Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00896/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00896-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Scott Huminski, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Hector Heretia, et al. 

Defendants.

No. CV11-0896-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 This order addresses eleven motions (Docs. 6, 8, 10, 12, 16, 21, 23, 24, 32, 33, 40) 

filed by Plaintiff pro se Scott Huminski and two motions (Docs. 20, 34) filed by 

Defendants. In addressing the motions, the Court will combine discussion of related 

motions. 

I. Motion to Amend and Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Motion to Amend. 

 Plaintiff moves for leave to amend on grounds that he needs more time to become 

familiar with federal rules and needs more time to respond to opposing papers on account 

of a disability. Doc. 6. Defendants oppose on account of Plaintiff failing to provide 

information about the substance of his amendment, as well as for failure to comply with 

Local Rule 15.1. Doc. 14. Plaintiff has not filed a reply. Plaintiff has, however, filed a 

motion to postpone, or hold in abeyance, decision on the motion to amend until the Court 

rules on the motions for injunctive relief (Doc. 16), a request that Defendants oppose 

(Doc. 25). The motions referenced by Plaintiff are not dispositive of the merits of the 

motion to amend, and therefore the Court will deny the motion to postpone. 

 Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court “should 

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freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Foman 

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 

F.3d 708, 880 (9th Cir. 2001). “In the absence of any apparent or declared reason – such 

as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to 

cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. – the leave 

sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. A party 

seeking leave to amend should, however, disclose the contents of the proposed 

amendment so that the court may ascertain whether leave to amend is warranted. See 

LRCiv. 15.1 (“A party who moves for leave to amend a pleading . . . must attach a copy 

of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion or stipulation, which must 

indicate in what respect it differs from the pleading which it amends, by bracketing or 

striking through the text to be deleted and underlining the text to be added.”). 

 In this case, Plaintiff did not state the substantive details of his amended 

complaint, nor has he filed an altered copy of the complaint as required by Local Rule 

15.1.1

 For these reasons, the motion to amend will be denied. 

II. Motion for Extension of Time.

 Plaintiff moves for an extension of time to file an amended notice of claim by 

July 29, 2011. Doc. 8. Plaintiff argues that such timeline is within the 180 days provided 

by statute. Id. Defendants have not responded to the motion, and the time for filing a 

response has expired. In light of the motion being colorable and unopposed, the Court 

will grant the motion. See LRCiv. 7.2(i). 

III. Motion for Accommodations. 

 Plaintiff moves for a permanent 10 business-day enlargement to all times 

prescribed by the rules of civil procedure in this case. Doc. 24 at 1. Plaintiff argues that 

 

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 On June 13, 2011, one month after filing the motion to amend, Plaintiff has filed 

a document purporting to be an amended complaint (Doc. 27). This untimely filing does not cure non-compliance with LRCiv. 15.1, however. 

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he suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) “arising from events and 

conduct similar to those of the City of Surprise.” Id. Plaintiff also attaches a letter 

allegedly issued by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) which states that Plaintiff 

“became disabled on November 29, 2008.” Id. at 2. Defendants oppose, arguing that the 

SSA letter “does not provide the type of disability, diagnosis or how the disability affects 

Plaintiff’s ability to respond.” Doc. 28 at 1. Plaintiff did not file a reply. 

 Rule 6(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets “good cause” as the 

standard for time extensions. The Ninth Circuit has observed that “‘good cause’ is a nonrigorous standard that has been construed broadly across procedural and statutory 

contexts.” Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to substantiate his claim of 

being diagnosed with PTSD and his claim, if he is in fact so diagnosed, that this disorder 

materially affects his ability to comply with filing deadlines. Plaintiff has not provided a 

formal diagnosis or analysis from a physician as an affidavit, and the SSA letter does not 

state PTSD as being the basis for Plaintiff’s disability. 

 In light of the above, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has meet the good cause 

standard in Rule 6(b)(1). The motion will be denied. 

