Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02615/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02615-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES ARTHUR JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

1

Case No.: 16-cv-2615 BTM(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT, DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 

VACATING ALJ’S DECISION AND 

REMANDING CASE FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

[ECF NOS. 12, 13]

Plaintiff James Arthur Johnson seeks review of the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits and 

Supplemental Security Income. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment. (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court will 

grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, deny Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment, vacate the Commissioner’s decision and remand the case for 

further proceedings.

 

1

 Defendant notes that Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 25(d), she is automatically substituted as the party defendant.

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed applications with the Social Security 

Administration seeking disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social 

Security Act and supplemental security income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social 

Security Act. Administrative Record (AR) 177-180, 181-186. In the applications, 

he alleged disability based on his history of neck and shoulder injury, “severe spine 

surgery,” and severe headaches. AR 73. Plaintiff was born on April 16, 1971. AR 

181. His alleged disability onset date was November 13, 2011. Id. 

Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on August 30, 2013, and upon 

reconsideration on January 21, 2014. AR 73-96, 97-120. On February 26, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed a request for hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 

138. A hearing was held by ALJ Robin L. Henrie on March 12, 2015, at which 

Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. AR 9-22, 31-72. A vocational expert 

testified at the hearing. AR 64-71.

On May 1, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff’s claim 

for benefits. AR 9-22. Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Appeals Council. 

Plaintiff’s request for review was denied on August 9, 2016, at which point the 

ALJ’s denial of his claim became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (“Commissioner”). AR 1-5. 

On October 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking review of the 

Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner filed 

an answer, along with the administrative record, on January 31, 2017. (ECF Nos.

9, 10.) In accordance with this Court’s briefing schedule, on March 20, 2017, 

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 12.) On April 24, 2017, 

the Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and response in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. (ECF Nos. 13, 14.) On May

15, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response to the Commissioner’s cross-motion/ opposition.

(ECF No. 15.)

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II. ALJ’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The ALJ conducted the five-step sequential analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1530.2 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since November 13, 2011, the alleged disability onset date. AR 11. 

At step two, she found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, degenerative joint disease of the 

bilateral shoulders, headaches, and occipital neuralgias. Id. 

At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 12. 

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity [(RFC)] 

to perform the full range of unskilled sedentary or light work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),” with the exception of a number of physical 

limitations, including that the work could not require “overhead lifting or overhead 

reaching” or “more than frequent reaching with the left upper extremity, frequent 

handling with the left upper extremity, frequent fingering with the left upper 

extremity, or any duties requiring feeling (note: claimant is right-handed).” AR 12-

13, 312-13. In arriving at her RFC determination, the ALJ indicated she gave “great 

 

2

 Under the Social Security Regulations, the determination of whether a claimant is disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act is a five step process. The five steps are as follows: (1) Is the 

claimant presently working in any substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Is the claimant’s impairment severe? 

If not, then the claimant is not disabled. If so, then the evaluation proceeds to step three. (3) Does 

the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific impairments set forth in Appendix 1 to Subpart 

P of Part 404? If so, then the claimant is disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step four. 

(4) Is the claimant able to do any work that she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step five. (5) Is the claimant able to do any other 

work? If not, then the claimant is disabled. If, on the other hand, the Commissioner can establish 

that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can do, the 

claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th 

Cir. 1999). 

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weight” to the opinion of state consultative examiner Bahnam Thomas, D.O., who

she noted had issued a report stating that Plaintiff “can frequently push/pull and 

reach with the left shoulder frequently and the right shoulder occasionally.” AR 18; 

see AR 505. She also said she was relying on the opinions of state consultants 

G. Taylor Holmes, M.D. and L. Naiman, M.D. Id. Dr. Holmes had determined that 

Plaintiff retained the functional capacity to “push and pull frequently with the left 

upper extremity and occasionally with the right upper extremity” and “perform 

overhead reaching frequently with the left upper extremity and occasionally with 

the right upper extremity.” Id.; see AR 80-81. Dr. Naiman reviewed the medical 

record on reconsideration and affirmed Dr. Holmes’s determination. Id.; see AR 

103. By comparison, the ALJ said she gave “little weight” to the opinions of 

Plaintiff’s treating physician William Shoemaker, M.D., who had written a report 

finding that Plaintiff was functionally restricted from performing “above the shoulder 

level work with the left upper extremity” but identified no limitations on his use of 

the right upper extremity. AR 18-19; see AR 450.

