Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04447/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04447-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITHLEY,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 THE HOMESTORE.COM, INC. ET AL,

Defendant. /

No. C03-04447 MJJ

CLAIMS CONSTRUCTION ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Plaintiffs Kevin Keithley and TREN Technologies Holdings, LLC

(collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “TREN”), and Defendants Homestore, Inc., The National Association of

Realtors, and The National Association of Home Builders of the United States’ (collectively, “Home

store”) proposed constructions of disputed terms in a Patent held by TREN. The parties filed briefs

and joint claims construction statements submitting proposed constructions of the disputed terms. 

On August 1, 2007, the Court held a claim construction hearing lasting several hours. The Court,

having considered the parties’ papers, oral arguments, evidence, and the patent-in-suit, now

construes the disputed terms as set forth below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The patent-in-suit is U.S. Patent No. 5,584,025 (“the ’025 Patent”) entitled, “Apparatus and

Method For Interactive Communication For Tracking and Viewing Data.” The’025 Patent lists

Kevin Keithley (“Keithley”) as the inventor. The claimed inventions is generally directed to the use

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of an information processing system for acquiring and displaying information relating to a specific

industry or interest, the example therein being real estate and related goods and services. The ’025

Patent describes and claims methods for acquiring and displaying real estate and property-related

information and a related system for tracking such information that address the inefficiencies of the

traditional real estate industry associated with the logistics of matching buyers and sellers, and the

actual showing of the prospective property. In describing the ’025 Patent to the Patent and

Trademark Office (“PTO”), the inventor explained that the “invention relates to a method of

accessing industry specific information, such as real estate properties for sale, through multimedia

personal computers.” (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3, Abstract.) 

DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS

At issue in the current case are a total of ten claim terms taken from Claim 1, Claim 3, and

Claim 5. The following is a list of the disputed claim terms identified by the parties in their joint

claims construction statement. 

1. “said end user inquiries being the retrieving and viewing of test and/or graphic data

from a database” (Id., Claim 1(e), 3(f).) 

2. “demographics” (Id., Claim 1.) 

3. “compiling and merging a plurality of first end user inquiries” (Id., Claim 1(f), 3(g),

and 5.) 

4. “demographic information” (Id., Claim1(f), 1(g), 2, 4, and 5.) 

5. “media means for receiving analog and digitized data and transmitting digitized data” 

(Id., Claim 3.) 

6. “server” (Id., Claim 3.)

7. “file server means for receiving data from said media means, receiving data inquiries

and transmitting data in response to said data inquiries” (Id., Claim 1, 1(b), 3, 3(b),

3(c), and 3(d).)

8. “media unit” (Id., Claim 5.)

9. “digitizer” (Id., Claim 5.)

10. “server’s unit” (Id., Claim 5.) 

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LEGAL STANDARD

The construction of a patent is a matter of law for the Court. Markman v. Westview

Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). In construing terms, the Court must conduct an

independent analysis of the claim terms; it is insufficient to simply choose between the competing

constructions that the parties have submitted. Exxon Chem. Patents v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553,

1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995). To determine the meaning of a patent claim, the Court primarily considers

three sources: (1) the claims; (2) the specification; and (3) the prosecution history. Markman v.

Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, Markman, 517 U.S.

370. 

“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to

which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed.

Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d

1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, in construing disputed terms, the Court first looks to the

words of the claims. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

Generally, the Court ascribes the words of a claim their ordinary and customary meaning. Id.

“[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a

person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective

filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. 

Other claims of the patent in question can also assist in determining the meaning of a claim

term. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Because an inventor normally uses claim terms consistently

throughout a patent, the usage of a term in one claim may reveal the meaning of the same term in

other claims. Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Conversely,

use of a term in a different way in another claim may also be useful in determining the particular

meaning of the disputed term. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538 (Fed. Cir.

1991). Particularly, the existence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation creates a 

presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim. Liebel-Flarseim

Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,

831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 

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Because the claims are part of a fully integrated written instrument comprised principally of

the specification, the Court must next review the specification. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-79. 

Because the specification must contain a description of the invention that is clear and complete

enough to enable those of ordinary skill in the art to make and use it, the specification is “always

highly relevant” to the Court’s claim construction analysis. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “Usually,

[the specification] is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. 

“In light of the statutory directive that the inventor provide a ‘full’ and ‘exact’ description of the

claimed invention, the specification necessarily informs the proper construction of the claims.” 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In some cases, the specification may reveal that the patentee has given a

special definition to a claim term that differs from its ordinary meaning. “In such cases, the

inventor’s lexicography controls.” Id. at 1316. The specification also may reveal the patentee’s

intentional disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope. “In that instance, as well, the inventor has

dictated the correct claim scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is

regarded as dispositive.” Id. Thus, the specification can act as a dictionary when it expressly or

impliedly defines terms used in the claims. Id.

Next, in addition to reviewing the specification, the Court should consider the patent’s

prosecution history, if it is in evidence. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history is

intrinsic evidence and consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the Patent and

Trademark Office (“PTO”) and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent. 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “The prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim

language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor

limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower then it would

otherwise be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d 1317; see also Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the prosecution history in construing a claim is to

exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

In addition to the foregoing intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit has also authorized district

courts to rely on extrinsic evidence in claim construction, which consists of “all evidence external to

the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned

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treatises.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. However, extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the

intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v.

U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Because dictionaries, and especially

technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms used in various field of

science and technology, those resources have been properly recognized as among the many tools

that can assist the court in determining the meaning of particular terminology to those of skill in the

art of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d 1318. Accordingly, the Court may consider this evidence,

if the Court deems it helpful in deciphering the true meaning of the claim terms. Id. 

With these canons of construction in mind, the Court turns to the construction of the disputed

claim terms.

ANALYSIS

1. “said end user inquiries being the retrieving and viewing of text and/or graphic data

from a database” 

The parties dispute the meaning of the term, “said end user inquiries being the retrieving and

viewing of test and/or graphic data from a database” which appears in Claim 1(e) and Claim 3(f) of

the ’025 Patent. The claim term reads as follows: 

accessing data files by said first end users, said accessing data

files by said first end users being a plurality of inquiries from

individual first end users, said end user inquiries being the

retrieving and viewing of text and/or graphic data from a

database.

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3, Claim 1(e), 3(f).) 

Plaintiffs contend that the proper construction of the term is “said end user inquiries being

requests for information that are passively monitored.” Defendants propose that the proper

construction of the term is “said end user inquiries being the opening and viewing data received by

an end user in response to one or more requests for data from a database.” Both parties’ proposed

constructions restate the initial claim language, “said end user inquiries being.” Accordingly,

putting aside this restated initial claim language, the parties’ dispute centers on the meaning of the

remaining claim phrase, “the retrieving and viewing of text and/or graphic data from a database.” 

As discussed more fully below, the Court finds that the available evidence supports Plaintiffs’

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proposed construction of the term at issue. 

In support of their construction, Plaintiffs initially argue that Defendants’ proposed

construction is not a construction at all, but is only a slightly revised restatement of the claim

language that adds an unnecessary limitation. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that Defendants’

proposed construction unnecessarily adds a limitation that the “end user inquiries” must consist of

data “received by an end user in response to one or more requests for data.” Plaintiffs insist that

reading such a limitation into the claim construction is improper. 

Next, Plaintiffs rely on the ’025 Patent prosecution reexamination history. Specifically,

Plaintiffs point to Keithley’s March 2005 and April 2005 representations to the PTO, made during

reexamination of the ’025 Patent. (Herbst Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 5, Response to Office Action in Ex Parte

Reexamination and Request for Continued Examination, submitted March 14, 2005 at ¶. 28-30; ¶ 8,

Ex. 6, Response to Office Action in Ex Parte Reexamination and Request for Continued

Examination, submitted April 14, 2005 at ¶. 30-32.) In Keithley’s March 2005 representation to the

PTO, in an attempt to differentiate the ’025 Patent from other prior art, he explained the difference

between “actively” collecting data—as taught by prior art, and “passively” collecting data—as

taught by the ’025 Patent. (Herbst Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 5 at ¶. 28-30.) There, Keithley conceded that claim

elements 1(c) and 1(d) include an initial form of collecting data that is similar to the “active” data

collection feature found in the prior art because the data is collected by having the end user answer

specific questions. (Id.) However, Keithley further explained that claim element 1(e) teaches a

second form of collecting data, not found in the prior art. (Id.) In particular, Keithley stated that

claim element 1(e) relates only to the system “passively” collecting data by watching the end user,

rather than requiring the end user to respond to questions. (Id.) In his March 2005 reexamination

representation, Keithley stated, “Claim 1 [ ] claims a second form of collecting data, which is a

relatively PASSIVE collection . . . Thus, a second set of data may be collected by PASSIVELY

watching the inquiries of the first end user as they ‘retrieve and view text and/or graphic data.’ . . . It

is the collection of data by watching the actions of the end user.” (Id. ¶. 29-30.) Keithley made an

nearly identical reexamination representation to the PTO in April 2005. (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. 6 at ¶. 30-32.)

