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Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 8, 2005 Decided July 15, 2005

Reissued September 13, 2005

No. 03-7162

PRO-FOOTBALL, INC.,

APPELLEE

v.

SUZAN S. HARJO, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

(USDC) for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv01385)

Philip J. Mause argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs was Norm D. St. Landau.

Thomas C. Morrison argued the cause for amici curiae

National Congress of American Indians, et al. in support of

appellants. With him on the brief was Walter Echo-Hawk.

Adam L. Barea and Robert R. Vieth were on the brief for

amicus curiae InterFaith Conference of Metropolitan

Washington in support of appellants.

Robert L. Raskopf argued the cause for appellee. With him

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on the brief were Marc E. Ackerman, Carolyn B. Lamm, and

Francis A. Vasquez, Jr.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: In 1992, seven Native Americans petitioned

the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) to cancel the

registrations of six trademarks used by the Washington Redskins

football team. After the TTAB granted their petition, the team’s

owner, Pro-Football, Inc., brought suit seeking reversal of the

TTAB’s decision. The district court granted summary judgment

to Pro-Football on two alternate grounds, holding that the TTAB

should have found the Native Americans’ petition barred by

laches and that in any event the TTAB’s cancellation decision

was unsupported by substantial evidence. The Native

Americans now appeal. Because we find that the district court

applied the wrong standard in evaluating laches as to at least one

of the Native Americans, we remand the record for the district

court to revisit this issue.

I.

The Lanham Trademark Act provides protection to

trademark owners. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127,

1141-1141n. To take advantage of many of its provisions,

trademark owners must register their marks with the Patent and

Trademark Office. Not all marks, however, can be registered.

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1052, the PTO must deny registration to

certain types of marks, including those which, in subsection

(a)’s language, “may disparage or falsely suggest a connection

with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national

symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”

Another section, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), provides that if a

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mark is registered in violation of section 1052(a), “any person

who believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration”

may file a petition “[a]t any time” with the PTO to cancel the

registration. This triggers a proceeding before the TTAB, see 15

U.S.C. § 1067, which takes evidence and determines whether to

cancel the mark. Yet another provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1069, states

that “[i]n all . . . proceedings equitable principles of laches,

estoppel, and acquiescence, where applicable may be considered

and applied.”

This case concerns the registrations of six trademarks

owned by Pro-Football, the corporate owner of the Washington

Redskins football team, that include the word “Redskin.” The

first—“The Redskins” written in a stylized script—was

registered in 1967, three more in 1974, another in 1978, and the

sixth—the word “Redskinettes”—in 1990. Pro-Football uses all

these marks in connection with goods and services related to its

football team, including merchandise and entertainment

services. 

In 1992, seven Native Americans petitioned for cancellation

of the registrations, claiming that the marks had disparaged

Native Americans at the times of registration and had thus been

registered in violation of section 1052(a). Pro-Football

defended its marks, arguing among other things that laches

barred the Native Americans’ claim. Rejecting this argument,

the TTAB found laches inapplicable due to the “broader

interest—an interest beyond the personal interest being asserted

by the present petitioners—in preventing a party from receiving

the benefits of registration where a trial might show that

respondent’s marks hold a substantial segment of the population

up to public ridicule.” Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 30

U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1831 (TTAB 1994).

On the merits, the parties presented the TTAB with a

variety of evidence, including (1) dictionary entries for

“redskin,” some of which contained usage labels identifying the

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term as offensive and others of which did not; (2) book and

media excerpts from the late nineteenth century through the

1940s that used the term “redskin” and portrayed Native

Americans in a pejorative manner; (3) a study that found

derogatory use of the term in Western-genre films from before

1980; (4) petitioners’ testimony about their views of the term;

(5) results from a 1996 survey of the general population and

Native Americans that asked whether various terms, including

“redskin,” were offensive; (6) newspaper articles and game

program guides from the 1940s onward using Native American

imagery in connection with Washington’s football team; and (7)

testimony and documents relating to Native American protests,

including one in 1972, aimed specifically at the team. In a

lengthy opinion, the TTAB concluded that a preponderance of

the evidence showed the term “redskin” as used by

Washington’s football team had disparaged Native Americans

from at least 1967 onward. Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50

U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (TTAB 1999). The TTAB cancelled the

registrations. Cancellation did not require Pro-Football to stop

using the marks, but it did limit the team’s ability to go after

infringers under the Lanham Act.

