Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01094/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Luby’s Inc., a Delaware corporation,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 04-1094 PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiffs Sally Case and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

have filed a claim against Defendant Luby’s, Inc., alleging that Luby’s discriminated

against Ms. Case because she is developmentally disabled, in violation of t he Americans

with Disabilit ies Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Doc. #1. Plaintiffs now move for

partial summary judgment on two issues: (1) whether Ms. Case was a qualified individual

for the job of floor attendant at Luby’s Restaurant and (2) whether she was disabled within

the meaning of the ADA. Doc. #168. Defendant’s cross-move for summary judgment on

the grounds that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, Defendant

possessed no knowledge of any disability, laches bars the present claim, and Plaintiffs’

harassment, failure-to-accommodate, and ret aliat ion claims are deficient. Doc. #172. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the parties’

motions.

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The Court will deny the request for oral argument because the parties have

submitted memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence and the Court

concludes that oral argument will not aid its decisional p rocess. See Mahon v. Credit Bur.

of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920,

926 (9th Cir. 1998); Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific. Dev. Malibu Corp.,

933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S. 920 (1992). The Court notes that the

parties submitted substantially more briefing than was necessary in t his case and wasted

many pages arguing about factual issues that must be resolved by a jury. Such overbriefing should not occur again. The parties are advised that they must comply with the

page limitations for motions in limine to be set fort h in the Court’s Order Setting Final

Pretrial Conference.

Background

Ms. Case began working for Luby’s Restaurant in August 1998 when she was 41

years old. Doc. #164, PSOF ¶ 1. She worked at Luby’s until December 2000. Id. Both

parties agree that Ms. Case p erformed the essential functions of her job as a floor

attendant adequately. Docs. #161 at 1, #168. Ms. Case filed a charge with the EEOC on

December 8, 2000, claiming that Luby’s discriminated against her because of her disability

“by harassing her, failing to provide a reasonable accommodation, further harassing her

for opposing t he unlawful discrimination, and by constructively discharging her.” Doc.

#1. Luby’s acknowledged receipt of the EEOC claim on December 21, 2000. Doc. #172 at

17. The parties held an unsuccessful settlement meeting on May 1, 2001. Id. The EEOC

investigation continued from June 2001 to November 2002. Id. On November 21, 2002,

approximately two y ears after the initial charge was filed, the EEOC issued a letter of

determination against Luby’s. Id. The conciliation process began in December of 2002 and

ended in July of 2003. Id. On May 27, 2004, the EEOC filed this lawsuit. Doc. #1. 

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Discussion

I. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the admissible evidence, viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and t hat the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed.

Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines which facts

are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the out come of the suit . . . will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. To preclude summary judgment the

dispute must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

II. ADA Claim.

The ADA prohibits a covered employer from discriminating against “a qualified

individual with a disability, because of the disabilit y of such individual . . . .” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a). For Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA,

she must show that she (1) has a disability, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) suffered an

adverse employment action because of her disability. See Snead v. Metropolitan Property

& Casualty Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001). To prove that she is a “qualified

individual with a disability,” Plaint iff must show that she is (1) an individual with a

disability as defined by the ADA and (2) could perform the essential funct ions of the

employment position, with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 

A. Qualified Individual.

Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Case was able to perform the essential functions of her

p osition at Luby’s with or without a reasonable accommodation. Luby’s argues t hat M s.

Case could perform the job wit hout accommodation. No party claims that Ms. Case was

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unable to perform the essential functions of her job. The Court accordingly will grant

partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on this issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 

B. Disability.

Both parties move for summary judgment on the question of whether Ms. Case is

disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). This determination involves three inquiries:

(1) whether Ms. Case’s condition is a physical or mental imp airment, (2) whether the

impairment limits a major life activity, and (3) whether t he limitation is substantial. See

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998); Wong v. Regents of the University of

California, 410 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). 

1. Impairment.

Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Case suffers from the ment al impairments of mental

retardation, impaired cognitive functioning, and organic brain syndrome. The Court will

address these claims separately.

a. Mental Retardation.

Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. O’Brien, opines that Ms. Case is mentally retarded. Dr.

O’Brien bases this opinion on Ms. Case’s low intellectual scores and the amount of

assistance she receives from her family in housekeeping, shop ping, finance management,

and medications. Doc. #164, Ex. I at 2. Plaintiffs submit other evidence in support of this

claim, including Ms. Case’s history of educational and developmental disability and the

testimony of her treating psychiatrist. Doc. #180 at 4.

