Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00250/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0201fl FLSA: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM STEVE VALENCIA, an 

individual, and LUIS FERNANDEZ 

SOTO, an individual, on behalf of 

themselves and on behalf of others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORTH STAR GAS LTD. CO., a 

California corporation; PEOPLEASE 

LLC, a South Carolina Corporation,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00250-GPC-JMA

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 

PEOPLEASE’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND GRANTING 

PLAINTIFFS LEAVE TO AMEND 

WITHIN 14 DAYS OF ENTRY OF 

THIS ORDER 

[ECF No. 7.]

Before the Court is Defendant Peoplease, LLC’s (“Defendant’s” or “Peoplease’s”)

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs William Steve Valencia and Luis Fernandez Soto’s 

(collectively, “Plaintiffs’”) Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) and, in the alternative, a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). (Dkt. No. 7.) The motion has been fully briefed. 

(Dkt. Nos. 10, 13.) The Court deems Defendant’s motion suitable for disposition without 

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Having reviewed the moving 

papers and applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On February 8, 2017, Plaintiffs William Steve Valencia (“Valencia” or “Plaintiff”) 

and Luis Fernandez Soto (“Soto” or “Plaintiff”) filed a putative hybrid class action in 

federal court against Defendants North Star Gas Ltd. Co. (“North Star” or “Defendant”) 

and Peoplease LLC (“Peoplease” or “Defendant”). (Dkt. No. 1, Compl.) Plaintiffs bring 

a putative collective action for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 

U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and a putative class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23 (“Rule 23”) for violations of California state law. (Id. ¶ 1.)

Plaintiffs allege that North Star “owns, operates, or otherwise manages a natural 

gas company responsible for distribution and supply of propane.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs 

allege that Peoplease “is Plaintiffs’ co-employer responsible for paying wages, payroll, 

and employment law compliance,” and that Peoplease “works with North Star to 

administer human resource services.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants 

employ Plaintiffs and others to transport propane by driving various routes to and from 

Defendants’ propane supply. These routes run throughout California, among other 

States.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs bring the instant action on behalf of themselves and on 

behalf of “current and former non-exempt employees who transported propane along 

certain routes for Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs’ core contention is that although 

“employees often work well in excess of 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week,” due to 

the length of time necessary to transport propane along certain routes, Defendants fail to 

pay Plaintiffs any overtime compensation. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs also allege that 

Defendants do not adequately compensate drivers for non-productive time and do not 

provide adequate wage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 18–22.)

Plaintiffs assert eight claims for relief based on Defendants’ (1) failure to pay 

wages due under the FLSA, (2) failure to pay overtime due under state law, (3) failure to 

pay regular wages under state law, (4) failure to pay meal period premium pay under state 

law, (5) failure to pay rest break premium pay under state law, (6) failure to provide 

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accurate itemized wage statements under state law, (7) failure to timely pay wages under 

state law, and (8) violation of the UCL. Plaintiffs do not specify under which state laws 

their second through fifth claims are brought.

Peoplease filed the instant motion on March 21, 2017 under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(e). (Dkt. No. 7.) Peoplease asserts that it is not in an 

employment relationship with Plaintiffs and thus cannot be held liable for violations of 

the Labor Code or the FLSA. (Id. at 7.) Peoplease further asserts that Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint is impermissibly vague for failure to specify the relevant statutes under which 

certain state law claims are brought, and for failure to specify which Defendant each 

cause of action is pled against. (Id. at 8.) In the alternative, Peoplease requests that the 

Court order Plaintiffs to make a more definite statement regarding their allegations 

against Peoplease. (Id.) Plaintiffs responded on April 14, 2017, (Dkt. No. 10), and 

Peoplease replied on April 28, 2017, (Dkt. No. 13).

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12 (b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal 

theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see 

also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to 

dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a complaint 

may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential 

facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give 

“detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

545 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is 

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facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, 

“the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must 

be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a 

plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the 

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 

2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal 

conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); W. 

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to 

dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to 

the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity 

is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Lee v. Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Rule 12(e)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides:

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a 

responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party 

cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a 

responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details 

desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed 

within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court 

may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

/ / / /

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ only specific allegations regarding PEOPLEASE are as follows:

Plaintiffs are informed and believe defendant Peoplease LLC is, and at all times 

mentioned was, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the 

laws of the State of South Carolina. Peoplease does business in the County of San 

Diego, State of California. Peoplease is Plaintiffs’ co-employer responsible for 

paying wages, payroll, and employment law compliance. Peoplease works with 

North Star to administer human resource services. 

(Compl. ¶ 14.)

At all times mentioned, Defendants were the agents, employees, alter egos, 

servants, joint ventures, or joint employers for and of each other. Defendants acted 

with the consent of the other Co-Defendants and acted within the course, purpose, 

and scope of their agency, service, or employment. All conduct was ratified by 

Defendants, and each of them. 

(Compl. ¶ 15.) 

I. Whether Peoplease is an Employer Under the California Labor Code

Peoplease first argues that it is not Plaintiffs’ “employer” under the California 

Labor Code. (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 11–17.) The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not met their 

burden to plead that Peoplease employed them within meaning of state law.

