Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02655/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02655-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 To the extent Petitioner’s Reply moves for default judgment against Respondents for failure

to timely file their Answer, the motion is without merit. Respondents’ Motion for Extension of Time

was granted by the Court and the Answer was accepted by the Court as timely filed. (Doc. No. 22.)

In addition, the Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. No. 27) by Order dated

April 15, 2008. (Doc. No. 29.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Martinez Gonzalez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Martin McDaniel, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV-06-2655-PHX-GMS (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Jose Martinez Gonzalez, who is presently confined at the Diamondback

Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the Court are the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 9), Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 23) and Petitioner’s Reply.1

 (Doc. No. 26.) Pursuant to the

Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for

Case 2:06-cv-02655-GMS Document 32 Filed 10/09/09 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

deny the Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 28, 2003, the State filed an indictment in Maricopa County Superior Court

charging Petitioner and four co-defendants with five counts each of kidnaping, class 5

dangerous felonies (Counts 1-5), and one count each of conspiracy to commit kidnaping, a

class 2 dangerous felony (Count 6.) (Answer, Ex. M.) The charges arose from an incident

in which Petitioner and his co-defendants assisted “coyotes” (alien smugglers) who held

illegal aliens captive at gunpoint in a house in Phoenix and refused to release them to family

members unless the family members paid $1500 for each of the aliens’ release. (Answer, Ex.

N.)

Petitioner was tried jointly with two co-defendants. (Id.) On September 15, 2003, a

jury convicted Petitioner on the conspiracy to commit kidnaping charge but found Petitioner

not guilty as to the kidnaping charges. (Answer, Ex. J.) On November 26, 2003, Petitioner

was sentenced to the minimum term of 7 years’ imprisonment. (Answer, Ex. K.)

On August 16, 2004, Petitioner filed an appeal in which he raised the following

claims: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to sever the trials of Petitioner and

his co-defendants; Petitioner did not receive a fair trial and a new trial is required; (2) the

trial court erred by giving a confusing and contradictory instruction regarding the duty of the

jury to apply the facts to each co-defendant, resulting in fundamental error; and (3) the trial

court erred when it denied defense counsel’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the

state did not produce substantial evidence to support its conspiracy charge against Petitioner.

(Answer, Ex. L.) On March 8, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision

affirming Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Answer, Ex. N.) 

On April 19, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Answer, Ex. O.) On July 19, 2005, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Answer,

Ex. P.)

Case 2:06-cv-02655-GMS Document 32 Filed 10/09/09 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Respondents briefed Ground 3 on the merits, construing Petitioner’s appeal as “arguably

fairly presenting this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,” but at the same time noting that it was

“doubtful” that a federal due process claim was, in fact, fairly presented. (Answer, p. 21, nt. 3.) For

the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that Ground 3 was presented only as a state law claim

on appeal. However, even if Ground 3 were to be so liberally construed as to be fairly presented,

the Court agrees with Respondents’ assessment that Ground 3 lacks merit. In considering Ground

3, the Court of Appeals reasonably applied the appropriate federal law. The Court held that

Petitioner's conviction could not be reversed based upon insufficiency of the evidence unless,

resolving all conflicts in the evidence against the defendant, there was a complete absence of

- 3 -

On August 29, 2005, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in Maricopa

County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. Q.) After Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a Notice

of Completion of Post-Conviction Review, the trial court afforded Petitioner the opportunity

to file a pro se petition. (Answer, Ex. R.) On April 5, 2006, Petitioner filed a “Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief” consisting of a pre-printed form on which Petitioner checked four

boxes. (Answer, Ex. S.) The trial court struck the pro se petition, ordering Petitioner to file

a petition in conformance with Rule 32.5, Ariz. R. Crim. P., no later than June 30, 2006.

(Answer, Ex. T.) Petitioner failed to file the petition and the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s

post-conviction relief proceedings on August 16, 2006.

On June 11, 2007, Petitioner filed the pending federal Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, arguing three grounds for relief:

Ground 1: The trial court abused its discretion and violated Petitioner’s 6th

Amendment and due process rights when it refused to grant Petitioner’s motion to sever;

Ground 2: Petitioner’s 14th Amendment and due process rights were violated when

the trial court gave confusing and contradictory jury instructions; and

Ground 3: Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on a lack of substantial evidence to

support the conspiracy charge. (Petition, pgs. 6-16.)

DISCUSSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be denied. Petitioner failed to

fairly present his claims as federal claims in state court.2

Case 2:06-cv-02655-GMS Document 32 Filed 10/09/09 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

probative facts to support the conviction. (Answer, Ex. N, pg. 5.) This is the federal standard. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). The Court of Appeals' application of federal law to

the facts before it was reasonable. The Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that Petitioner

knowingly participated in a kidnaping conspiracy when he approached undercover police

(attempting to bust an alien-smuggling ring under the guise of family members paying money for

the release of illegal alien relatives) and asked if they were “there for the people,” instructed the

police to move their car for the exchange, observed the exchange and then left the scene with other

co-defendants. (Answer, Ex. N; Ex. F pgs. 69, 71-72, 77, 79, 92-93, 108-110, 129-31; Ex. G, pgs.

5-8.)

