Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_11-cv-03273/USCOURTS-alnd-5_11-cv-03273-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12117ad - Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

AMANDA McBAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF DECATUR,

ALABAMA, 

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. CV-11-S-3273-NE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,Amanda McBay, Joanne Pearson, and Shannon Roberts, commenced

this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and §

504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (“the

Rehabilitation Act”), as well as the regulations implementing the ADA, 28 C.F.R. Part

35. The case currently is before this court on defendant’s motion to dismiss 1

plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). Due to the nature of plaintiffs’ claim, and the City of Decatur’s challenge 2

to the constitutionality of the ADA, the United States was entitled to and elected to

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 1. 1

Doc. no. 4. 2

FILED

 2014 Apr-11 AM 11:00

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 1 of 33
intervene. The government subsequently filed a brief in support of plaintiffs and as 3

amicus curiae. Upon consideration of the complaint, motions, and briefs, this court 4

concludes that defendant’s motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1): Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal district courts are tribunals of limited jurisdiction, “‘empowered to hear

only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article

III of the Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional

grant authorized by Congress.” University of South Alabama v. The American

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d

1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, an “Article III court must be sure of its

own jurisdiction before getting to the merits” of any action. Ortiz v. Fiberboard

Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,

523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1998)). 

A motion to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is governed

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). When ruling upon a Rule 12(b)(1) 5

 Doc. no. 10. 3

See doc. no. 13 (United States’ Motion to Participate as Amicus Curiae); doc. no. 13-1 4

(United States’ Brief as Intervenor and Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss); doc.

no. 19 (Order Granting United States’ Motion to Participate as Amicus Curiae). 

Rule 12(b)(1) provides that “a party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack 5

of subject-matter jurisdiction. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

2

Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 2 of 33
motion asserting a lack of jurisdiction on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint, the

court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true. See Williamson v.

Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).6

B. Rule 12(b)(6): Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be

Granted

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits a party to move to

dismiss a complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted,” must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires that

a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard

does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 544

U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citations omitted). 

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S.,

at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]”

devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557. 

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh 6

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

the close of business on September 30, 1981.

3

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can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at 557

(brackets omitted). 

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. 

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a complaint states

a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157-158. But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it

has not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). 

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

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must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis supplied). 

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must assume that all well-pleaded

facts alleged in the complaint are true. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S.

451, 453 (1994) (stating that on a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept as true the

factual allegations in the amended complaint”); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d

1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (setting forth the facts in the case by

“[a]ccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations (with reasonable inferences drawn

favorably to Plaintiffs) in the complaint as true”) (alteration supplied). Accordingly,

the statements contained in the following part of this opinion as the relevant “facts” for

Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may, or may not, be the actual facts. See, e.g., Williams v.

Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1281 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006). 

II. SUMMARY OF FACTS

Plaintiffs, Amanda McBay, Joanne Pearson, and Shannon Roberts, are Alabama

residents who require a wheelchair for mobility and have limited use of their upper

extremities. Defendant, the City of Decatur, Alabama (“Decatur” or “the City”), is the 7

owner, operator and/or lessee of the facilities, real properties, and improvements that

 Doc. no. 1 ¶¶ 3-5. 7

5

Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 5 of 33
comprise Point Mallard Park (“Point Mallard”). All three plaintiffs allege that they 8

have visited Point Mallard and were “denied full, safe and equal access to the subject

property due to [the City’s] lack of compliance with the ADA.” Each plaintiff also 9

asserts that she “continues to desire and intends to visit [Point Mallard,] but continues

to be denied full, safe and equal access due to the barriers to access which continue to

exist.” 

10

Plaintiffs assert that the barriers to access at Point Mallard cause the City to be

in violation of the ADA, specifically Title II and various regulations under that Title

of the Act. Plaintiffs also assert that the City is in violation of § 504 of the 11

Rehabilitation Act and its underlying regulations. See 29 U.S.C. §794 et seq.; 34 12

C.F.R. §104 et seq. To remedy these violations, plaintiffs seek a declaration that the

City is in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, an injunctive order directing

the City to bring the facilities at Point Mallard into compliance with those acts, an

injunctive order requiring the City to evaluate and neutralize its policies and

procedures towards persons with disabilities, and reasonable fees and costs. Plaintiffs

13

Id. ¶ 6. 8

Id. ¶¶ 3-5 (alteration supplied).

9

Id. (alteration supplied). 10

Id. ¶¶ 8-27. Plaintiffs identify thirty specific barriers to access and state that other barriers

11

may be identified upon a full inspection of the premises. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. 

