Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35957/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35957-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MADELINE CARDENAS; ROLANDO

MORA-HUERTA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General; RAND BEERS, in his

official capacity as Secretary of

Homeland Security; JOHN F.

KERRY, United States Secretary

of State; IAN BROWNLEE, Consul

General of The United States,

City of Ciudad Juarez; JOHN

DOES, 1–7, Consular Officers,

American Consulate General

Visa Section at Ciudad Juarez,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-35957

D.C. No.

1:12-cv-00346-EJL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 5, 2016

Portland, Oregon

Filed June 21, 2016

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2 CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Andrew D. Hurwitz,

Circuit Judges and Anthony J. Battaglia,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal for

failure to state a claim of United States citizen Madeline

Cardenas’ complaint challenging the denial by the U.S.

consulate in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, of her husband’s visa

application.

The panel held that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in

Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), is the controlling

opinion regarding the standard of judicial review applicable

to a visa denial. The panel held that the consular officer in

this case satisfied the “facially legitimate and bona fide

reason” test, because he cited a valid statute of inadmissibility

and gave a bona fide factual reason that provided a “facial

connection” to the ground of inadmissibility: the belief that

Cardenas’ husband was a gang associate with ties to the

Sureno gang.

* The Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by

designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES 3

COUNSEL

Maria Elena Andrade, (argued) and Benjamin Stein, Andrade

Legal, Boise, Idaho; Robert Pauw (argued), Gibbs Houston

Pauw, Seattle Washington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Katherine E.M. Goettel, (argued) and StaceyI. Young, Senior

Litigation Counsel; Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; William C.

Peachey, Director; United States Department of Justice,

Office of Immigration Litigation, Chicago, Illinois, for

Defendants-Appellees.

Robert Pauw, Gibbs Houston Pauw, Seattle Washington;

Charles Roth, Director of Litigation, National Immigrant

Justice Center, Chicago, Illinois; Hiroshi Motomura, Los

Angeles, California; for Amicus Curiae Law School

Professors.

Deborah S. Smith, Immigration Clinic Director, Universityof

Idaho College of Law, Moscow, Idaho, for Amicus Curiae

American Immigration Lawyers Association.

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4 CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

A consular officer denied the visa application of Rolando

Mora-Huerta, a Mexican national, on the ground that he was

a “gang associate” who intended to enter the United States

to engage in unlawful conduct. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii). This suit, by Mora’s wife, Madeline

Cardenas, a United States citizen, attacks the consular

officer’s decision. The district court dismissed Cardenas’

complaint for failure to state a claim.

The critical issue on appeal is the standard of judicial

review applicable to the visa denial. In Kleindienst v.

Mandel, the Supreme Court explained that judicial review of

a denial that implicates a constitutional right is limited to

ensuring that the decision was supported by a “facially

legitimate and bona fide reason.” 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 

But, because that standard “is used relatively infrequently,”

its precise meaning has long been “elusive.” Marczak v.

Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 517 (10th Cir. 1992). The Supreme

Court again addressed the issue in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct.

2128 (2015), but was unable to agree on a single rationale for

denying relief. We hold today that, under Marks v. United

States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), and our recent en banc

decision in United States v. Davis, No. 13-30133 (9th Cir.

June 13, 2016), Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Din is the

controlling opinion. Applying that opinion, we affirm the

district court’s dismissal of Cardenas’ complaint.

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CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES 5

I. Background1

In June 2008, Mora, who had no lawful status allowing

his presence in this country, was routed into removal

proceedings after a traffic stop. U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE ”) created a Form I-213 “Record

of Inadmissible Alien” that states, “MORA was identified as

a Sureno gang associate . . . by Nampa Police Department”

and that “MORA was a passenger in a vehicle owned and

driven by a [REDACTED] who had identifiers consistent to

being a member of the Sureno gang.”

Mora voluntarily departed to Mexico, and Cardenas filed

an immediate-relative petition on his behalf.2 TheCitizenship

and Immigration Service approved the petition and Mora

applied for a visa. On March 5, 2010, he was interviewed by

a consular officer in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, who asked him

whether he was in a criminal gang; Mora denied gang

membership.

Several months later, the consulate denied Mora’s visa

application, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), which makes

inadmissible “[a]ny alien who a consular officer or the

1 Because this is an appeal from an order dismissing the first amended

complaint for failure to state a claim, we take its well-pleaded allegations

as true. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007).

2 An immediate-relative petition allows a child, spouse, or parent of a

U.S. citizen to become eligible to enter the United States as a lawful

permanent resident, Robinson v. Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir.

2009), without waiting the “years—or even decades” that other visa

applicants do, Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2199

(2014).

