Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00435/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00435-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Benjamin Patrick Holden, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 09-435-TUC-DCB (JM) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Benjamin Patrick Holden’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance 

with the Local Rule – Civil 72, Rules of Practice of the United States District Court 

for the District of Arizona, and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the 

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of 

the record, dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

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I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 After a jury trial in the Pima County Superior Court, Holden was convicted on 

July 21, 2003, for the first degree murder of Daniel Tilley. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals described the underlying facts as follows: 

On July 29, 2002, the victim, T., arrived uninvited at the home of L., an 

acquaintance. A group of people, including Holden, were gathered at 

L.’s home. T., who was both intoxicated and confrontational, entered 

L.’s bedroom, where L. was in bed with an injured leg. L. and his 

girlfriend, K., repeatedly asked T. to leave L.’s home, but T. refused. 

 As the argument between L. and T. escalated, L. and K. 

summoned Holden to the bedroom to “get [T.] out of [there].” Holden 

asked T. to leave the home but T. refused and advanced upon him, 

holding a ceramic cow’s head and large conch shells. Holden 

brandished a handgun and ordered T. several times to leave the home, 

threatening to shoot him if he did not comply. T. refused and Holden 

shot him in the head, killing him. 

 Holden was arrested approximately one week later, and a grand 

jury indicted him for first degree murder. The jury rejected Holden’s 

alternative theories of self-defense and accident and found him guilty 

as charged. The trial court sentenced Holden to life in prison. 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 2. 

 On direct appeal, Holden raised three claims. He argued that his right to a fair 

trial was violated when the trial court allowed into evidence a statement Holden 

made to the victim, “ask Walter what it feels like to die.” Answer, Ex. B, p. 6. He 

also argued that he was entitled to jury instructions regarding intent and based on 

self-defense, defense of premises, defense of third parties, id., pp. 13-21, and that his 

motion for a mistrial should have been granted based on prosecutorial misconduct, 

id., pp. 21-29. The Court of Appeals found that none of Holden’s contentions 

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merited relief and affirmed the conviction. Id., Ex. A, pp. 1-2. Holden, raising the 

same arguments, petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review. Id., Ex. C. The 

Supreme Court denied review. Id., Ex. D. 

 In his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), Holden alleged a number of 

claims based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, and 

several claims related to alleged error during trial: 

1. Ineffective assistance of his trial counsel who failed to consult 

and present experts in support of Holden’s defense that he did not 

intend to pull the trigger and to corroborate Holden’s version of events 

through bloodstain pattern analysis; 

2. Holden was entitled to crime prevention and unintentional use 

of force jury instructions and his appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise the instruction claims in Holden’s direct appeal; 

3. Newly-discovered evidence supporting Holden’s version of 

events required a new trial; 

4. Prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the State elicited false 

testimony about the bloodstain evidence; 

5. Holden’s trial counsel was ineffective because he requested an 

incorrect and confusing self-defense instruction; 

6. Holden’s due process rights were violated because the jury 

reviewed portions of his statement that were supposed to be redacted; 

7. Holden’s counsel did not seek to have other prejudicial portions 

of Holden’s statement redacted; 

8. Holden’s trial counsel did not make it clear that it was Holden’s 

decision whether to testify; 

9. Holden’s trial counsel failed to present evidence of the victim’s 

reputation for violence; 

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10. Holden’s trial counsel failed to adequately argue for a Willits

jury instruction based on the police moving evidence at the scene, and 

appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal the trial court’s refusal of 

such an instruction; 

11. That he was entitled to a new trial because a juror did not 

disclose his law enforcement associations during voir dire; 

12. Fundamental error occurred because the jury was not properly 

instructed on the affirmative defense unanimity requirement; 

13. Holden was entitled to addition credit on his sentence under 

A.R.S. § 13-709(B); and 

14. That the cumulative effect of the errors required a new trial. 

Answer, Ex. E. The trial court denied review without analysis. Id., Ex. F. 

