Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00238/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00238-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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07cv238/06cr118

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR CARDENAS-ROJAS,

Petitioner, 

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

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Civil No. 07-CV-0238-L

Criminal No. 06-CR-0118-L

ORDER DISMISSING WITH

PREJUDICE PETITIONER’S 

MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255

TO VACATE, SET ASIDE OR

CORRECT SENTENCE

On February 5, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set

aside or correct sentence. Respondent has filed a response and opposition; Petitioner has not

submitted a reply, and the time for doing so has expired. The Court has reviewed the record, the

submissions of the parties, and the supporting exhibits and, for the reasons set forth below, will

dismiss Petitioner’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Victor Cardenas-Rojas (“Petitioner”) was charged by indictment with one

count of being a deported alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. On

June 1, 2006, a three-count superceding information was filed charging Petitioner with Illegal

Entry (Count One was a misdemeanor and Counts Two and Three were felonies) in violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1325. 

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 Petitioner and the Government agreed that USSG Section 2L1.2(a) applied to Petitioner, resulting in a

base offense level of 8. The parties also agreed that an upward adjustment of 16 levels was appropriate under

USSG Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) in light of Petitioner’s prior deportation after his conviction for inflicting corporal

injury on a spouse/cohabitant in violation of California Penal Code Section 273.5, an aggravated felony. Both

parties also stipulated that Petitioner would receive a three level downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility pursuant to USSG Section 3E1.1. Thus, Petitioner’s resulting offense level was 21. The parties

also agreed, for purposes of this case, that Petitioner was in a criminal history category VI. See Plea Agreement 

¶ X. A resulting offense level of 21, at a criminal history category VI, produces an applicable guideline range of

77 to 96 months.

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That same day, Petitioner pled guilty to the three-count superceding information before

the magistrate judge pursuant to a written plea agreement. Under the terms of the plea

agreement, Petitioner agreed to waive any right to appeal, or to collaterally attack his conviction

and sentence, unless the Court imposed a custodial sentence greater than the high end of the

guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to the plea agreement. See Plea

Agreement ¶ XI. In exchange, the Government agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of

54-months custody, the statutory maximum pursuant to the three-count superceding information. 

This joint request amounted to a recommendation from the Government of a sentence far below

the applicable guideline range for the offense.1 During the plea proceedings, Petitioner clearly

acknowledged that he understood, that by entering the plea agreement, he was waiving his rights

to appeal and collateral attack. On August 14, 2006, the Court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas

and sentenced Petitioner to a 54-month term of imprisonment (Six months as to Count One, and

24 months as to both Counts Two and Three) followed by a term of supervised release of one

year. 

ANALYSIS

 In the instant motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Petitioner contends that: 1) he was

improperly sentenced under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 because he was not charged with that offense; and

2) double jeopardy applies because he received two separate sentences (custodial and supervised

release). Both arguments fail because they are factually and legally inaccurate. The superceding

indictment, which charged the Petitioner with three counts of Illegal Entry in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1325 was the operative charging document, and the sentence imposed reflected as such.

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Furthermore, as part of his plea agreement, Petitioner waived both the right to appeal and

the right to collaterally attack the judgment and sentence. Because Petitioner does not challenge

the validity of the waiver, nor call into doubt the effectiveness of his counsel’s assistance

regarding his decision to enter into the agreement, the Court finds that the waiver should be

enforced. 

A knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right is enforceable. United States v.

Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). The right to collaterally attack a sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is statutory in nature, and a defendant may therefore waive the right to

file a § 2255 petition. See, e.g., United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993)

(by entering plea agreement waiving right to appeal sentencing issues, defendant relinquished his

right to seek collateral relief from his sentence on the ground of newly discovered exculpatory

evidence).

The scope of a § 2255 waiver may be subject to potential limitations. For example, a

defendant’s waiver will not bar an appeal if the trial court did not satisfy certain requirements

under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to ensure that the waiver was

knowingly and voluntarily made. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. Such a waiver might also

be ineffective where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement, or

if the sentence imposed violates the law. Id.; United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 528 (9th

Cir. 1996). Finally, a waiver may not “categorically foreclose” defendants from bringing § 2255

proceedings involving ineffective assistance of counsel or involuntariness of waiver. Abarca,

985 F.2d 1012, 1014; United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In this case, none of these potential limitations on the validity of Petitioner’s waiver are

applicable. First of all, the record indicates that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered

into the Plea agreement and that the requirements of Rule 11 were adhered to. Secondly, the

sentence imposed by the Court was in accordance with the negotiated agreement, and in

accordance with the applicable sentencing guidelines. Finally, Petitioner does not dispute the

effectiveness of his counsel’s assistance regarding his decision to enter into the plea agreement. 

Therefore, the Court finds that none of the recognized limitations to a defendant’s waiver of the

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right to bring a § 2255 motion are present in this case. Accordingly, the collateral attack waiver

provision in Petitioner’s plea agreement will be enforced. 

 CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Petitioner has waived his right to

collaterally challenge his conviction and sentence in this matter. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 10, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

Victor Cardenas-Rojas #98441-198

Federal Correctional Complex-Victorville

P.O. Box 5300

Adelanto, CA 92301

Hamilton Arendsen

Assistant United States Attorney

880 Front Street, Room 6293

San Diego, CA 92101

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