Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08050/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Matt J. Mided,

Petitioner

-vsEdwin Jensen, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-8050-PCT-GMS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation on Petition 

for Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at San 

Luis, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

on March 14, 2013 (Doc. 1). On August 19, 2013 Respondents filed their Response 

(Doc. 11). Petitioner filed a Reply on December 3, 2013 (Doc. 17). Respondents filed 

their Supplemental Exhibits on February 14, 2014 (Doc. 19).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual background as follows:

An anonymous subject contacted Detective Brandon Rumpf

of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office and informed him of a

possible delivery of methamphetamine to a service station in Black 

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Canyon City. The subject said the person making the delivery 

would be a man named Matt, about six feet four inches tall, with 

brown hair in a ponytail, and that he would be driving a red 1990smodel Toyota Tacoma pickup truck with white tabs over one of the 

wheel wells where a chrome strip had been removed. Based on the 

tip, Rumpf went with his partner, Detective Bret Hood, and several 

other detectives to the service station where the delivery was to be 

made.

While the detectives were at the service station, a red Toyota 

Tacoma pickup truck driven by a man matching the informant's 

description pulled up to a gas pump. Rumpf parked his vehicle 

behind the pickup truck, stuck his head outside the open window 

and yelled, "Max," to the pickup' s driver. The driver identified 

himself as "Matt." After Rumpf asked the driver for identification, 

he handed Rumpf a driver's license identifying him as Mided. 

Mided told Rumpf he was in Black Canyon City to pick up money 

to post bond for a friend. Rumpf asked Mided if he could search 

Mided's truck for drugs, to which Mided responded, "Yeah, go 

ahead."

While Rumpf was talking with Mided, Hood approached the

vehicle's passenger, Karen Humphrey. After handing Hood her

identification, Humphrey began to cry and told Hood there was an

outstanding warrant for her arrest. Humphrey told Hood there were 

drugs behind the seat in the pickup truck. Hood then told Rumpf of 

Humphrey's admission. Rumpf tilted the truck's front passenger-side 

seat forward and observed what was later determined to be some 

methamphetamine wrapped in plastic.

After Rumpf found the methamphetamine, another detective, 

Jeff Long, took swabs of the inside of the vehicle that tested positive 

for the presence of methamphetamine.

(Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 10/29/09 at 2-4.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. #, are referenced 

herein as “Exhibit ___.” Supplemental Exhibits (Doc. 19) to the Answer are referenced 

herein as “Exhibit S1___.”)

1

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Mided was charged in Yavapai County Superior Court with transportation for sale 

of a dangerous drug, possession of a dangerous drug, and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 10/29/09 at 4.) 

After requests for appointment of new counsel were granted three times, counsel 

moved to suppress the evidence from the truck. At the hearing on the motion, Petitioner 

asked to represent himself. The request was granted and advisory counsel was 

 

1

The list of exhibits in Respondents’ Supplement reverses the order of Exhibits S1-A 

and S1-B. The references used herein are those of the cover labels for the exhibits.

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appointed. (Id. at 4-5.) 

After a continuance of more than 30 days and appointment of an investigator, and 

denial of a second continuance, Petitioner proceeded with the suppression hearing. The 

trial court denied the motion, finding Petitioner consented to the warrantless search. (Id.

at 5, 11.) 

Eventually, Petitioner stipulated to a trial before the court on exhibits, with a 

stipulation to a maximum sentence of 7.5 years, withdrawal of an allegation of 

commission while on probation and all but one prior offense. At Petitioner’s request, 

advisory counsel was reappointed as counsel of record, and the stipulation was accepted 

by the trial court. (Id. at 5-6.) 

Based on the submitted exhibits, which included evidence of a prior 

felony conviction, a scientific report indicating the substance found 

in Mided’s truck was methamphetamine and testimony from the 

evidentiary hearing, the superior court found Mided guilty of 

transportation for sale of a dangerous drug methamphetamine, a 

Class 2 felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class 6 

felony. The court found Mided also guilty of possession of a 

dangerous drug but concluded that charge merged with the charge 

of transportation for sale of dangerous drug.

(Id. at 6.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to a mitigated term of 7.5 years on the transportation 

charge, and a concurrent, aggravated term of 2.75 years on the paraphernalia. (Id. at 6-7; 

Exhibit B, Verdict; Exhibit C, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a notice of direct appeal, and counsel was appointed. Counsel 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and related state 

authorities, espousing an inability to find an issue for review. (Exhibit D.) Petitioner 

filed a pro se Supplemental Brief (Exhibit E), arguing that the trial court erred in denying 

the motion to suppress, basing a decision on “’notes’ not facts as taken by the court 

reporter”, denying the motion to continue the suppression hearing, granting the 

prosecutions objections to questions, appointment of ineffective counsel, and allowing 

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inconsistent testimony by the detectives. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the ineffective assistance claim as 

properly raised on post-conviction review, rejected Petitioner’s claims, reviewed the 

record for reversible error, and affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Exhibit F, 

Mem. Dec. 10/29/09.)

