Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00892/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00892-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:3601 Fair Housing Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONYA BLANTON and DIANE JOA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TORREY PINES PROPERTY 

MANAGEMENT, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-CV-0892 W (NLS)

ORDER ON DISCOVERY DISPUTE 

NO. 2: DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION TO COMPEL 

[Dkt. No. 84]

Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery 

Dispute No. 2. (Dkt. No. 84.) Having considered the arguments presented by both 

parties and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to 

compel further responses to Interrogatory Nos. 22 and 23. 

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I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

This case presents claims related to the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and alleged 

discrimination based on familial status. (See Dkt. No. 29.) At the outset of this case, 

Plaintiffs Blanton and Joa alleged identical claims against Defendants, including claims 

for discrimination in violation of the FHA and the California Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (“CFEHA”). (See Dkt. No. 29.) 

This discovery dispute arose previously, and Defendants raised the question of 

Plaintiffs’ standing to pursue FHA and CFEHA based claims for discriminatory housing 

practices. (Dkt No. 65.) In response, this Court denied the pending motion to compel 

without prejudice, and set a deadline for briefing regarding Plaintiffs’ standing to 

continue to pursue their discrimination claims. (Dkt. No. 66.) Defendants moved to 

dismiss each of the Plaintiffs’ FHA and CFEHA claims. (Dkt. No. 72.) The Court 

dismissed Ms. Joa’s claims, but permitted Ms. Blanton’s claims to proceed. (Dkt. No. 

83.) This dispute now arises for the second time. 

Plaintiffs Blanton and Joa both seek to compel further responses to interrogatories 

propounded solely by Ms. Joa. (Dkt. No 84, pg. 2:12-13; pg. 10:26-27; Dkt. 84-3, Ex. 1.) 

Specifically, Plaintiffs move to compel responses to Interrogatory Nos. 22 and 23, which 

seek information for each of TPPM’s rental units relating to, in sum, the size/layout and 

occupancy of each unit within 14 geographical zip code areas.1 (Dkt. No. 84, at II.C.)

 

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Interrogatory No. 22 states: 

For each rental dwelling owned or operated by any defendant and located in 

the following zip codes within San Diego County ... please state the following 

information for the period between June 1, 2011 and June 1, 2015: (1) each 

dwelling by unit number and building address; (2) the size of each dwelling 

unit by square footage; and (3) the configuration of each dwelling unit by 

number of bedrooms, bathrooms and total number of rooms. Plaintiffs request 

this information be supplied in MS Excel.

Interrogatory No. 23 states:

For each rental dwelling owned or operated and located in the following zip 

codes within San Diego County ... please state the following information for 

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Plaintiffs argue that responses to the interrogatories are relevant to Ms. Blanton’s 

remaining discrimination claims, and are necessary for expert statistical analysis of 

disparate impact. (Id. at II.D.) Defendant Torrey Pines Property Management (“TPPM”) 

objects to Ms. Blanton’s continued pursuit of responses to interrogatories based upon 

lack of standing to compel responses as Ms. Blanton was not the propounding party. 

TPPM also objects that the discovery is irrelevant, over-broad, oppressive and unduly 

burdensome, and invades the Defendant’s privacy and requests commercially protected 

information.2 (Id. at II.F-G.)

II. Discussion 

A. Plaintiff Blanton Lacks Standing to Compel a Response

Motions to compel responses to interrogatories are governed by Rule 37 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a threshold matter, the party pursuing a motion to 

compel must have standing to bring the motion. Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F. 3d 503,

510 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Only ‘the discovering party’ ... may bring a motion to compel.”);

Loop AI Labs v. Gatti, No. 15-cv-00798-HSG (DMR), 2016 WL 4474584, 2016 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016) (“under Rule 37(a) ... a party lacks 

standing to move to compel answers to a different party's discovery requests”).

 

the period between June 1, 2011 and June 1, 2015: (1) each tenant household, 

identified by unique tenant number; (2) the dates of first and last occupancy 

by each tenant household; (3) the number of occupants in each household, 

based on the household’s first month of occupancy; (4) the number of minor 

children in each tenant household based on the household’s first month of 

occupancy; (5) the rent charged each tenant household for the household’s 

third month of occupancy. [Fn. 3.] Plaintiffs request that this information be 

supplied in MS Excel. 

Fn. 3: Plaintiffs request the monthly rent charged for the third month of 

tenancy to avoid the effects of move-in specials or first month rent discounts. 

If defendants certify that no such rent adjustments exist, then the first month 

rent is acceptable.

2 The Court notes TPPM’s request to submit additional briefing, but finds further briefing 

unnecessary under the facts and circumstances presented.

