Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02592/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02592-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2592

LINDA REED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COLUMBIA ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 14-C-330 — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 17, 2015∗ — DECIDED MARCH 30, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, TINDER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Linda Reed sued Columbia 

St. Mary’s Hospital alleging that the hospital discriminated 

∗ The defendants were not served with process in the district court 

and are not participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s 

brief and the record, we have concluded that the case is appropriate for 

summary disposition. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

 

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2 No. 14–2592

against her on the basis of her disability during her stay 

there. She alleges violation of Title III of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (prohibiting disability discrimination in public accommodations), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (prohibiting disability discrimination by entities that receive federal funding). In this, her second federal suit based on these facts, the district court dismissed her claims for two reasons. First, it concluded that 

her claims were precluded by the dismissal of her earlier 

suit. Second, even if her claims were not precluded, the district court concluded that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act could offer her any remedy. We disagree on both 

grounds and therefore vacate the judgment of the district 

court and remand.

Reed alleged in her first complaint that she has tardive 

dyskinesia, a neurological disorder that causes involuntary 

facial and limb movements and makes speaking difficult. 

During an inpatient stay at the hospital in March 2012, Reed 

alleged, its staff ignored her requests, treated her poorly, refused to consult with her regarding her care, and physically 

injured her when she was forcibly discharged. Judge 

Stadtmueller, the judge assigned to that first case, ruled that 

the complaint did not contain “a short and plain statement” 

of the claim as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a)(2), dismissed it, and invited Reed to amend. She did so. 

The amended complaint repeated these factual allegations 

and alleged an unelaborated claim of “retaliation,” a violation of Title III of the ADA, and several state-law claims.

Upon review of the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2), Judge Stadtmueller dismissed the action “without prejudice.” He considered whether any of her claims asCase: 14-2592 Document: 23 Filed: 03/30/2015 Pages: 10
No. 14-2592 3

serted a violation of federal law, including the Rehabilitation 

Act and the retaliation provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203. But for each potential federal violation, the judge 

believed that Reed failed to state a claim for relief.

The judge then wrote that because Reed did not state a 

violation of federal law, the court lacked jurisdiction and had

to dismiss the case without prejudice:

Having dismissed all of Ms. Reed’s claims 

that could conceivably arise under federal law, 

the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Likewise, the Court 

lacks diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332. Therefore, lacking a basis for jurisdiction over the potentially-federal claims, the 

Court may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims under 

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

The Court, accordingly, lacks jurisdiction 

over this case entirely, and must dismiss it. The 

Court will do so without prejudice.

Reed v. Columbia St. Mary’s Hosp., No. 14-C-145-JPS, 2014 WL 

805919, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 28, 2014). The conclusion of the 

order repeated that “for the reasons discussed above, Ms. 

Reed’s federal claims . . . are hereby DISMISSED without 

prejudice” but added that the reason is “for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2).” Finally, the court reiterated that 

“those claims having been dismissed, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter and therefore, this matter be and the 

same is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.” Id. In a separate judgment entered the same day, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), 

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the court again stated that the dismissal was “without prejudice.”

Reed apparently took the dismissal “without prejudice” 

at face value. Less than a month later, she filed in the same 

court a new case that expanded on the allegations deemed 

insufficient in the first case. The new case was assigned to 

Judge Randa.

According to the complaint in this second case, the allegations of which we must accept as true, see Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011), Reed suffers from tardive dyskinesia plus post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar 

disorder, and acute anxiety. Because tardive dyskinesia 

makes speaking difficult, Reed uses a computer to communicate. Reed went to the hospital in March 2012 hoping to 

receive alternative treatment for her disorders instead of the 

psychotropic medications she was taking. On one occasion, 

when Reed asked that staff bring the computer to her, they 

refused to do so because of her disabilities. When she repeated her request, she alleges, the staff retaliated against 

her by grabbing her and throwing her into a “seclusion 

room.” Later, staff summoned Reed to a meeting with a doctor to discuss her discharge, where, still without her computer, she was unable to communicate. When the hospital 

discharged Reed, she asked to call her case manager, but 

hospital staff refused Reed’s request, again because of her 

disabilities. To retaliate further they allegedly had Reed escorted out of the hospital by security guards, who injured 

her in the process.