Petitioner did not seek further direct review. (Exhibit G, Mandate 3/4/10; 

Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit H), counsel was 

appointed who filed a notice of inability to find an issue for review (Exhibit I). 

Petitioner then filed a pro per Petition for Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit J), but then 

sought and obtained leave to file an amended petition. (Exhibit K, Order 10/12/10.) 

Petitioner then filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit L), arguing 

that he was denied his right to self representation (id. at 11-14); he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s failure to secure surveillance video 

from the service station (id. at 14-16); denial of effective assistance of appellate counsel 

for failing to challenge the denial of the right to self-representation (id. at 17); denial of 

his right to a jury trial by requiring him to choose between self-representation and 

ineffective counsel (id. at 18-19.) 

The state responded, arguing that “most of the issues” were precluded because 

“they either were or could have been raised on appeal.” (Exhibit P, PCR Resp. at 5.) 

The state further responded that Petitioner’s waiver of counsel was knowing and 

voluntary, he was not denied his right of self-representation, none of his counsel was 

ineffective, and his claim of a sentencing discrepancy was without merit. 

The trial court summarily rejected the claims asserted by Petitioner, searched the 

record for a basis for post-conviction relief but found none, and dismissed the petition. 

(Exhibit M, Order 2/4/11.)

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Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising the same 

arguments asserted to the PCR court. (Exhibit S1-B, PFR.) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Exhibit N, Mem. Dec. 8/13/12.) Petitioner 

sought reconsideration, which was denied. (Exhibit O, Order 9/11/12.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit N, Mandate 10/22/12; Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 5.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 14, 2013 (Doc. 1).2 Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

(1) Petitioner’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights were violated because he did not receive effective 

assistance of counsel;

(2) Petitioner’s conviction was based on illegally obtained 

evidence, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments;

(3) Petitioner’s pre-trial, trial, and appellate counsel were 

ineffective in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments; and

(4) Petitioner was denied his right to self-representation, in 

violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments.

(Order 6/3/13, Doc. 4 at 2.) 

Response - On August 19, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 11). Respondents argue that Grounds One and Three are without merit, that 

Ground Two is not cognizable on habeas review, and that Ground Four was procedurally 

barred on review of Petitioner’s PCR petition.

Reply - On December 3, 2013, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 17). Petitioner 

argues that his claims in Grounds One and Three have merit, he was denied a full and 

 

2

The Court notes that Petitioner has interwoven his exhibits in the middle of his Petition, 

rendering review of the Petition and citation to page numbers unnecessarily difficult. 

The detrimental effect is compounded by the fact that many of his exhibits themselves 

contain exhibits. In the future, Petitioner is encouraged to append exhibits at the end of a 

pleading, clearly label them, and address them in the pleading by references to the labels.

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fair hearing on his exclusionary rule claim in Ground Two and thus it is cognizable, and 

that his failure to properly exhaust his state remedies on Ground Four was the result of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

Supplements –The Court directed Respondents to supplement the record with 

copies of briefs filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals, and set a deadline for Petitioner 

to object to the exhibits. (Order 2/3/14, Doc. 18.) On February 14, 2014, Respondents 

supplemented the record (Doc. 19). Petitioner has not filed any objections to the 

exhibits, and the time to do so has expired.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUNDS ONE AND THREE: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that PCR counsel was ineffective. In Ground 

Three, Petitioner argues that pre-trial, trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. 

1. Standards for Habeas Relief for State Prisoner

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, not every error justifies relief. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas 

relief may only be granted to a state petitioner in very narrow circumstances, e.g. where 

the decision was “an unreasonable application of or contrary to” Supreme Court law, or 

was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). However, 

those limitations only apply when a state petitioner’s claim has been “adjudicated on the 

merits.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

2. Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

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objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687 88, 694. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

3. Ground One – PCR Counsel

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel on the basis asserted in his Ground Three. 

(Petition, Doc. 1-3 at “6”, physical page 41.) Respondents argue, in effect, that a claim 

of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel does not amount to a constitutional violation, 

and that Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) held only that ineffective assistance of 

PCR counsel may establish cause to excuse a procedural default of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 6.) Petitioner simply replies that he 

believed the claim was allowed. (Reply, Doc. 17 at 3.) 

The Courts have long rejected claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. 

"There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. 

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

in such proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citations 

omitted). The Coleman Court thus held that the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel also 

could not establish cause to excuse a failure to properly exhaust state remedies and 

procedural default on a claim.

