Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00590/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00590-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL ARELLANO, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER HODGE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14-CV-590 JLS (JLB)

ORDER: (1) OVERRULING 

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS; 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; 

(3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS CLAIMS 

AGAINST DEFENDANTS GLYNN, 

SEELEY, AND ZAMORA; AND

(4) DENYING AS MOOT 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

CONSIDERATION

(ECF Nos. 63, 69, 110, 112)

Presently before the Court are Defendants K. Seeley, M. Glynn, and L. D. Zamora’s 

Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Defendants Glynn and Seeley in Plaintiff’s Third 

Amended Complaint (Glynn & Seeley MTD, ECF No. 63) and Motion to Dismiss Claims 

Against Defendant Zamora in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Zamora MTD, ECF 

No. 69) (collectively, Defendants’ MTDs). Also before the Court is Magistrate Judge Jill 

L. Burkhardt’s Report and Recommendation advising the Court to grant Defendants’ 

MTDs (R&R, ECF No. 110); Plaintiff Raul Arellano, Jr.’s Objections to the R&R (ECF 

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No. 114); and Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 115). Having 

considered the facts and the law, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 

114), ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety (ECF No. 110), and GRANTS Defendants’ MTDs 

(ECF Nos. 63, 69).1

BACKGROUND

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of 

the factual and procedural history underlying the instant motions. (See R&R 2–8,2 ECF 

No. 110.) This Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Review of the Report and Recommendation

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R. The district court must “make 

a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980); United 

States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the absence of timely 

objection, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

 

1 The Court also DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for the Court to Take in Consideration that Dock 

103 Did Arrived [sic] on Time. (Mot. for Consideration, ECF No. 112.) The Court notes that Plaintiff’s 

Response to Court’s Use of Internet Site was mailed on July 25, 2016 (see ECF No. 108), rendering it 

timely under the mailbox rule, see, e.g., Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270. In her R&R, Magistrate 

Judge Burkhardt notes that Plaintiff’s Response “took no position on the Court’s reliance on outside source 

materials, and . . . instead . . . reiterate[d Plaintiff’s] substantive arguments . . . .” (R&R 5 n.3, ECF No. 

110.) Accordingly, both Magistrate Judge Burkhardt and this Court recognize the timeliness of Plaintiff’s 

Response and have considered it to the extent permissible.

2 Pin citations to docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF page numbers electronically stamped at the top 

of each page.

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II. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (alteration in original). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ 

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 

when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to 

say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[F]acts that are 

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to 

relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true 

“legal conclusions” contained in the complaint. Id. at 678–79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555). This review requires “context-specific” analysis involving the Court’s “judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit 

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—

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but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)).

When a plaintiff appears pro se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally and 

affords the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 

890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Oretz v. Wash. Cnty., Or., 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 

1996)). When giving liberal construction to a pro se complaint, however, the Court is not 

permitted to “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Easter v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand 

a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268) (citing Jones v. Cmty. Redev. 

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984)). The Court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave 

to amend “unless the pleading ‘could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 

facts.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asserts two constitutional claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and 

Zamora: (1) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and 

(2) denial of equal protection. (See Third Am. Compl. (TAC) 23–26, ECF No. 59.)

I. Summary of the R&R’s Conclusions

A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

1. Defendants Glynn and Seeley

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt concludes that Plaintiff failed to plead facts supporting 

a plausible deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Glynn and Seeley based upon 

their response to Plaintiff’s second-level grievance. (See R&R 13, ECF No. 110.) In 

reaching this conclusion, Magistrate Judge Burkhardt first notes that “Plaintiff fails to plead 

any facts from which the Court may draw the reasonable inference that Defendants Glynn 

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and Seeley knew of an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health” because “the secondlevel response demonstrates that it was Defendants Glynn and Seeley’s understanding that 

all of the medical issues Plaintiff complained of in his grievance were adequately assessed 

and remedied at the first level of review.” (Id.) Moreover, “[t]he allegations in the Third 

Amended Complaint fail to demonstrate that Defendants Glynn and Seeley purposefully 

disregarded any risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health” because, “[t]o the contrary, the secondlevel response demonstrates Defendants Glynn and Seeley reviewed and considered 

Plaintiff’s grievance and appeal file in full and issued a written response in accordance with 

the finding of Defendant Velardi, a medical professional, that Plaintiff’s medical conditions 

were being treated adequately.” (Id. at 14.) Magistrate Judge Burkhardt rejects the 

allegation that Defendants Glynn and Seeley should have conducted an independent 

examination of Plaintiff, reasoning “[i]t is not deliberate indifference for prison officials 

serving in administrative roles to rely on the opinions of qualified medical staff in 

responding to plaintiff’s second-level grievance.” (Id. (citing Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 

1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 946 (2015); Doyle v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 12-cv-2769-YGR, 2015 WL 5590728, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

23, 2015)).) Magistrate Judge Burkhardt also rejects Plaintiff’s collateral argument that 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent when they were late in responding to Plaintiff’s 

grievance, noting that “Plaintiff fails to plead any facts that suggest the Defendants’ 

tardiness was purposeful or anything more than a mere inadvertence.” (Id. at 14–15.) 

