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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-10463

________________________

D.C. Docket Nos. 4:13-cv-00121-BAE-GRS; 4:05-cr-00059-BAE-GRS-1

MARTIN J. BRADLEY, III, 

 Movant - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

________________________

(January 19, 2017)

Before JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and DALTON,* District 

Judge.

PER CURIAM: 

 * The Honorable Roy B. Dalton, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, 

sitting by designation. 

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A grand jury indicted Martin J. Bradley III and others on numerous charges 

stemming from their alleged participation in several schemes to defraud the Florida 

and California Medicaid programs. After six weeks of trial, and seven days of 

deliberations, a jury convicted Bradley of 247 felonies, including racketeering, 

mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341, 1343,

1956, & 1962. The district court sentenced Bradley to a total of 300 months’ 

imprisonment, and we affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. See 

United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2011). 

After his direct appeal, Bradley filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255, asserting various grounds for relief. The district court denied the 

motion, see Bradley v. United States, No. 4: 13-CV-121, 2013 WL 6246775 (S.D. 

Ga. Dec. 3, 2013), and Bradley now appeals. With the benefit of oral argument, 

and following review of the extensive record, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

Bradley and his father, Martin J. Bradley, Jr. (“Bradley, Jr.”), owned BioMed Plus, Inc., a pharmaceutical wholesaler based in Miami. As relevant here, 

Bio-Med bought and sold blood-derivative medications, which are used to treat 

patients who suffer from viral diseases, immune deficiencies, and clotting 

disorders. 

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At trial, the government presented evidence of several fraudulent schemes 

carried out by Bio-Med, Bradley, Bradley, Jr., and other co-conspirators. Many of 

the schemes involved the so-called “recycling” of medications prescribed to 

patients who were covered by Florida Medicaid, California Medicaid, or the 

California Genetically Handicapped Persons Program (“GHPP”). Recycling, at 

least as that term is used here, refers to a process where medication is dispensed to 

patients, but not administered to them, and then repurchased and resold. Once a 

prescription was issued and billed to the Medicaid agencies, Bio-Med bought back 

unused medication from both clinics and patients at a fraction of the price. Then, 

Bio-Med resold the unused medications to pharmacies, which billed Medicaid 

again for the same drugs.

The government argued that Bradley and his co-conspirators caused the 

Florida and California Medicaid programs to pay for drugs they knew would not be 

taken as prescribed, bought back the drugs at a discount, and then resold the drugs 

for a significant profit. To carry out the Florida Medicaid scheme, Bradley and his 

co-conspirators paid physicians for the blood-derivative medications that went 

unused when a patient failed to appear at the clinic for an infusion appointment. 

To carry out the California Medicaid and GHPP schemes, Bradley and his coconspirators made arrangements with patients to buy back drugs that had already 

been delivered to those patients and billed to California Medicaid and GHPP. 

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Once the medication was obtained from the clinics or patients, it was sent to BioMed, relabeled, and resold. Often, the co-conspirators falsified records to disguise 

the source of the drugs, created phony invoices, and forged signatures in 

prescription books to cover up Medicaid billing for no-show patients.

Not all of the schemes were “recycling” schemes. For example, Bradley and 

his co-conspirators also engaged in a so-called “diversion” scheme, in which they 

used false pretenses to gain access to a restricted market for blood-derivative 

medications by representing that they would not sell the drugs on the open market, 

which they eventually did (at a high markup) after the product was recycled and 

delivered to Bio-Med. Bio-Med also sourced blood-derivative medications from 

Liz Pascual, who testified that she bought them from a source she developed for “a 

lot less” than the manufacturer’s price. She then sold those medications to 

Bradley, who instructed her to prepare invoices with the notation “direct account 

with manufacturer,” a phrase that made it appear as if the drugs had a legitimate 

pedigree. 

As noted, the jury convicted Bradley of 247 charges; Bradley, Jr., of four

charges; Albert L. Tellechea, another co-conspirator, of one charge; and Bio-Med

of 53 charges. The jury acquitted five other defendants on all charges against 

them. 

