Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17634/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17634-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RANDOLPH WOLFSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COLLEEN CONCANNON; LOUIS

FRANK DOMINGUEZ; PETER J.

ECKERSTROM; GEORGE H. FOSTER;

GUSTAVO ARAGON, JR.; ROGER

BARTON; S’ LEE HINSHAW; DAVID

STEVENS; J. TYRELL TABER;

LAWRENCE F. WINTHROP, in their

official capacities as members of the

Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct; ANNA MARY GLAAB;

MARET VESSELLA, Chief Bar

Counsel of the State Bar of Arizona,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-17634

D.C. No.

3:08-cv-08064-

FJM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Frederick J. Martone, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

September 9, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed January 27, 2016

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 1 of 31
2 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain, Susan P. Graber, William A. Fletcher, Ronald

M. Gould, Marsha S. Berzon, Richard C. Tallman, Johnnie

B. Rawlinson, Consuelo M. Callahan, Morgan Christen,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould;

Concurrence by Judge Berzon

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The en banc court affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by

Randolph Wolfson, an Arizona state judicial candidate in

2006 and 2008, who challenged several provisions of the

Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct regulating judicial

campaigns.

Wolfson challenged: (1) the Personal Solicitation Clause,

Rule 4.1(A)(6); (2) the Endorsement Clauses, Rule 4.1(A)(2),

(3), (4); and (3) the Campaign Prohibition, Rule 4.1(A)(5). 

Together, the clauses did not allow Wolfson, while running

for judicial office, to personally solicit funds for his own

campaign or for a campaign for another candidate or political

organization, to publicly endorse another candidate for public

office, to make speeches on behalf of another candidate or

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 2 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 3

political organization, or to actively take part in any political

campaign. 

Applying the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in

Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), the en

banc court first held that the district court erred when it

bypassed strict scrutiny in favor of the intermediate level of

scrutiny used by the Seventh Circuit. The panel nevertheless

held that the district court arrived at the correct result because

the Personal Solicitation Clause, the Endorsement Clauses,

and the Campaign Prohibition Rule all withstood First

Amendment analysis under strict scrutiny. The en banc court

held that Arizona has a compelling interest in upholding

public confidence in the judiciary and that in light of

Williams-Yulee, the Rules were narrowly tailored to its

compelling interest.

Concurring, Judge Berzon stated that in light of WilliamsYulee, she was in general agreement with Judge Gould’s

opinion for the en banc court. Judge Berzon concurred in

order to highlight her concern about articulating the

governmental interest at stake in regulating judicial elections. 

Judge Berzon stated that there is a separate, broader

governmental basis for regulating judicial behavior that goes

beyond a concern with biased decisionmaking in individual

cases. In her view, the societal interest in maintaining an

independent judiciarymore accuratelycaptures the reasons to

limit judicial candidates’ endorsements and campaigning

activity. Judge Berzon also noted that the majority opinion

did not distinguish between sitting judges who run for judicial

office and judicial candidates who are not yet, and may never

be, judges.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 3 of 31
4 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

COUNSEL

Anita Y. Milanovich (argued) and James Bopp, Jr., The Bopp

Law Firm, Terre Haute, Indiana, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Paula S. Bickett (argued), Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals;

Thomas C. Horne and Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorneys

General; Charles Grube, Senior Agency Counsel, Tempe,

Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees Commission Members.

Kimberly A. Demarchi and Peter R. Wand, Lewis and Roca

LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellee Maret

Vessella.

Igor V. Timofeyev, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, D.C.;

George W. Abele, Paul Hastings LLP, Los Angeles,

California; George T. Patton, Jr., Bose McKinney & Evans

LLP, Washington, D.C.; Karl J. Sandstrom, Perkins Coie

LLP, Washington, D.C.; Joshua L. Kaul, Perkins Coie LLP,

Madison, Wisconson, for Amicus Curiae Conference of Chief

Justices.

Randolph Sherman and Robert Grass, Kaye Scholer LLP,

New York, New York; Richard F. Ziegler and Justin O.

Spiegel, Jenner and Block, New York, New York; Matthew

Menendez and Alicia L. Bannon, New York, New York;

Hayley Gorenberg, New York, New York; and J. Gerald

Hebert and Megan P. McAllen, Washington, D.C., for

Amicus Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of

Law, Arizona Judges’ Association, American Judicature

Society, Justice at Stake, Campaign Legal Center, and

Lambda Legal Defense.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 4 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 5

Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General, and Alan D. Copsey,

Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Washington, for Amicus

Curiae States of Washington, Hawai’i, and Oregon.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Randolph Wolfson, an Arizona state

judicial candidate in 2006 and 2008, challenges several

provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct

regulating judicial campaigns. Specifically, Wolfson

challenges: (1) the Personal Solicitation Clause, Rule

4.1(A)(6)1; (2) the Endorsement Clauses, Rule 4.1(A)(2), (3),

(4)2; and (3) the Campaign Prohibition, Rule 4.1(A)(5)3. 