Conversely, in support of their construction, Defendants similarly point to the ’025 Patent

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In their joint claims construction statement, the parties generally cite to the same portions of the specification in

support of their respective constructions. (Jt. Claims Construction Statement 3-7) (containing parallel citations to: col. 1, ll.

12-45; col. 4, ll. 23-26; col. 7, ll. 17-30; col. 11, ll. 16-20.) As noted above, the parties also generally cite to the same portions

of the ’025 Patent prosecution history and re-examination history. (Id. 5-12) (containing parallel citations to: ’025 Patent

Prosecution History: Second Preliminary Amendment, filed 7/20/95, p. 10; Reexam History: Response filed 3/14/05 and

Response filed 4/14/05.) However, with the exception of the ’025 Patent prosecution reexamination history explained above,

neither party provides analysis as to how their citations support their respective construction of the term at issue.

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prosecution reexamination history. (Pleune Decl. ¶ 25, Ex. X, Response to Office Action in Ex

Parte 

Reexamination and Request for Continued Examination, submitted April 14, 2005 at ¶. 30-33.)1

Defendants accord significance to Keithley’s distinction between “active” and “passive” data

collection by focusing on the term, “inquiries,” and argue that Plaintiffs’ election to focus on the

second form of data collection, at the exclusion of the first form of data collection, is somehow

improper. However, Defendants fail to adequately explain how Plaintiffs’ data collection distinction

supports Defendants’ proposed construction over Plaintiffs’.

Conflicting with Defendants’ construction is the ’025 Patent prosecution reexamination

history wherein it reveals Keithley’s express clarification that the claim term at issue focuses on

“watching the actions of the end user” and monitoring “the behavior of the first end user as they surf

through the database.” (Herbst Decl. Ex. 5, ¶. 30, 32.) Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants’

reliance on the ’025 Patent prosecution reexamination history to be unsupportive of their proposed

construction.

Lastly, without citing legal authority, Defendants argue against Plaintiffs’ proposed

construction on grounds that it would require the Court to further interpret the phrase, “passively

monitored.” However, because “courts construe claim terms in order to assign a fixed,

unambiguous, legally operative meaning to the claim,” the Court finds Defendants’ argument

unconvincing. Chime v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

In reviewing the current record, the Court finds Keithley’s statements during the ’025 Patent

prosecution reexamination history to be compelling evidence in support of Plaintiffs’ proposed

construction. Plaintiffs’ proposed construction incorporates the term “passively monitored.” To that

end, it is undisputed that Keithley consistently explained in March 2005, and again in April 2005,

that Claim 1(e) relates only to the system “passively” collecting data by watching the end user,

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rather than requiring the end user to respond to questions. Because the prosecution history is

compelling and because Defendants’ arguments to the contrary lack merit, the Court finds that the

prosecution history weighs heavily in favor of Plaintiffs’ proposed construction. 

Additionally, although not specifically addressed by the parties in their claims construction

briefs, the Court notes that the other claims in the ’025 Patent also tend to support Plaintiffs’

proposed construction of the term at issue. As to the other claims, claims 1(c) explicitly refers to

obtaining “end user information from a first end user . . . .” (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3, ’025 Patent at

col. 14, ll. 46-47) (emphasis added.) Claim 1(d) explicitly refers to the act of the “end user”

“providing” “digital electronic end user information. (Id. at col. 14, ll. 49-53) (emphasis added.) 

Thus, in comparing the volitional nature of the contemplated conduct in the claim terms, it is

apparent that Claim 1(c) and Claim 1(d) envision more affirmative conduct than does Claim 1(e). 

Both Claim 1(c) and Claim 1(d) indicate that information will be taken “from,” or “provided” by, the

end user. In contrast, Claim 1(e) indicates no such requirement on the part of the end user. 

Finally, although the specification does not conclusively resolve the construction of the term

at issue, the Court finds that it tends to weigh in favor of Plaintiffs’ proposed construction. 

Although not specifically addressed by the parties in their claims construction briefs, the Court notes

that the specification states that “the instant invention provides detailed data on all aspects of

viewership and response.” (Id. at col. 1, ll. 37-38.) Accordingly, the specification contemplates

both the passive act of observing the end user’s viewership, along with the more active conduct of

eliciting a response. This reasoning in consistent with Plaintiffs’ repeated explanation between the

passive conduct associated with Claim 1(e), and the more active conduct associated with Claim 1(c)

and Claim 1(d). 

Taking into account the claims, the specification, and the relevant patent prosecution history,

the Court construes “said end user inquiries being the retrieving and viewing of test and/or graphic

data from a database” as “said end user inquiries being requests for information that are passively

monitored.” 

2. “demographics”

The parties dispute the construction of the term, “demographics.” “Demographics” is a term

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that appears in each of the independent claims of the ’025 Patent. (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3.) 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of “demographics” is “characteristics of human populations

and population segments, especially when used to identify consumer markets.” Defendants

proposed construction of the term is “physical characteristics of human populations and population

segments, such as age, occupation, income, sex, and marital status, to identify consumer markets.” 

Thus, the parties’ proposed constructions are similar to the extent they both define “demographics”

in terms of “characteristics of human populations and population segments” that can “identify

consumer markets.” However, the parties proposed constructions are different to extent that

Defendants’ construction proposes the use of additional terms. Defendants use the additional term,

“physical,” as a method of limiting the meaning of the subsequent phrase, “characteristics of human

populations.” Defendants also use the additional phrase, “such as age, occupation, income, sex, and

marital status,” as means of providing examples of “characteristics of human populations and

population segments.” The Court now turns the parties’ arguments in support of their respective

constructions. 

Initially, in support of their construction, Plaintiffs attack Defendants’ construction on

grounds that it adds unnecessary terms thereby rendering Defendants’ construction internally

inconsistent and confusing. In addressing Defendants’ use of the term, “physical,” Plaintiffs

emphasize that none of the intrinsic evidence make reference to the term as a way of describing the

“characteristics of human populations.” Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ use of the examples

“age, occupation, income, sex, and marital status” is internally inconsistent because some of the

examples are non-physical in nature, such as occupation, income, and marital status. 

Next, Plaintiffs point to the prosecution history wherein Keithley consistently defined

“demographics” in exact accordance with Plaintiffs’ proposed construction. In April 1995, Keithley

stated, “[t]he term demographics has a clear and definite meaning, based on standard dictionary

usage and the explanations in the instant application. Demographics means the characteristics of

human populations and population segments, especially when used to identify consumer markets. 

(American Heritage Dictionary.)” (Herbst Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 7, Amendment After Final, submitted April

11, 1995 at p. 15.) In July 1995, Keithley again stated that “demographics” meant the characteristics

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The Lifestyle Market Analyst, 1989, Standard Rate & Data Service, Inc.; Basic Marketing: A managerial approach,

6th Edition, McCarthy, 1978; Introduction to Marketing Management, Rewoldt, et al., 1977, and Marketing Research, Boyd,

Jr., et al. 1977. (Pluene Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. J at p. 15.)

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of human populations and population segments, especially when used to identify consumer markets. 

(American Heritage Dictionary.)” (Id. ¶ 10, Ex. 8, Second Preliminary Amendment, submitted July

20, 1995 at p. 6.) 