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6 CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES

AttorneyGeneral knows, or has reasonable ground to believe,

seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally,

or incidentally in . . . any other unlawful activity.”3 An

official with the Ciudad Juárez consulate later clarified the

basis for this decision in an email to Mora’s prior counsel:

At the time of Mr. Mora’s June 16, 2008

arrest, Mr. Mora was identified as a gang

associate by law enforcement. The

circumstances of Mr. Mora’s arrest, as well

as information gleaned during the consular

interview, gave the consular officer sufficient

“reason to believe” that Mr. Mora has ties to

an organized street gang.

In September 2010, Mora submitted evidence to the

consulate in support of his continued denial of gang

association. On February 8, 2012, the consulate stated that,

after “careful review” of the additional evidence, it would not

overturn the inadmissibility determination. Mora asked the

State Department to issue an Advisory Opinion overturning

the consular officer’s decision; the Department declined.

Cardenas and Mora (collectively, “Cardenas”) then filed

this suit challenging the § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) inadmissibility

determination. The parties stipulated to an extension of time

3 Mora’s visa application was also denied under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), which renders inadmissible for 10 years any alien

unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more. Plaintiffs do

not challenge that ground, which can be waived. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). The government also initially denied Mora’s visa

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), which makes inadmissible any alien

ordered removed under certain provisions of law, but later withdrew that

ground for denial because Mora had voluntarily departed.

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CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES 7

to answer the complaint to allow a second consular interview

and presentation of additional evidence. At the second

interview, Mora attempted to present an expert opinion

stating that he has never been a member of a gang, along with

a letter stating that he was accepted into a tattoo removal

program, but consular officers refused to accept or review

these documents. The consulate again denied Mora’s visa

application under § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii).

Cardenas then moved to compel the government to

answer the complaint and attached as exhibits to her motion

the documents the consular officers had refused to accept and

an affidavit from Mora describing the interview. The

government simultaneously moved to dismiss the complaint. 

Cardenas sought leave to file a first amended complaint,

adding defendants and describing the second interview and

denial.

The district court granted the motion to amend, construed

the motion to dismiss the original complaint as a motion to

dismiss the first amended complaint, and granted the motion. 

Citing Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir.

2008), the court held that Cardenas had a protected liberty

interest in marriage entitling her to seek review of the denial

of Mora’s visa application. But, the court found the consular

officer’s determination “facially legitimate and bona fide”

because he had reason to believe that Mora had “ties” to a

gang.

Cardenas timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a dismissal for failure to state

a claim de novo. Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186,

1187 (9th Cir. 2003).

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8 CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES

II. Discussion

A. The Doctrine of Consular Non-Reviewability

The Supreme Court has “long recognized the power to

expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute

exercised by the Government’s political departments largely

immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,

792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210

(1953)). Congress has “plenary power to make rules for the

admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those

characteristics which Congress has forbidden.” Mandel,

408 U.S. at 766 (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123

(1967)). “When Congress delegates this plenary power to the

Executive, the Executive’s decisions are likewise generally

shielded from administrative or judicial review.” AndradeGarcia v. Lynch, No. 13-74115, — F.3d —, 2016 WL

1719320, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016).

“Despite these rulings, ‘courts have identified a limited

exception to the doctrine of consular nonreviewability where

the denial of a visa implicates the constitutional rights of

American citizens.’” Id. (quoting Bustamante, 531 F.3d at

1061) (alteration omitted). This limited exception traces to

the Supreme Court’s decision in Mandel. Ernest Mandel was

a Belgian journalist, author, and revolutionary Marxist, who

had been temporarily admitted to the United States in 1962

and 1968 as a journalist and campus speaker. Mandel,

408 U.S. at 756. On both occasions, Mandel was found

ineligible for admission under § 212(a)(28) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, which barred aliens who

advocate world communism, but the Attorney General gave

him a discretionary waiver. Id. at 757. In 1969, Mandel was

invited to speak at several American universities. Id. at

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CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES 9

756–57. The consulate denied Mandel’s visa application,

again finding him inadmissible under § 212(a)(28). Id. at

757–58. The Attorney General declined to grant a waiver

because Mandel’s 1968 travels “went far beyond the stated

purposes of his trip, on the basis of which his admission had

been authorized and represented a flagrant abuse of the

opportunities afforded him to express his views in this

country.” Id. at 759. Mandel sued, joined by a number of

American professors who had invited him to speak or

expected to participate in colloquia with him. Id. at 759–60.

While the Supreme Court held that “Mandel personally,

as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no constitutional

right of entry,” the Court found that the denial of Mandel’s

visa implicated the professors’ First Amendment rights to

receive ideas. Id. at 762, 765–67. The Supreme Court found,

however, that Congress’s plenary power to exclude aliens

prevailed. Id. at 765–69. Congress could have enacted a

blanket prohibition on the admission of communist aliens;

instead, it had delegated to the Attorney General the

discretion to waive this prohibition. Id. at 767, 770. And,

“when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the

basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts

will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor

test it by balancing its justification against the First

Amendment interests of those who seek personal

communication with the applicant.” Id. at 770.

