Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04018/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04018-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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SRM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Harold Travis Lyons,

Petitioner

-vsJudy Frigo, et al.,

Respondent(s)

CV-05-4018-PHX-SRB (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Picacho,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on

December 12, 2005 (#1). On May 11, 2006, Respondents filed their Answer (#13). 

Petitioner filed a Reply on July 31, 2006 (#18).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 20, 1998, Petitioner was pulled over in a traffic stop because his rear

license plate light was out. (Exhibit G, Mem. Dec. at 2.) The officer determined that

Petitioner was driving on a suspended license. The officer also ran a check on the license

plate on the truck Petitioner was driving, and determined that the truck had been reported

stolen. (Id.) Petitioner told the officer that he had purchased the truck for $1,000 from a

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friend, Donnie Saunders, but had no documentation of the sale. Petitioner had been

operating the truck with out an ignition key, and speculated to the officer that a key was

broken off in the ignition. (Id. at 3.)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was charged in the Maricopa County Superior Court with one count of theft

by controlling property of another knowing or having reason to know that it was stolen, and

one count of driving on a suspended license. (Exhibit G, Mem. Dec. at 1-2.) Petitioner pled

not guilty and proceeded to trial. (Id. at 2.)

Petitioner was convicted, and on April 2, 1999, Petitioner was sentenced to 11.25

years on the theft charge, and 116 days on the driving on a suspended license charge, with

credit for 116 days served. (Exhibit D, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and appointed counsel filed a brief asserting a single

claim for relief: “Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow appellant to call

Donnie Saunders to the witness stand?” (Exhibit F, Opening Brief at 6.) Petitioner cited a

single federal authority, U.S. v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1980), as part of a

discussion of state court decisions concerning the purposes for which a court may require a

witness to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury, e.g. to explain

the failure of the witness to testify. (Exhibit F, Opening Brief at 8-9.) 

On February 15, 2000, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s motion to

supplement the appeal brief filed by his attorney. (Exhibit X , Order 2/15/00.) On April 11,

2000, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s direct appeal, issuing a Memorandum

Decision (Exhibit G) that discussed state court decisions governing the issue appealed.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court. He raised

a single issue:"Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow appellant to call

Donnie Saunders to the witness stand to corroborate the defense theory, and complete the

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story?'' (Exhibit H, Pet. Rev. at 2.) Other than referencing the witness' assertion of his Fifth

Amendment privileges, the petition cited no Federal law. On February 22, 2001 the Arizona

Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Exhibit I. Order 2/22/01.) The Order and

Mandate of the Arizona Court of Appeals issued on March 21, 2001. (Exhibit J, Order

3/21/01.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding - On March 15, 2001, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit K.) He filed his pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

(Exhibit L) the same day. Counsel was appointed, and on or about August 17, 2001,counsel

filed a Petition (Exhibit M) arguing that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel as a result of counsel's failure to: (1) argue the purposes for calling Donnie Saunders

to the stand despite his invocation of his Fifth Amendment Privilege; and (2) call to testify

two witnesses: an eyewitness to Petitioner's purchase of the truck from Donnie Saunders, and

Petitioner's passenger at the time of his arrest. Petitioner asserted no federal law in arguing

his claims, and referred to a single State decision, State v. Ysea, 191 Ariz. 372, 956 P.2d 499

(1998), as a basis for his ineffective assistance claims. (Exhibit M at 8.) An evidentiary

hearing was held on March 1, 2002. (Exhibit N.) 

On April 29, 2002, the trial court issued an Order (Exhibit O) denying the Petition.

The court found that trial counsel had tactical reasons for not calling the passenger, was

unaware of the purported witness to the sale, but was deficient with regard to the calling of

Donnie Saunders, the purported seller. However, the trial court found "in light of the

evidence presented at trial," no prejudice resulted from the failure to call Saunders to invoke

his privilege in the presence of the jury. (Id. at 3.)

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of

Appeals (Exhibit P), repeating the arguments made to the trial court. On September 25,

2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review (Exhibit Q). 

Second PCR Proceeding - On July 29, 2004, Petitioner filed a second Petition for

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Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit R). Petitioner argued: (1) denial of access to the court; (2)

conflict of interest with trial counsel; (3) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel;

(4) judicial misconduct and abuse of discretion; (5) manifest injustice; (6) actual innocence;

(7) insufficiency of the evidence as to all of the elements charged; and (8) insufficiency of

the evidence on the issue of the value of the truck (more than $3,000 but less than $25,000).

On August 19, 2004, the trial court summarily denied the petition as barred under

Arizona's preclusion bar, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) (Exhibit S). 

Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit

T), arguing that the trial court erred in finding his claims precluded. On August 3, 2005, the

Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review (Exhibit U). 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner commenced the current Federal habeas corpus proceedings by filing his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (#1) on December 12,

2005. Petitioner asserts the following eight primary grounds for relief: 

1. The ineffective assistance of trial counsel . 

2. The ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

3. Denial of due process from: (a) denial of hearing on request to call Donnie

Saunders; (b) failure to act on counsel’s conflict of interest; and (c) altered jury

instructions.

4. Denial of due process by cumulative errors.

5. Actual innocence. 

6. Denial of meaningful access to the courts by denial of hybrid representation.

7. Insufficient evidence.

Respondents filed their Answer to the Petition on May 11, 2006 (# 13). Respondents

argue that grounds for relief Three and Six are state law claims not cognizable in this Federal

habeas proceeding. Respondents argue that the grounds are all procedurally defaulted,

except for Ground Four and the portion of Ground One asserting ineffective assistance of

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1

 The concepts of “procedural default” and “procedural bar” have distinct but related natures, grounded in the

concepts of exhaustion on the one hand, and the "adequate and independent state procedural grounds" doctrine on the

other. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-732 (1991). In the latter, it is a "state judgment" that is being

treated with comity, id. at 730, while the exhaustion doctrine is a matter of treating the state courts themselves with

comity by allowing them "the first opportunity" to address the federal claim, id. at 731.