Conversely, in support of Defendants’ construction, Defendants accuse Plaintiffs of ignoring

critical statements made by the applicants during the prosecution history. Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs’ definition “was insufficient to obtain allowance of the ’025 Patent” and that Plaintiffs

ultimately submitted four articles2

 to the examiner that provided “additional information and

examples of demographics.” (Def.s’ Claim Construction Br. 10:3-8; Pluene Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7, 8, 11, 13-

16, Exs. C, F, G, J, L, M, N, O.) Pointing to the express demographic examples taken from the four

articles submitted by Plaintiffs, Defendants argue that similar examples should be included in the

construction of the term at issue. Defendants fail to provide factual citations that would support the

importation of the demographic examples found in Defendants’ proposed construction. However,

the Court’s independent review of the prosecution history reveals that the cited articles generally

describe “demographics” as including such dimensions as age, sex, family size, income, occupation,

education, family life cycle, religion, race, nationality, and social class. (Pluene Decl. ¶¶ 15, 16,

Exs. N, O.) 

In examining the parties’ respective constructions of “demographics,” the Court finds that

Defendants’ additional limitation (“physical”) and extra exemplary language (“such as age,

occupation, income, sex, and marital status”), are both unnecessary. The Court now addresses

Defendants’ proposed constructions in turn.

a. “physical”

Defendants’ proposal of limiting the “characteristics of human populations and population

segments” to only those that are “physical” fails for two reasons. First, it would effectively require

the Court to read in an unsupported additional limitation. Defendant has not cited, and the Court has

not located, any support for such a limitation in the claim language, the specification, or the

prosecution history. Because neither the claim language, the specification, nor the prosecution

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history include such a specific limitation, the Court shall not impose one. See e.g., Cargill, Inc. v.

Sears Petroleum & Transport Corp., 334 F. Supp.2d 197, 214 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Cornell

Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 114, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)); Innova/Pure Water, Inc.

v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2003), vacated &

remanded, 381 F.3d 1111, 72 USPQ 2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Adding limitations neither required

by claim terms nor unambiguously required by either the specification or the prosecution history of a

patent is impermissible.”); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 288 F.

Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Intertrust Technologies Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d

1031, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“the Court is wary of reading into claims a limitation that is not

expressly there.”); ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp., 272 F.

Supp. 2d 1028, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“while the specification and prosecution history may provide

interpretive context for the claims, the court may not read limitations into the claims.”). 

The second reason that Defendants’ proposed limitation fails is because it creates a facial

inconsistency when read in conjunction with the rest of Defendants’ proposed construction. In

particular, Defendant urges the Court to limit the “characteristics of human populations and

population segments” to only those that are “physical” in nature. Defendant then encourages the

Court to include a list of examples of such characteristics. However, Defendants’ own proposed list

includes examples that are non-physical in nature, such as occupation, income, and marital status. 

For these reasons, the Court finds Defendants’ proposed construction of limiting

“characteristics” to only those that are “physical” in nature to be unconvincing. 

b. Exemplary language—“such as age, occupation, income, sex, and marital status”

Defendants’ proposal of further describing the “characteristics of human populations and 

population segments” with a non-exhaustive list that includes “age, occupation, income, sex, and

marital status” could create unnecessary confusion. While Defendants’ examples are certainly

within the dimensions of the term, “demographics,” their list is by no means exhaustive of what the

term encompasses. By including such a list, a jury could mistakenly interpret the scope of the term

to be narrower than intended by: (1) finding the list of examples to be exhaustive; or (2) finding that

the term is somehow limited to a subset of the items on the list. Defendant fails to explain how the

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proposed exemplary language would aid in the determination of infringement. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Defendants’ proposed exemplary language is superfluous. 

Having considered the claims, the specification, and the relevant patent prosecution history,

the Court construes “demographics” as “characteristics of human populations and population

segments, especially when used to identify consumer markets.” 

3. “compiling and merging a plurality of first end user inquiries”

The parties dispute the construction of the term, “compiling and merging a plurality of first

end user inquiries.” The term at issue appears in claim elements 1(f), 3(g), and 5 of the ’025 Patent. 

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3.) 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the term is “collecting and combining the results of

passively monitoring requests for information.” Defendants’ proposed construction of the term is

“dynamic computer generation of information for a demographics database by continually

analyzing, organizing and combining multiple related first end user inquiries to identify distinct

trends that is more than maintaining a time record, count of the length of time, or number of user

inquiries.” In support of their respective constructions, Plaintiffs point to the claim language, the

specification, and the prosecution history, while Defendants primarily rely on the prosecution

history. The Court now turns to the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history. 

Turning to the claim language, in construing “compiling and merging a plurality of first end

user inquiries,” the Court is guided by general principles of claim construction and begins with the

phrase’s ordinary meaning. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (instructing the court to look first at the

words themselves). The Court may look to other words in the claims to provide contextual support

for the proper interpretation. Faroudja Lab., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1007

(N.D. Cal. 1999). At first blush, this phrase appears to lack any obvious “ordinary or customary

meaning.” See Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 38 F.3d 1192, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

However, its meaning becomes slightly more evident when the Court considers the phrase in

context. 

The Court observes that the phrase at issue, in context of the claim language, essentially

refers to what is done with the information collected from the passive monitoring of the end user

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inquiries encompassed by the preceding claim element 1(e). Although the parties contest the

construction of the preceding claim element 1(e), the parties do not appear to dispute that the phrase

at issue relates to the sequential step associated with the information collected from the end user

inquiries and how a demographics database is generated therefrom. The claim language supports an

interpretation that describes the particular step whereby the demographics databases are generated. 

The ’025 Patent specification tends to support this interpretation as described in Figure 1. 

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3.) The description of this diagram illustrates that certain databases at issue

“consists of all qualitative inquiries generated by viewers seeking more information on specific

property profiles viewed on the disclosed system,” (id., at col. 7, ll. 17-20), and are “generated by

viewership of any property profiles wherein the viewer may or may not be interested in pursuing the

transaction but has viewed the property,” (id., at col. 7, ll. 20-23). In referring to related databases at

issue, the specification describes it as “compris[ing] all qualitative inquires generated by viewers

seeking more information on specific goods or services advertised on the disclosed invention,” (id.,

at col. 7, ll. 23-26), and are “generated by viewership of any advertising message wherein the viewer

may or may not be interested in obtaining more information about the advertiser’s goods and/or

services,” (id. at col. 7, ll. 26-30). Accordingly, the specification contemplates that “respective

databases” would consist of, and be generated by, first end user inquiries pertaining to property or

advertisements. (Id. at col. 7, l. 31.) 

However, the Court’s review of the claim language and the specification does not appear to

support a wholesale adoption of either parties’ proposed construction. In following the canons of

construction, the Court now addresses the ’025 Patent prosecution history.

The ’025 Patent prosecution history reveals that the inventor described the claim at issue to

be one that generally “collects” inquiries. The inventor stated that the phrase at issue “compiles the

inquires and from the inquiries, generates a demographics database, from which consumer trends can

be ascertained . . . .” (Id. ¶ 9, Ex. 7, Amendment After Final, submitted April 11, 1995 at p. 16.) 

Subsequently, the inventor stated that, 

it is possible to collect data about the actual behavior of the end user, using the actual

behavior of the end user. By collecting data about the end users actions, as they are

“retrieving and viewing . . . data” it is possible to more accurately assess actual

preferences of the end user. This is a collection of data that does not require active

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work by the end user, like answering a questionnaire. It is the collection of data by

watching the actions of the end user . . . . 

(Id. ¶ 7, Ex. 5, Response to Office Action in Ex Parte Reexamination and Request for Continued

Examination, submitted March 14, 2005 at p. 30) (emphasis added.) In further describing claim 1(f)

the inventor stated that “[t]he features . . . state how to use data collected by assessing the user’s

actions.” (Id. at p. 31) (emphasis added.) In light of the prosecution history, the Court finds that the

phrase at issue necessarily means the process of “collecting the results of first end user inquiries.” 

Both parties urge the Court to include additional words and phrases in its construction of the

phrase at issue. Plaintiffs request the Court to import the words, “collecting and combining” and

“passively monitoring requests.” Defendants ask the Court to import the phrases, “dynamic

computer generation,” “by continually analyzing, organizing and combining multiple related first

end user inquiries,” “to identify distinct trends that is more than maintaining a time record, count of

the length of time, or number of user inquiries.” The only proposed additional word offered by both

parties is “combining.” However, the Court finds the remainder of the parties’ proposed extraneous

words and phrases to be unnecessary. 

