Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_18-cv-00689/USCOURTS-alnd-5_18-cv-00689-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

DAVID HAWTHORNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

RYAN D. MCCARTHY, Secretary 

of the Army, et al., 

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 5:18-cv-00689-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

The United States Army has asked the Court to dismiss this federal-sector 

civilian employment discrimination action. (Docs. 83, 89).2

 So have the union 

defendants: David Cox, David Mollet, and Abner Merriweather. (Doc. 79). 

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants 

challenge this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over David Hawthorne’s claims 

against them. And if the Court has jurisdiction, then the defendants ask the Court to 

 1 The Court is issuing this opinion during a declared national emergency concerning COVID- 19. 

To enable parties to pursue their rights during this emergency, the Court is continuing its work. 

For information about the timing of appeals, please review the information provided in the 

conclusion of this opinion. The Court is including this procedural information in each opinion that 

it issues during the national emergency.

2 The Army is sued by and through the Secretary of the Army. Mr. Hawthorne named Mark Esper 

as the Secretary of the Army in his amended complaint. (Doc. 73, p. 2). Ryan D. McCarthy is the 

current Secretary of the Army, so the Court has substituted Mr. McCarthy for Mr. Esper. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 25(d) (When a public officer ceases holding office, that “officer’s successor is 

automatically substituted as a party.”).

FILED

 2020 May-29 PM 12:23

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:18-cv-00689-MHH Document 96 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 51
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dismiss Mr. Hawthorne’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the 

Court finds that it has jurisdiction over this matter. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the 

Court will grant the union defendants’ motion to dismiss and will grant in part and 

deny in part the Army’s motion to dismiss.

3

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(1) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In the absence of subject 

matter jurisdiction, a district court may not hear a case. Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 

957, 961 (11th Cir. 1999). Consequently, when a defendant pursues “a Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion [] in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the 

Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” 

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. City of 

Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam)).

4

 

 3 Mr. Mollett also seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and (5), for insufficient 

process and insufficient service of process, respectively. Because Mr. Hawthorne has abandoned 

his claims against the individual defendants (see Doc. 80, pp. 14–15, ¶40), there is no need to 

discuss these rules.

4 The Hitt decision is binding authority in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Bonner v. City 

of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (adopting as binding precedent in the Eleventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered before October 

1, 1981).

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Attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be either 

facial or factual. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 

1279 (11th Cir. 2009). “Facial attacks to subject matter jurisdiction require the 

court merely to look and see if the plaintiff's complaint has sufficiently alleged a 

basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as 

true for the purposes of the motion.” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 

F.3d 1323, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1279)); see 

also, McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 

(11th Cir. 2007). “Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge the existence of 

subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251 (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “[W]here a defendant raises a factual attack on 

subject matter jurisdiction, the district court may consider extrinsic evidence such as 

deposition testimony and affidavits.” Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1279. “In so doing, 

a district court may weigh the facts, and the court is “not constrained to view them 

in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff.” Houston, 733 F.3d at 1336 (quoting 

Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1279)). 

Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint against the “liberal 

pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2).” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

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(2007). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). “Generally, to survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss and meet the 

requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ but rather ‘only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Maledy v. City of Enterprise, 2012 WL 1028176, *1 (M.D. Ala. March 

2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)). 

“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair 

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson, 551 

U.S. at 93 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

“Thus, the pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 

evaluates the plausibility of the facts alleged, and the notice stemming from a 

complaint’s allegations.” Keene v. Prine, 477 Fed. Appx. 575, 583 (11th Cir. 2012). 

“Where those two requirements are met . . . the form of the complaint is not 

significant if it alleges facts upon which relief can be granted, even if it fails to 

categorize correctly the legal theory giving rise to the claim.” Id.

This is particularly true with respect to pro se complaints. Courts must 

liberally construe pro se documents. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. “‘[A] pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. 

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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard 

than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”). Cf.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Still, a 

district court “may not serve as de facto counsel for a party, or ... rewrite an 

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Ausar-El ex. rel. Small, 

Jr. v. BAC (Bank of America) Home Loans Servicing LP, 448 Fed. Appx. 1, 2 (11th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court accepts as 

true the factual allegations in the complaint – or in this case, the amended complaint 

– and construes the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018), but “conclusory 

allegations . . . are not entitled to an assumption of truth—legal conclusions must be 

supported by factual allegations,” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709–10 (11th Cir. 

2010). Accordingly, in this opinion, the Court presents the factual allegations in the 

amended complaint in the light most favorable to Mr. Hawthorne and draws all 

inferences from the factual allegations in his favor. As the case proceeds, the 

evidence may, or may not, differ from the factual allegations in Mr. Hawthorne’s 

amended complaint.

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II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Mr. Hawthorne is an engineer and a civilian federal employee at the United 

States Army Sustainment Command located at Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, 

Alabama. (Doc. 73, p. 2, ¶ 1). Mr. Hawthorne is a member of both the American 

Federation of Government Employees, a national union that represents government 

workers, and the local chapter of that union, Local 1858 which is part of District 5 

of the national union. (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 7). (Doc. 73, p. 7, ¶ 23).

A. Alleged Sexual Harassment by Abner Merriweather

Mr. Hawthorne contends that Abner Merriweather, the president of Local 

1858, and an employee of the Army’s Aviation and Missile Research Development 

and Engineering Center, sexually harassed him and subjected him to a hostile work 

environment. (Doc. 73, p. 2, ¶ 1). Mr. Hawthorne alleges that Mr. Merriweathwr 

began harassing him on March 20, 2017. (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 2). On that date, Mr. 

Merriweather asked Mr. Hawthorne to accompany him to a casino in Mississippi. 

(Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 2). Mr. Hawthorne “told [Mr. Merriweather] no, and went on to 

say that [Mr. Merriweather] should take his lady to that event, and not to ask [Mr. 

Hawthorne] about such a thing.” (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 2). 

On May 8, 2017, Mother’s Day, Mr. Merriweather sent a group text to Mr. 

Hawthorne, and others, that said “Happy Mother’s Day.” (Doc. 16-8, p. 7; Doc. 73, 

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p. 3, ¶ 3).5 Mr. Hawthorne responded by text: “Abner I know you play a lot, but I 

don’t like the gay jokes in any form or fashion. There is nothing funny, playful or 

amusing about what you just said . . . Leave me out of the gay jokes . . . .” (Doc. 16-

8, p. 7; Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 3). Mr. Merriweather apologized and wrote that “he would 

never do anything like that again.” (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 3).6

 

During a May 20, 2017 phone conversation with Mr. Hawthorne, Mr. 

Merriweather asked Mr. Hawthorne to come to Mr. Merriweather’s home and cook 

for Mr. Merriweather. (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 4). Mr. Hawthorne alleges that he

explicitly told [Mr. Merriweather] that he needed to ask his lady to do 

that and not to be asking me about such things. I told him that it sounded 

like a gay request, and that a man should ask his lady or a lady should 

ask her man to do those things. I went on to tell him that he should not 

be asking me and to stop.

(Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 4). 

 5 Page 7 of Doc. 16-8 is a copy of Mr. Merriweather’s text message, and Mr. Hawthorne’s 

response, that is referenced in, but not attached to, the amended complaint. It is part of an exhibit 

filed by Mr. Hawthorne on June 15, 2018. This Court may consider documents that Mr. Hawthorne 

referenced in his amended complaint without converting the defendants’ motions to dismiss to 

motions for summary judgment, even though the documents are not physically attached to the 

amended complaint, if the documents are central to the complaint and no party questions their 

authenticity. Madura v. Bank of Am., N.A., 767 Fed. Appx. 868, 870 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Day 

v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005)). “A document is central to a complaint when it 

is a “’necessary part of [the plaintiff’s] effort to make out a claim.’” Madura, 767 Fed. Appx. at 

870 (quoting Day, 400 F.3d at 1276). The text message is a part of Mr. Hawthorne’s effort to 

make out a claim of harassment, and to date, no party has objected to it. 

In his amended complaint, Mr. Hawthorne refers to many such documents. To the extent that 

those documents appear in the record of this case without objection, the Court has considered them 

for purposes of this opinion. 

6 The Court has not located Mr. Merriweather’s reply email in the record. 

Case 5:18-cv-00689-MHH Document 96 Filed 05/29/20 Page 7 of 51
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At a bar on May 22, 2017, Mr. Merriweather approached Mr. Hawthorne and 

began telling another nearby patron that Mr. Merriweather had asked Mr. Hawthorne 

“to go on a cruise with him.” (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 5). Mr. Hawthorne immediately 

walked away from Mr. Merriweather and the patron. (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 5). The next 

day, Mr. Hawthorne sent Mr. Merriweather a text saying that Merriweather knew 

that “he did not ask me and/or my lady to go on a cruise with him . . . and not to lie 

on me or even ask me such a thing.” (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 5). That same day, Mr. 

Merriweather responded by texting an apology “for lying,” and “said he would not 

do that again.” (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶5). Later, by text, Mr. Merriweather called Mr. 

Hawthorne “too sensitive.” (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 5).

On May 26, 2017, at the Local 1858 office, Mr. Merriweather asked Mr. 

Hawthorne to accompany Mr. Merriweather on a cruise for just the two of them. 

(Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶6). Mr. Hawthorne declined and told Mr. Merriweather “not to ask 

me something like that because . . . that is something a person ask[s] of their 

companion.” (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 6).

