Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01100/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01100-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1433, “a citizen of the United States may apply to the Attorney

General for a certificate of citizenship on behalf of a child born outside the United States,” and the

Attorney General “shall issue such a certificate” if statutory conditions are fulfilled. 

- 1 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESS MUSTANICH, aka JESS WILLIAM

ALFARO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN

vs. PART

ALBERTO GONZALES, et al.,

Respondents.

HAYES, Judge:

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Jess Mustanich’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. # 1).

BACKGROUND

Born in El Salvador on August 15, 1978, Petitioner Jess Mustanich was adopted by United

States citizens shortly after his birth and moved to the United States. Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Pet.), ¶ 15. On February 22, 1979, the United States admitted Petitioner, age six months, as

a lawful permanent resident. Pet., ¶ 15.

In 1988, Petitioner’s father met with and telephoned officers of the Department of Homeland

Security in an attempt to secure United States citizenship for Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1433.1

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

Pet., ¶ 9; Return, Ex. C at 4-6. Petitioner’s father also sought the help of a juvenile court. Return, Ex.

C at 4-6. However, Petitioner’s father was unsuccessful in timely completing the paperwork necessary

to secure citizenship for Petitioner. Pet., ¶ 9. Petitioner alleges that the United States Government’s

neglect and error resulted in Petitioner’s application for citizenship not being processed before

Petitioner’s eighteenth birthday. Pet., ¶ 9; Return, Ex. C at 4-6.

On April 15, 1997, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of residential burglary, in violation

of California Penal Code §§ 459 and 460(a). Pet., ¶ 16. On December 21, 1998, Petitioner was

convicted of being a prisoner in possession of a sharp instrument, in violation of California Penal

Code § 4502(A). Pet., ¶ 16.

On July 10, 2003, Respondents took Petitioner into custody and initiated removal proceedings

against him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which provides for the removal of an alien

convicted of an aggravated felony. Pet., ¶ 17; Return, Ex. B. On February 10, 2004, an Immigration

Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s request for termination of removal proceedings and ordered Petitioner

removed to El Salvador. Pet., ¶ 17; Return, Ex. C. Petitioner argued unsuccessfully to the IJ that the

United States Government delayed and wrongfully impeded Petitioner’s father’s attempt to secure

citizenship for Petitioner. Pet., ¶ 15; Return, Ex. C. On July 29, 2004, the Bureau of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s administrative order of removal. Pet., ¶ 17; Return, Ex. D.

On August 26, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the BIA decision in the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Pet., ¶ 6; Return, Ex. H (Docket, Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit Case No. 04-74290). Petitioner also filed a motion to stay deportation. Return, Ex. H. On

August 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered Respondents to respond to

Petitioner’s motion to stay deportation and to file the administrative record on or before October 26,

2004. Return, Ex. H. Respondents did not comply with the Court of Appeals’ order. On November

3, 2004, Respondents requested an additional three months to file the administrative record and a

response to Petitioner’s motion to stay deportation. Return, Ex. H. On November 8, 2004, the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Respondents’ request for an extension of time, and ordered

Respondents to file the administrative record and a response to Petitioner’s motion to stay deportation

on or before January 25, 2005. Return, Ex. H. Respondents once again did not comply with the order

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

of the Court of Appeals. Return, Ex. H. On January 28, 2005, Respondents filed the administrative

record. Return, Ex. H.

On February 7, 2005, the Court of Appeals accepted Respondents’ late filing of the

administrative record, but noted that Respondents had “failed to file a response to the motion for a

stay.” Return, Ex. H. The Court of Appeals ordered that “within 21 days from the date of this order,

[respondents] shall file a response to the motion for stay. In light of this delay, if [respondents] [fail]

to comply with this order, the court will construe [respondents’] failure to respond as a [statement]

of non/opp to the stay motion.” Return, Ex. H. 

Respondents did not file a response to Petitioner’s motion to stay deportation within 21 days

of the Court of Appeals’ February 7, 2005, order. Return, Ex. H. On March 10, 2005, the Court of

Appeals ordered that, “[i]n light of this [court’s] Feb. 7, 2005 order, [respondents’] failure to respond

to the motion to stay removal is construed as a statement of non/opp to the stay motion.” Return, Ex.

