Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02659/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02659-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERRICK SATCHELL, et al.

Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDEX CORPORATION,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-02659 SI

No. C 03-02878 SI

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

CLASS CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs’ motion for class certificationis presently pending before the Court. Defendant has opposed

the motion. Having carefully considered the arguments of counseland the papers submitted, the Court hereby

GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion.

BACKGROUND

This action arises under Title VII ofthe CivilRights Act,42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq., (“FEHA”). Plaintiffs

allege that defendant FedEx Express (“FedEx” or “defendant”) discriminatesbased on race in (1) performance

evaluations, (2) promotion, (3) compensation, and (4) discipline throughout the Western Region. The Western

Region has four separate operations: Domestic Ground Operations (“DGO”), Air Ground Freight Services

(“AGFS”), Air Operations Division, and the Customer Call Centers. Plaintiffs’ proposed classes include

employees fromDGO and AGFS. AGFS performs ramp operations at airports and package sorting at major

sort facilities. DGO performs sort, delivery, and pick-up operations at local stations throughout the region.

Plaintiffs seek certification of a “Minority Employee Class” consisting ofAfrican-American and Latino

hourly employees in the following positions: Handler, Freight Handler, Material Handler, Checker-Sorter,

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Customer Service Agent, Courier, Swing Driver,Ramp Transport Driver (“RTD”), Ramp Area Driver, Shuttle

Driver, Dangerous Goods Agent, Information Agent, Operations Agent, Ramp Agent, Service Assurance

Agent, Truck Control Agent, Trace Representative, Input Auditor, TeamLeader, and Dispatcher. This class

seeks to prohibit defendant from (1) providing minority employees with disproportionately fewer promotions

to Checker/Sorter, Courier and other driving positions, and Operations Manager; (2) compensating minority

employeeslessforthe same work thansimilarly-situatednon-minoritycounterparts; and (3)discipliningminority

employees more frequently and more harshly than similarly-situated non-minority counterparts for the same

occurrences. 

In addition, plaintiffs propose a second class, the “African-American Lower-Level Manager Class,”

consisting of African-American managers below the Senior Manager level. This proposed class challenges

defendant’s alleged practices of compensating African-American lower-level managers less than their nonminority counterparts forthe same work, and disciplining suchmanagers more frequently and harshly than their

non-minority counterparts. 

According to plaintiffs, the effect of defendant’s discriminatory practices is thatthe highest percentage

of minority employees is in the lowest paid positions – hourly positions as Handler, Freight Handler, and

Material Handler – and the representation of minorities drops at each step up the promotions ladder. See

Statistical Analysis of Race and Ethnic Patterns in Federal Express Workforce by Richard Drogin, Ph.D.

(“Drogin Report”) ¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiffs allege thatFedEx has a culture of hostility towards minorities, and that

a lack of meaningful standards and monitoring allowsracial bias to infect performance evaluation, promotion,

compensation, and discipline decisions. 

With respect to promotion, plaintiffs allege discrimination in promoting employees from “casual” to

“permanent” status. Casual employees have the least job security of all FedEx employees. They also do not

have access to the FedEx intranet, including the on-line Job Change ApplicationTracking System(“JCATS”),

through which permanent employees apply for positions. As a result, promotions to permanent positions

allegedly take place through a “tap-on-the-shoulder” process. 

Plaintiffs also allege discrimination in promotion within the ranks of permanent employees. Plaintiffs

allege that the Basic Skills Test (“BST”), which an employee must pass to be promoted from Handler to

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Courier or other driving positions (the most common path), has a statistically significant adverse impact on

minorities, disqualifying almost two-thirds of African-Americans who apply for the Courier job.

In addition, plaintiffs allege discrimination in promoting employees to entry-level manager positions.

The Courier job is typically the stepping stone to the Operations Manager position, the first-line management

job. FedEx uses the “ASPIRE” program to select first-line managers, which involves one prerequisite class

and fourdevelopment classes. An employee cannot attend these classes without his or her manager’s approval.

