Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01779/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01779-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:185 Employee Pension Plan

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERTO PASTRANA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO: 06-CV-1779 W(AJB)

ORDER GRANTING IN-PART

AND DENYING IN-PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[DOC. NOS. 71, 74]

 v.

LOCAL 9509, COMMUNICATIONS

WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, a

Labor Organization; et al., 

Defendants.

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ summary-judgment motions. The Court

decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civil Local

Rule 7.1(d.1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN-PART and

DENIES IN-PART the motions (Doc. Nos. 71, 74).

//

//

//

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I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Pacific Bell Telephone Company (“PacBell”) is a regulated public utility,

and is a subsidiary of AT&T, Inc. (PacBell’s MSJ, 1:1–2; Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”),

¶ 4.) Defendant Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO (“CWA”) is an

international union that represents over 700,000 workers in the telecommunications and

other industries. (Union’s MSJ, 2:2–4; TAC, ¶ 7.) Defendant Local 9509, Communications

Workers of America, AFL-CIO (“Local 9509”) represents workers in the

telecommunications industry in the San Diego area. (Union’s MSJ, 2:18–19; TAC, ¶ 5.)

Local 9509 and CWA (collectively, the “Union”) are the recognized collective bargaining

representative for certain PacBell employees. (TAC, ¶ 11.) During the relevant period,

Plaintiff Alberto Pastrana was a PacBell employee and Union member. (Id.) 

On August 25, 1983, Pastrana pled no contest to one felony count of Lewd and

Lascivious Acts Upon a Minor. (Pastrana’s Notice of Lodgement (“NOL”), Ex. 2.) Pastrana

was sentenced to eleven months in custody and three years probation. (Id.)

Approximately 14 years after his no contest plea, in January 1997, Pastrana applied

for a job with PacBell. (Union’s Sep. State., Material Fact (“MF”) 6; Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 6

at 1.) The employment application asked about any criminal record. Pastrana did not

respond to the question. (Id., 3.) However, during his interview, Pastrana disclosed his

conviction. (PacBell’s Sep. State, MF 30–31.) 

Pastrana was hired as a cutover technician and eventually transferred to a service

technician position. (PacBell’s Sep. State., MF 34.) During his time with PacBell, Pastrana

generally received satisfactory reviews. (Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 12 [Green Depo.] at 16:5–7.)

On February 1, 2005, Connie Green, Area Manager of Installation and Repair, was

told by another PacBell supervisor that an employee was listed on a website for registered

sex offenders, known as the Megan’s Law website. (Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 12 [Green Depo.]

at 16:8– 17:19.) Green and another PacBell area manager looked on the website and found

Pastrana’s picture. (Id., 19:3–12, 21:13–14.) 

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Green suspected that Pastrana had failed to disclose his conviction when hired, and

should be suspended. (Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 12 [Green Depo.] at 19:13–22, 23:4–25:14.)

Green, therefore, contacted the company’s labor office for advice on suspending Pastrana.

(Id.) Green then contacted Buck Carter in PacBell’s Asset Protection department to

investigate. (Id., 26:19–27:4.) Later that day, Pastrana was suspended without pay. (Id.,

35:1–8, Ex. 1 [Pastrana Depo.] at 346:4–10.) 

After conducting an investigation, Carter concluded that Pastrana disclosed his

conviction before being hired, and that Pastrana did not violate PacBell’s Business Code

of Conduct. (Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 14 [Carter Depo.] at 71:22–25, 86:4–22.) Despite

Carter’s conclusion, Green believed that the conviction provided PacBell with just cause

to terminate Pastrana. (Id., Ex. 12 [Green Depo.] at 83:20–84:2, 94:7–12; Ex. 24.) On or

about February 18, 2005, PacBell discharged Pastrana.

On March 1, 2005, the Union filed a grievance on behalf of Pastrana challenging his

termination. (PacBell’s Sep. State., MF 4.) The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)

provides for a three-step grievance process for any discharged “regular employee.” (Id.,

MF 5; Reynold’s Decl., Ex. A [CBA] § 7.05A1–3.) Each step consists of a meeting between

the Union–as the employee’s representative–and escalating levels of PacBell’s management.

(Reynold’s Decl., Ex. A § 7.05A1–3.) If the grievance is not resolved at any of the meetings,

the Union may elect to arbitrate the grievance. (Id., §§ 7.08, 7.10A.)

