Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02181/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

---

– 1 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DEBORAH DEE LITTLE, ET AL., 

 Plaintiffs, 

Case No. 14-cv-02181-BAS(JMA) 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ 

COMPLAINT OF 

DEFENDANT SHELLEY 

ZIMMERMAN (ECF NO. 3); 

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION 

TO DISMISS THE SECOND, 

THIRD, AND FOURTH 

CAUSES OF ACTION OF 

PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 

FILED ON BEHALF OF 

DEFENDANTS WILLIAM D. 

GORE, MATTHEW STEVENS 

AND EVAN SOBCZAK (ECF 

NO. 7); 

(3) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART JUSTIN 

FAW’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

(ECF NO. 13) 

 v. 

WILLIAM D. GORE, ET AL.,

 Defendants. 

 

On September 12, 2014, Plaintiffs Deborah Dee Little and Dennis George 

Little (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against Defendants William 

D. Gore (“Gore”), as Sheriff for the County of San Diego, Shelley Zimmerman 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 1 of 32
 – 2 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(“Zimmerman”), as Chief of Police for the City of San Diego, Matt Stevens 

(“Stevens”), a Deputy Sheriff for the County of San Diego, Evan Sobczak 

(“Sobczak”), a Deputy Sheriff for the County of San Diego, Paul Paxton (“Paxton”), 

a Detective for the San Diego Police Department, and Justin Faw (“Faw”), a Special 

Agent for the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). Presently before the 

Court are (1) a motion to dismiss all causes of action filed by Zimmerman; (2) a 

motion to dismiss the second, third, and fourth causes of action filed by Stevens and 

Sobczak, and all causes of action by Gore; and (3) a motion to dismiss all causes of 

action by Faw. 

The Court finds these motions suitable for determination on the papers 

submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court DENIES Zimmerman’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 3); 

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss filed by Gore, 

Sobczak and Stevens (ECF No. 7); and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Faw’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13). 

I. BACKGROUND 

On October 16, 2012, Stevens swore an affidavit to San Diego County Superior 

Court stating that he observed “well over 100 growing marijuana plants” on 

Plaintiffs’ property while conducting aerial reconnaissance on September 17, 2012 

and October 11, 2012. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at ¶ 11-12.) Plaintiffs allege 

Defendant Stevens “knew from his observations that there were well under 100 

marijuana plants on the [property] but embellished his observations in order to 

deceive Judge Rubin into issuing a search warrant.” (Id. at ¶ 12.) Judge Rubin 

subsequently issued a search warrant authorizing the search of Plaintiffs’ property 

and the seizure of any marijuana. (Id. at ¶ 12.) 

 At 5:00 a.m. on October 17, 2012, Stevens, Sobczak, Paxton, and Faw 

(collectively, the “Defendant Officers”), members of the San Diego County 

Integrated Narcotics Task Force, executed the search warrant at Plaintiffs’ property. 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 2 of 32
 – 3 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Id. at ¶15.) The Defendant Officers, “dressed in military-style fatigues and armed 

with firearms, some of which were assault rifles, stormed [Plaintiffs’ property] in a 

SWAT-style raid with weapons drawn.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Upon entering Plaintiffs’ 

property, the Defendant Officers located Mr. Little, arrested him and put him in 

handcuffs. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Stevens allegedly “questioned [Mr. Little] without reading 

him Miranda rights despite keeping [Mr. Little] in handcuffs.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) The 

Defendant Officers then located Mrs. Little, and Sobczak “arrested [her] by putting 

handcuffs on [her] wrists behind her back and locking her in the rear seat of his patrol 

vehicle with the air conditioning running, despite the cold air outside. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 

Prior to her arrest, Mrs. Little informed the Defendant Officers that “she has been 

sick for the past two months with pneumonia.” (Id. at ¶19.) 

“After an unknown period of time, [Stevens] questioned [Mrs. Little] without 

reading her Miranda rights.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) Sobczak then removed Mrs. Little from 

the patrol vehicle “after an unknown period of time” and ordered her to remain seated 

in a chair. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Before sitting down, Mrs. Little, who was wearing only 

shorts and a t-shirt, informed the Defendant Officers “that the chair was on top of an 

anthill of red ants and that she was extremely allergic to red ants, that she was very 

cold, and that she was suffering from various symptoms of HIV.” (Id.) Despite 

informing the Defendant Officers on several occasions that she needed to use the 

bathroom and could not control her bladder because of radiation damage to her 

bladder and intestines from her cancer treatment, Mrs. Little was not allowed to use 

the bathroom. (Id. at ¶ 22.) As a result, she involuntarily relieved herself while seated 

outside and was unable to change into clean clothing until the Defendant Officers left 

the property. (Id.) 

At the time of the search, Plaintiffs were “valid qualified patients under Cal. 

Health & Safety [Code] §§ 11362.5 and 11362.765,” and Mr. Little was Mrs. Little’s 

primary caregiver. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs allege the Defendant Officers searching 

the property were aware of these facts. (Id.) 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 3 of 32
 – 4 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

In the course of conducting the search, Stevens claimed the Defendant Officers 

located over 640 pounds of marijuana “in the form of untrimmed buds, packaged 

marijuana, and marijuana edibles.” (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs allege that “[i]n reality, 

[they] were in possession of far less processed and unprocessed marijuana.” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs allege the Defendant Officers destroyed the seized marijuana the following 

day by dumping it at the Miramar Landfill. (Id. at ¶ 26.) 

On November 5, 2012, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a criminal 

complaint charging Plaintiffs with one count of unlawful possession of marijuana for 

sale in violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11359, and one count 

of unlawful cultivation of marijuana in violation of California Health and Safety 

Code section 11358. (Id. at ¶ 27.) In the course of pretrial hearings, the trial court 

granted a motion to exclude evidence pursuant to Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 

51 (1988) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), “finding that the 

[Defendant] [O]fficers had violated the [Plaintiffs’] due process rights by destroying 

material, exculpatory evidence.” (Id. at ¶ 28.) At the end of the trial, the jury returned 

a verdict of not guilty on the charge of unlawful possession and deadlocked on the 

charge of unlawful cultivation. (Id. at ¶ 29.) The trial court ultimately dismissed the 

cultivation count in the furtherance of justice pursuant to California Penal Code 

section 1385. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs commenced this action on September 12, 2014 asserting the 

following causes of action in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) search and seizure 

unsupported by a warrant against Stevens; (2) unreasonable search against all 

defendants; (3) excessive force against all defendants; (4) Miranda violations against 

Stevens; and (5) due process violations against all defendants. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 4 of 32
 – 5 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

must accept all allegations of material fact pleaded in the complaint as true and must 

construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 

1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed 

factual allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement 

to relief.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (alteration in original)). A court need 

not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[T]o be entitled to 

the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply 

recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of 

underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F. 3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Despite the 

deference the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the court 

to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that 

defendants have violated the...laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated 

Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983). 

