Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06501/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06501-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RYAN KATZENBACH and RIC OSUNA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GREG S. GRANT, TRACEY LYNN

DEFEO, and DOES 1-12, inclusive,

Defendants.

________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:04-cv-6501 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S

MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2)

AND 12(B)(6).

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Greg S. Grant (“Defendant” or “Defendant Grant”)

moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Ryan Katzenbach’s and Ric Osuna’s

(“Plaintiffs”) First Amended Complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and for failure

to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Katzenbach filed his original complaint pro se on

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 1 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiffs’ claims for Tortious Interference with

Contractual Relations and Unfair Business Practices under Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 are both listed under Count II of the

FAC. 

2 Defendant Grant asserts that Defendant Defeo is not a

defendant in this action because she has not been served. Only

Defendant Grant moves to dismiss.

2

November 2, 2004, alleging defamation. (Doc. 1, Compl.). 

Plaintiffs Katzenbach and Osuna filed a First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) pro se on November 24, 2004. (Doc. 9, FAC). The FAC is

almost 40 pages long and has about 26 exhibits. The FAC contains

six causes of action, which are actually 7 separate claims:

(1) Libel; (2) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations;

(3) Unfair Business Practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 17200;1 (4) Copyright Infringement; (5) Trademark

Infringement; (6) Invasion of Privacy; (7) Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress. 

Defendants Grant and DeFeo requested extension of time to

answer the FAC. (Doc. 12, Request, filed Dec. 2, 2004). They

were granted a 60-day extension from the time receipt of the

order to answer.2 (Doc. 13, Order, filed Dec. 6, 2004). On

February 7, 2005, Defendant Grant moved to dismiss on the basis

of lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2) and on the basis of failure to state a claim pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 15, Def.’s Mem.). Oral argument

was heard on March 14, 2005. Plaintiff Katzenbach was present

and Larry Zerner appeared on behalf of Defendant Grant.

//

//

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 2 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants arise out of the

apparent failure of Plaintiffs’ alleged negotiations with a

motion picture production company to result in production of a

movie based on a book that Plaintiff Osuna wrote. Plaintiffs

allege that the book, The Night the DeFeos Died: Reinvestigating

the Amityville Murders (“The Night The DeFeos Died”) was

published by Plaintiff Katzenbach’s publishing company, and

addresses the gruesome 1974 “haunted house” murders of members of

the DeFeo family. Ronald DeFeo is currently serving a life

sentence for the murder of his mother, father, and four siblings

in Amityville, New York. According to Plaintiffs, these murders

are the subject of several books and at least one movie.

According to the FAC, Defendant Tracy Lynn DeFeo is Ronald

DeFeo’s wife of approximately six months. Plaintiffs also allege

that Defendant Greg S. Grant is the owner and publisher of the

website www.thenightexposed.net, which Defendant Grant does not

dispute.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants interfered with

Plaintiffs’ negotiations with Sony Pictures and the USA Network

to produce the movie by sending a letter to Sony Pictures that

claimed Osuna’s book was a fraud. Plaintiffs also allege that

Defendant Grant published this letter and other defamatory

statements about Plaintiffs on his website. Plaintiffs do not

allege that they had a contract with Sony Pictures or the

USA Network to produce the movie, and allege only that they had a

“tentative deal.” 

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 3 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Plaintiffs filed a declaration in support of personal

jurisdiction on March 14, 2005. (Doc. 23). Pursuant to Local

Rule 78-230(b), all motions and accompanying affidavits must be

submitted not less than twenty-eight days (for personal service)

or thirty-one days (for electronic service or service by mail)

before the date the motion is to be heard. Plaintiff submitted

the affidavit in violation of the Local Rules. However,

Defendants were given an opportunity to respond to the

declaration. See Local Rule 78-230(e). Defendants have not

responded to the declaration or offered any evidence of their

own. The declaration is that of Deborah Martin, an acquaintance

of Mr. Katzenberg. Ms. Martin, a resident of California, states

that she ordered a painting from Defendant Grant on his website. 

Grant agreed to sell her a painting; however, no sale was ever

made.

4

Plaintiff Katzenbach is a resident and citizen of

California. Plaintiff Osuna is a resident and citizen of Nevada,

and Plaintiffs cite to Nevada law in their complaint in addition

to California law. Defendant Grant is a citizen of South

Carolina. 

Defendant Grant has offered paintings by Ronald DeFeo for

sale, both directly from Mr. Grant’s website and through E-Bay. 

Defendant Grant acknowledges he had a contract with E-Bay that

allowed for the sale of Ronald DeFeo’s paintings. The contract

contained a waiver of personal jurisdiction, consenting to

personal jurisdiction in Santa Clara County, California, in the

Northern District of California, to resolve disputes between

Defendant Grant and E-Bay. There is no evidence that Mr. Grant

ever made any sales of paintings, including sales to anyone in

California or through E-Bay.3 Defendant Defeo sent the letter to

Sony Pictures and the USA Network to addresses in California.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that Mr. Osuna’s wife is an exotic

dancer in Las Vegas and that she had a “promotional” website

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 4 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

about four years ago on which nude photographs of Mr. Osuna’s

wife were posted. Plaintiffs also acknowledge that Mr. Osuna

helped his wife with this website. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Pro Se Litigant-Review of Complaint.

Plaintiffs are pro se litigants. The court has a “duty...to

construe pro se pleadings liberally.” Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d

1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hamilton v. U.S., 67 F.3d 761,

764 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)

(quotation omitted)). The pleadings of pro se litigants “are

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10 (quotation omitted). 

B. Defendant Grant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(2).

1. Legal Standard.

Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that the district

court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant. See Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439,

1441 (9th Cir. 1987). “[U]ncontroverted allegations in the

complaint must be taken as true.” Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303

F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing AT&T v. Compagnie

Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)). “When a

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 5 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the

plaintiff is ‘obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit

or otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction.’” Scott v.

Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Amba Mktg.

Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir.

1977)). Any “conflicts between the facts contained in the

parties’ [pleadings and] affidavits must be resolved in [the nonmovant’s] favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie

case for personal jurisdiction exists.” AT&T, 94 F.3d at 588

(citations omitted); see also Dole, 303 F.3d at 1108 (finding

that “[c]onflicts between parties over statements contained in

affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor”). Where

the district court “relies solely on affidavits and discovery

materials, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case

of jurisdiction.” See Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580,

587 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1993). If an evidentiary hearing is held or

the case proceeds to trial, however, “the burden on the plaintiff

shifts to the preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

There is no applicable federal statute governing personal

jurisdiction for plaintiffs’ claims. As a result, California law

applies, as it is the state in which the forum district court

sits. See Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements

Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Core-Vent Corp.

v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993). 