Nathan Cowell was Pastrana’s Union representative throughout the grievance

process. Cowell attended each of the three step-meetings. The final Step III meeting

occurred on June 13, 2005. At the conclusion of the meeting, PacBell refused to reinstate

Pastrana. On June 14, 2005, PacBell formally denied Pastrana’s grievance in a letter sent

to the Union, as Pastrana’s representative. (Smith’s Decl., ¶9; PacBell’s Notice of Lodgement

(“NOL”), Ex. G at 1.)

After the Step III meeting, Cowell telephoned Pastrana and told him about the

company’s position. Thereafter, the Union alleges that Cowell met with Bob Borunda

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1

In his opposition to the Union’s summary-judgment motion, Pastrana has agreed to

dismiss the Union from the second claim for violation of Penal Code § 290.46. (Opp’n to Union’s

MSJ, 27:8–11.) 

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(Local 9509's Chief Steward) and Sandra Martinez (Local 9509's President) to discuss

whether to proceed to arbitration. (Union’s MSJ, 10:16–11:3.) Given the nature of

Pastrana’s conviction and the fact that the Union had lost three previous arbitrations, the

decision was made not to pursue arbitration. (Id.) The Union alleges that it notified

Pastrana about the decision on numerous occasions in 2005. Pastrana alleges that he was

not notified until March 2, 2006. (Opp.’n to Union’s MSJ, p.19:17–19; Keramati’s Decl., ¶ 4;

Pastran’s Decl., ¶ 7.) 

On September 1, 2006, Pastrana filed this lawsuit against the Union and PacBell.

On January 4, 2008, Pastrana filed the Third Amended Complaint, which asserts three

causes of action for: (1) unlawful discharge and breach of the duty of fair representation

in violation of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185;

(2) violation of California Penal Code § 290.46; and (3) wrongful termination in violation

of public policy (predicated on the California Penal Code violation). Defendants’ motions

followed.1

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment

as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman

v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

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A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party

can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party

failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23. “Disputes over

irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

“The district court may limit its review to the documents submitted for the purpose

of summary judgment and those parts of the record specifically referenced therein.”

Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the

court is not obligated “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” 

Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Richards v. Combined Ins. Co.,

55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)). If the moving party fails to discharge this initial burden,

summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s

evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1970).

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat

summary judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to

the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252) (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of

the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient.”). Rather, the nonmoving party must “go

beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from the

underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475

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U.S. at 587. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or

she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations.

Pastrana’s first cause of action alleges that PacBell terminated him without just cause

in violation of the CBA, and that the Union failed to fairly represent him in the grievance.

The applicable limitations period is six months. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b); DelCostello v. Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). The statute begins to run when the employee

knows, or reasonably should have known, the union breached its duty of fair

representation. Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986). Where, as

here, the claim is based on the Union’s failure to pursue arbitration on behalf of the

employee, the reasonable knowledge is imputed and limitations period starts as of the

CBA’s deadline for electing arbitration. Cook v. Columbian Chemicals Co., 997 F.2d 1239,

1241 (8th Cir. 1993); Shapiro v. Cook United, Inc. 762 49, 51 (6th Cir. 1985).

Defendants contend that Pastrana’s claims are time barred because the Union

decided in June 2005 not to pursue arbitration, yet Pastrana did not file this lawsuit until

September 2006. Defendants advance two theories to establish that Pastrana knew or

should have known that by July 2005, the Union decided not to pursue arbitration. First,

Defendants contend that Pastrana had actual knowledge because he was specifically

informed about the Union’s decision. Second, Defendants allege that the CBA provided

Pastrana with constructive knowledge that the Union’s deadline for deciding whether to

arbitrate expired in July 2005. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that

disputed issues of fact exist as to each theory.

1. There is a dispute regarding when the Union actually notified

Pastrana about the decision not to pursue arbitration.

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The Union alleges that in June 2005, the decision was made not to pursue

arbitration. Thereafter, Defendants contend that the Union informed Pastrana about the

decision on multiple occasions.

According to the Defendants, Cowell told Pastrana about the decision not to pursue

arbitration sometime between June 14 and June 24, 2005, and again in late November or

early December 2005. (Union’s MSJ, p.14:18–22; Union’s Sep. State., MF 49, 53.)

Additionally, on February 8, 2006, Defendants allege that CWA representative Laura

Reynolds telephoned Pastrana, who admitted that Cowell informed him that the grievance

was not going forward, that it was being closed out and would not be arbitrated. (Union’s

MSJ, p.14:23–15:7; Union’s Sep. State., MF 57.) Thereafter, on February 10 and 28, 2006,

Reynolds allegedly had telephone conversations with Pastrana and his attorney, during

which time Reynolds confirmed the Union’s decision not to pursue arbitration. Based on

these facts, Defendants contend that the limitations period began no later than February

28, 2006.

