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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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. F I~~ Jlppeall 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPM\i~ srenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT M~R 1 8 1993 

JIMMIE DEAN STOHLER, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

V. ) 

) 

STEVE HARGETT, Warden; SUSAN B. LOVING, ) 

Attorney General, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-5040 

(D.C. No. 90-C-600-E) 

(N.D. Okla. ) 

Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,** Senior 

District Judge.*** 

**Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Petitioner Jimmie Dean Stohler appeals from an order denying 

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S . C. 

§ 2254. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law o f 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel . 10th Cir. R. 

3 6 .3 . 

*** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P . 34 (a ) ; 10th Cir. R. 34.1 . 9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-5040 Document: 010110191136 Date Filed: 03/18/1993 Page: 1 
On January 21, 1982, Michelle Rae Powers was shot with a 

crossbow bolt. She died several days later. Stohler left town in 

early March of 1982, after he became the focus of the 

investigation into Powers' death and learned that charges were 

going to be filed against him. Shortly after he left town, 

Stohler and his coworker, Jack Ensminger, were charged with the 

murder. 

Stohler surrendered to the police in early September 1982. 

He gave a statement admitting to planning the murder, obtaining 

the weapon, and arranging for another person to do the killing. 

He also testified on behalf of the state in Ensminger's trial in 

September 1982. Ensminger was acquitted. 

The state of Oklahoma impaneled a grand jury in early 1983. 

The grand jury returned an indictment against Stohler for 

conspiracy to commit murder. On May 4, 1983, Stohler was charged 

with conspiracy to commit murder. Robert Doss, who is Stohler's 

good friend and Powers' ex-boyfriend and the father of her child, 

was charged in the same document with conspiracy to commit murder 

and first degree murder. 

Stohler pled nolo contendere to the conspiracy charge, then 

unsuccessfully attempted to preclude , on double jeopardy grounds, 

a trial on the murder charge based on his conviction on the 

conspiracy charge. See Stohler v. State ex rel. Lamm, 696 P . 2d 

1038 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). A jury found Stohler guilty of 

first degree murder. His appeal from his conviction, Stohler v. 

State, 751 P . 2d 1087 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), motion for postconviction relief, and appeal from the denial of the motion for 

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post-conviction relief were unsuccessful as well. Doss was 

acquitted. 

Stohler then commenced the present habeas corpus proceeding. 

The matter was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U. S . C. § 636, who conducted an evidentiary hearing and recommended 

that the petition be granted. Following a de novo hearing, the 

district court denied the petition. 

We first address whether we must dismiss Stohler's petition 

because he failed to exhaust his state remedies. A state prisoner 

bringing a § 2254 action must show he exhausted all claims in 

state court. Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F. 2d 392, 398 (10th Cir. ) , 

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 347 (1992) . A district court is required 

to dismiss a habeas petition that contains both exhausted and 

unexhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy. 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). 

Respondents argued before the district court that Stohler 

failed to exhaust his claim that he was denied a fair trial by the 

trial court's refusal to allow him to show some of the state's 

witnesses committed perjury. Respondents conceded that Stohler 

had exhausted all of his other claims. 

In its final order, the district court raised, apparently for 

the first time, the fact that Stohler had not exhausted his claims 

that his trial counsel, Tom Gann, had a conflict of interest based 

on Gann's affair with Stohler's ex-wife and simultaneous 

representation of Stohler and Robert Doss. 1 The district court 

1 Stohler also did not exhaust the claim that Gann was 

ineffective because he argued evidence to the jury that the trial 

court had ruled inadmissible . However, the state has not argued 

that the petition should be dismissed because this claim is 

unexhausted. We therefore do not address that issue. 

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nevertheless concluded that because a substantial amount of time 

and resources had been invested in the case both at the state and 

federal levels, it would be in the best interests of all concerned 

for the court to make a complete record of its findings and 

conclusions as to all issues presented. 

Respondents contend for the first time on appeal that the 

petition should be dismissed because Stohler failed to exhaust the 

conflict of interest claims identified by the district court as 

unexhausted . In Granbercy v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133 (1987) , the 

Court held that where the state has failed to raise nonexhaustion 

in the district court, "[t]he appellate court is not required to 

dismiss for nonexhaustion notwithstanding the State's failure to 

raise it, and the court is not obligated to regard the State's 

omission as an absolute waiver of the claim." Rather, the court 

must determine "whether the interests of comity and federalism 

will be better served by addressing the merits forthwith or by 

requiring a series of additional state and district court 

proceedings before reviewing the merits of the petitioner's 

claim. " Id. at 134. 

