Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01713/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01713-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Libel, Assault, Slander

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRIEN EDWARD SMITH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LOWE’S HIW, INC., 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-01713-WBS-AC 

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

On September 10, 2014, the court held a hearing on defendant’s June 16, 2014, motion to 

dismiss. Plaintiff Brien Edward Smith appeared in pro per. Y. Anna Suh appeared for defendant. 

On review of the motions, the documents filed in support and opposition, upon hearing the 

arguments of plaintiff and counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS 

FOLLOWS: 

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Allegations 

A detailed outline of plaintiff’s factual allegations can be found in the court’s April 14, 

2014 findings and recommendations. ECF No. 29. In sum, plaintiff brings suit for defamation 

based on statements made in three contexts: 

1. The late-March or early-April 2012 statement by Mr. Vipond to members of 

defendant’s management team; 

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2. The April 2, 2012, Employee Performance Report; and 

3. The April 5, 2012, Personnel Termination Form. 

Plaintiff claims that the statements were false, were published to someone other than 

plaintiff, were motivated by malice or ill will toward plaintiff, and have caused injury to plaintiff. 

B. Procedural Background 

Plaintiff initiated this action on July 1, 2013, in the Amador County Superior Court. See 

ECF No. 1-1 at Ex. A. On August 20, 2013, defendant removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(a), as it is a citizen of North Carolina, plaintiff is a citizen of California, and plaintiff seeks 

$1,000,000.00 in damages. ECF No. 1-1. 

On August 27, 2013, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint. ECF No. 

6. Then, on September 24, 2013, defendant filed a motion to strike. ECF No. 10. Thereafter, 

plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint, which the undersigned granted, thereby denying 

as moot defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion to strike. ECF No. 13. 

On January 16, 2014, plaintiff filed his first amended complaint, which included claims 

for defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). ECF No. 15. Defendant 

again moved to both dismiss and strike the pleading. ECF Nos. 18–19. On April 14, 2014, the 

court recommended that defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s defamation claim be granted 

with leave to amend because plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish publication 

and malice. ECF No. 29. The court also recommended that plaintiff’s NIED claim be dismissed 

without leave to amend because the claim was preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. 

The court’s recommendations were adopted in full by the district judge on May 13, 2014. ECF 

No. 33. 

On June 2, 2014, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint again asserting claims for 

defamation and NIED. ECF No. 34. On June 16, 2014, defendant filed a motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 35. On August 25, 2014, plaintiff filed his response, which was 

followed by defendant’s reply on September 3, 2014. ECF Nos. 37, 38. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to this rule is to test the legal sufficiency of 

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the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). 

“Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 

(9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, a 

defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the court’s ability to grant any relief on the 

plaintiff’s claims, even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true. 

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. Durning 

v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider facts 

which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1987), and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed 

with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). The 

court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

DISCUSSION 

A. Defamation 

1. Publication 

As to publication, defendant asserts that plaintiff fails to allege publication with sufficient 

specificity to make his defamation claim plausible. 

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional 

publication of a statement of fact which is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure 

or which causes special damage.” Ringler Assoc., Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 80 Cal. App. 4th 

1165, 1179 (2000). “Publication, which may be written or oral, is defined as a communication to 

some third person who understands both the defamatory meaning of the statement and its 

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application to the person to whom reference is made.” Id.; see also Restatement (2d) Torts, § 

577. Publication to a single individual is sufficient to satisfy the publication element of a 

defamation claim. Ringler Assoc., Inc., 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1179. In all cases of alleged 

defamation the truth of the offensive statements or communication is a complete defense against 

civil liability, regardless of bad faith or malicious purpose. Id. at 1180. 

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff asserts that the allegedly defamatory 

statements were made on three separate occasions: (1) by Mr. Vipond to members of defendant’s 

management team between March 27, 2012, and April 2, 2012; (2) in plaintiff’s April 2, 2012, 

Employee Performance Report; and (3) in plaintiff’s April 5, 2012, Personnel Termination Form. 

ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 10–12. According to plaintiff, the members of the management team to whom 

Mr. Vipond published the defamatory statements included some or all of the following: 

Operations Manager Brian Lajoie, Human Resources Manager Karen Briggs, Loss Prevention 

Manager Ralph Dominguez, and Regional Director Ed Burris. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant argues that 

these allegations are “vague and conclusory,” and accordingly do not give rise to a plausible 

inference of publication. ECF No. 37 at 8–10. However, all of the cases cited by defendant in 

support of his argument are factually dissimilar and distinguishable from a workplace defamation 

claim. See Solis v. City of Fresno, 1:11-CV-00053 AWI, 2012 WL 868681 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 

2012) (equal protection, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, and conspiracy); Lantiq 

N. Am., Inc. v. Ralink Tech. Corp., CV 11-00234 EJD, 2011 WL 2600747 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 

2011) (patent infringement). Further, plaintiff has not, as defendant claims, merely alleged facts 

“on information and belief.” ECF No. 35 at 6–7. 

It bears repeating that in adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion courts must accept as true 

the allegations in the complaint and construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. As long as the plaintiff alleges “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face” the court must deny the motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 

U.S. at 555. The court finds plaintiff’s allegation that Mr. Vipond made the untrue statements to 

members of the management team including, but not limited to, Operations Manager Brian 

Lajoie, Human Resources Manager Karen Briggs, Loss Prevention Manager Ralph Dominguez, 

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and Regional Director Ed Burris to be plausible. Accordingly, plaintiff has alleged facts 

sufficient to meet his burden at the motion to dismiss stage of establishing publication of Mr. 

