Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00907/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00907-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Zdravko Kotzev, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 10-0907-PHX-MHM

ORDER

The Court has before it Defendant Charles L. Ryan's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8).

The Court has also reviewed the Plaintiff Zdravko Kotzev's response to the motion to dismiss

(doc. 15) as well as Defendant Ryan's Reply. (Doc. 16). The Court has also reviewed the

Complaint. Having determined that oral argument is unnecessary, the Court issues the

following order.

I. Plaintiff's Complaint

On April 26, 2010 Plaintiff filed a seven-count pro per complaint alleging claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with his incarceration from December 9, 2005

to May 8, 2009. (Doc. 1) The Complaint challenges the constitutionality of various Arizona

statutes including A.R.S. § 41-1604.07, A.R.S. § 31-229, along with various policies of the

Arizona Department of Corrections. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges, in part, that the

Arizona Department of Corrections, applying these state statutes, required him to serve a

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sentence that exceeded the maximum sentence given him by the Court. Plaintiff also asserts,

in part, that the duration of his sentence prior to release was dependent in part on his english

literacy level and that this was unconstitutional. The complaint includes allegations of

unauthorized detention and confinement, conspiracy for deprivation of civil rights, ethnic

discrimination, unauthorized modification of sentence, double jeopardy violation; forcible

spousal separation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff is seeking over

$1.7 million in damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief and has named a number

of defendants including his parole officer and probation officer. The Defendants also include

Charles L. Ryan, "in his individual and official capacities as a Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections." 

II. Defendant Ryan's Motion

On July 1, 2010, Defendant Ryan filed a motion to dismiss. In his motion, Defendant

Ryan argues that because he is a state official, he is immune from suit in his official capacity

under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant Ryan also

argues that Plaintiff has not asserted any specific allegations about his direct involvement in

any alleged violation necessary to support a suit against him in his individual capacity under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Ryan seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's entire complaint against

him.

Plaintiff's response goes through each count and outlines more specifically the basis

for each of his claims. Plaintiff conclusively states that he has asserted a claim against

Defendant Ryan in his individual capacity, but none of Plaintiff's elaborations regarding his

claims include specific allegations regarding Defendant Ryan. Plaintiff also asserts that local

governments do not share Eleventh Amendment immunity from damage suits and that

Maricopa County is a municipal corporation which employs all Defendants so that Ryan is

a proper defendant in this case. Plaintiff also asserts that he his asserting his complaint on

behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and cites a number of cases including Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in support of his claims against Defendant Ryan in his

official capacity. 

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In his reply, Defendant Ryan stresses that he is not a local government official or a

Maricopa County employee, but the Interim Director of the Arizona Department of

Corrections, and that as a state official he cannot be sued in his official capacity for damages

under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Defendant Ryan also reiterates that Plaintiff has failed to include

allegations regarding actions attributable to Defendant Ryan, so that he cannot assert an

individual claim against him pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Defendant Ryan also points out

that Plaintiff has not sought to certify a class and so is not asserting a claim on behalf of

himself and all others similarly situated. 

Defendant Ryan also includes new arguments not raised in his initial motion to

dismiss. He identifies, for example, a number of claims that he alleges are questionable or

cannot be brought before this Court including the tort claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress and false imprisonment. Again, Defendant Ryan asks that the Court

dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against him in its entirety. 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff has brought numerous claims against Defendant Ryan in both his official

capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections and in his individual capacity.

Plaintiff brings these claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and seeks damages as well as

injunctive and declaratory relief. 42 U.S.C. §1983 allows a plaintiff to bring suit against any

person who acting under color of law, deprives them of any rights, privileges or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws. 

 Taking up first the claims against Defendant Ryan in his individual capacity,

Defendant Ryan argues that Plaintiff's complaint contains no allegations pertaining to any

individual actions by Defendant Ryan. Vicarious liability does not extend to §1983 suits so

that "a plaintiff must plead that each Government official defendant, through the official's

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v.

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, the complaint contains no such

allegations regarding Defendant Ryan individually, but only asserts conclusory claims based

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on Defendant Ryan's status as the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections.

Plaintiff has taken the opportunity in his response to further elaborate his claims. As an

initial matter, any elaboration in the response would not prevent dismissal of improper claims

asserted against Ryan in the complaint. More to the point, however, none of Plaintiff's

attempts to clarify his claims contain any more specific allegations pertaining to Defendant

Ryan. In fact, they only confirm that Plaintiff's claims against him are based only on his

general role as the director of prisons and not on any specific actions or conduct by him.

Plaintiff has not asserted any claim against Defendant Ryan in his individual capacity,

therefore, such claims are dismissed. 

As for Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Ryan in his official capacity, Defendant

Ryan is correct that any claims for damages are barred by state sovereign immunity.

Defendant Ryan, as the Arizona Director of Prisons is a state official (not a municipal

employee) so that damage claims against him are prohibited under the Eleventh Amendment.

Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 662-63, 677-68 (1974).

However, while Defendant Ryan correctly asserts that he is immune from suit for

damages, he overreaches when he asks to be entirely dismissed from the lawsuit. The

Plaintiff in this case seeks not only monetary relief, but also declaratory and injunctive relief

based on alleged constitutional violations. State officials are not immune from suit under

those circumstances. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public

Service Commission, 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (allowing injunctive and declaratory relief against

individual state officials despite Eleventh Amendment); see also Independent Living Center

of Southern California, Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We therefore adhere

to the general rule that injunctive relief is presumptively available to remedy a state's ongoing

violation of federal law" citing Ex parte Young and Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.

261 (1997)). Neither the Defendant's motion nor his reply offers any reason why Plaintiff's

claims for declaratory or injunctive relief against Defendant Ryan in his official capacity

should be dismissed. Therefore, while Plaintiff's claims to monetary damages against

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Defendant Ryan are properly dismissed, Plaintiff could still potentially obtain declaratory or

injunctive relief against this Defendant. 

Defendant Ryan's arguments regarding Plaintiff's tort claims, raised for the first time

in his reply, will not be considered by the Court at this time. Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901

F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting in part the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims

for damages against Defendant Ryan (Doc. 8). Counts 6 and 7 of Plaintiff's complaint are

dismissed as against this Defendant. Plaintiff may not obtain any damages from Defendant

Ryan in connection with any of his remaining claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying in part the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's entire

complaint against Defendant Charles Ryan. Plaintiff's constitutional claims, Counts 1-5, to

the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from Defendant Ryan, are not

dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to reassign this case.

DATED this 16th day of February, 2011.

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