/// 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 5 of 32
 – 6 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Generally, courts may not consider material outside the complaint when ruling 

on a motion to dismiss. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 

1994) (overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002)). “However, material which is properly submitted as part 

of the complaint may be considered.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1555, n. 

19. Documents specifically identified in the complaint whose authenticity is not 

questioned by the parties may also be considered. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 

1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (superseded by statute on other grounds); see also Branch, 

14 F.3d at 453-54. Such documents may be considered, so long as they are referenced 

in the complaint, even if they are not physically attached to the pleading. Branch, 14 

F.3d at 453-54; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(rule extends to documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint “necessarily relies” 

but which are not explicitly incorporated in the complaint). Moreover, the court may 

consider the full text of those documents even when the complaint quotes only 

selected portions. Fecht, 70 F.3d at 1080 n.1. Additionally, the court may consider 

materials which are judicially noticeable. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th 

Cir. 1994). 

As a general rule, a court freely grants leave to amend a complaint which has 

been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 

Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). However, leave to amend may be denied 

when “the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co., 

806 F.2d at 1401 (citing Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1962)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Zimmerman moves to dismiss all causes of action for failure to state a claim 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 3.) Stevens and Sobczak 

move to dismiss the second, third, and fourth causes of action, and Gore moves to 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 6 of 32
 – 7 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

dismiss all causes of action, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF 

No. 7.) Faw moves to dismiss all causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the 

grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims against him are barred by qualified immunity, and that 

Plaintiffs improperly brought section 1983, rather than Bivens, claims against him as 

a federal officer. (ECF No. 13.) 

A. Zimmerman’s Motion to Dismiss 

Zimmerman moves to dismiss all causes of action in the Complaint, arguing 

that she was not Chief of Police at the time of the incident, but rather the Assistant 

Chief, and is therefore not a properly named defendant in this action, and that Paxton 

was not acting as a San Diego Police Department Detective at the time of the incident, 

but rather under the authority of the Drug Enforcement Administration. (ECF No. 3-

1 at pp. 3-4.) As an initial matter, Zimmerman raises factual disputes in her motion. 

Courts may not consider material outside the complaint when ruling on a motion to 

dismiss, unless submitted as part of the complaint, identified in the complaint, or 

materials which are judicially noticeable. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 

1555, n. 19; Branch, 14 F.3d at 453-54; Barron, 13 F.3d at 1377; Lee, 250 F.3d at 

688. In support of her motion to dismiss, Zimmerman does not submit any materials 

or request judicial notice of the fact she was not Chief of Police at the time of the 

events underlying the Complaint, or that Paxton was not acting as a San Diego Police 

Department Detective at the time. Simply making these arguments in her motion is 

insufficient. Accordingly, these facts are not properly before the Court and cannot 

be considered in deciding the motion to dismiss. 

 Regardless, the Court notes this is an official capacity suit1

 and “[o]fficialcapacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against 

 1

 Although Zimmerman argues it is unclear whether she is being sued in 

her official or individual capacity, the Complaint, in combination with Plaintiffs’ 

opposition, make it clear that Zimmerman is only being sued in her official capacity. 

See Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14 (where it is not clear in the complaint whether an 

official is being sued personally, or in his or her official capacity, or both, “[t]he 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 7 of 32
 – 8 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-

66 (1985) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 

(1978)). “As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to 

respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a 

suit against the entity.” Id. (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–472 (1985)). 

“It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the 

entity.” Id. at 166. Accordingly, this suit, which is solely brought against 

Zimmerman in her official capacity, is not a suit against her personally, but a suit 

against the entity. 

 Moreover, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), if the prior Chief of 

Police had been named in the Complaint in his or her official capacity, once the prior 

Chief ceased to hold office, “[t]he officer’s successor is automatically substituted as 

a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Therefore, even if the prior Chief of Police had been 

named in the Complaint, the current Chief of Police, which is claimed to be 

Zimmerman, would automatically be substituted as a party. See Griffith v. Lanier, 

521 F.3d 398, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2008). As Zimmerman only moves to dismiss on the 

grounds she was an improperly named party because she was not the Chief of Police, 

and Paxton was not acting as a San Diego Police Department Detective, at the time 

of the incident, for the foregoing reasons, Zimmerman’s motion to dismiss is 

DENIED.

2

 

course of the proceedings in such cases typically will indicate the nature of the 

liability sought to be imposed”); Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 640-41 (9th Cir. 

1991). (See also Compl. at ¶ 5 (Zimmerman “is the chief policymaker and 

decisionmaker for the San Diego Police Department on the use of force and the 

disposition of evidence.”); ECF No. 8 at p. 3 (“[T]he Complaint specifies that 

Zimmerman is being sued in her official capacity as Chief of Police. . . . [Plaintiffs] 

sued Zimmerman in her official capacity in order [to] reach the City of San Diego.”) 

and p. 2 (“As Zimmerman is being sued in her official capacity....”).) 

2

 In her reply, Zimmerman also argues that the Complaint’s allegations 

regarding the policies promulgated and adopted are vague and conclusory. However, 

because Zimmerman did not make this argument in her initial motion to dismiss, the 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 8 of 32
 – 9 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. Faw’s Motion to Dismiss: Bivens vs. Section 1983 

Faw, who Plaintiffs allege is a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, moves to dismiss all causes of action alleged against him “because 

federal actors generally cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (ECF No. 

13-1 at p. 16.) Instead, Faw argues, the proper cause of action is pursuant to Bivens 

v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

(Id.) Bivens permits suits against “federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for 

violations of their constitutional rights,” W. Ctr. for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 

F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394), while section 1983 

only provides a cause of action against any person “acting under color of State law,” 

Morse v. N. Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 

42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

In their opposition to Faw’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs assert that their 

section 1983 claim against Faw is alternatively asserted as a Bivens claim, arguing 

that they need not plead a specific legal theory so long as sufficient factual allegations 

show that Plaintiffs may be entitled to some relief. (ECF No. 15 at p. 12.) Here, 

Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that Faw was a member of the San Diego County 

Integrated Narcotics Task Force at the time of the incident, and participated, along 

with other members, in executing a State search warrant at Plaintiffs’ property. 

(Compl. at ¶¶ 14, 15, n. 1.) The search warrant resulted in the State bringing criminal 

charges against Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶ 27.) 