The Supreme Court returned to the reviewability of

consular visa decisions last year in Din. Fauzia Din, a U.S.

citizen, was married to Kanishka Berashk, an Afghan citizen

who worked as a payroll clerk at the Afghan Ministry of

Social Welfare during Taliban rule. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d

856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). 

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10 CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES

The consulate denied Berashk’s visa application, finding him

inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), “a broad

provision that excludes aliens on a variety of terrorismrelated grounds.” Id. The government did not provide any

further explanation of the denial or specify which of the nine

subsections of § 1182(a)(3)(B) applied. Id. at 858–59; Din,

135 S. Ct. at 2132.

Din sued, relying on Bustamante, which held that under

the Due Process Clause, Mandel judicial review is available

when a citizen’s spouse is denied a visa. See Bustamante,

531 F.3d at 1062. The district court granted the government’s

motion to dismiss. We reversed, holding that Mandel

requires “the identification of both a properly construed

statute that provides a ground of exclusion and the consular

officer’s assurance that he or she ‘knows or has reason to

believe’ that the visa applicant has done something fitting

within the proscribed category.” Din, 718 F.3d at 856

(quoting Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115,

126 (2d Cir. 2009)). We found that the government had not

met this standard, because it did not offer the factual basis for

its denial or “cite to a ground narrow enough to allow us to

determine that [the statute] has been ‘properly construed.’” 

Id. at 861–62 (quoting Am. Acad., 573 F.3d at 126).

A fractured Supreme Court reversed. The plurality

opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and

Justice Thomas, rejected our holding in Bustamante and

stated that a citizen whose spouse is denied a visa is not

injured under the Due Process Clause. Din, 135 S. Ct. at

2131. Accordingly, the plurality found that no process was

due to Din under the Constitution because she “was not

deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property’ when the Government

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CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES 11

denied [her spouse] admission to the United States.” Id. at

2138.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the

judgment. Id. at 2139. The concurrence assumed without

deciding that Din’s constitutional rights were burdened by the

visa denial, but held that the reasons for the visa denial given

by the Government satisfied Mandel’s “facially legitimate

and bona fide” standard. Id. at 2140. The concurrence found

that the consular officer’s citation to § 1182(a)(3)(B)

provided a facially legitimate reason to deny admission and

“indicates [the government] relied upon a bona fide factual

basis.” Id.

Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion expressly rejected

Din’s claim that the government was required to provide

additional facts underlying the determination.

But unlike the waiver provision at issue in

Mandel, which granted the Attorney General

nearly unbridled discretion, § 1182(a)(3)(B)

specifies discrete factual predicates the

consular officer must find to exist before

denying a visa. Din, moreover, admits in her

Complaint that Berashk worked for the

Taliban government, which, even if itself

insufficient to support exclusion, provides at

least a facial connection to terrorist activity. 

Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith on

the part of the consular officer who denied

Berashk a visa—which Din has not plausibly

alleged with sufficient particularity—Mandel

instructs us not to “look behind” the

Government’s exclusion of Berashk for

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12 CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES

additional factual details beyond what its

express reliance on § 1182(a)(3)(B)

encompassed.

Id. at 2140–41 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770) (other

citation omitted).4

B. The Law After Din

Because no single rationale commanded a majority of the

Court in Din, Cardenas urges us to re-adopt the standard in

our opinion in that case. However, our Din approach was

squarely rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court, Din,

135 S. Ct. at 2131, and therefore we are not free to return to

it.

The government argues that Justice Kennedy’s

concurrence controls. We agree. In Marks v. United States,

the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court

decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result

enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court

may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who

concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” 

430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). As we recently explained, “the narrowest

4 The four dissenting Justices would have held that Din was denied due

process because the government failed to give her “a statement of reasons,

some kind of explanation, as to why the State Department denied her

husband a visa,” which could have been “either the factual basis for the

Government’s decision or a sufficiently specific statutory subsection that

conveys effectively the same information.” Id. at 2144–45 (Breyer, J.,

dissenting); see also id. at 2146 (noting that perhaps the reason was

Berashk’s employment as a payroll clerk for the Taliban government,

“[b]ut there is no way to know if that is so”).

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CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES 13

opinion must represent a common denominator of the Court’s

reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by

at least five Justices who support the judgment.” United

States v. Davis, No. 13-30133, slip op. at 14 (9th Cir. June 13,

2016) (en banc) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781

(D.C. Cir. 1991)); accord Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200,

1205 (9th Cir. 2012) (the narrowest opinion must be the

“logical subset of other, broader opinions” (quoting United

States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir.

