Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02119/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

DUNCAN J. McNEIL, III PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-2119

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

and Its Officers and Agencies; CLERK, 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, 

Western District of Arkansas; CLERK, 

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, 

Western District of Arkansas; UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Western District of Arkansas; 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES Trustee, 

Western District of Arkansas; UNITED STATES 

MARSHAL SERVICE, Western District of 

Arkansas; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 

Western District of Arkansas; SECRET SERVICE,

Western District of Arkansas and their officers; and

ALL JUDGMENT DEBTORS UNDER THE 

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS residing in, or doing 

business in, this district, fictitiously named as 

Doe 1 to Doe 500 DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Duncan J. McNeil, III, filed this pro se action on August 8, 2005. The case was filed

nunc pro tunc to June 16, 2005. McNeil’s in forma pauperis(IFP) application was granted (Doc.

2). The case is before the undersigned for a determination of whether it should be served upon

the defendants.

I. Background

McNeil’s original complaint consists of twenty-two pages. His supplemental or amended

complaint is twelve pages long. 

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The complaint and amended complaint are at times difficult to follow. McNeil is

currently incarcerated in the Spokane County Jail, Spokane, Washington. He alleges his

incarceration is in violation of his civil and constitutional rights and in retaliation for his

attempted exercise of his constitutionally protected rights. Complaint at p. 3. He also alleges

he has been subjected to unlawful searches and seizures. Id. at p. 8. He indicates he is being

denied access to the courts, a law library, and legal resources. Id. at p. 12. 

Further, McNeil alleges there has been a conspiracy to cover up his unlawful arrests,

incarceration, prosecution, and invalid criminal convictions. Complaint at p. 13. He maintains

the conspiracy was in response to his exercise of his constitutional rights. Id. 

In his supplemental complaint, McNeil indicates he is a “civil detainee” who has not been

lawfully sentenced on a valid criminal conviction. Supplemental Complaint at p. 2. Instead, he

asserts he has been imprisoned in retaliation, and in retribution for, his lawful acts and court

appointed duties to obtain execution and enforcement of a foreign judgment. 

He asserts he is not a prisoner and therefore not subject to the three strikes provision of

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Supplemental Complaint at p. 3. He alleges he is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury from the defendants’ acts of retaliation and retribution taken to

interfere with plaintiff’s attempts to execute and enforce the judgment. Id. He alleges

defendants’ acts of retaliation and retribution include: withholding of required medications,

medical care, and medical treatment; placing him on lock-down without adequate access to

exercise, phones, courts, a law library, a copier, religious counseling, and mental counseling; and

assigning plaintiff a security classification score of 1 on a scale of 0 to 31 thereby placing him

at risk. Id. at pp. 3-4. 

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He maintains the defendants and judgment debtors have seized his office, residence,

business, legal, and financial records. Supplemental Complaint at pp. 4-5. He states once the

court grants full faith and credit to the judgment he will amend this action to name specific

judgment debtors and specific property located within this district subject to attachment,

enforcement, or execution. Id. at p. 5.

He asserts he is a qualified individual with a disability and entitled to reasonable

accommodations. McNeil also asserts that he was appointed as the disbursing agent or

liquidating trustee and general manager of reorganized debtor Broadway Buildings II, L.P. by

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District ofCalifornia, case no. LA 98-18082,

by orders entered on March 19, 1999, and June 16, 1999. Complaint at p. 2. He maintains he

is the owner and trustee of a stipulated judgment entered on January 30, 2001, in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, in Duncan J. McNeil v. David

Baker, et al., Case No. 97-435. Complaint at p. 4. 

Pages eighteen through twenty-two of the complaint are the document he refers to as a

“stipulated judgment.” The document is entitled a “stipulated order re: liability and damages”

and reflects an agreement between McNeil as plaintiff, and the Citizens Against Bankruptcy &

Real Estate Fraud, L.P., as counter-claimants, that McNeil is owed the sum of $319,132.00 for

services rendered from the time period of June of 1996 to October 1, 2000. 

According to the stipulated facts set forth in the order, McNeil was employed in June of

1996 by the Citizens Against Bankruptcy & Real Estate Fraud, L.P. He performed services

related to the preservation and implementation of the JV/Loan Agreement and the confirmation

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and implementation of Broadway’s Confirmed Plan of Reorganization and a number of other

duties.

The stipulated order was entered on January 30, 2001, by United States District Judge,

Robert H. Whaley. Page seventeen of the complaint purports to be a certification of a judgment

for registration in another district dated March 15, 2002.