 

argument is waived. See Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 

2015 WL 4483955, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015); see also Zamani v. Carnes, 491 

F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding district court did not commit clear error in 

failing to consider arguments raised for the first time on reply because it “need not 

consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief”); United States v. 

Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the general principle that 

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived); Dytch v. Yoon, No. C 

10–02915 MEJ, 2011 WL 839421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2011) (explaining that 

parties “cannot raise a new issue for the first time in their reply briefs”). 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 9 of 32
 – 10 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“Although federal officials acting under federal authority are generally not 

considered to be state actors, they may be liable under [section] 1983 if they are found 

to have conspired with or acted in concert with state officials to some substantial 

degree.” Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Gibson v. 

United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Federal officers acting under 

federal authority are immune from suit under section 1983 unless the state or its 

agents significantly participated in the challenged activity.”). “The touchstone of this 

analysis is ultimately “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State 

and the challenged action of the [federal actors] so that the action of the latter may be 

fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 

419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). 

Given the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled that 

Faw was acting under color of state law. See e.g., Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 

1076-77 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King, 687 

F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (analyzing action brought against law enforcement officers 

who participated in a combined state and federal gang task force under section 1983); 

Reynoso v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No. C 10-00984 SI, 2012 WL 646232, at *5-6 (N.D. 

Cal. Feb. 28, 2012) (finding plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a symbiotic relationship 

between police officers and ATF agents engaging in a search of plaintiffs’ residence 

to claim liability under section 1983); see also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 

32 (1927) (“[T]he mere participation in a state search of one who is a federal officer 

does not render it a federal undertaking.”). Accordingly, to the extent that Faw moves 

to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs improperly brought this action as a section 

1983 action, the motion is DENIED.

3

 3

 Although courts have considered claims denominated as section 1983 

claims against federal officers to be Bivens claims for the purpose of deciding a 

motion to dismiss, as the same analysis largely applies, the Court declines to read a 

Bivens claim into Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Morse, 118 F.3d at 1340 n. 4 (assuming, 

as did the district court, for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss that the 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 10 of 32
 – 11 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

C. Motion to Dismiss First Cause of Action: Invalid Search Warrant 

in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Stevens 

Faw moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for search and seizure 

unsupported by a warrant. The Fourth Amendment prohibits a search conducted 

pursuant to “an ill-begotten or otherwise invalid warrant.” Bravo v. City of Santa 

Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). To establish a claim of judicial 

deception under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must “(1) establish that the warrant 

affidavit contained misrepresentations or omissions material to the finding of 

probable cause, and (2) make a ‘substantial showing’ that the misrepresentations or 

omissions were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. 

(citing Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

Plaintiffs allege Stevens made fraudulent statements in his warrant affidavit 

“concerning the amount of marijuana on [Plaintiffs’ property] and the implications 

of California’s medical marijuana laws in an effort to subvert the magistrate’s neutral 

function in issuing warrants, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the U.S. Constitution.” (Compl. at ¶ 31.) As a “proximate result of Stevens’s 

conduct,” Plaintiffs allege “Judge Rubin issued a warrant that was not in fact 

supported by probable cause, which led to an illegal search” of Plaintiffs’ property, 

the illegal arrest of Plaintiffs, and the illegal seizure and destruction of Plaintiffs’ 

marijuana. (Id. at ¶ 32.) 

Faw moves to dismiss this cause of action on the grounds that it is not directed 

to him, as it is not alleged that he participated in obtaining the search warrant. (ECF 

No. 13-1 at p. 9.) Plaintiffs agree that the only defendant on this cause of action is 

 

plaintiff’s claim could have been brought under Bivens although the complaint only 

recited a section 1983 claim); see also Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (“Actions under [section] 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save 

for the replacement of a state actor under [section] 1983 by a federal actor under 

Bivens.”) If Plaintiffs wish to bring section 1983 and Bivens claims, in the alternative, 

they must specifically do so in a First Amended Complaint, and provide supporting 

factual allegations for each claim. 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 11 of 32
 – 12 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Stevens. (See ECF No. 15 at p. 1.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Faw’s motion 

to dismiss the first cause of action as to him. 

D. Motion to Dismiss Second Cause of Action: Unreasonable Search in 

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against All Defendants 

Plaintiffs allege the Defendant Officers conducted an unreasonable search of 

Plaintiffs’ property. (Compl. at ¶ 37.) “The test of what is necessary to ‘execute a 

warrant effectively’ is reasonableness.” San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle 

Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F. 3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lawmaster v. 

Ward, 125 F. 3d 1341, 1349 (10th Cir. 1997)). A court “must examine the totality of 

the circumstances to determine whether a given search was reasonably executed.” 

United States v. Combs, 394 F.3d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]he test for 

reasonableness is often a question for the jury.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 

F.3d 646, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 1. Stevens and Sobczak 

Stevens and Sobczak move to dismiss the second cause of action on the 

grounds that “[d]escribing the execution of the search warrant as ‘SWAT-style’ and 

identifying the clothes worn and the weapons carried by the officers does not make 

the search unlawful.” (ECF No. 7-1 at p. 5.) In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that 

the Defendant Officers executed the search warrant at approximately 5:00 a.m. on 

October 17, 2012, unannounced, and “stormed” the property wearing military 

fatigues and using assault rifles “in a SWAT-style raid with weapons drawn.” 

(Compl. at ¶¶ 15, 16, 37.) Plaintiffs allege that the execution of the search in such a 

manner was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

(Id. at ¶ 37.) 

The deployment of a SWAT team in the dark with weapons drawn may be 

considered unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Bravo, 665 

F. 3d. at 1086 (“SWAT officers’ nighttime searches . . . constitute much greater 

intrusions on one’s privacy than ordinary daytime searches and carry a much higher 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 12 of 32
 – 13 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

risk of injury to persons and property); Alexander v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 29 F.3d 

1355, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a jury might conclude that deployment 

of a SWAT team for the purpose of inspecting property was excessive); Holland ex 

rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he decision 

to deploy a SWAT team to execute a warrant must be ‘reasonable’ because it largely 

determines how the seizure is carried out, thereby determining the extent of the 

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.”); Estate of Smith v. 

Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] decision to employ a SWAT-type 

team can constitute excessive force if it is not ‘objectively reasonable’ to do so in 

light of ‘the totality of the circumstances.’”); Rush v. City of Mansfield, 771 F. Supp. 

