Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00635/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00635-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shaun Hudson, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-00635-PHX-GMS (BSB)

REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Shaun Hudson has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an answer and argue that 

Petitioner’s claims lack merit. (Doc. 14.) Petitioner has filed a reply in support of his 

Petition. (Doc. 17.) As set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition be 

denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On March 18, 2013, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior 

Court for attempted second-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, unlawful 

imprisonment, assault, preventing the use of a telephone in an emergency, and two counts 

of disorderly conduct. (Doc. 14, Ex. A.) The charges were based on Petitioner’s 

confrontation with his wife on the morning of March 8, 2013. (Id.) Evidence at trial 

indicated that Petitioner cut his wife’s neck with a kitchen knife, and prevented her from 

using her cell phone to call 911. (Doc. 14, Ex. D at 104-07.) Petitioner then chased his 

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wife when she ran out of the house and knocked her down as she tried to run away. (Id. 

at 108-09.) Petitioner stabbed his wife in the cheek, and began choking her. (Id. at 109-

10.) A neighbor saw the incident and called police. (Id. at 112-13.) Petitioner’s wife 

was taken to the hospital and received treatment, including stitches, for lacerations and 

abrasions. (Id. at 60, 62, 120-21.) Later that morning, Petitioner turned himself into the 

police. (Doc. 14, Ex. E at 15-20; Ex. Q at ¶ 2.) 

 During a taped interview, Avondale Police Department Detective Heatherington 

read Petitioner his Miranda rights. (Doc. 14, Ex. E at 20-21; Ex. Q at ¶ 2.) Detective 

Heatherington asked: 

 Q: Are you willing to answer some questions for me? 

 A: Some, yeah. 

 Q: Okay. 

 A: I feel like I should have an attorney. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶ 2; Doc. 16 (trial exhibit 158).) After a pause, Detective 

Heatherington continued the interview and asked, “what happened this morning?” (Id.) 

Petitioner then confessed. (Id.) 

 During Petitioner’s trial, the State attempted to admit the recorded interview into 

evidence and used Detective Kalcum to lay the foundation for its admission because the 

interviewer, Detective Heatherington, was unavailable as a witness for trial. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. E at 20-33, 39-40; Ex. Q at ¶ 3.) Petitioner objected based on the best evidence rule, 

arguing that Detective Kalcum only monitored Petitioner’s interview and was not present 

for the first ten minutes of the interview. (Doc. 14, Ex. E at 22, 25.) Therefore, 

Petitioner argued that Detective Kalcum should only testify as to those portions of the 

interview that she actually observed. (Doc. 14, Ex. E at 22, Ex. F at 3.) However, 

Petitioner’s counsel later stipulated to the admission of the entire recording of the 

interview, as redacted by the parties. (Doc. 14, Ex. E at 33-34; Ex. F at 3.) Defense 

counsel preferred that “the entirety of that piece of evidence by played, if it’s going to be 

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admitted.” (Doc. 14, Ex. E at 34; Ex. H at 7 (trial exhibit 158).) The interview was then 

played for the jury. (Doc. 14, Ex. E at 40.) 

 After the trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated assault, unlawful 

imprisonment, disorderly conduct, two counts of misdemeanor assault, one count of 

misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and one count of misdemeanor preventing the use of a 

telephone in an emergency. (Doc. 14, Exs. K, L.) Petitioner was acquitted of the 

attempted second-degree murder charge. (Doc. 14, Ex. K.) 

 On February 21, 2014, the court sentenced to Petitioner to ten years’ imprisonment 

for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently with three-years’ 

imprisonment for disorderly conduct. (Doc. 14, Ex. K.) The court also sentenced 

Petitioner to three years’ probation for the unlawful imprisonment conviction. (Id.) For 

each of the four misdemeanor convictions, the court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent 

terms of six months’ jail time. (Doc. 14, Ex. L.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 On February 21, 2014, Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 14, Ex. N.) In his opening brief, Petitioner argued that “[i]t was 

fundamental error to allow [his] confession during a custodial interrogation into evidence 

when his request for an attorney was ignored by the detective who continued to interview 

him and obtained a confession after [Petitioner] had invoked his right to counsel.” 

