Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00840/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00840-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v.

PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE,

Respondent.

 /

1:10-cv-00840-SMS (HC)

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS, DIRECTING CLERK

OF COURT TO TERMINATE ACTION, AND

DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner consented to the

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. Local Rule 305(b). 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 13, 2010. Petitioner

contends that the criminal charges filed against him need to be investigated by federal authorities

because his rights are not been protected by his assigned counsel. The petition must be

dismissed. DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it

plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petition is not entitled to relief." Rule 4

of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990).

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

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a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair th

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court

th

violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.”

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States th

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

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In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

Here, Petitioner is challenging actions by his counsel regarding his pending criminal

charges in state court. However, Petitioner acknowledges that he did not seek review in the

California Supreme Court. (Petition, at 5.) Thus, the Court must dismiss the petition because it

contains unexhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 521-522.1

In addition, it appears that Petitioner has not completed the state criminal process for which he complains.

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Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal

proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief except under special circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). Moreover, federal courts can abstain in cases that present a federal constitutional issue, but

which can be mooted or altered by a state court determination. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United

States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-14, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244 (1976); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.

185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1063 (1959); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-17, 116 S.Ct.

1712, 1721 (1996). Because Petitioner’s state criminal proceeding are ongoing, even if Petitioner’s claims were

exhausted, this Court would be required to abstain review until the state proceeding are complete.

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ORDER 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed;

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action; and

3. The Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (in order to obtain a COA,

petitioner must show: (1) that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

petition stated a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right; and (2) that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In the present

case, the Court does not find that jurists of reason would not find it debatable

whether the petition was properly dismissed. Petitioner has not made the

required substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 4, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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