Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04968/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04968-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WIGFALL, et al

Plaintiffs,

v

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al,

Defendants.

 /

No C 06-4968 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiffs, who are former inmates of the San Francisco

county jail, claim that Sheriff’s Deputy Neu sexually harassed and

assaulted them on several occasions between May 5, 2005, and

September 19, 2005. Doc #8. Plaintiffs further allege that the

City and County of San Francisco (“the City”) and Sheriff Michael

Hennessey established various customs and practices that enabled

Deputy Neu to violate plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory

rights. Id.

//

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Case 3:06-cv-04968-VRW Document 25 Filed 01/22/07 Page 1 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants have moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to

dismiss (1) all state law claims asserted against the City and

Sheriff Hennessey and (2) state constitutional claims (i e, fifth,

sixth and seventh causes of action) asserted against Deputy Neu. 

Doc #16. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’

motion to dismiss. 

I

On a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a

light most favorable to the non-moving party. General Conference

Corp of Seventh-Day Adventists v Seventh-Day Adventist

Congregational Church, 887 F2d 228, 230 (9th Cir 1989). 

Accordingly, the facts upon which the court rules are those drawn

from plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc #8), taking its allegations as

true.

This case arises out of the alleged sexual harassment and

assault of plaintiffs during their incarceration at the City’s main

jail facility. Doc #8, ¶ 1. In particular, beginning on May 5,

2005, and continuing until September 2005, Deputy Neu allegedly

used his position of authority to coerce, harass, intimidate and

force plaintiffs into participating in sexual acts against their

will. See id, ¶¶ 12-26. Plaintiffs assert they informed other

deputy sheriffs about Deputy Neu’s behavior, but that “considerable

time elapsed before any known measures were taken to prevent or

stop the complained of conduct from occurring.” Id, ¶ 1. 

//

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Case 3:06-cv-04968-VRW Document 25 Filed 01/22/07 Page 2 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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II

Plaintiffs filed suit on August 16, 2006, advancing

eighteen federal and state causes of action. Doc #1. On November

30, 2006, defendants filed the present motion to dismiss.

FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss essentially “test

whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint.” 

Scheid v Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc, 859 F2d 434, 436 (6th Cir

1988). FRCP 8(a), which states that a plaintiff’s pleadings must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” provides the standard for judging

whether such a cognizable claim exists. Lee v City of Los Angeles,

250 F3d 668, 679 (9th Cir 2001). This standard is a liberal one

that does not require a plaintiff to set forth all the factual

details of the claim; rather, all that the standard requires is

that a plaintiff give the defendant fair notice of the claim and

the grounds for making that claim. Leatherman v Tarrant County

Narcotics Intell & Coord Unit, 507 US 163, 168 (1993) (citing

Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41, 47 (1957)). To this end, a plaintiff’s

complaint should set forth “either direct or inferential

allegations with respect to all the material elements of the

claim”. Wittstock v Van Sile, Inc, 330 F3d 899, 902 (6th Cir

2003). 

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim

which would entitle [it] to relief.” Hughes v Rowe, 449 US 5, 9

(1980) (citing Haines v Kerner, 404 US 519, 520 (1972)). See also

Conley, 355 US at 45-46. All material allegations in the complaint

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc Sec Litig, 183 F3d 970,

980 n10 (9th Cir 1999).

When matters establishing the basis for a state-law

immunity are present in the complaint, “[t]he [c]ourt can properly

grant a motion to dismiss * * * based on an immunity defense under

California law.” Jermon v County of Sonoma, 1997 WL 50266 at *8

(ND Cal) (Smith, J) (citing Fenton v Groveland Community Serv Dist,

185 Cal Rptr 758, 764 (Cal Ct App 1982)).

III

A

Defendants argue that the City and Sheriff Hennessey are

immune from claims arising under state law and move to dismiss

those claims pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Doc #16. Defendants rely

on two provisions in tandem, Cal Gov Code § 815(b) and § 844(6),

which are said to immunize public entities from claims of injury

asserted by prisoners. Section 815(b) provides that the liability

of a public entity “is subject to any immunity of the public entity

provided by statute, including this part.” Cal Gov Code § 815(b). 

