Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00396/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00396-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

D.S., by and through )

his guardian ad litem )

and next friend, )

Trina Williams, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:04cv396-MHT

) (WO)

COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY, )

STATE OF ALABAMA; )

MILTON WEBB; )

CHARLIE TERRELL; )

DARRYL ANDREWS; )

AND NATALIE JOHNSON, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

This case arises out of the rape of plaintiff D.S.,

by another juvenile detainee, when he was 11 years old

and in the custody of the Montgomery County Youth

Facility (“MCYF”). D.S., by and through his guardian ad

litem and next friend Trina Williams, now names as

defendants Montgomery County, Alabama and four MCYF

employees: Milton Webb, Charlie Terrell, Darryl Andrews,

and Natalie Johnson Mason.

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 1 of 44
2

D.S. asserts two claims against the defendants: (1)

they violated his right to substantive due process under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; and (2) they were negligent, grossly negligent,

wanton, and reckless, in violation of Alabama law.

Jurisdiction over this case, which was removed from

state court, is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

(federal question), 1343(a)(3) and (4) (civil rights),

1367 (supplemental), and 1441 (removal). This case is

now before the court on the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. The motion will be granted in part and

denied in part.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 2 of 44
3

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court's role

at the summary-judgment stage is not to weigh the

evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but

rather to determine only whether a genuine issue exists

for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986). In doing so, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that

party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND 

MCYF is a youth-detention facility operated by the

Montgomery County, Alabama. Either a parent, socialservices agency, or law-enforcement officer may commit a

juvenile to MCYF custody if there is probable cause to

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1. By exception, juveniles who are at least 16 years

old and arrested, charged or tried as an adult pursuant

to 1975 Ala. Code § 12-15-34.1, are not detained at MYDF

but, instead, are held at an adult facility. 

2. Defendants’ evidentiary submission in support of

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 68), exhibit 6,

Mason deposition, exhibit 4 attached thereto. PAXIL®

(paroxetine HCl) is a prescription medication that has

been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration

(FDA) for treatment of depression, generalized anxiety

disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder,

obsessive compulsive disorder, and posttraumatic stress

(continued...)

4

charge the juvenile with a criminal offense or

delinquency.1

On April 14, 2002, D.S.’s grandmother and aunt

brought him to MCYF for repeatedly striking his mother

and stealing money from his grandmother’s purse. During

the initial interview, D.S.’s family informed defendant

Mason, who was the intake officer on duty, that D.S. was

mentally ill and mildly retarded. Mason noted on the

complaint that accompanied D.S.’s intake documents that

D.S. was taking prescriptions for Paxil and Risperdal and

recommended that he should see a court-appointed mentalhealth therapist.2

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2. (...continued)

disorder. Official Paxil Website: What Does Paxil Treat

<http://www.paxil.com/about/ab_trt.html> (accessed on

February 15, 2005). RISPERDAL® (risperidone) is a

prescription medication that has been approved by the FDA

for treatment of bipolar I disorder and acute to manic or

mixed episodes associated with bipolar I disorder.

Official Risperdal Website: About Risperdal

<http://www.risperdal.com/html/ris/consumer/pd_risperid

one.xml;jsessionid=GIFNQZVEDYPPWCQPCCFTC0YKB2IIQNSC?art

icle=index_risperidone.jspf> (accessed on February 15,

2005).

5

After interviewing D.S. and his family, Mason

concluded that there was probable cause to charge him

with criminal conduct. The following day, a juvenile

court ordered D.S.’s continued custody at MCYF as a

pretrial detainee.

The MCYF detention unit includes three wings of

single-occupancy cells: all females are placed on

A-wing; males ages seven to 14 are generally placed on Bwing; and males ages 15 to 18 are generally placed on Cwing. Although age and gender are the primary placement

considerations, a detainee’s gang affiliation, if any,

and physical size are also considered. Suicidal

juveniles, because they pose a danger to themselves, are

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subject to increased surveillance while in their cells

but otherwise remain in general population. There are no

placement considerations for physically or mentally

handicapped juveniles, and there are no placement

considerations for non-gang affiliated juveniles who may

otherwise pose a danger to others. 

Because of his sex, age, physical size, and lack of

gang affiliation, D.S. was assigned to a cell on B-wing.

When D.S. was admitted, MCYF employees were directed to

“keep a close eye on him.” Defendants’ evidentiary

submission in support of motion for summary judgment

(Doc. No. 68), exhibit 4 attached to Howell deposition

transcript.

