Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02361/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02361-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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The caption has been modified to reflect dismissal of the doe *

defendants, as stated in the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order filed

January 24, 2007. This matter was determined to be suitable for

decision without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODERICK OHLSEN, )

) 2:06-cv-2361-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN; SAN JOAQUIN )

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; SAN )

JOAQUIN SHERIFF BAXTER DUNN; SAN )

JOAQUIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPUTY )

ROBERT SEMILLO; SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY )

SHERIFF’S SERGEANT JONES; and SAN )

JOAQUIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPUTY )

NESBITT, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff Roderick Ohlsen (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants

County of San Joaquin (“the County”), the San Joaquin County Sheriff’s

Department (“SJSD”), Sheriff Baxter Dunn (“Dunn”), Deputy Robert

Semillo (“Semillo”), Sergeant Michael Jones (“Jones”), and Deputy John

Nesbitt (“Nesbitt”) (collectively, “Defendants”) filed cross-motions

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for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state

law claims arising out of Defendants’ use of a police dog during

Plaintiff’s arrest.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 6, 2005, Plaintiff’s wife Jocelyn Ohlsen

(“Jocelyn”) dialed 911 during an argument she was having with

Plaintiff in their residence. (Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“SUF”) ¶ 2.) Plaintiff grabbed

Jocelyn’s wrist and hung up the phone, interrupting Jocelyn’s call. 

(Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) When the 911 dispatch operator called back, Plaintiff

answered and Jocelyn “yelled,” “[S]end someone here.” (Id. ¶ 5.)

As a result of these phone calls, Semillo responded to

Plaintiff’s residence. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) By the time Semillo arrived,

Plaintiff had left the residence. (Id. ¶ 7.) Semillo testified that

Jocelyn asked him to obtain a restraining order against Plaintiff, but

Jocelyn denies making this request. (Id. ¶ 8.) A restraining order

was issued later that evening. (Id. ¶ 9.)

After midnight, SJSD received a phone call from one of

Plaintiff’s neighbors, advising that Plaintiff had returned home. 

(Id. ¶ 11.) Semillo returned to Plaintiff’s residence and was flagged

down by Jocelyn who was outside the residence. (Id. ¶ 12.) Jocelyn

told Semillo that Plaintiff was in the house and had access to a gun,

though the parties dispute precisely what Jocelyn told Semillo about

Plaintiff’s gun. (See id.) Semillo testified that Jocelyn told him

Plaintiff “had a gun” and that she believed the gun was “in the

bedroom where [Plaintiff] was at.” (Decl. of Donald Cook in Supp. of

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Cook Decl.”), Ex. C (“Semillo Dep.”) at

39:9-18.) Jocelyn testified that she said “Plaintiff has a gun in the

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house and I’m not sure if he is going to use it or not.” (Cook Decl.,

Ex. D (“Jocelyn Dep.”) at 43:1-3.)

Semillo telephoned Plaintiff’s residence, spoke to Plaintiff

on the phone, and asked Plaintiff to come out of his residence. (SUF

¶ 15.) Plaintiff refused to come outside and told Semillo he was

going to bed. (Id. ¶ 16.) After Plaintiff refused to come out,

Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt (“the officers”) went to the front door,

knocked and rang the doorbell several times. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff

did not answer the door. (Id. ¶ 18.) Semillo asked Jocelyn for

permission to enter the residence. (Jocelyn Dep. at 53:24-25.) 

Jocelyn said “yes” and gave Semillo the keys to the residence. (Id.

at 54:1-2.) Semillo used the keys to unlock Plaintiff’s front door. 

(Id. at 54:3-4.) The officers did not have a warrant to enter

Plaintiff’s home or to arrest Plaintiff. (Semillo Dep. at 64:24-

66:2.)

The officers waited for five to eight minutes for Plaintiff

to voluntarily surrender before they entered the residence. (SUF 

¶ 21.) Before entering the residence, Semillo gave two separate

announcements which consisted of identifying himself as a sheriff’s

deputy and advising that unless Plaintiff surrendered himself, a

police dog would be released into the house and there was a

possibility of being bitten. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff did not respond

to the warnings, though Plaintiff testified he did not hear the

warnings. (Id. ¶ 24.)

