Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01185/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01185-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IVAN PEÑA, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

STEPHEN LINDLEY, in his official 

capacity as Chief of the California 

Department of Justice Bureau of Firearms, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:09-CV-01185-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

 On cross-motions, the parties move for summary judgment on claims related to 

the constitutionality of California’s Unsafe Handgun Act (“UHA”). The court heard argument 

on December 16, 2013, with Alan Gura and Donald Kilmer appearing for plaintiffs and 

Anthony Hakl III appearing for defendant. Subsequent to the hearing, the court directed 

supplemental briefing. In light of the supplemental briefing, plaintiffs’ pending motion to 

supplement the record, ECF No. 82, is DENIED as moot. For the following reasons, the court 

DENIES plaintiffs’ motion and GRANTS defendant’s motion. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 A. PARTIES 

 Individual plaintiffs Ivan Peña, Roy Vargas, Doña Croston, and Brett Thomas 

are law-abiding citizens of the United States and California. Pls.’ Second Am. Compl. 

(“SAC”) ¶¶ 1–4, ECF No. 53; Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 4, 9, 14, 19, ECF 

No. 73-1. Each is a member of plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. (“SAF”), and 

plaintiffs Vargas and Croston are “supporter[s] of and participant[s] in” the activities of 

plaintiff Calguns Foundation, Inc. (“CGF”). SAC ¶¶ 1–4. Plaintiffs Peña and Thomas are 

board members of CGF. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4. 

Plaintiff SAF is 

a non-profit membership organization incorporated under the 

laws of Washington with its principal place of business in 

Bellevue, Washington. SAF has over 650,000 members and 

supporters nationwide, including California. The purposes of 

SAF include education, research, publishing and legal action 

focusing on the Constitutional right to privately own and possess 

firearms, and the consequences of gun control. 

Id. ¶ 5; see also Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Undisputed Facts ¶ 2. Plaintiff CGF is 

a non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of 

California with its principal place of business in San Carlos, 

California. The purposes of CGF include supporting the 

California firearms community by promoting education for all 

stakeholders about California and federal firearm laws, rights and 

privileges, and defending and protecting the civil rights of 

California gun owners. CGF represents these members and 

supporters, which include California firearm retailers and 

consumers. CGF brings this action on behalf of itself and its 

supporters, who possess all the indicia of membership. 

SAC ¶ 6; see also Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Undisputed Facts ¶ 3. 

 Plaintiffs name as defendant Stephen Lindley in his official capacity as the Chief 

of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Firearms. SAC ¶ 7; Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s 

Undisputed Facts ¶ 1. In this capacity, defendant is responsible for formulating, administering, 

enforcing, and executing the challenged laws. SAC ¶ 7. 

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 B. UNSAFE HANDGUN ACT 

 The UHA is a penal statute that prohibits the manufacture, sale, gifting, or 

lending of any handgun in California that does not meet certain requirements. Cal. Penal Code 

§§ 31910, 32015(a). It finds its genesis in 1997, when the California Legislature passed S.B. 

500, which attempted to ban guns, known as “Saturday Night Specials,” that did not comply 

with federal safety standards. S.B. 500, 1997–1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 1997) (as passed 

by Senate, Sept. 9, 1997, but not enacted); Assem. Comm. on Appropriations, 1997–1998 Leg.-

Comm. Analysis of S.B. 500, Reg. Sess. at 1 (Cal. July 30, 1997). Noting that “[t]he leading 

cause of death among young people ages 10 to 17 in California [in 1996] was firearm 

violence,” “[t]he overwhelming majority of [which] were caused by the cheaply manufactured 

Saturday Night Special,” the Legislature sought to require that any handgun sold or 

manufactured in California undergo independent laboratory testing and be certified by the 

California Department of Justice (“DOJ”) as “safe.” Assem. Comm. on Appropriations, 1997–

1998 Leg.-Comm. Analysis of S.B. 500, Reg. Sess. at 2 (Cal. July 30, 1997). Finding that the 

bill would “fail to keep guns out of the hands of criminals,” while “depriv[ing] law-abiding, 

legitimate gun users of the needed protection of handguns,” however, Governor Peter Wilson 

vetoed the legislation, saying that S.B. 500’s “net [was] cast much too wide . . . .” S.B. 500 

Veto Message from Governor Wilson to Members of the Cal. Senate (Sept. 26, 1997). 

 The next year, the Legislature passed a narrower version of S.B. 500, known as 

S.B. 15 or the UHA, which the Governor signed into law. The UHA established a 

comprehensive regulatory scheme applicable to all handguns sold commercially in California. 

S.B. 15, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 1999). Specifically, the UHA criminalized the 

manufacture, import, lending, or sale of any “unsafe handgun,” permitting “imprisonment in a 

county jail [for a period] not exceeding one year.” Cal. Penal Code § 32000. The term “unsafe 

handgun” is defined to include any revolver or semiautomatic pistol that is “not already listed 

on the roster” of “tested handguns determined not to be unsafe” by the California Department 

of Justice. Id. §§ 31910, 32015(a). 

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 The purpose of the UHA was twofold. First, it was intended to reduce crime by 

eliminating the sale of cheap handguns. Fiscal v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 

158 Cal. App. 4th 895, 912 (2008); see also Assem. Comm. on Appropriations, 1999–2000 

Leg.-Comm. Analysis of S.B. 15, Reg. Sess. at 2 (Cal. July 7, 1999) (Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco and Firearms statistics show that four of five guns used in criminal acts are cheap guns 

that do not meet drop safety and other gun specification requirements). Second, it was meant to 

ensure handguns “fire when they are supposed to and that they do not fire when dropped” by 

requiring that all handguns be subject to a “drop test,” which the bill’s author submitted is “fair 

and reasonable for weapons sold to the public for self-protection. If a weapon is not reliable for 

self-defense it has no business being sold in California.” S. Rules Comm., 1999–2000 Leg.-

Comm. Analysis of S.B. 15, Reg. Sess. at 11 (Cal. Apr. 28, 1999). To be considered safe, 

revolvers must meet firing and drop safety requirements and must have a “safety device . . . that 

causes the hammer to retract to a point where the firing pin does not rest upon the primer of the 

cartridge.” Cal. Penal Code § 31910(a). Pistols must also meet the firing and drop safety 

requirements and must have a “positive manually operated safety device.” Id. § 31910(b)(1)–

(3). If a handgun not on the roster is sufficiently similar to a model already listed, then the 

similar model may be listed without undergoing testing, upon certification by the applicant in 

an affidavit that the model is indeed similar. Id. § 32030. Sufficient similarity means differing 

only in purely cosmetic feature[s] not affecting the “dimensions, material, linkage, or function[] 

of the magazine well, the barrel, the chamber, or any of the components of the firing 

mechanism of the firearm,” or differing only in finish or the material from which the grips are 

made. Id. 

