Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02105/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL SCOTT JONES,

Petitioner,

 v.

JOSE SOLIS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-2105 JSW

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Michael Scott Jones (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional

Training Facility in Soledad, California, filed this petition on May 3, 2004, for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the Court for consideration of

the merits of the habeas petition. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the

petition. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1989, Petitioner was convicted in Ventura County Superior Court of murder in the

second degree and use of a firearm. (Respondent’s Exhibit (“Resp. Exh.”) D at 1.) He was

sentenced to fifteen years to life plus two consecutive years. (Id.) Petitioner received a threeyear denial at his initial parole suitability hearing on November 16, 1999. (Id. at 37-40.) On

November 19, 2002, Petitioner appeared before the Board of Prison Terms (“BPT”) for his

second parole suitability hearing. (Pet. Exh. A.) The BPT found Petitioner unsuitable for

parole and issued a one-year denial, which Petitioner now challenges. (Id. at 39-42.) Petitioner

was again found unsuitable for parole at a hearing on February 2, 2004. (Resp. Exh. H at 52-

56.) 

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Following the November 19, 2002 denial of parole, Petitioner filed an administrative

appeal, which was denied on the merits. (Pet. Exh. B.) Petitioner then filed a state habeas

petition in the Ventura County Superior Court, which was denied on September 23, 2003. 

(Resp. Exh. I.) That petition was based on the same claims asserted in the instant action. (Id. at

1.) The superior court upheld the parole decision, finding that the record demonstrated that “the

Board’s decision was amply supported by the evidence in the record.” (Id. at 2.) The

California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s

habeas petitions. In re Jones, B171157 (Dec. 2, 2003) (Resp. Exh. J); In re Jones, S121259

(Jan. 28, 2005) (Resp. Exh. J). Petitioner timely filed his petition for federal writ of habeas

corpus on May 3, 2004. On October 25, 2004, this Court ordered Jose Solis (“Respondent”) to

show cause why the writ should not be granted. On January 27, 2005, Respondent filed an

answer to the petition. Petitioner filed a traverse on April 5, 2005. Petitioner retained counsel

and filed a supplemental traverse on October 3, 2005. Respondent filed a supplemental answer

on July 8, 2005.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this

Court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that

was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Courts are not

required to address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application

on the ground that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S.

63, 70-73 (2003). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from

obtaining relief by § 2254(d). Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002).

“Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of

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the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412

(2000); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005) (“clearly established” federal

law determined as of the time of the state court’s last reasoned decision); Alvarado v. Hill, 252

F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2001). “Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly

established law to [the Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The

Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that AEDPA – which embodies deep-seated principles

of comity, finality, and federalism – establishes a highly deferential standard for reviewing

state-court determinations. Id. at 436. Thus, the Court has emphasized that “[a] federal court

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the

precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12,

17 (2003) (per curiam). 

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established United

States Supreme Court precedent “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

in [Supreme Court] cases, ‘or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different result. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). Under the “unreasonable

application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. 

A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id.

at 412. The objectively unreasonable standard is not a clear error standard. Lockyer, 538 U. S.

at 75-76; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067-69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968

(2003). After Lockyer, "[t]he writ may not issue simply because, in our determination, a state

court’s application of federal law was erroneous, clearly or otherwise. While the ‘objectively

unreasonable’ standard is not self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a greater degree of

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deference to the state courts than [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] previously afforded them.” Clark,

331 F.3d at 1068. 

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision

of the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. 

LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000); Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569,

578-79 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 3 (2002). The court also looks to any

lower court decision examined and/or adopted by the highest state court to address the merits. 

Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (because state appellate court

examined and adopted some of the trial court’s reasoning, the trial court’s ruling is also

relevant). The standard of review under AEDPA is somewhat different where the state court

gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner’s federal claim and there is no

reasoned lower court decision on the claim. In such a case, a review of the record is the only

means of deciding whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable. Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969, 975 (2006). A district court must presume

correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This

presumption is not altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeal, rather

than by a state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242

F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue is structural error or

had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry

v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-96 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638

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(1993)). Under this standard, if the federal court determines that the state court’s harmless error

analysis was objectively unreasonable, and thus an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, the federal court then proceeds to the Brecht analysis. Id. at 787. 

