Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00611/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00611-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “a determination of a factual issue made by a state

court shall be presumed to be correct.” 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bryan Joseph Cox,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-10-611-TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Bryan Joseph Cox, who is presently confined in the Cibola Unit of the

Arizona State Prison Complex in San Luis, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the

Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1), Respondents’ Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 9) and Petitioner’s Reply. (Doc.

11.) The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the Pima County Superior Court, the facts giving rise to Petitioner’s

conviction are as follows:1

 

This case stems from an incident that occurred on July 27, 2006, when petitioner and co-defendant Cummins went to the residence of [JD] in an

attempt to collect a debt. Petitioner knocked on the door and then shot a slug

round from a sawed-off shotgun through the door. [JD], who was on the other

side of the door, was killed. It is not known whether defendants heard him fall

to the floor before they fled the scene. The facts suggest that they were not

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aware he had died, because Mr. Cummins continued to text message [JD]

about the money he wanted to collect from him. 

(Answer, Ex. A.)

On January 16, 2007, Petitioner was indicted on one count of first degree murder (a

class one felony), one alternative count of second degree murder (a class one felony) and one

count of first degree burglary (a class two felony). (Answer, Ex. G.) On November 21,

2007, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in which he plead guilty to one count of

second degree murder. (Answer, Ex. H.) On December 17, 2007 Petitioner was sentenced

to a 19-year term. (Answer, Ex. B.) 

On December 21, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief pursuant

to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Rule 32 Petition.”) In the petition that followed, Petitioner

raised three claims: (1) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial

counsel failed file pretrial motions or interview witnesses and was not adequately able to

advise Petitioner of the strength of the State’s case; (2) there was no factual basis for a

finding that Petitioner exhibited extreme indifference to human life as required by Rule 17.3,

Ariz. R. Crim. P.; and (3) Petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea.

(Answer, Exs. A, D.) After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Petitioner’s Rule

32 Petition on March 4, 2009. (Id.; Answer Exs. B, I, J, K.) Petitioner petitioned for review

of the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 Petition, raising the same claims in his petition for

review that he presented in his Rule 32 Petition. (Answer, Exs. B, E.) On October 28, 2009,

the Court of Appeals granted the petition but denied relief. (Answer, Ex. B.) Petitioner

petitioned for review by the Arizona Supreme Court; the Arizona Supreme Court summarily

denied review on April 27, 2010. (Answer, Ex. C.)

On October 12, 2010, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

in which he presents three claims: 

Ground 1: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial

counsel: (a) failed to file pretrial motions or interview witnesses and (b)

was not adequately able to advise Petitioner of the strength of the

State’s case; 

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2

 In addition, Petitioner failed to present Ground 2 as a federal claim in his Rule 32

Petition, and thus it is also barred on fair presentation grounds. To properly exhaust state

remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present" his claims to the state's highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A claim is

"fairly presented" if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the federal legal theory

on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling

legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S.

4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971). 

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Ground 2: There was no factual basis for a finding that Petitioner exhibited

extreme indifference to human life; and 

Ground 3: Petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea. 

DISCUSSION

The Magistrate recommends that the Petition be denied. Ground 2 fails to allege a

constitutional violation. Petitioner is procedurally barred from raising Ground 1(a). Grounds

1(b) and 3 are without merit.

A. Non-Cognizable Claim

In Ground 2, Petitioner alleges that the trial court entered judgment on the plea even

though there was no factual basis for a finding that Petitioner exhibited extreme indifference

to human life. Petitioner does not assert a violation of federal law with respect to Ground 2.

Because 28 U.S.C. § 2254 permits the Court to entertain a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

“only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States,” and because Ground 2 does not allege a violation of federal law,

Ground 2 fails to state a cognizable claim.2

B. Effect of Guilty Plea on Collateral Review

In Ground 1(a) Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

when his trial counsel failed to file pretrial motions or interview witnesses. Petitioner’s plea

agreement provides:

Defendant hereby waives any right to raise and/or appeal any and all motions, defenses, probable cause determinations, restitution orders, and

objections which defendant has asserted or could assert to this prosecution and

to the court’s entry of judgment against defendant and imposition of sentence

upon defendant consistent with this agreement.

(Answer, Ex. H.) A voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who

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3

 Although Ground 1(a) alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the specific allegations

relate to trial counsel’s alleged failure to engage in trial preparation. Petitioner does not allege

that this failure induced him or coerced him into accepting the plea. 

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has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked. See Mabry v.

Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984) (collecting cases),

disapproved on other grounds by Puckett v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173

L.Ed.2d 266 (Mar 25, 2009). Thus, a plea-convicted petitioner can only pursue federal

habeas relief on the grounds that he did not enter into the plea agreement voluntarily or the

plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. Ground 1(a) of the Petition

does not challenge the voluntariness of Petitioner's plea, nor does it allege that Petitioner

relied on ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to accept the plea offer.3

 Ground 1(a)

is therefore procedurally barred by the rule set forth in Mabry. In addition, a claim may be

procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was raised in state court but found by that court

to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30 (1991). The Court of Appeals, in denying Petitioner’s petition for review, held that by

entering his guilty plea, Petitioner had waived his right to challenge his counsel’s

effectiveness except for claims that relate directly to the validity of the plea. (Answer, Ex.

