Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01613/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01613-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Defendants are Kern County Superior Court Commissioner Louis P. Vega (“Commissioner Vega”), attorney

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Timothy Kleier (“Mr. Kleier”), Geraldine Cady (“Ms. Cady”), the Kern County Superior Court (“Superior Court”) and the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth District (“Fifth District”). Commissioner Vega, Mr. Kleier, Ms. Cady, the Superior Court

and the Fifth District will be referred to collectively as defendants. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL D. RUSSELL, CASE NO. CV F 07-1613 LJO TAG

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

vs. (Docs. 10, 13, 16.)

KERN COUNTY SUPERIOR

COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendants seek F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and/or F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of pro se plaintiff 1

Michael D. Russell’s (“Mr. Russell’s”) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983") claims arising from

underlying state court trust litigation. Defendants contend that Mr. Russell’s claims are barred under

doctrines precluding federal court review of state decisions and immunities. Mr. Russell fails

meaningfully to oppose dismissal of his section 1983 claims and continues to express displeasure with

adverse state court rulings. This Court considered defendants’ motions to dismiss on the record and

VACATES the January11 and 17, 2008 hearings, pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(c), (h). For the reasons

discussed below, this Court DISMISSES Mr. Russell’s section 1983 claims against defendants.

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BACKGROUND2

Underlying Trust Litigation

Mr. Russell and Mr. Kleier are California-licensed attorneys. Mr. Russell was appointed trustee

of Joseph A. Bain’s trust estate. Mr. Russell invested in an oil lease, that within two years lost 60

percent of the trust’s cash. Trust beneficiaries pursued a Superior Court action (“state court action”) to

remove Mr. Russell as trustee and for an accounting from Mr. Russell. Mr. Russell did not oppose his

removal as trustee, and Ms. Cady was appointed as successor trustee, although Mr. Russell alleges she

“was never properly appointed.” 

The state court action proceeded to trial in 2003 apparently on the beneficiaries’ claim that Mr.

Russell owed a surcharge to the trust estate. Mr. Kleier represented Ms. Cady in the state court action

over which Commissioner Vega presided. In the state court action, judgment was entered against Mr.

Russell and affirmed in part by the Fifth District.

Mr. Russell’s Claims

Mr. Russell filed his complaint (“complaint”) in this action on November 5, 2007 to take issue

with proceedings and rulings in the state court action andCommissioner Vega and Mr. Kleier’s conduct.

The complaint makes vague references that Mr. Kleier “presented improper evidence,” made certain

representations regarding evidence to Commissioner Vega, made “slanders and misrepresentations,”

influenced Commissioner Vega’s decision, and concealed signing of a judgment. The complaint alleges

that the conduct of Mr. Kleier, Ms. Cady and Commissioner Vega violates Mr. Russell’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights and California laws to guarantee Mr. Russell’s “constitutional right to a fair trial.”

According to the complaint, the Superior Court and Fifth District “have refused to acknowledge the

violations of Russell’s right to a fair trial, violations of his due process rights, and equal protections

afforded by the laws of the United States and the State of California.” The complaint further alleges that

the “judgment in the Superior Court action is void ab initio based on the misconduct” of Commissioner

Vega and Mr. Kleier.

For relief, the complaint seeks:

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1. Dismissal of the state court action’s complaint based on violation of Mr. Russell’s right

to a fair trial;

2. An order “overturning the judgment and for findings that any damages found that the

Kern County Superior Court case can be dismissed with prejudice based on the

misconduct of the Court and the Petitioners therein and their attorney, Timothy Kleier”;

3. A finding that Mr. Kleier and Ms. Cady “committed perjury and other matters of

misconduct in violation of Russell’s constitutional rights”;

4. A finding that the Fifth District’s decision “is insufficient and improper”;

5. “[A]ppropriate injunctive relief as against all defendants” and “a declaration of

misconduct” as to Commissioner Vega and Mr. Kleier; and

6. An award of attorney fees and costs against Mr. Kleier and Ms. Cady.

Defendants seek F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) dismissal that the complaint fails to establish this Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction and/or F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal that the complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. 

