Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-15836/USCOURTS-ca9-09-15836-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JERRY VALDIVIA; ALFRED YANCY; 

HOSSIE WELCH, on their own

behalf and on behalf of the class Nos. 08-15889 and

of all persons similarly situated, 09-15836

Plaintiffs-Appellees, D.C. No.  v. 2:94-CV-00671-

LKK-GGH ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

Governor of the State of OPINION

California,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 11, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed March 25, 2010

Before: John T. Noonan, Michael Daly Hawkins and

Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hawkins;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Noonan

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COUNSEL

Vickie P. Whitney, Office of the Attorney General of the

State of California, Sacramento, California, and S. Anne

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Johnson, Hanson Bridgett LLP, San Francisco, California, for

the defendant-appellant.

Loren G. Stewart and Ernest Galvan, Rosen, Bien & Galvan

LLP, San Francisco, California; Geoffrey Holtz, Bingham

McCutchen LLP, San Francisco, California, for the plaintiffsappellees.

Kent S. Scheidegger, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California, for amici Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Crime Victims United of California, and Senator George

Runner.

Wendy Musell, Stewart & Musell, San Francisco, California,

for amici The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern

California, Legal Services for Prisoners and Children, The

Justice Policy Institute, the National Council on Crime and

Delinquency, The Sentencing Project, Hadar Aviram, W.

David Ball, Sharon Dolovich, Malcolm M. Feeley, Michael

Pinard, Jonathan Simon and Jeremy Travis. 

OPINION

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated appeals stem from the November 2003

Valdivia Permanent Injunction (“the Injunction”)—based on

a stipulation between Jerry Valdivia (“Valdivia”) and a class

of similarly situated California parolees1 (“Plaintiffs”), and

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the State of California

(collectively “the State”)—prescribing procedures for parole

1More specifically, the Plaintiff class consists of: “(1) California parolees at large; (2) California parolees in custody as alleged parole violators,

and who are awaiting revocation of their state parole; and (3) California

parolees who are in custody having been found in violation of parole and

who have been thereupon sentenced to prison custody.” 

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revocation hearings in California. Here, the State appeals two

post-Injunction orders: (1) the March 25, 2008 order (“March

2008 order”) adopting the Injunction-related recommendations of the court-appointed Special Master regarding the use

of hearsay evidence in parole revocation hearings; and (2) the

March 26, 2009 order (“March 2009 order”) denying the

State’s motion to modify the Injunction to conform to the

voter promulgated statute, Cal. Penal Code § 3044, formerly

California Proposition 9 (“Proposition 9”). 

Bound by United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.

1999), we affirm the March 2008 order. Because the March

2009 order made no express determination that any aspect of

the California parole revocation procedures, as modified by

Proposition 9, violated federal constitutional rights, nor any

determination that the Injunction was necessary to remedy a

constitutional violation, we vacate and remand the March

2009 order for the district court to make that determination

and to reconcile the Injunction and Proposition 9.

Background Facts & Procedural History

In May 1994, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of

parole revocation procedures under the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process, as defined in Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-90 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that

California’s parole revocation hearing system violated their

procedural due process rights. Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F. Supp.

2d 1068, 1078 (E.D. Cal. 2002). The parties later agreed to

the Injunction, which limited “the use of hearsay evidence . . .

by parolees’ confrontation rights in the manner set forth in . . .

Comito.” 

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The March 2008 order

In response to the parties’ attempts to clarify the Injunction

in light of United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2005),

and after additional briefing and a hearing, the Special Master

recommended: (1) the State should be found in violation of

the Injunction; (2) all hearsay is subject to Comito balancing

—weighing “the releasee’s interest in his constitutionally

guaranteed right to confrontation against the Government’s

good cause for denying it,” Comito, 177 F.3d at 1170; (3)

hearsay exceptions do not eliminate having to engage in full

Comito balancing; and (4) the State did not demonstrate compliance with paragraph 24 of the Injunction.2

 In its March

2008 order, the district court fully adopted the Special Master’s conclusions and recommendations. The State subsequently filed this timely appeal.

The March 2009 order

Following passage of Proposition 9, Plaintiffs moved the

district court to enforce the Injunction and bar implementation

of Proposition 9 due to its conflict with the Injunction. The

State countered with a motion to modify the Injunction to

conform to Proposition 9. 

