Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02484/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02484-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐2484

ASHOKE DEB,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

SIRVA, INC., et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:13‐cv‐01245‐TWP‐DML — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Ashoke Deb contracted with an In‐

dian moving company, Allied Lemuir, to move his belong‐

ings from Calcutta, India to St. John’s, Canada, but his belong‐

ings never left India. He now seeks to hold the defendants,

two United States companies, SIRVA, Inc. and Allied Van

Lines, Inc., responsible for the improper disposal and loss of

his personal property in connection with his move. SIRVA

and Allied moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Deb

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
2 No. 14‐2484

had failed to state a claim for which the court could grant re‐

lief, that he had failed to join a necessary party, and that the

United States federal courts were not the proper venue for his

claim. The district court agreed with the latter argument and

dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Deb ap‐

peals. Because we have determined that the district court did

not hold the defendants to their burden of demonstrating that

India was an available and adequate forum for this litigation,

we vacate and remand the case to the district court to do so.

I.

Because the defendants, SIRVA and Allied Van Lines,

moved to dismiss, we will construe the facts in the plaintiff’s

favor for now, but will discuss the nuances of our assump‐

tions below. Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 773, n.19

(7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1894 (2015).

In August, 2009, in preparation for his move from Cal‐

cutta, India to his current home in St. John’s in the Province

of Newfoundland and Labradour, Canada, Deb, a citizen and

resident of Canada, contracted with an Indian company, Al‐

lied Lemuir, to move his personal belongings from Calcutta

to St. John’s. Deb’s belongings, however, never left India. On

September 5, 2009, Allied Lemuir e‐mailed Deb and informed

him that sea freight charges had risen substantially, and con‐

sequently, Deb would need to pay an additional amount of

money to have the items shipped. Deb refused to pay the ad‐

ditional amount and demanded that Allied Lemuir fulfill its

obligations under the contract as written. At the same time

that Deb was attempting to settle matters with Allied Lemuir

in India, he also contacted the defendants, the United States

companies of SIRVA and Allied Van Lines, in an effort to ob‐

tain his personal goods. Furthermore, from December 2010

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
No. 14‐2484 3

until May 2011, Deb’s Canadian counsel attempted to resolve

the issue with an attorney for Allied Van Lines Canada (“Al‐

lied Canada”).  

Allied Lemuir sent Deb a letter dated January 30, 2010, de‐

manding additional charges that had accrued for demurrage,

fumigation, renewal of customs clearance, and sea freight.

The letter stated that if Deb failed to remit payment within

seven days, it would assume he was no longer interested in

the shipment. Deb did not respond to the letter directly, but

rather relied on his Canadian lawyer to pursue a resolution

by other means, including by contacting the defendants in

this case and corresponding with them over the course of sev‐

eral months. On August 11, 2010, SIRVA’s claim services de‐

partment responded to Deb’s inquiries, stating that they were

unable to identify any record of Deb’s shipment in SIRVA’s

system, but stated that if the move was through Allied or

North American, the claims service representative would for‐

ward the message to the proper party if Deb provided a reg‐

istration number. According to a letter dated August 26, 2010,

which Deb says he did notreceive until it was sent to his coun‐

sel on April 12, 2013, Allied Lemuir eventually sold Deb’s

property to pay the additional amounts it had demanded

from Deb.  

Deb filed a legal action against Allied Canada in the Su‐

preme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada, in the

Trial Division on November 5, 2010. And, a few years later,

on July 12, 2013, while the Canadian case was still pending,

he filed his complaint in this case in the Indiana State Superior

Court against SIRVA and Allied Van Lines, both of which are

Delaware corporations with their principal place of business

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
4 No. 14‐2484

in Illinois and corporate offices in Indiana.1 On August 5,

2013, the defendants jointly filed a successful notice of re‐

moval in the district court in the southern district of Indiana.

Deb seeks to hold SIRVA and Allied Van Lines responsible

for the damages from the improper disposal and ultimate loss

of his personal property, which he alleges include original

works of intellectual property that, together with his other

personal belongings, exceed a value of $75,000. His amended

complaint alleges that SIRVA and Allied Van Lines are liable

to Deb as “joint venturers.” (R. 27, pp. 3‐4, Page ID 286‐287)

(Plaintiff’s Supp. App. B003‐B004).  

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dis‐

miss on June 6, 2014, based on the ground of forum non con‐

veniens, noting that both India and Canada offered appropri‐

ate alternative forums for the action. Deb appeals.  

II.

A.