The Ninth Circuit has applied § 2254(d) to review of parole suitability decisions. See,

e.g., Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also McQuillion v.

Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (assuming without deciding that AEDPA deferential

standard of review under § 2254 applies to such decisions).

DISCUSSION

I. Petitioner’s Habeas Action Challenging the 2002 Denial of Parole Suitability Is

Not Moot.

Respondent argues that the instant petition should be denied as moot because Petitioner

has since received a subsequent parole eligibility hearing in 2004 that again found him

unsuitable for parole. (Ans. at 8-9.) The mootness doctrine, on which Respondent bases his

argument, stems from the requirement in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution that there exist a

case or controversy through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. Throughout the

litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to

the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank

Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see also Cox v. McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1987)

(claim moot because petitioner cannot be released from term imposed for violating parole that

he has already served). An exception to the mootness doctrine exists, however, where a claim is

“capable of repetition yet evading review.” Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir.

2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 913 (2005) (habeas petition challenging a civil commitment

under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act was found to “evade review” because its

duration was too short to be fully litigated prior to its expiration). This exception applies when:

“‘(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or

expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be

subject to the same action again.’” Id. (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). 

Under the Ninth Circuit reasoning in Hubbart, “parole suitability hearings that are conducted

each year fall under both exceptions to mootness.” Hudson v. Kane, 2005 WL 2035590, *4

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(N.D. Cal. August 23, 2005). Therefore, the instant petition is not moot simply because

Petitioner has received subsequent parole suitability hearings. Because Petitioner’s claims fall

within an exception to the mootness doctrine, the Court reaches the merits of the claims.

II. Existence of a Federally Protected Liberty Interest in Parole.

Petitioner argues that the BPT violated his due process rights by failing to find him

suitable for parole, thus depriving him of a liberty interest. (Trav. at 6-15; Supp. Trav. at 5-8.) 

Respondent argues that no such liberty interest exists. (Ans. at 11-15; Supp. Ans. at 2-6.) In

general, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally

released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal &

Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). However, “a state’s statutory scheme, if is uses

mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when or unless

certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” 

McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901 (citing Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987);

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12).

The California statutory provision at issue provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he panel

or the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offense . . . is such that consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual and that a parole date, therefore, cannot

be fixed . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis added). This “shall-unless” language is

similar to the statutes that were at issue in Allen and Greenholtz. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 376

(“Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on parole . . . any person confined

in the Montana state prison or the women’s correction center . . . when in its opinion there is

reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or the

community.”) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-230201 (1985)) (emphasis added and in

original); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (“[w]henever the Board of Parole considers the release of

a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order this release unless it is

of the opinion that his release should be deferred because . . . .” (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-

1,114(1) (1976)) (emphasis added).

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1 Petitioner argues that the “some evidence” standard “deprives prisoners subject to

discretionary parole of reasonable or equitable due consideration.” (Traverse at 4-6.) 

Petitioner further contends in his supplemental traverse that Respondent should be required

to satisfy an evidentiary burden higher than the “some evidence” standard. (Supp. Traverse

at 11-19.) These arguments amount to nothing more than pleas to disregard the binding

authority of McQuillion, which this Court cannot do. 

7

Recognizing the similarity between California’s statutory scheme and the statutory

scheme at issue in Allen and Greenholtz, the Ninth Circuit has held that “California’s parole

scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. The scheme creates a

presumption that parole release will be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are

made.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court

reiterated the holding in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that

‘California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.’”)

(quoting McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902). Accordingly, under the holdings of McQuillion and

Biggs, Petitioner has a federally protected liberty interest in parole.

III. The Requirements of Federal Due Process.

Petitioner argues that the evidence before the BPT does not support its finding that

Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. (Pet. at 7.) A parole board’s decision satisfies the

requirements of due process if “some evidence” supports the decision.1

 McQuillion, 306 F.3d at

904 (adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985)); see also Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The evidence underlying the

board’s decision also must have some indicia of reliability. McQuillon, 306 F.3d at 904; Biggs,

334 F.3.d at 915. Most recently, in Biggs, the Ninth Circuit held that the some evidence

standard may be considered in light of the board’s decision-making process over time. See id.

at 917 (concluding that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the

circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation”).

