Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00756/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00756-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Reuben Charles Cowan, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Laura Escapule, et al.,

Respondents.

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CIV 15-00756-PHX-DLR (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Reuben Cowan, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison, Cimarron

Unit, Tucson, Arizona, has filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(hereinafter “amended habeas petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 4). Respondents

filed an Answer on August 12, 2015 (Doc. 12). On August 27, 2015, Petitioner filed a Reply

to Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 13).

Petitioner lists two grounds for habeas relief, all which he claims resulted in a

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel under the

United States Constitution:

Ground One: Petitioner’s counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial,

when counsel failed to object to the presentation of highly prejudicial and

multi-layered hearsay testimony from Detective Schira - specifically, Detective

Schira was allowed to testify that another detective told him that he heard that

“[s]omebody said a word on the street that [Petitioner] had bragged about

doing this.” 

Ground Two: Because of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance, Petitioner was

unconstitutionally denied due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution when he was convicted based

upon evidence insufficient to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Doc. 4 at 5, 7.)

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All exhibits referenced herein are attached as exhibits to Respondents’ Answer (Doc.

12.)

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Respondents assert that Petitioner has failed to exhaust ground one of his amended

habeas petition and it is procedurally defaulted, and that ground two of Petitioner’s amended

habeas petition lacks merit. (Doc. 12 at 2.) Respondents request that the Court dismiss

Petitioner’s petition with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

I. Trial and Appellate Court Proceedings. 

Petitioner was charged by indictment with one count of first degree murder, pled

alternatively as premeditated and felony-murder (count 1), one count burglary in the first

degree (count 2), two counts attempted armed robbery (counts 3 and 4), and as an accomplice

to all counts. (Exh. G.)1

 Petitioner went to trial on the charges, and was subsequently found

guilty of felony-murder (count 1), burglary in the first degree (count 2), and two counts of

attempted armed robbery (counts 3 and 4). (Exh. H at 10-11.) The trial court sentenced him

to life in prison for the murder conviction, 10-and-a-half years for the burglary conviction,

and 7-and-a-half years each for the attempted armed robbery convictions. (Exh. I at 39-40.)

Petitioner, through counsel, raised one issue on appeal - that the state failed to produce

substantial evidence to support a conviction, and thus the trial court erred in denying

Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal. (Exh. K at 2.) The Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed, finding that the trial evidence was “sufficient to survive [Petitioner]’s motion for

judgment of acquittal and to support his convictions for first-degree burglary and attempted

armed robbery, and for felony murder, for causing the victim’s death during the course of and

in furtherance of these offenses.” (Exh. N at 3.) The court further explained:

¶6 The victim’s girlfriend testified that she and her boyfriend awoke

sometime after 10 p.m. to the sound of a loud noise “like a crash or something

breaking.” Her boyfriend went to the living room, and she heard a male

repeatedly asking, “Where’s the money?” She then heard the sound of five or

six gunshots. A man holding a gun then entered the master bedroom and also

demanded of her, “Where’s the money?” The victim’s girlfriend heard the

voice of only one person the entire time. The victim died of gunshot wounds

to the chest and back.

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¶7 Police identified [Petitioner]’s fingerprint in the blood on the master

bedroom door. Police also identifed [Petitioner]’s fingerprint on the top part

of the west security gate adjacent to the victim’s apartment. The victim’s

DNA was identified as the major contributor to a bloodstain that also was

found on the west security gate, and [Petitioner]’s DNA could not be excluded

as a minor contributor.

¶8 Police found $10,100 in cash in a drawer in the master bedroom and

twelve pounds of marijuana elsewhere in the condominium. The

condominium’s back door was cracked as if it had been kicked in. A neighbor

and her visitor saw two men running away from the rear of the condominium

immediately after they heard the gunshots, but they could offer only a general

description and could not identify anyone.

