Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04879/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04879-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RAYMOND E. LOPEZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DAVE DAVEY, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 13-cv-4879-TEH 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Raymond Lopez, a state prisoner, has filed this pro se 

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should not 

be granted. Respondent has filed an answer. For the reasons set 

forth below, the petition is DENIED. 

I 

Petitioner was convicted of crimes in three separate trials. 

The witness dissuasion and arson case and the jail stabbing case 

were consolidated into a single appeal. The murder case was 

appealed separately and the Court denied the habeas petition in 

that case. See Lopez v. Lewis, Case No. 13-cv-0649-TEH. In this 

habeas petition, Petitioner only challenges the convictions for 

witness dissuasion and arson. 

On August 12, 2009, a Santa Clara County jury found 

Petitioner guilty of two counts of attempting to dissuade a 

witness from reporting a crime and one count of arson of a car. 

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People v. Lopez, No. H035015, 2012 WL 1264451, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 

App. April 11, 2012). The jury also found true the gang 

enhancement for each count. Id. 

Petitioner was sentenced to 7 years to life for the first 

witness dissuasion count, consecutive to 7 years to life on the 

second witness dissuasion count, consecutive to 7 years for the 

arson count. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) Ex. A at 626. The 

California Court of Appeal reversed one of the life-term gang 

enhancements for a witness dissuasion count. Lopez, 2012 WL 

1264451, at *1. Petitioner was resentenced to a term of 7 years 

to life for one witness dissuasion count, consecutive to two 

years and four months for the second witness dissuasion count, 

consecutive to 7 years for the arson count. Docket No. 15, Ex. 

M. 

II 

The following factual background is taken from the order of 

the California Court of Appeal.1

Defendant was charged by second amended 

information with two counts of attempting to 

dissuade a victim or witness from reporting a 

crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); counts 1 & 2), 

and one count of arson (§ 451, subd. (d); 

count 3). The information further alleged 

that all three counts were committed for the 

benefit of, at the direction of, and in 

association with a criminal street gang. (§ 

186.22, subd. (b)(1) & (4).) 

1. The Trial Evidence 

a. The Stabbing and Attempted Cover Up 

Crystal Lopez was defendant's girlfriend. 

Crystal invited her friends, Rosa C. and 

T.C., to visit her. On May 4, 2007, Rosa 

 

1

 This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 

1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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drove her car, a Nissan Sentra, with T.C. to 

meet Crystal in San Jose. The three females, 

along with defendant and his friend named 

“Roach,” then went driving in Rosa's car. 

Rosa and T.C. had previously met defendant. 

Roach drove, T.C. sat in the front passenger 

seat, and Rosa, Crystal, and defendant sat in 

the backseat. Rosa allowed Roach to drive 

her car because she was not familiar with San 

Jose. 

Defendant and Roach were Norteños, and 

defendant was part of a “set or subclique of 

Nortenos” called “Roosevelt Park Locos.” 

While the group was traveling in the car, 

Rosa allowed defendant to play a CD of 

“Norteno rap music.” The “gang music” was 

playing “[r]eally loud” while all the windows 

were rolled down. The lyrics included 

references to the numbers 13 and 14 and to 

“scraps.” A “scrap” is a “negative word” for 

a Sureño, and Sureños are a rival gang to 

Norteños. The music referred to “beating 

[scraps] up and killing them.” 

When the Nissan was stopped at a red light, a 

Ford Crown Victoria was nearby with two males 

in the front seat. Rosa saw the driver 

making hand gestures, which she characterized 

at trial as “gang signs.” Rosa testified 

that she was not “real familiar with gangs,” 

and that the driver was moving his hands 

“kind of like stereotypical of ... how you 

see it in the movies.” No one in the Nissan 

was “really paying attention” to the 

gestures, except defendant, who stated, “Look 

at these ... fuckers” and/or “look at these 

fools.” Defendant was “getting really 

fidgety” and was staring at the other car. 

Defendant told Crystal that the occupants of 

the car were “looking at him wrong.” 

According to Rosa, the driver of the Ford 

made “more gang signs” and defendant again 

indicated that he could not “believe what 

he's seeing.” Rosa testified that defendant 

“thr[ew] up gestures” that were “similar to 

the ones” by the driver of the Ford. The 

driver of the Ford responded “with more 

gestures” and displayed a knife. Defendant 

was angry and was glaring at the occupants of 

the Ford. 

Crystal testified that the occupants of the 

Ford “flipp[ed] ... off” defendant and also 

threw up three fingers, which was a gang sign 

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showing that they were Sureños. According to 

Crystal, defendant flipped them off and 

called them “fucking scraps,” but he did not 

respond with any gang sign. He yelled 

“[f]uck you” and that they were “lucky” there 

were “girls in the car.” Crystal told 

defendant to “[q]uit staring” and “[l]et it 

go.” Defendant said “something about them 

being in a rival gang” and that “they are 

throwing up signs.” 

Once the cars were moving, the Ford tailgated 

the Nissan and also appeared to be trying to 

hit it. Roach initially tried to get away 

from the Ford. At some point, however, 

defendant stated to Roach words to the effect 

of “[c]ome on,” “[l]et's go,” or “[l]et's get 

them.” Defendant appeared “pumped up” and 

“ready to jump out of the car.” Roach 

stopped the car in the middle of a 

residential street. Either before or after 

the Nissan stopped, the Ford hit the back 

passenger door of the Nissan. 

Crystal testified that the driver of the Ford 

exited the vehicle and tried to stab 

defendant through the Nissan's window. 

Defendant and Roach exited the car 

thereafter. Rosa did not remember anyone 

reaching into the car with a knife, nor did 

T.C. see this either, although she did hear 

defendant say “something about a knife being 

thrown.” 

Defendant did not testify at trial, but his 

testimony under oath from “another hearing,” 

in which the same prosecutor and the same 

attorney representing defendant were present, 

was read to the jury. Defendant stated that 

the driver of the Ford exited the car, came 

up to the Nissan, and tried to stab defendant 

through the open window. The passenger got 

into the driver's seat of the Ford and backed 

it up. Defendant and Roach exited the Nissan 

and went towards the individual who had just 

tried to stab defendant. Defendant stated 

that his “intent at that point in time ... 

was to fight this guy.” He felt that if he 

drove away, the occupants of the Ford “would 

have just kept coming.” 

T.C. was scared and Rosa was panicking. Rosa 

got into the driver's seat of her car and 

started driving away. Crystal yelled at Rosa 

to “[g]o back.” Crystal indicated that if 

Rosa “didn't go back” and defendant died, “it 

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was all going to be on” Rosa. Crystal also 

said that she would “mess [Rosa] up” if she 

did not go back. At defendant's trial, 

Crystal testified that she had pleaded guilty 

to a criminal threats charge for threatening 

Rosa at this point. She testified at 

defendant's trial as a result of an agreement 

with the district attorney's office. Prior 

to entering the agreement, she was charged 

with the same offenses as defendant and was 

facing a “substantial number of years in 

state prison.” If she testified truthfully, 

she might receive credit for time served and 

“get a misdemeanor offense.” 