 Holden raised the same claims in his Petition for Review of the denial of his 

PCR claims. Id., Ex. G. The Court of appeals, in a 29-page Memorandum Decision, 

analyzed each of Holden’s claims and concluded that the trial court had indeed 

miscalculated his sentence and that questions remained about his trial counsel’s 

advice as to whether Holden should testify at trial. Id., Ex. H. The appeals court 

corrected Holden’s sentence and remanded the case to the trial court “for an 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether Holden has established his counsel was 

ineffective for depriving him of his right to testify.” Id., p. 29. 

 Holden then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, where he presented 

the following issues: 

A. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that Holden was not 

prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to investigate or present expert 

testimony on the unintentional trigger-pull phenomenon and bloodstain 

analysis, which deprived Holden of his right to present his defense to a 

jury? 

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B. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that Holden was not 

entitled to a crime prevention instruction, which similarly deprived 

Holden of his rights? 

C. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that Holden was not 

prejudiced by the submission to the jury of a tape containing 

inadmissible and highly prejudicial material that was not redacted as 

ordered by the trial court? 

Answer, Ex. I, p. 1. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review, id., Exs. J & K, and 

the Court of Appeals issued its mandate on August 7, 2008, id., Ex. K. 

 The matter was then returned to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on 

the issue of whether Holden’s counsel had denied him his right to testify. Answer, 

Ex. O. The trial court held the evidentiary hearing on November 25, 2008, and on 

December 30, 2008, issued its ruling denying the claim. Id., Ex. P. Holden did not 

appeal the ruling. 

 In the Petition now before the Court, Holden raises four claims for relief: 

1. Holden’s conviction and sentence violated the Sixth 

Amendment because trial counsel was ineffective based on his failure 

to consult and present the necessary experts. 

2. The erroneous denial of Holden’s request for a crime prevention 

jury instruction violated due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

3. The State’s submission of an unredacted tape to the jury and 

trial counsel’s failure to investigate the tape constituted prosecutorial 

misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

4. The improper comments made by the prosecutor violated 

Holden’s due process rights. 

Petition, pp. 14-28. 

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II. TIMELINESS UNDER AEDPA 

Respondents assert that the Petition, which was filed on August 7, 2009, is 

untimely because Holden had one year from July 9, 2008, the date on which the 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review of Holden’s PCR petition. Answer, p. 7. 

However, this argument ignores that the Arizona Court of Appeals had partially 

granted relief and remanded the case for a hearing on Holden’s claim that he was 

denied the right to testify. Answer, Ex. H, pp. 22-23. After remand, the trial court 

denied the claim in a ruling dated December 30, 2008. Id., Ex. P. Although he 

ultimately did not do so, Holden thereafter had 30-days to appeal the denial. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). Holden filed the instant Petition on August 7, 2009, which is 

well within the one-year limitation period provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

III. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 

A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion 

occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing that a claim has been 

procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been 

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“fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories 

on which the claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. 

Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). The operative facts must be presented in 

the appropriate context to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation 

requirement is not satisfied, for example, when a claim is presented in state court in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered in the absence of special 

circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. An exact correlation of the claims in both 

state and federal court is not required. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. However, the 

substance of the federal claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts. 

Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). 

 A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court 

found his claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims 

in any forum, that no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 

693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1982). “To exhaust one's state court remedies in 

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack 

his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen 

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.1994), and then present his claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir.1999). 

The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that claims not presented to 

the state courts on direct review or through collateral review are generally barred 

from federal habeas review because an attempt to return to state court to present the 

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claims would be futile in most cases. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h); 32.2(a); 

32.4(a); and 32.9(c). Because these rules are consistently and regularly followed and 

are independent of federal law, their application will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of that claim in federal court. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 

(2002). A petitioner can avoid the bar on review of defaulted claims only where he 

can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or where he can establish 

cause for his noncompliance and the actual prejudice that results. Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). 

A. Ground 2: Failure to Instruct Jury on Crime Prevention

 Respondents contend that Holden is in procedural default of the portion of 

Ground 2 where he alleges that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment 

right to due process by failing to give his requested crime prevention instruction. 

