Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-07110/USCOURTS-ca10-07-07110-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and

collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

July 10, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SHARI A. HARRIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-7110

(D.C. No. 6:05-cv-234-FHS-SPS)

(E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

Shari A. Harris appeals from an order entered by the district court affirming

the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Exercising

jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

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I.

Ms. Harris protectively filed her application for disability benefits in

August 1996, almost twelve years ago. The case has been remanded for further

proceedings on two separate occasions by, first, the Appeals Council, and,

second, the district court. This lengthy procedural history is summarized by the

magistrate judge in his report and recommendation to the district court, see Aplt.

App., Vol. 2, Tab 6 at 3-4, and we need not repeat it here. 

Ms. Harris was last insured for disability benefits on December 31, 2002,

when she was forty-two years old. She has a high school education and was

previously employed as a factory worker. She alleges that she became disabled in

March 1996 due to lower back problems, and her counsel has summarized her

pertinent medical history as follows:

1. On August 23, 1995, Harris had a MRI scan of the lumbar

spine that showed congenital spinal stenosis, dessication of the

lumbar discs at L3-4 and L4-5, and advanced central extruded disc

herniation at L4-5.

2. On September 6, 1995, Harris had a hemilaminectomy with

foraminotomy at L3-4 and L4-5 with a diskectomy at L4-5. [The

surgery was performed by Dr. Don F. Rhinehart, a neurosurgeon.] 

3. On November 13, 1997, Harris had a lumbar MRI that

showed post surgical change at L4-5 with epidural fibrosis with the

possibility of a very mild annulus rupture at L3-4. 

[4.] On August 1, 2000, Harris had a lumbar MRI that showed

post surgical enhancing fibrosis on the posterior aspect of L4-5.

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1 The five-step sequential evaluation process is set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4).

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[5.] Dr. J. T. O’Connor treated Harris from August 7, 1995,

until 2000.

[6. In July 2000,] Dr. O’Connor completed a Medical Source

Statement describing Harris as having significant restrictions in her

ability to perform work-related activities.

 

Aplt. Br. at 5-6 (citations to the administrative record omitted). As further

background, we note that the medical records of Dr. O’Connor and Dr. Rhinehart

were thoroughly and accurately summarized by the magistrate judge in his report

and recommendation, see Aplt. App., Vol. 2, Tab 6 at 4-6, and we will assume a

working familiarity with the magistrate judge’s medical summary. 

After Ms. Harris’s application for disability benefits was denied initially

and on reconsideration, a de novo hearing was held before an Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ) in February 2004. In a decision dated April 15, 2004, the ALJ

subsequently denied Ms. Harris’s application for disability benefits at step five of

the five-step sequential evaluation process1

 for determining disability, finding

that: (1) she suffers from severe physical impairments due to her “status post

lumbar disc excision,” Aplt. App., Vol. 1, Tab 3 at 503; (2) her allegations

regarding her physical limitations are not totally credible; (3) on and before

December 31, 2002, she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the

full range of sedentary work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a); (4) because

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2 The Medical-Vocational Guidelines are set forth in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 2.

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vocational testimony at her prior hearings indicated that all of her past relevant

work was performed at more than the sedentary level of exertion, she was unable

to perform any of her past relevant work; but (5) applying the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines2

 at step five to determine whether she could perform “other work” that

exists in significant numbers in the national economy, and “[b]ased on an

exertional capacity for sedentary work, and [her] age, education, and work

experience, a finding of ‘not disabled’ is directed by Medical-Vocational Rule

201.28,” Aplt. App., Vol. 1, Tab 3 at 503. 

In April 2005, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Harris’s request for review

of the ALJ’s decision. Ms. Harris subsequently filed a complaint in the district

court. In October 2007, the district court entered an order adopting the report and

recommendation of the magistrate judge, and the court therefore affirmed the

denial of Ms. Harris’s application for disability benefits. This appeal followed.

II.

Because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ’s decision is the

Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of this appeal. See Doyal v.

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003). In reviewing the ALJ’s decision,

“we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the

agency.” Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.

Appellate Case: 07-7110 Document: 01012266563 Date Filed: 07/10/2008 Page: 4 
3 In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge misspelled

Dr. O’Connor’s name, spelling it as “O’Conner.” To avoid confusion, we have

corrected this mistake in the passages that we have quoted from the report and

recommendation.

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1991). Instead, we review the decision only to determine whether the correct

legal standards were applied and whether the ALJ’s factual findings are supported

by substantial evidence in the record. See Doyal, 331 F.3d at 760. “Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).

In this appeal, Ms. Harris claims the ALJ committed reversible error by: 

(1) failing to properly evaluate the opinions of her treating physician, 

Dr. O’Connor; and (2) failing to properly evaluate the credibility of her

allegations regarding her physical limitations. We disagree.