Rosa drove back to the scene where the males 

were fighting on a driveway. Defendant 

testified that he “sometimes” carried a 

knife, but denied having any weapons on him 

that day. He stated that he and Roach were 

hitting the individual and the individual 

stabbed defendant in the leg. Defendant and 

the individual then ran out of the way of the 

Ford, which was approaching them. Defendant 

wrestled the knife away from the individual 

and stabbed him repeatedly. Defendant stated 

that “it was more like a reaction, everything 

just happened.” According to defendant, he 

never said anything to the individual and 

“there was no exchange of words through the 

whole incident from beginning to end.” 

Defendant testified that that only he, and 

not Roach, stabbed the individual. 

According to Rosa, when the Ford went up the 

driveway, the driver appeared to be trying to 

hit defendant and Roach. The participants in 

the fight “dispersed.” The Ford then backed 

out of the driveway and onto the street, 

where it hit the front of Rosa's car. Either 

before or after Rosa's car was hit, defendant 

and Roach got into the backseat of Rosa's 

car. Crystal directed Rosa, who was still 

driving, out of the area. 

Defendant's hands were cut and his leg had a 

“pretty severe wound” from the stabbing. A 

lot of his blood got onto the backseat of 

Rosa's car. Defendant and Roach were 

“boasting about how they hurt the other 

guys.” Roach stated that “he got one of them 

really good” and that “he stabbed the guy 

deep.” Defendant told Roach to “shut up” and 

“not to say anything about it.” Defendant or 

Roach told the females, “you guys can't 

snitch. You guys can't tell anyone.” 

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Defendant also told them, “You guys didn't 

see nothing; nothing happened, right.” 

Defendant was “[b]asically saying [they] 

weren't there.” Defendant testified that he 

was “[t]rying to keep people from cooperating 

with the police.” 

Defendant wanted to go to Roosevelt Park 

because it was “his hood.” There were “a lot 

of cops” at the park however, so defendant 

said to “keep driving.” Defendant directed 

Rosa to a house, where two men approached the 

car. Crystal believed that the house 

belonged to defendant's grandmother and that 

the men approaching were defendant's father 

and cousin. Defendant explained what 

happened. He “talked about stabbing the 

guys” and said that he “got them good” 

although he also got “cut.” 

Defendant then directed Rosa to drive to a 

second house. Crystal testified that it was 

defendant's aunt's house. T.C. believed 

defendant's cousin and a person named “Boxer” 

lived at the house. Boxer, like defendant, 

was a Norteño and affiliated with the 

Roosevelt Park Locos. 

Everyone exited the car. Crystal told Rosa, 

“Calm down. Relax. Don't freak out. If 

you're not, they're going to fuck us up.” 

They all went into the house. Eventually, 

the people at the house included defendant's 

dad, aunt, uncle, two of his cousins, and 

Boxer. Defendant at some point stated that 

“he got in a fight with some scraps, and that 

one of them stabbed him.” Defendant, his 

dad, and his cousins told the three females 

“that [they] couldn't tell the cops, because 

they would ask too many questions.” 

T.C. heard defendant make a statement about 

her and Rosa “talking.” He stated, “Snitches 

end up in ditches,” which T.C. understood to 

mean that if she told the police, she would 

“get in trouble” or “would end up dying.” 

Defendant also told T.C. more than once that 

“snitches don't get stitches; they end up in 

ditches.” Additionally, he told T.C. that 

“you guys can't tell anyone or you'll get 

hurt.” 

One of the women at the house “was trying to 

stitch ... up” defendant's wound. Rosa, T.C., 

and Crystal were in the backyard. Rosa was 

scared. Crystal told her to “keep calm, to 

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not say anything, just relax.” 

Boxer, Roach, and possibly a third male 

followed Rosa and T.C. around. Rosa felt 

like she was being watched. While Rosa was 

outside the house, a male approached her and 

told her that she “had to do something about 

[her] car,” that “it had blood on it” and 

“was crashed,” and that she “had to deal with 

it.” Rosa felt the man “was trying to 

brainwash [her] to think that it ... was 

[her] fault.” He told her that they could 

burn the car and say that it was stolen. 

When Rosa and T.C. went into the house, 

defendant, Crystal, Roach, and at least two 

other men and two other women were present. 

One of the men stated that they needed to 

come up with a story about what happened, and 

he, Crystal, and another woman started making 

suggestions about the story. Rosa was told to 

report to the police that her car had been 

stolen. The plan also included Roach and at 

least one other individual burning Rosa's car 

somewhere so “that way the cops couldn't see 

the blood” or “the D.N.A.” Defendant was 

“helping to formulate [the] plan” about what 

they should tell the police and 

“occasionally” would say something during the 

discussion. For example, he said that T.C. 

was “not a good liar” and “to keep her out of 

it,” and that they should say they were 

shopping so they would “have an excuse of why 

[they] left Rosa's car somewhere.” 

Defendant's dad, uncle, cousins, Boxer, and 

Roach were also involved in telling the 

females what to say to the police. 

Defendant testified that he “made comments” 

to “any or all of the girls about talking 

about this incident” involving the Ford and 

its occupants. He admitted that “[t]he words 

... could be interpreted as a threat.” He 

also acknowledged that he did not want anyone 

to talk about the incident because he was 

worried about it being reported to the 

police. He further admitted that he was 

involved in a discussion about what to do 

with Rosa's car and that he said it should be 

burned. He wanted the car burned because he 

bled all over the car and he wanted to get 

rid of the blood. He denied actually burning 

the car himself. 

Rosa decided that she would “agree with 

whatever they” said so that she could leave 

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and that she would later tell the police 

“everything that happened.” Rosa was worried 

because of Crystal's earlier comment that “if 

they saw us freaking ... they were going to 

fuck us up.” Rosa felt that she “didn't have 

nowhere to run.” 

T.C. testified that she felt like she 

“couldn't leave” the house. She also 

testified that “everyone,” including Boxer, 

Roach, and defendant, told her that she 

“couldn't tell the police” what had occurred. 

T.C. did not feel like she could tell the 

police the truth because she was being 

followed at the house and someone was 

“hovering around” her. She was worried about 

her life if she were to call the police. T.C. 

explained at trial that “if he was capable of 

stabbing someone that wasn't really anything 

to him, ... if they were capable of having 

that on their conscience and not feel any 

guilt towards that, ... what if someone, 

like, betrayed them?” 

Roach told Crystal that she “couldn't tell 

the cops” and that she had to make sure that 

Rosa and T.C. “didn't tell the cops” either. 

Crystal told Rosa and T.C. to “do whatever 

the guys told them to do” because she did not 

want anything to happen to any of the three 

of them. 

Rosa gave her car keys to Roach and Boxer. 

She felt that she had no choice and that 

“they might hurt” her. When Rosa was asked 

at trial whether there was anything that led 

her to believe that she would be harmed if 

she “didn't go along with the story,” other 

than what Crystal said to her, Rosa 

responded, “I know a guy got stabbed because 

whatever. I mean, if they were willing to 

stab him, ... there was nothing to stop them 

to hurt me.” 

Crystal, Rosa, and T.C. left the house and 

went to get Crystal's car. Crystal told T.C. 

that defendant “is serious, and if we tell 

anyone, ... he will hurt us.” Rosa and 

Crystal went to another location and reported 

the car stolen. Rosa participated in the lie 

about what happened to her car because she 

was afraid Crystal would “tell on” her to 

defendant. The police arrived and Rosa 

provided the fabricated story. The police 

told Rosa to “stop lying” and handcuffed her. 