Specifically, Respondents argue that Holden did not raise a due process argument in 

his original PCR petition or in his petition for review. Answer, p. 12. 

 Citing federal authority, including the Fourteenth Amendment, Holden argues 

in his PCR petition that the crime prevention instruction was required and asserts that 

“[f]ailure to instruct on a defendant’s theory of the case where there is evidence to 

support the instruction violated the Due Process clause and the Sixth Amendment and 

is reversible per se as it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” Answer, Ex. E, p. 13. 

The argument was reiterated on appeal. Id., Ex. G, pp. 13. As such, this claim was 

fairly presented and exhausted. 

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B. Ground 3: Prosecutorial Misconduct Unredacted Statement 

Respondents also contend Holden failed to raise a portion of Ground 3 in state 

court proceedings. Holden contends that the submission of the unredacted tape to the 

jury constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Petition, p. 23. A review of Holden’s 

opening brief to the court of appeals in his direct appeal shows that he did argue 

prosecutorial misconduct, but he makes no mention of the unredacted statements. 

Answer, Ex. E. Holden does raise the claim in his PCR in the context of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, but not as one of prosecutorial misconduct. In fact, claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct are precluded from consideration in Arizona postconviction proceedings under Rule 32.2(a)(3), Ariz.R.Crim.P., because they could 

have been raised on appeal but were not. This claim was not raised in the state courts 

as a claim for prosecutorial misconduct and it is therefore not properly exhausted. 

C. Ground 4: Prosecutorial Misconduct for Improper Comments 

 Respondents next contention is that Holden did not exhaust his claim that 

improper comments made by the prosecutor in his closing argument amounted to 

misconduct and violated Petitioner’s right to due process. Answer, p. 13. They 

contend that while the claim was raised by Holden on direct appeal, it was never 

asserted as a due process violation. Id. 

 Turning again to the brief on appeal, Holden extensively argued several 

instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Answer, Ex. B, pp. 21-29. But, as 

Respondents assert, a claim is “fairly presented” to the state court only when a 

petitioner has described the operative facts and the federal legal theory upon which 

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the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-78(“[W]e have required a state 

prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal 

courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts where a petitioner has 

“alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim under the United 

States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.2000) 

(quotations omitted). The prosecutorial misconduct claims raised by Holden in the 

state court were based entirely on state law and no mention was made of federal law. 

Because Holden failed to alert the state court of the federal basis for the claim, it is 

unexhausted. 

 D. Procedural Default

 The portion of Ground 3 discussed above and all of Ground 4 is procedurally 

defaulted. Under the Arizona criminal rules, claims not previously presented to the 

state courts either on direct review or in post-conviction proceedings are generally 

barred from federal review because it would be futile to attempt to return to state 

court to present them unless they fit into one of the limited exceptions. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) (preclusion), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition must be filed 

within 30 days of trial court decision). Holden does not argue that his claims fit any 

of the exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). 

 In circumstances of procedural default, a federal court may only hear a claim 

where the petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a 

result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider 

the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

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750. Holden offers neither cause for the default nor argument that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice will result should the claims not be considered. Additionally, 

neither is apparent to the Court based on the record presented. These claims are 

unexhausted, procedurally defaulted and, therefore, not subject to review by the 

Court. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir.2000). 

 In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to federal law, the 

court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state court and the basis of the 

state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir.2002). A state 

court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal law either (1) if it 

correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a new set of facts in 

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a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails to extend a clearly 

established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

V. LEGAL DISCUSSION

 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Each of Holden’s remaining claims alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The operative legal standard applicable to these claims is a familiar one, addressed by 

the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

The standards enunciated there by the Court are applied unless there is other 

Supreme Court precedent directly on point. See Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S.Ct. 743, 

746 (2008). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show both deficient performance 

and prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation was ineffective. 466 

U.S. at 687. In the context of habeas claims evaluated under § 2254(d)(1) standards, 

the question “is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination 

was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable– a substantially 

higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). 

