Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05331/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05331-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARGARET EVE-LYNNE MIYASAKI,

Plaintiff,

v

REAL MEX RESTAURANTS, INC, dba

ACAPULCO SANTA CLARA, and DOES 1

through 10,

Defendants. /

No C 05-5331 VRW

ORDER

Margaret Eve-Lynne Miyasaki brings this federal civil

rights action against Real Mex Restaurants alleging employment

discrimination on the basis of her sex and race in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e-5. Doc #1

(Compl). Before the court is Real Mex’s petition to compel

arbitration. Doc #11. For reasons discussed below, Real Mex’s

petition is GRANTED.

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Case 3:05-cv-05331-VRW Document 31 Filed 08/17/06 Page 1 of 18
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I

Miyasaki began working as a karaoke disc jockey (or “DJ”)

for Real Mex’s Acapulco Restaurant in Santa Clara in June 2002. 

Doc #14 (Specht Decl) ¶3. At that time, she was told to sign Real

Mex’s dispute resolution agreement (DRA) as a condition of her

employment with no option of declining its terms and conditions. 

Doc #24 (Miyasaki Decl) ¶3. See also Specht Decl, Ex C (DRA). 

Miyasaki signed the DRA along with a form acknowledging her receipt

of the Real Mex employee handbook, which also contains a dispute

resolution policy. Specht Decl ¶¶4-5. See also id, Ex B (Employee

Handbook). 

The DRA describes its general scope as follows:

[Y]ou and the Company mutually agree to resolve by

mediation and binding arbitration any claim that, in

the absence of [the DRA], would be resolved in a

court of law under applicable state or federal law. 

The claims governed by this agreement are those that

you or [Real Mex] may have relating to your

employment with, behavior during or termination

from, [Real Mex]. Claims for workers compensation

or unemployment compensation benefits are not

subject to this agreement.

The DRA later provides a non-exclusive list of specific types of

claims to which it applies:

This includes, but is not limited to, claims of

employment discrimination * * *. It also includes

any claim you might have for unlawful harassment

including sexual harassment and unlawful

retaliation; any claims under contract or tort law;

any claim for wages, compensation or benefits; and

any claim for trade secret violations, unlawful

competition or breach of fiduciary duty.

The DRA further specifies that arbitrations are governed by the

National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes of the

American Arbitration Association (AAA) (the “AAA employment dispute

rules”).

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3

Miyasaki does not contest that her present claim falls

within the scope of the DRA. Miyasaki, however, opposes Real Mex’s

petition on the ground that the DRA is unenforceable. 

II

Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to

“reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration

agreements,” to “place [such] agreements on the same footing as

other contracts” and to “manifest a liberal federal policy favoring

arbitration agreements.” EEOC v Waffle House, Inc, 534 US 279,

288-89 (2002). The FAA applies to arbitration agreements in

employment contracts except those of transportation workers,

Circuit City Stores, Inc v Adams, 532 US 105, 119 (2001), and

likewise applies to claims under Title VII, Mago v Shearson Lehman

Hutton Inc, 956 F2d 932, 935 (9th Cir 1992). See also generally

EEOC v Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F3d 742 (9th Cir

2003) (en banc) (overruling Duffield v Robertson Stephens & Co, 144

F3d 1182 (9th Cir 1998)). 

The FAA mandates that courts treat arbitration agreements

as “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as

exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9

USC § 2. In determining the validity of such an agreement, federal

courts “should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the

formation of contracts.” First Options of Chicago, Inc v Kaplan,

514 US 938, 944 (1995). Consequently, “generally applicable

defenses, such as * * * unconscionability” can serve to “invalidate

arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 of the FAA.” 

Doctor’s Assocs, Inc v Casarotto, 517 US 681, 687 (1996).

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Against this legal backdrop that favors the enforcement

of arbitration agreements, Miyasaki advances two arguments why the

DRA should not be enforced.

III

Miyasaki contends that the DRA is unconscionable and

therefore unenforceable. Under California law, an arbitration

agreement is invalid as unconscionable only if it is both

procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Armendariz v

Foundation Health Psychcare Servs, Inc, 24 Cal 4th 83, 114 (2000). 