Together, the clauses do not allow Wolfson, while running

1

“A judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . personally solicit or

accept campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee

authorized by Rule 4.4 . . . .” Ariz. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule

4.1(A)(6) (2014), http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/rules/Arizona%

20Code%20of%20Judicial%20Conduct.pdf.

2

“A judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . (2) make speeches on

behalf of a political organization or another candidate for public office;

(3) publicly endorse or oppose another candidate for any public office;

(4) solicit funds for or pay an assessment to a political organization or

candidate, make contributions to any candidate or political organization

in excess of the amounts permitted by law, or make total contributions in

excess of fifty percent of the cumulative total permitted by law . . . .” Id.

at 4.1(A)(2), (3), (4).

3

“A judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . actively take part in any

political campaign other than his or her own campaign for election,

reelection or retention in office.” Id. at 4.1(A)(5).

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 5 of 31
6 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

for judicial office, to personally solicit funds for his own

campaign or for a campaign for another candidate or political

organization, to publicly endorse another candidate for public

office, to make speeches on behalf of another candidate or

political organization, or to actively take part in any political

campaign.

On May 21, 2008, Wolfson filed a complaint against the

Commissioners of the Arizona Commission on Judicial

Conduct and Chief Bar Counsel Robert B. Van Wyck

(collectively “the Commission”) in the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the campaign

regulations violated his First Amendment rights of freedom

of speech and freedom of association.4

The district court disagreed and granted the

Commission’s motion for summary judgment.5 Wolfson v.

Brammer, 822 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931–32 (D. Ariz. 2011). The

district court held that strict scrutiny was inappropriate, and

instead adopted the Seventh Circuit’s approach of applying an

intermediate level of scrutiny to assess judicial campaign

regulations like Arizona’s Rules. Id. at 929–30 (citing Siefert

v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 983–88 (7th Cir. 2010) and

4 Wolfson’s complaint also named as defendants Commissioners of

Arizona Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission, but Wolfson has since

voluntarily dismissed all claims against these defendants. Wolfson v.

Brammer, 822 F. Supp. 2d 925, 926–27 (D. Ariz. 2011).

5 The district court originally dismissed Wolfson’s claims as moot

because the election had passed and Wolfson was no longer a judicial

candidate. Wolfson v. Brammer, No. CV-08-8064-PHX-FJM, 2009 WL

102951, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2009). We disagreed, and reversed and

remanded the case. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1066–67 (9th

Cir. 2010). We now review the decision made on remand.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 6 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 7

Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2010)). 

Applying this level of scrutiny, the district court upheld

Arizona’s Rules as striking an appropriate “constitutional

balance” between judicial candidates’ First Amendment

rights and the state’s compelling interests in protecting

litigants’ due process rights and in ensuring the impartiality

of the judiciary. See id. at 931–32.

Wolfson timelyappealed. After an original panel hearing,

Wolfson v. Concannon, 750 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2014), the

case was ordered to be reheard en banc, Wolfson v.

Concannon, 768 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2014). Following this

decision but before we reheard the case, the Supreme Court

decided Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656

(2015).

I

The First Amendment, applicable to the States through

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, says

that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom

of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections

Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995). Wolfson’s appeal

requests that we address: (1) the district court’s application of

intermediate scrutiny to assess Arizona’s restrictions on

judicial candidate speech; and (2) the impact of WilliamsYulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), on Arizona’s

Personal Solicitation Clause, Endorsement Clauses, and

Campaign Prohibition.

II

We first address whether the district court was correct in

adopting the Seventh Circuit’s intermediate level of scrutiny

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 7 of 31
8 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

to assess Arizona’s judicial speech restrictions. We hold that,

in light of Williams-Yulee, it was not.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “[t]he First

Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to

speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” 

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,

339–40 (2010) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent.

Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). This “requires us to err on the side of protecting

political speech rather than suppressing it.” Fed. Election

Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).

In Williams-Yulee, a plurality of the Supreme Court

applied similar reasoning when addressing the level of

scrutiny appropriate for assessing Florida’s Code of Judicial

Conduct Canon 7C(1), a prohibition on personal solicitation

during judicial campaigns. See 135 S. Ct. at 1664–65 (“As

we have long recognized, speech about public issues and the

qualifications of candidates for elected office commands the

highest level of First Amendment protection.”). Picking up

where the Court left off in Republican Party of Minn. v.

White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002) (White I) (assuming

without deciding that strict scrutiny was appropriate for

restrictions on judicial candidates’ ability to announce their

views on various legal issues), the Williams-Yulee plurality

held that strict scrutiny was warranted. Williams-Yulee,

135 S. Ct. at 1665. “A State may restrict the speech of a

judicial candidate only if the restriction is narrowly tailored

to serve a compelling interest.” Id.