 Manufacturers and importers who seek to have a handgun listed bear the costs of 

creating and maintaining the rostering program. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 4072. There is a 

$200.00 annual listing fee for each model, payable by the manufacturer or importer. Id.

§§ 4071, 4072. If the responsible party fails to make this payment, the gun is delisted. Id.

§ 4071(d). If a manufacturer or importer discontinues manufacturing or importing the model, 

then a fully licensed wholesaler, distributor, or dealer may submit a written request and pay the 

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listing fee to maintain the model on the roster. Id. § 4070(d). Similarly, if a listing has lapsed 

or was removed for lack of payment, a manufacturer, importer, or “other responsible party” 

may submit a written request to have the model relisted. Id. § 4070(e). “‘Responsible party’ 

includes, but is not limited to, firearm manufacturers/importers and law enforcement agencies.” 

Id. § 4049(s). 

 The UHA was amended in 2003, requiring among other things that center fire1

semiautomatic2 pistols not listed by January 2007 come equipped with two additional safety 

features: 

 a “chamber load indicator,” which is “a device that plainly 

indicates that a cartridge is in the firing chamber”; and 

 a magazine disconnect mechanism, which is a “mechanism that 

prevents a semiautomatic pistol that has a detachable magazine 

from operating to strike the primer of ammunition in the firing 

chamber when a detachable magazine is not inserted in the 

semiautomatic pistol.” 

Cal. Penal Code §§ 32010(d), 16380, 16900. Not every chamber load indicator (“CLI”) meets 

the statutory requirement. Rather, each CLI must be “designed and intended to indicate to a 

reasonably foreseeable adult user of the pistol, without requiring the user to refer to a user’s 

manual or any other resource other than the pistol itself, whether a cartridge is in the firing 

chamber.” Id. § 16380. Rimfire3 semiautomatic pistols do not require a CLI but do require a 

magazine-disconnect mechanism (“MDM”). See id. § 32010(d). The CLI requirement took 

effect in January 2007, while the MDM requirement took effect a year earlier, in January 2006. 

 1

 Center fire ammunition “fires when the primer at the bottom-center of the cartridge 

case is struck and thus ignited by the gun’s firing pin.” Pls.’ Corrected Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ 

Mot.”) at 1 n.1, ECF No. 67-1. 

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 A semiautomatic gun fires “only one shot with each pull of the trigger.” Heller v. 

District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The energy of the just-fired bullet causes ejection of the spent case and the 

loading of the next cartridge, enabling rapid firing. Pls.’ Mot. at 1 n.2. 

 

3

 Rimfire ammunition incorporates the primer into the bottom rim of the case; when the 

rim is struck by the firing pin, the primer ignites the gun powder. Pls.’ Mot. at 2 n.3. For 

technical reasons, plaintiffs assert, CLIs are not feasible for firearms that use rimfire 

ammunition. Id.

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Handguns that appeared on the roster prior to an effective date are grandfathered in and need 

not comply with the respective requirements. See id.

 In 2007, the Legislature also passed the Crime Gun Identification Act (“CGIA”). 

Assem. B. 1471, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2007). This legislation imposed a 

microstamp-technology requirement, amending the UHA to expand the definition of “unsafe” 

handguns to include “semiautomatic pistols that are not designed and equipped with a 

microscopic array of characters that identify the make, model, and serial number of the pistol 

. . . and that are transferred by imprinting on each cartridge case when the firearm is fired.” 

Assem. B. 1471, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. Leg. Counsel Digest (Cal. 2007). In theory, a 

gun equipped with the technology imprints every bullet fired with a “microstamp” that 

identifies the weapon and owner. 

According to the bill’s author, the CGIA “is about catching criminals.” Assem. 

Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2007–2008 Leg.-Comm. Analysis of Assem. B. 1471, Reg. Sess. at 2 

(Cal. Apr. 17, 2007). Proponents claimed generally it would: “(a) help law enforcement solve 

handgun crimes; (b) help reduce gang-violence; and (c) help reduce gun trafficking of new 

semiautomatic handguns.” Id. Moreover, they claimed the legislation would “place[] no 

additional burden [on] gun owners,” because the “additional cost w[ould] be $0.50 to $2 a gun 

and no new licenses or permits [would be] required.” Id. 

 The opposition countered that “[m]andating [micro-stamping technology] . . . at 

th[at] time would be excessively premature as it [could] []not be scientifically justified, and it 

ha[d] not been proven to be practical in implementation.” Id. at 4. Further, the opposition 

noted that as of 2007, “micro-stamping [wa]s a ‘sole source’ technology” and that the costs 

“would not be contained by realistic competition,” “result[ing] [in] higher costs for retailers and 

their customers.” Id. at 4–5. 

 The Legislature addressed opponents’ concern about microstamping’s status as a 

sole-source technology, conditioning implementation of the requirement on DOJ certification 

“that the technology used to create the imprint is available to more than one manufacturer 

unencumbered by any patent restrictions.” Cal. Penal Code § 31910(b)(7)(A). Thus, although 

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the microstamping bill was signed into law in October 2007, Assem. B. 1471, 2007–2008 Leg., 

Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), the requirement did not take effect until May 2013, when the DOJ 

issued the required certification. DOJ Information Bulletin, Ex. N at 2, ECF No. 61-21.4

 Guns 

listed prior to the May 2013 date are grandfathered. DOJ Information Bulletin at 3. Despite 

the DOJ certification, “[n]o handguns currently available for sale in the United States have 

microstamping technology that satisfies the requirements of California’s Handgun Roster 

Law,” Interrog. No. 4, Ex. O at 3, ECF No. 61-22, and no manufacturer has submitted a 

handgun that complies with the UHA’s microstamping provision for approval, Interrog. No. 8, 

Ex. N at 4, ECF No. 61-23. 

 Finally, the UHA includes several exemptions from the rostering scheme, some 

of which were added in 2010: 

 “Firearms listed as curios or relics” under federal law,5

 Cal. Penal 

Code § 32000(b)(3); 

 The sale or purchase of a handgun to the DOJ or other law 

enforcement organizations, including their “sworn members,” for 

“use in the discharge of their official duties,” id. § 32000(b)(4); 

 Certain single-action6 revolvers, id. § 32100; and 

 The sale, loan, or transfer of any semiautomatic pistol to be used 

solely as a prop during the course of a movie, television, or video 

production, id. § 32110(h). 

