Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02593/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02593-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331pi Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WINNIE DIGGS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR 

VEHIC[LES] D[I]RECTOR JEAN 

SHIOMOTO; LEGAL DIVISION OF 

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR 

VEHIC[LES],

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-CV-2593 JLS (KSC)

ORDER: (1) SUA SPONTE

DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2), AND (2) DENYING 

AS MOOT MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF Nos. 10, 12)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Winnie Diggs, proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against Jean Shiomoto, Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the 

Legal Division of the Department of Motors Vehicles on November 13, 2018. See ECF 

No. 1. She also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF No. 2. 

After the Court denied Ms. Diggs’ initial motion for leave to proceed IFP on 

November 15, 2018, see ECF No. 3, Ms. Diggs filed a second motion for leave to proceed 

IFP on December 7, 2018. See ECF No. 4. The Court again denied Ms. Diggs leave to 

proceed IFP on December 12, 2018. See ECF No. 5.

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On December 18, 2018, Ms. Diggs filed a third motion for leave to proceed IFP. See 

ECF No. 6. Although the Court granted Ms. Diggs’ request to proceed IFP, it sua sponte

dismissed without prejudice Ms. Diggs’ initial complaint for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) on January 28, 2019. See ECF No. 9. The Court 

concluded that “Plaintiff d[id] not provide sufficient facts to allege conduct that deprived 

her of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution.” Id. at 6. Further, “she 

d[id] not provide specific facts related to Defendants to support her claims for relief.” Id. 

Nonetheless, the Court granted Ms. Diggs forty-five days’ leave to file an amended 

complaint. Id. at 8.

Ms. Diggs’ operative Amended Complaint followed on February 4, 2019. See ECF 

No. 10. On April 9, 2019, she filed a motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 12.

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Coleman v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 

1763 (2015) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)] at 

any time if the court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the 

action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted; [or] seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.”); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but 

requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim”).

All complaints must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

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mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). “[D]etermining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw 

on its experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court 

must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see 

also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the 

language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 

“While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.” Hoagland 

v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) 

(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts cannot accept legal conclusions set forth in a 

complaint if the plaintiff has not supported her contentions with facts. Id. (citing Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679).

In addition, courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, see 

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), a duty that is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, a

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court 

should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the 

defect,” unless the court determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc).

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B. Factual Allegations1

Ms. Diggs was a homeless, 63-year-old black woman who was living in Carlsbad, 

California, at the time of the actions underlying her Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 10 

(“FAC”) at 10. Although the timeline is not entirely clear, Ms. Diggs appears to allege that 

she began to suffer harassment from the police beginning in 2015. See id. She believes 

that the police began following her and, as a result of their stalking her, she received a 

dozen citations, whereas she previously had none. See id.

In February 2016, Ms. Diggs was falsely arrested for driving under the influence. 

Id. at 10, 12. Ms. Diggs was not driving, but rather sitting in her parked car at the time of 

the incident. Id. at 7. Ms. Diggs paid the DMV $120 for a video that would prove she was 

not driving at the time of her arrest, but the DMV never sent her the video. Id. at 10, 17. 

Instead, the DMV sent Ms. Diggs a form requesting that she receive a mental health 

evaluation. Id. at 10.

While Ms. Diggs was awaiting trial, mechanics in Carlsbad “deliberately put [her 

Volvo] in disrepair.” Id. at 7, 11. Ms. Diggs’ $1800 computer was also stolen, id. at 10–

11, which contained her personal and other intellectual properties, including a valuable 

business plan. Id. at 12. Four other computers have gone missing. Id. at 8.

In April 2016, Ms. Diggs “received a cleared license,” id. at 11, but the DMV failed 

to remove the suspension of her license in their system. Id. at 7. Consequently, after

Ms. Diggs purchased a Hyundai on June 1, 2017, to replace her Volvo so that she could 

take an assignment with the L.A. Census Bureau in California City, California, her Hyundai

was towed on June 14, 2017, for driving on a suspended license and an expired vehicle 

registration. Id. at 7, 11. The DMV later confirmed that Ms. Diggs had until September 8,

2017, to register the Hyundai, id. at 11, and a judge dismissed both charges in July 2017. 

Id. at 11, 18.

 

1 The Court accepts as true all material allegations in the FAC and construes the FAC and all reasonable 

inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to Ms. Diggs. See Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447. 

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Beginning in late 2017, Ms. Diggs began to experience attacks by use of a laser and 

electronic shocks perpetrated by dozens of people everywhere she went. See id. at 7, 11. 

She experiences hundreds of attacks each day, which cause her pain and suffering. Id. 

Ms. Diggs believes that she has been targeted for writing to government and local officials, 

thereby exposing a current climate of corruption, fraud, oppression, racism, and 

discrimination. Id. at 12, 18; see also id. at 10. Ms. Diggs first began writing to 

government officials in 2015, after which her Apple Air Book computer was repeatedly 

hacked. Id. Somebody has been interfering with Ms. Diggs’ correspondence, which often 

never reaches its intended recipients. See id. at 16–17.

