Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00267/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00267-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Jay Cohn,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00267-PHX-DLR (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

AND ORDER

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Michael Jay Cohn’s (“Petitioner”) Amended 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Amended Petition”) 

(Doc. 10). Respondents have filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 36), and Petitioner has 

replied (Doc. 38).1

 The matter is deemed ripe for consideration. 

Petitioner raises four grounds for habeas relief in the Amended Petition. The 

1 After filing his Reply, Petitioner filed “Documents Supporting Post Conviction Rehabilitation” (Doc. 48), docketed as “Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus.” Petitioner also filed a number of “notices,” most of which pertain to 

Petitioner’s claim that conditions within the Arizona Department of Corrections’ prison 

facilities are constitutionally inadequate. (Docs. 39-47, 49-51). Petitioner has not sought leave of Court to supplement his Amended Petition or Reply. Respondents have not 

responded to or moved to strike the notices. The “notices” may be considered 

unauthorized sur-replies and may be stricken by the Court. However, the undersigned has reviewed and considered the notices in making the recommendations contained 

herein. The undersigned will order that Petitioner is prohibited from filing any more 

notices without prior leave of the Court.

 

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undersigned finds that the all of the grounds are procedurally defaulted. It is therefore 

recommended that the Amended Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On November 25, 2013, Petitioner signed a plea agreement in which Petitioner 

pled guilty to second degree murder, a class 1 felony, in violation of Arizona law. (Doc. 

36-1 at 6-7). The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea. (Id. at 9-11, 39-50). On 

February 21, 2014, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a fifteen-year term of 

imprisonment. (Id. at 69-111). Petitioner did not file a notice for post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”) in the trial court.2

 (Doc. 182-85). Petitioner’s conviction and sentence thus 

became final on May 22, 2014. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4 (deadline for filing a PCR notice 

in an of-right PCR proceeding is “ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence 

within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or mandate by the appellate court in 

the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.”). 

On March 26, 2015, Petitioner filed the Amended Petition seeking federal habeas 

relief.3

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

A. Federal Habeas Relief is Unavailable to Challenges to the Conditions of 

Confinement

Federal law “unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a writ of 

habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 

1, 5 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the 

2 Under Arizona law, a defendant in a non-capital case who pleads guilty waives his or her right to a direct appeal. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–4033(B). A plea-convicted 

defendant, however, is entitled to an of-right PCR proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 

and 32.4. 

3 Respondents do not argue, and the undersigned does not find, that this habeas proceeding is untimely under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The statute of limitations is codified 

at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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exclusive avenue for a state court prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of his 

detention, even when the petition only challenges the execution of the sentence and not 

the underlying conviction itself. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1005, 1009 (9th Cir.

2004) (adopting the majority view that distinguishes between a federal prisoner’s ability 

to resort to § 2241 to attack the execution of a sentence and the structural differences in 

the habeas statutes that make a state prisoner’s resort to § 2241 improper to challenge the 

execution of a state sentence). However, “constitutional claims that merely challenge the 

conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive 

relief” are not cognizable in a Section 2254 habeas petition. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 

U.S. 637, 643 (2004) (emphasis added). Those claims instead should be presented in a 

civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.; Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 

749, 750 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars 

affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus . . . . [R]equests for relief turning 

on the circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action.”).

B. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

For over a century, it has been settled that a “state prisoner must normally exhaust 

available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal 

courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 

U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 

734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). 

The rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 

U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to 

review and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some 

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circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”).

C. Procedural Default Doctrine

If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state 

procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in 

a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the 

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state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

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than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). 

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. All Four Grounds are Procedurally Defaulted

Petitioner presents the following four grounds for habeas relief in the Amended 

Petition: 

Ground One: “Deprivation of 8th amendment rights by court policy 

and sentencing decision.” (Doc. 10 at 6). 

Ground Two: “Deprivation of 6th & 14th amendment due process 

rights/spoilage of evidence. Ineffectiveness of 

counsel, failure to submit all mitigating evidence to 

the court and ensure the courts understanding of the 

evidence.” (Id. at 7).

Ground Three: “Deprivation of access to counsel by the staff of the 

Maricopa Co. Jail (6th & 14th amendments).” (Id. at 

8).

Ground Four: “Deprivation of 8th amendment right to access bail 

bond. Deprivation of Supremacy Clause superceding 

state statute.” (Id. at 9).

To satisfy the exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine, Petitioner, who is a pleaconvicted defendant, must have presented the above claims to the trial court in a PCR 

petition. Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (“to exhaust one’s state 

court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or 

collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 

32”). Then, Petitioner must have petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of 

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the trial court’s ruling on the PCR petition. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005) (in noncapital cases, “claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for 

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”) 

(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). Claims that have 

been presented to the trial court, but not to the Arizona Court of Appeals are not 

exhausted. Id.; Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“To provide the State with the 

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate 

state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim”).

Here, Petitioner has not filed a PCR petition in the trial court. (Doc. 36-1 at 182-

85). Beginning in December 2014, however, Petitioner has filed a number of other 

documents in the trial court: 

1. “Notice of Intent to File Motion for Change of Jurisdiction,” filed on 

December 24, 2014. (Id. at 121-22). As the notice did not request relief, the 

trial court took no action. (Id. at 124).

2. “Motion for Order to Compel Access to legal resources, etc,” filed on January 

14, 2015. (Id. at 126-28). The trial court denied the Motion, finding that 

Petitioner would only be entitled to the relief requested in the Motion through a 

Petition for Special Action. (Id. at 155).

3. “Motion for Change of Jurisdiction to U.S. District Ct.,” filed on January 21, 

2015. (Id. at 130-51). Concluding that there is no pending issue for which a 

transfer of jurisdiction would be available, the trial court denied the Motion. 