We agree with the plurality and hold that strict scrutiny is

appropriate here. Even before Williams-Yulee, other courts

had come to similar conclusions. See Carey v. Wolnitzek,

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 8 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 9

614 F.3d 189, 199–200 (6th Cir. 2010); Republican Party of

Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 748–49 (8th Cir. 2005) (en

banc) (White II); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1315,

1322–23 (11th Cir. 2002). Additionally, our holding is not

limited to Arizona’s Personal Solicitation Clause, which has

no meaningful difference from Florida’s Canon 7C(1).6 We

also hold that strict scrutiny is similarly appropriate for

Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and for its Campaign

Prohibition. A decision otherwise would be contrary to the

Supreme Court’s broad reasoning in Williams-Yulee, which

addressed not just a prohibition on personal requests for

campaign contributions, but state restrictions on judicial

candidate speech generally. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct.

at 1665. A decision otherwise also would put us in conflict

with the approach taken by the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh

Circuits.

6 Florida’s Canon 7C(1) reads: “A candidate, including an incumbent

judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public election between

competing candidates shall not personally solicit campaign funds, or

solicit attorneys for publicly stated support, but may establish committees

of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for

the candidate’s campaign and to obtain public statements of support for

his or her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting

campaign contributions and public support fromany person or corporation

authorized by law.” Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of Florida 38

(2014), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/ethics/Code_Judi

cial_Conduct.pdf. Arizona’s Personal SolicitationClause similarly reads:

“A judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . personally solicit or accept

campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee . . . .”

Ariz. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 4.1(A)(6) (2014), 

http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/rules/Arizona%20Code%20of%20

Judicial%20Conduct.pdf.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 9 of 31
10 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

III

Federal, state, and local governments have struggled to

meet strict scrutiny when defending speech restrictions. See,

e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231–32

(2015); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S.

803, 813–14, 816 (2000); OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d

1053, 1062–64 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Alvarez,

617 F.3d 1198, 1215–18 (9th Cir. 2010). To overcome such

a high standard of review, the government is required to

prove that “the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and

is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” Citizens

United, 558 U.S. at 340 (quoting Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S.

at 464). Following Williams-Yulee,

7 we hold that Arizona

meets that standard for all of the challenged restrictions on

judicial candidate speech.

A. The Personal Solicitation Clause

Wolfson contends that Arizona’s Personal Solicitation

Clause, which prohibits him, while running for judicial office,

from personally soliciting funds for his own campaign, fails

strict scrutiny. He argues that Arizona’s interest is not

narrowly tailored, and that Williams-Yulee does not control

our decision because Florida and Arizona have different

interests in upholding their respective personal solicitation

prohibitions.

7 With the exception of the level of scrutiny addressed in Part II, above,

Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Williams-Yulee garnered a majority. 

Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 10 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 11

1. Compelling Interest

Wolfson does not contend that Arizona lacks a

compelling interest behind this solicitation prohibition.

Instead, he argues that Arizona’s interest is significantly

different than Florida’s interest in Canon 7C(1), making the

Court’s strict scrutinyanalysis in Williams-Yulee inapplicable

to Arizona’s Clause. Attempting to distinguish the two

states’ interests, Wolfson first points to Florida’s Code of

Judicial Conduct Canon 1 and its commentary: “Deference to

the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public

confidence in the integrity and independence of judges.

The integrity and independence of judges depend in turn

upon their acting without fear or favor.” Code of Judicial

Conduct for the State of Florida 6 (2014),

http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/ethics/Code

_Judicial_Conduct.pdf. He compares this language to that of

Arizona’s Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 1.2 and Comment

5, which he contends demonstrate that Arizona’s interest is

protecting the public’s perception of “the judge’s honesty,

impartiality, temperament, or fitness.” Ariz. Code of Judicial

Conduct Rule 1.2 (2014), cmt. n.5, http://www.azcourts.gov/

portals/137/rules/Arizona%20Code%20of%20Judicial%20

Conduct.pdf. An interest in judicial “honesty, impartiality,

temperament, or fitness,” Wolfson argues, is different than a

concern for “fear or favors.”

This is a distinction without a material difference. Even

if we consider the language to which Wolfson points, the

Supreme Court did not uphold Florida’s prohibition because

of an interest in curbing “fear or favors.” Instead, the Court

was broad in its language and reasoning. “We have

recognized the ‘vital state interest’ in safeguarding ‘public

confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 11 of 31
12 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

judges,’” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (quoting

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889

(2009)), because the “judiciary’s authority . . . depends in

large measure on the public’s willingness to respect and

follow its decisions.” Id. Arizona’s interest, outlined in Rule

1.2 and its comments, is similar, if not identical.

Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that the

“concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not

easily reduce to precise definition.” Id. at 1667. Even if

Arizona adopted slightlydifferent language for its articulation

of its interest,8 Arizona is similarly interested in upholding

the judiciary’s credibility. There are no magic words required

for a state to invoke an interest in preserving public

confidence in the integrity of the state’s sitting judges.

Arizona’s interest behind its Personal Solicitation Clause

is compelling.