California’s “long-arm” statute “allows courts to exercise

personal jurisdiction over defendants to the extent permitted by

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” Id.;

see also Rano, 987 F.2d at 587 (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys.

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 6 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Tech. Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977); Cal. Civ.

Proc. § 410.10 (stating that “[a] court of this state may

exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the

Constitution of this state or of the United States”). 

Determining whether a court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a defendant is ordinarily a two-step process:

(1) whether the forum state’s long-arm statute

reaches the defendant; and 

(2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports

with the federal constitutional principle of due

process. 

Id. For a defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction in

the forum state, due process requires that the defendant must

have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the

maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326

U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also Haisten v. Grass Valley Med.

Reimbursement Fund, 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986)

(California’s long-arm statute “confers jurisdiction to the

extent that it comports with due process”).

Due process may be satisfied by establishing that one of two

forms of personal jurisdiction exists: general jurisdiction or

specific jurisdiction. See Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1420-21

(9th Cir. 1987). 

(a) General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction exists when a defendant “is domiciled

in the forum state” or has “substantial” or “continuous and

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 7 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 In determining whether specific personal jurisdiction

exists, a reasonableness test is applied. The Ninth Circuit has

also used these same seven factors to determine the

reasonableness of general personal jurisdiction:

(1) The extent of purposeful interjection into the

forum state;

(2) The burden on the defendant of defending in the

forum;

(3) The extent of conflict with the sovereignty of

8

systematic” contacts with the forum state, even if the cause of

action does not arise out of or relate to those contacts. 

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082,

1086 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Panavision Intern., L.P. v.

Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16

(1984)).

“The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is

‘fairly high.’” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d at

1076 (citing Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086). To meet this standard,

the defendant’s “contacts with the forum state must be of a sort

that ‘approximate physical presence.’” Id. (quoting Bancroft,

223 F.3d at 1086). “Factors to be taken into consideration are

whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in

business in the state, serves the state's markets, designates an

agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated

there.” Id. (quoting Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086).

“Even if substantial, or continuous and systematic, contacts

exist, the assertion of general jurisdiction must be reasonable.”

Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1077 (citing Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis

Navigation Co., Inc., 1 F.3d 848, 851-53 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)).4

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 8 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendant’s state;

(4) The forum state’s interest in adjudicating the

dispute;

(5) The most efficient judicial resolution of the

controversy;

(6) The importance of the forum to plaintiff’s

interest in convenient and effective relief;

(7) The existence of an alternative forum.

See Amoco Egypt Oil Co., 1 F.3d at 852.

9

(b) Specific Jurisdiction.

“If, however, a forum state cannot assert general

jurisdiction over the defendant, it may still assert specific

jurisdiction depending on the quality and nature of the

defendant’s contacts with the forum state in relation to the

cause of action.” Lake, 817 F.2d at 1421. To determine whether

the district court can exercise specific jurisdiction over the

defendants, courts apply a three-part test:

(1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully

direct his activities or consummate some

transaction with the forum or resident thereof;

or perform some act by which he purposefully

avails himself of the privileges of conducting

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the

benefits and protections of its laws; 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or

relates to the defendant's forum-related

activities; and 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with

fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must

be reasonable.

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 9 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Harris Rutsky & Co., 328 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Lake, 817 F.2d at

1421). 

Under the first prong, “courts must examine the defendant’s

contacts with the forum at the time of the events underlying the

dispute when determining whether they have jurisdiction.” Steel

v. United States, 813 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987). “The

purposeful availment standard requires more than foreseeability

of causing injury in another state.” Terracom v. Valley Nat.

Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Burger King Corp.

v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)). “The foreseeability

that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such

that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court

there.” Terracom, 49 F.3d at 560 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). “The purposeful

availment prong prevents defendants from being haled into a

jurisdiction through ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated

contacts.’” Terracom, 49 F.3d at 560 (quoting Burger King, 471

U.S. at 475). 

“The second prong of the specific jurisdiction test

(litigation must ‘arise out of or relate to those activities’) is

met if, ‘but for’ the contacts between the defendant and the

forum state, the cause of action would not have arisen.” 

Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561 (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines,

897 F.2d 377, 385-386 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), rev’d

on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)).

The third prong of the test, reasonableness, is presumed

once the court finds purposeful availment: “[w]e presume that an

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 10 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5 See supra note 3 for a list of the seven factors.

11

otherwise valid exercise of specific jurisdiction is reasonable.” 

Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (1995) (citing Sher v.

Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990)(“once court finds

purposeful availment, it must presume that jurisdiction would be

reasonable”)). When such a presumption operates, the burden of

proving unreasonableness shifts to defendant. Ballard, 65 F.3d

at 1500. At this point, to avoid jurisdiction, the defendant

must “present a compelling case that the presence of some other

considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Ballard,

65 F.3d at 1500 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). In

judging reasonableness, the court “balance[s] all seven factors,

recognizing that none of the factors is dispositive in itself.”5

Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561 (citation omitted).

The law formerly required a plaintiff to demonstrate each of

these three factors to establish specific jurisdiction. Ochoa v.

J.B. Martin and Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir.

2002)(citing Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287). In light of

subsequent Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit adopted a

more “flexible approach.” Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Brand

v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also

Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397 (finding that a “modification” of

California’s “three-prong test” was necessary in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789

(1984)). 

“Jurisdiction may be established with a lesser showing of

minimum contacts ‘if considerations of reasonableness dictate.’”

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 11 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Id. (quoting Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397). “‘Under this analysis,

there will be cases in which the defendant has not purposefully

directed its activities at the forum state, but has created

sufficient contacts to allow the state to exercise personal

jurisdiction if such exercise is sufficiently reasonable.’” Id.

(quoting Brand, 796 F.2d at 1074). “[A]ctivity by the defendant

need not physically take place in the forum state so as to

constitute sufficient contact under the due process test

[citations omitted].... [T]he Supreme Court has consistently

rejected the notion that absence of physical contacts with a

forum state can defeat personal jurisdiction, ‘so long as a

commercial actor’s efforts are purposefully directed toward

residents of another State.’” Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1398 (quoting

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-477); see also Calder, 465 U.S. at

790.

2. Whether General Jurisdiction Exists.

As stated above, general jurisdiction exists when a

defendant “is domiciled in the forum state” or has “substantial”

or “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state,

even if the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to

those contacts. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086. It is undisputed

that Defendant Grant is a resident of South Carolina. The only

issue is whether Grant’s contacts with California are

“substantial” or “continuous and systematic,” and if so, whether

the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable. Gator.com,

341 F.3d at 1077. 

Under some circumstances, a website can be a purposeful

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 12 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

contact with the forum state for purposes of general

jurisdiction. For example, an exercise of personal jurisdiction

is proper where a defendant clearly does business with residents

of the forum state over the Internet, i.e., the website is

“interactive.” See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952

F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1079. 