A dayroom, where detainees participate in various

educational and recreational activities, is located on

B-wing. Because of the admitted need to watch juveniles

at all times, there is, immediately adjoining the

dayroom, a control room where MCYF childcare officers use

sound-amplification equipment and a glass wall to monitor

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detainees. At least one childcare officer must be in the

control room at all times when the dayroom is occupied.

 A boys’ restroom facility is adjacent to the dayroom

and the control room. Again, because of the need for

constant supervision of all juveniles, only one detainee

is permitted in the restroom at a time; the restroom door

does not have a lock on it; and there is a 8" by 16"

observation window in the common wall between the

restroom and control room, and, from the window, a

childcare officer can hear and, if necessary, observe a

detainee in the restroom. However, detainees frequently

cover the window with toilet paper and other debris to

prevent MCYF staff from observing them while they are in

the restroom.

On April 18, in the late morning, D.S. and another

detainee, C.P., were playing cards in the dayroom.

Defendants Webb, Terrell, and Andrews were the childcare

officers assigned to B-wing and, therefore, were

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immediately responsible for constantly monitoring,

supervising, and protecting D.S. and C.P. in the dayroom.

At some point during the card game, D.S. went to the

restroom; the childcare officers could not, however, see

into the restroom because toilet paper covered the window

between the control room and the restroom. Shortly

thereafter, C.P. entered the restroom with his “private

out,” grabbed D.S., and raped him. During the assault,

which lasted approximately five minutes, D.S. yelled for

MCYF staff. While the restroom was constructed in a way

so that yells from it could be heard in the control room,

no one responded. D.S. cries for help did, however,

cause C.P. to end the assault. D.S. ran out of the

restroom and darted toward the control room to notify

staff. C.P. grabbed D.S., threw him against the dayroom

wall, and threatened future harm if D.S. reported the

assault. When D.S. left the restroom, he looked into the

control room and saw two childcare officers; one was

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3. There is no reasonably reliable evidence that it

was to either Webb, Terrell, or Andrews that D.S., while

in the lunch line, reported the rape 

9

reading a newspaper, and the other appeared to be doing

something on a computer; neither looked up.

It appears that D.S. is confused as to who was on

duty during the incident. He says that Webb was present.

He also says that a “Calhoun” was present, but MYYF

records indicate that Officer Calhoun was not on duty

that day. In any event, Webb, Terrell, and Andrews all

admit the incident occurred on their shift. They were

therefore on duty and thus were directly responsible for

D.S.’s supervision and safety.

At approximately 11:40 a.m., two the childcare

officers took D.S. to the cafeteria for lunch. While

standing in the lunch line, D.S. reported the rape to one

of the officers.3

 However, no childcare officer

documented D.S.’s first report of the rape in the daily

logbook. In fact, D.S.’s behavior log for April 18

indicates that there was “no problem” during the staff’s

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4. The court cannot decipher the signature of the

childcare officer on duty during the first shift who made

this notation in D.S.’s chart.

5. The child care officer to whom D.S., for a third

time, reported the rape has not been named as a defendant

to this lawsuit. 

10

first shift. Defendants’ evidentiary submission in

support of motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 68),

exhibit 2, Howell deposition, plaintiff’s exhibit 4

attached to deposition transcript.4

After lunch, D.S. was returned to the B-wing dayroom.

Shortly thereafter, at approximately 12:00 p.m., D.S.

reported the rape to defendant Mason, and she immediately

directed MCYF staff to take D.S. to the doctor. D.S. was

not taken to a doctor, however. Again, there is no

documentation of D.S.’s second report of the rape. 

After dinner and a shift change in MCYF staff, at

approximately 6:00 p.m., D.S. reported the rape for a

third time to a childcare officer; the officer, in turn,

notified the MCYF director and a physician.5

 D.S. was

transported to the hospital at approximately 7:35 p.m.,

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seven hours after he first reported the rape. Hospital

records from a rape examination indicate that D.S.

suffered rectal tears, discharge, and bleeding as a

result of the incident. 

III. DISCUSSION

D.S. contends that the defendants’ conduct violated

his federal substantive-due-process right and Alabama

law. The court will discuss D.S.’s federal claims

separately from his state claims.

A. Federal Claim

To establish a claim under § 1983, D.S. must

demonstrate that the defendants, acting under color of

law, deprived him of some right protected by the United

States Constitution. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). D.S. rests his § 1983 claim

on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

contending that the defendants were deliberately

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6. Generally, the Eighth Amendment is the

appropriate mechanism to challenge unconstitutional

conditions of incarceration. Because D.S. “was a

detainee and not a prisoner, however, his constitutional

rights arise not from the Eighth Amendment, but from the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hale v.

Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir.

1995). 

12

indifferent to detention conditions that posed a

substantial risk of serious harm to him.6

1. Webb, Terrell, and Andrews

D.S. sued MCYF employees Webb, Terrell, and Andrews

in their individual capacities, asserting that, in

failing to protect from being raped, they were

deliberately indifferent to conditions posing a

substantial risk of serious harm to him. In Webb,

Terrell, and Andrews’s summary-judgment motion, they

assert qualified immunity. 

Qualified immunity shields a public employee from

liability for acts or omissions arising out of the

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7. The parties agree that the MCYF employees were

acting within the scope of their discretionary authority

under Alabama law when the allegedly unconstitutional

conduct occurred. See, e.g., Sims v. Metropolitan Dade

County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992). 

13

employee’s discretionary authority.7

 The qualifiedimmunity defense is based on the policy that public

employees sued for monetary damages under § 1983 have a

right to fair notice that a given course of conduct is

unlawful. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). A

public employee who successfully establishes the

qualified-immunity defense is entitled to summary

judgment to avoid the burdens and costs associated with

civil litigation. Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271,

1273 (11th Cir. 1989).

The Supreme Court has synthesized its qualifiedimmunity precedent into a two-pronged framework. Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201;

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). First,

a court must determine whether the evidence, construed in

the plaintiff’s favor, establishes a constitutional

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14

violation; the court should not merely assume that the

plaintiff has adequately asserted a violation of some

constitutional right. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769,

1774 (2007); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991);

Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir. 2003).

If the evidence adequately alleges a constitutional

violation, the court must then determine whether the

defendant’s acts or omissions transgressed clearly

established statutory or constitutional law of which a

reasonable person would have known. Hope, 536 U.S. at

737. 

This second element entails both objective and

subjective components. Objectively, "[t]he contours of

the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates

that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987). Subjectively, the court assesses the evidence in

light of facts that the defendant knew, or should have

known, but deliberately disregarded when alleged

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15

constitutional violation occurred. Dolihite v. Maughon,

74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir. 1996). A public employee

who is unaware of facts or circumstances that make his or

her conduct unconstitutional lacks the necessary

forethought for deliberate indifference. As such, “the

relevant question on a motion for summary judgment based

on a defense of qualified immunity is whether a

reasonable official could have believed his or her

actions were lawful in light of clearly established law

and the information possessed by the official at the time

the conduct occurred." Id.

As to the first element of the qualified-immunity

analysis, D.S. has adequately set forth a constitutional

violation arising out of the rape of him. A government

official’s failure to protect prisoners from violence

committed at the hands of other prisoners transgresses

the constitutional limits of punishment. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This principle is

considerably more imperative when the individual is a

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16

young child who is committed to the government’s custody

for pretrial detention. Surely, “if it is cruel and

unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe

conditions, it must be unconstitutional under the Due

Process Clause to confine the involuntarily committed--

who may not be punished at all--in unsafe conditions.”

Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982).

As to the objective component of the second element,

therefore, D.S.’s right to be free from sexual assaults

was clearly established at the time when the alleged

violation occurred. “[T]he right to personal security

constitutes a historic liberty interest protected

substantively by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 315

(internal quotations omitted); see also Thomas v. City of

Clanton, 285 F. Supp.2d 1275, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2003)

(Thompson, J.) (“a right to be free from sexually

motivated assaults [because] substantive due process

under the fourteenth amendment includes a right to bodily

integrity") (citing Romero v. City of Clanton, 220 F.

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17

Supp.2d 1313, 1316 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (Albritton, J.));

Johnson v. Cannon, 947 F. Supp. 1567, 1572-73 (M.D. Fla.

1996) (Kovachevich, J.); Battista v. Cannon, 934 F. Supp.

400, 405 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (Kovachevich, J.)). It is

obvious that the right to bodily integrity is not lost

when a child enters a governmental entity’s custody.

“[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its

power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it

renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same

time fails to provide for his ... reasonable safety--it

transgresses the substantive limits on state action set

by the ... Due Process Clause." DeShaney v. Winnebago

County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).

As to the subjective component of the second element,

to establish that Webb, Terrell and Andrews were

deliberately indifferent, D.S. must demonstrate that (1)

the childcare officers were aware of facts that created

a substantial risk of serious harm to him; (2) the

childcare officers’ conduct when he was assaulted

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18

constituted deliberate indifference to such harm; and

(3), absent the childcare officers’ conduct, the infirm

condition--that is, the excessive risk of sexual

abuse--would not have existed. Purcell ex rel. Estate of

Morgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (11th

Cir. 2005).

