Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04656/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04656-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IDENTITY ARTS, a California Limited

Liability Company,

Plaintiff, No. C 05-4656 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

BEST BUY ENTERPRISE SERVICES 

INC., a Minnesota Corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Before the court is defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to

Section 505 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 505. Having carefully reviewed the

parties’ papers and considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good

cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion, for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

This action stems from a dispute over faux movie trailers. On November 14, 2005,

plaintiff Identity Arts (“Identity Arts”) filed the instant action against Best Buy Enterprise

Services, Inc. and Best Buy Co. (collectively “Best Buy”), alleging that Best Buy had

created unauthorized faux movie trailers that infringed Identity Art’s own copyrighted trailer. 

The faux trailers, which are shown in movie theaters prior to the commencement of feature

films, serve as public service announcements that encourage movie patrons to turn off their

cell phones. 

In the original November 2005 complaint, Identity Arts asserted five causes of action

against Best Buy: (1) direct copyright infringement; (2) vicarious copyright infringement; (3)

contributory copyright infringement; (4) unfair competition under California Business &

Professions Code §17200; and (5) unjust enrichment. See generally Complaint for

Damages and Injunctive Relief for Copyright infringement, Unfair Competition, and Unjust

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Enrichment (“Complaint”). On February 10, 2006, the court issued an order denying

plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiff lacked standing due to

failure to properly register the works in question, and that plaintiff could not demonstrate a

likelihood of success on the merits of its infringement claim. See Order Denying Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (“February 10, 2006 Order”). Subsequently, on February 21, 2006,

the court granted the Best Buy defendants’ motion to dismiss Identity Arts’ fourth and fifth

causes of action alleging state law claims, with leave to amend. 

On June 16, 2006, Identity Arts filed its second amended complaint. See generally

Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief for Copyright infringement,

Unfair Competition, and Unjust Enrichment (“SAC”). The SAC alleged the same causes of

action as those alleged in the original complaint, but added one new state law claim

alleging breach of implied contract (for a total of six causes of action), based on new

allegations regarding a marketing strategy that Identity Arts contended it disclosed to Best

Buy during negotiations over the agreement between the parties. See SAC, ¶¶ 78-173. 

Best Buy moved for judgment on the pleadings as to all causes of action in plaintiff’s

second amended complaint. On April 18, 2007, the court granted defendants’ motion as to

all three copyright infringement claims and two of the three state law claims, leaving only

the breach of implied contract claim (or Desny claim) for continued adjudication. See

generally Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motions for Judgment on

the Pleadings (“April 18, 2007 Order”). The court subsequently entered judgment on the

copyright claims pursuant to Rule 54(b), allowing plaintiff to appeal the court’s decision

granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court also stayed the

proceedings regarding the remaining breach of implied contract claim pending plaintiff’s

appeal.

On August 31, 2007, Best Buy moved to recover $130,779 in attorney’s fees and

costs incurred in defending the copyright claims, pursuant to Section 505 of the Copyright

Act. On October 23, 2007, after reviewing the parties’ submissions in connection with the

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motion, the court ordered defendants to submit further documentation in support of the

reasonableness of the fee amount sought, as well as additional detail with respect to the

cost amounts sought. The parties’ supplemental briefing is now complete, and defendants’

motion for attorney’s fees and costs is now properly before the court.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Section 505 of the Copyright Act provides: “In any civil action under this title, the

court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than

the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court

may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17

U.S.C. § 505. Fees should be awarded to a prevailing defendant where a successful

defense furthers the policies underlying the Copyright Act, irrespective of plaintiff’s

culpability. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1994)(“Fogarty I”). The Ninth

Circuit has identified certain non-exclusive factors to guide courts’ discretion, so long as

those factors are faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act and are evenhandedly

applied. Those factors are: the degree of success obtained; objective reasonableness of

factual and legal arguments; frivolousness; motivation; and need for compensation and

deterrence. Ultimately, “[f]aithfulness to the purposes of the Copyright Act is . . . the pivotal

criterion.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1996)(“Fogarty II”).

