Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03247/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03247-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 196
Nature of Suit: Franchise
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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28 1 "Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), when an action is filed in the wrong

district, the district court may dismiss the action, or, for the convenience of

parties and witnesses, as well as in the interests of justice, the district court

may use its discretion to transfer a civil action to any other district where it

might have been properly brought." Grandinetti v. Bauman, 2007 WL 676012, at *5

WO

 

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Best Western International, )

Inc., )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 05-3247-PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Kantilal J. Govan and Aruna )

K. Govan, husband and wife, )

)

Defendants. ) )

Introduction

On August 29, 2006, this court denied a motion by defendants,

Kantilal and Aruna Govan, to dismiss this action based upon

improper venue pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). See Best

Western International, Inc. v. Govan, 2006 WL 2523460, at *6

(D.Ariz. Aug. 29, 2006) ("Govan I"). The court also denied

defendants' alternative motion to transfer venue to the Eastern

District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).1

 See id. 

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(D.Hawai'i Feb. 28, 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). 

2 Fed. R. App. P. 5(a)(3) authorizes a party to, among other things,

"petition for permission to appeal" where that party has first received district

court certification allowing an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1292(b). 

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Currently pending before the court is defendants' motion

pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 52

 to amend that order to allow an

interlocutory appeal in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 

(doc. 15). More specifically, defendants are requesting that as

section 1292(b) permits, this court amend Govan I to add the

following language:

The Court is of the opinion that this 

Order involves a controlling question 

of law as to which there is a substantial 

ground for difference of opinion and that an 

immediate appeal from this Order as authorized 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) may materially advance 

the ultimate termination of this litigation.

Id. at 4. 

Having carefully considered defendants' motion, plaintiff's

response thereto (doc. 21), as well as defendants' reply (doc. 23),

the court rules as follows.

Background

As explained more fully in Govan I, familiarity with which is

assumed, in the winter of 2001, defendants entered into a

"Membership Application and Agreement" with plaintiff Best Western

International, Inc. Complt. (doc. 1), exh. 1 thereto. "Best

Western is an Arizona non-profit corporation doing business in the

State of Arizona." Id., exh. 1 thereto at ¶ 2.

As a result of that Agreement, defendants became a member of

Best Western. As part of their membership privileges defendants

were licensed to use Best Western's "symbols" in connection with a

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hotel which they owned and operated in Madera, California. See id.

at 18. In addition to allowing defendants to use those symbols,

pursuant to that Agreement Best Western provided them with a host

of services, such a worldwide satellite reservation system and

worldwide marketing campaigns. 

That Agreement included a "Choice of Forum" clause which, as

noted in Govan I, specifically states that defendants

"acknowledge[] that Best Western is headquartered in Phoenix,

Arizona, that the majority of Best Western's records and employees

are in Phoenix, Arizona, and that Phoenix, Arizona is the most

convenient locale for actions between Best Western and

[defendants]." Id., at 19, ¶ 38. Although not mentioned in Govan

I, that clause further provides in relevant part that: 

UNLESS WAIVED BY BEST WESTERN IN WHOLE 

OR IN PART, . . . VENUE SHALL BE IN THE COURTS

[STATE OR FEDERAL] LOCATED IN MARICOPA COUNTY, 

ARIZONA. [DEFENDANTS] EXPRESSLY CONSENT[] AND 

SUBMIT[] TO THE JURISDICTION OF SAID COURTS 

AND TO VENUE BEING IN MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Defendants allegedly breached that Membership Agreement, and

thus Best Western commenced this action in the Superior Court of

Arizona, Maricopa County. See Complt. (doc. 1), exh. 1 thereto. 

Defendants removed to this district court asserting federal

jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Shortly after removal defendants then moved

to dismiss this action for improper venue in accordance with Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Alternatively, defendants moved for a transfer

of this action to the Eastern District of California pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

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3 That statute provides:

 A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only 

on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise 

provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district

where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in 

the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial 

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, 

or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the 

action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any 

defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the 

action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action 

may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). 