The complaint asserts claims of discrimination and retaliation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and it

seeks compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, 

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No. 14-2592 5

and a declaratory judgment under those two laws. Finally, 

the complaint alleges various constitutional violations 

against the hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Judge Randa dismissed Reed’s second case at screening, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), concluding that, because her first 

case had been dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, she was precluded from relying on the same facts to invoke the court’s jurisdiction in the current case. Alternatively, 

Judge Randa concluded that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act offered Reed the relief she sought. First, he 

stated that neither statute provided compensatory damages 

for claims of discrimination. Second, Judge Randa thought 

that retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act were not 

available because this case did not involve employment discrimination, and this court had not ruled whether the ADA 

offers a remedy for retaliation claims that are not based on 

employment. Third, he added, because she did not allege an 

ongoing violation, she did not sufficiently plead a claim for 

injunctive relief under either act. Finally, the judge concluded that Reed’s § 1983 claims failed because nothing in the 

complaint suggested that the hospital was acting under the 

color of state law.

Within 28 days of the dismissal, Reed moved the court to 

vacate the judgment and reinstate the case. She explained 

that she had thought Judge Stadtmueller’s order permitted 

her to file a new case and that her new complaint stated a 

claim. Judge Randa denied her motion without explanation. 

She then appealed the dismissal of her first suit, but later 

voluntarily dismissed that appeal after recognizing that she 

appealed that dismissal too late. She also filed this timely 

appeal from the dismissal of her second suit. Reed repeats 

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her arguments that the dismissal of the first suit did not preclude her second suit and that she adequately stated claims 

for relief.

We agree with Reed that both of Judge Randa’s reasons 

for dismissing her second case are incorrect. First, Judge 

Stadtmueller’s dismissal of Reed’s first case, professedly for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, does not preclude litigation of that issue in her second case because Judge Stadtmueller did not actually decide that issue. It is generally true 

that a dismissal said to be without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can, through the doctrine of issue 

preclusion, bar the invocation of a federal court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction in a second lawsuit based on the same 

facts. See Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146–47 (7th Cir. 2003); 

Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). But the 

issue of subject-matter litigation must have been “actually 

litigated” and decided in the first case. See Matrix IV, Inc. v. 

American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 649 F.3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 

2011). To determine whether an issue was truly litigated and 

decided, it is sometimes necessary to look beyond the judgment in an earlier action. See La Preferida, Inc. v. Cerveceria 

Modelo, S.A. de C.V., 914 F.2d 900, 907 (7th Cir. 1990). 

We can see from Judge Stadtmueller’s reasoning in the 

first case that he actually decided only that Reed failed to 

state a claim. He did not decide that her claims did not engage the court’s federal question subject-matter jurisdiction. 

True, he thought that as a consequence of Reed’s failure to 

state a federal claim, the court lacked jurisdiction. That was 

not correct. Failure to state a claim does not deprive a court 

of subject-matter jurisdiction unless the claim is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” which is a much more stringent 

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No. 14-2592 7

standard that is rarely satisfied. See McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 681 (7th Cir. 2014); Bovee v. Broom, 

732 F.3d 743, 744 (7th Cir. 2013); see generally Bell v. Hood, 

327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946). Nothing in the substance of Judge 

Stadtmueller’s order suggests that he deemed Reed’s potential federal claims to be so frivolous that they would fail even 

to invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction. He simply 

mischaracterized as jurisdictional the dismissal of Reed’s allegations for failure to state a claim.

When a court mischaracterizes its decision in that way, as 

happened in Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 

1172 (7th Cir. 2013), we can ignore the mischaracterization. 

Because the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction was not “actually litigated,” it was incorrect for Judge Randa to conclude that Reed was precluded from invoking the court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction in her second suit.

The problem here is that, in substance, Judge Stadtmueller decided that Reed’s complaint failed to state a claim. 

That sort of ruling is typically on the merits, see Paganis v. 

