Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-257/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

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MDL No. 1917

Case No. CV 07-5944-SC

ORDER DENYING PHILIPS 

TAIWAN LIMITED AND PHILIPS 

DO BRASIL LTDA.'S MOTIONS

TO DISMISS FOR INSUFFICIENT 

SERVICE OF PROCESS AND LACK 

OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

This Order Relates To:

ALL INDIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is Defendants Philips Taiwan Limited 

("PTL") and Philips do Brasil Ltda.'s ("PDBL")1 motion to dismiss 

the Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs' ("IPPs") claims for insufficient 

service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) 

and failure to adequately allege personal jurisdiction under Rule 

12(b)(2). The motions are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 2536-5 ("Opp'n) 

(filed under seal), 2560 ("Reply").2 Finding this matter suitable 

 1 PTL and PDBL were previously known as Philips Electronics 

Industries (Taiwan) ("PEIT") and Philips da Amazonia Industria 

Electronica Ltda. ("PAIEL"), respectively.

2 The IPPs also move to file a surreply. ECF No. 2575-3 (filed 

under seal). The Court GRANTS the motion. The Surreply, ECF No. 

2575-5, is accompanied by a Second Declaration of Lauren Capurro, 

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United States District Court

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for disposition without oral argument, Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), the Court 

DENIES both motions.

II. BACKGROUND

The parties are familiar with this case's facts. Plaintiffs 

are a class of indirect purchasers of cathode ray tubes ("CRTs") or 

products containing CRTs ("CRT Products"), which are the allegedly 

price-fixed goods that are the basis of this antitrust MDL. The 

movants, PTL and PDBL, are related to two of the Philips Defendants 

that have appeared in this case: Konklijke Philips Electronics, 

N.V. ("Royal Philips"), the movants' Dutch parent company; and 

Royal Philips's United States subsidiary, Philips Electronics North 

America Corporation ("PENAC"). Plaintiffs contend that PTL and 

PDBL have been properly served and that the Court has personal 

jurisdiction over both of them. PTL and PDBL dispute both of these 

claims.

These parties' service dispute began on April 6, 2009.

Plaintiffs wrote to PENAC and Royal Philips' counsel to ask if they 

would accept service on behalf of the other Philips Defendants, 

including PTL and PDBL, without Plaintiffs having to request

additional orders permitting service of foreign defendants via 

their domestic counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

4(f)(3). ECF No. 2536-6 ("Capurro Decl.") ¶¶ 2-4 & Exs. 1 ("Pls.' 

Apr. 6 Letter") & 2 ("Defs.' Apr. 14, 2009 Letter") (filed under 

seal). This request was based in part on an order the Court issued 

 

ECF No. 2575-7 ("Capurro Decl. II"). PTL and PDBL opposed the 

motion, ECF No. 2597, but the Court finds their arguments 

uncompelling. The Court disfavors surreplies, but they will, as 

always, be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 

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United States District Court

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on September 3, 2008, permitting service on several foreign 

defendants via their United States lawyers per Rule 4(f)(3). ECF 

No. 374 ("Sept. 3 Order"). 

Counsel for PENAC and Royal Philips refused to accept service, 

contending that PTL and PDBL had neither subsidiaries nor counsel 

in the United States. Defs.' Apr. 14 Letter at 1-2. Plaintiffs 

responded to say that the September 3 Order permitted service under 

Rule 4(f)(3) on any local agent (not necessarily a subsidiary or 

counsel), consistent with due process, per Rio Properties, Inc. v. 

Rio International Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Capurro Decl. Ex. 3 ("Pls.' May 6 Letter") at 1-2 (filed under 

seal). They argued that simply accepting service under similar 

terms to the September 3 Order, without having to brief another 

motion, would be efficient and inexpensive, particularly since PTL 

and PDBL's parent companies' involvement in the case assured that 

PTL and PDBL would have notice and an opportunity to be heard, so 

due process requirements would be satisfied. Id. Counsel for 

PENAC and Royal Philips subsequently agreed to accept service on 

behalf of PTL and PDBL, though they stated that they did so "under 

protest," meaning that they did not admit to personal jurisdiction 

and reserved the right to file a Rule 12(b)(5) motion based on 

improper service. Capurro Decl. Ex. 4 ("Defs.' May 11 Letter")

(filed under seal). 

