Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00323/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00323-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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ERISA is the acronym for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended,

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29 U.S.C. § 1000 et seq. ERISA plans are subject to, inter alia, funding, administrative, reporting, and

various rules and regulations to protect interstate commerce and plan beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN BECKSTRAND, ) No. 05-cv-0323-AWI-NEW (TAG)

)

Plaintiff, ) ORDER GRANTING IN PART

) AND DENYING IN PART 

vs. ) MOTION TO REOPEN/PERMIT DISCOVERY

)

ELECTRONIC ARTS GROUP ) (Doc. 45)

LONG TERM DISABILITY )

INSURANCE PLAN, )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________) 

Plaintiff Bryan Beckstrand (“Beckstrand”) filed the instant motion to reopen and permit

discovery. A hearing on the motion was held before the undersigned on May 21, 2007. 

Beckstrand’s counsel, Robert Rosati, and Robert Pohls, counsel for the defendant, appeared

telephonically. This Court took the matter under submission and now rules as follows. 

Background

Plaintiff Bryan Beckstrand (“Beckstrand”), while employed by Electronic Arts Group

(“EAG”), participated in, and qualified as a beneficiary of, EAG’s Group Long Term Disability Plan

(the “Plan”), which was subject had been organized and operated under the provision set forth in

ERISA. At all relevant times, Reliance Standard Life Insurance (“RSL”) both funded and 1

administered the Plan. Beckstrand, who suffers from HIV/AIDS, applied for disability benefits

under the Plan in 1999. The Plan granted Beckstrand benefits, but terminated the benefits at a

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subsequent administrative hearing and appeal. On March 7, 2005, Beckstrand filed the instant action

seeking declaratory relief. (Doc. 1). 

On August 5, 2005, Beckstrand filed a motion for partial summary judgment contending that

the Court should review the Plan’s decision de novo rather than for abuse of discretion, based on

various reasons, including, inter alia, its conclusion that he was not disabled based on the same

evidence that it had relied upon when it found him eligible for benefits. (Docs. 13, 14). In its

response, the Plan noted that, because it granted RSL discretionary authority, the standard of review

should be for abuse of discretion. (Doc. 15). The Court denied Beckstrand’s motion and specifically

stated that the administrative record would be reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Doc. 20). 

After holding a bench trial, the Court entered judgment for the Plan on October 23, 2006. 

(Docs. 26, 31, 32). On November 1, 2006, Beckstrand filed a motion to amend the judgment based

on an intervening Ninth Circuit en banc decision, Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d

955 (9th Cir. 2006), pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 33).

In his motion, Beckstrand asserted that the Court also should reopen, and allow him to conduct,

discovery. (Id.). The Plan agreed that the judgment should be set aside, but disputed that Abatie

entitled Beckstrand to propound additional discovery. (Doc. 34). On January 19, 2007, the Court

granted Beckstrand’s Motion to Amend Judgment, vacated the judgment, and re-opened the case. 

(Doc. 37). The Court, however, deferred ruling on the issue of discovery. (Id.). 

Motion to Reopen and Permit Discovery

On March 16, 2007, Beckstrand filed a “Motion to Reopen/Permit Discovery,” requesting

that this Court allow him to engage in limited discovery to ascertain if, and the extent to which, bias,

conflicts of interest, or procedural irregularities were present at the administrative level such that it

would affect the level of deference that this Court should accord the administrator’s decision. 

Beckstrand contended that none of this information would have been relevant or admissible before

Abatie. (Doc. 45). Beckstrand also sought leave to submit a medical evaluation to rebut the opinion

of Dr. Berman, whose report RSL relied on during the administrative appeal. (Doc. 45). The Plan

objected, asserting that Beckstrand could have conducted the discovery he now sought when he filed

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his motion for partial summary judgment, that nothing prevented Beckstrand from propounding

discovery earlier, that Abatie did not create a new rule regarding discovery in ERISA cases, and that

the Court, in rendering a judgment, was limited to the administrative record once it was determined

whether the standard of review was de novo or for abuse of discretion. (Doc. 46). Beckstrand

acknowledged that Abatie did not create a new discovery rule, but contended that it created new

criteria for applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review and held that extrinsic evidence was

admissible for the purpose of determining the level of deference to be accorded the administrator’s

decision. (Docs. 45, 47).

Discovery Requests 

1. Interrogatories

In his motion, Beckstrand seeks to propound interrogatories regarding two doctors upon

whose evaluations the decision to terminate his disability benefits was based. According to

Beckstrand, the interrogatory responses will reveal whether the doctors were predisposed to provide

an opinion favorable to the Plan and would ensure that they were familiar with his disease, from

which it could be determined whether there was a conflict of interest as well as whether Beckstrand

had a fair hearing. In order to obtain this information, Beckstrand proposes to ask the following four

questions to be answered with respect to each doctor, for a total of eight interrogatories:

1. Describe <doctor>’s training and experience treating patients with HIV/AIDS.

2. How many HIV/AIDS patients has Dr. <name> treated since January 2000.

3. How many disability claims has <doctor> evaluated at the request of the RSL

since January 1, 2000?