2d 827, 857-59 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (finding a reasonable jury could conclude that the 

use of a SWAT-style team was unreasonable). “The decision to deploy a SWAT 

team to execute a warrant necessarily involves the decision to make an overwhelming 

show of force—force far greater than that normally applied in police encounters with 

citizens.” Holland ex rel. Overdorff, 268 F.3d at 1190. Therefore, as the Ninth 

Circuit has stated, a “nighttime incursion by a SWAT force is a far more serious 

occurrence than an ordinary daytime intrusion pursuant to a regular warrant and 

therefore requires higher justification beyond mere probable cause to search.” Bravo, 

665 F.3d. at 1086. 

Given the alleged time and manner of the search, the Court finds Plaintiffs 

have pleaded “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss 

filed by Stevens and Sobczak on the second cause of action. 

 2. Faw 

Faw moves to dismiss the second cause of action on the grounds of qualified 

immunity, arguing that “officers who execute a search warrant often enter into a 

dangerous situation that requires the use of protective gear, weapons, and some use 

of force in order to minimize the risk of harm to both officers and occupants,” and 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 13 of 32
 – 14 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

searching the residence of suspected drug traffickers presents an “inherently 

dangerous” situation. (ECF No. 13-1 at pp. 10-11.) 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability even if 

his or her action resulted from “‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake 

based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 

551, 567 (2004)). The purpose of qualified immunity is to strike a balance between 

the competing “need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and 

liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. 

“Determining whether officials are owed qualified immunity involves two 

inquiries: (1) whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the 

injury, the facts alleged show the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right; 

and (2) if so, whether the right was clearly established in light of the specific context 

of the case.” Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The Supreme Court has instructed that courts may 

exercise “sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 

immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 

As discussed above, the Court has already determined that Plaintiffs have 

pleaded enough facts to plausibly allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Accordingly, the Court turns to whether the right was clearly established at the time 

of the incident. See Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(“A particular right is clearly established if the contours of [that] right [are] 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). While officers are 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 14 of 32
 – 15 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

given greater latitude in the execution of a search warrant in “inherently dangerous” 

situations, see Avina v. United States, 681 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012), the 

Ninth Circuit had clearly established at the time of the alleged incident that the use 

of a SWAT team, particularly at night, may be unreasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances, see Alexander, 29 F.3d at 1366-67; Bravo, 665 F. 3d. at 1086. Here, 

Plaintiffs allege the Officer Defendants arrived at 5:00 a.m., unannounced, and 

“stormed” the property wearing military fatigues and using assault rifles “in a SWATstyle raid with weapons drawn.” (See Compl. at ¶¶ 15-16, 37.) Plaintiffs further 

allege that the search warrant was issued because of the observed cultivation of 

marijuana plants by an elderly couple suffering from several serious ailments, which 

does not automatically imply the same level of dangerousness as suspected drug 

traffickers or gang members. See Avina, 681 F.3d at 1131-32 (inherently dangerous 

situation where warrant authorized for residence of suspected drug trafficker); 

Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100 (2005) (inherently dangerous situation where 

search warrant authorized a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resided 

on premises); see also Alexander, 29 F.3d at 1367 (“The force which was applied 

must be balanced against the need for that force[.]”). 

Given the foregoing, and considering all alleged facts in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court cannot determine at this time whether Faw is entitled 

to qualified immunity on this cause of action. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Faw’s motion to dismiss the second cause of action on the grounds of qualified 

immunity. 

E. Motion to Dismiss Third Cause of Action: Excessive Force in 

Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against All Defendants 

 Plaintiffs allege the Defendant Officers “violated the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by using excessive force on and effectuating 

an unreasonable arrest of [Mrs. Little], an older, seriously ill woman of small statute 

who posed no threat to the legitimate interests” of the officers. (Compl. at ¶ 43.) 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 15 of 32
 – 16 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the Defendant Officers used excessive force by (1) 

“handcuffing her wrists, placing them behind her back, and placing her in the back 

of a police cruiser, which caused [Mrs. Little] serious physical discomfort;” (2) 

“leaving on the air conditioning in the police cruiser despite the cold air outside and 

[Mrs. Little] having informed the [officers] that she had been suffering from 

pneumonia for two months;” (3) “ordering [Mrs. Little] to remain seated while 

handcuffed near a hill full of red ants after she expressly informed [officers] that she 

was seriously allergic to red ants;” (4) “ordering [Mrs. Little] to remain seated while 

handcuffed outside despite the very cold temperatures and that [Mrs. Little] only was 

wearing shorts and a t-shirt;” and (5) “failing to allow [Mrs. Little] to use the 

bathroom despite her informing the [officers] that she could not control her bladder 

due to radiation damage.” (Id.) 

Stevens and Sobczak move to dismiss the third cause of action for excessive 

force on the basis that no excessive force was used. Defendants argue that “none of 

the alleged facts in the complaint involve any actual force.” (ECF No. 7-1 at p. 6, 

line 14.) Faw similarly moves to dismiss on the grounds that only “very minimal 

force that was incident to the execution of a search warrant” was used in arresting 

Mrs. Little. (ECF No. 13-1 at p. 14, lines 18-20.) 

“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality 

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

396 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A court must first 

consider the nature and quality of the intrusion, evaluating the type and amount of 

force inflicted. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Deorle 

v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 2001)); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 

1440 (9th Cir. 1994). Next, the court must determine the government’s interest at 

stake in the use of force, weighing factors “including the severity of the crime at 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 16 of 32
 – 17 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 

others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Mattos, 661 F.3d at 441 (citing 

Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1279-80). “These factors, however, are not exclusive. Rather, 

[courts should] examine the totality of the circumstances and consider ‘whatever 

specific factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether or not listed in 

Graham.’” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

The reasonableness of a particular use of force requires taking the “perspective 

of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “The right to make an arrest carries with it the right to 

employ some level of force to effect it.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 818 (citing Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396). Thus, “[a] court must consider that the officer may be reacting to a 

dynamic and evolving situation, requiring the officer to make split-second decisions.” 

Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97). “[A]n officer need not have perfect 

judgment, nor must he resort only to the least amount of force necessary to 

accomplish legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id. 

 1. Handcuffing 

The Ninth Circuit has held that excessively tight handcuffing can constitute a 

Fourth Amendment violation, but only where a plaintiff claims to have been 

demonstrably injured by the handcuffs or where complaints to the officers about the 

handcuffs being too tight or painful are ignored. See e.g., Wall v. Cnty. of Orange,

364 F.3d 1107, 1109–12 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying qualified immunity on excessive 

force claim where arrestee suffered nerve damage as a result of continued restraint in 

tight handcuffs); LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 952, 960 (9th Cir. 

