Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01273/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01273-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gabriel Flores-Delgado, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Loretta Lynch, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01273-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Gabriel Flores-Delgado (Petitioner)’s 

Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 18), filed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241. Also pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Expedite[d] 

Release (Doc. 27), Motion for Bond Hearing (Doc. 36), Motion for Status (Doc. 37), and 

Motion for Decision Under 60 Day Rule (Doc. 38). The Magistrate Judge to whom this 

case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that 

Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for 

Expedited Release be denied. (Doc. 29). Petitioner filed an Objection (Doc. 34) and a 

Second Amended Objection (Doc. 35) to the R&R.1

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

 

1

 Although only Petitioner’s first objection (Doc. 34) was timely filed, the Court will consider Petitioner’s amended objection (Doc. 35) as well where Petitioner is filing 

pro se and the arguments put forth in this objection, nonetheless, do not alter the Court’s 

analysis. 

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recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1) (stating that “the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the report [and] recommendations to which objection is made”). Because Petitioner 

appears to have objected to each of the R&R’s recommendations, the Court will review 

those de novo. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The R&R sets forth the relevant background information underlying this case. See

(Doc. 29 at 1–7, 10). To the extent neither party appears to dispute the R&R’s procedural 

nor factual background, the Court will adopt the said account below as the basis for its 

review of Petitioner’s motions and objections. The R&R states: 

 On April 14, 2010, the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, Marion 

County, convicted Petitioner of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree. (Doc. 

25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 6; Attachment B.) On April 15, 2010, Petitioner 

was taken into the custody of U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) and issued a Notice to Appear (NTA), alleging that Petitioner was 

removable under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in 

the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the 

United States at any time or place other than designated by the Attorney 

General. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 7, Attachment C.) 

 . . . . 

 On August 11, 2011, Petitioner failed to appear for a hearing that 

was scheduled before an [Immigration Judge (IJ)] in Seattle, Washington 

and was ordered removed to Mexico in absentia. (Id., Attachment E.) On 

August 27, 2011, ICE removed Petitioner to Mexico based on his final 

order of removal. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 11.) 

 On October 21, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the removal 

proceeding arguing that he failed to appear at the August 11, 2011 hearing 

because he was in custody pursuant to a bench warrant. (Id. at ¶ 12, 

Attachment F.) On November 8, 2011, an IJ granted Petitioner’s motion to 

reopen that proceeding. (Id. at ¶ 13, Attachment G.) . . . 

 On March 9, 2012, Petitioner re-entered the United States at or near 

Sasabe, Arizona, without inspection or parole by an immigration officer. 

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(Id. at ¶ 14.) On March 11, 2012, Petitioner was detained and issued a 

Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order of Removal. (Id.) 

 On July 30, 2012, Petitioner was convicted in the United States 

District Court for the District of Arizona of violating 19 U.S.C. § 

1459(e)(1), Failure to Enter into the United States at a Designated Border 

Crossing Point. (Id. at ¶ 15, Attachment H.) Petitioner was released to ICE 

custody in Florence, Arizona, pursuant to an immigration detainer. (Doc. 

25, Ex. 1 Baeza Decl. at ¶ 15.) On September 17, 2012, Petitioner appeared 

before an IJ who reset the case to November 5, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 17.) 

 On October 19, 2012, DHS filed Additional Charges of 

Inadmissibility/Deportability, charging Petitioner as removable under INA 

§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been 

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. (Id. at ¶ 18, Attachment I.) 

On November 29, 2012, the IJ sustained the additional charge of 

removability and found Petitioner ineligible to apply for cancellation of 

removal. (Id. at ¶ 19.) The IJ also denied voluntary departure and ordered 

Petitioner removed to Mexico. (Id., Attachment J.) Petitioner reserved his 

right to appeal, and filed a timely appeal with the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (BIA) . . . . 

 On October 18, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the 

BIA’s September 23, 2013 decision [of removal] in the Ninth Circuit in 

Case No. 13-73691. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 31.) The Ninth 

Circuit granted Petitioner a temporary stay of removal while his petition for 

review remained pending.(Id., Attachment T) (footnote omitted). 