Once a court determines that fees are warranted under the Copyright Act, it must

determine the reasonable value of the work performed. Traditional Cat Ass'n v. Gilbreath,

340 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2003). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the

appropriate hours expended and the hourly rates. Fantasy Inc. v. Fogerty, No. C 85-4929-

SC, 1995 WL 261504, at *2 (N.D.Cal. May 2, 1995)(“Fogerty III”). 

The court begins by calculating the lodestar, or, "the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 433 (1980); see also Ackerman, 643 F. Supp. at 860. The party seeking

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attorneys' fees bears the burden of producing evidence supporting the hours worked and a

reasonable rate; the district court may reduce the award accordingly if insufficient evidence

is produced. Id. The district court may also exclude compensation for time that was "not

reasonably expended" in the case. Id. at 434 (court may deny compensation for "hours

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary"). 

In determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, this circuit generally balances

the following twelve factors: (1) The time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the

customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the

client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11)

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases. Id. at *8-9 (citing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.

1975)). However, not all factors are always relevant in determining whether an award is

reasonable. Id. Reasonable hourly rates are based on prevailing market rates in the

relevant community for counsel with similar experience. See, e.g., Fogerty III, 1995 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 6197, *12.

If a party is entitled to attorney's fees as a prevailing party on a particular copyright

claim, but not on other claims in the same lawsuit, the party can only recover attorney's

fees incurred in defending against that one claim or any related claims. Traditional Cat

Ass’n, 340 F.3d at 833. The “first step in the calculation of a reasonable attorney's fee in

the present case should have been to decide if the copyright and non-copyright claims are

related.” The district court then must make an attempt to apportion fees between the

copyright and non-copyright claims. In doing so, the court should consider what the case is

about and what part the copyright claims played in the overall makeup of the case,

although there is no precise formula for making such determinations. Id. at 833-34.

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B. Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees

A determination whether to grant Best Buy’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs

depends on resolution of two overriding issues: (1) whether an award of attorneys’ fees

and costs is preliminarily warranted under section 505 of the Copyright Act; and (2)

whether, if so, the amount of attorney’s fees and costs requested here are reasonable. 

1. Award of Fees and Costs Under Section 505 of the Copyright Act

As the parties correctly acknowledge, the Ninth Circuit has embraced certain factors

for use as a guide in determining whether an award of fees is appropriate under section

505, so long as these factors are consistent with the underlying purposes of the Copyright

Act. Fogerty II, 94 F.3d at 558-59 (citing Fogerty I, 510 U.S. 517). Here, the relevant

factors are: (a) purposes of the Copyright Act; (b) degree of success obtained; (c) objective

unreasonableness of factual and legal issues; (d) motivation; and (e) need to advance

considerations of compensation and deterrence. See Fogerty II, 94 F.3d at 557 n.2; id. at

560 (finding frivolousness element no longer required as component of fee award); see

also Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir.

1996); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986). 

Each factor is discussed below. 

a. purposes of Copyright Act

The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that a successful defense of a copyright

infringement action “may further the policies of the Copyright Act every bit as much as a

successful prosecution of an infringement claim by the holder of a copyright.” Fogerty II, 94

F.3d at 559. This is because a successful defense may serve the purpose of enlarging the

public domain, thereby increasing the likelihood of further creativity. See Fantasy, 94 F.3d

at 559 (citing Fogerty I, 510 U.S. at 526-27)(finding that purposes of Copyright Act were

satisfied where defense of underlying copyright action “increased public exposure to a

musical work that could, as a result, lead to further creative pieces”); see also, e.g.,

Gonzales v. Transfer Techs., Inc., 301 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2002)(“The [Supreme Court] in

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Fogerty reasoned that copyright defenses are as important as copyright claims (a

successful defense enlarges the public domain, an important resource for creators of

expressive works . . . .”)). 

