Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01314/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01314-85/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDRIKA MEDLOCK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TACO BELL CORP., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:07-cv-01314-SAB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS‟ 

MOTION TO DECERTIFY PLAINTIFFS‟ 

LATE MEAL PERIOD, REST BREAK, AND 

UNDERPAID MEAL PERIOD PREMIUM 

CLASSES

ECF No. 543

On October 5, 2015, Defendants Taco Bell Corp. and Taco Bell of America, Inc. 

(“Defendants”) filed a motion to decertify the late meal period, rest break, and underpaid meal 

period premium classes. (ECF No. 543). 

The hearing on Defendants‟ motion took place on December 2, 2015. Matthew Theriault 

and Andrew Sokolowski appeared in person and Monica Balderrama, Jerusalem Beligan, and 

Patrick Clifford appeared by telephone on behalf of Plaintiffs. Tracy Kennedy, Morgan Forsey, 

Nora Stiles, and John Makarewich appeared in person and Jason Overett appeared by telephone 

on behalf of Defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendants‟ motion 

to decertify the late meal period, rest break, and underpaid meal period premium classes.

I.

BACKGROUND

In these consolidated actions, Plaintiffs assert class claims against Defendants arising 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

from the alleged violations of California‟s Labor Code relating to the payment of minimum 

wages and overtime and the provision of meal and rest breaks. Plaintiffs also assert claims under 

California‟s Private Attorney Generals Act (“PAGA”), which authorizes “aggrieved employees, 

acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations...” Arias 

v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 980 (2009). The operative complaint is the Third Amended 

Consolidated Complaint filed on December 30, 2014. (ECF No. 522). 

Defendants‟ motions relate to issues pertaining to the class certification process in this 

action. Plaintiff‟s first motion to certify a class was filed on December 30, 2010. (ECF No. 

185). This motion sought to certify eight subclasses: 1) the Late Meal Break Subclass, 2) the 

Underpaid Automatic Adjustments Subclass, 3) the On-Duty Meal Period Agreement Subclass, 

4) the Unpaid On-Duty Meal Period Subclass, 5) the Rest Break Subclass, 6) the Final Pay 

Subclass, 7) the Vested Accrued Vacation Wages Subclass, and 8) the Non-Management 

Employee Vacation Subclass.

The motion to certify the final pay and vacation pay subclasses was denied without 

prejudice on September 30, 2011. (ECF No. 269). After additional briefing regarding the 

certification of the remaining subclasses, United States Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck issued 

a Findings and Recommendations on November 27, 2012 recommending that class certification 

be granted as to the Meal Break Subclass, but denying certification for all other subclasses. 

(ECF No. 341). The Findings and Recommendations were adopted on January 2, 2013, thereby 

certifying the following subclass:

Meal Break Subclass

All persons who work or worked as a non-exempt, hourly-paid 

employee at a corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurant in California 

from September 7, 2003, until the resolution of this lawsuit who 

worked for a period of time in excess of six hours and who worked 

for periods longer than five hours without a meal period of not less 

than thirty minutes as reflected in Defendants‟ employees‟ time 

records.

(Order to Adopt Findings and Recommendations on Class Certification 1:18-21.)

On April 22, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to strike the PAGA allegations from 

Plaintiff‟s First Amended Consolidated Complaint. (ECF No. 398). On May 22, 2014, the Court 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

denied Defendants‟ motion, but noted that there appeared to be some confusion regarding which 

claims were raised on a class-wide basis on behalf of the certified Meal Break Subclass and 

which claims were raised solely on an individual basis by the named plaintiffs. Accordingly, the 

Court ordered Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Consolidated Complaint which specified the 

claims that proceeded on a class basis and the claims that proceeded on an individual basis.

