Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00953/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00953-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE WALLACE,

CDCR # E-66269 Civil No. 11cv0953 DMS (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

P. COWAN; B. MORRIS; P.A. CORTEZ; G.

PEDERSON; J.S. VALASKANT,

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Com plaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 2, 2011, along with a Motion to ProceedIn Forma Pauperis (IFP)

and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. On May 10, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed IFP, but denied his Motion for Appointment of Counsel and dismissed his

Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See

May 10, 2011 Order [ECF No. 4] at 6. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended

Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. On

August 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

1 11cv0953 DMS (JMA) 

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II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions of the PLRA, the Court

must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Retaliation

Plaintiff claims that the Defendants, who were part of the committee that heard Plaintiff’s

disciplinary violation, retaliated against him by finding him guilty of a serious rules violation.

(See FAC 3-4.) Plaintiff claims that the actions taken were in retaliation for Plaintiff reading his

grievances at the disciplinary hearing to the committee members in defense of his position that

he was not guilty of a serious rules violation. (Id.) 

In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, Plaintiff must be able to prove the following

five factors: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against [Plaintiff]; (2)

because of (3) [Plaintiff’s] protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled [Plaintiff’s]

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-568 (9th Cir. 2005),

/ / / / /

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(citing Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813,

815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). 

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are not clear. It appears that he is claiming that the retaliation

comes from the presentation of his defense during the hearing. (See FAC at 3-4.) Plaintiff was

found guilty of the offense at the conclusion of the hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff has alleged no facts

to suggest that the actions of Defendants did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal nor does Plaintiff allege any facts to show that his First Amendment rights were “chilled.”

Plaintiff’s claims that the actions by Defendants were directly related to the fact that he spoke

up in his defense during the hearing simply do not contain enough facts for the Court to find that

the guilty verdict was in response to Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. If the

Court were to follow Plaintiff’s logic, than every prisoner who presented a defense during a

disciplinary hearing, and was later found guilty, would have a retaliation claim. See Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ___; 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Therefore, the Court must sua sponte dismiss

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).

C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated during his disciplinary hearing

because several correctional officers falsified rules violation reports which led to Plaintiff being

sentenced to Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”). “The requirements of procedural due

process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s

protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State

statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due

process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme

Court has significantly limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement

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that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir.

1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of his placement in Ad-Seg which show “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus

discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s

confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when

compared to those shared by prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of

whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (holding that

placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not present the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an

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opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that

if his amended complaint fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However,

Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which

to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the

superseded pleading. See S. D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Second Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter

be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-

79 (9th Cir. 1996).

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a form civil rights complaint to Plaintiff.

DATED: October 25, 2011

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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