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In moving to dismiss for improper venue, defendants argued

"that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a),3

 venue . . . is only proper in

California because" they "are both California residents, . . . the

hotel at issue . . . is located in California, and . . . all of

Defendants' alleged actions/inactions, as well as Plaintiff's

investigation thereof, took place in California." Govan I, 2006 WL

2523460, at *3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

(footnote added). Defendants further argued that the Agreement's

forum selection clause is "unconscionable because it is one-sided

and invalid under the California Franchise Relations Act [("the

Act")]." Id. (citations omitted). That Act reads as follows: 

A provision in a franchise agreement 

restricting venue to a forum outside 

this state is void with respect to any 

claim arising under or relating to a 

franchise agreement involving a franchise 

business operating within this state.

Id. (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20040.5 (West 1997)). 

In urging repudiation of the Agreement's forum selection

clause, defendants relied heavily upon Jones v. GNC Franchising,

Inc., 211 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2000), as they continue to on this

motion. As more fully explained in Govan I, the Ninth Circuit in

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Jones held that the Act "expresses a strong public policy of the

State of California to protect California franchisees from the

expense, inconvenience, and possible prejudice of litigating in a

non-California venue." Id. at 498. The Jones Court further held

that a forum selection clause which "requires a California

franchisee to resolve claims related to the franchise agreement in

a non-California court directly contravene[d] th[at] strong public

policy and [wa]s unenforceable under the directive of [the Supreme

Court in] Bremen." Id. On that basis, the Ninth Circuit affirmed

the district court's denial of a franchisor's motion to dismiss or

transfer venue under section 1406(a) based upon a contractual forum

selection clause. Id. In Govan I, the defendants urged this court

to reach the same result as did the Court in Jones. See Govan I,

2006 WL 2523460 at *3. 

This court declined to apply the Jones reasoning to the

present case, however. In denying defendants' motion to dismiss

for improper venue, this court expressly "concur[red] with

Plaintiff's assertion that venue in cases removed from state court

[is] governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), rather than 28 U.S.C. §

1391." Id. *4 (citing Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S.

663, 665 (1953)). Section 1441(a) states in relevant part that

"[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any

civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts

of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by

the . . . defendants, to the district court of the United States

for the district and division embracing the place where such action

is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a). In light of the foregoing, and

because "[d]efendants d[id] not challenge . . . venue under . . .

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[section] 1441(a)[,]" this court concluded that it "need not

analyze Defendants' argument regarding whether the enforcement of

the forum selection clause would contravene a 'strong public

policy' of California." Govan I, 2006 WL 2523460, at *5. This

court also denied defendants' alternative motion to transfer venue

as section 1404(a) permits. See id. at *5 - *6. 

Discussion

I. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

"'Section 1292(b) provides a mechanism by which litigants can

bring an immediate appeal of a non-final order upon the consent of

both the district court and the court of appeals.'" Kight v.

Eskanos & Adler, P.C., 2007 WL 173825, at *2 (S.D.Cal. Jan. 8,

2007) (quoting In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020,

1025-26 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc)). Certification of a nonappealable order under section 1292(b) is appropriate where the

order (1) "involves a controlling question of law[;]" (2) "as to

which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion[;]"

and (3) "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance

the ultimate termination of the litigation[.]" See 28 U.S.C. §

1292(b); see also Cement Antitrust, 673 F.2d at 1026. "All three

requirements must be met for certification to issue[]" under that

statute. Kight, 2007 WL 173825, at *2 (citation omitted). 

In United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959),

the seminal Ninth Circuit case on certification, the Court noted

"[t]hat § 1292(b) is to be applied sparingly and only in

exceptional cases[.]" Id. at 788 n.11 (citations omitted). This

view is consistent with the legislative history of section 1292(b)

which supports caution in its application. "[I]n passing this

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legislation Congress did not intend that the courts abandon the

final judgment doctrine and embrace the principle of piecemeal

appeals." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Thus, as the Ninth Circuit has more recently observed,

because"[s]ection 1292(b) is a departure from the normal rule that

only final judgments are appealable," it "must be construed

narrowly." James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1068

n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). Section 1292(b) certification "is intended

to be 'used only in exceptional situations in which allowing an

interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and expensive

litigation.'" Kight, 2007 WL 173825, at *1 (quoting Cement

Antitrust, 673 F.2d at 1026); see also In re Related Asbestos

Cases, 23 B.R. 523, 532 (N.D.Cal. 1982) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted) ("Certification under 1292(b) is intended to

be used in the few situations where an immediate appeal . . . would

more speedily terminate the litigation.") "'It is not thought that

district judges would grant the certificate in ordinary litigation

which could otherwise be promptly disposed of or that mere

question[s] as to the correctness of the ruling would prompt the

granting of the certificate.'" Lopritz v. CMT Blues, 271 F.Supp.2d

1252, 1254 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Woodbury, 263 F.2d at 785 n.2

