Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02628/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02628-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ammed Hassan,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Attorney General of the 

State of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 18-02628 PHX SRB (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

Petitioner Ammed Hassan, proceeding pro se, filed a petition seeking a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 20, 2018. (ECF No. 1). Respondents 

filed an answer to the petition, (ECF No. 13), and Hassan has filed a reply. (ECF No. 25). 

Hassan challenges his conviction for burglary, asserting violations of his rights to due 

process of law and the effective assistance of counsel.

I Background

A. Summary of evidence presented at trial

The following background is taken from the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in

Hassan’s appeal:

In the late evening hours of October 21, 2011, police were notified by 

an alarm company that an alarm was going off in the victim’s home. Upon 

arriving at the home, Detective Dowlen of the Scottsdale Police Department 

observed a man near the home holding a shoebox. After Dowlen had a brief 

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look at the man’s face, the man took off running, dropping the shoebox. 

Dowlen then gave chase on foot.

Although the man was able to evade capture, in the course of the chase 

a baseball cap flew off his head. As Dowlen returned to the house, he 

retrieved the cap from the ground. It was later determined that Hassan’s DNA 

was on the interior band of the cap.

A short distance from the victim’s house, police discovered the 

shoebox that was dropped by Hassan during the police pursuit. The box 

contained several pieces of costume jewelry that belonged to the victim.

In the course of the investigation, police located Hassan’s truck 

parked at the clubhouse of the golf course adjacent to the victim’s home. The 

officers eventually placed a GPS tracker on Hassan’s truck.1

A photo lineup containing a photo of Hassan was compiled and shown 

to Dowlen. Dowlen immediately identified Hassan from the line up, 

expressing his belief that Hassan was the man he had chased earlier.

The next day, Hassan retrieved his truck, and police followed him to 

the hotel where he was staying. Upon his arrival at the hotel, Hassan was 

arrested by the police.

. . . At trial, Dowlen identified Hassan as the suspect he saw running 

from the victim’s house.

State v. Hassan, 2013 WL 3963449, at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).

A primary component of Hassan’s defense was his allegation that the Scottsdale 

Police Department suspected him of criminal activity prior to the events of October 21, 

2011, and they had, accordingly, attached a GPS device to his truck months prior to that 

date, and the GPS device caused his truck to malfunction. Members of the Scottsdale Police 

Department testified at Hassan’s trial. These law enforcement officers testified that in from 

approximately February through August of 2011 they had, with court orders, placed GPS 

devices on Hassan’s truck and his wife’s van to monitor Hassan’s activities. A sergeant 

testified they had initially placed a hardwire GPS device on Hassan’s truck and that they 

 

1 Two detectives testified Mr. Hassan’s truck was found in the parking lot of a golf course 

near the scene of the crime shortly after the burglary. (ECF No. 19-1 at 96-97, 102-04, 108). The 

vehicle was physically surveilled from approximately 12:30 a.m. until 4:30 a.m. of the morning 

following the crime. (ECF No. 19-1 at 162-64). After Detective Dowlen identified Hassan as the 

suspect via the photo line-up, a GPS device was placed on the truck so the police would know 

when Hassan had returned to the truck and they could affect his arrest. (ECF No. 19-1 at 96-97, 

102-04, 108, 165). 

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had placed “maybe three or four” GPS devices on Hassan’s wife’s van, because “he kept 

finding them.” (ECF No. 19-1 at 120). A detective, the police sergeant, and a police officer

all testified that the two types of GPS devices used by the Scottsdale Police Department (a 

“hard-wired” device and a magnetic device) would not have impacted the mechanical 

functioning of his truck. (ECF No. 19-1 at 97-98, 109-10, 165). The sergeant also testified 

the Scottsdale Police Department had been conducting visual and GPS surveillance of 

Hassan “for some time” because he was suspected of committing residential burglaries. 

(ECF No. 19-1 at 119, 138-40). On cross-examination, defense counsel, utilizing the police 

department’s GPS logs, elicited testimony from the sergeant that there was a hard-wired 

GPS device on Hassan’s truck on “October 6,” 2011, the “last date” in that GPS log which 

began May 25, 2011. (ECF No. 19-1 at 125-26). However, upon redirect, the State noted 

the dates on the log of the hard-wired GPS unit on Hassan’s truck were “25-5-2011,” and 

“10-6-2011,” i.e., that the true actual date of the latest log entry was June 10, and not 

October 6. (ECF No. 19-1 at 135-36). All of the Scottsdale Police Department officers and 

detectives testified that there was no GPS device on Hassan’s truck on October 21, 2011. 

The sergeant further testified that some weeks prior to October 21, 2011, the Scottsdale 

Police Department had “pretty much given up” on surveilling Hassan because they 

believed he had left the state. (ECF No. 19-1 at 141-42). Defense counsel elicited testimony 

that the police never identified a crime occurring at any of the addresses logged on the GPS 

reports. (ECF No. 19-1 at 121-24).

A police detective testified that a towing company towed Hassan’s truck from the 

scene of his arrest; that the truck was towed to the police station to complete an inventory

of the contents of the truck; and that the truck was then turned-over to the “tow yard” and 

“permanently impounded.” (ECF No. 19-1 at 90, 94-96). The detective responsible for the 

vehicle testified that all of the inventoried items were left in the truck; that the truck was 

then towed by All City Towing to its impound yard; and that after the requisite 24-hour 

holding period the Scottsdale Police Department did not have any control over the truck. 

(ECF No. 19-1 at 171-73).

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Hassan testified at his trial. Hassan testified that he believed he began being visually 

surveilled by the Scottsdale Police Department in October or November of 2010, (ECF No. 

18-6 at 80, 107), and that the police later began placing GPS devices on his truck and his 

wife’s van. Hassan believed the GPS device was interfering with the proper functioning of 

his truck’s fuel pump. (ECF No. 18-6 at 82, 107). He testified that on the night of October 

21, 2011, he was traveling to meet a mechanic who could remove the GPS device from 

Hassan’s truck. Hassan testified that, while on his way to meet the mechanic, his truck 

began to stall so he pulled over and began pushing the truck off the road. (ECF No. 18-6 at 

83-86). He further testified that as he began to push the truck, “two kids” who were walking 

on the road began helping him push the truck, and they pushed the truck into the parking 

lot of a golf course. (ECF No. 18-6 at 86-87). Hassan testified he then walked to a shopping 

center at Shea Boulevard and Scottsdale Road, where he used a pay phone to call the 

mechanic. (ECF No. 18-6 at 87, 113). He testified that he could not reach the mechanic,

and he then tried “his girl’s phone number.” (ECF No. 18-6 at 113). Hassan testified a 

Spanish-speaking woman answered the call and her daughter translated the conversation 

from English to Spanish. He further testified the woman came and picked him up at the 

shopping center and drove him to a light-rail station, where he caught transportation back 

to his motel. (ECF No. 18-6 at 88) (“she said, well we’re not that far away. We’re dropping 

[the mechanic] off at his other job, and we can come and pick you up.” “Because they were 

supposed to come and pick me up and take me to Mesa, but they didn’t do that. What they 

ended up doing was picking me up and dropping me off at the el train near the state fair, 

which is where their destination was.”). On cross-examination Hassan testified that when 

he tried the mechanic’s “girl’s phone number,” “[a]t first I didn’t get through, but then I 

made another phone call to another friend of mine to try to get a ride. So then I called her 

one more time, and I actually got through.” (ECF No. 18-6 at 113). On cross-examination 

Hassan testified that he did not use his cell phone to call for a ride because the cell phone 

was a “minute phone,” which “had like two minutes left.” (Id.). Hassan testified that the 

next morning he “contacted a friend” who gave him a ride to collect a part for his truck; 

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that after acquiring the part he took a bus back to his truck, and that when he got back to 

his truck it started immediately without the new part being installed. (ECF No. 18-6 at 90).

Hassan flatly denied he committed the alleged crime. (ECF No. 18-6 at 120-21, 

123). He further testified he had a foot deformity which rendered him physically unable to

run from the police as alleged. (ECF No. 18-6 at 97-101). Prior to Hassan’s testimony 

defense counsel successfully precluded the introduction of Hassan’s prior out-of-state 

convictions for “multiple burglaries” as too remote, and stipulated to the admission of a 

prior non-remote non-specific felony conviction. (ECF No. 18-6 at 48-49). At the close of 

the prosecution’s case defense counsel moved for an acquittal, arguing the State’s 

“evidence boils down to a very shaky eyewitness ID . . . [Detective Dowlen] blatantly 

contradicted himself about not just the race, but the size of the” suspect when identifying 

Hassan in the photo line-up, and argued that the size of the DNA sample linked to Hassan 

was “an extremely small quantity.” (ECF No. 18-6 at 42-43). The Rule 20 motion was 

denied. (ECF No. 18-6 at 43-44). 

During its case on rebuttal, the State again elicited testimony from a Scottsdale 

Police Department detective that the police department, acting with a court order, placed a 

GPS surveillance device on Hassan’s truck “after February 20, 2011.” (ECF No. 18-6 

at 134). The State referenced a trial exhibit, “the first and last page of the hardwired GPS 

log,” indicating the device was working from May 25, 2011, through June 10, 2011, and 

that the device was removed on or about August 2, 2011. (ECF No. 18-6 at 137-38). The 

detective testified: “Once he left the State, we were done, because we believed he moved. 