After waiting one minute for Plaintiff to respond, a police

dog was released off-leash into Plaintiff’s residence. (Id. ¶¶ 24-

25.) Semillo gave the dog a “search command,” which is supposed to

order the dog to find someone and bite them until ordered to let go. 

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(Semillo Dep. at 68:2-19.) Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt did not

announce their presence in the home or give another verbal warning

about the police dog. (Id. at 58:21-25.) The dog went to Plaintiff’s

bedroom door, which was closed, and jumped and scratched on it,

indicating that a person was inside the room. (Id. at 60:13-14.) One

of the officers opened the bedroom door and allowed the police dog to

go in. (Id. at 74:20-22.)

The dog went into the bedroom and bit Plaintiff, who was on

his bed. (SUF ¶ 27.) Exactly what happened next is disputed. 

Semillo testified that Plaintiff tried to push the dog away, but

Plaintiff denies that he tried to push the dog, and instead testified

that he only attempted to protect his throat. (Semillo Dep. at 78:11-

16; Cook Decl., Ex. E (“Pl. Dep.”) at 58:21-25.) Semillo testified

that he ordered Plaintiff to lay down and “stop struggling with the

dog,” but Plaintiff testified that the officers’ only instructions to

him were to “stop resisting.” (Semillo Dep. at 79:12-17; Pl. Dep. at

55:11-24.) Semillo said he did not see a gun or weapon in Plaintiff’s

hands or nearby. (Semillo Dep. at 78:17-79:5.) The police dog

continued to bite Plaintiff for ten to fifteen seconds. (Id. at 81:1-

11.) Semillo testified that after Plaintiff “submitted” to the dog’s

bite, Semillo called the dog off and the dog stopped biting Plaintiff. 

(Id. at 81:19-22.) The officers arrested Plaintiff and Plaintiff was

ultimately convicted of spousal abuse. (SUF ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff alleges under § 1983 that Defendants violated his

Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure in

three ways: (1) unlawfully entering into Plaintiff’s residence without

a warrant, (2) unlawfully arresting Plaintiff, and (3) using excessive

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Plaintiff contends that “Defendants seek summary judgment on 1

all of [Plaintiff’s] claims but do not address [Plaintiff’s] unlawful

entry claim.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7:5-6.) Even though Defendants’ motion

does not specifically address Plaintiff’s warrantless entry claim,

Defendants address this claim in their opposition to Plaintiff’s summary

judgment motion. (See Defs.’ Opp’n at 8-11.) Since this matter may be

determined as a matter of law based on the uncontroverted facts, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 1 compels resolving the matter in this order by

granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for warrantless entry in

favor of Dunn, Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt based on qualified immunity.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (requiring that the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure be “construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action”).

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force when arresting Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges two state law

claims against the County and SJSD.

DISCUSSION

I. Warrantless Entry

A. Individual Officers

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his claim that the

officers violated his Fourth Amendment right by entering his residence

to arrest him without a warrant. (Pl.’s Mot. at 13:15-14:20.)

Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt also seek summary judgment on this claim,

arguing Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right was not violated since the

officers had valid consent to enter Plaintiff’s residence, and exigent

circumstances existed. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 8:19-11:15.) Alternatively, 1

these Defendants seek summary judgment on their qualified immunity

defense to this claim.

“Absent consent or exigent circumstances, a private home may

not be entered to . . . effect an arrest without a warrant.” Donovan

v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 n.6 (1981). Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt

argue they did not need a warrant since Jocelyn consented to the

entry. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 10:4-6.) Plaintiff counters that Jocelyn’s

consent was insufficient since Plaintiff refused to consent to the

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entry. (Pl.’s Reply at 1:24-2:8.) “[A] warrantless search of a

shared dwelling . . . over the express refusal of consent by a

physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to

[the non-consenting resident] on the basis of consent given to the

police by another resident.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120

(2006). Plaintiff’s refusal to come to the door to let the officers

in, under the circumstances, constitutes Plaintiff’s refusal to

consent to allowing the officers to enter his residence. See United

States v. Allende, 486 F.2d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that

suspect’s silence implies his refusal to admit police for purposes of

the “knock and announce” rule under 18 U.S.C. § 3109). Accordingly,

Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt have not shown that Jocelyn’s consent

justified their warrantless entry.

Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt also argue that exigent

circumstances justified their warrantless entry. (Defs.’ Opp’n at

9:3-22.) “The exigency exception can excuse a warrant for an in-home

arrest when probable cause exists and there is a compelling reason for

not obtaining a warrant.” Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952,

960 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]o come within the exigency exception,

[Defendants] must show both that dangerous circumstances existed and

that it was infeasible to obtain a warrant safely.” Id. at 966. 

These Defendants contend exigent circumstances existed since Plaintiff

had access to a gun, had refused to exit his home, and was a spousal

battery suspect. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 9:3-12.) A factual dispute exists

as to whether Plaintiff’s access to a gun some place in his residence

weighs toward creating dangerous circumstances justifying the

warrantless entry.

///

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But notwithstanding such disputes, the individual officers

argue they are entitled to prevail on this claim based on their

qualified immunity defense. This defense is decided by determining

whether Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right at issue was “clearly

established,” and whether “a reasonable [official] would have

understood that what he was doing violated that right.” Meredith v.

Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2003).

Although the Supreme Court held in 2006 that the consent of

one co-resident does not justify a warrantless entry where another coresident expressly refuses to consent, see Georgia, 547 U.S. at 120,

at the time of the incident in 2005 a contrary rule existed in the

Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 536 (9th

Cir. 1995) (holding that express consent of one co-resident permitted

warrantless entry even where another co-resident expressly refused to

consent to the entry); United States v. Murphy, 2005 WL 2416828, at *4

(D. Or. Sept. 30, 2005) (citing Morning and observing that “the Ninth

Circuit has . . . held that a co-tenant’s consent to the search of a

residence was effective even if the other co-tenant protested”). 

Since the Georgia rule was not clearly established at the time of the

incident, Dunn, Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt are entitled qualified

immunity on this claim. Accordingly, Dunn, Semillo, Jones and

Nesbitt’s summary judgment motion is granted on Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claim for warrantless entry.

B. Municipal Liability

Plaintiff argues the County and SJSD are liable for the

violation of his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless entry

since the violation was caused by a municipal policy. (Pl.’s Mot. at

21:8-22:28.) The County and SJSD counter “[P]laintiff has no evidence

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to show that [D]efendants’ policies were unconstitutional or fell

below the standard of care.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 6:10-11.)

To impose liability on the County and SJSD, Plaintiff must

establish: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he

was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this

policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the [P]laintiff’s

constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force

behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt By and Through Waugh v.

Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)).

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that County policy

makers were deliberately indifferent to his Fourth Amendment right

since, at the time of the incident, the Ninth Circuit rule permitted

the warrantless entry at issue. See Morning, 64 F.3d at 536. 

Therefore, these Defendants cannot be “said to have been deliberately

indifferent to the need [for a different policy].’” Oviatt, 954 F.2d

at 1477-78 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389); see Szabla v.

City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that

“a municipal policymaker cannot exhibit fault rising to the level of

deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has

not yet been clearly established”). Accordingly, the County and

SJSD’s summary judgment motion is granted on Plaintiff’s warrantless

entry claim; Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion is denied on this

claim.

II. Unlawful Arrest

All parties seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that

the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right by unlawfully

arresting him. Plaintiff indicates that his unlawful entry claim for

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Plaintiff also argues the force used against him was excessive 2

as a matter of law since “any force used in making an unlawful arrest is

unreasonable.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 15:6-16.) However, “[an] excessive force

(continued...)

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the officers’ entry into his residence is separate from his unlawful

arrest claim. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 13:15-15:1 (separately discussing

the entry into Plaintiff’s home and the unlawfulness of his arrest).) 

