Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01585/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01585-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441bc Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Nancy Carrera, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 13cv1585-BAS (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR

PROTECTIVE ORDER

[ECF No. 100]

vs.

First American Home Buyers

Protection Company, et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendant First American Home Buyer Protection

Company’s motion seeking a protective order precluding the deposition of Ms. Maggi

Havas, and a second Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition of First American. (ECF No.

100.) Plaintiffs filed their response in opposition to the motion on July 15, 2014. (ECF

No. 101.) On July 17, 2014, Defendant filed its reply. (ECF No. 102.) On July 21,

2014, the Court held oral argument. (ECF No. 103.) The Court grants in part and

denies in part the motion. 

I. Legal Standard

“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including

forbidding a deposition, or limiting its scope. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A), (D). “The

burden is upon the party seeking the [protective] order to ‘show good cause’ by

demonstrating harmor prejudice that will result fromthe discovery.” Rivera v. NIBCO,

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Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). This burden can be met by showing that the

sought after discovery is irrelevant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“the court must

limit the frequency or extent of discovery . . . if it determines that . . . “the burden or

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). “The compulsion of

production of irrelevant information is an inherently undue burden” for which a

protective order may issue. Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273

(W.D. Wash. 2010) (citingCompaq Computer Corp. v.Packard Bell Elecs., 163 F.R.D.

329, 335-36 (N.D. Cal. 1995)); Monte H. Greenawalt Revocable Trust v. Brown, No.

12cv1983, 2013 WL 6844760, *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 19, 2013) (“Discovery requests

seeking irrelevant information are inherently undue and burdensome”); Ginena v.

Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 04cv1304, 2011 WL 4749104, *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 6, 2011) (“If

discovery sought is not relevant, the court should restrict discovery by issuing a

protective order.”). 

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, district courts must safeguard

against discovery that goes beyond the bounds of relevancy:

TheCourt has more than once declared that the deposition-discovery rules

are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of

adequately informing the litigants in civil trials. . . . But the discovery

provisions, like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to

the injunction of Rule 1 that they “be construed to secure the just, speedy,

and inexpensive determination of every action.” [] To this end, the

requirement of Rule 26(b)(1) that the material sought in discovery be

“relevant” should be firmly applied, and the district courts should not

neglect their power to restrict discovery where “justice requires

[protection for] a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,

oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .”

Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (internal citations omitted).

II. Analysis

A. Maggi Havas

Plaintiffs seek to depose Maggi Havas, a former First American marketing

executive. Defendant argues that Ms. Havas’ deposition should not go forward as it

would be cumulative of its Rule 30(b)(6) witness’ deposition testimony from 2013.

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The parties and thus, the Court, refer to this deposition as occurring under Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), but it was actually a person most qualified deposition pursuant to

Cal. Code Civ. P. § 2025.230.

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While there may be some overlap, Ms. Havas is a third party and may provide

testimony that conflicts with or demonstrates knowledge superior to Defendant’s Rule

30(b)(6) witness’ testimony. Indeed, Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness held Ms.

Havas out as a person who has superior knowledge about Defendant’s sales and

marketing. The Court declines to preclude this deposition witness testimony on the

ground that her anticipated testimony is cumulative and, thus, unnecessary.

Plaintiffs seek to depose Ms. Havas because she is “knowledgeable about

Defendant’s sales and marketing materials, including the advertisements that are a

central focus of this case.” (ECF No. 101 at 5.) Defendant requests that Plaintiffs be

precluded from asking any “RESPA-related” questions. Plaintiffs oppose thisrequest 2

because it is a vague and amorphous limitation. Plaintiffs further argue that questions

regarding Defendant’s use of real estate agents are not related to RESPA, but rather go

to Defendant’s false and misleading advertisements and Plaintiffs’ claim that

Defendants engaged in unfair competition in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices

Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.

The Court agrees that the label “RESPA-related” is too amorphous of a

limitation for a protective order. Questions about whether and how real estate agents

were used to make or disseminate allegedly untrue or misleading statements would be

relevant to the claims and defenses in this action. For this reason, Magistrate Judge

McCurine held that “information as to whether First American [] utilized real estate

agents to communicate misleading statements regarding its home warranty policies to

home buyers is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” 

(ECF No. 76 at 7-8.) Further, Magistrate Judge McCurine ordered Defendant to

“RESPA” (Real Estate Settlement Practices Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617). 

