Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01421/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01421-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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 1 07cv1421 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN CORONA,

 Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of the Social Secuity

Administration,

 Defendant.

 

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Civil No. 07-1421-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

REMANDING TO ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW JUDGE 

(DOC. NOS. 30, 32) 

 I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In September 2004, Martin Corona (hereafter “Plaintiff”)

applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act,

alleging that he suffered from a disability since February 5, 2004

[Transcript (hereafter “Tr.”) 58-60]. The Commissioner denied the

application both initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. at 46-

50, 53-56). Plaintiff untimely requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (hereafter “ALJ”), but demonstrated good

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 2 07cv1421 

cause for his untimeliness. (Tr. 12). On July 28, 2006, the ALJ

held a hearing on Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 237-255). On

February 1, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision in which he found that

Plaintiff was disabled as of May 1, 2006, but not before that date.

(Tr. 12-18). The ALJ concluded the following: Plaintiff was 52 years

old on the date of the alleged onset of disability. He has limited

education and is not able to communicate in English. He has the

severe impairments of major depression, right eye blindness and left

eye hysterical loss of vision/somatoform disorder. Since the

alleged onset of his disability, Plaintiff was unable to perform his

past relevant work as a fishing vessel deckhand or fish packer. In

June 2007, the Appeals Council declined review of the ALJ’s decision

(Tr. 4-6). On August 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for

Review of Final Decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g).

On December 30, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment (hereafter “Motion”) pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. On January 29, 2010, Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, (hereafter

“Defendant”), through the United States Attorney, filed a CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (hereafter “Cross-Motion”) and

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s ruling should be reversed

because it lacks the support of substantial evidence and rests upon

an error of law. Defendant argues that the ALJ fairly and

accurately summarized the relevant medical and other evidence to

support his conclusion, and that he has not committed legal error.

 

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 3 07cv1421 

 II

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

 Plaintiff alleges that on February 5, 2004, he became disabled

due to the loss of his right eye and severe depression. (Tr. 239).

On July 28, 2006, the ALJ held a hearing regarding Plaintiff’s

application. At the hearing, the ALJ ordered that Plaintiff undergo

further psychological examination to test for mental retardation and

organic brain damage. (Tr. 247, 252). Plaintiff underwent further

psychological examination. (Tr. 222-236). On February 1, 2007, the

ALJ issued a decision in which he found that Plaintiff was disabled

as of May 1, 2006, but not before that date. The ALJ also found that

before May 1, 2006, Plaintiff was able to perform certain jobs that

existed in the national economy. (Tr. 12-18).

 III

SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “Act”), as

amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons

who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical

or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1)(D). Title XVI of the

Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent

persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. §

1382(a). Both titles of the Act define “disability as the

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months...” Id. The Act further provides that an individual

shall be determined to be under a disability only if

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are

of such severity that he is not only unable to do his

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 4 07cv1421 

previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work. Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining whether a person is disabled. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520,

416.920. Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in

“substantial gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are

denied. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decision

maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant

has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.

That determination is governed by the “severity regulation” at issue

in this case. The severity regulation provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of 

 impairments which significantly limits your physical 

 or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will 

 find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, 

 therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your 

age, education, and work experience. 

 §§ 404.1520 (c), 416.920 (c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the

abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” §§ 404.1521 (b),

416.921(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include “[p]hysical

functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,

pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “[c]apacities for seeing,

hearing, and speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and

remembering simple instructions”; [u]se of judgment”; “[r]esponding

appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work

situations”; and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.”

Id. 

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 5 07cv1421 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 

If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the

third step, which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to

one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary

acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful

activity. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P,

App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed

impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.

If the impairment is not one that is conclusively presumed to be

disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which

determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from

performing work he has performed in the past. If the claimant is

able to perform his previous work, he is not disabled. §§ 404.1520

(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform his previous work,

the fifth and final step of the process determines whether he is

able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his

age, education, and work experience. The claimant is entitled to

disability benefits only if he is not able to perform other work. §§

404.1520(f), 416.920(f). 

 IV

DISCUSSION

A. SCOPE OF REVIEW 

The Secretary’s decision to deny benefits will be disturbed

only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based

on legal error. Brawner v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,

839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). “Substantial evidence means

more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. It means

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 6 07cv1421 

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Davis v. Heckler, 868 F.2d 323, 325-26

(9th Cir. 1989). To determine whether substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s decision, the court will review the administrative record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ’s

decision and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.”

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). The ALJ

is responsible for determining and resolving conflicts in medical

testimony. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).

