Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01222/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01222-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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FILED 

AUG 1 2 1011 I 

CLERK, u.s. DISTRICT COU"T 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT O~ blliOMNIA 

BY D .. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BACKCOUNTRY AGAINST DUMPS; et 

aI., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

JIM ABBOTT; et aI., 

Defendants. 

CASE NO. 10-cv-1222 BEN (BGS) 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 

MOTION FOR INJUNCTION 

PENDING APPEAL 

[Docket No. 185] 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from the "Sunrise Powerlink Project," a I 17-mile transmission line projected 

to run Northwest from Imperial County to San Diego County, in California. As approved, the 

transmission line, which is supported by massive towers except for an underground segment in Alpine, 

runs along the Final Environmentally-Superior Southern Route. Plaintiffs Backcountry Against 

Dumps, The Protect Our Communities Foundation, East County Community Action Coalition, and 

Donna Tisdale seek to preserve the serene rural community in East San Diego County. 

On February 16, 20I 0, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court, challenging decisions by 

two federal agencies, specifically the Bureau ofLand Management ("BLM") and the Fish and Wildlife 

Service ("FWS"). According to Plaintiffs, these decisions were critical to the approval and 

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development of the Sunrise Powerlink. (Docket No.1.) SDGE intervened on the grounds that it is 

building the $1.9 billion transmission line. The operative complaint is the First Amended Complaint, 

filed on November 5, 2010. (Docket No.4!.) 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated several federal statutes, including the National 

Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70; Federal Land Policy Management Act, 43 U.S.C. 

§§ 1701-87; Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44; and National Historic 

Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq. Plaintiffs challenge several stages ofthe environmental 

review process by the BLM and FWS. With respect to the BLM, Plaintiffs challenge the Record of 

Decision ("ROD") dated January 20, 2009. (Docket No. 50-1, at 1-2.) The ROD was based on an 

October 2008 Final Environmental Impact Statement ("BIS") and granted two Rights-of-Way to 

facilitate the Sunrise Powerlink Project. (AR:A:722; A:1052.) Plaintiffs also challenge the BLM's 

resource management plan ("RNIP") of October 2008. (AR:A:1051.) With respect to the FWS, 

Plaintiffs challenge its Biological Opinion ofJanuary 2009. (Docket No. 50-1, at 6,22.) 

Prior to filing this lawsuit, on March 25,2009, Plaintiffs had appealed the BLM's ROD to the 

Interior Board ofLand Appeals ("IBLA") and sought a stay. (AR:A:586; A:592.) On July 14,2009, 

the IBLA denied the stay. (AR:A:403.) Although Plaintiffs contend that the IBLA was then divested 

ofjurisdiction (First Am. CompI. ~~ 31-32), on May 14,2010, while this action was pending in district 

court, the IBLA issued its decision affirming the ROD. (Docket No. 52, at 6.) 

Plaintiffs, Defendants, and SDGE filed motions for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 50,53, 

56.) On June 30, 2011, the Court granted Defendants' Motion for summary judgment, and denied both 

Plaintiffs' and SDGE's motions for summary judgment as moot. The Court also denied Plaintiffs' 

motion for preliminary injunction as moot. Plaintiffs appealed (1) the order denying Plaintiffs' motion 

for a preliminary injunction as moot, and (2) the order granting the Defendants' motion for summary 

judgment and denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion 

for injunctive relief in the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals, which was denied without prejudice to its 

renewal following presentation to the District Court. 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. In conjunction 

with this Motion, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for Briefing and Hearing of 

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Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal ("Ex Parte Motion"). (Docket No. 186.) In the Ex 

Parte Motion, Plaintiffs Backcountry Against Dumps, The Protect Our Communities Foundation, East 

County Community Action Coalition, and Donna Tisdale requested that the Court "direct[] that 

plaintiffs' Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal be decided on the papers without a hearing," i. e., 

that the hearing be cancelled. (Docket No. 186, at 1.) Neither Defendants nor SDOE opposed the 

request to vacate the hearing. The Court granted the Ex Parte Motion in part, scheduling a hearing for 

August 12,2011. The Court then vacated the hearing pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1.d because (1) 

Plaintiffs extensively briefed the issues not only in the present Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, 

but also in their previous Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 50) and Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction (Docket No. 121), and (2) Plaintiffs Backcountry Against Dumps, The Protect Our 

Communities Foundation, East County Community Action Coalition, and Donna Tisdale requested 

that the hearing be vacated. 

