Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02481/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. TURNER, Jr.,

Booking No. 197347785,

Plaintiff,

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; COUNTY 

OF SAN DIEGO; CITY OF SAN

DIEGO; WILLIAM D. GORE; 

CAPTAIN BUCHANAN,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-02481-LAB-MSB

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff, David B. Turner, Jr., currently imprisoned at George F. Bailey Detention 

Facility (“GBDF”), in San Diego, California, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1.)1

 

1 According to the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department’s website, Turner was last booked on June 6, 

2019, has been sentenced, and is serving his prison term in San Diego Superior Court Case No. 

SCD282052 in local custody. See https://apps.sdsheriff.net/wij/wijDetail.aspx?BookNum=zRQs IHv WI 

OkylpP4ARqdZiQYVorV1xdJ7ApeWLojNrs%3d (last accessed Feb. 18, 2020). The Court may take 

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Turner names the State of California, the City and County of San Diego, San 

Diego County Sheriff William D. Gore, and Captain Buchanan, whom he identifies as a 

Watch Commander at the County Jail as Defendants, and claims they violated his Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as Article 1 of the California Constitution, 

when on October 13, 2018, they placed him in an overcrowded cell and denied him good 

conduct credits “according to Proposition 57.” (See Compl. at 1‒4.) He demands 

“injunction release” and $154 million in general and punitive damages. (Id. at 4, 7.)2

Turner has not prepaid the full civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Turner, however, “face

an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 

filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

 

judicial notice of public records available on online inmate locators. See United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 

1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of Bureau of Prisons’ inmate locator available to the 

public); see also Foley v. Martz, 2018 WL 5111998, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2018) (taking judicial notice 

of CDCR’s inmate locator); Graham v. Los Angeles Cty., 2018 WL 6137155, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 

2018) (taking judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence of information 

regarding the status of inmate via the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s website and its inmate 

locator function).

2

 The Court also takes judicial notice of its own dockets on PACER which show Turner has filed more 

than thirty similar cases over the course of the last ten years, most of them alleging excessive force and 

the denial of medical care, and seeking monetary relief from the City and County of San Diego, County 

Sheriff’s Department officials, and the Metropolitan Transit System or “MTS.” See https://pcl.uscourts 

.gov/pcl/pages/search/results/parties.jsf?sid=3ee13dc867da42c1b64e13215b2a7397 (last accessed Feb. 

18, 2020). A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, 2009 WL 160937, *2 

(S.D. Cal. 2009) (citing United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen 

v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have 

a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson 

Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

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§ 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to 

preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner:

. . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to 

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also 

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) 

(under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may 

entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the 

PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in 

federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a 

strike, the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the 

central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or 

failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 

of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-

52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation 

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that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of 

filing.”).

B. Discussion

1. Imminent Danger Exception

Turner claims the State, City, County, Sheriff, and a Watch Commander at the 

Central Jail placed him in an overcrowded cell on October 13, 2019, and refused to apply 

good conduct credits to his sentence. (See Compl. at 1‒3.) However, he does not allege to 

be currently housed under those same conditions, and offers no plausible explanation as 

to how the denial of custody credits posed an imminent danger of serious physical injury

to him at the time he filed his Complaint. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52.

Section § 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception cannot be triggered solely by 

complaints of past harm or generalized fears of potential harm due to incarceration alone. 

See id. at 1053 (“The exception’s use of the present tense, combined with its concern 

only with the initial act of ‘bring[ing]’ the lawsuit, indicates to us that the exception 

applies if the danger existed at the time the prisoner filed the complaint.”); see also 

Parker v. Montgomery Cty. Corr. Facility/Bus. Office Manager, 870 F.3d 144, 154 n.12 

(3d Cir. 2017) (“Although prison can undoubtedly be a dangerous place, incarceration 

alone does not satisfy the requirement of “imminent danger of serious physical injury” 

for purposes of § 1915(g). Indeed, if it did, every prisoner would be entitled to IFP status 

and the exception would swallow the rule.”) (citation omitted); Williams v. Dep’t of 

Justice, Bureau of Criminal Info & Analysis, 2018 WL 5630514, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 

2018) (finding claims that defendants made “error[s] on [a] rap sheet” which resulted in 

the denial of parole and continued incarcerated insufficient to qualify as “imminent 

danger” under § 1915(g)); Youngblood v. Esquerra, 2020 WL 614812, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 10, 2020) (finding prisoner’s claims of having been “threatened with a Rules 

Violation Report and potential loss of good time credits if he refused to be double-celled” 

insufficient to meet § 1915(g)’s “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception).

/// 

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Therefore, the Court finds Turner’s Complaint contains no “plausible allegations” 

to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

2. Three Strikes‒ Litigation History

While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to show a prisoner is not 

entitled to proceed IFP, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to 

show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and 

therefore counts as a strike.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119‒20. That is the case here.

Based on a review of its own dockets, the Court finds that Plaintiff David B. 

Turner, Jr., currently identified under San Diego County Booking No. 197347785, and 

previously identified under San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Booking No. 

13719099, Booking No. 15780644, and CDCR Inmate #G-30643, while incarcerated, has

had at least five prior civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, 

malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

They are: 

1) Turner v. Metropolitan Transit System, et al., Civil Case No. 3:09-cv00770- L-POR (S.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2009) (Order denying amended motion to 

proceed IFP and dismissing amended complaint for failing to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)) (ECF No. 6) (strike 

one);

2) Turner v. Corporal Saunder (7294), et al., Civil Case No. 3:13-cv01368- MMA-DHB (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (Order dismissing action as 

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and denying motion to proceed 

IFP as moot) (ECF No. 3) (strike two); 

3) Turner v. County of San Diego, et al., Civil Case No. 3:13-cv-2288-

LAB-RBB (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) (Order sua sponte dismissing First 

Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim and as frivolous pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b) (ECF No. 7); (Nov. 11, 2014, 9th 

Circuit USCA, No. 14-56249) (Order denying appellant’s motion to proceed 

IFP “because we find that there is no non-frivolous issue presented in this 

appeal”) (ECF No. 13) (strike three); 

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4) Turner v. San Diego County, et al., Civil Case No. 3:13-cv-02729-JLSPCL (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2014) (Order granting IFP and sua sponte dismissing 

First Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1)) (ECF No. 13); (March 20, 2015 Order

dismissing case in its entirety for failing to state a claim pursuant to pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) and for failing to 

prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) in compliance with Court Order 

requiring amendment) (ECF No. 14) (strike four);

3 and

5) Turner v. San Diego County, et al., Ninth Cir. Ct. Appeal Case No. 15-

55544 (July 30, 2015 Order denying appellant’s motion to proceed IFP 

“because we find that the appeal is frivolous”) (Dkt. No. 4) (strike five).4

Thus, because Turner has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three “strikes” 

as defined by § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not 

entitled to the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis in this action. Accordingly, his 

Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is DENIED. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all 

prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing 

the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin 

v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is 

itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

///

///

 

3 See Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen (1) a district court dismisses a 

complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim, and (2) the court grants leave to amend, and (3) the 

plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal counts as a strike under § 1915(g).”).

4 See Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that appellate court’s denial of 

prisoner’s request for IFP status on appeal on grounds of frivolousness constituted a “strike” under 

§ 1915(g) “even though [it] did not dismiss the appeal until later when the [appellant] did not pay the 

filing fee.”).

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III. Conclusion and Orders

 Based on the foregoing, the Court: 

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to 

prepay the $400 civil and administrative filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in good 

faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2020

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

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