After oral argument, the district court issued its March

2009 order, granting, in part, Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the

Injunction, and denying the State’s motion to modify it. The

district court found that while several provisions of Proposition 9 conflict with the Injunction, application of the Supremacy Clause meant the Injunction prevails over state law, to the

extent of any conflict. Modification was also not warranted,

2Paragraph 24 of the Injunction states: “The use of hearsay evidence

shall be limited by the parolees’ confrontation rights in the manner set

forth under controlling law as currently stated in United States v. Comito,

177 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1999). The Policies and Procedures shall include

guidelines and standards derived from such law.” 

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according to the district court, because Proposition 9 did not

constitute a change in applicable law or facts. The court did

not reach whether Proposition 9 violates the U.S. Constitution. The State then filed this timely appeal of the March 2009

order, and the two appeals were consolidated.

JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction over the appeal of both orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 

Because the March 2008 order modifies an existing injunction, it is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1). See Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863,

865-66 (9th Cir. 1989). It also fulfills the three-part test of

Thompson v. Enomoto, 815 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (9th Cir.

1987). First, it “ha[d] the practical effect of the grant or denial

of an injunction”: it added the recommendations of the Special Master to the Injunction and mandated them, including

the qualitative assessment and training of Deputy Commissioners and the Special Master’s new role as a moderator and

supervisor. See id. Second, it had “serious, perhaps irreparable

consequences,” id., such as the possible contravention of

Supreme Court precedent by imposing “numerous . . . costly

obligations” on the State, including additional required training and monitoring programs. Cf. Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins.

Co. of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding

serious consequences where “none of the other cases in which

Allianz is, or may be, involved can be settled by or in the

other courts in which they are located absent permission of

Negrete Counsel and the court in this case”). Finally, it “can

only be challenged by immediate appeal because if [the State]

awaits the final determination of this case” the damage to

hearsay determinations in parole hearings, and the cost of

monitoring the Deputy Commissioners, will have already

accrued. See id. It is unclear how long this litigation, which

began over 15 years ago, will continue before a final judg4824 VALDIVIA v. SCHWARZENEGGER

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ment issues. “A decision by us months or years after that cannot repair the damage.” Id.

The March 2009 order is appealable, as both parties concede, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), as the State is appealing

an order refusing to modify an injunction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court’s March 2008 order adopted the Special

Master’s report and recommendations in its entirety. The legal

conclusions of a Special Master are reviewed de novo. See

United States v. Clifford Matley Family Trust, 354 F.3d 1154,

1163 n.10 (9th Cir. 2004). Factual findings of a Special Master are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error. See

Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. Los Angeles County Metro.

Transit Auth., 263 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001).

“[M]atters of discretion,” such as evidentiary rulings and

interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d

1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a reviewing

court cannot reverse absent a definite and firm conviction that

the district court committed a clear error of judgment in the

conclusion it reached upon a weighing of relevant factors.

SEC v. Coldicutt, 258 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2001). Motions

for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), such as

the one present in the appeal of the March 2009 order, are

reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Asarco

Inc., 430 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005).

ANALYSIS

I. The March 2008 Order

The State argues the district court erred in applying the

Comito test to parole revocation hearings via the March 2008

order. It contends any hearsay evidence falling under a tradiVALDIVIA v. SCHWARZENEGGER 4825

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tional or long-standing exception ought not to be subject to

the Comito balancing test, based on this court’s holding in

Hall, 419 F.3d 980. This argument, however, fails. The law

of this circuit is clear: the Comito test remains central to confrontation rights in parole hearings. The district court did not

err in subjecting the State’s parole revocation hearings to

these requirements. 

A. Nature of the confrontation rights of parolees

We begin by noting that parole revocation hearings are “not

part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of

rights due a [criminal] defendant” are not due a parolee. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. Nonetheless, parolees are due certain

“minimum requirements of due process,” including the right

to confront witnesses. Id. at 488-89. These rights, however,

are based in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth and

Fifth Amendments and not in the Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment and its articulation in the Crawford line of

cases.3 Hall, 419 F.3d at 985-86 (“We, like the two circuits

that have also addressed this question, see no basis in Crawford or elsewhere to extend the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation to supervised release proceedings.”) (referencing

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).

[1] In Comito, this court specified the test for the confrontation rights of parolees. “[I]n determining whether the admission of hearsay evidence violates the releasee’s right to

3Our dissenting colleague takes issue with our use of Comito balancing

“where no federal confrontation right is infringed,” and where the

Supreme Court has found that most hearsay exceptions do not implicate

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Dissenting Op. at

4839-40. But we are not faced here with applications of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause to parole revocation hearings, rather, the right

to confrontation as espoused by Fourteenth Amendment due process, and

its articulation in Morrissey by the Supreme Court, and in Hall and Comito in our circuit. There is therefore a federal confrontation right at issue

here, one that is rooted in due process rather than the Sixth Amendment.

