Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01997/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01997-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PAUL STEMPLE, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly 

Situated, 

 Plaintiff,

Case No. 12-cv-01997-BAS(WVG) 

CLASS ACTION 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION (ECF 

NO. 78); 

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

EX PARTE MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE 

SUPPLEMENTAL 

MEMORANDUM (ECF NO. 

85); AND 

(3) GRANTING JOINT 

MOTION TO STAY FOR 90 

DAYS (ECF NO. 88) 

 v. 

QC HOLDINGS, INC., 

 Defendant. 

 Presently before the Court are (1) a motion for reconsideration filed by 

defendant QC Holdings, Inc. (“Defendant”) of the Court’s order granting in part and 

denying in part the motion for class certification filed by plaintiff Paul Stemple 

(“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 78); (2) Defendant’s ex parte motion for leave to file a 

supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 

85); and (3) a joint motion to stay all proceedings for 90 days to allow time for a 

jointly agreed-upon mediation (ECF No. 88). 

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For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for 

reconsideration (ECF No. 78),1 DENIES Defendant’s ex parte motion for leave to 

file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for reconsideration (ECF 

No. 85), and GRANTS the joint motion to stay all proceedings for 90 days to allow 

time for a jointly agreed-upon mediation (ECF No. 88). 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff commenced this putative Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

(“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, class action on August 13, 2012. Defendant thereafter 

filed an answer and the parties proceeded to discovery. On February 14, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed a motion to certify the following class under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3): 

All persons whose 10-digit cellular telephone numbers with a 

California area code were listed by an account holder in the 

Employment and/or Contacts fields of a California customer loan 

application produced to [Defendant], which were called by 

[Defendant] using an [ATDS] and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice 

for the purpose of collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt 

from the account holder, between August 13, 2008 and August 13, 

2012. 

(ECF No. 39-1 at p. 4.) Defendant opposed class certification. (ECF No. 54.) On 

September 5, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for 

class certification. (ECF No. 75.) Specifically, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion 

for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and granted Plaintiff’s motion for class 

certification under Rule 23(b)(3), and modified the class definition sua sponte to 

state: 

All persons whose 10-digit cellular telephone numbers with a 

California area code were listed by an account holder in the 

Employment and/or Contacts fields, but were not listed in the 

 1

 The Court finds Defendant’s motion for reconsideration suitable for 

determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 

7.1(d)(1). 

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Personal fields, of a California customer loan application produced to 

[Defendant], which were called by [Defendant] using an ATDS and/or 

an artificial or prerecorded voice for the purpose of collecting or 

attempting to collect an alleged debt from the account holder, between 

August 13, 2008 and August 13, 2012. 

(Id. at pp. 15-18 (modification in bold)). Defendant now moves to reconsider the 

Court’s order granting class certification. (ECF No. 78) The parties also jointly 

move to stay this action for 90 days pending mediation. (ECF No. 88.) 

II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

A. Legal Standard 

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for extraordinary 

relief and may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. 

Engleson v. Burlington N.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Ben 

Sager Chem. Int’l v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977)). Under 

Rule 60(b), the court may grant reconsideration of an order based on: (1) mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 

due diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s decision; (3) fraud 

by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or 

(6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). That last prong is “used 

sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized 

only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action 

to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 

(9th Cir. 2007). 

 District courts also have the inherent authority to entertain motions for 

reconsideration of interlocutory orders. Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders . . . are subject to modification by the district 

judge at any time prior to final judgment.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Balla v. 

Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1989). To determine the merits 

of a request to reconsider an interlocutory order, the court applies the standard 

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required under a Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion. See Hydranautics v. FilmTec 

Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (Whelan, J.). 

“Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a 

previous order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the 

interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. 

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with 

newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was 

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. 

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); 

Kona Enters., Inc., 229 F.3d at 890. However, a Rule 59(e) motion for 

reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first 

time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation. Id. It does 

not give parties a “second bite at the apple.” See id. “[A]fter thoughts” or “shifting 

of ground” do not constitute an appropriate basis for reconsideration. Ausmus v. 

Lexington Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-2342-L, 2009 WL 2058549, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 

2009) (Lorenz, J.). 

B. Ex Parte Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum 

Defendant seeks to file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion 

for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting in part and denying in part 

Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. (ECF No. 85.) Defendant represents that 

after the Court’s class certification order was issued, Plaintiff served additional 

written discovery on Defendant seeking contact information for the members of the 

certified class. (Id. at p. 1.) Defendant argues that the new data supports Defendant’s 

contention that individualized inquiries will still be necessary to determine class 

membership for the following reasons: (1) “based on Defendants’ [sic] business 

records, as many as 2,204 of the 6,387 telephone numbers Plaintiff identified as those 

belonging to members of the (now-certified class) may in fact belong (or may have 

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belonged at some point) to Defendant’s customers;” and (2) “in many instances” the 

telephone numbers belong to companies and not to the individuals listed on the loan 

application. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) Defendant attached its proposed supplemental 

memorandum as Exhibit D to its ex parte motion. 

