Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16383/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16383-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PATRICK NOVAK; DANIEL ROCHA;

LARRY KENNER, DBA Kenner, Inc.,

a Hawaii corporation; KEN

SCHOOLLAND; BJORN ARNTZEN;

PHILIP R. WILKERSON; WILLIAM

AKINA, PH.D., Individually and as

Representatives of a Class of

Similarly Situated Persons,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

DOES 1–1000,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-16383

D.C. No.

1:12-cv-00638-

LEK-RLP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 19, 2015—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed July 30, 2015

Before: Richard R. Clifton, N. Randy Smith,

and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

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2 NOVAK V. UNITED STATES

Opinion by Judge Clifton;

Concurrence by Judge Friedland

SUMMARY*

Jones Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an

action challenging the constitutionality of the Jones Act’s

cabotage provisions, which prohibit foreign competition in

the domestic shipping market.

Plaintiffs alleged that the Jones Act’s provisions impaired

interstate trade between Hawaii and the rest of the United

States to such an extent that they violated the Constitution. 

Plaintiffs are individuals and a corporation who reside in

Hawaii and claim to have suffered pecuniary injury when

they purchased domestic ocean cargo shipping services on

west coast Hawaii routes.

The panel held that plaintiffs did not meet their burden to

show causation or redressability, two requisite elements for

Article III standing. The panel further held that although it

was possible that plaintiffs could establish standing if they

amended their complaint, any amendment would be futile

because plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause challenge to the Jones

Act would fail on the merits. The panel held that an amended

complaint would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a

claim because the enactment of the Jones Act was not beyond

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 3

the authority assigned to Congress under the Commerce

Clause. The panel also rejected plaintiffs’ claim alleging that

the Jones Act violated protections guaranteed under the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the panel

held that the district court did not violate plaintiffs’

procedural due process by ruling on the government’s motion

to dismiss without an oral hearing.

Judge Friedland concurred. She wrote separately to

express her view that San Diego County Gun Rights

Committee v. Reno, 98F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 19966), which

drove the majority opinion’s conclusion that plaintiffs lacked

Article III standing, should be reconsidered in an appropriate

case.

COUNSEL

John S. Carroll (argued), Honolulu, Hawaii, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Rachel S. Moriyama (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney, and Florence T. Nakakuni, United States Attorney,

Honolulu, Hawaii, for Defendant-Appellee.

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4 NOVAK V. UNITED STATES

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

This action challenges the constitutionality of the Jones

Act’s cabotage provisions, which prohibit foreign

competition in the domestic shipping market. Plaintiffs

allege that these provisions impair interstate trade between

Hawaii and the rest of the United States to such an extent that

they violate the Constitution. The district court dismissed the

action with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to

satisfy what it framed as prudential standing requirements

because they alleged only generalized grievances shared with

all residents and businesses in Hawaii.

We affirm the dismissal of this action. Plaintiffs have

alleged more than generalized grievances and have

demonstrated an “injury in fact,” but have not met their

burden to show causation or redressability, the other two

elements of Article III standing. Although it is possible that

Plaintiffs could establish standing if they amended their

complaint, anyamendment would be futile because Plaintiffs’

challenge to the Jones Act would fail on the merits. An

amended complaint would, we conclude, be subject to

dismissal for failure to state a claim because the enactment of

the Jones Act was not beyond the authority assigned to

Congress under the Commerce Clause. To the contrary, that

statute is precisely the kind of legislation, a regulation of

interstate commerce, that the Commerce Clause empowers

Congress to enact.

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 5

I. Background

Plaintiffs are six individuals and one corporation.1 All

reside in Hawaii and claim to have suffered pecuniary injury

when they purchased “domestic ocean cargo shipping

services on west coast Hawaii routes.” They sued the United

States, claiming that the root of their problem is found in the

cabotage provisions of the Jones Act, formally known as the

Merchant Marine Act of 1920. Cabotage is the transport of

goods or passengers between two points in the same country. 

Black’s Law Dictionary 243 (10th ed. 2014).