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II

In an appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion, we review factual findings 

for clear error and legal rulings de novo. See Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 

1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009). Bradley raises three issues. First, he contends that 

his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial by failing to investigate and 

present a defense on the “materiality” element of mail and wire fraud. Second, he 

argues that his appellate counsel furnished ineffective assistance on direct appeal 

by failing to raise a claim based on a supplemental racketeering instruction the 

district court gave to the jury over the objections of both sides. Third, he claims 

that the district court committed reversible error when it communicated with the 

jury during deliberations without notifying defense counsel or the government. 

Although Bradley raised his ex parte jury communication claim for the first time in 

his § 2255 motion, he asserts that the claim should be addressed on the merits 

because he has established cause and prejudice. 

III

An element common to both mail and wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 &

1343, is a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property, which 

requires a material misrepresentation, omission, or concealment of a material fact. 

See Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1238–39. See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 

(1999) (holding that “materiality is an element of the federal mail fraud [and] wire 

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fraud” statutes). “A misrepresentation is material if it has a natural tendency to 

influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision maker to whom it is 

addressed.” United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Bradley contends that the government had to prove that not disclosing the 

recycled status of the medications “had a natural tendency to influence, or was 

capable of influencing, the agencies’ decision to pay for the products.” See Br. of 

Appellant at 22–23. He argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

when they failed to defend on the element of materiality. 

To prove ineffective assistance, Bradley must show that (1) his counsel’s 

performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his 

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Because a 

failure to show either deficient performance or prejudice is fatal to a Strickland

claim, a court need not address both Strickland prongs if one is not satisfied. See 

Cox v. McNeil, 638 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 2011). 

At trial, the government presented evidence from three witnesses to 

demonstrate that the defendants’ failure to disclose how they obtained the 

medications was material because the Florida and California Medicaid agencies 

would not knowingly pay for recycled blood-derivatives. First, Douglas Hillblom, 

an employee of California Medicaid, testified that the agency does not pay for the 

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same drug twice. Mr. Hillblom also testified that, pursuant to Board of Pharmacy 

storage condition regulations, blood-derivative medications dispensed to patients 

could not be returned to pharmacies for credit back to California Medicaid. 

According to Mr. Hillblom, the no-credit rule stems from concerns over 

“contamination or degradation of the product” once it leaves “the control of the 

pharmacy.” Second, Harry Fry, an employee with the California Department of 

Health Services, testified that California’s GHPP would not pay for the same drug 

twice, nor would it “allow for payment of drugs for use by anyone else but the 

person to whom it was dispensed.” Finally, Jerry Wells, the Bureau Chief of 

Pharmacy Service for Florida Medicaid, testified that Florida Medicaid would not 

“pay for the same drug twice” except “unknowingly” in “fraudulent situations.” 

He also testified that pharmacy regulations prohibited dispensing drugs without 

patients present.

Bradley argues that the testimony of these three witnesses was “cursory and 

unsubstantiated” because none of them “identified the source of the rule or official 

policy he purported to be describing.” See Br. of Appellant at 5. Without more, 

says Bradley, the government’s case on the element of materiality was vulnerable 

to an attack that never came. Defense counsel did not examine Mr. Wells and Mr. 

Fry at all, and only briefly cross-examined Mr. Hillblom to confirm that certain 

medication cannot be returned to a pharmacy. See id. at 34–35. Furthermore, 

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Bradley argues that defense counsel failed to discover and present evidence that, at 

the time, there were no formal policies prohibiting payments for recycled drugs. 

According to Bradley, “[t]he only remotely relevant evidence counsel presented 

[on the materiality of recycling issue] was Lawrence ‘Ron’ Nicholson’s testimony 

that he could not find a California regulation prohibiting pharmacies from reselling 

unused, returned products.” Id. at 33. As a result, Bradley contends that his 

counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to prove that, even if the 

agencies had been aware that they already paid for medication once, they would 

have paid for recycled medication a second time. Put differently, Bradley says that 

his counsel failed to establish that the recycled status of the medication was 

immaterial to the alleged victims of the charged fraudulent schemes. 

