Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01017/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01017-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Docket No. 4.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MOODY,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE CO,

Defendant. /

No. C07-01017 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendants Liberty Life Assurance Company (“Liberty Life”), Liberty

Mutual Group Inc. (“Liberty Mutual”), and Synopsys, Inc. Group Disability Income Plan’s

(“Synopsys”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Improper Claims and Motion to Strike

Plaintiff’s Demand for Jury Trial.1

 Plaintiff Michael Moody (“Plaintiff” or “Moody”) opposes

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff concedes that Defendants’ motion to strike is proper. For

this reason, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Demand for Jury Trial. 

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Improper Claims

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from the denial of Plaintiff’s claim for long-term disability benefits under an

employee welfare plan insured by a group disability income policy that Liberty Life issued to

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Defendants contend that the Plan documents referenced in Plaintiff’s complaint refute Plaintiff’s allegations. 

Defendants have attached the Plan documents to their motion to dismiss. (Declaration of Beverly Henry (“Henry Decl.”),

¶¶ 3-5, Exs. A-C) (consisting of: (1) a copy of the summary plan description; (2) a copy of the Liberty Life Group Disability

Income Policy, number GF3-860-038492-01; and (3) a copy of the WRAP plan document.) According to the Plan

documents, the policy is issued by Liberty Life to Synopsis, the Plan sponsor. (Id. at ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Also according to the Plan

documents, Liberty Life, and not Liberty Mutual, is the insurer and “funding source of the Plan’s long term disability

coverage.” (Id. at ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Defendants also contend that the Plan documents establish that the plan administrator is

Synopsys, not Liberty Life or Liberty Mutual. (Id. at ¶ 4, Ex. B.) 

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Synopsys, the sponsor of the plan. On January 11, 2007 and February 13, 2007, Plaintiff filed the

Complaint and First Amended Complaint, respectively, in the Superior Court for the State of

California for the County of San Francisco. On February 16, 2007, Defendants removed the action

to this Court. The material allegations taken from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) are

as follows.

Plaintiff formerly worked for Synopsys as a project engineer. (FAC ¶ 11.) As part of his

employment, Plaintiff enrolled in the Synopsys, Inc. Group Disability Income Plan (“the Plan”),

policy number GF3-860-038492-01. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 4.) The Plan is an employee welfare benefit plan

governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001,

et seq. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 4.) 

As to Liberty Life, Plaintiff alleges that Liberty Life is the party designated by the Plan to

make benefits determinations and acts as the “funding source” for the Plan. (Id. at ¶ 7.) As to

Liberty Mutual, Plaintiff alleges that Liberty Mutual also makes benefits determinations. (Id.) As to

Liberty Life and Liberty Mutual, Plaintiff alleges that both entities are the Plan’s “administrator”

and “party in interest” within the meaning of ERISA, and are the “funding source” for the Plan,

thereby operating under a structural conflict of interest as to the adjudication of Plaintiff’s claim for

disability benefits. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.)2

In 2001, Plaintiff was in an automobile accident and has since been in extreme pain from his

neck down into his back and into his extremities. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff has been diagnosed with

degenerative disc disease in the lumbar region, degenerative disc disease in the cervical region, pain

disorder, and depression. (Id.) As a result of his condition, Plaintiff claims to have been, and

remains, totally disabled under the Plan. (Id.) 

In December 2003, Plaintiff applied for disability benefits under the Plan. (Id. at ¶ 15.) 

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Liberty approved Plaintiff’s request for benefits and made disability benefit payments to Plaintiff

until June 2004, at which time Liberty determined Plaintiff was no longer disabled under the terms

of the Plan. (Id. at ¶ 16.) In November 2004, Plaintiff appealed Liberty’s decision to terminate his

disability benefits and Liberty reinstated Plaintiff’s benefits. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Liberty continued to pay

disability benefits to Plaintiff until May 2005. (Id. at ¶ 17.) In October 2005, Plaintiff again

appealed Liberty’s decision to terminate his disability benefits. (Id. at ¶ 18.) In November 2005,

Liberty upheld its decision to terminate Plaintiff’s disability benefits on the basis that Plaintiff was

not totally disabled under the terms of the policy. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff alleges two causes of action in his First Amended Complaint. The first cause of

action is entitled, “Recovery of Benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(b)” and is alleged against all

three Defendants. (Id. at p. 5.) The second cause of action is entitled, “Breach of Fiduciary Duty

under 29 U.S.C. § 1109, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)” is alleged only against

Liberty Life. (Id. at p. 6.) 