The purpose of the Jones Act is to support this country’s

merchant marine and its shipbuilding and repair facilities, at

least in part so they may be available in times of war or

national emergency. 46 U.S.C. § 50101. One way the statute

aims to accomplish this objective is by limiting the domestic

shipping market to American companies, excluding foreign

competitors. Under the cabotage provisions, any ship

carrying cargo between two points in the United States must

have been “built in the United States,” 46 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a)(2)(A), and be “wholly owned by citizens of the

United States,” id. § 55102(b)(1).

1 The individual plaintiffs and appellants are Patrick Novak, Daniel

Rocha, Ken Schoolland, Bjorn Arntzen, Philip Wilkerson, and William

Akina; the corporate plaintiff and appellant is Kenner Inc. The action was

filed as a putative class action on behalf of all persons and entities who

purchased shipping services between the continental United States and

Hawaii in compliance with the Jones Act from at least September 1, 1959

to the present. Plaintiffs did not seek class certification prior to dismissal

of the action by the district court. Although they initially sought damages

and injunctive relief, Plaintiffs have abandoned their claim for damages.

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According to Plaintiffs, these provisions violate the basic

tenets of the Commerce Clause because they have effectively

“impaired, hindered, and substantially affected and

completely cut off Hawaii from interstate commerce.” “In

the absence of highways and railways,” the complaint alleges,

“the Jones Act promises to nullify interstate commerce to the

State of Hawaii.”

Plaintiffs’ theory is that, by excluding foreign

competition, the cabotage provisions have created “an

essentially monopolistic Hawaiian ocean shipping market”

that has resulted in “high prices” and “a de facto duopoly” of

two established firms in the Hawaii-mainland shipping

market. Plaintiffs contend that all Hawaii residents and

businesses, including themselves, have been harmed not only

by the increased shipping costs, but also by the resultant

inflated cost of doing business in Hawaii because higher

shipping costs lead to higher prices for imported goods. 

Plaintiffs assert that interstate trade between Hawaii and the

rest of the United States has been significantly stifled to such

an extent that the effect of the Jones Act’s restrictions

amounts to “an unlawful restraint of trade and interstate

commerce, thereby violating the Commerce Clause of the

United States Constitution.” Plaintiffs filed this action

against the United States, asserting a single cause of action

under the Commerce Clause.

The district court granted the government’s motion to

dismiss the action with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs

failed to establish standing on prudential grounds because

they alleged only generalized grievances. Specifically, the

court concluded that “Plaintiffs assert onlygeneralized claims

on behalf of an extremely broad class of persons or entities

that pay for interstate shipping or are consumers of goods that

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 7

have been shipped in interstate commerce. . . . This type of

broad, generalized allegation is simply insufficient to meet

standing requirements.” The court’s order cited Arizonans

for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997), and

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995), among other

authorities.

Plaintiffs appealed.

II. Discussion

We review de novo a district court’s determination on the

issue of standing. Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 991 (9th

Cir. 2009). “Where standing is raised in connection with a

motion to dismiss,” we “accept as true all material allegations

of the complaint, and construe the complaint in favor of the

complaining party.” Id. (alteration, citation, and quotation

marks omitted). We also “presume that general allegations

embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the

claim.” Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 907 (9th

Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We may

affirm on any proper ground supported by the record. 

Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2013).

A. Standing

The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III

standing consists of (1) “injury in fact,” (2) “a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained

of,” and (3) a likelihood “that the injury will be redressed by

a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (quotation marks omitted). 

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“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing these elements.” Id. at 561.

1. Injury in Fact

“[A]n injury in fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected

interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560

(quotation marks omitted). Because a generalized grievance

is not a particularized injury, a suit alleging only generalized

grievances fails for lack of standing. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.

Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3

(2014); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439–40 (2007) (per

curiam); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).

The district court determined that Plaintiffs alleged only

generalized grievances and consequently dismissed their

action for lack of standing.

2

In so doing, the district court

mistakenly focused only on the size of the population

allegedly harmed. “[T]he fact that a harm is widely shared

does not necessarily render it a generalized grievance.” 

Jewel, 673 F.3d at 909; see also Federal Election Comm’n v.

Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (recognizing that “where a

harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found

‘injury in fact.’”). Indeed, the instances in which the

Supreme Court has labeled a plaintiff’s claim a “generalized

grievance” “invariably appear[ ] in cases where the harm at

issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and

2 Although the district court framed its analysis under the prudential

standing rubric, the Supreme Court subsequently clarified that the rule

barring adjudication of generalized grievances is really a matter of

constitutional standing under Article III. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 9

indefinite nature—for example, harm to the common concern

for obedience to law.” Id. at 23 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs’ claim is not a generalized grievance because

the harm they allege is not entirely “of an abstract and

indefinite nature.” Id. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that

each of them individually suffered “pecuniary injury and

damages as a result of the Jones Act” when they “purchased

domestic ocean cargo shipping services.” This alleged injury

is not the kind of abstract or indefinite harm that the Supreme

Court has held to be insufficient to confer standing. See, e.g.,

Lance, 549 U.S. at 441–42 (holding that plaintiffs lacked

standing because “[t]he only injury [they] allege is that the

law . . . has not been followed”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.

737, 754 (1984) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an

asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with

law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on

a federal court.”), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark

Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 1377; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to

Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217, 219–20 (1974) (holding that

the “generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional

governance . . . is an abstract injury” that is an insufficient

basis for standing).

2. Causation

The second required element for Article III standing is

causation. This means that “there must be a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained

of.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. “When . . . as in this case, a

plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s

allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of

someone else, . . . causation and redressability ordinarily

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hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third

party to the government action or inaction—and perhaps on

the response of others as well.” Id. at 562. “‘[M]ore

particular facts are needed to show standing’” in such cases. 

Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 849

(9th Cir. 2002)). “That’s so because the third parties may

well have engaged in their injury-inflicting actions even in

the absence of the government’s challenged conduct.” Id. 

“To plausibly allege that the injury was not the result of the

independent action of some third party, the plaintiff must

offer facts showing that the government’s unlawful conduct

is at least a substantial factor motivating the third parties’

actions.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

We dealt with a somewhat analogous issue in San Diego

County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 (9th

Cir. 1996). In that case, members of various gun rights

groups sued the Attorney General of the United States, as

well as other government officials, challenging the Violent

Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (“VCCA”). 

Id. at 1124. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that

they had standing because they had suffered an economic

injury. Id. at 1130. They asserted that the VCCA had caused

the price of the affected firearms to increase from 40% to

100%. Id. We reasoned that “[a]lthough the [VCCA] may

tend to restrict supply, nothing in the Act directs

manufacturers or dealers to raise the price of regulated

weapons,” and that “[u]nder Lujan, plaintiffs’ injury [did] not

satisfy the requirements of Article III because it [was] the

result of the independent action of some third party not before

the court.” Id.

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 11

Here, Plaintiffs suggest that the cabotage provisions of the

Jones Act allowed two companies (not parties to this suit) to

establish a duopoly whereby they are able to dominate the

Hawaii shipping market and charge exorbitant rates. 

Plaintiffs’ own complaint, however, also alleges that the

Hawaii shippingmarket “hasseveral characteristics that made

it easy” for the two shipping companies in that market to keep

prices high, independent of the Jones Act: “market

concentration, significant barriers to entry, ease of

information sharing, lack of viable alternatives to ocean

shipping, and the commodity nature of ocean shipping

services.” In this light, Plaintiffs themselves have alleged

facts showing that the two companies “may well have

engaged in their injury-inflicting actions even in the absence

of the government’s challenged conduct.” Mendia, 768 F.3d

at 1013. This is fatal to Plaintiffs’ effort to allege causation.

3. Redressability

The third element of Article III standing, redressability,

requires that it “be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,

that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Although “[p]laintiffs need not demonstrate that

there is a ‘guarantee’ that their injuries will be redressed by

a favorable decision,” Graham v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt.

Agency, 149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on

other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S.

413 (2010), they do need to “show that there would be a

‘change in a legal status’” as a consequence of a favorable

decision “and that a ‘practical consequence of that change

would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that

the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the

injury suffered.’” Renee v. Duncan, 686 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th

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Cir. 2012) (citing Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002)). 

There is no standing if, following a favorable decision,

whether the injury would be redressed would still depend on

“the unfettered choices made by independent actors not

before the courts.” ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,

615 (1989).