Cal. Lab. Code § 1194 provides employees a cause of action for unpaid minimum 

wages or overtime compensation.1 To be liable under Cal. Lab. Code § 1194, a 

defendant must be an employer. See Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 49 (Cal. 2010), 

as modified (June 9, 2010) (“That only an employer can be liable, however, seems 

logically inevitable as no generally applicable rule of law imposes on anyone other than 

an employer a duty to pay wages.”). The California Supreme Court has adopted the 

 

1 Cal. Lab. Code § 1194 provides, in pertinent part: 

Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the 

legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to 

recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime 

compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

Cal. Lab. Code § 1194(a).

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Industrial Welfare Commission’s (“IWC’s”) definitions of the employment relationship 

for actions under § 1194. See id. at 52. “To employ . . . under the IWC's definition, has 

three alternative definitions. It means: (a) to exercise control over the wages, hours or 

working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a 

common law employment relationship.” Id. at 64.

A. Control Over Wages, Hours, or Working Conditions

Plaintiffs do not allege or contend that Peoplease exercises control over their hours 

or working conditions. (See Compl. ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 10.) Plaintiffs argue that Peoplease 

exercises control over their wages. (See id.) However, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not give 

rise to a reasonable inference that Peoplease exercised control over their wages. 

“‘[C]ontrol over wages’ means that a person or entity has the power or authority to 

negotiate and set an employee's rate of pay, and not that a person or entity is physically 

involved in the preparation of an employee's paycheck.” Futrell v. Payday California, 

Inc., 190 Cal. App. 4th 1419, 1432 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).

The task of preparing payroll, whether done by an internal division or department 

of an employer, or by an outside vendor of an employer, does not make Payday an 

employer for purposes of liability for wages under the Labor Code wage statutes. 

The preparation of payroll is largely a ministerial task, albeit a complex task in 

today's marketplace. The employer, however, is the party who hires the employee 

and benefits from the employee's work, and thus it is the employer to whom 

liability should be affixed for any unpaid wages.

Id.; see also Field v. Am. Mortg. Exp. Corp., No. C-09-5972 EMC, 2011 WL 3354344, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011) (interpreting California law and rejecting plaintiff’s 

argument that defendant payroll processing company exercised control over plaintiff’s 

wages where defendant’s “role was simply to carry out the ministerial task of payroll 

processing”). Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts showing that Peoplease had the 

power or authority to negotiate and set their rates of pay, beyond the mere responsibility 

to provide Plaintiffs with payment. See Futrell, 190 Cal. App. 4th at 1433 (citing cases 

concluding that “a payroll company, or any other person or entity that processes payroll, 

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is not an employer because he, she, or it, does not control the hiring, firing, and day-today supervision of workers supplying the labor”). Absent factual allegations tending to 

show such power or authority, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not yield a reasonable inference 

that Peoplease exercised control over Plaintiffs’ wages.2 Plaintiffs’ allegations thus do 

not satisfy the first definition of employment articulated in Martinez.

Plaintiffs correctly point out that Peoplease cites to cases adjudicated at summary 

judgment, not at a motion to dismiss stage. (Dkt. No. 10 at 9.) However, this 

observation does not save Plaintiffs’ threadbare allegations. Plaintiffs’ characterization 

of their allegations extend well beyond the bare language in their Complaint. (See, e.g.,

Dkt. No. 10 at 9 (noting that Peoplease “offer[s] a variety of services, including but not 

limited to, payroll, workers’ compensation, tax, human resources, employee benefits, 

compliance, and risk management” and stating that “human resources includes recruiting, 

hiring, negotiating and setting pay rates, setting schedules and hours, training, providing 

employee reviews, carrying out employee discipline and investigations, and terminating 

employment”), 10 (stating that Peoplease’s responsibilities extend “beyond the mere 

preparation of a paycheck” and that Peoplease “controls the exact payment of wages at 

issue in this action”), 12 (stating that Peoplease “controls substantial aspects of Plaintiffs’ 

rate and method of pay” and performs services such as “intervening in employment 

disputes to reach resolution”).) Plaintiffs may include such allegations in an Amended 

Complaint.

B. To Suffer or Permit to Work 

Plaintiffs also have not alleged any facts showing that Peoplease suffered or 

permitted them to work. “A proprietor who knows that persons are working in his or her 

 

2 Plaintiffs’ citation to dicta in Martinez does not avail their argument. “Certainly a promise to pay a 

person for work would be an offer of employment, as well as an exercise of control over wages and 

hours sufficient to bring the promisor within the wage order's definition of ‘employer.’” Martinez, 49 

Cal. 4th at 74 (citing Wage Order No. 14, Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11140, subd. 2(F)). Here, Plaintiffs 

have not identified a promise by Peoplease to pay for work and have not alleged an exercise of control 

over wages and hours sufficient to bring Peoplease within the state law definition of “employer.”