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confrontation in a particular case, the court must weigh the

releasee’s interest in his constitutionally guaranteed right to

confrontation against the Government’s good cause for denying it.” 177 F.3d at 1170. The weight given to a parolee’s

right to confrontation is assessed by two non-exhaustive factors: “the importance of the hearsay evidence to the court’s

ultimate finding and the nature of the facts to be proven by the

evidence.” Id. at 1171. If the hearsay evidence is not important to the finding of a violation, the error in admitting the

hearsay evidence can be considered harmless, but is still subject to the good cause analysis. Id. at 1171-72.

[2] Here, in the Injunction, the district court ordered the

State to follow Comito and limit the use of hearsay evidence

to the boundaries set by parolees’ confrontation rights. The

Special Master, and in turn the district court, did not err in the

determination that Comito balancing continues to be the test

in the Ninth Circuit, and that even if hearsay falls within a

recognized exception, it is still subject to Comito balancing.

B. United States v. Hall

In Hall, the parolee was faced with hearsay evidence from

a non-available declarant. After “[b]alancing the Comito factors,” the court found that the parolee had “little interest in

confrontation . . . because [the declarant’s out-of-court statements] w[ere] insignificant to the ultimate finding[,]” and

were “outweighed by the government’s substantial showing

of good cause” for failing to produce the declarant at the hearing. Hall, 419 F.3d at 989. While the hearsay exception evidence lessened “the importance of [the declarant’s out-ofcourt statements] to the court’s ultimate finding,” and rendered harmless any error in admitting those out of court statements, id. at 986 & n.5, the failure to produce the declarant

remained subject to analysis of the Government’s good cause

explanation, and to full Comito balancing.

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[3] The application of a balancing test to the admission of

hearsay evidence in parole revocation hearings is not an open

question in this circuit.4See Hall, 419 F.3d at 986; Comito,

177 F.3d at 1170-73; United States v. Walker, 117 F.3d 417,

420-21 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d

561, 564 (9th Cir. 1987). Hall did not overrule or modify the

Comito balancing test.

C. Hearsay exceptions and Comito balancing

[4] Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to

parole revocation hearings, see Walker, 117 F.3d at 420, evidence falling within enumerated hearsay exceptions is subject

to Comito balancing. While, in general, hearsay exception

evidence is admissible at trial because of assurances of reliability,5

 reliability or “trustworthiness” is included in the Comito

“right to confrontation” analysis: less reliable hearsay can

contribute to more weight placed on a parolee’s right to confrontation over the government’s good cause. Comito, 177

F.3d at 1171-72 (“Because the hearsay evidence was important to the court’s finding, and because it involved the least

reliable form of hearsay, Comito’s interest in asserting his

right to confrontation is at its apogee.”). Reliability does not

result in automatic admissibility: “Simply because hearsay

evidence bears some indicia of reliability does not render it

admissible.” Hall, 419 F.3d at 988. Therefore, evidence falling under a hearsay exception does not circumvent the Comito

balancing test. It remains a part of it as an “indicia of reliability,” and subject to good cause analysis.

4We are aware of the Second Circuit’s contrary holding. See United

States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006). However, as a threejudge panel, and with no intervening Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit precedent, we are bound by this court’s holding in Comito. 

5

See Fed. R. Evid. 803, Advisory Committee Notes (“The present rule

proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay

statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even

though he may be available.”). 

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D. Due process rights of parolees

[5] The Comito test does not elevate the due process rights

of parolees to those of criminal defendants. Criminal defendants have trial rights, including a jury trial, proof beyond a

reasonable doubt, application of the applicable rules of evidence, and Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. Even testimonial hearsay that falls under a “firmly rooted hearsay

exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” may not be admitted against a defendant without confrontation or cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68.

These protections stand in firm contrast to the conditional due

process rights of parolees, which can be justifiably denied—

and hearsay admitted—if the Government’s good cause is sufficient under Comito. 

