Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03106/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID CHRISTOPHER CRUZ, 

Petitioner,

v. 

PATRICIA VASQUEZ, Warden, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 16cv3106-AJB (BLM) 

(1) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(2) ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner David Christopher Cruz (“Petitioner” or “Cruz”), a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 

San Diego Superior Court conviction in case number SCE309627. (Pet. at 1, ECF No. 1 “Pet.”)1 

Cruz also requests an evidentiary hearing. (Id.) The Court has reviewed the Petition, the Answer 

and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, the Traverse, the 

lodgments, and all the supporting documents submitted by both parties. For the reasons 

discussed below, the Court DENIES the request for an evidentiary hearing and RECOMMENDS

the Petition be DENIED. 

                                                      

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted 

by the court’s electronic case filing system. 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 

(1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from those facts, 

are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the 

California Court of Appeal opinion: 

In early 2011, Cruz began dating Sharika Summers. Shortly thereafter, 

Cruz offered to care for Summers’s infant son, Cordero Cisneros, Jr., so Summers 

could save money on daycare. (Undesignated date references are to the year 

2011.) In March, Summers noticed bruises on Cisneros on multiple occasions. 

Summers wondered if Cruz was hurting Cisneros, but she dismissed the thought 

because Cruz acted liked everything was fine. 

According to Summers, Cruz treated Cisneros like his own son. Later that 

month, when Cisneros was approximately seven months old, Summers’s neighbor 

saw Cruz outside holding Cisneros. Cruz was panicking and asking for help. The 

neighbor brought Cruz and Cisneros into his apartment and called 911. The 

neighbor’s mother began performing CPR on Cisneros who was not breathing. 

Cisneros had swelling in the arms, chest and head area. He also had black, purple 

and green bruises on his legs, face, and chest. 

San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Damon Chandler arrived at the 

neighbor’s apartment before paramedics. Cruz was standing outside the 

apartment and told Deputy Chandler, “‘Please help me. I don’t know what’s wrong 

with my baby.’” Deputy Chandler observed that Cisneros had “purple blotches” on 

his face and an abrasion under his chin. Deputy Chandler could not find a pulse 

on Cisneros and administered CPR until the paramedics arrived. 

Deputy Chandler tried to obtain information from Cruz regarding what 

happened to Cisneros. Cruz said he had given Cisneros formula, some solid baby 

food, and then put him down for a nap. When Cruz checked on Cisneros two 

hours later, Cisneros was unresponsive. Cruz stated he administered CPR for 

approximately 15 minutes. 

San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Janine Alioto also responded to the 

scene. When she arrived, Deputy Alioto heard Cruz say, “‘It’s my fault. It’s my 

fault.’” Cruz told her that while he was babysitting Cisneros, he heard a loud crash 

like shelves falling. Cruz further said that when he went into Cisneros’s room, 

Cisneros was not moving. 

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While she was at work, Summers received a call about her son. She rushed 

home to see what happened. When she got there, Cruz ran up to her, got down 

on his knees, and said, “‘I’m sorry, I’m sorry, I’m sorry.’” Cruz told Summers that 

he was playing a video game in the living room when he heard a crash in Cisneros’s 

room. Cruz stated that when he went in Cisneros’s room, Cisneros was lying on 

his side. 

Summers saw Cisneros at the hospital. Cisneros had a large dark mark on 

his face like somebody had hit him. A doctor informed Summers that Cisneros 

was brain dead and could not be saved. 

That same night, deputies arrested Cruz. San Diego County Sheriff’s 

Detective Donnie Sossaman interviewed Cruz at the Sheriff’s station. Cruz stated 

that he got angry when Cisneros would not stop fussing. Cruz snatched Cisneros 

up and shook him. At that point, Cruz got scared because Cisneros’s head snapped 

back. Cruz also stated that he had hit Cisneros in the stomach, causing Cisneros 

to fall off the couch and onto the floor. Cruz put Cisneros in his crib and noticed 

that Cisneros would not sit up. Thus, Cruz attempted to do CPR on Cisneros and 

slapped him to try to revive him. Cruz admitted to getting mad and shaking 

Cisneros on three occasions. 

