Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05141/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05141-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 25, 1996 Decided December 6, 1996

No. 95-5141

CASTRO COUNTY, TEXAS,

APPELLEE

v.

JOE CRESPIN,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

95-5183

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv01782)

Judith A. Sanders-Castro argued the cause for appellant, with whom José Garza was on the briefs.

Paul J. Zidlicky argued the cause for appellee, with whom Carter G. Phillips was on the brief. Mark

D. Hopson entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD, Circuit Judge, andBUCKLEY, SeniorCircuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Appellant Crespin appeals from the decision of a three-judge District

Court denying his "motion to reopen" to file for attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of the

Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (1994), pursuant to which fees are awarded to "the

prevailing party."

Appellant intervened on behalf of defendant United States in an action brought by Castro

County under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994), to get preclearance of

a redistricting plan. On April 13, 1994, following a request by the parties, the District Court delayed

final disposition of the matter to allow the parties time to pursue settlement negotiations. The court

dismissed the action without prejudice, but gave the parties thirty days within which to file a motion

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to reopen; if no such motion was filed within thirty days, the case would be dismissed with prejudice.

Subsequently, after Castro County sought additional time, the District Court issued an order

extending the time for the filing of a motion to reopen to June 29, 1994. On June 28, 1994 Crespin

filed a "motion to reopen" solely for the purpose of seeking attorneys' fees. This motion in effect

requested permission to file a complete application for attorneys' fees under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(d)(2)(B). The District Court denied appellant's motion, mainly because the court found

that, under Rule 54(d)(2)(B), any application for fees should have been filed within fourteen days of

the April 13, 1994 order.

The appellant now challenges the District Court's refusal to entertain a request for fees. In

particular, appellant claims that a fee request could not have been filed within fourteen days of April

13, 1994, because the District Court's order of that date was not a final appealable order. Appellant

also points out that there was no way to assess fees until after June 29, 1994, when the case on the

merits was concluded. We agree with appellant's contentions and reverse the judgment of the District

Court.

First, we find that we have jurisdiction to hear appellant's claim. Although section 5 indicates

that "any appeal" shall be made directly to the Supreme Court, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, case law and

sound policy dictate that appeals on attorneys' fees emanating from actions under section 5 are made

to the federal courts of appeals. Second, we find that appellant Crespin has standing to pursue his

claim, because he has demonstrated injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability with regard to the

question of attorneys' fees. Finally, on the merits, we find that the District Court erred in denying

Crespin's June 28, 1994 motion requesting permission to file an application for fees. Appellant

reasonably concluded that, in light of the April 13, 1994 order, as amended, the District Court would

not entertain anything further from the parties absent a motion to reopen filed before June 29, 1994.

Furthermore, the decision of the District Court holding that appellant wasrequired to file anymotion

for fees within fourteen days of the April 13, 1994 order was simply wrong. The case on the merits

did not conclude untilJune 29, 1994. Before that time, both the parties' status and the amount of fees

incurred remained uncertain, making it impossible for the District Court to rule on anymotion for fees

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e). We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand

to allow appellant to file a complete motion for fees.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Section 5 Complaint

CastroCountyis a smallcountylocated inwesternTexas governed byaCommissionersCourt

that consists of five members: a County Judge (elected county-wide) and four Commissioners

(elected fromthe four individual precincts within the county). According to the 1990 Census, Castro

County has an Hispanic population of 46.16%. Cited in Brief of Appellee Castro County, Texas at

4. No Hispanic person had ever been elected to the Commissioners Court, however. Following the

1990 census, Castro County concluded that the four Commissioner precincts were malapportioned

under the one-person one-vote standard. Castro County then aimed to reconfigure its precincts.

On February 8, 1993, after two unsuccessful attempts at administrative preclearance by the

Department ofJustice, the Castro County Commissioners Court adopted a redistricting plan ("1993

Plan"). The 1993 Plan contained two majority Hispanic precincts. On May 10, 1993, the Assistant

Attorney General objected to Castro County's 1993 Plan. On August 25, 1993, Castro County filed

a complaint under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c), seeking judicial

preclearance of the redistricting plan, setting into motion the events that led to this law suit.

