Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00871/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00871-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983dp Civil Right Denial of Due Process

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESLEY C. DORSEY, JR., 

MARGARETE S. DORSEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

GARY KREEP, KERRY WELLS, 

CHARLES R. GILL, GALE 

E.KANESHIRO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-0871-WQH-NLS

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Complaint with Prejudice (ECF No. 14) filed by Defendants Judge Gary Kreep, Judge 

Kerry Wells, Judge Charles Gill, and Judge Gale Kaneshiro. 

I. Background 

On May 1, 2017, Plaintiffs Wesley C. Dorsey, Jr. and Margarete S. Dorsey (the 

“Dorseys”) initiated this action by filing the Complaint (ECF No. 1) against Defendants 

Judge Gary Kreep, Judge Kerry Wells, Judge Charles Gill, and Judge Gale Kaneshiro. On 

September 28, 2017, the Dorseys filed the First Amended Complaint (FAC) (the “FAC”). 

The FAC brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Dorseys’ 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Id. On October 12, 

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2017, Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss’ Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint with 

Prejudice (ECF No. 14). On October 19, 2017, the Dorseys filed an Opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 15). On November 13, 2017, Defendants filed a Reply to 

the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 16). 

II. Allegations of the First Amended Complaint 

In late 2015, the Dorseys were renting an apartment from the Leavitt Investment 

Company (“Leavitt”). FAC Ex. 4, ECF No. 8, at 37. The Dorseys and Ms. Cuevas, 

Leavitt’s property manager, entered into an agreement after the Dorseys encountered 

financial hardship. Id. at 43. Under the terms of that agreement, the Dorseys were 

permitted to pay partial rent but Leavitt had the right to demand payment of the full amount

due at any time. Id. at 45. 

Under California law, Leavitt could file a complaint to evict the Dorseys three days 

after serving the Dorseys with a notice of eviction (a “three-day notice”). Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 1161. California Civil Procedure Code § 1162 provides that three-day notices may 

be served

(1) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 

(2) If he or she is absent from his or her place of residence, and from his or 

her usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person of suitable 

age and discretion at either place, and sending a copy through the mail 

addressed to the tenant at his or her place of residence; 

(3) If such place of residence and business cannot be ascertained, or a person 

of suitable age or discretion there cannot be found, then by affixing a copy in 

a conspicuous place on the property, and also delivering a copy to a person 

there residing, if such person can be found; and also sending a copy through 

the mail addressed to the tenant at the place where the property is situated. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1162.

On November 10, 2015, Ms. Cuevas posted and mailed a three-day notice to the 

Dorsey’s place of residence. FAC at ¶ 20; FAC Ex. 2, ECF No. 8, at 21.

On November 17, 2015, the Leavitt Investment Company (“Leavitt”) filed an 

unlawful detainer complaint against the Dorseys in the Superior Court for the County of 

San Diego. FAC at ¶ 25 (citing Leavitt Investment Company v. Dorsey, Case No. 37-2015-

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00038520-Cl-UD-CTL (hereinafter the “Detainer Action”)). The Detainer Action was 

assigned to Defendant Judge Kreep. FAC Ex. 4, ECF No. 8, at 33. At trial, the Dorseys 

argued that Leavitt’s complaint was filed prematurely because the three-day notice was 

posted and mailed on Tuesday, November 10, 2015, and the following day was Veterans 

Day, so only two business days elapsed between the mailing and posting of the three-day 

notice and the filing of the complaint on Tuesday, November 17, 2015. Id. at 52:6-13. The 

Dorseys argued a trial that Section 1013(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure1

applied to extend the notice requirement from three days to five days because the notice

was mailed. Id. at 52:14-27. At trial, Judge Kreep held that Section 1013(a) only applied 

to post-litigation notices and that the complaint was filed properly on November 17, 2015. 

Id. at 54:6-13. On February 29, 2016, Judge Kreep entered judgment against the Dorseys, 

which resulted in their eviction from the property that they were then occupying. FAC at 

¶¶ 31–35. The Dorseys filed two motions for a new trial, both of which were denied by 

Judge Kreep. Id. ¶¶ 39–42. 