The defendants filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted), 12(b)(7) (failure to

join a party), and 12(b)(3) (improper venue). Subsumed

within this last category were the common law principles of

forum non conveniens and abstention. The district court dis‐

missed the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

                                                 

1 The district court stated that SIRVA has its principal place of business in

Indiana. Deb v. SIRVA Inc., No. 1:13‐CV‐01245‐TWP, 2014 WL 2573465, at

*1 (S.D. Ind. June 6, 2014) (R. 55 at p.2, Page ID 740), but this appears to be

incorrect. See Declaration of Abigail M. Jones, Memorandum in Support

of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Exhibit

1, ¶ 6.

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
No. 14‐2484 5

As the Latin name suggests, the doctrine of forum non

conveniens addresses the matter of convenience to the parties.

As the Supreme Court explained,

A federal court has discretion to dismiss a case

on the ground of forum non conveniens when

an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the

case, and trial in the chosen forum would estab‐

lish oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant

out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience,

or the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because

of considerations affecting the court’s own ad‐

ministrative and legal problems.

Sinochem Intʹl Co. v. Malaysia Intʹl Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,

429 (2007) (citing a long line of Supreme Court precedent) (in‐

ternal citations omitted). Today, the doctrine applies in the

federal courts only when the other jurisdiction is a foreign

one.2 Stated more simply, a district court may dismiss a case

on forum non conveniens grounds when it determines that

there are “strong reasons for believing it should be litigated

in the courts of another, normally a foreign, jurisdiction.”

Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 866, cert. de‐

nied, 135 S. Ct. 2817 (2015) (citing Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 429‐30).

A dismissal for forum non conveniens is “committed to the

sound discretion of the trial court” and “may be reversed only

                                                 

2 The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing ap‐

plication in federal courts only in cases where the alternative forum is a

foreign one. Otherwise, if the issue is one of convenience within the

United States federal court system, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

allow for transfer, rather than dismissal, when a sister federal court is the

more convenient forum. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a); Sinochem,

549 U.S. 422, 430.

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
6 No. 14‐2484

when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Piper Aircraft

Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981); Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563

F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2009).

The doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, is an ex‐

ceptional one that a court must use sparingly. Gulf Oil Corp. v.

Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504, 509 (the doctrine should be applied

only in “exceptional circumstances,” and “rather rare cases.”)

See also Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216,

1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The doctrine of forum non conveniens

is a drastic exercise of the court’s inherent power ... . There‐

fore, we have treated forum non conveniens as an exceptional

tool to be employed sparingly.”) “[U]nless the balance is

strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of fo‐

rum should rarely be disturbed. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 504.

The exceptional nature of a dismissal for forum non con‐

veniens means that a defendant invoking it ordinarily bears a

heavy burden in opposing the plaintiff’s chosen forum. Sino‐

chem, 549 U.S. at 430; Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508; In re Hudson,

710 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Factor VIII or IX Concen‐

trate Blood Products Litigation, 484 F.3d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 2007).

A heavy burden is appropriate, because if the doctrine is suc‐

cessfully invoked, the result is not a transfer to another court

but a dismissal, and the plaintiff will not be able to refile his

case in any other court if the statute of limitations has run. In

re Hudson, 710 F.3d at 718.

When a plaintiff’s choice is not his home forum, however,

the presumption in the plaintiff’s favor “applies with less

force,” for the assumption that the chosen forum is appropri‐

ate is in such cases “less reasonable.” Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430

(citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255–56). In U.S.O. Corp. v. Mi‐

zuho Holding Co., 547 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2008), we noted

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No. 14‐2484 7

that “[I]f the plaintiff is suing far from home, it is less reason‐

able to assume that the forum is a convenient one. ... [and

T]he risk that the chosen forum really has little connection to

the litigation is greater.”) (citing In re Factor VIII or IX Concen‐

trate Blood Products Litigation, 484 F.3d at 956.) It is true that

Deb lives in Newfoundland, Canada and not the United

States, but although the citizenship of the plaintiff defending

against a forum non conveniens claim is relevant to the issue

of convenience, it is not dispositive of the issue. See, e.g., Scot‐

tish Air Intʹl, Inc. v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224,

1232 (2d Cir. 1996). As we noted in the blood products litiga‐

tion, the issue is not so much about the foreign citizenship of

the plaintiff, but rather what that foreign nationality might in‐

dicate about the convenience to the plaintiff. In re Factor VIII

or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litig., 484 F.3d at 956. In other

words, when a plaintiff is suing far from home

the risk that the chosen forum really has little

connection to the litigation is greater. We do not

understand this as any kind of bias against for‐

eign plaintiffs. That would be inconsistent with

many treaties the United States has signed as

well as with the general principle that our

courts are open to all who seek legitimately to

use them. It is instead a practical observation

about convenience. A citizen of Texas who de‐

cided to sue in the federal court in Alaska might

face an equally skeptical court, which might

conclude that convenience requires a change in

venue under the federal statutory counterpart

to forum non conveniens.

