Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01224/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01224-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Juan Manuel Reynoso, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-01224 PHX SRB(MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On June 19, 2013, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed

a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 12) on December 30, 2013.

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to his petition on

January 16, 2014. See Doc. 14.

I Procedural history

An indictment returned August 13, 2009, charged

Petitioner with one count of second-degree murder. See Answer,

Exh. C. On September 4, 2009, Petitioner noticed the state trial

court that he intended to raise the issue, inter alia, of selfdefense. Id., Exh. D. On September 13, 2010, Petitioner entered

into a written plea agreement with regard to the single count of

the indictment, which agreement provided Petitioner would plead

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guilty to one count of manslaughter. Id., Exh. F. 

Respondents contend that, during the change-of-plea

proceedings, Petitioner’s counsel provided the following factual

basis for Petitioner’s plea:

Your honor, [on] August 4, 2009, in ...

Maricopa County ... Mr. Reynoso stabbed the

victim, Charles Heeler (phoenetic) in the

chest with a knife which caused the death of

Charles Heeler (phoenetic). There is no

justification for his act. [] When the Court

asked Reynoso if the factual basis was

correct, he responded, “Yes.”

Id. (Answer (Doc. 12)) at 3. See also id., Exh. M at Attach. F.

On November 5, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated

term of thirteen years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction

for manslaughter. Id., Exh. B & Exh. G.

Petitioner initiated a timely action for state postconviction relief, his first “of right” appeal of his conviction

and sentence, by docketing a notice of post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.,

Exh. H. In the notice of post-conviction relief Petitioner

alleged that the attorney who represented him during his plea

negotiations informed him that there was “‘no such thing as

self-defense in Arizona’”, and that Petitioner had not been

aware of Arizona’s self-defense statute until after his

conviction. Id., Exh. H. 

Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in his

Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. I. On June 16, 2011, Petitioner’s

appointed post-conviction counsel advised the state trial court

that, after corresponding with Petitioner and reviewing the

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relevant documents, he was “unable to find any claims for relief

to raise in post conviction proceedings.” Id., Exh. I.

Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel also sent a letter

to Petitioner, informing him that counsel had reviewed the

documents and arguments proffered by Petitioner, and that counsel

did not believe there were any arguments that would succeed in

altering Petitioner’s conviction. Id., Exh. J. In the letter,

post-conviction counsel informed Petitioner that he had spoken

with the trial attorney about Petitioner’s claims: 

As for your attorney, I wrote and asked him

about your statements that he told you there

was no self defense in Arizona. He wrote back

and said that you two discussed that topic at

length, including the State’s burden of proof

on the issue. He says you took the plea

because if you were convicted of second degree

and got the full 22 years, it would basically

be a life sentence. He also mentioned a jail

snitch who was going to testify against you.

And, of course, there was the DNA report which

did not help you. 

Id., Exh. J. Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel also stated

to Petitioner: “the bottom line is very simple—there is evidence

from which a reasonable person could believe that you recklessly

killed the victim and that it was not justified.” Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per brief in

his Rule 32 action. Id., Ex. K. Petitioner alleged that, if his

trial counsel had not been ineffective, he would not have pled

guilty and he would have proceeded to trial and been acquitted

because he would have asserted a “duress” defense. Id., Exh. A.

In a decision denying relief issued December 23, 2011,

the state trial court found that Petitioner had not established

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that he had a colorable claim for relief and dismissed the

petition pursuant to Rule 32.6(c), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. L. On January 11, 2012, Petitioner sought

review of the trial court’s denial of relief by the Arizona Court

of Appeals. Id., Exh. M. In the petition for review Petitioner

argued:

(a) Whether the facts show that (def) Reynoso

was indeed brutally attacked by a drug induced

armed Charles Edward Wheeler.

(b) Whether under Arizona law (def) satisfies

the justification use of force in crime

prevention applicability when (def) fought

back with a pocket knife resulting in

Wheeler’s death (CW) will mean Charles Edward

Wheeler. 

(c) Whether (def) meets the two prong test for

ineffective assistance of counsel that would

allow the Court to overturn (def) conviction

and allow (def) remanded for an evidentiary

hearing to hear arguments of duress defense.

Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction

relief on March 1, 2012, before the state appellate court had

ruled on the petition for review in his first Rule 32 action.

Id., Exh. N. In the second notice Petitioner asserted that he

was “actually innocent” of the crime of conviction, and he

provided the same information provided in the first Rule 32

action. On March 16, 2012, the trial court dismissed the second

Rule 32 action, noting Petitioner had failed to provide any new

information and finding that his claim was precluded under Rule

32.2(a)(2), which prohibits a petitioner from raising a

previously-raised issue in a subsequent post-conviction

proceeding. Id. Exh. O.

