Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02486/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02486-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARON CARTER,

Plaintiff,

 v

JO ANNE B BARNHART, Commissioner

of Social Security, 

Defendant. /

No C 05-02486 VRW 

ORDER

Plaintiff Sharon A Carter brings this action under 42 USC

§ 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the Social Security

Administration’s (SSA’s) final decision denying disability benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act). Now before

the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Doc

#6; Doc #7. For the reasons stated herein, the court DENIES

plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS the government’s motion. 

I

A

Plaintiff was born on January 10, 1951, completed high

school and one semester of college, then began her career as a

billing and invoice administrator at Dreisbach Enterprises in

Oakland, California in November 1979. AR 60, 216. In September

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1989 plaintiff began work as a billing and computer technician at

Thunder Road Adolescent Treatment Center, also in Oakland, where

she remained until the onset of her alleged disability. AR 95. 

Plaintiff coaches a children’s track team nine months of

the year and claims that her initial injury took place in 1996

during a track meet. AR 218, 231-32, 259. Plaintiff testified

that two car accidents, one in September 2000, the other in May

2001, exacerbated the 1996 injury and caused her to become disabled

as of June 23, 2000 at the age of 49. AR 42, 218, 259. Plaintiff

claims these injuries make it impossible to perform basic job

functions which require her to sit for eight to ten hours per day

and lift/carry up to ten pounds frequently. AR 60, 77. 

Plaintiff received treatment for her injuries by Raymond

W Yu, MD, an internist at Kaiser Permanente in Oakland, and Tipkins

Hood, MD, a private orthopedic surgeon, also in Oakland. AR 61. 

Medical records from plaintiff’s treating physicians date from

April 1997 through August 2004. AR 116-32, 133-69, 191-97, 204-06. 

Plaintiff testified that she began seeing Dr Yu in

February 1996 (following her initial injury) for treatment of back

pain, sciatica and high blood pressure. AR 61. The record,

however, only contains Kaiser records from April 1997 through

August 2004. See AR 133-69, 191-203. These records indicate

plaintiff’s hypertension was controlled with Atenol, and that her

chief complaint was back pain. Id. 

The Kaiser records show an April 1997 MRI of plaintiff’s

lumbar spine indicating “small broad-based central, left paramedian

and lateral disc protrusion at the L5-S1 level, resulting in mild

left L5 neutral foraninal compromise, mild flattening of the

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ventral thecal sac and impingement on the left * * * S1 nerve-root

axillae * * *,” as well as “[g]rade I L3-4 and L4-5

spondylolistheses with evidence of minor bilateral facet

arthropathy * * *.” AR 131-32. The records further indicate that

plaintiff underwent approximately five physical therapy sessions

between May and July 1999 to treat sciatica, decrease pain, and

improve range of motion and endurance. AR 161-62. 

The remaining Kaiser records show almost bi-monthly

office visits to Dr Yu from July 1999 through May 2001. See AR

133-69, 191-203. Dr Yu’s chart notes indicate plaintiff’s sciatica

was treated with 600-800 milligrams of Motrin and a modified work

schedule consisting of alternating six hours of work per day with

eight hours per day from approximately October 1999 through April

2000. Id. Kaiser records from September 2001 through September

2003 indicate “persistent” left sciatica treated with 600

milligrams of Motrin twice a day. AR 350-55. These records

further indicate Dr Yu discussed the option of additional physical

therapy, which plaintiff declined. Id. Records from December 2003

through July 2004 indicate persistent left sciatica as well as a

presentation of right sciatica. AR 394-97. Finally, in an August

2004 MRI the interpreting radiologist indicated nerve root

encroachment could be “exaggerated when patient stands,” but the

overall result was a “mild to moderate diffuse disc bulge at L5-S1"

with “no significant nerve root encroachment.” AR 409. 

Plaintiff claims she began seeing Dr Hood for acupuncture

treatment of her back injuries in October 1999. AR 61. While the

record purportedly includes Dr Hood’s “[m]edical records covering

the period from April 29, 1997 to March 5, 2001,” upon

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examination, the records show plaintiff’s first treatment with Dr

Hood as April 11, 2000. See AR 3, 116-32, 204-06. Dr Hood’s

records indicate plaintiff received a series of fourteen thirtyminute “electro acupuncture treatments” from April 2000 through

February 2001 (AR 119-21, 126, 128) and that she was first placed

on “disability” by Dr Hood in June 2000 due to “lower back pain.” 

AR 127. Further examination shows extension of plaintiff’s

“disability” through July 2001 due to “HNP L-4-5,” “HNP * * * L5-

S1,” and “herniated disk disease in lower back.” AR 123, 125. 

Although Dr Hood placed plaintiff on “disability,” the

record is, with one exception (discussed infra), devoid of records

of physical examinations, see AR 116-32, and consists principally

of acupuncture records concluding plaintiff “tolerated [the]

procedure[s] well” and “disability slips” stating plaintiff was

under the professional care of Dr Hood and had been “placed on

disability.” Id. The only report of a medical exam is dated May

29, 2001. AR 411. In this report, Dr Hood indicates plaintiff

came to his office for evaluation and treatment following her May

2001 car accident. Id. The report indicates a positive straight

leg raising test “at 60 degrees for back pain, but no sciatica.” 