Among the immunities referenced in § 815(b) is the one codified in

Cal Gov Code § 844(6):

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this

part, except as provided in this section and in

Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4 and 845.6, or in Title

2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3 of the

Penal Code, a public entity is not liable for:

(1) * * *

(2) An injury to any prisoner.

//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5

It is generally recognized that § 844(6) immunity

overrides any other statute imposing tort liability, including

those residing outside of the Tort Claims Act (§§ 810 et seq). The

comments to § 815 state in pertinent part: 

In the following portions of this division, there

also are many sections granting public entities and

public employees broad immunities from liability. 

* * * [U]nder subdivision (b) of this section, the

immunity provisions will as a general rule prevail

over all sections imposing liability.

Cal Gov Code § 815. See also California Government Tort Liability

Practice § 2-15 at 83-84 (stating that statutory immunities extend

to liabilities established by other statutes); 35 Cal Jur 3d,

Government Tort Liability, § 3, at 15-16 (accord); Wright v State

of California, 122 Cal App 4th 659, 672 (2004) (“[S]overeign

immunity is the rule in California; governmental liability is

limited to exceptions specifically set forth by statute.” (quoting

Cochran v Herzog Engraving Co, 155 Cal App 3d 405, 409 (1984)). In

short, as a general rule, statutory immunities prevail over

statutes that impose tort liability. 

Plaintiffs argue that § 844(6) immunity does not preclude

them from pursuing their claims under California Civil Code §§ 52

and 51(7), which provide damage remedies for civil rights

violations under California Law. Doc #20 at 5-6. In view of the

general rule set out above, the California Supreme Court imposes

strict requirements for a statute to override a government

immunity: the legislature must “decree[] that the provisions of

the [statute] are to displace [the immunity].” Schmidt v Superior

Court, 48 Cal 3d 370, 383 (1989). 

//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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6

Pursuant to this standard, the court in Gates v Superior

Court, 32 Cal App 4th 481 (1995), concluded that §§ 51(7) and 52 do

not override government immunities. In Gates, plaintiffs brought

state claims against City of Los Angeles police officials,

including claims under §§ 52 and 51(7), for failure to provide

police protection during a riot. Id. The court summarized its

analysis concerning immunity as follows:

[W]e have read 117 legislative committee and caucus

reports prepared since 1963 relating to Civil Code

sections 51.7 and 52. Nothing in those 117 reports

suggests that any damage immunity in the Tort

Claims Act is inapplicable to [claims under

sections 51.7 and 52].

Guided by this legislative history, the court in Gates concluded

that the City of Los Angeles was immune from plaintiffs’ claims

under §§ 51(7) and 52. See also Moore v Baca, 2002 WL 31870541 (C

D Cal 2002) (adopting Gates and extending its scope to immunity

under § 844(6)). 

Plaintiffs do not provide legislative history to support

their contention that §§ 51(7) and 52 override immunity under §

844(6). Nor do plaintiffs cite a single case that adopts their

theory. Instead, plaintiffs argue that Gates is inapplicable

because the injury was caused by third-party rioters, whereas

plaintiffs in the present case are suing for damages “proximately

arising out of the acts or omissions of its employees.” Doc #20 at

6. As defendants note, this is a distinction without a difference;

the third-party status of the primary tortfeasor has no bearing on

the court’s analysis of the legislative history of §§ 51(7) and 52. 

Accordingly, the court follows Gates and finds that §§ 51(7) and 52

are subject to the government’s immunity under § 844(6). 

Case 3:06-cv-04968-VRW Document 25 Filed 01/22/07 Page 6 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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7

Additionally, the court concludes that the immunity

provision precludes plaintiffs’ common law claims as well. In

their opposition, plaintiffs fail to respond to defendants’

assertion that the City and Sheriff Hennessey are immune from these

claims. The court suspects this omission stemmed from an absence

of legal support, as the court has not found a case in which a

common law tort trumped a public entity’s statutory immunity. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the City and Sheriff Hennessey

are immune from plaintiffs’ state law claims. 

B

Next, the court addresses defendants’ contention that the

state constitutional provisions alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint do

not provide a private cause of action for damages. Plaintiffs seek

tort damages under three clauses of the state constitution: 

article 1, § 13 (unreasonable seizure clause) and article I, § 7(a)

(due process and equal protection clauses). 