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b), Pro-Football filed suit in

the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking

reinstatement of its registrations on the grounds that: (1) laches

barred the Native Americans’ petition; (2) the TTAB’s finding

of disparagement was unsupported by substantial evidence; and

(3) section 1052(a) violates the First and Fifth Amendments to

the U.S. Constitution both facially and as applied by the TTAB.

Although in suits challenging TTAB decisions parties may

introduce new evidence in the district court, see Material Supply

Int’l, Inc. v. Sunmatch Indus. Co., 146 F.3d 983, 989-90 (D.C.

Cir. 1998), in this case the only such evidence of note related to

laches. After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary

judgment. Without reaching the constitutional issues, the

district court granted summary judgment to Pro-Football on the

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alternate grounds that laches barred the Native Americans’

petition and that the TTAB’s conclusion of disparagement was

unsupported by substantial evidence. Pro-Football, Inc. v.

Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). This appeal followed.

II.

An equitable doctrine, “[l]aches is founded on the notion

that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their

rights.” NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753

F.2d 131, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1985). This defense, which ProFootball has the burden of proving, see Gull Airborne

Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger, 694 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir.

1982), “requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party

against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the

party asserting the defense.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121-22 (2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In this case, the Native Americans contend both that

the statute bars the defense of laches and that even were laches

an available defense, Pro-Football has failed to prove it.

The Native Americans’ statutory argument runs as follows:

because section 1064(3) permits petitions alleging wrongful

registration under section 1052(a) to be filed “[a]t any time,”

laches is not a valid defense in cancellation proceedings. We

disagree. The words “[a]t any time” demonstrate only that the

act imposes no statute of limitations for bringing petitions.

Those words have nothing to do with what equitable defenses

may be available during cancellation proceedings. Indeed,

under the Native Americans’ logic, equitable defenses would

never be available as long as cancellation petitions are brought

within the specified statute of limitations—“[a]t any time” for

petitions alleging wrongful registration under section 1052(a) or

certain other grounds, see 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)-(5), and “[w]ithin

five years” of registration for petitions brought for all other

reasons, see id. § 1064(1). This would make section 1069,

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which explicitly permits consideration of laches and other

equitable doctrines, meaningless as to cancellation petitions.

For this reason, we disagree with the Third Circuit’s suggestion

that laches is not an available defense to cancellation petitions

brought pursuant to section 1064(3), see Marshak v. Treadwell,

240 F.3d 184, 193-94 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2001). Instead, we join the

Federal Circuit, see Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v.

Auto. Club de L’Ouest de la France, 245 F.3d 1359, 1360-61

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (permitting the defense of laches to a

cancellation petition brought under section 1064(3)), and our

own district court, see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 57

U.S.P.Q.2d 1140, 1145 (D.D.C. 2000), in concluding that the

statute does not bar the equitable defense of laches in response

to section 1064(3) cancellation petitions.

The Native Americans also offer several reasons why, in

their view, the district court erred in its assessment of laches in

this case. At this point, we need only consider one: their claim

that the district court mistakenly started the clock for assessing

laches in 1967—the time of the first mark’s registration—for all

seven Native Americans, even though one, Mateo Romero, was

at that time only one year old.

We agree with the Native Americans that this approach runs

counter to the well-established principle of equity that laches

runs only from the time a party has reached his majority. The

Supreme Court first embraced this principle in 1792, holding in

a case dealing with conflicting 1761 land grants that “laches

cannot . . . be imputed” as the “rights do not seem to have been

abandoned; for in 1761, the children were infants, and were

hardly of age, when this action was brought.” Gander’s Lessee

v. Burns, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 122 (1792). The Court has since held

to this principle. See Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613, 636-37

(1880) (evaluating laches “after [complainants] came of age”);

Wetzel v. Minn. Ry. Transfer Co., 169 U.S. 237, 240 (1898)

(acknowledging “that the minors were not affected by laches

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until they became of age”); cf. Wagner v. Baird, 48 U.S. (7

How.) 234, 242 (1849) (noting that equity makes allowances for

“circumstances to account for [a party’s] neglect, such as

imprisonment, infancy, coverture, or by having been beyond

seas”); 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,

as administered in England and America 844 n.(b) (photo.

reprint 1988) (Melville M. Bigelow, ed., 13th ed. 1886) (stating

that “[i]t is not laches to wait until one is in a legal condition to

sue”); William MacPherson, A Treatise on the Law Relating to

Infants 338-39 (Philadelphia, John S. Littel 1843) (observing

that “[i]t is a maxim of law that laches is not to be imputed to an

infant, because he is not supposed to be cognizant of his rights,

nor capable of enforcing them”).

