Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01708/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01708-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN TRONCOSO,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID LONG, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Civil No.12-1708-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS 

(DOC. NO. 13)

Ruben Troncoso (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se1/, has filed a Petition For Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Respondent

David Long (“Respondent”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss

the Petition. Petitioner has filed an Opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss. The Court ordered Respondent to file a

Reply to Petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.

Respondent filed a “Response To Petitioner’s Opposition to

1/

While Petitioner filed his Petition pro se, he is now represented by

counsel who filed Petitioner’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and

Reply on his behalf.

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Respondent’s Motion To Dismiss.” Petitioner filed a Reply

to Respondent’s Response.

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition,

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner’s Opposition to

the Motion to Dismiss, Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Opposition, Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s

Response, and the lodgments presented therewith, finds

that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested

and that Petitioner’s Petition is barred by the statute of

limitations. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury found Petitioner guilty of possession of

cocaine for sale, in violation of California Heath &

Safety Code §113512/ (counts 1, 7), transportation of

cocaine [§11352(a), counts 2, 8), transportation of

cocaine for sale or distribution to a non-contiguous

county [§11352(b), counts 3, 9], conspiracy to possess

cocaine for sale [§11351, Cal. Penal Code §182(a)(1),

counts 4, 10], conspiracy to transport cocaine [§11352(a),

Cal. Penal Code §182(a)(1), counts 5, 11], and conspiracy

to transport cocaine for sale or distribution to a noncontiguous county [§11352(b), Cal. Penal Code §182(a)(1),

counts 6, 12]. Counts one through six alleged acts occur2/

All references to code sections are to the California Health & Safety

Code, unless otherwise noted.

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ring on October 12, 2005, while counts seven through

twelve alleged acts occurring on October 28, 2005.

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 33 years

imprisonment, but awarded him 729 days of actual custody

credits plus 364 conduct credits pursuant to Cal. Penal

Code §4019, for a total of 1,093 days of presentence

credits. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 1-2).

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1). On

July 29, 2010, the Court of Appeal reversed Petitioner’s

convictions on counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 12, but

otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court

of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to recalculate Petitioner’s presentence custody credits according to

the amended version of Cal. Penal code §4019, amend the

abstract of judgment, and forward a copy of the amended

abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at 23). 

On August 7, 2010, the California Court of Appeal

modified its July 29, 2010 opinion, but stated: “There is

no change in the judgment.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1). 

On October 6, 2010, the Imperial County Superior

Court filed an Amended Abstract of Judgment in which it

recalculated Petitioner’s presentence custody credits.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 13).

Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review in the

California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2).

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On August 10, 2011, Petitioner constructively3/ filed

a Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the California

Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3). On August

22, 2011, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition, stating

that Petitioner failed to file the Petition in the appropriate court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 4).

On September 16, 2011, Petitioner constructively4/

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Imperial

County Superior Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5). On

November 8, 2011, the Petition was denied as untimely.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6).

On December 6, 2011, Petitioner constructively5/

filed another Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the

Imperial County Superior Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

7). On January 11, 2012, the Superior Court denied the

Petition for Petitioner’s failure to provide a declaration

to support his explanation for his delay in filing the

Petition and for failure to move for reconsideration of

the November 8, 2011 denial, pursuant to the requirements

of California law. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8).

On January 24, 2012, Petitioner filed a second

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court

of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9). On February 28,

3/

The Court gives Petitioner the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which deems

that a petition is constructively filed when it is delivered to prison officials

for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266(1988).

4/

See footnote 2.

5/

See footnote 2.

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2012, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10).

On February 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Review in the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 11).6/ On June 13, 2012, the California

Supreme Court denied the Petition without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 12).

On June 24, 2012, Petitioner constructively7/ filed

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. On

April 29, 2013, Respondent filed the Motion to Dismiss

that is now before the Court. On June 25, 2013, Petitioner

filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On August 1,

2013, Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On August 7, 2013, Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondent’s Response.

II

PETITIONER’S PETITION IS BARRED

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. The AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“the

AEDPA”) statute of limitations. The provisions of the

AEDPA apply to petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed

in federal court after the AEDPA’s effective date of April

24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059,

6/

It appears that Petitioner filed his Petition in the California Supreme

Court on February 5, 2012 before the Court of Appeal had ruled (on February 28,

2012) on his Petition filed in that court.

7/

See footnote 2.

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2068 (1997). Therefore, because the Petition was filed on

June 24, 2012, the AEDPA applies to this case.

Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA on April 24,

1996, “state prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in

deciding when to file a federal habeas petition.” Calderon

v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286

(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 U.S. 897 (1998),

overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States

Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“[D]elays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a

prisoner from seeking relief.” Id. 