First, we agree with the magistrate judge that the ALJ performed a legally

proper treating physician analysis that is supported by substantial evidence in the

administrative record.3

 We therefore adopt the following reasoning of the

magistrate judge:

The ALJ specifically addressed the conclusions Dr. O’Connor

expressed [in his July 2000] medical source statement and found they

were not entitled to controlling weight. See Langley v. Barnhart,

373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that a medical opinion

from a treating physician is entitled to controlling weight “if the

opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques” and “consistent with other

substantial evidence in the record”), quoting Watkins v. Barnhart,

350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003) [quotations omitted]. The ALJ

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4 We recognize that, as noted by the magistrate judge, “[n]ot all of the ALJ’s

reasons for rejecting Dr. O’Connor’s opinions were good ones.” Aplt. App., 

Vol. 2, Tab 6 at 8 n.3. In particular, “contrary to the ALJ’s findings,

Dr. O’Connor’s treatment notes from his [July] 2000 visit with the claimant

included objective findings from an examination.” Id.; see also id., Vol. 1, Tab 3

at 586 (medical record documenting that Dr. O’Connor saw Ms. Harris on July

27, 2000, for “a checkup” and reported that “[s]he is tender in the low back and

has a radiculopathy consistent with an L4-5, nerve root pain”). However, this

(continued...)

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observed, for example, [that] Dr. O’Connor’s conclusions on the

medical source statement were inconsistent with the opinions of

Dr. Philip McCown, a medical expert who testified at the claimant’s

1998 administrative hearing, Dr. Rhinehart’s opinion, and a formal

functional capacity assessment the claimant underwent in 1996. 

Although all of these were prior to Dr. O’Connor’s assessment, the

ALJ noted there was not significant change shown between the

claimant’s MRIs from 1995 to 2000. The ALJ also discussed the

factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and determined that

Dr. O’Connor’s opinions were not entitled to “as much weight as the

other evidence of record.” Id. at 1119 (“Even if a treating

physician[’s] opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, ‘[t]reating

source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be

weighed using all of the factors provided in [§] 404.1527.’”), quoting

Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300 [quotation omitted]. In particular, the ALJ

noted: (i) that Dr. Rhinehart was the claimant’s treating

neurosurgeon for her back and that Dr. O’Connor only provided

treatment symptomatically for the claimant’s low back pain; (ii) that

the claimant had not seen Dr. O’Connor for several months before

her [July] 2000 visit and that she was not examined by Dr. O’Connor

at the visit; and, (iii) that Dr. O’Connor had knowledge of

Dr. Rhinehart’s opinion from December 1995 that the claimant could

perform work at a lighter capacity when he assessed the claimant’s

limitations in [July] 2000. Thus, the ALJ clearly rejected

Dr. O’Connor’s opinions and provided reasons for doing so. 

Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301 (“[I]f the ALJ rejects the opinion

completely, he must give []specific, legitimate reasons[] for doing

so.”)[.] 

Aplt. App., Vol. 2, Tab 6 at 6-8 (citations to record and footnotes omitted).4

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4

(...continued)

oversight does not undercut the other valid reasons the ALJ relied on to reject

Dr. O’Connor’s opinions. In addition, it appears the ALJ understated the amount

of time that had passed between Dr. O’Connor’s last treatment of Ms. Harris and

his preparation of the July 2000 Medical Source Statement. In his decision, the

ALJ stated that “after examination on March 19, 1999, claimant did not return to

Dr. O’Connor until 16 months later, when claimant returned July 27, 2000 and

asked Dr. O’Connor to complete th[e] disability assessment.” Id., Vol. 2, Tab 6

at 498 (citing Admin. R. Exs. 14F/1 and 16F). The March 19, 1999 medical

record (Exhibit 14F/1) was not prepared by Dr. O’Connor, however. Instead, it

was prepared by a doctor with the initials “LDM.” Id. at 463. As a result, the

chronologically closest medical record of Dr. O’Connor to the July 2000 Medical

Source Statement is a medical record dated December 19, 1997, id. at 450,

although Dr. O’Connor also completed an untitled questionnaire on August 4,

1998, id. at 446-49.

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Second, we agree with the magistrate judge that the ALJ’s adverse

credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. As the

magistrate judge explained after summarizing the highly deferential standard of

review that is applied to an ALJ’s credibility determinations, id. at 8-9:

The ALJ noted the relevant factors set forth in Luna v. Bowen,

834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987) and cited evidence in support of his

reasons for finding the claimant’s subjective complaints not credible. 

He noted that the claimant received infrequent treatment and failed to

return to Dr. Rhinehart when her pain became more severe even

though he advised her to do so, and she failed to seek any other

orthopedic or neurologic treatment. The ALJ also indicated that the

claimant’s tests showed only mild abnormalities. Although she had a

brief period of time in 1997 that she rated her pain as an eight on a

scale of ten, after therapy she rated her pain at a three. The ALJ

discussed how the claimant was not taking any pain medication and

indicated this to her physicians. He indicated that although the

claimant had alleged she was significantly limited in her ability to

stand and walk and with respect to her ability to sit, her physicians

had recommended she engage in a walking program. The ALJ

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viewed the claimant’s report of daily activities as performed on a

voluntary basis and not because of any medical basis.

As the foregoing indicates, the ALJ linked his credibility

determination to the evidence as required by Kepler [v. Chater,

68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995)], and he provided specific reasons

for the determination in accordance with Hardman [v. Barnhart,

362 F.3d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 2004)]. There is no indication that the

ALJ misread the medical evidence as a whole, so his determination

as to the claimant’s credibility is entitled to deference. See Casias,

933 F.2d at 801.

Id. at 10.

 

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr.

Circuit Judge

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