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A. Standards for Granting Parole to Convicted Murderers in California.

In order to determine whether there was some evidence to support the BPT’s decision

that Petitioner was not suitable for parole, the Court must look to the relevant California

regulations.

California Penal Code § 3041 (b) provides:

The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity

of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of the

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

California Code of Regulations, title 15, § 2402, sets forth the criteria for determining whether

an inmate is suitable for release on parole. The opening paragraph of § 2402(a) states:

Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner

will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

Under § 2402(c), the listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole

include: 

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same

or separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after

the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates

an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted

or attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or

tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

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(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental

problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in

prison or jail.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2042(c).

Under § 2042(d), the listed circumstances tending to show suitability for parole

include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of assaulting

others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to

victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably stable

relationships with other.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate the

presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage, seeking help for

or relieving suffering of the victim, or indicating that he understands that

nature and magnitude of the offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as the result of

significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has built over a long period

of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of the crime,

the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome . . . and it appears the

criminal behavior was the result of that victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant history of

violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made realistic plans

for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon

release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability

to function within the law upon release.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d). 

The panel may consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b).

The regulations also contain a matrix of suggested base terms depending on the murder

degree and the circumstances surrounding the murder. The matrix provides three choices of

suggested base terms for several categories of crimes. See id. § 2403. For second degree

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 One axis of the matrix concerns the relationship between murderer and victim and 

the other axis of the matrix concerns the circumstances of the murder. The choices on the axis

for the relationship of murderer and victim are “participating victim,” “prior relationship,”

“no prior relationship,” and “threat to public order or murder for hire.” The choices on the

axis for the circumstances of the murder are “indirect,” “direct or victim contribution,”

“severe trauma,” or “torture.” Each of the choices are further defined in the matrix. See 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(c). 

3

 The California Supreme Court’s determination of state law is binding in a federal

habeas action. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.

510, 516-17 (1979). 

10

murders, the matrix of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years, to a high of 19, 20,

or 21 years, depending on some of the facts of the crime.2

 Although the matrix is to be used to

establish a base term, this occurs only after the prisoner has been found suitable for parole. See

id. § 2403(a). The California Supreme Court has determined that the statutory scheme places

individual suitability for parole above a prisoner’s expectancy in early setting of a fixed date

designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71.

While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., lifemaximum) sentences should “normally” receive “uniform” parole dates for

similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies “unless [the

Board] determines” that a release date cannot presently be set because the

particular offender’s crime and/or criminal history raises “public safety” concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. (Italics added.) Nothing in

the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under

standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole

date on the grounds the particular offender’s criminality presents a continuing

public danger.

Id. at 1070 (emphasis, brackets, and parentheses as in original).3

 In sum, “the Board, exercising

its traditional broad discretion, may protect public safety in each discrete case by considering

the dangerous implications of a life-maximum prisoner’s crime individually.” Id. at 1071. 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can alone

support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the prisoner

is laudable. “While the board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before

concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for

the prisoner’s release.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.

4th 616, 682-83 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) (“[t]he nature of the prisoner’s

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offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole” but might violate due

process “where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more

aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense”). 

B. Analysis.

1. The Commitment Offense.

The record before the Court does not contain a complete summary of the facts of

Petitioner’s commitment offense. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the statement

of facts by the California Court of Appeal in its opinion affirming the judgment of conviction,

People v. Jones, B047476 (March 21, 1991): 

Jones lived in a house with two roommates, Alex Morrissey and the victim,

Thomas Day. Morrissey was new to the house, but Jones and Day had been

roommates for about two years. Although Jones and Day were friends, they had

fights on occasion.

On the evening of May 29, 1989, Jones spent several hours with friends

drinking in a bar. One of the friends described him as being a little loud, but

acting normal. The group left the bar and went to the home of Bernie Hoffard

who lived across the street from Jones and Day. A friend drove Jones to

Hoffard’s house. On the way Jones showed a revolver to the friend stating that

he needed the gun for protection and asked that the gun not be mentioned to

anyone.

At Hoffard’s house the group played cards and continued to drink beer. Jones

was coherent, his speech was not slurred and he had no problem with minor

skills. Although he seemed a little angry and intoxicated, he was not out of

control. 