B.)

C. Merits

Petitioner properly presented Grounds 1(b) and 3 in his Rule 32 proceedings.

Accordingly, Grounds 1(b) and 3 are properly exhausted and the Court will consider the

merits of these claims.

i. Standard of Review

On habeas review, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness when fairly supported by the record. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426

(1985). The presumption of correctness also applies to a state appellate court's findings of

fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981). The question presented in a state prisoner's

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is “whether the state proceedings satisfied due process.”

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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 Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner’s petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner’s confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). General improprieties occurring in state

proceedings are cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently

violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)(“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state court determinations on state law questions.”); Bonin, 77 F.3d at 1158. The Supreme

Court has held in the habeas context that "this Court will not review a question of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) govern this case and pose special burdens. Chein v. Shumsky,

373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Under AEDPA, when reviewing a state criminal

conviction, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state court proceeding:

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established

Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth" in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but "nevertheless arrives at a

result different from" that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A

state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if "the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle" from a Supreme Court decision

"but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In

considering whether a state court has unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, "a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

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 The Petition is vague with respect to Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed to

apprise Petitioner as to the strength of the State’s case; the Magistrate Judge has referred to

Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition for further elaboration of this claim. To the extent Petitioner argues

in Ground 1(b) that his trial counsel failed to apprise Petitioner as to the strength of the State’s

case because trial counsel misinformed Petitioner regarding the length of sentence he would

potentially face if convicted of manslaughter, the claim is not exhausted, as Petitioner did not

include that factual allegation in his Rule 32 proceedings.

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independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."

Id. at 411; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). In conducting habeas review, we

"presum[e] that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002).

ii. Ground 1(b)

In Ground 1(b), Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

rendering his plea involuntary. According to Petitioner, his trial counsel was not adequately

able to advise Petitioner of the strength of the State’s case. Specifically, Petitioner contends

that the evidence supporting the charges of first or second degree murder was weak, and his

trial counsel should have conveyed to him the improbability that the State could gain a

conviction for either of those charges.4

 The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument,

adopting the order of the trial court. (Answer, Ex. B.) The trial court rejected the argument

on the ground that there was sufficient evidence to establish the first degree/felony murder

predicate offenses of first degree burglary and attempted armed robbery. The trial court did

not consider Petitioner’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a second

degree murder conviction. (Answer, Ex. A.)

The trial court and the Court of Appeals applied the correct federal law, relying on

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), clearly established precedent regarding

claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right to “effective assistance of counsel.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel has

two components. A defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was

deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

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“counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 687. It requires the

defendant to show that counsel's conduct “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687-688. Second, a defendant must show that the mistakes

made were "prejudicial to the defense," that is, the mistakes created a "reasonable probability

that, but for [the] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." 466 U.S. at 694. Counsel's performance is strongly presumed to fall within the

ambit of reasonable conduct unless Movant can show otherwise. Id. at 689-90. 

The trial court reasonably applied Strickland to the facts of Petitioner’s case with

respect to Petitioner’s claim that the evidence supporting the charges of first degree murder

was weak, and his trial counsel should have conveyed to him the improbability that the State

could gain a conviction for that charge. Petitioner argued that the felony murder predicate

offenses alleged – first degree burglary and attempted armed robbery – were not supported

by any evidence. However, there was evidence to support both offenses. As the trial court

noted, A.R.S. § 13-1508(A) provides: “A person commits burglary in the first degree if such

person or an accomplice violates the provisions of either § 13-1506 or 13-1507 and

knowingly possesses explosives, a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument in the course

of committing any theft or any felony.” A.R.S. § 13-1506 is violated if a person enters a

“fenced residential yard,” defined at A.R.S. § 13-1501 as “a unit of real property that

immediately surrounds or is adjacent to a residential structure and that is enclosed by a fence,

wall, building or similar barrier or any combination of fences, walls, buildings or similar

barriers,” with the intent to commit any theft or any felony therein. Petitioner argued before

the trial court that the victim’s residential property did not have a fenced yard as required by

A.R.S. § 13-1506 because evidence suggested that the victim’s property consisted of two

units surrounded by a single fence with an open gate. However, there was also evidence that

the gate could be closed, that the victim’s father sometimes closed the gate, and that the fence

completely surrounded the two units because they were treated as a single property. Thus,

there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Petitioner had violated

A.R.S. § 13-1508(A). Similarly, Petitioner claimed that there was insufficient evidence to

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support the predicate offense of attempted armed robbery. However, the evidence

demonstrated that Petitioner arrived at the victim’s home with a sawed-off shotgun intending

to coerce the victim into paying money against his will. These facts satisfy the elements of

an attempted armed robbery charge. See State v. Clark, 143 Ariz. 332, 334, 693 P.2d 987,

989 (App.1984) (“The essential elements of an attempted robbery are (1) intent to commit

robbery and (2) an overt act towards that commission. . . . Armed robbery is committed

when the defendant or an accomplice is armed with a deadly weapon.”); see also A.R.S. §

13-1001(A)(2), A.R.S. § 13-1904(A). Because there was evidence to support the predicate

offenses of the first degree murder charge, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to advise

Petitioner that it was improbable that the State could gain a first degree murder conviction.