On March 11, 2016, the Dorseys appealed Judge Kreep’s judgment and denial of the 

motions for a new trial to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court for the County of 

San Diego. Id. ¶¶ 34–46. The Dorseys’ appeal was assigned to Defendants Judge Wells, 

Judge Gill, and Judge Kaneshiro (the “Defendant Appellate Judges”). Id. ¶ 34. On January 

31, 2017, the “Defendant Appellate Judges” issued a Statement of Decision that rejected 

the Dorseys’ arguments on appeal and unanimously affirmed the judgment entered by 

Judge Kreep. Id. ¶¶ 46, 50. In their Statement of Decision, the Defendant Appellate 

Judges: (1) declined to review the Dorseys’ renewed motion for new trial, holding that an 

order denying a motion for new trial is not an appealable order; (2) held that Leavitt’s 

unlawful detainer complaint was timely filed after the expiration of the three-day notice 

 

1

“In case of service by mail . . . any period of notice and any right or duty to do any act or make any 

response within any period or on a date certain after service of the document, which time period or date 

is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended five calendar days . . . .” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 1013(a). 

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period; (3) held that Cuevas’s service by mail of the three-day notice was proper; and (4) 

held that the Dorseys waived the argument that there was no showing of reasonable 

diligence in Cuevas’s attempt at personal service by failing to object to the admission of 

the notice at trial. Id. 

On February 9, 2017, the Dorseys filed a petition for rehearing. Id. ¶ 47. On March 

2, 2017, in its modified decision, the Defendant Appellate Judges denied the petition for 

rehearing. Id. ¶ 50. On March 13, 2017, the Defendant Appellate Judges denied the 

Dorseys’ petition for transfer to the California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District, 

Division One. Id. ¶ 54. The Dorseys do not allege that they have sought review of the 

decision of the Defendant Appellate Judges by the California Supreme Court. See id.

The FAC alleges that Judge Kreep violated the Dorseys’ Fourteenth Amendment 

rights by: (1) failing to address the Dorseys’ contention that the service by mail of the threeday notice was defective; (2) failing to address the Dorseys’ contention that Leavitt filed 

its complaint prematurely; and (3) failing to rule on the issue of whether there was 

sufficient evidence submitted at trial to justify the decision of the court. Id. ¶ 57. The FAC 

alleges that the Defendant Appellate Judges violated the Dorseys’ Fourteenth Amendment 

rights by: (1) not addressing de novo the validity of the service by mail of the three-day 

notice; (2) denying supplemental briefing; (3) failing to address whether an objection based 

on the sufficiency of evidence introduced at trial can be waived; (4) failing to address 

whether a general denial of all allegations of the complaint requires defendants to plead 

affirmative defenses; and (5) failing to grant the Dorseys’ petition for rehearing. Id. ¶¶ 

65, 69. 

The FAC seeks the following injunctive relief: (1) an order from this court either (a) 

vacating the judgment in the Detainer Action or (b) requiring Defendants to provide a 

rehearing on the claims set forth in the FAC; and (2) an order directing the Clerk of the San 

Diego Superior Court to seal the Detainer Action. Id. at ¶¶ 72–73. The FAC also seeks a 

declaration (1) that the Defendants’ alleged acts constitute fraud on the court; (2) clarifying 

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the applicability of Cal. Civ. P. Code § 11772to the five-day extension provision of Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 1013(a); (3) that the service of the three-day notice was invalid under 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1162; (4) that Leavitt’s complaint was filed prematurely; (5) the 

applicability of Cal. Gov’t Code § 680813to the failure of the Defendant Appellate Judges 

to grant a rehearing on an issue not briefed by either party; and (6) outlining all Defendants 

violations of the California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3B(8). Id. ¶¶ 74–79.

III. Standard of Review 

Defendants move to dismiss the Dorseys’ claims on the grounds that “this Court 

lacks jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (ECF No. 

14-1 at 2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows for a motion to dismiss based 

on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “A plaintiff suing in a 

federal court must show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of 

whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction, and, if he does not do so, the court, on having 

the defect called to its attention or on discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless 

the defect be corrected by amendment.” Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env’t, 

236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926) 

abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)). 

