Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-03514/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-03514-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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 CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW 

[PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; [PROPOSED] ORDER 

 GRANTING PI 

DALE M. CENDALI (admitted for all 

purposes 11/30/93) 

DIANA M. TORRES (SBN 162284) 

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 

400 South Hope Street 

Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 

Telephone: (213) 430-6000 

Facsimile: (213) 430-6407 

dtorres@omm.com 

CARLA MENINSKY (State Bar No. 233470) O’Melveny & Myers LLP 

Embarcadero Center West 

275 Battery Street, Suite 2600 

San Francisco, CA 94111-3305 

cmeninsky@omm.com 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

The United States Olympic Committee and 

the International Olympic Committee 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

United States Olympic Committee 

and the International Olympic 

Committee, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Xclusive Leisure & Hospitality Ltd.; 

Beijingticketing.com; 2008-

0lympics.com; 

Beijingolympic2008tickets.com; 

Beijingolympictickets2008.com; 

Olympic-tickets.net; 

Olympicticketsbeijing2008.com; 

Does 1-10, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

Case No. C 08-03514 JSW 

[PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT 

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

Date: August 22, 2008 

Time: 9:00 a.m. 

Judge: Hon. Jeffrey S. White 

Case 3:08-cv-03514-JSW Document 63 Filed 08/25/08 Page 1 of 20
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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

This case having come before the Court on August 22, 2008, and the Court 

having heard the evidence and considered the arguments of counsel does hereby 

make, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), the following 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 

I. FINDINGS OF FACT 

A. The Plaintiffs’ Rights 

1. The USOC is the National Olympic Committee for the United States; 

as such, it coordinates the Olympic Movement in the United States, trains and 

underwrites expenses for United States athletes at the Olympic Games and 

Paralympic Games, and determines which United States city may present a bid to 

host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. (Burton ¶ 5.)1

 

2. The IOC is an international, non-governmental, non-profit 

organization and is the umbrella organization of the Olympic Movement. (Stupp ¶ 

3.) Since 1896, when the first modern games were held in Athens, Greece, the IOC 

has supervised the organization of the Olympic Games. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.)

3. Since 1896, Plaintiffs and their predecessors have used certain words 

and symbols in connection with the Olympic Games, including the word 

OLYMPIC and the Olympic Rings symbol, which is the most recognized sports 

emblem in the United States. USOC research shows that more than 86% of the 

U.S. population can identify the Olympic Rings as the symbol for the Olympic 

Games. (Burton ¶ 8; Stupp ¶ 7.) 

4. In addition, Plaintiffs also use specific marks in connection with each 

Olympic Games, including City & Year Marks, such as SYDNEY 2000, ATHENS 

 

1

 As used herein, “Burton” refers to the declaration of Richard Burton filed July 22, 2008; 

“Lintumaa” refers to the declaration of Kai Lintumaa filed July 21, 2008; “Pei” refers to the 

declaration of Lan Pei filed July 29, 2008; “Long” refers to the declaration of Fei Long filed July 

22, 2008; “Schneider” refers to the declaration of Courtney Schneider filed July 22, 2008; 

“Meninsky” refers to the declaration of Carla Meninsky filed August 11, 2008; and “Stupp” refers 

to the declaration of Howard Stupp filed July 22, 2008. 

Case 3:08-cv-03514-JSW Document 63 Filed 08/25/08 Page 2 of 20
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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -2- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

2004, TORINO 2006, and BEIJING 2008, and various symbols, logos, taglines, 

and other marks. (Burton ¶ 8; Stupp ¶ 7.) 

5. The USOC also owns U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 968,566, 

2,311,493, and 2,777,890 for the word mark OLYMPIC; Registration 

Nos. 2,739,492 and 2,764,102 for the word mark BEIJING 2008; and Registration 

No. 3,043,229 for the official emblem of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. 

(Burton ¶ 9; Stupp ¶ 8.) Collectively, Plaintiffs own dozens of U.S. trademark 

registrations that incorporate the Olympic Rings symbol. 