Blonstein, 3 F.3d 1067, 1071 (7th Cir. 1993), but the terms of 

his dismissal would not lead even a lawyer trained in federal 

jurisdiction to believe that if Reed did not file a timely appeal, she could not replead in federal court. The judge emphasized that the dismissal of Reed’s “claims” for failure to 

state a claim was without prejudice, which suggests that the 

faults of the complaint could be remedied with a new pleading. See Paul v. Marberry, 658 F.3d 702, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2011). 

The judge also wrote in the order that the “federal claims” 

were dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), a 

disposition that also can permit repleading. See id. at 705; 

E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 782 (7th 

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Cir. 2007). And to top it off, the judge repeated in both the 

conclusion of his order and the Rule 58 judgment that the 

court was dismissing “the matter” without prejudice.

We have emphasized that litigants may and should rely 

on the specific wording of a Rule 58 judgment to determine 

whether a judgment is final and appealable. See Hoskins v. 

Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763–64 (7th Cir. 2003), citing Furnace v. 

Bd. of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 218 F.3d 666, 669 

(7th Cir. 2000). Here, given the multiple signals in Judge 

Stadtmueller’s order and judgment that Reed could replead, 

we are hard-pressed to find any language that would lead a 

party (especially one acting pro se) to believe that the judgment in her first suit would prevent her from trying again 

and that her only route to pursue her claims was to appeal 

immediately. See Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 

1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting injustice that would occur if 

burden were placed on pro se plaintiff to understand that 

district court’s order “was final and therefore appealable 

even when the district court itself did not understand it as 

such”).

Because Reed’s second suit was not precluded, we turn to 

the merits of the allegations in the complaint. Here the result 

is mixed. We agree with Judge Randa that Reed failed to 

state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The hospital is a 

private entity, and nothing in the complaint suggests that it 

was acting under the color of state law. Judge Randa properly dismissed Reed’s claims under § 1983. See London v. RBS 

Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2010); Rodriguez v. 

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822–23 (7th Cir. 

2009).

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We also conclude, however, that Reed has stated viable 

claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and that it is 

premature to decide the types of relief that may be available 

to her (including injunctive relief) if she prevails on the merits.

Compensatory damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act, Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002), but 

may be available only for claims of intentional discrimination. See CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 

524, 528 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2014). Reed’s allegations that the hospital, with knowledge of her disability, purposely denied her 

access to the computer that helps her communicate, permit 

an inference of intentional discrimination sufficient to support a claim for compensatory damages. That claim is legally 

sufficient, at least at the pleading stage. Whether evidence 

will support Reed’s claim is a question for later in the case.

Second, Reed may also seek compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act for retaliation based on her allegation that the hospital threw her into a “seclusion room” 

when she asked for her computer. The Act does not limit retaliation claims to the employment context. Section 

794a(a)(2), which provides remedies for violations of the Rehabilitation Act outside of employment, expressly incorporates the “remedies, procedures, and rights” available under

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 

2000d–7. Those provisions include that law’s anti-retaliation 

provision. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e). Barker v. Riverside County 

Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 2009); Weber v. 

Cranston School Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2000). 

Other circuits have also recognized that the Rehabilitation 

Act provides for retaliation claims outside the employment 

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context. See, e.g., D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 

26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012); Mershon v. St. Louis Univ., 442 F.3d 1069, 

1074 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2006); Hoyt v. St. Mary’s Rehab. Ctr., 711 

F.2d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 1983).

In reaching the opposite conclusion about claims for retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, the district court cited 

29 U.S.C. § 794(d) and Dyrek v. Garvey, 334 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 

2003), but neither the statute nor the case supports the 

court’s conclusion. Section 794(d) provides only that complaints that allege discrimination or retaliation in the employment context will be analyzed according to the standards of Title I of the ADA and other provisions of the ADA 

(including the law’s prohibition against retaliation) as they 

relate to employment. In Dyrek we simply paraphrased this 

language of § 794(d). 344 F.3d at 597 n.3. Neither the statutory language nor our footnote implies that non-employment 

retaliation claims are prohibited, nor would either one lead 

us to split with our colleagues in other circuits on this issue.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment dismissing 

Reed’s suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is 

VACATED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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