An autopsy revealed that Cisneros had numerous bruises and abrasions on 

his face and body. He had multiple rib fractures that had occurred at different 

times and factures on the bones between his elbow and wrist. Cisneros also had 

multiple hemorrhages on the tissues below the surface of his scalp. 

The medical examiner classified Cisneros’s death as a homicide. He stated 

the cause of death was brain damage resulting from a lack of oxygen and blood 

flow to the brain caused by head injury. A defense expert testified that it was 

possible that Cisneros died from an “ear infection that either spread to the blood 

and developed sepsis or caused thrombosis of the big vein in the head.” 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 2-4.) 

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 4, 2012, Petitioner was charged by information with assault on a child by 

means of force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death (Cal. Penal Code § 

273ab(a) (count one) and murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (count two). (Lodgment No. 1, 

vol. 1 at 5-6.) 

/ / / 

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On October 9, 2013, a jury found Cruz guilty on both counts. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 

307-08; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 5 at 961-62.) On November 22, 2013, the trial court sentenced 

Cruz to a prison term of 25 years-to-life.2 (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 368, 427-28; Lodgment 

No. 2, vol. 6 at 990-91.) 

Cruz appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, arguing (1) the trial court 

erred in denying his request to represent himself; (2) California Penal Code section 237ab(a) 

improperly omits a mens rea element; and (3) section 237ab(a) violates the Equal Protection 

Clause and the Due Process Clause. (See Lodgment 3.) On May 20, 2015, the Court of Appeal 

denied Cruz’s claims and affirmed his conviction in a reasoned opinion. (See Lodgment No. 6.) 

On June 8, 2015, Cruz filed a petition for review for in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 

No. 7.) The court denied the petition on July 29, 2015 without comment or citation. (Lodgment 

No. 8.) 

Cruz then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the San Diego Superior Court on 

July 1, 2016. (Lodgment No. 9.) In it, Petitioner argued (1) defense counsel had coerced him 

not to testify in his own defense, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, (2) the prosecutor used 

evidence to mislead the jury, (3) the trial was unfair because Cruz’s initial interview with a 

detective was not presented to the jury and the evidence that was presented was improperly 

prejudicial, and (4) the trial court improperly denied his request to represent himself. (See id.) 

On July 12, 2016, the trial court denied the petition in a short opinion. (Lodgment No. 10.) 

On December 16, 2016, Cruz filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer and Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities on March 6, 2017. (ECF No. 12.) On March 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a Traverse. 

(ECF No. 15.) Cruz filed a supplemental Traverse on May 26, 2017. (ECF No. 19.) Respondent 

submitted Supplemental Lodgments under seal on June 29, 2017. (ECF No. 23.) 

                                                      

2

 The trial court sentenced Cruz to 25 years-to-life on count one and 15 years-to-life on count two. The 

court stayed the sentence on count two pursuant to Cal. Penal Code section 654. (See Lodgment No. 1, 

vol. 2 at 368, 427-28.) 

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Cruz’s Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a 

habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only 

whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 

540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In order to grant 

relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying 

the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is 

supported by the record.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court 

applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided 

a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See Bell 

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable 

application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from 

Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular 

case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court 

decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s 

application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer 

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “A state court’s 

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determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded 

jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the 

higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). 

If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas 

courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s 

decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court 

law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by 

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus 

claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be 

“contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes 

of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the 

time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. 

V. DISCUSSION 

Cruz raises five claims in his Petition, however, because some of the claims overlap or 

are redundant, the Court has grouped them as two general claims. In claims one and three, 

Petitioner contends his conviction under California Penal Code section 243ab(a) was a violation 

of his due process rights because the statute fails to set forth a sufficient mens rea element. 

(Pet. at 6, ECF No. 1.) In claims two, four and five, Petitioner argues his Sixth Amendment 

rights were violated when the trial court denied his request to represent himself. (Id. at 6-7.) 

Cruz also asks for an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 1.) Respondent argues both claims must be 

denied because Petitioner has failed to establish the state court’s decision was contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. (See generally, P. & A. in Supp. Answer, 

ECF No. 10-1.) 

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A. California Penal Code § 273ab(a) 

In claims one and three, Cruz argues that California Penal Code section 273ab(a) lacked 

a sufficient “mens rea” requirement, in violation of the Due Process clause. He asserts that due 

process requires there be a mens rea that “bears some relationship to the penalty.” (Pet. at 6, 

ECF No. 1.) 