6. The above marks (the “Olympic Marks”) are valuable assets to 

Plaintiffs. First, they represent the tremendous goodwill Plaintiffs have earned over 

the years. Second, Plaintiffs’ revenue comes primarily from the sale of rights to 

broadcast the Olympic Games and from the marketing, licensing, and sponsorship 

programs that involve the use of their marks. (Burton ¶ 10; Stupp ¶¶ 9-10.) Thus, 

the protection of the Olympic Marks under the OASA, the Lanham Act, and 

common law is essential to Plaintiffs’ continued ability to help promote and 

coordinate the Olympic Games. (Burton ¶ 10; Stupp ¶ 10.) 

B. Authorized Tickets to the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games 

7. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games began with the Opening Ceremony 

on August 8, 2008, and will conclude with the Closing Ceremony on August 24, 

2008. (Burton ¶ 3; Stupp ¶ 4.) 

8. The IOC and the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic 

Games (“BOCOG”) have delegated to the USOC the responsibility for coordinating 

all sales of tickets in the United States for the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympic 

Games. (Burton ¶ 11; Stupp ¶ 11.) 

9. The USOC has an exclusive sponsorship agreement with Global Sports 

Consultants, L/L/C/ d/b/a Jet Set Sports or CoSport that governs the sales of all 

authorized tickets to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games in the United States. 

(Burton ¶ 12.) Jet Set Sports and CoSport are the only official providers with the 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -3- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

right to distribute and sell Olympic tickets and hospitality packages in the 

United States, and use Olympic trademarks in the United States to promote and sell 

hospitality packages and tickets for the Beijing Olympic Games. (Id.) 

10. In the interests of security, and in an effort to prevent counterfeiting, 

each ticket to the Opening and Closing Ceremonies is embedded with a microchip 

containing the ticket’s serial number, which corresponds to information in a data 

base maintained by BOCOG that contains the bearer’s photograph, passport details, 

addresses, e-mail addresses, and telephone numbers. (Stupp ¶ 14.) 

11. These tickets may be transferred only once and only through a 

complex procedure requiring both the original ticket purchaser and the transferee to 

submit forms to BOCOG. (Id.) 

12. This is to maximize the security of the Games and eliminate massscale speculative ticket reselling. This is important, as ticket prices for the Beijing 

Olympic Games were intentionally set very low so as to allow as many people as 

possible to experience the Olympic Games ceremonies and competitions. (Stupp ¶ 

12.) 

C. The Defendants’ Conduct

13. Until this Court issued a temporary restraining order, Defendants 

operated seven websites (the “Websites”) offering for sale what they claimed to be 

tickets to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. One of the Websites, located at 

http://www.beijingticketing.com/ (the “Primary Website”), was the medium 

through which users could buy the tickets. The other websites operated by 

Defendants (the “Secondary Websites”), located at www.olympic-tickets.net, 

www.beijingticketing.com, www.beijingolympic2008tickets.com, 

www.beijingolympictickets2008.com, www.olympicticketsbeijing2008.com, 

www.2008-0lympics.com; and www.buy-olympic-tickets.co.uk, offered the same 

tickets for sale but contained hyperlinks connecting the user to the Primary Website 

at the point of purchase. (Lintumaa Ex. A.) 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -4- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

14. The Olympic Marks were used on the Websites and in the Secondary 

Websites’ domain names without Plaintiffs’ consent. The websites also repeatedly 

used the word marks OLYMPIC and BEIJING 2008 without Plaintiffs’ 

authorization. (Lintumaa Exs. A, D.) 

15. The Websites prominently displayed in several locations a human 

figure logo that closely resembles the Beijing 2008 Human Figure Logo. Directly 

below each instance of the logo also display the words “BEIJING 2008” in a 

typeface that closely resembles the Beijing 2008 Word Design. (Lintumaa Exs. A, 

D.) 