See Pls.’ Undisputed Facts ¶ 39, ECF No. 63. Private party transfers, in which two parties who 

 4

 The court takes judicial notice of the issuance of the DOJ certification because it can 

be “accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see Estate of Fuller v. Maxfield & Oberton Holdings, 

LLC, 906 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Daniels–Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 

629 F.3d 992, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is appropriate to take judicial notice of this 

information, as it was made publicly available by government entities . . . .”)). 

5

 Federal law defines curios or relics as “[f]irearms which are of special interest to 

collectors by reason of some quality other than is associated with firearms intended for sporting 

use or as offensive or defensive weapons.” 27 Fed. Reg. § 478.11. Additionally, a firearm 

must fall within one of three categories to be considered a relic, such as “[f]irearms which were 

manufactured at least 50 years prior to the current date, but not including replicas thereof.” Id.

6

 “Single-action” refers to a gun’s trigger function. In a single-action gun, the trigger 

drops the hammer only after the gun is cocked. Pls.’ Mot. at 6 n.4. 

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are not licensed firearm dealers wish to enter into a sale, are likewise unencumbered by the 

UHA. See Cal. Penal Code § 32110(a). Additional exemptions exist, but plaintiffs do not 

challenge them. 

C. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS 

 Plaintiffs bring two claims: (1) violation of the Second Amendment and 

(2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. SAC ¶¶ 63, 65. 

They seek injunctive relief, declaratory relief, costs of suit, and any other relief the court deems 

appropriate. 

Plaintiffs argue the UHA violates the Second Amendment because it bars the 

purchase of certain handguns that are “in common use” and therefore, constitutionally 

protected under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008). These handguns 

may not be manufactured or sold in California because they: (1) have not been tested for firing 

and drop safety; (2) are not listed due to nonpayment of an annual listing fee; (3) do not have a 

CLI, MDM, or both; or (4) do not have microstamping technology. Pls.’ Mot. at 13. Plaintiffs 

stated at hearing that their facial and as-applied challenges are “the same” but wished to 

“preserve [their] arguments.” Dec. 16, 2013 Hr’g Tr. 5:11–17 , ECF No. 79. 

 Each plaintiff identifies a particular handgun that he or she seeks to purchase 

from a willing seller but cannot buy because that handgun is not on the UHA roster: 

 Plaintiff Peña seeks to purchase an unlisted Para USA (Para 

Ordnance) P1345SR/ Stainless Steel .45 ACP 4.25”. This gun was 

previously listed on the roster but removed in December 2005. 

Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 43–44, ECF No. 74-8. 

 

 Plaintiff Vargas, who was born without an arm below the right 

elbow, seeks to purchase an unlisted Glock 21 SF with an 

ambidextrous magazine release. Id. ¶¶ 46–47, 49. This model is 

not listed, but the same model without the ambidextrous magazine 

release is listed. Further, the UHA permits plaintiff to buy the 

listed model and have it subsequently fitted with the ambidextrous 

magazine release. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. Glock attempted to roster the 

model with the ambidextrous magazine release, but the DOJ 

determined it was not sufficiently similar to the listed model to be 

listed without independent testing. Decl. of Leslie McGovern 

(“McGovern Decl.”) ¶ 9, ECF 74-1. 

 Plaintiff Croston seeks to purchase an unlisted Springfield Armory 

XD-45 Tactical 5” Bi-Tone stainless steel/black handgun in .45 

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ACP, model number XD9623. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Undisputed 

Facts ¶ 54. This gun is grandfathered onto the roster but only in 

other colors. This particular color is not listed because, plaintiffs 

assert, it was released after the CLI and MDM requirements went 

into effect. SAC ¶¶ 50–52. Plaintiffs also assert that the XD-45 

has a CLI but that the DOJ decided it was inadequate.7 Id. ¶ 53. 

Defendant’s undisputed evidence shows that the XD9623 was 

never submitted for rostering, whether as a similar gun or for 

testing in its own right. McGovern Decl. ¶ 5. 

 Plaintiff Thomas seeks to purchase an unlisted High Standard 

Buntline style revolver, the handgun at issue in Heller. SAC 

¶¶ 54–55. This model of revolver has never been submitted for 

DOJ testing. McGovern Decl. ¶ 7. 

Plaintiffs assert the UHA violates the Equal Protection Clause because it bars 

individual plaintiffs from possessing handguns that it permits other people to possess. SAC 

¶ 65. In plaintiffs’ estimation, the UHA “arbitrarily distinguishes between otherwise identical 

firearms, inherently making arbitrary distinctions among the people who would possess them, 

and arbitrarily bars people from possessing handguns deemed safe for others.” Pls.’ Mot. at 9. 

Thus, they conclude, it is unconstitutional. Id.

 D. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Plaintiffs filed suit in April 2009. Compl. at 10, ECF No. 1. Due to the Ninth 

Circuit’s then-pending decision in Nordyke v. King, the previously assigned district judge 

stayed the action in October 2009. October 2, 2009 Order at 5, ECF No. 24. In part to permit 

reconsideration in light of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 

(2010), the Nordyke opinion was delayed. It ultimately issued, after rehearing en banc, in June 

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 There is no evidence in the record indicating why the DOJ considered model number 

XD9623’s CLI inadequate. There is, however, a letter from the DOJ to Debra Else at 

Springfield Armory stating that models XD9611, XD9660, and XD9665 were not listed 

because their CLIs did not comply with DOJ regulations for CLIs, codified at title 11 

section 4060(d)(1) of the California Code of Regulations. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A at 4, 

ECF No. 61-8. These models’ CLIs did not comply because they did not inform a “reasonably 

foreseeable adult user of the pistol,” without consulting a user’s manual, that there was a round 

in the chamber. Id. at 5. The DOJ made this determination by asking six randomly selected 

“non-sworn” employees of the Firearms Division whether they could tell these models were 

loaded by looking at the CLIs; only one employee of the six could in fact tell. Id. Defendant 

provides a declaration from Leslie McGovern, Associate Governmental Program Analyst at the 

DOJ, which states that the XD9623 has never been submitted for testing, an assertion plaintiffs’ 

evidence does not contradict. McGovern Decl. ¶ 5. 

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2012. Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).8 This court 

subsequently lifted the stay in this case in August 2012. Minute Order, ECF No. 42. 

After the court lifted the stay, plaintiffs amended the complaint to account for 

the microstamping provision, which had since taken effect, making other amendments as well. 

See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 7, 19. Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint in June 

2013, id. at 12, and defendants answered the following month, Def.’s Answer at 5, ECF No. 54. 

