Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01329/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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JKM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jo Lesly Désiré, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Eric Holder, et al., 

Respondents,

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No. CV 08-1329-PHX-SRB

ORDER

Petitioner, Jo Lesly Désiré, filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 18,

2008. Petitioner argues that the immigration removal proceedings pending against him are

barred by res judicata and by Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) own

regulations. Respondents filed their Response in Opposition to the Petition on August 18,

2008. Petitioner filed his Reply on September 13, 2008. The Magistrate Judge issued his

Report and Recommendation on January 28, 2009, recommending that the Court find that

jurisdiction is not barred by the immigration statutes, but that the Petition should be

dismissed because Petitioner is not “in custody” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

Because the Magistrate Judge concluded that jurisdiction was lacking under § 2241, the

Report and Recommendation did not reach the merits of Petitioner’s claims. 

Petitioner filed a timely Objection to the Report and Recommendation arguing that

the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that he is not “in custody” for purposes of § 2241.

Respondents also filed a timely Objection arguing that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding

Case 2:08-cv-01329-SRB Document 20 Filed 12/14/09 Page 1 of 10
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 Petitioner had not been granted a stay of removal.

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that the immigration statutes do not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a

Response to Respondents’ Objection. Respondents did not respond to Petitioner’s Objection.

The Court will overrule Respondents’ objection and adopt the Report and

Recommendation’s jurisdictional findings in part. The Court will sustain Petitioner’s

Objection and reject the Report and Recommendation’s “in custody” determination. The

matter will be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for a supplemental report and

recommendation regarding the merits of Petitioner’s res judicata claim.

I. Factual Background

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Haiti, was admitted to the United States as a lawful

permanent resident in 1967 at the age of 14. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to unlawful transport,

import, sale, administration, or gift of a controlled substance under California Health and

Safety Code § 11352(a). In August of 1999, Petitioner was taken into custody by ICE and

detained in the Eloy Detention Center until he was removed to Haiti on May 25, 2006.1

On August 16, 1999, Petitioner was charged with being removable under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined

in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (“illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”). On June 2,

2000, an immigration judge sustained the charges against Petitioner and issued an order for

his removal to Haiti. On January 17, 2001, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. On August 15, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s second petition for review and vacated the removal

order. Desire v. Gonzales, No. 03-16178, 2007 WL 2326214 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2007)

(unpublished memorandum). The Ninth Circuit held that Petitioner’s California conviction

did not qualify as an aggravated felony under either the categorical approach or the modified

categorical approach. Id.

On February 11, 2008, the BIA granted the Department of Homeland Security’s

(DHS) motion to reopen and remand Petitioner’s removal proceedings to the immigration

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judge. Although the BIA agreed with Petitioner that res judicata barred the DHS from

attempting to establish that his California conviction was an aggravated felony, it held that

res judicata did not bar the DHS from charging that the same California conviction rendered

Petitioner removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted of a controlled

substance offense. Removal proceedings are currently pending against Petitioner in the

Immigration Court in Eloy, Arizona.

Petitioner’s current status is that of a lawful permanent resident alien residing in Haiti.

Cf. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009) (removal alone does not constitute

irreparable injury justifying a stay because aliens who prevail in their petitions for review

“can be afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with restoration of the

immigration status they had upon removal”). Although there was a delay in providing

Petitioner with the necessary paperwork, on July 29, 2008, the DHS provided him with the

proper documents for reentry into the United States. Petitioner, however, must arrange and

pay for travel to the Port of Entry in Miami, Florida, which is the only place he is authorized

to enter. Moreover, upon his arrival in the United States, the Government intends to

immediately return him to Eloy, Arizona, where he will be detained pending completion of

his reopened removal proceedings.

II. Jurisdiction

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)

In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge noted that this Court

previously held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) does not bar this habeas corpus action. The

Magistrate Judge further found that even if the prior holding is not law of the case,

§ 1252(a)(5) does not bar this action because Petitioner is not challenging a final order of

removal. Respondents do not address § 1252(a)(5) in their Objections to the Report and

Recommendation and the Court finds no reason to reconsider its prior ruling on the issue.

