Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02177/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02177-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAVE CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRUVEN HEALTH ANALYTICS INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-02177-SI 

SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIM 

CONSTRUCTION FOR THE

’726 PATENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 179, 180, 186, 188

On April 19, 2017, the Court held a supplemental Markman hearing. The Court adopts the 

constructions set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2015, plaintiff Cave Consulting Group, Inc. filed this lawsuit alleging that 

defendant Truven Health Analytics Inc. directly infringes U.S. Patent No. 8,768,726 

(“the ’726 patent”), titled “Method, System, and Computer Program Product for Physician 

Efficiency Measurement and Patient Health Risk Stratification Utilizing Variable Windows for 

Episode Creation,” by making, importing, using, selling, and/or offering for sale its physician 

efficiency measurement software and services. The ’726 patent relates to evaluating medical 

information to provide measurements of physician efficiency. ’726 Patent 1:29-31.

The Court held a Markman hearing on April 11, 2016, regarding the disputed ’726 patent 

term “calculating weighted episode of care statistics across medical conditions for a specialty type 

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utilizing a predefined set of medical conditions for a specific specialty type.”1 The Court 

construed that term to mean “calculating cost or length of care statistics for a group of medical 

conditions, using the relative importance of each condition to others of the group, using only 

medical conditions within a set defined in advance of processing for a specific specialty type.”

On February 15, 2017, the Court granted CCGroup leave to amend its complaint to include 

allegations that Truven indirectly infringes the ’726 patent. In its third amended complaint, 

CCGroup alleges infringement of claims 1-5, 9, and 10 (the “asserted claims”). The Court granted 

the parties a supplemental Markman hearing for disputed terms arising from the additional indirect 

infringement allegations.

The parties dispute two terms: (1) “assigning complete (non-partial) episodes of care to 

physicians” and (2) “consists of a subset of most prevalent medical conditions related to that 

specialty type.”2

LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 

370, 372 (1996). Terms contained in claims are “generally given their ordinary and customary 

meaning.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[T]he ordinary and 

customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of 

ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312. In determining the 

proper construction of a claim, a court begins with the intrinsic evidence of record, consisting of 

the claim language, the patent specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Id. at 

1313; see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “The 

 

1

 At that Markman hearing, the Court also construed two terms contained in 

U.S. Patent No. 8,340,981 (“the ’981 patent”). CCGroup subsequently removed the ’981 patent 

from this lawsuit, and only the ’726 patent remains.

2

 Truven originally contended that it and CCGroup disputed two additional terms: “stable 

efficiency scores” and “predefined set of medical conditions for a specific specialty type.” After 

determining that no dispute on claim scope existed, the Court requested that the parties submit a 

joint stipulation concerning their issues with those two terms, and the parties have done so. See

Dkt. No. 200.

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appropriate starting point . . . is always with the language of the asserted claim itself.” Comark 

Comm’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Abtox, Inc. v. 

Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, although claims speak to those skilled in the art, claim terms are construed in 

light of their ordinary and accustomed meaning, unless examination of the specification, 

prosecution history, and other claims indicates that the inventor intended otherwise. See Electro 

Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The written 

description can provide guidance as to the meaning of the claims, thereby dictating the manner in 

which the claims are to be construed, even if the guidance is not provided in explicit definitional 

format. SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001). In other words, the specification may define claim terms “by implication” such that 

the meaning may be “found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.” Vitronics, 90 

F.3d at 1582, 1584 n.6.

Additionally, the claims must be read in view of the specification. Markman, 

52 F.3d at 978. Although claims are interpreted in light of the specification, this “does not mean 

that everything expressed in the specification must be read into all the claims.” Raytheon Co. v. 

Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1983). For instance, limitations from a preferred 

embodiment described in the specification generally should not be read into the claim language. 

See Comark, 156 F.3d at 1187. However, it is a fundamental rule that “claims must be construed 

so as to be consistent with the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Therefore, if the 

specification reveals an intentional disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope, the claims must be 

read consistently with that limitation. Id.

Finally, the Court may consider the prosecution history of the patent, if in evidence. 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to 

exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution. See Southwall Techs., Inc. v. 

Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In most situations, analysis of this intrinsic 

evidence alone will resolve claim construction disputes. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.

