreasonable. As to standing, 

Tresóna should have known that Sybersound rendered its 

chances of prevailing on three of the four songs remaining at 

summary judgment “slim to none.” SOFA Entm’t, 709 F.3d 

at 1280. Tresóna’s argument that Minden Pictures overruled 

Sybersound ignored the significant differences between 

those two cases. The argument was also legally 

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unreasonable because our opinion in Minden Pictures did 

not purport to overrule Sybersound; nor did it address the 

precise standing issue decided in Sybersound and Corbello.

Tresóna’s fair use argument as to the one song it did have 

exclusive rights to, “Magic,” was likewise objectively 

unreasonable. Seltzer, in which we confronted “a close and 

difficult case” and found an action for infringement 

reasonable, is instructive in its differences. 725 F.3d at 1181. 

There, the band Green Day used a drawing of Scream Icon, 

a screaming, contorted face, in a video backdrop for a 

commercial concert tour. Id. at 1173–74. We explained that 

the “transformation was far from obvious given Green Day’s 

only slight alterations to the original,” and each of the 

remaining three fair use factors pointed in a different 

direction: the second factor weighed against fair use, the 

third was neutral, and the fourth weighed in favor of fair use. 

Id. at 1181. Here, in contrast, the use falls plainly within the 

enumerated fair use purposes of “teaching” and “nonprofit 

education[],” 17 US.C. § 107, and the portions of the song 

taken were used in a highly transformative work.

Tresóna did more than simply pursue an aggressive 

litigation strategy. It sued a public school teacher, a not-forprofit Boosters Club, and parent volunteers. Both during 

litigation, and in pre-litigation communications with Carroll, 

Tresóna repeatedly mischaracterized its copyright interests 

in the songs at issue by claiming to be the sole entity 

empowered to issue licenses. In light of Tresóna’s minimal 

and belatedly produced evidence supporting its claimed 

chain-of-title, these communications appear specifically 

designed to frighten Carroll and the Boosters Club into 

purchasing licenses from Tresóna, rather than to legitimately 

enforce its limited licensing interests or those of the true 

copyright owners. Indeed, Tresóna’s initial complaint 

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alleged exclusive rights in 79 songs used by the Burbank 

show choirs. And it was not until after briefing on Carroll’s 

summary judgment motion was complete that Tresóna 

belatedly produced any evidence of its chain of title, which 

demonstrated its claimed interests were almost entirely 

unsubstantiated. None of these actions furthers the purposes 

of the Copyright Act. SOFA Entm’t, 709 F.3d at 1280–81.

Courts have a legitimate interest in deterring the type of 

litigation conduct in which Tresóna engaged, and in 

compensating those who have been harmed by such conduct. 

Although the district court noted that it “[did] not believe 

that [Tresóna] will groundlessly reassert these claims,” the 

basis for that finding is unclear. Tresóna groundlessly 

asserted at least three claims of infringement in this very 

case, while simultaneously representing that it could have 

brought many more such claims. And while, after almost 

four years of litigation, Tresóna turned out to have standing 

as to the fourth remaining claim of infringement, it lost both 

in the district court and on appeal on two independent legal 

theories. As much of this litigation was avoidable from the 

beginning based on settled law when Tresóna filed its 

complaint, awarding attorneys’ fees to Defendants 

appropriately serves the interest in deterrence. See 

Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1987 (explaining that awarding fees 

encourages “[t]he copyright holder with no reasonable 

infringement claim . . . not to bring suit in the first 

instance”).

Awarding Defendants their attorneys’ fees insures that 

they are properly compensated for defending against 

overreaching claims of copyright infringement and pressing 

a defense that benefits those educating our youth. An award 

of attorneys’ fees here assures that “an overzealous 

monopolist [cannot] use his copyright to stamp out the very 

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creativity that the [Copyright] Act seeks to ignite,” SOFA 

Entm’t, 709 F.3d at 1278, allowing for greater breathing 

room for classroom educators and those involved in similar 

educational extracurricular activities.

The district court abused its discretion in denying 

Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees. We therefore award 

Defendants’ attorneys’ fees and remand to the district court 

for the calculation of the award. See Mag Jewelry Co. v. 

Cherokee, Inc., 496 F.3d 108, 124 (1st Cir. 2007) (reversing 

the district court’s denial of fees and remanding for the 

calculation of the amount).

VI. CONCLUSION

We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants but reverse the denial of attorneys’ fees under 

17 U.S.C. § 505.

Costs on appeal shall be awarded to Defendants.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 

REMANDED.

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