B. 28 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)

The Magistrate Judge also determined that 28 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not deprive

the Court of jurisdiction over this action. The Magistrate Judge found that § 1252(b)(9), like

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§ 1252(a)(5), only precludes habeas corpus jurisdiction over claims challenging an order of

removal. Because Petitioner’s res judicata claim does not challenge an order of removal or

the factual and legal issues to be resolved in a removal proceeding, the Magistrate Judge

concluded that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar Petitioner’s res judicata claim. The Magistrate

Judge also determined that Petitioner’s claim that the BIA violated its own regulations when

it reopened his removal proceedings is “at least arguably” also “an ancillary challenge

beyond the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” 

Respondents object on the grounds that the plain language of § 1252(b)(9) reveals that

it was intended to preclude habeas corpus challenges not only to removal orders, but also to

removal proceedings. As the Magistrate Judge noted, this argument has been explicitly

considered and rejected by the Ninth Circuit:

By virtue of their explicit language, both §§ 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) apply

only to those claims seeking judicial review of orders of removal. Section

1252(a)(5) is prominently directed to “judicial review of an order of removal.”

Section 1252(b)(9) explicitly covers “any action taken or proceeding brought

to remove an alien.” To the extent that this language could be viewed as

broader than § 1252(a)(5), as argued by the government, we are guided by the

Supreme Court. In St. Cyr, the Court confirmed that § 1252(b)(9) “applies

only ‘with respect to review of an order of removal under [8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(1) ].’” 533 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)).

The Court further emphasized, “[s]ubsection (b)(9) simply provides for the

consolidation of issues to be brought in petitions for ‘[j]udicial review’....” Id.

The language added by the REAL ID Act does nothing to change or undermine

that analysis.

Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court therefore agrees with the

Magistrate Judge that § 1252(b)(9) only precludes habeas corpus review of challenges to an

order of removal.

Respondents also object that Singh is distinguishable because it involved a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel that arose after the entry of an administratively final order

of removal. They argue that challenges like Petitioner’s, involving claims that arose before

issuance of a final order of removal, are barred by § 1252(b)(9) because they seek review of

removal proceedings. Respondents’ temporal argument is not well taken. The fact that

Singh’s ineffective assistance claim arose after issuance of his final order of removal was

relevant in Singh only because the timing demonstrated that Singh’s “claim [could] not be

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 Because the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s regulatory claim

in the next section of this Order, it will not address it here.

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construed as seeking judicial review of his final order of removal, notwithstanding his

ultimate goal or desire to overturn that final order of removal.” Id. at 979. A claim, like

Petitioner’s, that arises prior to an order of removal may also challenge a detention that arose

independent of the removal order. See Kharana v. Chertoff, No. C07-04754, 2007 WL

4259323 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007) (a habeas corpus challenge to a conviction that

served as a basis for a removal order was not distinguishable from Singh merely because the

claim arose prior to the order of removal). Because Petitioner’s claim that his removal

proceedings are barred by res judicata does not involve a challenge to a removal order, the

Court finds that § 1252(b)(9) does not deprive it of jurisdiction.2

C. 28 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

The Magistrate Judge also rejected Respondents’ argument that this Court lacks

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Although Respondents failed to address the issue in

their objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Court will

consider it de novo because lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable defect. See

Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2006).

Subsection 1252(g) deprives the courts of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus

jurisdiction, to review “any cause or claim by or on behalf of an alien arising from the

decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or

execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The

Supreme Court has held that § 1252(g) does not “cover[] the universe of deportation claims,”

rather it “applies to only three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her

‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal

orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)

(emphasis in original). In the process of considering why Congress would deprive the courts

of jurisdiction over these three discrete actions, the Court explained that “[s]ection 1252(g)

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was directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon

prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at 485 n.9. 

In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that § 1252(g)

does not bar this action because Petitioner’s claims do not challenge the Attorney General’s

exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The Court agrees that Petitioner’s res judicata claim

does not challenge the exercise of prosecutorial discretion because the Attorney General has

no discretion to proceed with removal proceedings if they are barred by a prior Ninth Circuit

order.