Then, when applying for a manager position, a candidate receives “screening” scores based on several

evaluation tools (that plaintiffs allege have not been validated), and is ultimately subjected to an interview by

a panelselected by the hiring manager. The hiring manager is supposed to select the highest-scoring candidate,

but plaintiffs contend that managers do not always follow this rule to the detriment of African-American and

Latino applicants.

Plaintiffs also allege that defendant uses a discriminatory performance evaluation system that causes

under-promotion of minority employees. They have introduced evidence of a statistically significant disparity

in the evaluation of minority employees and white employees in the same jobs. According to plaintiffs, this

disparity is due to the use of subjective criteria (like “teamwork,” “professionalism,” and “neatness”) and the

lack of guidance given to managers to ensure that the subjective criteria are used in the same way by all

managers. Performance evaluations directly impact eligibility for promotion. In addition, an employee’s current

manager must approve the employee’s application for promotion, and managers have complete discretion to

approve or disapprove these applications, without explanation or review ofthese decisions. Among approved

applicants, FedEx policy requires that the promotion be givento the applicationwith the highest “CEV” score,

which is based on their time in service and their last two performance evaluation scores, but in practice hiring

managers may select lower ranked applicants. 

Defendant’s personnel policy provides that an employee with an active discipline warning letter or

performance reminder is not eligible for promotion. Warning letters and “online counselings” can also be taken

into account in performance reviews, and an unsatisfactory performance review automatically results in the

issuance of a performance reminder letter. Thus, discipline decisions and performance evaluations are

intertwined, and have a significant adverse impactonpromotionopportunities forminority employees. Plaintiffs

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contend thatminority employees are disciplined much more frequently than white employees. Drogin Rpt. ¶¶

53-55, Table 22. 

Compensation is determined by a formula tied to performance evaluations and, by implication, to

discipline. See People Manual § 3-10, Table 1. Plaintiffs contend that minority employees and lower level

managers are paid less than non-minorities, when accounting for seniority, part-time status, casual/permanent

status, job title, and facility. 

Plaintiffs do not allege that defendant’s personnel systemis “entirely subjective.” Rather, they contend

that while FedEx’s operations are uniform, centralized, and hierarchical, and its personnel policies are also

uniformacross the company, managers are givensignificant discretion in making the decisions about discipline

and performance evaluation that impact compensation and promotion opportunities down the line.

In support of their motion, plaintiffs have submitted the following materials: (1) deposition, testimony,

declarations, and charges of discrimination by the named plaintiffs; (2) eighteen declarations fromcurrent and

former FedEx employees; (3) FedEx documents and the testimony ofFedEx’s corporate representatives; (4)

a report by statistician Richard Drogin regarding statistically significant disparities in evaluation, promotion,

compensation, and discipline decisions; (5) a report by sociologist William Bielby regarding racial stereotypes

in humanresources processes; and (6) a report by industrial organizationalpsychologist Nita French regarding

FedEx’s “Basic Skills Test.” In opposition, defendant has filed: (1) FedEx’s principal personnel manual, the

“People Manual”; (2) excerpts from the depositions of plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ experts; (3) declarations from

FedEx employees; (4) a report by statisticalexpert Mary Dunn Baker; (5) a report by industrial organizational

psychologist Jerilyn Hayward; and (6) a report by management practices expert Jan Duffy. Plaintiffs filed (1)

a reply declaration of Richard Drogin to the report of Mary Baker; (2) a reply declaration of Nita French to

the reports of Jerilyn Hayward and Jan Duffy; and (3) a report by labor economist Marc Bendick, Jr, as well

as additional excerpts of testimony.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court may certify a class if the plaintiff demonstrates that all of the requirements of Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 23(a) are satisfied and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) is satisfied. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23; Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 23(a) requires that

the following four factors must be met:(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all membersis impracticable,

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In short, the class must satisfy the

requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.

In addition to demonstrating that the Rule 23(a) requirements are met, plaintiff must establish one or

more of the following grounds for maintaining the suit as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b): (1) that there

is a risk of substantial prejudice from separate actions; (2) that declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the

class as a whole would be appropriate; or (3) that common questions oflaw or fact predominate and the class

action is superiorto other available methods of adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Here, plaintiffs assert

that this case falls within Rule 23(b)(2). 

