Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02316/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02316-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LARRY DEAN DAVIS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, a 

Delaware limited liability 

company; MIDLAND CREDIT 

MANAGEMENT, INC., a Kansas 

corporation; THE BRACHFELD 

LAW GROUP, A PROFESSIONAL 

CORPORATION, a California 

corporation; and ERICA LYNN 

BRACHFELD, individually and 

in her official capacity, 

Defendants. 

No. CIV. S-13-2316 LKK/CKD 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Larry Dean Davis sues defendants Midland Funding, 

LLC, Midland Credit Management, Inc., Brachfeld Law Group, PC, 

and attorney Erica Lynn Brachfeld, alleging claims under the 

federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–

1692p (“FDCPA”) and California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788–1788.33 (“Rosenthal Act”), 

as well as a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The 

gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendants wrongly 

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attempted to collect an obligation from him that was actually 

owed by another person. 

I. FORM OF MOTION 

 Defendants Midland Funding and Midland Credit Management 

have moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 36.) Defendants 

Brachfeld Law Group and Erica Lynn Brachfeld join in this motion. 

(ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff opposes, and also contends that this 

motion is more properly considered a motion to dismiss for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 40.) 

After the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Conference held on 

April 7, the court issued an order providing, in pertinent part: 

“Jurisdiction . . . is disputed by all defendants. Defendant 

shall bring on a motion for lack of jurisdiction within sixty 

(60) days from the date of this order.” (Order, April 8, 2014, 

ECF No. 32.) Defendants’ motion was filed on June 5, 2014, just 

within the sixty-day deadline. 

It does not appear that the court must decide whether 

defendants’ motion is better considered a motion for summary 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or a motion to dismiss for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Defendants 

incorrectly assert that this motion “involve[es] factual issues 

which also go to the merits . . . .” (Motion 3, ECF No. 36.) It 

does not. It presents a straightforward question of law: in order 

to proceed in federal court under the FDCPA, must a plaintiff, 

who alleges that he was subject to collection efforts on an 

obligation that he does not owe, be able to establish that the 

subject obligation is a “debt” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 

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§ 1692a(5)? Resolving this question does not hinge on any facts, 

disputed or undisputed, presented by the parties. As such, 

characterization of this motion as one brought under Rule 

12(b)(1) or Rule 56 appears irrelevant. 

 II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

Given the purely legal nature of the question presented, it 

is immaterial whether the court herein deems the factual 

allegations in the complaint to be true (as it would in a motion 

brought under Rule 12) or instead relies on the admissible 

evidence submitted by the parties (as it would in a motion under 

Rule 56). Therefore, the court will summarize the relevant facts 

from both sources. 

Plaintiff alleges as follows. 

In September 2011, plaintiff, whose name is Larry Dean 

Davis, received a telephone call from a representative of 

defendant Midland Credit Management, who was attempting to 

collect an obligation owed by one “Larry D. Davis.”1 (Complaint 

¶ 22.) Plaintiff informed the caller that the firm was attempting 

to collect from the wrong person, as plaintiff owed no debts. 

(Id.) Plaintiff provided the caller with the last two digits of 

his Social Security number; the caller confirmed that the numbers 

did not match the records for “Larry D. Davis.” (Id.) The caller 

stated that the firm would investigate the matter. (Id.) 

In March 2011, defendant Brachfeld Law Group sent defendant 

a collection letter. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 24, Ex. 1.) In a June 2011 

 

1 This individual is not a party to this action.

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telephone call, plaintiff was informed that the “Larry D. Davis” 

from whom Brachfeld Law Group was seeking to collect lived in 

Plano, Texas. (Id. ¶ 26.) In July 2011 and October 2011, 

Brachfeld Law Group again sent plaintiff collection letters. (Id. 

¶¶ 27, 29, Exs. 2, 3.) 

On October 4, 2011, defendant Midland Funding, LLC filed a 

lawsuit entitled Midland Funding, LLC v. Larry Davis, 

No. MCV0052495, in the Superior Court of California for the 

County of Placer (“State Court Action”).2 (Complaint ¶ 32.) 