There appears to be no dispute that the DRA is a contract of

adhesion and, as such, procedurally unconscionable. See id at 114-

15. The court will therefore focus on the substantive component.

A

Armendariz

Miyasaki argues that the DRA is substantively

unconscionable for lack of mutuality. The leading California case

addressing mutuality in employment arbitration agreements is

Armendariz, supra. Armendariz involved an arbitration agreement

that applied only to claims arising from the termination of

employment. After arriving at certain minimum requirements for the

arbitration of claims brought under the California Fair Employment

and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq, the

California Supreme Court turned its attention to whether the

agreement was unconscionably one-sided. Relying primarily upon two

decisions by California courts of appeal, Stirlen v Supercuts, Inc,

51 Cal App 4th 1599 (1997); Kinney v United HealthCare Servs, Inc,

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70 Cal App 4th 1322 (1999), the court held the arbitration

agreement unconscionable because it lacked the requisite “modicum

of bilaterality.” Armendariz, 24 Cal 4th at 117-18. Specifically,

the court concluded that 

an arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive

context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it

requires one contracting party, but not the other,

to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same

transaction or occurrence * * *. The arbitration

agreement in this case lacks mutuality in this sense

because it requires the arbitration of employee ——

but not employer —— claims arising out of a wrongful

termination. An employee terminated for stealing

trade secrets, for example, must arbitrate his or

her wrongful termination claim under the agreement

while the employer has no corresponding obligation

to arbitrate its trade secrets claim against the

employee.

Id at 120.

The court “emphasize[d],” however, that 

if an employer does have reasonable justification

for the [unilateral] arrangement —— i e, a

justification grounded in something other than the

employer’s desire to maximize its advantage based on

the perceived superiority of the judicial forum ——

such an agreement would not be unconscionable. 

Without such justification, we must assume that it

is.

Id.

In relying upon Stirlen and Kinney, the Armendariz court

effectively recognized two situations in which arbitration

agreements between employers and employees might lack the requisite

degree of bilaterality to justify their enforcement. First, as in

Kinney, arbitration agreements may be explicitly non-mutual when

the employer is expressly excepted from arbitrating any claims it

might have against the employee. See Kinney, 70 Cal App 4th at

1326. Second, as in Stirlen, an arbitration agreement may be

implicitly non-mutual even if it purports to apply to both parties,

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as when the agreement “specifically exclude[s] certain types of

disputes from the scope of arbitration” —— i e, types of disputes

that would be brought by employers. Armendariz, 24 Cal 4th at 116

(citing Stirlen, 51 Cal App 4th at 1528). In Stirlen, for example,

an arbitration agreement was held unconscionable because it

specifically excluded the only claims likely to be brought by the

employer against the employee (claims that an employee violated a

non-competition agreement or divulged confidential information). 

Stirlen, 52 Cal App 4th at 1541.

In effect, then, Armendariz attaches a rebuttable

presumption of unconscionability to arbitration agreements that are

either explicitly or implicitly non-mutual.

The DRA in this case does not fit within either

aforementioned category: It is bilateral on its face and it

specifically applies to any trade secret claim Real Mex might have

—— a feature that the Armendariz court seems to have contemplated

as evidence of the requisite “modicum of bilaterality.” 

Armendariz, 24 Cal 4th at 120.

B

Ingle

Miyasaki does not seriously dispute that the DRA is

claim-mutual on its face. See Doc #23 (Opp) at 8. Notwithstanding

that the DRA ostensibly applies to claims brought by Real Mex as

well as claims brought by employees, Miyasaki contends that Real

Mex must demonstrate that the DRA is in fact bilateral and has

failed to do so. Miyasaki relies primarily upon the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Ingle v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 328 F3d

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1165 (9th Cir 2003). 

By its terms, the arbitration agreement in Ingle applied

to “any and all employment-related legal disputes, controversies or

claims of an Associate, arising out of, or relating to, an

Associate’s application or candidacy for employment, employment or

cessation of employment.” Ingle, 328 F3d at 1173 n 5. In other

words, the agreement applied only to claims (1) brought by

employees that were (2) related to hiring, firing and the like. 