The parties simultaneously filed the instant cross-motions in October 2013, and plaintiffs filed 

a corrected memorandum in support of their motion in November 2013. Following the hearing 

in December 2013, the court ordered supplemental briefing, June 5, 2014 Order at 1–2, ECF 

No. 89, and both parties filed briefs, Def.’s Supp. Br. at 1, ECF No. 90; Pls.’ Supp. Br. at 1, 

ECF No. 91. Plaintiffs filed notices of supplemental authority on February 14, 2014, October 

2, 2014, and February 12, 2015. ECF Nos. 83, 92, 93. 

II. STANDING 

 A. INDIVIDUAL STANDING 

 Article III’s “case or controversy” language imposes on “the party invoking 

federal jurisdiction” the burden of establishing constitutional standing. Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 

(2013). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show injury that is “[1] concrete, particularized, 

and actual or imminent; [2] fairly traceable to the challenged action; and [3] redressable by a 

favorable ruling.” Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 

(2010)). “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum” requires that “the plaintiff suffer[] . . . 

invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Jackson v. City & Cnty. of 

San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014). Further, when seeking injunctive relief, a 

plaintiff must show “a very significant possibility of future harm.” Mortensen v. Cnty. of 

Sacramento, 368 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). On 

 8 Nordyke emphasizes “the crucial difference, with respect to constitutional analysis, 

between the government exercising the power to regulate . . . as lawmaker, and the government 

acting as proprietor . . . .” 681 F.3d at 1044–45 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Those facts are not before the court; thus, Nordyke is of limited utility here. See id.

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summary judgment, a “plaintiff can no longer rest on . . . mere allegations, but must set forth by 

affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the . . . motion will be taken to 

be true.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Here, the individual plaintiffs claim that because the UHA “constitute[s] a 

massive ban on handguns,” Pls.’ Mot. at 9, including the handguns plaintiffs seek to purchase, 

they are injured in several ways. Plaintiffs say they suffer: (1) “fear [of] arrest, prosecution, 

fine and incarceration if [they] complete[] th[ese] purchases,” id. at 6–7; (2) “increased costs in 

transporting and transferring . . . firearms from out-of-state dealers that they would not suffer if 

the firearms were available for sale in California,” id. at 13; (3) “a significant loss of . . . price 

competition,” id.; and (4) “a significant loss of choice,” id. 

 Plaintiffs have not established injury on the first asserted basis. Where “persons 

hav[e] no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, [they] are 

not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs . . . .” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971). 

Here, although each plaintiff claims to “fear arrest, prosecution, fine and incarceration” for 

purchase of an unlisted weapon, the UHA criminalizes only those who “manufacture[] or 

cause[] to be manufactured, import[] into the state for sale, keep[] for sale, offer[] or expose[] 

for sale, give[] or lend[]” such weapons. Cal. Penal Code § 32000. The statute does not 

criminalize the purchase or mere possession of an unlisted weapon. Id. Because this alleged 

injury is therefore “imaginary or speculative,” it is insufficient to confer standing. Younger, 

401 U.S. at 42. 

 Plaintiffs have also failed to establish injury on the second and third asserted 

bases. Although “palpable economic injuries have long been recognized as sufficient to lay the 

basis for standing,” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972), here, plaintiffs have 

adduced no “specific facts” to support their “mere allegations” as required under Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 561. The record is devoid of affidavit testimony or other evidence indicating the 

actual “costs [of] transporting and transferring . . . firearms from out-of-state,” or plaintiffs’ 

likelihood of incurring such costs. Pls.’ Mot. at 9. Similarly, plaintiffs have not directed the 

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court’s attention to data evincing loss of price competition in California resulting from the 

UHA. Plaintiffs have not established injury sufficient to confer standing on these bases. 

 Plaintiffs’ fourth and final asserted basis presents a closer question. Plaintiffs 

claim injury because the UHA causes “a significant loss of choice” in plaintiffs’ selection of 

“handguns whose possession and use is secured by the Second Amendment.” Pls.’ Mot. at 9. 

Injury requires “‘invasion of a legally protected interest.’” United States v. Windsor, ___ U.S. 

___, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also Jackson, 746 F.3d 

at 967. To determine whether an invasion has occurred, the court must first define the right at 

issue. Thus, determining whether prosecution of third-party gun sellers and manufacturers, 

who are not before the court, invades plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights is necessary to 

resolution of both standing and the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, “standing and the 

merits are inextricably intertwined.” Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1319 (1973). 

 In such cases, the court must address the merits, as it does below. See City of 

Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243 n.5 (1983) (addressing merits where Court 

“could not resolve the question [of] . . . standing without addressing the constitutional issue”); 

Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1319 (“If applicants are correct on the merits they have standing . . . . 

The case in that posture is in the class of those where standing and the merits are inextricably 

intertwined.”). But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“It would not be necessary to 

decide whether appellants’ allegations of impairment of their [constitutional rights] . . . will, 

ultimately, entitle them to relief, in order to hold that they have standing to seek it. If such 

impairment does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among those who have sustained 

it.”). In so doing, however, the court does not assume injury has occurred. Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 560 (holding injury may not be “hypothetical”). 

B. ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING 

 An organization may sue in its own or in a representative capacity. See United 

Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, 517 U.S. 544, 556 (1996). If suing in its own 

capacity, it must establish the same elements as an individual plaintiff. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 

In a representative capacity, however, “an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its 

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members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 

(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the 

claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the 

lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 

 Here, organizational plaintiffs CGF and SAF join the five individual plaintiffs in 

the action. As noted, CGF’s purposes “include supporting the California firearms community 

by promoting education for all stakeholders about California and federal firearm laws, rights 

and privileges, and securing, defending and protecting the civil rights of California gun owners, 

who are its members and supporters.” Decl. of Gene Hoffman, Jr. (“Hoffman Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF 

No. 61-7. SAF’s purposes “include education, research, publishing and legal action focusing 

on the Constitutional right to privately own and possess firearms, and the consequences of gun 

control.” Decl. of Alan Gottlieb ¶ 4, ECF No. 61-6. Both organizations attest that the UHA 

“regularly cause[s] the expenditure of resources . . . as people turn to [the] organization[s] for 

advice and information.” Id. ¶ 6; Hoffman Decl. ¶ 5. Also as noted, plaintiffs Peña, Croston 

and Thomas are members of both CGF and SAF. Decl. of Ivan Peña ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 61-2; 

Decl. of Doña Croston ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 61-3; Decl. of Brett Thomas ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 61-5. 

Vargas is a member of SAF and a “participant in CGF activities.” Decl. of Roy Vargas ¶¶ 2–3, 

ECF No. 61-4. 

