Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-35526/USCOURTS-ca9-08-35526-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MALAIKA BROOKS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF SEATTLE,

Defendant,

and No. 08-35526

STEVEN L. DAMAN, in his capacity D.C. No.

as an officer of the Seattle Police  2:06-cv-01681-RAJ

Department; DONALD M. JONES, in

OPINION his individual capacity as an

officer of the Seattle Police

Department; JUAN M. ORNELAS, in

his individual capacity as an

officer of the Seattle Police

Department,

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 10, 2009—Seattle, Washington

Filed March 26, 2010

Before: Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hall;

Dissent by Judge Berzon

4913

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 1 of 48
COUNSEL

Karen L. Cobb and Theron A. (Ted) Buck, Stafford Frey Cooper, Seattle, Washington, for the defendants-appellants.

Eric Zubel, Eric Zubel, PC, Seattle, Washington, for the

plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

HALL, Circuit Judge:

Sergeant Steven Daman, Officer Juan Ornelas, and Officer

Donald Jones (collectively “the Officers”) appeal the district

court’s denial of the Officers’ motion for summary judgment

on Malaika Brooks’s § 1983 and state law claims. Brooks had

sued the City of Seattle, the Seattle Police Department

(“SPD”) and its chief, as well as the Officers, based on the

Officers’ alleged excessive force when they tased her three

times to effect her arrest. The district court denied the Officers’ motion for summary judgment,1

 finding that they were

not entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The Officers challenge that denial. This court has jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse.

I.

On November 23, 2004, SPD Officer Juan Ornelas stopped

Brooks for speeding in a school zone.2 The situation deteriorated rather quickly. Brooks claimed she had not been speed1The district court granted summary judgment to the City of Seattle,

SPD, and the police chief on Brooks’s § 1983 or state law claims. 

2Because this appeal arises from a denial of summary judgment, we

assume that the version of material facts asserted by Brooks, the nonmoving party, is correct. See Robinson v. Prunty, 249 F.3d 862, 866 (9th

Cir. 2001). 

4918 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 2 of 48
ing, took her driver’s license out of Officer Ornelas’s ticket

book and only reluctantly gave it back, and then repeatedly

refused to sign a Notice of Infraction (“Notice”) regarding her

speeding violation.3 When SPD Officer Jones arrived at the

scene, Officer Ornelas told him that Brooks had refused to

sign the Notice and was being uncooperative. Officer Jones

tried to obtain her signature himself, but Brooks also refused

his entreaties, despite assurances that signing was not tantamount to admitting the violation. She accused Officer Jones

of lying to her about the import of signing,4 suggested he was

being racist, and became upset, repeating “I’m not signing,

I’m not signing” over and over. Throughout, she remained in

the car with the ignition running. 

3The Notice of Infraction gives notice that a traffic law has been violated and requires a signature indicating, without admitting to the crime,

that the recipient will respond as directed by the Notice. See Wash. Rev.

Code § 46.63.060. The Notice should be distinguished from a Citation to

Appear, which is a separate document that includes the violation allegedly

committed, but requires a signature promising to appear in court. See

Wash. Rev. Code § 46.64.015. 

There is considerable dispute as to whether the Officers gave Brooks

both a Notice based upon her speeding and violation and a Citation to

Appear based upon her refusal to sign the Notice. Officer Jones maintains

that he asked Brooks about both the Notice and the Citation to Appear.

Sergeant Daman claims he was also asking about both when he asked

Brooks if she would sign “the ticket.” Confusing matters, the Notice and

the Citation to Appear are frequently referred to by all parties interchangeably as “tickets” or “citations” even though the penalty for refusing to sign

them is quite different. Nonetheless, Brooks maintains that she thought the

“ticket” she was being asked to sign here was still the Notice. This panel

must view the facts in the light most favorable to her and assume she did

not refuse to sign the Citation to Appear. 

4Brooks has had a previous encounter with Notices and Citations to

Appear. During a 1996 traffic incident, she refused to sign both the Notice

and the Citation to Appear because she did not think she was guilty of the

traffic offense underlying the Notice. In that case, the ticketing officer’s

supervisor instructed the officer to give Brooks both tickets and allow her

to leave, even though the law would have permitted custodial arrest. 

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4919

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 3 of 48
Officer Ornelas then called his supervisor, SPD Sergeant

Daman. When Sergeant Daman arrived, Brooks continued to

refuse to sign the Notice. Sergeant Daman then asked her “if

[she] was going to sign the ticket.” When she refused, he told

Officers Ornelas and Jones to “[b]ook her.” They attempted

to follow those orders. 

Brooks refused to leave her car, remaining in it with the

ignition running and her door shut. Officer Jones then showed

Brooks his Taser, explaining that it would hurt “extremely

bad” if applied. Brooks told them she was pregnant and that

she needed to use the restroom. The officers discussed where

to tase her, deciding on her thigh. Officer Jones demonstrated

the Taser for her. Brooks still remained in the car, so Officer

Ornelas opened the door and reached over to take the key out

of the ignition, dropping the keys on the floorboard.5

Officer Ornelas then employed a pain compliance technique, bringing Brooks’s left arm up behind her back,

whereon Brooks stiffened her body and clutched the steering

wheel in order to frustrate her removal from the car. Officer

Jones discharged the Taser against Brooks’s thigh, through

her sweat pants, which caused Brooks “tremendous pain.” She

began to yell and honk the car’s horn. 

Within the next minute, Officer Jones tased her two more

times, against her shoulder and neck, the latter being the only

area of exposed skin. Brooks was unable to get out of the car

herself during this time because her arm was still behind her

back.6 The third tasing moved Brooks to the right, at which

point Officers Ornelas and Jones were able to extract her from

5The district court mistakenly found that the keys remained with Officer

Ornelas. Brooks herself says otherwise. 

6The district court suggests the Taser stun may have made her unable

to leave, but that is not consistent with Brooks’s declaration, which links

her inability to move with her arm being held behind her back rather than

any muscle lock-up. 

4920 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 4 of 48
the car through a combination of pushing and pulling. She

was immediately seen by medical professionals, and two

months later delivered a healthy baby.

Brooks was charged with (1) violation of Seattle Municipal

Code 11.59.090 for refusing to sign the Notice, and (2) resisting arrest. She was convicted of the first charge, but the jury

hung on the second, which was later dismissed. 

Brooks then filed this action against the Officers, asserting

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and assault and battery claims

under state tort law for the alleged excessive force. The district court denied the Officers’ motion for summary judgment

on those claims, finding a clearly established constitutional

violation that deprived the Officers of qualified immunity on

both the federal and state claims.

II.

We review de novo a denial of summary judgment based

on qualified immunity. See Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 932

(9th Cir. 2004). Our review is limited to the question of

whether, assuming all conflicts in the evidence are resolved

in Brooks’s favor, the Officers would be entitled to qualified

immunity as a matter of law. Id.

III.

Qualified immunity entitles the Officers “not to stand trial

or face the other burdens of litigation” on the § 1983 claim,

provided their conduct did not violate a clearly established

federal right. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

The qualified immunity inquiry asks two questions: (1) was

there a violation of a constitutional right, and, if so, then (2)

was the right at issue “clearly established” such that it would

have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in that situation?7See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

7After Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009), we have discretion to decide which step to address first. 

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4921

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 5 of 48
201-02 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v.

Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). If the Officers’ actions do

not amount to a constitutional violation, the violation was not

clearly established, or their actions reflected a reasonable mistake about what the law requires, they are entitled to qualified

immunity. See Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463,

471 (9th Cir. 2007).

A. Constitutional Violation

In her complaint, Brooks alleged that the Officers violated

her constitutional rights by using excessive force during her

arrest.

1. Probable Cause

Beginning in her opposition to the Officers’ motion for

summary judgment, Brooks has argued that the Officers did

not have probable cause to arrest her for refusing to sign the

Citation to Appear because she did not so refuse. Therefore,

she contends, there was no need for force, and any force used

was constitutionally unreasonable. See Headwaters Forest

Def. v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1204 (9th Cir.

2000). As an initial matter, we note that “establishing a lack

of probable cause . . . does not establish an excessive force

claim,” Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th

Cir. 2004). Thus, the result, even if we were to find no probable cause, is not as obvious as Brooks would make it. Indeed,

an arrestee’s resistance may support the use of force regardless of whether probable cause existed. See Arpin v. Santa

Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir.

2001) (finding an arrestee’s actions in “stiffen[ing] her arm

and attempt[ing] to pull it away” to be resistance justifying

the officer’s use of force in handcuffing regardless of whether

there was probable cause to arrest her). 

[1] Nonetheless, the existence of probable cause may be

considered as a part of the totality of circumstances affecting

4922 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 6 of 48
the excessive force analysis. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394

F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (permitting consideration of whether

the officer’s conduct “violated applicable police standards” in

assessing the reasonableness of the force used). It also

impacts the question of state law immunity on the assault and

battery claims. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.020(1) (finding

force used by a police officer not unlawful “[w]henever necessarily used . . . in the performance of a legal duty”); Staats

v. Brown, 991 P.2d 615, 627-28 (Wash. 2000) (describing

state qualified immunity on assault and battery as dependent

upon whether the force used to effect the arrest was excessive). Thus, we consider whether the Officers had probable

cause to arrest Brooks. 

[2] “Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to cause

a reasonably prudent person to believe that a crime has been

committed.” Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049,

1053 (9th Cir. 2009). Though we agree with the district court

that the Officers did have probable cause to arrest Brooks, we

arrive at that conclusion by a different path.8

[3] Brooks concedes that she refused to sign the Notice,

which amounted to a violation of Seattle Municipal Code

§ 11.59.090(c). For the purposes of the Fourth Amendment,

this is sufficient to find probable cause. See Virginia v.

Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1606-07 (2008) (holding that an

arrest based on probable cause does not violate the Fourth

Amendment, even if the relevant criminal offense is nonarrestable under state law).

However, because Virginia v. Moore does not answer the

8The district court found probable cause based on statutory authority to

arrest for the refusal to sign a Citation to Appear, see Wash. Rev. Code

§ 46.64.015, but then referenced Brooks’s “undisputed refusal to sign the

Notice.” Recognizing Brooks’s contentions that she did not refuse to sign

the Citation to Appear, our analysis is different. 

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4923

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 7 of 48
question of whether the Officers were following departmental

standards or are entitled to state law immunity, we march on.

Brooks’s arguments are all based on the premise that (1) she

could not be arrested for refusing to sign the Notice and (2)

although she could be arrested for refusing to sign the Citation, she never received it. However, she does not argue that

she was detained longer than was reasonably necessary under

Section 46.64.015 or that her conduct during that period of

detention could not provide grounds for lawful arrest.

[4] First, the Officers had clear authority for their initial

arrest and detention of Brooks. Brooks does not dispute that

her initial traffic violation permitted the Officers to arrest and

to detain her until they issued her a Notice. See Wash. Rev.

Code § 46.64.015 (2004) (“The arrested person, in order to

secure release, and when permitted by the arresting officer,

must give his or her written promise to appear in court as

required by the citation and notice by singing in the appropriate place . . .”).9

 In addition, Brooks’s refusal to sign the

Notice gave the Officers probable cause to continue to detain

her. Under Washington law, a police officer may arrest an

individual for committing a misdemeanor in his presence.

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.31.100. Failure to sign the Notice is a

misdemeanor. See Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.022 (making

failure to comply with Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.021(3),

which includes a requirement to sign the Notice, a misdemeanor). As there is no dispute that Brooks’s refusal to sign the

Notice took place in the presence of the Officers, there can be

no question that Washington law authorized her arrest.

[5] The Officers’ authority to arrest Brooks for these misdemeanors would ordinarily last no longer than necessary to

issue her a Citation. See Wash. Rev. Code § 46.64.015 (2004).

9

In 2006, the Washington legislature amended this statute to omit the

authorization to effect a custodial arrest for failure to sign the Citation to

Appear. See Wash. Rev. Code § 46.64.015. However, the earlier version

was applicable to the events of this case. 

4924 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 8 of 48
However, her conduct during this initial detention gave the

Officers probable cause to place her under custodial arrest for

other violations of state law—a point that Brooks does not

dispute. For instance, we find that probable cause existed to

arrest Brooks for obstructing an officer. See Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9A.76.020. “A person is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer if the person willfully hinders, delays, or

obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his

or her official powers or duties.” Id.; see Lassiter, 556 F.3d

at 1051, 1053 (listing the crime’s elements as “1) an action or

inaction that hinders, delays, or obstructs the officers; 2)

while the officers are in the midst of their official duties; 3)

the defendant knows the officers are discharging a public

duty; [and] 4) the action or inaction is done knowingly”). That

violation is a gross misdemeanor for which custodial arrest is

appropriate. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.76.020(3),

10.31.100. While trying to obtain Brooks’s signature on the

Notice, the officers were acting in the discharge of their official duties. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 46.61.021,

46.63.060(2)(j) (official duties when completing and issuing

Notice, which requires signature); State v. Richards, 36 P.3d

1119, (Wash. 2001) (official duties when seeking signature on

Citation to Appear).

[6] Based on Brooks’s undisputed uncooperative behavior,

a reasonably prudent person would have believed Brooks was

violating section 9A.76.020 by obstructing the Officers’

attempts to obtain her signature and complete the traffic stop.

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.020(1); see Lassiter, 556 F.3d at

1053 (finding probable cause to arrest an individual for

obstructing a police officer when that individual declined to

follow instructions and grabbed the officer’s arm when the

officer placed a hand on him). The record reflects that

Brooks’s detention was lengthened and the situation escalated

by her own resistance. The Officers were attempting—and

Brooks knew they were attempting—to complete and issue

the Notice by securing her signature on it as required by sections 46.61.021 and 46.63.060(2)(j). Her behavior interfered

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4925

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 9 of 48
with their lawful attempts to carry out that duty. Therefore,

the Officers had probable cause to arrest Brooks.

Additionally, Washington state courts have recognized that

although officers generally should issue citations for minor

traffic violations instead of making custodial arrests, there

might be “reasonable grounds” for making an arrest, such as

when “there was reasonable grounds to believe that the

accused will refuse to respond to a citation.” State v. Hehman,

578 P.2d 527, 528-29 (Wash. 1978); see State v. Covington,

144 Wash. App. 1012 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (finding it reasonable to believe that person without identification, claiming

not to own the vehicle he was driving, would disregard a

promise to appear on the citation if one were given); State v.

Jordan, 747 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (same);

State v. McIntosh, 712 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (same

and defendant also gave suspicious account of his activity on

evening of arrest).

[7] Even if Brooks never in fact received the Citation, her

conduct while in detention for the speeding violation and failure to sign the Notice made it reasonable to believe that she

also would not sign a Citation were one issued. Brooks has

admitted being uncooperative during her detention: she tried

to take her driver’s license away from Officer Ornelas; repeatedly refused his requests to sign the Notice; repeatedly

refused Officer Jones’s requests to do the same, even when

told it was her legal duty to sign; accused Officer Jones of

lying to her about the law and of racism; and became upset,

all while sitting in her car with the ignition running. Officer

Ornelas called for backup because of her behavior. When Sergeant Daman arrived at the scene, he asked her again to sign,

and she refused. Under these particular circumstances, it

would be reasonable to believe that serving Brooks the Citation would be futile. Therefore, even if Brooks’s account of

the incident were true, the futility of issuing the Citation

would provide the Officers probable cause to arrest her for

failure to sign the Notice.

4926 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 10 of 48
2. Excessive Force

[8] An excessive force claim is analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). This inquiry “requires

a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion

on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because reasonableness

“is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” the inquiry requires “attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including [1] the severity of

the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Id. These factors should be considered in relation to

the amount of force used. See Smith, 394 F.3d at 701. Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer

on the scene, making allowances for the split-second judgments officers are required to make in “tense, uncertain, and

rapidly-evolving” situations. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. 

The right to employ “some degree of physical coercion or

threat thereof” to effect an arrest accompanies the right to

make the arrest or investigatory stop, id. at 396, but the force

must be necessary to be reasonable, Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at

480. Where police have control over a suspect, the use of further force to bring the suspect under control may be unreasonable. See Headwaters Forest Def., 276 F.3d at 1125 (use of

pepper spray on protesters already under police control held

excessive). Officers are not required to use the least intrusive

means available; they simply must act within the range of reasonable conduct. See Scott v. Heinrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th

Cir. 1994). Determination of that reasonable range requires

consideration of the totality of the circumstances, Forrester v.

City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994),

including whether a warning was given, Deorle v. Rutherford,

272 F.3d 1272, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 2001), and the availability

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4927

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 11 of 48
of alternative methods of capturing and subduing a suspect,

Smith, 394 F.3d at 701-02. The fact that a suspect does not

threaten the officer does not shield him from the use of force.

See Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807-09 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when officers used injury-causing pain compliance techniques on passively resisting demonstrators). 

The Officers argue that the use of a Taser to gain Brooks’s

compliance—after previous unsuccessful, lawful attempts to

gain her cooperation and warnings the Taser would be used—

was not objectively unreasonable. The Officers note that a

Taser’s use in “drive-stun” mode inflicts only transitory,

localized pain. Applying the Graham factors, the Officers first

claim that the alleged crime was the more serious crime of

resisting arrest, not the failure to sign the Notice. Second, they

contend that, although Brooks initially posed only a minimal

risk, that risk escalated when she became confrontational and

refused to leave her running car. Third, and finally, they point

out that Brooks was actively resisting arrest by using force to

immobilize herself and remain in the car.

a. The Amount of Force

We first assess the quantum of force used by the Officers.

See Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir.

2007). The Officers claim there has been a significant misunderstanding of the force involved in the manner in which the

Taser was used here. We are inclined to agree. 

[9] The Taser’s use in “touch” or “drive-stun” mode—as

the Officers used it here—involves touching the Taser to the

body and causes temporary, localized pain only. According to

the SPD’s Use of Force Training Guideline,10 this usage was

10SPD’s policies, found constitutional by the district court, state that

officers must only use “the minimal amount of force necessary to overcome physical aggression or resistance to compliance with a lawful process.” The Use of Force Training Guideline provides context for that

general statement, presenting a continuum describing the suspect’s level

of resistance and the corresponding reasonable force which may be used

to react to that resistance. 

4928 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 12 of 48
considered a Level 1 tactic, akin to “pain compliance applied

through the use of distraction, counter-joint holds, hair control

holds, [and pepper spray]” and used to control passively or

actively resisting suspects. By contrast, applying a Taser in

dart mode (wherein darts are shot at the suspect from some

distance) achieves greater distance between the contact nodes

which can cause neuro-muscular incapacitation. In dart mode,

the Taser’s use is a Level 2 tactic to be employed only against

aggressive resistance. The district court did not differentiate

between the possible modes of use, noting only that the Taser

was discharged on Brooks’s thigh, shoulder, and neck, causing “a level of force (whether once or three times) that hurt

‘extremely bad,’ ” and constituted a “quantum leap” from the

previous force employed. These comments suggest the district

court thought the force used was severe. We find this to be an

overestimation that led the court to err in finding excessive

force. 

In two recent decisions, we addressed excessive force

claims involving the use of Tasers. See Mattos v. Agarano,

590 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that the

use of a Taser stun on a suspected domestic violence victim

while attempting to arrest her husband did not amount to

excessive force); Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.