With enactment of the AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time

frame for seeking federal habeas relief was dramatically

limited. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by, in part,

adding subdivision (d), which provides for a one-year

limitation period for state prisoners to file habeas

corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d)

states, in pertinent part:

 (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply

to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment

to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant

was prevented from filing by such

State action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if

the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

Petitioner timely appealed his convictions to the

California Court of Appeal. On July 29, 2010, the Court of

Appeal reversed several of Petitioner’s convictions and

remanded the case to the Superior Court to recalculate

Petitioner’s presentence custody credits and amend the

Abstract of Judgment. On October 6, 2010, the Imperial

County Superior Court filed an Amended Abstract of Judgment in which it recalculated Petitioner’s presentence

custody credits. Petitioner did not appeal the Amended

Judgment.

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s conviction

became final on September 7, 2010 because Petitioner did

not appeal the Amended Judgment to the California Supreme

Court. Respondent avers that Petitioner’s conviction

became final 40 days after the California Court of Appeal

filed its opinion on July 29, 2010. Respondent cites

California Rules of Court 24(a), 28(b), 45(1) and Smith v.

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Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other

grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

Respondent’s argument in this regard is unavailing.

California Rule of Court 24(a) has been renumbered.

The Rule’s new number is 8.264 which states in pertinent

part: “(A) Court of Appeal decision in a civil appeal,...

is final in that court 30 days after filing.” (emphasis

added). Since Petitioner’s appeal was in a criminal case,

California Rule of Court 24(a) and/or 8.264 are inapplicable.

California Rule of Court 28(b) has been renumbered.

The Rule’s new number is 8.500 which states that a Petition for Review must be filed and served within 10 days

after a Court of Appeal’s decision is final in that court.

Since Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review,

California Rule of Court 28(b) and/or 8.500 are inapplicable.

California Rule of Court 45(b) has been renumbered.

The Rule’s new number is 8.600, which applies to death

sentence appeals. Since there is no death sentence in this

case, California Rule of Court 45 and/or 8.600 are inapplicable.

Further Respondent ignores the fact that the Court

of Appeal remanded the case to the Superior Court to

recalculate Petitioner’s presentence custody credits.

 Petitioner correctly argues that his conviction

became final at the end of the time he could have sought

review by the California Court of Appeal of the Superior

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Court’s Amended Abstract of Judgment in which the Superior

Court recalculated Petitioner’s presentence custody

credits. U.S. v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.

2000)[“...remand orders... leave matters for the (trial)

court to decide.”] See also Coville v. McKenna, 192 Fed.

Appx. 641, 642, 2006 WL 2076519 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner

could have appealed the trial court’s recalculation of his

presentence credits, but he did not do so. In California,

a judgment must be appealed within 60 days of the date of

the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court 8.308). Therefore,

Petitioner’s conviction became final on December 5, 2010,

60 days after October 6, 2010, the date of the Superior

Court’s Amended Abstract of Judgment.

Therefore, absent tolling, Petitioner had one year

or until December 6, 2011, to file his Petition For Writ

of Habeas Corpus in this Court.8/ However, as explained in

detail below, Petitioner failed to file the Petition in

this Court within the one-year prescribed by 28 U.S.C.

§2244(d)(1), thus making it untimely and barred by the

statute of limitations. 

Petitioner filed multiple petitions for post-conviction relief in the California Superior, Appellate, and

Supreme Courts. The statute of limitations is tolled while

a “properly filed” state habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. Under the holding of Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), the “statute

8/

The statute of limitations period starts on the day after a petitioner’s

conviction and sentence become final under the state’s procedural rules. Ford v.

Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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of limitations is tolled from the time the first state

habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme

Court rejects petitioner’s final collateral challenge,”

provided the petitions were properly filed and pending

during that entire time. The statute of limitations is not

tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct

state appeal and the time the first state collateral

challenge is filed because there is no case “pending”

during that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006

The meaning of the terms “properly filed” and

“pending” in Nino have been clarified by the United States

Supreme Court. In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121

S.Ct 361 (2000), the Court held that a state application

for post-conviction review is “properly filed” “when its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filing,” “which usually

prescribe the form of the document, the time limits upon

its delivery, the court and office in which it must be

lodged and the requisite fee.” In Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214 (2002), the Court held that the time between

denial in a lower California court and the filing of a

subsequent petition in the next higher court does not toll

the statute of limitations, if the petition is ultimately

found to be untimely. Id. at 223-226. In Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), the Court held that

statutory tolling is not available for the period a

petition is under consideration, if it is dismissed as

untimely. Id. at 413.

