Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-02799/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-02799-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY JAMES COHEA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-00-2799 FCD PAN P

vs.

CHERYL K. PLILER, WARDEN,

et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner serving a life term proceeding without counsel in this

civil rights action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action proceeds on plaintiff’s July 11, 2003, second-amended complaint. 

June 25, 2004, defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12,

56. February 23, 2005, the court denied both motions without prejudice. 

April 12, 2005, defendants moved anew for dismissal upon the grounds plaintiff

failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, certain claims are untimely, and plaintiff fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. June 2, 2005, plaintiff

opposed.

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PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Access to the Courts

Plaintiff alleges that April 26, 1996, the United States District Court in the Central

District of California dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus upon the ground it

contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims. On August 22, 1997, he filed a new habeas

petition in the Central District August 28, 1997. Plaintiff asserts defendant Pliler enacted and

enforced various policies and decisions, including permitting only three hours of library and yard

time, insufficient books, forms and other materials, a lockdown followed by a reduction in library

time, and plaintiff’s assignment to vocational responsibilities, all of which interfered with

plaintiff’s time in the law library. Plaintiff alleges these policies and decisions denied him

meaningful access to the law library and so the Central District denied relief July 13, 1998.

Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that (1) January 24, 2001, J. Scogin, S. Flory, and G. Kelly failed

to pack plaintiff’s legal and religious books and broke plaintiff’s television when plaintiff was

transferred from one cell to another in retaliation for plaintiff’s resort to the appeals process; (2)

March 3, 1997, defendant M.A. Michaels refused to consider exculpatory evidence and found

plaintiff guilty of a false report because plaintiff filed an administrative appeal December 5,

1995; (3) defendant Colvin filed false rules violation reports January 14, 1998, February 10,

1998, February 25, 1998, March 3, 1998, and January 15, 1999, in retaliation for plaintiff’s

administrative appeals; (4) S. L. Scarsell endorsed Colvin’s February 24, 1998, and January 15,

1999, rules violations reports in retaliation for plaintiff’s resort to the appeals procedure; (5) 

March 10, 1998, defendant R. Yamamoto condoned Colvin’s March 3, 1998, false rules violation

report; (6) March 5, 1998, V. Rendon excluded exculpatory evidence from a rules violation

hearing and found plaintiff guilty in retaliation for plaintiff’s resort to the appeals process and the

federal courts; (7) on April 13, 1998, S. D. Akins excluded exculpatory evidence from a rules 

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violation hearing and found plaintiff guilty in retaliation for plaintiff’s resort to the appeals

process and the federal courts.

Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges (1) Colvin and McCargar conspired to file a rules violation report

falsely accusing plaintiff of being disrespectful; (2) D. Adams and A. Gold conspired to place

falsified rules violation reports into plaintiff’s central file so plaintiff would be removed from his

vocational assignment and would be placed in an isolated cell to prevent plaintiff from litigating

his habeas corpus and civil rights actions in state and federal courts; (3) defendants D. White, D.

Sims, R. Sanders, T. L. Rosario, S. Flory, Scogin, and G. Kelly conspired to place a rules

violation report containing false allegations in plaintiff’s central file to have plaintiff removed

from the institution’s B-Facility to the C-Facility; (3) January 29, 2001, S. Adcock, R. Hill, T.

Rosario and R. Sanders conspired to file a rules violation report falsely accusing plaintiff of

indecent exposure; (4) J. Colvin, D. McCargar, S.L. Scarsella, D. Baughman, M. A. Michaels, R.

Yamamoto, V. Rendon and S. D. Akins conspired to place rules violation reports containing false

allegations in plaintiff’s central file. 

Due Process

Plaintiff alleges: (1) August 8, 2000, D. Adams filed a rules violation report

falsely accusing plaintiff of indecent exposure; (2) August 18, 2000, D. Adams filed a rules

violation report falsely accusing plaintiff of appearing to threaten her; (3) August 18, 2000, D.

Adams filed a rules violation report falsely accusing plaintiff of refusing to follow directions; (4) 

August 21, 2000, D. Adams filed a rules violation report requiring plaintiff be removed from the

vocational program; (5) September 24, 2000, A. Gold excluded exculpatory evidence from a

hearing and found plaintiff guilty of D. Adams’ August 18, 2000, report. 