Here, this court has already noted that the plaintiff sought multiple times to “define[]

the scope of copyright protection too broadly,” and that plaintiff “impermissibly [sought]

protection for the general idea, or concept, of a faux movie trailer whose true nature is a

cell phone courtesy message, instead of seeking protection for plaintiff’s own expression of

the same idea.” See April 18, 2007 Order at 24:24-26. Best Buy’s successful defense,

therefore, secured the public’s access to the genre of cell phone courtesy messages in the

form of faux movie trailers, and paved the way for the creation of future works belonging to

this genre. This result furthers the purposes of the Copyright Act in the same manner

contemplated by the Ninth Circuit in Fogerty II. See 94 F.3d at 556.

Plaintiff argues that a contrary conclusion is warranted because defendants modeled

their faux movie trailers on plaintiff’s protected work, and thereby engaged in a

questionable business practice. For support, plaintiff invokes Berkla v. Corel Corp. See

302 F.3d 909, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). This reliance on Berkla is misplaced. It is true enough

that Berkla affirmed a denial of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 505 on grounds that

such an award would not be consistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act. However,

this conclusion was reached because the defendant’s use of the plaintiff's nozzles to model

its own works constituted an improper appropriation of the plaintiff’s products, as found by

the jury in the underlying case. See id. The jury’s findings furthermore constituted findings

of “maliciousness or oppressiveness or fraud” – which the defendant did not contest. Id. 

There are no comparable findings at issue in this case. Moreover, as the court previously

concluded, Best Buy’s own faux movie trailers were also premised on a contractual

provision in the contract between plaintiff and defendants that allowed Best Buy to make its

own faux movie trailers. See April 18, 2007 Order at 28-30. 

In sum, this factor weighs in favor of an award of attorney’s fees and costs. 

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b. degree of success obtained

 Best Buy prevailed on plaintiff’s copyright claims on at least two occasions: (1) in

connection with the court’s February 10, 2006 denial of plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

injunction; and (2) in connection with the court’s April 18, 2007 Order. In both orders, the

court concluded that there was an absence of substantial similarity under the extrinsic test,

and that Best Buy was furthermore authorized to create the works in question based on the

parties’ agreement. The court’s findings on both occasions are unequivocal, and compel

the conclusion that Best Buy achieved a high degree of success in pursuing its copyright

defense. Plaintiff, moreover, does not contest this factor. 

Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of awarding fees to Best Buy.

c. objective reasonableness

This factor requires the court to consider the objective unreasonableness of a party’s

claims, “both in the factual and in the legal components of the case.” See, e.g., Perfect 10,

Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1120 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants point to several

aspects of plaintiff’s case that they claim demonstrate objective unreasonableness. 

Ultimately, and for the reasons discussed below, the court agrees with defendants. 

First, plaintiff’s failure to properly register its original copyrighted work before

bringing suit suggests unreasonableness. As the court found in its February 2006 order

denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff lacked standing to bring its

copyright infringement claim, because Identity Arts had failed to register the original works

in question in compliance with a well-established jurisdictional prerequisite under the

Copyright Act. See February 10, 2006 Order at 6-7. Indeed, Identity Arts never even

sought to do so until well after the filing of the original complaint and after the court’s

preliminary injunction order, and only in connection with its second amended complaint. 

Even then, however, the court found no clear authority authorizing plaintiff to register its

work after the filing of its original complaint, and then subsequently amend its complaint to

relate back to the date of the work’s registration. Rather, the court simply found that, while

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1 Defendants also point to additional components of plaintiff’s case that they assert

should be viewed as objectively unreasonable – e.g., plaintiff’s repeat attempts to gain

copyright protection based on works that the court twice held to lack substantial similarity, and

plaintiff’s improper request for statutory and punitive damages under the Copyright Act. In

view of the foregoing discussion, the court finds it unnecessary to rely on these additional

factors. The court does note, however, that plaintiff did not contest these points, effectively

conceding them. 

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a jurisdictional defect continued to exist, the court would hold such defect cured, since

requiring plaintiff to re-file a new action would be judicially inefficient, in view of the lack of

prejudice to defendants. In sum, the court finds plaintiff’s failure to properly register the

alleged copyrighted work in question suggestive of objective unreasonableness, even if not

conclusive on the matter, since the court subsequently allowed plaintiff to cure its failure. 