16. The Websites’ use of the Olympic Marks misled the public into 

believing that Defendants were operating an official Olympic ticket site. (See Pei ¶ 

2; Long ¶ 3.) Even a Forbes Traveler writer appeared to have been confused, as the 

magazine reported in February, 2008 that: 

The safest bet is to go through the official ticketing websites, including www.beijingticketing.com, www.chinaolympic2008tickets.com, and www.beijing-2008tickets.com, www.cosport.com, or en.beijing2008.cn. 

(Schneider Ex. A (emphasis added).) 

17. The sole purpose of the Primary Website was to sell tickets to the 

Olympic Games. The Primary Website offered no other good or service. Thus, 

every instance of the Websites’ use of the Olympic Marks appeared in the context 

of an offer to sell tickets. (Lintumaa Ex. A.) 

D. Defendants’ Ticket Offers 

18. The Primary Website offered for sale tickets in 39 categories of 

Olympic events, including the Opening and Closing Ceremonies and 37 categories 

of individual athletic competitions. (Lintumaa Ex. A.) 

19. The tickets offered for sale ranged in price, from as low as $100 for 

early individual competitions, to as high as $2150 per ticket for the Opening 

Ceremonies. (Lintumaa ¶ 3.) When a user clicked on the links provided to select 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -5- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

and purchase tickets, the user was redirected to a subpage of the Primary Website to 

select and purchase tickets. (See id. ¶¶ 2-3, 12-13.) 

20. Many consumers have complained about having been deceived by the 

Websites. Each had purchased tickets to one or more events through the Websites 

but had not actually received any tickets. (See, e.g., Pei ¶¶ 2-5; Long ¶¶ 2-8.) 

21. A private investigator employed by Plaintiffs visited the Primary 

Website, ordered one ticket to the Opening Ceremony and another to a kayaking 

event, totaling $1,905. Defendants did not ask the investigator for his photograph 

or passport details, as required by BOCOG’s policy for admission (even with a 

valid ticket) to the Opening Ceremony, and neither provided such information. 

(Lintumaa ¶¶ 2-4.) 

22. Accordingly, Defendants could not provide a would-be purchaser with 

tickets that would gain them admission to the Opening Ceremony under BOCOG’s 

policy.2

23. In fact, Defendants did not provide the promised tickets. On August 3, 

2008, Defendants sent purchasers an email confirming that no tickets would be 

delivered, ostensibly because Defendants’ “supplier” had failed to supply 

Defendants with tickets. Rather than agree to refund the purchasers’ money, 

Defendants suggested that the purchasers seek recompense from their credit card 

companies. (Meninsky Ex. A.) 

24. Consumers who sought to purchase tickets from Defendants are less 

likely to purchase tickets or hospitality packages, and the USOC, which receives 

some incremental revenue from Jet Set Sports based on ticket sales, suffers directly 

as a result of Defendants’ conduct. (Burton ¶¶ 16; Stupp ¶ 9.) More importantly, 

consumers who are defrauded by Defendants will likely be soured on their 

experience attempting to go to the Olympic Games, and thus their view of the 

Olympic organizations will be tarnished. (Burton ¶ 14; Stupp ¶ 16.) 

 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -6- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

E. Defendants’ Efforts to Conceal Their Identities 

25. Defendants are concealing from the public their true identities and 

contact information. 

26. Each of the Websites lists XLH or X.L.& H. Ltd as the owner of the 

site with phone numbers in London, UK and offices in Phoenix, Arizona, but the 

address is false and none of the phone numbers leads to an operating telephone line. 

The websites further state that XLH is a Delaware Corporation, but XLH is not a 

corporation organized in Delaware or Arizona. (Lintumaa ¶¶ 7-8.) 

27. Plaintiffs have notified Defendants of this action, this Court’s 

temporary restraining order, and Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. (See

Docket Nos. 16, 27, 30, 37, 41, 45, 52, 58, 60.) 

28. If any of the foregoing findings of fact are deemed to be conclusions of 

law, they shall be incorporated herein as conclusions of law reached by this Court 

as though fully set forth as such. 