H. The Court of Appeals granted Petitioner’s motion for stay of deportation, and set a briefing

schedule with respect to Petitioner’s Petition for Review of the BIA’s decision. Return, Ex. H.

On May 19, 2005, Petitioner filed the opening brief in the Court of Appeals. Return, Ex. H.

Thereafter, on June 17, 2005, Respondents sought an extension of time to file an answering brief.

Return, Ex. H. On July 6, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted Respondents’ motion for an extension,

and ordered Respondents to file an answering brief on or before July 29, 2005. Return, Ex. H.

Respondents filed an answering brief on August 4, 2005. Return, Ex. H.

On June 18, 2007, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. # 1). As of the date of the Petition, Petitioner had been incarcerated for three

years and eleven months. Pet., ¶ 31.

During Petitioner’s detention, Respondents internally reviewed the terms of Petitioner’s

detention on three occasions. Return, Exs. E-G. On February 2, 2005, Respondents concluded that

Petitioner could not be released on supervision because, “you have demonstrated your inability and/or

lack of respect for the laws of this country as is reflected in your criminal and immigration record.”

Return, Ex. E. Respondents did not interview Petitioner before the February 2, 2005, custody

determination, and did not identify Petitioner as a flight risk or a danger to the community at the time.

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

Return, Ex. E. On November 1, 2005, Respondents concluded that Petitioner could not be released

on supervision because he was considered a “flight risk.” Return, Ex. F. Respondents did not

interview Petitioner before the November 1, 2005, custody determination, but noted that Petitioner

had a place to live, close family ties, and employment prospects in the United States. Return, Ex. F.

Respondents also concluded that Petitioner did not meet any of the criteria for continued detention

pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.14. Return, Ex. F. On November 8, 2006, Respondents concluded that

Petitioner could not be released on supervision because he was considered “a threat to the

community,” and a “flight risk.” Return, Ex. G. Respondents did not interview Petitioner before the

November 8, 2006, custody determination. Return, Ex. G.

During each of the three internal custody reviews, Respondents indicated that Petitioner was

being detained as an alien removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See Return, Exs. E-G.

Petitioner has not received a bail hearing before an IJ during his more than four year detention.

Pet., ¶ 31.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that he should be released pending resolution of his Petition for Review

in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Petitioner contends that he is being detained indefinitely

under the general detention statutes in violation of those statutes and the Constitution as articulated

in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005), and

Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner contends that there is no significant

likelihood that he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner further contends

that the sheer length of his detention–over four years as of the date of this Order–violates his right to

due process. Petitioner contends in the alternative that he is entitled to a bail hearing before an

immigration judge.

Respondents contend that Petitioner is being detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that

Tijani and Nadarajah do not apply to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents

further contend that the delay in removing Petitioner is due to Petitioner’s Petition for Review and

motion for a stay of removal in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that the delay is not

attributable to Respondents. Respondents contend that Petitioner’s release is reasonably foreseeable

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

and that the length of Petitioner’s detention does not violate due process.

I. Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alien detainees can properly challenge “the extent of the

Attorney General’s authority” to detain a removable alien under the general detention statutes.

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-89 (2001); see also Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17

(2003). Whereas here, an administrative order of removal is not final, “habeas corpus jurisdiction

remains in the district court . . . .” Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006);

see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) (describing how a removal order becomes final).

II. Respondents’ Authority to Detain Petitioner

Respondents contend that Petitioner is currently being detained by the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) pursuant to its discretionary authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1).