However, Plaintiff concedes that he “has never contended that

[D]efendants ‘lacked probable cause to arrest him,’” (Pl.’s Reply at

3:24-25), and instead argues that his arrest was unlawful solely

because the officers’ entry into his residence was unlawful. (Pl.’s

Mot. at 14:24-25.) Since Plaintiff does not contend the officers

lacked probable cause to arrest him, Plaintiff “cannot establish a

Fourth Amendment violation based solely on the arrest,” and

Defendants’ motion is granted on Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful

arrest; Plaintiff’s motion on this claim is denied. See Carpenter v.

City of Franklin, 2006 WL 3791931, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2006)

(granting defendant’s summary judgment motion on unlawful arrest claim

since defendant had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, even though

issue of fact existed precluding summary judgment on plaintiff’s

warrantless entry claim); see also Potts v. City Of Philadelphia, 224

F. Supp. 2d 919, 932-35 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (separately analyzing Fourth

Amendment claim for unlawful arrest without probable cause and Fourth

Amendment claim for warrantless entry).

III. Excessive Force

A. Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his claim that the

officers violated his Fourth Amendment right by using excessive force

while arresting him. (Pl.’s Mot. at 16-21.) Semillo, Jones and 2

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(...continued) 2

claim presents a discrete constitutional violation relating to the

manner in which an arrest was carried out, and is independent of whether

law enforcement had the power to arrest.” Bashir v. Rockdale County,

445 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d

404, 417 (5th Cir. 2007) (“That the deputies’ arrest of [plaintiff] was

unlawful on the facts alleged does not, however, mean that any force

used by the deputies to effectuate the arrest was necessarily excessive.

Rather, [plaintiff’s] excessive force claim is separate and distinct

from her unlawful arrest claim, and we must therefore analyze the

excessive force claim without regard to whether the arrest itself was

justified.”).

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Nesbitt also seek summary judgment on this claim, arguing the amount

of force used was reasonable as a matter of law. (Defs.’ Mot. at 9-

12.) Alternatively, these Defendants seek summary judgment on their

qualified immunity defense to this claim.

Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers may use only

such force as is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The excessive force

analysis requires weighing the gravity of the intrusion on Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the government

interest at stake. Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 961 (9th

Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that the intrusion

on his Fourth Amendment interests was serious. (Pl. Dep. 55:25-58:15,

84:7-23.). The government interest at stake is assessed by evaluating

the severity of the crime at issue, whether Plaintiff was resisting or

evading arrest, and, most importantly, whether Plaintiff posed an

immediate threat to the officers or others. Miller, 340 F.3d at 964

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The summary judgment record reveals

that genuine issues of material fact exist as to what Jocelyn told the

officers about Plaintiff’s access to a gun, what reasonable inferences

may be drawn from Jocelyn’s statement about Plaintiff’s gun,

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Both sides also submitted evidence which they argue allows the 3

issue to be determined as a matter of law in their favor. Defendants

submitted the report of a police dog expert, Brad Smith, who opined that

“based on the facts and circumstances known to the sheriff’s deputies,

the level of force used to find and arrest [Plaintiff] was reasonable.”

(SUF ¶ 38.) Plaintiff submitted evidence including depositions from

witnesses in other police dog cases and a report by a commission on the

use of police dogs. (See Cook Decl., Exs. I-R.) Each side objects to

the other’s evidence. The issue of whether this evidence is admissible

need not be reached since it would not change the result that there are

genuine issues of material fact based on admissible evidence which

preclude summary judgment.

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Plaintiff’s behavior while being bitten by the dog, and how quickly

Semillo was able to verify that Plaintiff had no weapon and did not

pose a threat to the officers during the time the dog was biting

Plaintiff. (See Semillo Dep. at 39:9-18, 78:17-79:5; Jocelyn Dep. at 3

43:1-3; Pl. Dep. at 58:21-25.) These factual issues preclude summary

judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt also argue they prevail on this

claim based on their qualified immunity defense. At issue is

“whether, in light of clearly established principles governing the

conduct in question, the officers objectively could have believed that

their conduct was lawful.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219-20

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031,

1036 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

“[T]he law surrounding excessive force in the use of police

dogs was clearly established at the time of [P]laintiff’s arrest.” 