2000) (finding excessive force question should have gone to a jury where an arrestee 

complained to officer who refused to loosen handcuffs); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 

1433, 1434–36 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying officer’s motion for summary judgment on 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 17 of 32
 – 18 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

excessive force claim where arrestee’s wrists were discolored and officer ignored his 

complaint); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding district court 

improperly granted summary judgment to officers where arrestee received treatment 

for injuries sustained as a result of rough handcuffing); Hupp v. City of Walnut Creek, 

389 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (denying plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment in the absence of “evidence of a physical manifestation of injury 

or of a complaint about tight handcuffs that was ignored”); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 

F.3d 937, 945 (6th Cir. 2002) (refusing to find a constitutional violation where 

officers immediately acted after arrestee complained that handcuffs were too tight). 

 Plaintiffs have not alleged that Mrs. Little was demonstrably injured by the 

handcuffs or that she made any complaints which were ignored by the Defendant 

Officers about the tightness of the handcuffs. Accordingly, the Court finds that 

Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege a constitutional violation with respect to how Mrs. 

Little was handcuffed during the arrest and GRANTS the motions to dismiss filed 

by Stevens, Sobczak, and Faw on this claim WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

2. Air Conditioned Vehicle 

Plaintiffs rely on Kassab v. San Diego Police Dept., 453 F. App’x. 747 (9th 

Cir. 2011), for their claim that putting Mrs. Little in an air conditioned car on a cold 

day, while she was only wearing shorts and a t-shirt, after she informed the officers 

she had pneumonia, constitutes excessive force. In Kassab, the Ninth Circuit 

reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant officers where 

the officers allegedly detained the plaintiff “in a police car for more than four hours, 

with the windows rolled up, no air conditioning, and an interior temperature of 115 

degrees.” Id. at 748. The plaintiff claimed to have “suffered from heat stroke, had 

difficulty breathing, and almost passed out several times.” Id. However, in Dillman 

v. Vasquez, No. 13–CV–00404 LJO SKO, 2015 WL 881574 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015), 

the court found there was no violation of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights 

where the plaintiffs were exposed to excessive heat for a time period between one 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 18 of 32
 – 19 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and two-and-a-half hours and when the defendant officer was “confined to the same 

patrol car as Plaintiffs for substantially the same amount of time.” Id. at *9-10 

(emphasis in original). The Dillman court explained: 

Whereas an “unnecessary exposure to heat” may cause a constitutional 

violation, see Dillman v. Tuolumne Cnty., No. 1:13–cv–404–LJO–

SKO, 2013 WL 1907379, at *15 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2013) (discussing 

cases) (“MTD Order”), being briefly confined in uncomfortable 

conditions, such as a hot patrol car, does not amount to a constitutional 

violation. See Estmon v. City of New York, 371 F. Supp. 2d 202, 214 

(S.D. N.Y. 2005) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where the 

plaintiff was held in hot police car for ten minutes); Frost v. Agnos, 152 

F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding “without merit” pretrial 

detainee’s “complain[t] about the temperature in his cell,” where 

plaintiff failed to show those circumstances “ultimately deprived him 

of the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities). In every case 

finding that a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to 

being exposed to excessive heat, the plaintiff was confined for 

substantially longer periods of time than were Plaintiffs. See, e.g., 

Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 945 (6th Cir. 2002) (arrestee held in 

police vehicle for three hours in 90 degree heat); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U.S. 730, 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (prisoner tied 

to hitching post and exposed to sun for seven hours); Kassab, 453 Fed. 

App’x at 748 (arrestee held in police car for more than four hours). 

Conversely, the Fifth Circuit held that “a post-arrest detention for 

approximately one-half hour in an unventilated police vehicle in the sun 

was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Arias [v. Amador], 

2014 WL 6633240, at *10 [(E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014)] (citing Glenn v. 

City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001)). Thus, the case law 

suggests that a brief (e.g., 30–minute–long) confinement in a hot patrol 

car does not violate the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g., Glenn, 242 F.3d 

at 314, but an extended (e.g., four-hour-long) confinement in a hot 

police car does violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Kassab, 453 

Fed. App’x at 478. 

Id. at *9. 

 Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged how long Mrs. Little was subjected to the cold 

temperatures of the police vehicle, what the approximate temperature was inside the 

vehicle, whether the officers were subject to the same conditions, or how she was 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 19 of 32
 – 20 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

injured as a result. As Dillman states, these factors are relevant to determining the 

unreasonableness of the confinement. Absent such allegations, the Court finds 

Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a constitutional violation with respect to 

this claim and GRANTS the motions to dismiss filed by Stevens, Sobczak, and Faw 

on this claim WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

3. Ant Hill

Plaintiffs cite no authority to show that being seated in a chair on top of or near 

an anthill of red ants after officers are informed the arrestee is extremely allergic to 

red ants constitutes excessive force. However, the Court finds the facts of Perry v. 

Post, No. CIV 04–2842–PHX–JAT (VAM), 2006 WL 3333092 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 

2006) to be instructive. In Perry, the court found the plaintiff had established an 

excessive force claim when the defendant officers purposefully dragged the plaintiff 

ten feet into an ant bed where he was bitten twenty times in two minutes while an 

officer taunted him about being bitten. Id. at *2-4. In making this determination, the 

court stated that “[p]urposefully dragging someone into an ant bed to be bitten might 

not be near the top of the Supreme Court’s list [‘of all the acts by which cruel and 

sadistic purpose to harm another would be manifest’] but the conduct definitely 

would make the list.” Id. at *4. The Perry court rejected the defendant officers’ 

“contention that [the] [p]laintiff must have suffered a physical injury to establish a 

constitutional violation.” Id. at *5 (emphasis in original). 

In this case, however, there is no allegation that Mrs. Little had any physical 

contact with the red ants, there was any danger of physical contact, how long she was 

near the red ants, or that Mrs. Little suffered any injury other than mental and 

emotional pain as a result of being near the anthill. She simply alleges she was seated 

in a chair that was either “on top of” or “near” a red anthill for an unspecified period 

of time. (Cf. Compl. at ¶ 21 with ¶ 43(c)).) Guided by Perry, the Court finds the 

mental and emotional pain alleged as a result of being merely being near—but not in 

actual contact with—red ants for an unspecified period of time, even when someone 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 20 of 32
 – 21 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

is seriously allergic to them, does not rise to the level of plausibility required to 

establish a claim for excessive force. Cf. Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F. 3d 1007, 

1010-15 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding sufficient allegations of a Fourth Amendment 

violation where an unarmed, peaceful plaintiff “feared for his life” when defendant 

officer held a gun “three or four feet” from the plaintiff’s head). As such, the Court 

GRANTS the motions to dismiss filed by Stevens, Sobczak, and Faw on this claim 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

4. Cold Temperatures and Minimal Clothing 

As previously discussed, courts have found that “unnecessary detention in 

extreme temperatures,” including extremely cold weather, violates the Fourth 

Amendment’s prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures. Miller v. Sanilac 

Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 251 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 

945 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Kassab, 453 F. App’x. at 748. Here, Plaintiffs simply 

allege the defendant officers committed excessive force when they ordered Mrs. 