Id. 

The administrative record also contains reports of

several consultative exams performed at the SSA’s request. See AR

170-71, 198-203, 339-48, 356-67, 398-408, 413-18. Medical records

from consulting physicians date from June 2001, just after

plaintiff’s initial application, through her final consultative

exam in November 2004. Id. 

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Prior to the SSA’s initial decision, plaintiff underwent

two consultative exams, one by an internist, the other by an

orthopedic surgeon. AR 170-71, 198-99. Burton Brody, MD performed

an internal medicine exam on June 20, 2001, and Michael Y Han, MD

conducted an orthopedic evaluation on June 8, 2002. Id. Dr

Brody’s exam demonstrated that plaintiff had “some degree of ageconsistent degenerative changes in her lumbar spine” but consistent

objective findings were minimal and plaintiff had “no apparent

limitations.” AR 171. Dr Han’s thoracolumbar and lumbosacral

spine exam, by contrast, demonstrated a “significantly decreased

[range of motion] of the lumbosacral spine * * *, as well as

minimal to no extension with pain.” AR 198-99. Dr Han recommended

restricting plaintiff’s lifting and carrying to ten pounds

frequently and restricting her sitting to less than six hours per

day over an eight-hour day with periodic alternating of sitting and

standing. AR 199. 

On November 3, 2003, Vicky Campagna, PhD, performed a

psychological evaluation and found plaintiff’s “ability to function

in a work-related setting” to be unimpaired. AR 356-60. A

subsequent evaluation by Dr Campagna about one year later resulted

in similar findings. AR 425-29. 

On November 17, 2003, John Chu, MD, performed a complete

orthopedic evaluation. AR 361-66. Dr Chu diagnosed plaintiff as

having “low back pain with left lower extremity radicular

symptoms.” AR 365. Dr Chu noted a subjective “decreased sensation

to monofilament testing of 5%,” found plaintiff able to lift up to

twenty-five pounds occasionally and to “stand, walk and sit for 6

hours in an 8-hour workday.” Id. Dr Chu noted plaintiff “must be

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allowed to periodically alternate [between] sitting and standing to

relieve pain and discomfort.” Id. Dr Chu then ordered x-rays of

plaintiff’s lumbar spine, which demonstrated “no compression injury

or disc narrowing” and resulted in an overall “negative

examination.” AR 368. 

On June 20, 2004, Rajeswari Kumar, MD, performed

plaintiff’s third complete orthopedic evaluation. AR 339-43. Dr

Kumar found plaintiff’s lumbar spine range of motion to be

restricted but found no clinical evidence of “radiculopathy” (i e

sciatica). AR 343. Dr Kumar further indicated plaintiff was able

to lift “10 pounds frequently” and sit for an unlimited amount of

time. Id. 

Finally, on November 20, 2004, Adi Klein, MD, performed a

comprehensive internal medicine evaluation. AR 413-18. Dr Klein’s

overall impression was “back pain due to disc disease by records

noting MRI L5, S1 disc disease with possible L5 impingement.” AR

417. Dr Klein noted plaintiff appeared to be “resisting the

examination” and while results were inconsistent, plaintiff was

“able to change position and get on and off [the] examining table

without difficulty.” Id. 

B

On January 12, 2001, plaintiff filed an application for

SSA benefits alleging disability due to back impairment, sciatica

and high blood pressure. AR 27, 29, 59, 256. The SSA denied

plaintiff’s application both initially and upon reconsideration. 

AR 29, 35. Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing before

an administrative law judge (ALJ) and on May 7, 2002, plaintiff,

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unrepresented by counsel, plaintiff’s witness and co-worker Valerie

Bolden and a vocational expert (VE) appeared before the ALJ. AR

30-40; AR 212. 

Plaintiff’s testimony included details about her hobbies,

injury, medical treatment and employment history. AR 216-35. 

Plaintiff explained that constant pain in her lower back and left

leg kept her from working, that she tried to “deal with the pain”

instead of taking her medication and for that reason, her pain’s

intensity varied. AR 224. Plaintiff’s witness testified that she

worked with plaintiff at Thunder Road for five years and witnessed

plaintiff’s difficulty with “getting up and down” from her desk. 

AR 236. The VE testified that plaintiff’s past work was “primarily

sedentary” and “on the cusp between skilled and semi-skilled.” AR

238. And, in answering a series of hypothetical questions from the

ALJ, the VE opined that a person similarly situated to plaintiff

would not be able to do her past relevant work, but could work as a

cashier or survey worker. AR 246.

