Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05282/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05282-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 3, 2001 Decided January 29, 2002

No. 00-5282

Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali,

Appellant

v.

District of Columbia, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv01348)

Robert N. Weiner, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs as amicus curiae for appellant.

Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali, appearing pro se, was on the briefs

for appellant.

Mark R. Davis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, State

of Virginia, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellees

Commonwealth of Virginia, et al.

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Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Carl J. Schifferle,

Assistant Corporation Counsel, filed the brief for appellees

District of Columbia, et al.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Randolph and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: A District of Columbia inmate claims

that following his transfer from the District's Lorton Correctional Facility to a Virginia prison pursuant to an interstate

compact, Virginia officials used excessive force in restraining

him, required him to register under his birth name rather

than his religiously inspired legal name, and neglected to give

him the insulin he required, resulting in his leg becoming

dangerously infected. The inmate also claims that the District denied him access to the courts by failing to transport

certain legal documents with him to the Virginia prison,

sending them instead to his home. The inmate filed suit in

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,

naming as defendants the Commonwealth of Virginia, various

Virginia officials, the District of Columbia, various District

officials, and the Attorney General of the United States.

Affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint, we

find that (1) all claims against Virginia, its agencies and its

officers in their official capacities are either barred by sovereign immunity or mooted by the inmate's transfer back to a

District prison, (2) the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Virginia officials in their personal capacities, (3) the

inmate lacks standing to bring a denial of court access claim,

and (4) neither the District nor its officials can be held liable

for torts committed by Virginia officials.

I.

Appellant Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali is a District of Columbia

inmate serving concurrent sentences for first-degree murder

convictions in 1964 and again in 1986. Ali's claims arise from

his April 1999 transfer from the District's Lorton Central

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Facility, located in Lorton, Virginia, to Virginia's Sussex II

prison in Waverly, Virginia. The transfer took place pursuant to a contract, authorized by the Interstate Corrections

Compact, Va. Code Ann. s 53.1-216; D.C. Code Ann.

s 24-1001, between the District of Columbia Department of

Corrections and the Virginia Department of Corrections.

According to Ali, during a strip-search undertaken in preparation for his transfer, Virginia prison official D. Davis "hit

[him] in the stomach," prompting Ali to punch Davis, at which

point several other officers leapt on Ali and wrestled him to

the ground. Compl. p p 10-11. Ali claims that his "face was

swollen up and at least four teeth were loosened of which one

had to be pulled...." Pl.'s Opp'n. to Va. Defs.' Mot. to

Dismiss p 30.

Ali also contends that Virginia prison officials humiliated

him when, after he arrived at Sussex II, they held a stun gun

to his head and forced him to register under his birth name,

James C. Long, rather than his legal name, Abdus-Shahid

M.S. Ali. Although originally convicted under his birth name,

Ali changed his name in 1979 for religious reasons. According to Ali, not only did he find the registration under his birth

name religiously offensive, but as a result of his incarceration

under the name James Long, Sussex II officials neglected for

fifteen days to give him the insulin shots required to treat his

diabetes. Sussex II medical staff apparently confused another inmate's file, labeled "James Long #268-200" and containing no diabetes diagnosis, with Ali's file, labeled "Ali #136-

476." Compl.p 16. As a result of this "medical malpractice,"

Ali alleges, his fingers became "numb," Compl. p p 16,17, and

his right leg, which became infected, "burst open" and "may

(in time) ... require amputation," Pl's Opp'n. to Va. Defs.'

Mot. to Dismiss p 11.

Finally, Ali contends that District prison officials "forced

him" to send certain legal documents home rather than

transporting them along with his other belongings to the

Sussex II prison. Compl. p 22. As a result, he experienced a

"set-back" in litigation pending in the District of Columbia

Superior Court. Compl. p 23.

