Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00455/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00455-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Veronica O. Wolfchief, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J. Astrue, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-12-0455-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Veronica O. Wolfchief (“Plaintiff” or 

“the claimant”) seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision finding her not 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. For the reasons that follow the 

Court will deny Plaintiff’s appeal. 

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income in April 2010. Doc. 14 at 2. She alleged that she was disabled as a result of 

multiple conditions beginning on February 1, 2009. Doc. 17 at 2. Her applications were 

twice denied and upon further review an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an 

opinion that she was not disabled. Id. That decision was ratified and became the 

Commissioner’s final decision. Doc. 14 at 3. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 Defendant=s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

Case 2:12-cv-00455-DGC Document 18 Filed 11/27/12 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence= means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If there is sufficient evidence 

to support the Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. Analysis. 

 For purposes of Social Security benefits determinations, a disability is 

the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. 

 Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a sequential five-step 

evaluation process. The claimant must show (1) he is not currently engaged in 

substantial gainful employment, (2) he has a severe physical or mental impairment, and 

(3) the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) precludes him from performing his past work. If at any step the 

Commissioner determines that a claimant is or is not disabled, the analysis ends; 

otherwise it proceeds to step five. If the claimant establishes his burden through step 

four, the Commissioner bears the burden at step five of showing that the claimant has the 

RFC to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from 

her alleged disability onset date through the date of his decision. Tr. at 20. At step two, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from lupus, hypertension, hepatitis C, carpal tunnel 

syndrome, and lumbar degenerative disc disease which in combination were severe 

Case 2:12-cv-00455-DGC Document 18 Filed 11/27/12 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

within the meaning of the regulations. Tr. at 20. At step three, the ALJ found that the 

combination of impairments did not meet or equal one of the listed impairments. Tr. at 

22; see C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. The ALJ discounted medical opinions of two 

treating physicians and determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to 

perform “light work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with some 

additional limitations. With those limitations, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had sufficient 

residual capacity to perform her past relevant work as a cashier. Tr. at 22-26. Because 

he found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work, the ALJ concluded that 

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. at 22-26.

 Plaintiff challenges the conclusions of the ALJ on two grounds. First, she contends 

that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of two doctors that testified she was 

substantially more limited than the ALJ concluded. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ 

improperly discounted her subjective testimony. The Court will consider each argument 

in turn. 

 A. Medical Opinion of Dr. Onisile. 

 Dr. Olu Onisile is one of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. While the “ALJ must 

consider all medical opinion evidence,” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 

Cir. 2008), “[t]he medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is entitled to ‘special 

weight,’” Rodriquez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988)). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating 

or examining physician by making “‘findings setting forth specific legitimate reasons for 

doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 

F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “The ALJ can meet this burden by 

setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical 

evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. (internal citation 

omitted). Furthermore, where the treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by 

another physician, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the opinion must be “clear and 

convincing.” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989); see Lewis v. Apfel, 

Case 2:12-cv-00455-DGC Document 18 Filed 11/27/12 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

236 F.3d 503, 517 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n ALJ may reject a treating doctor’s medical 

opinion, if no other doctor has contradicted it, only for ‘clear and convincing’ reasons 

supported by substantial evidence.”) (citing Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725). 

 Dr. Onisile has met with Plaintiff once a month since June 24, 2009. Tr. at 518. 

The ALJ considered Dr. Onisile’s treatment notes (Tr. at 402-39, 462-73, 534-63), a note 

Dr. Onisile wrote on February 15, 2010 (Tr. at 513), and the Multiple Impairment 

Questionnaire form that Dr. Onisile submitted on September 17, 2010 (Tr. at 518-25). 