Midland Funding’s counsel of record in the action was defendant 

Erica L. Brachfeld, on behalf of the Brachfeld Law Group. (Id. 

Ex. 4.) The complaint therein alleges that plaintiff is seeking 

to collect a debt assigned to it by Citibank. (Id.) 

Later that October, Plaintiff’s wife was served with the 

complaint in the State Court Action. (Id ¶ 57.) On the same day, 

plaintiff contacted defendants and informed them that he had no 

outstanding or unpaid credit cards accounts, and that they were 

suing the wrong person. (Id. ¶ 58.) But defendants continued to 

prosecute the State Court Action. (Id. ¶¶ 61.) 

In November 2012, plaintiff was served with a Request for 

Entry of Default and Court Judgment. (Id. ¶ 62, Ex. 5.) Plaintiff 

again called the Brachfeld Law Group to inform them that 

defendants had sued the wrong individual. (Id. ¶ 69.) Again, 

defendants did not dismiss the State Court Action. (Id. ¶¶ 70-

71.) 

 

2 The collection letters were sent to plaintiff at an address in 

Lincoln, California. (Id. Exs. 1, 2.) Lincoln is located in 

Placer County.

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On November 19, 2012, the state court entered a default 

judgment against plaintiff in the amount of $5,067.91 (Id. ¶ 74.) 

On December 6, 2012, plaintiff received another collection 

letter from defendants. (Id. ¶ 75, Ex. 7.) 

After plaintiff retained counsel, the default and the 

default judgment were vacated, and the State Court Action 

dismissed. (Id. ¶¶ 85-87.) 

The undisputed facts submitted by defendants are as follows. 

On August 31, 2010, Midland Funding acquired an unpaid 

financial obligation from CitiFinancial, Inc. belonging to an 

individual named “Larry D. Davis.” (Defendants term this 

obligation the “Account.”) (Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) 

3, ECF No. 36-1.) Midland Funding referred the Account to Midland 

Credit Management for collection; when the latter was unable to 

collect, it referred the Account to the Brachfeld Law Group for 

collection. (SUF 4, 5.) Midland Funding and Midland Credit 

Management lack any information as to whether the transactions 

which comprise the unpaid balance of the Account were incurred 

for personal, family, or household purposes. (SUF 6.) 

B. Procedural Background 

This action was commenced on November 6, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) 

Defendants Midland Funding and Midland Credit Management filed a 

joint Answer on December 17, 2013. (ECF No. 9.) Defendant 

Brachfeld Law Group filed an Answer on January 13, 2014 (ECF 

No. 16) and Erica Lynn Brachfeld filed an Answer on January 14, 

2014 (ECF No. 17); the latter two defendants then filed a joint 

First Amended Answer on March 16, 2014 (ECF No. 28). 

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II. ANALYSIS 

In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive 

debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that 

those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 

collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to 

promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt 

collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). That same year, the 

California Legislature enacted the Rosenthal Act “to prohibit 

debt collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices in the collection of consumer debts and to require 

debtors to act fairly in entering into and honoring such debts.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.1(b). In 1999, the California Legislature 

substantially amended the Rosenthal Act to incorporate many FDCPA 

provisions by reference, thereby making violations of these 

provisions into Rosenthal Act violations. Cal. Civ. Code § 

1788.17. While the FDCPA authorizes enforcement action by the 

federal Fair Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 1692l, both statutes 

largely rely on the efforts of private attorneys to regulate the 

debt collection industry. 

A. Defendants’ argument 

Defendants advance a textual argument for why plaintiff’s 

claims fall outside the FDCPA’s ambit. 

 Plaintiff has pled claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (“A debt 

collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence 

of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection 

with the collection of a debt”), § 1692e (“A debt collector may 

not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or 

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means in connection with the collection of any debt”), and 

§ 1692f (“A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable 

means to collect or attempt to collect any debt”). 