Mr. Hawthorne was recruiting new union members at a local bar on May 30, 

2017, when Mr. Merriweather approached and began calling Mr. Hawthorne “[h]is 

Boo Boo,” and telling Mr. Hawthorne “you know you are my Boo Boo.” (Doc. 73, 

p. 3–4, ¶ 7). This continued despite Mr. Hawthorne telling Mr. Merriweather to stop 

“15 to 20 times.” (Doc. 73, p. 3, ¶ 7). Mr. Hawthorne then moved to another seat, 

Case 5:18-cv-00689-MHH Document 96 Filed 05/29/20 Page 8 of 51
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but Mr. Merriweather followed and continued to call Mr. Hawthorne “[h]is Boo 

Boo,” sometimes whispering it. (Doc. 73, p. 4, ¶ 7). This continued even after two 

bar patrons intervened and asked Mr. Merriweather to stop. Mr. Hawthorne 

eventually left. (Doc. 73, p. 4, ¶ 7).

The next morning, May 31, 2017, at 3:00 a.m., Mr. Merriweather sent a text 

to Mr. Hawthorne about the previous day’s incident. (Doc. 73, p. 4, ¶ 8). At 3:30 

a.m. that same morning, Mr. Hawthorne responded and asked Mr. Merriweather not 

to text him again. (Doc. 73, p. 4, ¶ 8; Doc. 16-8, p. 5). The text continues, in 

pertinent part:

I told you to [s]top calling me that. It was offensive it was sexual [i]n 

nature, it was in fact to me sexual harassment. Only the day before, or 

two days before, with Judy on the phone you ask[ed] me to cook for 

you, [I find that] homosexual in nature too. And I was offended by it as 

was illustrative [sic] in my reply to you with Judy in the phone.

(Doc. 16-8, p. 5; see also Doc. 73, p. 4, ¶ 8). Mr. Merriweather replied by text 15 

minutes later saying “[e]verything [you] said above is correct, it was the manner [in 

which you] said it to me in a bully[ing] and dictating way . . . please don’t text me 

again.” (Doc. 16-8, p. 4; see also Doc. 73, p. 4, ¶ 8). In another text, Mr. 

Merriweather accused Mr. Hawthorne of “coming over to [and] physically 

threatening [Mr. Merriweather].” (Doc. 16-8, p. 4). Mr. Merriweather also 

apologized for calling Mr. Hawthorne “his Boo Boo.” (Doc. 16-8, p. 4).

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B. Mr. Hawthorne’s Sexual Harassment and Reprisal EEO 

Complaint Concerning Mr. Merriweather’s Alleged Conduct

On May 31, 2017, Mr. Hawthorne submitted to the Army’s Office of Equal 

Employment Opportunity a sexual harassment complaint against Mr. Merriweather.

(Doc. 73, p. 5; Doc. 73-1, pp. 1–2). Mr. Hawthorne alleges that he brought the May 

31, 2017 EEO complaint “pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) et seq.” (Doc. 73, p. 20, 

¶ 81). The factual basis for this EEO complaint was Mr. Merriweather’s conduct the 

previous day, and Mr. Merriweather’s request that Mr. Hawthorne cook for Mr. 

Merriweather. (Doc. 73, pp. 5, 16; Doc. 73-1, p. 2).

Because he was the local union president, the EEO office listed Mr. 

Merriweather as his own supervisor on forms related to Mr. Hawthorne’s EEO 

complaint. (Doc. 73, p. 16, ¶ 66). Mr. Hawthorne argued that Mr. Merriweather 

was acting in his capacity as an employee of the Army, as well as the local union 

president, when the events occurred. (Doc. 73, pp. 16-17, ¶¶ 66–68). On June 5, 

2017, Mr. Hawthorne emailed the Army’s EEO office and complained that Mr. 

Merriweather’s Army supervisor should be notified. (Doc. 73, pp. 16-17, ¶¶ 66–67). 

The EEO office did not do so. (Doc. 73, p. 16, ¶ 66). 

In correspondence dated June 5, 2017, Frank G. Alfano, counsel for Mr. 

Merriweather, accused Mr. Hawthorne of making 

false and defamatory allegations . . . in email correspondence to Judge 

Mason Barrett and Victor R. Donovan on Wednesday May 31, at 11:52 

AM. These allegations include, but are not limited to, the following:

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“On more than one occasion Mr. Merriweather has sexually harassed 

me after repeated efforts to stop.” In the same email you also state, “In 

any case I’ve filed a complaint with the EEO office.”

(Doc. 73-5, p. 33; see also Doc. 73, p. 55, ¶ 210). The letter demanded that Mr. 

Hawthorne make a public retraction or face a civil defamation suit. (Doc. 73-5, p. 

33). 

On June 13, 2017, Mr. Hawthorne sent an email to union executives at District 

5 and to the executive board of Local 1858, informing them of the complaint he had 

filed against Mr. Merriweather and asking that they remove Mr. Merriweather from 

his position as Local 1858 president pending the outcome of the investigation into 

the complaint. (Doc. 73, pp. 18–19, ¶¶ 72, 79; Doc. 73-5, p. 2). 

Until June 13, 2017, Mr. Hawthorne had served as the local union assistant 

vice president for the Logistics Support Activities – “LOGSA” employees. (Doc. 

16-8, p. 2). On June 13, 2017, Mr. Merriweather removed Mr. Hawthorne from the 

position, stating:

This action has been taken because on numerous occasions you have 

made slanderous and untrue accusations against this . . . [p]resident to 

individuals in person and in writing. You have also conducted a 

personal vendetta against this [p]resident in order to denigrate my 

reputation and my position as . . . [p]resident. [I]t is my intent to prefer 

charges against you with the Local Executive Board who shall appoint 

a Committee of Investigation for you engaging in conduct unbecoming 

a union member.

(Doc. 16-8, p. 3; see also Doc. 73, pp. 18, 20, ¶¶ 74, 80). On June 14 or 15, 2017, 

Mr. Hawthorne, via an email message to EEO counselor Brenda Joyce Cammon, 

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amended his EEO complaint to also add that Mr. Merriweather had removed him 

from his union position in reprisal for the filing of the initial complaint. (Doc. 73, 

pp. 19, 20, ¶¶ 79, 81, 84; Doc. 73-1, p. 2).

Ms. Cammon interviewed Mr. Merriweather on June 14, 2017. During the 

interview, Mr. Merriweather acknowledged calling Mr. Hawthorne “his Boo Boo,”

but stated that he did not realize that Mr. Hawthorne felt that the term was sexual in 

nature. (Doc. 73, p. 6, ¶ 17; Doc. 73-1, p. 4). Mr. Merriweather stated that he was 

shocked when Mr. Hawthorne got upset, explaining that the two were friends and 

often “clowned around.” (Doc. 73, p. 6, ¶ 17; Doc. 73-1, p. 4). According to Mr. 

Merriweather, Mr. Hawthorne became angry, “was hovering over [Mr. 

Merriweather] in an aggressive manner,” and was touching Mr. Merriweather. (Doc. 

73-1, p. 4). Mr. Merriweather stated that he became angered at Mr. Hawthorne’s 

reaction, so he continued to call Mr. Hawthorne “his Boo Boo,” even after the two 

were separated. (Doc. 73, p. 6, ¶¶ 17–18; Doc. 73-1, p. 4).7

 Mr. Merriweather denied

asking Mr. Hawthorne to cook for him. (Doc. 73-1, p. 4). 

Mr. Merriweather “indicated” to the EEO counselor that he removed Mr. 

Hawthorne from the union position because Mr. Hawthorne filed the sexual 

harassment complaint against Mr. Merriweather. (Doc. 73-1, p. 4). The EEO 

 7 Mr. Merriweather could not recall two bar patrons asking him to stop calling Mr. Hawthorne “his 

Boo Boo.” (Doc. 73-1, p. 4). He remembers only an unknown individual separating the two. 

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counselor’s report states that Mr. Merriweather said that he “wouldn’t feel 

comfortable meeting with [Mr. Hawthorne] alone.” (Doc. 73-1, p. 4). 

In his amended complaint, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that on June 19, 2017, he

contacted the Army EEO office regarding the correspondence from Mr. Alfonso and

asked that an additional claim of “obstruction” be added to his (Mr. Hawthorne’s) 

EEO complaint. (Doc. 73, p. 21, ¶ 86). Mr. Hawthorne’s email to Ms. Cammon 

states:

would like to file an additional . . . complaint of retaliation against the 

Agency and/or . . . Local 1858 and/or [the] 5th District for . . . creating 

a hostile and intimidating work environment along with ENDEAVORS 

TO INFLUENCE me to drop my sexual harassment [complaint] against 

Abner Merriweather[.]

(Doc. 73-5, p. 8; see also Doc. 73, p. 21, ¶ 86; Doc. 73-1, p. 7) (capitalization in 

original). In that email, Mr. Hawthorne referred to Mr. Alfonso’s June 5, 2017 letter 

as “obstruction of justice and [a] threat to intimidate a witness.” (Doc. 73-5, p. 9). 

The email continued: “I am asking the EEO office to add the claim of obstruction of 

Justice . . . against Abner Merriweather, . . . Local 1858, [the] 5th District and the 

Army Agency.” (Doc. 73-5, p. 9). Mr. Hawthorne also stated that he “would like 

to file these additional base complaints of retaliation against the Agency and/or . . . 