C. Analysis

Liberally construing Ms. Diggs’ First Amended Complaint, the Court must conclude 

that (1) Ms. Diggs has failed to state a plausible claim for relief under Section 1983 against 

Department of Motor Vehicles Director Jean Shiomoto pursuant to Section 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (2) Ms. Diggs’ Section 1983 claims are time-barred and therefore 

frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and (3) Ms. Diggs seeks monetary relief against 

those who are immune from liability under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). The Court also 

concludes that further amendment would be futile. 

1. Failure to State a Claim

Ms. Diggs purports to assert her claims against Director Shiomoto under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983.2

 See FAC at 3. Ms. Diggs fails to state a plausible claim for relief.

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey,

263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”

 

2 Ms. Diggs also purports to assert her claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents of Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). As made clear by the form Ms. Diggs used, however, Bivens 

claims may be asserted only against federal officials. See FAC at 3. Because the DMV is a state entity 

and Director Shiomoto is a state official, the Court addresses only Ms. Diggs’ claims under Section 1983.

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Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a 

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). A person “acts under color of state law [for purposes 

of section 1983] only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made 

possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk 

Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 

299, 326 (1941)). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff 

must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v. Cmty.

Redev. Agency of City of L.A., 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiffs 

must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged 

in” to state a claim). 

Here, even assuming Ms. Diggs can state a plausible claim for deprivation of a right 

secured by the Constitution, Ms. Diggs’ First Amended Complaint contains no specific 

factual allegations directly related to Director Shiomoto, much less any details as to what 

Director Shiomoto did, or failed to do, to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (noting that Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is 

plausible on its face’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). The Court previously 

granted Ms. Diggs leave to amend to remedy this deficiency, but Ms. Diggs’ First 

Amended Complaint contains fewer allegations concerning Director Shiomoto than 

Ms. Diggs’ original Complaint. Consequently, although this deficiency could in theory be 

cured, it appears unlikely that Ms. Diggs will clear this pleading hurdle.

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Statute of Limitations

The Court next determines that Ms. Diggs’ Section 1983 claims, as they relate to 

Director Shiomoto and (although not separately named) the DMV, cannot be cured because 

they are time-barred as evident from the face of Ms. Diggs’ First Amended Complaint. “In 

determining the proper statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

[federal courts] look to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum 

state.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Azer v. Connell, 306 

F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002)). Although the nature of Ms. Diggs’ claims against Director 

Shiomoto or the DMV arising under Section 1983 are far from clear, the statute of 

limitations would be, at most, two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute 

of limitations for personal injury claims). 

Here, the underlying false arrest for driving under the influence, in which the DMV 

was not involved, occurred in February 2016. See FAC at 12. Ms. Diggs’ license was 

cleared on April 2016, see id. at 11, meaning that any claims arising from the DMV’s 

conduct at Ms. Diggs’ hearing, review, and trial occurred and accrued before that date. See 

id. at 10. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for any claims against the DMV pertaining 

to the February 2016 false arrest and subsequent proceedings ran by April 2018. Ms. 

Diggs’ claims, not filed until November 2018, see generally ECF No. 1, are therefore timebarred.

3. Immunity

Although not alleged in her First Amended Complaint, it is also possible that 

Ms. Diggs intended to assert a claim against Director Shiomoto (or the DMV or other of 

its employees) for negligence under the California Tort Claims Act. Ms. Diggs alleges that 

the DMV restored her license, but wrongfully failed to lift her suspension, in April 2016.

FAC at 7, 11. Construing Ms. Diggs’ First Amended Complaint liberally and issues of 

claim presentment aside, such claims are barred by immunity.

Under California law, neither a public entity nor a public employee may be “liable 

for an injury caused . . . by . . . failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any 

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permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§§ 818.4, 821.2. Here, any timely tort claim asserted by Ms. Diggs against the DMV or its 

employees would arise from their failure fully to restore Ms. Diggs license, actions barred 

by the statutory licensing immunity.

4. Leave to Amend

Although courts generally take a liberal approach to amendment, particularly in 

cases prosecuted by pro se litigants, leave to amend is properly denied where—as here—

amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading 

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.”); Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 2012)

(“Because [Plaintiff] could not plead any additional facts to cure the deficiencies in his 

pleadings and has already been given leave to amend, he should not be given 

further leave to amend his claims.”). Here, Ms. Diggs has already been granted leave to 

amend her claim and she will be unable to cure the deficiencies because her claims against 

Director Shiomoto (and the DMV and other of its employees) are barred by statute of 

limitations or immunity. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE

Ms. Diggs’ First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court:

1. DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Ms. Diggs’ Amended Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii), and (iii);

2. DENIES AS MOOT Ms. Diggs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 

12);

3. CERTIFIES that an in forma pauperis appeal from this Order would not be 

taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 

/ / /

/ / /

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4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and 

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 24, 2019

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