Courts should not rely on extrinsic evidence in claim construction to contradict the 

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meaning of claims discernable from examination of the claims, the written description, and the 

prosecution history. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 

(Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583). However, it is entirely appropriate “for a 

court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to 

from the patent file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held 

understandings in the pertinent technical field.” Id. Extrinsic evidence “consists of all evidence 

external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, 

dictionaries, and learned treatises.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. All extrinsic evidence should be 

evaluated in light of the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1319.

DISCUSSION

Claims 1 and 10 are representative of the asserted claims for purposes of the Court’s 

Markman analysis:

1. A method implemented on a computer system of determining 

physician efficiency, the method comprising:

obtaining medical claims data stored in a non-transitory 

computer readable medium on the computer system;

performing patient analysis using said obtained medical claims 

data to perform episodes of care utilizing the computer 

system;

assigning complete (non-partial) episodes of care to 

physicians utilizing an assignment rule that allows 

assignment of an episode of care to more than one physician;

assigning at least one physician to a report group based on 

geographic area designation utilizing the computer system, 

each physician assigned to no more than one report group;

determining eligible physicians and episode of care assignments 

utilizing the computer system;

calculating condition-specific episode of care statistics utilizing 

the computer system;

calculating weighted episode of care statistics across medical 

conditions utilizing a predefined set of medical conditions 

for a specific specialty type utilizing the computer system; 

and

determining efficiency scores for physicians from said calculated 

condition-specific episode of care statistics and said 

weighted episode of care statistics calculated across medical 

conditions utilizing the computer system.

10. The method of claim 1 wherein:

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the predefined set of medical conditions for a specific specialty 

type consists of a subset of most prevalent medical 

conditions related to that specialty type.

Id. at 110:8-34, 111:1-4 (parties dispute the bold-underlined terms).

I. “Assigning Complete (Non-Partial) Episodes of Care to Physicians” (all asserted 

claims)

Claim Language

CCGroup’s Proposed 

Construction

Truven’s Proposed 

Construction

“Assigning complete

(non-partial) episodes of

care to physicians”

Plain and ordinary meaning

OR

For acute conditions:

“An acute episode is complete 

if it is representative of all 

healthcare services provided to 

a patient for an instance of a 

particular medical condition”

For chronic conditions:

“A chronic episode of care is 

complete if it is representative 

of all healthcare services 

provided to a patient for a 

particular medical condition 

during the duration of the 

chronic episode.”

“Assigning to physicians only 

episodes of care for which a 

patient was enrolled for the 

entire study period”

Previously, the parties agreed to construe “episodes of care” as “a group of all healthcare 

services provided to a patient for the diagnosis, treatment, and aftercare of a specific medical 

condition within a time frame of interest.” Dkt. No. 56 at 2:3-7. The parties dispute what it means 

for an episode of care to be “complete (non-partial).”3

Truven contends that the specification provides an express definition for “complete (nonpartial) episodes of care.” Truven contends that the specification defines “complete (non-partial) 

episodes of care” when it provides “[a] reason partial episodes often slip through the cracks and 

 

3

 The parties filed a stipulation agreeing that the claim term “assigning complete (nonpartial) episodes of care to physicians” requires that only complete episodes of care be used to 

analyze physician performance. Dkt. No. 200. However, this stipulation does not resolve the 

parties’ dispute regarding how to define “complete.”

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into an efficiency analysis is because the methodologies do not use a membership eligibility file to 

ensure the member is present for the entire study period.” See ’726 Patent 6:29-32. Truven also 

contends based on O2 Micro that the Court must reject CCGroup’s construction of plain and 

ordinary meaning because it does not resolve the parties’ dispute. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. 

Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d. 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the parties present a 

fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.). 

Finally, Truven contends that CCGroup’s alternate constructions must be rejected because they 

contradict the specification’s express definitions.

CCGroup contends that “assigning complete (non-partial) episodes of care” is clear on its 

face and does not require any construction. CCGroup disagrees with Truven’s assertion that the 

specification provides an express definition for the disputed term. CCGroup contends that 

Truven’s construction reads out every single embodiment described in the specification and 

ignores the specification’s call for separate tests to determine partial episodes of care for acute and 

chronic conditions. In the alternative to plain and ordinary meaning, CCGroup argues the two 

constructions in the chart above.

