Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00903/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00903-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1985 Consipracy to interfere with civil rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS BALDWIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JACOB CUTTINTG et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-903-L-KSC

ORDER REGARDING SUBJECT 

MATTER JURISDICTION

In this civil rights action, Defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a 

claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Docs. no. 6 & 8.) The Court issued an order to show cause 

("OSC") why the action should not be dismissed as preempted by the Civil Service 

Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §1101 et seq. ("CSRA"), and denied the motions without prejudice 

pending briefing on the OSC. (Doc. no. 18.) The Court finds the CSRA does not 

preempt this action.

I. BACKGROUND 

According to the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff was employed by the 

United States Border Patrol ("Border Patrol"). In the course of his employment, he 

befriended San Diego County Sheriff's Deputy Jessica Leon. Leon's relative David 

William Centrone became a suspect in an investigation of the West Coast Crips, 

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commenced by the East County Gang Task Force ("Task Force"). The Task Force 

believed that Leon provided sensitive law enforcement information to Centrone. They

tapped her mobile phone. 

Because of the wiretap, the Task Force members were able to read text messages 

exchanged between Plaintiff and Leon. In 2014, Defendants Kai Mandelleh, El Cajon 

Police Department SWAT officer, and Zeath Sanchez, San Diego County Deputy Sheriff, 

both detectives with the Task Force, investigated Plaintiff's association with Leon. They

believed that Leon sought to extract law enforcement sensitive information from Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff contends the suspicion was unreasonable to begin with and contrary to evidence, 

because he had no contact with Task Force members during the relevant time. Instead, 

he claims, that the investigation, including his interview, was in retaliation for Plaintiff's 

disparaging text messages about the Task Force investigation, the competency of the 

officers involved, and Defendant Jacob Cutting, El Cajon Police Department SWAT 

officer and former husband of Plaintiff's lover San Diego County Sheriff's Deputy 

Sharlene Wilson. The interview did not relate to leaking sensitive information to Leon, 

but to Plaintiff's romantic relationship with Wilson. 

The Task Force ultimately concluded that Plaintiff did not pass sensitive law 

enforcement information to Leon, but nevertheless informed the Border Patrol, Plaintiff's 

employer, that Plaintiff had been questioned for associating with Leon and was 

uncooperative. Border Patrol opened an internal investigation. Although Plaintiff's 

interview was recorded, the Task Force refused to provide the Border Patrol with the 

recording to corroborate Plaintiff's contention that he cooperated. 

Plaintiff contends that by pursuing unfounded allegations against him and passing 

false information to the Border Patrol, Defendants intentionally circumvented his 

constitutional rights for purposes of retaliation by Cutting, who was jealous, and Sanchez, 

for criticizing him for an error in collecting evidence. Plaintiff claims Defendants'

conduct caused him physical, mental and emotional injury requiring medical leave and 

mental health treatment. 

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Plaintiff also complains that Defendants' false reports to the Border Patrol damaged

his employment opportunities. Plaintiff was removed from the United States Marshal's 

San Diego Regional Fugitive Task Force. His superiors informed him of a Border Patrol 

policy to remove an agent from a task force upon request from a member of any of the 

other participating agencies, that he was removed without an internal investigation, and 

would not be allowed to apply for assignment to other task forces, because San Diego 

Sheriff's Department was a partner in most of them. Before conclusion of an internal 

investigation, Plaintiff was reassigned to the Border Patrol Imperial Beach station, his 

duties were downgraded, and he was turned down for multiple other assignments. 

Although Plaintiff ultimately secured a position as a criminal investigator with 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, his acceptance was delayed pending the 

conclusion of Border Patrol's internal investigation. He is pursuing a grievance through 

the National Border Patrol Council.

Plaintiff filed the pending action against Cutting, Mandelleh and Sanchez alleging 

violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983, conspiracy to deny him due 

process under 42 U.S.C. §1985, and conspiracy to interfere with federal officer's duties 

under 42 U.S.C. §1985(1). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing, among other 

things, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff's claims are 

preempted by the CSRA. The issue was not adequately briefed, and in light of the 

Court's duty to satisfy itself of the subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding to the 

merits, see Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon 

Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577, 583 (1999), the Court issued the OSC. If the CSRA applies, 

it preempts all of Plaintiff's claims.

II. DISCUSSION

"The CSRA established a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action 

taken against federal employees." Elgin v. Dept. of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, __, 132 S. 

Ct. 2126, 2130 (2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). "Congress 

intended the CSRA to be the sole mechanism through which employment disputes are 

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settled." Collins v. Bender, 195 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1999). Where it applies, its 

administrative procedures preempt federal court jurisdiction. Mangano v. United States, 

529 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets 

omitted); Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2134. Preemption applies even if it leaves the employee 

without a remedy. Orsay v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 289 F.3d 1125, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 

2002), abrogated on other grounds by Millbrook v. U.S., __ U.S. __; 113 S.Ct. 1441 

(2013).

