Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00684/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00684-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S . District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT BENYAMINI, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

TERESA SCHULTZ, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

CV F 05 0684 REC LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. #1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action has been referred to this Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72-302.

On April 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States

District Court for the Central District of California. By order of the Court dated May 4, 2005, the

action was transferred to the Fresno Division. In the petition before the Court, Petitioner raises five

grounds for relief: 1) Petitioner claims he was mentally incompetent at time of trial and was denied

the right to testify on his own behalf; 2) Petitioner claims the evidence was insufficient to support the

verdict; 3) Petitioner claims the reporter’s transcripts are incomplete; 4) Petitioner claims he received

ineffective assistance of counsel; and 5) Petitioner claims a juror was biased against him because of

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the juror’s relationship with Petitioner’s relative.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Summary Dismissal

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides in pertinent part:

If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk

to notify the petitioner. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. A petition for habeas corpus should not be

dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded

were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

B. Failure to State a Cognizable Federal Claim

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of

Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). See also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a

person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484

(1973).

Furthermore, in order to succeed in a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must

demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state court

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2). 

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In the instant case, Petitioner fails to state a cognizable federal claim with respect to Grounds

One and Three. In Ground One, Petitioner complains that he was incompetent throughout trial. He

states that he sustained head injuries in an incident on August 15, 1999, and also in other instances

prior to trial. He also states he was involved in a car accident. He states that because of his injuries,

he did not know his “constitutional rights,” the “meaning of due process,” “what everybody’s job

was in the courtroom and why,” or the meaning of various objections made at trial. He also states he

was forced to trust his attorney, he was rushed and ignored when he would speak out in court, and

his questions were not answered. Lastly, he claims he was not able to testify on his own behalf. 

With the exception of Petitioner’s claim that he was denied his right to testify on his own

behalf, this claim does not present a cognizable federal ground. Petitioner fails to state how his lack

of legal knowledge resulted in any trial error. Therefore, this Court will recommend that the claim be

dismissed except for Petitioner’s claim that he was denied his right to testify. 

In Ground Three, Petitioner complains that the reporter’s transcripts are missing certain

portions of the trial. This claim is also not cognizable in a federal habeas action. If Petitioner’s

copies are incomplete, he must seek complete copies from the trial court. If Petitioner is claiming 

that the court reporter failed to transcribe everything that occurred at trial, such a complaint is also

not cognizable. Petitioner fails to state how he was prejudiced by this error. In other words, he fails

to state how he was denied a fair trial as a result of the court reporter’s failure.

C. Failure to Exhaust State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

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1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.

1 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999);

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the 

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In this case, Petitioner states he has only presented, and therefore exhausted, Ground Two of

the petition in the California Supreme Court. Therefore, Grounds One, Three, Four, and Five are

unexhausted claims. The Court must dismiss without prejudice a petition that contains unexhausted

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1A dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a dismissal on the merits, and Petitioner will not be barred from returning

to federal court after Petitioner exhausts available state remedies by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)’s prohibition on filing second

petitions. See In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court has held that:

[I]n the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate for an order dismissing a mixed 

petition to instruct an applicant that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only 

exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). Once the petitioner is made 

aware of the exhaustion requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all potential 

claims before returning to federal court. The failure to comply with an order of the court 

is grounds for dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000). Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal court

and files a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims, the petition may be dismissed with prejudice.

U.S . District Court

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claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). However, the Court will grant Petitioner an opportunity to file a

motion to withdraw the unexhausted claims in lieu of suffering dismissal.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS:

1) Ground One be DISMISSED in part, as discussed above, for failure to state a cognizable

federal claim;

2) Ground Three be DISMISSED in whole for failure to state a cognizable federal claim; and

3) The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to

exhaust state remedies.1 

Petitioner may choose to file a motion to withdraw unexhausted Grounds One, Three, Four

and Five within thirty (30) days of the filing of this order so as to avoid suffering a dismissal of the

petition. 

Petitioner is forewarned that there is a one year limitations period in which Petitioner must

file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1). In most cases, the one year

period starts to run on the date the California Supreme Court denies Petitioner’s direct review. Rose

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-522. The limitations period is tolled while a properly filed request for

collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, the limitations period

is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121

S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001).

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Robert E. Coyle, United

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States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 14, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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