Luby’s expert , Dr. Hammer, disagrees. He finds Ms. Case to be highly adaptive and

therefore not mentally retarded, noting that she has lived independently, owns a home,

participates in household chores, cooks, and can write a check, count change, look up a

plumber in the phone book, and describe how she would store various food items.

Docs. ##161, 164, Ex. H at 35. 

This conflicting evidence gives rise to a question of fact that must be resolved by

the jury. The Court cannot make expert credibility determinations on summary judgment.

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Luby’s asks the Court t o “disregard” the opinion of Plaintiffs’ expert as “unreliable.”

Doc. ##161 at 2-6, 172 at 5-6. Specifically, Luby’s argues that Dr. O’Brien did not engage

in appropriat e adap t ive testing. Id. Luby’s cites Daubert v. Merrell Down

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), but has made no motion to strike the t est imony

of Dr. O’Brien. Doc. #161 at 4. Nor does Luby’s address the specific criteria set forth in

Daubert or Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or request a hearing under Rule 104(a) to

determine the admissibility of Dr. O’Brien’s testimony. The Court cannot simply choose

to disregard the testimony of an expert based on one party’s argument that it is unreliable.

Absent a showing that expert test imony should be stricken under the criteria of Daubert

and Rule 702, such credibility determinations must be made by the jury.

b. Organic Brain Syndrome.

Luby’s contends that the expert testimony of Dr. Schulte on organic brain syndrome

was disclosed for the first time in Plaint iff’s motion for partial summary judgment and

therefore must be disregarded by the Court. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. Schulte’s

opinions were not previously disclosed, but argue that such disclosures were not required

because Dr. Schulte is Ms. Case’s treating physician. Doc. #180 at 5. In support of this

argument, Plaint iffs cite cases holding that an expert report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) need not

be prepared by a treating physician because such an individual is not “retained or specially

employed to provide expert testimony in the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

The Court’s Case Management Order, however, required more than compliance with

Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The order specifically stated that “Plaintiff(s) shall provide full and

comp lete expert disclosures as required by Rule 26(A)(2)(A)-(C) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure by March 1, 2005.” Doc. #18 ¶6(a) (emphasis added). Rule 26(a)(2)(A)

provides that “a party shall disclose t o other parties the identity of any person who may

be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence.” (Emphasis added.) This disclosure obligation is separate from the report

requirement of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Because Dr. Schulte’s opinion about Ms. Case’s organic

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brain syndrome clearly falls within Rules 702, 703, and 705, Plaintiffs were obligated to

identify him as an expert witness by the Court ’s exp ert deadline even though he was not

required to prepare a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). See Rule 26(a)(2)(C). Having failed to

make t his required disclosure, Plaintiff’s may not use Dr. Schulte’s expert opinion on

organic brain syndrome in these motions or at trial. 

Plaintiffs cite no other evidence in support of their claim that Ms. Case suffers from

organic brain syndrome. The Court therefore will grant summary judgment on t his issue

in favor of Luby’s.

c. Impaired Cognitive Functioning.

Both parties’ experts agree that Ms. Case has a below average IQ of about 70. Doc.

#164, Ex. H at 57-58. Plaintiffs ask the Court to rule t hat a subaverage IQ of 70, by itself,

qualifies as an “impairment”within the meaning of the ADA. Doc. #180. Luby’s disagrees,

noting that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition

(“DSM-IV”), provides that a diagnosis of mental retardation requires bot h an IQ of 70 or

below and substantial limitations in adaptive functioning. Doc. #172.

In support of their claim that an IQ of 70 const itutes an “impairment” as a matter of

law, Plaintiffs cite only once case, Price v. Nat’l Bd. of Medical Examiners, 966 F.Supp.

419, 426 (S.D.W.Va.1997). The plaintiff in Price, however, had been diagnosed with

dyslexia and the only issue was whether the dyslexia created a substantial enough

imp airment of a major life activity to qualify for ADA protection. The case did not address

whether subaverage intelligence constitutes an impairment. Because Plaintiffs cite no

other case law in support of their claim, the Court cannot conclude that an IQ of 70,

standing alone, constitutes an impairment under the ADA. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment on this issue will be denied. 