On September 24, 2002 the ALJ issued an unfavorable

decision finding that while plaintiff suffered from degenerative

disc disease which significantly limited her ability to perform

basic work activities, plaintiff’s impairments did not “meet or

equal the criteria set forth in any applicable section of the

Listing of Impairments, 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” 

AR 16. Specifically, the ALJ found plaintiff’s medical records

from Kaiser to be void of evidence of “nerve root compression with

neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the 

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spine, motor loss, sensory or reflex loss and positive straight-leg

raising test as required by Section 1.04A for a Listing level

disorder of the spine.” AR 13. 

The ALJ found plaintiff had the residual functional

capacity (RFC) “to perform a limited range of light work, as

defined at 20 CFR § 404.1567(b), with sitting for 1 hour at a time

up to 6 hours per day, standing for 45 minutes at a time up to 8

hours per day, [with] occasional walking, bending, stooping,

kneeling, crouching, crawling and squatting,” and that while

plaintiff was precluded from performing her past relevant work she

could perform work “existing in significant numbers in the local

and national economies * * *.” AR 17. The ALJ based his decision

on the fact that all but one of plaintiff’s physical examinations

at Kaiser were negative, she was only placed on a limited work

schedule by her treating physician, and it was not until she saw Dr

Hood that she was placed on full work restriction. AR 14. 

The ALJ rejected Dr Hood’s findings as “not supported by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques”

and inconsistent with that of Dr Yu and the consultative exams of

Dr Brody and Dr Han. AR 14-15. The ALJ discredited plaintiff’s

subjective statements of pain which allegedly precluded her from

working since, despite her complaints of severe pain, she underwent

a minimal treatment regimen of Motrin, physical therapy and

acupuncture and reported an “ability to perform some household

chores” and to “coach[] a children’s track team several times each

week * * *.” AR 15, 17. Further, it was not until Dr Yu

“suggested that [plaintiff] could return to work on an unlimited

basis” that she “sought out * * * Dr Hood, who declared her unable

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to work,” but without reporting objective findings in support of

his “proscription against all work.” AR 15. 

The ALJ’s decision became final on February 7, 2003 when

the Appeals Council denied review. AR 5. Plaintiff then filed a

timely action for judicial review pursuant to 42 USC § 405(g) (See

Carter v Barnhart, No C 03-1518 CRB) and a new claim for benefits

dated September 10, 2003 (not included in current record). Upon

judicial review, the district court determined that while the ALJ

found plaintiff had the RFC to perform a “limited range of light

work,” “the evidence only indicated that [plaintiff] could perform

work at the sedentary level.” AR 281. Accordingly, the court

concluded that the ALJ’s initial finding was not supported by

substantial evidence and remanded the case for “further proceedings

to determine if plaintiff’s past work experience [could be]

transferable for sedentary work consistent with her limitations.” 

Id at 281, 282. 

Pursuant to the district court’s order, the Appeals

Council vacated the SSA’s February 2003 decision and remanded the

case to an ALJ for further proceedings. AR 265. The Council

specifically ordered the ALJ to “provide [plaintiff] an opportunity

to appear at a hearing [and] develop the record * * *.” Id. In

addition, the Council rendered plaintiff’s September 10, 2003 claim

duplicative, “associated” the two claims, and ordered the ALJ to

issue a new decision based on the newly associated claims. AR 266. 

On October 7, 2004, plaintiff — this time represented by counsel —

and a VE appeared before the same ALJ for the new hearing. AR 434. 

At the second hearing, plaintiff testified that she

continued to experience constant pain in her left leg. AR 438-49. 

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Plaintiff also explained that while Dr Yu “recommended physical

therapy at Kaiser” it “is not the type of physical therapy place

that can help my back” and she could not afford outside therapy. 

AR 442. Plaintiff went on to discuss her blood pressure, eyesight

and depression, which she had included in her second application. 

AR 444. The VE testified that a hypothetical person similarly

situated to plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, yet

could work as a self-service parking lot attendant or self-service

gas station cashier. AR 458-59. 

Pursuant to the remand order, the ALJ determined that 20

CFR §§ 404.983, 404.977 and § I-2-8-18 of the Hearings, Appeals and

Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) required him to conduct a new fivestep sequential analysis to determine plaintiff’s disability

eligibility. AR at 258-263. 

20 CFR § 404.983 provides: 

When a [f]ederal court remands a case to the

Commissioner for further consideration, the

Appeals Council * * * may remand the case to an

[ALJ] * * *. If the case is remanded by the

Appeals Council, the procedures explained in §

404.977 will be followed. Any issues relating

to [a] claim may be considered by the [ALJ]

whether or not they were raised in the

administrative proceedings leading to the final

decision in [that] case. 

20 CFR § 404.983. 20 CFR § 404.977(b) allows the ALJ to “take any

additional action that is not inconsistent with the Appeals

Council’s remand order,” and under HALLEX § I-2-8-18 (ALJ Decisions

in Court Remand Cases), “[w]hen the Appeals Council vacates a final

decision of the Commissioner, the ALJ must consider all pertinent

issues de novo.” Accordingly, the ALJ examined “all of the

evidence of record including the new medical evidence submitted

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since the date of [his] September 24, 2002 decision * * *,” AR 258,

to determine whether plaintiff’s alleged disability based on

“herniated disk disease with back and leg pain, hypertension,

retinitis pigmentosa, depression and equilibrium problems”

qualified her for disability benefits. AR 257. 

