Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00453/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00453-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MODESTO IRRIGATION DISTRICT, et

al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

CARLOS M. GUTIERREZ, et al., 

 Defendants,

 and

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA COUNCIL OF

FEDERATION OF FLY FISHERS, et

al.,

 Intervenor-Defendants.

1:06-cv-00453 OWW DLB

1:06-CV-00308 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION CONSOLIDATE. 

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES

SERVICE, et al.,

 Defendants,

 and

FEDERATION OF FLY FISHERS, et

al.,

 Intervenor-Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION 

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Before the court for decision is a motion to consolidate for

the purposes of summary adjudication the claims in Modesto

Irrigation District, v. Gutierrez., 1:06-CV-453 OWW DLB (“MID

II”) with those in California State Grange v. National Marine

Fisheries Service, 1:06-CV-0308 OWW DLB (“Grange”). The apparent

overlap between these cases would ordinarily invite

consolidation. However, oral argument on cross motions for

summary judgment in the Grange case was already heard on January

8, 2007, more than two weeks prior to the filing on January 24,

2007 of the MID II Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate. 

Nevertheless, the MID II Plaintiffs assert that consolidation for

the purposes of summary judgment would conserve judicial

resources and possibly clarify a number of issues for the Court. 

Federal Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors oppose

consolidation. 

II. BACKGROUND

On January 5, 2006, the National Marine Fisheries Service 

(“NMFS”) published a final decision, listing under the Endangered

Species Act (“ESA”) certain populations of West Coast Steelhead

(a life form of the species O. Mykiss), including five

populations of O. mykiss in California: Southern California,

South-Central California Coast, Central California Coast,

California Central Valley, and Northern California. 

The Grange case, filed by a coalition of forestry interests

on March 20, 2006, raises a number of largely legal (as opposed

to factual or scientific) challenges to the listing with respect

to all five California populations. As counsel for movant

declares: “Neither the Grange Plaintiffs’ points and authorities

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in support of their motion for summary judgment nor their

combined points and authorities [] opposing the Defendants’

cross-motion for summary judgment makes even a single reference

to the Administrative Record. Both briefs rely exclusively on

case law, statutes, legislative history and information contained

in the Federal Register.” (MID II, Doc. 58 at ¶10.) 

MID II, filed by a coalition of irrigation and water

districts on April 14, 2006, challenges only the California

Central Valley O. mykiss listing. In contrast to the Grange

case, the MID II Plaintiffs plan to raise numerous factual

arguments based upon information contained within the

administrative record. (Id. at ¶11.) 

A. Summary of the Complaints. 

The Grange case alleges:

(1) The listings unlawfully distinguish between resident

and migratory O. mykiss. 

(2) The listings unlawfully distinguish between hatchery

and naturally-spawning O. mykiss. 

(3) The listings fail to ensure that each population is

defined in compliance with the statutory requirement

that members of a listed population “interbreed[] when

mature.”

(4) In listing the five California populations of O.

mykiss, NMFS unlawfully abandoned its long-standing

practice of applying its ESU Policy to listings of O.

mykiss in favor of applying the joint NMFS-FWS DPS

Policy.

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(5) The ESA section 4(d) protective regulation promulgated

in connection with the listings unlawfully

distinguishes between hatchery and naturally-spawned O.

mykiss. 

MID II raises the following ten claims, all of which concern

only the California Central Valley O. mykiss listing:

(1) NMFS’s decision to list only the anadromous life form

of California Central Valley O. mykiss was based on an

unlawful interpretation of the statutory definition of

“species,” which includes “any subspecies of fish or

wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment

of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which

interbreeds when mature.” 

(2) The best available science does not support NMFS’s

conclusion that the anadromous form of Central Valley

O. mykiss is “markedly separate” from the resident

form.

(3) NMFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by (a) failing

to collect adequate scientific and commercial data on

both forms of California Central Valley O. mykiss

(anadromous and resident) and (b) failing to

incorporate and use scientific and commercial data

submitted by the MID II Plaintiffs and others.

