Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00758/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00758-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

LINDA DOWNS and )

R. ALLEN DOWNS, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:08cv758-MHT

) (WO)

REGIONS BANK, ) 

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Linda Downs filed this lawsuit claiming

that defendant Regions Bank violated federal law by

terminating her employment because of her gender and age

in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17, and by invading her

financial privacy in violation of the Right to Financial

Privacy Act (RFPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422. Downs also

asserts various state-law claims, and her husband joins

Case 2:08-cv-00758-MHT-CSC Document 58 Filed 01/25/10 Page 1 of 21
2

this action to charge the bank with a state-law loss-ofconsortium claim. Jurisdiction over Downs’s federal

claims is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal

question); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (ADEA); 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII); and 12 U.S.C. § 3416 (RFPA);

jurisdiction over Downs’s and her husband’s state-law

claims is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367

(supplemental). 

This case is currently before the court on Regions’s

motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment will be

granted in favor of the bank on Downs’s federal claims,

and her and her husband’s state-law claims will be

dismissed without prejudice.

I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

Case 2:08-cv-00758-MHT-CSC Document 58 Filed 01/25/10 Page 2 of 21
1. Downs defines check kiting as “using funds between

different banks when the funds are not there.” Pl.'s

Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 7. A dictionary defines it as “The

illegal practice of writing a check against a bank

account with insufficient funds to cover the check, in

(continued...)

3

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In

deciding whether summary judgment should be granted, the

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986).

II. BACKGROUND

Downs began working for Regions in 1982 as a teller.

Three years later, the bank promoted her to financialservice representative (then known as customer-service

representative), a position she served in until the bank

terminated her on March 6, 2007, for allegedly “kiting”

checks between her and her husband’s two personal

accounts.1

Case 2:08-cv-00758-MHT-CSC Document 58 Filed 01/25/10 Page 3 of 21
1. (...continued)

the hope that the funds from a previously deposited check

will reach the account before the bank debits the amount

of the outstanding check.” Black’s Law Dictionary 253

(8th ed. 2004). At the time of Downs’s termination,

Regions did not define check kiting in its employee

handbook. The handbook now contains the following

definition: “Kiting can be defined as illegally

benefitting from float; for example, by depositing and

drawing checks between two or more banks.” Def.’s Ex. A9. “Float” is the time period after a check is deposited

in one bank but before it clears the bank account from

which it was written. See, e.g., Downs Dep. 55-56. 

4

Downs and her husband had two joint checking

accounts: one at Regions and another at Maxwell Federal

Credit Union. Beginning in late January 2007 and

continuing through February, Downs wrote a series of

checks from her Regions account addressed to her husband,

which she deposited for him in their Maxwell account.

Each time Downs wrote her husband a check, he would on

that same day or soon after write her a check from their

Maxwell account for the same or similar amount of money,

which she would then deposit in their Regions account.

Case 2:08-cv-00758-MHT-CSC Document 58 Filed 01/25/10 Page 4 of 21
2. Robert Young Dec. Ex. 2. 

3. While Regions Bank Fraud Prevention Manager Robert

Young states there are eight check kiting “cycles,” the

reciprocal deposit for this transaction, if there was

one, does not appear in the evidence. 

5

A. Relevant Alleged Check-Kiting History2

Date

written

(date

deposited)

Check Writer 

(bank account

drawn from)

Check Recipient

(bank account

deposited to)

Amount

1/22/07

(1/23/07)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

$ 300

1/23/07

(1/23/07)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

$ 300

1/23/07

(1/24/07)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

$ 500

1/24/07

(1/24/07)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

$ 500

1/25/07

(1/26/07)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

$ 500

1/26/07

(1/26/07)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

$ 500

1/29/07

(1/30/07)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

$ 425

1/30/07

(1/30/07)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

$ 400

2/1/07 

(2/1/07)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

$ 4003

Case 2:08-cv-00758-MHT-CSC Document 58 Filed 01/25/10 Page 5 of 21
4. It appears that this deposit was made to the

Downs’s Regions “Christmas Club” saving account). 

