Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00457-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT E. HUNTER, and

HOWARD ELEY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; SHERIFF

SCOTT JONES, in his official

capacity,

Defendants.

No. 2:06-cv-00457-GEB-EFB

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Plaintiffs seek over $400,000.00 in attorney’s fees 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as the prevailing parties following a jury 

verdict finding that each Plaintiff prevailed on his claim that 

he was subjected to excessive force in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment while incarcerated at the Sacramento County Main Jail 

as a result of a custom or practice of the County of Sacramento.1

The jury awarded each Plaintiff $1.00 in nominal damages. 

(Verdict Forms, ECF Nos. 186-187.)

 

1 Plaintiffs also seek $15,642.35 in costs. Since these costs are the 

subject of a separate Bill of Costs (ECF No. 192), they are not addressed 

herein. (See Decl. of Gary Gorski ¶ 7, ECF No. 196 (“Costs are being taxed 

separately under the costs bill filed with the court.”).)

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Defendants counter that no attorney’s fees should be 

awarded. (Defs.’ Opp’n 2:11, ECF No. 206.) Defendants argue: 

“‘[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his 

failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary 

relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.’” (Id.

2:22-24 (alteration in original) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 

U.S. 103, 115 (1992)). In the alternative, Defendants argue that 

if fees are awarded, they should be reduced significantly “based 

on the minimal success shown by [Plaintiffs’] nominal award.” 

(Id. at 7:7-23.) Defendants further rejoin that any fees awarded 

are limited by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) since 

Plaintiff Eley is a “prisoner” under the PLRA. (Id. at 1:2-2:10.)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs initiated this action on March 3, 2006, 

alleging five claims against six named defendants. (See Compl., 

ECF No. 1.) After decision on two Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

(“Rule”) 12(b)(6) dismissal motions and a motion for summary 

judgment, one claim remained: the alleged use of excessive force 

against each Plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment as a

result of an official custom or practice (“Monell claim”). 

Trial on each Plaintiff’s Monell claim began on 

November 4, 2008, and the jury returned its verdict on November 

13, 2008. The jury was given general verdict forms which asked 

whether each Plaintiff prevailed on his Monell claim, and, if so, 

what amount of damages was caused by the County. The jury 

answered the first question “No” on each Plaintiff’s verdict 

form. (Verdict Forms, ECF No. 115-116.)

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Plaintiffs appealed, arguing, inter alia, that certain 

jury instructions should have been given at trial and that the 

refusal to give those instructions was prejudicial. Hunter v. 

Cnty. of Sacramento, 65 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011). On appeal, the 

Ninth Circuit held that the jury was inadequately instructed on 

the Monell claim, “vacate[d] the judgment[,] and remand[ed] for a 

new trial.” Id. at 1236.

The case was retried on February 26, 2013, through 

February 28, 2013, and the jury returned its verdict on March 1, 

2013. The jury decided that each Plaintiff prevailed on his 

Monell claim, and awarded each Plaintiff $1.00 in nominal 

damages. (Verdict Forms, ECF Nos. 186-187.) Judgment was entered 

“in accordance with the jury verdict” on March 4, 2013. (ECF No. 

188.)

Plaintiffs subsequently sought to amend the judgment 

“to include Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a 

Permanent Injunction.” (Pls.’ Mot. to Amend J. 1:25-27, ECF No. 

194.) That motion was denied on August 8, 2013. (Order Den. Pls.’ 

Mot. to Amend J., ECF No. 212.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“The general rule in our legal system is that each 

party must pay its own attorney’s fees and expenses . . . .” 

Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010). 

However, “[s]ection 1988 provides that a prevailing party in 

certain civil rights actions may recover ‘a reasonable attorney’s 

fee as part of the costs.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). 

“The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure effective access to the 

judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances. 

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Accordingly, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an 

attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an 

award unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“To determine the amount of a reasonable fee under § 

1988, district courts typically proceed in two steps. First, 

courts generally ‘apply . . . the lodestar method to determine 

what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee.’” Gonzalez v. City 

of Maywood, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 4779669, at *3 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)). “Second, ‘[t]he 

district court may then adjust [the lodestar amount] upward or 

downward based on a variety of factors.’” Id. (alteration in 

original) (quoting Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 

1111 (9th Cir. 2008).

A. Lodestar Figure

In calculating the lodestar figure, “the district court 

‘multiplies the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably 

expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.’”