The California Supreme Court has held that state

constitutional provisions do not necessarily support a claim for

monetary damages. See Katzberg v Regents of Univ of Cal, 29 Cal

4th 300 (2002). Indeed, “only two [California] decisions, each

filed two decades ago, have recognized an action for damages to

remedy a violation of the state Constitution * * * [and] [a]ll

subsequent decisions addressing the issue have declined to find

such an action for damages.” Katzberg, 29 Cal 4th at 311. As

relevant here, state courts have expressly rejected state

constitutional damage claims for violation of the due process and

equal protection clauses (plaintiffs’ sixth and seventh causes of

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action). See Katzberg, 29 Cal 4th at 329 (no private right of

action for damages for violation of the due process clause of the

California Constitutoin); Javor v Taggart, 98 Cal App 4th 795, 807

(2002) (“It is beyond question that a plaintiff is not entitled to

damages for a violation of the due process clause or the equal

protection clause of the state Constitution.”). See also Degrassi

v Cook, 29 Cal 4th 333, 335 (2002) (no private right of action for

damages for violation of free speech clause of California

Constitution). 

With respect to plaintiffs’ third state constitutional

claim (unreasonable seizure clause of article I, § 13), the legal

terrain is less developed. One court concluded that this provision

does not provide an action for damages, but did so without

articulating its full reasoning. See Rendon v Fresno Police

Department, 2006 WL 2694678 (E D Cal 2006). Plaintiffs

nevertheless urge this court to blaze a trail and recognize damage

claims under article I, § 13, reasoning that the provision “on its

face, does not expressly forbid the awarding of money damages.” 

Doc #20 at 6. But a damage remedy does not follow simply because

the drafter neglects to disclaim such a remedy; otherwise the

entire California Constitution would be actionable for monetary

relief. 

Instead, the court hews to the procedure for determining

the availability of damages recently adopted by the California

Supreme Court. In Katzberg v Regents of the Univ of Cal, 29 Cal

4th 300 (2002), the Court established that the overarching aim is

to determine whether “the enactors intended that [the

constitutional provision] include a damages remedy for its

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violation.” Katzberg, 29 Cal 4th at 317. To do so, courts first

look for evidence of “an affirmative intent either to authorize or

to withhold a damages action to remedy a violation.” Id at 317. 

The court’s inquiry under the first step involves “the language and

history of the constitutional provision at issue, including whether

it contains guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures implying a

monetary remedy, as well as any pertinent common law history.” Id. 

 Second, if the inquiry into intent is not dispositive,

the court must “undertake the ‘constitutional tort’ analysis

adopted by Bivens and its progeny.” Id. This analysis turns on

“whether an adequate remedy exists, the extent to which a

constitutional tort action would change established tort law, and

the nature and significance of the constitutional provision,” as

well as considering “the existence of any special factors

counseling hesitation in recognizing a damages action, including

deference to legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse policy

consequences, considerations of government fiscal policy, practical

issues of proof, and the competence of courts to assess particular

types of damages.” Id. 

Pursuant to the Katzberg analysis, the court first

examines the plain language of the statute to determine whether the

text contemplates recovery of damages for the provision’s

violation. Article I, § 13 states in full: 

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures may not be

violated; and a warrant may not issue except on

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,

particularly describing the place to be searched

and the persons and things to be seized. 

//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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As is apparent from the language, article I, § 13 does not contain

any specific authority for the recovery damages.

The Katzberg court also observed that, notwithstanding

the absence of explicit language, the intent to permit recovery of

damages may be inferred from language within the provision that

provides guidelines, mechanisms or other procedures that imply a

monetary remedy. Katzberg, 29 Cal 4th at 317. But article I, § 13

only contains general principles of law; it provides no mechanism

or guidelines and the only procedure contemplated (a particularized

warrant) does not imply a monetary remedy for the violation. 

Accordingly, nothing in the text of article I, § 13 impels the

court to infer an intent to authorize a damages action to remedy

the provision’s violation.

The Katzberg analysis is not, however, confined to the

plain language of the constitutional provision. Katzberg also

endorses the examination of the legislative history of the

provision and, in the case of amendments added by referendum,

ballot pamphlets. Katzberg, 29 Cal 4th at 349. The historical

notes to article I, § 13 state that its predecessor was adopted May

7, 1879, and was subsequently amended on November 6, 1934, and June

6, 1972. See West’s Annotated California Codes, Constitution,

article I, § 13. 