In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiffs have stated a

cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but, rather, whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met. See

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). The Court must conduct a rigorous analysis to

determine whether the Rule 23 requirements have been met. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,

457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). The Court is obliged to accept as true the substantive allegations made in the

complaint. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d

1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975). However, it “need not

blindly rely onconclusory allegations which parrotRule 23 requirements [and] may . . . consider the legal and

factual issues presented by plaintiff's complaints.” 2 Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class

Actions 7.26 (3d ed. 1992). 

The decision to certify a class is committed to the discretion of the district court. See Doninger v.

Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977). Under Rule 23(c), a court may maintain

a class action as to particular issues only or divide a class into subclasses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 

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1 Defendant argues that plaintiffs have apparently abandoned claims regarding promotions to Senior

Manager and compensation and promotion forLatino Managers, whichwere alleged in the complaint, and that

accordingly those claims should be dismissed. Plaintiffs respond that they seek only to certify the class claims

for which they currently have a sound evidentiary basis, and that any dismissal is premature. The Court

concludes that the appropriate course at this juncture in the litigation is to certify only the claims that are the

subject of plaintiffs’ motion, and if necessary the Court will later dismiss uncertified class claims. 

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DISCUSSION

I. Rule 23(a) Requirements

A. Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be so numerous that the number of potential plaintiffs cannot be

practicably joined. Whether joinder would be impracticable depends on the facts and circumstances of each

case and does not require any specific minimum number of class members. In this case, it is undisputed that

the proposed Minority Employee Class numbers in the thousands, and the African-American Lower Level

Manager Class contains hundreds of class members. Drogin Rpt. ¶¶ 13-16. The numerosity requirement is

easily met.

B. Common questions of law or fact1

Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement may be satisfied by “the alleged existence of common

discriminatory practices.” Arnold v. United ArtistsTheatre Circuit,Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 448 (N.D. Cal.

1994) (citation omitted). A defendant’s actions need not affect each class member in the same manner. Id.

In the Ninth Circuit, the commonality requirement has been “construed permissively,” and may be satisfied by

either “shared legal issues with divergent factualpredicates,” or “a common core of salient facts coupled with

disparate legal remedies.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1988). Indeed, the

Ninth Circuit considers the requirements for finding commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) to be “minimal.” Id. at

1020.

Plaintiffs contend that they have satisfied this requirement by raising both the common legal issue and

the common factualissue ofdiscriminationagainst minorities at FedEx. Specifically, they rely on the uniformity

ofpersonnelpoliciesthroughoutthe Western Region, as reflected in the “People Manual,” the Basic Skills Test,

performance evaluations and discipline records, and the compensation and promotion decisions based on all

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 FedEx also argues that there is no separate promotion claim because this claim is really based on

plaintiffs’ other challenges to performance evaluation and discipline. However, the fact that plaintiffs’ claims

are interrelated does not defeat commonality. 

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ofthese factors. Common questions of fact include (1) whether FedEx’s promotions, compensation, discipline

and evaluationpolicies and practices in the Western Region are arbitrary, subjective and discretionary and thus

susceptible to discriminatoryapplication by predominantly non-minority managers; (2) whether the Basic Skills

Test has been properly validated, (3) whether FedEx denies minorities equal promotional opportunities; (4)

whether performance evaluations are race-biased; and (5) whether the discipline system is applied unfairly to

minority employees. Common legal questions are also presented, such as (1) whether FedEx’s conduct

produces an adverse impact in violation of Title VII and FEHA; (2) whether FedEx’s conduct constitutes

adverse treatment under Title VII, § 1981, and FEHA, and (3) whether FedEx’s conduct can be justified as

a “business necessity.” 