In response to the Court‟s order, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Consolidated 

Complaint on June 11, 2014. (ECF No. 423). In response to the Second Amended Consolidated 

Complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, motion to strike, and motion to amend or alter 

the order on class certification. (ECF Nos. 427, 428, 458). On August 29, 2014, the Court 

amended its order on class certification to reflect that the only claims proceeding on a class basis 

are the claims related to late meal breaks, that the prerequisites for class actions set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 apply to Plaintiff‟s claims under California‟s Private 

Attorney Generals Act, and that only the PAGA claims based upon late meal breaks may proceed 

on a class-wide, representative basis. (ECF No. 487). 

On October 29, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the class certification order. 

(ECF No. 501). On December 16, 2014, the Court partially granted Plaintiffs‟ motion to amend 

the Court‟s order on class certification and included a certified Underpaid Meal Premiums Class 

and associated claims for underpaid meal premiums. 

Underpaid Meal Premiums Class: 

All persons who work or worked as a non-exempt, hourly-paid 

employee at a corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurant in California 

who, between September 7, 2003, until November 12, 2007, 

received at least one 30-minute automatic adjustment on Taco

Bell‟s Time and Attendance System as reflected in Defendants‟ 

employees‟ time records. 

Rest Break Class: 

All persons who work or worked as a non-exempt, hourly-paid 

employee at a corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurant in California 

from September 7, 2003, until the resolution of this lawsuit, who 

worked for a period of time in excess of six hours and less than 

seven hours without at least two rest periods of not less than ten 

minutes, as reflected in Defendants‟ employees‟ time records.

(Order Granting in Part Motion to Amend Order on Certification 14:12-26).

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

On December 30, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint. (ECF No. 522). 

In connection with the instant decertification motions, the Court is presented with and 

considers evidence originally produced in support of and opposition to the motion for 

certification and additional evidence provided post-certification. 

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND DECERTIFICATION

A. Class Decertification 

Motions to decertify a class are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(C), 

which states:

(C) Altering or Amending the Order. An order that grants or 

denies class certification may be altered or amended before final 

judgment. 

In deciding whether to decertify a class, a court may consider “subsequent developments 

in the litigation.” Gen. Tel. Co. of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 

L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). However, “actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains ... 

indispensable.” Id. 

The standard is the same for class decertification as it is with class certification: a district 

court must be satisfied that the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) are met to allow plaintiffs to 

maintain the action on a representative basis. Marlo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 639 F.3d 942, 

947 (9th Cir. 2011); see also O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 404, 410 

(C.D.Cal.2000) (in evaluating whether to decertify the class, the court applies the same standard 

used in deciding whether to certify the class in the first place). A motion to decertify a class is 

not governed by the standard applied to motions for reconsideration. Ballard v. Equifax Check 

Serv., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 593 n. 6 (E.D.Cal.1999) (“Because the court has the power to alter 

or amend the previous class certification order under Rule 23(c)(1), the court need not consider 

whether „reconsideration‟ is also warranted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) or [local rules governing 

reconsideration].”). Likewise, Plaintiff, as “[t]he party seeking class certification[,] bears the 

burden of demonstrating that the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) are met.” Marlo, 639 F.3d 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

at 947; United Steel Workers v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d at 807.

B. Class Certification 

To qualify for class certification, Plaintiff must satisfy all of the requirements of Rule 

23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). 

Rule 23(a) requires: (1) impracticability of joinder due to numerosity; (2) commonality of 

questions of law or fact; (3) typicality of claims; and (4) adequacy of representation. 

Numerosity requires that the class be so numerous that joinder of all members 

individually is “impracticable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). No specific numerical threshold is 

required; each case must be examined. General Tel.C. v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). 

Generally, 40 or more members will satisfy the numerosity requirement. Consolidated Rail 

Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2nd Cir. 1995). 

Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

23(a)(2). This requirement has been construed permissively; not all questions of law and fact 

need to be common. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). “However, 

it is insufficient to merely allege any common question.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 

F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011). Commonality is usually satisfied by a “common nucleus of 

operative facts.” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1992). The Ninth 

Circuit held that “a common contention need not be the one „that will be answered, on the merits, 

in favor of the class.‟ It only „must be of such a nature that is capable of classwide resolution.” 