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trial counsel as a result of counsel’s failure to call Donnie Saunders and Petitioner’s two

additional witnesses. Respondents argue that the un-defaulted portion of Ground One and

Ground Four are without merit. 

Respondents argue that despite the holding of Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th

Cir.1999), presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court is required to exhaust state remedies.

Respondents ask that this Court, if it does not accept Respondents’ reasoning, certify a

question to the Arizona Supreme Court about the availability of review by that court of

Federal claims by Arizona criminal defendants. 

On July 13, 2006, Petitioner filed his Reply(#18) in support of his Petition. Petitioner

argues that even with respect to claims based on state laws, this Court must review his claims

for constitutional error. Petitioner argues that his claims are not procedurally defaulted,

because although presented in a successive post conviction relief petition, that petition

asserted actual innocence, and thus was subject to an exception to the successive petition

rule. Alternatively, Petitioner asserts that exceptional circumstances justify relief despite any

procedural default. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that with the exception of two of his claims, Petitioner has failed

to properly exhaust his state remedies on his claims, because he never fairly presented the

claims to the state appellate courts. They argue that the claims are now either procedurally

defaulted or procedurally barred,1

 and thus must be dismissed with prejudice.

In so arguing, Respondents concede that Petitioner has presented those habeas claims

in his second PCR petition. Petitioner makes the same argument in his Reply. Both note,

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however, that the Arizona trial court refused to consider the claims, relying upon Arizona’s

preclusion bar. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). The postcard denial of Petitioner’s claims by the

Arizona court of appeals must be deemed to be on the same basis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 804 (1991) (to determine whether a state procedural ruling bars federal review, the

habeas court must look to the "last reasoned opinion on the claim"). 

Federal habeas review of a federal claim is precluded when the state court has

disposed of the claim on a procedural ground "that is both 'independent' of the merits of the

federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's decision." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

260 (1989); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). But see, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002)

(“assum[ing]” independence standard applies on habeas). “Once the state has adequately

pled the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative

defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner.” Bennett v. Mueller,

322 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir.2003). 

Petitioner offers nothing to show that the Arizona procedural bar applied to his

second PCR petition is not “independent and adequate.” Accordingly, this Court must deem

the preclusion bar pled by Respondents to be an independent and adequate state ground for

denying Petitioner’s claims. Therefore, Federal habeas review of those claims is barred, and

this Court must dismiss those claims.

Actual Innocence & Successive Petitions - Petitioner argues in his Reply that

because his second PCR petition asserted actual innocence, it should have been subject to an

exception to the successive petition rule, and therefore should not be deemed procedurally

barred. Petitioner, in essence, asks this Court to conclude that the dismissal of his second

PCR petition was in error under state law. A federal court may not second-guess the state

court’s construction of its own state law unless “it appears that its interpretation is an obvious

subterfuge to evade the consideration of a federal issue.” Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 862

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)).

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to show that the state court’s decision was in error.

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It is true that Arizona’s preclusion bar does recognize exceptions for certain claims. Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.2(b). And, among the exceptions recognized is that for claims of actual

innocence. Rule 32.1(h) provides an exception where:

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

However, it is not the entire petition that is excepted under Rule 32.1 (h). Rather, it is only

the specific “claim” whose “underlying” facts establish the petitioner’s actual innocence. 

B. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents also argue that those claims which Petitioner has presented to the

Arizona courts were not only procedurally barred, but were not properly exhausted, and are

now procedurally defaulted, because Petitioner failed to present those claims to the Arizona

Supreme Court. 

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, “claims of Arizona

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state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999).

Respondents cite the recent Supreme Court decision in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27

(2004), decided March 2, 2004, as rejecting the reasoning of Swoopes. However, since

Baldwin, the Ninth Circuit has reiterated its conclusion in Swoopes. In Castillo v.

McFadden, decided February 24, 2005, the court noted:

"In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 'claims of

Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas

once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.' Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999).

Castillo, 299 F.3d at 998, n. 3. Indeed, the Castillo decision even cites to Baldwin. Id. at

999.

Moreover, nothing in the Baldwin decision serves to undermine the rationale of

Swoopes. Respondents cite the portion of Baldwin which notes that the state habeas

petitioner is required to present his claims “in each appropriate state court (including a state

supreme court with powers of discretionary review).” Baldwin, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. However,

the question of “how” to present (e.g. is the state court required to search the record below

for federal claims) was before the Baldwin Court, not the question of “where” to present.

Moreover, that very portion of Baldwin cites O’Sullivan as one of its authorities. O’Sullivan

itself stands for the proposition that the mere fact that review by a court is “discretionary”

does not make it unavailable for exhaustion purposes. O’Sullivan also, recognized, however,

that not all discretionary procedures are “available.”

The exhaustion doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry into what

procedures are "available" under state law. In sum, there is nothing in

the exhaustion doctrine requiring federal courts to ignore a state law or

rule providing that a given procedure is not available. We hold today

only that the creation of a discretionary review system does not,

without more, make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable.

O'Sullivan, 526 U.S.at 847-848. 

Unlike the Illinois procedure considered in O’Sullivan, Arizona does not merely make

review by the Arizona Supreme Court discretionary. Rather, in Sandon, the Arizona

Supreme Court noted that there was no right to appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court except

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in cases where the death sentence or life imprisonment is imposed, citing Ariz. Rev. Stat.