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

29. In the United States, the intellectual property rights to the words and 

symbols associated with the Olympic Games are statutorily protected not only by 

the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, et seq., but by the Olympic and Amateur Sports 

Act (the “OASA”) as well. See 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a). The OASA grants to the 

USOC the “exclusive right to use” various marks associated with the Olympic 

Games in the United States. It further authorizes the USOC to pursue a civil action 

against any person who uses the protected marks “for the purpose of trade, to 

induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, 

athletic performance, or competition.” 36 U.S.C. § 220506(c). 

30. The marks protected by the OASA include the word OLYMPIC, as 

well as “any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing 

association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic Committee, the 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -7- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

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International Paralympic Committee, the Pan-American Sports Organization, or the 

[USOC].” 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a)(4), (c)(3) and (c)(4). 

31. In order to obtain a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, the 

moving party must show either “(1) a combination of probable success on the 

merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are 

raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the moving party.” 

Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 841-840 (9th Cir. 

Cal. 2001). These standards “are not separate tests but the outer reaches of a single 

continuum.” Id. 

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

1. Unauthorized Use of the Olympic Marks in Violation of the 

Olympic and Amateur Sports Act 

32. Through the OASA, Congress has granted the USOC the exclusive 

right to use and control the commercial use of certain Olympic symbols. 36 U.S.C. 

§ 220506; see U.S.O.C. v. Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d 263, 266-67 (2d Cir. 1984) 

(Congress intended to promote U.S. Olympic effort by providing USOC with 

“unfettered control over the commercial use of Olympic-related designations” and 

finding violation of the Act where defendant made commercial use of Olympic 

symbol without consent). 

33. Under the statute, any person who uses any of the Olympic symbols 

without the USOC’s consent “for purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods 

or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or 

competition” is liable for damages in accordance with the remedies provided in the 

Lanham Act. 36 U.S.C. § 220506(c)(4). 

34. The protected symbols include the words “Olympic” and “Olympiad,” 

among others, or any combination of these words “tending to cause confusion or 

mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection” with any Olympic activity, 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -8- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

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and any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing 

association with the International Olympic Committee. 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a). 

35. The statute establishes that the protection afforded to Olympic symbols 

is broader than the rights provided under the Lanham Act, effectively providing the 

USOC with an exclusive right in the Olympic words and symbols. San Francisco 

Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 (1987). 

36. The statute does not require the USOC to prove that a defendant’s use 

is likely to cause confusion, nor does the statute incorporate the defenses that are 

available under the Lanham Act. Id. Thus, under the OASA, the USOC has 

exclusive right to the use of all Olympic symbols and marks, including the official 

Beijing 2008 emblem, and the word marks “Beijing 2008” and “Olympic.” These 

exclusive rights under OASA entitle Plaintiffs to injunctive relief here. 

2. Infringement Under the Lanham Act

37. Until this Court issued a temporary restraining order, Defendants were 

making unauthorized use of Plaintiffs’ marks on their Websites in an effort to 

mislead consumers into believing that the tickets offered are “official” and that the 

sites are legitimate and in fact associated with the IOC and USOC. Such deception 

of the public is forbidden by Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act. 

38. Section 32(1) proscribes the use in commerce of any “reproduction, 

counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the 

sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 

connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 

to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114; K and N Engineering, Inc. v. Bulat, 259 Fed. Appx. 

994 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming lower court’s grant of summary judgment based on 

determination that defendants’ intentional use of plaintiff’s mark was likely to 

cause confusion). 

39. Plaintiffs here have shown a significant likelihood of establishing 

actionable infringement, as they can demonstrate (1) ownership of valid and legally 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -9- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

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protectable marks; (2) that Defendants “used” those marks “in commerce”; (3) the 

“use in commerce” was in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, 

or advertising of goods and services”; and (4) the infringing use was in a manner 

likely to confuse consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1114; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 

40. First, Plaintiffs’ ownership of Reg. No. 3,043,229 for the official 

emblem for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (“Beijing 2008”), Reg. Nos. 

