Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02114/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02114-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Otis Eugene Bunn, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-2114-PHX-GMS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (the “Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which Petitioner challenges his

criminal convictions in Maricopa County, Arizona, Superior Court, Case No. CR2003-0233-

1-001 DT. (Doc. 1) Respondents have filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (the “Answer”) and Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Docs. 10, 12) Also pending is a

Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and Oral Argument, which will be addressed by separate

order filed simultaneously herewith. As explained below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge

recommends the Petition be denied as untimely. 

I. Background

A. Factual Summary

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this case as follows: 

On October 10, 2003, Enterprise Rental Car employee Antoine Samuel

drove to Bunn’s residence to retrieve the key for a rental car, a Toyota Echo.

Upon seeing Samuel approach the residence, Bunn got into the rental car.

Samuel approached the car and asked Bunn for the key. Bunn chose not to

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1

 The docket and page numbers cited here were generated by the Court’s case

management and electronic filing system. They do not reflect the pre-printed numbers on the

documents.

2

 The Honorable Michael D. Gordon presided over the trial and the Honorable John

R. Ditsworth presided over the sentencing.

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return the key, and instead placed the car in reverse and “nipped” Samuel’s

foot. Samuel then returned to his car to report to his manager.

While Samuel was seated in his car, Bunn rammed it. Samuel testified

he was scared of being pushed into oncoming traffic and being injured. Bunn

continued to ram Samuel’s car until it had been pushed out of the driveway.

When there was a sufficient opening onto the street, Bunn drove through it and

went to police headquarters.

Officer Cor responded to the radio call on October 10, 2003. Officer

Ferree arrived soon thereafter. Officer Cor spoke with Samuel, who was

parked in the street and then went to the police headquarters. At the police

headquarters, Officer Cor arrested Bunn and searched his property pursuant to

procedure. Officer Cor discovered two yellowish colored rocks in Bunn’s

wallet. Ms. Stump, a forensic scientist for the Phoenix crime laboratory, later

confirmed the rocks to be cocaine base.

(Doc. 10, Exhibit (“Exh.”) F at 47-48)1

B. Trial and Sentencing

A five-day jury trial was held in August and September 2006, after which the jury

found Petitioner guilty of one count of Assault, a Class One misdemeanor; one count of

Criminal Damage, a Class Six felony; and one count of Possession or Use of Narcotic Drugs,

a Class Four felony.2

 (Doc. 10, Exhs. A-C) Petitioner, who had two prior felony convictions,

was sentenced on June 27, 2008, to ten years in prison for the drug offense, a consecutive

term of 3.75 years for the criminal damage offense, and time served for the misdemeanor

assault. (Doc. 10, Exh. C)

C. Direct Review

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on July 14, 2008. (Doc. 10, Exh. D) Petitioner’s

appointed appellate counsel subsequently filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), stating that after

searching the record, he could find no arguable grounds for reversal to present. (Doc. 10,

Exh. F at 47) Petitioner then filed a Pro Per Supplemental Brief on May 18, 2009. (Doc. 10,

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Exh. E) On June 18, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision in

which it affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 10, Exh. F) The Court of

Appeals reviewed the record for reversible error and found none. (Id.) After the time expired

for Petitioner to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals issued an

Order and Mandate on August 12, 2009. (Doc. 10, Exh. G)

D. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

 On July 11, 2008, three days before filing his Notice of Appeal, Petitioner initiated

State post-conviction proceedings by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 10,

Exh. H) On October 8, 2008, the attorney appointed to represent Petitioner in the postconviction proceedings filed a Notice of Completion of Post Conviction Review by Counsel;

Request for Extension of Time to Allow Petitioner to File Pro Per Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 10, Exh. I, J) Counsel stated in the Notice of Completion that, after

reviewing the record and corresponding with Petitioner, she found no grounds for postconviction relief and no basis upon which to file a petition. (Doc. 10, Exh. J) Counsel further

requested that Petitioner be granted a 30-day extension of time to file his own postconviction petition. (Id.) On November 10, 2008, Petitioner filed a timely Pro Per

Supplement to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the trial court. (Doc. 11, Exh. L) After

briefing was completed, the trial court issued a ruling on July 28, 2009. (Doc. 11, Exh. N)

The trial court determined Petitioner raised no colorable claims for relief and, as a result,

denied the petition. (Id.) On August 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing and

