Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00907/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00907-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUIS ALDANA GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE A. LIZARRAGA, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 1:13-cv-00907-AWI-SKO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Luis Aldana Gonzalez is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a first amended

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition alleges five grounds 

for habeas relief: (2 and 6) presentation of a prejudicial jury instructions; (3) constitutional error 

in denial of continuance motion; (4) excessive sentence; and (5) improper admission of evidence 

of prior crime.1 Having fully reviewed the record as a whole and applicable law, the undersigned 

recommends that the petition for habeas relief be denied.

I. Factual Background2

Petitioner and his wife lived on a two-acre property in a small town. They had seven 

grown children (Teresa, Araceli, Luis, Faustino, Israel, Daniel, and Gabriela) and many 

 

1 On April 2. 2014, the Court dismissed claim one, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, as a state law 

claim. See Doc. 12.

2 The Court adopts the facts determined by the California Court of Appeal. People v. Gonzalez, 2011 WL 5946927

(Cal. App. Nov. 29, 2011) (No. F059938). The state court’s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is 

presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

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grandchildren. Some of the extended family lived on the same property, and a large group of 

family and friends would frequently gather there on weekends to socialize.

Beginning approximately in 2003, Petitioner sexually molested two granddaughters, 

Luis’s daughter L., who was 18 years old at the time of trial, and Israel’s daughter, A., who was 

15 years old at the time of trial. Petitioner’s daughter Araceli testified at trial that Petitioner had

also molested her when she was a child.

A. Petitioner’s Sexual Offenses Against Granddaughter L.

Petitioner began molesting L. when she was eleven years old. Several incidents occurred 

in a chicken coop at the rear of Petitioner’s property while other members of the family were in 

the house. On one occasion, when about 12 people were in the house playing cards, Petitioner 

asked L. to help him rake leaves around the chicken coop. The two went out alone. Inside the 

chicken coop, Petitioner grabbed L. and attempted to take off her shirt. She felt uncomfortable. 

Petitioner fondled L.’s breasts and vaginal area through her clothing. He kissed her neck and 

cheek and called her a pet name. Frightened, L. did not call out, but told Petitioner to leave her 

alone and kicked Petitioner in his crotch. She ran crying into the house and entered the bathroom 

where no one could see her crying. Petitioner molested her in the chicken house on three more 

occasions.3

On three other occasions when L. was eleven years old, Petitioner told L. they would go to 

a nearby store. Petitioner instead drove his pick-up truck to an orchard. He put his hand in L.’s 

lap, unzipped her pants, and inserted his fingers into L.’s vagina, causing her pain.

When L. was twelve years old, the family was gathered in the garage. L. entered 

Petitioner’s house and went into a closet under the stairs to get a soda. Petitioner blocked her exit 

 

3 Testifying for the defense, Detective Klassen recalled that L. varied in the number of times she claimed to have 

been assaulted in the chicken house. On cross-examination, L. testified that she had lied to Police Detective Rodney 

Klassen when she told him that Petitioner had only molested her on one occasion. L. explained that she wanted 

Klassen to stop questioning her.

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and closed the door. He put his fingers into L.’s vagina and moved them in and out, then put her 

hand into his pants and onto his penis, then dropped his pants and underwear. L. feared that 

Petitioner would hurt her as her father had.4 Although afraid and crying, L. could not break away 

from Petitioner’s grasp or pull her hand away. Blocking the door, Petitioner pushed her head 

toward his penis. 

Afraid that she would get in trouble, L. did not tell anyone about the closet incident. She 

never confided in her mother because her father had told her that her mother would not believe 

her. She did not tell her father because she was afraid of him. When she returned home after 

visits to Petitioner’s house, however, she cried and told her mother that she did not want to go 

back there. On one occasion, she told her mother that she had a dream that Petitioner had 

molested her.

Several months after L.’s quinceañera, L.’s mother learned that Petitioner had molested 

his daughter Araceli. From then on, L.’s mother did not allow L. and her brother to visit 

Petitioner’s home.

B. Petitioner’s Sexual Offenses Against Granddaughter A.

After school, A. rode the school bus to her great-aunt Dawn’s home,5 which was on the 

same property as Petitioner’s house. On weekends, A. and her family would attend the gatherings 

there. Many children were always present, playing everywhere on the two-acre property.

Petitioner began molesting A. when she was eight years old. Despite the many people 

present on the weekends, Petitioner would take A.’s hand and lead her upstairs to a spare 

bedroom and touch her inappropriately. She would squirm and cry. Petitioner would touch A.’s 

 

4 L. testified that her father, Luis, Jr., first had intercourse with her when she was six or seven years old. Her parents 

were then separated but reconciled later. Thereafter, L.’s father had intercourse with her so many times that she could 

not remember or count the number of times. When L. was 15 years old, her father had intercourse with her the day 

after her quinceañera and told her it would be the last time.

5 Dawn, sometimes referred to in the record as “Aunt Donna,” is Petitioner’s sister-in-law. 

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vaginal area through her clothes or touch her vaginal area after removing her pants. He removed 

his own pants, put A.’s hands on his penis, and made her move her hands over it. Another time, 

he took off both their pants, lay down on top of her, and attempted to penetrate her vagina. When 

he eventually succeeded, he moved back and forth. Petitioner hurt A. and made her bleed. On 

another occasion, Petitioner took A. into the master bedroom, removed both their pants, showed 

her a pornographic movie, and touched her.

Petitioner told A. not to tell anyone what they were doing or “they would take her.” 

Although she did not like what Petitioner was doing to her, she liked the attention and felt special. 

She estimated that Petitioner touched her about 40 times and had intercourse with her about 15 

times. Once, he bit her and she cried. Petitioner last touched her when she was nine years old. 

He never told A. why he stopped, and she assumed she had done something wrong and was no 

longer special to him.

In 2006, A.’s parents learned that Petitioner’s daughter, Araceli, had accused Petitioner of 

molesting her when she was a child. As a result, they stopped taking their family to functions at 

Petitioner’s home. The last event the family attended was a Father’s Day party in 2006.

On August 10, 2008, A. began writing in a diary. In September or October 2008, when A. 

began the ninth grade, A.’s mother became worried about A.’s increasing shyness and isolation. 

A.’s mother found the diary and read A.’s account of having been sexually assaulted. Distressed, 

A.’s mother could read no more and called A.’s father, Israel, home from work. Together, they 

immediately went to school and brought A. home. When they told A. that they had read her 

diary, she began to sob and could not answer questions. Ultimately, A. identified Petitioner but 

could not relate the details and referred them to the account of the rape in her diary. On October 

1, 2008, Israel, who was Petitioner’s supervisor at a packing house, fired Petitioner.

