Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00535/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00535-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SURVJUSTICE INC, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ELISABETH DEVOS, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No.18-cv-00535-JSC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

INTERVENE 

Re: Dkt. No. 89 

 Six organizations—Women’s and Children’s Advocacy Project, Equal Means Equal, 

National Coalition Against Violent Athletes, Allies Reaching for Equality, Women Matter, We 

Are Woman, and SAFE Campuses, LLC (collectively, “Equality Advocates”)—move to intervene 

as Plaintiffs.1 (Dkt. No. 89.)2 After carefully considering the parties’ submissions, and having 

had the benefit of oral argument on March 7, 2019, the Court DENIES Equality Advocates’ 

motion to intervene because their motion is untimely, they have failed to establish Article III 

standing, and Plaintiffs adequately represent their interests. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural and Factual Background 

 Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on January 25, 2018, challenging the lawfulness of the 

Department of Education’s interpretive guidance regarding Title IX of the Education Amendments 

of 1972 (Title IX), issued by Defendants on September 22, 2017 (“2017 Guidance”). The 

 

1

 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 18 & 36.) Equality Advocates—not yet a party—has not consented, but the 

Court may still decide the motion to intervene. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, 842 

F.3d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 2016).

2

 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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complaint alleged that the Guidance: (1) violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); (2) 

violated the Equal Protection Guarantee of the Fifth Amendment; and (3) constituted an ultra vires 

action. (Complaint ¶ 2-3.) Plaintiffs amended their complaint on February 21, 2018, and 

Defendants moved to dismiss the action on May 2, 2018. (Dkt. Nos. 23 & 40.) Equality 

Advocates filed a motion for leave to file an amicus brief on June 14, 2018, which the Court 

granted on June 29, 2018. (Dkt. Nos. 46, 47, 57.) The parties appeared for oral argument on July 

19, 2018. (Dkt. No. 64.) On August 31, 2018, Equality Advocates filed their first motion to 

intervene. (Dkt. No. 71.) Both Plaintiffs and Defendants opposed that motion. (Dkt. Nos. 74 & 

75.) The motion was set for hearing on October 18, 2018. 

 Prior to the hearing date, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 81.) 

The Court held that Plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to show third party standing to bring 

an equal protection claim or state a claim for relief for ultra vires action; the Court dismissed both 

claims with leave to amend. (Id.) The Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ APA claim 

because the 2017 Guidance did not constitute final agency action as a matter of law. (Id.) Three 

days after the Court granted the motion to dismiss, Equality Advocates withdrew their first motion 

to intervene. (Dkt. No. 82.) Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on October 31, 2018. 

(Dkt. No. 86.) Equality Advocates moved to intervene for a second time as plaintiffs 20 days 

later. (Dkt. No. 89.) 

 Equality Advocates seek leave to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 24(a), and in the alternative, seek permissive intervention pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1), “to advance claims on behalf of women as a class.” (Dkt. No. 

89 at 7.) Equality Advocates argue that intervention as of right is warranted because the interest of 

women as a class are not adequately represented by Plaintiffs, as their only remaining claims are 

equal protection and ultra vires action claims. Equality Advocates further argue that Plaintiffs’ 

equal protection claim is limited in scope because it only attacks Defendants’ motivation as gender 

bias and does not assert a claim of unequal treatment. 

 Equality Advocates’ proposed complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under the 

following nine causes of action: (1) Action in Excess of Authority, APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C); (2) 

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Actions Not in Accordance with Law, APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (3) Actions Contrary to 

Constitutional Right, Power, Privilege, or Immunity, APA; (4) Actions Unwarranted by Facts, 

APA; (5) discrimination in violation of Title IX; (6) violation of the Tenth Amendment; (7) 

violation of the Spending Clause; (8) Declaratory Judgment; (9) Ultra Vires action. (Dkt. No. 89 

at ¶¶ 58-119.) Equality Advocates seeks a court order: (1) vacating the 2017 Guidance; (2) 

enjoining Defendants from requiring entities to abide by the guidance; (3) declaring that 

Defendants have violated the Administrative Procedures Act; (4) declaring that the guidance is 

unlawful; (5) declaring that the rules are discriminatory; (6) entering a restraining order and 

permanent nationwide injunction. (Id. at 48.) 