6

2/15/07

(2/15/07)

Allen Downs

(Regions)

Cash (Allen

Downs’s

Maxwell)

$ 1200

2/16/07

(2/16/07)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

$ 1200

2/20/07

(2/22/07)

Allen Downs

(Regions)

Cash (Regions)4 $ 1300

2/22/07

(N/A)

Linda Downs

(Regions savings

account cash

withdrawal)

N/A $ 1300

2/22/07

(2/23/07)

Allen Downs

(Regions)

Cash 

(Regions)

$ 1100

2/23/07

(2/23/07)

Allen Downs

(Maxwell)

Linda Downs

(Regions)

$ 1100

B. The Investigation

 In late February 2007, Robert Young, Regions Bank

Fraud Prevention Manager, received notification from a

computer program that Downs was possibly kiting checks.

After studying the deposit history between the Downs’s

Regions and Maxwell accounts, he generated a fraudprevention report and photocopied the checks and relevant

deposit slips from the transactions listed above. He

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determined that there was evidence that Downs had engaged

in check kiting. He then informed Bill Summers, a

Regions Bank Corporate Security Investigator, of his

findings.

Upon receiving Young’s report, Summers began an

investigation to determine if Downs was, in fact, kiting

checks. Summers contacted Maxwell to ses if there were

sufficient funds in the Maxwell account, and he

determined that Downs was engaging in check kiting,

though neither Regions nor Maxwell had lost any money as

a result of her conduct. 

On March 4, Summers met with Downs to discuss her

recent account activity. He asked her if she was kiting

checks, and she replied that she was not. After being

shown the fraud-prevention report, Downs explained

verbally and in writing that, because her husband is

self-employed, she often would deposit checks for him.

She would write a check from the Regions account and

deposit in his account at Maxwell because she knew that

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he would “give it back to [her] the next morning.”

Def.’s Ex. B. Downs wrote in her statement that “her

husband would call [her] at work and tell [her] to make

a deposit for him after work to cover his outstanding

checks.” Id. Summers explained to Downs that he

believed her described conduct to be check kiting, which

Downs disputed because she never bounced a check or

maintained a negative balance in either checking account.

The next day, Summers and Sandra Gayden, a Regions

Bank Human Resources Manager, summoned Downs to the

Regions corporate office. Summers and Gayden continued

questioning Downs about her checking-account activity and

asked her to add additional information to her statement

taken the previous day. After the meeting, Gayden called

Downs and informed her that the bank was terminating her

employment because of check kiting. She was replaced by

Matt Darby, a younger male.

At the time Downs was terminated, the Regions

employee handbook stated that, “Reports of significant

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financial irresponsibility, including but not limited to

check kiting ... may result in discipline up to and

including termination of your employment.” Def.’s Ex. H.

It is the bank’s policy to terminate all employees who

engage in check kiting. From 2005-2007, nine employees,

including Downs, were terminated for check kiting. The

eight employees fired aside from Downs were all under the

age of 40. Eight of the nine fired, including Downs,

were female. Andrea McCain Dec. 1-3.

During the time that Downs was terminated, Regions

was in the process of merging with another financial

institution and both companies were in the process of

downsizing their workforces. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. ADEA Claim

Downs claims, under the ADEA, that Regions terminated

her because of her age and in order to avoid paying her

retirement benefits. The ADEA prohibits an employer from

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5. While the Supreme Court recently held that the

text of the ADEA does not authorize a “mixed-motives”

age-discrimination claim and that, “to establish a

disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the

ADEA, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’

cause of the employer's adverse decision,” the Court did

not overturn the use of the evidentiary framework of

McDonnell Douglas in the ADEA context. See Gross v. FBL

Financial Services, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 2, 129 S.

Ct. 2343, 2349-50 n.2 (2009); See also Smith v. City of

Allentown, ___ F.3d ____, ____, 2009 WL 4912120, at *5

(3d Cir. 2009) (“Gross ... does not forbid our adherence

to precedent applying McDonnell Douglas to age

discrimination claims.”). 

10

discriminating against an employee because of that

employee’s age; the protected group under the ADEA

includes employees over the age of 40, 29 U.S.C.

§ 621(a)(1), as Downs was at the time of her termination.

Downs attempts to survive summary judgment by making

out an age-discrimination case under the burden-shifting

analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267

F.3d 1264, 1267 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001).5

 Under McDonnell

Douglas, Downs must first demonstrate a prima-facie case

of age discrimination. One method of demonstrating this

is to show that: (1) she was a member of the protected

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age group, (2) she was subjected to an adverse-employment

decision, (3) she was qualified to do the job, and (4)

she was replaced by a younger individual. Chapman v. AI

Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000). Once

she has satisfied this burden, a presumption of age

discrimination arises. The burden then shifts to Regions

to rebut this presumption by articulating a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. Id.

