Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04132/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04132-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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1 Cecil acknowledges the existence of a CBA between his union (United Stanford

Workers Local 715) and Stanford that covers his employment with Stanford. See Compl. ¶ 9; Opp'n

at 2.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-05-04132 RMW

JAH

E-FILED on 3-17-2006

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CHESTER WILLIAM CECIL,

Plaintiff,

v.

LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR

UNIVERSITY, and DOES 1 through 100,

Defendants.

No. C-05-04132 RMW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

[Re Docket Nos. 6, 17, 22]

Defendant Stanford University moves to dismiss plaintiff Chester Cecil's three causes of

action as preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). For the reasons

set forth below, the court grants defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Generally, the following facts are taken from the complaint and are accepted as true (as they

must be) for the purposes of the defendants' motions to dismiss. Additional facts are taken from the

collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") governing Cecil's employment.1

 According to the Ninth

Circuit, "a district court is free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to resolve factual disputes

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-05-04132 RMW

JAH 2

in determining whether it has jurisdiction over a claim." Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra

Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830

F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that although complaint did not mention collective bargaining

agreement, district court "properly looked beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the

contract claim was in fact a section 301 claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement

'artfully pleaded' to avoid federal jurisdiction"). Facts have also been taken from the declaration of

Cecil's attorney; Stanford does not object to consideration of this declaration and even cites to it. 

See Reply at 3.

Some years ago, Stanford University hired Chester Cecil as a full-time employee in the

position of "HVAC Mechanic." Compl. ¶ 12. Cecil and Stanford "entered into a written

employment agreement" on October 16, 1984. Id. ¶ 30. On February 5, 2004, Cecil was cited for

driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. ¶ 14. As a result, the California Department of Motor

Vehicles revoked his driver's license for one year. Id. Cecil informed his supervisor of the

revocation, who initially told Cecil that he might have to take a leave of absence while his license

was revoked, but later informed Cecil that he had to have a valid driver's license to continue working

for Stanford. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 

On June 14, 2004, Cecil requested a personal leave of absence; Stanford denied his request

on June 29. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Cecil then requested that his union file a grievance on his behalf to

challenge the denial of his request for a leave. Id. ¶ 20. Cecil was then "informed that if he checked

himself into a rehabilitation center for possible substance abuse, action to terminate his employment

would cease." Id. Cecil attempted to obtain admittance to a hospital, but could not be admitted until

July 19, 2004. Id. ¶ 21. On July 7, 2004, his union representative informed him that if he was not

admitted into rehabilitation by the next morning, his employment would be immediately terminated. 

Id. ¶ 22. The next day, Cecil was informed that he would still be fired if he lacked a valid driver's

license at the end of his rehabilitation and that he would not be granted any personal leave. Id. ¶ 23.

To avoid termination, Cecil, on the advice of his union, submitted a letter in which he stated

he was taking early retirement "under duress." Id. ¶ 24. Stanford refused to accept his letter because

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2 It is unclear under what legal theories Cecil seeks to proceed. His complaint refers to

no statute or case. His opposition to this motion likewise refers to no statute or case other than 28

U.S.C. § 1441(b), which Cecil cites in passing when discussing Stanford's removal of this action

from state court. Cecil does mention a "fundamental constitutional right" in his opposition, see

Opp'n at 4, but does not identify it. A fair reading of Cecil's complaint, though, is that he is alleging

state-law claims, and he indicated at the hearing on this motion that his complaint was indeed

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-05-04132 RMW

JAH 3

of the mention of duress. Id. Cecil sent Stanford a second letter removing the reference to duress. 

Id. 

It is unclear what—if anything—of relevance happened during the late summer and early

autumn of 2004, but in November 2004, Cecil retained his present attorney, Steven Zavodnick. 

Zavodnick Decl. ¶ 2. Zavodnick contacted Stanford and was referred to its "Director of Employee

and Labor Relations," Susan Hoerger. Id. ¶ 3. Zavodnick repeatedly called Hoerger until he

reached her on December 6, 2004. Id. ¶ 4. Hoerger then told Zavodnick she would not recognize

him as Cecil's representative until Cecil sent her a letter changing his representative from his union

to Zavodnick. Id. On December 13, 2004, Cecil notified Hoerger in writing that he was substituting

Zavodnick for the union. Id. ¶ 5. After another six weeks of leaving "numerable" unreturned

voicemail messages for Hoerger, Zavodnick reached her in January 2005 by calling from another

number. Id. ¶ 6-7; Compl. ¶ 9. Hoerger then informed him Stanford "would not recognize any

action brought by" Cecil without his union's representation. Compl. ¶ 9.