Cruz raised this claim in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court and it was 

denied without comment or citation. (Lodgment Nos. 7 & 8.) This Court therefore looks through 

to the last reasoned decision to address the claim – that of the California Court of Appeal. See 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The appellate court denied that claim, stating: 

Cruz argues his assault conviction violates due process because the offense 

does not have a requirement that the defendant know his act could result in death 

and thus it is an improper strict liability offense. In a related argument, he claims 

the trial court did not properly instruct the jury because CALCRIM No. 820, the 

instruction on assault on a child likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in 

death, did not require the jury to find that he knew or a reasonable person would 

have known his act was likely to result in death. 

Cruz was convicted of assault on a child with force likely to produce great 

bodily injury resulting in death in violation of Penal Code, section 237ab, 

subdivision (a) (section 237ab). That statute provides the following: “Any person 

who, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, assaults 

the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce 

great bodily injury, resulting in the child’s death, shall be punished by 

imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” Thus, a violation of section 

237ab requires proof that (1) a person had the care or custody of a child under 

eight years of age; (2) that person committed an assault upon the child; (3) the 

assault was committed by means of force that to a reasonable person would be 

likely to produce great bodily injury; and (4) the assault resulted in the death of 

the child. (People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 655 (Albritton); 

CALCRIM No. 820.) 

In Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 647, this Court rejected the same 

argument that Cruz makes here, namely that section 237ab is an unconstitutional 

strict liability offense. We explained that “[s]ection 273ab is a general intent crime. 

The mens rea for the crime is willfully assaulting a child under eight years of age 

with force that objectively is likely to result in great bodily injury -- that is, the 

assault must be intentional.” (Albritton, at p. 658.) We concluded that in order 

to violate section 273ab, “[o]nly a general criminal intent to commit the proscribed 

act -- assault on a child under eight years old with force that objectively is likely 

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to result in great bodily injury--is required. Whether the intended act in its nature 

is one likely to produce great bodily harm is a question for the jury. It is not 

required that the actor intend to produce great bodily injury or death, nor is it 

required that he know or should know the act is intrinsically capable of causing 

such consequences.” (Albritton, at p. 659.) 

Cruz asserts that due process requires the offense have a mens rea element 

associated with the death because the accused faces the same 25 years to life 

penalty as first degree murder. It is “immaterial that the punishment for a violation 

of section 273ab is the same as first degree murder. The Legislature exercised its 

prerogative in selecting the range of punishment, and there is no principle of law 

that precludes the same punishment for different crimes.” (People v. Norman

(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 228.) 

Lastly, we reject Cruz’s instructional error claim. He contends the jury 

instructions were incomplete because CALCRIM No. 820 did not include a 

requirement that he knew or a reasonable person would have known his act would 

result in death. As we explained, a violation of section 237ab does not require 

that the defendant knew his act would result in death. CALCRIM No. 820 properly 

instructs the jury that the People must prove the defendant committed the assault 

by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great 

bodily injury. In that regard, the instruction requires the jury to find “[w]hen the 

defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to 

realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably result in great bodily 

injury to the child.” (CALCRIM No. 820.) No further knowledge element was 

required. Thus, Cruz’s instructional error claim fails. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 10-13.) 

First, to the extent Cruz contends his conviction under California Penal Code section 

273ab(a) amounted to a violation of California state law, he fails to state a cognizable claim on 

federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (finding issues regarding 

state law are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review and it is not the province of the 

federal habeas court to re-examine state-court determinations on state-law questions). 

To the extent Cruz argues section 273ab(a) runs afoul of the Due Process Clause, his 

claim fails. Under California law, to prove assault against a child resulting in death, the 

prosecutor must introduce evidence satisfying the following four elements: “(1) [a] person had 

the care and custody of a child under eight years of age; (2) [t]hat person committed an assault 

upon the child; (3) [t]he assault was committed by means of force that to a reasonable person 

would be likely to produce great bodily injury; and (4) [t]he assault resulted in the death of the 

child.” People v. Stewart, 77 Cal. App. 4th 785, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (internal quotations 

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omitted); People v. Wyatt, 48 Cal. 4th 776, 780 (Cal. 2010). 