In weighing the issue of personal jurisdiction in the context of

the Internet, a “sliding scale” test is used in the Ninth Circuit

to ascertain what level of Internet activity is conducted in the

jurisdiction. Id. (general personal jurisdiction existed in a

California district court where retailer conducted large

percentage of its business via the Internet and engaged in

extensive marketing and sales in California and had extensive and

ongoing contacts with local California vendors). “This test

requires both that the party in question clearly do business over

the Internet, and that the internet business contacts with the

forum state be substantial or continuous and systematic.” Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that general jurisdiction over

Defendant Grant exists because “Defendant’s website is a

COMMERCIAL website, offering the paintings of Ronald Joseph

DeFeo, Jr. For sale on the site, effectuating such sales through

E-Bay, a California Corporation based in San Jose, California.” 

(Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 8 (emphasis in original)). Defendant does not

dispute that he offered paintings by Ronald DeFeo for sale, both

directly from his website and through E-Bay, but argues that no

personal jurisdiction exists because he made no sales to persons

in California, either directly or via E-Bay. 

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 13 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Defendant’s contract with a California corporation, without

something more, is insufficient to establish general personal

jurisdiction in a California court. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086

(no general personal jurisdiction even though, among other

things, Defendant had licensing agreements with several

California corporations). In the Internet context, under some

circumstances, extensive sales of merchandise via a website to

residents of the forum state are sufficient to establish general

jurisdiction. See Gator.com, 341 F.3d at 1078-9. Plaintiffs,

however, have not alleged, and do not dispute, that no sales of

paintings were made by Defendant Grant through his website to

California residents, either directly or via E-Bay. Plaintiff

has failed to establish a prima facie case of general

jurisdiction over Defendant Grant. Because there has been no

showing of systematic and continuous contacts with California,

the Court does not reach the second prong of the general

jurisdiction inquiry, i.e., whether the exercise of general

jurisdiction is reasonable. 

Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish that

general personal jurisdiction over Defendant Grant exists.

2. Whether Specific Jurisdiction Exists.

(a) Purposeful Availment.

Plaintiffs advance two arguments why the purposeful

availment prong of the specific jurisdiction test is satisfied. 

First, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Grant published

advertisements and information, including allegedly defamatory

statements about Plaintiffs, on his website that are available

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 14 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 The letter written by Defendant Tracy Lynn DeFeo to Sony

Pictures & USA Network is attached to the FAC as Ex. P. In it,

Mrs. DeFeo states, among other things: 

My name is Tracey Defeo. I am married to Ronald Defeo Jr. 

I am writing to inform you of a fraud that has been enacted

upon your studio and that you in turn are announced to

continue to enable and enact upon the public. 

I have learned that you are in production to make a movie of

Ric Osuna’s book, “The Night the Defeos Died” and that the

rights you acquired are based upon this self published book.

* * *

It has always been my understanding that your network does

not intend to deceive your audiences, nor does it

deliberately contribute to the financial gain of animal

abusers, convicted felons or pornographers. It is my intent

to inform you that the fraud that 210 sold books created

would be multiplied exponentially by your disregard and

inattention to this notice. I am obligated to further

notice and inform you that all rights reserved by the Defeo

family will be strictly enforced. 

15

for viewing nationally and internationally, including in

California. (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 8; Doc. 20, Pl.’s Opp. 5). 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Grant posted allegedly defamatory

statements and the letter written by Defendant Tracy Lynn Defeo

to Sony Pictures and USA Network on his website,6 and that these

activities were aimed at Plaintiff Katzenbach, a resident of

California, and were aimed to cause harm to him in California. 

(Doc. 20, Pl.’s Opp. 3).

Second, Plaintiffs assert that Grant’s contract with E-Bay

satisfies the purposeful availment element because the contract

contains a waiver of personal jurisdiction consenting to personal

jurisdiction in California. (Id. at 6). 

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 15 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

First, Defendant argues that merely posting information,

including advertisements and/or defamatory statements, on a

website does not establish purposeful availment. Defendant is

correct. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Cybersell,

Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997): 

[S]o far as we are aware, no court has ever held that an

Internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject the

advertiser to jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s home state.

[citation] Rather, in each, there has been “something more”

to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit

electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way

to the forum state.

Defendant Grant’s ownership of a website that is viewable in

California is not sufficient to establish the purposeful

availment element of the specific jurisdiction analysis. Id.;

see also Medinah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F. Supp. 2d

1132, 1135 (D. Nev. 2002).

In cases where intentional torts are alleged, including

cases involving the Internet, it is also appropriate to apply the

“effects test” of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984),

to determine whether the purposeful availment prong has been

satisfied. See Medinah Mining, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1135; see also

Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir.

1998) (applying effects test to trademark infringement and unfair

competition claims); Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59

F.3d 126, 128 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying effects test to

defamation, tortious interference with business relations, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress); Brainerd v.

Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir.

1989) (applying effects test to defamation and tortious

interference with contract claims). 

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 16 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

In this case, Plaintiffs have alleged seven causes of

action, which are all intentional torts. Application of the

effects test is therefore appropriate here. However, Plaintiffs’

argument for specific personal jurisdiction under the effects

test fails. 

Under the “effects test,” personal jurisdiction is based on:

“(1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state;

(3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered--and which the

defendant knows is likely to be suffered--in the forum state.” 

Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321, quoting Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 486. 

To satisfy the effects test, Plaintiffs must first

successfully allege an “intentional act.” The intentional act

alleged here is that Defendant Grant posted on his website

various defamatory statements, including an allegedly defamatory

letter to Sony and USA Network written by a third party (i.e.,

Defendant DeFeo). Publishing defamatory statements may be

sufficient to satisfy the “intentional act” element of the

purposeful availment test. Here, Plaintiff has alleged that

Defendant Grant published defamatory statements on his website. 

Defamation is an intentional tort and satisfies the first prong

of the effects test. 

The second element of the effects test is “express aiming.” 

The Ninth Circuit holds that “expressly aimed” means “when the

defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted

at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the

forum state.” Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. The Ninth Circuit has

cautioned, however, that any foreign act with foreseeable effects

in the forum state does not always give rise to personal

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 17 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

jurisdiction. Bancroft, 223 F.2d at 1087; see also

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 804-5 (9th

Cir. 2004). “Instead,...‘something more’ is required to

establish that the defendant expressly aimed its conduct at the

forum.” Medinah Mining, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. In order for

the “express aiming” element of the effects test to be satisfied,

the Defendant must know that the plaintiff is a resident of the

forum state and that the harm resulting from the intentional act

will be suffered in the forum state. Bancroft, 223 F.2d at 1087;

Medinah Mining, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1137; see also Calloway Golf

Corp. v. Royal Canadian Golf Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200-1

(C.D. Cal. 2000).

