Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02610/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02610-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 1 The petition was originally filed in the Central District of California and was subsequently

transferred to the Northern District. 

Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROOSEVELT JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

 vs.

B. CURRY, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 07-02610 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the denial of parole by the California Board of Prison

Hearings (“Board”) in 2003.1

 The Court found that the petition stated cognizable claims

and ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted.

Respondent filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition, and Petitioner filed a

traverse. Having reviewed the papers and the underlying record, the Court concludes that

Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the claims presented and will deny the petition.

///

BACKGROUND

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 2 Respondent first filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, but the Court

denied the motion, finding the petition was timely filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

(See Docket No. 15.) 

Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after his

conviction for first degree murder in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Petitioner was

sentenced to 26 years to life in state prison. On July 17, 2003, after an initial parole

suitability hearing, the Board denied parole. (Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A) (Docket No. 5). 

Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies by filing habeas petitions in the state courts,

with the California Supreme Court denying review on November 29, 2006. (Id., Ex. D.) 

The instant federal petition was deemed timely filed on March 29, 2007.2

 (See Docket

No. 15 at 2.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court will entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated

on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413

(2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the

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Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should

ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 409. In examining whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court’s method

as well as its result. Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). The

standard for “objectively unreasonable” is not “clear error” because “[t]hese two

standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of error fails to give proper deference to state

courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “results in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination

of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Where, as here, the highest state court to consider Petitioner’s claims issued a

summary opinion which does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal review

under § 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-

78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner’s claims is the opinion of the California Superior Court for the County of Los

Angeles. (Resp. Ex. 5 (In re Rooselvelt Johnson, Case No. BH003429, Oct. 19, 2005).)

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Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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B. Legal Claims and Analysis

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner alleges the following claims: (1)

the Board’s decision to deny parole violated his right to due process because it was not

based on at least “some” evidence of unsuitability; and (2) the denial of parole violated

his right to due process because it was based on the Governor’s blanket policy of denying

parole to all individuals convicted of murder. 

The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California prisoner with a sentence of a

term of years to life with the possibility of parole has a protected liberty interest in release

on parole and therefore a right to due process in the parole suitability proceedings. See

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex,

442 U.S. 1 (1979)). See also Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir.), reh’g and reh’g

en banc denied, 506 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2007); Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms,

461 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, No. 05-16455

(9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003).

A parole board’s decision must be supported by “some evidence” to satisfy the

requirements of due process. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting “some evidence”

standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-

55 (1985)). The standard of “some evidence” is met if there was some evidence from

which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal may be deduced. See Hill, 472 U.S.

at 455. An examination of the entire record is not required, nor is an independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses nor weighing of the evidence. Id. The relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the Board. See id. Accordingly, “if the Board’s determination of parole

suitability is to satisfy due process there must be some evidence, with some indicia of

reliability, to support the decision.” Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904). 

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was

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 3 The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the commitment

offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;” (2) previous

record of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; (5)

psychological factors such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the

offense;” and (6) prison misconduct. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c). The

circumstances tending to show suitability are: (1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social

history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense was committed as a result of stress

which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7)

age is such that it reduces the possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for future including

development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional activities that indicate ability to

function within the law. Cal. Code of Regs., tit., 15 § 2402(d).

Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and

regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 505

F.3d at 850. Accordingly, in California, the court must look to California law to

determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and

then must review the record in order to determine whether the state court decision

constituted an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” principle. Id.

California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402(a) provides that “[t]he panel

shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless

of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied

parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison.” Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a). The

regulations direct the Board to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” 

Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Further, the regulations enumerate various

circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole. Cal.

Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)-(d).3

Most recently, the Ninth Circuit reheard en banc the panel decision in Hayward v.

Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th. Cir.

2008), which presented a state prisoner’s due process habeas challenge to the denial of

parole. The panel opinion concluded that the gravity of the commitment offense had no

predictive value regarding the petitioner’s suitability for parole and held that the

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28 4 It is undisputed that at the time of the July 17, 2003 parole hearing, Petitioner had

served approximately 16 years of his sentence. (Resp’t at 1; Trav. at 1.)