2,739,492 and 2,764,102; and Reg. Nos. 968,566, 2,311,493, and 2,777,890 for the 

word OLYMPIC constitute prima facie evidence of Plaintiffs’ ownership of valid 

marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1115; Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 457 

F.3d 1062, 1064 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). 

41. Second, Plaintiffs have shown a significant likelihood of 

demonstrating that, by using Plaintiffs’ marks on the Websites to sell tickets to 

consumers nationwide, Defendants are making use of the marks in commerce in 

connection with goods or services. See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1075.

42. Third, Plaintiffs have shown a significant likelihood of demonstrating 

the central element of trademark infringement—likelihood of confusion, i.e., 

whether the similarity of the marks is likely to confuse customers about the source 

of the products or services. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast 

Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999). 

43. In determining likelihood of confusion, courts in this Circuit consider 

eight factors: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods or services; 

(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels 

used; (6) type of goods or services and the degree of care likely to be exercised by 

the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of 

expansion. AMF, Inc. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). 

44. In this case, each of the factors weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. 

Collectively, they overwhelmingly demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -10- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

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45. Here, there is no question that Plaintiffs’ marks are strong. In fact, the 

Olympic Marks are so strong that Congress, by passing the OASA, has granted 

exclusive use of those marks in the United States to the USOC. The Olympic 

Marks are entitled to more protection because they are more likely to be 

remembered and associated in the consumers’ minds with their owners. Brookfield, 

174 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted). 

46. Here, because Defendants purport to offer the same goods—i.e., 

tickets to the 2008 Olympic Games—offered by the USOC, through its agents, the 

parties’ goods and services are highly related, and thus this factor also favors 

Plaintiffs. AMF, 599 F.2d at 350. 

47. There can also be no question that Defendants are making use of 

trademarks that are identical to, or nearly identical to, Plaintiffs’ marks. Thus, this 

critical factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay Inc., 506 

F.3d 1165, 1174-76 (9th Cir. 2007). 

48. While proof of actual confusion is not a prerequisite, Eclipse 

Associates, Ltd. v. Data General Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1990), 

even Forbes Traveler, as set forth in the article attached to the Declaration of 

Courtney Schneider, believes beijingticketing.com is an official website.3

 Thus, 

Plaintiffs have evidence of actual confusion, which “is persuasive proof that future 

confusion is likely.” AMF, 599 F.2d at 352 (citations omitted). Thus, this factor 

weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

49. “Convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood of confusion.” 

AMF, 599 F.2d at 353 (citations omitted). Where, as here, Plaintiffs and 

Defendants sell their services to the same pool of customers, advertising in the 

same media, this factor weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

 

3 See Schneider Ex. A (“The safest bet is to go through the official ticketing websites, including 

. . . www.beijingticketing.com, . . .”).

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -11- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

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50. Here, the evidence of Defendants’ bad faith is overwhelming. As set 

forth above, Defendants were deliberately using marks similar to Plaintiffs’ 

Olympic Marks to deceive consumers, stating on their sites that the Websites sell 

“official tickets” to the Olympic Games, and have also concealed their identities, 

including by providing false contact information on the sites. 

51. Where the products are identical and the marks are strongly similar, 

however, the sophistication of buyers cannot be relied on to prevent confusion, and 

this factor will not mitigate the likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Eclipse 

Associates, 894 F.2d at 1118. Here, because Defendants are offering identical 

goods using marks that are nearly identical to Plaintiffs’, this factor also weighs in 

favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion. 

52. In assessing likelihood of confusion, “a ‘strong possibility’ that either 

party may expand his business to compete with the other will weigh in favor of 

finding that the present use is infringing.” AMF, 599 F.2d at 354 (citations 

omitted). 

53. Here, Defendants already purport to sell tickets for the 2008 Olympics, 

which is precisely the domain of Plaintiffs and their contractually-authorized 

agents. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. 

