Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00351/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00351-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUANITA TOVAR, IGNACIO CASE NO. 1:06-CV-00351 LJO GSA

SANDOVAL,

Plaintiff,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

vs. FOR ATTORNEY FEES

(Doc. 38)

CITY OF FRESNO, OFFICER STEVEN

WILLIAMS, individually and in his capacity

as an employee of the City of Fresno

Defendants.

__________________________________/

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants City of Fresno and Officer Steven Williams (collectively referred to as “defendants”)

filed a motion for attorneys fees pursuant to 42 Sec. 1988 (“section 1988”) on the grounds that plaintiffs’

federal claims are frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless. Defendants also seek fees under California

Code of Civil Procedure section 1038 (“section 1038”), on the groundsthat plaintiffslacked reasonable

cause to maintain their state law claims. This Court conducted a hearing on defendants’ motion on

November 2, 2007. Ms. Tovar and Mr. Sandoval (collectively “plaintiffs”) appeared by counsel Ali

Nehme, Tafoya & Associates. Defendants appeared by counsel Benjamin Ratliff, Weakley, Ratliff,

Arendt & McGuire, LLP. For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES defendants’ motion.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Summary

This case was filed after members of the City of Fresno Police Department (“police”) erroneously

served a search warrant at plaintiffs’ residence based on a belief that drug trafficking was occurring on

plaintiffs’ property. On June 16, 2004, a search warrant was prepared and was signed later that day by

Case 1:06-cv-00351-LJO-GSA Document 54 Filed 11/13/07 Page 1 of 7
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Judge Simpson, Fresno County Superior Court Judge.

At 7:30 that evening, approximately 7-10 members of the Major Narcotics Unit traveled to the

residence to execute the search warrant, including Sergeant Williams, who was in charge of the overall

execution of the search warrant. Ms. Tovar was instructed to exit the house and was escorted outside

by police officers. She was asked if she knew “Ortiz,” the suspected drug manufacturer. After two

detectives performed a protective sweep, and Mr. Sandoval was located in the bedroom, it was

determined that the plaintiffs were not involved in any criminal activity. When leaving, Sergeant

Williams referred Ms. Tovar to the City of Fresno’s risk management office in relation to the damaged

door and fence. 

 Based on the above, plaintiffs filed the instant action alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force

and unlawful search and seizure claims, as well as Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal

Protection Claims pursuant to 42 USC § 1983. The remaining causes of action were pursuant to state

law against Steven Williams for a violation of Civil Code § 51.7 (second), false arrest (third), assault

and battery (fourth) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (fifth). On August 3, 2007, Judge

O’Neill granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts. Defendants filed a motion for

award of defense costs in the amount of $29,023. In the alternative, defendants request an award in the

amount of $10,895.53 which is the amount they contend was spent after plaintiffs knew that the action

was frivolous. 

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims

1. Mr. Sandoval’s Claims

 Mr. Sandoval was in the bedroom when the search warrant was executed. He claimed that guns

were pointed at him and he was told to get on the floor. Officers eventually took Mr. Sandoval outside

of the residence but he did not allege that he suffered any physical pain as a result of the officer’s

conduct. 

In September 2006, Mr. Sandoval indicated that he did not want to be represented by current

counsel and that he wanted to dismiss his claims. After a series of hearings and motions, Judge O’Neill

determined that current counsel would proceed with the case and Mr. Sandoval’s claims would be

adjudicated on the merits. Because Mr. Sandoval filed no substantitve opposition to the motion for

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summary judgment, the court deemed the motion unopposed. 

2. Ms. Tovar’s Claim

Ms. Tovar’s federal claims were based on defendants violation of her constitutional rights.

Specifically, Ms. Tovar based her Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims on the fact

that defendants did not have probable cause to search the residence, and defendants did not execute the

warrant properly. With regard to the execution of the warrant, Ms. Tovar specifically alleged that: 1)

defendants did not knock and announce their presence prior to executing the warrant, 2) plaintiffs were

unreasonably detained during the execution of the warrant, 3) defendants did not display the search

warrant, and 4) the property damage that occurred during the warrant was unnecessary. Ms. Tovar also

argued that there was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment when officers escorted her

outside. She based her Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim on the same facts as the

Fourth Amendment claims. She argued a violation under the Equal Protection Clause because she

alleged she had been discriminated against and mistreated because she is Hispanic.