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Liberty Life and

Liberty Mutual on grounds that they are improper parties to that cause of action. According to

Defendants, the proper defendant in a claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is the Plan and/or the plan

administrator, neither of which are Liberty Life or Liberty Mutual. Lastly, Defendants move to

strike Plaintiff’s demand for a jury trial on grounds that there is no authority for a jury trial under

ERISA. Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action in the current motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the focus of a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is on the legal sufficiency, rather than the substantive merits of a claim, the

Court ordinarily limits its review to the face of the complaint. See Van Buskirk v. Cable News

Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). Generally, dismissal is proper only when the

plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable legal theory or failed to allege sufficient facts under a

cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F.3d

780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988);

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These documents comprise all of the relevant plan documents that relate to the long term disability benefits

provided by the Plan. (Henry Decl. ¶ 6.)

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Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, dismissal is

appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

a claim. See Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations in the complaint as true and

construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d

428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). However, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are

not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1998)

(citations omitted). 

ANALYSIS

I. Extrinsic Evidence: Plan Documents

As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether it may properly consider the Plan

documents relied upon by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss. Defendants have

attached three Plan documents to their motion to dismiss: (1) a copy of the summary plan

description; (2) a copy of the Liberty Life Group Disability Income Policy, number GF3-860-

038492-01; and (3) a copy of the WRAP plan document. (Henry Decl., ¶¶ 3-5, Exs. A-C.)3

According to Defendants, these Plan documents are sufficiently central to Plaintiff’s causes of action

to allow the Court to consider them in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Defendants contend

that these Plan documents establish that neither Liberty Mutual or Liberty Life were plan

administrators, and are therefore not proper defendants under section 1132(a)(1)(B). 

Plaintiff insists that it would be improper for the Court to consider matters outside the

complaint in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Plaintiff makes two arguments against this Court’s

consideration of the Plan documents. First, Plaintiff argues that two of these Plan document are not

contained in the administrative record, and therefore cannot be considered. Second, Plaintiff argues

that the Plan documents pertain to health care benefits, not disability benefits, and therefore are not

applicable.

A district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider documents “whose contents are

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alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically

attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading.” See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994),

overruled on other grounds in, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir.

2002); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, the court may

consider the full text of a document referred to in the complaint where the document is central to the

plaintiff’s claim and there are no questions as to the authenticity of the document attached to the

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Tunnell, 14 F.3d at 454; In re Stac Electronics Securities Litig., 89 F.3d

1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). The

Ninth Circuit has extended the above rule to documents that are crucial to the plaintiff’s claims even

though they were not actually referred to in the complaint. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706

(9th Cir. 1998) (finding that where the plaintiff’s complaint referred to an ERISA “group plan” and

its “cost containment program” but did not mention the documents governing plan membership and

coverage, such membership and coverage documents were properly considered by the court in ruling

on the defendant’s motion to dismiss.). The Ninth Circuit’s extension of the above rule is supported

by the policy concern underlying the rule: Preventing a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim from

surviving a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied. 

Id. (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196

(3rd Cir. 1993) (parentheses added)). Thus, where the documents do not support plaintiff’s claim,

the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a valid claim. Tunnell, 14 F.3d at 454; Venture

Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993).

In this case, Plaintiff’s complaint and First Amended Complaint both make reference to the

entities that serve as the “plan administrator,” “funding source,” “fiduciary,” and “party-in-interest.” 

(Compl. at ¶¶ 7-8; FAC at ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff also makes reference to the particular entities charged

with making benefits determinations and claims decisions. (Compl. at ¶ 7; FAC at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s

first cause of action rests on his membership in the Plan and the roles of the particular Defendants in

handling his claim. Because the Plan documents include key terms that identify the plan

administrator, the plan sponsor, and the funding source, the documents are essential to Plaintiff’s

operative complaint. Therefore, this Court will consider the documents in ruling on Defendants’

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In deciding to consider the Plan documents, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not directly disputed the Plan

documents’ authenticity. Instead, Plaintiff argues that it would be improper to consider the Plan documents because they are

not contained in the administrative record, citing Taft v. Equitable Life Ass. Society, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994).

