Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06263/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-06263-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Deputy Attorney General Charles J. Antonen represents and has acknowledged service on

behalf of Defendants Schwarzenegger, Clarke, Woodford, Hill-Culpepper and David. Although

there are others who are named as Defendants, none of them have been served.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT LYNN PINHOLSTER 

Plaintiff,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

 Defendants. 

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No. C 06-6263 SBA (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE AND ADDRESSING

PENDING MOTIONS

(Docket nos. 4, 5)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Scott Lynn Pinholster, a condemned state prisoner incarcerated at San Quentin State

Prison (hereinafter "SQSP"), filed this civil action in the Marin County Superior Court, Pinholster v.

Schwarzenegger, et al., CV 063545. He complains of deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs during his incarceration at SQSP.

Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Defendants,

who are represented by the State Attorney General's Office,1 filed a motion asking the Court to

screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In an Order dated April 17, 2007, the Court granted

Defendants' motion to screen the complaint.

On May 14, 2007, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Plaintiff's Exhibits of All

Administrative Exhaustion of Inmate Appeals, and Prior Service of Defendants" (docket no. 8). He

provided the Court with copies of his inmate appeal forms.

The Court now conducts its initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

BACKGROUND 

The background to Plaintiff's claim is taken from his complaint filed in state court. Plaintiff

states that he has a "chronic disc injury that requires long term chronic care pain medication

management." (Compl. at 5.) He alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious

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medical needs because he was not provided "chronic care pain management" from September 13,

2005 to November 21, 2005. (Id. at 6.) He claims that Defendants failed "to provide the changes

owed to the health care system and make the updates and changes to improve the medical care at

San Quentin State Prison," and that their failure "resulted in no chronic care pain medication for

over 60 days due to negligence and a broken health care system that still has not been fixed." (Id. at

7.) Plaintiff adds that such changes were "required" as agreed upon in Plata v. Schwarzenegger,

Case No. 01-1351 TEH. (Id.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary

relief from a Defendants who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two

essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

II. Legal Claims

A. Medical Claim

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX

Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of

"deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's

medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059. A serious medical

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need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the

"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner

has a serious need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)). A prison employee is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows

that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegations present a cognizable claim for relief against

Defendants SQSP Chief Medical Officer Clarke, former SQSP Health Care Manager Belavich,

SQSP Physician Dr. David, SQSP Nurse Practitioner Erikson, as well as SQSP Medical Technical

Assistants Hill-Culpepper and Anderson.

B. Named Defendants

In addition to naming the aforementioned members of SQSP medical staff as Defendants,

Plaintiff names Defendants Schwarzenegger (Governor of California) and Woodford (CDCR

Director). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Schwarzenegger and Woodford were members

of the medical staff who failed to provide him with his "chronic care pain management." Therefore,

Plaintiff appears to be attempting to sue Defendants Schwarzenegger and Woodford in their capacity

as a supervisor. A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of personal involvement

in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th

Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). A supervisor therefore generally "is only liable for

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under

§ 1983. That is, under no circumstances is there liability under § 1983 solely because one is

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responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Id.

Plaintiff's allegations do not support a theory of liability against Defendants Schwarzenegger

and Woodford for the asserted injuries based upon their personal participation or policymaking

decisions. Accordingly, the claims against Defendants Schwarzenegger and Woodford are

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Plaintiff can in good faith allege facts to cure the

pleading deficiency he may add this information to his amended complaint.

III. Pending Motions

Plaintiff has filed two motions for a temporary restraining order (hereinafter "TRO") and/or a

preliminary injunction (docket nos. 4, 5). He asks the Court to issue an Order requiring Defendants

"to have Plaintiff removed daily every morning before 7:00 AM to Marin County General Hospital

to receive all chronic care acute pain medications as a recommended by the pain management

centers to treat and control Plaintiff's daily acute chronic pain." (Oct. 27, 2006 Mot. for TRO at 8.) 

In his second motion for a TRO, he asks the Court to order Defendants "to remove Plaintiff outside

of the prison daily or ongoing medical care . . . until a hearing before this Court [where] Defendants

can show cause that an acceptable standard of care is in fact being provided and safeguards are in

place that this denial of owed acceptable standard of medical care has been halted." (Nov. 17, 2006

Mot. for TRO at 6.)