Regarding Plaintiffs’ proposed additional words, the Court finds it unnecessary to repeat

language relating to information that is “passively monitored.” Such a construction would be

repetitive of the Court’s construction of claim term 1(e). Next, regarding Defendants’ proposed

additional limiting phrases, the Court finds insufficient support in the record for their use here. See

Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing

Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 950, (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It is improper for a court to

add ‘extraneous’ limitations to a claim, that is, limitations added wholly apart from any need to

interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.”) (quoting E.I. du Pont

de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433, (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also

Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Where a specification

does not require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification into the

claims.”) (citing Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); cf. Constant

v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the written

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Plaintiff identifies the term in plural form as “demographics information,” while Defendant identifies the term in

singular form as “demographic information.” At the outset the Court notes that the parties are referring to the same term and

that the term’s construction does not depend on the Court adopting one form of the term over the other. (See Joint Claim

Construction Stmt. at 41) (referring to singular and plural form of the term as the same term at issue.) 

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description provided “no evidence to indicate that [ ] limitations must be imported into the claims to

give meaning to disputed terms”)). Defendant fails to identify applicable portions of the record that

support the importation of additional limitations to the phrase at issue. For these reasons, the Court

finds the parties’ proposed additional language to be unnecessary.

 Having considered the claims, the specification, the relevant patent prosecution history, and

the parties respective use of the term, “combining,” the Court construes “compiling and merging a

plurality of first end user inquiries” as “collecting and combining the results of first end user

inquiries.”

4. “demographic(s) information”

The parties dispute the construction of the term, “demographic(s) information.” The term

appears in claim elements 1(f), 1(g), 2, 4, and 5, of the ’025 Patent. (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3.)3

 

 The parties appear to agree that the term, “demographics information,” generally refers to the

information that populates the database that is subsequently made available to a second end user. 

(Id.) However, the parties do not agree on how to define such “demographic information.” 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the term is “information from which interests or preferences can

be assessed.” Defendants proposed construction of the term is “a collection of analyzed and

processed user inquiries that identify distinct trends or profiles regarding certain physical

characteristics of human populations and population segments, such as age, occupation, income, sex,

and marital status, to identify consumer markets. Such a collection results in something more than a

time period, count of the length of time, or number of user inquiries.” In support of their respective

constructions, both parties primarily rely on the specification and the prosecution history. However,

before turning to the parties’ reliance on the specification and the prosecution history, the Court first

addresses the claim language. 

In examining the claim language, a claim term is to be given its ordinary meaning unless the

patentee has explicitly redefined the term, or the term itself is so ambiguous it is incapable of being

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After a review of the ’025 Patent specification, the Court does not find any evidence that the inventor intended the

term, “demographics information,” to be wholly independent from the previously defined term, “demographics.” 

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understood without reference to the specification. See Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco

Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“A court must presume that the terms in the claim

mean what they say, and, unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and

accustomed meaning of claim terms.”). Because claim terms are normally used consistently

throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same

term in other claims. See Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001);

CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, the Court notes

that it has previously construed the claim term, “demographics.” The Court construed the claim

term in accordance with its ordinary meaning as, “characteristics of human populations and

population segments, especially when used to identify consumer markets.” As such, the Court is

compelled to build on its previous construction of “demographics” unless there is evidence the

patentee has otherwise redefined “demographics information” as having a wholly independent and

unrelated meaning. In order to determine whether the patentee has done so here, the Court now

turns to the specification and the prosecution history of the ’025 Patent. 

Turning to the ’025 Patent specification, Plaintiff argues for a broad definition of

“demographic information.” Plaintiff points to portions of the specification whereby the patentee

has described the invention as relating to a broad array of consumer trends such as, “design trends,

new housing development, and competitive practices,” (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 5 ll. 51-55),

“market trends and research as well as targeting advertising messages,” and “increasing demand for

housing . . . which could bring new deposit account relationship as well as the opportunity to book

new mortgages,” (id. at col. 11, ll. 37-46). Plaintiff contends that these examples are evidence that

the term, “demographic information,” relates broadly to trends that reflect market interest and

preferences of the end user.4

Defendants do not address the specification’s impact on the construction of the term at issue. 

Instead, Defendants focus on the ’025 Patent’s prosecution history.

Turning to the ’025 Patent prosecution history, the Court denotes that the parties have

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differing interpretations regarding its impact in construing, “demographics information.” 

Defendants aver that the patentee made certain relevant representations in an effort to avoid prior art. 

Specifically, Defendants point to the patentee’s March 1995 remarks wherein he described the

invention as one that “analyzed,” “processed,” and “created profiles of,” “inquiries.” (Pluene Decl.

¶ 8, Ex. G; ¶ 11, Ex. J.) According to Defendants, the patentee expressly carved out certain

functions that are not “demographics information”—such as the “maintaining a time record, a count

of the length of time, or the number of user inquiries.” As such, Defendants insist that the

construction of the term at issue must be narrowed to include only such information that is

“analyzed, processed, and created” from the first end user inquiries. 

Plaintiffs disagree that prosecution history requires such a limited definition of the term at

issue. Plaintiffs maintain that “demographics information” is broad so as to include “the trend in

popularity of houses in a particular price range, or style or location, or type of windows, or types of

appliances,” (Herbst Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 7 at p. 16), and “consumer trends,” (id.), and “forecast[s] [of]

demand for public goods and services,” (id. at p. 22). Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that the

limitations in Defendants’ construction are unnecessary.

To the extent, Defendants’ construction consists of a second attempt to add a “physical”

characteristic limitation, or to add exemplary language to the term at issue, the Court finds

Defendants’ construction unavailing. However, in light of the patentee’s descriptions of the term in

the prosecution history, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ construction is similarly unavailing. In the

prosecution history it is evident that the information at issue was more than a report of the time

spent, or number of inquiries made by, the first end user. Accordingly, the construction

“demographics information” lies somewhere between the parties’ competing interpretations. 

 Having considered the claim terms, the specification, and the relevant patent prosecution

history, the Court construes “demographics information” as “characteristics of human populations

and population segments, especially when used to identify consumer markets, that are created from

the collection of first end user inquiries that identify distinct trends in interests or preferences.”

5. “media means for receiving analog and digitized data and transmitting digitized data”

The parties dispute the construction of the phrase, “media means for receiving analog and

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digitized data and transmitting digitized data.” The phrase appears in Claim 3 as follows:

A method of acquiring and displaying property related information utilizing an

information processing system containing media means for receiving analog and

digitized data and transmitting digitized data; file server means for receiving data

from said media means, receiving data inquiries and transmitting data in response to

said data inquiries; data bases and data base storage means for sorting, storing and

retrieving information received, the method comprising the steps of: . . . .

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3.) 

 The parties agree that the phrase is means-plus-function language that the Court must

construe pursuant to Section 112(6) of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (“Paragraph 6” or

“Section 112(6)”). However, the parties do not agree as to how to define the mean-plus-function

phrase. Plaintiffs contend that when properly construed in light of the specification, the phrase

“receiving analog and digitized data and transmitting digitized data” should be construed to

encompass “receiving analog data or receiving digitized data.” Defendants insist that the patentee

failed to adequately disclose structure corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation and that

the claim is therefore invalid for indefiniteness. Consequently, the parties’ principal dispute is

whether the specification discloses “corresponding structure” for the means-plus-function phrase at

issue. Before addressing the parties’ dispute, the Court identifies the applicable legal standard for

constructing means-plus-function claim elements.

A “means-plus-function” claim is a special type of claim provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 112,

paragraph 6, which provides: “An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a

means or a step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts

in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material,

or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. 

Under this provision, an inventor can describe an element of the invention by the result

accomplished or the function served, rather than by describing the item or element to be used.

Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997). When using

means-plus-function language, “[t]he applicant must describe in the patent specification some

structure which performs the specified function.” Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing

Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259,

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1266-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A structure disclosed in the specification is only deemed to be “the

corresponding structure” if the specification clearly links or associates that structure to the function

recited in the claim. Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The

duty to link or associate structure in the specification with the function is the quid pro quo for the

convenience of employing the means-plus-function format. Id.