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, section 273ab(a) contains a mens rea element. As the 

state court noted, the statute requires general intent – specifically, intent to commit assault on 

a child under the age of eight with use of force objectively likely to produce great bodily injury. 

People v. Albritton, 67 Cal. App. 4th 647, 658-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Under section 273ab a 

defendant “need not know or be subjectively aware that his act is capable of causing great 

bodily injury. This means the requisite mens rea may be found even when the defendant 

honestly believes his act is not likely to result in such injury.” Wyatt, 48 Cal.4th at 781 (citations 

omitted). On habeas, federal courts must defer to a state court’s interpretation of state law, 

except in the “highly unusual case in which the ‘interpretation is clearly untenable and amounts 

to a subterfuge to avoid federal review’ of a constitutional violation.” Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 

624, 642 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir.1982); see 

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 n. 11 (1975). Here, the state court’s interpretation of 

section 273ab and its mens rea requirement is not unreasonable.3

Petitioner also argues his right to due process was violated because section 273ab allows 

imposition of the same punishment as that for first degree murder (25 years to life) without 

proof of the same mens rea required to support a murder conviction. (See Pet. at 5-6, 12-17, 

ECF No. 1.) State legislatures have broad authority to define crimes and impose punishments. 

“The elements of a state crime are determined by state law, and state legislatures have broad 

discretion to define the elements of a crime.” Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1977)); see also, e.g., Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)). The 

Due Process Clause prevents only imposition of punishments based on “arbitrary” distinctions. 

See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991). 

When a State’s power to define criminal conduct is challenged under the Due Process 

Clause, courts consider only whether the law “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the 

                                                      

3

 Even if the statute did not contain a mens rea element, Cruz would not be entitled to habeas relief. 

“There is no clearly established Supreme Court law defining the precise criteria courts should employ in 

determining which crimes constitutionally require a mental element and which crimes do not.” Hujazi v. 

Superior Court of California, 890 F.Supp. 2d 1226, 1237 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Morissette v. United 

States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952)); see also Powell v. State of Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968). 

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traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Patterson, 432 U.S. 

at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 58 (1996) 

(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Here, establishing the same penalty for assault on a child resulting 

in death as that of first degree murder does not amount to an “arbitrary distinction,” nor does 

it offend fundamental principles of justice. As such, Cruz has failed to establish a due process 

violation. 

In sum, the California Court of Appeal’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor 

an unreasonable application of controlling federal authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. The Court RECOMMENDS grounds one and three be DENIED. 

B. Faretta Motion 

In grounds two, four and five, Cruz argues his Sixth Amendment rights were violated 

when the trial court denied his request to represent himself. (See Pet. at 5-6, 17-21, ECF No. 

1.) Cruz raised this issue in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court, which was 

denied without comment or citation. (See Lodgment Nos. 7 & 8.) As such, this Court looks 

through to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, the last reasoned state court decision 

to address this issue. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The appellate court denied the claim, 

stating: 

A. Facts 

One month before trial, defense counsel informed the court that Cruz 

wished to bring a motion for substitution of appointed counsel under People v. 

Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). The trial court conducted a Marsden

hearing outside the presence of the prosecutor. Cruz complained that defense 

counsel refused to call a character witness and continuously told him to take a 

plea deal. Cruz thought defense counsel was not acting in Cruz’s best interest. 

When the court inquired if Cruz had other complaints, Cruz responded, “There’s 

not really much I can say to deter your mind. It seems like your mind is set up 

that I have a pretty good lawyer, even though I feel otherwise.” 

Defense counsel responded to Cruz’s allegations, explaining that he 

informed Cruz of the tactical dangers of opening the door to negative character 

evidence. Defense counsel indicated he conferred with multiple colleagues who 

all agreed that the defense should not open the door to character evidence. 

Defense counsel also stated he continued to discuss the possibility of a plea 

agreement with Cruz because of the mounting evidence against Cruz. Counsel 

believed a plea deal was in Cruz’s best interest based on the charges and evidence 

in the case. 

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The trial court denied the Marsden motion, explaining that defense counsel 

was doing a great job and using “Herculean efforts” to represent Cruz. The court 

stated it did not find any shortcomings in defense counsel’s advice to Cruz. Shortly 

thereafter, defense counsel informed the court that Cruz wanted to address the 

court about representing himself. Defense counsel stated it was the first time Cruz 

had made the request. 