Respondents explain that DHS detained and charged Petitioner in July of 2003 as a criminal alien

subject to deportation for commission of an aggravated felony, and that Petitioner was subject to

mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) between July 10, 2003, the original date

of detention, and July 19, 2004, the date that the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the

IJ’s order of removal. Return at 2-3. Respondents contend that the statutory authority to detain

Petitioner changed administratively from 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) when Petitioner

appealed the decision of the BIA to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Return at 4-5

(“Detention authority changes administratively when the removal order becomes administratively

final.”). Respondents contend that an alien cannot be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) during

the time that the alien’s appeal from an order of removal is pending in the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner does not address whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is the proper

basis for Petitioner’s detention, but Petitioner acknowledges Respondents’ contention that Petitioner

is currently being discretionarily detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

8 U.S.C. § 1226 provides for the discretionary and mandatory detention of removable aliens

by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) outlines the Attorney General’s discretionary power to

detain aliens, and provides that the Attorney General may arrest and detain an alien “pending a

decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Those

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 An alien mandatorily detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), could also be released by the

Attorney General if the Attorney General determined that the length and circumstances of the alien’s

detention no longer was authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or violated the United States Constitution.

See Tijani, 443 F.3d at 1242 (“[W]e interpret the authority conferred by § 1226(c) as applying to

expedited removal of criminal aliens;” “it constitutionally doubtful that Congress may authorize

imprisonment of this duration for lawfully admitted resident aliens who are subject to removal.” ).

- 6 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

aliens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) may be released on bond in the discretion of the

Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) provides for the mandatory

detention of certain aliens, including aliens who are removable by reason of having committed an

aggravated felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c)(1)(B). Aliens subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) must be detained

by the Attorney General, and are not statutorily entitled to release on bond during the removal period

except under the limited circumstances outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2), which are not relevant here.2

See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(1) (“[N]o alien described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act may be released from

custody during removal proceedings except pursuant to section 236(c)(2).”).

Respondents concede that Petitioner was detained and charged in July 2003 as an alien subject

to removal for conviction of an aggravated felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(g), and Petitioner does not dispute that he was convicted in California state court

of two counts of First Degree Burglary in April of 1997. Respondents likewise concede that Petitioner

was subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) during his administrative removal

proceedings before the IJ and BIA. However, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s current detention

is not pursuant 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because Petitioner’s detention changed administratively from 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c) to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) when Petitioner appealed the decision of the BIA to the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

Aside from citing to Code of Federal Regulation provisions which do not discuss the effect of

judicial review on mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), see Return at 4-5, citing 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.19, 1003.39, 236.1(c)(1), Respondents do not provide case or statutory support for their

argument that Petitioner’s detention changed administratively from 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a) when Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Indeed, nothing in the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) limits mandatory detention to administrative removal

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

 Pursuant to Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, this unpublished Ninth Circuit

opinion may be cited, but is not binding “precedent.”

- 7 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

proceedings as opposed to judicial removal proceedings, and no part of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 distinguishes

between administrative and judicial review of an IJ’s order of removal. A review of the relevant

statutory scheme, including the Code of Federal Regulations, reveals that aliens subject to

discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are eligible for release on bond and can appeal bond

decisions to an IJ–two options statutorily unavailable to aliens subject to mandatory detention under

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(1), 236.1(d), 1003.19(a). If this

Court were to adopt Respondents’ arguments, however, such opportunities for release would be

readily available to all aliens otherwise subject to mandatory detention despite clear language in 8

C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(1) precluding release of mandatorily detained aliens and the important policies

behind mandatory detention outlined in Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 528.

After reviewing a number of cases, it is evident that courts view the continued detention of an

alien after the alien has sought judicial review of an order of removal to remain statutorily authorized

by the subpart of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 that authorized the detention before judicial review. For instance,

in Madrane v. Hogan, 05-CV-2228, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7970, *4-6, 8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2007),

a removable alien was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and thereafter filed a Petition for

Review with the United States Court of Appeals and a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

district court. In evaluating the alien’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the government argued

and the district court agreed that the alien was “subject to pre-final order detention pursuant to §

1226(c)(1)(B)” while awaiting “a decision from the United States Court of Appeals on his petition for

review of a final order of removal.” Id. at 2-4, 8; see also Marks v. Clark, Case No. C06-1796-RSM,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53026, *8-11 (W.D. Wash. May 29, 2007) (alien is detained pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c) during pendency of alien’s Petition for Review in Ninth Circuit); Singh v. Clark,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50237, *8-11 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2007) (same). Similarly, in GamezVillagrana v. Gonzales, No. 05-75441, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18854 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007)3

, the

Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit evaluated an alien’s Petition for Review and noted that the alien

had been detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) during the time period that the Petition for Review

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

was pending in the Court of Appeals. Id. at 3 (“We note that petitioner has now been in the custody

of the Attorney General, pursuant to INA § 236(c) . . . for more than three years.”). 