The ALJ determined plaintiff’s allegations of disabling

hypertension and retinitis pigmentosa were not supported by the

record, had no more than a “minimal effect” and were not severe. 

AR 257. While the ALJ did not specifically address plaintiff’s

allegations of equilibrium problems, he did find she suffered from

“medically determinable impairments diagnosed as degenerative disc

disease and an adjustment disorder” which “significantly limit her

ability to perform basic work activities, as set forth at 20 CFR §

404.1512, and must be deemed to be ‘severe.’” AR 258. But the ALJ

determined that the evidence “fail[ed] to describe the degree of

functional limitation necessary to satisfy the ‘B’ criteria of

Section 12.04 for a Listing level affective disorder” and that

plaintiff was at all relevant times able to perform a wide range of

medium work. AR 259. As with his September 2002 decision, the ALJ

based this finding on medical evidence, plaintiff’s statements and

his own observations. AR 259, 262. 

First, the ALJ found plaintiff’s treatment records from

Kaiser to be “consistently negative save for intermittent findings

of positive straight leg raising on the left.” AR 259. The ALJ

again considered records from Dr Hood, which indicated plaintiff

“could not work at all,” but rejected this opinion as “inconsistent

with other substantial evidence * * * including the opinion of Dr

Yu * * * and the opinion of Dr Brody, who * * * documented his

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benign physical examination findings, and noted no deterioration in

[plaintiff’s] condition over time.” AR 260. The ALJ’s rejection

of Dr Hood’s finding was also based on the lack of “physical

examination findings to corroborate [his] conclusion.” Id. 

Second, the ALJ found determinative a series of

contradictory statements and actions on plaintiff’s part. AR 262. 

Although plaintiff reported “disabling symptoms,” she also reported

an ability to “perform a variety of household chores.” Id. 

Further, while plaintiff reported difficulty walking without pain,

“she also stated that she has to take a walk 3-4 times each day to

relieve her * * * pain.” Id. In addition, while plaintiff alleged

her inability to perform any work, she “reported that she is the

chairperson and owner of a children’s track team[,] and in that

role she coaches the athletes several times each week * * *,

attends track meets, works on a computer and handles all of the

paperwork.” Id. Finally, the ALJ asserted “[t]he lack of more

than very conservative treatment for [plaintiff’s] allegedly

disabling back and leg pain, and the lack of any ongoing treatment

for her allegedly disabling depression,” as well as inconsistencies

of plaintiff’s “presentation and behavior during examinations and

at the hearing” cast doubt on her allegations and “suggest some

exaggeration of her symptoms.” Id. 

Based on the evidence, the ALJ issued a second

unfavorable decision, this time finding that plaintiff had the RFC

to perform a “wide range of medium work.” AR at 264. Once the

second decision became final, plaintiff filed this timely action

for judicial review under § 405(g), asserting that the ALJ

“committed legal error by deviating from the court’s [remand]

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order” and conducting a second review of plaintiff’s alleged

disability. Doc #6. 

II

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as

to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be

conclusive.” 42 USC § 405(g). Accordingly, a district court may

overturn a decision to deny benefits only if the decision is (1)

not supported by substantial evidence or (2) if the decision is

based on legal error. Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th

Cir 1995) (citing Magallanes v Bowen, 881 F2d 747, 750 (9th Cir

1989)). When a reviewing court finds the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence, a finding that the ALJ committed

legal error will mandate the decision be set aside. Benitez v

Califano, 573 F2d 653, 655 (9th Cir 1978); Flake v Gardner, 399 F

2d 532, 540 (9th Cir 1968). 

A

Plaintiff contends that on remand from the district

court, the ALJ committed legal error in conducting a full

reconsideration of her disability status and that such error

warrants reversal. Doc #6 at 10. Defendant, however, asserts the

ALJ’s decision was “consistent with the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s

[o]rder of [r]emand” as well as SSA regulations. Doc #7 at 2. For

the reasons stated below, the court finds the ALJ did not commit

legal error warranting reversal. 

Plaintiff points to Sullivan v Hudson, 490 US 877, 886

(1989), in which the Supreme Court ruled “[d]eviation from the

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court’s remand order in [a] subsequent administrative proceeding[]

is itself legal error, subject to reversal on further judicial

review.” While the Sullivan court did not identify the particular

legal doctrines in support of its conclusion, plaintiff points to

two: (1) the law of the case and (2) the rule of mandate. Doc #6

at 10. “Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a ‘court is

generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already

been decided by * * * a higher court in the identical case.’” 

United States v Alexander, 106 F 3d 874, 876 (9th Cir 1997) (citing

Thomas v Bible, 983 F 2d 152, 154 (9th Cir 1993) (cert denied)). 