Injunctive relief may be granted if either of two sets of criteria are satisfied. The

"traditional" test requires the movant to: (1) establish a strong likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) show the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if the preliminary relief is not granted;

(3) show a balance of hardships favoring the movant; and (4) show that granting the injunction

favors the public interest. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League,

634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980). The "alternative" test requires that the movant demonstrate

either a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or

that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. See

Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). Under either test, the

likelihood of success on the merits matters. 

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 In the document entitled "Plaintiff's Exhibits of All Administrative Exhaustion of Inmate

Appeals, and Prior Service of Defendants" (docket no. 8), Plaintiff informed the Court that

Defendant Belavich was no longer at SQSP because he was transferred to California State Prison,

Los Angeles County in Lancaster, California as of May, 2006.

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The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations do not meet the requirements pursuant to which

the Court would exercise its discretion to grant injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. That is, at this stage of the pleadings, he has not shown a combination of

probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury if preliminary injunctive

relief is not granted. Accordingly, his motions for a TRO and/or a preliminary injunction (docket

nos. 4, 5) are DENIED as premature.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

1. The Court finds the Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs against Defendants Clarke, Belavich, David, Erikson, Hill-Culpepper and

Anderson.

2. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Schwarzenegger and Woodford are

DISMISSED with leave to amend as set forth above. Plaintiff shall file amended claims against

Defendants Schwarzenegger and Woodford no later than thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. 

The failure to do so will result in the dismissal of his claims against Defendants Schwarzenegger and

Woodford without prejudice. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall

serve, without prepayment of fees, copies of: (1) the removal notice and complaint as well as copies

of all attachments thereto (docket no. 1); (2) "Plaintiff's Exhibits of All Administrative Exhaustion

of Inmate Appeals, and Prior Service of Defendants" (docket no. 8); and (3) a copy of this Order

upon the following Defendants: SQSP Nurse Practitioner P. Erikson as well as SQSP Medical

Technical Assistant Anderson at SQSP; and former SQSP Health Care Manager T.G.

Belavich at California State Prison, Los Angeles County.2 The Clerk shall also mail copies of

these documents to the Attorney General of the State of California. Additionally, the Clerk shall

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serve a copy of this Order on Plaintiff. 

4. Defendants Clarke, Hill-Culpepper and David have already been served; therefore,

the Court directs the parties to abide by the scheduling order outlined below. In order to expedite

the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. In addition, no later than thirty (30) days from the date their answer is due,

Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall

be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary

judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the date their summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court

and served on Defendants no later than thirty (30) days after the date on which Defendants' motion

is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs:

The Defendant has made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A

motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact

-- that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would

affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary

judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will

end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for

summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations

(or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that

contradict the facts shown in the Defendants's declarations and

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material

fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in

opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered

against you. If summary judgment is granted [in favor of the

Defendant], your case will be dismissed and there will be no

trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Plaintiff is advised to read

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Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)

(party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of

material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears

the burden of proving his allegations in this case, he must be prepared to produce evidence in

support of those allegations when he files his opposition to Defendants' dispositive motion. Such

evidence may include sworn declarations from himself and other witnesses to the incident, and

copies of documents authenticated by sworn declaration. Plaintiff is advised that if he fails to

submit declarations contesting the version of the facts contained in Defendants' declarations,

Defendants' version may be taken as true and the case may be decided in Defendants' favor without a

trial. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment simply by repeating the allegations of his

complaint.

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall do so no later than fifteen

(15) days after the date Plaintiff's opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Leave of Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose Plaintiff and any

other necessary witnesses confined in prison. 

6. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants, or

their counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to

Defendants or their counsel.

7. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

8. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

However, the party making a motion for an extension of time is not relieved from his or her duty to

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P:\PRO-SE\SBA\CR.06\Pinholster6263.Service.frm8

comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having made a motion for an extension of

time. The party making the motion must still meet the deadlines set by the Court until an order

addressing the motion for an extension of time is issued. Any motion for an extension of time must

be filed no later than fifteen (15) days prior to the deadline sought to be extended.

9. Plaintiff's motions for a TRO and/or a preliminary injunction (docket nos. 4, 5) are

DENIED as premature.

10. This Order terminates Docket nos. 4 and 5.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2007 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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P:\PRO-SE\SBA\CR.06\Pinholster6263.Service.frm9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PINHOLSTER et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SCHWARZENEGGER et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-06263 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 9, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Scott Pinholster C-87601

San Quentin State Prison

San Quentin, CA 94974

Dated: October 9, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-06263-SBA Document 10 Filed 09/28/07 Page 9 of 9