Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01341/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01341-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Armando Adame,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents

CV-09-1341-PHX-JWS (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Buckeye,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 22,

2009 (Doc. 1). On February 8, 2010 Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 13). Petitioner

filed a Reply on April 5, 2010 (Doc. 18).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized

the factual background as follows:

At various times and for various durations of time, some of which

overlapped, defendant, Hector, and David were involved in

relationships with Shawna. Shawna and David had two children. There

was conflicting evidence as to whether defendant was the biological

father of Shawna's third child.

On the date of the incident, Shawna and defendant argued as

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they spoke to each other by telephone. During this argument, defendant

learned that Hector was with Shawna at her apartment. Defendant did

not want other men at Shawna's apartment when he was not present.

David was also present, as were two of his children, a woman named

Carley, and the woman who helped raise Shawna, Michelle. After the

conversation ended, Shawna warned everyone in the apartment that

defendant was angry and that he was on his way to the apartment.

Hector and Carley left the apartment. As they drove away they passed

defendant on his way to the apartment. Hector and Carley decided to

return to the apartment.

Upon his arrival, defendant encountered Shawna at the front

door of their apartment where they continued their argument. As they

argued, Hector arrived back at the apartment. During the argument,

David tried to get Shawna away from defendant in order to avoid any

further conflict. As David attempted to do so, defendant said "don't

touch her,” reached over Shawna and struck David in the face.

Defendant then walked towards Hector's vehicle. Hector was still

sitting in the vehicle. As he approached Hector's vehicle, defendant

removed a handgun from his waistband, pointed it at the vehicle, and

fired into the door. A few moments later, defendant fired a shot at

David's parked car. Defendant left the apartment complex before police

arrived, as did Hector and David.

(Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 6/14/05 at 2-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 13 are referenced

herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted on one count of weapons misconduct and one count of

unlawful discharge of a firearm. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) The state alleged three historical

priors. (Exhibit A, Alleg. Hist. Priors.) Petitioner proceeded through four days of trial

(Exhibit B, M.E. 4/21/03 thru 4/24/03), and was convicted on both counts, with the jury

finding that the Unlawful Discharge was a “dangerous offense.” (Exhibit A, Verdicts.) 

During the course of sentencing proceedings, the trial court ordered competency

evaluations of Petitioner . (Exhibit B, M.E. 11/14/03, M.E. 1/9/04.) At the sentencing

hearing, the trial court found that “based on the psychological reports received, the Court

finds no basis for any further Rule 11 proceedings.” (Exhibit C, M.E. 4/22/04 at 1.)

Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 10 years on the weapons misconduct

count and 2 and 1/4 years on the unlawful discharge. (Id. at 2.) 

/ /

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C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal through counsel, rasing the following arguments: 

1. Whether allegations of other bad acts and other crimes were

inadmissible, irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial? Whether the

alleged other bad acts made the entire trial unfair and constitute

fundamental error?

2. Whether failure to give a limiting instruction infected the jury's

consideration of the evidence?

3. Whether prosecutorial misconduct in repeatedly raising

admissible bad acts or crimes requires reversal?

(Exhibit D, Opening Brief at 27.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 6/14/05 at 16.) Petitioner sought review by the Arizona

Supreme Court on essentially the same grounds (Exhibit G), which was summarily denied

on December 29, 2005. (Petition, Doc. 1-1 at 6, Order 12/29/5.) 

D. FIRST PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On January 23, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit I).

On July 24, 2006, he file a pro per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit J), arguing:

(a) trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: (1) never visiting with

Petitioner, (2) failing to object to "other act" evidence admitted at trial, (3)

failing to request a limiting instruction at trial, (4) failing to interview or call

eyewitnesses reflected on the 911 transcripts; 

(b) the 911 transcripts constituted newly discovered evidence "that would have

refuted testimony given by state’s witnesses ; and

(c) claims of prosecutorial misconduct; and 

(d) the claim that the trial court should have assigned a new doctor to determine

his competency for trial.

The PCR court found: the prosecutorial misconduct claim was precluded because it was

raised on direct appeal; the 911 tapes were not newly discovered evidence because they had

been disclosed at trial; and that the ineffective assistance claims were without merit.