(Doc. 14, Ex. O.) Petitioner also argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 

vouching for Detective Heatherington. (Id. at 11.) 

 On November 17, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q.) The court noted that Petitioner had not moved to suppress 

the recorded confession at trial. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶ 4.) The court stated that such 

failure would “normally preclude appellate review,” but the court nonetheless reviewed 

for fundamental error. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-11.) The court stated that pursuant to Davis v. United 

States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994), “the defendant must unequivocally request counsel 

before an officer is required to cease questioning” during an interrogation. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-

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7.) The court concluded that Petitioner “did not unequivocally invoke his right to 

counsel” during the interrogation because his statement — “I feel like I should have an 

attorney” — was equivocal, and indicated only that Petitioner “might be invoking his 

right to counsel.” (Id. at ¶ 9 (emphasis in original).) 

 The court also reasoned that the contradiction between Petitioner’s statement that 

he was willing to answer “some” questions and his statement that he “[felt] like [he] 

should have an attorney,” further underscored the ambiguity of his statement about 

counsel. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The appellate court noted that “[e]ven though it would have been 

‘entirely appropriate’ for Detective Heatherington to clarify [Petitioner’s] statement [that 

he might want a lawyer] before proceeding, . . . Detective Heatherington was not 

constitutionally required to do so.” (Id. at n.7 (internal citations omitted).) 

 The court further found that even assuming fundamental error had occurred, 

Petitioner could not establish prejudice because the prosecutor did not comment on 

Petitioner’s post-Miranda silence. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-14.) Instead of remaining silent, 

Petitioner answered the detective’s questions after being read his Miranda rights. (Id.) 

Thus, the prosecutor’s comments about Petitioner’s admissions during the interview were 

“proper comments on [Petitioner’s] post-Miranda statements.” (Id.) In addition, the 

court concluded that Petitioner could not establish prejudice because he relied on the 

interview as part of his defense, and defense counsel repeatedly referred to it and quoted 

it at length during closing argument. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Defense counsel described Petitioner’s 

interview as “evidence of his intent, his cooperation with officers, and his purported 

request for an attorney.” (Id.) Defense counsel also encouraged the jury “to listen to 

[Petitioner’s] interview and listen to [Petitioner’s] own words.” (Id.) 

 The court also rejected Petitioner’s argument that the prosecutor “vouched” for the 

detective who continued to question him after his alleged request for counsel. The court 

explained that Petitioner mischaracterized the prosecutor’s comment. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.) 

The court stated that the prosecutor “commented on [Petitioner’s] admissions in the 

interview, as well as the inadequacy of his purported request for counsel and the 

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propriety of Detective Heatherington’s questioning.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) The court explained 

that such comments “were proper comments on [Petitioner’s] post-Miranda statements.” 

(Id.) Therefore, the court rejected Petitioner’s claims and affirmed his convictions. 

Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review of the 

appellate court’s decision. (Doc. 14, Ex. R.) 

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On December 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the 

trial court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 14, Ex. 

S.) The trial court treated the petition as a notice of post-conviction relief and, on 

December 17, 2015, appointed counsel. (Doc. 14, Ex. T.) In their answer, Respondents 

state that post-conviction counsel is still reviewing the file and investigating “certain 

issues [Petitioner] raised in correspondence with counsel.” (Doc. 14 at 7; Doc. 14, Ex. 

V.) In his reply, Petitioner does not respond to this assertion or otherwise discuss the 

post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 17.) Because a post-conviction petition has not been 

filed, the Court cannot determine whether the issues that are presented in this federal 

proceeding will be presented to the state court on post-conviction review. Although the 

parties do not address the effect of the pending post-conviction proceeding, the Court will 

do so before reviewing Petitioner’s claims. 