Under the rule of mandate, “lower courts are obliged to execute the

terms of a mandate” but are free to do “‘anything not foreclosed by

the mandate.’” United States v Kellington, 217 F 3d 1084, 1092

(9th Cir 2000) (citing Herrington v County of Sonoma, 12 F 3d 901,

904 (9th Cir 1993)). In certain situations “‘an order issued after

remand may deviate from the mandate * * * if it is not counter to

the spirit of the circuit court’s decision * * *.’” Id at 1093

(citing Lindy Pen Co v Bic Pen Corp, 982 F 2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir

1993)). 

Defendant contends, and plaintiff concedes, that there is

no published opinion of the Ninth Circuit applying either doctrine

under the circumstances. Doc #7 at 4; Doc #6 at 10. Plaintiff,

however, cites a number of cases from other circuits applying one

or both of these doctrines in cases remanded to an ALJ by a federal

court. See Key v Sullivan, 925 F 2d 1056, 1060 (7th Cir 1991)

(applying the law of the case doctrine); Wilder v Apfel, 153 F 3d

799, 803 (7th Cir 1998) (applying the law of the case doctrine);

Brachtel v Apfel, 132 F 3d 417, 419 (8th Cir 1997) (acknowledging

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the law of the case doctrine applies to administrative agencies on

remand); Gribsby v Barnhart, 294 F 3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir 2002)

(applying the law of the case and the rule of mandate to judicial

review of administrative decisions). Doc #6 at 10. Plaintiff also

cites Ischay v Barnhart, 383 F Supp 2d 1199 (C D Cal 2005), as an

example of a federal district court which, in the absence of Ninth

Circuit precedent, has found “the doctrine of the law of the case

and the rule of mandate [applicable] to matters remanded to [an]

[a]gency for further proceedings.” Ischay, 383 F Supp at 1216. In

support of its finding, the Ischay court relied on cases from other

circuits. Id. 

Plaintiff argues that when the ALJ “abandoned his

original [finding of plaintiff’s RFC] * * *” and found plaintiff

capable of “perform[ing] medium work * * *,” he ignored the

“binding law of the case” (that plaintiff was limited to sedentary

work) and “failed to comply with the [c]ourt’s mandate * * *. Doc

#6 at 11-12. Defendant, however, contends that the ALJ’s decision

to “consider all of the issues related to [p]laintiff’s claim for

disability benefits, including those considered at the time of the

original decision” as well as “new material evidence submitted

since the[n] * * *,” was a “reasonable interpretation of the

[d]istrict [c]ourt’s order” and was consistent with “Social

Security regulations * * *.” Doc #7 at 3. Defendant is correct

for two reasons. 

First, plaintiff’s argument ignores the fact that

determinations of disability, even after approval, are subject to

periodic review. 20 CFR § 404.1590. Not only did two years pass

between the ALJ’s initial determination and his new finding, but

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new medical evidence, including additional visits to Dr Yu as well

as two consultative psychological exams and three consultative

physical exams, were added to the record. See AR 339-43, 350-66,

394-97, 409, 413-18, 425-29. Accordingly, review of plaintiff’s

disability status would have been timely in any event. 

Second, the ALJ’s actions were supported by the

controlling federal regulations: 20 CFR §§ 404.983, 404.977 and

404.1520. Under 20 CFR § 404.983 (discussed supra), upon remand,

“[a]ny issues relating to [a] claim may be considered by the [ALJ]

whether or not they were raised in the administrative proceedings

leading to the final decision in [that] case.” Under 20 CFR §

404.977 (also discussed supra), the ALJ “may take any additional

action that is not inconsistent with the Appeals Council’s remand

order.” 20 CFR § 404-977(b). 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(3) provides

that “all evidence in [the claimaint’s] case record” will be

considered when “mak[ing] a determination or decision whether [the

claimant] is disabled.” These sections, taken together, support

the proposition that the ALJ has authority to reconsider

plaintiff’s disability upon remand as long as such reconsideration

is consistent with the remand order. 

In its remand order, the court found there were

“outstanding issues” which precluded the court from “making a

disability determination on the merits * * *.” AR 282. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on specific language directing “further

proceedings to determine if plaintiff’s past work experience is

transferable for sedentary work consistent with her limitations” is

misplaced. Doc #6 at 9. Again, plaintiff is disregarding the

ALJ’s broad direction to make disability determinations on the

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merits. AR 282. As defendant points out, “[t]he ALJ reasonably

determined that, ultimately, the court’s remand order required him

to determine whether [p]laintiff was disabled at any time since her

alleged disability onset date.” Doc #7 at 5. 

Since the ALJ’s actions were both consistent with the

remand order and the controlling federal regulations, there was no

legal error warranting reversal. For these reasons, and because,

for the purposes of this appeal, plaintiff concedes that she was

not disabled prior to her fiftieth birthday (Doc #6 at 13), the

sole issue to be determined is whether the ALJ’s March 17, 2005

finding that plaintiff is capable of performing a wide range of

medium work is supported by substantial evidence.

B 

In his March 17, 2005 decision, the ALJ found plaintiff

not disabled under the Act. AR 264. This decision is supported by

substantial evidence. 