//

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Concerned about A.’s emotional and psychological well-being, A.’s parents did not 

immediately call police but instead found a therapist to treat A. A.’s mother also began to drive 

A. to and from school daily. Although A. benefitted from therapy, she was never able to discuss

with her mother exactly what had happened.6

C. A. and L. Disclose the Sexual Assaults

Despite the difference in their ages, cousins A. and L. often spent time together. On 

February 21, 2009, when A. spent the night at L.’s house, A. told L. that Petitioner had sexually

assaulted A. L. then revealed to A. that Petitioner had also assaulted L. 

L. felt that A. had been assaulted because of L.’s failure to report her own assault. When 

Israel arrived to pick up A. the next morning, L. asked to meet later with Israel, A.’s mother, and 

L.’s mother, but not her father, Luis, Jr. Israel arranged the meeting, at which L., crying 

hysterically, revealed that both her father and Petitioner had molested her. That day, A.’s mother 

reported Petitioner’s assault on A. to the police.

As a result of her allegations, L. was ostracized by numerous family members, including 

her mother, brother, grandmother (Petitioner’s wife), uncle (Faustino), and cousin (Elizabeth). 

She was forced to move from her parent’s home to the home of a maternal uncle. Shortly after 

Petitioner’s daughter Araceli learned of L.’s and A.’s allegations, she moved with her family from 

their home on Petitioner’s property.

D. Petitioner’s Sexual Offenses Against Daughter Araceli

Araceli, who was 41 years old at the time of trial, testified that Petitioner molested her 

when she was between 11 and 14 years old. Despite Petitioner’s molestation, she testified that 

she loved him and that it was hard for her to testify against him.

//

 

6 Testifying for the defense, Detective Klassen recounted that when he interviewed A., she was embarrassed that he 

had read her diary and “completely shut down.” A video recording of the interview was shown at trial.

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The first incident occurred when Araceli was sick and Petitioner was applying vapor rub 

to her chest in the kitchen while the rest of the family watched television in another room. After 

applying the salve to Araceli’s neck, Petitioner slipped his hand under her shirt and touched her 

breast. Araceli was stunned and confused. Petitioner pulled down Araceli’s shirt and put his 

mouth on her breast and bit her nipples, causing her pain.

On another occasion, Araceli awoke on the couch to see Petitioner standing in front of her. 

Although her brothers and sisters were asleep in the same room, Petitioner out his hand inside her 

top and rubbed her breast. When Araceli pushed his hand away, Petitioner left the room. Araceli 

was too frightened to wake her siblings or tell her mother. 

Another time, while the family was praying the rosary in the living room, Araceli left to 

use the bathroom. Petitioner followed her in, closed the door, and attempted to touch Araceli’s 

breast. She pushed him away. Petitioner motioned toward Araceli’s pants, but she hung onto 

them. He left and closed the door. When Araceli returned to the living room, Petitioner had 

resumed praying with the others. Araceli said nothing because she did not think anyone would

believe her.

The last time Petitioner assaulted Araceli, she was home sick from school and sleeping in 

her parents’ bed. When she opened her eyes, Petitioner was standing by the bed. Araceli could 

hear people outside through the open window. As he came toward her, Araceli loudly told him 

“no” and told him to stay away. Petitioner appeared surprised, as if he did not expect Araceli to 

say “no.”

Araceli felt ashamed and believed that the abuse was her fault for not making Petitioner 

stop in time. When he drank, Petitioner would apologize to Araceli, saying that he was sorry that 

he hurt her and that he would not do it again.

//

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When Araceli was a sophomore in high school, she disclosed the abuse to her older sister 

Teresa. The police were called, and Araceli and Teresa were removed to foster care. Araceli and 

Teresa were brought to an office to confront Petitioner, who denied assaulting Araceli. Their 

mother did not believe Araceli. Araceli never recanted,7but the family proceeded to treat the 

situation as a “misunderstanding.” Araceli never again complained about the abuse, assuming 

that if her mother did not believe her, no one would.

Afraid to go home, Araceli ran away with her boyfriend. The family decided that Araceli 

had lied about the abuse so that she could run away. Araceli and her boyfriend stayed in Mexico 

for three months, but when their money ran out, they were forced to return to the United States. 

They lived apart from the family for two years, but after they married and had no money, they 

moved to a house on Petitioner’s property to raise their family.

E. Pretextual Telephone Call

With the assistance of Detective Klassen, Araceli made a pretextual telephone call to 

Petitioner on March 5, 2009. Araceli asked Petitioner why Israel had fired him, but Petitioner 

avoided answering the question. Araceli then asked what had happened with A. and L., and 

Petitioner acted like he did not know what she was talking about. When Araceli confronted 

Petitioner with his earlier abuse of Araceli, he admitted that he had touched her but claimed it was 

a misunderstanding and that she had forgiven him. Araceli told Petitioner that it was not a 

misunderstanding. Petitioner apologized, acknowledged that what he did to Araceli was wrong, 

and said that they had to move on. He denied A. and L.’s allegations and said that the situation 

with Araceli was a misunderstanding because he had never penetrated her. Insisting that he had 

done nothing to A. or L., he stated that he would not pay for what someone else had done.

//

 

7 Detective Klassen, testifying for the defense, recounted that when he interviewed Araceli, she told him that Teresa 

had retracted her allegations that Petitioner had abused Teresa, leaving Araceli alone and feeling betrayed.

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F. Expert Psychological Testimony

Dr. Anthony Urquiza, a psychologist who treated sexually abused children, testified as an 

expert witness for the prosecution. He characterized Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation 

Syndrome (CSAAS) as an educational, not a diagnostic, tool. Abused children may exhibit some 

or all of the syndrome’s five components.

The first component is secrecy. Most victims are sexually abused by someone with whom 

they already have an ongoing relationship. The abuser manipulates or coerces the child not to 

disclose the abuse. Some victims are silent because they crave special attention and need to be 

connected to and loved by someone, even though they dislike being abused. Children often put 

themselves in the position to be abused again because they get something important from their 

relationship with the abuser.

The second component is helplessness. Abused children do not yell, scream, or report the 

abuse because they have been manipulated or coerced, or because they are ashamed and 

humiliated. Because the children cannot protect themselves, the abuse continues. The most 

likely victims are children who are more passive and less confident.