In Martinez, the Court recognized, however, that because courts increasingly 

reserve review of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to post-conviction relief 

proceedings, the ineffectiveness of counsel in such PCR proceedings could effectively 

defeat any review of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the Court recognized a 

narrow exception to Coleman’s ruling on the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause to 

excuse a procedural default on such a claim. In Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 

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(2013), the Court extended Martinez to cases where state law did not mandate that 

claims of ineffectiveness be brought in PCR proceedings, but provided no other 

meaningful avenue for review.

The Martinez Court made clear, however, that it was not altering Coleman’s 

constitutional ruling that there was no constitutional right to effective PCR counsel. 

As Coleman noted, this makes the initial-review collateral 

proceeding a prisoner's “one and only appeal” as to an ineffectiveassistance claim, and this may justify an exception to the 

constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral 

proceedings. 

This is not the case, however, to resolve whether that 

exception exists as a constitutional matter.

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315. 

In Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124 (9

th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit recognized 

the apparent incongruity left between the Coleman constitutional ruling and the Martinez 

procedural ruling, but declined to decide what the Supreme Court did not. 

The Court made it plain that the exception extended no further... If 

Coleman's revetment is to be torn down, it is not for us to do it.

Hunton. 732 F.3d at 1126. 

Neither is it for this Court to do so.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground One is without merit and must be denied.

4. Ground Three – Trial and Appellate Counsel

In his Ground Three, Petitioner argues that “pre-trial, trial and appellate counsel” 

were ineffective. Petitioner complains that pre-trial counsel: (1) failed to pursue video 

evidence of the arrest, (2) failed to interview witnesses, (3) pressured Petitioner to sign a 

plea agreement, (4) failed to file a motion to suppress and then filed a “frivolous” motion 

to suppress, and (5) failed to adequately prepare for the suppression hearing. (Petition, 

Doc. 1-3 at “8”, physical page 43.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner fails to make specific allegations as to any 

counsel other than those representing him prior to his waiver of the right to trial counsel. 

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Respondents argue that the only claim supported by specific facts is that regarding the 

surveillance video, and that the state court’s rejection of that claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 7-9.) 

Petitioner replies that counsel should have obtained the surveillance video and the 

employees who operated it. (Reply, Doc. 17 at 12-13.) He argues any failure to further 

develop his claims resulted from the ineffective assistance of appellate and PCR counsel. 

In particular, Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel failed to raise his claims of 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel and his 4th Amendment claims. (Reply, Doc. 17 at 

13-15.) He argues that even without audio, the surveillance video would have shown a 

variety of improper acts, including the officer pointing a gun at him and immediately 

swabbing the vehicle, the timeline of the conversations, and potentially “how the 

contraband got behind the passenger’s seat.” (Id. at 15.) Petitioner reports that in April 

or May, 2008 he was advised by the service station manager that the surveillance videos 

were taped over every two months. (Id. at 15-16.) 

Surveillance Video Evidence – Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to obtain the surveillance video. Petitioner raised this argument in his PCR 

proceeding. The Arizona Court of Appeals noted that “[t]ypically a defendant who 

waives his or her right to counsel cannot raise a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” (Exhibit N, Mem.Dec. at 4.) The court then assumed without deciding that 

such a claim was cognizable, and concluded that Petitioner failed to provide allegations 

to support his claim:

Although Mided argues the surveillance video "could have shown" 

that he had not consented to the search, he does not explain how this 

is possible, given that his consent was verbal and he does not assert 

the video recording included audio. And, although he claims he 

interviewed employees who informed him the recording had been 

destroyed two months after his arrest, he provides no evidence

supporting this claim. Nor does he assert that any of his appointed 

attorneys were aware of the video recording, or had any reason to be 

aware of it, before its alleged destruction. Accordingly, he has not 

demonstrated that trial counsel's conduct fell below prevailing

professional norms or that he was prejudiced by counsel's conduct.

(Id. at 4-5.) 

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Here, the Arizona court rejected this claim on its merits. Accordingly, the 

limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) apply.

The Arizona Court of Appeals applied a standard requiring “that counsel’s 

performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency 

prejudiced the defendant.” (Exhibit N, Mem. Dec. 8/13/12 at 4 (quoting State v. Bennett, 

213 Arizona 562, ¶ 21, 146 P.3d 63, 68 (2006)).) Petitioner makes no argument that 

this is contrary to the standard of Strickland. Nor does Petitioner proffer anything to 

show that it was an unreasonable application of federal law or an unreasonable 

determination of the facts.