We conclude that dismissal is not required under Granberry . 

No unresolved factual issues or questions of state law remain. 

See id. at 134- 35. The interests of comity and federalism would 

not be better served by requiring Stohler to exhaust his conflict 

of interest claims in state court at this time . 

Turning to the merits of the first issue, Stohler argues that 

Gann had a conflict of interest because he became involved 

romantically with Stohler's then-wife, Kay, before Stohler' s trial 

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began. The district court found that the romance did not begin 

until after Gann's representation of Stohler ended, but even if it 

had begun during the appeal, Stohler failed to show any adverse 

effect. Because the district court's findings were based on 

testimony presented to that court, we must uphold them unless they 

are clearly erroneous. See Castleberry v. Alford, 666 F.2d 1338, 

1342 n.2 {10th Cir. 1981). A finding of fact is not clearly 

erroneous unless it is "without factual support in the record, or 

if the appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made." LeMaire ex rel. LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 

953 {10th Cir. 1987). Our review of the record does not convince 

us that the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. 

Stohler next argues that, under the test enunciated in Grady 

v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), his double jeopardy rights were 

violated because he pled nolo contendere to conspiracy, and one of 

the overt acts in the conspiracy charge was relitigated in the 

murder trial. Grady held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 

any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish 

an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, 

will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the 

defendant has already been prosecuted." Id. at 521. As the Court 

later explained, this language, taken out of context and read 

literally, would bar a conspiracy prosecution and a prosecution 

for the underlying substantive offense. United States v. Felix, 

112 S. Ct. 1377, 1383-84 (1992). However, the Court declined to 

interpret Grady in such a manner because of the long-standing rule 

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that a substantive crime and the conspiracy to commit that crime 

"are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes." Id. at 

1385 . We therefore hold the district court properly rejected 

Stohler's double jeopardy claim. 

Stohler next contends that the district court erred in 

finding that he did not have a plea agreement with the state that 

induced his confession. In support of his contention, Stohler 

points to certain findings of a grand jury indicating that a plea 

agreement had been made; statements made by Gann in a letter and 

motion indicating such an agreement had been made; and Gann's 

closing argument at Stohler's murder trial. 

The district court found that the weight of the evidence 

overwhelmingly supported the conclusion there was no plea 

agreement. Stohler testified at the Ensminger trial and before 

the grand jury that no agreement had been reached with the 

district attorney's office . Tom Gann, Kay Stohler Gann, and 

District Attorney David Moss testified that no plea agreement had 

been reached . Ample evidence supports the district court's 

finding. We uphold it. 

Stohler also argues the district court erred in finding that 

his confession was not coerced by promises of leniency. After an 

independent evaluation, the district court concurred with the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that Stohler 

knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and understood the 

consequences of his waiver. Stohler, 751 P.2d at 1089-90. 

The v oluntariness of a confession depends on the totality of 

the circumsta nces. Schnecklo th v . Bustamente, 412 U.S . 218, 226 

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(1973). Stohler had the burden of proving his confession was 

involuntary. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 925 (11th Cir. 

1985), modified on other grounds, 781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir. ) , cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986). We independently review whether a 

confession was voluntary. 

(1985). 

Miller v . Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 

In United States v. Garot, 801 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 

1986), relying on Hunter v. Swenson, 372 F . Supp. 287, 298 (W . D. 

Mo. ) , aff'd, 504 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S . 

980 (1975 ), we listed the following questions as relevant in 

addressing a claim that a confession was unconstitutionally 

coerced by a promise of lenience: 1) was an express or implied 

promise of leniency made; 2) if not, did the defendant reasonably 

believe such a promise had been made; 3) was the defendant's 

statement induced by either the promise or the defendant's 

reasonable belief that a promise had been made; and 4) was the 

inducing promise coercive? For guidance as to what constitutes 

coercion, we looked to United States v. Williams, 447 F. Supp. 

631, 636 (D. Del. 1978 ) , which rejected an inflexible rule that 

condemns any incriminating statement obtained due to promises, and 

instead applied a totality of the circumstances test that 

considers whether: 1 ) the defendant was in custody at the time of 

his statement; 2 ) he was alone and unrepresented by counsel; 3) 

the promise was initiated by the state, or by the defendant or his 

agent; 4) the defendant was aware of his constitutional and other 

legal rights; 5 ) the incriminating statement was part of an 

abortive plea bargain; 6) the promises or inducements were 

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fulfilled by the state; and 7) the defendant was subjected to 

protracted interrogation or there is evidence showing that 

coercion precluded his statement from being knowing and 

intelligent. Garot, 801 F. 2d at 1245 (citing Williams, 447 F. 

