Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03512/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ARTURO MARTINEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 05-3512-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Defendants Maricopa County and Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed because

Plaintiff failed to timely file an adequate notice of claim as required by Arizona Revised

Statutes section 12-821.01 (2003). Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims

as to Defendant Maricopa County on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to establish a theory of

municipal liability upon which his claims are predicated. 

I. BACKGROUND

On August 11, 2004, Plaintiff, Arturo Martinez, was a pre-trial detainee at a jail

facility located in Maricopa County. Plaintiff alleges that approximately one hour prior to his

court appearance, he was ordered by detention officers to put on “prisoner’s stripes.” When

he refused to do so, Plaintiff alleges that officers Bowman and Haider, attacked him with

their stun weapons, causing Plaintiff to lose all control over his bladder, bowels, and muscles.

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1

This Court dismissed Officers Urena, Rose, Haider, and Bowman from the action for

Plaintiff’s failure to serve them as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

Consequently, Maricopa County and Sheriff Joe Arpaio are the only remaining defendants

in the action.

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Plaintiff also alleges that soon thereafter, officers Urena and Rose, joined in and assisted the

two officers in further assaulting Plaintiff until he was fully incapacitated.

Plaintiff initially filed his complaint in state court on August 10, 2005, raising both

state and federal claims. In addition to the four officers involved in the incident, Plaintiff also

named Maricopa County and Sheriff Joe Arpaio as Defendants in the complaint.1

 The action

was subsequently removed by Defendants to this Court. Plaintiff filed a Motion to File

Amended Complaint, which was granted by the Court. 

Plaintiff raises four claims in his complaint, two of which are federal claims and two

of which are state claims. In his federal claims, Plaintiff asserts that the officers used

excessive force against him, thereby violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment and his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Plaintiff also raises an equal

protection claim, alleging that he was singled out for abuse based on his race or ethnicity.

Additionally, Plaintiff raises two state tort claims for assault and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. 

Defendants, Maricopa County and Sheriff Joe Arpaio, have moved to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants argue that the state claims should be

dismissed because Plaintiff failed to timely file a notice of claim against Defendants after the

cause of action accrued as A.R.S. section 12-821.01 (2003) requires. Alternatively,

Defendant, Maricopa County, argues that Plaintiff should not be able to proceed with his

state claims against the County under a theory of respondeat superior liability because the

incident arose out of the actions of four officers employed at the jail facility and the County,

itself, has no right to control the operation of its jails. Defendants, similarly, argue that

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Under A.R.S. section 12-821.01(B), “a cause of action accrues when the damaged

party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause,

source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage.”

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Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of municipal liability and, as such, his federal claims

against Maricopa County should be dismissed.

II. DISCUSSION

Unenumerated 12(b) Motion to Dismiss - State Claims

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants claim that because Plaintiff failed to satisfy

the notice requirements of A.R.S. section 12-821.01(A) (2003), his state law claims against

Defendants are barred. Section 12-821.01(A) provides that persons with claims against a

public entity or a public employee must, within 180 days after the accrual of the cause of

action,2

 file a notice of claim with the person(s) authorized to accept service for the public

entity or public employee. The claim must contain facts that will sufficiently enable the

public entity or public employee to appreciate the basis of liability upon which the claim is

founded. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). A specific amount for which the claim can be settled must

also be included in the claim, along with facts supporting that amount. Id. Failure to file a

notice of claim meeting the requirements of section 12-821.01(A) within 180 days after the

accrual of the cause of action bars a claimant from proceeding on his or her state law claims

against a public entity or public employee. Id.

Although Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the

failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies that are not jurisdictional should be treated as a

matter in abatement, which is subject to an unenumerated 12(b) motion to dismiss. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). In deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure

to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Although Wyatt involved a § 1983 claim in the context

of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the guidelines established with

regard to the exhaustion of administrative remedies and the Court’s ability to look beyond

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The letter is addressed only to the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office.

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the pleadings are equally applicable in the case at hand. The requirement of filing a notice

of claim with the state is mandatory and must be complied with before a plaintiff can

maintain a cause of action against it. Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Ariz. 1990).