DISCUSSION 

According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), "While an appeal is pending from an 

interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may 

suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the 

opposing party's rights." Rule 62(c), however, "does not restore jurisdiction to the district court to 

adjudicate anew the merits ofthe case." Natural Res. De! Council, Inc. v. Sw. Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 

1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the 

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence ofpreliminary relief, that the balance 

of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. 

De! Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,20 (2008). 

An injunction pending appeal is "not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might 

otherwise result." Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Instead, an injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 

the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 21. The determination whether to grant an 

injunction is "an exercise ofjudicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the 

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circumstances ofthe particular case." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1760 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Furthermore, there is no presumption that an injunction should issue, even in environmental cases. 

The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane) ("Our law does not ... 

allow us to abandon a balance of harms analysis just because a potential environmental injury is at 

issue."), overruled in part on other grounds by Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, as recognized by Am. Trucking 

Ass 'ns, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); id. ("[W]e decline to adopt 

a rule that any potential environmental injury automatically merits an injunction, particularly where 

... the plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims."). 

I. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS 

The Court will only consider the arguments raised by Plaintiffs that directly challenge the 

findings ofthe June 30 Order, as these arguments are dispositive. 

A. The BLM's Record of Decision and Environmental Impact Statement 

In the June 30 Order, the Court found that it could not determine the merits ofthe complaint 

because Plaintiffs failed to challenge the final agency action. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the 

ROD and EIS, rather than the IBLA's decision after appeal affirming the BLM's ROD and EIS. 

Accordingly, the Court found that Plaintiffs' claims based on the ROD and EIS failed as a matter 

oflaw. 

Plaintiffs argue that "[t]his Court's interpretation of 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.21(a)(3) and 4.403 

contradicts well-settled Ninth Circuit precedent and the plain language of BLM's regulations by 

holding that IBLA' s May 2010 dismissal ofPlaintiffs' appeal, issued months after this action was filed 

on February 16,2010, trumped this Court's extant jurisdiction over BLM's ROD." (PI. Mot. at 6.) 

Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that "[w ]hen IBLA failed to grant a stay, it forfeited jurisdiction. BLM's 

ROD then became the final agency action. Because under BLM's regulations its ROD was no longer 

inoperative, plaintiffs were therefore free to challenge that ROD in federal court." (Id.) In support 

of this proposition, Plaintiffs cite National Parks & Conservation Association v. Bureau ofLand 

Management, 606 F .3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010), Desert Citizens Against AirPollution v. Bisson, 231 F.3d 

1172 (9th Cir. 2000), Centerfor Biological Diversity v. u.s. Department ofInterior, 255 F. Supp. 2d 

1030 (D. Ariz. 2003), and Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993). 

As the Court explained in the June 30 Order, these cases are inapposite. Centerfor Biological 

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Diversity, National Parks, and Desert Citizens present different factual circumstances. In those cases, 

the IDLA entered a final decision and the plaintiffs challenged that decision. Those circumstances are 

not present here. Unlike the plaintiffs in Biological Diversity, Plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend 

their complaint when the IDLA issued its final decision, insisting instead that they need not do so. (See 

Docket Nos. 67, 84, 85 in Center for Biological Diversity v. u.s. Dep 't ofInterior, Case No. 01-CV1758 ROS, United States District Court for the District ofArizona.) In addition, Darby does not stand 

for the proposition that once an agency decides to award intermediate relief, further exhaustion of 

remedies is not required. Rather, Darby held that "[w]hen an aggrieved party has exhausted all 

administrative remedies expressly prescribed by statute or agency rule, the agency action is final for 

the purposes of [§ 10(c) of the APA] and therefore subject to judicial review [under § 10(a) ofthe 

APA]." Darby, 509 U.S. at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. BLM's Resource Management Plan 

In the June 30 Order, the Court found that the RMP is not a final agency action and, therefore, 

not reviewable by this Court. Specifically, the Court noted that the RMP is a regional land 

management plan for East San Diego County, because it describes the goals, objectives, and 

management plans for the project, rather than authorizes specific activity. The Court could not 

determine what impact results from the RMP without knowing specifically what permits will be made 

or granted in the future and what remedial programs will be imposed to fight the impact. As further 

review and permits are required for any action, the RMP did not mark the consummation of the 

agency's decision-making process, nor did it determine the rights or obligations of any party. 

In the June 30 Order, the Court relied on Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 

U.S. 55, 65 (2004), for the proposition that "Courts have found that resource management plans 

challenging a discrete final agency action that authorize site-specific activities are reviewable by this 

Court; however, programmatic challenges to a plan as a whole are not." (June 30 Order, at 6.) 

