Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00604/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00604-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12201 Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

DIONDRA JACKSON, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 

 ) 2:09-CV-604-WKW 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT ) 

OF CORRECTIONS, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

AMENDED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) these cases were referred to the undersigned 

United States Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended 

findings of fact and conclusions of law (Doc. 4, filed July 1, 2009). Pending before the 

Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15, filed Nov. 9, 2009). Plaintiff filed her 

response and the motion is ripe for this Court’s review. For good cause, it is the 

recommendation that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On June 29, 2009, Plaintiff Diondra Jackson (“Jackson”) filed a Complaint (Doc. 

1) against the Alabama Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and individual defendants 

who are employed by the DOC. Jackson, an African-American female, alleges the 

defendants discriminated against her, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., because of her race and in retaliation for 

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her “several complaints of unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment.”1 Jackson 

also alleges discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 

(“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117). 

The Court directed Jackson to amend her Complaint to clarify her claims and the 

supporting facts. See Doc. 6. On August 5, 2009, Jackson filed an Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 9). On November 9, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the action (Doc. 

15), alleging that Jackson’s Amended Complaint lacked (1) “valid, factually supported, 

and timely federal causes of action,” and therefore did not “state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” See Doc. 15, at 1. Defendants further allege that Jackson did not 

state the grounds alleged for this court’s subject matter jurisdiction and did not identify 

the individual defendants who allegedly violated her rights, thus making the case 

impossible to defend. See Doc. 15, at 1-2. 

Jackson’s Amended Complaint is a relatively brief narrative. It states: 

I am a Black female with a disability that has complained constantly 

about sexual harassment and intimidation by my co-worker(s) and upper 

management. I began my employment with the employer named above 

(Alabama Department of Corrections) as a Drug Treatment Counselor on 

August 2, 2008. I made my initial complaint of sexual harassment (men) in 

February of 2007. My complaints of sexual harassment were resolved to 

my satisfaction by Warden Hooks and the Warden II at that time; both of 

them retired and after they did chaos really began. The accused were 

placed at other posts and the Captain was asked to give the corrections 

 

1

 Jackson explains that her initial complaints of sexual harassment were dealt with to her satisfaction, but that the 

harassment resumed after the retirement of two DOC wardens. This Recommendation does not interpret the 

Amended Complaint as making any independent claim based on alleged sexual harassment, but only on employer 

retaliation for having made such complaints in the past. 

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officers a discussion on sexual harassment pertaining to me Diondra 

Jackson. It was disclosed to me by another male that a lot of the 

correctional officers had a bet out on me pertaining to which one of them 

would sleep with me first. I was very disappointed, annoyed and felt much 

disrespect from the comments and constant sexual harassment of telling 

them NO everyday of I do not want to go out with them; none of them. 

However, since that time I have been constantly subjected to 

harassment and intimidation to the point that I feared for my life from coworker(s) and upper management. The employer has failed to provide me 

with a workplace that is free from racial harassment and intimidation. The 

employer has also failed to discipline a female co-worker in such a manner 

that she follows the employer’s EEOC representative of the Alabama of 

Corrections instruction not to have any contact with me; which she refused 

to do. On March 26, 2008, I was given a memorandum regarding my 

attendance. On March 31, 2008, I was denied FMLA2

 family leave as 

requested by my physician, because of severe anxiety, fear and other issues 

caused by the constant harassment and retaliation from the prison staff 

(employer(s) and upper management). Nevertheless, on March 31, 2008, I 

was informed that I either recant my request for Family and Medical Leave 

Act (FMLA) leave or be discharged; and that came from Commissioner 

DeLoach of the Alabama Department of Corrections. That conversation 

happened in Warden Wise office and Captain Simmons was present. The 

phone conference included Commissioner DeLoach, the Alabama 

Department of Corrections attorney, Kim and the female over the treatment 

programs. Upon my refusal, humiliation and disrespect began, I was 

escorted by the Captain as if I was an inmate or committed an offense by 

the regulations of the prison to my office to get my belongings and then 

escorted off of the premises of the St. Clair of Corrections grounds. With 

 

2

 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.

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that being said, I was then told by Commissioner DeLoach, that I would be 

on leave without pay until I recanted my FMLA. A White employee, my 

co-worker in the Department that worked in, was allowed to take FMLA 

months before then with no problems. However, I was informed that I was 

being placed on leave without pay until I changed my mind about 

requesting it. 

