Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02058/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02058-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John R. Ruelas, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-2058-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Doc. 1,

and Supplement, Doc. 3. This case was referred to a Magistrate Judge who issued a Report

and Recommendation (Doc. 16) recommending that this Court find that the Petition in this

case is barred by the statute of limitations.

In reviewing a Report and Recommendation (R&R), this Court must conduct a de

novo review of any portion of the R&R to which either party objects. United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Because Petitioner has objected

to the recommendation that this Court find his Petition is barred by the statute of limitations,

the Court will review the Petition de novo.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides a one-year

statute of limitations from when a conviction becomes final for a defendant to file a habeas

petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). For defendants whose convictions became final before the

effective date of the statute, they have one year from April 24, 1996, to file their petitions.

Case 2:10-cv-02058-JAT Document 21 Filed 07/26/11 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 2007) for a summary of some

of the 1992 amendments.

- 2 -

See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

In this case, Petitioner’s conviction because final in 1994. See Doc. 3-1 at 26 (the

Arizona Court of Appeals decision affirming Petitioner’s conviction was filed February 28,

1994). Petitioner in this case filed his habeas petition in 2010. Thus, the Petition is beyond

the one year statute of limitations unless Petitioner can show he is entitled to statutory and/or

equitable tolling.

Statutory tolling is available any time Petitioner has a properly filed application for

state post conviction relief pending in state court. R&R at 5 (collecting cases). In this case,

between April 24, 1996 and April 24, 1997, Petitioner did not have any requests for relief

pending with the state court. Thus, applying statutory tolling, the Petition in this case is still

untimely.

In his objections, Petitioner disputes this conclusion. Doc. 19 at 15-16. Petitioner

argues that because he was convicted under the pre-1993 version of the Arizona post

conviction relief rules, his state conviction did not became “final” until he completed his post

conviction relief petition under the post-1993 version of the rules. Id.

1

 Indeed, although

under Arizona’s current post convictions relief rules (see Ariz. R. Crim. Pro. 32.4(a)) a notice

of post conviction relief is due 90 days after a defendant’s direct appeal become final, in

Petitioner’s case, the state court found Petitioner’s February 2007 post conviction relief

notice to be timely because Petitioner had been convicted under the prior version of the state

post conviction relief rules, and the 2007 notice was Petitioner’s first request for post

conviction relief. Doc. 12-1 at 75. 

In sum, Petitioner argues that for all Arizona defendants convicted under the pre-1993

version of the Arizona post conviction relief rules, the federal statute of limitations never

begins to run until a petitioner chooses to file a notice of post conviction relief in state court.

Doc. 19 at 15-16. Particularly, Petitioner makes this argument for ineffective assistance of

Case 2:10-cv-02058-JAT Document 21 Filed 07/26/11 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Because Petitioner went to trial in his case, Summers, 481 F.3d 710, is inapplicable.

3

 The Court notes the R&R relies on Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir.

2010) to conclude that there is no actual innocence gateway around the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. After the R&R was filed, the Court of Appeals voted to rehear Lee en banc; thus,

the panel decision can no longer be cited. However, in this case, none of Petitioner’s claims

in his Petition are based on actual innocence. See R&R at 4 (Petitioner argues: ineffective

assistance of counsel, due process violations by the state court’s denial of an evidentiary

hearing, denial of his right to trial by jury for sentencing purposes and double punishment).

- 3 -

counsel claims because Petitioner argues that the post conviction relief process is his only

opportunity to exhaust those claims. Id. 

While Petitioner has correctly recounted the law in Arizona, the Court disagrees that

Arizona’s leniency in allowing Petitioner to file a notice of post conviction relief

approximately 15 years after his conviction became final tolled the Federal statute of

limitations. Specifically, the time between when a defendant’s conviction becomes final on

direct appeal, and when the defendant timely files his notice of post conviction relief in

Arizona, is counted against the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See Isley v. Arizona Dept.

of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The AEDPA statue of limitations was

undeniably running for the 77-day period after [Petitioner’s] conviction became final and

before [Petitioner] filed his ‘Notice of Post Conviction Relief’ in state court, ... .”).

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling from 1996 (when AEDPA was

enacted) to 2007 (when he filed his Notice of Post Conviction Relief).2

Equitable tolling is available when a petitioner has been pursing his rights diligently

and some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way to prevent timely filing. R&R at 6-9.

Here, again, Petitioner’s conviction became final in 1994. Petitioner took no action on his

case until 2007 when he filed a state court post conviction relief petition. This Court agrees

with the R&R that Petitioner has presented no evidence that an extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way from 1997 (when the statute of limitations expired) to 2007 (when Petitioner

took any action on his case). See also R&R at 9. Accordingly, having considered equitable

tolling, the Court continues to find the Petition in this case is untimely.3

Case 2:10-cv-02058-JAT Document 21 Filed 07/26/11 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As a result, this Court need not decide whether an actual innocence gateway around the

statute of limitations would be available to Petitioner.

- 4 -

Thus, because the Petition is barred by the statute of limitations,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 16) is accepted and

adopted; Petitioner’s objections (Doc. 19) are overruled, the Petition is denied and dismissed,

with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of

appealability (Doc. 20) is denied because dismissal of the petition is based on a plain

procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find this Court’s procedural ruling debatable.

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 26th day of July, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-02058-JAT Document 21 Filed 07/26/11 Page 4 of 4