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governor’s reversal of parole was not supported by some evidence and resulted in a due

process violation. 512 F.3d at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an en banc

decision in Hayward.

Unless or until the en banc court overrules the holdings in Biggs, Sass, and Irons, it

remains the law in this circuit that California’s parole scheme creates a federally

protected liberty interest in parole and therefore a right to due process, which is satisfied

if some evidence supports the Board’s parole suitability decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-

29. These cases also hold that the Board may rely on immutable events, such as the

nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to find that the prisoner is

not currently suitable for parole. Id. at 1129. Biggs and Irons also suggest, however, that

over time, the commitment offense and pre-conviction behavior become less reliable

predictors of danger to society such that repeated denial of parole based solely on

immutable events, regardless of the extent of rehabilitation during incarceration, could

violate due process at some point after the prisoner serves the minimum term on his

sentence. See Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. The Court notes that Petitioner had not yet

served his minimum term on his sentence at time of the parole suitability hearing at

issue.4

 

1. “Some” Evidence

The Board’s decision denying parole in this case was based upon its review of the

nature and number of the commitment offenses, Petitioner’s prior criminal and social

history, and Petitioner’s behavior and programming during imprisonment. (Resp’t Ex. 2,

Ex. B at 5 (“Hr’g Tr.”).) The Board concluded that Petitioner was “not suitable for parole

and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society, or a threat to public safety if

released from prison at this time.” (Id. at 81.) The Board observed that the commitment

offense was carried out “in an especially cruel and callous manner,” and “carried out in a

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Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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dispassionate manner” that “showed a total disregard for another human being.” (Id.) 

The state superior court laid out the facts of the crime in its order denying petitioner’s

state habeas petition: 

Petitioner is serving twenty-six years for murder in the first degree. 

The record reflects petitioner was selling drugs for the victim, who was his

supplier. On the night of the commitment offense, petitioner went to the

victim’s residence. He told the Board he did so to give the victim money he

owed from drug sales, but that he was short by one hundred dollars. 

Petitioner became involved in an altercation with the victim’s cousin and

petitioner produced a knife. The victim and petitioner then began to

struggle. At some point the victim broke free and was on his knees when

petitioner stabbed him in the chest. Petitioner fled and the victim died from

his injuries.

(Resp. Ex. 5 at 2.)

The Board found that the motive for the crime was “inexplicable or very trivial in

relationship to the crime that was committed,” stating that “the loss of a human life over

drugs under any circumstances is trivial.” (Id. at 81.) The Board also considered

Petitioner’s prior-criminality as a juvenile into adulthood, which demonstrated an

escalating patter of criminal conduct and violence. (Id. at 82.) Furthermore, the Board

found “really disturbing” the fact that Petitioner’s problems with the law stemming from

substance abuse did not deter him from getting involved in drug activity in the prison

setting as evident from the drug related disciplinary reports he received while in prison. 

(Id.) Finally, the Board took into consideration Petitioner’s last psychological report

which estimated a higher than average level of dangerousness if released to the

community, outside a structured environment. (Id. at 83.) 

The Board acknowledged the presence of several factors tending to show

suitability: Petitioner upgraded vocationally and participated in education programs, (id.);

Petitioner had good parole plans, (id. at 84); and Petitioner had not received any

disciplinary reports since 1994, (id. at 85). However, the Board concluded that Petitioner

had not completed the necessary programming and urged him to “continue on the track”

of participating in self-help programs, particularly with respect to Petitioner’s substance

abuse problem. (Id. at 88-89.) 

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Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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In its order denying habeas relief, the state superior court determined that the

record contained “some evidence” to support the Board’s finding that Petitioner was

unsuitable for parole. The state court made the following observations:

The Board found [P]etitioner unsuitable for parole because the

commitment offense was especially cruel and callous in that it was carried

out in a dispassionate manner, demonstrated a “total disregard” for another

human being, and the motive was “inexplicable or very trivial.” The Board

also found [P]etitioner unsuitable because of his prior criminal history,

misconduct during his incarceration, and because the psychological

evaluation was not supportive of release. 