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt therefore recommends that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claims against Defendants Glynn and Seeley be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 15.)

2. Defendant Zamora

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt determines that “Plaintiff fails to plead any facts that 

support a plausible deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Zamora” stemming 

from Defendant Zamora’s response to Plaintiff’s third-level grievance. (Id. at 15–16.) 

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt first notes that “the Third Amended Complaint fails to plead 

any facts that suggest Defendant Zamora herself performed any action that would have 

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caused her to become aware of the existence of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health” 

because although Defendant Zamora signed the response to Plaintiff’s third-level 

grievance, the response reveals that the grievance was reviewed by Defendant Zamora’s 

staff and not Defendant Zamora personally. (Id. at 16.) Magistrate Judge Burkhardt also 

concludes that she “cannot reasonably infer from the Third Amended Complaint that 

Defendant Zamora became aware of an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health via the 

information her staff communicated to her” because the response indicates that “the 

information Defendant Zamora’s staff provided to her suggests . . . that all of the medical 

issues Plaintiff raised in his third-level grievance had been adequately assessed and 

remedied at a lower level of review.” (Id.) Moreover, that Defendant Zamora’s response 

differs from Plaintiff’s own assessment of his medical needs does not establish deliberate 

indifference (id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.3d 240, 242 (9th 

Cir. 1989)), and a prison administrator may rely on the medical opinions of other qualified 

staff (id. at 17 (citing Peralta, 744 U.S. at 1087)). Finally, “Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint fails to allege any facts that suggest Defendant Zamora directed her staff to be 

deliberately indifferent in responding to Plaintiff’s medical needs or otherwise personally 

participated in any deliberately indifferent conduct of her staff,” as would be required to 

establish vicarious liability. (Id. at 17.) Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Burkhardt 

recommends that the Court dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims 

against Defendant Zamora. (Id. at 17–18.)

B. Equal Protection

1. Defendants Glynn and Seeley

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt concludes that “Plaintiff fails to plead any facts that 

support a plausible equal protection claim against Defendants Glynn and Seeley,” either 

under the theory that they intentionally discriminated against him based upon his 

membership in a protected class or under a “class of one” theory that Defendant Glynn and 

Seeley intentionally treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals 

without a rational basis. (Id. at 19.) With respect to the former theory of liability, 

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Magistrate Judge Burkhardt notes that Plaintiff’s TAC “fails to allege any facts that suggest 

Defendants Glynn and Seeley acted with the intent or purpose to discriminate against 

Plaintiff based upon his being Hispanic.” (Id.) Under the latter theory, the TAC “is devoid 

of any facts that suggest that Defendants Glynn and Seeley harbored any hostility toward 

Plaintiff individually and that as a result of such hostility, the Defendants intentionally 

treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals.” (Id. at 19–20.) 

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Burkhardt recommends that the Court dismiss without 

prejudice and with leave to amend Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against Defendants 

Glynn and Seeley. (Id. at 20.)

2. Defendant Zamora

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt also “finds Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails 

to plead any facts that support a plausible equal protection claim against Defendant 

Zamora.” (Id.) First, “[t]he Third Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts connecting 

any intentional conduct by Defendant Zamora to Plaintiff’s protected class status.” (Id.) 

Second, “the Third Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts that suggest Defendant 

Zamora harbored any hostility toward Plaintiff individually and that as a result of such 

hostility, she intentionally treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated 

individuals.” (Id.) Moreover, the response to Plaintiff’s third-level grievance reveals that 

Defendant Zamora had a rational basis for treating Plaintiff differently from other similarly 

situated individuals, as the medical staff evaluating Plaintiff with respect to the appeal 

issues determined that Plaintiff’s medical treatment was adequate and appropriate and, 

under California law, prisoners may not demand that they be prescribed certain 

medications. (Id. at 20–21.) Magistrate Judge Burkhardt therefore recommends that the 

Court dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend Plaintiff’s equal protection claim 

against Defendant Zamora. (Id. at 21.)

C. Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Expert

Magistrate Judge Burkhardt also recommends that the Court deny without prejudice 

Plaintiff’s request that the Court grant Plaintiff an expert witness (see Opp’n to Glynn & 

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Seeley MTD 7–8, ECF No. 72) for failure to comply with the Court’s Local Rules (R&R 

21, ECF No. 110).

II. Discussion

Plaintiff “object[s] to all recommendations of the Magistrate.” (Objs. 1, ECF No. 

114.) Accordingly, the Court reviews Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s R&R de novo.

A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

An inmate has an Eighth Amendment right to adequate physical and mental health 

care. Doty v. Cnty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Deliberate indifference to 

the serious medical needs of an inmate is not only inconsistent with the basic standards of 

decency but, more importantly, is antithetical to the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).

A determination of deliberate indifference involves a two-step analysis consisting of 

both objective and subjective inquiries. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate a serious medical need such that failure to provide 

treatment could “result in further significant injury” or “unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s response 

to the medical need was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citing McGuckin 

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992)). Deliberate indifference consists of (1) a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

(2) harm caused by the indifference. Id. Such indifference may be manifested when 

“prison officials deny, delay[,] or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may 

be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. 

United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). This standard is one of subjective 

recklessness. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839–40. Therefore, mere negligence in responding to 

and treating a medical condition does not rise to the standard of deliberate indifference. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Rather, the defendant must have acted or failed to act despite 

knowing of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8.

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1. Defendants Glynn and Seeley

Plaintiff first contests Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s conclusion that he did not plead 

any facts that Defendants Glynn and Seeley knew of an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s 

health, noting that Defendants do not contest that he had a serious medical need. (Objs. 4, 

ECF No. 114.) While it is true that Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff’s serious medical 

need (see R&R 11, ECF No. 110 (citing Glynn & Seeley MTD Mem. 6–8, ECF No. 63-1; 

Zamora MTD Mem. 6–8, ECF No. 69-1)), that does not mean that Defendants knew of a 

substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, see, e.g., Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (explaining two 

prongs of deliberate indifference test). 

Plaintiff next argues that “Defendants could not have determined that Nurse Velardi 

had already addressed all [his] issues” for several reasons: (1) neither the first nor second 

level review addressed the adequacy of Plaintiff’s seizure medication (Objs. 4–5, 6–10, 

ECF No. 114), (2) Plaintiff wrote in his second level grievance that he was suffering from 

severe pain (id. at 5, 11–12), and (3) neither the first nor second level review addressed the 

adequacy of Plaintiff’s request for “neurotins [sic]” (id. at 5–6, 12–15). Plaintiff argues 

that prison administrative officials “can be found liable even for following the advice of 

prison medical officials if it is obvious, even to a layperson, that the person is in need of 

critical medical care.” (Id. at 9 (citing McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2009)) 

(emphasis in original).) Defendants counter that “Defendants Glynn and Seeley knew that 

Plaintiff was not being denied medications or medical care—only that he was not receiving 

the medication of his choice.” (Reply 3, ECF No. 115.)

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Burkhardt and Defendants that Plaintiff has 

failed adequately to allege that Defendants Glynn and Seeley were deliberately indifferent 

in responding to Plaintiff’s second-level grievance. As Magistrate Judge Burkhardt (see 

R&R 14, ECF No. 110) and Defendants (see Reply 3, ECF No. 115) recognize, prison 

administrative officials are not deliberately indifferent when they rely on the opinions of 

qualified medical staff in responding to a second-level grievance, see, e.g., Peralta, 744 

F.3d at 1087 (affirming judgment as a matter of law in favor of second-level reviewer who 

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authorized someone else to sign a second-level response on his behalf where the secondlevel reviewer “understood his role to be administrative” and didn’t think . . . that he should 

second-guess staff dentists’ [who signed the first-level appeals] diagnoses”); Doyle, 2015 

WL 5590728, at *9 (“It simply cannot be said that, by signing off on the denials at the 

second . . . level[], defendants . . . disregarded a substantial risk of harm to [plaintiff]’s 

health by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it.”).

Here, Defendants Glynn and Seeley’s response to Plaintiff’s second level appeal 

notes that Defendant Velardi’s response to Plaintiff’s first level appeal “stated based on the 

Primary Care Providers interview and exam, [Plaintiff is] being treated adequately for [his] 

back pain which is musculoskeletal in nature.” (TAC 40, ECF No. 59.) Defendants Glynn 

and Seeley then note that although Plaintiff is now requesting “[n]erve pain medication & 

a stronger pain medication for back,” he “ha[s] not provided any new information or 

documentation that would alter the 1st level review findings.” (Id.) Defendants Glynn and 

Seeley reasonably relied on the expertise of Plaintiff’s Primary Care Provide and 

Defendant Velardi, and there is no indication from their response to Plaintiff’s second-level 

grievance that Plaintiff was in need of critical medical care, much less that Defendants 

Glynn and Seeley were made aware of such a need or were deliberately indifferent to it, as 

Plaintiff claims.

