Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03313/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03313-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ananat Kumar Tripati,

Plaintiff

-vsCorizon Incorporated, et al.,

Defendants.

CV-18-3313-PHX-JJT (JFM)

Report and Recommendation

This matter is before the undersigned magistrate judge on referral for pretrial 

proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Because the appropriate resolution of 

screening of the amended pleading is dispositive of some of Plaintiff’s claims, the 

undersigned proceeds by way of a Report & Recommendation to the referring district 

judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

A. BACKGROUND

1. Original Complaint

On October 15, 2018, pro se Plaintiff, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Florence, filed his original Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 3). 

Defendants - Plaintiff named as Defendants various current or former employees 

of the Arizona Department of Corrections, prison health contractor Corizon Health Inc. 

(“Corizon”) and various of its current or former employees, the law firm Renaud, Cook, 

Drury, Masaros P.C. (hereafter “Renaud Cook”), and two attorneys within that firm, 

Keefe Commissary Network (“Keefe”) (a cigarette supplier), and various current or former 

Assistant Arizona Attorneys General. (Id. at 6.) Additional defendants were referenced, 

but not named, and thus allegations related to them were disregarded by the Court on 

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screening. (Id. at 5, n. 3.) 

Claims – Alleging federal question and diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff asserted 

eight counts, alleging “claims concerning medical care for conditions including high blood 

pressure, COPD, and pain. Plaintiff also alleges medical and religious claims concerning 

his diet; violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),2 

42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to d-8 and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; retaliation; 

deprivation of property; denial of access to the court; conspiracy; violation of the Equal 

Protection Clause; legal malpractice; and ‘Supervisory Defendants.’” (Id. at 5.) 

IFP and Three Strikes - In the Service Order filed June 14, 2019 (Doc. 21), the 

Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP application, finding that although Plaintiff had “three strikes” 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), his claims of denial of “ medically appropriate treatment for 

his high blood pressure, pain, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD),” 

liberally construed, sufficiently alleged an imminent danger of serious physical injury. (Id.

at 2-3.)

Screening – On screening, the Court dismissed without prejudice Counts 1 (in 

part), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and Defendants McWilliams, Kepney, Ruiz, Curran, Erwin, 

Respicio-Moriarity, Robertson, Ryan, Glynn, Pratt, Ulibarri, Keefe Commissary Network, 

Martinez, Osler, Han, Talley, Arredonto, Bonorand, Days, Pachecho, Jacobs, Lawrence, 

Dossett, Johnson, Klausner, Rogers, Morrissey, Carter, Conlon, Hover, Grimm, Basha, 

and Renaud, Cook, Drury, Mesaros PA. Defendants Corizon, Stewart, Powell, Osinloye, 

Arhin, Weigel, Minev, Igwe, Young, and Bohuszewicz were required to answer the 

portions of Count 1 that concerned treatment of Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and 

interference with a prescribed medical diet. (Id. at 38-39.) 

2. First Amended Complaint

On June 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend (Doc. 24) and lodged his

proposed First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25). Finding the amendment to be of-right, 

the Court granted the motion to amend, but in light of the screening requirement ordered 

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provision of a “redlined” copy of the amendment pursuant to Local Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15.1. (Order 6/27/19, Doc. 26.) The First Amended Complaint (Doc. 27) was 

filed the same day. 

3. Second Amended Complaint 

On July 29, 2019, before screening of the First Amended Complaint was completed, 

Plaintiff filed a second Motion to Amend (Doc. 38) and lodged his Second Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 40). The Court granted leave to amend, but service stayed pending 

screening. (Order 8/21/19, Doc. 42.) In so doing, the Court related: 

The Court observes that Plaintiff has denominated this as a 

“supplemental complaint,” but has reincorporated his First Amended 

Complaint. Accordingly, the Court will file this as the Second 

Amended Complaint, rendering the First Amended Complaint nonexistent. 

(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff has not sought reconsideration of or objected to that Order.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 43) was filed the same date. 

Because the First Amended Complaint was never screened, the undersigned 

compares the Second Amended Complaint to the original Complaint for purposes of 

assessing whether deficiencies in claims repeated from the original Complaint have been 

cured. 