Counsel’s Knowledge of Video – Petitioner counters the Arizona Court of 

Appeals finding that there was nothing to suggest that counsel was aware of the tape by 

arguing that Petitioner “notified the 1st counsel appointed Ray Hanna of the exculpatory 

evidence, the surveillance video and he refused to even try to obtain it.” (Reply, Doc. 17 

at 15.) Petitioner reports being told that the video destruction occurred “every two 

months” (id. at 16), which presumably would have been during Hanna’s tenure, 

Petitioner having sought to replace Hanna “[l]ess than two months” after his appointment 

(Exhibit D, Opening Brief at 1).

3

Petitioner proffers nothing beyond his own statement to establish counsel’s 

knowledge of the surveillance tape.4 Even presuming counsel was aware of the tape, 

Petitioner fails to establish that it would have been helpful.

No Audio – The Arizona court concluded that the lack of an audio recording 

rendered the surveillance video irrelevant on the basis that the consent to the search was 

verbal. Petitioner argues that even without audio, the surveillance video would have 

shown a variety of improper acts, including the officer pointing a gun at him and 

immediately swabbing the vehicle, the timeline of the conversations, and potentially 

 

3

Petitioner describes his conversation with counsel Hanna as occurring on May 25, 

2007, just 23 days after his arrest. (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit 5, Petitioner’s Affidavit at 

1.)

4

Petitioner relates that counsel Hanna told Petitioner “there are no tapes.” (Petition, 

Doc. 1, Exhibit 5, Petitioner’s Affidavit at 2.) 

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“how the contraband got behind the passenger’s seat.” (Id. at 15.) 

Petitioner fails to explain how the officer producing a gun or swabbing the vehicle 

would have disproven his having given verbal consent. To the extent that Petitioner 

might intend to suggest that the gun or an unauthorized swabbing rendered his verbal 

consent involuntary, Petitioner fails to show that these facts were ever presented to the 

state courts as part of his claims.

5

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), Petitioner may obtain 

relief from the state court’s decision on the merits by showing that it was “based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Nowhere in his Petition for Review did 

Petitioner argue that his verbal consent was involuntary, nor did he assert that the 

officers pointed a gun at him or swabbed the vehicle prior to his consent. Indeed, 

Petitioner has consistently maintained that no consent was ever given. (See Exhibit L, 

Amended PCR Petition; Exhibit S1-B, Petition for Review; Exhibit S1-C, Reply on 

PFR.) 

To the extent that Petitioner simply proffers those allegations as support for his 

contention that he was under arrest at the time any consent would have been given, 

Petitioner fails to suggest how that would prove he had not given his consent, nor even 

that it was involuntary. 

Nor does Petitioner explain how the timeline of visible events from the video 

would negate his having given consent. To be sure, there were discrepancies between 

the arresting officers as to the precise timeline. In disposing of Petitioner’s direct 

appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the testimony at the suppression 

hearing:

At the evidentiary hearing, the Sheriff's Office detectives testified 

consistent with the facts as stated above, although there were some 

inconsistencies. Hood, for example, testified he was not sure if 

Rumpf began searching Mided's truck before Hood told him 

 

5

In her Anders brief, appellate counsel observed that Petitioner’s “third appointed 

counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that Appellant’s alleged 

consent to the search was coerced.” (Exhibit D, Opening Brief at 2.) However, 

Petitioner did not raise such allegations in his petition for review (Exhibit S1-B).

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Humphrey admitted there were drugs in the truck. Rumpf stated 

Hood told him of Humphrey's admission after Mided consented to 

the search, but before Rumpf searched the vehicle. Long testified 

that he did not learn of Humphrey's statement until after he and 

Rumpf had begun the search, but that he and Rumpf did not begin 

the search until after Mided had consented. Mided maintained he 

never consented to the search.

(Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 10/29/09 at 5.) Petitioner now alleges:

The video evidence, had counsel obtained it would have shown 

petitioner pulling up to the gas pump, going inside to pay for gas 

and then pumping the gas into the vehicle. I[t] would have shown 

officers arriving, Rumpf point his gun at me, when he told me 

“come here I need to talk to you” (an unconstitutional act), it would 

also show the timeline of me talking to Rumpf, Hood removing the 

passenger and Long immediately swabbing the vehicle, showing 

Rumpf searching too minutes (approx 5) showing Long was 

searching with the first minute or two. 

(Reply, Doc. 17 at 15.) Again, Petitioner never alleged any of these facts to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Exhibit S1-B, Petition for Review; Exhibit S1-C, Reply on PFR.) 

Moreover, nothing in what Petitioner alleges would have negated a finding that the 

search of the vehicle was conducted with Petitioner’s consent. Petitioner admits he 

talked to Rumpf before the search and swabbing of the vehicle began. Petitioner does 

not suggest how the video could establish that his conversation with Rumpf did not 

include a consent to the search.