The court instructed Cruz to fill out an “Acknowledgement Regarding SelfRepresentation and Waiver of Right to Counsel” pursuant to People v. Lopez

(1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568 (Lopez waiver). Cruz completed the Lopez waiver, 

stating that he wanted to represent himself and acknowledging the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation. 

After receiving Cruz’s Lopez waiver, the court confirmed with Cruz that this 

was the first time he was seeking to represent himself and commented the case 

was two and a half years old. The court then inquired whether Cruz would be 

ready to proceed with trial at the scheduled date, which was in approximately one 

month. Cruz stated that he would not be ready to proceed and needed time to 

research. Cruz agreed with the court that they would be “starting from scratch 

timewise.” 

The court denied Cruz’s Faretta motion, stating, “[N]ow, virtually at the last 

minute, and certainly comparatively the last minute, the defendant is making a 

request that he’s never made before and he’s making it immediately after his 

request to relieve his attorney was denied which causes [the court] to question 

whether or not this is an unequivocal request. [The court does not] think that it 

is. [The court] think[s] it’s a result of ‘if I can’t get rid of this attorney, then I’ll 

represent myself.’ That’s not unequivocal.” The court also found the request was 

not timely made because the case was two and a half years old, Cruz would not 

be ready for trial on the date set and Cruz required a continuance of undetermined 

length. 

B. Analysis 

Cruz contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial Faretta motion. 

We disagree. A criminal defendant has the right under the Sixth Amendment of 

the federal Constitution to conduct his or her own defense. (Faretta, supra, 422 

U.S. at p. 819; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 959.) Accordingly, when 

a defendant voluntarily and intelligently makes a timely, unequivocal assertion of 

the right to proceed pro se, the court must honor that request regardless of how 

unwise the decision may seem. (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-

128.) The right to self-representation must be invoked within a reasonable time 

before the commencement of trial and the trial court should consider the quality 

of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity to 

substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the 

proceedings, and the disruption or delay that might reasonably be expected to 

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follow the granting of such a motion. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 

827.) 

To determine whether the defendant invoked the right to selfrepresentation, we review the entire record, including facts following the Faretta

ruling, de novo. Even if the trial court denied the request for an improper reason, 

if the record as a whole establishes the request would properly be denied on other 

grounds, we will nonetheless affirm the judgment. (People v. Dent (2003) 30 

Cal.4th 213, 218.) 

1. Timelineness Requirement 

A Faretta motion is timely if made “within a reasonable time prior to the 

commencement of trial.” (People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128; People 

v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 98-99.) In California, there is no bright-line test for 

determining the timeliness of a Faretta motion. (People v. Clark, at p. 99.) 

However, courts have held that Faretta motions with a request for continuance 

were untimely when made shortly before commencement of trial, subject to the 

court’s discretion. (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 740, 742; People v. 

Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 853; People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63, 78-79; 

People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205; People v. Hill (1983) 148 

Cal.App.3d 744, 757; People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 784-791; People 

v. Morgan (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 523, 531; People v. Hall (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 

125, 132.) 

Here, Cruz made his Faretta motion approximately one month prior to trial, 

an amount of time that was certainly not untimely on its face. However, Cruz 

stated that he would not be ready to start trial in one month as he needed time to 

research. He did not offer the court a specific date when he would be ready and 

agreed with the court that they would be “starting from scratch timewise.” At that 

point, the case was two and a half years old. On this record, we conclude the trial 

court did not err in denying the Faretta motion as granting it would have interfered 

with the orderly administration of justice. 

2. Unequivocal Requirement 

The requirement that a Faretta motion be unequivocal “is necessary in order 

to protect the courts against clever defendants who attempt to build reversible 

error into the record by making an equivocal request for self-representation.” 

(People v. Williams (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1586.) To determine whether a 

request was unequivocal, a reviewing court should examine a defendant’s words 

and conduct to decide whether that defendant truly desired to give up counsel and 

represent himself or herself. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 25-26 

(Marshall).) “Equivocation of the right of self-representation may occur where the 

defendant tries to manipulate the proceedings by switching between requests for 

counsel and for self-representation, or where such actions are the product of whim 

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or frustration.” (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1002.) 

