Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02413/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02413-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Terrell Barnes, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Dennis Smith, 

Respondent.

No. CV11-02413-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Petitioner Terrell Barnes has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 6. On March 9, 2012, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed Respondent FCI-Phoenix, and ordered the 

remaining Respondent, Warden Dennis Smith, to answer the petition. Doc. 7. 

Respondent filed an opposition to the petition (Doc. 12), and Petitioner filed a traverse to 

the opposition (Doc. 15). Petitioner also filed a motion to introduce newly available 

information (Doc. 13), a motion for discovery (Doc. 14), and a motion to compel 

discovery (Doc. 16). On May 16, 2012, Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey issued a report 

and recommendation (“R&R”) that the petition (Doc. 6) and three pending motions 

(Docs. 13, 14, 16) be denied. Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R (Doc. 18), 

Respondent filed a response to the objection (Doc. 19), and Petitioner filed a traverse to 

the response (Doc. 20). For the reasons that follow, the Court will accept the R&R and 

deny Petitioner’s motions. 

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I. Background. 

Petitioner is currently an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in 

Phoenix, Arizona. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Southern District of Texas of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine base pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846. See United States v. 

Farahkhan, 135 F.3d 140 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming convictions). On July 19, 1996, 

Petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent 240-month terms of imprisonment followed 

by ten years of supervised release. Id. Petitioner’s convictions and sentence were 

affirmed on direct appeal. Id. Petitioner’s motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

was denied. United States v. Barnes, No. 4:96CR00024 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2000). 

 Petitioner alleges the following. He was transferred to FCI Phoenix on August 19, 

2010, where he applied for the prison’s residential drug abuse treatment program 

(“RDAP”) and was placed on the waitlist. Doc. 6, at 3. On December 19, 2010, 

Petitioner was assigned to the RDAP unit. See id. On April 20, 2011, Petitioner filed a 

BP-8 (administrative remedy), requesting an explanation of a policy statement that 

impaired his ability to receive a 12-month reduction in his sentence for successful 

completion of RDAP. Doc. 6, at 19-20 (Ex. A). The response to Petitioner’s BP-8 

stated: 

When a position comes open in RDAP, the inmate from the RDAP wait list 

who is closest to release is placed into treatment. This is done in order to 

ensure that individuals have an opportunity to receive treatment prior to 

release. This means that some individuals will be on the wait list for 

extended periods of time as the wait list changes due to program interviews 

and movement in and out of the institution. While a person may be eligible 

for up to 12 months of sentence reduction for successfully completing 

RDAP, there is no guarantee they will receive the full 12 months. Due to 

capacity and institutional treatment needs, most often individuals do not 

begin participating in RDAP with enough time to complete 9 to 12 months 

of direct treatment in prison and 6 months of follow-up care in the 

community to receive the full 12 months of sentence reduction. This is an 

issue throughout the BOP (Bureau of Prisons) and efforts have been made 

to increase program capacity within the past several years. Just as every 

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individual who is determined eligible for RDAP treatment, you will be 

required to wait until there is space available and you are the closest to your 

PRD (projected release date) out of those on the wait list to begin treatment. 

Doc. 6, at 21 (Ex. A). 

 On May 10, 2011, Petitioner filed a BP-9 (administrative remedy) to Respondent, 

challenging RDAP’s policy for creating a disparity between short and long term inmates. 

Doc. 6, at 3, 23-25 (Ex. B). Specifically, Petitioner alleges that inmates sentenced to 

more than 37 months, including himself, do not receive the full 12-month reduction, 

while inmates sentenced to less than 37 months do. Doc. 6, at 24. Petitioner also alleges 

that although he has been on the RDAP wait list since December 21, 2010, and has been 

subject to RDAP requirements, he was not credited with sentence reduction, while other 

inmates were added to the wait list ahead of him and immediately began receiving 

sentence reduction credit. Id. On May 19, 2011, Respondent denied the grievance, 

stating in relevant part: 

Review of this matter revealed the institutional practice is to prioritize 

participation in RDAP based on the PRD of the individuals waiting to enter 

the program. This is done to ensure all individuals who qualify for RDAP 

treatment have an opportunity to receive treatment prior to release. As 

PRDs are not assigned by treatment staff, but are used to determine the 

placement of all candidates into the program, the use of this accepted 

practice is not influenced by prejudice or bias. Further, RDAP is currently 

at 100% capacity and has been since you were assigned to the unit. 