54. In sum, consideration of the relevant factors amply demonstrates that 

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that Defendants’ attempt to capitalize 

on the success of Plaintiffs’ business by using the same well-known trademarks for 

the very services that Plaintiffs are already offering in violation of section 32(1) of 

the Lanham Act. 

3. False Endorsement and False Advertising 

55. Plaintiffs have also shown that they are likely to establish that 

Defendants’ conduct constitutes both false endorsement and false advertising under 

the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); § 1125(a)(1)(B). 

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CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW -12- [PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

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56. A false endorsement claim requires a showing that: (1) goods or 

services were involved; (2) interstate commerce was affected; and (3) there was a 

false designation of origin or false description of the goods or services. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1125(a)(1)(A). In establishing the last factor, the court will look for the plaintiff 

to show that there is a likelihood of confusion. White v. Samsung Electronics 

America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 

57. As set forth above, Plaintiffs have shown that Defendants are falsely 

claiming to sell in interstate commerce tickets for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, using 

Plaintiffs’ registered Olympic marks and are claiming to sell “official tickets” to 

create the misimpression that Plaintiffs endorse or in some way approve of the 

Websites and authorize the sale of the tickets. 

58. Defendants’ use is both likely to cause and actually has caused 

confusion. Thus, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail with respect to their false 

endorsement claim. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, 125 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1997).

59. To show false advertising, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants: 

(1) use a false or misleading description of fact or representation of fact in a 

commercial advertisement about its own or another’s product; (2) that has actually 

deceived or has the potential to deceive a significant portion of the audience; (3) the 

deception is material in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the 

defendant caused the statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) it is likely that 

some harm will result from the misrepresentation. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); 

Southland Sod Farms v. Stoner Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997). The 

Ninth Circuit also requires that the plaintiff show that the injury was “competitive,” 

i.e., harmful to the plaintiff’s ability to compete with the defendant. Smith v. 

Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). 

60. Plaintiffs have shown a significant likelihood that they will prevail on 

the merits of their false advertising claim. Plaintiffs have shown a competitive 

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injury, as Defendants’ conduct impacts Plaintiffs’ ability to sell tickets to the 

Olympic games. Id. 

61. Plaintiffs have also shown that Defendants are falsely claiming that 

they are selling bona fide tickets to the Olympic Games and using Plaintiffs’ marks 

and other symbols to lead consumers to falsely think that the sites are legitimate 

and that the goods are authentic. Pepsico, Inc. v. Plank, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

14378, *13 (C.D. Ca. Jul. 18, 2002). This constitutes false advertising. 

4. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 

62. A defendant is liable under the ACPA to the owner of a protected mark 

if it has: (1) a bad faith intent to profit from that mark and (2) registers, traffics in, 

or uses a domain name that (3) is identical or confusingly similar to plaintiff’s 

mark, or protected by special legislation. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). 

63. As set forth above, Defendants have registered and used domain names 

incorporating “Olympics” and “Beijing 2008,” which are (1) protected by reason of 

36 U.S.C. § 220506 and (2) identical, confusingly similar to, and dilutive of 

Plaintiffs’ registered trademarks. Plaintiffs also have shown that Defendants have a 

bad faith intent to profit from their use of these marks, which they have used with 

the intent of financially benefiting from consumers seeking legitimate online 

locations for sales of authorized Olympic tickets. 

64. Such conduct harms, for commercial gain, the goodwill represented by 

the marks by creating a likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, 

affiliation, or endorsement of the Defendants’ Websites. See Johnson v. Connolly, 

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31721, *7-8 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 18, 2007). 

65. Thus, Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their claim for 

cybersquatting. 

5. Unfair Competition 

66. California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) proscribes any “unfair 

or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 

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advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200. A business practice is unlawful “if 

it is forbidden by any law.” Olszewski v. Scripps Health, 30 Cal. 4th 798, 827 (Cal. 

2003). The UCL is “intended to protect competitors as well as consumers from 

unfair practices.” Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 303, 315 

(Cal. 2003). 