A Faretta motion made “in passing anger or frustration” or “to frustrate the 

orderly administration of justice” is not unequivocal and may be denied. (Marshall, 

supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 23.) Moreover, a Faretta motion made immediately 

following an unsuccessful Marsden motion may be seen as equivocal if the 

circumstances show the defendant’s true desire was actually different 

representation and not self-representation. (See People v. Valdez (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 73, 99 [defendant’s single reference to right of self-representation, made 

immediately following denial of Marsden motion, supports conclusion that 

defendant did not make an unequivocal Faretta motion]; People v. Scott (2001) 

91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1203-1206 [Faretta motion was equivocal where defendant 

made the motion immediately after the trial court denied his Marsden motion and 

defendant’s comments suggested he made the motion because the court would 

not replace his attorney with a different public defender].) 

Here, in light of the totality of the circumstances, Cruz’s Faretta motion 

could be seen as equivocal. He sought self-representation after the trial court 

denied his Marsden motion to substitute appointed counsel. It was clear that Cruz 

was frustrated with the court during the Marsden hearing. Even before the court 

made its ruling, Cruz was perturbed, commenting that the court had already made 

up its mind and there was nothing he could do to change it. 

Cruz’s emotional response “‘did not demonstrate to a reasonable certainty 

that he in fact wished to represent himself.’” (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 

22.) 

Cruz’s Lopez waiver does not convince us that his request was unequivocal. 

Although he completed the waiver, he did so immediately after the court denied 

his Marsden motion and he expressed frustration with the court. The test of a 

valid waiver of counsel is not whether the defendant completed a particular form 

and received specific advisements; rather, the record as a whole must demonstrate 

that defendant truly desired to represent himself. (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 

Cal.3d 1194, 1225; Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 25-26.) Cruz had never 

before requested to represent himself and did not renew the motion at any time 

after the court denied it. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1028, [noting 

that a “self-representation request that was an ‘impulsive response’ to the trial 

court's denial of the defendant’s motion for substitute counsel and was not 

renewed at a later court date was not unequivocal”].) Based on the record before 

us, it appears that Cruz’s Faretta motion resulted from his “passing anger or 

frustration.” (People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 825.) Accordingly, we 

conclude the trial court did not err in denying Cruz’s request for selfrepresentation. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 4-10.) 

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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a 

criminal case the right to be represented by counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 

(1975). The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments also guarantee a defendant the right to 

represent himself, but in order to invoke this right, a defendant must waive his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel. See id. at 835. That waiver must be “knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” 

Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 

Moreover, a Faretta request for self-representation must be timely, unequivocal, and not made 

for purposes of delay. Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 

McCormick v. Adams, 621 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Here, the California Court of Appeal concluded that Cruz’s request for self-representation 

was equivocal and untimely. When a state court concludes that a Faretta request was equivocal, 

a federal habeas court must determine whether that decision was an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2014); Stenson, 

504 F.3d at 883. In doing so, federal courts examine three factors: “the timing of the request, 

the manner in which the request was made, and whether the defendant repeatedly made the 

request.” Stenson, 504 F.3d at 882. 

In applying these factors, a federal habeas court “must give significant deference to the 

trial court’s factual findings.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).) As such, Cruz’s burden here 

is not to convince this Court that his request was unequivocal, but that the state court’s finding 

otherwise was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. at 883. 

After considering the record as a whole, the California Court of Appeal concluded that 

Cruz’s request was equivocal. The court noted that Cruz made his request immediately after 

the trial court denied his Marsden motion to substitute counsel. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 32-

33.) During the Marsden hearing, Cruz expressed frustration with defense counsel’s decision 

not to call a character witness at trial. (Supp. Lodgment at 13-15.) Cruz also stated that he 

was dismayed that defense counsel advised him to consider taking a plea deal. (Id. at 15-16.) 

After hearing from defense counsel, however, the trial court concluded Cruz’s counsel was 

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providing “great representation” and that there were no shortcomings in the advice defense 

counsel was providing Cruz. (Id. at 29.) The court stated that “the only conclusion I can reach 

is that you don’t like your predicament, but you’re in that predicament.” (Id. at 29-30.) 

Immediately following the denial of his Marsden motion, Cruz made his Faretta motion. 