 Doc. no. 1 ¶¶ 28-34. 12

Id. at 12 -14 (demands for relief). 13

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Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 6 of 33
also ask, with regard to their Rehabilitation Act claim, that the City be required to

“undertake a self-evaluation” of its programs, policies, and practices that could affect

individuals with disabilities, and to modify its policies, practices and procedures as

necessary to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 

14

III. DISCUSSION

The City asserts that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for the following

reasons: (1) plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled standing to challenge the alleged

barriers to access at Point Mallard; (2) plaintiffs lack standing to challenge deficiencies

of which they are not yet aware; (3) Title II of the ADA cannot constitutionally be

applied to the circumstances alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint; (4) even if Title II of the

ADA is constitutionally valid as applied, the regulatory provisions relied upon by

plaintiffs are not susceptible to enforcement by means of private action; and (5)

plaintiffs have inadequately pled their Rehabilitation Act claims.

A. Standing

The City’s standing argument has two parts. First, the City asserts that plaintiffs

have not pled sufficient facts to establish standing. Second, the City asserts that

plaintiffs do not possess standing to assert claims for potential ADA violations that are

not listed in the complaint, but may be discovered in the future.

Id. at 14, ¶¶ (D)-(E). 14

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1. Sufficiency of pleading

To establish that she possesses standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate, among

other things, that she has suffered an “injury-in-fact” as a result of the defendant’s

conduct or omissions. See Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001). The 15

City asserts that plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that they have

actually been injured by the City’s alleged violations of the ADA. 

Each plaintiff stated in the complaint that she 

visited the Defendant’s premises at issue in this matter, and was denied

full, safe and equal access to the subject properties of Defendant which

are the subject of this lawsuit due to their lack of compliance with the

ADA. [Plaintiff] continues to desire and intends to visit the Defendant’s

premises but continues to be denied full, safe and equal access due to the

barriers to access which continue to exist.16

Plaintiffs also make the following allegations:

16. Defendant’s failure to adequately meet all of its obligations

including, inter alia, to complete a Self-Evaluation, to develop a

Transition Plan for modification of existing facilities, and to have fully

implemented all structural modifications, has denied, and continues to

deny, Plaintiffs full, safe and equal access to Defendant’s programs,

services and activities that are otherwise available to persons without

disabilities at the Park.

. . . .

The other requirements are a casual connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the

15

defendant’s conduct, and proof that the plaintiff’s injury will be adequately redressed by a victory

in the case. Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001).

 Doc. no. 1 ¶¶ 3-5 (alteration supplied). Plaintiffs also make similar allegations of being 16

denied access in other paragraphs of the complaint. See id. ¶¶ 16, 17, 19, 21, 22.

8

Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 8 of 33
19. Plaintiffs were subjected to discrimination in attempts to

access the programs, services and facilities operated and owned by

Decatur. Plaintiffs continue to desire to utilize Decatur’s programs and

services as well as return to the Park owned and operated by Decatur and

therefore will continue to suffer discrimination by Decatur in the future.

. . . .

21. Decatur has discriminated against Plaintiffs by denying full

and equal enjoyment of benefits of a service, program or activity

conducted by a public entity as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,

and by failing to remove architectural barriers pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §

35.150(c).

22. Defendant, Decatur has discriminated, and continues to

discriminate against the Plaintiffs, and others who are similarly situated,

by denying access to, and full and equal enjoyment of goods, services,

facilities, privileges, advantages and/or accommodations of Decatur in

derogation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

23. The Plaintiffs have been unable to and continue to be unable

to enjoy access to the benefits of the programs, services and facilities

owned, operated and/or leased by Decatur.17

Plaintiffs also list thirty examples of alleged deficiencies in the Point Mallard facilities

that have allegedly caused the discriminatory denial of access to those facilities. By

way of example, plaintiffs allege:

(i) At the water park, the accessible route leading to the entrances

from the parking spaces designated as accessible are too steep and

do not have handrails.

(ii) The ticket counters leading into the water park are too high for a

Id. ¶¶ 16, 19, 21-23. 17

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Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 9 of 33
wheelchair user.

(iii) The second water park area has many accessible parking spaces

that have signs that are too low to be viewed over parked vehicles.

(iv) Most access aisles at parking spaces designated as accessible are

too narrow.

