Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02090/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

 Counsel for the United States Customs and Border Protection agency also was

present during the in Chambers discussion. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Allen Hartman,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

United States Customs and Border

Protection, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 14-2090-TUC-DCB (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

AND ORDER

Defendants have filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6) (“MTD”). (Doc. 12). This matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 11). Based on the

agreement of counsel, the Magistrate Judge heard this matter in Chambers on June 25, 2015.

Plaintiff’s counsel appeared by phone and Defendants’ counsel appeared in person. Plaintiff

was present during a portion of the proceedings in Chambers.1

 

For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss with leave to file an

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Amended Complaint. The Magistrate Judge enters an Order setting deadlines for further

proceedings in this case. 

I. Plaintiff’s Complaint

This action arises from an initial incident on April 11, 2011 when Plaintiff allegedly

was physically injured during an encounter with federal agents in Nogales, Arizona. Plaintiff

has named as defendants United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), United

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), United States Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”), the United States of America, and Unknown Named Agents

John Does 1-10 of the CBP or ICE. Plaintiff has asserted nine claims for relief in the

Complaint (“Compl.”): (1) unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution against unknown named federal agents based on Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (First Cause of

Action); (2) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against unknown named

federal agents based on Bivens (Second Cause of Action); violation of due process under the

Fifth Amendment against unknown named agents based on Bivens (Third Cause of Action);

battery in violation of Arizona law against Defendant United States based on the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”) (Fourth Cause of Action); assault in violation of Arizona law against

the United States based on the FTCA (Fifth Cause of Action); law enforcement misconduct

based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Sixth Cause of Action); failure to train, supervise and ratification

based on § 1983 (Seventh Cause of Action); violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under

§ 1983 (Eighth Cause of Action); and a claim for punitive damages under Arizona law (Ninth

Cause of Action) (Compl., ¶¶ 61-92).

Under the heading “General Allegations Re: Incident of April 11, 2011” set forth in

the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on April 11, 2011, while en route to a convenience store

as a passenger in a car driven by a friend, he exited the vehicle intending to walk north

because the vehicle was about to cross the international border with traffic into Nogales,

Sonora, Mexico. (Id., ¶¶ 9-19). At the time, Plaintiff, an American citizen and Arizona

resident, was on probation in Arizona and would violate his probation conditions if he left

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the United States without his Probation Officer’s consent. (Id., ¶¶ 5, 17). He alleges that

immediately after exiting the vehicle, he was surrounded by approximately eight agents of

Defendant CBP or Defendant ICE who “yelled” at him “to re-enter the vehicle and cross into

Mexico.” (Id., ¶¶ 20-21). Plaintiff attempted to explain the situation to the agents and ask

for a supervisor “when an unknown agent of Defendant CBP or Defendant ICE later

identified to [Plaintiff] only as ‘Agent Terry’ suddenly, unexpected, and violently tackled

him from behind and knocked him onto the side of a bus.” (Id., ¶¶ 21-22). Plaintiff asserts

that these actions by “Agent Terry” were done both “intentionally and without any

provocation” and “negligently and without any provocation.” (Id., ¶¶ 23-24). 

Plaintiff received medical treatment from the Nogales Fire Department Emergency

Medical Technicians at the DeConcini Port of Entry for injuries that included avulsion to his

right eyelid, left rib pain, and loss of short-term memory. (Id., ¶¶ 29-30). Plaintiff was

transported to the Carondelet Holy Cross Hospital and treated for neck and back pain, an

irregular forehead laceration, and a chipped tooth. (Id., ¶¶ 31-32). A CT scan of Plaintiff’s

head revealed “‘right periorbital soft tissue swelling and scalp laceration’” and “‘deformity

of the right zygomatic arch.’” (Id., ¶ 33). Plaintiff was released from the hospital during the

early morning hours of April 12, 2011. (Id., ¶ 34). He briefly returned to the hospital that

evening regarding complaints of a severe headache, loss of memory, episodes of vomiting

and diarrhea, and continued generalized pain. (Id., ¶¶ 35-39). On April 16, 2011, Plaintiff

was treated at the hospital emergency room complaining of “episodes of ‘passing out,

hearing stuff wrong, not seeing right, forgetting things, body hurts’” and similar conditions.