Supp. at 636-37) . 

Stohler testified before the grand jury that no promises were 

made, but there was a possibility of leniency if he cooperated. 

District Attorney Moss testified before the district court that he 

did not make any recommendation as to a specific amount of years 

on a reduction or anything else, but took the position that 

Stohler would have to earn his consideration. He later agreed 

that he would have reduced the charges to 

solicitation for a term of years if Stohler had 

implicating Doss, which Stohler did not give. 

conspiracy or 

given testimony 

If a promise was made, or Stohler reasonably believed a 

promise had been made, the totality of circumstances nonetheless 

support the conclusion that Stohler's statement was voluntary. 

While he was in custody when he made his statement, he was 

represented by counsel. Gann testified that he approached Moss 

about an agreement, but Moss was not interested initially. 

Stohler, a former police officer, was aware of his constitutional 

rights; in fact, he admitted he knew anything he said could and 

would be used against him. The statement was not part of an 

abortive plea bargain. Moss testified that the state agreed to 

reduce the charge to second degree murder and recommended twenty 

years to life. However, the judge refused to accept the 

agreement. The state also did not ask for the death penalty on 

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the first degree murder charge. Finally, given Stohler's age, 

education, and experience in law enforcement, a five-hour 

interrogation was not so protracted as to make the statement 

involuntary. Stohler has not identified any other evidence in the 

record showing that coercion precluded the statement from being 

knowing and intelligent. We conclude the statement was voluntary . 

Stohler next argues that the state trial court violated his 

right to present a defense by excluding extrinsic evidence that 

Doss and Powers had been involved in a custody dispute, and that 

Powers allegedly abused her and Doss's son . The constitutional 

right to present a defense requires that a defendant not be 

arbitrarily deprived of relevant, material evidence that is vital 

to the defense. United States v. Begay, 937 F . 2d 515, 523 (10th 

Cir. 1991). Stohler concedes the excluded evidence was not 

relevant to self-defense or a justification defense. Rather, he 

argues that the evidence was relevant to his motive and intent. 

Stohler relied on Wadley v. State, 553 P.2d 520 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1976), at trial. Wadley held that "the conduct, attitude, 

and feelings of the accused and the deceased [victim] toward each 

other may be shown in a murder case to establish motive, malice or 

intent." Id. at 523. However, in Wadley, the defendant had 

admitted fighting with the victim but denied any intent to 

seriously injure her. Id. at 522. The evidence at issue, that he 

told others about beating her previously, would have been relevant 

to show whether he had the requisite motive and intent. 

The issues at Stohler's trial were whether he unlawfully and 

with malice aforethought caused Powers' death. See Okla. Stat. 

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tit. 21, § 701.7A. The excluded evidence of child abuse was 

intended not to show whether he had the requisite intent, but why 

he had that intent. However, Stohler's motive for planning the 

murder was not a legally recognized defense. See, e.g., Okla. 

Stat. tit. 21, §§ 731 , 733. The evidence therefore did not tend 

to prove or disprove any issue in the case . See Okla. Stat. tit. 

12, § 2401. Exclusion of the evidence did not violate Stohler's 

right to present a defense. 

Stohler also contends that his right to present a defense was 

violated by the trial court's refusal to allow him to impeach Moss 

and Jerry Quinton, the chief investigator for the district 

attorney's office, to show that his confession was induced by 

promises and therefore was involuntary. The trial court refused 

to allow the use of grand jury testimony to impeach Moss because 

it was remote in time and misleading. We see no indication that 

Stohler requested impeachment of Quinton with the grand jury 

testimony. As the trial court could not have erred in denying a 

request that was never made, that issue is not before us. 

Stohler elicited testimony from Moss that while no formal 

agreement had been reached, it was understood if Stohler came back 

and testified, Moss was obligating himself to give Stohler some 

consideration, and there was a "gentleman's agreement" to give 

Stohler leniency. Stohler has not identified any specific 

inconsistent statements made by Moss before the grand jury that 

add anything to the testimony elicited at trial. He has not 

e st ab lished any denial of his right to present a defense. 