 1. Ground 1: Lack of Expert Testimony 

 In Ground 1, Holden contends trial counsel was ineffective because he failed 

to investigate and present an explanation of the unintentional trigger pull 

phenomenon and bloodstain evidence in support of his defenses. The Arizona Court 

of Appeals offered the last reasoned decision on these claims in its Memorandum 

Decision addressing Holden’s PCR petition. Answer, Ex. A., pp. 4-10. Holden has 

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not shown the appeals court’s application of Strickland to these claims to be 

unreasonable. 

 In his PCR proceedings, Holden offered the opinion of Dr. Roger Enoka, a 

human movement consultant, to support the claim that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to present expert testimony that unintentional trigger-pull phenomenon led to 

Holden shooting Tilley. Dr. Enoka opined that “conditions at the time the weapon 

was discharged . . . [were] consistent with those shown to precipitate . . . the 

unintentional discharge of a firearm.” Petition, p. 16. The opinion focused on the 

high level of tension in the room, the movement of Tilley toward Holden, the 

proximity of Tilley to the gun, the backward step by Holden away from Tilley, and 

the physical constraints created by an object on the floor and the step between the 

rooms. Id. 

 Rejecting Holden’s claim in his PCR proceedings, the Court of Appeals 

addressed only the prejudice prong of Strickland. The court reasoned that Dr. Enoka 

“would not conclude with certainty the evidence showed the discharge had been 

accidental but simply concluded the circumstances surrounding the shooting ‘could 

have caused Mr. Holden to hold the gun more firmly and thereby unintentionally pull 

[] the trigger.’” Answer, Ex. H, p. 9. The court then added that: 

Many of the circumstances on which [Dr. Enoka] based that conclusion 

were taken from Holden’s version of events- a version that was 

discredited on many points by the testimony of other witnesses. In 

addition, had the jury believed Holden’s version of the events, the jury 

could have drawn many of the same inferences as Enoka without the 

benefit of his expert testimony. See Gorney v. Meaney, 214 Ariz. 226, 

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¶ 15, 150 P.3d 799, 804 (App.2007) (expert testimony inappropriate 

when jury can determine issue without it). 

 Thus, although Enoka’s testimony would have provided a 

scientific explanation for Holden’s theory that he had accidentally 

pulled the trigger, it would not have been enough to change the 

outcome of this case, given evidence that strongly contradicted 

Holden’s assertion that the gun had discharged accidentally. Holden 

discharged the gun within three inches of Danny’s head, he did so after 

repeatedly threatening to kill Danny, and none of the three 

eyewitnesses to the shooting corroborated that Danny aggressively 

lunged at Holden. Therefore, although the testimony most likely would 

have been relevant and admissible, Holden did not suffer prejudice by 

its absence and the trial court did not err by dismissing the claim. 

Answer, Ex. H, pp. 9-10. 

 Holden contends that Dr. Enoka’s opinion would have countered the 

testimony of Detective Amado that a close-range wound could not have resulted from 

an unintentional firing. He also asserts that Dr. Enoka’s testimony would have 

educated the jurors about unintentional firings and the failure to present such 

evidence prejudiced him at trial. Petition, p. 17. The problem with Holden’s 

argument is that it ignores substantial elements of the Court of Appeals’ rationale. 

He does not dispute that he repeatedly threatened to kill Danny and he offers nothing 

to undermine the appellate court’s finding that “none of the three eyewitnesses to the 

shooting corroborated that Danny aggressively lunged at Holden.” In fact, Dr. 

Enoka’s opinion confirms that neither witness whose testimony he was provided was 

able to see what happened at the time the weapon was discharged. Answer, Exhibit I, 

App. 1, p. 3. Holden also ignores Dr. Enoka’s statement that there was not “enough 

evidence to state with certainty that the discharge was unintentional.” Id. Under 28 

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U.S.C. § 2254(d), it is Holden’s burden to show that the state court’s opinion was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. Without addressing this evidence, and given the 

deferential standard of review, the state court’s factual determination supporting its 

finding that Holden suffered no prejudice cannot be characterized as unreasonable. 

