Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00708/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00708-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DEBORAH K. SHEIMAN,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 12-708-TUC-CKJ 

ORDER

On July 9, 2013, Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro issued a Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 27) in which he recommended that this Court remand this matter to

the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for further consideration. Plaintiff Deborah K.

Sheiman (“Sheiman”) has filed objections and Defendant (“the Commissioner”) has filed a

response. This Court has made a de novo review of those portions of the report and

recommendation to which an objection has been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the following

reasons, the Report and Recommendation will be adopted.

Procedural History

ALJ George w. Reyes issued a written decision in this matter in which he determined

that Sheiman was not disabled because she could perform her past relevant work, which was

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semi-skilled and skilled. The ALJ determined Sheiman had not rebutted the presumption of

continuing nondisability and, in reaching his decision at step four of the five step sequential

process utilized to evaluate DIB and SSI claims, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. 416.920, the

ALJ found that Sheiman:

has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant may only occasionally balance.

[Sheiman] must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as dangerous machinery

or unprotected heights. [Sheiman] is able to respond to changes in a routine work

setting.

Administrative Record (“AR”) 19. The Appeals Council denied Sheiman's request for

review. 

Sheiman filed the Complaint in this case on September 27, 2012. Sheiman has filed

an Opening Brief (Doc. 17) and the Commissioner has filed a Motion to Remand (Doc. 24).

Magistrate Judge Ferraro has issued a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 27). 

Disability

An insured individual is entitled to disability insurance benefits if he or she

demonstrates, through medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, an

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or metal impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]"

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1) and (2). For a disability to be found, the impairment must be so

severe that, considering the age, education, and work experience of the claimant, the claimant

cannot "engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); see e.g., Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

A claimant can make a prima facie case for disability if she proves that she is not

presently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the disability is severe, and she is not able

to perform any work she has done in the past. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th

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Cir. 2002); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If the claimant meets this

burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. "When evidence reasonably supports

either confirming or reversing the ALJ's decision, [a reviewing court] may not substitute [its]

judgment for that of the ALJ." Batson v. Commissioner of SSA, 400 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th

Cir. 2004).

When adjudicating a subsequent claim involving an unadjudicated period, as here, a

presumption of continuing nondisability exists and a claimant is not disabled with respect to

that period unless the claimant rebuts the presumption. Social Security Acquiescence Ruling

97-4(9); see also Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988). The presumption may be

rebutted by showing a “changed circumstance” such as a change in a claimant’s age category

or an increase in the severity of a claimant’s impairment. Id. Further, if a claimant rebuts

the presumption, the prior residual functional capacity (“RFC”) must be given effect unless

there is new and material evidence relating to the determination or there has been a change

in the law. Id.

Routine Work Setting 

 Sheiman asserts she proved she was clearly disabled at step five given the ALJ’s

residual functional capacity (”RFC”) assessment. Sheiman asserts the magistrate judge erred

in determining that a routine work setting encompasses unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled

work. The magistrate judge stated:

The ALJ’s language did not limit the claimant to a routine work setting, rather, he

stated only that changes in a routine work setting were within her abilities. Further,

none of the sources upon which Sheiman relies tie routine work setting solely to

unskilled work. Rather, under the governing regulations and rules, all competitive

work requires the ability to deal with changes in a routine work setting not solely

unskilled work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b); SSR 85-15; Program Operations

Manual System (POMS) § 25020.010 (providing that ability to respond to changes

in a routine work setting is a basic mental ability needed for any job). [Footnote

omitted.] It is not clear why the ALJ singled out this one basic work activity to

include in Sheiman’s RFC but taken in context of the remainder of his decision it was

not intended to restrict her to unskilled work. This is clear because he found she

could do her past relevant work, which he classified as semi-skilled and skilled. 

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Report and Recommendation, p. 5, citing AR 21. 

Sheiman asserts that she proved the ALJ restricted Sheiman to unskilled work by

virtue of his restriction of Sheiman to a routine work setting. Doc. 29, p. 2. Sheiman argues,

that because the ALJ made the statement in the context of the RFC assessment, he was

finding Sheiman was unable to respond to changes in a non-routine work setting. In support

of this argument, Sheiman cites to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) where an RFC is defined as the

most a claimant can still do despite her limitations. 

However, the ALJ’s statement in the context of the RFC assessment did not limit

Sheiman to a routine work setting. Further, Sheiman has not provided any authority that a

routine work setting can only be in reference to unskilled work. Rather, this Court agrees

with the magistrate judge that the governing regulations and rules lead to the opposite

conclusion, i.e., that under the governing regulations and rules, work requires the ability to

deal with changes in a routine work setting. See e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(6) (“When

we talk about basic work activities, we mean the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most

jobs. Examples of these include . . . Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.”).

