Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02261/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02261-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

LOYDELL L. VESTAL PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 04-2261

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff Loydell L. Vestal appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On January 26, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 12). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $6,119.93 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 36.40 attorney hours of work before the court

at an hourly rate of $168.13, and $67.68 in expenses. (Doc. # 17). The defendant has filed a

response, expressing objections to both the hourly rate and certain hours requested. (Doc. # 15).

On May 12, 2006, this court directed plaintiff’s counsel to submit a copy of the consumer

price index. (Doc. # 16). Plaintiff moved to amend her petition on May 22, 2006. (Doc. # 17).

Since a copy of the Consumer Price Index was attached to the original EAJA petition for

attorney’s fees, the Order entered on May 12, 2006, was entered in error. Therefore, plaintiff’s

motion to amend her petition is granted. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

Case 2:04-cv-02261-BSJ Document 18 Filed 06/07/06 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

2

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questionsinvolved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

Case 2:04-cv-02261-BSJ Document 18 Filed 06/07/06 Page 2 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

3

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Case 2:04-cv-02261-BSJ Document 18 Filed 06/07/06 Page 3 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

4

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at $168.13 per hour, for the 36.40

hours which she asserts she devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this court. The party

seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum

statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living

or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains

at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In

Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be

increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify

hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of theConsumer Price Index.

Plaintiff's counsel attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index as an exhibit (Doc. # 13) and

has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned believes

her argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has merit. 

The Commissioner has raised an objection to the hourly rate requested. We agree that

the rate requested is too high and find that an award based upon an hourly rate of $148.00 per

hour, reflecting an increase in the cost of living, will result in consistent hourly fee awards

in cases in Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, based

upon the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees

in this case is $148.00 per hour.

Case 2:04-cv-02261-BSJ Document 18 Filed 06/07/06 Page 4 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

5

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claimsshe spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 4.70 hours of work from October 12, 2004, through

November 19, 2004. The Complaint was not filed in this court until November 30, 2004. (Doc.

# 1). We note, time spent at the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See

Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, some of the time

submitted on the above referenced dates was clearly in preparation for the filing of the Complaint

with this court. Therefore, we will allow 2.00 hours. Accordingly, 2.70 hours must be deducted

from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.60 hour on December 9, 2004 (preparation of correspondence

to accompany Complaint and original Summons to 3 defendant’s by certified mail), from which

we deduct 0.50 hour; and 0.90 hour on February 25, 2005 (drafter/executed Affidavits of Service

to opposing counsel x 3), from which we deduct 0.80 hour. This time cannot be compensated,

in full, under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th

Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not compensable under the

EAJA). Accordingly, we deduct 1.30 hours from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.30 hour on February 14, 2005, (receipt/review letter stating

30 days for appeal brief and docketing briefing schedule). This court concludes that the time

submitted on the above referenced date, should not have taken an attorney experienced in

handling social security cases more than five or six minutes to review these documents. Bowman

v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989). Therefore we are reducing the 0.30hour

submitted on the above date to 0.10 hour. Accordingly, 0.20 hour must be deducted from the

total compensable time sought by counsel.

Case 2:04-cv-02261-BSJ Document 18 Filed 06/07/06 Page 5 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

6

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 26.90 hours for reviewing the transcript, researching

and writing plaintiff’s appeal brief. Defendant objects and finds the time submitted to be

excessive. Plaintiff’s counsel frequently represents social security plaintiff’s before this court

and should be well versed in social security law and we find that the time submitted for preparing

this brief to be excessive. While many medical terms were defined in the brief, there were no

unique or complex issues to be developed in this particular case. Therefore we are reducing the

number of hours submitted for the preparation of plaintiff’s brief to 16 hours. Accordingly,

10.90 hours must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $67.68 in expenses incurred with regard to

postage and photocopying. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $67.68

to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 21.30

(36.40-15.10) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $148.00 per hour, and $67.68 in expenses

for a total attorney's fee award of $3,220.08. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not

out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7 day of June 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-02261-BSJ Document 18 Filed 06/07/06 Page 6 of 6 PageID #: <pageID>