Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00269/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00269-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY ERVIN,

NO. CIV. S-05-269 LKK/GGH PS

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CA,

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

The court is in receipt of plaintiff’s motion, entitled

“Motion for relief under FRCP 52(b) and 60(b)”. It is currently

set to be heard on the December 1, 2006 law and motion calendar.

The court decides the matter based on the papers and without oral

argument.

Plaintiff originally filed his complaint in the Northern

District of California on November 22, 2004, alleging violations

of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as to

all defendants, and conversion as to defendant Castellanos. On

Case 2:05-cv-00269-LKK -GGH Document 62 Filed 11/16/06 Page 1 of 4
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 As explained in the findings and recommendations, plaintiff 1

is a non-practicing attorney with electro-impulse cardiovascular

disease and congenital heart murmur arrhythmia, who alleges that

these disorders substantially limit major life activities such as

hearing, speaking, walking, and performing manual tasks. He sued

the Judicial Council, Superior Court in Sacramento County, four

judges assigned to that bench, and the State Bar. Most of the

allegations concerned prior lawsuits plaintiff was involved in

which were litigated in that court. He complained of various

actions by the judges in handling his cases which he alleges

violated his rights under the ADA. As for the State Bar,

plaintiff claimed that his status as “not entitled” to practice

implies that he is insane, and violates the ADA. Plaintiff sought

damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief.

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February 7, 2005, the Northern District transferred the action to

this court. 

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On June 26, 2006, the magistrate judge assigned to the case

filed findings and recommendations. Plaintiff filed objections on

July 14, 2006, and July 17, 2006, and they were considered by this

court. On September 11, 2006, the findings and recommendations

were adopted by this court. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss by

defendants Virga, Cecil, McMaster, and Castellanos, was dismissed

as moot (because a dismissal had already been ordered), defendants

Judicial Counsel and Superior Court of California, County of

Sacramento, were dismissed with prejudice, and this action was

terminated. Plaintiff now seeks to have the court reconsider or

vacate its prior ruling pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 52 (b) and 60 (b). 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (b) provides that “[o]n

a party's motion filed no later than 10 days after entry of

judgment, the court may amend its findings - or make additional

findings - and may amend the judgment accordingly.” Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 52(b). Judgment was entered in this case on September 12, 2006.

Under Rule 52(b), a party has ten days to file a motion pursuant

to the rule. Plaintiff filed the pending motion on September 26,

2006 – fourteen days after judgment was entered. Plaintiff,

therefore, failed to file his Rule 52 motion in accordance with the

time limits set forth in Rule 52(b). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that on “motion

and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party .

. . from a final judgment . . . for . . . . any reason justifying

relief from the operation of the judgment. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(6). This catch-all provision of Rule 60(b) “vests power in

courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such

action is appropriate to accomplish justice.” Klapprott v. United

States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949). Nonetheless, in order to seek

relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the movant must demonstrate

“extraordinary circumstances.” Liljeberg v. Health Services

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988)(quoting Ackermann v. United

States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)).

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of

“extraordinary circumstances” which would justify vacating the

court’s prior ruling. Plaintiff states that the “transferor

Court’s complex transfer order was issued by a District Judge –

Jenkins. Such complex transfer order is an extra-ordinary

circumstance.” Pl.’s Mot. for Relief at 5. Plaintiff fails to

explain what he means by this statement or how the transfer order

was, in fact, such an extraordinary circumstance that it would

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warrant this court vacating its prior decision. Moreover, the

court notes that the findings and recommendations issued on June

26, 2006 addressed the issue of how and why the case was

transferred. 

For these reasons, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. The hearing

set for December 1, 2006 is accordingly VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2006. 

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