Defendants raise a number of specific challenges to commonality. As a general matter, FedEx

contends that plaintiffs cannot pursue a theory of subjective decision making because FedEx’s personnel

decisions are not entirely subjective, but rather are driven by objective factors spelled out in the People Manual

and the DGO and AGFS manuals. This argument is unavailing. A court may certify a class where the

challenged personnel policies contain both objective and subjective components. See Watson v. Fort Worth

Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988) (noting that subjective decision-making is a “practice” subject

to challenge under Title VII); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Relatedly, FedEx contends that there is no common “promotion” claim because promotion decisions

are based on objective factors such as (1) time in service;(2) meeting minimumqualifications, including passing

the Basic Skills Test; (3) active discipline related to the position; and (4) the applicant’s past two performance

evaluations.2 However, plaintiffs argue that even if promotions are based on “objective” criteria, defendant

ignores the adverse impact of these criteria and has failed to validate the use of such criteria. Plaintiffs also

contend that FedEx managers have unmonitored discretion to approve or not approve employee applications.

FedEx also challenges the conclusions of plaintiffs’ sociologist-expert regarding the discretionary

aspects of the promotion process because it is based on the statisticalanalysis ofDrogin, whichFedEx argues

is flawed. Indeed, defendant devotes much of its opposition to criticizing Drogin’s methods and arguing that

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the analysis ofdefendant’s expert, Mary Baker, is more accurate and sound. However, an evaluation of which

party has presented more compelling statistical evidence is a question of fact that should be resolved on the

merits by the trier offact and not at the class certificationphase. See Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1225

(9th Cir. 1991); see also Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999). 

FedEx also arguesthatcommonalityislackingbecause plaintiffs have disparate promotion claims,some

named plaintiffs never sought promotions, and not all class members received poor evaluations, including

proposed named plaintiffs Brown, Stevenson, and Smith. These arguments relate more to the typicality ofthe

plaintiffs than to whether there are common issues of law and fact; as discussed in Section I.C. infra, however,

the named plaintiffs need not represent each and every type of claim in order to be “typical” and adequately

represent the class. 

FedEx also argues that there is neither a common “performance evaluation claim” nor a common

“compensation claim.” Defendants highlight the fact that FedEx uses 12 separate performance evaluations for

hourly employees that evaluate different job-related criteria. However, the fact that FedEx uses a number of

different evaluation forms does not defeat commonality. Instead, what is relevant for purposes of class

certification is whether FedEx’s systems and processes for evaluating employees present common issues. As

plaintiffs note, all Operations Managers are evaluated with the same form, and the 12 different forms for hourly

employees use the same rating scale and have overlapping categories. In addition, all of the forms are centrally

designed and disseminated, and a single individual is responsible for all of them. Further, plaintiffs allege that

the discretionary nature ofreviews, as well as the fact that they have notbeen validated, present common issues

of fact.

FedEx also contends that plaintiffs’ compensation claims must fail because plaintiffs’ own statistical

analysis shows that minorities received higher evaluations on average than whites in many job categories, and

defendant’s statistical analysis suggests that in many jobs in many of the relevant years, minorities received

higher compensation than whites. In support of these arguments, defendants rely heavily on their own

statistician who challenges Drogin’s statistical analyses as flawed. As stated above, however, it is not

appropriate at the class certification phase for the Court to decide which party’s statistical model is correct.

See Bouman, 940 F.2d at1225; see also Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292. 

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FedEx also contends that there is no common “discipline claim,” because discipline claims are

particularly “ill-suited for class treatment,” and again because Drogin’sstatisticalanalysis is flawed. Defendant

also argues thatmanagers have little discretion in whether to issue discipline, because the two primary reasons

for discipline are attendance and accidents. It is plaintiffs’ contention, however, that FedEx’s discipline system

suffers from the same defects of manager discretion, lack of systematic monitoring, and adverse impact that

characterize its promotion, evaluationand compensationsystems. Discipline claims have been certified in other

cases. See, e.g., Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Service, 665 F.2d 482, 492 (4th Cir. 1981); Binion v.

Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 163 F.R.D. 517, 521-24 (N.D. Ill. 1995); see also Battle v. White

Cap, Inc., 1999 WL 199594, *3 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 1999).

Finally, FedEx contends that there is no common claim based on the BST, because there are four Basic

Skills Tests covering reading comprehension, map reading, sorting, and listening, and different employees have

to pass different portions ofthe tests; thus, there will be no class-wide proofonthe appropriateness ofthe tests.

