Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03100/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03100-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1 Local 10 has not yet appeared in this action. 

Although a summons was issued as to Local 10, it is unclear

whether the complaint was actually served. All other parties,

however, have consented to my jurisdiction, including entry of

final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all

proceedings.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES TROY WALKER,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOC., et

al.,

Defendant(s).

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No. C07-3100 BZ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Defendants Pacific Maritime Association, Marine Terminals

Corporation, and C&H Sugar Company, Inc. have filed motions to

dismiss Mr. Walker’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). For the reasons set forth

below, defendants’ motions are GRANTED.

On June 13, 2007, Mr. Walker filed his complaint against

the three defendants and the International Longshore Union

Local 10.1 The complaint is written on an employment

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2 Mr. Walker attached to his complaint a copy of a

typed letter describing the job incident, which he provided to

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The letter, dated

April 27, 2007 and signed under penalty of perjury, states that

he was working “on a sugar ship at C&H Sugar for Marine

Terminals” on May 1, 2002, that he sustained severe head

injuries resulting from the operation of a backhoe, and that he

has not been able to work since that time. 

3 In an unsworn letter filed in opposition to

defendants’ motions, Mr. Walker states that he “felt” that he

“was treated unfairly because I’m a A man with no family

history on the water front.” See Docket No. 23. He describes

“a B person” who was a third or fourth generation waterfront

worker who was also injured and who supposedly received more

compensation while out on injury. 

4 Attached to Mr. Walker’s complaint is the second page

of a two-page letter dated September 21, 2005 from Philip R.

Weltin of the Weltin Law Office, P.C. In the letter, attorney

Weltin appears to advise Mr. Walker that his recovery in the

case would be limited to that available under the Longshore and

Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA), and that acceptance of

a lump sum payment would be against Mr. Walker’s interests. At

the September 19, 2007 hearing on defendants’ motions, the

attorney for Marine Terminals explained that Weltin is

representing Mr. Walker in his pending LHWCA claim. 

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discrimination complaint form and claims violations of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compl. ¶ 3. In

describing the discriminatory acts complained of, Mr. Walker

describes having received severe injuries on the job.2

 Id. at

¶ 4. There is no explanation of what acts of the defendants

were discriminatory. Nor does Mr. Walker state how the

defendants’ acts were discriminatory, i.e., with regard to his

race, religion, etc.3 Id. at ¶ 5. Finally, in describing the

facts surrounding his claim for discrimination, Mr. Walker

states: “The attorney said it’s just a workman compensation

case. Why am I not getting paid for pain and suffering?”.4

Id. at ¶ 6. This is alleged to have occurred on or about

September 21, 2005. Id. at ¶ 7. 

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5 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should be

granted only if plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth facts

sufficient to establish a plausible right of recovery. See

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

For purposes of such a motion, the complaint is construed in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded

factual allegations are taken as true. Everest & Jennings,

Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir.

1994); see also Mitan v. Feeney, 2007 WL 2068106, at *9 (C.D.

Cal.) (discussing the post-Twombly standard). In resolving a

12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider materials attached by

plaintiff to his pleadings. See Canlas v. Eskanos & Adler,

P.C., 2005 WL 1630014 at *2 (N.D. Cal.) (citing Durning v.

First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997)).

3

At the September 19, 2007 hearing on defendants’ motions,

Mr. Walker, though not under oath, elaborated on his claims. 

He explained that he filed a claim against Marine Terminals

under the LHWCA but that his trial keeps getting continued. 

He stated that he knew of several former co-workers who were

injured on the job and who received greater compensation than

what he has been offered in settlement. He stated that some

of the co-workers were female, some were white, and some had

family links to waterfront work. He also complained about the

representation he received from his previous attorney, Cory

Birnberg, and that attorney Weltin, apparently his current

worker’s compensation attorney, had refused to represent him

in district court. Mostly, however, Mr. Walker insisted that

he is entitled to more money for his injuries than what has

been offered, and he feels that defendants have stalled and

used other tactics to force an unfair settlement on him. 

In support of their motions, defendants argue that to the

extent Mr. Walker claims Title VII violations, they are time

barred.5 Generally, a Title VII claimant must file charges

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission “within one

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6 Mr. Walker attached, amongst other things, three

right-to-sue notices from the DFEH, one for each of three

separate EEOC charges filed by Mr. Walker against defendants. 

One is dated May 3, 2007, and the other two May 4, 2007. Each

notice states that the EEOC had referred the complaint to the

DFEH; the DFEH waived its right to investigate the matter; the

EEOC would handle the investigation; and the notice served as a

right-to-sue letter for purposes of filing suit in state court.

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hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Where

a claimant has first initiated proceedings with a state or

local agency, such as the Department of Fair Employment and

Housing, he must file charges with the EEOC “within three

hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice

occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that

the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under

the State or local law, whichever is earlier . . . .” Id.

Based on right-to-sue notices issued by the DFEH and

attached by Mr. Walker to his complaint, it appears that Mr.