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) Motion To Dismiss Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) authorizes a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Fundamentally, federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.

375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 341 (1994). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case

unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F. 2d 1221,

1225 (9 Cir. 1989). Limits on federal jurisdiction must be neither disregarded nor evaded. Owen th

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (1978). A plaintiff bears the

burden to establish that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396.

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) attack on jurisdiction may be facial to confine inquiry to the complaint’s

allegations, or factual to permit a court to look beyond the complaint. Savage v. Glendale Union High

School, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039-1040, n. 2 (9 Cir. 2003). When a defendant challenges jurisdiction th

“facially,” all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the question for the court is

whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading. Thornhill Publishing Co.

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v. General Telephone Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9 Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & th

Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3 Cir. 1977). In a factual challenge, a court may rely on evidence rd

extrinsic to the pleadings and resolve factual disputes relating to jurisdiction. St. Clair v. City of Chico,

880 F.2d 199, 210 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 541 (1989); Roberts v. Corrothers,

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812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9 Cir. 1987). In addition, a court “need not presume the truthfulness of the th

plaintiffs’ allegations.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9 Cir. 2000). th

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiencyof a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where th

there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper th

when “plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102 (1957). 

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). “However, conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d

696, 699 (9 Cir. 1998). A court need not permit an attempt to amend a complaint if “it determines that th

the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.

N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9 Cir. 1990). th

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants’ attacks on Mr. Russell’s section

1983 claims.

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Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants contend Mr. Russell’s claims are barred for failure to state a claim and lack subject

matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which prohibits federal court review of state

court decisions. A federal court is not the proper forum to attack state court orders. Federal courts lack

jurisdiction to review or modify state court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker

v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on 28

U.S.C. § 1257 which grants the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction to review decisions of the

highest state courts for compliance with the federal Constitution. See Rooker, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct.

149; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303. The doctrine provides that “lower federal courts do not

have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme

Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.” Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, 142

F.3d 326, 330 (6 Cir. 1998). “This is equally true in constitutional cases brought under [28 U.S.C.] § th

1983, since federal courts must give ‘full faith and credit’ to the judicial proceedings of state courts.’”

Gottfried, 142 F.3d at 330 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). “Federal district courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction to review such final adjudications or to evaluate constitutional claims that are ‘inextricably

intertwined with the state court’s [decision] in a judicial proceeding.’” Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288,

296 (3 Cir. 1992) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n. 16). rd

Moreover, a federal court lackssubject matter jurisdiction to review final determinations of state

courts and claims “inextricably intertwined” with final state court decisions, even if such “inextricably

intertwined” claims were not raised in state court. See Rooker, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149; Feldman,

460 U.S. at 483-487 and n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303; Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9

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Cir. 1998) (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional). A federal district court is a court

of original jurisdiction and has no authority to review final determinations of state courts. Worldwide

Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9 Cir. 1986); Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court of th

State of Cal. for County of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9 Cir. 1994). “[A] losing party in state court th

is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United

States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s

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federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (1994).

“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district

court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the

judgment of that court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9 Cir. 2003). “If a federal plaintiff asserts

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as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court

judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district

court.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal adjudication of a claim that

“amounts to nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on prior state court decisions.”

Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9 Cir. 1995). th

As illustrated by its requested the relief, the complaint attacks state court action proceedings and

seeks review and modification of state court action orders and the Fifth District’s review. This Court

is unable to review the fully litigated state court action and subsequent appellate proceedings. Mr.

Russell’s claims here are no less than inextricably intertwined with the state court action and appellate

proceedings. Mr. Russell’s recourse was to seek further state appellate review, not resort to this Court.

