Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02516/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02516-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2516

___________

Thomas L. Harris, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* 

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

R.I. Brownlee, Acting Secretary, * Eastern District of Arkansas. 

United States Department of the Army, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 11, 2006

Filed: February 26, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Harris filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) alleging that his employer, the United States Army Corps of

Engineers (Corps), discriminated against him because of his race. The Corps and

Harris agreed that they would settle the dispute by having an independent classifier

review his employment grade level. After the reviewer did not find fault with his

classification, Harris filed this suit claiming that the review was inadequate and that

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The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas. 

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the Corps breached the settlement agreement. The district court1

 granted summary

judgment to the Secretary of the Army, and Harris appeals. We affirm.

A.

Thomas Harris served as an accounting officer in the resource management

department of the Corps' Little Rock office until his retirement in September 2004.

Thomas McCrary, chief of the resource management office in Little Rock,

recommended to the district commander in 1998 that Harris be reclassified from a GS12 to a GS-13 level employee because of the assignment of additional duties. The

human resources office for the southwestern division conducted a review of Harris'

position the following year, but did not find ample justification for an upgrade of his

position to GS-13. 

After he received an annual performance rating of satisfactory instead of

exceptional in 2001, Harris filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC alleging

that because of his race and protected conduct undertaken before the EEOC his annual

performance rating had been downgraded and his position not upgraded to the GS-13

level. Instead of proceeding to investigate the complaint, the Corps entered into a

Negotiated Settlement Agreement with Harris in November 2001 in which it agreed

to an independent review of his position. The agreement required that the Corps and

Harris agree on an independent classifier to "conduct a classification review ('desk'

audit)" of Harris' position. As part of the desk audit, the classifier would be

"instructed to consider the Position Descriptions of GS-12 and GS-13 Accounting

Officer positions" from offices which had adopted standardized position descriptions

originally created by the Fort Worth office. The agreement further required that the

classifier "interview three Accounting Officers GS-12 and three Accounting Officers

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GS-13" as part of the audit. The Corps agreed to pay Harris' attorney $1,000 for her

"assistance on this case," and Harris waived "his right to pursue administrative or

judicial action in any forum" concerning the matters raised in his complaint. 

The parties agreed that Wayne Kessler, a classification specialist for a private

contractor, would conduct the audit. Kessler met with Harris and McCrary in June

2002 and prepared his report that August. Kessler was not made aware of the terms

of the settlement agreement. Although he reviewed position descriptions for

accounting officers in the Fort Worth, Tulsa, Galveston, and Savannah districts, he did

not conduct interviews with any other accounting officers. In his August report

Kessler concluded that Harris' position should be classified at the GS-12 grade. He

also created a revised position description which he felt more accurately described

Harris' duties.

Harris filed a petition with the Corps alleging that it had failed to comply with

the terms of the settlement agreement. The Army determined that the audit had

substantially complied with the terms of the agreement and denied the petition. Harris

appealed the agency's decision to the EEOC, which affirmed the decision of the Corps

because the audit had "substantially complied with the settlement agreement." 

B.

Harris brought this suit in September 2003. He claims under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act that he has been discriminated against on account of his race by the

Corps and that he should be classified as a GS-13 grade employee. Along with an

upgrade of classification level, he seeks equitable relief, damages for mental anguish,

punitive damages, and attorney fees. He also claims that the Corps breached the

settlement agreement and that his 2001complaint should be reinstated or in the

alternative the court should order the Corps to comply with the terms of the

agreement. The Corps responds that it did not discriminate against Harris and that it

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did not breach the agreement. In the event that the court determines it did breach the

agreement, the Corps asserts that it should not reach the merits of Harris'

discrimination and retaliation claims because he has yet to exhaust his administrative

remedies on those.

 The parties filed a joint motion for stay of discovery and all other deadlines

on May 19, 2005. The motion stated that "whether there is a material breach of the

Negotiated Settlement Agreement is the threshold issue to be determined by the

Court" and requested that all the deadlines be stayed pending a determination by the

court of whether the Corps breached the agreement. The district court granted the

motion and directed Harris to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement to

facilitate determination of the breach issue. The Corps responded to Harris' motion

by arguing that he was not entitled to specific performance of the agreement and by

filing a motion for summary judgment. 