To establish the performance prong of his ineffective assistance claim, 

Bradley “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. “The test has nothing to do 

with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good 

lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the 

trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” 

White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992). 

We approach the Strickland performance inquiry armed, unavoidably, with 

the double-edged sword that is hindsight. We know that Bradley was convicted of 

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many crimes, “and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it 

has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel 

was unreasonable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. But Strickland instructs us to be 

“highly deferential” when we scrutinize counsel’s performance. Id. “A fair 

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate 

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 

time.” Id. There, therefore, is a “‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s attention to 

certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than ‘sheer 

neglect.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). In other words, we generally will not second guess 

a lawyer’s strategic choices.

Bradley was represented at trial and on appeal by a nationally renowned 

team of experienced criminal defense lawyers. When we review the performance 

of experienced trial counsel, “the presumption that [their] conduct was reasonable 

is even stronger.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000)

(en banc). That is not to say that the performance of experienced counsel is above 

reproach. Even a Clarence Darrow can have a bad day. But our cases recognize 

that “the more experienced an attorney is, the more likely it is that his decision to 

rely on his own experience and judgment in rejecting a defense” is reasonable. 

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Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1040 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Gates v. 

Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Bradley has not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel acted 

reasonably in this case. At trial, counsel chose to argue that Bradley made no 

misrepresentations to the Florida and California Medicaid programs. To support 

that defense theory, counsel argued that nothing in the state regulations precluded 

recycling. They also argued that there was no proof that any of the medications at 

issue were actually recycled, so there could be no misrepresentation as to their 

recycled status.

1

 

Defense counsel’s decision to develop one theory of defense rather than 

another—in this case, a defense focused on the absence of misrepresentations

rather than lack of materiality—is not tantamount to deficient performance. That is 

so even if defense counsel failed to consider the sort of immateriality-of-recycling 

defense that Bradley has developed in his briefs. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1316

n.16 (“No lawyer can be expected to have considered all of the ways. If a defense 

lawyer pursued course A, it is immaterial that some other reasonable courses of 

defense (that the lawyer did not think of at all) existed . . . .”). And it is entirely 

 1 During closing arguments, Bradley’s defense counsel argued: “We asked numerous people[,] is 

there any proof that the factor obtained from patients was ever resold. They could find no proof 

through their computer systems, through anything else, other than the supposition of the three 

cooperators that anything was ever resold.” And the point was reiterated: “If it was resold, and 

by the way, we kept asking, is there proof that it was resold, that it went through this and came 

back, and was sold a second time. Is there any proof of that? There is no proof. None.”

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possible that counsel chose not to focus on materiality because it might cut against 

the argument that there were no misrepresentations to begin with. It is risky to 

defend on a “we may have lied but it didn’t matter” theory, even if that theory is 

only presented in the alternative. As we have recognized, “good advocacy requires 

the winnowing of some arguments in favor of stressing others: multiplicity of 

arguments or defenses hints at the lack of confidence in any one.” Rogers v. Zant, 

13 F.3d 384, 388 (11th Cir. 1994). 

Bradley has failed to establish deficient performance, and his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim therefore fails.

IV

While the jury was deliberating, the district court decided to give a 

supplemental RICO instruction over the objections of both sides. At the time, the 

jury was not deadlocked and had not expressed any confusion about the original

RICO instruction. But the district court nevertheless concluded that the jury 

“need[ed] some help” and provided what it described as a “simplified” explanation 

of RICO. See D.E. 1019 at 17. The instruction—delivered to the jury in writing 

during its fifth day of deliberations—explained again the distinction between the 

200+ counts of the indictment and the 200+ racketeering acts alleged as part of the 

RICO charge. The supplemental instruction also included this sentence: “As you 

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would know from my instructions and the verdict, you must reach a verdict of 

‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ as to each defendant and as to each of the 258 counts.”