(Id., ¶¶ 40-43). Plaintiff allegedly was diagnosed with “‘post-concussive syndrome’” and

“‘mild dehydration.’” (Id., ¶ 44). 

Under the heading “General Allegations Re: Incident of April 12, 2012,” Plaintiff

alleges that these latter conditions continued after the April 11, 2011 incident and that on

April 12, 2012, while riding his motorcycle with friends, he experienced a loss of

consciousness and lost control of his motorcycle. (Id., ¶¶ 50-51). Plaintiff alleges that the

resulting motorcycle crash caused the fuel tank to break and burst into flames and that he

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sustained significant injuries, including severe burns to his right hand and knee and lung

damage. (Id., ¶¶ 51-54). Plaintiff was hospitalized and remained in a coma for four months,

received rehabilitation treatment for two months, and underwent reconstructive surgeries on

his hand and leg. (Id., ¶¶ 55-58). Plaintiff alleges that the April 12, 2012 accident “was

directly related to the neurological/brain injury suffered on April 11, 2011” which “left him

experiencing episodes of loss of consciousness” and this is what occurred on April 12, 2012.

(Id., ¶¶ 59-60). 

II. Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss 

Defendants seek dismissal of all claims except the Fourth Cause of Action, of all

defendants except the United States, and of the “general allegations” related to the April 12,

2012 incident. Defendants cite Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and other authority. Plaintiff has filed a Response (“Resp.”) that opposes

dismissal as to the April 12, 2012 allegations but otherwise concedes dismissal of all claims

except the Fourth Cause of Action and of all defendants except the United States. (Doc. 20,

Resp.). Defendants have filed a Reply. (Doc. 21). 

III. Standards of Review

A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) can be a facial or factual jurisdictional attack. Safe Air

For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial challenge asserts that

the complaint on its face does not allege facts that would invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. The

facts alleged are presumed true in a facial challenge. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073

(9th Cir. 2009). A factual challenge disputes the veracity of the complaint’s allegations that

would, if true, invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. When considering a

factual challenge, the court may consider matters outside the pleadings to determine subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. Once a defendant presents evidence that there is a lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden to present affidavits or other evidence

necessary to establish that jurisdiction actually exists. Id.

“‘To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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face;’ that is, plaintiff must ‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Telesaurus

VPC, LLC. v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)); see also Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009) (to defeat a motion to dismiss, the “non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff

to relief.”). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on the “lack of a cognizable legal

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”

Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011). 

“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint...” does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

Telesaurus, 623 F.3d at 1003 (pleadings that are no more than legal conclusions “‘are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Thus “[t[hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court “cannot assume any facts necessary to [the

plaintiffs’]...claim that they have not alleged.” Jack Russell Terrier Network of Northern

Calif. v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The court will assume “‘ well-pleaded factual allegations,’ ...to be true, ‘and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Telesaurus, 623 F.3d

at 1003 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Determining plausibility is a “context-specific task...” that requires the court to “draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A complaint cannot survive dismissal

where the court can only infer that a claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id. The

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2

 The statute of limitations for a Bivens action is based on the forum state’s personal

injury statute. Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1991). In Arizona, the statute

of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542. 

3

 Defendants additionally argue that the Third Cause of Action based on Bivens

asserting a violation of the Fifth Amendment should be dismissed because the claim is more

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court construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and

resolves all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010).

IV. Discussion. 

A. Plaintiff’s Three Bivens Claims

Defendants move to dismiss the First through Third Causes of Action based on Bivens

as time-barred. (MTD at 4-5). As Defendants correctly argue, in Arizona, a Bivens claim

must be asserted within two years of its accrual. See Ramage v. United States, No. CIV 14-

2132-TUC-CKJ, 2014 WL 4702288, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 2014).2

 Federal law is applied

to determine when a Bivens claim accrues but tolling provisions for Bivens claims are

borrowed from the forum state. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002).