Alcantar v. Hobart Service, 800 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 

v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011); Amgen, 133 S.Ct. at 1191). 

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] 

typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” In General Tele. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 

457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13 (1982), the Court noted “[t]he commonality and typicality requirements 

of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” Under Rule 23(a)(3)‟s permissive standard, “representative claims 

are typical if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not 

be substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. A named plaintiffs‟ claim is “typical” 

under Rule 23 if it arises “from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the claims of the other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” 

Ballard v. Equifax Check Services, 186 F.R.D. 589, 595 (E.D.Cal. 1999).

Finally, the person representing the class must be able “fairly and adequately to protect 

the interests” of all members in the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). The representation is 

“adequate” if the attorney representing the class is qualified and competent and the class 

representatives are not disqualified by interests antagonistic to the remainder of the class. 

Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 597, 512 (9th Cir. 1978).

If an action meets the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the party seeking class certification 

must show the action is appropriate under Rule 23(b). Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 

591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Rule 23(b)(3) provides for certification when 

“the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”

Common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions, satisfying the 

first component of the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry, where “the issues in the class action that are subject 

to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole, ... predominate over those issues 

that are subject only to individualized proof.” Ortega v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 

361, 366 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. (In re Visa 

Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.), 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2001)). In evaluating predominance, 

the Court looks to whether the focus of the proposed class action will be on the words and 

conduct of the defendants rather than on the behavior of the individual class members. Id. 

“Considering whether „questions of law or fact common to class members predominate‟ begins, 

of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action.” Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 

655 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 131 

S.Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011)). A plaintiff can satisfy the superiority requirement when he or she can 

show that the “class-wide litigation of common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote 

greater efficiency.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996).

\ \ \

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek to decertify all three of the certified classes. Defendants present two 

arguments as to why the motions for decertification should be granted. First, Defendants assert 

that Plaintiffs fail to meet the commonality requirement, because the issues of law and fact that 

Plaintiffs said would establish liability do not actually exist. Second, Defendants assert that 

named Plaintiffs Medlock, Hardiman, and Leyva are not typical of the class they seek to 

represent. Defendants do not challenge numerosity and adequacy, so the Court will not address 

these elements in this order. The Court will first address typicality.

A. Typicality

Defendants argue that Hardiman, Medlock, and Leyva are not typical of the class that 

they seek to represent. However, they were non-exempt employees of Defendants during the 

time period of the class. Although these three named Plaintiffs may not have been aware of the 

alleged uniform policy that employees had to work five hours before taking a meal period, this 

does not mean that they are not typical of the class. A named plaintiffs‟ claim is “typical” under 

Rule 23 if it arises “from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the 

claims of the other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” 

Ballard v. Equifax Check Services, 186 F.R.D. 589, 595 (E.D.Cal. 1999). According to 

Plaintiffs‟ allegations, Hardiman, Medlock, and Leyva were still subject to Defendants‟ policies 

for meal period and rest break scheduling. Therefore, Hardiman, Medlock, and Leyva are typical 

of the class that they seek to represent even if they personally were not aware of the alleged 

uniform policy that employees had to work five hours before taking a meal period. The Court 

next reviews each class separately to determine if each class meets the commonality requirement

of Rule 23(a)(2) and the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 

B. Late Meal Break Claim

Plaintiffs allege that California law requires meal breaks to be given prior to the fifth 

hour of work and that Defendants‟ official meal break policy violated California law because 

they provided for meal breaks after the fifth hour of work. 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Plaintiffs seek liability with respect to this claim under California Labor Code sections 

226.7 and 512.

Section 512 states, in pertinent part:

(a) An employer may not employ an employee for a work 

period of more than five hours per day without providing the 

employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except 

that if the total work period per day of the employee is no more 

than six hours, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent 

of both the employer and employee....

