Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03107/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03107-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO K. BENNETT,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. C 06-3107 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS

FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL; DENYING

MOTIONS FOR SUMMONS;

DENYING MOTIONS TO 

ATTACH EVIDENCE

WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

DENYING MOTIONS FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER ORDER OF

DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND

(Docket Nos. 2, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15,

16, 18, 24, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) employees and the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff has been granted leave to

proceed in forma pauperis in a separate written order. Plaintiff has filed motions for

appointment of counsel, motions to issue summons and motion for an order of service, motions

**Original filed 3/23/07**

Case 5:06-cv-03107-JF Document 41 Filed 03/23/07 Page 1 of 10
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Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.05\Bennett107dwltamisc 2

to attach evidence, and motions for a temporary restraining order. The Court will DENY

Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel (docket nos. 2, 13, 18, 24, 39) without prejudice. 

The Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motions to issue summons and for order of service (docket nos.

10, 11, 14, 15, 16), motions to attach exhibits and legal mail (docket nos. 30, 32, 35) and motions

for a temporary restraining order (docket nos. 36, 37) without prejudice. The Court will

DISMISS the complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff may include any supporting

documentation and exhibits with his amended complaint. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on September 19, 2005, he received a letter from his attorney,

stamped “legal mail” on the outside of the envelope, which was opened outside of his presence. 

Plaintiff names the following Defendants: Director of the Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation Jeanne Woodford, PBSP Warden Kirkland, PBSP Captain Patten, and PBSP mail

room staff. Plaintiff requests injunctive relief that the PBSP Defendants be fired and monetary

damages for his pain and suffering. 

DISCUSSION 

A. The Merits

1. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro

se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under

the color of state law committed a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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 1Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner's lawyer, is not “legal mail.” See

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

With minute exceptions correspondence from a court to a litigant is a public document. See

Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987). 

Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

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Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under section 1983 if the plaintiff

can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. 

See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d

1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the

meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which

the plaintiff complains. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633; Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th

Cir. 1995). 

2. Plaintiff’s Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants opened his legal mail outside of his presence. Prisoners

enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). A prison, however,

may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as

long as the regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Prison officials may institute procedures for inspecting “legal

mail,” e.g., mail sent between attorneys and prisoners, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

576-77 (1974) (incoming mail from attorneys), and mail sent from prisoners to the courts, see

Royse v. Superior Court, 779 F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1986) (outgoing mail to court).1 But the

opening and inspecting of “legal mail” outside the presence of the prisoner may have an

impermissible “chilling” effect on the constitutional right to petition the government. See

O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11

(1972)); but cf. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318

(9th Cir. 1998) (prison officials may open and inspect mail to prisoner from courts outside

prisoner’s presence because mail from courts, as opposed to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not

Case 5:06-cv-03107-JF Document 41 Filed 03/23/07 Page 3 of 10
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 2The Wolff Court declined to decide the constitutional provision under which a prisoner's

right to legal correspondence free from government inspection may arise, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at

575-76, but recent Ninth Circuit opinions have focused on a prisoner’s First Amendment right to

petition the government for redress of grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to

the courts, see O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 324-326 (9th Cir. 1996).

Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

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“legal mail”).2

 If so, prison officials must establish that legitimate penological interests justify

the policy or practice. See O’Keefe, 82 F.3d at 327 (mail policy that allows prison mailroom

employees to open and read grievances sent by prisoners to state agencies outside prisoners’

presence reasonable means to further legitimate penological interests).

“Legal mail” may not be read or copied without the prisoner’s permission. See Casey v.

Lewis, 43 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). But

again, prison officials may establish that legitimate penological interests justify the policy or

practice. See O’Keefe, 82 F.3d at 327.

Plaintiff claim fails at the outset because he fails to set forth specific facts showing how

each Defendant proximately caused a constitutional deprivation. For a claim to be cognizable, a

Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s deprivation of protected

rights.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. But here, Plaintiff alleges facts without explaining the actions of

each Defendant involved. As such, Plaintiff fails to link Defendants to his claim. Accordingly,

the complaint does not state a cognizable claim against any of the named Defendants. 

Plaintiff must allege facts supporting each claim against each individual Defendant 

separately in his amended complaint showing his entitlement to relief from each Defendant. 

Plaintiff should list the constitutional right he has, describe what each Defendant did or failed to

do, and describe how each Defendant’s acts or omissions caused him injury. He should not refer

to the defendants as a group, i.e., “the defendants;” rather, he should identify each involved

Defendant by name and link each of them to a specific claim by explaining what each Defendant

did or failed to do that caused a violation of his constitutional rights. 

As to Plaintiff’s claim against the Director of the Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation Jeanne Woodford and PBSP Warden Kirkland, Plaintiff is cautioned that there is

Case 5:06-cv-03107-JF Document 41 Filed 03/23/07 Page 4 of 10
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Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

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no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is

responsible for the actions or omissions of an employee. Liability under Section 1983 arises

only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1)

personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v. County

of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff has named the PBSP mail room staff as a Defendant, without identifying any

individual names of the mail room staff. The use of “Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored

in the Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly,

the PBSP mail room staff are DISMISSED without prejudice. Should Plaintiff learn the

identities through the use of discovery and be able to allege facts which directly link them to his

claims he may include each Defendants individual name in his amended complaint and/or seek

leave to amend his complaint to add them as named Defendants. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629

F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980).