A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1). Sandon, 161 Ariz. at 158, 777 P.2d at 221. The Arizona Supreme

Court held that a petition for such discretionary review by the Arizona Supreme Court was

not required to exhaust state remedies for federal habeas purposes. “Once the defendant has

been given the appeal to which he has a right, state remedies have been exhausted.” Id.

(quoting State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 585, 684 P.2d 154, 157 (1984)). That

determination is the “more” that the Supreme Court found lacking in Illinois.

The pronouncement that Sandon makes review by the Arizona Supreme Court

“unavailable” is not a “rank fiction” as suggested by Respondents. (Answer, #13 at 13.)

Rather it is the federal term of art which signifies the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision to

exclude itself from the process necessary to subsequent federal habeas review, while still

providing itself and the citizens of Arizona the opportunity for that court’s discretionary

review.

The Arizona courts have not retreated from Sandon. Until they do so, or the Supreme

Court overrules O’Sullivan, this Court must conclude that Swoopes remains good law.

Moreover, the absence of any signal that Sandon is no longer a clear pronouncement of.

Arizona law makes certification of a question to the Arizona Supreme Court both

unnecessary and inappropriate. 

Respondents encourage this Court to divine from the number of cases in which

discretionary review is granted by the Arizona Supreme Court some abandonment of Sandon.

(Answer, #13 at 12-13.) However, this Court need not rely upon such perceptions to ascertain

the will of the Arizona court. In O'Sullivan, Justice Souter noted that it was not controlling

that the "state court has occasionally employed [a procedure for discretionary review] to

provide relief." Indeed, Swoopes was not based upon some sporadic rejection of jurisdiction

by the Arizona Supreme Court, but upon the state court's expression that its jurisdiction was

"outside the standard review process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for the

purpose of exhaustion." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S .at 1735 (Souter, J. concurring). 

Respondents also argue that Sandon was a procedurally peculiar case, i.e. a delayed

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petition fore review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which should not be relied upon outside

that context. (Answer #13 at 13-14.) Sandon dealt with a case where the defendants had

simultaneously appealed and filed a PCR petition, and after the PCR petition was denied,

consolidated the petition for review with the direct appeal. Unsuccessful, the defendant filed

a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court, seeking review of only 3 of the 13 issues

decided below. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The defendant then filed a

federal habeas petition raising claims presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, but not the

Arizona Supreme Court. The federal court dismissed the claims as unexhausted, based on

the failure to present them to the Arizona Supreme Court. The Petitioner then sought delayed

review of the additional claims by the Arizona Supreme Court. Noting that the case would

ordinarily be disposed of summarily, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that “because the

Court continues to receive large numbers of prisoner petitions seeking to exhaust state

remedies, we briefly address that issue based upon the procedural history of the case.”

Sandon, 161 Ariz. at 157, 777 P.2d at 220. Thus, although the specific petition before the

Arizona Supreme Court in Sandon was a delayed petition for review, the procedure they were

addressing was the normal petition for review on a direct appeal or petition for postconviction relief. They concluded that the claims were exhausted. “When counsel, whether

retained or appointed, has followed the procedures as outlined above, as counsel for Sandon

did in this matter, the case in the Arizona courts is over.” Id. at 158, 777 P.2d at 221. 

Because the Sandon court was addressing the procedure prior to the habeas petition

(i.e. the direct appeal and PCR petition for review) to explain why the subsequent, delayed

petition was unnecessary, the only unique procedure involved was the consolidation of the

direct appeal and PCR processes in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Respondents do not

suggest why such consolidation should make the analysis of Sandon inapposite to cases

where the direct appeal and PCR petition for review are serial rather than simultaneous. The

Sandon court made nothing of that unique process, other than to note it in the procedural

history. Instead, they focused on the discretionary nature of their own review to conclude

that it was not necessary for exhaustion for federal purposes.

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Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that the rationale and holding

of Swoopes remains in tact after the Baldwin decision. Because Petitioner received neither

a life sentence nor the death penalty, the presentation of his claims to the Arizona Court of

Appeals was sufficient to exhaust his state remedies. 

Arizona Procedural Bars to Further Exhaustion - Respondents assert that

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims may no longer be presented in the state courts, citing

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b), and 32.4. (Answer #13 at 17.)

Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct appeal expires twenty days after

entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure do not

provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct

appeal is no longer available. 

Further, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions for post-conviction relief (other

than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal,

whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995)

(applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant

deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). While Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory

claims if they fall within the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through

(h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to him. 

Moreover, under the rules applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, a claim

may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post conviction relief that “has been waived

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.” Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. 

C. STATE LAW CLAIMS

Respondents argue that Grounds for relief Three and Six are based on state law and

therefore are not cognizable on habeas review. Indeed, a state prisoner is entitled to habeas

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution,

laws or treaties of the United States. Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors

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in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991);

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

Further, violations of state law, without more, do not deprive a petitioner of due

process. Cooks v. Spalding, 660 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026

(1982). It has long been understood that a state may violate its own law without violating

the United States Constitution. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948).

We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a

denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a

state court on state law would come here as a federal

constitutional question.

Id., 334 U.S. at 731.

 To qualify for federal habeas relief, an error of state law must be “sufficiently

egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law guaranteed by

the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). To sustain such

a due process claim founded on state law error, Petitioner must show that the state court

"error" was "so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process." 

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reiger v. Christensen,

789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1986)). To receive review of what otherwise amounts to

nothing more than an error of state law, a petitioner must argue “not that it is wrong, but that

it is so wrong, so surprising, that the error violates principles of due process”; that a state

court’s decision was “such a gross abuse of discretion” that it was unconstitutional. Brooks

v. Zimmerman, 712 F.Supp. 496, 498 (W.D.Pa.1989). 

D. APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL DEFENSES TO INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS

Ground One - Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel - For Ground One of his

Petition, Petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the following bases: (a)

failure to investigate actual innocence claim; (b) failure to subpoena evidence; (c) failure to

interview potential witnesses; (d) conflict of interest; (e) failure to object to evidence; (f)

failure to request jury instructions; (g) failure to argue the jury’s expectation to hear

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Petitioner’s First PCR Petition, i.e. failure to call Charles Pennell who was present when Petitioner bought the truck from

Donnie Suanders, and Carried Dyer, Petitioner’s passenger at the time who saw paperwork for the purchase of the truck

and a broken key which Petitioner put in the ignition. (See Answer, #13 at 27-28 and n. 4.)

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testimony from a listed witness; (h) failure to adequately cross examine witness; and (i)

failure to object to jury instruction. 

Petitioner presented no claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal. 

He did assert ineffective assistance of counsel in his first PCR petition. However,

those claims were limited to arguing that counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to argue the

purposes for calling Donnie Saunders to the stand despite his invocation of his Fifth

Amendment privilege; and (2) to call to testify a witness to Petitioner's purchase of the truck

from Donnie Saunders, and Petitioner's passenger at the time of his arrest. To the extent that

parts (c) and (g) of Ground One are based upon the same claims, these claims were presented

to the state courts and decided on Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding.2

 

Although Petitioner did not explicitly invoke federal law in arguing ineffective

assistance of counsel, the trial court acknowledged that the right to counsel he relied on arose

under federal law by citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). (Exhibit O, M.E.

4/29/02 at 3.) The requirements of exhaustion have been met where the state has actually

passed on the federal claim. See Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d

1200, 1206 (11th Cir.1984) ("[t]here is no better evidence of exhaustion than a state court's

actual consideration of the relevant constitutional issue"); and Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d

1352, 1356-57 (8th Cir.1990) (state court's sua sponte consideration of an issue satisfies

exhaustion). Thus, these claims were properly exhausted, and this Court may address them

on their merits.

The balance of these ineffective assistance claims were presented in Petitioner’s

second PCR petition, i.e. (1) failure to investigate actual innocence claim (see Exhibit R,

Second PCR Pet. at Exhibit 2, Memorandum at 10); (2) failure to subpoena evidence (id. at

11); (4) conflict of interest evidence (id. at 14); (5) failure to object to evidence (id. at 16);

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(6) failure to request jury instructions (id. at 16-17); (8) failure to adequately cross examine

witness (id. at 21-22); (9) failure to object to jury instruction (id. at 25-26). These claims

were denied on the basis of Arizona’s independent and adequate preclusion bar and as such,

consideration of them by this habeas court is barred.

Based on the foregoing, only parts (c) and (g) of Ground One can be addressed on

their merits, and the balance of Ground One must be dismissed as procedurally barred.

Ground Two - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel - For Ground Two of

his Petition, Petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on the basis that

appellate counsel failed: (1) to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) to appeal the

denial of Rule 20 motion; (3) to challenge defective jury instruction; (4) to appeal motion for

new trial; and (5) to raise all meritorious issues on direct appeal including not being able to

confront his accuser (the alleged victim who was subpoenaed to testify – the owner of the

truck). Respondents argue that these claims are either procedurally defaulted, or

procedurally barred to the extent the were raised in Petitioner’s second PCR petition.

(Answer # 13 at 20-21.)

Petitioner presented no claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal. He did

assert ineffective assistance of counsel in his first PCR petition. However, those claims were

limited to arguing that trial counsel was ineffective. (See Exhibit M.)

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were presented in Petitioner’s

second PCR petition. (See Exhibit R, Second PCR Pet.) Petitioner argued that appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing: (1) to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence (Exhibit

R at 29-31); (2) to appeal the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal (id. at 31-32);

(3) to challenge a defective jury instruction (id. at 32); (4) to challenge the trial cant’s failure

to appoint new counsel to cure a conflict of interest (id. at 32-34); and (5) to raise all

meritorious issues of appeal (id. at 34). Thus, it appears that the substance of Petitioner’s

current Ground Two was raised in his Second PCR petition. However, those clams were

denied on the basis of Arizona’s independent and adequate preclusion bar and as such,

consideration of them by this habeas court is barred. 

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 Therefore, Petitioner’s Ground Two must be dismissed as procedurally barred.

Ground Three - Denial of Due Process - For Ground Three of his Petition, Petitioner

asserts a denial of his due process rights and rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments

in three regards: (a) the denial of Petitioner’s request to call Donnie Saunders to the stand

without holding a hearing to determine whether non-incriminating testimony could be

presented; (b) failure to conduct a hearing or to appoint new counsel based on counsel’s

conflict of interest; and (c) giving of altered jury instructions.

Respondents argue that these claims are state law claims not cognizable on federal

habeas review. To the extent that Petitioner is asserting some violation of state law,

Respondents are correct in noting that such claims would not be cognizable. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). However, Petitioner does not merely assert violations of state

law, but argues that the trial court’s actions resulted in a denial of Petitioner’s federal rights

under the “Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment ... 5th Amendment, [and] 6th

Amendment.” (Petition, #1 at 7.)

Respondents also argue that these claims are procedurally defaulted and/or

procedurally barred. Each claim will be addressed in turn. 

