Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01846/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01846-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD TUCKER,

CDCR #Ak-1434,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; 

DANIEL PARAMO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01846-JLS-PCL

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT AS 

FRIVOLOUS AND FOR FAILING 

TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 

AND 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On July 12, 2016, Plaintiff Gerald Tucker, currently incarcerated at the Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding 

pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he 

filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 14).

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On January 17, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 

simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim and as frivolous 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. (ECF No. 17, at 7–8.) Plaintiff was 

granted leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading 

found in his original Complaint. (Id.) On February 27, 2017, Plaintiff has filed what 

appears to be his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 18.)

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the 

Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is 

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Rule 8

Once again, Plaintiff’s FAC is difficult to decipher as many of the claims Plaintiff is 

attempting to allege are disjointed and incomprehensible. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure provides that in order to state a claim for relief in a pleading it must contain 

“a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

8(a)(1) & (2). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC falls short of complying with 

Rule 8.

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

While not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that officials with the 

California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) are under “suspicion of 

murder” and are “covering up” the alleged murder of his brother and sister-in-law. (FAC 

at 1–2.) There are no comprehensible allegations contained anywhere in Plaintiff’s FAC. 

“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is 

frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. . . . [The] term ‘frivolous,’ 

when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also 

the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A pleading 

is “factual[ly] frivolous[ ]” under § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)(1) if “the facts alleged rise 

to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially 

noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 

(1992). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, the court need not accept the 

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allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations,” Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327, to determine whether they are “‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ [or] ‘delusional,’” 

Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325–28). 

Applying these standards to the allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) § 1915A(b)(1). See 

Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 920 n.1.

D. Freedom of Association

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges his brother and sister-in-law were wrongfully

removed from his list of approved visitors and thus, violates his constitutional rights, he 

has failed to state a claim. (See FAC at 2, 4–5.) 

Incarceration by necessity restricts the scope of a prisoner’s associational rights. 

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131–32 (2003); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 

(9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, a regulation that impinges on an inmate’s First Amendment 

rights “is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. 

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 526 (2006). 

Thus, in order to state a First Amendment freedom of association claim, Plaintiff 

must plead facts sufficient to show how or why the removal of certain individuals from his 

approved visitor list do not serve any legitimate penological interest. See Turner, 482 U.S. 

at 89–90. 

Here, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to include any factual content to show that the ban on 

certain visitors serves no legitimate penological purpose. Turner, 482 U.S at 89; see also 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, even if Plaintiff did allege prison officials’ decision to 

remove certain family members from his approved visitor list served no legitimate 

penological purpose, courts nevertheless “accord substantial deference to the professional 

judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the 

legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to 

accomplish them,” Overton, 539 U.S. at 132, and “[t]he burden . . . is not on the State to 

prove the validity of [a] prison regulation[] but on the prisoner to disprove it.” Id. (citing 

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Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)). 

Thus, because Plaintiff offers no “factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference” that any specific prison official was in violation of his First 

Amendment rights in the absence of any legitimate penological purpose, see Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Turner, 482 U.S at 89, the Court finds these claims subject to sua sponte 

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–

27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as frivolous and for failing 

to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b);

2) DENIES Plaintiff further leave to amend as futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. 

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of 

discretion where further amendment would be futile); Gonzalez, 759 F.3d at 1116 (district 

court’s discretion in denying amendment is “particularly broad” when it has previously 

granted leave to amend);

3) CERTIFIES that an appeal of this final Order of dismissal would be frivolous 

and therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

be frivolous); and

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to terminate this civil action and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2017

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