Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01717/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01717-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAJIDA JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv1717 JM(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY

LLC,

Defendant.

DefendantJohns Hopkins UniversityApplied Physics LaboratoryLLC (“APL”)

moves for summary judgment on all claims asserted in Plaintiff Sajida Johnson’s

whistleblower complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion and, alternatively, moves for

summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants APL’s motion for

summary judgment, denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and instructs the

Clerk of Court to close the file.

BACKGROUND

The Claims

On June 5, 2012, Plaintiff commenced this action in the Superior Court for the 

County of San Diego by alleging two causes of action for (1) retaliation for refusing

to participate in conduct violating Labor Code §§1102.5 and 1102.6 and (2) wrongful

termination in violation of public policy. In broad brush, Plaintiff alleges thatshe blew

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the whistle on APL’s wrongful conduct and, as a consequence, suffered a retaliatory

discharge. On July 11, 2012, APL removed this diversity action to this court. (Ct.

Dkt. 1).

Plaintiff’s Employment with APL

On June 28, 2010, Plaintiff was hired by CDI Corporation as an analyst for a

leased-worker position with APL. (Johnson Depo. 17:10-19:1). Plaintiff was then

employed by APL from about June 2010 through December 23, 2011 as a Business

Analyst and later as a Project Manager. (Compl. ¶9). From June 28, 2010 thru June

2011, Plaintiff worked on various projects at Camp Pendleton. In early to mid 2011,

APL offered Plaintiff a full-time position as an APL employee. Plaintiff declined the

offer because she could make more money as a leased-worker with CDI. (Id. at 27:19-

29:8). 

In July 2011, the Bureau of Navy Medicine and Surgery (“BUMED”), the

agency that oversees Navy Medicine and the Naval Medical Centers, retained APL to

perform a process improvement project located at the Naval Medical Center in

Portsmouth, Virginia (“NMCP”). APL has a multi-faceted contract with the U.S. Naval

Sea Systems Command (“NAVSEA”), under which there is a task order with BUMED

for APL to provide performance improvement services to Navy Medicine. (Ward

Depo. 28:20-30:6; 99:21-101:13). When a specific contract is assigned to APL under

the contract, BUMED generally creates a statement of work defining the scope of the

project. (Id. at 101:14-102:22). Tim Ward (“Ward”), BUMED’s Deputy Director of

the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, is responsible for determining the

scope of the project, to ensure the contractors follow the scope, and to ensure that the

project’s deliverables are achieved. (Id. 30:19-31; 47:5-48:6). Ward was the sponsor

of the BUMED/APL contract at issue. (Id. at p.47:19-22). 

In order to carry out the performance improvement project at NMCP, APL

assigned Plaintiff as the Project Manager. APL also assigned Leon Stafford to assist

her and Kara Tuohey, APL’s Chief Engineer, as a technical advisor. (Tuohey Depo.

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19:10-13; 29:9-13). The performance improvement project wasrequested byBUMED. 

BUMED tasked APL to build a spine template that had been recommended by the

Navy’s Musculoskeletal Continuum of Care Advisory Board (“MCCAB”).

Ward’s Testimony, Generally

Ward testified that, fromBUMED’s perspective,the project had several different

objectives. (Ward Depo. 24:4-5). The primary purpose of the project “was to look at

the functioning of AHLTA (Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology

Application, the military’s online electronic medical record system) in orthopedic

clinics and to see if there was anything that could be done to improve how the

providers use AHLTA, and to improve the amount of time that the providers have to

[] interact with AHLTA versus interacting with the patients.” (Ward Depo. 25:6-15). 

BUMED also wanted to determine whether the time spent in AHLTA by physicians

could be reduced, whether patient flow could be improved, whether referrals by

primary care physicians to orthopedists could be reduced, and whether the number of

patientsseen by orthopedic surgeons could be increased. (Id. 23:20-28:19). Ward also

testified that physicians spend as much time documenting in AHLTA asthey do talking

to patients and that trying to improve the use of AHLTA was one of the goals of the

project. (Id. 15:5-10). Ward also testified that an average primary care appointment

took 10 to 15 minutes 15 years ago but today each appointment is 20 minutes. (Id.