 On June 18, 2013, Petitioner filed another petition for review with 

the Ninth Circuit in Case No. 13-72155. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 

23, Attachment O.) This appeal is currently pending a decision. (Id.) 

(footnote omitted). On March 19, 2014, the Ninth Circuit combined 

Petitioner’s petitions for review in Case Nos. 13-72155 and 13-73691. 

(Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 35.) A temporary stay of removal is still in 

effect. (Id.) . . . 

 On July 12, 2013, Petitioner’s custody status was reviewed and it 

was determined that he should remain in custody. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza 

Decl. at ¶ 26.) On July 14, 2013, a Post Order Custody Review was 

conducted. (Id. at ¶ 27.) On July 24, 2014 [sic], it was determined that 

Petitioner should remain in custody. (Id.) (footnote omitted). 

 On October 4, 2013, Petitioner had a bond hearing before an IJ in 

Florence, Arizona. (Id. at ¶ 30.) That same date, the IJ denied Petitioner’s 

request for a change in custody based on his conclusion that Petitioner 

represented a danger to the community and a flight risk. (Id. at ¶ 30, 

Attachment S.) Petitioner reserved his right to appeal. (Id.) On October 23, 

2013, Petitioner timely appealed the IJ’s October 4, 2013 decision to the 

BIA. (Id. at ¶ 32.) 

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 Petitioner had another bond hearing in November 2013 before an IJ 

in Florence, Arizona.[2] (Id. at ¶ 33, Attachment U.) In a November 15, 

2013 decision, that was filed on November 18, 2013, the IJ denied 

Petitioner’s request for bond based on his finding that Petitioner was a 

danger to the community and a flight risk. (Id. at ¶ 33, Attachment U; Doc. 

25, Ex. 2.) On February 7, 2014, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s November 18, 

2013 decision. (Doc. 25, Ex.1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 34, Attachment V.) 

 On April 25, 2014, Petitioner’s custody was reviewed by an IJ in 

Florence, Arizona. His request for bond was denied based on the IJ’s 

conclusion that Petitioner was a danger to the community and a flight risk. 

(Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 36, Attachment W.) On May 14, 2014, 

Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision denying him bond to the BIA. (Id. at ¶ 

38.) On December 19, 2014, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s April 

25, 2014 order denying Petitioner’s request for a change in custody status. 

(Id. at ¶ 40, Attachment X.) In its decision, the BIA agreed with the IJ that 

Petitioner failed to present materially changed circumstances since the prior 

bond order, and that he remained both a danger to the community and a 

flight risk. (Doc. 25, Attachment X.) 

 On January 12, 2015, Petitioner’s custody status was reviewed by an 

IJ in Florence, Arizona. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶ 41.) That same 

day, the IJ denied Petitioner’s request for bond based on his finding that 

Petitioner was a danger to community and a flight risk. (Doc. 25, Ex. 1, 

Baeza Decl., Attachment Z.) 

 On July 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a “request for a bond hearing 

pursuant to Casas-Castrillon.”3 (Id. at ¶ 46.) On August 31, 2015, an IJ in 

Eloy, Arizona denied Petitioner’s request for another bond hearing. (Id. at ¶ 

46, Attachment BB.) Petitioner appealed that decision to the BIA. (Id. at 

46.) That appeal was pending as of the date the government filed its 

response. (Id. at ¶ 46, Attachment CC.) 

 

2

 As the Magistrate Judge correctly observed, see (Doc. 29 at 9), the Baeza 

declaration states that Petitioner had bond hearings on both October 4, 2013 and 

November 18, 2013. (Doc. 25-1 at 3). But the IJ’s November 15, 2013 order, that was 

filed on November 18, 2013, refers to the October 4, 2013 bond hearing, and does not mention another hearing in November 2013. (Doc. 25-3 at 6). The Court construes the 

procedural history to reflect that Petitioner had one bond hearing on October 4, 2013. 

3

 The Baeza declaration refers to the April 25, 2014 and January 12, 2015 proceedings as “bond hearings.” (Doc. 25, Ex. 1, Baeza Decl. at ¶¶ 36, 41.) However, Respondents’ briefing does not characterize these proceedings as bond hearings under Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t. of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2008) . . . . 

[The Court agrees with Respondents that these proceedings are properly characterized not as bond hearings, but as custody reviews.] 