(v) At the ice skating rink, the parking spaces designated as accessible

are not on the shortest accessible route to the entrance.18

The City asserts that those allegations are not sufficient because plaintiffs do not

explain exactly how the enumerated barriers to access have caused them to suffer any

injury under the ADA, and they do not specifically state whether they actually

encountered the alleged barriers during their visit(s) to Point Mallard. The court

disagrees, because the injury to plaintiffs is plain, or at least easily inferred, from each

of the enumerated deficiencies. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”)

(emphasis supplied). For example, when plaintiffs state that the accessible route from

the parking spaces to the entrance to the water park is too steep and lacks handrails, the

obvious inference is that plaintiffs were unable to traverse that route due to the

steepness of the grade and the lack of handrails. When plaintiffs state that the ticket

Id. ¶ 24(i)-(v). 18

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Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 10 of 33
counters leading into the water park are too high for a wheelchair user, the obvious

inference is that plaintiffs could not reach the ticket counters from their wheelchairs. 

Requiring plaintiffs to make explicit those obvious inferences would strain the concept

of notice pleading, even under the additional requirements imposed by the Twombly

and Iqbal decisions. 

The primary case relied upon by the City — Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.),

Inc., 631 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011) — is only persuasive authority, and it is

distinguishable. In Chapman, the plaintiff merely attached to his complaint an

“Accessibility Survey” that identified all of the defendant’s violations of ADA

regulations and the state building code “without connecting the alleged violations to

Chapman’s disability, or indicating whether or not he encountered any one of them in

such a way as to impair his full and equal enjoyment of the Store.” Id. at 954. As

such, the complaint did little more than “‘perform a wholesale audit of the defendant’s

premises.’” Id. at 955 (quoting Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., No.

CIV–S–03–1843 DFL CMK, 2005 WL 2072013, at (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2005)). The

court was therefore left to “guess which, if any, of the alleged violations deprived [the

plaintiff] of the same full and equal access that a person who is not wheelchair bound

would enjoy when shopping at” the defendant’s store. Id. at 955 (alteration supplied). 

Here, in contrast, plaintiffs did connect all of the alleged ADA violations at Point

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Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 11 of 33
Mallard to their disabilities, and they did indicate they had encountered all of the

alleged deficiencies in a manner that deprived them of access to the Point Mallard

facilities. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ ADA claimwill not be dismissed for failure to plead

sufficient facts to show that they possess standing. 

2. Standing to challenge unidentified violations

In addition to the thirty deficiencies identified in the complaint as resulting in

ADA violations, plaintiffs state: 

There are other current barriers to access and violations of the

ADA in Decatur which were not specifically identified herein as the

Plaintiffs are not required to engage in a futile gesture pursuant to 28

C.F.R. § 36.501 and, as such, only once a full inspection is performed

[19]

by Plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ representatives can all said violations and

barriers to access be identified.20

 This regulation provides, in pertinent part: 19

Any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability

in violation of the Act or this part or who has reasonable grounds for believing that

such person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation of section 303 of

the Act or subpart D of this part may institute a civil action for preventive relief,

including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order,

or other order. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the

Attorney General to intervene in the civil action if the Attorney General or his or her

designee certifiesthat the case is of general public importance. Upon application by

the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may

appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of

the civil action without the payment of fees, costs, or security. Nothing in this

section shall require a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if the

person has actual notice that a person or organization covered by title III of the Act

or this part does not intend to comply with its provisions.

28 C.F.R. § 36.501(a) (emphasis supplied).

 Doc. no.1 ¶ 25. 20

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Plaintiffs also state, with regard to their Rehabilitation Act claim, that, “[u]pon

information and belief, there are other current violations of the Rehabilitation Act in

Decatur and only once a full inspection is performed by Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’

representatives can all said violations be identified.” Plaintiffs later clarified in 21

briefing that they are not seeking any relief from the City of Decatur that extends

beyond the facilities at Point Mallard.22

The City argues that plaintiffs do not have standing to assert claims for potential

ADA violations that may be discovered in the future, but are not currently listed in the

complaint. The City relies upon the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in

Norkunas v. Seahorse NB, LLC, 444 F. App’x 412 (11th Cir. 2011). In that case, the

disabled plaintiff asserted several deficiencies in the defendant’s hotel property,

including certain deficiencies in the hotel’s accessible guestrooms. See Norkunas v.

Seahorse NB, LLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (M.D. Fla. 2010). Because the

plaintiff did not actually stay in an accessible room, however, the district court found

that he did not have standing to assert that the accessible rooms were non-ADAcompliant. Id. The court reasoned that, without knowledge of the barriers in the

Id. ¶ 34 (alteration supplied). 21

See doc. no. 9 (Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law), at 22

14 n.2 (“[I]t is not Plaintiffs’ intent to expand the scope of this case beyond Point Mallard Park or

beyond those specific facilities mentioned in Plaintiffs’ Complaint which plaintiffs believe to be part

of Point Mallard Park.”) (alteration supplied). 

