Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00355/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00355-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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Plaintiff also asserted a claim for sex discrimination, but subsequently agreed that

that summary judgment was appropriate on that claim. Response to Motion for Summary

Judgment at 4 (doc. 35). 

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aaron Roth, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-0355-PHX-FJM

ORDER

We have before us plaintiff Aaron Roth’s “Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend

Judgment” (doc. 47), defendant Maricopa County’s response (doc. 48), and plaintiff’s reply

(doc. 49). Plaintiff brought an action for retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e3(a)

(doc. 1).1

 In our order granting summary judgment to defendant, we concluded that plaintiff

had not provided evidence of adverse employment action, and therefore could not make a

prima facie case of retaliation (doc. 38). Plaintiff now argues that our judgment was based

on a misconstruction of the facts. Because we find no error in our judgment, we deny

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

I

At the outset, we address defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s motion is untimely

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According to plaintiff, his reclassification had actually been approved by the Board

of Supervisors on May 16, 2007.

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because it is actually a motion to reconsider, and pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(g), plaintiff had to

file it within fourteen days of the filing of the order that is the subject of the motion. 

We disagree. Our adoption of a local rule to regulate requests for reconsideration

before judgment has no effect on timely motions to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), Fed.

R. Civ. P. Plaintiff contends that we erred in basing our judgment on a misconstruction of

the facts. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion is proper and timely under Rule 59(e), Fed. R. Civ.

P. 

II

Plaintiff argues that we misconstrued the factual record and that we viewed the facts

in the light most favorable to the defendant, rather than plaintiff. We have “considerable

discretion when considering a motion to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).” Turner v.

Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). We will only

grant the motion if our decision “involved a clear error of law.” In re Onecast Media Inc.,

439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff’s motion centers on our discussion of Human Resources employee Bryan

Church’s handling of plaintiff’s resignation, and the news that his position had been

reclassified. Therefore, we briefly review again the relevant facts. According to Church’s

deposition, he learned of the official reclassification of plaintiff’s position on June 6, 2007.

DSOF, ex. 4, 24–25.2

 At that point, Church’s department had already prepared the letters of

notification, because they had anticipated the board’s final approval. Human Resources

planned to distribute the letters to the affected employees’ supervisors, who were to give

them to employees the following Monday, June 11, 2007. However, plaintiff’s name was

removed from the list of those to receive letters on May 29, 2007, the date that Human

Resources analyst Gordon Boesen notified Church that plaintiff had resigned. Church stated

that after receiving Boesen’s email, he called someone at Compensation and told him that

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plaintiff had resigned, and Compensation asked if plaintiff would be in his old position on

June 22, 2007, the date a paycheck would be issued covering the first pay period for the

reclassified position. When Church responded “no,” the Compensation employee said, “His

name should be removed from the list.” DSOF, ex. 4, 38, lines 15–16. At that person’s

instruction, Church sent an email asking that plaintiff’s name be taken off the list. DSOF,

ex. 9. Plaintiff submitted his official resignation on June 4, 2007. 

A

Plaintiff argues that we erred in relying on Church’s uncontroverted testimony that

a Compensation Section employee told him to remove plaintiff from the reclassification

notification list. DSOF, ex. 4. We disagree. We reject plaintiff’s contention that Church’s

email of May 29, 2007, requesting that the recipients remove plaintiff’s name from the

“Finance/HR Study,” contradicts his assertion that he was instructed by someone else to do

so. DSOF, ex. 9. To the contrary, Church explicitly stated that he sent that email pursuant

to instruction he received from a Compensation employee. Thus, there is no contradiction

in Church’s statement. 

Plaintiff also claims we erred in saying that Church had been told not to tell anyone

of the reclassification until the letters went out. According to plaintiff, Church actually said

in his deposition that he was not to inform anyone of the reclassification until it was

approved by the Board of Supervisors. DSOF, ex. 4, 15–17. Therefore, according to

plaintiff, as of May 16, 2007, Church was under no direction to keep the reclassification a

secret. 

We do not accept plaintiff’s characterization of Church’s deposition. Church

specifically affirmed that he had been instructed not to advise any employees about possible

reclassification even if he had “information indicating that a position was approved for

reclassification.” DSOF, ex. 4, 15–16, lines 22–3. Moreover, Church stated that did not

learn of the official reclassification of plaintiff’s position until June 6, 2007. DSOF, ex. 4,

24.

Plaintiff contends that a jury could choose not to believe Church’s testimony that a

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Compensation employee had told him not to give plaintiff a reclassification letter. But

plaintiff points to no evidence controverting Church’s statement. Plaintiff cannot create a

genuine issue of material fact by simply asserting that a jury could choose not to believe

Church’s uncontested statement. To the contrary, plaintiff must “do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Sluimer v. Verity, Inc., 606

F.3d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 2010).

B

Plaintiff notes that in our summary judgment order, we erroneously stated that

plaintiff’s resignation was effective June 4, 2007, when in fact, that was the date of the

official resignation letter, and his resignation was effective June 15, 2007. Therefore,

plaintiff was entitled to the increased salary for one pay period. While we did misstate the

effective date of plaintiff’s resignation, we disagree that this led to any error in our judgment.

Even if the change in title was due to go into effect before plaintiff’s last day in his old

position, plaintiff has introduced no evidence to suggest that Church or anyone else had a

duty to inform him of a reclassification that would not be effective until after plaintiff had

given notice of his resignation. Without such a duty, plaintiff cannot show an adverse

employment action. 

C

Plaintiff takes issue with our conclusion that even if Church knew of plaintiff’s

interest in the reclassification of his position, that would have imposed “no duty on Church

to share reclassification news ahead of schedule, and possibly in violation of an office-wide

policy.” Order of Aug. 4, 2010 at 4 (doc. 38). Plaintiff asserts that Church did not just fail

to give plaintiff advance notice, but rather, actively prevented him from finding out about the

reclassification on schedule. According to plaintiff, Church had a duty not to deprive

plaintiff of the extra salary, even if for only one pay period. Plaintiff argues that the temporal

proximity of plaintiff’s sex discrimination complaint and Church’s alleged interference with

his notification is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that there was a causal link

between Church’s actions and plaintiff’s complaint. See Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d

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1080, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008). 

We disagree that Church deprived plaintiff of any opportunity to stay in his old job.

Plaintiff contends that had Church done nothing, plaintiff would have received a

reclassification letter sometime after June 6, 2007, when the letters were prepared. Plaintiff

could then have decided for himself if he wanted to stay in his job. This ignores the fact that

plaintiff submitted his official resignation on June 4, 2007. Therefore, even if Church had

done nothing, the notification would have come too late for the decision to have remained

entirely in plaintiff’s hands. And, as already noted, Church had no duty to ensure plaintiff

heard about the reclassification once plaintiff decided to resign. 

III

Because plaintiff has not shown clear error in our order granting summary judgment,

IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiff’s “Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment”

(doc. 47). 

DATED this 6th day of October, 2010.

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