[6] The dissent is concerned that the admission of hearsay

exception evidence against a criminal defendant “is a foregone conclusion” while such evidence would be admissible in

a parole revocation hearing once it is subject to a showing of

“good cause.” Dissenting Op., at 4841. Hearsay evidence that

is testimonial in nature, however, regardless of any exceptions, is inadmissible against a criminal defendant under

Crawford. However, both testimonial and non-testimonial

hearsay are admissible against a parolee, provided the hearsay

fulfills Comito balancing. Moreover, the admission of hearsay

evidence falling within an exception against a criminal defendant is not a foregone conclusion; all hearsay evidence is subject to Fed. R. Evid. 403 balancing (whether the evidence is

more prejudicial than probative). The Federal Rules of Evidence, and such prejudicial/probative weighing, do not govern

parole revocation hearings, see United States v. Walker, 117

F.3d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1997), and therefore do not protect

parolees as they do criminal defendants. 

Raising an argument neither party raised in this appeal, the

dissent also contends we have failed to define hearsay. See

Dissenting Op., at 4840-41. California parole revocation proVALDIVIA v. SCHWARZENEGGER 4829

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ceedings, however, are governed by state law whose hearsay

definitions would apply. Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, we are not “mandating” applicable hearsay law, or

attempting to redefine it, see Dissenting Op., at 4840, but

merely ensuring that state procedures comport with federal

due process per the law of this circuit.

[7] The district court, therefore, did not err in subjecting

the State’s parole revocation hearings to the Comito balancing

requirements.6 Comito balancing remains the framework for

confrontation rights in parole revocation hearings, and does

not elevate the due process rights of parolees over those of

criminal defendants. 

E. Corroborating hearsay with hearsay

The Special Master recommended, and the district court

adopted the ruling, that “[h]earsay cannot be used to corroborate proffered hearsay unless it, too, survives a Comito balancing test.” The district court did not err in this

determination.

[8] Neither Comito nor Hall offer a clear rule on whether

6The dissent finds that our upholding the application of Comito balancing to these state parole hearings is a violation of principles of federalism,

as no Ninth Circuit cases have previously applied such a procedure to state

procedures, but rather only to federal supervised release or probation. See

Dissenting Op. at 4840. However, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrissey, and this court in Comito, imposed “certain minimum due process

requirements” for parole revocation, revocation of probation, and revocation of supervised release, necessary to protect a parolee’s constitutional

right to confrontation. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1170, 1172. The district court,

in its June 2002 partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs,

found that California’s parole revocation hearing system violated Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. Valdivia, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.

This order was not appealed. There is therefore a demonstrated constitutional violation present in the California parole revocation hearing system,

and principles of federalism do not permit a state to violate what this court

has already deemed to be a constitutionally-protected right. 

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other hearsay evidence can be used to corroborate or support

the reliability of proffered hearsay in a parole revocation hearing without being subject to a balancing test. The court in

Comito specifically declined to consider the admissibility of

the underlying hearsay. 177 F.3d at 1169 (“While the additional evidence may also be subject in whole or in part to

valid objections based on hearsay and Comito’s right to confrontation, those challenges are not raised before us.”). While

the court in Hall did not subject the underlying hearsay to any

sort of balancing test, it did not articulate a particular rule as

to whether or when a balancing test should be employed. See

419 F.3d at 987. 

We affirm, therefore, not because Hall and Comito hold

that “on balance . . . these courts expect corroboration to come

from competent evidence,” but because of the Supreme

Court’s description in Morrissey of the due process rights of

parolees. 

[9] The basic question we face here is whether the government should be required to provide good cause for the

absence of the declarant in the underlying hearsay statement

that it seeks to use as an indicia of reliability. To satisfy due

process, Morrissey requires the State to demonstrate good

cause. The Court in Morrissey considered the rights described

in its opinion to be a floor—the basic, minimal rights afforded

to parolees by due process. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488-89

(“Our task is limited to deciding the minimum requirements

of due process.”). Among these rights is “the right to confront

and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).” Id. at 489. The good cause balancing of Comito for all

hearsay fits comfortably with Morrissey’s basic minimum due

process guarantees for parolees. Admitting hearsay without

the good cause analysis does not. 

The dissent’s concern that we have exceeded Morrissey’s

“minimum requirements,” 408 U.S. at 488-89, see Dissenting

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Op. at 4843, is a concern not with our opinion, but with Comito itself, which states:

Under Morrissey, every releasee is guaranteed the

right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at a revocation hearing, unless the government shows good cause for not producing the

witness. This right to confrontation ensures that a

finding of a supervised release violation will be

based on verified facts. Accordingly, in determining

whether the admission of hearsay evidence violates

the releasee’s right to confrontation in a particular

case, the court must weigh the releasee’s interest in

his constitutionally guaranteed right to confrontation

against the Government’s good cause for denying it.

