Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01361/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01361-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID GROM,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SAUL,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:18-cv-01361-SKO

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 

SECURITY COMPLAINT

(Doc. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 2, 2018, Plaintiff David Grom (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for disability insurance 

benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title II of the Social Security Act 

(the “Act”). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, 

without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1

///

 

1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 8, 9.)

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB and SSI payments, 

alleging he became disabled on December 31, 2012 due to depression. (Administrative Record 

(“AR”) 129, 172.) Plaintiff was born on May 21, 1965 and was 47 years old as of the alleged onset 

date. (AR 144.) Plaintiff has a high school education, past work experience as a machine operator, 

warehouse worker labor stores, construction worker, and van driver, and last worked full-time in 

approximately 2011. (AR 51–52, 91.)

A. Relevant Medical Evidence

1. Aspen Family Medical Group of Modesto, Inc.

In approximately 2013, Plaintiff established care with Aspen Family Medical Group of 

Modesto, Inc. (“AFM”). (See AR 464.) On September 15, 2013, AFM2noted that Plaintiff’s 

“medication [was] still making [his] teeth grind” and causing him anxiety. (AR 464.) In April 2014, 

Plaintiff reported “suicidal thoughts” and that he had pain and swelling in his left foot. (AR 455–

56.) In an undated note, AFM stated that Plaintiff reported for a follow up on his depression, and 

reported “some impairment” on his medication. (AR 451.) AFM saw Plaintiff for a “discuss[ion] 

about depression” on December 8, 2015. (AR 490.) 

2. Ken Erickson, F.N.P.

On July 22, 2014, family nurse practitioner Ken Erickson completed a mental capacity 

assessment for Plaintiff. (AR 468–70.) Mr. Erickson diagnosed Plaintiff with “major depressive 

disorder with anxiety.” (AR 468.) Mr. Erickson opined that Plaintiff had moderate impairment in 

the ability to remember locations and work procedures, understand, remember, and carry out simple 

or detailed instructions, sustain an ordinary routine with special supervision, work in coordination 

with others, make simple work-related decisions, interact appropriately with the general public, get 

along with coworkers or peers without distracting them, maintain socially appropriate behavior, 

respond appropriately to changes in the work setting, be aware of normal hazards, travel in 

unfamiliar places, and set realistic goals; and marked limitation in the ability to maintain attention 

 

2 The treatment notes submitted from AFM do not indicate what individual evaluated or treated Plaintiff, and simply 

have boxes for the assigned “MA” to initial. (See, e.g., AR 464.) Thus, this section refers to action taken by the 

individual evaluating Plaintiff as being taken by AFM. 

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and concentration for extended periods, perform activities within a schedule, complete a normal 

work day or work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, and perform 

at a consistent pace. (AR 468–70.) Mr. Erickson also opined Plaintiff would miss three days of 

work per month. (AR 469.) 

3. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto

Plaintiff was admitted to Doctors Medical Center of Modesto on July 28, 2016 for rightsided hemiparesis. (AR 514.) Internist Kristofer Richter, D.O., noted that Plaintiff underwent a 

lumbar puncture upon admission, and an MRI of the spine showed lesions in his spinal cord around 

C3-C4. (AR 514.) Dr. Richter also noted that Plaintiff had “some sort of a demyelinating condition 

that we do not have an exact diagnosis at discharge.” (AR 514.) Neurologist Jeffrey Levin, M.D., 

saw Plaintiff for a follow up after his July 28, 2016 procedure. (AR 518–19.) Dr. Levin stated that 

Plaintiff “presented with a 3-4 day history of sensory changes in his right arm and right leg” but he 

was “without any significant weakness.” (AR 518.) Dr. Levin also noted that Plaintiff appeared to 

have some “demyelination” in his spine. (AR 518.) Plaintiff underwent a follow-up cervical spine 

MRI on July 28, 2016. (AR 642.) Imaging showed advanced disc degeneration, mild central spinal 

canal stenosis, and severe bilateral neural foraminal stenosis. (AR 642.) Later imaging showed 

severe discogenic disease. (AR 531.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with cervical myelopathy. (AR 520.) 

On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff was discharged, and Dr. Levin noted that Plaintiff “still complains of

some numbness in his right arm and leg” and should follow up in the next 6-8 weeks. (AR 560.)