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
8 No. 14‐2484

Id. at 956. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly true that although

Deb is not a citizen or resident of the United States, litigation

in Indiana would be far more convenient from a geographical

perspective than one in India. And in any case, even if we ap‐

ply the presumption in favor of Deb with less force, it is still

the defendants’ burden to oppose the chosen forum.  

In short, as we consider whether the district court exerted

permissible discretion to dismiss the case on forum non con‐

veniens grounds, we consider whether it properly placed the

burden on the defendants to demonstrate that a finding of fo‐

rum non conveniens was within the realm of appropriate con‐

clusions.

To determine whether a dismissal for forum non conven‐

iens is appropriate, a court first must determine if an alterna‐

tive and adequate forum is available and then go on to bal‐

ance the interests of the various participants. We start with

the availability of the forum because, “[a[s a practical matter,

it makes little sense to broach the subject of forum non con‐

veniens unless an adequate alternative forum is available to

hear the case. Therefore, the first step in any forum non con‐

veniens inquiry is to decide whether such a place exists.”

Kamel v. Hill‐Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing

Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22). The availability of the fo‐

rum is really a two‐part inquiry involving availability and ad‐

equacy. In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litig.,

484 F.3d at 957. “An alternative forum is available if all parties

are amenable to process and are within the forum’s jurisdic‐

tion. An alternative forum is adequate when the parties will

not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly.” Id. (citing

Kamel, 108 F.3d at 803). Adequacy only comes into play to the

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
No. 14‐2484 9

extent that the remedy would be so inadequate that for all in‐

tents and purposes the forum is not available. Piper Aircraft,

454 U.S. at 255, n.22. A forum is not inadequate merely be‐

cause the law in the foreign jurisdiction is less favorable to the

party opposing dismissal. Id. at 247, 250; Stroitelstvo Bulgaria

Ltd. v. Bulgarian‐Am. Enter. Fund, 589 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir.

2009).

We begin, therefore, by looking to the defendants to see if

they have met their burden of establishing that an alternative

forum is available and adequate. Fischer, 777 F.3d at 867. After

demonstrating that India offered an adequate forum, we

would go on to balance the interests by focusing on the (1)

relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) availability of

compulsory process and costs for attendance of witnesses; (3)

possibility of viewing the premises, if appropriate; and (4)

other practical issues, including the ease of enforcement of

any ultimate judgment. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. As we

will describe, however, we need not go on to balance the in‐

terests, because we conclude that the defendants have failed

to show there was an available and adequate forum available

elsewhere.  

B.

The district court concluded that there were “two possible

forums that satisfy this requirement” of an alternate available

forum—Canada and India. Deb v. SIRVA Inc., No. 1:13‐CV‐

01245‐TWP, 2014 WL 2573465, at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 6, 2014) (R.

55 at 5, Page ID 744). We begin first with the analysis of India

as an alternate forum. The defendants argued that India was

an appropriate forum because the Indian courts could exer‐

cise jurisdiction over Allied Lemuir, and “assuming, arguendo,

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10 No. 14‐2484

that Deb’s joint venture theory is correct, and SIRVA and [Al‐

lied Van Lines] were doing business in India as Allied Lemuir,

and, therefore, responsible for the joint venture’s actions, the

Indian courts would be able to exercise jurisdiction over

SIRVA and [Allied Van Lines].” Defendants’ brief at 19‐20.

It is worth stopping for a moment to unpack the defend‐

ants’ argument further. Recall that Deb contracted with Allied

Lemuir to move his belongings. The failed contract was with

Allied Lemuir. Deb never sued Allied Lemuir, but instead

sued two United States companies, the defendants here,

SIRVA and Allied Van Lines. As we just explained, in order

for a district court to dismiss this case for forum non conven‐

iens, the defendants have the burden of demonstrating that

an alternate forum is available—in other words, that Deb

could sue these defendants, SIRVA and Allied Van Lines, in

India. And the only way that Deb can sue SIRVA and Allied

Van Lines in India is if the defendants had something to do

with the wrongdoing that occurred in India—either that they

broke the contract and sold the goods (which we know they

did not do) or they have some legally sufficient affiliation

with Allied Lemuir that would allow the Indian courts to ex‐

ert jurisdiction over them.

Oddly, in order to support dismissal for forum non con‐

veniens then, the defendants end up trying to thread a small‐

eyed needle by claiming, on the one hand, that they could be

subject to jurisdiction in India, while simultaneously refusing

to acknowledge an actual legal affiliation with Allied Lemuir.