Pastrana denies each of the Union’s factual allegations. He contends that he first

learned about the Union’s decision not to arbitrate on March 2, 2006, when Reynold’s

informed Pastrana’s attorney about the decision. (Opp.’n to Union’s MSJ, p.19:17–19;

Keramati’s Decl., ¶ 4; Pastran’s Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendants, however, argue that Pastrana’s denial

is based on a declaration wherein “Plaintiff conveniently alters his deposition testimony.”

(Union’s Reply, 1:11–15.) But neither Defendant has cited any portion of Pastrana’s

deposition transcript that contradicts the contention that he did not learn about the

Union’s decision until March 2, 2008. 

The Union’s contention that Cowell notified Pastrana sometime between June 14

and 24, 2005, and again in late November or early December 2005, is not based on

Pastrana’s deposition testimony. Rather, these factual allegations are based entirely on

Cowell’s declaration and deposition testimony. (See Union’s Sep. State., MF 49 at 22:15–17,

MF 53 at 23:15–25.) Moreover, the Union has not identified anywhere in Pastrana’s

deposition transcript where he acknowledges that Cowell told him about the Union’s

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With regard to material fact 49, the Union contends that Pastrana’s deposition testimony

is inconsistent with his declaration that Cowell informed Pastrana that the Union was “going to

take the grievance all the way up to arbitration.” (See Union’s Concordance 12:7–14:16.) But

regardless of whether Cowell made the statement, it does not establish when Pastrana learned

about the Union’s decision. As for material fact 53, the Union does not identify any

inconsistencies between Pastrana’s declaration and his deposition testimony. (Id. 19:7–19.) 

3

The Union relies on Radobenko v. Automated Equipment, 520 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1975)

in support of its argument. (Id. p. 1:16–17.) In Radoben, the Ninth Circuit held that a party may

not “create his own issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony. . ..”

Id. at 544. Because the Union has not established that Pastrana’s declaration contradicts his prior

deposition testimony, Radoben does not assist the Union.

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decision not to arbitrate. (See Union’s Concordance, MF 49 at 12:7–14:16, MF 53 at 19:7–19.2)

Thus, the Union has not established that Pastrana provided conflicting testimony in his

deposition and declaration.3

 

Similarly, the contention that on February 8, 2006 Pastrana admitted to Reynolds

that he knew about the Union’s decision is based on Reynold’s declaration and deposition

testimony. (Union’s Sep. State., MF 57 at 25:12–27.) At paragraph 9 in his declaration,

Pastrana denies Reynold’s statement. (Pastrana’s Decl., ¶ 9.) And the Union does not

identify any conflicting testimony in Pastrana’s deposition transcript. (Union’s Concordance,

MF 57 at 27:22–29:6.) Instead, the Union argues that Pastrana’s denial is insufficient to

create a disputed issue of fact because during his deposition, Pastrana testified that he

remembered “very little, other than I was not happy with whatever answers I got at the

time.” (Union’s Reply, 1, fn. 4, citing Pastrana’s Depo. 535:2–5, 537:18–538:6.) The Court

would be speculating if it were to construe this vague statement as an acknowledgment that

Pastrana knew the Union decided not to pursue arbitration. At best, Pastrana’s delayed

recall raises a potential credibility issue for the jury.

The Union’s claim that on February 10 and 28 Reynolds informed Pastrana and his

attorney about the Union’s decision is also based solely on Reynold’s testimony. (See

Union’s Sep. State., MF 59 at 26:9–25.) Pastrana and his attorney both deny Reynold’s

statement. (Keramati’s Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3; Pastrana’s Decl. ¶ 9.) The Union asserts that Pastrana

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The Union also contends that it is undisputed that on “June 24, 2005, Local 9509 advised

Plaintiff by mail that his grievance would not be taken to arbitration.” (Union’s Sep. State., MF 50.)

Pastrana disputes this fact. (See Pastrana’s Decl., 7.)

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and his attorney’s statements in their declaration are “off-point and irrelevant.” (Union’s

Concordance, MF 59 at 30:7–31:8.) The Union’s assertion is absurd. Keramati declares that

during the February 10, 2006 phone call, “Reynolds did not inform me that the local had

decided not to pursue Pastrana’s grievance.” (Keramati’s Decl. ¶ 2.) This statement is clearly

on point and relevant to the material fact raised. Moreover, the Union has again failed to

demonstrate that Pastrana’s or his attorney’s declaration are contradicted by other

testimony. 

Because disputed issues of material fact exist, Defendants’ request for summary

judgment on this ground is denied.4

 

2. The CBA does not establish that Pastrana had constructive

knowledge about the Union’s decision.