Ms. Tovar’s state claims were also based on the city’s failure to follow the appropriate protocol

regarding the execution of the search warrant. She argued violations of California Civil Code § 51.7

because police violated her right to be free from violence, or intimidation by threat of violence against

her person or property because of race, color, or national origin. She also argued false arrest and battery

because officers had their guns pointed when the search warrant was executed, she was not free to leave,

and she was pushed out of her home. Finally, the basis Ms. Tovar’s intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim was that she experienced severe stress as a result of the police mistreatment as evidenced

by the fact that she urinated on herself after she was escorted outside of the house by police.

C. Motion for Summary Judgment

On July 2, 2007, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 3, 2007, Judge

O’Neill granted the motion and made the following rulings:

1) Probable cause existed at the time the search warrant was executed. Plaintiffs

failed to provide any evidence that officers acted intentionally or recklessly in

procuring the search warrant.

2) Plaintiff failed to present evidence that the officers failed to knock and

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announce their presence when the search warrant was executed.

3) Officers executing a search warrant have the authority to detain the occupants of the

premises while a proper search is being conducted. In this case, the duration of the

detention of plaintiffs was not unreasonable.

4) Although there is a statutory requirement that an officer show a copy of a warrant to

the person from whom or from whose premises property is taken, neither the Fourth

Amendment nor Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the

executing officer serve the warrant on the owner prior to commencing the search.

5) Even if ultimately the police searched the wrong house, the search warrant was based

on probable cause and it particularly described the house that police believed to be the

residence of the suspect based on surveillance and their investigation into DMV

records.

6) The damage to plaintiffs’ door and fence was not unnecessarily destructive given the

circumstances of the search warrant.

7) The police officer’s conduct in escorting Ms. Tovar was objectively reasonable and did

not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

8) Plaintiff failed to provide evidence to support an official act of discrimination, any

direct evidence of intentional discrimination, any departure from normal procedures,

or that the procedures employed were based on her race.

9) Police officers have a right to detain a person while executing a search warrant. In this

case, plaintiff was not detained any longer than necessary and her false arrest claims

must fail.

10) The force applied in evacuating Ms. Tovar from the residence was legally permissible.

11) Although Ms. Tovar urinated on herself, the police were legally justified in removing

Ms. Tovar from the house and detaining her until the search was completed. There is

no evidence that the police officer’s conduct was so extreme as to exceed all bounds

of that usually tolerated in a civilized society sufficient to establish intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1988 Defense Costs Award

Section 1988(b) provides that in “any proceeding to enforce a provision” of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

“the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

costs.” The standard to award section 1988(b) attorney fees depends on which side prevails:

The authorization of an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 applies

differently to prevailing defendants than to prevailing plaintiffs. . . . [A] prevailing

defendant should not routinely be awarded attorney’s fees simply because he has

succeeded, but rather only where the action is found to be “unreasonable, frivolous,

meritless, or vexatious” . . . Thus, the mere fact that a defendant prevails does not

automatically support an award of fees.

Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402 (9 Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1000, 115 th

S.Ct. 510 (1994). The Ninth Circuit has further held that “[a]ttorneys’ fees in civil rights cases should

only be awarded to a defendant in exceptional circumstances.” Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048, 1055

(9 Cir. 1991) th ; Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9 Cir. 1990) th ; see also Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d

1428, 1434, n. 8 (9 Cir. 1989) th (defendants’ attorney’s fees request denied although summary judgment

for defendants).

A defendant mayrecover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff “only if the District Court finds ‘that

the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in

subjective bad faith.’ . . . The plaintiff’s action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless or

without foundation.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173 (quoting Christiansburg Garment

Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421,98 S.Ct. 694 (1978)). Furthermore, a defendant may recover attorney

fees if the plaintiff continued to litigate after a claim “clearly became” frivolous, unreasonable or

groundless. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15, 101 S.Ct. 173. Under section 1988(b), the prevailing party “should

ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.”