To do this, the brief on appeal dances around these issues by

making naked assertions such as, “the District Court also

properly found that the Indian courts would be able to exer‐

cise jurisdiction over SIRVA and [Allied Van Lines], even

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No. 14‐2484 11

without their consent,” or by trying to connect Allied Lemuir

with the defendants without really connecting them:

Here, as the District Court correctly found, the

Indian Courts may exercise jurisdiction over Al‐

lied Lemuir as a resident of India that con‐

ducted business in India. Further, as the District

Court determined, assuming arguendo, that

Deb’s joint venture theory is correct, and that

SIRVA and [Allied Van Lines] were doing busi‐

ness in India as Allied Lemuir, and, therefore,

responsible for the joint venture’s actions, the

Indian courts would be able to exercise jurisdic‐

tion over SIRVA and [Allied Van Lines] be‐

cause: (1) Allied Lemuir is an Indian corpora‐

tion and resident; and (2) SIRVA and [Allied

Van Lines] would have been doing business in

India and responsible for the joint venture’s ac‐

tions.

Defendants’ brief at 16, 19. All of these assertions depend on

the notion that SIRVA and Allied Van Lines were somehow

connected with Allied Lemuir. But it is the defendant’s bur‐

den to demonstrate that forum non conveniens is appropriate,

and the only evidence to support this contention comes from

the bald assertions in the plaintiff’s compliant that SIRVA and

Allied Van Lines were doing business in India as a joint ven‐

ture with Allied Lemuir.  

The plaintiff’s assertion, to which the defendants’ point to

support a dismissal, is that Allied Lemuir is a member of the

SIRVA Group and is part of a joint venture with SIRVA and

Allied Van Lines. (R. 27, pp. 2‐3, Page ID 285‐286) (Plaintiff’s

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
12 No. 14‐2484

Supp. App. B002‐B003). To support that assertion, Deb at‐

tached to the complaint some marketing materials that Allied

Lemuir posted on the internet boasting of its affiliation with

SIRVA and Allied Van Lines. Id. at Ex. C. Of course, at this

point, in the current posture of a motion to dismiss, the de‐

fendants’ affiliation with SIRVA and Allied Van Lines has

never been questioned, tested or explored. All we have is

some pages printed out from the internet in which a foreign

company with the word “Allied” in its name is asserting in

marketing material that it is reliable because it is affiliated

with two international companies, one of which also has the

name “Allied” in its name. The material has not been authen‐

ticated or verified, no court has ever made a determination

about any connection between Allied Lemuir and the defend‐

ants in this case, and the defendants have never admitted any

connection to Allied Lemuir. This is so because this case

comes before us on a motion to dismiss in which a court can‐

not determine the truth of factual assertions. When consider‐

ing a motion to dismiss, the district court ordinarily assumes

the truth of all well‐pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s com‐

plaint. Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir.

2015). But this rule is less absolute when considering a motion

to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(3) than under Rule

12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(3), which allows for dismissal for

improper venue, the district court assumes the truth of the al‐

legations in the plaintiff’s complaint, unless contradicted by

the defendant’s affidavits. 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1352 (2004). Rule

12(b)(3) is a somewhat unique context of dismissal in that a

court may look beyond the mere allegations of a complaint,

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No. 14‐2484 13

and need not view the allegations of the complaint as the ex‐

clusive basis for its decision. Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean

Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012).  

This Circuit has not had the opportunity to discuss the in‐

tricacies of the assumptions a court should make when a de‐

fendant contradicts the plaintiff’s bald assertion of venue in a

motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3),

but we have before concluded that, when considering a mo‐

tion to dismiss in general, a court may consider matters out‐

side of the pleadings to resolve factual questions pertaining

to jurisdiction, process, or indispensable parties. English v.

Cowell, 10 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1993). Moreover, other cir‐

cuits to have considered the question agree that it is appropri‐

ate for a district court to look outside the complaint, or partic‐

ularly at a defendant’s contradictory statements, when con‐

sidering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3). For exam‐

ple, the Second Circuit has noted:

If the defendant presents evidence that venue is

improper and the plaintiff responds with con‐

trary evidence, “it may be appropriate for the

district court to hold a Rule 12(b)(3) motion in

abeyance until the district court holds an evi‐

dentiary hearing on the disputed facts.” Mur‐

phy, 362 F.3d at 1139. ... “Alternatively, the dis‐

trict court may deny the Rule 12(b)(3) motion

while granting leave to refile it if further devel‐

opment of the record eliminates any genuine

factual issue.” Id.

Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir.