Among other things, the police told Rosa that 

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they had a witness who had described her. 

Rosa told the police that she did not want to 

talk “on the street.” At trial, Rosa 

explained that she was afraid “somebody 

else,” including Crystal, might hear her 

telling the truth to the police, that “they'd 

know” it was her telling the truth, and that 

“they would come after” her. She thought 

“somebody would come after” her because “it 

would be [her] fault ... that [defendant] and 

Roach would get caught.” After being taken 

to the police station, Rosa disclosed the 

truth about what had happened that day. 

Crystal was arrested that same night, and 

four months later she told police the truth 

about what had happened. 

When T.C. was initially questioned by the 

police, she was scared. She lied and said 

that she “didn't know anything.” T.C. told 

the truth after the police told her that 

“they,” in reference “to [defendant's] gang,” 

would not “hurt” her and that the police 

would “protect” her. 

The police pulled the Ford over after the 

incident occurred. The individual in the 

passenger seat had been stabbed at least ten 

times, including in his head, chest, abdomen, 

back, hand, and leg. At the scene of the 

stabbing, the police found a knife. At some 

point, Rosa's car was found burned. 

The parties stipulated that Norteños are a 

criminal street gang as defined by section 

186.22. The parties also stipulated that 

defendant “is a member of the Nortenos, 

specifically Roosevelt Park Locos.” 

b. Gang Expert Testimony 

Rocky Zanotto, a detective in the gang 

investigation unit for the San Jose Police 

Department, testified as an expert on 

Hispanic criminal street gangs. He explained 

that Norteños associate with the number 14, 

and will usually tattoo their bodies with 

four dots and one dot. Their enemy, the 

Sureños, associate with the number 13 and 

will “tattoo three dots on their body as 

opposed to four.” 

According to Detective Zanotto, music is one 

“indicator for gang members to identify rival 

gang members.” Further, it is 

“disrespectful” for a gang to play its 

“gangster rap” music while driving through a 

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rival gang's neighborhood. Regarding the CD 

that defendant played in Rosa's car, the 

detective believed it contained “Norteno gang 

rap,” based on the CD cover and song titles. 

Detective Zanotto explained that violence is 

“a way of life for gang members,” and that 

gang members expect violence “on a daily 

basis.” If a violent confrontation occurs 

with a rival gang, “[y]ou are expected to 

step up and back up your fellow gang member.” 

In the gang culture, violence “benefits gang 

members.” “[T]he more violent you are, the 

crazier you appear, the more street 

credibility you are going to get because 

nobody is going to mess with you. Nobody is 

going to mess with your” specific gang. 

“When your gang commits a violent act, the 

whole gang gets the notoriety from rival 

gangs.” In addition, the violence “controls” 

and “terrorizes” the community. If a gang 

has a violent reputation, community members 

will not call the police or testify against 

the gang. 

Respect is important to gangs, including 

respect from other gangs. If other gangs do 

not respect and fear a gang, that gang “will 

just dissolve.” If a gang member is believed 

to have been disrespected, the gang member is 

expected to not let it “go unchallenged” and 

to “deal with” it, which usually means 

violence. Gang signs are displayed “to 

challenge rival gang members or in some cases 

to intimidate regular citizens.” If someone 

throws a gang sign at a Norteño, that gang 

member is “expected to react with some type 

of violence.” 

In gang culture, the concept of not 

cooperating with police is “one of the 

primary things that they live by.” Even if a 

gang member acted legally in responding to a 

fight, gang culture dictates that the member 

not cooperate with the police. Gang members 

are viewed as cowards for cooperating with 

the police. Further, police involvement 

interferes with the ability of gang members 

to “take care” of it themselves later on. 

Gang members also discourage nonmembers from 

reporting crimes to the police. This 

benefits the gang “[b]ecause it allows the 

gang to thrive and grow.” “They can sell 

drugs in the open.... They can commit crimes 

against rivals and not worry about Joe 

Citizen sitting on his porch smoking and 

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say[ing] no, he did it. I saw the whole 

thing.” 

Based on a review of the facts in this case, 

which included reviewing police reports and 

information from the investigating officer, 

Detective Zanotto believed that the occupant 

of the Ford who had been stabbed was a 

Sureño. As for the other occupant, he 

testified that if the individual is in the 

same car, he is “definitely an associate” and 

“[i]f he is participating in that crime in 

any way, then he is a member.” 

Detective Zanotto testified that the Norteño 

gang would benefit by telling witnesses not 

to report the events of May 4, 2007, if the 

gang members “were able to spin this crime 

and not have the police get involved.” Once 

others learned about defendant's actions, 

“what he did and how he reacted 

appropriately,” that is going to “give him 

more status in the gang.” “And by getting 

away with the crime and being able to 

dissuade witnesses,” the gang member 

“personally benefits” by not going to jail. 

At the same time, the gang benefits because 

the gang member does not go to jail, the 

“true facts of the case are never really 

revealed” while the version relayed always 

“supports” the gang's cause, and it “benefits 

the gang's reputation because they were able 

to stab a Sureño numerous times” and get away 

with it. Further, dissuading witnesses who 

are not a part of the gang culture benefits 

the gang because the fear instilled in the 

witnesses will be communicated to others, and 

those people in the community “are not going 

to testify against gang members in the 

future.” 

Detective Zanotto believed that the events 

that occurred on May 4, 2007, leading up to 

the stabbing, were gang related based on the 

“totality of everything,” including the 

music, the hand gestures between the cars, 

defendant's reference to “scraps,” the “backand-forth exchange by a group of gang 

members,” and the end result of violence, 

“which is very common.” The detective also 

referred to evidence concerning the Nissan 

being pulled over, as opposed to being forced 

off the road or disabled so that it could not 

be driven. Further, the detective identified 

events after the stabbing that suggested the 

incident was gang related, including driving 

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to Roosevelt Park, going to a family member's 

house where one family member had medical 

training, getting stitched up at the house, 

the arrival of another gang member at the 

house, the formulating of a plan to get rid 

of evidence, and the “snitches” and “ditches” 

statement. 

Regarding the burning of Rosa's car and the 

statements concerning the hiding of DNA 

evidence from defendant's blood, Detective 

Zanotto testified that hiding the blood would 

personally benefit defendant as well as the 

gang. The gang would benefit because 

evidence of the underlying violent act would 

be destroyed. 

In Detective Zanotto's opinion, the attempted 

dissuasion of witnesses was committed for the 

benefit of or in association with a criminal 

street gang, the Norteños. He explained that 

the gang will benefit because “if they can 

dissuade citizens not to testify, they are 

never going to be caught. They can kill 

people at will and nobody is ever going to 

convict them and send them to jail.” 

Detective Zanotto believed that the crime of 

attempted witness dissuasion was committed in 

association with other gang members, based on 

the presence of three gang members, including 

Boxer and Roach, at the residence “directing 

people to do different things.” 

The defense rested without proffering any 

testimony or other evidence. Defense counsel 

conceded to the jury that defendant was 

guilty of both counts of attempting to 

dissuade witnesses and the count for arson. 