Petitioner offers nothing but speculation that the video would show how the 

contraband got in his vehicle. Moreover, Petitioner’s argument to the state court was not 

that the contraband was not his (e.g. perhaps to suggest it was planted by the officers), 

but simply that he had not consented to the search.

Destruction – Petitioner argues that whether or not there was audio, the 

surveillance video has long since been destroyed. Petitioner contends that it remained 

available at a time that pre-trial counsel should have pursued its capture. However, the 

destruction of the tape would only be relevant if it included audio to demonstrate that 

during Petitioner’s self-admitted conversation with Detective Rumpf Petitioner did not 

consent to the search. Despite alleging various conversations with employees of the 

service station about the surveillance video, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to show 

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that audio was included.

Search Incident to Arrest or Investigatory Stop – In rejecting Petitioner’s direct 

appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the seizure of Petitioner was 

appropriate under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), etc. as an investigatory stop on the 

basis of reasonable suspicion, with the reasonable suspicion in this case resulting from 

the information provided by the confidential informant and its verification by 

Petitioner’s appearance at the place and time and in the vehicle indicated. (Exhibit F, 

Mem. Dec. 10/29/09 at 7-8.) 

Apparently in response, Petitioner argues in his related Ground Two that the 

“scene was secure,” that Petitioner “had no access to the vehicle from the outset.” 

(Petition, Doc. 1-3 at “7”, physical page 42.) In his Reply, he argues that under Arizona 

v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009),6and the preceding state court decision in State v. Gant, 

216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640 (2007), a warrantless search of his vehicle was thus no longer 

justified. 

The Supreme Court has long recognized an exception to the warrant requirement 

for searches incident to arrest and incident to an investigatory stop. In Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court recognized an exception for a pat-down for weapons where 

an officer was conducting an investigatory stop:

where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him

reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal 

activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing 

may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of 

investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 

makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages 

of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or 

others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others 

in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing 

of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 

used to assault him.

 

6 Because the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gant was decided on April 21, 2009, 

long after Petitioner’s conviction, it was unavailable to counsel at trial, and thus is 

largely irrelevant to the effectiveness of trial counsel. It did, however, predate the 

determination of his direct appeal, and thus was available to appellate counsel. 

However, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court 

in Gant. Because it does not alter the outcome, the undersigned treats the U.S. Supreme 

Court’s decision as being available to both appellate and trial counsel.

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392 U.S. at 30. 

Similarly, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court recognized an 

exception for protective searches incident to an arrest, and expanded it to include areas 

within the reach of the arrestee, even if not on his person: 

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 

search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the 

latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. 

Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the 

arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the 

arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the 

arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 

And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a 

weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like 

rule.

395 U.S. at 762-63. 

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court acknowledged 

that evidence of a crime discovered in the course of a warrantless but proper protective 

search of a suspect could nonetheless be used against the suspect.

In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Court expanded the scope of a 

Terry search incident to an investigatory stop to include “the area surrounding a suspect” 

in which a weapon might be hidden and within the grasp of the suspect. 463 U.S. at 

1049. 

In Gant, however, the Court clarified that the exception to the warrant 

requirement for such protective searches was not a free ranging invitation to search. The 

Court held that the rationale for the protective search “authorizes police to search a 

vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and 

within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Gant, 

556 U.S. at 343. Under Gant, and Petitioner’s allegations that he was removed from and 

unable to access the vehicle at the time the search was conducted, the search would 

arguably not have been permissible as a protective search incident to an investigatory 

stop or an arrest. 

Petitioner’s Gant argument is misplaced, however, for two reasons. First, in his 

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direct appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals did not rely upon Terry to justify the search 

of the vehicle and seizure of the drugs, but only to address Petitioner’s argument “that 

the detectives illegally seized him.” (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 10/29/09 (emphasis added).) 

Thus, the state court was not required to apply the analysis under Gant or its 

predecessors concerning the limits on a search for weapons or resulting seizures of 

evidence.

Second, in his petition for review in his PCR proceedings, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals again did not rely upon the warrant exception for protective searches, but upon 

Petitioner’s consent to the search. With that consent, officers no longer were required to 

limit their search to a protective search for weapons within his reaching distance.

Thus, even if the video would have shown that Petitioner was “secured” away 

from the vehicle, it would not have invalidated the consent based search.

Prejudice - To establish prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As 

discussed hereinabove, Petitioner fails to assert allegations that would establish a 

reasonable probability that the surveillance tape would have resulted in a different 

finding on the suppression issue. Nor did Petitioner present evidence to that effect to 

the state courts, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

As noted by the Arizona court on direct appeal, both Detectives Rumpf and Long 

testified that the search of the vehicle did not begin until after Petitioner had consented to 

the search.7 As discussed hereinabove, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to show that 

the video tape would have contradicted that testimony, let alone have overcome it.