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MOTION TO DISMISS

Failure to Exhaust

On a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies,

the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed facts. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108 (9th Cir. 2002). A prisoner may bring no § 1983 action until he has exhausted such

administrative remedies as are available. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The requirement is mandatory. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). The administrative remedy must be exhausted

before suit is brought and a prisoner is not entitled to a stay of judicial proceedings in order to

exhaust. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002). 

California prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” 15 Cal.

Admin. Code § 3084.1(a). The regulations require the use of specific forms but contain no

guidelines for grievance content. 15 Cal. Admin. Code §§ 3084.2, 3085 (designating use of CDC

Form 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form for all grievances except those related to disabilities

under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which are filed on CDC Form 1824, Reasonable

Modification or Accommodation Request). Prisoners ordinarily must present their allegations on

one informal and three formal three formal levels of review. 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 3084.5. 

While presentation on the third level, the Director’s Level of Review, exhausts the remedy for

departmental purposes, 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 3084.1(a), when prisoners cannot present their

allegations on any subsequent level, they have exhausted available remedies for purposes of 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005). A California prisoner who

correctly completes an appeal form provided by prison officials provides information adequate to

exhaust the administrative remedy. See Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) (error to

dismiss complaint for failure to identify defendants in administrative form because the form

provided by the prison did not require such identification). Defendant has the burden of

identifying the remedies that remain available. Ibid. 

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October 18, 2000, plaintiff submitted a grievance complaining he was denied yard

time four days that month and since he could use the law library only during yard time, he also

was denied time in the law library. The appeal was denied on the Director’s Level of Review

November 2, 2001. 

March 26, 2001, plaintiff filed a grievance complaining prison staff destroyed his

television. The appeal was denied on the Director’s Level of Review December 20, 2001.

April 18, 2001, plaintiff submitted a grievance complaining Adcock made a rules

violation report falsely accusing him of misconduct, Adcock and others conspired falsely to

respond to investigative questions and that the hearing officer refused to let plaintiff question 

officers or call witnesses to testify on plaintiff’s behalf. The appeal was denied on the Director’s

Level of Review January 22, 2002.

Defendants maintain records of appeals for five years from the date of the

decision on the Director’s Level of Review and so Pliler concedes any grievance plaintiff filed in

1998 would have been destroyed before she filed her motion. Accordingly, she cannot

demonstrate plaintiff failed to exhaust this claim. 

Pliler’s motion on this ground should be denied. 

For like reason, the court cannot find plaintiff failed to exhaust the following

claims: March 3, 1997, M.A. Michaels refused to consider exculpatory evidence and found

plaintiff guilty of a rules violation report in retaliation for plaintiff’s December 5, 1995,

administrative appeal; defendant Colvin filed false rules violation reports January 14, 1998,

February 10, 1998, February 25, 1998, March 3, 1998 and January 15, 1998, in retaliation for

plaintiff’s resort to the appeals process; March 10, 1993, R. Yamamoto approved Colvin’s false

reports to retaliate against plaintiff; March 5, 1998, V. Rendon excluded exculpatory evidence

and found plaintiff guilty at a hearing on a rules violation report to retaliate against plaintiff;

April 13, 1998, D. Akins excluded exculpatory evidence from a rules violation hearing and found

plaintiff guilty in retaliation for plaintiff’s resort to the appeals process and to the federal courts.

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Defendants’ exhibits show plaintiff exhausted the claims staff destroyed his

television, Adcock falsely accused him of misconduct and conspired with others falsely to

respond to investigative questions and that the hearing officer denied plaintiff due process, and

he was denied access to the courts in October 2000. But plaintiff filed the complaint December

27, 2000, before completing the appeals process.

Since plaintiff did not exhaust these claims before commencing this action, they

should be dismissed without prejudice.

Defendants adduce no evidence showing plaintiff failed to exhaust the other

claims and so they should not be dismissed on this ground.

Statute of Limitations

The court may dismiss an action as untimely on a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b) of the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure insofar as the pleadings demonstrate

untimeliness. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). Insofar as the

court considers papers outside the pleadings, the court must treat the motion as one for summary

judgment. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS UNDER RULE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

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to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Summary judgment should be entered, after

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the

opposing party to establish the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

satisfy its burden, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings,

but must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate the fact in contention is

material, i.e., it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d

1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not conclusively establish a material issue of fact favoring its position. It is sufficient that

“the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a 

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 The law of the forum state determines the limitation period for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

1

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1995). Federal law governs when a claim accrues, see Elliott v. City of Union

City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1994), and the forum state’s law governs tolling as long as application of state

law does not defeat federal goals of the statute at issue, see Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 537-39 (1989); Bacon v.

