Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01597/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01597-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DEMONT OSHAUN HILL, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 09-01597 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On or about August 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 15) on February 4, 2009.

Respondents contend the action for habeas relief should be

denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to file his

action within the applicable statute of limitations.

Respondents also argue Petitioner failed to properly exhaust all

of his habeas claims in the state courts. On March 9, 2010, a

Report and Recommendation was filed recommending the petition be

denied and dismissed. See Docket No. 19. On March 10, 2010,

Petitioner’s response to the answer to his habeas petition was

docketed. See Docket No. 17. The first Report and

Recommendation was vacated on March 24, 2010. See Docket No.

Case 2:09-cv-01597-MHM Document 21 Filed 03/26/10 Page 1 of 10
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1

 Accordingly, Petitioner has finished serving the sentence

imposed pursuant to his conviction for conspiracy to commit armed

robbery.

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20. 

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment issued May 18,

1994, charged Petitioner and a co-defendant with conspiracy to

commit armed robbery (Count I); first-degree murder (Count II);

attempted armed robbery (Count III); and aggravated assault

(Count IV). See Answer, Exh. A. All of the offenses were

alleged to occur on the same day and the murder victim was also

a victim of the attempted armed robbery.

At the conclusion of a jury trial conducted in November

of 1995 Petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit

armed robbery and guilty of attempted armed robbery. The jury

found Petitioner not guilty of murder and not guilty of

aggravated assault. Id., Exh. B.

On January 12, 1996, after an aggravation and

mitigation hearing, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of ten

years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for conspiracy to

commit armed robbery (Count I). Id., Exh. C. Petitioner was

sentenced to a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment pursuant

to his conviction on the charge of attempted armed robbery

(Count III). Id., Exh. C. The state trial court ordered that

the sentence on Count III be served consecutively to the

sentence imposed on Count I. Id., Exh. C at 6.1

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2

 In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47, 66

S. Ct. 1180, 1183-84 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a member of

a conspiracy may be held liable for the substantive crimes committed

by his co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. In affirming

the denial of habeas relief in an unpublished opinion which is not

precedential but which is indicative of the reasoning of the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, the Ninth Circuit stated:

Gaitan contends that his due process rights were

violated when the trial court submitted a

Pinkerton instruction to the jury. After viewing

the instruction in the context of the jury

instructions as a whole, we disagree because the

Pinkerton instruction by itself did not so infect

the entire trial that Gaitan’s conviction

violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72-73, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d

385 (1991); Masoner v. Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003,

1006 (9th Cir. 1993).

Gaitan v. Stewart, 1998 WL 700294, at * 1.

-3-

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner asserted he was denied his

right to due process of law because the jury was given a

“Pinkerton”2 instruction. Petitioner also asserted the

imposition of consecutive sentences was not proper. Id., Exh.

D. 

In a decision issued January 17, 1997, the Arizona

Court of Appeals concluded that giving the instruction was

error, but that the error was harmless because the jury had not

convicted Petitioner based on the erroneous instruction. See

id., Exh. D at 3. The Court of Appeals further stated that the

consecutive sentences were not improper. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court, arguing the jury had been instructed on a “nonexistent

theory of criminal liability,” which constituted a structural

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defect not amenable to harmless error analysis. Id., Exh. D.

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review in a decision issued May

28, 1997. Id., Exh. E. 

Petitioner filed an action seeking post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on April 29, 2002. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner re-asserted the

claims stated in his direct appeal and also claimed that the

government had committed perjury in Petitioner’s direct appeal.

Petitioner acknowledged his Rule 32 action was not timely but

alleged he had not previously been aware of the availability of

post-conviction relief or the time limitations regarding postconviction relief. Petitioner further asserted his recent

awareness of the government’s misstatements in its pleadings in

his direct appeal constituted newly discovered evidence which

excused his untimely Rule 32 action, Id., Exh. F. The state

trial court denied relief and dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32

action on May 31, 2002. Id., Exh. G. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on August

3, 2009. Petitioner asserts:

1. The state trial court violated his right to due

process of law by wrongfully sentencing him “under an incorrect

application of the sentencing guidelines”.

2. His sentences are grossly disproportionate to the

severity of his crimes, in violation of his right to due process

and the Eighth Amendment.

3. The state trial court erroneously ordered his

sentences be served consecutively, in violation of his rights to

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28 -5-

due process of law.

4. The state trial court committed fundamental error by

giving the jury a Pinkerton instruction, in violation of

Petitioner’s right to due process of law and his right to a fair

trial.

5. His Fifth Amendment right to be free of double

jeopardy has been violated because he is being “twice punished

for a greater crime (Attempted Armed Robbery) being served

consecutive to its lesser underlying crime (Conspiracy to Commit

Armed Robbery)”.

Respondents assert the federal habeas petition must be

dismissed because it was not filed within the applicable statute

of limitations. Respondents further argue Petitioner did not

properly exhaust all of his federal habeas claims in the Arizona

state courts. 

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

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pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 &

Supp. 2009). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.

Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053

(9th Cir. 2008). 

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review in Petitioner’s

direct appeal in a decision issued May 28, 1997. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final for the

purpose of the statute of limitations on or about August 28,

1997, when the time expired for seeking certiorari by the United

States Supreme Court in his direct appeal. See, e.g., Randle v.

Crawford, 578 F.3d 1177, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2009).

The statute of limitations began to run on August 29,

1997, and expired on August 30, 1998. See Bunney v. Mitchell,

262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner did not file his

federal habeas action until August 3, 2009, almost eleven years

after the statute of limitations expired. Petitioner’s action

seeking state post-conviction relief, filed in April of 2002,

more than three years after the statute of limitations expired,

could not and did not restart the already-expired statute of

limitations for filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing

Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston

v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). A state-court

petition that is filed after the expiration of the statute of

limitations under the AEDPA does not revive the running of the

limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th

Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.

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2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001).

In response to the assertion that his habeas petition

was not timely filed, Petitioner again asserts that his

constitutional rights have been violated and that he is,

accordingly, entitled to relief. Petitioner maintains that he

has exhausted his federal habeas claims in the state courts and

that he has established cause and prejudice to excuse any

procedural default of his habeas claims. Petitioner does not

directly address the argument that his federal habeas petition

was not filed within the deadline stated by the AEDPA.

Petitioner asserts that, until he finished serving his sentence

for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, he could not contest the

validity of his sentence for attempted armed robbery without

incriminating himself. Petitioner further contends that he has

recently become innocent by completely serving his sentence for

conspiracy to commit armed robbery because the sentence imposed

for attempted armed robbery violates his federal constitutional

rights, including his right to be free of double jeopardy. See

Docket No. 18. 

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005). See also WaldronRamsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 130 S. Ct. 244 (2009).

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris,

515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034

(9th Cir. 2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th

Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is “typically applied

sparingly”). The petitioner must establish a causal connection

between the alleged roadblock to their timely filing of their

federal habeas petition and the actual failure to file the

petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034; Lawrence v.

Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See Espinoza Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026;

Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

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lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049; Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195

F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999). 

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Hill’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 25th day of March, 2010.

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