At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work

as a painter. AR 20. At step five, based on the testimony of the vocational expert, 

and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 

found Plaintiff would be able to perform jobs existing in the national economy, 

including the positions of a ticket seller (booth) (DOT No. 211.467-030), with 

34,000 positions nationwide, optical lens assembler (DOT No. 713.687-026), with 

28,000 positions nationwide, and food and beverage order clerk (DOT 713.687-

026), with 42,000 positions nationwide. AR 21. Accordingly, she concluded that 

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and denied 

his claim.

//

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III. STANDARD

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits may be set aside if it is based on legal 

error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 

1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence means “more than a scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 

2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is 

“relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in the 

medical evidence, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 

1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it 

supports or detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Robbins v. Social Sec. 

Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). Where the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner’s 

decision, the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 

F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may not substitute its judgment for that 

of the Commissioner. Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred because her RFC determination failed to 

incorporate Dr. Thomas’s opinion that Plaintiff was limited to occasional reaching 

with his right upper extremity, and that the hypothetical to the vocational expert 

was therefore incomplete. Defendant responds that the ALJ’s RFC assessment 

should be affirmed because it was supported by substantial evidence. 

The ALJ “is responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in 

the evidence.” Bennett, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 1127. When resolving conflicts in 

medical opinions, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between “three types of 

physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who 

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examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who 

neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). As a rule, the opinions of treating 

physicians are given more weight than the opinions of examining and 

nonexamining physicians, and “[t]he opinion of an examining physician is, in turn, 

entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a nonexamining physician.” Id. The 

opinion of an examining doctor, even where contradicted by another doctor, “can 

only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 830-31. 

Here, the ALJ erred by disregarding aspects of Dr. Thomas’s opinion without 

articulating any reason for doing so. See Betts v. Colvin, 531 Fed. Appx. 799, 800 

(9th Cir. 2013). In Betts, the Ninth Circuit held the ALJ erred by purporting to give 

great weight to the opinions of an examining physician, while simultaneously failing 

to include many of that physician’s opined limitations in the RFC. Id. Here, the 

ALJ likewise gave “great weight” to Dr. Thomas’s opinions, but failed to incorporate 

in her RFC assessment his finding that Plaintiff was limited to occasional reaching 

with the right upper extremity. Although the RFC restricted Plaintiff from doing any 

overhead reaching, “overhead reaching” is a narrower restriction than “reaching.” 

See Soc. Sec. Ruling (“SSR”) 85-15, 1983-1991 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 343, 1985 

WL 56857, at *7 (Soc. Sec. Admin. Jan. 1, 1985) (defining reaching as “extending 

the hands and arms in any direction”) (emphasis added). The ALJ’s failure to 

incorporate the full extent of Dr. Thomas’s restriction in the RFC, or alternatively 

to reject that aspect of his opinion and provide a specific and legitimate reason for 

doing so supported by substantial evidence, was legal error. Betts, 531 Fed. 

Appx. at 800; Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

Defendant argues the Court should affirm the ALJ’s RFC determination 

because it was consistent with the opinions of Drs. Holmes, Naiman, and 

Shoemaker, and thus was supported by substantial evidence. To begin with, the 

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non-harmless legal error is sufficient cause for reversal. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (an ALJ’s decision may be set aside if it is “based on 

legal error or [is] not supported by substantial evidence in the record....”), 

superseded by statute on other grounds, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). Also, 

although the ALJ’s RFC determination was consistent with the opinions of Drs. 

Holmes and Naiman, they were nonexamining experts, and nonexamining experts’ 

opinions are not considered substantial evidence justifying the rejection of the 

opinion of an examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831; Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999). And while the RFC 

determination was arguably consistent with the opinion of treating physician Dr. 

