Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00284/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00284-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXIS CASTILLO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; 

PERRY HOLLIS; MARTIN SCANLAN;

DAVID SMITH; RON ROTH; COUNTY OF

SAN MATEO; FRANK KASTELL; 

SHERYL WOLCOTT; and DOES 1–50, 

Defendants. /

No. C 05-00284 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

EXCLUDE DR. FRED

BLACKWELL AS EXPERT

The basic issue presented is whether a party can properly designate expert testimony

under FRCP 26(a)(2)(A) by reserving a so-called “right” in boilerplate fashion to call any

expert designated by the other side. 

In this Section 1983 excessive-force case, plaintiff moves for the exclusion of all

testimony by Dr. Fred Blackwell, a physician who examined plaintiff Alexis Castillo, and of

any reference to his opinions about the case of plaintiff’s injuries. Although defendants Officer

Perry Hollis and the City and County of San Francisco may call Dr. Blackwell to provide

percipient testimony, he was not properly designated by defendants to give opinion testimony. 

He therefore may not offer opinion testimony nor may defendants refer to his opinions. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A) requires disclosure to the other side of the

identity of any person who may be used at trial to present opinion evidence under Rule 702, 703

or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. If a witness is retained or specially employed to

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provide expert testimony, the disclosure must be accompanied by a written report prepared and

signed by the witness. FRCP 26(a)(2)(B). As the 1993 Advisory Notes state, a treating

physician ordinarily is not employed or specially retained and need not prepare a report so long

as his or her name and identity are disclosed. 

Dr. Blackwell was not retained or specially employed by either side. He was not a

treating physician. He was a physician who performed an examination of plaintiff in

connection with his claim for workers’ compensation. Both sides designated Dr. Blackwell as a

percipient witness. The issue is whether the defense can call Dr. Blackwell and inquire about

his medical conclusions, namely a conclusion that eighty percent of the shoulder injury at issue

here in was attributable to a prior, work-related accident, and twenty percent to the police

handcuffing at issue herein.

Without question, this would be opinion testimony under Rule 702. Therefore,

defendants were required to disclose him in their expert disclosures. The case management

scheduling order required that such disclosures be made by October 28, 2005. Since he was not

retained or specially employed, no expert report was required from Dr. Blackwell, as stated. 

That much is clear. But the issue remains whether he was ever disclosed at all as required by

the rule. Defendants’ expert disclosures did not name Dr. Blackwell. They did, however, add

this language: “All experts designated by plaintiffs.” This was in addition to several persons

actually named and identified. In turn, plaintiff’s disclosure named three retained experts. It

also included this sentence: “In addition, plaintiff reserves the right to call any and all

percipient witness physicians, including, but not limited to, Dr. Blackwell, any experts

disclosed by defendants and any other experts that they may be permitted to call by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” In other words, like two mirrors reflecting into each other, both

sides asserted a supposed right to call any expert disclosed by the other side, although plaintiff’s

notice at least named Dr. Blackwell. 

Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that this sentence limited Dr. Blackwell’s testimony to

percipient facts. It is true that the sentence used the word “percipient” but it is also true that the

disclosure itself was part of the expert disclosure. This appears to the Court to have been a

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calculated ambiguity leaving the door open to seek expert opinion from the doctor along with

percipient facts. It has turned out that plaintiff will not call Dr. Blackwell after all. The defense

wishes to do so. 

For the Court, the more fundamental issue is whether generalized incorporations by

reference to the other side’s disclosures are adequate at all. Again, remember that defendants

merely stated, “All experts disclosed by plaintiffs.” (Actually, the notice should have said

“plaintiff” not “plaintiffs,” because there is only one plaintiff in the case. The use of the plural

underscores the boilerplate character of the wording.) 

This order holds that such a disclosure at most allows the defense to ask opinion

questions on cross-examination of witnesses otherwise called to the stand by plaintiff, and vice

versa. It did not fairly give notice that the defense would call such persons, even if uncalled by

the other side. 

There are two good reasons for this ruling. First, to rule otherwise would mean that the

defense by its incorporation by reference was vouching for the expert qualifications of every

person so designated and waiving any challenge to the qualification of designated experts. Yet

both sides in litigation regularly challenge the opposing side’s experts, including those like Dr.

Blackwell who do not have to give a report. Therefore, the incorporation cannot be deemed to

be anything more than notice that the defense intends to ask expert opinion questions on

cross-examination of the witnesses noticed and called by the other side, possibly even

exceeding the scope of the direct examination. As to such witnesses, the qualifications

presumably will have been proven up and accepted during the direct examination. 

Second, any other holding will defeat the purpose of the disclosure rule. The purpose is

to give each side clear notice of who will be giving opinion testimony in the respective

cases-in-chief so that each side can prepare to respond, including taking depositions. A vague

cross-reference to the other side’s witnesses does not provide that notice. This is especially so

because counsel often insert vague, ambiguous and flexible caveats, reserving the supposed

right to call generalized categories of witnesses. These insertions have little or no practical

effect. Clearcut notice is required. Incorporating them into the other side’s disclosure by

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* This written order, issued on the fourth day of trial, closely tracks the oral order. 

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reference would have even less practical effect. Therefore, this order holds that the defense

disclosure did not adequately put plaintiff on notice that it intended to call Dr. Blackwell in its

case-in-chief and to ask Rule 702, 703 or 705 opinion questions. 

This, however, does not end the matter. Under Rule 37(c)(1) and under Rule 26, the

court has the discretion to allow a late or supplemental disclosure. Rule 37(c)(1) requires

preclusion unless the failure to disclose was harmless or there was substantial justification for

the late disclosure. Here, the late disclosure is not harmless. If plaintiff had known that

defendants were seeking to use Dr. Blackwell for an opinion, they presumably would have

taken his deposition. The Court has been informed that he was not deposed and that plaintiff

did not retain an expert to meet the problem. Possibly, they would have brought a motion in

limine to bar his opinion as lacking adequate foundation under Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), or other authority. In that connection, a deposition

would have been most helpful. And there is no substantial justification for the late disclosure

within the meaning of Rule 37(c). The defense knew about the doctor’s 80/20 opinion by the

time of plaintiff’s deposition yet defense counsel neglected to disclose that they would seek to

use opinion evidence from Dr. Blackwell in their expert disclosure. 

Finally, there is little prejudice to defendants. They have already retained and will

present a different medical expert on the same subject. To bring in Dr. Blackwell would, to a

degree, be cumulative, at least as to expert opinion. 

This motion was made on the first day of trial. This order was delivered orally on the

third day of trial.*

 It is possible that the evidence will yet develop in a way that will create a

substantial justification for allowing defendants to call Dr. Blackwell. Therefore, this order is

without prejudice to reconsideration based on facts developing between now and the end of the

trial. Finally, of course, this order does not bar either side from calling Dr. Blackwell as a

percipient witness subject to other objections under Rule 403 or otherwise. This order,

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however, does bar Dr. Blackwell from being called as a defense witness to give opinion

testimony. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2006 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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