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The parties do not dispute that Interrogatory Nos. 22 and 23 were propounded by 

Ms. Joa only. (See Dkt. 84-3, Ex. 1.) Ms. Blanton is not the propounding party, and 

lacks standing to compel responses under Rule 37. Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F. 3d 503,

510 (9th Cir. 1997); Loop AI Labs v. Gatti, No. 15-cv-00798-HSG (DMR), 2016 WL 

4474584, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114247, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016). See also, In

re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 454 (D. Kan. 2006) (non-settling defendants lack 

standing to seek enforcement of settled defendant’s discovery requests). 

Plaintiffs argue that in any event Ms. Joa should get the discovery because she and 

Ms. Blanton overlapped in time at the subject apartments and were subject to the same 

occupancy policy. (See Dkt. 29, ¶¶ 14-17, 19-21.) The Court does not find this timing 

overlap to be enough of a tie between the Plaintiffs so as to allow the requested 

discovery. Even though Ms. Joa and Ms. Blanton are co-plaintiffs, their alleged claims 

arise out of different sets of facts. (Id.) While Ms. Joa and Ms. Blanton were arguably 

tied together by the same question of law regarding whether they each suffered familial 

status discrimination due to the occupancy policy, that tie was severed when the district 

judge found that Ms. Joa did not suffer any concrete injury for any alleged violation of 

the FHA or CFEHA. (Dkt. No. 83.) Further, at the time of the filing of the complaint 

and propounding of the discovery, Plaintiffs were aware of the fact that Ms. Joa did not 

suffer any concrete injury for any alleged violation of the FHA or FEHA because TPPM 

did not begin to enforce its occupancy policy against Ms. Joa until 2014, when all of her 

children had already reached the age of majority. (See Dkt. No. 29, ¶ 20.) While aware

of these distinct factual scenarios, Plaintiffs decided to serve the interrogatories that 

related to the discrimination claims and issue of disparate impact only in Ms. Joa's name.

Plaintiffs’ should have been aware that Ms. Joa did not have standing to assert such 

claims. In sum, not only is there no standing, but there is no common set of facts or 

common question of federal law that binds these Plaintiffs together as to these 

interrogatories.

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Additionally, Plaintiffs cite to no authority permitting a party to compel responses 

to discovery propounded in another party’s name. This Court found only one case that 

permitted a motion to compel to proceed when the interrogatories were propounded in 

another party’s name. In Morden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (“Morden”), No. C05-

2112RSM, 2006 WL 1727987, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42047, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 

22, 2006), plaintiff Morden propounded discovery requests for the purposes of class 

certification relating to “off the clock” claims in a Fair Labor Standards Act case. Id. at 

*1-2. The discovery was propounded prior to the time that Plaintiff Siddiqui, who 

asserted the “off the clock” violations, joined the action. Id. at *3-4. There, the 

Washington District Court held that in the absence of any authority from the parties 

regarding standing, and in light of the ability of Plaintiff Siddiqui to propound identical 

discovery, the Court’s time and resources were best served by addressing the merits of 

the motion. Id. at *4. 

 The facts of the case before the Court are distinguishable from Morden, and 

compel a different result. Here, Defendant TPPM cited to relevant authority that 

precludes the unnamed party from pursuing a motion to compel. (Dkt. 84, pgs. 11:13-

12:6, citing Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F. 3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1997) and In re Urethane

Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 454 (D. Kan. 2006).) Fact discovery closed November 30, 

2016; precluding Plaintiff Blanton from issuing identical discovery and eliminating any 

saved resources for the Court or parties. (See Dkt. 51, Scheduling Order.) Plaintiffs also 

assert that they have not exceeded the permitted 25 written interrogatories because each 

Plaintiff may propound 25 separate written interrogatories. (Dkt. 84, pg. 10:20-24.) 

Plaintiffs thereby confirm that each set of interrogatories propounded was intended to be 

for the propounding Plaintiff only. Any other construction would impermissibly permit 

50 interrogatories per plaintiff in violation of Rule 33. 

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel can only proceed as asserted by Ms. Joa. Accordingly, 

this Court turns to analysis under the standards of Rule 26 as applied to Ms. Joa.

///

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B. The Interrogatories are Irrelevant to Ms. Joa’s Claims 

With proper standing, a party can obtain and compel discovery of non-privileged 

information so long as it is relevant and proportional. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). If the 

discovery requested is not proportional, it falls outside the bounds of Rule 26. See In re

Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564-65 (D. Ariz. 2016) 

(“Relevancy alone is no longer sufficient — discovery must also be proportional to the 

needs of the case.”).

Once the propounding party establishes that the request seeks relevant information, 

“[t]he party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery should not be 

allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” 

Superior Commc'ns v. Earhugger, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 215, 217 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see 

Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975) (requiring defendants “to 

carry heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied”).

Plaintiffs concede that the information requested via Interrogatory Nos. 22 and 23 

is relevant only to prove a “pattern or practice of discrimination” for the purposes of the

disparate impact claim. (Dkt. No. 84, pg. 8:10-15.) Ms. Joa no longer asserts any valid 

claim for discrimination, rendering the discovery sought irrelevant to her remaining 

causes of action. 