Cal. Labor Code § 512.

Section 226.7 states, in pertinent part:

(b) An employer shall not require an employee to work during 

a meal or rest or recovery period mandated pursuant to an 

applicable statute, or applicable regulation, standard, or order of 

the Industrial Welfare Commission, the Occupational Safety and 

Health Standards Board, or the Division of Occupational Safety 

and Health.

(c) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal or rest 

or recovery period in accordance with a state law, including but not 

limited to, an applicable statute or applicable regulation, standard, 

or order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the Occupational 

Safety and Health Standards Board, or the Division of 

Occupational Safety and Health, the employer shall pay the 

employee one additional hour of pay at the employee‟s regular rate 

of compensation for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery 

period is not provided.

Cal. Labor Code § 226.7.

The Industrial Welfare Commission‟s (“IWC”) Wage Order No. 5 applies to restaurant 

workers such as Plaintiffs. Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1027 

n.7 (2012). Subdivision 11 of Wage Order No. 5 states:

11. Meal Periods

(A) No employer shall employ any person for a work period of more than five (5) 

hours without a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that when a work 

period of not more than six (6) hours will complete the day‟s work the meal 

period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and employee....

Wage Order 5-02 Wages, Hours and Working Conditions in the Public Housekeeping Industry, 

http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/wageorder5_010102.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2015). Under Section 

512 and Wage Order No. 5, a first meal period must be given no later than the start of an 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

employee‟s sixth hour of work. Brinker Restaurant Corp., 53 Cal. 4th at 1041.

“[A]n employer‟s obligation when providing a meal period is to relieve its employee of 

all duty for an uninterrupted 30-minute period.” Brinker Restaurant Corp., 53 Cal. 4th at 1038. 

However, employers do not have any duty to ensure that employees do no work during meal 

periods. Id. “Proof an employer had knowledge of employees working through meal periods 

will not alone subject the employer to liability for premium pay; employees cannot manipulate 

the flexibility granted them be employers to use their breaks as they see fit to generate such 

liability. On the other hand, an employer may not undermine a formal policy of providing meal 

breaks by pressuring employees to perform their duties in ways that omit breaks.” Id. at 1040.

In order to establish commonality, Plaintiffs‟ point to language in Defendants‟ “Hourly 

Employee Guide” which states:

 Meal Periods

 you are required to take a full 30-minute, uninterrupted, 

meal period after 5 hours of work

 unless 6 hours completes your work day

(Theriault Decl., Ex. G, at pg. 5.)

Plaintiffs point to meal break matrixes and wallet cards in support of their interpretation 

of Defendants‟ policy. The “Required Rest Breaks and Meal Periods” document presents the 

following table:

Length of Work Period Paid Rest Breaks 30 Minute Meal Periods

0-2:59 hours 0 0

3-4:59 hours ONE: 10 minute rest break 0

5-5:59 hours ONE: 10 minute rest break ONE: 30 minute meal period

6-6:59 hours ONE: 10 minute rest break ONE: 30 minute meal period

7-9:59 hours TWO: 10 minute rest breaks ONE: 30 minute meal period

10-10:59 hours TWO: 10 minute rest breaks TWO: 30 minute meal periods

11-13:59 hours THREE: 10 minute rest breaks TWO: 30 minute meal periods

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

(Theriault Decl., Ex. I, at pg. 15.)

The “wallet card” presents a similar table:

Hours Worked 10 Minute Paid Rest Breaks 30 Minute Meal Periods

3-4:59 hours ONE 0

5-5:59 hours ONE ONE1

6-6:59 hours ONE ONE

7-9:59 hours TWO ONE

10-10:59 hours TWO TWO

11-13:59 hours THREE TWO

(Theriault Decl., Ex. H.)

Defendants argue that the matrix is not a uniform policy to provide meal periods only 

after five hours of work and it was not consistently applied in the way that Plaintiffs propose. 