Defense counsel told the jury that it had to 

decide whether defendant committed the crimes 

“for the benefit, association with a gang” 

and whether defendant had the requisite 

specific intent under the gang allegations. 

Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *1-7 (footnote omitted). 

III 

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

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States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 

(1975). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal 

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless 

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, habeas relief 

is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of 

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under 

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

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“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court 

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether 

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in 

conducting its analysis, the federal court must presume the 

correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the 

petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by 

clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the 

Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas review, AEDPA ‘imposes a 

highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ 

and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of 

the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly 

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the 

dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A 

federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a 

view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 

Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 

12, 17 (2003). 

When applying these standards, the federal court should 

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. See 

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Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no 

reasoned opinion from the state’s highest court, the court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

804. 

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and 

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses 

Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner alleges that: 1) there was 

insufficient evidence to support the specific intent element of 

the gang allegations and the trial court erred in giving a 

special instruction regarding the allegations; 2) there was an 

erroneous jury instruction regarding the “proof of threats” 

element; 3) the gang expert provided improper opinion testimony; 

4) the gang expert improperly testified regarding a gang slogan; 

and 5) cumulative error. 

IV 

A 

 Petitioner first contends that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the gang enhancements for all three counts. 

He argues there was insufficient evidence that any of the crimes 

were committed with the specific intent to promote or assist 

other criminal conduct by gang members. He also argues that the 

trial court erred in issuing a jury instruction regarding 

specific intent. 

 The gang allegation for each count required proof that 

Petitioner committed the offense “for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, 

with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any 

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criminal conduct by gang members.” § 186.22, subd. (b)(1) & (4). 

This scienter requirement “applies to any criminal conduct, 

without a further requirement that the conduct be ‘apart from’ 

the criminal conduct underlying the offense of conviction sought 

to be enhanced.” People v. Albillar, 51 Cal. 4th 47, 66 (2010). 

In addition, “[t]here is no further requirement that the 

defendant act with the specific intent to promote, further, or 

assist a gang; the statute requires only the specific intent to 

promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by gang members. 

[Citations.]” Id. at 67. 

 The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM 1401 which 

states that the prosecution had to prove Petitioner “intended to 

assist, further, or promote criminal conduct by gang members.” 

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 1339. The trial court also gave 

an instruction requested by the prosecution that “defendant's own 

conduct may qualify as the gang-related criminal activity. [¶] 

There is no requirement that the defendant intended to assist or 

promote criminal activity other than his own.” RT at 1341. 

 The California Court of Appeal discussed relevant state law 

and denied the claim regarding the jury instruction as follows: 

We agree with the conclusion in People v. 

Hill, supra, 142 Cal. App. 4th 770, that the 

specific intent element may be satisfied when 

the defendant gang member intended to promote 

or further the defendant's own gang related 

criminal conduct, and that the defendant's 

specific intent need not relate to criminal 

activity apart from the offense that the 

defendant commits. (Id. at p. 774.) 

. . . 

Here, with respect to the specific intent 

element of subdivision (b)(1) and (4) of 

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section 186.22, a defendant gang member who 

commits a gang related felony can commit that 

felony with the specific intent to promote or 

further criminal conduct by a gang member–

that same felony by the defendant gang 

member. It is not reasonable that the 

Legislature, in attempting to deter criminal 

gang activity, intended the punishment 

provided by that subdivision to apply to a 

defendant committing a gang related crime 

with the intent to promote or further 

criminal conduct by other gang members, but 

not apply the punishment if the defendant 

intends to promote or further criminal 

conduct committed by the defendant gang 

member himself or herself. 

We are not persuaded by defendant's argument 

that the reference to “gang members” in the 

plural (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) & (4)) means 

that the statute requires the defendant to 

have specifically intended to promote or 

further criminal conduct by another gang 

member. We believe that a reference to “gang 

members” in the plural in subdivision (b)(1) 

and (4) of section 186.22 may mean “gang 

member” in the singular. (See § 7 [the plural 

number includes the singular, and words and 

phrases must be construed according to the 

context].) 

In sum, we believe that the specific intent 

element may be satisfied when a defendant 

gang member commits the underlying offense 

with the specific intent to promote or 

further the defendant's own gang-related 

criminal conduct, and that the defendant's 

specific intent need not relate to criminal 

activity apart from the charged offense that 

the defendant committed. In this case, the 

trial court instructed the jury pursuant to 

CALCRIM No. 1401 that the prosecution had to 

prove defendant “intended to assist, further, 

or promote criminal conduct by gang members.” 

Defendant stipulated that he was a member of 

a criminal street gang. The trial court's 

special instruction stated: “The defendant's 

own conduct may qualify as the gang-related 

criminal activity. [¶] There is no 

requirement that the defendant intended to 

assist or promote criminal activity other 

than his own.” This special instruction 

correctly informed the jury that the specific 

intent element may be satisfied if the 

defendant intended to promote his own gangrelated criminal activity. Because the trial 

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court's special instruction was not 

erroneous, we conclude that defendant's 

substantial rights were not affected by the 

instruction. (§ 1259.)

Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *9-10. The California Court of Appeal 

also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the 

specific intent element of the gang enhancements: 

[S]ubstantial evidence supports the specific 

intent element of the gang allegations for 

the attempted dissuasion and arson counts. 

At trial, defendant stipulated that he was a 

member of Norteños, a criminal street gang. 

The evidence established that Roach and Boxer 

were also Norteño gang members. As defendant 

acknowledges, it was conceded at trial that 

he committed the attempted dissuasion counts 

and that he assisted in burning Rosa's car to 

cover up his blood. The evidence at trial 

further reflected that defendant, Roach, and 

Boxer jointly participated in these crimes. 

Defendant verbally attempted to dissuade Rosa 

and T.C., and Roach and Boxer told T.C. that 

she could not tell the police what had 

occurred. Further, Roach told Crystal that 

she had to make sure that Rosa and T.C. did 

not tell the police what had happened. Roach 

and Boxer also followed Rosa and T.C. around. 

All three gang members participated in the 

creation of the false story and the plan to 

burn Rosa's car. A reasonable inference 

arises that the gang members' efforts were 

directed at hiding from the police any 

evidence linking defendant and Roach to the 

earlier incident involving the stabbing of a 

rival gang member. Defendant does not 

dispute that there is substantial evidence 

that he committed the offenses, attempted 

dissuasion and arson, for the benefit of the 

gang. In view of the record, we believe that 

substantial evidence also supports the 

inference that defendant committed these 

gang-related offenses with the intent to 

promote or further these gang-related 

offenses by defendant himself. A rational 

factfinder might have also reasonably 

concluded that defendant intended to assist 

Roach and Boxer in the commission of these 

offenses. (See Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th 

at p. 68.) In sum, we determine that 

substantial evidence supports the specific 

intent element of the gang allegations. 

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Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *11. 

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under 

state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 

(1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the 

jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction 

by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process. See id. at 72; Cupp v. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) ("'[I]t must be 

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, 

erroneous or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated 

some [constitutional right].'"). The instruction may not be 

judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the 

context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against 

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who 

alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction 

cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

therefore states a constitutional claim, see Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to 

federal habeas relief, see id. at 324. 

 The Supreme Court has emphasized that "Jackson claims face a 

high bar in federal habeas proceedings . . . ." Coleman v. 

