Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01029/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01029-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

J&N PUBLISHING L.L.C. D/B/A JUAN 

AND NELSON PUBLISHING, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

BLU ICE ENTERTAINMENT, L.L.C., et 

al., 

Defendants. 

Case No.19-cv-01029-EDL 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE: MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. No. 19 

Before the Court is an unopposed Motion for Default Judgment filed by Plaintiffs J&N 

Publishing L.L.C. d/b/a Juan and Nelson Publishing and Mayimba Music, Inc. (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”), against defendants Blu Ice Entertainment, L.L.C. (“Blu Ice”) and Duc V. Luu (“Luu” 

and, together with Blu Ice, “Defendants”). The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion on 

September 23, 2014. Dkt. No. 24. 

In the absence of the Defendants’ consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate 

Judge, the Court hereby issues a report and recommendation on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default 

Judgment and orders that this action be reassigned to a District Judge. For the reasons stated in 

this Report and Recommendation, the Court recommends granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default 

Judgment and ordering a permanent injunction, statutory damages in the amount of $60,000, and 

attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $16,662.33. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs call this a “garden-variety action for copyright infringement” of three musical 

compositions listed on Exhibit A to the Complaint: “Nadie Se Muere,” “Tu Eres Ajena,” and “No 

Te Puedo Perdonar.” Compl. Ex. A, Dkt. No. 1-1; Jones Decl. ¶¶ 22-26, Exs. 7-9, Dkt. No. 19-2. 

A. The Parties 

Each Plaintiff is a member of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 

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(“ASCAP”) an unincorporated membership association with more than 700,000 songwriter, 

composer, and music publisher members. Compl. ¶ 15; Jones Decl. ¶ 3. Each member of 

ASCAP, including each of the Plaintiffs, has granted to ASCAP the nonexclusive license to 

authorize the nondramatic public performances of the member’s copyrighted music—including the 

Songs involved in this lawsuit. Compl. ¶ 4; Jones Decl. ¶ 3. On behalf of all its members, 

ASCAP licenses the right to perform publicly the millions of copyrighted songs in the ASCAP 

repertory (including the musical compositions involved in this suit). Id. ASCAP’s licensees 

include television networks and stations, radio stations, restaurants, nightclubs, bars, hotels, music 

venues, and many other kinds of music users. Jones Decl. ¶ 3. 

According to the Complaint, Defendants are the owners and operators of Roccapulco 

Supper Club located at 3140 Mission Street, San Francisco, California 94110. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12. 

Blu Ice is a limited liability company organized under the laws of California, and Luu is an 

officer, manager, and/or owner of Blu Ice responsible for the control, management, operation, and 

maintenance of the affairs of Blu Ice. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11, 12. 

B. Prior ASCAP License and Termination for Non-Payment 

On August 1, 2012, Blu Ice entered into a license agreement with ASCAP (the “Prior 

ASCAP License”). Jones Decl. ¶ 13, Exs. 1-2 (License Agreement); Compl. ¶ 17(a). However, 

Blu Ice failed to pay license fees as required under the terms of the Prior ASCAP License. As a 

result, on August 30, 2015, ASCAP sent Defendants a Notice of Termination, pursuant to which 

ASCAP notified Defendants that, unless they paid to SCAP the past-due license fees within 30 

days, ASCAP would terminate the Prior ASCAP License. Jones Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. 3 (August 30, 

2015 Letter to Luuc); Comp. ¶¶ 17(b)-(c). Defendants’ Prior ASCAP License was terminated 

effective September 30, 2015. Compl. ¶ 17(c). 