(quoting in turn S.Rep. No. 2434 91958), reprinted in 1958

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5260). More succinctly put, section 1292(b)

was not intended "'merely to provide review of difficult rulings in

hard cases.'" Environmental Protection, 2004 WL 838160, at *2

(quoting United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th

Cir. 1966)). Consequently, only "[i]n rare circumstances" may a

district court "allow an immediate appeal of an interlocutory

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order." Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v.

Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 2007 WL 1119193, at *2 (N.D.Cal.

April 16, 2007) (citing James, 283 F.3d at 1068, n.6). 

"The decision to certify an order for interlocutory appeal is

committed to the sound discretion of the district court." United

States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 2004 WL 3030121, at *1 (C.D.Cal.

Dec. 27, 2004) (citing Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S.

35, 47 (1995)). Hence, "a district court's denial of a motion to

certify a decision for immediate appeal under section 1292(b) is

not reviewable by the appellate court." Environmental Protection

Information Center v. Pacific Lumber Co., 2004 WL 838160, at *2,

n.6 (N.D.Cal. April 19, 2004) (citing Executive Software v. U.S.

Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1550 (9th Cir. 1994)). By the same

token, however, "[e]ven where the district court makes such a

certification, the court of appeals nevertheless has discretion to

reject the interlocutory appeal, and does so quite frequently." 

James, 283 F.3d at 1068, n.6 (citation omitted). With these

standards firmly in mind, the court will consider whether

defendants have met the three criteria necessary for section

1292(b) certification. 

A. "Controlling Question of Law"/"May Materially Advance the 

Ultimate Termination of the Litigation"

"Congress did not specifically define what it meant by

'controlling'" as used in section 1292(b). See Cement Antitrust,

673 F.2d at 1026. Likewise, "[t]he Ninth Circuit's guidance as to

what constitutes a controlling question of law is minimal." Sierra

Foothills Public Utility District v. Clarendon American Insurance

Company, 2006 WL 2085244, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2006). It is

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well settled, however, that "[t]he issue need not be 'dispositive

of the lawsuit in order to be regarded as controlling[.]'" Id. at

*2 (quoting Woodbury, 263 F.2d at 787-88). But at the same time,

the issue "cannot be 'collateral to the basic issues of [the]

case.'" Id. In this Circuit "all that must be shown in order for a

question to be 'controlling' is that resolution of the issue on

appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the

district court.'" Kight, 2007 WL 173825, at *2 (quoting Cement

Antitrust, 673 F.2d at 1026). Thus, it is clear is that "'at the

very least, a controlling question of law must encompass every

order which, if erroneous, would be reversible error on final 

appeal.'" Sierra Foothills, 2006 WL 2085244, at *2 (quoting Cement

Antitrust, 673 F.2d at 1026) (other citation omitted). 

"The third requirement for an interlocutory appeal -- that the

appeal must be likely to materially speed the termination of the

litigation -- is closely linked to the question of whether an issue

of law is 'controlling,' because the district court should consider

the effect of a reversal on the management of the case." L.H.

Meeker v. Belridge Water Storage District, 2007 WL 781889, at *6

(E.D. Cal. March 13, 2007) (citing Cement Antitrust, 673 F.2d at

1026); see also Environmental Protection Information, 2004 WL

838160, at *3 n. 7 (A "court must assess whether immediate

appellate reversal will speed the outright disposition of [an]

action (even if this conflates the 'controlling issue' analysis

with the 'speed disposition' one").") Given this close link, the

court will jointly address the first and third elements necessary

for certification under section 1292(b). The court will then

address the third element -- whether there exists a substantial

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ground for difference of opinion. 