Petitioner also argued in his Rule 32 proceedings that his trial counsel should have

advised him that the State would be unlikely to obtain a conviction on the second degree

murder charge because there was insufficient evidence to suggest that Petitioner acted with

extreme indifference to human life. Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals provided

a reason for rejecting this claim. Where a state court gives no reasoned explanation for its

decision on a petitioner's federal claim, this Court reviews the record before it to determine

whether the state court’s denial of that claim constituted an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. See Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (9th Cir.

2002). The Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner’s trial counsel acted reasonably with

respect to the second degree murder charge. A person commits second degree murder if,

without premeditation, and under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human

life, the person recklessly engages in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby

causes the death of another person. See A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(3). In the present case, there

was evidence indicating that Defendant acted with extreme indifference to human life.

Defendant alleges in his Rule 32 Petition that the last time the co-defendant had attempted

to collect the debt, the victim had chased him around the yard with a pipe; thus Defendant

anticipated a violent confrontation when he visited the victim’s residence. (Answer, Ex. D.)

Defendant then knocked on the door of the victim’s residence and fired a round from a

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sawed-off shotgun through the door. Even if, as Defendant claims, he did not think anyone

was home, a jury could conclude that shooting through the front door of someone’s private

residence while ignoring the possibility that a person could be standing on the other side of

the door constitutes recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a grave risk of death. See,

e.g., State v. Warrior, 2008 WL 2555106, *4 (2008) (unpublished) (upholding jury verdict

on second degree murder charge where defendant entered a yard attempting to collect a debt

and then fired several warning shots in the air). Because there was evidence to support a

second degree murder charge, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to advise Petitioner

that it was improbable that the State could gain a second degree murder conviction.

Accordingly, Ground 1(b) is without merit.

iii. Ground 3

In Ground 3, Petitioner claims that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the

plea. According to Petitioner, he did not know that manifesting extreme indifference to

human life was an element of the second degree murder charge to which he plead. Petitioner

claims that, had he known this fact, he would not have entered into the plea agreement

because he does not believe sufficient evidence supported that element of the second degree

murder charge. The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument, adopting the order of

the trial court. (Answer, Ex. B.) The trial court rejected the argument on the ground that

Petitioner was clearly aware that he was pleading guilty to second degree murder and was

fully informed of his rights by the Court. (Answer, Ex. A.)

In reaching its decision, the trial court stated that it was constitutionally obligated to

ensure that Defendant understood: (1) the nature of the charges; (2) the nature and range of

possible sentences; (3) the constitutional rights waived by pleading guilty; (4) the right to

plead not guilty; and (5) that the right to appeal is also waived. (Answer, Ex. A.) This is a

correct statement of the applicable federal law. See United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912

F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). The trial court’s conclusion was a reasonable application of

the facts to the governing law. Petitioner signed the plea agreement, which specifically states

that Petitioner is pleading guilty to second degree murder, a class one felony. (Answer, Ex.

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 To the extent that Petitioner is now claiming he did not understand the nature of the

second degree murder charge because he plead only to “reckless disregard” for human life, not

“extreme indifference to human life,” as required by A.R.S. § 13-1104, the argument is without

merit. It appears from the record that the prosecutor mis-spoke at the hearing and paraphrased

A.R.S. § 13-1104, which defines second degree murder’s “extreme indifference” element as

“recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby causes the death of

another person.” There is no evidence to suggest that the prosecutor’s statement could have

reasonably lead Petitioner to believe he was pleading guilty to some other, lesser offense.

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G.) The plea agreement also states that Petitioner had been advised by his attorney of the

nature of the charge. (Answer, Ex. G.) At the change of plea hearing, Petitioner confirmed

that he had reviewed and understood the plea agreement before signing it. (Answer, Ex. G.)

The trial court asked Petitioner if he wanted to plead guilty to second degree murder, a class

one felony, and Petitioner responded in the affirmative. (Answer, Ex. F.) The prosecutor

asked the defendant to acknowledge that his actions “were in reckless disregard for human

life,” which Petitioner acknowledged.5

 (Answer, Ex. F, pgs. 10-11.) Petitioner’s attorney

affirmed in the plea agreement that he had discussed the factual basis for and the nature of

the offense with Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. G.) Petitioner’s attorney also testified that he

believed Petitioner was at risk for being convicted of second degree murder if the case

proceeded to trial because shooting into a house could be construed as extreme indifference

to human life, and that he communicated that risk to Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. I, pgs. 33-34.)

Accordingly, the record is sufficient to demonstrate that Petitioner was adequately informed

of the mens rea element of the second degree murder charge at the time he entered his plea.

See, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 437 (1983) (denying habeas relief where

record supported state court’s conclusion that petitioner’s plea was voluntary). 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections

are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should

use the following case number: CV-10-611-TUC-FRZ.

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The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 12th day of July, 2011.

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