Local 1858 for claims of creating a hostile, intimidation and/or creating a work 

environment [sic] pursuant to Title VII’s 42 USC 2000e-3(a).” (Doc. 73-5, p. 9; see 

also Doc. 73-1, p. 8). Continuing, Mr. Hawthorne wrote: 

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I would also like to make the claim that the employer and/or . . . [L]ocal 

1858 (executive board as has been notified) and or the Army Agency 

participated in . . . [local union] [p]resident and Army employee Abner 

Merriweather[’s] retaliation against me when they did not take proper 

action to restrict Abner Merriweather’s duties as [the] UNION 

[p]resident and /or [an] Army Employee.

(Doc. 73-1, p. 8; Doc. 73-5, p. 9). According to the email, this “continued to create 

a hostile and intimidating work environment while also encouraging the union 

[p]resident and Army Employee Abner Merriweather[’s] obstruction.” (Doc. 73-1, 

pp. 8–9; Doc. 73-5, p. 9). Mr. Hawthorne ended:

So Ms. Cammon please file this additional claim of Army Agency 

and/or . . . Local 1858 Executive Board and/or . . . [the] 5th District 

creating a hostile and intimidat[ing] work environment pursuant [to the] 

letter from Abner Merriweather[’s] [l]egal office.

(Doc. 73-1, p. 10; Doc. 73-5, p. 11). Chanley Pickard, an Army EEO specialist, 

responded to Mr. Hawthorne’s June 19, 2017 email the same day, writing: “your 

email is Acknowledged [sic], this claim will be added to your current [complaint]. 

(Doc. 73, p. 55, ¶ 211; Doc. 73-1, p. 6). 

On June 22, 2017, Michelle Perrin, the LOGSA union vice president, sent the 

following email to the Local 1858 Executive Board:

I know that you all are aware of the fact that Mr. David Hawthorne filed 

an EEO complaint [against] President Abner Merriweather. I will be 

Mr. Hawthorne’s Representative in his EEO case. Mr. Hawthorne was 

removed from his duties for engaging in conduct unbecoming a union 

member per Article XXIII, Section 2(e) of the American Federation of 

government Employees AFL-CIO Constitution, dated August 2015. 

Mr. Hawthorne was within his rights as a bargaining unit employee to 

file a complaint. It just so happen[s] that the complaint was filed against 

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the President of Local 1858. I want to make sure that Mr. Hawthorne 

was removed for the right reasons and not just because he filed a 

complaint against the [p]resident. I am requesting that the Executive 

Board look into this matter.

(Doc. 73-5, p. 1; see also Doc. 73, pp. 21–22, ¶ 89). 

On June 27, 2017, Everett Kelly, who is the national vice president for District 

5, wrote the following in an email to Theodore Stewart, assistant president of Local 

1858:

I sent all the documents to the National office seeking advice as it 

relates to brother Hawthorn[e]’s allegations. It is the opinion of the 

[a]ttorney after going through all the attachments that this does not rise 

to the level of unlawful sexual harassment. The [a]ttorney [i]ndicated 

that some would say that there are no sexual connotations to the name 

“boo boo”. But even if there were, three times is not frequent and it is 

not severe/egregious. It is my opinion that there is nothing for any of 

us to do at this time.

(Doc. 73-5, pp. 17–18; see also Doc. 73, p. 22, ¶¶ 90–91).

On July 14, 2017, EEO Director Jennifer S. Thompson issued the Army’s 

“final decision” dismissing Mr. Hawthorne’s EEO complaint “in accordance with 

29 CFR 1614.107(a)(1) and AR 690-600 Chapter 4, Section II, 4-4a(1)” for “failure 

to state a claim.” (Doc. 73-9, pp. 28-33; see also Doc. 73, pp. 7, 26, ¶¶ 23, 103; Doc. 

73-1, pp. 20–25). In her written opinion, Director Thompson noted that Mr. 

Hawthorne’s complaint “alleged Reprisal for previous EEO activity 

(ARREDSTON17MAY01829) and discrimination on the bases of Sex (male).” 

(Doc. 73-9, p. 28; see also Doc. 73-1, p. 20). She also noted that Mr. Hawthorne 

Case 5:18-cv-00689-MHH Document 96 Filed 05/29/20 Page 15 of 51
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based his claims only on Mr. Merriweather’s rescinding Mr. Hawthorne’s 

appointment as assistant vice president of Local 1858 LOGSA employees, the 

incident at the bar on May 30, 2017, and Mr. Merriweather’s alleged request that 

Mr. Hawthorne cook for Mr. Merriweather. (Doc. 73-1, p. 20; Doc. 73-9, p. 28). In 

other words, in her written opinion, Director Thompson did not expressly 

acknowledge all of the additional claims Mr. Hawthorne set out in his email of June 

19, 2017, and which Ms. Pickard stated would be added. Director Thompson wrote:

The Commission has long defined an “aggrieved employee” as one who 

suffers a present harm or loss in respect to a term, condition, or privilege 

of employment for which there is a remedy. According to Smith v. 

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No 01A32477, actions by union 

officer against union official fail to show an agency action adversely 

affecting Complainant’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 

due to the alleged action of the agency for which there is a remedy. See 

Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC request No. 02931049. The 

alleged discrimination actions were not within the purview of EEOC 

regulations if the alleged discriminating union officials were acting in 

their representational capacity.

(Doc. 73-9, pp. 28–29; see also Doc. 73, p. 25, ¶ 101; Doc. 73-1, pp. 20–21).

Mr. Hawthorne appealed Director Thompson’s decision to the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission’s Office of Federal Operations, and he filed 

an EEO complaint against Director Thompson. On September 7, 2017, the Army 

filed its brief in opposition to the appeal. (Doc. 39-1, pp. 214–28). In the amended 

complaint, Mr. Hawthorne calls this brief a Final Agency Decision or “FAD”. (Doc. 

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73, p. 26, ¶ 103) (citing Doc. 39-1, p. 214).8 The brief uses language like the 

language Director Thompson used in her opinion, including that “[a]s a general rule, 

discriminatory actions are not within the purview of EEOC regulations if the alleged 

discriminating union official acts in his or her representational capacity.” (Doc. 39-

1, p. 217).

On November 21, 2017, the OFO affirmed the agency’s decision, writing that 

“[a]s [Mr. Hawthorne] is challenging actions directly related to his position within 

the union, he must raise this claim within the union grievance process.” (Doc. 73-3, 

p. 17). The OFO affirmed dismissal of the sexual harassment and hostile work 

environment claims, stating that “[t]he actions alleged, without more, concern 

isolated incidents that are simply insufficiently severe or pervasive to state a valid 

hostile work environment claim.” (Doc. 73-3, p. 17).9

 

Mr. Hawthorne had 30 days from the date he received the EEOC’s denial to 

seek reconsideration. (Doc.73-1, p. 21). In an April 11, 2018 email, Mr. Hawthorne 

requested that the OFO reconsider its decision. (Doc. 73-3, p. 21). In his request 

for reconsideration, he asserted that he did not receive the denial until April 10, 2018. 

 8

 Counsel for the Army explained Mr. Hawthorn’s misnomer to him in an email dated October 

19, 2017. (Doc. 73-3, p. 14; Doc. 73, p. 28, ¶ 111). 

9 The OFO also stated that to the extent that Mr. Hawthorne was “challenging actions directly 

related to his position within the union, he must raise this claim within the union grievance 

process.” (Doc. 73-3, p. 17). 

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(Doc. 73-3, p. 21). The record does not indicate whether the OFO took additional 

action on Mr. Hawthorne’s administrative effort to obtain relief.

10 On May 3, 2018, 

Mr. Hawthorne filed in this Court a “Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief” in 

which he asked this Court to prevent the Army from dismissing this EEO claim for 

failure to state a claim. (Doc. 1). 

As noted, in September 2017, Mr. Hawthorne made an EEO complaint against 

Director Thompson “because she dismissed [his] [EEO] complaint [concerning Mr. 

Merriweather] . . . without dismissing all the claims.” (Doc. 73, pp. 7, 25, ¶¶ 23, 

100; Doc. 73-6, p. 9). In his complaint concerning Director Thompson, Mr. 

Hawthorne alleged:

the Agency counsel did not add all his claims that were acknowledged, 

and also truncated others, as such they restrained him from filing a 

complaint when they dismissed his complaint without adding all of his 

claims, thereby also denying him his due process.

(Doc. 73-1, p. 43). Mr. Hawthorne alleged that the claims were “acknowledged” in 

the June 19, 2017 email from Chanley Pickard and were ignored in Director 

Thompson’s decision. (Doc. 73-1, p. 43). 

Mr. Hawthorne called Director Thompson’s dismissal “intentional” and 

claimed that it was in retaliation because “I won an appeal over turning [sic] her 

 10 In its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, the Army states that it moved to dismiss the 

pending OFO appeal because the instant case overlapped with that administrative action. (Doc. 

83, p. 3).

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efforts to deny my claim in case number ARREDSTON15AUG04058.” (Doc. 73-

6, p. 9). In the email triggering the EEO process concerning his complaint against 

Director Thompson, Mr. Hawthorne also complained “against Army Agency 

Attorneys relative to their Final Agency Decision (FAD) dated September 7, 2017.” 

(Doc. 73-6, p. 9). Mr. Hawthorne alleged that when the decision in case number 

ARREDSTON15AUG04058 was overturned, an investigation discovered that the 

Army’s attorneys made intentional misrepresentations to the EEOC. (Doc. 73-6, p. 

9).11 Mr. Hawthorne alleged that the use of “the same language” in the Army’s brief 

in opposition to his appeal made it clear to him that Director Thompson and the 

Army were retaliating against him because of the results of that investigation. (Doc. 

73-6, p. 9). Mr. Hawthorne designated the claim against Director Thompson “Claim 

1” and the claim against the Army attorneys “Claim 2.” (Doc. 73-6, p. 9).