Gonzalez, 2013 WL 4779669, at *3 (quoting Ballen v. City of 

Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006)).

“Ultimately, a ‘reasonable’ number of hours equals 

‘[t]he number of hours . . . [which] could reasonably have been 

billed to a private client.’” Gonzalez, 2013 WL 4779669, at *4 

(alteration in original) (quoting Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111)).

Hours “that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” 

should be excluded. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. 

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“The [moving] party has the burden of submitting 

billing records to establish that the number of hours it has 

requested are reasonable. Thus, . . . the district court should 

begin [its inquiry] with the billing records the prevailing party 

has submitted.” Gonzalez, 2013 WL 4779669, at *4. “The party 

opposing the fee application [then] has a burden of rebuttal that 

requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging 

the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts 

asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” 

Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The reasonable hourly rate is “calculated according to 

the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal community, and 

the general rule is that the rates of attorneys practicing in the 

forum district, here the Eastern District of CaliforniaSacramento, are used.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1405 (citation 

omitted). “Within this geographic community, the district court 

should ‘tak[e] into consideration the experience, skill, and 

reputation of the attorney . . . .” Gonzalez, 2013 WL 4779669, at 

*6 (first alteration in original) (quoting Dang v. Cross, 422 

F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

“‘[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce 

satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own 

affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those 

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 

reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.’” Camacho 

v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). 

“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys 

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regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate

determinations in other cases . . . are satisfactory evidence of 

the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps 

Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Ingram 

v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (indicating a 

district court may “rely on its own familiarity with the legal 

market” in determining a reasonable hourly rate). 

B. Adjustments to Lodestar Figure

Calculating the lodestar figure “does not end the 

inquiry.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “[T]he court may increase or 

decrease the lodestar [amount] based on factors identified by 

th[e Ninth C]ircuit in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 

F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 

1726, 48 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1976), that are not subsumed within the 

initial calculation of the lodestar.” D’Emanuele v. Montgomery 

Ward & Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled 

on other grounds by Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); see 

also Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553-54. (“[T]here is a ‘strong 

presumption’ that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that 

presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which 

the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that 

may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.”).

One such factor is “the ‘results obtained.’ This factor is 

particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed ‘prevailing’

even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief.” 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

In such cases, the district court must apply 

a two-part analysis. First, the court asks 

whether the claims upon which the plaintiff 

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failed to prevail were related to the 

plaintiff’s successful claims. If unrelated, 

the final fee award may not include time 

expended on the unsuccessful claims. If the 

unsuccessful and successful claims are 

related, then the court must apply the second 

part of the analysis, in which the court 

evaluates the “significance of the overall 

relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation 

to the hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation.” [Hensley, 461 U.S. at 43]. If 

the plaintiff obtained ‘excellent results,’

full compensation may be appropriate, but if 

only ‘partial or limited success’ was 

obtained, full compensation may be excessive. 

Such decisions are within the district 

court’s discretion. 

Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(citation omitted); accord Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 

644, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2005). “At the heart of this inquiry is 

whether Plaintiff[s’] ‘accomplishments . . . justify the fee 

amount requested.’” Thomas, 410 F.3d at 650 (quoting Thorne, 802 

F.2d at 1142).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Whether Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Any Award of Attorney’s 

Fees

Plaintiffs argue: 

As the prevailing part[ies] in this action, 

Plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to 

reasonable attorney’s fees. Because 

Plaintiff[s] achieved the benefit sought by 

bringing suit, Plaintiffs have crossed the 

‘statutory threshold’ to a fee award. In 

[c]onstitutional challenges to policy or 

statute, success is measured not only by the 

amount of the recovery, but also in terms of 

the importance of the constitutional 

litigation. There is no doubt that the action 

brought about the exact result sought by 

Plaintiff — a finding that the County Jail 

has had a longstanding policy of using 

excessive force. 

(Pls.’ Mot. for Att’y Fees (“Pl.’s Mot.”) 5:11-17, ECF No. 195.) 

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Defendants counter that in order for a “‘district court 

. . . to award fees after a judgment for only nominal damages, it 

must point to some way in which the litigation succeeded, in 

addition to obtaining a judgment for nominal damage[s].’” (Defs.’ 