Furthermore, the statutory notice requirements with respect to filing a notice of claim are

procedural, rather than jurisdictional. Id. at 1181, 1183. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss will be treated as an unenumerated 12(b) motion, permitting this Court to look

beyond the pleadings to consider the allegations and exhibits contained within Defendants’

Motion and Plaintiff’s Response. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not file a sufficient notice of claim within the

statutorily required 180 days, thus barring his state law claims against Defendants. Given that

the cause of action accrued on August 11, 2004, Plaintiff had until February 7, 2005 to serve

a notice of claim upon each Defendant named in his Amended Complaint. Defendants

maintain, however, that Plaintiff did not serve a notice of claim on Defendant Sheriff Joe

Arpaio until March 3, 2005. Affidavit of Margaret Difrancesco. Furthermore, no such notice

was ever served upon Defendant Maricopa County. Affidavit of Fran McCarroll. Plaintiff,

however, offers as evidence a letter dated November 17, 2004,3

 which he argues constitutes

an adequate notice of claim. The question this Court must decide, then, is whether the

November 17 letter sufficiently meets the requirements set out under section 12-821.01.

The purpose behind the notice of claim statute “is to allow the public employee and

his employer to investigate and assess their liability, to permit the possibility of settlement

prior to litigation and to assist the public entity in financial planning and budgeting.” Crum

v. Superior Court, 922 P.2d 316, 317 (App. Div. 1996). To best effectuate the purpose of the

statute, section 12-821.01 requires that the notice contain (1) enough information to enable

the public entity to intelligently ascertain the nature of the claimant’s loss so that it can

conscientiously allow or disallow the claim and (2) an approximation of damages in the form

of a specific amount for which the claim can be settled. See Howland v. State, 818 P.2d 1169,

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1175 (App. Div. 1991); State v. Brooks, 534 P.2d 271, 274-75 (App. Div. 1975). The

adequacy of a notice of claim, then, turns on whether the notice meets both of these

requirements. See Crum, 922 P.2d at 318 (holding that plaintiff’s letter to county attorney

did not constitute sufficient notice of claim because the letter contained no reference to the

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim raised in plaintiff’s complaint and failed to

include a specific amount of damages being sought); Howland, 818 P.2d at 1175 (holding

that the amount plaintiff was requesting in the notice of claim was not supported by the bare

assertions made by plaintiff in a letter to defendants where the letter failed to specifically

describe the factual allegations made in subsequent complaint); Brooks, 534 P.2d at 274-75

(holding that plaintiff’s letter directed to Attorney General failed to meet the requirements

of the notice of claim statute because, although the letter contained sufficient information to

enable the state to investigate its liability, it did not include a specific amount for which the

claim could be settled).

The November 17, 2004 letter, written by Plaintiff’s counsel and directed to the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, merely states that counsel has been retained on a matter

that arose on August 11, 2004. Yet, beyond stating that “Maricopa Sheriff’s deputies fired

their Taser weapons and struck Mr. Martinez while he was in a holding cell,” the letter

provides very little detail about the incident. For example, one of the central factual

allegations made in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is that Plaintiff was assaulted by the

detention officers because he resisted their order to wear “prisoner’s stripes.” Yet the

November 17 letter makes no reference to this allegation. The use of a stun weapon is not

uncommon in detention facilities. Often, detention officers have no other choice but to use

such force, especially in cases involving violent and unruly detainees. But without stating the

reasons why this force was used on Plaintiff, the letter does not provide sufficient notice of

a claim for which the public entity or employer should be held liable. Nor does the November

17 letter make reference to any theory of liability contained in Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint, such as the state law tort claims for assault and infliction of emotional distress.

Even if Plaintiff had provided sufficient detail about the incident, the letter would still be

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Plaintiff specifically requested the production of: any audio or video recording of the

incident, any force reports documenting the use of a taser weapon, a list of inmates who were

in the vicinity at the time of the incident, and any medical records arising out of the incident.

5

It is worthy to note that the statute, in its former version, specifically created an

exception for excusable neglect. Under former section 12-821, a claim not filed within

statutory period after the cause of action has accrued is barred,

except upon a showing of excusable neglect if the action is brought within the

otherwise applicable period of limitations, provided that if there is no

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defective as a notice of claim because Plaintiff failed to include a specific amount for which

he was willing to settle his claim. 

It appears the real intent of the November 17 letter was, not to inform Defendants of

a notice of claim, but to request that certain evidence be produced by the Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office.4

 This is further evidenced by language contained at the end of the letter,

which reads as follows: “I anticipate that we will submit the mandatory claim form very

shortly after receiving the above requested information.” Plaintiff’s November 17 letter, thus,

does not constitute a sufficient notice of claim as required under A.R.S. section 12-821.01

because it fails to set out in sufficient detail the nature of Plaintiff’s loss and does not contain

a specific amount for which settlement of the claim could be reached. 