At that time, this case's previous Special Master had required 

all defendants seeking to file motions to dismiss to file one joint 

motion for issues affecting all defendants in that group -- e.g., 

the Philips Defendants -- with one additional brief permitted per 

group. ECF No. 448 ("SM's Order Re: MTDs"). Accordingly, the 

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Philips Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' thenoperative complaint on May 18, 2009, focusing mainly on pleading, 

limitations, and personal jurisdictional matters. See generally

ECF No. 476 ("Philips MTD I"). As to PTL and PDBL specifically, 

the Philips Defendants stated that neither PTL nor PDBL had been 

served despite the agreement stated in Defendants' May 11 Letter, 

so they moved to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(5). Id. at 1 n.1. 

Plaintiffs' opposition brief to the defendants' motions to 

dismiss notes that PTL and PDBL's motions had been deferred by 

stipulation, so the Rule 12(b)(5) motion was not further discussed 

by either the Special Master or the Court. ECF No. 536 ("Opp'n I") 

at 1 n.1. That stipulation, entered on July 15, 2009, vacated the 

briefing schedule and hearing date on the arguments PTL and PDBL 

raised in the Philips MTD I. ECF No. 519 ("MTD Stip.") at 2. It 

noted that the parties would meet and confer on jurisdictional 

discovery and a new briefing schedule, and would then submit the 

new schedule to the Court. Id.

The parties' positions become murky after they filed the MTD 

Stipulation. On May 20, 2010, the Special Master had filed a 

report stating that certain parties with jurisdictional motions had 

suspended those motions pending further proceedings. ECF No. 718 

("May 20 Status Report") at 2. On May 24, 2010, PTL and PDBL's 

counsel wrote a letter to the former Special Master in response to 

his report, intending to clarify "the parties' agreement concerning 

[PTL and PDBL's] pending Rule 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss 

[Plaintiffs' complaints] for lack of personal jurisdiction." ECF 

No. 720 ("Defs.' May 24 Letter"). Counsel wrote that the parties 

would "continue to meet and confer on the issue of personal 

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jurisdiction in hopes of avoiding further briefing and argument on 

these motions altogether," though he stated that he meant to 

preserve his clients' objections to personal jurisdiction and leave 

the Rule 12(b)(2) motions pending. Id. Neither party references 

or provides proof of any further discussions on the issue after 

that letter.

The next motion on which PTL and PDBL appear is another joint 

motion to dismiss, ECF No. 733 ("Joint MTD II"), filed June 25, 

2010. That motion, filed under Rule 12(b)(6), asked the Court to 

dismiss a number of Plaintiffs' state causes of action and noted in 

a footnote, id. at 1 n.1, that the jointly filing Defendants meant 

to reassert and preserve all prior arguments, including those 

raised in the Philips MTD I. Briefing and argument on that motion 

proceeded before the Special Master, and the Court entered a 

stipulation modifying and adopting the Special Master's tentative 

ruling on October 25, 2010, after which Plaintiffs were given leave 

to file a third consolidated amended complaint. No one -- not PTL, 

PDBL, or Plaintiffs -- ever again raised the service issue until 

the instant motion.

Neither party is likely to disagree that this particular 

motion arrives amid some procedural confusion. Interpreted 

charitably, this is likely due to logistical and communications 

problems. PTL and PDBL never calendared a motion of their own, nor 

did they specifically raise a Rule 12(b)(5) defense after their 

first motion, which was itself made in a footnote. In their only 

specific attempt to clarify anything, their counsel stated only 

that PTL and PDBL meant for their Rule 12(b)(2) motions to remain 

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pending subject to the parties' discussions. He said nothing about 

service, nor did he calendar any further motions.