This Court is unable to find relevant authority whereby a named Plaintiff was 

permitted to pursue discovery relevant only to another party’s claim without any 

relevance to their own remaining case. In addition, the Notes to the 2000 and 2015 

Amendments explain that Rule 26 was intended to address the distinction between 

discovery “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action” and discovery “relevant 

to a claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Notes of Advisory Committee on 2015 

Amendments. See also, In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99cv0121 L (JAH), 2002 

WL 33009225, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27991, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2002) (noting 

parties have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not 

identified in the pleadings). Interrogatories 22 and 23 are irrelevant to Ms. Joa’s claims or 

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defenses, even if perhaps relevant to the subject matter of the litigation. Plaintiffs’ 

motion to compel is denied. 

C. The Interrogatories are Impermissibly Disproportionate

Even were Ms. Joa able to articulate relevance to her own claim, or proceed to 

collect discovery relevant only to Ms. Blanton’s claims, the requests are also 

disproportionate and beyond the bounds of Rule 26. 

Both Plaintiffs’ complaint and argument rely heavily on the disparate impact on 

renter families in the City of El Cajon. (See Dkt. Nos. 29; 84, pg. 3:10-4:2.) The scope 

of information sought in Ms. Joa’s discovery requests is not limited to the City of El 

Cajon, but seeks information from across San Diego County. Plaintiffs argue that 

Plaintiffs’ expert needs broad information to create an appropriate data pool, and submit a 

declaration from their expert in support. (Dkt. 84, pg. 8:27-9:5.) 

Plaintiffs’ expert’s declaration simply states that information from the Dominguez 

Way apartments would not be sufficient and that he would have to combine information 

across zip codes. (Dkt. No. 84-2, ¶ 2.) Ms. Joa’s interrogatories seeks information for 14 

separate zip codes. (Dkt. No. 84, at II.C; Dkt No. 84-3, Ex. 1.) The City of El Cajon 

appears to contain at least three distinct zip codes: 92019, 92120, and 92121. (See City 

of El Cajon Zip Code Map, available at http://www.ci.el-cajon.ca.us/discover-elcajon/about/map.) Plaintiffs’ expert fails to offer any reasoning as to why information 

beyond the combined zip codes of the City of El Cajon is necessary. While statistical 

information is relevant to disparate impact cases, Plaintiffs’ pleading is specific to the 

City of El Cajon, and so too must be the scope of discovery. See Mountain Side Mobile 

Estates P’ship v. Sec. of Housing and Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1253 (10th Cir. 1995) 

(“In this case, the appropriate comparables must focus on the local housing market and 

local family statistics. The farther removed from the local statistics the plaintiffs venture, 

the weaker their evidence becomes.”) cited with approval in Budnick v. Town of 

Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008); see also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 

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Defendant also argues that the Interrogatories are overbroad and overly 

burdensome because, inter alia, the data sought would require excessive amounts of time 

to collect, and ultimately will not yield accurate information because it is based on the 

information as contained in the residents’ applications, which may or may not be 

accurate. (Dkt. 84, pg. 17:23-18:6.) As evidence of the unreliability of the information 

sought, Defendant points to Plaintiff Blanton’s own application. (Id.) Ms. Blanton’s 

application lists only herself and three children, omitting two additional children and 

members of the household. (Id.) 

The Court finds this argument persuasive, and finds the requests impose an undue 

burden disproportionate to the needs of the case. While some of the information sought 

is likely part of TPPM’s business records (such as the address, number of bedrooms and 

bathrooms per unit, and the price of rent), some information sought appears to require 

tenant files to be pulled at great burden and expense to TPPM. (See, Dkt. 84-4, ¶ 3

estimating 496 hours to pull and review each file for the geographical areas identified.) 

Interrogatory 23, in particular, asks for information including the number of occupants

per unit, how many of them are children, and the first and last dates of occupancy. TPPM 

states that to gather this information, individual tenant files will have to be pulled and 

reviewed, to gather information that is unreliable at best. (See, Dkt. 84-4.) Even 

assuming that such information is needed for Plaintiffs’ expert’s analysis, accurate 

information is required to produce reliable expert testimony and results. As Ms. 

Blanton’s application demonstrates, accurate information is not likely to be gathered. 

The burden and expense of compiling this information coupled with the unreliability of 

the same makes the request disproportionate to the needs of the case.

Defendant raises additional objections based upon privacy and commercially 

sensitive information. However, because the Court finds that neither Plaintiff may 

pursue the discovery based upon standing, relevance, and proportionality, the Court need 

not address any further objections. 

///

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel responses to Interrogatory 

Nos. 22 and 23 are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 10, 2017

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