Plaintiffs argue that Norton is inapplicable to the present case because "in that case plaintiffs 

challenged BLM's inaction in failing to curtail off-road vehicle use ofwilderness study areas. Here, 

by contrast, BLM took final agency action to allow massive, tangible development of federal lands." 

(PI. Mot. at 8.) As stated in the June 30 Order, to be reviewable by this Court, the RMP must be a 

"final agency action" for purposes ofthe Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 

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704. Section 551(13) defines "agency action" to include ''the whole or a part ofan agency rule, order, 

license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." Agency action, therefore, 

includes both acts and failures to act. This distinction does not alter the rule that a plaintiff may 

challenge only "discrete agency action[s]," while "broad programmatic attack[s]" are precluded. 

Norton, 542 U.S. at 64; see also Ohio Forestry Ass 'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 734 (1998). 

In addition, Plaintiffs cite Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Us. Bureau of Land 

Management, 625 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010), Friends ofYosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789 (9th 

Cir. 2003), Kern v. Us. Bureau ofLand Management, 284 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), and California 

Wilderness Coalition v. Us. Department ofEnergy, 631 F .3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2001), for the proposition 

that courts may review federal agency land use plans that allow development. These cases, however, 

are inapposite. Oregon Natural Desert Association, Kern, and California Wilderness Coalition all 

involve circumstances in which the agency failed to issue an EIS or give any consideration to the 

impacts ofa RMP. See Or. Natural Desert Ass 'n, 625 F.3d at 1103 (BLM "explicitly disclaimed any 

general obligation to analyze the impacts ofits Plan on wilderness values, or to consider management 

options for areas with those values, and took no action contrary to that statement"); Kern, 284 F.3d 

at 1078 (proposed RMP did not contain an "EIS analyzing the impact ofreasonably foreseeable future 

timber sales within the Coos Bay District"); Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1096-11 06 (agency 

failed to issue an EIS or an Environmental Assessment). Such is not the case here. In addition, Norton 

is similarly inapplicable. That case discussed when "NEPA requires a full evaluation of site-specific 

impacts," and found that the CMP's EIS contained sufficient specific data and information for the 

CMP to be prepared as a programmatic document Norton, 348 F.3d at 801. Whether the RMP was 

properly prepared as a programmatic document is not at issue here. 

C. Plaintiffs' Claims Based on FWS' Biological Opinion 

The June 30 Order found that Plaintiffs' claims challenging the January 2009 biological 

opinion based on the deferral ofspecies surveys and FWS' Incidental Take Statement were moot. The 

Court also found that Plaintiffs' claims based on the scope of the biological opinion lacked merit 

because Plaintiffs failed to establish that FWS must consider "connected" projects in its biological 

opinion. Plaintiffs did not challenge these findings of the Court. Accordingly, the Court will not 

address these findings here. Overall, Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. 

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II. LIKELIHOOD OF IRREPARABLE HARM 

As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree about whether there is a presumption of 

irreparable harm in environmental cases. In support of the proposition that irreparable harm is 

presumed, Plaintiffs cite AllianceJor the WildRockiesv. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Although it is true that "[t] he Supreme Court has instructed us that environmental injury, by its nature, 

can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long 

duration, i.e., irreparable," "this does not mean that any potential environmental injury warrants an 

injunction." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, Plaintiffs argue that "[i]rreparable 

damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a 

proposed action." (PI. Reply at 4 (quoting Save Our Ecosys. v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 

1984)).) Here, however, the Court has not found that the agency failed to thoroughly evaluate the 

environmental impact of Sunrise Powerlink. 

Plaintiffs argue that their "use of the federal lands along the Powerlink route, including the 

McCain Valley, will be irreparably harmed by Powerlink." (PI. Mot. at 2.) Plaintiffs note that 

"BLM's FEIS admits that the Project will have at least 41 'significant, unmitigable impacts' to 

environmental resources." (Id. (quoting AR:A:1052:42107-08, 42171, 45803-06).) The EIS' 

identification ofsignificant and unmitigable impacts, however, are not per se irreparable harms. See 

McNair, 537 F.3d at 1005 ("declin[ing] to adopt a rule that any potential environmental injury 

automatically merits an injunction"). 