Defendants - In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff again names as 

Defendants:

(1) Corizon;

(2) Dr. Stewart; 

(3) Dr. Arhin;

(4) Dr. Minev;

(5) Health care provider Powell;

(6) Health care provider Osinloye;

(7) Health care provider Weigel; 

(8) Health care provider Igwe; 

(9) ADOC employee Young; and

(10) ADOC employee Bohuszewicz. 

He re-adds previously dismissed Defendants: 

(11) Nursing Supervisor Angela Martinez;

(12) ADOC employee Angela Arredonto;

(13) ADOC employee Norma Ruiz; 

(14) ADOC employee Kevin Curran;

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(15) ADOC Grievance Officer Roderico Kepney;

(16) ADOC Grievance Officer Julia Erwin;

(17) ADOC Grievance Officer Juliette Respicio-Moriarity;

(18) ADOC Grievance Officer Cheryl Dossett;

(19) ADOC Grievance Officer Daryl Johnson; 

(20) ADOC attorney Karyn Klausner;

(21) ADOC attorney Courtney Glynn; 

(22) Dr. David Robertson; 

(23) ADOC Regional Director Carson McWilliams;

(24) Charles L. Ryan; 

(25) Richard Pratt; 

(26) Paralegal Betty Ulibarri; 

(27) Debra Han;

(28) ADOC Tucson employee Panaan Days;

(29) ADOC Tucson employee Dawn Talley;

(30) ADOC Tucson employee Gerard Bonorand;

(31) ADOC Tucson employee Glen Pachecho;

(32) ADOC Tucson employee Anna Jacobs; 

(33) Regional Director Timothy Lawrence, 

(34) Assistant Attorney General Kelly Joan Morrissey;

(35) Assistant Attorney General Paul Edward Carter;

(36) “Renaud, Cook, Drury, Masaros P.C.” (hereafter “Renaud Cook”);

(37) Renaud Cook attorney Kristin Whitney Basha; and 

(38) Renaud Cook attorney Timothy Regis Grimm II.

He adds as new defendants: 

(39) Renaud Cook attorney Joseph Scott Conlon;

(40) Renaud Cook attorney Charles Stedman Hover III; 

(41) Deputy Warden Edward Shuman;

(42) Deputy Warden Patrick O’Brien; 

(43) COIII Steven Bell; 

(44) Property Officer Tracy Williams; 

(45) Publications Officer Diane Miller; 

(46) Corizon employee Adam Perkins;

(47) Corizon employee Betty Hahn

(48) Corizon employee Phyllis Raney;

(49) Corizon employee Thomas Smith; 

(50) Trinity Food Services; 

(51) Trinity employee Meghan Queen; and

(52) Centurion of Arizona, LLC

He deletes Susan Rogers, Defendants Keefe Commissary Network, and George 

Osler.

Claims - Plaintiff makes various modifications to Counts 1 through 6, discussed 

hereinafter. He deletes Counts 7 and 8. 

Relief – In addition to seeking damages, costs and fees, Plaintiff now seeks 

“liquidation of Corizon,” and injunctive relief.

/ /

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B. SCREENING OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

1. Screening Required 

In cases filed by persons appearing in forma pauperis the court is required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2) to dismiss cases that are frivolous, malicious, fail to adequately state a claim, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires the Court 

to actively screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or 

officer or employee of a governmental entity. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion 

thereof if the Plaintiff has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) applies the same 

standard to such complaints by prisoners/detainees even if the defendants are not governmental 

entities, or officers or employees of a governmental entity. 

2. Pleading Standards

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the -

defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 

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are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Reasonable inferences can be drawn from the facts. “Iqbal demands more of 

plaintiffs than bare notice pleading, but it does not require us to flyspeck complaints 

looking for any gap in the facts.” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 924 (9th Cir. 

2012). 

And, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).