Since the September 30, 2015 termination of the Prior ASCAP License, ASCAP claims to 

have attempted to contact the Defendants to offer to enter into a new ASCAP license or reinstate 

the prior license. Compl. ¶ 18; Jones Decl. ¶ 15, Exs. 4-6 (August 14, 2018 Letter; December 1, 

2015 Letter; and September 23, 2015 Letter). During the course of its dealings with Defendants, 

ASCAP representatives repeatedly have warned the Defendants about the consequences of 

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performing ASCAP’s members’ music without authorization at Roccapulco Supper Club. Jones 

Decl. ¶ 15, Exs. 4–6. ASCAP’s various communications gave Defendants notice that the 

unauthorized performance of ASCAP’s members’ music at Roccapulco constitutes copyright 

infringement. Complaint ¶ 20; Jones Decl. Exs. 4–5. Despite these notices and warning, 

Defendants continued to perform publicly ASCAP’s members’ music at Roccapulco Supper Club, 

without permission, for the entertainment of their patrons. Complaint ¶¶ 25–28; Jones Decl. Ex. 4. 

According to ASCAP’s calculations, the Defendants have “saved” or “avoided” 

approximately $35,000.00 in ASCAP license fees and charges that should have been paid to 

ASCAP for the period from November 1, 2015, through the present had the establishment 

Roccapulco Supper Club been properly licensed during that time. Jones Decl. ¶ 27. ASCAP also 

was forced to incur out-of-pocket investigative expenses totaling $1,248.16 in order to obtain the 

evidence of infringement described below and on which this action is based. Id. ¶ 28. In addition, 

according to ASCAP’s file on Roccapulco Supper Club, the Defendants owed ASCAP $10,439.36 

in license fees and charges under the Prior ASCAP License as of September 30, 2015, the date of 

termination. Jones Decl. ¶ 29. 

C. Evidence of Infringement 

Following the termination of the Prior ASCAP License, ASCAP hired a third-party, 

independent investigator, Walter Buss, to visit Roccapulco Supper Club. Jones Decl. ¶ 17. At 

ASCAP’s request, on the evening of July 21, 2018, Mr. Busse visited Roccapulco Supper Club for 

the purpose of observing, and taking notes regarding, the music performed at the club. Busse 

Decl. ¶ 4. During Mr. Busse’s investigation, he took contemporaneous notes regarding, inter alia: 

(i) the sources and types of musical entertainment; (ii) the décor and layout of the club; (iii) the 

titles of the songs that he heard and was able to identify; and (iv) the approximate time at which 

each of the identified songs was performed. Id. ¶ 5. Based on those notes, Mr. Busse 

subsequently drafted an official report of his investigation. Id. ¶ 7, Ex. 1. According to Mr. 

Busse’s report, he heard the following musical compositions, among others, performed at 

Roccapulco Supper Club: (i) “Nadie Se Muere,” originally written by Orlando Santana, and 

played by the disc jockey at 10:29 p.m.; (ii) “Tu Eres Ajena,” originally written by Alejandro 

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Montero Lorenzo, and played by the disc jockey at 10:15 p.m.; and (iii) “No Te Puedo Perdonar,” 

originally written by Hector Pena Pacheco, and played by the disc jockey at 12:05 a.m. Busse 

Decl. ¶ 8. 

Plaintiffs allege that on the night of Mr. Busse’s investigation, neither Defendants, nor 

anyone acting on their behalf or otherwise involved in the performance of music at the 

establishment on the dates in question, had obtained a license from ASCAP. Compl. ¶ 26; Jones 

Decl. ¶ 20. Nor had they obtained permission in advance directly from any of Plaintiffs. Id. As a 

result, Plaintiffs allege that the performances at Roccapulco Supper Club of the musical 

compositions involved in this suit were unauthorized. Id. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On February 25, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint alleging three causes of action for 

copyright infringement against Defendants. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs consented to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction on March 14, 2019. Dkt. No. 10. Plaintiffs state that it was difficult to serve process 

on Defendants because multiple service attempts at residence and business addresses were 

necessary before Defendants could be served. Dkt. No. 23, 1. Defendants were ultimately served 

by substituted service, as permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) and California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 415.20. Id. Accordingly, the deadline for Defendants to file their response was June 

6, 2019. Id. Defendants did not file any response before or on June 6, 2019. 

On June 14, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Entry of Default as to Blu Ice 

Entertainment, L.L.C. and Duc V. Luu, the Defendants in this action. Dkt. No. 14. On June 17, 

2019, the clerk of this Court entered default as to Defendants in this action. Dkt. No. 15. 