23:8-11). Ward also noted that orthopedic injuries are the number one reason that

active duty Navy personnel are unable to perform their duties. 

Ward also testified that one difficulty with the project was implementation by

primary care physicians. Ward cited studies indicating that compliance by primary care

physicians with new clinical practice guidelines (“CPGs”), such as implementation of

the proposed spine template, islessthan 25%. (Id. 18:9-16). From the inception of the

project, Ward did not have “any great expectations that the primary care doctors were

going to follow the template.” (Id. 22:16-17).

Ward explained that BUMED’s projects are broken into four phases or parts:

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scoping, diagnostic, implementation, and sustainment. The spine project template

ended at the end of the diagnostic phase of the project. Ward directed the project to

stop because there was “no significant findings of where to move that future state

(phase), and there was no implementation plan of how to actually get to that result. 

There was nothing to implement.” (Id. 64:2-15). Ward met with Captain Daniel

Unger, M.D. (“Unger”) to discuss his decision to end the project and told him that APL

was going to complete and hand over the template for the NMCP to implement. One

part of the project, called the AIM form (the history and physical exam for people with

back pain), was developed by APL and has been adopted by BUMED. (Unger Depo.

42:4-12). 

Captain Unger’s Testimony, Generally

Unger, chairman of the MCCAB and an orthopedic surgeon at NMCP, served

as clinical organizer or champion for the project, overseeing the clinical content for the

template. Unger, a former chairman of MCCAB, “thought it would be of benefit for

the Navy . . . [to] come up with a centralized, consistentspine template to evaluate back

pain that would incorporate the CPGs within the template so there would be consistent

evaluation and treatment throughout the Navy following the clinical practice

guidelines. . . .” (Unger Depo. 13:8-23). After several meetings with MCCAB

members, Unger testified that “it became obvious that the AHLTAinfrastructure would

not allow us to develop a comprehensive spine template from the subjective and

objective all the way through the assessment and plan.” (Id. 16:16-20). Staff at the

hospital made Unger aware of this fact. (Id.17:1-2). Unger also testified that

decreasing inappropriate referrals was not necessarily one of the objectives of the

study. His “hope” for the project was “to standardize the evaluation and treatment per

the clinical practice guidelines Navy-wide and potentially DOD-wide so bottom line

is to provide consistent and thorough care throughout the enterprise for back pain. I

think the offshoot from other perspectives was that it may impact clinical referral

patterns and things like that.” (Id. at 9.18:16-22). He also noted that the development

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of a spine template could, if successful, result in fewer inappropriate referrals and

fewer MRIs ordered. (Id. at 19:5-11). 

Unger identified that the use of the template, if successful, would result in

improved patient care. (Id. 37:4). Even if the number of referrals to a specialist did not

decline under the project, the project would be a success “because it would standardize

the documentation and the diagnosis and give treatment, standardized treatment

algorithms per the CPGsfor low back pain to primary care providers who at the current

state do not have such a template to go by.” (Id. 38:17-22). No one at APL ever told

Unger that the template could reduce inappropriate referrals. (Id. 19:12-16). Unger

never focused on whether the template would reduce inappropriate referrals. (Id. 33:8-

19). Unger learned in October or November 2012 that the project would not proceed

to the implementation phase. (Id. 39:8-12; Johnson Decl. ¶7).

In Unger’s view, there were two reasons why the project was not successful. 

First, there was a technical issue with the AHLTA system that was not compatible with

the spine template and, second, the “primary care physicians were mandated to use the

Tri-Service workflow and they couldn’t use any other template.” (Id. 43:20-44:4). 