In the four years that followed that clarification, neither

side rejoined either the service or the personal jurisdiction

issue, until now. Plaintiffs claim that PTL and PDBL accepted

service in 2009 and did not actually raise the argument again. PTL 

and PDBL state that either they were never properly served or, in 

the alternative, that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

them because they are foreign companies with insufficient minimum 

contacts with the United States.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Service and Waiver

A federal court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant 

if service of process is insufficient. Omni Capital Int'l v. 

Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). A court may dismiss 

the action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(5). Once a defendant challenges service, a 

plaintiff bears "the burden of establishing that service was valid 

under Rule 4." Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir.

2004).

Under the circumstances now before the Court, though neither 

party raises the issue, there is a question whether PTL and PDBL 

have waived their right to object to Plaintiffs' service of 

process. As a general rule, if a party files a responsive pleading

or makes a Rule 12 motion but does not raise one of the defenses 

listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5), the party waives the right to raise 

the defense in a later-filed Rule 12(b) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. 

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P. 12(h); Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1318 

(9th Cir. 1998). But having raised the issue at an early stage of 

the proceedings does not mean that a party cannot waive it later. 

Peterson, 140 F.3d at 1318 (defenses like lack of personal 

jurisdiction can be waived as a result of a party's litigation 

conduct); see also Craters & Freighters v. Daisychain Enters., No. 

09-4531 CW, 2010 WL 761310, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010), aff'd 

sub nom Craters & Freighters v. Benz, 465 Fed. App'x 719 (9th Cir. 

2012) (defense of insufficient process can be waived based on 

litigation conduct).

Deciding whether PTL and PDBL waived their insufficient 

service of process defense requires the Court to evaluate PTL and 

PDBL's conduct in this case to determine whether their behavior 

militates in favor of finding waiver. See Peterson, 140 F.3d at 

1318 (citing other circuit courts' cases holding that certain 

factors can favor finding waiver even if a defense was properly 

raised in a Rule 12 motion); see also New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 

356 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2003). In this case, as 

explained below, the Court finds that PTL and PDBL's earlier 

conduct in this litigation constitutes waiver of their Rule 

12(b)(5) defense.

In PTL and PDBL's favor, they raised their Rule 12(b)(5) 

motion in the Philips Defendants' first motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs' complaint, and, when read most charitably, the first 

footnote of the Joint MTD II technically preserves all previously 

raised defenses. But PTL and PDBL's counsel, clarifying his 

clients' positions regarding the Special Master's May 20 Status 

Report, stated very clearly that the only pending motions were PTL 

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and PDBL's Rule 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss, and that the issue of 

personal jurisdiction was the only pending motion. Defs.' May 24

Letter at 1. 

The Court finds that in this particular long-running MDL, 

filing sworn statements and participating in status conferences 

before a Special Master are litigation activities that support a 

finding of waiver. In such situations, permitting a defendant to 

represent to the Court and other parties that a defense has been 

abandoned, without putting that party at risk of waiver, could 

unfairly allow parties to take advantage of other litigants who 

take the abandonment on its face and do not then return to the 

issue. See Peterson, 140 F.3d at 1317-18. The Court finds that 

the vaguely worded language of the Joint MTD II footnote, submitted 

after the May 24 Letter,3 does not override PTL and PDBL's 

counsel's clear statement of the parties' litigation status.

The May 24 Letter, sent on Howrey LLP's letterhead and signed 

by "Counsel to PEIT and PAIEL," did not indicate that counsel

continued to appear "under protest," that PTL and PDBL still 

maintained that service was improper, or that the Rule 12(b)(5) 

motion was meant to be preserved and reasserted. The May 24 Letter

references the complaints only to dispute their allegations of 

personal jurisdiction -- it never refers to the service of the 

complaints themselves. PTL and PDBL certainly had the opportunity 

to maintain their service objections before the Special Master, or 

 3 That note read, in relevant part, "Defendants reassert and 

preserve each of the arguments raised in their prior joint and 

individual Motions to Dismiss, specifically . . . Philips 

Defendants' May 18, 2009 Motion to Dismiss Indirect Purchaser 

Plaintiff's [sic] Consolidated Amended Complaint." Joint MTD II at 

3 n.1. 

