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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 12, 2013 Decided May 28, 2013

No. 11-5264

BRIAN A. DAVIS,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-01433)

Robert S. Silverblatt, Student Counsel, argued the cause as 

amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the briefs 

were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, Nilam A. 

Sanghvi and Rita K. Lomio, Supervising Attorneys, and Roshni 

J. Patel, Student Counsel.

Brian A. Davis, pro se, filed the brief for appellant.

Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for 

appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., 

U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney.

USCA Case #11-5264 Document #1438004 Filed: 05/28/2013 Page 1 of 13
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Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, 

and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Appellant Brian Davis was 

sentenced to prison for crimes involving powder and crack 

cocaine before Congress and the Sentencing Commission took 

steps to reduce the disparity in sentencing ranges between the 

two. Unfortunately for Davis, these efforts were directed at 

crimes involving lesser amounts of cocaine than his. In a suit 

that seeks declaratory relief and possibly damages, Davis 

claims that these efforts violate the Equal Protection Clause 

because they do not reach his crimes. This appeal does not take 

up the merits of Davis’s claims, but their form. The district 

court dismissed his suit on the ground that the only relief 

available to Davis is in habeas. For the reasons set forth below,

we reverse.

I

For years, the Sentencing Guidelines treated one gram of 

cocaine base, commonly known as “crack cocaine,” the same 

as one hundred grams of powder cocaine. See Dorsey v. United 

States, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2327-28 (2012). This 

100-to-1 ratio came in for heavy criticism from many quarters, 

and both Congress and the Sentencing Commission took steps 

to reduce the sentencing disparities it created. Id. at 2328-29. In 

2007, the Commission issued Amendment 706, which lowered 

base offense levels for crimes involving less than 4.5 kg of 

crack cocaine. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL amend. 

706 (2011). Then, in response to the Fair Sentencing Act of 

2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372, the 

Commission issued Amendment 750, which reduced the ratio 

to 18-to-1 for crimes involving less than 8.4 kg of crack

cocaine. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, 

amend. 748 (temporarily reducing the ratio); id., amend. 750 

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(making Amendment 748 permanent). The Commission made 

both amendments retroactive, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c), allowing 

inmates convicted based on the old sentencing ranges to seek 

discretionary sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2).

In 1993, Davis was convicted of conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute and the distribution of powder and 

crack cocaine. The sentencing court assigned him a base 

offense level of 42, which at the time applied to offenses 

involving 15 kg or more of crack cocaine. The court sentenced

Davis to life imprisonment. Davis has sought relief from this 

sentence, but because neither Amendment 706 nor 

Amendment 750 applies to offenses involving 15 kg or more of 

crack cocaine, they are of no help to him. In fact, a district 

court has twice denied his attempts to reduce his sentence

under Amendment 706. He did find some relief elsewhere. In 

2008, the district court reduced his sentence from life to 360 

months based on an unrelated amendment to the Guidelines. 

In 2011, Davis brought this pro se lawsuit seeking relief 

under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), and 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This latest resort to the courts 

differs from his previous efforts. Davis does not request a 

sentence modification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 

Instead, he seeks a declaration that Amendments 706 and 750 

deny him equal protection of the laws because they fail to

reduce the sentencing disparity for defendants convicted of 

crimes involving higher quantities of crack cocaine. Only if 

Davis succeeds on the merits will the sentencing reductions in 

Amendments 706 and 750 be made applicable to his offense, 

allowing him to seek a discretionary reduction of his sentence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 

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The question before us is whether he has selected the 

proper vehicles for his equal protection challenges. Neither the 

Declaratory Judgment Act nor Bivens has carried Davis far. 

Even before the Commission had answered Davis’s complaint, 

the district court dismissed his claims for lack of jurisdiction 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Davis v. U.S. 

Sentencing Comm’n, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2011).

Declaratory relief was unavailable, the court held, because “an 

adequate remedy is available by petitioning the sentencing 

court for a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 2 (citations omitted).

And Davis’s Bivens action was “patently insubstantial”

because he neither sued an individual nor requested damages. 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Davis appealed, and we 

appointed an amicus to brief and argue the case on his behalf.

1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the 

district court’s dismissal de novo. Doe v. Metro. Police Dep’t, 

445 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

II

We first consider whether Davis must bring his equal 

protection challenge by means of a habeas petition. The answer

turns on whether his claim for relief is at the “core of habeas.”