An accused device with a structure that is not identical to the structure described in the patent

will literally infringe the patent if the accused device performs the identical function required by the

means-plus-function claim with a structure identical or equivalent to that described in the patent.

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Kahn, 135

F.3d at 1476. “Thus, the statutory provision prevents an overly broad construction by requiring

reference to the specification, and at the same time precludes an overly narrow construction that

would restrict coverage solely to those means expressly disclosed in the specification.” Symbol

Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

Where an element is expressed as a “means” to perform a particular function, a presumption

arises that the claim element should be construed as a means-plus-function claim under section

112(6). Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Conversely, a claim

term that does not use the words “means” or “step for” is presumptively not governed by section

112(6). CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This

presumption “is a strong one that is not readily overcome.” Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood

Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, even in the absence of express

means-plus-function language, a claim may be construed to include a means-plus-function element if

the proponent of the means-plus-function construction demonstrates that “the claim term fails to

‘recite sufficiently definite structure for performing that function.’” CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1369

(quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). In making this determination,

the court must assess whether the “term, as a name for a structure, has a reasonably well understood

meaning in the art.” Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

If the specification lacks an adequate disclosure of corresponding structure, “the claim is invalid for

failure to satisfy the definiteness requirement of § 112, ¶ 2.” Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude

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Medical, Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

At the outset, the Court notes that it will construe the phrase at issue as a means-plusfunction term. Because Claim 3 describes the phrase at issue as a “means for,” there is a

presumption that the Court should construe the phrase in accordance with section 112(6). Neither

the parties or the Court have located evidence indicating that the claim should be construed

otherwise. In light of the existing presumption, and the parties’ agreement to have the phrase

construed as a means-plus-function term, the Court will construe the phrase at issue in accordance

with section 112(6). See Medical Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d

1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that where the parties agree that a term is a means-plus-function

term, the court’s task is to identify the function of the term and its corresponding structure.). The

Court now turns to the merits of the parties’ respective contentions as to whether specification

sufficiently discloses the structure for performing the claimed function. 

In support of their proposed construction, Plaintiffs argue that the specification sufficiently

discloses the structure associated with “receiving analog and digitized data and transmitting

digitized data.” Plaintiffs assert that the following excerpt from the ’025 Patent specification

supports their interpretation of the functional language:

FIG. 2 illustrates the information flow to and from the Media’s

multimedia device 100 to the Server’s Processor 400. The raw

data is either gathered from outside sources, generally in the

form of analog information 110, or entered directly at the

Media’s multimedia PC 102 [in digital form]. Any analog

information 110, albeit audio, video, photos, text, or graphics,

must be digitized by Media’s digitizer 108 to be read by the PCs

used herein. The digitized information is sent directly to the

Media’s multimedia PC 102. Information from . . . other sources

is received via the Media’s modem 104, or by any other means,

for entry into the Media’s multimedia device 100. Data

produced by the Media’s personnel is directly entered onto the

multimedia PC 102. Once entered, the information is edited at

the media’s multimedia PC 102.

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3, col. 7, ll. 37-67.) According to Plaintiffs, this passage teaches that the

multimedia PC (one of several structures corresponding to the claims “media means”) can receive

data in two different forms—“analog” or “digitized” (digital) form. Plaintiffs aver that the

specification, as restated in the context of section 112(6), teaches that the “media means” performs

two distinct functions: (1) receiving analog data; or (2) receiving digital data. Consequently,

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According to Plaintiffs, there are additional excerpts from the specification that sufficiently discloses the structure

associated with “receiving analog and digitized data and transmitting digitized data.” (Joint Claims Construction Stmt. at

54-55) (“The system further, includes medial terminal for production of fields, including digitized property descriptions. The

media terminal has digitizing capabilities to digitize analog input and i/o for receiving and transmitting the digitized

information.” (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 3, ll. 39-43.) “The media’s multimedia device 100 would preferably consist

of a digitizer 108, compress/decompress unit 106, modem 104, and multimedia PC 102.” (Id. at col. 5, ll. 58-60.))

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consistent with the teaching, the phrase “receiving analog and digital data” should be construed to

reflect that the “media means” “receives analog data or receives digital data.”5

In support of their indefiniteness contention, Defendants make a series of arguments. First,

Defendants contend that the ’025 Patent specification expressly addresses the term, “Media,” only

once wherein it does not disclose the structure associated with intended the recited function. 

Media—The primary party responsible for production of

property files and possibly all other advertising displayed on the

system. The Media has access to all files on the Server and,

alternatively, may be part of the Server’s system. The Media can

include multimedia communications, conglomerates, or local

media entities.

(Id., col. 5, ll.16-23.) Second, Defendants accuse Plaintiffs of improperly attempting to broaden the

phrase at issue by changing the argued function from the conjunctive—“receiving analog data and

digitized data,” to the disjunctive—“receiving analog data or digitized data.” Third, Defendants

assert that Plaintiffs’ proposed construction is incorrectly directed to the “media’s multimedia

device,” rather than the true claim at issue, which is “media means.” Thus, according to Defendants,

Plaintiffs’ attempt to link “multimedia device” to the specification necessarily fails. 

Here, a review of the ’025 Patent reveals that its specification sets forth sufficient

corresponding structure to perform the function of “receiving analog and digitized data and

transmitting digitized data.” (Id.); See Default Proof Credit Card System, Inc. v. Home Depot

U.S.A., Inc. (d/b/a The Home Depot), 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating “a

‘corresponding structure’ must include all structure that performs the recited function.). The ’025

Patent specification makes clear that the function can receive both analog and digital data. (Herbst

Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 7, ll. 37-52.) Per the specification, the analog data may be received from

outside sources and is then digitized to be entered the PC 102; whereas the digital data may be

received directly into the PC 102. (Id.) The specification also discloses that the function transmits

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The term, “server,” appears in claim elements 1 (“file server means”), 1(b) (“file server means”), 3 (“file server

means”), 3(b) (“file server means”), 3(c) (“file server means”), 3(d) (“file server means”), 3 (“file server meansr”), 5

(“server’s unit”), 6 (“server’s unit”), 7 (“server’s unit”), and 8 (“server’s unit”). (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3.)

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digitized information. (Id., at col. 3, ll. 39-43; col. 7, ll. 66-col. 8, ll. 3); see Altilis, Inc. v. Symantec

Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating “under § 112 every structure disclosed in the

specification and its equivalents should be considered.”). 

The components of such a function, and their operation, are as follows: 

-the multimedia PC 102

-the digitizer 108, or data entry device, or modem 104 and compress/decompress unit

106. 

Thus, the Court finds that the specification sufficiently discloses the components and the

operation of the phrase at issue such that one skilled in the art would identify the structure therein. 

Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Having

considered the parties arguments and the specification, the Court construes “media means” as “(i)

receiving analog data that is digitized for entry into a PC; or (ii) receiving digitized data for direct

entry into a PC. Such resulting digitized data is later transmitted to the server’s computer where it is

designated a location and stored with other similar files on the database.”

6. “server”

The parties dispute the construction of the term, “server,” as it appears in claim element 3

(“server”).6

 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction for the term, “server,” is “a computer system that receives

requests and provides responsive information.” Defendants’ proposed construction is “system that

receives digital property information and stores digital property information.” As such, the parties

agree that the proper “server” construction should describe “server” as a “system.” The parties also

agree that under the doctrine of claim differentiation, the construction of “file server means” and

“server’s unit” are presumed to be different. See Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile U.S.A.,

Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Tandon Corp. v. United States Int’l Trade

Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that under the doctrine of claim

differentiation, different claims are presumed to be of different scope.)). However, because the

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Dictionary definitions and other objective reference materials available at the time that the patent was issued may

also provide evidence of the ordinary meaning of a claim. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322; Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix,

Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A dictionary “has the value of being an unbiased source, accessible to the public

in advance of litigation.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, district courts “are free to consult

such resources at any time in order to better understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions

when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained

by a reading of the patent documents.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n. 6. A court should be cautious, however, not to place

too much reliance on dictionaries, as the resulting construction may be too broad. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321.