In contrast, Petitioner’s regulatory claim does challenge a discretionary decision.

Petitioner claims that the DHS violated its own regulations when it granted the motion to

reopen his removal proceedings. A “‘[m]otion to reopen is discretionary.’” Lin v. Holder,

No. 08-71227, 2009 WL 4360802, *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2009) (quoting Valeriano v. Gonzales,

474 F.3d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 2007)). And a decision to reopen proceedings is effectively a

discretionary determination to “[re]commence proceedings,” which decision is not

reviewable “except as provided in [] section [§ 1252].” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Therefore, the

Ninth Circuit will have jurisdiction under § 1252(a) to review the decision to reopen for

abuse of discretion, Lin, 2009 WL 4360802 at *2, but § 1252(g) deprives this Court of

jurisdiction over the discretionary decision to reopen pursuant to the immigration regulations.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that the BIA violated its own regulations when it reopened

Petitioner’s removal proceedings will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed because Petitioner failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). In his Response

to Respondents’ Objections, Petitioner argues first that Respondents have waived the issue

by presenting it for the first time in their Objection to the Report and Recommendation.

Petitioner also asserts that the exhaustion argument is meritless because Petitioner exhausted

his administrative remedies when he asserted his res judicata claim in opposition to the

DHS’s motion to reopen filed with the BIA. 

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3

 Although the statutorily-mandated administrative exhaustion requirement applies

to both habeas corpus petitioners and those seeking direct review in the court of appeals, see

Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007), it only limits a court’s authority to

review “a final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). As noted previously, Petitioner’s res

judicata claim does not challenge an order of removal. But when administrative exhaustion

is not statutorily required, it may nonetheless be “judicially imposed as a matter of

prudence.” Puga, 488 F.3d at 815. 

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The Court agrees with Petitioner’s latter point. Even if exhaustion is required,3

Petitioner fully exhausted his administrative remedies by presenting his res judicata claim

to the BIA in opposition to Respondents’ motion to reopen. The BIA has considered and

rejected Petitioner’s res judicata claim. Nothing more is required. Accordingly, the Court

will not dismiss the Petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

IV. Custody

The Magistrate Judge recommended that this action be dismissed because Petitioner

is not “in custody” as is required to proceed with a habeas corpus petition filed under 28

U.S.C. § 2241. The Magistrate Judge initially noted that it has long been established that the

concept of being “in custody” extends beyond physical detention. The Magistrate Judge then

distinguished Petitioner’s circumstances from various cases in which a person has been found

to be “in custody” even though he or she was not physically detained under the legal

authority the person sought to challenge.

Aliens who have been deported from the United States before their habeas corpus

petitions are filed do not satisfy the “in custody” requirement of habeas corpus jurisdiction.

Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “under extreme

circumstances – when the INS removed an immigrant ‘in violation of the immigration

judge’s order and after interference with his right to counsel’ – the district court had habeas

corpus jurisdiction over an immigrant who had already been removed.” Id. (quoting Singh

v. Waters, 87 F.3d 346, 349 (9th Cir. 1996)). But the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge

that Petitioner does not meet the extreme circumstances test because his removal was lawful

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when it was effected and because Petitioner does not challenge the now-vacated removal

order that authorized his removal from the United States. 

Petitioner also argued that the fact that he was prevented from entering the United

States is a sufficient restraint on liberty to constitute “custody” for habeas corpus purposes.

See Subias v. Meese, 835 F.2d 1288, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987); but see, Samirah v. O’Connell,

335 F.3d 545, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2003) (Subias sweeps to broadly – “an alien abroad who

seeks entry into the United States must, at the very least, suffer some unique restraint that

would, in light of historical precedent constitute custody for the purposes of habeas corpus

jurisdiction”). The Magistrate Judge rejected this argument because on May 14, 2008 –

before this habeas corpus petition was filed – the Government indicated that it would permit

Petitioner to reenter the United States. Petitioner objects on the grounds that he tried, but

was unable to reenter the United States on July 21, 2008 – three days after the Petition was

filed. He argues that because he was prevented from entering the United States, he was “in

custody” when the Petition was filed. See Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir.