On June 21, 2005, Cecil filed suit against Stanford in the California Superior Court. Notice

of Removal ¶ 1. Cecil alleged three causes of action: constructive termination, breach of contract,

and breach of implied contract. Compl. at 4, 7, 10. On October 12, 2005, Stanford removed the

action to this court. Notice of Removal at 1. Stanford now moves to dismiss Cecil's three causes of

action as preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that all three causes of action alleged by plaintiff are completely

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and therefore are within this court's jurisdiction. Section 301 of

the LMRA provides for federal jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an

employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Suits claiming a breach of a CBA are

governed by § 301, which displaces any state claim2

 based on a CBA, as well as any state claim the

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framed entirely in state-law terms.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-05-04132 RMW

JAH 4

outcome of which depends on the interpretation of the terms of a CBA. Young, 830 F.2d at 997;

Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1998); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers,

911 F.2d 233, 237 (9th Cir. 1990). A state claim is also preempted by § 301 where it does not

specifically refer to a CBA but is nonetheless "substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of

an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471

U.S. 202, 213 (1985).

Stanford moves to dismiss each of Cecil's causes of action as preempted by § 301, asserting

that Cecil's claims boil down to "whether Stanford required Plaintiff to maintain to [sic] possess a

valid driver's license as a condition of and to perform his work, and whether Stanford was within its

discretion to deny his request for leave of absence, and allegedly constructively terminated him," all

of which is within the ambit of the CBA. Mot. at 3. In his opposition to Stanford's motion to

dismiss, Cecil does not discuss his claims individually. Rather, the gist of his argument seems to be

that Stanford breached the CBA by not allowing Zavodnick to represent Cecil in his grievance. See

Opp'n at 3. 

Cecil's second cause of action, for breach of contract, is clearly preempted by § 301. While

Cecil's complaint does not refer to the CBA, his position of "HVAC Mechanic" is covered by the

CBA. CBA, Ex. A-2 at 4. Whether the contract allegedly breached is the CBA or an individual

contract, the result is the same: "Because any independent agreement of employment concerning

that job position could be effective only as part of the collective bargaining agreement, the CBA

controls and the contract claim is preempted." Young, 830 F.2d at 997 (quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

 Cecil's other two claims, for constructive termination and breach of implied contract, are

preempted as well. Analysis of these claims is "substantially dependent" on the provisions in the

CBA concerning pertaining to termination. See CBA, art. IX.B.1 (no termination "except for just

cause"). Cecil himself argues that Stanford violated paragraph 40 (article I.C.9.b) of the CBA by

excluding Zavodnick from the CBA's grievance process. Opp'n at 3. As the court cannot consider

these other two claims independently of the CBA, they are preempted by § 301.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-05-04132 RMW

JAH 5

Where claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, courts must decide whether

to dismiss them or treat them as claims brought under § 301. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220-21. 

Stanford makes a conclusory argument that Cecil has failed to exhaust his extrajudicial remedies

under the CBA, mandating dismissal of his action under (for example) Ritza v. International

Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1988). As noted in Ritza,

failure to exhaust the grievance process under a CBA is akin to a jurisdictional defect and thus

requires a court to make factual findings in the course of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). 

Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368-69. While Stanford discusses the standard for dismissal in such

circumstances, it has neither presented nor pointed to evidence that Cecil failed to exhaust his

remedies under the CBA before filing suit. See Reply at 9-10. In fact, Cecil's evidence at present

allows an inference that he pursued the grievance process as far as he could. See Zavodnick Decl.

¶ 7. The court thus lacks sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding exhaustion of

remedies under the CBA. The court will therefore merely dismiss all of Cecil's claims as preempted,

rather than treating them as § 301 claims at this time.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) generally requires leave of court to amend a

complaint, though leave is to "be freely given when justice so requires," Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), and it

is generally not appropriate to deny leave "unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved

by amendment." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Stanford's entire argument for dismissing Cecil's complaint with prejudice is "Defendants request

that the Motion to Dismiss be granted with prejudice to refiling. Cater v. Norfolk Comm. Hospital

Ass'n. 761 F.2d 970, 974 (4th. Cir., 1985)." Reply at 10. As it is not clear that Cecil's complaint

cannot be saved by amendment, the court grants him thirty days' leave to file an amended complaint

and attempt to state a viable claim that is not preempted by § 301.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-05-04132 RMW

JAH 6

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

1. dismisses the complaint as completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA;

2. grants plaintiff thirty days' leave to file an amended complaint.

DATED: 3/8/06 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-05-04132 RMW

JAH 7

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff:

Steven D Zavodnick szavodnick@verizon.net 

Counsel for Defendants:

Michael Terence Lucey mlucey@gordonrees.com

Carol Capri Copsey ccopsey@gordonrees.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 3-17-2006 /s/ JH 

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:05-cv-04132-RMW Document 29 Filed 03/17/06 Page 7 of 7