Accordingly, the petition was summarily dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. (Exhibit

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1

 Petitioner casts this filing as his second PCR proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4.) 

2

 Petitioner casts this as his third PCR petition. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) 

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M, M.E. 11/15/06.) 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing (Exhibit N).1

 The Court appointed advisory

counsel and granted an evidentiary hearing (Exhibit B, M.E. 2/26/07), which was held on

April 27, 2007 (Exhibit Q R.T. 4/27/07). The PCR court concluded that the claims of

ineffective assistance were without merit, and summarily dismissed the petition. (Exhibit R,

M.E. 6/19/07.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit S),2

 seeking relief on the basis of

the ineffective assistance of his PCR counsel, an improper investigation by officers and

prosecutors, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at 6.) The Arizona Court of

Appeals summarily denied review. (Exhibit U, Order 1/21/09.) 

In the Petition, Petitioner alleges he appealed his PCR proceeding to the Arizona

Supreme Court, but provides no evidence of that appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) The record

provided by Respondents reflects no such appeal.

E. SECOND PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

During the pendency of his first PCR proceeding, Petitioner filed a second PCR

Notice (Exhibit O), asserting ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. The PCR court

summarily dismissed, finding that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel was not a cognizable

claim. (Exhibit P, M.E. 1/10/07.) There is no evidence that Petitioner sought review on this

Petition. 

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 22, 2009 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition

asserts the following three grounds for relief:

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(1) “Witness recanting of testimony - no police reports or interviews were

gathered by counsel to lodge a defense for Petitioner. Due process rights

violated and protected under Amendments VI & XIV U.S. and Arizona

Constitution”;

(2) “Counsel’s failure to provide Petitioner with an adequate defense - failure of

counsel to argue key points, investigate and interview witnesses. Failure to

object at key points of trial and hearings”; and

(3) “Issue of competency to stand trial [-] a mitigation specialist brought this issue

to the court[’]s attention.”

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 6-8.) 

Answer - Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 13) on February 8, 2010. As

to Ground One (Due Process), Respondents argue that to the extent Petitioner intends to

assert a claim based on witness recantation, it is unsupported and without merit, and is

procedurally defaulted. To the extent that Petitioner intends to assert a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, it is without merit. To the extent that Petitioner intends to assert a free

standing claim of actual innocence, the claim is not cognizable on habeas, and is in any event

without merit. (Id. at 12-15.) 

As to Ground Two (Ineffective Assistance), Respondents characterize the claim as

complaining that counsel was ineffective because of: 

1. No interviews of arresting officers and investigators.

2. Lack of preparation before and during trial.

3. Petitioner was never contacted or visited by counsel at the jail

to prepare an adequate defense for trial.

4. Counsel allowed the State prosecution throughout to attack

Petitioner’s character and falsify the facts.

(Answer, Doc. 13 at 16.) Respondents concede the claims are properly exhausted, but

contend they are without merit. (Id. at 16-20.)

As to Ground Three (Competency), Respondents contend that this claim was

dismissed by the PCR Court as waived by failure to raise it on direct appeal pursuant to an

independent and adequate state ground, and thus is procedurally barred from habeas review.

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(Answer, Doc. 13 at 20-21.) Respondents further argue that the claim is without merit. (Id.

at 21-26.) 

Reply - On April 5, 2010, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 18). Petitioner simply asks

for a ruling in his favor, citing the injustices at trial and the length of his sentnece.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his state remedies on the

portions of Ground One based upon recantation of a witness. Respondent argues that this

claims is now procedurally defaulted, and thus must be dismissed with prejudice.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). 

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b. Proper Forum

 Ordinarily, a petitioner has not satisfied the exhaustion requirement unless he has

fairly presented his claim to the highest state court. Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38

(9th Cir. 1994). In Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth

Circuit held that under Arizona law, absent a death penalty or life sentence, Arizona state

prisoners have exhausted claims presented in habeas petitions if they have been ruled upon

by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

d. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,”

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d

750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal

claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state law claim was made.”