The Court construes “complete (non-partial) episodes of care” by plain and ordinary 

meaning, but the Court holds that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would not 

interpret a “complete” episode of care to require the patient to be enrolled for the entire study 

period.

The Court disagrees with Truven that the language it relies on offers an explicit definition 

of “complete (non-partial) episodes of care.” Truven’s excerpt from the ’726 patent’s Background 

section does not demonstrate that the patentee has acted as his or her own lexicographer. See

Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted) (“To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set 

forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning.”). The 

’726 patent contains no such “clearly express[ed] [] intent” to redefine “complete (non-partial) 

episodes of care.” See id. In fact, the intrinsic evidence favors the opposite conclusion when one 

compares Truven’s evidence with instances in the ’726 specification where the patentee does act 

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as its own lexicographer. See, e.g., ’726 Patent 13:21-25 (“Physicians are professionals delivering 

medical care services, not just physicians. This provider type includes physicians, chiropractors, 

acupuncturists, podiatrists, nurse practitioners, physical therapists, and other professionals 

delivering medical care services.”).

“[C]laims must be construed so as to be consistent with the specification, of which they are 

a part.” Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Court 

agrees with CCGroup that Truven’s construction is inappropriate because it is inconsistent with 

the ’726 specification. For example, the preferred embodiment contemplates separate tests to 

identify partial episodes of care for acute and chronic medical conditions. See ’726 Patent 65:37-

39 (“[T]he system of the present invention uses different analytical approaches to identify partial 

episodes for acute and chronic medical conditions . . . .”). Truven’s construction, by contrast, 

provides one definition of partial episodes of care for both acute and chronic medical conditions. 

The patent also provides examples of the separate tests that can be used to identify partial episodes 

of care for acute and chronic medical conditions. See ’726 Patent Table 23, 66:15-20, 52:14-16. 

For example, the specification states that “[i]n an embodiment, all chronic medical condition 

episodes begin during the first half of the study period to be considered complete episodes of care. 

Chronic episodes beginning in the second half of the study period are treated as partial.” 

’726 Patent 66:15-17. The specification also states that “[a]cute condition episodes are considered 

complete (or end) if an amount of time (equal to the window period) elapses in which no ICD.9 

codes for that condition are present.” Id. at 52:14-17. These examples focus on when the episode 

is first diagnosed or when treatment ends, not whether a patient is enrolled for an entire study 

period. Because “claims must be construed so as to be consistent with the specification,” the 

Court cannot adopt Truven’s proposed construction. See Merck, 347 F.3d at 1371.

The Court agrees with Truven that O2 Micro requires the Court to resolve the “dispute 

regarding on the scope of [a complete (non-partial) episode of care].” See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 

1362. However, the Court disagrees with Truven that O2 Micro requires the Court to provide an 

express definition of “complete (non-partial)” episodes of care. The Federal Circuit in Eon Corp. 

elaborated on O2 Micro and clarified that “a district court’s duty at the claim construction stage is, 

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simply, . . . to resolve a dispute about claim scope that has been raised by the parties.” Eon Corp. 

IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, at 

this stage of the lawsuit, it is enough for the Court to hold that a POSITA would not interpret a 

“complete” episode of care to require the patient to be enrolled for the entire study period, and for 

the Court to allow the parties to otherwise explain to the jury why the accused software does or 

does not satisfy the plain and ordinary language of this limitation. 

For the reasons stated above, the Court adopts plain and ordinary meaning for “assigning 

complete (non-partial) episodes of care to physicians.”

II. “Consists of a Subset of Most Prevalent Medical Conditions Related to That Specialty 

Type” (claim 10)

Claim Language

CCGroup’s Proposed 

Construction

Truven’s Proposed 

Construction

“Consists of a subset of 

most prevalent medical 

conditions related to that 

specialty type”

Plain and ordinary meaning

OR

“Consists of medical conditions 

that generally account for 60% 

to 80% of the episodes treated 

by that specialty type”

Indefinite

Truven contends that “consists of a subset of most prevalent medical conditions related to 

that specialty type” is indefinite for three reasons. CCGroup disagrees and contends that plain and 

ordinary meaning should govern that claim language.