There is no evidence that Defendant Grant knew that

Defendant Katzenbach was a resident of California. In fact, the

only information regarding this issue is Grant’s “Declaration,”

which states that Grant did not know Mr. Katzenbach was a

resident of California until this lawsuit was filed. (Doc. 15,

Def.’s Mem. 3-5; Grant Decl. ¶ 7). Assuming that Mrs. DeFeo’s

letter to Sony Pictures and USA Network was defamatory, the harm

of the defamation would have been suffered in California, since

Sony and USA Network are located in California and any film would

most likely have been produced in California. However, there is

no allegation that Sony and USA Network ever looked at the letter

on Grant’s website. The letter was written by Mrs. DeFeo, not by

Defendant Grant. While the letter was originally sent to

California, it was Mrs. DeFeo, not Defendant Grant, who sent the

letter. Mr. Katzenbach is not even mentioned by name in the

letter; only Plaintiff Osuna is mentioned, and he is a resident

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 18 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

of Nevada. There is no evidence, nor any legal support, that

Grant’s posting of the letter, or any of the other defamatory

statements, in South Carolina, was expressly aimed at Katzenbach

in California. See Medinah Mining, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1137-8;

Callaway Golf, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1200-1; Schwarzenegger, 274

F.3d at 807. Plaintiffs have not established the second element

of the effects test based on his posting of information to his

website. Plaintiffs have failed to establish the purposeful

availment element based on Grant’s posting of information on his

website.

Plaintiff’s second argument for purposeful availment is

based again on Grant’s contract with E-Bay. This case does not

involve the E-Bay contract. The contract contains a choice of

forum provision for disputes relating to that contract and a

waiver of personal jurisdiction consenting to personal

jurisdiction in Santa Clara County, California, in the Northern

District of California, to resolve disputes between Mr. Grant and

E-Bay. Defendant Grant (who does not deny having such a contract

with E-Bay) purposefully availed himself of the privileges of

doing business in California by entering into this E-Bay

contract, by which he agreed to personal jurisdiction in

California for E-Bay business disputes. 

(b) Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Arise Out of

Defendants’ Forum-Related Activities.

The next inquiry is whether Plaintiffs’ claims in this suit

arise out of Defendant’s forum-related activities. Plaintiff has

shown that Defendant Grant purposefully availed himself of the

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 19 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

laws and privileges of California by submitting to a waiver of

jurisdiction by signing the E-Bay contract. The E-Bay contract

is unrelated to the claims in this case. Plaintiffs’ claims here

arise out of Grant’s posting of information on his website that

is alleged to have contributed in part to the apparent failure of

Plaintiffs’ negotiations with a motion picture production company

to produce a movie. 

The purpose of Mr. Grant’s website was not clarified by

either party. One of the purposes appears to be to keep the

Amityville murders and Mr. Defeo in the public interest, and to

attempt to commercialize and profit from the continuing notoriety

and public interest of this subject. Mr. Grant’s attempted sales

of paintings by Mr. Defeo on his website, including through EBay, are remotely related to this purpose. There seems to be

some logical connection between the subject matter of Mr. Osuna’s

book, the Plaintiffs’ alleged movie deal, and the purpose of Mr.

Grant’s website. The connection, however, is tenuous.

Ultimately, the defamation claim and the other intentional

tort claims that are the subject matter of this lawsuit do not

“arise out of” the E-Bay contract. Plaintiff has failed to

establish the first two elements of specific jurisdiction.

(c) Whether Assertion of Jurisdiction over

Defendant is Reasonable.

If a plaintiff successfully establishes the first two

elements of specific jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the

defendant to establish that exercise of jurisdiction would not be

reasonable. It is unnecessary to continue with the

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 20 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 The Court notes that Defendant Grant argues that the

assertion of personal jurisdiction in California would be

unreasonable because (1) he suffers from Facioscapulohumeral

Muscular Dystrophy and (2) he is currently unemployed and

subsides on disability payments, which would both make it

difficult for him to travel to California to defend this case. 

(See Doc. 15, Def.’s Mem. at Grant Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5).

21

reasonableness analysis because Plaintiffs have failed to

establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction.7

3. Conclusion.

Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case that

either general or specific jurisdiction exist over Defendant

Grant. Defendant Grant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED with

leave to amend.

C. Defendant Grant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

State a Claim Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to attack a

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is

disfavored and rarely granted: “[a] complaint should not be

dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In deciding whether to grant a

motion to dismiss, the court “accept[s] all factual allegations

of the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987,

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 21 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 Plaintiffs cite Nevada state law in their complaint. 

There was no discussion by the parties as to whether Nevada or

California law applies here. In diversity cases, such as this

one, federal district courts apply the law of the forum state

unless a party has timely invoked the law of another state. Erie

R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 30 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Bird v. Lewis &

Clark College, 303 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002). Neither

party discussed the applicable law in their papers or during oral

argument. The law of the State of California will therefore be

applied.

22

991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“The court need not, however, accept as true allegations

that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For

example, matters of public record may be considered under Fed. R.

Evid. 201, including pleadings, orders and other papers filed

with the court or records of administrative bodies. See Lee v.

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be

accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981).

1. Whether Plaintiffs State a Claim for Defamation.

Plaintiffs’ FAC contains a claim for “Defamation of

Character, Libel & Slander,” and cites Cal. Civ. Code §§ 43, 45,

45(a), 46, 46(1), 46(3), and 46(5).8 As a preliminary matter,

Defendant Grant argues that Plaintiffs do not state a claim for

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 22 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

slander because “all of the allegations in the FAC involve

written statements.” (Doc. 15, Def.’s Mem. 6). Plaintiff

responds that Cal. Civ. Code § 46 states that slander can be

communicated by “any mechanical or other means,” and argues that

the alleged defamatory statements were transmitted via the

internet and therefore via “mechanical” means. (Doc. 20, Pl.’s

Mem. 9).

Cal. Civ. Code § 46 defines slander as “a false and

unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications

by radio or any other mechanical means....” (emphasis added). 

Cal. Civ. Code § 45 defines libel as “a false and unprivileged

publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed

representation to the eye....” (emphasis added). The traditional

distinguishing factor between slander and libel is that slander

is a statement communicated orally, whereas libel is communicated

via the written word. Plaintiffs do not state a claim for

slander, since all of their allegations relate to Defendants’

written statements. See Varian Med. Syst., Inc. v. Delfino, 6

Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 341-2 (2003) (analyzing legislative history of

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 45 and 46 and finding that California

legislature did not intend to include communications via the

Internet in definition of slander), rev’d on other grounds 35

Cal.4th 180 (2005). The phrase “mechanical means” refers to

mechanical means capable of transmitting orally uttered

statements. See id.