(Id. at 175).

4. “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,” filed on August 11, 2015. (Id. at 

159-73). Because there was no pending motion for which summary judgment 

would be available, the trial court denied the Motion. (Id. at 177).

5. “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” filed on May 15, 2015. (Id. at 179-80). 

The trial court denied the Petition after finding that there is no showing that 

Petitioner is illegally held or restrained. (Doc. 38-1 at 6).

In his Reply, Petitioner asserts that his grounds for habeas relief have been 

exhausted in light of above state court filings. (Doc. 38 at 10-11). Yet none of the filings 

are a PCR notice or petition. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38. Further, Petitioner concedes that 

he has not sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 6-9). Thus, none of the 

grounds have been exhausted. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998.

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Respondents assert that all four grounds are technically exhausted, but 

procedurally defaulted because Petitioner would be precluded from post-conviction relief 

on all four grounds under Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (Doc. 36 at 14). Rules 32.2(b) and 

32.4(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P., do not bar untimely claims that fall within the categories set 

forth in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d) through (h):

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or 

sentence. Newly discovered material facts exist if:

(1). The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2). The defendant exercised due diligence in 

securing the newly discovered material facts.

(3). The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for 

impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence 

substantially undermines testimony which was 

of critical significance at trial such that the 

evidence probably would have changed the 

verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant’s failure to file a notice of post-conviction

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed 

time was without fault on the defendant’s part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably 

overturn the defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be 

sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would 

have found defendant guilty of the underlying offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would not 

have imposed the death penalty.

Petitioner does not assert that any of the above exceptions apply to his claims. 

Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply. All four grounds are deemed 

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procedurally defaulted.4 Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a claim is procedurally defaulted “if the 

petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be 

required to present his claims in order to meet the requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1)). 

B. Petitioner’s Procedural Default is Not Excused

The merits of a habeas petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims are to be 

reviewed if the petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to consider the federal 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 

903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013). 

In the Amended Petition, Petitioner explains that he did not raise the issues 

presented in the Amended Petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals because his “legal 

research required more than 90 days post sentencing so I could not seek relief per [Ariz. 

R. Crim. P.] 32.” (Doc. 10 at 6-9). Petitioner’s status as a pro se litigant does not exempt 

Petitioner from the “cause and prejudice” standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir.1986). In other words, the fact that Petitioner is 

pro se and “mostly self-taught in the law” (Doc. 38 at 11) does not constitute cause. Id. 

at 909 (cause not established in case of illiterate petitioner who relied on the assistance of 

another inmate who was released); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.

1988) (illiterate petitioner with a mental condition who relied upon incompetent 

“jailhouse lawyers” failed to show cause). Petitioner has not shown that an objective 

factor external to Petitioner impeded with his efforts to file a PCR notice. Petitioner has 

therefore failed to show cause for his procedural defaults. Where a petitioner fails to 

4 In addition, it appears that the gravamen of Ground One is Petitioner’s challenge to the conditions of confinement. In the “Supporting Facts” section, Petitioner alleges that the trial judge sentenced him “to a medically hostile, dangerous and inadequate prison (Arizona Dept. of Corrections).” (Doc. 10 at 6). To the extent that Ground One 

does not attack the legality or duration of his confinement, habeas relief is unavailable. 

See Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 386-87 (7th Cir. 2005) (habeas corpus unavailable to prisoner seeking transfer to a different institution); see also Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 

573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A civil rights action, in contrast [to a habeas petition], is the 

proper method of challenging ‘conditions of . . . confinement’ ”).

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establish cause, the Court need not consider whether the petitioner has 

shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner 

has not satisfied the “cause and prejudice” exception to excuse his procedural defaults.

To satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, Petitioner must show 

that “a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who 

is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Petitioner states that “it is possible 

Petitioner was poisoned, resulting in sudden, aggressive, uncontrollable behavior.” (Doc. 

38 at 12). To the extent Petitioner argues that the miscarriage of justice exception should 

be applied to excuse Petitioner’s procedural defaults, Petitioner does not proffer any new 

evidence to support actual innocence. Petitioner’s speculation regarding whether he was 

poisoned is insufficient to satisfy the miscarriage of justice exception.

5

 Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 324 (“To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.”). After 

reviewing the record, the undersigned finds no evidence showing that a constitutional 

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of an innocent man. The undersigned 

thus finds the miscarriage of justice exception inapplicable to this case. Wood, 693 F.3d 

at 1117. Consequently, the undersigned recommends that the Court not excuse 

Petitioner’s procedural defaults.

5 Moreover, it is unclear “whether the Schlup actual innocence gateway always applies to petitioners who plead guilty.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 n. 9 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“We are aware of a potential incongruity between the purpose of the actual 

innocence gateway announced in Schlup and its application to cases involving guilty (or no contest) pleas. . . . For purposes of our analysis, however, we assume without deciding that the actual innocence gateway is available to [the plea-convicted habeas 

petitioner].”). Decisions in which the Ninth Circuit or United States Supreme Court have considered gateway claims of actual innocence in a plea context involved subsequent 

case law that arguably rendered the defendant’s acts non-criminal. See, e.g. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-23 (1998); Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F .3d 1131, 1134-35 

(9th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Avery, 719 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2013).

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss the Amended Petition with prejudice. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner is prohibited from filing any additional “notices” 

or supplementary information in this case without prior leave of the Court. Failure to 

comply with this order may result in the filed document being stricken by the Court. 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition (Doc. 10) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and the undersigned finds that jurists of reason would 

not find it debatable whether the Court was correct in its procedural ruling.6

Effect of Recommendation 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

6 “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without 

reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [Certificate of Appealability] 

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

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District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 16th day of February, 2016. 

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