Castro County's motion for a three-judge panel was granted on August 31, 1993. In

December of 1993, the District Court granted Joe Crespin leave to intervene as a defendant. At the

time, Crespin was represented by four Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund

("MALDEF") attorneysfromSan Antonio, one MALDEF attorney fromWashington, D.C., and one

attorney from the law firm of Gray & Becker.

On April 8, 1994, after the defendant and the intervenor had engaged in months of discovery,

the parties filed a joint motion to stay the proceedings pending settlement discussions, subject to the

right to reopen. On April 13, 1994, in response to the motion to stay, the District Court dismissed

the case without prejudice to be dismissed with prejudice unless the parties filed a motion to reopen

by May 13, 1994. See Castro County, Texas v. United States, Civ. No. 93-1782 (D.D.C. Apr. 13,

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1994),reprinted in Appendix ("App.") D (all appendix citesrefer to appellant Crespin'ssubmission).

The District Court's order read as follows:

ORDERED that the above-entitled cause shall be, and hereby is, DISMISSED,

without prejudice, fromthe docket ofthis Court, without coststo any party; and that

any of the parties may reopen this case on or before 4:00 p.m. on May 13, 1994,

should the case not be settled. Any party wishing to reopen this case under the above

condition may do so upon oral application to the Courtroom Deputy Clerk, Mr.

Joseph E. Burgess, ((202) 273-0553); absent such a request to reopen this case on

or before May 13, 1994, the above-captioned case shall stand dismissed, with

prejudice.

Id. Subsequently, pursuant to a motion by Castro County, the District Court extended the time in

which to reopen to June 29, 1994.

B. Crespin's "Motion to Reopen"

On June 28, 1994, Crespin filed a document entitled a "motion to reopen" that requested only

permission to seek attorneys' fees. One day later, the Attorney General precleared a newly

agreed-upon redistricting plan for Castro County, thus concluding the section 5 action. A month

later, on July 29, 1994, the District Court denied Crespin's "motion to reopen." See Castro County,

Texas v. United States, Civ. No. 93-1782 (D.D.C. July 29, 1994), reprinted in App. C. The District

Court ruled: (i) Crespin gave no reason why the case needed to be reopened for the court to assess

attorneys' fees, and (ii) even if his motion to reopen were construed as a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(d)(2)(B) motion for fees, it did not meet the requirements of that Rule because, inter

alia, it was not filed within fourteen days of the April 13, 1994 order and did not estimate the amount

of fees sought. See id. at 2-3, reprinted in App. C.

C. Crespin's Motion for Reconsideration and for Relief from Judgment/MALDEF's Motion for

Intervention

On August 8, 1994, Crespin filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

seeking reconsideration of the District Court's July 29, 1994 judgment. On November 9, 1994,

MALDEF filed a motion to intervene on the issue of attorneys' fees, stating that Crespin had

discharged MALDEF as his counsel. On April 12, 1995, the District Court denied the motion for

reconsideration as moot. The panel concluded that, by discharging MALDEF as his counsel, Crespin

appeared to have abandoned his interest in attorneys' fees. The panel further concluded that, even

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if the motion for reconsideration were not moot, Crespin would not be entitled to relief pursuant to

Rule 60(b) because claimsfor attorneys'fees are not the type of actionsthat would justify relief under

Rule 60(b). In a footnote, the panel denied as untimely MALDEF's motion to intervene. See Castro

County, Texas v. United States, Civ. No. 93-1782 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1995), reprinted in App. B.

Both Crespin and MALDEF appealed to this court the District Court's orders denying the motions

to reopen and for reconsideration/intervention.

D. Castro County's Motion to Dismiss

In response to the appeals to this court, Castro County moved to dismiss on the ground that

appeals from three-judge orders in Voting Rights Act cases lie directly to the Supreme Court. A

motions panel referred the motion to dismiss to a merits panel and instructed the parties to brief the

issue.