The ALJ is likewise responsible for resolving ambiguities. Id. The

Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). In reaching his

findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing

from the evidence. Beane v. Richardson, 457, F. 2d 758 (9th Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972). 

B. ALJ’s FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

In this case, the ALJ specifically found the following:

1. Plaintiff meets the insured status

requirements of the Social Security Act through the

date of the decision.

2. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity at any time relevant to this

decision.

3. Plaintiff has the following severe

impairments: major depression, right eye blindness,

and left eye hysterical loss of vision/somatoform

disorder.

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Prior to May 1, 2006, Plaintiff exhibited mild

restrictions of activities of daily living; moderate

difficulties maintaining social functioning; moderate

difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence,

or pace; and no episodes of decompensation. As of May

1, 2006, Plaintiff exhibited moderate to marked

restrictions of activities of daily living; moderate

to marked difficulties maintaining social functioning,

marked difficulties maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace; and no episodes of

decompensation.

4. Since the alleged onset date of disability,

Plaintiff has not had an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the

listed impairments.

5. After careful consideration of the entire

record, the undersigned finds that, prior to May 1,

2006, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity

to perform simple repetitive tasks with minimal public

contact, at positions requiring only monocular vision.

As of May 1, 2006, Plaintiff is no longer able to do

so in the competitive workplace on a regular and

continuing basis.

In making this finding, the undersigned considered all

symptoms in accordance with requirements of 20 CFR

404.1529 and SSR’s 96-4p and 96-7p.

At the hearing, Sidney Bolter, M.D., a board certified

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 8 07cv1421 

psychiatrist, opined on the basis of his review of the

record as a whole that the evidence was insufficient

to make a reasoned determination of the nature and

severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments. In fact,

Plaintiff had no treatment in one and one-half years.

Consultative psychiatric and psychological evaluations

were recommended and ordered, added to the record at

exhibits 17F and 18F. The consultative psychologist

and psychiatrist opined that Plaintiff would be able

to perform simple repetitive tasks, but identified

significant signs, symptoms and findings consistent

with Plaintiff’s allegations as to the nature,

severity and functionally limiting effects of his

impairments.

The undersigned will credit those allegations as of

six months prior to the date of the consultative

examinations, prior to which I concur that Plaintiff

was able to perform simple repetitive tasks within the

parameters set forth above. Dr. Englehorn, the

consultative examining psychiatrist, recommended

mental health treatment and medication.

The record shows that Plaintiff’ opthamologist did not

consider him disabled, but rather, declared him fit

for duty. No visual pathology was identified in the

left eye (Exhibit 1F). Plaintiff’s right eye is blind,

and an artificial eye was implanted; examination of

the left eye was normal. (Exhibits 1F, 2F, 3F, 4F,

6F). The state agency found that Plaintiff’s visual

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 9 07cv1421 

impairment was not severe (Exhibits 7F, 14F).

Moreover, Dr. Cooper, a board certified opthamologist,

reiterated in January 2006 that Plaintiff’s left eye

visual loss had no physical etiology, Plaintiff’s

signs and findings within normal limits for that eye.

Dr. Cooper thus diagnosed a hysterical loss of left

(eye) vision. However, Dr. Cooper opined no specific

resultant work related limitations aside from

avoidance of hazardous environments (Exhibit 15F).

Plaintiff also developed depression, and began

treatment in November 2004. Dr. Moscona, his

psychologist, opined in January 2005 that Plaintiff

was detached and distracted, disoriented and

depressed. Additional objective testing was

recommended, however, and longitudinal symptoms or

objective pathology are lacking. I thus disagree with

the state agency (Exhibits 10F, 11F) and Dr. Bolter

that the record is insufficient to establish duration,

and that, within 12 months of onset, Plaintiff was

expected to be able to perform simple repetitive tasks

with limited public contact. Indeed, aside from that

January 2005 report the record is absent clinical

reports prior to the consultative examinations ordered

after hearing. (Exhibit 8F).

Following the hearing, Dr. Englehorn, a psychiatrist

opined on the basis of Plaintiff’s examination that

Plaintiff would be able to perform simple repetitive

tasks. However, Dr. Englehorn did identify moderate

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 10 07cv1421 

limitations in several areas of functioning, and

opine(d)(sic) that Plaintiff had psychiatric

disability involving profound depression. Psychiatric

treatment and medication were recommended. Affect was

flat, Plaintiff could not remember his own telephone

number, and global functioning was notably marked by

serious impairment secondary to demonstrated

psychomotor pathology and symptomatology (Exhibit

17F). Dr. Whitehead, a psychologist, similarly opined

that Plaintiff could perform simple repetitive tasks.