Opp’n 3:23-4:2 (quoting Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 

(9th Cir. 1994)). Defendants argue that application of the 

factors used “in determining whether a plaintiff succeeded in 

some way beyond the judgment for nominal damages . . . shows that 

[P]laintiffs have not carried their burden.” (Id. at 4:2-11.)

“[A] plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing 

party under § 1988.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. “That does not, 

however, mean that such a plaintiff is necessarily entitled to an 

award of fees.” Benton v. Or. Student Assistance Comm’n, 421 F.3d 

901, 904 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112). “In 

some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally ‘prevails’ 

under § 1988 should receive no attorney’s fees at all. A 

plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but receives no more 

than nominal damages is often such a prevailing party.” Farrar, 

506 U.S. at 115. Therefore, “[i]f a district court chooses to 

award fees after a judgment for only nominal damages, it must 

point to some way in which the litigation succeeded, in addition 

to obtaining a judgment for nominal damage.” Wilcox, 42 F.3d at

555 (emphasis in original).

There are three factors a district court 

should consider in determining whether a 

plaintiff succeeded in some way beyond the 

judgment for nominal damages. First, the 

court should consider “[t]he difference 

between the amount recovered and the damages 

sought,” which in most nominal damages cases 

will disfavor an award of fees. Farrar, 506 

U.S. at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 

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Second, the court should consider “the 

significance of the legal issue on which the 

plaintiff claims to have prevailed.” Id.

Third, the court should consider whether the 

plaintiff “accomplished some public goal.” 

Id. We have approved of the consideration of 

these factors in nominal damages cases. 

Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 947 (9th 

Cir. 2005); Benton [v. Or. Student Assistance 

Comm’n, 421 F.3d 901, 905-06 (9th Cir. 

2005)]. We have held that “[w]here the 

district court properly has weighed [these 

three] factors, the resulting award [of 

attorney’s fees] is not an abuse of its 

discretion.” Cummings, 402 F.3d at 947.

Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 593 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010).

Here, “although the jury awarded no compensatory 

damages” to either Plaintiff, which “weigh[s] against a fee 

award[,]” the other two Farrar factors weigh in favor of a fee 

award. “In contrast to the injury to a business interest alleged 

in Farrar,” Plaintiffs’ Monell claim involves the 

unconstitutional use of force, which “has the level of 

significance required to tip this factor in favor of awarding 

reasonable fees.” Butler v. Frett, No. 99-4367(RBK), 2006 WL 

1806412, at *6 (D.N.J. June 29, 2006) (awarding attorney’s fees 

under § 1988 when the plaintiff prevailed on his claim that an 

officer failed to prevent the use of excessive force by another 

unidentified officer and the jury awarded $1.00 in nominal 

damages); see also Wilcox, 42 F.3d at 556-57 (upholding award of 

attorney’s fees in action where the jury found the entity 

defendant had a policy which resulted in the use of excessive 

force against plaintiff and awarded nominal damages); Guy v. City 

of San Diego, 608 F.3d 582, 588-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing the 

district court’s decision not to award attorney’s fees when the 

plaintiff prevailed on his excessive force claim and was awarded 

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nominal damages).

Further, “the judgment that [a County practice or 

custom] was unconstitutional will benefit [the public] by 

preventing the [County] from reverting to [such a custom or 

practice] in the future.” Wilcox, 42 F.3d at 556-57; see also

Mahack-Watkins, 593 F.3d at 1063 (stating that verdict in the 

plaintiff’s favor on excessive force and wrongful death claims 

“served the public purpose of helping to protect [persons like 

the decedent] from being subjected to similar unlawful treatment 

in the future”). “It is logical to expect, in the face of this 

jury verdict, that the [County] w[ill] take a closer look at [its 

practices concerning the] level of force used by its [officers in 

the Sacramento County Main Jail]. Such a result . . . justif[ies] 

some amount of . . . attorney fees.” Guy, 608 F.3d at 590.

B. Amount of Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiffs request fees totaling $416,605.00, 

comprising 1190.30 hours billed at $350.00 per hour. 

1) Lodestar Calculation

a) Reasonable Hours Expended

Plaintiffs filed the declarations of attorneys Gary 

Gorski and Daniel Karalash in support of their fee request. Mr. 

Gorski avers he spent a total of 1177.30 hours on this action 

(Decl. of Gary Gorski (“Gorski Decl.”) ¶ 7; Supplemental Decl. of 

Gary Gorski (“Suppl. Gorski Decl.”) ¶ 17, ECF No. 209.) Mr. 

