Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00370/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD ALLBRITTON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-0370 WBS JFM P 

vs.

CLAUDE E. FINN, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1982 conviction

on charges of second degree murder and arson causing great bodily injury, and the sentence of

fifteen years to life in prison imposed thereon. Petitioner contends that the terms of his plea

bargain have been breached. 

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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 In re the Application of Harold Allbritton, Case No. FCR205297, citing In re Clark, 5 1

Cal.4th 750, 767 (1993). (Resp.’s Ex. 7.)

 In re the Application of Harold Allbritton, Case No. FCR205301, citing In re Clark, 5 2

Cal.4th 750, 767 (1993). (Resp.’s Ex. 8.)

 In re Harold Allbritton, S115741, denied January 22, 2004, citing In re Robbins, 18 3

Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998). (Resp.’s Ex. 11.)

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Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) The court looks

to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza,

297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The claims contained in the instant petition were summarily denied by the

California Superior and Supreme Courts. See Resp. Exh. 7 , 8, 11. Because this court is 1 2 3

“presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by any ratio decidendi” on this

issue, an independent review of the record is required “to determine whether the state court

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 Petitioner is not challenging the denial of parole by the Board of Prison Terms. 4

Petitioner avers that his separate challenge to the parole board decision was still pending

exhaustion in the state supreme court at the time petitioner filed the instant petition. (Pet. at 4.)

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clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982

(9th Cir. 2000); accord Wilcox v. McGee, 241 F.3d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner contends that Solano County officials, including representatives of the

Solano County District Attorney’s office and the Vallejo Police Department, violated his plea

agreement by opposing his parole before a Board of Prison Terms panel, and further argues that

the Solano County Court is not enforcing the plea agreement, resulting in a two-year denial in a

parole hearing decision rendered on June 13, 2002. (Pet. at 5, 5a, Exhs. A & B.) Petitioner 4

maintains that under the plea agreement, in order to parole at half time---seven and one half

years---petitioner was obligated to work and to demonstrate good behavior. (Pet. at 5.) 

Petitioner has now served almost 25 years in prison, has remained disciplinary free for the entire

time of his incarceration and receives positive prison work reports. (Pet., at 5, Exh. B.) In a

separate decision the panel found that petitioner as a murder convict could not reasonably expect

to parole during the next two years. (Pet., Exh. B.) Petitioner avers that his separate challenge to

the parole board decision is still pending exhaustion in the state supreme court. (Pet., at 4.) In

essence, petitioner contends that the terms of his plea bargain have been breached. 

THE RECORD

Petitioner has not provided a copy of a written plea agreement and review of the

record does not indicate a written plea agreement was prepared. The plea hearing transcript

reflects petitioner withdrew his not guilty pleas to counts I - III and agreed to enter pleas of guilty

to Count I, which would be reduced to second degree murder, and to Count II, arson with great

bodily injury, and the prosecution would dismiss Count III, arson of an inhabited structure or

property. (Resp.’s Ex. 1, lodged March 28, 2005, at 5.) It was agreed that the sentencing for

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 On March 20, 1994, petitioner’s sentence was modified for count 2 to run consecutively 5

with count 1. (Pet., Exh. C.)

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Counts I and II would run consecutively. (Id.) Defense counsel informed the court he would 5

cover what the sentencing agreement meant once he got through the voir dire of petitioner. (Id.)

Defense counsel then confirmed with petitioner that he and defense counsel had

discussed the negotiations and the entry of the plea; petitioner agreed. (Id., at 5-6.) Petitioner

confirmed that he fully understood the intent and the import of the negotiations and what was

transpiring at the plea hearing. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner denied needing any additional time to

consider the plea offer. (Id. at 6.) Defense counsel reviewed the constitutional and statutory

rights petitioner was waiving with regard to the preliminary hearing by accepting the plea offer

and entering a guilty plea; petitioner waived his right to a preliminary hearing. (Id. at 6-8.) 

Defense counsel continued:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, other than what has been discussed

here in court today, that is, that the entry of a plea of guilty to

Count I would be a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree

and that the court would accept a plea and the district attorney

would accept a plea of guilty to a Violation of Section 450(a) of the

Penal Code, commonly called arson, and dismiss the remaining

Count III, have any other promises been made to you or to anyone

close to you to induce you or convince you to enter these pleas?

PETITIONER: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Has anybody threatened you personally or

a member of your family or close friend to cause you to enter this

plea?

PETITIONER: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you understand that pursuant to your

plea the Court could impose as a sentence for the Violation of

Section 187 of the Penal Code in the second degree, a term of 15

years to life?

PETITIONER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you understand also that the Court

under the term of this plea would sentence you consecutively for

the Violation of Section 451(a) of the Penal Code which would be

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one-third of the middle term now provided for by law for that

crime which would be two years 4 months. Do you understand

that?

PETITIONER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you understand that the total sentence

specified would then be 17 years 4 months to life?

PETITIONER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you understand also that with good

time and so forth that can be reduced at this time to one third of

that specified time.

PETITIONER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Do you understand that there have

been rumors or discussions that the legislature was going to pass a

law to reduce that one-third to one-half, but we don’t know

whether or not that will affect your case.

PETITIONER: Yes.

(Id., at 9-10.) Defense counsel went on to confirm that petitioner is a United States Citizen, was

not under the influence of any drug, narcotic or alcohol that would render him unable to

understand the nature or consequences of his pleas. (Id. at 10.) Petitioner again confirmed he

had had sufficient time to discuss the case with defense counsel and that entry of the plea was in

his best interest. (Id. at 11.) Defense counsel reviewed the constitutional rights petitioner would

waive by entering his guilty plea; petitioner confirmed he understood those rights and waived

them. (Id. at 11-14.) 

