Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00768/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00768-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAKEITH LEROY MCCOY,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. HOLGUIN, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00768-MJS (PC)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL 

COMPLAINT

(ECF NO. 3)

 THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s May 20, 

2015 motion to seal the Complaint. (ECF No. 3.)

Courts have long “recognize[d] a general right to inspect and copy public records 

and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, 

Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). Therefore, there is “a strong presumption in favor of 

access” to court records unless the records are ones “traditionally kept secret.” 

Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). In order to 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 5 Filed 06/01/15 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

overcome this strong presumption in this case, Plaintiff must articulate “compelling 

reasons” and demonstrate a “specific prejudice or harm will result if no [protection] is 

granted.” See id.; Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 

2002). Under this standard, the Court “weigh[s] relevant factors, base[s] its decision on 

a compelling reason, and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on 

hypothesis or conjecture.” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 679 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal 

quotations omitted)). 

Compelling reasons “exist when . . . court files might . . . become a vehicle for 

improper purposes . . .” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598) 

(internal quotations omitted)). However, “[t]he mere fact that the production of records 

may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will 

not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 

1136).

Here, Plaintiff seeks to seal his Complaint because he fears that Defendants will 

retaliate against him if they learn of the action and Plaintiff’s claims. These are not

compelling reasons for sealing the Complaint. Generalized fears of retaliation are 

insufficient to overcome the presumption in this case. See, e.g., Fernandez v. 

Centric, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21634, *2-5 (D. Neb. Feb. 15, 2013). The action cannot 

in any event proceed without Defendant’s knowledge.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to seal the Complaint (ECF No. 3.) is DENIED; and,

///

///

///

///

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 5 Filed 06/01/15 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

2. The Complaint will be unsealed thirty (30) days from the date of service of 

this order unless Plaintiff files a notice of voluntary dismissal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 31, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 5 Filed 06/01/15 Page 3 of 3