Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04108/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04108-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GUSTAVO COLIN LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WARDEN, SAN QUENTIN PRISON, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 19-cv-04108-PJH 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND 

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff 

has filed a second amended complaint. 

DISCUSSION 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 

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is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

(citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 

to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 

Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

LEGAL CLAIMS 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to protect him from an assault by another 

inmate and that he received inadequate medical care. 

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, 

prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other 

prisoners. Id. at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. 

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to protect 

inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at the prison violates 

the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, 

objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately 

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United States District Court 

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indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is 

deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two 

elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the 

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059. 

“In a § 1983 or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer for the torts of their 

servants – the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each 

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own 

misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (finding under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, and Rule 8 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that complainant-detainee in a Bivens action 

failed to plead sufficient facts “plausibly showing” that top federal officials “purposely 

adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because 

of their race, religion, or national origin” over more likely and non-discriminatory 

explanations). 

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between 

the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 

678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if a supervisory official is not directly 

involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, “[a] supervisor can be liable in this 

individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or 

control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for 

conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The claim that a 

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supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional conditions and ‘culpable actions of his 

subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct 

of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability.’” Keates v. 

Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208) (finding that 

conclusory allegations that supervisor promulgated unconstitutional policies and 

procedures which authorized unconstitutional conduct of subordinates do not suffice to 

state a claim of supervisory liability). 

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is 

that of the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 377-78 (2004); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 

1994). In the event the state has multiple statutes of limitations for different torts, courts 

considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal 

injury actions. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999). In California, the 

general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the two-year period set 

forth at California Civil Procedure Code § 335.1 and is the applicable statute in § 1983 

actions.1 See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Silva, 

169 F.3d at 610 (limitations period for filing § 1983 action in California governed by 

residual limitations period for personal injury actions in California, which was then one 

year and was codified in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3)). 

Plaintiff argues that he was mistakenly released from federal custody and 

transferred to San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”) while he awaited deportation by federal 

authorities. At SQSP plaintiff was walking to his housing unit when a riot broke out and 

1 California Civil Procedure Code section 352.1 recognizes imprisonment as a disability 

that tolls the statute of limitations when a person is "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or 

in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for life." Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). The tolling is not indefinite, however; the disability of 

imprisonment delays the accrual of the cause of action for a maximum of two years. See 

id. 

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United States District Court 

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he was assaulted by an unknown individual. He states he was rendered unconscious 

and suffered serious injuries. While he was recovering from his injuries he was deported 

to Mexico. It is now clear that this occurred in April 2013. 

The prior complaints were dismissed with leave to amend to provide more 

information. While plaintiff has now named additional individual defendants, he still must 

describe their specific actions and how they violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff 

must present more information how the doctors allowing him to be released from custody 

for deportation violated his constitutional rights with respect to his injuries. He must 

describe the actions of the doctors who treated him, not simply supervisors who were 

employed at the prison at that time and may have been involved. Furthermore, the 

statute of limitations is four years when including tolling for plaintiff’s imprisonment. The 

incident occurred in April 2013 and this case was filed in July 2019. Plaintiff must 

describe why this case should not be dismissed as untimely. 

CONCLUSION 

1. The second amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in 

accordance with the standards set forth above. The third amended complaint must be 

filed no later than May 22, 2020, and must include the caption and civil case number 

used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an 

amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it 

all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th 

Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. 

Failure to file an amended complaint may result in dismissal of this case. 

2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed 

“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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United States District Court 

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Dated: April 7, 2020 

 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

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