3(a) Denial of Request to Call Saunders - Petitioner did assert on direct appeal the first

of his claims in his Ground Three. Petitioner’s appellate brief asked: "Did the trial court

abuse its discretion by refusing to allow appellant to call Donnie Saunders to the witness

stand?" (Exhibit F, Opening Brief at 6.) In making this claim, Petitioner cited a federal

authority, U.S. v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1980), as part of a discussion of state

court decisions concerning the purposes for which a court may require a witness to invoke

their Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury, e.g. to explain the failure of the

witness to testify. (Exhibit F, Opening Brief at 8-9.) Those state court decisions included

State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 587, 676 P.2d 615, 619 (Ariz.,1983), which is itself founded

upon a Fifth Amendment analysis. The Arizona Court of Appeals relied on Corrales in

rejecting the claim, and the Arizona Supreme Court’s post-card denial is deemed to be based

on the same reasoning. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991).

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It is true that Petitioner has somewhat reformulated his claim, now asserting that the

error consisted of the failure to hold a hearing to determine whether non-incriminating

testimony could be presented prior to the trial court’s ruling prohibiting the calling of

Saunders. However, “new factual allegations do not render a claim unexhausted unless they

‘fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts.’ ” Chacon v.

Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260

(1986)). Here, the fundamental claim remains the same: Petitioner should have been

permitted to call Saunders to the stand despite his assertion of his Fifth Amendment

privilege, in order to explain to the jury Saunders' absence..

However, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the basis that Petitioner

waived the claim by failing to argue to the trial court a res gestae basis for calling Saunders.

"Because defendant failed to apprise the trial court of the reason for calling Saunders as a

witness, defendant cannot now claim that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find

that the value of calling Saunders outweighed the potential prejudice." (Exhibit G, Mem.

Dec. at 7.) Accordingly, this claim was procedurally barred, and is now not subject to habeas

review.

3(b) Conflict of Interest - Petitioner also argues in Ground Three that the trial court

erred when it failed to address trial counsel’s conflict of interest. Petitioner did not assert this

claim in either his direct appeal or his first PCR petition. (Exhibit F and M.) 

Petitioner did assert the facts underlying this claim in his second PCR Petition.

(Exhibit R, Attachment 2, Memorandum at 35-36.) However, even if deemed to be a

presentation of his federal claim, this claim was procedurally barred, when the state courts

dismissed this petition under the Arizona preclusion bar. Accordingly, this claim is not now

subject to habeas review.

3(c) Altered Jury Instructions - Finally, Petitioner argues in Ground Three that the trial

court erred when it issued “altered” jury instructions. Petitioner did not assert this claim in

either his direct appeal or his first PCR petition. (Exhibit F and M.) 

Petitioner did assert the facts underlying this claim in his second PCR Petition.

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(Exhibit R, Attachment 2, Memorandum at 36.) However, this claim was also procedurally

barred when the state courts applied the Arizona preclusion bar to that PCR petition.

Accordingly, this claim is not now subject to habeas review.

Ground Four - Denial of Due Process - For Ground Four of his Petition, Petitioner

asserts a denial of his due process rights resulting from: “The numerous instances of

ineffectiveness of both trial and appellate counsels, coupled with the trial court errors and

abuses.” Petitioner argues that this resulted in “manifest injustice” and a “miscarriage of

justice.” (Petition, #1 at 8.) Respondents assert that this is simply a reassertion of Petitioner’s

other claims, and thus subject to the same defects and defenses that preclude relief on the

individual claims. (Answer, #13 at 21.) The undersigned, however, construes this claim to

be an assertion that the cumulative errors in the state courts combined to deny Petitioner due

process of law. See Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1254 (9th Cir. 1996). (“Multiple errors,

even if harmless individually, may entitle a petitioner to habeas relief if their cumulative

effect prejudiced the defendant.”). 

However, Petitioner did not properly exhaust such a claim. It was not presented in

either his direct appeal or his first PCR petition. (See Exhibit F and M.) This claim was

arguably presented in Petitioner’s second PCR Petition. (See Exhibit R, Attachment 2,

Memorandum at 37.) However, this claim was also procedurally barred when the state courts

dismissed this petition under the Arizona preclusion bar. Accordingly, this claim is not now

subject to habeas review.

Ground Five - Actual Innocence - For his Fifth Ground for relief, Petitioner asserts

that he is actually innocent of the charges. (Petition, #1 at 7.) Respondents properly argue

(Answer #13 at 20-21) that this claim was first presented in Petitioner’s second PCR petition

(Exhibit R, Attachment 2, Memorandum at 38), was subject to the state procedural bar, and

is now not subject to federal habeas review. 

Ground Six - Denial of Access - For his Ground Six, Petitioner asserts that he was

denied meaningful access to the courts when the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to allow

Petitioner to supplement his direct appeal. 

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Respondents argue that, in essence, because there is no federal right to hybrid

representation, see e.g. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984), Petitioner must be

challenging the state law ruling that hybrid representation is not permitted in the Arizona

courts. However, Respondents confuse the absence of a federal right with the absence of a

federal claim. Petitioner, at least now, clearly asserts a claim under federal law.

Moreover, Petitioner does not assert that he was entitled to hybrid representation in

violation of the Sixth Amendment, but instead argues that he was denied meaningful access

to the courts by the denial of such representation. Petitioner explicitly makes this claim

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Petition, #1 at “8".) Indeed, Prisoners have

a federal constitutional right of access to the courts, which right of access is grounded in the

Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.

1995). 

Respondents also argue that this claim is either procedurally barred or procedurally

defaulted. (Answer #13 at 20-21.) This claim was not presented in Petitioner’s briefs on

direct appeal, first PCR petition, or second PCR petition. (See Exhibits F, M and R.) 