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

On the other hand, both the federal and state courts are tasked with enforcement of the

federal constitution. See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus,

"a citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as

a citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue.” Id.

e. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

In his Ground One, Petitioner argues inter alia that he was denied his due process

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3

 Petitioner makes no reference to any particular recanting witness, and proffers no

evidence of a recantation. The Arizona Court of Appeals observed that Petitioner’s

girlfriend, Shawna, told police at the scene that Petitioner was the shooter. At trial, she

recanted and claimed it was someone named Cesar. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 6/14/05 at 3.) 

Defense counsel testified that he interviewed Shawna prior to trial and recorded her

recantations. (Exhibit Q, R.T. 4/27/07 at 25, 27.) 

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rights because a witness recanted.3 Petitioner claims that the issue was raised on direct

appeal in all of his PCR proceedings. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

No such claim was raised on direct appeal. Instead, Petitioner’s claims were limited

to the other bad acts and other crimes evidence, and related prosecutorial misconduct, and

a failure to give a limiting instruction. (Exhibit D, Opening Brief at 27.)

No such claim was raised in Petitioner’s sole foray to the Arizona Court of Appeals

in his PCR proceedings. (Exhibit S, Petition for Review.) The closest Petitioner came was

his allegations that there was newly discovered evidence in the form of new witnesses who

should have been presented at trial. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state

remedies on the witness recantation portion of his Ground One. 

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis,

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

(1984).

Two Arizona rules commonly bar delayed presentations of claims: Arizona’s waiver

bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a), and its timeliness bar in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4.

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4

 Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type

of waiver required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz.

at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission),

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived by

omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal sentence

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(Answer, Doc. 16 at 14-15.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for review of

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a

subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a claim

may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post conviction relief that "has been waived

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). 

Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply shows "that the

defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding."

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show

that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights

“that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399,

166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v.

Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver

of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the

Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at

450, 46 P.3d at 1071.4

 Petitioner’s unexhausted claim does not fit within those categories.

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(waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge conflict of

interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 2008).

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Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by waiver, Petitioner would now be barred from

raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for

post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order

and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128,

912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition

of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That time has long

since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b) (exceptions to waiver bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to timeliness bar).

Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his claims. Nor,

does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the excepted claims as

follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

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not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a claim

is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state

courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application.

In the absence of any specific evidence of recantation, this Court cannot find that this

exception would apply. Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely

notice of appeal. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims

of actual innocence, has no application to Petitioner’s simple claim of recanted testimony in

the absence of an assertion of actual innocence. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404,

166 P.3d 945, 959 (App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where petitioner had “ not established

that trial error ...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”). 

Summary - Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that review through

Arizona’s direct appeal and post-conviction relief process is no longer possible for

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Summary re Procedural Default - Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal claims in

Ground One based upon recantation by a witness, and is now procedurally barred from doing

so. Accordingly, this unexhausted claims is procedurally defaulted, and absent a showing

of cause and prejudice or actual innocence, must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE STATE GROUNDS

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims of incompetency in Ground Three were

dismissed by the PCR Court as waived by failure to raise it on direct appeal pursuant to an

independent and adequate state ground, and thus is procedurally barred from habeas review.

(Answer, Doc. 13 at 20-21.)

“[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be

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unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] declined to address a prisoner's federal claims

because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state

judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, -

- - U.S. - - -, 2011 WL 611627, 6 (2011). 

 "[T]he mere fact that a federal claimant failed to abide by a state procedural rule does

not, in and of itself, prevent this Court from reaching the federal claim: The state court must

actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the

case." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). Where

there is no reason given by the state court for its decision, and no lower or other reasoned

decision to look through to, the habeas court must ascertain for itself if the unreasoned

judgment rests on independent and adequate state grounds, taking into consideration such

things as the form of the "post card" denial, the arguments submitted in opposition to the

claims, and the state court's knowledge of the effect of an unreasoned decision. Hunter v.

Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1992).

Respondents argue that the PCR court dismissed this claim as barred under Arizona

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3). However, the PCR court did not specifically address

Petitioner’s claim of incompetency. Rather, the court simply inserted in the paragraph

concerning Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct, without connection to any specific

claim, an isolated reference to the Rule 32.32(a)(3).