And that’s why we got our tag back from Ohio PD, off his wife’s car. And we had our tag 

back from his truck. We were done.” (ECF No. 18-6 at 138). Defense counsel questioned 

the detective regarding the inventory of Hassan’s vehicle at the time it was towed and 

before it was impounded, noting the police inventory listed the items found in the truck as

“Blue backpack . . . DVD, miscellaneous clothing, car battery charger . . . wallet with 

Hassan’s Arizona driver’s license, Hassan’s TEF Bank checkbook, pair of Dickeys work 

boots . . . Samsung Boost mobile cell phone.” (ECF No. 18-6 at 6).

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B. State appellate and Rule 32 proceedings

The jury found Hassan guilty of burglary in the second degree.2. . .

. . . [T]he trial court held a hearing [and] . . . determined that Hassan 

had a total of five prior convictions. . . .

The trial court sentenced Hassan to a term of 13 years, and imposed 

an additional 2 years because the offense was committed while he was on 

pretrial release, making a total of 15 years. A.R.S. § 13–708(D). He was 

given credit for 312 days served [and] ordered to pay $700 in restitution to 

the victim.3

Hassan, 2013 WL 3963449, at *1-2.

Hassan filed a timely notice of appeal. (ECF No. 14-5). Hassan’s appointed counsel 

found no colorable claims to raise on his behalf and filed an Anders brief. (ECF No. 14-6).

Hassan filed a pro per brief, asserting Detective Dowlen’s identification of him as the 

perpetrator of the crime was unreliable and the photo line-up was unduly suggestive.

Hassan, 2013 WL 3963449, at *2. Hassan also alleged the prosecution “used perjured 

testimony by several police officers” and “denied him access to witnesses during 

discovery.” Id. He also asserted “his counsel failed to interview certain witnesses,” “he 

should have received a Willits instruction, contending the police destroyed evidence in bad 

faith . . .”, and a Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search of his motel room after his 

arrest Id.4

 

2 On the morning of July 25, 2012, at 10:30 a.m., the jury was instructed, closing argument 

was heard, and the case was submitted to the jury. (ECF No. 18-6 at 141). The jury returned its

guilty verdict at 1:48 p.m. on July 25, 2012. (ECF No. 14-3 at 2). 

3 At the sentencing hearing counsel contested the adequacy of the State’s evidence of 

Hassan’s prior convictions and argued for a lesser sentence based on Hassan’s family ties, his age, 

and his health. (ECF No. 18-5). Hassan addressed the sentencing court and asked the court to 

impose a lesser sentence. (Id.).

4 Detective Dowlen testified that the suspect fled through a wet, grassy area. (ECF No. 19-

1 at 59). On cross-examining the detective stated no photographs were taken because “you really 

couldn’t see footprints.” (ECF No. 19-1 at 59). During defense counsel’s cross-examination of a 

police officer responding to the scene of the burglary, the following colloquy occurred:

Q. You saw -- you tracked some footprints on the ground; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were these footprints?

A. It was somewhere near the wash on, I believe, just east, southeast of the 

residence. There was some footprints in the grass.

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The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Hassan’s conviction and sentence in a 

memorandum decision. Id. at *1-5. The appellate court held the “mere fact” of some 

evidence challenging the reliability of the Detective Dowlen’s identification did not 

constitute reversible error, and substantial evidence supported the reliability of the 

detective’s identification of Hassan as the perpetrator of the crime. The appellate court 

found no evidence that the photo lineup was unduly suggestive and that this issue was

waived because the defense never moved to suppress the identification. Id. at *2. The court 

further concluded Hassan failed to establish that police officers perjured themselves at trial, 

finding “such contentions merely go to the weight and credibility of these witnesses, and 

do not, in light of all the evidence in this case, constitute reversible error, much less proof 

of perjury.” Id. The appellate court also found Hassan’s Willits claim waived and without 

merit, concluding Hassan “has not shown that the potential exculpatory value of the 

evidence was more than speculative, nor has he shown that he was prejudiced. In short, 

Hassan has shown nothing that would entitle him to a Willits instruction, nor is there 

anything on the record to support this claim.” Id. at *3. The appellate court held Hassan 

waived his Fourth Amendment claim. Id.

A motion for reconsideration was denied and the Arizona Supreme Court denied a 

petition for review. (ECF No. 15-2; ECF No. 15-3; ECF No. 15-4; ECF No. 16-1).

Hassan filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, and was appointed counsel. (ECF No. 16-2; ECF No. 16-3). 

Hassan’s post-conviction counsel reviewed the record and concluded she was unable to 

“discern any colorable claim upon which to base a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” 

(ECF No. 16-4 at 2). Hassan filed a pro per Rule 32 petition, alleging nineteen claims of 

 

Q. And they were pretty distinct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did anyone show up to take photographs of the footprints?

A. I do not know.

Q. But to your knowledge, that wasn’t done?

A. No.

(ECF No. 19-1 at 149-50). Upon redirect, the officer affirmed that the footprints he observed where 

in “an area” where Detective Dowlen’s pursuit of the suspect had occurred. (ECF No. 19-1 at 153).

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ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (ECF No. 16-5). The state trial court 

summarized his claims as follows: “Defendant [contends] counsel failed to do the 

following: thoroughly investigate his case; object to certain witnesses, felony convictions, 

and other evidence; withdraw a jury instruction (sic); and communicate with the defendant 

regarding trial strategy. Defendant also complained that appellate counsel failed to raise 

certain arguments . . .” (ECF No. 17-5). In an order issued January 26, 2015, the state trial 

courtsummarily dismissed Hassan’s petition. (ECF No. 16-9). The court concluded Hassan 

failed to demonstrate his trial or appellate counsel’s performance was deficient or that he 

suffered any prejudice. (Id.). Hassan sought a rehearing, which was denied on September 

26, 2015. (ECF No. 16-10; ECF No. 17-5). 

Hassan petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. (ECF No. 17-7). In his 

petition he asserted, inter alia, that the State failed to comply with the defense’s request to 

disclose the complete logs from the GPS devices. (ECF No. 17-7 at 16). Hassan argued:

“The evidence is material in that it supports appellant’s alibi, as in going to have a GPS 

device removed from his truck the night of the incident.” (Id.). He also asserted additional 

claims for relief than those stated in his Rule 32 petition to the trial court: 

(1) the police did not preserve requested exculpatory alibi evidence in 

bad faith violating due process; (2) the trial court failed to comply with 

Arizona Rule of Evidence 609 which prejudiced Hassan because his prior 

felony conviction was used to impeach him and opened the door for other 

aggravator findings by the trial court; (3) the trial court took judicial notice 

of evidence in violation of A.R.S. § 13-708(D) and the State illegally built 

its allegations of historical prior felony convictions on this evidence to 

enhance his sentence; (4) the trial court erred in its ruling on a discovery 

request; (5) trial and appellant counsel failed “to move or take action on 

appellant’s behalf.”

(ECF No. 13 at 6).

In a decision issued October 10, 2017, the Court of Appeals granted review but

summarily denied relief. State v. Hassan, 2017 WL 4508314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). The 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review and a motion for rehearing. (ECF No. 17-9; ECF 

No. 18-1; ECF No. 18-2; ECF No. 18-3). 

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C. Hassan’s federal habeas claims

Hassan asserts he is entitled to federal habeas relief because:

1. A third-party destroyed alibi evidence.

2. He was unable to gather evidence material to his innocence.

3. He was denied his rights pursuant to Apprendi and Blakely.

4. He was improperly impeached by the use of a prior conviction.

5. He was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Hassan asserts his counsel:

a. improperly opened the door to his prior convictions;

b. failed to ascertain Hassan’s prior Michigan conviction was not a 

felony in Arizona and could not have been used to impeach him;

c. failed to exclude the Detective Dowlen’s in-court identification;

d. failed to acquire the complete GPS logs;

e. failed to assert the State had destroyed his “access to alibi 

witnesses,” i.e., his cell phone;

f. failed to assert the police failed to collect the “culprit[’]s shoe 

prints.”

g. failed to present the jury with evidence of police misconduct;

h. forfeited his entitlement to a Willits instruction;

i. “released all subpoenaed witnesses that he agreed to call who 

supported police misconduct theory;” and

j. “changed the theory of the case from ‘police set Hassan up’ to []drug 

addicted nephews may have committed the crime without evidence to 

support the theory.”

(ECF No. 1 at 6-10).

Respondents contend Hassan’s claims are vague and conclusory, not cognizable,

procedurally defaulted, and without merit.

II Analysis

A. Governing law

1. Exhaustion and procedural default

Absent specific circumstances the Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the 

merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan 

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 

(1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state 

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courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim 

to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 

489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). In noncapital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is 

satisfied if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See 

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 

736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 2008). To fairly present a federal habeas claim in the state courts the

petitioner must present the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th 

Cir. 2009). To present the substantial equivalent of a federal habeas claim to the state courts 

the petitioner must include a reference to the operative federal constitutional guarantee 

relied on by the petitioner in the federal habeas claim and a statement the facts supporting 

the claim. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 

F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). 

A petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has the right to raise 

a previously-unpresented claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available to the 

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the 

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state courts. See Woodford 

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006). If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally 

barred pursuant to state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural 

default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92. Procedural default occurs when a 

petitioner has never presented a federal habeas claim in state court and he is now barred 

from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including rules regarding waiver and the 

preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52. In Arizona, claims not previously 

presented to the state courts in either a direct appeal or on collateral review are generally 

barred from federal habeas review because an attempt to return to state court to present 

them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of claims for which a successive 

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Rule 32 action is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) & (b). Procedural 

default also occurs when a claim presented to the state courts was denied pursuant to an 

independent and adequate state procedural rule. Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 1033, 1059 (9th 

Cir. 2017).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, and 

the preclusion of claims bar Hassan from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any 

unexhausted federal habeas claims, he has exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, any claim 

not previously fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules 

regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal 

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for affirming a conviction and 

denying federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar).

If a prisoner has procedurally defaulted a federal habeas claim in the state courts he 

is not entitled to a review of the merits of the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice. 

E.g., Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse 

for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim, i.e., an objective factor outside of the 

defense’s control, and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional 

violation. Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011). Both cause and prejudice 

must be shown to excuse a procedural default. E.g., Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. It is the 

petitioner’s burden to establish cause and prejudice with regard to their procedural default 

of a federal habeas claim in the state courts. Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415 (9th 

Cir. 1998). The Court may also consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

failure to consider the merits of the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Atwood, 870 F.3d at 1059; Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. A petitioner 

meets the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception only by “establish[ing] that under 

the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 

505 U.S. 333. 339 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Although relief may not be granted on an unexhausted claim absent a showing of 

cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, “[a]n application for a writ of 

habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to 

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). See also 

Kirkpatrick v. Chappell, 926 F.3d 1157, 1166 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2019); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 

686 F.3d 758, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012).

2. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s decision denying the claim 

was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established” federal 

law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 166, 

172-73 (2012); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). A state court’s decision is 

contrary to federal law if the state court applied a rule contradicting the governing law 

established by the United States Supreme Court, or if it reaches a different result from that 

of the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See, e.g., Brown v. 

Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004).

Furthermore, the state court’s decision constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law only if it is objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 

U.S. 766, 773 (2010); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect one. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. “’A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded 

jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Woods v. Etherton, 

136 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016), quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. 

“Deciding whether a state court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of 

federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of fact requires the federal 

habeas court to train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why 

state courts rejected a state prisoner’s federal claims . . .” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 

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1191-92 (2018) (internal quotations omitted). When there is no “reasoned” state court 

decision explaining the state’s denial of a claim presented in a federal habeas petition, the 

District Court must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the 

state court’s decision summarily denying the claim was objectively reasonable. Murray v. 

Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 801-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 414 (2018). 

3. Standard governing Strickland claims

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a habeas petitioner must 

show his attorney’s performance was deficient and he was prejudiced by the alleged 

deficiency. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel’s 

performance will be found deficient only if counsel’s actions “fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness,” as measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. 

See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). When evaluating 

defense counsel’s performance, the Court “must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . .” 

Strickland 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotations omitted). To establish prejudice the 

petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

It is the petitioner’s burden to demonstrate both prongs of the Strickland test. Wong 

v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16-17 (2009); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 

(2009); Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2014). If a habeas petitioner cannot meet 

“the highly demanding and heavy burden of establishing actual prejudice” it is unnecessary 

to determine whether his counsel’s performance was deficient. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 

979, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose 

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course 

should be followed.”); Rhoades v. Henry, 611 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010); Rios v. 

Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland

test obviates the need to consider the other.”).

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On federal habeas review an exhausted Strickland claim is reviewed under a 

“doubly deferential” standard. Atwood, 870 F.3d at 1057. The question for a court applying 

Strickland in this circumstance is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard . . .” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 788. Even if the 

Court could conclude on de novo review that the petitioner might satisfy both prongs of 

the Strickland test, the “AEDPA requires that a federal court find the state court’s contrary 

conclusions . . . objectively unreasonable before granting habeas relief.” Woods v. Sinclair, 

764 F.3d 1109, 1132 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).

B. Hassan’s claims for relief

1. Destruction of evidence

Hassan asserts he was denied his right to due process of law because the tow yard, 

which he contends acted with authority bestowed by the Scottsdale Police Department,

destroyed allegedly exculpatory evidence, i.e., his cell phone, in violation of the doctrine 

of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 52 (1988). Hassan alleges that after defense counsel 

obtained a court order to access the truck at the tow yard, the truck was sold at auction and 

the “evidence” contained in the truck was lost. (ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 1-1 at 23). Hassan 

asserts he was, therefore, unable to contact his alibi witness(es), whose phone numbers 

were contained in his cell phone. Hassan argues: (1) the Scottsdale Police Department 

denied him his “right” to gather evidence, i.e., the towing company acted under the police 

department’s authority because the police deemed his truck permanently impounded; (2)

the police department did not comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-4305 because 

they failed to give him adequate notice of the status of his vehicle; and (3) the police failed 

to return phone calls or emails concerning Hassan’s vehicle. (ECF No. 1 at 6).

Respondents contend these claims were not properly exhausted in the state courts.

5

Hassan acknowledges he did not present these claims in the state courts as “stand-alone” 

claims pursuant to Brady or Youngblood, but argues his “good faith” effort to exhaust these 

 

5 The factual basis for these claims was presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals as an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Hassan’s Rule 32 action, in which he cited to Brady and 

Youngblood. (ECF No. 17-7 at 4-9). 

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claims by presenting the factual basis for the claims to the state courts as ineffective 

assistance of counsel, is sufficient to warrant consideration on the merits.6(ECF No. 25 

at 4). 

Regardless of any failure to exhaust the claims stated in Ground One they may be 

denied on the merits. The record before the Arizona Court of Appeals (ECF No. 17 at 75-

89) and the exhibits attached to Hassan’s federal habeas petition (ECF No. 1-2 at 2-6)

include the report of an investigator hired to assist Hassan’s counsel in both the instant 

matter and CR2011141962.7 These records and exhibits also include emails from defense 

counsel to the prosecutor regarding discovery, pretrial motions, and plea negotiations, and 

a motion for access to Hassan’s impounded truck and a court order granting that motion. 

(ECF No. 17 at 75-100; ECF No. 1-2 at 2-6,15-17, 25-28; ECF No. 17-9 at 31). The record 

in this matter, specifically an attachment to Hassan’s “Motion to Supplement Defendant[’s]

pro-per Petition for Post Conviction Relief with Exhibited Facts” (ECF No. 16 at 74-77), 

also includes notes apparently taken by defense counsel during a meeting with Hassan on 

December 20, 2011. (ECF No. 16 at 80). Although hand-written and difficult to read, the 

notes include the following, under the notation “Alibi:” “[Defendant’s] tire blew out, on 

way to his mechanic/pushed truck into parking lot of golf course/attendant helpful/Karen 

picked him up.” (ECF No. 16 at 81). In the margin next to this note is the word “phone,” 

which is underlined, and “Karen,” which is circled with the notation: “get her #.” (Id.). At 

the bottom of the page is the notation: “is phone evidence?” (Id.). 

 

6 Hassan states these facts are also the basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

regarding counsel’s failure to “pursue a judicial finding ‘for police destruction of only access to 

alibi witnesses;’” counsel’s failure to present “’police investigator’s misconduct and act of bad 

faith befor[e] the jury;’” counsel’s absence of knowledge that “’a Willits instruction cannot be 

given when allegation of bad faith is present;’” counsel “’releas[ing] all subpoenaed witnesses that 

he agreed to call who supported police misconduct theory;’” and counsel “’chang[ing] the theory 

of the case from police set Hassan up to drug addicted nephews may have committed the crime 

without evidence to support the theory.’” (ECF No. 25 at 4). 

7

In CR2011141962 Hassan was charged with being a prohibited possessor of a weapon 

(an 8-inch fixed blade buck knife), and criminal trespass of a residence.

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The defense investigator attempted to locate and retrieve the cell phone left in 

Hassan’s truck at the time of his arrest. The investigator contacted the Scottsdale Police 

Department on January 17 and January 25, 2012, and was informed Hassan’s phone “was 

believed left in the vehicle at the time the vehicle was impounded,” although the 

investigator was told “there was no phone listed” on the police department’s inventory of 

the truck. (ECF No. 17 at 76). The investigator located the vehicle at the impound yard of 

All-City Towing, and was informed that the impound yard did not inventory the vehicle

upon arrival and that items were not removed from a vehicle upon impoundment, i.e., if a 

phone had been in the vehicle at the time of the impound it would still be in the truck. (ECF 

No. 17 at 77). The investigator was informed he would need a Power of Attorney notarized 

by Hassan, the registered owner, to be allowed to retrieve anything from the truck. (Id.). 

The investigator informed defense counsel of these findings on January 26, 2012, and 

counsel “indicated he would get back to [the investigator] on what to do next.” (Id.). 