On August 20, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment. Dkt. No. 19. Through 

their motion, Plaintiffs request the following judgment against Defendants: (1) A permanent 

injunction restraining Defendants from publicly performing in their business establishment known 

as Roccapulco Supper Club any copyrighted musical composition owned by Plaintiffs or any 

copyrighted musical composition in the repertory of Plaintiffs’ performing rights licensing 

organization, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”), without 

first obtaining proper authorization to do so; (2) Statutory damages in the sum of $20,000.00 for 

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each count of copyright infringement, for a total of $60,000.00; (3) Attorney’s fees and costs in 

the amount of $16,662.33; and (3) Interest as permitted by 28 U.S.C. §1961. 

This Court held a hearing on the Motion for Default on September 23, 2019 and continued 

the initial case management conference to October 1, 2019. Dkt. No. 23. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Pursuant to Federal Rule 55(b), the Court may enter a default judgement upon motion by 

the Plaintiff after entry of default by the clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). “The district court’s 

decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980). Upon an entry of default by the clerk, the factual allegations of the 

plaintiff's complaint will be taken as true, except those relating to the amount of damages. See 

Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008); accord TeleVideo 

Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-918 (9th Cir. 1987). If the facts necessary to 

determine damages are not contained in the complaint, or are legally insufficient, they will not be 

established by default. See Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 

1992). “It is well settled that a default judgment for money may not be entered without a hearing 

unless the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or capable of mathematical calculation.” Davis v. 

Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 

F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979)). 

A court should consider seven discretionary factors, often referred to as the “Eitel factors,” 

before issuing a decision on a motion for default judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 

1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). The Eitel Factors are as follows: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive 

claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the 

action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts, (6) whether the 

default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Id. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Jurisdiction and Service 

Before turning to the merits, the Court is obliged to consider whether jurisdiction is proper. 

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See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that in a default judgment proceeding, 

“a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter 

and the parties”). Additionally, the Court must “assess the adequacy of process on the party 

against whom default is requested.” Bank of the West v. RMA Lumber Inc., No. 07–cv–06469 

JSW (EMC), 2008 WL 2474650, *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2008). “Without a proper basis for 

jurisdiction, or in the absence of proper service of process, the district court has no power to 

render any judgment against the defendant’s person or property unless the defendant has 

consented to jurisdiction or waived the lack of process.” S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138–39 

(9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear cases that, like this one, arise under 

the United States Copyright Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Additionally, the Court has personal 

jurisdiction over Defendants because the restaurant they operate (where the alleged infringement 

occurred) is located in San Francisco, California, and Defendant Luuc also resides in this District. 

Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 8, 10. The Defendants were also properly served. Service on an individual is 

proper if it is done by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of 

general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Service on a corporation, like Blu Ice, may be performed “in the manner 

prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). California law 

allows service of an individual “by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual 

office hours in his or her office . . . and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and 

complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy 

of the summons and complaint were left.” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 415.20. Service is then deemed 

complete on the tenth day after mailing. Id. Applying these rules here, service on Defendants was 

effected on May 16, 2019, ten days after May 6, 2019, when the complaint and summons were left 

for each of the Defendants with a manager at the restaurant and then mailed to each of the 

Defendants at the restaurant’s address. Dkt. No. 12 (Proof of Service); Shen Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8, Dkt. 

No. 14-1. 

Accordingly, the jurisdictional prerequisites are thus satisfied, and Defendants were 

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properly served. 

B. Default Judgment under Eitel 

i. Prejudice to the Plaintiff 

Under the first Eitel factor, Plaintiffs will suffer prejudice absent a default judgment 

because it “would be without another course of action to seek a recovery.” Wilamette Green 

Innovation Ctr., LLC v. Quartis Capital Partners, No. 14-cv-00848, 2014 WL 5281039, at *6 

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (citations omitted) (“Denying a plaintiff a means of recourse is by itself 

sufficient to meet the burden posed by this factor.”). 

ii. The Merits of the Claim and the Sufficiency of the Complaint 

The second and third Eitel factors—the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of the 

complaint—are generally considered together because after the entry of default, well-pleaded 

factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true, except as to the amount of damages. Fair 

Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir.2002). 

The allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint, taken as true, make out a claim for copyright 

infringement. To succeed on a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff (1) “must show 

ownership of the allegedly infringed material,” and (2) “must demonstrate that the alleged 

infringers violate[d] at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 

106.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir.2007). With respect to 

ownership, the Complaint alleges that at least one Plaintiff owns each of the musical compositions 

at issue. Jones Decl. ¶¶ 22-26, Exs. 7-9, Dkt No. 19-2. With respect to violating § 106, the 

Complaint alleges that Defendants performed three songs at Roccapulco Supper Club without 

authorization. Busse Decl. ¶ 20., Dkt. No. 19-3; 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (securing to owners of 

copyrights in musical works the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly”). The 

allegations in the Complaint therefore state a valid claim for copyright infringement. Accordingly, 

the second and third Eitel factors are satisfied. 

iii. The Amount of Money at Stake 

As to the fourth Eitel factor, the Court must consider “the amount of money at stake in 

relation to the seriousness of defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Security Cans, 238 

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F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Requests for such large sums of money generally counsel 

against entry of default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. “The Court considers Plaintiff’s 

declarations, calculations, and other documentation of damages in determining if the amount at 

stake is reasonable.” Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. 06–CV–03594, 2007 WL 

1545173, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 

Here, Plaintiffs seek statutory damages of $20,000 per song, totaling $60,000, which is less 

than twice the $35,000 licensing fees Defendants would have owed ASCAP. See Jones Decl. ¶ 

27. This is in the same range as awards in other similar cases. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. 

JMN Rest. Mgmt. Corp., No. 14-CV-01190-JD, 2014 WL 5106421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 

2014) (awarding statutory damage award of $36,000.00, or $6,000.00 per infringement, which was 

found to be “slightly more than three times the license fees [plaintiff] would have recovered”); 

Granite Music Corp. v. Center Street Smoke House, Inc., 786 F.Supp.2d. 716, 731-33 (W.D.N.Y. 

2011) (awarding statutory damages totaling $30,000.00 where defendants would have paid 

$10,877.00 had they been licensed during the relevant time period); EMI Mills Music, Inc. v. 

Empress Hotel, Inc., 470 F.Supp.2d 67, 75-76 (D.P.R. 2006) (awarding statutory damages of 

$60,000.00 where licensing fees would have been $18,000.00); Odnil Music Ltd. v. Katharsis 

LLC, No. CIV S-05-0545 WBSJFM, 2006 WL 2545869, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2006) 

(awarding statutory damages totaling $12,000.00 where defendants would have paid $3,401.71 

had they been licensed during the relevant time period). 

Because the requested amount is not high enough to militate against granting a default 

judgment, the fourth Eitel factor is satisfied. 

iv. The Remaining Eitel Factors 

The remaining three factors are the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts, 

whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and the strong policy favoring decisions on the 

merits. These remaining factors, on balance, also weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 

Because Defendants have not appeared, there is no indication that the material facts are subject to 

dispute, that their default is due to excusable neglect, or that a decision on the merits will be 

possible. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Kiflit, No. 12-cv-00866-LHK, 2012 WL 4717852, at *3 

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(N.D.Cal. Oct. 2, 2012). 

In sum, the Eitel factors favor entry of default judgment. Accordingly, the Court 

recommends granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment. 

C. Joint and Several Liability 

“Liability for copyright infringement extends to those who own or control the premises 

where the infringing conduct occurred, have the right and ability to supervise those responsible for 

the infringing conduct, and derive direct financial benefit from infringing performances on those 

premises.” Odnil Music Ltd. v. Katharsis LLC, No. CIV S-05-0545 (WBS) (JFM), 2006 WL 

2545869, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2006); see also Range Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, 

Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To impose vicarious liability on a defendant for 

copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant exercises the requisite control 

over the direct infringer and that the defendant derives a direct financial benefit from the direct 

infringement.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (under the 

Copyright Act, two or more infringers may be held liable “jointly and severally”). 