23

Court separately construes the terms, “file server means” and “server’s unit,” the Court will limit its

current construction of the term, “server,” only to the extent it appears in claim element 3. 

In support of their competing constructions of “server,” both parties primarily rely on the

’025 Patent specification. However, before turning to the specification, the Court must first

addresses the claim language. See Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582 (stating that in construing

disputed terms, the Court first looks to the words of the claims ascribing the words their ordinary

and customary meaning.) “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning

that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the

invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. 

In construing the ordinary and customary meaning, the Court notes that the dictionary definition for

“server” reads, “[a] computer that manages centralized data storage or network communications

resources. A server provides and organizes access to these resources for other computers linked to

it.” American Heritage Science Dictionary (2007); See also Microsoft Computer Dictionary (4th

Ed. 1994) (defining “server” as “[o]n a local area network, a computer running administrative

software that controls access to all or part of the network and its resources (such as disk drives or

printers). A computer acting as a server makes resources available to computers acting as

workstations on the network.”).7

 Although not dispositive, the Court finds that the claim language in

light of the ordinary and customary meaning of “server” to be illustrative.

Turning to the ’025 Patent specification, Defendants insist that it clearly defines “server” as,

“Server—The computer system which stores all files. Input facilities for raw data may be located at

the Server’s location.” (Herbst Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 5, ll. 23-25.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants

misapply the specification because the specification explicitly qualifies its “server” description by

providing that “the following terminology is used for consistency and should in no way limit the

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scope of the invention.” (Id. at col. 5, ll. 2-4.) Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants’ construction

unduly restricts “server” to “digital property information” per the disclosed embodiment. 

The Court finds that construction of term, “server,” is somewhere in between the parties’

proposed constructions. Most compelling is the specification’s description of the term, “server.” 

See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“Usually, [the specification] is dispositive; it is the single best guide

to the meaning of a disputed term.”). From that description it is clear that “server” includes a

“system which stores files” and also has “input facilities for raw data.” (Herbst Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at

col. 5, ll. 23-25.) Also instructive is the specification’s description of the invention. The

specification repeatedly describes “server” as a component with an “input/output [device]” for

“receiving and providing [or transmitting] data [and database storage].” (Id. at col. 3, ll. 33-35; col.

4, ll. 10-14.) As such, the Court construes “server,” in part, as “computer system that receives,

stores, and provides data.” The remaining issue is whether the “data” at issue should be limited to

“digital property data.”

It is evident that the disclosed embodiments of the ’025 Patent describe “server” as a

component “storing digital real estate information,” (id. at col. 3, ll. 35-36) and “stor[ing]

information regarding property profiles, real estate professionals, community profiles, real es [sic]

state financing, local businesses and services . . . .” (id. at col. 4, ll. 2-5). However, because it is

improper to read limitations from the specification into the claim, the Court may not limit “data” to

“digital data” as Defendants’ proposed construction does. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. For

this reason, the Court refuses to adopt Defendants’ proposed limitation. 

Having considered the claim terms, the specification, and the relevant patent prosecution

history, the Court construes “server” as “computer system that receives, stores, and provides data.” 

7. “file server means for receiving data from said media means, receiving data inquiries

and transmitting data in response to said data inquiries”

The parties dispute the construction of the term, “file server means.” The term appears in

claim elements 1, 1(b), 3, 3(b), 3(c), and 3(d). (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3.) Within Claim 1, the term

appears as follows:

1. A method of acquiring and displaying real estate information

utilizing an information processing system containing file server

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means for serving files, said file server means having i/o means

for receiving and transmitting data, and database storage means

for storing information in database files, the method comprising

the steps of:

. . . 

b) storing digitized real estate data and related information as

information records in said database storage means of said file

server means in a manner in which data can be selectively

accessed . . . .

(Id.) The complete phrase at issue appears in Claim 3 as follows:

3. A method of acquiring and displaying property related

information utilizing an information processing system

containing media means for receiving analog and digitized data

and transmitting digitized data; file server means for receiving

data from said media means, receiving data inquiries and

transmitting data in response to said data inquiries; databases

and database storage means for sorting, storing and retrieving

information received, the method comprising the steps of: . . . .

. . . 

b) transmitting said property related information in appropriate

format to said file server means;

c) said file server means analyzing said property related

information and storing said property related information in

related database storage means,

. . . 

d) said file server means receiving an information request from

multiple end users relating to the end users’ information needs,

the extent of information available to said end users being

determined by said end users’ access code . . . .

(Id.) 

a. Is the term at issue a means-plus-function element?

The threshold issue is whether “file server means” constitutes a mean-plus-function element

subject to Section 112(6). The parties dispute whether the phrase is a means-plus-function element. 

As previously discussed, Section 112(6) applies to a limitation expressed as a “means or step

for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support

therefor.” 35 U .S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. A means-plus-function claim “shall be construed to cover the

corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. 

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However, a means-plus-function claim is limited to the structure, and equivalents, disclosed in the

specification for performing that function. Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc., 412 F.3d at 1298. 

Thus, a court first must determine whether Paragraph 6 applies. Apple Computer v. Burst.com, Inc.,

2007 WL 1342504 at *18 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Where it applies, the court must then identify the

claimed function and the corresponding structure. Id. (citing Medical Instr. & Diag. Corp. v. Elekta

AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As noted above, the use of the word “means” in a term

creates a presumption that Paragraph 6 applies. Id. However, that presumption is rebuttable by

evidence that the limitation “recites sufficient structure or material for performing [the] function.” 

Id. (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also

Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kemco Sales, Inc.

v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102

F.3d 524, 531-32 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A court must decide on an “element-by-element basis” based

upon the patent and the prosecution history whether section 112(6) applies. Cole, 102 F.3d at 531.

In determining whether section 112(6) applies here, the Court notes that the disputed phrase

uses the word “means” combined with another term: “file server.” Thus, as a threshold matter, the

Court must determine whether Plaintiffs have overcome the presumption that section 112(6) applies. 

Plaintiffs contend that the presumption “fails” because the term, “file server,” connotes a structure to

a person of ordinarily skill in the art, citing Cole and Envirco Corp. Defendants, in turn, argue that

the presumption does apply, citing WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.

1999). 

In Cole, the issue was whether section 112(6) applied. There, the Federal Circuit affirmed

the district court’s conclusion that the term “perforation means ... for tearing” was not a

means-plus-function clause, because the claim sufficiently described a structure (i.e., the perforation

itself) to perform the function of tearing. Cole, 102 F.3d at 531. Relying on the dictionary

definition for the word “perforation,” the court construed the term, “perforation means ... for

tearing” to mean “perforations.” Id. 

Similarly, in Envirco Corp., the issue was whether section 112(6) applied. There, the

Federal Circuit held that the word “baffle” alone constituted sufficient structure, and trumped the use

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of the word “means.” Envirco Corp., 209 F.3d at 1364-65. Relying on the dictionary definition of

“baffle,” the court stated “[b]ecause the term ‘baffle’ itself imparts structure, meaning a surface

which deflects air, its use in the claims rebuts the presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies.” Id. at 1365. 

Accordingly, the court determined that the district court erred in construing the “second baffle

means” as a means-plus-function claim element under § 112, ¶ 6. Id. .

However, in WMS Gaming, the Federal Circuit addressed a different issue. There, Federal

Circuit had already determined that section 112(6) applied, and subsequently held that the district

court erred by identifying the corresponding structure for a means-plus-function limitation as “an

algorithm executed by a computer.” WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. The court held that this

identification of structure was overly broad because it was not limited to the algorithm disclosed in

the specification. Id. at 1348. Specifically, the court stated, “[i]n a means-plus-function claim in

which the disclosed structure is a computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an

algorithm, the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose

computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.” WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. 

Here, the Court finds Defendants have misapplied WMS Gaming. Unlike the current case, in

WMS Gaming, the issue was not whether section 112(6) applied. There, the court had already

determined that section 116(6) applied. Id. Rather, the issue there was whether the patent

sufficiently disclosed the corresponding structure. Id. Because the issue in the current case is

whether section 112(6) applies, the Court finds that WMS Gaming is factually inapposite. 

