Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04117/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Plaintiff Mona Lisa Lacy (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the denial of her

application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by according

inadequate weight to the opinion of her treating physician and rejecting her subjective 

complaints (Doc. 14 at 11, 20). 

A person is considered “disabled” for the purpose of receiving social security 

benefits if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result 

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration’s decision 

to deny benefits should be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Bayliss 

v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “It means such 

Mona Lisa Lacy,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-18-04117-PHX-SPL

ORDER

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 1 of 12
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted). The Court must review 

the record as a whole and consider both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 

detracts from the ALJ’s determination. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985).

I. DISCUSSION

A. PLAINTIFF’S SYMPTOM TESTIMONY

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in rejecting her symptom testimony (Doc. 14 at 20–

26). In evaluating a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step 

analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ must decide 

whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an impairment 

reasonably expected to produce some degree of the symptoms alleged. Id. If the first test 

is met and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the testimony regarding 

the severity of the symptoms only by providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 

the rejection. Id. Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medical impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause the alleged symptoms but concluded that her statements as to the 

intensity or limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible (AR 22).1 

“In determining credibility, an ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of 

credibility evaluation, such as considering claimant’s reputation for truthfulness and 

inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 

2005). Additionally, “general findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the ALJ found that: (1) the 

medical evidence was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statements, (2) inconsistencies between 

her statements and conduct, and (3) inconsistencies between her statements and doctor 

opinions regarding her condition. (AR 30–31) At the outset, it appears that the ALJ 

discounted Plaintiff’s testimony because it was not “entirely consistent with the medical 

1 Administrative Record (Doc. 10).

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 2 of 12
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 22) This is a standard which is much 

higher than what is required on the part of a claimant. Indeed,

the claimant is not required to show “that her impairment could 

reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom 

she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably 

have caused some degree of the symptom.” Smolen v. Chater, 

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). Nor must a claimant 

produce “objective medical evidence of the pain or fatigue 

itself, or the severity thereof.” Id.

Garrison, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s medical records did not need 

to fully support the severity of her reported symptoms. 

The ALJ then looked to Plaintiff’s earning records and noted that she had not 

worked for several years prior to the alleged onset date. (AR 22) The ALJ further noted 

that Plaintiff stated she had stopped working in 2009 due to her condition but that there 

had been no treatment for the condition until August 2014 and Lacy had reported to a 

treating mental health provider that she had not worked in seven years due to raising her 

children. (AR 22) The ALJ concluded that the conflicting reasons raised questions as to 

whether her unemployment was due to her alleged impairments or other non-medical 

reasons. (AR 22) During her testimony, Plaintiff testified that she had stopped working 

because she was laid off, not because of her impairment. (AR 51) The Court notes that the 

record indicates that Plaintiff began to experience severe symptoms of fibromyalgia in 

August and September 2014, when she sought medical attention regularly because of the 

symptoms, which is around the same time she claimed disability. (Doc. 14 at 3–7) The 

ALJ’s citation to one statement from 2009 is not specific, clear, and convincing evidence 

to discount Plaintiff’s testimony.

The ALJ then discussed the medical records at length but never specifically links 

them to any particular symptom testimony. The ALJ mentions reports that Plaintiff was a 

busy stay at home mother of four, and that she reported she had “good” ability to prepare 

food, bathe, manager her money, shop, and take her medications. (AR 31) The ALJ 

reasoned that all those statements were inconsistent with her allegations of “disabling pain 

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 3 of 12
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and limitations.” (AR 31) Without more specificity from the ALJ, the Court finds that the 

ALJ failed to meet her burden of clearly identifying the specific parts of Plaintiff’s

testimony she found not credible and why. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ 

committed legal error in assessing Plaintiff’s testimony.

B. MEDICAL OPINION OF JOSEPH NOLAN

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ accorded inadequate weight to the opinion of 

Plaintiff’s treating rheumatologist, Joseph W. Nolan, M.D. (Doc. 14 at 11–20). 

To reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining 

doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence. If a treating or examining 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an 

ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216 (internal citation omitted). “The ALJ can meet this burden by 

setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 

stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 

747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

The ALJ provided four reasons for giving Dr. Nolan’s October 2014 opinion little 

weight: (1) the assessment was “quite conclusory, providing very little explanation of the 

evidence relied on in forming that opinion;” (2) Dr. Nolan treated Plaintiff only three times 

prior to completing the assessment and the ALJ concluded that “there [was] no evidence 

that such restrictions persisted;” (3) the assessment was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 

“reports of exercising regularly and being a busy stay at home mom of four several weeks 

prior to when the opinion was rendered;” and (4) the assessment was “inconsistent with 

her essentially normal physical examination findings, including that she had no muscle 

atrophy and a 5/5 strength. (AR 29) 

1. CONCLUSORY ASSESSMENT

First, the ALJ gave Dr. Nolan’s assessment and opinions therein little weight 

because she found the assessment quite conclusory. (AR 29) The ALJ noted that Dr. 

Nolan’s opinions were that “[Plaintiff] would experience pain and/or fatigue sufficiently 

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 4 of 12
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sever to interfere with attention and concentration constantly, that she would experience 

deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in 

a timely manner on a constant basis. (AR 29; AR 349–51) Further Dr. Nolan opined that 

[Plaintiff] would not be able to sustain work on a regular or continuing basis.” (AR 29; AR 

349–51) Those opinions were in the form of checked boxes on a checklist which Dr. Nolan 

filled out. (AR 349–51) The ALJ gave no further explanation as to why she thought the 

assessment was conclusory. In reviewing the assessment (entitled “Fibromyalgia Residual 

Functional Capacity (RFC) Questionnaire), the Court finds that it does not seem 

conclusory: the first page has several boxes with a list of symptoms for the physician to 

check and out of the 18 symptoms available, Dr. Nolan checked 15 of the boxes. (AR 349–

51) Dr. Nolan also checked the boxes stating that the patient’s impairments either have 

lasted 12 months or can be expected to last the next 12 months and that the patient suffered 

pain. (AR 349–51) Without more explanation from the ALJ, the Court cannot truly discern 

why the ALJ found the opinions in the form to be conclusory. The Commissioner’s counsel 

argues that the ALJ properly discounted the opinions contained in the questionnaire 

because it was in the form of a check-the-box form lacking any narrative explanation. (Doc. 

20 at 17) It is true that the ALJ may properly reject such opinions in the form of a checkthe-box document. See, e.g. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2017). But 

such “flat-out” rejections are permissible if the ALJ also determined that the opinions 

therein do not have supportive objective evidence, are contradicted by other statements and 

assessments of the claimant’s medical condition, and are based on the claimant’s subjective 

descriptions of symptoms. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th

Cir. 2004). The Court finds that the first requirement is not met here.

Furthermore, “[i]n Social Security cases the ALJ has a special duty to fully and 

fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered.” Smolen 

v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996), superseded by statute on other grounds

(citing Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.1983)). “If the ALJ thought he needed 

to know the basis of [the treating physician’s] opinions in order to evaluate them, he had a 

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 5 of 12
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

duty to conduct an appropriate inquiry, for example, by subpoenaing the physicians or 

submitting further questions to them.” Id. The ALJ did not inquire further as to the basis 

for Dr. Nolan’s opinions in the checklist. The record also contains objective evidence 

supporting the opinions in the checklist as the ALJ herself acknowledged. Indeed, the ALJ 

noted in her decision all the instances where Plaintiff reported the symptoms to Dr. Nolan. 

(AR 23–24) The record contains progress notes by Dr. Nolan reporting his opinion at each 

of Plaintiff’s visits. (AR 386, 387, 389–90) The only contradictory evidence the ALJ relied 

on is contained in her third and fourth reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Nolan’s 

opinions and will be addressed below. Lacking any specific support to simply disregard 

the opinions in the form of a checklist, the Court finds that the ALJ’s first reason to discount 

Dr. Nolan’s opinion was legal error. 