However, Petitioner did present his request for hybrid representation directly to the

Arizona Court of Appeals when he moved for leave to supplement or to require counsel to

file an Anders brief. In rejecting the motion, the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the

merits of the federal claim, as evidenced by the citation to State v. Rickman, 148 Ariz. 499,

715 P.2d 752 (1986), which is based on both Arizona law and federal Sixth Amendment law

as set out in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (no right to “hybrid”

representation as part of the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation). (See Exhibit X,

Order 2/15/00.)

There is nothing in the record, however, to suggest that a Due Process or Equal

Protection right of meaningful access was asserted by Petitioner or addressed by the Arizona

Court of Appeals in connection with Petitioner’s request to file a supplemental brief. 

Petitioner would be barred from now raising this due process claim before the Arizona Court

of Appeals under Arizona’s preclusion bar (Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2), and under its timeliness

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rules (Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4). None of the exceptions in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h)

to the timeliness bar would apply.

Nor does it appears that such exceptions in Rule 32.1 would apply to Petitioner. The

excepted claims are:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely

cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment

evidence substantially undermines testimony which was of critical

significance at trial such that the evidence probably would have

changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief

of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault

on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that

no reasonable fact- finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) has no because Petitioner is attacking the

validity of his conviction, not the duration of his incarceration. Petitioner’s Ground 6 is not

based on newly discover evidence, and therefore paragraph (e) has no application. Paragraph

(f) has no application because Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and the notice of

post-conviction relief of-right applies only to petitions filed following a guilty or nolo

contendre plea. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 (defining when petition of-right). See also Moreno

v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998) (on certified question holding that “notice

of appeal” in 32.1(f) is direct appeal only, and not appeal from denial of post-conviction

relief). Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner’s Ground 6 does not assert a

change in the law. Finally, paragraph (h) has no application because the Petitioner’s Ground

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 Arguably, Petitioner did exhaust a Sixth Amendment claim based on the denial of the request to file a

supplemental brief. However, Petitioner’s Ground Six is not based on the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, to the extent

that the claim is based on the Sixth Amendment, it would likely be without merit. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.

168, 183 (1984) (no right to hybrid represenation).

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6 is not based upon an assertion of facts establishing his innocence.

 Accordingly, the claim presented in Petitioner’s Ground Six is procedurally

defaulted.3

 

Ground Seven - Insufficient Evidence - For his Seventh ground for relief, Petitioner

argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, resulting in a denial of

due process. (Petition #1 at “6”.) Respondents argue that this claim is either procedurally

defaulted or procedurally barred.

Petitioner did not assert this claim in his direct appeal or his first PCR petition. (See

Exhibits F and M.) Petitioner did assert the claim in his Second PCR Petition. (Exhibit R

at 1.) However, that claim was rejected as procedurally barred, and is thus barred from

habeas review.

Summary re Exhaustion of Claims - Petitioner has failed to fairly present, and has

now procedurally defaulted on the claims in Ground 6. Petitioner presented the claim in

Ground 3(a)(denial of request to call Saunders), but that claim was disposed of on the

independent and adequate state ground of waiver, and is thus procedurally barred. Petitioner

presented in his Second PCR Petition the claims in Grounds 1 (except parts (c) and (g)), 2,

3(b), 3(c), 4, 5, and 7, but those claims were disposed of on the independent and adequate

state grounds of Arizona preclusion bar, and are thus procedurally barred. Petitioner has

properly exhausted his claims in Grounds 1(c) (ineffective assistance re failure to interview

potential witnesses) and 1(g) (failure to argue the jury’s expectation to hear testimony from

a listed witness).

Cause and Prejudice - If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim,

or it has been procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not

obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice”

sufficient to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Petitioner has not

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offered any basis for a finding of cause and prejudice.

Petitioner does argue that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied where there is an

“‘exceptional circumstance where need for remedy afforded by writ is apparent.’ ” (Reply,

#18 at 4 (quoting Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (1968)).) Petitioner mischaracterizes the

import of Fulwood which does not authorize relief in the face of a procedural default based

on apparent need. Rather, Fulwood held that the procedural default could be overlooked in

the particular circumstances of that case, given the special concern for the “welfare of

minors,” the “rehabilitative goals of juvenile court proceedings” and the fact that the

procedural default was caused by the juvenile’s attorney. Id. at 942. 

Even if Petitioner correctly summarized the law in 1968 at the time of the decision in

Fulwood, that law would not apply here for two reasons. First, Fulwood dealt with a

challenge to detention under the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, and thus dealt

with a federal judgment, not a state court one. Second, at the time Fulwood was decided, the

procedural default rules were judicially adopted guides for the exercise of the court’s habeas

power. The court in Fulwood noted that the exhaustion rule “has not been regarded as

‘jurisdictional.’” Fulwood, 394 F.2d at 944, n. 8. The law of exhaustion changed, however,

when the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996," Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat 1214, was enacted on April 24, 1996. The effect of the AEDPA was to codify the

exhaustion and procedural default rules at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B), which permits

consideration of unexhausted claims where “circumstances exist that render such [state]

process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” The cause and prejudice standard

is one example of such circumstances, but the simple “need” for habeas relief is not.

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion

intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish

cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added).

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Here, Petitioner has not expressly argued “actual innocence” as a basis for excusing

any procedural default. However, his Ground 5 is an assertion of actual innocence.

The standard for “actual innocence” to avoid a procedural default is the same as that

applied in evaluating whether to allow successive habeas petitions. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505

U.S. 333, 338 (1992). That standard was articulated in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436

(1986) as follows: 

[T]he prisoner must “show a fair probability that, in the light of

all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally

admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and

evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to

have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts

would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.”

Id., 477 U.S., at 455, n. 17, quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on

Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970).

