Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00249/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aaron Antonio Beale, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV-09-249-TUC-DCB-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Aaron Antonio Beale, who is presently confined in the Huerfano County

Correctional Center in Walsenberg, Colorado, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for a Report and Recommendation. Before the Court

are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) and Respondents’ Answer to Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 8). Petitioner did not file a Reply. The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after independent review, deny the Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 26, 2005, police found several items of contraband in Petitioner’s car, which

led to him being charged with possession and transportation of a dangerous drug for sale,

possession of a deadly weapon during a felony and by a prohibited possessor, and possession

of drug paraphernalia (CR 2005-667). (Dkt. 8, Ex. A.) The State offered a plea agreement

in which Petitioner would be sentenced to a total of 9.25 years imprisonment for this case and

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Respondents were not able to locate a copy of the plea agreement initially offered in

Petitioner’s case, nor were they able to locate the transcript from the January 24, 2006 change of

plea hearing. (Dkt. 8 at 2-3 nn.1-2.) The facts regarding Petitioner’s change of plea proceedings

as stated herein are taken from the minute entries and transcripts from the trial court’s consideration

of Petitioner’s PCR Petition. Some correspondence in the record before this Court suggests that the

sentence offered in the plea agreement was 9 years, not 9.25. (Dkt. 8, Ex. G at Exs. C, D.)

- 2 -

a prior unrelated case (CR 2004-391).1

 (Dkt. 8, Ex. H at 18.) However, at the change of plea

hearing on January 24, 2006, Petitioner was unable to provide a factual basis for one charge

in the plea agreement: possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor. (Dkt. 8,

Ex. C, Ex. H at 28-29.) After the prosecutor explained the concept of constructive

possession, Petitioner indicated that he still did not understand. (Dkt. 8, Ex. C, Ex. I at 16.)

The court recessed to allow Petitioner to consult with his attorney. (Dkt. 8, Ex. C, Ex. E at

29, Ex. I at 16.) When proceedings resumed, Petitioner was still unable to provide a

sufficient factual basis for the plea. (Dkt. 8, Ex. C, Ex. H at 29-30, Ex. I at 17.) The trial

court advised Petitioner that he could re-schedule his change of plea hearing for January 31,

2006, and set a trial date of February 8, 2006, for CR 2004-391. (Dkt. 8, Ex. C.) When trial

counsel indicated a scheduling conflict with the morning of January 31, 2006, the trial court

expressed its willingness to find another time on January 31 to schedule a hearing if

Petitioner wanted to enter a plea. (Id.) The trial court concluded “‘[w]e either will or we

won’t, and Mr. Beale, I will either see you on the 31st or the 8th of February.’ At that point

it was the Court’s understanding that the matter would be tried if no plea was entered on

January 31, 2006.” (Id.)

No change of plea hearing occurred, the State withdrew the plea offer and CR 2004-

391 proceeded to trial. (Dkt. 8, Ex. C.) Petitioner attempted to accept the plea agreement

on the morning of trial, but the prosecutor had withdrawn the offer. (Id., Ex. G at 5-6.)

Petitioner was found guilty of two charges in CR 2004-391 and was sentenced to terms of

imprisonment to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed in CR-2005-667. (Id.

8, Ex. D at 3-4.)

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in CR-2005-667 wherein the sentences would

run concurrently to the sentences in CR-2004-391. (Dkt. 8, Ex. D at 3.) Petitioner agreed

as part of the plea deal that he would not pursue a special action to enforce the joint plea

agreement from CR-2004-391 and CR-2005-667. (Id. at 4.) On April 11, 2006, Petitioner

was sentenced to a total of fifteen years imprisonment. (Dkt. 8, Ex. F at 5.)

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) pursuant to Arizona Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32 encompassing both CR-2004-391 and CR-2005-667. (Dkt. 8, Ex.

G.) In his PCR Petition, Petitioner presented two, interrelated claims for relief: (1) trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately communicate the terms of the State’s first

plea offer; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner to accept the second

plea offer. (Id. at 6.) On January 15 and 25, 2008, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing

on Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (Dkt. 8, Exs. H, I.) On February 14, 2008, the trial court

denied the petition. (Id., Ex. J.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. In his petition

for review, Petitioner presented three claims for relief relevant to CR-2005-667: (1) trial

counsel was ineffective with respect to the original plea offer; (2) the PCR court erred in

evaluating the second plea agreement; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by

implicitly concluding that the state had not been estopped from withdrawing the plea

agreement. (Dkt. 8, Ex. K.) The Court of Appeals denied the petition for review in a

memorandum decision filed on February 5, 2009. (Id., Ex. B.)

DISCUSSION

On April 30, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, in

which he presents one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).

A. Exhaustion

Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his claims because he did not

file a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court. This argument is without merit.

Respondents’ argument arises from the statutory requirement that a petitioner exhaust

“the remedies available in the courts of the State,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) & (c), which

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

requires giving state courts a “fair opportunity to act,” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

844 (1999). In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit held that, in cases not carrying a life sentence or

the death penalty, “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal

habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Respondents submit that Swoopes was incorrectly decided and

has been implicitly overruled by more recent case law. (Dkt. 7 at 6.)

In support of their argument, Respondents cite Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004),

and O’Sullivan v. Boerckel. In Baldwin, a case appealed from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme

Court addressed the question of what constitutes notice of the federal nature of a claim

sufficient to satisfy the fair presentment requirement of exhaustion. In laying the

groundwork for its decision, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state

court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting

that court to the federal nature of the claim.” 541 U.S. at 29 (citations omitted). 

