Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00258/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00258-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY BURCIAGA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

MARTIN D. BITER, Warden, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:12-cv—00258-LJO-SKO-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE:

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THE PETITION (DOCS. 8, 9, 1)

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Rules 302 and 304. Pending before the Court is Respondent’s

motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that as to some of

the claims in the petition, Petitioner failed to exhaust his

state court remedies. The motion was filed on May 7, 2012, but

the proof of service submitted with the motion was defective. 

(Doc. 8-1.) An amended declaration of service by mail was filed

on May 14, 2012, which reflected that on the same date,

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Respondent mailed the motion to Petitioner at his address as

listed in the docket. (Doc. 9.) Although the time period for

the filing of opposition to the motion has passed, no opposition

to the motion has been filed.

I. Proceeding by Way of a Motion to Dismiss 

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d

1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997).

A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a state court only on the ground that the custody is in violation

of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28

U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. –, -, 131 S.Ct. 13,

16 (2010) (per curiam). 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) allows a district

court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face

of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” 

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file motions to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 4 instead of answers if the motion to

dismiss attacks the pleadings by claiming that the petitioner has

failed to exhaust state remedies or has violated the state’s

procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418,

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate a motion to dismiss

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a petition for failure to exhaust state remedies). Further, a

respondent may file a motion to dismiss after the Court orders

the respondent to respond, and the Court should use Rule 4

standards to review a motion to dismiss filed before a formal

answer. See, Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(C.D.Cal. 1982).

In this case, upon being directed to respond to the petition

by way of answer or motion, Respondent filed the motion to

dismiss. The material facts pertinent to the motion are

contained in the pleadings and in copies of the official records

of state judicial proceedings which have been provided by the

parties, and as to which there is no factual dispute. The Court

will therefore review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to

its authority under Rule 4.

II. Background 

Petitioner filed his petition on February 23, 2012. 

Petitioner, an inmate of Kern Valley State Prison, is serving a

sentence of life without parole and twenty-five years to life

pursuant to his conviction of first degree murder in May 2008 in

the Madera County Superior Court. Petitioner alleged the

following claims in the petition: 1) because Petitioner was

arrested without probable cause, all resulting evidence should

have been suppressed, including an overly suggestive in-field or

“show-up” identification; 2) the trial court erred in not

instructing the jury on lesser included offenses; 3) trial

counsel, who was being treated with harsh chemotherapy, committed

unprofessional errors, such as admitting guilt in the courtroom

in front of the jury, which affected the outcome of the

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proceedings; and 4) cumulative trial errors (the first three

grounds) warranted reversal. (Pet., doc. 1, 4-5.)

Although Respondent agrees that Petitioner presented some of

his claims to the California Supreme Court, Respondent moves to

dismiss the petition contending that the petition contains some

claims as to which state court remedies have not been exhausted,

and must be dismissed as a mixed petition. Respondent contends

that in the petition filed in the California Supreme Court,

Petitioner did not raise either the inadmissibility of the infield identification or cumulative error. 

Documents submitted in support of the motion show that in

his petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court,

Petitioner argued that his arrest was not supported by probable

cause, his detention or arrest was impermissibly prolonged, his

confession was involuntary and thus improperly admitted, the

failure to instruct on lesser included offenses of second degree

murder and involuntary manslaughter violated Petitioner’s rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment, and counsel’s pursuit of an

untenable theory of defense was ineffective assistance of counsel

in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution because a better alternative existed. (LD 3, 2.)1

In the argument portion of the petition for review, one of

the specific argument headings was as follows: 

REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED TO DETERMINE IF THE FACTORS

CITED BY THE COURT OF APPEAL WERE SUFFICIENT TO 

ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST OR IF THE EVIDENCE

OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE ARREST MUST BE SUPPRESSED

BECAUSE THE ARREST VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.

“LD” refers to documents lodged by Respondent in support of the motion

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to dismiss.

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(Id. at 4.) In the text of the argument under this heading, no

mention was made of the in-field identification. (Id. at 4-9.) 

The next argument heading appearing in the petition concerned

whether Petitioner’s statements to police during his detention or

arrest were involuntarily obtained. (Id. at 9.) In the course

of argument under this heading, Petitioner contended that the

fruits of an illegal arrest or detention may not be used as

evidence unless the information obtained was sufficiently

attenuated. (Id. at 9-10.) However, the only evidence or fruits

that were mentioned in the course of the text of the argument

were Petitioner’s confessions to police. (Id. at 10-11.) No

further mention was made of either the propriety of the detention

or arrest or the admissibility of any fruits thereof. (Id. at

11-30.) There was also no mention of cumulative error in the

petition for review. 

A check of the official website of the California courts

confirms Respondent’s assertion that Petitioner has not filed any

state court habeas petitions.

III. Analysis 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

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A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

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court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001).

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

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claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, Petitioner did not separately set forth the facts of

the case in his petition for review. He instead adopted the

statement of facts set forth in the CCA’s decision, which

detailed the circumstances of the in-field identification in the

course of addressing the claim that it was suggestive. (LD 3, 3;

LD 2, 5-6, 15-16.) However, Petitioner did not expressly argue

that the identification was inadmissible in the petition. Thus,

he did not directly present the issue to the California Supreme

Court.

