Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01484/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01484-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHIU LIN, in her individual 

and representative capacity 

as Trustee, Kuo & Chiu Lin 

Family Trust,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-01484-GEB-DAD

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 

OF LAW

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and $8,000.00 in statutory damages 

under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”) for certain 

accessibility barriers at a barbecue restaurant in Sacramento, 

California. 

A bench trial was held on August 25, 2015. The 

following witnesses testified: Plaintiff; Plaintiff’s expert, 

Paul Bishop; Defendant’s son, Bryan Lin; and Defendant’s expert, 

Christopher Cormier. Exhibits 3, 4, 6, and 101 were admitted. The 

parties also stipulated to certain facts, which are incorporated

in the June 17, 2015, Final Pretrial Order (“FPO”). 

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The following findings of fact and conclusions of law 

are made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 after 

considering the stipulated facts, testimony, and documentary 

evidence presented. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff Scott Johnson is a level C-5 

quadriplegic; he cannot walk and uses a wheelchair for mobility. 

(FPO 3:21-27, ECF No. 27.)

2. Plaintiff has a specially equipped van with a 

wheelchair lift that deploys from the passenger side. (FPO 4:1-

2.)

3. T&R Taste of Texas Restaurant (the “restaurant”) 

is located at 3621 Broadway, Sacramento, California.

4. At all times relevant to this case, Defendant Chiu 

Lin, as Trustee of the Kuo & Chiu Family Trust, owned the 

restaurant.

5. Plaintiff visited and purchased food at the 

restaurant on the following dates: February 15, 2013; March 4, 

2013; April 2, 2013; and June 5, 2013 (“visits”). (Trial Exs. 3-A 

– 3-D.)

6. Plaintiff drove himself to the restaurant on each 

visit. (Trial Tr. 31:23-25, ECF No. 41.) 

7. On each visit, the restaurant did not offer 

sufficient, ADA-compliant accessible parking facilities to its 

disabled patrons. (FPO 5:3-5.)

8. During each visit, Plaintiff had difficulty in 

exiting and re-entering his vehicle. (Trial Tr. 32:7-11.)

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9. During each visit, Plaintiff used the restaurant’s 

restroom. (Id. at 31:16-18.)

10. On each visit, the restaurant’s restroom had sink 

faucet handles with traditional “twisty style” knobs that 

required persons to grasp and twist with the wrist. (FPO 4:25-

27.)

11. In using the restaurant’s restroom to wash his 

hands and face after eating, Plaintiff experienced difficulty 

using the sink knobs. (Trial Tr. 30:23-24, 31:3-8, 31:16-20.)

12. On each visit, the grab bar mounted on the 

restaurant’s restroom wall adjacent to the toilet jutted out 21 

inches away from the wall. (FPO 5:1-3.)

13. In using the restaurant’s restroom, the position 

of the grab bars “made it difficult [for Plaintiff] to keep [his] 

balance correct for using the toilet.” (Trial Tr. 30:25-31:1, 

31:16-18, 31:21-22.)

14. On April 16, 2012, the restaurant was inspected by 

a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”) inspector Christopher 

Cormier. (FPO 4:7-9.)

15. After receiving Mr. Cormier’s report concerning 

his April 16, 2012 inspection, Defendant began to correct the 

accessibility barriers identified in the report. (Trial Tr. 

47:21-48:4.)

16. Defendant’s efforts to correct the accessibility 

barriers identified in Mr. Cormier’s report were not completed 

until on or around October 2, 2013; work on the parking lot was 

not completed until on or around October 2, 2013. (Id. at 48:5-8, 

52:10-53:18.) 

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17. All accessibility barriers referenced in the 

Complaint and in the Final Pretrial Order have been corrected. 

(Id. at 15:9-18, 17:5-17, 20:12-21:6, 22:22-24.)

DISCUSSION

A. ADA Claim for Injunctive Relief

“Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by 

public accommodations.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 

730 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. ' 12101, et seq.). “To 

prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must 

show that (1) []he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) 

the defendant . . . owns, leases, or operates a place of public 

accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 

accommodations by the defendant because of h[is] disability.” 