Smith v. City of Auburn, 2006 WL 1419376, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. May 19,

2006) (holding the law was clearly established in 2002). It was also

clearly established that allowing a police dog to continue to bite a

plaintiff who is unarmed and not a threat constitutes excessive force. 

See Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir.

2000) (holding that where plaintiff “did not pose a threat of bodily

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harm to the officers or to anyone else” and “was not attempting to

flee or to resist arrest,” no reasonable officer could believe that

allowing a police dog to bite the plaintiff for two minutes was

reasonable force); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1090-93

(9th Cir. 1998) (holding “it was clearly established that excessive

duration of the [dog’s] bite and improper encouragement of a

continuation of the [dog] attack by officers could constitute

excessive force,” and affirming denial of qualified immunity where

officer did not order the dog off until the plaintiff complied with an

order to show his hands). Therefore, at issue is whether the officers

“objectively could have believed that their conduct was lawful.” 

Bias, 508 F.3d at 1219-20.

Factual issues exist as to what Jocelyn told the officers

about Plaintiff’s gun, what reasonable inferences may be drawn from

what Jocelyn said about Plaintiff’s gun, how long it took Semillo to

verify that Plaintiff was not a threat to the officers’ safety during

the time the dog was biting Plaintiff, and whether Plaintiff resisted

the dog’s bite or only attempted to protect his throat. (See Semillo

Dep. at 39:9-18, 78:17-79:5; Jocelyn Dep. at 43:1-3; Pl. Dep. at

58:21-25.) “Because there are unresolved factual issues surrounding

the use of the dog, . . . [whether a reasonable officer in this

situation could have believed his conduct was lawful] becomes a

question for the jury.” City of Auburn, 2006 WL 1419376, at *6. 

Accordingly, Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt’s motion on this ground is

denied.

Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt also seek summary judgment on

their qualified immunity defense to Plaintiff’s claim that the

officers were required to give another verbal warning at Plaintiff’s

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closed bedroom door after the police dog gave indication that the

bedroom was occupied. Plaintiff does not offer evidence controverting

the officers’ evidence that they gave a verbal warning prior to

entering Plaintiff’s residence. (SUF ¶ 23.) Plaintiff contends the

law was clearly established that the officers were required to give a

second verbal warning at his closed bedroom door. (See Pl.’s Reply at

6-7; Pl.’s Mot. at 19:15-20:4.) The officers contend they did not

repeat their warning once inside Plaintiff’s house because they feared

that could alert Plaintiff to their position and they had reason to

believe he may be armed with a gun. (Semillo Dep. 73:19-25.) Since

the law on this issue “did not put the officer[s] on notice that

[their] conduct would be clearly unlawful,” the officers prevail on

this portion of their qualified immunity summary judgment motion. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

B. Dunn

Dunn seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force

claim, arguing he is entitled to qualified immunity since Plaintiff

has presented no evidence that Dunn ratified the actions of the

officers, created an improper policy, or participated in the incident. 

(Def.’s Mot. at 17:4-5.) “In order for a person acting under color of

state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of

personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: there is no

respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Jones v. Williams,

297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Since Plaintiff has failed to

present evidence demonstrating Dunn’s personal participation in the

alleged use of excessive force, Dunn’s motion for summary judgment is

granted on this claim.

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The County has not demonstrated that the policies of SJSD are 4

not attributable to the County. See Bacon v. Kolender, 2007 WL 2669541,

at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2007) (finding “relevant Ninth Circuit case

law has already established that the policies of the Sheriff for the

County . . . are policies directly attributable to the County . . . for

purposes of [municipal] liability”) (citing Streit v. County of Los

Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2001)).

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C. Municipal Liability

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment against the County and

SJSD, arguing a municipal policy caused the officers to use excessive

force in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right. (Pl.’s Mot.

at 21-22.) The County and SJSD also seek summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against them, arguing Plaintiff has

not presented evidence proving the County and SJSD have an

unconstitutional policy. (Defs.’ Mot. at 6:25-26.)