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Based on these allegations, Ali filed suit in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia against

three categories of defendants: (1) the Commonwealth of

Virginia and the Virginia Department of Corrections, as well

as the Attorney General, the Governor, the Chief Warden of

the Sussex II State Prison, and Corrections Officer D. Davis

in their personal and official capacities; (2) the Mayor of

Washington, D.C., the Warden of the Lorton Central Facility,

and the District of Columbia Department of Corrections; and

(3) the Attorney General of the United States. While Ali's

handwritten complaint contains many claims, he alleges essentially four causes of action: (1) that corrections officers

used excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; (2) that

the denial of insulin also violated his Eighth Amendment

rights; (3) that forcing him to sign his birth name violated the

First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration

Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. ss 2000bb to 2000bb-4; and (4) that

the failure to transfer all his legal papers to the Virginia

prison violated his First Amendment right to court access.

The district court dismissed Ali's complaint with prejudice.

With respect to his claims against the Virginia defendants

(except for the claim relating to the use of his birth name),

the court concluded that Ali failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA). As to the birth name issue, the district court

held that "the mere fact that correctional authorities maintain

an inmate's records in the name he used when convicted

implicates no constitutional right." Ali v. District of Columbia, No. 99-1348, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. July 11, 2000). Finding

the claims against the District defendants and the Attorney

General of the United States based on the actions of Virginia

prison officials, the district court dismissed these claims as

well. The district court also noted that "to the extent" Ali

sought "injunctive and declaratory relief," such claims were

"moot" in light of Ali's "transfer[ ] back to Lorton." Id. at 4.

Ali, supported by the amicus we appointed, now appeals the

dismissal of his two Eighth Amendment claims (excessive

force and denial of insulin), his First Amendment and RFRA

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claims (use of his birth name) and his access to court claim.

Our review is de novo. See Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 192

(D.C. Cir.1995) (reviewing "de novo a dismissal for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted").

II.

We begin with Ali's claims against the Virginia defendants.

According to Virginia, the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because Ali failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as required by the PLRA. See 42 U.S.C.

s 1997e(a) ("No action shall be brought ... until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."). Virginia

argues that although Ali filed a complaint pursuant to the

prison's grievance procedures, because he filed suit before

those procedures were completed, he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. See Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that remedies

must be exhausted at the time the complaint is filed). Alternatively, Virginia argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars Ali's claims against the Commonwealth and its

officials in their official capacities and that the district court

lacked personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants in

their personal capacities.

We start, as we generally do, by making sure we possess

subject matter jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon

Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) (explaining that courts

generally address subject matter jurisdiction even before

personal jurisdiction unless the subject matter question raises

a "difficult and novel" question of law). Virginia's subject

matter jurisdiction argument depends on reading the PLRA's

exhaustion requirement as a jurisdictional bar. Although we

have never directly ruled that the requirement is not jurisdictional, in Jackson we rejected inmates' argument that the

defendants had waived their exhaustion defenses, 254 F.3d at

267 (D.C. Cir. 2001), an issue we never would have considered

if exhaustion were jurisdictional. Removing any doubt, we

now hold, as has every circuit to have considered the matter,

that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement simply "governs the

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timing of the action" and does not contain the type of

" 'sweeping and direct' " language that would indicate a jurisdictional bar rather than a "mere codification[ ] of administrative exhaustion requirements." Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d

684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.

749, 757 (1975)). See also Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d

357, 358 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The 42 U.S.C. s 1997e exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional."); accord Basham v.

Uphoff, No. 98-8013, 1998 WL 847689, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 8,

1998); Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 1999);

Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999); Nyhuis

v. Reno 204 F.3d 65, 69 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2000); Curry v. Scott,

249 F.3d 493, 501 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2001).

Having found the PLRA's exhaustion requirement not jurisdictional, we have no reason to consider the merits of the

Virginia defendants' exhaustion defense because Ali's claims

against them are barred on other grounds: sovereign immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction. As to the first, the

Eleventh Amendment bars all suits in federal court against a

state by citizens of another state. See U.S. Const. Amend. XI.

