Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02052/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHARLES MESIROW, )

an individual )

) No. CIV 04-2052 PHX RCB 

Plaintiff, ) 

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

LEISERV, INC. dba VIA LINDA )

LANES, an Illinois )

corporation, )

)

Defendant. ) )

Plaintiff Charles Mesirow brought this personal injury action,

which was removed to this Court from the Superior Court of Arizona

for Maricopa County by Defendant Leiserv Inc. ("Leiserv") (doc. #

1). A trial before this Court is scheduled to begin on December 6,

2005. Currently pending before the Court are Leiserv's motions in

limine to exclude unrelated prior incidents (doc. # 50); to exclude

an allegedly outdated study and related information (doc. # 51);

and to limit Plaintiff's evidence of medical expenses to amounts

actually accepted as payment in full for the services rendered by

medical providers (doc. # 52). Plaintiff opposes only the latter 

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two of these motions. Response (doc. # 53).

I. BACKGROUND

Mesirow was bowling at Via Linda Lanes on November 29, 2002

when, in his approach to release the bowling ball, he apparently

slipped on a translucent substance and fell, landing on his left

knee and head. Compl. (doc. # 1) ¶¶ 8-10.

In the mid to late 1970's, Brunswick Corporation published a

Safety Manual that referred to Brunswick Recreation Centers' Study

of Accident Claims (collectively, the "BRC Study" or "Study"). 

Mot. (doc. # 51), Ex. 2 ¶¶ 2-3. According to the Study, twentynine percent of customer-related claimed accidents were

attributable to slips, trips, and falls in approach areas. Id.,

Ex. 1.

Between November 29, 2002 and October 18, 2004, Mesirow sought

and obtained treatment for the injuries sustained in his fall. 

Mot. (doc. # 52), Ex. 1. While the amounts billed for many of the

services have been fully paid by either Mesirow or his insurer,

some balances have apparently been written-off or otherwise

discounted as a result of his insurer's negotiations with

providers. See Response (doc. # 53) at 7; Mot. (doc. # 52), Ex. 1. 

The present motions in limine concern whether evidence of

certain unrelated prior incidents should be admitted at trial (doc.

# 50); whether the BRC Study should be admitted at trial (doc. #

51); and whether Plaintiff's evidence of medical expenses should be

limited only to the amounts actually paid by him or his insurer, to

the exclusion of any discounts given by providers (doc. # 52).

. . .

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Evidence of Unrelated Prior Incidents

Leiserv contends that certain prior incidents are not relevant

to the instant dispute, or are not substantially similar to

Plaintiff's claimed accident, and should therefore be excluded at

trial. Mot. (doc. # 50). Plaintiff does not oppose this motion,

agreeing not to introduce evidence of these incidents, but

reserving the right to do so "in the event defendant opens the door

to their admissibility." Response (doc. # 53). Therefore,

Leiserv's motion in limine to exclude unrelated prior incidents

(doc. # 50) is granted, subject to reconsideration should Plaintiff

contend at trial that Defendant has opened the door to their

admissibility.

B. The BRC Study

Leiserv argues that the BRC Study should be excluded, because

(1) its age renders it irrelevant to the pending dispute; (2) its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury; and (3)

the Study summarizes inadmissible hearsay statements made by

injured parties in incident reports. 

1. Relevance

Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. Fed. R. Evid.

402. It is defined as evidence "having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Plaintiff maintains that the Study is relevant to the standard

of care owed by Leiserv, as well as Leiserv's notice of the

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possibility of injury in the approach area. Response (doc. # 53)

at 1-2. Leiserv contends that the Study is irrelevant on account

of its age, and because Plaintiff does not claim to have fallen due

to a worn approach floor or inadequate approach finish as discussed

in the Study. Mot. (doc. # 51) at 2. Neither argument dispels the

probative value of the Study to the facts in this case. Plaintiff

claims to have slipped on a translucent substance in the approach

area and fallen. The Study is relevant, because it notes the

frequency of falls in the approach area, as well as the effect of

approach finish on desired characteristics. Id., Ex. 1. The age

of the study does not negate its probative value, but goes to the

weight of the evidence. Furthermore, the Study's discussion of

approach finish does not establish that a worn or inadequate

approach finish is the only possible cause of a bowler's fall in

the approach area as Leiserv suggests. See id. Therefore, the

study is relevant.