Doc. 6, at 26 (Ex. B). 

 Meanwhile, on May 16, 2011, Drug Abuse Program Coordinator M. Cortes issued 

a memorandum regarding RDAP Wait Treatment Readiness. Doc. 6, at 28 (Ex. C). 

Cortes stated that the use of the DAP Wait Treatment Plan/Agreement was being 

discontinued and that activities would be available to those waiting to enter RDAP on a 

voluntary, rather than a mandatory, basis. Id. Participation in treatment activities would 

not count toward the 500 treatment hours required to complete RDAP. Id. 

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On June 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a BP-11 Regional Administrative Remedy 

Appeal in which he again asserted violation of equal protection and argued that the 

May 16 memorandum breached the terms of the RDAP treatment plan. Doc. 6, at 31-32 

(Ex. D). Regional Director Robert E. McFadden denied relief, citing excerpts of Program 

Statement P5330.11, Psychology Treatment Programs. Doc. 6, at 33-34 (Ex. C). He 

explained that therapy credit was not available for merely living on the RDAP residential 

unit and abiding by unit rules. Id. On August 10, 2011, Petitioner filed a BP-11 Central 

Office Administrative Remedy Appeal. Doc. 6, at 35. Petitioner did not receive a 

response. See Doc. 6, at 4. 

 On January 20, 2012, Petitioner filed a § 2241 action alleging the Bureau of 

Prisons (“BOP”) (1) violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and Petitioner’s 

right to equal protection by arbitrarily using a sliding scale for inmate sentence reduction 

which results in a disparate impact among short and long term inmates, and by 

misapplying the sliding scale sentencing reduction (“SSSR”) toward long term “DAP 

wait/RDAP participants” without notice; and (2) arbitrarily expanding RDAP without 

crediting mandatory participation toward the official entrance date. Doc. 6, at 6, 13. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A party may file written objections to an R&R’s proposed findings and 

recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court must 

undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are 

made. See id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

III. Discussion. 

The APA provides a cause of action for persons “suffering legal wrong because of 

agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of 

a relevant statute,” 5 U.S.C. § 702, but withdraws that cause of action to the extent that 

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the relevant statute “preclude[s] judicial review” or the “agency action is committed to 

agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). Agency actions can be held unlawful when 

they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3621 governs imprisonment of persons convicted of federal 

crimes, and provides that BOP “shall make available appropriate substance abuse 

treatment for each prisoner the [BOP] determines has a treatable condition of substance 

addiction or abuse.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). The BOP must make available residential 

substance abuse treatment for eligible prisoners, id. § 3621(e)(1), and as an incentive for 

successful completion of RDAP, the BOP may reduce a prisoner’s sentence by up to one 

year, id. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Determining which prisoners are eligible to participate in 

RDAP is within the discretion of the BOP, id. § 3621(e)(5)(B), as is the decision to grant 

or deny eligible prisoners sentence reductions upon successful completion of the 

program, id. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Federal courts lack jurisdiction under the APA to review 

the BOP’s individualized RDAP determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621. 

Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Congress specified in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3625, entitled Inapplicability of the Administrative Procedure Act, that ‘[t]he 

provisions of sections 554 and 555 and 701 through 706 of [the APA] do not apply to the 

making of any determination, decision, or order under [18 U.S.C. §§ 3621-3625].’”) 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3625) (alterations in original). Judicial review remains available for 

allegations that BOP action is contrary to established federal law, violates the United 

States Constitution, or exceeds its statutory authority. Id.; see Close v. Thomas, 653 

F.3d 970, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner alleges that the manner in which BOP 

reduces sentences for short and long term inmates violates the Equal Protection Clause. 