Some courts have concluded that an alien’s detention pending judicial review of an order of

removal was pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See, e.g., Azeke v. Gonzales, No. C-07-0709 MMC, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33815, *1-3 & fn. 4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007). However, those cases do not stand

for the proposition that an alien’s detention pending judicial review of an administrative order of

removal changes administratively to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as proposed by Respondents. Rather, those

cases stand for the proposition that an alien subject to discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a) before judicial review, remains subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) during the

pendency of judicial review. Accordingly, while it is true that the alien in Azeke was subject to

discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) pending judicial review, it was not because the

statutory basis for the detention changed administratively to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)–rather, it was because

the alien in Azeke was not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for the charge of

overstaying his visa. Azeke, No. C-07-0709 MMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33815, *1-3 & fn. 4 (N.D.

Cal. Apr. 25, 2007).

DHS charged Petitioner with removability for being a criminal alien convicted of an

aggravated felony, and Petitioner concedes that his convictions for burglary constitute aggravated

felonies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(g); Return, Ex. B. Accordingly,

the Court concludes that Petitioner is subject to detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) until

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rules on Petitioner’s pending Petition for Review and lifts

the stay of deportation. See Marks, Case No. C06-1796-RSM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53026, *8-11

(W.D. Wash. May 29, 2007; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (defining the removal period).

/

/

/

/

/

/

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

 In Zadvydas, the United States Supreme Court held that a detention of six months or less

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is presumptively reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700-01.

- 9 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

II. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) Authorizes Petitioner’s Continued Detention For Over Four

Years 

A. Background

In 2003, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory detention of an alien pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) was a “constitutionally permissible” part of the removal process for the “limited

period” necessary to complete removal proceedings. Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 526, 531. The

Court distinguished Zadvydas v. Davis, a case in which the Supreme Court held that an alien subject

to a final order of removal could not be indefinitely detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, on the

grounds that (1) an alien detained for the limited period necessary to effect removal pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c) was not detained indefinitely, and (2) mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c) was generally of a much shorter duration than “post-removal-period detention” pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1231–“in the majority of cases [mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)] lasts

for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas.” Denmore, 538 U.S. at 527-

31. With respect to detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the Supreme Court cited statistics from

the Executive Office for Immigration Review and noted that “the detention at stake under § 1226(c)

lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five

months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” Denmore, 538 U.S. at 530.

Though the Denmore Court characterized constitutional detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) as

“limited” and “brief,” it did not explicitly limit the length of mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c), and did not articulate a presumptively reasonable length of detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c) as it did in Zadvydas for detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231.4

 Denmore, 538 U.S. at 526,

531; see also Madrane v. Hogan, No. 1:05-CV-2228, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7970, *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb.

7, 2007) (detailing Denmore’s references to “brief” and “limited” detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1226(c)). 

Three years after Denmore, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a habeas

petition filed by an alien who had been mandatorily detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for “two

years and four months.” Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). Distinguishing Denmore on

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

the grounds that the alien in Denmore conceded removability, the Court of Appeals concluded that

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) applied to “expedited” removal proceedings, and remanded the petition to district

court with instructions to grant the writ unless the Attorney General established that the alien was a

flight risk or a danger to the community in a bail hearing before an IJ. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242. The

Court of Appeals concluded that “two years and four months of process is not expeditious,” and cited

Zadvydas for the proposition that “it is constitutionally doubtful that Congress may authorize

imprisonment of this duration for lawfully admitted resident aliens who are subject to removal.”

Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Court referenced the “year or

more” of time necessary for judicial review to support the Court’s granting of the writ. Tijani, 430

F.3d at 1242.

Less than a year after Tijani, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again addressed the

scope of detention pursuant to general immigration statutes in Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069

(9th Cir. 2006). Rejecting the government’s contention that Denmore v. Kim authorized indefinite

detention, the Court of Appeals held that, “general immigration detention statutes do not authorize the

Attorney General to incarcerate detainees for an indefinite period.” Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1076,

1078, 1080-81. The Court further held that detention pursuant to general detention statutes must be

for a reasonable period, and only if there is a significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future. After a presumptively reasonable six-month detention,

once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood

of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with

evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.

Id. at 1079. The Nadarajah Court held that a detention of nearly five years is “plainly unreasonable

under any measure.” Id. at 1080.

B. The Parties’ Arguments

Citing Zadvydas, Tijani, and Nadarajah, Petitioner contends that his continued detention is

indefinite and unreasonable, and that his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably

foreseeable future. Specifically, Petitioner argues that he is not likely to be removed because (1) his

Petition for Review in the Ninth Circuit may well succeed, and (2) El Salvador is unlikely to issue

travel documents for Petitioner because Petitioner was adopted by American citizens at age six months

and moved to the United States. Petitioner contends that the sheer length of his detention without a

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

bail hearing is unreasonable and violates due process, and at the very least, entitles him to a bail

hearing before an IJ under Tijani.

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s detention is not indefinite, and note that the majority

of Petitioner’s detention is attributable to Petitioner’s filing of a Petition for Review in the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Respondents contend that delays pending judicial review are not

attributable to the government. Respondents further contend that Nadarajah controls the analysis,

and argue that Nadarajah displaced Tijani. With respect to Petitioner’s request for a bail hearing,

Respondents contend that they afforded Petitioner three constitutionally adequate internal custody

reviews.

C. Analysis

In light of Tijani’s holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) authorizes only “expedited” removal

proceedings, and Nadarajah’s holding that detention pursuant to general immigration statutes must

be “reasonable” in the first instance, the Court must determine whether Petitioner Jess Mustanich’s

removal proceedings have been “expeditious,” and whether his continued detention without a bail

hearing is “reasonable.” Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242; Nadarajah, 433 F.3d at 1079-80. In Denmore, the

United States Supreme Court held that a six month detention was authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),

and thus, at minimum, six months must be considered reasonable and expeditious. Denmore, 538 U.S.

at 530-01. In Tijani, the Court of Appeals held that a removal proceeding of two years and four

months was not “expeditious,” and granted the petitioner a bail hearing. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242. Of

the two years and four months at issue in Tijani, at least some of the time accrued while the

petitioner’s order of removal was before the Ninth Circuit. Id. In Nadarajah, the Court of Appeals

held that a five year detention was “plainly unreasonable by any measure.” Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at

1080. 

Respondents have detained Petitioner for more than four years pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

Seven months accrued during proceedings before the IJ, five-and-a-half months during proceedings

before the BIA, and approximately thirty-six months during proceedings before the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit. 

In Denmore, the Supreme Court noted that removable aliens appeal to the BIA in only 15%

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 In Gamez-Villagrana v. Gonzales, No. 05-75441, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18854, *3-4 (9th

Cir. Aug. 2, 2007), the Court of Appeal noted with approval the consideration of periods of detention

which accrue during proceedings before the Court of Appeal.

- 12 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

of cases involving detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and that where an alien appeals an order

of removal to the BIA, mandatory detention generally lasts only five months. Denmore, 538 U.S. at

530. Here, Petitioner’s proceedings before the IJ and the BIA lasted approximately 12 1⁄2 months, 7

1⁄2 months longer than in the typical case. Respondents do not set forth facts which establish that

Petitioner is responsible for delay during the IJ and BIA proceedings. Accordingly, the length of

detention during proceedings before the IJ and the BIA weighs against a finding that Petitioner’s

removal proceedings and detention have been “expeditious” and “reasonable.” Tijani, 430 F.3d at

1242; Nadarajah, 433 F.3d at 1079-80. 

