Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04367/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04367-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRED HEMPSTEAD,

Petitioner,

 vs.

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PAROLE

HEARINGS,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-4367 CRB (PR)

ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Fred Hempstead, a prisoner at San Quentin State Prison, filed a pro se

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the

California Board of Prisoner Terms’ (“BPT”) decision of July 21, 2004 finding

him not suitable for parole. 

On February 27, 2006, the court found that petitioner’s claim appears

cognizable under § 2254 and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of

habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and petitioner

filed a traverse. 

Case 3:05-cv-04367-CRB Document 10 Filed 03/22/07 Page 1 of 6
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On December 6, 2006, petitioner filed a second petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under § 2254 alleging that on December 2, 2005, the California

Board of Parole Hearings ("BPH") (formerly BPT) found him suitable for parole,

but on April 17, 2006, the governor exercised his discretion and reversed the

BPH's decision. Petitioner's challenge to the governor's reversal of his parole

grant is the subject the second petition and is not before the court at this time. 

The only issue before the court at this time is whether the BPH’s

December 2005 decision finding petitioner suitable for parole rendered moot

petitioner’s instant challenge to the BPT’s July 2004 parole denial. Per order

filed on December 11, 2006, the court ordered respondent to address this matter. 

Respondent filed an answer in response to the court’s order and petitioner filed a

supplemental traverse.

DISCUSSION

The case or controversy requirement of Article III of the United States

Constitution deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear moot cases. Iron Arrow

Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). To satisfy the Article III case

or controversy requirement, the petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened

with an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,

477 (1990). The party asserting mootness bears the burden of establishing that

there is no “effective relief” remaining that the court could provide. Southern

Oreg. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 The instant action challenging the BPT’s July 2004 decision was rendered

moot by the BPH’s subsequent December 2005 decision finding petitioner

suitable for parole. The alleged injury – a constitutionally deficient parole

suitability hearing – cannot be redressed effectively with a new parole hearing

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because petitioner has already received that relief from the BPH. Petitioner’s

petition has lost its character as a present, live controversy because the alleged

injury cannot be redressed by a favorable judicial decision against the BPH. 

Accord Smith v. Brown, No. C 04-3983 VRW (PR) (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2006)

(finding subsequent decision granting parole rendered moot challenge to earlier

decision denying parole, despite governor's reversal of parol grant).

 Petitioner claims that the BPH’s December 2005 decision finding him

suitable for parole does not moot his challenge to the BPT’s July 2004 parole

denial because he still has not been released on parole and, because the governor

and the BPT/BPH are essentially the same decision-making body, his continuing

injury is still traceable to respondent. He also claims that the protracted process

of exhausting state remedies and the frequency of BPT/BPH hearings qualifies

for the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness. The

claims are without merit.

Contrary to petitioner's assertions, there is no injury that is likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision against the BPH where, as here, the

adverse decision has been superseded by a favorable BPH decision. The most

favorable relief this court could grant petitioner is a new BPH parole hearing. 

But because petitioner has already received a new BPH hearing and has been

granted parole by the BPH, there is no continuing injury addressable to the BPH

to which this court could provide relief. Petitioner's present, live controversy is

with the governor and is the subject of his pending second habeas petition.

Petitioner's reliance on cases where the court has ordered the immediate

release of the petitioner, rather than a new BPH hearing, do not compel a

different conclusion. In those cases, the petitioner challenged the governor’s

parole reversal rather than a prior BPT/BPH finding of parole unsuitability. 

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Where the petitioner challenges the governor’s reversal, the proper judicial

remedy may preclude a new parole hearing because the BPH has already granted

parole suitability and petitioner does not contest this decision. Instead, the court

may find that proper habeas relief would require a remand to the governor for

reconsideration or possibly immediate release from custody. See, e,.g., Thomas

v. Brown, No. C 05-1332 MHP (PR), 2006 WL 3783555, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec.

21, 2006) (finding governor’s reversal of BPT parole grant was not supported by

some evidence and ordering petitioner’s immediate release from prison); Martin

v. Marshall, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (same). Such relief

may well be in order if petitioner prevails in his second petition challenging the

governor’s reversal of parole. It would be inappropriate in the context of this

petition.

Petitioner's present, live controversy arises from the decision of the

governor to reverse the BPH's grant of parole. The governor is not a party to the

instant petition and the instant petition does not challenge the governor’s

independent parole decision. Petitioner's challenge to the governor's action is the

subject of his second petition. In a similar situation, the Supreme Court of

California found, “Even though the goal of both habeas corpus proceedings was

to obtain petitioner’s release on parole, each petition challenged, on different

grounds, separate parole decisions made by independent parole authorities. 

Accordingly, we determine that the two proceedings constitute separate cases.” 

In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 669 (2002). 

Petitioner's contention that the governor and BPT/BPH are essentially the

same decision-making body and that the governor’s April 2006 reversal involves

the same issues and parties as the BPT’s July 2004 parole denial is without merit. 

While gubernatorial review of parole determinations must be supported by some

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evidence and is limited to the same factors considered by the BPT/BPH, the

governor still “undertake[s] an independent, de novo review of the prisoner’s

suitability for parole.” Id. at 660. The governor’s decision may rely upon factors

or evidence not discussed in the BPH decision and “the determination whether

some evidence supported the particular findings forming the basis for the

Governor’s decision is not the same as the determination whether some evidence

supported the factual basis for the Board’s decisions.” Id. at 670. 

Petitioner claims that his challenge to parole denial falls within the narrow

“capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. 

To qualify for this exception, petitioner must demonstrate that: “(1) the

challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its

cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same

complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Murphy v.

Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982); see Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 777 (9th

Cir. 2004) (finding that habeas petition challenging a two-year commitment

under California’s Sexual Violent Predators Act evaded review because its

duration was too short to be fully litigated prior to its expiration). 

Petitioner’s challenge to parole denial may satisfy the duration prong

under “capable of repetition yet evading review” because it is difficult for a

prisoner to complete state exhaustion and receive a ruling on the merits on a

subsequent federal habeas petition in the one or two years between parole

hearings. Considering “the frequency with which parole hearings are held, the

time it takes for a petitioner to exhaust state court remedies with respect to each

claim, and the time required for a decision in this court, it is possible that

petitioner's claims as to a particular suitability hearing could always be

considered ‘moot’ at the time a decision is rendered.” Hodge v. Carey, No. CIV

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S-02-2157 DFL EFB P, 2007 WL 163247, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan 18, 2007).

Petitioner does not demonstrate that there is a “reasonable expectation”

that he will be subjected to the same injury again, however. Petitioner's injury in

this instant action stems from the BPT’s July 2004 decision finding him

unsuitable for parole. In light of the BPH’s December 2005 decision finding him

suitable for parole, petitioner has no real expectation that he will be subjected to

the same injury as alleged in the instant action. The possibility that the BPH will

again find petitioner unsuitable for parole, without “some evidence” supporting

the decision, is simply too speculative and remote at this time to qualify for the

cited exception to mootness. See Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482-83.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the BPH’s December 2005

decision to grant parole rendered moot petitioner’s instant action challenging the

BPT’s July 2004 decision to deny parole. The instant action is DISMISSED.

Petitioner's present, live controversy lies with the governor's April 2006

decision to reverse the BPH's December 2005 parole grant and is the subject of

petitioner's separate, pending petition in this court.

The clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this order, terminate all

pending motions as moot and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 22, 2007 CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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