Molski, 481 F.3d at 730 (citing 42 U.S.C. '' 12182(a)-(b)). “The 

third element—that the plaintiff was denied public accommodations 

on the basis of disability—is satisfied if the defendant failed 

to remove architectural barriers where such removal was readily 

achievable.” Lozano v. C.A. Martinez Family Ltd. Partnership, ---

F. Supp. 3d ----, 2015 WL 5227869, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)).

“Injunctive relief is the sole remedy available to 

private parties under the [ADA]; [the ADA] does not authorize a 

claim for money damages.” Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, 

Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2010). “Because a private 

plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief (i.e. for removal of 

the barrier [or barriers]) under the ADA, a defendant’s voluntary 

removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of 

mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 

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654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff has 

established all three elements of his Title III claim concerning 

the accessibility barriers alleged in the Complaint and 

referenced in the FPO. Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning 

of the ADA; at all relevant times, Defendant owned the 

restaurant, which is a place of public accommodation as defined 

by the ADA; and Plaintiff encountered accessibility barriers at 

the restaurant, the removal of which was readily achievable. 

Further, it is undisputed that Defendant has removed all 

accessibility barriers referenced in the Complaint and Final 

Pretrial Order. (Trial Tr. 15:9-18, 17:5-17, 20:12-21:6, 22:22-

24.) 

Therefore, the sole issue to be decided on Plaintiff’s 

Title III claim is whether Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive 

relief to remedy two accessibility barriers that were raised for 

the first time at trial: the incorrect verbiage and location of 

an old tow-away sign, and the restroom door’s inadequate amount 

of strike-side clearance. (Trial Tr. 9:16-11:11, 20:12-21:6.)

Although the parties dispute in post-trial briefing 

whether Plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief for barriers not 

alleged in the Complaint, the Court need not reach this issue 

since the trial record does not support awarding injunctive 

relief to remedy either newly mentioned barrier for the following 

reasons. 

///

///

///

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1) Old Tow-Away Sign

Plaintiff’s expert, Paul Bishop, testified that during 

his November 2014 visit to the restaurant, he “found an older 

tow-away sign at the entrance to the parking lot that did not 

comply with the current California Building Code or California 

Vehicle Code requirements.” (Trial Tr. 9:16-10:1.) Specifically, 

Mr. Bishop testified that “[t]he wording or the text on that sign 

does not comply with the current building code or vehicle code 

requirements, and . . . lacks the contact information for how to 

reclaim a towed vehicle.” (Id. at 10:5-9.) Mr. Bishop further 

testified that the sign was not located where it should have 

been. (Id. at 10:15-11:11.)

However, Defendant’s expert, Christopher Cormier, 

testified that the restaurant’s “signage at the handicapped 

parking” is ADA compliant, making the older sign at the 

restaurant’s entrance “unnecessary.” (Id. at 59:13-60:24; see 

also Trial Ex. 6-B.) Plaintiff presented no evidence to rebut Mr. 

Cormier’s testimony. 

In light of the record concerning the restaurant’s ADAcompliant signage, injunctive relief requiring Defendant to 

correct the older tow-away sign is not warranted. 

2) Restroom Door Strike-Side Clearance

“An architectural barrier need only be removed where it 

is ‘readily achievable’ to do so.” Yates v. Bacco, No. C-11-01573 

DMR, 2014 WL 1089101, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014) (citing 42 

U.S.C. 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)). “Readily achievable means ‘easily 

accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty 

or expense.’” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 

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939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9)).

“Th[e Ninth C]ircuit has ‘yet to decide who has the 

burden of proving that removal of an architectural barrier is 

readily achievable.’” Moore v. Robinson Oil Corp., 588 F. App’x 

528, 530-31 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 

F. Supp. 2d 998, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2014)). However, “[i]n this 

case, regardless of the allocation of the burden of proof, there 

[i]s insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that [removal 

of the side-strike door clearance barrier i]s ‘readily 

achievable.’” Id.

Defendant presented the only evidence at trial on the 

subject. Mr. Cormier’s report concerning his April 16, 2012 

inspection of the restaurant identified the restroom door’s 

inadequate strike-side clearance. (Trial Ex. 101, p. 27.) 

However, the report states: “The location of the existing door 

does not allow for the required 12[ inch] strike-side clearance . 

