Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00628/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00628-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST R. GRANDBERRY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0628 MCE GGH P

vs.

R. CASTRO, et al., 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action is proceeding on the original petition filed

March 24, 2006. Petitioner challenges his 1987 conviction for assault on prison staff. Pending

before the court is respondent’s May 8, 2006, motion to dismiss on grounds that the petition is

barred by the statute of limitations. After carefully reviewing the record, the court recommends

that respondent’s motion be granted.

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

Petitioner did not appeal his 1987 conviction. Clearly, the instant action was filed

more than one year after petitioner’s conviction became final, and more than one year after

AEDPA’s effective date (April 24, 1996).

In opposition to the pending motion, petitioner argues that the sentencing court

and Folsom Prison officials refused to give him records he needed to raise the claim brought in

the instant petition. Petitioner claims that he did not receive these records until July/August

2004. Petitioner argues that because the state created impediment to his filing of the petition was

not removed until July/August 2004, the limitations period should run from that date rather than

from when the conviction became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(B).

In support of his claim that the state court prohibited him from receiving the

records necessary to file a timely petition, petitioner cites his sentencing transcript attached to the

petition as exhibit A. The sentencing transcript indicates that petitioner pled guilty. Petition,

Exhibit A, p. 3. At this hearing, petitioner asked the court to grant him “pro per status” so that he

could gain access to certain legal materials at Folsom Prison. Id. Petitioner stated that he wanted

to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. Id., p. 4. The court denied petitioner’s

motion for the “records” of his case. Id., p. 9. In his declaration attached to the petition,

petitioner also states that officials at Folsom Prison possessed the relevant records and repeatedly

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denied his requests for access to these records until 2004. Petition, Exhibit D. 

While petitioner claims that the denial of the records regarding his conviction

prevented him from filing a timely federal petition, it does not appear that petitioner required

these records in order to raise the one claim raised in this petition: petitioner was denied his right

to counsel at arraignment and sentencing. Petitioner did not need these records to raise this claim

as he knew that he was denied counsel at these proceedings. 

Moreover, petitioner’s claim that Folsom Prison officials and the sentencing court

denied him access to the records he needed to file his petition is not well supported. The only

records submitted by petitioner in support of the petition are the transcript from the sentencing

hearing, the judgment and the abstract of judgment. Officials at Folsom Prison would not have

had these documents in their possession. Rather, the court presumes that Folsom Prison officials

would have possessed documents relevant to the underlying offense of assault on prison staff. 

The transcript and judgment would have been in the trial court’s possession. While the

sentencing court denied petitioner’s motion for “records,” this ruling could not have

encompassed the documents submitted in support of the instant petition as the transcript from the

sentencing hearing and the judgment were not even in existence yet. For these reasons, the court

finds that petitioner’s claim that Folsom Prison staff and the sentencing court denied him access

to the relevant records is not well supported. Accordingly, the court does not find that a state

created impediment prevented petitioner from filing a timely petition. Therefore, the limitations

period runs from the date on which the conviction became final. Under these circumstances, the

petition is not timely unless petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. 

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. Petitioner

filed his first state habeas petition in Sacramento Superior Court on December 2, 2004. Because

this petition was filed more than one year after petitioner’s conviction became final, he is not

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entitled to tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9

th

Cir. 2001) (once the statute has run, a collateral action cannot revive it).

In his opposition, petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling. A

habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that equitable tolling should apply to avoid

dismissal of an untimely petition. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Equitable tolling is available “only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was denied

access to the records in his criminal case until 2004. As discussed above, petitioner did not need

these records to file a timely federal petition. In addition, petitioner has not demonstrated that he

was actually denied access to the records submitted in support of the petition. As discussed

above, petitioner’s claim that Folsom Prison officials and the sentencing court denied him access

to the reporter’s transcript, judgment and abstract of judgment is not well supported. For these

reasons, petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

In his opposition petitioner also argues that sections of the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) are unconstitutional in that they violate the separation of

powers doctrine. Petitioner cites Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d 1165 (9 Cir. 2005), where the Ninth th

Circuit ordered the parties to brief whether the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

violate the separation of powers doctrine. Section 2254(d)(1) sets forth the standards by which

federal courts review state court proceedings. Petitioner also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1) and

(2) which set forth the standards for evaluating state court factual determinations as well as the

standard by which federal petitioners may obtain evidentiary hearings.

“A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as

it has an adverse impact on his own rights.” County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S.

140, 154-55, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979). Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the sections of

AEDPA cited above because none of them have been applied to petitioner. Accordingly, the

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court need not consider these arguments. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s May 8, 2006,

motion to dismiss be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 11/13/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

grand628.157

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