On November 16, 2017, Mr. Hawthorne asked the Birmingham, Alabama 

District Office of the EEOC to appoint “an Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission administrative judge” to hear this EEO complaint. (Doc. 73, p. 29, ¶

118; Doc. 73-7, p. 5). 

On December 21, 2017, Army EEO Director Rufus B. Caruthers, Jr. issued 

the Army’s final decision dismissing Mr. Hawthorne’s EEO complaint against 

 11 The misrepresentations allegedly took place in agency case number 

ARREDSTON13JUN02070.

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Director Thompson and the Army attorneys. (Doc. 73, pp. 7–8, 33, ¶¶ 24, 131; Doc. 

73-8, pp. 7–11). Director Caruthers’s opinion explained that “29 CFR 

1614.107(a)(8) and AR 690-600 Chapter 4-4(14)” forbade such “spin-off 

complaints,” or complaints “about the processing of an existing complaint.” (Doc. 

73, p. 33, ¶ 131; Doc. 73-8, p. 7). 

On January 29, 2018, apparently in response to Mr. Hawthorne’s request for 

the appointment of an administrative law judge, EEOC Administrative Law Judge 

Justice Bean sent Mr. Hawthorne an order regarding this claim. (Doc. 73, pp. 8, 35, 

¶¶ 25, 135). The Court has not located a copy of the order in the record. Mr. 

Hawthorne alleges that in the order, Judge Bean “stated there were 5 questions the 

Judge wanted me to reply to relative to [the] complaint against EEO [D]irector 

Jennifer Thompson.” (Doc. 73, pp. 8, 35, ¶¶ 25, 135). On February 8, 2018, Mr. 

Hawthorne responded to Judge Bean’s order. (Doc. 73, p. 8, ¶ 25; Doc. 73-9, pp. 1–

7). It is unclear from the amended complaint what, if anything, came of the 

proceedings that allegedly involve ALJ Bean. 

C. Mr. Hawthorne’s EEO Complaint Against Joe Sanchez, Michael 

Drylie, and David Martin

Mike Drylie is the Engineer Team Lead in Mr. Hawthorne’s department. 

(Doc. 73, p. 8, ¶ 27). Mr. Hawthorne alleges that in late November or early 

December of 2017, during a meeting with him and another engineer, Mr. Drylie “cut 

[Mr. Hawthorne] off, yelled, hissed, and puffed” every time Mr. Hawthorne tried to 

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offer input. (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). Mr. Drylie did not treat the other engineer in the 

meeting the same way. (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). After the meeting, Mr. Drylie 

apologized to Mr. Hawthorne for this conduct. (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). 

In January or February of 2018, Mr. Drylie approached Mr. Hawthorne at a 

restaurant and asked Mr. Hawthorne if he (Mr. Hawthorne) was the whistle-blower 

who had prompted an investigation from the Office of Special Counsel. (Doc. 73, 

p. 14, ¶¶ 56–57; Doc. 73-10, p. 15; Doc. 73-11, p. 24). 

Around the end of January 2018, Mr. Drylie and Mr. Hawthorne became 

involved in an argument and took the dispute to James Baker, the Deputy Program 

Manager. (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). 

On February 5, 2018, after Mr. Hawthorne would not give Mr. Drylie any 

specifics about what Mr. Hawthorne planned to discuss during the next Integrated 

Product team meeting, Mr. Drylie called Mr. Hawthorne and, “in a hostile voice,” 

began cursing at Mr. Hawthorne. (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). Mr. Drylie said, “David what 

the fuck is wrong with you?” (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). Mr. Hawthorne responded, “you 

are not going to be fucking cursing at me.” (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). On February 6, 

2018, Mr. Hawthorne sent Mr. Baker an email recounting this event and later spoke 

to Mr. Baker about it in person. (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). 

In mid-February of 2018, Mr. Drylie told Mr. Hawthorne about a conversation 

with Jose Sanchez, a Logistics Management Specialist Supervisor. (Doc. 73-11, p. 

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24). Mr. Drylie told Mr. Hawthorne that Mr. Sanchez “wanted to grow [Mr. Drylie] 

for a supervisory position.” (Doc. 73-11, p. 24). 

In a March 14, 2018 email, Mr. Drylie asked Mr. Hawthorne and two other 

engineers “to make an attempt at developing wear criteria for a few enrolled weapon 

systems which do not currently have criteria.” (Doc. 73, p. 9, ¶ 29; Doc. 73-10, pp. 

19–20). On March 26, 2018, Mr. Hawthorne sent an email to Mr. Drylie to explain

that he completed the project “best [he] could” because Mr. Drylie had only given 

“limited guidance on it.” (Doc. 73, pp. 10, 11, ¶¶ 35, 41; Doc. 73-10, pp. 17–18). 

Mr. Hawthorne asserted that Mr. Drylie had explained the assignment for about an 

hour and refused to answer any questions after that time. (Doc. 73, p. 10, ¶ 36; Doc. 

73-10, p. 17). In the email, Mr. Hawthorne stated that he felt “singled out” because, 

of the two other engineers assigned the task,

one . . . was not going to be here . . . [and] the other . . . has been working 

on this type of thing form much of the 5 years I’ve been here . . . and I 

was the only one to be here and never have worked this before and yet 

I could not get clarity or guidance from you on the project while you 

were still here.

(Doc. 73, p. 11, ¶ 41; Doc. 73-10, p. 18). 

On March 29, 2018, Mr. Drylie sent a response email to Mr. Hawthorne. 

(Doc. 73, p. 12, ¶ 44; Doc. 73-10, p. 16). In that response, Mr. Drylie indicated that 

he was “somewhat confused and concerned by [Mr. Hawthorne’s] Email.” (Doc. 

73, p. 12, ¶ 44; Doc. 73-10, p. 16). His emailed continued: “The task in question is 

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a part of your core duties and is described in both your Position Description and AR 

750-1. This task is also specifically listed as a performance objective on your annual 

performance plan.” (Doc. 73, p. 12, ¶ 44; Doc. 73-10, p. 16). Mr. Drylie explained 

that “[o]ver the 5 years you have been in this position we have discussed the 

development of evaluation criteria on multiple occasions” and that sufficient 

guidance had been given on the project, not only on March 14, 2018, but in previous 

meetings. (Doc. 73, p. 12, ¶¶ 45–47; Doc. 73-10, p. 16). Mr. Drylie explained that 

he “did deploy a different management technique in this situation, as previous efforts 

over the previous 5 years did not seem to be working.” (Doc. 73, p. 12, ¶ 48; Doc. 

73-10, p. 17). Mr. Drylie stated that he had “wanted each of [the engineers] to work 

the assignment on [their] own in the hopes that [they] would learn the process for 

[themselves] and also provide an opportunity for process improvement by having 3 

additional sets of eyes on [Mr. Drylie’s] work.” (Doc. 73, p. 12, ¶ 47; Doc. 73-10, 

p. 16). Mr. Drylie also wrote:

I am sorry that the message that this was purely a learning exercise and 

that my sole expectation was that you made an attempt was not 

completely clear to you. In this sense I believe the exercise was 

successful and effective, and I believe this is illustrated in the 

completed project you submitted.

(Doc. 73, p. 12, ¶ 48; Doc. 73-10, p. 17).

On April 2, 2018, Mr. Hawthorne sent a lengthy reply to Mr. Drylie’s email. 

(Doc. 73, pp. 13–15, ¶¶ 52–61; Doc. 73-10, p. 14–16). In part of that reply, Mr. 

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Hawthorne called Mr. Drylie’s previous email “an absolute mischaracterization of 

me, my work ethic and my ability to understand and do my job.” (Doc. 73, pp. 13–

14, ¶ 53; Doc. 73-10, p. 14). Mr. Hawthorne wrote, among other things:

[I]n your March 30th 2018 reply to me you intentionally misrepresented 

what kind of work you did with me and you intentionally 

misrepresented over what period of time you did that work. because 

you have not worked with me for 5 years on wear analysis. What you 

have done is defamed me, used the profanity cursing at me, 

vociferously yelled at me in front of my team members and at times 

vehemently. and it all started after you asked me about being a whistle[-

]blower and ramped up after you were told by Joe Sanchez that he 

would be grooming you for management to promote you supervisor. 

In the month of January/February you saw me out at cantina Laredo 

restaurant with friends in Bridge Street and made your way over to me 

to ask me if I was the whistle blower that prompted the (OSC) 

investigation. I of course said to you, “no I was not”, after a long gazing 

stair of doubtful thought to my answer you an a few more minutes of 

small talk you left.

(Doc. 73, p. 14, ¶¶ 56–57; 73-10, p. 15). Mr. Hawthorne’s reply email concluded: 

“I've filed a reprisal EEO complaint against Joe Sanchez and you for the continued 

hostile work environment and defamation of character.” (Doc. 73, p. 15, ¶ 61; Doc. 

73-10, p. 16). 

In an April 2, 2018 email to Ms. Pickard in the Army’s EEO office, Mr. 

Hawthorne began the EEO complaint process against Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Drylie 

for “reprisal.” (Doc. 73, p. 13, ¶ 50; Doc. 73-10, p. 1). The email explained:

I claim that Joe Sanchez and/or Agency has recently informed Michael 

Drylie, within or before the month of March 2018, that they the Agency 

was going to begin grooming Michael Drylie for a supervisor position; 

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in return Michael Drylie assisted Joe Sanchez and/or Agency in 

intentionally and maliciously defaming, belittle me in front of my 

coworkers and also literally and literally and unequivocally lying on my 

in a disparaging way relative to my work at LOGSA which ultimately 

affects the perception of someone wanting to hiring me for another 

federal position or federal training assignments I may apply for within 

or outside of LOGSA agency. 

