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Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 19-1068

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Timothy Farkas

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Addition Manufacturing Technologies, LLC, formerly known as Mckee-Addision

Tube Forming, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee

Overton Industries, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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 Submitted: September 24, 2019

Filed: March 11, 2020

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, BEAM and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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SMITH, Chief Judge.

Appellate Case: 19-1068 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/11/2020 Entry ID: 4889997
Timothy Farkas’s fingers were severely injured by a machine that uses a

hydraulic clamp to crimp metal tubes. He then filed this suit against Addition

Manufacturing Technologies, LLC (“Addition”), the machine designer’s successor.

The district court1found that Farkas failed to provide evidence from when the

machine entered the stream of commerce, which is necessary to sustain Farkas’s

products liability claims. The court granted Addition’smotion forsummary judgment.

We affirm. 

I. Background

The machine that injured Farkas’s fingers is a tube-end forming machine. To

operate the machine, the user inserts a piece of thin pipe known as tube. After

inserting tube into the machine, the user presses a foot pedal to activate the hydraulic

press. The machine then uses hydraulicsto bring clamps around the tube and to shape

the end of the tube. The hydraulic press can form tube ranging between 1 inch and

2.75 inches in diameter. 

Addition’s predecessor manufactured and sold the machine at issue in 1992 to

Walker Culver, according to its specifications. At the time of sale, the machine

included a point-of-operation guard. That guard consisted of a metal plate that, once

lifted, revealed a Lexan pane with a hole slightly larger than the size of tube. The

guard prevented the operator’s fingers from fitting in the clamp when there was tube

in the machine. The guard at the time of the machine’s initial sale only applied to the

tube size that Walker Culver specified. The machine itself, however, was capable of

crimping multiple sizes of tube.

1The Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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Various companies bought and sold the machine over the years. Relevant here,

a company sold the machine to Farkas’s employer in 2014. At that time, Farkas’s

employer engaged Overton Industries, Inc. to alter the guard in place to accommodate

multiple sizes of tube. 

While at work, Farkas used the machine to crimp a piece of tube that was

smaller than the guard. This allowed Farkas to insert his fingers into the point of

operation on top of the tube. When the machine crimped the tube, it also crushed

Farkas’s fingers. He then filed this diversity suit against Addition and other parties. 

Farkas asserts that Addition is strictly liable for the product’s design defect,

failed to warn about that defect, and negligently manufactured the product. Addition

moved for summary judgment, claiming that Farkas failed to provide evidence that

the original guard wasinadequate at the time of the machine’s initialsale. The district

court found that Farkas’s expert considered the wrong guard because the expert’s

deposition showed his conclusions relied on the guard present at the time of the

injury, not the guard from the time of sale. The court concluded that, without

evidence of the initial guard’s appropriateness and relevant industry standards, Farkas

could not establish any of his claims. Farkas v. Addition Mfg. Techs., LLC, 4:17-CV761 RLW, 2018 WL 6434776, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2018). The district court, thus,

granted Addition’s summary judgment motion. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

“We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.” Rester v.

Stephens Media, LLC, 739 F.3d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 2014). “Summary judgment is

appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Mack v. Stryker

Corp., 748 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We consider

“the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giv[e] that party the

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benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record.” Marlowe v.

Fabian, 676 F.3d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 2012). The parties agree that Missouri

substantive law applies in this diversity case. See Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75

F.3d 1252, 1255 (8th Cir. 1996). 

A. Strict Liability Claims

We first consider Farkas’s strict liability claims. To establish a claim for strict

liability for product defect, Farkas must offer “proof the product was then in a

defective condition unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use,

proof the product was used in a manner reasonably anticipated, and proof plaintiff

was damaged as a direct result of such defective condition as existed when the

product was sold.” Johnson v. Auto Handling Corp., 523 S.W.3d 452, 466 (Mo.

2017) (en banc) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). To establish a strict liability failureto-warn claim, the plaintiff must prove that

(1) the defendant sold the product in question in the course of its

business; (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous at the time ofsale

when used as reasonably anticipated without knowledge of its

characteristics; (3) the defendant did not give adequate warning of the

danger; (4) the product was used in a reasonably anticipated manner;

and (5) the plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of the product being

sold without an adequate warning. 

Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (emphasis

added).2 Note that both claims require the plaintiff to show that the product was

defective or dangerous at the time of sale. This case turns on that requirement. 

2Farkas points out that the district court did not address his failure-to-warn and

negligent product liability claims. “When a district court fails to address a matter

properly presented to it, we ordinarily remand to give the court an opportunity to rule

in the first instance.” GEICO Cas. Co. v. Isaacson, 932 F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 2019).

“But we have refrained fromremanding in cases where it is unnecessary on the record

before us.” Id. at 724–25. We find that it is unnecessary to remand here based on the

record before us. 

