Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06529/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06529-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFF S. HARNDEN, )

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Plaintiff, )

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vs. )

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D. KEY, et al., )

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Defendant. )

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No. CV-F-02-6529 REC/LJO P

ORDER DEEMING PLAINTIFF'S

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

TO BE MOTION TO RECUSE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND DENYING

DEEMED MOTION TO RECUSE

(Doc. 69)

On January 18, 2006, plaintiff Jeff S. Harnden, proceeding

in pro per, filed a pleading captioned "writ of mandate". In

this pleading, plaintiff complains of various actions and/or

inactions of the Magistrate Judge assigned to this action and to

various orders issued by the Magistrate Judge in connection with

this action. The pleading asserts that the Magistrate Judge is

biased and seeks the recusal of the Magistrate Judge.

Rule 81(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in

pertinent part:

The writs of scire facias and mandamus are

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28 U.S.C. § 144 provides: 1

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a

district court makes and files a timely and

sufficient affidavit that the judge before

whom the matter is pending has a personal bias

or prejudice against him or in favor of any

adverse party, such judge shall proceed no

further therein, but another judge shall be

assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the

reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice

exists, and shall be filed not less than ten

days before the beginning of the term at which

the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause

shall be shown for the failure to file it

within such time. A party may file only one

such affidavit in any case. It shall be

accompanied by a certificate of counsel of

record stating that it is made in good faith.

28 U.S.C. § 455 provides in pertinent part: 2

(a) Any ... magistrate judge of the United

States shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the

following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or

prejudice concerning a party ....

2

abolished. Relief heretofore available by

mandamus or scire facias may be obtained by

appropriate action or by appropriate motion

under the practice prescribed by these rules.

The court therefore deems the “writ of mandate” to be a motion to

recuse the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 1

255. 

2

So deemed, the motion to recuse is denied. The standard for

judging the appearance of impartiality requiring recusal under

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3

Section 455(a) is an objective one and involves ascertaining

“whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts

would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th

Cir. 1983). The test for personal bias or prejudice in Section

144 is identical to that in Section 455(b)(1) and requires

recusal only if the bias or prejudice is directed against a party

and stems from an extrajudicial source. United States v. Sibla,

624 F.2d 864, 867, 869 (9 Cir. 1980). In Liteky v. United th

States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the Supreme Court held that recusal

under Section 455(a) is subject to the limitation of

“extrajudicial source” applicable to Section 144. The Supreme

Court further held:

First, judicial rulings alone almost never

constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion ... In and of themselves

(i.e., apart from surrounding comments or

accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly

show reliance upon an extrajudicial source;

and can only in the rarest circumstances

evidence the degree of favoritism or

antagonism required ... when no extrajudicial

source is involved. Almost invariably, they

are proper grounds for appeal, not for

recusal. Second, opinions formed by the

judge on the basis of facts introduced or

events occurring in the course of current

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not

constitute a basis for bias or partiality

motion unless they display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair

judgment impossible. 

510 U.S. at 555. The Supreme Court further explained:

[J]udicial remarks during the course of a

trial that are critical or disapproving of,

or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or

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their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias

or partiality challenge. They may do so if

they reveal an opinion that derives from an

extrajudicial source; and they will do so if

they reveal such a high degree of favoritism

or antagonism as to make fair judgments

impossible. As example of the latter (and

perhaps the former as well) is the statement

that was alleged to have been made by the

District Judge in Berger v. United States,

255 U.S. 22 (1921), a World War I espionage

case against German-American defendants: ‘One

must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not

[to be] prejudiced against the GermanAmericans’ because their ‘hearts are reeking

with disloyalty.’ ... Not establishing bias

or partiality, however, are expressions of

impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and

even anger, that are within the bounds of

what imperfect men and women, even after

having been confirmed as federal judges,

sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary

efforts at courtroom administration - even a

stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary

efforts at courtroom administration - remain

immune.

Id. at 555-556. In United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980), the Ninth Circuit held

that a judge’s views on legal issues may not serve as the basis

for motions to disqualify. Id. at 882. In explaining the type

of bias or animus that is required to compel the recusal of a

judge, the Ninth Circuit held:

It is an animus more active and deep-rooted

than an attitude of disapproval toward

certain persons because of their known

conduct, unless the attitude is somehow

related to a suspect or invidious motive such

as racial bias or a dangerous link such as a

financial interest, and only the slightest

indication of the appearance or fact of bias

or prejudice arising from those sources would

be sufficient to disqualify. 

Id. at 881.

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5

Here, plaintiff’s deemed motion to recuse the Magistrate

Judge is based on plaintiff’s disagreement with various actions

and/or inaction or rulings of the Magistrate Judge. The court

has reviewed the record in this action and concludes that the

Magistrate Judge has acted appropriately in this case, that there

is no evidence of bias or prejudice from an extrajudicial source,

and that plaintiff’s disagreements with the Magistrate Judge’s

rulings are a matter of review by this court under the applicable

Local Rules of Practice or appeal upon final resolution of this

action. 

ACCORDINGLY:

1. The “writ of mandate” filed on January 18, 2006 is

deemed to be a motion to recuse the Magistrate Judge; and 

2. The deemed motion to recuse the Magistrate Judge is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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