Plaintiff argues SJSD had three policies that caused the

constitutional violation: (1) a policy that a dog bite is no more

forceful than use of a Taser, (2) a policy that they do not need to

re-warn a person about the use of a dog at a closed interior door, and

(3) a policy that a person struggling with a police dog is “resisting

arrest” and the dog should not be called off until the person complies

with officers’ orders to stop resisting the dog. (Pl.’s Mot. at 4

22:12-15.) Although Plaintiff has presented no evidence that these

policies were written, a municipal “policy” need not be written or

have received formal approval to be actionable. Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). “Absent a formal

governmental policy, [Plaintiff] must show a ‘longstanding practice or

custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local

government entity.’” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

1996) (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir.

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1992)). The unwritten policy must be so “persistent and widespread”

that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled city policy.” 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

The County and SJSD argue no unconstitutional policy existed

since their expert, Officer Brad Smith, “has reviewed the County’s use

of force policies and concludes that no [unconstitutional] policy

exists.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 18:3-10.) Plaintiff counters he has

presented evidence showing that the violations of his rights were

pursuant to SJSD policy. (Pl.’s Mot. at 22:16-18.) Semillo testified

that everything he did during the incident was consistent with and in

accordance with SJSD policies. (Semillo Dep. at 45:17-46:12.) 

Semillo also testified that it is SJSD policy to not call off the dog

until the person whom the dog is biting becomes passive and stops

trying to push the dog away. (Id. at 83:4-18.) Lieutenant Ruben

Orozco, who oversees the SJSD dog program, testified that use of the

police dog was in accordance with SJSD policy. (Cook Decl., Ex. F at

51:18-24.)

The County and SJSD also argue no unconstitutional policy

existed since “Officer Smith opines that the County’s use of force

policies comply with all applicable laws and regulations, or in other

words, meet the applicable standards of care.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 18:3-

10.) However, under the circumstances, Officer Smith’s opinion that

the policies at issue are constitutional is a legal conclusion and

therefore will be disregarded. See Smook v. Minnehaha County, 340 F.

Supp. 2d 1037, 1044-45 (D.S.D. 2004) (holding in § 1983 action that

expert’s “conclusions that the [municipality’s] policies and

procedures were ‘neither unconstitutional nor unlawful’ are legal

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conclusions and will be rejected to that extent”), rev’d on other

grounds, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006).

The County and SJSD also argue that since Plaintiff has not

presented an expert opinion on municipal policy, Plaintiff cannot

prove his allegation that the SJSD policies in question are

unconstitutional. (Defs.’ Mot. at 18:16-19:7.) But Plaintiff has

presented Federal Rule of Evidence 701 evidence showing genuine issues

of material fact exist on the constitutionality of the subject

policies. See McNeil v. City Of Allentown, 2001 WL 1468314, at *2

(E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2001) (“[P]laintiff must produce evidence of custom

or policy to succeed against the municipal defendants under § 1983, it

is well established that expert testimony is not required.”) (citing

Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Since genuine issues of material fact exist on the SJSD

policies in question, the motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim against the County and SJSD are denied.

IV. State Law Claims

The County and SJSD seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

California Civil Code section 52.1(b) and California Constitution

Article I section 13 claims against them, arguing no state law civil

rights claim exists in the absence of a federal violation. (Defs.’

Mot. at 13:4-5.) Plaintiff counters that summary judgment should be

granted in his favor since the County and SJSD are automatically

liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (Pl.’s Mot. at 23.) 

However, since issues of fact preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim, both motions are denied on Plaintiff’s state

law claims.

///

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SUMMARY

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion is denied. Defendants’

summary judgment motion is granted in part and denied in part: Dunn,

Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt’s motion is granted on Plaintiff’s

warrantless entry claim based on their qualified immunity defense; the

County and SJSD’s motion is granted on Plaintiff’s warrantless entry

claim; Defendants’ motion is granted on Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest

claim; Semillo, Jones and Nesbitt’s motion is granted in part on

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, since they are entitled to

qualified immunity for failing to give a second warning inside

Plaintiff’s residence; Dunn’s motion is granted on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim; and the remainder of Defendants’ motion is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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