Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01710/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01710-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Cannon & Wendt Electric Co., Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 07-1710-PHX-EHC

ORDER

On June 25, 2010, this case came before the Court for a Hearing on Plaintiff’s

Application for an Order to Show Cause Why Defendant Should Not Be Held in Contempt

for Failure to Obey an Order of the Court (Doc. 105). Plaintiff contends that Defendant has

failed to comply with certain provisions of the Consent Decree (Doc. 104) filed on April 12,

2010. On May 18, 2010, Defendant filed a Preliminary Response to the Application for Show

Cause Order (Doc. 106). On June 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 109).

Pursuant to the Court’s Order (Dkt. 108) filed on June 1, 2010, the parties filed a Joint

Status Report (Doc. 111) on June 18, 2010 regarding disputed issues. The parties filed a

Supplemental Joint Status Report (Doc. 112) on June 24, 2010.

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserted claims for discrimination regarding Defendant’s former

employee Victor Cortez under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. On September 22, 2009, the Court filed an Order denying

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 89 - Order). The Consent Decree (Doc.

Case 2:07-cv-01710-EHC Document 116 Filed 10/12/10 Page 1 of 7
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104) was approved and consented to by counsel for the parties and an official of Defendant

company all of whom signed the Consent Decree. The Court entered and ordered the

Consent Decree on April 9, 2010. The Consent Decree was filed on April 12, 2010. 

Consent decrees “‘have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees,’ a dual

character that has resulted in different treatment for different purposes.” Gilmore v. People

of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 1001 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000). Courts may use contract

principles in construing consent decrees. Thompson v. Enomoto, 915 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th

Cir. 1990). “The contract law of the situs state applies.” Id.

The scope of a consent decree is discerned within its four corners, “‘and not by

reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it’ or by what ‘might

have been written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in

litigation.’” Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984)(quoting

United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-682 (1971)). “A district court has the

power to modify a consent decree if experience with the administration of the decree shows

the need for modification in order to accomplish the primary goals of the decree.”

Thompson, 915 F.2d at 1388. “‘A consent decree is a judgment, has the force of res judicata,

and it may be enforced by judicial sanctions, including ... citations for contempt.’” Gilmore,

220 F.3d at 1001 n.17 (quoting Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 528

(9th Cir. 1984)). 

The disputed issues raised in Plaintiff’s Application for Order to Show Cause, the

Joint Status Report, and the Supplemental Joint Status Report are discussed as follows. 

Defendant’s Payment to Cortez of $20,000 in Back Pay

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not paid Victor Cortez $20,000 in “back pay” as

required by paragraphs 3-6 of the Consent Decree.

Defendant responds that a disputed issue remains regarding whether Defendant is

required to obtain a Form I-9 prior to issuing a 2010 payroll check to Victor Cortez. A Form

I-9 is an Employment Eligibility Verification and is attached as Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s

Case 2:07-cv-01710-EHC Document 116 Filed 10/12/10 Page 2 of 7
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Preliminary Response. Defendant argues that its failure to verify employment eligibility and

properly retain a current Form I-9 possibly would subject Defendant company to criminal

and civil liabilities. Defendant had on file a 2000 Form I-9 as to Victor Cortez based on an

“unexpired INS employment authorization” which by its terms expired on January 7, 2009.

Defendant argues that it is required to re-verify employment eligibility when an employee’s

work authorization expires. Defendant informs the Court that Victor Cortez is refusing to

sign the Form I-9 (Employment Eligibility Verification). Defendant asks that the Court

decide the following issues: (1) that Defendant is not required to obtain a Form I-9; or (2)

whether Victor Cortez is required to complete the Form I-9 prior to receiving the check in

payment of the “back pay” amount. In the Supplemental Joint Status Report, Defendant

suggests amending the Consent Decree to change the “back pay” to compensatory damages

(which are not run through a payroll account).

In its Reply, Plaintiff argues that current U.S. Department of Homeland Security

guidelines disallow the re-verification of expired permanent residence cards, and that

Defendant must pay Victor Cortez the “back pay” amount without requesting a Form I-9.