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes the Petitioner has failed to 

 

7

Petitioner suggests in his Ground Two that Detective Long’s testimony was not first 

hand knowledge, but based on an after-the-fact review of Detective Rumpf’s written 

report of the incident. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) That, of course, does not establish that the 

surveillance video would have negated a finding of consent.

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show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the surveillance video. Even 

if this Court could find that trial counsel was ineffective, Petitioner has failed to show 

that the rejection of his claim of ineffectiveness based upon the video tape was an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law or an unreasonable determination of the 

facts.

Interview Witnesses – Petitioner contends counsel should have interviewed the 

service station employees to secure information on the video tape. For the reasons 

discussed above, that video tape would not have altered the outcome, and thus 

interviewing the employees concerning the matter has not been shown to have been 

prejudicial. This claim is without merit.

Plea Agreement – Petitioner complains that counsel Hanna attempted to coerce 

him into a plea agreement. It appears that Petitioner simply raises this as part of the res 

gestae of his narrative that counsel Hanna was not diligently representing him.

Even if Petitioner intended to raise this as a separate claim, Petitioner did not 

enter into such an agreement. Whatever detrimental effect any such efforts by counsel 

Hanna might have had, they would have been erased by the appointment of Petitioner’s 

second and third counsel thereafter. This claim is without merit.

Motion to Suppress – Petitioner complains that counsel failed to file an 

appropriate motion to suppress. Petitioner’s third counsel filed a motion to suppress “on 

grounds that [Petitioner’s] alleged consent to the search was coerced.” (Exhibit D, 

Opening Brief at 2.) In contrast, at the suppression hearing (while self-represented) and 

in the present proceeding Petitioner has not contended that a consent was coerced but 

that none was given.

However, Petitioner fails to establish that any motion to suppress would have 

been granted. Thus, even a motion to suppress mimicking Petitioner’s present arguments 

would have been futile. “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 

572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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This claim is without merit.

Suppression Hearing – Petitioner complains that counsel failed to adequately 

prepare for the suppression hearing, in turn leaving Petitioner to litigate on his own. 

Petitioner fails to suggest what additional preparation was required. To the extent that 

Petitioner relies upon the omitted surveillance video and related witnesses, Petitioner 

fails (as discussed hereinabove) to establish that a different result would have occurred 

had such evidence been presented. 

Even if Petitioner were understood as arguing that the prejudice from the failure 

to prepare was the impact on Petitioner’s decision to proceed without counsel, Petitioner 

proffers nothing beyond the surveillance video evidence to establish that a different 

result would have occurred had Petitioner been represented by counsel at the suppression 

hearing. Petitioner does not, for example, provide additional testimony or other evidence 

that would have negated a finding of consent. Thus, whatever Petitioner’s limitations 

may have been, he proffers nothing to establish that counsel would have obtained a 

different result.

This claim is without merit.

Appellate Counsel – Finally, Petitioner complains that appellate counsel failed to 

raise arguments on direct appeal on these issues.

To the extent that Petitioner believes appellate counsel should have raised his 

claims of ineffective assistance, Petitioner neglects to consider the impact of the 

direction by the Arizona appellate courts that such claims must be brought in a petition 

for post-conviction relief. The Martinez Court observed: “The State of Arizona does not 

permit a convicted person alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel to raise that 

claim on direct review. Instead, the prisoner must bring the claim in state collateral 

proceedings.” Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012). 

To the extent that Petitioner believes that appellate counsel should have directly 

challenged the suppression of the evidence, then for the reasons discussed hereinabove, 

Petitioner fails to establish that such an argument would have been fruitful. 

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This claim is without merit. 

Summary – For the reasons discussed hereinabove, Petitioner has failed to show 

that his pre-trial, trial or appellate counsel were ineffective. Accordingly, Ground Three 

is without merit and must be denied.

B. GROUND TWO: ILLEGAL SEARCH

For his Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the search of his vehicle was 

unconstitutional because it was not supported by a warrant, probable cause, or consent. 

(Petition, Doc. 1-3 at “7”, physical page 42.) Respondents argue that this claim may not 

be raised on habeas review pursuant to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 494 (1976) because 

Petitioner had an opportunity for a full and fair hearing on the claim. (Answer, Doc. 11 

at 6-7.) 

Petitioner argues that he did not have such an opportunity because the trial judge 

relied on “notes” of the suppression hearing rather than the actual reporters transcript in 

making his decision, and the notes were incorrect. Thus, he argues, the trial court’s 

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Reply, Doc. 17 at 4-

7.) Petitioner further argues that the search was not a valid search incident to arrest 

pursuant to State v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1 (2007), the testimony of consent was 

uncorroborated, no probable cause supported the search, and this Court should establish 

a “bright-line” rule requiring written consents to a search. (Reply, Doc. 17 at 7-12.)