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in their subsequent letter to the Special Master and the Court

after the Special Master's May 20 Report. Even if PTL and PDBL 

were correct that Plaintiffs had not re-served them with process by 

the time the Philips MTD I was filed, Reply at 2, the May 24

Letter's conspicuous statement that only the Rule 12(b)(2) defense 

remained overrides any service disputes that remained at that time. 

Therefore, even if the Joint MTD II were enough to meet the minimum 

requirements of Rule 12, the Court finds that PTL and PDBL's 

clarification of their litigation position militates in favor of 

finding waiver in this case. Peterson, 140 F.3d at 1319.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES PTL and PDBL's Rule 12(b)(5) 

motion as untimely, finding that their May 24 Letter clarified that 

they had waived any service objections to Plaintiffs' complaint by 

May 24, 2010 at the latest. The Court now turns to PTL and PDBL's

Rule 12(b)(2) motion, which they properly preserved.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

defendants may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The Court may consider evidence presented in affidavits and 

declarations determining personal jurisdiction. Doe v. Unocal 

Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs bear the 

burden of showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006). "[T]his demonstration requires that the plaintiff 

make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to 

withstand the motion to dismiss." Id. (quotations omitted). 

"[T]he court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff 

. . . ." Id. (quotations omitted). "The plaintiff cannot simply 

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rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, but uncontroverted 

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true." Mavrix Photo, 

Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quotations and citations omitted). The Court may not assume the 

truth of allegations that are contradicted by affidavit. Data 

Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 1977).

Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant 

only if (1) a statute confers jurisdiction and (2) exercising 

jurisdiction would comport with constitutional due process. See

Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 

1177 (9th Cir. 2004). Since the federal Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §

22, confers jurisdiction in this case, the question on this motion 

is whether exercising jurisdiction would comport with due process. 

For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consistent with due process, the defendant must 

have "certain minimum contacts" with the relevant forum "such that 

the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 

463 (1940)). The relevant forum for this case's minimum contacts 

analysis is the United States. Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co. 

Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1989). 

If a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the 

relevant forum, personal jurisdiction may be founded on either 

general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Panavision Int'l, 

L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). "A court may 

exercise specific jurisdiction where the cause of action arises out 

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of or has a substantial connection to the defendant's contacts with 

the forum." Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai 

Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hanson 

v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). "Alternatively, a defendant 

whose contacts are substantial, continuous, and systematic is 

subject to a court's general jurisdiction even if the suit concerns 

matters not arising out of his contact with the forum." Id.

(citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 

408, 415 n.9 (1984)). 

Plaintiffs do not argue that the Court has general 

jurisdiction over PTL and PDBL. They only argue that the Court 

should exercise specific jurisdiction. Courts may exercise 

specific personal jurisdiction depending on "the nature and quality 

of the defendant's contacts in relation to the cause of action."

Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287. The Ninth Circuit applies a threeprong test when analyzing a claim of specific jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully 

direct his activities or consummate some transaction 

with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or 

relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; 

and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with 

fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be 

reasonable.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first 

two prongs, and if he or she fails to satisfy either, specific

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jurisdiction is not established. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 

1361 (9th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff satisfies these prongs, the 

burden shifts to the defendant "to present a compelling case" that 

the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Burger King 

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).