Little “to remain seated while handcuffed outside despite the very cold temperatures 

and . . . [Mrs. Little] only was wearing shorts and a t-shirt.” (Compl. at ¶ 43(c).) 

The Court finds these allegations insufficient to plausibly allege an excessive 

force claim, in light of the fact there are no allegations as to how cold it was outside, 

how long Mrs. Little remained outside, whether the Defendant Officers were 

subjected to the same temperatures, whether or not Mrs. Little informed the 

Defendant Officers that she was cold, whether Mrs. Little needed medical attention 

as a result of being in the cold, or how Mrs. Little was injured as a result of being 

seated in such a condition. See Miller, 606 F.3d at 251-52 (finding no excessive force 

where there were no allegations the arrestee was left in the cold longer than necessary 

to conduct a field sobriety test or that the deputy was not exposed to the cold for the 

same amount of time, and the arrestee never told the deputy he was cold or indicated 

he needed medical attention during the booking process, and did not present 

symptoms for hypothermia); Johnson v. Ciesielski, No. 10-cv-1453-LJM-DML, 2013 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 21 of 32
 – 22 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WL 139673, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2013) (finding no excessive force where an 

individual was allegedly “handcuffed in sub-freezing weather [and] placed on the 

curb with no more than a thin jacket and shorts, and held him for a time exceeding 

one (1) hour,” where there was no evidence the plaintiff demonstrated any symptoms 

of hypothermia, complained of being cold, requested any medical attention, or had 

medical records showing he suffered an adverse reaction to the weather); see also 

Arias v. Amador, 61 F. Supp. 3d 960, 975-76 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding force is not 

excessive when an arrestee is exposed to extreme temperatures for thirty minutes or 

less). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss filed by Stevens, 

Sobczak, and Faw on this claim WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

5. Restroom 

Plaintiffs allege that “on several occasions [Mrs. Little] also informed the 

[Defendant] [O]fficers that she needed to use the bathroom and could not control her 

bladder because of radiation damage to her bladder and intestines from her cancer 

treatment. Nonetheless, the [Defendant] [O]fficers did not allow [Mrs. Little] to use 

the bathroom.” (Compl. ¶22.) As a result, [Mrs. Little] involuntarily relieved herself 

while seated outside and was unable to change into clean clothing until the 

[defendant] officers left.” (Id.) Although Plaintiffs bring this alleged violation as an 

excessive force claim, the Court has not located any case law finding that the refusal 

to allow a detainee to use the restroom constitutes “excessive force.” Such refusal is 

more properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 

detention. 

Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, “the police may detain a 

building’s occupants while officers execute a search warrant as long as the detention 

is reasonable.” Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006). “The 

reasonableness of a detention made pursuant to a search warrant is examined under 

the totality of the circumstances and includes consideration of any danger posed to 

the police by the detainee, the nature of the crime being investigated/the object of the 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 22 of 32
 – 23 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

search, any resistance by the detainee, the age of the detainee, and the health or 

medical condition of the detainee.” Campbell v. City of Bakersfield, No. CIV F04–

5585 AWI TAG, 2006 WL 2054072, at *26 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2006) (citing 

Franklin, 31 F.3d at 876). “A detention conducted in connection with a search may 

be unreasonable if it is unnecessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged, or if it 

involves an undue invasion of privacy.” Franklin, 31 F.3d at 876. “Detentions, 

particularly lengthy detentions, of the elderly, or of children, or of individuals 

suffering from a serious illness or disability raise additional concerns.” Id. 

Under certain circumstances, refusing to allow a detained individual to use the 

restroom may rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, but the Court finds 

no authority, and Plaintiffs cite none, establishing the right on the part of one lawfully 

detained pursuant to the execution of a search warrant to use a toilet upon demand. 

See Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F. 3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Dawson, 435 

F.3d at 1069 (“[D]enying Plaintiffs’ requests . . . to use the restroom unattended 

furthered the officers’ interest in facilitating an efficient inspection by [Department 

of Public Health] personnel” as “[a] tenant left unsupervised to use the restroom . . . 

could retrieve a weapon and assault an officer.”). In Hunter, for example, during an 

hour-and-a-half search, the plaintiff “asked to be allowed to use the toilet, explaining 

that she was disabled and taking medication that caused her to urinate frequently. The 

officers refused [the plaintiff’s] repeated requests until she urinated and defecated on 

herself.” Id. at 828. In granting qualified immunity to the defendant officer on any 

claimed violation of rights resulting from his denial of the plaintiff’s request to use 

the toilet, the Eighth Circuit explained that although the plaintiff’s “dignity was 

certainly compromised by what transpired as the search was conducted, [it was] 

unable to conclude that the Constitution requires that police engaged in a search for 

drugs allow a resident of the subject property access to a ready means of disposal of 

such contraband.” Id. at 831. 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 23 of 32
 – 24 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

As mentioned above, the length of time of the detention is particularly relevant. 

Cf. Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 837-39 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding 

that a detainee who was “held for more than four hours in painful restraints without 

being allowed access to a bathroom, even though he was not a target of the 

investigation and police had no articulable reason for suspecting him of misconduct” 

had “at least conceivably alleged a violation of his clearly established Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure”); Pac. Marine Ctr., Inc. v. 

Silva, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1286-87 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (although “[a] complete denial 

of the usage of the toilet over the period of many hours . . might give rise to a 

constitutional violation,” only “[o]ne request to use the restroom over a four hour 

period is not a constitutional violation.”); Campbell, 2006 WL 2054072, at *27 

(denying summary judgment and qualified immunity after finding that “three refusals 

to use the restroom after six hours is arguably unnecessarily degrading and painful”). 