A. How many times did he conclude that the claimant was disabled?

B. How many times did he conclude that the claimant was not disabled?

C. How many times did he recommend additional tests?

4. Describe all contacts and communications between RSL and <doctor>,

directly or indirectly, regarding Plaintiff which are not documented in the

Administrative Record. (That is, was there a “back channel” in which the

doctor was instructed regarding his opinion?)

(Doc. 45-3, pp. 10-11). 

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B. Requests for Production of Documents

Beckstrand also seeks leave of court to issue requests for the production of the following

documents, which, according to Beckstrand, will reveal whether RSL had any internal standards or

protocol and, if so, whether RSL adhered to them during Beckstrand’s administrative proceedings. 

The intent is to elicit and/or demonstrate procedural irregularities, which, Beckstrand contends, also

constitutes a factor to be weighed in determining how much deference to be accorded the

administrative record. (Doc. 45). Specifically, Beckstrand asked that he be permitted to serve

requests for production of documents on the Plan to obtain the following materials:

1. All documents setting forth or constituting RSL’s claims manuals, training

manuals, or any other documents setting forth RSL’s standards, practices,

protocols, or criteria for evaluating disability and/or long term disability

claims as in effect from January 1998 through January 31, 2006 and any

changes thereafter.

2. All Documents setting forth RSL’s standards, practices, procedures or

protocols for processing appeals of denials of terminations of long term

disability claims as in effect from January 1998 through January 31, 2006 and

any changes thereafter.

3. All Documents setting forth RSL’s standards, criteria, protocol, rules, or

regulations regarding evaluation of claimants who have HIV/AIDS.

4. All Documents setting forth or constituting RSL’s standards, criteria, protocol,

rules or an regulations regarding the weight to be accorded Social Security

Disability determinations of claimants who are applying for long term

disability benefits from RSL.

(Doc. 45-3, p. 11).

C. Submission of Additional Medical Report

In addition to the foregoing discovery, Beckstrand seeks leave of court to submit a medical

evaluation to rebut the opinion prepared by Dr. Berman, upon which RSL relied during Beckstrand’s

administrative appeal. (Doc. 45-3, p. 4). Beckstrand asserts that, under Abatie, denying him the

opportunity to respond to Dr. Berman’s opinion constitutes an impermissible procedural irregularity. 

(Doc. 45-3, p. 4). The Plan responded that permitting a claimant to review a doctor’s opinion before

an administrative decision was rendered was not allowed under this Court’s precedent. (Doc. 46,

p. 7).

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Relevant Law

In Abatie, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that, unless the language of an ERISA plan confers

discretion on the administrator “to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of plan,

a court must review the denial of benefits de novo.” Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d

955, 963 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quotations and citations omitted). Before Abatie, if the plan

expressly conferred discretion on the administrator, the standard of review was for abuse of

discretion only. Id. This Circuit, however, previously employed a burden-shifting approach under

which, if the plaintiff presented material, probative evidence sufficient to demonstrate that an insurer

who both administered and served as the funding source of the plan (a “conflicted administrator”)

denied benefits because of this conflict of interest, or self-interest, thereby breaching his fiduciary

responsibilities, “the burden . . . shifted to the administrator to prove that the conflict of interest did

not affect his decision.” Id. at 966. If the administrator could not meet his burden, the de novo

standard of review would be employed by the court. Id.; see Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d

1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (creating the burden-shifting analytical approach), overruled by Abatie, 458

F.3d at 966-67. The en banc Circuit Court rejected this burden-shifting approach, finding, inter alia,

that it imposed an undue burden on the ERISA beneficiaries (plaintiffs) and that it did not comply

with the requirements set forth in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111-13, 109

S.Ct. 948, 954-56 (1989). Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966-67. 

The Abatie decision provided a different analytical method for courts to employ when

reviewing, for abuse of discretion, ERISA cases that involve conflicted administrators. See id. at

967-73. First, Abatie held that any conflict of interest is a factor that must be weighed on a case-bycase basis. Id. at 968. Abatie noted that the use of a “straightforward abuse of discretion analysis”

enables the district court to “tailor its review to all the circumstances before it.” Id. (citation

omitted). The Ninth Circuit stated that

A district court, when faced with all the facts and circumstances, must decide in each

case how much or how little to credit the plan administrator’s reason for denying

insurance coverage. An egregious conflict may weigh more heavily (that is, may

cause the court to find an abuse of discretion more readily) than a minor, technical

conflict might. 