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s recommendation 

and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against 

Defendants Glynn and Seeley.

2. Defendant Zamora

Plaintiff first contests Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s conclusion that there is no 

evidence that Defendant Zamora herself reviewed Plaintiff’s grievance, arguing that the 

fact that the third level response was reviewed by staff under Defendant Zamora’s 

supervision “means that Zamora also had knowledge of what the grievance said and to 

what her staff responded.” (Objs. 16, ECF No. 114.) The Court cannot draw the inference 

Plaintiff urges from the face of the third-level response, which clearly indicates that “[t]his 

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appeal was reviewed on behalf of the Deputy Director, Policy and Risk Management 

Services, by staff under the supervision of the Chief, Office of Third Level Appeals-Health 

Care” and “[Plaintiff’s] appeal file . . . w[as] reviewed by licensed clinical staff.” (TAC 

36, ECF No. 59.)

Turning to Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s additional bases for dismissing his Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendant Zamora, Plaintiff argues that “everything stated on 

the 3rd level grievance response by Zamora is all a lie[, a]nd in order to prove [it] is all a 

lie [he] would need to use discovery.” (See Objs. 16–21, ECF No. 114). Additionally, 

while Plaintiff concedes that a difference in judgment based on Plaintiff’s own assessment 

of his medical needs is insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference, he notes that 

such is the case “only if the current medication does not put [Plaintiff] in circumstances of 

a serious medical need due to been [sic] ineffective.” (Id. at 21.) Defendants respond that 

“Defendant Zamora noted that Plaintiff’s medical . . . records indicated that Plaintiff had 

been evaluated for seizure disorder, his seizure disorder was currently managed on Keppra, 

he was receiving Elavil for his chronic back pain, and he currently did not meet nonformulary criteria for gabapentin.” (Reply 3, ECF No. 115 (citing TAC 36, ECF No. 59).) 

Accordingly, 

[t]he Magistrate Judge properly determined that Defendant 

Zamora . . . did not purposely disregard an excessive risk to 

Plaintiff’s health since the information that staff provided to her 

suggested that all of the medical issues had been adequately 

assessed by medical care providers and that Plaintiff merely 

presented a different assessment of his medical need than that of 

the medical-care professionals.

(Id.)

For the reasons set forth above, see supra Part II.A.1, the Court agrees with 

Defendants. As with Defendants Glynn and Seeley, “[i]t simply cannot be said that, by 

signing off on the denials at the . . . third level[], defendant[] . . . disregarded a substantial 

risk of harm to [plaintiff]’s health by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it.” Doyle, 

2015 WL 5590728, at *9. Whether or not Defendant Zamora’s staff relayed “lies” to her 

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does not change this analysis, as Defendant Zamora and her staff reasonably relied upon 

the medical information relayed to them by Plaintiff’s Primary Care Provider and 

Defendant Velardi.

Finally, Plaintiff explains that “there was [sic] reasons why [he] didn’t need to 

specify facts on how supervisor Zamora was liable for her own subordinates[’] actions,” 

namely, (1) “these issue [sic] was never an issue brought up to [Plaintiff] before in order 

for [Plaintiff] to respond, and (2) “the Supervisor Zamora working and participating with 

her subordinates, had knowledge of 3rd level response and the merits of claim.” (Objs.

21–22, ECF No. 114.) For the same reason that Plaintiff’s first objection to Magistrate 

Judge Burkhardt’s dismissal of this claim fails, this objection therefore does also: the face 

of the third-level response clearly indicates that Defendant Zamora was neither personally 

involved in nor directed her staff in responding to Plaintiff’s third-level grievance. (See 

TAC 36, ECF No. 59.) Therefore, as Magistrate Judge Burkhardt explained, “Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts that suggest Defendant Zamora directed 

her staff to be deliberately indifferent in responding to Plaintiff’s medical needs or 

otherwise personally participated in any deliberately indifferent conduct of her staff.” 

(R&R 17, ECF No. 110.)

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s recommendation 

and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against 

Defendant Zamora.3

B. Equal Protection

The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State 

shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of 

 

3 Plaintiff also asks for leave to add Defendant Zamora’s staff to his complaint. (Objs. 22, ECF No. 114.) 

To the extent this request can be construed as a motion for leave to amend, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 

request on the grounds that amendment would be futile for the reasons stated above. See Saul v. United 

States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where 

the amendment would be futile . . . or would be subject to dismissal.”)