To state a claim for libel, the First Amendment requires

that a plaintiff first establish that the allegedly false

statement on which the claim is based is “of and concerning” the

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 23 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

plaintiff. Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal.3d 1033, 1045

(1986). To satisfy this requirement, “the plaintiff must

effectively plead that the statement at issue either expressly

mentions him or refers to him by reasonable implication.” Id. at

1046. For a statement to be libelous, California law requires

that the offending statement “expressly or impliedly assert a

fact that is susceptible to being proved false, and [is]

reasonably able to be interpreted as stating actual facts.” 

Coastal Abstract Svc., Inc. v. First Amer. Title Ins., 173 F.3d

725, 729 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotations

omitted); see also Couch v. San Juan Unified School Dist., 33

Cal. App. 4th 1491, 1501 (3d Dist. 1995). 

Whether a published statement is reasonably susceptible of

an interpretation that implies a provable assertion of fact is a

question of law for the court. Id. To answer the question

whether a statement has a defamatory meaning or is mere opinion

(which is not actionable), “the court looks to whether the

reasonable reader would interpret the statement, taken in

context, to imply a false assertion of fact.” Isuzu Motors, Ltd.

v. Consumers Union of United States, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, (C.D.

Cal. 1998) (citing Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 563, 566

(9th Cir. 1993); see also Norse, 991 F.2d at 566 (“To discern

whether a statement has a defamatory meaning, we interpret it

from the standpoint of the average reader, [ ] judging the

statement not in isolation, but within the context in which it is

made.”). 

Plaintiffs assert that a number of statements published by

Defendant Grant on his website are libelous.

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 24 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

//

(a) First Statement.

The first statement Plaintiffs allege is defamatory is the

following:

Attention: If you feel that fraud and deceit has been

perpetrated upon you from the book “The Night the Defeos

Died” and continues to be with the production of a movie

based upon that book and wish to make this known to the

court by the way of a sworn (before a notary) affidavit

please email mrsdefeo@hotmail.com. Only do this if you

purchased the book “The Night the Defeos Died.” Also, if

you have had any first hand observations of the deception

and lack of any form of moral guidance Ric Osuna, Geraldine

Gates, Ryan Katzenbach, Katco and Xlibris have conspired to

create and deceive the public with please email

mrsdefeo@hotmail.com. Thank you Mrs. Defeo.

(Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 50, Ex. O (emphasis added); see also Doc. 15,

Def.’s Mem. 7). Defendant does not deny that the first statement

identified by Plaintiffs appeared on his website. Defendant

argues this is not a defamatory statement because it only asks

readers of the book whether they “feel” they were deceived by the

book. (Doc. 15, Def.’s Mem. 7). Defendant analogizes the

statements to inquiries readers would make if they felt deceived

by “the slant [an] author took, or the information he chose to

include or exclude.” (Id. at 7). For example, Defendant argues

that calling Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 911 “deceptive” is

not libelous because doing so merely expresses the viewer’s

opinion that Moore’s shading of the facts was deceptive. (Id.). 

Plaintiffs respond by claiming that the statement accuses

Plaintiffs of committing a “crime of moral turpitude,” and that

statement is therefore per se defamatory. (Doc. 20, Pl.’s Opp.

10). Defendant replies that “no one reading the post on the

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 25 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

website [in context] would believe that the statement accused

Plaintiffs of the crime of deception.” (Doc. 22, Def.’s

Reply 5). Defendant cites portions of the FAC that provide some

context for the statement. Plaintiff Osuna based his book The

Night the Defeos Died on interviews with a woman named Geraldine

Gates who claims to have been Ronald Defeo’s wife at the time of

the murders. Plaintiffs allege that “[s]ome believed that

Geraldine Gates’ account of the story...was true. Others did not

accept that, and labeled Gates a fraud seeking money and

publicity.” (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 25). Defendant argues that if the

above statement is considered in the context of the controversy

regarding Ms. Gates that has arisen in the “Amityville

Establishment,” it is not libelous because “Plaintiffs are only

accused of publishing a book which used interviews with a witness

who might not have told the truth.” (Doc. 22, Def.’s Reply 5).

The statement refers to Plaintiffs Katzenbach and Osuna by

name, so the first requirement of libel that the statement is “of

or concerning” the plaintiffs is met. The next step is to

determine whether the statement is “reasonably able to be

interpreted as stating actual facts,” and if so, whether those

facts are susceptible to being proved false. Coastal Abstract,

173 F.3d at 729. Without directly stating so, this statement

implies that Plaintiffs are dishonest and immoral and that

Plaintiff Osuna’s book is deceptive. These statements are not

statements of fact. They are statements of opinion about the

moral character and honesty of Plaintiffs and about the content

and presentation of the book. The statements do not accuse

Plaintiffs of committing any crime, let alone any crime of “moral

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 26 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

turpitude,” that would meet the standard for per se defamation. 

The statements do not accuse the book of containing false facts;

they accuse the book of being deceptive. History and facts can

be interpreted and presented in a number of different ways;

readers are entitled to express their opinions about then

interpretation and the author’s presentation.

Defendant Grant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Claim for

Libel as to the First Statement (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 50) is GRANTED. 

(b) Second Statement.

The second statement complained of can be divided into two

parts and is contained in the letter sent by Tracey Lynn Defeo to

Sony Pictures:

I am writing to inform you that a fraud has been enacted

upon your studio.... I have learned that you are in

production to make a movie of Ric Osuna’s book “The Night

the Defeos Died,” and that the rights you acquired are based

upon this self-published book. 

* * *

It has always been my understanding that your network does

not intend to deceive your audiences, nor does it

deliberately contribute to the financial gain of animal

abusers, convicted felons or pornographers.

(Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 53, Ex. P) (emphasis added). Although this letter

was written and sent by Defendant Defeo, the letter was posted on

Defendant Grant’s website, and therefore was published Defendant

Grant as well.

First, the letter mentions Plaintiff Osuna by name, and is

therefore “of or concerning” Mr. Osuna. The letter does not

mention Plaintiff Katzenbach by name. Plaintiff Katzenbach

asserts he is impliedly referenced because he was involved in the

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 27 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

movie production negotiations with Sony and USA Pictures. 

However, Plaintiffs have not plead that his involvement in the

movie was generally known to the public or that the proposed

movie has acquired a secondary meaning associated with him. 

Plaintiff Katzenbach is not a public figure, so it is not likely

that the general public would have known about his involvement

with Mr. Osuna and the potential movie deal. That Sony Pictures

and USA Network may have known about his involvement is

irrelevant for the purposes of the analysis as to Defendant

Grant; Grant is not alleged to have sent the letter to Sony and

USA, but instead is only alleged to have posted it on his

website. Plaintiffs do not allege that Sony or USA Network

viewed the letter on Grant’s website. The allegedly defamatory

statements in the letter are therefore not “of and concerning”

Plaintiff Katzenbach and are only “of and concerning” Plaintiff

Osuna.