(4) NMFS failed to adequately justify abandoning its

practice of applying the ESU Policy to O. mykiss in

favor of applying the DPS Policy. 

(5) NMFS’s conclusion that the anadromous form of

California Central Valley O. mykiss constitutes its own

“distinct population segment” is inconsistent with

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USFWS’s application of the same policy to other Pacific

salmonids, including the coastal cutthroat trout and

the Coastal-Puget Sound bull trout.

(6) NMFS’s decision to rely on physical characteristics to

distinguish anadromous O. mykiss from resident O.

mykiss is arbitrary and capricious. Because anadromous

California Central Valley O. mykiss exhibit a large

overlap in such characteristics (e.g., size) vis-a-vis

resident California Central Valley O. mykiss, the use

of such characteristics to distinguish between resident

and anadromous may result in Defendants’ (a)

determining that an anadromous adult was taken in

violation of the ESA when it was in fact a large

resident adult or (b) designating streams as containing

protected anadromous adults when they in fact only

contain large resident adults. 

(7) NMFS acted unlawfully by (a) failing to provide genetic

evidence that naturally-spawned and hatchery spawned

California Central Valley O. mykiss, whether anadromous

or resident, that co-occur within the same stream are

genetically distinct; (b) including within the DPS

certain streams that are dominated by genetically outof-DPS O. mykiss; and (c) automatically classifying

naturally spawned progeny of out-of-DPS parents as

within-DPS (i.e. protected) O. mykiss. 

(8) NMFS’s failure to conduct the O. mykiss listing jointly

with FWS is arbitrary and capricious because the two

agencies agreed to jointly list certain species in a

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1974 MOU between the two agencies,. 

(9) NMFS lacked any basis for concluding that the

California Central Valley DPS should be listed as

threatened, a determination which requires an

examination of five threats: destruction of habitat or

range, overutilization, disease or predation,

inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms, and other

natural and manmade factors affecting the continued

existence of the species. 

(10) NMFS’s decision to include the North Valley Floor,

Upper Calaveras, Stanislaus River, San Joaquin Valley

Floor, Delta-Mendota Canal, and North Diablo Range

Hydrologic Unit as critical habitat for O. mykiss was

arbitrary and capricious. 

The First, Third, and Fourth claims in the Grange case

substantially overlap with the First, Second, and Fourth Claims

in the MID case. 

B. Additional Chronology.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs in MID II claim not to have been

aware of the Grange case at all until August 2006. (See Reply,

Doc. 69, at 13.) A brief chronology is necessary to

understanding (a) how this might have occurred and (b) why this

motion to consolidate was not filed until January 2007. 

Both Grange and MID II were preceded by Modesto Irrigation

District v. Evans, 1:02-cv-06553 OWW DLB (“MID I”), filed in

December 2002, which successfully challenged NMFS’s previous

listing of the California Central Valley O. mykiss. Summary

judgment invalidating the previous California Central Valley O.

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mykiss listing was entered in favor of the MID I plaintiffs on

May 12, 2004. (MID I, Doc. 79.) Initially, the listing was

allowed to remain in force during remand. The district court

gave the Federal Defendants several extensions of time to file a

revised listing, setting a final deadline of December 14, 2005. 

(See MID I, Doc. 112.) However, the Federal Defendants failed to

issue a new listing by that deadline, so the initial listing was

vacated. (Id.) 

As explained above, a new listing was published on January

5, 2006. On March 20, 2006, the Pacific Legal Foundation

(“PLF”), which represents the Grange Plaintiffs, filed their

lawsuit challenging the new listing with respect to all five

California populations of O. mykiss, apparently without informing

counsel for the Plaintiffs in MID I.

On April 14, 2006, the MID I Plaintiffs filed their renewed

challenge to the California Central Valley O. mykiss listing, MID

II. 

