Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03499/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3499

___________

Linda Kay Crumpley-Patterson, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States 

 * District Court for the Western

Trinity Lutheran Hospital; Baptist- * District of Missouri.

Lutheran Medical Center; City of Lee's *

Summit, Missouri; Michael J. Black, *

Sergeant, Lee's Summit Police *

Department, *

*

Defendants/Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: September 13, 2004

Filed: November 2, 2004

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

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The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

2

Trinity is now known as Baptist Lutheran Medical Center.

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Linda Kay Crumpley-Patterson (Patterson) appeals the district court's1

 order

granting Trinity Lutheran Hospital's2

 (Trinity) motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

to dismiss her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. We affirm. 

I.

The relevant facts, as alleged in Patterson's complaint, are as follows. On

August 4, 2001, Lee's Summit, Missouri, police arrested Patterson after two

neighbors accused her of pointing a gun at them. The police held Patterson in jail

overnight and the following day transported her to Trinity for a psychiatric

evaluation. Trinity officials advised Patterson she "present[ed] a serious harm to

[her]self or others" and told her she would be held "against her will for a 96-hour

period." Patterson alleges Trinity failed to follow Missouri state law requiring

petitions for involuntary commitment be approved by the County Probate Court.

Patterson further alleges Trinity held her against her will until August 8 in violation

of her due process rights, despite a psychiatrist's conclusion she was not a danger to

herself or others. 

On August 13, 2001, Patterson alleges she was again involuntarily confined to

Trinity. This time, Trinity told Patterson she would be held against her will for

twenty-one days unless she signed an authorization for treatment. Patterson signed

the authorization and once again a staff psychiatrist determined she was not a threat

to herself or others. On August 17, Trinity released Patterson from her second

confinement. 

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Lee's Summit and Black were later dismissed and those dismissals are not

before the court. 

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Patterson sued Trinity, the City of Lee's Summit and Michael J. Black, a

sergeant on the Lee's Summit police force,3

 alleging 1) deprivation of constitutional

rights under § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 2) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights,

and 3) three pendent state law claims. Eventually, all of the claims were dismissed.

The only issue before us on appeal is the dismissal of the § 1983 claim. 

The district court dismissed the § 1983 claim because 1) Patterson failed to

plead Trinity was engaged in a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of

unconstitutional misconduct, and 2) Trinity was not a state actor. On appeal,

Patterson argues the dismissal was inappropriate because she did not need to make

a showing of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional

misconduct, and Trinity was acting under color of state law. We disagree. 

II.

 The standard for a district court to employ in ruling on a motion to dismiss is

clear. A district court must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true,

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and all reasonable inferences

from the complaint must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, Hafley v.

Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996). "[D]ismissal is inappropriate 'unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.'" McCormack v. Citibank, N.A., 979 F.2d

643, 646 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

This court reviews a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Hafley, 90

F.3d at 266. 

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 Section 1983 creates a cause of action against "every person, who under color

of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" subjects any person to

deprivation of immunities secured by the Constitution or federal laws. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Section 1983 secures most constitutional rights from infringement by

governments, not private parties. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349

(1974). Where a private party acts under color of state law, however, it can be held

liable under § 1983. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (holding

private party acts under color of state law if it is "willful participant in joint action

with State or its agents"); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970)

(holding proof of conspiracy between restaurant and police established restaurant

acted under color of law). 

A corporation acting under color of state law will only be held liable under

§ 1983 for its own unconstitutional policies. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978). The test is whether there exists a policy, custom or action by those

who represent official policy which inflicts an injury actionable under § 1983. Id. at

694. In other words, to prove a policy, custom or action, Patterson must show "a

continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct" by

Trinity's employees; "[d]eliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such

conduct by [Trinity's] policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that

misconduct;" and she "was injured by acts pursuant to [Trinity's] custom, i.e., that the

custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation." S.J. v. Kansas City

Mo. Pub. Sch. Dist., 294 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). 

Patterson need not, however, specifically plead the existence of an

unconstitutional policy or custom to survive a motion to dismiss. Doe v. Sch. Dist.

of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003). 

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[A] plaintiff may not be privy to the facts necessary to accurately

describe or identify any policies or customs which may have caused the

deprivation of a constitutional right. Moreover, such a holding would

disregard the liberality of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) which requires merely

"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief," and 8(f), which states "pleadings shall be so construed

as to do substantial justice."

Id. 

Accordingly, Patterson's complaint is not deficient because she failed to

incorporate language specifically alleging the "existence of an unconstitutional policy

or custom." Id. Nevertheless, Patterson's failure to include any "allegations,

reference, or language by which one could begin to draw an inference that the

conduct complained of . . . resulted from an unconstitutional policy or custom"

renders the complaint deficient. Id. "At a minimum, a complaint must allege facts

which would support the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom." Id. 

Here, the district court found Patterson failed to include in her complaint any

language or facts from which an inference could be drawn that Trinity had a policy

or custom of illegal involuntary commitments. Our review of the complaint confirms

the district court's finding. We are unable to divine anything from the complaint

alleging such a policy or custom. 

Citing Doe v. School District of Norfolk, 340 F.3d at 613, Patterson argues she

was not required to show, at this juncture, the existence of such a practice or custom

because those facts may have been developed during discovery. The argument misses

the mark. The district court dismissed the complaint because Patterson failed to

include any allegations suggesting the existence of an unconstitutional practice or

custom. On appeal, Patterson has again failed to allege the existence of an

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Because we find the complaint deficient on its face, we express no opinion

about whether Trinity was acting under color of law.

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unconstitutional practice or custom and at oral argument conceded the absence of any

such allegations in the complaint.4

 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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