Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03156/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3156

___________

Earl Leon Luckes, Jr., *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

County of Hennepin, Minnesota; * District of Minnesota.

Patrick D. McGowan, Sheriff; *

Michele Smolley, Chief Deputy; *

Thomas Merkel, Inspector; Former *

Inspector Richard Estensen, officially *

and individually, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: May 13, 2005

Filed: July 28, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Earl Leon Luckes, Jr., appeals from the district court’s1

 grant of summary

judgment against him and in favor of appellees Hennepin County, Minnesota, and

Sheriff Patrick D. McGowan. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 04-3156 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/28/2005 Entry ID: 1933825
2

The record does not reflect the impetus for the traffic stop, save for a brief

assertion by appellees that Luckes’s driving “attracted the attention” of the Minnesota

State Patrol. Thus, the question of exactly which characteristic of Luckes’s driving

was unusual is left to our speculation and that of the reader. Similarly, the record

does not reflect whether Luckes was aware of either the suspension or the expiration

of his license prior to the stop.

3

The appellees claim that Luckes actually arrived at the ADC at 8:12 a.m.

Because this case comes before us on summary judgment, however, we read the

record in the light most favorable to Luckes as the nonmoving party and give him the

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record. Turner v. Honeywell

Fed. Mfg. & Techs., LLC, 336 F.3d 716, 719-20 (8th Cir. 2003).

-2-

I.

On May 5, 1999, the Minnesota State Patrol issued two traffic citations to

Luckes for failure to produce proof of insurance, in violation of Minn. Stat. §

169.791, and failure to wear a seat belt, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.686.

Through the claimed inadvertence of Luckes and his wife, the fines imposed by the

citations were not paid, and bench warrants for Luckes’s arrest were subsequently

issued on June 15, 1999. In addition, Luckes’s driver’s license was suspended on

January 12, 2000.

On May 9, 2001, Luckes was again stopped by the Minnesota State Patrol and

cited for driving with a suspended license, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24, and

driving with an expired license, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.27.2

 The citing

officer then arrested Luckes pursuant to the bench warrants and transported him to

the Hennepin County Adult Detention Center (ADC). Luckes arrived at the ADC at

approximately 7:30 a.m. and was placed in a holding cell.3

 Prior to being placed in

the cell, he was told by an officer that he had “picked the worst day to be here.” In

addition, a sign posted in various locations at the ADC asked inmates to “be patient”

due to the fact that completing their paperwork and processing “may take more than

eight hours.”

Appellate Case: 04-3156 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/28/2005 Entry ID: 1933825
4

The record is inconsistent regarding the precise time at which Luckes left the

jail. Luckes first claimed in a deposition that he was released at approximately 7:30

a.m., but later claimed in an affidavit that he was not released until 8:30 a.m. The

record also contains a booking report, signed by Luckes, that indicates a 7:48 a.m.

release. Even reading these facts in the light most favorable to Luckes, the only

reasonable inference to be drawn is that he was released at 7:48 a.m. In any event,

the one hour difference between a 7:48 a.m. and an 8:30 a.m. release time does not

affect our disposition of Luckes’s § 1983 claim.

-3-

The evening before Luckes was detained, the ADC activated a new

computerized jail management system designed to update the ADC’s record keeping

and processing functions. During Luckes’s time at the ADC, the facility encountered

a number of problems with the system, thereby increasing the ADC’s intake and

booking processing times. These operational difficulties, superimposed upon the

ADC’s standard inmate processing procedures, resulted in Luckes’s detention at the

ADC until 7:48 a.m., a period of approximately twenty-four hours.4

During his twenty-four-hour detention, Luckes was repeatedly placed in

overcrowded cells with persons arrested for crimes significantly more violent in

nature than the mere failure to pay traffic fines. He endured threats and intimidation

from other inmates, as well as mockery prompted by his speech impediment. Each

time he was taken to complete a step in the booking and processing procedure, ADC

personnel repeated the activity a number of times because of their lack of familiarity

with the new system. Finally, after initially being told that he would be released

“shortly after booking,” Luckes’s ordeal ended and he left the ADC. During Luckes’s

stay, approximately 107 persons were booked into the ADC and approximately 96

were released.

Luckes subsequently brought suit against Hennepin County and Sheriff

McGowan, as well as against certain other county officers in both their official and

personal capacities, in federal district court. The county officers were later

Appellate Case: 04-3156 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/28/2005 Entry ID: 1933825
-4-

voluntarily dismissed from the case, and Luckes’s suit proceeded against Hennepin

County and Sheriff McGowan in his official capacity only (collectively, the County).

Luckes’s complaint asserted that: (1) the County had a policy, practice, custom, or

usage of unreasonably delaying the release of persons entitled to release, in violation

of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and thus was

liable for Luckes’s wrongful detention under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the County was

liable for its violation of Luckes’s rights under the Minnesota Constitution; and (3)

the County was liable in tort for false imprisonment.

