Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00485/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00485-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD WEESE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-00485 JSW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Donald Weese’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Commissioner”). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5, the motions have been

submitted on the papers without oral argument. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record

and considered the parties’ papers and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the

Court hereby DENIES Weese’s Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Commissioner’s

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Weese brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c) to obtain judicial

review of a final decision of the Commissioner denying his request for Social Security benefits.

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Weese is a sixty-four year old man with a high school education who worked as a sheet

metal worker. (Administrative Transcript “Tr.” at 181, 214.) Although Weese claimed that he last

worked as a sheet metal worker in about March 1990, his treating physician, James Stone, M.D.,

noted in 1995 that Weese reported an attempt to return to work as a contractor briefly in September

1995. (Id. at 542.) Weese initially applied for Title II benefits in 1992, alleging disability since

March 7, 1990 because of nerve damage in his left arm. (Id. at 181-84, 210-12.)

Weese has undergone examinations by several medical professionals over a period of years. 

Among these professionals is Weese’s treating physician, Dr. Stone, a family practitioner and not an

orthopedist or neurologist, who prepared a physical capacities form in January 1993 recommending

limitations on Weese’s ability to stand, sit, and lift and carry weights. (Id. at 267, 543.) In July

1993, neurosurgeon Alan Hunstock, M.D., concluded that surgery would not improve Weese’s back

pain and also suggested limitations. (Id. at 534.) In July 1995, and then again in February 1996,

Kevin Satow, M.D., performed a consultative examination but found only minimal abnormalities

and proposed a functional capacity permitting higher limits in terms of lifting weight. (Id. at 365.) 

Also in February 1996, consultative examiner Andrew Burt, M.D., an orthopedist, performed an

evaluation and found multiple physical abnormalities. (Id. at 369, 373-74.)

Following denial of his claim at both the initial level and upon reconsideration in 1992,

Weese successfully requested a hearing, which occurred on September 8, 1993 before

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Homer Ball, Jr. (Id. at 539.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable

decision on July 29, 1994, finding that Weese had the residual functional capacity for medium work

not involving the use of his left arm. (Id. at 539.) The Appeals Council denied Weese’s request for

review of this decision because the ALJ’s decision was supported by the record and was in

accordance with the law and regulations. (Id. at 540.) Weese did not appeal this determination. (Id.

at 540.)

Weese filed the current application for a period of disability and disability benefits on April

11, 1995, alleging disability due to spinal stenosis since December 27, 1992. Subsequent to a denial

of his claim both initially and upon reconsideration, Weese successfully requested an ALJ hearing. 

(Id. at 294-97, 310-11, 322-23, 325.) ALJ Catherine Lazuran held a hearing on September 17, 1997

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and issued an unfavorable decision dated November 26, 1997. (Id. at 540.)

After the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ decision, Weese requested judicial

review. (Id. at 541.) The United States District Court for the Northern District of California

remanded the case for further proceedings, primarily because it found that the ALJ had failed to

address certain essential parts of Dr. Stone’s opinion and provide specific reasons for rejecting it. 

(Id.) The Court did find, however, that the ALJ was entitled to afford weight to Dr. Satow’s

opinion. (Id. at 554-55.) In making this finding, the Court also endorsed the ALJ’s use of the

testimony of Louis Lesko, M.D., the medical advisor and a nonexamining orthopedist, to support Dr.

Satow’s opinion. (Id. at 554.)

On April 9, 2002, ALJ Lazuran held a hearing on remand with Weese, his thenrepresentative Irene Lontz, and a vocational expert present. (Id. at 647-717.) The ALJ again found

Weese not disabled in a decision dated January 31, 2003. Dr. Stone had noted on December 14,

2001 that Weese was working full time in heating and air conditioning. (Id. at 543.) After the April

2002 hearing, in a letter dated November 14, 2002, the ALJ attempted to obtain additional evidence

from Irene Lontz and Dan McCaskell, Weese’s current representative, regarding an explanation

from Weese and Dr. Stone about this statement concerning when Weese was working. (Id. at 543,

640.) No further evidence was provided by either representative. (Id. at 543.) The ALJ’s decision

became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council declined Weese’s request for

review. (Id. at 521-23.)

On June 28, 2005, Weese commenced this action for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. 

Weese first argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s rejection of the treating

physician’s opinion. Weese also argues that the ALJ’s post-hearing contact with Lontz, Weese’s

prior representative, violated Social Security Administration procedure and Weese’s right to due

process. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not violate Weese’s due process rights or

agency procedures and that the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of

legal error.

///

///

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ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review of Commissioner’s Decision to Deny Social Security Benefits.

A federal district court may not disturb the final decision of the Commissioner unless it is

based on legal error or the fact findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g); Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). Considering the administrative

record as a whole, “[s]ubstantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s decision must

be upheld “where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id. at 1039-

1040. To determine whether substantial evidence exists, courts must look to the record as a whole,

considering both evidence that supports and undermines the ALJ’s findings. Desrosiers v. Sec’y of

Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). An ALJ’s decision must be upheld,

however, if the evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984).

