Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05330/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05330-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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Case No. C 09-5330 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

**E-Filed 3/22/2010**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GABRIELA R. CARNERO, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 09-5330 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

DENYING MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AND

VACATING TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER 

[re: document nos. 6, 15, 29]

Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (“Chase”) and Flagstar Bank, FSB (“Flagstar”)

move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. The Court has considered the moving and responding papers and the oral argument

presented at the hearing on March 5, 2010. For the reasons discussed below, the motions to

dismiss will be granted, with leave to amend. 

Plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in this action on January 6,

2010. Their motion for preliminary injunction was set for the same date and time as the motions

to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the motion for preliminary injunction will be

denied, and the TRO will be vacated.

Case 5:09-cv-05330-JF Document 41 Filed 03/22/10 Page 1 of 6
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Case No. C 09-5330 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

I. BACKGROUND

On October 22, 2009, Plaintiffs Gabriela Carnero (“Gabriela”) and Jose Carnero (“Jose”),

brother and sister, filed the instant action in the Santa Clara Superior Court, alleging twenty-two

claims arising out of a mortgage transaction entered into by Gabriela with respect to real property

located at 5645 Blossom Avenue, San Jose, California. The fifty-three page complaint

(excluding exhibits) is somewhat difficult to follow. Gabriela alleges that she purchased the

Blossom Avenue property in 1999. Complt. ¶ 26. In 2007, Gabriela relied upon information

presented to her by Defendant Randy Omoto (“Omoto”), a loan broker, in entering into two loans

as part of a refinance transaction. Id. ¶ 27. Gabriela subsequently discovered that she did not

need to refinance but should have obtained an home equity line of credit. Id. Omoto also

persuaded Gabriela to refinance her home on other occasions in 2001 and 2003. Id. Omoto

allegedly falsified Gabriela’s loan applications by, inter alia, inflating her income, so that she

would “qualify for a predatory loan.” Id. Defendants have refused to honor Gabriela’s attempt

to rescind the loan. Id. ¶ 32. Defendants allegedly call and harass Gabriela. Id. ¶ 33. 

Defendants refuse to modify the loan. Id. ¶ 45.

On November 10, 2009, Defendant Chase removed the action to this Court on the basis of

federal question jurisdiction. On January 6, 2010, the Court issued a TRO enjoining a trustee’s

sale that had been scheduled for January 7, 2010. The order stated as follows: “Given Plaintiffs’

pro se status, their clarification regarding the imminence of the trustee’s sale, their explanation as

to the timing of their application for TRO, and the lack of opposition, the Court will issue a TRO

effective until 5:00 p.m. on Friday, January 15, 2010, or until further order of the Court.” Order

of 1/6/2010 at 2. The Court had scheduled a hearing on Chase’s motion to dismiss for January

15. The Court subsequently continued the hearing on Chase’s motion so that it could be heard

with Flagstar’s motion to dismiss, and ordered that the status quo remain in effect pending

disposition of Defendants’ motions.

II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed

Case 5:09-cv-05330-JF Document 41 Filed 03/22/10 Page 2 of 6
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Case No. C 09-5330 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

against a defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against that

defendant. “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). For purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court “must

presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987). 

However, mere conclusions couched in factual allegations are not sufficient to state a

cause of action. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chem.

Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.1988). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A

claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Thus, “for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the

non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly

suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. ” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962,

969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

B. Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Jose is named as a plaintiff in this action even

though the complaint makes clear that Gabriela is the sole owner of the property in question. 

When questioned by the Court at the hearing, Jose indicated that the members of his family were

fully supportive of each other, but he did not identify any legal interest that he holds in the

property. The Court reminded Jose that he could not act as his sister’s attorney. Jose will be

dismissed as a named plaintiff.

Turning to the federal claims asserted in the complaint, Gabriela fails entirely to allege

the roles of each defendant in the alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15

U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. Moreover, because Gabriela obtained the loans in 2007, her damages

claims under TILA appear to be time-barred. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (one-year limitations

period for damages claims); see also King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986)

Case 5:09-cv-05330-JF Document 41 Filed 03/22/10 Page 3 of 6
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Case No. C 09-5330 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

(damages claim begins to run when the transaction underlying the alleged violation is

“consummated”). Gabriela states conclusorily that she is entitled to equitable tolling, but she

does not allege any facts that would support tolling. With respect to her rescission claim,

Gabriela has not alleged a present or future ability to tender the loan proceeds. See Avina v. BNC

Mortg., Case No. C 09-4710 JF (RS), 2009 WL 5215751, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2009)

(explaining this Court’s rationale for requiring a plaintiff to allege an ability to tender before

permitting the plaintiff to pursue a TILA rescission claim). Gabriela appears to be attempting to

assert claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2607 as

well, but her claims under that statute are equally deficient.

Unless and until Gabriela alleges a viable claim under federal law, the Court will decline

to address her state law claims. Given Gabriela’s pro se status and the fact that the operative

complaint is her original pleading, the Court will afford Gabriela an opportunity to amend to cure

the pleading deficiencies noted in this order. Any amended complaint should allege precisely

what role each defendant played in the loan transactions at issue, and how each defendant’s

actions violated particular provisions of TILA and/or RESPA. 

III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 376 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish that he

is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the

public interest.” Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 651 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374). The issuance of a preliminary injunction is committed

to the discretion of the District Court. Id. “To the extent that our cases have suggested a lesser

standard, they are no longer controlling, or even viable.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los

Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted).

The TRO issued by the Court on January 6 was issued on an emergency basis and without

opposition from Defendants. Now that the Court has had an opportunity to review Gabriela’s

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Case No. C 09-5330 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

complaint carefully, and particularly in light of the potentially dispositive legal arguments raised

by Defendants, the Court concludes that Gabriela has failed to demonstrate that she is likely to

succeed on the merits, that the balance of equities tips in her favor, or that an injunction is in the

public interest. Accordingly, her motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied. The TRO

will be vacated.

IV. ORDER

(1) Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

(2) Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED; and 

(3) the TRO issued on January 6, 2010 is VACATED.

DATED: March 22, 2010

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:09-cv-05330-JF Document 41 Filed 03/22/10 Page 5 of 6
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Case No. C 09-5330 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

Copies of Order served on:

David C. Scott dscott@mccarthyholthus.com 

Glenn Harlan Wechsler glenn@glennwechsler.com, larry@glennwechsler.com,

linda@glennwechsler.com 

Lawrence Daniel Harris larry@glennwechsler.com 

Matthew Edward Podmenik lrodriguez@mccarthyholthus.com 

Roshni V Patel RPatel@mccarthyholthus.com 

Seth Michael Harris seharris@mccarthyholthus.com, civilefile@mccarthyholthus.com 

Gabriela R Carnero

Jose R. Carnero

5645 Blossom Avenue

San Jose, CA 95123

Gabriela R Carnero

Jose R. Carnero

1558 Minnesota Avenue 1/2

San Jose, CA 95125-4445

Case 5:09-cv-05330-JF Document 41 Filed 03/22/10 Page 6 of 6