Disability under the Act is defined as “the inability to

do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment * * * which has lasted

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

12 months.” 20 CFR § 404.1505(a). To determine whether a claimant

is disabled, the ALJ conducts the five-step sequential analysis set

forth in 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). Step one considers

whether the claimant is currently employed in substantial gainful

activity. If not, the second step asks whether the claimant has a

severe impairment. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments is deemed “severe,” step three determines whether the

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condition meets or equals the conditions set forth in the Listing

of Impairments in Part 404 of the Regulations, Subpart P, Appendix

1. If the claimant does not have a “listing level” impairment,

step four asks whether the claimant can perform her past relevant

work. If not, step five considers whether the claimant has the

ability to perform other work which exists in substantial numbers

in the national economy. The ability to perform other work

mandates a finding of not disabled. 42 USC § 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20

CFR §§ 404.1520(b)-(g). 

When evaluating a mental impairment, the ALJ employs a

“special technique” during his analysis. 20 CFR § 404.1520a(a). 

Use of the “technique” must be documented in the ALJ’s decision and

“include a specific finding as to the degree of [plaintiff’s]

limitation * * *” in (1)”[a]ctivities of daily living,” (2) “social

functioning,” (3) “concentration, persistence, or pace” and (4)

“episodes of decompensation.” 20 CFR §§ 404.1520a(c)(3),

404.1520a(e). 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff was

capable of performing a wide range of medium work is not supported

by substantial evidence in that the ALJ “substituted his own

judgment for the opinions of the treating and examining

physicians.” Doc #6 at 10. Defendant asserts the finding is

substantially supported by “[n]ew evidence, including medical

information” which confirmed that plaintiff was not credible and

that she was in fact capable of performing a wide range of medium

work. Doc #7 at 5-6. 

In determining whether an ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence, the reviewing court considers the

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administrative record as a whole. Andrews, 53 F3d at 1039. 

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id at 1039-40. 

The ALJ’s decision must be upheld where “the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id. It is

not within the jurisdiction of the court to determine credibility

or to resolve conflicting medical testimony or ambiguities in the

record. Id. 

While neither party dedicates more than a few sentences

to the ALJ’s analysis in their briefs, See Doc #6; Doc #7, it is

clear that steps one and two are not at issue. There is ample

evidence (in the form of testimony and medical findings) in the

record to support the ALJ’s determinations that plaintiff has not

engaged in any substantial gainful activity since June 23, 2000 and

that plaintiff suffers from “severe” impairments (degenerative disc

disease and adjustment disorder) which significantly limit her

ability to perform basic work activities. AR 258. Accordingly,

the court will limit its discussion to steps three through five of

the ALJ’s analysis. 

1 

Step three requires the ALJ to analyze a claimant’s

“severe” impairments and consider whether the impairments meet the

“listing level” criteria set forth in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1. Here, the ALJ found neither plaintiff’s degenerative

disc disease nor her adjustment disorder to be “listing level.” 

Both findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

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Section 1.04(A) of the Appendix sets forth requirements

for a “listing level” spine disorder and requires evidence of: 

Nerve root compression characterized by neuroanatomic distribution of pain, limitation of

motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with

associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness)

accompanied by sensory or reflex loss, and * * *

positive straight-leg raising test[s].

20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 1.04(A). In conducting

his analysis, the ALJ found plaintiff’s most recent medical records

relating to her disc disease failed to meet listing level criteria. 

While plaintiff’s 1997 Kaiser MRI described “impingement on * * *

[plaintiff’s] nerve-root axillae * * *,” AR 132, her August 2004

MRI indicated a lack of “significant nerve root encroachment.” AR

409. While a 2002 examination by consulting physician Dr Han

showed a “significantly decreased [range of motion] of the

lumbosacral spine,” AR 198, plaintiff’s more recent Kaiser records

consistently indicated “good strength” and a lack of sensory loss. 

AR 350-54; AR 394-96. Finally, while plaintiff’s Kaiser records

indicated positive straight-leg raising tests as recently as April

2004, See AR 394-96, both of plaintiff’s 2004 consultative exams

noted “inconsistent” results. AR 341, 417. Despite identification

of positive straight-leg raising tests, plaintiff’s August 2004 MRI

and recent Kaiser records represent the substantial evidence

necessary to uphold the finding that plaintiff’s medical records

did not meet the “listing level” criteria set forth in 20 CFR Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 1.04(A). 

In order to be considered “listing level,” an adjustment

disorder must meet the criteria set forth in § 12.04 of the

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Appendix. An ALJ’s complete analysis of plaintiff’s mental

impairment under § 12.04, if properly documented in his decision,

constitutes fulfillment of 20 CFR § 404.1520a’s requirement to

apply the “special technique” (see supra). Here, the ALJ found

that plaintiff’s medical records failed to describe the degree of

functional limitation necessitated by § 12.04. AR 259. This

finding is supported by substantial evidence and was properly

documented to fulfill the § 404.1520a requirement. 