On February 15, 2012, defense counsel filed a motion for a court order directed to 

All-City Towing, “for defense access to defendant’s property,” i.e., Hassan’s truck. (ECF 

No. 17 at 80). The motion asserted that, at the time of Hassan’s arrest, “officers impounded 

his truck. Without listing the truck or its contents as evidence, they had it stored at AllCity.” (Id.). The motion further averred Hassan told counsel “the phone contains numbers 

of potential defense witnesses, and that these stored numbers constitute the only contact 

information [Hassan] has for those witnesses,” and that the “state has no objection to this 

motion.” (ECF No. 17 at 81). The motion was granted and on February 28, 2012, the 

Superior Court issued an order directing All-City Towing to provide defense counsel and 

his investigator access to the truck and the contents of the truck. (ECF No. 17 at 82).

On March 1, 2012, defense counsel filed a motion to continue in the instant matter 

and in Hassan’s other pending criminal proceeding, noting the parties were discussing a 

plea but awaiting discovery in the form of fingerprint results, GPS logs, and police radio 

“traffic” transcripts, and that counsel was “still trying to acquire potentially exculpatory 

evidence in the form of phone numbers contained in the defendant’s cell phone.” (ECF No. 

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17 at 85). Counsel noted the court had issued an order allowing him access to the truck, but 

that after he had “acquired the information on the phone, [the defense] will still have to 

investigate the resulting leads . . .” (Id.). On or about March 9, 2012, defense counsel 

responded to an email from the prosecutor, stating: “Mr. Hassan has not yet decided 

whether he’s interested in a plea . . . On the [burglary] case . . . the judge has signed a court 

order to get me into Mr. H’s truck and get phone numbers off his phone, in order to get in 

touch with potential defense witnesses; but I haven’t been able to get down to the tow yard 

yet. . . .” (ECF No. 1-2 at 17). 

The investigator and defense counsel “were going to go to the All City Storage 

facility” on April 6, 2012, but when the investigator called All City “to check the status of 

the vehicle” he was informed the vehicle had been sent to auction on February 22. (ECF 

No. 17 at 79). When the investigator contacted the auctioneer, he was informed there had 

been no inventory of any items possibly remaining in the truck when it was received from 

impound or prior to auction, and that all items located in vehicles prior to auction were 

donated or “tossed.” (Id.). 

An email from defense counsel to the prosecutor dated April 18, 2012, states, inter 

alia:

I’m especially disturbed by this fact: as you know, I filed a motion with [the 

state superior court] asking for a court order to get access to the defendant’s

truck. As I told you, I wanted to get his cell phone, which, according to Mr. 

Hassan, contained phone numbers of alibi witnesses. [The judge] signed the 

order, but before I could get to the tow yard I was informed that the truck had 

been sold along with all of its contents. This is quite disturbing. As stated 

clearly in the police report, the police impounded the truck. Thus, as far as 

I’m concerned, the truck and all its contents were in the state’s possession. I 

had informed you as well as the judge that it contained potentially 

exculpatory evidence. At the minimum, if we go to trial, I will ask for a 

Willetts (sic) instruction. 

(ECF No. 17 at 74). 

The record filed in state court also includes a supplemental note, dated October 22, 

2011, by Scottsdale Police Detective Vahle, stating that after Hassan was arrested at his 

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motel, the detective spoke to the manager of the motel. (ECF 17 at 87). The manager 

“requested that Hassan be trespassed from the property” and, accordingly, “Hassan’s truck 

was towed back to [Scottsdale Police Department] District 3 where I assisted with an 

inventory prior to it being permantly (sic) impounded.” (Id.). A supplemental note by a 

different detective, who testified at Hassan’s trial, states that on the evening of Hassan’s 

arrest “Hassan’s vehicle was towed to the District 3 station for an inventory search pursuant 

to the tow. . . . The items in the vehicle were inventoried pursuant to SPD policy.” (ECF 

No. 17-9 at 33). Attached to the detective’s notes are photos, which are not entirely legible, 

of the bed of a truck and the interior of a truck. (ECF No. 17-9 at 35-36). The photographs 

of the interior and bed of the truck and the impound report prepared by the Scottsdale Police 

Department were admitted into evidence at Hassan’s trial. (ECF No. 19-2 at 2; ECF No. 

19-1 at 81). 

At trial the prosecutor elicited the following testimony from Detective Vahle:

Q. And in a case such as this, what’s the purpose of having the truck towed?

A. In this case, it was on private property, with that being the Budget Inn 

where [Hassan] was staying. The manager did not want him there. He was 

evicted from there so, therefore, he did not want the vehicle on the property.

Q. In terms of the tow sheet itself, is there different boxes you can check in 

terms of the purpose for the towing, how long to keep the property, and that 

sort of thing?

A. Yes. It can be driver arrested; it can be in a collision; it could be a DUI 

where it’s a 30-day mandatory hold.

It could be for evidence, maybe scene of a murder or some blood in 

it. Or it could be seizure; used in the crime and it’s valuable and the police 

want to seize it.

Q. And in this particular case, what kind of impound was done to the truck?

A. Driver arrested.

Q. And there’s a box checked 28-872?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What does that mean relative to the truck and the custody of the truck?

A. That means it’s towed because the driver was arrested and then it’s 

impounded.

Q. At that point, how long is the truck held?

A. As soon as we inventory it and we determine if there’s nothing valuable, 

and then it usually gets turned over to the tow yard. 

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And at that point, then the owner can pick it up or we can determine 

at a later date if it’s valuable and was used in a crime, and we can seize it or 

we can determine what we need to do with it.

(ECF No. 19-1 at 94). This line of inquiry continued as follows:

Q. In this particular case, an inventory was done and there was nothing of 

evidentiary value found within the truck?

A. Correct.

Q. And the police didn’t retain custody of the truck at that point?

A. It’s my understanding, no.

Q. And you testified earlier that, when a truck is towed and impounded in 

such a situation, it becomes the property of the tow yard?

A. Correct.

Q. And that they return it to the rightful owner?

A. Yes.

(ECF No. 19-1 at 95-96).

8

During trial, the Scottsdale Police Department Detective Pocklington testified:

Q. In this particular case, why did you have the defendant’s truck towed from

the hotel?

A. It’s our department policy, per A.R.S. 28-872, that when we make an 

arrest from a vehicle, that the vehicle gets towed down to All City Towing 

and that vehicle [is] held for 24 hours. And after the 24 period, the registered 

owner can pick up the vehicle.

***

Q. And after the 24-hour period, did Scottsdale police have any control over 

the vehicle?

A. No.

***

Q. Did you conduct the inventory search of the truck?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. While going through the truck, did you find anything of evidentiary value 

as to this case?

A. No.

(ECF No. 19-1 at 170-73). 

 

8

See also J. Edward Moreno, Arizona makes millions off towed vehicles, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,

Aug. 7, 2019, available at 2019 WLNR 24087825: “If the owner doesn’t retrieve or give up their 

vehicle within 30 days [of towing and impoundment], it is considered abandoned. . . . After 30 

days, the [towing company can] claim [the vehicle] as abandoned and put it up for sale.”

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Under certain circumstances, the state’s failure to collect or preserve evidence 

constitutes a due process violation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58; Villafuerte v. Stewart, 

111 F.3d 616, 625-26 (9th Cir. 1997). The duty to preserve evidence is limited to material 

evidence, i.e., evidence whose exculpatory value was apparent before its destruction and 

that is of such nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence from other 

sources. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); Richter v. Hickman, 521 F.3d 

1222, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the state’s “destruction” of evidence is only a per 

se violation of due process when the destroyed evidence is material exculpatory evidence. 

If the exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent to the police, or if the defendant 

could obtain comparable evidence from other sources, the doctrine of Trombetta is not 

violated. “Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that 

duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the 

suspect’s defense.” Trombetta, 467 U.S.at 488.

With regard to evidence which does not fall under the purview of Trombetta, the 

“failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process 

of law” “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.” 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. See also Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F .3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Although the good or bad faith of the police is irrelevant to the analysis when the police 

destroy evidence which is clearly material exculpatory evidence, the analysis is different 

if the evidence is only potentially useful; there is no due process violation in that 

circumstance unless the defendant can show the police acted in bad faith conduct in failing 

to preserve the evidence. Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48 (2004); Youngblood, 488 

U.S. at 58.

In the context of potentially useful evidence, the burden is on the petitioner to show 

the evidence was lost via an act of bad faith, i.e., that the exculpatory value of the evidence 

was apparent to the State or the its agents before it was “destroyed.” Sanders v. Cullen, 873 

F.3d 778, 811 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 798 (2019). “The presence or absence 

of bad faith turns on the government’s knowledge of the apparent exculpatory value of the 

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evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.” Id. To establish bad faith on the part of the 

Scottsdale Police Department Hassan must prove the department’s “official animus” or 

“conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488. When 

the police act “in accord with their normal practice,” there is no showing of bad faith. Id.

For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded a Trombetta claim is 

defeated when a police department’s actions are in “substantial compliance” with state 

statutes regarding disposition of personal property or evidence. Ashworth v. Myers, 45 F.3d 

435 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Due Process Clause does not impose on the police “an undifferentiated and 

absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary 

significance in a particular prosecution.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. The record does not 

indicate that the phone left in the truck was, in and of itself, material exculpatory evidence. 

See DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2001). Nor does the record demonstrate

that the value of the exculpatory “evidence,” i.e., Hassan’s cell phone, was apparent to the 

Scottsdale Police Department prior to impoundment of the vehicle by the towing company

or prior to the 30-day period before the truck was deemed “abandoned.” Hassan asserts the 

cell phone held exculpatory evidence in the form of contact information for potential alibi 

witnesses, but this information would not be apparent to the police department by virtue of 

the phone’s existence. And Hassan only speculates as to the potentially exculpatory nature 

of the information contained in the phone, i.e., that even if the phone had been retrieved 

the purported alibi witnesses could have been located, would have been willing to testify, 

and would have testified as to Hassan’s version of the events. Furthermore, the record 

indicates that Hassan had other means of finding these witnesses; counsel pursued other 

avenues of establishing Hassan’s purported alibi, which counsel at one point deemed more 

important than obtaining the phone. An investigation note dated February 22, 2012, states:

I received the following email from Attorney Stafford:

Re Hassan: here’s something we should check out that I was neglecting: 

Hassan says that he parked at the golf course the night of the burg because 

his truck broke down. He says that a golf course employee helped him push 

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the truck into the parking lot. He remembers him as a young white guy 

“whose job it was to park the golf carts.” when you get a chance, please try 

to track this guy down. If he exists he’d actually be a more important witness 

for us than the girl whose name is on the phone in the truck. (sic)

(ECF No. 17 at 78). Defense counsel later informed the investigator that Hassan described 

the golf course employee as a “white teenager, 5 ft 10, dark blond hair,” and that the contact 

was at approximately 8 p.m. (Id.).

9 The investigator followed-up with the manager of the 

golf course, who spoke with the four employees who matched the description given by 

Hassan, and “none of them recalled anything relating to what [the investigator] described” 

to the golf course manger regarding Hassan’s statement that an employee assisted in 

pushing the vehicle into the parking lot at 8 p.m. on the night in question. (Id.). 

Additionally, Hassan argued to the state appellate court that the phone and a map 

also located in the truck were “evidence of such nature that defendant would be unable to 

obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable available means.” (ECF No. 17 at 27), 

However, Hassan then countered this assertion by detailing other, albeit unsuccessful, 

means of contacting witnesses regarding his purported alibi:

The girl who stopped to help appellant fix a flat tire . . . and translated to the 

mechanic why appellant was late to bring him the truck for previously agreed 

repair at the shop, sent a text to appellant’s phone with her contact 

information the night of the crime. Appellants phone also held the mechanics 

address and phone number as well as the only contact number for the 

wife/girlfriend and 13 or 15 year old girl who drove appellant from 

Scottsdale to the light rail train stop before the first reported alarm call. [] 

The mechanics (sic) contact information and repair shop address was written 

on the map. The defense investigator could not locate the mechanic with just 

the apartment complex location the apartment manager did not off handly

(sic) know the family without an address. The mechanic did not work for Sun 

 

9 This contradicts Hassan’s statement at trial in response to a jury question: “What time did 

the mechanic’s girlfriend pick you up from the mall?” Hassan’s response was: “I would say it 

would have been around 7:10, 7:20. Because when I tried to call, I distinctively remember looking 

at my watch, and it was around 6:45, 6:55, almost 7:00.” When asked: “Q. What time was the truck 

pushed into the golf course lot?” Hassan responded: “A. I don’t know the exact time of that.” (ECF 

No. 18-6 at 127).

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Devil, the shop in back did hire hispanics. However (sic) did not recognize 

the name “Piszza or Paroo,” or description provided. . . . 10

(Id.). Hassan also testified at his trial that the mechanic who was to take the GPS device 

off of his truck the night of the burglary “lived right here in Mesa, in the same apartment 

complex I used to live in,” and when testifying about the mechanic implied that he worked 

at “J&J Auto Repair in Mesa. (ECF No. 18-6 at 83-84). 

To the extent the phone itself could be classified as “potentially useful evidence,” 

Hassan has not met his burden of showing bad faith on behalf of the Scottsdale Police 

Department. Once informed by defense counsel of Hassan’s allegation that the phone 

contained the contact information of potential defense witnesses, which occurred after the 

police department had relinquished control over the truck and its contents to the tow yard, 

the State did not oppose defense counsel’s motion seeking access to truck to retrieve the 

phone. And, at best, the police detective’s initial incorrect statement to the investigator that 

the inventory of the truck did not include a phone constitutes negligence, and the 

misinformation was quickly remedied. The Circuit Courts of Appeal have uniformly 

concluded that negligence by the police department regarding the failure to preserve 

evidence does not establish bad faith. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 372, citing Villafuerte v. Stewart, 

111 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 1997); Wilson v. Sheldon, 874 F.3d 470, 479 (6th Cir. 2017);

United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 912 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Of course, mere negligence on 

the government’s part in failing to preserve such evidence is inadequate for a showing of 

bad faith.”). Hassan has failed to establish either bad faith on the part of the police, either 

before or after the impoundment. See DiBenedetto, 272 F.3d at 13. 

Additionally, in his federal habeas petition Hassan asserts the tow yard’s destruction 

of this “evidence” is attributable to the Scottsdale Police Department. This last argument 

fails because the doctrine regarding the preservation of evidence stated in Trombetta and 

 

10 Nowhere in his pleadings does Hassan proffer a reason why a stranger who stopped to 

help him fix a flat tire would send him a text with her contact information, nor does he state, with 

regard to his reports of his conversations with the mechanic, that the mechanic did not speak 

English. 

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Youngblood applies only to the actions of the “state,” and there is no evidence that the tow 

yard acted under the direction of the police department in sending the truck to auction after 

the thirty-day abandonment period had passed. See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 

1056-57 (10th Cir. 2002). The tow yard did not act as an agent of the police department

because the police department’s control over the disposal of the truck and its contents 

ceased no later than November 22, 2011, and the truck and its contents were sent to auction

on February 22, 2012, two weeks before the motion seeking a court order to access the 

contents of the truck was filed and three months after the abandonment period expired.

The fact that the police department did not have control over the vehicle or its contents was 

acknowledged by the fact that the motion sought an order directed at the towing company, 

rather than the police department. 

Hassan makes no colorable showing that the Scottsdale Police Department, or the 

towing company acting at the behest of the police department, acted to prevent disclosure 

of evidence favorable to the defense, nor is there any reason to believe that the exculpatory 

value of the phone itself was apparent prior to its destruction. The Supreme Court has 

displayed an “unwillingness to read the ‘fundamental fairness’ requirement of the Due 

Process Clause, as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain 

and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a 

particular prosecution.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. The “mere failure to preserve 

evidence,” which could have led to other evidence, which other evidence “might have 

exonerated the defendant does not constitute a due process violation.” Phillips v. Woodford, 

267 F.3d 966, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, evidence 

which is only of “speculative materiality” is not considered exculpatory for purposes of 

Trombetta, particularly when there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 

Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 495-96 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Hassan also claims that the police did not comply with state statutes when 

relinquishing control of his truck and its contents to the tow yard. Even assuming that 

Hassan had any rights arising from Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 13-4305 rather 

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than § 28-872, pursuant to which his vehicle was towed and impounded, his allegation that 

his right to due process was violated by the Scottsdale Police Department’s failure to 

comply with a state statute does not state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. A 

violation of a state statute by the police, implicating the admission or exclusion of evidence 

at trial, does not breach a defendant’s right to due process of law unless it renders the 

defendant’s trial “fundamentally unfair.” See Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2009); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). Hassan 

testified as to his alibi, offering a non-inculpatory explanation for his truck being located 

near the scene of the burglary, and the jury by its verdict determined this explanation not 

credible and/or outweighed by the evidence that he had committed the burglary. Hassan’s 

trial was not rendered “fundamentally unfair” by the omission of this evidence because it 

is not clear that any alibi witnesses existed, that they would have testified in support of the 

facts asserted by Hassan in his own testimony, or that their testimony would have 

outweighed the other evidence presented to the jury. For these same reasons, Hassan’s 

claim that his due process rights were violated by the police department’s failure to contact 

him or return his phone calls regarding the location of his truck and its contents does not 

state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief because these acts of the police department 

did not deprive Hassan of his right to due process of law. A habeas petitioner cannot 

“’transform a state law issue into a federal one by merely asserting a violation of due 

process.’” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting Langford v. Day, 

110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997).

2. Brady claim

Hassan contends he was denied his due process right to request and gather evidence 

material to his innocence, i.e., the full logs of the GPS devices placed on his truck. (ECF 

No. 1 at 7). Hassan contends the withholding of this evidence violated the doctrine of Brady 

v. Maryland. (ECF No. 1-1 at 24-26). Respondents assert Hassan did not exhaust this claim 

in the state courts. Regardless of any procedural default of this claim, it may be denied on 

the merits.

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The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that a defendant’s right 

to due process of law is violated when the government fails to disclose evidence that is 

material to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. See 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In order to 

prevail on a Brady claim in a federal habeas action, the petitioner must demonstrate that: 

(1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the petitioner, either because it was exculpatory 

or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the government, either willfully or 

inadvertently; and (3) prejudice resulted. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-

82 (1999). However, if the petitioner was aware of the essential facts enabling him to take 

advantage of any such evidence at the time of his trial, the government does “not commit 

a Brady violation by not bringing the evidence to the attention of the defense.” Raley v. 

Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

A GPS log comprised of twenty to thirty pages was admitted at trial as “Exhibit 27”. 