Doc. 18, at 2. The petition is therefore within this Court’s jurisdiction. 

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A. APA Claim. 

 The R&R finds that “Petitioner’s claim with regard to the policies governing an 

inmate’s priority to be received into RDAP appears to be precluded” by Close v. Thomas, 

653 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011). Doc. 17, at 6. Close argued that the statutory phrase 

“proximity to release” in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) required that BOP give nonviolent 

offenders priority placement in RDAP to maximize the opportunity for a one-year 

sentence reduction upon successful completion of the program. Close, 653 F.3d at 974. 

The Ninth Circuit held that Congress had unambiguously directed BOP to provide RDAP 

services to eligible offenders “with priority . . . based on an eligible prisoner’s proximity 

to release date,” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(1)(C), as calculated by applying the definition of 

“date of release” in § 3624(a). Id. at 975. This conclusion was “buttressed by the fact 

that the early release at issue here is discretionary: ‘[t]he period a prisoner convicted of a 

nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program 

may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons[.]’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B)) 

(emphasis in original). 

 The R&R concludes, based on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Close, that there is no 

APA violation caused by the implementation of regulations and policies regarding 

inmates’ eligibility for RDAP and by BOP decisions regarding SSSR provisions. See 

Doc. 17, at 7. Petitioner does not dispute this conclusion. Doc. 18, at 3. The SSSR is an 

internal BOP guideline for awarding early release incentives, as outlined by Program 

Statement P5331.02. See Doc. 12, at 4; Fiscus v. Thomas, No. CV 10-910-MO, 2011 

WL 2174025 (D. Or. May 31, 2011). It “explains and clarifies the amount of time the 

BOP may be inclined to award to inmates depending on the length of their sentence.” 

Fiscus, 2011 WL 2174025, at *3. Internal guidelines may be altered by the BOP at will, 

and are not subject to the rigors of the APA, including public notice and comment. See 

Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1227; Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 For these reasons, Petitioner’s allegations that the BOP acted arbitrarily by using a 

sliding scale for inmate sentence reduction and failing to give proper notice, and that 

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BOP acted arbitrarily by expanding RDAP without crediting mandatory participation, fail 

under APA review. The Court will adopt the R&R with respect to Petitioner’s APA 

challenges. 

B. Due Process Claim. 

“A due process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognized liberty or property 

interest at stake.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995). Petitioner 

cannot prevail on a due process claim because inmates do not have a protected liberty 

interest in either RDAP participation or in the associated discretionary early release 

benefit. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) 

(holding that a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be released prior to the 

expiration of a valid sentence); Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d at 986 n.4 (holding that 18 

U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) does not create a due process liberty interest in a one-year 

sentence reduction). Petitioner concedes that he does not claim entitlement to a sentence 

reduction. Doc. 18, at 3. To the extent that Petitioner makes a due process claim (see 

Doc. 18, at 3), the Court will adopt the R&R’s analysis and reject that claim. 

C. Equal Protection Claim. 

 Petitioner seeks “judicial review of an inequity in sentence reductions between 

two newly identified suspect classes.” Doc. 18, at 4. He alleges an equal protection 

violation arising from “a combined method of calculation” – the improper application of 

the SSSR combined with the PRD to determine a RDAP participant’s eligible reduction 

of sentence – “which provides short term inmates unfair advantages over long term 

inmates.” Id. at 3-4. He argues that this advantage, ascertained through BOP’s method 

of calculation, is contrary to Congress’s intent for § 3612(e). Id. 

