Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00513/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00513-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Melissa E. Caves, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV 12-513-TUC-CRP

ORDER 

 This action commenced when Plaintiff Melissa Caves sought judicial review of 

Defendant’s decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs on the issue, this 

Court entered an Order reversing the decision and remanding the matter for an immediate 

calculation and award of benefits. (Doc. 21). Plaintiff’s counsel, J. Patrick Butler, now 

seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $5,966.10 under the Equal Access to Justice Act 

(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d) (Plaintiff’s Motion (Docs. 23 & 24)) for time he and 

attorney Eric Schnaufer spent working on Plaintiff’s case. Although Defendant does not 

contest the amount of fees requested, Defendant argues that fees are not warranted 

because the government’s action in this case was substantially justified (Defendant’s 

Opposition (Doc. 25)). For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for 

attorneys’ fees. 

Case 4:12-cv-00513-CRP Document 26 Filed 06/18/15 Page 1 of 7
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

DISCUSSION

 The EAJA “authorizes federal courts to award attorneys’ fees, court costs, and 

other expenses when a party prevails against the United States, although fee-shifting is 

not mandatory.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff is a 

prevailing party because the decision denying her benefits was reversed and remanded for 

an immediate award of benefits. See Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854-55 (9th Cir. 

2002); Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Under the EAJA, reasonable attorneys’ fees shall be awarded unless Defendant 

shows her position in this case was “substantially justified or that special circumstances 

make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. 

“Substantially justified” means “‘justified in substance or in the main’—that is, justified 

to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 

565, (1988); see also Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “Put 

differently, the government’s position must have a ‘reasonable basis both in law and 

fact.’” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 

565). Further, the EAJA’s reference to the government’s position encompasses “both the 

government's litigation position and the underlying agency action giving rise to the civil 

action.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870 (citations omitted). The government bears the burden of 

showing that its position was substantially justified. Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition, 

408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Defendant argues that an award of attorneys’ fees should be denied because her 

position was substantially justified. (Response (Doc. 25)). In the context of a Social 

Security disability determination, “district courts should focus on whether the 

government’s position on the particular issue on which the claimant earned remand was 

substantially justified, not on whether the government’s ultimate disability determination 

was substantially justified.” Hardisty, 592 F.3d at 1078 (citing Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 

562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995)). A position can be substantially justified pursuant to the EAJA 

even when the position is ultimately incorrect. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2. The test for 

Case 4:12-cv-00513-CRP Document 26 Filed 06/18/15 Page 2 of 7
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

determining whether a position was substantially justified, therefore, focuses on whether 

“a reasonable person could think it correct[.]” Id. If “there is a genuine dispute” between 

reasonable minds then the position is “substantially justified” pursuant to the EAJA. Id. at 

565. However, the government’s defense of “basic and fundamental errors” cannot be 

considered as substantially justified. Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 

2008) (holding, inter alia, that it was legal error to discredit claimant’s testimony without 

giving clear and convincing reasons and to reject a treating physician’s opinion without 

providing adequate reasons for doing so, and that the Commissioner was not substantially 

justified in defending it). 

 In this case, the Court found that Defendant’s final decision merited remand for 

immediate award of benefits because the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinion of 

Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist Dr. Bupp in favor of examining psychologist Dr. 

Armstrong. (Doc. 21). The record supports the conclusion that Plaintiff suffered from 

long-standing mental health issues. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s severe impairments 

included bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder and anxiety disorder. The 

government contends that the underlying administrative decision and the decision to 

oppose Plaintiff’s request for judicial review was substantially justified because “a 

reasonable mind could believe that the ALJ’s articulation and treatment of [Dr. 

Bupp’s]...opinion was adequate.” (Doc. 25, p. 6) (citations omitted). Defendant stresses 

that Dr. Bupp’s treatment notes indicating Plaintiff was improved and “much more stable 

and healthy” on medication, supports the conclusion that reasonable minds could have 

agreed with the ALJ’s decision to reject Dr. Bupp’s opinion as inconsistent with his 

treatment notes and inconsistent with “Plaintiff’s statements regarding her abilities....” 

(Id. at pp. 5-6). 

 However, when rejecting treating Dr. Bupp’s opinion that Plaintiff suffered from 

marked limitations in multiple areas, the ALJ failed to heed Ninth Circuit authority that 

when 

discussing mental health issues, it is error [for an ALJ] to reject a claimant's 

testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of 

Case 4:12-cv-00513-CRP Document 26 Filed 06/18/15 Page 3 of 7
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

treatment. Cycles of improvement and debilitating symptoms are a common 

occurrence, and in such circumstances it is error for an ALJ to pick out a 

few isolated instances of improvement over a period of months or years and 

to treat them as a basis for concluding a claimant is capable of working. 

See, e.g., Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir.2001) 

(“[The treating physician's] statements must be read in context of the 

overall diagnostic picture he draws. That a person who suffers from severe 

panic attacks, anxiety, and depression makes some improvement does not 

mean that the person's impairments no longer seriously affect her ability to 

function in a workplace.”). 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014) (footnote omitted). Instead, 

“[r]eports of ‘improvement’ in the context of mental health issues must be interpreted 

with an understanding of the patient's overall well-being and the nature of her symptoms. 

Id. (citing Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Nor are 

the references in [a doctor's] notes that Ryan's anxiety and depression were ‘improving’ 

sufficient to undermine the repeated diagnosis of those conditions, or [another doctor's] 

more detailed report.”)). Additionally, such reports of improvement “must also be 

interpreted with an awareness that improved functioning while being treated and while 

limiting environmental stressors does not always mean that a claimant can function 

effectively in a workplace.” Id. at 1017-18 (citing Hutsell v. Massanari,, 259 F.3d 707, 

712 (8th Cir. 2001); Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2011)) (footnote 

omitted). 