B. Legal Standard for Establishing a Prima Facie Case for Disability.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for disability. Id. at 1452. The

disability assessment by the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine

whether a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. 

First, the claimant must not be working. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant’s

impairment must be “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, when the claimant has an impairment

that meets the duration required and is listed in Appendix 1 (a list of impairments presumed severe

enough to preclude work located in subpart P of part 404 of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920), or is equal to a

listed impairment, benefits are awarded without considering the claimant’s age, education, and work

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a

listed impairment, the Commissioner assesses all relevant medical and other evidence in the

claimant’s case record and makes findings to determine the residual functional capacity of the

claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The residual functional capacity assessment serves in the fourth

step to determine if the claimant can perform past work. Id. Payments are denied if the claimant

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can do past work. Id. If the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work, the

claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity are considered to see if

the claimant is capable of performing other work that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920(g). The claimant is not entitled to benefits if the claimant can adjust to other work. Id.

In Weese’s case, the ALJ determined that he was not disabled because (1) he does not have

any of the related clinical findings so as to meet or equal the level of severity of any of the listings in

Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4; (2) he has the residual functional capacity for light work;

and (3) based on the vocational expert testimony, Weese’s age, education, and residual functional

capacity, Weese is able to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the regional and

national economies. (Tr. at 546.)

C. The ALJ’s Determination that Weese Is Not Disabled Is Supported by Substantial

Evidence and Free of Legal Error.

Weese argues that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Stone’s opinion is not supported by substantial

evidence and that the ALJ erred by giving greater weight to Dr. Satow’s opinion. The

Commissioner argues that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for discrediting Dr.

Stone’s opinion and accepting Dr. Satow’s. The Commissioner also contends that the Court’s

finding in the prior proceedings, that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s reliance on Dr.

Satow’s opinion, bars Weese from re-arguing this issue under the “law of the case” doctrine. Weese

replies that the law of the case doctrine does not apply because (1) the first decision was clearly

erroneous, and (2) a manifest injustice would otherwise result. These two grounds render the

doctrine inapplicable. Mendenhall v. NTSB, 213 F.3d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States

v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997)).

An ALJ gives more weight to a treating physician’s opinion than to the opinion of a

nontreating physician because a treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040-41. 

Similarly, an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than does that of a nonexamining

physician. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1). The ALJ may reject, however, the controverted opinions of a

treating physician by providing specific, legitimate reasons that are based on substantial evidence. 

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Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). Such evidence includes

the length of the treatment relationship, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, and the

opinion’s supportability in objective medical evidence such as medical signs and laboratory

findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(3). Further, in considering such evidence, the opinion of a

specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty carries more weight than that of

a nonspecialist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5).

Here, the law of the case doctrine applies. The Court addressed the issue of the weight to

accord Dr. Satow’s opinion in contradicting that of Dr. Burt and Dr. Stone in the prior proceeding. 

(Tr. at 554-55.) Weese cites no support for his first argument that the prior decision of the Court

was clearly erroneous. What remains is Weese’s contention that manifest injustice results from

accepting the opinion of Dr. Satow, who is less experienced, over that of Dr. Stone. The specific

and legitimate reasons that the ALJ provided for discrediting Dr. Stone’s opinion, in light of the very

deferential substantial evidence standard afforded to the ALJ’s decision, reveal that manifest

injustice would not result from granting more weight to Dr. Satow’s opinion than Dr. Stone’s.

In particular, the ALJ offered three main reasons for discrediting Dr. Stone’s opinion

regarding “possible” neck osteoarthritis and right shoulder radiculopathy. First, the ALJ determined

that no objective medical evidence, in the form of MRIs or x-rays of the neck or right shoulder,

established these conditions or supported Dr. Stone’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3); (Tr. at

543.). The ALJ also found that Weese’s symptoms were not very severe because Dr. Stone had

referred to the above two possible diagnoses and indicated that “very simple conservative treatment

would be tried,” but failed to implement more serious measures like an MRI, EMG, or nerve

conduction studies. (Tr. at 543.) The ALJ further determined that Dr. Stone’s opinions did not rise

to the level of diagnoses given his failure to obtain objective tests to verify his speculations. (Id.)

Second, the lack of objective evidence made the ALJ attribute more weight to Dr. Lesko’s

testimony that Dr. Stone was simply reporting the patient’s allegations. (Id. at 544.) This lack of

objective evidence also bolstered the weight the ALJ already gave to Dr. Lesko’s opinion because he

is an orthopedist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5).

Third, the ALJ discredited Dr. Stone’s opinion regarding osteoarthritis and radiculopathy

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because he is neither an orthopedist nor a neurologist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5); (Tr. at 543.). Dr.

