Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03869/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03869-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jon La'Marr Gary,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-03869-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

On November 5, 2018, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (“the Petition”). (Doc. 1.) On June 13, 2019, Magistrate Judge Bibles issued 

a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) concluding the Petition should be denied. (Doc. 

11.) Afterward, Petitioner filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 22) and Respondents filed a 

response (Doc. 24). Separately, Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 

19) and a “motion for due process” (Doc. 21). For the following reasons, the Court will 

deny Petitioner’s objections to the R&R, deny his request for counsel, grant his motion for 

due process, and terminate this action.

I. Background

The relevant factual and procedural background is set forth in the R&R. In a 

nutshell, Petitioner pleaded guilty in September 2011 to two counts of child abuse. (Doc. 

11 at 2.) The charges arose from an incident in which Petitioner discovered a 22-year-old 

man having sex with his 11-year-old niece, lost his temper, and then assaulted both the 

perpetrator and the niece. (Id. at 2-3.) The plea agreement provided that Petitioner would 

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receive a sentence of two years’ imprisonment on Count 2 and a consecutive term of 

lifetime probation on Count 1. (Id. at 2.) In January 2012, Petitioner was sentenced. (Id.

at 4.) He did not, at that time, appeal his sentence or seek post-conviction relief concerning 

his sentence. (Id.)

In July 2012, Petitioner was released from prison, at which point he began serving 

his lifetime probation term. (Id.) In January 2013, Petitioner’s probation officer filed a 

petition to revoke, which alleged that Petitioner had absconded from probation, failed to 

submit to drug testing, failed to participate in domestic violence counseling, and failed to 

report to the probation officer as directed. (Id. at 4 & n.5.) This petition resulted in a twomonth term of incarceration. (Id. at 4.) Then, in December 2013, Petitioner’s probation 

officer filed another petition to revoke. (Id.) This time, the superior court revoked 

Petitioner’s probation and imposed a 10-year term of imprisonment. (Id.)

In May 2014, during the disposition hearing, Petitioner’s probation violation 

counsel argued that the probation tail imposed as part of Petitioner’s original sentence “may 

have been illegal.” (Id. at 5.) In response, the superior court stated that any deficiency in 

the original plea agreement should be addressed through a petition for post-conviction 

relief (“PCR”) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) The court appointed PCR 

counsel to assist Petitioner, but PCR counsel found no colorable claims. (Id.) As a result, 

Petitioner pursued a pro per PCR petition. (Id.)

In July 2015, the superior court denied Petitioner’s PCR petition, concluding that 

his trial counsel hadn’t been ineffective because Petitioner was properly charged with, and 

convicted of, two separate crimes arising from the assault on his niece and that Petitioner’s 

counsel had, in any event, made the argument (albeit unsuccessfully) that Petitioner 

shouldn’t receive consecutive sentences. (Id. at 5-6, 10)

In May 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief for similar reasons, 

holding, inter alia, that Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim was unavailing because “[a] 

review of the record indicates that [Petitioner] caused his niece several injuries and that

those injuries were sustained after multiple individual acts of violence committed against 

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her” and that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim was unavailing because “while 

counsel . . . was unsuccessful in her request, she raised the issue of double jeopardy.” (Id.

at 6-7, 11.)

In June 2017, Petitioner filed a second Rule 32 action. (Id. at 7.)

In August 2018, the trial court dismissed the action as untimely and successive. (Id.)

In November 2018, Petitioner filed the Petition. (Doc. 1.) Although it is not a model 

of clarity, it appears to assert—and the R&R interprets it as asserting—(1) a claim that 

Petitioner was denied his right to be free of “double jeopardy” and to be free from an 

excessive and illegal sentence, (2) a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (3) 

a claim of ineffective assistance of probation revocation counsel. (Id. at 6.)

The R&R was issued in June 2019. (Doc. 11.) It concludes that Petitioner’s first 

two claims are time-barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations because they seek 

to challenge his original sentence, which became final in April 2012, and he is ineligible 

for statutory tolling (because he didn’t file a PCR petition challenging the revocation of 

parole until well after April 2013) or equitable tolling (because he didn’t diligently pursue 

his rights and acknowledges his factual guilt). (Id. at 8-10.) As for Petitioner’s third claim, 

the R&R concludes it was timely asserted and that Petitioner properly exhausted it in state 

court (id. at 10-11) but further concludes that it fails on the merits. (Id. at 13-16.)

II. Legal Standard

A party may file written objections to an R&R within fourteen days of being served 

with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 Rules”). Those 

objections must be “specific.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 14 days after being 

served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis added).

District courts are not required to review any portion of an R&R to which no specific 

objection has been made. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (“It does 

not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual 

or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to 

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those findings.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations 

de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). Thus, district judges need not review 

an objection to an R&R that is general and non-specific. See, e.g., Warling v. Ryan, 2013 

WL 5276367, *2 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Because de novo review of an entire R & R would 

defeat the efficiencies intended by Congress, a general objection ‘has the same effect as 

would a failure to object.’”) (citations omitted); Haley v. Stewart, 2006 WL 1980649, *2

(D. Ariz. 2006) (“[G]eneral objections to an R & R are tantamount to no objection at all.”).1

III. The R&R

Petitioner’s 16-page “response to report and recommendation” does not specifically 

identify any portion of the R&R that Petitioner deems objectionable and does not 

specifically ask the Court to reverse or overturn any portion of the R&R’s legal analysis. 

(Doc. 22.) Instead, Petitioner simply offers a narrative of the facts underlying his case. 

(Id.) For this reason, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s objections are insufficient under 

Rule 72(b). (Doc. 24 at 1-2 [“[Petitioner’s] objection to the R&R . . . does not point to any 

specific flaws in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis or conclusion; it merely reiterates the same 

legal claims that were presented in his habeas petition and reply.”].)

Respondents are correct. Petitioner’s general objection to the R&R leaves the Court 

with nothing to review. Thus, the Court will adopt the R&R’s recommended disposition.

IV. Other Motions

On October 3, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 

19.) That motion will be denied. “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply 

in habeas corpus actions. Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not 

entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that 

appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney v. Lewis, 801 

 

1 See generally S. Gensler, 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 

Commentary, Rule 72, at 422 (2018) (“A party who wishes to object to a magistrate judge’s 

ruling must make specific and direct objections. General objections that do not direct the 

district court to the issues in controversy are not sufficient. . . . [T]he objecting party must 

specifically identify each issue for which he seeks district court review . . . .”).

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F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). Based upon a review of the documents filed in this case, 

the Court concludes, in its discretion, that the appointment of counsel is not required here.

On October 3, 2019, Petitioner also filed a “motion for due process,” which asks the 

Court “to protect [Petitioner] and his case for and in the right to due process.” (Doc. 21.) 

The motion will be granted, insofar as Petitioner’s right to due process in this case has been 

respected.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) The reference to the magistrate judge is withdrawn as to Petitioner’s motion 

for appointment of counsel (Doc. 19) and Petitioner’s motion for due process (Doc. 21).

(2) Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 19) is denied.

(3) Petitioner’s motion for due process (Doc. 21) is granted.

(4) The R&R’s recommended disposition (Doc. 11) is accepted.

(5) The Petition (Doc. 1) is denied.

(6) A Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

(7) The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 30th day of January, 2020.

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