“A Bivens claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury” which

is the basis of the action. Western Ctr. for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156

(9th Cir. 2000). 

Accepting the Complaint’s factual allegations as true, Plaintiff’s alleged unlawful

search and seizure and resulting physical injuries occurred on April 11, 2011, the date of the

initial incident and Plaintiff’s receipt of medical treatment. Because Plaintiff knew of the

incident and his injuries, he had a complete and present cause of action as of that date. The

filing of the Complaint some three years later on May 15, 2014 is beyond the limitations

period. Plaintiff concedes the issue as he has admitted that the first three causes of action

should be dismissed because the cited personal injury statute of limitations properly applies

to the Bivens claims. (Resp. at 1-2). Plaintiff has not alleged in the Complaint and does not

argue in his Response that the delay in filing suit should be excused by circumstances of

tolling. It is recommended that the first three causes of action should be dismissed.3

 

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properly based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment. (MTD at 6-7). Based on Plaintiff’s

concession that the Bivens claims should be dismissed, the Court recommends that it is not

necessary to consider Defendants’ additional argument. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Assault Claim Under the FTCA

Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action is a claim of assault based on a violation of the

FTCA. The FTCA grants the federal court jurisdiction to hear claims for certain torts

allegedly caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any federal employee acting

within the scope of his office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Under the FTCA,

liability is assessed “in accordance with the law of the place where the act ... occurred.” 28

U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Defendants contend that under Arizona law, “[a] person commits the

tort of assault if he acts with intent to cause another harmful or offensive contact or

apprehension thereof, and the other person apprehends imminent contact.” (MTD at 7, citing

Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 810 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987)). Defendants argue that the

Complaint’s allegations are insufficient because the only person alleged to have manifested

an intent to cause Plaintiff such harmful or offensive contact was “Agent Terry” but the

Complaint “specifies that Plaintiff never apprehended imminent contact from ‘Agent Terry’”

who allegedly attacked Plaintiff “suddenly” and “unexpected[ly]... from behind....” (MTD

at 7, citing Compl., ¶ 22). In his Response, Plaintiff agrees that the Fifth Cause of Action

should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim for assault, citing the Restatement

(Second) of Torts §§ 13-20, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203(A)(1) and Garcia, 826 F.2d at 810,

n.9. (Resp. at 2). Based on Plaintiff’s concession, it is recommended that the Fifth Cause

of Action should be dismissed.

C. Plaintiff’s Three § 1983 Claims

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Sixth through Eighth Causes of Action are

untenable as based on § 1983 because the Complaint brings allegations against a federal

official acting under color of federal law. (MTD at 8). To state a claim for relief under §

1983, Plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of

the United States and that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of

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4

 Defendants additionally contend that the § 1983 causes of action should be

dismissed because the same statute of limitations and claim accrual principles apply to them

as apply to the Bivens claims. (MTD at 8, n. 1). Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations

for personal injury cases applies to § 1983 claims. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987,

991 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542). It is unnecessary to consider this

argument in light of the recommended ruling that the § 1983 claims should be dismissed as

untenable. 

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state law. Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not allege any instance of state action involving a state official. Plaintiff

agrees that his § 1983 claims are improper and should be dismissed. (Resp. at 2). It is

recommended that Plaintiff’s Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action should be

dismissed.4

D. Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages

Defendants contend that the Ninth Cause of Action should be dismissed because

Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of punitive damages. Defendants argue that the punitive

damages claim is derivative of Plaintiff’s Bivens and § 1983 claims, which are deficient and

subject to dismissal, and that punitive damages are not available in an FTCA suit. (MTD at

8). Based on the recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s Bivens claims, his § 1983 claims and

his FTCA assault claim, Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is his Fourth Cause of Action based

on battery under the FTCA. The United States is not liable for punitive damages in an FTCA

suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Plaintiff concedes the dismissal of his punitive damages claim as not

available in an FTCA case. (Resp. at 2). The Ninth Cause of Action should be dismissed.

