Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01886/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01886-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAZDAR ALZAYADIE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-1886 JLS (JMA)

ORDER: GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES

(Doc. No. 30)

vs.

MICHAEL ASTRUE,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Nazdar Alzayadie’s amended motion for attorney’s fees.

(Doc. No. 30.) Also before the Court are Defendant Michael Astrue’s opposition (Doc. No. 32

(Opp’n)) and Plaintiff’s reply (Doc. No. 34 (Reply)). Having considered the parties’ arguments and

the law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

On August 11, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment after finding

that Plaintiff is disabled and entitled to social security benefits. (Doc. No. 26 (Order Adopting R&R),

at 1–2.) The Court concluded that the administrative law judge erred in upholding Defendant’s denial

of benefits. (Id.) After judgment was entered in her favor, Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), a party who prevails in an action seeking

reversal of a government agency’s decision is entitled to attorney’s fees unless the government

establishes that (1) its position was substantially justified or (2) special circumstances make the award

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1

 All further statutory references are to Title 28 of the United States Code, unless otherwise

indicated.

2

 Included in the sixty-nine hours are the five hours that Ms. Manbeck spent preparing

Plaintiff’s reply. Plaintiff requests an additional $630 for those five hours. (Reply 1.) Although

Defendant has not had the opportunity to address this request, the Court presumes that Defendant

would challenge these hours as unreasonable. 

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for fees unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).1

ANALYSIS

Before discussing points of contention, the Court clarifies what is not at issue in this motion.

Both parties agree that Plaintiff is a “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 2412. (Doc. No. 30-1

(P. & A.), at 3–4; Opp’n 1.) Both parties also agree that Defendant has not established that (1) his

position was substantially justified or (2) special circumstances make the award for fees unjust. (P.

& A. 4–8; Opp’n 1.) 

In short, neither party disputes, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees.

(P. & A. 15; Opp’n 8.) Defendant insists, however, that the requested fees and costs are not

reasonable because (1) the hours billed are excessive, (2) the hourly rate at which Plaintiff billed is

excessive, and (3) Plaintiff has not properly documented costs. (Opp’n 2–9.) Defendant also insists

that any fees awarded should be made payable to Plaintiff, not Plaintiff’s attorney, Ms. Manbeck. (Id.

at 9.) The Court addresses each contention in turn. 

1. Hours Billed

Under the EAJA, a plaintiff may recover attorney’s fees for hours “reasonably expended on

the litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Ms. Manbeck claims she spent sixtynine hours working on this case.2

 (P. & A. 15.) Defendant offers several reasons why this total is

unreasonable. (Opp’n 4–8.) 

Defendant initially relies on caselaw suggesting that “routine” social security cases such as this

one can be reasonably litigated in fifteen to thirty hours. (Opp’n 4.) But those cases hardly establish

a consensus, and several of them hail from outside the Ninth Circuit. More persuasive is Plaintiff’s

citation to Ninth Circuit cases that have found fifty hours or more to be a reasonable time in which

to litigate social security cases. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Bowen, 701 F. Supp. 1471, 1472 (N.D. Cal.

1988) (50 hours). The Court’s independent research also discloses cases upholding as reasonable sixty

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hours or more spent litigating social security cases. See, e.g., Steen v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1468791, at

*1 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (69 hours); Sanfilippo v. Astrue, 2009 WL 528926, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar.

2, 2009) (72 hours); Nayab v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4748172, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) (73 hours).

Defendant also contends that Ms. Manbeck simply spent too much time on this routine case.

(Opp’n 5–8.) Although Defendant variously attempts to color the time billed as excessive, the entries

themselves are not inherently unreasonable. Any argument to the contrary ignores the size of the

record (over 500 pages), Ms. Manbeck’s thorough briefing of the issues, and the complete success that

Ms. Manbeck achieved for her client. The Court is hesitant to penalize whatever inefficiency Ms.

Manbeck exhibited in obtaining such a favorable result. 

Finally, Defendant argues Ms. Manbeck improperly billed for clerical tasks, namely, preparing

in forma pauperis materials and filing documents with the court. (Opp’n 5–6.) The Court agrees that

these tasks are not compensable under federal fee shifting statutes. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S.

274, 288 n.10 (1989); Costa v. Astrue, 2011 WL 221837, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 18, 2011) (deducting time

spent filing document); Mauzy v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2521425, at *6 (N.D. W. Va. June 21, 2010)

(deducting time spent preparing in forma pauperis materials); Fouissi v. Astrue, 2008 WL 2018344,

at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2008) (deducting time spent filing motion). Deducting hours spent on these

tasks is difficult, however, because Ms. Manbeck’s billing entries do not differentiate between time

spent on legal matters and clerical tasks. (See Doc. 30-2 (Manbeck Decl.), at 3.) Under these

circumstances, the Court deducts two hours from the undifferentiated four hours billed on legal and

clerical matters.

2. Hourly Rate

Under the EAJA, a court may not award attorney’s fees in excess of $125 per hour unless it

determines that an increased cost of living or special factor justifies the higher fee. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

Plaintiff argues that an increased cost of living and special factors justify departure from the $125-perhour cap. (P. & A. 9–13.)

A. Cost of Living

In calculating the cost-of-living increase, the Court must multiply the $125-per-hour cap by

the annual average consumer price index for all urban consumers for the years in which the attorney

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3 See Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, U.S. Cts. for the Ninth

Circuit, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last visited Feb. 17,

2011). 

4

 Id. Plaintiff contends the adjusted hourly rate for 2010 is $174.64. (P. & A. 9.) Recently,

however, the rate was increased to $175.06 in order to reflect current cost-of-living. 