2009) (holding that shooting a Taser gun at a disoriented,

half-naked man while stopping him for a seatbelt violation

constituted excessive force).

The Mattos court did not engage in an in-depth analysis of

the quantum of force involved in the use of a Taser. See 590

F.3d at 1087 (“[I]t is difficult for us to opine with confidence

regarding either the quantum of force involved in a deployment of a Taser gun or the type of force inflicted.”). In Mattos, a police officer applied a Taser directly to plaintiff’s back,

causing her to feel “an incredible burning and painful feeling

locking all of [her] joints.” Id. at 1085 (internal quotation

marks omitted; alteration in original). The panel, however,

cited conflicting testimony regarding the amount of force used

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4929

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 13 of 48
and the severity of plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 1087. It observed

that “the Taser, in general, is more than a non-serious or trivial use of force but less than deadly force,” and noted that

“[u]nfortunately, there is a lot of room between these end

points.” Id. The panel noted that “the record on this point is

not as developed as we could hope for,” but concluded that

“the Taser stun was a serious intrusion into the core of the

interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.”

11 Id. The Mattos panel did not differentiate drive-stun and dart modes, nor

did it differentiate the quantum of force used on Mattos from

the quantum of force used in Bryan.

The Bryan panel undertook a more detailed analysis of the

quantum of force. The panel concluded that the use of a

Taser, in a manner equivalent to dart mode, “constitute[s] an

intermediate, significant level of force that must be justified

by a strong government interest that compels the employment

of such force.” Bryan, 590 F.3d at 774 (internal quotation

marks omitted).12 In Bryan, a police officer discharged his

X26 Taser from a distance of approximately 20-25 feet,

embedding a barbed electrical probe into Bryan’s arm. Id. at

771. The X26’s powerful electrical pulse delivered an excruciating pain throughout Bryan’s body and caused Bryan to

lose all muscular control, fall face first onto the pavement,

shatter four front teeth, and suffer facial abrasions and swell11Although the Mattos panel appears to accept that the Taser was

deployed in drive-stun mode, see 590 F.3d at 1087 (“[D]efendant’s expert

conceded that a Taser in the drive stun mode induces subject control

through pain compliance . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)), Mattos’s description of a generalized loss of muscle control is more indicative

of a Taser in dart mode. She also claims to have “removed the Taser’s

prongs herself,” id., another characteristic of dart mode. 

12The holding in Bryan applied to the X26 Taser model and “all controlled electric devices that cause similar physiological effects.” See

Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772 n.2. Although this would clearly implicate the use

of a Taser in dart mode—which has similar physiological effects as the

X26—the localized, non-incapacitating effect of the drive-stun mode has

markedly different physiological effects. 

4930 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 14 of 48
ing. Id. He also needed to have the electrical barb surgically

removed from his flesh. Id. at 773. Because the pain inflicted

by the X26 Taser was “intense, [was] felt throughout the

body, and [was] administered by effectively commandeering

the victim’s muscles and nerves,” we held the X26 Taser to

be “an intermediate or medium, though not insignificant,

quantum of force.” Id. at 774-75.13

[10] The force at issue here is markedly different than the

force in Bryan, and, unlike in Mattos, we have the benefit of

a fully-developed record on the use of a Taser in drive-stun

mode. The use of the Taser in drive-stun mode is painful, certainly, but also temporary and localized, without incapacitating muscle contractions or significant lasting injury. Brooks

said she sustained burn marks and now has scars on her upper

arm and thigh, which is certainly not insignificant, but these

injuries are far less serious than those inflicted on Bryan by

the X26 Taser—excruciating pain throughout his entire body,

temporary paralysis, facial abrasions, shattered teeth, and a

sharp barb lodged into his flesh. Thus, the use of the Taser in

drive-stun mode—as opposed to dart mode—seems unlike the

force used in Bryan or uses of force which this court has previously considered severe. See, e.g., Davis, 478 F.3d at 1055

(holding that the force used was “extremely severe” when

officer slammed suspect head-first into the wall, breaking his

neck, then pressed to the ground by the officer’s knee and

punched); Smith, 394 F.3d at 701-02 (severe when officers

pepper sprayed suspect four times and sicced a police dog on

him three times while he was pinned down, then failed to

rinse the spray from his eyes and bite wounds). Indeed, the

13Other circuit and district court decisions have also found the Taser

dart application to be an intermediate amount of force. See, e.g., Draper

v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004); Sanders v. City of

Fresno, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1168 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (citing cases). But

see Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding a jury could

have found a Taser dart application unreasonable in light of testimony

about its “strong incapacitating effect” and the fact that the police department considered it just below deadly force on the force continuum). 

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4931

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 15 of 48
amount of force here was more on par with pain compliance

techniques,14 which this court has found involve a “less significant” intrusion upon an individual’s personal security than

most claims of force, even when they cause pain and injury.

Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807 (considering pain compliance techniques that caused bruises, pinched nerves, and a broken

wrist). Although certainly a “serious intrusion,” Mattos, 590

F.3d at 1087, when compared to the far more serious intrusion

in Bryan, we find the quantum of force here to be less than

the intermediate.15

b. The Graham Factors

i. Severity of the Crime

[11] Brooks was detained for refusing to sign her name on

the Notice. The Officers were attempting to take her into custody for refusing to sign the Citation to Appear (albeit erroneously, under the facts as Brooks states them). Neither of these

crimes were serious. As discussed above, see supra Part

III.A.1, Brooks’s behavior also gave the Officers probable

cause to arrest her under Washington Revised Code

§ 9A.76.020(1) for obstructing a police officer in the exercise

of his official duties. This court has held that in certain cir14The use of a Taser in drive-stun mode is considered a pain compliance

technique both by the SPD’s Use of Force Training Guideline and our

jurisprudence. See San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v.

City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 969 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). 

15Three recent, out-of-circuit cases involved the use of a Taser in drivestun mode, but none specifically address the quantum of force represented

by that usage. See Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491 (8th Cir.

2009); Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008); Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2008). We do not hold that the use of a Taser

in drive-stun mode can never amount to excessive force, but solely that

such use was not excessive based upon Brooks’s conduct. Cf. Brown, 574

F.3d at 498 (concluding that a material issue of fact existed as to excessive

force where officer applied Taser to frightened motor vehicle passenger

speaking to a 911 operator on her cell phone). 

4932 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 16 of 48
cumstances, obstruction of an officer can justify the use of a

Taser. See Mattos, 590 F.3d at 1087-88 (concluding that

plaintiff’s obstruction of her husband’s arrest made it more

likely that her husband would assault the officers). Although

obstructing an officer is a more serious offense than the traffic

violations,16 it is nonetheless not a serious crime. See id.;

Davis, 478 F.3d at 1055. This factor weighs in favor of finding the force excessive.

ii. Threat Posed to Officers or Bystanders

[12] The threat posed is the most significant Graham factor. See Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).

The district court found that Brooks posed no danger to the

public or officers because she never used or threatened force

against the Officers (using it only to immobilize herself) and

could not have hurt anyone with her car. The last point stems

from the court’s misunderstanding of the record; even Brooks

admits that the keys remained on the floorboard of her car and

were not in the Officers’ possession. Whether the keys were

on the floorboard or in the Officers’ possession, it seems clear

that Brooks was not going to be able to harm anyone with her

car at a moment’s notice. Nonetheless, some threat she might

retrieve the keys and drive off erratically remained, particularly given her refusal to leave the car and her state of agitation. 

[13] It would also be incorrect to say Brooks posed no

threat to officers. While she might have been less of a threat

because her force so far had been directed solely at immobilizing herself, a suspect who repeatedly refuses to comply

with instructions or leave her car escalates the risk involved

for officers unable to predict what type of noncompliance

16Obstruction of an officer is a gross misdemeanor, Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9A.76.020, while refusing to sign either the Notice or Citation to Appear

is a misdemeanor, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 46.61.021(1) (2004); id.

§ 46.61.022 (2009). 

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4933

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 17 of 48
might come next. A contemporaneous statement by Officer

Jones confirms this fear. That Brooks remained in her car,

resisting even the pain compliance hold the Officers first

attempted, also reveals that she was not under their control.

Finally, the Washington legislature’s action in making

obstructing an officer a gross misdemeanor for which custodial arrest is appropriate suggests that Brooks posed the sort

of threat that it was appropriate to remove from the streets.

See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.76.020(3), 10.31.100. Therefore,

Brooks may not have posed a great threat, she did pose some

threat by virtue of her continued non-compliance, which

weighs against finding the less-than-intermediate force excessive.

iii. Resistance to Arrest and Risk of Flight

[14] Though the risk of flight, as described above, was

present but small, there is little question that Brooks resisted

arrest: the district court noted she “does not deny that she

used force to resist the [O]fficers’ efforts,” she grasped the

steering wheel and wedged herself between the seat and steering wheel, and she refused to get out of the car when asked.

Brooks’s conduct was defined by the SPD Use of Force

Training Guideline as “actively resistant” because she

employed force to defeat the Officers’ attempts to control her.

