Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00533/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00533-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE RAFAEL ORTIZ-CASTILLO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11-cr-2511 – IEG

Related Case: 12-cv-533 – IEG

ORDER 

(1) DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR TIME

REDUCTION PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 2255

[Doc. No. 37 in 11-cr-2511]

(2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Petitioner Jose Rafael Ortiz-Castillo (“Petitioner”), a federal inmate proceeding pro se,

submitted a motion for time reduction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Doc. No. 37.] He seeks

relief on the grounds that, due to his alien status, he is ineligible for (1) a one-year reduction of

sentence through a drug program, (2) an early release to a halfway house, and (3) a Unicor job. 

[Id. at 2.] Petitioner argues that the availability of these programs to United States citizens, but not

to aliens, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Equal Rights Act of 1964. [Id.] Having considered

Petitioner’s arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion

for Time Reduction.

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BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged with, and ultimately pleaded guilty to being an alien found in the

United States after having been previously deported (felony) in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and

(b), which carries a maximum sentence of twenty years. [See Doc. Nos. 11, 23-26.] As part of his

Plea Agreement, Petitioner expressly “waive[d], to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or

to collaterally attack his [conviction and ]sentence, . . . unless the Court impose[d] a custodial

sentence above the greater of the high end of the guideline range recommended by the

Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing.” [Doc. No. 26 at 10.] At

sentencing, the Government calculated a guideline range of 46 to 57 months and recommended a

sentence of 46 months. [Doc No. 31.] Petitioner calculated a guideline range of 46 to 57 months

and sought a sentence of 30 months. [Doc. No. 33.] On February 13, 2012, the Court sentenced

Petitioner to 41 months in federal custody. [Doc. Nos. 35-36.]

DISCUSSION

Section 2255(a) authorizes the Court to “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence of a federal

prisoner that “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Claims

for relief under § 2255 must be based on some constitutional error, jurisdictional defect, or an error

resulting in a “complete miscarriage of justice” or in a proceeding “inconsistent with the

rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979)

(internal quotation marks omitted). If the record clearly indicates that a petitioner does not have a

claim or that he has asserted “no more than conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts and

refuted by the record,” a district court may deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing. 

United States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1986).

I. Waiver

As an initial matter, it is clear that Petitioner waived any right to collaterally attack his

sentence. “‘A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if (1) the language of the

waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and

voluntarily made.’” United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted). In this case, as part of his Plea Agreement, Petitioner expressly waived “any right . . . to

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collaterally attack his [conviction and] sentence,” unless “the Court impose[d] a custodial sentence

above the greater of the high end of the guideline range recommended by the Government

pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing.” [Doc. No. 26 at 10.] At sentencing, the

Court imposed a sentence of 41 months, which was lower than the high end of the Government’s

recommended guideline range of 46 to 57 months. [See Doc. Nos. 31, 36.] Because the Court did

not impose a sentence above the high end of the guideline range recommended by the

Government, Petitioner’s waiver applies. There is also no indication that the waiver was not

knowingly and voluntarily made. Accordingly, Petitioner’s collateral attack on his sentence is

precluded by a valid waiver. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993);

see also United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1990) (public policy

supports plea agreements because, inter alia, of the finality that results).

II. Merits

Even assuming Petitioner did not waive the right to collaterally attack his sentence, his

claims fail on the merits. Aliens present in the United States illegally are entitled to the full

protections of the Equal Protection Clause. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982). Nonetheless,

to state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiff must allege that he was

treated differently from other similarly situated persons. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Unless a suspect classification is present, the unequal treatment must

only be “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 440.

The policy precluding deportable aliens from participating in certain community-based

programs does not violate equal protection because it is rationally related to the government’s

interest in preventing those individuals from fleeing. See McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176,

1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (the exclusion of deportable aliens from participating in a community-based

treatment program was rationally-based, and therefore constitutional, seeing as “prisoners with

detainers pose a flight risk during the community-based treatment phase because they are subject

to possible deportation upon release from custody, and therefore have reason to flee a halfway

house”). Similarly, the denial of a one-year reduction does not violate due process because it does

not “impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

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prison life;” rather, it “merely means that the inmate will have to serve out his sentence as

expected.” Id. at 1185 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

As other courts have concluded, deportable aliens are not “similarly situated” to United

States citizens with respect to the benefits that Petitioner seeks. See, e.g., Aguilar-Marroquin v.

United States, 2011 WL 1344251, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2011); Rendon-Inzunza v. United

States, 2010 WL 3076271, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2010); Santos v. United States, 940 F. Supp.

275, 281 (D. Haw. Aug. 16, 1996). Because United States citizen inmates must re-enter domestic

society upon completion of their sentences, they have a strong incentive to comply with

community-based placement. On the other hand, non-citizen inmates subject to deportation upon

completion of their sentences may have an opposite incentive to flee from the community-based

placement. Accordingly, “[i]t is not an equal protection violation to allow United States

citizen-inmates, who must re-enter domestic society, to participate in rehabilitative or other

programs while denying that privilege to deportable inmates.” Rendon-Inzunza, 2010 WL

3076271, at *1. Because the two groups are not “similarly situated” for purposes of relief that

Petitioner seeks, there is no equal protection violation. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439; see

also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003) (“Congress may make rules as to aliens that

would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”).

CONCLUSION

Because Petitioner’s collateral attack is precluded by a valid waiver, and because it fails on

the merits, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion for sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

The Court also denies a certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not “made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2012 ________________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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