In addition, Plaintiffs list several specific injuries that they argue will result from the 

construction of Sunrise Powerlink. First, Plaintiffs argue that Sunrise Powerlink will "destroy the 

majestic wildlands and visual splendor of the McCain Valley's unparalleled desert beauty" and 

"degrade the extraordinary scenery, spiritual and cultural value, and recreational use of the nearby 

Carrizo Gorge Wilderness Area, Table Mountain Area of Critical Environmental Concern, Coyote 

Mountains Wilderness Area, Jacumba Wilderness Area, and Yuha Desert." (PI. Mot. at 3.) In fact, 

Sunrise Powerlink avoids the federally designated Wilderness Areas, and does not pass through the 

Table Mountain Area of Critical Environmental Concern. (Woldemariam Decl. ~~ 32,33.) Sunrise 

Powerlink does pass through the Yuha Desert, but only within a federally designated energy corridor, 

co-located with Southwest Powerlink. (Id. 31, Exh. 3.) As for visual impacts ofSunrise Powerlink, 

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the area already contains marunade structures, such as Southwest Powerlink, Interstate 8 (a four-lane 

highway), three mining districts, and a right-of-way for wind energy site testing and monitoring. 

(AR:A:1445:59440,59442.) 

Second, Plaintiffs argue that Sunrise Powerlink will "cut through thousands of acres of 

designated Critical Habitat of the Peninsular bighorn sheep," "slice through 39 acres of designated 

Critical Habitat of the endangered Quino checkerspot butterfly," and "encroach on 122 acres of 

proposed Critical Habitat for the endangered Arroyo toad, 168 acres managed for the flat-tailed Homed 

lizard, and 743 acres ofsensitive vegetative communities, and impact 9 golden eagle nests." (PI. Mot. 

at 3.) Plaintiffs exaggerate this alleged harm to the environment. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

has found that Sunrise Powerlink will not jeopardize the Quino checkerspot butterfly, arroyo toad, or 

Peninsular bighorn sheep, or destroy or adversely modify their designated critical habitat. (2010 BiOp 

[Docket No. 55], at 81-120.) The FWS also found that Sunrise Powerlink is not likely to jeopardize 

the continued existence ofthe flat-tailed homed lizard. (Id at 120-34.) Sunrise Powerlink will in fact 

impact 266 acres on BLM land. (Colton Decl. 119.) Lastly, there are in fact three Golden Eagle nests 

on BLM land, two ofthose within 4,000 feet of where Sunrise Powerlink will be located. (Id 140.) 

Third, Plaintiffs argue that Sunrise Powerlink will "create severe wildfire hazards by impeding 

fire suppression." (PI. Mot. at 3.) The BLM does acknowledge that Sunrise Powerlink entails wildfire 

and fire suppression risks. (See, e.g., AR:A:I052:46320, 46473,46793.) On the other hand, fire risks 

assume a strung and energized line, which will not occur until mid-2012. (Shreve Decl. 113 [Docket 

No. 159].) The Ninth Circuit is expected to resolve Plaintiffs' appeal by this time, which moots this 

concern for an injunction pending appeal. 

Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that Sunrise Powerlink will "destabilize steep slopes and trigger erosion 

and permanent loss of vegetation." (PI. Mot. at 4.) The FEIS, however, addresses impacts to water 

resources, including erosion and sedimentation, and outlines mitigation measures that will reduce such 

impacts to levels that are less than significant. (AR:A: 1052:46753,46754.) Overall, the Court finds 

that some environmental harm is likely to result ifan injunction is not issued pending appeal, although 

not to the extent that Plaintiffs claim. 

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III. BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 

Plaintiffs argue that the balance ofequities and the public interest favor granting an injunction 

pending appeal because (1) Sunrise Powerlink will cause environmental injury, (2) SDGE "will not 

experience a shortfall of transmission capacity if Sunrise [Powerlink] is delayed or never built," (3) 

"[ e ]njoining Powerlink would not prevent development of less impactful renewable energy," and (4) 

SDGE "can obtain full recovery of all abandoned costs related to the Powerlink." (PI. Mot. at 4 

(internal quotation marks omitted).) In their Reply, Plaintiffs also argue that it is in the public interest 

to ensure that BLM complied with the requirements ofNEPA before the project continues forward. 

First, the harm to the environment that Plaintiffs argue will result has been discussed above. 