(ECF No. 19-1 at 120-21). The first date of this log was March 2, 2011, and the log 

purportedly covered a period of “three weeks or so.” (ECF No. 19-1 at 121, 125). Portions 

of a second log were introduced into evidence as “Exhibit 24”; the parties stipulated that 

only the first and last pages of that log would be introduced. (ECF No. 19-1 at 124-25). 

The first date of the second log was May 25, 2011 (ECF No. 19-1 at 135), and the last date 

appeared to be October 6, 2011. (ECF No. 19-1 at 125-26). However, on redirect 

examination it was revealed that the rendering of the last date appeared to be incorrect, i.e., 

the date was “10-6-2011,” i.e., June 10, rather than October 6. (ECF No. 19-1 at 135). 

The complete record in this matter indicates the evidence referenced by Hassan, i.e., 

the “full” GPS logs, were either nonexistent (with regard to Hassan’s allegation that a GPS 

device was on his truck in the days prior to and on the day of the burglary), or were not 

suppressed by the government. The record clearly indicates the complete logs were 

disclosed to the defense during discovery, one of the logs was admitted at trial in its 

entirety, and defense counsel stipulated to the admission of only two pages of the other log

being introduced into evidence. Furthermore, Hassan is unable to establish that any 

“suppressed” evidence was exculpatory, because at Hassan’s trial his counsel elicited 

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testimony that the disclosed GPS surveillance itself was entirely exculpatory rather than 

incriminatory, i.e., throughout the entirety of the police GPS surveillance of Hassan from 

February through August of 2011, Hassan was never present at the scene of any crime. 

Accordingly, Hassan has failed to establish a colorable Brady claim.

3. Enhancement of sentence

Hassan contends his federal constitutional rights were violated because the trial 

judge, rather than the jury, found him guilty of the facts used to enhance his sentence, citing 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 

(2004). (ECF No. 1 at 8). Hassan asserts he was improperly sentenced “to an additional 

two years to be served after serving an aggravated sentence of 13 years,” based on facts 

found by a judge rather than the jury, i.e., he was on bond at the time of his arrest, he had 

a prior conviction from the State of Michigan,11 and the burglary was committed for 

pecuniary gain. (Id.). Respondents assert this claim was not properly exhausted in the state 

courts and that the claim is procedurally defaulted. Regardless of any procedural default of 

the claim, it may be denied on the merits.

At the conclusion of his jury trial the jury found Hassan guilty of burglary in the 

second degree, a class 3 felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 13-1507. (ECF 

No. 14 at 17, 21). After the jury returned its guilty verdict, the state trial court conducted a 

bench trial and heard testimony and received exhibits establishing by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Hassan had four prior felony convictions in addition to the prior felony 

conviction he admitted to during his trial. (ECF No. 14 at 19-20; ECF No. 18-5).12 Hassan’s 

 

11 The Michigan conviction was for fleeing a police officer; the conviction was deemed 

admissible at trial for the purposes of impeachment, but the parties stipulated that the Michigan 

conviction could not be used to aggravate Hassan’s sentence. 

12 The State presented evidence that the State of Illinois convicted of Hassan of residential 

burglary in 1983, and in 1986 convicted Hassan on charges of residential burglary, theft, unlawful 

use of a firearm by a felon, and “armed violence.” In 1992 the State of Illinois convicted Hassan 

on two counts of residential burglary in one case, and one count of burglary in a separate case. 

(ECF No. 18-5 at 20-22). At the sentencing hearing Scottsdale Police Detective Grieber testified 

that in October of 2011 Hassan was serving a term of probation with regard to a conviction for 

criminal trespass occurring in February of 2011. Detective Grieber further testified: 

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defense counsel contested the adequacy of the State’s evidence of these prior convictions. 

(ECF No. 18-5 at 12-27). The sentencing court was also presented with evidence that as of 

September 15, 2011, at an initial hearing in Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. 

CR2011141962, Hassan was placed on pretrial release with regard to charges of unlawful 

possession of a weapon and criminal trespass, (ECF No. 18-5 at 23), and that on February 

20, 2011, Hassan had been arrested “arrested [in Arizona] for criminal trespass in a 

residential back yard where the home owner confronted him. He received a year of 

probation for that.” (ECF No. 18-5 at 35).13

At his sentencing Hassan asserted that the 2011 Arizona arrests were false 

accusations:

When I told them that I was panning for gold, a guy came back there. 

I got scared and I ran. Yeah, I jumped that lady’s fence, and when she came 

out, I didn’t run. I didn’t zoom by her. I didn’t do none of that. I literally 

stood there. Ask her.

***

And then, he said I was -- I was on probation. . . I didn’t take probation 

until after I was arrested. 

That’s when I said, okay, let’s get this case over with so I can

concentrate on this case, this instant case. That’s when I took probation. I 

wasn’t on probation. 

(ECF No. 18-5 at 41-42).

 

In August of 2011, Chandler PD arrested him for residential burglary that 

was never charged. 

Again, in August, late August of 2011, Scottsdale patrol found Mr. Hassan’s 

wallet and his ID in a wash in an affluent neighborhood which we know is his M.O. 

of what he does and how he gets into the people’s homes. 

And then, [in October of] 2011, Scottsdale police arrested Mr. Hassan for a 

Phoenix residential burglary where probable cause existed, and when they arrested 

him, he was armed. . . .

Mr. Hassan is the quintessential repeat offender. He knows nothing but in 

his adult life from 1978 until 2011, 33 years of his adult life has either been in 

prison, parole, or probation. . . . 

(ECF No. 18-5 at 36).

13 The charge of criminal residential trespass in first degree was brought in CR2011004735 

in the Scottsdale City Court. Hassan was released on pretrial bond in that matter at the time of the 

instant crime, and pleaded guilty in the Scottsdale City Court matter on November 15, 2011.

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At the conclusion of the bench trial the state court sentenced Hassan to an aggregate 

term of 15 years’ imprisonment. (ECF No. 14 at 21-22). In imposing more than the 

presumptive sentence, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating 

factor of Hassan’s prior convictions. (ECF No. 18-5 at 43-44).14 Hassan was sentenced 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-703(C), which provides that if a defendant has 

two or more historical prior felony convictions they will be sentenced “as a category three 

repetitive offender” and their presumptive term may be aggravated by the fact that they 

were on release from another crime at the time of the crime of conviction. See Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G). A category three repetitive offender found guilty of a class 3 

felony faces a presumptive sentence of 11.25 years and a maximum sentence of 20 years’ 

imprisonment. Id. § 13-703(J). Additionally, Hassan was sentenced to a consecutive 

sentence of two years’ imprisonment pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-708.

15

Arizona law provides that the sentencing court may find the existence of an 

aggravating factor, i.e., the existence of a prior felony conviction, “on any evidence or 

information introduced or submitted to the court or the trier of fact before sentencing . . .

and factual findings and reasons in support of such findings are set forth on the record at 

the time of sentencing.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-701(C) & (D)(6). Furthermore, if at 

least one aggravating circumstance, such as a prior felony conviction, has been established 

 

14 At the conclusion of the bench trial on sentencing the court found as an aggravator that 

Hassan had committed the crime for pecuniary gain. However, the docket entry imposing Hassan’s 

sentence states only that a more-than-presumptive sentence was imposed based on Hassan’s prior 

felony convictions. (ECF No. 14 at 21). 

15 Subsection D of § 13-708 provides:

A person who is convicted of committing any felony offense that is 

committed while the person is released on bond or on the person’s own 

recognizance on a separate felony offense . . . shall be sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment two years longer than would otherwise be imposed for the felony 

offense committed while on release. The additional sentence imposed under this 

subsection is in addition to any enhanced punishment that may be applicable under 

§ 13-703, § 13-704, § 13-1204, subsection C or § 13-714. . . . The penalties 

prescribed by this subsection shall be substituted for the penalties otherwise 

authorized by law if the allegation that the person committed a felony while 

released on bond or on the person’s own recognizance . . . is admitted or found by 

the court. . . . 

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“the trial court may find by a preponderance of the evidence additional aggravating 

circumstances.” Id. § 13-701(F).

In Apprendi v. New Jersey the Supreme Court held that, “other than the fact of a 

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added). In Blakely v. Washington the Supreme Court 

explained that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence 

a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted 

by the defendant.” 542 U.S 296, 303 (2004). In Arizona, the “statutory maximum” for 

purposes of Blakely is the presumptive, unaggravated sentence. State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 

578, 583-84, 115 P.3d 618, 623-24 (2005). 

Hassan was sentenced to more than the presumptive sentence but less than the 

statutory maximum aggravated sentence based on the fact of his prior. The Arizona 

Supreme Court, sitting en banc, has held:

Under A.R.S. § 13–702, the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes 

a defendant to an aggravated sentence. Therefore, once a jury finds or a 

defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits 

the sentencing judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to the 

imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.

Id., 210 Ariz. at 585, 115 P.3d at 625. The United States Supreme Court denied a writ of 

certiorari in Martinez, which was decided five years after Apprendi and one year after 

Blakely, and has been cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals when 

considering a state defendant’s habeas claims regarding their sentence. See Romero v. 

Ryan, 693 F. App’x 580, 581 (9th Cir. 2017); Mullins v. Ryan, 679 F. App’x 617, 618 (9th 

Cir. 2017).