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During the machine’s life, the original guard was lost. Without proof of the

sufficiency of the original guard, Farkas cannot show that it was defective at the time

of sale. He attempts to satisfy the element by arguing that the original guard was

categorically deficient because any such guard is inherently dangerous when the

activation switch is a foot pedal. He highlights two reasons. First, the machine can

bend multiple sizes of tube, but the original guard only applied to one size, so

subsequent users had to remove the guard to use all of the machine’s capabilities.

Second, a foot pedal allows the operator to have their hands free when using the

machine. Those features—in Farkas’s opinion—render the machine inherently

dangerous, especially when compared to alternatives that require the operator to

remove their hands from the point of operation to activate the machine. 

The district court found that there was no evidence “that a machine with a foot

pedal and a properly-working point of entry guard” was inherently dangerous.

Farkas, 2018 WL 6434776, at *8. And because Farkasfailed to provide evidence that

the point-of-operation guard was not working at the time the machine was sold, the

court found that Farkas failed to prove that a defective condition existed when

Addition sold the machine. 

Farkas, citing to multiple places in the record, asserts that a material issue of

fact exists. For instance, he points to his expert’s testimony, which implies that

Addition should have used a light curtain rather than a point-of-operation guard. This

could show the existence of an alternative design. Yet Farkas’s expert does not

conclude that the combination of a foot pedal and point-of-operation guard is

inherently dangerous. Just the opposite. Addition asked the expert if there was “ever

an appropriate time to have a foot pedal operation along with a hand operation

on—on a machine like this?” Dep. of Dr. J. Kenneth Blundell at 5, Farkas v. Addition

Mfg. Techs., LLC, 4:17-CV-761 RLW(E.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 2018), ECF No. 103-1. The

expert responded, “Yes. If—if you have—have the area guarded.” Id. The question

then became whether the machine was properly guarded at the time of sale. The

expert could not testify to that, however, because he did not have any information

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about the original guard. Id. at 8. Instead, he stated the guard that was on the machine

at the time of the accident was inherently dangerous and implied that a light curtain

was preferable. So the expert’s testimony does not show that the machine’s design

was inherently dangerous or defective at the time of sale. 

Farkas also points to a competitor’s statement that it manufactures machines

with two-hand controls or light curtains and to Addition’s testimony that it no longer

sells the machine with point-of-operation guards. Again, that evidence shows the

effectiveness of alternatives, but it does not indicate that the foot pedal and point-ofoperation guard combination was inherently dangerous. Proof that newer machines

are safer does not, without more, prove the older machine was inherently dangerous.

The same applies to other witness statements, which indicated that the injury would

not have occurred if the machine had a light curtain or two-hand control. The district

court correctly concluded that this evidence does not create a material issue of fact. 

Farkas cites authorities that we find unpersuasive. In Egelhoff v. Holt, the

Supreme Court of Missourirejected a modification defense. 875 S.W.2d 543, 552–53

(Mo. 1994) (en banc). There, the plaintiff alleged that she modified caps on the end

of metal supports for her above-ground pool. Id. But that modification was in

response to the defendant’s defective product; the caps did not fit on the supports

because the caps were for a smaller diameter pole. Id. The court found that there was

“sufficient evidence from which the jury could have determined that the caps would

pop out, exposing the sharp edges of the posts, even if the caps had not been

modified.” Id. at 553.

Egelhoff is distinguishable. Had Farkas offered evidence indicating that the

machine was inherently dangerous when sold, Egelhoff could counter arguments

regarding subsequent modifications. But as discussed above, he did not. Further, the

plaintiff in Egelhoff did not argue that the defendant should have selected a different

kind of safety measure. Rather, the plaintiff there showed that the safety measure

employed was improperly fitted to the pool support when the product entered the

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stream of commerce. Id. Here, Farkas failed to provide evidence regarding whether

the safety features operated correctly at the time the machine entered the stream of

commerce, and his evidence is otherwise inadequate to show inherent danger.

Egelhoff does not help his case. 

Similarly, G.W.M. v. Flink Co., No. 4:08-CV-158, 2009 WL 2337117 (E.D.

Mo. July 29, 2009), provides little support. There, the defendants argued that the

plaintiff could not prove a defective condition because the relevant guard was

missing. Id. at *4. The court, however, found that there was a genuine issue of

material fact because the plaintiff’s expert indicated that the guard “should have been

designed out of” the machine. Id. Farkas argues that the same should apply here, but

his expert’s testimony is not as strong. Farkas’s expert did not opine that the guard

in place at the time of manufacturing should have been designed out of the machine.

Rather, he implied that a light curtain was preferable and that the guard that existed

at the time of the accident was inherently dangerous. But that was not the relevant

inquiry. The relevant inquiry was whether (1) a similarly-guarded machine was

inherently dangerous and, if not, (2) whether the guard at the time of sale was

adequate. In short, Farkas’s expert’s testimony failed to establish a triable issue of

fact, even under G.W.M., on either issue.