The parties stipulated to the factual basis supporting petitioner’s plea on the basis

of the police reports “and on the basis of the West Doctrine in that Mr. Allbritton would be

entering this plea to avoid the more serious consequences of conviction of a higher degree of

murder and the possibility of special circumstances.” (Id. at 14.) Petitioner confirmed he

understood and waived his rights to a speedy and public trial. (Id. at 15.) 

At this time, the court inquired about the potential sentence:

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THE COURT: All right. The only question I had, when

discussing the length of possible sentence, you indicated that there

is a possibility under the present law that the term could be as low

as, and you mentioned one-third; one-third would be reduced by

one-third?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: He would be on the first sentence eligible

for parole at one-third of 15 years.

THE COURT: One-third of 15?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right, which would be 10 years.

He would then be eligible for parole on the second offense at the

conclusion of one-third of two years four months.

 PROSECUTION: Actually I think it’s the other way around. He gave the right

numbers but subtracting the other way. It’s one-third off for good behavior.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Correct.

PROSECUTION: It’s how they compute it. I assume with the 17

years, 4 months sentence it’s going to be somewhere between

eleven and a half (11-1/2) and twelve (12) years.

THE COURT: At which minimum time would have to be served

under the present law.

PROSECUTION: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You understand that, Mr. Allbritton?

PETITIONER: Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And that is generally as I explained it to

you before coming into court today, is it not?

PETITIONER: Yes.

(Id. at 15.) The court inquired whether petitioner was satisfied that he had sufficient time to

discuss this matter with defense counsel; petitioner responded he had. (Id. at 15-16.) When

asked if he was satisfied that entering the pleas was in his best interest, petitioner responded,

“Yes.” (Id. at 17.) Defense counsel stated: 

I concur in the entry of pleas and that there, as far as I’m

concerned, has been an adequate opportunity to investigate and

discuss the facts and the legal issues and defenses that may be

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available in this matter. . . . And I would concur in the entry of the

pleas.

(Id. at 17.) The court took petitioner’s plea and found that the plea was entered freely and

voluntarily. (Id. at 17-18.)

During the January 7, 1983 sentencing hearing, the following took place:

THE COURT: I wasn’t sure there was an allegation of proof of

GBI; so just for my own records, because of the great violence

involved in this, I am going to deny probation. I will, pursuant to

the report and to the bargain made in this matter, sentence the

[petitioner] on Count I, murder in the second degree, to the

California Department of Corrections for a period of 15 years to

life.

In addition to that, on Count II, Violation of Section 451(a), I’ll

sentence him to consecutive sentence, which would be one-third of

the mid term or two years and four months.

In addition to that period of time, upon your release, Mr. Albritton,

you would be subject to parole for a period of up to three years.

And credits --

DEFENSE COUNSEL: There would be substantial –

PROSECUTION: 219 days, I believe, is the total.

THE COURT: Continued through today, for a total of 146 days. 

Against that, he would receive 73 days of good time work time

credit, a total of 219 days.

(Resp.’s Ex. 2, lodged March 28, 2005, at 4-5.)

“Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law

standards.” Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. De la

Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir.1993)). Although a criminal defendant has a due process

right to enforce the terms of a plea agreement, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,

261-62, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971), there is no evidence that petitioner's subjective expectations about

how parole would be decided were part of the plea agreement. Petitioner has not pointed to any

language in any plea agreement that shows that any particular term in his plea agreement has

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been breached. Petitioner claims that the district attorney and others told petitioner he would

parole at 7-1/2 years if he worked and behaved. (Pet. at 5b, 1.) However, petitioner has

presented no document or record citation to support that statement. 

There is no language in the plea hearing that states petitioner would be paroled so

long as he worked and behaved himself in prison. There is no basis in the record to support a

reasonable inference that his plea agreement carried a guarantee of release after 7-1/2 years. 

Although there is a discussion on the record concerning good time credits, there is no promise

made to petitioner that he would parole in 7-1/2 years. In Brown v. Poole, the prosecutor

actually stated:

Now, if you behave yourself at the state prison, as most people do,

and I am inclined to believe that you will, you are going to get out

in half the time. You get half of that 15 years off, or half of that 17

years off with the imposition of the extra two years, for good

time/work-time credits. That's up to you.

Id., 337 F.3d at 1157-58. Here, the prosecution did not make a promise on the record as to the

length of time petitioner must serve or indicate that if petitioner behaved himself in prison he

would get out in half the time.

In addition, there is no language in the plea hearing that forbids Solano County

officials, including representatives of the Solano County District Attorney’s office and the

Vallejo Police Department, from appearing at parole hearings and/or arguing against petitioner’s

release on parole. 

At the plea hearing, defense counsel noted petitioner would become eligible for

parole. (Resp.’s Ex. 1, at 15.) To the extent petitioner believed eligibility meant actual release

on parole, he has not shown that such a term existed in his plea agreement. Eligibility does not

mean suitability, and under state law (as it existed when he was sentenced and as it exists now),

the inmate must be found suitable before his term and release date are set. Petitioner's sentence

upon his conviction based on a plea agreement was 15 years to life and not a straight term of

years sentence. Petitioner has received the parole considerations to which he was entitled under

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that agreement and sentence. Accordingly, petitioner’s claim that his plea agreement was

breached in violation of his right to due process fails.

For the foregoing reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 17, 2008.

001; allb0370.157

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