The third component is entrapment and accommodation. The secrecy and helplessness 

create a trap from which children cannot escape. They accommodate to the situation by 

disassociating from the horrible feelings that accompany abuse—the shame, humiliation, and 

disgust of someone fondling them, penetrating them, or forcing them to engage in oral copulation. 

Shutting down their feelings allows the children to cope with something they cannot control. 

Children who are good at disassociating may have a flat affect and may discuss what happened to 

them without emotion, or they may vacillate between crying and disassociating. When children 

are forced to deal with their feelings about the abuse, they tend to disassociate.

//

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The fourth component of the syndrome is delayed and unconvincing disclosure. Although 

people commonly think children will report abuse immediately, most disclosures are significantly 

delayed from the onset of the abuse, often by more than a year. In many cases, children wait until 

they are over 18, and some wait for decades. Sometimes, the delay is due to fear, and sometimes,

due to shame, humiliation, or guilt. Abused children often decide to bury the secret, and when 

they finally disclose the abuse, their method is not direct or complete. Instead, they gradually 

release information that eventually reveals the abuse. Disclosure is a process, not an act. When 

disclosure does occur, it is often unconvincing because the children’s stories and excuses for not 

wanting to be around the abuser may be changing and inconsistent, Further, children may not be 

able to recount accurately what happened, when it happened, or how many times it happened. If 

the child was abused many times, the incidents will tend to run together.

The fifth component is retraction. About 25 percent of abused children will retract some 

or all of their disclosure. Some are pressured to retract by others to protect the abuser from 

conviction and imprisonment.

G. Defense Case

Petitioner presented the testimony of multiple family members. Each family member who 

testified on Petitioner’s behalf set forth specific evidence that he or she believed disproved 

allegations of Petitioner’s molestation of A., L., or Araceli. They characterized Petitioner as 

much-loved and the center of attention at family gatherings, and maintained that Petitioner would 

not have been able to leave a family gathering for 15 to 30 minutes without his absence being 

noted. (Petitioner’s wife testified that he had never left the room without her since 2000.) They 

described A. and L. as relating to their grandfather affectionately, without any reluctance to 

interact with him. Dawn testified that while Dawn was babysitting A. and her brother after 

school, A. would often go next door to visit her grandparents, but that Dawn did not observe their 

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interaction because Dawn would be busy in her own home, watching A.’s brother.

L.’s mother acknowledged that she and Luis, Jr., had a rocky marriage but that she and the 

children had decided that the family should stay together. L.’s family stopped going to family 

gatherings after L.’s quinceañera, and the children were allowed to visit Petitioner’s home only 

when they were accompanied by Luis, Jr. L. told her mother that Petitioner and Luis, Jr. had 

molested her at a time when L. was being punished and was forbidden to see her boyfriend or use 

the telephone. L. lied frequently, requiring her mother to punish her. L.’s mother disbelieved the 

allegations against Luis, Jr., because she had found a letter from L. to a friend, in which L. 

claimed that she had lost her virginity in the eighth grade. If L. lost her virginity in the eighth 

grade, reasoned her mother, her father or grandfather could not have abused L. earlier.

Petitioner also presented the testimony of two of A.’s friends, who recounted various 

sexual and reproductive incidents of which A. had spoken. A. denied having told some of the 

stories to which the friends testified.

A longtime friend of Araceli named Arjelia testified that when Arjelia inquired about 

gossip she had heard, Araceli denied that Petitioner had abused her.

H. Rebuttal Testimony

A.’s high school teacher, Eric Ford, opined that in his experience, A. was generally 

truthful and gave him no reason to distrust her. Araceli testified that she and Arjelia were no 

longer friends and confirmed that she had told Arjelia that a rumor that Araceli had been raped 

was a lie.

L.’s maternal grandmother, Consuela, testified that after L. testified at trial she was sad, 

inconsolable, and unable to speak. On each of the three days that L. testified, L. vomited in a 

court house restroom immediately after leaving the witness stand. Consuela had known L. since 

birth and considered her truthful.

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II. Procedural Background

On February 2, 2010, the Tulare County District Attorney charged Petitioner with three 

counts of lewd acts upon A., a child under fourteen years of age (Cal. Penal Code § 288(a)) and 

ten counts of forcible lewd acts against L., a child under the age of fourteen years (Cal. Penal 

Code § 288(b)(1)).

8

 The information further alleged as to all counts that defendant committed the 

sexual offenses against multiple victims (Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(b) and (e)(4)) and as to counts 

1 through 4 and 9 through 13, that Petitioner had substantial sexual contact with the victims (Cal. 

Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(8)).

Petitioner was tried before a jury in the Tulare County Superior Court between January 26

and February 8, 2010. On February 8, 2010, the jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts and 

found all special allegations to be true. 

On March 11, 2010, Petitioner moved for a new trial, a mistrial, or in the alternative,

modification of the verdict or dismissal of the counts. On March 16, 2010, the trial court denied 

the motion and sentenced Petitioner to a 15-year-to-life consecutive term for each count, for an 

aggregate sentence of 195 years to life.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal on March 23, 2010. The California Court of Appeal 

affirmed the judgment on November 29, 2011. The California Supreme Court denied review on 

February 1, 2012.

On or about April 30, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

Tulare County Superior Court. The superior court denied relief on May 2, 3013. 

Petitioner filed a petition in this Court on June 14, 2013. On July 9, 2013, the Court 

ordered Petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust 

all claims in state court. 

 

8 Each count identified a specific sexual assault.

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The California Court of Appeal summarily denied the state petition on July 11, 2013. 

On July 31, 2013, Petitioner responded to the federal order to show cause and moved for 

an order of stay and abeyance pending the issuance of the decision on the petition pending in the 

California Supreme Court.

The California Supreme Court summarily denied the state petition on October 16, 2013.

Petitioner filed his first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 8, 2013. 

On April 2, 2014, the Court dismissed Petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance as moot, 

dismissed ground one of the federal petition as a state question not cognizable in a federal habeas 

proceeding, and ordered Respondent to respond to the petition.

III. Standard of Review

A person in custody as a result of the judgment of a state court may secure relief through a 

petition for habeas corpus if the custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). On April 24, 1996, 

Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which 

applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed thereafter. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

322-23 (1997). Under the statutory terms, the petition in this case is governed by AEDPA's 

provisions because Petitioner filed it after April 24, 1996.

