Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-00206/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-00206-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

DELORES DIANE WARD, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:14cv206-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Delores Diane Ward (“Plaintiff”) filed applications for disability insurance benefits 

under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq, and for 

supplemental security income under Title XIV of the Act. Her applications were denied 

at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before 

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision 

in which he found Plaintiff not disabled from the alleged onset date of May 1, 2005, 

through the date of the decision. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which 

rejected her request for review of the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently 

became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to 

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Case 1:14-cv-00206-WC Document 15 Filed 02/27/15 Page 1 of 16
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See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the 

court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties 

have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the 

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 10); 

Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9). Based on the court’s review of the record and the 

briefs of the parties, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to benefits when the person is 

unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of 

Impairments]? 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

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An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Id. at 1238-39. The RFC is what the claimant is 

still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical 

and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. 

at 1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (“grids”) or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

 

3

 McDaniel is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The same sequence applies to disability 

insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. 

See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

4

 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

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III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was fifty-two years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ, and had 

completed the twelfth grade. Tr. 60. Following the administrative hearing, and 

employing the five-step process, the ALJ found at Step One that Plaintiff “has not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2005, the alleged onset date[.]” Tr. 

21. At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe 

impairments: “lumbar degenerative disc disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 

congestive heart failure, major depressive disorder, and anxiety[.]” Id. At Step Three, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments[.]” Id. at 32. 

Next, the ALJ articulated Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of 

light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). In 

function-by function terms, the claimant can perform lifting and carrying of 

20 pounds occasionally, and she can perform lifting, and carrying of 10 

pounds frequently. The claimant can perform standing and walking with 

normal breaks for about 6-hours out of an 8-hour workday, and she can 

perform sitting for about 6-hours out of an 8-hour workday. Due to 

psychological factors, the claimant remains capable of understanding, 

remembering, and carrying out short and simple instructions. 

Id. at 34. After consulting the VE, the ALJ concluded at Step Four that Plaintiff “is 

unable to perform any past relevant work[.]” Id. at 45. Finally, at Step Five, applying the 

grids, the ALJ determined that “[b]ased on a residual functional capacity for the full 

range of light work, considering the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, a 

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finding of ‘not disabled’ is directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.14.” Id. at 46. 

Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as 

defined in the Social Security Act, from May 1, 2005, through the date of th[e] 

decision[.]” Id. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents the following issues for this court’s consideration in review of 

the ALJ’s decision: 

A. Whether the ALJ “failed to comply with Social Security Ruling (‘SSR’) 83-

14 and/or SSR 85-15 by failing to cite examples of specific occupations 

Ms. Ward can perform and the incidence of such work in the national 

economy.” 

B. Whether the ALJ “failed to follow the ‘slight abnormality’ standard in 

finding that Ms. Ward’s cervical degenerative disc disease is non-severe.” 

C. Whether the ALJ “failed to properly apply the pain standard.” 

Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 5. 

V. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to cite specific occupations.

 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because, although he 

found that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 

the claimant can perform[,] . . . the ALJ failed to cite specific examples of jobs Ms. Ward 

could perform and incidence of such work in the region in which she resides or in several 

regions of the country.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 7 (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff 

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appears to believe that the ALJ was required to provide such examples of occupations 

because, according to Plaintiff, the ALJ relied on a “vocational resource” to find that she 

is not disabled and, therefore, SSRs 83-14 and 85-15 required the ALJ to identify and 

discuss occupations which Plaintiff can perform given her RFC. Id. at 6-7. Defendant 

claims that the ALJ was not required to cite examples of jobs Plaintiff can perform 

because he relied upon the Grids in finding that she is not disabled. Def.’s Br. (Doc. 13) 

at 4-5. 

 As the court explained previously, the ALJ may utilize either the Grids or a 

vocational expert in performing his analysis under Step Five. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 

1239-40. As the court explained in Phillips, 

The Medical Vocational Guidelines (“grids”) provide applicants with an 

alternate path to qualify for disability benefits when their impairments do 

not meet the requirements of the listed qualifying impairments. The grids 

provide for adjudicators to consider factors such as age, confinement to 

sedentary or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, 

and lack of job experience. Each of these factors can independently limit 

the number of jobs realistically available to an individual. Combinations of 

these factors yield a statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not 

Disabled.” 