The Court finds the claim of prosecutorial misconduct was raised on

appeal and may not be raised in a post-conviction proceeding under this

rule. Rule 32.2(a)(2), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Claims not

specifically raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred in this

proceeding. Rule 32.2(A)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(Exhibit M, M.E. 11/15/06 at 1.) 

 Here, there is no connection in the PCR court’s Order between its recitation of Rule

32.2(a)(3) and the incompetency claim. Thus, this Court must ascertain for itself whether

the rejection of the claim was on independent and adequate state grounds.

On the other hand, the State argued in response to the PCR Petition that the

incompetency claim was procedurally barred:

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5

 The Arizona Court of Appeals issued a summary denial (Exhibit U, Order 1/21/09)

of the Petition for Review.. Pursuant to Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), this

court looks through that order to the PCR court’s order.

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Similarly, claims of incompetence at trial must be raised on direct

appeal. Because Petitioner did not raise that claim in his direct appeal,

it is procedurally barred in this proceeding. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3).

(Exhibit K, PCR Resp. at 4.) Respondents did not address the claim on its merits. (Id.

generally.) No other claim was argued as being procedurally barred under Rule 32.2.(a)(3).

In his PCR Reply, Petitioner simply argued that he had raised the claim on direct appeal, but

only cited the procedural recitation in his Opening Brief on direct appeal, and pointed to no

argument of the claim. (Exhibit L, PCR Reply at 2 (citing Exhibit D, Opening Brief at 1-2.)

In the Petitioner for Review proceedings, Petitioner argued that the competency issued

had not been ruled on by the PCR court. (Exhibit S, PFR at 2.) The state again argued the

incompetency claim was procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Exhibit T, PFR Resp.

at 5.)5

Under these circumstances, the undersigned must conclude that the trial court’s

reference to Rule 32.2(a)(3) was an adoption of the state’s argument that Petitioner’s

incompetency claim was procedurally barred under that rule, and that the dismissal of the

PCR Petition, insofar as it encompassed the incompetency claim, was on that procedural

ground. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that this claim was disposed of by the PCR

Court as procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(a)(3). 

Federal habeas review of a defaulted federal claim is precluded only when the state

court has disposed of the claim on a procedural ground "that is both 'independent' of the

merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's decision." Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). But see Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) ("assum[ing]"

independence standard applies on habeas). A state's application of the bar is not adequate

unless it is " 'strictly or regularly followed.' " Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988)

(citation omitted) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982))

Rule 32.2(a) has been found to be independent of federal law. See Stewart v. Smith,

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536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed the

burden of proving the adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent and

adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden

to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner may

satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that

demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation

to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule. Once

having done so, however, the ultimate burden is the state's. 

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that Rule 32.2(a)(3) is not

adequate to bar federal habeas review. 

Summary re Procedural Bar - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes

that Petitioner’s claims in Ground Three (Incompetency) were disposed of on an independent

and adequate state procedural bar sufficient to bar habeas review.

C. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE

The undersigned has determined herein above that Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted the portion of his Ground One based on witness recantation. In addition, the

undersigned has concluded that Petitioner’s claims in Ground Three (Competence) were

disposed of on independent and adequate state grounds. 

If a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Although both "cause" and "prejudice"

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, a court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43

(1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991).

 "Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123. Petitioner

offers nothing to establish cause to excuse his procedural default or procedural bar.

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion

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6

 Petitioner’s Ground One contains a string of unrelated allegations, including

assertions that the prosecution failed to prove possession of a weapon and prior bad acts,

judicial misconduct resulted from the judge failing to take action, and the absence of a jury

instruction precluding consideration of non-relevant information. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.)

None of these conclusory allegations are supported by any specific factual references. 

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intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish

cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). 

Petitioner makes no pretension of establishing his actual innocence as an excuse for

a procedural default. To the extent that Petitioner raises actual innocence as a substantive

claim, the Court finds it to be without merit, as discussed hereinafter.

Summary re Procedurally Defaulted & Procedurally Barred Claims - Petitioner

has failed to show cause to excuse his procedural default and/or the procedural bar, and has

failed to show his actual innocence to avoid them Accordingly, the portion of Petitioner’s

Ground One founded on recantation of a witness, and his Ground Three (Competency) must

be dismissed with prejudice.