2. Narrowly Tailored

Wolfson’s arguments that Arizona’s Personal Solicitation

Clause is not narrowly tailored are precluded by WilliamsYulee. First, Wolfson contends that the Personal Solicitation

Clause is overbroad because it covers solicitation methods,

such as mass mailings and speeches to large groups, that

8 Wolfson’s articulation of Arizona’s interest stresses selective words

and ignores the plain language of Rule 1.2 which is nearly identical to the

interests Florida stated in Canon 1. “A judge shall act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity,

and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the

appearance of impropriety.” Ariz. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 1.2

(2014), http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/rules/Arizona%20Code%2

0of%20Judicial%20Conduct.pdf.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 12 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 13

would not result in a quid pro quo. However, the Supreme

Court rejected the argument that the state may prohibit only

solicitation methods that are the most likely to erode public

confidence. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671. The Court

held that the argument “misperceives the breadth of the

compelling interest” and that, though that “interest may be

implicated to varying degrees in particular contexts, . . . the

interest remains whenever the public perceives the judge

personally asking for money.” Id.

Second, Wolfson argues that the Personal Solicitation

Clause is not the least restrictive means to effectuate

Arizona’s interest because Arizona could have adopted

contribution limitations or a mandatory recusal rule. Again,

the Supreme Court did not consider this argument persuasive. 

Id. at 1671–72. Forced recusals would disable jurisdictions

with a small number of judges, erode public confidence in the

judiciary, and create an incentive for litigants to make

contributions for the sole purpose of forcing the judge to later

recuse himself or herself from the litigant’s cases. Id.

Contribution limits would be similarly ineffective. The

improper appearance of a judicial candidate soliciting money

would still remain and, even though the Court had previously

held that contribution limitations advance the interest against

quid pro quo corruption, a state is not restricted to pursuing

its interest by a single means. Id. at 1672.

We hold that Arizona’s Personal Solicitation Clause is

narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s compelling interest. 

The state reasonably wants to uphold the public’s perception

of publicly elected judges as being fair-minded and unbiased,

and may do so by prohibiting judicial candidates from

making personal solicitations.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 13 of 31
14 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

B. The Endorsement Clauses and the Campaign

Prohibition

Wolfson also argues that Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses

and Campaign Prohibition are not narrowly tailored to

Arizona’s compelling interest in public confidence in the

judiciary’s integrity.

9 These Clauses prohibit him, while

running for judicial office, from personally soliciting funds

for a campaign for another candidate or political organization,

publicly endorsing or making a speech on behalf of another

candidate for public office, or actively taking part in any

political campaign. Wolfson contends that the prohibitions

are underinclusive, overbroad, and generally not tailored

enough to the interest at hand. We disagree. Arizona can

properly restrict judges and judicial candidates from taking

part in political activities that undermine the public’s

confidence that judges base rulings on law, and not on ?party

affiliation.

1. Underinclusivity

Wolfson contends that Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses

and Campaign Prohibition are underinclusive because they

allow judicial candidates to receive endorsements, allow

judicial candidates to endorse public officials and noncandidates, and allow other candidates to participate in

judicial campaigns. “[U]nderinclusiveness can raise ‘doubts

9 Wolfson again does not contest that Arizona has a compelling interest

in upholding the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition. 

Arizona has a compelling interest in upholding the public confidence in

the judiciary and furthers this interest through a ban on personal

solicitation and curtailment of judicial candidates’ ability to engage with

the political branches of government.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 14 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 15

about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest

it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or

viewpoint,’” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668 (quoting

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740

(2011)), and can “reveal that a law does not actually advance

a compelling interest.” Id. However, “[a] State need not

address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop” and can

“focus on . . . [the] most pressing concerns.” Id.

Once again, Williams-Yulee controls our reasoning. In

assessing whether Florida’s solicitation clause was

underinclusive, the Court looked at whether Canon 7C(1) was

“aim[ed] squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine

public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary,” “applie[d]

evenhandedlyto all judges and judicial candidates, regardless

of their viewpoint,” and was “not riddled with exceptions.” 

Id. at 1668–69. We do not believe that the analysis should be

any different when assessing a prohibition of endorsements

or participation in political campaigns. Williams-Yulee may

have been about a prohibition on direct candidate solicitations

of campaign contributions, but the Supreme Court’s

reasoning was broad enough to encompass underinclusivity

arguments aimed at other types of judicial candidate speech

prohibitions such as Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and its

Campaign Prohibition.

And both the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign

Prohibition fit easily under the Williams-Yulee

underinclusivity analysis. First, Arizona squarely aimed at

preventing conduct that could erode the judiciary’s

credibility. When a judicial candidate actively engages in

political campaigns, a judge’s impartiality can be put into

question, and the public can lose faith in the judiciary’s

ability to abide by the law and not make decisions along

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 15 of 31
16 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

political lines. Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and

Campaign Prohibition are aimed at these valid concerns. See

Arizona Judicial Code of Conduct Rule 4.1, Comment 1

(“Rather than making decisions based upon the expressed

views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes

decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case. 

Therefore, in furtherance of this interest, judges and judicial

candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, be free and

appear to be free from political influence and political

pressure.”). Further, the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign

Prohibition apply to both judges and judicial candidates and

have few exceptions.10

We need not question whether Arizona could have, as

Wolfson argues, prohibited more types of endorsements or

campaign participation. “[P]olicymakers may focus on their

most pressing concerns” and the fact that the state could

“conceivably could have restricted even greater amounts of

speech in service of their stated interests” is not a death blow

under strict scrutiny. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. 

Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition

are not underinclusive.

2. Overinclusivity

Wolfson next contends that the Endorsement Clauses and

Campaign Prohibition are unconstitutionally overbroad

because the Campaign Prohibition bans involvement with

10 Judges and judicial candidates may make limited contributions to

another candidate or political organization under Rule 4.1(A)(4) and may

engage in political activity that pertains to the legal system or attend

dinners or similar functions that do not constitute a public endorsement of

candidates under Rule 4.1(C).

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 16 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 17

ballot measures, and the Endorsement Clauses forbid judges

from endorsing anyone, even candidates like the President of

the United States who are highly unlikely to appear before the

judge.11 A regulation “may be overturned as impermissibly

overbroad because a substantial number of its applications are

unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly

legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State

Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Again, Williams-Yulee forecloses Wolfson’s arguments. 

There, the petitioner contended that even though Florida

could constitutionally prevent judges from soliciting one-onone or in person with lawyers and litigants, Canon 7C(1) was

overbroad because it included a prohibition of solicitation

through mass mailings. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at

1670–71. The petitioner argued that the latter would have

less impact on the public confidence of the judiciary. Id. at

1671. But the Supreme Court was not convinced, reasoning

that such distinctions became so fine as to be unworkable,

and in large part, Florida’s restriction still left judicial

candidates “free to discuss any issue with any person at any

time.” Id. at 1670–71. Further, the Court held that though

11 We need not reach whether Arizona could constitutionally forbid

judges from discussing ballot measures. Arizona interprets the Clauses to

allow candidates to discuss any disputed issue, including those in issuebased initiatives, while cautioning that judicial candidates shall not “with

respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the

court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with

the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office” and

shall “act in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity and

independence of the judiciary.” Ariz. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory

Op. 06-05 (2006); see also Ariz. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Op. 08-

01 (2008).

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 17 of 31
18 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

these speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored, they need

not be “perfectly tailored.” Id. at 1671 (quoting Burson v.

Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992)). “[M]ost problems arise

in greater and lesser gradations, and the First Amendment

does not confine a State to addressing evils in their most

acute form.” Id.; see also O’Toole v. O’Connor, No. 15-

3614, 2015 WL 5515061, at *5 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2015).

Wolfson asks us to draw a similarly unworkable and

unnecessary line. Although supporting a United States

presidential candidate may have less of an effect on the public

confidence than endorsing or campaigning for an Arizona

State senator or a local prosecutor, creating a rigid line is as

unworkable as it is unhelpful. Judges engaging in political

acts may present different levels of impropriety in different

situations. It is not our proper role to second-guess Arizona’s

decisions in this regard. Much as the state drew a line

between personal solicitation by candidates and by

committees in order to preserve public confidence in the

judiciary’s integrity, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671, so

too can the state decide that judicial candidates should not

engage in legislative or executive campaigns. “These

considered judgments deserve our respect, especiallybecause

they reflect sensitive choices by States in an area central to

their own governance—how to select those who ‘sit as their

judges.’” Id.(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460

(1991)).

Our conclusion is consistent with White I. Arizona’s

prohibitions do not prevent judicial candidates from

announcing their views on disputed legal and political

subjects. See White I, 536 U.S. at 788. Instead, Arizona

simply makes the distinction that a judicial candidate may do

so only in relation to his or her own campaign. This follows

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 18 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 19

the reasoning in White I, where the Supreme Court was

concerned about restrictions on the ability to express legal

views while campaigning, see id. at 770–74, not on the ability

to advance the political views and aspirations of another

candidate. The latter is not the kind of speech the Court in

White I sought to protect. See Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d

1010, 1026 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he endorsement clause does

not regulate speech with regard to any underlying issues, and

thus the candidates are free to state their positions on these

issues, in line with White I.”); Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984

(“While an interest in the impartiality and perceived

impartiality of the judiciary does not justify forbidding judges

from identifying as members of political parties, a public

endorsement is not the same type of campaign speech [as

that] targeted by the impermissible rule against talking about

legal issues the Supreme Court struck down in White I.”);

Bauer, 620 F.3d at 711–12 (holding that the reasoning

employed in Siefert to uphold a prohibition against judicial

candidate endorsements is equally applicable to a prohibition

on partisan activities).

The compelling interest in preserving public confidence

in the integrity of judiciary warrants a favorable view of

Arizona’s attempt to foreclose judicial candidates from

engaging in political campaigns other than their own. The

Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are not

fatally overbroad.

3. Least Restrictive Means

Finally, Wolfson contends that Arizona’s Endorsement

Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are not narrowly tailored

because they do not offer the least restrictive means to further

the state’s interest. He argues that the Clauses do not prevent

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 19 of 31
20 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

judges from favoring certain candidates that may appear in

court, and even if they did, recusal would be the best way to

handle such impartiality or appearance of impartiality. The

government may only “regulate the content of

constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a

compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to

further the articulated interest.” Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc.

v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).