The next step is to determine whether the statements in the

letter are facts susceptible to be proved false. Plaintiff first

complains that the phrase “self-published book” is defamatory

because it is false and it hurts Plaintiff Katzenbach’s

reputation. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Osuna’s book was

published by Mr. Katzenbach. Plaintiffs argue that the statement

that Mr. Osuna published his book himself injured Mr.

Katzenbach’s reputation as a publisher since Mr. Katzenbach had

represented to Sony and USA Network that Mr. Katzenbach was the

publisher of Mr. Osuna’s book. Plaintiffs’ arguments fail as to

Defendant Grant. There are no allegations that Mr. Katzenbach is

a public figure or that his reputation as a publisher in the

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 28 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 Plaintiffs do not appear to base their libel claim on the

statement “a fraud has been enacted on your studio.” This

statement will not be considered. Arguendo, it is a statement of

opinion.

29

public eye would be negatively affected by the implication that

Mr. Osuna’s book was self-published. From the face of the

letter, there is no reference to Plaintiff Katzenbach. This

statement cannot support a defamation claim and Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s libel claim as to this statement

(Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 53, 21:12-4) is GRANTED.

9 

The Plaintiffs next complain that the statements in the

second part of the letter imply that that Plaintiff Osuna has

deceived Sony and USA Network because his book is deceitful and

that Plaintiff Osuna is an animal abuser, convicted felon and/or

a pornographer.

The accusation that someone is an animal abuser, a convicted

felon, and/or a pornographer is defamatory per se. These

statements are facts susceptible to being proved false and tend

to harm reputation.

The only statement for which Defendant Grant asserts the

defense of truth is the reference to pornographers. Plaintiffs

made a number of allegations in their FAC relating to a website

on which Mr. Osuna and his wife posted nude photographs of Mr.

Osuna’s wife. Plaintiff Osuna does not dispute that his wife is

an exotic dancer and that she had a website on which

“promotional” nude photographs were posted. Plaintiffs assert

that the website no longer exists. Whether Defendants can

succeed with a truth defense is a mixed question of law and fact

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 29 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

not appropriately decided on a motion to dismiss. 

Finally, the accusation that someone has been deceitful is

not defamatory per se an accusation is not a fact reasonably

susceptible to being proved false. As discussed above, the

implication is that someone has been deceptive is an opinion. 

Defendant Grant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for

defamation is GRANTED with respect to all statements in the

letter, except with respect to the reference to Plaintiff Osuna

as an animal abuser, convicted felon, or pornographer, (Doc. 9,

FAC ¶ 53, 21:23-5) as to which Defendant Grant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for Libel is DENIED.

(c) Third Statement. 

The third statement alleged to be defamatory is a posting to

Defendant’s website that states: “New 10/05/04 Here are some

links to Ric Osuna’s wife’s porn site....” (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 55). 

Defendant does not dispute that this statement was posted to his

website. Defendant argues that this statement is not libelous

because it is true. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs acknowledge

in the FAC that Ric Osuna’s wife is an exotic dancer who works in

Las Vegas, and that Ric Osuna was the photographer for a website

for his wife. In addition, Defendants point to Ex. Y of the FAC,

which are excerpts from a deposition transcript of Plaintiff

Osuna in which Defendants argue that Osuna admits that he helped

his wife with her website which published nude photographs of

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 30 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Plaintiffs argue that the deposition was not signed by

Plaintiff Osuna and that “the unauthorized use of such

constitutes defamation and libel as well as claims of violation

of privacy.” (Doc. 20, Pl.’s Mem. 12). The deposition

transcript is a public document, regardless of whether it was

signed, unless it is the subject of a protective order or was

sealed. There is no evidence that the deposition transcript is

sealed or the subject of a protective order. Plaintiffs attached

the deposition transcript to their complaint in this litigation,

which is also a public proceeding. Plaintiffs’ argument has no

merit. Plaintiffs do not deny that Mr. Osuna’s wife had a

website. Photographs posted on a website cannot be the subject

of invasion of privacy. Websites are not, by definition,

private; one of their very purposes is to be viewable by and

accessible to the public at large.

31

her.10 (Doc. 9, FAC, Ex. Y). In a footnote to the FAC,

Plaintiffs claim that the purpose of the website was to promote

Plaintiff Osuna’s wife’s dancing, which is a “legal profession,”

and that it has not been active for at least 4 years. (Doc. 9,

FAC 22 n. 3). 

Plaintiffs argue that the above statement is defamatory on

its face because “it would require readers to read the entire

deposition to understand exactly what is being said.” Plaintiffs

further argue that “[o]nly upon reading the deposition would

readers conclude that Plaintiff Osuna was being badgered by Lutz’

counsel....” (Id.). 

The statement at issue here refers only to Plaintiff Osuna,

and is not of or concerning Plaintiff Katzenbach. The statement

implies that Mr. Osuna’s wife has a “porn site.” The implication

that an individual is directly involved or associated with a

pornographic website can tend to injure an individual’s

reputation, and therefore is per se defamatory. 

Here, the defense of truth is asserted. Plaintiffs dispute

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 31 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 The parties also do not raise the question of

applicability of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which provides that “[n]o

provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be

treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided

by another information content provider.” The applicability of

this section will therefore not be addressed here.

32

that the website was “pornographic,” and assert that the website

was merely a “promotional” website. Plaintiffs have conceded

that Plaintiff Osuna was at one time involved with his wife’s

website. Plaintiffs attach to the FAC Mr. Osuna’s deposition

testimony from another litigation wherein Mr. Osuna admits that

it posted “adult related material for swingers clubs and things

like that.” (Doc. 9, FAC, Ex. Y at 1). Whether the material

found there, which has not been provided, is susceptible to being

viewed as pornography is a matter of opinion. The defense of

truth involves mixed questions of law and fact not appropriately

decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Libel claim as to

Plaintiff Osuna regarding the statement “Here are some links to

Ric Osuna’s wife’s porn site” (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 55) is GRANTED.

(d) Fourth Statement.

The fourth statement Plaintiffs allege is defamatory is a

posting to Defendant’s website by a person known as

“Sherbetbizarre.” The statement refers to Plaintiff Katzenbach

and states “He Failed Before.”11 (Doc. 15, Def.’s Mem. 8). The

posting refers to a book published by Plaintiff Katzenbach’s

company titled The King is Dead. The person known as

“Sherbetbizarre” posted two book covers of The King Is Dead, one

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 32 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

with a banner stating that the book was soon to be a major

television event and another cover (from a later edition of the

book) without the banner. Plaintiffs allege that this statement

is defamatory because it implies that Plaintiff Katzenbach is a

“failure.” (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 57). 