67. By defining unfair competition to include any “unlawful . . . business 

act or practice,” a plaintiff can establish a cause of action of unfair competition 

under the UCL by demonstrating that the defendant violated other laws through its 

business practices. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 949 (Cal. 2002). “To 

prevail on a false advertising or false designation of origin claim, a plaintiff need 

only show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id.; Colgan v. 

Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 

68. Based on the facts set forth above, Plaintiffs are significantly likely to 

prevail on their claims under the UCL, as Defendants are deceiving the public about 

their affiliation with Plaintiffs and the legitimacy of the tickets they are advertising 

for sale. 

B. Irreparable Harm 

69. In trademark infringement actions, the Ninth Circuit has held that once 

the plaintiff has established a likelihood of confusion, irreparable harm is presumed. 

GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1209. This is because it is reasonable for the court to 

assume that continuing infringement will leave the plaintiff with a loss of control of 

its reputation and a loss of its goodwill. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, 

Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1984). 

70. Because of their likely success on the merits, Plaintiffs are entitled to a 

presumption of irreparable harm. 

71. Even absent the presumption, Plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury 

in the absence of an injunction. Prior to the issuance of the temporary restraining 

order, Defendants were usurping Plaintiffs’ well-established brand name and good 

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will and causing consumers to misidentify Plaintiffs with Defendants’ fraudulent 

Websites. See id., 725 F.2d at 526 (irreparable injury results from continuing 

infringement based on loss of control over reputation and a loss of goodwill). 

72. Significantly, Defendants were also leading consumers to believe that 

Defendants are associated with or approved by Plaintiffs when they were not. Such 

an association between Plaintiffs and Websites that are aimed at deceiving the 

public tarnishes Plaintiffs’ image and threatens to turn the public off to the 

Olympics in general. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066. 

73. In addition to these obvious harms, a significant source of irreparable 

injury lies in the fact that Defendants are lessening the value of Plaintiffs’ 

intellectual property, on which Plaintiffs rely for revenue, and harming Plaintiffs’ 

relationships with their sponsors, consumers and other third parties. By making use 

of Plaintiffs’ marks as set forth herein, Defendants’ conduct diminishes the value of 

these rights. 

74. Thus, Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed without an injunction. 

C. The Balance of Hardships 

75. Because Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the 

merits and that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction, it is 

not necessary for the Court to consider whether the balance of hardships tips 

decidedly in favor of Plaintiffs and whether there are fair grounds for litigation. See 

GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1209. 

76. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs can satisfy the alternate test as well: as 

discussed above, there are fair grounds for litigation, and the balance of hardships 

weighs strongly in Plaintiffs’ favor. As set forth above, if the Court allows 

Defendants to continue to use Plaintiffs’ marks in connection with their suspect 

business venture, Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured. See Apple Computer, 725 

F.2d at 526. 

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77. In contrast, Defendants have no legitimate business interest to protect, 

but rather have built a business on deliberately infringing conduct. Where the 

intent to infringe is clear, even if the defendant’s entire business was built upon the 

infringing mark, the balance of hardships weighs in favor of the plaintiff. Apple 

Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1255 (3d Cir. 1983) (if 

reliance on infringing activity barred issuance of injunction, “a knowing infringer 

would be permitted to construct its business around its infringement, a result we 

cannot condone.”). 

D. Public Interest 

78. In addition to the concerns of Plaintiffs and Defendants, this Court 

may also consider the public interest in the balance of hardships in an unfair 

competition suit. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066. 

79. Thus, because consumers are being led to believe there is a 

relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants, when in reality none exists, and 

consumers are at risk of being defrauded, the public interest militates against 

allowing Defendants to continue to confuse consumers in this fashion. See V.E.W., 

Ltd. v. Karla Hour Couture, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22742 (N.D. Ca. Dec. 16, 

1997). 

80. If any of the foregoing conclusions of law are deemed to be findings of 

fact, they shall be incorporated herein as factual findings by this Court as though 

fully set forth as such. 