 Both Plaintiffs and Defendants again oppose Equality Advocates’ motion to intervene. 

(See Dkt. Nos. 90 & 91.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides, in relevant part, that, “[o]n timely motion, 

the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . (2) claims an interest relating to the property 

or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as 

a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing 

parties adequately represent that interest.” To establish the right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), 

a third party applicant must satisfy four elements: 

(1) the intervention application is timely; (2) the applicant has a significant 

protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the 

action; (3) the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or 

impede the applicant’s ability to protect its interest; and (4) the existing parties 

may not adequately represent the applicant’s interest. 

Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “While an applicant seeking to intervene has the burden to show that these four 

elements are met, the requirements are broadly interpreted in favor of intervention.” Citizens for 

Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

// 

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 A. Timeliness 

 Intervention sought as a matter “of right” can be granted only “[o]n timely motion.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 24(a). Timeliness is a threshold question addressed to the court’s sound discretion. The 

district court’s timeliness determination is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. NAACP v. 

New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973); Smith v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 

853-854 (9th Cir. 2016). Courts consider the following factors when determining whether 

intervention was timely: (1) the stage of the proceedings at the time the applicant seeks to 

intervene; (2) prejudice to the existing parties from applicant’s delay in seeking leave to intervene; 

and (3) any reason for and the length of delay in seeking intervention (i.e., how long the 

prospective intervenors knew or reasonably should have known of their interest in the litigation). 

Smith, 830 F.3d at 854. If a court finds “that the motion to intervene was not timely, [it] need not 

reach any of the remaining elements of Rule 24.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 

131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 Equality Advocates do not address the three timeliness factors in their moving papers but 

instead argue generally that their application is timely because Plaintiffs filed their second 

amended complaint in October 2018 and “all the issues raised by Equality Advocates have already 

been submitted in this case, in the form of an amicus brief and previously filed Motion to 

Intervene.” (Dkt. No. 89 at 16.) Both parties argue that the application is untimely based on the 

factors outlined in Smith. 

 1. Stage of the Proceedings 

 As discussed above, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on October 31, 2018, 

following the Court’s October 1, 2018 order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first 

amended complaint. Defendants argue that the case is at an advanced stage because the parties 

have already completed two rounds of briefing. Defendants further argue that Equality 

Advocates’ motion to intervene is untimely because they filed it after the parties agreed on a 

stipulated briefing schedule for Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Equality Advocates’ only 

response is that “[p]laintiff filed their amended complaint only a week ago on October 31, 2018.” 

(Dkt. No. 89 at 16.) This response makes little sense, as Equality Advocates filed their motion to 

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intervene on November 20, 2018, which was three weeks after the second amended complaint was 

filed. The Court has already ruled on two rounds of motions to dismiss and a motion for 

reconsideration. Equality Advocates bring claims that have already been substantively decided by 

the Court. Based on the status of the claims at issue at this stage of the litigation, this factor 

weighs against timeliness. 

 2. Prejudice to the Existing Parties from Applicant’s Delay 

 The most important factor in determining a motion under Rule 24(a) is whether the 

applicant’s delay in seeking intervention will prejudice the existing parties. Smith, 830 F.3d at 

857. Prejudice under this factor is “that which flows from a prospective intervenor’s failure to 

intervene after he knew, or reasonably should have known, that his interests were not being 

adequately represented—and not from the fact that including another party in the case might make 

resolution more difficult.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

 Equality Advocates argue that the parties will not be prejudiced by intervention because 

Equality Advocates’ legal arguments were raised in their amicus brief and previous motion to 

intervene. Nonetheless, Defendants and Plaintiffs argue that they are prejudiced by the 

introduction of new legal theories, some of which the Court has already dismissed.3 See Smith v. 

Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding intervention would prejudice the parties 

where it would greatly widen the scope of litigation). Plaintiffs argue that they are further 

prejudiced because if Equality Advocates intervenes, Defendants are likely to move to dismiss 

Equality Advocates’ additional claims which would require a third round of briefing. The parties’ 

arguments regarding prejudice and undue delay based on the introduction of new claims are 

persuasive.4

 

 

3

 Plaintiffs and Defendants both note that Equality Advocates assert four claims under the APA 

despite the Courts previous ruling that the 2017 Guidance does not constitute final agency action 

as a matter of law. While the Court has reconsidered the dismissal with prejudice, (see Dkt. No. 

121), granting intervention will require it to duplicate analysis it has already engaged in with the 

current parties. 

4

 In their reply, Equality Advocates insist that Defendants and Plaintiffs would not be burdened by 

Equality Advocates’ APA claims because Plaintiffs did not assert the same facts and legal 

arguments to support their APA claims. Further, Equality Advocates concedes that Defendants 

will be required to file another motion to dismiss but argues that this will require few resources 

since it will mirror the motion to dismiss in the Massachusetts case. 

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 In Smith v. Marsh, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that 

intervention would prejudice the parties where the putative intervenor sought to “inject new issues 

and matters that are well beyond the scope” of the parties’ claims and defenses, and “many 

substantive and procedural issues had already been settled by the time of the intervention motion.” 

194 F.3d at 1051. Although in Smith the length of delay between the complaint and the attempt to 

intervene (15 months) was longer than the delay here, similar indicators of prejudice apply. 

Equality Advocates’ additional claims under the Tenth Amendment, Spending Clause, and Title 

IX generally would expand the scope of the litigation when neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have 

addressed any of those legal theories. Smith, 194 F.3d at 1051 (finding that intervenors would 

prejudice defendants by adding claims challenging the constitutionality of anti-discrimination 

law). Thus, this factor weighs against timeliness. 

 3. Applicants’ Proffered Reason for Delay 

 The focus of the length of delay prong “is on the date the person attempting to intervene 

should have been aware his interests would no longer be protected adequately by the parties, rather 

than the date the person learned of the litigation.” Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n of 

City & County of San Francisco, 934 F.2d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). Equality Advocates assert that they refrained from 

intervening in the hopes that Plaintiffs would amend their complaint to advance the legal theories 

set forth by Equality Advocates in their June 2018 amicus brief. (Dkt. No. 89 at 9.) This 

argument is unpersuasive. 

 Equality Advocates’ motion to intervene acknowledges that Plaintiffs filed their original 

complaint in January 2018 and first amended complaint the following month, and that “[n]either 

complaint included a Title IX claim, a Tenth Amendment claim, or a Spending Clause claim.” 

(Dkt. No. 89 at 11.) Indeed, Plaintiffs assert that counsel for Equality Advocates “tweeted 

disagreement with the arguments made in the complaint, which disagreement is reflected in the 

legal arguments [Equality Advocates] now seek to inject into this litigation.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 6.) 

Equality Advocates also acknowledge that they were aware at the time Plaintiffs opposed 

Defendants’ first motion to dismiss in June 2018 that Plaintiffs failed “to address[ ] or 

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advocate[ ] for equal treatment of women.” (Id.) At oral argument Equality Advocates explained 

that they delayed moving to intervene in the hopes that Plaintiffs would change their tact. But 

differences in litigation strategy is an insufficient explanation for delay. League of United Latin 

Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1306 (finding that because differences in litigation strategy did not 

satisfy the inadequate representation prong because such differences could not justify the 

applicants’ delay). 

 In sum, Equality Advocates’ proposed reason for delay fails to excuse their delay in 

seeking to intervene. Thus, this factor weighs against intervention. 

 *** 

 Equality Advocates’ motion to intervene is not timely. The Court may deny Equality 

Advocates motion to intervene on this basis alone. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 131 

F.3d at 1302 (“[I]f we find that the motion to intervene was not timely, [we] need not reach any of 

the remaining elements of Rule 24.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if 

timeliness was met, however, the remaining Rule 24(a)(2) elements are not satisfied. 