Defendants also correctly point, however, to the licensing agreement between

Identity Arts and Best Buy, as further evidence of objective unreasonableness. As the

court held in ruling on Best Buy’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the license

agreement – whose validity plaintiff conceded – is “explicit on its face” and expressly grants

Best Buy the right to produce its own faux movie trailer commercials. See April 18, 2007

Order at 28-29. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the provision of the agreement granting

defendants the right to produce their own faux movie trailers, is not susceptible of any other

reasonable interpretation. Indeed, the court itself held as much, when it previously ruled

that the agreement’s grant of authority was “express and unambiguous.” See id. at 30. In

view of this clear grant of authority, the court finds that Identity Arts’ lawsuit alleging

copyright infringement was objectively unreasonable – both from a factual perspective and

a legal perspective. 

In sum, therefore, the court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of an award of

attorney’s fees and costs.1 

d. motivation

This factor tips in favor of an award of attorneys’ fees where it is demonstrated that a

plaintiff’s motivation in alleging copyright claims is to secure benefits other than merely

redressing grievances – i.e., where plaintiff has an improper motivation. See, e.g., Maljack

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Prods., 81 F.3d at 889 (finding that motivation factor properly supported grant of attorney

fee award to defendant where evidence demonstrated that plaintiff had brought lawsuit in

effort to expose defendant to risk and to “secure a competitive advantage in the market” for

plaintiff). Here, defendants contend that plaintiff’s improper motivation is present, by virtue

of plaintiff’s “broad and unprecedented assertion of purported copyright over ideas, genres

and cinematic techniques in the public forum.” See Mot. ISO Atty. Fee and Costs at 13:15-

17. 

Defendants have not persuaded the court on this point. They have introduced no

evidence that plaintiff brought this action in bad faith or to harass Best Buy, or even that

plaintiff brought this action out of a desire to secure a competitive advantage in the market. 

Defendants rely on the court’s April 18, 2007 Order for proof of the contrary, but the court’s

ruling that plaintiff defined the scope of copyright protection too broadly is not synonymous

with a finding that plaintiff’s motivation in bringing suit in the first place was improper (even

if ill-advised). 

Accordingly, this factor weighs against an award of attorney’s fees.

e. Need for Compensation and Deterrence

Defendants contend that their successful defense of the instant case warrants

compensation in the form of attorney’s fees and costs, and that an award of fees will deter

others from attempting to assert monopolies over general ideas based on unreasonable

factual and/or legal positions. Plaintiff, by contrast, contends that it maintained a

meritorious claim for infringement throughout the litigation, and that even if defendants

didn’t technically violate the Copyright Act, their actions constituted a questionable

business practice – thereby obviating any considerations of need for compensation and

deterrence. 

On balance, this factor weighs in defendants’ favor. Defendants’ successful defense

of the action, in the face of objectively unreasonable factual and legal circumstances (e.g.,

the agreement’s explicit grant to defendants of the right to make faux movie trailers),

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2 In its supplemental documentation, Best Buy notes that its finalized billing

records reflect total fees in the amount of $155,358.00 – a higher amount than the $154,

409.00 in total fees originally sought – as well as a lesser total fee amount to cover the time

spent by Mr. Martinez working on the case. Best Buy also notes, however, that it is not

seeking to recover the additional total fee amount, and also waives its claim to the higher fee

amount including time spent by Mr. Martinez. Accordingly, Best Buy continues to seek $123,527 in total (representing 80% of the total $154,409.00 incurred, in order to account

solely for copyright claims).

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warrants compensation. Moreover, in view of the agreement’s existence, and plaintiff’s

improper attempt to seek protection over general ideas and plots, a fee award would also

aid in deterring other would-be plaintiffs from prosecuting any similarly ill-advised and

meritless claims for copyright infringement. Finally, despite Identity Arts’ contention that

this factor does tip in favor of attorney’s fees, due to defendants’ questionable business

practices, plaintiff has failed to actually establish any questionable business practice, in

view of the court’s finding that defendants were authorized to produce their own faux movie

trailers. 