However, Taft is procedurally distinguishable from the current case. Taft did not involve consideration of extrinsic evidence

in the context of a motion to dismiss, but instead involved consideration of extrinsic evidence in the form of live testimony

from the defendant’s expert physician during a bench trial on plaintiff’s ERISA claims. Id. There, the physician’s live

testimony indicated that his previous conclusions in the administrative record might have been different had he been aware

of additional information pertaining to the plaintiff’s condition. Id. at 1471. In that context, the Ninth Circuit determined

that it was improper for the district court to consider the physician’s testimony against the administrator because that evidence

was not actually before the administrator at the time it made its benefits determination. Id. at 1472. The court explained that

it would be unfair to find that a plan administrator abused its discretion by failing to consider evidence not before it. Id.

Here, the Plan documents do not consist of new physician’s opinion offered in the context of a bench trial. The Plan

documents are not new evidence. While not in the administrative record, the Plan documents clearly existed at the time

Defendants’ made their benefits determinations. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s fairness concerns in Taft are not present

here.

Plaintiffs final argument, that the WRAP document pertains to health care benefits, not disability benefits, is patently

incorrect. Both the summary plan description and the WRAP document explicitly provide that they pertain to “Long Term

Disability.” (Henry Decl., ¶¶ 3 and 5, Ex. A at Appendix A, and Ex. B at Appendix A.) 

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Plaintiff has failed to provide authority that Liberty Mutual and Liberty Life’s alleged status as “parties-in-interest,”

“funding sources,” and/or “fiduciaries” permits Plaintiff to recover benefits from them under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See

Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating “suits for breach of fiduciary duty only

against the fiduciary [under] §§ 1109(a); 1105(a).”) (citations omitted); see also Ford v. MCI Communications Corp. Health

and Welfare Plan, 399 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that suits to recover benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)

are limited to being brought against the plan or the plan administrators.) (citations omitted). Accordingly, as more fully

explained below, the Court’s inquiry is limited to Liberty Mutual and Liberty Life’s alleged status as “plan administrators.”

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motion to dismiss.4 The Court now turns to the import of the Plan documents on Plaintiff’s first

cause of action under § 1132(a)(1)(B). 

II. Proper Defendants Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)

The Court must now determine whether the Plan documents defeat Plaintiff’s first cause of

action against Liberty Life and Liberty Mutual as a matter of law. Defendants maintain that Liberty

Mutual and Liberty Life are not proper defendants in Plaintiff’s claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B) because

neither acted as a “plan administrator.” Defendants contend that the Plan and/or the plan

administrator are the only proper defendants for such a claim. Plaintiff disagrees and insists there is

no limit on the universe of possible defendants for his claim. Plaintiff also accords significance to

the factual allegations in the operative complaint identifying both Defendants as plan administrators. 

According to Plaintiff, because he has alleged that Liberty Mutual and Liberty Life acted as co-plan

administrators, parties-in-interest, fiduciaries, and/or funding sources, such allegations must be taken

as true, and interpreted in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.5

 After consideration of the parties’

arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the Plan documents are sufficient

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While some earlier cases seemed to support the conclusion that ERISA permitted suits to recover benefits only

against the Plan as an entity, e.g., Gelardi, 761 F.2d 1323; Madden v. ITT Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried Employees,

914 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1990), those cases held only that employers, who were not also plan administrators, could not be sued

under ERISA. Gaines v. The Sargent Fletcher, Inc. Group Life Ins. Plan, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2004). To

the extent that those cases, which dealt only with suits brought against employers who were not also administrators, contain

broad language suggesting that even administrators cannot be sued under ERISA, more recent decisions from this and other

circuits have rejected such an implication. Id. (citing Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754 (acknowledging in dicta that this circuit and

others now recognize suits brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) against plan administrators, and stating that the third

party insurer defendant may well have been a proper party defendant had it been acting as the plan administrator)). Everhart

found support for its conclusion in Taft where the court concluded that “the beneficiary of an ERISA plan may bring a civil

action against a plan administrator” to recover benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Id. (citing Taft, 9 F.3d at 1471; see also Layes

v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir.1998) (permitting suit under Section 1132(a)(1)(B) against the plan

administrator, but not a non-administrator employer); Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th

Cir. 1997) (holding that “[t]he proper party defendant in an action concerning ERISA benefits is the party that controls

administration of the plan”); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that an employer is not a

proper defendant in an action for benefits under ERISA unless it is “shown to control administration of the plan.”)). “Thus,

this Circuit and others have clearly acknowledged that plan administrators are proper parties to a suit under § 502(a)(1)(B).”