Contrary to Sheiman’s assertion that the magistrate judge made an error in the law, the Court

adopts this determination of the magistrate judge.

Sheiman also asserts that the magistrate judge erred in determining the ALJ did not

restrict Sheiman to unskilled work because ALJ Reyes found that Sheiman could perform

“semi-skilled” and “skilled” work. Indeed, Sheiman asserts she is relying on the plain

language of the ALJ’s decision. However, the magistrate judge did not erroneously assume

the correctness of the ALJ’s rationale. Rather, the magistrate judge simply placed the ALJ’s

statement regarding the routine work setting in the context of the entire ALJ decision – this

context does not mean the magistrate judge assumed the correctness of the ALJ’s rationale.

Moreover, this Court disagrees with Sheiman’s “plain language” reading. Simply because

the statement was included next to the RFC assessment does not limit the statement to

unskilled work. Rather, a plain language reading results in a conclusion the ALJ determined

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Sheiman has not pointed to any evidence in the record that she has no transferrable

skills, while a vocational expert testified Sheiman may have transferable skills to a sedentary

position. It must be determined if new and material evidence support an RFC finding

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Sheiman is able to respond to changes in a routine work setting – nothing more, nothing less.

Residual Functional Capacity

As stated by the magistrate judge:

Here, the ALJ acknowledged Chavez but found Sheiman had not proven a change in

circumstances. (AR 16-17.) This was error. Sheiman, in fact, rebutted the

presumption of non-disability because she had moved into the category of advanced

age, which begins at age 55. 20 C.F.R. §§ 1563(e), 416.963(e). The ALJ also erred

because he failed either to adopt the RFC finding from the prior proceeding or to

assess whether new evidence allowed him to re-determine Sheiman’s RFC.

Doc. 27, p. 6. The parties have not objected to this conclusion. However, Sheiman asserts

the errors warrant an immediate award of benefits.

“When an ALJ's denial of Social Security disability benefits is not supported by the

record, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for

additional investigation or explanation; a court may exercise its discretion and direct an

award of benefits, however, where no useful purpose would be served by further

administrative proceedings and the record has been thoroughly developed.” 81 CJS, Social

Security and Public Welfare § 170 (2013), citing Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.

2012). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

Remand for further proceedings is appropriate where there are outstanding issues that

must be resolved before a determination can be made, and it is not clear from the

record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if all the evidence

were properly evaluated. 

Hill, 698 F.3d at 1062, citations omitted. In this case, the ALJ did not adopt Sheiman’s RFC

finding from the prior proceeding or assess whether new evidence allowed him to

re-determine Sheiman’s RFC. As discussed by the magistrate judge, see Doc. 27, pp. 9-7,

it is not clear the ALJ would be required to find Sheiman disabled if all of the evidence were

properly evaluated.1

 Indeed, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s assessment that

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different from the 2001 decision and, if so, whether Sheiman still has the residual functional

capacity to perform her past work or alternate work.

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“what Sheiman is asking the Court to do is to reverse the ALJ’s erroneous finding that there

was no change in circumstances, with respect to her age category but then, without

consideration of the record, hold the ALJ to his finding that there was no change in

circumstances, with respect to her impairments.” Report and Recommendation, Doc. 27, p.

7. Rather, this Court finds there are outstanding issues to be resolved before a determination

can be made. An award of benefits at this time is not appropriate.

Relationship Between Unskilled Work and a Routine Work Setting

Sheiman alternatively requests the Court order an ALJ on remand to reconcile a

restriction to a routine work setting with a finding of non-disability based on semi-skilled and

skilled work. However, the resolution of the terms may not be at issue in the context of a

new decision by the ALJ. In effect, Sheiman is requesting this Court to direct the ALJ to

issue an advisory opinion if such resolution is not needed. The Court declines to do so.

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 684

(1967) (Generally, courts invoke the ripeness doctrine and refuse to decide matters which

would involve "entangling themselves in abstract disagreements . . . "); West v. Secretary of

the DOT, 206 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2000) (courts avoid advisory opinions on abstract

propositions of law). 

Accordingly, after an independent review, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 27) is ADOPTED.

2. The Commissioner’s Motion for Remand (Doc. 24) is GRANTED.

3. This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative

proceedings consistent with the Report and Recommendation, as adopted by this Court, and

pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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4. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in this case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

58 and shall then close its file in this matter.

DATED this 24th day of September, 2013.

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