2

“RESPA prohibits referralfeesfor real estate settlement services: ‘No person shall give

and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or thing of value [for referring] business

incident to or a part of a real estate settlement service involving a federally related

mortgage loan.’” Prudential Locations LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &Urban Dev., 739

F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a)). Plaintiffs do not have a

RESPA cause of action in this case.

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respond to discovery requests that sought “policies and procedures for utilizing real

estate agents and brokers in any capacity relating to home warranty contracts” and

“documents, including but not limited to scripts related to First American’s training of

persons utilizing to sell and/or market First American’s home warranty contracts.” (Id.

at 8.) The content ofsuch written advertisements, marketing or training materials, and

solicitations, including to whom and from whom they were sent or directed is relevant

to this case.3

However, as explained below, Defendant has met its burden to show good cause

exists for a protective order limiting the scope of such deposition questioning.

B. Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) Witness

On June 25, 2014, Plaintiffs issued a Notice of Deposition to Defendant pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). The Notice contains 10 topics for which

Plaintiffs seek deposition testimony on Defendant’s behalf. Defendant seeks to

preclude the deposition and raises objections to Topics 1 through 5.

In seeking to preclude the deposition, Defendant argues that a second Rule

30(b)(6) deposition is not allowed without both prior leave of court and a determination

that the deposition complies with Rule 26(b)(2). (ECF No. 100 at 5.) The Court

agrees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2)(A)(ii)

provides that leave of court must be granted to take a deposition if “the deponent has

already been deposed in the case.” The Federal Rules in turn provide that a court must

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To the extent Plaintiffs argue that kickbacks and commissions to real estate 3

agents can serve as the predicate act to their unfair competition claim, that argument

has already been rejected by the Court. (ECF Nos. 76, 94.) Moreover, the record also

supports the conclusion that, in an effort to avoid having their case removed to federal

court, Plaintiffs made the strategic decision not to plead kickbacks and commissions

under RESPA. Such claims could give rise to federal question jurisdiction under

RESPA, and Plaintiffs sought to plead this case so that it would be tried in state court. 

This strategy was ultimately unsuccessful.

See also Burdick v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., No. 07cv4028, 2008 WL 5102851, at

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*2-*3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008) (“This court agrees with the reasoning and decisions of

those courts which have held that the prior judicial approval requirement applies to

deposition notices and subpoenas issued to corporations pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6).”);

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limit the deposition to the extent that “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative

or duplicative,” “the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the

information by discovery in the action,” or “the burden or expense of the proposed

discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount

in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance ofthe issues atstake in the action,

and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(2)(C)(I)-(iii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2).

Defendant argues that it already produced a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on its behalf

on March 19, 2013. (ECF No. 100 at 6.) This was Plaintiffs’ opportunity to obtain the

information they now seek over a year later. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs waited

too long – until June 25, 2014 – to complain that a second deposition is warranted

because Defendant’s witness did not adequately answer questions. The Court agrees

in part. Waiting over a year istoo long, but the convoluted record relevant to thisissue

reflects that for months Plaintiffs actively pursued third party witness depositions that

they believed would provide the discovery that they did not get from Defendant’s

witness. Then, on May 29, 2014, Plaintiffs learned that one of the proposed third party

witnesses likely did not have the relevant information sought, and the Court directed

the parties to meet and confer regarding appropriate witnesses for this case. The

second 30(b)(6) deposition notice was issued as a result of the dialogue between the

parties as to who was most likely to have the information Plaintiffs seek. Thus,

because of the unique procedural history of this case, the Court concludes that the

window has not yet shut for Plaintiffs to conduct a second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of

Defendant.

Defendant argues that even if the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to conduct a

second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the deposition topics must be narrowed to comply

with Rule 26(b).

Groupion, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., No. 11cv870, 2012 WL 359699, *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb.

2, 2012) (same).