The Supreme Court has held that Congress has channeled state 

prisoners’ claims for relief – however styled – into habeas

alone if the prisoners seek a remedy that is at the “core of 

habeas.” See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005)

(quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973)). In 

order to determine whether Davis, a federal prisoner, must 

bring his equal protection challenge by means of a habeas 

 1 From this point forward, references to Davis’s arguments 

mean those made by the amicus on his behalf. We appreciate the 

amicus counsel’s able assistance in this case.

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petition, this court must resolve two interrelated questions:

Does the scope of the habeas-channeling rule differ for federal 

and state prisoners? And is the rule for federal prisoners so 

broad that it includes equal protection challenges to Guidelines 

amendments?

The modern habeas-channeling rule emerged in Preiser v. 

Rodriguez, when the Supreme Court held that a prisoner may 

not challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement” by 

means of an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 411 U.S. 

at 489. The state prisoners in Preiser alleged that their period 

of incarceration had been unlawfully extended when the New 

York State Department of Correctional Services revoked their 

good-conduct credits towards early release. Id. at 476-77. The 

Court held that Congress set out the procedures prisoners must 

follow to attack their confinement in the habeas statute. To 

allow them to pursue release by other means would frustrate 

the intent of Congress. Id. at 489-90.

We applied Preiser’s habeas-channeling rule fifteen years 

later in Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808-10

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). That case was distinguishable from 

Preiser in two ways. First, it involved a federal, not state, 

prisoner. Id. at 808-09. Second, that prisoner would not 

necessarily secure an earlier release if he succeeded on the 

merits of his claim. Success on the merits would have won him 

nothing more than an earlier appointment with the parole 

board, which retained discretion to deny him parole. Id. at 809. 

We saw no legal significance in either distinction. With regard 

to the first distinction, we noted that channeling federal 

prisoners’ claims into habeas raised even fewer concerns than 

channeling state prisoners’ claims because federal prisoners 

have greater access to federal courts. Id. (citing Preiser, 411 

U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Regarding the second 

distinction, we explained that “Preiser cannot . . . be limited to 

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[claims that] would result in immediate release or a definite 

reduction in the actual amount of time to be spent in prison.”

Id. Preiser taught us that “Congress’ provision of an express 

remedy for unlawful detentions means” that it intended 

prisoners to rely on that remedy exclusively. Id. This intention 

covered all claims relating to terms of detention, we reasoned, 

including Chatman-Bey’s claim “that he [was] being deprived 

of the chance to secure his release.” Id. 

Both Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the next two 

Supreme Court cases to apply Preiser’s habeas-channeling 

rule, involved state prisoners whose successful claims would, 

like those of the prisoners in Preiser, result in earlier or 

immediate release. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479-80; Balisok, 520 U.S. 

at 648. Each decision described the rule in terms that cast doubt 

on our view, expressed in Chatman-Bey, that its scope 

extended beyond claims for immediate release or a definite 

reduction in the length of imprisonment. In both cases, the 

Court stated that a prisoner must bring his claim in habeas if “a 

judgment in [his] favor . . . would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . .” Heck, 512 U.S. 

at 487 (emphasis added); Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643 (quoting 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).

In Anyanwutaku v. Moore, we relied on the fact that the 

plaintiffs in Heck and Balisok were state prisoners to hold that 

prisoners in the custody of the District of Columbia are 

required to bring their claims in habeas only when success on 

the merits would “necessarily imply, or automatically result in, 

a speedier release from prison.” 151 F.3d 1053, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 

1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Anyanwutaku

habeas-channeling rule for District prisoners was narrower 

than the Chatman-Bey rule for federal prisoners. It channeled

into habeas only claims that would guarantee a speedier release 

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from prison. The Anyanwutaku panel distinguished

Chatman-Bey on the basis that it “dealt expressly with federal 

prisoners.” Id. at 1057. In light of this distinction, the panel 

declined to “decide whether Chatman-Bey ha[d] any 

continuing vitality after Heck and Balisok.” Id. As a result, we 

were left with a narrow habeas-channeling rule for state and 

District prisoners and a broad rule for federal prisoners.

Two years later, we were required to confront the issue 

Anyanwutaku “left open” – Chatman-Bey’s “‘continuing 

vitality after Heck and Balisok.’” Razzoli v. Fed. Bureau of 

Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Anyanwutaku, 151 F.3d at 1057). Razzoli involved a federal

prisoner who brought an action challenging the decision of the 

United States Parole Commission to delay his eligibility for 

parole by two years. Razzoli, 230 F.3d at 373. Because success 

on the merits would entitle Razzoli to earlier consideration for 

parole, but not necessarily earlier release from prison, the rule 

in Chatman-Bey required him to seek relief in habeas, but the 

rule in Anyanwutaku did not. Deciding that Heck and Balisok

had not “flatly contradict[ed]” the Chatman-Bey holding, id. at 

375, we held that a federal prisoner must still bring his claim in 

habeas even when success on the merits “would have a merely 

probabilistic impact on the duration of custody.” Id. at 373. 