However, Dr. Whitehead identified objective pathology

consistent with an ability to respond appropriately to

usual work situations, coworkers, supervisors, the

public, or changes in a routine work setting. Indeed,

memory, mood, affect, concentration, and cognition

were impaired (Exhibit 18F).

After considering the evidence of record, the

undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected

to produce the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s

statements concerning the intensity, duration and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

credible prior to May 1, 2006. For example, as noted

by the medical expert, Plaintiff underwent minimal

treatment and the record was absent ongoing symptoms

or objective signs or findings to corroborate

Plaintiff’s allegations at that time. Moreover, the

consultive examiners opined that Plaintiff would be

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 11 07cv1421 

able to perform simple repetitive tasks. In fact, the

only pertinent evidence of record prior to the onset

is that from Dr. Moscona, who admitted that objective

testing was needed; the state agency and Dr. Bolter

opined that the record was insufficient to establish

duration at that time, and that, within 12 months of

Plaintiff’s November 2004 depressive onset, Plaintiff

was expected to be able to perform simple repetitive

tasks with limited public contact. Nor did Dr.

Moscona opine duration. Further, objective evaluation

of Plaintiff’s left eye has been normal, and Dr.

Cooper merely recommended avoidance of hazardous work

environments on the basis of the claimant’s hysterical

loss of vision. 

6. Since the alleged onset date of disability,

Plaintiff has been unable to perform his past relevant

work as a fishing vessel deckhand or fish packer. So

opined the vocational expert, and I concur and so

find.

7. Plaintiff was born on August 7, 1951, and was

52 years old on the alleged disability onset date,

defined as closely approaching advanced age; he

attained advanced age in August 2006.

8. Plaintiff has a limited education and is not

able to communicate in English.

9. Plaintiff possesses no transferable skills.

10. Prior to May 1, 2006, but not thereafter,

considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work

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 12 07cv1421 

experience, and residual functional capacity, there

were a significant number of jobs in the national

economy that Plaintiff could have performed.

In determining whether a successful adjustment to

other work can be made, the undersigned must consider

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, age,

education, and work experience in connection with the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines. If Plaintiff can

perform all or substantially all of the exertional

demands at a given level of exertion, the medicalvocational rules direct a conclusion of either

“disabled” or “not disabled” depending on Plaintiff’s

specific vocational profile. When Plaintiff cannot

perform substantially all of the exertional demands of

work at a given level of exertion and/or has nonexertional and/or has non-exertional limitations, the

medical vocational rules are used as a framework for

decisionmaking unless there is a rule that directs a

conclusion of “disabled” without considering the

additional exertional and/or nonexertional

limitations. If Plaintiff has solely nonexertional

limitations, section 204.00 in the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines provides a framework for decisionmaking.

Plaintiff’s ability to perform work at all exertional

levels is comprised by nonexertional limitations. To

determine the extent of erosion of the occupational

base of unskilled work at all exertional levels caused

by these limitations, the ALJ asked the vocational

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 13 07cv1421 

expert whether jobs existed in the national economy

for an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education,

work experience, and residual functioning capacity as

determined for the period prior to May 1, 2006. The

vocational expert testified that given all of these

factors the individual would have been able to perform

the requirements of representative occupations such as

janitor (1 million nationally and 9,000 locally); hand

packager (105,000 nationally and 700 locally); and

laundry laborer (118,000 nationally and 1,400

locally). As of May 1, 2006, there are no jobs that

Plaintiff is able to perform in the national economy,

considering his residual functional capacity and

vocational profile.

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the vocational expert’s

testimony is consistent with the information contained

in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the

undersigned concludes that prior to May 1, 2006, but

not thereafter, Plaintiff was capable of making a

successful adjustment to work that existed in

significant numbers in the national economy.

Plaintiff has therefore been disabled since May 1,

2006.

11. Plaintiff was not disabled prior to May 1,

2006, but became disabled on that date and has 

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 14 07cv1421 

 continued to be disabled through the date of this decision.

(Tr. 14-17)(citations omitted)(emphasis in original).

C. The ALJ Did Not Err With Regard to Plaintiff’s Borderline

 Intellectual Functioning

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to review and evaluate

the substantial evidence of Plaintiff’s borderline mental

retardation as a severe mental impairment. Defendant argues that

there is no evidence in the record of Plaintiff’s borderline mental

retardation. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in failing to review

and evaluate any such evidence.

