Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06632/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06632-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH KEKEA MARIBUSAN,

Plaintiff, 

 v.

 J. E. TILTON, J. D. STOKES, D. A.

DACANAY, D. DESEO, in their

official and individual capacities,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-6632 WHA (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

Plaintiff, an inmate at San Quentin, filed this case in state court alleging violations of

state law and his federal civil rights. Defendants removed it to this court. Defendants’ opposed

motion to dismiss is before the Court for ruling. 

DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the settlement agreement in Castillo v.

Alameida, No. C 94-2847-MJJ-JCS is will be granted. The Court also takes judicial notice of

the order dismissing plaintiff’s prior case, Manibusan v. Alameida, No. C 04-2611 JSW (PR)

(Order Feb. 28 2006). See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2) & (f); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.

Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 584 (9th Cir.1982) (court may take judicial

notice of plaintiff’s prior complaints and orders dismissing them).

///

Case 3:06-cv-06632-WHA Document 13 Filed 08/28/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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B. Res Judicata

Defendants raise res judicata in their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Although

ordinarily affirmative defenses may not be raised by motion to dismiss, it is permissible to do so

if, as here, the defense involves no disputed issues of fact. See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d

1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).

In non-diversity cases, federal courts apply federal law to determine the preclusive

effect of prior federal court judgments. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402

U.S. 313, 324 n. 12 (1971). The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, provides that a

final judgment on the merits bars further claims by the parties or their privies based on the same

cause of action. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 322 F .3d 1064,

1077 (9th Cir. 2003). The doctrine prohibits the re-litigation of any claims that were raised or

could have been raised in a prior action. W. Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189,

1192 (9th Cir.1997). It is irrelevant whether the new claims that plaintiff seeks to pursue now

were actually pursued in the action that led to the judgment; rather, the question is whether they

could have been brought in the previous case. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 322 F.3d at 1078. 

The Ninth Circuit has listed four factors which may be considered when determining

whether successive claims constitute the same cause of action: (1) whether rights or interests

established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second

action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether

the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of

the same transactional nucleus of facts. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers-Employers, 994

F.2d at 1429. These factors, however, are "tools of analysis, not requirements." Id. at 1430. 

For example, the Ninth Circuit has previously applied the doctrine of res judicata solely on the

ground that the two claims arose out of the same transaction, without reaching the other factors. 

See id. at 1430. Determining whether two events are part of the same transaction is essentially

dependent on whether the events are related to the same set of facts and whether the events

could conveniently be tried together. See id. at 1429.

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Case 3:06-cv-06632-WHA Document 13 Filed 08/28/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In Manibusan v. Alameida, plaintiff’s previous case involving his SHU term, the court

described his claims as concerning “[p]laintiff’s placement and retention in administrative

segregation as a gang member.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Attach. at 1) The present case

concerns defendants’ alleged failure to provide meaningful review of plaintiff’s designation as a

member of a prison gang and his consequent housing in a secure unit. It is clear that both

claims – if in fact there is any difference – are part of the same transaction, are related to the

same set of facts, and could conveniently have been tried together. See Int'l Union of Operating

Engineers-Employers, 994 F.2d at 1429. 

Plaintiff contends that the earlier case and this one are different because the first case

involved only his initial “validation” as a gang member and this one involves his continuing

placement in the SHU without what he contends is the necessary annual consideration of

whether he should be retained there. Although it appears he is incorrect, in that the court in the

earlier case considered that case to involve “retention” in the SHU as well as placement there, it

does not matter. Whether or not the present claims were actually litigated in the previous case,

“res judicata bars not only all claims that were actually litigated, but also all claims that 'could

have been asserted' in the prior action." See Int'l Union of Operating Engineers-Employers

Constr. Indus. Pension, Welfare and Training Trust Funds v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th

Cir.1993). That is, even if the present claims were not in the previous case, they clearly could

have been, and that is enough to preclude the present case. The motion to dismiss will be

granted.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for judicial notice (document number 10 on the docket) and their

motion to dismiss (document 9) are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for disclosure (document 8)

is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 27 , 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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