Thus, the agreement in Ingle was both explicitly and implicitly

non-mutual. 

The court wasted little time concluding that the

agreement was non-mutual on its face and that Circuit City had

failed to offer any business justification within the meaning of

Armendariz. Id at 1173. That conclusion would have been

sufficient to support the panel’s holding that the agreement was

unconscionable. But the panel, per Judge Pregerson, went on to

discuss the agreement’s implicit shortcomings: “By essentially

covering only claims that employees would likely bring against

Circuit City, this arbitration agreement’s coverage would be

substantively one-sided without the express limitation to claims

brought by employees.” Id at 1174. See also id at 1174 n 8.

The panel held that 

under California law, a contract to arbitrate

between an employer and an employee, such as the one

we evaluate in this case, raises a rebuttable

presumption of substantive unconscionability. 

Unless the employer can demonstrate that the effect

of a contract to arbitrate is bilateral —— as is

required under California law —— with respect to a

particular employee, courts should presume such

contracts substantively unconscionable.

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Id at 1174.

The broad brush with which the panel painted leaves

little room for doubt that neither explicit nor implicit nonmutuality is necessary to trigger the presumption prescribed by

Ingle. See id (“The only claims realistically affected by an

arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee are those

claims employees bring against their employers.”); id at 1175

(“Even if the limitation to claims brought by employees were not

explicit, an arbitration agreement between an employer and an

employee ostensibly binds to arbitration only employee-initiated

actions.”). See also Michael J McGuiness & Adam J Karr,

California’s “Unique” Approach to Arbitration, 2005 J Disp Resol

61, 80 (“[I]n the Ninth Circuit’s view, it does not matter whether

the text of the agreement commits employers as well as employees to

arbitration. The mere fact that the agreement is between an

employer and employee is enough to make it so one-sided as to

‘shock the conscience * * *.’”). On the other hand, because Ingle

stated that the presumption it described applied to arbitration

agreements between employers and employees “such as the one we

evaluate in this case,” the court could interpret Ingle’s

presumption to apply only when an arbitration agreement is either

explicitly unilateral or implicitly unilateral (or both). 

Apparently, Miyasaki believes the broader reading of

Ingle is the correct one, for she invokes the Ingle presumption

notwithstanding that the DRA ostensibly applies to all claims

arising between herself and Real Mex that could be brought by

either party. 

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C

For the following reasons, the court concludes that Real

Mex need not show that the DRA is bilateral in effect as well as

appearance. 

First, as suggested above, inasmuch as Ingle contemplated

that the presumption of substantive unconscionability applies when

the agreement is neither explicitly nor implicitly non-mutual, that

portion of the opinion is properly treated as obiter dicta. 

Second and more important, application of the Ingle

presumption in this case is inconsistent with the approach taken by

California courts. As mentioned above, the DRA satisfies the

requirements of Armendariz. And since Armendariz, the California

Supreme Court has indicated that an agreement that is neither

explicitly nor implicitly non-mutual is not fatally one-sided. See

Little v Auto Stiegler, Inc, 29 Cal 4th 1064 (2003). “[U]nlike the

agreement in Armendariz, which explicitly limited the scope of the

arbitration agreement to wrongful termination claims and therefore

implicitly excluded the employer’s claims against the employee, the

arbitration agreement in [Little],” similar to the DRA in this

case, “contained no such limitation, instead applying to ‘any

claim, dispute or controversy * * * between the employee and the

Company.” Id at 1075 n 1 (citation and alteration omitted). For

this reason, the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement was

unconscionable for lack of mutuality “[did] not appear to be

valid.” Id. Notably, the opinion in Little was filed over two

months prior to, but was not cited by, Ingle. 