Our precedent also classifies Brooks’s conduct as active resistance. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1442 (hiding and fleeing is resisting arrest and offering physical resistance to an officer’s

efforts constitutes a greater level of active resistance). While

Brooks’s resistance may not have been violent or aggressive,

those aspects are more relevant to the second Graham factor,

leaving the fact of her resistance here to weigh against finding

the force used excessive.

c. Totality of the Circumstances

In addition to the Graham factors described above, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances may look to

4934 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 18 of 48
other factors as well. See Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806 n.2. The

district court posited that the Officers could have controlled

Brooks with “less violence.” The availability of alternative

methods is a proper factor to consider, Smith, 394 F.3d at 701,

but it is unclear just how much it should be considered, given

that “the appropriate inquiry is whether the officers acted reasonably, not whether they had less intrusive alternatives available to them,” Scott, 39 F.3d at 915. Some cases speculate as

to available alternatives, see Davis, 478 F.3d at 1056, while

others look to expert testimony and departmental determinations as to whether less intrusive methods were available, see

id.; Smith, 394 F.3d at 703, and still others eschew hypothetical arguments about whether officers could have used methods less painful or injurious as being part of an impermissible

after-the-fact analysis, see Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807-08 & n.4;

cf. Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1188-89 (9th Cir.

2002) (recognizing that expert evidence about less intrusive

alternatives does not determine reasonableness). 

[15] We agree with the Forrester panel here: the district

court’s general and vague statement that there were “numerous other means of removing” Brooks reflects after-the-fact

speculation and fails to address what else these officers could

have done in the situation that confronted them at that

moment, when they needed to get the resistant Brooks out of

the car to arrest her. Furthermore, this case is unlike Smith

and Davis, where there was evidence suggesting it would

have been reasonable to use less force. Here, there has been

no departmental determination that the Officers could have

used alternative methods. Indeed, the Officers followed the

SPD’s Use of Force Training Guideline, applying pain compliance techniques (of which drive-stun Taser use was one) to

control an actively resisting suspect.17 It is true that two other

17The district court concluded the Officers did not follow SPD policy.

The court did not elaborate, but may have been referring to a violation of

the general statement that officers “shall only use the minimal amount of

force necessary to overcome . . . resistance to compliance.” Nonetheless,

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4935

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 19 of 48
pain compliance methods would have also been appropriate

under the policy in light of Brooks’s conduct—hair control

holds and pepper spray—but there is no indication those

would have been less intrusive or worked better, particularly

given that Brooks had already resisted one pain compliance

hold and, as a large woman, had proved difficult to dislodge.

Also the pepper spray’s effects would have lasted longer. See

LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 960-61 (9th

Cir. 2000) (describing pepper spray effects as lasting up to

forty-five minutes). We thus find the “availability of alternatives” factor does not weigh in favor of finding the Officers’

actions unreasonable.

[16] Other factors we have considered also weigh against

finding a constitutional violation. The Officers gave multiple

warnings that a Taser would be used and explained its effects.

See Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1284 (finding that warnings should be

given, when feasible, before force more serious than that

employed here is used); see also Bryan, 590 F.3d at 780 (considering the failure to give a warning as a factor militating

against the reasonableness of X26 Taser usage). While the

court may consider what the officers knew about a suspect’s

health, see Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir.

1994), the record indicates that, when the Officers discovered

Brooks’s pregnancy, they took steps to employ a localized

type of force away from her stomach. Brooks’s arrest was

supported by probable cause under Washington law and the

Officers’ use of force was in accordance with the SPD’s Use

of Force Training Guideline. See Smith, 394 F.3d at 703 (considering whether the officer’s conduct “violated applicable

police standards” in assessing the reasonableness of the force

that statement should be read in context with the Use of Force Training

Guideline, which spells out what force would be appropriate in response

to certain levels of non-compliance. The Officers’ Taser use was consistent with that Guideline. The district court found the SPD’s use-of-force

policy constitutional. 

4936 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 20 of 48
used). These factors thus mitigate against a finding of excessive force.

[17] The Taser was used three times in this case, which

constitutes a greater application of force than a single tasing.

Nonetheless, in light of the totality of the circumstances, this

does not push the use of force into the realm of excessive.

After the first use, Brooks did not communicate that she was

willing to comply with the Officers’ commands, but instead

started yelling and honking her horn, which would likely have

been perceived by the Officers as an escalation of her resistance. The same behavior followed the second tasing. The

third tasing moved Brooks to the right, at which point Officers Ornelas and Jones were able to extract her from the car.

Therefore, while using the Taser three times makes this a

closer case, we find that it does not show excessive force in

light of the corresponding escalation of Brooks’s resistance

and the fact that it was the third tasing that appeared to dislodge her such that the Officers could finally extract her from

her car and gain control over her.

[18] In conclusion, then, this case presents a less-thanintermediate use of force, prefaced by warnings and other

attempts to obtain compliance, against a suspect accused of a

minor crime, but actively resisting arrest, out of police control, and posing some slight threat to officers. In this situation,

we find, assuming all the facts in Brooks’s favor, that the

Officers’ behavior did not amount to a constitutional violation. See Arpin, 261 F.3d at 921-22 (finding no excessive

force when physical force was used to handcuff suspect who

had refused to cooperate with an officer’s requests for identification and stiffened her arm and attempted to pull free from

the officer); Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807-08 (9th Cir. 1994)

(finding no excessive force when injury-causing pain compliance holds were used against passively resisting demonstrators); see also Draper, 369 F.3d at 1278 (finding no excessive

force when officer used Taser gun to effect the arrest of an

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4937

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 21 of 48
uncooperative suspect for a traffic violation). Therefore, the

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.18

IV.

[19] Because the district court found that the Officers’ conduct amounted to excessive force, it declined to find qualified

immunity for the Officers on Brooks’s state law claims. See

Staats, 991 P.2d at 627-28 (holding that immunity is not

available for assault and battery claims “arising out of the use

of excessive force to effectuate an arrest”). However, because

we find the Officers’ use of force reasonable and not excessive under the Fourth Amendment, we reach the issue. Under

Washington law, force used by a police officer is not unlawful

“[w]henever necessarily used . . . in the performance of a

legal duty.” Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.020(1). Where the use

of force is reasonable, an officer is entitled to state law qualified immunity for assault and battery claims. See McKinney

v. City of Tukwila, 13 P.3d 631, 641 (Wash. App. 2000). As

discussed above, the Officers had probable cause under

Washington law to arrest Brooks for obstructing an officer in

18In light of our holding, we need not reach the second step of Saucier’s

qualified immunity inquiry. However, were we to conclude that the force

used was excessive, Brooks has not shown that the use of a Taser in drivestun mode in overcoming her resistance to arrest violated a clearly established constitutional right. The shortage of cases regarding this sort of

Taser usage, the Officers’ adherence to the SPD’s Use of Force Training

Guidelines, and the likely factual misunderstanding between the parties as

to what document Brooks had refused to sign all suggest that a reasonable

officer would not have known he was violating the law. See Mattos, 590

F.3d at 1089-90 (noting the lack of relevant case law involving Tasers at

the time of the incident, and concluding that “the officers’ conduct was not

so patently violative” of plaintiff’s constitutional rights that a reasonable

officer would know the action was unconstitutional) (citations omitted);

see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06 (holding that officers should not be

held to have violated the Constitution if they had a reasonable, but mistaken, belief as to whether the force used was legal in those circumstances), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct.

808 (2009). 

4938 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 22 of 48
the exercise of his official duties, did so at the behest of the

superior officer on the scene, and acted reasonably and in

accordance with the SPD’s Use of Force Training Guideline.

Thus, the Officers are entitled to immunity for these state law

claims.

V.

For the reasons discussed above, we REVERSE the district

court and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent. 

Here is what happened to Malaika Brooks, a pregnant

mother, as she was driving her son to school one day: Two,

soon three, police officers surrounded her. The officers

thought she was speeding in a school zone; she says she was

not. Brooks provided her identification when asked, so there

was no doubt who she was or where to find her. The officers

wrote her a ticket but she refused to sign it. Refusing to sign

a speeding ticket was at the time a nonarrestable misdemeanor; now, in Washington, it is not even that.1

 Brooks had no

weapons and had not harmed or threatened to harm a soul.

Although she had told the officers she was seven months

pregnant, they proceeded to use a Taser on her, not once but

three times, causing her to scream with pain and leaving burn

marks and permanent scars.

I fail utterly to comprehend how my colleagues are able to

1

In 2006, the Washington legislature amended the relevant statutes to

remove the requirement that the recipient of a notice of infraction sign the

notice. See 2006 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 270 (H.B. 1650). 

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4939

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 23 of 48
conclude that it was objectively reasonable to use any force

against Brooks, let alone three activations of a Taser, in

response to such a trivial offense. Obviously, the sensible

reaction to her refusal to acknowledge the ticket in writing

would have been to so note on the ticket and send her on her

way. Instead, a traffic offense — assuming it occurred —

turned into an encounter that inflicted physical and, in all likelihood, emotional pain on a citizen who was not in any way

dangerous to anyone. As “the situation here was far from that

of a lone police officer suddenly confronted by a dangerous

armed felon threatening immediate violence,” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001), we should be

holding the force used constitutionally excessive. But the

majority does the opposite: it sanctions the use of painful

force causing permanent scars against a citizen who threatened no harm. I have no choice but respectfully to dissent.

I. Background

As the majority’s fact recital glosses over some critical

facts, I begin by supplementing it briefly. 

Malaika Brooks was driving her eleven-year-old son to

school at the African American Academy when she was

stopped for speeding in a school zone.2 She gave the officer

her license and told her son to get out of the car and go to

school. The officer, Officer Ornelas, prepared a notice of

infraction and asked Brooks to sign it. Convinced it was not

she but the driver in front of her who had been speeding,

Brooks told Officer Ornelas she would not sign the ticket

because she did not want to admit fault. She also grabbed her

driver’s license from Officer Ornelas but gave it back after he

told her he still needed it.

2The ticket reports that she was driving 32 miles per hour, while the

posted speed limit was 20 miles per hour. 