 Plaintiffs have established that their songs were performed without authorization at 

Roccapulco Supper Club on the evening of July 21, 2018; (ii) as of July 21, 2018, Defendants 

jointly had, and still have, the right and ability to supervise and control activities including public 

performance of musical compositions at Roccapulco Supper Club; and (iii) Defendants derive a 

direct and financial benefit from the public performance of musical compositions at Roccapulco. 

Compl. ¶¶ 6–14. Thus, the Court recommends that Defendants be held jointly and severally liable, 

and vicariously liable, for their acts of infringement. See, e.g., Range Road Music, 668 F.3d at 

1155. 

D. Request for Relief 

In light of Defendants’ default, Plaintiffs request judgment awarding a permanent 

injunction, statutory damages totaling $60,000, attorneys fees and costs totaling $16,662.23, and 

interest. Dkt. No.19-4. 

i. Permanent Injunction 

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants and their employees from infringing their copyrights. 

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The Copyright Act allows a Court to grant injunctions “on such terms as it may deem reasonable 

to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). The fact that Defendants 

have continued to violate plaintiffs’ copyrights despite years of warnings suggests that, absent an 

injunction, they will go on doing so—a conclusion bolstered by the fact that the Defendants have 

not responded to plaintiffs’ allegations in this Court. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. JMN Rest. Mgmt. 

Corp., No. 14-CV-01190-JD, 2014 WL 5106421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2014). Accordingly, 

the Court recommends entering an injunction restraining Defendants and their respective agents, 

servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons or entities in active participation and concert 

with them, from publicly performing, or causing or permitting to be publicly performed, in their 

business establishment known as Roccapulco Supper Club, located at 3140 Mission St., San 

Francisco, California, or in any other place owned, controlled, managed, or operated by 

Defendants, any copyrighted musical composition owned by Plaintiffs or any copyrighted musical 

composition in the repertory of Plaintiffs’ performing rights licensing organization, the American 

Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”), without first obtaining proper 

authorization to do so. 

E. Damages 

Under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act, a plaintiff may elect to recover statutory damages 

instead of actual damages, and Plaintiffs here have chosen to do so. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 

Ordinarily, a district court may award damages of between $750 and $30,000 per copyright 

infringement. Where the infringement is willful, a district court may award enhanced statutory 

damages of up to $150,000 per infringement. District courts have “wide discretion in determining 

the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, constrained only by the specified maxima and 

minima.” Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.1984) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 

504(c)(1)). “Factors the Court can consider in determining the amount of a damages award are: 

the expense saved by the defendant in avoiding a licensing agreement; profits reaped by defendant 

in connection with the infringement; revenues lost to the plaintiff; and the willfulness of the 

infringement.” Controversy Music v. Shiferaw, No. C03-5254 MJJ, 2003 WL 22048519, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. July 7, 2003) (citations omitted). “The Court can also consider the goal of 

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discouraging wrongful conduct.” Id. (citing F.W. Woolworth Co., v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 

344 U.S. 228, 233, 73 S.Ct. 222, 97 L.Ed. 276 (1952)). 

In this case, Plaintiffs request statutory damages in the amount of $60,000, which 

represents an award of $20,000 per song. Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants have ‘saved’ or 

‘avoided’ approximately $35,000 in ASCAP license fees and charges that should have been paid 

to ASCAP for the period from November 1, 2015, through the present had the establishment 

Roccapulco Supper Club been properly licensed during that time.” Pls. Br. 5, Dkt. No. 19. 

Plaintiffs also state that ASCAP incurred $1,248.16 in investigative expenses. Id. Plaintiffs do not 

allege willfulness in the Complaint but do note that ASCAP has made repeated efforts to secure a 

license and payment. See Jones Decl. ¶ 15. ASCAP sent Defendants multiple letters to inform 

Defendant of the need to secure a license with ASCAP in order to perform their works lawfully. 

