Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02444/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02444-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Albert Nichols, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-06-2444-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 1) and

Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 12). Having considered the

arguments set forth by the parties in their pleadings and motions and the evidence in the

record as a whole, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant

Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB)

under Title II of the Social Security Act alleging an onset date of December 31, 2001 (Tr. 70,

572-574). Plaintiff was last insured for Social Security disability on December 31, 2001 (Tr.

66). Plaintiff also applied for Supplemental Security Income, which was denied initially and

upon reconsideration (Tr. 95-99, 39-42). At Plaintiff's request, an Administrative Law Judge

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held a hearing on January 25, 2006 (Tr. 592-607). The ALJ found that Plaintiff became

disabled on July 12, 2004 and that, prior to that date, the Plaintiff had the residual functional

capacity to perform light work (Tr. 22). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff's

request to review the ALJ's decision (Tr. 4-6).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881

F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). When reviewing a determination of a disability onset date,

this Court must resolve “whether the chosen onset date is supported by substantial evidence,

not whether an earlier date could have been supported.” Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 797

(9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Swanson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1061,

1065 (9th Cir. 1985)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

preponderance. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). It is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, this Court

considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ's

conclusions and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusions. Id. If there is

sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute

its own determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990).

Additionally, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995). Thus, if on the record before this Court, substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner’s decision, this Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498,

501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Under the Social Security Act, a “disability” is defined as an “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

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impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). An

individual is determined to be under a disability if, “[H]is physical or mental impairment or

impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423

(d)(2)(A); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. If the claimant shows that he or she is unable to

perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant

“[C]an perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.” Reddick,

157 F.3d at 721. The Plaintiff has the burden to establish disability. Flaten v. Secretary of

Health and Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1459-1460 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the evidence

can have more than one rational interpretation and the Commissioner has provided a rational

interpretation of the evidence, the Commissioner's decision should be upheld. Sandgathe v.

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not properly consider Plaintiff’s claim that he

qualified for disability status under Listings 4.04 and 3.02. Further, Plaintiff asserts that the

disability onset date chosen was arbitrary and without medical support.

A. LISTINGS 4.04 AND 3.02

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not adequately consider the Social Security

Listings, specifically Listings 4.04 and 3.02. The ALJ acknowledged that the Plaintiff had

“severe impairments of hypertension, coronary artery disease, status post PCTA and stenting

in October 1998, status post four-vessel coronary artery bypass grafting in August 2002,

asthma, history of treatment for nephrolithiasis/hematuria/renal coli, low back pain, morbid

obesity, a bleed on the brain, and a history of diabetes” (Tr. 21). Even with the numerous

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impairments the ALJ acknowledges the Plaintiff suffered, the ALJ found no impairment or

combination of impairments were severe enough to meet or medically equal an impairment

in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Appendix 1, Subpart P (Tr. 21). 

The medical record supports a finding that Plaintiff’s condition did not meet or

medically equal Listing 4.04, which provides the requirements for disability due to ischemic

heart disease. Plaintiff’s ability to participate in exercise testing in 1999 is contrary to the

Listing (Tr. 15, 213). In 1998 the Plaintiff’s doctor reported that the Plaintiff was

“asymptomatic from a cardiac standpoint.” Additionally, the Plaintiff’s medical record does

not show any further cardiac treatment until 2002 (Tr. 15, 202). In 2003, the Plaintiff

underwent another exercise electrocardiogram that was negative for ischemia (Tr. 16, 267).

Also, in February 2004, Dr. Liguori stated that in a medical evaluation Plaintiff had a normal

examination and no cardiac complaints (Tr. 16, 292-293).

Plaintiff also argues his condition met the requirements of Listing 3.02, which

provides the requirements for disability due to “chronic pulmonary insufficiency.” Although

a pulmonary function test in April 2003 revealed severe obstructive lung disease, a State

Agency physician reported test results of “FEV1 47% and FVC 81%” and did not

recommend any Listing level impairment (Tr. 282). The record contains no evidence of any

functional assessments by treating physicians prior to October 2002 (Tr. 19). The

combination of the State Agency’s recommendations and the Plaintiff’s lack of functional

assessments support a finding that the Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for Listing

3.02. 

The ALJ’s decision that the Plaintiff’s conditions did not meet or medically equal any

of the Social Security listings is supported by substantial evidence. In addition to Plaintiff’s

objections to the ALJ’s consideration of the Listings, Plaintiff also claims that the disability

onset date selected was arbitrary and capricious. 