3. Three Strikes Satisfied

As discussed hereinafter, Plaintiff continues to maintain, at a minimum, the claims 

that survived screening of the original Complaint, which included a claim meeting the 

“imminent danger” requirement for a grant of in forma pauperis status. Although the 

undersigned concludes that other claims are now adequately alleged that would not appear 

to meet that requirement, in forma pauperis status is granted as to the entire suit if any 

claim qualifies, and not on a piecemeal, claim-by-claim basis. See Hooker v. American 

Airlines, 302 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (in forma pauperis appeal); and Phillips v. 

Ayers, 316 F. App'x 605, 606 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (applying Hooker to filing 

complaint in district court). 

4. Deleted State Law Claims

In the first Screening Order, because Plaintiff failed to allege the citizenship of any 

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defendants, the court dismissed from the original Complaint the diversity based state law 

claims in Counts 7 (Malpractice) and 8 (Negligence of Supervisory Defendants). (Order

6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 6-7.) Plaintiff has now deleted those claims. 

5. Counts 1 and 4 - HIPAA Allegations

In the first Screening Order, the Court found that HIPAA did not create a private 

right of action, the Court dismissed the HIPAA claims in Counts 1 and 4. (Order 6/14/19, 

Doc. 21 at 9.) 

6. Count 1 Claims

In Count 1 of the SAC, Plaintiff repeats unchanged his allegations from the original 

Complaint (¶¶ 1-55, at pp. 7, 10-11, 15-17),1 with the following exceptions: Plaintiff 

supplements ¶ 16 (p. 10), and adds allegations at pages 12-14, asserting claims and/or 

allegations based on forgery by Queen, Pressuring Igwe, Corizon Altering Records, 

Independent Review, Pressure from Phoenix, Violation of Privacy, Igwe’s Return from 

Vacation, Centurion Continues Practices, Worsening Conditions, Contrary to Written 

Policy, Stewart for Profit, and Robertson. 

Count 1 asserts claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs, in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show (1) a 

“serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in 

further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the 

defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 

Cir. 2006).

/ /

/ /

 

1 As filed, the SAC follows no logical page numbering, reusing the same numbers for 

multiple pages. Accordingly, the undersigned references the sequential page number (“p.” 

or “pp.”), rather than the numbering utilized by Plaintiff.

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a. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

The Court found that Plaintiff’s claims in Count 1 adequately stated a claim for 

deliberate indifference to his high blood pressure, heart condition, and COPD. 

Accordingly, Defendants Corizon and Stewart, Powell, Osinloye, Arhin, Weigel, Minev, 

and Igwe were required to respond to those portions of Count 1. (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 21 

at 10-13.) Because Plaintiff does not diminish his allegations in Count 1 against these 

defendants, they should again be required to answer this claim. 

He adds allegations that Defendant Igwe has refused to provide medical treatment 

“that helped,” including access to a nephrologist, urologist, and allergist. (SAC at p. 13, 

¶¶ R-T.) These additional allegations are merely additive to the claim of deliberate 

indifference against Defendant Igwe.

He adds allegations that Defendants Deputy Warden Shuman and ADOC employee 

Bohuszewicz have ordered medical personnel to stop performing blood pressure checks 4 

to 6 times per day as previously ordered by a cardiologist. He argues his blood pressure 

has degraded and is no longer controllable, personnel have administered medication before 

taking his blood pressure, which is required for the proper dosing of medication, and when 

taken it is taken improperly resulting in false low readings. (SAC at pp. 13-14, ¶ T.) These 

additional allegations are merely additive to the claim of deliberate indifference against 

Defendant Bohuszewicz, but now adequately states such a claim against Defendant 

Shuman.

Plaintiff now alleges that since taking over from Corizon, Defendant Centurion has 

continued the same policies denying medications and treatment by specialist that underlie 

his claims against Corizon. (SAC at p. 14, ¶ U.) This adequately states a claim of 

deliberate indifference as to Defendant Centurion. 

b. Parsons

Finding that the settlement and consent decrees entered in Parsons v. Ryan, No. 

CV-12-0601-PHX-ROS, and Hook v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 972 F.3d 1012, 

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1014 (9th Cir. 1992) could not be collaterally enforced, the Court dismissed the related 

claim in Count 1. (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 9-10.) 