Under § 12.04, if “a disturbance of mood, accompanied by

a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome” is not a documented

“chronic affective disorder of at least 2 years” there must be

evidence of:

Medically documented persistence, either

continuous or intermittent of * * * depressive

syndrome * * * resulting in at least two of the

following: (1) [m]arked restriction of

activities of daily living, (2) [m]arked

difficulties in maintaining social functioning,

(3) [m]arked difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace or (4)

[r]epeated episodes of decompensation, each of

extended duration. 

20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.04. While there is no

evidence that plaintiff’s adjustment disorder is a “chronic

affective disorder of at least 2 years,” Kaiser records support a

finding that plaintiff suffers from depressive syndrome. AR 354;

AR 395-96. Accordingly, in order to be “listing level” the

disorder must meet two of the four criteria set forth in § 12.04

(see supra). The ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s impairment does

not meet the requisite criteria is supported by substantial

evidence. 

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The ALJ found that plaintiff’s adjustment disorder

created “no more than a mild restriction of activities of daily

living” and that there were no “[marked] difficulties in

maintaining social functioning.” AR 259. The ALJ based these

findings on plaintiff’s “reported [] ability to perform a variety

of household chores[,] [] [to] care for her son” and to “get along

well with friends and neighbors * * *.” AR 259. The record

supports these findings. In her 2004 hearing, plaintiff stated she

wakes up by six-thirty in the morning, takes a shower, a short

walk, and does light housekeeping. AR 259; AR 445-47. Plaintiff

also stated she does not sleep during the day and that, for the

most part, she gets along well with family and friends. AR 447-48. 

Additionally, Dr Campagna’s November 2004 psychological evaluation

indicates that while plaintiff reported “poor” sleep and appetite,

she “volunteer[s] with [a] track team, work[s] on her computer * *

* tak[es] short walks * * *” and has “good to excellent

interpersonal relationships.” AR 426. The ALJ also found that

plaintiff’s only psychological exams show no more than “mild

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and

there is no evidence of episodes of decompensation * * *.” AR 259. 

An examination of the record supports this finding. 

Since the ALJ’s findings regarding the four criteria in §

12.04 are substantially supported by the record and because the ALJ

documented his complete analysis as required by § 404.1520a, it was

proper for the ALJ to move on to steps four and five of the

sequential analysis. 

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2

Under step four, when a claimant’s impairments cannot be

considered “listing level,” the ALJ must assess the claimant’s RFC

to determine the most work she “can still do despite * * *

limitations.” §§ 404.1520(e); 404.1545(A)(1); 404.1546(c). The

ALJ found plaintiff, at all relevant times, capable of performing a

“wide range of medium work as defined at 20 CFR § 404.1567(c), with

a slight limitation in performing detailed work.” AR 259. 

Under the “[p]hysical exertion requirements” set forth in

§ 404.1567, medium work “involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at

a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to

25 pounds.” 20 CFR § 1567(c). If someone can do medium work, [it

is] determine[d] that he or she can also do sedentary and light

work.” Id. Section 404.1567(a) defined sedentary work as: 

[I]nvolv[ing] lifting no more than 10 pounds at

a time and occasionally lifting or carrying

articles like docket files, ledgers, and small

tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as

one which involves sitting, a certain amount of

walking and standing is often necessary in

carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if

walking and standing are required occasionally

and other sedentary criteria are met. 

20 CFR § 404.1567(a). Section 404.1567(b) defines light work as: 

[I]nvolv[ing] lifting no more than 20 pounds at

a time with frequent lifting or carrying of

objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though

the weight lifted may be very little, a job is

in this category when it requires a good deal of

walking or standing, or when it involves sitting

most of the time with some pushing and pulling

of arm or leg controls.” 

20 CFR § 404.1567(b).

The ALJ found that the medical evidence and plaintiff’s

statements and conduct undermined her allegations of disabling

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symptoms in reference to both her degenerative disc disease and

mental condition. AR 259-63. This finding was supported by

substantial evidence. 

The ALJ’s finding regarding plaintiff’s mental condition

warrants little discussion. While Dr Yu’s records indicate an

impression of “depression/stress” (AR 354, 395-96), there is

nothing to show that Dr Yu at any time prescribed anti-depressants

or referred plaintiff to a therapist. In fact, plaintiff testified

that “a psychologist * * * would not do any good * * *” (AR 454),

and the only psychological examinations on the record come from the

consulting psychologist, who found plaintiff’s “ability to function

in a work-related setting” to be unimpaired except for a slight

limitation to perform detailed work. AR 360, 428. The consulting

psychologist also found plaintiff’s mood to be “within normal

limits,” and her memory, concentration, fund of knowledge, insight

and judgment to be “adequate.” AR 427. The complete lack of

evidence of treatment for plaintiff’s adjustment disorder

substantially supports the ALJ’s finding that the disorder did

nothing more than slightly limit plaintiff’s ability to perform

detailed work. 