On May 12, 2006, the district court entered final judgment

in MID I. The order formally granted PLF amicus status in any

renewed challenge in the MID II case. (Doc. 112 at 4.) PLF

still apparently did not inform counsel for the MID Plaintiffs

that it had already filed its own lawsuit. Nor did any party to

either lawsuit file notices indicating that Grange and MID II

were related cases until January 7, 2007, one day prior to oral

argument on the motions for summary judgment in Grange. 

On May 30, 2006, the Federal Defendants answered the Grange

complaint. 

On July 31, 2006, the Federal Defendants answered the MID II

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complaint. 

In August 2006, the MID II Plaintiffs claimed to learn of

the Grange complaint for the first time

On September 13, 2006, the Administrative Record (“AR”) in

Grange was produced. 

On September 26, 2006, the Federal Defendants informed

counsel for the MID II Plaintiffs that the AR for MID II would

not be ready until December 1, 2006. 

By November 20, 2006, cross-motions for summary judgment in

Grange were fully briefed.

On December 1, 2006, the AR was produced in MID II.

On January 8, 2007, oral argument was heard on cross-motions

for summary judgment in Grange. 

Shortly thereafter, in January 2007, the MID II Plaintiffs

realized that the AR produced in MID II was identical to that

produced in the Grange case.

On January 24, 2007, the MID II Plaintiffs filed their

motion to consolidate. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework.

Consolidation of cases is governed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 42(a), which provides:

When actions involving a common question of law or fact

are pending before the court, it may order a joint

hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in

the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;

and it may make such orders concerning proceedings

therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or

delay.

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Whether or not to consolidate cases or proceedings rests in the

sound discretion of the district court. In re Adams Apple, Inc.,

829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987); Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D.,

980 F.2d 1514, 1531 (5th Cir. 1993); Shump v. Balka, 574 F.2d

1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978); In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 182

F.R.D. 441, 444 (D.N.J. 1998). First, a court must determine

whether there are common questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 42. Then, a court “must balance the interest of judicial

convenience against the potential for delay, confusion and

prejudice that may result from such consolidation.” Bank of

Montreal v. Eagle Assoc., 117 F.R.D. 530, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 

Factors such as differing trial dates or stages of discovery

usually weigh against consolidation. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2383 (2006).

B. The Cases Share Common Questions of Law and Fact. 

Defendant-Intervenors argue that the cases are not as

similar as the MID II Plaintiffs suggest. Specifically,

Defendant-Intervenors suggest that, while the Grange case

“primarily challenges [NMFS’s] consideration of hatchery fish in

its decision to protect five populations of steelhead [] in

California,” MID II “center[s] upon the allegation that NMFS

unlawfully applied the [DPS] Policy in its listing of anadromous,

but not co-occurring resident O. mykiss.” (Doc. 66 at 3.) This

argument is not particularly compelling. First, DefendantIntervenors describe the Grange case in an overly narrow fashion. 

In addition to challenging the hatchery versus naturally spawned

distinction employed in the listings, the Grange case also

alleges that NMFS unlawfully failed to include both resident and

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The breifs in the Grange case also lack focus and 1

clarity on many other levels. The parties did not clearly brief

the applicable standard of review, nor did they thoroughly

examine all of the legal issues raised. 

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anadromous fish in the same DPSs and that NMFS unlawfully applied

the DPS Policy in reaching its listing decisions. These claims

substantially overlap with claims in MID II.

C. Judicial Economy.

Here, the MID II Plaintiffs maintain that consolidation will

conserve judicial resources and avoid the issuance of potentially

conflicting opinions. Federal Defendants disagree, arguing that

“there will be absolutely no judicial economy in avoiding

overlapping motions or hearings” because the district court has

already reviewed three sets of cross-motions for summary judgment

in the Grange case and the case is “all but decided.” (Doc. 63-1

at 4.) 

First, the Federal Defendants are incorrect that the Grange

case is “all but decided.” Although the district court has

invested considerable time and resources into drafting an

opinion, that process is not yet complete and has been made more

challenging by the fact that, as discussed above, the briefs in

the Grange case are largely devoid of substantive references to

the administrative record. On the one hand, this can be 1

explained by the fact that the arguments raised by the Plaintiffs

in Grange were largely legal and arguably could be addressed

without a penetrating examination of the administrative record. 