2. Substantially Limited in a Major Life Activity.

In addition to possessing a mental or physical disability, Plaintiffs must also show

t hat Ms. Case is substantially limited in a major life activity in order to qualify for ADA

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protection. Wong, 410 F.3d at 1063. “Major life activities” include caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, learning, working, reading, and thinking. See Toyota Kentucky

v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185 (2002); Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th

Cir. 2005). The ADA does not define the term “substantially limits,” but the Sup reme Court

has explained t hat “to be substantially limited in the specific major life activity . . . an

individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from

doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.” Toyota

Kentucky, 534 U.S. at 185 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii)).

 Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Case invariably is substant ially limit ed in a major life

activity because she is mentally retarded, citing the criteria for a diagnosis of mental

retardation and dicta in Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc., 967 F. Sup p . 653, 658 (D.

Puerto Rico 1997). Luby’s disputes these arguments and authorities and asserts that even

mentally retarded individuals may be found not to be substantially limited in major life

activities. Plaintiffs’ “invariability” argument is p remised on a finding that Ms. Case is

mentally retarded. As explained above, this is a factual issue that must be decided by the

jury after considerat ion of the disputed evidence concerning her condition. Because the

Court cannot conclude as a matter of law and undisputed fact that Ms. Case is mentally

retarded, it cannot conclude that she invariably is substantially limited by mental

retardation. 

Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Case is limited in many major life activities, including her

ability to read, think, care for herself, and work. Doc. # 164, Ex. I at 5-6. Plaint iff’s expert

found that these impairment s substantially limit her daily life activities. Id. Luby’s expert

disagrees, noting that “Ms Case [does] not have subst ant ial limitations in adaptive

functioning . . . .” Doc. #164, Ex. H. The parties present considerable factual evidence and

arguments in their efforts to persuade the Court, all of which simply demonst rates the

existence a factual dispute that must be resolved by a jury. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial

summary judgment on this issue will be denied.

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has not decided whether a hostile work environment claim is

actionable under the ADA, but t he p art ies do not raise this issue. See Roberts, 319

F.Supp.2d at 988; Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that

“[o]ur court has not yet held that such a claim exist s, let alone what its source in the statute

might be. We decline to do so here.”).

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B. Hostile Work Environment.

Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Case was subject t o a hostile work environment on the basis

of her disability. Luby’s has moved for summary judgment, arguing t hat Plaintiffs cannot

satisfy the elements of such a claim. Doc. #172. To establish a hostile work environment

claim under the ADA, Plaint iff must prove that (1) she is a qualified individual with a

disability; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based

on her disability; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term,

condition, or p rivilege of her employment; and (5) some factual basis exists to impute

liability for the harassment to the employ er. See Roberts v. Dimension Aviation, 319

F.Supp.2d 985, 988 (D. Ariz. 2004); Flowers v . Southern Regional Physician Services, Inc.,

247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001).1

 As noted above, the Court finds that Plaint iffs have

p rovided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether or not M s.

Case is a qualified individual with a disability eligible for protection under the ADA. 

In determining whet her a work environment is abusive, the Court must consider the

“frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening

or humiliat ing, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with

an employee’s work performance.” Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts, 168 F.3d

871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 963 (1993). Ms. Case testified

t hat the general manager of Luby’s, Ms. Nye, told her to “shut up” on numerous

occasions, called her a “retard,” and slapped her on the face. Doc. #164, Ex. A, O. She also

reported that Luby’s employees intentionally hid her bicycle in the men’s room, blocked

her way out of the kit chen when she tried to pass, barked like a dog at her when she

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entered a room, and threatened to cut her arm with a bread slicer. Docs. #163, 164, Ex. A.

Ms. Case testified that she believed the harassment was because of her disability. Id.

Luby’s argues that “Ms. Case’s allegations do not establish severe and pervasive

harassment as required by law,” noting that many of the “allegations are vague,

conclusory, and lacking in sufficient detail to avoid summary judgment.” Doc. # 172. The

Court disagrees. Construing the evidence in t he light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the

Court finds that there are sufficient facts to raise a triable issue for the jury to consider. 

Luby’s further argues that the Court must grant summary judgment because Luby’s

did not know Ms. Case suffered from a mental disabilit y and t herefore “cannot have

breached a legal obligation to accommodate that disabilit y , nor can it be deemed to have

harassed Ms. Case on the basis of that disability.” Id. See Hedberg v. Indiana Bell

Telephone, 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995) (it is intuitively clear from the ADA’s language

that an employer cannot fire an employee “because of” a disability when it had no

knowledge of the disability). Luby’s also contends that Plaintiffs have not proven the

required elements to establish a claim because the allegations do not “ reflect any relation

between t he alleged conduct and Ms. Case’s alleged disability [and] certainly . . . do not

evidence that Ms. Case’s alleged disability act ually motivated the conduct.” Doc. #172.