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 31.) As the trial court noted, at that point, the case was two-and-ahalf years old and was set to go to trial in 30 days. (Id. at 34-35.) Cruz acknowledged he would 

need a continuance if the motion was granted. (Id. at 35.) The trial court then stated: 

What concerns me is now, the length of age of this case. The complexity 

is not really a factor because a person has a constitutional right to represent 

themselves no matter what the complexity of the case is, but in this instance, it’s 

been around for two and a half years. And now, virtually at the last minute, and 

certainly comparatively the last minute, the defendant is making a request that 

he’s never made before and he’s making it immediately after his request to relieve 

his attorney was denied which causes me to question whether or not this is an 

unequivocal request. I don’t think that it is. I think it’s a result of “If I can’t get 

rid of this attorney, then I’ll represent myself.” That’s not unequivocal. 

The other considerations, and we discussed this during the Marsden

hearing, the quality of representation afforded to the defendant which he has 

received, the reasons for the request don’t speak well in his favor because of the 

denial of the Marsden motion. The fact that his matter has been around for two 

and a half years and the indication from the defendant that he would not be 

prepared for trial on the date set and would require an additional continuance of 

an undermined length. 

For those reasons, I find that the request is not timely, is not made 

unequivocally and is therefore denied. 

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 35-36.) 

Nothing in this case suggests that the state court’s conclusion that Cruz’s request was 

equivocal was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable 

application of federal law. As for the timing of the request, the Ninth Circuit has held that a 

relevant consideration in evaluating the equivocal nature of the request is whether the defendant 

made it “in the context of a substitution motion.” See Wafer v. Hedgpeth, 627 Fed. Appx. 586, 

587 (9th Cir. 2015); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 883 (“A clear preference for receiving new counsel 

over representing oneself [may] be an indication that the request, in light of the record as whole, 

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is equivocal.”) When the record shows that a defendant’s assertion that he wishes to represent 

himself was made as an emotional or impulsive response to a trial court ruling, it is not 

unequivocal. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, given the timing of 

Cruz’s request, the trial court reasonably determined it arose out of Cruz’s dissatisfaction with 

counsel, the desire for a new attorney, and in response to the denial of his Marsden motion. 

Cruz’s clear preference was appointment of new counsel. Cruz had never before asked to 

represent himself and did not renew his request in the weeks leading up to his trial. (See 

Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 34.) The trial court, which was in the best position to assess the 

context of Cruz’s words, reasonably concluded he did not really want to represent himself. 4 See 

United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that “a request 

to represent oneself made while at the same time stating a preference for representation by a 

different lawyer and rearguing the change of counsel motion is insufficient to invoke Faretta”). 

When Cruz’s request to represent himself is considered in the context of the entire record, 

the state court’s conclusion that the request was equivocal is neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 407-08. Moreover, the state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable 

determinationof the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), see also Stenson, 504 F.3d at 883. The 

Court therefore RECOMMENDS claims two, four and five be DENIED. 

C. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Cruz asks this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claims. (See Pet. at 1, ECF 

No. 1.) Cruz does not, however, identify what evidence, if any, he intends to present. 

 Petitioner’s request is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, 

563 U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011). There, the Supreme Court held that where habeas claims 

have been decided on their merits in state court, a federal court's review under 28 

U.S.C.§ 2254(d)(1) – whether the state court determination was contrary to or an unreasonable 

                                                      

4 Having concluded that the state court reasonably found Cruz’s Faretta request to be equivocal, this 

Court need not address the timeliness of the request. See Stenson, 504 F.3d at 882.

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application of established federal law – must be confined to the record that was before the state 

court. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. The Court specifically found that the district court should 

not have held an evidentiary hearing regarding Pinholster’s claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel until after the Court determined that the petition survived review under section 

2254(d)(1). Id. at 1398; see also Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Here, for the reasons discussed in Sections IV(A)-(B) of this Report and Recommendation, 

none of Petitioner's claims survive review under section 2254(d). The Ninth Circuit has stated 

that “an evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) 

precludes habeas relief.” Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Anthony J. Battaglia under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, the Court 

DENIES Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. 

In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) 

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be 

entered DENYING the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written objections 

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than September 11, 2017. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

/// 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the Court 

and served on all parties no later than October 2, 2017. The parties are advised that failure 

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: 8/14/2017 

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