2012). And the Ninth Circuit has noted that when the outcome

of a 12(b)(3) motion might have a “dramatic effect on the

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
14 No. 14‐2484

plaintiff’s forum choice ... no disputed fact should be re‐

solved against that party until it has had an opportunity to be

heard.” Murphy v. Schneider Natʹl, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th

Cir. 2004); Pierce v. Shorty Smallʹs of Branson Inc., 137 F.3d 1190,

1192 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Plaintiff contends that in responding to

a motion to dismiss for improper venue, he was entitled to

rely upon the well pled facts of his complaint. This is true,

however, only to the extent that such facts are uncontroverted

by defendant’s affidavit.”); Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas Indus., Inc.,

896 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1990) (“When a complaint is dis‐

missed on the basis of improper venue without an evidentiary

hearing, the plaintiff must present only a prima facie showing

of venue. ... Further, [t]he facts as alleged in the complaint are

taken as true to the extent they are uncontroverted by defend‐

ants’ affidavits.”) (internal citations omitted).  

Ordinarily these cases speak of the ability of a court to

view evidence of the party moving to dismiss (the defendant)

in order to rebut the allegations of the non‐movant’s (the

plaintiff’s) complaint asserting facts supporting its chosen

venue. This case is unique in that, in an unusual course of

events, the defendants cite to the plaintiff’s bare allegation of a

joint venture in the complaint in order to support their con‐

tention that the case should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3).

But the general premise is the same. Where one party makes

a bald claim of venue and the other party contradicts it, a dis‐

trict court may look beyond the pleadings to determine

whether the chosen venue is appropriate.

It is worth noting that the plaintiff’s burden in defending

a motion to dismiss is low. Other than the exceptions dis‐

cussed, a court generally accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as

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No. 14‐2484 15

true for purposes of the motion to dismiss, as long as the com‐

plaint contains sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for

relief that is legally sound and plausible on its face. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The defendants’ burden in al‐

leging forum non conveniens, however, is heavy. Sinochem,

549 U.S. at 430. Defendants must submit evidence of an ade‐

quate and alternative forum. Combining the principles we

discussed above—that the district court may look beyond the

bare allegations of the complaint where the defendants dis‐

pute facts related to venue, and that defendants bear the

heavy burden of showing an alternate forum—we look to see

whether the district court placed the burden on the defend‐

ants to demonstrate that an alternate forum was available,

and whether the defendants met that burden. We conclude

that the district court did not hold the defendants to the bur‐

den, nor did the defendants meet it. To the contrary, to the

extent the defendants offered any evidence or argument at all,

it was evidence that they would not, in fact, be subject to ju‐

risdiction in India.  

Much of the language of the Defendants’ Memorandum in

Support of its Motion to Dismiss argues that they had nothing

to do with Allied Lemuir’s actions and thus could not be as‐

sociated with the Indian company. The defendants do not

even offer any evidence that they were doing business in In‐

dia. If, in fact, the defendants had nothing to do with Deb’s

loss and have no connection to Allied Lamuir, an Indian court

would have no business asserting jurisdiction over them. In

short, rather than supporting their burden of demonstrating

that there is an available and alternative forum in India, they

instead offer allegations that they would not be subject to ju‐

risdiction in India. For example, in their briefing below on the

motion to dismiss, the defendants state the following:

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16 No. 14‐2484

Deb’s assertion that Defendants had an agency,

joint venture, or any other kind of relationship

among themselves, with Allied Lemuir, or any‐

one else that could impute liability on Defend‐

ants for breach of contract or conversion is

equally unavailing. Deb has failed to offer any

evidence of a joint venture or even alleged an

association of two or more persons to carry out

a single business enterprise for profit.  

Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 10. (R. 30, p.10, Page ID

414). The memorandum is replete with similar allegations

which, if true, would seem to lead to the conclusion that a

court in India could not assert jurisdiction over the defend‐

ants. For example, the defendants state:

• “While Deb makes much ado about a self‐serving, unau‐

thenticated Allied Lemuir document (Amended Complaint

Ex. C) purporting to demonstrate that Allied Lemuir was cre‐

ated as a joint venture between Lemuir, [Allied Van Lines]

and several other Allied companies, merely calling a relation‐

ship a ‘joint venture’ does not mean that a joint venture ex‐

ists.” Id. (internal citation omitted);

• “Deb added allegations in an attempt to bolster his asser‐

tion that SIRVA and [Allied Van Lines] are liable to Deb for

the acts of Allied Lemuir as ‘joint venturers’ (which they are

not). Id. at 2, (R. 30, p.2, Page ID 406);

• “Defendants are Delaware Corporations that are not in

privity with Deb, and have never conducted any business

with him. Further, Deb has failed to establish any ‘joint ven‐

ture’ or agency relationship between or among Defendants

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
No. 14‐2484 17

and Allied Lemuir (and in particular, at the time of the ship‐

ment) or any reason to believe that Deb had transacted with

anyone otherthan Allied Lemuirto transport his belongings.”

Id.;  

• “Defendants have never conducted business or entered

into any agreements with Deb ... Instead Plaintiff’s dealings

in transporting his household belongings have been exclu‐

sively with Allied Lemuir, a legally separate entity.” Id. at 3, (R.