Pro-Football asserts that were we to apply this principle

here, it “would logically mean that trademark owners could

never have certainty, since a disparagement claim could be

brought by an as yet unborn claimant for an unlimited time after

a mark is registered.” Appellee’s Br. at 48. At the least, this

assertion is overstated—only owners of those trademarks that

may disparage a population that gains new members (as opposed

to one that disparages, say, a single corporate entity, see, e.g.,

Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635

(TTAB 1988)), would face such a prospect. But even if

registrations of some marks would remain perpetually at risk, it

is unclear why this fact authorizes—let alone

requires—abandonment of equity’s fundamental principle that

laches attaches only to parties who have unjustifiably delayed in

bringing suit. Pro-Football forgets that “laches is not, like

limitation, a mere matter of time,” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327

U.S. 392, 396 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted), but

rather turns on whether the party seeking relief “delayed

inexcusably or unreasonably in filing suit” in a way that was

“prejudicial” to the other party, Rozen v. District of Columbia,

702 F.2d 1202, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Why should

equity give more favorable treatment to parties that harm

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expanding numbers of people (in which case, under ProFootball’s theory, laches runs from the date of harm) than it

gives to parties that harm only a few people (in which case

laches runs from whenever those people are free of legal

disabilities)? Why should equity elevate Pro-Football’s

perpetual security in the unlawful registration of a trademark

over the interest of a Native American who challenged this

registration without lack of diligence? Why should laches bar

all Native Americans from challenging Pro-Football’s

“Redskins” trademark registrations because some Native

Americans may have slept on their rights?

The fact that Pro-Football may never have security in its

trademark registrations stems from Congress’s decision not to

set a statute of limitations and instead to authorize petitions for

cancellation based on disparagement “[a]t any time.” See 15

U.S.C. § 1064(3). Congress knew perfectly well how to set

statutes of limitations—as noted earlier, it required that petitions

for cancellations on many other grounds be brought “[w]ithin

five years” of registration, id. § 1064(1)—but consciously

declined to do so with respect to cancellation petitions based on

disparagement. Indeed, Congress may well have denied

companies the benefit of a statute of limitations for potentially

disparaging trademarks for the very purpose of discouraging the

use of such marks. See id. § 1065 (providing that marks “shall

be incontestable” after five years “[e]xcept on a ground for

which application to cancel may be filed at any time under

paragraphs (3) and (5) of section 1064” (emphasis added)); cf.

In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 329 (C.C.P.A. 1938)

(noting that the “field is almost limitless from which to select

words for use as trade-marks, and one who uses debatable marks

does so at the peril that his mark may not be entitled to

registration”).

Here, Romero has brought his own claim, and there is no

reason why the laches of others should be imputed to him. In

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accordance with the context-specific approach required by

equity, the district court should have measured both his delay

and the resulting prejudice to Pro-Football based on the period

between his attainment of majority and the filing of the 1992

cancellation petition. 

For several reasons, we prefer not to undertake our own

analysis of Romero’s laches. The district court never addressed

this issue, the parties have briefed it minimally at best, and, most

significantly, we may owe deference to the district court’s

assessment of laches. Compare Daingerfield Island Protective

Soc’y v. Lujan, 920 F.2d 32, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (conducting

abuse-of-discretion evaluation of laches in reviewing a district

court’s summary judgment ruling), with CarrAmerica Realty

Corp. v. Kaidanow, 321 F.3d 165, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(conducting de novo evaluation of laches in reviewing a district

court’s summary judgment ruling). Therefore, we shall remand

the record for the district court to evaluate Romero’s laches. 

In assessing prejudice, the district court should address both

trial and economic prejudice. As to trial prejudice, the court

should consider the extent to which Romero’s post-majority

delay resulted in a “loss of evidence or witnesses supporting

[Pro-Football’s] position,” see Gull Airborne Instruments, 694

F.2d at 844. As to economic prejudice, we express no view as

to how such prejudice should be measured where, as here, what

is at stake is not the trademark owner’s right to use the marks

but rather the owner’s right to Lanham Act protections that turn

on registration. We encourage the district court to take briefing

on whether economic prejudice should be measured based on

the owner’s investment in the marks during the relevant years,

on whether the owner would have taken a different course of

action—e.g., abandoned the marks—had the petitioner acted

more diligently in seeking cancellation, or on some other

measure.

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III.

While retaining jurisdiction over the case, we remand the

record to the district court for the purpose of evaluating whether

laches bars Mateo Romero’s claim.

So ordered.

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