13

Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 13 of 33
accessible rooms, a plaintiff “has not suffered an ‘injury in fact’ which establishes

standing at the time of filing the complaint.” Id. at 1319 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). The district court acknowledged that courts

in other Circuits had held that “a plaintiff need not encounter all barriers nor have

knowledge of all barriers to obtain relief.” Id. at 1319 n.14 (citing Steger v. Franco,

Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2000); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, 293 F.3d

1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002)). Even so, the district court found that “courts in the

Eleventh Circuit have been more cautious, requiring a showing of plaintiff’s actual

knowledge of particular barriers for the plaintiff to have standing to challenge those

barriers.” Id. (citing Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357,

1365 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Fox v. Morris Jupiter Assocs., No. 05-80689-CIV, 2007 WL

2819522, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2007)). 

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that decision on appeal. The plaintiff argued to

the Eleventh Circuit that “the statutory language of the ADA allows for standing to

bring an entire facility into compliance once one barrier is encountered,” but the

Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected that construction of the statute. Norkunas, 444 F.

App’x at 416. Instead, the Circuit panel held that, because the plaintiff “did not

experience discrimination as a result of his stay in a designated accessible room, he

was not discriminated against through barriers contained therein and he does not meet

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the injury in fact requisite for standing.” Id.

Even though the Norkunas decision is unpublished and, therefore, not binding,

this court concludes that it should be followed because it is clear, well-reasoned, and

consistent with decisions from most other courts within the Eleventh Circuit. Under

Norkunas, plaintiffs do not have standing to raise violations of the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act that they have not yet experienced. The claims sought to be asserted

in paragraphs 25 and 34 of plaintiffs’ complaint, therefore, are due to be stricken.

As another judge from this district has noted in a similar case, however, this

ruling “in no way limits [plaintiffs’] ability to amend [their] complaint.” If plaintiffs 23

later encounter additional barriers to access at Point Mallard, they may seek leave to

amend their complaint to encompass those barriers, and leave will be freely given as

justice requires. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

B. Rehabilitation Act Claim

The court will next address the City’s argument that plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation

Act claim must fail because they did not adequately allege that any particular City

departments, agencies, entities or other instrumentalities receive federal funding.24

Doc. no. 14 in James Mason v. Redstone Ridge, LLC, Civil Action No. 5:12-cv-1685- 23

AKK, at 5 (alterations supplied). 

As the United States, appearing in the capacities of intervenor and amicus curiae, points 24

out, “the existence of a valid Section 504 claim renders it unnecessary for the Court to consider at

this time the city’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of Title II.” Doc. no. 13-1 (United

States’ Brief as Intervenor and Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), at 4. More

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Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 15 of 33
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states, in the part pertinent to the following

discussion, that: 

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States .

. . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance . . . . 

29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis supplied). The statute defines the term “program or

activity” as including

all of the operations of — 

(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or

other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or 

(B) the entity of such State or local government that

distributes such assistance and each such department or agency

(and each other State or local government entity) to which the

assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local

government . . . 

any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.

29 U.S.C. § 794(b). The former Fifth Circuit has held, in the context of interpreting

the phrase “program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” that

it is not sufficient, for purposes of bringing a discrimination claim under

section 504, simply to show that some aspect of the relevant overall entity

specifically, the United States states that “[t]he city’s obligations are the same pursuant to Section

504 and Title II, and so as long as [sic] the plaintiffs maintain a live Section 504 claim, the

constitutionality of Title II is a purely academic question that should not be decided.” Id. at 7

(alterations supplied). 

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Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 16 of 33
or enterprise receives or has received some form of input from the federal

fisc. A private plaintiff in a section 504 case must show that the program

or activity with which he or she was involved, or from which he or she

was excluded, itself received or was directly benefitted by federal

financial assistance.

Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 769 (5th Cir. 1981). 

25

In their complaint in the present case, plaintiffs allege only that “[d]efendant is

the direct recipient of federal funds sufficient to invoke the coverage of Section 504,

and is unlawfully and intentionally discriminating against Plaintiffs on the sole basis

of the disabilities of Plaintiffs.” Plaintiffs never specify any particular City program 26

or activity that receives federal funds; and, even more importantly, they never state that

any such program or activity actually caused the Rehabilitation Act violations at issue

here. Without even a bare allegation that they actually were discriminatorily affected

by a specific program or activity that receives federal financial assistance, plaintiffs

cannot support a claim under the Rehabilitation Act. 

C. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges to the ADA

As recently as 2011, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that it intends to abide by the 25

principles set forth in Brown. See Muckle v. UNCF, 420 F. App’x. 916, 918 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Moreover, plaintiffs do not appear to challenge that Brown contains the proper standard. See doc.

no. 9 (Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law), at 37-38 (“While

Defendant may correctly be arguing that Plaintiffs will ultimately have the burden of proving that

individual departments and/or programs of the Defendant actually received federal funds sufficient

to invoke application of the Rehabilitation Act to Point Mallard Park, that argument is no basis for

dismissal at this juncture.”). 

 Doc. no. 1 ¶ 31 (alteration supplied). 26

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The ADA was enacted in 1990 with the stated purpose of creating “a clear and

comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against

individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Title II of the Act governs

discrimination in the provision of public services, and states that “no qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132

(emphasis supplied). The term “public entity” includes “any State or local

government,” as well as “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other

instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 

A private plaintiff alleging a violation of Title II has the burden of proving three

prima facie elements:

(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s

services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against

by the public entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or

discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.

American Association of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 647 F.3d 1093, 1101 (11th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir.

2007)). When passing the ADA, Congress stated its specific intent “to invoke the

sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth

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amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of

discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4)

(emphasis supplied). Despite that clear statement of Congressional intent, the City

challenges the application of Title II in this case as an invalid exercise of

Congressional power, both under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce

Clause. 

Notably, the City is not asserting immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.27

While the relevant case law regarding the constitutionality of the ADA is often

triggered by assertions of immunity, the question of whether Congress had “the power

to abrogate the states’ immunity from suit is a different question from whether the

substantive provisions of the ADA are a valid exercise of Congress’s power.” Nelson

v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 648 (6th Cir. 1999). Even so, the ADA cases triggered by an

Eleventh Amendment challenge are still instructive. 

The test for valid abrogation of a state governmental entity’simmunity under the

Eleventh Amendment is a two-step process. First, the court must ask whether

Congress intended to abrogate state immunity. University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531

U.S. 356, 363 (2001). If so, the second question is whether the act was “pursuant to

a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Id. (quoting Kimel v. Florida Board of

Doc. no. 12 (Reply of City of Decatur, Alabama, in Support of Motion to Dismiss), at 12 27

(“This, however, is not a case in which sovereign immunity has been claimed . . . .”). 

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Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). Even though immunity is not at issue in the present

case, it still is necessary to determine whether Congress validly enacted the ADA

pursuant to “one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.” United States

v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). The two potential bases of enumerated powers

at issue this case are the Commerce Clause of Article I, and Section 5 of the 28

Fourteenth Amendment: its enforcement provision. 

29

1. Fourteenth Amendment

When invoking the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for enacting the ADA,

Congress was utilizing its enforcement power under Section 5 of that Amendment,

which provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,

the provisions of this article.” The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Section 5

is “a positive grant of legislative power.” Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651

(1966). Congress is thus given the power to promulgate laws prohibiting or providing

remedies for “constitutional violations . . . even if in the process it prohibits conduct

which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy

previously reserved to the States.’” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)

(quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). The Court has thus

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate Commerce with 28

foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; . . .”) (1787). 

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate

29

legislation, the provisions of this article.”) (1868). 

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interpreted Section 5 as giving Congress a broad scope of power:

Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the

objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce

submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons

the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection

of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought

within the domain of congressional power.

Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-518 (internal citations omitted). 

Even so, the power granted to Congress by Section 5 is not without limitations.

“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has

been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a

constitutional violation.” Id. at 519. In short, this power is “remedial,” not substantive.

See id. The test which the Supreme Court has adopted to determine whether legislation

is remedial or substantive is one of “congruence and proportionality.” Id. at 520

(“There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented

or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”). That test implicates three issues for

analysis by a court in the context of a challenge to the validity of the ADA, i.e.: 

(1) the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce

when it enacted the ADA; (2) whether there was a history of

unconstitutional discrimination to supportCongress’s determination that

prophylactic legislation was necessary; and (3) whether Title II is an

appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment.

Association for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Florida International University, 405

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F.3d 954, 957 (11th Cir. 2005) (hereinafter “FIU”) (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-

370). Additionally, a court applying the test must “consider the harm to be prevented

on a ‘claim-by-claim basis.’” Gaylor v.Georgia Department of Natural Resources, No.

2:11–CV–288–RWS, 2012 WL3516489, *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2012) (quoting United

States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006)).