City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004). Since

California’s rule permitting equitable tolling for the time a plaintiff pursues an alternative remedy does not defeat the

purpose of the federal exhaustion requirement, plaintiff is entitled to tolling for time he spent pursuing available

administrative remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) encourages resolution of

claims without litigation and allows development of a record that can assist a federal court in resolving claims in the

event of a civil action); see also Addison v. State, 146 Cal.Rptr. 224 (Cal. 1978) (California’s limitations periods

seek to prevent plaintiffs from inexcusably delaying commencement of an action such that the claims become stale

and so where a plaintiff delays commencing an action while reasonably and in good faith pursuing an alternative

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genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts before the court must be drawn in favor

of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn

out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which

the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45

(E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine

issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of

fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 587 (citation omitted).

On September 23, 2003, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

Statute of Limitations Law1

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remedy, time for commencing an action equitably is tolled); see also Dillon v. Board of Pension Commrs. 18 Cal.2d

427 (Cal. 1941) (doctrine of equitable tolling applies whenever exhaustion of administrative remedies is a

prerequisite to commencing a civil action). 

On January 1, 2003, a two-year limitation period for personal injury actions became law. Cal. Code. Civ.

2

Pro. § 335.1; Abreu v. Ramirez, 284 F.Supp.2d 1250 (C.D. Cal. 2003). While defendants’ argument depends upon

the new limitation period, it does not apply to plaintiff because his cause of action accrued before it became law.

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (new statute of limitations does not apply retroactively). 

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Absent tolling, a plaintiff must file an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 one year

from when the claim accrues. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 340(3) (West Supp. 2002). A claim accrues 2

when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the basis of the cause of action.

See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). This action commenced December 27,

2000, when plaintiff filed a complaint. See Cal. Civ. Code § 350.

Defendant Pliler contends plaintiff’s claim she denied him meaningful access to

the courts is untimely. 

Plaintiff’s cause of action against defendant Pliler accrued July 13, 1998, when

the District Court denied relief on his habeas petition. Absent tolling, he had until July 13, 1999,

to file a civil rights action.

Since defendant Pliler has not adduced evidence on the question of whether plaintiff

pursued administrative remedies, or if he did how long it took, there is a genuine dispute about

whether the claim untimely. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) . Pliler is not

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Pliler’s motion on this ground should be denied.

For like reasons, the following defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of

law: (1) Colvin on the claim he allegedly retaliated against plaintiff February 27, 1997, January 14,

1998, February 10, 1998, February 24, 1998, March 3, 1998, and January 15, 1998; (2) Michaels

on the claim he retaliated against plaintiff March 3, 1997; (3) Scarsella on the claim he retaliated

February 27, 1998, and January 21, 1999; (4) Yamamoto for allegedly retaliating March 10, 1998;

(5) Rendon for retaliating March 5 and 15, 1998; (6) Akin for violating due process April 13, 1998.

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Failure to State a Claim

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept

plaintiff’s allegations as true, read the complaint most favorably to plaintiff, give plaintiff the benefit

of every reasonable inference that appears from the pleading and argument of the case and dismiss

the complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be

proved consistent with the allegations. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 658 (1963); Retail

Clerks International Association, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 754 n.6

(1963); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The court may consider documents

attached to the complaint in evaluating a motion to dismiss. Parks School of Business, Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

Defendant Pliler asserts plaintiff has failed to state a claim she violated plaintiff’s

right of access to the courts.

To state a claim, plaintiff must allege that on a specific day an identified state actor

refused to assist plaintiff prepare and file a habeas corpus petition or section 1983 complaint either

by allowing meaningful access to an adequate law library or assistance from persons trained in the

law and that the deprivation caused a specific, actual injury to the prisoner’s habeas or section 1983

litigation efforts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). The right guarantees “meaningful access

to the courts” but does not guarantee the ability “to litigate effectively once in court.” Lewis, 518

U.S. at 354. Access is meaningful if prisons provide tools necessary to bring non-frivolous claims

challenging their convictions directly or collaterally and to challenge the conditions of their

confinement. Id. at 356.