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business without having been formally hired, or while being paid less than the minimum 

wage, clearly suffers or permits that work by failing to prevent it, while having the power 

to do so.” Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 69; see also Futrell, 190 Cal. App. 4th at 1434

(“There is no evidence in the current case [defendant payroll processing company]

allowed [plaintiff] to suffer work, or permitted him to work, because there is no evidence 

showing [defendant] had the power to either cause him to work or prevent him from 

working.”). Plaintiffs’ allegations do not satisfy the second definition of employment 

articulated in Martinez.

C. Common Law Employment Test 

Finally, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts showing that Peoplease created a 

common law employment relationship with Plaintiffs. 

The essence of the common law test of employment is in the “control of details.” 

A number of factors may be considered in evaluating this control, including: (1) 

whether the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (2) whether, 

considering the kind of occupation and locality, the work is usually done under the 

alleged employer's direction or without supervision; (3) the skill required; (4) 

whether the alleged employer or worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and 

place of work; (5) the length of time the services are to be performed; (6) the 

method of payment, whether by time or by job; (7) whether the work is part of the 

alleged employer's regular business; and (8) whether the parties believe they are 

creating an employer-employee relationship. The parties' use of a label to describe 

their relationship does not control and will be ignored where the evidence of their 

actual conduct establishes a different relationship exists. 

Futrell, 190 Cal. App. 4th at 1434 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ allegations do 

not satisfy the third definition of employment articulated in Martinez.

II. Whether Peoplease is an Employer under the FLSA

Peoplease next argues that it is not Plaintiffs’ “employer” under the FLSA. (Dkt. 

No. 7-1 at 17–20.) The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to plead 

that Peoplease was a joint employer of Plaintiffs under the FLSA.

To be liable under the FLSA, a defendant must be the plaintiff’s “employer.” See 

Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983), 

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abrogated on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 

(1985). Two or more employers may be joint employers for purposes of the FLSA. See 

id. at 1469; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.106. Courts evaluate the “economic reality” of an 

employment situation to determine whether an employment relationship exists under the 

FLSA. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). The Ninth 

Circuit employs a non-exhaustive list of factors for the “economic reality” assessment. 

See Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. These factors include, inter alia, whether the employer: 

“(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled 

employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and 

method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Id. (internal citation 

omitted); see also Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 946–47 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(confirming the Bonnette factors and articulating additional factors that may be relevant

to the analysis).

While Plaintiffs’ burden at the pleading stage is light, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not 

give rise to a plausible inference that Peoplease had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs, 

that Peoplease supervised and controlled Plaintiffs’ work schedules or conditions of 

employment, that Peoplease determined the rate and method of payment, or that 

Peoplease maintained employment records. The totality of the circumstances do not 

suggest that Peoplease was a joint employer of Plaintiffs in “economic reality.” See 

Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 (concluding that state agency was a joint employer of 

plaintiffs, where the agency paid plaintiffs’ wages, controlled the rate and method of 

payment, maintained employment records, “exercised considerable control over the 

structure and conditions of employment by making the final determination, after 

consultation with the [co-employer], of the number of hours each [plaintiff] would work 

and exactly what tasks would be performed,” and “intervened when problems arose 

which the [co-employer] and the [plaintiff] could not resolve”).

/ / / /

/ / / /

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III. Ambiguity in Pleading

Peoplease argues that Plaintiffs’ Complaint suffers from a number of deficiencies: 

(1) Plaintiffs’ third claim does not exist under the California Labor Code, (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 

21); (2) Plaintiffs do not specify against which Defendant each claim is pled, (id. at 21–

22); and (3) Plaintiffs do not specify under which state laws their second through fifth 

claims are brought, (id. at 22–23).3 In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs specify under 

which statute their third claim is brought, (Dkt. No. 10 at 13), and note that each claim is 

pled against both Defendants, (id. at 14). However, Plaintiffs do not specify under which 

laws their second, fourth, and fifth claims are brought; they suggest that defense counsel 

should be capable of identifying the labor statutes at issue. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs should cure the aforementioned deficiencies in an amended pleading. 

While “[p]arties are expected to use discovery, not the pleadings, to learn the specifics of 

the claims being asserted,” Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 

(C.D. Cal. 1994), fact discovery will not clarify Plaintiffs’ legal theories. Plaintiffs have 

responded to Peoplease’s first and second objections in their opposition brief, and should 

include this information in their Amended Complaint. Given Plaintiffs’ position that the 

relevant labor statutes are readily discernible, Plaintiffs should be able to identify the 

statutes in an Amended Complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiffs may amend their Complaint within fourteen (14) days of entry of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

3 Peoplease also argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege alter ego liability. (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 23–24 

(citing Compl. ¶ 15).) Plaintiffs respond that they seek to hold Peoplease liable as a joint employer, not 

as an alter ego, of North Star. (Dkt. No. 10 at 14.) Given Plaintiffs’ representation, Plaintiffs should 

remove their formulaic recitation of alter ego liability from their Amended Complaint. To the extent 

Plaintiffs wish to assert an alter ego liability theory in their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs should heed 

the pleading requirements for overcoming the state law presumption against alter ego liability. See, e.g., 

Johnson v. Serenity Transportation, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 974, 983–84 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

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Dated: May 16, 2017

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