Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00314/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00314-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Erik Scott Maloney, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CV 13-00314-PHX-RCB(BSB)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

This matter is before the court on plaintiff pro se Erik

Scott Maloney’s second amended civil rights complaint (“SAC”)

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 17). On June 28, 2013,

this court granted plaintiff leave to file that SAC. Ord.

(Doc. 13) at 6:17-19, ¶ (4). As 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)

requires, the following constitutes the court’s screening of

plaintiff’s SAC. 

In screening the original complaint (Doc. 1), the court

dismissed without prejudice defendants Hetmer and Morris. 

Doc. 5 at 7:8, ¶ (3). However, Charles L. Ryan, the Director

of the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) and Mike 

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Linderman, ADOC’s Administrator of Pastoral Activities, were

ordered to answer counts I, II and III; and Wayne Mason, a

Chaplain at the Florence complex where plaintiff is housed,

was ordered to answer count II of that complaint. Id. at

7:9-10, ¶ (4). All three defendants have waived service of

process as to the original complaint, though no answer or

other response to that complaint have been filed. See Docs.

14, 15 and 20. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The court is required to screen complaints brought by

prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an

officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally

frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more

than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at

679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a

court must assess whether there are other “more likely

explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro

se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342

(9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner]

‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). With these

principles firmly in mind, the court will review the SAC in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1955A(a).

II. Second Amended Complaint

“[T]he general rule is that an amended complaint

supercedes the original complaint and renders it without

legal effect[.]” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also Valadez–Lopez v. Chertoff,

656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and

citations omitted) (“[I]t is well-established that an amended

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complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated

thereafter as non-existent.”). Thus, as previously

explained, plaintiff’s first amended complaint superseded his

original complaint. See Ord. (Doc. 13) at 4:10 - 5:1. And

now, the SAC supersedes the FAC so that the SAC becomes the

operative complaint. 

The first three counts in the SAC, all pertaining to

Ramadan, are virtually identical to the first three counts in

plaintiff’s original complaint. The only differences are

that in accordance with this court’s screening order, Lance

Hetmer and Stephen Morris are no longer named as defendants.

Likewise, the SAC omits all allegations pertaining to them. 

Unlike the original complaint, however, the SAC includes a

fourth count, alleging a violation of the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000cc-1(a), against defendant Ryan. Basically, in that

count the plaintiff alleges that defendant Ryan violated his

religious exercise rights by implementing a policy which

limits the amount of books, including religious books,

available to him at any one time. 

III. Failure to State a Claim

An inmate may bring a claim for violation of his

religious exercise rights under RLUIPA. RLUIPA prohibits the

government from imposing a substantial burden on the

religious exercise of an institutionalized person unless the

government establishes that the burden furthers a “compelling

governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive

means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1) - (2). “While [RLUIPA]

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adopts a ‘compelling governmental interest’ standard,

[c]ontext matters in the application of that standard.” 

Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,

722–23, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005)) (other

citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

An inmate claiming a RLUIPA violation “must allege facts

plausibly showing that the challenged policy and the

practices it engenders impose a substantial burden on the

exercise of their religious beliefs.” Id. at 1125 (citing

Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005). 

RLUIPA does not define ‘substantial burden[,]’ but th[e]

[Ninth Circuit] has held that ‘a substantial burden on

‘religious exercise must impose a significantly great

restriction or onus upon such exercise.” Id. at 1124-25

(quoting San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360

F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). In other words, “[t]he

burden must be more than a mere inconvenience, and must

prevent the plaintiff from engaging in [religious] conduct or

having a religious experience[.]” Navajo Nation v. United

States Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotations and citations omitted), overruled on

other grounds by 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

“In the context of a prisoner’s constitutional challenge

to institutional policies, th[e] [Ninth Circuit] has held

that a substantial burden occurs ‘where the state . . .

denies [an important benefit] because of conduct mandated by

religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an

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adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his belief.’”

Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at

995 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)). Thus,

“[p]risoners pursuing a RLUIPA claim must plead ‘factual

allegations showing their religious exercise was so burdened

as to pressure them to abandon their beliefs.’” Hill v.