Shoemaker, who did not identify a functional restriction on Plaintiff’s ability to use 

his right upper extremity, the ALJ gave Dr. Shoemaker’s opinions “little weight,” a 

credibility determination neither party has challenged. The ALJ is responsible for 

making credibility determinations, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and 

resolving ambiguities in the first instance. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). On this record, the Court cannot and will not 

attempt to insert its own post hoc rationale for the ALJ’s RFC determination. Bray 

v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing 

principles of administrative law require us to review the ALJ's decision based on 

the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations 

that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”); Edwards v. 

Berryhill, 2017 WL 615382, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2017) (same). 

Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s legal error was not 

harmless. An ALJ’s error is not harmless “unless it can confidently conclude that 

no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a 

different disability determination.” Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 

1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006); see Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an ALJ’s error is harmless if it was “inconsequential to 

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the ultimate nondisability determination”). If fully credited, Dr. Thomas’s opinion 

supports a limitation to occasional reaching with the right upper extremity, which is 

a more extensive limitation than the overhead reaching limitation reflected in the 

ALJ’s RFC. Plaintiff persuasively argues that the failure to include this limitation 

was not inconsequential to the vocational expert’s determination that he had the 

residual capacity to perform the jobs of ticket seller (booth), optical lens assembler, 

and food and beverage order clerk. All of these jobs require at least frequent 

reaching (where “frequent” is defined as up to two-thirds of the work day), which is 

more than occasional reaching ( “occasionally” being defined as one-third or less 

of the work day). SSR 83-10, 1983-1991 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 24, 1983 WL 31251, 

at *5-6 (Soc. Sec. Admin. Jan. 1, 1983) (“‘Occasionally’ means occurring from very 

little up to one-third of the time[;]” and “‘[f]requent’ means occurring from one-third 

to two-thirds of the time.”); Dictionary of Occup. Titles (“DOT”) at 211.467-030, 

1991 WL 671853 (job of ticket seller requires worker to reach “constantly - ... 2/3 

or more of the time”); DOT at 713.687-026, 1991 WL 679273 (job of lens inserter 

requires frequent reaching, “from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time”); DOT at 209.567-014, 

1991 WL 671794 (job of food and beverage order clerk requires worker to reach 

frequently, “from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time”). Although the regulations do not specify 

bilateral reaching, it is difficult to believe the reaching would not involve the 

dominant hand. See Marquez v. Colvin, No. ED CV 15-1561 MRW, 2016 WL 

1695368, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2016) (remanding so the vocational expert 

could explain the apparent variance between claimant’s limitation on overhead 

reaching with his dominant right arm and DOT listings that appeared to require 

bilateral reaching). The Court cannot confidently conclude that the vocational 

expert would have reached the same conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s capacity for 

employment had the RFC incorporated Dr. Thomas’s limitation to occasional 

reaching with the right upper extremity. Therefore, the ALJ’s error in failing to 

either incorporate that limitation in the RFC or explain its omission from the RFC 

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was not harmless. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to award benefits rather than remand the case to the 

ALJ. The Court declines to do so. The decision whether to remand for further 

proceedings is within the court’s discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 

(9th Cir. 2000). Remand is appropriate where, as here, there are outstanding 

issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and 

it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant 

disabled. Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2003); see

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (courts have “flexibility to 

remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt 

as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act”). Moreover, “[i]n cases where the vocational expert has failed to 

address a claimant's limitations as established by improperly discredited evidence, 

we consistently have remanded for further proceedings rather than payment of 

benefits.” Harman, 211 F.3d at 1180. Here, it is not clear whether the ALJ will be 

required to find Plaintiff disabled after properly evaluating the medical evidence. 

Instead, remand is appropriate so the ALJ can address the conflicting medical 

opinions regarding the scope of Plaintiff’s limitation on reaching with his right arm, 

and either incorporate Dr. Thomas’s more restrictive limitation into the RFC, or 

provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting it that are supported by 

substantial evidence, and so that the vocational expert can address Plaintiff’s 

ability to work based on a properly evaluated RFC. 

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V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

(ECF No. 12) is GRANTED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF 

No. 13) is DENIED. The Commissioner’s decision is VACATED and this matter is 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2017

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