Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04623/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04623-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES CLINTON ROLAND,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.K. SCRIBNER,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-4623 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Respondent A.K. Scribner’s (“Respondent”) Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to

Dismiss Petitioner Charles Roland’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). 

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 30, 1995, Petitioner was driving by the San Jose home of Donna Sylvia

(“Sylvia”), Petitioner’s wife from whom he was separated. When Petitioner saw a man enter

Sylvia’s house, he parked his car and looked through the windows of the house. Seeing two couples

inside socializing with Sylvia, Petitioner entered the house. Once inside, Petitioner stabbed Anthony

Ruiz (“Ruiz”) once in the stomach, stabbed Mike Novello (“Novello”) repeatedly in the stomach and

chest, and cut Sylvia’s face and back. Petitioner then left the house and walked down the driveway,

where he encountered a neighbor, Jason Jeffrey (“Jeffrey”). Petitioner stabbed Jeffrey to death. 

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 “Rule 24 of the California Rules of Court provides that ‘a decision of the Supreme Court

becomes final 30 days after filing.’ Under Rule 24, a denial of a habeas petition within the California

Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is not final for 30 days (and therefore is subject to further action

during that time).” Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

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Petitioner then left the scene. Later, Petitioner turned himself in to the police, reporting that he was

the man they were looking for because he had “just killed three people.”

On June 17, 1996, Petitioner was charged with:

Count 1: murder of Jason Jeffrey with personal use of a deadly weapon; 

Count 2: attempted murder of Anthony Ruiz with personal use of a deadly weapon

and infliction of great bodily injury;

Count 3: attempted murder of Michael Novello with personal use of a deadly

weapon and infliction of great bodily injury; and

Count 4: assault with a knife on Donna Sylvia with great bodily injury.

On October 7, 1996, a jury found Petitioner guilty of Counts 1 and 3; not guilty of the attempted

murder of Ruiz, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of Count 2 – assault with a deadly weapon

with great bodily injury; and not guilty of Count 4. On November 4, 1996, Petitioner was sentenced

to consecutive terms of 16 years to life on Count 1 and 15 years (later reduced) on Counts 2 and 3.

On July 17, 1998, the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed

the conviction, but reversed with respect to Count 3 on the ground that the trial court failed to

instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense. On November 18, 1998, in accordance with the Court

of Appeal mandate, the trial court reduced Count 3 to voluntary manslaughter. After re-sentencing,

Petitioner’s total term on Counts 2 and 3 was 11 years and 6 months in prison, followed by an

indeterminate term of 16 years to life. 

On February 13, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Santa Clara

County Superior Court. On April 16, 2004, that petition was denied. On May 10, 2004, Petitioner

re-filed his petition with California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District. On July 8, 2004, that

petition was denied. On July 19, 2004, Petitioner re-filed his petition in the California Supreme

Court. That petition was denied on September 22, 2004, in a decision that became effective on

October 21, 2004.1

 On November 1, 2004, having exhausted his state court remedies, Petitioner

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court. Respondent then filed the instant motion

to dismiss on the grounds that the Petition is untimely.

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 This date is arrived at by adding 60 days (the amount of time Petitioner had to appeal pursuant

to California Rule of Court 30.1) to the date he was re-sentenced (November 18, 1998).

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LEGAL STANDARD

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year

statute of limitations on applications for writs of habeas corpus for persons in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period runs from the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been recognized by the Supreme Court and made applicable

to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A–D). The time during which a properly-filed petition for state postconviction relief (e.g. a habeas petition filed in state court) is pending “shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

In the context of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the

respondent may file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer on the merits where the petition is

procedurally defective, e.g., if the petition was not timely filed. White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). 