Defendants baldly assert that this court's "determination that

venue is proper in Arizona, notwithstanding California's Franchise

Relations Act, is a legal decision that presents a controlling

question of law of utmost importance." Doc. 15 at 3. Defendants

further contend that if the court denies this motion, and if they

ultimately succeed on appeal, "then the entire case may have to be

litigated a second time[.]" Id. at 4. Based upon the foregoing,

evidently it is defendants' position that this court's venue

determination in Govan I constitutes reversible error. Hence, the

venue issue amounts to a controlling question of law because its

disposition on appeal will materially affect the outcome of this

litigation. Resolution of the venue issue will also, from

defendants' standpoint, materially advance the ultimate termination

of this litigation. 

Framing the challenged issue differently, Best Western

counters that Govan I does not involve a "controlling question of

law" because reversal of the "the question [of] whether 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a), rather than 28 U.S.C. § 1391 controls venue in removed

cases would . . . have no effect whatsoever on the outcome of the

litigation[.]" Doc. 21 at 3 (emphasis added). Furthermore,

according to Best Western an immediate appeal would not materially

advance the termination of this litigation. Indeed, such an appeal

would have the opposite effect in that it would "unnecessarily

protract[] the case and increase[] the cost of this litigation." 

Id. at 4. 

 In their reply, defendants state that Best Western is under

the "mistaken impression that the legal issue [they] seek to appeal

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is whether 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) controls venue in removed cases." 

Doc. 23 at 1. Defendants are "not contest[ing] the general initial

application of § 1441(a) to venue in removed cases[.]" Id. In fact,

they expressly concede that that issue is not a "controlling

question of law worthy of interlocutory appeal." Id. Rather, as

defendants frame it, the "controlling issue of law" which does

warrant granting this certification motion "is whether a franchisor

doing business in California may sidestep that state's important

public policy against forum selection clauses for its franchisees,

as enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Jones . . . , by filing a

lawsuit in the franchisor's choice state court." Id.3 at 1-2

(citation omitted). 

Regardless of how the issue for certification is defined,

there is case law to support defendants' position that if venue is

found to be improper on appeal, the result will be reversal. See,

e.g. Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491

(9th Cir. 1979) (on interlocutory appeal Court reversed district

court's denial of summary judgment based on improper venue); and

Bechtel v. Liberty National Bank, 534 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976)

(reversing judgment on the merits after trial where district court

improperly denied a defendant's motion to dismiss for improper

venue). In fact, in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v.

Witherspoon, 2005 WL 2709508 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 20, 2005),

reconsideration denied, 2005 WL 3470653 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 19, 2005),

the court granted a motion for an interlocutory appeal of its order

denying defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue. In

certifying that appeal the court found that "an immediate appeal"

of the venue issue would "materially advance the ultimate

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termination of th[at] litigation . . . because a reversal by the

Ninth Circuit of this court's ruling on intra-district venue may

result in the vacation of any substantive rulings made by this

court and the transfer of this action to the Sacramento Division."

Id. at 8( (citing, inter alia, Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.,

346 U.S. 338, 74 S.Ct. 83 (1953)).

On the other hand, case law exists supporting Best Western's

opposing view, i.e. venue issues do not involve controlling

questions of law; nor do they materially advance the termination of

litigation. For example, in Graves v. C & S National Bank of

Georgia, 491 F.Supp. 280 (D.S.C. 1980), the court denied

plaintiffs' motion for an interlocutory appeal of its order finding

that venue was improper under the National Bank Act's venue

provision. In denying that motion, the Graves court held that the

venue issue was not a "controlling question" because "the decision

as to whether venue [wa]s proper and transfer appropriate [wa]s not

determinative of th[at] . . . case." Id. at 282. Likewise, the

court found that venue "relate[d] to [a] preliminary matter . . .

as opposed to any determinative legal issue in the case itself." 

Id. at 283. Thus, the court explained that "any determination on 

. . . [venue] [wa]s less likely to result in the avoidance of

expensive litigation." Id. 

In addition, the Graves court reasoned that although its

decision did "set venue in Georgia, . . . , a decision for or

against transfer does not end the litigation or otherwise determine

the rights of the parties as a trial would still be required at

some later date." Id. at 282. As an additional reason for denying

certification, the Graves court found that "an immediate appeal

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would result in postponing th[e] trial and increase the time and

costs of litigation." Id. 