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend the complaint to cure these deficiencies. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days of

the date this order is filed to include sufficient facts to support his claim against each Defendant

and the alleged constitutional violation he suffered. Based upon the Court’s dismissal with leave

to amend, Plaintiff’s motion to issue summons and motion for order of service of the original

complaint (docket nos. 10, 11, 14, 15, 16) are DENIED. 

B. Motions for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has filed five motions for appointment of counsel. However, there is no

constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18,

25 (1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only the power to “request” that counsel

represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). This does not

give the courts the power to make “coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States

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Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

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Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 

The court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 only in

“exceptional circumstances,” the determination of which requires an evaluation of both (1) the

likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro

se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520,

1525 (9th Cir. 1997); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v.

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Both of these factors must be viewed together

before reaching a decision on a request for counsel under § 1915. See id. Neither the need for

discovery, nor the fact that the pro se litigant would be better served with the assistance of

counsel, necessarily qualify the issues involved as complex. See Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (where

plaintiff’s pursuit of discovery was comprehensive and focused and his papers were generally

articulate and organized, district court did not abuse discretion in denying request for counsel). 

The Court concludes that appointment of counsel is not necessary at this time. 

The Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend and has yet to review the

merits of Plaintiff’s claims in his amended complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motions for

appointment of counsel (docket nos. 2, 13, 18, 24, 39) are DENIED without prejudice.

C. Motions to Attach Exhibits and Legal Mail

Plaintiff has filed two motions to attach exhibits, a motion to attach legal mail and also

filed several exhibits in this action. The Court notes that Plaintiff must include all of his exhibits

and attachments with his amended complaint. Plaintiff may not send in attachments and

documents separately to be included with his amended complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

motions (docket nos. 30, 32, 35) are DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may include his

supporting documentation with his amended complaint as set forth below. 

D. Motions for Temporary Restraining Order 

Plaintiff has filed two motions for a temporary restraining order to prohibit Defendants

from opening his legal mail. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants ongoing actions have resulted in

harm to him and violated his constitutional rights by opening his legal mail outside of his

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 3 The district court cannot properly balance the hardships without taking into account the

hardship, or lack of hardship, to the non-movants. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 568 (9th

Cir. 1996).

Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.05\Bennett107dwltamisc 7

presence. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 sets forth the procedure for issuance of a preliminary

injunction or temporary restraining order (“TRO”). Prior to granting a preliminary injunction,

notice to the adverse party is required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). Therefore, a motion for

preliminary injunction cannot be decided until the parties to the action are served. See Zepeda v.

INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that requests for injunctive relief may be based upon either of

two sets of criteria. The “traditional” test requires the movants to: (1) establish a strong

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) show the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if

the preliminary relief is not granted; (3) show a balance of hardships favoring the movants;3 and

(4) show that granting the injunction favors the public interest. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum

Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980). 

The “alternative” test requires that the movants demonstrate either a combination of

probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions

are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor. See Diamontiney v. Borg, 918

F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1990); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th

Cir. 1988); American Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). These two

formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable

harm increases as the probability of success decreases. Diamontiney, 918 F.2d at 795. At the

very least, however, the moving party must show a fair chance of success on the merits. 

Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 567 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Court notes that a temporary restraining order cannot be granted at this stage because

the Defendants have not been served and are not on notice. Furthermore, the Court concludes

that Plaintiff has not shown sufficient facts to establish that he actually faces irreparable harm

based on his complaint concerning his legal mail. Nor has plaintiff shown his probable success

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Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.05\Bennett107dwltamisc 8

on the merits. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motions for a temporary restraining order (docket nos. 36,

37) are DENIED without prejudice. 

 CONCLUSION 

1. Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel (docket nos. 2, 13, 18, 24, 

39) are DENIED without prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s motions to attach evidence and legal mail (docket nos. 30, 32, 35) are

DENIED without prejudice.

3. Plaintiff’s motion to issue summons and order of service of the original 

complaint (docket nos. 10, 11, 14, 15, 16) are DENIED. 

4. Plaintiff’s motions for a temporary restraining order (docket nos. 36, 37) are 

DENIED without prejudice. 

5. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend, as indicated 

above, within thirty days from the date this order is filed. The amended complaint must include

the caption and civil case number used in this order (06-3107 JF (PR)) and the words

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely

replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. 

See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 321 (1992). 

Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the original complaint, such as supporting

documentation of the prison appeal process, by reference. Plaintiff must include all of his claims

and name all Defendants in the amended complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint

within the designated time will result in the Court dismissing the complaint without

prejudice for failure to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 6. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice

of Change of Address.” 

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Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\cr.05\Bennett107dwltamisc 9

He must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion or ask for an extension of time to do

so. Failure to comply may result in the dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: JEREMY FOGEL 

 United States District Judge

3/23/07

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Order Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel; Denying Motions for Summons; Denying Motions to Attach Evidence

Without Prejudice; Denying Motions for Temporary Restraining Order Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

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A copy of this ruling was mailed to the following:

Mario K. Bennett

V-23447

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95531-7500

Case 5:06-cv-03107-JF Document 41 Filed 03/23/07 Page 10 of 10