Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08211/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08211-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Annessa Y. Morrison, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-08211-PCT-DGC

AMENDED ORDER 

Plaintiff Annessa Morrison, appearing on her own behalf, seeks review under 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the 

Commissioner”), which denied her disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security 

Act. Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by 

substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be 

affirmed. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff was born on November 9, 1968. She has an associate degree in graphic 

design. She has worked as a professional singer, a waitress, a sales manager, and a 

videogame tester. Plaintiff suffers from various impairments, including fibromyalgia. 

A.R. 55. As described by the Ninth Circuit, 

[F]ibromyalgia, previously called fibrositis, [is] a rheumatic disease that 

causes inflammation of the fibrous connective tissue components of muscles, tendons, ligaments, and other tissue. . . . Common symptoms . . . 

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include chronic pain throughout the body, multiple tender points, fatigue, stiffness, and a pattern of sleep disturbance that can exacerbate the cycle of pain and fatigue associated with this disease. Fibromyalgia’s cause is unknown, there is no cure, and it is poorly-understood within much of the 

medical community. The disease is diagnosed entirely on the basis of patients’ reports of pain and other symptoms. 

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see also 

Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2001); SSR 12-2P (July 25, 2012).

 On January 25, 2011, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning September 17, 2007. On 

November 9, 2012, Plaintiff appeared with her attorney and testified at a hearing before 

the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. On December 14, 2012, the ALJ decided 

that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The 

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the hearing decision, making the 

ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. 

II. Legal Standard. 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance. Id. It is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In determining whether substantial evidence 

supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. As a general rule, 

“[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 

which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

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III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process. 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final 

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of 

the Social Security Act through December 31, 2012, and that she has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since September 17, 2007. At step two, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia and depression. At step 

three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 

Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to 

perform: 

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[S]edentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) except that the 

claimant requires an opportunity to sit/stand for a few minutes each hour. 

The claimant can occasionally engage in postural activities. The claimant 

can frequently do hand work. The claimant must have limited public 

contact. 

A.R. 16. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past 

relevant work. At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Plaintiff’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. 

IV. Analysis. 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Credibility. 

Plaintiff argues: (1) The ALJ failed to apply SSR 12-2p in evaluating her 

fibromyalgia; (2) The ALJ failed to apply SSR 96-4p in evaluating the limitations caused 

by fibromyalgia and depression; (3) The ALJ failed to apply SSR 96-7p in assessing her 

credibility; and (4) The ALJ did not accurately present her testimony. The Court finds 

that two of the cited social security rulings, SSR 12-2p and 96-4p, are not directly 

relevant to Plaintiff’s argument, which focuses on whether the ALJ properly discredited 

Plaintiff’s testimony.1

 SSR 96-7p, which discusses how an adjudicator is to assess a 

claimant’s allegations of pain, is relevant to this argument. The Court will therefore 

address whether the ALJ properly presented and discredited Plaintiff’s “statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of her symptoms. 

 

1

 SSR 12-2p (July 25, 2012) addresses how an adjudicator is to decide if fibromyalgia is a medically determinable impairment, and how fibromyalgia is evaluated in assessing a claimant’s disability. SSR 96-4p (July 2, 1996) clarifies that a symptom is not a medically determinable impairment, that a medically determinable impairment must exist for a finding of disability, and that symptoms can cause exertional or nonexertional 

limitations. Plaintiff does not explain how the ALJ violated the two rulings, and the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to be consistent with them. The ALJ appropriately found that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia is a medically determinable impairment and evaluated it in assessing Plaintiff’s disability. The ALJ also did not confuse symptoms with impairments and appropriately considered the kinds of limitations that Plaintiff’s 

symptoms might impose. 

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1. Legal Standard. 

An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 

testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably 

be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 

995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “In this analysis, the claimant is not

required to show ‘that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity 

of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused 

some degree of the symptom.’” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th 

Cir. 1996)). Second, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the 

claimant’s testimony about the testimony of her symptoms only by offering specific, 

clear, and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. at 1014-15; Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 

1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014). 

To support a lack of credibility finding, the ALJ must “‘point to specific facts in 

the record which demonstrate that [the claimant] is in less pain than she claims.’” 

Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 592 (quoting Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

Specific facts that are relevant to this determination include: (1) the claimant’s reputation 

for truthfulness; (2) the inconsistencies in her testimony; (3) the extent to which 

claimant’s daily activities show that she is capable of working; (4) the extent to which the 

claimant seeks treatment for her symptoms; (5) the claimant’s failure to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment; and (6) the opinions of physicians and third parties 

concerning the nature and severity of the claimant’s symptoms. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 

504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th 

Cir. 1997); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 

2. Claimant’s Testimony. 

At the hearing (A.R. 27-53), Plaintiff testified that she lived in a house with her 

husband and eighteen-year-old daughter. She has previously worked as a professional 

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singer, a customer service representative for a financial company, a waitress, a sales 

manager for an auto-sales magazine, and a videogame tester. She had to leave her job as 

a customer service representative because she took too many sick days. She left her most 

recent job as a videogame tester because she was “in pain . . . [and] couldn’t sit in a chair 

and do the video game anymore.” A.R. 33. Plaintiff’s “big issue” is fibromyalgia. 

