Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00873/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00873-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Phillip Dunn

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Matthew Cate, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-0873-NVW

ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought this section 1983 action

challenging the conditions of his confinement in two prisons within the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff’s claim against

Defendant Fisher was dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Only

Plaintiff’s claims for inadequate medical treatment against Defendants Cate, Greenman,

and Enenmoh remain. On November 23, 2009, the Court ordered the remaining

Defendants to provide further briefing on the two defenses asserted in their Motion to

Dismiss. Specifically, the Court asked Defendants to provide further briefing with

respect to: (1) whether Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel, and (2) whether Defendants are proper parties to this action in light of

their alleged lack of authority over the medical policies and practices that Plaintiff

complains of. The Court now resolves Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

Case 1:08-cv-00873-NVW Document 31 Filed 01/12/10 Page 1 of 8
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I. Background

Plaintiff claims that he was denied adequate medical care while he was housed at

the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison in Corcoran, California (SATF)

and at Avenal State Prison (ASP). Plaintiff suffers from various illnesses, including

Chronic Pain Syndrome, Degenerative Disk Disease, and Failed Back Syndrome. 

Plaintiff complains that Defendants have established a policy of arbitrarily denying

inmates access to pain medication. Plaintiff further claims that Defendants have

arbitrarily reduced or eliminated his pain medication, arbitrarily taken away his

wheelchair and knee braces and provided inadequate replacements, and prevented

Plaintiff from seeing the surgeon who operated on his back in 2006 and from obtaining

therapy after the surgery. 

On March 13, 2008, approximately three months before Plaintiff filed suit in

federal court, Plaintiff brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court also

alleging lack of adequate medical treatment. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that, while at

SATF and ASP, his medication was arbitrarily reduced or eliminated, and his wheelchair

and knee braces were taken away and inadequate substitutes provided. Plaintiff alleged

that the inadequate care provided to him was the result of established policies or

practices. 

In September 2008, the state court decided Plaintiff’s claims on the merits, finding

that Plaintiff was receiving appropriate review and attention with regards to his

prescription pain medication, and that assistive devices that addressed Plaintiff’s needs

and preferences had been or were being procured pursuant to a Corrective Action Plan

submitted to the court. The state court subsequently dismissed Plaintiff’s petition without

prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to file a new petition if medical personnel failed to comply

with the Corrective Action Plan. In re Dunn, No. 08W0047A (Cal. Super. Ct. Kings

County Sept. 15, 2008). 

Case 1:08-cv-00873-NVW Document 31 Filed 01/12/10 Page 2 of 8
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I. Standard of Review

To avoid dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must

“provide the grounds of [his] entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). The pleading must not merely allege conduct that is

conceivable, but a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. In considering a motion to dismiss,

“all factual allegations set forth in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to plaintiff[]." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. Analysis

A. Defendants’ Lack of Control Over Inmates’ Medical Care

Defendants assert that the Plata Receiver is the proper party in this action because

Defendants lack authority and control over medical care within the CDCR. The Court

directed Defendants to provide further briefing in light of the seemingly contrary and

persuasive reasoning of In re Estevez, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1445, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 479 (Ct.

App. 2008), which held that the state, through its appointed representatives, “cannot

abdicate its constitutional responsibility to provide adequate medical care,” even though a

Receiver has been appointed to manage the delivery of medical services to inmates in

California. Id. at 1463, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 492-93. Defendants responded that the

analysis of In re Estevez is inapplicable here because, in that case, the court held that

prison wardens no longer have authority to determine what medical care inmates receive,

and merely acknowledged that it would be proper for the warden to offer his or her

opinion regarding what would constitute adequate inmate medical care for the benefit of

the state court in fashioning appropriate habeas relief. 

Defendants’ reading of In re Estevez is incorrect. The court in that case did

acknowledge that “inasmuch as [California law] requires the writ of habeas corpus be

directed to the person having custody of or restraining the person on whose behalf the

application is made, the warden would appear to be the respondent, while the Receiver

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would appear to be the real party in interest.” Id. at 1462, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 492.

