Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07111/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 24, 1995 Decided June 27, 1995

No. 94-7111

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANT

v.

PRO FOOTBALL, INC., D/B/A WASHINGTON REDSKINS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv02665)

-

Jeffrey L. Kessler argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Richard Ben-Veniste.

James E. Conway appeared pro hac vice and argued the cause for appellee National Football League

Management Council. Daniel L. Nash was on the brief.

Robert B. Cave argued the cause for appellee Pro Football, Inc. With him on the brief were Peter

W. Tredick, John G. Roberts, Jr. and Mark J. Larson.

W. James Young and Hugh L. Reilly were on the brief for amici curiae Terry Orr, et al.

Ronald C. Forehand, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General was on the

brief for amicus curiae Commonwealth of Virginia.

Before WILLIAMS, SENTELLE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant National Football League Players Association

("NFLPA") appeals from a District Court order vacating as contrary to public policy an arbitrator's

award in favor of the NFLPA against appellee Pro Football, Inc., d/b/a/ Washington Redskins

("Redskins") and granting summary judgment for appellees. Appellant contends that the District

Court erred in concluding that the agency shop provision of the National Football League ("NFL")

collective bargaining agreement violated the laws of the state of Virginia. Because we conclude that

time and events have mooted the dispute before us, we decline to reach the merits of this appeal and

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 1 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

vacate the District Court's judgment and order.

I.

On May 6, 1993, the National FootballLeague Players Association ("NFLPA"), acting asthe

sole bargaining representative for professionalfootball playersin the NFL, and the National Football

League Management Council("NFLMC"), acting asthe sole bargaining representative for NFL team

owners, signed a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") which governs the employment of

professionalfootball playersin the NFL for the years 1993-2000. Contained in the CBA is a standard

"agency shop" provision, which requires NFL players to pay union dues or an equivalent service fee

within 30 days of employment, stating:

Every NFL player has the option of joining or not joining the NFLPA; provided,

however, that as a condition of employment commencing with the execution of this

Agreement and for the duration of this Agreement and wherever and whenever legal:

(a) any active player who is or later becomes a member in good standing of the

NFLPA must maintain his membership in good standing in the NFLPA; and (b) any

active player (including a player in the future) who is not a member in good standing

of the NFLPA must, on the 30th day following the beginning of his employment or

the execution ofthis Agreement, whichever islater, pay, pursuant to Section 2 below

or otherwise to the NFLPA, an annualservice fee in the same amount as any initiation

fee and annual dues required of members of the NFLPA.

NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article V, § 1. The CBA also provides that if a player has

not paid proper fees within seven days of written notification of non-payment to the NFLMC, the

player shall be suspended without pay by his team. Finally, "[a]ny dispute over compliance with, or

the interpretation, application or administration" ofthe union shop provision isto be resolved through

binding arbitration. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article V, § 5.

Section8(a)(3) oftheNationalLaborRelationsAct("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(1988),

permits employersto enter into union or agency shop agreements with unions. NLRA section 14(b)

permits individual states and territories to enact right-to-work laws which outlaw such union shop

agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). Virginia has enacted a right-to-work statute, Va. Code Ann. §§

40.1-58 to 40.1-69, pursuant to that authority.

On December 17, 1993, the NFLPA sent a written notice to the NFLMC, identifying those

players who had not paid proper dues and feesfor 1993. On December 24, 1993, the NFLMC in turn

notified the Washington Redskins that the team should suspend 37 of its players for failure to pay

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 2 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1993 dues. The Redskins refused to suspend the players, asserting that Virginia's right-to-work law

prohibited the club from suspending the players.

On December 24, 1993, the NFLPA filed a grievance pursuant to the CBA and requested an

expedited hearing before an arbitrator. On December 27, 1993, one day before the appointed

arbitrator, Herbert Fishgold, was to conduct a hearing on the matter, Terry Orr, a Redskins player,

sought a temporary restraining order in the Circuit Court of Loudoun County, Virginia, arguing that

the agency shop provision in the CBA violated Virginia's right-to-work law. Fishgold conducted a

six-hour arbitration hearing the following day, in which the Redskins argued that the team is a

Virginia employer, subject to Virginia right-to-work laws, because the club's players spend the vast

majority of their working hours practicing at Redskins Park in Loudoun County, Virginia.