Plaintiff’s Testimony, Generally

Plaintiff declaresthatWard “exercised inappropriate influence over the direction

of the project.” (Johnson Decl. ¶4). APL “was supposed to take its direction from

Captain Unger” because MCCAB was the client. However, Ward took a different

approach to the project and provided contradictory direction to APL concerning the

scope of the project. (Id. ¶5). “The scope of the project was never clearly defined and

throughout the life of the project, the scope continually changed.” (Id. ¶8). The goals

of the project included making AHLTA easier to use, enabling physicians to spend

more time with patients, and reducing the number of inappropriate referrals to surgery.

(Id. ¶10). 

Early on in the project, Plaintiff told Kara Tuohey, APL’s chief engineer, and

Robert Beasley, a BUMED engineer, that “the template could not accomplish all of

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those goals.” (Id. ¶11). Plaintiff explains that, “[b]ecause of the way AHLTA is

programmed, the physicians did not have to fill out all the boxes in the template before

ordering a particular procedure. If the physician chose to only fill out the patients’

name and birthday, nothing in AHLTA’s programming code could stop the physician

from referring that patient on to surgery.” Plaintiff further explains that the military

does not possess the proprietary rights to the source code and that the program could

not be reprogrammed. (Id. ¶11). Even if physicians could be forced to use the

template, one could not determine whether there was any reduction in referrals because

no one knew what percentage of the surgery and MRI referrals were inappropriate

before the template was implemented. As noted in a July 21, 2011 email from Plaintiff

to Robert Beasley, “[i]f the chief complaint is that we need to reduce the number of

referrals, this will not be accomplished by new/revised templates alone. This is an

access issue that involves BUMED and how they process consults.” (Plaintiff’s Exh.

2). Beasley responded that “[i]t should not be the expectation of the contractor to

lower the inappropriate referrals.” (Beasley Depo. 81:17-19). 

Johnson informed her supervisors that “the template would not have an effect on

inappropriate referrals.” (Johnson Decl. ¶13). When Plaintiff and Stafford raised their

concerns that the template would not do what Unger and MCCAB thought it would do,

Tuohey, Plaintiff’s supervisor, would say, “Let’s go forward. Let’s continue to work

on it. It will be okay.” Tuohey also informed Plaintiff that Ward “needed to score a

big one” with the MCCAB.” Id. She also informed Mr. Beasley, a BUMED

representative, that the project was a waste of money. (Id. at ¶15). 

On September 28, 2011, Captain Henry requested an update on the project. 

After providing the update, Captain Henry called APL’s work a “high school science

project” and stated that the template project was no longer authorized by the MCCAB. 

(Id. ¶16). (Id. ¶16). The official reason for ending the project “at the end of the

diagnostic phase instead of moving on to the implementation phase was because the

project was not going to be successful.” However, Plaintiff represents that Ward and

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Beasley blamed the failure of the project on a lack of assistance from Unger. (Johnson

Depo. 361:11-22). 

1

On December 16, 2011, an out-briefing was scheduled to discuss several

different projects including the spine template project. (Ward Depo. 80:10-12). Ward

and Beasley generally attributed the failure of the project to a lack of assistance from

Unger. (Johnson Depo. 361:11-22). Tuohey and Hopfinger blamed the failure of the

project on Plaintiff and Stafford. (Hopfinger Depo. 89:6-21). Smith and Turgeon, both

with APL, informed Plaintiff that there might not be any work for her once Plaintiff

completed work on a Strategic Sourcing project but that they would follow up with Ms.

Johnson when they had more information. (Johnson Decl. ¶19).

On December 19, 2011, Unger returned from a long vacation and called Plaintiff

to ask why no one appeared for the regular weekly AHLTA template meeting. 

(Johnson Decl. ¶20). Unger “might not be aware of the termination of the project” and

he stated that he felt “blindsided.” Id. On December 21, 2013 Plaintiff sent Unger an 2

email detailing her views on the reasons why the project was not successful. In the

email, Plaintiff told Unger that the project never had the capacity to “reduce

inappropriate referrals and MRI’s.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. 1). She also indicated that the

“project was poorly and inadequately scoped on the part of APL.” She also stated that,

“[d]espite [her] concerns, objections and warnings regarding diagnostic, metrics and

implementation, the project began on 9/6/11 without a signed statement of work

between APL and BUMED.” Id. She believed that the project was a waste of money

and that she was “disgusted by the behavior of APL and Mr. Ward.” Id.

