Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02097/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02097-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. MIX, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:10-cv-02097-SMS PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND

(ECF No. 14, 15)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

REQUEST FOR RELIEF FROM

RESPONDING TO THE COMPLAINT, AND

FOR A THIRTY-DAY EXTENSION OF TIME

TO RESPOND TO THE COMPLAINT, TO

COMMENCE UPON ISSUANCE OF

SCREENING ORDER

(ECF No. 1)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Guillermo Garcia (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action in Tuolomne County Superior Court

on May 17, 2010. On November 9, 2010, Defendant McCue removed the action and filed a motion

for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to

the removal on April 6, 2011, which the Court construes as a motion to remand the action. (ECF

No. 14.) Defendants filed an opposition on April 18, 2011. (ECF No. 15.)

II. Motion to Remand

Plaintiff moves to remand this action alleging the “Separate and Independent” causes of

action would not be removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Plaintiff acknowledges that he is bringing

claims for violations of the First and Eighth Amendments of the United Constitution, but contends

1

Case 1:10-cv-02097-BAM Document 16 Filed 10/04/11 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that the separate and independent causes of action are not removable and a case may not be removed

based upon a federal defense.

Defendant opposes the motion on the ground it is untimely and the allegations on the face

of the complaint assert claims for a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under federal law. Defendants

argue that the Court has original jurisdiction over the federal law claims and that removal was proper

on this basis alone. Additionally, Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time, filed December 26,

2010, was untimely and therefore the time to file a motion to remand had already passed. 1

Initially, the Court shall address the timeliness of Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time. 

This action was removed on November 9, 2010, and the motion to remand for any defect, other than

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, must be made within thirty days after the filing of notice of

removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time was not mailed until

December 22, 2010, more than the thirty days required by section 1447(c). The basis of Plaintiff’s

motion is that the “separate and independent” causes of action raised in his complaint are not

removable. In other words, Plaintiff’s motion is based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Since

Plaintiff is challenging subject matter jurisdiction his motion was not required to be filed within

thirty days and his extension of time was timely filed. See GMAC Mort., LLC v. Bruce, 2010 WL

3069879, *2 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 5, 2010) (Section 1447(c) excludes motions for remand on the grounds

that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction from the thirty window).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove from state court any action “of which

the district courts have original jurisdiction.” Federal courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all

civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that his claims in this action are based upon violations of his rights

under the United States Constitution, however he argues that removal is improper because the court

does not have jurisdiction over the separate and independent claims. 28 U.S.C. 1441(c) provides

that “whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action . . . is joined with one or more

otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed. . . .” This

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time was file on December 28, 2010. (ECF No.

1

6.)

2

Case 1:10-cv-02097-BAM Document 16 Filed 10/04/11 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

allows the removal of the entire action when the federal court has original jurisdiction over at least

one of the claims. Carlsbad Technology, Inc. V. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1865 (2009). Since

Plaintiff concedes that he is bringing claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

this action was properly removed by Defendant and Plaintiff’s motion to remand shall be denied.

III. Motion for Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleadings

Defendants move to have the complaint screened and for a thirty day extension of time to file

a responsive pleading once the complaint is screened. The Court is required to screen complaints

brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court screens complaints in the order in which

they are filed and strives to avoid delays whenever possible. Plaintiff’s complaint will be screened,

however, there are hundreds of prisoner civil rights cases presently pending before the court, and

delays are inevitable despite the Court’s best efforts. The Court will grant Defendant’s request that

she be relieved from the obligation to file a responsive pleading until 30 days after the complaint is

screened.

IV. Order

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to remand, filed April 6, 2011, is DENIED; 

2. Defendant’s motion for an extension of time, filed November 9, 2010, is

GRANTED; and 

3. Defendants shall have thirty (30) days to file a responsive pleading, to commence

upon issuance of the screening order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2011 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3

Case 1:10-cv-02097-BAM Document 16 Filed 10/04/11 Page 3 of 3