Section 112 requires that a patent specification “conclude with one or more claims 

particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as 

his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (2006 ed.) To prove the claim term indefinite and therefore 

claim 10 invalid, Truven needs to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the claim, 

when read in light of the specification and prosecution history, “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable 

certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” See Nautilus, Inc. v. 

Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). 

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A. The Language of the Disputed Term as a Whole

Truven first contends that the term “consists of a subset of most prevalent medical 

conditions related to that specialty type” is indefinite because it has at least two possible 

meanings: “1) a predefined set that consists of a subset, where this subset includes all of the most 

prevalent medical conditions or 2) a predefined set that consists of a subset, where this subset is a 

subset of the most prevalent medical conditions.” Truven Opening Brief at 14:24-27.

CCGroup contends that the well-established meaning of “consists of” in patent law makes 

clear that “‘predefined set’ can only include medical conditions from the “subset of most prevalent 

medical conditions related to that specialty type.” CCGroup Responsive Brief at 13:14-16 

(emphasis in original). Thus, CCGroup contends, any process that includes a medical condition 

not among the “most prevalent medical conditions related to that specialty type” is not within the 

scope of the claim.

“The phrase ‘consisting of’ is a term of art in patent law signifying restriction and 

exclusion, while, in contrast, the term ‘comprising’ indicates an open-ended construction.” 

Vehicle Tech. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, 212 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000). By using the 

patent law term of art “consisting of,” the language of the disputed term indicates “with reasonable 

certainty” to a POSITA that the “predefined set” can only include medical conditions among those 

most prevalent in that specialty type, and that any “predefined set” including a medical condition 

not among the most prevalent in that specialty type is outside the scope of the claim. See Nautilus, 

134 S. Ct. at 2124. The Court holds that Truven has not demonstrated by clear and convincing 

evidence that the claim, when read in light of the specification and prosecution history, “fail[s] to 

inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Id.

B. “Related to that Specialty Type”

Next, Truven contends that the phrase “related to that specialty type” renders “consists of a 

subset of most prevalent medical conditions related to that specialty type” indefinite because the 

phrase requires a POSITA practicing the invention “to apply subjective factors” in deciding what 

medical conditions are “related” to a particular specialty type. Truven provides expert testimony 

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stating that such determinations under “related to that specialty type” are “subjective and contextdependent.” See Adams Decl. at ¶ 6.

CCGroup contends that primary care physicians send their patients to specialists every day 

based on specific medical conditions and therefore that a POSITA could readily classify a medical 

condition by specialty type. CCGroup also contends that two prior art patents listed in the 

’726 patent illustrate that matching medical conditions to specific specialties is standard practice. 

CCGroup provides expert testimony supporting its contentions. See Bergeron Decl. ¶¶ 32-38.

The Court holds that Truven has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that a 

POSITA could not map a medical condition to a particular specialty type “with reasonable 

certainty.” Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124. The test for indefiniteness involves whether a POSITA 

can ascertain the boundaries of an invention with reasonable certainty. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 

2124. Some subjectivity and context-dependency in and of itself does not render a claim 

indefinite, as “[s]ome modicum of uncertainty . . . is the price of ensuring appropriate incentives 

for innovation.” Id. at 2128 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Related to that 

specialty type” in the context of this patent is not a “facially subjective claim term,” as the term 

does not inherently turn on a person’s taste or opinion. Cf. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, 

Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350-52 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding “aesthetically pleasing” indefinite because 

“it [wa]s completely dependent on a person’s subjective opinion); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, 

Inc., 766 F.3d. 1364, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding “in an unobtrusive manner that does not 

distract a user” indefinite where the one specification example did not inform a skilled artisan 

“what other forms of display are unobtrusive and nondistracting”). Moreover, a court must 

analyze definiteness “in light of the teachings of the prior art,” and CCGroup provides unrebutted 

evidence that objective, prior art methods existed for mapping medical conditions to specialty 

types using standardized medical condition classification codes. Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l 

Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Bergeron Decl. Exs. 1, 2. 