2. Unfair Prejudice

Although relevant, the BRC Study, or portions of it, may be

excluded at trial "if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury." Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The Court does not agree with Leiserv's characterization of

the Study as being so "cloaked in the mantle of science" as to be

misleading or confusing to the jury. See Mot. (doc. # 51) at 3. 

The mere fact that percentages are used in reporting the frequency

with which accidents have occurred in different areas of the

Brunswick bowling centers should not by so mystifying that the jury

would give undue credence to a nonexistent scientific underpinning. 

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However, the Court is sympathetic to Leiserv's concern about

the age of the Study. In particular, the Court finds that the

danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative

value of the following portions of the Study: (1) the second

sentence of the first paragraph of the Study's first page,

beginning with the phrase "Center personnel should become

familiar"; (2) the second sentence of the first paragraph of the

Study's second page, beginning with the phrase "In some cases"; and

(3) the entire final paragraph of the Study's second page,

beginning with the phrase "There are many external sources." 

Accordingly, these portions of the Study will be excluded under

Rule 403.

As to the remainder, the Court cannot conclude that the

Study's probative value to the issues raised by Plaintiff is so

minimal, on account of its age, as to be substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury. Any flaw deriving from the age of the Study

as to the remaining portions is more appropriately addressed in the

form of a limiting instruction. Cf. Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc.,

285 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the inadequacies

of a study should be considered as going to the weight of the

evidence rather than its admissibility).

3. Hearsay

An out of court statement "offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted" is inadmissible hearsay unless

otherwise provided for by the Rules or by the Supreme Court

pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress. Fed. R.

Evid. 801, 802. Rule 803(6) creates the business record exception

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to the hearsay rule, admitting the following records of regularly

conducted activity:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any

form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or 

diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 

information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if 

kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 

activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 

business activity to make the memorandum, report, record 

or data compilation . . . unless the source of 

information or the method or circumstances of preparation

indicate lack of trustworthiness.

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).

Leiserv argues that the BRC Study should be excluded because

it summarizes inadmissible hearsay statements made by injured

parties in incident reports, and maintains that the business record

exception of Rule 803(6) does not apply because the circumstances

of the reports' preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 

Mot. (doc. # 51) at 4-6. In particular, Leiserv states that (1)

the injured patrons were under no duty to report the facts

accurately, (2) the employees taking their statements were not

obligated to verify the facts, and (3) the reports were not

generated in the ordinary course of business. Id.

To the extent that the Study summarizes the frequency with

which incidents were reported in different locations within the

Brunswick bowling centers, the Court does not share Leiserv's

concern regarding the trustworthiness of the underlying reports. 

The potential danger that some patrons or employees may have

inaccurately recorded the facts, whether intentionally or not, is

slight in view of the fact that the Study relies only upon the

accuracy of the reported location of the incidents. Indeed, the

fact that Brunswick compiled these portions of the reports to

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create an internal manual on safety is further indicia of their

reliability. Finally, the fact that accidents, by their nature, do

not occur in the ordinary course of business for a bowling center,

does not mean that documentation of their occurrence is not a

regular activity. Accordingly, the Court finds that the

circumstances of the reports' preparation indicate sufficient

trustworthiness so that those portions of the underlying reports

summarized in the Study would be admissible.