 Each of these provisions regulates debt collectors’ conduct 

when attempting to collect a “debt,” which the FDCPA defines, in 

turn, as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to 

pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, 

property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the 

transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household 

purposes . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 

 At trial, plaintiff would ordinarily bear the burden of 

showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants 

had violated the FDCPA. Among the elements that plaintiff would 

have to prove is that defendants were attempting to collect a 

“debt,” as defined by the statute. 

Defendants contend – and plaintiff does not dispute – that 

plaintiff is unable to establish whether the alleged obligation 

of “Larry D. Davis” which defendants sought to collect arose from 

a “debt.” But as (i) plaintiff is simply unaware of the nature of 

the transactions, if any, which gave rise to the alleged 

obligation, and (ii) each of the FDCPA provisions under which 

plaintiff is proceeding proscribes conduct in the collection of a 

“debt,” it follows that the FDCPA cannot apply to defendants’ 

conduct herein. Or so defendants’ argument goes. 

B. Authority cited 

Defendants cite three Ninth Circuit cases – Bloom v. I.C. 

Sys., Inc., 972 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that whether 

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an obligation was incurred for “personal, family, or household 

purposes” depends on the ultimate use of the borrowed funds); 

Slenk v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 236 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(holding that courts must “look to the substance of the 

transaction and the borrower’s purpose in obtaining the loan” in 

deciding whether it was incurred for “personal, family, or 

household purposes”); and Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 

2004) (holding that an obligation must be incurred in a 

consensual transaction in order to qualify for FDCPA protection) 

– in support of their position that plaintiff herein must prove 

that they were seeking to collect a “debt,” as that term is 

defined under 15 U.S.C § 1692a(5). 

 This court has previously read Bloom, Slenk, and Turner 

together to “yield[] the following test: a plaintiff alleging an 

FDCPA violation must be able to show that the obligation giving 

rise to the challenged collection efforts arose from a 

transaction, first, involving a consensual dealing, and second, 

the subject of which was primarily for personal, family, or 

household purposes. In deciding the second question, courts may 

look to the ostensible purpose for which the obligation was 

entered into, but it is the funds’ actual use that is paramount.” 

Davis v. Hollins Law, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 

(Karlton, J.). 

 Taken literally, the court’s prior reading of these 

precedents might appear to support defendants’ position. But, in 

the court’s view, these cases simply do not apply to the issue at 

hand, as in none of them does the plaintiff dispute having 

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incurred the subject obligation.3 All three instead concern the 

nature of the underlying obligation and whether the FDCPA was 

intended to reach the collection of such obligations. This is a 

legitimate inquiry because the FDCPA was not intended to address 

the collection of commercial debts. The issue presented herein is 

whether a debt collector that attempts to collect an obligation 

from the wrong person is subject to the FDCPA, even if there is 

some possibility that the underlying obligation stemmed from a 

commercial transaction. 

A number of prior cases reject defendants’ line of argument. 

See, e.g., Collins v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 2:12-

cv-138, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162624 (E.D. Tenn. Jun. 7, 2013) 

(“The Court believes that Defendants’ position — that a consumer 

cannot pursue an FDCPA action where she alleges that she lacks 

knowledge of the nature of the obligation because of identity 

theft — is untenable.”); Gonzalez v. Law Firm of Sam Chandra, 

APC, No. 13–CV–0097–TOR, 2013 WL 4758944 , 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

126375 (E.D. Wash. Sep. 4, 2013) (“Defendants ‘alleged’ that 

Plaintiff owed a debt when they mailed her ‘dunning’ letters and 

later garnished her wages using her Social Security number to 

 

3 Another case cited by defendants, Bartlett v. Blaser, Sorenson & 

Oleson, No. 4:13–cv–00017–REB, 2014 WL 2780462, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 85205 (D. Idaho Jun. 19, 2014) (Bush, M.J.), is similarly 

inapt. There is no allegation therein that defendants had 

directed collection efforts at the wrong plaintiff. Rather, the 

Bartlett court granted summary judgment to the defendants, on the 

grounds that the obligation that they sought to collect from 

plaintiff (a state court judgment stemming from allegedlynegligent plumbing work that he had performed) did not arise from 

a “transaction,” and therefore was not a “debt” within the 

meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). This holding is perfectly 

consistent with the rule derived above from Bloom, 972 F.2d at 

1067, Slenk, 236 F.3d at 1072, and Turner, 362 F.3d at 1219.