2005)). “Stated differently, Marks applies when, for

example, ‘the concurrence posits a narrow test to which the

plurality must necessarily agree as a logical consequence of

its own, broader position.” United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d

337, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting King, 950 F.2d at 782).

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence fits this description. The

Din plurality’s broad position was that (1) “an unadmitted

and nonresident alien . . . has no right of entry into the United

States, and no cause of action to press in furtherance of his

claim for admission,” and (2) the Due Process Clause does

not enable an alien’s citizen spouse to bring suit on his behalf. 

135 S. Ct. at 2131. The Kennedy concurrence’s narrower

position is that, even assuming a citizen spouse can bring

such a challenge, the challenge fails as long as the consular

officer has cited a valid statute of inadmissibility which

implies a bona fide factual basis behind the denial. Id. at

2140–41. The plurality would necessarily agree that, when

the consular officer cites such a statute, the denial stands, at

least in a case only raising the due process rights of a citizen

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14 CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES

spouse. The Kennedy concurrence therefore represents the

holding of the Court.5

Under the Din concurrence, the facially legitimate and

bona fide reason test has two components. First, the consular

officer must deny the visa under a valid statute of

inadmissibility. Id. (consular officer’s citation to

§ 1182(a)(3)(B) “suffices to show that the denial rested on a

determination that Din’s husband did not satisfy the statute’s

requirements,” and “the Government’s decision to exclude an

alien it determines does not satisfy one or more of [the

statutory conditions for entry] is facially legitimate under

Mandel”). Second, the consular officer must cite an

admissibility statute that “specifies discrete factual predicates

the consular officer must find to exist before denying a visa,”

or there must be a fact in the record that “provides at least a

facial connection to” the statutory ground of inadmissibility. 

Id. at 2141. Once the government has made that showing, the

plaintiff has the burden of proving that the reason was not

bona fide by making an “affirmative showing of bad faith on

the part of the consular officer who denied [ ] a visa.” Id.

C. Application of the Din Test

As Cardenas implicitly recognizes by advocating for a

broader standard of review, adoption of Justice Kennedy’s

Din concurrence as the controlling opinion of the Court

dooms her claims in this case. The consular officer gave a

facially legitimate reason to deny Mora’s visa because he

cited a valid statute of inadmissibility, § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii),

5

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence would also control under the “results”

approach urged in Judge Bea’s Davis dissent. See Davis, No. 13-30133,

slip op. at 43 (Bea, J., dissenting).

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CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES 15

which denies entry to an alien who intends to enter with the

intent to engage in “unlawful activity.” He also provided a

bona fide factual reason that provided a “facial connection”

to the statutory ground of inadmissibility: the belief that Mora

was a “gang associate” with ties to the Sureno gang.

6

Cardenas argues that she properly alleged bad faith

because, when Mora appeared for the second interview, the

consular officer refused to accept or review the proffered

expert opinion that Mora had never been a gang member or

the letter showing his acceptance into a tattoo removal

program. But, the allegations about the second interview

obviously cannot raise a plausible inference that the officer

acted in bad faith in making the original decision. And,

although counsel’s purpose in arranging the second interview

was to allow Mora to submit additional evidence, that the

consular officer did not accept Mora’s new documents does

not show bad faith. During his second interview, Mora was

extensively questioned by two officials and was given the

opportunity to argue that he had no ties to the Sureno gang.

7

6 Cardenas argues that the statutory phrase “any other unlawful activity”

only refers to unlawful activity related to national security, citing the

heading and other subsections of § 1182(a)(3)(A). But, Cardenas waived

this argument by failing to raise it below—she did not mention the words

“national security” in her response to the motion to dismiss, much less

argue that the statute was so limited. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New

Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 2003) (arguments

raised for the first time on appeal are usually not considered).

7

In any event, as the government noted at argument, the visa denial is

without prejudice to future applications. If Mora has new information, he

can submit a new visa application.

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16 CARDENAS V. UNITED STATES

Cardenas also alleges that the consular officer acted on

the basis of racial stereotypes. According to Mora’s affidavit,

at his second interview, he told the consular officer that he

was pulled over on the way to the home of his friend,

Cuauhtemoc Coss. They then discussed whether Coss was a

gang member. When Mora said that Coss had two tattoos,

one featuring the name of his daughter and another saying

“Brown Pride,” the officer said, “[w]ith those tattoos, you

don’t believe he’s a gang member?” Mora asserts that this

was racial discrimination and therefore bad faith. But, the

conversation about Coss is not alleged in the first amended

complaint; it is only mentioned in Mora’s affidavit, which

was attached to Cardenas’ motion to have defendants answer

the complaint. And, even if the affidavit is considered, the

remark does not plausibly establish that the decision to deny

Mora a visa was made on a forbidden racial basis, as opposed

to a possibly mistaken basis about what Coss’ tattoos

signified. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (requiring that bad faith be “plausibly alleged

with sufficient particularity”).

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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