Plaintiff now adds allegations in relation to Parsons that Defendant Raney and 

other unnamed employees of Corizon and Centurion have made false entries in his medical 

records. (SAC at pp. 12-13, ¶¶ J-M) 

He also adds the following to his allegation in ¶ 16: “A claim for damages for 

violation of rights in a class action can be brought by the injured prisoner...in an 

independent action seeking damages, this.” Plaintiff cites as support Hiser v. Franklin, 94 

F.3d 1287 (9

th Cir. 1996). (SAC at p. 10.) 

But Hiser is inapposite. In Hiser (which involved a prisoner’s right of access 

claims), the court merely found that despite the similarity of legal theories (access to the 

courts), a prior class action did not bar under claims preclusion a new cause of action that 

was “based on a different set of operative facts,” i.e. because the plaintiff was not 

incarcerated until two years after the class action was settled. Hiser said nothing about 

whether the settlement agreement or judgment in the earlier class action could be enforced 

in the new action.

Accordingly, Plaintiff still fails to state a claim with regard to enforcement of these 

earlier cases.

c. Second-Hand Smoke

Finding the original Complaint’s claims of second-hand smoke vague and 

conclusory, they were dismissed. (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 14-15.) Plaintiff does not 

modify these claims, and they should again be dismissed. 

d. Diet/Independent Review/Pressure from Phoenix/Igwe’s Return

On screening the original Complaint, the Court summarized Plaintiff’s series of 

suits concerning his efforts to obtain an allergy diet, and in particular, because of his Hindu 

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religious tenets, a vegetarian allergy diet. The Court found that his claims of being denied 

a low-salt, gluten-free, allergy diet were vague and conclusory except as to Defendant 

Young and Bohuszewicz on the basis of their direction that Plaintiff not receive an 

unidentified medical diet, who were required to answer that portion of Count 1. (Order 

6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 15-22.) 

The Court found Plaintiff failed to allege when the Defendants Dr. Stewart, 

provider Powell, provider Osinloye, Dr. Arhin, and Dr. Minev refused to prescribe his diet, 

and when Defendant Dr. Robertson refused to provide a diet prescribed by Corizon, what

the diet was, or the condition for which it was prescribed, and thus failed to adequately 

allege claims against these defendants. (Id. at 21-22.)

Plaintiff’s new allegations fail to cure those deficiencies.

Plaintiff now adds allegations that in January 2019 (after the filing of the original 

Complaint), Defendant Igwe was directed by a Corizon employee to cancel Plaintiff’s 

medical diet approved in August 2014, but Igwe refused. However, he alleges that 

Defendant Deputy Warden Shuman subsequently directed Defendant Young to cancel the 

diet. He also alleges that Bohuszewicz (along with Shuman) forced Igwe to change the 

medical orders regarding Plaintiff’s diet. Subsequently, a vegetarian allergy diet was 

approved, and although Defendant Trinity was required to comply, Queen refused. He 

alleges Defendant Shuman and Defendant Curran contacted Pratt and requested Pratt 

cancel the diet. Plaintiff relates these facts to his vegetarian allergy diet. (SAC at p. 12, 

¶¶A-I.) Apart from being duplicative of the already recognized claim against Defendants 

Young and Bohuszewicz, Plaintiff makes a variety of claims of efforts to terminate his 

vegetarian allergy diet, but fails to show that it resulted in the termination. Although 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Queen refused to comply with his diet order, he makes no 

allegations showing that Queen recognized any risk of harm related to such refusal. These 

allegations fail to adequately state a claim. 

He alleges that Pratt and Stewart then called Defendant NP Hahn and directed that 

his diet not be provided. (SAC at 13, ¶ O.) He further alleges Defendant NP Hahn falsely 

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stated she had approved changes, and Defendants Perkins, Robinson, Glynn, Dossett, and 

Kepney claimed to have investigated but did not find Hahn’s deception. (Id. at ¶ N.) 

Plaintiff fails to allege any change in his diet resulting from these allegations. Nor does 

Plaintiff allege a recognizable claim against the grievance officers. He fails to allege any 

harm from their failed investigation.

