Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02815/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02815-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

 

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, ECF 

No. 12. Plaintiff filed this motion in response to defendants’ pending motion to dismiss, ECF 

No. 7. Defendants have not filed an opposition or non-opposition, but address plaintiff’s 

motion’s deficiencies in their reply brief for their motion to dismiss. ECF No. 13. In the interest 

of judicial economy, the court considers both motions together and decides the matter without a 

hearing. For the following reasons, plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is GRANTED IN 

PART and defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Jessie Hunt commenced this action against the Lincoln Unified School 

District (LUSD) and the San Joaquin County Office of Education (SJCOE) on December 2, 

2014. Compl., ECF No. 1. After meeting and conferring, the parties stipulated to grant plaintiff 

JESSIE HUNT, III, No. 2:14-cv-02815 KJM-CKD 

Plaintiff, 

v. ORDER 

LINCOLN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY OFFICE OF 

EDUCATION, a special district, 

Defendants. 

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leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 4. In that complaint, plaintiff alleges he suffers 

from unspecified disabilities and pleads the following claims: 1) failure to provide free and 

appropriate public education (FAPE); 2) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and; 3) racial 

discrimination. Am. Compl., ECF No. 6. Defendants SJCOE and LUSD then filed a motion to 

dismiss the action in its entirety on April 20, 2015, or in the alternative to dismiss SJCOE as a 

defendant. ECF No. 7. As noted above, plaintiff did not oppose the motion, but instead filed the 

instant motion to further amend. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 12 at 7-18. The proposed 

second amended complaint states identical claims, but with additional factual allegations in an 

attempt to cure the deficiencies argued in defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 2. Defendants 

replied. ECF No. 13. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides, “[t]he court should freely give 

[leave to amend its pleading] when justice so requires,” and the Ninth Circuit has “stressed Rule 

15’s policy of favoring amendments.” Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 

1160 (9th Cir. 1989). “In exercising its discretion [regarding granting or denying leave to 

amend] ‘a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15−to facilitate decision on 

the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.’” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 

F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 

1981)). However, “the liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several limitations. 

Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint would cause the opposing 

party undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue 

delay.” Ascon Properties, 866 F.2d at 1160 (internal citations omitted). Not all the factors merit 

equal weight, and prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight. Eminence Capital, 

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Generally, additional claims result in 

prejudice to a defendant when plaintiff has substantially delayed requesting leave to amend. See, 

e.g., United States v. Pend Oreille Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544, 1522−53 (9th Cir. 

1994); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). In 

addition, a court should look to whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint, as 

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“the district court’s discretion is especially broad ‘where the court has already given plaintiff one 

or more opportunities to amend [its] complaint.’” Id. at 1161 (quoting Leighton, 833 F.2d at 186 

n.3). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Rule 15 Factors 

Here, granting leave to amend will not cause undue delay. A scheduling 

conference has not yet been held, and discovery has not yet commenced. Plaintiff has attached a 

proposed second amended complaint to his motion, so it may be promptly filed if approved. 

Second, there is no evidence plaintiff’s motion to amend is sought in bad faith. 

Rather it is an attempt to address deficiencies raised by defendants’ motion to dismiss. For 

example, plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint alleges specific disabilities and theories 

supporting his claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et 

seq. (IDEA), ECF No. 12, ¶¶ 10, 20−31, correcting a deficiency alleged in defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. The proposed amendment puts defendants on notice of more defined claims and factual 

allegations, and thus provides defendants with a better opportunity to raise defenses. 

Most importantly, defendants would not be prejudiced should the court grant 

leave to amend because the case is at an early stage, plaintiff has not substantially delayed the 

action by requesting leave, and plaintiff has agreed to dismiss defendant SJCOE. ECF No. 12 at 

1. See Rose, 893 F.2d at 1079; see also Leighton, 833 F.2d at 187−88. Courts regularly grant 

leave to amend where, as here, amendment would cure deficiencies in the original complaint. 

See, e.g., Estate of Makarowsky ex rel. Gast. v. Lobdell, 2012 WL 3877714, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 

2012). 

The court still must consider whether plaintiff’s proposed amendments would be 

an “exercise in futility.” Accordingly, the court will address each of plaintiff’s claims as pled in 

the First Amended Complaint and attacked by defendants’ motion, and whether leave to amend 

the claims as proposed in the Second Amended Complaint would be futile. 

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B. Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) (Claim One) 

Leave to amend plaintiff’s FAPE claim would be futile if plaintiff did not exhaust 

his administrative remedies. “[W]hen determining whether the IDEA requires a plaintiff to 

exhaust, courts should start by looking at a complaint’s prayer for relief and determine whether 

the relief sought is also available under the IDEA. If it is not, then it is likely that § 1415(l) does 

not require exhaustion in that case.” Payne v. Peninsula School Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 875 (9th 

Cir. 2011), overruled in part by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014). However, 

if the relief sought is predicated on the IDEA, meaning plaintiff actually seeks relief available 

under the IDEA, then exhaustion is clearly required. Id. “The IDEA’s exhaustion provision 

applies only to “the filing of a civil action . . . seeking relief that is also available under [the 

IDEA]”; otherwise, the IDEA does not “restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies” 

available under § 1983, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or other federal laws. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(l). Id. at 878. 