When plaintiffs sue state officials in their official capacities

for monetary damages, the suits are, in substance, suits

against the state and also barred by sovereign immunity.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Congress may

abrogate state sovereign immunity through a legitimate exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment, section five, enforcement

powers. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). States

can also waive their sovereign immunity, but "we will find

waiver only where stated by the most express language or by

such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave

no room for any other reasonable construction." Edelman,

415 U.S. at 673 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Applying these principles to this case, we note first that it

makes no difference that Ali may be a District of Columbia

resident rather than a citizen of "another state," as the

Eleventh Amendment provides. See 13B Charles Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure s 3618,

at 568-570 (2d ed. 1984) (General rule is that prisoner retains

residency had at time of incarceration). In Alden v. Maine,

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the Supreme Court held that "the sovereign immunity of the

States neither derives from, nor is limited by the terms of the

Eleventh Amendment. Rather, [it] is a fundamental aspect

of sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today ...

except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain

constitutional Amendments." 527 U.S. at 713. Cf. also Hans

v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 5 (1890) (holding despite the literal

language of Eleventh Amendment that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suit in Federal Court against a state by a

citizen of that same state.)

The question, then, is whether Ali has pled a cause of

action arising under a federal statute that abrogates Virginia's sovereign immunity. He has not. RFRA does not

apply to the states, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536

(1997), and the Supreme Court has held that section 1983

does not abrogate state sovereign immunity, Will v. Michigan

Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Nor has

Virginia waived its sovereign immunity simply because the

Interstate Corrections Compact, adopted by the Commonwealth, provides that "[t]he fact of confinement in a receiving

state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal

rights which said inmate would have had if confined in an

appropriate institution of the sending state." Va. Code Ann.

s 53.1-216, Article IV(e); see also id. at Article I (defining

"state" as including the District of Columbia). Not only does

this language fall far short of the required "most express

waiver," Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, but we see no basis for

finding that the "overwhelming implication," id., of the Compact's text is that Virginia intended to waive sovereign immunity. Even assuming the Compact creates rights enforceable

by individual inmates, the Compact says nothing about how

inmates may enforce these rights. A "reasonable construction," id., of the Compact would suggest that Virginia intended inmates to vindicate any rights through the traditional

methods of either prospective injunctive relief against Commonwealth officials, see id. at 664, 668 (holding Eleventh

Amendment bars "equitable restitution" but not prospective

injunctive relief having only an "ancillary effect on the state

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treasury"), or damage suits against Commonwealth officials in

their personal capacities, see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-

31 (1991) ("Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier

against suits to impose 'individual and personal liability' on

state officials under s 1983" (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 238 (1974))), neither of which requires waiver of

sovereign immunity. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 732 (noting the

difference between the existence of a legal right under Federal law and the "implementation of the law in a manner

consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the States"

(emphasis added)). We thus conclude that the doctrine of

sovereign immunity bars Ali's claims against the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Virginia Department of Corrections, as well as his claims against the Attorney General, the

Governor, the Chief Warden of the Sussex II State Prison

and Officer Davis to the extent that Ali seeks damages from

these individuals in their official capacities.

Because the district court found all claims for injunctive

relief moot in light of Ali's return to the Lorton facility and

because Ali does not appeal this determination, the next

question with respect to the Virginia defendants is whether

the district court had personal jurisdiction over the individual

officials in their personal capacities. Amicus argues that

jurisdiction is proper under the District of Columbia long-arm

statute either because the defendants "transact[ed]" business

in the District, "contract[ed]" to do so, or "caus[ed] tortious

injury in the District ... by an act or omission outside the

District...." D.C. Code Ann. s 13-423(a)(1), -(2), -(3). We

disagree. Nowhere in his complaint does Ali allege that any

defendants acting in their individual capacities either transacted business in the District or contracted to do so. It is

true, as amicus points out, that Virginia has contracts with

the District, makes reports to the District concerning District

inmates it houses, and receives money from the District.