[PROPOSED] ORDER

On August 22, 2008, this Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiffs’ 

motion for preliminary injunction. After full consideration of all papers filed in 

support of Plaintiffs’ motion and all evidence presented at the hearing, and having 

granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order on July 24, 2008, the 

Court finds that there is GOOD CAUSE appearing to GRANT Plaintiffs’ Order 

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for Preliminary Injunction, and finds as follows: 

1. Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that they are 

likely to succeed on the merits of their claims against Defendants; 

2. There is a reasonable inference that unless enjoined, Defendants 

will continue to use Plaintiffs’ trademarks to deceptively market and solicit sales of 

tickets to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing; 

3. Defendants have caused and, if permitted to continue such 

conduct unrestrained, Defendants will likely continue to cause, irreparable damage 

and harm to Plaintiffs; 

4. The harm to Plaintiffs if a Preliminary Injunction is not granted 

far outweighs any harm that Defendants may suffer if it is granted; 

5. The relief Plaintiffs request is in the public interest. 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants and all persons and/or 

entities acting on their behalf, for their benefit or in active concert or participation 

with them are HEREBY ENJOINED as follows: 

1. They shall not display (1) the word mark OLYMPIC, U.S. 

Trademark Registration Nos. 968,566, 2,311,493 and 2,777,890; (2) the word mark 

BEIJING 2008, U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 2,739,492 and 2,764,102; or (3) 

the official emblem of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, U.S. Trademark 

Registration No. 3,043,229, or any part or variation thereof (the “Olympic Marks”), 

or any terms that are confusingly similar thereto, on the Websites www.olympictickets.net, www.beijingticketing.com, www.beijingolympic2008tickets.com, 

www.beijingolympictickets2008.com, www.olympicticketsbeijing2008.com, 

www.2008-0lympics.com; and www.buy-olympic-tickets.co.uk or any other 

Website; 

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2. They shall not directly or indirectly infringe the Olympic Marks 

in any manner including, but not limited to, by using them in advertising or offering 

for sale any tickets or other goods or services using said trademarks; 

3. They shall not engage in any conduct that tends falsely or 

misleadingly to represent that the actions of Defendants, the tickets sold by 

Defendants, or Defendants themselves are connected with Plaintiffs or 

organizations guided by the Olympic Charter, including the IOC, the USOC, the 

international sports federations, and the other National Olympic Committees, 

Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games and local clubs and the persons 

belonging to them (the “Olympic Movement”), are sponsored, approved, or 

licensed by Plaintiffs or the Olympic Movement, or are in some way connected or 

affiliated with Plaintiffs or the Olympic Movement, or that is likely to confuse, 

mislead, or deceive members of the public, into believing Plaintiffs and Defendants 

to be the same; 

4. They shall not affix, apply, annex, or use in connection with 

tickets or any other goods or services, a false description or representation, 

including words or other symbols, tending to falsely describe or represent such 

goods or services as being those of Plaintiffs; 

5. They shall not otherwise compete unfairly with Plaintiffs in any 

manner; 

6. The following domain names shall remain impounded so that 

neither Defendants nor the consuming public can gain access thereto: 

www.olympic-tickets.net, www.beijingticketing.com, 

www.beijingolympic2008tickets.com, www.beijingolympictickets2008.com, 

www.olympicticketsbeijing2008.com, www.2008-0lympics.com; and www.buyolympic-tickets.co.uk; 

7. Defendants shall no longer continue to operate the following 

Websites under the current domain names or under any other domain name: 

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www.olympic-tickets.net, www.beijingticketing.com, 

www.beijingolympic2008tickets.com, www.beijingolympictickets2008.com, 

www.olympicticketsbeijing2008.com, www.2008-0lympics.com; and www.buyolympic-tickets.co.uk; and 

8. They shall not effect assignments or transfers, form new entities 

or associations or utilize any other means or device for the purpose of 

circumventing or otherwise avoiding prohibitions set forth herein. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August _____, 2008 

By: 

United States District Court Judge 

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