Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_94-cv-01665/USCOURTS-caed-2_94-cv-01665-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO ESPINOZA,

NO. CIV. S-94-1665 LKK/DAD

Petitioner,

v.

O R D E R

STEVEN ORNOSKI,

Respondent.

 /

Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to reconsider

the Magistrate Judge’s March 3, 2006 order, granting petitioner’s

request for leave to file a second amended writ of habeas corpus

petition to include two new claims, the proposed Twenty-first and

Twenty-second claims for relief. Respondent explains that it does

not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s order granting the request for

leave to amend, but does “object to the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion within the order that petitioner’s claim under Atkins

is exhausted.” Mot. to Reconsider at 6. I cannot agree. Having

reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s Order (“Mag. Order”), respondent’s

motion to reconsider must be DENIED.

Case 2:94-cv-01665-KJM-SCR Document 227 Filed 09/06/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

I. MOTION TO RECONSIDER STANDARDS

The standard employed by the district court in reviewing

decisions of the magistrate judge depends upon the character of the

underlying decision. Non-dispositive pre-trial motions referred to

the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) are

reviewed under a clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,

673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). On the other hand, a

magistrate judge's determination concerning matters referred

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) are for the most part reviewed

de novo. Thus, the district court reviews de novo those portions

of the proposed findings of fact to which objection has been made,

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore

Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.1981), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 920, 102 S.Ct. 1277 (1982), and the magistrate

judge's conclusions of law. Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518

(9th Cir. 1989) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist.,

708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court may, however, assume

the correctness of that portion of the proposed findings of fact

to which no objection has been made and decide the motion on

applicable law. See United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617

(9th Cir.1989)(citing Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208

(9th Cir.1979)).

II.

 DISCUSSION

This matter is before the court because respondent asserts

Case 2:94-cv-01665-KJM-SCR Document 227 Filed 09/06/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that petitioner’s

Atkins claim is exhausted. The procedural background of this case

is somewhat complicated, and because the Magistrate Judge’s order

sets forth this background, no purpose is served by repeating it

here. See Order at 2-4. I turn only to respondent’s insistence

that petitioner failed to exhaust his Atkins claim before the

California Supreme Court and repeat only those facts that are

necessary to the adjudication of this motion. 

As explained by petitioner, within one year of the Supreme

Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002),

petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, asserting a claim under Atkins, along

with a claim challenging the constitutionality of certain penalty

phase jury instructions regarding aggravating circumstances and a

claim that his conviction and sentence of death were obtained in

violation of international law. See Mag. Order at 3. The

California Supreme Court denied that motion by order filed June 29,

2005. The Supreme Court’s Order stated in its entirety:

The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on June 19,

2003, is denied. 

Each claim is denied on the merits for failure to state a

prima facie case for relief.

The denial as to Claim I (Atkins v. Virginia)(2002)(536 U.S.

304) is without prejudice to filing a new petition and

supporting documentation to comply with the requirements of

In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40.

///

Case 2:94-cv-01665-KJM-SCR Document 227 Filed 09/06/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The Ninth Circuit noted that “in the context of procedural 1

default, the [Supreme] Court recognized a presumption in favor of

federal habeas jurisdiction when a state court’s decision is

ambiguous...” Greene, 288 F.3d at 1087 n. 4 (citing Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)). Citing Coleman, the appellate

court explained that “unless a state court clearly and expressly

4

Based on this language, respondent argues that petitioner has not

exhausted all available state court remedies because “the

California Supreme Court has not been given the required fair

opportunity to correct the constitutional violation.” Mot. to

Reconsider at 5-6. Respondent maintains that petitioner “retains

the right under state law to return to state court and properly

plead a case of cruel and unusual punishment based on his mental

retardation within the meaning of Atkins.” Id. at 6. Respondent’s

argument does not lie. 

As the Magistrate Judge pointed out in his order, the Circuit

made clear in Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir.

1974) that an ambiguity of this character is a decision on the

merits. In Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002),

the Ninth Circuit further explained than when faced with “cryptic”

opinions issued by a state supreme court, particularly “so-called

postcard denial[s],” courts must construe a “bare postcard denial

from the California Supreme Court as a decision on the merits, for

purposes of the exhaustion requirement, unless that court expressly

relied on a procedural bar” (citing Harris, supra). The court held

that although a state supreme court’s decision may be ambiguous,

the Ninth Circuit has “adopted a plausible construction that it

acted on the merits of a claim presented to it.” Id. 

1

Case 2:94-cv-01665-KJM-SCR Document 227 Filed 09/06/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

relies on an independent and adequate state ground, a federal court

may address the merits of the habeas petition.” Id.

5

Given the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harris and Greene, the

Magistrate Judge correctly noted that the California Supreme

Court’s order that “[e]ach claim is denied on such merits for

failure to state a prima facie case for relief is compelling with

respect to exhaustion...” Mag. Order at 7 (internal quotations

omitted). As noted previously, on a motion to reconsider, a

magistrate judge's order is reviewed by this court under a clearly

erroneous or contrary to law standard. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A); Local Rule 72-303(f); United States v. Raddatz, 447

U.S. 667, 673 (1980). Respondent has failed to demonstrate to this

court that “clear error” has been committed by the magistrate judge

or that there are some changed circumstances which warrant this

court's reconsideration of the matter. 

Accordingly, respondent’s motion to reconsider must be DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 5, 2006.

Case 2:94-cv-01665-KJM-SCR Document 227 Filed 09/06/06 Page 5 of 5