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of 

the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 

(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme 

malfunctions" in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under AEDPA, a petitioner can prevail 

only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 

529 U.S. at 413.

"By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state 

court, subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 

538 U.S. at 71. To do so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the 

Supreme Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must 

then consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state court contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court 

must apply the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the 

state court is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme 

Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

"A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that 

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' 

on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, the AEDPA standard is difficult to 

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satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not demonstrate that the state court's 

determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 

IV. Improper Admission of Evidence of Petitioner’s Assault of His Daughter Araceli

As his fifth ground for habeas relief, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in 

admitting evidence under California Evidence Code § 1108 of the uncharged offense that 

Petitioner had molested his daughter Araceli some 26 years earlier. Petitioner’s argument relies 

on California law (People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4

th 903(1999)). The California Court of Appeal 

rejected Petitioner’s claim, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under 

California Evidence Code § 352 when it elected to admit the evidence pursuant to California 

Evidence Code § 1108. The state court added that in any event, given the strength of the case 

against Petitioner, any error was harmless.

Issues regarding the admission of evidence are matters of state law, generally outside the 

purview of a federal habeas court. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Basing this claim solely on California precedent, Petitioner himself acknowledges its nature as a 

state-law claim.

"The admission of evidence does not provide a basis for habeas relief unless it rendered 

the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process." Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 930 

(9th Cir. 1995). "[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a 

finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules." Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 

422, 438 n. 6 (1983). "Although the [U.S. Supreme] Court has been clear that a writ should be 

issued when constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, see Williams, 529 

U.S. at 375 . . . , it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly 

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ." 

Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. Since the state appellate court's disposition of Petitioner's appeal was 

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not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, a federal district court 

may not grant the writ based on the trial court's admission of evidence of Petitioner’s earlier 

molestation of his daughter Araceli.

V. Jury Instructions Did Not Violate Due Process

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his 14th Amendment right to due process by 

instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 1191 (ground two) and 359 (ground six). Petitioner 

also contends that inclusion of CALCRIM No. 359 violated his rights under the 6th Amendment.

A. Federal Habeas Review of Jury Instruction Errors

Generally, claims of instructional error are questions of state law and are not cognizable 

on federal habeas review. “It is not the province of a federal court to reexamine state court 

determinations of state law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). “The fact 

that a jury instruction violates state law is not, by itself, a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.” 

Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006). “[A] petitioner may not transform a state-law

issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 

F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To prevail in a collateral attack on state court jury instructions, a petitioner must do more 

than prove that the instruction was erroneous. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 

Instead, the petitioner must prove that the improper instruction “by itself so infected the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. And even if 

there were constitutional error, habeas relief cannot be granted absent a “substantial and injurious 

effect” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

A federal court’s review of a claim of instructional error is highly deferential. Masoner v. 

Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1993). A reviewing court may not judge the instruction 

in isolation but must consider the context of the entire record and of the instructions as a whole. 

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Id. The mere possibility of a different verdict is too speculative to justify a finding of 

constitutional error. Henderson, 431 U.S. at 157. “Where the jury verdict is complete, but based 

upon ambiguous instructions, the federal court, in a habeas petition, will not disturb the verdict 

unless ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a 

way’ that violates the Constitution.” Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72). 

Even when the trial court has made an error in the instruction, a habeas petitioner is only 

entitled to relief if the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 

(1946)). A state prisoner is not entitled to federal habeas relief unless the instructional error 

resulted in “actual prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. A violation of due process occurs only 

when the instructional error results in the trial being fundamentally unfair. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 

72-73; Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 746 (9th Cir. 1995). If the court is convinced that the 

error did not influence the jury, or had little effect, the judgment should stand. O’Neal v. 

McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995).

B. Jury Instructions Regarding Evidence of Petitioner’s Assault of Araceli Are 

A Matter of State Law Outside Federal Habeas Jurisdiction

As his second ground for relief, Petitioner contends that the trial court’s instructing the 

jury using CALCRIM No. 1191 was prejudicial, permitting the jury to convict him based on

Araceli’s claim, that she had been abused as a child, which was a remote uncharged offense. 

Petitioner concedes that he did not object to the instruction before the trial court. Respondent 

contends that the Court should decline to reach this issue since it is a question of state law. The 

undersigned agrees with Respondent.

1. The Instruction

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The trial court provided the CALCRIM No. 1191 instruction as follows:

Now, the People presented evidence that [Petitioner] committed the 

crime of a lewd act upon a child, that child being Araceli Guzman, 

at the time of the alleged act that is not charged in this case.

Now, the crime of lewd act upon a child is defined for you in these 

instructions. I’ve already read that instruction to you.

You may consider the evidence relating to Araceli Guzman only if 

the People have proved by what’s called a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant, in fact, committed that uncharged 

offense. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is, of course, 

different. It’s a different standard than proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt. It’s a lesser standard.

A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you 

conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.

If the People have not met this burden of proof, that is by a 

preponderance of the evidence, you must disregard this evidence 

entirely.

Now if you decide that [Petitioner] committed the uncharged 

offense, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that 

evidence that [Petitioner] was disposed or inclined to commit 

sexual offenses and based on that decision also conclude that 

[Petitioner] was likely to commit and did commit the crimes of 

lewd act upon a child and forcible lewd act upon a child as charged 

here. If you conclude that [Petitioner] committed the uncharged 

offense, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all 

the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that 

[Petitioner] is guilty of lewd act upon a child and forcible lewd act 

upon a child. The People must still prove each charge beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose except for the 

limited purpose that I have described to you.

8 RT 1257:15-1258:25.

2. State Court Decision

Having previously rejected Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in admitting 

evidence of his earlier assaults on his daughter Araceli, the Court of Appeal quickly disposed of 

the related instructional claim:

[Petitioner] contends that the evidence did not support the giving of 

CALCRIM No, 1191 on the prior offense evidence. He does not 

challenge the instruction itself, but asserts that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove his predisposition and thereby support the 

instruction. He maintains that even if the prior offenses were 

relevant and admissible, they still did not reasonably prove his 

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propensity to commit sexual offenses 20 years later. Lastly, he 

adds that even if the offenses did prove a propensity 20 years later, 

they did not prove a propensity to commit the forcible acts charged 

in counts 4 through 13.

We have already concluded that the evidence of [Petitioner’s] prior 

offenses against Araceli was properly omitted. The evidence 

provided ample evidence to support the giving of CALCRIM No. 

1191.

Gonzales, 2011 WL 5946927 at *13.