Plaintiff contends that on February 23, 2005, medical

consultant Dr. Edward P. O’Malley (hereafter “Dr. O’Malley”)

reviewed Plaintiff’s entire case file (Tr. 186) and opined that

Plaintiff suffered from affective disorder and mental retardation

(Tr. 189). Dr. O’Malley also noted that Plaintiff’s “significantly

subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in

adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental

period, ie., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the

impairment before age 22.” (Tr. 193). Finally Dr. O’Malley opined

that Plaintiff “can understand, remember, and carry out a two-step

command involving simple instructions,” “can sustain simple

repetitive tasks with adequate pace and persistence,” “can adapt and

relate to coworkers and supervisors,” and “cannot work with the

public.” (Tr. 188).

Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Esther Moscona and

Dr. Lawrence Cooper, Plaintiff’s treating physicians, corroborated

that Plaintiff was “significantly limited” by borderline

intellectual functioning.

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 15 07cv1421 

However, Dr. O’Malley did not opine that Plaintiff had mental

retardation. Dr. O’Malley merely indicated that mental retardation

needed to be ruled out. (Tr. 193). Similarly, Dr. Moscona did not

opine that Plaintiff had mental retardation. Rather, Dr. Moscona

indicated that mental retardation needed to be ruled out. (Tr. 183).

Dr. Moscona also noted that psychological testing was necessary to

adequately assess Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning. (Tr. 180,

183). Further, Dr. Cooper is an opthamologist who did not comment

on Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning.

The only diagnosis of Plaintiff’s borderline intellectual

functioning was the opinion of consultive examiner Dr. Dan Whitehead

(hereafter “Dr. Whitehead”)(Tr. 234). In October 2006, five months

after the date that the ALJ found Plaintiff to be disabled, Dr.

Whitehead examined Plaintiff and concluded that Plaintiff’s overall

intelligence was “in the borderline to low average range,”(Tr. 235),

and that his “ability to understand, carry out and remember simple

instructions, and respond appropriately to coworkers, supervisors

and the public was in the low average to borderline” range. (Tr.

236). Dr. Whitehead did not find that Plaintiff suffered from

mental retardation. Further, Dr. Whitehead opined that Plaintiff

“seems fully capable of performing simple and repetitive tasks.”

(Tr. 236).

Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in

reviewing and evaluating Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning. The

record does not contain any evidence that Plaintiff suffered from

mental retardation. Moreover, the ALJ ordered further expert

opinions regarding Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning to be

obtained prior to his decision. These opinions were obtained and

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1Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard are unclear.

2See footnote 1.

 

 16 07cv1421 

did not conclude nor opine that Plaintiff suffered from mental

retardation. Rather, the opinions of the doctors who further

examined Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff could perform simple

repetitive tasks. Therefore, the Court concludes and RECOMMENDS

that Plaintiff’s Motion in this respect be DENIED and Defendant’s

Cross-Motion in this regard be GRANTED. 

D. The ALJ Did Not Err In Concluding That The Evidence In 

 the Record Did Not Establish Plaintiff’s Disability As 

 Of February 2004

Plaintiff appears to contend1/ that the ALJ’s conclusion that

Plaintiff could perform simple repetitive tasks with minimal public

contact is unsupported by the record. Plaintiff appears to further

contend2/ that evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff was

capable of non-public simple repetitive tasks by November 2005, 15

months after Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date of February

2004. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to show that the ALJ

erred in concluding that the evidence in the record did not

establish Plaintiff’s disability as of February 2004.

The evidence in the record establishes the following:

1. Dr. Moscona, Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, began

seeing Plaintiff on November 16, 2004. (Tr. 185). When Dr. Moscona

last saw Plaintiff in January 2005, she noted that Plaintiff was

emotionally “withdrawn,” (Tr. 181), “will have... difficulty in

functioning adequately,” (Tr. 182), that he suffers from “severe

depression,” (Tr. 183), and that “psychological testing might

clarify (his) level of functioning.” (Tr. 183). The ALJ credited

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 17 07cv1421 

all of Dr. Moscona’s comments and noted that no longitudinal

symptoms nor objective pathology were present in Dr Moscona’s

records pertaining to Plaintiff. (Tr. 15).

2. On July 28, 2006, at the hearing, medical expert Dr.

Sidney Bolter, PhD. (hereafter “Dr. Bolter”) testified that he

reviewed Plaintiff’s psychiatric file. He stated that the files

indicate that the last time Plaintiff saw Dr. Moscona was one and

one-half years before the hearing, that further psychological

testing might clarify Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning, that no

further records from Dr. Moscona are in the record, and that the

record is insufficient to establish symptoms of disability starting

in February 2004, Plaintiff’s alleged disability date. (Tr. 246-

248).

