Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02050/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph A. Trenton, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-2050-PHX-MHM (DKD)

ORDER

Plaintiff, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis in Buckeye,

Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. #1), a

“Declaration in Support of the Plaintiff[’s] Attempts to Exhaust Administrative Remedies”

(Doc. #3), and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #4). The Court will order

Defendants Schriro, Rollins, Rivas, Curran, Araujo, Hargrove, Bleichroth, Stark, and

Rodriguez to answer Counts One and Two of the Complaint and will dismiss the remaining

claims and Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The statutory

fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time

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the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a

separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees

according to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

III. Complaint

In his four-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following employees of the Arizona

Department of Corrections (ADOC): Director Dora B. Schriro, Northern Regions Operations

Director Bennie Rollins, Warden David Rivas, Deputy Warden Curran, Lieutenant Araujo,

Captain Sigona, Correctional Officer (C.O.) III Hargrove, C.O. III Bruemmer,

C.O. Bleichroth, C.O. Stark, Nurse Rodriguez, Dr. E. Vinluan, and C.O. John Doe. Plaintiff

also sues Defendant West Valley Hospital, a hospital that is allegedly retained by ADOC to

provide medical services, and Defendant Dr. John Doe, a doctor employed by Defendant

West Valley Hospital.

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schriro, Bleichroth, Stark, Bruemmer,

Rodriguez, Vinluan, and Araujo were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was suffering from severe back pain, that

he requested emergency medical attention on multiple occasions but did not receive it, was

threatened with discipline if he did not stop complaining, finally received medical care two

weeks after his initial request, and then had to wait two months for a magnetic resonance

imaging (MRI) test. He complains about the medication he received from Defendant Vinluan

and alleges that Defendant Vinluan laughed at him, called him a liar, and did not allow

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Plaintiff to explain his symptoms. He also asserts that Defendant Schriro failed to have an

“adequate protocol for responding to Plaintiff’s emergency medical needs, or fail[ed] to

provide properly trained staff who could assess and remedy Plaintiff’s medical needs.”

In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schriro, Rollins, Rivas, Curran,

Hargrove, and Araujo failed to protect Plaintiff from a well-known, well-documented threat

of attack, despite their personal awareness of the threat, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. He also alleges that

Defendant C.O. John Doe did not stop the attack once it had begun.

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant West Valley Hospital and Defendant

Dr. John Doe were deliberately indifferent because they did not acknowledge Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs and discharged him prematurely, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the state statutory tort of

medical malpractice/negligence.

In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schriro and Sigona violated his First

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by “sanctioning and condoning improper [d]isciplinary

proceedings, which were written out of retaliation toward Plaintiff, and was conducted in an

attempt to hide the events described in [Count Two].” Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Schriro is aware that her disciplinary procedures “routinely violate inmate rights” but she

refuses to take corrective action. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Sigona violated ADOC

policy when he changed the disciplinary charge at the hearing, thereby preventing Plaintiff

from having an opportunity to investigate the new charge. Plaintiff contends that Defendants

Schriro and Sigona denied Plaintiff notice of the charge against him, staff assistance, the

right to present witnesses, deprived him of due process, and allowed the disciplinary charge

to stand in an attempt to bar Plaintiff from seeking redress for Count Two.

In his Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary

damages.

. . . . 

. . . .

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IV. Failure to State a Claim

A. Counts One and Three

The Court notes that a claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical

treatment arises under the Eighth Amendment. However, not every claim by a prisoner that

he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a

“serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in

further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the

defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations

omitted). 

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of and disregard

an excessive risk to inmate health; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw

the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the

medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain

or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies,

delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the

prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not support

a claim under § 1983. See Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

“A difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious

medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in

medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for

deliberate indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404,

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407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. 

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges he requested medical attention from Defendant

Bruemmer and Defendant Bruemmer gave Plaintiff an emergency health needs request form.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Rodriguez stated she made the decision not to see

Plaintiff or obtain treatment for him. These allegations do not state a claim for deliberate

indifference against Defendant Bruemmer. Therefore, the Court will dismiss without

prejudice Count One against Defendant Bruemmer. 