4. Satish Sharma, M.D.

On January 4, 2017, internist Satish Sharma completed an Internal Medicine Evaluation after 

examining Plaintiff. (AR 694–703.) Dr. Sharma noted that Plaintiff’s complaints included 

numbness in the right arm, neck pain, low back pain, syncopal episodes, and depression. (AR 700.) 

Dr. Sharma diagnosed Plaintiff with neck and back pain with intermittent radicular pain upper 

extremities, numbness in the right arm, cervical radiculopathy, West Nile virus, posttussive syncope, 

and depression. (AR 702.) Dr. Sharma opined that Plaintiff could push, pull, lift and carry 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, walk, sit and/or stand for 6 hours of an 8-hour 

workday, stoop, kneel crouch and crawl occasionally, should not drive, operate heavy machinery or 

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work at unprotected heights, and had limitations in feeling objects with his right hand. (AR 697, 

702–03.) 

5. Patricia Spivey, Psy.D.

On November 24, 2014, psychologist Patricia Spivey completed a Mental Status Disability 

Report after examining Plaintiff. (AR 473–75.) Dr. Spivey noted that Plaintiff reported he had 

depression and took medication for it, had been divorced for ten years and is now homeless. (AR 

473.) Dr. Spivey stated Plaintiff had four DUIs in the past, and has been sober since his last DUI. 

(AR 473.) Dr. Spivey opined that Plaintiff had no limitation in his ability to follow simple or 

complex instructions, maintain adequate pace or persistence, and communicate effectively in 

writing; mild limitation in his ability to maintain adequate attention/concentration, adapt to changes 

in job routine, and verbally communicate effectively; moderate limitation in his ability to withstand 

the stress of a routine work day and interact appropriately with others, and marked limitation in his 

ability to maintain emotional stability. (AR 475.) 

6. State Agency Physicians

On December 2, 2014, C. Bullard, M.D. a Disability Determinations Service medical 

consultant, assessed the severity of Plaintiff’s physical impairments and determined that Plaintiff’s 

physical impairments were non-severe. (AR 121.) Upon reconsideration, on March 24, 2015, 

another Disability Determinations Service medical consultant, A. Nasrabadi, M.D., affirmed Dr. 

Bullard’s findings. (AR 149.)

On December 26, 2014, R. Ferrell, M.D., a Disability Determinations Service medical 

consultant, assessed the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments. (See AR 124.) In assessing 

Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity (RFC),

3 Dr. Ferrell opined that Plaintiff was 

moderately limited in his ability to maintain attention and concentration, perform activities within a 

 

3 RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work 

setting on a regular and continuing basis of 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. TITLES 

II & XVI: ASSESSING RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY IN INITIAL CLAIMS, Social Security Ruling 

(“SSR”) 96-8P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that 

result from an individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments. Id. “In determining a 

claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record including, inter alia, medical records, lay 

evidence, and ‘the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable 

impairment.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006).

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schedule, accept instructions, get along with coworkers, maintain socially appropriate behavior, 

respond appropriately to changes, and set realistic goals. (AR 124–25.) Dr. Ferrell further stated 

that Plaintiff had no limitation in any other area. (AR 124–25.) 

Upon reconsideration, on March 27, 2015, another Disability Determinations Service 

medical consultant, E. Aquino-Caro, M.D., affirmed Dr. Ferrell’s findings as to the severity of

Plaintiff’s impairments and his mental RFC. (AR 151–53.) 

B. Administrative Proceedings

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on January 2, 2015, 

and again on reconsideration on March 27, 2015. (AR 172–76, 179–84.) On May 11, 2015, 

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 186–87.)

On December 1, 2016, Plaintiff appeared without counsel and testified briefly before an 

ALJ as to his alleged disabling conditions. (AR 79–114.) Plaintiff testified he became “disabled” 

in approximately 2012 due to depression, as he was homeless and “wanted to commit suicide[.]” 

(AR 94.) Plaintiff stated that in approximately August 2016, he had a back injury that required 

hospitalization and surgery. (AR 95.) Plaintiff testified that with the resulting back and neck pain,

he is only able to walk about ten minutes at a time, or a total of an hour and a half in a day, and 

stand about fifteen minutes at a time and an hour and a half in a day. (AR 99.) Plaintiff stated he 

does not handle stress well but was not getting mental health treatment. (AR 102.) 

A Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing that Plaintiff had past work as a machine 

operator, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) code 699.682-018, which was medium work

with a specific vocational preparation (SVP)4of 5; a warehouse worker, laborer stores, DOT code 

922.687-058, which was medium work with a SVP of 2; a construction worker, DOT code 869.664-

014, which was medium work with a SVP of 4; and a van driver, DOT code 913.663-018, which 

was light work with a SVP of 3. (AR 104–06.) The ALJ asked the VE to consider a person of 

Plaintiff’s age, education, and with his work background. (AR 106.) The VE was also to assume 

 

4 Specific vocational preparation (SVP), as defined in DOT, App. C, is the amount of lapsed time required by a typical 

worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a 

specific job-worker situation. DOT, Appendix C – Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991). 

Jobs in the DOT are assigned SVP levels ranging from 1 (the lowest level – “short demonstration only”) to 9 (the highest 

level – over 10 years of preparation). Id.

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this person was able to lift and carry twenty pounds frequently, sit for six hours of an eight-hour 

workday, stand and/or walk for six hours of an eight-hour workday, precluded from climbing 

ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, precluded from working around unprotected heights and hazardous 

machinery, limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, occasional balancing, stooping, 

kneeling, crouching and crawling, able to perform simple, repetitive tasks, and limited to no more 

than occasional interaction with supervisors co-workers, and the public. (AR 106.) The VE testified 

that such a person could not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work. (AR 109.) The VE testified 

such a person could perform other light, unskilled, SVP 2 jobs in the national economy, however, 

including: assembler, DOT code 712.687-010, with approximately 330,000 jobs available in the 

national economy; cleaner, DOT code 323.687-014, with approximately 560,000 jobs available; and 

packing line worker, DOT code 753.687-038, with approximately 310,000 jobs available. (AR 109.) 

In a second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to consider an individual with the limitations

described in the first hypothetical except that the person is able to lift and carry ten pounds 

frequently, and is able to sit for six hours and stand/walk for two hours of an eight-hour workday. 

(AR 109.) The VE testified that such a person could not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work but 

could perform the assembler job, and could perform the job of a nut sorter, DOT code 521.687-086, 

with approximately 17,000 jobs available, and almond blancher, DOT code 521.687-010, with 

approximately 800 jobs available. (AR 110.)

C. The ALJ’s Decision

In a decision dated June 1, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined 

by the Act. (AR 58–72.) The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520. (AR 60–71.) The ALJ decided that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since December 31, 2012, the alleged onset date (step one). (AR 60.) At step two, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “cervical spine degenerative disc disease 

and cervical myelopathy”; “thoracic spine degenerative disc disease”; seizures; “post tussive 

syncope”; “positivity for West Nile virus”; depression; and anxiety. (AR 61.) The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled 

one of the Listings (step three). (AR 62.) 

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The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and applied the RFC assessment at steps four and five. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (“Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your residual 

functional capacity ... We use this residual functional capacity assessment at both step four and step 

five when we evaluate your claim at these steps.”). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the 

RFC:

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he 

can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. He can sit for 

about six hours of an eight-hour workday. [Plaintiff] cannot climb ladders, ropes, 

and scaffolds. He cannot work around unprotected heights and hazardous 

machinery. [Plaintiff] can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and 

climb ramps and stairs. He can perform simple repetitive tasks. [Plaintiff] can have 

no more than occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.

(AR 63.) Although the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be expected 

to cause the alleged symptoms[,]” he rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony as “not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” (AR 65.) At step five, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work but that jobs exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (AR 69–71.)

Plaintiff sought review of this decision before the Appeals Council, which denied review on 

May 25, 2018. (AR 6–11.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Applicable Law

An individual is considered “disabled” for purposes of disability benefits if he or she is 

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

However, “[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [her] physical or 

mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do [her] 

previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

“The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining 

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whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 

F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). The Ninth Circuit has provided the 

following description of the sequential evaluation analysis:

In step one, the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and 

evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 

If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the ALJ proceeds to step three and considers whether the 

impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. pt. 

404, subpt. P, [a]pp. 1. If so, the claimant is automatically presumed disabled. If not, the ALJ 

proceeds to step four and assesses whether the claimant is capable of performing her past relevant 

work. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step five and examines whether 

the claimant has the [RFC] . . . to perform any other substantial gainful activity in the national 

economy. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any 

step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).

