Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00473/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00473-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victor O. Dema, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.; Robert

Feinberg; and Michael J. Yates, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-473-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Victor Dema filed an amended complaint against Defendants Snell &

Wilmer, L.L.P. and attorneys Robert Feinberg and Michael Yates on August 8, 2007.

Dkt. #10. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to

Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. #11. Plaintiff has

responded and Defendants have replied. Dkt. ##12, 13. The Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background.

Beginning on September 22, 2005, Defendants represented Banner Medical Center

in a state court civil defamation action brought by Plaintiff (“Banner Case”). During

discovery in the Banner Case, Defendants obtained and disclosed documents relating to

Plaintiff’s past criminal proceedings regarding an alleged sham marriage. Plaintiff alleges

that these records were improperly created and obtained. Plaintiff asserts that the court in

Case 2:07-cv-00473-DGC Document 14 Filed 12/03/07 Page 1 of 6
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The complaint’s caption lists “defamation of character in course of judicial process,

conspiracy to discriminate, racially motivated discrimination, false light invasion of privacy,

spoliation of evidence, invasion of privacy, abusive discovery tactics intended to invade

plaintiff’s legal rights, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Dkt. #10. 

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the Banner Case disallowed one of his exhibits as evidence, that Defendants filed a motion

for summary judgment on behalf of Banner that was granted, and that the state court judge

signed the order ninety days after choosing to grant the motion. 

After receiving an adverse judgment in the Banner Case, Plaintiff sued Defendants

in this Court. Dkt. #1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. #6. Before this Court

could rule on the motion, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint to remedy deficiencies in the

first complaint. The amended complaint asserts federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,

1983, and 1985, and numerous state law claims.1

 Dkt. #10. Defendants then filed this

motion to dismiss. Dkt. #11.

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would

entitle him to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). When analyzing

a complaint for failure to state a claim, “[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d

1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given

a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences

are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1998).

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim fails because it does not establish a

contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Section 1981 guarantees the

“right . . . to make and enforce contracts[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. “Any claim brought under

[§] 1981 . . . must initially identify an impaired ‘contractual relationship,’ under which the

plaintiff has rights.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). Plaintiff

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alleges no contractual relationship. Plaintiff and Defendants were opponents in the Banner

Case. He had no contract with Defendants. The Court accordingly will dismiss Plaintiff’s

§ 1981 claim. 

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for persons deprived of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and federal law by those acting under color of state

law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acting under

color of state law must exercise power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible

only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 49.

Courts give “careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement.” Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d

702, 708 (1991). Mere “conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts,” are “insufficient to

state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.” Id. 

Private actors associated with a winning party in a court proceeding usually have not

acted under color of state law. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Super. Ct., 318 F.3d

1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (private attorney representing opposing party was not acting

under color of state law, despite plaintiff’s claims that the attorney conspired with state

officers to deny due process); Price, 939 F.2d at 707-08 (private landowners who sought

court approval before taking actions regarding real property did not act under color of state

law simply by resorting to the courts); Phillips v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural &

Ornamental Iron Workers, 556 F.2d 939, 940 (9th Cir. 1977) (union officials who brought

allegedly meritless suits against members did not act under color of state law simply by

resorting to the court system).

Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that Defendants acted under color of state law,

but his factual allegations do not support the claim. Defendants were private attorneys

representing a private party in a civil lawsuit, not state actors. Plaintiff discusses various

events in the Banner case – alleged defamation by Defendants based on publication of

various records, the judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s request to present certain evidence, an

alleged racial connection between the judge and Defendants, and the grant of summary

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judgment against Plaintiff – but these allegations, even construed liberally, fail to support any

reasonable inference that Defendants were acting under color of state law. The Court will

dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify which of three subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1985

he pleads. Subsection (1) addresses conspiracy to prevent federal officials from discharging

their duties – a provision that clearly does not apply here. Subsection (2) deals with

conspiracy to obstruct justice by force, intimidation, or threat, but Plaintiff alleges no such

facts. Subsection (3), prohibiting conspiracy to deprive a person of rights or privileges, is

the only plausible subsection. 

To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove (1) a

conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person of equal

protection of the law, or of equal privileges and immunities under the law, (3) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) that the plaintiff was injured in his person or property,

or that the plaintiff was deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Further, the plaintiff must

prove that the deprivation of a protected right was motivated by some racial, or otherwise

class-based, invidious discriminatory animus. Id. Mere conclusory allegations of a

conspiracy are not sufficient. A valid claim must be supported by specific factual

allegations. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988);

Gillepsie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1988) (pro se plaintiff who claimed merely

that he was a black prisoner who was denied medical care failed to allege specific facts

suggesting a conspiracy or motivation by racial animus, and thus did not state a § 1985(3)

claim); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff who

showed only that an alleged coconspirator deceived the plaintiff, but not that an agreement

between the coconspirator and the defendant existed, did not state a claim for conspiracy).

Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to present evidence in court because it was

“missing,” that the state court judge ruled against him on several motions, that a bias of racial

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identity existed, and that defendants met with state court officials to form a conspiracy.

Plaintiff does not explain how his inability to produce evidence or the judge’s decisions

showed any action by Defendants at all, much less a conspiracy between Defendants and the

judge. Furthermore, Plaintiff supports his claim of racial bias only by indicating that he is

African-American and Defendants are Caucasian. This fact alone does not show racial bias

or a conspiracy based on race. Finally, all of Plaintiff’s allegations appear to be facts

necessarily connected with Defendants’ responsibility to represent Banner and the state

judge’s legal decisions based on that representation. Nothing suggests action outside of

Defendants’ typical professional activity. Such professional activities do not state a claim

for civil conspiracy. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion regarding the section 1985(3)

claim.

III. State Law Claims.

Because the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court has discretion to

dismiss the remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3). “To decline jurisdiction

under section 1367(c)(3), the district court must first identify the dismissal that triggers the

exercise of discretion and then explain how declining jurisdiction serves the objectives of

economy, convenience and fairness to the parties, and comity.” Tr. of Constr. Indus. &

Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923,

925 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The foregoing discussion identifies the dismissal of federal claims that triggers the

Court’s discretion under § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims are most

properly addressed by the courts of Arizona – courts charged with administering the laws of

Arizona and more familiar with state-law claims. Courts have recognized that when all

federal claims are eliminated early in a case and only state claims remain, the district court

has “a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 348–51 (1988); see Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 289

F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002) (declining supplemental jurisdiction after granting summary

judgment against plaintiffs’ federal claims); Oye v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(declining supplemental jurisdiction after granting defendants’ motion to dismiss federal

claims). Given that this case is only at the pleading stage, additional resources dedicated to

resolving state law claims should occur in state court. The Court will decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. #11) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed.

3. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims.

4. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 3rd day of December, 2007.

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