Plaintiff cites this portion of her deposition testimony. However, the court

1

could not locate this testimony in the record submitted by the parties. The court notes

other instances where the court could not locate the evidence cited by Plaintiff. For

example, on pages 13 and 14 of her opposition, Plaintiff cites the Smith deposition at

pages 189:7-191:8. However, the Smith deposition submitted by Plaintiff does not

contain those pages nor does APL’s submission. The court highlights that evidence

cited, but not attached as an exhibit, has not been considered on this motion. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). 

The court notes that Unger testified that he was not misled or blindsided by 2

anyone from APL or by the limitations of AHLTA. 

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On December 20, 2011, Plaintiff completed a diversity survey wherein Plaintiff

stated that she had a negative experience working for APL because of her race. 

(Johnson Decl. ¶21). She also identified that there was evidence of racial

discrimination within APL. She also states that some unknown person added the

following sentence to the diversity survey form she completed: “I have been told that

my last day with APL is January 6, 2012. Id. 

On December 21, 2011, Plaintiff’s domain account was modified by APL’s

helpdesk. (Johnson Decl. ¶21). On December 23, 2011, Plaintiff wasinformed by CDI

Corporation that her position with APL “was over effective immediately.” (Id. ¶23). 

Plaintiff declares that she “was terminated because I pushed back on the AHLTA

template project and complained about the diversity problems I saw within my group.”

(Id. ¶24). Plaintiff informed Beasley, a government employee, and Unger that the

project was not going to be successful, a waste of taxpayer money, and that the project

would not reduce inappropriate surgery referrals and inappropriate MRI referrals. Id. 

Termination of Plaintiff

As indicated above, Plaintiff was in a leased-worker position. At the same time

Plaintiff worked on the spine project, Plaintiff was also working part time on a

“Strategic Sourcing” project. (Hopfinger Decl. ¶3). Some time prior to December 20,

2011 APL informed Plaintiff it may not have any work for Plaintiff after midDecember. APL was not tasked with another BUMED project until the end of

February 2012. Id.

On December 15, 2011, Patrick Hopfinger, the Group Supervisor for APL

decided to terminate Plaintiff’s leased-worker position “because APL did not have any

projects to assign Johnson, nor was it aware of any upcoming projects that BUMED

had decided to fund and assign to APL to which she could be assigned.” (Hopfinger

Decl. ¶6). Hopfinger also did not believe that “Johnson had been aggressive in

attempting to achieve BUMED’s goals for the project or advancing the project

forward.” Id. A December 16, 2011 email from Hopfinger to APL personnel

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acknowledged his decision to terminate Plaintiff. (Hopfinger Decl. Exh. 12). On

December 19, 2011, Hopfinger executed a “Notice of Termination of Leased Worker

Services.” (Id. Exh. 13). 

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine

issue asto any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 698 (9th

Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the file which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that

the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating

the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). The opposing party cannot rest on

the mere allegations or denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and

by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). The opposing party also may not rely solely on

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Any doubt

asto the existence of any issue of material fact requires denial of the motion. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment,

when “‘the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with

evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence were

uncontroverted at trial.’” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)

(emphasis in original) (quoting International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d

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1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992)).

The Retaliation Claim

Labor Code section 1102.5(b) provides:

(b) An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing

information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the

employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses

a violation ofstate or federalstatute, or a violation or noncompliance with

a state or federal rule or regulation.

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 1102.5(b), a plaintiff must show:

(1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer thereafter subjected him to an

adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the two.” Jadwin v. County

of Kern, 610 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Mokler v. County of

Orange, 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 138 (2007). Following the McDonnell Douglas model,

once Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, “the employer is required to

offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Morgan 

v. Regents of University of California , 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68 (2000). If the employer

produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of

retaliation ‘drops out of the picture,’ and the burden shifts back to the employee to

prove intentional retaliation.” Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 Cal.App.4th 1441,

1453 (2002). 