The City has elected not to present a substantive argument on the second issue

generally addressed by a court in the context of a challenge to the constitutionality of

the ADA — i.e., whether there was a history of unconstitutional disability

discrimination to support Congress’s determination that prophylactic legislation was

necessary. Thus, the court will discuss only the first and third factors. For the 30

beginning step of the analysis — i.e., determining “ the constitutional right or rights

that Congress sought to enforce” — there are two relevant categories of cases. The

first category, encompassing those cases in which the plaintiff “seeks to enforce the

Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘prohibition on irrational discrimination,’” are examined

under rational basis review. FIU, 405 F.3d at 957. Naturally, all valid claims under

Doc. no. 5 (City’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss), at 25 (“The Eleventh Circuit 30

has at times interpreted dicta from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane to imply that the second

step of the Flores inquiry has been conclusively met. . . . Because it is not necessary to make a

contrary assumption in order to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a Title II cause of action in

the circumstances of this case, below, the City skips over the historical component of the inquiry and

focuses on the nature of the right sought to be protected and the absence of congruence and

proportionality between that right and the chosen congressional remedy.”). 

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Title II of the ADA will include discrimination against a disabled plaintiff and, thus,

will trigger at least rational basis review. The second category of authorities, however,

narrows the first category to a smaller field of cases involving disability discrimination

that inherently impacts heightened constitutional rights, thereby requiring a “more

searching judicial review.” Id. (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 539 (2004)). 

For example, the Lane case addressed access barriers that prevented disabled persons

from taking part in court proceedings — barriers that, in turn, affected their

fundamental rights under the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses. Lane, 541 U.S.

at 530; see also FIU, 405 F.3d at 957. The holding in Lane was explicitly limited “to

the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services.” Lane, 541 U.S. at

530. 

It is true that other circuits and districts have narrowed the scope of valid Title

II claims solely to those implicating a fundamental right. Even so, the Eleventh Circuit

has not followed that path. In FIU, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the ADA under Section

5 “as applied to access to public education.” FIU, 405 F.3d at 958. The court admitted

that public education is not a “fundamental right,” but nevertheless distinguished it

from other rights that warrant only rational basis review by characterizing public

education as “vital to the future success of our society.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit’s

decision in FIU is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v.

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Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). There, the Court found that Section 5 validly created

private remedies for actual Fourteenth Amendment violations, but it left open the

question of whether claims for Title II violations that did not independently violate the

Fourteenth Amendment were “nevertheless valid.” Id. at 159. Additionally, the

Supreme Court has recognized that Congress’s Section 5 power allows it to prohibit

“a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by

the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s text.” Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81

(2000) (alteration supplied). Thus, this court concludes that Congressintended for the

scope of the ADA to reach past solely fundamental rights. 

In the present case, plaintiffs allege Title II violations with regard to a water

park, parking spaces, ice skating rink, campgrounds, picnic area,sports field,recreation

center, and swimming pools. There is much debate in the parties’ briefs as to whether 31

these facilities should be considered “entertainment and recreation” facilities (as

suggested by the City), or forums for exercising the rights to assembly, association, and

speech (as suggested by plaintiffs), or merely part of the broad category of “public

facilities” (as suggested by the United States). It is not necessary to resolve that

debate, however, because, as discussed below, even if the facilities at issue are

characterized as “entertainment and recreation” and, therefore, deserving of only

 Doc. no. 1 ¶ 24. 31

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rational basis review, they still survive scrutiny under the “congruence and

proportionality” test. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.

The next question is whether Title II, as applied to issues of equal access to

entertainment and recreational venues, is an appropriate remedial measure for the

history of unconstitutional discrimination identified in the statute. The right to equal

access in entertainment and recreational settings is not as compelling as the right to

equal access to the courts, governmental administration and service facilities, or even

safe public transportation routes. Even so, Congress still addressed discrimination

against people with disabilities in the realm of recreational and entertainment venues

during the drafting of the ADA, albeit primarily in connection with Title III, which

applies to private accommodations. The facilities at issue here do not fall under Title 32

III, because they are public facilities. Nevertheless, they serve functions that are

similar to the privately owned facilities addressed in Title III. It would be illogical 33

for Congressto prevent disability discrimination in privately owned accommodations,

yet allow it to occur at the hands of local governments providing similar programs in

Title III applies to “private entities” such as hotels, restaurants, theaters, convention 32

centers, retail stores, service establishments, public transportation hubs, museums, libraries, parks,

zoos, private schools, social service centers, and exercise facilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7). In

contrast, Title II applies to public entities. 