McNeil alleges he has registered the “foreign judgment” with the following courts:

United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Washington, Case No. MC-02; United States

District Court, Eastern District of Washington, Case No. 04-427; United States Bankruptcy

Court, Western District of Washington, Case No. 02-103, United States District Court, District

of Idaho, Case No. MC-05114, and Spokane County Superior Court, Case No. MC-02-2-02825-

4. Complaint at p. 4.

He maintains the defendants each “acquired certain duties pursuant to the foreign

judgments.” Complaint at p. 4. He asserts the defendants are required to give the foreign

judgment Full Faith and Credit pursuant to the United States Constitution. Id. at p. 5. Among

other things, he asserts defendants have a statutory, ministerial, non-discretionary duties to issue

execution and enforce the judgment. Id. McNeil alleges defendants breached their duties. Id.

at p. 6.

He maintains the defendants failed to create, maintain, correct, and disseminate, accurate

records on him and the judgment. Complaint at p. 7. He asserts he has been denied records

under the Freedom of Information Act, denied access to the courts or agency adjudicative

proceedings, and denied reasonable accommodations. Id. at pp. 8-9. He states defendants have

failed to comply with their own agency’s rules and regulations. Id. at p. 9.

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He alleges the defendants have failed to pay him the liquidated damages as provided in

the judgment and have refused to surrender real and personal property vested in him pursuant

to the judgment. Complaint at p. 8. In his supplemental complaint, he alleges one or more of

the defendants and judgment debtors is a resident of this judicial district and has property that

is subject to the foreign judgment. Supplemental Complaint at p. 4.

He asserts this court has jurisdiction pursuant to the declaratory judgment act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution Art. IV § 1, the statute

requiring federal courts to give full faith and credit to state court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1738,

the statute giving district courts jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in suits to enforce liens

on property in the district, 28 U.S.C. § 1655, and the provision of Privacy Act which governs

the maintenance of individual records by federal agencies, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g). 

In his supplemental or amended complaint, McNeil states this is a “common law action,

as a supplemental bill in the aid of the execution and enforcement” of the foreign judgment.

Supplemental Complaint at p. 2. He also maintains diversity of citizenship exists. Id. at p. 4.

He alleges this court has federal question jurisdiction to protect his rights under the First, Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. at p. 7.

McNeil prays for a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus as to the foreign

judgment. He also seeks liquidated, compensatory, and punitive damages, costs of the suit, and

attorney’s fees. 

II. Discussion

We conclude McNeil should not have been granted IFP status. As part of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, signed into law on April

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26, 1996, section1915, which governs proceedings filed IFP, was amended in an effort to address

concerns about, and reduce the number of, frivolous prisoner initiated lawsuits. 28 U.S.C. §

1915. Prior to the PLRA's amendments to § 1915, a prisoner who attained IFP status was

exempted from paying court fees. Afterthe enactment of the PLRA, prisoners granted IFP status

are required to pay the filing fee albeit in installments. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

The PLRA also added subsection 1915(g) which limits the ability of a prisoner, who has

filed at least three claims that have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state

a claim, to obtain IFP status. Specifically, § 1915(g) provides that:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the

prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in

any facility, brought an action . . . in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This provision has commonly become known as the "three strikes rule"

or the "three strikes provision" and has withstood constitutional challenges. See e.g., Medberry

v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999).

The three strikes rule applies to McNeil. He has had more than three previous actions

that qualify as strikes against him under section 1915(g). See e.g., McNeil v. United States, et

al., Civil No. 05-04773 (C.D. Cal.)(dismissed as frivolous on 6/27/2005); McNeil v. Vexatious

Litigant Orders, et al., Civil No. 05-04142 (C.D. Cal.)(dismissed as frivolous on 6/27/2005);

McNeil v. McNeil v. Tighe, et al., Civil No. 04-379 (E.D. Wash.)( dismissed as frivolous on

11/9/2004);, McNeil v. Miller, et al., Civil No. 04-00378 (E.D. Wash.)(dismissed as frivolous

on 11/9/2004); McNeil v. Gregoire, et al., Civil No. 04-00372 (E.D. Wash.) (dismissed as

frivolous on 11/9/2004); McNeil v. Whaley, Civil No. 04-00371 (E.D. Wash.)(dismissed as