D. MERITS OF GROUND ONE (DUE PROCESS/ACTUAL INNOCENCE) 

Respondents characterize Petitioner’s Ground One as setting out: (1) the recantation

claim disposed of herein above as procedurally defaulted; (2) a duplicate of his ineffective

assistance claim in Ground Two based upon uncalled witnesses; and (3) a freestanding claim

of actual innocence.6

 (Answer, Doc. 13 at 13-14.) Petitioner does not oppose that

characterization. The undersigned adopts it.

As noted, the portion of this claim related to recantation is procedurally defaulted. The

portion concerning ineffective assistance is discussed in connection with Ground Two.

The remaining claim is an assertion of actual innocence. 

Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have

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never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an

independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state

criminal proceeding...This rule is grounded in the principle that federal

habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in

violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact.

Herrera v. Collins,506 U.S. 390, 400-401 (1993). Thus, there is no recognized authority for

habeas relief on a free-standing claim of actual innocence.

Even if such a claim were cognizable, Petitioner has failed to make one out. “[T]o be

entitled to relief, a habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence claim must go beyond

demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably

innocent.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997). A finding of "actual

innocence" is not to be based upon a finding that insufficient evidence to support the charge

was presented at trial, but rather upon affirmative evidence of innocence. See U.S. v.

Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank robbery

case, without evidence that insurance did not exist, not sufficient to establish actual

innocence to excuse procedural default). 

Here, with one exception, Plaintiff points to no affirmative evidence of his innocence.

At best, he makes vague references to limited evidence on some issues (e.g. possession of

a gun, prior bad acts). 

Plaintiff does provide a letter from Teresa Trujillo, a 911 caller, in which she claims

that she observed the shooting in October, 2002, and when shown a picture of Petitioner by

his sister in April, 2007 she did not recognize him as the shooter. (Petition, Exhibits, Doc.

1-1 at physical page 1.) 

In contrast, the state had eyewitness testimony from several other witnesses who

identified Petitioner, as well as the police statements by Petitioner’s girlfriend (albeit

recanted) that Petitioner was the shooter. (Exhibit Q, R.T. 4/27/07 at 32-33.) Comparatively,

a failure to identify Petitioner from a picture some four and a half years after the fact would

not create a probability of actual innocence. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish his actual innocence, and this portion

of his Ground One is without merit.

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E. MERITS OF GROUND TWO: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Respondents characterize Petitioner’s Ground Two as reurging from his PCR

proceedings a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel founded upon allegations that trail

counsel was ineffective for failing to :

(1) interview arresting officers and investigators;

(2) prepare before and during trial;

(3) contact or visit Petitioner at the jail and thereby prepare an adequate defense;

(4) challenge the prosecution’s attacks on Petitioner’s character and falsification

of the facts. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 16.)

Petitioner does not oppose that characterization of his claims. (See generally Reply, Doc.

18.) The undersigned adopts it.

1. Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, a

petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 687-88, 694. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may

reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the

claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

Moreover, to succeed on his claims in this habeas proceeding, Petitioner bears an

extremely heavy burden. He must establish both that the state court got it wrong on prejudice

and that it got it wrong on deficient performance. Further, Petitioner must show that both of

these determinations were either based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts, or

were contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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2. State Court Ruling

The PCR court initially rejected all of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance as

not supported by the record. ” (Exhibit M, M.E. 11/15/06 at 2.) After Petitioner’s motion

for rehearing, the PCR court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which defense counsel

testified. (Exhibit Q, R.T. 4/27/07.) The court again rejected Petitioner’s claims, finding that

“defendant failed to establish that his attorney’s performance was unreasonable under the

circumstances or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of his attorney’s conduct.”

(Exhibit R, M.E. 6/19/07.) The state court’s findings on individual claims will be addressed

hereinafter.

2. Failure to Interview Officers and Investigators

For his first claim of ineffective assistance, Petitioner argues that counsel failed to

interview police officers and investigators. The PCR court did not separately address this

claim, and thus the undersigned finds that it was simply disposed of as “not supported by the

record.” (Exhibit M, M.E. 11/15/06 at 2.)