He also alleges Defendants Raney, Pratt, Robertson, Curran, Shuman, Stewart, 

Hahn and Perkins directed that his “medical treatment” be changed. (Id. at ¶ P.) He does

not identify the treatment changed, the risk of significant harm, or any awareness of that 

risk. This claim is vague and conclusory.

He alleges when he contacted Igwe about the cancellation of his diet, she 

acknowledged his need for it, but refused to reinstate the diet due to “pressure” from 

Queen, Bohuszewicz, Shuman, Young, Raney, Stewart, Robertson, Pratt, and Curran. 

(SAC at p. 13, ¶R-T.) This allegation is merely additive to his allegations against 

Defendants Igwe, Bohuszewicz, Shuman, Young, and Stewart. As to Defendants Corizon 

employee Raney, Dr. Robertson, Richard Pratt, and ADOC employee Curran, these claims 

are vague and conclusory. Plaintiff proffers no indication of the basis or reason for the 

“pressure,” or that these defendants were aware of a significant risk of harm from the lack 

of the diet. Accordingly, these allegations fail to adequately state a claim against these 

additional defendants.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations that in February 2019, Defendant Robertson 

cancelled Plaintiff’s diet at the urging of Defendants Curran, Bohuszewicz, Queen, 

Shuman and Raney fails to adequately state a claim. (SAC at p. 14, ¶ CC.)

Plaintiff adds allegations that physicians have overturned decision by Dr. 

Robertson. He also alleges that in 2015 and 2016, Dr. Robertson has overturned decisions 

from grievances regarding his diet. (Id.) This alleges nothing more than a difference of 

medical opinion. “A difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference to 

[a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

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e. Retaliation regarding Forgery by Queen

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Queen, an employee of Trinity Food Service, forged 

a lab result for another inmate. He alleges that, to protect Defendant Queen, Defendant 

Shuman blamed Plaintiff and directed another officer to issue a disciplinary “ticket.” He 

alleges that the ticket was found to be false and was dismissed, but had been orchestrated 

by Defendants Bohuszewicz and Shuman in retaliation for Plaintiff utilizing the grievance 

process. (SAC at p. 12, ¶ A-B.) Although asserted in connection with Plaintiff’s claims 

of deliberate indifference, in liberally construing a pro se complaint, the Court is not to 

place reliance on the division of factual allegations among various claims or grounds for 

relief, but instead to ““look[] to the entire petition.” Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 

(9th Cir. 2001), as amended (June 5, 2001). 

A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of 

his First Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 

559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that his exercise 

of his First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor behind the 

defendants’ conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 

287 (1977); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff adequately alleges (1) adverse action, (2) causative connection, and (3) 

protected conduct. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9

th Cir. 2005) (recognizing 

prisoners’ First Amendment right to file prison grievances). That Shuman was also 

allegedly motivated by a desire to protect Queen does not preclude the retaliatory motive 

from being a motivating factor, i.e. as to a choice of who to blame.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “an objective standard governs the chilling inquiry; 

a plaintiff does not have to show that his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed, but 

rather that the adverse action at issue would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness 

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from future First Amendment activities. To hold otherwise would be unjust as it would 

allow a defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an 

unusually determined plaintiff persists in his protected activity.” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 

1271 (emphases added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable 

inference is that a prisoner of ordinary firmness would be (4) chilled from pursuing prison 

grievances by knowingly false disciplinary charges of forging medical records.

Moreover, a reasonable inference from knowingly filing a false ticket solely to 

protect another employee from consequences of misconduct and as retaliation is the (5) 

absence of a legitimate penological interest. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff adequately states a claim of retaliation against Defendants 

Bohuszewicz and Shuman based on a false disciplinary report of forgery.

f. Alteration of Records

In addition to relying on Parsons, in his allegations of modified records, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants Bohuszewicz and Shuman pressured Corizon employees to change 

medical records, Defendant Raney “cancelled all other special needs orders.” (SAC at pp. 