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C. “Most Prevalent Medical Conditions”

Finally, Truven contends that the phrase “most prevalent medical conditions” is an 

indefinite, facially subjective phrase because there is no objective definition for “most prevalent 

medical conditions” that would inform a POSITA of the invention’s boundaries. Truven admits 

that “[i]n the context of this claim, it appears that ‘most prevalent’ has something to do with how 

common particular medical conditions are with a specific specialty type.” Truven Opening Brief 

15:20-21. But Truven argues that there is no single, objective way to define “prevalent,” and 

provides expert testimony that a POSITA, depending on her goals, might consider factors such as 

cost, frequency of occurrence at a physician’s office, and/or duration of treatment in making the 

determination regarding a “prevalent medical condition[].” See Adams Decl. ¶ 5. Truven’s expert 

also argues that a POSITA would not know how many “prevalent medical conditions” constitute 

“most prevalent medical conditions.” Id.

CCGroup contends that “most prevalent” is a term of degree and not a facially subjective 

term. CCGroup also contends that a POSITA would recognize that “most prevalent medical 

conditions” refers to the most commonly occurring conditions treated by each physician type, and 

CCGroup provides supportive expert testimony. See Bergeron Decl. ¶¶ 29-30. As intrinsic 

support, CCGroup points to the discussion of how to construct a “marketbasket” in the preferred 

embodiment. See ’726 Patent 70:47-55 (“A marketbasket consists of the most common conditions 

treated by each physician specialty type . . . .”). CCGroup contends that the ’726 patent provides 

more than 30 examples of such marketbaskets and therefore provides enough certainty to a 

POSITA regarding claim scope. See id. at 74:57-87:62 (Tables 29-60). Finally, CCGroup 

provides expert testimony that a POSITA could readily derive sets of “most prevalent medical 

conditions” using databases of medical claims data. See Bergeron Decl. ¶¶ 36-48.

The Court holds that Truven has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that 

the phrase “most prevalent medical conditions” renders claim 10 indefinite. Truven concedes that 

“[i]n the context of this claim, it appears that ‘most prevalent’ has something to do with how 

common particular medical conditions are with a specific specialty type.” Truven Opening Brief 

15:20-21. In doing so, Truven admits that the ’726 patent uses the term “most prevalent” to refer 

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to the frequency at which a particular medical condition is encountered within a specific specialty, 

and not to factors such as cost or acute exacerbations of chronic conditions. Frequency of 

occurrence can be objectively measured and does not depend on a person’s taste or opinion. 

Therefore, the Court finds that “most prevalent” is a term of degree and not a “facially subjective” 

term as Truven argues.

The Federal Circuit has held that “claims involving terms of degree are not inherently 

indefinite.” Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

(holding that the language “visually negligible” in a patent for a “graphical indicator” was not 

indefinite where the written description provided guidance on how to create visually-negligible 

indicators and two specific examples for comparison); see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., 

L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A] patentee need not define his invention with 

mathematical precision in order to comply with the definiteness requirement.”) (citation omitted). 

In deciding the question of indefiniteness on a term of degree, a court closely examines the written 

description of the invention. See Sonix Tech., 844 F.3d. at 1378 (“[T]he written description is key 

to determining whether a term of degree is indefinite.”). A term of degree does not make a claim 

indefinite if the written description and other intrinsic evidence provide enough objective detail to 

render the claim scope reasonably certain. See id. at 1377-79.

Here, CCGroup’s expert testifies that a POSITA would understand “most prevalent 

medical conditions” to mean the “most frequently encountered medical conditions related to a 

specialty type.” Bergeron Decl. ¶¶ 29-30. CCGroup’s expert testifies that a POSITA could 

determine which medical conditions are “most prevalent” within a particular specialty by using

databases of medical claims data. CCGroup’s expert further testifies that a POSITA would 

understand the marketbaskets of Tables 29-60 to be exemplary “subsets of most prevalent medical 

conditions related to that specialty type.” Id. at ¶ 31; see ’726 Patent 74:57-87:62. Given 

CCGroup’s expert testimony and the 32 examples in the written description from which a skilled 

artisan could compare a potentially infringing product, the Court cannot conclude that Truven’s 

evidence meets the high standard of clear and convincing. 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

The Court construes “consists of a subset of most prevalent medical conditions related to 

that specialty type” according to plain and ordinary meaning.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby adopts the claim constructions provided above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2017

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-02177-SI Document 206 Filed 04/25/17 Page 13 of 13