30, p.3, Page ID 407) (emphasis ours);  

• “Defendants are not liable to Deb under common agency

principles when Defendants never agreed to act as principal

creating any sort of agency relationship between Defendants

and Allied Lemuir as to this shipment.” Id. at 10, (R. 30, p.10,

Page ID 414);

• “Defendants cannot be held liable to Deb for Allied

Lemuir or anyone else’s actions under a joint venture, agency,

apparent authority, or any other theory, and Deb’s Amended

Complaint must be dismissed for his failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 12, (R. 30, p.12, Page

ID 416)

• Allied Lemuir, a separate and distinct Indian company,

not a party to this lawsuit, arranged with Deb to transport

Deb’s belongings from India to Canada. Id. at 15, (R. 30, p.15,

Page ID 419);

•   “Even assuming the veracity of these facts (which De‐

fendants dispute) Deb has failed to assert cognizable or viable

claims. There was no mistaking that Deb was dealing exclu‐

sively with Allied Lemuir for this shipment. Not one docu‐

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
18 No. 14‐2484

ment memorializing the transaction governing the transpor‐

tation of Deb’s personal belongings mentions SIRVA or

AVL.” Id. at 11, (R. 30, p.11, Page ID 415).

Having spent so much time asserting that they had no re‐

lationship with Allied Lemuir, it is no wonder that the de‐

fendants were left to make broad conclusory allegations about

India as an available forum. In its memorandum in support of

the motion to dismiss, under the section labeled “India is an

Available Forum” the defendants correctly note that the case

law requires that “all parties must be subject to the jurisdic‐

tion of the foreign court and amenable to process.” Id. at 20

(R. 30, p.2, Page ID 424). They then baldly assert that “India

meet[s] the requirements of an adequate alternative forum.”

Id. at 20. That is the whole of the defendants’ claim that India

is an available forum.3 They do not offer any evidence that

they would be subject to jurisdiction in India, but rather

simply conclude without reasoning, law, or concessions that

India is an adequate alternative. The defendants cannot have

it both ways. They cannot vehemently deny any connection

with the underlying actions giving rise to this litigation or any

connection to Allied Lemuir, and simultaneously assert that

the plaintiff could sue them in an Indian court. If there is an

                                                 

3 In their brief before this court, the defendants argue that Deb only chal‐

lenged the adequacy of India as a forum but not the availability. It was,

however, the defendants’ burden to meet in the first instance. Sinochem,

549 U.S. at 430. And in any event, Deb explicitly argued below and in his

brief on appeal that the “Defendants fail to provide evidence that they are

subject to jurisdiction in India.” Plaintiff’s Brief at 13, Plaintiff’s Response

in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 20 (Plaintiff’s Supp.

Appendix B060).

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
No. 14‐2484 19

independent basis on which an Indian court might assert ju‐

risdiction over the defendants, unconnected to the facts of this

case, the defendants have not noted it.

Without any evidence or a concession to the jurisdiction of

the Indian courts, whatever the burden defendants had to

show an adequate and alternative forum in India, there can

be no doubt that the defendants did not meet it. And their ap‐

pellate brief is no more illuminating. The defendants’ argu‐

ment on the adequacy of India as a forum in this court is

simply that “the District Court correctly determined that Can‐

ada and India were available alternative forums.” Defend‐

ants’ brief at 11‐12. And because the defendants have no evi‐

dence, they rely upon a 1978 case from the Second Circuit for

the proposition that the district court need “nothing more

than a belief” that the Indian courts would be able to exercise

jurisdiction. Defendants’ brief at 15 (citing Schertenlieb v.

Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1163 (2d Cir. 1978). The defendants de‐

duce this principle from language of the Schertenlieb case

which states “that a district court should not dismiss unless it

justifiably believes that the alternative forum will take jurisdic‐

tion, if the defendant consents.” Id. (emphasis ours). In addi‐

tion to being an almost 40 year old case from a different cir‐

cuit, the Schertenlieb case not only does not help the defend‐

ants, it undermines their argument entirely. To begin, the lan‐

guage of the case requires a “justifiable belief”—presumably

one supported by evidence. Id. We can assume this is so be‐

cause in Schertenleib, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower

court’s dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds based on

three strong factors that demonstrated that an alternate forum

was available: first, the court had expert testimony that the

defendant could be subject to jurisdiction in the foreign forum

if the defendant conceded to jurisdiction there; second, it had

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
20 No. 14‐2484

the defendant’s actual concession to jurisdiction in the foreign

forum; and third, the court also secured the defendant’s

agreement to waive the statute of limitations should the case

need to return to the district court in the United States. Id. at

1160, 1166. In this case, on the other hand, the defendants’

