Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02168/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 12 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Roman Robaina, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIV 11-2168-PHX-PGR (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On January 26, 2012, Petitioner Roman Robaina, who is confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex-Safford, has filed a pro se First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (hereinafter “first amended habeas petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 5).

On July 3, 2012, Respondents filed an Answer, limited to affirmative defenses (Doc. 12), and

Petitioner has not filed a Reply.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner, along with 63 others, were indicted by a State of Arizona, Maricopa

County Grand Jury in September, 2007, on 161 felony counts: Petitioner was charged in the

following 29:

• Conspiracy to commit participating in a criminal syndicate (Count 1)

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

• Conspiracy to commit illegally conducting an enterprise (Count 2)

• Conspiracy to commit money laundering (Count 3)

• Conspiracy to commit human smuggling (Count 4)

• Conspiracy to commit assisting in a criminal syndicate (Count5)

• Conspiracy to commit illegal use of a wire or electronic communication (Count 6)

• Participating in a criminal syndicate (Count 7)

• Illegally conducting an enterprise (Count 9)

• Money laundering in the first degree (Counts 11)

• Human smuggling (Counts 42, 48)

• Illegal use of wire or electronic communication (Counts 63, 68, 72, 75, 77, 86, 106,

108, 109, 110, 111, 148, 149, 152, 153, 157, 159, 161)

(Exh. A.)

On February 20, 2008, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the state, wherein

he agreed to plead guilty to Counts 3, 4, 42, and 68. (Exhs. C, D.) The parties stipulated

that, as to Count 3, Petitioner would receive a prison sentence, and as to Counts 4, 42, and

68, Petitioner would be placed upon supervised probation upon his release from prison.

(Exh. C, at 2 ¶2.) The plea agreement set forth the range of sentence on Count 3: a

presumptive sentence of 3.5 years, a minimum sentence of 2.5 years (2 years if the trial court

found exceptional circumstances), and a maximum sentence of 7 years (8.75 years if the trial

court found exceptional circumstances). (Id., at 1-2, ¶1.) Petitioner agreed to “judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of sentence,”

and that the court, “[i]n making the sentencing determination, [] is not bound by the rules of

evidence.” (Id., at 3,¶7.)

Petitioner placed his initials next to all of the paragraphs of his plea agreement, and

signed at the end, indicating that he had “personally and voluntarily placed his initials in each

of the above boxes and signed the signature line below to indicate [he] read and approved all

of the previous paragraphs in [the] agreement, both individually and as a total binding

agreement.” (Exh. B, at 5.) During the plea colloquy with the court, Petitioner confirmed

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

that he had read and approved the agreement, that he had gone over it with his attorney, and

that he agreed with everything in it. (Exh. E, at 7-8.) Petitioner’s attorney informed the court

that he “spent approximately three hours in two sessions with an official court interpreter and

we went through this particular plea extensively and asked many, many questions ...and I’m

convinced that he thoroughly understands everything.” (Id., at 8.) The court then asked

Petitioner if his attorney’s representation was true, and Petitioner responded, “Yes.” (Id.)

The court also confirmed the sentence range for each of the offenses to which Petitioner was

pleading guilty, and the sentencing stipulation between the parties. (Id., at 9-11.)

Sentencing took place on June 2, 2008. (Exhs. J, K.) The court found the fact that

the offenses were committed for pecuniary gain, and the fact that accomplices were utilized

to be aggravating factors. (Exh. J, at 10.) The court did not find any mitigating factors, and

therefore sentenced Petitioner to the maximum term of 7-years in prison on Count 3, and

probation on the remaining counts, to begin upon Petitioner’s release from prison. (Exh. K.)

A. First Rule 32 Petition.

On June 28, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and was

appointed counsel. (Exhs. L, M.) On December 8, 2008, appointed counsel filed a Notice

with the court that she was “unable to find any colorable claims for relief to raise on

[Petitioner’s] behalf.” (Exh. N, at 2.) Thereafter, on December 17, 2008, Petitioner filed a

pro per Petition for Post-Conviction relief (hereinafter “PCR”), in which he requested a

sentence reduction based upon the following claims: (1) a lack of communication with

counsel regarding sentence agreed to in Petitioner’s plea agreement, (2) improper use of

sentencing enhancement factors, (3) Petitioner’s lack of understanding of his plea agreement,

(4) the prosecutor falsely represented Petitioner’s offense as a “long term crime” that was

committed for financial gain, and (5) Petitioner’s sentence should not have been enhanced

because there were mitigating factors and the crime was a crime of passion. (Exh. P.)

After the State filed a detailed Response to Petitioner’s PCR, Petitioner filed a second

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, followed by a Motion to Dismiss his “current” PCR.