 Holden also contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert 

analysis of the bloodstain evidence at the crime scene. Holden’s expert, Tom Bevel, 

opined that the bloodstain evidence corroborates Holden’s description of Tilley’s 

position when the gun was discharged. Specifically, Holden asserts that the Court of 

Appeals improperly discounted the significance of Bevel’s conclusion that Tilley 

could have remained upright for a few moments after being shot because such 

evidence “supports an inference that Tilley could have moved backward after being 

shot, which increased the likelihood that a jury would accept Holden’s claim that 

Tilley had moved close to him just before the discharge.” Petition, p. 18. 

 The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that Holden’s counsel was 

ineffective on this point, finding that: 

Bevel’s opinion does not substantially conflict with the state’s theory, 

which Holden has inaccurately characterized. Specifically, Holden 

contends that state argued that Danny ‘was backed in the corner of the 

bed’ when he was shot- a proposition Bevel would have contradicted. 

In fact, the state only claimed Danny’s head was ‘backed in the corner 

of that bed’ when he was found dead. In making this statement, the 

state relied on photographs that showed a large pool of blood where 

Danny’s head had rested after he was shot. The state did not attempt to 

pinpoint exactly where Danny had been standing when he was shot but 

did argue Danny could not have fallen back by the corner of the bed if 

he had been standing in the doorway, as Holden claimed. 

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Answer, Ex. H, p. 6. Rather than asserting the unreasonableness of the Court of 

Appeals’ decision, Holden merely reiterates the assertions he made before the Court 

of Appeals. He argues that Bevel’s opinion “contradicts one of the State’s key points 

in Closing Argument (that Tilley was standing by the corner of the bed) and supports 

Holden’s claim that Tilley moved close to him just before the gun fired.” Petition, p. 

19. However, the Court of Appeals addressed this claim by noting that the State did 

not attempt to pinpoint Tilley’s location when he was shot and simply argued that, 

based on where his head came to rest, he could not have been standing in the 

doorway. Answer, Ex. H, p. 6. Nothing Holden offers calls into doubt the 

reasonableness of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. 

 Holden next asserts that his claim of self-defense would have been bolstered 

if his trial counsel had presented to the jury Bevel’s opinion that Tilley’s arm was 

raised when he was shot. Petition, p. 19. Rejecting this claim, and finding that 

Holden was not prejudiced by the omission of Bevel’s testimony at trial, the Court of 

Appeals stated: 

 But Bevel never stated that such evidence supports Holden’s 

contention that Danny had been reaching for the gun. Rather, Bevel 

opines that the bloodstains are consistent with Danny’s hand having 

been up by his head or face, rather than Danny reaching out in front of 

him. 

Answer, Ex. H, p. 7. Holden points out that, given Danny Tilley was shot from no 

more than three inches away from his head, Bevel’s opinion is consistent with 

Holden’s claim that Tilley was reaching for the gun when it was fired. However, 

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reviewing Bevel’s statement establishes that he was not requested to offer an opinion 

on that issue. Answer, Exhibit I, App. 2. The only mention of this issue appears 

when Bevel is asked and confirms that “it is true that Benjamin Holden asserted that 

he was backing out the bedroom doorway when Tilley lunged at him and the gun 

discharged?” Id., p. 11. Bevel never adopts Holden’s assertion as his own opinion. 

As it stands, Bevel’s opinion about the location of Tilley’s hands when he was shot is 

consistent with a defensive reaction to the gun. When the ambivalence of this 

evidence is coupled with the Court of Appeals’ unchallenged conclusion that, “none 

of the three eyewitnesses to the shooting corroborated that Danny aggressively 

lunged at Holden,” Answer, Ex. H, pp. 9-10, the rejection of this claim by the state 

court cannot be rejected as unreasonable. 

 2. Ground 2: Failure to Instruct Jury on Crime Prevention 

 Holden next claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the trial court’s denial of his request for a crime prevention instruction. 