B. Significant Protectable Interest Relating to the Controversy 

Equality Advocates have not adequately alleged standing; therefore, they have not satisfied 

the significant protectable interest prong of Rule 24(a)(2). Standing is implicitly addressed in the 

significant interest requirement. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 

821, n.3. (9th Cir. 2001); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(analyzing standing under the significant protectable interest prong). 

An intervenor of right must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief 

beyond that which the plaintiff requests. Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 

1645, 1651 (2017); see also Hill v. Volkswagen, 894 F.3d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding no 

intervention as of right where requested relief goes beyond what the plaintiff requested and 

intervenor has not adequately alleged Article III standing). Equality Advocates’ 

proposed complaint seeks a court order: (1) vacating the 2017 Guidance; (2) enjoining Defendants 

from requiring entities to abide by the guidance; (3) declaring that Defendants have violated the 

Administrative Procedures Act; (4) declaring that the guidance is unlawful; (5) declaring that the 

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rules are discriminatory; and (6) entering a restraining order and permanent nationwide injunction. 

Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint seeks a court order: (1) declaring the Dear Colleague Letter 

and the Q&A issued in September 2017 unlawful; (2) an injunction ordering Defendants to vacate 

the Dear Colleague Letter and the Q&A issued in September 2017; (3) an award of Plaintiffs 

costs, attorneys’ fees, and other disbursements for this action; and (4) any other relief this Court 

deems appropriate. Because Equality Advocates proposed complaint seeks additional claims for 

relief beyond what Plaintiffs’ request, Equality Advocates must establish Article III standing. 

 Equality Advocates argue that they have standing under a “zone of interest” of Title IX, 

but as Defendants argue, they fail to show Article III standing as either an association or an 

organization. Equality Advocates’ reliance on standing under a “zone of interest” test fails absent 

a showing that they also satisfy Article III standing. See Pit River Tribe v. BLM, 793 F.3d 1147, 

1155 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the plaintiff is required to have Article III standing and to be in 

the zone of interest protected or regulated by the statute); see also Federal Election Commission v. 

Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1998) (addressing both the zone-of-interests test and Article III 

standing). Equality Advocates could have established Article III standing by sufficiently pleading 

organizational or associational standing. See Smith v. Pacific Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 

1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2004) ( “[A]n organization may satisfy the Article III requirement of injury in 

fact if it can demonstrate: (1) frustration of its organizational mission [by defendant’s actions]; and 

(2) diversion of its resources to combat [that frustration].”); Western Watersheds Project v. 

Kraayenbrink, 620 F.3d 1187, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that since intervenors had 

associational standing to pursue the appeal they had Article III standing). However, Equality 

Advocates do not argue that they have organizational or associational standing and, as discussed 

below, the proposed complaint fails to plead facts demonstrating either associational or 

organizational standing. 

1. Organizational Standing 

 Under organizational standing, “[a]n organization may satisfy the Article III requirements 

of injury in fact if it can demonstrate: (1) frustration of its organizational mission [by the 

defendant’s actions]; and (2) diversion of its resources to combat [that frustration].” Smith v. Pac. 

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Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, each intervenor must establish 

its own standing. 

 a. Frustration of Organizational Mission 

Where a defendant’s conduct has “perceptibly impaired” an organizational plaintiff’s 

“ability to provide [services to its clients], there can be no question that the organization has 

suffered injury in fact.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). Here, the 

only intervenor who alleges that it has clients who suffered an injury as a result of the 2017 

Guidance is the Women’s and Children’s Advocacy Project (“WCAP”). WCAP alleges that two 

of its clients were “subjected to policies and procedures that afforded them separate, different and 

worse treatment compared to the policies and procedures afforded to students who suffered harms 

based on race and national origin. Both clients filed complaints with the Department of 

Education’s Office for Civil Rights before the DeVos Rules were issued.” (Dkt. No. 89 at 13.) 

However, WCAP has not satisfied the second prong of organizational standing, which requires 

diversion of resources. 