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Stohler next argues that Gann's representation of him was 

ineffective. To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim one must prove both that counsel's performance was 

deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

Stohler argues Gann was ineffective because he simultaneously 

represented Stohler and Doss. Stohler must demonstrate that 11 an 

actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's 

performance . " Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). The 

district court found that Gann was no longer representing Doss 

when he began representing Stohler. However, Gann testified that 

he continued to represent Doss with respect to a child custody 

matter after he began his representation of Stohler. 

Nevertheless, Stohler still must show that Gann's 

representation of Doss adversely affected Gann's representation of 

Stohler. He notes that Gann used some information he obtained 

from Doss as part of his defense tactic, and speculates that if 

Doss had testified at Stohler's trial, this could have caused Gann 

to compromise one client or the other. This does not establish 

that Gann's actual representation of Stohler was adversely 

affected. Stohler also maintains that the magistrate judge's 

finding that Gann enticed Stohler back to Tulsa to give a 

confession in which Doss was not implicated, resulting in 

Stohler's legal demise, was correct. However, he has not 

identified any evidentiary support for the finding. We conclude 

that Stohler failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on Gann's representation of Doss. 

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Stohler next argues that Gann was ineffective because he 

failed to insist on a mandatory post-examination competency 

hearing. There is no evidence that Stohler was incompetent. 

Thus, if Gann had requested the hearing, the outcome would have 

been no different. The district court properly rejected this 

claim. 

Stohler contends Gann was ineffective because he told the 

jury he would prove that Powers' abuse of her child led to 

Stohler's involvement in the crime, and that Stohler's confession 

was involuntary, after the trial court ruled such evidence 

inadmissible. Stohler discussed the abuse in his videotape 

statement, which the jury heard. Further, Moss and Quinton 

testified concerning the circumstances surrounding Stohler's 

surrender and statement. Thus, it was not error for Gann to refer 

to these matters in his closing argument. 

Stohler argues Gann was ineffective because he failed to 

present Kay Stohler Gann's alibi testimony that she and Stohler 

had dinner at Jamil's restaurant the night of the murder. He 

asserts that Gann should have known the state would attempt to 

prove an inference could be drawn that Stohler was at the scene of 

the murder because the district attorney made this argument in her 

opening statement. 

Even if Kay Stohler Gann had testified that she and Stohler 

ate at Jamil's the night of Powers' murder, Stohler admitted at 

the Ensminger trial that there might have been enough time to 

finish eating at Jamil's and drive to Powers' apartment and shoot 

her. Additionally, the jury heard his confession to participating 

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in the planning of the crime. The jury was instructed that all 

persons concerned in the commission of a crime are regarded as 

principals and are equally guilty thereof. See Okla. Stat. tit. 

21, § 172 . Stohler has not shown that Gann's failure to call Kay 

Stohler Gann prejudiced the defense. 

Stohler's next claim of ineffective assistance appears to be 

that Gann based part of his defense on his claim that Stohler's 

acts amounted to the crime of solicitation, but Stohler had 

already been convicted of that crime. We fail to see how this 

strategy prejudiced Stohler's defense. 

The next claim of error is that Gann's appellate brief and 

petition for rehearing before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals were inadequate because they did not cite to authority in 

support of some arguments and did not include portions of the 

grand jury transcript. Stohler made no showing in this appeal 

that he would have prevailed on any of these issues had Gann 

supplied the missing information. 

Stohler notes Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821, 823 (10th Cir. 

1990), held that "when courts have found counsel constitutionally 

inadequate, because [he] failed to properly perfect an appeal, 

they do not consider the merits of arguments that the defendant 

might have made on appeal." The attorney in Abels failed to 

perfect an appeal by failing to file any brief. Id. at 822. In 

contrast, Gann did not fail to properly perfect the appeal; he 

failed to provide authorities for some of his arguments on appeal . 

The Supreme Court held that the prejudice component of Strickland 

is inapp licable and prejudice presumed where there has been an 

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actual or complete denial of the assistance of counsel on appeal; 

however, it distinguished a complete lack of representation from a 

situation where counsel failed "to argue an issue as effectively 

as he or she might." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S . 75, 88 (1988). We 

conclude that Stohler failed to establish ineffective assistance 

of counsel in his direct appeal. 

Finally, Stohler argues that the cumulative effect of errors 

denied him a fair trial. 

reject this argument. 

Because we have found no errors, we 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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