However, plaintiffs contend that the BST is itself invalid, and thus whether a class member is required to take

only a portion ofthe BST, orseveralportions, plaintiffs assert that the BST will have a common adverse impact

on class members.

The Court concludes that plaintiffs’ performance evaluation, discipline, promotion, and compensation

claims present common questions of law and fact. Plaintiffs are challenging the uniform personnel policies of

FedEx, and there are certainly common legal questions about whether the discretionary nature of personnel

decision-making constitutes disparate treatment or disparate impact. SeeWatson, 487 U.S. at990-91 (1988);

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 150-51 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Morgan v. United Parcel

Service, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 356 (E.D. Mo. 1996). In addition, the statistical evidence on which plaintiffs

rely is common to the class, and thus the inferences drawn from this evidence will also be common to all class

members. See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 (1977). The

question ofwhether defendant’s statisticalmodelis superior to plaintiffs’ is for another day. See Caridad, 191

F.3d at 292.

C. Typicality

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The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at

157 n. 3. Typicality exists if the named plaintiffs’ claims are “reasonably coextensive” with those of absent class

members. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. Typicality does not mean that the claims of class members must

be identicalor substantially identical. See Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has

submitted declarations of the eight proposed class representatives and eighteen class members, alleging that

they all experienced the same discriminatory practices in performance evaluation, promotion, compensation,

and discipline.

Defendant argues that the class lacks a named plaintiff for many of the claims, because none of the

named plaintiffs sought hourly promotions to Courier, RTD or Checker-Sorter during the limitations period;

none of the named plaintiffs is a Latino who sought and was denied a promotion to management; and the only

casual employee plaintiff, Rachel Hutchins, only sought a promotion to a Customer Service position and did

not seek a promotion to Courier.

Given the permissive standard for typicality, the Court finds that the claims of the putative class

representatives are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members, even if they have not

experienced each and every alleged formofdiscrimination. See Arnold v. United Artists, 158 F.R.D. at 449

(holding that it is sufficient for plaintiffs’ claims to “arise fromthe same remedialand legaltheories” as the class

claims). With respect to plaintiffs’ promotion claims, there is no requirement that plaintiffs have a class

representative for every job category. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 957; see also Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d

1459, 1472 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that a job-by-job requirement for typicality “would permit an employer

to defeat the broad enforcement of Title VII simply by administering different objective tests as part of the

application process for each job.”); Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167 (holding that “there is no requirement that

plaintiffs have a class representative for each management category that they seek to represent.”).

Defendants also argue that the disciplinary records of the named plaintiffs make them inadequate. 

However, because plaintiffs allege FedEx disciplines class members more frequently and more harshly than

similarly-situated non-minority employees, the fact that some of the named plaintiffs have been disciplined by

FedEx makes them typical, not inadequate.

Defendants also argue that none of the named plaintiffs filed an EEOC charge alleging discrimination

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based on performance evaluation scores. However, the Court concludes that the named plaintiffs exhausted

their administrative remedies with respect to this claim. The EEOC charges attached to the complaint allege

discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment, and in particular named plaintiff Gonzales’ EEOC

charge states he was discriminated against when FedEx lowered his performance scores. 

Finally, defendants argue that all of the named plaintiffs either took and passed or were exempt from

the BST, and thus the class representatives cannot adequately represent this claim. Although plaintiffs argue

that they do not have a separate “claim” with respect to the BST, the Court agrees with defendant that if the

validity of the BST is to be challenged, separately or otherwise, some representative plaintiff must have taken

and failed some part of the BST. Plaintiffs will be given the option to amend their complaint to add such an

individual.

D. Adequacy of representation

Adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4) involves two elements: (1) that the representative

party’s attorney be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation; and (2) that the suit not

be collusive and that the representative plaintiffs’ interests not be antagonistic to those of the remainder ofthe

class. See Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Defendant appears to concede the first element, and the Court finds it satisfied because the firms

representing plaintiffs have demonstrated competence and possess considerable experience inhandlingcomplex

class action lawsuits. With respect to the second element, defendant has argued that the interests of class

representatives Derrick Satchell and Kalini Boykin conflict with those of the class because they are managers

who made many of the evaluation, discipline, and promotion decisions challenged here. The Court finds that

this conflict is avoided by the creation of two separate classes, as proposed by plaintiffs. 