2. LENGTH OF TREATMENT BY DR. NOLAN

The ALJ also gave Dr. Nolan’s opinions little weight because he only saw Plaintiff

three times before filling out the assessment. (AR 29). In determining the weight to give a 

treating source’s medical opinion, the ALJ must consider the length of the treatment 

relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship, the supportability of the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the 

record as a whole, specialization, and other relevant factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). 

Although the length of the treatment relationship is one consideration, the Court 

finds that, absent a weighing of the remaining factors, it alone does not establish a sufficient 

and legitimate reason to give Dr. Nolan’s opinion little weight. See Price v. Colvin, 635 F.

App’x 379, 380 (9th Cir. 2016). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has considered and given 

great weight to opinions of physicians who had seen a claimant for less time than Dr. Nolan, 

concluding they had attained the status of treating physician. See, e.g., Le v. Astrue, 529 

F.3d 1200, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that the physician who had treated claimant 

five times in three years had been found by the District Court to be a treating physician for 

purposes of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527); Ghokassian v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 

1994) (holding that a physician who saw the claimant twice in a 14-month period was his 

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 6 of 12
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treating physician). Under those decisions, the Court finds that the ALJ’s second reason 

for giving Dr. Nolan’s opinion little weight was legal error.

The ALJ also mentioned that there was no reason to believe the restrictions outlined

in Dr. Nolan’s opinions had persisted. (AR 29) The Commissioner’s counsel argues that 

the ALJ reasonably concluded that “there was no indication that the restrictions found by 

Dr. Nolan . . . would persist.” (Doc. 20 at 17) This is quite different from the language used 

by the ALJ. The ALJ stated that “there is no indication to believe that the restrictions 

persisted.” (AR 29) The ALJ’s choice of words and plain meaning of such words show that 

the ALJ meant that she reviewed the record and that she concluded there was no evidence 

to show the restrictions Dr. Nolan identified had persisted after Dr. Nolan gave such 

opinion. The ALJ did not mean that there was no evidence at the time of Dr. Nolan’s 

opinion that the restrictions would persist. With that clarification in mind, the Court finds 

that there is ample evidence that the restrictions persisted. Indeed, Lacy returned to visit 

Dr. Nolan several times during the relevant period and Dr. Nolan identified multiple 

positive tender points at each treatment visit. (Doc. 14 at 3–7) Accordingly, the Court finds 

that the ALJ’s finding that there is no evidence the restrictions continued is unfounded.

3. PLAINTIFF’S REPORTS OF HER LIFESTYLE

The ALJ also reasoned that Dr. Nolan’s opinions of restrictions were inconsistent 

with Plaintiff’s own “reports of exercising regularly and being a busy stay at home mom 

of four several weeks prior to when the opinion was rendered.” (AR 29) The ALJ did not 

cite any exhibit or other material in the record on which she based this reasoning, which 

makes it impossible for the Court to assess the basis for the reasoning. The statement is 

also very vague as “several weeks” can be interpreted in many different ways. The 

Commissioner’s counsel points to page 340 of the administrative record in support of this 

statement. Besides the fact that the ALJ should have cited such evidence herself, such 

evidence still fails to satisfy the burden on the ALJ to justify her opinion. The note cited 

contains the statement that “the patient is a busy stay at home mom with 4 children” but no 

other statement as to what it entails. (AR 340)

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 7 of 12
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

It is true that a claimant’s ability to engage in daily activities that are incompatible 

with the severity of symptoms described by a treating physician may support the rejection 

of that opinion. Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1162 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600–02 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the ALJ did not discuss 

her reasoning any further. Particularly, the ALJ did not identify which daily activities or 

aspects of being a “busy stay at home mom of four” conflicted with or exceeded the 

restrictions identified by Dr. Nolan. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 

2017) (concluding that ALJ erred by relying on the claimant’s activities to discount her 

treating physician’s opinion where there were no details about what the activities involved 

or the extent of those activities); Padilla v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2018 WL 

4770807, at *7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2018); see also Ong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 2018 

WL 3323169, at *16 (D. Ariz. July 6, 2018) (finding that “the ALJ’s conclusory assertion 

that the limitations Dr. Roberson assessed were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities of 

daily living does not satisfy the standard required for rejecting an examining physician’s 

opinion” because the ALJ “must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, 

rather than the doctors’, are correct.”). The ALJ did not explain why her interpretation was 

correct as opposed to Dr. Nolan’s. Accordingly, this reasoning for discounting Dr. Nolan’s 

opinion was also in error.

4. PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICAL FINDINGS

The last reason the ALJ gave to discount Dr. Nolan’s October 2014 opinions of 

Plaintiff’s restrictions was that it was “inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] essentially normal 

physical examination findings, including that she had no muscle atrophy and 5/5 strength.” 

(AR 29) This reasoning is in error for two reasons: (1) it is based on “cherry-picking” of 

the records, and (2) the ALJ cannot substitute her judgment for the one of a medical doctor 

when interpreting medical evidence. 

First, the ALJ cited to one visit where it appears that Plaintiff had no muscle atrophy 

and 5/5 strength. Looking further into that record, it does look like the ALJ picked that 

statement out of the progress note but did not look to the rest of the note. Indeed, the visit 

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 8 of 12
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was with Vivian Perlman, a physician assistant at Barrow Epilepsy, and Plaintiff had 

presented for issues with migraines. (AR 340) Although PA Perlman did write the 

statement the ALJ referred to, she also wrote that “motor strength is equal, but limited by 

pain.” (AR 341) This is exactly the type of “cherry-picking” of the records which an ALJ 

cannot engage in. Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Second, and more importantly, it is well-settled that “ALJs cannot usurp the role of 

doctors when interpreting medical evidence.” Leusch v. Beryhill, 2019 WL 176768, at *6 

(D. Ariz. Jan 11, 2019) (citing Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 683). The Court cannot affirm the ALJ’s 

opinion simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence out of a mixed and 

complex record, about which the ALJ failed to make comprehensive, specific, and 

legitimate findings. Id. (citing Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007)). The Ninth 

Circuit has expressly recognized that

[f]ibromyalgia is a rheumatic disease that causes inflammation 

of the fibrous connective tissue components of muscles, 

tendons, ligaments, and other tissue. Typical symptoms 

include “chronic pain throughout the body, multiple tender 

points, fatigue, stiffness, and a pattern of sleep disturbance that 

can exacerbate the cycle of pain and fatigue.” What is unusual 

about the disease is that those suffering from it have “muscle 

strength, sensory functions, and reflexes [that] are normal.”

Their joints appear normal, and further musculoskeletal 

examination indicates no objective joint swelling. Indeed, there 

is an absence of symptoms that a lay person may ordinarily 

associate with joint and muscle pain. The condition is 

diagnosed entirely on the basis of the patients’ reports of pain 

and other symptoms. There are no laboratory tests to confirm 

the diagnosis. Id.

Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 656 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted) 

(emphasis added). With that background and definition in mind, the Court finds that the 

ALJ’s fourth reason to discount Dr. Nolan’s opinions was legal error because it directly 

contradicts medical criteria for fibromyalgia without explaining why the ALJ’s opinion 

and not Dr. Nolan’s is correct.

The ALJ also gave little weight to Dr. Nolan’s April 2017 assessment for similar 

reasons, which the Court will not analyze again. Additionally, the ALJ stated that the 2017 

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 9 of 12
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

opinions were “rendered more than 2 years after the claimant’s date last insured, and Dr. 

Nolan did not indicate that these limitations were applicable prior to the claimant’s last 

insured.” (AR 30) This statement is in contradiction with the ALJ’s previous conclusion 

with regards to Dr. Nolan’s October 2014 assessment where the ALJ reasoned that “there 

was no indication such restrictions persisted.” (AR 29) The ALJ acknowledged that some 

restrictions were present in October 2014 but later, in discounting Dr. Nolan’s 2017 

assessment relies on the assertion that Dr. Nolan did not express that the restrictions were 

present in October 2014. In both instances, Dr. Nolan opined that Plaintiff would not be 

able to sustain work on a regular and continuing basis. (AR 351, 489–91) The Court notes 

that there was an additional questionnaire filled out by Dr. Nolan in 2017, which quantifies 

specific restrictions such as “stand or walk less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday.” (AR 

486–88) It might be that the ALJ referred to those restrictions which Dr. Nolan did not link 

to the relevant period and the Court finds that the ALJ was correct in discounting that part 

of the 2017 assessment. It still does not justify giving little weight to the opinions contained 

in the rest of the assessment.