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Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (finding 

that the Third Circuit "unduly impinged on the jury's role as 

factfinder" and failed to apply the deferential standard of 

Jackson when it engaged in "fine-grained factual parsing" to find 

that the evidence was insufficient to support petitioner's 

conviction). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state 

court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that 

the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne 

v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). The federal court 

"determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.'" Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319). 

 Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief for these 

claims. The jury instructions issued by the trial court have 

been upheld by state courts. To the extent Petitioner argues 

there was an error under state law, he is not entitled to federal 

habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) 

(stating that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court 

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions”). 

In addition, the Ninth Circuit has rejected arguments similar to 

what Petitioner presents. See Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 

1215-16 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To sustain Emery's gang enhancements, 

there must have been evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 

could find that Emery acted with the ‘specific intent to promote, 

further or assist in’ some type of ‘criminal conduct by gang 

members,’ which may include the crimes of conviction.”). Nor has 

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he demonstrated that the jury instruction so infected the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. 

 Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the state 

court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of the evidence 

was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. 

Petitioner conceded that he committed the underlying crimes, and 

the California Court of Appeal described the abundance of 

evidence establishing that Petitioner committed the crimes with 

the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal 

conduct by gang members. Looking at all of this evidence, a 

rational juror could have found that Petitioner’s actions 

intended to further criminal conduct by gang members. Petitioner 

is not entitled to habeas relief on these claims. 

B 

Petitioner next argues that the trial court failed to 

instruct the jury on the “proof of threat” element required for 

the life-term gang enhancement each of the two counts of 

dissuading a witness for the benefit of a criminal street gang. 

 Petitioner was charged with life-term gang enhancements for 

count 1, dissuading Rosa, and count 2, dissuading T.C. He was 

charged with the standard gang enhancement for count 3, the arson 

charge. Unlike the standard gang enhancement, the life-term 

enhancement contains the additional element of making threats. 

The trial court gave the same instruction for each of the three 

enhancements, thus omitting the requirement that the jury find 

that Petitioner made threats to support the life-term gang 

enhancements for counts 1 and 2. 

 On direct appeal Respondent conceded error but argued the 

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error was harmless. The California Court of Appeal found the 

error harmless with respect to count 2, dissuading T.C, but 

reversed the life-term gang enhancement for count 1, dissuading 

Rosa. Petitioner now argues that the enhancement regarding T.C. 

should be reversed. 

The California Court of Appeal stated the following in 

finding the error harmless with respect to T.C.: 

In this case, as to count 2, regarding the 

attempted dissuasion of T.C. and the 

accompanying gang allegation, we determine 

that the trial court's error in failing to 

instruct regarding the requirement of an 

express or implied threat was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. T.C. testified that she 

heard defendant say, “[s]nitches end up in 

ditches,” in reference to her and Rosa 

“talking.” T.C. understood this statement to 

mean that if she told the police, she would 

“get in trouble” or “would end up dying.” 

Defendant also told T.C. more than once that 

“snitches don't get stitches; they end up in 

ditches.” Additionally, he told T.C. that 

“you guys can't tell anyone or you'll get 

hurt.” T.C's testimony that she heard these 

statements from defendant was uncontroverted. 

Indeed defendant admitted that he made 

comments to one or more of the three females 

“about talking about [the] incident” and that 

his comments “could be interpreted as a 

threat.” Given the words used by defendant, 

we do not believe the statements could be 

interpreted as something other than threats 

of force or violence. (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1) 

[attempt to dissuade must be accompanied by 

“an express or implied threat of force or 

violence”]; see People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 

Cal.App.4th 1333, 1344 [violation of section 

136.1, subdivision (c)(1) may be established 

where the defendant's words or actions 

support inference that the defendant 

attempted by threat of force to induce 

withholding testimony].) In view of the 

uncontradicted testimony by T.C. that 

defendant made multiple threats to her 

concerning talking to the police, and 

defendant's admission that he threatened at 

least one of the females, we conclude that 

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the jury could not have rationally found the 

omitted threat element unproven as to the 

count pertaining to the attempted dissuasion 

of T.C. (See People v. Ortiz (2002) 101 Cal. 

App. 4th 410, 416 [holding that failure to 

instruct on threat element was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt where 

uncontradicted testimony of the defendant's 

statements to the victim was such that “no 

reasonable jury could have decided” the 

defendant made the statements “and yet have 

viewed the statements ... as not threatening 

force”].) The instructional error as to the 

threat element was therefore harmless as to 

the true finding on the gang allegation for 

count 2. 

Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *15. 

A jury instruction that omits an element of an offense is 

constitutional error subject to “harmless error” analysis. See 

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1999) (direct review); 

Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2003) (§ 2254 

case). Harmless error applies whether the error is characterized 

as a misdescription of an element of an offense in a jury 

instruction, or as an omission of the element. See California v. 

Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (omission of "intent" element from 

aiding and abetting instruction subject to harmless error 

analysis where jury could have found intent based on evidence it 

considered); Evanchyk, 340 F.3d at 940-41 (violation of due 

process based on jury instructions that omitted “intent” element 

of first-degree felony murder subject to harmless error 

analysis). 

The omission will be found harmless unless it "'had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict.'" Roy, 519 U.S. at 4 (quoting Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Where the trial court 

simply fails to alert the jurors that they must consider an 

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element of the crime, the omission is harmless if review of the 

facts found by the jury establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the jury necessarily found the omitted element. See 

Uchimura v. United States, 125 F.3d 1282, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(applying plain error analysis on direct review of a federal 

criminal conviction); see, e.g., Neder, 527 U.S. at 15-20 (error 

harmless because “the omitted element was uncontested and 

supported by overwhelming evidence”). But if the reviewing 

federal habeas court is in grave doubt as to whether the error 

had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. See 

Evanchyk, 340 F.3d at 940-42. 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. A review of 

the records indicates that T.C. testified to several threats that 

Petitioner made towards her. Any error made by omitting the 

element from the jury instruction was harmless due to the 

uncontroverted evidence that Petitioner threatened T.C. The 

evidence presented at trial established beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the jury necessarily found the omitted element. The intent 

element evidence was uncontested and supported by a great deal of 

evidence. This is not a situation where the Court is in grave 

doubt regarding the error. The error did not have a substantial 

and injurious effect on the jury verdict; therefore, the claim is 

denied. 

C 

 Petitioner next contends that the prosecution’s gang expert 

provided improper expert testimony that usurped the jury’s role. 

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant background 

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for this claim: 

During a hearing on motions in limine, 

defense counsel acknowledged that the expert 

may “talk about the benefit and association” 

element of the gang allegations. He stated, 

however, that he was “concerned” about the 

prosecution's gang expert testifying about 

“an ultimate issue of fact” and particularly 

defendant's specific intent. The prosecutor 

agreed that the expert “cannot testify as to 

the specific intent the defendant had.” The 

trial court granted defense counsel's 

“request,” ruling that the gang expert may 

offer an opinion regarding whether the crime 

was committed for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, or in association with a 

criminal street gang, but that the expert was 

precluded from offering an opinion on whether 

defendant had the requisite specific intent 

under section 186.22. 