Hoffard’s brother complained about the noise at about 3 a.m., and the party

moved to Jones’ house across the street. The card playing and beer drinking

continued there until Day came out of his room to complain about the noise. 

Jones told Day that he paid rent too and was entitled to invite people to his

house. Jones and Day locked arms. Hoffard suggested that the party move

back to his house, but recommended that Jones call it an evening and stay home. 

Jones complied, and the others left. Morrissey, the third roommate, heard Day

tell Jones, “‘Thirty days and you are out of here.’”

Morrissey and several neighbors heard the sound of gun shots. Then Day

knocked on Morrissey’s door and asked him to call an ambulance. By the time

the ambulance arrived, Day had stopped breathing and could not be revived.

Jones left the house, and took a bicycle from a neighbor’s garage. A police

officer saw Jones riding the bicycle without any apparent balance problems. 

Jones jumped off the bicycle and began running when the officer approached. 

Another officer tackled Jones, and a gun skidded away from Jones’ body. After

he was arrested, he told the police that he did society a favor. Several days later

he told a friend that he knew what he was doing and “the dick head deserved it.”

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An autopsy performed on Day disclosed that he had been shot five times, and

that several shots had been fired into his back. A comforter removed from

Day’s bedroom contained several bullet holes caused by a gun fired somewhere

between contact and four inches away. No alcohol or illegal narcotics were

found to be present in Day’s body.

Jones did not testify at his trial. However, evidence introduced in his defense

disclosed the following:

Jones began to see Renee Grimes in December of 1988, but after a few months

the relationship deteriorated. Nevertheless, Jones remained infatuated with

Grimes and was upset because she did not want to be his girlfriend. Also,

during the few weeks prior to the shooting, Jones had missed some work

because of drinking, and was exceptionally irritable on the job. His boss told

him to take a couple of weeks off. Adding to the emotional upset was Day’s

statement that Jones had 30 days to be out of the house.

A psychologist testified that Jones had a low estimate of his own worth and

poor coping skills. Losing a girlfriend, a job and a place to live overwhelmed

his ability to cope.

At 6:30 a.m. on May 20, Jones’ blood alcohol was .26 percent. Thus, his blood

alcohol at 4 a.m. was between .28 and .32 percent. An expert testified that

alcohol substantially impairs judgment, perception and the ability to control

impulses and emotions.

(Resp. Exh. C at 1-4.)

2. Petitioner’s Prior Parole-Related Proceedings.

Petitioner first appeared before the BPT for a parole suitability hearing on November

16, 1999. The BPT found Petitioner unsuitable for parole, finding the following:

Many factors were considered. First and foremost was the commitment

offense itself. The offense was carried out in an especially cruel manner, a

manner which demonstrates a callous disregard for human suffering. These

conclusions are drawn from the Statement of Facts wherein the inmate, after

partying with his friends and abusing alcohol during the time, was involved in

an argument with his roommate culminating with the shooting of his

roommate. The victim was shot five times with several shots in the back. Of

course this resulted in killing a human being . . . . Regarding institutional

behavior, sir, I acknowledge that you have accomplished one vocation, one

vocation. And this Panel would like to see you obtain another vocation in

addition to the one you currently have. Your parole plans, you lack realistic

parole plans in that you do not have viable residential plans in the last county

of legal residence. And you don’t have acceptable employment plans. We feel

that you need shore that up, sir. You need to get solid parole plans. Also, this

Panel notes that the District Attorney from the County of Ventura is opposed to

the parole suitability. And this Panel makes the following findings: The

inmate needs therapy in order to discuss, to face, discuss, understand and cope

with stress in a nondestructive manner. Until progress is made, the prisoner

continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others.

(Resp. Exh. D at 37-39.)

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3. Petitioner’s November 19, 2002 Parole Hearing.

At the November 19, 2002 hearing, the BPT denied Petitioner parole, finding that: 

[Petitioner] is not yet suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison. The offense

was carried out in an especially cruel manner. The offense was carried out in a

dispassionate manner. The offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrates

an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. These conclusions are

drawn from the Statement of Facts, wherein the victim, Day, age 33, and the

inmate were friends and had lived together in the past. The inmate went out

partying and drinking at a bar and was brought home late in the evening drunk. 