B. DISABILITY ONSET DATE

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The medical record substantially supports the appropriateness of the ALJ’s onset date

of July 12, 2004. When reviewing a determination of a disability onset date, this Court must

resolve “whether the chosen onset date is supported by substantial evidence, not whether an

earlier date could have been supported.” Villa, 797 F.2d at 797. In July 2004 the Plaintiff

was given a restriction of sedentary work and began treatment for back pain (Tr. 21-22). In

September of the same year he complained of a three month history of back pain and was

prescribed physical therapy (Tr. 16-17, 504-512, 530-533). Also in 2004, Plaintiff’s x-rays

revealed a bleed on his brain for which he underwent surgery (Tr. 17, 345-346, 355-356). 

The ALJ’s chosen onset date is supported by substantial evidence of the Plaintiff’s severe

back problems.

Plaintiff argues he became disabled sometime prior to July 2004. But Plaintiff's

medical records indicate that prior to July 2004, the Plaintiff had substantial periods during

which his functioning was normal (Tr. 17-18). In 2001, Plaintiff thought he could stand and

walk for twenty minutes at a time (Tr. 602-603). In September 2002, Dr. Liguori stated that

the Plaintiff was treated for pneumonia, but described him as doing well (Tr. 15, 307).

Plaintiff reported in December of 2002 that he was walking for exercise and had no shortness

of breath or “dyspnea” on exertion (Tr. 16, 304-305). In June 2003, Plaintiff was given an

exercise test in which he exhibited “above average” functional capacity (Tr. 16, 294, 367-

370). In February 2004, Plaintiff stated he had the ability to walk one mile six days a week

for exercise (Tr. 18, 292, 304). Also in February 2004, Dr. Liguori stated that Plaintiff had

a normal medical examination and had no cardiac complaints (Tr. 16, 292-293). The great

deal of positive medical assessments prior to 2004 support the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff

had the residual functional capacity to work before 2004.

The ALJ also discounted the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and other

symptoms prior to 2004 when weighing the opinions of Dr. Chung and Dr. Liguori. See

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (the ALJ is free to disregard a

physician’s opinion which is based on subjective complaints). An ALJ may consider various

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factors in determining the credibility of the allegedly disabling subjective symptoms. See

20 C.F.R. 404.1529 and 416.929 (2006). The ALJ discredited the Plaintiff’s subjective

degree of impairment because his complaints were not supported by objective evidence. For

example, while the Plaintiff testified that he had fatigue while being questioned by his

attorney, his medical records only show one complaint of fatigue which occurred in 1998 (Tr.

17-19, 206, 596). The ALJ stated that the Plaintiff’s daily activities were not as limited as

might be expected relative to his subjective complaints and specifically cited to the Plaintiff’s

ability to cook meals and care for his grandchildren (Tr. 17-19). Because the ALJ has stated

specific and substantial evidence to discredit the Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his

subjective symptoms, the ALJ’s findings are entitled to deference. See Bunnell v. Sullivan,

947 F.2d 341, 345-346 (9th Cir. 1991).

Additionally due to inconsistences in the record the ALJ discounted parts of Dr.

Chung and Dr. Liguori’s opinions (Tr. 19). In response to Plaintiff’s complaints of

headaches, Dr. Chung ordered a CT scan on November 22, 2004 and stated that there were

abnormal findings on the diagnostic study (Tr. 312). Dr. Chung also completed an

assessment form for Social Security that stated that the Plaintiff’s physical capacity would

not allow for sustained full-time employment (Tr. 265-266). However, in Dr. Chung’s

functional capacity form, on which he based his decision, there are no objective findings

outlined (Tr. 19, 265-266). Dr. Liguori completed an assessment form for Social Security

in August of 2004 that allowed for light lifting, but not light standing (Tr. 290). The ALJ

found it significant that Dr. Liguori restricted Plaintiff from lifting more than ten pounds for

a year, while the treating record only stated that the restriction was necessary for a few weeks

(Tr. 19, 297, 300). 

When reviewing a determination of a disability onset date, this Court must resolve

“whether the chosen onset date is supported by substantial evidence, not whether an earlier

date could have been supported.” Villa, 797 F.2d at 797. The ALJ’s chosen onset date is not

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arbitrary as it is supported by substantial evidence of the Plaintiff’s severe back problems.

Additionally, the record supports the ALJ’s rejections of an earlier disability onset date.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court may set aside the ALJ's denial of disability benefits to Plaintiff only if the

findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or if the denial was based on legal

error. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457.

The evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s level of impairment did not rise to the levels

required by the Social Security Listings. Moreover, the ALJ’s selected onset date of July 12,

2004 is supported by substantial evidence and cannot be considered arbitrary. The Court

therefore will deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant Defendant's cross

motion for summary judgment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

(Doc. # 8) is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment

(Doc. # 12) is GRANTED.

DATED this 9th day of July, 2007.

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