At the beginning of the testimony by the gang 

expert, the trial court instructed the jury 

pursuant to CALCRIM No. 332 as follows: “This 

witness will be allowed to testify as an 

expert and to give opinions. You must 

consider the opinions, but you are not 

required to accept them as true and correct. 

The meaning and importance of any opinions 

are for you to decide. In evaluating the 

believability of an expert witness, follow 

the instructions about the believability of 

witnesses generally. In addition, consider 

the expert's knowledge, skill, experience, 

training and education, the reasons the 

expert gave for an opinion, and the facts or 

information on which the expert relied on in 

giving the opinion. You must decide whether 

the information on which the expert relied 

... was true and accurate. And you may 

disregard any opinion that you find 

unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by 

the evidence.” 

Relevant to defendant's contentions on 

appeal, the gang expert, Detective Zanotto, 

was asked at trial if he “ha[d] an opinion as 

to whether or not the dissuading of the 

witnesses was committed for or in association 

with a criminal street gang, the Norteños.” 

The detective stated, “Yes.” When asked for 

his opinion in that regard, Detective Zanotto 

explained that both the individual 

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personally, as well as the gang would “reap 

the benefits of getting away with dissuading 

someone not to testify. And it goes back to 

if they can dissuade citizens not to testify, 

they are never going to be caught. They can 

kill people at will and nobody is ever going 

to convict them and send them to jail.” The 

prosecution then asked the detective, “in 

regards to the association, what are you 

basing your opinion on this crime was 

committed in association with other gang 

members?” Detective Zanotto answered: 

“During the time at the residence, it's my 

opinion there were three members of a 

criminal street gang there directing people 

to do different things.” The detective 

subsequently testified that Boxer and Roach 

were two of the three gang members to whom he 

was referring. 

After the close of evidence, the trial court 

again instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM 

No. 332 concerning expert witness testimony. 

The court also instructed the jury: “An 

expert witness may be asked a hypothetical 

question. A hypothetical question asks the 

witness to assume that certain facts are true 

and then to give an opinion based on the 

assumed facts. It is up to you to decide 

whether an assumed fact has been proved. And 

if you conclude that an assumed fact is not 

true, consider the effect of the expert's 

reliance on that fact in evaluating the 

expert's opinion.” (See CALCRIM No. 332.) 

Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *16-17. 

The California Court of Appeal then denied this claim 

stating: 

In this case, contrary to defendant's 

contention, the testimony at issue did not 

concern defendant's specific intent. The 

expert's testimony, as framed by the 

questions posed to him, was directed to 

another element of the gang allegations: 

whether the crime was committed “for the 

benefit of ... or in association with any 

criminal street gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. 

(b)(4), italics added.) Specifically, 

Detective Zanotto was asked whether he had an 

opinion regarding whether “the dissuading of 

the witnesses was committed for or in 

association with a criminal street gang, the 

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Norteños” (italics added), and he responded 

affirmatively. In response to further 

questioning, the detective explained how the 

gang would benefit, and he stated the basis 

for his opinion that the crime was committed 

in association with other gang members. In 

contrast, the specific intent element of the 

gang allegations requires proof that the 

defendant had “the specific intent to 

promote, further, or assist in any criminal 

conduct by gang members.” (Ibid.) The 

challenged testimony here did not offer the 

expert's opinion on defendant's specific 

intent. Rather, the testimony offered an 

explanation as to why Norteño gang members in 

general would be motivated to attempt to 

dissuade witnesses from reporting the 

activities of gang members. If they dissuade 

witnesses, they will not get “caught” for 

those activities. They can commit crimes “at 

will” and will never be punished. Although 

the testimony explained defendant's possible 

motivation for attempting to dissuade Rosa 

and T.C., the gang expert did not offer an 

opinion as to whether defendant actually 

harbored the requisite specific intent when 

engaging in the conduct. 

Further, the subject matter of the challenged 

testimony by Detective Zanotto was a proper 

area of expert testimony because it pertained 

to the culture and habits of Norteños, an 

area “sufficiently beyond common experience.” 

(Evid.Code, § 801, subd. (a); see also 

Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 617; 

Killebrew, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 657.) 

As we explained, the detective's testimony 

offered an explanation as to why Norteños in 

general would be motivated to attempt to 

dissuade witnesses from reporting the 

activities of gang members. If they dissuade 

witnesses, they will not get “caught” or 

punished for those activities. The detective 

had also earlier explained that discouraging 

the reporting of crimes “allows the gang to 

thrive and grow.” “They can commit crimes 

against rivals and not worry about Joe 

Citizen sitting on his porch smoking and 

say[ing] no, he did it. I saw the whole 

thing.” The detective also testified that 

the gang benefits because the gang member 

does not go to jail, the “true facts of the 

case are never really revealed” while the 

version relayed always “supports” the gang's 

cause, and it “benefits the gang's reputation 

because they were able to stab a Sureño 

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numerous times” and get away with it. In 

sum, the expert's testimony regarding the 

motivation of Norteños concerned a subject 

matter well beyond common experience. 

Moreover, although Detective Zanotto referred 

to Boxer, Roach, and implicitly defendant as 

“directing people to do different things” at 

the residence, the testimony was in response 

to the prosecution's question about the basis 

for his opinion that the crime was committed 

in association with other gang members. The 

jury was twice instructed, before expert 

testimony by Detective Zanotto and at the 

close of evidence, that in evaluating the 

believability of an expert witness, the jury 

should consider “the reasons the expert gave 

for an opinion, and the facts or information 

on which the expert relied on in giving the 

opinion.” The jury was further instructed 

that it “must decide whether the information 

on which the expert relied ... was true and 

accurate,” and that it “may disregard any 

opinion that [it] find[s] unbelievable, 

unreasonable, or unsupported by the 

evidence.” We must presume the jury followed 

the court's instructions. (People v. Gray 

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 231.) Accordingly, we 

determine that the challenged testimony by 

the gang expert was properly admitted. 

Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *18. 

The United States Supreme Court has left open the question 

of whether the Constitution is violated by the admission of 

expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue to be resolved by 

the trier of fact. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 761 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Thus, while, under Ninth Circuit precedent, it is 

"well established . . . that expert testimony concerning an 

ultimate issue is not per se improper," id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted), for purposes of habeas corpus review no Supreme 

Court case has squarely addressed the issue and, therefore, a 

state appellate court's decision affirming the admission of such 

testimony is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 761-62; 

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see, e.g., Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 

2009) (habeas relief not available under § 2254(d) for claim that 

expert's opinion testimony as to whether hypothetical robberies 

would have been gang-related should have been excluded because it 

pertained to an ultimate issue of fact for the jury to decide). 

 Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court 

opinion was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 

authority. As noted above, there is no Supreme Court authority 

regarding this issue. The facts of this case are quite similar 

to Briceno, where the Ninth Circuit found that the petitioner was 

not entitled to relief. For those same reasons, Petitioner’s 

claim is denied. 

 Moreover, a review of the record demonstrates that the 

expert witness did not usurp the jury’s role. The expert did not 

testify regarding Petitioner’s specific intent. The expert 

testified regarding gang culture and what actions and behavior 

would benefit a street gang. While the prosecutor asked 

hypothetical questions, they were proper. The trial court 

repeatedly instructed the jury on the proper manner to view 

expert testimony and that the jury was responsible to determine 

if a fact had been proven. For all these reasons, this claim is 

denied. 