IV. Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. 

 Plaintiff moves for an entry of default judgment against Defendants under 

Rules 55(b)(2) and 15(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 33. A 

response is not yet due from Defendants. The Court will deny the motion because it has 

no colorable basis in law or fact. 

 Under Rule 55, a default judgment is proper only when the party against whom the 

judgment is sought “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

Plaintiff asserts that he “filed and served his First Amended Complaint on June 13, 2011 

along with an Opposition to Defendants’ Rule 12 motion.” Doc. 33 at 1. Plaintiff asserts 

that the Court accepted and docketed the First Amended Complaint, and that Defendants 

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failed to defend against this amended complaint. Id.

 Rule 15 provides that a plaintiff may amend his complaint once without leave of 

court “within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a 

motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In 

all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written 

consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

 In this case, Defendants’ answer to Plaintiff’s original complaint appears to have 

been filed on April 28, 2011 (Doc. 1 at 7). The document Plaintiff characterizes as a first 

amended complaint was filed on June 13, 2011 (Doc. 27), well beyond the 21-day period. 

Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown that it obtained Defendants’ written consent to file the 

amended complaint, nor has Plaintiff secured leave from this Court. The Court therefore 

finds that Plaintiff has not properly filed an amended complaint, and the motion for entry 

of default will accordingly be denied. 

 Because the document at Doc. 27 is not a properly-filed pleading, as discussed 

above, the Court will strike it from the docket on its own.2

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1). 

V. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 

 Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment (Doc. 21), Defendants oppose 

(Doc. 35), and Plaintiff filed a reply (Doc. 37). 

 A motion for summary judgment is premature at this stage: a Rule 16 conference 

has not been set, the parties do not appear to have engaged in discovery, and Defendants’ 

answer does not admit liability (Doc. 1 at 7-8). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), (c). Plaintiff’s 

motion will therefore be construed by the Court as a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings under Rule 12(c). In re 1982 Sanger, 738 F.2d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir.1984) 

(“The moving party’s label for its motion is not controlling. Rather, the court will 

 

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 While the Court was in the process of reviewing Plaintiff’s many filings and drafting this order, Defendants moved to strike the document at Doc. 27 (Doc. 34); 

Plaintiff opposed (Doc. 39). Because the Court has stricken the document on its own, the 

motion will be denied as moot. 

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construe it, however styled, to be the type proper for relief requested.”). 

 Plaintiff’s complaint makes several claims for relief, including allegations that his 

constitutional rights were violated. Doc. 1-1. The complaint requests $9,999.99 in 

damages, and was filed in the Highland Justice Court, a justice court in Maricopa County, 

Arizona. Id. The complaint was filed on a one-page form, and the allegations are 

conclusory at best. Id. Defendants’ answer denies liability for the claims asserted. 

Doc. 1 at 7-8. In light of the complaint’s conclusory allegations and the denial of liability 

by Defendants, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law on the pleadings. The motion will therefore be denied.3

VI. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 

 Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) (Doc. 20), 

Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 26), and Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 30). The parties have not 

requested oral argument. Under Rule 12(c), “[j]udgment on the pleadings is properly 

granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). 

A Rule 12(c) motion is properly filed “[a]fter the pleadings are closed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(c). 

 Although Plaintiff has filed an initial complaint (Doc. 1) and Defendants an 

answer (Doc. 1 at 7-8), the Court has not held a Rule 16 hearing and has not entered a 

deadline for filing amended pleadings. Defendants’ motion will therefore be denied as 

premature. 

VII. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions. 

 Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as a 

sanction against their alleged “strategy of delay, harassment and confusion.” Doc. 23. 

The motion is made under Rule 11(b)(1), not Rule 12(f). Doc. 23 at 1. Defendants 

 

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 Plaintiff also filed a motion to strike Defendants’ separate statement of facts. Doc. 40. Because the Court concluded above that a summary judgment motion is premature at this stage, the motion to strike will be denied as moot. 