“The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through four of 

the analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 

1989)). “However, if a claimant establishes an inability to continue her past work, the burden shifts 

to the Commissioner in step five to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 

work.” Id. (citing Swenson, 876 F.2d at 687).

B. Scope of Review

“This court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits [only] 

when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the 

record as a whole.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is defined 

as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 

1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098). “Put another way, substantial 

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evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). 

“This is a highly deferential standard of review ...” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “The ALJ’s findings will be upheld if supported by 

inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id.; see, e.g., Edlund, 253 F.3d at 

1156 (citations omitted) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the 

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.”).

Nonetheless, “the Commissioner’s decision ‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a 

specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 

143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Rather, a court must ‘consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] 

conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Finally, courts “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 

454 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006)). Harmless error “exists when it is clear from the record 

that ‘the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Tommasetti, 

533 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[T]he 

burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s 

determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s physical symptom statements 

and mental symptom statements and failed to account for all of Plaintiff’s limitations in the RFC 

assessment. (See Doc. 21 at 6.) The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly evaluated 

Plaintiff’s credibility and formulated Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. 22 at 3–11.) For the reasons stated 

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below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred in her evaluation of Plaintiff’s physical 

symptom statements, and will remand the case on that basis.

A. The ALJ Erred in Her Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Physical Symptom Statements.

1. Legal Standard

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ 

must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, 

the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged. Id. The claimant is not required to show that her impairment “could reasonably be expected 

to cause the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged; [he] need only show that it could reasonably 

have caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 

(9th Cir. 2007)). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ 

can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if he gives “specific, 

clear and convincing reasons” for the rejection. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility, including 

(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation 

for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 

inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 

treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. If the ALJ’s finding is supported 

by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bray v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. 

Other factors the ALJ may consider include a claimant’s work record and testimony from 

physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which 

he complains. Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The clear and convincing standard is “not an easy requirement to meet” and it “is the most 

demanding [standard] required in Social Security cases.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (citation 

omitted). “General findings are insufficient” to satisfy this standard. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 

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1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

“[R]ather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines 

the claimant’s complaints.” Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834); see, e.g., Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 2008) (“To support a lack of credibility finding, the ALJ [is] required to 

‘point to specific facts in the record which demonstrate that [the claimant] is in less pain than she 

claims.’” (quoting Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993)); cf. Burrell, 775 F.3d at 

1138 (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s “decisions make clear that [courts] may not take a general 

finding . . . and comb the administrative record to find specific” support for the finding).

2. Analysis 

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (AR 65.) The ALJ also found that “[Plaintiff’s] 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” (AR 65.) Since 

the ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to 

cause the alleged symptoms,” the only remaining issue is whether the ALJ provided “specific, clear 

and convincing reasons” for her adverse credibility finding. See Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s symptom statements as to his physical impairments were less 

than credible because they were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and the medical 

opinion evidence. (AR 65–70.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his 

physical symptom statements. (Doc. 21 at 6.) The Court agrees; the ALJ erred in discounting 

Plaintiff’s credibility as to his symptoms of physical impairments, and that error was not harmless. 

Plaintiff testified that after his 2016 back injury and surgery, with the resulting back and 

neck pain, he is only able to walk about ten minutes at a time, or a total of an hour and a half in a 

day, and stand about fifteen minutes at a time or an hour and a half in a day. (AR 95, 99.) He further 

testified that he is still numb on the right side of his body, has pain in his pelvic area, and he walks 

with a limp. (AR 95–96.) The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of his 

physical symptoms because they were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and opinion 

evidence. (AR 65, 67–68.) 

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The Court finds that neither reason offered by the ALJ constitutes a clear and convincing 

reason to discredit Plaintiff’s physical symptom statements. First, as to the alleged inconsistency 

with the opinion evidence, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s allegations of physical symptoms “are not 

consistent with medical opinions that suggest that [Plaintiff] has considerable work-related 

abilities,” namely, the opinions of the state agency physicians and Dr. Sharma. (AR 67.) However, 

the ALJ does not articulate which of Plaintiff’s statements are contradicted by which parts of the 

opinions of the state agency physicians and Dr. Sharma. The ALJ does not even specifically 

mention any statement Plaintiff gave during his testimony that she finds to be not credible. This is 

required of the ALJ because, without that specification, the Court is left to speculate as to which 

statements the ALJ intended to discount and how they are undermined by the evidence, which the 

Court may not do. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494–95 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We cannot 

review whether the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting [claimant]’s 

pain testimony where, as here, the ALJ never identified which testimony she found not credible, and 

never explained which evidence contradicted that testimony . . . In sum, we cannot substitute our 

conclusions for the ALJ’s, or speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions.”). This is 

highlighted by the fact that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s testimony was contradicted by the state 

agency physicians’ opinions, thus Plaintiff’s testimony was untrustworthy, but then found that the 

state agency physicians’ opinions were unsupported and entitled to little weight. (AR 67.) Thus, 

the Court finds this is not a valid clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s credibility.

