Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02981/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02981-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rogelio Benavides Gutierrez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Flannican; Terry Goddard, Attorney

General, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 05-2981-PHX-DGC (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Rogelio Benavides Gutierrez filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus on

September 27, 2005, challenging his convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court for

t wo counts of aggravated assault, and the imposition of concurrent 12 and 7 year terms of

imp risonment. The charges arose from an automobile accident which occurred while

Gutierrez was driving a t axi, exp erienced an epileptic seizure, and at a high rate of speed,

crashed into a police vehicle. Both vehicles burst into flames, causing serious injuries to

the police officer and injuries to Gutierrez's passenger, who was thrown from the taxi.

During the trial, the jury heard evidence of Gutierrez's prior seizure history over a sp an of

several years, including four driving-related incidents following seizures, his previous

denials to medical providers and the Motor Vehicle Division of the Ariz ona State

Department of Transportation of any seizure-related history or medications, and his failure

to medicate properly.

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He raises four grounds for habeas relief: I) the grand jury proceedings were

fundamentally unfair because exculpat ory information was not presented; II) there was no

reliable evidence presented at trial that Gutierrez had suffered a seizure within 2 years prior

t o the accident; III) Gutierrez was denied his right to a fair trial because, following his

conviction, the Arizona Attorney General announced her intention to investigate Ford

Motor Company for possible negligent design of the Crown Victoria; and IV) Gutierrez was

denied his right to a fair trial because he was not allowed to cross-examine the victim as to

motive or bias. Respondents contend that Grounds I-III fail to assert a federal

constitut ional claim, and that Ground IV is without merit. For the reasons stated below, the

Court recommends that Gutierrez's petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

On direct review, appellate counsel raised the following issues of trial court error:

1. Allowing fundamental irregularities in the determination of probable cause;

2. Failing to grant a directed verdict at the close of the state's case-in-chief or

after the verdicts were rendered;

3. Admitting prior bad acts evidence relating to prior alleged seizures;

4. Denying a design defect as a supervening cause under the facts of this case;

5. Barring impeachment of a witness on the issue of a civil lawsuit against Ford

Motor Company; and

6. Imposing sentences greater than the statutory minimum under the

circumstances of this case.

(Doc. #10, Exh B at 4).

In Ground I, Gutierrez reurges the issue appellate counsel raised on direct review:

that the grand jury proceedings were fundamentally unfair in that the state failed to present

the law prop erly and failed to present exculpatory information (Doc. #1 at 5). Gutierrez's

loss of this issue in state court conclusively decided the issue as t here is no federal

constitutional right to a grand jury indictment in a state court proceeding. Hurtado v.

Calif., 110 U.S. 516 (1884); U.S. v. Jordan, 291 F.3d 1091, 1094 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002). Gutierrez

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attempted to make a broader argument in his state court appeal. He argued that his Federal

Constitutional Due Process right to a fair trial "encompasses the right to a fair

determination of probable cause to believe that the Defendant committed the crime" (Doc.

#10, Exh B at 5). Gutierrez, however, does not refer to any federal source of authority for

this argument in his habeas petition. 

Even assuming he could frame the issue as a federal claim to this Court, the state

court decided this issue, both on direct review and in Gutierrez 's special action, on state

law grounds: 1) that any error relating to grand jury proceedings is a "closed question"

after the jury determines a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and 2) the trial

court's conclusion, that none of the facts identified by Gutierrez met the statutory

definition of clearly exculpatory evidence, was not error. See Id., Exh A at 6, Exh G at 2.

Alt hough Gutierrez references the right to a fair trial, the issue is one of state law, and

therefore cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). This

Court will not reconsider the state court ’s determination regarding state law; it will honor

t he trial court’s statutory construction. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Melugin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478, 1487 (9th Cir. 1994).

In Ground II, Gutierrez argues, although not as clearly as he did on appeal, that

because "there was not reliable evidence that he had a seiz ure wit hin the 2 years prior to

the accident," the trial court should not have admitted the other act evidence. See Doc. #1

at 6, "Attach-Pages." He essentially argues t hat t he probative value of the other act

evidence, admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, was

substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice, and it should have been excluded under

a Rule 403 analysis. See Id. On direct review, the court of appeals decided that 1) t he

evidence was probative of Gutierrez's state of mind at the time of the incident; 2) it was not

unfairly prejudicial; and 3) the trial court properly instructed the jury on the limited use of

the evidence (Doc. #10, Exh A at 6-10). In doing so, it interpreted the Ariz ona Rules of

Evidence, and this Court will honor the trial court’s statutory construction. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire; Melugin v. Hames. There is no reason to believe on this

record that the state's ap p lication of its Rule 404(b) violated Gutierrez's due process rights

by rendering the proceedings fundamentally unfair. Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149,

1159 (9th Cir. 1994).

In Ground III, Gutierrez asserts he was denied a fair trial because following his

conviction, the then Arizona Attorney General "announced her intention to investigate

Ford Motor Company for its negligent design of the Crown Victoria" (Doc. #1 at 7). He

implies that the State of Arizona, through its agents, knew of the design defect. On direct

review, Gutierrez argued that the court committed fundamental error in not allowing him to

produce evidence of the design defect as a superseding cause, thus relieving him of

criminal liability. In finding no error, the court of appeals stated:

The fact that a vehicle might burst into flames when hit in the rear by

another speeding vehicle is neit her unforeseeable nor extraordinary,

regardless of whether the victim's vehicle contains a defective gas tank.