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 . . . . [Here, the R&R discusses Petitioner’s request for a UNonimmigrant Status Visa (U Visa) filed with the U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services.4

] 

 On August 31, 2015, Petitioner filed his pending [habeas] Petition 

raising three grounds for relief. (Doc. 18.) In Grounds One and Three, 

Petitioner alleges that his prolonged detention while his petition for review 

is pending before the Ninth Circuit violates his right to procedural and 

substantive due process. (Doc. 1 at 4, 6.) In Ground Two, Petitioner simply 

states “Denial of Bond.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) 

(Doc. 29 at 2–7). Having stated the procedural and factual background relevant to the 

instant matter, the Court will now identify the legal standard to be applied to Petitioner’s 

motions and requests. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Title 8, Section 1226 of the United States Code grants the Attorney General 

permissive authority to arrest and detain an alien pending a decision whether the alien is 

to be removed from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Because the government 

retains an interest in assuring an alien’s whereabouts, or presence, should a court order an 

alien’s removal, it is reasonable for the government to detain the alien while he or she 

seeks judicial relief. See Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008); 

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). To be sure, discretionary detention 

authority pursuant to § 1226(a) is limited to the “period reasonably necessary to bring 

about [an] alien’s removal from the United States.” Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1065 

(citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689). The Ninth Circuit has held that the government may 

detain an alien who has been “subjected to a prolonged detention pending judicial 

review” of removal proceedings as long as the government provides “adequate 

procedural protections.” Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 948, 950. Furthermore, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that “‘adequate procedural protections’” requires that the “government’s 

asserted justification for physical confinement ‘outweighs the individual’s 

constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’” Prieto-Romero, 534 

 

4

 The Court will not review the factual background or procedural history of the U Visa Petition because this Court does not have jurisdiction over that matter. 

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F.3d at 1065 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91); see also Casas-Castrillon, 535 

F.3d at 951 (holding that an alien must be provided with an adequate opportunity to 

contest the necessity of his prolonged detention). 

 Namely, the Attorney General must provide an alien who has been detained for a 

prolonged period of time pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) an individualized bond hearing 

before an IJ. Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 951. Accordingly, because serious 

constitutional concerns exist where a statute may allow indefinite deprivation of human 

liberty, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692, “an alien is entitled to release on bond unless the 

government establishes that he is a flight risk or will be a danger to the community,” 

Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 948 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Importantly, 

8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) states that an IJ’s discretionary determination on this point is 

nonreviewable: 

The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding [an alien’s 

detention and release under] this section shall not be subject to review. No 

court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under 

this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, 

revocation, or denial of bond or parole. 

8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Pertinent to this case, such nonreviewable “discretionary judgment” 

of the Attorney General exists from the time when Federal Circuit Courts issue a stay 

pending review of an administratively final order of removal until the time when Circuit 

Courts render a decision and withdraw the stay of removal. Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 

1058–59. Following an initial bond redetermination, “an alien’s request for a subsequent 

bond redetermination shall be made in writing and shall be considered only upon a 

showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially since the prior bond 

redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

First, the Court will discuss whether Petitioner is entitled to another bond hearing, 

including consideration of Petitioner’s objections to the R&R’s recommended denial of a 

bond hearing. Second, the Court will analyze whether Petitioner’s detention is authorized 

by statute and in accordance with his substantive and procedural due process rights, 

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including consideration of the due process claims Petitioner raises in objection to the 

R&R. Third, the Court will address Petitioner’s motion for expedited release. Lastly, the 

Court will consider Petitioner’s motion for decision. 

 A. Bond Hearing5

 and Custody Redetermination 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a bond hearing because he has been in 

custody for a prolonged period of time, approximately forty-eight months. See (Doc. 18 

at 4, 6; Doc. 35 at 1). However, Petitioner was afforded an individualized bond hearing 

before an IJ in Florence, Arizona, on October 4, 2013, see (Doc. 25-1, Attach. S at 2), 

which was reconsidered on November 15, 2013, see (Doc. 25-3). Furthermore, 

Petitioner’s custody status has been reviewed by either an IJ or the BIA on at least five 

occasions since his removal was temporarily stayed by the Ninth Circuit. See (Doc. 25-1, 

Attachs. V, W, X, Z, BB). 