177 F.3d at 1170 (internal citations omitted). While Comito

could be construed as going beyond the minimal requirements

espoused in Morrissey, we are not bound to adhere only to

minimal requirements; Comito is not inconsistent with those

requirements, and no intervening precedent has arisen since

Comito, either in our circuit or in the Supreme Court, to suggest otherwise.7

[10] In addition, allowing hearsay that does not pass Comito balancing to be considered in the determination of a statement’s reliability seems contrary to this Circuit’s holding in

Hall. Hall did say that “long-standing exceptions to the hearsay rule that meet more demanding requirements for criminal

prosecutions should satisfy the lesser standard of due process

accorded the respondent in a revocation hearing.” Hall, 419

F.3d at 987 (emphasis added). Should satisfy, however, does

7The dissent suggests our excerpting of Comito here to be “inapposite”

because “the hearsay at issue was actually admitted against the parolee as

evidence.” See Dissenting Op. at 7 (emphasis in original). However, in

both Hall and Comito, the hearsay was admitted after application of the

Comito balancing test. 177 F.3d at 1173; Hall, 419 F.3d at 986-87, 989.

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not mean “do satisfy.” The court in Hall, after making this

statement, went on to subject Hall’s medical records, which

fell under the business records exception to the hearsay rule

(Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)), to Comito balancing, weighing “Hall’s

interest in excluding hearsay evidence . . . against the government’s good cause for not producing [the witness].” Id. Thus,

following this circuit’s example in Hall, and the reasoning of

Morrissey and Comito, we believe that hearsay used to corroborate other hearsay remains subject to Comito balancing.

The process nonetheless remains “flexible enough to consider

evidence . . . that would not be admissible in an adversary

criminal trial.” Id. (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489).

The State argues that subjecting all hearsay to this balancing test is too arduous a burden, eliminating the “flexibility”

Morrissey, id., seems to embrace. Comito itself, however,

allows for the admission of testimonial evidence not normally

admissible in criminal trials. While Crawford restricts the use

of certain unauthenticated evidence, Crawford, 541 U.S. at

61, in a parole revocation hearing, under the Comito balancing test, testimonial hearsay evidence is admissible against a

parolee without the testimony of a declarant, provided the

government demonstrates the requisite good cause for its

inability to produce the declarant. 

[11] Therefore, subjecting underlying hearsay to the Comito balancing test conforms with Morrissey and our precedent,

and the district court did not err in adopting this recommendation of the Special Master on this record.

F. Morrissey and Other Obligations Imposed on the

State

Other obligations imposed on the State by the March 2008

order, including professional training for Deputy Commissioners, do not contravene the Supreme Court’s determination

that a hearing body need not necessarily be composed of judicial officers or lawyers. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486. Nor does

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the imposed disciplinary system contravene Morrissey’s

directive that hearing officers remain “neutral and detached.”

Id. at 489. 

The March 2008 order not only encourages the neutral,

detached behavior envisioned by Morrissey, but also increases

the experience and training of the officers. Nor does it mandate an entire body filled with judicial officers or lawyers,

which was the Court’s fear in Morrissey. Id. at 486 (“The

independent officer need not be a judicial officer.”) (emphasis

added). 

[12] While the State was not found to have violated the

Injunction, the Special Master found that the State had not

fully complied with its requirements. Where the state has not

“fully complied with the court’s earlier orders,” the district

court has “ample authority to go beyond earlier orders.” Hutto

v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); see also Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986) (“a federal

court must order effective relief” and a “defendant’s history

of noncompliance with prior orders is a relevant factor in

determining the necessary scope of an effective remedy”).

Here, in implementing a disciplinary system, the district court

was merely attempting to ensure compliance with the Injunction and was therefore not limited by its earlier orders. The

obligations imposed by the district court here, therefore, do

not constitute error in contravention of court precedent.

G. Dismissal of the State’s Objections

[13] The district court did not err in dismissing the State’s

objections to the evidence presented in the Special Master’s

report. While the State has argued several potential evidentiary errors in its briefs, we address here only those for which

the State has provided support as opposed to mere conjecture.

[14] Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and should not be reversed unless, more probably than

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not, the error tainted the outcome. Harman, 211 F.3d at 1175;

Gribben v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 1166, 1172

(9th Cir. 2008); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). In addition, we may

affirm the district court’s decision to admit evidence on any

basis in the record, so long as the issue has been briefed.