Plaintiffs state in a footnote to the FAC that Plaintiff

Katzenbach had sold the rights and options to Twentieth Century

Fox, but that those rights had since “reverted back” to

Katzenbach. Plaintiffs assert that Katzenbach, by his own

choice, decided to sit on the rights before pitching the

screenplay to another studio. (Doc. 9, FAC, p. 24 n. 4). 

Defendant maintains that the allegedly defamatory statement, “He

Failed Before” is not the same as “He is a failure,” and that in

any event the statement “He Failed Before,” is factually true. 

(Doc. 22, Def.’s Reply 6).

First, the statement refers to Plaintiff Katzenbach, and

therefore is only “of or concerning” Plaintiff Katzenbach. 

Second, taken in context, the statement “He Failed Before” is an

opinion characterizing the fact that Plaintiff’s book cover, at

one time, stated that the book was to be a television program,

and that the statement was removed from a later edition of the

book. Plaintiff Katzenbach does not deny that at one time the

rights to his book belonged to Twentieth Century Fox, and that

later the rights reverted back to him. Nor was any television

program based on the book ever aired. Plaintiff does not believe

that the reversion of the rights back to him means that he

“failed.” The person who posted the statement, however, does

interpret the events in this way. This statement is opinion. 

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 33 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 Plaintiffs cite O’Connor v. McGraw Hill, 159 Cal. App. 3d

478 (1984), in support of their argument that “He Failed Before”

implies that Plaintiff Katzenbach is a failure: “A defendant is

liable for what is insinuated as well as for what is stated

explicitly.” O’Connor is distinguishable and does not support

Plaintiffs’ argument. The allegedly defamatory statements in

O’Connor were published in a magazine and implied that a large

corporation had lost its bid on a contract to be the sponsor for

the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles due to the arrogance of

one of the corporation’s attorneys during bid negotiations. The

attorney allegedly lost his job after the article was printed and

sued the publisher of the magazine for defamation. The Court

held the attorney’s claim should not be dismissed because the

implication that his behavior caused a breakdown in the contract

negotiations could be considered defamation. Whether or not the

attorney’s behavior caused a breakdown was a fact susceptible to

being proved false. Here, there is no such implied fact in the

statement “He failed before.” This statement is opinion. 

O’Connor does not apply.

34

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that support a claim of

//

//

//

defamation for the statement “He Failed Before.”12

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ libel claim as to

the statement “He Failed Before” (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 57) is GRANTED.

2. Whether Plaintiffs State a Claim for Tortious

Interference with Contractual Relations.

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is tortious interference

with contractual relations. To state a claim for tortious

interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must plead

the following 5 elements:

(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party;

(2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s

intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 34 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or

disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5)

resulting damage.

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stears & Co., 50 Cal.3d 1118,

1126 (Cal. 1990). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to

allege the first and fourth elements of this claim. Defendant

argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege the existence of a contract

and that they only allege that they struck a “tentative deal”

with USA Networks and Sony Pictures regarding the production of

the film. (Doc. 15, Def.’s Mem. 9). Second, Defendant also

argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged an actual breach of the

alleged contractual relationship, and in fact allege the opposite

when they assert that “[s]aid project with USA Networks and Sony

Pictures is currently, as of date of this complaint, is [sic] in

development.” (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 22).

Plaintiffs acknowledged during oral argument that there is

no contract with Sony or USA Network, and no breach. Plaintiffs

have failed to plead all elements required for a claim for

tortious interference with contractual relations. Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for Tortious Interference

with Contractual Relations is GRANTED with leave to amend.

3. Whether Plaintiffs State a Claim for Unfair

Business Practices Under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200.

Plaintiffs appear to confuse their claim for tortious

interference with contractual relations with their claim for

unfair business practices under Cal Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 

These are separate causes of action and must be pled separately. 

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 35 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

Whether Plaintiff has stated a claim under Section 17200 is

analyzed under that law. 

To state a claim under Section 17200, a plaintiff need not

allege the elements of a tort; a plaintiff must only allege that

the defendant engaged in a business practice or act that was

unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent, and that members of the public

are likely to be deceived by the practice. Bank of the West v.

Super Ct. of Contra County, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266-7 (1992); see

also Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Section 17200 “governs anti-competitive business practices as

well as injuries to consumers, and has as a major purpose the

preservation of fair business competition.” Cel-Tech

Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular, 20 Cal.4th 163, 180

(1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The tort

encompasses practices which offend established public policy or

that are immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or

substantially injurious to consumers.” Glenn K. Jackson Inc. v.

Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1203 (9th 2001).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s unfair, unlawful, or

fraudulent act under Section 17200 is the posting of the

following statement on his website:

One last thing!!! Stopping the movie being produced by Sony

and aired by USA Network of the book by Ric Osuna, The Night

the Defeos Died is a priority!

The statement was later revised to state:

One last thing!!! Stopping the movie being produced by

“SONY” and Aired by “USA” Network of the book by Ric Osuna,

The “Night the Defeos Died,” until a revision is made.

Defendant argues that posting these statements is not a wrongful

act within the meaning of the Unfair Business Practices Act. 

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 36 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 Plaintiffs assert in their opposition brief (but not in

their Complaint) that Defendant is in competition with Plaintiff

because he has “joined forces with others who have interests in

releasing” another Amityville Horror movie.

37

Plaintiffs do not allege in their Complaint that Defendant

Grant is in competition with Plaintiffs.13 Plaintiffs do not

allege that the public is likely to be deceived by these

statements. Plaintiffs only allege that, by posting these

statements on his website, Defendant Grant interfered with

Plaintiffs’ business relationship with Sony Pictures and/or USA

Network. (See FAC ¶ 65). This is not sufficient for a unfair

business practices claim.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim against

Defendant Grant under Section 17200. Defendant Grant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 is

GRANTED with leave to amend.

4. Whether Plaintiffs State a Claim for Copyright

Infringement.

Plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement against

Defendant Grant is based on the allegation that Defendant Grant

allowed the person known as “Sherbetbizarre” a/k/a Jason Pyke to

post on Grant’s website the cover graphics of the book, The King

is Dead, which were designed by Plaintiff Katzenbach and are

alleged to be copyrighted by him.

Section 411 of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 411) provides

in part:

(A) Except for an action brought for a violation of the

rights of the author under section 106A(a), and subject to

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 37 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 Defendant argues in the alternative that posting the

graphic covers of the first and second edition of The King is

Dead was a fair use permitted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §

107. Defendant’s fair use argument need not be considered

because there is no copyright. In addition, the fair use defense

is not appropriately decided at the pleading stage. Fair use is,

under some circumstances, appropriately decided on a summary

judgment motion. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority,

Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1986). Defendant,

however, has moved for dismissal, not for summary judgment. 

Consideration of Defendant’s fact-intensive arguments regarding

why use of the graphic book covers is a “fair use” is not

appropriate at the pleading stage. Plaintiff’s copyright claim

is not dismissible for this reason.

