Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01350/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01350-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The Defendants are the State of Arizona, Arizona Department of Corrections

("ADC") Director Dora Schriro, Mike Linderman, Sandra Walker and Wanda Hofmann.

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kristofer M. Seneca, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-03-1350-PHX-SRB

OPINION AND ORDER

This Order addresses two pending motions, both of which were filed by Defendants1

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a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as Moot (Doc. 110), and a Motion to Withdraw the

Mootness Argument as it pertains to the Book Limitation (Doc. 115). For the reasons that

follow, the latter motion is denied as moot and the former motion is granted in part and

denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

These motions concern the impact that changes in certain ADC policies have had on

the concerns raised by Plaintiff in his Complaint. More precisely, the issue is whether the

remaining count of Plaintiff's Complaint is now moot by virtue of the policy changes.

Case 2:03-cv-01350-SRB Document 119 Filed 11/17/05 Page 1 of 7
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At all relevant times and in all relevant documents, the term "religious items" does

not include religious books.

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The remaining count in Plaintiff's Complaint, Count Two, alleges a violation of the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), codified at 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2003 & Supp. 2004). The Complaint takes issue with an

ADC policy in effect at the time the Complaint was filed which restricted the number of

"religious items" an inmate could possess to seven (sometimes, the "Seven-Item Policy").2

Plaintiff contended that this policy substantially burdened his ability to fully practice his

religion, as he required the use of twenty religious items. The Complaint also alleges that

the ADC improperly bars donations of religious items, and requires inmates to purchase all

such items from the inmate store.

On July 11, 2005, the ADC eliminated the numerical restriction on the number of

religious items an inmate could possess. Under the new policy, an inmate may possess as

many religious items as can be stored in a box designated for that sole purpose. The parties

do not dispute that, at the time of the policy change, each inmate's religious property box was

nine inches by twelve inches by four inches, but that box has subsequently been enlarged to

equal the size of other standard inmate property boxes. 

On September 20, 2005, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that

the recent policy changes render moot the remainder of the Complaint. On October 19, 2005,

Defendants filed a motion to withdraw the aspect of their mootness argument pertaining to

the number of religious books that an inmate may actually possess. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A case becomes moot "when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties

lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996,

1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287, 120 S. Ct. 1382,

1390 (2000)). These criteria are satisfied when "it can be said with assurance that there is

no reasonable expectation . . . that the alleged violation will recur, and interim relief or events

Case 2:03-cv-01350-SRB Document 119 Filed 11/17/05 Page 2 of 7
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have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." Los Angeles

County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 630, 99 S. Ct. 1337, 1383 (1979) (citations, quotations and

some punctuation omitted). 

Count Two of the Complaint alleges three violations: first, the ADC restricts the

number of "religious items" an inmate may possess to seven; second, the ADC does not

permit inmates to receive donations of religious items; third, the ADC requires that all

religious items be purchased from the inmate store. (Compl. at 5-5A.) The Court will

separately discuss the impact of the new ADC policy on the viability of each of these claims.

A. ADC Policy Concerning the Number of Religious Items an Inmate May

Possess

Count Two of the Complaint alleges, among other things, that the Seven-Item Policy

impermissibly infringes on Plaintiff's ability to practice his religion. (Compl. at 5.) The new

ADC policy eliminates the seven-item restriction, and allows inmates to possess as many

religious items as can fit into a standard inmate property box. Defendants argue that because

this policy essentially provides Plaintiff with even more than that which his Complaint

sought, this portion of his Complaint has become moot.

In response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff relies on the rule that voluntary cessation

by a defendant of allegedly illegal conduct does not make a case moot. See Gluth v. Kangas,

951 F.2d 1504, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that voluntary cessation of allegedly

unconstitutional prison policy does not render moot inmate's claim where prison has history

of violations, policy is vague, and it cannot be said "with assurance" that there is no

"reasonable expectation" that alleged violations will not recur); Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corrs., 776 F.2d 851, 851 (9th Cir. 1985). See also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,

94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974) (per curiam). While Defendants do not dispute the existence of that

rule, they argue that where, as here, "the possibility of recurrence of the challenged conduct

is only a speculative contingency," Burbank v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1975),

the case must still be dismissed as moot. In support of their argument, Defendants cite the

fact that the new policy has been formally approved and implemented, and that the ADC has

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"no history of adopting new regulations when faced with legal challenges only to

subsequently revert back to the old procedure when the action was dropped." (Def.'s Mot.

to Dismiss at 8.) The Court agrees with Defendants that in light of these facts, there is no

reasonable expectation that the ADC will revert to the Seven-Item Policy once this case has

ended. See id.; Vieira v. Woodford, 2002 WL 1226852, *2 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2002)

(dismissing inmate's claim as moot where prisoner sought modification of a particular prison

guideline and, during pendency of litigation, prison policy was so modified, and there was

no indication that prison would revert to prior policy). See, e.g., McCarthy v. Ozark Sch.

Dist., 359 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2004) ("A speculative possibility is not a basis for

retaining jurisdiction over a moot case.").

Plaintiff also argues that the new policy restricts his access to certain religious items,

such as a Zabuton, a Zafu and a yoga mat, by eliminating the exemption for oversized items.

(Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 9 n.2.) While this may be true, that argument 

is flawed for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff has taken the position throughout this

litigation that ADC policy would, in his view, pass muster under RLUIPA if he were simply

allowed to possess as many religious items as could be fit in a nine-inch by twelve-inch by

four-inch box. (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) ADC policy now conforms with Plaintiff's

position. Plaintiff's attempt to pursue essentially a new legal theory so late in the litigation

is, the Court finds, unduly prejudicial and will not be permitted. See Green Country Food

Mkt., Inc. v. Bottling Group, 371 F.3d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that plaintiffs are

not allowed "to wait until the last minute to ascertain and refine the theories on which they

intend to build their case," as such a practice would "waste the parties' resources, as well as

judicial resources, on discovery aimed at ultimately unavailing legal theories and would

unfairly surprise defendants. . . . ") (citations and quotations omitted).

Second, to the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that the he has been denied access to

certain items under the new policy, that denial cannot be the subject of this action. In order

to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional policy in federal court, an inmate must first

exhaust his claim through the prison's administrative grievance procedures. 42 U.S.C. §

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1997e(a) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . any . . .

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any . . . prison . . . until such administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted."); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825

(2001). Here, the Complaint challenges under RLUIPA the ADC policy limiting inmates to

possessing seven religious items. That policy changed in July 2005 and afforded Plaintiff

the relief he sought in filing the Complaint. Plaintiff now seeks, through the same complaint,

to challenge aspects of the new policy, in particular, the policy's alleged elimination of the

exemption of oversize items. To allow Plaintiff to proceed with that challenge would enable

him to circumvent the requirement that he first exhaust the prison grievance procedures with

respect to the new policy. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825

(2001); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an

inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies before the filing of the complaint, and that

"a prisoner does not comply with this requirement by exhausting available remedies during

the course of the litigation.") (citations omitted); Morgan v. Ariz. Dept. of Corrs., 976 F.

Supp. 892, 895 (D. Ariz. 1997) (citations omitted). Accordingly, this aspect of Plaintiff's

Complaint must be dismissed as moot.

B. ADC Policy Concerning the Procedures Inmates Must Follow to Obtain

Religious Items

Next, the Court turns to the remaining violations alleged in Count Two of the

Complaint, both of which concern Plaintiff's ability to obtain religious items through the

prison store and through donation. These alleged violations appear to have fallen through

the cracks of this litigation, as the legality of the Seven-Item Policy dominated the discussion

of Count Two of Plaintiff's Complaint. Neither party addressed these alleged violations in

their respective motions for summary judgment, and Defendants did not explicitly address

these alleged violations in their motion to dismiss, other than to argue generally, in their

reply, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies concerning the approval of

additional religious items. 

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The Court concludes that because these issues have fallen so far off the radar, it would

be premature to conduct a trial about them. Accordingly, the parties are encouraged to fully

brief these issues. The briefs may address whether Plaintiff, as he is required to do,

exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this action, and whether, assuming he

has, material questions of fact remain about the legality of the ADC's procedures under the

RLUIPA. 

With regard to the exhaustion issue, the Court advises the parties that copies of the

actual grievances Plaintiff allegedly filed in connection with these issues do not appear in the

Court file. While Plaintiff makes reference to those grievances repeatedly, and even claims

to have attached copies of the grievances to various documents, for whatever reason, those

attachments never made their way into the Court file. Copies of these grievances should be

included with the parties' motions. All motions concerning these issues should be filed

within forty days of this Order.

C. ADC Policy Concerning Inmate Possession of Religious Books

Finally, the Court turns to an issue about which there has been some confusion:

whether the ADC's limitation on the number of religious books an inmate may possess falls

within the scope of this lawsuit. It does not. Count Two of the Complaint, the only portion

of the Complaint that remains, makes no mention of the ADC policy limiting inmates to

seven religious books. As such, even though this issue has managed, with some persistence,

to wriggle its way into briefs and orders throughout this litigation, the absence of this issue

in the remaining portion of the Complaint precludes a trial on the subject.

II. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Complaint has been reduced, through prior orders, to one count, and that

count alleges three separate violations of RLUIPA. The first alleged violation, the restriction

on the number of religious items an inmate can possess to seven, is dismissed as moot,

because, under new ADC policy, Plaintiff is permitted to possess as many religious items as

can fit into a standard inmate property box. The second and third alleged violations, which

concern the methods by which inmates procure religious items, are not dismissed as moot,

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and the parties may file motions for summary judgment concerning these alleged violations.

Finally, the legality of whether, under RLUIPA, the ADC may restrict the number of

religious books an inmate may possess to seven, is not an issue for trial as it is not mentioned

in the remaining portion of the Complaint. As all of the alleged violations are either

dismissed as moot or unfit for trial, the trial date is vacated.

IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

the Complaint as Moot (Doc. 110). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Defendants' Motion to Withdraw the

Mootness Argument as it pertains to the Book Limitation (Doc. 115).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating the trial date.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if parties wish to file motions in light of this

Order, those motions must be filed within forty days of this Order.

DATED this 17th day of November, 2005.

Case 2:03-cv-01350-SRB Document 119 Filed 11/17/05 Page 7 of 7