In the absence of a clear, strategic choice to forego

presentation of a federal issue, a petitioner has “fairly

presented” a claim not named in a petition if it is “sufficiently

related” to an exhausted claim. Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d

1019, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374

F.3d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that by exhausting his

procedural due process challenge in his state court petition, the

petitioner had fairly presented his substantive due process claim

that he was tried while mentally incompetent because “the clear

implication of his claim was that by following a constitutionally

defective procedure, the state court erred in finding him

competent”)). Claims are “sufficiently related” or “intertwined”

for exhaustion purposes when, by raising one claim, the petition

clearly implies another error. Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1025.

Although the inadmissibility of one type of alleged fruit of

Petitioner’s arrest or detention, namely, Petitioner’s

confessions, was expressly argued before the California Supreme

Court, Petitioner did not mention either the in-field

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identification or physical evidence consisting of Petitioner’s

footprints at or near the scene as fruits of the allegedly

unlawful detention or arrest. The admissibility of this other

evidence was expressly presented to the CCA, which considered and

rejected Petitioner’s contentions. (LD 2, 16.) It thus appears

that Petitioner chose not to present the additional issues to the

California Supreme Court.

Further, the issue raised before the California Supreme

Court was not simply that Petitioner’s confessions were

inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree, but rather that the

absence of the appropriate Miranda protocol rendered the

confessions inadmissible in conjunction with the unreasonableness

of the detention or arrest. (Id. at 9-11.) Petitioner’s

argument before the California Supreme Court was based on not

only the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but also the Fifth

Amendment. By raising the claim concerning Petitioner’s

confession before the California Supreme Court, it was not

clearly implied that other fruits were also inadmissible for the

same reasons. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment fruits claims concerning the infield identification and the physical evidence were not clearly

implied by Petitioner’s raising the claim that his confession was

involuntary.

With respect to the cumulative error claim, although

Petitioner raised cumulative error before the CCA (LD 1, 76-77),

Petitioner did not expressly raise this error before the

California Supreme Court. As noted, Petitioner did not raise all

the component errors before the Supreme Court. However, even if

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Petitioner had done so, briefing a number of isolated errors that

turn out to be insufficient to warrant reversal does not

automatically require the Court to consider whether the

cumulative effect of the alleged errors prejudiced the

Petitioner. Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1025. 

Further, the decision in Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 930

(9th Cir. 2000), cert. den., 534 U.S. 839 (2001), suggests that a

cumulative error claim must be clearly identified in a

petitioner's brief before a state court to be exhausted. Wooten,

540 F.3d at 1026. In Solis, the petitioner set forth his

cumulative error claim in the penultimate paragraph of a lengthy

brief, stating that the “errors complained of above, individually

and cumulatively denied appellant Due Process and a fair trial

under federal and state constitutions.” The petitioner did not

label his cumulative error claim as an issue in the contents

section of the brief; he did not argue the substance of the claim

or cite authority for it. The government did not address the

claim in its brief. The Solis Court held that the district court

properly declined to review the cumulative error claim. Id. at

930. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner did not

fairly present the cumulative error claim to the California

Supreme Court.

In summary, it is concluded that state court remedies were

not exhausted as to the portion of Petitioner’s first claim

pertaining to the suppression of the in-field identification

because only the admissibility of Petitioner’s confessions was

raised before the California Supreme Court. Further, state court

remedies as to Petitioner’s cumulative error claim were not

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exhausted because the claim was not presented to the California

Supreme Court. 

The instant petition is thus a mixed petition containing

exhausted and unexhausted claims. As previously noted, where a

petition is mixed, the Court must dismiss the petition without

prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the claims

if he can do so. Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 521-22. However, the

Court must give a petitioner an opportunity to amend a mixed

petition to delete the unexhausted claims and permit review of

properly exhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520.

IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Petitioner be granted thirty (30) days to file a motion

to withdraw the unexhausted claims; and

2) In the event that Petitioner does not file such a

motion, the Court should assume that Petitioner desires to return

to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims, and the Court

should then dismiss the entire petition without prejudice.2

Petitioner is informed that a dismissal for failure to exhaust will not

2

itself bar him from returning to federal court after exhausting his available

state remedies. However, this does not mean that Petitioner will not be

subject to the one-year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Although the limitations period is tolled while a properly filed request for

collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it is not

tolled for the time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001).

Petitioner is further informed that the Supreme Court has held in

pertinent part:

[I]n the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate

for an order dismissing a mixed petition to instruct

an applicant that upon his return to federal court he is to

bring only exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.

41(a) and (b). Once the petitioner is made aware of the

exhaustion requirement, no reason exists for him not to

exhaust all potential claims before returning to federal

court. The failure to comply with an order of the court

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 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if

served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

is grounds for dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ.

Proc. 41(b). Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).

Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal

court and files a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims, the

petition may be dismissed with prejudice.

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