. . .” (Id.) Further, when discussing the restroom door at trial, 

Mr. Cormier testified that “[b]ased on . . . looking [at] and 

evaluating the structure[,] . . . it appeared that there was no 

feasible way to change that swing of the door to make it fully 

compliant to match the required strike-side clearance.” (Trial 

Tr. 64:17-23.) Plaintiff presented no evidence to rebut Mr. 

Cormier’s opinions. 

Plaintiff’s attorney suggested that automating the 

restroom door “where there is a button you push, and the door is 

automatically opened[,]” is an alternative means to remedy the 

strike-side clearance barrier. However, Plaintiff presented no 

evidence concerning this proposed alternative; Plaintiff’s 

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counsel’s argument is not evidence.

On this record, injunctive relief requiring Defendant 

to provide 12 inches of strike-side clearance for the restroom 

door is unwarranted. 

B. Unruh Act Claim for Statutory Damages

“In the disability context, [the Unruh Act] operates 

virtually identically to the ADA.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 731. “Any 

violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the 

Unruh Act.” Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f)). “The Unruh Act, 

however, . . . allow[s] for monetary damages.” Id. “And even if a 

defendant has removed barriers to access and thereby mooted the 

plaintiff’s ADA claim, those remedial measures will not moot a[n 

Unruh Act] claim for damages.” Johnson v. Wayside Property, Inc., 

41 F. Supp. 3d 973, 980-81 (E.D. Cal. 2014).

“The [Unruh Act] generally provides for a minimum of 

$4,000 in statutory damages for each occasion a plaintiff has 

been denied full and equal access to a place of public 

accommodation.” Johnson v. Patel, No. 2:14-cv-02078 WBS DAD, 2015 

WL 5560257, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015) (citing Cal. Civ. 

Code '' 52(a), 55.56(a)). “A plaintiff is denied full and equal 

access if a plaintiff has ‘personally encountered’ a violation or 

has been ‘deterred from accessing a place of public 

accommodation’ on a particular occasion.” Id. (quoting Cal. Civ. 

Code ' 55.56(b)). “A violation personally encountered by a 

plaintiff may be sufficient to cause a denial of full and equal 

access if the plaintiff experienced difficulty, discomfort, or 

embarrassment because of the violation.” Cal. Civ. Code § 

55.56(c). 

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Here, although Plaintiff personally encountered 

accessibility barriers at the restaurant on at least four 

occasions, Plaintiff requests statutory damages for only two 

occasions, totaling $8,000. (See Pl.’s Post Trial Br. 5:2-23, ECF 

No. 42.) However, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s statutory damages 

should be reduced because of her affirmative defenses, which are 

addressed below. 

1) California Civil Code section 55.56(f)(1)

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s statutory damages should 

be limited to $1,000 per occasion under California Civil Code 

section 55.56(f)(1). This section “provides that a defendant’s 

liability for statutory damages is reduced to a minimum of $1,000 

for each [occasion] if the defendant shows[, inter alia,] that 

[she] has corrected all construction-related violations that are 

the basis of [Plaintiff’s complaint] within 60 days of being 

served with the complaint.” Lozano, 2015 WL 5227869, at *6. 

Here, Defendant presented no evidence at trial 

concerning the date she was served with the Complaint. Further, 

even if the Court takes judicial notice, sua sponte, of this 

date, the trial record establishes that Defendant did not remedy 

all accessibility barriers that are the subject of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within sixty days of being served. Plaintiff filed a 

proof of service for Defendant, which states Defendant was served 

on July 27, 2013. (See Proof of Service, ECF No. 6.) However, 

Defendant’s son testified at trial that construction on the 

restaurant’s parking lot was not completed until early October 

2013, more than sixty days later. (Trial Tr. 48:5-8, 52:10-

53:18.) 

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Accordingly, Defendant has not shown this affirmative 

defense applies.

1

2) California Civil Code section 55.56(h)

Defendant also contends it was unreasonable for 

Plaintiff to visit the restaurant on more than one occasion, and 

therefore, his statutory damages should be limited to one 

occasion under California Civil Code section 55.56(h). 