Satow, on the other hand, is a consultative orthopedic examiner and did not diagnose these two

conditions. (Tr. at 543.) Even though Dr. Satow’s report contained some errors, the ALJ was

entitled to give it more weight because Dr. Satow is a specialist in the field of Weese’s impairment. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5). In addition, because Weese “did not complain much to Dr. Satow

or others about his neck or right arm” and stated at the April 2002 hearing that his main problem was

spinal stenosis, the ALJ concluded that Weese’s claimed cervical osteoarthritis and right shoulder

impingement had not been severe conditions. (Tr. at 544.)

Therefore, the law of the case doctrine bars Weese from re-arguing the issue of the propriety

of the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Satow’s opinion. See Mendenhall, 213 F.3d at 469. This holding

disposes of Weese’s arguments that Dr. Satow’s examination was cursory in nature and failed

correctly to capture Weese’s conditions. Furthermore, the legitimate reasons for discrediting Dr.

Stone’s opinion, which the ALJ articulated in her decision, show that manifest injustice would not

result from accepting Dr. Satow’s and Dr. Lesko’s opinion over that of Dr. Stone in determining that

Weese is not disabled. That is, the ALJ’s acceptance of Dr. Satow’s opinion and discrediting of Dr.

Stone’s contradicting opinion constitute substantial evidence for the determination that Weese is not

entitled to social security benefits. The evidence regarding Weese’s work activity and the

vocational expert’s testimony further strengthen this conclusion. (Tr. at 545.)

Weese correctly notes that one of Dr. Stone’s reports refers to Weese bringing in “records of

an IME” with Drs. Burt and Miller. (Id. at 618.) Weese also emphasizes that both Dr. Burt’s and

Dr. Miller’s opinions conclude that Weese has limitations and physical abnormalities. (Id. at 373-

74, 501.) The Court in the first proceeding, however, found that it was proper for the ALJ to

consider the difference between Dr. Satow’s opinion and Dr. Burt’s opinion as a different reading of

the MRI, or a difference of opinion. (Id. at 554-55.) Weese offers a different explanation by

arguing that these differences of opinion reveal errors in the alleged cursory nature of Dr. Satow’s

examination. But even if the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the

Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. Thus, substantial

evidence supports ALJ Lazuran’s decision denying Weese social security benefits.

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D. The ALJ’s Post-Hearing Contact with Lontz Did Not Violate Weese’s Due Process

Rights or Social Security Administration Procedure.

Weese argues that the ALJ violated his due process rights by contacting and eliciting

detrimental information from Lontz ex parte, and then relying on this information, to determine that

Weese is working and that his claims to the contrary are not credible. Weese also argues that the

proper procedure was to admit the evidence only after having given him and his current

representative an opportunity to respond. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision

indicates that she learned about Weese’s work activity from Dr. Stone’s notes, which were

submitted while the record was still open, and that Lontz did not provide any post-hearing evidence

upon which the ALJ could rely.

Most courts hold that when an ALJ chooses to go outside the testimony adduced at the

hearing in making a determination on a social security claim, “the ALJ must afford the claimant not

only an opportunity to comment and present evidence but also an opportunity to cross-examine the

authors of any post-hearing reports.” Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1989); accord

Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1984) (denial of due process rights by use of posthearing vocational report without opportunity to cross-examine or present rebuttal evidence); Allison

v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1983) (ALJ’s use of post-hearing medical report to deny

claimant benefits exceeded statutory authority and violated due process). The ALJ’s error in

eliciting detrimental post-hearing information is harmless, however, where the ALJ “did not need to,

and did not in fact rely” on such an ex parte report. Rice v. Chater, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 26732,

at *25 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1996).

Similarly, Social Security Administration procedures, contained in the Hearings, Appeals

and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”), require the ALJ to proffer all post-hearing evidence

unless (1) the claimant or the claimant’s representative submitted the evidence and there is no other

claimant to the hearing; (2) the claimant has knowingly waived his or her right to examine the

evidence; or (3) the ALJ proposes to issue a fully favorable decision. HALLEX I-2-7-30.

In this case, Lontz did not provide any ex parte or post-hearing information. The ALJ

specifically stated so in her decision. (Tr. at 543.) The Commissioner correctly notes that all of the

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conversations referenced in the ALJ’s letter to Lontz occurred during Lontz’s representation of

Weese. (Id. at 638-640.) Moreover, the ALJ relied instead on Dr. Stone’s notes of December 14,

2001, which state that Weese “is back working full time in heating and air conditioning.” (Id. at

543, 608.) The ALJ thus learned of Weese’s work activity through Dr. Stone’s own notes, which

were in the record during the hearing. (Id. at 543.) Weese’s contention that the ALJ relied on ex

parte evidence to determine that Weese’s claims are not credible also lacks merit because the ALJ

initially gave Weese the benefit of the doubt regarding his work activity, in light of the unclear

record. (Id. at 543.) Thus, the ALJ did not receive any post-hearing evidence she was required to

proffer, and did not violate Weese’s due process rights.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Weese’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and GRANTS Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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