Davis does not dispute that, under our decision in Razzoli, 

he must bring his equal protection challenge by means of a 

habeas petition even though his claim has only a “probabilistic 

impact on the duration of custody.” If his equal protection 

challenge succeeds, Davis is at best one step closer to an earlier 

release from prison. A victory would not secure his immediate 

release or even a reduction in his time served because the 

district court would retain discretion to deny him any sentence 

reduction under § 3582(c)(2) even if he were to prevail on his 

equal protection challenge. See Dillon v. United States, __ U.S. 

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__, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691-92 (2010). Under Razzoli, that 

makes no difference for federal prisoners. Razzoli channels

their claims into habeas based on the possibility of an earlier 

release, not on its certainty. See Razzoli, 230 F.3d at 373.

Seeking to avoid the force of Razzoli, Davis argues instead 

that two Supreme Court decisions – Wilkinson and Skinner –

have undermined its reasoning. As Davis points out, we are not 

bound by circuit precedent that has been “eviscerated by 

subsequent Supreme Court cases.” Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Comm’n, 863 F.2d 968, 978 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

The Razzoli court offered four reasons for its decision to 

retain Chatman-Bey’s broader habeas-channeling rule for 

federal prisoners instead of taking direction from Heck and

Balisok. 230 F.3d at 375-76. First, both Heck and Balisok

involved claims that would have a definite impact on the 

duration of custody, and the Supreme Court had yet to decide 

whether a “probabilistic” claim like Razzoli’s “need be 

brought in habeas.” Id. at 375. Second, the Razzoli panel 

reasoned that habeas cannot be exclusive if it is not available, 

and habeas is at least available for “probabilistic” claims. Id.

Third, the Seventh Circuit had interpreted Preiser, Heck, and 

Balisok to call for habeas-channeling even of “probabilistic” 

claims. Id. at 376. Fourth, the Supreme Court had yet to decide 

a habeas-channeling case that involved federal prisoners, 

leaving the panel without guidance on whether the distinction

between federal and state prisoners was significant. The panel 

decided it was significant because extending Anyanwutaku’s

narrower rule to federal prisoners might lead to congestion in 

the D.C. Circuit. The habeas statutes require prisoners to bring 

their petitions in the places they are imprisoned or were 

sentenced. This works to distribute prisoners’ cases across the 

nation. By contrast, many other federal prisoner causes of

action could be brought in the D.C. Circuit, where many of the 

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federal agencies that might be defendants, like the 

Commission, are found. Id.

Because three of these four reasons are no longer sound, 

we overturn Razzoli. Like Razzoli, the state prisoners in 

Wilkinson v. Dotson challenged their parole eligibility dates, 

and success on the merits of their claims would not necessarily 

have resulted in earlier release. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 76-77.

Confronting such “probabilistic” claims for the first time, the 

Supreme Court held that they need not be brought in habeas. 

Claims that “will not necessarily imply the invalidity of 

confinement or shorten its duration” are not at the “core” of 

habeas and therefore may be pursued through other causes of 

action. Id. at 82 (emphasis added). After Wilkinson, the 

Seventh Circuit no longer channels “probabilistic” claims into

habeas. See, e.g., Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 444 (7th 

Cir. 2006).

In Skinner v. Switzer, the Supreme Court suggested that 

habeas might not even be available for “probabilistic” claims, 

undercutting another reason for the Razzoli rule. __ U.S. __, 

131 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011) (“Switzer has found no case . . . in 

which the Court has recognized habeas as the sole remedy, or 

even an available one, where the relief sought would neither 

terminat[e] custody, accelerat[e] the future date of release from 

custody, nor reduc[e] the level of custody.” (quoting 

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 86 (Scalia, J., concurring)) (alterations 

in original)). In other words, “probabilistic” claims may not 

even lie within the bounds of habeas, much less at its core. If 

habeas is not even “proper” for claims with only a probabilistic 

impact on custody, see Razzoli, 230 F.3d at 375, it could not be 

the case that Congress intended that prisoners asserting such 

claims should be limited to habeas.