¶9 When he was arrested eight months after the murder, [Petitioner] first

denied knowing the victim or ever having been to his condominium, but later

equivocated and said it was possible that he purchased marijuana from the

victim at some point. At trial, [Petitioner] testified he had gone to the

condominium the night of the murder to buy marijuana, having purchased

marijuana there two weeks earlier. He testified he entered the dark

condominium through an open back door, heard shooting, and must have left

his finger print on the master bedroom door by accident while he tried to avoid

the gunfire. He said he saw a man holding a gun in the bedroom, and stumbled

over a man lying on the floor on the way out. [Petitioner] did not claim to have

sustained any injury causing him to bleed while at the condominium, and he

explained that he did not realize blood was on his hands. . . .,

¶11 It was for the jury, not us, to determine the credibility of [Petitioner]’s

explanation of why his fingerprint was in blood on the bedroom door and on

the gate with a bloodstain matching the victim’s DNA (the west security gate).

On this record, the jury could reasonably infer that [Petitioner] had gone to the

condominium of a person whom he knew dealt marijuana with the intent of

robbing him at gunpoint, kicked in the back door to gain entry, demanded

money from the victim resulting in the victim’s murder, and then entered the

master bedroom wielding the firearm and demanded money from the victim’s

girlfriend. We find the evidence sufficient to support the denial of the motion

for judgment of acquittal and to support the convictions.

(Id. at 4-6.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, and that petition

was summarily denied on July 23, 2013. (Exh. O.) 

II. State Post-Conviction Proceedings.

On August 19, 2013, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Exhs. Q, R.) In his PCR, Petitioner checked

14 boxes on the form petition that denoted generic grounds for post-conviction relief. (Exh.

R at 1-2.) On August 28, 2013, the trial court appointed counsel for petitioner and ordered

that the petition for post-conviction relief be filed within 60 days. (Exh. S.) PCR counsel

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In neither request for extension does Petitioner complain of not having documents

necessary to frame his PCR claims.

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filed two subsequent motions to extend the deadline to file a petition, which were both

granted by the court. (Exhs. T, U, V, W.) On March 28, 2014, PCR counsel filed a Notice

of Completion of Post-Conviction Review and Request for Extension of Time to Allow

Petitioner to Proceed Pro Per, indicating that he had “communicated with Petitioner,

reviewed the transcripts and all relevant documents in this matter, and [was] unable to

discern any colorable claim upon which to base a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Exh.

X.) PCR counsel also filed a PCR Counsel’s Notice of Compliance, indicating to the court

that he “had no files or documents in his possession that [Petitioner] did not already have.”

(Exh. Y.)

The trial court thereafter ordered that PCR counsel immediately forward Petitioner

the complete trial and appellate files and transcripts in his possession no later than May 1,

2014, and that PCR counsel then file a Notice of Compliance that includes an “itemization

of what constituted ‘the file’ as well as the method of delivery.” (Exh. Z.) The court order

also gave Petitioner until June 2, 2014, to file a pro per PCR petition. (Id.) Thereafter,

Petitioner filed two motions for extension of time to file his petition2

, which the court

granted, ultimately extending the deadline to August 22, 2014. (Exhs. AA-DD.) The court

warned Petitioner each time an extension was granted that no further extensions would be

granted “absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.” (Exhs. BB, DD.) Just prior to

the last deadline, Petitioner filed with the court, on July 29, 2014, a letter he had written to

PCR counsel requesting that he provide Petitioner “all the paperwork you have concerning

my case.” (Exh. EE.) 

In response to Petitioner’s letter, the court, on October 1, 2014, ordered PCR counsel

to file an amended Notice of Compliance by October 15, 2014, specifically finding that

counsel’s prior Notice of Compliance was “wholly inadequate.” (Exh. FF.) PCR counsel

filed an Amended Notice of Compliance, in which he described the documents in Petitioner’s

possession:

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 Despite the Court’s initial PCR Order of 8/28/13, no prior counsel ever

supplied undersigned with any materials, and no prior counsel ever filed a

Notice of Compliance.

 Nevertheless, in correspondence with the defendant, and an extensive legal

call, undersigned ascertained from defendant that he had the entire Record and

transcripts in his possession. Indeed, in defendant’s first letter to undersigned,

dated 9/1/13, in response to undersigned’s introductory letter requesting

defendant’s input on potential PCR issues, defendant asked for time to “go

through all my legal work and trial transcripts.”