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964 (1968); Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983).

A case is frivolous when “the result is obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit.”

Vernon, 27 F. 3d 1385, 1402. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not itself a

sufficient justification for the assessment of fees. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,14, 101 S. Ct. 178(1980);

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quoting Christiansburg Garment Company v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). 

Defendants presented lengthy arguments in support of the motion wherein they argued that

plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous and meritless. Plaintiffs filed a response arguing that based on the

current state of the law with regard to the particularity requirement of search warrants and the

requirement to serve a search warrant, plaintiffs claims were not frivolous. 

Having read and reviewed the arguments and exhibits presented, the Court cannot conclude

that defendants are entitled to attorney fees. In this case, the plaintiff relied upon facts that were not

meritless to challenge the existence of probable cause and the validity of the search warrant including:

1) that Officer Lincoln and Officer Williams who were officers involved in the investigation, both

admitted in their depositions that they never met with the suspect at or near plaintiffs’ house, 2) that they

never saw the suspect enter the plaintiffs’ residence, 3) that no drug transactions occurred at the

residence and, 4) that Detective Lincoln indicated that the did not check the public utilities records which

would have indicated that plaintiffs had been living at the residence for 13 years. 

It was not frivolous or unreasonable for the plaintiffs to present those facts and arguments to

the court to challenge the existence of probable cause and the validity of the search warrant especially

in light of the fact that the police executed the search at the wrong house. Defendants’ arguments that

court should grant attorney fees once plaintiffs’ expert testified that no excessive force was used in

connection with the incident are unpersuasive since the excessive force claim is closely related to the

validity of the search warrant. Finally, the fact that the plaintiffs are elderly and Ms. Tovar urinated on

herself during the course of the search indicate that she did in fact suffer significant stress. In sum,

plaintiffs’ case was not groundless or without merit and the circumstances at hand render an attorney

fees award unjust. 

B. Section 1038 Defense Costs Award

 The defendants further seek an award of costs to defend plaintiffs’ state law claims. Section

1038(a) provides in pertinent part:

(a) In any civil proceeding under the California Tort Claims Act . . . , the

court, upon motion of the defendant . . . shall, at the time of the granting of any

summary judgment . . . determine whether or not the plaintiff . . . brought the

proceeding with reasonable cause and in the good faith belief that there was a

justifiable controversy under the facts and law which warranted the filing of the

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complaint . . . . If the court should determine that the proceeding was not brought in

good faith and with reasonable cause, an additional issue shall be decided as to the

defenses costs reasonably and necessarily incurred by the party or parties opposing

the proceeding, and the court shall render judgment in favor of that party in the

amount of all reasonable and necessary defense costs, in addition to those costs

normally awarded to the prevailing party.

Section 1038 applies to initiation of an action and “to steps to pursue it after it has been filed.” Knight

v. Capitola, 4 Cal.App.4th 918, 931, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 (1992). “To avoid an order to pay defense costs

under section 1038, a plaintiff must have filed and pursued the action in good faith and with reasonable

cause. . . . Thus a defendant who can meet the procedural criteria of section 1038 need only show either

that the plaintiff did not act in good faith or that the plaintiff lacked reasonable cause for the action.”

Knight, 4 Cal.App.,4th at 931-932, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d at 882 (Italics in original); Kobzoff v. Los Angeles

County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center, 19 Cal. 4 851, 855, 863-864, 80 Cal. Rptr 2d 803 (1998) th . “A

defendant may not recover section 1083 costs simply because it won a summary judgment or other

dispositive motion; victory does not per se indicate lack of reasonable cause. The victory is simply the

first step.” Kobzoff, at 19 Cal. App. at 856, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806. (citations omitted).

In this case, the police executed a search warrant at the wrong residence. Although the court

ultimately found that the search warrant was valid, the police made an error which may have been

avoided if police officers had taken additional steps to confirm the information related to their suspect

and the occupants ofthe residence. Based on the above analysis, the lawsuit was instituted in good faith

and with reasonable cause. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court DENIES defendants’ motions for attorneys fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1038.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 9, 2007 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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