Plaintiff filed an opposition, arguing that the “new” information Defendant 

seeks to introduce has been in the possession of Plaintiff since at least March 2014, 

prior to the time Defendant filed its opposition to the motion for class certification, 

and Plaintiff is not permitted a second bite at the proverbial apple on a motion for 

reconsideration. (ECF No. 87.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff. A motion for 

reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first 

time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation. See Sch. 

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., 5 F.3d at 1263. Accordingly, Defendant’s ex parte

motion to file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for 

reconsideration of the Court’s order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s 

motion for class certification is DENIED.

2

C. Motion for Reconsideration 

Defendant requests reconsideration of the Court’s class certification order on 

the ground that the Court committed clear error. (ECF No. 78 at p. 6.) Defendant 

first argues that “[a]lthough the Court’s certified class definition purports to resolve 

 2

 As Plaintiff acknowledges, “[a]n order that grants or denies class 

certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(c)(1)(C); see also Officers For Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of the City & Cnty. 

of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 633 (9th Cir. 1982); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 

437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978). Thus, “a district court retains the flexibility to 

address problems with a certified class as they arise, including the ability to 

decertify.” United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & 

Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO,CLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 809 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)). 

The new information and argument Defendant seeks to introduce by way of its 

motion for reconsideration would more appropriately be presented on a fully noticed 

motion for class decertification. 

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‘individualized issues with respect to “prior express consent”‘ provided by QC 

customers, it is premised upon both legal and factual misconceptions.” (Id. at p. 1.) 

Specifically, Defendant argues that the amended class definition (1) “fails to address 

the individualized inquiry still required to prove the existence of prior express 

consent given that individuals, under certain circumstances, can provide prior express 

consent to be called at a telephone number other than their own” (id. at p. 4; see also

pp. 7-9); and (2) “fails to take into account the possibility that cell numbers called by 

QC may have belonged to customers whose hard copy applications are no longer in 

existence” or have not been produced (id. at p. 6). 

Defendant previously made the first argument in its opposition to Plaintiff’s 

motion for class certification. The Court did not find it availing then, and Plaintiff 

has not persuaded the Court it committed clear error, the initial decision was 

manifestly unjust, or there has been any relevant intervening law or newly discovered 

evidence the Court has not considered. As to the second argument, Defendant raises 

the following arguments or hypotheticals for the first time: (1) “an individual listed in 

the Employment or Contacts fields might have applied for a loan from QC outside the 

State of California—in which case his or her name would not appear in the ‘Personal’ 

section of any loan application produced to Plaintiff during class certification 

discovery in this case;” and (2) “the possibility that cell phone numbers called by QC 

may have belonged to QC customers whose hard copy applications are no longer in 

existence.” (Id. at p. 6 (emphasis added)). These arguments are improperly raised on 

a motion for reconsideration which may not be used to raise arguments or present 

evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the 

litigation.3

 See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., 5 F.3d at 1263.4

 3

 Defendant argues reconsideration is warranted because it did not have 

the opportunity to object to the Court’s modified class definition. (ECF No. 78 at p. 

3.) However, in the present motion, Defendant asks the Court to reconsider many of 

the same arguments it previously raised, and any new arguments or issues raised by 

Defendant were not created by the Court’s modification. They were arguments 

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 Defendant further argues that the Court’s “certification decision failed to 

address the inherent practical difficulties the parties will encounter when relying on 

Plaintiff s list of cell phone numbers to ascertain individual class members.” (ECF 

No. 78 at pp. 9-10.) More specifically, Defendant argues that (1) reverse lookup will 

only identify the individual who currently uses the cellular number; (2) reverse 

lookup will not identify the persons who were called, only the company that owns the 

number, if the number listed was a business number; and (3) applicants may have 

failed to follow directions in the application and provided inaccurate information. 

(Id.) Defendant previously made the first argument in its motion for class 

certification and has not identified any grounds for reconsideration. The last two 

arguments, which were not previously addressed, not only lack merit, but are 

improperly raised on a motion for reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah 

Cnty., 5 F.3d at 1263. 

Because Defendant fails to demonstrate entitlement to reconsideration, the 

Court DENIES its motion. (ECF No. 78.) 

IV. JOINT MOTION TO STAY 

 The parties jointly seek a temporary stay of 90 days of all proceedings and 

deadlines in this matter to allow them the opportunity to schedule, prepare for, and 

participate in a mediation session. Having read and considered the moving papers, 

and good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS the joint motion (ECF No. 88). 

V. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for 

reconsideration (ECF No. 78), DENIES Defendant’s ex parte motion for leave to 

file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for reconsideration (ECF 

 

Defendant could have raised at the time it filed its opposition. 

4

 The Court further notes that on the issue of individualized consent, 

hypotheticals are insufficient to defeat class certification. See Meyer v. Portfolio 

Recovery Associates, LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012); Agne v. Papa John’s 

Intern., Inc., 286 F.R.D. 559, 567 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 

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No. 85), and GRANTS the joint motion to stay all proceedings for 90 days to allow 

time for a jointly agreed-upon mediation (ECF No. 88). 

 Accordingly, the action is HEREBY STAYED for 90 days from the date of 

this Order. The parties shall file a joint report concerning the status of the mediation 

effort no later than June 18, 2015. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 20, 2015 

 

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