Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00301/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00301-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN C. THOMPSON, 

 Plaintiff,

 v.

J. GONZALES, et al., 

 Defendants.

1:15-cv-00301-EPG-PC

 

ORDER FINDING COGNIZABLE 

CLAIMS 

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO EITHER:

 (1) FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT,

 (2) NOTIFY COURT OF HIS 

WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY 

AGAINST DEFENDANTS GONZALES, 

PEREZ, AND JOHNSON FOR 

CONSPIRACY AND RETALIATION

OR

 (3) NOTIFY COURT THAT HE 

STANDS ON THE COMPLAINT, 

SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS 

CONSISTENT WITH THIS ORDER

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff John C. Thompson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed a 

complaint commencing this action on February 25, 2015.

1

 (ECF No. 1.) In that complaint, 

 

1 On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), and no other parties have made an appearance. (ECF No. 6.) Therefore, pursuant to 

Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of California, the undersigned shall conduct any and 

all proceedings in the case until such time as reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix 

A(k)(3).

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Plaintiff asserts that correctional officer defendants planted a cellphone charger in his cell in 

retaliation for Plaintiff exercising his freedom of speech at a prison-sanctioned meeting with 

the warden, during which Plaintiff complained about those correctional officers.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff‟s allegations are 

taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id. 

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III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The events at issue in Plaintiff‟s Complaint allegedly occurred at Corcoran State Prison 

(CSP) when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the custody of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff names as defendants Sergeant J. Gonzales, 

Correctional Officer (C/O) D. Perez, C/O B. Johnson, and C/O R. Roque (collectively, 

“Defendants”). Defendants were all employed by the CDCR at CSP during the relevant time. 

Plaintiff‟s allegations follow.

Plaintiff alleges that on June 26, 2014, he attended a meeting with the Warden, his 

administrative staff, and the inmate-constituted Men‟s Advisory Council (“MAC”). The MAC

is a lawfully constituted and legally mandated group of inmate liaisons to meet with prison 

officials to discuss issues concerning the prison population. 

After addressing various agenda items, the Warden opened the floor to an “open 

forum,” in which an inmate Bowlin and also Plaintiff discussed a number of complaints from 

the prison population. One complaint concerned misconduct on the part of facility 3A staff 

involving excessive use of force. Plaintiff specifically complained regarding conduct of 

defendants Sergeant J. Gonzales and C/O B. Johnson. 

On June 29, 2014, Defendants Gonzales, Johnson and Perez searched Inmate Bowlin‟s 

cell, left it in disarray, and confiscated some of his personal property. When asked why 

defendants had searched Inmate Bowlin‟s cell, Defendant Gonzales replied, “Go complain

about that at your next Warden‟s meeting.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

Defendants Gonzales, Johnson and Perez then went to Plaintiff‟s cell, escorted Plaintiff 

to the shower, stripped him naked, and proceeded to search Plaintiff‟s cell. Defendants 

Gonzales, Perez, and Johnson left after thirty minutes with a bag of trash and an extension cord.

Later that day, defendant R. Roque generated a cell search receipt, which claimed that 

defendant Roque had searched Plaintiff‟s cell and confiscated contraband including an altered 

extension cord and cellphone charger. When confronted, Defendant Roque claimed he had 

nothing to do with the cell search receipt and had not participated in the search. Defendant 

Roque claimed he had only delivered the cell search receipt to Plaintiff. 

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On July 2, 2014, Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation Report for possession of a 

cellphone charger. Plaintiff was initially found guilty, but that finding was vacated by the 

Chief Disciplinary Officer. Plaintiff was ultimately found not guilty. Defendants never 

produced any cell phone during the investigation into the Rules Violation Report. 

The Rules Violation Report was authored by Defendant Perez. Defendant Perez also 

asked for Plaintiff to be removed from the MAC. 

Defendant Gonzales also intercepted Inmate Bowlin‟s appeal and summoned Inmate 

Bowlin to the program office. Defendant Gonzales told Inmate Bowlin that the retaliation was 

now over for Inmate Bowlin but that Plaintiff “would have to ride his own.” (ECF No. 1 at 9.)

Defendant Gonzales then replaced Inmate Bowlin‟s property and tore up Inmate Bowlin‟s 

appeal.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state 

law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A 

person „subjects‟ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to 

perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint 

is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “In a § 1983 action, the 

plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the actionable cause of the 

claimed injury. To meet this causation requirement, the plaintiff must establish both causationin-fact and proximate causation.” Harper v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008)

(internal citations omitted). Proximate cause requires “'some direct relation between the injury 

asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”' Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 

1, 130 S. Ct. 983, 989, 991 (2010) (quoting Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 

268 (1992)).