3. The Trial Court’s Providing CALCRIM No. 1191 Was a Matter of 

State Law and Not Cognizable in Federal Habeas Review

Federal habeas relief is available to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 328 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). Petitioner’s challenge of the jury instructions repeats his challenge to the admission of 

evidence of his sexual assault of Araceli under California Evidence Code § 1108, namely, that the 

evidence was insufficient and too remote to prove propensity to sexually assault children. To the 

extent that this issue repeats the evidentiary challenge, it too is a state law issue that is not within 

the scope of federal habeas jurisdiction. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75. The state court acted reasonably 

in denying this claim.

C. Jury Instruction on Corpus Delicti Did Not Lessen the Burden of Proof

Petitioner contends that when considered in conjunction with CALCRIM No. 1191, the 

trial court’s use of CALCRIM No. 359 diluted the prosecution’s burden to prove that Petitioner 

committed the charged crimes. Respondent again responds that CALCRIM No. 359 is a matter of 

state law outside the Court’s jurisdiction in a federal habeas proceeding.

1. The Jury Instructions Given at Trial

California law requires trial courts to instruct on corpus delicti whenever the defendant’s 

extrajudicial statements are part of the prosecution’s evidence. CALCRIM No. 359, Bench Notes 

(citing People v. Howk, 56 Cal. 2d 687, 707 (1961)). Accordingly, the trial court gave the jury 

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the following instruction:

The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on his outof-court statements alone. You may only rely on the defendant’s 

out-of-court statements to convict him if you conclude that other 

evidence shows that the charged crime was committed.

That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to 

support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed.

The identity of the person who committed the crime may be proved 

by the defendant’s statements alone.

You may not convict the defendant unless the People have proved 

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

8 RT 1253:1-14.

2. State Court Decision

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim, finding that any error was harmless. It 

explained that the corpus delicti rule, which has its roots in the common law, “is intended to 

ensure that [a criminal defendant] will not be falsely convicted, by his or her untested words 

alone, of a crime that never happened.” Gonzalez, 2011 WL 5946927 at *13 (quoting People v. 

Alvarez, 27 Cal. 4

th 1161, 1169(2002)). The rule requires the prosecution to prove the body of the 

crime itself independent of a defendant’s extrajudicial statements. Gonzalez, 2011 WL 5946927 

at *13 (quoting People v. Sapp, 31 Cal. 4

th 240, 303 (2003)). Because Petitioner’s extrajudicial 

statements in this case concerned the uncharged assault of Petitioner’s daughter Araceli, 

Petitioner contended that the corpus delicti rule did not apply and the instruction was 

inappropriately given. Gonzalez, 2011 WL 5946927 at *13. According to Petitioner, giving the 

corpus delicti instruction when the out-of-court statement did not concern any of the charged 

crimes “diluted the prosecution’s burden of proof by allowing the jurors to use Petitioner’s 

extrajudicial admission of his assault on Araceli to convict him of assaulting A. and L. based on 

slight evidence supporting reasonable inference that A. and L. were assaulted.” Gonzalez, 2011 

WL 5946927 at *13.

The state court found that the evidence of Petitioner’s assaults of A. and L. was so 

compelling that any error in presenting CALCRIM No. 359 was “harmless beyond a reasonable 

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doubt.” Id. at *14. The court added, “The overwhelming state of the evidence is enough to 

convince us, but we also note that the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 220 on proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt, CALCRIM No. 200 on the possibility that some instructions may not 

apply, and CALCRIM Nos. 1110 and 1111 on the elements the prosecution was required to prove 

to obtain convictions of the sex offenses against A. and L. Taken together, these instructions 

dispel any notion that the jury misunderstood the requisite burden of proof.” Id.

3. The Harmless Error Determination Was a Matter of State Law

CALCRIM No. 359 specifically instructs the jury that it may “not convict the defendant 

unless the People have proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The instruction tells the jury 

that “a defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on his out-of-court statements alone” 

and that it may “only rely on the defendant’s out-of-court statements to convict him if . . . other 

evidence shows that the charged crime was committed.” When the substance of CALCRIM No. 

359 is kept in mind, Petitioner’s argument that giving the instruction confused the jury and made 

the jury more likely to convict Petitioner of the charges involving his abuse of A. and L. based on 

Petitioner’s out-of-court statements concerning his earlier abuse of Araceli appears illogical. This 

is because Petitioner is not really objecting to the trial court’s inclusion of CALCRIM No. 359 

but is actually repeating his argument that the trial court should not have admitted evidence of 

Petitioner’s earlier molestation of Araceli because it was irrelevant and prejudicial and tended to 

show that Petitioner “was disposed to commit sexual offenses.” Doc. 11 at 49-50.

As discussed above, the trial court’s admission of evidence concerning Petitioner’s sexual 

assault of his daughter Araceli is a question of state law that is not within the scope of federal 

habeas relief. Petitioner’s challenge to CALCRIM No. 359 seeks to circumvent that lack of 

jurisdiction by coloring the admission of the evidence of the assault on Araceli as a due process 

error. A petitioner cannot circumvent the limits of federal habeas jurisdiction by characterizing a 

state evidentiary determination as a due process issue. Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389.

When a federal district court reviews state jury instructions, the federal court generally 

must defer to the state court’s determination of state law. “It is not the province of a federal court 

to reexamine state court determinations of state law questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. The 

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Court should decline to address Petitioner’s challenge to the trial court’s instructing the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 359.

VI. Denial of Continuance to Obtain Discovery Did Not Violate Due Process

Relying on California state law, Petitioner contends in his fourth ground for relief that the 

trial court “committed error of constitutional magnitude” when it refused to grant his motion for a 

continuance to seek a copy of the 1984 police reports of Araceli and Teresa’s allegations that 

Petitioner assaulted them. Respondent counters that because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

any actual prejudice arising from the trial court’s denying the continuance motion, habeas relief is 

not warranted.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

On the morning of January 25, 2010, Petitioner’s counsel moved for a continuance to 

review or obtain various items of additional evidence. 2 RT 8-9. The argument focused on the 

prosecution’s failure to provide (1) specific contact information for three of A.’s friends, Mariah 

Taylor, Maricruz Lara, and Nicole Navarette, whose police interviews had been produced in 

discovery, and (2) reports generated when Araceli disclosed Petitioner’s abuse some twenty years 

earlier, including CPS, school, and police reports.9 Although the contention of the habeas petition 

is based on Petitioner’s need to obtain the police report of Petitioner’s abuse of Araceli, the scope 

of the motion to compel was broad and equally, if not more, focused on Petitioner’s inability to 

interview A.’s friends.

