Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01222/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01222-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1

 Plaintiff’s counsel used the minor’s first and last name initials throughout the

Complaint, presumably to protect the minor’s true name and identity. In Plaintiff’s Response

to the subject Motion, however, counsel did not redact the minor’s name, his date of birth or

his Social Security number. (docket # 8-3; Exhibit B at 3) If this omission was an oversight,

Plaintiff’s counsel shall promptly file a motion to seal this Exhibit, consistent with the

District’s ECF Manual; otherwise, it will remain a public document.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Austin on behalf of minor son,

S.A.,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona; et al,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-1222-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This action arises on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed on July 3, 2008.

(docket # 5) On August 4, 2008, all parties expressly consented in writing to magistratejudge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (docket # 6 and # 9) The Court concludes that oral argument on the pending Motion is unnecessary because the parties have

adequately briefed the issues. Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d

1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999). After considering the parties’ briefings and the relevant case

law, the Court will grant the Motion and will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend

some claims and without leave to amend others. 

BACKGROUND

On June 10, 2008, Plaintiff Christopher Austin, father of the minor, S.A.,1

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 The record does not indicate whether S.A. is presently incarcerated within ADOJC.

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now 17 years of age, filed this § 1983 action in the Maricopa County Superior Court.

Defendants timely removed this lawsuit to this United States District Court on July 2,

2008, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). On July 3, 2008, Defendants filed their Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), FED.R.CIV.P., for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, and Rule 12(b)(5), FED.R. CIV.P., for

insufficiency of service of process on Defendant Kellie Warren (“Warren”) only. (docket

# 5) 

Plaintiff’s Response wholly fails to address Defendant Warren’s claim that

service of process on Defendant Michael Branham (“Branham”), Director of the Arizona

Department of Juvenile Corrections (“ADOJC”), did not constitute valid service upon

Defendant Warren. (docket # 8) Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(5) Motion will be summarily

granted, the improper service will be quashed, and Plaintiff will be given an opportunity

to effectively serve Warren with process by a deadline. LRCiv 7.2(I); Randolph v. City of

East Palo Alto, 2007 WL 1232057, * 2-3 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Stevens v. Security

Pacific Nat’l Bank, 538 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1976).

THE ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff Christopher Austin claims that between August, 2007 and

September, 2007, his son, S.A., was sexually molested by an ADOJC employee, Officer

Lori A. Sommerville (“Sommerville”), while S.A., age 16 at the time, was incarcerated in

ADOJC’s Adobe Mountain School, Nova Unit, in Phoenix.2

 (docket # 1 and # 8 at 7) 

Plaintiff alleges that Sommerville “pled guilty on or about April 2008 to five counts of

Solicitation to Commit Unlawful Sex Conduct with a Person In Custody.” (docket # 1 at

¶ 10) Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants have negligently failed to exercise their

duty of high care to protect victims of [sexual] abuse and have treated [such] incidents

and occurrences with a cavalier indifference in violation of the state constitutional rights

of due process and equal protection.” Id. at ¶ 11 (emphasis added). Plaintiff claims that

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Sommerville’s “sexual misconduct was known or should have been known by those in

supervisory or higher level positions” at ADOJC. Id. at ¶ 22 and ¶ 27. 

Paragraphs 33-38 of the non-verified Complaint allege Defendants violated

S.A.’s rights under, among others, “the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution . . . when [the] incarcerated minor SA was sexually abused by an

adult[,]” ADOJC officer and employee Sommerville. Id. at 15-16. Paragraphs 39-44

further claim that “Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause to the United States

Constitution . . . [when] Defendants denied SA the right to safe and humane treatment as

a boy incarcerated by” ADOJC. Id. at 16-17. Significantly, there are no specific factual

allegations against Defendants Branham and Warren in the Complaint, detailing how

they knew or should have known of Sommerville’s sexual misconduct or her propensity

to commit such misconduct. There are no allegations in the Complaint as to Branham’s

and Warren’s positions of employment with ADOJC during the relevant time and

whether Branham and Warren are being sued in their individual or official capacities with

ADOJC. 

After setting forth 16 “general allegations,” Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges,

or attempts to allege, four separate causes of action or claims against the Defendants:

negligence (Count One), negligent supervision and hiring (Count Two), a Fifth

Amendment substantive due process violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count

Three), and an equal protection violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Four).