 The organizational plaintiffs have established direct standing. “An organization 

may establish a sufficient injury in fact if it substantiates by affidavit . . . that a challenged 

statute or policy frustrates the organization’s goals and requires the organization to expend 

resources in representing clients they otherwise would spend in other ways.” Comite de 

Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[a]n organization cannot 

manufacture . . . injury by incurring litigation costs or . . . choosing to spend money fixing a 

problem that otherwise would not affect the organization . . . . It must instead show that it 

would have suffered some other injury if it had not diverted resources to counteracting the 

problem.” Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 

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quotation marks omitted). As the UHA imposes a number of regulations on firearms, it 

adversely affects the missions of CGF and SAF, both of which endeavor to protect the right of 

Californians to possess firearms. Further, the organizations attest to expending resources 

addressing the UHA that, in its absence, they could conserve or expend in other ways. Finally, 

there is no indication the injury is “manufacture[d],” as the UHA would increase the 

organizations’ expenditures, even barring direct involvement in the instant litigation. 

Having found direct standing, the court declines to address representational 

standing. 

III. STANDARD 

 Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

“Material” facts are those that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and an “issue of fact [is] . . . 

‘genuine’” where established by the presence or absence of “specific facts,” not mere 

“metaphysical doubt,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 

(1986). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law “[w]here the record taken as 

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party . . . .” Id. at 587 

(citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)); accord Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 50(a) (“If a party has been fully heard on an issue . . . and the court finds that a 

reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that 

issue, the court may . . . grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . .”). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing “that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 

(1986). If the moving party does so successfully, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, 

who “must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .” Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co., 475 U.S. at 585. In carrying their burdens, both parties must “cit[e] to particular parts of 

materials in the record . . . or show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

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support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). On summary judgment, the court views all 

evidence and draws all inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587–88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th 

Cir. 2008). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. SECOND AMENDMENT 

 The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to 

the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 

infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. This language “confers an individual right to keep and bear 

arms,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 622, “the core lawful purpose of [which] is self-defense,” id. at 630; 

Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). The right, however, “is not 

unlimited.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Instead, it is tempered by “presumptively lawful 

regulatory measures,” id. at 627 n.26, including “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 

firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 

places such as schools and government buildings,” and “laws imposing conditions and 

qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,” id. at 626–27. 

To determine whether a statute violates the Second Amendment, the Ninth 

Circuit has adopted a two-step approach “bear[ing] strong analogies to the Supreme Court’s 

free-speech caselaw.” Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960; United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 

(9th Cir. 2013). Under this framework, the court “(1) asks whether the challenged law burdens 

conduct protected by the Second Amendment and (2) if so, . . . appl[ies] an appropriate level of 

[heightened] scrutiny.” Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136. “[T]he rare law that ‘destroys’ the [Second 

Amendment] right[] requir[es] . . . per se invalidation.” Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1170. 

In this case, defendant contends the UHA does not burden the Second 

Amendment at step one because it is “presumptively lawful.” Def.’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. 

(“Def.’s Opp’n”) at 6, ECF No. 74. Alternatively, if the court reaches step two, defendant 

argues the UHA withstands even intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 10. For different reasons, 

plaintiffs also maintain the court need not apply means-ends scrutiny; because the UHA 

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prohibits protected arms, they argue it is per se invalid. Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 

(“Pls.’ Opp’n”) at 12, ECF No. 73. Relying on Chovan, plaintiffs argue in the alternative that 

the UHA imposes a substantial burden on the Second Amendment and the statute fails under 

either strict or intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 12–15. 

 Amicus Glock, Inc. asserts that the UHA burdens the Second Amendment 

because it bans handguns “that are in ‘common use’ by ‘law-abiding citizens for lawful 

purposes.’” Glock Amicus Curiae Br. at 5 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 627), ECF No. 66. 

Accordingly, Glock advocates the application of heightened scrutiny: “The proper 

constitutional test for analyzing the challenged portions of California’s roster requirements as 

applied to commercial sales is intermediate scrutiny analogous to that used when considering 

restrictions on commercial speech protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 2. Additionally, 

Glock contends the UHA does not survive intermediate scrutiny because its various exceptions 

and exemptions render it underinclusive. Id. at 8–9. 

1. Step 1: Burden on Conduct Protected by Second Amendment 

The court asks first whether, “based on a ‘historical understanding of the scope 

of the right,’” “the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment . . . .” 

Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625). “[A] challenged law falls outside 

the historical scope,” and thus does not burden protected conduct, where: (1) “the regulation is 

one of [several] ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’”;9 or (2) “the record includes 

 9

 The Supreme Court provided a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful 

regulatory measures,” stating: 

Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis 

today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in 

[Heller] should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 

mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 

sensitive places such as schools or government buildings, or laws 

imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 

arms. 

554 U.S. at 626–27. The language itself is ambiguous as to whether the Court here deems all 

regulatory measures falling within these categories “longstanding” and therefore presumptively 

lawful, or whether only “longstanding” regulatory measures within these categories are 

presumptively lawful. However, the Ninth Circuit has suggested the former reading is correct: 

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persuasive historical evidence establishing “that the regulation . . . imposes prohibitions that 

fall outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment.” Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 

n.26; Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137). Additionally, as the test does not qualify the term “burdens,” 

the question is not one of degree. See id.; Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136. Thus, if the regulated 

conduct burdens the Second Amendment, even minimally, and the government cannot show 

that the regulation is a “presumptively lawful regulatory measure[]” or “fall[s] outside the 

historical scope of the Second Amendment,” review proceeds to the second step. Jackson, 

746 F.3d at 960. 

Defendant argues the UHA does not burden plaintiffs’ Second Amendment 

rights for two reasons. Def.’s Opp’n at 5–7. Defendant points out handguns remain widely 

available in California: over one million handgun transactions, a figure that grows by the 

hundreds of thousands annually, have occurred in California since plaintiffs filed suit, and the 

current handgun roster includes more than one thousand models. Id. at 5. Moreover, plaintiffs, 

who already own guns suitable for self-defense, are able to acquire more through alternate, 

legal avenues, id., a factor which has led courts to uphold regulations akin to the UHA, id. at 6 

(citing serial-number statute in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) 

and gun-registration law in Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1251–58). 

 Second, defendant contends the UHA is a law “imposing conditions and 

qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” and is, therefore, “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 

5–6 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). Likening the UHA’s safety-feature 

requirements to founding-era gunpowder-storage laws, defendant insists the statute does not 

 

In the first step, we ask whether the challenged law burdens 

conduct protected by the Second Amendment, based on a 

historical understanding of the scope of the [Second Amendment] 

right, or whether the challenged law falls within a well-defined 

and narrowly limited category of prohibitions that have been 

historically unprotected. 

Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (equating 

“habitual drug users” with “felons and mentally ill people” and rejecting Second Amendment 

challenge without undertaking historical analysis). 

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burden the right of self-defense even “remotely.” Id. at 6 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 632). 