Bradley argues that the supplemental jury instruction was coercive, and that 

his counsel on direct appeal (the same lawyers who tried the case) rendered 

ineffective assistance because they failed to raise a claim based on the 

supplemental instruction, even though they objected to the instruction at trial. 

Again, Strickland requires satisfaction of two elements: deficient performance and 

prejudice. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). Here, even if we 

assume that counsel performed deficiently on appeal, we cannot say that Bradley 

was prejudiced by their failure to challenge the supplemental jury instruction. 

To establish prejudice, Bradley must demonstrate a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s alleged error in raising the jury instruction issue on appeal, 

the outcome would have been different. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 285; Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. He has not met that burden. 

The coercive-instruction cases Bradley relies on arose in a scenario where 

the jury had announced it was deadlocked. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 504 

F.3d 1218, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007); Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715, 742–43 (10th 

Cir. 2010); Smith v. Curry, 580 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Yarborough, 400 F.3d 17, 20–22 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. McElhiney, 275 

F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d 193, 

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194 (1st Cir. 1998). These decisions demonstrate that when a jury has announced 

a deadlock, certain instructions (including instructions telling the jury that it must 

reach a verdict) create a danger of coercion and prejudice. But Bradley has not 

cited any authority to support the proposition that an instruction like the one given 

here is coercive per se when the jury is not deadlocked. 

In our view, the reasonable probability of prejudice is significantly 

diminished where, as here, there is ample evidence to support conviction, cf. 

Boschen v. United States, 845 F.2d 921, 922 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 

defendant could not establish Brady violation, which requires showing a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 

different had the allegedly exculpatory evidence been disclosed, because the 

evidence of guilt was overwhelming), and there is no indication that the jury was 

deadlocked or that it was pushed to make a decision it otherwise would not have. 

As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “a non-deadlocked jury is less susceptible to 

such coercion.” Cramer v. Fahner, 683 F.2d 1376, 1389 (7th Cir. 1982).

Because Bradley has not shown a reasonable probability that the instruction 

affected the outcome of his trial, he cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of 

Strickland. As a result, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to 

the supplemental jury instruction fails. 

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V

Throughout the trial, the jury sent several notes to the district court. Most 

dealt with non-substantive issues. One note, for example, asked the court if it 

would grant a juror permission to participate in an in-law’s wedding. Another 

asked the court if it would allow certain jurors to phone their families. Two of the 

jury notes, however, were substantive, and the district court’s ex parte responses to 

them form the basis for Bradley’s third claim. 

A

On March 24, 2006, the second day of deliberations, the jury sent the first 

substantive note, which requested a dictionary. Without notifying or consulting the 

parties, the district court responded:

I cannot provide you with a dictionary. You have the 

charts and exhibits which are replete with definitions. 

You also have the charge and summary charts.

The problem with the district court’s response, besides the fact that it was sent 

without the parties’ knowledge, is that at trial the charts, summary charts, and 

exhibits were primarily (though not exclusively) introduced by the government.

Later that same day, the jury sent the second substantive note. In it, the jury 

asked: “Do you treat the company and the owner of the company differently in the 

acts? Because we are confused on how to distinguish between the company and 

the individual.” When it received the jury’s second note, the district court

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convened the parties to discuss an appropriate response but did not disclose the 

existence of the first note it had received earlier that day or its response to that 

note.

Defense counsel argued that the district court’s response to the second note 

should make clear that the liability of a company and its owner must be assessed 

independently. The government asked the district court to include language 

advising the jury that a corporation can only act through its agents. Ultimately, the 

parties and the district court reached a compromise on the following response, 

which was sent to the jury:

In answer to your question, the owners and the 

corporation are separate defendants, so you must 

consider them separately as to each count. Of course, the 

corporation can only act through its agents who can be its 

owners, employees, etc. 

The jury did not send another note that day, and there was no indication it needed 

additional clarification from the district court. 