Plaintiff alleges that April 26, 1996, the United States District Court in the Central

District of California dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus upon the ground it contained

both exhausted and unexhausted claims, August 22, 1997, he filed a new habeas petition in the

Central District, and August 27, 1997, that court dismissed the petition with leave to amend.

Plaintiff filed an amended petition and the court denied relief on the merits February 13, 1998. 

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Plaintiff asserts that between April 26, 1996, and February 13, 1998, defendant Pliler

enacted and enforced various policies and decisions, including permitting only three hours of library

and yard time, insufficient books, forms and other materials, a lockdown followed by a reduction in

library time, and plaintiff’s assignment to vocational responsibilities, all of which interfered with

plaintiff’s time in the law library. Plaintiff alleges these policies and decisions denied him

meaningful access to the law library, resulting in the February 13, 1998, denial of relief.

These allegations show plaintiff navigated federal habeas corpus procedure and

obtained a ruling on the merits. Plaintiff’s remedy for disagreement with the outcome was to appeal.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Relying upon Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1984), defendants seek an order

striking plaintiff’s request for an order expunging the allegedly false rules violations reports. 

The sole remedy in federal court for a prisoner seeking release from custody is to

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Therefore, to obtain

declaratory or injunctive relief for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other

harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983

plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). Habeas corpus may provide appropriate

relief when a prisoner seeks to expunge a disciplinary finding from his record "if expungement is

likely to accelerate the prisoner's eligibility for parole." Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th

Cir. 1989) (assuming habeas corpus jurisdiction where disciplinary sanctions involved forfeiture of

good time credit or segregation). Otherwise, a prisoner may seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1999) (where after hearing there is no evidence

to support finding of guilt, prisoner may seek an order of expungement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983). 

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Plaintiff alleges D. Adams filed four rules violation reports making false charges

against plaintiff. He asserts that at one hearing A. Gold excluded exculpatory evidence from the

disciplinary hearing and so plaintiff was found guilty. Nowhere does plaintiff allege defendants

revoked good-time credits and he does not seek restoration of any such credits.

Plaintiff’s allegations state a cognizable claim for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants’ motion on this ground should be denied.

Sua Sponte Dismissal

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), 

The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.

To state a claim for conspiracy, plaintiff must allege two or more people intended to

agree unlawfully to cause plaintiff harm and took some concerted action in furtherance of that goal.

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1999). A mere allegation of conspiracy

without factual specificity is insufficient. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d

621 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff alleges (1) Colvin and McCargar conspired to file a false rules violation

report stating plaintiff had been disrespectful; (2) D. Adams and A. Gold conspired to place falsified

rules violation reports into plaintiff’s central file so plaintiff would be removed from his vocational

assignment and would be placed in an isolated cell to prevent plaintiff from litigating his habeas

corpus and civil rights actions in state and federal courts; (3) defendants D. White, D. Sims, R.

Sanders, T. L. Rosario, S. Flory, Scogin, and G. Kelly conspired to place a false rules violation report

in plaintiff’s central file; (3) January 29, 2001, S. Adcock, R. Hill, T. Rosario and R. Sanders

conspired to file disciplinary report falsely accusing plaintiff of indecent exposure; (4) J. Colvin, D.

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McCargar, S.L. Scarsella, D. Baughman, M. A. Michaels, R. Yamamoto, V. Rendon and S. D. Akins

conspired to place false rules violation reports in plaintiff’s central file. 

These allegations are insufficient to state any claim for conspiracy.

These claims should be dismissed with leave to amend.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the court rule on defendants’

April 12, 2005, motion as follows:

1. The motion to dismiss upon the ground plaintiff failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies made upon behalf of defendants Pliler, M.A. Michaels, Colvin, R.

Yamamoto, V. Rendon and D. Akins be denied as explained above;

2. The motion to dismiss upon the ground plaintiff failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies on the claim Adcock falsely accused plaintiff of misconduct and conspired

with others to violate due process be granted without prejudice;

3. The motion to dismiss upon the ground plaintiff untimely commenced this action

be denied;

4. Pliler’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted be granted;

5. The motion to dismiss plaintiff’s due process claims be denied;

6. Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims be dismissed with leave to amend; and,

7. Defendants be directed to file and serve an answer.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with

the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

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Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 6, 2006.

\004

\cohe2799.msj f&r

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