Id. at 1240. An ALJ’s use of a vocational expert as a resource in performing his Step 

Five analysis is clearly contemplated as an alternative measure when the Grids are not 

utilized by the ALJ. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “‘exclusive reliance on 

the grids is not appropriate either when [the] claimant is unable to perform a full range of 

work at a given residual functional level or when a claimant has non-exertional 

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impairments that significantly limit basic work skills.’” Id. at 1242 (quoting Francis v. 

Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

In this case, the ALJ indeed determined that “applying the Medical-Vocational 

Rules directly supports a finding of ‘not disabled[.]’” Tr. 45. Specifically, the ALJ 

found that “[b]ased on a residual functional capacity for the full range of light work, 

considering the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, a finding of ‘not 

disabled’ is directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.14.” Tr. 46. Plaintiff does not 

argue that use of the grids by the ALJ was inappropriate because she is unable to perform 

the full range of light work, as found by the ALJ, or because she has non-exertional 

impairments that significantly limit her basic work skills. Rather, Plaintiff is only 

arguing that the ALJ should have queried a vocational expert about the types and number 

of jobs available to her because she believes that the ALJ relied on such a vocational 

resource at Step Five. As explained above, the ALJ plainly relied upon the Grids at Step 

Five and, therefore, was not required to utilize a vocational source in finding Plaintiff not 

disabled. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239-40. As such, the ALJ did not commit reversible 

error in failing to question a vocational expert about the types and number of jobs 

available to Plaintiff given her RFC. 

B. Whether the ALJ failed to follow the “slight abnormality” standard in 

 concluding that Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc disease is not a 

 severe impairment. 

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Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in failing to “discuss 

or apply the ‘slight abnormality’ standard in regards to Ms. Ward’s cervical degenerative 

disc disease.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 8. She also asserts that the ALJ “failed to include 

any limitations in his RFC assessment resulting from Ms. Ward’s well documented 

cervical degenerative disc disease.” Id. at 9. She claims that her “cervical degenerative 

disc disease requires more severe limitations in the ALJ’s determination of her ability to 

perform work, such as limiting [her] to less than light work[,]” and therefore should have 

been recognized as a severe impairment by the ALJ and accounted for in his RFC 

determination. Id. Defendant argues that, “[b]ecause the ALJ identified other severe 

physical impairments and considered Plaintiff’s cervical spine condition when assessing 

her RFC, any error in failing to find Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc disease as a 

separate, severe impairment is no more than harmless error.” Def.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 6. 

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff has failed to show that her cervical degenerative disc 

disease indeed causes additional limitations on her ability to work beyond those described 

in the ALJ’s RFC. Id. at 6-7. 

As discussed above, the ALJ found Plaintiff to suffer from the severe impairment 

of, inter alia, “lumbar degenerative disc disease.” Tr. 21. Although the ALJ did not also 

expressly find Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc disease to constitute a severe 

impairment, it is evident that the ALJ reviewed medical evidence documenting that 

condition and various treatments that Plaintiff received to address it while discussing the 

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conditions he found to be severe impairments. See Tr. 23-24 (discussing Plaintiff’s 

follow-up visit with Dr. Shores in which he diagnosed “bilateral cervical facet 

syndrome,” and subsequent “facet joint medial branch block” procedures administered to 

Plaintiff on September 15, 1010, and September 29, 2010). See also Tr. 290-93. As the 

ALJ noted, Tr. 24 & 37, Plaintiff advised Dr. Shores that these procedures resulted in 

“100% relief in her neck pain after undergoing the confirmatory right C2-3, C3-4, and 

C4-5 facet joint injections.” Tr. 271. Moreover, while Plaintiff correctly points out that 

an April 15, 2010, MRI of her cervical spine “showed degenerative changes at C5/6,” 

Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 8, the physician’s report states only that “there is mild focal spinal 

stenosis present.” Tr. 335. The physician’s impression was that Plaintiff had “mild 

subligamentous bulging of the disc” but that “intervertebral neural foramina are patent 

bilaterally at this level. No abnormal signals from the conus medullaris are present.” Id. 