12-13, ¶¶ K-M.) Assuming Plaintiff intended these allegations as separate claims of 

deliberate indifference, they are too vague to adequately state a claim. They allege no risk 

of significant harm or deliberate indifference thereto.

g. Privacy/Confidentiality

Plaintiff alleges various defendants obtained private medical information without 

his consent, other defendants refused to take corrective action. He argues this was in 

violation of doctor patient confidentiality. The Ninth Circuit has held that “prisoners do 

not have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in prison treatment records 

when the state has a legitimate penological interest in access to them.” Seaton v. Mayberg, 

610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff fails to allege, and offers no facts on which it 

could reasonably be inferred, that prison officials did not have a legitimate penological 

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interest in accessing his medical records, particularly in the face of his lawsuits and 

grievances over his medical care. These allegations fail to adequately state a claim. 

h. Violations of Policies, Procedures and Contracts

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]heir actions taken in this cause of action” violated contracts, 

policies, procedures, and directives. (SAC at p. 14, ¶¶ W.) This claim fails to identify any 

particular defendant, or any specific provision of any contract, policy procedure or 

directive. Thus, it is vague and conclusory, and fails to adequately state a claim.

i. Miscellaneous State Claims

Plaintiff alleges that various individual healthcare providers violated Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 12-2301. (SAC at p. 14, ¶ X.) That provision governs the admission of evidence of 

advance payment of partial damages prior to trial. That provision has no application to 

the facts alleged, and fails to adequately state a claim.

Plaintiff alleges that various healthcare provider defendants and Corizon and 

Centurion have intentionally, recklessly, and negligently delayed or denied him medical 

care, that they did so for profit, and thus have engaged in racketeering. These claims arise 

under state tort law. The Arizona statutes provide: “If a claim against a licensed 

professional is asserted in a civil action, the claimant or the claimant's attorney shall certify 

in a written statement that is filed and served with the claim whether or not expert opinion 

testimony is necessary to prove the licensed professional's standard of care or liability for 

the claim.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2602. This statute extends to corporations, etc. practicing 

a license profession. Plaintiff has not attached such written statement. 

7. Count 2 – RLUIPA and Equal Protection

Noting that Plaintiff’ repetitive litigation bordered on abusive (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 

21 at 25, n. 17), the Court found that his RLUIPA and equal protection claims in Count 

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2, based on denial of a “blended” diet failed to adequately state claims. (Id. at 22-25.) In 

Count 2 of the SAC (p. 8), Plaintiff repeats unchanged his allegations from the original 

Complaint (¶¶ 56-63). The deficiencies in Count 2 remain and this count should again be 

dismissed. 

8. Count 3 – Alien Tort Claims Act

The Court found that Plaintiff’s claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act were too 

vague and conclusory to state a claim, and Count 3 was dismissed. (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 

21 at 25-26.) In Count 3 of the SAC (p. 9), Plaintiff repeats unchanged his allegations 

from the original Complaint (¶¶ 64-65). The deficiencies in Count 3 remain and this count 

should again be dismissed. 

9. Count 4 - Retaliation

Regarding the retaliation claims in Count 4, the Court found failure to adequately 

allege retaliatory conduct regarding HIPAA violations, non-compliance with Parsons, 

transfers, discipline, loss of property, computer access, diet, denial of access, legal mail 

and property. (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 26-32.) Noting prior similar litigation by 

Plaintiff, the Court also found Plaintiff failed to adequately state a claim of retaliation 

regarding education. (Id. at 32-34.) 

In Count 4 of the SAC, Plaintiff repeats largely unchanged his allegations from the 

original Complaint (¶¶ 66-89, pp. 18-20; ¶¶ 90-107, pp. 24-25; ¶¶ 108-115, at pp. 28-29). 

He adds additional language to ¶ 101 (p. 25), and the Exhaustion allegation (p. 29). He 

adds claims and allegations at ¶¶ 89(A) to 89(S) (pp. 21-23) and ¶¶ 107A to 107E (pp. 26-

27).

On screening the original Complaint, the Court denied Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

regarding a denial of access based on refusal of inmate account statements on the basis 

that Plaintiff failed to show that the actions “were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff 

exercising constitutionally protected rights.” (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 30.) Plaintiff 

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adds allegations that detrimental actions against him have continued, have expanded, and 

are uniquely imposed on Plaintiff, and that the Judge ordering the statements had found a 

violation of his order. (SAC at p 21, ¶ 89(A)-89(B).) This does not cure the deficiency in 

failing to show a retaliatory motive.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s new allegations that he has been denied legal calls fails to 

show a retaliatory motive. (Id. at ¶ 89(C).) 

