Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00241/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00241-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1333in Personal Injury

---

1

3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN GONZALES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DR. GWEN GLEASON-ROHRER,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); 

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

AND § 1915A(b) 

3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

[ECF Nos. 2, 3.]

SUSAN GONZALES (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and with claims of brain 

damage, has filed a Complaint claiming Medical Malpractice. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff 

claims DR. GWEN GLEASON–ROHRER (“Defendant”), while employed at San Diego 

Family Care, failed to properly treat Plaintiff for pre-diabetes and diabetes. (Id. at 2–3). 

Plaintiff did not pay the $400 civil and administrative filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a) at the time she submitted her Complaint. Instead, she a filed Motion to 

Case 3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC Document 4 Filed 02/27/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
2

3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF No. 3). 

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF No. 2.) 

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

In order to commence a civil action, Plaintiff must pay a filing fee of $4001. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite her failure to prepay the entire fee 

only if Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The court may authorize a 

lawsuit’s commencement without payment of the filing fee if the plaintiff submits an 

affidavit demonstrating his or her inability to pay the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Such affidavit must include a complete statement of the plaintiff’s assets. Id. However, 

an IFP action is subject to dismissal if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous 

or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2). When a plaintiff moves to proceed IFP, the court first “grants or denies IFP 

status based on the plaintiff's financial resources alone and then independently determines 

whether to dismiss the complaint” pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Franklin v. Murphy, 745 

F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984).

Here, Plaintiff submits a declaration of her assets and the information she provided 

is sufficient to satisfy the requirements under § 1915(a). Based on her affidavit in 

support of her IFP motion, Plaintiff indicates she is unemployed, receives $817.40 in 

disability and $166.04 in Social Security payments per month, and owns no real or 

personal property. Plaintiff also indicates her monthly obligations are $325 and she is not 

left with a lot in light of her ongoing medical expenses. Therefore, the Court concludes 

that Plaintiff meets the § 1915(a) requirements and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to 

 

1

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of 

$50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, 

§ 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 

proceed IFP. Id.

Case 3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC Document 4 Filed 02/27/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 6
3

3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Proceed IFP.

II. Sua Sponte Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by 

any person proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 

subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is 

“frivolous, or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B). 

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 

1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se . . . to 

construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 

Case 3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC Document 4 Filed 02/27/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 6
4

3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that 

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation are not interpreted 

so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. McNeil v. United States, 

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

B. Discussion

First Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s 

sole cause of action is for “medical malpractice,” a state law tort, and she has not stated 

either the amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship between the parties.

2

 

Nor does it appear that the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) is implicated. See 

28 U.S.C. §1346 (permitting a person injured by a Government employee acting within 

the scope of his or her employment to seek tort damages against the Government). Even 

construing Plaintiff’s pro se filings liberally, the complaint does not reveal or suggest a 

FTCA claim. Plaintiff’s employer is San Diego Family Care and has not been alleged to 

be a Government employer. Nor has Plaintiff alleged exhaustion of administrative 

remedies, a jurisdictional requisite to relief pursuant to the FTCA. See Valadez-Lopez v. 

Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The requirement of an administrative claim 

is jurisdictional.” (quoting Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Second, even assuming that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 

her claim, Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to 

support a claim for medical malpractice. On February 25, 2016, Plaintiff claims she had 

her initial medical visit with Defendant (ECF No. 1 at 2). Plaintiff was told by Defendant 

that she had pre-diabetes and was prescribed Metformin. At that time, Plaintiff claims 

Defendant did not have her medical records from Kearny Mesa Medical Clinic and that 

she did not have them in 2017. Id. On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Type 2 

 

2 The Court is doubtful that diversity jurisdiction exists, given Plaintiff’s San Diego residency and 

Defendant’s likely San Diego residency. 

Case 3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC Document 4 Filed 02/27/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 6
5

3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Mellitus Diabetes. Id. On June 12, 2017, nurse practitioner Della Burns prescribed 

Plaintiff Metformin, which Plaintiff alleges made her sick. 

On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff had an “emergency appointment” with Defendant 

where she was prescribed more Metformin. Id. Plaintiff further states she is upset, 

depressed, and embarrassed and seeks monetary relief for the alleged medical negligence. 

Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims Defendant is liable for medical negligence for prescribing her 

Metformin and for a lack of knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical history. Id.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain claims that “plausibly give 

rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiff’s allegations are 

insufficient to overcome the “low threshold” required to survive the Court’s initial sua 

sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2) and 1915A (b).1 See Wilhelm v. 

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff admits that she has been treated 

by Defendant since 2016 but alleges medical negligence because she did not respond well 

to the prescribed Metformin. Based on these facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim for medical negligence by stating merely that she did not respond well to the 

course of treatment Defendant ordered and that she was “upset, depressed, and 

embarrassed”. Plaintiff has provided conclusory statements about the medical care she 

received and has failed to allege medical negligence by Defendant.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint currently fails to state a claim, and must be 

dismissed sua sponte and in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1). 

III. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff requests for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 

However, the motion to appoint counsel for this action is moot since the Court has 

 

1 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and 

not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [any individual defendant] may choose to 

bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

Case 3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC Document 4 Filed 02/27/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 6
6

3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

already dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. Therefore, the Court DENIES 

plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For this reason, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF 

No. 3) is GRANTED and the action is DISMISSED without prejudice based on her 

failure to state a claim. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel as moot.

(ECF No. 2.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2019

Case 3:19-cv-00241-GPC-KSC Document 4 Filed 02/27/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 6