3. On October 17, 2006, Dr. Dan Whitehead (hereafter “Dr.

Whitehead”) stated that he did not review any of Plaintiff’s

psychiatric records. He opined that the results of the tests he

administered to Plaintiff indicated that Plaintiff’s overall

intelligence was “in the borderline to low average range,” and that

Plaintiff is “capable of performing a variety of work activities

that require simple and repetitive tasks. (Tr. 235). His opinion

does not mention the alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s disability.

4. On November 6, 2006, Dr. H. Douglas Englehorn (hereafter

“Dr. Englehorn”) saw Plaintiff for a psychiatric consultation. (Tr.

226). Dr. Englehorn noted that Plaintiff reported that he had “a

two year history of fairly steady levels of depression.” He opined

that Plaintiff is “probably capable of performing simple repetitive

tasks,” and has a “moderate impairment... (relating) to peers and 

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supervisors in the workplace.” (Tr. 228). Dr. Englehorn’s opinion

does not mention the alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s disability.

It is clear from the record that neither Plaintiff’s treating

psychologist, Dr. Moscona, nor any of the consultative psychologists

or psychiatrists, Dr. Bolter, Dr. Whitehead and Dr. Englehorn,

determined that Plaintiff was disabled as of February 2004, the

alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s disability. In fact, Dr. Moscona

opined that further psychological testing was needed to assess

Plaintiff’s level of functioning. Further medical opinions revealed

that Plaintiff was capable of performing simple repetitive tasks in

a non-public setting. Further, it is clear that there is no

evidence in the record that shows that February 2004 was the onset

date for Plaintiff’s disability.

Plaintiff attempts to support his assertion that the onset of

his disability began in February 2004. Plaintiff cites the Notice

of Reconsideration (Tr. 47), and a claim representative’s purported

interpretation of the evidence (Tr. 203). However, Plaintiff’s

reliance on these documents is misplaced. These documents are not

medical evidence of the onset of Plaintiff’s disability. Notably,

on the same day the claim representative purportedly interpreted the

evidence, Dr. O’Malley opined that Plaintiff had few significant

limitations, could understand, remember and carry out two-step

commands involving simple instructions, and could perform repetitive

tasks with adequate pace and persistence, but could not work with

the public. (Tr. 186-188).

As a result of the foregoing, the Court can not conclude that

the ALJ erred in not finding Plaintiff’s disability onset date to be

in February 2004. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that

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Defendant’s Cross-Motion in this regard be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

Motion in this regard be DENIED.

E. Plaintiff Was Not Disabled Under The Medical-Vocational

 Guidelines Or 20 C.F.R. §202.1562

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consult the MedicalVocational Guidelines in finding that Plaintiff was not disabled

from February 2004 to May 2006. Defendant argues that the MedicalVocational Guidelines to which Plaintiff refers are inapplicable.

Once a claimant establishes that he suffers from a severe

impairment that prevents him/her from doing any past work, the

claimant has made a prima facie showing of disability. At this

point, the burden shifts to Defendant to show that the claimant can

perform some other work that exists in “significant numbers” in the

national economy, taking into consideration the claimant’s residual

functional capacity, age, education and work experience. Tackett v.

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999), 20 C.F.R. §

404.1560(b)(3). There are two ways for Defendant to meet the burden

of showing that there is other work in “significant numbers” in the

national economy that a claimant can perform: (a) by the testimony

of a vocational expert, or (b) by reference to the MedicalVocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subt. P, app. 2. Id. at

1101, citing Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Services, 846

F.2d 573, 577-578 (9th Cir. 1988)(emphasis added).

In some cases, the ALJ may rely on the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines to determine whether a claimant can perform work that

exists in “significant numbers” in the national economy. The

Medical-Vocational Guidelines are a grid system for assessing claims

that involve substantially uniform levels of impairment. The

Guidelines may be used where they completely and accurately

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3Medical-Vocational Guideline Rule 201.00(g) states in pertinent part:

“Individuals approaching advanced age (age 50-54) may be significantly limited in

vocational adaptability if they are restricted to sedentary work. When such

individuals have no past work experience or can no longer perform vocationally

relevant past work and have no transferable skills, a finding of disability

ordinarily obtains...”

