Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01229/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01229-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH JEROME PACKNETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

FERNAND ALVAREZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01229-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

The following background is taken from the Court’s July 10, 2015 Order:

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the R. J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”), has filed a pro se civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that Defendants 

violated his constitutional rights while he was housed at San 

Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”) from November through December 

2012. Plaintiff, who claims he suffers from mobility impairment 

and severe back disorder, alleges numerous claims stemming from 

his November 2012 sub-facility transfer from H-Unit Facility B to 

South Block without any classification committee hearing prior to 

the transfer. The alleged constitutional violations at SQSP ended on 

December 26, 2012, which is the date that Plaintiff was transferred 

from SQSP to RJDCF, with layovers at the California Training 

Facility and the California Institution for Men (“CIM”). Plaintiff 

seeks monetary and punitive damages as well as declaratory relief.

Dkt. 5 at 1. In his complaint, Plaintiff named the following Defendants at SQSP: Doctors Fernand 

Alvarez and Alison Pachynski; Correctional Counselors B. Martin and F. Gray; Acting Facility 

Captain V. Wiggins; Classification Staff Representative B. Powell; Appeals Coordinators S. Hays 

and M. L. Davis. 

The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and recognized claims for deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs, retaliation, due process, and various state law violations. See id. at 3-10. 

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim against Defendants Alvarez, 

Pachynski, Martin, Wiggins, Gray, and Powell with prejudice. Id. at 11. However, the Court 

granted Plaintiff leave to file an amendment to the complaint for the limited purpose of bringing a 

disability discrimination claim against SQSP and the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), which he filed on October 1, 2015. Dkt. 21.

Case 4:15-cv-01229-YGR Document 60 Filed 11/23/16 Page 1 of 6
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On October 1, 2015, Plaintiff filed his amendment to the complaint. Dkt. 21.

On October 22, 2015, Defendants filed a Request to Strike Plaintiff’s Amendment to the 

Complaint or, Alternatively, Request for Screening Order. Dkt. 22. 

On April 20, 2016, the Court denied Defendants’ request to strike and granted their request 

for a screening order, and dismissed Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims without further 

leave to amend. Dkt. 33.

On May 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal

of the disability discrimination claims. Dkt. 37. The Court will construe his request as a motion 

for leave to file a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 7-9(a).1 See Civil L.R. 7-9(a). 

Defendants have filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, and Plaintiff has filed a reply. Dkts. 38, 

58.

For the reasons outlined below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of his disability discrimination claims.

DISCUSSION

In the Northern District of California, Local Rule 7-9 allows for the filing of motions for 

reconsideration only with respect to interlocutory orders made in a case prior to the entry of final 

judgment. Civil L.R. 7-9(a). No pre-judgment motion for reconsideration under Local Rule 7-9 

may be brought without leave of court. Id. The moving party must specifically show: (1) that at 

the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was 

presented to the court before entry of the interlocutory order for which the reconsideration is 

sought, and that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did 

not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; (2) the emergence of new material 

facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order; or (3) a manifest failure by the 

 

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Plaintiff has also requested “a thirty day continuance, [or] fourteen days since time is of 

the essence to complete this brief.” Dkt. 37 at 4. However, Plaintiff’s request is conclusory, and it 

is not supported with any reasons as to why a continuance is necessary. Moreover, Plaintiff has 

since requested to file an untimely reply to Defendants’ opposition to his motion for 

reconsideration, and such a request was granted. Dkt. 57 at 2. Plaintiff’s reply (dkt. 58) has been 

considered by the Court in its analysis of the motion at issue. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for a 

continuance is DENIED as moot. Dkt. 37.

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court to consider material facts which were presented to the court before such interlocutory order. 

Civil L.R. 7-9(b). Unless otherwise ordered by the court, no response need be filed to a motion 

under the Local Rule. Civil L.R. 7-9(c). 

In the instant motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff has not shown 

that a material difference in fact or law exists, or that there has been an emergence of new facts or 

a change in the law. Though not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to argue that there was a failure 

by the Court to consider material facts. He argues that he has been excluded from a certain

program called the “Patton College Program [which is] an accredited program that accepts college 

credit for inmates seeking their AA degree.” Dkt. 58 at 2. However, the Court has reviewed 

Plaintiff’s amended claim and finds that his allegations do not correct the pleading deficiencies of 

his disability discrimination claims, as explained below.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.§ 12101 et seq., 

and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended and codified in 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), 

prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in the programs, services or activities of a public 

entity. The elements of a cause of action under Title II of the ADA are: (1) that the plaintiff is a 

qualified individual with a disability; (2) that the plaintiff was either excluded from participation 

in or denied the benefits of a service, program, or activity of a public entity, or was otherwise 

discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 

discrimination was by reason of disability. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th 

2001); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A cause of action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 

essentially parallels an ADA cause of action. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2182 

(1999); Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135.

In its July 10, 2015 Order, the Court stated as follows:

. . . Plaintiff claims that he suffers from a mobility 

impairment and severe back disorder, and he claims that he is 

identified as a “handicapped person as set forth in the Armstrong

Remedial Plan.”