In sum, then, this factor, as well as all of the above, generally tip in favor of an award

of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 505 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §

505 (court may allow for grant of “full costs” as well as “reasonable attorney’s fee”). The

court therefore finds that an award of attorney’s fees and costs are warranted. 

2. Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees and Costs Sought

Having determined that attorney’s fees and costs are warranted under section 505,

the only remaining issue for the court is whether the fees and costs requested–

$123,527.00 in fees2 and $7,252.14 in costs – are reasonable. 

a. fees

Defendants have submitted the declarations of Robert Hinton, David Martinez and

Peter Haviland in support of their fee request, as supplemented by the follow-up declaration

of David Martinez. See generally Declarations of Robert F. Hinton, David Martinez and

Peter L. Haviland ISO Motion for Atty’s Fees and Costs (“Original Decl.”); Supplemental

Declaration ISO Motion for Atty’s Fees and Costs (“Supp. Decl.”). The court has reviewed

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this evidence and finds that the number of hours expended on the litigation is reasonable,

the hourly rate is reasonable, and the requested fees are reasonable. See Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1980). 

Preliminarily, the submitted declarations set forth the following: Mr. Hinton, lead

counsel on the case, billed over 103 hours at a rate of $460 to $500 in 2006-2007; Mr.

Covelman billed 77.9 hours at a rate of $310/hour; and Mr. David Martinez billed 224.6

hours at $360-390/hour. See Original Decl. ¶¶ 17-23; Supp. Decl. ¶ 3. All fees were billed

in all aspects of the case, including “case investigation, analysis and strategy, document

review, review and analysis of all pleadings, discovery and memoranda,” etc. See

generally Original Decl. Collectively, defendants’ fees total $154,409. However,

defendants discounted 20% of these fees, estimating that copyright claims constituted only

80% of all work litigated, making the final fees sought $123,527. 

The court finds the amount of time spent litigating the case – i.e., a total of more

than 405 hours – to be reasonable. The parties conducted investigation and discovery,

participated in a motion for preliminary injunction, a motion to dismiss, motions for

judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for entry of judgment, over the course of

approximately two years. Moreover, Best Buy has properly reduced the fee amount sought

here by 20% – an approximation that the court further finds reasonable, as it agrees with

defendants that the copyright claims presented in the underlying action presented the vast

majority of the issues litigated before the court. See, e.g., Traditional Cat Ass’n, 340 F.3d

at 833 (“a party entitled to attorney’s fees as a prevailing party on a particular [copy-right]

claim, but not on other claims in the same lawsuit, can only recover attorney’s fees incurred

in defending against that one claim or any ‘related claims.’”). 

The court also finds the hourly rates charged by counsel to be reasonable. Best Buy

has submitted a survey from Pricewaterhouse Coopers demonstrating that defense

counsels’ billing rates are comparable with, or even lower than, rates of other comparable

firms in Los Angeles. See Original Decl., ¶ 30, Ex. A. Accordingly, Best Buy’s rates are

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within market rates in Los Angeles, the market in which Best Buy’s counsel practice. 

Plaintiff, after combing through defendants’ billing record exhibit, raises several

objections to the fee amounts requested by defendants, including: (a) that hours spent at

hearings in this case are overstated; (b) that 18.1 hours claimed by Mr. Covelman in

drafting a case analysis and strategy memorandum after defendants’ answer was filed,

were unreasonable; (c) that 92.95 hours spent on the motion for judgment on the pleadings

was excessive and unreasonable; (d) that 22.55 hours spent on discovery was

unreasonable; (e) that 47.1 hours spent on drafting defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees

was unreasonable; and (f) that 0.2 hours spent performing administrative work was also

unreasonable. Plaintiff requests that Best Buy’s attorney’s fees be reduced accordingly. 

The majority of plaintiff’s objections are unpersuasive. Plaintiff has provided no

evidence or convincing argument, for example, that suggests that the 18.1 hours spent by

Mr. Covleman in drafting a case analysis and strategy memorandum were unreasonable. 

