Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01769/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01769-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Matthew Caine Gaddis,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-11-1769-PHX-PGR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

on Motion to Stay

Under consideration is Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed 

March 28, 2012 (Doc. 12). Petitioner seeks a stay of consideration of his habeas 

petition, arguing that “there are many more issues that need to be addressed” but noting 

his obligation to first exhaust his state remedies on those claims. Respondents have not 

responded to the motion.

Because the disposition of the motion could be dispositive of some of Petitioner’s 

claims, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and 

recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 

72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Standards for Motions to Stay – Motions to stay to permit exhaustion of state 

remedies are subject to two disparate standards, dependent upon the status of exhaustion 

of the existing petition. 

Rhines: Stay of Mixed Petitions - In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the 

Supreme Court held that consideration of a petition containing unexhausted claims could 

Case 2:11-cv-01769-PGR Document 16 Filed 05/01/12 Page 1 of 6
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be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies, but only in limited circumstances:

Because granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner's failure to 

present his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only 

appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause 

for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court. 

Moreover, even if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the 

district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant him a stay 

when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.

 

544 U.S. at 277. Thus, a stay of such a petition requires good cause for the failure to 

exhaust, and a finding of some merit.

Kelly: Stay of Fully Exhausted Petitions – Prior to Rhines, in Kelly v. Small, 315 

F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit had established a three step procedure 

whereby a state habeas petitioner could stay consideration of his petition containing 

unexhausted claims. 

Pursuant to the Kelly procedure, (1) a petitioner amends his petition 

to delete any unexhausted claims; (2) the court stays and holds in 

abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing the 

petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the 

deleted claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his petition and 

re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to the original petition.

King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9

th Cir. 2009). 

In King, the Ninth Circuit held that the three step procedure outlined in Kelly

“remains available after the Supreme Court's decision in Rhines,” id., “because it does 

not leave a mixed petition pending, does not sanction any exception to [the exhaustion 

requirement] and so does not present the same dangers of abuse,” id. at 1140. They 

observed that the pendency of the federal petition did not toll the statute of limitations, 

meaning subsequently added (or re-added) claims had some likelihood of being 

untimely, and thus the Kelly procedures were unlikely to be abused. Id. at 1141.

The King court also recognized that a stay under Kelly was not an extraordinary 

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procedure that impinged upon the exhaustion rule, but was merely “in part an exercise of 

litigants' usual prerogative...to amend complaints if they can do so to make them 

cognizable in federal court, and in part an exercise of the equally normal discretion of 

federal courts to control the timing of decision in cases pending before them.” Id. at 

1141. Thus, no extraordinary showing of “good cause for failure to exhaust” was 

required.

Status of Present Petition – Petitioner’s original Petition (Doc. 1) was dismissed 

with leave to amend on the basis that petitioner had failed to assert any federal grounds 

for relief. (Order 12/8/11, Doc. 5.) Petitioner’s present First Amended Petition, filed 

December 21, 2011 (Doc. 6) attacks his November 9, 2010 conviction in Maricopa 

County Superior Court for money laundering. Petitioner asserts four grounds for relief 

including claims that: (1) the plea agreement was accepted after expired and was 

factually inaccurate; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) lack of jurisdiction. 

Petitioner asserts he filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed as untimely, and asserts 

no post-conviction relief proceedings. Respondents have not yet responded to the 

Petition, and the due date for a response is May 21, 2012. (Order 4/12/12, Doc. 14.) 

Motion to Stay – Given the absence of any timely state review, it appears that all 

of Petitioner’s present claims must be unexhausted. Thus, the procedure in Rhines

would appear to apply. 

Good Cause - Petitioner’s motion offers no clear indication of good cause for his 

failure to previously exhaust his state remedies. Petitioner does complain that he is 

untrained, pro se, and subject to limited legal resources. However, those complaints 

relate to his present circumstances in seeking to exhaust his state remedies now, not 

earlier. Petitioner does not address why, as a pleading Arizona defendant, he did not 

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seek appointment of post-conviction relief counsel in the state courts, which would have 

avoided the problems of his pro se status. See Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 32.4(c)(2) (governing 

appointment of counsel in PCR proceedings of-right for pleading defendants). Thus, the 

undersigned finds no basis in the current motion for a finding of good cause for failure to 

properly exhaust.

Viability of Claims - Moreover, Petitioner’s motion fails to identify the claims he 

hopes to exhaust and subsequently add for consideration. Rhines requires a finding that 

the proposed new claims are not “plainly without merit.” Moreover, a proper exercise of 

discretion under Kelly would call for some suggestion on the record that the claims to be

exhausted and subsequently added had sufficient merit and likelihood of success in light 

of any applicable procedure defenses, to merit the delay in the litigation.

It would appear that any claims now submitted by Petitioner would be barred by 

the habeas statute of limitations. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a state habeas petitioner 

normally has only one year from the conclusion of direct review to file his habeas 

petition. Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal was apparently dismissed as untimely (Amend. 

Petition, Doc. 6 at 2). It would appear, therefore that Petitioner’s one year would have 

begun running when his time to seek timely review expired. For an Arizona pleading 

defendant, his PCR of-right is functionally direct review, and must be sought within 90 

days after judgment. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus 

Petitioner’s one year would have begun running on February 7, 2011, and expired on 

February 7, 2012. 

His untimely direct appeal would not have tolled the running of the statute. See 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (when a state petition is untimely under state 

law, then it is not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) for purposes of 

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statutory tolling). Moreover, the continued pendency of the instant federal proceeding 

would not toll the running of the statute. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) 

(only state proceedings toll the statute).

Thus, it appears that any claims added in the future would be barred by the habeas 

statute of limitations. Thus, regardless of any facial merit of any such new claims, they 

appear to be unlikely to be successful before this Court.

Therefore, whether determined under the “plainly meritless” standard of Rhines or 

the discretionary standard under Kelly, Petitioner has failed to support his request for a 

stay by showing the potential merit of his new claims.

Denial Without Prejudice – Respondents have not been heard from on the existing 

Petition. Moreover, without a response from Respondents, Petitioner has had little 

opportunity to address the kinds of opposition raised in the instant Report & 

Recommendation. Consequently, the undersigned will recommend that the instant 

motion be denied without prejudice to the filing of a properly fleshed out and supported 

motion, showing the nature of claims to be exhausted and then added, and the reasons 

why Petitioner believes they would not be barred by the habeas statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Motion to Stay 

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed March 28, 2012 (Doc. 12) be DENIED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.

EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

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of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file 

objections to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be 

considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute 

a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. 

Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated: May 1, 2012

11-1769r RR 12 04 30 on MStay HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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