Gorski further avers, in relevant part:

Since the beginning of this action, I 

have meticulously kept track of my hours of 

service as demonstrated by [my] detailed 

billing statement. . . . The information 

contained therein is true and correct, and 

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accurately represents the work performed, and 

time taken to perform said work. The time and 

activity was inputted at the time the service 

was provided, or shortly thereafter.[] Since 

there was a symbiotic relationship between 

all causes of action and the parties, and 

that the primary goal was to prevail on the 

Monell claim, there is no doubt success was 

achieved.

Based upon the foregoing and in my 

opinion, each and every item in the billing 

charges submitted by me would have been 

undertaken by a reasonable and prudent lawyer 

to advance or protect my client’s 

interests . . . . 

(Gorski Decl. ¶¶ 56-57 (paragraph nos. omitted).) Mr. Karalash 

declares he spent a total of 13 hours on this case. (Decl. of 

Daniel Karalash (“Karalash Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 197.) 

Defendants raise a number of objections to Plaintiffs’ 

claimed hours. Specifically, Defendants argue the time spent “on 

the various incarnations of the complaint,” expert-related 

billings, and trial preparation is excessive; the hours spent on 

law and motion should be reduced to reflect Plaintiffs’ limited 

success on the motions; time related to a unrelated judgment lien 

against Plaintiffs’ counsel should be excluded; time transporting 

Plaintiffs’ expert to and from the airport should be excluded; 

and no fees should be allowed for the “non-attorney nature of the 

work claimed” by Mr. Karalash. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 8:26-12:18.)

Defendants’ arguments are addressed in turn.

i) Excessive Hours

Defendants’ argument that time spent on various tasks 

is excessive is conclusory and is unpersuasive.

“In general, courts ‘should defer to the winning 

lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was 

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required to spend on the case.’” Hiken v. Dept. of Def., No. C 

06-02812 JW, 2012 WL 3686747, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012) 

(quoting Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112); accord Knox v. Chiang, No. 

2:05-cv-02198-MCE-CKD, 2013 WL 2434606, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 

2013). “An attorney’s sworn testimony as to the amount of time 

required to perform a task ‘is evidence of considerable weight on 

the issue of the time required.’” Hiken, 2012 WL 3686747, at *7

(quoting Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081 (N.D. 

Cal. 2010)). For courts to deny compensation for a task, “it must 

appear that the time claimed is obviously and convincingly 

excessive under the circumstances.” Id. “It must also be kept in 

mind that lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on 

contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their fees. The 

payoff is too uncertain, as to both the result and the amount of 

the fee.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112.

Here, Defendants “have not tethered any evidence” to 

their general objection that “the amount of hours billed are 

objectively unreasonable . . . .” L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 645 F. 

Supp. 2d 888, 898 (E.D. Cal. 2009); accord Butler, 2006 WL 

1806412, at *9 (stating “other than to label [certain] hours as 

‘excessive,’ the [opposing party] does not present any argument 

or explanation to suggest that these hours were not reasonably 

expended”). “By contrast, Mr. [Gorski] has submitted a sworn 

affidavit attesting to the fact that the hours listed in his 

entries [represents the work performed and the time taken to 

perform said work].” Butler, 2006 WL 1806412, at *9. 

For the stated reasons, “the Court finds that the 

claimed hours . . . do not warrant a reduction for 

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excessiveness.” Id.

ii) Unsuccessful Law & Motion 

Defendants argue the hours Plaintiffs spent opposing

their dismissal and summary judgment motions should be reduced to 

reflect Plaintiffs’ limited success in opposing such motions. 

(Defs.’ Opp’n 10:12-11:8.) However, since it is “impossible to 

isolate” the amount of time Plaintiffs’ counsel spent 

successfully opposing certain portions of Defendants’ motions 

from the time spent unsuccessfully opposing other portions 

thereof, any reductions made to reflect the Plaintiffs’ limited 

success will be included in the later adjustment to the lodestar 

value. Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants also argue that since “[P]laintiffs [wer]e

not entitled to injunctive relief[,]” all time spent prosecuting 

Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the judgment to include injunctive 

relief should be excluded. Since the time spent prosecuting this 

unsuccessful motion can be isolated, it is excluded from the 

lodestar calculation. The 36.5 hours spent in connection with 

this motion on March 2, March 3, March 5, March 23, March 24, 

March 30, and April 1, 2013 are excluded. (See Billing Invoice

21, 22, Gorski Decl., Ex. B, ECF No. 196-2.)