Consequently, the Redskins argued that it would be illegal to enforce the agency shop provision

against the Redskins and the team's players. In turn, the NFLPA argued that the players' predominant

job situs was the District of Columbia, where the team played at least 8 games a year. Because the

District of Columbia does not have a right-to-work law, the NFLPA argued that the agency shop

provision was enforceable and that the players should be suspended.

On December 29, 1993, Fishgold issued hisfinding, ordering theRedskinsto complywith the

agreement and to suspend players who failed to pay their dues or fees. Purporting to apply the

Supreme Court'ssitustest from Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp.,

426 U.S. 407 (1976), Fishgold found that the District of Columbia was the players' predominant job

situs because the Redskins play more gamesthe team's "raison d'etre"there than anywhere else.

Thus, the arbitrator issued an award requiring the Redskins to suspend any players who failed to pay

proper fees or dues. Subsequently, Judge Thomas D. Horne of the Loudoun County Circuit Court

granted Terry Orr a temporary restraining order ("TRO") which enjoined the Redskins from

suspending Orr. Orr v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2224 (Va.

Cir. Ct. 1993). Judge Horne interpreted Mobil Oil contrary to Fishgold, holding that Virginia's

right-to-work law appliesto Orr and histeammates, who spend a vast majority of their working time

in Virginia. Id. In response to Judge Horne's ruling, the arbitrator amended his prior award to

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 3 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

exclude Terry Orr from the list of players to be suspended.

Following issuance of Judge Horne's order, the NFLPA filed this suit in the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia, seeking injunctive relief and a TRO ordering the defendants, the

Redskins and the NFLMC, to comply with the arbitration award. Specifically, the NFLPA sought

to have the players suspended prior to the Redskins' game against the Minnesota Vikings on

December 31, 1993. Judge Joyce Hens Green denied the request for a TRO on December 30, 1993,

finding that the NFLPA was unable to demonstrate a substantial likelihood ofsuccess on the merits.

National Football League Players Ass'n v. Pro-Football, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1993). The

New Year's Eve game was played without any suspensions of Redskins players. Nevertheless, the

Redskins lost the game 14-9.

At the conclusion ofthe 1993 season, the parties continued to pursue this matter before Judge

Thomas F. Hogan. The Redskins filed a counterclaim against the NFLPA seeking a declaratory

judgment finding the arbitrator's award to be unlawful and unenforceable. Both parties filed motions

for summary judgment, asserting that there were no genuine issues of material fact. On May 12,

1994, the District Court entered summary judgment against the NFLPA. National Football Players

Ass'n v. Pro-Football, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 71, 80 (D.D.C. 1994). Rejecting the suggestion that it defer

to the arbitrator's views regarding the legality of his award, the District Court instead conducted de

novo review of the arbitrator's decision "to determine whether he made an error of law that compels

the defendants to violate Virginia law and public policy." Id. at 76. The District Court determined

that the arbitrator erred in interpreting Mobil Oil to provide that District of Columbia law governed

the legality of the union shop provision; instead, Virginia law applied. Id. at 80. Accordingly, the

court declared Fishgold's arbitration award unenforceable as "contrary to the laws and public policy

of Virginia." Id. The NFLPA then docketed this appeal.

Since this appeal was docketed, Terry Orr and 15 of his teammates have continued to seek

broad declaratory and injunctive relief in Virginia state court. In that proceeding, the NFLPA

submitted a sworn statement in support of a motion to dismiss or stay the proceeding which stated

that it would no longer seek suspension of any member of the 1993- 94 Redskins for failure to pay

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 4 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

dues. In September 1994, five Redskins players moved for summary judgment in that action. The

Virginia court granted that motion December 21, 1994. See Orr v. National Football League

Players Ass'n, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2845 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1994). The NFLPA has petitioned the

Supreme Court of Virginia for review of that decision. The Virginia Supreme Court has yet to act

on the petition.