A habeas petitioner may not leave a court to speculate what evidence a purportedly

deficient investigation would have discovered. In order to prevail on an allegation that

defense counsel conducted an insufficient investigation resulting in ineffective assistance,

the petitioner must show specifically what that investigation would have produced. A

petitioner may not simply speculate about what a witness’ testimony, but must adduce

evidence to show what it would have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir.

1997). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a putative witness must generally be presented

in the form of actual testimony by the witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply

state that the testimony would have been favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain

an ineffective assistance claim.” U.S. v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991).

Here, Petitioner proffers no explanation what information or testimony he believes an

interview of officers and investigators would have produced. Nor does he even specifically

identify them. Nor did he provide such information to the PCR Court. (See generally

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Exhibit J, PCR Pet.; Exhibit L, PCR Reply; Exhibit Q, R.T. 4/27/07.) Under these

circumstances, the undersigned finds this claim of ineffectiveness to be without merit.

4. Failure to Prepare

Petitioner complains that trial counsel failed to prepare before and during trial. Apart

from Petitioner’s allegations concerning the lack of jail visits (discussed hereinafter),

Petitioner does not elaborate in his Petition as to how counsel failed to prepare. 

Petitioner has consistently argued that counsel failed to interview the 911 callers. At

the PCR hearing, Petitioner showed that trial counsel had failed to interview people who had

called 911 to report the shooting. 

Q. Okay. Did you ever make me aware that there possibly

could have been other alibi suspect witnesses that - - to come and ask

me what would those people say is - - you didn’t want to pursue the

witnesses, because a blue car was involved and I drove a blue car. Is

that what your are saying?

A. [Defense counsel Reece] No. I’m saying that I didn’t see

those calls leading to getting an alibi defense.

Q. So you didn’t investigate?

A. I did not investigate the calls.

(Exhibit Q, R.T. 4/27/07 at 20.)

Q. And is the statement accurate that you, for whatever reasons,

didn’t investigate the 911 calls that were in the DR reports?

A. Did I make a statement to him about that?

Q. No. You reviewed them, but chose not to investigate them?

A. I did not investigate them, no.

(Exhibit Q, R.T. 4/27/07 at 29.)

Even if this Court presumes that such failure was deficient performance, Petitioner

must still establish prejudice, i.e. a reasonable probability that had counsel interviewed those

witnesses there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have been convicted.

However, Petitioner has never produced or proffered any proof showing that such interviews

would have produced admissible evidence which would have altered the outcome of the trial.

Petitioner has tendered the letter from Trujillo discussed herein above, asserting she

did not recognize Petitioner’s photograph as a shooter. “[E]vidence about the testimony of

a putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the witness

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or on affidavit.” Ashimi, 932 F.2d at 650. Despite being encouraged by the PCR court to

do so (Exhibit Q, R.T. 4/27/07 at 39, 41), Petitioner has not produced an affidavit from

Trujillo.

Even if taken as competent evidence, Trujillo’s testimony is insufficient to justify

relief. In light of the other significant testimony from the involved eyewitnesses (as discussed

herein above in connection with Petition’s actual innocence claim), the undersigned cannot

find that the PCR court’s conclusion Petitioner did not establish prejudice was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts or was contrary to or an unreasonable application of

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

5. Failure to Visit Petitioner

Petitioner complains that counsel did not visit him at the jail, and thus could not

prepare an adequate defense. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that “counsel did not see

Petitioner for over ‘400 days’ to discuss or prepare his defense.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Petitioner does not explain this calculation. The Indictment was issued October 11, 2002.

(Exhibit A.) Trial began April 21, 2003, just 192 days later.

The record indicates that counsel had significant contact with Petitioner in the interim,

albeit not at the jail. At the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified that he received Petitioner’s

file at the end of October, but did not speak to Petitioner until after a hearing some 35 days

later, on the 2nd of December. (Exhibit Q, R.T. 4/27/07 at 15-16, 23.) In the interim,

Petitioner called and asked counsel to file an “O.R.” motion, which was done. (Id. at 16-17.)