 Before the federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner 

must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O’Sullivan 

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). A petitioner has not exhausted state court 

remedies if he has a state appeal pending at the time he files a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in federal court. Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating 

that “[w]hen . . . an appeal of a state criminal conviction is pending, a would be habeas 

corpus petitioner must await the outcome of his appeal before his state remedies are 

exhausted, even where the issue to be challenged in the writ of habeas corpus has been 

finally settled in the state courts.”); Martineau v. Elliot, 2008 WL 3582811, at * 1 (D. 

Ariz. August 13, 2008) (dismissing habeas corpus petition as premature when the 

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petitioner presently had a Rule 32 petition pending in the Maricopa County Superior 

Court). The Ninth Circuit has explained that “Sherwood stands for the proposition that a 

district court may not adjudicate a federal habeas petition while a petitioner’s direct state 

appeal is pending.” Henderson v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2013.) 

 The record reflects that Petitioner exhausted on direct appeal in state court the 

claims he now presents to this court, and that state court proceeding has concluded. 

(Doc. 14; Ex. Q.) Currently, Petitioner has a collateral Rule 32 proceeding pending in 

state court. However, because Petitioner already presented his claims on direct appeal, he 

is not required to present his claims in a post-conviction proceeding to satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(stating that in Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” 

requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction 

proceedings). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are exhausted and are properly before the 

Court. 

 Moreover, there is no basis to stay this proceeding and hold it in abeyance pending 

the resolution of the post-conviction proceeding. In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-

78 (2005), the Court held that the district court has limited discretion to hold in abeyance 

a habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims to permit a petitioner 

to return to state court to exhaust additional claims while the federal proceedings are 

stayed. Recently, in Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit 

held that a district court has the discretion to stay and hold in abeyance fully unexhausted 

petitions under the circumstances set forth in Rhines. However, the Rhines stay and 

abeyance procedure does not apply in this case. If Petitioner attempts to present the 

claims that he raised in his § 2254 Petition in a petition for post-conviction relief, the 

state court would find them procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(a)(2) because those 

claims were “[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal . . . .” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(2). Therefore, the stay and abeyance procedure is unavailable. See Felder 

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v. Hickman, 2007 WL 2265146, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007) (when a claim is 

procedurally barred and no state remedies remain, it is exhausted and the stay and 

abeyance procedure does not apply); Greer v. Ariz. Attorney General, 2006 WL 2553403, 

at *7 n.8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 1, 2006) (when claim is procedurally barred under state law it 

would be futile for a petitioner to return to state court to attempt to exhaust her claims 

and the stay and abeyance procedure does not apply). Therefore, the Court finds no 

basis to stay the pending habeas corpus proceeding pending resolution of the postconviction proceeding. 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On March 7, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner presents the following claims: (1) His Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment rights, and his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were 

violated during his police interrogation (Ground One); and (2) the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct by commenting that a detective did nothing wrong by continuing to question 

Petitioner during the police interrogation (Ground Two). (Doc. 1 at 6-7.) As previously 

noted, Petitioner exhausted these claims in the Arizona Court of Appeals and, therefore, 

they are properly before this Court on federal habeas corpus review. 

II. Review of Claims Adjudicated on the Merits 

 When a federal claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, the federal court 

reviews that claim under § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d), a federal court cannot grant habeas 

corpus relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was contrary 

to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of 

the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that 

it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” based on the record before the state 

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). It is a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

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Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). When evaluating state court decisions on habeas review, 

federal courts look through summary or unexplained higher state court opinion to the last 

reasoned decision on the claim. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v. 

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). A state court decision is an 

“unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but 

unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 

133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). 

 Federal courts may also grant habeas corpus relief when the state court decision 

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Or, to put it 

conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process 

unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not 

merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th 

Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th Cir. 

2014); see also Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (the 

statutory presumption of correctness applies to findings by both trial courts and appellate 

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courts). Additionally, state court findings of fact are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id. 

 If the federal court determines, considering only the evidence before the state 

court, that the adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or 

that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

the court evaluates the claim de novo, and may consider evidence properly presented for 

the first time in federal court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 536 U.S. 170, 182-84 (2011). 

 Additionally, when a state court decision is deemed to be contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless the 

erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 

(9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 631. 

A. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his “Fifth Amendment/Sixth Amendment” 

rights were violated. (Doc. 1 at 6.) To support his claim, Petitioner cites Miranda v. 

Arizona and refers to “page 3 — line 19” of an attached transcript, which purports to be a 

transcript of his interview with police.1

 (Id.) Liberally construing the Petition, it appears 

that Petitioner presents the same claim he presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

which is that the trial court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by failing to 

sua sponte suppress his recorded interview because Detective Heatherington continued to 

 

1

 Respondents correctly point out that the Petition does not strictly comply with Rule 2(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases because it does not “state the 

facts supporting each ground.” (Doc. 14 at 11.) However, that failure is inconsequential because Respondents do not argue that the Petition should be denied on that basis and 

they were able to discern the basis of Petitioner’s Miranda claim. (Id.) 

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question him after he requested an attorney. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶ 4.) As previously 

noted, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q.) As 

Respondents argue, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim because he has not 

shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966), the Supreme Court held “that 

a suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to 

have counsel present during questioning, and that the police must explain this right to 

him before questioning begins.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. at 457 (1994) 

(discussing Miranda). The right to counsel recognized in Miranda “requir[es] the 

special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.” Edwards v. Arizona, 

451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981). “If a suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after 

receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him.” 

Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-76 (1979)). 

“But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to 

further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself 

reinitiates conversation.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-485). 

 The determination of whether a suspect has invoked his right to counsel “is an 

objective inquiry.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59 (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 

523, 529 (1987)). To invoke the Miranda right to counsel, “at a minimum,” a suspect 

must make “some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a 

desire for the assistance of an attorney.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991). 

“But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a 

reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the 

suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, [Supreme Court] precedents do not 

require the cessation of questioning.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. “Rather, the suspect must 

unambiguously request counsel.” (Id.) A suspect “must articulate his desire to have 

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counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 

would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to 

meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop 

questioning the suspect.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. In Berguis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 

(2010), the Supreme Court reiterated that a suspect must invoke his Miranda right to 

counsel “unambiguously.” Id. at 381. The Court clarified that “[i]f an accused makes a 

statement concerning the right to counsel that is ambiguous or equivocal, or makes no 

statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation, or ask questions to clarify 

whether the accused wants to invoke his or her Miranda rights.” Id. 

 In Davis, the Court affirmed the lower court’s determination that the petitioner’s 

remark that “maybe I should talk to a lawyer” was not a request for counsel. Id. at 461. 

The Court concluded that there were no grounds for suppression of the suspect’s 

statement. (Id.) In this case, the Arizona Court of Appeals cited to and relied upon Davis 

when analyzing Petitioner’s Miranda claim. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶ 7.) As previously 

discussed, the appellate court concluded that Petitioner’s statement that “I feel like I 

should have an attorney” was not an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.2

 (Id. 

at ¶¶ 7-9.) The appellate court also determined that the circumstances of Petitioner’s 

 

2

 Petitioner attached to his Petition a document that purported to be a partial transcript of his interview with police. (Doc. 1 at 13.) Petitioner does not identify the source of this transcript. (Id.) Respondents assert that the partial transcript does not accurately reflect the recorded interview that was admitted at trial. (Doc. 14 at 11 n.3.) 

Respondents note that there is a discrepancy between Petitioner’s transcript and the Arizona Court of Appeals’ recitation of the contents of the recorded interview. (Id.) As 

Respondents note, according to the appellate court, Petitioner responded, “Some, yeah[,]” when the detective asked whether Petitioner was willing to answer some questions. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶ 2.) However, the transcript Petitioner filed states that he responded, “I guess so, yeah,” and includes a handwritten notation with a star and the word 

“(some).” (Doc. 1 at 13.) Because the partial transcript has no certificate of authenticity or accuracy, and suggests in handwriting that the word “some” is missing, the Court concludes that it is not clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness to which the state court’s factual findings are entitled. See 28 

U.S.C § 2254(e)(1). Additionally, the Court listened to the recorded interview that was 

admitted at trial and confirmed that that appellate court accurately quoted that recording. (Doc. 16 (trial exhibit 158).) Additionally, even if the transcript Petitioner provided were accurate, it would not change the Court’s analysis. 

