Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01554/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01554-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN C. LEAF,

Plaintiff,

vs.

T. FELKER, et al.,

Defendants.

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2:08-cv-01554-HDM-RAM

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Felker filed the

present motion to dismiss (#24) on August 13, 2009; defendants

Cimino, Sader, Foulk, and Casaurang joined in the motion on

December 3, 2009 (#36). Plaintiff opposed the motion (#25), Felker

filed a reply (#26), and plaintiff filed a surreply (#27). On

October 14, 2009, the court ordered supplemental briefing. Felker

filed his supplemental brief on November 16, 2009 (#35). Plaintiff

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filed his response on December 2, 2009 (#37). Defendants’ motion

seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

Plaintiff claims that on October 3, 2007, he was transferred

into facility “C” at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). Before

that, he had been housed in facility “B” at HDSP, a lower custody

yard. Plaintiff claims he voiced concerns to prison officials

about the transfer because of a “well documented threat against all

white inmates housed on facility ‘B’ whom then are later rehoused

on facilities ‘C’ or ‘D’ that have not attacked anyone on facility

‘B’ before being rehoused.” (Compl. 5). He claims that, despite

his concerns, he was transferred into facility “C” and on January

11, 2008, was attacked by another inmate and “nearly stabbed to

death.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff underwent an emergency splenectomy at Renown Medical

Center in Reno, Nevada, as a result of his wounds sustained in the

attack. (See Def. Supp. Ex. L). He spent eight days in the

hospital before being transferred to the infirmary at High Desert

State Prison (“HDSP”). (Compl. 42). Plaintiff was released from

the infirmary and into administrative segregation on January 28,

2008. (Id. at 42, 50). 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and is a prerequisite

to all suits about prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,

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524, 532 (2002). Administrative remedies must be exhausted prior

to filing suit; exhaustion during the pendency of the suit is

insufficient. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir.

2002) (per curiam); Vaden v. Summerhill,449 F.3d 1047, 1150-51 (9th

Cir. 2006). There must be “proper exhaustion” of available

administrative remedies, meaning the inmate must “us[e] all steps

the agency holds out. . . .” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90

(2006). A prisoner does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

filing an untimely appeal. Id. at 83-84.

Failure to exhaust is treated as a matter in abatement and is

subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. Wyatt v. Terhune,

315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). In deciding a motion to

dismiss on such grounds, “the court may look beyond the pleadings

and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1120. If the court

finds the prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies,

the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Id.

Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense; defendants thus

bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wyatt,

315 F.3d at 1119). Further, before the court can find a failure to

exhaust, the defendants must prove that “some relief remained

available” that the prisoner failed to pursue, “whether at

unexhausted levels of the grievance process or through awaiting the

results of the relief already granted as a result of that process.” 

Id. at 936-37 (emphasis original).

Prisoners in the State of California have the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon

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 The court takes judicial notice of the fact that Martin Luther King 1

Day, which in 2008 fell on Monday, January 21, is a California state

holiday. Fifteen working days from January 11, 2008, excluding weekends and

Martin Luther King Day, would have been February 4, 2008.

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their welfare.” Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). Prisoners

are required to file any such grievances “within 15 working days of

the event or decision being appealed. ” Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15,

§ 3084.6(c). Working days are defined as excluding the first day,

weekends, and holidays. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4003(j)(2).

However, the appeals coordinator may only deny a grievance as

untimely if the “[t]ime limits for submitting the appeal are

exceeded and the appellant had the opportunity to file within the

prescribed time constraints.” Id. § 3084.3(c)(6). California

regulations thus “explicitly create an exception to the timely

filing requirement.” Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th

Cir. 2009). Accordingly, where an inmate “was unable to file

within the fifteen-day filing period, his failure to file timely

does not defeat his claim.” Id.

There is no question that plaintiff did not file a grievance

within fifteen working days of the October 3, 2007, transfer

decision. Nor does plaintiff argue that he was unable to file a

grievance during that period. Accordingly, plaintiff did not

exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the October 3,

2007, transfer decision, and the question before the court is

whether plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with

respect to the January 11, 2008, attack.

Under California’s regulations, plaintiff had until February

4, 2008, in which to file a grievance regarding the January 11,

2008, attack. Between October 3, 2007, and July 7, 2008, 1

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plaintiff filed at HDSP one grievance that was accepted for review,

log number 08-00752. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Clark Decl. ¶3). 

Plaintiff also filed a grievance on June 22, 2008, which was denied

as untimely. (Id. ¶5). Finally, plaintiff filed a grievance on

July 14, 2008, which was screened out at the informal level. (Id.

¶6). 

Plaintiff asserts that log number 08-00752, filed on March 14,

2008, relates to his claims in this action. While log number 08-

00752 discusses plaintiff’s pain and need for medication following

the attack and subsequent splenectomy – and therefore tangentially

relates to plaintiff’s claims – it does not in any way raise an

issue regarding the events leading up to the attack, which are the

subject of this action. Accordingly, log number 08-00752 did not

serve to exhaust plaintiff’s administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff’s grievance filed on June 22, 2008, directly relates

to the claims asserted in this action, and if fully pursued through

the grievance system, it would have served to exhaust plaintiff’s

administrative remedies. The June 22, 2008, grievance, however,

was filed more than four months late, and was denied as untimely. 

