Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05324/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05324-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 16, 2007 Decided April 6, 2007

No. 06-5324

MOHAMMAD MUNAF AND

MAISOON MOHAMMED, AS NEXT FRIEND OF MOHAMMAD

MUNAF,

APPELLANTS

v.

PETE GEREN, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE 

U.S. ARMY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cv01455)

Joseph Margulies argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs were Jonathan L. Hafetz, Aziz Z. Huq, Eric M.

Freedman, and Susan L. Burke.

Gregory G. Garre, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S.

Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General,

Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, David B. Salmons, Assistant to

the Solicitor General, Douglas N. Letter, Litigation Counsel, and

Lewis Yelin, Attorney.

USCA Case #06-5324 Document #1033349 Filed: 04/06/2007 Page 1 of 9
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Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE. 

Opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH, concurring in

the judgment.

 SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Mohammad Munaf, an

American citizen, traveled to Iraq in 2005. In October 2006 he

was convicted on kidnapping charges and sentenced to death by

the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (“CCCI”). He is being held,

in Iraq, by United States military personnel serving as part of the

Multi-National Force–Iraq (“MNF-I”). Munaf sought a writ of

habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, naming the Secretary of the Army and others as

respondents. Soon after Munaf’s conviction by the Iraqi

criminal court, the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction

and dismissed the petition. Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp.

2d 115 (D.D.C. 2006). Munaf appeals. Constrained by

precedent, we hold that the district court does not have the

power or authority to entertain Munaf’s petition and we

therefore affirm. 

Our result is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in

Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948), as that decision has

been applied by this court in Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983

(D.C. Cir. 1949), and interpreted by Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-

5126 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2007). In Hirota, Japanese citizens

sought permission to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus

directly in the United States Supreme Court. The petitioners

were held in Japan, where they had been tried by a military

tribunal authorized by General Douglas MacArthur acting as the

Supreme Commander for the occupying Allied Powers. Hirota,

338 U.S. at 198. In a short per curiam opinion the Supreme

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Court concluded that the sentencing tribunal “[was] not a

tribunal of the United States” and held that “[u]nder the

foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no

power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the

judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners.” Id. 

Flick involved a habeas petition filed in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia by a German citizen

held in Germany by American forces after he was convicted by

a military tribunal. 174 F.2d 983. Relying on Hirota, we

framed the jurisdictional question as follows: “Was the court

which tried and sentenced Flick a tribunal of the United States?

If it was not, no court of this country has power or authority to

review, affirm, set aside or annul the judgment and sentence

imposed on Flick.” Id. at 984. Finding that the military tribunal

was not a U.S. court, we held that the district court lacked

jurisdiction to review Flick’s habeas petition. Id. at 986.

Our recent decision in Omar involved a habeas petition

filed on behalf of a United States citizen being held in Iraq by

U.S. forces acting as part of the MNF-I. Omar, slip op. at 2. As

in Hirota and Flick, Omar involved detention overseas and a

multinational force. But unlike the petitioners in Hirota and

Flick, Omar had not been charged or convicted by a non-U.S.

court. We distinguished Hirota and Flick on this basis and went

on to hold that the district court had jurisdiction to hear Omar’s

habeas claim. Slip op. at 12-14.

Unlike Omar, the instant case is controlled by Hirota and

Flick. The MNF-I is a multinational force, authorized by the

United Nations Security Council, that operates in Iraq in

coordination with the Iraqi government. The CCCI is an Iraqi

criminal court of nationwide jurisdiction and is administered by

the government of Iraq; it is not a tribunal of the United States.

Accordingly, the district court has no power or authority to hear

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Munaf was born in Iraq and was naturalized as a United

States citizen in 2000. 

this case.

Munaf contends that Hirota and Flick do not control

because, like Omar and unlike the petitioners in Hirota and

Flick, Munaf is a United States citizen.1

 See, e.g., Johnson v.

Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) (describing citizenship as

“a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection”). But

Munaf’s citizenship does not take his case out of the ambit of

Hirota and Flick. Hirota did not suggest any distinction

between citizens and noncitizens who were held abroad pursuant

to the judgment of a non-U.S. tribunal. Indeed, Justice Douglas

wrote a separate opinion criticizing the Hirota majority for

seeming to foreclose habeas review even for American citizens

held in such circumstances. See 338 U.S. at 204-05 (Douglas,

J., concurring) (1949). In Omar, we held that “the critical

factor in Hirota was the petitioners’ convictions by an

international tribunal.” Slip op. at 12. We explained that,

because Hirota “articulates no general legal principle at all,” the

decision is controlling as a matter of precedent if the

circumstances important to the Court’s decision are present here.

Id. at 11. As in Hirota, Munaf’s case involves an international

force, detention overseas, and a conviction by a non-U.S. court.

As we noted in Omar, conducting habeas proceedings in the face

of such a conviction risks judicial second-guessing of a non-U.S.

court’s judgments and sentences, and we explained that Hirota’s

repeated references to the petitioners’ sentences “demonstrate[]

that the Court’s primary concern was that the petitions

represented a collateral attack on the final judgment of an

international tribunal.” Id. at 12-13. Whether a habeas petition

represents a collateral attack on a conviction by a non-U.S. court

is not dependent on the petitioner’s citizenship. In light of the

precedent established by Hirota, specifically as interpreted in

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Munaf’s conviction was automatically appealed to the Iraqi

Court of Cassation. At oral argument, Munaf’s counsel stated that the

status of that appeal is unclear.