(Exh. GG.)

PCR counsel also stated that Petitioner had even offered to send counsel trial

transcripts that had not yet appeared on the electronic court record for counsel to view, but

that counsel declined the offer. (Id.) Subsequent to PCR counsel’s Amended Notice of

Compliance, on October 16, 2014, the trial court dismissed the PCR proceedings, as the due

date (August 22, 2014) had passed, and Petitioner had not yet filed a petition and had not

secured additional extensions. (Exh. HH.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals of the trial court’s dismissal of PCR proceedings. (Exh. II.)

On October 17, 2014, after the trial court had dismissed his PCR proceedings,

Petitioner filed a letter to the court in which he requested that his attorney provide him with

the “Attorney File.” (emphasis in original) (Exh. JJ). Petitioner did not identify what in

particular this attorney file would contain, but asserts that it will “demonstrate and prove that

counsels actions/inactions reflect unethical or improper statements to deny [Petitioner] the

effective counsel assistance of protecting ALL [Petitioner]’s rights.” (Id. at 4.) On

November 24, 2014, the trial court issued another minute entry finding Petitioner’s PCR

counsel’s Amended Notice of Compliance inadequate, in that he did not adequately satisfy

the court that he had reviewed and provided the necessary trial record to reach a conclusion

that there existed no colorable claims. (Doc. KK.) The court ordered Petitioner’s PCR

counsel to supplement his response “to include whether additional components of the PCR

file exist and if not, what was considered prior to filing the notice of completion, . . . [and]

[i]f additional documents exist, they shall be forwarded to defendant.” (Id.)

PCR counsel subsequently filed a supplement to his earlier notice of compliance,

indicating that “the entirety of the file received by undersigned, consisting of Minute Entries,

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Pleadings, Police Reports, trial counsel notes, and Discovery on CDs from the Maricopa

County Attorney’s Office, was shipped to defendant on December 19, 2014, via USPS

Priority Mail.” (Doc. NN.) Petitioner filed no additional pleadings in response, or thereafter.

(Exh. OO; Doc. 12, n 4.) Petitioner filed his amended habeas petition on April 24, 2015.

DISCUSSION

I. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Respondents assert that ground one of Petitioner’s amended habeas petition is

procedurally defaulted. Before a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief to a state

prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991). The federal court will not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus

unless each and every issue has been exhausted. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230 (2004);

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982). To properly exhaust state remedies, the

prisoner must have afforded the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his

federal constitutional claims by "fairly presenting" them to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 29 (2004) (stating that "[t]o provide the State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the

prisoner must 'fairly present' her claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the

court to the federal nature of the claim."). A petitioner must describe both the operative facts

and the federal legal theory so that the state courts have a "fair opportunity" to apply

controlling legal principles to the facts bearing on his constitutional claim. Id., at 33. In

cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, claims are exhausted once the Arizona

Court of Appeals has ruled on them. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). 

Where a prisoner fails to "fairly present" a claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, his claims are procedurally defaulted. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. There are two types of procedural default.

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First, a state court may have applied a procedural bar when the prisoner attempted to

raise the claim in state court. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05. For example, a habeas

petitioner may be barred from raising federal claims that he failed to preserve in state court

by making contemporaneous objections at trial or by raising the claim on direct appeal or

post-conviction review. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 841-42 (9th Cir. 1995)(stating that

failure to raise contemporaneous objection at trial to an alleged violation of federal rights

constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.

1991)(finding procedural default where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that petitioner had

waived his claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in his first petition for postconviction review.) If the state court found a procedural bar but also addressed the merits

of the underlying federal claim, the "alternative" ruling does not vitiate the independent state

procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d

329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc court held that a state court may alternatively deny relief

on the merits of a federal constitutional claim even after dismissing the claim on procedural

grounds). 

A higher court's subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court's

application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. In order to "constitute

adequate and independent grounds sufficient to support a finding of procedural default, a

state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of the

petitioner's default." Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). Arizona courts

have consistently applied their procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002)(holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) is an adequate and

independent procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998)(rejecting

the argument that Arizona courts have not "strictly or regularly followed" Rule 32); Carriger

v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)(rejecting the assertion that Arizona courts'

application of procedural default rules had been "unpredictable and irregular."). 