After the December hearing (at which Petitioner was released), he walked and talked with

Petitioner “for more than five minutes” about Petitioner’s purported alibi. (Id. at 17.) At the

Trial Management Conference on January 1, 2003, they discussed Petitioner’s alibi

witnesses. Counsel contacted one of the witnesses who said the other would refuse to testify

because she was on probation. (Id. at 17-18.) They had conversations about interviewing

other witnesses, and various plea offers. (Id. at 25, 27, 30.) Petitioner then failed to appear

for a second hearing on January 27, and a warrant for his arrest was issued, and he was

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rearrested on March 5th. (Id. at 17-18, 24, 30-31.) Petitioner proceeded to trial in April. (Id.

at 25.) 

Other than the bare complaint that counsel did not visit him in jail, Petitioner makes

no showing that counsel did not adequately communicate with Petitioner. Nor does

Petitioner point to any specific impact on the representation from the lack of jail visits.

Counsel did communicate with Petitioner, and pursued the witnesses and strategies discussed

with Petitioner. Counsel utilized other available means of contact, including phone and

personal contact at the time of hearings. Petitioner offers no reason to believe that additional

visits in the jail were necessary or would have been productive.

Under these circumstances, the undersigned cannot find deficient performance or

prejudice. This claim is without merit.

6. Objections

Petitioner complains that counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s attacks on

Petitioner’s character and falsification of facts. Petitioner does not elaborate.

The PCR Court rejected this portion of Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim, observing

that the “Arizona Court of Appeals determined that most of the evidence at issue would have

been admitted at trial because of the Petitioner’s untruthful testimony during trial.” (Exhibit

M, M.E. 11/15/06 at 2.)

On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged various other acts evidence. The Arizona

Court of Appeals observed that counsel “did not object to the admission of any evidence as

improper other act evidence.” (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 6/14/05 at 4.) The court went on,

however, to analyze Petitioner’s claims under Arizona’s “fundamental error” review process,

and found that none of the opposed evidence resulted in “error going to the foundation of the

case, error that takes from defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such

magnitude that defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.” (Id. at 5.) Because

this limited form of review does not determine whether the objections would hav been

sustained, it renders the holding of the court non-binding for purposes of finding ineffective

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assistance. Nonetheless, the court’s rationale is instructive.

Prior Altercation - With regard to testimony by Shawna and Petitioner about prior

violence between them, the court found that the prosecution properly impeached statements

from both denying altercations between them, by introducing evidence of a prior altercation

between them that required police intervention. (Id. at 5-7.)

Second Shooting - With regard to testimony by Shawna and her caretaker, Michelle,

of a second shooting incident in which Petitioner allegedly shot at Shawna and her sometime

boyfriend, Hector, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the Shawna’s testimony was

properly admitted to impeach her claims of Petitioner’s nonviolence, and that Michelle’s

testimony was volunteered by Michelle and was attributed by her to a third party rather than

Petitioner. (Id. at 7-9.) 

Possession of Firearms - With regard to testimony by Michelle and Petitioner that

Petitioner possessed firearms on other occasions, the court found that the testimony by

Petitioner was properly obtained to impeach his statements that he never had a weapon, and

Michelle’s testimony was volunteered as an explanation for her telling the 911 operator that

Petitioner had a gun when she had, in fact, not seen him with a gun on that occasion. (Id. at

9-10.) 

Drug Usage - With regard to testimony about Petitioner’s drug use, the court noted

that a woman, Carley, responded to a question about Petitioner being an aggressor by noting

that his behavior differed depending on whether he was on drugs. During cross-examination

to show Shawna lied in statements to the police, she denied telling the police she and

Petitioner used drugs together. David, the father of several of Shawna’s children, testified

he did not want Shawna to have custody because she and Petitioner did drugs together, but

admitted he had not seen Petitioner use drugs. (Id. at 10-12.) The court noted that

“Defendant's alleged drug use was not mentioned in closing argument.” (Id. at 16, n. 5.) The

court concluded: “In the context presented to the jury, evidence of defendant's alleged drug

use appears to have had little or no probative value to the determination of defendant's guilt

or innocence, the determination of any disputed material issue or the determination of the

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credibility of any witness.” (Id. at 11.) 