D 

 Petitioner also argues that the gang expert improperly 

relied on a police report containing hearsay that indicated 

Petitioner or his accomplice yelled a gang slogan. He maintains 

this violated the Confrontation Clause and his right to due 

process. 

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The following occurred at trial: 

At trial, [gang expert] Detective Zanotto 

indicated that he had reviewed police reports 

containing statements by the individual from 

the Ford who was stabbed. The detective was 

then asked whether this individual had 

reported that defendant stated gang slogans 

“while this event was occurring on May 4th 

out on that driveway.” Detective Zanotto 

testified, “I don't know specifically if he 

said the defendant, but somebody made some 

gang slogans.” In response to further 

questioning, Detective Zanotto indicated that 

this information “help[ed] form” his opinion 

that the attempted dissuasion of Rosa and 

T.C. was committed for the benefit of the 

gang. On cross-examination, Detective 

Zanotto acknowledged that he did not have a 

statement from any other individual regarding 

gang slogans being made. On redirect 

examination, the detective indicated that the 

individual had reported the gang slogans 

while he was in the infirmary at jail. 

. . . 

After the expert testified, and outside the 

presence of the jury, defense counsel stated 

his objection on the record to the testimony 

by the expert regarding gang slogans. 

According to defense counsel, a police report 

stated that when defendant and Roach exited 

the car, they “yelled puro ... Norte, showing 

their willingness to commit extreme acts of 

violence for the benefit of the Norteño 

movement....” The individual from the Ford 

had apparently reported these gang slogans to 

the police. Relying on People v. Coleman 

(1985) 38 Cal. 3d 69 (Coleman) and Crawford 

v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), 

among other authorities, defense counsel 

argued that the expert was being allowed to 

testify that the gang slogan had been made, 

which was an ultimate issue of fact in the 

case; the statement by the individual from 

the Ford was being used for the truth of the 

matter, was testimonial in nature, and its 

validity or truthfulness was questionable; 

and the statement was prejudicial while the 

probative value was questionable. Defense 

counsel further stated that he agreed only 

“under protest” to “watering . . . down” the 

testimony by “referring to slogans and not 

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using the specific statement.” The trial 

court explained that when the objection was 

previously discussed in chambers, the court 

engaged in an Evidence Code section 352 

analysis and “thought [the proposed 

testimony] was more probative than 

prejudicial.” After the court indicated that 

the proposed testimony would be permitted, 

the parties “and the officer talked about 

basically watering down the actual statement 

to a gang slogan . . . .” 

The trial court later gave a limiting 

instruction to the jury as follows: “Officer 

Rocky Zanotto testified that in reaching his 

conclusions as an expert witness, he 

considered statements made by other persons 

such as other law enforcement officers, crime 

victims, gang members, and statements made by 

[the individual from the Ford] to San Jose 

police officers. You may consider those 

statements only to evaluate the expert's 

opinion. Do not consider those statements as 

proof that the information contained in the 

statements is true.” (See CALCRIM No. 360.) 

Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *18-19. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim as follows: 

In this case, we determine that the trial 

court properly admitted the gang expert's 

testimony regarding an individual's statement 

about gang slogans, and that the trial 

court's limiting instruction was sufficient 

to address any potential prejudice from 

admission of the statement. The expert's 

testimony was relevant to show the basis for 

his opinion. Further, the testimony about 

the statement concerning gang slogans was 

relatively brief, and the testimony did not 

indicate who uttered the gang slogan or the 

specifics of what was expressed. This 

reduced the potential for prejudice from the 

statement. Moreover, the court instructed 

the jury that it may consider the statement 

by the individual “only to evaluate the 

expert's opinion,” and that the statement was 

not to be considered “proof that the 

information contained in the [statement] is 

true.” (See CALCRIM No. 360.) We do not 

believe the instructions would have been 

ineffective in this case, as defendant 

argues. (Cf. Coleman, supra, 38 Cal. 3d at 

p. 92 [“in aggravated situations, where 

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hearsay evidence is recited in detail, a 

limiting instruction may not remedy the 

problem”].) 

. . . 

 [W]e conclude that the challenged testimony 

concerning gang slogans was properly admitted 

to show the basis of Detective Zanotto's 

opinion, and was not admitted for the truth 

of the statement concerning gang slogans. 

Thus, admission of the testimony did not 

violate the confrontation clause. 

Even if the expert's testimony concerning a 

statement about gang slogans should have been 

excluded, we find that defendant was not 

prejudiced by any error in the admission of 

the testimony. A confrontation clause 

violation is subject to federal harmlesserror analysis under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 

at page 24. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 

475 U.S 673, 681–682, 684.) “[A]n otherwise 

valid conviction should not be set aside if 

the reviewing court may confidently say, on 

the whole record, that the constitutional 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (Id. at p. 681.) 

In this case, there was overwhelming evidence 

that the attempted dissuasion counts were 

gang related, and that evidence included 

facts showing that the underlying incident 

involving the Ford was gang related. When 

defendant and another Norteño gang member 

were in Rosa's car, defendant played Norteño 

rap music. The music made references to 

scraps, a derogatory reference to Sureños, 

and to beating and killing them. The music 

was playing loudly while all the windows were 

rolled down. When Rosa's car was near the 

Ford, the occupants, who were Sureños, made 

gang signs, which are generally used to 

challenge a rival gang. Defendant was angry, 

referred to them as scraps, flipped them off, 

and yelled at them. After the two cars 

stopped, defendant suffered a stab wound 

while one of the occupants of the Ford was 

stabbed multiple times. 

In describing to others what had happened, 

defendant stated that he had been in a fight 

with “some scraps, and that one of them 

stabbed him.” Crystal testified that 

whenever she went out with defendant, he said 

that if anything happened when she was around 

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him, she could not tell on him. After the 

stabbing incident, defendant similarly told 

all the females in Rosa's car that they 

“didn't see nothing” and “nothing happened.” 

Crystal testified that defendant and others 

“from his gang” used to say that “‘snitches' 

... ‘get stitches or end up in ditches.’“ 

Defendant made similar statements to T.C. 

after the stabbing incident. 

At the second house where the group stopped, 

another Norteño gang member, Boxer, was 

present. This gang member and Roach, also a 

Norteño, followed Rosa and T.C. around. Roach 

told Crystal that he did not want any of the 

females talking to the police. Defendant, 

Roach, and Boxer were involved in telling the 

females what to say to the police. Roach and 

Boxer obtained Rosa's car keys and her car 

was later burned. 

Detective Zanotto believed that the events 

that occurred on May 4, 2007, leading up to 

the stabbing, were gang related based on the 

“totality of everything,” including the 

music, the hand gestures between the cars, 

the reference to “scraps” by defendant, the 

“back-and-forth exchange by a group of gang 

members, and the end result was violence, 

which is very common.” The detective also 

referred to evidence concerning the Nissan 

being pulled over, as opposed to being forced 

off the road or disabled so that it could not 

be driven. Further, the detective identified 

events after the stabbing that suggested the 

incident was gang related, including driving 

to Roosevelt Park, going to a family member's 

house where one family member had medical 

training, getting stitched up at the house, 

the arrival of another gang member at the 

house, the formulating of a plan to get rid 

of evidence, and the “snitches” and “ditches” 

statement. 