Defendants also argue that because Pastrana had a copy of the CBA and knew that

PacBell had denied reinstatement at the Step III meeting, Pastrana should have known that

the Union’s 35-day deadline for selecting arbitration expired on July 22, 2005. The Court

is not persuaded.

There is no dispute that Pastrana was given a copy of the CBA. (PacBell’s Sep. State.,

MF 6.) While Pastrana denies referring to the CBA, as a Union member Pastrana had a

duty to know his appeal rights. Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927–28 (7th

Cir. 1974); Cook v Columbian Chemicals Co., 997 F.2d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1993)

(“constructive notice of the existence of [union members]’s cause of action [against union]

could be imputed to him by operation of the collective bargaining agreement under which

he worked.”) Nevertheless, based on the CBA’s terms, the Court cannot find that Pastrana

should have known the Union’s deadline for choosing arbitration expired in July 2005. 

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5

 For example, Pastrana’s sister (who retired from PacBell and was a Union member)

either contacted or attempted to contact the Union on August 30, 2005, September 28, 2005 and

October 6, 2005 (Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 31 [Elvira Pastrana Depo.] at 38:17–44:1.)

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The CBA provides that the Union and PacBell could extend the 35-day deadline for

deciding whether to pursue arbitration. (Reynold’s Decl., Ex. A [CBA] § 7.10C.)

Additionally, Pastrana testified that after the Step III meeting, Cowell told him that the

“company’s position had not changed, that they were refusing to settle and refusing to

reinstate me . . . that as far as [Cowell] was concerned, they – you know, they should settle

or reinstate me, that he would continue to fight it, but that if it went into arbitration, it would

be a long process, that I would need to be patient.” (Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 1 [Pastrana

Depo.] at 435:9–436:6.) 

A reasonable inference could be drawn from the CBA’s terms and Cowell’s alleged

statement that Pastrana believed the Union and PacBell agreed to extend the deadline

beyond July 2005 for deciding whether to pursue arbitration. Such a belief would also be

consistent with Pastrana and his sister, Elvira Pastrana’s, continued efforts after July 2005

to contact the Union regarding the status of Pastrana’s grievance.5

 For these reasons, the

Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Pastrana knew by July 2005 that the Union

decided not to pursue arbitration.

3. Pastrana’s claims against PacBell commenced at the same time

as his claims against the Union.

 There is no dispute that after the Step III meeting, PacBell notified the Union of the

decision not to reinstate Pastrana. (Smith’s Decl., ¶ 9; PacBell’s NOL, Ex. G at 1.) Nor is

there any dispute that under the CBA, PacBell was not allowed to have direct contact with

Pastrana, and thus was required to provide notice of its decision to the Union, as Pastrana’s

representative. (Reynold’s Decl., Ex. A [CBA] § 7.05F.) PacBell therefore argues that the

Union’s alleged failure to notify Pastrana about the arbitration decision does not impede

the commencement of the statute of limitations as to Pastrana’s claims. (PacBell’s MSJ,

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7:7–21–23.)

In support of its position, PacBell relies on an unpublished Florida district court

case, Brown v. SCM Corp., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3209 (1985). In Brown, the court ruled

that the union’s belated notice of its decision not to arbitrate did not delay the running of

the statute of limitations on the union member’s claims against the company. Brown,

however, conflicts with several federal appellate decisions.

In Vadino v. A Valey Engineers, 903 F.2d 253 (3rd Cir. 1990), an employee filed suit

against his former employee for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. Among the

issues considered was “whether the statute of limitations may be tolled as to the employer

not only on the basis of its own actions and statements but also on the basis of assurances

given by the Union representatives.” Id. at 261. In holding that the Union’s conduct could

toll the employee’s claims against the employer, the Third Circuit explained:

A contrary holding would put the plaintiff in an untenable position because

of the interconnection between the two claims. If Vadino’s [i.e., the

employee’s] cause of action against A. Valey [i.e., the employer] were to

accrue at the time of the alleged breach of the collective bargaining

agreement and before the futility of further appeals to the Union became

apparent, Vadino’s ability to file a section 301 suit against A. Valey would be

ephemeral because such a claim could not be maintained until he could fairly

allege that the Union refused to process his grievance. [Citation omitted.] The

unfair representation claim is the necessary “condition precedent” to the

employee’s suit. [Citation omitted.] Allowing the section 301 claim to be

tolled until the unfair representation claim also accrues is consistent with the

congressional goal of resolving labor disputes in the first instance through the

collectively bargained grievance procedure, because the employee will be

encouraged to persist in efforts to have the union act on his or her behalf.