United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th

Cir. 1995) (“court of appeals may affirm a decision to admit

evidence on a different ground than that relied upon by the

district court as long as the issue has been fully briefed on

appeal, and there is sufficient basis in the record for us to

address it” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Special

Master did not improperly use judicial notice, nor rely on

inadmissible hearsay to support his findings.

The Special Master did not use judicial notice to bypass the

process of authenticating documents on which he relied. Transcripts were submitted as evidence, but the original tapes

remained in the State’s custody. For the State to challenge the

authenticity of transcripts to which they have the original

tapes defeats the purpose of the evidentiary rule. Plaintiffs

attempted to obtain the tapes from the State; when they were

declined, they resorted to transcripts.8 Plaintiffs were not

required to submit the originals for authentication in court,

and the State never challenged their authenticity in court, rendering judicial notice possible.9

Judicial notice is used to supplant authentication of “adjudicative facts”—“simply the facts of the particular case.” Fed.

8Under Fed. R. Evid. R. 1004(3), the party is not required to present the

original in court (here, the recording), “[a]t a time when an original was

under the control of the party against whom offered, that party was put on

notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a subject

of proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce the original at the

hearing[.]” 

9

See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.”). 

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R. Evid. 201, Advisory Committee Notes. Stated another way,

“the adjudicative facts are those to which the law is applied

in the process of adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to the jury. They relate to the parties, their activities,

their properties, their businesses.” Id. (citations omitted). The

authenticity of these transcripts was not challenged by either

party. Thus judicial notice was proper, and the Special Master

correctly admitted and relied upon the transcripts. 

Additionally, the Special Master’s findings were based not

on inadmissible hearsay, but rather on observations by

employees and observers, statements based in personal

knowledge that were not out-of-court statements. For these

reasons, we affirm the district court’s March 2008 order

adopting the Special Master’s report and recommendations.

II. The March 2009 Order

The district court, in its March 2009 order, denied modification of the Injunction to conform with California’s Proposition 9. While the court correctly found the State had not met

its burden to show a significant change in circumstances normally necessary for modification under Rufo v. Inmates of

Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992), such a showing may not have been necessary in light of federalism principles. The district court made no express determination that the

Injunction’s procedures were necessary to remedy federal

constitutional violations, and did not expressly find any aspect

of the California parole revocation procedures, as modified by

Proposition 9, in violation of basic constitutional rights. 

[15] A district court may refuse to modify a federal injunction in light of a given state law where such a law violates

federal law. See Clark v. Coye, 60 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir.

1995). However, merely finding that a state law conflicts with

a federal injunction, such as the court found here, is insufficient to deny modification of the injunction, and “clearly constitute[s] an abuse of discretion.” Id. (“In the case before us,

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Bill 35 was held to be inconsistent with the terms of the

injunction, not with the federal law upon which the injunction

was based. The district court has never concluded that Bill 35

violates federal law. It is irrelevant whether Bill 35 frustrates

the broad purpose of the district court’s injunction.”).

Further, while the Injunction was put in place to remedy

claimed constitutional violations, it is not clear that these procedures were required to remedy the violation of basic constitutional rights. The district court made this clear in the

hearing prior to issuing the March 2009 order:

[I]n this case I never found any of the things that

now everybody is concerned about, whether they

were consistent with the Constitution of the United

States or not. . . . . What I found was that the parties

had agreed to get rid of this lawsuit. There clearly

were some procedures which were violative of the

Federal Constitution, and they said, “Look, we’re

going to solve this whole problem, and we, the plaintiffs, will give away some of our constitutional rights

in order to gain these other rights.” . . . . It isn’t

really true that this Court made a determination that

these specific procedures were required by the Federal Constitution. The Court said, “You guys are

happy, I’m happy.”

While these procedures were put in place in an attempt to

remedy a claimed constitutional violation, they were not necessary or required by the Constitution. There is no indication

anywhere in the record that these particular procedures are

necessary for the assurance of the due process rights of parolees. 