 As discussed in the Court’s Order (Doc. 21), any notation of improvement from 

time to time did not vitiate Dr. Bupp’s opinion. Further, while the ALJ also supported his 

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled by citing Plaintiff’s stated aspirations to work, 

pursue a master’s degree, or publish a book, he failed to take into account the evidence of 

record supporting the finding that Plaintiff was actually unable to maintain employment 

due to her mental limitations. As Plaintiff succinctly pointed out, “[s]uggestions by a 

person with bipolar disorder to engage in such activities are not even a scintilla of 

evidence for full-time work capacity.” (Order (Doc.21), p.13 (quoting Reply (Doc.19), p. 

7)). Finally, even though examining Dr. Armstrong, whose opinion the ALJ favored, 

Case 4:12-cv-00513-CRP Document 26 Filed 06/18/15 Page 4 of 7
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

indicated that Plaintiff’s sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction, and 

adaptation were within normal limits on the day of his examination but nonetheless were 

“subject to bipolar interference”, nothing in the record supported the conclusion that the 

limitations the ALJ assessed were consistent with functioning “subject to bipolar 

interference[.]” 

At bottom, the ALJ failed to set forth specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting 

treating Dr. Bupp’s opinion. When a hypothetical question was posed to the VE 

incorporating the marked limitations found by Dr. Bupp, the VE testified that such 

limitations would preclude Plaintiff from working. The ALJ’s burden to state legally 

sufficient reasons to reject a treating doctor’s opinion or to discount credibility is clear 

under the law. See e.g. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (setting out 

ALJ’s burden to reject physician testimony); Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin, 466 F.3d 880, 

884 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating test for discounting a claimant’s credibility). Yet, the ALJ 

failed to satisfy his burden. The Ninth Circuit has found that the government was not 

substantially justified in defending, inter alia, the ALJ’s failure to meet his burden in 

rejecting a treating physician’s opinion in favor of a non-treating physician’s opinion. 

Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1071-72. 

 Here, the ALJ’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and based on 

legal error given his failure to state legally sufficient reasons to support the decision to 

deny benefits. Defense of such a fundamental error lacks substantial justification on this 

record. Id. When the government's underlying position is not substantially justified, the 

Court need not address whether the government's litigation position was justified. Meier, 

727 F.3d at 872 (citing Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1071). Moreover, consideration of the 

government's position in this litigation would inevitably result in the conclusion that the 

government’s defense of the ALJ’s errors is not substantially justified. See e.g., Sampson 

v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that “[i]t is difficult to imagine any 

circumstance in which the government's decision to defend its actions in court would be 

substantially justified, but the underlying administrative decision would not.”); Meier,

Case 4:12-cv-00513-CRP Document 26 Filed 06/18/15 Page 5 of 7
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

727 F.3d at 873 (same); Green v. Colvin, 2013 WL 1878924 at *2 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2013) 

(“While it may be possible that some decision will be unsupported by substantial 

evidence or based on legal error and yet still have a reasonable basis in law and fact, this 

is not that case.”). This is especially so given that Defendant’s attempt to establish 

substantial justification essentially restates her arguments that the Court previously 

rejected in its order remanding this matter for an immediate award of benefits. See Meier,

727 F.3d at 873 (rejecting government’s attempt to establish substantial justification for 

its position by relying on arguments raised on previous unsuccessful appeal); Shreves v. 

Colvin, 2013 WL 4010993 at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2013) (rejecting government’s reliance 

on arguments made in opposing judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to show 

substantial justification for its position). In light of the errors in the ALJ’s analysis, the 

Court cannot conclude that the government was substantially justified in defending the 

administrative decision in this case. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees 

under the EAJA. 

 Defendant does not contest the amount of fees requested. (See Doc. 25). 

However, Defendant points out that in light of Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), 

EAJA fees awarded “belong to the Plaintiff and are subject to offset under the Treasury 

Offset Program (31 U.S.C. ' 3716(c)(3)(B)).” (Doc. 25, p. 7 n.1). “The parties agree that 

any EAJA fees should be awarded as payable to Plaintiff and not to Plaintiff’s attorney.” 

(Id. (citations omitted)). 

 Attorneys’ fees and expenses under the EAJA must be reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. 

'2412(d)(2)(A). The district court has discretion to determine a reasonable fee award. 

See 28 U.S.C. '2412(b); Pierce, 487 U.S. at 571. The Court has reviewed the hours 

billed by Plaintiff’s counsel. (See Doc. 24, pp. 8-9 & Exhs. B, C). The Court finds 

reasonable the submission of 5.25 hours on behalf of Mr. Butler and 26.8 hours on behalf 

of Mr. Schnaufer billed at the cost-of-living adjusted rates. See Costa v. Comm’r. of 

Social Security, 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (in determining the reasonableness 

of fee requests, the court may consider the fact that “[m]any district courts have noted 

Case 4:12-cv-00513-CRP Document 26 Filed 06/18/15 Page 6 of 7
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that twenty to forty hours is the range most often requested and granted in social security 

cases.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is to entitled attorneys’ fees in the uncontested 

amount of $5,966.10. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (Doc. 23), in the amount of $5,966.10 is GRANTED. Payment will 

be made payable to Plaintiff and delivered to Plaintiff’s attorney at his office: J. Patrick 

Butler, Tretschok, McNamara & Miller, P.C., P.O. Box 42887, Tucson, AZ 85733-2887. 

 Dated this 18th day of June, 2015. 

Case 4:12-cv-00513-CRP Document 26 Filed 06/18/15 Page 7 of 7