II. ANALYSIS

A. This Court's Jurisdiction to Hear Appeals on the Issue of Attorneys' Feesin Voting Rights Cases

Castro County brought this case to a three-judge panel under section 5 of the Voting Rights

Act, which governs actions by states and their political subdivisions for judicial preclearance of

changes in voting qualifications or procedures to ensure such changes do not deny or abridge voting

rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). This provision states that "[a]ny action under this section shall be

heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284

of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." Id. Castro County suggests that,

following the language of the statute, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear "any appeal" from the

decision of a three-judge panel.

We find that the "any appeal" language of 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) does not apply to this appeal,

which raises only an issue of attorneys' feesthat in no way affectsthe disposition on the merits of the

section 5 action. There are two justifications for this holding: First, case law from both the Supreme

Court itself and other circuits indicates that jurisdiction over an appeal from the determination of a

three-judge panel on the issue of attorneys' fees lies with the federal courts of appeals. Second, the

policy concerns militating in favor of direct appeal to the Supreme Court in cases involving

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substantive determinations under 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) do not apply in cases concerned solely with

attorneys' fees.

1. Case Law

Judgments from the Supreme Court and case law from this and other circuits indicate that

jurisdiction lies in the courts of appeals, not the Supreme Court, in appeals involving attorneys' fee

claims emanating from Voting Rights Act cases. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly

addressed the question, the matter was squarely before the Court in Franklin v. Lawrimore, 116 S.

Ct. 42 (1995) (mem.). In Franklin, the appellants attempted to appeal a three-judge district court

order denying their petition for attorneys' fees in a section 5 case. Appellees moved to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction, arguing "[t]here is no statutory provision for an appeal from the District Court's

action on a petition for attorney's fees to be made to the Supreme Court. The appeal provisions of

42 U.S.C. § 1973c are not applicable because the application for attorney'sfeesis not an action under

Section 5." See Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 6, Franklin (No. 94-2032). The Supreme Court

issued a summary order vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the district court "for entry

of a fresh judgment from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit." 116 S. Ct. at 42. The Supreme Court's order was issued without reasoning,

but given that the jurisdictional issue wasraised in the motion to dismiss and the only issue on appeal

was attorneys' fees, it seems safe to assume that the Court found that attorneys' fees rulings should

be appealed to the circuit courts. See also Clinton v. Jeffers, 503 U.S. 930 (1992) (remanding

attorneys' fees determination of a three-judge panel "with instructionsto enter a fresh judgment from

which an appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit").

Castro County cites one Supreme Court case in support of its contention that appeal of an

attorneys' fees case lies with the highCourt: NAACP v. NewYork, 413 U.S. 345 (1973). In NAACP,

the Court interpreted the "any appeal" language in section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1973b(a)(5) (1994), which governs actions by states or their politicalsubdivisions for declaratory

judgments that any tests or devices do not deny or abridge voting rights. The language of the "any

appeal" provision of section 4(a) exactly parallels the "any appeal" language at issue in this case, so

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the reasoning of the Court in construing that language is relevant here. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496

U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (noting that "identicalwords used in different parts ofthe same act are intended

to have the same meaning" particularly where there is a substantial relation between the two sections

(internal quotation omitted)).

In NAACP v. New York, the NAACP sought to intervene in the section 4(a) action in district

court after the United States consented to New York's motion for summary judgment on the section

4(a) question. See 413 U.S. at 348-49. The Court addressed the issue whether the "any appeal"

language ofsection 4(a) includes an appeal by a would-be, but unsuccessful, intervenor. The Court

determined that the words "any appeal" were "subject to broad construction; they could be said to

include review of any meaningful judicial determination made in the progress of the § 4 lawsuit." Id.

at 353-54. The Court therefore found that the NAACP was required to bring its claim to the

Supreme Court.

The situation in this case, however, is quite different from the situation faced by the Court in

NAACP: the District Court's orders regarding the motions to reopen by Crespin and the motion to

intervene byMALDEF are directed solelyto the issue of attorneys'fees and, therefore, cannot be said

to be "meaningful judicial determinations made in the progress of" the section 5 action. Indeed, the

claim for attorneys' fees comes only at the conclusion of the section 5 action, so a determination on

attorneys' fees cannot possibly affect "the progress of" litigation in a section 5 case. NAACP is,

therefore, inapplicable.