As I left the premises, I began having a severe panic attack and 

called 911. After I called 911, I called St. Clair’s attorney representative 

and her and Captain Simmons came to the scene. As I sat in my car and the 

EMT workers assisted me, the EMT worker whispered in my ear and 

insisted I get into the ambulance as Captain Simmons insisted otherwise. It 

went to the point where he was trying to get the workers to persuade me not 

to get in. One of the EMT workers on the scene told me to go and sit in the 

parking lot of the closest fast food restaurant and relax. After I got into the 

ambulance, the EMT workers recommended that I find an attorney because 

of the conversations that had gone on at the scene of trying to persuade me 

and the EMT workers to divert me from receiving proper medical services. 

I believe that I was discriminated against in violation of Title VII of 

the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended because of my race and in retaliation 

for my several complaints of unlawful discrimination and sexual 

harassment. I also believe that I was discriminated against in violation of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended. 

Doc. 6 at p. 1-3. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. 

Gilmore v. Day, 125 F.Supp.2d 468, 471 (M.D. Ala. 2000). To survive a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim 

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to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 

S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the “court must 

view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all the plaintiff’s 

well-pleaded facts as true.” Am. United Life Ins. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th

Cir. 2007) (citing St. Joseph’s Hosp. Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th

Cir. 1986)). In other words, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court will 

accept the petitioner’s allegations as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 

104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984); Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 

706 (11th Cir. 1998). However, “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of 

facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Jackson v. 

BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Oxford Asset 

Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)). 

Thus, a complaint should be dismissed “when the allegations in a complaint, 

however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 

127 S.Ct. at 1966. Further, “this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of 

minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Id. (citations 

omitted). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-

65 (citations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level. Id., 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Thus, it does not require a heightened fact 

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pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face. Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. It is not enough that the pleadings merely “le[ave] 

open the possibility that the plaintiff might later establish shome set of undisclosed facts 

to support recovery.” Id. at 561, 127 S.Ct. 1968. (internal quotation and alteration 

omitted). Consequently, the threshold for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is 

“exceedingly low.” Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc. 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 

1985). 

All litigants, pro se or not, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Although the Court is required to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings, the 

Court does not have “license to serve as de facto counsel for a party . . . or to rewrite an 

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain and action.” GJR Investments, Inc., v. 

County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) 

(overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2595585 (11th

Cir. 2010); accord Giles v. Wal-Mart Distribution Center, 359 Fed. Appx. 91 (11th Cir. 

2009). 

Finally, the Court notes that a plaintiff is not required to present a prima facie case 

in order to survive a motion to dismiss, and the ordinary rules for assessing the 

sufficiency of a complaint apply. Swierkiewicz, v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 

S.Ct. 992, 997 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 

(1974) (“When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the 

reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a 

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limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the 

claimant is entitled of offer evidence to support the claims.”)). 

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 

Defendants challenge the (1) validity/timeliness of the action; (2) subject matter 

jurisdiction of this court; and (3) lack of identified DOC employees who discriminated 

against Jackson. 

Federal Jurisdiction 

Jackson does not specifically invoke this Court’s jurisdiction through reference to 

28 U.S.C. § 1343, her allegations of discrimination under Title VII, a federal statute, give 

notice that jurisdiction is appropriate in this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (vesting 

United States District Courts with original jurisdiction of any civil action for “relief under 

any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights. . . .”). 

Individual Liability Under Title VII 

Though Defendants’ motion to dismiss is minimalistic and provides the Court with 

little argument, a threshold inquiry into the proper defendants is appropriate at the outset. 

Jackson does not indicate whether this action is against Warden Wise and Warden Carter 

in their individual or official capacities. In the Eleventh Circuit, a plaintiff may not bring 

a Title VII claim against an employer’s agent in his individual capacity. See Mason v. 

Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996) (no individual responsibility under Title 

VII); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The relief granted 

under Title VII is against the employer, not the individual employees whose actions 

would constitute a violation of the Act.”) (emphasis in original); see also Cross v. 

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Alabama Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 

1995) (affirming the Busby holding after the 1991 amendments to Title VII and holding 

liability under Title VII is limited to official-capacity actions). Therefore, Jackson cannot 

maintain an action against the wardens in their individual capacity. 

A plaintiff may bring a Title VII suit against an individual in his official capacity. 