For example, it is logical to infer that Point Mallard, if privately-owned, would be “a 33

gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation,” as

defined within Title III of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L). 

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similar public locations. Moreover, that logical inconsistency would contradict the

stated purpose of the ADA — that of creating a “‘clear and comprehensive national

mandate’ to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them

‘into the economic and social mainstream of American life.’” PGA Tour, Inc. v.

Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001) (quoting S.Rep. No. 101-116, p. 20 (1989); H.R.Rep.

No 101-485, pt. 2, p. 50 (1990)). Further, because Title II only applies to remedy

“irrational discrimination,” and allows for great flexibility in determining the extent

of the “reasonable modifications” required by the implementing regulations, a public

entity like defendant is not unduly burdened by the statute’s remedial requirements. 

Indeed, Congressional investigations into the potential costs of Title II compliance

have found that retrofitting older facilities does not have to be expensive, and that 34

building new facilities to be accessible is not a burden either. Thus, this court finds 35

that, as applied to entertainment and recreational venues like those described in

plaintiffs’ complaint, Title II is a congruent and proportional exercise of Congressional

“Numerous inexpensive changes can be made to make a facility accessible, including 34

installing a permanent or portable ramp over an entrance step; installing offset hinges to widen a

doorway; relocating a vending machine to clear an accessible path; and installing signage to indicate

accessible routes and features within facilities.” H.R.Rep. No 101-485, pt. 2, p. 35-36 (1990).

“Several witnesses also recognized that newly constructed build-ups should be fully 35

accessible because the additional costs for making new facilities accessible are often nonexistent or

negligible. According to Michael Oestreicher, who directs an architectural firm that designs

barrier-free environments, there is absolutely no reason why new buildings constructed in America

cannot be barrier-free since additional cost is not a significant factor.” H.R.Rep. No 101-485, pt. 2,

p. 36 (1990).

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power under Section 5. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.

2. Commerce Clause

Because this Court has found that Title II, as applied to plaintiffs’ claims, is a

valid exercise of Section 5 enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, there

is no need to determine Title II’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause of

Article I of the United States Constitution. “A fundamental and longstanding principle

of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in

advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S.

439, 445 (1988)). 

D. Private Right of Action

Defendants also argue that, even if the ADA is a valid exercise of Congressional

power, the “plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed to the extent that they are based upon

or attempt to rely upon technical, abstract violations” of the regulations promulgated

by the United States Attorney General for the purpose of implementing the ADA. It 36

has been recognized that a regulation can “be enforced through the private right of

action available under the organic statute that it implements.” Iverson v. City of Boston,

452 F.3d 94, 100 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284-285

 Doc. no. 5, at 48. 36

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(2001)). That application is limited, however, and excludes private enforcement

actions based upon “regulations that go beyond what the statute itself requires.”

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293 n. 8. As the Sixth Circuit has observed,

a private plaintiff cannot enforce a regulation through a private cause of

action generally available under the controlling statute if the regulation

imposes an obligation or prohibition that is not imposed generally by

the controlling statute. On the other hand, if the regulation simply

effectuates the express mandates of the controlling statute, then the

regulation may be enforced via the private cause of action available

under that statute.

Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir.

2004). 

The Eleventh Circuit has applied the foregoing principles to bar any

“freestanding private right of action to enforce a statute’s implementing regulation

unless Congress has clearly indicated, expressly or impliedly, to the contrary.”

American Association of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 605 F.3d 1124, 1133 (11th

Cir. 2010) (“Harris I”), opinion vacated upon rehearing on other grounds by American

Association of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 647 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2011)

(“Harris II”). The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Harris I noted the specific provision 37

of an enforcement remedy in the statutory language of the ADA itself, finding that

“[t]he regulations, by contrast, interpret and define the scope of the ADA,” rather than

While Harris has been vacated on re-hearing on other, factually-related grounds, the 37

reasoning on this point is still valid and persuasive. 

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provide any sort of private right of action that is already present in the statute. Id.

(alteration supplied). 

The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits reached the same conclusion, and based their

opinions on Sandoval. See Iverson, 452 F.3d at 100; Ability Center, 385 F.3d at 913;

Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2009). In Ability Center v.

Sandusky, the plaintiffs asserted two ADA claims: failure to install accessible curb

ramps on renovated sidewalks; and, failure to apply the transition plan required by

ADA regulations. Ability Center, 385 F.3d at 902. The Sixth Circuit, applying

Sandoval, found that the defendant’s failure to install accessible curb ramps when

renovating streets and sidewalks gave rise to a valid claim for violation of the ADA,

because the statutory language contemplated such injuries and remedies. Id. at 913. 