II. Rule 23(b) requirements

Once the four requirements of23(a) have been met, the Court must determine whether the case meets

any of the three requirements of Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs argue that this class should be certified under Rule

23(b)(2), which provides in pertinent part:

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An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are

satisfied, and in addition:

* * * 

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable

to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

relief with respect to the class as a whole.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

Defendants argue that class certification is improper because the FedEx has not acted on grounds “generally

applicable” to the class and because damages issues predominate over plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive and

declaratory relief. 

Defendant argues that Rule 23(b)(2) requires a homogeneity that is lacking because the employment

decisions at issue were made by many different individuals applying many different policies. However, plaintiffs

are not challenging a series of unrelated and discrete decisions, but rather a set of policies, procedures and

systems that allegedly affect class members in a similar fashion. Plaintiffs allege that FedEx has acted in a

manner generally applicable to the class by (1) using selection procedures with an adverse impactthat have not

been validated such as the BST and excessively discretionary performance reviews, (2) implementing a

discipline system with adverse impact and no systematic monitoring of outcomes, (3) building these

discretionary results into a compensation system based on biased performance reviews that has significant

adverse impact; (4) discriminating in promotions, both because ofthe built-in biases of the BST, performance

review, and discipline components, and because of a lack of monitoring of “pass-overs” where managers

disregard policy, and (5) by maintaining a “tap the shoulder” system of promotion from casual to permanent

jobs. Accordingly, the Court concludes that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.

Second, the fact that plaintiffs seek damages in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief does not

preclude certificationunder Rule 23(b)(2). See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 2003); Probe

v. State Teachers’ Retirement System, 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, plaintiffs seek the following

injunctive relief: (1) permitting casual employees to apply for and view the posting of jobs on the JCATS

system; (2) eliminating passage of the BIT as a requirement for promotions into Courier and RED positions;

(3) modifying performance evaluationcriteria and monitoringperformance evaluations to make themconsistent,

without adverse impact; and (4) modifying the discipline criteria and monitoring the discipline system. Plaintiffs

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3

 The Court assumes that the class periods for the “Minority Lower Management Class” asserted in

the complaint are the same for the proposed “African-American Lower Manager Class.” 

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also seek equitable monetary reliefin back and front pay, which does not affect class treatment under 23(b)(2).

See Probe, 780 F.2d 776. While plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages as well, the Court

concludes that injunctive relief, and not monetary damages, is the primary relief sought.

III. Class period 

The parties debate the appropriate start-dates forthe class claims alleged in the complaint. The class

start dates are governed by statutes of limitations, which differ among claims and, with respect to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981, according to types of claims; and by the dates on which various representative plaintiffs filed their

administrative claims. 

Plaintiffs’ consolidated amended complaint alleges the following different class periods according to

type of claim and subclass: (1) for plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, a class period beginning June 20, 2002 for the

MinorityEmployeeClass and a class period beginning July 10, 2002 forthe African-AmericanLowerManager

Class;3 (2) for plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a class period beginning October 17, 1999 for both

classes; and (3) for plaintiffs’ FEHA claims, a class period beginning June 13, 2001 forthe Minority Employee

Class and a class period beginning July 31, 2001 for the African-American Lower Manager Class. See

Consolidated Amended Complaint ¶¶ 164, 187, & 204.

The parties’ discussion of the class period centers on plaintiffs’ promotion claims. According to

FedEx, the first EEOC charge that raised a promotion claim was filed on April 8, 2003, and thus the earliest

possible date for the beginning of the Title VII liability period is June 12, 2002. The Court notes that this is 8

days earlier than the Title VII class period asserted by plaintiffs. See id. at ¶ 164. To be conservative, the

Court will use the later date: The Title VII class period shall begin on June 20, 2002 for the Minority Employee

Class and on July 10, 2002 for the African-American Lower Manager Class.