Therefore, the employee’s claim on the employer’s alleged breach of the

collective bargaining agreement is tolled until it was or should have been clear

to the employee the union would not pursue the grievance. [Citations

omitted.] 

Id.; see also Butler v. Local Union 823, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that claim

against employer did not accrue until claim against union).

Although the Court has not found a Ninth Circuit decision evaluating the issue,

Bliesner v. Communication Workers of America, 464 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2006) cited

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Vadino with approval, and acknowledged that a claim for “breach of a duty of fair

representation by the union is a prerequisite to a successful suit against the employer for

a breach of the CBA.” Id. at 914. To the extent that the union’s breach is a prerequisite

to the claim against the employer, the limitations period on Pastrana’s claim against PacBell

did not accrue until Pastrana’s claim against the Union accrued. See also Hill v. Georgia

Power Co., 786 F.2d 1071, 1077 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that an employee’s cause of

action against the union and employer accrue simultaneously in a hybrid case).

Accordingly, PacBell’s request for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations

is denied.

B. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation.

A union breaches its duty of fair representation when its conduct toward a member

is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253

(9th 1985) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). Negligence by the union in

handling a member’s grievance is insufficient to constitute a breach of its duty. Id. A

union acts arbitrarily when it ignores a meritorious grievance or handles it in a perfunctory

manner. Id. at 1253–1254.

The Union argues that it decided not to pursue arbitration based on the following

undisputed facts: (1) Pastrana was a convicted for child molestation and served jail time;

(2) PacBell had a policy of not hiring convicted felons; (3) Pastrana was hired in error;

(4) Pastrana’s job involved going into customers’ homes; and (5) PacBell terminated

Pastrana after discovering its error. The Union also considered PacBell’s expressed

concern about potential liability arising from permitting a convicted felon from entering

customers’ homes; the probability that an arbitrator would look unfavorably on Pastrana’s

claim; and recent arbitrations that the Union lost in cases viewed as stronger than

Pastrana’s. Based on these facts, the Union contends that its decision was neither arbitrary,

discriminatory or in bad faith.

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The Union objects to Sexton’s declaration on a number of grounds. Because the Court

is relying only on ¶ 10, the Court will deny the objection to the other paragraphs as moot. 

As for the Union’s objection to ¶10, at this juncture in the case, the Court finds Sexton’s

testimony admissible as a party admission. The parties do not dispute that when the statement

was made, Sanborn handled grievances for the Union. As such, her statement about Borunda’s

handling of Pastrana’s grievance appears to be within the scope of her employment. See Fed. R.

Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) (“A statement is not hearsay if [it] is offered against a party and is . . . a

statement by the party’s . . . servant concerning a matter within the scope of the . . .

employment.”) 

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Among Pastrana’s theories in opposition, Pastrana disputes the Union’s contention

that Cowell, Borunda and Martinez met in June 2005 and decided not to pursue arbitration.

Because Pastrana’s theory raises disputed issues of material fact, the Union’s request for

summary judgment of this claim must be denied. 

Pastrana contends that in January 2006, he talked to Borunda, who stated that

Pastrana’s “grievance was poorly documented, that he believed the case was at the district

and then provided Pastrana with the name of an attorney to contact.” (Opp’n to Union’s

MSJ, 23:8–12, citing Pastrana’s Depo. at 27–30, attached to Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 1.) Borunda

denies that this conversation took place. However, on summary judgment, the Court must

resolve all disputes in favor of the non-moving party. Assuming the conversation

occurred, a reasonable inference may be drawn that Borunda’s belief that the grievance was

at the district suggests that he did not attend the June 2005 meeting; otherwise Borunda

would have known that the local decided not to pursue arbitration.

Moreover, Pastrana’s theory is also (arguably) supported by Linda Sexton’s

declaration. Sexton contends that on January 6, 2006, she talked to Amelia Sanborn, an

Area Steward for the Union. (Sexton’s Decl., ¶10; Obj. to Sexton’s Decl., ¶4.) During that

conversation, Sanborn allegedly stated,

there was a lot of excitement at the local, that Mr. Borunda had not done

anything with a grievance of an outside tech who was fired and that Mr.

Borunda was now in hot water. [Sanborn] stated that Mr. Borunda had failed

to send the grievance to arbitration and that the grievance had timed out.