only argument is that the district court “properly found that

the Indian courts would be able to exercise jurisdiction over

SIRVA and AVL, even without their consent.” Defendants’

brief at 16. The defendants do not tell us why that finding was

proper, particularly when it was based on the district court’s

naked belief—without evidence, without expert testimony,

and without a concession to jurisdiction. Nothing in the

Schertenleib case stands for the proposition that a district

court’s unsupported belief that a defendant would be subject

to jurisdiction in a foreign court, without more, is enough to

grant a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. In fact,

the cases clearly refute the idea that a district court’s mere be‐

lief is enough and instead place in the hands of the defendant

the burden (and generally a heavy one) of demonstrating the

availability and adequacy of the foreign forum. Atl. Marine

Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568,

583 n.8 (2013); Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430; Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at

508; Fischer, 777 F.3d at 867; In re Hudson, 710 F.3d at 718; In re

Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation, 484 F.3d

at 956; U.S.O. Corp. v. Mizuho Holding Co., 547 F.3d 749, 749–

50 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Ford Motor Co., Bridgestone/Firestone N.

Am. Tire, LLC, 344 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2003).  

The defendants also argue that the district court was not

required to condition the dismissal of Deb’s complaint on the

defendants’ concession to jurisdiction in India. Defendant’s

brief at 16‐17 (citing Leetsch v. Freedman, 260 F.3d 1100, 1104

(9th Cir. 2001)). This may be so, but a concession is merely one

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
No. 14‐2484 21

form of evidence that a defendant can present to meet her bur‐

den of demonstrating that a foreign jurisdiction will be avail‐

able and adequate. This is precisely what the Leetsch court ex‐

plains: there is no “inflexible test requiring conditional dis‐

missal” but rather, “a district court can be required to impose

conditions if there is a justifiable reason to doubt that a party

will cooperate with the foreign forum.” Leetsch, 260 F.3d at

1104. The defendants’ many arguments disavowing any con‐

nection to Allied Lemuir and the events giving rise to this lit‐

igation give this court more than fair pause about whether

they will cooperate with the Indian forum. The defendants in

this case have not consented to jurisdiction in India and have

offered not one shred of evidence that they would be subject

to jurisdiction in India.  

In contrast to the matter before us, in the cases in which

one party successfully moved to dismiss a case for forum non

conveniens, that party presented evidence of an available and

adequate alternate forum or made a concession that it would

accept service and jurisdiction there in order to guarantee

availability of the alternate forum. For example, in Fischer, the

district court had before it a list of the available remedies,

plaintiffs’ concerns with bringing suit in the foreign forum,

and expert testimony from both sides as to whetherthose con‐

cerns were enough to render the forum inadequate. Fischer,

777 F.3d at 867. In the blood products litigation, the court

heard expert testimony from experienced British lawyers,

some of whom supported the plaintiffs and others who sup‐

ported the drug companies, and eventually accepted the de‐

fendants’ claim of an available alternative forum, but only af‐

terthe defendants agreed to accept service in the United King‐

dom. In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litig., 484

F.3d at 956‐57. And in Kamel, 108 F.3d at 803, the defendant

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
22 No. 14‐2484

expressly consented to Saudi Arabia’s jurisdiction and then

submitted the affidavit of an expert in Saudi Arabian law to

assure the court that Saudi law would recognize the defend‐

ant’s consent to jurisdiction or have jurisdiction even without

consent. Id. Once again we note that the defendants here of‐

fered no evidence, no experts, and no concession. The district

court abused its discretion by finding that the Indian courts

“should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants”

without placing the burden on the defendants to demonstrate

that this was so. See Deb, 2015 WL 2372465, at *3 (R. 55 at 6,

Page ID 745).

To the extent that the defendant offers any information in

support of its burden, it is the generalized conclusion that in

other cases, involving other facts and other parties, courts

have determined that India is an adequate forum. Memoran‐

dum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint at 21 (R. 30, p.21, Page ID 425). The de‐

fendants cite cases to argue that India’s legal system, like ours,

was inherited from the British, and that its remedies for

breach of contract and conversion are similar to ours. Id. Such

generalized information does not meet the burden that the de‐

fendants must satisfy to demonstrate that Deb realistically

could sue SIRVA and Allied Van Lines in India.

The defendants’ newly introduced references to Indian

law fail for the same reason. In this court, the defendants have

attached documents purporting to be from the Indian Code of

Civil Procedure and case law from a jurisdiction in India.

