Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02310/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frederick Larry St. Clair, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 08-2310-PHX-DGC (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of a pro se Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, filed on December 18, 2008, by Petitioner Frederick Larry St. Clair, who

is confined in the Arizona State Prison. (Doc. #1.) Respondents filed an Answer on April

17, 2009 (Doc. #12), and Petitioner filed a Reply on May 7, 2009 (Doc. #13).

BACKGROUND

I. Trial Proceedings.

On September 2, 2003 Petitioner was indicted by a Maricopa County Grand Jury on

seven counts of Sexual Abuse, Class 3 felonies and dangerous crimes against children, four

counts of Molestation of a Child, class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children, and

ten counts of Sexual Conduct with a Minor, Class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against

children. (Doc. #12, Exh. A.) The state filed an Allegation of Multiple Offenses not

Committed on the Same Occasion, pursuant to A.R.S. 13-702.02. (Id., Exh. B.) The state

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

also filed a Notice of Intent to use Defendant’s other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Pursuant to

Rules 404(b) and (c), Arizona Rules of Evidence. (Id., Exh. C.) 

Petitioner entered into a Plea Agreement with the state on January 26, 2004, in which

he agreed to plead guilty to one count of Sexual Conduct with a Minor, one count of

Attempted Sexual Conduct with a Minor, and one count of Attempted Molestation of a Child.

(Id., Exh. D.) Language in the agreement notified Petitioner that the crime of Sexual

Conduct with a Minor carries a presumptive sentence of 20 years, a minimum sentence of

13 years and a maximum sentence of 27 years. (Id., ¶1.) Petitioner and the state stipulated

that Petitioner would be sentenced to prison on this count. (Id., ¶2.) The parties also

stipulated that Petitioner would be placed on lifetime probation on the remaining two counts,

that the probation would include all sex offender terms, that Petitioner would have to register

as a sex offender, and that Petitioner would have to pay restitution to the victim in an amount

not to exceed $100,000. (Id.) Petitioner was advised of these same provisions in court by

the judge at his change of plea proceedings, and acknowledged understanding and agreeing

to them. (Doc. #12, Exh. E.) 

Petitioner was sentenced on April 5, 2004 to the presumptive term of 20 years in

prison for the Sexual Conduct with a Minor conviction, and lifetime probation on the

remaining two counts, to commence upon Petitioner’s physical release from prison. (Id.,

Exhs. G,H.) II. Post-conviction Proceedings.

Petitioner filed a Rule 32, Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter “PCR”),

stating the following as his cause of action and relief requested:

This is a first filing of a Rule 32 Petition in this case. I feel that there was

extreem predudico on the part of the pre-sentence reporter, also my good risk

assessment was not used. The judge would not hear from my attorney at

sentencing. Had made decision on case without hearing any arguement. Also

I feel that my attorney let the prosicution have there way. This is a first

offence and no priors of any kind.

(Doc. #12, Exh. I, at 4.) Petitioner requested that the court appoint counsel to represent him.

(Id.) On April 28, 2004, the trial court appointed the Office of the Public Defender to

represent him. (Doc. #12, Exh. I.) 

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

On August 2, 2004, Petitioner’s attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Doc. #12, Exh. J.) Attached to the motion was a statement signed by

Petitioner indicating that he was requesting “that the petition for post-conviction relief in this

matter be dismissed as [he] no longer wish[ed] to contest the judgment of guilt or sentence

entered against [him] in th[e] case.” (Id., at 3.) He also acknowledged that his petition

would be dismissed and that he would “not be able to file another petition . . . unless there

is new evidence which would have changed the verdict or sentence, a law has changed which

would probably overturn the conviction or sentence, or, [Petitioner is] held in custody after

[his] sentence has expired.” (Id.) On August 5, 2004, his petition was dismissed. (Doc. #12,

Exh. K.)