The district court granted summary judgment on Luckes’s § 1983 claim,

holding that it could find no authority establishing that a processing time in excess

of eight hours was unconstitutional and that Luckes had not presented any evidence

to support his claim that such delays were unreasonable. The district court also found

that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not recognized a private constitutional cause

of action for unreasonable seizures, and accordingly granted summary judgment on

Luckes’s second claim. Finally, the district court declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Luckes’s state law tort claim, given the dismissal of his federal

claim, and thus dismissed the tort claim without prejudice. Luckes appeals only the

dismissal of his § 1983 claim.

II.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the

same standards as the district court. Bockelman v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 403 F.3d

528, 531 (8th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that no genuine issue of

material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Id. To survive a motion for summary judgment on a § 1983 claim, “the plaintiff

must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether (1) the defendants acted

under color of state law, and (2) the alleged wrongful conduct deprived the plaintiff

of a constitutionally protected federal right.” Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d

Appellate Case: 04-3156 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/28/2005 Entry ID: 1933825
5

Despite Luckes’s apparent argument to the contrary, he must show both that

the County’s conduct was conscience-shocking and that the County violated one or

more of his fundamental rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and

tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor

justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 651 (8th

-5-

590, 596 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotations omitted). It is undisputed that the

County acted under color of state law, and so Luckes must raise a genuine issue of

material fact only as to whether the County’s conduct deprived him of a

constitutionally protected federal right.

 

Luckes first attempts to make this showing by asserting that the County’s

conduct deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches

and seizures. Because Luckes was named in a valid bench warrant, however,

probable cause for his arrest pursuant to that warrant was established, and his Fourth

Amendment argument is thus without merit. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152

F.3d 564, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1998). Rather, Luckes’s claim that his extended detention

violated his constitutional rights is more properly analyzed under the framework of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hayes v. Faulkner

County, 388 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 2004) (Due Process Clause controls when issue

is extended detention following arrest by warrant); Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 569-70.

Luckes accordingly argues in the alternative that his twenty-four-hour detention

violated his substantive due process rights.

In determining whether extended detention following an arrest pursuant to a

valid warrant violates substantive due process, we utilize the framework set forth by

the Seventh Circuit in Armstrong. Hayes, 388 F.3d at 673. Under this framework,

we look to the totality of the circumstances and consider: (1) whether the Due Process

Clause prohibits the alleged deprivation of rights; (2) whether the defendants’

conduct offended the standards of substantive due process; and (3) whether the

totality of the circumstances shocks the conscience.5

 Id. Although the Armstrong

Appellate Case: 04-3156 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/28/2005 Entry ID: 1933825
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Bye, J., concurring) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521

U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)) (internal quotations omitted).

-6-

framework specifically dealt with detentions prior to an initial appearance before a

magistrate following arrest under a valid warrant, see id., we believe that it is equally

applicable to Luckes’s claim that his booking and processing time after arrest under

a valid warrant was excessive.

Luckes asserts that the County violated his substantive due process interest in

freedom from incarceration by maintaining a booking and release procedure that was

deliberately indifferent to that interest, resulting in a twenty-four-hour detention. We

have previously stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

protects an individual’s liberty interest from unlawful state deprivation, such as where

the state detains the individual after he is entitled to release. E.g., Davis v. Hall, 375

F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004). In addition, we have recognized that, in certain

circumstances, deliberate indifference to an individual’s constitutional rights may

shock the conscience. Kuha, 365 F.3d at 606. Even assuming, arguendo, that Luckes

has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was entitled to

immediate release and whether the County was deliberately indifferent to his liberty

interest, however, his substantive due process claim fails because the totality of the

circumstances indicates that his lengthy detention—while unfortunate and

understandably upsetting—does not shock the conscience.

Luckes ultimately argues that the County’s inefficiently executed booking and

release procedures resulted in his extended detention, the duration of which should

shock our conscience. This is a question of law. Hayes, 388 F.3d at 675. Our cases,

and those of the Seventh Circuit that we have cited with approval on this subject, see,

e.g., Hayes, have held that post-arrest detentions of fifty-seven days, thirty-eight days,

and eighteen days sufficiently shock the conscience to establish a substantive due

process violation. See Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 581-82 (fifty-seven days); Hayes, 388

Appellate Case: 04-3156 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/28/2005 Entry ID: 1933825
-7-

F.3d at 675 (thirty-eight days); Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 723-24 (7th Cir.

1985) (eighteen days). Such detentions far exceed the twenty-four-hour detention

experienced by Luckes. Furthermore, although we held in Young v. City of Little

Rock, 249 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2001), that a thirty-minute detention could shock the

conscience, the detention at issue in that case involved the public chaining and strip

search of an innocent person. Id. at 736. In contrast, Luckes complains of no such

treatment from County personnel, and he in fact committed the offenses for which he

was arrested. 

We need not delineate with precision the duration and circumstances of

detention that might result in a substantive due process violation. Suffice it to say

that the circumstances of Luckes’s detention do not. Because Luckes cannot show

that his substantive due process rights were violated, the County cannot be held liable

for his detention under § 1983. See Kuha, 365 F.3d at 603 (municipality may not be

held liable under § 1983 in absence of constitutional tort).

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-3156 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/28/2005 Entry ID: 1933825