However, Federal Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment in

the Grange case requests that the district court validate the

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listings and confirm that they are based on the best available

science. (See Grange, Doc. 45 at 23-24 (Federal Defendants

Argued: “With respect to whether NMFS properly applied the DPS

policy to the best available data to delineate steelhead-only

DPSs, Plaintiffs primarily argue that resident rainbow trout

share the same habitat and interbreed with steelhead, so

therefore steelhead cannot be considered discrete....However,

NMFS found that steelhead-only populations meet the discreteness

criterion of the DPS policy because resident rainbow trout and

steelhead remain markedly separate physically, physiologically,

ecologically, and behaviorally. [Quoting extensively from the

Federal Register.] Based on these factors, NMFS concluded that

steelhead are discrete from rainbow trout, within the meaning of

the DPS policy.”).) This analysis cannot be verified without a

detailed examination of the administrative record. 

To the extent that the MID II Plaintiffs “plan to present

arguments and citations from the AR during their case that are

different from those presented by the Grange plaintiffs,”

consolidation may indeed conserve judicial resources by

facilitating the court’s examination of the record. (Doc. 58 at

7.) Moreover, absent consolidation, there is a real risk that

the district court may issue inconsistent rulings on those claims

for which there is substantial overlap. Of particular note is

the fact that the MID II Plaintiffs indicate that will be raising

new legal arguments regarding some of the same legal challenges

made in the Grange case. 

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D. Delay, Confusion, and/or Prejudice.

Finally, a court must balance any gains in judicial economy

against any delay, confusion, or prejudice that might result from

consolidation. Here, although there would be some delay in

issuing a decision on summary judgment in the Grange case if the

cases were consolidated, it is not clear how any party would be

prejudiced by such delay. Nor have Defendants or DefendantIntervenors indicated how they would be otherwise prejudiced or

how additional confusion would be created by consolidation. 

This is a close call. Although this motion to consolidate

comes at a procedurally awkward stage in the Grange case, given

that motions for summary judgment are under submission, the

overlap between the two cases and the potential for the arguments

in MID II to shed light on the issues raised in the Grange case

tip the scales slightly in favor of consolidation. In an

administrative record case, the district court’s ultimate role is

to reach the correct legal conclusion based upon the law and the

administrative record. Consolidation appears likely to

facilitate this endeavor. 

The MID II Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate is GRANTED, but

the cases will be consolidated for purposes of summary judgment

only.

E. Defendant-Intervenor’s Request That The Cases Not Be

Completely Merged.

In the event that the motion to consolidate is granted,

Defendant Intervenors request that the Court explicitly state

that it is not merging the cases such that the parties in one

case become parties to the other. See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry.

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Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496097 (1933)(expressing the generally held

rule that “consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience

and economy in administration, but does not merge the suits into

a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make

those parties in one suit parties in another”). Specifically,

the Defendant-Intervenors in MID II, the Delta Fly Fishers and

Center for Biological Diversity, indicate that they chose to

intervene in the MID II case to defend against the particular

challenge to the California Central Valley listing and do not

desire to become involved in the much broader Grange challenge. 

Plaintiffs in the MID II case do not object to DefendantIntervenors’ request. Accordingly, the request not to

consolidate for other purposes is GRANTED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Modesto Irrigation

District, v. Gutierrez., 1:06-CV-453 OWW DLB (“MID II”) and

California State Grange v. National Marine Fisheries Service,

1:06-CV-0308 OWW DLB (“Grange”) are consolidated for the limited

purpose of ruling on the pending summary judgment motions in both

cases. No further oral argument or briefing will be permitted in

the Grange case, as cross motions for summary judgment in that

case are already under submission. Consolidation for the abovementioned purpose does not merge the two cases such that the

parties in one case become parties to the other.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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