For legislative history, defendants rely on Proposition

7, a measure included on the November 4, 1974, ballot. See Doc

#22. Proposition 7 contained various recommendations of the

California Constitution Revision Commission, including the

renumbering of article 1, § 13 and the addition of article 1, §

7(a) (the due process and equal protection clauses). Id at 26-27,

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71-72. The court in Katzberg examined these materials and found

nothing in them to suggest that the voters affirmatively intended

to create a damages remedy with respect to the due process and

equal protection clauses of article I, section 7. Proposition 7 is

relevant to California’s due process and equal protection clauses

because the measure substantively amended those clauses; that logic

does not, however, extend to article 1, § 13, which Proposition 7

merely renumbered. Hence, defendants’ reliance on these materials

is misplaced. 

Due to the absence of dispositive evidence concerning

intent, the court proceeds along the Katzberg analysis and assesses

whether non-constitutional remedies are adequate to rectify the

alleged wrong. See Katzberg, 29 Cal 4th at 325. In the present

case, the sheer number of claims arising from the alleged assault

and sexual harassment (eighteen) suggests that plaintiffs have an

adequate remedy at law. The alleged conduct triggers a panoply of

criminal and civil actions under California law, many of which

permit plaintiffs to recover money damages. Indeed, among Deputy

Neu’s many alleged violations of law, the “unreasonable seizure” of

plaintiffs seems the least applicable.

Additionally, plaintiffs retain a number of remedies

under federal law. Although the court in Katzberg declined to

consider whether federal tort law could satisfy the “adequate

remedy” element of its analysis, other California courts have found

relevant the existence of federal causes of action. See e g,

Carlsbad Aquafarm, Inc v State Department of Health Services, 83

Cal App 4th 809 (2000). In Carlsbad Aquafarm, for instance, the

court noted that the plaintiff had an equally effective monetary

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remedy under 42 USC § 1983, id at 822, which is a statute

plaintiffs rely on in the present action. In view of these state

and federal causes of action, the court finds that plaintiffs have

an adequate remedy independent of article I, § 13 of the California

Constitution. 

Plaintiffs’ sole argument pertaining to the Katzberg

analysis is to proclaim that “[t]he protection provided for by Cal

Const Art 1 § 13 is a cornerstone of our country’s democracy.” Doc

#20 at 7. The court doubts whether democracy is better served by

disregarding voter intent and creating a cause of action by

judicial fiat. But in any event, the California Supreme Court

disregarded this very argument: “the relative importance of the

constitutional right is of little help in determining the

availability of a damages remedy for a violation of that right.” 

Katzberg, 29 Cal 4th at 328 (quoting Carlsbad Aquafarm, Inc v State

Dept of Health Services, 83 Cal App 4th 809, 823 (2000)). 

Accordingly, the court finds that the Katzberg analysis militates

against fashioning a new tort remedy under article I, § 13. 

As a fallback position, plaintiffs urge the court not to

dismiss their constitutional claims because they seek injunctive

relief in addition to monetary damages. In response, defendants

contend that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief

because plaintiffs are no longer incarcerated.

To establish an entitlement to injunctive relief,

plaintiffs must demonstrate there is a substantial likelihood that

they will suffer an injury in the future. City of Los Angeles v

Lyons, 461 US 95, 102 (1983). This requirement is not satisfied by

general assertions that plaintiffs may be incarcerated in the

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future. O’Shea v Littleton, 414 US 488, 497 (1974) (“We are * * *

unable to conclude that the case-or-controversy requirement is

satisfied by general assertions or inferences that in the course of

their activities respondents will be prosecuted for violating valid

criminal laws. We assume that respondents will conduct their

activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and

conviction.”). See also Spencer v Kemna, 523 US 1, 15 (1998)

(rejecting standing because it was “contingent upon respondents’

violating the law, getting caught, and being convicted”). 

Under O’Shea and its progeny, this court rejects

plaintiffs’ resignation that they will return to San Francisco

county jail. Plaintiffs thus lack standing to seek injunctive

relief pursuant to their state constitutional claims. Accordingly,

the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state

constitutional claims.

IV

In sum, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ state claims against the City and Sheriff Hennessey. 

The court also GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

state constitutional claims (i e, claims 5, 6 and 7). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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