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 Dkt. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that the 

 

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Armstrong v. Brown, Case No. C 94-2307 CW (“Armstrong”), is a class action in this 

district concerning disability accommodations for prisoners and parolees in the CDCR. The 

Armstrong court-ordered Remedial Plan as amended January 3, 2001 (“Armstrong Remedial 

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aforementioned Defendants at SQSP discriminated against his 

disability by denying him “an individual determination under the 

Armstrong Remedial Plan in [the] H-Unit of Facility B, which 

required housing placement in an institution best suited to 

accommodate his medical needs.” Id. Plaintiff adds that he is 

“otherwise qualified and prison officials[’] action excluded him 

from participation in an H-Unit, Facility B Unit Classification 

Committee Hearing (“UCC”), prior to an improper sub-facility 

transfer and retaliatory prison to prison transfer.” Id. He also 

alleges that Defendants Alvarez, Pachynski, Martin, Wiggins, Gray 

and Powell discriminated against his disability by exposing him to 

“an Extended Travel by State Transportation Bus” during which he 

was “injured” due to his “significant back disorder.” Id. at 57.

Dkt. 5 at 4 (footnote in original). Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims were initially

dismissed on the grounds that he did not allege the remaining two elements of a cognizable ADA 

claim, specifically that he has been excluded from participating in a prison program or service, and 

such exclusion is by reason of his disability. Id. at 6. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, which the Court screened 

in its April 20, 2016 Order. See Dkt. 33. The Court noted that in his amendment to the complaint, 

Plaintiff “filed his amended disability discrimination claim against SQSP and the CDCR.” Id. at 5 

(citing Dkt. 21 at 4-5). The Court further explained that Plaintiff stated as follows:

16. On October 17, 2011, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a 

“Mobility Impairment,” Chronic Lower Extremity Weakness . . . 

ambulatory with a cane. On June 3, 2011, Plaintiff was diagnosed 

with “Severe Canal Stenosis, Severe Bilateral Disk Disease with 

Foraminal narrowing with Nerve Root Impingement.[”] Including 

Degenerative changes at multiple levels of Lumbar Spine. Exhibit 

B, Attachment VIII. Medical Chrono’s indicated no prolonged 

sitting, no stooping or bending over, identifying Plaintiff as 

“Mobility Impaired.” (walking is a major life activity). Plaintiff 

was qualified to participate in every program or service held in HUnit, including “Classification Hearing.[”]

17. Plaintiff was arbitrarily excluded from participating in HUnit Classification Committee Hearing by a non-treating physician 

from outside of H[-]Unit who increased disability level without 

Notice, Warning or consult with one of the Plaintiff’s primary care 

physicians. Every part of H-Unit was accessible to individuals with 

disabilities, and upon information and belief [SQSP] and [the 

CRCD] both receive federal funding. At that time, Plaintiff was 

housed in H-Unit, Facility B, a general population low security unit 

 

Plan”) requires the CDCR “to ensure that prisoners and parolees with disabilities are accessibly 

housed, that they are able to obtain and keep necessary assistive devices, and that they receive 

effective communication regarding accommodations.” Armstrong v. Brown, Case No. 94-2307 

CW, ECF No. 1974 (order filed January 13, 2012).

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at SQSP. Plaintiff’s medical needs are complex and involved three 

(3) treating physicians, one primary care physician and two 

specialist[s]; Dr. Clarene David, M.D. (P&S); Dr. Denise Ricker, 

M.D.[,] Nephrologist; and Dr. John Panagotacos, M.D., Neurologist.

Id. The Court determined that Plaintiff “seem[ed] to raise the same conclusory allegations that he 

made in his original complaint, including that he was discriminated against because of his 

disability.” Id. at 6. In addition to the aforementioned allegations, the Court further noted that 

Plaintiff also stated as follows:

Plaintiff is an individual diagnosed with a severe mobility 

impairment along with a degenerative back disorder; but was 

otherwise qualified to [be a] participant in H-Unit Program & 

Classification Hearing. Plaintiff was excluded and denied the 

benefits of San Quentin H-Unit services, activities, and 

Classification Hearing. Such exclusion was based on an increase in 

mobility impairment level, (allegedly because he could not do stairs) 

which was by reason of his disability. Plaintiff was treated 

differently than all other non-disabled prisoner housed in H-Unit.

Id. (citing Dkt. 21 at 7). However, the Court found that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations in his 

amendment to his complaint “d[id] not describe the ‘H-Unit services [and] activities’ that he was 

allegedly denied and fail[ed] to explain whether he was denied similar services and activities after 

his transfer to South Block at SQSP.” Id. at 7 (citing Dkt. 21 at 7, 10-11). Therefore, the Court 

dismissed the disability discrimination claims upon determining that “while Plaintiff name[d] the 

proper Defendants, he ha[d] failed to state a cognizable disability discrimination claim against

SQSP and the CDCR.” Id.

In the present motion, Plaintiff now attempts to indicate that he was denied the right to 

participate in the “Patton College Program.” Dkt. 58 at 2. However, it seems that Plaintiff was 

not denied such a right but was merely transferred further from the program, i.e., to “South 

Block,” which is “located on the upper yard,” while “Patton College was on the lower yards.” Id. 

Plaintiff complains that he was then “exposed . . . to having [to] navigate those lower yard-upper 

yard stairs at a minimum of 4 to 6 times a day.” Id. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed 

to show that he was excluded from the “Patton College Program.” Even if Plaintiff could 

successfully show that he was excluded from participating in such a program, he still fails to show 

that such exclusion was by reason of his disability. Lastly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

allegations in the present motion are conclusory and do not otherwise require reconsideration. 

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In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations in his motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

fail to show that there was “manifest failure by the court to consider material facts which were 

presented to the court.” See Civil L.R. 7-9(b).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established grounds for reconsideration, and his motion for 

leave to file a motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Dkt. 37.

This Order terminates Docket No. 37.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

November 23, 2016

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