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oppose, arguing that the motion was not served on them 21 days before it was filed with 

the Court, and also that a Rule 11 sanction is not warranted here. Doc. 29. Plaintiff did 

not file a reply. The Court agrees that Plaintiff failed to give Defendants the opportunity 

to correct the issue as required by Rule 11(c)(2)’s “safe harbor provision,” and will deny 

the motion on that ground. Retail Flooring Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Beaulieu of Am., LLC, 

339 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003). 

VIII. Motions for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. 

 Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 10) and a temporary restraining 

order (“TRO”) (Doc. 12). Defendants oppose (Doc. 15), and Plaintiff filed a reply 

(Doc. 17). 

 To obtain a TRO and a preliminary injunction Plaintiff must show that he is likely 

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that injunctive relief is 

in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 

374 (2008). The test includes a sliding scale. If Plaintiff shows that the balance of 

hardships will tip sharply in his favor, he need not make a strong showing of likelihood 

of success on the merits – the existence of serious questions will suffice. Alliance for 

Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1049-53 (9th Cir. 2010). Serious questions exist 

when a plaintiff shows a “‘fair chance of success on the merits.’” Republic of the 

Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (quoting Nat’l 

Wildlife Fed’n v. Coston, 773 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

 Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction asserts that Officer Heredia wrote 

him an email stating, “Please do not have any type of contact with either Michael Nelson 

[sic] or Anthony Tsontakislaw [sic] until I speak with you and hear your side.” Doc. 10 

at 1 (alterations in original). Plaintiff characterizes this as a threat, and asserts in part that 

Defendants have “never withdrawn or attempted to narrowly-tailor the THREAT to be 

consistent with First Amendment principles or the broader speech protections provided 

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by the Arizona Constitution.” Id. (capitalization in original). Plaintiff contends that the 

email constituted a “police order restricting [Plaintiff’s] access to Courthouses,” and that 

Defendants intend to enforce this threat “through the abuse of police power.” Id. at 2. 

Plaintiff seeks an injunction barring Defendants from “enforcement of the THREAT in 

court matters and otherwise violating Huminski’s First Amendment rights.” Id. at 7 

(capitalization in original). Plaintiff’s motion for TRO references the motion for 

preliminary injunction. Doc. 12 at 1. 

 Assuming Plaintiff’s allegation about the contents of the email as true, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show irreparable harm or that the balance of equities 

tips sharply in his favor. As Defendants acknowledge in their response, the email does 

not bar Plaintiff from being present in court and does not threaten any harm or injury if 

Plaintiff refuses the request made in the email. Doc. 15. Plaintiff’s evidence does not 

persuade the Court otherwise. Moreover, in light of the conclusory assertions in 

Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the 

merits. 

 Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for TRO based apparently on an amended 

complaint. Doc. 32. Because an amended complaint was not properly filed with this 

Court, the motion at Doc. 32 will be denied as moot. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiff’s motion to postpone ruling (Doc. 16) is denied. 

 2. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 6) is denied as stated above. 

 3. Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time (Doc. 8) is granted. 

 4. Plaintiff’s motion for accommodations (Doc. 24) is denied as stated above. 

 5. Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default (Doc. 33) is denied. 

 6. The Clerk shall strike Doc. 27 from the docket. 

 7. Defendants’ motion to strike (Doc. 34) is denied as moot. 

 8. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 21) is denied. 

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 9. Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 40) is denied as moot. 

 10. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 20) is denied. 

 11. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (Doc. 23) is denied. 

 12. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 10) is denied. 

 13. Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO (Doc. 12) is denied. 

 14. Plaintiff’s renewed motion for a TRO (Doc. 32) is denied as moot. 

 15. A case management conference shall be set by separate order. 

 Dated this 18th day of July, 2011. 

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