- 4 -

A. Exhaustion

i. Legal Standard

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). First enunciated in Ex parte

Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a

procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an

appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation

obviated before resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

The requirement is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state

courts' role in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989)

(citation omitted). The requirement is also based on a pragmatic consideration that fully

exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a complete factual record once they reach

federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest

court, either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will

consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose, 455

U.S. at 519. A petitioner must have also presented his claim in a procedural context in which

its merits will be considered. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. A habeas petitioner's claims may

be precluded from federal review on exhaustion grounds in either of two ways. First, a claim

may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but

Case 2:06-cv-02655-GMS Document 32 Filed 10/09/09 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to

which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a petitioner

has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not review the claim

unless the petitioner shows "cause and prejudice" for the failure to present the constitutional

issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992); Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

ii. Grounds 1-3 were not fairly presented.

Petitioner presented Grounds 1-3 on direct review. However, Petitioner failed to

argue these grounds based on federal law.

To properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to

the state’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts

have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his

constitutional claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 277-78 (1971). Resolving whether a petitioner has fairly presented his claim to the state

court is an intrinsically federal issue to be determined by the federal court. Wyldes v.

Hundley, 69 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1995); Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1556 (10th

Cir. 1994). Commenting on the importance of fair presentation, the United States Supreme

Court has stated:

If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of

prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the

prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must

say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.

Case 2:06-cv-02655-GMS Document 32 Filed 10/09/09 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per curiam). Following Duncan, the Ninth

Circuit has held that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus has not exhausted)

federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that the claims were

based on federal law. See, e.g., Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-70 (2000), as

amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (general reference to insufficiency of evidence,

right to be tried by impartial jury and ineffective assistance of counsel lacked specificity and

explicitness required to present federal claim); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th

Cir. 2000) (broad reference to “due process” insufficient to present federal claim); see also

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The mere similarity between a claim

of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.”).

In presenting Ground 1 to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued that he was

entitled to a severance pursuant to 17 A.R.S. Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 13.4(a), State v.

Grannis, 900 P.2d 1, 7 (Ariz. 1995) and State v. Cruz, 672 P.2d 470 (Ariz. 1983). (Answer,

Ex. L, pgs. 7-9.) Petitioner did not specifically indicate to the state court that his claim was

based on federal law. The Court of Appeals, in analyzing the merits of Petitioner’s claim,

likewise did not include any discussion of federal law. (Answer, Ex. N.) Although

Petitioner alleged in the caption of his claim that he “did not receive a fair trial,” a general

appeal to a broad constitutional principle is insufficient to establish fair presentation of a

federal constitutional claim. See Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005)

(a federal claim is not exhausted by a petitioner's mention, in passing, of a broad

constitutional concept, such as due process).

In presenting Ground 2 to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued that the

trial court’s jury instruction was confusing and amounted to fundamental error pursuant to

State v. Valenzuela, 984 P.2d 12, 15 (Ariz. 1999). (Answer, Ex. L, pg. 13.) Petitioner did not

indicate that he was presenting a federal claim or include reference to the federal Constitution

or federal case law. The Arizona Court of Appeals analyzed Petitioner’s claim as a state law

claim. (Answer, Ex. N.) As stated above, Petitioner’s passing reference to a “fair trial” was

not sufficient to federalize his claim.

Case 2:06-cv-02655-GMS Document 32 Filed 10/09/09 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

In presenting Ground 3 to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued that he was

entitled to a judgment of acquittal pursuant to 17 A.R.S. Rules of Crim. Pro., Rule 20 and

State v. Edwards, 665 P.2d 59 (Ariz. 1983). (Answer, Ex. L, pg. 15.) Petitioner did not alert

the Court of Appeals that he was presenting a claim arising under federal law, and the Court

of Appeals analyzed the merits of Ground 3 as a state law claim. (Answer, Ex. N, pgs. 4-6.)

The only reference to federal law related to Ground 3 appears in Petitioner’s introductory

sentence: “The government must prove every element of a charged offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, & XIV.” (Answer, Ex. L, pg. 15.) This

passing reference to the federal Constitution was insufficient to put the Arizona Court of

Appeals on notice of Petitioner’s federal claim. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993,

1002 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that exhaustion demands more than a citation to a general

constitutional provision, detached from any articulation of the underlying federal legal

theory). 

In state court, Petitioner alleged facts which form the bases of Grounds 1-3 but

presented those allegations in support of claims arising under state law. Petitioner failed to

make any sufficient reference to the United States Constitution, a federal statute or a federal

case. The state court was not alerted to a federal claim. Because Grounds 1-3 were not fairly

presented in state court, they remain unexhausted absent a showing of cause and prejudice

or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

iii. Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice or made a colorable

showing of actual innocence.

A federal court may only grant review of a procedurally defaulted claim if petitioner

makes a showing of cause and prejudice, Netherland, 518 U.S. at 162, or a colorable

showing of actual innocence amounting to a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Sawyer

v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992). To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner

must show an external impediment which rendered Petitioner unable to comply with the

procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To show prejudice, the

petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the error worked to his substantial

Case 2:06-cv-02655-GMS Document 32 Filed 10/09/09 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

disadvantage, infecting the entire trial with constitutional error. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. If

petitioner cannot meet one of the requirements, it is unnecessary for federal courts to address

the other requirement. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982). Petitioner may also

be granted federal review if he can demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A

fundamental miscarriage of justice results when the petitioner can demonstrate that a

constitutional error caused the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Carrier, 477 U.S.

at 496.

Petitioner has not asserted cause and prejudice or actual innocence amounting to a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Accordingly, Grounds 1-3 were not properly exhausted

and the Court need not consider the merits of those claims.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV-06-2655-PHX-GMS.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 9th day of October, 2009.

Case 2:06-cv-02655-GMS Document 32 Filed 10/09/09 Page 8 of 8