In a similar vein, in Mazzella v. Stineman, 472 F.Supp. 432

(E.D.Pa. 1979), the court found that certification would not

materially advance the termination of that litigation. In so

finding, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that "because the

court of appeals may well adopt [their] interpretation of the venue

statutes, an immediate appeal might obviate the need for a second

trial and thus materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation." Id. at 435. In rejecting this argument the court

observed that Mazzella was "an ordinary case, rather than an

exceptional one." Id. at 436. Further, the court saw "no reason

to believe that the trial . . . w[ould] be either protracted or

exceptionally costly." Id. Thus, even if an immediate appeal might

obviate the need for a second trial, significantly, the court found

that that "savings . . . [wa]s not so significant as to warrant"

certification under section 1292(b). Id. Accordingly, the Mazzella

court denied certification of its decision finding venue improper

and transferring the action to another district. Id.; see also 

Same Day Surgery Centers, L.L.C. v. Montana Regional Orthopedics,

2003 WL 1565942, at *3 (D.Minn. March 4, 2003) (interlocutory

appeal of denial of motion to transfer not allowed in a "relatively

straightforward contract dispute" which did "not present protracted

and complex litigation[,]" because even if there was the risk of a

second trial, that did not show that an appeal would "materially

advance the resolution of th[at] litigation[]").

Given these divergent views, it is a close call as to whether

defendants have shown a "controlling question of law" which "may

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materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation[.]" 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). On balance, though, under the facts

presented, the court finds that defendants, as the party seeking

certification, have not met their burden of showing that

"exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic

policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of

final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475,

98 S.Ct. 2454, 2461 (1978)). 

Defendants have not met their burden primarily because this is

an ordinary, unexceptional contract dispute. "The factual and

legal issues in this case are not complex and would not necessitate

protracted and expensive litigation." Lopritz v. CMT Blues, 271

F.Supp.2d 1252, 1254 (S.D.Cal. 2003). As the Ninth Circuit

explained in Wright, the legislative history of section 1292(b)

indicates that that statute is to be applied only in "exceptional

cases" such as "antitrust and similar protracted cases[.]" Wright,

359 F.2d at 785 n.2 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

Obviously, the present straightforward contract dispute does not

fall into that category of cases. Defendants' argument for

certification, at most, would "merely provide review of [a]

difficult ruling[] in [a] hard case[]." See id. Section 1292(b)

was not enacted for that purpose, though. See id.

Even if defendants were able to persuade the court that the

venue issue presents a "controlling question of law" which "may

materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation" so

as to bring it within the ambit of section 1292(b), still, the

court would deny this certification motion. The court would deny

this motion because, as explained below, defendants have not shown

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that there is a "substantial ground for difference of opinion" on

the venue issue. 

B. "Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion"

As to the second criteria for section 1292(b) certification,

defendants assert that the court's "determination that venue is

proper in Arizona, notwithstanding California's Franchise Relations

Act . . . is one that reasonably could provoke a substantial

difference of opinion." Doc. 15 at 3 (emphasis added). This is

not the governing legal standard, however. Rather, "[t]he term

[substantial ground for difference of opinion] refers to the legal

standard applied in the decision for which certification is sought

and whether other courts have substantially differed in applying

that standard." Central Valley Chrysler Jeep, 2005 WL 3470653, at

*2 (citation omitted); see also Stanford Junior University, 2007 WL

1119193, at *2 (citations omitted) ("In order to secure an

interlocutory appeal, [defendant] must demonstrate a legitimate and

'substantial ground for difference of opinion' between and among

judicial bodies.") Thus, "[a] party's strong disagreement with the

court's ruling is not sufficient for there to be a 'substantial

ground for difference'; the proponent of an appeal must make some

greater showing." Hansen v. Schubert, 459 F.Supp.2d 973, 1000

(E.D.Cal. 2006) (citation omitted). 

In an attempt to show a substantial ground for difference of

opinion, without explaining, defendants assert that Govan I and

Jones "present two different answers to th[e] question[]" of

"whether [the Act] is immaterial in cases involving California

franchisees that are removed to judicial districts outside of

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4 Defendants' framing of the issue in this way is puzzling in several

ways, but the most significant is that plainly this action was not removed to a

"judicial district[] outside of Arizona." See Doc. 15 at 3. 

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Arizona."4 Doc. 15 at 3. As an additional basis for asserting

that there is a "substantial ground for difference of opinion," 

defendants claim that "[t]his case presents an issue of first

impression[.]" Id.