Flick and Omar, American citizenship cannot displace the fact

of a criminal conviction in a non-United States court and permit

the district court to exercise jurisdiction over Munaf’s habeas

petition. 

Munaf also argues that he does not challenge his conviction

by the Iraqi court but rather the lawfulness of his detention at the

hands of United States military personnel. As with Munaf’s

citizenship argument, we do not think that Hirota and Flick can

be distinguished on this ground. In Hirota and Flick, as in this

case, U.S. forces who were operating as part of a multinational

force detained the petitioners. And as in those cases, continued

confinement is dependent on a conviction by a court not of the

United States – specifically, a multinational tribunal in Hirota

and Flick and, in this case, the CCCI, which is a foreign tribunal.

The fact that the MNF-I is not an arm of the Iraqi government

but rather cooperates with Iraq and its courts in matters of

detention does not bring this case outside the scope of Hirota.

Munaf states in his brief that “[e]ven if the Iraqi charges were

dismissed tomorrow the United States does not suggest [Munaf]

would be released.” But the district court’s jurisdiction to

inquire into such matters is precisely the issue; if the charges

were dismissed, and United States forces were to continue to

hold Munaf, this would be a different case. Under Omar the

district court arguably would have jurisdiction over Munaf’s

habeas claim.2

 See Omar, slip op. at 14.

* * *

One final point deserves emphasis. In holding that the

district court lacks jurisdiction, we do not mean to suggest that

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we find the logic of Hirota especially clear or compelling,

particularly as applied to American citizens. In particular,

Hirota does not explain why, in cases such as this, the fact of a

criminal conviction in a non-U.S. court is a fact of jurisdictional

significance under the habeas statute. And as we acknowledged

in Omar, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466

(2004), are grounds for questioning Hirota’s continued vitality.

Omar, slip op. at 9. But we are not free to disregard Hirota

simply because we may find its logic less than compelling. “If

a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a

case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line

of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which

directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative

of overruling its own decisions.” Id. at 9 (quoting Rodriguez de

Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484

(1989)).

 

For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.

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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I believe the district court had jurisdiction over Munaf’s

habeas corpus petition. The critical considerations are that

Munaf is an American citizen and that he is held by American

forces overseas. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per

curiam), in which the habeas petitioners were Japanese citizens

held in Japan, therefore does not apply. There is a longstanding

jurisdictional distinction between citizens and aliens detained

outside the sovereign territory of the United States. In Johnson

v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 781 (1950), decided two years

after Hirota, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to issue

writs of habeas corpus for German prisoners held by the United

States in Germany. But the Court stated that its holding did not

apply to American citizens, to whom the “Court long ago

extended habeas corpus” when they were held outside the

United States. See id. at 769-70 (citing Chin Yow v. United

States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908)). 

It is hardly surprising then that eight of the nine Justices in

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), explicitly agreed that

American citizens held by American officials overseas could

invoke habeas jurisdiction. For himself and four other Justices,

Justice Stevens wrote that “[a]liens held at the [Guantanamo

Bay Naval] base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to

invoke the federal courts’ authority under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241.”

Id. at 481. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and

Justice Thomas, stated that “[n]either party to the present case

challenges the atextual extension of the habeas statute to United

States citizens held beyond the territorial jurisdictions of the

United States courts,” “[a]nd that position – the position that

United States citizens throughout the world may be entitled to

habeas corpus rights – is precisely the position that this Court

adopted in Eisentrager . . . even while holding that aliens abroad

did not have habeas corpus rights.” Id. at 497, 502 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting) (citation omitted).

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It is true that Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126, slip op. at 12

(D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2007), distinguished Hirota and Flick v.

Johnson, 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1949), on the ground that in

both cases the alien petitioners held overseas had been convicted

by an international tribunal. But Omar did not speak to the

jurisdictional issue confronting us here. To extend Hirota to

habeas petitions filed by American citizens not only would

contradict Eisentrager and the majority and dissenting opinions

in Rasul, but also would constitute an unwarranted extension of

an opinion that “articulates no general legal principle at all,”

Omar, slip op. at 11. 

Habeas petitions test the legality of detention. The fact that

the United States is holding Munaf because of his conviction by

a foreign tribunal thus goes to the question whether he is entitled

to the writ, not to the question whether the court has jurisdiction

to consider the petition. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681

(1946). As to the merits, I believe Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S.

524 (1957), is conclusive. After Japan indicted a United States

soldier for killing a Japanese woman in Japan, the soldier sought

a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia to prevent his transfer to Japanese

authorities. Id. at 525-26. The district court denied the writ on

the merits but issued a preliminary injunction against the

soldier’s transfer. Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21, 27

(D.D.C. 1957). Referring to a Security Treaty between the

United States and Japan, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of

the writ but reversed the grant of the injunction, 354 U.S. at 530,

reasoning that a “sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to

punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,

unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its

jurisdiction,” id. at 529 (citing The Schooner Exchange v.

McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)). In Munaf’s

case, the Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force

Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002), in

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conjunction with United Nations Security Council Resolutions

1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004), and 1637, U.N.

Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 11, 2005), commands the same result.

Cf. Holmes v. Laird, 549 F.2d 1211, 1219 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

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