(Sexton’s Decl., ¶ 10.6

) Although Sanborn did not identify Pastrana as the “outside tech 

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The Court recognizes the Union’s contention that because Sanborn handled FMLA

grievances, her statements were outside the scope of her duties. But the Union cites no evidence

to establish the scope of Sanborn’s duties. As the moving party, the Court resolves the uncertainty

against the Union. If, however, at trial the Union establishes that Sanborn’s statements were

outside the scope of her duties, such testimony would not be admissible.

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who was fired,” a reasonable inference could be drawn that she was referring to Pastrana.

Pastrana’s theory raises disputed issues of material fact that require credibility

determinations and weighing evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Union is not

entitled to summary judgment on this ground.

C. PacBell Lacked Good Cause to Terminate Pastrana.

The CBA provides that employees cannot be terminated without just cause.

(Reynold’s Decl., Ex. A [CBA] §§ Art. 7.12B, 7.19A.) Because the CBA does not define just

cause, the parties rely on California law, which defines just cause as a fair and honest reason

for discharge. Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 330 (1981). 

PacBell argues that Pastrana’s conviction, and the fact that his work required him

to enter customer’s homes, constitutes just cause. (PacBell’s MSJ, 15:15–21.) PacBell

further argues that “the fact Pastrana’s criminal behavior occurred before his hire” does

not preclude a just cause finding. (Id., 13, 15–17.) The Court is not persuaded under the

facts of this case.

PacBell relies on College of St. Scholastica, 96 L.A. 250 (1991) (PacBell’s NOL, Ex.

LL at 462) to support the argument that pre-employment misconduct may constitute just

cause. PacBell’s reliance on that case is misplaced.

In College of St. Scholastica, the grievant was hired as a janitor by the College. As

a janitor, the grievant had keys to the student residence halls. Four months after he was

hired, the College learned that the grievant was charged with domestic abuse and criminal

sexual conduct five years earlier. Id., 96 L.A. at 246. During the investigation that

followed, the College also learned that after being hired, the grievant was again charged

with domestic abuse. The grievant was eventually terminated. 

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In finding that the College had just cause, the arbitrator first found that because the

College was not aware of the conviction at the time of hiring, the College did not waive the

right to consider the conviction in deciding whether to terminate the grievant. Id. 96 L.A.

at 250. Also relevant in the arbitrator’s decision was the amount of time that elapsed

between the conviction and hiring:

If the grievant had not just in March of 1990 [after being hired] engaged in

domestic abuse, which is in essence aggressive and physical conduct against

his wife . . ., I probably would not have been as concerned regarding his

misconduct back in 1984. However, the recent occurrence indicates to me

that he yet retains aggressive feelings against the female gender and thus is

not an employee who can be trusted and would be safe in an environment

involving substantial number of females as at the College. 

Id. 252. Finally, the arbitrator also recognized that the grievant’s length of employment

was important: “If the grievant had had [sic] an extended period of service with the

Employer, I would have given him a greater amount of consideration, even to the extent of

reinstatement because he would have had a greater investment in the position and in his job

and would have demonstrated that he had surmounted his prior conduct and was not an

unreasonable risk.” Id. at 254 (emphasis added). 

It is doubtful that Pastrana would have been terminated under the reasoning used

in College of St. Scholastica. Here, there is no dispute that before Pastrana was hired, he

disclosed his conviction to PacBell. (PacBell’s Sep. State., MF 30–31.) PacBell, therefore,

arguably waived the right to rely solely, if at all, on his conviction to establish just cause.

Additionally, unlike the grievant in College of St. Scholastica, Pastrana’s conviction

occurred 14 years before he was hired, and more than 20 years before he was fired.

(Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 2, Ex. 6 at 1.) While the Court believes that PacBell may have been

justified in removing Pastrana from a position in which he was entering customer’s homes,

PacBell may have had an obligation to attempt to find Pastrana another position within the

company. This is particularly true given Pastrana’s investment in the company in terms of

his years of service. And as the arbitrator in College of St. Scholastica suggests, the

significant lapse in time between Pastrana’s conviction and his termination (as well as the

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nature of the crime he was charged with) indicates that he was not a threat to other PacBell

employees. 

In addition, other facts suggest that PacBell lacked just cause to terminate Pastrana.

First, there is no dispute that after conducting his investigation, Buck Carter determined

that Pastrana did not violate PacBell’s code of conduct. (Pastrana’s NOL, Ex. 14 [Carter

Depo.] at 71:22–25, 86:4–22.) Second, the Union members involved in evaluating

Pastrana’s grievance admitted that they did not believe PacBell had just cause. (PacBell’s

NOL, Ex. F [Cowell Depo.] at 225:22–226, Ex. H [Borunda Depo.] at 81:19–82:6.) Third,

PacBell appears to concede that Pastrana’s conviction did not constitute just cause when

evaluated under the company’s seven-step analysis for evaluating just cause. (See PacBell’s

Reply, 6:22–24.) Instead, PacBell argues that the test is not applicable because it pertains

only “to cases in which the employee has committed on the job misconduct, which is not

at issue here.” (Id.) 