On September 20, 2005, Petitioner filed a notice of change of address with the trial

court, indicating therein that he had “filed a Post Conviction Relief Form 24C,” and therefore

would “need results [sent] to [him] at the [new address].” (Id., Exh. O.) The trial court

record does not contain the referenced Form 24C. (Id., Exh. S.) On October 5, 2005,

Petitioner filed a Request for Preparation of Post-Conviction Record, in which he requested

various documents from trial court proceedings. (Id., Exh. M.) The trial court denied that

request on October 27, 2005, indicating that defendant was required first to file a Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief, before being entitled to copies of transcripts at the court’s expense.

(Id., Exh. N.) 

On December 4, 2006, the state filed a Motion to Determine Counsel, Set Restitution

Hearing and Transport Defendant, in which it requested a hearing to determine whether or

not Petitioner should be ordered to pay restitution to the victim. (Id., Exh. O.) The court

ordered that counsel be appointed to represent Petitioner, and on January 26, 2007, at a Status

Conference at which Petitioner was present, the court ordered Petitioner to make restitution

to the victim in the total amount of $73,218.85, and ordered a payment schedule. (Id. at 4-6.)

On October 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a Notice of PCR, indicating therein that there

had been no previous PCR, and also indicating, by checking the form’s pre-printed boxes,

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

that his untimely filing should be excused because: (1) newly discovered material facts exist

which probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, (2) the defendant’s failure to

file a timely notice of post-conviction relief or notice of appeal was without fault on the

defendant’s part, and (3) there has been a significant change in the law that would probably

overturn the conviction or sentence. (Doc. #12, Exh. P.) In his own handwriting he

explained that his plea agreement was ambiguous, that he was denied the right to have a jury

determine any fact in aggravation of his sentence, that lifetime probation is cruel and unusual

punishment and violates Petitioner’s right to equal protection of the law and to due process.

(Id.) 

On November 16, 2007, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR, finding his petition

untimely, and further that he had failed to raise any claims qualifying as exceptions to the

time limits imposed by the Rule, citing Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h), Ariz.R.Crim.P.

(Doc.#1, Exh. C.) With regard to his untimely claim that a lifetime probation sentence is

unconstitutional, the trial court ruled alternatively that “A.R.S. 13-902(E) authorizes lifetime

probation upon conviction of a sexual offense. This term of probation does not constitute

cruel and unusual punishment or violate defendant’s rights to due process or equal protection

of the laws.” (Id.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of that dismissal on November 21, 2007, raising

two of the three issues he had raised in his Notice of PCR: the ambiguity of his plea

agreement, and the denial of his right to have a jury determine any fact in aggravation of his

sentence. (Doc. #12, Exh. Q.) The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied his petition

on October 21, 2008. (Id., Exh. R.)

III. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On December 18, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition. (Doc. #1.) He

identifies four grounds for relief:

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

- 5 -

Ground One: Petitioner claims he was denied access to the courts, because

Rule 32 is unconstitutional, and the prison did not provide the AEDPA1

 to

inmates. 

Petitioner admits not presenting this issue to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

(Doc. #1, at 6.)

Ground Two: Petitioner claims that the indictment returned against him was

multiplicitous.

(Id., at 7.)

Ground Three: Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective by not objecting

to an illegal sentence, not raising the right to confrontation, and not objecting

to a multiplicitous indictment.

(Id., at 8.)

Ground Four: Petitioner claims a sentence of lifetime probation is illegal.

(Id., at 9.)

Petitioner acknowledges that his petition is untimely under the AEDPA, but claims

that the “State did not provide Notice of Rules to the Arizona Department of Corrections, nor

were provided through Sate appointed ineffective assistance of counsel, nor by the State

Courts and Agents of the State. (Doc. #1, at 11.) He attaches in support of this assertion

another corrections inmate’s letter, dated June 2, 2008, to the warden librarian inquiring as

to whether or not the library currently carries, or ever carried the “legal reference 28 U.S.C.

