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Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 8, 2008 Decided March 4, 2008

No. 07-5064

SILVIA PATRICIA MIRANDA JUAREZ,

APPELLANT

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT

ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv01468)

Peter Kryn Dykema argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Brentin V. Evitt, Senior Counsel, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GRIFFITH and

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Chief Judge: Silvia Miranda Juarez appeals

from the district court’s entry of summary judgment upholding

the Drug Enforcement Administration’s denial of her Freedom

of Information Act (FOIA) request. She argues that the

agency’s affidavits and underlying explanations were

insufficient to justify withholding the records she requested

under FOIA’s Exemption 7(A), which protects records and

information compiled for law enforcement purposes.

Alternatively, she urges that the district court erred by failing to

conduct a segregability analysis for the withheld documents.

For the following reasons, we reject appellant’s arguments and

affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

Appellant Silvia Miranda Juarez (“Miranda”) is a Mexican

citizen who lived in the United States with her husband and two

sons from 1994 to 2002 on a series of business-related, limitedterm visas. Miranda and her husband together own two

businesses in this country: America Transfers, Inc. and Mexico

Transfers, Inc. Both businesses provide money transfer services

primarily to workers remitting funds to relatives in Latin

America. Together, these companies operate 119 branch offices

in fifteen states.

Under the conditions of her visa, Miranda was required to

leave the United States and file for an extension at an American

consular office abroad. Miranda traveled to Monterrey, Mexico

for this purpose in July 2002, but her visa renewal application

was rejected by the United States Consulate there. A consular

official told Miranda that her application was denied because

she was under investigation for money laundering and that she

was therefore ineligible for reentry into the United States.

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Miranda initially asserted that this was a case of mistaken

identity and submitted a FOIA request to DEA for records of

any investigation relating to her. DEA conducted a search of its

investigative filing systems for responsive records and found

one fourteen-page investigative record confirming Miranda was

the subject of a DEA criminal law enforcement investigation.

Later, DEA found two additional pages of records, bringing the

total to sixteen pages. Citing FOIA Exemptions 2, 3, 7(A), 7(C),

7(D), and 7(F), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), (3), (7), DEA withheld the

documents in their entirety from Miranda. Miranda appealed

this denial administratively to the DOJ’s Office of Information

and Privacy, but that office affirmed DEA’s decision.

Miranda commenced the current action on August 27, 2004,

seeking judicial review of DEA’s decision to withhold the

information she requested. DEA moved for summary judgment

on December 1, 2004, arguing that because there was an

ongoing criminal investigation, it had properly withheld the

requested information from Miranda. During the following

seventeen months, Miranda and DEA delayed this action while

the parties engaged in discussions over Miranda’s willingness to

cooperate in the ongoing investigation. While DEA agents at

one point met with Miranda, they did not question her but only

offered to listen to any information she could provide them.

After DEA showed no further interest in Miranda’s participation

in their investigation, Miranda filed her memorandum in

opposition to DEA’s motion for summary judgment on May 19,

2006. 

On December 13, 2006, the district court granted DEA’s

motion and entered summary judgment in its favor. As the

district court noted in its memorandum opinion accompanying

the summary judgment order, Miranda had asserted only one

alleged issue of material fact in opposition to DEA’s motion.

Specifically, she argued that DEA had wrongfully denied her

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FOIA request because there was no ongoing criminal

investigation to justify the use of Exemption 7(A). The district

court ruled that the affidavits tendered by DEA in support of its

motion for summary judgment confirmed the existence of an

active investigation of Miranda and of potential adverse

consequences that would flow from the release of further

information – including a more specific description of the

documents’ contents. As Miranda was unable to produce any

contravening evidence, the district court granted DEA summary

judgment. 

Miranda raises three issues in this appeal. We consider

each in turn. 

II. Propriety of Summary Judgment

Miranda first claims that the district court’s entry of

summary judgment was improper because DEA failed to

establish that FOIA Exemption 7(A) applied. That exemption

protects from mandatory disclosure “records or information

compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent

that the production of such law enforcement records or

information . . . could reasonably be expected to interfere with

enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). This Court

has further interpreted § 552(b)(7)(A) to require a law

enforcement agency invoking the exception to show that the

material withheld “relates to a concrete prospective law

enforcement proceeding.” Bevis v. Dep’t of State, 801 F.2d

1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Carson v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d

55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2003). A district court may grant summary

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judgment to a government agency claiming Exemption 7 when

“the agency affidavits describe the documents withheld and the

justifications for nondisclosure in enough detail and with

sufficient specificity to demonstrate that material withheld is

logically within the domain of the exemption claimed.” King v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see

also PHE, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 983 F.2d 248, 250 (D.C. Cir.