Defendants also argue that they use the “2-2-2” mnemonic for rest and meal breaks, instead of 

the matrix. 

Defendant cites to Ordonez v. Radio Shack, Inc., 2013 WL 210223 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 

2013), and Cummings v. Starbucks, 2014 WL (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014). In Ordonez v. Radio 

Shack, Inc., 2013 WL 210223 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013), the plaintiff did not argue that 

defendant‟s written policy did not comply with California law. Plaintiff‟s argued that they were 

entitled to relief because of “the existence of de facto „uniform‟ policies that deprive putative 

class members of the ability to take the statutorily prescribed meal breaks; and second, statistical 

evidence that demonstrates that over half of all putative class members „experienced significant 

meal break violations throughout the class period.‟” The instant case is distinguishable from 

Ordonez, because the Plaintiffs here point to the written “Hourly Employee Guide,” including 

the Meal Period Matrix, as Defendants‟ policy. Plaintiffs have submitted evidence to show the 

 

1 The “Matrix” contains a note that indicates that “[i]f six hours completes the day, the employee may elect to forego 

the meal period.”

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

existence of a common policy that is communicated to all putative class members, and is 

applicable to all putative class members. The policy is part of training materials provided to all 

putative class members. 

Defendants argue that the statistical evidence does not support that Defendants have a 

uniform or consistent policy of illegally providing meal periods only after the completion of five 

hours of work. Defendants argue that “Dr. Walker has determined that the data reflects 87.5% of 

all shifts over six hours have a meal period punch before the end of the fifth hour (or are 

accounted for by a premium payment for a meal period penalty or an on-duty meal period 

agreement).” (ECF No. 543 at 25.) In Dr. Walker‟s report, he states:

32. Based on the methodology discussed above, I identified 

9,311,285 shifts worked by non- exempt employees at corporateowned Taco Bell restaurants between September 16, 2003 and 

December 24, 2014 as reflected in Taco Bell‟s raw punch data. Of 

these 9.3 million shifts, 6,570,205 shifts were longer than six 

hours. Thus 2,741,080 shifts, approximately 29%, were six hours 

or less.

33. Out of the 6,570,205 shifts lasting longer than six hours 

and worked by non-exempt employees at corporate-owned Taco 

Bell restaurants, 4,058,730 shifts, approximately 62%, included an 

unpaid break of at least 30 minutes (a meal period) that 

commenced before completion of the first five hours of work. Thus

there were 2,511,475 shifts, or 38% of shifts at least six hours long, 

lacking a recorded, unpaid meal period that commenced before the 

end of the fifth hour of work.

34. Out of the 2,511,475 shifts lacking a timely, recorded, 

unpaid meal period, 888,694 were worked by managers who were 

parties to on-duty meal period agreements.

22 After deducting these 

shifts, 1,622,781 shifts remain. These 1.6 million shifts represent 

shifts over six hours worked at corporate-owned Taco Bell 

restaurants by non-exempt employees, other than managers subject 

to on-duty meal agreements, which shifts do not include a 

recorded, unpaid break of 30 minutes or longer that commenced 

prior to the end of the fifth hour of work.

35. Of these remaining 1.6 million shifts, 141,938 were 

graveyard shifts, i.e., shifts starting between 8 PM and 4 AM.23I 

understand that Taco Bell entered into on-duty meal period 

agreements with its non-exempt employees for work on graveyard 

shifts. After deducting shifts that were shorter than six hours, shifts 

that included a qualifying unpaid meal period, shifts worked by 

managers subject to on-duty meal agreements and graveyard shifts 

also subject to on-duty meal agreements, 1,480,843 shifts remain.

