Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03978/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03978-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Many inmates apparently believe that they will receive an immediate payout from

a fund established in Hart v. Hill, No. CV 77-0479-PHX-EHC (MS) (D. Ariz.). No such fund

exists. The inmat es in Hart asked for injunctive relief and not monetary damages. The

Court at this time expresses no opinion whether Plaintiff’s lawsuit may result in an award

of damages. 

TERMPSREF

JDN

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Albert David Serpa, Sr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-3978-PHX-DGC (JCG)

ORDER

This is one of more than one thousand civil rights actions filed since September

2004 by M aricopa County Jail inmates.1 Plaintiff is an inmate at the Lower Buckeye Jail in

Phoenix, Arizona. The Court will require an answer to the Complaint.

A. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis & Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Pursuant t o 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of

$250.00 for this action. No initial partial filing fee will be assessed by this Order. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). 

Plaint iff will be obligated for monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding

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month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account. The Court will direct the appropriate

agency to collect these monthly payment s, which will be forwarded to the Clerk of Court

each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Plaintiff should take notice that if he is released before the filing fee

is paid in full, he must pay the remaining unpaid amount of the filing fee within 120 days

of the date of his release. If Plaintiff fails to pay the remainder of the filing fee within 120

days of the date of his release, the action will be dismissed, unless Plaintiff shows good

cause, in writing, why he is unable to pay the remainder of the filing fee.

B. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the Plaint iff has raised

claims t hat are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

C. Complaint

Plaintiff's Complaint concerns his previous confinement at the Estrella Jail in

Phoenix, Arizona. In his Complaint Plaintiff alleges that the overcrowded conditions at the

jail caused intolerable noise levels, the living conditions were unsanitary, and recreational

opportunities were inadequate. He claims that he has suffered loss of sleep, high stress,

inability to concentrate, exposure t o communicable diseases, infections, and threats to his

health and safety. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Joseph Arpaio, the Maricopa

County Sheriff, is liable for violating Plaintiff's civil rights. These allegations adequately

state a claim, and the Court will require an answer to the Complaint.

D. Dismissal

1. Hart v. Hill

Throughout his Complaint, Plaintiff refers to Hart v. Hill, No. CIV 77-0479-PHX-EHC

(MS) (D.Ariz.), claiming that the conditions of his confinement violated an Amended

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Judgment in that action. Jurisdiction to enforce the judgment is retained by the court

which entered it. Jeff D. v. Kemp t horne, 365 F.3d 844, 853 (9th Cir. 2004). A civil rights

action is not the proper means by which to enforce the decree. Cagle v. Sutherland, 334

F.3d 980, 986 (11th Cir. 2003); Klein v. Zavaras, 80 F.3d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1996); DeGidio

v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 534 (8th Cir.1990); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (5th Cir.

1986). Standing alone, remedial orders cannot serve as a substantive basis for a § 1983

claim for damages because such orders do not create “rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws.” Green, 788 F.3d at 1123-24. Remedial decrees are

the means by which unconstitutional conditions are corrected but they do not create or

enlarge constitutional right s. Id. at 1123. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to enforce Hart v.

Hill, his claim is not properly brought in this action. Instead, his allegations must

separately state a violation of a constitutional right. 

2. Count I - Overcrowding

Allegations of overcrowding, alone, are insufficient to state a claim under t he Eighth

Amendment. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of

Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 471 (9th Cir. 1989). Where crowding causes an increase in violence or

reduces the provision of ot her constitutionally required services, or reaches a level where

the institution is no longer fit for human habitat ion, however, the prisoner may be able to

state a claim. See Balla, 869 F.2d at 471; Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir.

1984). M oreover, to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered specific

injury as a result of the specific conduct of a defendant, and show an affirmative link

between the injury and that conduct. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

In Count I, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific personal injury or any lack of

const it ut ionally required services as a result of the overcrowding. Plaintiff simply states

that there are four men to a cell, inmates are housed in the day room, and inmates sleep on

the floor. These allegations fail to demonstrate a constitutional violat ion. Accordingly,

Count I is dismissed without prejudice. 

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3. Count II - Day Room Access

To have standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “an invasion of a legally protected

interest that is concrete and particularized and act ual or imminent.” Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). “[A] plaintiff must allege [1] personal injury [2]

fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be

redressed by the requested relief." Idaho Conservat ion League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508,

1513 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)) (emphasis in original).