[16] This circuit’s law is clear: unless a state law is found

to violate a federal law, or unless the Injunction is found necessary to remedy a constitutional violation, federalism principles require the reconciliation of the state law and federal

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injunctions. See Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393-94 (9th

Cir. 1997) (finding state law prevailed, and vacating injunction, where no determination made by district court that the

injunction was necessary to remedy a constitutional violation); Clark, 60 F.3d at 604 (“[T]he scope of federal injunctive relief against an agency of state government must always

be narrowly tailored to enforce federal constitutional and statutory law only.”). Therefore, we vacate and remand the

March 2009 order for the court to reconcile Proposition 9 with

the Injunction.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s March 2008 order, as we are

bound by Comito. Because the district court made no express

determination that any aspect of the California parole revocation procedures, as modified by Proposition 9, violated constitutional rights, or that the Injunction was necessary to remedy

a constitutional violation, we vacate and remand the March

2009 order for the district court to make that determination

and reconcile the Injunction with California law as expressed

in Proposition 9.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED

IN PART.

Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:

I concur in Part II of the majority’s opinion. A federal court

cannot disregard or encroach on state prerogatives unless it

must do so to vindicate federal law or the Constitution. For

this same reason, however, I dissent from the majority’s analysis in Part I. Hearsay evidence that falls within a firmly

rooted hearsay exception does not offend any federal right

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held by parolees, and we therefore have no authority to

impose “Comito balancing” when such evidence is proffered

in parole revocation hearings conducted by a state. The majority’s contrary holding places the Ninth Circuit in conflict with

the only other circuit to squarely consider this issue. See

United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006). I

also dissent because I see no basis to require additional “Comito balancing” where the hearsay in question serves only to

corroborate the reliability of proffered hearsay evidence and

is not actually admitted against the parolee.

I.

In hearings on the revocation of parole, Morrissey instructs

that the “minimum requirements of due process” include “the

right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” 408

U.S. at 488-89. This right to confrontation is applied through

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It provides no greater guarantee than that afforded to criminal

defendants under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973); Morrissey, 408 U.S.

at 489; United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir.

1987). The Sixth Amendment, in turn, does not enact the

hearsay rule, nor is it offended by evidence that falls within

a firmly rooted hearsay exception. As the Supreme Court

explained:

We have allowed the admission of statements falling

within a firmly rooted hearsay exception since the

Court’s recognition in Mattox v. United States, 156

U.S. 237 (1895), that the Framers of the Sixth

Amendment “obviously intended to . . . respec[t]”

certain unquestionable rules of evidence in drafting

the Confrontation Clause. Justice Brown, writing for

the Court in that case, did not question the wisdom

of excluding deposition testimony, ex parte affidavits and their equivalents. But he reasoned that an

unduly strict and “technical” reading of the Clause

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would have the effect of excluding other hearsay evidence, such as dying declarations, whose admissibility neither the Framers nor anyone else 100 years

later “would have [had] the hardihood . . . to question.”

Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1999) (citations omitted) (alterations and ellipses in original); see Melendez-Diaz

v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2009) (observing

that most hearsay exceptions do not implicate a criminal

defendant’s right to confrontation because they “cover[ ]

statements that by their nature [are] not testimonial—for

example, business records or statements in furtherance of a

conspiracy” (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

56 (2004))).

By requiring “Comito balancing” where no federal confrontation right is infringed, the majority recedes from the principles of federalism espoused in Part II of its opinion. It

imposes on the state a procedure crafted by the Ninth Circuit

that has heretofore applied only to the revocation of federal

supervised release or probation, not the revocation of state

parole. See Hall, 419 F.3d at 982; Comito, 177 F.3d at 1167;

United States v. Walker, 117 F.3d 417, 418-19 (9th Cir.

1997); United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 309 (9th Cir.

1993); Simmons, 812 F.2d at 562-63.

The majority requires this procedure whenever the state

relies on “hearsay” evidence, yet its opinion does not purport

to define this now critical term. In the federal system, the term

“hearsay” expressly excludes, inter alia, statements by coconspirators or admissions by a party to the proceeding. See Fed.

R. Evid. 801(d)(1), (2); Hall, 419 F.3d at 986. But under California law, these same statements are termed “hearsay” and

are admissible only under “hearsay exceptions.” See Cal.

Evid. Code §§ 1200-01, 1220, 1223. Which definition of

“hearsay” does the majority mandate in California’s parole

proceedings? I presume we will be called upon to answer this

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question—and others like it—in due course. Contra Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488 (“We cannot write a code of procedure; that is the responsibility of each State.”).1

By demanding that the state establish “good cause” to rely

on business records, excited utterances, and the like, the

majority expands the confrontation rights of parolees beyond

those held by criminal defendants. Contra id. at 489; Simmons, 812 F.2d at 564. The majority attempts to justify this

expansion by noting that—unlike in criminal trials—the state

can always trump parolees’ confrontation rights, even if no

firmly rooted hearsay exception applies. See Maj. Op. 4829.

