Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02836/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02836-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 47:0605 Communications Act of 1934

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

G&G Closed Circuit Events LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Leila Venegas Alcantara, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-18-02836-PHX-JJT

ORDER

Plaintiff G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC, has filed a Motion for Default Judgment 

against Defendant Eladio E. Monroy pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). 

(Doc. 39.) Defendant Monroy filed no response. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

finds default judgment against Defendant Monroy is warranted.

I. Background.

Plaintiff obtains licenses to distribute pay-per-view programming to various 

commercial establishments, including bars and restaurants. Plaintiff contracted for the right 

to broadcast a series of boxing matches headlined by the International Boxing Federation 

World Middleweight Championship bout between Gennady Golovkin and Saul “Canelo” 

Alvarez, which was telecast September 16, 2017. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Monroy 

“specifically directed or permitted the employees of Restaurant Casita del Mar to 

unlawfully intercept” Plaintiff’s program and display it to the public at the restaurant, 

which is located at 2401 North 32nd Street in Phoenix, Arizona and owned and operated by 

Gisselle, LLC—of which Defendant Monroy is one of two managing members. (Doc. 1, 

Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also claims that, as a managing member, Defendant Monroy “had 

Case 2:18-cv-02836-JJT Document 40 Filed 03/04/20 Page 1 of 6
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

an obvious and direct financial interest in the activities” of the restaurant, including 

unlawful interception of Plaintiff’s program. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff filed suit against 

Defendant Monroy, Gisselle, and Gisselle’s other managing member—Leila Venegas 

Alcantara1—seeking statutory damages for their alleged violations of the Communications 

Act of 1934 and the Cable and Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 

1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605 et seq.

Plaintiff served process on Defendant Monroy on April 1, 2019. (Doc. 33.)

Defendant Monroy did not answer or otherwise respond, and the Clerk of Court entered 

his default three weeks later, on May 15, 2019. (Doc. 38.) Plaintiff then filed the present 

motion for default judgment against Defendant Monroy on June 20, 2019. (Doc. 39.).

Defendant Monroy has not responded thereto despite the passage of several months.

II. Default Judgment.

After the Clerk of Court enters default, the Court may enter default judgment 

pursuant to Rule 55(b). The Court’s “decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 

discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Although the 

Court should consider and weigh relevant factors as part of the decision-making process, 

it “is not required to make detailed findings of fact.” Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 

F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Court considers the following factors in deciding whether default judgment is 

warranted: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the claims, (3) 

the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at stake, (5) the possibility of 

factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable neglect, and (7) the policy favoring 

decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). In 

considering the merits and sufficiency of the complaint, the Court accepts as true the 

complaint’s well-pled factual allegations, but the plaintiff must establish all damages 

sought in the complaint. See Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 

1977). Having reviewed the complaint and default judgment motion, the Court finds that 

1 Defendants Gisselle and Venegas Alcantara have appeared in this action. (See Doc. 14.)

Case 2:18-cv-02836-JJT Document 40 Filed 03/04/20 Page 2 of 6
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Eitel factors favor default judgment against Defendant Monroy and statutory damages 

in the amount of $30,000.00 are warranted.

A. Possible Prejudice to Plaintiff.

The first Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. Defendant Monroy failed 

to respond to the complaint or otherwise appear in this action despite being served with the 

complaint, the application for default, and the motion for default judgment and supporting 

documentation. The Court is satisfied that if Plaintiff’s motion is not granted, Plaintiff “will 

likely be without other recourse for recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. 

Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). This prejudice to Plaintiff supports the entry of 

default judgment.

B. Merits of the Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint.

The second and third Eitel factors (so grouped in Plaintiff’s supporting 

Memorandum) favor default judgment where, as in this case, the complaint sufficiently 

states a plausible claim for relief under the Rule 8 pleading standards. See id. at 1175; 

Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff seeks relief under 47 

U.S.C. § 605. To be held liable for a violation this statute, “a defendant must be shown to 

have (1) intercepted or aided the interception of, and (2) divulged or published, or aided 

the divulging or publishing of, a communication transmitted by the plaintiff.” Nat'l 

Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1981). Section 605 applies 

to satellite television signals. DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff has alleged that, under Defendant Monroy’s supervision and to his financial 

benefit, Casita del Mar willfully intercepted and displayed the licensed program on 

September 16, 2017. Plaintiff’s allegations are supported by the sworn affidavit of 

investigator Gerardo Alvarez Hose, who visited Casita del Mar on September 16, 2017 and 

saw the program being displayed on two televisions in the restaurant, and by screenprints 

of the restaurant’s Facebook page during the week prior to the event advertising that the 

fight would be shown at the restaurant. (Doc. 39-4.) Hose estimated that 45 patrons were 

watching the program. (Id.) Because the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint are 

Case 2:18-cv-02836-JJT Document 40 Filed 03/04/20 Page 3 of 6
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

deemed true upon default, see Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant 

Monroy violated § 605. The second and third factors favor default judgment.

C. Amount of Money at Stake.

Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in 

relation to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff seeks $10,000 in statutory 

damages and $30,000 in enhanced statutory damages. (Doc. 39 at 3.) The Court finds that 

as alleged, Defendant Monroy’s violation of § 605 was serious. Casita del Mar willfully 

displayed the program to approximately 45 patrons and advertised its availability 

beforehand. (Doc. 39-4.)