Hassan was sentenced beyond the presumptive sentence based on the fact of his 

prior convictions. Accordingly, his sentence did not run afoul of Apprendi and Blakely. 

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4. Improper impeachment 

Hassan’s fourth ground for relief asserts “Improper impeachment in violation of the 

5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.” (ECF No. 1 at 9). Hassan

asserts: “This was a crime in Michigan that is not a crime in Arizona therein (sic) Hassan 

did not need to be impeached and sentence range increased. The prosecutor knew the 

Michigan [crime] is not a felony in Arizona.” (Id.). Respondents assert this claim was only 

presented to the state courts as one alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Regardless 

of any procedural default of this claim, it may be denied on the merits.

Prior to presenting the defense case, when Hassan had determined he wanted to 

testify, defense counsel acknowledged, “with respect” to Rule 609 of the Arizona Rules of 

Evidence, that Hassan had been convicted of a felony within the last ten years (not 

including jail time), rendering the conviction admissible pursuant for the purpose of 

impeachment of Hassan’s own testimony. (ECF No. 18-6 at 47). The subject conviction 

was by the State of Michigan in 2000, for the third-degree felony of fleeing from a police 

officer. (Id).

Hassan now claims that he could not be “impeached” with the 2000 Michigan felony 

conviction because the crime was not equivalent to a felony under Arizona law. This claim 

is without merit because Rule 609 does not require a foreign felony conviction also be 

considered a felony in Arizona before it may be introduced for the purpose of impeaching 

a witnesses’ testimony. Rule 609 provides:

(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character 

for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction:

(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death 

or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence:

***

(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, 

if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that 

defendant . . .

The rule’s plain language requires only that the prior crime was one “punishable by 

. . . imprisonment for more than one year” in the “convicting jurisdiction.” Ariz. R. Evid. 

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609(A)(1). Accordingly, even if the equivalent of the Michigan crime was not a felony in 

Arizona it was still admissible for impeachment purposes when Hassan chose to testify at 

his trial and Hassan’s claim that he could not be impeached with evidence of this conviction 

is without merit.

5. Ineffective assistance of counsel

Respondents contend several of Hassan’s claims are not cognizable because they 

are vague. Specifically, Respondents make this argument with regard to Hassan’s claims:

that counsel was ineffective for failing to “pursue a judicial finding for police destruction” 

of his access to his alibi witnesses (Ground 5e); that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

“pursue a judicial finding” that the police should have but did not “collect” the “culprit’s 

footprints” (Ground 5f); his claim that counsel did not present the “police investigator’s 

misconduct and acts of bad faith” (Ground 5g); and that trial counsel “released all 

subpoenaed witnesses that he agreed to call who supported police misconduct theory.”

(Ground 5i).

Conclusory allegations that are not supported by specific facts do not merit habeas 

relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). A habeas petitioner cannot satisfy the 

Strickland test by asserting “vague and conclusory allegations that some unspecified and 

speculative testimony might have established his defense.” Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 

F.2d 284, 298 (3d Cir. 1991). See also Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“cursory and vague [ineffective assistance of counsel claims] cannot support habeas 

relief”). Cf. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that a petitioner’s 

conclusory suggestion that a federal constitutional right had been violated fell “far short of 

stating a valid claim of constitutional violation.”). 

Hassan claims that the facts underpinning his free-standing Youngblood/Trombetta

claim are also the basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding counsel’s 

failure to “pursue a judicial finding for police destruction of only access to alibi witnesses”

and counsel’s failure to present “police investigator’s misconduct and act of bad faith 

befor[e] the jury.” He also claims these facts support his ineffective assistance claim based 

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on counsel’s absence of knowledge that “a Willits instruction cannot be given when 

allegation of bad faith is present” and his claim that counsel “changed the theory of the 

case from ‘police set Hassan up’ to ‘drug addicted nephews may have committed the crime’

without evidence to support the theory.” (ECF No. 25 at 4). Counsel’s performance is 

neither deficient nor prejudicial when counsel “fails” to raise a meritless claim or assert an 

unsustainable objection. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 2173 (9th Cir. 2005); Rupe v. 

Wood, 93 F.3d 1343, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Hassan’s allegation that his due process 

rights were violated by the police department’s failure to preserve evidence is without 

merit, as explained supra, these ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be denied on 

the merits.

Hassan’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on counsel’s failure to call 

subpoenaed witnesses such as the manager of All-City Towing, is without merit. Counsel 

declined to call the manager of the towing company in support of the allegation that the 

police failed to preserve evidence in bad faith. Defense counsel made a strategic decision

to withdraw his request for a Willits instruction after thoroughly investigating the issue of 

the “destroyed” evidence and an off-record hearing with the trial court on this issue. 

Counsel presumably decided to withdraw his request for the instruction because the trial 

court indicated a Willits instruction was not warranted and would not be given. Because 

there was no other purpose in calling any witnesses regarding the failure to preserve any 

evidence in the truck, counsel’s decision to release the witnesses was a reasonable strategic 

decision. 

Trial counsel’s strategic choices, “made after thorough investigation of law and 

facts relevant to plausible options, are virtually unchallengeable . . .” Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 690-91. Specifically, the decision to forgo the use of specific witness testimony is a 

matter of strategy within trial counsel’s discretion. Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 

1092 (9th Cir. 2009); Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2006). Counsel “cannot be 

deemed ineffective because, with the benefit of hindsight,” a federal habeas court later 

determines “other trial strategies” or witnesses “may have been a better choice.” Turner v. 

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Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 876 (9th Cir. 2002), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90; 

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will neither second-guess 

counsel’s decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision of hindsight.”). Counsel is 

not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable appraisal of a 

claim’s dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim, such as 

Hassan’s Willits claim, be dropped altogether. Knowles, 556 U.S. at 127.

Hassan asserts, in Ground 5(a) of his petition, that his counsel “opened the door” to 

the admission of Hassan’s prior convictions without telling Hassan he was going to do so, 

resulting in the impeachment of Hassan’s credibility when denying he did not commit the 

burglary. (ECF No. 1 at 10). Respondent asserts this claim was not properly exhausted in 

the state courts. This claim may be denied on the merits because Hassan is unable to 

demonstrate that counsel’s alleged failure to preclude the fact of his prior felony conviction 

was either deficient performance or prejudicial. As explained supra, once Hassan made the 

decision to testify the Arizona Rules of Evidence allowed the fact of his prior Michigan 

felony conviction to be presented to the jury. Counsel’s performance is not deficient for 

failing to raise a meritless objection, i.e., for failing to object to admissible evidence. 

Furthermore, a reasonable and common defense strategy is to preempt the State’s 

introduction of a prior felony conviction for the purpose of impeachment by introducing 

the fact of the prior conviction during direct questioning. See, e.g., Cotton v. Eckstein, 2018 

WL 3213312, at *8-9 (E.D. Wis. 2018); Lopez v. Rudek, 2012 WL 524423, at *3 (N.D. 

Okla. 2012); Lister v. Jones, 2009 WL 2163514, at *8 (W.D. Okla. 2009) (“It is a wellrecognized trial strategy for defense counsel to bring out . . . prior convictions, on direct 

examination rather than allowing the prosecutor to first expose such evidence . . . This 

strategy attempts to . . . mitigate the prejudicial effect of such evidence and add some 

credence to the defendant’s testimony by showing [] he freely admits past wrongs.”); 

Woody v. Brown, 2007 WL 3146946, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

The trial transcript demonstrates that counsel’s strategy regarding the prior 

conviction was guided by tactical considerations and that he consulted with Hassan as to 

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the inevitability of the admission should Hassan choose to testify. Hassan has not, 

therefore, overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct fell within the “wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance” required of counsel, nor has he overcome the 

presumption that the challenged action could be “considered sound trial strategy.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Therefore, this claim may be denied on the merits.

Hassan asserts in Ground 5(c) that counsel was ineffective for failing to “have 

[Detective Dowlen’s] in court identification thrown out as unreliable.” (ECF No. 1 at 10).

Respondents maintain Hassan did not exhaust this claim in the state courts. On appeal 

Hassan asserted Detective Dowlen’s identification of him as the perpetrator was unreliable 

and unduly suggestive. In his Rule 32 action Hassan also asserted a similar claim, i.e., that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Detective Dowlen’s identification 

of Hassan as the perpetrator of the burglary.

Hassan is unable to establish prejudice arising from this alleged error. Counsel 

thoroughly cross-examined the State’s witnesses regarding the composition of the photo 

line-up, its presentation to Detective Dowlen, and the identification of Hassan by Detective 

Dowlen. Counsel elicited testimony that Hassan’s physical features were not similar to 

Detective Dowlen’s initial description of the suspect he encountered at the scene of the 

crime, repeatedly pointing-out to the jury that Detective Dowlen initially described the 

burglar he encountered at the scene of the crime as a different, race, size, and weight than 

Hassan. Additionally, in denying Hassan’s similar claim on appeal, the state court 

concluded the detective’s identification of Hassan as the perpetrator was not unreliable and 

that the photo line-up was not unduly suggestive; accordingly, it is unlikely a motion to 

suppress or a motion to prohibit the detective’s in-court identification of Hassan as the 

perpetrator would have succeeded. 