Webb, Terrell, and Andrews admit that D.S. testified

that MCYF staff were aware that C.P. had thrown shoes at

him and punched him and that a notation in D.S.’s

behavior log indicated that, on April 16, two days before

the rape, a MCYF staff member warned D.S. and C.P. that

they should stop playing together; D.S. also says that

MCYF staff were aware that C.P. had threatened to have

sex with a “14-year-old white boy” and the staff told

“C.P. that he better stop having sex with the white

boys.” Webb, Terrell, and Andrews argue, however, that

there is insufficient evidence that they were aware that

C.P. presented a serious danger to D.S.; they point to

portions of D.S.’s other testimony in which he states

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8. In his affidavit, D.S. asserts the following

facts:

“From April 14, 2002 to April 18, 2002,

the date I was sexually assaulted by

C.P., C.P. had thrown shoes at me on

several different occasions, and had

punched me in the back. Staff were aware

of these incidents, as a staff member

saw C.P. throw a shoe at me, and I also

reported being punched by C.P. to staff.

I do not recall the names(s) of the

staff member witnessing the shoe

throwing incident or the staff member I

reported the punching incident to ...

[S]taff assigned to B-wing were informed

that C.P. was threatening to have sex

with a fourteen year old white boy in BWing ... I recall staff telling C.P.

that he better stop having sex with the

white boys.”

Plaintiff’s submission of evidentiary materials in

opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Doc. No. 91), exhibit 15, D.S. affidavit.

19

that he does not remember the staff members’ names who

saw C.P. hit him or heard C.P. make sexually motivated

threats to another detainee.8

Webb, Terrell, and Andrews misperceive the nature of

the constitutional violation with which they have been

charged. The evidence reflects that Webb, Terrell, and

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20

Andrews had the direct and immediate responsibility as

on-duty childcare officers to monitor, supervise, and

protect D.S. and C.P. at all times while they were in the

daycare room and that they abdicated this responsibility

totally: they failed to notice that D.S. and C.P. had

left the daycare room; they failed, despite the oneperson-only-in-the-restroom rule, to prevent D.S. from

following D.S. into the restroom; they failed to remove

the toilet paper that covered the window between the

restroom and the control room and thus blocked their

view; they failed to respond to D.S.’s yells for help,

despite the fact, as they admit, that the yells should

have been audible in the control room; and, when D.S. and

C.P. left the restroom, they were either reading the

paper or working on a computer. The evidence, read in

D.S.’s favor, shows that C.P. was able to rape D.S. only

because of Webb, Terrell, and Andrews’s total dereliction

of their duty to monitor, supervise, and protect to the

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21

two boys at all times--and thus shows that D.S.’s rape

can be laid squarely at their feet. 

This case does not necessarily turn on Webb, Terrell,

and Andrews’s failure to predict C.P.’s behavior but

rather on their failure to meet their day-to-day

constitutional responsibility, while on duty at MCYF, to

supervise and protect D.S. while he was in their direct

custody. Or, to put it another way, regardless as to

whether they were aware of C.P.’s aggressive and

inappropriate propensities, they still had a day-to-day

constitutional responsibility, while on duty at MCYF, to

supervise and protect D.S. while he was in their direct

custody, and as far as the court can tell from the

current record, they grossly and inexcusably failed to

meet this responsibility.

A factfinder could reasonably conclude that, while

D.S. was under Webb, Terrell, and Andrews’s direct care,

they were deliberately indifferent to D.S.’s welfare when

D.S. was raped. Because the court concludes that

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22

defendants Webb, Terrell, and Andrews are not entitled to

qualified immunity, the childcare officers’ summaryjudgment motion will be denied on D.S.’s federal claim.

2. Mason

D.S.’s failure-to-protect claim against Mason fails

with respect to the subjective component of the second

element. A public employee violates a pretrial

detainee's right to substantive due process if the

employee deliberately fails to abate a serious risk of

substantial harm to the detainee. While it appears that

there were only the most rudimentary segregation criteria

in place when D.S. was detained and that there were no

special placement considerations for violent, mentally

ill, or mentally retarded detainees, Mason was not

responsible for assigning D.S. to a particular MCYF wing

or for his care thereafter; that task was delegated to

others. Mason was, at most, responsible for recommending

further psychiatric evaluation of D.S., which she did in

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23

this case. The evidence does not support the conclusion

that, within the confines of her job and her authority,

she was indifferent to D.S.’s welfare at the time of

D.S.’s rape.