CSRA applies if the conduct underlying the complaint can be challenged as a 

prohibited personnel practice. Mangano, 529 F.3d at 1247. "The CSRA defines 

'prohibited personnel practices' as any 'personnel action' taken by someone in authority 

that violates one of ... enumerated practices. 'Personnel action,' in turn, is defined 

comprehensively ... ." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) for "personnel practices" and 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) for "personnel action"); see also Orsay, 289 F.3d at 1129 (CSRA 

provisions regarding personnel actions contain "broad language," and Ninth Circuit case 

law gives it an "inclusive construction"). Personnel practices are prohibited reasons for 

taking personnel actions. Orsay, 289 F.3d at 1129 (citing 5 U.S.C. §2302(b)). Even if a 

prohibited reason for the conduct at issue is not the primary reason for the personnel 

action, it is sufficient if it is "implicit" in the complaint. Id. When a claim falls within its 

broad ambit, the CSRA preempts constitutional, statutory, and tort claims. See, e.g.,

Mangano, 529 F.3d at 1247 (infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with 

right to practice chosen profession, abuse of process); Orsay, 289 F.3d at 1129-32 

(Privacy Act claim under 5 U.S.C. §552a); Saul, 928 F.2d at 834 (Bivens claim for 

unlawful search and seizure of personal mail). 

The fact that a plaintiff complains about the conduct of third parties rather than his 

employer or supervisor, does not necessarily change the analysis. This issue was 

addressed in Orsay, where other defendants were named in addition to the plaintiff's 

employer:

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The CSRA reaches “prohibited personnel practices” by “[a]ny 

employee who has authority to take, recommend, or approve 

any personnel action” “with respect to an employee in ... a 

covered position in an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) & (b) 

(emphasis added). The CSRA contains no specific requirement 

that the employee that engaged in the prohibited personnel 

practice be an employee of the organization that employs the 

employee subject to the adverse personnel determination.

Orsay, 289 F.3d at 1131. For purposes of the CSRA, "any employee" is a federal 

employee. See id. § 2105. 

However, the CSRA does not preempt federal claims involving conduct that does 

not fall within one of its broadly construed categories of personnel action. Brock v. 

United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Orsay, 289 F.3d at 1131 

(CSRA preemption applies when "the underlying conduct ... involve[s] a 'personnel 

action'."). For example, wiretapping, warrantless searches, or uncompensated takings, 

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386 n.28 (1983), aiming a loaded weapon, Orsay, 289 F.3d 

at 1129, rape and sexual assault, Brock, 64 F.3d at 1424-25, or warrantless search of the 

employee's home, Collins, 195 F.3d at 1079-80, fall outside the CSRA's broad scope.

In large part, Plaintiff complains about the actions taken by the Border Patrol, his 

employer, in response to Defendants' alleged unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff was 

removed from the U. S. Marshals San Diego Regional Fugitive Task Force and denied 

other employment opportunities. (Compl. at 16; see also id. ("damages include, but are 

not limited to: being transferred off the U.S. Marshals San Diego Regional Fugitive Task 

Force, deprivation of other prestigious assignments, an inability to laterally transfer to 

other agencies, a potential compromise of ability to pass regular required background 

checks, and the loss of overtime opportunities.") To the extent Plaintiff complains about 

Border Patrol's actions, the allegations fall within several categories of "personnel action" 

under the CSRA -- "transfer or reassignment" under 5 U.S.C. §2302(a)(2)(A)(iv), 

"decision concerning pay, benefits or awards" under §2302(a)(2)(A)(ix), and "any other 

significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions" under 

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§2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). They also fall within "prohibited personnel practices" -- "willfully 

obstruct any person in respect to such person's right to compete for employment" under 

§2302(b)(4); "discriminate ... against an employee ... on the basis of conduct which does 

not adversely affect the performance of the employee" under §2302(b)(10); and 

"personnel action [which violates] the merit system principles" under §2302(b)(12).

1

 

However, the Border Patrol is not a named Defendant. None of the named 

Defendants are federal employees with authority to take any employment action as to 

Plaintiff. (See Compl. at 2-3.) Plaintiff complains he was investigated and questioned by 

Defendants ostensibly because he was suspected of leaking sensitive information about a 

local law enforcement operation. In reality, he alleges, he was investigated and 

questioned for private reasons -- to interfere in his romantic relationship, and get even for 

criticizing Sanchez. Under either scenario, the connection between Defendants' conduct

and Plaintiff's employment is highly attenuated. See Collins, 195 F.3d at 1079. 

Defendants were not federal employees, and their conduct occurred outside Plaintiff's 

workplace for non-work related reasons. Defendants' conduct therefore falls outside the 

broad scope of "personnel action" and "personnel practice" as defined in the CSRA.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's claims are not preempted by the CSRA. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2017

 

1 The merit system principles include "fair and equitable treatment" of employees, 

including "proper regard for their ... constitutional rights," and protection of employees 

"against arbitrary action." 5 U.S.C. §2301(b)(2)&(8)(A).

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