(Exhs. Q, S, T.) In Petitioner’s request to dismiss his first PCR he indicated his intent to

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

raise, in a new PCR, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered

evidence, and that the reason he had not asserted these claims in his first petition was that

Petitioner is a Cuban national with “almost no English skills and [had] been reliant on

interpreters.” (Exh. T, at 1.) On May 11, 2009, the court construed Petitioner’s Motion to

Dismiss as a “motion to amend,” and, finding that Petitioner had not demonstrated good

cause as required by Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.6, denied the motion. (Exh. V.) The court then

granted Petitioner additional time to file a Reply to the State’s Response to his PCR. (Id.)

On July 31, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for special action in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, claiming that the state court abused its discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s second

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Exh. Y.) On August 6, 2009, the Court of Appeals

declined to accept jurisdiction. (Exh. Z.)

On October 5, 2009, the trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s PCR, finding

that:

The only grounds the Defendant offers that are even relatively close to any of

the reasons that Post-Conviction Relief are considered is the fact that some of

the facts were untrue, which would fall under Rule 32.1(e) newly discovered

material.

However, the facts that the Defendant offers, which are that the offense was

not long lasting and that the crime was not committed solely for financial gain.

These facts are not newly discovered material and even though he states that

he was unable to communicate this, Counsel for Defendant filed a sentencing

recommendation that stated Mr. Robaina was doing this because he thought he

was helping the people that he was bringing into the country.

As far as the remainder of Mr. Robaina’s arguments, lack of communication

between Defendant and attorney does not seem to have existed as Counsel for

Defendant filed a Sentencing recommendation seemingly based on a statement

from Defendant.

Accordingly, Mr. Robaina obviously communicated with his Counsel. As to

the Defendant’s next argument that he did not understand what he was

agreeing to, the Defendant not only signed and initialed all appropriate

portions of the Plea Agreement, he also stated in open court that he understood

to what he was doing and saying and that he had no questions.

Finally, the Defendant waived his right to have a jury look to his

mitigating/aggravating factors and furthermore, since an aggravated sentence

was not given this point is moot.

Furthermore, the State correctly cites State v. Brown, 212 Ariz. 225, 231

(2006), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial with respect

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

to aggravating factors necessary to enhance a sentence does not apply if the

defendant waived his right in a plea of guilty to jury fact finding on

aggravating circumstances.

Here, since the Defendant waived his right to jury fact finding on weighing the

mitigating factors against the aggravating factors, the Judge has the right to set

the sentence as he sees fit. This was done in this case and accordingly the

Defendant has no standing to address the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances in this case.

(Exh. AA.)

Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

B. Petitioner’s Motion to Correct Presentence Incarceration Credits.

On July 6, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion to Correct Pre-Sentence Incarceration

Credits, alleging that he was entitled to 20-days additional presentence incarceration credits

toward his sentence. (Exh. BB.) The State filed a response indicating its agreement that

Petitioner was entitled to 19-days additional credit. (Exh. CC.) On August 23, 2010, the

court entered an order giving Petitioner credit for an additional 19-days of presentence

incarceration toward his sentence. (Exh. DD.)

C. Second PCR Proceeding.

On October 24, 2011, Petitioner filed a second Pro Per PCR, arguing that new

Arizona case-law, as applied, would establish his innocence, that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction, and that his Constitutional rights were otherwise violated.

(Exh. EE.) The state moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Petitioner’s claims were

precluded under Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P., because they were raised or should have been

raised in Petitioner’s first PCR. (Exh. FF.) On November 14, 2011, the trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s second PCR, reasoning:

It is difficult to determine if the defendant has put forth any cognizable claims

under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. At first glance, it appears that the defendant is

claiming, pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(g), that there has been a significant

change in the law that if applied retroactively to the defendant’s case, it would

probably affect the outcome. To support his argument, the defendant cites

seven different Arizona Court of Appeal and Arizona Supreme Court cases.

However, all of the cases cited by the defendant had been decided by the

respective courts many years prior to the defendant committing the crimes he

was subsequently convicted of. Therefore, the defendant’s claim under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(g) would fail.

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

The defendant’s petition could also be read as making a claim under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(a) which states that a defendant may be entitled to postconviction relief if their sentences or convictions were obtained in violation of

their constitutional rights. Here, it appears that the defendant is claiming that

his convictions were obtained on the grounds of insufficient evidence.

However, it is important to note that the defendant chose to waive his right to

trial and to have evidence submitted to a jury. Therefore, any argument made

in regards to lack of evidence will not be relevant here.

It also appears that the defendant may be making an extremely delayed request

for reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of the defendant’s previous Rule

32 proceeding. The Court dismissed the defendant’s previous Rule 32

proceeding on October 6, 2009. Any motion for reconsideration pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(a) must be submitted to the Court within 15 days of the

decision being challenged. The Court will not entertain such a motion at this

time considering more than 2 years have passed.