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A. Retaliation

Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under 

section 1983. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). 

Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)

(footnote omitted).

The prisoner need not demonstrate a total chilling of his First Amendment rights in 

order to establish a retaliation claim. See id. at 568-69 (rejecting argument that inmate did not 

state a claim for relief because he had been able to file inmate grievances and a lawsuit). That a 

prisoner‟s First Amendment rights were chilled, though not necessarily silenced, is enough. Id.

at 569. To prove retaliation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant took adverse action 

against him that “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

Amendment activities.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)).

A prisoner‟s § 1983 retaliation claim must rest on proof that he was retaliated against 

for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate 

penological interest. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997). The prisoner

bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the 

conduct of which he complains. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995).

B. Analysis

The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim for retaliation against Defendants 

Gonzales, Perez and Johnson. The allegations in Plaintiff‟s complaint, construed in Plaintiff‟s 

favor and accepted as true for the purposes of screening his complaint, would establish that 

those three defendants were acting as prison officials and took an adverse action by searching 

Plaintiff‟s cell and fabricating evidence regarding contraband because Plaintiff as a prisoner 

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expressed his opinions about their conduct in an appropriate setting. Although there may be 

factual questions regarding whether this action chilled Plaintiff‟s exercise of his rights, the facts 

indicate that the actions were taken for the purpose of chilling such rights—i.e., stopping 

Plaintiff from complaining about excessive force by these defendants. Plaintiff‟s allegations 

also indicate that the cell search and contraband allegation did not advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.

That said, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has stated a retaliation claim against 

Defendant Roque. The complaint alleges that Defendant Roque delivered a cell search receipt 

indicating contraband, but denied any involvement besides delivering the receipt. Those facts 

alone do not set out a violation of constitutional rights or an intent to chill Plaintiff‟s 

constitutional rights. 

C. Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Gonzales, Perez, Johnson, and Roque conspired 

together to retaliate against him. In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to 

section 1983, a complaint must “allege [some] facts to support the existence of a conspiracy 

among the defendants.” Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff 

must allege that defendants conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was 

done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 

1974).

A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof of “„an agreement or 

meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,‟” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-

41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v. 

Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, 

Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “„To be liable, each participant in the 

conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share

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the common objective of the conspiracy.‟” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel 

Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

Plaintiff has alleged facts supporting the allegation that Defendants Gonzales, Perez, 

and Johnson entered into an agreement or had a meeting of the minds to violate Plaintiff's 

constitutional rights. However, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that 

defendant Roque entered into an agreement to retaliate against Plaintiff for exercising his First 

Amendment rights. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint states cognizable claims 

against Defendants Gonzales, Perez, and Johnson for conspiracy to retaliate and for retaliation 

against Plaintiff for the exercise of a First Amendment right. However, Plaintiff fails to state 

any claim against Defendant Roque.

Plaintiff shall be required to either file an Amended Complaint, or notify the Court of 

his willingness to proceed only on the conspiracy and retaliation claims against Defendants 

Gonzales, Perez, and Johnson as found cognizable by the Court. Should Plaintiff choose to 

proceed only on the cognizable claims, the Court will begin the process to initiate service upon 

Defendants Gonzales, Perez, and Johnson.

Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, the Amended Complaint should be 

brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . 

. . to „state a claim that is plausible on its face.‟” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). There is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her 

own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis 

added). Plaintiff should state clearly, in his own words, what happened and how each 

defendant‟s actions violated the particular right described by Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purposes of adding allegations of events occurring or claims arising after the original 

Complaint. Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in 

his amended complaint. In addition, Plaintiff should take care to include only those claims that 

were administratively exhausted before he filed the initial Complaint on February 25, 2015. 

If Plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended 

complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F. 3d 896, 907 

n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superceded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the prior

complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in 

an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of 

perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

either:

(1) File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this 

order,

(2) Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is instead willing to proceed only on the cognizable 

conspiracy and retaliation claims against defendants Gonzales, Perez, 

and Johnson discussed above, or

(3) Notify the Court in writing that he stands on the Complaint as filed, 

subject to dismissal of claims consistent with this order;

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3. Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 

1:15-cv-0301-EPG-PC; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action may be dismissed for 

failure to comply with a Court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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