The Protected Activity

The protected activity element has three components: a disclosure, based on

reasonably based suspicions, of illegal activity. Mokler v. County of Orange, 157

Cal.App.4th 121, 138 (2007). “To have a reasonably based suspicion ofillegal activity,

the employee must be able to point to some legal foundation for his suspicion - some

statute, rule or regulation which may have been violated by the conduct he disclosed.”

Turner v. City & Cnty of San Francisco, 892 F.Supp.2d 118, 1199-200 (N.D. Cal.

2012). 

Plaintiff comes forward with evidence to show that she told Beasley (an

industrial engineer with BUMED) as early asJuly 21, 2011 that the template would not

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impact the number of patients inappropriately referred for surgery or MRIs. Beasley

confirms that he began having doubts in September or October 2011 that the project

would not reduce inappropriate referrals. Plaintiff also presents evidence to show that

she informed Beasley and Unger of her belief that Ward (deputy director of BUMED)

“wasinappropriately directing APL’s activities on the project in violation ofthe FAR.” 

Plaintiff declares her belief that Ward exercised inappropriate influence over the

direction of the project. Section 37.104 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations

(“FAR”) provides, in general, that federal employees are not allowed to create an

employer-employee relationship with contractors. (Johnson Decl. ¶4). Plaintiff

represents that she told Unger, Webster Smith, an assistant group supervisor at APL,

and Beasley of her concerns. The email Plaintiff sent to Unger also identifies that the

project was a waste of money and that referrals would not be reduced. (Johnson Exh.

1).

Plaintiff argues that the FalseClaimAct was violated when APL represented that

the template could reduce inappropriate referrals and MRIs. (Oppo. at p.20:21-21:4). 

3

A false claim is one that is presented for payment to the government that is fraudulent

or simply false. U.S. ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiff argues that this case is analogous to the typical case where a private employee

discoversthat the employer overcharged the government under a government contract. 

 This argument is not persuasive. 

Plaintiff argues that she informed her supervisors and Beasley that the project

would not be successful (i.e. the project would not reduce inappropriate specialist or

MRI referrals) and constitute a waste of time and taxpayer money. Plaintiff informed

Beasley on several occasions of these facts and also informed Unger via email of these

facts. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 1). The difficulty with Plaintiff’s first argument is that there is

Plaintiff also alleges that the conduct violated several other stautes: 18 U.S.C. 3

§648 (embezzlement of public funds by person charged with safekeeping by Act of

Congress); Cal. Penal Code §470 et seq. (Prohibitions against counterfeiting and

forgery); and Cal. Government Code §12650 (California’s false claim act). However,

Plaintiff fails to identify how any of these statutes were violated.

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no evidence that anyone at BUMED or APL believed that the spine template would

reduce the number of inappropriate referrals. The undisputed record shows that

BUMED did not task APL with delivering a reduction of inappropriate referrals;

Unger, the chairman of MCCAB, did not define the project’s success by whether

inappropriate referrals were reduced; Ward did not believe that the template would

reduce inappropriate referrals; Beasley had doubts about the ability of the project to

reduce inappropriate referrals; and Plaintiff did not believe that the project would be

successful from this point of view. (Unger Depo. 15:4-21; 18:9-19:21; 33:8-39:19;

Ward Depo. 16:12-28:19; Beasley Depo. 26:13-29:9). All parties testified that the

manner in which primary care physicians used AHLTA would not permit the template

to reduce inappropriate referrals (Ward testified that only about 25% of physicians

would be likely to follow the template). (Ward Depo. 18:9-16). The court notes that

there is no evidence that any person believed that (1) reducing the number of

inappropriate referrals was a primary goal of the project or (2) the project would result

in the reduction of inappropriate referrals.