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In a memorandum decision issued May 30, 2013, the

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief in Petitioner’s first Rule

32 action. Id., Exh. P. The Court of Appeals noted that

Petitioner’s allegations that he did not know of the potential

to assert self-defense were “belied by the record” and that he

provided no support for his claims other than his self-serving

affidavit. Id., Exh. P at 3-4.

In Petitioner’s federal habeas action he contends that

he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, in

violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, because his trial

counsel failed to investigate a toxicology report. He also

argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel

because counsel misstated the applicable law regarding

self-defense. 

Respondents contend that Petitioner procedurally

defaulted his federal habeas claims. Reynoso’s claims are

procedurally defaulted “because he did not fairly present his

claims in state court and he presents no excuse for the default.”

Answer (Doc. 12) at X.

Both of Reynoso’s grounds for relief are

procedurally defaulted because he failed to

“fairly present” those claims in state court.

See Dickens, 688 F.3d at 1067. The grounds for

relief stated in Reynoso’s habeas corpus

petition are different than the claims Reynoso

raised in his petition for review in state

court. In the present habeas petition, Reynoso

alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective

for (1) failing to investigate the victim’s

toxicology reports and for (2) misstating the

applicable law regarding self-defense. (Dkt.

1-1, at 11-12.) Neither of these claims was

made in his petition to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Rather, in state court, he claimed

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1

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

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(1) that he was “brutally attacked” by the

victim, (2) that he satisfied the “use of

force in crime prevention applicability” when

he stabbed the victim to death, and (3) that

he met “the two prong test for ineffective

assistance of counsel” regarding duress. (Ex.

M.) Thus, because Reynoso failed to fairly

present his claims in state court, federal

review of those claims is barred. See e.g., Dickens, 688 F.3d at 1067.

Id. at 8-9.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30,

111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a federal

habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state courts the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer,

395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1 The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases arising in

Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement

is satisfied if the habeas petitioner presented his claim to the

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Arizona Court of Appeals, either on direct appeal or in a

petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles,

483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a specific

federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation of a state

law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas claim was not

“fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S.

at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

For purposes of exhausting state remedies, a

claim for relief in habeas corpus must include

reference to a specific federal constitutional

guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts

that entitle the petitioner to relief. The

federal claim is fairly presented if raised in

the petition itself, an accompanying brief, or

another similar document filed with that

court.

Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

134 S. Ct. 102 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted

and emphasis added).

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A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by any

available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still

available to the petitioner at the time they file their action

for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the petitioner is

procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state

courts. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93, 126 S.

Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now barred

from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including rules

regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489

U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural default also

occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the state courts,

but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule.

See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct.

2590, 2594-95 (1991).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural bar

occurs when the petitioner has presented his

claim to the state courts and the state courts

have relied on a state procedural rule to deny

or dismiss the claim. An implied procedural

bar, on the other hand, occurs when the

petitioner has failed to fairly present his

claims to the highest state court and would

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now be barred by a state procedural rule from

doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly presented

to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his first Rule 32 action. See

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty

v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Stewart

v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002)

(holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

recently confirmed this holding in Hurles v. Ryan, concluding

“Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for

denying relief.” 706 F.3d 1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 2013), petition

for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3009 (Jun. 17, 2013)(No. 12-1472).

See also Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012).

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

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from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991).

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-

86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of

justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See

Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649; Thomas v.

Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief).

The Court concludes Petitioner “fairly presented” the

substance and factual basis for his ineffective assistance of

counsel claims throughout his pleadings to the Arizona Court of

Appeals in his first Rule 32 action. See Gentry, 705 F.3d at

897-99.

A claim is not “fairly presented” if the state

court “must read beyond a petition or a brief

... in order to find material” that alerts it

to the presence of a federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347.

*** 

...a petitioner has “fairly presented” a claim

not named in a petition if it is “sufficiently

related” to an exhausted claim. See Lounsbury, 374 F.3d at 788. Claims are “sufficiently

related” or “intertwined” for exhaustion

purposes when, by raising one claim, the

petition clearly implies another error. See

id.

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Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008).

Additionally, the claims may be denied on the merits

notwithstanding any alleged failure to properly exhaust the exact

claims raised in his federal habeas petition.

 B. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque,

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal court

may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the

state court’s adjudication on the merits was ‘contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012),

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of United States

Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that

is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme

Court but reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v.

Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005);

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149

(2004); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012),

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cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). 

A state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law if it correctly

identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts

in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or

fails to extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new

set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See

McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The

state court’s determination of a habeas claim may be set aside

under the unreasonable application prong if, under clearly

established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in

which the principle should have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone,

530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney

v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the

state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law only if it can be considered objectively

unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S.

Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An

unreasonable application of law is different from an incorrect

one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d

1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one and

does not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state

court might have incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of

a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d

Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th

Cir. 2010).

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 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545

U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d

943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881; Anderson v.

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption

of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate

court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of

fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303,

1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court

has held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits

in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim

on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398

(2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court must

review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated,

i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the

deference to the state court’s decision that the Anti–Terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires.

See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.

930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858–59 (2007); Runningeagle, 686

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F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th

Cir. 2011).

C. Petitioner’s claims for relief

The Court concludes that Petitioner did substantively

properly exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claims by

bringing the factual predicate and the legal basis for the claims

before the Arizona Court of Appeals in his petition for review

in his first Rule 32 action. The Arizona Court of Appeals

discussed Petitioner’s claims of error in granting review and

denying relief on Petitioner’s claims. See Answer, Exh. P.

Accordingly, having found that the claims were properly

exhausted, the Court will discuss whether the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision determining Petitioner was not deprived of his

right to the effective assistance of counsel was clearly contrary

to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Petitioner asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges

that his counsel failed to use a toxicology report to show that

the victim was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs at the

time of the conflict, establishing that Petitioner acted in selfdefense. Petitioner also asserts that his counsel improperly

advised him regarding Arizona law on self-defense and that,

absent his counsel’s incorrect advice, he would not have pled

guilty but would have gone to trial and asserted self-defense.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a habeas petitioner must show both that his attorney’s

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

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outcome of his criminal proceedings. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The

petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct was within the range of reasonable professional

assistance required of attorneys in that circumstance. See id.,

466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Counsel’s performance will

be held constitutionally deficient only if the habeas petitioner

proves counsel’s actions “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” as measured by “prevailing professional norms.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65. See also

Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2010). To

establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish that there is

“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. See also, e.g.,

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-88 (2011). 

To succeed on a claim that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985). In Hill, the Supreme

Court adapted the two-part Strickland standard to challenges to

guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel, holding

that a defendant seeking to challenge the validity of his guilty

plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel must show

that (1) his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective

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standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

474 U.S. at 57–59, 106 S. Ct. at 369-70. See also Womack v. Del

Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007).

 To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was

deficient because counsel failed to raise a particular argument,

the petitioner must establish the argument was likely to be

successful, thereby establishing that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144

(9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir.

2006). “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the

errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.

Counsel’s performance is not deficient nor prejudicial when

counsel “fails” to raise an argument that counsel reasonably

believes would be futile. See Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 741;

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. It is Petitioner’s burden to

establish both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and

that he was prejudiced thereby. See, e.g., Wong, 130 S. Ct. at

384-85. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy

task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010), quoted

in Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

“To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel based on alleged erroneous advice regarding a guilty

plea, a petitioner must demonstrate more than a ‘mere inaccurate

prediction.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 868 (9th

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Cir. 2004), quoting Iaea, 800 F.2d at 864-5. Additionally,

although counsel can be deemed ineffective for failing to provide

proper advice during the plea process, to be entitled to habeas

relief Petitioner must come forth with objective evidence to show

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have accepted the

plea offer and would have insisted on going to trial. See Diaz

v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991); Toro v.

Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991). Conclusory,

after-the-fact statements that Petitioner would not have pled

guilty do not meet this requirement. See Diaz, 930 F.2d at 835.

Petitioner has not brought forward objective evidence

indicating that his counsel’s advice as to accepting the plea

bargain was incorrect. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded

that, as a matter of fact, Petitioner had been apprised of the

Arizona law relative to self-defense and that Petitioner chose

to plead guilty to manslaughter to obtain a lesser sentence.

Petitioner has not brought forward objective evidence

establishing that he was improperly advised and would have

proceeded to trial but for his counsel’s advice.

IV Conclusion

Petitioner exhausted his ineffective assistance of

counsel claims by fairly presenting the substance of the claims

to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his pleadings in his first

Rule 32 action. Additionally, notwithstanding any failure to

exhaust the claims, the claims may be denied on the merits

because the Arizona Court of Appeals did not err in concluding

that Petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of

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counsel in his plea proceedings.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Reynoso’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections

to any factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge

will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review

of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or

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judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 27th day of January, 2014.

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