The other five intervenors do not adequately allege that their organizational missions have 

been frustrated as a result of the 2017 Title IX policy change. The five intervenors other than 

WCAP provide their mission and organization history as a basis for their interest in this litigation. 

Several of the intervenors —Equal Means Equal, National Coalition Against Violent Athletes, 

Allies Reaching for Equality, Safe Campuses, LLC—allege that since the release of the 2017 

Guidance, they have “served many women and victims of sex-based harms who were subjected to 

discrimination by schools in the form of separate, different, and unequal treatment in the response 

to and redress of sex-based harm on campus.” (Dkt. No. 89 at 13-16.) However, this does not 

sufficiently allege that they have observed a decrease in student-filed complaints, have been 

frustrated due to declines in reporting, or that the 2017 Guidance made it more difficult to obtain 

beneficial outcomes for their clients. Simply stating their organizational mission and that they 

have served clients after the 2017 Guidance is not enough to show that Defendants’ conduct has 

“perceptibly impaired” an organizational plaintiff’s “ability to provide [services to its clients].” 

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Havens, 455 U.S. at 379. Therefore, they have not sufficiently alleged that their organizational 

mission is frustrated such that they have standing. 

 b. Diversion of Resources 

“[A] diversion-of-resources injury is sufficient to establish organizational standing at the 

pleading stage, even when it is ‘broadly alleged.’” Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 

F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 379). Equality Advocates have not 

sufficiently pled any diversion-of-resources injury. 

Equality Advocates have not sufficiently alleged that the 2017 Guidance has required them 

to divert resources that otherwise “would have been spent on some other activity that advances 

their goals.” See Nat’l Council of La Raza, 800 F.3d at 1040 (finding organizational standing 

where plaintiffs were not “simply going about their ‘business as usual,’ unaffected by 

[defendant’s] conduct.”); see also Smith, 358 F.3d at 1105 (allegations of diversion of resources 

sufficient to survive motion to dismiss where plaintiff-organization “specifically stated in its 

complaint that ‘in order to monitor the violations and educate the public regarding the 

discrimination at issue, [plaintiff] has had (and, until the discrimination is corrected, will continue) 

to divert its scarce resources from other efforts to [further its mission]’ ”). Equality Advocates do 

not make any claims that they have had to increase the number of students’ rights trainings, 

increase staff attention to Title IX policy, or divert staff resources to getting school officials to 

respond to complaints. 

Equality Advocates, as a whole, provide no allegations as to how their resources have been 

diverted from other matters due to the 2017 Guidance. 

 2. Associational Standing 

 “[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its 

members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to 

protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief 

requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” United Food & 

Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Equality Advocates has not pleaded that that any of the 

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intervenors are associations or that they have members; thus, they do not establish Article III 

associational standing. 

*** 

Equality Advocates have not established that they have standing to intervene; therefore, 

they do not have a significant protectable interest in this litigation. Southwest Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity, 268 F.3d at 810 n.3. 

 C. Whether Disposition Will Impair or Impede Equality Advocates’ Interest 

 The third intervention prong considers whether the disposition of the action may, as a 

practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect its interest. Prete, 438 F.3d at 

954. Equality Advocates make no argument under the third prong, but generally argue that the 

“interest of women as a class are not adequately represented by the plaintiffs”; namely, because 

Plaintiffs do not assert any Title IX claim, a Tenth Amendment claim, Spending Clause claim, or 

claims for women’s rights to equal treatment. (Dkt. No. 89 at 2-3.) 

 Where “other means” exist to protect the intervenors’ interests, such as an alternative 

forum, the intervenors’ interests may not be impaired. California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 

450 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, the District of Massachusetts is another forum in which 

two of the intervenors have pending litigation in which they assert the same Title IX, Spending 

Clause and Tenth Amendment claims Equality Advocates include in their proposed complaint. As 

Plaintiffs have not asserted these claims, it is unclear how Equality Advocates’ interests will be 

impaired by this litigation. And, in any event, Equality Advocates is not bound by a judgment in 

this Court. This factor, too, warrants denial of the motion to intervene.