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identify her. The fact that the debt actually belonged to someone 

else does not strip Plaintiff of a cause of action under the 

FDCPA.”). 

 Ultimately, the precedents that defendants cite in 

support of their position are simply unpersuasive. 

C. Statutory interpretation 

It is also unclear whether defendants’ reading of 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692a constitutes sound statutory interpretation. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), the FDCPA subsection on which 

defendants rely, provides: 

The term “debt” means any obligation or

alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money 

arising out of a transaction in which the 

money, property, insurance, or services which 

are the subject of the transaction are 

primarily for personal, family, or household 

purposes, whether or not such obligation has 

been reduced to judgment. (emphasis added.) 

Another FDCPA provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3), reads: 

The term “consumer” means any natural person 

obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any 

debt. 

A final FDCPA provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), reads in pertinent 

part: 

The term “debt collector” means any person 

who uses any instrumentality of interstate 

commerce or the mails in any business the 

principal purpose of which is the collection 

of any debts, or who regularly collects or 

attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 

debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or 

due another. (emphasis added.) 

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The highlighted text strongly suggests that Congress intended the 

FDCPA to protect consumers who were subjected to collection 

efforts for obligations they did not owe. 

 Other courts concur. While the Ninth Circuit appears not to 

have considered the issue, the Eighth Circuit rejected an 

argument similar to defendants’ (albeit one based on subsection 

(3), rather than subsection (5), both quoted above), reasoning as 

follows: 

[R]esolution of whether the plain language of 

§ 1692a(3)’s “consumer” definition 

encompasses [plaintiff James] Dunham, someone 

mistakenly contacted by a debt collector, 

turns on the proper reading of the phrase 

“allegedly obligated to pay.” [Defendant] PRA 

argues that because it erroneously contacted 

the wrong “James Dunham,” it did not “allege” 

that Dunham was “obligated to pay any debt.” 

In other words, PRA only alleged that the 

“James Dunham” who actually owes the payment 

obligation owed a debt, not the “James 

Dunham” who filed this lawsuit. Thus, PRA 

contends, Congress’s decision to limit . . . 

protections only to “consumers” reflects a 

congressional desire to withhold a cause of 

action . . . from an individual like Dunham 

who a debt collector mistakenly contacts. 

Under PRA’s interpretation of the [FDCPA], a 

person who has been abused by a debt 

collector’s harassing tactics, which the 

FDCPA generally prohibits, could not invoke 

the protection of the FDCPA if the debt 

collector contacted the individual by 

mistake. This interpretation would read the 

phrase “allegedly obligated” to only apply to 

those who actually owe or owed the specific 

debt at issue, despite whether a debt 

collector asserted a person owes the specific 

debt. PRA’s position too narrowly constricts 

the plain meaning of “alleged.” [. . .] PRA 

alleged, albeit mistakenly, that Dunham owed 

the payment obligation. Simply put, a 

mistaken allegation is an allegation 

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nonetheless. Thus, we read § 1692a(3) to 

include individuals who are mistakenly dunned 

by debt collectors. 

Dunham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 663 F.3d 997, 1002 

(8th Cir. 2011). Another district court in the Ninth Circuit, 

faced with the same argument, chose to follow Dunham: 

The Court finds [Dunham’s] reasoning 

persuasive and adopts it in full. Defendants 

“alleged” that Plaintiff owed a debt when 

they mailed her “dunning” letters and later 

garnished her wages using her Social Security 

number to identify her. The fact that the 

debt actually belonged to someone else does 

not strip Plaintiff of a cause of action 

under the FDCPA. These claims may proceed. 