 In response, Plaintiffs offer testimony t hat Luby’s was informed by at least two

individuals that Ms. Case suffered from a developmental disability. First, Ms. Case’s sister

testified that she met with Ms. Nye approximately 20 times over the course of Ms. Case’s

employment to report incidents of harassment and to exp lain to Ms. Nye that Ms. Case was

a “special” girl and required more patience. Doc. #164, Ex. D at 98. Ms. Case’s sister also

testified t hat on two or three occasions she called the 1-800 number Luby’s provided for

its employees to complain about working conditions and reported the ongoing harassment

of her sist er. Doc. #164, Ex. D. Second, Plaintiffs offer testimony of Leticia Cano, a social

worker from the Division of Developmental Disabilities who visited Luby’s on June 13,

2000 and spoke with Ms. Nye. Doc. #164, Ex. T. Ms. Cano testified that she introduced

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herself to M s. Ny e, explained where she came from, gave a brief job description, and then

proceeded to inquire about Ms. Case’s reduction in work hours. Id.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds a

genuine factual dispute as to whether Luby’s knew of Plaintiff’s alleged impairment . Doc.

#172. Summary judgment generally is not appropriate if a party’s knowledge or state of

mind is at issue. See Braxton-Secret v. Robins Co., 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985)

(reversing summary judgment and stating that “[q]uestions involving a person’s state of

mind, e.g., whether a p art y knew or should have known of a particular condition, are

generally factual issues inappropriat e for resolution by summary judgment”); Mendocino

Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1302 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing summary

judgment and quoting Braxton-Secret); Consol. Elec. Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 437,

438 (9th Cir. 1966) (reversing summary judgment and stating that “[w]hen an issue requires

determination of state of mind, it is unusual that disp osition may be made by summary

judgment”). Luby’s’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of hostile work

environment will be denied.

III. Laches.

Luby’s argues that t he Court should dismiss this lawsuit on the basis of laches

because the EEOC unreasonably delayed the filing and prosecution of this lawsuit,

result ing in prejudice to Luby’s. Doc. #172. To establish a laches defense, Luby’s must

show unreasonable delay on t he p art of Plaintiffs and prejudice to Luby’s. See Boone v.

Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1979). Luby’s argues that a

forty-two month delay from the time Plaintiff filed her initial charge to the time the EEOC

formally brought suit constitutes an unreasonable delay. Doc. #172. Luby’s argues that

although the EEOC promptly notified it of Ms. Case’s complaint and initiated a timely

investigation, twenty four months passed before the EEOC issued its let t er of

determination. Id. Luby’s then notes an unexplained ten and one-half month delay

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2 Laches may properly be raised as a defense in this case because the defense

applies to employ ment discrimination actions brought by the EEOC when such actions are

not governed by a statute of limitations. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v . EEOC, 432

U.S. 355, 373 (1977) (stating that dist rict courts have the power to provide relief to a

defendant that has been “significantly handicapped in making his defense because of an

inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action”); EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86, 88

(9th Cir. 1980) (“Laches . . . may be used as a defense t o a T it le VII action.”); Miller v.

Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating in an ADEA action that

“laches is inapp licable when Congress has provided a statute of limitations to govern the

action”).

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between the end of the conciliation phase in July of 2003 and the filing of the complaint in

May of 2004. Id.2

Plaintiffs argue that forty two months is not an unreasonable period of t ime wit hin

which t o bring a formal complaint and blame much of the delay on Luby’s. Doc. #163 at

20. Plaintiffs argue that the EEOC expended “substantial efforts to conciliate the Charge”

and point to the exchange of several settlement offers during the complained-of twenty

four month period. Doc. #163 

As noted above, “[t]he defense of laches ‘requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by

the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the

defense.’” Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 666 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations

omitted). Courts are “unwilling to rule that any set lengt h of delay is per se unreasonable,

but rather [will] look to the facts of each case to determine reasonableness.” E.E.O.C. v.

Liberty, 584 F.2d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 1978). “Laches questions are seldom susceptible of

resolution by summary judgment, because ‘where laches is raised as a defense the factual

issues involved can rarely be resolved without some preliminary evidentiary inquiry.’” 

Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 666.