To the contrary, the court finds the opposite to be true, particularly since the preparation of

a case analysis and strategy memorandum for a client serves a legitimate and important

purpose in streamlining further aspects of the case. Moreover, the mere fact that the

memorandum may have occurred after defendants had submitted their answer adds

nothing to plaintiff’s argument, for the litigation continued after defendants filed their

answer, thereby implicating continued litigation tactics and strategy concerns. 

The court is also unable to conclude that 92.95 hours spent in preparing defendants’

motion for judgment on the pleadings was unreasonable. Given the thoroughness and

significance of this motion to the litigation, its dispositive effect on all but the Desny claim,

and the fact that the total hours claimed encompassed the drafting of the motion, review of

plaintiff’s opposition, and the drafting of defendants’ reply brief, the amount of time spent on

the motion was reasonable. See Supp. Decl., Ex. A at 7-10. Similarly, 22.5 hours spent on

discovery is not unreasonable. Plaintiff claims that time spent for discovery should

nonetheless be discounted, because the discovery was ultimately rendered moot, in view of

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the court’s ruling on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, there is

no basis upon which to conclude that a reduction in defendants’ fee award is appropriate,

just because necessary work that was undertaken in well-founded anticipation of continued

litigation, ultimately becomes unnecessary. Finally, the 0.2 hours that was spent by

counsel in filing a stipulation and calendaring a new response date, was also reasonable. 

Plaintiff asserts that such “administrative work” should have been performed by a paralegal

or secretary, not counsel. However, while paralegals and secretaries routinely perform

such work, the filing of a stipulation with the court, as well as calendaring, are ultimately the

responsibility of counsel, and the court declines to penalize counsel for having properly

performed tasks for which they are ultimately responsible. In sum, therefore, the court

overrules plaintiff’s objections to all the foregoing items. 

With respect to plaintiff’s objections regarding items (a) and (e), however, the court

finds that some adjustment to the amount of fees sought is necessary. Item (a) refers to

the 6.00 hours that Mr. Hinton claimed for attendance at the January 18, 2006 hearing on

plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, as well as the 3.65 hours that Mr. Hinton claimed

for attendance at the February 15, 2006 hearing on Best Buy’s motion to dismiss. See

Supp. Decl., Ex. A at 2. The court finds that 6.00 hours claimed for attendance at the

hearing is unreasonable, particularly in view of the fact that the court’s civil law and motion

calendar rarely extends to a 6 hour period, and because travel time has not been claimed. 

Accordingly, the court will reduce any award for time spent attending the January 18

hearing by 3.00 hours. As for the 3.65 hours that Mr. Hinton spent at the February 15

hearing, the court will also reduce any award by .65 hours, for a total of 3.00 hours. As a

result, the fees sought in connection with these two hearings will be reduced by $1,679.00. 

Item (e), by contrast, refers to the 47.1 hours spent on the instant motion for

attorney’s fees, to which plaintiff objects. This is typically referred to as “fees upon fees.” 

Defendants have requested fees upon fees in the amount of $20,777.00 (this amount is

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3 Plaintiff’s opposition claims that the 47.1 hours spent on the attorney’s fee motion corresponds with $18,604.50. However, the court’s own review of the billing entries and

records discloses that defendants spent an actual total of 52.6 hours on the motion and are seeking a total of $20,777.00 in associated fees, not including any fees spent in drafting the

reply. Accordingly, the court utilizes this latter fee amount, premised on the 52.6 hours

recorded in defendants’ billing records. 

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included in the $123,527 fee award sought).3 See Supp. Decl., Ex. A at 15-16. In addition

to this amount, Best Buy also seeks an additional $3,950.00 in fees incurred in preparing

the reply brief for the attorney’s fee motion. See First Supplemental Declaration of David

Martinez ISO Mot. for Atty. Fees Reply (“First Supp. Decl.”), ¶ 4. It is Best Buy’s burden to

establish that the fees it seeks were reasonably necessary to the successful litigation of

their claims. See Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir.1984).