“When a plaintiff [seeks] multiple claims for statutory 

damages, the UCRA requires the court to consider the 

reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct in light of his duty to 

mitigate damages.” Johnson v. Patel, 2015 WL 5560257, at *3 

(citing Cal. Civ. Code ' 55.56(h)). Specifically, California 

Civil Code section 55.56(h) prescribes:

In assessing liability under subdivision 

(d) in an action alleging multiple claims for 

the same construction-related accessibility 

violation on different particular occasions, 

the court shall consider the reasonableness 

of the plaintiff’s conduct in light of the 

plaintiff’s obligation, if any, to mitigate 

damages.

Assuming, without deciding, that section 55.56(h) 

applies to Plaintiff’s statutory damages claims2, Defendant has 

 

1 Based on Defendant’s post-trial briefing, it appears Defendant has 

abandoned the affirmative defense that Plaintiff’s statutory damages should be 

limited to $2,000 per occasion under California Civil Code section 

55.56(f)(2). However, in the event Defendant has not abandoned that 

affirmative defense, Defendant has not shown that it applies since the record 

establishes that Defendant failed to correct “all construction-related 

violations that are the basis of [Plaintiff’s Complaint] within 30 days of 

being served with the [C]omplaint.” Cal. Civ. Code ' 55.56(f)(2)(A). 

2 Section 55.56(h) references subdivision (d), which concerns deterrence 

claims. See, e.g., Johnson v. Patel, 2015 WL 5560257, at *3 (“Section 55.56(h) 

applies to deterrence claims . . . .”). Therefore, it is unclear whether

section 55.56(h) applies to Plaintiff’s statutory damages claim since his Post 

Trial Brief indicates he is seeking statutory damages for two actual visits to 

the restaurant. 

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not shown that Plaintiff acted unreasonably in visiting the 

restaurant on two occasions. 

Plaintiff’s following trial testimony is relevant to 

Defendant’s mitigation affirmative defense:

Can you explain your need for multiple 

visits to a site where known barrier 

violations would deny you full and equal

access?

A. The food’s good, and I like 

barbecue. There’s not really that many 

alternatives for barbecue in that area. It’s

extremely convenient.

Q. You say it’s extremely convenient. 

In which area of Sacramento do you reside?

A. Carmichael.

Q. And this location is located at 

36th and Broadway in Sacramento, right?

A. That’s correct.

Q. How far away do you live from this 

restaurant?

A. I’m about ten miles, I believe.

Q. Now, between your residence and the 

T&R barbecue, there must be other barbecue 

restaurants along the way or in your

neighborhood?

. . . . 

THE WITNESS: I’m sure there’s other 

barbecue, but when I’m wanting to eat, I’m 

not going to drive back home to eat. This 

restaurant’s at a convenient location when 

I’m in that area, and I was in that area 

quite a bit.

(Trial Tr. 35:13-36:11.) 

Plaintiff testified that on some of the dates he ate at 

the restaurant, he also visited a nearby bait & gun store and 

that his visits to that store are the subject of another ADA 

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accessibility complaint he filed in this federal judicial 

district. (Trial Tr. 36:12-38:11.) Defendant presumably asked 

Plaintiff about these visits to challenge Plaintiff’s stated 

motive in eating at the restaurant. However, there is no evidence 

that Plaintiff visited the bait and gun store when he dined at 

the restaurant on February 15, 2013, and March 4, 2013. 

Therefore, Defendant has not shown that it was unreasonable for 

Plaintiff to visit the restaurant on these two occasions.

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to a 

statutory damages award of $8,000 ($4,000 per occasion for two 

visits to the restaurant). 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the 

ADA and Unruh Act. 

2. At all relevant times, Defendant owned the 

restaurant, which is a place of public accommodation under the 

ADA and Unruh Act.

3. During his visits to the restaurant, Plaintiff was 

denied full and equal access to a place of public accommodation 

because of his disability(ies).

4. Injunctive relief to remedy the two accessibility 

barriers raised for the first time at trial is unwarranted.

5. Plaintiff is entitled to $8,000 in statutory 

damages ($4,000 per occasion, for two actual visits to the 

restaurant). 

CONCLUSION

Given the above conclusions of law, Defendant is 

ordered to pay Plaintiff $8,000 in statutory damages. 

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Within ten days from the date this Order is filed, the 

parties shall file a joint proposed judgment consistent with this 

Order or separate proposed judgments, if agreement cannot be 

reached on a joint proposed judgment. 

Dated: October 13, 2015

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