Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05800/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05800-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Van E Flury,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Hassayampa Justice Court,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-05800-PHX-SMB

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Hassayampa Justice Court’s Motion to 

Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, Order that Real Party 

in Interest Be Rejoined as Party to Action (Doc. 16). Plaintiff filed a response. (Doc. 21.) 

Defendant filed no reply. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Claiming jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2283, Plaintiff, proceeding pro per, 

filed this federal action seeking to enjoin a state court injunction, specifically an injunction 

against harassment issued by the Hassayampa Justice Court. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff, a used 

car dealer, is a commercial tenant of the Sun City Professional Building.1 Ms. Sandra 

Hickman is a commercial tenant in the same building complex. A dispute between the two 

ensued. As a result, Ms. Hickman filed a petition for injunction against harassment against 

Plaintiff. The Hassayampa Justice Court issued the injunction. Plaintiff did not request a 

1 Plaintiff’s principle place of business is located at 12630 N. 103rd Avenue, Sun City, 

Arizona. 

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hearing or pursue remedies available to him under State law. (See generally Doc. 1.) 

Plaintiff now petitions this Court for relief.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant Hassayampa Justice Court moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) & (6). (Doc. 16.)

a. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Standard

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, well-pled factual allegations are 

presumed true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins 

v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for 

failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s minimum requirements. Rule 

8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 

L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80

(1957)). A complaint setting forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to 

dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter stating a claim to relief that is “plausible on 

its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility only exists if the pleader sets forth 

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Plausibility does not 

equal “probability,” but instead requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a 

defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Where a “complaint is 

deficient under Rule 8, [plaintiff] is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 686 (2009).

Furthermore, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se

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complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Rivera v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., No. CV-15-

02213-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 3548763, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2016) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)). All “[p]leadings must be 

construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).

b. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss a 

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if, considering the factual allegations in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, the action: (1) does not arise under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States, or does not fall within one of the other enumerated 

categories of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution; (2) is not a case or controversy 

within the meaning of the Constitution; or (3) is not described by any jurisdictional statute.” 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1331, 1346. Thus, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and are presumed to 

lack subject matter jurisdiction until the plaintiff satisfies his burden to establish otherwise. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 

391 (1994). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any 

time. Hansen v. Dept. of Treasury, 528 F. 3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction solely under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 

2283. The Anti-Injunction Act precludes federal courts from staying state court 

proceedings, with three exceptions: “except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or 

where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect and effectuate its judgments.” 28 

U.S.C.A. § 2283; see also Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit de Corp., 682 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th 

Cir. 1982). These “narrow” exceptions may “not be enlarged by loose statutory 

construction.” Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 306, 131 S.Ct. 2368, 180 L.Ed. 2d 341

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(2001) (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 

100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1998)). The Anti-Injunction Act's “purpose is to forestall the inevitable 

friction between the state and federal courts that ensues from the injunction of state judicial 

proceedings by a federal court.” Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630, 97 S. 

Ct. 2881, 2887, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (1977). Accordingly, “[a]ny doubts as to the propriety 

of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of 

permitting the state courts to proceed.” Id.; see also Atl. Coast R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of 

Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) 

(“Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by 

intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state 

appellate courts and ultimately [the Supreme Court].”). 

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to proceed in federal court but does not explain

how his case falls into one of the Anti-Injunction Act’s three narrow exceptions. None of 

the exceptions apply here and the Anti-Injunction Act precludes the injunctive relief 

Plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff’s citation to § 2283 does not fit the first exception. The two latter 

exceptions also have no application. The second exception, “where necessary in aid of its 

jurisdiction,” typically applies to in rem actions, which this is not. See Vendo, 433 U.S. at 

642. The third exception, the relitigation exception, is construed as particularly “strict and 

narrow”, Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148, and simply does not apply where, as here, 

there are no prior orders of this Court to “protect or effectuate,” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283. With 

no exception to § 2283’s preclusive effects, this Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s claim and will dismiss his complaints, (Docs. 1, 20), and terminate this 

action.2

2 Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s nearly identical 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 20); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring a complaint to present 

the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction rests); Franklin v. State of Or., State 

Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1342, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding a court may dismiss an action 

sua sponte where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction) (citing Cal. Diversified 

Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974)). With no jurisdiction, the 

court “is not required to issue a summons or follow other procedural requirements.” Loux 

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 44, 458 (9th Cir. 1967). While ordinarily, the Court would permit 

Plaintiff to amend, “amendment to cure defective jurisdictional allegations is proper only 

to correct ‘incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually exist[], and not defects in 

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Additionally, even assuming this Court had jurisdiction, the Court is precluded from 

granting the relief requested by the Younger abstention doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 

U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Younger abstention is appropriate when: 

(1) there is a state judicial proceeding, (2) the proceeding implicates important state

interests, (3) there is an adequate opportunity in state proceedings to raise constitutional 

challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin ongoing state proceedings. Arevalo 

v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Here, the injunction at issue is authorized under Arizona law and offers Plaintiff an 

appropriate way to challenge the injunction against harassment and protect his 

constitutional rights. See A.R.S. § 12-1809. Section 12-1809 provides a method to seek 

relief from an injunction. In relevant part, the statute reads: 

“At any time during the period during which the injunction is in effect, the 

defendant is entitled to one hearing on written request. No fee may be 

charged for requesting a hearing. A hearing that is requested by a defendant 

shall be held within ten days from the date requested unless the court finds 

compelling reasons to continue the hearing. The hearing shall be held at the 

earliest possible time.”

A.R.S. § 12-1809(H). Following a hearing at the justice court, an injunction order may be 

appealed to the superior court. A.R.S. § 12-1809(O). Thus, all four factors are satisfied 

and abstention is appropriate—the state court proceeding under A.R.S. § 12-1809 is 

ongoing, this action implicates the state court’s ability to enforce state statutes, Plaintiff 

has adequate opportunity to seek redress in the state proceedings, and Plaintiff requests a 

stay of state proceedings.

jurisdictional facts themselves.’” Trust v. American Honda Fin. Corp., No. 2:16-cv-1237-

ODW-SS, 2016 WL 756461, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (quoting Bull HN Info. Sys. 

V. Hutson, 184 F.R.D. 19, 22 (D. Mass. 1999)). Here, such further amendment would be 

futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F. 3d 336 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint, like the initial Complaint, provides insufficient support to establish this Court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction.

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IV. CONCLUSION

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Defendant Hassayampa Justice Court’s Motion to 

Dismiss, (Doc. 16), and DISMISSING both Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. 1), and Amended 

Complaint, (Doc. 20).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING the alternative relief sought as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DIRECTING the Clerk of Court terminate this case.

Dated this 23rd day of April, 2020.

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