 The R&R relies on Reeb, in which the Ninth Circuit denied the petitioner’s equal 

protection claim because he did not “present any facts demonstrating that he was treated 

differently from others who were similarly situated to him.” See Doc. 17, at 8; Reeb, 636 

F.3d at 1229 n.4. Petitioner objects that his case is distinguishable from Reeb for three 

reasons: he has presented case samples (see Doc. 6, at 10-12), he argues the cumulative 

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effect of BOP’s improper calculations, and his circumstances affect a broader group with 

potential class action ramifications. Doc. 18, at 4. 

 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal 

government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 

347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954); McClean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Cf. Doc. 12, at 4. Equal protection claims are considered under a two-step analysis. 

First, petitioner must show that the statute in question “results in members of a certain 

group being treated differently from other persons based on membership in that group.” 

United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995). Proof of 

discriminatory intent is required to show that state action having a disparate impact 

violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 

Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). “Second, if it is demonstrated that a 

cognizable class is treated differently, the court must analyze under the appropriate level 

of scrutiny whether the distinction made between the groups is justified.” Lopez-Flores, 

63 F.3d at 1472. 

 Whether a described class of persons is sufficiently distinct and cognizable for 

equal protection is a question of fact. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “neither prisoners nor ‘persons convicted of crimes’ 

constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes.” United States v. Whitlock, 639 

F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court is not aware of any case that has recognized 

long term inmates, distinct from short term inmates, as a cognizable class. 

 Even if long term inmates were a cognizable class, Petitioner has not shown that 

BOP’s method of calculating sentence reductions results in long term inmates being 

treated differently from other inmates based on their membership in the class of long term 

inmates. On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(1) prioritizes inmates for RDAP based on their 

proximity to release date. Petitioner has not alleged that sentence reduction calculation 

methods are motivated by intent to discriminate against long term inmates. See Village of 

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. Petitioner has merely shown that RDAP inmates 

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receive different sentence reductions depending on the length of their original sentence. 

See Doc. 6, at 10-12. 

 Because Petitioner does not challenge rules that burden a fundamental right or 

target a suspect class, the BOP policy is valid as long as it survives the rational basis test, 

which accords a strong presumption of validity. See McLean, 173 F.3d at 1186; 

Whitlock, 639 F.3d at 941. A government policy is valid under the rational basis test if it 

is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 

U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Rodriguez v. Cook, 163 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 BOP has explained that its practice is to prioritize participation in RDAP based on 

the PRD of the inmates waiting to enter the program, and that “[t]his is done to ensure all 

individuals who qualify for RDAP treatment have an opportunity to receive treatment 

prior to release.” Doc. 6, at 26 (Ex. B). BOP admits that, as a result of this practice, 

“some individuals will be on the wait list for extended periods of time as the wait list 

changes due to program interviews and movement in and out of the institution,” and that 

“[d]ue to capacity and institutional treatment needs, most often individuals do not begin 

participating in RDAP with enough time . . . to receive the full 12 months of sentence 

reduction.” Doc. 6, at 21 (Ex. A). 

 The Court need not inquire whether BOP’s policy is the best way to manage its 

RDAP program because “rational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a 

license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Heller v. 

Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (citation omitted). The Court finds that BOP’s policy is 

rationally related to its legitimate interest in ensuring that qualifying inmates have an 

opportunity to receive treatment prior to release. The Court will deny Petitioner’s equal 

protection claim for the reasons in the R&R as well as those set forth above. 

IV. Conclusion. 

Petitioner has not established a violation of the APA or a violation of his 

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The Court therefore accepts the 

findings and recommendations in Judge Aspey’s R&R. 

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IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The factual findings and conclusions in Judge Aspey’s R&R (Doc. 17) are 

accepted. 

 2. Terrell Barnes’s petition for habeas corpus (Doc. 6) is denied. 

 3. The motion to introduce newly available information (Doc. 13), motion for 

discovery (Doc. 14), and motion to compel discovery (Doc. 16) are denied. 

 4. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 3rd day of July, 2012. 

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