ANALYSIS

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s habeas petition should be dismissed because it was not

timely filed. Petitioner claims, to the contrary, that his petition is not barred by AEDPA’s statute of

limitations because he is entitled to statutory and equitable tolling. There is no dispute that

Petitioner’s judgment became final on January 17, 19992

 and that the instant federal habeas petition

was not filed with this Court until November 1, 2004. Thus, under AEDPA, absent tolling, the

statute of limitations would have run on January 17, 2000. There is also no dispute that much of the

2004 calendar year is excluded from the calculation of the limitations period here because Petitioner

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 The 46 days is arrived at by adding the 24 days between the denial of Petitioner’s first state

court habeas petition (on April 16, 2004) and his re-filing the habeas petition with the state appellate

court (on May 10, 2004), with the 11 days between the denial of the second state habeas petition (on

July 8, 2004) and his re-filing the petition with the California Supreme Court (on July 19, 2004), with

the 11 days between the state Supreme Court’s denial (on October 21, 2004) and Petitioner’s filing of

the instant federal habeas petition in this Court (on November 1, 2004). 

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filed (unsuccessful) state habeas petitions during this period (first, with the trial court; then, with the

state appellate court; and finally, with the California Supreme Court). The time during which those

petitions were pending is excluded from the limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Those respective petitions were pending from February 13, 2004, until April 16, 2004; from May 10,

2004, until July 8, 2004; and from July 19, 2004, until October 21, 2004. The instant petition was

then filed on November 1, 2004. Thus, assuming the 20-month gap is tolled, with the exception of

46 days that would be counted in the limitations period,3

 the period from February 13, 2004, until

the present is excluded from the limitations period calculation. At issue is whether any portion of

the period between January 17, 1999, and February 13, 2004, should be statutorily or equitably

tolled such that Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is rendered timely. 

Petitioner contends first that he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling for the 20-month

gap between the date his state court judgment became final (January 17, 1999) and when he hired

counsel to represent him in seeking federal habeas relief (September 2000) because during that

period, he (through his father) exercised due diligence in searching for counsel. Petitioner next

contends that most of the period between September 2000 (when he hired counsel) and February

2004, when the first state habeas petition was filed, should be statutorily and equitably tolled

because Petitioner’s attorney was diligently investigating Petitioner’s case during that time and

could not have discovered the factual predicate of Petitioner’s claims until March 2003 at the

earliest. 

According to Respondent, Petitioner has failed to explain his inactivity during the 20-month

gap between the date upon which Petitioner’s judgment became final (January 17, 1999) and the

date he retained habeas counsel (September 2000). Thus, Respondent contends, AEDPA’s one-year

limitations period, which began to run on January 17, 1999, has expired. Respondent argues that the

Court need not reach Petitioner’s other tolling arguments (explaining his failure to act between

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September 2000 and February 2004) since the statute of limitations had long since run. Respondent

contends that the factual predicate discovered by counsel in March 2003 was discoverable long

before that and that statutory tolling is not warranted on that basis. The Court agrees with

Respondent and finds that no tolling is warranted. 

A. Statutory Tolling of the 20-Month Gap Is Not Warranted.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), AEDPA’s limitations period does not begin to run

until the date on which the factual predicate of the claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. Here, Petitioner appears to claim that because his father

diligently searched for counsel to represent Petitioner in his pursuit of habeas relief and was unable

to find an attorney for his son until September 2000, the Court should find that Petitioner is entitled

to statutory tolling of that 20-month period of delay. The Court disagrees. Due diligence, under

subsection (D), has been found where facts previously undiscoverable come to light through a

petitioner’s due diligence. There is no case law suggesting that subsection (D) was intended to

encompass a petitioner’s diligent search for an attorney. In fact, habeas petitioners have no right to

counsel. Thus, Petitioner could have filed a timely petition pro se during that 20-month period. His

failure to do so suggests a lack of diligence. Furthermore, the Court notes that even if a diligent

search for habeas counsel did trigger subsection (D), here, Petitioner has not demonstrated his own

diligence in that search. 