4Medical-Vocational Guideline Rule 202.00(d) states in pertinent part:

Maximum sustained work capability limited to light work as a result of severe

medically determinable impairment(s). “... where age, though not advanced, is a

factor which significantly limits vocational adaptability, an individual’s

vocational scope is further significantly limited by... inability to communicate

in English, a finding of disability is warranted...

5Guideline Medical-Vocational Guideline Rule 203.00(b) states in pertinent

part: : “an individual who (1) has marginal education, (2) has work experience of

35 years or more during which he or she did only arduous unskilled physical labor,

(3) is not working, and (4) is no longer able to do this kind of work because of

severe impairment(s) is disabled.

620 C.F.R. §404.1562(a) states in pertinent part: “If you have more than a

marginal education and work experience of 35 years or more during which you did

only arduous unskilled physical labor, and you are not working and are no longer

able to do this kind of work because of severe impairments,... we will consider

you unable to do lighter work, and therefore, disabled.

 

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represent a claimant’s limitations. Tackett, supra, at 1101-1102. “A

non-exertional impairment, if sufficiently severe, may limit the

claimant’s functional capacity in way not contemplated by the

Guidelines. In such a case, the Guidelines would be inapplicable.

Desrosiers, supra, at 577.

Here, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to consult

Medical-Vocational Guidelines, Rule 201.00(g)3/, 202.00(d)4/,

203.00(b)5/ and 20 C.F.R. 404.15626/.

Plaintiff argues that under Medical-Vocational Guidelines,

Rule 201.00(g), the ALJ should have found him to be disabled.

However, Rule 201.00(g) refers to a claimant that is restricted to

sedentary work. The evidence in the record reflects that Plaintiff

was not restricted to sedentary work. Instead, the record reflects

that Plaintiff’s impairments were monocular vision and depression,

neither of which require him to be restricted to sedentary work.

This Rule does not completely and accurately represent Plaintiff’s

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limitations. Therefore, Rule 201.00(g) is inapplicable to

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues that under Medical-Vocational Guidelines,

Rule 202.00(d), the ALJ should have found him to be disabled.

However, Rule 202.00(d) applies to a claimant who has been

exertionally limited to light work. The evidence in the record

reflects that Plaintiff was not restricted to light work. Instead,

the record reflects that Plaintiff’s impairments were monocular

vision and depression, neither of which require him to be restricted

to light work. This Rule does not completely and accurately

represent Plaintiff’s limitations. Therefore, Rule 202.00(d) is

inapplicable to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues that under Medical-Vocational Guidelines,

Rule 203.00(b) and 20 CF.R. §404.1562, the ALJ should have found him

to be disabled. However, Rule 203.00(b) and 20 C.F.R. §404.1562

apply to a claimant who has been exertionally limited to medium

work, who has had more than 35 years experience in arduous unskilled

labor. The evidence in the record reflects that Plaintiff’s

impairments did not require him to be restricted to medium work or

that he had 35 or more years experience of arduous unskilled labor.

This Rule and 20 CF.R. §404.1562 do not completely and accurately

represent Plaintiff’s limitations. Therefore, Rule 203.00(b) and 20

CF.R. §404.1562 are inapplicable to Plaintiff.

Moreover, the ALJ is not required to consult the MedicalVocational Guidelines. Instead, the ALJ can seek vocational expert

testimony. Tackett, supra at 1101. That is exactly what the ALJ did

in this case. (See Tr. 250-255).

Consequently, the Court can not conclude that the ALJ erred

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in failing to consult the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, as argued

by Plaintiff. As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s

Cross-Motion in this regard be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion in

this regard be DENIED.

F. The ALJ Erred in Relying On Vocational Expert Testimony

 Without Establishing That The Testimony Was Consistent 

 With the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on expert

vocational testimony regarding what jobs Plaintiff could perform

because he did not establish that the evidence was consistent with

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (hereafter “DOT”). Defendant

asserts that Plaintiff fails to show that the vocational expert’s

testimony was inconsistent with the DOT.

Once the ALJ decides that a claimant cannot return to his

former job, the ALJ must identify specific jobs existing in

substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant can

perform, despite his identified limitations. A vocational expert

witness may be required to identify jobs that match the abilities of

the claimant, given his limitations. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d

1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)

Social Security Ruling 00-4p (hereafter “SSR 00-4p”) states

in pertinent part that “(w)hen a (vocational expert)...provides

evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the

adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any

possible conflict between that (vocational expert)... evidence and

information provided in the (DOT).”(emphasis added)

SSR 00-4p further provides that the adjudicator “will ask”

the vocational expert “if the evidence he or she has provided is

consistent with the (DOT) and obtain a reasonable explanation for

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and visual measurement of distances. MedicineNet.com

 

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any apparent conflict.” SSR 00-4p at *4 (emphasis added), Massachi

v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007).