4940 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 24 of 48
The other officer on the scene, Officer Jones, then also

asked Brooks to sign the ticket. She told him she would

accept the ticket but would not sign it, because she had not

been speeding. They began to argue: Officer Jones told

Brooks that signing the ticket was not an admission of guilt

and asked whether she could read. Brooks told Officer Jones

that she believed, based on past experience, that he was lying

about what it meant to sign the ticket, and that he was racist

for suggesting she could not read.3

The Officers allege that they also issued Brooks a criminal

citation and notice to appear because she would not sign the

notice of infraction and that she refused to sign that as well.

Brooks maintains she was only asked to sign the notice of

infraction. For purposes of this appeal, we are required to

view the facts in the light most favorable to Brooks, the nonmoving party, and so, as the majority recognizes, must

assume she was never asked to sign a criminal citation. 

Officer Jones told Brooks she would have to go to jail if

she did not sign the ticket. He called his sergeant, Sergeant

Daman, who soon arrived on the scene.4 Sergeant Daman

asked Brooks whether she would sign the ticket. When she

would not, he instructed Officers Ornelas and Jones to “book

her.” In response, Officer Ornelas told Brooks to get out of

the car. She refused. Officer Jones then produced his Taser.

He yelled at Brooks, asking her if she knew what the Taser

was, how many volts it had, and what it could do to her. She

told him she did not. She also told him that she was seven

months pregnant and needed to use the restroom.

3Several years earlier, Brooks had been cited for disregarding a stop

sign displayed by a school bus. Believing she was not guilty, Brooks

refused to sign the notice of infraction. She was then issued a criminal

citation for refusing to sign the notice; she also refused to sign the criminal

citation. The arresting officer called her supervisor, who instructed the

officer simply to give Brooks both tickets and allow her to leave. 

4

I refer to all three officers collectively as “the Officers.” 

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4941

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 25 of 48
Officers Ornelas and Jones began discussing where on

Brooks’s body they should use the Taser. Up to this point,

Brooks’s car was still running, but now Officer Ornelas

reached inside, turned off the ignition, and dropped the keys

on the floorboard. Brooks continued to refuse to get out of the

car: she gripped the steering wheel, braced her legs against

the floor, and yelled for help. Officer Ornelas pulled Brooks’s

left arm up behind her back and held it there while Officer

Jones activated his Taser against her body three times: once

on her thigh, once on her left arm, and once on her bare neck.

While the voltage was inflicted Brooks was unable to get out

of the car, as Officer Ornelas was still holding her arm behind

her back. She experienced “tremendous pain,” screamed for

help, and, instinctively, honked her horn. 

After using the Taser for the third time, the Officers

dragged Brooks from her car and laid her on her stomach in

the street. She continued yelling for help and told the Officers

they were hurting her stomach. They held her down until they

had handcuffed her; then they walked her to the patrol car and

drove her to the police station.

The Taser left burn marks on Brooks’s thigh, arm, and

neck. She has scars on her thigh and upper arm. Her doctor

has told her that the scar on her arm is likely permanent.

II. Probable Cause

At the outset, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that

the Officers had probable cause to place Brooks under custodial arrest. Whether Brooks’s arrest was lawful has implications for both the federal Fourth Amendment excessive force

inquiry and the question whether the Officers are entitled to

qualified immunity from Brooks’s state law claims.

First, the majority’s assertion that the Officers had “clear

authority for their initial arrest and detention of Brooks” is

incorrect. Maj. op. at 4924 (emphasis added). The Officers

4942 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 26 of 48
initially stopped Brooks for speeding in a school zone; that

offense is a civil infraction. See Seattle Mun. Code

§ 11.52.100; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 46.61.440, 46.63.020. All

the Officers had authority to do at that point was to “detain”

Brooks “for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify

[her], check for outstanding warrants, check the status of [her]

license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle’s registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction.”

Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.021 (2004); see also id. § 46.63.060

(2004).

The majority’s citation to Wash. Rev. Code § 46.64.015 in

its discussion of Brooks’s initial detention is thus misplaced.

That section refers not to a “notice of traffic infraction” but

to a “traffic citation and notice to appear in court,” which a

police officer may serve on a person who has committed a

traffic violation “punishable as a misdemeanor or by imposition of a fine.” Id.

In other words, the Officers did not have authority to arrest

Brooks and serve her with a citation and notice to appear until

she refused to sign the notice of infraction. Only then had she

committed a misdemeanor. See Wash. Rev. Code

§§ 46.61.022, 46.61.021 (2004). And even then, as the majority properly acknowledges, the Officers had no authority to

take Brooks into custodial arrest. Rather, they were entitled to

detain her only as long as “reasonably necessary to issue and

serve a citation and notice,” Wash. Rev. Code § 46.64.015

(2004) — which, according to Brooks, they never did. 

Because the record, viewed in the light most favorable to

Brooks, is bereft of facts to support a finding that the Officers

had probable cause to place Brooks under custodial arrest, the

majority, casting about for a theory, creates one from thin air:

The majority maintains that there was probable cause to arrest

Brooks for obstructing an officer. Brooks was never charged

with obstructing an officer,5 nor have the Officers ever sug5Brooks was charged with, but not convicted of, resisting arrest. The

Officers did not have probable cause to arrest Brooks for that offense

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4943

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 27 of 48
gested that they had probable cause to arrest Brooks on that

ground. Because the Officers never raised this theory in their

briefs, Brooks has had no opportunity to dispute it. I would

consider the question waived and not address it. See Outdoor

Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 900

(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125,

1138 (9th Cir. 2006).

In any event, the majority fails satisfactorily to explain how

Brooks “obstructed” the Officers in the discharge of their

powers or duties by refusing to sign the notice of infraction.

See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.020 (providing that “[a] person

is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer if the person

willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement

officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or

duties”). When they stopped Brooks for speeding in a school

zone, the Officers were entitled “to identify [her], check for

outstanding warrants, check the status of [her] license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle’s registration, and

complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction.” Wash. Rev.

Code § 46.61.021 (2004). Brooks’s refusal to sign the notice

of infraction — though a misdemeanor — did not prevent the

Officers from accomplishing any of those tasks. The Officers

were fully able to “complete and issue a notice of traffic

infraction” without obtaining Brooks’s signature. In fact, they

did so, writing “File Direct” in the space provided for

Brooks’s signature. A refusal to provide a name or current

address might have frustrated the Officers’ attempt to issue a

notice of infraction; the refusal to sign did not. The majority’s

attempt to elevate the misdemeanor of refusing to sign the

notice to the gross misdemeanor of obstructing an officer is

simply beyond the pale.

either: under Washington law, the crime of resisting arrest requires that the

underlying arrest be lawful. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.040. If the

Officers had no authority to take Brooks into custodial arrest to begin

with, then they had no probable cause to arrest her for resisting arrest. 

4944 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 28 of 48
Nor does the majority point to any authority supporting its

off-the-wall theory. The one case on the Washington

obstructing-an-officer offense the majority cites is certainly

no help. In Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049 (9th

Cir. 2009), the police responded to a 911 call from a neighbor

of Kenneth and Alpha Lassiter. The neighbor reported hearing

Kenneth threaten to cut Alpha’s throat, and other threats were

audible on the 911 recording. When the officers arrived at the

Lassiters’ home, Alpha reluctantly answered the door, then

lied and said no one else was home. The officers encountered

Kenneth standing between the living room and kitchen, and

they insisted he sit down so that they could investigate a possible assault. Kenneth repeatedly refused, and when an officer

put his hand on Kenneth, “ostensibly to guide him to a chair,”

Kenneth reacted by grabbing the officer’s arm. Id. at 1051.

We held that the police had probable cause to arrest Kenneth

for obstructing an officer because “[his] conduct made it

impossible for the police to carry out their duty. More than

just a momentary noncompliance with police orders, his conduct had the practical effect of precluding the officers from

securing the scene and investigating a possible assault.” Id. at

1053.

Brooks’s behavior was in no way similar to Kenneth Lassiter’s. Kenneth Lassiter repeatedly failed to obey the officers

and physically interfered with the officers’ attempt to require

him to do so, “ma[king] it impossible” for them to carry out

their duty. Id. Brooks initially cooperated with the Officers:

she pulled over promptly and produced her driver’s license

when asked to do so. As a result, the Officers were able to

carry out their duty of identifying her and issuing a notice of

traffic infraction. Then she refused to sign the notice. That’s

it. There was noncompliance with a police request, but where

is the “obstruction”?

Far more similar to Brooks’s behavior, although considerably more colorable as an obstruction offense, is the behavior

of the plaintiff in Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir.

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4945

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 29 of 48
1993). Palmer, stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, submitted to two field sobriety tests, but then told the

officer he was tired of taking tests and returned to his car.

Palmer offered to answer questions in his car or to accompany

the officer to the police station to take a breath test. We held

that these facts, if credited, established that “no reasonable

officer could believe there was probable cause to arrest

Palmer for ‘obstructing a public servant,’ ” because Palmer,

though uncooperative, did not actually flee the scene. Id. at

1437. 

The majority should have reached the same result here as

in Palmer. Brooks stopped her car, she provided identification, and the Officers issued a notice of infraction. The failure

to sign the notice no more prevented the Officers from carrying out their duty than did Palmer’s refusal to cooperate further after taking two field sobriety tests. 

In short, there was just no cause to arrest Brooks for

obstructing an officer. None. That is probably why the Officers have never suggested that there was.

The majority also comes up with an alternative theory to

justify the custodial arrest, also never argued by the Officers

and so also waived, relying on State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527

(Wash. 1978). This approach is not a whit better on the merits

than the majority’s other creation.