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frivolous on 11/9/2004). Additionally, in several other cases McNeil has been denied IFP status

and the cases have been dismissed when McNeil failed to tender the filing fee after he was

denied in forma pauperis (IFP) status. See e.g., McNeil v. United States., Civil No. 05-00897

(M.D. La.)(IFP status denied 7/6/2005 and case dismissed for failure to tender the filing fee on

8/4/2005); McNeil v. United States, et al., Civil No. 05-00368 (N.D. Okla.)(IFP status denied

7/15/2005 and case dismissed for failure to tender the filing fee on 8/15/2005). Finally, in at

least one case, McNeil has been denied IFP status and the case summarily dismissed based on

his failure to advise the court that he has “struck out.” See McNeil v. United States, et al., Civil

No. 05-03592 (N.D. Ill.) (IFP status denied and case dismissed 6/30/2005).

In this case, in an effort to avoid application of the “three strikes rule” McNeil has alleged

he is a “civil detainee” not a prisoner. We find this argument to be without merit. The term

“prisoner” is defined to mean: “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is

accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law

or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(h). McNeil is detained at the Spokane County Jail and he has alleged his

incarceration is pursuant to criminal convictions. Clearly, he is a prisoner as defined by the

PLRA.

He has also alleged he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. However,

McNeil has made only this conclusory allegation. The allegations of the complaint and

supplemental complaint contain no indication McNeil is in imminent danger of serious physical

injury. Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003)(requisite imminent danger of

serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed, not when the wrongdoing

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occurred); McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710-11 (8th Cir. 2002)(allegations that five tooth

extractions had been delayed and tooth infection was spreading was sufficient to meet imminentdanger exception); Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding allegations

of ongoing danger sufficient where prisoner specified two incidents where he had suffered harm

and allegations were supported by documentary evidence, including corroborative prisoner

disciplinary reports). 

Therefore, McNeil is not eligible for IFP status. However, having brought this action,

McNeil remains obligated to pay the full filing fee of $250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

This case also is subject to dismissal because it is frivolous. First, to the extent McNeil

challenges his incarceration and conviction, his claims are barred. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that claims for

damages for "allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused

by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid" is not cognizable

until "the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. See

also Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1996)(collecting cases applying Heck to actions under

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct.

1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971)(a claim that a federal official has violated an individual's

constitutional rights is considered a Bivens action).

Second, with respect to his claims that defendants violated his rights by withholding

required medications, medical care, and medical treatment; placing him on lock-down without

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adequate access to exercise, phones, courts, a law library, a copier, religious counseling, and

mental counseling; and assigning plaintiff a security classification score of 1 on a scale of 0 to

31 thereby placing him at risk. We note that plaintiff is incarcerated in Spokane, Washington,

and not in this district and there is no allegation that any of the named defendants were

personally involved in, or anyway responsible for, any of these alleged unconstitutional acts.

See e.g., Ellis v. Norris, 179 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)(stating that prisoner must allege

defendants' personal involvement or responsibility for the constitutional violations to state a §

1983 claim); Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37-38 (8th Cir. 1995)(“[T]here is no

respondeat superior liability under Bivens. Defendants are liable for their personal acts only.”).

Third, certain of the events McNeil complains about occurred more than three years

before the filing of this complaint and are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. A three

year statute of limitations applies. See Sanchez v. United States, 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir.

1995)(Bivens action, like § 1983 is governed by state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury

actions); Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir.1992) (personal injury

action in Arkansas governed by three-year statute of limitations). Thus, to the extent McNeil

challenges violations of his constitutional rights that occurred more than three years prior to the

filing of the complaint, those claims are barred.

Fourth, to the extent McNeil alleges that his property has been taken, the claim fails.

Neither the negligent nor the intentional taking of property states a claim of constitutional

dimension if adequate post-deprivation remedies exist. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

533, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984)(intentional deprivation of property does not

violate due process when meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available); Barnett v. Centoni,

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31 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 1994)(negligent or intentional deprivation of prisoner's property fails to

state claim under § 1983 if state has adequate post-deprivation remedy). Adequate postdeprivation remedies exist because Arkansas recognizes a cause of action for conversion. See

e.g., Elliot v. Hurst, 307 Ark. 134, 817 S.W.2d 877, 880 (1991)(cause of action for conversion

lies where distinct act of dominion is exerted over property in denial of owner's right).

Fifth, a Bivens claim cannot be brought against the United States, its agencies, or its

employees in their official capacities. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86, 114 S. Ct. 996, 127

L. Ed. 2d 308 (1994). Thus, the defendants cannot be sued for the alleged constitutional

violations.