Swoopes was decided on remand to the Ninth Circuit for consideration in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision in the O’Sullivan case. In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit, just like the

Baldwin court, began by reiterating the general rule stated in O’Sullivan that, “in order to

satisfy the exhaustion requirement for federal habeas relief, state prisoners must file for

discretionary review in a state supreme court when that review is part of ordinary appellate

review.” Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009 (citing O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 843-48). Further, the

fact that a state employs a discretionary review system does not, in itself, make state supreme

court review “unavailable.” Id. (citing O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848.) The court recognized,

however, that the Supreme Court had “acknowledged an exception to the exhaustion

requirement,” when a State provides that a specific remedy is unavailable. Id. (quoting

O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847). 

The Ninth Circuit proceeded to assess Arizona’s discretionary review system. The

court cited two Arizona cases, State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 684 P.2d 154 (1984), and

State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), which made it clear that, “in cases not

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 To the extent Petitioner is attempting to raise any other IAC allegations, they were

not properly exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971);

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989).

- 5 -

carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, review need not be sought before the Arizona

Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. Thus, the

court concluded, “post-conviction review before the Arizona Supreme Court is a remedy that

is ‘unavailable’ within the meaning of O’Sullivan,” and unnecessary to exhaust state

remedies. Id. There is nothing in Baldwin that suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that this

analysis is flawed or that the holding has been overruled.

Also strongly suggestive of the continued vitality of Swoopes is that the Ninth Circuit

continues to cite the case for the very proposition Respondents suggest was overruled. In

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2005), the court stated that “[i]n cases not

carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Id.

at 998 n.3 (quoting Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010). At least one other circuit also has cited

Swoopes for this proposition without questioning its continuing validity. See Lambert v.

Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233 (3rd Cir. 2004). In light of this analysis, Respondents’

argument that the reliability of the holding in Swoopes is questionable fails.

B. Merits

In the petition, Petitioner articulates very little detail regarding the facts of his IAC

claim; rather, he incorporates the factual basis set forth in the petition for review. The one

IAC claim Petitioner properly exhausted by raising it in the PCR petition and the petition for

review alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately communicate the terms

of the first plea offer.2

i. Legal Standard

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) established a

“substantially higher threshold for habeas relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of

‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences.’” Schriro v.

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206

(2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . . .

demandsthatstate-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7

(1997)).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664

(9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim undersubsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists

of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction

became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006);

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s 

clearly established precedentsifthe decision applies a rule that contradictsthe governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s

application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner must show that the

state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.”

Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeasrelief is available only if the state

court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In

considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed

to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Miller-El II,

545 U.S. at 240.

ii. The IAC claim is without merit

Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance when his trial counsel failed

to adequately communicate the terms of a plea offer (including the element of constructive

possession) that would have resolved CR-2004-391 and CR-2005-667, thereby causing him

to lose the favorable plea. The governing federal law standard for claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984),

which recognizes a right to “effective assistance of counsel” arising under the Sixth

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Amendment. The Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel has two

components. A defendant must first demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient,

i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 687. It requires the defendant

to show that counsel’s conduct “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at

687-88. Counsel’s performance is strongly presumed to fall within the ambit of reasonable

conduct unless petitioner can show otherwise. Id. at 689-90. Second, a defendant must show

that the mistakes made were “prejudicial to the defense,” that is, the mistakes created a

“reasonable probability that, but for [the] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694.

Although Petitioner challenged his counsel’s performance with respect to the first plea

offer in his PCR petition, the PCR court concluded that because Petitioner was not

challenging the later plea negotiations or his counsel’s conduct with respect to the plea

ultimately entered in this case, there was no basis for relief. (Dkt. 8, Ex. J.) In contrast, the

court of appeals addressed Petitioner’s claim of IAC with respect to the original plea offer

and denied relief for the reasons set forth in its opinion addressing CR 2004-391. (Id., Ex.

B at 4.) Although neither Petitioner nor Respondents submitted, in this case, the court of

appeals decision in CR 2004-391, it is part of the record in Petitioner’s federal habeas case

challenging his 2004 conviction. Exhibits for Answer, Dkt. 7, Ex. K, Beale v. Ryan, No.

CV09-248-DCB-DTF (D. Ariz. filed Aug. 3, 2009).

Petitioner did not attempt to rebut any of the state courts’ factual findings, therefore,

they are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The court of appeals stated that

Petitioner admitted the prosecutor had explained constructive possession during the change

of plea hearing, and his counsel had reviewed constructive possession with him during

recess. Exhibits to Answer, Dkt. 7, Ex. K at 4 (CV09-248). Further, the court noted that trial

counsel discussed the plea agreement with Petitioner both the day before and the morning

of the change of plea hearing. Id. The court of appeals cited both Petitioner’s testimony

during the evidentiary hearing, that he was reluctant to accept a nine-year prison term, as well

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

as trial counsel’s statement that he had detailed conversations regarding the plea with

Petitioner and Petitioner’s “main concern” was the amount of prison time he was facing. Id.

These factual findings are not objectively unreasonable in light of the state court

record. For example, Petitioner testified, at the PCR evidentiary hearing, that trial counsel

reviewed each element of each charge with him, and that he had no hesitation about the plea

agreement after his counsel reviewed it with him the day before the hearing. (Dkt. 8, Ex. I

at 10-11, 15.) At the change of plea hearing, Petitioner told the court that he understood

everything in the plea agreement. (Id. at 16.) In light of these factual findings, it was

objectively reasonable for the court of appeals to conclude that trial counsel’s performance

regarding the plea offer was not deficient.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an

order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-09-249-TUCDCB.

DATED this 5th day of January, 2010.

Case 4:09-cv-00249-DCB-DTF Document 9 Filed 01/06/10 Page 9 of 9