E. Dismissal of All Defendants Except the United States

Defendants move to dismiss all defendants except the United States because the only

remaining claim in the Complaint is the FTCA battery claim. (MTD at 10-11). The only

proper party defendant in an FTCA case is the United States. Kennedy v. U.S. Postal

Service, 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff agrees that Defendants DHS, CBP,

ICE and all individual defendants should be dismissed from this lawsuit. (Resp. at 3). It is

recommended that these defendants should be dismissed from this case.

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F. Dismissal of “General Allegations Re: Incident of April 12, 2012;” Leave

to Amend

Defendants argue that the “general allegations” concerning the April 12, 2012

motorcycle crash should be dismissed from the Complaint because Plaintiff has not alleged

any cognizable legal theory under which any Defendant bears responsibility for the resulting

injuries. (MTD at 9). Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations that he lost

consciousness after the initial events and that the motorcycle crash approximately one year

later on April 12, 2012 “‘was directly related to the neurological/brain injury suffered on

April 11, 2011'” are not sufficient. (Id.). Plaintiff opposes dismissal of the “general

allegations” related to the April 12, 2012 incident, contending that the allegations satisfy the

requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and Defendants are attempting to compel Plaintiff to meet

a “heightened pleading” standard applicable to causes such as fraud under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).

(Resp. at 3-5). Plaintiff alternatively contends that he should be allowed to file an amended

complaint if the Court determines that the “general allegations” related to the April 12, 2012

incident are insufficient. (Resp. at 5-7). Defendants argue in their Reply that if Plaintiff is

allowed to amend, Plaintiff should be required to eliminate any irrelevant allegations, causes

of action, and prayers for relief which he no longer is pursuing or to which he is not entitled.

(Reply at 3).

During the Court’s discussion with counsel, counsel for the parties agreed that

Plaintiff should be allowed to file an amended complaint. Any amended complaint that

Plaintiff may file should omit irrelevant allegations, dismissed causes of action, and

irrelevant prayers for relief consistent with this Report and Recommendation. 

The general allegations language objected to by the United States regards whether

Plaintiff can prove a causal connection between the head injury suffered in April 2011 and

the blackout while riding a motorcycle in April 2012. The government says this is not

plausible. Plaintiff says it is properly alleged.

Without question, establishing proximate cause between the battery and the

motorcycle accident will require expert medical testimony. Just as lay testimony cannot

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make that causal connection, it is not clear to this Court that lay opinion can say that it is

implausible. Nonetheless, the resolution of this issue has significant impact on case

management and early case evaluation. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 1 and Rule 26(a)(2)(D)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court will order expedited disclosure by Plaintiff

of expert opinion establishing the causal link between the battery and the motorcycle

accident. That disclosure must fully comply with Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and be delivered to defense counsel no later than Wednesday, September 16, 2015.

 The Court therefore will set deadlines for further proceedings in the case. 

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

after its independent review:

(1) grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 12);

(2) grant Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss as to the First through Third and

Fifth through Ninth Causes of Action and these claims should be dismissed

with prejudice;

(3) grant Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss as to all Defendants except the

United States of America and dismiss from this case United States Customs

and Border Protection, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

United States Department of Homeland Security, and Unknown Named

Agents John Does 1-10; and

(4) deny Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss as to the “General Allegations Re:

Incident of April 12, 2012” with leave to refile after September 16, 2015. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and LRCiv 7.2(e) of the Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within Fourteen (14) Days after

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to

another party’s objections within Fourteen (14) Days after being served with a copy.

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from

the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case

number: CV 14-2090-TUC-DCB.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff shall have until July 24, 2015 to file an Amended Complaint;

(2) Defendant United States shall have until August 17, 2015 to file an Answer,

Response, or Motion to Strike; 

(3) Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a Scheduling

Conference will be held on Tuesday, September 22, 2015 at 11:00 a.m., with

a formal Order setting the Scheduling Conference to be issued. The parties

shall file a Joint Case Management Plan by Tuesday, September 15, 2015; 

(4) Plaintiff shall disclose to Defense Counsel an expert opinion establishing the

causal link between the battery and the motorcycle accident in compliance

with Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no later than

Wednesday, September 16, 2015. 

DATED this 30th day of June, 2015.

 

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