Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02768/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02768-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 49:1471 Federal Aviation Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Sydney is a minor.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELLY ILCZYSZYN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-15-2768 EMC

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO REMAND

(Docket No. 23)

Plaintiffs Kelly, Sydney, Logan, and Hannah Ilczyszyn1

 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) have filed

suit against Defendants Southwest Airlines Co. (“Southwest”), several Southwest flight attendants, a

Southwest pilot, and a Southwest first officer (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs assert a single

claim for wrongful death related to an injury that their husband/father, Richard Ilczyszyn

(“Richard”), sustained while he was traveling on a Southwest airplane. Currently pending before the

Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. (The Court has deferred Defendants’ motion to dismiss until

after the remand motion is resolved.) Plaintiffs argue that removal of the instant action was

improper because, contrary to what Defendants assert, there is no complete preemption and,

furthermore, no significant federal issues are implicated.

A hearing was held on Plaintiffs’ motion on August 27, 2015. This order memorializes the

Court’s oral rulings made at the hearing and adds additional analysis as necessary.

Case 3:15-cv-02768-EMC Document 28 Filed 09/01/15 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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First, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument of complete preemption. Defendants have not

cited to any case holding that there is complete preemption (as opposed to defensive preemption)

under the FAA or ADA. Moreover, case law indicates or has held to the contrary. See, e.g., Webb

v. Desert Bermuda Development Co., 518 Fed. Appx. 521, 522 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that “[t]he

FAA does not create a federal cause of action for personal injury suits,” and, “[c]onsequently, the

complete preemption doctrine is inapplicable here and does not provide a basis for removal”);

Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that “the complete preemption doctrine

applies only to ‘claim[s] which come[] within the scope of [a federal] cause of action,’” and, “[h]ere

the parties agree that there is no federal cause of action for plaintiffs’ claims, which places this case

outside the realm of complete preemption”); Wayne v. Dhl Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1184

(9th Cir. 2002) (noting, “[i]n contrast to ERISA, the ADA [Airline Deregulation Act] does not even

provide for a private right of action to enforce its provisions” and, “[t]herefore, the ADA does not

provide a basis for federal jurisdiction under the complete preemption doctrine”).

Second, the Court rejects Defendants’ Grable argument. See Grable & Sons Metal Products,

Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005). In Grable, the Supreme Court

held that, “[w]hether or not a complaint pleads a federal cause of action, ‘federal-question

jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues.’” Dennis, 724 F.3d

at 1253 (quoting Grable, 545 at 312). More specifically, “[a] state cause of action invokes federal

question jurisdiction only if it ‘necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and

substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved

balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.’” Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661,

674 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 314). The Supreme Court has explained that, for

Grable purposes, a substantial federal question would be at issue if resolution of the federal question

would both be (1) dispositive of the case and (2) controlling in numerous other cases. See Empire

HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700 (2006). Thus, for example, in Grable,

there was a substantial federal question because (1) it appeared that the only issue contested in the

case was the federal question of whether the IRS had complied with a federal statute and (2) the

federal question “presented a nearly ‘pure issue of law,’ one ‘that could be settled once and for all

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and thereafter would govern numerous tax sale cases.’” Id.; see also Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct.

1059, 1066 (2013) (stating that “[t]he substantiality inquiry under Grable [also] looks . . . to the

importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole,” not whether the issue is significant to the

particular parties in the immediate suit; in Grable, “we primarily focused not on the interests of the

litigants themselves, but rather on the broader significance of the notice question for the Federal

Government”). Accordingly, where a case is “fact-bound and situation specific,” a substantial

federal question is less likely to be found. Empire, 547 U.S. at 701 (noting that plan administrator’s

reimbursement claim was “fact-bound and situation specific”; ultimately concluding that there was

no federal question jurisdiction over the claim). 

Contrary to what Defendants argue, Plaintiffs’ cause of action does not necessarily raise a

federal issue. Plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful death is in effect a claim that Defendants failed to

properly respond to a medical emergency. That claim does not require resolution of a federal issue. 

That the complaint makes reference to Defendants’ improperly treating the situation as a security

problem (thus potentially implicating TSA rules and regulations) does not make the claim dependent

on a federal issue. Plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful death can stand independently without implicating

TSA rules and regulations. Indeed, federal regulations alluded to by Defendants here are in the

nature of a defense rather than being part of Plaintiffs’ cause of action. See Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bd.

of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 680 F.3d 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that “Grable does not alter

the rule that a potential federal defense is not enough to create federal jurisdiction under § 1331”);

see also Cal. Shock Trauma Air Rescue v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 636 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2011)

(stating that “Grable did not implicitly overturn the well-pleaded complaint rule”; “[t]he Grable

complaint did present a federal issue on its face”) (emphasis in original).

Moreover, as noted, there is no substantial federal issue under Grable where the case is factbound and situation specific. That is the case here, particularly given Defendants’ assertion that

they were simply acting in compliance with “Southwest’s TSA-approved security program which

contains [SSI].” Docket No. 13 (Mot. to Dismiss at 11). As Plaintiffs argue, this case is analogous

to Bennett v. Southwest Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2007). There, the plaintiffs claimed that

the flight operator, the airplane manufacturer, and the airport operator had acted negligently, leading

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For the Northern District of California

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to a plane accident that hurt people on the ground. The defendants removed the case to federal court

arguing that the Grable standard was met “for aviation accidents because of the dominant role that

federal law plays in air transport.” Id. at 909. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, noting that “[w]e have

a fact-specific application of rules that come from both federal and state law rather than a contextfree inquiry into the meaning of federal law.” Id. at 910.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is granted. This order disposes of Docket No. 23.

The Clerk of the Court is ordered to remand in accordance with this opinion and

administratively close the file in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2015

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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