The ALJ noted Dr. Onisile’s opinion that Plaintiff’s multiple conditions cause her 

considerable pain and physical limitations. Tr. at 24. Dr. Onisile concluded his note with 

his opinion that Plaintiff could not work for at least the next year. Tr. at 513. In the 

questionnaire, Dr. Onisile reported that Plaintiff suffered from chronic pain that was 

constant and limited her to sitting for one to two hours and standing or walking for less 

than one hour during an eight hour workday. Tr. at 520. It also stated that Plaintiff was 

markedly limited in her ability to use her hands and was “incapable of even low stress 

jobs.” Tr. at 522-23. 

 The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Onisile’s opinion because “it heavily favors 

the claimant’s subjective complaints and is inconsistent with the objective findings, other 

opinion evidence and the record as a whole, including Dr. Onisile’s own treatment 

notes.” Tr. at 25. The ALJ engaged in a fairly detailed analysis of the treatment notes 

and the reports from the objective tests. Tr. 23-25. The ALJ cited extensively from the 

record and found that the treatment notes “repeatedly and consistently report the claimant 

is ‘stable’ and ‘ambulatory,’ with ‘no change’ in her condition and with ‘within normal 

limits’ physical examinations.” Tr. at 23. The ALJ noted that claimant reported a “0” on 

a “1-10” pain scale in September 2009 (Tr. at 265) and that the record contains an April 

2009 note of a reported decrease in back pain (Tr. at 386). 

 The ALJ also found evidence that the course of treatment was particularly 

conservative – mostly routine visits to refill prescriptions with a primary care physician – 

and opined that such a course of treatment does not seem consistent with the levels of 

Case 2:12-cv-00455-DGC Document 18 Filed 11/27/12 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

disability that Plaintiff claims and Dr. Onisile reported. Tr. at 24. Specifically, the ALJ 

identified a notation by Dr. Onisile that Plaintiff was “still not in to see hand surgeon or 

neurosurgeon,” (Tr. at 537), which the ALJ understood to imply that the condition was 

“not so severe as to warrant immediate surgical intervention, or the claimant’s attempt at 

pursuing additional methods of treatment.” Tr. at 24. The ALJ also found that the 

treatment notes confirm an unchanging regimen of medication and treatment which 

suggests that the regimen is effective. Tr. at 24. 

 The ALJ’s review of the reports of physical examinations and objective medical 

tests also buttressed his conclusion that Dr. Onisile’s ultimate conclusion was 

unsubstantiated. The ALJ cited objective tests that showed Plaintiff had only mild and 

moderate degenerative disc disease, mild distal sensory neuropathy, unremarkable results 

on hip X-rays, and no evidence of acute intracranial abnormality. Tr. at 360-64, 444, 

514-17, 544. Physical examinations revealed Plaintiff was “normal,” “within normal 

limits,” and “unremarkable.” Tr. at 478-500, 534-63, 567-82. Tests of muscles, gait, 

range of motion, sensory results, and deep tendon reflexes also produced normal or 

unremarkable results. Tr. at 478-500, 534-63, 567-82. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “cherry pick[ed] evidence in support of [his] own 

conclusions.” Doc. 14 at 10 (citing Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 

2001)). Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ should not have relied on the evidence of the 

“0” on the pain scale because the report was from an eye exam and not relevant to the 

alleged impairment. Doc. 14 at 16; Tr. at 265. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Dr. 

Onisile’s testimony does not conflict with the objective tests or medical records. Doc. 14 

at 10-11. 

 The ALJ may discount the opinion of a treating physician by “setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. This is precisely 

what the ALJ has done. While the ALJ failed to notice that one particular piece of 

evidence – the “0” on the pain scale – was reported at an eye exam, the majority of the 

Case 2:12-cv-00455-DGC Document 18 Filed 11/27/12 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

cited evidence remains unrefuted. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and comports with the Ninth Circuit’s requirements for 

discounting treating physician evidence. 