At home he eventually had a party in his residence that woke the victim. An

argument ensued and the victim was shot five times by the inmate. The inmate

then escaped on a bicycle, and when he was arrested a few hours later, he was so

intoxicated that he indicates now that he cannot remember the facts of the

commitment offense. The prisoner has an unstable social history and prior

criminality that includes alcohol use from age 11, two arrests for alcohol rated –

alcohol related offenses. And he failed to graduate from high school, later

receiving a GED. Also the Panel notes that we received a response from the

Venture County District Attorney’s Office. Well on the 3042 notices, they

indicated that they opposed parole and were going to send another letter. 

However, they didn’t send that other letter. But they did indicate that they were

opposed. The Panel makes the following findings: The prisoner needs to continue

to participate in self-help in order to face, discuss, understand, and cope with

stress in a non-destructive manner. The prisoner should be commended for

remaining disciplinary free the entire time. No – In 13, years, no 115’s. 

Completing vocational silk screening and some business classes. He has nine

laudatory chronos from NA and AA, one laudatory chrono from the Inmate Day

Labor. He should also be commended for participating in the ongoing

participation in the video reports, and participating in the Children’s Holiday

Festival 2001. The Panel recommends that the prisoner remain disciplinary free

and continue to participate in self-help. He should also cooperate with clinicians

in the completion of a clinical evaluation. This is a one-year denial, and we’re

going to request a new psych report for the next hearing.

(Pet. Exh. A at 39-40.) 

4. Whether Some Evidence Supports the BPT’s Decision.

The BPT denied parole in 2002 based on its conclusion that Petitioner presented an

unreasonable risk or danger to others based on the nature of the commitment offense, his

unstable social history, and his prior criminality. The Court considers whether some evidence

supported the BPT’s finding of unsuitability based on these factors. The facts behind

Petitioner’s commitment offense provide “some evidence” supporting the BPT’s finding that this

offense was “carried out in a manner that demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.” (Pet. Exh. A at 39; Resp. Exh. C at 1-4.) After a night of drinking, Petitioner

returned home with a group of friends and engaged in an argument with his roommate. Angry

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and intoxicated, Petitioner shot his roommate five times, shooting him several times in the back

at close range. He then fled from the scene and ran from police. After his arrest, he showed no

remorse and in fact expressed pride in his actions to both police and a friend. Therefore, the

Court finds that the BPT’s finding regarding the nature of the commitment offense was

supported by some evidence. 

The BPT also found that Petitioner had an unstable social history and prior criminality. 

(Pet. Exh. A at 40.) This finding was based on Petitioner’s history of alcohol abuse and his

involvement in two other alcohol-related offenses. (Id. at 9, 10-11, 13.) At the hearing,

Petitioner admitted that he considers himself an alcoholic and that he began drinking alcohol at

age 15. (Id. at 9, 13.) In addition, Petitioner admitted his prior conviction for drunk driving in

1984 and his prior arrest for being intoxicated in a public place in 1986. (Id. at 10.) 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the BPT’s finding concerning Petitioner’s social history and

prior criminality was supported by some evidence. 

Although the record reflects evidence that Petitioner has worked to improve himself

while incarcerated, including remaining disciplinary-free, completing vocational silk screening

and business classes, and participating in self-help, the record also reflects evidence supporting

the BPT’s denial, including consideration of the nature of the offense committed and Petitioner’s

history of alcohol abuse. (Id. at 15-20, 40-41.) Recognizing Petitioner’s gains, the BPT stated:

“You had a very serious drinking problem and the Panel wants to be confident that when you’re

released that you’ll be able to hold on to these gains.” (Id. at 41.) The BPT’s decision to deny

Petitioner parole based on the nature of the commitment offense and Petitioner’s unstable social

history and prior criminality is supported by some evidence. Therefore, the Court concludes that

the state court’s decision denying Petitioner’s habeas petition based on the BPT’s parole

suitability determination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, or a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented.

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5. Whether the BPT’s Reliance on the Unchanging

Facts of the Crime Violates Due Process.