Moreover, Defendant's negligence created the very risk that caused the

harm. Defendant creat ed t he risk of catastrophic loss from a collision by

driving at speeds of over 100 miles per hour when he knew that he was

improperly medicated for his seizures. These acts created a great risk of a

collision resulting in serious injury.

(Id., Exh A at 14). 

Again, the state court relied on Arizona law in its interpretation of the criminal standard for

superseding cause. See Id. at 13. This Court will not reexamine the state court’s

determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire; Melugin v. Hames.

In Ground IV, Gutierrez contends, as he did on appeal, that he was denied the

opportunity to cross-examine the victim in an attempt to impeach him as to motive or bias.

Specifically, Gutierrez sought to elicit from the victim information about his intention to file

a civil suit against Ford M ot or Comp any . In rejecting his argument, the court of appeals

stated as follows:

This case is unlike the aut hority cited by Defendant, State v. Gertz,

186 Ariz. 38, 918 P.2d 1056 (App. 1995). In Gertz, the defendant was accused

of sexually abusing the alleged victim. Id. at 39-40, 918 P. 2d at 1057-58.

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During cross-examination, the alleged victim denied contemplating a civil

action against the defendant. Defense counsel argued that the victim's

testimony was mot ivated by the potential civil action. The trial court barred

the defendant from testifying that t he victim had sued him. Id. On appeal,

we held that the defendant was not merely attemp t ing to impeach the victim,

but was affirmatively attempting to prove motive or bias, and that the trial

court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to do so. Id.

at 42, 918 P.2d at 1060.

Gertz is inapplicable. Defendant sought to cross-examine the victim

officer regarding whether he intended to sue a third party, Ford M ot or

Company - not Defendant. Moreover, the credibility issue pivotal in Gertz

is lacking here. In Gertz, the absence of physical evidence of the alleged

sexual abuse made the victim's credibility crucial. In contrast, the victim

officer testified that he did not recall the collision or its aft ermath because he

was in a coma for weeks, and he testified only briefly about his injuries.

Nothing in his testimony contradicted Defendant's defense to the charge.

Defense counsel nevertheless argued that Gertz gave him an absolute

right to question a witness regarding a contemplated lawsuit. The superior

court disagreed, deciding that any claim against Ford Motor company would

not be relevant t o est ablishing any sort of bias or motive on the part of the

victim.

The superior court properly insisted on relevance, and correctly found

that the proposed quest ions lacked relevance. Defense counsel contended

that the officer might have a motive to exaggerate his injuries. The sup erior

court st ated that such a theory was "ridiculous," stating, "the officer's face

is burned off," and that he could not p ossibly exaggerate the extent of his

injuries. In light of the evidence, defense counsel conceded that he would

not likely argue t o the jurors that the officer's injuries were exaggerated. The

superior court did not abuse its discretion.

(Id., Exh A at 11-12).

A trial court may place reasonable restrictions on a defendant's right to present relevant

evidence, wit hout violating his constitutional rights. See United States v. Scheffer, 523

U.S. 303, 308 (1998). In this case, the trial court limited defense counsel's inquiry because

the victim's testimony was marginally relevant at best. See Delaware v . Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. 673, 679 (1986). "[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation

Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination [including]

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Id. 

In considering whether there was a deprivation of defendant's confrontation clause

rights at his trial the Court must consider whether the questioning would have promoted

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the p rop er function of cross-examination: "exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying."

See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974). Cross-examination about the victim's

potential civil suit could only be motivated by a desire to show that the victim's testimony

was affected by the potential of such a law suit. This is not an unreasonable concern and

it is the reason that such cross-examination is usually permitted. In this case, however, the

scope of such potentially shaded or biased testimony was limited by the fact that the

victim witness could not testify about the crash itself because he had no memory of it

what soever. (Doc. #10 Exh H, R.T. 2/21/02 at 64). Here the victim's testimony was almost

exclusively limit ed t o his injuries and thus our focus is on whether the victim's testimony

about his injuries could have been affected by the potential for a civil suit. In other words,

was cross-examination relevant or necessary to check any possible incent ive t o exaggerate

his injuries to bolster a p otential civil case. The answer is provided by the unique

circumstance of this case. It is clear from t he record that it would have been nearly

impossible for the victim to exaggerate his injuries t o a jury as he testified before them

sp eaking from a face which had been burned off. Defense counsel conceded at trial t hat

exaggerat ion of the injury was not a risk and Gutierrez acknowledged in his Reply filed on

direct review that the bias and motive sought to be exposed by the jury's knowledge of any

civil suit would not be the victim's bias and motive, but "the possibility of exaggeration or

other distortion of all testimony from p olice officers whose brother-in-arms was so

t ragically and so severely injured." (Id., Exh D at 7). No jury reasonably could have found

cross-examination about a potent ial civil suit to illuminate a possible motive for favoring

the prosecution.

The trial judge's decision to exclude such marginally relevant cross-examination did

not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights. The st at e court decision is a

reasonable application of clearly established Federal law.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Rogelio Benavides Gutierrez's Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc #1).

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This recommendation is not an order t hat is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any not ice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of t he dist rict court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure t imely t o file objections to the

Magistrat e Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court wit hout further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a p arty’s

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant

to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendat ion. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 26th day of May, 2006.

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