FedEx also argues that the earliest possible date for the beginning of the liability period for Section

1981 promotion claims is January 1, 2002 under the applicable state statute, California Code of Civil

Procedure § 340(3). Plaintiffs contend that the liability for their promotion claims dates back to October 17,

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4Plaintiffsfiledtheir consolidated amended complaint on October 17, 2003. The parties do not dispute

that October 17, 1999 is the beginning of the class period for plaintiffs’ Section 1981 compensation claims.

In addition, the parties do not discuss the FEHA class period. 

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1999 under 28 U.S.C. § 1658, the four-year catch-all federal statute of limitations.4

The class period for plaintiffs’ Section 1981 promotion claims is determined by whether those claims

were actionable priorto 1990. In Jones v. R.R. Donnelly, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004), the Supreme

Court held that Section 1981 claims that were not actionable priorto the 1991 Civil Rights Act are governed

by the four-year catch-all statute, rather than the applicable state statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit, in

Sitgraves v. Allied Signal, Inc., 953 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1992), held that denials ofpromotionwere actionable

priorto the 1991 CivilRights Act where the promotion “risesto the levelof a new and distinctrelation between

the employee and the employer.” Id. at 572. Sitgraves held that the move from a non-supervisory position

to a supervisory position met this test, as did a move from compensation based on hours worked to

compensation based on an annual salary. Id. at 574. 

Applying these tests, the Sitgraves court found actionable the claims of individuals who sought

promotions from positions as hourly-compensated, non-supervisory employees to supervisory, salaried

positions of professional rank. Id. In contrast, the court found non-actionable the claims of individuals who

worked in semi-skilled, hourly positions who sought promotion to skilled, hourly positions that offered

significant pay increases but no new supervisory responsibilities. Id. The court remanded for further findings

with regard to another individual because the record was unclear whether the promotion “would have changed

his position from supervised to supervisor; whether he was already a supervisor and the promotion simply

moved him one step up the management ladder but would not have materially changed his contractual

relationship with the employer; or whether a change in the nature of his supervisory functions would have

significantly altered the nature of his relationship to management.” Id.

Applying Sitgraves to the Section 1981 claims in this case, the Court concludes that changes from

“casual” to permanent employment at FedEx were actionable priorto 1990, and thus are governed by the state

statute oflimitations. “Casual” employees do not have regular work schedules, receive no benefits, and do not

have access to the FedEx intranet; when such employees become permanent, they enter into a “new and

distinct” relationship with FedEx. Similarly, under Sitgraves the denial of promotions fromhourly permanent

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5 Plaintiffs argue that statistically significant disparities dating back to 1999 are relevant to plaintiffs’

promotion claims, because there may be a pattern-and-practice ofdiscriminationthat constitutes a “continuing

violation.” In any event, plaintiffs contend, time-barred discriminatory acts may be relevant background

evidence fortimely discrimination claims. See AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 n. 9 (2002); Lyons

v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1107 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court does not read Morgan’s footnote so

broadly as to support a continuing violation theory forthe pattern-and-practice allegations here. Time-barred

acts may be relevant to the conduct alleged here, and the Court will apply FRE 401's relevance standard to

this evidence, as the Ninth Circuit held proper in Lyons.

6

 The Western Region is now comprised of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,

Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, part of Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. From 1999 to

November 2003, it was comprised ofonly six states:California, Hawaii, parts ofWashington, Oregon, Alaska,

and Nevada.

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positions to salaried permanent positions would have been actionable prior to 1990. See id. In contrast,

promotions from one hourly permanent position to another, such as moving from Handler jobs to Courier,

Checker/Sorter and Ramp Transport Driver, would not have been actionable priorto 1990 because although

these promotions lead to pay increases, they do not include new supervisory responsibilities nor do they

significantly change the employee’s relationship to management. See id.5 

The Court will certify the classes for the time periods which accord with this analysis. The result,

however, is cumbersome, and the parties may at a later time wish to seek a modificationto these time frames.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion

for class certification.