Luby ’s cites several cases where laches barred a claim, but the decisions in these

cases were based largely on the EEOC failing to provide any explanat ion for its delay or

claiming workload as an excuse for the delay. See Liberty, 584 F.2d at 858 (the only

justification for the delay is its heavy workload); Alioto, 623 F.2d at 88 (“The EEOC does

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not suggest an excuse other than its backlog of cases for the nineteen month delay.”);

Boone, 609 F.2d at 959 (“[p laint iff] offered no evidence from which this court ... could even

infer an excuse for his seven year delay.”). Here, Plaintiffs claim to have made “substantial

efforts to conciliate” and blame Luby’s for much of the delay. Doc. #163. Const ruing the

facts in Plaint iffs’ favor, Luby’s has failed to show unreasonable delay as a matter of law

and undisputed material fact. The Court accordingly will deny Luby’s motion for summary

judgment on the defense of laches. 

IV. Failure to Accommodate Claim.

Luby ’s argues that it had no obligation to accommodate Ms. Case’s disability

because it had no knowledge about her disability. As noted above, however, Luby ’s

knowledge is a factual issue to be resolved by the jury.

Luby’s argues that Ms. Case was capable of performing her job and did not require

any accommodation. Luby’s also argues that no accommodation was requested by or on

behalf of Ms. Case and therefore that no obligation arose to discuss or consider such an

accommodation.

Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Case required greater assist ance and a softer approach in

management and discipline. Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Case’s sist er requested such an

accommodat ion from Ms. Nye. In support of their argument that a “softer approach” to

management is an accommodation required by the ADA, Plaintiffs cite Kent v. Derwinski,

790 F.Supp. 1032, 1039-40 (E.D. Wash. 1991). 

Luby’s responds with a detailed fact ual argument. Luby’s does not claim that a

“softer approach” is not a required accommodation under the ADA and does not address

the Kent case. Luby ’s instead disputes and characterizes Plaintiffs’ evidence and makes

factual arguments that such an accommodation was not required or requested. These

factual issues must be resolved by the jury.

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V. Retaliation claim.

Luby’s first argues that Plaintiffs cannot pursue a ret aliation claim because Ms.

Case did not assert such a claim in her initial EEOC charge. Citing Occidental Life, 535 F.2d

at 542, Plaint iffs argue that the EEOC can pursue any charge included in the EEOC’s

determination. Plaintiffs also argue that because the determination in this case included

retaliation and Ms. Case intervened in an EEOC case that contained that claim, retaliation

is properly included. In reply, Luby’s argues in a single sent ence that the EEOC never filed

a retaliat ion charge or gave Luby’s an opportunity to respond, but cites no evidence in

support of this assertion. Doc. #177 at 27. 

Even though Ms. Case did not check the retaliation box, it is apparent t hat the EEOC

investigation, including the retaliation claim, grew out of her charge of disability

discrimination. “Subject matter jurisdiction extends over all allegations of discrimination

t hat either ‘fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.’” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9t h Cir. 2002) (quoting

Farmer Bros., 31 F.3d at 899); see Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990).

Similarly, allegations not included in the EEOC charge may be considered if the new claims

are “‘like or reasonably related to the allegat ions contained in the EEOC charge.’” B.K.B.,

276 F.3d at 1100 (citations omitted). Because the ret aliat ion claim investigation in fact grew

out of Ms. Case’s charge, and is like or reasonably related to her charge, the Court will

decline to grant summary judgment on this basis.

Luby’s also argues that there is no evidence of retaliation against Ms. Case in

response to any protected activity. Plaintiffs respond by asserting that a variety of

harassing actions occurred after M s. Case and her sister complained about conditions of

her employment and t hat t wo of the harassers, Ms. Nye and Mr. Martinez, knew of the

complaints. Evidence cit ed by Plaintiffs, however, does not show the timing of these

events or that they occurred after protected activity. Because such timing is necessary for

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an inference of causation t o be drawn, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not

produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that “there was a causal

link between the protected activity and the adverse [actions].” Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,

196 F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment on

Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim.

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #168) is granted with

respect to Ms. Case’s ability to perform the esse ntial functions of her job,

but otherwise is denied.

2. Luby’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #172) is grante d with respect

to Plaintiff’s organic brain syndrome argument and retaliation cl aim, but

otherwise is denied.

3. The Court will set a Final Pretrial Conference by separate order.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2005.

Case 2:04-cv-01094-DGC Document 189 Filed 12/29/05 Page 14 of 14