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performed work in the matter. See Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Ninth Circuit has established adjusted maximum rates for work performed in 2009 and 2010, the

years for which Plaintiff seeks recovery.3

 Those rates are $172.24 and $175.064 per hour, respectively.

The Court will award fees to Plaintiff in accordance with these rates. 

B. Special Factors

Plaintiff seeks a $50-per-hour rate enhancement for a “special factor,” namely, the expertise

with which Ms. Manbeck represents refugees in social security cases. (P. & A. 10.) A court may

award a “special factor” enhancement if the party seeking it establishes that (1) her attorney possessed

distinctive knowledge and skills in the practice area that (2) were necessary to the litigation in

question and (3) could not be obtained elsewhere at the statutory rate. Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536,

541–42 (9th Cir. 1989); Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492, 1496 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has failed to

satisfy this burden. 

Ms. Manbeck has not sufficiently explained why her expertise in “war refugees’ culture” is

“necessary” to the underlying litigation in this matter. (See P. & A. 10–12.) The only connective link

that Ms. Manbeck articulates—the “ability to empathize” with her client—is not only unpersuasive,

but wholly unsubstantiated. As another court put it, “Ms. Manbeck fails to allege, much less

demonstrate, that she possesses distinctive knowledge . . . in Plaintiff’s Iraqi culture . . . . Even if she

had, Ms. Manbeck fails to demonstrate how this expertise was necessary to this litigation, other than

the obvious fact that Plaintiff h[er]self hails from Iraq.” Jawad v. Barnhart, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1077,

1089 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988)).

Ms. Manbeck also has not demonstrated why Plaintiff could not have retained other counsel

with similar skills at the statutory rate. The speech barrier that would have made it difficult for

Plaintiff to seek counsel elsewhere is the same barrier with which Ms. Manbeck must deal because,

as she admits, she does not speak Plaintiff’s language either. (Opp’n 3 n.2.) Further, Ms. Manbeck

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assumes too much in attributing her success in litigating social security cases to the “simpl[e]” fact

that she provides “unique services not otherwise available to war refugees.” (P. & A. 12.) Without

more, her request for an enhancement must be declined. 

3. Costs

A prevailing party may recover expenses necessary to prepare the case. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

Plaintiff requests reimbursement for $250 in copying costs, $50 in phone bills, and $50 in postage

costs. (P. & A. 13.) Defendant contends, however, that Plaintiff has failed to provide adequate

documentation verifying these expenses. (Opp’n 8–9.) Because Plaintiff has not, the Court declines

to award Plaintiff a $350-reimbursement for costs. See Nayab, 2008 WL 4748172, at *6 (denying

plaintiff’s request on similar facts). 

4. Plaintiff’s Assignment of Rights to Counsel

Plaintiff requests that the award be paid directly to Ms. Manbeck and provides the Court with

an affidavit assigning the EAJA fees to Ms. Manbeck. (Doc. No. 33 (Alzayadie Aff.).) Defendant

argues that the assignment is irrelevant because the Supreme Court has recently held that an EAJA

fee award is payable to the litigant. (Opp’n 9 (citing Astrue v. Ratliff, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 2521,

2529 (2010)).) 

In Ratliff, the Supreme Court resolved a split among the federal circuits as to the proper payee

of EAJA fees. Ratliff, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. at 2525. The Court held that EAJA fees are payable to

the claimant himself, not his attorney, and are “therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a

pre-existing debt that the litigant owes the United States.” Id. at 2524. In ruling, the Court noted that

the government has historically made direct payments to attorneys “only in cases where the plaintiff

does not owe a debt to the government and assigns the right to receive the fees to the attorney.” Id.

at 2529 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the eight months since the Court decided the issue, several courts have declined to read

Ratliff as precluding payment arrangements between the claimant and his attorney. See, e.g.,

Castaneda v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2850778, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). But those decisions are

instructive only insofar as the claimant does not owe a debt to the government. See Ramsey v. Astrue,

2011 WL 198110, at *3 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 19, 2011) (collecting cases enforcing assignment if and

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5

 See Preston v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3522156, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2010) (“In light of Ratliff, this Court finds it a better practice to simply award the EAJA fees directly to Plaintiff as the prevailing

party and remain silent regarding the direction of payment of those fees. It is not the duty of the Court

to determine whether Plaintiff owes a debt to the government that may be satisfied . . . . The Court

leaves it to the discretion of the Commissioner to determine whether to honor Plaintiff’s assignment

of EAJA fees.”); Young v. Commissioner, 2010 WL 3043428, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2010) (“While

Plaintiff’s counsel presented a document executed by Plaintiff that purports to assign future EAJA

fees, nothing in the record supports a determination that Plaintiff does not currently owe a federal debt.

Therefore, the attorney’s fees awarded under the EAJA shall be payable directly to Plaintiff.”).

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only if no debt is found to exist). In this case, whether Plaintiff owes a debt to the government is

unknown, and the Court is hesitant to delve into the logistics of determining whether an offsetqualifying debt exists.5

 Under these circumstances, the assignment cannot be honored.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s

motion for attorney’s fees. Because no special factor exists in this case, the Court only enhances the

attorney’s fee award for cost of living. As previously discussed, the enhanced hourly fee is $172.24

for work performed in 2009 and $175.06 for work performed in 2010. Ms. Manbeck billed twelve

hours in 2009 and fifty-two hours in 2010. The Court deducts two hours from the time Ms. Manbeck

spent on clerical tasks undertaken in 2009 and 2010. The Court also denies Plaintiff’s request for

costs. Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff attorney’s fees totaling $11,452.70, which includes

(1) $1,894.64 for work performed in 2009, (2) $8,928.06 for work performed in 2010, and (3) $630

for preparing Plaintiff’s reply. The award is payable to Plaintiff, not Ms. Manbeck.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 14, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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