Plaintiffs argue that the Court has specific jurisdiction over 

PTL and PDBL because they expressly aimed their anticompetitive 

actions at the United States by coordinating information with CRT 

Product manufacturers to ensure that CRT Products were sold in the 

United States at supracompetitive prices, and because PTL and PDBL 

participated in a settlement with the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs 

("DPPs"). Plaintiffs also contend that PTL and PDBL sold 

substantial quantities of CRTs into the United States, because PTL 

was the legal entity responsible for Philips Display Components' 

("PDC")4 production of color display tubes ("CDTs") for the United 

States market until the Philips-LG joint venture of June 2001, 

while PDBL was responsible for PDC's production of 14" and 20" 

color picture tubes ("CPTs") for sale in the United States until 

June 2001.5 

i. Participation in the Settlement with the DPPs

The Court agrees with PTL and PDBL that participation in the 

DPP settlement, on its own, does not support a finding of personal 

jurisdiction over PTL and PDBL. While PTL and PDBL are certainly 

bound by that settlement agreement, Plaintiffs' present motion does 

not relate to that agreement, and neither PTL nor PDBL has 

 4 "PDC" is what Plaintiffs call the CRT divisions within each 

regional Philips Electronics entity.

5 CPTs and CDTs are different subtypes of CRTs. CPTs were used in 

televisions, and CDTs were used in computer monitors.

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undertaken any affirmative claim related to it. See Dow Chem. Co. 

v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2005) (supporting a 

finding of personal jurisdiction where a defendant had 

independently sought affirmative relief before a court concerning a 

transaction or occurrence that formed the basis of a different 

case). The Court does not find that existence of the settlement 

agreement, without more, raises a prima facie case that PTL and 

PDBL purposefully availed themselves of, or directed activity into, 

the Court's jurisdiction. 

ii. Purposeful Direction

The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test for purposeful 

direction: "the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) 

causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in 

the forum state." Id. When considering the first prong, 

"something more than mere foreseeability" of an effect in the forum 

state is necessary. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805 (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). And as the Ninth Circuit has 

warned, "the foreign-acts-with-forum-effects jurisdictional 

principle must be applied with caution, particularly in an 

international context." Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, 

Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

The parties do not appear to dispute the first prong of the 

test. See Opp'n at 21-25, Reply at 9-12. But PTL and PDBL contend 

that Plaintiffs fail to show that PTL and PDBL "sold and 

distributed CRT Products either directly or through [their] 

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subsidiaries or affiliates throughout the United States." Reply at 

10-12. 

Plaintiffs argue that PTL and PDBL expressly aimed their 

anticompetitive activities at the United States, and that their 

evidence carries their burden at this stage. An antitrust 

defendant "expressly aims" an intentional act at a forum state when 

its allegedly anticompetitive behavior is targeted at a resident of 

the forum, or at the forum itself. See In re W. States Wholesale 

Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 743 (9th Cir. 2013). 

The parties discuss Plaintiffs' pleadings and proof in terms 

of two series of events: the first concerns PTL and PDBL's 

direction of price-fixing activities into the United States 

primarily via Glass Meetings,6 and the second concerns PTL and 

PDBL's manufacture of CDTs and CPTs, respectively, for sale in the 

United States.

a. Meetings

Plaintiffs' evidence regarding PTL and PDBL's participation in 

Glass Meetings consists mainly of meeting reports, all 

unfortunately under seal.7

 These meeting reports indicate that PTL 

employees participated in the Glass Meetings, discussing both the 

risk of decreased CDT demand in the North American market generally 

and the comparative strength of the United States monitor market. 

 6 "Glass Meetings" were what the Defendants in this MDL allegedly 

called their organized, high-level, intra-company meetings to 

exchange pricing information and establish plans for the future.

7 The Court's December 27, 2012 Order still stands: "[T]he Court 

will look favorably upon motions to intervene filed by members of 

the public who wish to access the sealed documents. If such 

motions are filed, the Court will not hesitate to appoint a Special 

Master to review the documents to be unsealed, whose fee shall be 

paid directly by the party seeking to preserve confidentiality." 

ECF No. 1512.