Vipond’s statements. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the allegedly defamatory statements in his April 2, 2012, 

Employee Performance Report and April 5, 2012, Personnel Termination Form were published 

when they were included in his personnel file. According to plaintiff, courts have held that 

statements included in a personnel file are published if an employer falsely accuses an employee 

of criminal conduct, lack of integrity, dishonesty, incompetence, or reprehensible personal 

characteristics or behavior. ECF No. 34 ¶ 7. In every case plaintiff cites for this proposition 

however, the allegedly defamatory statements were published to someone other than the person 

defamed or the court did not have to reach the issue of publication because the claim failed for 

other reasons. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 942–44 (1979), overruled on other grounds 

by White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 563, 574 n.4 (1999); Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 

2d 822, 825 (1943); Jensen v. Hewlett Packard Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 958, 970 (1993); Kelly v. 

General Telephone Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278, 284 (1982). In fact, publication requires that the 

defamatory statement, whether oral or in writing, be communicated “to a third person.” Shively 

v. Bozanich, 31 Cal. 4th 1230, 1242 (2003). 

At the court’s January 10, 2014, hearing, plaintiff stated that defendant shared his April 2, 

2012, Employee Performance Report and April 5, 2012, Personnel Termination Form with third 

parties. If plaintiff has reason to believe that his personnel file documents were shown to others, 

he must specifically allege facts supporting his belief in his complaint. Because such allegations 

are absent from the second amended complaint, the motion to dismiss should be granted as to the 

alleged defamatory statements in the Employee Performance Report and Personnel Termination 

Form. Because plaintiff has represented that facts exist which would cure the deficiency, 

however, a final opportunity to amend will be recommended. 

2. The Common Interest Privilege 

Defendant also argues that the statements included in his personnel file and made by Mr. 

Vipond are protected by a “common interest” privilege pursuant to California Civil Code § 47(c). 

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Generally, because an employer and its employees have a common interest in protecting 

the workplace from abuse, an employer’s statements to employees regarding the reasons for 

termination of another employee generally are privileged. King v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 

152 Cal. App. 4th 426, 440 (2007); Deaile v. General Tel. Co. of Cal., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 846 

(1974). In order for this qualified privilege to apply, the communicator and the recipient must 

have a common interest, the communication must be made without malice, and the statements 

must be reasonably calculated to protect or further that common interest. Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c); 

Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 720–21 (2007). In order to prevent application of the qualified 

privilege, malice may be alleged by pleading that the publication was motivated by hatred or ill 

will toward the plaintiff. See Sanhorn v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 18 Cal. 3d 406, 413–14 (1976). 

Plaintiff argues that the common interest privilege does not apply because defendant’s 

conduct was motivated by malice based on plaintiff’s filing of a wage claim and his prior 

participation in a class action. The court already noted in its April 14, 2014, findings and 

recommendations that while this allegation could support a plausible inference of malice, plaintiff 

must assert more than these conclusory allegations. He must assert, for example, that defendant, 

and specifically those who made the allegedly defamatory statements, knew of this participation. 

Because plaintiff has failed to allege any new facts in his second amended complaint that would 

support a plausible claim of malice, the court finds that the common interest privilege bars his 

defamation claim. 

3. Leave to Amend 

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s defamation claims should be dismissed without leave to 

amend because further opportunities to amend at this point would be futile. ECF No. 35 at 13–

14. Leave to amend should “be freely granted, when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the 

underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the 

pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

omitted). Dismissal without leave to amend is only proper in situations where “‘the pleading 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Id. (quoting Doe v. United States, 

58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Further, plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and therefore his 

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complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 

At the court’s September 10, 2014, hearing, plaintiff assured the court that he is aware of 

specific facts demonstrating that Mr. Vipond published the allegedly defamatory statements in 

retaliation for plaintiff’s lawsuit against defendant. In light of plaintiff’s representation, the court 

is not convinced that he cannot possibly cure his complaint by alleging additional facts. 

Accordingly, the court recommends that plaintiff be afforded a final opportunity to amend. 

B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Defendant also moves to dismiss plaintiff’s NIED claim based on the fact that the district 

court judge dismissed it without leave to amend in his May 13, 2014, order. A party can only 

vacate a final order with a motion for relief from judgment granted by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

Rule 60. Plaintiff has neglected to file such a motion, and has instead simply repeated his NIED 

argument from his first amended complaint. ECF No. 15 ¶ 8; ECF No. 34 ¶ 8. Accordingly, the 

court orders that plaintiff’s NIED claim be stricken from the second amended complaint because 

it was already subject to a final judgment. Plaintiff is cautioned that if the district judge adopts 

the recommendation for leave to amend, he should omit the NEID claim from a third amended 

complaint. 

CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s NIED claim is 

stricken from his complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendant’s June 16, 2014, motion to dismiss (ECF No. 35) be granted; and 

2. Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his complaint to assert defamation claims based on 

the allegedly defamatory statements included in his personnel file and Mr. Vipond’s 

statements to defendant’s management team. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: September 11, 2014 

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