An ALJ may rely on expert testimony which contradicts the

DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to

support the deviation. Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435.

The procedural requirements of SSR 00-4p ensure

that the record is clear as to why an ALJ relied on

a vocational expert’s testimony, particularly in

cases where the expert’s testimony conflicts with the

(DOT)... (T)he Social Security Administration relies

primarily on the (DOT) for ‘information about the

requirements of work in the national economy.’ The

Social Security Administration also uses testimony

from vocational experts to obtain occupational

evidence. Although evidence provided by a vocational

expert ‘generally should be consistent’ with the

(DOT), neither the (DOT) nor the (vocational

expert)... evidence automatically ‘trumps when there

is a conflict.’ Thus, the ALJ must first determine

whether a conflict exists. If it does, the ALJ must

then determine whether the vocational expert’s

explanation for the conflict is reasonable and

whether a basis exists for relying on the expert

rather that the (DOT).

Massachi, 406 F.3d at 1153 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

1. Janitor

 Mark Remas, the vocational expert testified, and the ALJ

found, that Plaintiff could perform the work of a Janitor. (Tr. 253-

254, 17). The ALJ found that, “(P)ursuant to SSR 00-4p, the

vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with the information

contained in the DOT.” (Tr. 17). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff

was blind in his right eye (Tr. 14), and acknowledged that Plaintiff

had monocular vision and was limited by the fact that he does not

have depth perception7/. (Tr. 253). However, the ALJ did not ask the

vocational expert about any possible conflict between his testimony

and the evidence provided by the DOT. Had the ALJ asked about a

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conflict, or reviewed the DOT’s description of a Janitor, he would

have found that depth perception is required to perform the job of

a Janitor. (DOT § 382.664-010). Therefore, Plaintiff would not be

able to perform this job. As a result, there is a conflict between

the vocational expert’s testimony and the evidence provided by the

DOT. The ALJ failed to discharge his duties pursuant to SSR 00-4p.

Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not able to

communicate in English. (Tr. 16). However, the DOT describes a

Janitor to be able to read safety rules and instructions in the use

and maintenance of shop tools and equipment, write reports and essays

with proper format, punctuation, spelling and grammar using all parts

of speech, and speak before an audience with poise, voice control and

confidence using correct English. Had the ALJ asked about a conflict

or reviewed the DOT evidence, he would have found that the

requirements of a Janitor contain language and reading requirements.

The Court finds that there is a conflict between the

vocational expert’s testimony and the evidence provided by the DOT

Further, the ALJ’s decision does not comport with his own findings

and evidence presented in the record.

The ALJ did not ask the vocational expert about any possible

conflict between his testimony and the evidence provided by the DOT.

Consequently, the ALJ did not discharge his duties pursuant to SSR

00-4p. Therefore, in light of the record presented, the Court finds

that Plaintiff’s lack of depth perception and his inability to

communicate in English make it impossible to him to perform the work

of a Janitor.

2. Hand Packager

The vocational expert testified, and the ALJ found, that

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Plaintiff could perform the work of a Hand Packager. However, the ALJ

did not ask the vocational expert about any conflicts between his

testimony and the evidence presented in the DOT.

Specifically, had the ALJ asked the vocational expert about

any conflicts, or reviewed the DOT’s evidence of the requirements for

a Hand Packager, he would have found that the position requires the

recognition of the meaning of 2,500 two- or three- syllable words and

reading at 95-120 words per minute. Further, the ALJ would have

found that a Hand Packager must be able to speak simple sentences

using normal word order and present and past tenses. Additionally,

the ALJ would have found that a Hand Packager must have depth

perception. (DOT § 920.587-018).

As noted above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to

communicate in English and acknowledged that Plaintiff does not have

depth perception. Therefore, the Court finds that there is a

conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the evidence

provided by the DOT. Further, the ALJ’s decision does not appear to

comport with his own findings and the evidence presented in the

record. 

The ALJ did not ask the vocational expert about any possible

conflict between his testimony and the evidence provided by the DOT.

Consequently, the ALJ did not discharge his duties pursuant to SSR

00-4p. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s inability to

communicate in English and his lack of depth perception make it

impossible for him to perform the work of a Hand Packager.

