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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 21, 1997 Decided May 27, 1997

No. 96-7201

VINCENT BURNS AND 

ICELLA BURNS-BURCHELL,

APPELLEES

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 96-7209

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(94cv02005)

Robert J. Kniaz, Deputy General Counsel, argued the 

cause for appellant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority, with whom Robert L. Polk, General Counsel, and 

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Frederic H. Schuster, Associate General Counsel, were on the 

briefs.

Leonard P. Buscemi argued the cause and filed the brief 

for appellant Terrance D'Souza.

Thomas C. Mugavero argued the cause for appellees, with 

whom Mark Edward Futrovsky and Peter L. Scherr were on 

the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and WILLIAMS, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Terrance D'Souza and WMATA 

appeal the magistrate judge's determination that D'Souza, the 

driver of a bus involved in a collision with a car driven by 

appellee, was negligent as a matter of law. WMATA also 

appeals the jury's verdict that appellee was not negligent. 

We reverse on both points and direct a new trial.

I.

At approximately 4:00 p.m. on February 26, 1993, Terrance 

D'Souza, the operator of a Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority (WMATA) bus, was heading north on Bladensburg Road in the District of Columbia in the left turn 

lane, and attempted to make a left hand turn onto Eastern 

Avenue. After D'Souza was approximately three-quarters of 

the way through his turn, a car operated by Vincent Burns, 

heading south on Bladensburg Road, struck D'Souza's bus 

near the right rear wheel.

D'Souza and his wife sued Burns for injuries and loss of 

consortium arising out of the accident. Burns and his wife, in 

turn, filed a third-party complaint against WMATA, which 

conceded that D'Souza was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The parties consented to 

the assignment of the cases to a magistrate, who determined 

that they would be tried in the order in which they were filed. 

Since D'Souza's case would be tried first, the magistrate 

allowed WMATA to participate in the questioning of witUSCA Case #96-7209 Document #274494 Filed: 05/27/1997 Page 2 of 8
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1 Since their interests are aligned, references to WMATA as a 

party on appeal should be assumed to include D'Souza. 

nesses during that case as necessary to protect its interests 

as third-party defendant.

At the end of D'Souza's affirmative case, Burns moved for a 

judgment that D'Souza was contributorily negligent as a 

matter of law, thus barring any recovery from Burns by 

D'Souza under District of Columbia law. See, e.g., W.M. 

Schlosser Co., Inc. v. Maryland Drywall Co., Inc., 673 A.2d 

647, 653 n.13 (D.C. 1996). Burns relied on D'Souza's testimony that, although he had an unobstructed view of oncoming 

traffic prior to beginning his turn, he claimed not to have 

seen Burns' vehicle. Burns thought that testimony established that D'Souza failed to see an approaching and immediate hazard (Burns' car), and that such failure to see constituted negligence as a matter of law. The magistrate agreed and 

granted Burns' motion.

The parties then turned to Burns' claim against WMATA. 

Because D'Souza had been found negligent as a matter of law 

and WMATA had conceded that D'Souza was acting in the 

scope of employment, the only remaining issues were whether 

Burns was contributorily negligent (which would bar recovery 

by Burns from WMATA) and, if he was not, the extent of any 

damages suffered by Burns and his wife. The magistrate put 

these questions to the jury, which returned a verdict finding 

that Burns was not contributorily negligent and awarding him 

and his wife $563,000 in damages.

II.

WMATA1contends that the magistrate erred in holding 

that D'Souza was negligent as a matter of law for "failure to 

see" Burns' vehicle. Its essential argument is that substantial evidence showed that Burns' car was not visible to 

D'Souza at the time he commenced his turn, thus making the 

District of Columbia "failure to see" doctrine inapplicable. 