B. Medical Opinion of Dr. Wang.

 Dr. George Wang, M.D., was also a treating physician and the same legal 

standards apply to his opinion. In January 2011, Dr. Wang submitted a Multiple 

Impairment Questionnaire. Tr. 526-33. Dr. Wang opined that Plaintiff could sit for two 

hours and stand or walk for two hours during an eight hour workday. Tr. at 528. He also 

concluded that Plaintiff would benefit from a sit/stand option. Tr. at 528. Dr. Wang 

believed Plaintiff could occasionally lift up to twenty pounds and carry up to twenty 

pounds frequently, (Tr. at 529) and he ultimately concluded that Plaintiff was capable of 

low stress jobs. Tr. at 531. 

 The ALJ gave Dr. Wang’s opinion some weight. Tr. at 25. He accepted Dr. 

Wang’s conclusion that Plaintiff could only occasionally lift up to twenty pounds and 

would benefit from a sit/stand option. Tr. at 25. Those limitations were included in the 

residual functional capacity calculation. Tr. at 25. The ALJ found, however, that any 

additional limitations were not supported by the objective medical evidence. Tr. at 25. 

The ALJ found that Dr. Wang’s “conservative” and “routine” course of treatment was 

inconsistent with severe limitations. Tr. at 25. 

 The Court finds that the ALJ properly discounted portions of Dr. Wang’s 

testimony. As noted above, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed the objective medical evidence 

and the treatment notes. Tr. at 23-24. That review revealed substantial medical and 

clinical evidence that conflicted with some of Dr. Wang’s conclusions. “‘When there is 

conflicting medical evidence, the [ALJ] must determine credibility and resolve the 

conflict.’” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (quoting Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019). 

C. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints.

 The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to evaluate the credibility of a 

claimant’s subjective testimony. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

Case 2:12-cv-00455-DGC Document 18 Filed 11/27/12 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). If the claimant meets this first test, and there is no 

evidence of malingering, then the ALJ “can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ may consider 

at least the following factors when weighing the claimant=s credibility: the claimant=s 

reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in the claimant=s testimony or between 

her testimony and her conduct, the claimant=s daily activities, her work record, and 

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of 

the symptoms of which claimant complains. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (citing Light v. 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789,792 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

 At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did suffer from lupus, hypertension, 

hepatitis C, carpal tunnel syndrome, and lumbar degenerative disc disease. The ALJ 

concluded, however, that the “evidence indicates claimant’s impairments are not as 

severe or as limiting as alleged.” Tr. at 23. While “[p]ain of sufficient severity caused by 

a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormality’ may 

provide the basis for determining that a claimant is disabled,” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 

344-45), the ALJ concluded that the “record as constituted contains minimal, if any . . . 

supporting objective medical evidence.” Tr. at 23. 

 The ALJ then proceeded to the review of the treatment notes, test results, and 

physical exam records that the Court referenced above with regard to the rejection of Dr. 

Onisile’s medical opinion. The general tenor of those materials suggested that the 

Plaintiff’s impairment was mild to moderate. Tr. at 23-24. The conservative course of 

treatment and Plaintiff’s failure to see a surgeon suggested that Plaintiff’s condition was 

not as severe as she reported. Tr. at 24. 

Case 2:12-cv-00455-DGC Document 18 Filed 11/27/12 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ mischaracterized the record when he gave little 

weight to Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Doc. 14 at 16. As noted above, however, the 

ALJ engaged in a thorough review of the record and determined that Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints were not credible. The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for his 

conclusion. The treatment notes show Plaintiff receiving a steady course of conservative 

treatment over a period of years, and show her to be stable and ambulatory with largely 

normal physical exams. Tests performed showed either normal conditions or mild to 

moderate problems, and Plaintiff appears to have taken no steps to receive greater or 

different treatment as would be expected if she truly were suffering from debilitating 

symptoms as she now contends. The Court accordingly finds the ALJ’s conclusions to be 

supported by substantial evidence and that he did not error in discounting Plaintiff’s 

subjective testimony. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s appeal of the Commissioner’s decision is

denied. 

 Dated this 27th day of November, 2012. 

Case 2:12-cv-00455-DGC Document 18 Filed 11/27/12 Page 8 of 8