Initially, Petitioner contended that the People had failed to facilitate defense contact with 

A.’s friends, although all three young women lived in the community and the prosecution

interviews had been conducted by arrangements through the local high school. As the arguments 

progressed, Petitioner’s attorney was unclear about whether he sought a discovery order or a 

continuance:

With respect to the—there’s this 20-year-old case hovering over all 

 

9 Additional discussion concerned the prosecution’s contact the prior weekend with another woman who reportedly 

had been assaulted by Petitioner in the distant past. The prosecutor represented that when its investigator made 

contact, the woman confirmed that she had been sexually assaulted by Petitioner but expressed unwillingness to be a 

witness in the pending prosecution. After the prosecution represented that it did not intend to call the woman in 

question as a trial witness, defense counsel did not pursue the matter further.

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this, and the—the person in this case, one of the—my client’s 

daughter had made allegations way back 20 years ago. This is part 

of the motion.

There apparently was an investigation by the District Attorney’s 

Office’s [investigator] Gregg White, who tried to secure the CPS 

reports, as well as the school records. I did and apparently was told 

they’ve been purged or destroyed. However, I know there was [sic]

police reports generated according to Araceli Guzman, and if there 

are police reports generated, I don’t have those. I don’t know if the 

People have those. I know that they would have access to them. 

I know they intend to call the—I guess the alleged victim in that 

case, although she’s not included in this report, Ms. A. Guzman, 

and if they do intend to call her and there is [sic] police reports to 

impeach her, I would like a copy of those.

I know that there was a witness that I discovered who contradicts 

her—her allegations, but if there’s police reports, I don’t have them

yet and I have requested those.

2 RT 37:7-38:3.

After the trial judge observed that counsel’s argument seemed to be a discovery request, 

not a motion to continue, Petitioner’s counsel contended that the lack of discovery formed a basis 

for the continuance request. Counsel conceded that he had not filed a timely motion regarding the 

alleged discovery violations and that he did not know if the prosecution had police reports, but 

argued that the People had better access to police reports than he did. 

The deputy district attorney stated that District Attorney’s Office’s Investigator White had 

tried to secure police reports but had been unsuccessful. Police Detective Klassen testified that he 

had run the names associated with the report but had been unsuccessful, perhaps because the 

reports were so old and had been mis-archived or destroyed.10 When Petitioner’s counsel 

attempted to examine Klassen about the extent of White’s efforts to locate the police reports, the 

trial court stopped him, pointed out that Klassen could not testify regarding White’s actions, and 

asked counsel if he had subpoenaed White to testify regarding the motion. Counsel replied that 

he had simply assumed that White would be present (White was not in court) and began to argue 

a motion in limine, which the court found not to be ripe pending resolution of the continuance 

motion. Petitioner’s counsel then argued for a continuance to permit further discovery:

 

10 After the motion for continuance had already been denied, the prosecution learned that Araceli had used a different 

name at the time of the assault. The police report was identified but was not recoverable due to technical difficulties.

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[W]hat I’ve submitted to the court in my motion, written 

declarations and what I have additional discovery I received since

then, that’s what I’m submitting to the court and asking a 

continuance, not a long continuance, I don’t need a whole month, 

but I do need time to subpoena these people to question them.

Yes, my investigator can scramble to go find ‘em. It’s just if we 

started the trial tomorrow, we haven’t even subpoenaed some of 

these people, He’s scrambling, we’re barely going to get addresses 

today, and would a week help? Probably tremendously, So I’m, 

not looking to put this over for a significant period of time.

2 RT 45:22-46:9.

Counsel continued in the same vein, requesting at least a week to locate and interview Taylor,

Lara, and Navarette.

The State opposed the motion, noting that jury voir dire was scheduled to begin the next 

day. It argued that defense counsel had known the names of A.’s three friends “for a substantial 

period of time,” knew that they attended a local high school, and had never requested more 

specific contact information. 2 RT 48. The People did not intend to call them as witnesses. 

Transcripts of the interviews were less than five pages each, and an audiotape Petitioner had 

requested a new copy was 37 minutes long. Since the defense would not need to present its 

witnesses until after the jury was seated and the prosecution case concluded, which would not 

occur until the following week, the People argued that no continuance was necessary. 

Petitioner’s counsel conceded that his investigator could question additional witnesses while 

counsel was at trial but contended that proceeding with trial would preclude his use of any 

impeachment information in cross-examination.

The trial court acknowledged Petitioner’s right to a fair trial and effective assistance of 

counsel. It found that the State had produced discovery on time and that defense counsel had the 

information about which he now sought a continuance for “quite some period of time.” 2 AR 

50:9. To the extent that the request for a continuance related to the testimony of Taylor and Lara, 

those witnesses were local, equally accessible to both sides, and should have been known to the 

defense by the prior May (about 9 months earlier) had it promptly reviewed the discovery 

provided by the State.11 On the other hand, the case was “aging.” 2 RT 52:26. 

 

11 Earlier in the hearing, defense counsel stated that although it had CDs of the statements and interviews much 

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Defense counsel estimated that it needed an additional week to investigate; the parties 

agreed that at least a week would be available to prepare the defense case while the parties chose 

a jury and the State presented its case. Taking all factors into account, the trial court denied the 

continuance motion.

B. State Court Opinion

Petitioner raised this issue in his state petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Tulare 

County Superior Court rejected the claim as not supported by the evidence. In re Luis Aldana 

Gonzalez (Tulare Cty. May 2, 2013) (No. 282554) (Lodged Doc. 21 at ¶ 4). The court stated, 

“Petitioner fails to establish how any continuance would have benefitted petitioner or changed the 

outcome of trial.” Id.

C. Denial of Continuance to Secure Evidence Did Not Violate Due Process

Trial courts are accorded broad discretion on matters regarding continuances. See Morris 

v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983); Unger v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). A trial court 

abuses its discretion if it arbitrarily insists “upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable 

request for delay.” Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12.

In the Ninth Circuit, a court may consider four factors to determine whether a trial court’s 

denial of a continuance request was an abuse of discretion: (1) the degree of appellant’s diligence 

before requesting a continuance; (2) whether the grant of a continuance would have served a 

useful purpose; (3) the inconvenience that granting a continuance would cause to the court or the 

government; and (4) the prejudice to appellant in denying the continuance. United States v. Flynt, 

756 F.2d 1352, 1358-61 (9th Cir. 1985). “These factors must be considered together, and the 

weight given to any one may vary from case to case.” Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 556 (9th

Cir. 1985); Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1359. However the court weighs the factors, the appellant must 

demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the court’s denial of the motion. Gallego v. 

McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1072 *(9th Cir. 1997).

The record supported the trial court’s finding that defense counsel had not acted diligently 

 

earlier, because of delays in securing an investigator, the defense had not reviewed the materials until the prior 

month. It sought additional time to compare its transcripts of the statements and interviews with the video recordings 

and with transcripts prepared by the prosecution.

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to pursue the discovery that he sought on the eve of trial. Although he had the transcripts and 

video recordings of the prosecution’s interviews with A.’s friends at about the same time he took 

over as Petitioner’s counsel (May 2009), counsel delayed reviewing the materials until the month 

before trial was scheduled. He never filed a timely motion to compel discovery or even asked the 

prosecution for the information and materials that formed the basis for the request for 

continuance. Because the prosecution had been unable to secure copies of any reports prepared 

more than 20 years earlier when Araceli disclosed that she had been abused, continuing the trial 

to secure the reports was unlikely to be useful. Since the prosecution did not intend to call A.’s 

friends as witnesses, there was little purpose in granting a continuance to allow the defense to 

discover impeachment evidence. In any event, the petition restricts its claim of error to the 

provision of reports concerning Petitioner’s alleged assault of Araceli. The inconvenience to the 

trial court, the prosecution, and Petitioner himself was substantial.

The decisive factor in this case, however, is that Petitioner demonstrates no prejudice 

attributable to the trial court’s denial of the continuance. As the trial court found, the evidence 

against Petitioner was overwhelming. The state court reasonably determined that denial of the 

continuance did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process.

VII. Petitioner’s Sentence Is Not Excessive

Following his conviction on all thirteen counts, the trial court sentenced Petition to an 

aggregate term of 195 years to life imprisonment. Reasoning that his crimes were not violent and 

that a 195-year term will be impossible to serve, Petitioner contends that this excessive sentence 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

A. The Crimes of Which Petitioner Was Convicted

The jury convicted Petitioner of three counts of lewd acts against a child in violation of

California Penal Code § 288(a) and ten counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child in violation of 

California Penal Code § 288(b)(1). With regard to each count, the jury found to be true the 

aggravating factors set forth in Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(8) (substantial sexual contact with a 

child younger than 14 years) and Penal Code §667.61(b) (multiple victims). The trial court 

imposed a sentence of 15 years to life in prison on each count, to be served consecutively.

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B. State Court Opinion

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim that because the trial court 

mistakenly believed that consecutive sentences were required for the 13 convictions, it failed to 

exercise its sentencing discretion. “[T]he transcript of the sentencing hearing unambiguously 

demonstrates that the court not only was aware of its discretion (the probation officer’s report 

even recommended concurrent sentences on some counts), but was so disturbed by the case that it 

would have imposed an even greater sentence if it could have done so.” Gonzalez, 2011 WL 

5946927 at *15. The trial court stated:

I am going to sentence you to 195 years to life. That is not the death 

penalty. The death penalty is not allowed in these circumstances. 

Whether it should be or not is not for me to decide, but I can say to 

you, and I will say to your family that for all intents and purposes, 

you are dead to the world, and that is appropriate, and that is just. 

You should never, ever, ever be released from prison, and it is my 

intent that that should be accomplished by the sentence I am about 

to impose upon you.

Gonzalez, 2011 WL 5946927 at *16.

C. Petitioner’s Sentence Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 

punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const., amend. VIII. Courts determine whether punishment is cruel 

or unusual by looking beyond historical conceptions to “the evolving standards of decency that 

mark the progress of a maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting 

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). “This is because ‘[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is 

not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains 

the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.’” Kennedy v. 

Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) 

(Burger, C.J., dissenting)). “[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be 

graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).

The constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies “not only [to] 

barbaric punishments, but also [to] sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.” 

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). In federal habeas cases, whether a sentence violates 

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the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires the court to 

determine whether the term is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“[T]he only relevant clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or 

‘unreasonable application of’ framework is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise 

contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Id.

at 73. Successful challenges based on disproportionality are “exceedingly rare.” Solem, 463 U.S. 

at 289-90.

Supreme Court cases addressing proportionality can be categorized either as challenges to 

term-of-years sentences or as categorical restrictions on death sentences. Graham v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 48, 59 (2010). In term-of-years challenges, such as Petitioner’s challenge in this case, the 

Court applies a “narrow proportionality principle, that does not require strict proportionality 

between crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly 

disproportionate to the crime.” Id. at 59-60 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 

1000-01 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine disproportionality:

A court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the 

severity of the sentence. ‘In the rare case in which [this] threshold 

comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality’ 

the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the 

sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and 

with sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. If 

this comparative analysis validates(s) an initial judgment that [the] 

sentence is disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual.

Graham, 560 U.S. at 60 (internal quotations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit summarized:

First, the Supreme Court has uniformly applied—and thus given 

true meaning to—the gross disproportionality principle by 

consistently measuring the relationship between the severity of the 

punishment inflicted upon the offender and the nature and number 

of the offenses committed, even though it has sometimes used 

different frameworks to conduct this analysis. . . . Second, the 

Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a court’s proportionality 

analysis “should be informed by objective factors to the maximum 

possible extent” instead of relying upon “subjective views” 

regarding the fit between the offenses and the punishment.

Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted).

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Considering Norris’s Eighth Amendment habeas claim, the Ninth Circuit outlined the 

procedure for determining gross proportionality:

[W]e begin by determining whether “the crime committed and the 

sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” 

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 . . . (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see 

Graham, [560 U.S. at 60]. In doing so, we compare the harshness 

of the penalty imposed upon the defendant with the gravity of his 

triggering offense and criminal history. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28-29 . 

. . (plurality opinion); accord Ramirez v. Warden, 365 F.3d 755, 

767-70 (9th Cir. 2004). This analysis can consider the penological 

justifications for the state’s sentencing scheme. Graham, [560 U.s. 

at 71], “[the offender’s] mental state and motive in committing the 

crime, [and] the actual harm caused to the victim or to society by 

his conduct,” id. at [87] (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (citing Solem, 

463 U.S. at 292-94 . . .), as well as “[t]he absolute magnitude of the 

crime,” Solem, 463 U.S. at 293 . . . ; accord Taylor v. Lewis, 460 

F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006).