Under the doctrine, a driver must "fail[ ] to look effectively 

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2 D'Souza's testimony on this score was not quite as clear as 

the magistrate made it out to be. Although he did confirm on 

cross-examination that he did not see any southbound vehicles on 

Bladensburg Road just prior to beginning his turn, his testimony on 

direct, when asked if he saw any southbound traffic when he started 

his turn, was only that he "didn't see any make it." (Emphasis 

added.) 

ard." Singer v. Doyle, 236 A.2d 436, 437 (D.C. 1967); see 

also Frager v. Pecot, 327 A.2d 306, 307 (D.C. 1974). The 

magistrate thought that this was conclusively decided by 

D'Souza's admission that he did not see Burns' car prior to 

beginning his turn,2in light of other testimony that Burns' 

car was visible just prior to the accident. Since D'Souza had 

"fail[ed] to look observantly and see what was there to be 

seen," he was negligent as a matter of law.

But in considering Burns' motion, the magistrate was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

D'Souza, see, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 8 F.3d 826, 829 

(D.C. Cir. 1993), and she did not. Whereas D'Souza had 

testified that he could see "one to two hundred feet" down 

Bladensburg Road prior to making his turn, the magistrate 

placed him at the top end of that spectrum, stating that "[h]e 

testified ... that he could see at least 200 feet down the 

road." This difference is significant, for, as noted, WMATA 

argues that D'Souza could not have seen Burns' car at the 

point he began his turn. WMATA's argument clearly carries 

more weight if one assumes, as the trial court should have, 

that D'Souza could only see 100 feet (which does not seem 

unreasonable, given that the accident occurred late in a 

winter afternoon with a light snow falling).

Moreover, Burns testified that he was traveling between 25 

and 35 miles per hour at the time of the accident. If D'Souza 

could see 200 feet up Bladensburg Road, he could see any 

vehicle traveling at 30 miles per hour (the middle of that 

range) that would cross through the intersection in approximately the next four-and-a-half seconds. But if he could only 

see 100 feet up the road, he could only see those vehicles that 

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and-a-quarter seconds. Other testimony indicated that 

D'Souza's 40 foot bus had completed three quarters of its turn 

(at least 30 feet), traveling at five to 15 miles per hour, which 

would take somewhere between a second-and-a-half and almost five. It is apparent, then, that Burns' vehicle may have 

come into view during D'Souza's turn. It is not our purpose 

to determine at exactly what point, if ever, Burns' vehicle 

came into D'Souza's view. Rather, we mean to emphasize 

that the evidence, viewed in a light favorable to WMATA, 

suggests that Burns' vehicle may have come into view only 

after the time D'Souza was well into his turn, at which point 

he would have beenand should have beenlooking west on 

Eastern Avenue. In light of the time of day of the accident, 

the lack of visibility, the speed of Burns' driving, and the 

necessary time lapse between when D'Souza began his turn 

and when the accident took place, we think a jury quite 

reasonably could infer that D'Souza did not improperly "fail 

to see" Burns' approaching car.

Even were we to accept the magistrate's conclusion that no 

reasonable jury could dispute that D'Souza negligently failed 

to see "what was there to be seen," we would question her 

implicit characterization of Burns' vehicle as an "immediate 

hazard." "An approaching vehicle is an "immediate hazard' 

when it is so close to the intersection that, should it continue 

with undiminished speed and should the unfavored vehicle 

start, the two would reach the point where their paths would 

converge at approximately the same time." Singer, 236 A.2d 

at 437 n.2. As it happened, Burns' vehicle struck D'Souza's 

bus in the rear after it was well into its turn, so it is by no 

means clear that it was an "immediate hazard" at the time 

D'Souza began his turn. In any event, some testimony was to 

the effect that Burns accelerated and passed a car in front of 

him as he approached the intersection, rather than "continue[d] with undiminished speed." We do not, of course, resolve the differing recollections of the various witnesses; that 

is not our job, but, in ruling on a motion for judgment as a 

matter of law, neither is it the magistrate's.

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3 WMATA also argues, rather convincingly, that Burns was the 

party who should be thought negligent as a matter of law. However, at oral argument, WMATA's counsel expressly stated that its 

argument was contingent on our upholding the magistrate's conclusion that D'Souza was negligent as a matter of law. We cannot 

conceive of any reason why WMATA would want to limit its 

argument so, but since we reverse the conclusion that D'Souza was 

negligent as a matter of law, we do not reach the question whether 

Burns was.

4 18 D.C.M.R. Part 2200 (1995) states in relevant part:

2200.3: No person shall drive a vehicle on a street or highway 

at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the 

conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.

