Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_98-cv-00053/USCOURTS-azd-4_98-cv-00053-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Rudolph Wood, III,

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

No. CV-98-0053-TUC-JGZ 

Death Penalty Case 

Order 

 

 Petitioner Joseph Wood is an Arizona death row inmate. His execution is 

scheduled for July 23, 2014. On Thursday, July 17, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion 

seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) and a motion for a stay of execution. (Docs. 116, 

117.) Briefing was completed Saturday, July 19. On Sunday, July 20, the Court denied 

the motions. (Doc. 124.) 

 Now before the Court is Petitioner’s motion, filed Monday, July 21, asking the 

Court to alter or amend its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. (Doc. 125.) In the alternative, Petitioner seeks a certificate of appealability 

with respect to the Court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. (Id.) 

Case 4:98-cv-00053-JGZ Document 126 Filed 07/21/14 Page 1 of 5
2 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISCUSSION 

 A motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure is in essence a motion for reconsideration. Rule 59(e) offers an 

“extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation 

of judicial resources.” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 

2000). The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that a motion brought pursuant to Rule 

59(e) should only be granted in “highly unusual circumstances.” Id.; see 389 Orange 

Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Reconsideration is appropriate only if the court is presented with newly 

discovered evidence, if there is an intervening change in controlling law, or if the court 

committed clear error. McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (per 

curiam); see School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. AcandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 

1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration is not a forum for the moving party 

to make new arguments not raised in its original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. 

Lynnwood Equipment, Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor is it the time to 

ask the court to “rethink what it has already thought through.” United States v. 

Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998). 

 Petitioner argues that the Court erred in finding that his claim of ineffectiveness 

of sentencing counsel (Claim D) constituted an unauthorized second or successive 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). (Doc. 124 at 20–22.) Petitioner asserts that this 

Case 4:98-cv-00053-JGZ Document 126 Filed 07/21/14 Page 2 of 5
3 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court’s denial of funds for neurological testing prevented him from presenting what is a 

fundamentally altered, and therefore unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 125 at 3–4.) He characterizes this argument as 

an “attack on the integrity of his federal habeas corpus proceedings.” (Doc. 125 at 2.) 

 While Petitioner is asking the Court “to rethink what it has already thought 

through,” the Court will briefly address Petitioner’s argument. 

 In Claim 10(C)(3)(a) of his habeas petition, Petitioner alleged that trial counsel 

performed ineffectively at sentencing by failing to adequately prepare and present 

evidence of Petitioner’s diminished capacity, including personality changes following 

several serious head injuries, and his social history, including his family history of 

alcoholism and mental illness. Petitioner also alleged that counsel performed 

ineffectively by failing to obtain and present an in-depth neurological evaluation. (Doc. 

24 at 136–42.) 

 The Court found that Claim 10(C)(3)(a) had been properly exhausted in 

Petitioner’s PCR proceedings in state court. (Doc. 63 at 37.) The Court considered the 

claim on the merits and denied relief. (Doc. 79 and 45–62.) The Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals affirmed. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court of 

Appeals also affirmed this Court’s denial of evidentiary development, explaining that 

“Wood is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or additional discovery in federal court 

because this ineffective assistance of counsel claim is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 

Case 4:98-cv-00053-JGZ Document 126 Filed 07/21/14 Page 3 of 5
4 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2254(d)(1), as it was adjudicated on the merits in the PCR proceedings. Review of such 

claims ‘is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim 

on the merits.’” Id. at 1122 (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 

(2011)). 

 In seeking to reopen judgment with respect to allegations of ineffective 

assistance of sentencing counsel, Petitioner is advancing a habeas claim. Therefore, the 

motion is a second or successive petition. This is true whether he is raising a new, 

fundamentally altered claim or supporting a previous claim with new evidence. See 

Gonzales v. Crosby, 535 U.S. 524, 531–32 (2005). “It makes no difference that the 

motion itself does not attack the district court’s substantive analysis of those claims but, 

instead, purports to raise a defect in the integrity of the habeas proceedings. . . .” Post v. 

Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 424 (6th Cir. 2005). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend 

judgment is denied. (Doc. 125.) 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 4:98-cv-00053-JGZ Document 126 Filed 07/21/14 Page 4 of 5
5 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent a certificate of appealability is 

needed, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could debate its denial of 

Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, the Court grants a certificate of appealability on this 

issue. 

 Dated this 21st day of July, 2014. 

Case 4:98-cv-00053-JGZ Document 126 Filed 07/21/14 Page 5 of 5