The Court hereby certifies the following classes:

1. A “Minority Employee Class” consistingofall African-American and Latino Handlers, Freight

Handlers, Material Handlers, Checker-Sorters, Customer Service Agents, Couriers, Swing

Drivers, Ramp Transport Drivers, Ramp Area Drivers, Shuttle Drivers, Dangerous Goods

Agents, Information Agents, Operations Agents, Ramp Agents, Service Assurance Agents,

Truck Control Agents, Trace Representatives, Input Auditors, Team Leaders, and

Dispatchers, working in defendant’s Western Region6 who are or were employed during the

class period, who allege claims of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

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 The Court notes that the proposed class definitions contained in plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification differ slightly from the class definitions contained in plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Complaint

with regard to the job positions listed. Compare Plaintiffs’ Motion at (i) and Complaint at ¶ 17. This order

adopts the class definitions contained in plaintiffs’ motion.

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CivilRights Act of1964 (both disparate impact and disparate treatment), 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

and for those class members working, or who worked, in California, the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act; and 

2. An “African-American Lower-Level Manager Class” consisting of all African-American

Operations Managers working in defendant’s Western Region during the class period who

allege claims of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (both disparate impact and disparate treatment), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and forthose class

members working, or who worked, in California, the California Fair Employment and Housing

Act.7

The Court certifies the following claims for the Minority Employees Class: (1) claims concerning

promotions to Checker/Sorter, Courier and other driving positions, and Operations Manager; (2) claims

concerning compensation; and (3) claims concerning discipline.

The Court certifies the following claims for the African-American Lower Manager Class: (1) claims

concerning compensation; and (2) claims concerning discipline. 

The class periods are as follows:

(1) for plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, a class period beginning June 20, 2002 for the Minority Employee

Class and a class period beginning July 10, 2002 for the African-American Lower Manager Class;

(2) for plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

(A) a class period beginning October 17, 1999 for both classes with respect to compensation

claims; 

(B) a class period beginningOctober 17, 1999 for promotion claims by class members alleging

denial of promotion from one permanent hourly position to another permanent hourly position; 

(C) a class period beginning January 1, 2002 for promotion claims by class members alleging

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denial of promotion from casual positions to permanent positions; 

(D) a class period beginning January 1, 2002 for promotion claims by class members alleging

denial of promotion from permanent hourly positions to permanent salaried positions; and

(3) for plaintiffs’ FEHA claims, a class period beginning June 13, 2001 for the Minority Employee

Class and a class period beginning July 31, 2001 for the African-American Lower Manager Class. 

In addition, the Court appoints Valerie Brown, Rick Gonzales, Cynthia Guerrero, Rachel Hutchins,

Kelvin Smith, Sr., and Ken Stevenson as Class Representatives ofthe Minority Employee Class, and appoints

Derrick Satchell and KaliniBoykin as Class Representatives of the African-American Lower-Level Manager

Class. Plaintiffs are directed to amend the complaint to add a class representative who has failed the BST

within 30 days of the filing date of this order.

The Court also appoints as Class Counsel of both the Minority Employee Class and the AfricanAmericanLower-LevelManager Class the following law firms: Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP;

Schneider & Wallace; the Law Offices of John Burris; and the Law Offices Kay McKenzie Parker.

The Court further orders that this litigation be bifurcated into separate phases. The first phase will

address liability and relief applicable to the class as a whole, including declaratory and injunctive relief, and

whether defendant is liable for punitive damages. This phase of the action is certified under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). If liability is established, the second phase of this case will address appropriate

individualcompensatory and equitable relief, including individualentitlementto back and front pay. The precise

procedures to be used during the second phase, if any, will be determined later in this litigation. 

If plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint to add a class representative with requisite experience with

the BST, they must do so no later than October 12, 2005. The parties are ordered to meet and confer

concerning a form of class notice, and a plan for providing same to the class members, and present their

suggestions to the Court in a joint statement to be filed no later than October 31, 2005 A further case

management conference will be held on Friday, November 18, 2005. [No. C-03-2659 SI, #92; No. C-03-

2878 SI, #61.]

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2005 

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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