In light of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court concludes that

Plaintiff’s disclosure that the template project would not be successful is not an

actionable protected activity. A protected disclosure is one that tends to disclose

suspicions ofillegal activity. See Mokler, 157 Cal.App.4th at 138. The court concludes

that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Plaintiff disclosed

any illegal activity. There is simply no evidence showing that any party represented

or believed that the template would reduce inappropriate referrals. See Love v. Motion

Indus., Inc., 309 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (the plaintiff’s disclosure of

safety concerns without reference to any statute, rule, or regulation fails to support

plaintiff’s belief that his employer engaged in actionable conduct).

To the extent Plaintiff argues that she engaged in a protected activity when she

made the general statement to Unger and Beasley that “the project was a waste of time

and money,” the court concludes that this is not a protected disclosure. The fact that

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the government and APL engaged in conduct considered a “waste of time and money”

constitutes a generic non-actionable disclosure becausePlaintifffailsto cite any statute,

rule or regulation that may have been violated by such a generic statement. See MizeKurzman v. Marin Cmty. Coll. Dist., 202 Cal.App.4th 832, 852 (2012) (differences of

opinion regarding policies the plaintiff believes to be unwise or wasteful are not

“disclosures” under Labor Code §1102.5). 

Plaintiff also argues that she told Tuohey, Webster Smith, and Kevin Turgeon

that Ward exercised improper control over the project in violation of Section 37.104

of the FAR. Plaintiff argues that she attended a FAR seminar and she believed,

“[b]ased on the presentation and her knowledge of 48 CFR §37.104(c)(1), that Ward

was not allowed to direct or supervise APL’s activities.” (Oppo. at p.22:21-23). The

only evidence cited by Plaintiff isthe argument that Unger provided instruction to APL

but “then Ward would instruct APL not to do what Unger wanted them to do.” (Oppo.

at p.23:2-3). The regulation at issue provides:

(c)(1) An employer-employee relationship under a service contract occurs

when, as a result of (i) the contract's terms or (ii) the manner of its

administration during performance, contractor personnel are subject to the

relatively continuous supervision and control of a Government officer or

employee. However, giving an order for a specific article or service, with

the right to reject the finished product or result, is not the type of

supervision or control that converts an individual who is an independent

contractor (such as a contractor employee) into a Government employee.

The evidence submitted by Plaintiff consists of allegations that Ward, deputy director

of BUMED, provided contradictory instructions to those provided by Unger, the

project champion. In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff cites no specific evidence to

show that Ward engaged in “relatively continuous supervision and control” as

contemplated by the regulation. Plaintiff testifies that Ward was “too involved in the

decision-making for the project” and would contradict Unger, (Johnson Depo. 71:21-

72:6; 166:11-22). Such conclusory statements fail to show a violation of FAR. 

Consequently, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of showing that she was engaged in a

protected activity. Plaintiff may not rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by

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factual evidence. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

In sum, the court concludes that Plaintiff failsto raise a genuine issue of material

fact with respect to whether of not she engaged in a protected activity. APL is entitled

to summary judgment on the Labor Code § 1102.5(b) claim.

Causation

In order to establish a whistleblower claim, Plaintiff must show a nexus between

her conduct and her termination. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7

Cal.4th 1164, 1191 (1994) (Plaintiff must show that “the employer’s conduct was

motivated by impermissible considerations under a ‘but for’ standard of causation”).

Here, Plaintiff fails to show that her statements to Beasley in July 2011to the

effect that the project would not be successful (i.e. reduce inappropriate referrals) or

the December 21, 2011 email to Unger is the but-for causation. The court concludes

that the timing of the events does not establish the requisite causation. There is simply

no evidence before the court that the stated goal of the project was to reduce

inappropriate referrals. To the contrary, Unger, Ward, Plaintiff, and others all testified

that the reduction of inappropriate referrals was not the goal of the project. With

respect to the Unger email, the undisputed evidence shows that APL decided to end

Plaintiff’s leased-worker contract on December 15, 2011, six days before Plaintiff’s

email to Unger. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to causation. While Plaintiff attempts to show causation by

temporalrelatedness, Jadwin, 610 F.Supp.2d at 1156 (“To establish a causal link solely

with timing evidence, the adverse action must follow ‘within a relatively short’ time

after the protected activity.”), the circumstances identified by Plaintiff are not

sufficiently related in time. In fact, the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s leased-worker

position occurred prior to Plaintiff’s December 21, 2011 email to Unger. 