In Count III, Plaintiff asserts that the civil rights of all pretrial detainees are violated

by the overcrowded conditions; he fails to allege any personal injury. As described supra,

in order to have standing Plaintiff must allege personal injury that is fairly traceable to

Defendant's alleged unlawful conduct. See Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1513.

At this juncture, Plaintiff's vague allegations fail to demonstrate that he has standing t o

state a claim. Consequently, Count II is dismissed without prejudice.

4. Count III - Lighting

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is in violation of " onditions related t o

natural light, windows, artificial lighting, and temperature which do not safe guard . . .

pretrial detainees from eye fatigue." Compl. at 6. "T he Eighth Amendment guarantees

adequate heating." Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition,

"[a]dequate lighting is one of the fundamental attributes of 'adequate shelt er' required by

t he Eight h Amendment." Id., at 1090. Plaintiff's allegations, however, fail to demonstrat e

how Defendant has allegedly violated light or t emp erature standards. Standing alone, the

allegations in Count III do not rise to a constitution violat ion. T hus, Count III will be

dismissed without prejudice.

5. Count V - Mail

“Regulating correspondence between prisoners and government agencies can serve

to prevent criminal activity and maintain prison security.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82

F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir.1996). “[T]he prevention of criminal activity and t he maint enance of

prison security are legitimate penological interests which justify the regulation of both

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incoming and outgoing prisoner mail.” Id. (citations omitted).

In order to state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff must show that he suffered some real

injury: mere delay or interference does not state a claim. See Morgan v. Montanya, 516

F.2d 1367, 1371 (2nd Cir. 1975). Plaintiff's allegation that the jail's handling of the mail

constitutes a loss of p rivacy does not rise to a constitutional violation. Accordingly,

Count V will be dismissed without prejudice.

6. Count VII - Access to Law Library

In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied constant access to a law library and

the assistance of a legal clerk. As a pretrial detainee during his confinement at the

Maricopa County jail, Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts for his criminal prosecution

was guaranteed by the State’s offer of a criminal defense attorney. T he Ninth Circuit and

ot her courts have uniformly held that the right of access to the courts cannot be violated

when an inmate is offered the assistance of court -appointed counsel. See United States

v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The offer of court-appointed counsel to

represent [Defendant] satisfied the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful

access to the courts.”); United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1990) (“principles

of due process are not violated when a defendant waives his right to counsel, even though

by doing so he destroys any meaningful access to the court that he may have had”). The

Supreme Court of Arizona follows the same principles. See, e.g., State v. Henry , 863 P.2d

861, 876 (Ariz. 1993); Salstrom v. State, 714 P.2d 875, 878 (Ariz. 1986). 

The Maricopa County Superior Court records show that the State of Arizona filed

a criminal case against Plaintiff. See State v.Serpa, No. CR2005-011852-002. The state court

records indicate that in this case Plaintiff has been represented. Plaintiff therefore fails to

state a claim for the denial of his right of access to the courts due t o lack of access to a law

library or legal clerk, because he has a lawyer representing him in his criminal prosecution.

Count VII will be dismissed without prejudice.

7. Count VIII - Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is in violation of classification standards. There is

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no const itutional right to enjoy a particular security classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429

U.S. 78 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Further, Plaintiff has failed

to allege how or why the medical treatment constitutes a violation of civil rights, nor has

Plaintiff alleged any personal injury. For those reasons discussed under Count II, t his

claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

8. Count IX - Intake Area

Plaintiff fails to allege any personal injury in Count IX, thus, for the reasons

discussed under Count I and II, this claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

9. Count XI - Inmate Classification

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is in violation of classification standards. There is

no constitutional right to enjoy a particular security classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429

U.S. 78 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). 

In Count XI, Plaintiff also contends that Defendant has not provided sufficient

professional counseling for incoming pre-trial det ainees. Pre-trial detainees do not have

a constit ut ional right to receive professional counseling upon arrival at the Maricopa

County jail. A p re-trial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement

arises from the Due Process Clause rather than from the Eighth Amendment p rohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v.

Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment provides

a minimum standard of care for det ermining a plaintiff’s rights as a pretrial detainee.

Anderson v. Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-313 (9th Cir. 1995).