In the second procedural default scenario, the state prisoner may not have presented

the claim to the state courts, but pursuant to the state courts' procedural rules, a return to state

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court would be "futile." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). Generally, any claim

not previously presented to the Arizona courts is procedurally barred from federal review

because any attempt to return to state court to properly exhaust a current habeas claim would

be "futile." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief is precluded for claims waived at trial, on

appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4 (stating that in a

Rule 32 of-right proceeding, notice of post-conviction relief must be filed within 90 days

after entry of judgment and sentence or within 30 days appellate mandate); Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court's

decision). A state post-conviction action is futile where it is time barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d

at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness

under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for postconviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). 

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004). To establish cause, a petitioner must establish that

“some objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts to comply with the

State’s procedural rules.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) The following

objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate

that the alleged constitutional violation "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimension." United States v. Frady, 456

U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis omitted). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court

need not reach the prejudice prong. 

To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

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reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B).

Ground One: ineffective assistance of counsel - trial counsel’s failure to object to hearsay

testimony from Detective Schira.

Petitioner did not present this claim on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings.

Petitioner asserts in his Reply to Respondents’ Answer to his amended habeas petition that

this issue was raised in his reply brief on appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The only

issue identified in Petitioner’s appellate brief was that the state failed to produce substantial

evidence to support a conviction. (Exh. K.) Petitioner claims that the following paragraph

in his reply brief alerted the court to the hearsay issue:

No witness testified that they heard Cowan brag about murdering Gosa.

Appellee argued that Cowan bragged that he committed the murder. The

record shows that on cross-examination by defense counsel, Detective Schira

testified that Detective Verthein told him that he heard that “Somebody said

a word on the street that Mr. Cowan had bragged about doing this.” Appellee

asks this court to find that this multi-level hearsay statement satisfied the

substantial evidence required to withstand a motion for judgment of

acquittal...Respectfully, a rumor on the street is not adequate and sufficient to

support a conclusion of Cowan’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Doc. 13 at 3.)

This discussion however, was in the context of the larger discussion of the issue raised

in Petitioner’s appeal - the sufficiency of the evidence. (Exh. M.) This excerpt from

Petitioner’s reply brief, is in response to Appellee’s arguments regarding the evidence

supporting the guilty verdicts, and did not “raise” the hearsay/ineffective assistance of

counsel issue as an independent constitutional issue on appeal.

Petitioner also argues that, in his initial PCR notice he had identified as an issue

“[T]he introduction at trial of an identification obtained in violation of constitutional rights

(and)...[T]he denial of the constitutional right to representation by a competent lawyer at

every critical stage of the proceedings.” (Doc. 13 at 4; Exh. R at 1-2.) Merely checking the

boxes on the PCR form asserting generic constitutional violations does not sufficiently

describe both the operative facts and the federal legal theory so that the state court had a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing on Petitioner’s

constitutional claim. Baldwin, at 541 U.S. at 33. 

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Additionally, Petitioner was given the opportunity to file a pro per PCR petition once

his PCR counsel withdrew after finding no colorable claims to raise, and was then given two

extensions of time by the court. Instead of filing a petition, Petitioner filed letters with the

court indicating that he wanted the “paperwork” and the “attorney file” but did not identify

what documents he did not have but needed to obtain in order to prepare his petition.

Additionally, he did not dispute PCR counsel’s representation to the court that Petitioner had

in his possession the “entire record and transcripts.” 