D. Possible Dispute Concerning Material Facts.

In light of the sufficiency of the complaint and Defendant Monroy’s default, “no 

genuine dispute of material facts would preclude granting [Plaintiff’s] motion,” at least 

with respect to Defendant Monroy. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.

E. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect.

Plaintiff properly served Defendant Monroy with the summons and complaint. 

(Doc 33). It therefore is unlikely that Defendant Monroy’s failure to answer and the 

resulting default were due to excusable neglect. Gemmel v. Systemhouse, Inc., No. CIV 04-

187-TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 65604, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2008). This Eitel factor, like the 

other five discussed above, weighs in favor of default judgment.

F. Policy Favoring a Decision on the Merits.

The last factor usually weighs against default judgment given that cases “should be 

decided on their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. The mere 

existence of Rule 55(b), however, “indicates that this preference, standing alone, is not 

dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, it may well be that Plaintiff’s claims 

against the other Defendants, Gisselle and Venegas Alcantara, are decided on the merits, 

given those Defendants have appeared. Although the final factor weighs against entry of 

default judgment, the Court is also compelled to deem the well-pled factual allegations 

against Defendant Monroy as true upon his default, see Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. The Court 

Case 2:18-cv-02836-JJT Document 40 Filed 03/04/20 Page 4 of 6
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

therefore is not precluded by this factor from entering default judgment against Defendant 

Monroy. See PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; Gemmel, 2008 WL 65604, at *5.

G. Conclusion.

Six of the seven Eitel factors favor default judgment, and one factor weighs against 

it. Considering all the factors together, the Court concludes that default judgment against 

Defendant Monroy is appropriate.

III. Damages.

“A default judgment may be entered without a hearing on damages when the amount 

claimed is capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in the documentary 

evidence or in detailed affidavits.” Taylor Made Golf Co. v. Carsten Sports, Ltd., 175 

F.R.D. 658, 661 (S.D. Cal. 1997). Plaintiff does not seek actual damages, but rather 

statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605. Under this statute, “the party aggrieved 

may recover an award of statutory damages for each violation of subsection (a) of this 

section involved in the action in a sum of not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the 

court considers just[.]” § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). The statute further provides that when a 

violation “was committed willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect commercial 

advantage or private financial gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award of 

damages, whether actual or statutory, by an amount of not more than $100,000 for each 

violation.” § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). In assessing statutory damages, the Court is mindful of the 

need to deter piracy of licensed shows, as well as the importance of not putting restaurants 

or bars out of business for a single violation. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake 

Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff requests $10,000 in statutory damages and $30,000 in enhanced statutory 

damages to be entered against Defendant Monroy. The requested damages are largely 

reasonable. Defendant Monroy supervised the piracy of the program and displayed it to 

approximately 45 patrons. (Doc. 39-4.) The showing was not an accident, as evidenced by 

Casita del Mar’s advertisement of it on Facebook beforehand. (Id.) The Court finds the 

requested statutory damages of $10,000 and a component of the requested enhanced 

Case 2:18-cv-02836-JJT Document 40 Filed 03/04/20 Page 5 of 6
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

damages—in the amount of another $20,000—to be reasonable given this willful conduct. 

See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Wing Spot Chicken & Waffles, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 659, 

667-69 (E.D. Va. 2013) (awarding $4,000 in statutory damages and $27,000 in enhanced 

damages for displaying a pirated program to 40 patrons); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

McCausland, No. 1:10-CV-01564-TWP, 2012 WL 113786, at *3-4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 13, 

2012) (awarding $10,000 in statutory damages and $30,000 in enhanced damages for 

displaying a pirated program to 15 patrons).

IV. Claims Against Other Defendants.

“[A] default judgment against one defendant does not preclude a codefendant from 

contesting the plaintiff’s claim, and a non-defaulting defendant is not bound by the facts 

deemed admitted because of a codefendant’s failure to appear.” Empire Fire & Marine Ins. 

Co. v. Pandt-Brown, 322 F. Supp. 3d 694, 696 (E.D. Va. 2018) (quoting The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 

Cranch) 126, 143 (1815); Pfanenstiel Architects, Inc. v. Chouteau Petroleum Co., 978 F.2d 

430, 432 (8th Cir. 1992)). While default judgment against Defendant Monroy is appropriate 

here, no factual allegations are deemed as true against Defendants Gisselle and Venegas 

Alcantara, and Plaintiff’s claims against those Defendants will be decided on the merits.

In its Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff does not ask the Court to enter partial 

final judgment against Defendant Monroy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), 

and the Court does not otherwise find there is no just reason for delay of entry of judgment 

here. Accordingly, while Plaintiff will be entitled to default judgment against Defendant 

Monroy, the Court will enter final judgment at the end of this litigation.

IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant 

Monroy (Doc. 39). Plaintiff will be entitled to default judgment against Defendant Monroy 

in the amount of $30,000 at the end of this litigation. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants 

Gisselle, LLC and Venegas Alcantara remain pending.

Dated this 4th day of March, 2020.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

Case 2:18-cv-02836-JJT Document 40 Filed 03/04/20 Page 6 of 6