He has also made the work environment so uncomfortable I had to take 

that issue to my immediate manager Jim Baker . . .. 

I believe these actions are Based on previous cases involving Joe 

Sanchez where he and other Agency managers, but specifically Joe 

Sanchez and Agency legal counsel because of the nexus to my previous 

cases, have been cited for intentionally not telling the truth under oath 

and/or on official agency responses to the EEOC OFO during an 

investigation for case number ARREDSTON13JUL02070 and 

ARREDSTON15AUG04058.

(Doc. 73-10, p. 1; Doc. 73, pp. 50–51, ¶¶ 198–199) (citation to exhibits

omitted).

In an April 9, 2018 email to Katrisa Norwood in the Army EEO office, 

Mr. Hawthorne wrote:

NEW CLAIM AGAINST THE LOGSA DEPUTY COMMANDER 

DAVID MARTIN:

I would like to file another claim against David Martin Deputy Director 

of LOGSA. I claim that each time that I’ve made a title VII complaint 

against members of LOGSA it HAS been when the LOGSA Military 

Commander has be in Transition to LOGSA or has been away on leave 

from LOGSA and that Deputy Director David [M]artin HAS been 

directly or indirectly involved with those LOGSA employees I made 

the claims against.

I believe proof of this is that when I made a claim against the LOGSA 

Agency in 2013 for complaint number ARREDSTON13JUL02070 one 

of those claim were made against David Martin for his direct 

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involvement, while the LOGSA Military commander was absent and 

LOGSA was awaiting its new Army Military commander; and at the 

time his subordinate management official told me that if I did not drop 

my claim that there would be collateral damage to my career ... I did 

not drop my claim and every time since that 

ARREDSTON13JUL02070 complaint like my current complaint here 

in 2018 against the LOGSA agency David Martin has been at the head 

of the LOGSA organization while the Army commander has been away 

on leave or in transition to come command LOGSA. So Ms. Katrisa 

Norwood please add this claim against David Martin to my current 

complaint.

(Doc. 73-10, p. 21; Doc. 73, pp. 35–36, 51, ¶¶ 136–137, 200). On April 25, 2018, 

Mr. Hawthorne emailed Ms. Norwood again writing:

Please add the Bases to my current 2018 complaint of Age.

I did not think of it or make the connection before but now, today, that 

I think about it I believe these retaliatory efforts of not being truthful 

about my work and performance has to do with retaliation from 

previous complaints and the fact that I am older than all of my peers in 

my group and the Agency just believe me to be expendable because of 

my age as well as the retaliation I was promised if I did not drop my 

previous e EEO complaints.

So please add the Bases of Age discrimination to my current 2018 

complaint against the LOGSA Agency.

(Doc. 73-11, p. 4, Doc. 73, p. 51, ¶ 201). 

On July 23, 2018, Mr. Hawthorne mailed a request for a hearing on this claim 

to the EEOC. (Doc. 73, p. 38, ¶ 149; Doc. 73-12, p. 1; Doc. 73-13, p. 2). The EEOC 

received this request via certified mail on July 24, 2018. (Doc. 73, p. 38, ¶ 150; Doc. 

73-13, p. 1).

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Director Thompson dismissed this EEO complaint on July 24, 2018 “in 

accordance with 29 CFR 1614.107(a)(1), under 1614.103, and AR 690-600 Chapter 

4, Section II, 4-4a(1)” for “failure to state a claim.” (Doc. 73, p. 38, ¶ 149); Doc. 

73-5, p.12; Doc. 73-13, p. 16). Director Thompson wrote:

In your formal complaint of discrimination, you alleged discrimination 

on the bases/basis of Age (49, 1968) and Reprisal 

(ARREDSTON15AUG04058 and ARREDSTON13JUL02070) when: 

a. On 29 March 2018, Michael Drylie, Team Lead, Oil and Analysis 

Program, LOGSA, age (39: YOB: 1979) and reprisal (previous EEO 

activity: unaware and none), sent an email stating you worked in the 

Oil and Analysis Program for five years and that he deployed 

different management techniques; which you feel defamed you.

(Doc. 73-5, p. 12). Director Thompson continued: 

[T]he test to analyze the actions of an employer are whether those 

actions could reasonably deter an individual from filing or pursuing a 

complaint of discrimination in addition to an adverse employment 

action. The comments [alleged] were not accompanied by any 

disciplinary or other action, nor do they rise to the level that may 

dissuade an individual from pursuing a complaint of discrimination in 

the future. [Mr. Hawthorne] failed to allege that [he]suffered a personal 

loss or harm with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of 

employment.

(Doc. 73-5, p. 12, Doc. 73, pp. 51–52, ¶ 202). An August 17, 2018 letter from the 

Army to Mr. Hawthorne states that Mr. Hawthorne “received [the] Notice of 

Dismissal on 8 August 2018.” (Doc. 73-13, p. 7).

Unbeknownst to Mr. Hawthorne, on July 19, 2018, prior to the dismissal, 

Director Thompson had forwarded Mr. Hawthorne’s EEO complaint, and a copy of 

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her proposed dismissal order, to Brian Frye, Army agency counsel “for legal 

sufficiency review.” (Doc. 73-13, p. 15; Doc. 73, pp. 39–40, 45–46, 52, ¶¶ 154, 179, 

204). In response, on July 23, 2018, Mr. Frye recommended that Director Thompson 

“revise Mr. Hawthorne’s claim in her proposed order, to more closely track” Mr. 

Hawthorne’s “‘actual words . . ..’” (Doc. 73-13, p. 15; Doc. 73, p. 52, ¶ 205). Also, 

Mr. Frye reported that, in his opinion, “Mr. Hawthorne’s formal complaint does 

sufficiently state a claim for purposes of acceptance of the investigation.” (Doc. 73-

13, p. 15; Doc. 73, p. 39–40, 46, 52, ¶¶ 154, 180, 203). 

In an August 10, 2018 email to Director Rufus and Director Thompson, Mr. 

Hawthorne began another EEO complaint process against Director Thompson for 

sex discrimination in her handling of Mr. Hawthorne’s EEO complaint against Mr. 

Drylie, Mr. Sanchez, and Mr. Martin. (Doc. 73, p. 40, ¶ 157; Doc. 73-4, pp. 1–3). 

Mr. Hawthorne complained that Director Thompson dismissed his EEO complaint 

but allowed a similar claim by another female employee. (Doc. 73-4, p. 2; Doc. 73, 

p. 41, ¶¶ 160–161).12 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Claims Stated in the Amended Complaint

Mr. Hawthorne asserts several claims against the Army. (Counts 1-5, 8). In 

Counts 1-4, Mr. Hawthorne contends that Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1) violates 

 12 The formal complaint of discrimination for this claim appears at Doc. 84-1, pp. 17–22. 

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section 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. ¶ 706. (Doc. 73, pp. 47–

50, 54–55, ¶¶ 188, 191, 194, 196, 216). In Count 5, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that the 

Army discriminated against him on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. §§2000e through 2000e-17, when Director 

Thompson dismissed his 2018 EEO complaint. (Doc. 73, p. 56, ¶ 215). In Count 8, 

Mr. Hawthorne alleges that the Army “breached its duty of care when it did not 

protect [Mr. Hawthorne]” from Mr. Merriweather’s alleged harassment and 

retaliation. (Doc. 73, p. 59, ¶ 223). In Count 8, Mr. Hawthorne also asserts that the 

Army is liable under Title VII for discrimination based on sex, sexual harassment, 

creating a hostile work environment, and retaliation. (Doc. 73, p. 60, ¶ 235). 

In his amended complaint, Mr. Hawthorne includes claims against defendants 

other than the Army.13 In Count 6, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that Local 1858 and Mr. 

Merriweather are liable under Title VII for sexual harassment. (Doc. 73, p. 58, 

¶220). In Count 7, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that Local 1858 “breached its duty of care 

when it did not protect” him from Mr. Merriweather’s alleged harassment and 

retaliation. (Doc. 73, pp. 58–59, ¶¶ 221). Similarly, in Count 10, Mr. Hawthorne

 13 Mr. Hawthorne did not formally name Local 1858, District 5, or the national union as parties. 

(Doc. 73, p. 2). But, as noted earlier, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a 

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. The union entities acknowledge they 

have been sued. When the amended complaint is viewed as a whole, it is clear to the Court that 

Mr. Hawthorne intended to sue, and makes claims against, these entities. Accordingly, the Court 

construes the amended complaint as being filed against Local 1858, District 5, and the national 

union. 

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alleges that Local 1858 “breached its duty of care” when, “after being made aware 

of the sexual harassment complaint and the retaliation,” the local union did not 

initiate an investigation. (Doc. 73, p. 61, ¶ 237). 

In Count 9, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that District 5 and Everett Kelley 

“breached their duty of care” when Mr. Kelley wrote his email of June 27, 2017, in 

which he stated that Mr. Merriweather’s conduct did not rise to the level of sexual 

harassment, and “there is nothing for any of us to do at this time.” (Doc. 73-5, pp. 

17–18; Doc. 73, p. 60, ¶ 236). In Count 11, Mr. Hawthorne states that the national 

union and David Cox, the president of the national union, “breach[ed] [their] duty 

of care . . . when [their] attorneys, according to Everett Kelley . . . advised [Mr. 