Leave to Amend Rule 32 Petition. (Doc. 11, Exh. O) On November 24, 2009, the trial court

denied the Motion for Rehearing as untimely because it was not filed within fifteen days after

the ruling as required by Rule 32.9, Ariz.R.Crim.P. (Doc. 11, Exh. P)

On December 31, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Doc. 11, Exh. Q) The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Review on April

28, 2011, because Petitioner failed to file it “within 30 days of the trial court’s final decision

disposing of the petition for post-conviction relief proceedings,” as required by Rule 32.9(c),

Ariz. R. Crim. P. (Doc. 11, Exh. R) Petitioner then filed two Petitions for Review in the

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3

 According to a Deputy Clerk at the Arizona Supreme Court, the Court issued only

one denial of review despite Petitioner’s two Petitions for Review. It appears the Court

treated Petitioner’s second Petition for Review as an amended petition, resulting in the first

being superseded.

4

 The docket reflects the Petition was actually filed on October 5, 2012. (Doc. 1) The

August 3, 2012 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the Petition, doc. 1 at 34, and reflects

the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.

2 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner fails to explain the significant delay between when the Petition

was placed in the prison mailing system and its actual filing date.

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Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 11, Exhs. S, T) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review

on September 27, 2011. (Doc. 11, Exh. U)3

E. Federal Habeas Petition

On August 3, 2012, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

District Court.4

 (Doc. 1) Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in the Petition. In Ground

One, Petitioner alleges his trial counsel had a conflict of interest involving his representation

of another defendant who had an adversarial relationship to Petitioner. Petitioner contends

he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. In Ground Two, Petitioner

alleges the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process by failing to

hold an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief, which raised his

counsel’s alleged conflict of interest. Petitioner alleges in Ground Three the trial court

violated his right to due process by improperly determining his motion for rehearing

regarding the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief was untimely and denying it.

In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the pre-trial and

trial stages of his case. On December 19, 2012, Respondents filed their Answer and

supporting exhibits. (Docs. 10, 11) Petitioner then filed his Reply on January 18, 2013.

(Doc. 12) 

II. Discussion

Respondents argue the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred because it was not

filed within the applicable statute of limitations period. Alternatively, Respondents contend

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 The AEDPA, which was signed into law on April 24, 1996, governs federal habeas

petitions filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327

(1997).

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Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. Because the information presented clearly

establishes the Petition was filed after the limitations period expired, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge finds the Petition is barred and recommends it be denied on that basis. It

is, therefore, unnecessary to address Respondents’ alternative argument.

A. Legal Standards

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)5

 imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An application for post-conviction relief remains

“pending” for purposes of the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) until it achieves final

resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedure. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

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219-220 (2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state

court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921,

925 (9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of postconviction relief is filed even though the petition itself may not be filed until later. Isley v.

Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that

Isley’s state petition was “pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and he was

entitled to tolling from the date when the Notice was filed. The district court erred in

dismissing his petition as untimely.”).

State post-conviction petitions rejected as untimely by the state court are not “properly

filed” under § 2244(d)(2), and do not toll the statute of limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as

untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under §

2244(d)(2).”). “When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end

of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

The AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner

must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way” that prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis

1. Limitations Period

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals, on direct review, affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences on June 18, 2009. (Doc. 10, Exh. F) Petitioner then had thirty

days to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (petition

for review to the Arizona Supreme Court must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the

decision by the Court of Appeals). As a result of Petitioner’s failure to seek review in the

Arizona Supreme Court, his convictions became final upon the expiration of the time to seek

review, which was July 20, 2009. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495

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F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (direct appeal was final on the date the petitioner allowed

his time to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court to expire). Thus, absent any tolling,

the AEDPA’s statute of limitations period would have started to run the next day, on July 21,

2009. 

Petitioner, however, had filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on July 11, 2008,

which was still pending on July 21, 2009, thus tolling the limitations period. The limitations

period remained tolled for only one week, however, until July 28, 2009, the date the trial

court denied the Petitioner’s post-conviction petition. Neither Petitioner’s Motion for

Rehearing in the trial court nor his Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals

further tolled the limitations period because they were rejected as untimely. See Pace, 544

U.S. at 417 (“Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was

not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”) Thus, the

limitations period began to run the day after the trial court denied his post-conviction

petition, on July 29, 2009, because no application for post-conviction relief was “pending”

at that time. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1077 (after denial

of review by the Arizona Supreme Court, “nothing remained ‘pending’ for purposes of §

2244(d)(2).”); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 334 (2007) (“When the state courts have

issued a final judgment on a state [post-conviction] application, it is no longer pending even

if a prisoner has additional time for seeking review of that judgment through a petition for

certiorari.”) The limitations period ran uninterrupted until it expired one year later on July

29, 2010. Petitioner filed his Petition in this District Court on August 3, 2012, more than two

years after the limitations period expired. Consequently, the Petition is untimely.