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Capurro Decl. Exs. 22 ("Mar. 1, 1999 Notes"), 25 ("May 26, 2000 

Notes") (filed under seal). Meeting participants, including a PTL 

manager, also specifically agreed to convey "Agreed Prices" to 

their customers and to avoid leaking meeting minutes. May 26, 2000 

Notes. 

PTL and PDBL contend that reports like these are not specific 

enough to show express aim toward the United States. See Reply at 

10-12. They argue that Plaintiffs' evidence as to PDBL's lack of 

cooperation with price-fixing agreements at some point in 1999 

actually shows that PDBL was not participating in the conspiracy 

and directing CRTs to the United States prior to 1999. Id. at 11 

(citing Opp'n at 23) (relevant documents under seal). PTL and PDBL 

therefore conclude that Plaintiffs' proof does not show that PDBL 

was involved in United States-directed price-fixing activities 

after 1999. Id. Finally, PTL and PDBL note that a Philips Display 

Components Company North America Strategy Review for the years 

1996-2000, Capurro Decl. Ex. 34 (filed under seal), refers to dates 

prior to PDBL's alleged participation in the conspiracy and does 

not specify where PDBL ships CRTs. Reply at 11. PTL and PDBL 

contend that purportedly corroborating testimony is similarly nonspecific because it only refers to PDBL's supply of CRTs to "North 

America," probably Mexico, and states that at some unspecified 

time, CRTs used in the United States were produced by a separate 

entity in a United States factory. Id. (citing Capurro Decl. Ex. 

19 (filed under seal)).

The Court disagrees with PTL and PDBL's interpretation of 

these facts. While North America generally, and Mexico 

specifically, were indeed discussed at these meetings, the reports 

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indicate that the United States market was quite significant to the 

alleged co-conspirators, and that PTL employees specifically 

discussed potential price and shipping charges directed toward the 

United States. Capurro Decl. Ex. 31 ("Apr. 14, 2000 Report"). 

Moreover, PENAC's Rule 30(b)(6) witness, as well as various other 

depositions and pieces of documentary evidence, confirmed that 

PENAC's Mexican operations produced monitors for the United States 

market, and it has always been clear in this case that the United 

States market was the most significant CRT and CRT Product market 

for most of the defendants in the case, including Philips. See, 

e.g., IPP Surreply at 5-7 & Capurro Decl. II ¶¶ 8-10 & Exs. A-F.

PDBL is correct that the sealed documents also state that PDBL 

was not cooperating with certain Defendants' pricing and supply 

amounts to Sharp Roxy Electronics Corp. ("SREC"), a Malaysian TV 

manufacturer, whose New York office handled purchases from PDBL. 

Capurro Decl. Ex. 27 ("January 8, 2000 Email") (discussing SREC's 

forecast in an email thread involving a PDBL Marketing Manager)

(filed under seal). But the Court is not convinced by PDBL's 

contention that this is evidence of PDBL's innocence: the evidence 

indicates that PDBL agreed to "correct" its prices to SREC -- that

is, to "raise the price to match everyone else." Capurro Decl Ex. 

30 ("Jan. 24, 2000 Report"). This is not innocent behavior.

b. Sales

As to PTL and PDBL's sale of CRTs into the United States, PTL 

and PDBL contend that sale of CRTs to "North America," without 

more, or sale of monitors (not CRTs) to the United States, cannot 

establish specific jurisdiction, especially since testimony 

indicates that PTL-manufactured CDTs were shipped to Mexico, not 

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the United States. ECF No. 2560-1 ("Koons Decl.") ¶ 9 & Ex. A ("De 

Moor Depo.") (filed under seal) at 226:5-10. PTL contends that 

even if those monitors were later sold into the United States by a 

separate legal entity, PTL itself did not create the contact with 

the United States. Reply at 10 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 

1115, 1122 (2014)). They claim that Plaintiffs' evidence of PTL's 

CRT sales into "North America" does not specifically state that PTL 

sold CRTs to United States customers. Id. at 10 (citing Capurro 

Decl. Exs. 23, 24, 34, 37 (filed under seal)). They also claim 

that other documents refer only to PTL's sale of computer monitors, 

not CRTs, to the United States. Id. (citing Capurro Decl. Exs. 19, 

22, 25 (filed under seal)). 