The current case is more analogous to Cole and Envirco Corp. because there the courts

considered the same issue now before this Court—whether section 112(6) applies. Similar to Cole

and Envirco Corp., this Court finds the dictionary definition of the term at issue to be instructive

here. As noted above, the relevant dictionary definitions of “server” are: (1) “[a] computer that

manages centralized data storage or network communications resources. A server provides and

organizes access to these resources for other computers linked to it.” American Heritage Science

Dictionary (2007); and (2) “On a local area network, a computer running administrative software

that controls access to all or part of the network and its resources (such as disk drives or printers). A

computer acting as a server makes resources available to computers acting as workstations on the

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network.” Microsoft Computer Dictionary (4th Ed. 1994); see also American Heritage Dictionary

(2007) (defining “file server” as “[a] computer that controls a central repository of data that can be

downloaded or manipulated in some manner by a client.”). Thus, the relevant dictionary definitions

connote an inherent structure in the term, “file server.”

Additionally, reviewing the operative claims on an element-by-element basis, the Court

concludes that “server means” is not a means-plus-function term. Each of the functions recited as

part of the claimed method have a corresponding structure that is evident from the language of

Claim 1 itself or from Claim 3. First, it is clear from the patent and Claim 1 that the “file server” has

“[input/output] means for receiving and transmitting data, and database storage means for storing

information in database files.” (Herbst Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 3.) Second, Claim 3 provides that the “file

server” “receive[s] data . . ., and transmit[s] data in response to said data inquiries.” (Id.) Thus,

consistent with the relevant dictionary definitions the term “file server” inherently connotes a

sufficient structure such that the section 112(6) presumption does not apply here. Because the “file

server means” element does not qualify for section 112(6) treatment, it is not limited to the structure

corresponding to the claimed function as “described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35

U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Instead, this Court construes the term in accordance with standard claim

construction rules.

b. “file server”

The parties’ proposed constructions are as follows. Plaintiffs’ proposed construction for the

term, “file server,” is “a server that receives property related information, analyzes and stores that

information in files, and provides data derived from one or more files responsive to requests.” 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction for “file server” is inconsistent with their previous proposed

construction for “server.” As noted above, in construing “server” Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’

importation of a “digital property information” limitation. However, in their proposed construction

of “file server,” Plaintiffs now seek a construction that imports a “property related information”

limitation. Because Defendants argue that “file server” is a means-plus-function element, they do

not offer an alternative construction. In construing “file server,” the Court now turns to the claim

language, the specification, and the prosecution history. 

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As to the claim language, the Court initially emphasizes that it has previously construed part

of the term at issue when it construed the term, “server,” as “computer system that receives, stores,

and provides data.” Because claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent, the

usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims. See

Rexnord Corp., 274 F.3d at 1342; CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc., 112 F.3d at 1159. As such, from the

outset, the Court is partially guided by its previous construction of “server.” To that end, a claim

term is to be given its ordinary meaning unless the patentee has explicitly redefined the term, or the

term itself is so ambiguous it is incapable of being understood without reference to the specification.

See Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc., 175 F.3d at 991. Therefore, this Court will look to the

ordinary meaning of “file server” unless there is evidence the patentee has otherwise redefined “file

server” as having a wholly independent and unrelated meaning. In considering the term’s ordinary

meaning, the Court finds that “file server” does have an ordinary meaning as set forth in the relevant

dictionary definitions, as noted above. However, before turning to the ’025 Patent specification, the

Court does recognize that the claims at issue do limit themselves to “real estate information,”

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 14, ll. 34-36, Claim 1), and “property related information,” (id. at col.

15, ll. 3-4, Claim 3). 

 Turning to the ’025 Patent specification, the Court again finds that the specification’s

description of the term, “server,” is compelling. (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 5, ll. 23-25); see

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“Usually, [the specification] is dispositive; it is the single best guide to

the meaning of a disputed term.”). The specification also references “file” and “server” together. 

The specification reads “[e]ach file sent [from the Media’s multimedia device 100] to the Server’s

computer 412 is designated a location, ensuring that it will be stored with other similar files on the

database in the Server’s computer 412. (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 7, ll. 67-col. 8, ll. 3.) 

Consequently, if the Court is to construe “file server” differently than “server,” the specification

supports only a slight modification.

Turning to the ’025 Patent prosecution history, the Court has not located, and the parties

have not provided, guidance as to how to construe “file server.” 

Thus, having considered the claim terms and the specification, the Court construes “file

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server” as “computer system that receives, stores, and provides data. Said file server that stores data

in the form of files and provides data responsive to user requests.” 

8. “media unit”

The parties dispute the construction of the term, “media unit.” The term at issue appears in

Claim 5 of the ’025 Patent as follows:

5. A system of tracking real estate and real estate related

demographic information using a computer network system

comprising:

a media unit, said media unit having:

a multimedia computer;

a digitizer, said digitizer receiving information

from outside said network system and

within said multimedia computer;

i/o means, . . . .

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 15, ll. 57-66.) 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the term is “a computer system capable of producing real

estate related information.” Defendants first contend that “media unit” declared invalid for

indefiniteness. However, in the event the term is not indefinite, Defendants alternatively propose the

term’s construction to be a “system that receives analog property information and transmits digital

property information via modem to the server’s unit.” In support of their respective constructions,

the parties primarily rely on the ’025 Patent specification. However, before turning to the

specification, the Court first addresses the words of the claims. See Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at

1582.

Turning to the claim language, the Court notes again that is must ascribe the words of a claim

their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term

is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time

of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at

1313. Here, the Court finds that the claim language is not helpful in ascertaining the ordinary

meaning of “media unit.” Consequently, the Court will turn to the specification.

The ’025 Patent specification provides slightly more insight into the meaning of “media

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unit.” Although the specification does not directly refer to “media unit,” it contains several

references to “media” and “media multimedia device.” Both parties cite to these portions of the

specification in support of their respective constructions. 

In referring to the term, “media,” the specification provides, “[t]he system further includes

media terminals for production of files, including digitized property descriptions. The media

terminal has digitizing capabilities to digitize analog input and i/o for receiving and transmitting the

digitized information.” (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 3, ll. 39-43.) The specification also refers to

“media multimedia device,” reading “[t]he media’s multimedia device 100 would preferably consist

of a digitizer 108, compress/decompress unit 106, modem 104, and multimedia PC 102.” (Id. at col.

5, ll. 58-60.) Next, the specification also refers generally to “media” in describing Figures 2 and 3. 

There, the specification provides,

FIG. 2 illustrates the information flow to and from the Media’s

multimedia device 100 to the Server’s Processor 400. The raw

data is either gathered from outside sources, generally in the

form of analog information 110, or entered directly at the

Media’s multimedia PC 102. Any analog information 110, albeit

audio, video, photos, text, or graphics, must be digitized by

Media’s digitizer 108, to be read by the PCs used herein. The

digitized information is sent directly to the Media’s multimedia

PC 102. Information from Real Estate Agents and other sources

is received via the Media’s modem 104, or by any other means,

for entry into the Media’s multimedia device 100. Data

produced by the Media’s personnel is directly entered onto the

multimedia PC 102. Once entered, the information is edited at

the media’s multimedia PC 102, as illustrated in FIG. 3. 

In FIG 3, the edited information is placed in a file which

corresponds to its existing database and compressed at the

Media’s compress/decompress unit 106. For example, the agent

property profile is sent via Media’s modem 104 to the Real

Estate Agent’s modem 206. The new file is received via the

Real Estate Agent’s modem 206 where it is sent to the Real

Estate Agent’s compress/decompress unit 204. After

decompression, the file is sent to the Agent’s multimedia PC 202

for review and proofing. The Real Estate Agent enters either

approval or proofing instructions at this point.

After proofing, the file is sent back to the Media’s multimedia

device 100 with instructions for changes. When final approval

has been granted by the Agent, the file is sent, as shown in FIG.

2, via the Media’s modem104 to the Server’s modem 410. Each

file sent to the Server’s computer 412 is designated a location,

ensuring it will be stored with other similar files on the database

in the Server’s computer 412.

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(Id. at col. 7, ll. 37-col. 8, ll. 3.) Finally, in providing terminology, the specification also refers to

“media” by providing,

Media—The primary party responsible for production of

property files and possibly all other advertising displayed on the

system. The Media has access to all files on the Server and,

alternatively, may be part of the Server’s system. The Media can

include multimedia communications, conglomerates, or local

media entities.