Nevertheless, the following morning the district court sent an unprompted 

instruction to the jury, this time without advising the parties or giving them an 

opportunity to be heard. This follow-up instruction stated:

If my answer to your question yesterday was insufficient 

let me know. I shall explain further. Once again, a 

corporation can only act through its agents and 

employees, who may also be the owners. 

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The follow-up instruction reiterated the language the government wanted—that a 

corporation can only act through its agents who may be the owners—but it left out 

the agreed-to language that a corporation and its owners must be considered 

separately.

The jury responded to the district court’s unsolicited follow-up instruction

with a note of its own: “Your answer cleared up any misunderstanding there may 

have been.” This note was also not provided to the parties, and it is unclear 

whether the jury was referring to the initial note or the follow-up instruction.

Bradley, like the government, was not aware of the two ex parte messages

the district court sent the jury, or of the jury’s response to the second follow-up 

instruction. Understandably, therefore, he did not object to them before the jury 

reached its verdict. 

On March 31, 2006, two days after trial ended, the clerk docketed the

undisclosed notes and the district court’s responses. But the docketing was done in 

a way that made it appear as though they had been filed contemporaneously on the 

day the communications actually occurred, even though the notes and responses 

were not docketed until after trial was over and counsel had been excused. So, 

even if defense counsel had been monitoring the docket for new entries made after 

trial, it would have appeared as if no new entries were made on March 31:

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To notice the entries docketed on March 31, counsel would have had to 

scroll up the docket to find entries 591 and 592, which, though numerically out of 

sequence, appeared as if they had been docketed on March 24 and March 25:

To make detection even more difficult, the new docket entries were simply 

labeled “jury notes,” an innocuous description that would not have alerted 

government or defense counsel that the entries contained anything other than the 

jury notes and responses they were made aware of during trial. Perhaps not 

surprisingly, defense counsel did not discover the undisclosed ex parte notes until 

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after Bradley’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and raised 

them for the first time in the subsequent § 2255 motion.

B

Generally, a claim that could have been asserted on direct appeal is barred if 

it is raised for the first time on collateral review. See Davis v. United States, 417 

U.S. 333, 345 n.15 (1974). A prisoner who wishes to obtain collateral review of a

defaulted claim must demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice

resulting from the alleged error. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 

(1998); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68 (1982).

In its order denying Bradley’s § 2255 motion, the district court agreed that it 

had erred in engaging in undisclosed communications with the jury and not 

advising the parties of the instructions it had sent on its own (and the one it had 

received in response). Although it believed that its ex parte communications likely 

“focused the jury’s attention on the [g]overnment’s view of the case,” and “risked 

suggesting to the jury that [the government’s materials] were reliable sources of 

information [it] approved of,” Bradley, 2013 WL 6246775, at *13, the district 

court denied Bradley relief. It concluded that any claim related to the ex parte 

communications was procedurally barred because Bradley had not raised the claim 

on direct appeal and had not shown cause for his failure to do so.

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C

We agree with Bradley that the district court erred in communicating with 

the jury without giving defense counsel (and the government) notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a), a 

criminal defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial, including the 

stage when the court responds to notes from the jury. See Rogers v. United States, 

422 U.S. 35, 38 (1975); United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957, 966 (11th Cir. 1989), 

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 486 n.3 

(1997). See also Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81 (1919) (“We 

entertain no doubt that the orderly conduct of a trial by jury, essential to the proper 

protection of the right to be heard, entitles the parties who attend for the purpose to 

be present in person or by counsel at all proceedings from the time the jury is 

impaneled until it is discharged after rendering a verdict.”). As Rogers made clear, 

“the jury’s message[s] should have been answered in open court and [Bradley’s] 

counsel [and the government] should have been given an opportunity to be heard 

before the trial judge responded.” Rogers, 422 U.S. at 39.

Whether Bradley’s claim relating to the district court’s ex parte 

communications is defaulted “is a mixed question of law and fact, which we 

review de novo.” Fordham v. United States, 706 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2013). 