But recusal is no answer at all, and this unworkable

alternative was flatly dismissed in Williams-Yulee. A rule

requiring judges to recuse themselves from every case where

they endorsed or campaigned for one of the parties could

“disable many jurisdictions” and cripple the judiciary. See

Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671. Four of Arizona’s

counties have only one superior court judge and two other

counties have only two superior court judges. Arizona

Judicial Branch, Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report 4,

http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/38/2014%20Annual%20R

eport.pdf. Campaigning for frequent litigants would cause an

insurmountable burden that other judges and other counties

may not be able to bear. Moreover, an extensive recusal

record could cause the same erosion of public confidence in

the judiciary that Arizona’s Endorsement Clauses and

Campaign Prohibition are trying to prevent.

We hold that the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign

Prohibition are narrowly tailored to achieve Arizona’s

compelling interest.

IV

Even though the district court erred when it bypassed

strict scrutiny in favor of the intermediate level of scrutiny

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 20 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 21

used by the Seventh Circuit, it arrived at the correct result. 

The Personal Solicitation Clause, Endorsement Clauses, and

Campaign Prohibition all withstand First Amendment

analysis under strict scrutiny. Arizona has a compelling

interest in upholding public confidence in the judiciary. And

in light of Williams-Yulee, we hold that Arizona’s Rules are

narrowly tailored to its compelling interest. The judgment of

the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Given Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656

(2015), I am in general agreement with Judge Gould’s

opinion for the en banc court (“main opinion”). There are

two points, however, as to which the main opinion is terse, at

best, and which therefore, in my view, deserve further

exploration.

First, I concurred in the panel opinion to highlight my

concern about articulating the governmental interests at stake

in regulating judicial elections, and write separately here, too,

to reiterate the same concern. Wolfson v. Conannon,

750 F.3d 1145, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring). 

The main opinion supports all three of Arizona’s challenged

restrictions on judicial candidates’ behavior during judicial

election campaigns on the basis of the same governmental

interest — judicial impartiality. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 15–16. 

But three different species of speech regulation of judicial

candidates are here at issue, not one. And while one of the

regulations — the ban on personal solicitation — is closely

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 21 of 31
22 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

related to the restriction considered in Williams-Yulee, two —

the bans on endorsements and campaigning for nonjudicial

candidates and causes — are quite different. As to the latter

two bans, I am not at all sure that the governmental interest

in preventing biased judicial decisionmaking survives the

compelling interest/narrowly tailored standard we are

required to apply. I am convinced, however, that there is a

societal interest underlying those two restrictions —

maintaining an independent judiciary— that more accurately

captures the reasons to limit judicial candidates’

endorsements and campaigning activity, and that does meet

the compelling interest/narrow tailoring requirements.

Additionally, the main opinion does not distinguish

between sitting judges who run for judicial office and judicial

candidates who are not yet, and may never be, judges. This

distinction turns out not to be dispositive of this case, but it is

worth explaining why that is so.

1. As the main opinion and the Supreme Court recognize,

“[t]he concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does

not easily reduce to precise definition.” Williams-Yulee v.

Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015). In my view, this

case requires us to disentangle two distinct facets of this

compelling interest.

First, society has an interest in judicial impartiality that is

“both weighty and narrow.” Wolfson, 750 F.3d at 1163

(Berzon, J., concurring). This fundamental interest is

enshrined in the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on a judge

trying a case in which she “has an interest in the outcome.” 

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 880

(2009).

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 22 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 23

It is this impartiality concern that underlay the solicitation

restriction in Williams-Yulee and also undergirds Arizona’s

ban on judges’ personal solicitation of funds. “[M]ost donors

are lawyers and litigants who may appear before the judge

they are supporting,” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667, and

“personal solicitation by a judicial candidate ‘inevitably

places the solicited individuals in a position to fear retaliation

if they fail to financially support that candidate,’” id. at 1668

(quoting Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability

Com’n, 368 Ark. 577, 585 (2007)). This impartiality interest

is important; its reach is also fairly limited. Impartiality’s

“root meaning” refers to the lack of “bias for or against either

party to the proceeding.” Republican Party of Minn. v.

White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002) (emphasis in original). 

Restrictions that can be justified by society’s interest in

impartiality are those that aim at protecting the due process

rights of litigants appearing before a judge in court.

There is, however, a separate, broader governmental basis

for regulating judicial behavior that goes beyond a concern

with biased decisionmaking in individual cases. That interest

is society’s concern with maintaining both the appearance and

the reality of a structurally independent judiciary, engaged in

a decisionmaking process informed by legal, not political or

broad, nonlegal policy considerations. As I explained in my

concurrence to the panel opinion,

Maintaining public trust in the judiciary as

an institution driven by legal principles rather

than political concerns is a structural

imperative. The rule of law depends upon it.

The fundamental importance of this

structural imperative has been recognized

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 23 of 31
24 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

from the founding of the nation. As

Alexander Hamilton emphasized in The

Federalist No. 78, the courts possess “neither

FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment

. . . .” Id. at 433 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

Deprived of those alternative sources of

power, the authority of the judiciary instead

“lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of

substance and perception that shows itself in

the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit

to determine what the . . . law means and to

declare what it demands.” Planned

Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,

865 (1992); see also White, 536 U.S. at 793

(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The power and

the prerogative of a court . . . rest, in the end,

upon the respect accorded to its judgments.”). 