 At Petitioner’s bond hearing, the IJ found that Petitioner was a “danger [to the 

community] and [a] flight risk,” denying his release. (Doc. 25-1, Attach. S at 2). See 

Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 948 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 

1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an alien is not entitled to release on bond if the 

“government establishes that he is a flight risk or will be a danger to the community”). In 

denying Petitioner’s further requests for a change in his custody status, both the BIA and 

IJ referenced that Petitioner failed to present materially changed circumstances since his 

prior bond hearings and that he continued to remain a danger to the community and a 

flight risk. (Doc. 25-1, Attachs. X at 3, BB at 3–4). 

 It appears that in attempts either to satisfy this requirement of materially changed 

circumstances, see (Doc. 26 at 2), or to raise objections to the R&R, see (Doc. 34-1 at 3), 

Petitioner argues for his actual innocence of his sexual abuse conviction. Specifically, 

 

5

 As stated previously, Petitioner’s second ground for relief in his habeas petition simply states “Denial of Bond.” (Doc. 18 at 5). Thus, Petitioner appears to challenge the denial of bond. But as the Magistrate Judge correctly notes, “[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” 

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, the Court will consider de 

novo Petitioner’s arguments for his entitlement to a bond hearing raised in objection to 

the R&R and in subsequent motions. See (Docs. 34–36). 

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Petitioner argues that he does not pose a danger to the community because the victim of 

his sexual abuse purportedly stated to the Police that her and Petitioner’s sexual 

encounter was consensual. See (Id.) Furthermore, Petitioner claims that the victim’s 

statements to the police that she was acting out of “resentment and spite” due to 

Petitioner carrying on sexual relationships with other women is proof of his actual 

innocence. (Doc. 34 at 9 (citing Doc. 34-1 at 3)). Petitioner’s arguments go to the merits 

of Petitioner’s sexual abuse conviction; they do not constitute evidence of a material 

change in circumstances justifying another bond hearing. Indeed, Petitioner pleaded no 

contest to sexual abuse in the second degree and was convicted. Thus, this conviction 

remains relevant to the IJ’s and BIA’s determinations that Petitioner posed a danger to 

the community.6

 Furthermore, Petitioner’s claim that due to the victim’s statements he is 

exonerated from his conviction of a crime of moral turpitude ultimately goes toward 

issues of his removability or deportability, not his entitlement to another bond hearing. 

See Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding crimes of moral 

turpitude, which include grave acts involving baseness or depravity, warrant removal or 

deportation pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)). 

 Petitioner also moves the Court for a bond hearing in order that he might be 

reunited with his family, whom Petitioner has been separated from for approximately the 

last forty-eight months. See (Doc. 18 at 4, 6; Doc. 36 at 1). Petitioner has submitted his 

son’s medical, psychological, and education records with his motion for a bond hearing 

that was filed on February 16, 2016. See (Doc. 36 at 2–11). These records detail his son’s 

diagnosis of and recommended treatment for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.7 Id.

 

6

 Likely contrary to Petitioner’s intentions, the authority he cites in support of his contention that he does not pose a danger to the community tends to support, not undercut, the IJ’s findings. For example, Alarcon-Serrano v Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 220 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) holds that a conviction is not 

required for an IJ to find that an alien poses a danger to the community. Rather, it is sufficient if an IJ “knows or has reason to believe” that the alien was engaged in illegal activity. Id. Thus, a conviction, moreover a charge of the gravity of sexual abuse, 

supports to an even greater extent the IJ’s finding of Petitioner posing a danger to the community. 

7

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Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), hardship to a citizen or permanent resident child may 

be sufficient to warrant suspension of the parents’ deportation. Cerrillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 

809 F.2d 1419, 1422 (9th Cir. 1987). Namely, preservation of family unity is one factor 

courts will consider in making a hardship determination within a deportation proceeding. 

Id. at 1423. However, Petitioner’s deportation proceedings are not before this Court and 

there is no legal authority that suggests preservation of family unity is a factor to be 

considered in a motion for a bond hearing by a petitioner seeking habeas relief under § 

2241. Thus, although it appears that Petitioner’s children are United States citizens, see

(Doc. 25-1, Attach. A at 3), and that Petitioner’s family unity may be a relevant 

consideration in a deportation determination, the Court will not take into account this 

factor in Petitioner’s motion for a bond hearing. 

 Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s motions for another bond hearing 

because Petitioner has already been afforded an individualized bond hearing in 

accordance with Casas-Castrillon. See (Doc. 25-1, Attach. S at 2). Furthermore, the 

evidence Petitioner has put forth fails to demonstrate the requisite material change in 

circumstances to warrant another bond hearing determination—that he no longer poses a 

danger to the community or a flight risk. Moreover, the IJ’s discretionary decisions 

granting or denying bond are not subject to judicial review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) 

(stating that the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding detention of an 

alien “shall not be subject to review”); Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1058 (holding that an 

“alien may appeal the IJ’s bond decision to the BIA . . . but discretionary decisions 

granting or denying bond are not subject to judicial review”). 

 B. Due Process Violations 

Petitioner alleges that his continued detention while he awaits a decision of his 

appeal before the Ninth Circuit “is not authorized by any statute” and “violates both his 

 

submitted all appear to be from institutions in Mexico. See (Doc. 36 at 2–11).Thus, 

Petitioner gives the impression that his son, at the very least, receives medical care and attends school in Mexico. If Petitioner is seeking bond in order to be reunited with his 

children (seemingly in Mexico), it would tend to support the IJ’s and BIA’s findings that Petitioner is a flight risk. See (Doc. 29 at 5–6). 

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substantive and procedural due process rights.” See (Doc. 18 at 4, 6). However, the Court 

agrees with the R&R’s recommendation that Petitioner’s detention is authorized by § 

1226(a), which allows the Attorney General to detain an alien “pending a decision on 

whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also

Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 948. Although Petitioner’s custody has spanned a time 

period of several years, Petitioner’s procedural and substantive due process rights have 

not been violated. See Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 951. Importantly, as stated 

previously, Petitioner received an individualized bond hearing before an IJ in accordance 

with Casas-Castrillon on October 4, 2013 and the IJ found Petitioner posed a flight risk 

and danger to the community. (Doc. 25-3 at 9–12). The IJ stated that the government had 

met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner should not 

be released pending judicial review of the BIA’s order of removal. (Id. at 12). The 

primary evidence the IJ relied upon in his determination was Petitioner’s criminal history 

(including criminal charges or convictions for forcible sodomy, assault, domestic 

violence, theft, and identity theft), “his history of failing to comply with immigration 

orders, his limited ties to the United States, and a disincentive for him to appear given the 

apparent weakness of his case.” (Doc. 29 at 9 (citing Doc. 25-3 at 11–12)). To the extent 

that Petitioner appears to challenge the merits of the IJ’s and BIA’s findings that he posed 

a flight risk and a danger to the community, as stated previously, the Court does not have 

authority to review the IJ’s discretionary judgment regarding a petitioner’s detention or 

release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). 

 Additionally, Petitioner has received copious other custody reviews. As mentioned 

supra, either an IJ or the BIA has reviewed Petitioner’s custody status on at least five 

occasions since his removal was temporarily stayed by the Ninth Circuit. See (Doc. 25-1, 

Attachs. V, W, X, Z, BB). Most recently, on August 31, 2015, an IJ considered and 

denied Petitioner’s further request for another bond hearing (Doc. 25-1, Attach. BB at 3–

4). The IJ reasoned that Petitioner failed to demonstrate, or even argue as is his burden, 

that his circumstances had materially changed. (Id.) For the same reasons as set forth in 

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the Court’s analysis above regarding a bond hearing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s 

continued detention does not violate his procedural or substantive due process rights. 

 In his objections to the R&R, Petitioner appears to claim several other alleged due 

process violations. See (Docs. 34, 35). First, Petitioner alleges he is being subjected to 

double jeopardy. (Doc. 35 at 11). Second, Petitioner alleges Border Patrol Officers 

physically abused him, using excessive force. (Id. at 13). 