As noted, when it resolved the § 2255 motion, the district court concluded that

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Bradley had shown actual prejudice but failed to demonstrate cause, and therefore 

his jury note claim was procedurally defaulted. We address cause first, and then 

turn to prejudice.

1

A prisoner can establish cause for a procedural default by showing that 

“some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply 

with the . . . procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1988). This 

may be done by “showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel . . . or that some interference by officials made 

compliance impracticable.” Id. (citations omitted). For example, in Strickler v. 

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 & n.23 (1999), the Supreme Court held that the 

petitioner established cause for failing to raise a Brady claim prior to federal 

habeas because the prosecution asserted an open file policy and the petitioner 

reasonably relied on the pertinent file to contain all Brady materials. And in Ward 

v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1176–77 (11th Cir. 2010), we found cause in a case where 

some jurors in a capital case had asked a bailiff a question about the possibility of 

sentencing the petitioner to life without parole, but the questions and the bailiff’s 

answer to that question (that such a sentence was not available) were not given in 

open court. As we explained, “[t]he external impediment in this case stems from 

the failure of the bailiff and/or trial judge to inform Ward or his counsel about the 

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jury’s question concerning parole.” Id. See also id. at 1178 (“[W]e conclude that 

Ward established sufficient cause to excuse his procedural default based on the 

state’s concealment of the jury’s question regarding parole.”). 

Although the length of time it took Bradley’s counsel to discover the ex 

parte notes and communications gives us some pause, we conclude, contrary to the 

district court, that Bradley has established sufficient cause. A confluence of 

external factors impeded defense counsel’s ability to raise, at trial or on direct 

appeal, claims concerning the district court’s ex parte communications with the 

jury. First, the parties were never advised about the two jury notes at issue and the 

district court’s ex parte responses (or the jury’s own follow-up note). Second, as 

described earlier, the notes and responses were filed and described in a way that

made them appear as though they had been docketed contemporaneously during 

deliberations. And because the jury had sent some notes during trial and 

deliberations that had been provided to the parties, there was no reason for anyone 

to think the unthinkable—that they had not been told that the jury had asked 

questions during deliberations, and that, even worse, the district court had chosen 

to respond more than once to the notes in an ex parte fashion. Even if defense 

counsel (who also represented Bradley on direct appeal) had been monitoring the 

docket for new entries after trial, it would have appeared as if no new entries were 

made on March 31.

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In sum, defense counsel, like the government, had no reason to suspect 

substantive ex parte communications by the district court as a result of nondisclosed jury notes and therefore had no reason to scour the docket for evidence 

of such communications. Defense counsel likewise had no reason to suspect the 

docketing discrepancy that occurred here. In fact, no one should have reason to 

suspect the back dating of docket entries, since such a practice would surely 

undermine public confidence in the courts. Under these circumstances, we decline 

to place such a burden on defense counsel. The obstacle to raising claims 

concerning the ex parte communications was external to Bradley and his counsel, 

who were justified in thinking that the district court had acted appropriately (i.e., 

that it had not engaged in undisclosed ex parte communications with the jury about 

substantive issues), and that the docket would have accurately reflected any 

undisclosed communications with the jury.

2

 

2

To demonstrate prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural bar and obtain 

collateral relief, however, Bradley must show “actual prejudice” resulting from the 

district court’s ex parte communications, a “significantly higher hurdle than would 

exist on direct appeal.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 166–67. “To establish ‘prejudice’ 

 2 Because we have determined that Bradley established cause to excuse his procedural default, 

we need not address his alternative argument that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

discover the ex parte communications.

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[under the cause and prejudice standard], a petitioner must show that there is at

least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003).

“A jury’s interruption of its deliberations to seek further explanation of the 

law is a critical moment in a criminal trial . . . .” United States v. Kopstein, 759 

F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And 

“the influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great 

weight,” Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Gay, 755 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933)), as “jurors are ever 

watchful of the words that fall from him,” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 

607, 612 (1946). “Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is apt to be 

the decisive word.” Id. When a court responds to the jury without giving counsel 

notice and an opportunity to be heard, “the aggrieved party will have lost the value 

of the chance: the opportunity to convince the judge that some other or different 

response would be more appropriate, the circumstances considered.” United States 

v. Parent, 954 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1992). “Being kept in the dark, . . . counsel [is]

powerless to prime the pump of persuasion.” Id. 