Id., Exs. 4-6. Plaintiffs also point to the Prior ASCAP License for which Defendants owe 

$10,493.36 in unpaid license fees. Jones Decl. ¶ 29. 

In Sailor Music v. IML Corp., the court noted that, based on a survey of statutory damages 

awards throughout the country provided by the plaintiffs in that case, “courts typically award three 

times the amount of a properly purchased license for each infringement.” 867 F.Supp. 565, 570 

(E.D.Mich.1994). This rule of thumb has been applied in later decisions. See, e.g., Broad. Music, 

Inc. v. JMN Rest. Mgmt. Corp., No. 14-CV-01190-JD, 2014 WL 5106421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

10, 2014) (awarding plaintiff $36,000 in statutory damages, which “is slightly more than three 

times the license fees it would have recovered”). The requested $60,000.00 amount falls well 

below three times the $35,000 amount Defendants would have paid in license fees. 

Plaintiffs further argue that the $60,000 amount “falls within the well-established range of 

damages awarded in ASCAP matters.” Pls. Br. at 12 (citing Granite Music, 786 F.Supp.2d. at 

731-33 (awarding statutory damages totaling $30,000.00 where defendants would have paid 

$10,877.00 had they been licensed during the relevant time period); EMI Mills Music, Inc. v. 

Empress Hotel, Inc., 470 F.Supp.2d 67, 75–76 (D.P.R. 2006) (awarding statutory damages of 

$60,000.00 where licensing fees would have been $18,000.00); Odnil Music Ltd. v. Katharsis 

LLC, No. CIV S-05-0545 (WBS) (JFM), 2006 WL 2545869, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2006); 

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(awarding statutory damages totaling $12,000.00 where defendants would have paid $3,401.71 

had they been licensed during the relevant time period)). 

Considering the amount of the license fees for $35,000 that Defendant avoided paying, the 

numerous warnings and notices by ASCAP of the unauthorized performances in violation of 

ASCAP’s members’ copyrights, and the need to deter similar conduct, the $60,000.00 in statutory 

damages is reasonable. Accordingly, the Court recommends granting an award of $60,000 in 

statutory damages. 

F. Attorneys’ Fees 

Finally, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of the attorneys’ fees and costs they have incurred 

in the prosecution of this copyright infringement action. Attorneys’ fees and costs are recoverable 

under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 505. 

In this case, Plaintiffs have submitted the Declaration of Sharon Mayo, which details the 

time spent and hourly rate of the lawyers and legal assistants who worked on the case. Mayo 

Decl., Dkt. No. 19-1. A total of 25.4 hours was spent, which includes time spent on the 

preparation of the complaint, the motion for entry of default, and the application for default 

judgment, for a total of $14,081.40. Mayo Decl., Ex. A. Plaintiffs also present a total of 

$1,244.43 in costs, including filing fees and the cost of serving defendant with the complaint and 

the notice of default. Id., Ex. B. In addition, Plaintiff estimates that they will likely incur another 

$1,336.50 in attorneys’ fees for the preparation for and attendance at the hearing on the Motion for 

Default Judgment. Mayo Decl. ¶ 16. 

The amount of time expended and the hourly rates charged appear reasonable. Therefore, 

the Court recommends granting the award of $15,417.90 in attorneys’ fees and $1,244.43 in costs. 

G. Interest on the Judgment 

The Court also recommends granting Plaintiffs’ request for interest on the judgment from 

the date of this judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends that the District Court grant 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment and enter Plaintiffs’ proposed order permanently 

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enjoining Defendants from publicly performing, or causing or permitting the public performance 

of, the music compositions identified in Exhibit A of the Complaint or any musical composition 

licensed through the ASCAP without license to so perform or have performed, and ordering 

Defendants to pay statutory damages to Plaintiffs in the amount of $60,000, and attorney’s fees 

and costs in the amount of $16,662.33. 

Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Dated: September 26, 2019 

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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