3. Montgomery County

A local government may be held liable under § 1983

when execution of a government's policy or custom is

responsible for inflicting the injury such that the

government acts as “the moving force of the

constitutional violation.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

D.S. asserts a § 1983 claim against Montgomery County

for failing to develop and implement procedures or

policies reasonably designed to protect him from being

sexually assaulted.

The county responds that D.S. has failed to “identify

those officials or governmental bodies who speak with

final policymaking authority for the local governmental

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24

actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the

particular constitutional or statutory violation at

issue." McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785

(1997) (internal quotations omitted). In further support

of its summary-judgment argument, the county has

presented evidence that detainee-on-detainee violence at

MCYF is rare.

D.S. does not respond to the county’s summaryjudgment argument or rebut its evidence in his responsive

brief or the pretrial hearing order. Despite the bare

allegation in his complaint, D.S. has failed to provide

any evidence to support his claim that Montgomery County,

through its policies or practices, or lack thereof,

deprived him of substantive due process. Moreover, there

is insufficient evidence creating a causal connection

between the county's responsibilities and the assault.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Essentially, it appears that

D.S. has abandoned his § 1983 failure-to protect claim

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9. While it appears from D.S.’s brief that he has

three state claims against the defendants (placement-ingeneral-population claim, failure-to-protect claim, and

failure-to-provide-prompt-medical-care claim), it appears

that he is pursuing only one federal claim, a failure-toprotect claim, against the defendants.

25

against the county. Summary judgment will be granted as

to the county on D.S.’s federal claim.

B. State Claims 

D.S. asserts that the defendants were negligent,

reckless, grossly reckless, and wanton misconduct in

violation of Alabama law. More precisely, D.S. points

out three aspects of his detention as tortious: (1)

placing him in the general detention population; (2)

failing to supervise and protect him; and (3) failing to

provide prompt medical attention after he was raped.9

 In

response, Webb, Terrell, Andrews, and Mason argue that

they are entitled to statutory immunity (1975 Ala. Code

§ 6-5-338(a)) and state-agent common-law immunity.

Montgomery County argues that, because D.S.’s claims

against it rest solely on respondeat-superior theory, it

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10. Cranman provides that:

“A State agent shall be immune from

civil liability in his or her personal

capacity when the conduct made the basis

of the claim against the agent is based

upon the agent's

(continued...)

26

too is immune from tort liability because its agents are

entitled to immunity.

1. Webb, Terrell, and Andrews

Section 6-5-338(a) provides in pertinent part:

“(a) Every peace officer ... employed

... by ... a county ... shall at all

times be deemed to be officers of this

state, and as such shall have immunity

from tort liability arising out of his

or her conduct in performance of any

discretionary function within the line

and scope of his or her law enforcement

duties.”

1975 Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a). “Whether a qualified peace

officer is due § 6-5-338(a) immunity is now judged by the

restatement of State-agent immunity articulated by Ex

parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000).” Hollis v.

City of Brighton 885 So.2d 135, 142-43 (Ala. 2004).10

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10. (...continued)

(1) formulating plans, policies, or

designs; or

(2) exercising his or her judgment in

the administration of a department or

agency of government, including, but not

limited to, examples such as:

(a) making administrative

adjudications;

(b) allocating resources;

(c) negotiating contracts;

(d) hiring, firing,

transferring, assigning, or

supervising personnel; or

(3) discharging duties imposed on a

department or agency by statute, rule,

or regulation insofar as the statute,

rule, or regulation prescribes the

manner for performing the duties and the

State agent performs the duties in that

manner; or

(4) exercising judgment in the

enforcement of the criminal laws of the

State, including, but not limited to,

law-enforcement officers' arresting or

attempting to arrest persons [emphasis

added]; or

(5) exercising judgment in the discharge

(continued...)

27

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 27 of 44
10. (...continued)

of duties imposed by statute, rule, or

regulation in releasing prisoners,

counseling or releasing persons of

unsound mind, or educating students.

“Notwithstanding anything to the

contrary in the foregoing statement of

the rule, a State agent shall not be

immune from civil liability in his or

her personal capacity

(1) when the Constitution or laws of the

United States, or the Constitution of

this State, or laws, rules, or

regulations of this State enacted or

promulgated for the purpose of

regulating the activities of a

government agency require otherwise; or

(2) when the State agent acts willfully,

maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,

beyond his or her authority, or under a

mistaken interpretation of the law.”

792 So.2d at 405.

28

Therefore, for both § 6-5-338(a) immunity and state-agent

immunity, the court need look to only Cranman and its

progeny. 