§2244.” (Id., Exh. A.) On June 10, 2008, the librarian responded that “department order 902

attachment ‘A’ is very specific on which legal texts I can include in our library. Title 28

§2244 is not on that list.” (Id., Exh. B.) The librarian attached the list of titles made

available pursuant to department order 902, to include the Federal Civil Judicial Procedure

and Rules, Federal Criminal Code and Rules, and Post-Conviction Remedies by Larry

Yackle. (Id., Exh. C.)

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is

untimely under the AEDPA, as it was not filed within one year of the conclusion of

Petitioner’s state court proceedings, and that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

(Doc. #12.) Petitioner, in his Reply, argues that the limitations period should not apply as

he was not given notice of the AEDPA’s limitations provision, because of the prison library’s

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

failure to stock separately 28 U.S.C. §2244, and because of the impermissibly vague nature

of the AEDPA in general. (Doc. #13, at 4-6.)

DISCUSSION

 The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A state prisoner must file a

federal petition within one year from "the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). "[T]he period

of 'direct review' in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner

can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or

not the petitioner actually files such a petition." Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

"The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward" the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Lott, 304 F.3d at

921. A state petition that is not filed however, within the state's required time limit is not

"properly filed" and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). "When a post-conviction petition is untimely under

state law, 'that [is] the end of the matter' for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)." Id. at 414. 

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is "pending" during that period.

Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (The

petitioner was "not entitled to tolling during the interval between the completion of one round

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

of state collateral review and the commencement of a second round of review."). Moreover,

filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinstate a limitations period that

ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th

Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s first PCR was dismissed by the trial court on August 5, 2004. (Doc. #12,

Exh. K.) Although he consented to the dismissal, he would have had 30 days to seek review

in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). Thus, Petitioner’s conviction

became final on September 7, 2004, the first court-day after the 30-day expiration. Under

the AEDPA, Petitioner’s was required to file his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on or

before September 6, 2005. He did not file it until December 16, 2008; thus, unless he can

demonstrate statutory or equitable tolling, his petition should be dismissed as untimely.

I. Statutory Tolling.

Petitioner filed a second PCR on October 17, 2007. (Doc. #12, Exh. P.) This second

PCR was filed over 3 years after his conviction became final. Thus, Petitioner’s time to file

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus had already lapsed: filing a second PCR does not

reinstate an expired limitation period. Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823. See Fisher v. Gibson, 262

F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001) (there is no tolling for state post-conviction review filed

after the expiration of the statute of limitations); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th

Cir. 2001) (a collateral action may toll, but does not restart the statute).

Furthermore, Petitioner’s notice of change of address, and his Request for Preparation

of Post-Conviction Record were also sent to the court after the AEDPA limitation period had

expired, and in any event were not properly filed “petitions for post-conviction relief” that

could toll the statute of limitations under the AEDPA. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Spencer, 412

F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Not every filing by a criminal defendant meant to advance his

challenge to a judgment of conviction amounts to an application for other collateral review

of the judgment or claim.”); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 957-62 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding

that a clemency hearing does not constitute a tolling-triggering “properly filed application

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

for State post-conviction or other collateral review” under §2244(d)(2)). Petitioner is not

entitled to any statutory tolling of the AEDPA limitations period.

II. Equitable Tolling.

The Ninth Circuit has previously applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to the

AEDPA limitations period. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). Equitable

tolling is appropriate “if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128

F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)

(tolling of statute of limitations due to extraordinary circumstances requires that a defendant

diligently pursue his claim). A petition bears the burden of establishing that he pursued his

rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. Pace, 544 U.S.

at 418; United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1218 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1999).

Respondents argue that the United States Supreme Court opinion in Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007) established that the AEDPA limitations period

is jurisdictional, and therefore equitable tolling does not apply. The Ninth Circuit has

concurred with the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Diaz v. Kelly:

[I]t would be an unwarranted extension of Bowles to think that the Court was

impliedly rendering equitable tolling inapplicable to limitations periods just

because they are set forth in statutes. Since a statute of limitations is a defense,

see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c), it has not been regarded as jurisdictional, see Day v.

McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006)

(AEDPA limitations period), and has been subject to equitable tolling, see

Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 453,

112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). We think it remains so after Bowles.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United

States, __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 750, __ L.Ed.2d __, confirms our view. The

Court there noted that most limitations periods are non-jurisdictional

affirmative defenses and are subject to equitable tolling, see id. at 753-54, and

viewed the limitations period governing suits against the United States in the

Court of Federal Claims as jurisdictional only because a long line of prior

decisions had so held and were entitled to adherence under principles of stare

decisis, see id. at 756.

515 F.3d 149, 153-154 (2nd Cir. 2008).

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e agree with

the Second Circuit that Bowles did not invalidate equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

limitations.) See also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (assuming, without

deciding, that equitable tolling applies to federal habeas proceedings).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate equitable tolling applies in his case. He has not

demonstrated that he has “purs[ued] his rights diligently,” and that “some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19, n.8. Petitioner waited 3 years

before filing his second PCR, and over 4 years before filing the instant habeas petition. Such

delay in seeking relief is antithetical to a finding of diligence on Petitioner’s part. See Pace,

544 U.S. at 418-19 (no finding of due diligence when the petitioner had waited over 4 years

before filing second PCR); Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.

2007) (finding that the petitioner “did not pursue his petition with diligence” in part because

he made “no effort to seek relief between the denial of his last Rule 32 petition in October

1994 and the filing of the motion to recall the mandate in March 2000,” and hence petitioner

was “not entitled to equitable tolling.”)

Petitioner suggests that the absence in the prison library of the specific statutory

reference to AEDPA’s 1-year limitation period, 28 U.S.C. §2244, deprived him of his “right

to fair notice before the government may deprive [him] of a protected liberty interest. . . .”

(Doc. #13, at 2.) He attaches a June 2008 letter authored by the warden librarian, who

provided another correction inmate a list of legal resources available to prison inmates.

(Doc. #1, Exh. C.) Although 28.U.S.C. §2244 does not appear on this list, Petitioner presents

no evidence as to when this particular list went into in effect. Nor does Petitioner explain

why the failure to include the referenced material prevented him from timely filing a second

PCR.

Moreover, three of the 19 legal resources available in the prison library included the

text of the 28 U.S.C. §2244: Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules, Federal Criminal

Code and Rules, and Post-Conviction Remedies by Larry Yackle. (Doc. #1, Exh. C.)

Petitioner disputes that these publications provided sufficient notice of the requirements of

the AEDPA:

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Now the Respondents are attempting to continue to neglect their

responsibilities to provide this “notice” of the provisions concerning AEDPA

by concealing these important rights not only to Petitioner, but to the inmate

population as well and misleading this Court by stating that if petitioner had

discovered this fact in question by his own diligence or if he had read the

entire volume of Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules, Federal

Criminal Code and Rules, and Post-Conviction Remedies by Larry Yackle

is what the Respondents seem to suggest that somehow coming across in a

timely manner, Petitioner would have discovered under the Title

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a misleading title in and of

itself, for the fact that petitioner is neither a terrorist nor is the Death Penalty

applied to his case for the fact that Petitioner’s case is non capital in nature, the

Rule of Lenity apply’s in this case.” [emphasis added.]

Petitioner’s difficulty understanding the legal text applicable to his case, or his “lack

of sophistication” is not, by itself, “an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable

tolling.” See Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (petitioner’s inability

to correctly calculate the limitations period is not an extraordinary circumstance). Petitioner

admits that he had access to the text of the AEDPA, but claims that it is contained in larger

volume publications, making it hard to find, and that the title of the Act is misleading, and

therefore he was not given notice of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Petitioner does not

state an extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from filing his habeas petition on

time.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to equitable tolling, and thus, his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied as untimely under the AEDPA’s 1-year

statute of limitation.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. The objections shall not exceed 15 pages in length. Thereafter, the

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

parties have ten days within which to file a response to the objections. The responses shall

not exceed 10 pages in length. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 24th day of August, 2009.

 

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 14 Filed 08/24/09 Page 11 of 11