(docket # 1; Exhibit 1 at 11-17)

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss sets forth four separate grounds why

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which may be granted: 1) the State of

Arizona (the “State”) is entitled to statutory immunity for the criminal acts of its

employees; 2) the State is not a party within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 3) ADOJC

is not a proper party because it is not a jural entity separate and apart from the State; and

4) the Complaint alleges no specific facts to warrant any liability on Defendants Branham

and Warren. (docket # 5)

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Plaintiff’s Response contends, among others, that the Complaint contains

“more than sufficient allegations setting forth facts to state a claim for recovery against

the State of Arizona acting through the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections

(“ADJC”), Michael Branham, ADJC director and his deputy director, Kellie Warren, for

harms that resulted from the sexual molestation of Mr. Austin’s minor child, SA, by an

ADJC Officer while SA in custody.” (docket # 8 at 2) The Court disagrees.

RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

In order to survive a dismissal motion for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “more than labels and conclusions and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). It must contain

factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

“The pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely

creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id., (quoting 5 C. Wright &

A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)); Yadin

Company, Inc. v. City of Peoria, 2008 WL 906730, * 4 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“The Supreme

Court also explained that Rule 8 requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of

entitlement to relief.”) (internal quotations marks omitted). In Twombly, an anti-trust

case, the Court tightened the standard for surviving Rule 12(b)(6) motions established in

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” ). Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

at 1967-69. The Court expressed concern that Conley’s standard could lead to

unnecessary and expensive pretrial discovery just to demonstrate the groundlessness of a

plaintiff’s case in complex anti-trust litigation. Id. The Court held that a complaint must

include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974.

 “Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

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3

 The United States Department of Justice’s 38-page letter, dated January 23, 2004,

to Governor Janet Napolitano regarding its Civil Rights Institutionalized Persons Act

(“CRIPA”) and Section 14141 investigation of, among others, Arizona’s Adobe Mountain

School. (docket # 8; Exhibit A, 1-38)

4

 Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections’ Criminal Investigative Report, file #

: 2007-21542C. (Id; Exhibit B, 1-72) 

5

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides:

(a) Screening.--The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any

event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in

which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity.

(b) Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify cognizable

claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the

complaint--

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

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Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990); Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d

668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, a district court “may not look beyond the complaint to a

plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion

to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998).

Because Exhibits A3

 and B4 to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

docket # 8, were not properly submitted as part of the Complaint, the Court will not

“incorporat[e] by reference” and consider these exhibits in ruling upon Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss. Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); Amfac Mtg.

Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1978).

Prior to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a pro se prisoner/

litigant was entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to

amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). Subsequent to passage of the PLRA in

1996,5

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relief.

(c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term “prisoner” means any person

incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the

terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A (emphasis added). By its express definition of “prisoner,” this statute

applies to an “adjudicated delinquent” such as S.A., the minor herein.

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ment and “should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was

made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation

of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Citing Rule 15(a), FED.R. CIV.P.,

and prior Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, including Doe v. United States, 58

F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in Lopez,

stating “[t]he dismissal without leave to amend was therefore contrary to our longstanding rule that [l]eave to amend should be granted if it appears at all possible that the

plaintiff can correct the defect. ” Id. at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Neither counsel has cited, nor has this Court’s independent research

discovered, any Ninth Circuit authority applying the new Twombly standard in the

context of determining whether to permit a § 1983 plaintiff to amend his complaint.

However, Ninth Circuit practice allows counseled plaintiffs in § 1983 actions an

opportunity to amend their complaints to demonstrate viable claims which mitigates

harsh rulings on motions to dismiss which may be more technical in nature than

substantive. Yadin Company, Inc., 2008 WL 906730 at * 2 (“[t]he Court dismissed the §

1983 claim, the sole federal claim, with leave to amend because it failed to state an

actionable claim against Peoria pursuant to Monell . . . .”); Alexander v. City and County

of Honolulu, 2007 WL 2915623 (D. Hawaii 2007); Martinez v. County of Madera, 2005

WL 2562715 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 

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6 Plaintiff’s Response indicates that “[i]n the event information through disclosure or

discovery identifies other pertinent facts or parties, Plaintiffs (sic) request leave to amend the

Complaint.” (docket # 8 at 7)

7

 A.R.S. § 12-820(B) provides:

B. A public entity is not liable for losses that arise out of and are directly

attributable to an act or omission determined by a court to be a criminal felony

by a public employee unless the public entity knew of the public employee’s

propensity for that action. This subsection does not apply to acts or omissions

arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle.