Here, because plaintiff’s first claim rests on the IDEA, First Am. Compl. at 8; 

Second Am. Compl. at 6, administrative exhaustion is required. See Cayla R. v. Morgan Hill 

Unified School Dist., 2012 WL 1038664, at *5 (N.D. Cal 2012) (holding that a claim based on 

failure to deny appropriate education requires administrative exhaustion under the IDEA). 

However in Albino, the Ninth Circuit held that “a plaintiff is not required to say anything about 

exhaustion in his complaint ... [because it is an affirmative defense . . . [and only] in those rare 

cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may 

successfully move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” Albino, 747 F.3d 

at 1171. Thus, although plaintiff does not plead administrative exhaustion in either complaint, 

his claim does not fail as a matter of law because there is no such pleading requirement under 

Albino. Further, this is not one of the rare instances where it is clear from the face of the 

complaint that plaintiff has not met the exhaustion requirement. It is not an exercise in futility to 

grant leave to amend the FAPE claim. Defendants may plead plaintiff’s failure to exhaust under 

the IDEA as an affirmative defense. 

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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim Two) 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and amendment is 

therefore futile. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars suits brought 

against states in federal court when the state has not waived its sovereign immunity. See 

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. 

Dist., 982 F. Supp. 1396, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 237 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001). Because 

states are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, suits against state agencies in 

which a judgment would be satisfied out of public funds are also prohibited. See, e.g., Quern v. 

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979). School districts in California are considered to be state 

agencies for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 

F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992). 

It is true that in Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 was not 

applicable to government entities. See 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). However, Monroe was 

overturned in part by Monell v. Department of Social Services, holding that a § 1983 claim may 

be brought against a municipality under certain exceptions. See 436 U.S. 658, 700 (1978). 

Under the Monell exception, municipalities are not liable based on a respondeat superior theory, 

but rather, based on official municipal policies or customs. Id. at 691, 694. As relevant to this 

case, school districts in California are not considered “municipalities” or “persons,” but agencies 

of the state for § 1983 purposes. Belanger, 963 F.2d at 253 (“California law treats public 

schooling as a statewide or central governmental function. As discussed . . . the public schools 

of this state are a matter of statewide rather than local or municipal concern.”); see also Carmen, 

982 F. Supp. at 1403; Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177, 577 (1956). Thus, school districts in 

California enjoy sovereign immunity and cannot be found liable under § 1983. Belanger, 963 

F.2d at 253. 

Here, plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against LUSD, a California school district. 

Even if plaintiff were to demonstrate LUSD had an official policy or long-standing custom that 

violated a right protected under § 1983, the suit is barred because LUSD enjoys Eleventh 

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Amendment sovereign immunity as an agency of the state. Accordingly, giving plaintiff leave to 

amend to add a § 1983 claim would be futile. 

D. Racial Discrimination (Claim Three) 

 Plaintiff’s third claim for racial discrimination states, “the Defendant districts 

have engaged in racial discrimination by reason of the fact that African American students are 

discipline[d] more harshly than students of other races.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 6; see 

also Second Am. Compl. at 15−16. In the proposed Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff 

alleges the “Office of Civil Rights,” without indicating whether this is a federal or state agency, 

has determined that defendant district has engaged in racial and economic discrimination because 

African American students are disproportionally disciplined more harshly than students of other 

races and are “turned down for special education services more frequently than other students.” 

ECF No. 12 at 15−16. As pled, plaintiff has not adequately identified the nature of this claim or 

the constitutional or statutory basis for the claim. Specifically, the court cannot determine if 

plaintiff is attempting to proceed with a separate § 1983 claim, or invoke a different civil rights 

statute. If the claim is predicated on § 1983, then it is barred as previously discussed. 

 “[A]lthough the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must 

give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim 

plainly and succinctly.” Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984); 

see also Villalobos v. Bosenko, 2014 WL 1612432, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2014). “Without . . . [some] 

constitutional or federal statutory basis . . . this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction altogether.” 

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007) (“Within the constitutional bounds, Congress 

decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides 

whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what 

conditions, federal courts can hear them.”) (citation omitted). 

 The court grants plaintiff leave to plead a viable discrimination claim if plaintiff 

can allege facts demonstrating how the conditions complained of resulted in deprivation to his 

federal constitutional or statutory rights. Bosenko, 2014 WL 1612432, at *3 (citing Ellis v. 

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is 

GRANTED in part, as to the FAPE and racial discrimination claims. Because the proposed 

Second Amended Complaint is deficient as noted above, plaintiff is directed to file a new Second 

Amended Complaint consistent with this order within 14 days. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, 

ECF No. 7, is denied as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 5, 2015. 

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