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Id. The weight that the court may attribute to a conflict of interest and, hence, the degree of

deference it will accord the administrator’s decision, may be based upon evidence of, inter alia,

“malice, self-dealing, . . . a parsimonious claims-granting history, [or] inconsistent reasons for

denial.” Id. Under Abatie, the district court can consider extraneous evidence, that is, evidence

other than that contained in the administrative record, when deciding the nature, extent, and effect of

the administrator’s conflict of interest, if any, on the decision to deny benefits. Id. at 970.

With respect to procedural irregularities at the administrative level, Abatie stated that

administrators are required to comply with the requirements of both ERISA and the plan under

which the claimant sought benefits. Id. at 971. As an initial matter, unless the violation of ERISA

and/or the plan’s rules are “wholesale and flagrant,” the court should not employ a de novo standard

of review when the plan grants discretion to the administrator. Id. In general, the district court

should apply the same analysis as that discussed above when there appears to be a procedural

irregularity. See id. at 971-73. “A procedural irregularity, like a conflict of interest, is a matter to be

weighed in deciding whether an administrator’s decision was an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 972. 

Abatie cites with approval several cases from other courts that have held that the level of deference

accorded the administrator’s decision varies depending upon the nature and extent of the procedural

irregularity. Id. Again, extrinsic evidence may be considered to ascertain whether there were any

procedural irregularities and, if so, the that it had on the administrator’s decision. Id. at 973. 

Once the district court has determined the level of deference to accord the administrator’s

decision based on a conflict of interest or procedural irregularity, the court’s ruling on the merits of

the case is limited to the administrative record. No extrinsic evidence on the merits will be

considered unless the standard of review is de novo or the procedural irregularity resulted in an

incomplete record, in which case the court may permit additional evidence to “recreate what the

administrative record would have been had the procedure been correct.” Id. at 970-71, 973. 

In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its prior opinion, which conformed to the

opinions in several federal appellate courts, and stated that:

///

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 During the hearing, Beckstrand’s counsel admitted that he did not have a medical report to rebut 2

Dr. Berman’s opinion, but would have to ask a doctor to prepare the evaluation. 

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a district court should not take additional evidence merely because someone at a later

time comes up with new evidence and that [i]n most cases only the evidence that was

before the plan administrator at the time of determination should be considered.2

Opeta v. Northwest Airlines Pension Plan for Contract Employees, 484 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir., May 7,

2007) (brackets in original) (quotations and citations omitted). It should be noted that Opeta, and the

cases it references, were appeals from decisions made under a de novo standard of review, in which

extrinsic evidence on the merits is more likely to be admissible. Abatie, 455 F.3d at 970-71. 

Moreover, in a decision modified after Abatie, this Circuit noted that a district court may consider

only evidence within the administrative record at the time of the administrator’s decision when the

standard of review is for abuse of discretion. Silver v. Executive Car Leasing Long-Term Disability

Plan, 466 F.3d 727, 732 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). The three-judge panel further stated that this restriction

is based on the principle that district courts should not function “as substitute plan administrators,”

and that expanding the record on appeal “would frustrate the goal of prompt resolution of claims by

the fiduciary under the ERISA scheme.” Id. (quoting Perry v. Simplicity Eng’g, 900 F.2d 963, 967

(6th Cir.1990)). 

Conclusion

In the instant case, neither party contends that the standard of review is de novo. (See

generally docket). As discussed above, under the new analytical approach set forth in Abatie,

extrinsic evidence is admissible not as part of a burden-shifting paradigm, but as a factor for the

district court to weigh in determining what effect, if any, a conflict of interest or procedural

irregularity will have on the level of deference to be accorded the administrator’s decision. Before

Abatie, such evidence was relevant only to the extent that it offered material proof that the

administrator was so conflicted that his decision should be reviewed de novo. Thus, absent

probative evidence of a severe conflict, discovery that would lead to evidence that, among other

things, the plan had a record of denying benefits, continuously retaining doctors who rendered

opinions favorable to the plan, or had standards or protocols with which the administrator complied,

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was of no use to a plaintiff. Such evidence now goes to the deference that the court will use in

reviewing the merits of the case and, thus, is relevant and admissible under Abatie. The introduction

of extrinsic, additional evidence on the merits of the case, however, remains inadmissible – once the

level of deference is determined by the court, its ruling on the merits must be based solely on the

administrative record.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Motion to Reopen/Permit Discovery, (Doc. 45), is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART;

2. Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to serve the proposed interrogatories and requests for

production of documents on Defendant, (Doc. 45-3);

3. Defendant is ORDERED to respond to the interrogatories within thirty (30) days of the

date that the interrogatories are served by Plaintiff upon Defendant;

4. Defendant is ORDERED to respond to the requests for production of documents, and to

produce all non-privileged and/or non-objectionable documents, together with a privilege log and/or

a reason for non-production, as appropriate, within thirty (30) days of the date that the requests for

production of documents are served by Plaintiff upon Defendant; and

5. Plaintiff’s request to submit a rebuttal medical evaluation is DENIED, (Doc. 45-3).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 4, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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