Exclusionary Rule Not Applicable on Habeas – Petitioner argues that the state 

courts erred in allowing consideration of the evidence seized from his vehicle. Such a 

claim would be based upon the trial court’s failure to enforce the exclusionary rule, 

which normally precludes the introduction of evidence obtained from an illegal search. 

But, the exclusionary rule is not applicable in these proceedings. “Exclusion is 

‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned 

by an unconstitutional search. The rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to 

deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” Davis v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011). 

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In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court recognized that habeas 

proceedings are so far removed from the offending conduct that any deterrent effect is 

outweighed by the societal cost of ignoring reliable, trustworthy evidence and the 

judicial burden of litigating collateral issues. Thus, the Court held that “where the State 

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a 

state prisoner may not be granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence 

obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. at 494. 8

Petitioner argues he was not provided an opportunity for a full and fair litigation 

of his claim because the trial court relied on its notes rather than a reporter’s transcript of 

the proceedings. However, Petitioner points to no authority precluding a fact-finder 

from utilizing its own notes to resolve a factual issue. The undersigned knows of none. 

Indeed, the federal courts have long permitted juries to take and consider their own notes 

in deciding a case. See e.g. Harris v. U.S., 261 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1958). 

Nor does Petitioner point to any authority requiring a fact finder to consult a 

reporter’s transcript before deciding an issue. The undersigned knows of none.

The heart of Petitioner’s argument seems to be, not that the judge consulted his 

notes, but that the notes were (according to Petitioner) an incorrect summary of the 

actual testimony. However, Stone did not mandate a correct determination of a Fourth 

Amendment claim. 

Indeed, in Mack v. Cupp, 546 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1977), the petitioner argued that 

he was entitled to raise his Fourth Amendment claims in his habeas petition because the 

state court had wrongly resolved various factual issues and had considered facts that 

were not in the record. The Ninth Circuit observed in comparison that the standard 

applicable to granting evidentiary hearings in a habeas proceeding (the “Townsend” 

standard) was “concerned with the accuracy of the state’s decision making, a 

consideration that is not relevant to the mandate of Stone v. Powell.” 564 F.2d at 901. 

 

8

This limitation on consideration of Fourth Amendment claims does not extend to 

related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 

365 (1986). 

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“Nevertheless, the court's mistaken recitation of the facts, even assuming arguendo that it 

resulted in an incorrect decision, is not enough, in and of itself, to establish that Mack's 

claims were not fully and fairly considered.” Id. at 902. See also Locks v. Sumner, 703 

F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Petitioner poses the question “what is Fair?” (Reply, Doc. 17 at 4 (emphasis in 

original).) The answer from the Ninth Circuit is that “fair” is something other than 

“correct.”

It is true that Petitioner has complained repeatedly throughout his proceedings 

about the limitations on his capabilities of self-representation at the suppression hearing. 

However, other than the surveillance video and related witnesses, Petitioner points to 

nothing which he was unable to present at his suppression hearing. Under the facts 

alleged by Petitioner, the surveillance video was not lost, however, because of any 

deficiency in the state court’s hearing on his suppression motion. Indeed, it purportedly 

had been taped over long before Petitioner was self-represented, and long before the 

suppression hearing itself.

Here, Petitioner clearly had a full and fair opportunity to present his Fourth 

Amendment claims to not only the trial court, but also the appellate court. See Johnson 

v. Meacham, 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978) (full and fair opportunity provided by 

opportunity for review on appeal, even though claim ultimately denied for failure to raise 

it at trial). Petitioner’s invitation for this Court to reexamine the correctness of the 

determinations in those proceedings is the very sort of invitation that the Supreme Court 

concluded in Stone must be declined. 

Rule Making Not Appropriate - Similarly, this Court must decline Petitioner’s 

invitation to “set a bright-line rule” requiring the use of written consent forms. The clear 

import of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is to limit the use of habeas review of state court 

decisions on the merits of a federal claim to the search for decisions that have misapplied 

law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, either previous to the state court’s 

decision or explicitly made retroactive by the U.S. Supreme Court. Because the Arizona 

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courts have addressed Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims on the merits, this Court 

cannot engage in after-the-fact rulemaking to upset their decisions.

C. GROUND FOUR: PROCEDURAL BAR

In his Ground Four, Petitioner argues that his right of self-representation was 

denied “once Petitioner was forced to choose between poor inadequate counsel and selfrepresentation by not giving Petitioner access to necessary materials for defense.” 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents argue that this claim was procedurally barred by the Arizona Court 

of Appeals in Petitioner’s PCR proceeding based upon Petitioner’s failure to raise them 

on direct appeal. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 9-11.)