See Cross, 49 F.3d at 1504. However, when a plaintiff names both the employer and the 

individual supervisor in his official capacity, the supervisor may be dismissed from the 

action. See Taylor v. Alabama, 95 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (citing Cross) 

(where a Title VII plaintiff names the employer as a defendant, any of the employer’s 

supervisory officials also named in the complaint may be dismissed from the action); see 

also Moss v. W & A Cleaners, 111 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1187 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“If a Title 

VII plaintiff names his or her employer as a defendant, any of the employer’s agents also 

named in the complaint may be dismissed from the action.”). Jackson named the DOC as 

a defendant, thus the Title VII complaints against the wardens in their official capacities 

are redundant and therefore due dismissal. 

The Title VII Claims 

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to 

fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 

any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).” Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 

___, 2010 WL 2631839 at *7 (11th Cir. July 2, 2010). Title VII also prohibits retaliatory 

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discrimination against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an 

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 

hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).” Id. at *11. 

Jackson alleges that she was “discriminated against in violation of Title VII of the 

1964 Civil Rights Act” because of her race and in retaliation for complaints of unlawful 

discrimination and sexual harassment. These general allegations place her claim squarely 

within those remedied by the statute. Thus, the claim for Title VII relief is “plausible on 

its face,” because it presents a basic outline of a black woman who alleges she suffered 

discrimination because of (1) her race, and (2) her history of complaints concerning 

sexual harassment. 

First the Court must look to the timeliness of the action. The Eleventh Circuit 

interprets the Title VII enforcement provisions as permitting a plaintiff to bring a civil 

action against a named respondent within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Gant v. Jefferson Energy 

Cooperative, 348 Fed. Appx. 433, 434 (11th Cir. 2009) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1)). Jackson’s Response to Defendant’s Motion avers that she exhausted her 

administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the EEOC and received her right-tosue letters. See Doc. 21, at 3. A review of the original complaint shows that Jackson 

received a right-to-sue letter dated March 25, 2009. See Doc. 1, attachments. As such, 

her ninety day time frame began on that date which puts June 23, 2009 as the ninety day 

deadline. On April 27, 2009, Jackson received the right to sue letters from her attorney. 

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Id. Jackson did not file her complaint until June 29, 2009. Jackson also attaches to her 

original complaint a letter which explains her reasons for filing her complaint six days 

past the ninety day window. Id. 

The filing a complaint within ninety days is non-jurisdictional and is subject to 

equitable tolling upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Zipes v. Trans World 

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1135, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); see also 

Gant, 348 Fed. Appx. At 434 (citing Zipes). “[T]raditional equitable tolling principles 

require a claimant to justify her untimely filing by a showing of extraordinary 

circumstances.” Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Gant, 

348 Fed. Appx. at 434 (citing Jackson, its holding, and applying it in a Title VII context). 

These include “fraud, misinformation, or deliberate concealment.” Gant, 348 Fed. Appx. 

at 434 (quoting Jackson). However, “[a]ttorney negligence is not a basis for equitable 

tolling.” Johnson v. Florida Department of Corrections, 513 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 348, 172 L.Ed.2d 86 (2008). 

Based on the above, the Court finds that Jackson filed her complaint outside of the 

ninety day window and there are no extraordinary circumstances which justify equitable 

tolling. Consequently, the Title VII claims merit dismissal as they were not timely filed. 

 The ADA Claim 

The ADA provides that “[N]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring 

advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 

other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A 

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plaintiff makes a prima facie case of ADA discrimination when she shows “(1) she has a 

disability; (2) she is a qualified individual;3

 and (3) she was subjected to unlawful 

discrimination because of her disability.” Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447 

(11th Cir. 1996). Jackson avers, but does not identify, any disability that is covered by the 

ADA. Therefore she cannot obtain relief under the ADA. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) be GRANTED; 

(2) This case be DISMISSED; and 

(3) Any remaining outstanding motions be DENIED as moot. 

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said 

Recommendation not later than August 23, 2010. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the 

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by 

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from 

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the 

 

3

 Under the ADA, a “qualified” individual is a person who, in addition to being disabled, is qualified to hold the job 

position in question. 42 U.S.C. §12111(8); see also Dockery v. North Shore Medical Center, 909 F.Supp. 1550, 

1555 (S.D. Fla. 1995). 

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District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 

33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) 

(en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

 DONE this 9th day of August, 2010. 

 /s/ Terry F. Moorer 

 TERRY F. MOORER 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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