Petitioner does not attach or cite any record to support this claim in his amended

habeas petition. He asserts that his trial counsel should have objected to the trial testimony

of Detective Schira - specifically, that another detective had told him about hearing

somebody say a word on the street that Petitioner had bragged about the crimes. This was

testimony that Petitioner heard during his trial, and this same testimony was discussed in

Petitioner’s state appellate court brief. Petitioner can not demonstrate that he was deprived

of the necessary records to raise this claim in a PCR petition. Petitioner claims that his PCR

counsel abandoned him and that he received conflicting messages from the court when it

continually ordered updates to PCR counsel’s notice of compliance. The trial court was

clear, however, that Petitioner was to file his pro se PCR petition by a date certain, and when

the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR proceedings on October 16, 2014, because he had

not filed a petition, Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of that order, or file a petition for

review of that dismissal with the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Finally, although the last notice of compliance supplement filed by Petitioner’s PCR

counsel, indicated that he had sent “the entirety of the file” he had received to Petitioner on

December 19, 2014, Petitioner does not identify any document received in that mailing that

he did not already possess, or that was necessary for him to present his claim. Even

assuming that PCR counsel’s compliance filings and the trial court’s delayed orders caused

confusion, this does not explain (1) Petitioner’s failure to file a PCR petition by the due date

of August 22, 2014, (2) no action on Petitioner’s part between that date and October 17,

2014, when Petitioner sent a letter to the trial court, and (3) Petitioner’s failure to file a

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petition for review of the trial court’s dismissal to the Arizona Court of Appeals. This

purported “confusion” also does not explain complete inaction on Petitioner’s part after PCR

counsel’s last compliance filing, on December 23, 2014. 

Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted because any attempt to return to state court

would be futile, as Petitioner would be time-barred from presenting his claim. Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.4 (stating that in a Rule 32 of-right proceeding, notice of post-conviction relief must

be filed within 90 days after entry of judgment and sentence or within 30 days appellate

mandate); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must be filed within thirty

days of trial court's decision). Petitioner’s claim is barred then from federal review absent

a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke, 541

U.S. at 393-94.

Petitioner claims that he is a “lay person,” and “not an expert in the requirements for

exhaustion,” and that he “believed that his Arizona Post-Conviction Petition was exhausted

on August 22, 2014, when his supplemental brief in support was due.” (Doc. 13 at 6.) 

Petitioner does not demonstrate cause for his default, as he does not identify “some objective

factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rules.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Although PCR counsel’s attempt to file an adequate notice

of compliance was muddled at best, the lack of clarity as to the documents counsel received

and reviewed does not excuse Petitioner’s complete inaction, particularly considering that

Petitioner possessed the information he needed to adequately present his claim. Petitioner

also fails to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice resulting in the conviction of

one who is actually innocent - he does not establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. 

The evidence against Petitioner was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt even without the hearsay testimony of Detective Schira. Petitioner was identified as

having been at the scene of the murder by his own fingerprints and palm print, in the victim’s

blood, found both inside and outside of the victim’s condo. (Exh. C at 24, 126.) Petitioner’s

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fingerprints and palm print were identified on the exterior gate of the condominium complex,

in the victim’s blood. (Exh. C at 10-12, 131-32; Exh. D at 14, 17-21.) Additionally,

Petitioner’s own DNA could not be excluded from the blood on the gate. (Exh. D at 33.)

Witnesses saw two men running together from the scene of the crime, although they did not

get a close enough look to identify either one of them. (Exh. B at 109-12, 126, 152-53). 

Petitioner testified during his trial and admitted that he was in the victim’s condo at

the time of the murder, that he had walked into the condo through the back door to purchase

marijuana from the victim, even though he claimed that another person committed the murder

while he was present. (Exh. F at 34-38.) Despite the Petitioner’s fingerprint having been

found inside the victim’s residence, Petitioner denied any knowledge of the murder when

arrested and interviewed by Detective Verthein and when confronted about his bloody

fingerprints. (Exh. F at 41-43, 46-47.) Petitioner’s trial testimony was also inconsistent with

the physical evidence. His recounting of the murder, that he fell to the floor when he heard

the shooting, then “advanced” toward the bedroom door, “pushed the door open,” and then

turned around after having seen a “man with a gun,” and the stumbled over the victim while

exiting the condo, did not explain why his fingerprint, in the victim’s blood was on the

bedroom door panel if he had only stumbled over the victim while exiting the condo. (Exh.

F at 34-38; Exh. C at 24.) 