The question, then, is whether plaintiff had the opportunity to

file a grievance in the fifteen-day period such that California’s

exception to the timely filing requirement applies. 

Plaintiff was in the hospital from the date of attack until

January 19, 2008, when he was discharged “in good condition,”

(Compl. 69), and transferred to the infirmary at HDSP, (id. at 42). 

On January 28, 2008, plaintiff was discharged from the infirmary

and released to administrative segregation. (Id. at 42, 50). It

appears from the record that plaintiff remained in administrative

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 Plaintiff alleges that the inmate grievance form does not tell him

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how to appeal anything other than the loss of property. In fact, the form

states that an inmate “may appeal any policy, action or decision which has

a significant adverse affect [sic] upon” him, and therefore sufficiently

apprises plaintiff that the form should be used to complain of the conduct

or decisions of prison officials.

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segregation at least through May 8, 2008. (See Compl. 75).

The evidence before the court is that there is an

institutional practice to provide grievance forms to any inmate

that so requests, both in the infirmary and in administrative

segregation. (Def. Supp. Ex. A (D. Reith Decl. ¶¶ 4-5)). None of

the officers working in infirmary while plaintiff was there ever

ignored or denied an inmate’s request for a grievance. (Id. Exs.

B-I). Moreover, every inmate is provided with a grievance form

upon arrival in administrative segregation. (Id. Ex. A (D. Reith

Decl. ¶ 4)). 

Plaintiff does not allege, nor does he provide any evidence,

that he ever requested a grievance form between January 11, 2008

and February 4, 2008, during his stays in the infirmary and

administrative segregation. In fact, his only argument is that it

would have been futile to do so. Specifically, plaintiff argues

that if he had asked for a form, it is likely none would have been

available because the prison frequently runs out of the inmate

grievance forms. (Pl. Opp’n to Def. Supp. 3). This is a 2

speculative argument that is insufficient to call into question

defendants’ assertions that grievance forms were available to all

inmates in the infirmary and administrative segregation upon

request. Plaintiff also asserts that he filled out all forms as

soon as he was able to do so. (See Pl. Opp’n to Def. Supp. 3)

(Plaintiff “requested the necessary forms and filed them as timely

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as he was able to obtain them and complete them for filing.”). 

Such assertions are vague and do not provide a basis for the court

to conclude that plaintiff requested and was denied an inmate

grievance form in the fifteen working days following the attack. 

 Accordingly, there is nothing to counter defendants’

assertions that had plaintiff asked for a form, one would have been

available to him. Plaintiff’s failure to request a grievance form

does not absolve him of his responsibility to exhaust his

administrative remedies under the PLRA. Therefore, the evidence in

the record supports the conclusion that forms were available to the

plaintiff during the fifteen-day period following the attack. 

Nonetheless, plaintiff asserts that he was physically unable

to complete a grievance during this time period. Plaintiff asserts

that he was in extreme pain and discomfort from both his injuries

and his surgical recovery. He states he required immediate medical

treatment and that it was not possible to get every form he needed. 

Plaintiff attended an Institutional Classification Committee

(“ICC”) hearing on January 24, 2008, and was noted by the committee

as being in “good health.” (Def. Supp. Ex. J). The ICC minutes

note that plaintiff understood the committee’s actions at the

meting and agreed with those actions. (Id.) Also, plaintiff’s

condition was good upon his arrival at the infirmary – he was

discharged from the hospital in good condition, he was walking

without assistance, and his only medical restriction related to

heavy lifting. (Compl. 50-53, 69). Finally, plaintiff’s injuries

were not of the type that would affect his reasoning or his ability

to write. 

Moreover, the evidence in the record indicates that plaintiff

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was indeed able to file something in writing during the crucial

fifteen-day period in question. Plaintiff wrote a medical request

on February 2, 2008, two days before the fifteen-day period

expired. (See Def. Supp. Ex. K). The fact plaintiff was able to

write and file any request during the fifteen-day period

demonstrates to the court that plaintiff was physically able to

write and file a timely inmate grievance regarding the January 11,

2008, attack. 

Finally, the fact that plaintiff waited until June 22, 2008,

to finally file a grievance about the attack belies his assertions

that he filed the grievance as soon as he was able to get a form

and was physically able to do so. Rather, plaintiff’s successful

filing of three separate medical request forms in February and

March 2008, (see Def. Supp. Exs. L-M), combined with plaintiff’s

significant delay in filing a grievance about this incident,

suggest to the court that rather than being prevented from timely

filing because of pain and discomfort, plaintiff instead simply

elected not to file his grievance until five months after the

attack. 

Therefore, the court concludes that after his release from the

hospital on January 19, 2008, plaintiff had sufficient time and

ability to file a grievance within the fifteen-day filing period. 

In light of this conclusion, the court concludes that the Ninth

Circuit’s recent decision in Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024 (9th

Cir. 2009) is inapposite. In that case, there was insufficient

evidence in the record, and the magistrate judge had made no

finding, as to whether the plaintiff had the ability to file his

grievance within the fifteen-day period. Here, the court has

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determined that plaintiff was able to file in the fifteen-day

period, but chose not to do so. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss (#24, #35, #36) is

hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. The clerk of the court shall enter judgment

accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: This 7th day of January, 2010.

____________________________ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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