Cranman has been interpreted to establish a burdenshifting analysis. Ex parte Alabama Dept. of Mental

Health and Mental Retardation, 937 So.2d 1018, 1023-24

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 28 of 44
11. See infra note 10.

12. In Hollis II, the Alabama Supreme Court wrote

(continued...)

29

(Ala. 2006). In order to establish immunity from a

claim, the defendant seeking to assert the defense must

present evidence indicating that the claim arises from

conduct that falls within a category giving rise to

immunity, id. at 1024; if this burden is met, the burden

then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant

acted in a manner that precludes application of the

immunity. Id.; see Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405 (“a State

agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or

her personal capacity ... when the State agent acts

willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,

beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken

interpretation of the law”).

Webb, Terrell, and Andrews contend that they fall

within the third and fourth categories for immunity set

forth in Cranman,11 as later amended by Hollis v. City of

Brighton (Hollis II), 950 So.2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006).12

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 29 of 44
12. (...continued)

that, “Because the peace officers' immunity statute does

not limit the availability of immunity to ‘enforcement of

the criminal laws,’ we today modify category (4) of

Cranman to read as follows:

‘A State agent shall be immune from

civil liability in his or her personal

capacity when the conduct made the basis

of the claim against the agent is based

upon the agent's

...

(4) exercising judgment in the

enforcement of the criminal laws of the

State, including, but not limited to,

law-enforcement officers' arresting or

attempting to arrest persons, or serving

as peace officers under circumstances

entitling such officers to immunity

pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code

1975.’”

950 So.2d at 309.

30

These categories are that:

“ A State agent shall be immune from

civil liability in his or her personal

capacity when the conduct made the basis

of the claim against the agent is based

upon the agent's

***

(3) discharging duties imposed on a

department or agency by statute, rule,

or regulation insofar as the statute,

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 30 of 44
31

rule, or regulation prescribes the

manner for performing the duties and the

State agent performs the duties in that

manner; or

(4) exercising judgment in the

enforcement of the criminal laws of the

State, including, but not limited to,

law-enforcement officers' arresting or

attempting to arrest persons, or serving

as peace officers under circumstances

entitling such officers to immunity

pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code

1975.”

Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405, as modified by Hollis, 950

So.2d at 309.

Webb, Terrell, and Andrews argue, with regard to

D.S.’s state failure-to-protect claim, that they are

entitled to § 6-5-338(a) and state-agent immunity because

they “discharged their duties pursuant to statu[t]e,

facility rules and [American Correctional Association]

regulations in the manner in which these rules were

prescribed.” Defendants’ brief (Doc. No. 69), p.37.

Relying on Cranman, they contend that, “At the time of

the incident, [they] were engaged in discretionary

functions under the 3rd and 4th categories ... and are

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 31 of 44
32

thus entitled to state-agent immunity.” Id. They

explain that, “As child care officers, [they] are

responsible for supervising the youths in detention and

for security in the detention area,” and that, “In doing

so, [they] are responsible for making reasoned decisions

based on the given situation that occurs with the

residents.” Id. 

Webb, Terrell, and Andrews misunderstand the import

the Alabama Supreme Court has given Cranman. In Ex parte

Alabama Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation,

defendants Johnson and Marshall, two employees of the

Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental

Retardation (DMHMR), asserted that they are entitled to

state-agent immunity, even though they had failed to

intervene in an incident in which plaintiff, a DMHMR

resident, had been assaulted by another resident.

Johnson and Marshall stated that, “in not intervening in

the incident ... they were merely discharging the duties

imposed on them.” 937 So.2d at 1028. The court

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 32 of 44
33

criticized this contention, stating that Johnson and

Marshall failed to “support ... their conclusory

statements with specific facts regarding their failure to

become involved in [the] assault,” id., “nor do they,”

according to the court, “demonstrate that in refusing to

interfere they were adhering to a specific rule or

regulation applicable to the incident.” Id. The court

summarized that, “when a defendant asserting State-agent

immunity ‘states in conclusory terms that his duties

required him to exercise his judgment and discretion[,]

... yet fail[s] to state his involvement or his adherence

to a rule or regulation governing the exercise of his

duties, in the actions underlying the claims asserted

against him,’ there was insufficient evidence to support

a conclusion that the defendant was entitled to

State-agent immunity.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Wood, 852

So.2d at 711-12.) The court then concluded that “Johnson

and Marshall failed to carry their burden of establishing

that their conduct in not intervening in [the] assault

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 33 of 44
34

.... fell within the ambit of State-agent immunity.” Ex

parte Alabama Dept. of Mental Health and Mental

Retardation, 937 So.2d at 1028-29. Or, to put it another

way, according to the court, “Johnson and Marshall do not

show that their actions fall within the performance of a

function that clearly entitles them to State-agent

immunity.” Id. at 1029. 