Like the Supreme Court, this circuit has not expressly addressed the question of its appellate

jurisdiction over attorneys'feesissuesin section 5 litigation. However, it is noteworthy that this court

has heard such casesin the past, apparently without objection. See Commissioners Court of Medina

County, Texas v. United States, 683 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d

240 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

The only circuit to address the issue, the Fifth Circuit, found that circuit courts have

jurisdiction over the decisions of three-judge courts on the issue of attorneys' fees. In Ward v.

Dearman, 626 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1980), the court found that when "a three judge court dismisses

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1 Although we may not subscribe to the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, we find the results in

these cases persuasive. 

a case as moot, the appeal is to the court of appeals rather than to the Supreme Court." Id. at 491.

In Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1993), the court said, "We now hold that we have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to hear appeals from three-judge courts on the issue of

attorneys' fees." Id. at 455 n.2.1

In short, what little case law there is on the subject supports the conclusion that jurisdiction

over an appeal from the determination of a three-judge panel on the issue of attorneys' fees lies with

the federal courts of appeals. And we can find no case law to the contrary.

2. The Policy Underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1973c

Just as case law does not support requiring appellant Crespin to pursue his appeal in the

Supreme Court, the policy concerns that animate direct appeal to the Supreme Court in section 5

cases are inapplicable to attorneys'fee claims. The requirement of direct appeal to the Supreme Court

was enacted by Congress to ensure the speedy resolution of disputes over voting rights. This was

seen as necessary because, as the Court noted in NAACP, "the enforcement of the voting rights

statutes "has encountered serious obstaclesin variousregions ofthe country,' and progress "has been

painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of State and local officials and repeated delays in

the judicial process.' " NAACP, 413 U.S. at 354 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 9 (1965)). While

the availability of attorneys' fees plays a critical role in encouraging aggrieved and interested parties

to participate in the process of enforcing voting rights, an attorneys' fee determination is ancillary to

the merits of the claimsthat were Congress's primary concern. The purpose of direct Supreme Court

appealhastening the resolution of suits involving voting rights, see 413 U.S. at 355does not

mandate direct appeal to the Supreme Court of attorneys' fees issues, in which no individual's right

to vote is at stake.

B. Crespin's Standing to Raise Attorneys' Fees Issues

In a supplemental brief filed after the close of the regular briefing schedule, Castro County

argued that Crespin has no standing to pursue this appeal. Castro County did not press this claim

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2

In Diamond, the Court found that an intervenor's interest in attorneys' fees was insufficient to

support a challenge to the merits of the case. 476 U.S. at 69-71 (The case involved an

intervenor's attempt to defend the constitutionality of a state criminal abortion statute when the

state did not appeal the lower court's decision that the statute was unconstitutional.). Diamond

does not control this case, however, where intervenor is using his interest in attorneys' fees solely

to support a challenge on the question of attorneys' fees. 

during oral argument, and for good reason. The suggestion that Crespin lacks standing is a

contention that is devoid of merit. 

In Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), the Supreme Court held that "an intervenor's

right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is

contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III." Id. at 68.

The original defendant in this case, the United States, left the action when the case on the merits was

settled. Therefore, intervenor, appellant Crespin, must satisfy the Article III standing requirements

to pursue a claim for attorneys' fees before this court. On the facts of this case, Crespin's standing

is obvious.2

Under section 5, attorneys' fees are awarded only to "the prevailing party." 42 U.S.C. §

1973l(e). Thus, no determination about a party's entitlement can be made until the underlying case

on the merits has been resolved, after which time the parties may raise the independent issue of

attorneys' fees. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that denial of attorneys' fees under a

fee-shifting statute is an ancillary question to the main subject matter of the litigation. See Budinich

v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200 (1988) ("As a general matter, at least, we think it

indisputable that a claim for attorney's fees is not part of the merits of the action to which the fees

pertain."). Therefore, Crespin's claim for attorneys' fees did not mature until after the section 5 action

had concluded.