These documents are not in the record and were never pre‐

sented to the district court. A party appealing a Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal may elaborate on his factual allegations so long as

the new elaborations are consistent with the pleadings,

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
No. 14‐2484 23

Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745, n.1 (7th Cir. 2012),

and we assume that the same would be true for a Rule 12(b)(3)

dismissal. But SIRVA and Allied are not the parties opposing

dismissal here. They had their shot at bearing the burden of

demonstrating that the United States was an inconvenient fo‐

rum. The question we face in this appeal is whether the dis‐

trict court properly dismissed this case under the doctrine of

forum non conveniens without holding the defendants to

their burden of demonstrating that there was an available and

adequate remedy elsewhere. It did not.

Deb argues in his reply brief that the new documents do

not even address the power of the Indian courts to exercise

personal jurisdiction. We do not know what they do or do not

assert. The relevant point is that they were not made part of

the record below and have never been authenticated nor sub‐

ject to an adversarial process in which the parties had an op‐

portunity to argue about their meaning and import.

We can conclude that the district court failed to hold the

defendants to any burden—whether heavy or not—of

demonstrating that there is an alternate available and ade‐

quate forum for this litigation.

C.

The district court also ostensibly based its forum non con‐

veniens dismissal on the basis that Canada offered a second

possible forum. Its only discussion of the matter, however,

was to say:

In this case, there are two possible forums that

satisfy this requirement. Mr. Deb has already

filed a claim in the Canadian courts arising out

of the same course of conduct that gave rise to

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
24 No. 14‐2484

the instant case, and he does not argue that the

Canadian court forum is somehow improper.

Deb, 2014 WL 2573465, at *3 (R. 55, p.5, Page ID 744).  

The parties never briefed the issue of the Canadian court

as an alternative forum, however. The discussion about Can‐

ada in the briefing below centered on whether the United

States courts ought to abstain from hearing this matter under

the Colorado River doctrine. See Colo. River Water Conservation

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).4 That doctrine

allows courts to conserve judicial resources by abstaining

from accepting jurisdiction when there is a parallel proceed‐

ing elsewhere. Id. It has sometimes been applied when iden‐

tical concurrent litigation is, as in this case, pending abroad.

See U.S.O. Corp., 547 F.3d at 750. Abstention under the Colo‐

rado River doctrine may only be used in “exceptional” circum‐

stances if it would promote “wise judicial administration.”

Freed v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 756 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th

Cir. 2014).

The determinations under the Colorado River doctrine for

abstention are not the same as those made when deciding

whether a case should be dismissed for forum non conven‐

iens. Our decision in Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d

483, 498‐99 (7th Cir. 2011) provides a concise description of

                                                 

4 In their Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the defendants merely state that Canada

would also be an appropriate alternate forum for the reasons indicated in

their argument about Colorado River abstention. But such undeveloped ar‐

guments are waived. Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d 285, 295

(7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1685 (2016).

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
No. 14‐2484 25

the process for determining whether Colorado River abstention

is appropriate:

First, the court must determine whetherthe con‐

current state and federal actions are actually

parallel. If so, the court must consider second

whether exceptional circumstances justify ab‐

stention. ... Two suits are parallel for Colorado

River purposes when substantially the same

parties are contemporaneously litigating sub‐

stantially the same issues. Precisely formal sym‐

metry is unnecessary. A court should examine

whether the suits involve the same parties, arise

out of the same facts, and raise similar factual

and legal issues. In essence, the question is

whether there is a substantial likelihood that the

[foreign] litigation will dispose of all claims pre‐

sented in the federal case. Any doubt regarding

the parallel nature of the [state] suit should be

resolved in favor of exercising jurisdiction.  

Id.

The district court did not engage in a Colorado River ab‐

stention analysis. Nor did it ever engage in a forum non con‐

veniens analysis about Canada similar to the one we de‐

scribed above for India. Other than its first assertion that Can‐

ada was a possible forum, all of its discussion pertained to In‐

dia as a forum. It is true that Deb sued Allied Canada in a

Canadian court, but again, we have no idea whether Allied

Canada has any connection to the defendants in this case, let

alone whether they are “substantially the same party” (see Ad‐

kins, 644 F.3d at 498) and the defendants did not offer any ev‐

idence that they would be subject to jurisdiction in Canada.  

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26
26 No. 14‐2484

In sum, although it is within a district court’s sound dis‐

cretion to dismiss a suit for forum non conveniens (Piper Air‐

craft, 454 U.S. at 257), it can only do so after placing the burden

on the defendant to demonstrate availability and adequacy of

an alternative forum. The district court erred by failing to

properly place the burden. It may be that after conducting a

proper look into the adequacy of the forum along with a bal‐

ancing of the interests, the court may determine that a dismis‐

sal for forum non conveniens is indeed appropriate. Based on

the bare claims before the district court, however, such a de‐

termination was in error. The defendants may refile their mo‐

tion in an attempt to meet their burden. For that reason we

VACATE the decision of the district court and REMAND for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Case: 14-2484 Document: 41 Filed: 08/11/2016 Pages: 26