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th

Cir.1989). As there is no obligation to raise meritless claims on appeal, Pollard v. 

White, 119 F.3d 1430, 1435 (9th Cir.1997), a petitioner must show that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he probably would have prevailed on appeal, id. at 1434 n. 9. 

 Although the claim was not raised on direct appeal, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals addressed the substantive question of whether the trial court should have 

included the crime prevention instruction at trial within the context of Holden’s postCase 4:09-cv-00435-DCB Document 10 Filed 06/28/12 Page 17 of 25
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conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that 

Holden was not entitled to the instruction because there was no evidence to support 

the instruction: 

there was no evidence Danny was threatening anyone with a deadly 

weapon or dangerous instrument at the time Holden entered the 

bedroom in an effort to make Danny leave. And even assuming the 

cow’s head or conch shells could be considered dangerous instruments, 

the record is clear Holden continued to point the gun at Danny well 

after Danny had put any such items down. 

Answer, Ex. H, p. 13. 

 “Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and 

convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the 

merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on 

factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in 

the state court proceedings, § 2254(d)(2).” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 

(2003). Here, it is Holden’s burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

the state court’s determination that Danny Tilley was shot “well after” he put any 

such items down was objectively unreasonable. Holden dances around the factual 

findings of the state court but never offers anything convincing to undermine them. 

For example, he cites a witness who testified that Tilley had tried to hit Holden with 

the ceramic cow head, but admits this was before Holden had pulled out the gun. 

Petition, p. 22. He cites other testimony where a witness could not recall if Tilley 

had put down the shells, and offers that, “If Tilley still had the giant, heavy shells . . . 

he could have hurled them and injured anyone there.” Id. (italics added). A state 

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court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it would 

not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Jefferies v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 

(9th Cir.1997). Holden’s factual assertions do not establish that the state court’s 

findings are “clearly incorrect.” At best, he has offered points which might merit 

some debate; however, that the factual findings are debatable renders them 

reasonable under the standards of the AEDPA. Accordingly, Holden is not entitled 

to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

 3. Ground 3: Unredacted Tape

 The remaining claim involves an audio tape of Holden’s statement to police. 

The tape was supposed to be redacted to remove references to allegations that Holden 

had held a woman against her will several days after Tilley’s death because she owed 

him money. Petition, p. 23. The tape was apparently submitted unredacted to the 

jury for use during deliberations. Holden claims that this amounted to ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

 The Court of Appeals rejected this claim because Holden could not show he 

was prejudiced by the submission of the tape “because he had not shown any of the 

twelve jurors listened to the tape during their deliberations.” Answer, Ex. H, p. 27. 

In an attempt to overcome this finding, Holden relies on United States v. 

Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385 (D.C. Cir.1998), for the proposition that the court must 

presume the jurors listened to the tape and, therefore, “prejudice must be presumed 

and a new trial granted.” 

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 In Cunningham, the jury was inadvertently provided unredacted 911 calls and 

police radio transmissions that were not supposed to be admitted into evidence. In a 

post-trial meeting with prosecutors and defense counsel, several jurors mentioned 

that they had the unadmitted recording with them during deliberations. 145 F.3d at 

1390. After this discovery, the defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that his 

Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated because he could not 

cross-examine the individuals whose statements appeared on the tape. Id. at 1391. 

The trial court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed. In doing so, the 

court stated that, “absent any compelling evidence to the contrary,” it would be 

presumed that the jurors listened to the tape. Id. at 1395. 

 As a threshold matter, Cunningham, a decision from the District of Columbia 

Circuit, is not “clearly established federal law as determined by the United States 

Supreme Court” upon which habeas relief can be founded. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Additionally, Cunningham did not involve a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Rather, the petitioner there raised a stand-alone claim that the inadvertent 

submission of the unredacted 911 calls from several non-testifying individuals 

violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Cunningham, 145 F.3d at 

1394. Thus, the claim raised in Cunningham is quite unlike the ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim Holden raised in the state court and raises here. 