Given the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged an 

excessive force claim. Even if the Court considers this claim as one for unreasonable 

search under the vague language of paragraph 37 of the Complaint, as Plaintiffs do 

not allege how long Mrs. Little was detained or prevented from using the restroom, 

the Court finds the facts as stated in the Complaint do not rise to the level of 

plausibility required to allege a constitutional violation, and GRANTS the motions 

to dismiss filed by Stevens, Sobczak, and Faw on this claim WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 24 of 32
 – 25 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F. Motion to Dismiss Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983: Miranda Violations Against Stevens4

 Plaintiffs allege that Stevens “violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the U.S. Constitution by interrogating the LITTLES while they were in custody 

without reading them their rights, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 

(1966).” (Compl. at ¶ 49; see also ¶¶ 18, 20, 50-52.) “The Miranda exclusionary 

rule [is] a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the text 

of the Self–Incrimination Clause [of the Fifth Amendment]—the admission into 

evidence in a criminal case of confessions obtained through coercive custodial 

questioning.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003). However, failing to 

read a suspect his or her Miranda rights is not a Fifth Amendment violation “absent 

use of the statements in a criminal case.” Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F. 3d 910, 923 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766). A statement “has been ‘used’ in a 

criminal case when it has been relied upon to file formal charges against the declarant, 

to determine judicially that the prosecution may proceed, and to determine pretrial 

custody status.” Id. at 925. A Fifth Amendment Miranda violation may provide the 

basis for a section 1983 action. See Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 430 

(9th Cir. 2010); Stoot, 582 F.3d at 925-26. 

Plaintiffs concede in their opposition that “they failed to allege that they gave 

any statements or that [such statements] were used against them at trial.” (ECF No. 

11 at p. 6, lines 3-4.) Plaintiffs further failed to allege the statements were used 

against them in any other capacity, but assert they would be able to allege additional 

facts if given leave to amend. (See id. at p. 6, lines 4-7.) Although Stevens and 

 4

 Although Plaintiffs state in paragraph 49 that the Defendant Officers 

violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “by interrogating the LITTLES while 

they were in custody without ready them their [Miranda] rights,” the rest of the 

Complaint clearly indicates that this cause of action is only against Stevens. If 

Plaintiffs choose to file a First Amended Complaint, they must clarify who the 

defendants are for each cause of action, and in what capacity they are being sued. 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 25 of 32
 – 26 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Sobczak argue leave to amend should not be granted, the Court finds it appropriate 

to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS 

the motions to dismiss filed by Stevens, Sobczak, and Faw with respect to this claim 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

G. Motion to Dismiss Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983: Due Process Violation Against All Defendants 

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant Officers violated the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by (1) destroying material, 

exculpatory evidence, and (2) depriving Plaintiffs of their marijuana without due 

process of law. (Id. at ¶¶ 54, 55.) Faw moves to dismiss this claim on the grounds 

that marijuana is “absolutely prohibited by federal law,” thus Plaintiffs “have no 

substantive or procedural due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to 

possess a narcotic that is prohibited under federal law.” (ECF No. 13-1 at pp. 15, 

16.) Additionally, Faw argues, under the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 

marijuana possessed in violation of the act is subject to forfeiture and destruction. 

(Id. at p. 16.) 

“The Fourteenth Amendment places procedural constraints on the actions of 

government that work a deprivation of interests enjoying the stature of ‘property’ 

within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.” Memphis Light Gas & Water Div. 

v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). “Property interests derive not from the Constitution 

but from existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such 

as state law.” Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 683 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 

2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 9; 

Lawson v. Umatilla Cnty., 139 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1998). However, “federal 

constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate 

claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” Memphis Light, 436 U.S. 

at 9; Samson, 683 F.3d at 1057; Lawson, 139 F.3d at 692. That is, even though “state 

law creates a property interest, not all state-created rights rise to the level of a 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 26 of 32
 – 27 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

constitutionally protected interest.” Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1548 n. 3 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

With respect to medical marijuana, although California state law may create a 

property interest in the marijuana, California district courts have found there is no 

protected property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Barrios 

v. Cnty. of Tulare, 13–CV–1665 AWI GSA, 2014 WL 2174746, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 

23, 2014); Staffin v. Cnty. of Shasta, No. 13:cv-00315 JAM-CMK, 2013 WL 

1896812, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2013); Schmidt v. Cnty. of Nev., No. 10-cv-3022 

FCD/EFB, 2011 WL 2967786, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011). 

As the court explained in Schmidt: 

The Supreme Court has held that no person can have a legally protected 

interest in contraband per se. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 

53, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951); see also Cooper v. City of 

Greenwood, Mississippi, 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1990) . . . . “An 

object is contraband per se if its possession, without more, constitutes 

a crime; or in other words, there is no legal purpose to which the object 

could be put.” United States v. Harrell, 530 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th 

Cir.2008). Under the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), it is 

illegal for any private person to possess marijuana. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 

841(a)(1), 844(a). Thus, under federal law, marijuana is contraband per 

se, which means no person can have a cognizable legal interest in it. 

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 

(2005) (“The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any 

purpose.” (emphasis in original)). 

“The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any 

conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.” Id. at 

29. While California’s Compassionate Use Act (“CUA”) provides 

narrow exceptions for marijuana use involving qualified patients and 

care givers, federal law dictates that marijuana is illegal for any 

purpose. Id. at 27. . . . 

In this case, plaintiff cannot recover damages as a result of the 

confiscation or destruction of marijuana because he had no cognizable 

property interest in the marijuana. Plaintiff asserts a due process claim 

under the federal Constitution in federal court, where, under federal 

law, marijuana is undisputably illegal and contraband per se. 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 27 of 32
 – 28 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Schmidt, 2011 WL 2967786, at *5-6. 

 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Cnty. of Butte v. Super. Ct., 175 Cal. App. 4th 729 

(2009), is misplaced. In Butte, the plaintiff asserted that the destruction of his medical 

marijuana plants was a violation of due process under the California Constitution, 

and not, as asserted here, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Butte, 175 

Cal. App. 4th at 739-40 (acknowledging the Compassionate Use Act “has no effect 

on marijuana arrests and prosecutions or searches and seizures under federal law 

because “[t]he Act presents the unusual circumstance of a state law that, under limited 

circumstances, permits the possession of a substance deemed to be contraband under 

federal law.”). 

As Plaintiffs had no property interest in the marijuana that was protected by 

the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, Faw’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

fifth claim for deprivation of Plaintiffs’ marijuana without due process of law is 

GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court finds that the claim 

cannot be saved by amendment. See Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1401; see 

also Barrios, 2014 WL 2174746, at *5; Staffin, 2013 WL 1896812, at *5; Schmidt, 

2011 WL 2967786, at *6. 

However, as Plaintiffs point out in their opposition, Faw does not move to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim the Defendant Officers violated the Fourteenth Amendment 

by destroying material, exculpatory evidence. (See ECF No. 15 at p. 9.) Faw does 

not make this argument until his reply. Because Faw did not make this argument in 

his initial motion to dismiss, the argument is waived. See Somers, --- F. Supp. 3d ---

-, 2015 WL 4483955, at *13; Dytch, 2011 WL 839421, at *3; Zamani, 491 F.3d at 

997; Anderson, 472 F.3d at 668. 