IV. Discussion

Because federal court jurisdiction to review state court judgments is vested 

exclusively in the United States Supreme Court, district courts lack subject matter 

jurisdiction to review an appeal from a state court judgment. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 

 

2

“Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter the provisions of [California Code of Civil Procedure 

§§ 307–1062.5] are applicable to, and constitute the rules of practice in the proceedings mentioned in 

this Chapter.”

3

“Before the Supreme Court, a court of appeal, or the appellate division of a superior court renders a 

decision in a proceeding other than a summary denial of a petition for an extraordinary writ, based upon 

an issue which was not proposed or briefed by any party to the proceeding, the court shall afford the parties 

an opportunity to present their views on the matter through supplemental briefing. If the court fails to 

afford that opportunity, a rehearing shall be ordered upon timely petition of any party.”

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263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 

462, 483 (1983). Accordingly, a district court may not adjudicate an action seeking to 

reverse or nullify a final state court judgment. Id. Nor may it adjudicate issues 

“inextricably intertwined” with those adjudicated by the state court (e.g., claims that the 

judgment violates the non-prevailing party’s constitutional rights). Id. at 483. The nonprevailing party in state court cannot avoid a state court judgment by bringing a claim in 

federal district court that the state judgment violates the party’s federal rights. Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292-293 (2005); Johnson v. De 

Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994). 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes “de facto appeals” from state court 

judgments when a federal plaintiff asserts a legal wrong from an allegedly erroneous 

decision by a state court and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision. 

Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). The four requirements of the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine are: (1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 

must have filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended; (3) plaintiff must 

complain of injuries caused by the state court judgment; and (4) the plaintiff must be asking 

the district court to review and reject the state court judgment. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284.

A. Plaintiffs Must Have Lost in State Court 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies when a plaintiff was the losing party in 

state court. Id. at 291; Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1005-1006; Bennett v. Yoshina, 

140 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant Judge Gary Kreep issued a judgment 

against the Dorseys and denied two motions for a new trial filed by the Dorseys. FAC at 

¶¶ 31–35. The Defendant Appellate Judges affirmed the judgment. Id. ¶¶ 46, 50. The

Court finds that the Dorseys were the losing party in state court. 

B. Plaintiffs Must Have Filed Suit in Federal Court After the State 

Proceedings Ended

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal actions filed after the state court 

proceedings have ended. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284. “Proceedings end for Rooker–Feldman

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purposes when the state courts finally resolve the issue that the federal court plaintiff seeks 

to relitigate in a federal forum, even if other issues remain pending at the state level.” 

Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended 

on denial of reh’g (July 21, 2005) (citing Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta 

de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005)).

On February 29, 2016, Defendant Judge Kreep entered judgment against the Dorseys 

on the Detainer Action. FAC at ¶¶ 31–35. On January 31, 2017, and as modified on March 

2, 2017, the Defendant Appellate Judges rejected the Dorseys’ claims and unanimously 

affirmed the judgment issued by Judge Kreep. Id. ¶¶ 46, 50. On March 13, 2017, the 

Defendant Appellate Judges denied the Dorseys’ petition for transfer. Id. ¶ 54. The 

Dorseys do not allege that they have sought review of the decision of the Defendant 

Appellate Judges by the California Supreme Court. See id. Consequently, the Dorseys 

have exhausted their appeals. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(a)(1) (“A party may file a petition in 

the Supreme Court for review of any decision of the Court of Appeal . . . except the denial 

of a transfer of a case within the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court.”); Cal. R. Ct. 

8.500(e)(1) (“A petition for review must be served and filed within 10 days after the Court 

of Appeal decision is final in that court.”). The Dorseys filed their Complaint on May 1, 

2017, (ECF No. 1), after the period of time during which the Dorseys could have appealed 

the decision of the Defendant Appellate Judges had elapsed, see FAC at ¶¶ 46, 50 (The 

Defendant Appellate Judges issued their modified decision on March 2.); Cal. R. Ct. 