Earlier in 2005 the parties had deposed Kessler, the independent classifier. He

testified that he had been asked to perform a position classification audit of Harris'

position, in contrast to a consistency review which compares and classifies multiple

positions. The audit resulted in Kessler's determination that Harris' position was

properly classified as GS-12. In reaching this conclusion, Kessler testified that the

position descriptions of other accounting officers at the GS-12 and GS-13 levels were

of marginal value because there were no evaluative statements explaining why

classifiers had graded those officers at the different levels. He also stated that

interviews of other officers would not be relevant to a classification of Harris'

performance and that he based his classification on the Office of Personnel

Management standards. According to Kessler, he prepared a new position description

for Harris after he met with him and his supervisor and Harris did not dispute the

accuracy of the description.

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The district court denied Harris' motion for specific performance of the

agreement and granted summary judgment to the Corps on his contract claim. It

concluded that it only had jurisdiction over that claim and noted that Harris had not

exhausted administrative remedies regarding his discrimination and retaliation claims.

It then dismissed the breach of contract claim, holding that Harris was not entitled to

specific performance of the agreement or reinstatement of his complaint, the two

forms of relief available to him on this claim. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a).

Harris appeals, arguing that the district court erred when it concluded that the

government did not materially breach the terms of the settlement agreement and that

we should either enforce the agreement or reinstate his complaint. We review a grant

of summary judgment de novo, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non moving party. Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2005).

C.

Harris argues that he did not receive the benefit of the bargain contemplated in

the settlement agreement and that the Corps' failure to comply with all its terms

constitutes a substantial and material breach of the agreement. As a result, he requests

that we either order specific enforcement of the agreement or permit reinstatement of

his original discrimination complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a). The Corps asserts

that it did not materially breach the settlement agreement and that Harris received the

benefit of the bargain he made in the negotiated agreement. Moreover it argues,

specific performance of the agreement would be impossible since it would violate the

statutory requirement that employees be paid in conformance with standards published

by the Office of Personnel Management and would also be impractical because Harris

is now retired and his former supervisor is deceased.

A plaintiff alleging that the government failed to comply with the terms of a

Title VII Negotiated Settlement Agreement can "request that the terms of the

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This Court has never determined whether federal or state law governs the

enforcement of Title VII settlement agreements. See Sheng v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 117

F.3d 1081, 1083 n.1 (8th Cir. 1997). Since the parties do not dispute that the basic

contract principles determinative in this case are the same under either Arkansas or

federal law, we need not address this question. Id.

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settlement agreement be specifically implemented or, alternatively, that the complaint

be reinstated." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a). Settlement agreements, including those

entered into by the government, are viewed in light of governing contract principles,2

Gilbert v. Monsanto Co., 216 F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2000); Sheng v. Starkey Labs.,

Inc., 117 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1997), and a party is not entitled to rescission of

a contract absent a material breach of the agreement. Vereen v. Hargrove, 96 S.W.3d

762, 765 (Ark. App. 2003). Harris is thus not entitled to rescission of the agreement

and reinstatement of his complaint absent a material breach of the agreement by the

Corps. Id. Whether a breach of contract is material is measured by examining the

"extent to which the injured party will obtain the substantial benefit . . . reasonably

anticipated." DHC Resort, LLC v. Razorback Entertm't Corp., 329 F.3d 974, 976 (8th

Cir. 2003) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(a) (1981)); see also

Vereen, 96 S.W.3d at 765. 

Harris asserts that he did not receive the benefit he anticipated when he entered

into the agreement because the independent classifier did not interview other

accounting officers at the GS-12 and GS-13 levels and failed to consider the position

descriptions prepared by the Fort Worth office. We disagree. 

The Corps is required by law to assign Harris' class and grade "in conformance

with standards published by the Office of Personnel Management," 5 U.S.C. § 5107,

and the independent classifier determined that Harris was appropriately placed at the

GS-12 level after performing a full desk audit, interviewing both Harris and his

supervisor, and reviewing the Office of Personnel Management Standards. The

undisputed evidence in the record establishes that the classifier considered position

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descriptions for other GS-12 and GS-13 accounting officer personnel which were

based on the Office of Personnel Management Standards and that he prepared a

revised position description for Harris based on his job duties. Although the Corps

is permitted "when facts warrant" to "change a position which it has placed in a class

or grade," id., Harris has provided no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder

could conclude that the classifier erred when he determined that Harris was properly

classified as a GS-12 level employee or that the classifier's recommendation would

have changed if he had spoken with other accounting officers. 

Based on the circumstances of this case and the independent review of Harris'

position performed by the classifier, we conclude that Harris received the benefit of

the bargain that he "reasonably expected," Restatement (Second) of Contracts,

§ 241(a) (1981), when he entered into the settlement agreement. The district court did

not err when it determined that the Corps did not materially breach the agreement.

Because Harris does not assert that he is entitled to relief absent a material breach of

the agreement, we need not reach other issues raised by the parties.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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