Failure to Appear - With regard to Petitioner’s absconding in the middle of the

prosecution, the court observed that this was elicited to impeach Petitioner’s claims to always

accepting responsibility for his actions. (Id. at 12-13.) 

Petitioner does not suggest any reason to believe that trial counsel would have been

successful at trial in having this evidence excluded, had he timely raised an objection.

Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:

Except as provided in Rule 404(c) [character evidence in sexual

misconduct cases] evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

“Rule 404 only applies when evidence of a prior bad act or crime is introduced in the state's

case-in-chief for substantive purposes and to show that the alleged crime or bad act actually

occurred.” State v. Cannon, 148 Ariz. 72, 75, 713 P.2d 273, 276 (1985). When introduced

for other purposes, e.g. those listed in the rule and others, including impeachment, the rule

has no application. So, for example, “evidence of a prior attempt by the defendant to kill the

victim [may be introduced] to rebut the defendant's claim at trial that he would be unable to

harm a loved one.” Id.

The evidence of (1) the prior altercation, (2) Shawna’s testimony of a second shooting,

(3) Petitioner’s testimony on firearms, (4) Shawna’s testimony on drug usage, and (5)

Petitioner’s testimony on his failure to appear were all impeachment of a prior statement by

the witness.

The remaining evidence was either introduced for some other purpose outside Rule

404(b), or was ultimately of no moment. Michelle’s testimony about the second shooting

would not have been prejudicial because she attributed the shooting to a third party.

Michelle’s testimony about the firearms was not introduced “to prove the character of

[Petitioner] in order to show action in conformity therewith,” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b), but to

explain her representation to the 911 operator that Petitioner had a gun. Similarly, Carley

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and David’s testimony on drug usage was not introduced “to prove the character of

[Petitioner] in order to show action in conformity therewith,” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). There

was no assertion that Petition was using drugs at the time of the offense, or that drugs

otherwise contributed to the offense. Moreover, the testimony by Carley was volunteered by

her in response to questioning by defense counsel about who was the aggressor between

Petitioner and Shawna. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 6/14/05 at 10-11.) The testimony by David

was defused by his admission that he had never seen Petitioner use drugs.

Even if the objections would have been successful, failure to raise the objections was

not per se deficient performance. Good trial counsel will let any number of technical

violations of the rules of evidence go without objection. “If counsel reasonably believes that

correcting the error will actually cause greater harm to his client, perhaps by creating an

unfavorable impression of counsel or the defendant in the eyes of the judge or jury, counsel's

failure to object would not constitute deficient performance.” Gordon v. U.S., 518 F.3d

1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008). Here much of the offending testimony was not obviously

elicited by the prosecution’s questions, but was interjected by the witness. Thus counsel’s

only option was to make an after-the-fact objection and attempt to “unring the bell.” Doing

so would have simply highlighted the offending testimony in the eyes of the jury, with vague

hopes that a limiting instruction by the court would actually be heeded in the jurors’

deliberations.

The undersigned cannot find deficient performance in counsel’s failure to object to

the admission of this evidence. Nor can the undersigned find prejudice, given the eyewitness

testimony against Petitioner.

Even if the undersigned could find ineffective assistance, the undersigned has found

no basis for concluding that the state courts’ rejections of the claims were based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts, or were contrary to or an unreasonable application

of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, Ground Two is without merit.

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F. SUMMARY

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the portion of his Ground One based on witness

recantation, and Petitioner’s claims in Ground Three (Competence) were disposed of on

independent and adequate state grounds. Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice

or actual innocence to avoid the effect of the procedural default and procedural bar.

Accordingly, these claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

The portion of Ground One based on actual innocence is not cognizable, and is

unsupported. Ground Two (ineffective assistance) is without merit. Accordingly, the

balance of the Petition is without merit and must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

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should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id. (emphasis added).

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part on

the merits. 

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the

reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on the merits, under the reasoning

set forth herein, the constitutional claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the portion of Ground One founded

on recantation of a witness, and all of Ground Three (Competency) of Petitioner's Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 22, 2009 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of of Petitioner's Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed June 22, 2009 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3), unless otherwise

permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation shall not exceed ten

(10) pages. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc),

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins

v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: April 28, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\09-1341-001r RR 11 02 04 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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