B. Equitable Tolling of the 20-Month Gap is Not Warranted.

Petitioner also appears to argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the 20-month

interval of inaction due to his father’s diligent search for an attorney to represent Petitioner in his

pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court finds that equitable tolling is not warranted on this

record. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has “recognized that AEDPA’s statute of limitations

provision is subject to equitable tolling.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit has “made clear, however, that equitable tolling is

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‘unavailable in most cases.’” Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066 (citing Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Indeed, equitable tolling is “appropriate only ‘if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.’” Miranda, 292 F.3d at

1066 (citing Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (emphasis added by Miranda)). “[T]he threshold necessary to

trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066 (citing United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). 

In Olivares v. Lewis, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15445, *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2001), a habeas

petitioner argued that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because his family retained an

attorney to collaterally attack the state court conviction and the attorney neglected to file any

petition. The court found the petitioner’s argument “unavailing,” reasoning that “[a]n attorney’s

failure to file a timely petition in a noncapital case does not warrant equitable tolling because it does

not render it impossible for the petitioner to file for habeas relief pro se.” Id. at *4 (citing Frye v.

Hickman, 258 F.3d 1036, slip op. 10163, 10167 (9th Cir. 2001)). The court found that the retained

counsel’s failure to file a timely petition did not constitute “an extraordinary circumstance beyond

[the petitioner’s] control . . . .” Id. Additionally, in Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir.

2001), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “an unsuccessful search for counsel was not an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”

Here, to explain the 20-month gap between January 1999 and September 2000 when he

retained federal habeas counsel, Petitioner says only that his father was diligently searching for an

attorney. Because Petitioner was not entitled to an attorney in the first instance, and, in fact, could

have filed for habeas relief pro se, the Court finds that the reason for the delay proffered by

Petitioner does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. 

C. That Petitioner’s Counsel Did Not Discover the Factual Predicate Underlying Many of

Petitioner’s Claims Does Not Alter the Result.

Petitioner argues that even if he is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling on the grounds

that his father was diligently searching for a federal habeas lawyer, he is entitled to statutory tolling

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) because his attorney could not have discovered the factual

predicate underlying several of his claims until, at the very earliest, March 2003. Respondent

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contends that Petitioner does not meet the requirements of subsection (D) here because even if

Petitioner’s counsel did not discover the factual predicate underlying Petitioner’s claims until 2003,

the facts were there to be discovered and with due diligence, Petitioner could have discovered them

far sooner. The Court agrees with Respondent.

Pursuant to subsection (D), the limitations period begins “when the prisoner knows (or

through due diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their

legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Petitioner’s best arguments in this regard center on Petitioner’s counsel’s March 2003 discovery that

Petitioner’s trial counsel had previously represented two of the witnesses against Petitioner (one of

whom was one of the victims) in separate cases, creating a possible conflict of interest, and trial

counsel’s failure to investigate the criminal histories and past drug use of three of the prosecution

witnesses. But there is nothing special about March 2003 here. Through due diligence, Petitioner

(on his own or through earlier-hired counsel) could have discovered the very facts that underlie his

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Had he hired diligent

counsel sooner or had he otherwise begun an investigation into his underlying case, he could have

discovered, long before March 2003, that his trial attorney had previously represented two of the

prosecution witnesses and that his attorney failed to look into their criminal histories. Just because

Petitioner did not discover these facts until March 2003 does not render them undiscoverable until

that time under subsection (D) and does not justify his failure to file a federal habeas petition until

nearly six years after his state court judgment became final.

—

Having determined that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling on the 20-

month gap of inactivity between January 17, 1999, and September 2000, the Court finds that

AEDPA’s limitations period expired on January 17, 2000. The Court need not consider Petitioner’s

additional tolling arguments for the period of time between September 2000 and February 2004.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus for untimeliness is GRANTED. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is

hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

This Clerk of Court shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September_ 8__, 2005

 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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