Virginia officials, however, undertake all such actions in their

official capacities. In addition, because the District's Lorton

facility, the site of the alleged assault, is located in Virginia,

no tortious acts took place in the District.

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III.

Turning to the remaining defendants, we begin with Ali's

court access claim against the District of Columbia defendants, the only claim not based on the actions of Virginia

officials. To maintain a court access claim, an inmate must

demonstrate "actual injury," that is the inmate must show

"that an actionable claim ... which he desired to bring has

been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim

is currently being prevented...." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 356 (1996). This Ali has failed to do. He alleges neither

that he actually lost any otherwise valid legal claim nor that

he is unable to raise such a claim in any other proceeding.

He alleges only that he has an "open case" in the District of

Columbia Superior Court that has been "set back." Compl.

p 23. Without more, this claim is insufficient to give rise to

Article III standing. See, e.g., Hudson v. Robinson, 678 F.2d

462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982) (mere delay in filing papers in court

not enough to establish actual injury to court access if papers

ultimately filed or accepted and considered by court).

Ali's remaining claims against District officials--his Eighth

Amendment and religious freedom claims--all rest on the

actions of Virginia officials. In Monell v. New York City

Dep't of Social Servs., the Supreme Court, interpreting section 1983, held that while the word "person" includes a

municipality, the phrase "any person who ... subjects ...

any citizen" implies a strict causal relationship. Accordingly,

the Court held that plaintiffs suing municipalities under section 1983 may not rely on a respondeat superior theory;

rather, they must show that municipality agents or employees

acted "pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature."

Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Ali makes no allegation

that could give rise to liability under Monell. For example,

although he claims mistreatment by Virginia officials, Ali

never alleges that the District had a policy of sending inmates

to Virginia prisons that routinely mistreat inmates. See, e.g.,

Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 265 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (inmates alleged that the District had a practice of

sending them to prisons with grooming policies that violated

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cable to this case because the Virginia officials acted as

agents for the District. Monell, however, expressly states

that "a local government may not be sued under s 1983 for

an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).

Ali's failure to state a section 1983 claim against the

District defendants does not end our inquiry, for while Ali's

complaint states no RFRA claim against the District, amicus

argues that he constructively amended his complaint to include such a claim by citing the statute in his Opposition to

the Virginia Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Even construing

Ali's pleadings "liberally," Richardson v. United States, 193

F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and assuming that he "recognized the need" to amend his complaint, id. at 549, we think a

single citation to RFRA in a filing responding to Virginia's

motion to dismiss insufficient to put the District on notice

that it faced a RFRA claim. See Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 711

F.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that complaint must

give "defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the

grounds upon which it rests"). Indeed, even the district

court seems not to have realized that Ali intended to raise a

RFRA claim against the District of Columbia. See Ali, No.

99-1348, slip op. at 2-4. Under these circumstances, we

decline to find that Ali constructively amended his complaint

to state a RFRA claim against the District and its officials.

Finally, we reject Ali's claims against the Attorney General

of the United States. The district court's reasons for dismissing these claims are entirely correct.

IV.

Amicus argues that if Ali can sue neither District nor

Virginia officials, the District, by "transferring prisoners to

other states," can "deprive them of remedies for constitutional violations." Amicus's Reply at 12. Not so. Although we

affirm the district court's dismissal with prejudice of all

claims against the Virginia officials in their individual capacities, we emphasize that this action merely "acts as res

judicata for the jurisdictional issue." Posner v. Essex Ins.

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Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1221 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, nothing in

either this opinion or the actions of the district court prevents

Ali from filing suit against Virginia officials in their personal

capacities in the appropriate federal district court in Virginia.

This is precisely the remedy that section 1983 gives every

Virginia inmate, whether transferred from the District or not.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

So ordered.

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