Here, Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood that the

shipping companies would lower their prices if the challenged

provisions of the Jones Act were invalidated. On the

contrary, as we have noted, Plaintiffs themselves have alleged

several reasons—“market concentration, significant barriers

to entry, ease of information sharing, lack of viable

alternatives to ocean shipping, and the commodity nature of

ocean shipping services,”—that suggest prices might remain

high even if the Jones Act were invalidated. Indeed,

Plaintiffs allege that the two shipping companies serving the

Hawaii market have engaged in a “conspiracy” to keep prices

high. But, as Plaintiffs acknowledge in their complaint, the

Jones Act “does not permit collusion, market sharing, market

allocation, market manipulation or price fixing.” This

suggests that enjoining enforcement of the Jones Act would

not redress the alleged conspiracy between the shipping

companies. According to Plaintiffs’ own complaint, any such

conspiracy would be the result of “the unfettered choices

made by independent actors not before the courts.” ASARCO,

490 U.S. at 615.

B. Leave to Amend

We must next decide whether Plaintiffs should be granted

leave to amend in order to correct the deficiencies we have

identified. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, leave to amend a party’s pleading “should [be]

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 13

freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires,” because the

purpose of the rule is “to facilitate decision on the merits,

rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Chudacoff v.

Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir.

2011) (alterations in original) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Nevertheless, the “general rule that parties are

allowed to amend their pleadings . . . does not extend to cases

in which any amendment would be an exercise in futility or

where the amended complaint would also be subject to

dismissal.” Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293,

1298 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Futility alone can

justify a court’s refusal to grant leave to amend. See Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

We decline to order that leave be granted to amend the

complaint. We conclude that amendment would be an

exercise in futility because even if Plaintiffs established

standing, they would still fail to state a claim.3 Plaintiffs’

claim under the Commerce Clause would not survive a

motion to dismiss because the Commerce Clause does not

limit the authority of Congress to regulate interstate

commerce. By its terms, the Commerce Clause empowers

Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and

among the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. As

3 Strictly from a standing perspective, it would not necessarily be futile

for Plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Materials outside the record

support the notion that the Jones Act causes economic injury to residents

of Hawaii. See, e.g., U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, The Economic Effects of

Significant U.S. Import Restraints xviii (2002) (estimating that the

economic welfare gain from the “complete liberalization of maritime

cabotage services under the Jones Act . . . would be slightly more than

$656 million”). If Plaintiffs cured the deficiencies we have identified in

their complaint, they might well be able to establish Article III standing

to challenge the Jones Act.

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Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge, the broad power of

Congress has been well established for nearly 200 years, at

least since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). There may

sometimes be debates as to whether a given enactment by

Congress falls within its authority under the Commerce

Clause—debates that might turn on whether the regulated

activity has a sufficient effect on interstate commerce. See,

e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,

2587 (2012). But “[t]he commerce clause is in no sense a

limitation upon the power of Congress over interstate and

foreign commerce.” Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,

328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946).

Plaintiffs’ complaint is aimed squarely at a regulation of

commerce among the several states, specifically shipping

between Hawaii and the other states. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege

that the Jones Act violates the Commerce Clause because its

cabotage provisions constitute “an unlawful restraint of trade

and interstate commerce.” Thus, they acknowledge that the

regulation at issue here concerns interstate commerce.

That the regulation may be a “restraint of trade” does not

matter. As noted above, the Commerce Clause does not limit

the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Id. 

Quite the opposite, it is well established that, by virtue of the

Commerce Clause, Congress has broad authority to regulate

the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as

well as any activity substantially relating to interstate

commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,

558 (1995); Prudential Ins., 328 U.S. at 423.

It is true that the purpose of the Commerce Clause is to

encourage and promote interstate commerce. Bos. Stock

Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977). But

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 15

the Supreme Court has made clear that this means the Clause

prevents states from burdening interstate commerce. See

General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997)

(“The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce

Clause prohibitsstate taxation or regulation that discriminates

against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby

impedes free private trade in the national marketplace.”)