Ex parte Alabama Dept. of Mental Health and Mental

Retardation controls here. Similarly, Webb, Terrell, and

Andrews offer only conclusory statements as to why they

failed to monitory, supervise, and protect D.S.: that,

“As child care officers, [they] are responsible for

supervising the youths in detention and for security in

the detention area,” and that, “In doing so, [they] are

responsible for making reasoned decisions based on the

given situation that occurs with the residents.”

Defendants’ brief (Doc. No. 69), p.37. They neglect to

explain, however, how the given situation concerning D.S.

warranted their total abdication of their responsibility

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 34 of 44
35

as on-duty childcare officers to monitor, supervise, and

protect D.S. and C.P. at all times while they were in the

daycare room; or, to be more specific using the words of

Ex parte Alabama Dept. of Mental Health and Mental

Retardation, they neglect to explain how “they were

adhering to a specific rule or regulation applicable to

the incident,” 937 So.2d at 1028, when they failed to

notice that D.S. and C.P. had left the daycare room; they

failed, despite the one-person-only-in-the-restroom rule,

to prevent D.S. from following D.S. into the restroom;

they failed to remove the toilet paper that covered the

window between the restroom and the control room and thus

blocked their view; they failed to respond to D.S.’s

yells for help, despite the fact, as they admit, that the

yells should have been audible in the control room; they

were either reading the paper or working on a computer

when D.S. and C.P. left the restroom. Webb, Terrell, and

Andrews, in short, “do not show that their actions [or

inactions] fall within the performance of a function that

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 35 of 44
13. D.S. also contends that Webb, Terrell, and

Andrews are not “peace officers” within the ambit of § 6-

5-338(a). Subsection (b) of § 6-5-338 states that: 

“This section is intended to extend

immunity only to peace officers and

governmental units or agencies

authorized to appoint peace officers.

No immunity is extended hereby to any

private non-governmental person or

entity, including any private employer

of a peace officer during that officer's

off-duty hours.” 

1975 Ala. Code § 6-5-338(b). Webb, Terrell, and Andrews

admit that they are “not municipal or county peace

officers in the truest sense,” but argue that they are

otherwise entitled to immunity because they were

“assuming custody over youths charged with criminal

offenses, enforcing laws of the State of Alabama and

maintaining order throughout the juvenile detention

facility.” Defendants’ brief in support of motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 69), p. 32. The court, while

seriously doubting that Webb, Terrell, and Andrews fall

within § 6-5-338(a)’s coverage, need not reach this

issue. Because § 6-5-338(a) immunity and Cranman

immunity have been merged, the court has looked solely to

Cranman.

36

clearly entitles them to State-agent immunity.” Id. at

1029.13

With regard to D.S.’s placement-in-general-population

claim and failure-to-provide-prompt-medical-care claim,

D.S. had not shown what role, if any, Webb, Terrell, and

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 36 of 44
37

Andrews (either together or separately) played in the

circumstances giving rise to these claims. Webb,

Terrell, and Andrews are therefore entitled to summary

judgment on these claims.

2. Mason

Mason contends that she is entitled to immunity on

all of D.S.’s state claims. The court agrees. As an

MCYF intake officer, Mason was responsible for

determining whether the MCYF could properly assert

jurisdiction over juveniles brought to the facility,

whether there was probable cause that the juvenile

committed criminal conduct, and whether the juvenile

should be detained at the facility. Unlike with Webb,

Terrell, and Andrews, the evidence reflects that Mason’s

actions and decisions were totally within the confines of

her authority. Mason was not responsible for assigning

D.S. to a particular MCYF wing or for his care

thereafter; that task was delegated to others. Aside

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 37 of 44
38

from her general commitment responsibilities, Mason was,

at most, responsible for recommending further psychiatric

evaluation of D.S., which she did in this case. 

The evidence also reflects that, on learning that

D.S. had been raped, Mason immediately directed MCYF

staff to take him to a doctor. While, unfortunately,

D.S. was not taken to a doctor, there is nothing in the

record to support the conclusion that her

responsibilities extended beyond what she did.