Second, in regards to providing electricity, Plaintiffs argue that SDGE will not experience a shortfall 

of transmission capacity if Sunrise Powerlink is delayed, Sunrise Powerlink will create a power 

surplus, and the additional generation from Sunrise Powerlink is not needed until 2020 at the earliest, 

citing Powers' Declaration, ~~ 3, 4-19. Mr. Powers' arguments, however, were rejected by the 

California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC"). (Strack Decl. ~~ 13-18,25.) The CPUC found that 

Sunrise Powerlink will be needed to ensure reliable delivery of electricity to the San Diego area "by 

2014 and perhaps sooner given the many uncertainties inherent in" its analytical model. 

(AR:A:789:39550, 39552.) 

Third, in regards to the development of renewable energy, "[Sunrise Powerlink] ... will 

facilitate the development of renewable resources, thus advancing state policy to reduce GHG 

emissions." (AR:A:789:39552; see also A:789:39274 ("[A]pproval of [Sunrise Powerlink] will help 

to unlock the potential of one ofthe richest renewable energy regions in California."); A:722:38464; 

Strack Decl. 39-48.) Plaintiffs' argument to the contrary was also rejected by the CPUC. (See Strack 

Decl. ~ 25.) The development of renewable energy is a national energy priority. See Energy Policy 

Act of2005, Pub. L. 109-58, § 211, 119 Stat. 594, 660 (2005) (requiring 10,000 MW of renewable 

energy on public land by 2015). 

Fourth, in regards to BLM's compliance with NEPA, it is true that "Congress's determination 

in enacting NEPA was that the public interest requires careful consideration ofenvironmental impacts 

before major federal projects may go forward." S. Fork Bank Council ofW. Shoshone ofNev. v. u.s. 

Dep't ofthe Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 728 (9th Cir. 2009). In South Fork Bank Council, however, the 

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plaintiffs "show[ ed] a likelihood ofsuccess on the NEP A claims because there was inadequate study 

ofthe serious effects of processing refractory ore and exhausting scarce water resources." Id. Such 

is not the case here. 

The completion of Sunrise Powerlink has additional benefits. "[Sunrise Powerlink] will 

generate over $115 million per year in net benefits" to consumers in the form ofreduced energy costs. 

(AR:A:789:39552; A:568:35836, 35837; A:I052:42443.) Plaintiffs' argument that money would be 

saved if Sunrise Powerlink were not built has already been rejected by the CPUC. (See Strack Decl. 

~, 49-53, 60.) Furthermore, additional delay would increase the costs of constructing Sunrise 

Powerlink by $16 to 22 million per month (Woldemariam Decl. ~~ 84-92; Colton Decl. ~ 45). In 

addition, SDGE has already employed 450 to 500 people to construct Sunrise Powerlink, and plans 

to employ 650 to 700 people at the peak of construction. (Woldemariam Decl. ~ 84.) Maintaining 

jobs is in the public interest. See McNair, 537 F.3d at 1005. 

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not consider economic harm when deciding whether 

injunctive relief is appropriate, citing Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), 

Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988), and Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 

(9th Cir. 1975). In Parker, the court found that the defendants did not comply with federal 

environmental law because the region at issue was not included in the study report to the President and 

Congress. Parker, 309 F. Supp. at 601. Such is not the case here. In addition, Hodel and Morton 

instruct agencies to not consider a party's preexisting investments when approving an EIS; they do not 

instruct courts to not consider economic harm when determining whether to issue an injunction. See 

Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1157; Morton, 527 F.2d at 798. On the contrary, courts may consider economic 

harm when determining whether to grant injunctive relief. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 

F.3d 462, 475 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Economic harm may indeed be a factor in considering the balance of 

equitable interests."); McNair, 537 F.3d at 1005 (balance of harms did not tip in environmental 

organization's favor where a Forest Service project would "further the public's interest in aiding the 

struggling local economy and preventing job loss"). Overall, Plaintiffs have not shown that the 

balance of equities and public interest favor granting an injunction pending appeal. 

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IV. OVERALL BALANCE OF HARMS ANALYSIS 

The Court finds that some environmental harm is likely to result ifan injunction is not issued 

pending appeal. The Court also finds, however, that Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to 

succeed on the merits or that the balance of equities and the public interest favor granting an 

injunction. Accordingly, the overall balance of harms analysis does not favor granting Plaintiffs an 

injunction pending appeal. See McNair, 537 F.3d at 1005 ("[W]e decline to adopt a rule that any 

potential environmental injury automatically merits an injunction, particularly where ... the plaintiffs 

are not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims."). 

CONCLUSION 

F or the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Inj unction Pending Appeal is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August I~ 2011 

T BENITEZ 

.'t!IiJj~s...t:J strict Court Judge 

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