In finding Petitioner unsuitable for parole, the BPT relied on unchanging factors: the

commitment offense, Petitioner’s unstable social history, and his prior criminality including

alcohol use since youth. The BPT also relied on these unchanging factors among others in

finding Petitioner unsuitable for parole on November 16, 1999. (See Resp. Exh. at 37.) The

Court now turns to the question whether the BPT’s sole reliance in 2002 on the unchanging

factors amounts to a violation of due process. 

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit indicated that a continued reliance on an unchanging factor

such as the circumstances of the offense could, under certain circumstances, result in a due

process violation. 334 F.3d at 917. Biggs was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life

following a 1985 first degree murder conviction. Id. at 912. In the case before the Ninth Circuit,

Biggs challenged the 1999 decision by the BPT finding him unsuitable for parole despite his

record as a model prisoner. Id. at 913. While the Ninth Circuit rejected several of the reasons

given by the BPT for finding Biggs unsuitable, it upheld three: (1) the commitment offense

involved the murder of a witness, (2) the murder was carried out in a manner exhibiting a callous

disregard for the life and suffering of another, and (3) Biggs could benefit from therapy. Id.

However, the Ninth Circuit cautioned the BPT regarding its continued reliance on the gravity of

the offense and Biggs’s conduct prior to the offense:

As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable reliance on the

gravity of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment to justify denial of

parole can be initially justified as fulfilling the requirements set forth by state

law. Over time, however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply

because of the nature of his offense would raise serious questions involving his

liberty interest.

Id. at 916.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” Id. at 917. The Ninth Circuit did not specify what number of hearings or

years might constitute the requisite length of time to find that continuing reliance on an

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unchanging fact to deny parole amounts to a violation of due process, nor has it since. Neither

have the district courts which have addressed challenges to the denial of parole based solely on

the commitment offense. In cases similar to Biggs, however, where the denial of parole was

made at the petitioner’s first parole suitability hearing, or at the first parole suitability hearing

where the BPT relied solely on the facts of the commitment offense to deny parole, no due

process violation has been found because there was some evidence to support the BPT’s finding

and Biggs has not been addressed, see, e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232 (denial of parole at first

parole suitability hearing); or no due process violation has been found because there was some

evidence to support the BPT’s finding and the circumstances have been found not to rise to the

level of the concerns raised in Biggs, see, e.g., Hudson, 2005 WL 2035590 at *9-10 (denial of

parole at third parole suitability hearing, but first denial based solely on the facts of the

commitment offense). 

In contrast, in those cases where the petitioner has had several parole suitability hearings

over a long period of time and the BPT panel relied solely on the commitment offense to deny

parole, a violation of due process and entitlement to relief under Biggs has been found. See, e.g.,

Irons v. Warden of Cal. State Prison - Solano, 358 F. Supp. 2d 936, 947 (E.D. Cal. 2005)

(finding due process violation in denial of parole at fifth parole suitability hearing after petitioner

had served sixteen years of fifteen years to life sentence for second degree murder and met

circumstances tending to indicate suitability for parole), appeal docketed, No. 05-15275 (9th Cir.

Feb. 17, 2005); Johnson v. Finn, 2006 WL 195159, *12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2006) (finding due

process violation in denial of parole at twelfth parole suitability hearing after petitioner had

served twenty-four years of sentence of life with the possibility of parole and met circumstances

tending to indicate suitability for parole); Masoner v. State, No. CV-03-1261-ER (C.D. Cal. Jan.

23, 2004) (finding due process violation based on BPT’s “continued reliance” on pre-conviction

factors to justify denial of parole suitability after petitioner had served twenty-one years of

fifteen years to life sentence for second degree murder, had participated in therapy and self-help

programming and had impeccable prison record).

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The Court finds that Petitioner’s case here more closely resembles the facts of Biggs

than it does those cases where a due process violation has been found. At the time of his

November 19, 2002 parole denial, Petitioner had served thirteen years of a fifteen years to life

(plus two consecutive years) sentence and had only had one previous parole suitability hearing. 

Also, the denial of parole suitability at the first hearing had been based on factors in addition to

the nature of the commitment offense. While the Court can envision that at some point the facts

of Petitioner’s case may more closely resemble those cases where relief has been granted, at this

time the Court does not find that the BPT’s reliance solely on the nature of the offense in

denying Petitioner parole at his 2002 hearing violated his federal due process rights. 

Accordingly, this claim for relief is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. The clerk

shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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