Although Respondents also conclude the Petition is barred by the statute of

limitations, they mistakenly contend Petitioner’s “convictions and sentences became final on

August 27, 2009, upon the expiration of the 30 days provided by Rule 32.9(c), Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure, for filing petitions for review from the trial court’s July 28, 2009,

denial of his PCR petition.” (Doc. 10 at 6) Respondents cite two cases in support, neither of

which stands for the proposition they are asserting. (See id.)

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Respondents are confusing the analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) and the

statutory tolling analysis under § 2244(d)(2). Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the issue is when the

judgment became final. That occurs at “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In the instant case, as noted

above, the judgment became final on July 20, 2009, upon the expiration of Petitioner’s time

to seek review of his direct appeal in the Arizona Supreme Court. The statutory tolling

provision, on the other hand, tolls the limitations period during the time a properly filed state

post-conviction petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Respondents mistakenly

considered “the expiration of the time for seeking such review” in their analysis of how long

the limitations period was tolled, even though that consideration only applies in the context

of determining when the judgment became final. See Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1074

(recognizing distinction between standard for determining when an application for postconviction relief is “pending” under § 2244(d)(2) and for determining when direct review

was final under § 2244(d)(1)(A)); Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-220 (an application for postconviction relief remains “pending” for purposes of the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) only

until it achieves final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedure). Thus,

although their ultimate conclusion is correct, Respondents’ determination of when the

limitations period began to run is not.

2. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner argues in one of his grounds for relief, and in his Reply, that the trial court

failed to give him timely notice of its July 28, 2009 decision denying his petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. 1 at 23; Doc. 12 at 2) Thus, he claims the trial court’s subsequent

denial of his Motion for Rehearing as untimely was improper. Petitioner’s contention will

be construed as a request to apply equitable tolling.

As referenced above, the limitations period set forth in § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling where a petitioner shows he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that

extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition. Holland, 130 S.Ct.

at 2562. Equitable tolling is applied sparingly, as reflected by the “extraordinary

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circumstances” requirement. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.

2009). Equitable tolling is not available in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”) (citation omitted). An “external

force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely ‘oversight,

miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part.’” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at

1011(quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)). A pro se petitioner’s

ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication do not constitute “extraordinary

circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006) (collecting cases from other circuits and holding that “a pro se petitioner’s lack

of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance”); see also Johnson v.

United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (in the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 context, rejecting

movant/prisoner’s attempt to justify his lack of diligence on his pro se status and lack of legal

sophistication and stating: “we have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural

ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for

promptness”); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n. 4 (“a pro se petitioner’s confusion or

ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling”), cert. denied,

558 U.S. 897 (2009). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of demonstrating

it is warranted in his case. Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing, inter

alia, Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562).

Here, Petitioner has failed to show extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and

prevented him from filing a timely petition. Even if this Magistrate Judge accepted as true

Petitioner’s self-serving assertion that he did not receive timely notice of the trial court’s

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, that would only excuse his failure to file a

timely Motion for Rehearing. As referenced above, however, the Arizona Court of Appeals

rejected his Petition for Review as untimely, not because the Motion for Rehearing to the

trial court was late, but because Petitioner failed to file his Petition for Review within thirty

days of the trial court’s denial of the Motion for Rehearing. (Doc. 10, Exh. R) Petitioner

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does not allege he received untimely notice of the trial court’s denial of his Motion for

Rehearing. Thus, at best, if Petitioner’s untimely Motion for Rehearing was excused, the

limitations period would have been tolled an additional four months, until November 24,

2009, the date the trial court denied the Motion for Rehearing. Because the habeas Petition

was untimely by more than two years, four months of additional tolling would not make a

material difference. Petitioner has alleged no other basis to apply equitable tolling. 

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner filed the Petition after

the limitations period expired. Additionally, equitable tolling, even if it applied here, would

not toll the limitations period enough to render the Petition timely. Consequently, the Petition

is barred by the AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 1, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

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undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

DATED this 11th day of October, 2013.

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