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Because they involve state prisoners, Wilkinson and 

Skinner leave untouched the Razzoli panel’s final reason for 

adopting a broad habeas-channeling rule for federal prisoners:

the concentration in the D.C. Circuit of the agencies commonly 

named in federal prisoner actions. See Razzoli, 230 F.3d at 376. 

We hold that this reason is not strong enough, standing alone, 

to support the continued use of the Razzoli rule. Statutes and 

rules governing venue are adequate to protect the interests of 

justice in other cases. See Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 

929–33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). We see no reason they 

cannot work just as well here. Anxiety over case congestion 

cannot foreclose a remedy created by Congress, as with the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, or by the Constitution, as with 

Bivens.

Acknowledging the weakness of the venue consideration, 

Appellee’s Br. 30, the Commission insists that there is another 

distinction between state and federal prisoners that justifies 

Razzoli’s broader habeas-channeling rule for federal prisoners: 

They have readier access to federal courts. Appellee’s Br. 

19-30. The Commission argues that Razzoli’s broader rule 

would not be appropriate for state prisoners because the high 

procedural barriers of the habeas statute would undermine

§ 1983’s policy of providing access to federal courts for 

victims of state abuses of civil rights. This argument does not 

amount to much. It might be true that a broad 

habeas-channeling rule would be inappropriate for state 

prisoners, but this argument does not explain why a narrow

habeas-channeling rule is not also appropriate for federal 

prisoners. Our decision in this case will neither advance nor 

inhibit § 1983’s policy. Federal prisoners are unlikely to bring 

claims arising from their imprisonment by means of this 

statute, which creates a cause of action against individuals 

acting under color of state or District of Columbia law. The 

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Commission’s reasoning does not justify perpetuating 

Razzoli’s distinction between state and federal prisoners.

Because the Supreme Court has knocked out three of the 

pillars on which Razzoli rests, we now allow that holding to 

fall.

2 Adopting Wilkinson’s habeas-channeling rule, we hold 

that a federal prisoner need bring his claim in habeas only if 

success on the merits will “necessarily imply the invalidity of 

confinement or shorten its duration.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 

82. Otherwise, he may bring his claim through a variety of 

causes of action.

3 And so it is with Davis. Success with his 

equal protection challenges to Amendment 706 or Amendment 

750 will not “necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] 

confinement or shorten its duration.” Id. Success would do no 

more than allow him to seek a sentence reduction, which the 

district court retains the discretion to deny. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2). His claim for declaratory relief avoids the 

habeas-channeling rule we announce today, and its dismissal 

was improper. In so holding, we take no position on whether 

 2 In so doing, we acknowledge that a prior panel of this court 

reaffirmed Razzoli in the wake of Wilkinson. See Davis v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 334 Fed. App’x 332 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Because it 

was unpublished, while that decision is precedential, it is not binding 

on this panel. See In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Moreover, it issued before the Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner

further undermined Razzoli.

3 Our decision to reject the distinction between state and federal 

prisoners for the purposes of habeas-channeling is consistent with 

the congruity the Supreme Court has generally recognized in the area 

of habeas. For example, in Davis v. United States, the Court held that 

the grounds for habeas relief are the same for state and federal 

prisoners. 417 U.S. 333, 344 (1974); see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 

87 (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing concerns about creating 

habeas incongruity between state and federal prisoners).

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dismissal for failure to state an equal protection claim might 

otherwise be proper.

III

The district court also dismissed Davis’s Bivens action for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it found the claim

“patently insubstantial.” Davis, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 2. We 

disagree with that finding. We have cautioned that “patently 

insubstantial” presents an especially high bar for dismissing a 

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and is no substitute 

for a dismissal on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6). Best v. Kelly, 

39 F.3d 328, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Patently insubstantial

claims must be “essentially fictitious,” consisting of such 

things as “bizarre conspiracy theories, . . . fantastic 

government manipulations of [the claimant’s] will or mind, 

[or] supernatural intervention.” Id. at 330.

Davis’s complaint is admittedly flawed under Bivens, and 

possibly fatally so. He does not identify an individual federal 

officer, and he does not request damages. See Correctional 

Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (stating that 

Bivens recognizes a cause of action for damages against federal 

officers in their personal capacity). But Davis’s claim, flawed 

though it may be, is not based on plainly fictitious allegations, 

and his pleading errors may be corrected through the liberal 

construction or amendment we are accustomed to providing a 

pro se prisoner. Of course, his claim might also be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim. We take no view on that matter. 

What we do determine, however, is that the district court had 

jurisdiction to take up the merits of his inartfully pled Bivens 

claim.

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IV

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of Davis’s complaint and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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