Wamble-Fisher, 2013 WL 3223631, at *4 (D.Idaho March 25,

2013) (quoting Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1125). The burden is

then on the government to prove that the substantial burden

on the inmate’s religious practice both furthers a compelling

governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of

doing so. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995.

“By its terms, RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor

of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious

beliefs.” Id. (citation omitted). “Nonetheless, [a]

prison’s accommodation of religious observances should not be

elevated over an institution’s need to maintain order and

safety.” Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1230 (S.D.Cal.

2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In count IV, plaintiff alleges a violation of RLUIPA

against defendant Ryan only. Plaintiff Maloney alleges that

he is seeking to exercise his religion by engaging in

“Dawwah[,]” which, among other things, “requires a Muslim

practitioner to obtain knowledge of the religion of Islam

and teach it to others by either proselytizing or . . .

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1 The page number references to plaintiff’s SAC, (Doc. 17), are to

the page numbers generated by the District Court’s electronic filing

system, not the pre-printed page numbers on the complaint form or those

hand-written by the plaintiff.

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studying with” them. SAC (Doc. 17) at 13:4-61; and 13:13-14. 

The plaintiff also alleges that as part of Dawwah, the Qur’an

requires “one” to “back up his words/teaching with proof and

evidence” in the form of “relivent [sic] text or book . . .

to establish truthfulness and accuracy of the information.” 

Id. at ¶ 3. 

On January 30, 2013, defendant Ryan allegedly violated

RLUIPA by rescinding a “policy . . . which allowed for an

unlimited number of books provided they fit into a property

box[,]” and implemented another policy limiting the number of

books readily accessible to inmates. Id. at 13:16-14:1

(emphasis added). More specifically, defendant Ryan

allegedly “set a limit on books at ten . . . to include

religious books, and a limit on property boxes at Four[,] 

. . . forc[ing] Plaintiff to store the remainder of his

books[.]” Id. at 14:2-4. To retrieve those stored books,

plaintiff “must submit a written request to exchange books,

then wait over a week until the property officer” provides

the requested books. Id. at 14:5-7. 

Allegedly, this book “policy inhibits” the plaintiff in

two ways. Id. at 14:8 and 11. First, it “inhibits [his]

ability to teach” in that he does not “have the necessary

proof and evidence on hand” to engage in Dawwah. Id. at 14:8-

9. Second, allegedly, this policy “inhibits [plaintiff’s]

ability to retain the knowledge necessary to teach and

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proselytize[.]” Id. at 14:11-12. 

As the court construes count IV, under the current policy

up to four property boxes, each containing no more than ten

books, i.e., a maximum of 40 books, religious or otherwise,

are readily available to an inmate on any given day. Other

books are kept in storage and available, although not

immediately, upon request. Plaintiff Maloney thus has at his 

disposal on an ongoing basis, at the very least, ten religious

books, and perhaps up to as many as 40. Indeed, as plaintiff

alleges, presently, on any given day, “on average” he uses

“anywhere from 3 to 5 different books[.]” Id. at 14:13-14. 

Count IV does not state a RLUIPA claim that is plausible

on its face because plaintiff Maloney has not pled an

essential element of such a claim. Namely, the plaintiff has

not sufficiently alleged that defendant Ryan’s claimed policy

of limiting books, religious and otherwise, has substantially

burdened the exercise of his religion. Given the ready

availability of a number of plaintiff’s religious books, and

the facility’s retrieval process for others, plainly the

alleged book policy does not “impose a significantly great

restriction or onus upon [the] exercise” of plaintiff’s

religion. See Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1125 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); see also Callaway v. Frink, 2013

WL 1856524, at *5 (D.Mont. April 3, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL

1856471 (D.Mont. May 2, 2013) (citation omitted) (Plaintiff’s

“desire for more Odinist books does not establish a RLUIPA

violation.”) This is all the more so given the lack of

allegations explaining how or why having to wait over a week

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to be provided with additional requested religious books has

put “significant pressure” on plaintiff Maloney to “abandon

[his] religious beliefs.” See id. Additionally, there is

nothing in the SAC from which it can be reasonably inferred

that defendant Ryan’s purported book policy is “oppressive[;]”

or that it burdens plaintiff Maloney “to a ‘significantly

great extent,’ so as to make the religious practice

‘effectively impracticable.’” See Davis, 901 F.Supp. at 1230

(quoting San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034-35).

