Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01533/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01533-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEVERLY TOWNE, et al., No. CIV S-05-1533-WBS-CMK

Plaintiffs, 

vs. ORDER

SHASTA COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendants’ expert witness

disclosure and for exclusion of testimony (Doc. 13), filed on August 2, 2006. Defendants filed

an opposition (Doc. 15) on September 1, 2006, and plaintiffs filed a reply (Doc. 16) on

September 6, 2006. Thereafter, the matter was taken under submission. 

Plaintiffs contend that they were discriminated against based upon their

disabilities in the processing of their application for foster parent status in the overall manner in

which their application was handled by defendants. Factually, plaintiffs, who are disabled

persons, assert that defendants’ “live scan” fingerprinting machine is not accessible and, for this

reason, Plaintiff Beverly Towne’s fingerprints were never collected by defendants and that this

effectively resulted in denial of their application for foster parent status to care for their

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grandchildren. 

Defendants served an expert witness disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(a)(2) listing five individuals as “non-retained experts.” The disclosure further

stated:

All of the above are employees of the Shasta County Department

of Social Services. The above witnesses may be asked to testify as to the

policies and procedures of Shasta county and applicable State laws with

respect to Relative placement, the appropriateness of the manner in which

the plaintiff’s application for relative placement was handled by

defendants, whether plaintiffs were provided proper consideration, and

whether plaintiffs’ disability played any role in their consideration as a

potential relative placement.

 

Following receipt of defendants’ disclosure, plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to defendants’

counsel asserting that the disclosure was defective because it was not accompanied by the

experts’ reports. Plaintiffs state that defendants have not responded to the letter.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) governs the disclosure of expert

testimony. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provides that such disclosures “shall, with respect to a witness who

is retained or specifically employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an

employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written

report prepared and signed by the witness.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). It is undisputed

that the experts in question are not retained experts, but are defendants’ employees. Therefore,

the relevant language from Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires expert reports as to any “witness . . . whose

duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony. . . .” 

Plaintiffs cite McCulloch v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 223 F.R.D. 26 (D.

Conn. 2004), for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, reports may be required from a

party’s employee even when the employee’s duties do not regularly involve giving expert

testimony. In McCulloch, the employee witnesses in question were designated to “opine that

they did perform their duties [to handle and investigate insurance claims] adequately.” See id. 

The court held that the defendant’s employees were not exempt from the report requirement

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because they were directed to act outside the scope of their regular duties by preparing to testify

as expert witnesses. See id. at 28. The court reasoned:

. . . The court agrees with plaintiff that the interests in this case

weigh in favor of requiring expert reports, notwithstanding Hartford’s

claim they are primarily serving as fact witnesses. In order to present

opinion about the adequacy of their performance, these witnesses must

provide substantially more than a recital of facts about what they may

have observed on the job. These witnesses will develop opinions

specifically for trial, the basis of which the defendant is entitled to be

informed about. Furthermore, to find otherwise would risk encouraging

corporate defendants to attempt to evade the report requirement by

designating its own employees first as fact witnesses and then asking them

to offer some related expert opinion. See id. 

Plaintiffs argue that the employees identified in defendants’ disclosure will be required to

formulate opinions regarding plaintiffs’ legal claims and that such opinions are outside the scope

of their employment as social workers. Specifically, plaintiffs assert:

Given that Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination under the ADA based upon

an individuals disability is not generally the subject matter normally

addressed by social workers within the gambit of their employment . . . .

Plaintiffs have not directed the court to any Ninth Circuit cases or cases from this district which

support their position. 

As a remedy for defendants’ claimed violation of the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report

requirement, plaintiffs assert that this court should automatically exclude the witnesses’

testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). 

In response to plaintiffs’ argument, defendants argue:

Plaintiffs contend that a report should be required because

these witnesses will be providing testimony on subject matter

which is not normally within the scope of their employment duties. 

This is simply not true. These witnesses are directly involved in

the handling of relative placement applications. They have

received education and training in this area. The applicable

standards for handling a relative placement application and the

manner in which Shasta County handles relative placement

applications is directly within the scope of their employment

duties, and is a regular part of their daily job functions. 

Defendants’ employees are precisely those witnesses for

whom a report is not required. All were directly involved in some

fashion with the Department’s handling of the Towne’s

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application, and this is precisely the area in which they have been

identified to render opinion testimony. 

As to automatic exclusion of the witnesses’ testimony, defendants argue that, if the court agrees

that they failed to comply with the report requirement, they should be provided an opportunity to

supplement their disclosure with the required reports. Defendants assert that this would be

appropriate because they acted under a good faith belief that they were not required to submit

reports and because plaintiffs would not be prejudiced. 

It appears that plaintiffs’ concern that the witnesses will be called to offer expert

testimony as to discrimination under federal law – which is clearly outside the scope of their

employment – stems from defendants’ statement in their disclosure that the witnesses may testify

as to “the appropriateness of the manner in which the plaintiffs’ application for relative

placement was handled,” “whether plaintiffs were provided proper consideration,” and “whether

plaintiffs’ disability played any role in their consideration as a potential relative placement.”

However, in the context of the entire disclosure, the court does not agree with plaintiffs that the

witnesses in question here would be called to offer expert opinion as to their federal legal claims. 

Specifically, the court notes that this language in defendants’ disclosure was preceded by the

statement that the witnesses’ testimony would be limited to “. . . the policies and procedures of

Shasta county and applicable State laws. . . .” From the entirety of the disclosure it is clear that

the witnesses are not being identified for the purpose of rendering any opinion on, as plaintiff

puts it, her “claim of discrimination under the ADA based upon an individual’s disability.”

Rather, they are being identified to possibly render opinion testimony as to local and state

policies and laws regarding aspects of their social work, namely relative placement. 

/ / 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to strike (Doc.

13) is denied.

DATED: November 28, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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