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Petitioner’s first petition for relief after his

convictions and sentence became final was filed on August

10, 2011 in the California Court of Appeal. On August 22,

2011, the California Court of Appeal denied the Petition

for failure to file the Petition in the appropriate court.

On September 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Imperial County Superior

Court. On November 8, 2011, the Superior Court denied the

Petition as untimely. On December 6, 2011, Petitioner

filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

Imperial County Superior Court. On January 11, 2012, the

Superior Court denied the Petition for Petitioner’s

failure to provide a declaration in support of his explanation for the delay in filing the Petition and for

failure to follow California’s procedural rules.

Petitioner waited until August 10, 2011 to file a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court

of Appeal. From December 6, 2010, (the day after Petitioner’s conviction became final), to August 10, 2011,

(the date Petitioner filed his first Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal), 247 days

(8 months, 4 days) elapsed in which the statute of limitations was not tolled. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

On August 22, 2011, the California Court of Appeal

denied the Petition without prejudice to Petitioner filing

it in the Imperial County Superior Court. On September 6,

2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the Imperial County Superior Court. From August

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10, 2011 (the date Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal) to August

22, 2011 (the date the California Court of Appeal denied

the Petition without prejudice to refiling in the proper

court), a period of 12 days, the statute of limitations

was tolled. Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.

2012).

The Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus that Petitioner filed on September 16, 2011 (in the Imperial County

Superior Court), and December 6, 2011 (in the Imperial

County Superior Court) did not toll the statute of limitations. In each of these Petitions, the courts in which

they were filed found them to be untimely, and procedurally deficient. As a result, they were not “properly

filed” and do not toll the statute of limitations. 28

U.S.C.2244(d)(2), Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8.

Therefore, from August 22, 2011 (the date the

California Court of Appeal denied the Petition without

prejudice to refiling it in the proper court) to January

11, 2012 (the date the Imperial County Superior Court

denied Petitioner’s second Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in that court), 142 days (4 months, 20 days)

elapsed when the statute of limitations was not tolled.

On June 24, 2012, Petitioner filed the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus that is now pending before this

Court. From June 13, 2012 (the date the California Supreme

Court denied his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

that court) to June 24, 2012, the statute of limitations

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was not tolled because there was no case pending during

that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. From June 13, 2012

to June 24, 2012, 11 days elapsed. Therefore the statute

of limitations was not tolled for 11 days.

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to statutory

tolling of the statute of limitations for his September

16, 2011 and December 6, 2011 Petitions for Writ of Habeas

Corpus filed in the Imperial County Superior Court. The

September 16, 2011 Petition (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5)

was denied as untimely on November 8, 2011. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 6). The December 6, 2011 Petition (Respondent‘s Lodgment No. 7) was denied as untimely and for

other procedural reasons on January 11, 2012 (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 8). Thereafter, on January 24, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Court of Appeal (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9).

On February 28, 2012, the California Court of Appeal

denied the Petition on the merits. It did not address the

timeliness of the Petition. Therefore, Petitioner contends

that the California Court of Appeal impliedly overruled

the untimeliness findings of the Imperial County Superior

Court, thereby allowing for statutory tolling of the

statute of limitations. Petitioner cites Campbell v.

Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1060-1061 (9th Cir. 2010) and

Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2011) to

support his position. Also, Petitioner argues that he

“expressly presented the timeliness issue in his Petition

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for Writ of Habeas Corpus constructively filed in” the

California Court of Appeal on January 24, 2012. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s argument lacks

merit because, pursuant to Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189,

194 (2006), a federal court should not presume that a

California court’s denial of a petition for writ of habeas

corpus on the merits means that the petition was timely.

Moreover, Campbell and Trigueros identify unique circumstances, not present here, in which it may be found that

a California appellate court has impliedly overruled a

Superior Court’s finding of untimeliness.

In Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal

court should not presume that a California court’s denial

on the merits of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

means that the petition was timely. In Evans, the court

stated: “(T)he Ninth Circuit must not take ‘such words’

(the words ‘on the merits’) as an absolute bellwether on

the timeliness question.” “An approach that presumes that

an order denying a petition ‘on the merits’ means that the

petition was timely would lead to the tolling of AEDPA’s

limitation period in circumstances where the law does not

permit tolling.” Evans, 546 U.S. at 194-195.

In Campbell, the Ninth Circuit held that statutory

tolling applies to state petitions for writs of habeas

corpus that are denied as untimely if a higher court later

reverses the untimeliness finding. Campbell, 614 F.3d

1060-1061. 