The Court finds that this contention is overridden in part by 

countervailing facts. For example, a PTL manager explicitly 

testified to his meeting with United States companies like Dell and 

Gateway to "promote tube sales," and to his attendance of United 

States consumer electronics shows. Capurro Decl. Ex. 10 ("Smith 

Depo.") at 214:22-216:16, 328:22-329:3. 

Further, PTL focuses on the act of sale itself, but equally 

important is the act of aiming anticompetitive activity to the 

United States. In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust 

Litig., 715 F.3d at 743. The Court finds that such is the creation 

of a type of contact -- aiming anticompetitive acts toward the 

United States but rerouting them through a related entity should 

not shield PTL from what Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged to 

have been United States-directed price-fixing activity. See

Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475,

for the principle that the defendant must create the contact with 

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the forum state). 

Finally, the Rule 30(b)(6) witness whom PTL and PDBL cite as 

having stated that PTL-manufactured CDTs and monitors were sold 

through Mexico says, in the same deposition, that the monitors were 

being manufactured specifically for a United States company. De 

Moor Depo. at 140:22-141:8, 175:17-176:18. This supports the 

finding that PTL was expressly aiming anticompetitive activity at 

the United States. See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas 

Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at 743. At this point, with specific 

evidence indicating that PTL's actions were aimed toward setting 

supracompetitive prices in the United States, the Court finds that 

PTL directed its activities toward this forum.

Regarding PDBL, the Court's findings are similar. PDBL's 

contention that it was not cooperating with purported price-fixing 

deals sometime in 1999 is weak. The fact that PDBL was clearly 

participating in price-fixing meetings meant to direct sales of its 

CRTs into the United States is enough, at this stage, for the Court 

to find that it has personal jurisdiction over PDBL. Specifically, 

the November 9, 1999 Report, Capurro Decl. Ex. 28, states clearly 

that PDBL had in the past offered low prices to customers in the 

United States but had recently begun to refuse to do so, while the 

January 24, 2000 Report states correspondingly that PDBL would 

follow pricing guidelines in the future. At least some of these 

prices were directed to a buyer in New York. See Capurro Decl. ¶

53 (SREC negotiated its deals with PDBL from New York). PDBL never 

addresses those facts. The Court finds Plaintiffs have 

sufficiently made a prima facie showing that PDBL expressly aimed 

its price-fixing activities at the United States.

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iii. But-For Causation

Regarding the last prong of specific jurisdiction analysis, 

Plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing that PTL and PDBL's

United States-directed actions were a "but-for" cause of their

claims. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat., Inc., 223 F.3d 

1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000); Unocal, 248 F.3d at 924. This "butfor" test requires "some nexus between the cause of action and the 

defendant's activities in the forum." Shute v. Carnival Cruise 

Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 387 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other 

grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established this nexus by 

pleading that they paid artificially high prices in the United 

States for CRT Products, and that the prices were set by PTL and 

PDBL during Glass Meetings and in other United States-directed 

actions.

iv. Reasonableness

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the standard for 

specific jurisdiction. The next issue is whether exercising 

jurisdiction would be reasonable. PTL and PDBL do not argue this 

point, but the Court must nevertheless consider it. In determining 

whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant would 

be reasonable, the Court must consider seven factors:

(1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful 

interjection into the forum state, 

(2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the 

forum, 

(3) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of 

the defendant's state, 

(4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the 

dispute, 

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(5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the 

controversy, 

(6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's 

interest in convenient and effective relief, and 

(7) the existence of an alternative forum.

Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1088 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. 

at 476-77). It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate 

unreasonableness. Id. at 1088.

First, the extent of PTL and PDBL's purposeful interjection 

into the United States is enough for the Court to find that they 

are subject to personal jurisdiction here, as explained above.