Further, Ingle’s presumption has been all but ignored by

California courts. See Nyulassy v Lockheed Martin Corp, 120 Cal

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App 4th 1267, 1278-88 (2004) (addressing enforceability of

employment arbitration agreement without reference to Ingle); Fitz

v NCR Corp, 118 Cal App 4th 702, 723-27 (2004) (same); Abramsom v

Juniper Networks, Inc, 115 Cal App 4th 638, 655-58 (2004) (same);

Martinez v. Master Protection Corp, 118 Cal App 4th 107, 114-119

(2004) (same). Rather, California courts have uniformly declined

to find arbitration agreements unconscionable for lack of mutuality

when the agreement is neither explicitly nor implicitly non-mutual. 

See Jones v Humanscale Corporation, 130 Cal App 4th 401, 415

(2005); McManus v CIBC World Markets Corp, 109 Cal App 4th 76

(2003). Indeed, the court is aware of only one (unpublished)

instance in which a California court has looked to Ingle; the court

limited Ingle to its facts and compelled arbitration because the

agreement was mutual on its face. See Huskey v Hollywood

Entertainment Corp, 2006 WL 1793612, *11 (Cal Ct App). See also,

e g, Employers Ins of Wausau v Granite State Ins Co, 330 F3d 1214,

1220 n 8 (9th Cir 2003) (“[W]e may consider unpublished state

decisions, even though such opinions have no precedential value.”).

Unsurprisingly, federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit have

followed the lead of the state courts. See Marshall v Pontiac, 287

F Supp 2d 1229, 1233 (CD Cal 2003) (“[T]he outcome is dictated by

Little * * *. Therefore, plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration

agreement is unconscionable for lack of mutuality must also be

rejected.”). See also Jones v Deja Vu, Inc, 419 F Supp 2d 1146,

1149 (ND Cal 2005) (Zimmerman); Irwin v UBS Painewebber, Inc, 324 F

Supp 2d 1103, 1109 (CD Cal 2004).

In sum, the court concludes that to the extent that the

portion of Ingle upon which Miyasaki relies is not dicta,

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application of the Ingle presumption in this case would be

inconsistent with California law as interpreted by California

courts. The DRA is neither explicitly nor implicitly unilateral. 

Miyasaki’s argument that the DRA is unconscionable for lack of

mutuality is accordingly rejected.

IV

Putting aside the purported lack of mutuality, Miyasaki

argues that the DRA is unconscionable because the AAA employment

dispute rules incorporated by reference into the DRA limit

procedural remedies while shifting costs to employees. Opp at 9-

10.

A

Before turning to Miyasaki’s arguments, the court notes

that it is not clear whether the issues presented are governed by

state or federal law. On the one hand, California courts

contemplate that discovery limitations and cost-related

considerations are matters that are governed by generally

applicable state law. See Little, 29 Cal 4th at 1079 (“The

Armendariz requirements are * * * applications of general state law

contract principles regarding the unwaivability of public rights to

the unique context of arbitration, and accordingly are not

preempted by the FAA.”). On the other hand, because Miyasaki’s

underlying claim arises under federal law, her challenge to the

enforceability of the DRA would seem to be governed by the

principle that a federal claimant cannot be forced to arbitration

when that forum would frustrate the claimant’s ability to vindicate

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her statutory rights. See Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp,

500 US 20, 31 (1991) (concluding that discovery limitations in

arbitration did not frustrate plaintiff’s ability to vindicate his

rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Green Tree

Financial Corp v Randolph, 531 US 79, 90-91 (2000) (recognizing

that an arbitration agreement might not be enforceable under the

FAA when arbitration costs effectively prevent a claimant from

vindicating federal statutory rights). The court need not resolve

the questions of choice of law or preemption that lurk behind

Miyasaki’s arguments. See, e g, Robert S Safi, Beyond

Unconscionability: Preserving the Class Mechanism Under State Law

in the Era of Consumer Arbitration, 83 Tex L Rev 1715, 1729 n 81

(2005) (“Randolph should not be read as creating a federal common

law of unconscionability that supersedes, rather than merely

supplements, state law * * *. A validity challenge based on an

unconscionable [provision] is conceptually distinct from a

challenge based on the plaintiff’s inability to vindicate statutory

rights in the arbitral forum. The former relates to the validity

of the agreement itself, while the latter relates to the adequacy

of the forum to hear the particular claim.” (citation omitted)). 

