Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01037/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTOINE DOUGLASS JOHNSON, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

FELICIA PONCE, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:16-cv-1037 JAM AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 

302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

Although petitioner has provided a copy of his trust account statement, it is not certified 

and he has not provided a signed certificate from an appropriate prison official showing the 

balance in his account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Rule 3(a)(2) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules).1 However, the court will not 

assess a filing fee at this time. Instead, the undersigned will recommend summary dismissal of 

the petition. 

 

1

 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases are appropriately applied to proceedings undertaken 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Habeas Rule 1(b). 

Case 2:16-cv-01037-JAM-AC Document 17 Filed 12/19/16 Page 1 of 7
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II. The Petition 

Petitioner, who is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Herlong, 

challenges a 2012 conviction in the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Washington for health care fraud, filing false income taxes, and illegal distribution of controlled 

substances. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. Petitioner argues that the petition is properly brought under § 

2241 because “the remedy by motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to 

test the legality of [his] detention.” Id. at 6. 

III. Challenging the Validity of a Conviction Under § 2241 

Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules requires the court to summarily dismiss a habeas petition “[i]f 

it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to 

relief in the district court.” “[A] petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave 

to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave 

granted.” Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971). 

In this case, petitioner is clearly challenging the legality of his conviction and sentence. 

“As a general rule, ‘§ 2255 provides the exclusive procedural mechanism by which a federal 

prisoner may test the legality of detention.’” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

By the terms of section 2255, a prisoner authorized to apply for 

section 2255 relief may not bring a section 2241 petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus “if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply 

for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such 

court has denied him relief.” 

Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). “Under the 

savings clause of § 2255, however, a federal prisoner may file a habeas corpus petition pursuant 

to § 2241 to contest the legality of a sentence where his remedy under § 2255 is ‘inadequate or 

ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-65 

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). “[A] § 2241 petition is available under the ‘escape 

hatch’ of § 2255 when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an 

‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting that claim.” Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 

(9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 

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An inquiry into whether a § 2241 petition is proper . . . is critical to 

the determination of district court jurisdiction, because the proper 

district for filing a habeas petition depends upon whether the 

petition is filed pursuant to § 2241 or § 2255. In particular, a 

habeas petition filed pursuant to § 2241 must be heard in the 

custodial court . . . , even if the § 2241 petition contests the legality 

of a sentence by falling under the savings clause. 

Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865. As addressed below, petitioner does not qualify for the “escape 

hatch” exception. Relief is therefore unavailable to him under § 2241 and the petition must be 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

A. Actual Innocence 

 Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent because he “was convicted for conduct not 

prohibited by law because [he] was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated 

by federal actors.” ECF No. 1 at 3. He further asserts that his claim is based on “newly 

discovered evidence” in the form of opinions in federal criminal proceedings in the United States 

District Court for the Western Division of Virginia. Id. at 8. 

 Specifically, petitioner alleges that had he been found to have “held [him]self out as 

providing drug treatment through state authorization to prescribe Suboxone” and therefore been 

covered by 42 CFR Part 2, the government’s search warrants would have been quashed as invalid 

because the government did not obtain an order under 42 CFR Part 2 prior to beginning its 

investigation. Id. at 8-13. Petitioner further alleges that if his confidential communications 

relating to drug addiction treatment for his patients had been covered by the confidentiality 

regulations, “the government’s authority to prosecute [him] would have been prohibited by law 

due to non-compliance with 42 USC § 290dd-2 and CFR Part 2.” Id. at 14-18. He argues that the 

two criminal cases out of Virginia are evidence of his innocence because the defendants in those 

cases were found to be entitled to the protections of 42 CFR Part 2 and the confidentiality 

regulations and that their similar circumstances demonstrate that petitioner should have also been 

entitled to those protections. Id. at 8-19. Petitioner appears to argue that the only difference 

between himself and the Virginia defendants is race, specifically that he is black while they are 

white. Id. at 9, 14-15, 18-19. 

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Despite petitioner’s framing of the issue, he is not claiming actual innocence. Instead, 

what petitioner actually argues is that had he been treated the same as the defendants in the 

Virginia cases, the government would not have been able to obtain the evidence it used to convict 

him, or that evidence would have been thrown out. Id. at 13, 18. In other words, he argues that 

the government treated him differently because of his race, and in doing so denied him due 

process and equal protection under the law. He does not argue that he did not do the things for 

which he was convicted and fails to establish that his conduct was not prohibited by law since he 

is challenging the government’s conduct in obtaining evidence against him. 

B. Unobstructed Procedural Shot 

With respect to the second requirement for bringing a § 2241 petition under the savings 

clause, “it is not enough that the petitioner is presently barred from raising his claim of innocence 

by motion under § 2255. He must never have had the opportunity to raise it by motion.” Ivy v. 

Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, if a habeas petitioner raises an actual 

innocence claim that could have been raised during trial or on direct appeal, or in a § 2255 motion 

prior to the lapse of the one-year limitation period, the fact that he may be procedurally barred 

from now raising it does not mean that § 2255’s remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Even if 

petitioner had made a claim for actual innocence, he would still fall outside § 2255’s savings 

clause because he already raised these arguments during his criminal prosecution and appeal. 

During his criminal prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the superseding indictment 

on the grounds that the government failed to obtain an order authorizing both the investigation 

and the use of confidential patient records or communications in furtherance of the investigation. 

United States v. Johnson (Johnson I), Case No. 03:09-cr-05703 RBL, ECF No. 107 (W.D. Wash. 

June 24, 2010).2 Petitioner cites the same federal statutes and regulations in the instant petition as 

he did in his motion to dismiss. Compare id. with ECF No. 1 at 8-19. In denying the motion to 

 

2

 The court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States ex 

rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(collecting cases); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable 

of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned). 

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dismiss, the court found that petitioner “did not hold himself out as a substance abuse treatment 

program,” and that the government was therefore not required to obtain a court order prior to 

initiating its investigation. Johnson I, ECF No. 387 at 6. The court also found that the seizure of 

patient records was done in accordance with a properly obtained search warrant. Id. Petitioner 

also raised these arguments in motions to suppress (Johnson I, ECF Nos. 108, 113), which were 

denied on the same ground (Johnson I, ECF No. 387 at 6 n.5). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed the district court’s finding that petitioner was not a substance abuse treatment program. 

Johnson I, ECF No. 698. After the Ninth Circuit’s mandate issued, petitioner filed a § 2255 

motion in which he challenged his conviction, in part, on the grounds that he held himself out as a 

substance abuse treatment program and the government was therefore required to obtain a court 

order prior to beginning its investigation of him or using patient records to criminally investigate 

him. Johnson I, ECF No. 707-1. The court denied the motion, in relevant part, on the ground that 

petitioner’s claim that he held himself out as a substance abuse treatment program was 

procedurally barred because it had already been addressed by the Ninth Circuit. Johnson I, ECF 

No. 708 at 9-10. 

Petitioner has had an unobstructed procedural shot at raising the claims in the instant 

petition, and is therefore not entitled to challenge his conviction under § 2241. 

C. Conclusion 

For the reasons outlined above, petitioner may not challenge his conviction through a § 

2241 petition. Since petitioner can only challenge his conviction through a § 2255 motion, which 

must be brought in the court which imposed the sentence, the petition should be dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Since court records demonstrate that petitioner has 

already pursued a § 2255 motion, and there is no indication that he has received authorization 

from the Ninth Circuit to pursue a second or successive § 2255 motion, the court declines to 

construe the instant petition as a § 2255 motion and transfer it to the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Washington. 

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IV. Miscellaneous Motions 

Also before the court are petitioner’s motions to commence discovery, for appointment of 

counsel, to substitute a party, and for writ of mandamus. ECF Nos. 9, 12, 15. Petitioner has also 

filed requests to commence this action and for supervision of the Chief Judge. ECF Nos. 13, 14, 

16. In light of the recommendation that the petition be dismissed, the motions to commence 

discovery, for appointment of counsel, and to substitute a party will be denied. ECF Nos. 9, 12. 

As for petitioner’s motion for a writ of mandamus and requests to commence the action 

and for supervision, these requests will be denied as moot. Petitioner complains that the court has 

taken no action on his petition since it was filed in May 2016, and requests that the court take 

immediate action by either screening his petition or assigning another judge to handle the case. 

ECF Nos. 13-16. The Eastern District of California maintains one of the heaviest caseloads in the 

nation, a significant portion of which is comprised of pro se inmate cases. This sometimes causes 

unavoidable delays in the resolution of individual matter and petitioner appears to acknowledge 

this fact in his most recent filing. ECF No. 16. While the court understands petitioner’s 

frustration, these delays are often unavoidable and transfer of the case to another judge, as 

petitioner requests, would do little to expedite the process and would potentially only serve to 

cause more delay, as all judges in this district labor under extraordinary caseloads. Moreover, 

these requests are mooted by this order, which screens the petition and recommends dismissal for 

the reasons set forth in Section III above. 

V. Summary 

The petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot bring a petition 

under § 2241 because has not made a claim for actual innocence and he has already had an 

opportunity to argue these claims. Petitioner’s other pending motions are denied as a result of 

these findings and recommendations. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED. 

2. Petitioner’s motion to commence discovery and for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 

9) is DENIED. 

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3. Petitioner’s motion to substitute a party (ECF No. 12) is DENIED. 

4. Petitioner’s motions for writ of mandamus and court action (ECF Nos. 13-16) are 

DENIED as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that: 

1. The petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

2. No certificate of appealability shall issue. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 

objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 16, 2016 

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