It is also clear that, although Crespin was only an intervenor, and not the principal defendant,

and that the case on the merits was concluded pursuant to a settlement, Crespin still was entitled to

seek attorneys' fees. This court has recognized both that a party intervening as a defendant in a

section 5 action may be a prevailing party and that a party may prevail by a consent judgment,

negotiated settlement, or when action by another party rendersthe case moot. Commissioners Court

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3 With regard to appellant MALDEF, we summarily affirm the decision of the District Court

denying MALDEF's motion to intervene, because MALDEF filed no brief in this court. See

Garden State Broadcasting Ltd. Partnership v. FCC, 996 F.2d 386, 388 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

("[Appellant], however, made no filings after it docketed its appeal. We therefore dismiss

[appellant's] appeal for failure to prosecute."); Barber v. American Sec. Bank, 841 F.2d 1159,

1162 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[C]ounsel's failure to file a brief on time [and] his failure to file a motion

for an extension ten days prior to the date his brief was due ... warrant dismissal...."). 

of Medina County, 683 F.2d at 439-40.

Finally, there can be no doubt that Crespin has demonstrated the requisite (i) injury-in-fact,

(ii) causation, and (iii) redressability to satisfy standing to raise this appeal on attorneys' fees. See

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (setting forth the requirements for Article III standing).

His claim that he is entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) meets the injury-in-fact

standard. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975) ("Congress may create a statutory right or

entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where plaintiff would

have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence ofstatute."). Crespin's injury was caused

by the refusal of Castro County and the District Court to entertain his request to file a motion for

fees. And the injury he suffered obviously will be redressed by favorable action of this court,

mandating that he be allowed to pursue a request for fees under Rule 54(d)(2)(B).

Accordingly, we find that Crespin's claim for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) is

sufficient to satisfy standing requirements to bring a challenge on the issue of attorneys' fees.

C. The District Court's Denial of Appellant's Motion to Request Permission to File for Attorneys'

Fees

Having confirmed our jurisdiction to hear this case and Crespin's standing to bring it before

us, we now turn to the merits of the District Court's decision. Our decision addresses only appellant

Crespin's claim.3

On June 28, 1994, Crespin filed a document entitled a "motion to reopen" that requested only

permission to seek attorneys'fees. On June 29, 1994, the section 5 action concluded. A month later,

on July 29, 1994, the District Court denied Crespin's "motion to reopen," resting its decision on two

grounds: (i) it was unnecessary for Crespin to move to reopen to seek attorneys' fees; and (ii) even

if Crespin's motion were construed as a request for fees, it was deficient because it failed to comply

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with the Rule 54(d)(2)(B) requirements. See Castro County, Texas v. United States, Civ. No. 93-

1782 (D.D.C. July 29, 1994), reprinted in App. C. We reverse the judgment of the District Court,

because it is wrong as a matter of law in holding that Crespin had to file a motion for fees within

fourteen days of the District Court's April 13, 1994 order.

It is of no moment that Crespin's June 28, 1994 motion wastitled a "motion to reopen." The

motion sought only to raise the issue of attorneys' fees, and it had no purpose whatever to address

the merits ofthe underlying case, except asrelevant to a claimfor fees. In short, it is uncontested that

Crespin's motion was nothing more than a request for permission to file for attorneys' fees. Under

normal circumstances, Crespin probably would not have been required to file such a motion; in fact,

it is not clear that he had to file the motion in this case. Nonetheless, the District Court's April 13,

1994 order caused Crespin to proceed with caution. The April 13 order, which provided that the case

would be dismissed "without costs to any party" and with prejudice absent a request to reopen it

within thirty days, see Castro County, Texas v. United States, Civ. No. 93-1782 (D.D.C. Apr. 13,

1994), reprinted in App. D, can be reasonably read to say that the District Court would not entertain

anything further from the parties absent a motion to reopen. (The original thirty-day deadline for

further action before the District Court under the April 13, 1994 order had been extended to June 29,

1994 at the request of Castro County.) Given his reasonable construction of the April 13, 1994

order, Crespin can hardly be faulted for making a timely request, i.e., a request prior to the June 29,

1994 deadline, to be heard by the District Court on a claim for fees.