Petitioner replies that the fault lies with appellate counsel, and the limitations on 

his access to legal resources during trial. (Reply, Doc. 17 at 18-19.) 

1. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Exhaustion Requirement - Generally, a federal court has authority to review a 

state prisoner’s claims only if available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth 

v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed 

in case law, has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas 

relief, the burden is on the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each 

claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. 

denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

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1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Procedural Default - Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without 

prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a 

petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, 

and those remedies are now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the 

petitioner has "procedurally defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas 

relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally 

proper absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 

468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Procedural Bar - Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of 

barring claims actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent 

showings of ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a 

state court [has] declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had 

failed to meet a state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on 

independent and adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 

131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

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Application to Ground Four – Here, Petitioner raised the instant claim in his 

Petition for Review in his PCR proceedings. The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed 

the claim and found it procedurally barred

However, Mided's claim that his waiver of counsel was involuntary 

is precluded by Rule 32.2(a)(3) because it could have been, but was 

not, raised on direct appeal. For the same reason, we find precluded 

his claim that the state interfered with his right to self-representation 

by denying him access to resources he believed necessary to mount 

his defense.

(Exhibit N, Mem. Dec. 8/13/12 at 3.)

Petitioner makes no suggestion that the waiver bar under Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) is not independent and adequate. 

2. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural 

defaults based on: (1) the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel; and (2) the limitations on 

his legal resources during trial.

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Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel – Ineffective assistance of counsel 

may constitute cause for failing to properly exhaust claims in state courts and excuse 

procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel showing “cause” is itself subject to the 

exhaustion requirements. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986); Edwards v. 

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). Accordingly, “[t]o the extent that petitioner is alleging 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause for the default, the exhaustion 

doctrine requires him to first raise this ineffectiveness claim as a separate claim in state 

court.” Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, Petitioner has never asserted to the state courts a claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise arguments concerning his right of selfrepresentation. Indeed, in rejecting the underlying substantive claims, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals noted: “Finally, Mided does not argue his appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise this claim.” (Exhibit N, Mem. Dec. 8/13/12 at 3.) 

Accordingly, Petitioner may not rely upon any such ineffectiveness as cause to 

avoid the procedural bar of his claim.

Limitations on Legal Resources – Petitioner complains about the limits on his 

legal resources while incarcerated in the Yavapai County Jail during trial. While such 

limitations might be relevant to the merits of his procedurally barred claim, they are 

irrelevant to showing cause for his failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. Not only 

was Petitioner represented by appellate counsel at that time, and thus not dependent upon 

his own legal resources, but his Supplemental Brief on direct appeal reflects that he was 

then incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison in Yuma, Arizona, not the Yavapai County 

Jail.

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Although both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural 

default, a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

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establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

3. Actual Innocence as Cause

Petitioner argues that failing to hear his claim would result in a “miscarriage of 

justice.” (Reply, Doc. 17 at 18.) 

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner asserts that had his efforts at litigating his claims not been 

obstructed, “petitioner would have gained employee interviews, and witnesses, and 

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evidence to prove his innocence.” (Reply, Doc. 17 at 19.) Those broad and conclusory 

assurances are not sufficient to meet the requirements under Schulp. 

The only actual evidence or testimony that Petitioner suggests is available to him 

is the surveillance video. However, Petitioner mainly contends that its function would 

be to show an unconstitutional search. An unconstitutional search does not establish 

Petitioner’s actual innocence - - it is irrelevant to his actual innocence. The only manner 

in which he contends it would relate to his actual innocence is his conclusory speculation 

that it show who planted the drugs in his car. Of course, the video no longer exists. 

(And the assumption that it would show drugs being planted contradicts testimony that 

his passenger was aware of and admitted the pre-existing presence of the drugs.) Thus, 

Petitioner offers nothing more than conjecture to support a claim of factual innocence.

Petitioner proffers no new evidence to establish his actual innocence of the crimes 

for which he was convicted. Thus, he fails to make a showing that no reasonable juror 

would have found him guilty. Accordingly his procedurally barred claims must be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the Adistrict court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.@ Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising Aout of process issued by a State court@, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner=s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

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(ACOA@) is whether the applicant has Amade a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(2). AWhere a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy ' 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court=s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.@ Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). AWhen the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner=s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.@ Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court=s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. 

To the extent that Petitioner=s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under 

the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that Ajurists of reason@ would not 

Afind it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.@

To the extent that Petitioner=s claims are rejected on the merits, under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the constitutional claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ground Four of the Petitioner's 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed March 14, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed March 14, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing 

recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability 

be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 20, 2014

13-8050r RR 14 01 30 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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