A defendant must comply strictly with Rule 32 by asserting substantive

grounds which bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order for the

Court to grant relief. State v. Manning, 143 Ariz. 139, 141, 692 P.2d 318, 320

(1984). Defendant fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an

untimely Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 32.4(a).

(Exh. GG.) 

Petitioner did not seek review of the court’s dismissal in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

D. Petitioner’s Motion to Amend to Existing Post Conviction Relief to Have Ruling

Appeal Dismissal Review.

On December 2, 2011, Petitioner filed in the trial court a Motion to Amend to Existing

Post Conviction Relief to Have Ruling Appeal Dismissal Review. (Exh. HHH.) Although

filed as a pleading in court, Petitioner addressed the motion to the “Office of the Attorney

General,” and indicated therein that he is “writing this motion to request that the Rule 32

management unit review the decision to not further proceed in Petitioner’s post-conviction

relief.” (Id.) This motion was filed subsequent to Petitioner’s filing of his initial habeas

petition in this Court. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner’s initial habeas petition, filed on November 2,

2011, was dismissed sua sponte, without prejudice, by this Court for failure to name the

proper Respondent, and for failure to allege federal constitutional rights as to each claim.

(Doc. 4.) Petitioner then filed his first amended habeas petition on January 23, 2012. (Doc.

5.) According to Respondents, at the time of the filing of their Answer to Petitioner’s first

amended habeas petition, the trial court had not ruled on Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. 12, at

9.) 

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

In their Answer to Petitioner’s first amended habeas petition, Respondents argue that

Petitioner’s petition is untimely and should be dismissed, as it was filed past the 1-year

deadline imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C. §2244(d). 

DISCUSSION

The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). 

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period.

See id. Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a

limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely.

Petitioner’s conviction became final on November 4, 2009, which is 30-days after his first,

timely, of-right PCR was dismissed by the trial court, as Petitioner did not seek appellate

review. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S. —, —; 132 S.Ct.

641, 656 (2012) (for a state prisoner who does not seek review in the state’s highest court,

the judgment becomes final on the date that the time for seeking such review expires). Thus,

absent statutory or equitable tolling, the deadline for Petitioner to file his habeas petition was

November 4, 2010, thus rendering Petitioner’s first habeas petition, filed on November 4,

2011, and his subsequently filed first amended habeas petition untimely. Because

Petitioner’s Second PCR was filed after the deadline to file a habeas petition had expired,

even if this Court were to find that the second PCR had not been dismissed on procedural

grounds, its filing would not restart the clock. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823; Jiminez v.

Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Additionally, although Petitioner’s motion relating

to presentence incarceration credits likely does not constitute an application for postconviction or other collateral review within the meaning of the AEDPA, the motion was only

pending for 48-days, thus hypothetically extending the AEDPA statute of limitations

expiration date to December 22, 2010. Petitioner’s habeas petition would still be untimely

even if Petitioner was entitled to statutory tolling of that period.

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

Although Petitioner is not entitled to sufficient statutory tolling to render his habeas

petition timely, the statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, ––– U.S. –––, –––; 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).

However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his

way’” and prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S.

at 418).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s]

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969

(9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)

(stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high,

lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citation omitted). “When external forces, rather than

a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). Petitioner must also establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary

circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney

General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify

equitable tolling. Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of

the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not,

by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). In Petitioner’s first

amended habeas petition, Petitioner’s listed excuse for not filing his habeas petition on time

was his “lack of awareness” that he could file a habeas petition while he had a PCR

proceeding pending. (Doc. 5, at 11.) The record reveals however, that there were many

months during the running of the statute of limitations that Petitioner had no active postCase 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

conviction proceedings pending. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling

and his habeas petition is untimely.

Alternatively, even if Petitioner had filed his habeas petition on time, none of his

claims were presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. A state prisoner must exhaust his

remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary

v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly exhaust state remedies, a

petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s highest court in a procedurally

appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona,

a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly

pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either direct appeal

or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt to return to

state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of claims for

which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h) & 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief, except

for narrow exceptions); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 (time bar). Petitioner’s claims are procedurally

defaulted because, as evidenced by the state court record, he did not present them to the

appellate court, and any further attempt by Petitioner to properly exhaust his claims would

be futile.

The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless

a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991); Murray, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

Pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to “some external objective

factor” that prevented him from following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

presenting his claim. Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, I811 (9th Cir. 2011). Regarding the

“miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court has made clear that a fundamental miscarriage

of justice exists when a Constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent, or the subject of fundamentally unjust incarceration. See Murray, 477 U.S.

at 495-96. Petitioner makes no showing that a miscarriage of justice would result if this

Court were not to consider his claims, or cause for his noncompliance and actual prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, and alternatively that

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s

First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Doc. 5), be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s First Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 5) be DENIED and

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 14th day of January, 2013.

Case 2:11-cv-02168-PGR Document 14 Filed 01/14/13 Page 12 of 12