Gonzalez v. Law Firm of Sam Chandra, APC, No. 13-CV-0097-TOR, 

2013 WL 4758944, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126375 (E.D. Wash. Sep. 4, 

2013). 

 This court finds the reasoning in these opinions to be 

persuasive. By its plain text, the FDCPA encompasses claims 

brought by individuals subjected to collection efforts for 

obligations they are falsely alleged to have owed. 

Nevertheless, the court recognizes that the circular 

definitions in 15 U.S.C §§ 1692a(3) and (5) give rise to some 

confusion. Subsection (3) defines “consumer” as “any natural 

person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt,” and 

subsection (5) defines “debt” as “any obligation or alleged 

obligation of a consumer . . . .” It is therefore at least 

possible to argue that, even if the FDCPA protects persons dunned 

for others’ obligations, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) still requires 

plaintiffs to characterize the nature of the underlying 

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obligation as one incurred for “personal, family, or household 

purposes.” 

Such an interpretation runs afoul of the canon against 

absurdities, a longstanding principle of statutory 

interpretation. “All laws should receive a sensible construction. 

General terms should be so limited in their application as not to 

lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will 

always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended 

exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this 

character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail 

over its letter.” United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 

(1868). What must be avoided is “[t]o adopt such a construction 

[as] would put a stop to the ordinary business of life. [. . .] 

If a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, 

the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity. The court 

must restrain the words.” Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 

143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has 

cautioned that courts should invoke the canon only “rarely . . . 

to override unambiguous legislation.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 

Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002). Ultimately, as Justice 

Kennedy has observed, “[T]his narrow exception to our normal rule 

of statutory construction does not intrude upon the lawmaking 

powers of Congress, but rather demonstrates a respect for the 

coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act in an 

absurd way.” Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 

440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 

 It would be absurd to hold that a plaintiff who is subject 

to debt collection efforts for an obligation that he does not owe 

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is ineligible for the FDCPA’s protections simply because he 

cannot characterize the nature of that obligation. 

Such a holding is absurd because it would fail to restrain 

debt collectors from suing anyone, willy-nilly, whose name was 

similar to that of an alleged debtor.4 It is difficult to 

conceive of a more unfair debt collection practice than dunning 

the wrong person. This is particularly true given studies showing 

that anywhere from 29% to well over 90% of debt collection 

lawsuits result in default judgments in favor of the debt 

collector or creditor. See Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A 

Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 

Loyola Consumer L. Rev. 179 (2014). Given these statistics, it is 

quite likely that any given individual in plaintiff’s position 

who is sued for an obligation (particularly one who cannot afford 

an attorney) would not appear in court and be adjudged liable for 

someone else’s debt. Plaintiff himself was adjudged in default 

until he retained counsel. 

The law provides a variety of methods to collect on a 

judgment. To have one’s wages garnished or one’s bank account 

levied for a debt one does not owe would “put a stop to the 

 

4 It is no answer to say that plaintiffs could seek redress in 

state court. Many states have not enacted legislation regulating 

debt collection practices. And, while California has codified the 

Rosenthal Act, that Act is similar to the FDCPA in addressing the 

collection of “consumer debt,” i.e., “transaction[s] between a 

natural person and another person in which property, services or 

money is acquired on credit by that natural person from such 

other person primarily for personal, family, or household 

purposes.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(e) (emphasis added). In other 

words, a state court that chose to force plaintiffs to satisfy 

the Rosenthal Act’s statutory text would compel similar 

absurdities to those discussed herein. 

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ordinary business of life,” Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 460, 

for almost anyone. Congress could not have intended such a 

result. And, in fact, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, the 

FDCPA’s legislative history makes clear that “Congress designed 

the Federal Act to ‘eliminate the recurring problem of debt 

collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect 

debts which the consumer has already paid.’” Swanson v. S. Or. 

Credit Serv., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting S. 

Rep. No. 382 at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 

1699). 

To sum, applying the canon against absurdities ensures that 

the FDCPA will “receive a sensible construction.” United States 

v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1868). 