The challenged testimony by the expert, that 

“somebody made some gang slogans” at some 

point after the Nissan and the Ford stopped 

in the residential area, lacked any specifics 

about who uttered the gang slogans as well as 

what specifically was expressed. Further, 

the defense on cross-examination elicited an 

acknowledgment from Detective Zanotto that 

there was no statement from any other 

individual regarding gang slogans being made, 

other than the statement by the individual 

from the Ford. 

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Although the prosecutor in argument to the 

jury made reference (without any objection 

from the defense) to the testimony concerning 

gang slogans, that reference was relatively 

brief. Further, the prosecutor made the 

reference in the context of arguing that, 

even if the jury accepted defendant's 

testimony that no words were exchanged during 

the stabbing incident, defendant's testimony 

still supported the inference that the 

incident was gang related. The prosecutor 

argued: “I mean, although it would make sense 

that things [gang slogans] were said like 

that in this exchange, this is scarier. So 

again the defendant knows why this fight is 

occurring. He doesn't even have to talk 

about it.... He doesn't have to say one word 

to this guy and the other guy who is driving 

the car and getting out of the car and going 

what's going on here? Because the defendant 

knows this is all about the gang. The 

defendant knows this is all about the life. 

He knows these aren't random individuals just 

coming up and he had to defend himself. He 

knows this is part of what occurs in gang 

culture. So there is no exchange of words.” 

In sum, in considering the strength of the 

prosecution's case that the crime was gang 

related, including the evidence showing that 

the underlying incident involving the 

stabbing of the individual from the Ford was 

gang related, and in view of the somewhat 

ambiguous testimony about gang slogans being 

uttered, we believe that any error in 

admitting the testimony was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *20-23 (footnote omitted). 

The ultimate goal of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure 

reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a 

substantive guarantee. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 

(2004). An expert may render an opinion and explain the facts on 

which that opinion is based without violating the Confrontation 

Clause. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228 (2012) 

(“When an expert testifies for the prosecution in a criminal 

case, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the 

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expert about any statements that are offered for their truth. 

Out-of-court statements that are related by the expert solely for 

the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which that opinion 

rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall outside the 

scope of the Confrontation Clause.”); Hill v. Virga, 588 Fed. 

App’x 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2014) (Supreme Court has not clearly 

established that admission of hearsay statements relied on by 

expert violates Confrontation Clause).2

Confrontation Clause claims are subject to harmless error 

analysis. United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 

2004) (post-Crawford case); see also United States v. Allen, 425 

F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005). For purposes of federal habeas 

corpus review, the standard applicable to violations of the 

Confrontation Clause is whether the inadmissible evidence had an 

actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. See Hernandez v. 

Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Brecht). 

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review 

unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the 

error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the 

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. 

Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court 

“has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or 

overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation 

sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” Holley v. 

Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that 

 

2 The Supreme Court decided Williams on June 18, 2012, after the 

California Court of Appeal issued its opinion. The California 

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on June 27, 

2012. Ex. L

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trial court’s admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was 

“fundamentally unfair” under Ninth Circuit precedent but not 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law under § 2254(d)). Failure to comply with 

state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 

basis for granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. 

See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031. 

Petitioner has failed to show that the California Court of 

Appeal’s opinion was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 

authority. There is no clearly established Supreme Court 

authority that admission of hearsay statements relied on by an 

expert violates the Confrontation Clause. See Williams, 132 S. 

Ct. at 2228; Hill, 588 Fed. App’x at 724. Moreover, the Supreme 

Court held in Williams that an expert may render an opinion and 

explain the facts on which that opinion is based without 

violating the Confrontation Clause. 

Even if the trial court did err, the error was harmless. 

The trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that it could only 

use the expert’s statements to evaluate the expert's opinion, but 

not to consider the information in the statements to be true. As 

described in detail by the state court, there was overwhelming 

evidence that the crimes were gang related. If there was an 

error in admitting the brief statements regarding the gang 

slogans, the error was harmless. 

Similarly, Petitioner has not shown that the admission of 

this evidence resulted in the denial of the fundamentally fair 

trial guaranteed by due process. For the same reasons discussed 

above, if admitting the evidence was an error, it was harmless 

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and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. This claim is 

denied. 

E 

 Petitioner also argues that the cumulative effect of the 

errors alleged above deprived him of a fair trial. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim: 

Defendant contends that the cumulative effect 

of the errors that he has raised on appeal 

deprived him of a fair trial, “requiring 

reversal of the disputed gang findings.” The 

California Supreme Court has stated that “a 

series of trial errors, though independently 

harmless, may in some circumstances rise by 

accretion to the level of reversible and 

prejudicial error.” (People v. Hill (1998) 

17 Cal.4th 800, 844.) In this case, we have 

not found numerous errors by the court or 

counsel. We have determined that, to the 

extent there was error in admitting testimony 

by the gang expert concerning gang slogans 

being uttered, the error was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. We have also determined 

that instructional error as to the issue of a 

threat in connection with the attempted 

dissuasion counts warrants reversal of the 

judgment as to the true finding on the gang 

allegation for count 1, attempting to 

dissuade Rosa, only. Defendant fails to 

demonstrate, and we do not believe, that the 

cumulative error doctrine warrants reversal 

in this case as defendant was not deprived a 

fair trial. (See id., at pp. 844–847) 

Lopez, 2012 WL 1264451, at *24. 

In some cases, although no single trial error is 

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative 

effect of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much 

that his conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 

334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where 

multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant's efforts to 

challenge every important element of proof offered by 

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prosecution); Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1179-81 (9th Cir. 

2002), overruled on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 

815, 829 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing conviction based on 

cumulative prejudicial effect of (a) admission of triple hearsay 

statement providing only evidence that defendant had motive and 

access to murder weapon; (b) prosecutorial misconduct in 

disclosing to the jury that defendant had committed prior crime 

with use of firearm; and (c) truncation of defense crossexamination of police officer, which prevented defense from 

adducing evidence that someone else may have committed the crime 

and evidence casting doubt on credibility of main prosecution 

witness). 

 Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when 

the government's case is weak. See, e.g., Thomas, 273 F.3d. at 

1180 (noting that the only substantial evidence implicating the 

defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a person who had 

both a motive and an opportunity to commit the crime). However, 

where there is no single constitutional error existing, nothing 

can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. See 

Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly, 

there can be no cumulative error when there has not been more 

than one error. United States v. Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 956 (9th 

Cir. 2012). 

The state court’s opinion was not unreasonable. While the 

state court found an error and reversed one of the life-term gang 

enhancements, Petitioner has not shown that this error combined 

with other alleged errors raised in this petition cumulatively 

prejudiced him to warrant habeas relief. As noted in the claims 

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above, even if errors were made, they were harmless, and 

cumulatively, they remain harmless. Moreover, there was 

overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt for the underlying 

counts and the remaining gang enhancements. This claim is 

denied. 

V 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. 

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 

11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has 

not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not 

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court 

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of 

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions 

as moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 08/12/2015 

________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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Case 3:13-cv-04879-TEH Document 16 Filed 08/13/15 Page 39 of 39