However, the court went further and rejected the California Attorney General’s claim that

the Receiver was the sole and proper party to respond to medical claims, and that the

warden need only respond to the extent necessary to establish the legality of the inmate’s

physical custody. The court stated, 

To the extent that the warden does not have control over an inmate’s

medical care due to specific restraints imposed by statute or court order, the

warden may defer to such party as is legally mandated to provide the

requisite care–at this juncture, the Receiver. However, we do not read the

orders in Plata so broadly that we can conclude, with certainty, that

responsibility for all inmate medical care has been removed from the state,

regardless of the adequacy of care provided by a delegated authority. In

part, we so conclude because the state, and through its appointed

representative, the warden, cannot abdicate its constitutional

responsibility to provide adequate medical care, concomitant with

which is the duty to assure said care is not dispensed without any

regard for the effect on the prison system as a whole. That

responsibility is uniquely that of the warden as representative of the

state, as opposed to being that of the Receiver. In short, the existence

of the orders in Plata, and the appointment of the Receiver, do not

relieve the state of its constitutional responsibility to determine whether

adequate care is in fact being provided, or whether the proposed [sic]

medical care or actions to facilitate that care are inconsistent with the

state’s overall constitutional responsibility for public safety and

welfare.

Id. at 1463, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 493 (emphasis added). 

Defendants attempt to distinguish In re Estevez by construing Plaintiff’s claims

narrowly. To wit, Defendants contend that Plaintiff seeks to hold them personally liable

in tort for establishing medical policies that harmed him, but that it is a matter of

judicially noticeable fact that the Secretary of the CDCR could not have established those

specific policies because the federal Receiver possesses the exclusive authority to do so. 

However, Plaintiff’s claim is essentially one for failure to provide adequate medical care. 

Plaintiff contends that he did not receive adequate medication and assistive devices for

his medical condition. The plaintiff in In re Estevez complained that he had not received

adequate post-surgical care, therapy, and consultations as recommended by his surgeon. 

These claims are virtually indistinguishable. Id. at 1456, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 487. 

Defendants do not adequately explain why the reasoning that the state cannot abdicate its

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The action in Medical Development International could not have proceeded in federal

court because the Eleventh Amendment would presumably have barred an action for

damages in federal court against the CDCR, and MDI sought damages. However, this is not

the case in a federal court action requesting prospective injunctive relief and/or damages

against state officers in their personal capacities. 

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constitutional responsibility to provide medical care, and therefore the warden, as a

representative of the state, is a proper respondent in a state habeas action alleging failure

to provide adequate medical care is not equally compelling in a federal action naming

Defendants and similarly alleging lack of adequate medical care.

Medical Development International v. California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, 585 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2009), lends further support to the conclusion that

Defendants are proper parties to this action. In that case, both the CDCR and the

Receiver took the position that they were immune from suit on a contract action seeking

damages--the Receiver because he was covered by judicial immunity, and the CDCR

because the claim against it arose from the CDCR’s compliance with the Receiver’s

orders. Id. at 1220. The court, however, disapproved of what it called a “Catch-22

gambit,” and explained that “some courthouse door” should be open to the plaintiff. Id. at

1221. The court further noted with approval that, “[i]t would be possible to let claims

against CDCR simply proceed against CDCR, presumably in state court, without directly

involving the Receiver or requiring him to be named as a party. Indeed, we have been

informed that some legal actions, such as individual suits by prisoners complaining about

medical services provided to them, have been treated that way.”1

 Id. The fair import of

both Medical Development International and In Re Estevez is that the Secretary of the

CDCR and his or her subordinates are proper parties in an action by an inmate alleging

lack of adequate medical care. Therefore, Defendants’ contention that they are not proper

parties in this action fails. 