For the foregoing reasons, Leiserv's motion in limine to

exclude the BRC Study (doc. # 51) is granted in part and denied in

part. Plaintiff may not present evidence of or make any reference

to (1) the second sentence of the first paragraph of the first page

of the Study; (2) the second sentence of the first paragraph of the

second page of the Study; or (3) the entire final paragraph of the

second page of the Study. Plaintiff may present the remaining

portions of the first page of the Study, captioned "Accident

Prevention," only for the purpose of showing that Leiserv had

notice of the frequency with which falls were reported to occur in

the approach area to the lanes at Brunswick bowling centers; and

may present the remaining portions of the second page of the Study,

captioned "Slips/Trips/Falls on Approaches," only for the purpose

of showing that Leiserv was aware of the effect of approach finish

in maintaining desired slide conditions. Finally, Plaintiff's

introduction of the Study into evidence for these purposes will be

subject to the Court's issuance of a limiting instruction advising

the jury to take into consideration the fact that the Study was

conducted and published approximately thirty years ago.

. . .

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1

 Because this is a diversity case arising from alleged

negligence occurring in Arizona, the Court must apply Arizona

substantive law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).

Although the collateral source doctrine functions as an evidentiary

rule, it is closely tied to state substantive policy in Arizona. See

Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744, 752 (1977)

(acknowledging legislature's right to abolish the collateral source

rule in medical malpractice cases as a matter of public policy).

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C. Evidence of Plaintiff's Medical Expenses

Finally, Leiserv argues that Plaintiff's evidence of medical

expenses should be limited only to the amounts actually paid by him

or his insurer, to the exclusion of any discounts obtained through

his insurer's negotiations with his health care providers. See

Response (doc. # 53) at 7; Mot. (doc. # 52), Ex. 1. Plaintiff

maintains that the collateral source rule precludes any reduction

of his claimed medical expenses by the amount of these write-offs. 

Response (doc. # 53) at 4. For the reasons below, the Court finds

that Plaintiff, through compensatory damages, should not be

entitled to recover a greater amount than he, or his insurer, have

actually paid or may remain legally liable, and rejects Plaintiff's

argument that the collateral source rule requires otherwise.

Arizona follows the common law collateral source rule, which

provides that "[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the

injured party from other sources are not credited against the

tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a part of the

harm for which the tortfeasor is liable."1 Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 902(2) (1979); see also Taylor v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 130

Ariz. 516, 637 P.2d 726, 729-30 (1981). The Arizona Supreme Court

has stated that the purpose of the rule is "to avoid a windfall to

the tortfeasor, if a choice must be made between him and the

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injured party." Michael v. Cole, 122 Ariz. 450, 595 P.2d 995, 997

(1979). However, Arizona law is equally strong in its admonishment

that compensatory damages are not intended to confer a windfall on

the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brown v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 26

Ariz. App. 538, 549 P.2d 1056, 1057 (Ct. App. 1976) (". . . [A]

plaintiff is entitled to be made whole and nothing more, and cannot

be allowed to be compensated in excess of the damages he has

suffered."). Some courts have balanced these competing interests

by allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of amounts paid by

a collateral source such as an insurer, but disallowing evidence of

write-offs that no one incurred. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hayes, 72

F. Supp. 2d 635, 637-38 (W.D. Va. 1999) (precluding plaintiff from

referring to or introducing evidence at trial of any amount of

medical bills that represented write-offs); Ward-Conde' v. Smith,

19 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541-42 (E.D. Va. 1998).

Plaintiff fails to cite any authority in which the collateral

source rule has allowed a recovery in excess of amounts actually

paid by either a plaintiff or a collateral source. Three of the

cases cited by Plaintiff do not even invoke the collateral source

rule, and instead, reach their results based on the courts'

interpretation of contract language in insurance policies.

In Coconino County v. Fund Adm'rs Ass'n, 149 Ariz. 427, 719

P.2d 693, 696 (Ct. App. 1986), the Arizona Court of Appeals

interpreted the meaning of the phrase "expenses actually incurred"

in a medical insurance policy. In that case, the insured was

eligible for county medical assistance, and so, his health care

providers directly billed the county medical assistance program. 

Id. The court held that, although he was not directly billed, the

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2

 A coordination of benefits clause in an insurance contract

would prevent the total payout to an insured from exceeding the total

amount of medical bills resulting from a covered loss. See Nahom,

885 P.2d at 1116.

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insured had "actually incurred" his hospitalization expenses as

defined in his insurance policy, because the providers would have

held him liable in the event that the county did not pay. Id.