3. Laundry Worker

The vocational expert testified, and the ALJ found, that

Plaintiff could perform the work of a Laundry Worker. However, the

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ALJ did not ask the vocational expert about any conflicts between his

testimony and the evidence presented in the DOT. Specifically, had

the ALJ asked the vocational expert about any conflicts, or reviewed

the DOT’s evidence of the requirements for a Laundry Worker, he would

have found that the position requires the recognition of the meaning

of 2,500 two- or three- syllable words and reading at a rate of 95-

120 words per minute. (DOT § 361.684-014)

As noted above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not able to

communicate in English. Therefore, the Court finds that there is a

conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the evidence

provided by the DOT. Further, the ALJ’s decision does not appear to

comport with his own findings and with the evidence presented in the

record. 

The ALJ did not ask the vocational expert about any possible

conflict between his testimony and the evidence provided by the DOT.

Consequently, the ALJ did not discharge his duties pursuant to SSR

00-4p. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s inability to

communicate in English make it impossible for him to perform the work

of a Laundry Worker.

As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion in

this regard be GRANTED and Defendant’s Cross-Motion in this regard

be DENIED. Further, the Court RECOMMENDS that this case be REMANDED

to the ALJ so he can discharge his duties pursuant to SSR 00-4p.

G. The ALJ Did Not Err With Regard To the Opinions of 

 Dr. Moscona and Dr. Cooper

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred because he did not

“expressly state clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting the

opinions of Dr. Moscona and Dr. Cooper, Plaintiff’s treating

physicians. Defendant argues that the ALJ did not reject the

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opinions of Dr. Moscona and Dr. Cooper. Therefore, the ALJ did not

need to state clear and convincing reasons for any such rejection.

Medical opinions of a claimant’s treating physicians are

entitled to special weight and, if the ALJ disregards those opinions,

“he must set forth specific legitimate reasons for doing so, and this

decision must itself be based on substantial evidence.” Embrey v.

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799

F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).

A treating physician’s medical opinion as to the nature and

severity of an individual’s impairment must be given controlling

weight if that opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with

the other substantial evidence in the record. Edlund v. Massanari,

253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001).

1. Dr. Moscona

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to state clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting Dr. Moscona’s Global Assessment

Functioning (hereafter “GAF”) score of 32 for Plaintiff. However,

Dr. Moscona did not opine on Plaintiff’s GAF. In fact, Dr. Moscona

commented that “(p)sychological testing might clarify (Plaintiff’s)

level of functioning.” (Tr. 180, 183). Accordingly, the ALJ noted

that “longitudinal symptoms and objective pathology are lacking” from

Dr. Moscona’s records regarding Plaintiff and “the record is absent

clinical reports prior to the consultive examinations ordered after

hearing...” (Tr. 15). Therefore, the Court can not conclude that the

ALJ failed to state clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Dr.

Moscona’s GAF score of 32 for Plaintiff because Dr. Moscona did not

opine on Plaintiff’s GAF.

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2. Dr. Cooper

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to state clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting Dr. Cooper’s opinion regarding

Plaintiff’s limitations. Dr. Cooper opined that “(i)f not for the

loss of (Plaintiff’s) right eye (enucleation) there would be no

reason he would not have been able to continue working as a crew

member,” and “(t)he dysfunctionality of the vision in (Plaintiff’s)

left eye would render him incompetent to function safely whilst being

around dangerous equipment and would be a recipe for further

accidents.” (Tr. 215). The ALJ agreed with Dr. Cooper by finding,

“(s)ince the alleged onset date of disability, (Plaintiff) has been

unable to perform his past relevant work as a fishing vessel deck

hand or fish packer.” (Tr. 16). Therefore, the ALJ did not reject

Dr. Cooper’s opinion of Plaintiff’s limitation. Consequently, the

ALJ did not need to state clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

Dr. Cooper’s opinion.

As a result, the Court can not conclude that the ALJ erred

with regard to the opinions of Dr. Moscona and Dr. Cooper.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion in this

regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Cross-Motion in this regard be

GRANTED. 

 VI

CONCLUSION

The Court has found that most of the arguments presented in

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment are unsupported by the record

in this case. However, the Court has found that conflicts exist

between the vocational expert’s testimony and the evidence provided

by the DOT. Additionally, the Court has found that evidence in the

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record shows that Plaintiff does not have depth perception and is

unable to communicate in English. Therefore, he would be unable to

perform the work of the occupations suggested by the vocational

expert and found by the ALJ. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the

case be REMANDED to the ALJ so that he can discharge his duties

pursuant to SSR 00-4p. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 19, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

June 18, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

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those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 19, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:07-cv-01421-WQH-WVG Document 34 Filed 04/19/10 Page 30 of 30