8.500(e)(1) (“A petition for review must be served and filed within 10 days after the Court 

of Appeal decision is final in that court.”). The Court finds that the state proceeding has 

ended for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.4

 

4

In their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the Dorseys contend that the state proceedings have 

not ended because the Dorseys have filed motions in the Detainer Action that have not yet been 

adjudicated. ECF No. 15 at 7:3-7. However, the FAC does not allege that the Dorseys have filed any 

pending motions in the Detainer Action. Even if the Dorseys have filed motions in the Detainer action, 

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C. Plaintiffs Must Complain of Injuries Caused by the State Court 

Judgment

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction 

over claims “complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment.” Exxon, 544 

U.S. at 291. The Dorseys allege that Defendants injured them by violating their Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. The Dorseys allege that Judge Kreep violated their Fourteenth 

Amendment rights by (1) failing to address the Dorseys’ contention that the service by mail 

of the three-day notice was defective; (2) failing to address the Dorseys’ contention that 

Leavitt filed its complaint prematurely; (3) failing to rule on the issue of whether there was 

sufficient evidence submitted at trial to justify the decision of the court. FAC at ¶ 57. The 

Dorseys allege that the Defendant Appellate Judges violated their Fourteenth Amendment 

rights by: (1) not addressing de novo the validity of the service by mail of the three-day 

notice; (2) denying supplemental briefing; (3) failing to address whether an objection based 

on the sufficiency of evidence introduced at trial can be waived; (4) failing to address 

whether a general denial of all allegations of the complaint requires defendants to plead 

affirmative defenses; and (5) failing to grant the Dorseys’ petition for rehearing. Id. ¶¶ 65, 

69. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s’ claims are based on injuries caused by the state-court 

judgments. 

D. Plaintiffs Must Be Asking the District Court to Review and Reject the 

State Court Judgment

District courts do not have jurisdiction over claims “essentially invit[ing] federal 

courts of first instance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments,” Exxon, 

544 U.S. at 283–84, or claims “inextricably intertwined” with state court judgments,

District of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483. A federal claim is “inextricably 

 

the state proceeding has still ended for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because “the state courts 

finally resolve[d] the issue that the federal court plaintiff seeks to relitigate in a federal forum.” 

Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 604 (citing Federacion de Maestros, 410 F.3d at 25).

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intertwined” with a state court judgment if its success depends on a determination that the 

state court wrongly decided the issues before it. Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (stating that “we have found claims inextricably intertwined where the relief 

requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its 

ruling” (internal quotes omitted)). “The clearest case for dismissal based on the Rooker–

Feldman doctrine occurs when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 

erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on 

that decision . . . .’” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)).

The Dorseys seek injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

Dorseys seek injunctive relief in the form of an order either (a) vacating the judgment in 

the Detainer Action or (b) requiring Defendants to provide a rehearing on the claims set 

forth in the FAC. FAC at ¶ 72.5 The Dorseys also seek a declaration: (1) that the 

Defendants’ alleged acts constitute fraud on the court; (2) clarifying the applicability of 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1177 to the five-day extension provision of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 

1013(a); (3) that the service of the three-day notice by Ms. Cuevas was invalid under Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 1162; (4) that the complaint for the Detainer Action filed on November 

17, 2015, was filed prematurely; (5) on the applicability of Cal. Gov’t Code § 68081 in 

regard to the failure of the Defendant Appellate Judges to grant a rehearing on an issue not 

briefed by either party; and (6) outlining all of Defendants’ violations of the California 

 

5 The Dorseys also request an order directing the Clerk of the San Diego Superior Court to seal the 

Detainer Action. FAC at ¶ 73. Parties only have standing to request relief that is likely to redress their 

alleged injuries. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The Dorseys’ alleged 

injuries are violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights caused by the decisions issued by the 

Defendants. FAC at ¶¶ 57, 65, 69. Sealing the Detainer Action would not redress those alleged injuries. 

Consequently, the Dorseys do not have standing to request an order directing the Clerk of the San Diego 

Superior Court to seal the Detainer Action, and the Court does not have jurisdiction over that request. See 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.

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Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3B(8). Id. ¶¶ 74–79. The Court addresses each request for 

relief in turn.