Best Western responds that defendants have not made the

requisite "difference of opinion" showing because they have not

"cite[d] [to] a single decision in which any other court has

substantially differed with this Court in determining the

appropriate statue governing venue in removed cases." Doc. 21 at

4. Instead, as Best Western construes defendants' argument, they

are simply "re-hash[ing]" their disagreement with this court's

ruling in Govan I; and, as set forth above, this is insufficient to

show a "substantial difference of opinion" warranting certification

under section 1292(b). See id.

In their reply, rather than directly responding to these

arguments, defendants reframe the issue about which they claim

there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. This

time, as noted earlier, as defendants frame it, the issue is

"whether a franchisor doing business in California may sidestep

that state's important public policy against forum selection

clauses for its franchisees, as enunciated . . . in Jones, . . . ,

by filing a lawsuit in the franchisor's choice state court." Doc.

23 at 1-2 (citation omitted). As defendants read Govan I, this

court "impliedly" addressed that issue "by finding that Defendants'

removal in effect waived any venue challenged.'" Id. at 2 (citation

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omitted). Not only is this finding "contrary to the law regarding

non-waiver of venue challenges by removal," but defendants assert

that "[m]ore importantly, th[is] Court's holding renders [the Act]

illusory and in direct conflict with . . . Jones." Id. Further,

according to defendants, "the Ninth Circuit [needs] to clarify

whether Jones is limited only to those cases that were initially

filed in federal court or a California state court." Doc. 15 at 3. 

Try as they might, defendants have not made the necessary

showing of a "substantial ground for difference of opinion" within

the meaning of section 1292(b). Defendants' attempt to demonstrate

a conflict between Govan I and Jones is unpersuasive. Govan I and

Jones involved different issues. In the former the issue was which

statute governs venue in removed actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) or 28

U.S.C. § 1391. Thus, the court found no need to address the

argument, based upon Jones, that the forum selection clause in the

Agreement at issue herein contravenes a strong public policy of

California. What is more, because Jones was removed to a

California district court, the Jones Court was considering whether

enforcement of the forum selection clause there would "contravene a

strong public policy of the forum in which [the] suit [wa]s

brought[,]" i.e. California. See Jones, 211 F.3d at 497 (citing

M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). 

Plainly, as Best Western pointed out in Govan I, such an analysis

is irrelevant here because "even if the Court were to follow Jones,

it would have to review whether the Agreement's forum selection

clause contravenes a strong public policy of the State of

Arizona[,]" not California. Govan I, 2006 WL 2523460, at *4

(citation omitted). Therefore, the court disagrees with

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defendants that "[a]t the very least[]" Govan I "conflict[s]" with

Jones[.]" See Doc. 15 at 3. 

Further, essentially it is defendants' position that this

court improperly declined to follow Jones. However, without more

defendants have not shown the requisite "substantial ground for

difference of opinion." See Sierra Foothills, 2006 WL 2085244, at

* 5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)) (Defendant's "bald assertion that

this court's interpretation of [the] Gunderson [case] is incorrect

does not establish that 'there is substantial ground for difference

of opinion' as to the controlling law on this issue.") Thus, at

the end of the day, defendants are left with their disagreement

with this court's ruling in Govan I, which "even if vehement, . . .

does not establish a 'substantial ground for different of opinion'

sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for an

interlocutory appeal." See First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948

F.Supp. 1107, 1116 (D.D.C. 1996). 

In short, defendants "may disagree with the way the court has

interpreted the relevant [law], but at least one party [is always]

convinced that the court got it wrong." Environmental Protection,

2004 WL 838160, at *4 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). As the court soundly reasoned in Environmental

Protection though, "[s]uch disagreement is not tantamount to a

disagreement among the courts, and it does not itself compel

section 1292(b) review." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in

original). "If it did, nearly every judgment would give rise to an

interlocutory appeal." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

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Conclusion

In short, keeping in mind that section 1292(b) is to be

"sparingly" applied, and only in "rare circumstances," the court

finds that defendants have not satisfied the requirements for

certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion seeking to amend the

court's August 29, 2006, Order to add the necessary language for

certification to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) is DENIED (doc. 15). 

Given that denial, in accordance with the court's prior order

of October 13, 2006, 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants "shall have up to and

including the fifth day following" the date of this order in which

to file their answer. See Doc. 18 at 1. 

DATED this 29th day of May, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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