On screening the original Complaint, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

based on opening his legal mail and refusing to make copies of his outgoing legal mail in 

cases going back to 2001, finding them vague and conclusory, failing to show a retaliatory

motive, and failing to show occurrence within the 2 year statute of limitations. (Order 

6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 31-32.) Plaintiff adds allegations of denial of copies in June 2019 

and July 2015. (SAC at p. 21, ¶ 89(D).) And, he attaches a copy of a letter from his 

attorney which he asserts was wrongly opened, seized, and lost. (SAC at p. 32.) Plaintiff 

still fails to allege facts to show a retaliatory motive for these actions. 

Similarly, Plaintiff’s new allegations of violation of his attorney client privilege, 

searches, seizures of his documents, denial of access to them, denial of his self-compiled 

books of cases and law reviews, falsifying evidence, interference with grievances, and 

providing indemnity and a defense to the offending parties, all fail to allege facts to show 

a retaliatory motive for the referenced actions. (See SAC pp. 21-23, ¶¶ 89(E)-89(K), 

89(O)-89(S).) 

Plaintiff adds allegations that various defendants have “invoked retributive actions 

against me for exercising my right to petition.” (SAC p. 22, ¶ 89(L)-89(M). This 

allegation is vague and conclusory, proffering no facts from which to draw a reasonable 

inference of a retaliatory motive. 

Plaintiff adds allegations that various defendants’ retaliatory conduct is begun 

knowing it will continue, that it had occurred, and that it was bad public policy. That those 

defendants failed to properly advise against such conduct, concealed evidence of it, and 

failed to exercise supervision and discipline to prevent it, and instead had a custom and 

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tradition encourage it. (SAC pp. 26-27, ¶¶ 107A-107E.) However, Plaintiff ails to allege 

a retaliatory motive in such actions. Moreover, because Plaintiff fails to adequately make 

out any clam of retaliation, any claim of derivative liability based on custom, usage, 

supervision, etc. also fails to adequately state a claim.

In screening the original Complaint, the Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations 

regarding denial of access to education failed to adequately state a claim because he “has 

not alleged facts in his Complaint in this case to support that approval to participate in 

distance learning or correspondence courses was withdrawn for reasons other than his 

criminal alien/detainer status.” (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 34.) Plaintiff adds a new 

allegation that “the director in a grievance appeal allowed my taking college courses in 

spite of my citizenship.” (SAC at p. 25, ¶ 101.) 

In screening the original Complaint, the Court found Plaintiff’s allegations 

regarding denial of access to a computer failed to state a claim because he failed to show 

a retaliatory motive, he acknowledged that he still is allowed to use computers in 

Programs, and that allegations that he was not allowed to use laptops failed because he 

failed to connect the allegations to a defendant or to show retaliatory motive. (Order 

6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 28-29.) Plaintiff now attaches a copy of a directive that he be allowed 

use of the prison computers. (SAC at p. 33.) This fails to cure the deficiencies. 

Plaintiff adds allegations regarding exhaustion of his claims in Count 4. (SAC at 

p. 29.) But that does not establish an adequate claim in the Count. 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Count 4 still fails to adequately state a claim, 

and should again be dismissed.

10. Count 5 – Equal Protection

The Court found Plaintiff failed to adequately state an Equal Protection claim in 

Count 5. (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 34-35.) In Count 5 of the SAC, Plaintiff repeats 

unchanged his allegations from the original Complaint (¶¶ 116-120, pp. 29-30). The 

deficiencies in Count 5 remain and this count should again be dismissed. 

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11. Count 6 - Conspiracy

Finally, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to adequately state a conspiracy claim 

in Count 6. (Order 6/14/19, Doc. 21 at 35.) In Count 6 of the SAC, Plaintiff repeats 

largely unchanged his allegations from the original Complaint (¶¶ 121-124, p. 30), only 

moving (from the deleted page previously containing Counts 7 and 8) the allegation that 

he exhausted his remedies. The deficiencies in Count 6 remain and this count should 

again be dismissed. 