It is the courts’ perceived legitimacy as

institutions grounded in established legal

principles, not partisanship, “that leads

decisions to be obeyed and averts vigilantism

and civil strife.” Bauer, 620 F.3d at 712. 

Loss of judicial legitimacy thus corrodes the

rule of law, “sap[ping] the foundations of

public and private confidence, and . . .

introduc[ing]in its stead universal distrust and

distress.” The Federalist No. 78, at 438. In

this sense, “[t]he rule of law, which is a

foundation of freedom, presupposes a

functioning judiciary respected for its

independence, its professional attainments,

and the absolute probity of its judges.” NY

State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres,

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 24 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 25

552 U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).

This nation’s political history

demonstrates the disastrous effects of the

perceived politicization of the courts. 

Charges that King George “ha[d] obstructed

the Administration of Justice” and “ha[d]

made judges dependent on his Will alone

. . . .” were among the founding generation’s

justifications for the 1776 revolution. The

Declaration of Independence para. 11 (U.S.

1776). Similar concerns apply outside the

context of a monarchy: Where the judiciary is

drawn into the political intrigues of its

coordinate branches, the public might well

“fear that the pestilential breath of faction

may poison the fountains of justice. The habit

of being continually marshaled on opposite

sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of

law and of equity.” The Federalist No. 81, at

452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961). And where the politicization of

the judiciary brings it into alliance with the

politicians who staff the other two branches of

government, the public may no longer

consider “the courts of justice . . . as the

bulwark of a limited Constitution against

legislative encroachments,” The Federalist

No. 78, at 437, or executive excesses. In

short, when sitting judges support the

campaigns of nonjudicial candidates — via

endorsements, speeches, money, or other

means — the public may begin to see them

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 25 of 31
26 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

not as neutral arbiters of a limited system of

governance, but as participants in the larger

game of politics.

Wolfson, 750 F.3d at 1164–65 (Berzon, J. concurring)

(footnotes omitted).

In short, a deep-seated interest in the structural

independence of the judiciary has been recognized as

indispensable to our constitutional order since the founding

era. See id. at 1164. An independent judge “must above all

things put aside his estimate of political and legislative

values” when interpreting the law. Benjamin Cardozo, The

Nature of the Judicial Process, 90 (1921) (internal quotation

mark omitted) (quoting Lorenz Brütt, Die Kunst der

Rechtsanwendung, 57 (1907)).

When judges swap endorsements with legislative or

executive candidates, or make speeches during nonjudicial

political campaigns, their political and legislative values are

brought to the fore, threatening the public’s perception of

their independence. To quote again from my panel

concurrence:

The defendants here express precisely this

concern — that if sitting judges may support

the campaigns of others, the public will

perceive them as masters of the political

game, powerbrokers “trading on the prestige

of their office to advance other political ends

. . . .” Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984; see also Model

Code of Judicial Conduct R. 4.1, cmt.4 (2011)

(justifying prohibitions on endorsements and

speeches on behalf of other candidates as

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 26 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 27

“prevent[ing sitting judges] from abusing the

prestige of judicial office to advance the

interests of others”). The opposite fear is

equally justified: Today’s powerbroker is

tomorrow’s pawn, as the political winds shift

and the next election cycle approaches. The

endorsing judge entwines his fate with

whomever he endorses and earns the enmity

of his favored politician’s opponents. “This

kind of personal affiliation between a member

of the judiciary and a member of the political

branches raises the specter — readily

perceived by the general public — that the

judge’s future rulings will be influenced by

this political dependency.” Wersal v. Sexton,

674 F.3d 1010, 1034 (8th Cir. 2012) (Loken,

J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in

original).

Wolfson, 750 F.3d at 1165 (Berzon, J., concurring).

I read neither Williams-Yulee nor the main opinion to say

anything to the contrary. Both impartiality and independence

are implicit, for instance, in the majority’s reference to “the

judiciary’s ability to abide by the law and not make decisions

along political lines.” Maj. Op. at 15–16. But because First

Amendment doctrine focuses on the breadth and nature of the

interests at stake, it is important to be clear that the interests

raised by this case are not limited to the due process concerns

signaled by the term judicial impartiality.

This dual focus is particularly critical where, as in this

case, the two interests affect aspects of the regulations at

issue differently. The main opinion takes Williams-Yulee’s

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 27 of 31
28 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

reasoning regarding the personal solicitation of funds and

applies it to uphold a ban on judicial candidates endorsing or

campaigning for nonjudicial political candidates and

organizations. But the concerns raised by these distinct

activities only partially overlap. An in-person solicitation

creates a unique risk of a quid pro quo arrangement, or at

least the appearance of one, between a judicial candidate and

a donor. See Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1029 (8th Cir.