Norris, 622 F.3d at 1290.

Having submitted to this Court a brief that apparently was submitted to the state court, 

Petitioner does not address the applicable federal standards. Instead, Petitioner focusses on the 

second of three factors articulated in People v. Mendez, 188 Cal. App. 4

th 47, 64-65 (2010), “a 

comparison with the punishment for more serious offenses within the jurisdiction.” Doc. 11 at 

71. Petitioner argues that his sentence for 13 counts of sexually assaulting children under 14 

years old is disproportionate when compared to a 25-years-to-life sentence imposed for a single 

count of premeditated murder. Because Petitioner’s 195-year sentence relates to 13 separate 

terms of 15 years to life, his comparison is not apt, even if the state standard applied in a federal 

habeas action.

The 9

th Circuit directs the Court to compare the harshness of the penalty with the gravity 

of the triggering offense and Petitioner’s criminal history. Norris, 622 F.3d at 1290. In 

evaluating the gravity of the offenses, the Court must look beyond the “label of the crime” to the 

“factual specifics of the offense. Id. at 1292 (quoting Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 

2005)). Relevant considerations include whether the crime involved the use of force, the degree 

of force used, whether weapons were involved, and whether the offense threatened grave harm to 

society. Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2004).

“Sexual molestation of a child is a very serious offense.” Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 

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F.3d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1994). “When a child molester commits his offense, he is well aware that 

the harm will plague the victim for a lifetime.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 651 (2003) 

(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The severity is exacerbated when the abuse is committed by “familial 

figures of authority,” who take advantage of young and defenseless victims, violating the child’s 

trust and using their confidential relationship with the victim to conceal the crime. Id. at 652. 

The aggregate sentence imposed on Petitioner and the state court’s accompanying explanation 

reasonably expressed societal outrage at a grandfather’s repeated sexual abuse of two young 

granddaughters. Further, despite Petitioner’s claim that his “conduct was not violent” (see Doc. 1 

at 60 (page omitted from Doc. 11)), federal courts “have consistently held that sexual offenses 

against young children constitute ‘crimes of violence.” United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 

507, 515 (9th Cir. 2009).12 

Although Petitioner had no criminal record at the time of conviction, he faced thirteen 

counts alleging sexual molestation of his granddaughters A. and L. As in Cacoperdo, these 

counts were only representative of a pattern of conduct as to both children that continued over a 

period of years. See 37 F.3d 508. In addition, the record revealed a long-term pattern of conduct 

of Petitioner’s molesting other children over a period of decades. “The impact of these crimes on 

the lives of the victims is extraordinarily severe.” Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 508.

The severity of Petitioner’s conduct is also relevant. For example, in Norris, defendant

disputed the seriousness of his conduct, the momentary touching of a young girl’s genitals outside 

of her clothing, as de minimus. 622 F.3d at 1292. The Ninth Circuit rejected his characterization 

emphasizing that as a crime against a person, it inherently required a degree of force, and that the 

conduct involved “a purposeful touch with the purpose of sexual gratification.” Id. The sexual 

 

12 “See, e.g., Dos Santos v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 81, 84-84 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a conviction under a 

Connecticut statute criminalizing “contact with the intimate parts ... of a child under the age of sixteen years” is a 

“crime of violence”); United States v. Ortiz–Delgado, 451 F.3d 752, 757 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that a conviction 

under California Penal Code section 288(a) is a “crime of violence”); [United States v.] Medina–Maella, 351 F.3d 

[944,] 947 [(2003)]; [United States v.] Pereira–Salmeron, 337 F.3d [1148,] 1155 [(2003)]; [United States v.] Rayo–

Valdez, 302 F.3d [314,] 316 [(2002)] (holding that a conviction under a Texas statute criminalizing the aggravated 

sexual assault of child under fourteen is a “crime of violence”); Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 583 (11th Cir.1995) (per 

curiam) (holding that a conviction under a Florida statute criminalizing attempted lewd assault on a child under 

sixteen is a “crime of violence”); United States v. Reyes–Castro,13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that a 

conviction under a Utah statute criminalizing the indecent touching of a child under fourteen is a “crime of 

violence”).” Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 515.

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acts inflicted on A. and L. were far more extensive and forceful than a single, brief touch through 

clothing and were repeated on many occasions. After reviewing defendant’s criminal history, 

which included both sexual and nonsexual offenses, the Ninth Circuit upheld his life sentence 

without possibility of parole under Washington State’s recidivist sentencing law. Id. at 1295-96. 

Convicted in Nevada of ten counts of sexually molesting his teen-aged stepdaughters, 

Cacoperdo similarly challenged his life sentence on each count, six of which were to be served 

consecutively.13 Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 506-07. The Ninth Circuit held, “Cacoperdo’s sentence 

is neither extreme nor grossly disproportionate to his crimes.” Id. at 508. In light of the 

sentences imposed in this comparable case, Petitioner’s sentence does not shock the conscience.

Petitioner argues that, given his advanced age (Petitioner was 62 years old when he was 

convicted), an aggregate 195-year-to-life sentence is tantamount to his receiving a death sentence. 

This Court has previously rejected the argument that a Petitioner’s advanced age can 

counterbalance factors indicating the propriety of a severe sentence. See, e.g., Higgins v. 

Hedgpeth, 2010 WL 1904866 at *24 (E.D.Cal. May 10, 2010) (No. 2:06-cv-02192-RAJ-JLW 

HC) (rejecting 68-year old defendant’s claim that a 32-year-to-life sentence was so 

disproportionate as to constitute sentence of life without parole).

A comparison of the gravity of Petitioner’s offenses to the sentence imposed does not 

raise an inference of disproportionality. The state court reasonably determined that Petitioner’s 

sentence was not constitutionally excessive.

VIII. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a 

certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by 

the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 

13 Citing Ramirez v. Arizona, 437 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1971), the 9th Circuit declined to consider the issue of 

consecutive versus concurrent sentences as a matter of state law. Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507.

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(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding 

to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the 

United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending 

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) 

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by 

paragraph (2).

If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

"if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims 

or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate 

"something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . 

part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court's determination that Petitioner is not entitled 

to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or his claims deserving of encouragement to 

proceed further. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

IX. Conclusion and Recommendation

The undersigned recommends that the Court deny the Petition for writ of habeas corpus 

with prejudice and decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C ' 636(b)(1). Within thirty 

(30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, either party may file 

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate 

Judge=s Findings and Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections, if any, shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may constitute waiver of the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 ((9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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