Hehman held that custodial arrest is generally not proper

for a minor traffic violation, id. at 529, but suggested that

such an arrest might be permissible “when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused will refuse to respond

to a citation.” Id. at 528 (quoting ABA Standards Relating to

Pretrial Release § 2.1 (Tent. Draft Mar. 1968)). In all three

cases adopting that suggestion cited by the majority, including

one unpublished decision by the Washington Court of

Appeals, the person arrested failed to produce any identification and either did not own or did not claim to own the vehi4946 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 30 of 48
cle he was driving. See State v. Covington, 144 Wash. App.

1012 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (unpublished); State v. Jordan,

747 P.2d 1096 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); State v. McIntosh, 712

P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). The Washington courts have

never approved a custodial arrest for a non-arrestable offense

where the driver, like Brooks, produced identification and

owned the car she was driving. No case supports the majority’s assertion that limited uncooperative behavior is enough to

provide “reasonable grounds to believe that the accused will

refuse to respond to a citation.” Hehman, 578 P.2d at 528.

Here, Brooks’s explanation for her refusal to sign was that

she did not want to indicate she was guilty, not that she

intended to ignore the ticket. And, given that the Officers had

and recorded Brooks’s name and address, there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the City would be unable

to hold Brooks accountable for the infraction or misdemeanor.

Thus, Washington’s narrow exception to the usual preclusion

of custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation does not apply,

and the majority’s conclusion that the Officers had probable

cause to place Brooks under custodial arrest for the traffic

violation itself is wrong.

The absence of probable cause to support a custodial arrest

affects both the excessive force inquiry and the question

whether the Officers are entitled to state qualified immunity.

III. Excessive Force

Because I find the majority’s excessive force analysis

entirely unpersuasive at each turn, I revisit each step of the

objective reasonableness inquiry under Graham v. Connor,

beginning with “the nature and quality of the intrusion on

[Brooks’s] Fourth Amendment interests.” Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471

U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4947

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 31 of 48
A. Nature and Quality of Intrusion

I begin from the proposition that “[t]he three factors articulated in Graham, and other factors bearing on the reasonableness of a particular application of force, are not to be

considered in a vacuum but only in relation to the amount of

force used to effect a particular seizure.” Smith v. City of

Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chew v.

Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994)). The majority

acknowledges this court’s determination in Mattos v. Agarano, 590 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), that a single

application of a Taser in drive-stun mode to the back of a suspect’s hand amounted to “a serious intrusion into the core of

the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment: the right to

be ‘secure in [our] persons.’ ” Id. at 1087 (quoting U.S.

CONST. amend IV). Nonetheless, the majority minimizes the

amount of force the Officers used against Brooks in two different ways: (1) it distinguishes between the Taser’s two operating modes, the more commonly employed dart mode and

the drive-stun mode used in this case, and (2) it compares the

drive-stun mode to “pain-compliance techniques.” Neither

consideration has anything to do with the factors that really

matter here: The force used was quite painful, and it left permanent scars.

As to the majority’s first factor, we have held that Tasers

used in dart mode “constitute an intermediate, significant

level of force that must be justified by a strong government

interest that compels the employment of such force.” Bryan v.

McPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 774-75 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d

1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations and brackets

omitted). The majority observes that using a Taser in drivestun mode does not cause the same neuromuscular incapacitation that the dart mode produces. Noting that the Taser

deployment in Bryan caused the suspect to fall to the pavement and shatter his teeth, the majority concludes that, “when

compared to the far more serious intrusion in Bryan, we find

4948 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 32 of 48
the quantum of force here to be less than the intermediate.”

Maj. op. at 4932. But in Mattos, we characterized the single

activation of a Taser in drive-stun mode as a “serious intrusion.” And the Eighth Circuit in Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491 (8th Cir. 2009), held that a reasonable jury

could find that a single application of a Taser in drive-stun

mode to the arm of an individual suspected of committing a

“minor, nonviolent crime[ ]” and who posed no “realistic

threat to [the officer’s] safety” constituted excessive force. Id.

at 497-98. Although the court explained the difference

between the dart and drive-stun modes, id. at 495 n.3, the distinction played no role in the court’s excessive force analysis.

As to the majority’s second factor, the majority minimizes

the amount of force used in this case by equating it to “paincompliance techniques,” which it asserts “this court has found

involve a ‘less significant’ intrusion upon an individual’s personal security than most claims of force.” Maj. op. at 4932

(quoting Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807 (9th

Cir. 1994)). The majority states, somewhat misleadingly, that

“[t]he use of a Taser in drive-stun mode is considered a pain

compliance technique . . . by . . . our jurisprudence.” Maj. op.

at 4932 n.14 (citing San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 969 n.8 (9th Cir.

2005)). But San Jose Charter did not distinguish between

Taser modes or even mention the drive-stun mode; it simply

noted that the officers in that case “did not bring with them

any of the variety of non-lethal ‘pain compliance’ weapons

used by police forces, such as tasers or stunbag shotguns.”

402 F.3d at 969 n.8. 

In fact, that footnote defeats the majority’s suggestion that

pain-compliance techniques are necessarily a “less significant” intrusion than most claims of force. The other paincompliance weapon identified in the footnote, a stunbag shotgun, has been recognized by this court as capable of causing

“grave physical injury.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1279 (holding

that “the degree of force used by [the officer] is permissible

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4949

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 33 of 48
only when a strong governmental interest compels the

employment of such force,” id. at 1280). Moreover, we have

held that Forrester cannot be read so broadly as to apply to

all so-called pain-compliance techniques:

Forrester did not hold that pain compliance techniques are constitutionally permissible as a matter of

law. Nor did it establish a rule of qualified immunity

for the use of pain compliance techniques to arrest

passively resisting misdemeanants. Forrester simply

held that whether the use of [Orcutt Police Nonchakus, two sticks of wood connected at one end by

a cord] as a pain compliance technique constituted

excessive force was a question of fact that was properly submitted to the jury for its decision.

Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt (Headwaters I), 240 F.3d 1185, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other

grounds, 534 U.S. 801 (2001) (internal quotation omitted). 

The majority’s emphasis on placing a specific Taser mode

in a predetermined category of degree of force for purposes

of a Graham analysis is thus entirely wrongheaded. In short,

“[r]ather than relying on broad characterizations, we must

evaluate the nature of the specific force employed” on Brooks

in this case. Bryan, 590 F.3d at 774; see Deorle, 272 F.3d at

1279 (considering the specific effects of the force used on the

suspect as part of the quantum of force inquiry).

Doing so, I would conclude that the degree of force used

on Brooks was significant. Before Officer Jones used his

Taser on Brooks, Officer Ornelas pulled her left arm up

behind her back and held it there. That “pain-compliance”

hold prevented Brooks from complying with the Officers’

subsequent demands that she get out of her car. While Brooks

was thus immobilized, Officer Jones used his Taser on her

three times: first he applied it to her thigh, then he “dug it

into” her left arm, and finally he deployed it against her bare

4950 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 34 of 48
neck. At least on the second and third uses, Officer Jones

cycled the Taser through its full five-second cycle while

Brooks screamed for help. Brooks experienced “tremendous

pain,” fear, and “shock.” She began crying and instinctively

honked her horn. The Officers then dragged Brooks from the

car, laid her on her stomach in the street, and held her down

while they handcuffed her, despite her protestations that she

was pregnant and they were hurting her stomach. The Taser

left burn marks on Brooks’s thigh, shoulder, and neck. It also

left scars, including a scar on her arm that is probably permanent. 

In sum, the Officers inflicted a significant and frightening

amount of force at a time when Brooks was already immobilized by a pain-compliance hold. The three Graham factors,

and other factors bearing on reasonableness, must be considered in light of that force.

B. Governmental Interests at Stake

1. Severity of the Crime

“The character of the offense is often an important consideration in determining whether the use of force was justified.”

Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280. As the majority recognizes, for purposes of this appeal the only crime Brooks committed was the

misdemeanor of refusing to sign the notice of infraction. Maj.

op. at 4919 n.3. The majority acknowledges that that crime

was not “serious.” Id. at 4932. In fact, it was trivial. At the

time, it was not an arrestable offense, and today, the signature

requirement no longer exists. See 2006 Wash. Legis. Serv.

Ch. 270 (H.B. 1650). This factor favors Brooks overwhelmingly.

Even if the majority is correct that there was probable cause

to arrest Brooks for obstructing an officer, that crime, as committed by Brooks (if it was), was also minor. See Davis v. City

of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007)

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4951

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 35 of 48
(“Trespassing and obstructing a police officer, as those

offenses were committed by [the suspect], are by no means

such serious offenses as to provide an officer with a reasonable basis for subduing a person by the means employed by

Officer Miller.”); Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281-82 (holding that

“the crime being committed, if any, was minor” where the

suspect “was charged with nothing more than obstructing the

police in the performance of their duties”). 

This court has held that crimes significantly more severe

than obstructing an officer do not justify the use of force

against a suspect. In Smith, the suspect’s wife called the

police to report that he had physically abused her. Acknowledging “the seriousness and reprehensibility of domestic

abuse,” the court nonetheless held that “the circumstances are

not such in this case as to warrant the conclusion that Smith

was a particularly dangerous criminal or that his offense was

especially egregious.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 702-03. The court

concluded that “the nature of the crime at issue provides little,

if any, basis for the officers’ use of physical force.” Id. at 703.

In comparison, Brooks was many fathoms from being a “dangerous criminal.” She was not suspected of harming anyone

at all, just of refusing to sign a piece of paper. The crimes she

is alleged to have committed were trivial and provided no justification for the use of any force, let alone the significant

force the Officers employed.