Assuming this contention is accurate, PacBell fails to identify any alternative test that

would be applicable to this case. Instead, PacBell cites a number of decisions, which

involved off-duty misconduct that occurred during the time of employment. (See e.g.

Taylor v. United States Civil Service Commission, 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967) (dismissed

by U.S. Air Force for off-duty misconduct); Hayes v. Dept of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535

(Fed. Cir. 1984) (off-duty misconduct after being employed for approximately 8 years).

Because this case involves a pre-employment conviction that was disclosed before being

hired, those cases simply do not apply. 

PacBell knew about Pastrana’s misconduct before he was hired. There is no

evidence before the Court that during Pastrana’s employment, PacBell received any

complaints regarding Pastrana. After nearly ten years of service, Pastrana was discharged

for the previously disclosed twenty-year old conviction. No attempt was made to reassign

Pastrana. No severance was offered to Pastrana. Under these undisputed facts, Pastrana’s

discharge was not fair and honest, and thus not based on just cause.

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D. The After Acquired Evidence Doctrine Limits Pastrana’s Damage

Claims.

PacBell argues that assuming Pastrana’s prior felony conviction does not constitute

good cause, the company was justified in terminating Pastrana because of subsequently

discovered wrongdoing. (PacBell’s MSJ, 22:16–23:9.) The Court agrees.

In order to prevail against the Union and PacBell, Pastrana must establish that the

Union breached its duty of fair representation and that PacBell lacked good cause to

discharge him. Bliesner v. Communication Workers of Am., 464 F.3d 910, 913–914 (9th

Cir. 2006). Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing

to justify the termination, the employer must establish “that the wrongdoing was of such

severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if

the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.” McKennon v. Nashville

Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362–363 ( 1995).

After Pastrana was terminated, PacBell discovered two separate incidents of

wrongdoing. PacBell argues that either incident justified his termination. The first incident

involved Pastrana’s arrest on December 29, 1999 for possession of methamphetamines.

(PacBell’s Sep State, MF 47.) As a result of his arrest, Pastrana did not report to work on

December 30 and 31. (Id., MF 48.) Rather than request personal time off for the absences,

Pastrana’s girl friend contacted PacBell and stated that he had a cold, thereby enabling

Pastrana to be paid for the absences. (Id.) 

Pastrana argues that the incident does not qualify as good cause for two reasons.

First, Pastrana contends that he was unaware that his girlfriend lied about him having a

cold. However, after Pastrana returned to work, he was reminded about the reason given

for his absence. (PacBell’s Sep State., MF 49.) Despite learning about his girlfriend’s

misrepresentation, Pastrana said nothing and accepted payment for the days missed. (Id.)

Pastrana next argues that PacBell has not established that the misrepresentation

would have led to his termination. But PacBell provided evidence that while Pastrana was

employed, PacBell discharged eight of nine employees who falsified the reason for missing

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work in order to get paid. (PacBell’s Sep. State., MF 51–53.) Such evidence is persuasive in

establishing that the employer would have terminated the employee. O’Day v. McDonnell

Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1996) 

PacBell also argues that Pastrana would have been terminated for misrepresenting

that he was still married to his ex-wife, Jennie Pastrana, so that she could receive medical

benefits. There is no dispute that only eligible Class I dependents, such as spouses and

children, are eligible for company medical, dental and vision benefits. (PacBell’s Sep State,

MF 54.) Nor is there any dispute that Alberto Pastrana and Jennie Pastrana divorced more

than four years before he began working at PacBell. (Id., MF 58.) Nevertheless, he

identified her as his “spouse” and enrolled her on his benefits plan. (Id., MF 56). As a

result, PacBell paid over $11,790 in benefits from November 1997 until Pastrana’s

termination in February 2005. (Id., MF 60.) PacBell contends that Pastrana’s deception

violated the company’s Code of Business Conduct and, when discovered, would have

resulted in his termination. (Id., MF 61, 62; PacBell’s MSJ, 25:11–14, citing Southwestern

Bell Tel. Co., 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 46 (1990).)

Pastrana does not dispute that he misrepresented his ex-wife’s status in order to

obtain benefits, but instead asserts that PacBell failed to prove that it would have

terminated him. But Pastrana offers no evidence supporting his contention, nor does he

offer any evidence refuting PacBell’s claim that he violated the company’s code of conduct

or that it would have terminated him. Moreover, given the amount stolen–over $11,000

in benefits–the Court is persuaded that PacBell would have terminated Pastrana.