The bank has the burden of production, not of persuasion,

and it is sufficient if its evidence explains Downs’s

termination in a manner legally sufficient to justify a

judgment in its favor. See Texas Dep't of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55 (1981). 

If Regions satisfies its burden of production, the

presumption of discrimination is eliminated, and Downs

must present evidence, which may include the previously

produced evidence establishing the prima-facie case, to

show by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason

given by the bank was not the real reason for the

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12

adverse-employment decision but rather a “pretext for

discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Downs may

meet this burden by persuading the court that “age was

the ‘but-for’ cause of [the bank’s] adverse decision.”

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., ___ U.S. ____,

____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 

Downs has established a prima-facie case of age

discrimination. She was over the age of 40 at the time

of her termination, she was subjected to an adverseemployment action, she was qualified to do the job as a

Regions employee in good-standing for over 24 years with

strong performance reviews and no disciplinary record,

and she was replaced by a younger individual. Chapman,

229 F.3d at 1024. 

Because Downs has established a prima-facie case of

age discrimination, the court turns its attention to

whether Regions has articulated a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for her firing. The bank

asserts that Downs was fired because she was kiting

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13

checks between her and her husband’s personal checking

accounts in violation of bank policy. As this is a

legitimate and non-discriminatory reason to terminate an

employee, Downs must demonstrate with evidence “that the

reason[] given by [the bank] [was] not the real reason[]

for the adverse employment decision.” Id.

Downs argues that she was fired because of Regions

merger with another bank. She explains that Regions and

the other bank were reducing their collective workforce

by “employees retiring, employees being laid off with

severance pay, employees voluntarily resigning, and, as

in this case, employees being terminated.” Pl.’s Resp.

Mot. Summ. J. 26. Downs posits that, as a part of the

merger, Regions chose to terminate her because of her age

and to deny her retirement benefits. Because Downs

offers no evidence that the merger was the true reason

for, or in anyway connected with, her firing, her

statement amounts to nothing more than conjecture;

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6. One Regions employee was retained after being

accused of check kiting when video evidence proved that

the employee’s check book was stolen and used by a family

member. Gayden Dec. 4. 

14

however, she claims that the bank’s rationale must be

pretextual as she believes that she was not check kiting.

Downs argues that she did not engage in check kiting

because she never bounced a check and because, while the

checks were “floating” between her and her husband’s

accounts, there was a positive balance in the accounts.

Downs cannot prevail, however, for two reasons. First,

she has failed to demonstrate that Regions treated any

similarly situated employee accused of check kiting

differently from the way she was treated. Second,

Regions, has affirmatively shown that all nine employees

found check kiting between 2005 and 2007 were terminated

and that Downs was the only one of these nine over the

age of 40.6

 See, e.g., Penn v. Dep’t of Corr., 411 F.

Supp. 2d 1326, 1332-35 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (Thompson, J.).

In other words, not only has Downs failed to point to any

evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, from which an

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7. In her affidavit, Downs asserts that she “ran into

Bill Summers after [her] termination and he told [her]

that he did not believe that what Regions did was right,

that others had done far worse and were not fired and to

call him if [she] needed a witness one day.” Downs

Aff 4. Downs presents no evidence of others committing

worse acts at Regions with less discipline and Summers

has offered a sworn declaration on behalf of Regions

stating that he believes Downs was check kiting. 

15

inference of age discrimination could be drawn, the bank

has affirmatively shown that it did not discriminate

because of age in dealing with those who were accused of

or engaged in check kiting. 

To be sure, Downs contends that she did not engage in

check kiting. But whether her conduct is labeled check

kiting and regardless as to whether the banks lost any

money, Downs has failed to demonstrate that Regions

treated any employee accused of similar conduct

differently from the way she was treated, and the bank

has affirmatively shown that all employees who were

accused of such conduct between 2005 and 2007 were

terminated. How her conduct is labeled makes no

difference.7

Case 2:08-cv-00758-MHT-CSC Document 58 Filed 01/25/10 Page 15 of 21
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At bottom, all Downs has done is “quarrel with the

wisdom of [Regions’s] reason,” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030,

and attempted to show that Regions was mistaken in its

conclusion that she was kiting checks. However, “[a]n

employer who fires an employee under the mistaken but

honest impression that the employee violated a work rule

is not liable for discriminatory conduct.” Damon v.

Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354,

1363 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999). Regardless as to whether

Regions was mistaken in its definition of check kiting or

how it labeled Downs’s conduct, there is simply no

evidence of disparate treatment here.

Therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor

of Regions on Downs’s age-discrimination claim.

B. Title VII Claim

Downs’s Title VII claim is identical to her ADEA

claim, but she replaces age with gender as the

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discriminatory purpose for Regions’s adverse-employment

decision. 

Downs establishes a prima-face case for gender

discrimination under Title VII: (1) she is a member of a

protected class (in this case, female), (2) she was

subjected to an adverse-employment action, (3) she was

qualified to do the job, and (4) she was replaced by a

male. See Evans v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 418 F.

Supp. 2d 1271, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (Thompson, J.).

However, she has failed to demonstrate, as with regards

to her ADEA claim, that the bank’s reason for terminating

her (check kiting) was a pretext for gender

discrimination. She has failed to come forward with any

similarly situated male employee who was treated

differently from the way she was treated, and Regions has

affirmatively demonstrated that it applies its check

kiting policy in a non-discriminatory manner to both

males and females. 

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Therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor

of Regions on Downs’s gender-discrimination claim.

C. RFPA Claim

Downs argues that Regions invaded her financial

privacy in violation of the RFPA. In her brief, Downs

cites to 15 U.S.C. § 6801-6810 as the RFPA. This is

actually the citation for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

(GLBA), which requires, among other things, that

financial institutions establish privacy policies and

ensure costumers are aware of the privacy policies in

place. Downs has no viable claims against Regions under

the GLBA, as, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6805, “[n]o private

right of action exists for an alleged violation of the

GLBA.” Dunmire v. Morgan Stanley, 475 F.3d 956, 960 (8th

Cir. 2007). In any event, at the pre-trial conference

for this case, Downs’s counsel acknowledged that she was

not relying on the GLBA but rather was relying on the

RFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 3401-3422, and specifically 12 U.S.C.

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§ 3403(a) and Chao v. Community Trust Co., 474 F.3d 75

(3d Cir. 2007), in crafting Downs’s claim. 

Downs’s right-to-financial-privacy claim fails under

the RFPA. She is correct that the RFPA prohibits

unauthorized access into financial records; however, she

overlooks that the RFPA is designed to regulate the

federal government’s access to a customer’s bank records

and does not regulate disclosure to entities other than

the government. The RFPA provides: 

“No financial institution, or officer,

employees, or agent of a financial

institution, may provide to any

Government authority access to or copies

of, or the information contained in, the

financial records of any customer except

in accordance with the provisions of

this chapter.”

12 U.S.C. § 3403(a). Under the RFPA, “‘Government

authority’ means any agency or department of the United

States, or any officer, employee, or agent thereof.” 12

U.S.C. § 3401(3).

The case Downs cites to support her position, Chao v.

Community Trust Co., 474 F.3d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2007),

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20

involves the Department of Labor’s attempt to investigate

a violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Regions, unlike the

Department of Labor, is a private financial institution,

and thus is not a “Government authority.” Because Downs

does not assert that Regions disclosed her financial

records to any government authority, her claim under the

RFPA must fail.

Therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor

of Regions on Downs’s right-to-financial-privacy claim.

D. State-Law Claims

This court “may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim if ... [it] has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because summary judgment will be

granted on Downs’s ADEA, Title VII, and RFPA claims, the

court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

both her and her husband’s state-law claims against

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8. Downs charges Regions with violating Alabama’s Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, 1975 Ala. Code § 25-1-

20 to -29, libel, slander, defamation of character,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false

imprisonment. 

Regions.8

 Accordingly, the state-law claims will be

dismissed, albeit without prejudice. See United Mine

Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966);

L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 685 (11th Cir. 1995).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the applicable statute

of limitations under state law will be tolled 30 days so

as to allow Downs and her husband time to refile their

claims in state court.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment will be

granted in favor of Regions and against Downs on all of

Downs’s federal claims, and her and her husband’s

state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 25th day of January, 2010.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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