Mason has, therefore, established as to all three of

D.S.’s state claims (placement-in-general-population

claim, failure-to-protect claim, and failure-to-provideprompt-medical-care claim) that her actions and decisions

were consistent with her authority and responsibilities

and thus fell squarely within the discretionary

categories set forth in Cranmen. E.g., 792 So.2d at 405

(“A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in

his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the

basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 38 of 44
39

agent's ... (3) discharging duties imposed on a

department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation

insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes

the manner for performing the duties and the State agent

performs the duties in that manner ....”).

The burden, therefore, is now on D.S. to show that

she acted in a manner that precludes application of the

immunity, see Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405 (“a State agent

shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her

personal capacity ... when the State agent acts

willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,

beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken

interpretation of the law”), and D.S. has not met this

burden. Summary judgment will therefore be granted on

all of D.S.’s state claims against Mason. 

3. Montgomery County

Montgomery County argues that, to the extent D.S.’s

claims against it rest solely on respondeat-superior

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 39 of 44
14. To be sure, the court does not understood D.S. to

(continued...)

40

theory, it too is immune from tort liability because its

sued employees are entitled to immunity. It is true

that, “under principles of vicarious liability, where a

municipal employee enjoys immunity, the municipality

likewise is immune as to claims based on the employee's

conduct.” City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson, 785 So. 2d

1128, 1131 (Ala. 2000). 

The county’s argument is, however, unavailing as to

D.S.’s failure-to-protect claim because, as previously

discussed, the childcare officers on duty when D.S. was

raped are not immune from his state claims; but the

argument has merit on D.S.’s placement-in-generalpopulation claim and failure-to-provide-prompt-medicalcare claim. The county, therefore, may not take cover in

their immunity to avoid respondeat-superior liability on

D.S.’s failure-to-protect claim, but may do so on D.S.’s

placement-in-general-population claim and failure-toprovide-prompt-medical-care claim.14

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 40 of 44
14. (...continued)

say that his claims against the county are necessarily

predicated solely upon respondeat-superior liability.

D.S.’s claims that the county failed to implement

adequate screening and segregation criteria for violent,

mentally retarded, or mentally ill juveniles and failed

to provide adequate supervision may be direct-liability

claims as well. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Mobile County,

841 So. 2d 1237, 1239-40 (Ala. 2002) (holding that a

county may be directly liable for death of a pretrial

detainee if the county negligently failed to provide for

the secure custody, care, and safekeeping of the

deceased). However, the evidence does not support these

factual allegations against the county directly.

15. The county also contends that there is a cap on

any damages recoverable from it under state law. The

court need reach this issue at this time.

41

The county asserts, however, that D.S. may not

recover punitive damages from it, and D.S. acknowledges

this to be true. 

Summary judgment will therefore be granted as to the

county on D.S.’s state placement-in-general-population

claim and failure-to-provide-prompt-medical-care claim

and for punitive damages on the failure-to-protect claim;

summary judgment will be denied in all other respects on

the failure-to-protect claim.15

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42

C. Official Capacities

Webb, Terrell, and Andrews contend that, because the

county has been named as a defendant on both D.S.’s

federal and state claims and because claims against

governmental employees in their official capacities are

functionally equivalent to claims against the entity they

represent, it is redundant and thus unnecessary to sue

them in their official capacities. The court agrees.

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690

n. 55 (1978); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776

(11th Cir. 1991); Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783,

788 (Ala. 2004). Summary judgment will therefore be

granted against Webb, Terrell, and Andrews on all of

D.S.’s federal and state claims to the extent they have

been sued in their official capacities. 

***

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43

For the reasons given above and in summary, Webb,

Terrell, Andrews Webb, Mason, and Montgomery County’s

motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and

denied in part as follows: Summary judgment will be

denied on D.S.’s federal failure-to-protect claim against

Webb, Terrell, and Andrews in their individual

capacities; this claim will proceed to trial. Summary

judgment will be denied on D.S.’s state failure-toprotect claim against Webb, Terrell, and Andrews in their

individual capacities and against Montgomery County

except as to punitive damages; this claim will proceed to

trial except as to punitive damages against Montgomery

County. Summary judgment will be granted in all other

respects, that is, summary judgment will be granted on

the federal failure-to-protect claim against Mason and

the county; on the state failure-to-protect claim against

Mason; on the state failure-to-protect claim against the

county to the extent punitive damages are sought; on the

state placement-in-general-population and failure-toCase 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 43 of 44
provide-prompt-medical-care claims against Mason and the

county; and on all federal and state claims to the extent

Webb, Terrell, Andrews, and Mason have been sued in their

official capacities. Mason is no longer a party to this

case.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

 DONE, this the 16th day of November, 2007.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:04-cv-00396-MHT-CSC Document 228 Filed 11/16/07 Page 44 of 44