Mr. Russell provides no meaningful support or authority for his use of a section 1983 action to unwind

state court proceedings. Mr. Russell’s misplaces reliance on the overruled decision Gresham Park

Community Organization v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (1981), overruling recognized by Christo v. Padgett,

223 F.3d 1324 (11 Cir. 2000). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court to act on matters litigated th

in state court proceedings.

Younger Abstention

To the extent that the state court action continues, defendants seek dismissal of this action

pursuant to the abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971). Younger

abstention is proper where (1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings, (2) that implicate important

state interests, and (3) there is an adequate opportunityin the state proceedings to raise federal questions.

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521

(1982); Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1405 (9 Cir. 1994). The “policy objective th

behind Younger abstention is to avoid unnecessary conflict between state and federal governments.”

United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 707 (9 Cir. 2001). Younger permits “state courts to try state th

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cases free from interference by federal courts,” particularly where the party to the federal case may fully

litigate his claim before the state court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281 (1975)

(quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 91 S.Ct. 746). Younger “contemplates the outright dismissal of the

federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts.” Gibson v.

Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689 (1973); Beltran v. State of California, 871 F.2d 777, 782

(9 Cir. 1988). “Younger generally directs federal courts to abstain from granting injunctive or th

declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.” Martinez v. Newport

Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 781 (9 Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Green, 255 F.3d 1086. th

Younger abstention further supports dismissal of Mr. Russell’s claims. Although the status of

the state court action is unclear, Mr. Russell has had no less than an adequate opportunity to address in

state court trial and appellate proceedings the issues which he raises in this action. The complaint’s

requested relief would interfere with the state court action, to the extent it continues to proceed. Younger

directs this Court to abstain from doing so. This Court is not in a position to interject into state court

proceedings.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Commissioner Vega, the Superior Court and Fifth District (collectively “judicial defendants”)

contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars Mr. Russell’s claims. According to the Eleventh

Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in

law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of Another State,

or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” The United States Supreme Court has noted: “The

[Eleventh] Amendment . . . enacts a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on

the federal judiciary’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Idaho v. Couer d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 117

S.Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997).

“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an

unconsenting state. Though its language might suggest otherwise, the Eleventh Amendment has long

been construed to extend to suits brought against a state by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of

other states.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9 Cir. 1991), cert. th

denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992) (citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,

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116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,

144, 113 S.Ct. 684 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9 Cir. 1991). th

The Eleventh Amendment barssuits against state agencies as well as those where the state itself

is named as a defendant. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 144, 113 S.Ct. 684; Natural Resources

Defense Council v. California Dept. of Transportation, 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9 Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 th

F.2d at 1053; see also Lucas v. Department of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9 Cir. 1995) (per curiam) th

(Board of Correctionsis agencyentitled to immunity); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9 Cir. 1989) th

(Nevada Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).

The California Superior Court and appellate court systems are branches of the State of California,

see Cal. Const. art. VI, and are state agencies subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Greater Los

Angeles Counsel on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9 Cir. 1987); County of Sonoma v. th

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 222 Cal.App.3d 1133, 1136-1137, 272 Cal.Rptr. 297 (1990)

(“The system of courts in California is a statewide system, established by the State Constitution and the

statutes enacted by the Legislature pursuant thereto.”) A section 1983 plaintiff is unable to state a claim

against a California Superior Court or its employees “because such suits are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.” Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9 Cir. 2003). th

The Eleventh Amendment’s bar to actionsin federal court against states and their agency courts

supports dismissal of Mr. Russell’s claims against the judicial defendants. The complaint alleges no

conduct that falls outside the scope of the immunities. The judicial defendants are immune from suit

as they performed functions intimately associated with the judicial process and/or are a state agency.

See Stevens v. Rifkin, 608 F.Supp. 710, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1984); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). Mr. Russell

admits that the judicial defendants’ assertions “are correct” but fails to demonstrate that “they are not

on point.”

