Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00224/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00224-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Pursuant to an Order referring this matter to this Court for a determination of 

whether equitable tolling applies, and, if so, for a recommendation on the merits (Doc. 

37), the Court submits this Report and Recommendation. 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner’s counsel relied upon a deadline calculation provided by a non-lawyer 

contractor. The calculation was wrong. The contractor and counsel failed to appreciate 

what counsel agrees was a “relatively simple statutory framework in calculation of the 

deadline.” (Doc. 47 at 15.) The hidden illness of a contractor does not alter the fact that 

Petitioner, through his agent, miscalculated the date. Because the law is well-established 

that miscalculations of a deadline do not warrant equitable tolling, the Court recommends 

that no equitable tolling be applied in this case. 

Michael Eugene Traverso, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-13-0224-PHX-DLR (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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II. APPLICABLE LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

 A. EQUITABLE TOLLING 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1–year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 

2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015). 

“Under [Ninth Circuit] cases, equitable tolling is available . . . only when extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time 

and the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of [the prisoner’s] untimeliness.” 

Curiel v. Miller, 780 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 

556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases,” and 

“the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(internal quotations omitted). 

 “Courts take a flexible, fact-specific approach to equitable tolling.” Gibbs v. 

Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2014). The grounds for granting equitable or 

statutory tolling are “highly fact-dependent.” Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1147 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable 

tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

 1. Miscalculation of Time Limits 

 It is well settled, and undisputed by the parties, that negligence in calculating 

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filing dates is insufficient to merit equitable tolling. (Doc. 47 at 5, 9.) “Holland held that 

‘garden variety claim[s] of excusable neglect’—such as ‘simple miscalculation’ of time 

limits—do not constitute an extraordinary circumstance.” Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 885. The 

Court in Gibbs noted Justice Alito’s logic was instructive on this point. “[T]he principal 

rationale for disallowing equitable tolling based on ordinary attorney miscalculation is 

that the error of an attorney is constructively attributable to the client and thus is not a 

circumstance beyond the litigant’s control.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, mere negligence 

or professional malpractice1

 is insufficient to justify tolling. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 

1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We conclude that the miscalculation of the limitations 

period by Frye’s counsel and his negligence in general do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.”). Instead, an attorney must have 

committed “egregious misconduct” for equitable tolling to apply. Shannon v. Newland, 

410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 2. Attorney Misconduct 

 Ordinarily, a federal habeas petitioner is “bound by his attorney’s negligence, 

because the attorney and the client have an agency relationship under which the principal 

is bound by the acts of the agent.” Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 2012). 

However, an attorney’s “virtual abandonment” of a client may constitute an extraordinary 

circumstance because “under agency principles, a client cannot be charged with the acts 

or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him.” Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 

923 (2012).2

 

 

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 “Although an attorney’s behavior can establish the extraordinary circumstances required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice is insufficient.” Hunter v. Galaza, 366 Fed.Appx. 766, 767, 2010 WL 582674, 1 (9th Cir. 

2010) (unpublished). 

2

 Examples of attorney abandonment, not applicable here, include an attorney’s refusal to file a petition at the client’s request, Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th 

Cir.2003), and an attorney’s “near-total failure to communicate with petitioner or to respond to petitioner’s many inquiries and requests over a period of several years,” Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2568 (Alito, J., concurring). 

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III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner argues that equitable tolling should apply in this case because his 

counsel engaged in “egregious misconduct” by failing “to realize the mental and physical 

circumstances and background of [the third-party contractor] through the time period [the 

contractor] was working on” Petitioner’s petition. (Doc. 47 at 5.) For the reasons below, 

the Court rejects this argument. 

 A. Reliance on a Third Party 

 The fact that an attorney relied on a third party’s calculation of a deadline is not an 

extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling. When a petitioner relies upon an 

agent to assist with the calculation of a deadline, the petitioner is responsible whether that 

agent is an attorney or a third party. It makes no difference, therefore, that Petitioner’s 

agent relied upon someone else to calculate a deadline. Ultimately, Petitioner—perhaps 

with the advice of counsel or others—bore the responsibility of calculating the deadline. 

To hold otherwise would produce an incongruous result: a petitioner’s or attorney’s 

miscalculation would not yield equitable tolling, yet reliance on a third-party 

miscalculation would yield equitable tolling. Such a position is untenable. 

 Here, the miscalculation of the filing deadline is negligence that does not justify 

equitable tolling. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007) (“Attorney 

miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the 

post-conviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel.”); United 

States v. Aguirre–Ganceda, 592 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Extraordinary 

circumstances do not include a lawyer’s miscalculation of a limitation period.”). 

 B. Reason for Miscalculation 

 Petitioner’s reason for the legal miscalculation of the deadline is not an 

extraordinary circumstance. A petitioner or agent’s education, reliance on a paralegal, or 

reliance on a third party is insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of equitable tolling because 

petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the limitations period was not an extraordinary 

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circumstance); Harris v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 628 F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming 

denial of equitable tolling where “paralegal made a clerical error and skipped a month 

when counting days and marking the calendar” even though petitioner asserted she 

“regularly checked with her lawyer” and requested the staff diligently post several 

reminders before the deadline). 

 C. Health of C.S. 

 Illness by a petitioner may be cause for equitable tolling. A mental impairment 

amounts to an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling if the 

impairment (1) was “so severe that the petitioner was unable personally . . . to understand 

the need to timely file . . . a habeas petition,” and (2) “made it impossible under the 

totality of the circumstances to meet the filing deadline despite petitioner’s diligence.”