A.R.S. § 12-820(B)

8

 In 1984, Arizona’s legislature enacted the Actions Against Public Entities or Public

Employees Act, codified at A.R.S. §§ 12-820 to 12-823. For a discussion of the legislative

history of this act, see City of Tucson v. Fahringer, 164 Ariz. 599, 600, 795 P.2d, 819, 820

(1990), and Note, A Separation of Powers Analysis of the Absolute Immunity of Public

Entities, 28 Ariz.L.Rev. 49, 50 (1986).

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Despite Plaintiff’s failure to formally move to amend his Complaint6 and

the Court’s overly broad indication in its August 7, 2008 Order that it would not grant

such amendment sua sponte, docket # 11 at 1, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint with leave to timely file an Amended Complaint, consistent with this Order.

ARIZONA’S IMMUNITY FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES

Relying upon A.R.S § 12-820.05(B),7 Defendants seek dismissal of, at

least, Counts One and Two which are predicated upon Sommerville’s sexual misconduct

with the juvenile, S.A. (docket # 5 at 2-3) Defendants correctly point out that their

“immunity is limited to situations where the public entity does not know of its

employee’s ‘propensity for that action,’ A.R.S. § 12-820.05(B), [and] Plaintiff has not

pled any facts from which one might infer that the State had the requisite knowledge.” Id. 

Even though Arizona’s limited immunity statute was enacted in 1984,8

 it

appears that no Arizona appellate court has directly addressed how much evidence must

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be pled and proven to establish a prime facie case of the State’s liability for the felonious

acts of its employees. In 2003, however, the Hon. Roslyn O. Silver, United States District

Judge, authored McGrath v. Scott, 250 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1233-35 (D. Ariz. 2003) and

predicted how the Arizona Supreme Court would rule on a similar immunity issue

presented in that case. In McGrath, Judge Silver drew an analogy with a different statute, 

A.R.S. § 41-621(L)(1), which contains language identical to A.R.S § 12-820.05(B), and

followed its interpretation by the Arizona Court of Appeals in State v. Heinze, 196 Ariz.

126, 993 P.2d 1090 (App.1999). Judge Silver concluded in McGrath that “[e]nough

evidence existed, despite no prior felonies by the State’s employee, to allow a jury to find

that if the State was ‘aware of the work environment [the State] created, it should have

anticipated even the final [felonies of rape and sexual assault] with which [the State

employee] is charged in these cases.’ ” Id. at 1234.

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to timely file an

Amended Complaint to plead sufficient facts, if he can, to meet the new Twombly

standard and survive another dispositive motion on the immunity issue.

WHETHER DEFENDANTS ARE “PERSONS’ WITHIN MEANING OF § 1983

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Alright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

266 (1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color

of law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Neither a state nor its employees acting in

their official capacity is considered a “person” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617

(2002); Bank of Lake Tahoe v. Bank of America, 318 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The State and its employees Branham and Warren are not subject to suit for

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9

 An exception to this immunity rule applies to claims for injunctive relief against a

state official in his or her official capacity. Bank of Lake Tahoe, 318 F.3d at 918. Because

Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages and not injunctive relief, see docket # 1 at 16-17, this

exception is not applicable to this case.

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damages in their official capacities.9 Because “it appears beyond doubt that [P]laintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his [§ 1983] claim[s] which would entitle him to

relief[,]” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1967-69, Plaintiff’s claims for damages in Counts Three

and Four against Defendants in their official capacities will be dismissed without leave to

amend.

ADOJC IS NOT A JURAL ENTITY

Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal of Defendant ADOJC because it is not

an jural entity separate and apart from the State of Arizona. (docket # 5 at 3-4) Plaintiff

apparently concedes that ADOJC is not a proper party to this lawsuit because his

Response wholly fails to address this issue.

“State agencies that may sue and be sued are known as jural entities;

non-jural entities are not subject to suit.” Morgan v. Arizona, 2007 WL 2808477, * 8 (D.

Ariz. 2007) (citations omitted). Citing “settled” Arizona case law and contrasting it with

governmental administrative agencies or entities “which are expressly authorized to sue

and be sued in their own right[,]” Defendants argue that “an action cannot be brought

against a state agency that lacks the authority to sue and be sued.” Kimball v. Shofstall,

17 Ariz. App. 11, 13, 494 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Az. App. Ct. 1972) (“Neither the constitution nor [Arizona] statutes provide that the State Board [of Education] is an autonomous

body with the right to sue and to be sued.”); Yamamoto v. Santa Cruz County Board of

Supervisors, 124 Ariz. 538, 539, 606 P.2d 28, 29 (Az. App. Ct. 1979)(“A court has no

jurisdiction until a party is brought before it who legally exists and is legally capable of

being sued.”). Id. at n. 3. Also see, Morgan, supra. (The Arizona Department of

Corrections “is a creation of the Arizona Legislature. . . The enabling legislation for

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ADOC does not authorize it to sue or be sued in its own right as a separate and distinct

legal entity.”). 