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence must show "it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence" presented

in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A showing that a

reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not sufficient. Rather, the

petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. Id. at

329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d

1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner fails to make any showing of his actual innocence. His Ground 5

proffers no new evidence of his actual innocence, nor does it offer anything to impeach the

credibility of the evidence presented against him at trial. While Petitioner protests in his

other grounds for relief that various exculpatory evidence was available, Petitioner presents

nothing to support the claim, e.g. no affidavits or sworn statements by witnesses, etc. Such

conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a claim or justify an evidentiary hearing.

See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342, 1352 (8th Cir. 1997) (no right to evidentiary hearing

on actual innocence claim where no affidavits from purported witnesses submitted, and

expected testimony not specified).

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Even if this Court were to accept Petitioner’s unsupported allegations that Mr.

Pennell would testify that he observed Petitioner’s purchase of the truck, and that Ms. Dyer

would testify that she saw paperwork for the purchase of the truck and a broken off key, the

Court could not say that no reasonable juror could have convicted Petitioner. Petitioner’s

conviction was for possession with knowledge that the truck was stolen. The existence of

a sale between Saunders and Petitioner, and Petitioner’s possession of a broken off key

would not have left the jury without evidence that the Petitioner knew the truck was stolen.

They could have reasonably relied upon other evidence of its stolen status, including the

purchase price ($1,000 compared to a value of $3,900), the presence of the owner’s tools in

the truck, that the truck had never been titled in Saunders’ name, etc. Moreover, the jury

could reasonably have discounted Ms. Dyer’s testimony, and have accepted instead the

arresting officer’s testimony that Petitioner had no paperwork evidencing a sale.

Petitioner has failed to establish his actual innocence to excuse his procedural default.

Summary - Based upon the foregoing, with the exception of Grounds 1(c)

(ineffective assistance re failure to interview potential witnesses) and 1(g) (failure to argue

the jury’s expectation to hear testimony from a listed witness), all of Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted or procedurally barred, and must be dismissed with prejudice.

C. GROUNDS 1(c) - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE RE WITNESSES

Petitioner asserts in his Ground 1(c) that trial counsel was ineffective because he

failed to interview potential witnesses, i.e. Charlie Pennell, an eyewitness to Petitioner's

purchase of the truck from Donnie Saunders, and Carrie Dyer, Petitioner's passenger at the

time of his arrest who saw paperwork for the purchase of the truck and Petitioner putting a

broken off key into the ignition. Respondents argue that the trial court properly found that

trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision to not call Ms. Dyer due to concerns about

her testimony and criminal history, and there was no evidence that counsel knew of the

existence of Mr. Pennell at the time of trial. Respondents argue that based upon those

factual findings, the trial court properly found that trial counsel’s performance was not

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defective. (Response, #13 at 27-28.) Petitioner does not reply to those arguments.

1. Standard of Habeas Review

In evaluating the merits of Petitioner’s claims, this Court is subject to a series of

limitations and presumptions.

Legal Determinations - While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search

for violations of federal law, not every error justifies relief. “[A] federal habeas court may

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24–

25 (2002) (per curiam). To justify habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Intrinsic Review of Facts - Further, Federal courts are authorized to grant habeas

relief in cases where the state-court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state

court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992,

999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Extrinsic Review of Facts - Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry

the facts of his case in the federal courts. There is a well established presumption of

correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1), which states that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct” and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut the

presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.”

Applicable State Court Determination - In applying these standards, a federal

habeas court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by a state court. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360

F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

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2. Standards for Finding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim,

petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. Although the petitioner must prove both

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was

reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

This two-pronged test — deficient performance and prejudice — poses a mixed

question of law and fact. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Thompson v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 1509,

1515 (9th Cir. 1996). However, in a federal habeas corpus petition, state court findings of

fact made while deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim are entitled to the

presumptions of correctness. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 1995).

An objective standard applies to proving deficient performance, and requires a

petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th

Cir. 1991)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s

actions is judged from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. Tactical decisions with which a defendant disagrees cannot form the basis for a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992). "Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself

sufficient to support a charge of inadequate representation." Gustave v. United States, 627

F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, the reviewing court need not determine the actual

reason for an attorney's actions, as long as the act falls within the range of reasonable

representation. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d at 456-457.

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3. Application to Trial Court’s Decision

Defective Performance - Here, the trial court applied the appropriate standard of

defective performance and prejudice to Petitioner's challenge to counsel's failure to call Mr.

Pennell and Ms. Dyer. It is true that the trial court utilized an Arizona formulation of the

prejudice prong, “minimal competence as determined by professional norms” (Exhibit O,

Order 4/29/02 at 2-3). In referencing that standard, however, the trial court cited State v.

Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397, 694 P.2d 222, 227 (1985), which also referenced the "minimal

competence" language, but explicitly adopted the deficient performance standard established

in Strickland. Nash, 143 Ariz. at 397, 694 P.2d at 227. 

In finding that counsel's performance was not defective, the trial court made factual

findings that: (1) trial counsel made a tactical decision to not call Ms. Dyer based upon

concerns about the substance of her testimony and her criminal history; (2) trial counsel was

never aware of Mr. Pennell's existence as a potential witness. (Exhibit O, Order 4/29/02 at

2.) Petitioner offers nothing to show that these findings were “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Nor has he shown anything to overcome the presumption of

correctness which attaches to these findings. let alone providing the “clear and convincing

evidence”required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Nor has Petitioner offered anything to counter

the trial court's conclusion that these facts showed trial counsel's performance was not

defective. 

As for counsel's decision to not call Ms. Dyer, tactical decisions with Petitioner

disagrees cannot form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Morris v.

