Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01819/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01819-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint filed on May 20,

2015. (Doc. 37). Defendants City of Clovis and individual defendant police officers1filed an 

opposition on June 10, 2015 (Doc. 42), and Plaintiff filed a reply on June 18, 2015. (Doc. 45). 

The Court deemed the matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 

230(g) and vacated the hearing scheduled for June 26, 2015. Having considered the moving, 

opposition, and reply papers, and the entire Court’s file, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is DENIED. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this unlawful arrest and excessive force action on November 11, 2013. 

(Doc. 1). In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts twelve causes of action against Defendants related to a

 

1 Defendants are the City, Sergeant Gomez (“Sgt. Gomez”), Corporal Aranas (“Cpl. Aranas”), Officer 

Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), Officer Taifane (“Taifane”), Officer Velasquez (“Velasquez”), Officer Peters (“Peters”), 

Steve Cleaver (“Cleaver”), James Koch (“Koch”) and Does 1-25 (collectively “Defendants”). 

GEORGE MICHAEL MACIAS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF CLOVIS and the following 

employees of said City’s Police Department: 

SERGEANT J. GOMEZ (ID #5048), 

CORPORAL C. ARANAS (ID #5196), 

Officer CESAR GONZALEZ (ID #5422), 

Officer E. TAIFANE (ID # 5057), Officer A. 

VELASQUEZ (ID #5445), Officer C. 

PETERS (ID #5515), STEVE CLEAVER 

(ID #5469), JAMES KOCH (ID #5136) and 

DOES 1-25, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-01819-BAM 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO AMEND 

(Doc. 37)

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traffic stop occurring on September 30, 2012, including: (1) violation of Civil Rights pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants; (2) violation of Civil Rights under the California

Constitution Art. 1 §§ 7 and 13 against all Defendants; (3) violation of the Bane Act under 

California Civil Code § 52.1 against all Defendants; (4) violation of the Bane Act under California 

Civil Code § 52.1 against Officer Cleaver only; (5) battery against Officer Cleaver only; (6) 

assault against all Defendants; (7) battery against all Defendants; (8) false arrest/imprisonment

against all Defendants; (9) violation of the Bane Act under California Civil Code § 52.1 against 

Officer Cleaver only; (10) assault against Officer Cleaver only; (11) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress against all Defendants; (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress against 

Officer Cleaver only. Compl. at ¶¶ 46-101.

In the current motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to add a Tenth Cause of Action for 

“Malicious Prosecution” in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 37 at 

2). Plaintiff concedes that the amendment is untimely, but he argues that no prejudice will result 

from the inadvertent failure to include this cause of action in his initial complaint. In opposing the 

motion, Defendants argue that the time for amending the complaint has passed as the Scheduling 

Order set the deadline to amend pleadings for February 20, 2015. (Doc. 35). Defendants also 

argue there is no good cause to modify the scheduling order. 

ANALYSIS

Modifying the Scheduling Order

Pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Order issued on December 1, 2014, the deadline to file 

any motion for leave to amend was February 20, 2015. (Doc. 35). Plaintiff filed his motion on 

May 20, 2015, three months after the deadline. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides that after service of a responsive pleading, “a party may 

amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 

leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Granting or denying leave to amend rests in 

the trial court’s sound discretion and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. Swanson v. 

United States Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). In exercising discretion, “a court 

must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits rather 

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than on the pleadings or technicalities.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). 

However, where a case management scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16 sets a deadline 

for amending pleadings and the deadline has passed, the liberal policy regarding amendment of 

pleadings no longer applies. To allow the amendment, the scheduling order must be modified 

which requires leave of court and a showing of “good cause.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 

F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 950 (2001). Pursuant to Rule 16(b), a 

scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The “good cause” standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party 

seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 

1992). The district court may modify the scheduling order “if it cannot reasonably be met despite 

the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Id. If the party was not diligent, the inquiry 

should end. Id.

Plaintiff argues that the Court should grant leave to file a second amended complaint 

because Defendants will not be prejudiced; no depositions have been taken and ample time exists 

to complete non-expert and expert discovery. (Doc. 45 at 3). Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s 

unexplained delay in moving to amend weighs against amendment. According to Defendants, 

Plaintiff fails to identify any recently discovered facts as Plaintiff could have filed a timely claim

for malicious prosecution as early as March 10, 2014—when Plaintiff was acquitted of the 

criminal charge of resisting arrest. (Doc. 42 at 4). Defendants further argue that they will be 

prejudiced if Plaintiff is allowed to amend because Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim 

contains new allegations which are based on Defendants’ alleged conduct in the prosecution of the 

plaintiff, i.e. the criminal trial, not his initial arrest.

Under Rule 16, the Court looks to whether Plaintiff has shown good cause and diligence in 

seeking amendment. Here, Plaintiff fails to argue or show good cause for modifying the 

Scheduling Order. Plaintiff requests leave to amend, but does not argue that he was diligent in 

attempting to meet the Scheduling Order deadlines or otherwise explain his failure to comply with 

the deadline. Plaintiff has had access to the same facts pled in the proposed new complaint since 

March 2014, as his additional claim is not based on newly discovered facts. Indeed, Plaintiff’s 

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new malicious prosecution claim is based on representations made in his 2014 criminal trial. 

Plaintiff has known of the same facts since March 2014—over eleven months before the 

amendment deadline. Plaintiff does not explain why circumstances supporting his malicious 

prosecution claim were undiscoverable until now. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown diligence 

in pursuing his new claim, and therefore does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 16(b). 

Overall, Plaintiff’s motion is untimely because it was filed after the Scheduling Order 

deadline. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d at 608–609 (motions filed after the 

deadlines set in a scheduling order are untimely and may be denied solely on this ground). 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s request for leave fails to show good cause for modifying the Scheduling 

Order because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was diligent in attempting to meet the 

Scheduling Order deadline. Given this evidence, Defendants’ argument is well-taken, and the 

Court finds Plaintiff failed to show he exercised the requisite diligence warranting an order 

granting him leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Leave to Amend is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 26, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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