The District Court found that even if Crespin's June 28, 1994 motion were construed as a

request for fees, it must be denied for failure to complywith the Rule 54(d)(2)(B) requirements. Rule

54(d)(2)(B) mandatesthat motionsfor fees meet three requirements: (i) service within fourteen days

ofthe entry ofjudgment; (ii)specification of the judgment and the grounds entitling the moving party

to the award; and (iii) estimation of the amount sought. While the District Court held that Crespin

had failed to meet all three requirements, its fatal error in this case was its finding that he missed the

deadline for filing a fee motion because the motion should have been filed within fourteen days of the

April 13, 1994 order.

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The April 13, 1994 order surely did not trigger the Rule 54(d)(2)(B) fourteen-day filing

requirement. Our conclusion on this point rests on two grounds. First, the April 13, 1994 order was

not a final order subject to appeal. Rule 54(a) defines judgment to "include[ ] a decree and any order

from which an appeal lies." The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that the deadline for filing

attorney feesis "fourteen days after final judgment.... One purpose of this provision is to assure that

the opposing party is informed of the claim before the time for appeal has elapsed." FED. R. CIV. P.

54 advisory committee's notes (1993 Amendments). The Rule thus posits a relationship between a

judgment and its appealability. The April 13, 1994 order was not appealable when it was entered,

because it was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1993). "A "final decision' generally is

one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment." Budinich, 486 U.S. at 199 (1988) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In this case,

the April 13, 1994 order did not end the litigation on the merits, because it contemplated not only

further settlement negotiations by the parties, but the possibility that the case would be litigated

further in the event that settlement talks failed. The order, thus, would not have been immediately

appealable and could not trigger Rule 54(d)(2)(B)'s filing requirements.

Second, at the time of the April 13, 1994 order, it would have been impossible for any court

to order fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e), which provides for an award of fees to "the prevailing

party," because both the results in the case and the amount of fees that would be incurred remained

unknown. It is therefore both incorrect as a matter of law and illogical to characterize the April 13,

1994 order as final for purposes of Rule 54(d)(2)(B).

The District Court's mischaracterization of the April 13, 1994 order infects its entire

disposition of the case. The District Court found that Crespin's June 28, 1994 motion did not meet

the requirements of Rule 54(d)(2)(B), but the District Court, in effect, told Crespin that it did not

matter what was filed, as the crucial flaw was the failure to file it within fourteen days of the April

13, 1994 order. Under the District Court's decision, it would not have mattered if Crespin had filed

a complete motion for fees within fourteen days of June 29, 1994 (the date on which the case was

dismissed with prejudice) because the trial court would have viewed any such filing as untimely.

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4 Given our disposition, it is unnecessary for us to reach the question whether the District

Court's denial of Crespin's Rule 60(b) motion was an abuse of discretion. 

Further, in fact, it was the District Court's failure to respond quickly to Crespin's June 28, 1994

request for permission to proceed that resulted in Crespin's failure to file a complete motion within

fourteen days of June 29, 1994. Crespin believed that he was required to request permission to file

for attorneys' fees, not an unreasonable belief; he did not file a request within fourteen days of June

29, 1994 because he was awaiting permission from the District Court. The District Court did not

answer his request until after fourteen days from June 29, 1994. It simply would be unfair to allow

the delay in the District Court's response to defeat his request.

Consistent with a reasonable reading of the April 13, 1994 order, Crespin timely filed a

request to proceed to a determination on the issue of attorneys' fees. This request should have been

granted by the District Court in enough time to allow Crespin to comply with the filing requirements

of Rule 54(d)(2)(B). We remand the case to the District Court to allow Crespin to file a complete

request for fees and for a determination on the merits of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e).4

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons already given, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the

case so that Crespin may pursue his claim for attorneys' fees.

USCA Case #95-5141 Document #239240 Filed: 12/06/1996 Page 13 of 13