The majority points to Mattos, in which this court held that

using a Taser against a woman charged with obstructing government operations did not constitute excessive force. See 590

F.3d at 1089. In Mattos, however, the police had responded

to a domestic violence call, and the woman’s actions prevented them from arresting her husband, who was “belligerent

and appeared to be intoxicated.” Id. at 1088. The court considered the situation particularly dangerous and noted that

“more officers are killed or injured on domestic violence calls

than on any other type of call.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005)). We acknowl4952 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 36 of 48
edged that obstructing the officers was “not a serious crime,”

but also took into consideration the judgment that the

woman’s actions “carried the potential for a far more serious

crime — assault on an officer.” Id. Preventing officers from

arresting another person who appears to pose some danger to

them is a far cry from refusing to sign a traffic ticket. Mattos

does nothing to suggest that Brooks’s crime was anything but

minor.

2. Immediate Threat to the Safety of Others

The “most important single element of the three [Graham]

factors [is] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to

the safety of the officers or others.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 702

(quoting Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441) (emphasis added). Had the

majority applied this factor correctly, it is inconceivable that

it would have determined that Brooks presented an “immediate threat.” Instead, the majority excises the word “immediate” from the inquiry, departs from the record to speculate

about actions Brooks might have taken, and concludes, rather

inexplicably, that a mother driving her son to school did pose

“some threat.” Maj. op. at 4934. That is not true on this record

and, in any event, under Graham, not enough.

The majority offers three reasons for its conclusion that

Brooks posed “some threat.” None is remotely convincing. 

First, the majority suggests Brooks might have retrieved

her car keys from the floorboard, where Officer Ornelas had

dropped them, and “drive[n] off erratically.” Id. at 4933. To

begin with, it is very unlikely that Brooks, who was seven

months pregnant and weighed over 240 pounds, was even

capable of getting to her keys, restarting the ignition, and

driving off before the Officers could stop her. Nor is there any

indication whatever in the record that Brooks was inclined to

flee. Had she been, she had ample opportunity to do so;

instead, she provided identifying information when asked and

waited while Officer Ornelas wrote a ticket. 

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4953

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 37 of 48
Even if Brooks were somehow able to retrieve her keys and

drive off, it is purely speculative to suggest that her driving

might have been “erratic” and posed some threat to the Officers or others. This case is nothing like Miller v. Clark

County, 340 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003), in which the officer

“was entitled to assume that [the suspect] posed an immediate

threat,” in part because the officer knew he “was a felony suspect wanted for the crime of attempting to flee from police by

driving a car with a wanton or willful disregard for the lives

. . . of others, . . . a crime that evinces a willingness to threaten

others’ safety in an attempt to escape responsibility for past

crimes.” Id. at 965 (internal citation omitted). Brooks was not

a felony suspect, and she had never shown any propensity to

flee from the police, whether “with a wanton or willful disregard for the lives of others” or otherwise. Moreover, the

majority’s imagined scenario certainly does not qualify as an

“immediate threat,” and the majority admits as much, stating

that “it seems clear that Brooks was not going to be able to

harm anyone with her car at a moment’s notice.” Maj. op. at

4933. 

The stacked-up, unsubstantiated speculations that Brooks

might have been able to retrieve the keys and might have

decided to drive off (although she did not when she had the

keys) and might have driven erratically if she did drive off

and might have endangered people had she done so simply

won’t do as a basis for believing Brooks posed a danger to

someone. Indeed, if Officer Ornelas really believed she was

going to take off and endanger people, all he had to do was

hold on to the keys rather than drop them in the car.

Second, the majority contends that Brooks posed a threat to

the Officers’ safety because she had refused to comply with

their demands that she leave her car, and they were “unable

to predict what type of noncompliance might come next.” Id.

at 4933-34. Like the earlier suggestion that Brooks might

retrieve her keys and drive off erratically, the suggestion that

she might engage in some unpredictable and dangerous act of

4954 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 38 of 48
noncompliance is based on nothing. “The record does not

reveal an articulable basis for believing that [Brooks] was

armed or that [she] posed an immediate threat to anyone’s

safety.” Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441. On the contrary, she had just

dropped her son off at school, she was not suspected of any

but the most trivial of crimes, she was unarmed, and she sat

wedged in a car that was not running and in which she could

not easily reach her keys. She had not harmed or threatened

to harm anyone. Officer Ornelas had performed a warrant

check and found that she was “all clear.” Given all of that,

there is just no evidence that Brooks posed any threat to anyone’s safety, let alone an immediate threat — much less so,

in fact, than in other cases in which we have held that there

was no realistic danger to officers or others. See Smith, 394

F.3d at 702 (holding that, despite the suspect’s agitation and

his initial refusal to remove his hands from his pockets, “a

rational jury could very well find that he did not, at any time,

pose a danger to the officers or others” because there was “no

indication in the record that . . . there was any reason to

believe that he possessed any weapon,” and he “made no

threats, verbal or physical, toward [the officer] or anyone

else”); Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281-82 (concluding that “the danger to [the officer] and others appears to have been minimal”

where the suspect was emotionally disturbed but “had discarded his crossbow . . . and carried only a bottle or a can”

and “had not harmed or attempted to harm anyone”); Chew,

27 F.3d at 1442 (holding that a rational jury could “easily”

find that a suspect who fled a traffic stop and hid in a scrap

yard for ninety minutes but did not “engage[ ] in any threatening behavior during this time” ”posed no immediate safety

threat to anyone”).

The majority cites Officer Jones’s incident report, which

recounts his assessment of the situation as “very dangerous.”

But “a simple statement by an officer that he fears for his

safety or the safety of others is not enough; there must be

objective factors to justify such a concern.” Deorle, 272 F.3d

at 1281. Officer Jones says he was concerned because the car

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4955

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 39 of 48
was still running. But by the time Officer Jones used his Taser

on Brooks, it was not running. Officer Ornelas had already

taken the keys from the ignition and dropped them on the

floorboard. The majority is unable to point to any objective

factors to justify Officer Jones’s perception that the situation

was so dangerous that he needed to use his Taser — not once,

but three times — on a pregnant woman ensconced in a car.

Finally, the majority relies, entirely inappropriately, on the

Washington legislature’s determination that obstructing an

officer is an arrestable offense to conclude that “Brooks posed

the sort of threat that it was appropriate to remove from the

streets.” Maj. op. at 4934. First, as I have already explained,

Brooks was not even arguably guilty of obstructing an officer.

Second, it cannot be the case that every person who obstructs

an officer also “poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 702. “[A]n officer’s use

of force must be objectively reasonable based on his contemporaneous knowledge of the facts.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281.

This court cannot judge whether a suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of others simply by looking to whether

she is suspected of an arrestable offense. Instead, there must

be an “articulable basis” in the record for believing the suspect is not only a suspect but a dangerous one. Chew, 27 F.3d

at 1441. In this case, it is clear there was no such basis, “articulable” or otherwise. Thus, this “most important” Graham

factor weighs heavily in Brooks’s favor. Smith, 394 F.3d at

702.

3. Resistance to Arrest or Evading Arrest by Flight

The third Graham factor is whether the suspect was “actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

Smith, 394 F.3d at 701 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

The majority begins by asserting that “the risk of flight . . .

was present.” Again, that is the wrong inquiry. The question

is not whether Brooks might have been able to flee had she

decided to try, but whether she was “attempting to evade

4956 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 40 of 48
arrest by flight.” See Smith, 394 F.3d at 703 (“Smith did not

attempt to run from the officers.”). It is clear from the record

that she was not.

As to the question of resisting arrest, the majority is likely

correct that Brooks’s conduct would have been classified as

“actively resistant” under the Seattle Police Department’s Use

of Force Training Guideline. The guideline defines an “actively resistant” suspect as one who “physically tenses his or

her muscles and/or locks their arms and legs using resistive

tension to avoid being controlled by the officer.” Brooks does

not dispute the Officers’ report that she held on to the steering

wheel and braced her legs against the floor to avoid being

pulled from her car. 

All told, however, Brooks’s resistance was minimal. The

majority misleads when it says she “employed force to defeat

the Officers’ attempts to control her.” Maj. op. at 4934.

Although she tensed her muscles to prevent her own body

from being moved, she did not use force against the Officers.

This level and type of resistance, if it weighs against a finding

of excessive force at all, does so only slightly. See Smith, 394

F.3d at 702-03 (concluding that the suspect’s resistance was

not “particularly bellicose” because “he did not attack the

officers,” even though he “continually ignored the officers’

requests to remove his hands from his pajamas and to place

them on his head” and “shout[ed] expletives at the officers”);

see also Davis, 478 F.3d at 1056 (holding that a suspect who

was “somewhat uncooperative and resisted [the officer’s]

attempts to search his pockets” was not “actively resisting

arrest”).

C. Totality of the Circumstances

An additional factor this court may consider in its Graham

analysis is whether the Officers’ conduct “violated applicable

police standards.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 703. This factor is particularly important in a case, like this one, in which there was

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4957

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 41 of 48
no probable cause to support a custodial arrest. According to

the Seattle Police Department’s Policy and Procedure Manual,

an officer may “use only the minimal amount of force necessary to overcome physical aggression or resistance to compliance with a lawful process.” (Emphasis added.) Also, nondeadly force is justified only when “necessarily used . . . [i]n

the performance of a legal duty.”

Officer Ornelas, testifying in Brooks’s criminal trial, confirmed that departmental regulations prohibited taking Brooks

into custody for refusing to sign the notice of infraction:

PROSECUTOR: So, then just so I make sure I am

clear then and to make sure I’m not misunderstanding, although she refused to sign the speeding ticket,

which itself is a crime, you did not book her for that.

ORNELAS: Correct, sir.

PROSECUTOR: Could you within your discretion if

you had wanted to at that point?

ORNELAS: Do what, sir?

PROSECUTOR: Arrest her for refusing to sign the

speeding ticket —

ORNELAS: No, sir.