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statements were further indication of their ambiguity. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Specifically, the 

appellate court noted that Petitioner stated that he was willing to answer “some” 

questions, but also stated that he “fe[lt] like [he] should have an attorney.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner did 

not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel is an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent. The record reflects that when Detective 

Heatherington asked if Petitioner was willing to answer “some questions,” he responded 

“Some, yeah.” (Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶ 2; Doc. 16 (trial exhibit 158).) He then stated, “I feel 

like I should have an attorney.” (Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶ 2; Doc. 16 (trial exhibit 158).) After 

a pause, the detective continued the interview and asked Petitioner, “what happened that 

morning.” (Id.) Petitioner then confessed. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶¶ 2-3.) 

 Petitioner’s statement to Detective Heatherington was similar to the statement in 

Davis that the Supreme Court found an ineffective innovation of the petitioner’s Miranda

right to counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 (finding statement that “maybe I should talk to a 

lawyer” was not a request for counsel). Additionally, Petitioner has not identified any 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation that would have made “a reasonable police 

officer” understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 

459. The Court has listened to the recording of the interrogation that was introduced at 

trial and has found no such circumstances. (Doc. 14, Ex. AA (filed with the Court on 

7/28/2016); Doc. 16 (trial exhibit 158).) 

 In his reply, Petitioner relies upon Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004), 

to argue that he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. (Doc. 17 at 2.) In Abela, the 

Sixth Circuit concluded that the petitioner’s “actions confirm that a reasonable officer 

would understand Abela’s statement to be a clear request for counsel.” Id. at 926. In 

Abela, the petitioner stated “maybe I should talk to an attorney by the name of William 

Evans.” Id. The petitioner also showed the investigating officer the attorney’s business 

card. Id. The officer said he would call the petitioner’s attorney and “left the room 

presumably to do so.” Id. The officer later returned to the room, read the petitioner his 

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Miranda rights, and resumed questioning him. Id. at 927. This case is distinguishable 

from Abela. Petitioner only stated that he “fe[lt] like he should have an attorney.” He 

did not identify a particular attorney by name or give the officer an attorney’s business 

card. Therefore, the Abela decision does not support a conclusion that the appellate court 

unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent in this case. 

 In conclusion, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground One 

because he has not shown that the state court’s determination of that claim was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

B. Ground Two 

 Liberally construing the Petition, in Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the 

prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for Detective Heatherington and that the 

appellate court’s rejection of this claim was unreasonable.3

 (Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner 

argues that the prosecutor commented that Detective Heatherington did nothing wrong by 

continuing to question Petitioner during the interrogation. (Doc. 14, Ex. O at 11.) The 

appellate court rejected this claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 14, Ex. Q.) Petitioner has not 

shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

 In Parker v. Matthews, ___U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012), the Supreme 

Court held that Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), is the “clearly established 

Federal law” applicable to a prosecutor’s alleged improper comments for purposes of 

review under the AEDPA. Therefore, the appropriate standard for a claim of 

 

3

 Respondents correctly note that Ground Two does not include the specific facts in support of that claim in violation of Rule 2(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. (Doc. 14 at 13.) However, this failure is inconsequential because Respondents and the Court can discern the basis for Petitioner’s claim in Ground Two from his citation 

to page eleven of the “opening brief,” that Petitioner filed in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 14 at 13; Doc. 14, Ex. O at 11.) Additionally, Respondents do not urge the Court to deny relief based on Petitioner’s failure to comply with Rule 2(c)(2). (Doc. 14 at 13.) 

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prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of 

supervisory power.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. To succeed on a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct, a petitioner must prove that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper and that 

they so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 

due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974); see also Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 

prosecutor.”). A petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief in the absence of a due 

process violation, even if the prosecutor’s comments were “undesirable or even 

universally condemned.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642. 

 When evaluating a petitioner’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the court 

“must consider the probable effect of the prosecutor’s [comments] on the jury’s ability to 

judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). To make such 

an assessment, the court must consider the prosecutor’s remarks in context. See Boyde v.