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With respect to Topics 1 and 2 of the June 25, 2014 Notice, Defendant objects

that Plaintiffs are seeking cumulative deposition testimony because Topics 1 and 2 are

“virtually indistinguishable” from a topic contained in the first deposition notice and

testified to by Defendant on March 19, 2013. The topics all concern Defendant’s use

of sales persons and real estate agents to market and sell home warranty plans. In 5

response, Plaintiffs present evidence that in the first deposition the deponent was not

prepared to testify as to how the sales force is trained or how the sales force is told to

market, or told what to say. Thus, the Court concludes that while there may be some

overlap, there is non-cumulative testimony that Plaintiffs are entitled to obtain through

a second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.

With respect to Topics 3-5, Defendant asserts a relevance objection and seeks

a protective order this basis. Defendant seeks protection under Rule 26 with respect

to testimony sought from its Rule 30(b)(6) witness (and Ms. Havas) on these topics

because they are “RESPA-related” topics. Topics 3-5 read as follows:

3. All benefits provided by First American to real estate agents.

4. An identification and description of all contracts and agreements between

First American and real estate agents during the Class Period.

5. The total advertising and marketing budget for First American for each

year of the Class Period, including any detailed subcategories for the

budget and/or actual amount of money spent by First American on

marketing and advertising to real estate agents.

Plaintiffs contend that these topics are relevant because there is extensive evidence that

These topics are as follows: (1) “First American’s training and use of real estate 5

agents during the Class Period to market and sell home-warranty plans, including an

identification and description of all brochures, advertisements, training materials, and

information given to real estate agentsto educate them about the benefits and coverage

of First American’s home-warranty plans;” and (2) “An identification and description

of all information, brochures, advertisements, solicitations, and other material First

American asks real estate agents to give or forward to consumers to encourage

consumers to acquire a First American home-warranty plan.” (ECF No. 100-1 at 8.)

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“[o]ne way that Defendant sells its plans is by training and incentivizing real estate

agentsto recommend the sale of the plans to consumers.” (ECF No. 101 at 2.) Further,

Plaintiffs seek testimony regarding how the sales force istrained or how the sales force

is told to market, or told what to say regarding home warranty plans. (Id. at 6.)

The Court concludes based on the arguments of counsel and the plain language

oftopics 3, 4 and 5, that Plaintiffs intend to seek irrelevant deposition testimony insofar

as they focus on the details of how real estate agents were incentivized. Here, the law

ofthe case isthat information concerning the payment or receipt of commissions to real

estate agents from Defendant First American is irrelevant. (ECF Nos. 76, 87, 94.) 

Thus, Defendant has shown good cause for a protective order limiting the scope of

deposition testimony. 

Therefore, to protect the witnesses and Defendant in this case fromundue burden

and expense, this Court ordersthat Plaintiffs’ counsel is not permitted to ask deponents

in this case questions about the payment and/or receipt of fees, kickbacks, service

charges, commissions, compensation or things of value to real estate agents and

brokers for services or referrals. Nor shall counsel ask about any understanding,

agreement, or investigation regarding the same. 

III. Conclusion

Defendant’ motion seeking a protective order for the depositions of Ms. Maggi

Havas and Defendant’s second Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness (ECF No. 100) is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs are granted leave to

conduct the depositions of Ms. Havas and Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Absent

further leave of court, the depositions are each limited to 1 day of 7 hours and shall

take place on or before August 15, 2014. Further, the depositions shall be governed 6

While Plaintiffs have leave of court to conduct these depositions on or before 6

August 15, 2014, this Order does not otherwise extend or alter the parties’ July 29,

2014 deadline for completion of all discovery related to class certification. (ECF No.

92.)

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by the following PROTECTIVE ORDER:

Plaintiffs’ counsel is not permitted to ask deponents in this case questions about

the payment and/or receipt of fees, kickbacks, service charges, commissions,

compensation or things of value to real estate agents and brokers for services or

referrals. Nor shall counsel ask about any understanding, agreement, or

investigation regarding the same. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

30(c)(2), Defendant’s counsel may instruct a deponent not to answer only if the

questions asked violate this Order. Should Plaintiffs’ counsel disagree with this

instruction, they may take a brief recess to call the magistrate judge for

resolution. Should counsel be unable to reach the magistrate judge during the

course of the deposition, then Plaintiffs’ counsel shall preserve any objections

on the record and ask the deponent whether he/she would be able to answer the

question if he/she was instructed to answer by the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 23, 2014

JILL L. BURKHARDT

United States Magistrate Judge

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