 Turning to plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease,

plaintiff “alleged an inability to perform all work due to her pain

and other symptoms.” AR 262. Based on the medical evidence

concerning plaintiff’s back injury and plaintiff’s statements and

conduct, the ALJ found plaintiff capable of performing a wide range

of medium work. AR 259. This finding is supported by substantial

evidence. 

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Regarding plaintiff’s medical treatment, the evidence

demonstrates that despite complaints of severe pain, treatment

consisting of, at most, Motrin, physical therapy and acupuncture

was at all times conservative. In the 2004 hearing, plaintiff

testified that she does not take the Motrin prescribed because she

is “not a person that likes to take pills.” AR 442. The record

also demonstrates that plaintiff declined additional physical

therapy sessions because it “is not the type * * * than can help

[her] back.” Id. And, although there is nothing in plaintiff’s

treating records to prove plaintiff saw a surgeon, she testified

that she “refused the back surgery * * *” because Dr Hood advised

it would cause her to become unable to walk. AR 443. 

A careful examination of all available Kaiser records

confirms the ALJ’s determination that “save for intermittent

findings of positive straight leg raising on the left” plaintiff’s

Kaiser records have been consistently negative for significant

findings. AR 259. Further, it does not appear that Dr Yu at any

time restricted plaintiff’s lifting or carrying and the last time

Dr Yu limited plaintiff’s sitting was over six years ago, in April

2000. 

In addition, in June 2004 Dr Kumar found plaintiff able

to lift “10 pounds frequently” and sit for an unlimited amount of

time. AR 343. And, while Dr Hood did deem plaintiff “disabled,”

there is a lack of objective evidence to support this finding;

moreover, the last records from Dr Hood show plaintiff was only

“disabled” through July 2001, over five years ago. AR 123, 125. 

Moreover, while Dr Chu found plaintiff able to lift up to 25 pounds

occasionally and to “stand, walk and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour

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workday” with the ability “to periodically alternate sitting and

standing to relieve pain and discomfort,” AR 365, Dr Chu submitted

these findings in November 2003, almost one year prior to

plaintiff’s negative MRI in August 2004. And, while Dr Klein noted

plaintiff was able to lift “10 pounds frequently” and to “sit for 6

hours with appropriate breaks,” AR 417, as the ALJ noted, Dr Klein

based his conclusion “on a finding of possible L5 impingement”

which he was unable to confirm “due to [plaintiff’s] apparent

intentional refusal to comply with [Dr Klein’s] attempt to conduct

a thorough examination.” AR 261. Accordingly, the ALJ found Dr

Klein’s conclusions unsupported. Id. 

In addition to the medical evidence, the ALJ did not find

plaintiff’s statements to be “particularly convincing or credible.” 

When an ALJ assesses a claimant’s credibility, “[t]hat assessment

must be given great weight.” Rashad v Sullivan, 903 F2d 1229, 1231

(9th Cir 1990) (citing Hudson v Bowen, 849 F 2d 433, 434 (9th Cir

1988)). But for an ALJ to reject a claimant’s subjective

statements of pain involving their alleged disability, he must

provide “specific, cogent reason[s] for the disbelief.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s testimony “may not be entirely discounted simply

because [of] a lack of objective findings.” Id (internal

quotations omitted). 

Here, the ALJ sufficiently documented his finding that

plaintiff was not credible. The ALJ pointed to plaintiff’s

contradictory statements that despite allegedly disabling pain,

plaintiff can bathe and groom herself, perform household chores,

walk short distances and volunteer as a track coach. AR 434-54. 

This evidence, taken together with plaintiff’s medical records, 

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substantially supports the finding that plaintiff has the RFC to

perform a wide range of medium work with a slight limitation in

performing detailed work. 

In his decision, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s RFC,

the fact that she was closely approaching advanced age and her

level of education mandated a finding of not disabled under Rules

203.21 and 203.22 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

(Guidelines). 

Plaintiff, who concedes she was not disabled prior to

turning fifty, is, under the Rules, a “person closely approaching

advanced age,” § 404.1563(d), with a “high school education and

above.” § 404.1564(b)(4). Given plaintiff’s RFC to perform a wide

range of medium work, Rules 203.22 and 203.23 of the Guidelines

“direct a finding of ‘not disabled.’” 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 2 §§ 203.22, 203.23. According to the VE who testified at

plaintiff’s hearing, plaintiff was incapable of performing her past

relevant work. AR 458. 

If a claimant is not disabled and cannot perform her past

relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five and determines if the

claimant’s RFC is such that she is capable of performing other work

that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. §

404.1560(C). If a claimant can adjust to other work, the ALJ will

find her not disabled under the Act. § 404.1520(g). In

plaintiff’s hearing, the VE testified plaintiff’s RFC is such that

she is capable of performing other work that exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ’s

determination that plaintiff is not disabled under the Act is

upheld. 

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III 

Since there was no legal error and the ALJ’s decision was

supported by substantial evidence, plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment is DENIED and the government’s motion is GRANTED. The

clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant and

against plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

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