Starting eight years ago, “[t]he fatigue was enormous and I could count on a crash every 

day where you’re so exhausted you could barely move but you can’t sleep. The pain had 

started spreading through my muscles and I had very severe migraine headaches at the 

time.” A.R. 35. In the spring and fall, she experiences as many as fifteen severe 

migraines that incapacitate her for a day. In the summer and winter, she has about five. 

Plaintiff stated that she was not able to function during her migraines. A.R. 39. 

Plaintiff also testified about her daily activities. On “a good day I get up, spend a 

couple of hours watching T.V. in bed, taking my pills. I can make it down to get a 

muffin or frozen waffle for breakfast. I might be able to spend 20, 30 minutes cooking in 

the early evening, maybe an hour on the computer doing some research on my condition 

and the rest of the time I’m pretty much lying or leaning back in some way.” A.R. 46. 

On a bad day, she will come downstairs for food but will otherwise stay in bed. She has 

about ten bad days a month. Plaintiff can usually do thirty to sixty minutes of household 

chores a day, but has difficulty carrying laundry and vacuuming. She is unable to do 

grocery shopping on her own, although she sometimes accompanies her husband to the 

store. For hobbies, Plaintiff sculpts and paints on small canvases. For exercise, she does 

leg lifts and arm circles in the hot tub, and she can walk one or two blocks on “a good 

day.” A.R. 46. 

 3. ALJ’s Decision. 

In discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ relied on numerous pieces of 

evidence and testimony. A.R. 16-20. The evidence that the ALJ cited reveals two 

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony: (1) Medical opinions are not consistent with 

Plaintiff’s testimony, and (2) Plaintiff’s daily activities show that her symptoms are not as 

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severe as she claims. Based on these reasons and the evidence supporting them, the 

Court finds that the ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her pain and 

symptoms. 

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2001) 

is instructive. Kathryn Rollins suffered from fibromyalgia. She claimed that she 

experienced severe pain throughout her body and this pain prevented her from working. 

The ALJ found her testimony to be not credible. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit 

highlighted two findings that supported the ALJ’s decision. First, doctors who had 

examined Rollins had found that she was not restricted in her activity. And second, 

“Rollins’ claim to have totally disabling pain was undermined by her own testimony 

about her daily activities, such as attending to the needs of her two young children, 

cooking, housekeeping, laundry . . . and so forth.” Id. at 857. These findings, similar to 

the ALJ’s findings in this case, were a sufficient basis for discrediting Rollins’ testimony. 

As in Rollins, the medical opinions in this case are not consistent with Plaintiff’s 

claims of disabling pain. The ALJ gave great weight to two opinions. The first was a 

psychological evaluation by Donald Degroot, Ph.D, who concluded that Plaintiff’s “daily 

and social activities and abilities do not appear to be impaired” by depression and that her 

cognitive abilities were above average. A.R. 403. The second opinion was a medical 

evaluation by Sidney Eisenbaum, M.D., who physically examined Plaintiff and found: 

“She had a diagnosis of fibromyalgia made in the past, but today her clinical exam is 

normal. I do believe that she is capable of most activities.” A.R. 411. These opinions 

strongly support the ALJ’s decision. And “[w]hile subjective pain testimony cannot be 

rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, 

the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s 

pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(2)). 

The testimony and record regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities are also not 

consistent with Plaintiff’s claim of disabling pain. The ALJ highlighted the following 

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facts: Plaintiff engaged in container gardening, cooked basic meals, performed “all selfcare activities” such as bathing and washing, possessed a driver’s license and was able to 

drive, exercised “in her hot tub” and by going for walks, performed household chores 

such as washing dishes and doing laundry, cared for her teenage daughter, enjoyed 

hobbies such as painting and sculpting, played an online videogame frequently, wrote 

songs, auditioned for a rock band, and engaged in “fun activities” such as going to the 

movies and playing games with her family. A.R. 18-19.2

Plaintiff’s daily activities are similar to those of the claimant in Rollins, and they 

undermine Plaintiff’s pain testimony. A woman who can take care of her child, enjoy 

various hobbies, and audition for a rock band is not likely to be one who must spend most 

of her day in bed, as Plaintiff claims. The Court is aware that “the mere fact that a 

plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or 

limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her 

overall disability.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). But daily 

activities “may be grounds for an adverse credibility finding ‘if a claimant is able to 

spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of 

physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.’” Orn, 495 F.3d at 639 (quoting 

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). Here, Plaintiff has been engaged in 

extensive daily activities, and medical opinions have cast doubt on her claims of 

disabling pain. The ALJ, therefore, did not err in relying on Plaintiff’s daily activities as 

a reason for rejecting her testimony. 

In discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ also relied on other types of 

evidence. For example, the ALJ highlighted a medical evaluation giving Plaintiff a 

“probable” fibromyalgia diagnosis but stating that all of Plaintiff’s symptoms could not 

 

2

 The Court notes that the ALJ mischaracterized some of the record. While the 

ALJ stated that Plaintiff enjoys going to the movies, the cited report states that “[h]er fun activities include movies and games with the family. . . . She reports she is not able to continue her hobbies or fun activities[.]” A.R. 400. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ misstated that her daughter helps her prepare dinner once a week. Doc. 25 (citing A.R. 17). The Court finds this mistake to be immaterial. 

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be explained on the basis of fibromyalgia alone. See A.R. 251. The ALJ also noted that 

“[i]n February 2010, the claimant reported that she was not sure whether she had actually 

been diagnosed with fibromyalgia and had been advised by various specialists to find a 

‘life coach.’” A.R. 19. Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been to multiple doctors, 

that Plaintiff had found them unhelpful, and that doctors had not taken her complaints 

seriously. 

This evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia is not as severe as 

she claims. If doctors have doubted that fibromyalgia could cause all of her claimed 

symptoms, doctors have not taken her complaints seriously, and Plaintiff herself has not 

been sure of her diagnosis, then the ALJ could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff’s 

fibromyalgia is unlikely to cause the alleged symptoms. The Court recognizes that 

Plaintiff is not required to provide “objective medical evidence to corroborate the severity 

of the pain alleged,” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), and 

that “the ALJ may not reject subjective symptom testimony . . . simply because there is 

no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged.” 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282 (emphasis in original). But when combined with the other 

reasons the ALJ gave for discrediting Plaintiff, this evidence bolsters the ALJ’s final 

conclusion. In sum, the ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her pain and symptoms. 

B. Additional Arguments. 

 1. The ALJ Did Not Err in Discounting Treatment Records. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to records from various 

treatment providers. In her decision, the ALJ stated: “As for the other records, the 

undersigned has considered records from the claimant’s treatment providers and also 

accords them little weight as they do not give any opinion as to the claimant’s workrelated abilities and only contain notes documenting the course of treatment.” A.R. 20. 

Plaintiff does not explain how this statement was erroneous or point to specific records 

that the ALJ improperly discounted. Rather, Plaintiff cites one exhibit (A.R. 231-38) that 

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lists numerous records that document Plaintiff’s possible impairments. To the extent that 

Plaintiff asks the Court to review every treatment record and decide whether the ALJ 

properly discounted it, the Court declines to do so. “Plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing that the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial evidence or that the 

ALJ’s decision was based on legal error.” Santiago v. Barnhart, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 

1056 (N.D. Cal. 2003). By merely claiming error and citing an exhibit that lists 

numerous records, Plaintiff has not carried that burden. 

 2. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. 

Citing SSR 96-8P (July 2, 1996), Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing 

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.3

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of 

sedentary work and occasional “postural activities.” A.R. 16. This finding is supported 

by substantial evidence, including the opinions of Doctors Degroot and Eisenbaum. A.R. 

403, 411. Plaintiff also recounts portions of her testimony that are inconsistent with the 

ALJ’s finding. The Court has already found that the ALJ did not err in rejecting 

Plaintiff’s testimony. The ALJ’s RFC assessment was not erroneous. 

 3. A Significant Number of Jobs Exist in the National Economy.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found that there are a significant number 

of jobs in the national economy that she is capable of performing. Under the Social 

Security Act, a claimant is considered disabled if: 

[H]e is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 

economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in 

which he lives . . . . ‘[W]ork which exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country. 

 

3

 SSR 96-8p discusses how to appropriately assess a claimant’s RFC. The ruling defines the RFC as “an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” The 

ruling then lists the evidence and factors that an adjudicator may consider in assessing a claimant’s RFC. The ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC was consistent with this 

ruling. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). Interpreting this statute, the Ninth Circuit has found 

that 25,000 jobs existing in the national economy constitutes a “significant number.” 

Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 529 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff is capable of working as an address clerk and that there exist approximately 

84,000 address-clerk positions in the national economy. Under Ninth Circuit law, this is 

a sufficient number of possible jobs. 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

Dated this 30th day of April, 2015. 

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