Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-05095/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-05095-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY MILLS,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. MITCHELL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-05095-HSG 

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT; 

DENYING MOTION FOR REMAND

Dkt. Nos. 4, 11

INTRODUCTION

On September 2, 2016, the instant action was removed from the Marin County Superior 

Court by all defendants. Docket No. 1. Defendants have requested that the Court screen this 

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Docket No. 4. On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed 

an opposition to Defendants’ removal of the action, requesting that the Court remand this action to 

state court. Docket No. 11. Plaintiff is pro se, and pro se litigants are held to less stringent 

standards than are attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Jackson v. Carey, 

353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003). This Court will therefore liberally construe Plaintiff’s 

opposition as a motion to remand the instant case to state court. Defendants filed an opposition to 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Docket No. 12, and Plaintiff filed a reply, Docket No. 13. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Docket No. 11) and 

GRANTS Defendants’ request for screening (Docket No. 4). The Court screens the complaint in 

the order below. 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Remand

Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded because Defendants’ Notice of Removal, 

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filed on September 2, 2016, was untimely. Docket No. 11 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

were properly served with the summons and a copy of the complaint on June 30, 2016, in 

accordance with the requirements set forth in sections 415.30 and 416.50(a) of the California Code 

of Civil Procedure. Id. Defendants argue that removal was timely because Plaintiff’s initial 

attempt to serve the complaint on June 30, 2016 was defective, and Plaintiff did not properly serve 

the complaint until August 3, 2016. Docket No. 12 at 2. 

1. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed. On April 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint 

in Marin County Superior Court. Docket No. 11 at 1. On May 31, 2016, Plaintiff mailed the 

following documents to the SQSP Litigation Coordinator: a signed notice and acknowledgement 

of receipt addressed to defendant Van Blarcom, Docket No. 12-1 at 4; a summons executed by the 

Marin County Deputy Clerk and addressed to all defendants, id. at 5; an unexecuted summons 

addressed to all defendants, id. at 6; a file-stamped copy of the first page of the complaint 

indicating that the case was filed April 19, 2016 and assigned case number CIV 1601564, id. at 7; 

a notice of case management conference, id. at 8; an alternative dispute resolution informational 

notice, id. at 9–10; a civil case cover sheet, id. at 11–12; a copy of the complaint, id. at 13–46; and 

a declaration of service by mail, id. at 47. These documents were received by the SQSP Litigation 

Coordinator on June 30, 2016. Docket No. 11 at 5. In a letter dated July 11, 2016, the California 

Attorney General’s Office informed Plaintiff that service was improper under section 415.30(a) of 

the California Code of Civil Procedure, and returned all documents received to Plaintiff. Docket 

No. 12-1 at 49. In a response dated July 21, 2016, the SQSP Litigation Coordinator informed 

Plaintiff that his documents had been received on June 30, 2016, but “service was improper under 

Civil Code 415.30(a).” Docket No. 11 at 5. Plaintiff re-served the complaint on August 3, 2016. 

Docket No. 12 at 2. 

2. Analysis

Section 1446 of the United States Code, title 28, governs removal of civil actions from 

state courts. In relevant part, Section 1446 provides as follows: 

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[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the 

receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading 

setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 

30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then 

been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is 

shorter.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The words “or otherwise” do not dispense with the historic function of 

service of process as the official trigger for responsive action by a named defendant. “Receipt” of 

the complaint by any other means is not sufficient. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 

Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 354 (1999) (faxed file-stamped copy of complaint did not trigger removal 

period) (“one becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon 

service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party 

served must appear and defend”). Service of process in state court actions is governed by state 

law.

Section 415.30(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure allows for service by mail in 

the following manner:

A copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first-class mail or airmail, 

postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of the notice and 

acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return envelope, postage prepaid, 

addressed to the sender.

Cal. Civ. Proc. § 415.30(a). Section 415.30(e) of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides 

that service of a summons by mail “is deemed complete on the date a written acknowledgment of 

receipt of summons is executed, if such acknowledgment thereafter is returned to the sender.” 

Cal. Civ. Proc. § 415.30(e).

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants were properly served by mail on June 30, 2016 is 

contradicted by the record before the Court. The record indicates that Plaintiff failed to comply 

with section 415.30(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure in that he failed to include two 

copies of the acknowledgement of receipt form, and failed to include a self-addressed stamped 

envelope for return of the acknowledgment form. The Court notes that Plaintiff does not dispute 

that he served Defendants with only one copy of the acknowledgement of receipt form, that he 

failed to include a self-addressed stamped envelope for return of the acknowledgment form, and 

that he did not receive a written acknowledgment of receipt of summons with respect to the 

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documents received on June 30, 2016 by the SQSP Litigation Coordinator. The Court finds that 

Plaintiff did not serve Defendants on June 30, 2016 because he failed to comply with the service 

requirements set forth in section 415.30(a). See Thongnoppakun v. Am. Exp. Bank, No. 2:11-CV08063-ODW, 2012 WL 1044076, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (“Absent strict compliance with 

Rule 4(d) or section 415.30, service of a summons and complaint by mail does not constitute 

proper service on a defendant, even if that defendant has actual notice that a complaint has been 

filed against that defendant.”); Duran v. Macias-Price, No. 07CV01209AWISMS, 2007 WL 

4554390, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2007) (plaintiff failed to effect service when he mailed 

summons and complaint separately from two copies of a notice and acknowledgment of receipt 

form, and when he failed to mail postage prepaid return envelope addressed to sender; section 

415.30 requires that the summons, complaint, two copies of a notice and acknowledgment of 

receipt form, and return envelope be mailed together). Defendants were not served with the 

complaint until August 3, 2016. Defendants’ removal of this action on September 2, 2016 is 

therefore timely. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for remand.