2005) (“if a petitioner is in custody at the time he files his federal habeas petition, his

subsequent release from custody does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction”). But there

is no allegation that the Government intentionally prevented Petitioner from entering the

United States on July 21, 2008. Petitioner was unable to reenter the United States on that

date solely because the necessary paperwork had not been processed on the date it was

promised. A simple delay in the processing of travel documents is an insufficient restraint

to constitute “custody” for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction.

The Magistrate Judge also found that the Government’s intention to return Petitioner

to detention upon his arrival in the United States does not constitute “custody” because that

detention is “prospective only” and because it is only “a possibility, not a current fact.” The

Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner’s circumstances are no different than an alien

who, while serving a federal criminal sentence in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, is

served with a DHS detainer letter, which is insufficient place an alien in DHS custody for

habeas corpus purposes. See Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 299, 303 (9th Cir. 1994), superceded

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by statute on other grounds as recognized in Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir.

1995). The Court disagrees.

The Ninth Circuit held in Garcia that a bare detainer letter is insufficient to place an

alien in INS (now DHS) “custody” for purposes of challenging future INS proceedings. But

in so holding, the court noted that a detainer letter is “issued before there is a warrant or an

order to show cause directed to the alien.” Id. A “detainer letter itself merely advises that

an investigation has been commenced and that an order to show cause and warrant will be

issued when available.” Id. Unlike a bare detainer letter, “a detainer plus a warrant does

constitute a form of custody.” Id.; Chung Young Chew, 309 F.2d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 1962)

(Where “a warrant is obtained by the [INS] while the person named is in a penal institution,

and on the basis thereof a detainer is lodged with that institution, the [INS] gains immediate

technical custody”). A bare detainer is not like a warrant because it “‘does not claim the

right to take a prisoner into custody in the future nor does it ask the warden to hold the

person for that purpose.’” Id. (quoting Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1162-66 (6th

Cir.1990)). The Garcia court noted that if immigration officials commence removal

proceedings before the alien is released from prison, “habeas corpus may then well be

available.” Garcia, 40 F.3d at 304.

Removal proceedings have been commenced and are currently pending against

Petitioner in the Immigration Court in Eloy, Arizona. He is charged with being a lawful

permanent resident who is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted

of a controlled substance offense. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), “The Attorney General shall

take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense

covered in section [1227(a)(2)(B)].” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner

is therefore subject to a provision that requires his mandatory detention pending resolution

of his immigration proceedings. He is not currently in physical detention only because the

Attorney General cannot reach him in Haiti. As soon as he arrives in the United States, the

Attorney General must take him into custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). Petitioner is

therefore effectively under an unexecuted order of detention. Moreover, that detention is

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redressable in this habeas corpus petition – if Petitioner’s removal proceedings are barred by

res judicata, he will not be subject to detention under § 1226(c). Accordingly, Petitioner is

“in custody” for purposes of this habeas corpus action.

V. Conclusion

Section 1252(g) deprives the Court of habeas corpus jurisdiction over Petitioner’s

claim that the BIA violated its own regulations when it exercised its discretion to reopen his

removal proceedings. But the immigration statutes do not deprive the Court of jurisdiction

to consider Petitioner’s claim that the reopened proceedings are barred by res judicata.

Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his res judicata claim.

Additionally, because Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, he is “in custody” for

purposes of this habeas corpus action. This matter will therefore be referred back to the

Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation on the merits of Petitioner’s res judicata

claim.

IT IS ORDERED overruling Respondents’ Objections and sustaining in part

Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED adopting in part and denying in part the Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 16) as set forth in this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Petitioner’s claim that the BIA violated

its own regulations when it exercised its discretion to reopen his removal proceedings.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED referring this matter to Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin

for a report and recommendation on the merits of Petitioner’s res judicata claim.

DATED this 11th day of December, 2009.

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