1993). 

We are satisfied that DEA provided affidavits sufficient to

meet these requirements. DEA describes the withheld

documents with reasonable specificity: its affidavits state that

the documents are, with one exception, DEA Form 6s, the forms

the agency uses to record investigative information it has

developed pursuant to its mission to enforce the controlled

substances laws of the United States and related criminal

statutes. The affidavits confirm that DEA’s investigation of

Miranda remains ongoing. Further, the affidavits assert that the

release of any portion of the withheld documents would

compromise the investigation as it could lead to destruction of

evidence and disclosure of potential witnesses’ identities as well

as DEA’s investigative techniques. The affidavits disclose that

at least one document contains one confidential source’s name

and, even if that name were redacted, the details contained in the

remaining information could reveal that source’s identity and

possibly another informant’s as well. 

We find unpersuasive appellant’s contention that DEA’s

claim of Exemption 7(A) should be rejected because DEA has

failed to establish a “plausible basis” for its investigation.

Miranda makes a rather curious argument that because her

money-transfer businesses face a high degree of government

scrutiny on a routine basis, that this should effectively inoculate

her from suspicion for money laundering. She makes this

argument despite the fact that her businesses transfer money

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principally to countries from which most illicit drugs flow into

the United States. We note that to accept appellant’s argument

on this point is to conclude that the enterprises most capable of

violating the money laundering statutes would be the least

suspect of committing such violations. The same reasoning

would compel one to conclude that regulated securities

exchange dealers would be unlikely to violate the securities laws

and registered firearms dealers would be unlikely to violate the

firearms laws. We can hardly say that the district court erred by

failing to credit such an argument.

We also reject Miranda’s contention that DEA failed to

establish by its affidavits that a law enforcement investigation

was ongoing or leading to a concrete enforcement action.

Miranda cites the DEA’s failure to follow up with her requests

to cooperate as evidence from which the district court should

have inferred that DEA was no longer actively pursuing its

investigation. While it is true that Exemption 7(A) cannot

justify withholding material unless it relates to a “concrete

prospective law enforcement proceeding,” see NLRB v. Robbins

Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 232 (1978), this is not quite

the formidable hurdle appellant would make it out to be. As the

Supreme Court explained in Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.

regarding the genesis of this “concrete” requirement:

The tenor of [Congressional testimony on Exemption 7’s]

statutory language clearly suggests that the release of

information in investigatory files prior to the completion of

an actual, contemplated enforcement proceeding was

precisely the kind of interference that Congress continued

to want to protect against. Indeed, Senator Hart stated

specifically that Exemption 7(A) would apply “whenever

the Government’s case in court—a concrete prospective

law enforcement proceeding—would be harmed by the

premature release of evidence or information . . . .”

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Id. (emphasis added). Thus, so long as the investigation

continues to gather evidence for a possible future criminal case,

and that case would be jeopardized by the premature release of

that evidence, Exemption 7(A) applies. The DEA’s affidavits

here informed the district court that the criminal investigation

remained ongoing, and from that the district court could

reasonably infer that this investigation may eventually lead to a

prosecution. Further, the only inference one must necessarily

draw from DEA’s lack of continued contact with Miranda is that

it does not desire her participation in its investigation—it does

not necessarily undermine DEA’s claim that the investigation

remains ongoing. 

Appellant has argued repeatedly before both the district

court and this court that the DEA’s lack of interest in

interviewing her despite her repeated expressions of willingness

to engage an interview should be taken as evidence that no

investigation is ongoing. That argument is a non sequitur.

While in many investigations the cooperation of the subject is

obviously desirable, in many others such an interview would be

the last technique an investigative agency would wish to

employ. The very nature of the questions asked by an

investigating agent would tell a knowledgeable subject the

direction in which the investigation was going and provide

strong clues as to the evidence it had in hand. The predicates of

questions asked might indeed provide a subject with the ability

to make well-educated guesses as to the nature of cooperating

individuals and other sources. Thus, the lack of desire on the

DEA’s part to interview Miranda is no evidence that she is not

the subject of an ongoing investigation.