Second, the Court finds that PTL and PDBL's burdens could be 

substantial. However, the inconvenience for PTL and PDBL must be 

so great as to constitute a deprivation of due process, which is 

not the case here. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323. They are 

represented by talented United States counsel, and the facts do not 

indicate to the Court that participating in this litigation further 

would be untenable for them. Costliness and evidentiary complexity 

are simply parts of modern multinational litigation, especially 

when the claims at issue concern an international price-fixing 

conspiracy. 

Third, as noted above, Defendant specifically directed pricefixing activity toward and into the United States. Even though 

much of the alleged conspiracy-related activity occurred abroad, 

just as it did with many other Defendants, the end target and end 

result was the United States. Moreover, only a narrow exercise of

specific jurisdiction is at issue as to PTL and PDBL, which lessens 

the concerns of comity raised in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 

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746, 761-63 (2014) (finding that international comity concerns 

should have weighed more heavily in an appellate court's analysis 

of general jurisdiction). This case is to some degree 

international in character, which would weigh in PTL and PDBL's

favor, see Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nav. Co., Inc., 1 F.3d 

848, 852 (9th Cir. 1993), but in this case the Court finds that 

those Defendants' United States-oriented activity, plus the 

narrower jurisdictional basis of specific jurisdiction, mitigates 

that concern.

Fourth, Plaintiffs are United States citizens who allege that 

they were harmed by PTL and PBL's activities, which set 

anticompetitive prices on products Plaintiffs purchased in the 

United States. That gives United States federal courts an interest 

in hearing this case. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.

Fifth and sixth, because the Court has handled the MDL for 

years, the efficiency, effectiveness, and convenience of this 

matter's resolution are best served by keeping the case in this 

forum, regardless of the ultimate remedy (if any) granted to 

Plaintiffs. While some evidence and many witnesses related to PTL 

and PDBL may be abroad, the same is true for most parties in this 

case, and a combination of modern technology and coordination among 

the parties has so far ensured that evidentiary matters are handled 

efficiently. 

Finally, concerning the existence of an alternative forum, the 

Court has received no briefing on the issue. The Court finds, as 

in other cases raising the same issue, that this factor favors

neither party.

///

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The Court finds, under the circumstances described above, that 

exercising specific jurisdiction over Defendant for the purposes of 

this case is reasonable. The Court notes that PTL and PDBL 

occasionally object to Plaintiffs' allegations on the grounds that 

the various Philips Defendants left the CRT business in June 2001, 

either because of a joint venture with LG or for other reasons. 

See, e.g., Reply at 11 n.9. But Plaintiffs have sufficiently 

alleged that, for at least some times during the Class Period of 

1995-2007, PTL and PDBL had minimum contacts with the United States 

sufficient for the Court to find that exercising specific 

jurisdiction over them is reasonable.

C. Tardiness and Discovery

PTL and PDBL ask that if the Court denies their motions to 

dismiss, it forbid Plaintiffs from requesting or receiving 

additional discovery. Reply at 7 n.8. They also note that they 

would be prejudiced by being added at this late hour and not being 

able to fully participate in discovery. Id. The Court is not 

convinced by the prejudice argument, especially since PTL and 

PDBL's lawyers have been involved in this action for years, and the 

Philips Defendants have had numerous opportunities to defend the 

interests of all of their constituent entities. 

The Court does not find that the late confirmation of PTL and 

PDBL's status -- particularly given the evident lack of clarity 

between their present and former counsel's positions -- would work 

any unfairness on them. As to discovery, both parties should be 

held to the calendar as it stands now. As the Court has made 

clear, it has no plans to alter the trial calendar further. If the

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parties later come to specific stipulations that will neither cause 

prejudice nor derail this case, the Court will consider them.

V. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the Court DENIES Defendants Philips Taiwan 

Limited and Philips do Brasil Ltda.'s motion to dismiss the 

Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs' Fourth Consolidated Class Action 

Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2014

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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