 D. Whether Parties Adequately Represent the Applicant’s Interest 

 A putative intervenor must also show that the existing parties do not adequately represent 

the intervenor’s interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). “If an applicant for intervention and an existing 

party share the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises.” 

Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass'n, 647 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2011). Both 

Equality Advocates and Plaintiffs seek to have the 2017 Guidance vacated. As long as their 

objectives are the same, the proposed intervenor’s disagreement with the existing party's litigation 

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strategy or tactics does not make their interests adverse so as to justify intervention. League of 

United Latin Am. Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1306. 

 In their reply, Equality Advocates argue that their objectives are not the same as Plaintiffs 

because Equality Advocates seeks a “declaration that the Rules are discriminatory” and “a 

nationwide injunction.” This argument is unpersuasive because the ultimate purpose of this 

litigation is the same: to vacate the 2017 Guidance. Equality Advocates’ argument that Plaintiffs 

do not adequately represent them because they fail to assert Tenth Amendment, Spending Clause, 

and Title IX claims is also unavailing because this merely reflects a difference in litigation 

strategy and not the ultimate objective. L.A. Taxi Coop., Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-cv01257-JST, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114227, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2015) (finding that 

intervenors argument that plaintiffs do not adequately represent them because they did not 

challenge the constitutionality of the defendant’s actions were differences in litigation strategy); 

See Renewable Land, LLC v. Rising Tree Wind Farm LLC, No. 1:12-cv-00809-RJT, 2013 U.S 

.Dist. LEXIS 34908, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013) (finding that intervenors motion for 

preliminary injunction amounted to nothing more than differences in litigation strategy). In sum, 

Equality Advocates have not established that Plaintiffs do not adequately represent Equality 

Advocates’ ultimate interest. 

*** 

 The Court DENIES Equality Advocates’ Rule 24(a)(2) motion to intervene as of right 

because Equality Advocates have not established that (1) they timely moved to intervene, (2) they 

have a protectable interest in the lawsuit’s subject matter, (3) that any interest they may have will 

as a practical matter be impaired by the disposition of this lawsuit, or (4) that Plaintiffs will not 

adequately protect those interests. 

II. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION 

 Rule 24(b)(1)(B) provides that “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to 

intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of 

law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). In the Ninth Circuit, permissive intervention generally 

requires: “(1) an independent ground for jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common 

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question of law and fact between the movant’s claim or defense and the main action.” Freedom 

From Religion Found., Inc. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 843 (9th Cir. 2011). Even if an applicant 

satisfies those threshold requirements, the district court has discretion to deny permissive 

intervention. See Orange v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.1986) (“Permissive intervention 

is committed to the broad discretion of the district court.”). Where a litigant timely presents such 

an interest in intervention, courts consider a number of factors in deciding whether to permit 

intervention, including: 

the nature and extent of the intervenors’ interest, their standing to raise relevant 

legal issues, the legal position they seek to advance, and its probable relation to the 

merits of the case[,] whether changes have occurred in the litigation so that 

intervention that was once denied should be reexamined, whether the intervenors’ 

interests are adequately represented by other parties, whether intervention will 

prolong or unduly delay the litigation, and whether parties seeking intervention 

will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in 

the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented. 

Spangler v. Pasadena Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977) (footnotes omitted). 

As discussed above, Equality Advocates’ motion is untimely. League of United Latin Am. 

Citizens, 131 F.3d at 1308 (“In the context of permissive intervention . . . we analyze the 

timeliness element more strictly than we do with intervention as of right.”). Equality Advocates 

had notice of Plaintiffs’ arguments at the outset of this litigation and chose to file an amicus brief 

instead of seeking to intervene. Further, Equality Advocates have not established Article III 

standing. Additionally, Plaintiffs will be able to adequately represent Equality Advocates in this 

litigation as both parties’ ultimate objective is the same. The Court declines to exercise its 

discretion to permit Equality Advocates to intervene. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Equality Advocates’ Motion for 

Leave to Intervene under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and 24(b)(1)(B). 

This Order disposes of Docket No. 89. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 29, 2019 

 

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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