California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991). See Denhum v. Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501, 1505-06

(9th Cir. 1992) (no ineffective assistance where counsel declined to call alibi witness

"because of ‘glaring' inconsistencies in her proposed testimony").

As for counsel's failure to call Mr. Pennell, the reasonableness of counsel’s actions

is judged from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at

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689. Counsel cannot be faulted for failure to call a witness of whom he has no knowledge,

unless he has failed to adequately investigate the case. See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d

1032 (9th Cir. 1995). There is nothing in the record, and Petitioner suggests nothing, which

would have caused trial counsel to undertake an investigation to discover Mr. Pennell. The

trial court found that Petitioner had only told trial counsel about Ms. Dyer and Mr. Saunders

as potential witnesses. (Exhibit O, Order 4/29/02 at 2.).

Prejudice - The trial court also found that "any failure to call these witnesses did not

prejudice Petitioner in light of the evidence presented at trial." Thus, the trial court identified

the proper standard. Although Petitioner offers nothing to show that the trial court's

application of that standard was unreasonable, the lack of any other direct evidence to

contradict or support Petitioner's innocent purchaser defense would suggest that testimony

by witnesses supporting that defense may have altered the outcome of the trial. Nonetheless,

even if the trial court erred in finding a lack of prejudice, such a finding was not necessary

to the rejection of Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim because the court had already

found a lack of defective performance. Although the petitioner must prove both elements,

a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable

or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Conclusion - Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel concerning the failure to call Ms. Dyer and Mr. Pennell must be denied.

D. GROUNDS 1(g) - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE RE SAUNDERS TESTIMONY

Petitioner asserts in his Ground 1(g) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

argue the jury’s expectation to hear testimony from a listed witness as a basis for calling

Donnie Saunders to the stand. Respondents argue that the trial court properly rejected this

claim in Petitioner's first PCR petition, based upon a determination that there was no

prejudice. (Answer, #13 at 27.) 

The trial court concluded that trial counsel had performed deficiently by failing to

argue for the right to call Donnie Saunders to the stand and requiring him to assert his Fifth

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Amendment privileges before the jury to explain why Petitioner was not presenting

testimony from Saunders. (Exhibit O, Order 4/29/02 at 3.) However, the trial court

concluded that "trial counsel's deficient performance did not prejudice Petitioner in light of

the evidence presented at trial." (Id.) 

The trial court again identified the proper standard, and Petitioner offers nothing to

show that the trial court's application of that standard was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law. 

It is true that the evidence actually presented to the jury arguably would have left the

impression that Donnie Saunders was purely an invention by Petitioner. The arresting officer

indicated that he was not successful at the time of arrest in contacting Saunders, although

Petitioner had provided him a phone number. (Exhibit B, R.T. 1/12/99 at 58, 67-68.)

Another investigating officer testified that a court order following up a lead on that phone

number was unsuccessful. (Id. at 73-77.) Thus, the evidence before the jury was that no one

had been able to contact Saunders, and Petitioner was the only one asserting that Saunders

even existed. 

On the other hand, had Saunders appeared, the jury would have been precluded from

making any inferences from his reliance on his Fifth Amendment rights against selfincrimination. “[T]he general rule is that when a witness, other than the accused, declines

to answer a question on the ground that his answer would tend to incriminate him, that

refusal alone cannot be made the basis of any inference by the jury, either favorable to the

prosecution or favorable to the defendant.” Drechsler, Inferences Arising from Refusal of

Witness Other than Accused to Answer Question on the Ground That Answer Would Tend

to Incriminate Him, 24 A.L.R.2d 895, § 2 (2006). They would have simply had

corroboration of the fact that Saunders actually existed. That would not preclude them from

concluding that Saunders delivered the truck to Petitioner with Petitioner's knowledge or

reason to know of its stolen status. That conclusion would be sufficient to find Petitioner

guilty. See A.R.S. § 13-1802(a)(5) (defining crime of theft to include knowingly "controls

property of another knowing or having reason to know that the property was stolen"). 

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There was substantial evidence that Petitioner knew or had reason to know of the

stolen status of the vehicle, including the broken, keyless, status of the ignition, the lack of

a license plate light, the lack of evidence of a sale of the vehicle to or by Saunders or

Petitioner, and the extremely low purchase price claimed by Petitioner (e.g. $1,000 compared

to a value of $3,900). Thus, even if the jury had concluded that Petitioner actually had

"purchased" the truck from Saunders, they would have still had significant evidence that

under the conditions of that sale Petitioner knew or and reason to know that the truck was

stolen. 

Under these circumstances, the undersigned cannot say that the trial court was

unreasonable in its determination that there was not a "reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

E. SUMMARY

Petitioner failed to fairly present, and has now procedurally defaulted on the claims

in Ground 6. Petitioner presented the claim in Ground 3(a)(denial of request to call

Saunders), but that claim was disposed of on the independent and adequate state ground of

waiver, and is thus procedurally barred. Petitioner presented the claims in Grounds 1 (except

parts (c) and (g)), 2, 3(b), 3(c), 4, 5, and 7, but those claims were disposed of on the

independent and adequate state grounds of Arizona's preclusion bar, and are thus

procedurally barred. Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence

to avoid the effect of his procedural bar or procedural default, and therefore these claims

must be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner has properly exhausted his claims in Grounds 1(c) (ineffective assistance

re failure to interview potential witnesses) and 1(g) (failure to argue the jury’s expectation

to hear testimony from a listed witness), but each of these claims is without merit and must

be denied.

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds 1 (except parts (c) and (g)),

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed December

12, 2005 (#1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Grounds 1(c) and (g) of the Petitioner's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed December 12, 2005 (#1) be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: March 26, 2007 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\05-4018-1r RR 06 08 16 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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