Plaintiff argues that this Court should, “in the interest of justice and equity,” consider

his November 17 letter as sufficient notice of claim to all parties named in his Amended

Complaint, thus bringing his notice of claim within the statutorily required 180 days. Plaintiff

maintains that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, in failing to respond to the requests

made in the November 17 letter, withheld vital information, without which Plaintiff could

not proceed with his notice of claim. Plaintiff, thus, contends that any delay in service of his

notice of claim, was not of his own doing, but was a result of the “stall techniques” carried

out by the Sheriff’s Office. Defendants contend, however, that the Sheriff’s Office processed

the request as it would any other in the normal course of its business. 

In Pritchard, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the time requirement in the notice

of claim statute5

 was procedural, not jurisdictional. 788 P.2d at 1184. The court further held

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excusable neglect, and if the absence of excusable neglect is because of the

conduct of the claimant’s attorney, then the action shall proceed, and the

public entity and public employee shall have a right of indemnity against the

claimant’s attorney for any liability assessed in the action.

This proviso, however, has since been repealed by the legislature.

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that issues of excusable neglect or incompetence under the statute were to be resolved like

any other disputed issues of fact. Id. Although disputed issues of fact are usually the province

of the jury, the court may, in an unenumerated motion to dismiss, look beyond the pleadings

and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. Although certain evidence

was not within Plaintiff’s counsel’s possession at the time the November 17 letter was

drafted, counsel, based solely on Plaintiff’s recollection of the incident, could have drafted

a notice of claim sufficiently laying out the nature of Plaintiff’s loss. Counsel could have also

approximated the extent of Plaintiff’s loss in arriving at a specific amount for which the

claim could be settled. After all, the notice of claim merely serves “to preserve the claim for

later proceedings.” Hernandez v. State, 35 P.3d 97, 101 (Ariz. App. Div. 2001). In City of

Tucson v. Fleischman, 731 P.2d, 634, 638 (Ariz. App. Div. 1986), the Arizona Court of

Appeals held that counsel’s need to investigate client’s claim, will not render the failure to

file a timely notice of claim excusable. Here, Plaintiff’s counsel knew or should have known

about A.R.S. section 12.821.01 and its requirements and accordingly filed an adequate notice

of claim. See Fleischman, 731 P.2d at 638 (charging the plaintiff’s attorney with constructive

knowledge of the notice of claim statute).

Plaintiff did not serve Defendant Sheriff Arpaio with a notice of claim until March 3,

2005, nearly a month after he was statutorily required to under A.R.S. section 12-821.01.

Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the letter dated November 17, 2004 does not

constitute a sufficient notice of claim as required by section 12-821.01. As such, Plaintiff is

barred from proceeding with his state law tort claims against Sheriff Arpaio. Because

Defendant Maricopa County was never served with a notice of claim, Plaintiff’s state law

claims as to Maricopa County are similarly barred. “[A]ny action against a public entity or

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public employee must be preceded by notice of the claim to each entity and each employee

named in the subsequent lawsuit.” Johnson v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Ariz.

App. 1988). Because this Court has dismissed the state law claims as to both Defendants, it

need not decide Defendants’ alternative argument that the state law claims be dismissed as

to Maricopa County because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of respondeat superior

liability.

12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim - Federal Claims

Defendants also move, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims

against Maricopa County for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to state a municipal liability claim.

A court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would

entitle him to relief." Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). "The federal

rules require only a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.'" Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). "The Rule 8 standard contains a powerful presumption against

rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim." Id. at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted).

"All that is required are sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims

against them." McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). Indeed, though "‘it

may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely[,] . . . that

is not the test.'" Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249 (quoting Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974)). "‘The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Id.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, therefore, is disfavored and rarely

granted. Id. at 248-49. As such, when analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim, "[a]ll

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party." Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the

Court must assume that all general allegations "embrace whatever specific facts might be

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necessary to support them." Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995) (citations omitted). Legal conclusions,

however, couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness and

"conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a

motion to dismiss." Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). It is the burden

of the party bringing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim to demonstrate that the

requirements of Rule 8(a) have not been met. Gallardo v. DiCarlo, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1160,

1165 (C.D. Calif. 2002).

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Maricopa County “may be held

independently or vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of its officers and employees.”

Defendants, however, contend that the allegations of municipal liability made in Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint are without support. A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983

on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92

(1978) (Section 1983 “cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on

[municipalities] solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship

with a tortfeasor.”); see also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 783 (1995)

(applying the Monell standard to a county). Thus, in order to establish municipal liability, a

plaintiff must show a policy, practice or custom of the municipality which permitted the

alleged constitutional violation to occur. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.

1999). 

In Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185-87 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth

Circuit stated that there are two routes which can “lead to the conclusion that a municipality

has inflicted a constitutional injury.” Under the direct route to municipal liability, a plaintiff

can establish that the municipality violated his constitutional rights by showing that it acted

with the requisite “state of mind” implicating the underlying violation just as the plaintiff

would have to prove if he was alleging that a natural person had violated his rights. Id. at

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An example of this direct path to municipal liability would be a city’s policy of

discriminating against pregnant women in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at

1186.

