Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01237/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01237-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition,

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and Petitioner’s opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK CALVIN GEORGE, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

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A. P. KANE, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-01237 AWI LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS [Doc. #7]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by jury

trial on August 9, 1995, of one count of selling cocaine in violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 11352(a). See Lodged Doc. No. 1. Allegations that Petitioner had suffered two prior robbery

convictions were found to be true. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of 25

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U.S. District Court

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years to life in state prison with the possibility of parole. Id. 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “5 DCA”). On April 8, 1997, the 5 DCA affirmed the judgment. See Lodged Doc.

th th

No. 2. Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. See Lodged Doc.

No. 3. On June 18, 1997, the petition was denied. See Lodged Doc. No. 4.

On October 17, 1997, Petitioner was resentenced.

Petitioner filed six post-conviction challenges with respect to the pertinent judgment in the

state courts, as follows:

1. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court;

Filed: November 4, 1998; Denied: November 25, 1998;

2. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5 DCA; th

Filed: February 4, 1999; Denied April 8, 1999;

3. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court;

Filed: May 3, 1999; Denied: August 25, 1999;

4. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court;

Filed: March 17, 2005; Denied: March 25, 2005;

5. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 5 DCA; th

Filed: April 13, 2005; Denied: April 21, 2005;

6. Petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court;

Filed: May 6, 2005; Denied: March 29, 2006.

See Lodged Docs. Nos. 5-16.

Petitioner has also filed two federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. On

March 13, 1998, Petitioner filed a petition in case no. 1:98-CV-05250 OWW DLB HC. The petition

was dismissed without prejudice at Petitioner’s request so he could return to the state courts to

exhaust his state remedies. On October 4, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition in case no. 1:99-CV-06446

JKS HC. On February 25, 2004, following remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the

petition was dismissed with prejudice on the merits.

On September 11, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

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Court. On December 18, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as successive and

for violating the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). On January 3,

2007, Petitioner filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." See

also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.1990). 

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

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4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period and for being successive. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is

similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on September 11, 2006, and therefore, it is subject to the

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provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, Petitioner was resentenced on October 17, 1997. Thus, direct

review concluded on December 16, 1997, when the sixty (60) day period for filing an appeal to the

5 DCA expired. Rule 31(a), Cal.R.Ct.; People v. Mendez, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 302, 19 Cal.4th th

1084, 1086, 969 P.2d 146, 147 (1999). The one year limitations period commenced the following

day and Petitioner had one year until December 16, 1998, in which to file his federal petition for writ

of habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.2001). However, Petitioner

delayed filing the instant petition until September 11, 2006, almost eight years beyond the due date. 

Absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

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Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9 th th

Cir.2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state court petition and the

filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1247 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the "AEDPA's one-year grace period is tolled during the pendency

of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at issue."); cf. Dils v. Small, 260

F.3d 984, 986 (9 Cir.2001) (Court found no tolling between consecutive filings at the same level);

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Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.2001) (holding that the interval between a

motion for sentence modification in the state superior court and a habeas petition in the superior

court was not tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on December 17, 1997. Petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kern County Superior Court on November 4, 1998.

At that point, 322 days of the limitations period had expired. The limitations period then tolled for

Petitioner’s first round of collateral review until September 24, 1999, which was thirty (30) days

after the California Supreme Court denied the petition. Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th

Cir.2001). The limitations period recommenced and expired 43 days later on November 7, 1999. 

Although Petitioner filed three more post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim in the state courts, those petitions did not operate to toll the statute of

limitations. The first collateral challenge was filed on March 17, 2005, over five years after the

limitations period expired. Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral

challenges had no tolling consequences. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) th

(Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). 

Therefore, the petition is untimely.

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D. Successive Petition

A federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a

prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The court must also dismiss a second or successive petition

raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive,

constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due

diligence, and these new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). However, it is not the district court that decides whether a

second or successive petition meets these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or

successive petition. 

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by this

section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an

order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words, Petitioner must

obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive petition in district court. 

See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must dismiss any second or

successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave to file the petition because

a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or successive petition. Pratt v. United

States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997),

cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current

petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Petitioner makes no showing that he has

obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to file his successive petition attacking the conviction. 

That being so, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's renewed application for relief

from that conviction under Section 2254 and must dismiss the petition. See Greenawalt, 105 F.3d at

1277; Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

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GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice as successive and for

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation,

any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” 

Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if

served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation will then be

submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. th

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 13, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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