The Dorseys request an order from this court either (a) vacating the judgment in the 

Detainer Action or (b) requiring Defendants to provide a rehearing on the claims set forth 

in the FAC. On January 31, 2017, the Defendant Appellate Judges affirmed the judgment 

against the Dorseys entered by Judge Kreep. Id. ¶ 46. On March 2, 2017, the Defendant 

Appellate Judges denied the Dorseys’ petition for rehearing. Id. ¶¶ 47–50. An order 

vacating the judgment issued in the Detainer Action would “reverse [an] unfavorable statecourt judgment[].” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 283–84. An order requiring Defendants to provide 

a rehearing on the claims set forth in the FAC would reject the state court order denying 

the Dorseys’ petition for rehearing. FAC at ¶¶ 46–50. 

The Dorseys request a declaration clarifying the applicability of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 1177 to the five-day extension provision of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1013(a) in reference 

to the service of the three-day notice by posting and mailing. Id. at ¶ 75. The Dorseys 

argued at trial that § 1177 applied to extend § 1162’s three-day notice requirement to five 

days under §1013(a) when an individual mails any notice of litigation. FAC Ex. 4, ECF 

No. 8, at 52:6-13. At trial, Judge Kreep held that § 1013(a) only applied to post-litigation 

notices and that the complaint was filed properly on November 17, 2015. Id. at 52:14-27; 

54:6-13. Judge Kreep entered a judgment in accordance with that holding and the 

Defendant Appellate Judges affirmed the judgment entered by Judge Kreep. FAC at ¶¶ 31,

46. The Dorseys’ request for a declaration clarifying the applicability of § 1013(a) applied 

to § 1177 asks this Court to reject the judgment issued by Judge Kreep and affirmed by the 

Defendant Appellate Judges. 

The Dorseys request a declaration that the service of the three-day notice by Ms. 

Cuevas was invalid under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1162. Id. ¶ 76. Defendant Judge Kreep 

determined that the three-day notice was valid. FAC Ex. 4, ECF No. 8, at 54:6-13. Judge 

Kreep entered a judgment in accordance with that holding and the Defendant Appellate 

Judges affirmed the judgment entered by Judge Kreep. FAC at ¶¶ 31, 46. The Dorseys

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request for a declaration that the service of the three-day notice by Ms. Cuevas was invalid 

would reject the state-court judgment. 

The Dorseys request a declaration that the Leavitt’s complaint was filed 

prematurely. Id. ¶ 77. Judge Kreep held that the complaint was not filed prematurely. 

FAC Ex. 4, ECF No. 8, at 54:6-13. Judge Kreep entered a judgment in accordance with 

that holding and the Defendant Appellate Judges affirmed the judgment entered by Judge 

Kreep. FAC at ¶¶ 31, 46. A declaration stating that Leavitt filed its complaint prematurely 

would reject the state-court judgment.

The Dorseys request a declaration of the applicability of Cal. Gov’t Code § 68081 

to the failure of the Defendant Appellate Judges to grant the Dorseys’ request for a 

rehearing. Id. ¶ 78. The Defendant Appellate Judges denied the Dorseys’ request for a 

rehearing. Id. The Dorseys’ request would reject the Defendant Appellate Judges decision

denying a rehearing. 

The Dorseys request a declaration that the Defendants’ decisions constitute fraud on 

the court. Id. ¶¶ 74–79. The Dorseys also request a declaration outlining all of Defendants’

violations of the California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3B(8). Id. These requests are

“inextricably intertwined” with the judgments issued in the Detainer Action because 

granting them would require a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues 

before it. Cooper, 704 F.3d at 779. 

E. Conclusion

In sum, the allegations of the FAC allege that the Dorseys lost in state court then 

filed suit after the state proceedings had ended alleging injuries based on the unfavorable 

state court judgments and seeking relief that would reverse those state court judgments. 

Consequently, the Court lacks jurisdiction over all of the Dorseys’ claims under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

F. Leave to Amend

Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the Dorseys’ claims without leave to amend. 

(ECF No. 14 at 11:13-19). A district court may dismiss a claim without leave to amend if 

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“any proposed amendment would be futile.” Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 

296 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Klamath Medical Serv. 

Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Court finds that any proposed 

amendment would be futile because no plausible amendment to the Complaint would allow 

the Court to assert jurisdiction in compliance with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

V. Conclusion 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED. The FAC (ECF No. 8) is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.

Dated: March 28, 2018

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