Petitioner also had motive, as he admitted that he had previously been to the victim’s

condo to purchase marijuana, and thus knew the victim sold marijuana and likely kept money

at his condo. This was consistent with the victim’s girlfriend’s testimony that she heard the

intruder demand to know where the victim kept the money. (Exh. F at 24-28; Exh. C at 49-

51.) Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to excuse his

procedural default. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.

614, 623-24 (1998) (noting “actual innocence” under Schlup “means factual innocence, not

mere legal insufficiency”). “To be credible, [an actual-innocence] claim requires petitioner

to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be

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exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical

evidence–that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

Even if this Court were to conclude that Petitioner’s PCR counsel was ineffective for

not raising a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, there is no prejudice. In order to prevail

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a prisoner must demonstrate that “(1) the

performance of his attorney was deficient or unreasonable under all the circumstances, or (2)

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his attorneys’ alleged unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S.

668 (1984). If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A court

need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining whether

prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14. “If it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,

which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697).

Even assuming that Petitioner’s PCR counsel was ineffective in not raising the claim,

Petitioner can not demonstrate prejudice. Had Petitioner’s PCR counsel raised the issue, and

had the trial court found trial counsel ineffective by not objecting to the hearsay evidence,

Petitioner can not demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that without the hearsay

evidence (assuming trial counsel’s objection had been sustained), the result of the proceeding

would have been different, that is, that the jury would not have found guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. As set forth above, the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming

without the hearsay evidence. The Arizona Court of Appeals, in concluding that the evidence

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presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions, did not include the hearsay

evidence in its analysis. (Exh. N at 4-6.)

B. Merits Analysis

Respondents assert that ground two of his amended habeas petition should be denied

on the merits. In reviewing a cognizable claim under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not"

grant habeas relief with respect to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings" unless the State court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme

Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court

as to the AEDPA standard of review). "When applying these standards, the federal court

should review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d

1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,"

or (2) "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent." Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an

'unreasonable application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted). This Court must “presume the correctness of [the] state courts’ factual

findings” and a petitioner has the burden to “rebut this presumption with ‘clear and

convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-474 (2007) (quoting 28

U.S.C. §2254(e)(1)). 

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3

Petitioner does not identify in what ways his trial counsel was ineffective in allowing

him to be convicted upon insufficient evidence, other than to repeat his claim that counsel

should have prevented the hearsay evidence from being admitted. (Doc. 4 at 7; Doc. 13 at

9-12.)

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Ground Two: ineffective assistance of counsel - trial counsel’s failure to object to

conviction based upon insufficient evidence.

Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he was

convicted based upon evidence insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt on the charges. Petitioner’s trial counsel moved for judgment of acquittal at the end

of the state’s evidence, and Petitioner challenged the denial of that motion on appeal.3

Essentially, Petitioner’s habeas claim rests upon Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process right to be convicted only upon sufficient evidence. See Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The Arizona Court of Appeals denied this claim, finding

that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Petitioner’s convictions:

We find that the evidence was sufficient to survive [Petitioner]’s motion for

judgment of acquittal and to support his convictions for first-degree burglary

and attempted armed robbery, and for felony murder, for causing the victim’s

death during the course of and in furtherance of these offenses. []. As charged

here, first-degree burglary requires proof that the defendant unlawfully entered

a residential structure armed with a deadly weapon, with the intent to commit

theft or any felony therein. []. Attempted armed robbery requires proof that a

person armed with a deadly weapon attempted to take property from another’s

person or immediate presence against his will by using threats or force with

intent to coerce surrender of the property. [].

(Exh. N at 3-4.)

 For the reasons set forth in the above analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict

Petitioner, the state appellate court decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme

Court, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

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 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that ground one of Petitioner’s amended

habeas petition is procedurally defaulted and Petitioner has not established cause to excuse

the default, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred, and that ground one

alternatively fails on the merits. This Court furthermore finds that ground two of Petitioner’s

amended habeas petition fails on the merits. Wherefore, this Court will recommend that

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 4) be DENIED and

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the amended

habeas petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

procedural ruling debatable, and Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

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(9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 11th day of April, 2016.

Case 2:15-cv-00756-DLR Document 15 Filed 04/11/16 Page 17 of 17