At bottom, Farkas failed to provide facts showing the machine was inherently

dangerous or improperly guarded at the time it entered the streamof commerce. Thus,

we conclude that he has not established a material issue of fact as to hisstrict liability

claims.

B. Negligent Product Liability

Farkas’s negligent products liability claim fares no better. “For products

liability to be founded in negligence, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty,

the defendant’s breach thereof, and proximately caused damages.” Morrison v.

Kubota Tractor Corp., 891 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). We hold that

Farkas failed to show that Addition owed him a duty under Missouri law.

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“The extent and limits of the duty of a manufacturer of a product dangerous

because of the use to which it is to be applied depend upon the nature and character

of the defect and of plaintiff’s knowledge thereof.” Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc.,

377 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Mo. 1964). 

[T]he manufacturer of a product which is potentially dangerous when

used in its intended fashion . . . is under a duty to the user to exercise

ordinary care in its manufacture, and is liable to a user injured thereby

if the injury resultsfrom a latent defect bespeaking lack of ordinary care

in producing the product. 

Morrison, 891 S.W.2d at 426 (emphasis added) (citing Stevens, 377 S.W.2d at 346).

Important here is the latent defect requirement. “[T]he manufacturer may be held

liable if the defect or danger is latent or concealed, but where the danger is open,

obvious and apparent, or the user has actual knowledge of the defect or danger, there

is no liability on the manufacturer.” Stevens, 377 S.W.2d at 347. “No defect can be

considered latent which is discoverable by the exercise of due care or reasonable

diligence.” Edwards v. Springfield Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 495 S.W.2d 489, 497

(Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (cleaned up).

In Stevens, the Supreme Court of Missourifaced the question of whether a load

binder—a device which takes the slack out of chains that secure loads on

trailers—was negligently manufactured. 377 S.W.2d at 344–46. The binder operated

by moving a lever back and forth between an open and closed position, which

tightened the chain. Id. at 344. The court noted that “[t]he perilous nature of the

product was obvious and apparent to plaintiff; its lack of a safety ratchet was plain

to be seen.” Id. at 348. Further, “[i]ts use created no danger not known to and

appreciated by plaintiff, an experienced trucker who had used load binders for years

and knew and appreciated full well their dangerous characteristics and propensities.”

Id. Because of that, the court found that the plaintiff could not recover from the

manufacturer. Id.

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We have previously applied the Stevens rationale. See Kerber v. Am. Mach. &

Foundry Co., 411 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1969). There, a machine had an opening that

exposed the chains and sprockets of a conveyor belt. Id. at 420. Reaching through that

opening to adjust misplaced dough, the plaintiff’s hand was mangled. Id. We found

that “reasonable men could [not] differ in finding that the danger was not latent or

concealed, but . . . was open, obvious and apparent to all who used it, particularly the

plaintiff who had . . . actual knowledge of the danger.” Id. at 421.

The Missouri Court of Appeals has also applied Stevens. In Morrison, the

plaintiffs brought a claim on behalf of an individual who died when a tractor that

lacked roll-over protection rolled on him. 891 S.W.2d at 423–24. The court found no

latent defect because a lack of roll-over protection “is something open and obvious

which is readily revealed merely by looking at a tractor.” Id. at 427. In addition, the

decedent was aware of the dangers of driving without roll-over protection. Id.

Morrison thus indicates that a manufacturer is only liable if the danger is latent. See

id. at 427–28.

The Missouri Court of Appeals discussed what constitutes a latent danger in

Edwards, 495 S.W.2d at 497. There, an exploding soda bottle injured a woman. Id.

at 491–92. The woman essentially argued that the shelves where the bottle was placed

were improperly designed because there was no place to store individual bottles. Id.

at 493. The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff failed to plead a design defect

but noted that “even if . . . the display unit . . . might be said to have been designed

with some ‘defect’ . . . plaintiff’s firm position that there was ‘a latent defect’ cannot

be honored.” Id. at 497.

Farkasfailed to establish a latent defect.The danger was not concealed. Rather,

the absence of guarding was visible and obvious. As in Morrison, where the lack of

roll protection was obvious, the lack of guarding was apparent here. And the dangers

associated with it were apparent. In Kerber, the danger was obvious where the

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plaintiff placed his hand into the part of the machine where the conveyor belt’s chains

and sprockets were located. Here, Farkas placed his hand into the point of operation

of a machine that bent metal. 

In short, Farkas has not offered evidence that the danger of a tube forming

machine to the user’s hand was anything but “open, obvious, and apparent.” The

defect, therefore, is not latent under Missouri case law. Consequently, there is not a

material issue of fact regarding his negligence claim. 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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