Plaintiff reports that an attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Special

Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practices consulted with the U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and then in an e-mail on June 2, 2010 notified

Defendant’s counsel of the following: “If the individual is not being hired or employed by

the employer, the employer cannot require the individual to complete a Form I-9” (Doc. 109 -

Exhibit 4). Plaintiff argues that Defendant continues to unreasonably delay paying Victor

Cortez the “back pay” amount despite receiving this e-mail. Plaintiff argues that Defendant

failed to raise any concerns relating to the Form I-9 prior to the entry of the Consent Decree.

In the Supplemental Joint Status Report, Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s assertion that “the

backpay ordered by the Consent Decree be ‘changed’ to compensatory damages because this

‘change’ would subject Mr. Cortez to a higher level of scrutiny from the IRS, and would

violate the terms of the Consent Decree negotiated by the Parties, and Ordered by the Court.”

Case 2:07-cv-01710-EHC Document 116 Filed 10/12/10 Page 3 of 7
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At the hearing on June 25th, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Defendant was not rehiring

Cortez as an employee and described the issue regarding the Form I-9 as “frivolous.”

Defendant’s counsel argued that the issue concerned “back pay” and the Form I-9 matter

requires resolution by the Court. 

In this case, Cortez allegedly suffered an adverse employment action when his

employment was terminated by Defendant company on May 6, 2005. Cortez was

unemployed for approximately seven months until he was hired by another company on

December 30, 2005. An award of back pay is generally calculated from the date of the

discriminatory discharge until the date of the final judgment. Kraszewski v. State Farm

General Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 1182, 1184-1185 (9th Cir. 1990); Edwards v. Occidental

Chemical Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990). Back pay is calculated by subtracting

the actual wages a discharged employee earned subsequent to termination from the amount

the employee would have earned absent the employer’s discrimination. Gotthardt v. National

R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). Sias v. City Demonstration

Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1978). According to Defendant, it had on file a 2000

Form I-9 as to Victor Cortez based on an “unexpired INS employment authorization” which

by its terms expired on January 7, 2009. It therefore appears that Defendant had on file a

Form I-9 as to Cortez during the time between Cortez’s May 6, 2005 employment

termination and the date he was hired by another company on December 30, 2005. Cortez

was not an employee of Defendant and did not perform any work for Defendant in 2010.

Cortez’s completion of another Form I-9 appears unnecessary. 

The Consent Decree (Doc. 104) at paragraph 3 requires Defendant to pay Victor

Cortez a sum of money that includes $20,000 for “back pay.” The Consent Decree at

paragraph 4 requires Defendant to pay Cortez the settlement amount within five (5) business

days of entry of the Decree. Paragraph 4 further provides that: “For the amount designated

as back pay, $20,000, Defendant shall be responsible for paying the employer’s share of

FUTA and FICA and the amount will not be taken from the settlement amount.” The

Case 2:07-cv-01710-EHC Document 116 Filed 10/12/10 Page 4 of 7
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Consent Decree at paragraph 6 requires Defendant to mail the check, via certified mail,

within time periods specified in the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree does not contain

any term regarding completion of a Form I-9 by Victor Cortez regarding Defendant’s

payment to Cortez of the $20,000 in “back pay.” 

A district court’s authority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute

which the decree is intended to enforce, not from the parties’ consent to the decree.

Firefighters Local Union No. 1784, 467 U.S. at 576 n. 9. Plaintiff’s Complaint asserted

claims for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The parties have not provided any discussion regarding the

basis of this litigation and a Form I-9. As discussed above, the scope of a consent decree is

not discerned by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.

Defendant will be required by November 15, 2010 to pay Victor Cortez $20,000 in “back

pay” as required under the Consent Decree.

The Selection of the In-House Trainer

In the Joint Status Report (Doc. 111), the parties raised an additional disputed issue

“other than those raised in Plaintiff’s Application for Order to Show Cause,” that is,

Plaintiff’s objection to Defendant’s request to utilize its employee, Robert Hanson, for the

training required under the Consent Decree (see Consent Decree, ¶ 11(A)). 