With respect to the jury’s request for a dictionary, the district court 

explained that its response was actually prejudicial because it “directed the jury to 

materials put together by the [g]overnment and containing the [g]overnment’s take 

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on the case.” Bradley, 2013 WL 6246775, at *13. Bradley contends that the 

district court correctly found that, “[g]iven the sheer volume of evidence in this 

case, the [district court’s] response to the jury’s request for a dictionary focusing 

the jury on certain items prepared by the [g]overnment very well may have 

improperly influenced the verdict.” Br. of Appellant at 53. The government 

responds that “[t]here [is] no indication of what term the jury wanted to define 

when it asked for a dictionary, what counts or defendants that unknown definition 

might have related to, or what importance, if any, that definition ultimately played 

in the jury’s deliberations.” Br. of Appellee at 57–58.

On the note responding to the request for a dictionary, we agree with the 

government and conclude that Bradley has not shown actual prejudice. First, the 

ex parte nature of the note is insufficient, in and of itself, to show prejudice. See 

generally United States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting 

that “there is no blanket prohibition against the ex parte examination of jurors by a 

trial judge” and that, even if such communication violated Rule 43, the error may 

be harmless). Indeed, a court’s ex parte communications with a jury (or juror) are 

subject to harmless error analysis. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119–20 

(1983); Rapp, 871 F.2d at 966; United States v. McDuffie, 542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th 

Cir. 1976). Although the district court’s note told the jury that it had the charts, 

summary charts, and exhibits for review, it did not refer the jury to only the 

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government’s evidence. Second, although most of the charts, summary charts, and 

exhibits at trial were introduced by the government, the defense introduced 

hundreds of exhibits, including the 2001 Florida Medicaid policy manual, Def. Ex. 

690, which contained a number of rules and definitions. It is at best unclear 

whether the jury would have interpreted the note as instructing it to look only at the 

evidence introduced by the government. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 

391 (1999) (“Our decisions repeatedly have cautioned that instructions must be 

evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the entire charge.”). Third, given 

the substantial evidence presented against him, as set out in our opinion on direct 

appeal, we cannot say that Bradley suffered actual prejudice from the district 

court’s note relating to the request for a dictionary. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 169–

73.

3

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an ex parte communication can 

be harmless in some cases. See Rushen, 464 U.S. at 119–20. See also United 

States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Rogers, 422 U.S. at 

40); Rapp, 871 F.2d at 966. The district court ruled that the unprompted and ex 

parte instruction it provided to the jury about corporate/individual liability was 

prejudicial because “it arguably altered the law the Court set forth in its initial, 

agreed upon response.” Bradley, 2013 WL 6246775, at *14.

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In support of the district court’s ruling, Bradley argues that, by omitting the 

admonition to consider individual and corporate defendants separately, the note 

“may have unduly linked the liability of corporations to the actions of its agents” 

and “press[ed] the jury to find Bradley guilty if it also found corporate liability for 

Bio-Med.” Br. of Appellant at 55. The government responds that the jury had 

already been instructed on the omitted phrase—to consider the corporation and 

individual separately—the day before and in the regular jury instructions. See Br. 

of Appellee at 61. For the reasons which follow, we agree with the district court, 

but only in part. 

We know, from the question that it sent to the court (the one that was 

disclosed to the parties), that the jury was having some trouble distinguishing the 

corporate liability from individual liability. That was not, in retrospect, surprising, 

for the case involved multiple complex schemes carried out by several actors

through various entities. It could be difficult to determine whether to attribute 

criminal acts to Bio-Med or to specific individuals or both. And it is not intuitive 

that a corporation—a legal entity which exists, legally, apart from its officers, 

directors, and employees—can be convicted of a crime requiring intent. 