iii) Judgment Lien

Defendants object to the inclusion of “hours . . . 

claimed for work related to a [judgment] lien filed by the County 

of Yolo” against Messrs. Gorski and Karalash. Review of the 

docket evinces that the referenced judgment lien concerns an 

unrelated Yolo County Superior Court case, Lancaster v. County of 

Yolo, Case No. CV07-1551. (See Notice of Lien, ECF No. 139.) 

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Therefore, the 6.9 hours billed on August 11, 2011, and January 

13, 2012, in connection with that lien are excluded. 

iv) Expert’s Airport Transportation

Defendants also object to time billed “for travel time 

to pick up and return [Plaintiff’s] expert to the airport.” 

(Defs.’ Opp’n 10:2-6.) 

In determining whether travel time should be 

compensated, “[t]he central inquiry is whether the time sought is 

reasonable.” Transbay Auto Serv., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 

No. C 09-04932 SI, 2013 WL 843036, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 

2013); see also Cotton v. City of Eureka, 889 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 

1177 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (indicating a moving party “may recover 

fees for reasonably expended travel time”). 

On January 7, 2013, Plaintiffs’ counsel picked up 

Plaintiffs’ expert witness from the airport; however, his billing 

entry for that time also included “me[eting] with expert, [and 

d]iscuss[ing] case.” (Billing Invoice 15.) Therefore, this travel 

time is not excluded as unreasonable. See Transbay Auto Service, 

Inc., 2013 WL 843036, at *7 (declining to reduce attorney’s fees 

for travel time that included other tasks). However, the 5.3 

hours billed on January 11, February 19, 2013, and March 5, 2013, 

appears to reflect only time spent transporting Plaintiffs’ 

expert to or from the airport. This time is unnecessary and 

should not have been included in the “exercise [of] billing 

judgment.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (stating “[h]ours that are 

not properly billed to one’s client, also are not properly billed 

to one’s adversary”). Therefore, the referenced 5.3 hours are 

excluded. 

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v) Mr. Karalash’s Time 

Defendants argue “[n]o fees should be allowed” for Mr. 

Karalash’s “non-specific claims for ‘taking notes’ and ‘proof 

reading.’” (Defs.’ Opp’n 12:26-13:5.) In the alternative, 

Defendants argue if his time is compensated, “the hourly rate 

should reflect the non-attorney nature of the work claimed to 

have been done.” (Id. at 13:3-4.) 

Mr. Karalash avers that his “involvement [in this 

action] was minimal,” and that he “was retained by Mr. 

Gorski . . . more as a back-up in case he had a conflict.” 

(Karalash Decl. ¶ 2.) Mr. Karalash further declares that he 

“spent the following hours on this case: 8 – hours proof reading 

Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment[,] . . . 2 

– hours proof reading Plaintiffs’ Appellate Brief[, and] 3 –

hours on the second day of testimony of Expert Witness David 

Orsay taking notes.” (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Since the referenced tasks are “clerical” in nature, 

they “are not properly reimbursable in a section 1988 fee award.” 

Frevach Land Co. v. Multnomah Cnty., Dept. of Envir. Servs., No. 

CV-99-1295-HU, 2001 WL 34039133, at *12 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2001) 

(deducting from a fee award “all time which is primarily 

secretarial or clerical in nature[,]” including proofreading); 

see also S.A. v. Patterson Joint Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:10-cv00943-OWW-SKO, 2010 WL 3069204, at *6 (recommending attorney’s 

fees be reduced for time spent taking notes at a hearing, stating 

“notetaking is essentially a clerical function”), report and 

recommendation adopted in full, No. 1:10-cv-00943-OWW-SKO (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 10, 2010). Therefore, all of Mr. Karalash’s time is 

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excluded. 

For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ claimed hours are 

reduced by 61.7 hours as follows:

36.5 Hours - work related to prosecution of motion to 

amend judgment to include injuctive 

relief

6.9 Hours - judgment lien

5.3 Hours - travel time taking expert to or from 

airport

13 Hours - Mr. Karalash’s hours

b) Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiffs request an hourly rate of $350.00 per hour, 

arguing such a rate “is supported by [Mr. Gorski’s] experience, 

prior awards, the type of services provided, and customary rates 

for similar attorneys in the region.” (Pls.’ Mot. 9:23-27.) Mr. 