B. Initial Screening

1. Standard

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or an employee of a governmental 

entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b) (1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

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than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

2. Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that SQSP prison officials retaliated against him for exercising his First 

Amendment rights. According to the complaint, on December 17, 2014, Correctional Officer S. 

Arana “illegally” removed Plaintiff from his assigned job position as lead yard attendant. Docket 

No. 1-1 at 7 and 15. On December 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Officer Arana 

regarding this incident, and Plaintiff was ultimately reinstated in his prior job position. Id. at 7 

and 15. Officer Arana took “adverse action” against Plaintiff in response to this grievance. Id. at 

7. On May 2, 2015, when Plaintiff returned to his job as lead yard attendant, Officer Arena gave 

Plaintiff’s job to another inmate and reassigned Plaintiff to sweeping and mopping stairs. Id. at 

15. Officer Arena told Plaintiff, “A job is a job get use (sic) to it!” Id. Officer Arena withheld 

Plaintiff’s May 2015 salary despite paying all other inmates. Id. at 5. In June 2015, Officer Arena 

instructed Plaintiff to pack his belongings and move to another cell, stating that Lieutenant Walls 

wanted the cell for inmate Rankins. Id. at 15. When Plaintiff suggested that inmate Rankins be 

housed with Plaintiff, Officer Arena told Plaintiff that if Plaintiff did not comply with the move, 

Plaintiff would be assigned to the administrative segregation unit. Id. Officer Arena harassed 

Plaintiff daily and informed Plaintiff that he did not appreciate Plaintiff undermining Officer 

Arena’s officers. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff filed grievances regarding Officer Arena’s harassment and retaliatory behavior. 

Docket No. 1-1 at 5–6. Plaintiff took these grievances to Officer Arena’s supervisors, Sgt. J. Van 

Blarcom, Lt. B.A. Wells, and Captain E. Evans. Id. However, none of these supervisors acted on 

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Plaintiff’s grievances and instead allowed Officer Arena to continue harassing Plaintiff. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that the retaliatory acts were ongoing as of March 25, 2016, the date he 

drafted the complaint. Docket No. 1-1 at 6. On January 25, 2016, Correctional Officer Johnson 

authored a false document in support of Officer Arena. Id. On February 3, 2016, Defendants 

conducted a “massive search” of Plaintiff’s cell in retaliation for Plaintiff requesting the full name 

of defendants. Id. at 9. On February 4, 2016, Plaintiff was moved from his cell again without any 

apparent reason. Id. at 6. Defendants added documents to Plaintiff’s grievances and falsified a 

128B chrono. Id. Officer Mitchell is covering up the misconduct as well. Id.

3. Legal Claims

Plaintiff’s allegations state a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim against Officer 

Arana. “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Prisoners may not be retaliated against for exercising their right of access to the courts, see 

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995), and this constitutional prohibition 

clearly includes retaliation for filing a complaint, see Sorrano’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 

1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s allegations also state a cognizable First Amendment 

retaliation claim against Sgt. J. Van Blarcom, Lt. B.A. Wells, Captain E. Evans, and Officer 

Mitchell. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (person “subjects” another to 

deprivation of constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does affirmative act, 

participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform act which he is legally required to do 

that causes deprivation of which complaint is made).

Plaintiff’s allegations also state a cognizable state-law intentional tort claim for violation 

of his civil rights. Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 323 (Cal. 1899) (tort is “any wrong, not 

consisting in mere breach of contract, for which the law undertakes to give to the injured party 

some appropriate remedy against the wrongdoer.”); Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 29 Cal. 

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4th 300, 325 (Cal. 2002) (“courts, exercising their authority over the common law, may, in 

appropriate circumstances, recognize a tort action for damages to remedy a constitutional 

violation.”). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims that are so related to 

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), as is the case 

here. The Court therefore retains jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim.

CONCLUSION

1. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall 

serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint (Docket No. 1), and a copy of this 

order upon Officer Arana, Sgt. J. Van Blarcom, Lt. B.A. Wells, Captain E. Evans, and 

Officer Mitchell at San Quentin State Prison, San Quentin, CA 94964. The Clerk shall also 

mail a courtesy copy of the complaint and this order to the California Attorney General’s Office.

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, Defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary 

judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely and 

adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 

F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th 

Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).1 

If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

Defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

 

1

If Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary 

judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that 

failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 

should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Such a motion should 

also incorporate a modified Wyatt notice in light of Albino. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 

1120, n.14 (9th Cir. 2003); Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012).

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motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

3. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact — that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in [current Rule 56(c)], that contradict the facts shown in Defendants’ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).2

4. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants’ 

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until Defendants’ 

counsel has been designated, Plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

Defendants, but once Defendants are represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to Defendants.

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

 

2

The Rand notice does not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again concurrently 

with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939.

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before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

7. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

8. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 4 and 11.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

12/29/2016

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