In this appeal, the NFLPA argues that the District Court applied an improper standard of

review in determining that Virginia law applies to the Redskins and that, in any event, the District

Court's determination that the arbitration award violates a clear public policy of Virginia was

erroneous. Appellees dispute each of the NFLPA's substantive arguments and argue additionally that

subsequent events have mooted this appeal. Specifically, they contend that the passage of time and

the NFLPA's disavowal of the relief granted by the arbitrator moot the issues before this court.

Because we agree with the appellees that the issues in this appeal have been mooted, we decline to

reach the merits of appellant's arguments and vacate the judgment and order of the District Court.

II.

It is wellsettled that "a federal court has no authority "to give opinions upon moot questions

or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in

issue in the case before it.' " Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 447,

449 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Under the mootness doctrine, a case

is not justiciable and must be dismissed "if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that

makes it impossible for the court to grant "any effectual relief whatever.' " Church of Scientology,

113 S. Ct. at 449 (quoting Mills, 159 U.S. at 653).

To determine whether this case has becomemoot, we must look to the nature ofrelief granted

by the arbitrator and the District Court. The NFLPA, in its grievance filed with the arbitrator, sought

"an order that the Redskins comply with Article V of the CBA, which requires the Redskins to

suspend all Redskin players who have not paid union dues or service fees required by the CBA."

Arbitrator Fishgold'ssubsequent award waslimited to ordering the Redskins "to comply with Article

V of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by suspending without pay any Washington Redskins

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 5 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

player who has not paid his union dues or executed a dues checkoff authorization by one o'clock p.m.

E.S.T. December 31, 1993." When it filed its complaint in the District Court, the NFLPA sought "an

Order ... requiring the Washington Redskins and National Football League to comply with the

arbitration award of December 30." The District Court, in an order dated December 30, 1993, denied

the NFLPA's motion for a TRO. As a result, no Redskins players were suspended for the final game

of the 1993-94 season on December 31, 1993. Subsequently, several months after completion of the

season, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Redskins and NFLMC and

declared Fishgold's arbitration award as "unenforceable because it is contrary to the laws and public

policy of Virginia." 857 F. Supp. at 80.

Clearly, the only relief requested by appellants was an order suspending 37 Redskins players

for the final game of the 1993-94 season for failure to pay that season's union dues and fees. That

relief, in fact, was granted by the arbitrator; however, the Redskins, with the blessing of the District

Court, did not comply with the arbitrator's award by the December 31, 1993 deadline, and no players

were suspended for the Vikings game. As a result, the only relief for which the appellants prayed and

which the District Court could have grantedsuspension of the Redskins players for the remainder

of the 1993-94 seasonbecame impossible to grant as a result of the playing of the New Year's Eve

game against the Minnesota Vikings. At that point, the matter in dispute before the arbitrator, failure

to pay feesfor the 1993-94 season, could not be affected by the District Court by virtue of the limited

reliefsought byappellant. Thus, nothing else appearing, under the venerable mootness rule reiterated

in Church of Scientology, it appears that we must dismiss this case as moot.

Appellant arguesthat severalfactors preserve this matter for appeal. First, NFLPA contends

that the declaratory relief granted by the District Court to the Redskins will have continuing effect

on the relationship between the Players Association and the Redskins and its players (and any

similarlysituated teams). Thus, appellant argues, this court can grant effectual relief, saving the cause

from mootness, by rescinding the declaratory order. We disagree.