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

36. Of these 1,480, 843 shifts, 377,355 included a paid break 

30 minutes or longer and commencing prior to the end of the fifth 

hour of work. After deducting these shifts having paid breaks 

lasting 30 minutes or longer, 1,103,488 shifts remain. I understand 

that it is Taco Bell‟s position that only these 1,103,488 shifts are 

even potentially eligible for a late meal period violation under 

California law. These 1,103,488 shifts represent only 16.8% of all 

shifts lasting six hours or longer worked by non-exempt employees 

at corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurants as reflected in Taco 

Bell‟s raw punch data. 114,496 of these 1,103,488 shifts had a 

meal period that was late by ten minutes or less. Deducting these 

114,496 shifts that were late by 10 minutes or less, 988,992 shifts 

remain.

37. Many of these 988,992 shifts are shifts in which there was 

no recorded meal period at all. I understand that Taco Bell had a 

practice and policy of “Auto-Paying” an hour of wages for eligible 

shifts occurring on or after November 13, 2007 in which no meal 

period was recorded.

24

 My review of the PVR‟s pertaining to Lisa 

Hardiman, Sandrika Medlock, Miriam Leyva and Loraine Naranjo 

confirms that they were paid an hour‟s wages for eligible shifts 

after November 13, 2007 in which no meal period was recorded.

After deducting the 164,922 shifts which should have been 

autopaid, as well as making the other adjustments above related to 

shifts lasting six hours or less, shifts with timely meal periods and 

shifts worked pursuant to on-period meal agreements, 824,070 

shifts remain in which an eligible meal period was recorded more 

than 10 minutes late.

24 See, e.g., Exhibit 1004 to the Deposition of Taco Bell Corp., 

Tawanda Starms, August 19, 2008 (TBMED000012402-404.

(Walker Report, ¶¶ 32-37.)

Dr. Walker‟s calculation that 87.5% of meal period punches are timely or otherwise 

lawful, takes into account on-duty meal period agreements, shifts where the employee received 

an auto pay, and meal periods that were late by less than ten minutes. There were 6,570,205 

shifts lasting longer than six hours and worked by non-exempt employees. Dr. Walker 

calculated that 1, 030, 632 shifts were over six hours long by non-exempt employees who were 

parties to on-duty meal period agreements. Therefore, there were actually only 5,466,744 shifts 

by non-exempt employees that were longer than six hours by employees not subject to on-duty 

meal period agreements. Dr. Walker identified 1, 103, 461 shifts lasting longer than six hours 

and worked by non-exempt employees that had late meal period punches, including those that 

were late by less than ten minutes. Therefore, based on Dr. Walker‟s calculations, of the nonCase 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

exempt employees who were not a party to an on-duty meal period agreement, punched out for a 

meal period before the end of the fifth hour, 74.2% of the shifts indicated a legally compliant 

unpaid meal period. 

The Court finds that the wording of the “Hourly Employee Guide” is persuasive evidence 

which supports Plaintiffs‟ claim that it was Defendants‟ policy that meal breaks were not to be 

given until after the fifth hour of work. The Court also acknowledges the language in Brinker, 

where the California Supreme Court stated that employer liability with respect to a class of 

employees may be premised on a uniform policy which violates California wage and hour law. 

Class-wide liability regarding a policy, which was equally applicable to all employees, could be 

established through common proof if plaintiffs could demonstrate that the policy did not comply 

with California law. Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1033. 

In this case, Plaintiffs‟ allegations about Defendants‟ meal policy presents a common 

contention capable of classwide resolution. Rule 23 only requires Plaintiffs to establish the 

existence of a common contention capable of classwide resolution- the determination of its truth 

or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 

stroke. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551. “Plaintiffs need not show that every 

question in the case, or even a preponderance of questions, is capable of classwide resolution. 