Kelley] that they should do nothing because [the] claim of sexual harassment did not 

rise to unlawful [s]exual [h]arassment.” (Doc. 73, p. 61, ¶¶ 239–239). 

B. Claims Based on Violations of Criminal Statutes

The amended complaint contains many references to federal criminal statutes. 

(See Doc. 73, pp. 21, 28, 41 ¶¶ 86, 115, 162 (18 U.S.C. § 1505); Doc. 73, pp. 44, ¶

174 (18 U.S.C. §1001(a)). In his response to the union defendants’ motion to 

dismiss, Mr. Hawthorne states that he is “making the claim and requesting the civil 

penalties [for] 18 USC 1505 and 18 USC 1001 violations.” (Doc. 80, p. 13, ¶ 35). 

Recently, in an opinion in another case filed by Mr. Hawthorne, Magistrate Judge 

Herman N. Johnson explained that neither 18 U.S.C. § 1001 nor 18 U.S.C. § 1505

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creates a private right of action. See Hawthorne v. McCarthy, No. 5:16-CV-01525-

HNJ, 2020 WL 836840, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2020). The Court adopts Judge 

Johnson’s analysis concerning §§1001 and 1505, and the Court will dismiss all

claims based on 18 U.S.C. §§1001 and 1505.

C. The Claims Against the Individual Defendants

In his response to the union defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mr. Hawthorne 

states:

To the extent that [defense counsel] believes that I am suing Abner 

Merriweather and David Mollett or Mr. David [Cox] personally, he is 

wrong. I am suing the Organization of . . . Local 1858 . . . [the] 5th 

District . . . and the . . . National office . . . for said reasons as outlined 

in ECF 73.

(Doc. 80, pp. 14–15, ¶ 40). Based upon this representation, the Court will dismiss 

all claims against Mr. Merriweather, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Mollett.

14 

D. The Claims Against the Army

i. The Administrative Procedures Act Claims

In dismissing two of Mr. Hawthorne’s EEO complaints, the Army cited Army 

Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1) which allows an EEO officer to dismiss an EEO complaint 

 14 In his amended complaint, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that Mr. Merriweather is liable for sexual 

harassment under Title VII. (Doc. 73, p. 58, ¶ 220). As a matter of law, Mr. Merriweather cannot 

be liable for a Title VII violation because he is not Mr. Hawthorne’s “employer.” See Dearth v. 

Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A] Title VII claim may be brought against only the 

employer and not against an individual employee.”); 42 U.S.C. § 20003-16(c) (requiring a civil 

action by a federal employee to name “the head of the department, agency, or unit” as the 

defendant).

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for “failure to state a claim.” (Doc. 73-1, p. 20 (ARREDSTON17MAY01829); Doc. 

73-5, p. 12 (ARREDSTON18APR01146)).15 Specifically, AR 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1) 

states: “A complaint or a portion of a complaint will be dismissed by the EEO officer 

(subject to final decision by the Army Director of EEO or designee) if” the complaint 

fails to state a claim. “In determining whether a complaint states a claim under 29 

CFR Section 1614.103, the proper inquiry is whether the conduct, if true, would 

constitute an unlawful employment practice under the EEO statutes.” AR 690-600 

¶ 4-4.a.(1). 

In Counts 1–4, Mr. Hawthorne asks this Court “to hold unlawful,” “set aside,” 

“declare unconstitutional,” and/or “invalidate” Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1)

because, Mr. Hawthorne argues, the regulation violates section 706(2), subsections 

A through D, of the Administrative Procedures Act – the APA. (Doc. 73, pp. 47–

50, 54–55, ¶¶ 188, 191, 194, 196, 216). Section 706(2) provides, among other 

 15 The United States Court of Federal Claims has described the EEO process as follows:

The procedures for accepting and dismissing EEO complaints are governed by 

Army Regulation 690–600. Pursuant to this regulation, an EEO supervisor reviews 

a formal EEO complaint to determine if the complaint meets any of the indicated 

grounds for dismissal (e.g., the complaint has failed to state a claim, is untimely, or 

is moot). If the EEO supervisor identifies no ground for dismissing the complaint, 

the supervisor is required to provide the complainant with a written decision 

accepting the claim as well as request assignment of the case to an investigator.

Santiago v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 154, 162 (2012).

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things, that a district court may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 

and conclusions” that the court determines are:

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short 

of statutory right; [and/or]

(D) without observance of procedure required by law[.]

4 U.S.C. § 706. 

In Count 1, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1) 

violates APA § 706(2)(C), which authorizes this Court to “hold unlawful and set 

aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” which are “in excess of statutory 

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” (Doc. 73, pp. 47–

48, ¶¶ 188–191). Title VII requires the EEOC to “issue such rules, regulations, 

orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate” to ensure that federal 

government personnel actions “shall be made free from any discrimination based on 

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)–(b). Title 

VII requires the Army, to “comply with such rules, regulations, orders and 

instructions” enacted by the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). 

Under these statutory provisions, the EEOC enacted 29 C.F.R. § 

1614.109(b)—which states that “[EEOC] [a]dministrative judges may dismiss 

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complaints pursuant to § 1614.107, on their own initiative, after notice to the parties, 

or upon an agency’s motion to dismiss a complaint”—and the Army enacted Army 

Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1)—which sets out the standard by which an Army EEO 

officer shall dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. Mr. Hawthorne asserts 

that Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1) conflicts with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(b). (Doc. 

73, p. 48). Mr. Hawthorne contends that the EEOC should not be able to dismiss a 

claim pursuant to Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1) without going through the process 

identified in 29 C.F.R. §1614.109(b). (Doc. 73, p. 48).

Mr. Hawthorne’s argument rests on a misunderstanding of 29 C.F.R. § 

1614.109(b). That regulation applies only after “a complainant requests a hearing,” 

and the EEOC has appointed an administrative judge “to conduct a hearing in 

accordance with the section.” 29 C.F.R. §1614.109(a). Before a request for an 

administrative hearing, an agency, such as the Army, “shall dismiss an entire 

complaint . . . [t]hat fails to state a claim.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1).16 Therefore, 

Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1) is consistent with applicable EEOC regulations. As 

the purported conflict was the only basis for Count 1, the Court will dismiss Count 

1.

17 

 

17 In each dismissal of the EEO complaints that referenced Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a.(1), the 

Army also referenced 29 C.F.R. 1614.107(a)(1). (Doc. 73-1, p. 20 (ARREDSTON17MAY01829); 

Doc. 73-5, p.12 (ARREDSTON18APR01146)). As to ARIMCOMHQ17SEP0481 and 

ARREDSTON18APR01146, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that he requested a hearing before the Army 

issued a final determination of dismissal based on failure to state a claim. (Doc. 73, p. 29, 38, ¶¶

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In Count 2, Mr. Hawthorne asks the Court to set aside Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 

4-4.a.(1) because the regulation is “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, 

or immunity” in violation of section 706(2)(B). (Doc. 73, pp. 48–49, ¶¶ 192–194). 

Mr. Hawthorne lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Army Reg. 690-

600 ¶ 4-4.a(1). To have standing, Mr. Hawthorne must plead facts that indicate that 

he has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). Here, Mr. 

Hawthorne has not alleged an “injury in fact” because, even if the Army’s regulation 

is unconstitutional, he is entitled to a de novo review of his claims in federal district

court. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407; 5 U.S.C. § 704. Therefore, 

he has not been harmed. 

In Count 3, Mr. Hawthorne alleges a violation of section 706(2)(D), in that 

the Army regulation was enacted “without observance of procedure required by 

law.” (Doc. 73, pp. 49–50, ¶¶ 195–196). Court’s typically read section 706(2)(D) 

as requiring a reviewing court to invalidate an agency rule that does not comport 

with the APA’s rulemaking procedures. Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores 

Agricolas v. Solis, 933 F. Supp. 2d 700, 709 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Record Buck Farms, 

 

118, 149–150; Doc. 73-7, p. 5; Doc. 73-12, p. 1; Doc. 73-13, pp.1–2). But in Count I, Mr. 

Hawthorne challenges the validity of Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a (1). In Count I, he does not 

challenge the way in which the Army applied Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a (1). 

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Inc. v. Johanns, 510 F. Supp. 2d 868, 874 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Ocean Conservancy v. 

Evans, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1186 (M.D. Fla. 2003). Those procedures include, 

among other things, publishing general notice of the proposed rule in the Federal 

Register and giving “interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule 

making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 

opportunity for oral presentation.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c). The amended complaint 

makes no allegation that the issuance of Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a(1) ran afoul of 

these rules or any others set out in the APA. 

The language of section 706(2)(D) does not expressly limit review to only 

whether the Army followed “rulemaking procedures” in enacting Army Reg. 690-

600 ¶ 4-4.a(1), but Mr. Hawthorne offers no other reason for invalidating the 

regulation. He alleges only that there is “no [C]ongressional or constitutional 

authority for the Army to use that regulation” and that the regulation conflicts with 

29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(b). (Doc. 73, p. 50, ¶ 196). For the reasons previously stated, 

these arguments are without merit.

Section 706(2)(A) allows this Court to set aside agency action that is 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law.” 4 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). In Count 4, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that, with regard to 

the EEO complaints in ARREDSTON18APR01146 and 

ARREDSTON17MAY01829, the Army used Army Reg. 690-600 ¶ 4-4.a(1) against 

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him in an “arbitrary” and “capricious” manner, and abused its discretion, in violation 

of section 706(A). (Doc. 73, pp. 50, 53, 54, 55, ¶¶ 197, 210, 216, 217).18 Mr. 

