Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04015/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04015-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

RICHARD L. LAMB PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-4015

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff Richard L. Lamb appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On March 15, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 11). Plaintiff now moves for an award

on $3,175.00 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice

Act (hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 25.40 hours of work before the court at

an hourly rate of $125.00. (Doc. # 13). The defendant has filed a response, expressing no

objection to this award. (Doc. # 14).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

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judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

The Commissioner does not oppose the award of a reasonable attorney's fee under the

EAJA, does not object to the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees and

does not dispute the number of hours expended by counsel. (Doc. # 14). The court construes this

lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the government's

decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficultyof questions involved; the skill required

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to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the

EAJA at an hourly rate of $125.00. We find plaintiff's attorney entitled to compensation at this

rate. 

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks a total of 4.50 hours of work from January 18, 2005, through

February 22, 2005. The Complaint was not filed in this court until February 24, 2005. (Doc. #

1). We note, time spent at the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See

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Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, some of the time

submitted on the above referenced dates was clearly in preparation for the filing of the Complaint

with this court. Therefore, we will allow 2.00 hours. Accordingly, 2.50 hours must be deducted

from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel requests 0.10 hour on February 25, 2005, (letter to the clerk’s office

with executed magistrate jurisdiction form), from which we deduct 0.05 hour; and 0.10 hour on

March 9, 2005, (letter to the clerk with returned summonses), from which we deduct 0.10 hour.

This time cannot be compensated, in full, under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department

of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support

staff is not compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, 0.15 hour must be deducted from the

total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 3.70 hours on February25, 2005, March 9, 2005, April

11, 2005, April 21, 2005, May 21, 2005, and March 16, 2006, to review the file. The EAJA

requires that a party seeking an award of fees and other expenses ... “submit to the court an

application... including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness...stating the

actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.” 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The undersigned concludes that the mere addition of the phrase

“reviewed of file” to the above time entries, falls short of what the statute contemplates.

Plaintiff’s counsel frequently represents social security plaintiff’s before this court, should be

well versed in social security law and the proceedings before this court, and has been given

ample time for the review and preparation of the necessary documents on behalf of plaintiff.

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We further point out, there were no complex or unique issues in this case. Therefore, we

deduct 3.70 hours from the amount of compensable time sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 2.50 hours on March 17, 2006, to review the file to

prepare the EAJA petition and to prepare the petition and Affidavit. We find the time sought on

the above referenced date to be excessive and deduct 1.00 hour from the total compensable time

sought by counsel.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 18.05

(25.40-7.35) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $125.00 per hour for a total attorney's fee

award of $2,256.25. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due

benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 12 day of May 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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