In concluding his opinion below, Judge Hogan stated that "the Court will vacate the

arbitrator's award and enter a declaratory judgment finding that the award is unenforceable because

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 6 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

it is contrary to the laws and public policy of Virginia." 857 F. Supp. at 80. Judge Hogan's opinion

therefore makes clear that the only effect of the declaratory order is to render Arbitrator Fishgold's

award unenforceable; it does not declare the union shop provision of the CBA unenforceable with

respect to the Redskins for the remaining years of the CBA. Judge Hogan's order is consistent with

the relief prayed by the NFLPA, which never requested the arbitrator or the District Court to declare

the CBA enforceable against the Redskins under all circumstances. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Elec.

& Space Technicians, Local 1553, AFL-CIO, 822 F.2d 823, 827 (9th Cir. 1987) (arbitrators have

no authority to decide issues not submitted by the parties). Consequently, this court would not alter

the future relationship between the parties to the CBA by vacating the District Court's declaratory

order because that order does not affect that future relationship, only an arbitrator's award regarding

the 1993-94 season. That season and the time for application of the suspensions having passed, this

argument does not save appellant's claim from mootness. See Monzillo v. Biller, 735 F.2d 1456,

1460 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (where reliefsought and granted by the district court expired on its own terms,

there is nothing left for appellate court to review).

Next, the NFLPA argues that, by virtue of its submission of a claim for damages to the

arbitrator after he had issued his award, it has a live claim for damages which saves this cause from

mootness. While a claim for damages can justify a decision on the merits of an appeal even where

claimsfor equitable relief otherwise have been rendered moot,see Memphis Light, Gas &Water Div.

v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978), the NFLPA has not presented such a claim for damages. In its

original grievance, the NFLPA asked simply for "legal and related expenses"a prayer for attorneys'

fees and court costs. However, standing alone, a "request for attorneys' fees does not preserve a case

which otherwise has become moot on appeal." Monzillo, 735 F.2d at 1463 (internal quotations

omitted; citations omitted). Furthermore, its claim for contract damages was not submitted to the

arbitrator until after he issued his award. Fishgold properly found that he had no jurisdiction to

decide that claim, as we noted in Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington

Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1971), "[O]nce an arbitrator has made and published a final

award his authority is exhausted and he is functus officio and can do nothing more in regard to the

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 7 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

subject matter of the arbitration." Id. (citation omitted). As a result, no live claim for damages which

could save appellant's claim from mootness exists before us.

Finally, appellant contends that this controversy falls within the narrow exception to the

mootness doctrine as a claim which is "capable of repetition yet evading review." See Southern Pac.

Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). We disagree. Although the professional football

season may be five to six monthslong, there is nothing inherent in the case that makes "the challenged

action ... too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration." Atlantic Richfield Co. v.

United States, 774 F.2d 1193, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). We find no reason to believe

that a grievance filed at the beginning of a season could not necessarily be fully litigated before the

claim became moot. As such claims "do not necessarily evade review," City of Vernon, Cal. v.

FERC, 983 F.2d 1089, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1993), we agree with the Redskins that the claim is moot.

III.

Having found the claim moot, we must next decide whether to vacate the District Court's

order. The established practice in federal court in dealing with civil cases which have become moot

is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss. United States v.

Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). However, vacatur is an equitable doctrine, and in considering

whether to vacate a moot decision, courts must take a "view of the nature and character of the

conditions which have caused the case to become moot." U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner

Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 391 (1994) (citation omitted). Principally, courts must look at

"whether the partyseeking relieffromthe judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action."

Id. The Redskins argue that vacatur is improper here because appellant disavowed all requested relief

when it stated that it would no longer pursue suspensions of the Redskins players. Our opinion

makes clear, however, that this cause had become moot by the passage of time even before the

NFLPA's disavowal of its requested relief. See infra pp. 7-8. This is more the case in which the

cause has "become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any of the parties," U.S. Bancorp,

115 S. Ct. at 390 (quoting Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 83 (1987)); thus, vacatur is proper here.

U.S. Bancorp, 115 S. Ct. at 390.

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 8 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the decision of the District Court be vacated and

remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss.

USCA Case #94-7111 Document #132444 Filed: 06/27/1995 Page 9 of 9