2012) (en banc). The risk of such an arrangement is more

attenuated, though, when it comes to endorsements and

campaigning for nonjudicial candidates and issues. 

Candidates can, of course, exchange endorsements in a

mutually beneficial arrangement. But there may be many

scenarios where “[a] judicial candidate’s endorsement of an

executive or legislative candidate . . . benefits the endorsee

more than the endorser.” Id. at 1049 (Beam, J., dissenting). 

The same can be true when a judicial candidate lends their

time or credibility to a nonjudicial issue campaign.

Reframing the governmental interest underlying

restrictions on judicial candidates’ role in campaigns or

political organizations other than their own also brings better

into focus the requisite “less-restrictive means” analysis. 

Personal recusal is an ineffective alternative to the solicitation

bar because, as Williams-Yulee and the majority point out, it

would be problematic to have many recusals in smaller

jurisdictions, and individuals would have a “perverse

incentive” to donate to judges in the hopes of forcing the

judge to recuse if elected. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at

1671–72; Maj. Op. at 13. In contrast, recusals might be a

better alternative to the endorsement and campaign bars, if

the only concern were avoiding conflicts of interest. The

number of nonjudicial endorsements or campaign speeches a

candidate makes is likely to be far lower than the number of

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 28 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 29

individuals donating to his or her campaign. And the concern

of hostile donations as “a form of peremptory strike against

a judge,” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1672, disappears

where the judicial candidate is the one choosing whom to

endorse.

It is not clear to me, then, that the compelling interest of

judicial impartiality, or the reasons for concluding that the

restrictions are sufficiently narrowly focused, translate well

from the solicitation realm to the practice of campaigning for

or endorsing other candidates or issues. But these restrictions

surely do advance the vital interest in structural judicial

independence. The campaign and endorsement restrictions

respond to a structural need — they restrict judges from

engaging in nonjudicial campaigns, to prevent them from

being entangled in the legislative and executive political

process. Judges must have the confidence to stand firm

against nonjudicial elected officials. That confidence could

give way — or appear to give way — if judges behave just

like those elected officials, by engaging in the usual, often

contentious and fiercely partisan, political processes.

2. I also write to note another distinction that both the

main opinion and Williams-Yulee elide. Both opinions lump

together sitting judges running for re-election and nonjudge

candidates aspiring to the office. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee,

135 S. Ct. at 1668; Maj. Op. at 14. The main opinion does so

not onlywith respect to the restriction directly pertinent to the

judicial election, the solicitation restriction, but with respect

to the two other restrictions as well.

It is worth considering whether that uniform treatment is

justified. On reflection, it seems to me that competing

considerations pull in various directions with regard to the

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 29 of 31
30 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON

application to sitting judges and judicial candidates of the

nonjudicial endorsement and campaigning restrictions. In the

end, I agree with the main opinion’s conclusion that all three

regulations at issue are valid with respect to both groups.

First, sitting judges are already public employees. The

Supreme Court has held in the Pickering line of cases that

public employee speech may be subject to greater restrictions

than the First Amendment would otherwise allow. See

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will

Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The Seventh Circuit,

for instance, has applied Pickering to adopt a balancing test

when evaluating restrictions on sitting judges’ speech. See

Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010); Siefert v.

Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010). But Pickering does

not appear to apply to the speech of candidates for judicial

office who are not yet public employees.

Second, the structural judicial independence interest that

to me is central to upholding two of the three judicial

campaign restrictions here applicable comes into full force

only when the individual elected actually ascends the bench. 

Before that, the concern is somewhat contingent — the

candidate may become a judge. Still, that contingency may

be sufficient reason for treating a judicial candidate who is

not a sitting judge according to the rules of judicial ethics. 

The structural independence concerns are largelyaspirational,

and the public perception of the judicial role may be most at

the forefront during judicial elections. So drawing the line on

nonjudicial political participation at the point of declaration

of judicial candidacymay help to forward both the reality and

the appearance of a politically independent judiciary.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 30 of 31
WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 31

Moreover, if sitting judges were subject to greater

restrictions on political activity than nonjudge candidates,

two individuals may end up running for the same judicial

office on somewhat uneven footing. The Supreme Court has

“repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a

compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing field’ that

can justify undue burdens on political speech.” Ariz. Free

Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.

2806, 2825 (2011). But those cases have concerned attempts

at government intervention designed to adjust for nongovernmental disparities. Here, stricter restrictions during

judicial campaigns on nonjudicial endorsement and

campaigning for sitting judges than for nonincumbent

candidates for judicial positions would create the disparity,

not level it. Such political participation gives judicial

candidates more opportunity for exposure to the electorate,

and more chance to connect with voters on nonjudicial

matters they care about. The inequity of allowing some

candidates for judicial office but not others those

opportunities, when added to the aspirational and appearance

concerns just discussed, seem sufficiently compelling to

justify parallel restrictions for sitting judges and nonjudges,

when both are running for the same judicial office.

In sum, I concur in the main opinion, in light of the

further conclusions I reach in this concurrence.

 Case: 11-17634, 01/27/2016, ID: 9841983, DktEntry: 113-1, Page 31 of 31