Sixth, this court does not have jurisdiction by virtue of the existence of diversity of

citizenship. The United States and its agencies are not citizens for diversity purposes and cannot

be sued in diversity. See e.g., Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 160, 42 S. Ct. 261, 66 L. Ed. 2d 531

(1922); General Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1991).

Seventh, the United States and its agencies have sovereign immunity from suit and can

only be sued with their consent and under whatever terms Congress may impose. United States

v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058 (1941). Thus, defendants are not

subject to suit under the general common law or under any statute that does not contain a wavier

of sovereign immunity.

Eighth, the proper way to register a judgment obtained in another this district is by

utilizing 28 U.S.C. § 1963. This statute allows a litigant who has obtained a valid judgment who

wants to recover money or property in another district to register the judgment by filing a

certified copy of the judgment in the district where the money or property is. Once registered

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in this district, the judgment has the same effect as if the judgment were entered in this district.

See e.g., Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Int’l Yachting Group, Inc., 252 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir.

2001); Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1965). 

Plaintiff cannot circumvent the registration procedure set forth in § 1963 by filing a civil

action against those who might be called upon to enforce or execute on the judgment. As no

judgment has been registered, defendants have no duty to enforce or execute on the judgment

McNeil allegedly has obtained in the Eastern District of Washington. Furthermore, as no foreign

judgment has been registered, McNeil’s alleged judgment is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit

as he avers.

We note that no judgment is attached to the complaint or supplemental complaint.

Instead, there is attached a stipulated order regarding liability and damages and what purports

to be a certification of judgment for registration in another district. However, the certification

states the judgment was entered in CS-97-435 on March 15, 2002, in the Eastern District of

Washington. Review of the docket sheet in that case indicates no docket entry on March 15,

2002. Furthermore, the last docket entry in that case was entered on March 12, 2001, and is an

order entered by the Honorable United States District Judge Robert H. Whaley denying the

motion for entry of a stipulated judgment. 

Ninth, with respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), McNeil has alleged

only that he is a qualified individual with a disability and that he was denied reasonable

accommodations. He has not alleged any of the named defendants were involved in the alleged

ADA violations, or he has ever been in the Western District of Arkansas, or he was excluded

from participating in, or benefitting from, a public program, service, or activity, or he had any

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connection with any of the defendants prior to the filing of this lawsuit. The allegations are

insufficient to state a cognizable claim.

Tenth, with respect to the Privacy Act claim, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), McNeil has not alleged

that he exhausted his administrative remedies. See e.g., Taylor v. United States Treasury Dep’t.,

127 F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1997)(exhaustion of administrative remedies required under the

Privacy Act, § 552a(d)(3)). Furthermore, he has not alleged what agency records are at issue or

how any of the particular agencies named as defendants failed to fulfill their record keeping

obligations.

Finally, we note that plaintiff has filed similar lawsuits in various districts around the

country. See e.g., McNeil v. United States, et al., Civil No. 05-00368 (N.D. Okla.). In these

cases, McNeil has named as defendants, the United States, and various courts, agencies, and

officials, for the district in which he is filing suit. In denying McNeil leave to proceed IFP in the

Northern District of Oklahoma, the Honorable Claire V. Eagan, United States District Judge,

noted that McNeil had “filed at least 43 civil actions in other federal district courts, many

asserting essentially the same claims against officials located in those districts.” McNeil v.

United States, et al., Civil No. 05-00368, Doc. 3, entered July 14, 2005, at page 2. It was also

noted that McNeil had been found to be a vexatious litigant by the Eastern District of

Washington. Id. (citing McNeil v. Whaley, et al., 04-00371 (E.D. Wash.)). McNeil has also

been found to be a vexatious litigant by the Central District of California, CA-00-02379-SB,

Order entered November 2, 2002, and by the Spokane County Superior Court, LA 98-18082-SB.

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III. Conclusion

I therefore recommend that: 

(1) McNeil’s IFP status be revoked on the grounds he has more than three strikes under

the Prison Litigation Reform Act and is not in imminent physical danger;

(2) McNeil’s claims be dismissed on the grounds the claims are frivolous, are barred by

the statute of limitations, and fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted; and 

(3) the clerk be directed to collect the $250 filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. 

McNeil has ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which to file

written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections

may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. McNeil is reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

DATED this 25th day of August 2005.

 

 /s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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