As explained further below, Miyasaki’s arguments fail under both

California and federal law.

B

Miyasaki first draws a bead on Rule 7 of the AAA

employment dispute rules, which provides: “The arbitrator shall

have the authority to order such discovery, by way of deposition,

interrogatory, document production, or otherwise, as the arbitrator

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considers necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in

dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration.” 

Doc #13 (Pope Decl), Ex B (AAA Employment Dispute Rules) at 6. In

Miyasaki’s view, this “is clearly an extreme limitation of the

discovery that would available in a court proceeding.” Opp at 9. 

1

In Ferguson v Countrywide Credit Industries, 298 F3d 778,

786 (9th Cir 2002), the arbitration agreement limited depositions

of corporate representatives to no more than four designated

subjects. Applying California law, the Ferguson court held that,

standing alone, the discovery provision was valid because the

arbitrator is ultimately responsible to “balance the need for

simplicity in arbitration with the discovery necessary.” Id

(relying upon Mercuro v Superior Court, 96 Cal App 4th 167, 184

(2002)). Although the court ultimately found the agreement as a

whole to be unconscionable, the discovery provision simply

buttressed the court’s belief that the arbitration agreement

“unduly favor[ed] Countrywide at every turn.” Id.

Unlike the provision in Ferguson, the DRA here places no

limit on discovery except by incorporation of the AAA rules which

provide discovery necessary “to a full and fair exploration of the

issues in dispute.” AAA Employment Dispute Rules at 7. Moreover,

the DRA is not permeated with other terms favoring Real Mex. The

court therefore declines to invalidate the DRA as unconscionable. 

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2

Miyasaki next argues that the discovery limitations will

prevent her from vindicating her rights under Title VII. Opp at

12-13. In Gilmer, supra, the plaintiff similarly argued that

arbitration would abrogate his rights under the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act because, among other things, “the discovery

allowed in arbitration is more limited than in the federal courts.” 

Gilmer, 500 US at 31. The Court rejected this argument, holding

that by agreeing to arbitrate, a party “trades the procedures * * *

of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of

arbitration.” Id (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 628 (1985)).

The AAA employment dispute rules give the arbitrator

authority “to order such discovery * * * as the arbitrator

considers necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issue in

dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration.” AAA

Employment Dispute Rules at 7 (emphasis added). This limitation

does not obviously deprive Miyasaki of her ability to develop her

case in arbitration. In any event, Miyasaki has not distinguished

this case from Gilmer. 

C

Miyasaki next takes aim at Rule 24 (which dispenses with

the rules of evidence), Rule 25 (which provides that the arbitrator

may consider the evidence of witnesses in the form of affidavits)

and Rule 39 (which provides that witness expenses will be borne by

the party producing the witness). Miyasaki contends that these

provisions “grossly favor[]” Real Mex and that their effect is to

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deprive her of the benefit of live cross-examination as would be

available in federal court unless she is willing to bear the

expense of producing Real Mex employees as witnesses. Opp at 10.

Although the arbitrator may consider evidence of

witnesses by affidavit, the arbitrator “shall give it only such

weight as the arbitrator deems it entitled to after consideration

of any objection made to its admission.” AAA Employment Dispute

Rules at 10. By asking the court to find this provision “grossly”

unfair, Miyasaki effectively asks the court to question the

neutrality of the arbitrator. The Supreme Court has refused to

indulge the idea that the “arbitral body conducting a proceeding

will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and

impartial arbitrators.” Mitsubishi, 473 US at 634.

Regarding arbitration costs, in Randolph, supra, the

Court considered whether an arbitration agreement that was silent

as to cost and fee allocation would leave plaintiff “unable to

vindicate her statutory rights in arbitration.” Randolph, 531 US

at 90. Resting the burden of “showing the likelihood of incurring

such costs” on the party opposing arbitration, the Court refused to

invalidate the agreement because plaintiff failed to substantiate

her claims that she would be “required to bear prohibitive

arbitration costs if she pursues her claim in an arbitral forum.” 