2200.4: In every event speed shall be so controlled as may be 

necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other 

conveyance on or entering the street ... in compliance with 

legal requirements and the duty of all persons to exercise due 

care.

2200.5: The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with requirements of this section, drive at an appropriate reduced 

speed when approaching and crossing an intersection ... or by 

reason of weather....

In addition, we take judicial notice of 18 D.C.M.R. 2200.6, which 

provides that the legal speed limit in D.C. is 25 miles per hour 

unless otherwise posted. WMATA elicited testimony to this effect, 

though it did not introduce this particular regulation into evidence. 

See Lyons v. Barrazotto, 667 A.2d 314, 324 (D.C. 1995). 

III.

WMATA's second argumentindependent of the firstis 

that the jury's determination that Burns was not contributorily negligent should be reversed because the magistrate's 

instruction regarding Burns' alleged speeding was in error.3

During trial, WMATA elicited substantial, though not uncontradicted, testimony that Burns was traveling over the 25 

mile per hour speed limit that governs Bladensburg Road at 

Eastern Avenue. One witness testified that Burns was traveling at an "excessive" speed "above" the legal limit. Another recalled that Burns was "coming at a fast pace." As noted 

above, Burns himself testified that he was traveling between 

25 and 35 miles per hour (though in the same breath he 

claimed to be "within the speed limit"). At WMATA's request, the magistrate instructed the jury on the relevant 

traffic regulations,4but she refused to instruct the jury that 

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violation of those regulations constituted "negligence per se," 

instead opting to instruct that such violations were merely 

"evidence of negligence."

In the District of Columbia, the "unexplained" violation of a 

traffic regulation "enacted ... to ... prevent the type of 

accident that occurred" constitutes negligence per se. Perkinson v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., 821 F.2d 686, 692 (D.C. Cir. 

1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the time of her 

decision, the magistrate did not explain her refusal to give the 

negligence per se instruction. Later, denying WMATA's 

post-trial motions, she said only that the instructions "viewed 

as a whole ... fairly presented the applicable legal standards 

and principles," since "the only evidence of [speeding] came 

from Mr. Burns himself" and "there [wa]s ample evidence in 

the record that would support a finding that the defendant 

entered the intersection at a proper speed." It is simply not 

so that the "only evidence" of Burns' speeding came from 

Burns himself, but even if it were the denial of the negligence 

per se instruction would have been erroneous; surely, the 

jury was entitled to conclude Burns was speeding based 

solely on his testimony. And the trial court's statement to 

the effect that there was evidence in the record sufficient to 

support a finding that Burns was not speeding, while accurate, also strikes us as somewhat of a non sequitur. The 

negligence per se instruction is applied by the jury only if the 

jury determined Burns was in fact speeding; if it concluded 

he was not, the point would be moot.

On appeal, Burns offers a (slightly) more plausible explanation for the magistrate's decision to instruct the jury that 

speeding, if found, constituted evidence of negligence and not 

negligence per se. Burns does not contest that D.C.'s speedUSCA Case #96-7209 Document #274494 Filed: 05/27/1997 Page 7 of 8
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ing laws were enacted to prevent the sort of collision that 

occurred here, but he does claim that his speeding, if any, was 

explained. That is, he was traveling in Maryland, where he 

claims the speed limit is 30 miles per hour, before he entered 

D.C., where the speed limit is 25. In the first place, this only 

"explains" the speeding if he was going less than 30, which is 

open to debate. More important, we do not think a driver's 

claimed ignorance of the law governing where he is driving 

excuses the violation of that law. To excuse his alleged 

speeding such that it would only amount to evidence of 

negligence and not negligence per se, Burns would have to 

show that he "did all a reasonable person who wished to 

comply with the law would do." Leiken v. Wilson, 445 A.2d 

993, 1001 (D.C. 1982). He has not.

The jury should have been instructed that Burns' speeding, 

if proven, was negligence per se. We have no way of 

knowing what the jury actually decided with respect to Burns' 

speed, and so we cannot say that this error was harmless.

* * * *

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded 

for a new trial.

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