Gorski declares in support of his fee request, in relevant part, 

as follows:

I graduated from California State 

University, Sacramento in 1988 and Widener 

University, School of Law (formerly Delaware 

Law School) in the Spring of 1991. I was 

first admitted to practice law in the 

November 1991 in the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania. I am a solo practitioner, and 

have been since 1995. I passed both the 

California and Pennsylvania bar exams on my 

first attempt.

The breadth of my practice has involved 

not only similar actions such as the present 

matter, but also a wide panoply of complex 

litigation matters in both state and federal 

court, which has lead [sic] to a variety of 

published opinions . . . .

My entire legal career has been devoted 

to trial practice. I have handled a broad 

range of cases involving both state and 

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federal law including, but not limited to, 

unfair business[] competition, construction 

litigation, deceptive trade practices, RICO, 

defamation, Bivens actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

Title VII, ADA, FEHA, Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 

552a), FOIA (5 U.S.C § 552), and various 

state negligence and contract actions. 

. . . . 

During my legal career, I have been 

personally responsible for approximately 750 

legal files in which an adversarial action 

was commence by way of a criminal complaint, 

lawsuit, arbitration notice, or 

administrative action.

I have personally tried approximately 85 

cases in my legal career, and co-chaired on 

an additional 35 (approximately).

I have litigated approximately 105 cases 

by way of arbitration or administrative 

proceedings.

(Gorski Decl. ¶¶ 9-11, 20-22 (paragraph nos. omitted).) 

Defendants rejoin that attorney’s fees “should not 

exceed [a rate of] $250.00/hr.” (Defs.’ Opp’n 13:7-8.) Defendants 

filed the Declaration of Andrea Miller, a local civil rights 

attorney, in support of their opposition. Ms. Miller avers: “it 

is [her] opinion . . . that $350.00 per hour is the appropriate 

prevailing rate awarded to the most experienced attorneys in this 

district on a contested fee motion.” (Decl. Andrea Miller ¶ 9, 

ECF No. 206-1.) Ms. Miller further declares that Mr. Gorski’s 

“hourly rate should probably not exceed $250” per hour, given his 

experience “and the lack of unique issues or extra ordinary 

complexity” trying this action. (Id. ¶ 13.)

However, in light of recent § 1988 fee awards issued in 

the Eastern District of California – Sacramento, and Mr. Gorki’s 

nearly 22 years of experience as a litigator, the requested rate 

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of $350.00 per hour is reasonable. See e.g. Knox, 2013 WL 

2434606, at *8 (awarding $450.00 per hour in a § 1983 case as 

“the hourly rate at the top of the compensation range that exists 

in the Sacramento legal market”); H.W. ex rel. Nelson v. E.

Sierra Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV S-11-0531 GEB GGH, 2012 WL 

4469262, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012) (awarding $350.00 per 

hour in § 1983 case to attorneys with eleven and twelve years 

experience), report and recommendation adopted in full, No. CIV 

S-11-0531 GEB GGH, 2012 WL 5013016 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010);

Jones v. Cnty. of Sacramento, No. CIV S-09-1025 DAD, 2011 WL 

3584332, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (awarding hourly rate of

$350.00 in excessive force case to attorney with twenty-four 

years experience); Beecham v. City of West Sacramento, No. Civ. 

S-07-1115 JAM EFB, 2009 WL 3824793, at *4 (awarding hourly rate 

of $375.00 per hour to attorneys with approximately twelve years 

experience).

Accordingly, the lodestar figure is $395,010.00 

(1128.60 hours x $350.00 / hour). 

2) Adjustment of Lodestar Due to Plaintiffs’ Limited 

Success

Defendants contend that any fee awarded “should be 

reduced by at least 90%” to account for Plaintiff’s “minimal 

success.” (Defs.’ Opp’n 7:7-22.) Defendants argue:

In addition to the Monell claim against 

the County, [P]laintiffs originally sought 

other relief. Claims in the Second Amended 

Complaint were asserted against the deputy 

involved in the Eley incident, Kevin Sowles; 

against the former Sheriff, Lou Blanas, 

personally; on a claim that [P]laintiff 

Hunter was denied access to a telephone; and 

for the certification of a class for the 

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purposes of a class action. Following 

[D]efendants’ motion for summary judgment, 

the only claim that remained was [the Monell

claim]. In a case involving an award of 

nominal damages, the overall success of the 

plaintiff is a prime consideration in 

determining a fee award. Here, [P]laintiffs 

were unsuccessful or abandoned each claim 

other than the [Monell claim]. The lack of 

success on those claims requires a downward 

adjustment of any fee award. 