However, it is not immediately apparent to the court that fees incurred in bringing an

attorney’s fees motion were reasonably necessary to the successful litigation of Best Buy’s

defense. While other federal statutes – e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 – have

been construed to permit the recovery of fees upon fees, defendants have not submitted

any controlling authority regarding the availability of fees upon fees vis-a-vis the Copyright

Act specifically. Accordingly, the court declines to award such fees. Moreover, with

respect to the $3,950.00 requested in conjunction with the work done on the reply brief,

Best Buy has submitted the same type of generic supporting declaration that the court held

was insufficient in its October 23, 2007 order requiring supplemental documentation. See

First Supp Decl., ¶ 4. No itemized billing records in connection with the work done on the

reply appear to have been submitted. As such, the court reduces the total fee amount

requested by $20,777.00, and declines to award the additional $3,950.00 requested by

Best Buy in relation to the work undertaken on the reply brief. 

Finally, the court has itself found two more entries that warrant an adjustment to the

fee amount sought by Best Buy. First, Best Buy seeks reimbursement for .30 hours

(totaling $138.00) that Mr. Hinton spent analyzing “plaintiff’s initial disclosures and Rule 11

re plaintiff’s newly alleged marketing agreement” on July 5, 2006. See Supp. Decl., Ex. A

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4 Defendants’ papers state that they seek costs in the amount of $7,252.14.

However, defendants appear to have made a simple mathematical error, as 80% of the total

cost amount of $9315.17 is $7,452.14. 

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at 6. However, plaintiff’s marketing agreement allegations were made in connection with its

state law claim, not the copyright claims for which an award of attorney’s fees is

permissible. Accordingly, the court will reduce any award by $138.00. Second, Mr. Hinton

spent another .30 hours (again, totaling $138.00) analyzing “statute of limitations and

breach of implied contract (‘Idea theft’ cause of action) with D. Martinez” on August 25,

2006. See id. at 7. Since this entry, too, dealt with defendants’ response to plaintiff’s

independent state law claims rather than a defense to the copyright claims, the court will

reduce plaintiff’s award by another $138.00 – for a total reduction of $278.00 for the two

foregoing entries. 

In sum, and with the foregoing reductions taken into account, the court awards

defendants a modified total of $100,793.00 in attorney’s fees.

b. costs

Section 505 allows the court in its discretion to award “full costs.” See 17 U.S.C. §

505. Defendants claim total costs equal to $9,315.17, which have been provided in

itemized format. See Original Decl., Ex. B. These costs represent approximately $570 for

the court reporter, $245 for printing, $506 for copies, and remaining costs associated with

legal research charges, FedEx mailings, hotels, experts, and miscellaneous matters. See

id. Defendants have discounted their costs by 20% – once again, in order to account for

costs spent solely on the copyright claims – which means they are seeking costs here in

the amount of $7,452.14.4

 

Plaintiff takes issue with defendants’ cost amounts, to the extent such costs include

general overhead expenses such as postage, telephone calls and attorney travel. 

According to plaintiff, such costs cannot be awarded under section 505. 

This is not correct. As defendants point out, “full costs” are recoverable under

section 505 of the Copyright Act, as noted by the Ninth Circuit in Twentieth Century Fox

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Film Corp. V. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.39 869, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2005). This includes the type

of general overhead costs that plaintiff challenges. See id. (“we hold that district courts

may award otherwise non-taxable costs, including those that lie outside the scope of §

1920, under § 505.”). Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff challenges travel expenses

specifically, such expenses have not been claimed by Best Buy in its pursuit of costs. See

First Supp. Decl., ¶ 3.

In sum, then, plaintiff’s arguments for reducing costs are without merit, and the court

finds that Best Buy’s itemization of costs sufficient to support the reimbursement sought. 

Accordingly, the court awards defendants costs in the amount of $7,452.14. 

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion for an

award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $100,793.00, and costs in the amount of

$7452.14, for a total award in the amount of $108,245.14. 

Payment of attorney’s fees and costs is stayed, however, until after the resolution of

plaintiff’s appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2008 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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