Rather, evidently plaintiff Maloney is “seek[ing] additional

religious accommodations beyond those already provided by the

prison to facilitate the religious exercise of [his] . . .

faith.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1125. Failure to provide

additional religious accommodations does not, however, amount

to a substantial burden for RLUIPA purposes. See id. at

1125.

Count IV does baldly allege that the book “policy has

substantially burdened the religious exercise of Dawwah by

putting pressure on plaintiff to modify his behavior

substantially and to violate his beliefs.” SAC (Doc. 17) at

14:15-17. This bald assertion does not overcome the pleading

deficiencies just outlined, however, in that the court cannot

reasonably infer from that allegation, unsupported by factual

content, that defendant Ryan has violated RLUIPA. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Indeed, that broad, conclusory

allegation is precisely the sort of “[t]hreadbare recital” of

an element of a cause of action[,]” which the Supreme Court

has found does not satisfy Rule 8's pleading requirements. 

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See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

In sum, because count IV does not allege a plausible

RLUIPA claim against defendant Ryan, count IV will be

dismissed. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

As previously stated, counts I, II, and III are identical

in all relevant ways to counts I, II, and III of the SAC.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth in this court’s prior

screening order, defendants Ryan and Linderman must answer

counts I, II, and III of the SAC and defendant Mason must

answer count II of the SAC. See Doc. 5 at 3-6. Accordingly,

the court will order service of the SAC (Doc. 17) upon

defendants Ryan, Linderman and Mason. 

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of

address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of

Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply

may result in dismissal of this action.

B. Copies

Plaintiff must serve defendants, or counsel if an

appearance has been entered, a copy of every document that he

files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, plaintiff must submit an additional

copy of every filing for use by the court. See LRCiv 5.4.

Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken

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without further notice to plaintiff. 

C. Possible Dismissal

If plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision

of this Order, including these warnings, the court may dismiss

this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may

dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the

Court).

E. No Further Amendments Without Leave of Court

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

a party to amend his pleading "once as a matter of course at

any time before a responsive pleading is served . . ." 

Because plaintiff has now amended his complaint more than

once, he may not file another amended complaint without first

seeking permission from the court.

IT IS ORDERED as follows:

(1) Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed.

(2) Defendant Ryan must answer counts I, II, and III of

the Second Amended Complaint.

(3) Defendant Linderman must answer counts I, II, and III

of the Second Amended Complaint. 

(4) Defendant Mason must answer count II of the Second

Amended Complaint.

(5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service

packet including the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 17), this

Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

defendants Ryan, Linderman, and Mason.

. . .

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2 If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona

Department of Corrections, plaintiff must list the address of the specific

institution where the officer or employee works. Service cannot be effected

on an officer or employee at the Central Office of the Arizona Department

of Corrections unless the officer or employee works there.

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(6) Plaintiff must complete2 and return the service packet

to the Clerk of Court within 21 days of the date of filing of

this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide service

of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of

service of the summons or complete service of the Summons and

Second Amended Complaint on a defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Second Amended Complaint or within 60 days of

the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the action may

be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a

copy of the Second Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order

for future use.

(9) The United States Marshal must notify defendants of

the commencement of this action and request waiver of service

of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The notice to defendants must include a copy

of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of

summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned by a

defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver

was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons,

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Complaint, and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule

4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is

effected, file the return of service for Defendant, along with

evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting

service upon Defendant. The costs of service must be

enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and must

include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying

additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and

for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285),

if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by

the Court.

(10) A defendant who agrees to waive service of the

Summons and Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to

the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(11) Defendants must answer the Second Amended Complaint

or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time

provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(12) Any answer or response must state the specific

defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may

strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed.

(13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Bridget

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S. Bade pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 22nd day of July, 2013.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

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