38

the provisions of subsection (b), no action for infringement

of the copyright in any United States work shall be

instituted until registration of the copyright claim has

been made in accordance with this title.

Defendant correctly states that the registration requirement

is jurisdictional and that Plaintiff Katzenbach cannot bring an

action for copyright infringement until he has registered the

work with the Copyright Office. See Kodadek v. MTV Networks,

Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff concedes

that he has not registered The King is Dead book covers with the

copyright office, although claimed in his brief that he is in the

process of registering. Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that

he has no copyright and did not reassert that he was still in the

process of registering.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim for

Copyright Infringement is GRANTED without leave to amend.14

5. Whether Plaintiffs State a Claim for Trademark

Infringement.

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 38 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 According to Plaintiffs, “meta-tags” are “‘keywords’ that

attract visitors to their website through the use of search

engines that find the keywords in the hidden code.” (Doc. 9, FAC

¶ 81). 

39

The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, name,

symbol, or device, or any combination thereof...used...to

identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique

product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to

indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is

unknown.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). “[The Lanham Act] makes

actionable the deceptive and misleading use in commerce of ‘any

word, term, name, symbol, or device’ on any goods or ‘in

connection with any goods.’” Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E &

J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)). To state a claim for trademark

infringement, a plaintiff must allege a valid trademark and must

also allege three elements: (1) distinctiveness;

(2) nonfunctionality; and (3) likelihood of confusion. Id. at

1046-7; see also Talking Rain Beverage Co. Inc. v. South Beach

Beverage Co., 349 F.3d 601, 603 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claim is brought only on

Plaintiff Osuna’s behalf. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have

infringed upon Osuna’s alleged common law trademarks to the

phrases “The Amityville Murders,” and “The Night the Defeos

Died,” and to his proper name, “Ric Osuna” by inserting these

phrases as “meta-tags” into Defendant Grant’s website.15 (Doc.

9, FAC ¶¶ 81, 83). 

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that show a valid

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 39 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

trademark. As stated above, a trademark is “any work...used by a

person...to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including

a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others.” 

15 U.S.C. § 1127. Marks identifying services can also be

trademarks. See id. Plaintiff identifies no goods or services

that are distinguished by the phrases “The Amityville Murders,”

“The Night The Defeos Died,” or “Ric Osuna.” Plaintiff

identifies no goods or services sold under the same name or to

which a secondary meaning has attached. The words are generic

descriptions of events and an individual name.

Trademarks can also be valid if registered with the

trademark office, or if the person using the trademark intends to

apply for a trademark. Plaintiffs provided no evidence of any

registered trademark and did not indicate any intent to register.

Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for trademark

infringement. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

for trademark infringement is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

6. Whether Plaintiffs State a Claim for Invasion of

Privacy.

To state a cause of action for invasion of privacy, a

plaintiff must allege: (1) a legally protected privacy interest,

(2) a reasonable expectation of privacy, (3) a serious invasion

of the privacy interest. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 7 Cal.4th 1, 40 (1994).

“Legally recognized privacy interests are generally of two

classes: (1) interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse

of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 40 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41

privacy’); and (2) interests in making intimate personal

decisions or conducting personal activities without observation,

intrusion, or interference (‘autonomy privacy’).” Id. 

Plaintiffs assert that the following constitute invasions of

their “privacy interests:” (1) Defendant Grant’s posting to his

website Plaintiff Osuna’s uncertified deposition testimony from a

Nevada state court case in which he is questioned and offers

answers regarding his wife’s website; (2) Defendant’s posting to

his website a link to the same website; and (3) the active

searching by defendants for links to the now-defunct website. 

(Doc. 9, FAC ¶¶ 91-2). 

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for invasion of

privacy because they have failed to identify any legallyprotectable privacy interests. First, testimony provided in a

deposition as part of litigation is not private, whether or not

it was signed, because litigation is, by its nature, public. A

reasonable person could not expect that anything said in a

deposition would remain private. Second, there is no privacy

interest in a website link. A reasonable individual would not

expect that links to a website are private because the Internet

is a public forum. Plaintiff Osuna acknowledges in the FAC that

his wife, an exotic dancer, had a website and that Ric Osuna

participated in this website. Third, it is not an invasion of

privacy for Internet users to search for a website. The Internet

is a public forum.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for invasion

of privacy is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 41 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42

7. Whether Plaintiffs State a Claim for Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress.

The elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the

intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s severe or

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous

conduct. Christensen v. Super Ct., 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991)

(internal citations omitted), cited with approval in In re Peck,

295 B.R. 353, 366 (9th Cir. 2003). Conduct is deemed outrageous

if it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually

tolerated in a civilized community.” Christensen, 54 Cal.3d at

903 (citation omitted). The conduct must be “of a nature that is

especially calculated to cause...mental distress of a very

serious kind.” Ochoa v. Super. Ct., 39 Cal.3d 159, 165 n. 5

(1985) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ only complaint against

Grant is that he ran a website on which other people (not Grant)

made statements about Plaintiffs that they “felt” were defamatory

and that there was a statement posted on the website saying that

stopping a movie based on Osuna’s book is a priority.” (Doc. 15,

Def.’s Mem. 19). Defendants are correct in that these type of

actions do not rise to the level of “outrageous conduct” under

applicable case law. Instead, they express views about

Plaintiffs’ intellectual property and public promotion efforts

that are critical of Plaintiffs. Such a risk of critical comment

is inherent in the commercialization of such ideas and activities

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 42 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43

intended for public consumption.

Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. The only “extreme and

outrageous conduct” of Defendant that Plaintiffs allege is the

conduct referred to in support of the other causes of action,

i.e., the posting of allegedly defamatory information on

defendant Grant’s website. The conduct here fails to rise to the

level of conduct not tolerated in a civilized society.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress claim is GRANTED without leave

to amend.

V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons:

Defendant Grant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) is GRANTED

with leave to amend;

Subject to the absence of jurisdiction in this Court,

Defendant Grant’s Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs’ claims for:

1) Libel is GRANTED, except with respect to the

reference to Plaintiff Osuna as an animal abuser,

convicted felon, or pornographer, (Doc. 9, FAC ¶ 53,

21:12-4; ¶ 55), for which Defendant’s motion is DENIED;

2) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations is 

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 43 of 44
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

44

GRANTED with leave to amend;

3) Unfair Trade Practices under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200 is GRANTED with leave to amend;

4) Copyright Infringement is GRANTED without leave to

amend;

5) Trademark Infringement is GRANTED with leave to

amend.

6) Invasion of Privacy is GRANTED without leave to

amend; and

7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is

GRANTED without leave to amend.

Any amended Complaint shall be filed within twenty (20) days

following date of service of this Order.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 7, 2005

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

_____________________________

Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06501-OWW -LJO Document 25 Filed 06/08/05 Page 44 of 44