But it is quite likely that most hearsay evidence offered in

parole hearings will fall under some firmly rooted hearsay

exception. See generally, e.g., United States v. Wake, 948

F.2d 1422, 1435 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]here are, needless to

say, numerous exceptions to hearsay not being admissible.”).

As a matter of constitutional law, the majority equips parolees

to exclude such evidence if the state cannot demonstrate

“good cause,” yet the admissibility of this same evidence

against criminal defendants is a foregone conclusion.2

The majority braces its holding by noting that parolees will

still lack many of the other rights enjoyed by criminal defendants, such as the right to a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Maj. Op. 4920. But this rationale is foreign to

our jurisprudence. We cannot retool discrete constitutional

1

In my view, the type of “hearsay” evidence that raises federal due process concerns is straightforward. Because the Fourteenth Amendment confers no greater confrontation right than that afforded to criminal

defendants, the state must show “good cause” only where it relies on evidence that would violate the Confrontation Clause in a criminal proceeding. 

2The majority posits that certain rules of evidence, such as Rule 403 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence and its state analogues, may help to alleviate this disparity. See Maj. Op. 4829. I decline to rely on legislative enactments and the discretion of trial judges to offset the asymmetry that the

majority injects into the Constitution. 

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guarantees so long as the total quantum of “due process”

afforded to parolees will not exceed that of criminal defendants. Like parolees, juveniles in delinquency proceedings

have no right to a jury trial, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,

403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), yet we are not empowered to

enhance juveniles’ confrontation rights, raise the burden of

proof, or demand greater effectiveness from their appointed

attorneys.

The majority asserts that its decision is compelled by the

“law of this circuit,” rejecting the Second Circuit’s contrary

views in a footnote. Maj. Op. 4826; id. at 4828 n.4. Yet our

prior caselaw involved federal probationers challenging evidence that would be inadmissable against criminal defendants.

These precedents do not dictate our decision in a case involving state parolees disputing evidence “whose admissibility

neither the Framers nor anyone else 100 years later ‘would

have [had] the hardihood . . . to question.’ ” Lilly, 527 U.S.

at 126 (alteration and ellipses in original).

Furthermore, our most recent decision in Hall strongly supports the approach taken by the Second Circuit. Compare

United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 344 (2d Cir. 2004)

(“[T]he [due-process] balancing analysis need not be made

where the proffered out-of-court statement is admissible

under an established exception to the hearsay rule.”), with

Hall, 419 F.3d at 987 (“[L]ong-standing exceptions to the

hearsay rule . . . should satisfy the lesser standard of due process accorded the respondent in a revocation proceeding.”).

Indeed, the Hall court favorably cited the same line of Second

Circuit precedents that the majority today rejects out of hand.

See Hall, 419 F.3d at 986 (citing Aspinall, 389 F.3d at 342).

The majority’s headlong decision to create a circuit split is

both unpersuasive and unnecessary.

II.

To apply its prescribed “balancing test,” the Comito court

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ability of the proffered [hearsay] evidence,” and advised that

the greater the reliability of the proffered evidence, the lesser

a respondent’s interest “in testing it by exercising his right to

confrontation.” See 177 F.3d at 1171. Today, the majority

holds that when hearsay is considered solely to evaluate the

reliability of proffered hearsay evidence, it too must be independently subjected to “Comito balancing.” To support its

holding, the majority excerpts at length from our decisions in

Comito and Hall, yet in each instance the hearsay at issue was

actually admitted against the parolee as evidence; it was not

used solely to assess the reliability of hearsay evidence proffered for admission. See Maj. Op. 4832-33. The majority’s

excerpts are inapposite.

It is well-established, moreover, that trial judges may routinely consider inadmissible evidence to evaluate the competence of evidence actually proffered for admission. See, e.g.,

Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). No decision by the Supreme Court or

the Ninth Circuit has found this practice to contravene the

minimum requirements of due process or to require additional

procedural safeguards. By requiring such safeguards in parole

revocation hearings, the majority departs from Supreme Court

precedent and exceeds our limited authority to intervene in

the criminal justice system of the fifty states. The majority

declares: “[W]e are not bound to adhere only to minimal

requirements [of due process].” Maj. Op. 4831. The Supreme

Court has stated: “Our task is limited to deciding the minimum requirements of due process.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at

488-89.

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