Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00648/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00648-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Paul Raymond Weakley, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

J.T. Shartle, Warden, 

Defendant.

No. CV 12-648 TUC DCB

ORDER 

 This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald, pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. On May 4, 2015, Magistrate 

Judge Macdonald issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R). He recommends that 

the Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1) and grant the Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment in a 

Civil Case (Doc. 27) to the extent it seeks a ruling in this case. The Magistrate Judge 

found the Petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies and reached the merits of 

his challenge to a prison disciplinary action resulting in his loss of good time credits. The 

Magistrate Judge found there was no violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court 

accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R as the findings of fact and conclusions of 

law of this Court, denies the Petition, and grants the Motion for Judgment in a Civil Case. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The duties of the district court in connection with a R&R by a Magistrate Judge 

are set out in Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

Case 4:12-cv-00648-DCB Document 30 Filed 07/30/15 Page 1 of 5
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). Where the parties object to a R&R, “‘[a] judge of the [district] court shall 

make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is 

made.’” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). 

 This Court's ruling is a de novo determination as to those portions of the R&R to 

which there are objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 

1000 n. 13 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th 

Cir.2003) (en banc). To the extent that no objection has been made, arguments to the 

contrary have been waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (objections are 

waived if they are not filed within fourteen days of service of the Report and 

Recommendation), McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure to 

object to Magistrate's report waives right to do so on appeal); see also Advisory 

Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 

F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (when no timely objection is filed, the court need only 

satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the 

recommendation)). 

 The parties were sent copies of the R&R and instructed that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), they had 14 days to file written objections. See also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 

(party objecting to the recommended disposition has fourteen (14) days to file specific, 

written objections). The Court has considered the objections filed by the Defendants and 

the parties’ briefs considered by the Magistrate Judge. 

OBJECTIONS 

 On May 14, 2015, Petitioner filed an Objection to the R&R raising three specific 

objections. Petitioner contends his right to a fair and impartial hearing in disciplinary 

proceedings was violated because: 1) the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”), Vickie 

Petricka, also investigated the incident; 2) a faulty method was used to test the alcohol 

content of the liquid he was charged with making, possessing, or using; and 3) his due 

process rights were violated when 3) “the western region and central office refused to 

Case 4:12-cv-00648-DCB Document 30 Filed 07/30/15 Page 2 of 5
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

properly hear his appeals.” (P’s Objections at 3). 

 In evaluating whether the Due Process Clause is violated in a prison disciplinary 

hearing, the district court must ask, “whether there is any evidence in the record that 

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent, Mass. 

Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). “[T]he requirements of due 

process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary 

board to revoke good time credits.” Id. The standard is “minimally stringent” only 

requiring “‘any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the 

disciplinary board.’” Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Hill, 472 

U.S. at 454-56). 

 The Court finds that the record in this case fully supports the Magistrate Judge’s 

conclusion the petition should be denied. As a procedural matter, Petitioner’s claim that 

DHO Petricka also acted as an investigating officer in his disciplinary hearing is 

precluded because the issue was not raised in the original petition. See State of Nev. v. 

Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to consider an argument 

Petitioner raised for the first time in a reply brief). Even if the issue was properly raised, 

the claim is unfounded. DHO Petricka investigated Petitioner’s claim that his due process 

rights had not been explained to him in the context of the administrative hearing. DHO 

Petricka did not investigate Petitioner’s misconduct that necessitated the hearing—she 

investigated his allegation that Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) procedures had not 

been followed. (Reply (Doc. 22), Exs. 16 and 17.) 

 The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the R&R as to 

Petitioner’s objection to the use of the Alco-Sensor to test the alcohol content of the 

suspected liquid. (R&R (Doc. 28) at 15.) The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Program 

Statement approves the use of certain Alco-Sensor models for liquid testing and considers 

a reading of .02 or higher positive for alcohol. (R&R (Doc. 28) at 15) (citing BOP 

Program Statement 6590.07 ¶¶ 6, 9.) The liquid at issue here tested well above that limit 

at .400. (Response (Doc. 14), Ex. 2, Attach. 2.) The record is devoid of any evidence that 

Case 4:12-cv-00648-DCB Document 30 Filed 07/30/15 Page 3 of 5
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the Alco-Sensor used was unfit for measuring a liquid’s alcohol content as Petitioner 

claims. 

 Finally, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the BOP’s failure to 

answer Petitioner’s appeals did not violate the Due Process Clause. Petitioner cites no 

authority for his position that, “by not responding to petitioner’s DHO appeals the BOP 

has violated petitioner’s rights of due process and equal protection....” (P’s Objections at 

3-4). Petitioner questions the legitimacy of the BOP’s practice of permitting inmates to 

consider the absence of a response to an appeal to be a denial at that level after a 

specified amount of time has passed, but his misgivings have no bearing on the issue at 

hand. The practice is an established and codified part of the BOP’s administrative remedy 

process. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. Petitioner might prefer a different notification 

procedure, but he suffered no denial of due process or equal protection when the BOP 

denied his appeal by not responding within the allotted time. 

CONCLUSION 

 After de novo review of the issues raised in Defendant's objections, this 

Court agrees with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Magistrate 

Judge in his R&R for determining the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The 

Court adopts it, and for the reasons stated in the R&R, the Court denies the Petition. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that after a full and independent review of the record, in respect 

to the objections, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 28) is 

accepted and adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 

1) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment in a Civil Case 

(Doc. 27) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment for 

Defendant and against Plaintiff. 

Case 4:12-cv-00648-DCB Document 30 Filed 07/30/15 Page 4 of 5
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the Plaintiff, proceeding here in 

forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, should file an appeal, the Court finds the appeal 

is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3) and FRAP 24(a). 

 Dated this 29th day of July, 2015. 

 

Case 4:12-cv-00648-DCB Document 30 Filed 07/30/15 Page 5 of 5