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III. In Camera Review

Miranda next claims that the district court abused its

discretion by failing to conduct an in camera review of the

requested documents. It is true that FOIA provides district

courts the option to conduct in camera review, 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(4)(B), but it by no means compels the exercise of that

option. See Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 224; PHE,

983 F.2d at 252–53. We review a district court’s decision

whether to conduct in camera review of FOIA documents for

abuse of discretion, Horowitz v. Peace Corps, 428 F.3d 271, 282

(D.C. Cir. 2005), and we have provided guidance on the exercise

of that discretion, see Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1298–99

(D.C. Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Founding

Church of Scientology of Washington D.C., Inc. v. Smith, 721

F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 

In this case, due to the minimal length of the documents

involved, we agree with appellant that the district court would

not have abused its discretion had it chosen to review the

documents in camera. See id. at 1299 (observing that an in

camera review of a fifteen-page document would have offered

the district court an efficient technique for conducting its de

novo review). But that does not in itself compel a conclusion

that the district court’s decision not to conduct an in camera

review constituted an abuse of its discretion. If a district court

believes that in camera inspection is unnecessary “to make a

responsible de novo determination on the claims of exemption,”

Carter v. Dep’t of Commerce, 830 F.2d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (quoting Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir.

1978)), it acts within its “broad discretion” by declining to

conduct such a review, id. 

Nor was the district court’s omission in its memorandum

opinion of any specific discussion of Miranda’s request that it

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conduct an in camera review of the withheld documents in error.

When a district court finds that a law enforcement agency’s

affidavits sufficiently describe the documents and set forth

proper reasons for invoking an exemption, in camera inspection

of those documents is unnecessary. See Lam Lek Chong v. U.S.

Drug Enforcement Admin., 929 F.2d 729, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Because the district court here was satisfied that DEA’s

affidavits properly placed the withheld documents within the

scope of Exemption 7(A), it did not need to reach the question

of in camera review in its opinion. 

IV. Segregability

Miranda’s final claim is that the district court erred by

failing to make a segregability finding. We recently reiterated

that the district court both has “an affirmative duty to consider

the segregability issue sua sponte” and that it errs when it

“approves the government’s withholding of information under

the FOIA without making an express finding on segregability.”

Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). 

Under this Circuit’s law, the district court’s failure to

address segregability in its memorandum opinion is reversible

error. Id. Nevertheless, in this instance we need not prolong the

case further by remanding it solely for this purpose. We recall

that our review of summary judgment is de novo. “[O]ur task

[is] precisely the same as the district court’s” when “the decision

under review [is] a final determination by the district court as to

the legal sufficiency of [an] agency’s determination to disclose

contested information.” Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873

F.2d 325, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1989). As we have the same record

before us as did the district court, we are just as capable of

evaluating the DEA’s affidavits regarding segregability as is the

court below. We conclude that no part of the requested

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documents was improperly withheld. 

The FOIA requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable

portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting

such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(b). This Circuit has long recognized, however,

that documents may be withheld in their entirety when nonexempt portions “are inextricably intertwined with exempt

portions.” Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force,

566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977). A court may rely on

government affidavits that show with reasonable specificity why

documents withheld pursuant to a valid exemption cannot be

further segregated for this reason. Armstrong v. Executive

Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

Here, DEA provided sufficient information in its affidavits

to allow a court to affirm withholding of the documents in toto.

DEA stated that it had conducted a page-by-page review of all

investigative records contained in the requested documents, and

determined that each document, and each page of each

document, contained information subject to law enforcement

withholding exemptions. It justified its inability to simply

redact sensitive portions (i.e., informant names) from these

documents by pointing out that the balance of information

remaining in the documents could still reveal the extent of the

government’s investigation, the acts on which it is focused, what

evidence of wrongdoing it is aware of, the identity of

cooperating sources, and the agency’s investigative techniques

in this investigation. The affidavits further attested that release

of any of this information could jeopardize the investigation.

For these reasons we are satisfied that no portions of the

withheld documents may be segregated and released to

appellant.

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V. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district

court’s judgment.

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