In sum, APL is entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Code § 1102.5(b)

claim.

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Reasons for Termination of the Leased-Worker Contract and Pretext

Even assuming Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, APL

comes forward with evidence to show legitimate reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s

leased-worker position. The group supervisor of APL, Hopfinger, explains that APL

does not have specific funding to maintain leased-workers without an active BUMED

project to which to assign them. Even though APL offered Plaintiff a full-time position

with APL, she rejected that offer, preferring to remain a leased-worker. Upon

termination of the template project, “APL was not aware of any upcoming projects to

assign Johnson.” (Hopfinger Decl. ¶¶4, 5; Exh. 12).

On December 15, 2011, Hopfinger decided “to terminate Plaintiff’s leasedworker position because APL did not have any projects to assign Johnson, nor was it

aware of any upcoming projects that BUMED had decided to fund and assign to APL

to which she could be assigned.” Hopfinger also relates that he did not believe that

“Johnson had been aggressive in attempting to achieve BUMED’s goals” for the

project “or advancing the project forward.” (Id. ¶6). On December 19, 2011,

Hopfinger signed a Notice of Termination of Leased Worker Services.” (Id. Exh. 13). 

The court concludes that APL has met its burden of demonstrating nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s position. Thus, the burden shifts to

Plaintiff to show that the reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

Plaintiff first argues that, under Guz v. Bechtel, 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (2000), her

unidentified evidence of “direct evidence of discriminatory intent” means she does not

have to show that APL’s proffered legitimate reasons are pretextual. (Oppo. at p.25:9-

11). The court notes that Guz discusses the classic McDonnell Douglas test as applied

to employment discrimination laws. Id. at 354-56. The court could not locate in the

California Supreme Court’s opinion where it altered the McDonnell Douglas

formulation. Notwithstanding, the court notes that certain evidence of retaliatory

discrimination may be ofsuch a character that it not only establishes a prima facie case

but effectively rebuts any proffered legitimate reasons. However, that is not the case

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here.

Next, Plaintiffsetsforth several arguments, none of which are targeted to APL’s

proffered reasons (the completion ofthe BUMED contracts and the dissatisfaction with

Plaintiff’s performance). Plaintiff does not identify anyBUMED contracts maintained

by APL at the time of her discharge. While APL discussed potential upcoming

BUMED projects at the “all hands” meeting where Plaintiff was present on or about

December 12, 2011, Plaintiff fails to identify that, as of that point in time, APL

possessed other BUMED projects. Further, Plaintiff presents no evidence that APL’s

dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s performance on the project was pretextual.

Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment in favor of APL, finding that

it has come forward with unrebutted legitimate reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s

leased-worker position.

The Wrongful Termination Claim

To state a claim for wrongful termination, Plaintiff must show that her

termination violated a fundamental public policy embodied in federal or state law. 

Green v., Talee Eng. Co.,, 19 Cal.4th 66, 84 (1998). The claim must be “tethered to

fundamental policiesthat are delineated in constitutional orstatutory provisions.” City

of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1159 (1998).

Plaintiff, who has the burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact,

sets forth a three-sentence argument in support of this claim. However, the failure to

cite any evidence is fatal to this claim. Plaintiff cannot rest on the mere allegations or

denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the party’s] own

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file’

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324 (citation omitted). As Plaintiff fails to identify any evidence in support of

this claim, APL is entitled to summary judgment. 

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In sum, the court grantssummary judgment in favor of APL and against Plaintiff

on all claims. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 8, 2013

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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