The ALJ noted the physician’s impressions in his review of the medical evidence of 

Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc disease. Tr. 36. As such, it is apparent that 

objective medical evidence of the severity of Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc disease 

was indisputably reviewed by the ALJ and furthermore indicated only that her condition 

was “mild” and that her pain was substantially abated with treatment. 

The great weight of evidence in the record, as well as the greater portion of 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints about her pain, concern her lower back, which the ALJ 

did expressly find to be a severe impairment. Although Plaintiff asserts that her “record 

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is replete with documentation of her cervical degenerative disc disease[,]” she points to 

no records corroborating her assertion that this condition “requires more severe 

limitations in the ALJ’s determination of her ability to perform work” or that it otherwise 

“constitutes more than ‘slight abnormalities.’” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 8-9. As such, 

Plaintiff failed to carry her burden at Step Two to show that her cervical degenerative 

disc disease constitutes a severe impairment, much less that it necessitates functional 

limitations greater than those discussed in the ALJ’s RFC finding. 

Furthermore, given that the ALJ did find that Plaintiff suffers from other severe 

impairments, including, particularly, lumbar degenerative disc disease, any error by the 

ALJ in failing to find Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc disease a severe impairment 

was clearly harmless because, as discussed above, the record (see Tr. 36, 37) makes clear 

that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc disease in the subsequent 

sequential steps of his analysis when he articulated Plaintiff’s RFC. See Freeman v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2014 WL 6657482, *2 (11th Cir. Nov. 25, 2014) (“Although 

the ALJ found that Mr. Freeman’s back pain was not a sever impairment, the record 

demonstrates that she considered and discussed these symptoms at subsequent steps of 

the sequential analysis. Accordingly, any error in failing to find that Mr. Freeman’s 

lower back pain was severe was harmless because the symptoms were nonetheless 

considered in the subsequent steps in the analysis.”). 

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 At bottom, two views of the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s cervical 

degenerative disc disease are permitted by the record. On the one hand, the ALJ may 

have failed, as a matter of mere oversight, to include Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc 

disease among those impairments which he found to be severe. This supposition is 

supported by the fact that he discussed the condition in the section of his opinion which 

concludes “[b]ecause these impairments have more than a minimal effect on the 

claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities, they are considered severe 

impairments.” See Tr. 23-24, 32. On the other hand, the ALJ simply determined that 

Plaintiff’s cervical degenerative disc disease is not a severe impairment because, in his 

estimation, Plaintiff failed to show that it causes more than a minimal restriction in her 

ability to do basic work activities. In either respect, the record is clear that the ALJ 

considered the evidence related to the condition in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff 

has failed to demonstrate reversible error on the part of the ALJ. 

C. Whether the ALJ properly applied the pain standard.

 Plaintiff’s final claim is that the ALJ failed to properly apply the pain standard. 

She asserts that she “fulfills the pain standard given that there is evidence of an 

underlying medical condition and that medical condition can reasonably be expected to 

give rise to the claimed pain.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 12. She appears to contend that the 

ALJ’s credibility finding with respect to her subjective testimony about pain 

demonstrates the ALJ’s purportedly erroneous application of the pain standard. Id. 

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Defendant maintains that the ALJ properly applied the pain standard, and, furthermore, 

that the ALJ’s credibility findings respecting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony about her 

pain are supported by substantial evidence. Def.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 7-8. 

 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has articulated a 

three-part “pain standard” to be utilized where a claimant attempts to establish disability 

through subjective testimony about pain. 

The pain standard requires: “(1) evidence of an underlying medical 

condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the 

severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical 

condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” 

[Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002)]. If the ALJ 

determined that the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms, then 

the ALJ evaluates the extent to which the intensity and persistence of those 

symptoms limit her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). At this 

stage, the ALJ considers the claimant’s history, the medical signs and 

laboratory findings, the claimant’s statements, statements by treating and 

nontreating physicians, and other evidence of how the pain affects the 

claimant’s daily activities and ability to work. Id. § 404.1529(a). 

 A claimant’s testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies 

the pain standard is sufficient to support a finding of disability. Foote v. 

Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.1995). If the ALJ decides not to 

credit a claimant’s testimony about her symptoms, the ALJ “must articulate 

explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Failure to articulate the reasons 

for discrediting subjective pain testimony requires . . . that the testimony be 

accepted as true.” Id. at 1561–62. 