So long as there is „even a single common question,‟ a would-be class can satisfy the 

commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 

544 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Here, Plaintiffs have identified a common issue that establishes liability. Although 

Defendants have presented compelling evidence that the “Hourly Employee Guide,” the 

“Matrix,” and the “Wallet Card” did not reflect the official policy on the timing of meal breaks, 

and that the 2-2-2 methodology was used instead, the record is still susceptible to the 

interpretation presented by Plaintiffs. The Defendants‟ written policy documents appear to 

suggest that Defendants did not authorize a meal break before the end of the fifth hour for a shift 

over six hours whereas California law requires a meal break before the end of the fifth hour of a 

shift that is longer than six hours. See Cal. Labor Code § 226.7. The Plaintiffs have presented a 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

common issue regarding the legality of Defendants‟ policy pertaining to meal breaks for 

employees with shifts over six hours in length. The Court also finds that Rule 23(b) is met for 

this claim, because questions common to the members of the class predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members and a class action is a superior method for 

resolution of the controversy. The Court does not find that this class is unmanageable, because 

as stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented that there are common proofs of 

liability. Therefore, the Court finds that the meal break class is properly certified.

C. Underpaid Meal Period Premium Class

In its December 16, 2014 order amending the Court‟s order on class certification, the 

Court found:

Here, Taco Bell‟s automatic meal premium payment system 

presents a common contention capable of classwide resolution. 

Plaintiffs contend that the automatic payment system generally

underpaid employees because it paid only a half-hour‟s worth of 

pay when California law requires a full hour‟s worth of pay. The 

fact that, hypothetically, some undefined number of employees 

were not entitled to any meal premium pay does not defeat class 

certification, as under Wang, Plaintiffs need not show that every

question in the case is capable of classwide resolution. 

Significantly, the evidence in the record does not suggest that 

number of employees who were erroneously paid meal premiums 

is substantial. Further, even the meal break class that was certified 

in this action suffers from the same issue: the time records may be 

inaccurate and include employees who actually received timely 

meal breaks even though the time records suggest otherwise.

The record contains no indication that improperly recorded meal 

periods were a significant problem in Defendants‟ time records. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that it was erroneous to deny 

certification on such a hypothetical possibility. The fact that 

Defendants‟ policy erroneously provided for a half-hour‟s worth of 

pay for meal premiums when it should have been a full hour‟s 

worth of pay presents a sufficient issue to meet the commonality 

requirement of Rule 23. Accordingly, the Court will amend its 

order on class certification to include a claim brought on behalf of 

the Underpaid Meal Period Premium Subclass.

(ECF No. 520 at 7:3-20.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have common proof to give any particular 

meaning to a late meal period punch. Defendants present the same arguments that they presented 

in opposition to Plaintiffs‟ motion to amend the Court‟s order on class certification. The Court 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

again does not find persuasive Defendants‟ arguments on this issue. 

Plaintiffs‟ allegations about Defendants‟ automatic meal premium payment system 

present a common contention capable of classwide resolution. Plaintiffs contend that the 

automatic payment system generally underpaid employees for meal premiums because it paid 

only a half-hour‟s worth of pay when California law requires a full hour‟s worth of pay. As 

stated in the Court‟s December 16, 2014 order amending certification, the fact that the time 

records may be inaccurate and include employees who actually received timely meal breaks even 

though the time records suggest otherwise does not preclude this claim from being certified. 

As stated above, Rule 23 only requires Plaintiffs to establish the existence of a common 

contention capable of classwide resolution- the determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an 

issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 

v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551. The Plaintiffs have presented a common issue regarding the legality 

of Defendants‟ policy erroneously providing for a half-hour‟s worth of pay for meal premiums 

when it should have been a full hour‟s worth of pay. The Court also finds that Rule 23(b) is met 

for this claim, because questions common to the members of the class predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members and a class action is a superior method for 

resolution of the controversy. The focus of the action will be on the conduct of the Defendants 

and their policy as opposed to the conduct of individual class members. The Court does not find 

that this class is unmanageable, because as stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have 

presented that there are common proofs of liability on this claim. Therefore, the Court finds that 

the underpaid meal period premium class is properly certified. 

D. Rest Break Class

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants‟ rest break policy only allowed for one 10 minute rest 

break for employees working more than six, but less than seven, hours of work. Plaintiffs 

contend that California law requires two 10 minute rest breaks for such shifts.