The district court’s original response, the one the parties had agreed on, 

achieved a careful balance: it acknowledged the obvious truth that a corporation 

can only act through its agents, while reminding the jury that it must consider the 

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corporation and its agents separately. The district court’s ex parte follow-up 

instruction, however, focused the jury squarely on the notion that a corporation can 

only act through its agents. It is likely, we think, that the note led the jury to 

believe that an individual defendant also must be held responsible for each crime 

committed by the corporation. This second instruction, the last word the jury heard 

on the matter, was likely to carry special weight. It is significant, as well, that 

Bradley and Bio-Med were convicted of all 53 crimes with which they were jointly 

charged. As to these charges (Counts 1–53), we conclude (in agreement with the 

district court) that Bradley has shown actual prejudice. See Henderson, 353 F.3d 

at 892.3

The cases cited by the government are inapposite. They all stand for the 

proposition that an ex parte communication with the jury, though inappropriate, 

can be harmless if it merely accurately restates the law. See McDuffie, 542 F.2d at 

241; United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 759 (11th Cir. 1984); United 

States v. Breedlove, 576 F.2d 57, 60 (5th Cir. 1978). None of these cases support 

the conclusion that there is no prejudice in the scenario we are presented with 

here—i.e., when the district court sends an unprompted response to the jury with 

 3 In support of its argument that the ex parte corporate/individual liability instruction was not 

prejudicial, the government notes that, in Count 1, which charged a RICO violation, the jury 

found Bio-Med had committed certain predicate racketeering acts, but not Bradley. See Br. of 

Appellee at 62. Although this is true, the discrepancy was small. The vast majority of the 

predicate offenses the jury found as to Bradley and Bio-Med overlapped. And, more 

importantly, the jury ultimately convicted them both under Count 1.

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an incomplete instruction on corporate/individual liability and the corporation and 

its principal are convicted on all counts in which they were jointly charged.

We do not, however, believe that Bradley has shown actual prejudice on the 

remaining charges on which he was convicted. These charges did not have BioMed as a co-defendant, and given the ample evidence presented by the 

government, it is difficult to see how the district court’s second instruction on 

corporate/individual liability was prejudicial as to them.

Because we have concluded that Bradley established cause and prejudice to 

excuse the procedural bar on his jury communication claim, the merits analysis 

does not require much more ink. As we explained, in Rogers the Supreme Court 

recognized that a defendant has the right to be present and participate during 

communications between a judge and jury. See Rogers, 422 U.S. at 38. That rule 

was plainly violated here.

Having decided that Bradley demonstrated actual prejudice, we have also

necessarily decided—as the government conceded on appeal and as the Fourth 

Circuit has held—that the error in this case was not harmless as to Counts 1–53. 

See Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 976 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[H]armless error analysis is 

essentially the same analysis we are required to perform in order to decide whether 

Smith has shown actual prejudice to excuse his procedural default . . . .”).

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We therefore reverse the decision of the district court insofar as it rejected 

Bradley’s jury note claim, and direct that Bradley’s convictions on Counts 1–53 be 

set aside. The government can elect to retry Bradley on these charges. But if it 

chooses not to retry Counts 1–53, then the district court must re-sentence Bradley.

VI

For the reasons indicated above, Bradley has failed to establish that his 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on direct appeal. 

Bradley has established cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default 

of his claim concerning the second ex parte instruction on corporate/individual 

liability. Although the district court found that the ex parte communications

actually prejudiced Bradley, we conclude that the only charges affected by the 

district court’s ex parte instruction to the corporate/individual liability note were 

those in which both Bradley and Bio-Med were jointly charged and convicted. We 

therefore reverse as to Counts 1–53, and vacate Bradley’s convictions on those 

counts. As to Bradley’s remaining counts of conviction, we conclude that the ex 

parte instruction on corporate/individual liability did not result in actual prejudice.

The denial of Bradley’s § 2255 motion is affirmed in part, reversed in part, 

and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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