H. Gore’s Motion to Dismiss 

Gore moves to dismiss all causes of action against him, in both his official and 

individual capacities, arguing that “the Complaint in the instant case merely alleges 

that Defendants had promulgated and adopted policies causing officers to execute 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 28 of 32
 – 29 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

warrants unlawfully; such a conclusory, formulaic recitation of a claim is insufficient 

to overcome a motion to dismiss.” (ECF No. 7-1 at p. 7.) As with Zimmerman, Gore 

is being sued solely in his official capacity.5

 (See ECF No. 11 at p. 6, lines 11-12.) 

Therefore, this suit shall be treated as a suit against the entity. See Graham, 473 U.S. 

at 165-66; Streit v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Local governing bodies can be sued directly under section 1983 when “the 

action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by 

that body’s officers,” or there is a widespread practice that, although not authorized 

by an ordinance or an express municipal policy, is “so permanent and well settled as 

to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 

of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978); see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of 

Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Castro v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 671 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff . . . must show a pattern of 

similar incidents in order for the factfinder to conclude that the alleged informal 

policy was ‘so permanent and well settled’ as to carry the force of law.”). The Ninth 

Circuit has broadly defined “policy” for purposes of a Monell claim as “‘a deliberate 

choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the 

official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject 

matter in question.’” Brass v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). A policy can 

be one of action or inaction. Fairley, 218 F.3d at 918. 

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege Gore, as the chief policymaker and decision 

maker for the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department on the use of force and the 

disposition of evidence, “promulgated, adopted, ratified, and acquiesced to policies, 

 5

 Plaintiffs similarly allege Gore “is the chief policymaker and 

decisionmaker for the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department.” (Compl. at ¶ 4.) 

However, if Plaintiffs choose to file a First Amended Complaint, they must specify 

whether Gore is being sued in his official or individual capacity. 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 29 of 32
 – 30 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

procedures, and customs” governing: (1) “the conduct of investigations and execution 

of search warrants relating to marijuana offenses that cause police officers to conduct 

such investigations and execute such warrants in violation of the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments;” (2) “the conduct of police contacts with civilians that lead 

to arrests of individuals with no regard to whether they can pose a risk of physical 

resistance and with no regard to the discomfort or pain of those individuals, and such 

policies, procedures, and customs cause police officers to illegally arrest 

individuals;” and (3) “the disposition of evidence in marijuana investigations by 

which law enforcement are directed to seize and destroy marijuana and marijuana 

products soon after collection without regard to the materiality or exculpatory nature 

of the evidence and without regard to the rights of the owners of the marijuana to 

seek its return, even in the face of evidence that the marijuana was legally possessed 

and cultivated.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 38, 44, 56.) 

While the Ninth Circuit previously had a liberal pleading policy with respect 

to Monell claims, requiring nothing more than “a bare allegation that government 

officials’ conduct conformed to some unidentified government policy or custom,” 

this precedent did not survive Iqbal. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 

F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts in this circuit now generally dismiss claims 

that fail to identify the specific content of the municipal entity’s alleged policy or 

custom. See La v. San Mateo Cnty. Transit Dist., No. 14-cv-01768-WHO, 2014 WL 

4632224, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014). 

Under Iqbal, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ bare allegations as to Plaintiffs’ second 

and third causes of action to be insufficient to give fair notice and to enable Gore to 

defend himself effectively. In addition, the allegations with respect to Plaintiffs’ third 

cause of action must fail because, as discussed herein, Plaintiffs have failed to allege 

a cognizable underlying constitutional violation. See Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 

916 (9th Cir. 1994). With respect to Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action, Plaintiffs’ 

allegations that Gore “promulgated, adopted, ratified, and acquiesced to policies, 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 30 of 32
 – 31 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

procedures, and customs governing the disposition of evidence in marijuana 

investigations by which law enforcement are directed to seize and destroy marijuana 

and marijuana products soon after collection without regard to the rights of the 

owners of the marijuana to seek its return, even in the face of evidence that the 

marijuana was legally possessed and cultivated” must similarly fail because Plaintiffs 

have not sufficiently alleged an underlying cognizable due process violation. (See

Compl. at ¶ 56.) 

However, with respect to Plaintiffs’ allegations that Gore “promulgated, 

adopted, ratified, and acquiesced to policies, procedures, and customs governing the 

disposition of evidence in marijuana investigations by which law enforcement are 

directed to seize and destroy marijuana and marijuana products soon after collection 

without regard to the materiality or exculpatory nature of the evidence,” the Court 

finds Plaintiffs allegations to be sufficient to allege a Monell claim. (Compl. at ¶¶ 

38, 44, 56.) 

Accordingly, Gore’s motion to dismiss the Monell claims is GRANTED IN 

PART, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the second and third causes of action,

and DENIED IN PART. 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Zimmerman’s motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 3); GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss 

filed by Gore, Sobczak, and Stevens (ECF No. 7); and GRANTS IN PART and 

DENIES IN PART Faw’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13). In summary: 

(1) The Complaint only alleges section 1983 causes of action against Gore 

and Zimmerman in their official capacities; 

(2) The first cause of action for invalid search warrant is alleged against 

Stevens only; 

(3) The second cause of action for unreasonable search is not dismissed; 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 31 of 32
 – 32 – 14cv02181 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(4) The third cause of action for excessive force is dismissed with leave to 

amend; 

(5) The fourth cause of action for Miranda violations against Stevens is 

dismissed with leave to amend; 

(6) The fifth cause of action for due process violations is dismissed without 

leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’ claim the Defendant Officers violated 

the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving Plaintiffs of their marijuana 

without due process of law. However, the fifth cause of action is not 

dismissed as to Plaintiffs’ claim the Defendant Officers violated the 

Fourteenth Amendment by destroying material, exculpatory evidence; 

and 

(7) Sheriff Gore is dismissed from all causes of action except the Monell 

claim in the fifth cause of action that he “promulgated, adopted, ratified, 

and acquiesced to policies, procedures, and customs governing the 

disposition of evidence in marijuana investigations by which law 

enforcement are directed to seize and destroy marijuana and marijuana 

products soon after collection without regard to the materiality or 

exculpatory nature of the evidence.” 

If Plaintiffs wish to file a First Amended Complaint, they must do so no later 

than January 15, 2016. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 8, 2015 

 

Case 3:14-cv-02181-BAS-JMA Document 17 Filed 12/08/15 Page 32 of 32