Therefore, defendant concludes, the UHA does not infringe the core Second Amendment right 

of “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id.

 Plaintiffs respond that because there is a right to keep and bear arms, there must 

be a corresponding right to acquire them. Pls.’ Mot. at 10 (citing, inter alia, Marzzarella, 

614 F.3d at 92 n.8). Although conceding the State may ban “dangerous and unusual” arms, id.

(citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 627), plaintiffs argue “the acquisition of handguns of the kind in 

common use for lawful purposes, the sort of handguns that law-abiding citizens would expect 

to keep,” “cannot be prohibited—even if the state would prefer people use different (or no) 

firearms,” id. at 11. Relying on Heller, they assert handguns are protected by the Second 

Amendment because the guns are “in common use” and that the UHA not only burdens but 

bans them. See Pls.’ Mot. at 9 (quoting 554 U.S. at 627). 

 Plaintiffs accordingly contend that this court need determine only whether the 

unlisted handguns, effectively banned in California because they are deemed “unsafe,” are arms 

“in common use” within the meaning of the Second Amendment. Pls.’ Opp’n at 12. If they are 

not, then plaintiffs’ challenge ends because the arms are not protected; if they are, then an 

injunction must issue because the arms may not be banned. Id. In plaintiffs’ estimation, the 

UHA amounts to a ban of new handguns that do not have microstamping, CLI, or MDM 

technology; have not been submitted by the manufacturer for testing; or for which no annual 

listing fee has been paid. Pls.’ Mot. at 13. Plaintiffs analogize to First Amendment doctrine 

and assert that permitting California to ban these types of handguns is akin to permitting it to 

ban entire categories of books. Pls.’ Opp’n at 1. 

“In order to uphold the constitutionality of a law imposing a condition on the 

commercial sale of firearms, a court necessarily must examine the nature and extent of the 

imposed condition.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 n.8. Here, the UHA criminalizes the 

manufacture and sale of new guns deemed “unsafe,” Cal. Penal Code § 32000, permitting 

commercialization of only handguns that appear on a state roster, id. § 32015. To be added to 

the roster, a new handgun must comply with specified requirements, depending on the type of 

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gun and listing date: inclusion of microstamping (as of May 2013), CLI (as of January 2006 or 

2007), and MDM features (same), id. § 31910; firing and drop safety testing (as of 1999), id.; 

and payment of a listing fee (as of 1999), id. § 32015(b)(1). The UHA thereby “impos[es] 

conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms . . . .” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 

The law does not, however, “prohibit[] the commercial sale of firearms.” 

Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 n.8; see also United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 

2011) (noting Heller’s distinction between “regulations” and “prohibitions”). Whereas the 

“imposi[tion] of conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” is 

“presumptively lawful,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, the prohibition of commercial sale 

“would be untenable,” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 n.8, because it would “effect[] a 

‘destruction of the [Second Amendment] right,’” Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Heller, 

554 U.S. at 629) (emphasis in original). As opposed to “conditions and qualifications,” Heller, 

554 U.S. at 627, “[a] ‘prohibition’ does more than merely alter or restrain a person’s behavior; 

it is an edict, decree, or order which forbids, prevents, or excludes,” Barton, 633 F.3d at 175 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (“[A] ban is not merely 

regulatory; it prohibits . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original)). Thus, 

categorical prohibitions “go too far.”10 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1170. In Heller, for example, the 

Court invalidated the contested law, without subjecting it to constitutional scrutiny, because it 

was a “complete ban on handguns in the home . . . .” Id. at 1170 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 

629). Similarly, in Peruta, the court summarily struck down the law in question because it was 

a “near-total prohibition on keeping [arms] . . . .” Id. In Silvester v. Harris, the subject of 

 10 The court notes, however, that “Heller said nothing about extending Second 

Amendment protection to firearm manufacturers or dealers. If anything, Heller recognized that 

firearms manufacturers and dealers are properly subject to regulation . . . .” Teixera v. Cnty. of 

Alameda, No. 12-cv-03288-WHO, 2013 WL 4804756, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “‘although the Second 

Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms, it does not necessarily give rise to a 

corresponding right to sell a firearm.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 342, 

344 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)); cf. United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 

413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (“[T]he protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of 

one’s home does not give rise to a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others.”). 

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plaintiffs’ second notice of supplemental authority, a fellow district judge found a ten-day 

waiting period to purchase a firearm an unconstitutional burden on the rights of those who 

already owned firearms. 2014 WL 4209563, at *28 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2014) (discussing 

longstanding presumptively lawful regulations as discussed in Heller, finding that waiting 

periods do not qualify, but noting laws “prohibiting the sale of certain types of firearms” may 

qualify). 

The UHA is distinguishable from the the laws at issue in Heller and Peruta; the 

UHA does not effectively ban firearms. Under the instant statutory scheme, the commercial 

sale of firearms proceeds robustly: “[s]ince this lawsuit was filed, there have been 

approximately 1.5 million legal handgun transactions in California,” Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s 

Undisputed Facts ¶ 25, and as of February 11, 2015, the handgun roster included 795 models,11

Roster of Handguns Certified for Sale, Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Attorney Gen. 

(accessible at http://certguns.doj.ca.gov/). Plaintiffs concede “California’s handgun rostering 

laws [do not] bar access to all handguns.” Pls.’ First Notice of Supplemental Authority at 4, 

ECF No. 83 (emphasis in original). In other words, the UHA does not “amount[] to a 

prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’” requiring per se invalidation. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 

Further, each individual plaintiff admits to both having obtained and being able to obtain 

handguns capable of use for self-defense. Def.’s Opp’n at 5. Plaintiffs nonetheless say “[t]hat 

[whether] some handguns are allowed is beside the point.” Pls.’ First Notice of Supplemental 

Authority at 4 (emphasis in original). “Rather, [they] claim that particular unrostered handguns 

are constitutionally-protected [sic], such that barring access to those handguns violates their 

 11 The court notes that in their proposed supplemental brief plaintiffs assert that the 

number of listed handguns declined ten percent between October 2013 and January 2014 and 

that “the number . . . will continue its steep decline.” Pls.’ Mot. to Supplement R. at 2, ECF 

No. 82-1. “[A]bsent relief from the microstamping requirement,” they continue, “semiautomatic handguns will all but disappear from the California consumer market in due course.” 

Id. Even if the court considered this argument, plaintiffs do not offer evidence sufficient to 

support a finding of imminent disappearance and the court would have no reason to address 

hypothetical facts not before it. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) 

(“A justiciable controversy is . . . distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or 

abstract character . . . .”). 

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Second Amendment rights, in the precise way that Plaintiffs would exercise those rights.” Id. 