To state a § 1983 medical claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaint iff must show

that Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference may occur if “prison officials

deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.” Hutchinson v. United States,

838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). A mere delay in medical or dental care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. Shapley v.

Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff must show

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the delay in treatment was harmful. Id. Plaintiff’s allegation that pre-trial detainees are not

provided professional counseling and orientation fails to state a constitutional claim, and

will be dismissed.

10. Count XII - Food

Plaintiff fails to allege any personal injury in Count XII, thus, for the reasons

discussed under Count II, this claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

11. Count XIII - Grievance Policy

An inmate has no free-standing constitutional right to a grievance process. In

Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner

does not have a protected liberty interest in prison grievance procedures. The mere denial

of a grievance does not give rise to the inference of active unconstitutional behavior.

Where a defendant’s only involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is the

denial of administrative grievances, the failure t o intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to

remedy alleged unconstitutional behavior does not amount to active unconstitutional

behavior for purposes of § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant used the grievance procedure to inhibit inmates from

pursuing legal remedies does not rise to a const itutional violation. Accordingly, Count

XIII will be dismissed.

E. Rule 41 Cautionary Notice

Plaintiff should take notice that if he fails to timely comply with every provision of

this Order, or any order entered in t his matter, this action will be dismissed pursuant to

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss action for failure to comply with any order

of the Court).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted. Plaintiff is

obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $250.00 for this action. Plaintiff is assessed no

initial partial filing fee. 

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(2) The Maricopa County Sheriff or his designee shall collect the filing fee from

Plaintiff’s trust account by collect ing monthly payments in an amount equal to 20 percent

of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account and forwarding the

p ayments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the

name and number assigned to this action.

(3) Counts I, II, III, V, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XII, and XIII are dismissed without prejudice.

(4) The Clerk of Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including the Complaint,

this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for Defendant Arpaio.

(5) Plaintiff shall complete and return the service p acket to the Clerk of Court within

20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(6) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or complete

service of the Summons and Complaint on each Defendant within 120 day s of the filing of

the complaint or within 60 days of the filing of t his Order, whichever is later, the action may

be dismissed as to each Defendant not served pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure and Rule 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

(7) The United States Marshal shall retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

and a copy of this Order for future use.

(8) T he United States Marshal shall notify Defendant of the commencement of this

action and request waiver of service of the summons p ursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant shall include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal shall file waivers of service of the summons or requests for waivers that were

returned as undeliverable as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service of summons

is not returned by a Defendant within thirt y days from the date the request for waiver was

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

the Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

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(b) Within 10 days after p ersonal service is effected, file the return of service

for t he Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service

of the summons and of the costs subsequent ly incurred in effecting service upon

the Defendant. The costs of service shall be enumerat ed on the return of service

form (USM-285) and shall include the cost s incurred by the Marshal for

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM -285), if required. Costs of

service will be taxed against the personally served defendant pursuant to Rule

4(d)(2) and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by

the Court.

(9) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint shall

return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(10) Defendant shall answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(11) Any answer or responsive pleading shall state the specific Defendant (s) by

name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may st rike any answer, responsive pleading,

or other motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant(s) by name on

whose behalf it is filed.

(12) Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant, or if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for

consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original document and copy, to

be filed with the Clerk of the Court, a certificat e st at ing t he date a true and correct copy of

the pleading or document was mailed to Defendant or counsel. Any paper received by a

District Court Judge or Magistrate Judge which has not been filed with the Clerk of Court

may be disregarded by the Court.

(13) At all times during the pendency of this action, Plaintiff shall immediately advise

the Court and the United States Marshal of any change of address and its effective date.

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Such notice shall be captioned “ NOT ICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” The notice shall

contain only information pertaining to the change of address and its effective date.

Plaintiff shall serve a copy of the notice on all opposing part ies. The notice shall not

include any motions for any other relief. Failure to file a Notice of Change of Address may

result in t he dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

(14) A clear, legible copy of every pleading or other document filed shall

accompany each original pleading or other document filed with the Clerk for use by the

District Judge or Magistrate Judge t o whom the case is assigned. Failure to comply with

this requirement may result in the pleading or document being st ricken without further

notice to Plaintiff. 

(15) This matter is referred t o M agistrate Judge Jennifer C. Guerin pursuant to Rule

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings.

DATED this 9th day of January, 2006.

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