As to the alleged inconsistency with the objective medical evidence, the Court finds this is 

not a valid clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s credibility either. As with the ALJ’s 

discussion of the medical opinions, the ALJ’s decision provides little to no guidance as to which 

disabling effects the ALJ believes to be undermined by which aspects of the objective medical 

evidence in the record. As stated above, to be clear and convincing, the ALJ must specify which of 

the claimant’s complaints are contradicted by which clinical observations, and the ALJ failed to do 

that here. See Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2017) (where there is no evidence 

of malingering, “the ALJ must give ‘specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting’ the 

testimony by identifying ‘which testimony [the ALJ] found not credible’ and explaining ‘which

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evidence contradicted that testimony’”) (quoting Brown–Hunter, 806 F.3d at 489, 494); Regennitter 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that an ALJ’s 

determination that a claimant was not credible because his “complaints are ‘inconsistent with 

clinical observations’ . . . . could satisfy the requirement of a clear and convincing reason for 

discrediting a claimant’s testimony, except that the ALJ did not specify what complaints are 

contradicted by what clinical observations.”) Further, the treatment notes mentioned by the ALJ do 

not appear to support the ALJ’s conclusion that the record contains mostly “mild findings” as to 

Plaintiff’s physical impairments, and appear to support a contrary conclusion. (See, e.g., AR 65 

(noting that Plaintiff had nonspecific focal hyperintense lesion in the spinal cord, myelinating discs, 

“advanced” disc degeneration, central spinal canal stenosis, “severe” bilateral neural foraminal 

stenosis, “severe” discogenic disease, “moderate” ventral spinal cord compression, and upper 

cervical demyelination.)) 

In sum, the ALJ failed to sufficiently specify which specific statements by Plaintiff were 

contradicted by which specific parts of the record, and sufficiently explain how they are 

contradictory. Thus, the Court cannot find that the reasons offered by the ALJ for discounting 

Plaintiff’s physical symptom statements were valid, clear and convincing. See Brown–Hunter, 806 

F.3d at 494. The Court will remand the case on that basis for the ALJ to reevaluate Plaintiff’s 

symptom statements and reformulate Plaintiff’s RFC, if necessary. 

B. The ALJ’s Error Was Not Harmless

The Court now turns to the analysis of whether this error by the ALJ was harmless. The 

Ninth Circuit “ha[s] long recognized that harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act 

context.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 

925, 932 n.10 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that the harmless error analysis applies where the ALJ errs by 

not discharging their duty to develop the record). As such, “the court will not reverse an ALJ’s 

decision for harmless error.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885).

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An error is harmless “where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted); see also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that an error is also harmless “‘if the 

agency’s path may reasonably be discerned,’ even if the agency ‘explains its decision with less than 

ideal clarity’” (quoting Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004)). “In 

other words, in each case [courts] look at the record as a whole to determine whether the error alters 

the outcome of the case.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. “[T]he nature of [the] application” of the 

“harmless error analysis to social security cases” is “fact-intensive―‘no presumptions operate’ and 

‘[courts] must analyze harmlessness in light of the circumstances of the case.’” March v. Colvin, 

792 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Molina, 674 F.3d at 1121). “[T]he burden of showing 

that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” 

Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409 (citations omitted).

Here, the Commissioner does not contend that any error by the ALJ in evaluating Plaintiff’s 

credibility was harmless, and the record establishes that the ALJ’s error was not harmless. The 

Court agrees with Plaintiff that if the ALJ had credited Plaintiff’s physical symptom statements 

regarding certain functional abilities and included appropriate limitations in the RFC, that may have 

changed the disability determination. (See Doc. 21 at 12–13.) This is especially true here, where 

Plaintiff alleged fairly significant limitations, including that he could only walk or sit for limited 

periods of time throughout the day. (See AR 95, 99.) Thus, the error was not “inconsequential to 

the ultimate nondisability determination,” see Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115, and was not harmless. 