Similarly, once Defendant Vinluan saw Plaintiff, he prescribed medication and

ordered an MRI. Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Vinluan may be claims of

indifference, negligence, or medical malpractice, or may raise issues of differences in

opinion regarding the medication Plaintiff should have received, but they are insufficient to

state a claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant Vinluan. Therefore, the Court will

dismiss without prejudice Count One against Defendant Vinluan. 

In Count Three, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants West Valley

Hospital and Dr. John Doe are based on their failure to provide adequate medical care. This

is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does

not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. Ybarra v. Bastian, 647 F.2d 891,

892 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, asserting claims under Arizona statutes does not state a claim

under § 1983. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count Three and Defendants West Valley

Hospital and Dr. John Doe.

B. Count Two - Defendant C.O. John Doe

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v.

Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further,

a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id.

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A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment in failing to protect an inmate only

when two conditions are met. First, the alleged constitutional deprivation must be,

objectively, “sufficiently serious;” the official’s act or omission must result in the denial of

“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, the

prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with

deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Id. In defining “deliberate indifference”

in this context, the Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. A merely negligent failure to protect an inmate is

not actionable under § 1983. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant C.O. John Doe was in the gun tower when Plaintiff was

attacked and did not order the inmates to stop attacking Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant C.O. John Doe had “no reason not to stop [Plaintiff’s] beating, other than wanting

to allow inmates to kill [Plaintiff].” Plaintiff’s allegation is entirely speculative and does not

state a claim of deliberate indifference. Thus, the Court will dismiss Count Two against

Defendant C.O. John Doe.

C. Count Four

In Count Four, Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and a First

Amendment retaliation claim.

1. Due Process

In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must first decide whether Plaintiff was

entitled to any process, and if so, whether he was denied any constitutionally-required

procedural safeguard.

Liberty interests which entitle an inmate to due process are “generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected

manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless

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imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, to determine whether an inmate is entitled to the procedural protections afforded

by the Due Process Clause, the Court must look to the particular restrictions imposed and ask

whether they “‘present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might

conceivably create a liberty interest.’” Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). 

To determine whether the sanctions are atypical and a significant hardship, courts look

to prisoner’s conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the

sanction will affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). “Atypicality” requires not merely an empirical comparison, but

turns on the importance of the right taken away from the prisoner. See Carlo v. City of

Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has not identified what disciplinary sanctions he received. Therefore, it is

impossible to assess whether the sanctions imposed an atypical and significant hardship.

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights in

Count Four.

2. Retaliation

A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that

inmate’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A

prisoner suing prison officials under section 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was

retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does

not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and

discipline.”).

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Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of retaliation because he does not allege that

receiving a disciplinary report chilled his exercise of his First Amendment rights or that he

suffered more than minimal harm. Nor does he allege that the disciplinary report did not

advance a legitimate correctional goal. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of

retaliation in Count Four.

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a due process or retaliation claim in Count Four,

the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Four.

VI. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a claim in Count One against Defendants

Schriro, Bleichroth, Stark, Araujo, and Rodriguez and a claim in Count Two against

Defendants Schriro, Rollins, Rivas, Curran, Hargrove, and Araujo. The Court will order

these Defendants to answer Counts One and Two.

VII. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

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an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #4), is granted.

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial filing fee.

(3) Counts Three and Four and Defendants Sigona, Bruemmer, Vinluan, West

Valley Hospital, Dr. John Doe, and C.O. John Doe are dismissed without prejudice.

(4) Defendants Schriro, Rollins, Rivas, Curran, Araujo, Hargrove, Bleichroth,

Stark, and Rodriguez. must answer Counts One and Two.

(5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Doc. #1), the “Declaration in Support of the Plaintiff[’s] Attempts to Exhaust

Administrative Remedies” (Doc. #3), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver

forms for Defendants Schriro, Rollins, Rivas, Curran, Araujo, Hargrove, Bleichroth, Stark,

and Rodriguez.

(6) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv

16.2(b)(2)(B)(I).

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(8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

the “Declaration in Support of the Plaintiff[’s] Attempts to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies,” and a copy of this Order for future use.

(9) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, the “Declaration in

Support of the Plaintiff[’s] Attempts to Exhaust Administrative Remedies,” and this

Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and

return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(10) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint

must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(11) Defendants Schriro, Rollins, Rivas, Curran, Araujo, Hargrove, Bleichroth,

Stark, and Rodriguez must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion

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within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

(12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings.

DATED this 19th day of February, 2008.

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