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In Trigueros, the Ninth Circuit did not presume that

the California Supreme Court’s order denying Trigueros’

petition automatically meant that the court considered and

found Trigueros’ petition timely. Instead, it found

“compelling circumstances” indicating that the California

Supreme Court considered and rejected the timeliness

argument. The “compelling circumstances” present in

Trigueros were (1) the California Supreme Court requested

briefing on the merits, even though the Superior Court

found Trigueros’ petition untimely and the California

Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition filed in

that court, and (2) the state and Trigueros briefed the

timeliness issue, thereby having before it all of the

timeliness arguments of the parties. The Trigueros court

considered Trigueros’ petition timely because the California Supreme Court had the timeliness question before it,

but did not cite to any case involving untimeliness of the

petition.

Here, the Imperial County Superior Court found

Petitioner’s September 16, 2011 and December 6, 2011

Petitions to be untimely. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court

of Appeal. On February 28, 2012, the California Court of

Appeal denied the Petition on the merits. It did not

reverse the Superior Court’s findings of untimeliness.

Therefore, Campbell does not apply to Petitioner’s Petitions to the Imperial County Superior Court.

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Moreover, the California Court of Appeal did not

request briefing on the merits of the Petition or on the

timeliness issue. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 14). Therefore, the Court concludes that the compelling circumstances present in Trigueros are not present in this case.

Petitioner’s claim that he expressly presented the

timeliness issue in his January 24, 2012 Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal is

unavailing. Petitioner’s presentation of the timeliness

issue states that (1) he has always used due diligence to

bring the issue presented in the Petition before the

Court, (2) he first learned of the Court of Appeal’s July

29, 2010 decision in April 2011, (3) two months later in

mid-June 2011, he consulted another prisoner regarding his

case, (4) in July 2011, the other prisoner advised him

about the substantive issue raised in the Petition (Respondent‘s Lodgment No. 9 at 13), and (5) the other

prisoner agreed to prepare the Petition for Petitioner.

(Respondent‘s Lodgment No. 9 at 14). The presentation also

includes a general recitation of the dates Petitioner

filed his various Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Respondent‘s Lodgment No. 9 at 14).

The Court finds that Petitioner did not, in fact,

address the timeliness issue. If Petitioner had addressed

the timeliness issue, he would have argued to the Court of

Appeal that his September 16, 2011 and December 6, 2011

Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the Imperial

County Superior Court were indeed timely, despite the fact

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that the Imperial County Superior Court found them to be

untimely. However, his presentation to the Court of Appeal

contains no such argument or discussion. Further, Petitioner’s consultation with another prisoner about his case

appears to have concerned the substantive issue raised in

the Petition, not the timeliness issue. 

As a result, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory

tolling of the statute of limitations for his September

16, 2011 and December 6, 2011 Petitions filed in the

Imperial County Superior Court. See also Roe v. Lewis,

2012 WL 4120373 at *4 (C.D. 2012), Chavez v. Lewis, 2012

WL 538242 at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 

Adding together the periods of time when the statute

of limitations was not tolled (8 months, 4 days + 4

months, 20 days + 11 days), results in a total of 1 year,

1 month and 5 days, which is beyond the one year statute

of limitations mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Accordingly, Petitioner failed to file his Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in a timely fashion and it is

therefore barred.

2. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling

of the Statute of Limitations

Petitioner does not argue that he is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. However,

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Petition is not

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that equitable

tolling is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). see

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Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562 (2010). In

Holland, the Court recognized equitable tolling of the

AEDPA one-year limitations period when the prisoner can

show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). The

Ninth Circuit has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v.

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v.

United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th

Cir. 1998). However, the Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted

that “equitable tolling will not be available in most

cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.

[quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696,

701 (9th Cir. 1996)]. The Beeler court wrote that district

judges must “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process” and “only authorize

extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Id. at

1289.

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary circumstances” he has identified were the

proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a

lack of diligence on his part. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d

1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling “is unavail12cv1708 18

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able in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest the

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

 The obligation to act diligently “does not pertain

solely to the filing of the federal habeas petition,

rather it is an obligation that exists during the period

appellant is exhausting state court remedies as well.” Roy

v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) citing Lacava

v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3rd Cir. 2005). When courts

assess a habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable tolling, they must conduct a “highly fact-dependent”

inquiry. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th

Cir. 2000), Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir.

2002). The extraordinary circumstances must be the “butfor and proximate cause” of the untimely filing. Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Petitioner has not presented anything to the

Court to suggest that his Petition is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Consequently,

the Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition is not entitled

to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

 III

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this

matter, the Court has determined that Petitioner has

failed to comply with the AEDPA’s statute of limitations

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and that he is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d).

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 6, 2013,

any party to this action may file written objections with

the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all

parties no later than September 20, 2013. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 13, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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