In the December 16, 2014 order amending the Court‟s order on class certification, the 

Court stated:

Defendants failed to persuasively demonstrate that any defects in 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

record keeping was fatal to the maintenance of a class action. 

Plaintiffs adequately demonstrated that the proposed class 

definition was ascertainable. Irrespective of isolated inaccuracies 

in the records, the class definition relied upon precise, objective, 

and presently ascertainable criteria, namely 1) employees, 2) who 

worked shifts between 6 and 6:59 hours, 3) without 2 recorded rest 

breaks.

Alternatively, Defendants argue that the rest break claims are not 

amenable to class treatment because the time records are 

insufficient to establish liability because they do not indicate why 

rest breaks were missed. While this may be true, Plaintiffs‟ have 

identified a common issue that establishes liability. Much like 

Plaintiffs‟ theory of liability with respect to meal breaks, 

Defendants‟ written policy documents appear to suggest that 

Defendants did not authorize a second rest break in some 

circumstances where California law requires a second rest break. 

Taco Bell‟s “Required Rest Break and Meal Period Matrix” 

appears to indicate that employees who worked shifts between “6-

6:59 hours” only received one 10 minute rest break. (See Decl. of 

Matthew T. Theriault in Supp. of Pls.‟ Mot. to Amend Class Cert. 

Order Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(C) or, in the Alt., Mot. for Recon. 

of the Order Denying Class Cert., Ex. E, at pg. 6 and Ex. G, at pg. 

16, ECF No. 501.2.) California law requires two 10 minute rest 

breaks for shifts more than six hours up to ten hours. Brinker 

Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1029 (2012).

As discussed above, a single common question can suffice to 

satisfy Rule 23‟s commonality requirement. Wang v. Chinese 

Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 544 (9th Cir. 2013). The rest 

break matrixes present a significant common question regarding 

the legality of Defendants‟ policy pertaining to rest breaks given to 

employees who work shifts between 6 to 6:59 hours in length. 

Accordingly, the Court will amend the order on class certification 

to certify a Rest Break Class.

(ECF No. 520 at 13:1-25.) 

Defendants argue that the statistics show that the statistical evidence does not support that 

Defendants have a uniform and consistently applied policy of not authorizing and permitting 

such breaks. Defendants argue that approximately 65% of the time, employees punched out for a 

second paid rest break on shifts over six hours and less than seven hours. However, it is clear 

that Defendants‟ written policy documents, including the matrix, appear to suggest that 

Defendants did not authorize a second rest break in some circumstances where California law 

requires a second rest break. Taco Bell‟s “Required Rest Break and Meal Period Matrix” 

appears to indicate that employees who worked shifts between “6-6:59 hours” only received one 

10 minute rest break. 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Here, Defendants‟ written policy documents appear to suggest that Defendants did not 

authorize a second rest break in some circumstances where California law requires a second rest 

break. As stated above, a single common question can suffice to satisfy Rule 23‟s commonality 

requirement. Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d at 544. The rest break matrix and 

other written materials present a common question regarding the legality of Defendants‟ policy 

pertaining to rest breaks given to employees who work shifts between 6 and 6:59 hours in length. 

The Court also finds that Rule 23(b) is met for this claim, because questions common to the 

members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and a 

class action is a superior method for resolution of the controversy. The Court does not find that 

this class is unmanageable, because as stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented 

that there are common proofs of liability and the classwide litigation will promote greater 

efficiency. The focus of the action will be on the conduct of the Defendants and their policy as 

opposed to the conduct of individual class members. Therefore, the Court finds that the rest 

break class is properly certified. 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants‟ motion to decertify the classes is denied as the 

Plaintiffs have shown that certification on the late meal break class, rest break class, and 

underpaid meal premium class is warranted. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERD that Defendants‟ motion to decertify the class is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 11, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 572 Filed 12/11/15 Page 17 of 17