(emphasis in original). In essence, plaintiffs’ position is that choosing the manner in which 

their Second Amendment rights are to be exercised—specifically, their selection of particular 

arms—is part and parcel of the right itself and the state’s imposition of “conditions and 

qualifications” that deprive plaintiffs of their choices is unconstitutional. See id. 

The court is not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument. “Heller did not purport to 

‘clarify the entire field’ of Second Amendment jurisprudence and does not provide explicit 

guidance on the constitutionality of regulations which are less restrictive than . . . near-total 

ban[s] . . . .” Jackson, 746 F.3d at 959 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). The Court in Heller

addressed only a “handgun ban [that] amount[ed] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ 

[handguns] that [was] overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful purpose [of 

self-defense].” Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. Because that “law totally ban[ned] handgun 

possession,” it “amount[ed] to a destruction of the right,” and was “clearly unconstitutional.” 

Id. at 628–29. As discussed above, however, the equivalent circumstance is not present here. 

The UHA does not adversely impact the access to and sale of firearms generally; plaintiffs’ 

Second Amendment rights are satisfied by the scheme’s allowing the purchase of nearly 1000 

types of rostered firearms. This degree of regulation is negligible and does not burden 

plaintiffs’ rights under the Second Amendment. 

 Further, the Court noted in Heller that “the right [protected by the Second 

Amendment is] not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 

and for whatever purpose.” 554 U.S. at 626. Rejecting reasoning analogous to plaintiffs’ here, 

the Ninth Circuit held in Peruta that California “has the power to” decide the manner in which 

Second Amendment rights may be exercised: “[A]s the historical sources have repeatedly 

noted, the state has a right to prescribe a particular manner of carry, provided it does not cut[] 

off the exercise of the citizen right altogether to bear arms, or, under the color of prescribing 

the mode, render[] the right itself useless.” 742 F.3d at 1172 (alterations in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “California’s favoring [one mode of carry over another] . . . does not 

offend the Constitution, so long as it allows one . . . .” Id. Consequently, “[i]nsistence upon a 

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particular mode of carry” “fall[s] outside the scope of the right to bear arms . . . .” Id.; see also 

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 

Here, plaintiffs insist they have the right to determine “the precise way [in which 

they] . . . would exercise” their Second Amendment rights; they demand access to handguns of 

their choosing. Pls.’ First Notice of Supplemental Authority at 4. California, however, has 

“express[ed] a preference for” handguns it deems safe, just as it has for “concealed rather than 

open carry” of arms. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1172. The state “has the power to do so” subject to 

the limiting principle that the regulation not “cut[ ] off the exercise of the right of the citizen 

altogether to bear arms, or, under the color of prescribing the mode, render[ ] the right itself 

useless.” Id. (internal quotation omitted, alteration in original); cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 

497, 539 (1961) (“In reviewing state legislation, whether considered to be in the exercise of the 

State’s police powers, or in the provision for the health, safety, morals or welfare of its people, 

it is clear that what is concerned are the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). The court finds plaintiffs’ “[i]nsistence upon . . . 

particular” handguns to “fall outside the scope of the right to bear arms.” Peruta, 742 F.3d at 

1172; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. It need pursue the inquiry no further. See Jackson, 746 

F.3d at 960; Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136. The court also rejects plaintiffs’ contention that 

“particular unrostered handguns are constitutionally-protected [sic] . . . .” Pls.’ First Notice of 

Supplemental Authority at 4. The Second Amendment does not protect guns, but rather 

conduct. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136. 

The UHA is “one of the ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ identified 

in Heller” and, as such, “falls outside the historical scope” of the Second Amendment.12 

Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960. As the Jackson court employed the disjunctive in its articulation of 

 12 Because this court finds the UHA presumptively lawful, the court’s holding is 

distinguishable from the holding in Mance v. Holder, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16679 (N.D. Tex. 

Feb. 11, 2015), which plaintiffs submitted with their third notice of supplemental authority. 

ECF No. 93. In Mance, the court found a federal interstate handgun transfer ban was not 

presumptively lawful, and that it burdened plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights; the court 

struck down the restriction after applying strict scrutiny, which is not the standard applicable 

here. 

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the rule, no evaluation of “historical evidence” is required here. See id. (“To determine 

whether a . . . law falls outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment,” the court 

“ask[s] whether the regulation is one of the presumptively lawful regulatory measures 

identified in Heller or whether the record includes persuasive historical evidence establishing 

that the regulation . . . imposes prohibitions . . . fall[ing] outside” the Amendment’s scope. 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Dugan, 657 F.3d at 999. 

The UHA does not burden plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. 

2. Step 2: Scrutiny Required? 

 Because the UHA does not burden the Second Amendment at the first step, the 

court need not proceed to the second step. Heightened scrutiny is not triggered. See id. at 961 

(“If a prohibition falls within the historical scope of the Second Amendment, [the court] . . . 

proceed[s] to the second step . . . .”); accord NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 

Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012) (“If a challenged law burdens conduct that falls 

outside the Second Amendment’s scope, then the law passes constitutional muster.”); Ezell v. 

City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the government can establish that 

a challenged firearms law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment 

right . . . then the analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically unprotected, and 

the law is not subject to further Second Amendment review.”). 

 Rational basis review is likewise improper here as it “is a mode of analysis . . . 

use[d] when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions 

on irrational laws.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. In such cases, “‘rational basis’ is not just the 

standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee.” Id. “[T]he same 

test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, 

enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech . . . or the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. 

Otherwise, “the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional 

prohibitions on irrational laws[] and . . . have no effect.” Id.

Instead, “[w]here a challenged statute apparently falls into one of the categories 

signaled by the Supreme Court as constitutional, courts have relied on the ‘presumptively 

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lawful’ language to uphold laws in relatively summary fashion.” Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-

03799 RS, 2011 WL 995933, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (citing United States v. Vongxay, 

594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Davis, 304 F. App’x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 

2008); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010)); see also Dugan, 657 F.3d 

at 999 (equating “habitual drug users” with “felons and mentally ill people” for Second 

Amendment purposes and summarily terminating analysis). 

The court denies plaintiffs’ Second Amendment challenge, without the need for 

further discussion. 

B. EQUAL PROTECTION 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No state 

shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. 

Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This directive requires “that all persons similarly situated . . . be 

treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing 

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). Indeed, “to trigger equal protection review at all, [a 

challenged law] must treat similarly situated persons disparately.” Barnes-Wallace v. City of 

San Diego, 704 F.3d 1067, 1084 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Persons 

are not similarly situated where they “are different in fact,” such that the “distinctions . . . 

drawn [by the challenged law] have some relevance to the purpose for which classification is 

made.” Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must “show that the 

[challenged] law is applied in a discriminatory manner or imposes different burdens on 

different classes of people.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Accordingly, “‘[t]he first step in equal protection analysis is to identify the [challenged law’s] 

classification of groups.’” Id. (quoting Country Classic Dairies, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of 

Commerce Milk Ctrl. Bureau, 847 F.2d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 1988)). “Once the plaintiff 

establishes [the] classification, it is [then] necessary to identify a ‘similarly situated’ class 

against which the plaintiff’s class can be compared.” Id. (citing Attorney Gen. v. Irish People, 

Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 

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Only after identification of a classification does the court proceed to “[t]he next 

step [and] determine the level of scrutiny.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,” it need 

only “bear[] a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 

(1996). Such review requires that a “classification . . . be upheld . . . if there is any reasonably

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Heller v. 

Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). 

Plaintiffs argue the UHA creates several privileged classes exempt from 

compliance with the roster: (1) people who move into the state, (2) people who have out-ofstate family, (3) law enforcement personnel, (4) “curios” or “relics” as defined by statute, 

(5) people involved in movie or television production and (6) guns with certain CLIs. Pls.’ 

Mot. at 18–19. Because persons in these classifications, in contrast to the general population, 

need not comply with the UHA, plaintiffs argue there is disparate treatment. Id. Plaintiffs do 

not claim any classifications are suspect or quasi-suspect but assert the law infringes the 

fundamental Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 16–17. They thus argue 

strict scrutiny is proper and summary judgment on this claim warranted. Id. at 17–18. 

 For his part, defendant contends as a threshold matter that plaintiffs have failed 

to identify distinct classifications that the statute treats disparately. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 

(“Def.’s Mot.”) at 19, ECF No. 55. Further, according to defendant, plaintiffs are neither 

similarly situated to any properly identified class nor subject to disparate treatment. Id.; Def.’s 

Opp’n at 10–11. Even were equal protection review proper, he continues, the UHA neither 

burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Def.’s Mot. at 19; 

Def.’s Opp’n at 11. Defendant thus concludes the law is subject to only rational basis review, 

and summary judgment should be granted in his favor. Def.’s Mot. at 19; Def.’s Opp’n at 11. 

1. Curios, Relics, and CLIs 

The court first finds that “curios” or “relics” and guns with certain CLIs are not 

subject to equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees only “that all persons 

similarly situated . . . be treated alike,” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439; it “relates to equality 

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between persons as such,” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). Thus, as 

plaintiffs here claim disparate treatment of objects, not persons, the argument fails. The 

pertinent provisions do not treat persons disparately. They classify certain types of guns as 

exempt or define guns with certain CLIs as “safe” but apply the exemptions and definitions 

equally and identically to all persons. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 32000(b)(3), 32010(d)(1)–(2), 

16380. 

2. Incoming Residents, Out-of-State Family, and Movie Production 

The court also finds that the UHA does not treat (1) people who move into the 

state, (2) people who have out-of-state family, or (3) people involved in movie or television 

production differently from other persons. Plaintiffs argue that because “unrostered guns are 

permitted by private importation or as intra-family gifts,” “[t]he roster . . . privileges people 

who move into the state[] or who have family out-of-state [sic].” Pls.’ Mot. at 18. However, 

California residents, including those who have no out-of-state family, are not prevented from 

possessing unlisted guns, receiving them as intra-family gifts from in-state relatives, or 

bringing them into the state for noncommercial purposes. The law thus exempts specific types 

of transactions without regard to the persons involved. See Cal. Penal Code § 32000(a) 

(punishing “any person in [California] who manufactures or causes to be manufactured, 

imports into the state for sale, keeps for sale, offers or exposes for sale, gives, or lends any 

unsafe handgun”); id. law revision commission comments (2010) (noting “exception for 

infrequent transfer of handgun between members of same immediate family”). 

Similarly, plaintiffs protest the “exceptions for movie and television 

production.” Pls.’ Mot. at 19. However, the law states only that it “shall not apply to . . . [t]he 

sale loan or transfer of any semiautomatic pistol that is to be used solely as a prop during the 

course of a motion picture, television or video production by an authorized participant therein,” 

without dictating who may or may not be such a participant, Cal. Penal Code § 32110(h). 

Equal protection is concerned with “law [being] applied in a discriminatory manner or 

impos[ing] different burdens on different classes of people,” Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187; 

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McGowan, 366 U.S. at 427, a condition that does not obtain here. Equal protection analysis is 

not triggered by this provision either. 

3. Law Enforcement

Plaintiffs’ assertion that the UHA treats law enforcement personnel differently, 

is, however, persuasive. Whereas the law’s prohibitions apply to “any person in this state” who 

engages in specified actions, see Cal. Penal Code § 32000(a), transactions involving “sworn 

members” of law enforcement personnel “for use in the discharge of their official duties” are 

exempt, id. § 32000(b)(4).13 This provision results in disparate treatment because exempting a 

group of people from compliance with the UHA “imposes different burdens on different classes 

of people.” Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187. That said, active law enforcement personnel and 

laymen are not similarly situated to plaintiffs. 

 “Differen[ces] in fact,” Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309, exist between law enforcement 

personnel and laymen. Law enforcement personnel shoulder a duty to ensure public safety and 

thus assume different responsibilities, risks, and rights. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 

1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding it “manifestly rational for . . . peace officers to possess and use 

firearms more potent than those available to the rest of the populace in order to maintain public 

safety”), abrogated on other grounds by Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. These differences are directly 

“relevan[t] to the purpose for which classification is made” in the UHA, namely, public safety. 

Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not “identif[ied] a ‘similarly situated’ 

class against which the plaintiff[s]’ class can be compared.” Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187. Equal 

 13 The UHA does not apply to: 

The sale or purchase of a handgun, if the handgun is sold to, or 

purchased by, the Department of Justice, a police department, a 

sheriff’s official, a marshal’s office, the [California] Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the California Highway Patrol, 

any district attorney’s office, any federal law enforcement 

agency, or the military or naval forces of this state or of the 

United States for use in the discharge of their official duties. 

This section does not prohibit the sale to, or purchase by, sworn 

members of these agencies of a handgun. 

Cal. Penal Code § 32000(b)(4).

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protection analysis is, therefore, not triggered by the law enforcement exemption. Id. But see 

Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1088–89 (rejecting, under rational basis review, equal protection challenge 

to California gun law’s disparate treatment of off-duty and retired peace officers and laymen). 

The court grants summary judgment on the equal protection claim in favor of 

defendant. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above: 

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 61, is DENIED; and 

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 55, is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 25, 2015. 

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