... The factors related to the commitment offense that tend to favor

unsuitability are set forth in California Code of Regulations, title 15, section

2402(c)(1)(A)-(E). “Disregarding another human being” is not among

them. It is likely not included because it would apply to virtually every life

term inmate. However, an inmate may be unsuitable for parole if the crime

was carried out in dispassionate and calculated manner (Cal. Code Regs.,

tit. 15, §2402(c)(1)(B)) or if the motive is “inexplicable or very trivial to the

offense” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2402(c)(1)(E)) (footnote omitted.) Here

[P]etitioner stabbed the victim to death while he was on his knees,

apparently over some drug related dispute. Those facts are “some

evidence” the crime was carried out in a dispassionate manner and the

motive was very trivial. 

An inmate may be unsuitable for parole if he has a previous record

of violence. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,§2402(c)(2).) The record reflects

when [P]etitioner was seventeen years old he threatened to shoot a security

guard in a school parking lot. Later, [P]etitioner and a companion returned

tot he area and [P]etitioner menaced the security guard with a tire iron. 

Therefore, there is “some evidence” [P]etitioner is unsuitable because of a

previous record of violence. 

An inmate may also be unsuitable for parole if he engages in

“serious misconduct” during his incarceration. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,

§2402(c)(6); Cal. Cod Regs., tit. 15, §3315.) The record reflects

[P]etitioner has received six 115 disciplinary violations during his

incarceration. Most significantly, two were for possession of a controlled

substance and one was for trafficking a controlled substance. Thus, there is

“some evidence” [P]etitioner is unsuitable because of serious institutional

misconduct. 

Lastly, the psychological evaluation completed by Dr. C. Saindon,

concluded [P]etitioner’s risk for danger in the community is “higher than

the average citizen,” given his history. Thus, there is “some evidence” the

evaluation did not favor [P]etitioner’s release.

(Resp. Ex. 5 at 2-3.) 

As noted by the state court, the Board denied Petitioner parole not only because of

the nature and circumstances of Petitioner’s commitment offense but also because of

Petitioner’s criminal history, misconduct during incarceration, and unfavorable

psychological evaluation. Contrary to petitioner’s claim that the Board’s decision was

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Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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not based on “some” evidence of unsuitability, the record clearly shows that there was

“some evidence” to support the Board’s decision finding Petitioner unsuitable for parole,

and the evidence underlying the Board’s decision has some “indicia of reliability.” 

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (citing McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904).

2. “Blanket Policy”

Petitioner’s second claim is that the denial of parole violated his right to due

process because it was based on the Governor’s blanket policy of denying parole to all

individuals convicted of murder. Petitioner asserts that the Board and the Governor are

conspiring to maintain this “no parole policy.” (Trav. 15.) Put another way, Petitioner is

claiming that the Board is systematically biased. The state superior court rejected this

claim, finding that Petitioner “has failed to present any evidence that the Board has a ‘no

parole police.’” (Resp’t Ex. 5 at 3.) 

 A prisoner is entitled to have his release date considered by a parole board that is

free from bias or prejudice. O’Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990)

(citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.

471, 489 (1972); and Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

However, Petitioner has failed to present any evidence in support of his assertions,

including a showing of bias by any of the individual commissioners on the Board. 

Without such evidence, Petitioner’s claim that the Board is conspiring with the Governor

in maintaining a “no parole policy” is conclusory. The parole suitability hearing

transcript shows that the Board considered Petitioner’s suitability on an individual basis

and in considerable detail, and the record as a whole reflects an individualized treatment

of Petitioner’s case. Finally, Petitioner raised no concerns when asked at the hearing

whether Petitioner had any reason to believe that the panel members would not be fair

and impartial. (Hr’g Tr. at 9.) Accordingly, the state courts’ rejection of this claim was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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Order Denying Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus

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This Court concludes that Petitioner’s right to due process and liberty interest were

not violated by the Board’s decision to deny parole. The state courts’ decisions were not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

CONCLUSION 

The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state court proceedings and parole hearing. 

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: JEREMY FOGEL

 United States District Judge

1/19/10

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROOSEVELT JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. /

Case Number: CV07-02610 JF 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the

attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s)

hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into

an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Roosevelt Johnson D-63610

Chuckwalla Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 2349

D-10-258-J

Blythe, CA 92226

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

1/27/10

1/27/10

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