Plaintiff’s Response completely fails to address Defendants’ arguments that

ADOJC should be dismissed from this lawsuit because it may not be sued “as a separate

and distinct legal entity.” Morgan, 2007 WL 2808477 at * 8. Defendants’ Motion as to

ADOJC will be granted without leave to amend. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1967-69.

NO FACTS ALLEGED FOR LIABILITY OF BRANHAM AND WARREN

Defendants move for dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Defendants

Branham, Director of ADOJC, and Warren, Deputy Director of ADOJC, presumably in

both their official and individual capacities. The Court has already discussed dismissal of

these parties as Defendants in their official capacities.

Under § 1983, a supervisor is personally liable if he or she caused a

constitutional deprivation. Heath v. Maricopa County, 2007 WL 1526430, * 6 (D. Ariz.

2007) (citing Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994)). To establish a § 1983

claim against a supervisor, a plaintiff must show, “1) [the supervisor’s] personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or 2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Heath, 2007

WL 1526430 at * 6 (citing Redmond v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th

Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). As previously discussed, a state’s supervisors cannot be

held liable on any theory of vicarious liability under § 1983 and they “are not liable for

actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d

642 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989). The State’s supervisors are only potentially liable for their

individual actions.

State supervisors may be subject to § 1983 liability “even without overt

personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving

force of the constitutional violation.’ ” Hansen, 885 F.2d 642 at 646 (citing Thompkins v.

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10 Plaintiff’s reliance on Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) is

misplaced. This opinion was withdrawn and superseded on denial of rehearing by Hydrick

v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987)).10 A supervisor may also be liable for the

constitutional violations of subordinates “if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

The Complaint contains neither specific factual allegations against

Defendants Branham and Warren nor allegations that they are liable in their individual

capacities as supervisors for their own misconduct or that of Sommerville’s. There are no

allegations detailing exactly how these Defendants were directly or indirectly involved in

the deprivation of S.A.’s rights and no specific allegations of the actions they took which

led to the deprivation of S.A.’s rights. The Complaint’s bald conclusions without more

that Sommerville’s “sexual misconduct was known or should have been known,” docket

# 1, ¶ 22 at 14, by Defendants Branham and Warren and they failed to act to prevent the

sexual misconduct from occurring or reoccurring are just the kind of “labels and

conclusions” disfavored in Twombly. 127 S.Ct. at 1965. 

To be fundamentally fair to S.A., amendment of the Complaint is

authorized even his counsel should have anticipated this § 1983 action would be removed

to federal court which has applied the Twombly standard since May 21, 2007 in order to

reduce the costs of potentially groundless litigation. Because this Court is unable to

determine at this time if the Complaint may be cured by the allegation of specific facts,

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to timely

file an Amended Complaint to plead sufficient facts, if Plaintiff can, to comply with the

new Twombly standard.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, docket # 5, is

GRANTED solely as to (1) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims alleged in Counts Three and Four

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11 Counsel are encouraged to cooperate with each other and waive service of process

pursuant to Rule 4(d), FED.R.CIV.P., to reduce the costs of litigation. Hy Cite Corp. v.

Badbusinessbureau.com, 418 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1153 (D.Ariz. 2005) (“The Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure impose a duty on certain defendants ‘to avoid unnecessary costs of serving

the summons.’ ”). Waiver of service satisfies this Order.

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against the Defendant State of Arizona and Defendants Michael Branham and Kellie

Warren in their official capacities as State employees, and (2) Defendant Arizona

Department of Juvenile Corrections without leave to amend. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, docket

# 5, is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s remaining claims with leave to file an Amended

Complaint on or before Monday, October 6, 2008. Absent good cause shown, failure to

file an Amended Complaint by this deadline shall result in the denial of leave to amend

ab initio by operation of law and the Clerk is hereby directed to enter Judgment in favor

of Defendants and terminate this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s alleged service of process

on Defendant Kellie Warren is hereby QUASHED. Absent good cause shown and if an

Amended Complaint is timely filed, Plaintiff shall properly serve Defendant Kellie

Warren with the Amended Complaint on or before October 31, 2008 or this lawsuit may

be dismissed against her pursuant to Rule 4(m), FED.R.CIV.P.11 See, Mann v. Am.

Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Dated this 22nd day of September, 2008.

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