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1185.6

 Under the indirect route to municipal liability, a plaintiff does not have to establish

that the municipality itself violated his rights under the Constitution or directed its employees

to do so. Id. at 1186. Rather, “a plaintiff can allege that through its omissions the

municipality is responsible for a constitutional violation committed by one of its employees,

even though the municipality's policies were facially constitutional, the municipality did not

direct the employee to take the unconstitutional action, and the municipality did not have the

state of mind required to prove the underlying violation.” Id. However, bearing in mind that

a municipality cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior, “the plaintiff

must show that the municipality’s deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the

omission caused the employee to commit the constitutional violation.” Id. Deliberate

indifference can be established by showing that the municipality had actual or constructive

notice that the omission would lead to the constitutional violation. Problems of proof,

however, become much more difficult when a plaintiff’s rights have been violated by a

municipal employee acting under a constitutionally valid policy. Id. 

Plaintiff maintains that since Maricopa County is responsible for the screening,

training and supervision of all employees hired to handle pre-trial detainees in the custody

of its jail system, it must ensure that its employees follow established policies and procedures

which govern how the detainees are to be treated. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that the officers’ use of excessive force was a result of the inadequate training that

they received under Maricopa County’s employee training policy. Plaintiff further alleges

that, because its policies were poorly implemented, Maricopa County fostered an

environment encouraging its employees to engage in discriminatory acts against persons of

color.

In Canton v. Ohio, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the

“inadequacy of police training” may result in a municipality being held liable under § 1983

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“where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with

whom the police come into contact.” An omission, such as failure to train, reflects a

“deliberate” or “conscious” choice on a municipality’s part and, as such, may constitute a

policy or custom creating liability for the municipality. Id. at 389. However, mere allegations

that an existing training program constitutes a “policy” for which the municipality is

responsible will not suffice. Id. As contemplated by the Canton Court, 

In resolving the issue of a city's liability, the focus must be on adequacy of the

training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform.

. . . It may be, for example, that an otherwise sound program has occasionally

been negligently administered. Neither will it suffice to prove that an injury or

accident could have been avoided if an officer had had better or more training,

sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct. Such a

claim could be made about almost any encounter resulting in injury, yet not

condemn the adequacy of the program to enable officers to respond properly

to the usual and recurring situations with which they must deal. And plainly,

adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do

says little about the training program or the legal basis for holding the city

liable.

Id. at 390-91 (internal citations omitted).

Although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are minimal, Plaintiff’s allegations

are exactly the type of legal conclusions, couched as factual allegations, that cannot defeat

a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff merely infers from the officers’ conduct that Maricopa County

has an inadequate training program for its employees, yet does not go further to explain the

training program’s inadequacy. Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff make any factual

allegations concerning the level of force that officers in Maricopa County are trained to use

in situations such as that involved here. It is certainly reasonable that officers in the setting

of a jail would be trained on the appropriate use of force in situations that arise involving pretrial detainees. Yet without more facts, this Court cannot conclude that Maricopa County had

an inadequate training program which caused Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be violated.

For all that is alleged, Maricopa County could have a perfectly sound training program for

its officers, which just was not adhered to by the officers in the instant case. 

Plaintiff’s equal protection claim also cannot survive dismissal. Although Plaintiff

alleges that Maricopa County fostered racism by encouraging its officers to engage in

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Defendants did not move to dismiss the federal claims against Sheriff Arpaio.

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conduct exhibiting a discriminatory intent against persons of color, he fails to allege any facts

tending to support the general legal conclusion that an animus against persons of color

motivated his treatment by the officers. Nor does Plaintiff allege any facts establishing that

the use of force was disproportionately and routinely applied by Maricopa County officers

to persons in the suspect category. Again legal conclusions, without factual support, cannot

overcome a motion to dismiss. Although he does not do so explicitly, Plaintiff, in both

federal claims, is trying to hold Maricopa County liable under a theory of respondeat

superior. This is explicitly prohibited by Monell. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, because Plaintiff does not allege any facts which support his theory of

municipal liability, his excessive force and equal protection claims under § 1983 are

dismissed as to Defendant Maricopa County.7

 Additionally, the state claims will be dismissed

due to the failure to comply with the notice of claim statute.

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DOC. # 15) is

granted in its entirety, however, the Clerk of the Court shall not enter judgment at this time

because the motion does not address the federal claims as they relate to Sheriff Arpaio. Thus,

those claims will proceed to discovery.

DATED this 4th day of October, 2006.

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