(Id. at col. 5, ll. 16-22.) In light of the specification, the Court now turns to the parties’ proposed

constructions.

At the outset, the Court finds that “media unit” is not an indefinite term as Defendants

contend. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he statutory requirement of particularity and

distinctness in claims is met only when [the claims] clearly distinguish what is claimed from what

went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise.” 

Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing United

Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)). The definiteness requirement,

however, does not compel absolute clarity. Id. Only claims “not amenable to construction” or

“insolubly ambiguous” are indefinite. See Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348,

1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Honeywell Intern., Inc. v. International, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir.

2003); Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus,

the definiteness of claim terms depends on whether those terms can be given any reasonable

meaning. Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1347. Here, as discussed more fully below, because “media unit”

has a reasonable meaning in light of the intrinsic evidence, the Court finds it is not an indefinite

term.

 In construing the term, “media unit,” the Court recognizes that the specification identifies a

list of parties, entities, systems, and devices associated with the invention. (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3

at col. 5.) The specification identifies “media” as a the primary party responsible for production of

property files and possibly all other advertising displayed on the system. (Id. at col 5, ll. 17-23.) 

The device associated with the “media” is a “multimedia device” described as “[a] device and/or

system which includes, but is not limited to, video and audio-graphic conferencing and multimedia

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messaging . . . capable of storing, transmitting, receiving, compressing, decompressing and error

correcting, digital information for displaying text, graphics, audio and video.” (Id. at col 5., ll. 26-

34.) From there, the patent describes the “media unit” as comprised of a multimedia computer,

digitizer, and input/output means. (Id. at col. 15, ll. 61-66, Claim 5.) Taken together, the

specification and claim language contemplate that the “media unit” is “computer system capable of

receiving analog or digital real estate and real estate related information, and transmitting said real

estate and real estate related information.”

The Court now turns to the parties’ proposed limitations in their respective constructions. 

Defendants’ proposed construction imports three limitations into “media unit”: (1) requiring receipt

of “analog” property information; (2) requiring transmission of “digital” property information; and

(3) requiring that the transmission be “via modem to the server’s unit.” As to Defendants’ first

proposed limitation, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the media unit receives only “analog

property information.” To the contrary, the specification clearly contemplates that the “media unit”

is capable of receiving both analog and digital information. Similarly, the claim itself does not

contain any indication of such a limitation. The Court finds Defendants’ second and third proposed

limitations also to be problematic. Defendants’ second and third proposed limitations both attempt

to import limitations from the ’025 Patent’s embodiment. Because claims should not be limited to

the preferred embodiment, the Court also finds no basis to conclude that the transmissions from the

“media unit” are required to be either “digital” or “via modem to the server’s unit.” See Northern

Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also

Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1362 (stating “particular embodiments appearing in a specification will not be

read into the claims when the claim language is broader than such embodiments”). 

Plaintiffs’ proposed limitation limits the information associated with “media unit” to be “real

estate related information.” The Court finds this limitation to be appropriate because the claim itself

specifically teaches “[a] system of tracking real estate and real estate related demographic

information using a computer network system comprising . . . a media unit.” (Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex.

3 at col. 15, ll. 58-60) (emphasis added.) 

Thus, having considered the claim terms and the specification, the Court construes “media

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unit” as “computer system capable of receiving analog or digital real estate and real estate related

information, and transmitting said real estate and real estate related information.”

9. “digitizer” 

The parties dispute the construction of the term, “digitizer.” The term at issue appears in

Claim 5 of the ’025 Patent as follows:

5. A system of tracking real estate and real estate related

demographic information using a computer network system

comprising:

a media unit, said media unit having:

a multimedia computer;

a digitizer, said digitizer receiving information

from outside said network system and

within said multimedia computer;

i/o means, . . . .

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 15, ll. 57-66.) 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the term is “a device that converts information in analog

form to digital form.” Defendants’ proposed construction of the term is “hardware device for

converting analog audio, video, text, photograph and graphics to a digital format.” Thus, the parties

agree that the claimed “digitizer” functions to convert information from analog format to digital

format.” However, the parties disagree as to whether the claimed function should be limited to

converting only particular types of analog data into digital data.

Here, the Court finds that Defendants’ proposed construction is improper for two primary

reasons. First, by limiting the claimed function to “analog audio, video, text, photograph and

graphics,” the proposed construction improperly imports limitations from the specification. (Herbst

Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 7, ll. 39-45); See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Second, by restricting the

claim in such a manner, the proposed construction also improperly limits the claimed function to the

preferred embodiment. (See Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 7, ll. 39-45); See Northern Telecom Ltd.,

215 F.3d at 1292; see also Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1362.

For this reason, and after having considered the intrinsic evidence before the Court, the Court

construes “digitizer” as “a device that converts information in analog form to digital form.”

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10. “server’s unit” 

The parties dispute the construction of the term, “server’s unit.” The term at issue appears in

Claim 5 of the ’025 Patent as follows:

5. A system of tracking real estate and real estate related

demographic information using a computer network system

comprising:

. . . 

a server’s unit, said server’s unit having:

a computer, said computer having storage

capabilities; communication means, said

communication means enabling said

server to interact with remote terminals;

a plurality of databases, at least one of said

plurality of databases being an

automatically updated demographic

pattern database, said demographics

pattern database being updated

automatically by analyzing database

information requests, said database

information requests being a plurality of

inquiries from a plurality of individual

remote terminals, said remote terminal

inquiries being the retrieving and viewing

of text and/or graphic data from a

database;

demographic database updating means, said

updating means automatically updating

said demographics pattern database by

compiling and merging a plurality of end

user inquiries and storing said compiled

and merged inquiries in said demographics

pattern database.

(Herbst Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 at col. 15, ll. 67-col. 16., ll. 18.) 

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the term is “a server system providing storage

information.” Defendants’ proposed construction of the term is “a single unit that includes a

modem, computer and multimedia database.” In support of their respective constructions, the parties

primarily rely on the ’025 Patent specification. 

The Court finds that Defendants’ proposed construction is improper for the same two reasons

as its previously proposed construction. First, by limiting the claimed function to “modem,

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computer and multimedia database,” the proposed construction improperly imports limitations from

the specification. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Second, by restricting the claim in such a

manner, the proposed construction also improperly limits the claimed function to the preferred

embodiment. See Northern Telecom Ltd., 215 F.3d at 1292; see also Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1362. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ proposed construction is too narrow. However, Plaintiffs’ proposed

construction is too broad and is therefore similarly unacceptable. 

Having considered the claim terms, the specification, the relevant patent prosecution history,

and construction of earlier claim terms, the Court construes “server’s unit” as “a computer unit with

storage capabilities and communication means that also contains demographics databases.”

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court construes the disputed terms as follows: 

1. “said end user inquiries being the retrieving and viewing of test and/or graphic data 

from a database” as “said end user inquiries being requests for information that are passively

monitored.”

2. “demographics” as “characteristics of human populations and population segments, 

especially when used to identify consumer markets.” 

3. “compiling and merging a plurality of first end user inquiries” as “collecting and 

combining the results of first end user inquiries.”

4. “demographic information” as “characteristics of human populations and population 

segments, especially when used to identify consumer markets, that are created from a collection of

first end user inquiries that identify distinct trends.”

5. “media means for receiving analog and digitized data and transmitting digitized data” 

as “(i) receiving analog data that is digitized for entry into a PC; or (ii) receiving digitized data for

direct entry into a PC. Such resulting digitized data is later transmitted to the server’s computer

where it is designated a location and stored with other similar files on the database.”

6. “server” as “computer system that receives, stores, and provides data.” 

7. “file server means” as “computer system that receives, stores, and provides data. 

Said file server that stores data in the form of files and provides data responsive to user requests.”

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8. “media unit” as “computer system capable of receiving analog or digital real estate 

and real estate related information, and transmitting said real estate and real estate related

information.”

9. “digitizer” as “a device that converts information in analog form to digital form.”

10. “server’s unit” as “a computer unit with storage capabilities and communication 

means that also contains demographics databases.”

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 10, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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