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ second claim, however, finding the defendant’s

failure to “develop a transition plan in violation of § 35.150(d) does not in and of itself

similarly hinder the disabled.” Id. at 914. 

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, and denied the

claim of a plaintiff who was attempting to enforce the transition plan required by 28

C.F.R. § 35.150(d). Lonberg, 571 F.3d at 852. 

The First Circuit also denied a claim based on the transition plan regulation, as

well as a claim of violation based on the ADA regulatory self-evaluation plan. See

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Ability Center, 452 F.3d at 101. That court pointed out the “important distinction”

between claims that allege “violations of, and [a] concomitant right to enforce, the selfevaluation and transition plan regulations,” on the one hand, and a claim asserting “a

direct violation of Title II,” on the other. Id. at 100 (alteration supplied). 

Therefore, the task for this court is to determine whether plaintiffs’ claims are

based upon “express mandates of the controlling statute,” Ability Center, 385 F.3d at

907, or “go beyond what the statute itself requires.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293 n. 8. 

Like the plaintiffs in Iverson, the plaintiffs in the present case have based their

claims on a mixture of the ADA regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, and

remedies expressly provided in the statute itself. Plaintiffs reference both the transition

plan and the self-evaluation required by 28 C.F.R. § 35.105, and claim that the City’s

failure to develop and implement those plans has denied them their rights to equal

access under the ADA. As with similar claims addressed by the previously cited 38

opinions of the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, this part of the plaintiffs’ claim in the

present case is not enforceable as a private right of action. Even so, the plaintiffs’

ADA claim is not based solely on those regulations. Plaintiffs also allege the City’s

failure to complete required structural changes needed for “equal program, service, or

Doc. no. 1 ¶¶ 11-13. 38

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activity access,” and they claim discrimination “as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. §12101 39

et seq., and by failing to remove architectural barriers pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §

35.150(c).” While the lack of a self-evaluation or transition plan does not directly 40

harm plaintiffs, defendant’s failure to make reasonable modifications to eliminate or

ameliorate structural barriers to equal access does directly harm plaintiffs in a manner

anticipated by Title II. This court agrees with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that 

“Title II contemplates that such accommodations must sometimes come in the form of

public entities removing architectural barriers that impede disabled individuals from

securing the benefits of public services.” Ability Center, 385 F.3d at 907. As a

41

consequence, this court concludes that plaintiffs possess a valid and enforceable private

right of action for those alleged violations of the ADA that fall under the express

mandate of the statute.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ claim for a violation of Title II of the ADA

is enforceable in this private cause of action as it pertains to the express mandate of

Title II. Plaintiffs’ claim cannot be based on either the self-evaluation or transition

Id. ¶ 14. 39

Id. ¶ 21. 28 C.F.R. §35.150(c) demands that structural changes undertaken to existing 40

facilities must be made either within three years of January 26, 1992, or “as expeditiously as

possible.”

 The Sixth Circuit, in Ability Center, found 28 C.F.R. §35.151 to be enforceable through 41

a private cause of action. This regulation requires new construction and alternations to existing

construction to be made accessible. 

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plan regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, but the lack of compliance with

those regulations can, nevertheless, be cited as evidence of overall ADA noncompliance. In their request for relief, plaintiffs ask the court to direct defendant “to

evaluate and neutralize its policies and procedures . . . to allow Defendant to undertake

and complete corrective procedures.” To the extent that plaintiffs are requesting this 42

court to order compliance with the transition plan and self-evaluation regulations

referenced in the complaint, the request is denied. Even so, plaintiffs’ claimis properly

based on their allegations of discrimination in equal access and defendant’s failure to

reasonably modify structural barriers. 

IV CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

In accordance with the foregoing, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claim (Count II) is

DISMISSED with prejudice. The claims sought to be asserted in paragraphs 25 and

34 of the complaint also are stricken and DISMISSED, but without prejudice to

plaintiffs’ right to amend their complaint to add additional violations that may be

discovered in the future. The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to all other aspects of

plaintiffs’ ADA claim (Count I). 

The stay on discovery is lifted, and the parties are ORDERED to proceed with

Doc. no. 1, at 14 ¶ (C). 42

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Case 5:11-cv-03273-CLS Document 22 Filed 04/11/14 Page 32 of 33
discovery pursuant to the Uniform Initial Order that will be entered contemporaneously

herewith. The parties must submit a report of their discovery planning conference on

or before April 25th, 2014. 

DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of April, 2014.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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