Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00479/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00479-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer, and 1

Petitioner’s traverse. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND CRUZ,

Petitioner,

v.

D.G. ADAMS, WARDEN,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-00479 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant

to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, following his

conviction by jury trial of first degree burglary. See Exhibit A, Respondent’s Answer. 

In the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus filed April 12, 2005, Petitioner contests

the loss of good time credits as a result of a prison disciplinary action. Exhibit B, Answer. The

disciplinary action was based upon Petitioner being found guilty of manufacturing alcohol, which

was discovered in his cell on October 25, 2003. 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kings County Superior Court,

Case 1:05-cv-00479-AWI-DLB Document 11 Filed 12/08/06 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

which was denied on April 6, 2004. Petition, at 5. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which was also denied on

April 22, 2004. Id. Lastly, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court, which was denied on March 23, 2005. Petition, at 15. 

In the instant petition, Petitioner contends that he was not afforded proper due process

because he was given adequate notice that contraband was found in his cell. 

On September 12, 2005, Respondent filed an answer to the instant petition, and Petitioner

filed a traverse on November 7, 2005. Court Docs. 7, 10. 

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to a judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed

by the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner’s claims for relief arise out of a disciplinary hearing at

Pleasant Valley State Prison, California, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28

U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(d). If a constitutional violation has resulted in the loss of time credits,

such violation affects the duration of a sentence, and the violation may be remedied by way of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-78 (9 Cir. 1990). th

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner’s claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for writ of habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Case 1:05-cv-00479-AWI-DLB Document 11 Filed 12/08/06 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003), disapproving the

Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000); Williams, 529 th

U.S. 362. “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175 (citations omitted). “Rather, that

application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394

U.S. 286, 290 (1969), direct review of a criminal conviction is the primary method for a

petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993). In

addition, the state court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court

must accept all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v.

Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110

F.3d 1380, 1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

C. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon , 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial

Case 1:05-cv-00479-AWI-DLB Document 11 Filed 12/08/06 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

court violated her due process rights "he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court." 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is 

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) ("a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.").

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state

remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal

claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based

on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme

Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of

the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the

federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be decided under

state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal

grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d

Case 1:05-cv-00479-AWI-DLB Document 11 Filed 12/08/06 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added).

Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to adequately present his federal claim to the

state courts, as he merely presented a generalized claim of “due process.” Respondent’s

argument has merit. In his state petition for writ of habeas corpus submitted to the California

Supreme Court, Petitioner stated, as he does here, that his due process rights were violated

because he was not afforded proper notice pursuant to California Code of Regulations §§ 3327

and 3328. Thus, Petitioner raised the claim solely as a state law claim and did not provide

sufficient notice of any federal claim. Further, general appeals to broad constitutional principles,

such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish

exhaustion. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9 Cir. 1999). For purposes of exhausting state remedies, a claim for relief th

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162-163;

see also Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 998 (9 Cir. 2000) (a claim is not “fairly presented” th

to the state court unless the petitioner “specifically indicated to that court that those claims were

based on federal law.”) Accordingly, Petitioner failed to raise any cognizable federal claim in the

state courts, and the instant petition is therefore unexhausted. 

D. Merits of Claim

Notwithstanding the fact that Petitioner failed to exhaust the instant federal petition, the

petition is clearly without merit. Petitioner contends that he was not afforded proper due process

because he was given adequate notice that contraband was found in his cell, and there was no

physical evidence to support the finding of guilt. 

Prisoners cannot be entirely deprived of their constitutional rights, but their rights may be

diminished by the needs and objectives of the institutional environment. Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,

Case 1:05-cv-00479-AWI-DLB Document 11 Filed 12/08/06 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

so a prisoner is not afforded the full panoply of rights in such proceedings. Id. at 556. Thus, a

prisoner’s due process rights are moderated by the “legitimate institutional needs” of a prison. 

Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Superintendent, etc. v. Hill, 472

U.S. 445, 454-455 (1984).

However, when a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time

credits, due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of at least 24

hours of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety

and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and

(3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-567. In addition, due process

requires that the decision be supported by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, citing United

States ex rel. Vatauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927).

As Respondent submits, to the extent Petitioner is relying on the state law regulation of

15 California Code of Regulations § 3287(4), which provides for written notice of contraband

which is removed from an inmate’s cell, this claim is not reviewable via § 2254, and was already

resolved against him in the state courts. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9 Cir. th

1993) (due process does not require prison comply with its own procedures which are more

onerous than those required by the Constitution), abrogated on other grounds in Sandin v.

Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The Superior Court denied the petition as it did not state a

cognizable claim for relief. Exhibit C, Respondent’s Answer.

Petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to immediate notification of the charges and the

fact that contraband had been found, fails to state a cognizable federal claim. Under federal law,

there is no requirement that a Petitioner receive immediate notification of the charges against

him. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

To the extent Petitioner’s claim can be liberally construed to include a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, it also fails on the merits. Respondent submits a copy of the Rules

Violation Report (“RVR”), which indicates that a hearing was held on November 5, 2003. 

Exhibit B, Respondent’s Answer. Petitioner did not object that all of the due process

Case 1:05-cv-00479-AWI-DLB Document 11 Filed 12/08/06 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

requirements were complied with. Id. at 2. Petitioner pled not guilty to the charges, stating “I

don’t have any knowledge of the contraband in my cell.” Id. Petitioner was given the opportunity

to call witnesses, but did not request any witnesses at the hearing and none were called. Id. The

hearing officer found Petitioner guilty of manufacturing alcohol, because in response to a cell

search an officer “discovered a plastic bag with a brownish pulpy substance that contained

chunks of mashed fruit and juice. The brownish pulpy substance was warm to the touch and had

a strong pungent odor of fermentation and alcohol.” Id. at 3. Petitioner failed to submit any

evidence to refute the charges. Id. This is sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt. 

In sum, all due process requirements were satisfied and the guilty finding was supported

by “some evidence.” Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are without merit and the petition should

be denied. 

RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of

habeas corpus be DENIED. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk of Court be

DIRECTED to enter judgment.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served 

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 1:05-cv-00479-AWI-DLB Document 11 Filed 12/08/06 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 8, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00479-AWI-DLB Document 11 Filed 12/08/06 Page 8 of 8