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Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection 

claim may be established by showing that defendants intentionally discriminated against a 

plaintiff based on his membership in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. 

Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis,

345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), or that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, 

Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 (2008); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. 

Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008).

1. Defendants Glynn and Seeley

Plaintiff notes that his “contention is that on the facts stated in 3rd Amendment 

Complaint it can be infered [sic] that deffendants [sic] intentionally treated [him] different 

that other similar situated inmates, as there was no rational basis for difference in 

treatment.” (Objs. 23, ECF No. 114.) Additionally, “it can also be inferred that 

discriminatory treatment was intentionally directed just at [him], and it was no accident or 

a random act.” (Id.) Sending Plaintiff to a specialist or doctor to address his seizure and 

pain medication “is something that 2nd level reviewers as how Deffendants [sic] were will 

do [sic] for any similar situated inmate because thats [sic] part of their job whenever their 

confronted with individuals expressing facts that are consider serious medical needs.” (Id.

at 24.) Defendants respond that “Plaintiff essentially argues that Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs so they must have violated his equal protection 

rights since they must have treated other inmates differently,” which “is not the basis for 

an equal protection claim.” (Reply 4, ECF No. 115 (citing Objs. 22–26, ECF No. 114).)

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Glynn and Seeley treated him any 

differently from any other inmate filing a grievance because of his membership in any 

cognizable protected class or that Defendants Glynn and Seeley harbored any hostility 

against Plaintiff individually. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge 

Burkhardt’s recommendation and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s 

equal protection claim against Defendants Glynn and Seeley.

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2. Defendant Zamora

Plaintiff contests that “those rational basis [Defendant Zamora provided in the thirdlevel response] are actually unfundamental [sic].” (Objs. 25, ECF No. 114.) Specifically, 

“[b]y Zamora not doing what they should have done, and what they do whenever other 

similar situated individuals bring forward claims like [Plaintiff’s], [i.e., sending Plaintiff to 

a specialist,] this reveals that she intentionally disregarded a multiple serious medical needs 

[Plaintiff] brought forward to her, as she left [him] to suffer daily without any help.” (Id.) 

Moreover, a nurse’s determination over a year ago that Plaintiff was prescribed the correct 

medication is not a rational basis for Defendant Zamora to deny Plaintiff help. (Id. at 25–

26.) Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s Objections concerning Defendant Zamora are 

identical to those raised regarding Defendants Glynn and Seeley. (See Reply 3–4, ECF 

No. 115.)

The Court again agrees with Defendants and Magistrate Judge Burkhardt that 

Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against Defendant Zamora is deficient because Plaintiff 

has failed to allege any facts suggesting that Defendant Zamora discriminated against 

Plaintiff based upon his membership in a protected class or that Defendant Zamora 

intentionally treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals because 

she harbored any hostility toward Plaintiff. The Court also agrees with Magistrate Judge 

Burkhardt that Defendant Zamora’s reliance upon California law and Plaintiff’s evaluation 

by medical staff provides a rational basis for denying Plaintiff’s third-level grievance. 

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s recommendation and 

DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against 

Defendant Zamora.

C. Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Expert

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants address Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s 

recommendation that the Court deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for appointment 

of an expert. (See generally Objs., ECF No. 114; Reply, ECF No. 115.) Plaintiff does, 

however, request both that he be given leave to amend his complaint and that the Court 

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send him a copy of his Objections (Objs. 26, ECF No. 114), to neither of which requests 

Defendants respond (see generally Reply, ECF No. 115).

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s recommendation to DENY 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s request that the Court grant him an expert witness 

for failure to comply with Civil Local Rule 7.1. The Court additionally ORDERS the 

Clerk of the Court to send Plaintiff a copy of his Objections (ECF No. 114). Finally, the 

Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s request that he be given 

leave to amend, as detailed above. Specifically, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend 

his equal protection claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and Zamora, but will not be 

granted leave to amend his Eighth Amendment claims against those defendants. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court:

1. OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 114);

2. ADOPTS in its entirety Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s R&R (ECF No. 110);

3. GRANTS Defendants’ MTDs (ECF Nos. 63, 69). Specifically, the Court 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against 

Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and Zamora and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

Plaintiff’s equal protection claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and Zamora. 

Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint within sixty (60) days of the date on which 

this Order is electronically docketed. Failure to file an amended complaint by this date 

may result in dismissal of the aforementioned claims with prejudice;

4. DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Consideration (ECF No. 112);

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5. DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of 

Expert; and

6. ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to send Plaintiff a copy of ECF No. 114.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2016

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