D. Policies underlying the FDCPA 

 Sound policy reasons also counsel against placing the burden 

on the plaintiff as defendants urge. Because dunning the wrong 

person is among the most unfair of debt collection practices, the 

FDCPA should be interpreted in a manner that incentivizes debt 

collectors to ensure that they direct their efforts at the right 

person. 

 Requiring wrongly-targeted plaintiffs to prove the nature of 

the obligation being sought would have precisely the opposite 

effect. 

In most such cases, plaintiffs lack any practical method to 

determine the nature of an underlying obligation. Such a 

determination would require the following steps: 

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1. Obtaining documents through discovery that memorialize 

the alleged obligation, e.g., credit card statements or a 

promissory note. Since it is the end use of any purchases 

that determines whether the obligation was incurred for 

“personal, family, or household purposes,” it is likely that 

the testimony of the person who incurred the debt would be 

required to characterize the proceeds’ use. 

2. Locating the person who actually incurred the obligation. 

The difficulty of this step should not be understated, given 

that debt collectors are in the business of locating 

debtors, and therefore (presumably) quite skilled at it. To 

require wrongly-dunned plaintiffs (or their attorneys) to be 

better at locating alleged debtors than debt collectors 

themselves is the quintessence of an absurdity. 

3. Subpoenaing the actual obligee’s testimony for 

deposition. Note that an individual who allegedly owes a 

debt, but has to date been left alone by debt collectors, is 

unlikely to voluntarily testify as to the composition of 

that debt. And even if the actual obligee is subject to the 

court’s subpoena power, he or she may be able to quash the 

subpoena as unduly burdensome. See Fed R. Civ. P. 45.5

 

 

5 Incidentally, if the court were to adopt defendant’s reading of 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), then it would certainly have to deny the 

instant motion as premature. This action recently commenced and 

plaintiff has had no opportunity to conduct the arduous efforts 

that would be required to obtain documents from the alleged 

original creditor, locate the real “Larry Dean Davis” (an 

individual last known to be in Texas), and then compelling and 

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Congress could not have intended to erect such hurdles. 

Finally, even this line of reasoning assumes that there 

actually is an underlying debt to collect. Debt collectors 

sometimes try to collect nonexistent debts. See, e.g., Tourgeman 

v. Collins Fin. Servs., __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 2870174, 2014 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 11940 (9th Cir. Jun. 25, 2014) (“According to 

Tourgeman, he completed repayment within two years of buying the 

computer. But Dell Financial’s records reflected otherwise. 

Tourgeman’s allegedly outstanding debt therefore was charged off 

and then sold, along with more than 85,000 other Dell Financial 

debts, to Collins Financial Services.”); Chiverton v. Fed. Fin. 

Grp., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D. Conn. 2005) (“The 

defendant told Chiverton that it had purchased the debt Chiverton 

owed to Fleet Bank and was trying to collect it. Chiverton again 

disputed the debt and informed the defendant that he had 

satisfied the debt in full. This time, Chiverton faxed the 

defendant copies of documents verifying that the debt was no 

longer outstanding.”). And how are individuals to protect 

themselves from unscrupulous debt collectors who invent debts out 

of whole cloth? It may be months or years before law enforcement 

became aware of, and could halt, such activities. 

In Tourgeman, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, in enacting 

the FDCPA, “Congress intended to achieve its goal of regulating 

debt collectors’ conduct by motivating consumers to bring 

enforcement actions if they are the targets of unlawful 

 

conducting his deposition. 

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collection efforts.” Id., 2014 WL 2870174 at *6, 2014 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 11940 at 20. To exempt collection activities directed at 

the wrong individual from FDCPA coverage would undoubtedly 

undermine this goal. Ultimately, “[b]ecause the FDCPA . . . is a 

remedial statute, it should be construed liberally in favor of 

the consumer.” Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs. Inc., 

460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Riddle, 

305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002)). 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment (ECF No. 36) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 6, 2014. 

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