Walker filed charges first with the EEOC and that those

charges were referred to the DFEH, which chose not to

investigate.6 The notices refer specifically to EEOC case

filing numbers in each matter, which indicate that the

complaints were filed in 2007. Moreover, Mr. Walker attached

to his complaint a copy of a letter he wrote and swore to

which describes his EEOC charge against Pacific Maritime. The

letter is dated April 27, 2007 and is stamped as having been

received by the EEOC on May 4, 2007. 

Judging from his complaint, and assuming the statements

he made at the hearing were included in his complaint,

attorney Weltin told Mr. Walker on September 21, 2005 about

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7 I also agree with the defendants that Mr. Walker’s

complaint does not state facts sufficient to support his Title

VII claims. Even after the hearing, it is unclear to me how

Mr. Walker suffered an adverse employment action, and how

amending his complaint could cure the deficiencies.

8 Section 905(a) of the statute states in part: “The

liability of an employer prescribed in . . . this title shall

be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such

employer to the employee . . . except that if an employer fails

to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter,

an injured employee . . . may elect to claim compensation under

the chapter, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty

for damages on account of such injury or death.” 

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the limitations on his recovery. By that time, Mr. Walker

knew of the amount of compensation offered by Marine Terminals

to settle his claim. Assuming that the longer 300-day filing

period applies, and that Mr. Walker presents Title VII claims,

Mr. Walker should have filed with the EEOC by July 18, 2006. 

Documents attached to Mr. Walker’s complaint demonstrate that

Mr. Walker did not file his administrative charges until May

2007, which is too late. The claims are therefore dismissed

without leave to amend.7

As noted, however, Mr. Walker’s complaints are focused on

his efforts to be paid for the injuries he received in 2002. 

Marine Terminals, his employer at the time, argues that, as to

it, the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq., provides the

exclusive remedy to Mr. Walker for his injuries.8 I agree. 

Mr. Walker has filed an administrative claim under the LHWCA. 

Under the plain terms of the statute, he cannot file both an

administrative claim and a civil action against Marine

Terminals. The administrative claim Mr. Walker has filed is

his exclusive remedy against Marine Terminals for the injuries

he suffered in 2002. Any complaints Mr. Walker has about the

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9 At the hearing, counsel for C&H stated that C&H was

not the owner of the vessel at issue. Pacific Maritime, it was

explained, is an association of longshore employers and is

neither an employer or a vessel owner.

10 Even if Mr. Walker did have some reason for believing

C&H or Pacific Maritime were responsible for his injuries,

such claims likely would be barred by the three-year filing

limitation applied to maritime tort actions under 46 U.S.C.

App. § 763a recently re-codified at 46 U.S.C. § 30106. See

Williams v. Grieg Shipping A/S, 219 F.R.D. 537, 538 (S.D. Ala.

2003) (applying the three-year filing limitation to a section

905(b) action); Woodard v. Totem Ocean Trailer Exp., Inc., 2000

WL 33128494, at *1 (W.D. Wash.) (same); Logwood v. Appollo

Marine Specialists, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 925, 927 (E.D. La. 1991)

(same); see also Mendez v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries

Co., Ltd., 52 F.3d 799, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying § 763a

to a negligence claim against the manufacturer of a vessel). 

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delays in hearing his LHWCA claim must be directed to the

appropriate judge or agency. To the extent his complaint may

be read as seeking to impose liability on Marine Terminals for

these injuries in addition to its liability under the LHWCA,

the claim must be dismissed. 

Nor can Mr. Walker avoid the exclusivity of the LHWCA by

attacking the other defendants. Although section 905(b) may

allow for an injured employee to bring a negligence action

against the owner of the vessel involved in the accident, Mr.

Walker has not claimed that C&H or Pacific Maritime owned the

vessel that he was injured on.9 Mr. Walker has provided no

factual or legal support for the maintenance of a suit against

C&H and Pacific Maritime as an attempt to collect a greater

payment for his injuries.10 Thus, his claims must be

dismissed as to C&H and Pacific Maritime as well. 

Mr. Walker’s complaint fails to allege a discrimination

claim and, in any event, such claims are time barred. To the

extent Mr. Walker seeks to hold the defendants liable for the

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11 With his complaint, Mr. Walker filed a “Motion to

Appoint Attorney.” Docket No. 3. In an employment

discrimination case, a court may appoint counsel at its

discretion. Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 662

F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981). When appointment of counsel

is requested, the court considers: a) the plaintiff’s financial

need; b) efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel; and

c) whether the plaintiff’s claim has merit. See id. Because

Mr. Walker’s claims are so flawed, I DENY Mr. Walker’s motion

to appoint counsel.

12 Mr. Walker’s claim against the International

Longshore Union Local 10 remains. 

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injuries he suffered in 2002, such claims are barred by the

LHWCA and the applicable filing limitations. No amendment to

his complaint can correct these problems.11 For these

reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED.12 

Dated: September 24, 2007

Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

G:\BZALL\-BZCASES\Walker v. Pac. Maritime\ORDER GRANT MOT DISMISS 2.wpd

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