McMahon v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 583 F.App’x 886, 893 (11th Cir. 2014). 

 Upon review of the ALJ’s decision, it is apparent that the ALJ properly applied the 

pain standard. The ALJ recognized his obligation to apply and then accurately described 

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the pain standard in his opinion. See Tr. 34. Having surveyed the objective medical 

evidence and Plaintiff’s own prior statements and testimony about her pain, the ALJ 

found as follows: 

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [RFC 

articulated by the ALJ]. 

Tr. 35. As for the specific reasons why the ALJ partially discredited Plaintiff’s 

complaints of disabling pain, the ALJ stated as follows: 

The claimant has testified to inability to walk and stand for no more than 

10-minutes. She reported being unable to pick up 10-pounds, and she was 

unable to stoop, which is inconsistent with the medical evidence of record. 

There are no treating or examining physicians that have restricted the 

claimant from sitting, standing or lifting/carrying due to her medical 

impairments. The claimant has rated her pain as 7/10 from the pain scale 

with 10 being the worse pain, which the evidence of record documents 

improvement with her medication regimen and epidural/block injections. 

The claimant has stated that she can drive an automobile and she drives 

maybe three times a week to appointments, grocery store and to the 

pharmacy, which is inconsistent with total disability and consistent with the 

limitations outlined in . . . the residual functional capacity for light work. 

The claimant states that she can take care of her own personal care such as 

bathing, dressing, and grooming. She can perform light housework, 

grocery shop, cook, and she could do the laundry—all which are consistent 

with the limitations recited in the residual functional capacity . . . . She has 

denied being able to perform any yard work, which is inconsistent with her 

reports to Dr. Shores that she felt well enough to mow her lawn to due [sic] 

pain relief. . . . Although, the claimant does live in a rural area, she has a 

car and she has admitted to driving to herself [sic] to appointments, grocery 

shopping, and to the pharmacy. The claimant may not be able to do her 

past work, but she admitted to working after her alleged onset date in her 

prior job on and off because of her medical condition, which suggests that 

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she can perform the work activity as outlined in the residual functional 

capacity of light work . . . . 

Tr. 43-44. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that “the claimant has overstated the extent of 

her medical condition and functional restrictions. While the claimant’s condition may 

reasonably be expected to result in mild to moderate deficits, the evidence as a whole 

does not support a finding that the claimant experiences the disabling limitations as she 

so alleged.” Tr. 44. 

 Rather than challenging any of the specific reasons the ALJ articulated for 

partially discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff simply states in a conclusory fashion 

that 

Ms. Ward’s complaints of severe pain are consistent with the severe 

impairments the ALJ found Ms. Ward to be suffering from and with the 

medical record. In fact, Ms. Ward satisfies the pain standard given that it 

does not require objective proof of the pain itself. As such, Ms. Ward 

satisfies the requirement of an underlying medical condition that could 

reasonably be expected to produce her pain. 

Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 12. Of course, there is no dispute that the ALJ indeed found that 

Plaintiff satisfied the pain standard because he determined that the “claimant’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms[.]” Tr. 35. But, contrary to Plaintiff’s apparent belief, this finding, alone, 

does not compel the conclusion that Plaintiff is disabled. Rather, as the Eleventh Circuit 

has made clear, once the ALJ determines that a claimant’s impairments might reasonably 

be expected to cause the sort of pain described by the claimant, the ALJ is required to 

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“evaluate[] the extent to which the intensity and persistence of” the claimant’s alleged 

pain “limit her ability to work.” McMahon, 583 F.App’x at 893 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(b)). To do this, the ALJ does not rely on just the Plaintiff’s statements. Rather, 

“the ALJ considers the claimant’s history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, the 

claimant’s statements, statements by treating and nontreating physicians, and other 

evidence of how the pain affects the claimant’s daily activities and ability to work.” Id. 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)). As recounted above, the ALJ exhaustively performed 

this analysis, Plaintiff has not identified any singular instance in which the ALJ 

improperly relied upon record evidence, and, moreover, the ALJ’s credibility findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. As such, the ALJ did not fail to properly 

apply the pain standard and did not commit reversible error in rendering his credibility 

findings regarding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of disabling pain. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

Done this 27th day of February, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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