By way of background, Defendant’s employee Robert Hanson, Director of Training

and Safety (a management position), took the photograph that allegedly showed Victor

Cortez working under a golf cart supported by a forklift. This asserted activity allegedly

was a safety violation and was an alleged reason in part for Cortez’s employment

termination. Cortez appeared to dispute being the employee depicted in the photograph. 

Plaintiff objects to Hanson as the in-house trainer because Hanson allegedly

participated in retaliating against Cortez. Plaintiff also objects because Hanson’s resume

does not indicate that he has obtained any certifications, training or proficiency in the areas

of equal employment opportunity or workplace discrimination and harassment. 

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Defendant has responded that Hanson is qualified based on his resume and has been

approved by the EEOC for equal opportunity training in another case. 

The in-house trainer dispute does not otherwise concern Victor Cortez. The dispute

is between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding a provision set forth in the Consent Decree.

The Consent Decree provides that “[w]ithin ninety (90) days of the entering of this

Decree, Defendant shall provide training on national origin discrimination and retaliation,

according to” certain terms as set forth in the Decree. These terms include that “Defendant

shall retain and pay for a qualified consultant/lecturer who shall provide consultation and

training for a period of three (3) years from the date of this Decree” (Doc. 104 - Consent

Decree ¶¶ 11 & 11(A)). The Consent Decree further provides that “Defendant must obtain

the EEOC’s written approval for the consultant/trainer” (id.).

The Consent Decree’s terms provide that Defendant must obtain Plaintiff’s written

approval for the consultant/trainer. Plaintiff has demonstrated in the Joint Status Report that

it does not agree with Defendant’s selection of Hanson. Defendant therefore will be required

to select a consultant/lecturer that Plaintiff has approved in writing by November 15, 2010.

Other Issues

In the Application for Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had not

paid Cortez $80,000 in compensatory damages or issued to him an apology letter as required

by the Consent Decree. These issues have since been resolved by the parties.

In its Reply, Plaintiff moves for an Order that (1) fines Defendant an appropriate

amount per day for each day Defendant fails to comply with the Consent Decree; (2) requires

Defendant to pay to Victor Cortez a sum comparable to the attorney’s fees and costs incurred

by Plaintiff EEOC in prosecuting the Show Cause Application; (3) extends the Consent

Decree by one additional year (to April 12, 2014); and, (4) requires Defendant to pay Victor

Cortez the remaining $20,000 (back pay) due under the Consent Decree plus interest for the

continued delay from April 28, 2010 through (a) the date the $80,000 in compensatory

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damages was paid on May 19, 2010 and (b) the date the $20,000 in back pay (presently due)

is paid to Victor Cortez. 

The Consent Decree contains a duration and compliance provision as follows:

23. The duration of this decree shall be three (3) years from its

entry. This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for the

duration of this decree, during which the Commission may

petition this Court for compliance with this decree. Should the

Court determine that Defendant has not complied with this

decree, appropriate relief, including extension of this decree for

such period as may be necessary to remedy its non-compliance,

may be ordered.

(Doc. 104 - Consent Decree ¶ 23). The Court declines to order further relief under the

Consent Decree as requested by Plaintiff subject to the right of Plaintiff to re-apply for relief

as appropriate after the November 15, 2010 deadline set in this Order. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for an Order to Show Cause Why

Defendant Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Failure to Obey an Order of the Court (Doc.

105) is granted in part and denied in part without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for an Order to Show

Cause, etc. (Doc. 105) is granted to the extent that by November 15, 2010 (1) Defendant shall

pay to Victor Cortez $20,000 in “back pay” and (2) Defendant shall select a

consultant/lecturer that Plaintiff has approved in writing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for an Order to Show

Cause, etc. (Doc. 105) is denied without prejudice to the right of Plaintiff to re-apply for

relief under the Consent Decree as appropriate after the November 15, 2010 deadline set in

this Order. 

DATED this 12th day of October, 2010.

Case 2:07-cv-01710-EHC Document 116 Filed 10/12/10 Page 7 of 7