The majority of Petitioner’s detention accrued after Petitioner appealed the order of the BIA

to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Respondents argue that this time is not attributable to

Respondents because Petitioner appealed to the Ninth Circuit and filed a motion to stay deportation.

Respondents contend that detention during judicial review of a BIA’s decision is irrelevant in

evaluating the length of an alien’s detention in the context of a habeas petition. Petitioner contends

that the sheer length of his detention during judicial review is relevant to whether his detention is

reasonable.

Whether detention pending judicial review can be considered in assessing the reasonableness

of an alien’s mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and if so, how it should be

considered, is a question that has not been explicitly addressed by either the United States Supreme

Court or the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit referenced the period of judicial review which had elapsed and that which was yet to come in

support of its holding in Tijani that the alien’s removal proceedings were not expeditious, and it is

apparent that the Tijani Court included at least some time which accrued during judicial review in its

conclusion that the petitioner had been detained for two years and four months. Tijani, 430 F.3d at

1242.5

 As in Tijani, some district courts have considered detention pending judicial review in

determining whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) authorized a prolonged detention. See Martinez-Herrera v.

Crawford, No. CIV 07-0267-PHX-NVW (DKD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53334, *6-8 (D. Ariz. Jun.

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

20, 2007) (noting that the Ninth Circuit considered detention pending judicial review in evaluating

the detention in Tijani); Singh v. Crawford, No. CV 06-2194-PHX-MHM (GEE), Doc. # 22 at 4 (D.

Ariz. Apr. 13, 2007) adopted by Singh v. Crawford, No. CV 06-2194-PHX-MHM (GEE), 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 57249 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2007) (considering 2 years in which alien was detained pending

judicial review); but see Singh v. Gonzales, No. CV 06-135-PHX-JAT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27837,

*6 (D. Ariz. Apr. 13, 2007) (noting that petitioner’s continued custody is the result of his own actions

in appealing to the Ninth Circuit). After reviewing the relevant case law, and particularly Tijani, the

Court concludes that it can and must consider periods of detention which accrue pending judicial

review in determining whether removal proceedings and detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) are

expeditious and reasonable.

The Court finds unpersuasive Respondents’ argument that because Petitioner appealed to the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and sought a stay of removal, the period of Petitioner’s

detention which accrued pending judicial review should not be considered. As noted above, other

courts, including the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in Tijani, have considered periods of

detention which accrue pending judicial review in assessing the merits of a habeas petition. Tijani,

430 F.3d at 1242; see also Ly v. Hanson, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the entire

removal process, and not just the original deportation hearing, is subject to the constitutional

requirement of reasonableness). In addition, even if the court were permitted to ignore periods of

detention which accrue during judicial appeal under certain circumstances, the court would still be

required to consider those periods where, as here, (1) a petitioner asserts a “substantial” non-frivolous

claim to citizenship, Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1247 (Tashima, J., concurring), (2) a petitioner has not

frivolously delayed administrative or appellate proceedings, and (3) a respondent delays the

proceedings on appeal. Here, Petitioner has at least a “substantial” claim to citizenship, especially

considering that he was adopted by American citizens at age six-months and moved to the United

States, and it is evident that Petitioner has not delayed the administrative or judicial removal

proceedings. Respondents, on the other hand, twice failed to file the administrative record when

ordered to do so by the Court of Appeals, and once sought a three month extension of time to file the

record. Return, Ex. H. Though originally required to file the administrative record on or before

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

October 26, 2004, Respondents did not file the record until January 28, 2005–three months after it was

originally due. Return, Ex. H. Respondents also repeatedly delayed in responding to the motion for

a stay of deportation, and not only failed to comply with Court of Appeals’ orders requiring a response

to the motion to stay, but sought, and were granted, a three month extension to file a response to the

motion which they then failed to comply with. Return, Ex. H. As noted by the Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit, “although an alien may be responsible for seeking relief, he is not responsible for

the amount of time that such determinations may take. The mere fact that an alien has sought relief

from deportation does not authorize the INS to drag its heels . . . .” Ly, 351 F.3d at 272. On this

record, there is no doubt that the Court must consider the periods of Petitioner’s detention which

accrued while Petitioner appealed to Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit.