 As to Petitioner’s first charge, Petitioner has not been subjected to double 

jeopardy. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[n]o person shall be subject for the same offence to 

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”). Here, Petitioner seems to be referencing 

statements contained in the R&R that “[o]n October 19, 2012, DHS filed Additional 

Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability, charging Petitioner as removable . . . for having 

been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude”, (Doc. 29 at 3), and the IJ’s 

consideration of dismissed charges against Petitioner for assault, theft, and identity theft 

as relevant criminal history, (Doc. 25-3 at 9–11). On the contrary, Petitioner has not been 

prosecuted twice for any crime. DHS merely filed additional grounds for which Petitioner 

was subject to removal; specifically his reentry to the United States without inspection or 

parole by an immigration officer and his conviction of failing to enter the country at a 

designated border crossing point. Furthermore, Petitioner is not being subjected to double 

jeopardy by virtue of the IJ citing his Oregon state criminal conviction for sexual abuse in 

the second degree and his dismissed charges of assault, theft, and identity theft in his 

bond hearing determination. Instead, as discussed supra, Petitioner’s conviction and 

criminal charges are deemed relevant evidence regarding a determination of the potential 

danger he poses to the community. See Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 948; AlarconSerrano, 220 F.3d at 1119. 

 As to Petitioner’s second charge, alleged physical abuse by law enforcement 

officers is unrelated to whether Petitioner has been afforded adequate procedural 

protections to ensure that his prolonged detention is justified. See Prieto-Romero, 534 

F.3d at 1065 (holding that appropriate factors for consideration of whether prolonged 

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detention is justified relate to a petitioner’s dangerousness and risk of flight). For these 

reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention is not unlawful and that his 

due process rights have not been violated. 

C. Motion for Expedited Release 

After the habeas petition (Doc. 18) was fully briefed, Petitioner filed a motion for 

expedited release under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(a). See (Doc. 27). The motion states that 

Petitioner appeals the IJ’s denial of cancellation of removal and appears to raise nearly 

identical challenges to Petitioner’s detention as he asserted in the pending habeas 

petition, which the Court has already addressed above. Thus, the Court will deny the 

motion for the expedited release. 

D. Motion for Decision Under 60 Day Rule 

Most recently on April 25, 2016, Petitioner filed a “60 days Rule” motion for 

habeas relief under 8 C.F.R. § 1241.13–14.8

 (Doc. 38). Section 1241.14 that Petitioner 

cites does not apply to his continued detention because it governs “Post-Hearing 

Detention and Removal,” where “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 

reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 1241.14. Conversely, Petitioner is being 

detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) precisely for the purpose that when the Ninth 

Circuit rules on his appeal in the reasonably foreseeable future, his whereabouts are 

known should his order of removal be affirmed. See Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1065. In 

a like vein, § 1241.13 that Petitioner cites does not apply to his current circumstances 

because it only governs review procedures for aliens that “would not pose a danger to the 

public or a risk of flight,” but the IJ found and the BIA affirmed that the government met 

its burden of establishing that Petitioner does pose such risks. Thus, because the 

provisions that Petitioner cites are inapposite to his instant case of detention by virtue of 

 

8

 In this motion, Petitioner also refers to “C.F.R. § 1241.3(b)(2)(ii).” (Doc. 38 at 

2). However, this subsection of the provision only applies to deportation proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997. C.F.R. § 1241.3(b)(2)(ii). Clearly, all of Petitioner’s immigration and removal proceedings commenced after that date and the Court is not 

reviewing Petitioner’s detention post a deportation hearing. Therefore, this subsection of the provision is inapplicable. 

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his appeal to the Ninth Circuit of an administratively final order of removal, the Court 

finds Petitioner’s Motion for “60 days Rule” lacks merit and the Court will deny the 

motion. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is accepted (Doc. 29), 

Petitioner’s objections (Docs. 34, 35) are overruled, and the Second Amended Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 18) is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter 

judgment accordingly.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Expedited Release 

(Doc. 27) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Bond Hearing (Doc. 

36) is DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Status (Doc. 37) is 

DENIED AS MOOT.9

 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Decision Under 60 Day 

Rule (Doc. 38) is DENIED. 

Dated this 17th day of May, 2016. 

 

9

 This Order constitutes notification of the status of Petitioner’s motions and 

requests before the Court, rendering Petitioner’s motion for status moot. 

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