Because the Officers knew they had no authority to effect a

custodial arrest, they were not performing a legal duty and

Brooks was not refusing to comply “with a lawful process.”

Under the Seattle Police Department’s own policies, then, the

Officers were not justified in using any force. The Officers’

failure to comply with departmental standards is evidence a

jury could rely on in deciding that the repeated use of a Taser

— any Taser — on Brooks was unreasonable. See Smith, 394

F.3d at 703.

4958 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 42 of 48
The court may also consider the availability of alternative

methods of dealing with a suspect that adequately ensure that

the suspect will be subject to conviction and punishment. Cf.

Smith, 394 F.3d at 703. The majority rejects the district

court’s finding that there were “numerous other means of

removing” Brooks from her car, characterizing that finding as

“reflect[ing] after-the-fact speculation and fail[ing] to address

what else these officers could have done in the situation that

confronted them at that moment, when they needed to get the

resistant Brooks out of the car to arrest her.” Maj. op. at 4935.

The flaw in the majority’s reasoning is its underlying assumption: that the Officers “needed” to remove Brooks from her

car. 

Again, the Officers had no authority to effect a custodial

arrest. They had already obtained Brooks’s name and address

on the notice of infraction, and there was no need to compel

her to sign the notice. The Officers could simply make a notation indicating that Brooks had not signed — in fact, they did

exactly that. The clear alternative open to the Officers in this

case — and one infinitely more sensible than the route they

chose — was to allow Brooks to go on her way.

Finally, the majority maintains that the Officers’ decision,

upon being informed of Brooks’s pregnancy, “to employ a

localized type of force away from her stomach . . . . mitigate[s] against a finding of excessive force.” Id. at 4936. I fail

to see how the majority could so conclude. The Officers could

not have known how this woman who was seven months

pregnant would respond, physically or psychologically, to the

repeated application of thousands of volts of electricity to any

part of her body. They could not be sure, for instance, that the

pain and shock would not cause premature labor. See March

of Dimes, Preterm Labor and Birth: A Serious Pregnancy

Complication (April 2008), http://www.marchofdimes.com/

pnhec/188_1080.asp (citing physical abuse and stress as risk

factors for premature labor). Brooks’s physical condition militates in favor of finding excessive force.

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4959

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 43 of 48
In sum, Brooks committed a trivial, nonviolent, and nonarrestable crime. There is no evidence that she posed any threat

at all to the safety of the Officers or others. Her resistance was

minimal and nonviolent and she was not attempting to flee.

The Officers violated departmental standards by using force

when they had no authority to effect a custodial arrest. 

In these circumstances, no amount of force was justified.

For “the essence of the Graham . . . analysis is that the force

which was applied must be balanced against the need for that

force: it is the need for force which is at the heart of the Graham factors. . . . [W]here there is no need for force, any force

used is constitutionally unreasonable.” Headwaters I, 240

F.3d at 1199 (internal quotations omitted). And, just as the

Eighth Circuit held in Brown that a reasonable jury could find

that a single application of a Taser in drive-stun mode to the

arm of an individual suspected of committing a “minor, nonviolent crime[ ]” and who posed no “realistic threat to [the

officer’s] safety” constituted excessive force, 574 F.3d at 498,

so there is no question whatever that a reasonable jury could

find that the repeated use of a Taser on a woman driving her

son to school whose only crime was refusing to sign a notice

of infraction was objectively unreasonable.

D. Qualified Immunity

Because I think it obvious that the Officers violated

Brooks’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure by using (grossly) excessive force on her, I reach the second step of the qualified immunity inquiry: whether the right

violated was clearly established in a “particularized . . .

sense.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled

on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808

(2009). The question is whether the Officers’ “use of force

was premised on a reasonable belief that such force was lawful, or . . . ‘whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confront4960 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 44 of 48
ed.’ ” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202).

Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the relative scarcity

of federal cases resolving excessive force claims arising from

the use of Tasers does not preclude a denial of qualified

immunity. “[N]otwithstanding the absence of direct precedent, the law may be, as it was here, clearly established. Otherwise, officers would escape responsibility for the most

egregious forms of conduct simply because there was no case

on all fours prohibiting that particular manifestation of unconstitutional conduct.” Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285-86 (internal

citation omitted). When there is no case law directly on point,

the question we must ask is “whether the state of the law at

the time of the alleged wrong gave the defendants fair warning that their alleged treatment of the plaintiff was unconstitutional.” Davis, 478 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 741 (2002)) (internal quotations and brackets omitted).

Here, there is “no question that any reasonable officer

would have known that the force used was excessive, from an

elementary understanding of the obligations of law enforcement officers toward all individuals in the community they

serve as well as from a review of the well-established law.”

Davis, 478 F.3d at 1056-57. This is not a close case. Any reasonable officer should have known that using a Taser repeatedly on a pregnant woman who had committed a trivial,

nonviolent crime and who posed no realistic threat to the

safety of others was unlawful. Even if the Officers did irrationally perceive some threat at the time (rather than developing

a post-hoc explanation for their behavior), that would not suffice; a reasonable officer would not have seen any danger in

the objective circumstances. And “a number of our cases . . .

inform law enforcement officers of their obligation under the

Constitution to refrain from the use of excessive force.” Id.

Just as Brown, 574 F.3d at 499, held that “[a]t the time [the

officer] deployed his Taser and arrested [the plaintiff], the law

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4961

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 45 of 48
was sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable officer that it

was unlawful to Taser a nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant

who was not fleeing or resisting arrest, who posed little to no

threat to anyone’s safety,” so I would hold the law here sufficiently clear to inform the Officers that using a Taser, in any

mode, to subdue Brooks was unconstitutional. See Bryan, 590

F.3d at 782 (“No reasonable officer confronting a situation

where the need for force is at its lowest — where the target

is a nonviolent, stationary misdemeanant twenty feet away —

would have concluded that deploying intermediate force without warning was justified.”).6

For these reasons, the Officers are not entitled to summary

judgment on Brooks’s § 1983 claim.

IV. State Qualified Immunity

Nor are the Officers entitled to qualified immunity from

Brooks’s state law claims. Under Washington law, qualified

immunity is not available “for claims of assault and battery

arising out of the use of excessive force to effectuate an

arrest.” Staats v. Brown, 991 P.2d 615, 627-28 (Wash. 2000).

Even if there were no excessive force, however, I would still

disagree with the majority’s grant of state qualified immunity,

because the Officers effected a custodial arrest in contravention of Washington law.

6Although the majority does not reach the second step of the qualified

immunity inquiry, it notes that this court held in Mattos that “it would not

have been clear to any reasonable officer on August 23, 2006, that use of

a Taser in the situation they confronted was constitutionally impermissible.” 590 F.3d at 1089. Again, however, the Mattos court focused on the

domestic violence context in distinguishing Bryan and reaching its conclusion: “The officers used the Taser only once in a domestic violence situation that could have quickly become much more dangerous to everyone

involved.” Id. at 1090. Here, the Officers used the Taser multiple times in

a situation utterly devoid of the indicators of dangerousness present in

Mattos. 

4962 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 46 of 48
The standard for Washington state qualified immunity is

different from the standard for qualified immunity under federal law. See Staats, 991 P.2d at 627. Under Washington law,

an officer is entitled to qualified immunity from state law

assault and battery claims only if the officer “(1) carries out

a statutory duty, (2) according to procedures dictated to him

by statute and superiors, and (3) acts reasonably.” Id. (internal

quotation omitted). An officer does not fulfill his statutory

duty when he “consummate[s] the arrest contrary to existing

court rule and statute.” Id. Also, “an arrest amounting to a

statutory violation [cannot] be ‘reasonable.’ ” Id.

Applying these rules in Staats, the Washington Supreme

Court denied state qualified immunity to a state fish and wildlife officer whose actions were similar to those of the Officers

in this case. Id. at 626-28. The plaintiff in Staats refused to

provide the defendant wildlife patrol officer with identification. After the “quite heated discussion” that followed Staats’s

refusal, the officer arrested him for “refusing to cooperate to

receive a citation, contrary to former RCW 75.10.040

(1992).” Id. at 618. At that point, Staats “sidestepped and

attempted to walk away” from the officer. Id. The officer then

grabbed him and allegedly “slammed” him to the ground. The

officer also purportedly “pulled Staats’ ears straight out from

his head causing extreme pain and suffering.” Id. Staats was

later charged with both “refus[ing] to give information to an

officer performing his duties, contrary to former RCW

75.10.040,” and “resisting arrest, contrary to RCW

9A.76.040.” Id.

After reviewing the text of Wash. Rev. Code § 75.10.040

and the case law interpreting the statute, the court concluded

that Staats’s “arrest for refusal to provide identification” was

unlawful because “(1) simply withholding information is not

criminal resistance under [the] statute as a matter of law, and

(2) [the officer] was not acting in discharge of a duty when

he demanded information to support issuance of a citation he

had no lawful authority to issue.” Id. at 623. The court further

BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE 4963

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 47 of 48
held that, because the officer had “consummated the arrest

contrary to existing court rule and statute,” he was not entitled

to state qualified immunity. Id. at 627.

In this case, as I have explained, the relevant statutes did

not permit the Officers to take Brooks into custody for refusing to sign the notice of infraction. Thus, the Officers “consummated the arrest contrary to existing . . . statute.” Id. That

statutory violation also made the Officers’ conduct unreasonable. See id. Under Washington law, the Officers are not entitled to summary judgment on Brooks’s state law claims.

V. Conclusion

For these reasons, I would affirm the district court’s order

denying summary judgment to the Officers. I respectfully dissent.

4964 BROOKS v. CITY OF SEATTLE

Case: 08-35526 03/26/2010 ID: 7279290 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 48 of 48