Id at 90-91. 

The DRA here requires Real Mex to “pay the arbitrator’s

fees” while “the employee will pay only an amount equal to court

fees, if a civil action had been filed by or against an employee.” 

Employee Handbook at 3. Nonetheless, Miyasaki suggests that the

DRA would effectively “shift the expense of producing employer

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witnesses from the employer to the employee.” Opp at 10. Although

the Court in Randolph did not reach “[h]ow detailed the showing of

prohibitive expense must be,” 531 US at 522, Miyasaki provides no

evidence or non-conclusory argument to substantiate her claim. 

Moreover, Miyasaki’s claim of expense-shifting is tenuous

because rather than compelling physical presence, Miyasaki could

examine Real Mex witnesses in depositions. She would bear

deposition-related expenses in federal court unless she prevailed

the merits of her claim. So, too, in arbitration, for although

Rule 39 of the AAA employment dispute rules requires each party to

bear expenses incurred in producing witnesses, Rule 34(d) provides

that the arbitrator may award “any remedy or relief that would have

been available to the parties had the matter been heard in court”

and assess expenses “in favor of any party.” 

In sum, the provisions Miyasaki challenges do not unduly

favor Real Mex and Miyasaki has failed to demonstrate that

arbitration-specific costs would preclude her from vindicating her

rights under Title VII.

V

After the court notified the parties that the present

motion was suitable for decision without oral argument, Doc #28,

Miyasaki submitted an “offer of proof of argument that would have

been presented at the hearing” had one been held, Doc #29. In this

final attempt to avoid arbitration, Miyasaki argues that the DRA

effectively and impermissibly shortens the statute of limitations

on her Title VII claim. See Circuit City Stores, Inc v Adams, 279

F3d 889, 894-95 (9th Cir 2002) (suggesting that time limitations

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stricter than those provided for by statute may render an

arbitration agreement unenforceable).

The DRA reads:

If a dispute arises, you and the Company agree to

try, in good faith, to resolve the dispute. If the

dispute cannot be resolved informally within 30

days, you and the Company agree to submit the

dispute to non-binding mediation before a mediator

* * * within 30 days. * * * If mediation does not

resolve the dispute, [or if no mediation is held

within 60 days, or if the parties mutually agree to

waive the mediation] you and the Company agree that

the dispute will be resolved by final and binding

arbitration.” 

DRA at 2. See also id at n 2 (supplying bracketed information). 

Apparently, Miyasaki suspects that because no mediation occurred in

this case, Real Mex will argue before the arbitrator that she

cannot proceed in arbitration. Without deciding the question, the

court will comment that Miyasaki’s interpretation is not the most

plausible reading of the above-quoted language. At the very best,

the DRA is ambiguous in this respect. In any event, “this matter

of contract interpretation should be for the arbitrator, not the

court[], to decide.” Green Tree Financial Corp v Bazzle, 539 US

444, 453 (2003). Further, the court “should not, on the basis of

mere speculation that an arbitrator might interpret th[is]

ambiguous agreement[] in a manner that casts [its] enforceability

into doubt, take upon [itself] the authority to decide the

antecedent question of how the ambiguity is to be resolved.” 

Pacificare Health Systems, Inc v Book, 538 US 401, 406-07 (2003)

(quotation omitted).

As in Book, the proper course here is to compel

arbitration. But to alleviate Miyasaki’s concerns, despite that a

court may “order summary judgment when all claims are barred by an

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arbitration clause,” Sparling v Hoffman Constr Co, 864 F2d 635, 638

(9th Cir 1988), the court will simply stay proceedings. If, and

only if, the arbitrator interprets the DRA in a manner that timebars Miyasaki’s claims, the court will entertain a motion for

reconsideration by Miyasaki, provided that such motion shall not

attempt to re-litigate any other ruling in this order. 

VI

In sum, Real Mex’s petition to compel arbitration is

GRANTED. This action is STAYED pending arbitration. The parties

are ORDERED to inform the court once this matter has been resolved.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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