Absolute Judicial Immunity

Under a longstanding rule, Commissioner Vega is entitled to absolute immunity:

Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity

of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction,

as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335,

20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting

maliciously and corruptly, and it “is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or

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corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should

be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of

consequences.

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

Judges are absolutely immune from damages for judicial acts taken within the

jurisdiction of their courts. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9 Cir. 1986) (en th

banc) (Ashelman). Grave procedural errors or acts in excess of judicial authority do not

deprive a judge of this immunity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57, 98 S.Ct.

1099, 1104-05, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (Stump). A judge loses absolute immunity only

when he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial

in nature. See Forrester v. White, __ U.S. __, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544-46, 98 L.Ed.2d 555

(1988); Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 & n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 & n. 7, Ashelman, 793 F.2d

at 1075.

Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995, 109 S.Ct. 561(1988). th

Moreover, “as long as a judge has jurisdiction to perform the ‘general act’ in question, he or she

is immune “however erroneous the act may have been, . . . however injurious in its consequences it may

have proved to the plaintiff’ and irrespective of the judge’s motivation.” Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d

1008, 1012 (9 Cir. 2000) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 106 S.Ct. 496 (1985); th

see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978) (“the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction

must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.”)

As a subordinate judicial officer, Commissioner Vega is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.

See Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 830-831 (9 Cir. 1995). Mr. Russell’s claims arise from th

Commissioner Vega’s judicial acts committed within his judicial jurisdiction. Even if Commissioner

Vega’s alleged acts were malicious or corrupt, his actions are protected under absolute immunity. 

Citing impertinent authority, Mr. Russell attempts to skirt judicial immunity by arguing that he

seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. To be plain, Mr. Russell seeks to use this Court to disrupt state

court rulings adverse to him and to intimidateCommissioner Vega in future proceedings, if any. Despite

how Mr. Russell attempts to dress his claims, the result is the same. This Court is unable to render the

relief he seeks, including “a new trial before a new trier of fact.” Absolute judicial immunity serves as

further grounds to bar Mr. Russell’s claims.

Section 1983 Deficiencies

The complaint fails to allege a sufficient claim under section 1983, which provides in pertinent

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part:

Every person who, under the color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) defendants deprived plaintiff of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 928 (1987). Section th

1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of defendant and deprivation

allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that

“[a] person ‘subjects’ another to deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section

1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). The complaint fails to satisfy the linking requirement as to th

defendants and to articulate how they deprived Mr. Russell of constitutional rights and resulting harm.

Furthermore, municipalities and other local government units are persons to whom section 1983

applies. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1387-1388 (1997); Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9 Cir. th

1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 950 (1997); Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9 Cir. 1995). A defendant th

has acted under color of state law when he or she has “exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law

and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61

S.Ct.1031 (1941)); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-318, 102 S.Ct. 445 (1981); Johnson v.

Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 559 (1997); Vang v. Xiong, 944 F.2d th

476, 479 (9 Cir. 1991); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9 Cir. 1986). Generally, th th

private parties are not acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-708 (9th

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Section 335.1 provides: “Within two years: An action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, 3

an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.”

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Cir. 1991).

Mr. Kleier and Ms. Cady are private parties. Pertinent to Mr. Russell’s claims, Mr. Kleier acted

as a private attorney in litigation adverse to Mr. Russell. Ms. Cady merely replaced Mr. Russell as

trustee. The complaint fails to, and under the facts pled, is unable to allege that Mr. Kleier or Ms. Cady

exercised power possessed by virtue of state law. The complaint fails to state a cognizable section 1983

claim against defendants.

Apparently recognizing such deficiencies to his claims, Mr. Russell asserts that Mr. Kleier and

Ms. Cady submitted evidence outside of trial and that Commissioner Vega accepted and relied on such

evidence. The evidence issue is an attack on Commissioner Vega’s ruling and a matter reserved to the

state courts. In the guise of section 1983 claims, Mr. Russell improperly seeks from this Court what

substantively constitutes appellate review of state court proceedings.