Finally, assuming that PacBell would not have terminated Pastrana for one of his

violations, there can be little doubt that PacBell would have terminated Pastrana after

discovering both of his violations. Accordingly, Pastrana’s damage claims are limited to

the period from his termination until PacBell discovered his wrongdoing. See McKennon,

513 U.S. at 362.

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7

Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references in this section are to the California

Penal Code.

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E. Penal Code Claim

Pastrana claims that PacBell violated California Penal Code § 290.46 by using his

conviction information found on the Megan’s Law website as the basis for an employment

decision.7

 PacBell argues that they are exempt from section 290.46’s prohibition because

Pastrana’s job involved entering private residences, and PacBell is a public utility. The

Court agrees. 

Section 290.46(l) prohibits the use of information disclosed by the Megan’s Law

website for any purpose related to employment. Penal Code § 290.46(l)(2)(E). However,

section 290.46(l) includes an exception for the “authorized access to, or use of, information

pursuant to, among other provisions, Sections 11105. . . .” Id. § 290.46(l)(3). Section

11105 requires the Department of Justice to “maintain state summary criminal history

information” and provides that it may furnish this criminal history to any public utility.

Penal Code § 11105(a)(c)(10)(A). The section also allows the public utility to use the

criminal history information to fulfil “employment, certification, or licensing duties.” Id.

§ 11105(c). Specifically, non-nuclear public utilities may use the information “to assist in

employing current or prospective employees, contract employees, or subcontract

employees who, in the course of their employment may be seeking entrance to private

residences or adjacent grounds.” Id. § 11105(c)(10)(A).

It is undisputed that Pastrana’s job duties required him to enter private residences

in order to make repairs and conduct service. (PacBell’s Sep State, MF 34.) It is further

undisputed that PacBell is a public utility as defined in Public Utilities Code § 216.

Therefore, PacBell had the right to obtain Pastrana’s information directly from the

Department of Justice under Penal Code sections 290.46(l)(3) and 11105(c)(10)(A). 

Pastrana nevertheless argues that PacBell violated section 290.46 (l)(2)(E) because

it never obtained his conviction information directly from the Department of Justice, only

from the Megan’s Law website. This argument lacks merit.

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8

PacBell argues that because Pastrana’s third cause of action is premised on the Penal

Code § 290.46 violation, dismissal of the Penal Code claim also results in dismissal of the third

cause of action. Pastrana does not address this issue in his opposition. The Court agrees with

PacBell. See Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 (1999) (dismissing claim for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy because predicate FEHA violation claim failed.).

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The Megan’s Law website was developed and is maintained by the Department of

Justice. Penal Code § 290.46(a)(1) (“On or before the dates specified in this section, the

Department of Justice shall make available information concerning persons who are

required to register pursuant to Section 290 to the public via an Internet Web site as

specified in this section.”). As a result, the United States Supreme Court has noted that a

visit to this type of website is “analogous to a visit to an official archive of criminal

records.” See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) (holding that because the conviction

information is already available to the public, making the process more efficient, cost

efficient, and convenient cannot be an ex post facto punishment). 

PacBell was entitled to obtain the information regarding Pastrana’s conviction from

the Megan’s Law website. The Court cannot condemn PacBell for using a readily available

public service to find Pastrana’s conviction information when they could have obtained the

exact same information from the Department of Justice directly. Moreover, PacBell did

not rely solely on the information found on the website. PacBell employees further

confirmed with Pastrana that he had, in fact, been convicted of the particular crime

mentioned on the website. The appearance of Pastrana’s name on the website merely

served, in this case, to provide PacBell with notice that one of their customer-facing

employees had a sexual offense conviction on his record. The fact that this notification

resulted in an investigation and Pastrana’s eventual termination does not result in a

violation of section 290.46. PacBell was exempted from that provision by section

11105(c)(10)(A) and therefore cannot be held liable for its use of the Website.8

 

IV. CONCLUSION

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In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN-PART and DENIES INPART Defendants’ summary-judgment motions and ORDERS as follows:

• Defendant PacBell’s Request for judicial notice is granted.

• Summary judgment is denied as to Pastrana’s first cause of action.

• Summary judgment is granted as Pastrana’s second and third causes of

action.

• Based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine, Pastrana’s damage claims are

limited to damages from the date he was discharged to the date PacBell

discovered Pastrana’s wrongful conduct, as set forth in section III.D.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 19, 2008

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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