C. The ALJ’s Error Warrants Remand for Further Proceedings

The Commissioner and Plaintiff request that if the ALJ’s decision is reversed, the Court 

remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings, as opposed to awarding benefits. 

(Doc. 21 at 13–14; Doc. 22 at 11 n.4.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that “the record requires 

further development,” and will remand the case the Commissioner to allow the ALJ to re-assess 

Plaintiff’s credibility and incorporate any necessary limitations in the RFC. (See Doc. 21 at 14.) 

Where the ALJ commits an error and that error is not harmless, the “ordinary ... rule” is “to 

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remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099 

(citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit recognized a limited exception to this typical course where 

courts “remand[] for an award of benefits instead of further proceedings.” Id. at 1100–01 (citations 

omitted); see also id. at 1100 (noting that this exception is “sometimes referred to as the ‘credit-astrue’ rule”). In determining whether to apply this exception to the “ordinary remand rule,” the court 

must determine, in part, whether (1) “the record has been fully developed;” (2) “there are 

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made;” and (3) 

“further administrative proceedings would be useful.” Id. at 1101 (citations omitted). As to the last 

inquiry, additional “[a]dministrative proceedings are generally useful where the record has not been 

fully developed, there is a need to resolve conflicts and ambiguities, or the presentation of further 

evidence . . . may well prove enlightening in light of the passage of time.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Ultimately, “[t]he decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence or simply to award 

benefits is in [the court’s] discretion.” Swenson, 876 F.2d at 689 (citation omitted).

Here, the Court finds that the “credit-as-true” exception to the “ordinary remand rule” is

inapplicable because additional administrative proceedings would be useful. If the ALJ changes her 

evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, she should incorporate any warranted additional 

limitations in the RFC. Conversely, there may be specific, clear and convincing reasons the ALJ 

can offer for discounting the testimony. See Voisard v. Berryhill, No. 2:17-CV-1023-EFB, 2018 

WL 4488474, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2018) (“That the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons 

for discounting plaintiff’s subjective testimony in this instance does not compel a finding that he is 

unable to do so.”). Even if the ALJ decides to credit as true some or all of Plaintiff’s symptom 

statements and adjust her RFC determination for Plaintiff, the ALJ may still conclude that Plaintiff 

is not disabled--either because he has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant work 

or because he has the RFC to perform the requirements of other work that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy. The ALJ may also elect to further develop the record, if deemed 

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necessary. Further proceedings would therefore be useful to allow the ALJ to resolve this 

“outstanding issue[]” before a proper disability determination can be made. See Varney v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988). On remand, the ALJ should 

reevaluate Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and address any necessary changes to the RFC 

determination. If the ALJ again discounts Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms, she can then provide an 

adequate discussion of the specific testimony she is discounting and the specific evidence that 

contradicts that testimony. See Payan v. Colvin, 672 F. App’x 732, 733 (9th Cir. 2016). The ALJ 

must also reevaluate her conclusions at Steps Four and Five of the disability determination in light 

of any changes to Plaintiff’s RFC. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court will remand this case for further proceedings. 

D. The Court Declines to Determine Plaintiff’s Remaining Assertions of Error

As the Court finds that remand is appropriate for the ALJ to reconsider Plaintiff’s symptom 

statements regarding his physical impairments, the Court does not determine Plaintiff’s additional 

assertions of error regarding the ALJ’s credibility determination related to Plaintiff’s mental 

symptom statements and her formulation of the RFC. (See Doc. 21 at 10–12); cf. Newton v. Colvin, 

No. 2:13-cv-2458-GEB-EFB, 2015 WL 1136477, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2015) (“As the 

matter must be remanded for further consideration of the medical evidence, the court declines to 

address plaintiff’s remaining arguments”); Willmett ex rel. A.P. v. Astrue, No. 2:10-cv-01201 KJN, 

2011 WL 3816284, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011) (“Because this legal error warrants remanding 

this matter for further proceedings, the undersigned does not reach the remainder of [the] plaintiff’s 

arguments seeking reversal of the ALJ’s and Appeals Council’s decisions.”). 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence and is, therefore, VACATED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for further 

proceedings consistent with this Order. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in 

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favor of Plaintiff David Grom and against Defendant Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social 

Security. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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