Limitations Period

In addition, Mr. Russell’s claims are susceptible to a statute of limitations defense. Federal civil

rights statutes have no independent limitations period. Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d 650, 653

(9 Cir. 2000); Abreu v. Ramirez, 284 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The applicable th

limitations period is determined by borrowing the forum state’slimitations period for personal injuries.

Johnson, 207 F.3d at 653; Abreu, 284 F.Supp.2d at 1257. Section 1983 claims “are best characterized

as personal injury actions.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938 (1985). 

On January 1, 2003, California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“section 335.1") took 3

effect to extend the prior limitations period for personal injury actions (and correspondingly to federal

civil rights claims, see Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271-272, 105 S.Ct. 1938; Johnson v. Railway Express

Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716 (1975); Krug v. Imbrodino, 896 F.2d 395, 396-397 (9 Cir. th

1990)) from one year under California Code of Civil Procedure section 340(3) to two years. Abreu, 284

F.Supp.2d at 1255; see Cal. Senate Bill 688 (Burton), Stats. 2002, ch. 448, §3. Applying California law,

claims brought under section 1983 and which arise in California are generally barred if not brought

within two years if they accrue after January 1, 2003. See Johnson, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716; Elliot

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v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9 Cir. 1994); Krug, 896 F.2d at 396-397; see also Taylor v. th

Regents of University of California, 993 F.2d 710, 711 (9 Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1076, 114 th

S.Ct. 890 (1994); Donoghue v. County of Orange, 828 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9 Cir. 1987). Federal law th

“determines when a federal cause of action accrues, despite the fact that state law determines the relevant

statute of limitations.” Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group, 189 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9 Cir. 1999); th

Elliott, 25 F.3d at 801-802. Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason

to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Tworivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9 Cir. th

1999); Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9 Cir. 1996). th

The complaint refers to matters arising as early as 2003 to cast doubt whether a portion of Mr.

Russell’s claims are timely.

Malice

The complaint suggests that Mr. Russell brings this action with malice and in absence of good

faith to attempt to vex the judicial defendants, who ruled against him, his opposing counsel Mr. Kleier,

and Ms. Cady, who succeeded him as trustee. The test for maliciousness is a subjective one and requires

the court to “determine the . . . good faith of the applicant.” Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236

U.S. 43, 46, 35 S.Ct. 236 (1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968, n. 1 (11 Cir. 1986). A th

complaint is malicious if it suggests an intent to vex defendants or abuse the judicial process by

relitigating claims decided in prior cases. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981);

Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10 Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 985, 101 S.Ct. 1524 (1981); th

Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F.Supp. 627, 628-629 (N.D. Ind. 1983); cf. Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754,

757 (7 Cir. 1986) (court has inherent power to dismiss case demonstrating “clear pattern of abuse of th

judicial process”). A lack of good faith or malice also can be inferred from a complaint containing

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with intent to deceive the court. See Horsey

v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

As discussed above, the complaint reflects an attempt to relitigate issues decided adversely to

Mr. Russell in state court proceedings. Such attempt to relitigate issues and to vex defendants provides

further grounds to dismiss this action.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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The complaint indicates that this Court lacksjurisdiction in that Mr. Russell seeksto exploit this

Court to interfere with and obstruct state court proceedings and rulings. This Court is unable to address

Mr. Russell’s claims given that he had the opportunity to pursue such claims in state court proceedings.

The complaint is deficient to allege section 1983 claims which are subject to immunities and reflect Mr.

Russell’s intent to vex defendants. As such, this Court:

1. DISMISSES this action with prejudice; 

2. DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment against plaintiff Michael D. Russell and in favor

of defendants Commissioner Louis P. Vega, Timothy Kleier, Geraldine Cady, Kern

County Superior Court, and California Court of Appeal, Fifth District; and

3. DIRECTS further the clerk to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2008 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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