California, 494 U.S. 370, 385 (1990); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 

1998). The Supreme Court has assessed the fairness of a petitioner’s trial by considering, 

among other circumstances, whether the prosecutor’s comments manipulated or misstated 

the evidence, whether the trial court gave a curative instruction, and “the weight of the 

evidence against the petitioner.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82. 

 Petitioner complains that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Detective 

Heatherington. Improper vouching typically occurs when the prosecutor gives personal 

assurances of the witness’s truthfulness or suggests that there is information not presented 

to the jury that supports the witness’s testimony. See United States v. Berger, 295 U.S. 

78, 86-88 (1935); see also Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359-60 n. 15 (1958). 

“Vouching constitutes misconduct because it may lead the jury to convict on the basis of 

evidence not presented; it also carries the imprimatur of the government, which may 

induce the jury to adopt the government’s judgment rather than its own.” Runningeagle 

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v. Schriro, 2007 WL 4200743, at *15 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2007) (citing United States v. 

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985)). 

 To support his claim of improper vouching, Petitioner appears to rely on several 

portions of the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument. (Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 14, Ex. O at 8-

9; Doc. 14, Ex. G at 16-33, 56-69.) During the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, 

the prosecutor argued that Petitioner was trying to “have it both ways,” by claiming both 

that he was willing to cooperate with police, but also that police coerced him into 

confessing in violation of his Miranda rights. (Doc. 14, Ex. G at 58-59.) The prosecutor 

then told the jury that merely saying the word “attorney” was not enough to invoke the 

right to counsel. (Id. at 59.) The prosecutor stated that “the mere escaping of the lips of 

the word attorney doesn’t invoke that, if they think maybe they should or they feel maybe 

I should have one or something, that doesn’t — that’s not the case when they would 

cease questioning.” (Id.) The prosecutor continued, “It’s “I want an attorney,” or “I 

won’t answer questions without an attorney,” and that did not happen here, ladies and 

gentlemen. Just saying, oh, I feel like I should have one, but whatever, that’s not asking 

for an attorney.” (Id.) The prosecutor also mentioned that Petitioner continued 

answering questions for about thirty-five to forty minutes without asking for an attorney. 

(Id.) The prosecutor urged the jury to listen to the recording of the confession and verify 

that it was not coerced. (Id.) The prosecutor stated that Detective Heatherington did not 

coerce Petitioner, promise him anything, or “put words in [Petitioner’s] mouth.” (Id.) 

 As the court of appeals concluded, there was no improper vouching in Petitioner’s 

case because the prosecutor did not attempt to place the prestige of the government 

behind Detective Heatherington or suggest that information not presented at trial 

supported his testimony or conduct. (Doc. 14, Ex. G at 16-33, 56-69.) Rather, the 

prosecutor properly relied upon the evidence presented at trial to argue that Petitioner’s 

confession was not coerced. (Id. at 59.) The Court has listened to the recorded 

confession and concludes that it confirms that Detective Heatherington did not threaten, 

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coerce, or promise anything to Petitioner in return for confessing. (Doc. 14, Ex. AA; 

Doc. 16.) 

 The prosecutor’s summary of the law applying Miranda was also accurate. As the 

prosecutor argued, mentioning an attorney is not sufficiently clear to invoke the right to 

counsel. Rather, the invocation of the Miranda right to counsel must be “clear” and 

“unambiguous[].” See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461; Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381. 

 Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that the court of appeals 

reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct, explaining that the 

prosecutor’s comments were “proper comments on [Petitioner’s] post-Miranda

statements.” (Doc. 14, Ex. Q at ¶ 14.) Additionally, even if Petitioner could show that 

the prosecutor’s comments were improper, he has not established a due process violation 

because the jury was instructed that counsel’s arguments did not constitute evidence. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. G at 4.) 

 In conclusion, Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s rejection of his 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, he is not entitled to habeas 

corpus relief on Ground Two. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief and recommends that the Petition be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be granted because reasonable jurists could find 

the ruling debatable. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which to 

file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 27th day of September, 2016. 

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