Hassan also contends counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel did not 

“know a Willits instruction cannot be given when allegation of bad faith is present.” ((ECF 

No. 1 at 10) (Ground 5(h)). Respondents assert this claim is unexhausted, and the claim 

may be denied on the merits. The trial transcript indicates counsel made a conscious, 

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strategic decision to withdraw his request for a Willits instruction, after an off-the-record 

conference in chambers with the trial court and the prosecutor. (ECF No. 18-6 at 49-50).

Because this was a reasonable strategic decision, made after a thorough investigation of 

the facts and evidence, Hassan is unable to establish counsel’s performance was deficient. 

Nor is Hassan able to show that he was prejudiced by this decision, because the record in 

this matter indicates a Willits instruction was not warranted and would not be given had 

counsel not withdrawn his request. To be entitled to a jury instruction pursuant to the 

holding in Willits, a defendant must prove both that the state failed to preserve exculpatory, 

material, accessible evidence, and resulting prejudice. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 

485, 503, 975 P.2d 75, 93 (1999). In his appeal Hassan raised a claim invoking Willits, and 

the Court of Appeals concluded Hassan had “not shown that the potential exculpatory value 

of the evidence was more than speculative, nor has he shown that he was prejudiced. In 

short, Hassan has shown nothing that would entitle him to a Willits instruction, nor is there 

anything on the record to support this claim.” Hassan, 2013 WL 3963449, at *3.

The state court’s determination that a Willits instruction was not warranted, an issue 

of state law, is binding on a federal habeas court. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691

(1975) (“state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Taylor v. Kincheloe, 920 

F.2d 599, 609 (9th Cir. 1990). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to request a jury

instruction which is not supported by the evidence. See Zapien v. Davis, 849 F.3d 787, 796 

(9th Cir. 2015) (holding counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a non-meritorious 

issue); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (same). Furthermore, inherent 

in Strickland’s prejudice requirement is the principle that, in order to demonstrate that 

counsel failed to litigate an issue competently, the habeas petitioner must prove that the 

issue was meritorious. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). To succeed 

on an allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a particular ruling the 

petitioner must show that, had counsel acted otherwise the trial court would have ruled as 

requested. Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 

1159, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the state appellate court determined a Willits 

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instruction was not warranted, Hassan is unable to establish any prejudice arising from 

counsel’s alleged error in withdrawing his request for such an instruction. See Knowles, 

556 U.S. at 124 (holding the petitioner failed to show his counsel’s performance was 

deficient for “merely recommending the withdrawal of what he reasonably believed was a 

claim doomed to fail.”).

Furthermore, Hassan is unable to establish any deficient performance with regard 

to any of counsel’s alleged errors. The record in this matter indicates that defense counsel’s 

investigation of this matter was exhaustive. A thorough review of the entire record in this 

matter, including the transcripts of Hassan’s trial, reveals defense counsel had a 

comprehensive command of the facts and evidence in this matter. Counsel ably and 

convincingly argued the inconsistencies in the State’s evidence, including the police 

department’s failure to preserve the “footprint” evidence; the contradictions in Detective 

Dowlen’s physical description of the suspect and Hassan’s height, weight, age, and race; 

the information provided in the GPS logs, including the fact that nothing in the GPS logs 

was inculpatory. Counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, 

noting weaknesses in the State’s evidence and contradictions in the witnesses’ testimony. 

Counsel also ably guided Hassan through his testimony regarding his alibi and Hassan’s 

explanation for the presence of his truck near the scene of the crime on the night in 

questions. 

Hassan is also unable to establish prejudice arising from any of counsel’s errors. 

When considering whether a habeas petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged 

errors, “the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 

factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

695. When answering that question the federal habeas court must necessarily consider the 

strength of the state’s case against the petitioner. Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 999 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“even if counsel’s conduct was arguably deficient, in light of the 

overwhelming evidence of guilt, [the petitioner] cannot establish prejudice”); Johnson v. 

Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). The State’s case against Hassan 

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was a strong one, and included both witness testimony placing him at the scene of the crime 

and his own presence near the scene of the crime at approximately the time of the crime, 

and Hassan’s DNA on evidence found at the scene of the crime. Because Hassan has failed 

to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, his unexhausted Strickland claims 

must be denied.

Respondents allow that the claims for relief stated in Grounds 5b, 5d, and 5j, of 

Hassan’s habeas petition were exhausted in the state courts. Respondents contend these 

claims should be denied because the state court’s denial of relief on these claims was 

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland.

In Ground 5b Hassan asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ascertain 

that Hassan’s prior Michigan felony conviction was not admissible for the purpose of 

impeachment because the Michigan crime of conviction was not a felony pursuant to 

Arizona law. As previously explained, the plain language of Rule 609 does not require that 

a prior foreign felony conviction be classified as a felony under Arizona law for the 

conviction to be admissible for the purposes of impeaching the defendant’s trial testimony. 

By denying this claim in Hassan’s Rule 32 action the state court impliedly found counsel’s 

performance was not deficient nor prejudicial because the prior conviction was admissible. 

The state court’s decision that Hassan failed to show deficient performance and prejudice 

with regard to counsel’s alleged failure to assert a non-meritorious claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland.

In Ground 5d Hassan alleges counsel was ineffective because he did not “pursue”

the full GPS logs. The trial court found that Hassan had failed to raise a colorable claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and the state appellate court also summarily denied relief. 

(ECF No. 17-8). The Arizona courts’ denial of this claim implies counsel’s alleged failure 

to acquire this evidence, object to the admission of only partial evidence, or introduce the 

full evidence at trial, was not deficient nor prejudicial. The record indicates counsel 

received the full available logs through pretrial discovery, and the state court could 

reasonably conclude counsel made a strategic decision to use the logs as exculpatory rather 

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than inculpatory evidence. Because counsel actually used the GPS logs as exculpatory 

evidence the state court could reasonably conclude Hassan failed to establish any prejudice 

with regard to this claim. Because the state court could reasonably conclude Hassan failed 

to establish either prong of the Strickland test with regard to this claim, the state court’s 

denial of the claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.

16

In Ground 5j Hassan asserts counsel was ineffective because counsel “changed the 

theory of the case from ‘police set Hassan up’ to ‘drug addicted nephews may have 

committed the crime without evidence to support the theory.’” (ECF No. 1 at 10). In his 

Rule 32 action Hassan alleged his counsel was ineffective because counsel did not inform

Hassan as to why counsel changed the defense theory of the case. (ECF No. 16-5 at 9). The 

trial court found that Hassan raised no colorable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(ECF No. 16-9 at 2-3). In his petition for review Hassan alleged “counsel without warning 

changed the theory of the case from ‘police set appellant up’ to “drug addicted nephews 

may have committed the crime’ see (tr. 07/25/2012, at 39),17 without supporting evidence.” 

(ECF No. 17-7 at 19). The appellate court denied relief. (ECF No. 17-8).

The state court’s denial of relief on this claim was not an unreasonable application 

of Strickland. This claim fails because the record of the pretrial and trial proceedings 

indicates that the defense’s theory of the case was, from start to finish, that there was 

insufficient evidence to find Hassan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense counsel 

told the jury in his opening statement that the evidence would demonstrate Hassan was 

innocent and in the wrong place at the wrong time. (ECF No. 19-3 at 28-32). The defense’s 

theory of the case was chosen and presented to the jury after a thorough investigation of 

 

16 To the extent Hassan asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue or introduce 

evidence of a log establishing a GPS device was on his truck at the time of the instant crime, 

thereby supporting his claim that the GPS device caused his truck to malfunction as he testified, 

there is no factual basis for such a claim. All of the evidence produced in this matter indicates no 

GPS device was on Hassan’s truck at the time of the crime. Because Hassan is unable to establish 

that the purported GPS log exists, there is no sufficient factual basis for such a claim.

17 This portion of the transcript, presumably including closing argument, is not included in 

the record in this matter.

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the State’s evidence, Hassan’s discussions with counsel regarding his purported alibi, and 

counsel’s investigation of any evidence supporting that alibi. Counsel’s choice of a sound 

defense strategy, and any decisions made regarding the implementation of that strategy, 

are “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. See also Ayala v. Chappell, 

829 F.3d 1081, 1103 (9th Cir. 2016). It is well settled that “counsel’s tactical decisions at 

trial . . . are given great deference and must similarly meet only objectively reasonable 

standards.” Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238, 1250 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Reynoso v. 

Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (“trial counsel is typically afforded leeway 

in making tactical decisions regarding trial strategy”). “As long as defense counsel uses a 

‘sound trial strategy,’ employing that strategy does not constitute deficient performance.” 

Elmore, 799 F.3d at 1250. Additionally, to establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To prevail 

on this ineffective-assistance claim, Hassan must show, therefore, a “reasonable 

probability” that he would have prevailed on his “police set Hassan up” defense. Because 

Hassan has not established that his trial counsel deviated from that theory of defense, he 

fails to demonstrate prejudice.

A petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating counsel’s choices regarding the 

presentation of his defense constituted deficient performance and were prejudicial.

Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). Hassan fails to make this 

showing and, accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable 

application of Strickland.

III Conclusion

All of Hassan’s unexhausted habeas claims may be denied on the merits. The state 

courts did not err in denying his exhausted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Hassan’s petition seeking a federal 

writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections 

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Hassan seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

///

///

///

///

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Dated this 30th day of August, 2019.

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