(citations, alteration, and quotation marks omitted). As to

Congress, however, it is solely a grant of power to regulate

the realm of interstate commerce, not a restriction.4In

particular, contrary to Plaintiffs’ implied assertion, the

antitrust laws are not written into the Commerce Clause as a

limit on Congress’ power. The Commerce Clause does not

provide a legal basis for Plaintiffs’ claim.

On appeal, perhaps in tacit recognition that the legal

theory espoused in their complaint was not viable, Plaintiffs

have argued that, even if the Jones Act is a valid exercise of

congressional power derived from the Commerce Clause, it

violates protections guaranteed under the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment. In the context of the Commerce

4 The federal government only has the powers granted to it by the

Constitution. The definition of interstate commerce under the Commerce

Clause thus affects the scope of the authority given Congress by that

clause, and court decisions emphasizing limits on the definition of

interstate commerce are sometimes described as limiting the authority of

Congress. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (“Congress’ authority is

limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution, and . . . those

enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer

limits . . . .”). Here, however, there is no dispute that the Jones Act

regulates interstate commerce under any definition, and the Commerce

Clause places no limits on the power of Congress to regulate within that

interstate commerce realm. “[T]he sovereignty of Congress, though

limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects.” Gibbons,

22 U.S. at 197.

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Clause, we have held that “the requirements of due process

are satisfied if the law passed . . . has a reasonable relation to

a legitimate legislative purpose and is not arbitrary,

capricious or discriminatory.” Boylan v. United States,

310 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1962). Plaintiffs do not argue

that the Jones Act’s cabotage provisions are not reasonably

related to a legitimate legislative purpose, nor do they assert

that the provisions are arbitrary or capricious.

Plaintiffs do contend that the Jones Act is discriminatory

because its effects on Hawaii commerce are disproportionate

as compared to the rest of the United States. But that alleged

discrimination does not support a viable cause of action,

whether framed as a matter of due process or as an attempt to

enforce a supposed structural limitation on federal power

under the Commerce Clause. “There is no requirement of

uniformity in connection with the commerce power.” Currin

v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939); see also Am. Trucking

Ass’ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 322 & n.20 (1953)

(explaining that the Due Process Clause is not violated even

where a regulatory scheme causes some businesses to fail);

Sec’y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616–19

(1950) (explaining that legislation did not offend the Due

Process Clause even where it set different quotas for sugar

from refiners in island territories than from refiners on the

mainland, thereby creating inequalities); see generally

Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity

Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 Va. L. Rev. 249

(2005) (considering historical arguments in favor of an

inherent uniformity constraint on the commerce power, but

recognizing that the Supreme Court has for decades

consistently stated that no such constraint exists).

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The closest that Plaintiffs come to identifying legal

support for their due process theory is to quote, in both their

opening brief and their reply brief, from the Supreme Court’s

1939 decision in Currin, specifically the first sentence of the

following paragraph:

If it be assumed that there might be

discrimination of such an injurious character

as to bring into operation the due process

clause of the Fifth Amendment, that is a

different matter from a contention that mere

lack of uniformity in the exercise of the

commerce power renders the action of

Congress invalid. For that contention we find

no warrant. It is of the essence of the plenary

power conferred that Congress may exercise

its discretion in the use of the power. 

Congress may choose the commodities and

places to which its regulation shall apply. 

Congress may consider and weigh relative

situations and needs. Congress is not

restricted by any technical requirement but

may make limited applications and resort to

tests so that it may have the benefit of

experience in deciding upon the continuance

or extension of a policy which under the

Constitution it is free to adopt. As to such

choices, the question is one of wisdom and

not of power.

Currin, 306 U.S. at 14. The first sentence might

acknowledge that there could be a due process limitation on

some exercises of power, but it does not support Plaintiffs’

claim that the Jones Act crosses the line. The rest of the

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paragraph provides the most telling response, especially the

final sentence. It is not for us to evaluate the wisdom of the

Jones Act. That task is for Congress. Congress has the

power to regulate interstate commerce, and it is up to

Congress to decide how to exercise it. As Chief Justice

Marshall stated nearly 200 years ago, “[t]he wisdom and the

discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the

influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in

this, as in many other instances . . . the sole restraints . . . to

secure them from its abuse.” Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197.