 Having concluded that the standards described in Cunningham are 

inapplicable to Holden’s claim, the Court must determine the applicable standard and 

whether that standard was reasonably applied by the state court. In relation to 

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ineffective assistance of counsel claims, United States Supreme Court authority does, 

under limited circumstances, provide the presumption of prejudice Holden seeks. In 

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Supreme Court held that prejudice 

could be presumed in an narrow range of ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

without inquiring into counsel's actual performance “if counsel entirely fails to 

subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Id 466 U.S. 648, 

659 (1984). In Cronic, the Court “identified three situations implicating the right to 

counsel that involved circumstances ‘so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost 

of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.’” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 

685, 695 (2002), (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–59)). The three exceptional 

situations identified in Chronic involve a complete denial of counsel, an entire failure 

of counsel to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, or 

situations in which no attorney could provide effective assistance. Cronic, 466 U.S. 

at 659-60. In these rare circumstances, a petitioner is spared “the need of showing 

probable effect upon the outcome, and have simply presumed such effect,” because 

“the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is 

unnecessary.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002); See also Roe v. Flores–

Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000) (In Cronic and other cases “we held that the 

complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of a judicial proceeding mandates a 

presumption of prejudice . . . .”). 

 Here, Holden does not argue that the representation provided by his counsel 

was so lacking that he is entitled to the presumption of prejudice described in Cronic. 

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Nor could he. Even a cursory review of the record establishes that his counsel was 

present and subjected the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Thus, 

even if the Court presumes, as the Arizona Court of Appeals did, that Holden’s 

counsel’s representation was deficient and fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, the cases nevertheless emphasize that 

mistake-free counsel is not guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, United States v. 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006). As such, Holden must establish 

prejudice under Strickland. 

 To establish prejudice, Holden must show that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Applying this 

standard, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that: 

 Holden submitted the affidavit of one of the jurors who said 

only that she could not remember whether the jury had listened to the 

tape but ‘may have done so.’ In addition, he submitted two affidavits 

by an investigator who said two other jurors told him they could not 

remember having listened to the tape and he could not find two of the 

jurors. 

Answer, Ex. H, p. 27 n. 8. Based on this evidence, which is identical to what he 

relies on in the instant petition, the Court of Appeals concluded that, “Holden cannot 

show he was prejudiced by the state’s failure to redact the final portion of the tape 

because he has not shown any of the twelve jurors listened to the tape during their 

deliberations.” Id., Ex. H, p. 27. 

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 As discussed above, the state court applied the correct legal standard to 

Holden’s ineffective assistance claim. As such, this Court can reject the Court of 

Appeals’ conclusion only if it determines that the standard was applied “in a way that 

is objectively unreasonable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 

1132 (9th Cir. 2002). Under this standard, even a strong case for relief will not 

necessarily render the state court’s decision unreasonable. Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 770, 776 (2011). To obtain relief, Holden must show that the 

state court’s ruling on this claim was “so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. 

 Holden, in urging a presumption of prejudice, largely avoided arguing 

prejudice. He does counter the state court’s finding of no prejudice noting that two 

jurors stated that they may have listened to the tape, another told his investigator a 

similar story, and that two jurors could not be located. Petition, p. 24. He also notes 

that both the prosecution and the defense urged the jurors to listen to the tape during 

deliberations and argues, as such, “it is virtually inconceivable that the jury did not 

do so.” Id. at 24-25. However, even accepting this latter assertion as fact, it does not 

foreclose fairminded disagreement on this claim. Even under Holden’s version of 

events, the unredacted statement made so little impact on the three jurors who 

admitted they might have listened to it, that they cannot be sure they did in fact listen 

to it. A fairminded argument could be made that if the unredacted portions of the 

statement had impacted their decision, they would have recalled having listened to it 

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and being impacted by what was said. This factor alone prevents this Court from 

concluding that the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. 

 As a result, Holden has not satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland

standard and “it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly 

established Federal law.’ ” Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). As such, under the terms of § 2254(d)(1), relief is 

unauthorized. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Holden’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 09-435-TUC-DCB. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 28th day of June, 2012. 

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