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B. Preclusion 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred because a

California state court already adjudicated Plaintiff’s claims concerning the lack of

adequate medical care at SATF and ASP. Federal courts hearing § 1983 actions must

give preclusive effect to state court judgments. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of

Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984). To determine whether a state court judgment should have

preclusive effect in a federal court action, federal courts apply state rules governing

preclusion. Id. at 83-85. In California, a party is precluded from relitigating an issue

already decided if there was a final judgment on the merits, the issue decided in the prior

adjudication is identical to the one presented in the new action, and the party against

whom preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior

adjudication. Miller v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 376, 381, 214 Cal. Rptr. 125,

128 (Ct. App. 1985). California law also allows for the defensive use of collateral

estoppel by a party who was a stranger to the first action. Burdette v. Carrier Corp., 158

Cal. App. 4th 1668, 1688, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 201 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Bernhard v.

Bank of America, 9 Cal. 2d 807, 812-13, 122 P.2d 892, 894-95 (1942)).

A decision actually rendered in a California state habeas court action precludes an

identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent section 1983 action if the state

habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and determined

under federal standards. See Silverton v. Dept. of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th

Cir. 1981). Two issues that Plaintiff raises here were actually decided in Plaintiff’s prior

state habeas case. Those are whether Defendants have provided adequate assistive

medical devices and whether Plaintiff received appropriate prescription pain medication. 

With respect to the claim that Defendants did not provide him with adequate assistive

devices, the state habeas court found that, “In regards to [Plaintiff’s] other assistive

medical appliances, it appears that [the CDCR] has provided the same to [Plaintiff] and/or

is actively engaged in securing items which adequately address [Plaintiff’s] medical

needs.” With respect to the claim that Defendants did not provide adequate medication,

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to comply with the Corrective Action

Plan in his Response to Defendant’s Supplemental Brief for Motion for Summary Judgment.

However, the Court will not consider new claims raised in a responsive brief that were not

alleged in the complaint. 

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the state habeas court found that, “in regards to his prescription pain medications,

Petitioner appears to be receiving appropriate review and attention.” The state habeas

court also noted that the denial of the state habeas petition was without prejudice to

Petitioner’s ability to refile if Defendants failed to act in a manner consistent with the

Corrective Action Plan developed to satisfy Plaintiff’s medical needs. However, nowhere

in his complaint does Plaintiff allege that Defendants have failed to comply with the

Corrective Action Plan.2

 Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in

the prior state habeas action, the state habeas court rendered a final judgement on the

merits, and Plaintiff was a party to the previous action. Plaintiff is therefore collaterally

estopped from raising these claims in this action. 

Plaintiff, however, is not barred from asserting a claim for damages with respect to

the initial deprivation of his assistive devices. The state habeas court specifically declined

to address that issue stating, “In regards to [Plaintiff’s] claims concerning the original

confiscation of his wheelchair, such a claim for liability and damages is more properly

addressed in one of the alternate civil forums of recovery available to [Plaintiff].” Plaintiff

is also not barred from asserting a claim concerning Defendants’ alleged denial of therapy

and treatment following Plaintiff’s back surgery in 2006, because the state habeas court

did not address that issue. 

Defendants have also asserted the defense of res judicata. However, Defendants

have not satisfied their burden to shown that the doctrine of res judicata applies. In

California, a plaintiff is not barred from raising claims that could not have been raised in a

previous action. See Landeros v. Pankey, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1167, 1174, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d

165, 169 (Ct. App. 1995) (“Collateral estoppel does not apply to an issue which could not

have been raised in the prior proceeding.”); Vella v. Hudgins, 20 Cal. 3d 251, 255, 572

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P.2d 28, 30 (1977) (holding that judgment in unlawful detainer has very limited res

judicata effect because only a limited number of claims are cognizable in such actions). 

The state habeas court explicitly stated that with respect to Plaintiff’s claim concerning the

original confiscation of his assistive devices, such a claim for liability and damages could

and would not be addressed in the state habeas action. Defendants contention that

Plaintiff’s entire action is barred by res judicata therefore fails.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 19) is

granted in part and denied in part. All claims are dismissed except Plaintiff’s claim

concerning the initial deprivation of his assistive devices and Plaintiff’s claim that he was

not allowed to see the doctor or obtain therapy after having back surgery. 

DATED this 12th day of January, 2010.

Case 1:08-cv-00873-NVW Document 31 Filed 01/12/10 Page 8 of 8