Likewise, although it is true that “[t]he liberty protected

by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains

within it the prohibition against denying to any person the

equal protection of the laws,” United States v. Windsor,

133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013), “equal protection is not a

license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of

legislative choices,” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S.

307, 313 (1993). Where, as here, rational basis review

applies and “there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action,

our inquiry is at an end.” Id. at 313–14 (quotation marks

omitted). This is not, for instance, a case involving invidious

racial discrimination, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,

500 (1954), or indeed a case of intentional, invidious

discrimination of any kind, see generally Vill. of Arlington

Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265

(1977) (holding that a “discriminatory intent or purpose is

required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause”).

Thus, we decline to order that leave be granted for

Plaintiffs to amend their complaint because, for the reasons

discussed above, it would be futile to do so.

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 19

C. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiffs also assert that the district court violated their

right to procedural due process by ruling on the government’s

motion to dismiss without an oral hearing. We reject this

argument. Plaintiffs admit they “had [an] opportunity to

present arguments counter to Defendant’s motion,” but they

do not explain why that opportunity to present arguments in

writing was inaedquate for purposes of due process. It was

sufficient. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,

470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (“The essential requirements of due

process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond. The

opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing,

why [a] proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental

due process requirement.” (emphasis added)). The district

court did not err in ruling on the government’s motion

without an oral hearing.

III. Conclusion

Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to make the showing necessary

to establish Article III standing. We affirm the dismissal of

the action and we decline to grant leave to amend the

complaint.

AFFIRMED.

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in Judge Clifton’s thoughtful opinion, which

faithfully applies our circuit precedent. I write separately to

express my view that San Diego County Gun Rights

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20 NOVAK V. UNITED STATES

Committee v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1996), which

drives the opinion’s conclusion that Plaintiffs lack Article III

standing, should be reconsidered in an appropriate case.

Gun Rights ignores one of the most basic rules of

microeconomics. According to Gun Rights, the fact that a

law “restrict[s]supply” of a good is insufficient to support the

inference that the law causes an increase in the price of that

good. 98 F.3d at 1130. But the law of supply and demand

tells us that, when demand for a good remains constant, a

decrease in the supply of that good will cause an increase in

price. See DAVID BESANKOW & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM,

MICROECONOMICS 37 (4th ed. 2010); see also CHARLES

ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,

13AFEDERALPRACTICE&PROCEDURE § 3531.5 n.35 (3d ed.

2008) (criticizing the causation analysis in Gun Rights for

failing to recognize that “[r]estriction of lawful supply

inevitably increases the price absent a change in the demand

schedule”).

In accordance with basic economics, plaintiffs should be

able to show that a challenged statute has caused an increase

in price by showing that it has decreased supply. But Gun

Rights prevents plaintiffs from establishing causation in this

manner unless they can show that the statute actually “directs

manufacturers or dealers to raise the price of regulated”

goods. 98 F.3d at 1130. This contravenes the rule that

causation may be indirect: “causation may be found even if

there are multiple links in the chain connecting the

defendant’s unlawful conduct to the plaintiff’s injury.” 

Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). As

long as plaintiffs can show, “without relying on speculation

or guesswork,” that challenged governmental conduct is “at

least a substantial factor” behind an injury, they can establish

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NOVAK V. UNITED STATES 21

causation. Id. at 1013. The law of supply and demand

requires no speculation or guesswork, so there should be little

doubt that a statute reducing supply is at least a substantial

factor behind a rise in price.

Were it not for Gun Rights, I would conclude that

Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Jones Act. At a

minimum, Plaintiffs allege that the Jones Act limits the

supply of vessels available to serve the Hawaii shipping

market. This alone should be sufficient to establish that the

Jones Act causes prices in that market to be higher than they

otherwise would be. But, regrettably, Gun Rights requires

more.

That said, this case is a poor vehicle for revisiting Gun

Rights because, as Judge Clifton’s opinion explains, Plaintiffs

have failed to state a claim whether or not they have

established standing. I expect the day will come, however,

when it will be necessary to reconsider how plaintiffs injured

by high prices can show that a defendant’s challenged

conduct caused those prices to increase. When it does, we

should overrule Gun Rights and bring the law of our circuit

into conformity with fundamental principles of economics.

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