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Petitioner does not argue that 

he was impaired. Moreover, counsel was not impaired.3

 Instead, counsel relied on a third 

party who was impaired. 

 The Court finds that the illness of C.S. is insufficient to justify equitable tolling. 

The sole cause of the miscalculation was counsel’s unfortunate failure to properly 

calculate a deadline. Counsel concedes that C.S. “missed what would be a relatively 

simple statutory framework in calculation of the deadline to a normal habeas attorney.” 

(Doc. 47 at 15.) Counsel explains the reason for the miscalculation, along with C.S.’s 

incapacity, was that (1) “the file provided by (Petitioner) did not contain a copy” of an 

order denying review, and (2) “the contractor” was “unaware of the Hemmerle4

 decision” 

 

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 Respondent cites to Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003), in 

which the Seventh Circuit Court stated that “attorney incapacity is equivalent to attorney negligence for equitable tolling purposes” and “no principled distinction exists between 

incapacity and negligence for equitable tolling purposes.” (Doc. 29 at 19.) The Court 

does not adopt this absolute position because it is possible that an attorney’s incapacity could result in abandonment. See Cantrell v. Knoxville Cmty. Dev. Corp., 60 F.3d 1177, 

1180 (6th Cir. 1995) (“If Cantrell pursued his claim diligently, yet was abandoned by his attorney due to his attorney’s mental illness, equitable tolling may be appropriate.”). Importantly, however, the Court does not find that Petitioner was abandoned by his counsel due to mental impairment. 

4 Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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and “incorrectly docketed February 6, 2012” as a dispositive date. (Doc. 20 at 10.) The 

appellate orders in this case were publicly available. Counsel (and to a lesser extent, nonlawyer C.S.) should have been aware of Hemmerle, which was well-established law long 

before this habeas case began. 

 Counsel had almost nine months to review the file and correctly calculate the 

deadline. The fact that counsel relied on a third party to assist with the calculation is not 

an extraordinary circumstance. 

 D. Abandonment/Egregious Behavior 

 Although abandonment or egregious behavior can warrant equitable tolling, 

counsel’s conduct does not satisfy those standards. Petitioner was not abandoned by his 

attorney. In Maples, the Court explained that while agency law binds clients, including 

federal habeas petitioners, to their attorneys’ negligence, “a client cannot be charged with 

the acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him.” Id. at 924. Courts are 

charged with adopting a “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon decisions made in other 

similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1096–97. A review of cases cited by 

Petitioner demonstrates that he was not abandoned by his attorney. 

 In Holland, the Supreme Court held that an attorney’s conduct could amount to 

“egregious behavior” where the attorney (1) failed to file a federal habeas petition despite 

his client’s request to do so, (2) failed to advise the client about the fact that the Florida 

Supreme Court had decided his case, and (3) failed to communicate with his client over a 

period of years despite pleas from petitioner. Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2563. Here, counsel 

laudably communicated with Petitioner during the representation, counsel “diligently and 

regularly communicated with C.S. on the status of the petition,” and counsel required 

written correspondence from C.S. regarding the deadline calculation. (Doc. 47 at 14.) 

 There is no allegation that counsel failed to communicate with Petitioner or failed 

to respond to Petitioner’s inquiries with respect to preparation of the Petition. In fact, 

Petitioner’s counsel professionally and consistently communicated with Petitioner. Nor 

can it be said that Petitioner was left without functioning counsel, as occurred in Maples. 

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Instead, Petitioner argues that the contractor failed to properly calculate the filing 

deadline. This is nothing more than ordinary negligence, not abandonment. 

 The Court has considered the cases cited by Petitioner, but finds that the facts of 

those cases are distinguishable. See Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1013–1015 (9th Cir. 

2011) (finding extraordinary circumstances where attorney failed to file a timely petition 

despite numerous promises to the contrary; petitioner’s three-and-a-half-year delay in 

eventually filing a pro se petition attributable to having been deceived, bullied and lulled 

by apparently inept and unethical lawyer); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 

2003) (allowing equitable tolling where petitioner’s counsel was hired almost a year in 

advance, failed to do anything to prepare the petition or to respond to numerous letters 

and phone calls, and withheld petitioner’s file for over two months after the limitations 

period expired); Gibbs (finding equitable tolling where counsel failed, despite the 

petitioner’s repeated inquiries, to inform that the state court had denied the appeal state 

post-conviction petition). Petitioner points to no comparable abandonment by counsel. 

 Here, Petitioner knew his state court appeals had concluded. Petitioner hired 

counsel to assist with his habeas petition. Counsel communicated with Petitioner, 

consulted with C.S., reviewed correspondence provided by C.S., and otherwise diligently 

handled this matter. The sole, unfortunate error was the calculation of the deadline. A 

simple miscalculation does not warrant equitable tolling. 

 E. Evidentiary Hearing 

The Court accepts the parties’ Stipulation “that there is no need for an evidentiary 

hearing and that the facts necessary for a determination of the legal issues can be 

determined from the pleadings and supporting affidavits presented to the Court.” (Doc. 

45.) The Court agrees that the record is sufficiently developed for the Court to determine 

whether equitable tolling should apply in this case. See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 

768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding “a district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary 

hearings to further develop the factual record” when the record is “amply developed”). 

 

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CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that equitable tolling is not merited in 

this case. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied as untimely. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

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findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of June, 2015. 

 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

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