12. Conclusions

Count 1 continues to adequately state a claim for deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s high blood pressure, heart condition, and COPD. Accordingly, Defendants (1) 

Corizon, (2) Stewart, (3) Arhin, (4) Minev, (5) Powell, (6) Osinloye, (7) Weigel, and (8) 

Igwe should be required to respond to those portions of Count 1. Plaintiff also now 

adequately states such claims of deliberate indifference against Defendants (41) Shuman 

and (52) Centurion. 

Count 1 adequately states a claim for deliberate indifference regarding Plaintiff’s a 

low-salt allergy diet as to Defendants (9) Young, (10) Bohuszewicz, and (41) Shuman. 

Count 1 also adequately states a claim of retaliation against Defendants (10) 

Bohuszewicz and (41) Shuman based on a false disciplinary report of forgery.

Although Plaintiff has made various additions to his allegations in Count 4, Plaintiff 

fails to cure the deficiencies in his original allegations, and fails to adequately state a claim 

in Count 4, and this Count should again be dismissed without prejudice.

Having failed to adopt any substantive changes in Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6 from his 

original Complaint, Plaintiff again fails to adequately state claims in these counts, and they 

should again be dismissed without prejudice.

Because Plaintiff fails to make out any claims against them, the Court should 

dismiss without prejudice Defendants (11) Martinez; (12) Arredonto; (13) Ruiz; (14) 

Curran; (15) Kepney; (16) Erwin; (17) Respicio-Moriarity; (18) Dossett; (19) Johnson; 

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(20) Klausner; (21) Glynn; (22) Robertson; (23) McWilliams; (24) Ryan; (25) Pratt; (26) 

Ulibarri; (27) Han; (28) Days; (29) Talley; (30) Bonorand; (31) Pachecho; (32) Jacobs; 

(33) Lawrence; (34) Morrissey; (35) Carter; (36) Renaud Cook; (37) Basha; (38) Grimm; 

(39) Conlon; (40) Hover; (42) O’Brien; (43) Bell; (44) Williams; (45) Miller; (46) Perkins;

(47) Hahn; (48) Raney; (49) Smith; (50) Trinity Food Services; and (51) Queen.

C. SERVICE

The undersigned will recommend answers as to various claims. In the interests of 

efficient administration, the undersigned will not recommend an order for service, but will 

instead defer such orders, which may be issued by the magistrate judge, until after a ruling 

on this Report & Recommendation.

D. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment.

However, pursuant to Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file 

objections to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered 

a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), and will constitute a waiver 

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 

1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

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issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED the Court issue its order requiring:

(A) Defendants Corizon, Stewart, Arhin, Minev, Powell, Osinloye, Weigel, Igwe, 

Shuman, and Centurion must respond to the claims in Count 1 of the Second 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 43) alleging deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s high 

blood pressure, heart condition, and COPD. 

(B) Defendants Young, Bohuszewicz, and Shuman must respond to the claim in Count 1 

of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 43) alleging deliberate indifference 

regarding low-salt allergy diet. 

(C) Defendants Bohuszewicz and Shuman must respond to the claim in Count 1 of the 

Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 43) alleging retaliation based on a false 

disciplinary report of forgery.

(D) The remainder of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 43), including the remainder 

of Count 1, and all of Counts 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.

(E) Defendants Martinez, Arredonto, Ruiz, Curran, Kepney, Erwin, Respicio-Moriarity,

Dossett, Johnson, Klausner, Glynn, Robertson, McWilliams, Ryan, Pratt, Ulibarri,

Han, Days, Talley, Bonorand, Pachecho, Jacobs, Lawrence, Morrissey, Carter,

Renaud Cook, Basha, Grimm, Conlon, Hover, O’Brien, Bell, Williams, Miller,

Perkins, Hahn, Raney, Smith, Trinity Food Services, and Queen be DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Dated: October 3, 2019

18-3313o Order 19 10 01 re RR Screen SAC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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