Hawthorne alleges that “based on the Army’s director’s arbitrary and capricious use 

of the Army regulation . . . this regulation is suitable for invalidation.” (Doc. 73, pp. 

54–55, ¶ 216). 

Even if the Army’s decision to dismiss Mr. Hawthorne’s EEO complaints 

were arbitrary and capricious, the Court would not have to invalidate Army Reg. 

690-600 ¶ 4-4.a(1) to provide relief to Mr. Hawthorne. As noted, Mr. Hawthorne is 

entitled to a de novo review of the merits of those decisions here in federal district 

court. Therefore, if the Army erred when it dismissed one or more of his EEO 

complaints for failure to state a claim, this Court may reinstate the claims; it does 

not have to invalidate the regulation. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count 4. 

ii. The Title VII Claim Based on Director Thompson’s Dismissal of 

ARREDSTON18APR01146 

In Count 5, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that the Army discriminated against him

on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII when Director Thompson dismissed 

ARREDSTON18APR01146. (Doc. 73, p. 56, ¶ 215). Based on this alleged conduct, 

 18 The Army states that Count 4 also concerns ARIMCOMHQ18OCT03864 (Doc. 89, p. 1, n. 2), 

but that EEO complaint is not mentioned in Count 4.

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Mr. Hawthorne filed an EEO complaint with the Army that it designated

ARIMCOMHQ18OCT03864. (Doc. 73, pp. 56–57, ¶ 216). 

The Army argues that the Court must dismiss this count because Mr. 

Hawthorne:

has not complied with the Court’s standing order on [this] EEO claim[]. 

Plaintiff has not attached the necessary EEO documents or provided the 

notice of the right to sue. It is therefore not clear whether Plaintiff has 

exhausted this claim or if the claim is timely raised here. Therefore, the 

Court should dismiss Count 5 based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply 

with the Court’s order. 

(Doc. 83, p. 10). The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

Both federal statutes and EEOC regulations require a federal 

employee to exhaust an administrative process before filing a civil 

complaint of discrimination in the workplace. An aggrieved federal 

employee first must file a formal complaint with the agency that 

allegedly discriminated against him. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(a). After the 

agency has rendered a final decision, the employee has the option to 

appeal the decision of the agency to either the federal district court or 

the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c). If the employee appeals to the 

EEOC and the EEOC does not issue a decision within 180 days, the 

employee may file a complaint in the district court. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 

1614.407(d).

Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 

In his June 2019 brief in opposition to the Army’s initial motion to dismiss 

his amended complaint, Mr. Hawthorne states that he has not received a final agency 

decision in ARIMCOMHQ18OCT03864. (Doc. 84, pp. 15–16). He contends that 

this was because the Army EEO officers “are just not cooperating,” and “are not 

following the law.” (Doc. 84, pp. 15–18, ¶¶ 34–41). A copy of an email in the 

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record indicates that the Army may have issued a final decision on this claim in

October 2019. (Doc. 88, p. 3). That decision does not appear in the record. In his 

opposition to the Army’s supplemental motion to dismiss, Mr. Hawthorne states that

the Army dismissed ARIMCOMHQ18OCT03864 “according to Army regulation 

AR 690-600 Section 4-4(14)” and “unlawfully . . . under the authority of 29 

CFRS1614.107.” (Doc. 94, pp. 12–13). For the purposes of this opinion, the Court 

gives Mr. Hawthorne the benefit of the doubt and finds that through his supplemental 

submissions, he has sufficiently identified a final administrative decision on this

EEO complaint.

The Army also contends that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this 

matter under the APA. Under the APA, the Court may review only “final agency 

action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The 

Army argues Mr. Hawthorne has not identified a final agency action in Count 5. The 

Supreme Court has noted:

As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action 

to be “final”: First, the action must mark the “consummation” of the 

agency’s decisionmaking process, it must not be of a merely tentative 

or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which 

rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal 

consequences will flow.

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). The Army’s decision dismissing 

ARIMCOMHQ18OCT03864 was the both consummation of the agency’s process 

and a determination of Mr. Hawthorne’s rights. It therefore was “final.”

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The Army argues that even if Mr. Hawthorne properly exhausted his 

discrimination claim against Director Thompson, the Court should dismiss that 

claim because Mr. Hawthorne cannot raise a claim challenge the process of handling 

another EEO complaint. In support of its argument, the Army cites several decisions 

from other courts including Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 2002) 

(EEOC’s dismissal of an underlying charge of discrimination not reviewable under 

the APA), Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1979) (EEOC’s failure to make 

a reasonable cause determination for more than two years after the filing of the 

original charge is not actionable under the APA); and Georator v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 

765 (4th Cir. 1979) (EEOC’s determination of reasonable cause on underlying 

charge of discrimination is not reviewable under the APA). In each decision, the 

plaintiff challenged the administrative process. Here, Mr. Hawthorne challenges 

Director Thompson’s intent, arguing that discriminated against him in her handling 

of the underlying case. The cases on which the Army relies do not require dismissal 

of Mr. Hawthorne’s Title VII claim pursuant to the APA. Therefore, the Court will 

deny the Army’s motion as it relates to Count 5.

iii. Claims Based on Article 13(a) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 

Between the Army and Local 1858

Article 13(a) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Army and 

Local 1858 reads: “The Employer and the Union will conduct a continuing 

campaign to eradicate every form of prejudice or discrimination based upon race, 

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color, religion, age, sex (gender), physical or mental handicap, sexual harassment, 

national origin, or reprisal.” (Doc. 73-2, p. 23). In Count 8, Mr. Hawthorne alleges 

that “pursuant to Article 13(a) . . . the Army breached its duty of care when it did 

not protect [Mr. Hawthorne]” from Mr. Merriweather’s alleged harassment and 

retaliation. (Doc. 73, p. 59, ¶ 223). Mr. Hawthorne also contends that the Army is 

liable under Title VII for discrimination based on sex, sexual harassment, creating a 

hostile work environment, and retaliation because of Mr. Merriweather’s conduct. 

(Doc. 73, p. 59, ¶ 223 (referencing “Title VII”); Doc. 73, p. 60, ¶ 235 (citing 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq.). 

The Army argues that sovereign immunity bars Count 8 to the extent that the 

count is based on Article 13(a) and the allegation that the Army “breached its duty 

of care.” Under the principle of sovereign immunity, the United States “is immune 

from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in 

any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. 

Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its 

agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “Jurisdiction 

over any suit against the Government requires a clear statement from the United 

States waiving sovereign immunity, together with a claim falling within the terms of 

the waiver. The terms of consent to be sued may not be inferred, but must be 

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unequivocally expressed.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 

465, 472 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Mr. Hawthorne does not 

argue that the United States has waived sovereign immunity for a claim based on 

breach of a collective bargaining agreement, and the Court is not aware of authority 

establishing waiver.19 Accordingly, to the extent that Count 8 sets out a claim 

against the Army pursuant to Article 13(a), the Court will dismiss the claim.

The Title VII claim in Count 8 is another matter. The Army argues that Mr.

Hawthorne has not exhausted the administrative prerequisites to filing the Title VII 

claim in Count 8. In his brief, Mr. Hawthorne states that the basis for the claims in 

Count 8 is Mr. Merriweather’s conduct. (Doc. 84, p. 33, ¶ 83). Mr. Hawthorne set 

out that conduct in his May 2017 EEO complaint, ARREDSTON17MAY01829.

The Army assumed in its brief that Mr. Hawthorne had abandoned his claims 

based on ARREDSTON17MAY01829. Still, the Army stated:

Plaintiff’s merits challenges likewise fail. Actions taken by a union 

representative do not state a claim of harassment for which the Army is 

responsible and therefore the EEOC correctly concluded that he had not 

stated a claim for relief. In addition, even if the claims against the union 

president could go forward, the EEOC correctly dismissed them on 

the basis that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to state a claim for a hostile work environment. Accordingly, 

the case should be dismissed consistent with Rule 12(b)(6). 

 19 Mr. Hawthorne argues that the APA waives sovereign immunity and/or that sovereign immunity 

does not apply in APA cases. (Doc. 84, pp. 13–14, 24–27, 37–38, ¶¶ 30–33, 60–69, 96–100). The 

claim under Article 13(a) is not an APA claim. 

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(Doc. 83, p. 6). The Army also adopted by incorporation the arguments it made for 

dismissal of this claim in its previous motions, “to the extent [the Army] is 

misreading the [amended] complaint. (Doc. 83, p. 10, n. 1).20 

The Court has considered the factual allegations in 

ARREDSTON17MAY01829 and the factual allegations that Mr. Hawthorne asked 

the Army EEO office, in his email of June 19, 2017, to add to his EEO complaint. 

For several reasons, those factual allegations do not support a Title VII claim against 

the Army concerning Mr. Merriweather’s alleged conduct.

First, the Army does not control and is not responsible for conduct by union 

members in the performance of their union duties or by the union itself. 

Second, Mr. Hawthorne has not alleged an adverse employment action 

resulting from Mr. Merriweather’s conduct to support a discrimination claim. As 

the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Sexual harassment can constitute discrimination based on sex for 

purposes of Title VII. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 

1244–45 (11th Cir.1999) (en banc). Generally, sexual harassment 

comes in two forms: harassment that does not result in a tangible 

employment action (traditionally referred to as “hostile work 

environment” harassment), and harassment that does result in a tangible 

employment action (traditionally referred to as “quid pro quo” 

harassment). See generally Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 

U.S. 742, 760–63, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).