(Id. at 7:25-8:9.)

“[T]he extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial 

factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s 

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. “A 

reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however 

significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the 

litigation as a whole.” Id. “[W]here the plaintiff achieved only 

limited success, the district court should award only that amount 

of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.” 

Id. “There is no precise rule or formula for making these 

determinations. . . . The court necessarily has discretion in 

making this equitable judgment.” Aguirre v. L.A. Unified Sch. 

Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hensley, 461 

U.S. at 436-37). 

Here, Plaintiffs initially brought multiple claims 

against more Defendants than the single Monell claim against the 

County of Sacramento that was tried. Further, each Plaintiff was 

awarded only $1.00 in nominal damages on his successful Monell

claim; Plaintiffs did not obtain injunctive or declaratory 

relief. Under the circumstances, although a finding of Monell

liability against the County of Sacramento concerning a practice 

or custom regarding the use of excessive force in the Sacramento 

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County Main Jail is certainly not insignificant, a 50% downward 

adjustment to the lodestar is appropriate to reflect the extent 

of Plaintiffs’ success. See, e.g., Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, No. C 

05-1143 SI, 2008 WL 512707, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008) 

(reducing lodestar by 80% to account for the plaintiff’s limited 

success in obtaining nominal damages on excessive force and 

wrongful death claims; no Monell claim), aff’d 593 F.3d 1054 (9th 

Cir. 2010); Beecham, 2009 WL 3824793, at *5 (applying a 50% 

downward adjustment to lodestar where “there was a large 

disparity in the amount of damages awarded as compared to the 

amount sought by” the plaintiffs at trial); Butler, 2006 WL 

1806412, at *11 (reducing lodestar by 50% to reflect the 

plaintiff’s “limited degree of success”). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ 

fee award is reduced to $197,505.00.

C. Whether the PLRA Limits the Attorney’s Fees Awarded

Defendants argue that any attorney’s fees awarded to 

Eley are limited by the PLRA to 150% of his monetary judgment, 

i.e., $1.50. (Defs.’ Opp’n 1:3-18.) Defendants further argue that 

because the action was tried jointly on behalf of Hunter and 

Eley, and separate fee awards per Plaintiff are not sought, any 

award of attorney’s fees must be calculated by “reducing [the 

total award] by one half plus $1.50, to account for the PLRA 

limitations” to Eley’s award. (Id. 1:20-26.)

The PLRA contains certain limitations on the award of 

attorney’s fees under § 1988 in “any action brought by a prisoner 

who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional 

facility.’” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (emphasis added). However, 

assuming Eley is a “prisoner,” as defined by the act, it has not 

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been shown that the PLRA’s attorney’s fees limitations apply when 

an action is commenced by a prisoner and non-prisoner. See Turner 

v. Wilkinson, 92 F. Supp. 2d 697, 704 (1999) (stating “[s]ince 

not all of the original plaintiffs were prisoners, the Court does 

not believe that this case can properly be characterized as a 

suit ‘brought by a prisoner’). Further, even if the PRLA 

limitations do apply under such circumstances, “the Court 

perceives of no logical way to separate the attorney[’s] fees

expended on behalf of the two [P]laintiffs.” Id. For example, Mr. 

Gorski avers:

The amount of time spent litigating Mr. 

Eley’s claim as compared to Mr. Hunter’s is 

immaterial and virtually impossible to 

separate. Even had Mr. Eley not been a party 

to the case, I would have still have called 

him as a witness, and used his declaration in 

opposing summary judgment. Anytime spent 

specifically to his claim, and not Mr. 

Hunter’s is insignificant.

(Suppl. Gorski Decl. ¶ 2.)

Therefore, the referenced PLRA attorney’s fee 

limitation is not applied to the fee award.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for 

attorney’s fees is granted, in part. Plaintiffs are awarded 

$197,505.00 in attorney’s fees. 

Dated:October 10, 201313 

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