Id. 

In the current case Defendants have conceded that a plan administrator is a proper defendant under § 1132(a)(1)(B).

(Def.’s Rep. 1:9-10.) Therefore, this Court need not reach the issue of whether a particular line of cases limits §

1132(a)(1)(B) claims to the “plan” itself and otherwise forecloses claims against a “plan administrator.” 

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to defeat Plaintiff’s first cause of action as to Liberty Life and Liberty Mutual.

Section 1132(a)(1)(B) provides that “[a] civil action may be brought by a participant or

beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under

the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[.]”

 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). ERISA authorizes actions to recover benefits against the Plan as an

entity, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1), and against the Plan’s administrator. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); See

also Everhart v. Allmerica Financial Life Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 2001).6

 The Ninth

Circuit has recognized that the plan itself, in addition to the plan administrators, are proper parties to

a suit under § 1132(a)(1)(B). See e.g. Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754. ERISA defines a “plan

administrator” as “the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which

the plan is operated[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i). 

The Plan in this case, as evidenced by the Plan documents, designated Synopsys as the plan

administrator and plan sponsor (Henry Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, Exs. A-B), and designated Liberty Life as the

insurer (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. B). Accordingly, only the Plan itself and Synopsys would be proper defendants

in a claim for benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court need not

accept as true conclusory allegations or legal characterizations . . . [n]or need it accept unreasonable

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inferences or unwarranted deductions of fact. See e.g. Transphase Systems, Inc. v. Southern Calif.

Edison Co., 839 F. Supp. 711, 718 (C.D. Cal. 1993); see also Hon. William R. Schwarzer, et al.,

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, § 9:221 (2007). Here, the Court finds that in light of the Plan

documents, Plaintiff’s conclusory factual allegations in the operative complaint are insufficient to

state a claim against Liberty Life and Liberty Mutual as “plan administrators.” However, that is not

to say under no factual circumstances could Liberty Life and Liberty Mutual be considered “co-plan

administrators.” In amending his first cause of action Plaintiff must plead sufficient additional facts

for this Court to conclude that Liberty Mutual and Liberty Life were “plan administrators” despite

the Plan documents indicating otherwise.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff makes two final arguments to defeat the current motion. Initially,

Plaintiff argues that his first cause action against Liberty Mutual and Liberty Life is proper, citing

Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000). In relying on

Harris Trust, Plaintiff conflates § 1132(a)(1)(B) with § 1132(a)(3). See Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754 n.

3. In Harris Trust, the Supreme Court determined that liability under § 1132(a)(3) is not limited to

the plan itself or its fiduciary. Harris Trust, 530 U.S. 247. There, the Supreme Court held that §

1132(a)(3) authorizes suit against a non-fiduciary “party in interest” to a breach of fiduciary duty. 

Id. In considering Harris Trust’s reach, the Ninth Circuit has determined that Harris Trust’s

reasoning is not applicable to liability under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754. In

Everhart, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that while Harris Trust gave authorization to reach other

parties under § 1132(a)(3), “no similar express authorization to reach [other] parties exists for §

1132(a)(1)(B). Id. For this reason, the Court is not convinced that Harris Trust compels a different

result here.

Next, Plaintiff requests that this Court consider additional extrinsic evidence as support for

his contention that Liberty Mutual and Liberty Life are “co-plan administrators.” However, Plaintiff

fails to provide legal authority allowing a court to consider the extrinsic evidence offered by a

Plaintiff in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. On this record, the Court finds that consideration of

the parties’ respective extrinsic evidence is an exercise best completed in the context of a Rule 56

motion. For this reason, the Court declines to consider Plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Improper

Claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall have LEAVE TO AMEND the first cause of

action within 30 days of the filing date of this Order. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to

Strike Plaintiff’s Demand for Jury Trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April___, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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