 20 The Army moved to dismiss earlier versions of Mr. Hawthorne’s complaint, and the Army asked 

the Court to dismiss those complaints in Doc. 29 and Doc. 54. Mr. Hawthorne filed responses to 

each motion. (Docs. 34, 59). Because Mr. Hawthorne had an opportunity to respond, the Court 

will consider the Army’s incorporated arguments. 

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Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507–08 (11th 

Cir. 2000). Mr. Hawthorne does not allege that Mr. Merriweather or the Army 

engaged in quid pro quo harassment, as the amended complaint alleges no tangible 

employment action that the Army or an agent of the Army took against Mr. 

Hawthorne.

21 

Third, Mr. Hawthorne has not alleged facts to support a hostile work 

environment claim. A hostile work environment exists when “the workplace is 

permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently 

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an 

abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); 

Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). The 

severity requirement: 

contains both an objective and a subjective component. See Harris, 510 

U.S. at 21–22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370–71, 126 L.Ed.2d 295. Thus, to be 

actionable, this behavior must result in both an environment “that a 

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive” and an environment 

that the victim “subjectively perceive[s] ... to be abusive.” 

Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22). To evaluate the 

objective severity of the alleged harassment, a district court considers, among other 

 21 Mr. Hawthorne alleges that Mr. Merriweather, as union president, stripped Mr. Hawthorne of 

the position of vice president in retaliation for the filing of an EEO complaint against him. That 

is not an employment action by the Army or by an agent of the Army.

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things: (1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether 

the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 

and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job 

performance. Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276 (citing Allen v. Tyson Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 

647 (11th Cir. 1997) (in turn citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23)). 

Mr. Merriweather’s alleged conduct occurred outside of the workplace, and

Mr. Hawthorne has not alleged that the conduct affected him at work. To be sure, 

the efforts of union leaders affect the workplace, so interactions between union 

leaders may not be entirely unrelated to the workplace. But in this case, Mr. 

Hawthorne and Mr. Merriweather work in completely different departments of the 

Army, and their only alleged connection is their membership in Local 1858. Alleged 

harassing conduct on Mr. Merriweather’s part outside of the Redstone Arsenal 

would not follow Mr. Hawthorne into the workplace and impact Mr. Hawthorne’s 

relationship with the Army. 

The retaliation claim in Count 8 based on the EEO complaint filed in 

ARREDSTON17MAY01829 also fails. 

Title VII’s antiretaliation provision forbids employer actions that 

“discriminate against” an employee (or job applicant) because he has 

“opposed” a practice that Title VII forbids or has “made a charge, 

testified, assisted, or participated in” a Title VII “investigation, 

proceeding, or hearing.” § 2000e–3(a).

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Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006). Mr. 

Hawthorne’s retaliation claim is based on Mr. Merriweather’s removal of Mr. 

Hawthorne from Mr. Hawthorne’s union position. As noted above, because Mr. 

Merriweather took that action as a member of the union, not as an employee of the 

Army, the retaliation claim against the Army fails. 

Thus, the Court will dismiss Count 8.

E. Claims Against Local 1858, District 5, and the National Union

i. Title VII Claims Against Local 1858

In Count 6, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that Local 1858 is liable for sexual 

harassment under Title VII based on Mr. Merriweather’s conduct. (Doc. 73, p. 58, 

¶ 220; Doc. 80, p. 8, ¶¶ 21–22 (“This claim is based on 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a), et 

seq.”)). The Court will dismiss Count 6 because Mr. Hawthorne did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies with respect to the union defendants. 

“Before a potential plaintiff may sue for discrimination under Title VII, [he]

must first exhaust [his] administrative remedies. The first step down this path is 

filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC.” Wilkerson v. Grinnell 

Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

5(b). A charge must be “in writing under oath or affirmation” and must “contain 

such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.” 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(b). A charge allows the EEOC to investigate the charge with an employer 

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and attempt to resolve the charge short of litigation. Mr. Hawthorne filed several 

EEO charges with the Army, but he has not identified a charge against Local 1858. 

The Supreme Court has held that Title VII's charge-filing requirement is 

“mandatory.” Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019). 

Because Mr. Hawthorne did not file a charge with the EEOC naming Local 1858,

the Court must dismiss Count 6.

ii. Claims Based on Article 13(a) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 

between the Army and Local 1858

In Count 9, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that District 5 and Everett Kelley 

“breached their duty of care” under Article 13(a) of the Collective Bargaining 

Agreement between the Army and Local 1858 when Mr. Kelley wrote his email of 

June 27, 2017, in which he stated that Mr. Merriweather’s conduct did not rise to the 

level of sexual harassment, and “there is nothing for any of us to do at this time.” 

(Doc. 73-5, pp. 17–18; Doc. 73, p. 60, ¶ 236). Mr. Hawthorne contends that District 

5 “should have initiated an investigation to comply with Article 13(a).” (Doc. 73, p. 

60, ¶236). He also asserts that “the 5th District . . . interfered with . . . . Local 1858 

Adhering to Article 13(a) and investigating.” (Doc. 73, p. 60, ¶ 236). In Count 11, 

Mr. Hawthorne alleges that the national union and Mr. Cox “breach[ed] [their] duty 

of care” under Article 13(a) “when [their] attorneys, according to Everett Kelley . . 

. advised [Mr. Kelley] that they should do nothing because [the] claim of sexual 

harassment did not rise to unlawful [s]exual [h]arassment.” (Doc. 73, p. 61, ¶¶239-

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239). In Count 7, Mr. Hawthorne alleges that the local union “breached its duty of 

care [under Article 13(a)] when it did not protect [Mr. Hawthorne]” from Mr. 

Merriweather’s alleged harassment and retaliation. (Doc. 73, pp. 58–59, ¶¶ 221–

222; Doc. 73-1, pp. 13 and 1–109 generally). In Count 10, Mr. Hawthorne alleges 

that the local union “breached its duty of care” pursuant to Article 13(a) when, “after 

being made aware of the sexual harassment complaint and the retaliation,” the local 

union did not initiate an investigation. (Doc. 73, p. 61, ¶ 237). Thus, each of these 

theories of actionable conduct are tethered to Article 13(a).

The Court will dismiss these claims because to the extent that Article 13(a) of 

the collective bargaining agreement between Local 1858 and the Army gives rise to 

an enforceable duty, it is a duty that Mr. Hawthorne must pursue through the 

collective bargaining dispute resolution process. “Title VII of the Civil Service 

Reform Act (“CSRA”) explicitly governs labor-management relations in the federal 

sector.” Warren v. Local 1759, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, 764 F.2d 1395, 1396 

(11th Cir. 1985) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.). Under the CSRA, Local 1858, 

District 5, and the national union have a duty of fair representation and must 

“represent[] the interests of all employees in the unit . . . without discrimination.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1). “[A] breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor 

practice.” Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 

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532 (1989) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(8)). The CSRA states that “unfair labor 

practices” include, among other things, acts 

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by 

the employee of any right under this chapter;

(2) to cause or attempt to cause an agency to discriminate against any 

employee in the exercise by the employee of any right under this 

chapter; [and]

(4) to discriminate against an employee with regard to the terms or 

conditions of membership in the labor organization on the basis of race, 

color, creed, national origin, sex, age, preferential or nonpreferential 

civil service status, political affiliation, marital status, or handicapping 

condition[.]

5 U.S.C. §7116(b)(1–2, 4). 

The CSRA confers exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice 

complaints on the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 5 U.S.C. § 7118; Karahalios, 

489 U.S. at 532 (“Under § 7118, unfair labor practice complaints are adjudicated by 

the FLRA[.]”); Warren, 764 F.2d at 1399. Judicial review of a decision of the FLRA 

lies with a federal circuit court of appeals. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). Federal district courts 

lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear duty of fair representation/unfair labor 

practices cases. And the CSRA preempts federal causes of action resulting from 

unfair labor practices. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 537. 

Because the “duties” Mr. Hawthorne ascribes to the union defendants fall 

squarely within the categories of unfair labor practices set out above, the CSRA 

preempts his claims based on Article 13(a). If he wishes to pursue those claims, Mr. 

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Hawthorne must do so before the Fair Labor Relations Authority. Accordingly, this 

Court will dismiss the Article 13(a) claims against the union defendants. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies the Army’s motion to 

dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, (Docs. 83, 89), as to Count 5. In all 

other respects, the Court grants those motions and dismisses the remaining counts 

(Counts 1–4, 8) with prejudice. 

The Court grants the union defendants motion to dismiss, (Doc. 79), in its 

entirety. The following claims are dismissed with prejudice: all claims based on the 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1505; all claims against the individual 

defendants; and all claims in Count 6. The Court dismisses without prejudice the 

remaining claims against Local 1858, District 5, and the national union so that Mr. 

Hawthorne may pursue those claims in a proper forum if he wishes. (Counts 7, 9, 

10–11). 

The recent General Orders Regarding Court Operations During the Public 

Health Emergency Caused by the COVID-19 Virus, (N.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2020 and 

April 13, 2020), do not affect the deadline to challenge a final order or judgment on 

appeal. See https://www.alnd.uscourts.gov/general-order-regarding-courtoperations-during-public-health-emergency-caused-covid-19-virus, p. 2, ¶ 7. The 

parties are reminded that under Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

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Procedure, a party may request an extension of time for a notice of appeal. In 

addition, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6), a party may ask a district court to reopen the time 

to file a notice of appeal for 14 days. Parties are advised to study these rules carefully 

if circumstances created by the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency require 

motions under FRAP 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6).

DONE and ORDERED this May 29, 2020.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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