In Nahom v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ariz., 180 Ariz. 548,

885 P.2d 1113, 1119-20 (Ct. App. 1994), the Arizona Court of

Appeals addressed the situation where two or more insurance

policies cover the same loss without providing for coordination of

benefits.2 The court held that in those unique circumstances, each

insurer was required to pay all of the insured's qualifying medical

expenses under their respective policies, even if the insured would

receive payment in excess of the hospital's actual charges. Id. at

1119. Any perceived windfall to the insured was attributable

solely to contract principles, and had nothing to do with the

collateral source rule from tort law, which is at issue in this

case.

Likewise, in Samsel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 204 Ariz. 1, 59 P.3d

281, 289-90 (2002), the Arizona Supreme Court determined that the

plaintiff was entitled to recovery under the medical payments

provision of her automobile policy for amounts already paid by her

HMO. Like Nahom, the outcome of the case turned on the insurer's

failure to include a coordination of benefits clause in its policy

with respect to the medical payments coverage. Id. at 289-91. It

in no way represented a novel extension of the collateral source

rule, or the basic principles of compensatory damages.

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3

 The parties shall have until the close of the first day of

trial to submit proposed limiting instructions contemplated by Parts

II.B and II.C of this order with respect to Leiserv's motions in

limine (doc. ## 51-52).

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Accordingly, the Court finds that the collateral source rule

is best honored by permitting Plaintiff to recover amounts paid by

him or his insurer, but barring recovery of any amount of discounts

or write-offs which neither Plaintiff nor his insurer incurred. 

However, the Court is circumspect with respect to the practical

difficulties of presenting evidence of medical expenses sterilized

of any reference to these non-recoverable amounts. Therefore,

Leiserv's motion in limine (doc. # 52) is granted so that Plaintiff

may, at his option, (1) present evidence only of the amounts

actually paid by him or his insurer, and such portions for which he

may remain legally liable, subject to a limiting instruction3 to

the jury that Plaintiff may recover no more than the amounts

actually paid by him or his insurer, and such portions for which he

may remain legally liable; or (2) present evidence of his medical

expenses in any other manner stipulated by the parties and

consistent with this order.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the forgoing analysis,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's motion in limine to exclude

unrelated prior incidents (doc. # 50) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion in limine to

exclude the BRC Study (doc. # 51) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. Plaintiff may not present evidence of or make any reference

to (1) the second sentence of the first paragraph of the first page

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of the Study; (2) the second sentence of the first paragraph of the

second page of the Study; or (3) the entire final paragraph of the

second page of the Study. Plaintiff may present the remaining

portions of the first page of the Study for the purpose of showing

that Defendant had notice of the frequency with which falls were

reported to occur in the approach area to the lanes at Brunswick

bowling centers; and may present the remaining portions of the

second page of the Study for the purpose of showing that Defendant

had notice of the effect of approach finish in maintaining desired

slide conditions. Plaintiff's introduction of the Study for these

purposes will be subject to the Court's issuance of a limiting

instruction advising the jury to take into consideration the fact

that the Study was conducted and published approximately thirty

years ago.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion in limine to

limit Plaintiff's evidence of medical expenses to amounts actually

accepted as payment in full for the services rendered by medical

providers (doc. # 52) is GRANTED. Plaintiff may, at his option,

(1) present evidence only of the amounts actually paid by him or

his insurer, and such portions for which he may remain legally

liable, subject to a limiting instruction to the jury that

Plaintiff may recover no more than the amounts actually paid by him

or his insurer, and such portions for which he may remain legally

liable; or (2) present evidence of his medical expenses in any

other manner stipulated by the parties and consistent with this

order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties shall have until the

close of the first day of trial in which to submit proposed

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limiting instructions contemplated by Parts II.B and II.C of this

order.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2005.

 Robert C. Broomfield

Senior United States District Judge

Copies to counsel of record

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