C. MEDICAL OPINION OF DR. SAPIN

The ALJ accorded great weight to the opinion of one of the state agency’s medical 

consultant, Dr. Neil Sapin, M.D. (AR 30) Dr. Sapin completed his review of the records as 

part of the reconsideration determination. (AR 98–100) Although Plaintiff argues that it is 

unclear why the ALJ accorded great weight to this opinion when it accorded little weight 

to the opinion of another state agency medical consultant, Dr. Luther Woodcock, M.D., the 

Court finds that the ALJ’s reasoning is clear. The ALJ stated that she gave little weight to 

Dr. Woodcock’s opinion because he concluded that Plaintiff suffered no severe 

impairment, which was contrary to the record. (AR 30) Then, the ALJ stated that for the 

same reasons, meaning the evidence in the record that Plaintiff had a severe impairment, 

she accorded great weight to the opinion of Dr. Sapin that Plaintiff could perform light 

work. (AR 30) The ALJ credited Dr. Sapin’s opinion because she believed it matched the 

records: that Plaintiff had a severe impairment but could perform some light work.

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 10 of 12
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

There are a couple of points regarding Dr. Sapin’s opinion and the weight the ALJ 

should accord to such opinion which are worth mentioning. First, Dr. Sapin’s specialty 

code, 19, indicates he was an internist, and not a rheumatologist, which is the relevant 

specialty for a case of fibromyalgia. (AR 100) See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 727

(9th Cir. 1998) (relying on the Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) definitions 

regarding a condition); PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, “MEDICAL SPECIALTY 

CODES,” DI 24501.0004(B), https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424501004 (last 

visited March 13, 2020). It is hard to see how the opinion of a non-treating internist would 

carry more weight than the opinion of a treating rheumatologist on a case of fibromyalgia, 

but this again returns to the ALJ’s error is discrediting Dr. Nolan’s opinion more than an 

error in weighing Dr. Sapin’s opinion. Second, Dr. Sapin was a non-treating physician who 

reviewed the record up to August 7, 2015. This poses some question as to the weight to 

give his opinion given that he only reviewed part of the full record. However, the Court 

finds that the ALJ did not commit error in weighing the opinion of Dr. Sapin given his 

review of most of the relevant record and besides his lack of specialization in 

rheumatology. However, the Court also finds that such opinion alone is not enough to 

support a denial of benefits when viewing the record as a whole and for the reasons stated 

in this opinion. Finally, the Court notes that the vocational expert concluded that limitations 

consistent with Plaintiff’s reported symptoms would preclude work. (AR 65–66, 69)

II. CONCLUSION

It is in this Court’s discretion to reverse and remand for an award of benefits or 

further proceedings. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

credit-as-true rule requires a court to remand for calculation and award of benefits rather 

than a remand for further proceedings when: “(1) the record has been fully developed and 

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or 

medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the 

ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 11 of 12
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1020. However, “even [if] all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied,” a court 

may remand for further proceedings if “an evaluation of the record as a whole creates 

serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Id. at 1021.

Here, all three conditions of the credit-as-true rule are met: (1) the ALJ failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Nolan’s opinion and Plaintiff’s 

subjective testimony; (2) the record has been fully developed, and as a result, a remand for 

further proceedings would not be useful; and (3) based on the vocational expert’s 

testimony, the ALJ would have been required to find Plaintiff disabled had she credited 

Dr. Nolan’s opinion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 

vacated and remanded to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for an 

award of benefits.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 18th day of March, 2020.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

Case 2:18-cv-04117-SPL Document 23 Filed 03/18/20 Page 12 of 12