Notwithstanding the length of Petitioner’s detention, Respondents cite Nadarajah and argue

that Petitioner should not be released or afforded a bail hearing because his “removal remains

reasonably foreseeable.” Return at 6; see also Nadarajah, 433 F.3d 1078. However, this Court cannot

determine when the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit might adjudicate Petitioner’s Petition for

Review, and even if the Court of Appeals were to adjudicate the Petition, it is not clear that the order

of the BIA would be affirmed as opposed to reversed and remanded. As noted above, Petitioner has

at least a “substantial” claim that he should be considered an American citizen, and the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently remanded a similar case to district court and held that “the

Constitution is violated when a person with a non-frivolous claim to U.S. citizenship is deported

without receiving a judicial determination of that claim.” Gamez-Villagrana v. Gonzales, No. 05-

75441, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18854, *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007), citing Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d

1129, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, while Nadarajah held that the likelihood of removal was

relevant, it also held that a detention had to be “reasonable” in the first instance. Nadarajah, 443 F.3d

at 1079.

As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Zadvydas, when determining the

reasonableness of an alien’s detention, a court should consider that “as the period of . . . confinement

grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.”

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Here, Petitioner has been in Respondents custody for well over 4 years,

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

during which time Petitioner’s administrative proceedings took longer than usual, and Respondents

significantly delayed in the Court of Appeals. The Court has been unable to find a single case in

which a court upheld either a more than four year mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)

as reasonable, or a removal proceeding of the same length as expeditious. The Court also concludes

that Petitioner has a non-frivolous claim to citizenship, which may warrant further judicial

proceedings on remand. On this record, and particularly given the length of Petitioner’s detention,

the Court concludes that Petitioner’s removal proceedings are not “expeditious,” and his continued

detention without bail is not “reasonable.” See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242 (two year and four month

removal proceeding not expeditious); Nadarajah, 433 F.3d at 1079-80 (five year detention plainly

unreasonable); see also Singh v. Crawford, No. CV 06-2194-PHX-MHM (GEE), 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 57249 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2007) (2 1⁄2 year detention, some of which accrued during judicial

review, unreasonable under Tijani); Martinez-Herrera v. Crawford, No. CIV 07-0267-PHX-NVW

(DKD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53334, *6-7 (D. Ariz. Jun. 20, 2007) (21 month detention

unreasonable under Tijani); Abeogba v. ICE, No. CV 05-2247-PHX-MHM (LOA), 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 51319 (D. Ariz. July 18, 2006) (5 year detention unreasonable). As noted in Tijani, it is

“constitutionally doubtful that Congress may authorize imprisonment of this duration for lawfully

admitted resident aliens who are subject to removal.” Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242. 

III. Bail Hearing

Petitioner contends that his unreasonable detention entitles him to release. However,

consistent with Tijani, the government should be given the opportunity to establish that Petitioner is

a flight risk or a danger to the community in a bail hearing before an IJ. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242; see

also Singh v. Crawford, No. CV 06-2194-PHX-MHM (GEE), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57249 (D. Ariz.

Aug. 3, 2007) (requiring bail hearing before release); Martinez-Herrera v. Crawford, No. CIV 07-

0267-PHX-NVW (DKD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53334, *6-7 (D. Ariz. Jun. 20, 2007) (same);

Abeogba v. ICE, No. CV 05-2247-PHX-MHM (LOA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51319 (D. Ariz. July

18, 2006) (same).

/

/

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 - 07CV1100 WQH (LSP)

/

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Petitioner’s more than four year detention is unreasonable and his

removal proceedings not “expeditious.” Accordingly, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

is hereby granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Petitioner’s request for release is DENIED.

(2) Petitioner’s request for a bail hearing before an IJ is GRANTED.

(3) Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bail hearing before an IJ within 10 days

of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 26, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-01100-WQH-LSP Document 6 Filed 09/26/07 Page 16 of 16