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Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐2493

JOSE HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

THOMAS J. DART, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 1236 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 13, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 2016

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.  Plaintiff‐appellant, Jose Hernandez,

a disabled prisoner, sued Defendants‐appellees, Sheriff

Thomas J. Dart and Cook County (collectively “Defendants”),

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and deliberate

indifference to his medical needs. These two claims stemmed

from his treatment while he was a pre‐trial detainee in the

custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections

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(“CCDOC”). The district court granted summary judgment in

favor of Defendants, holding that Hernandez failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies, as the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires. We hold that

Hernandez did indeed exhaust his remedies and remand the

case so that its merits may be heard.

I.  BACKGROUND

An April 22, 2012, car accident essentially rendered

Hernandez a quadriplegic. He has no use of his legs and

limited use of his arms; importantly, he cannot write. The

passenger in Hernandez’s car died as a result of the crash.

Hernandez was driving under the influence of drugs and

alcohol at the time of the accident, and was convicted in May

2014 of aggravated driving under the influence involving an

accident causing death.Law enforcement did nottake him into

custody for his role in the accident until March 9, 2013. On that

day, Hernandez was hospitalizedatThorekMemorial Hospital

for treatment of pressure wounds that had developed during

his stay at a nursing home.

Under Cook County Sheriff’s Office policy, correctional

officers must shackle one hand and one foot of a hospitalized

pre‐trial detainee to his or her hospital bed. Additionally, two

armed correctional officers must guard the detainee at all

times. When Hernandez came into custody at Thorek on

March 9, he was duly shackled and guarded. This continued

when the CCDOC briefly transferred Hernandez to Cook

County Jail on March 14. He was specifically sent to the facility

of Cermak Health Services (“Cermak”), the on‐site health

care provider at Cook County Jail. That same day, Cermak

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No. 15‐2493 3

personnel decided to transfer Hernandez to Stroger Hospital,

where he remained from March 14, 2013, to April 18, 2013; the

shackling continued. Hernandez claims that the shackling

stunted his recovery: the doctors had instructed him to move

every two hours to help his sores heal, but he was unable to do

so while shackled to the bed. Hernandez orally complained

about the shackling to correctional and hospital personnel, but

the condition remained.

There is a CCDOC Inmate Information Handbook (the

“Handbook”) that enumerates the CCDOC’s grievance

process. CCDOC relief workers visited Hernandezperiodically

while he was hospitalized, but never gave him the Handbook

or told him about the grievance process. He states that he

learned aboutthe process from other Cook County Jail inmates

after his discharge from Stroger on April 18.

According to CCDOC policy, an inmate must file a written

grievance within fifteen days of the alleged incident. Written

grievance forms are available in all living units throughout the

jail, and an inmate can obtain a form from a CCDOC relief

worker or other jail personnel upon request. Once the inmate

has received the response to his grievance from the relevant

party (for example, the CCDOC or Cermak), the inmate has

fourteen days to appeal the decision.

Hernandez never filed a written grievance regarding his

shackling at Thorek, Cermak, and Stroger. After discharge

from Stroger on April 18, he entered the jail general

population. While at the jail, he complained about the medical

care that he was receiving. Unable to write, he had fellow

inmates assist him in writing and filing various grievances.

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One of these written grievances is relevant to this appeal.

On August 3, 2013, Hernandez filed a grievance stating that

Cermak nursing staff refused to help him move between his

geriatric, or “jerry,” chair in his room and his bed. His

grievance states that the incident in question occurred on

August 2, 2013. Inability to move between the chair and the

bed would cause pressure sores to worsen, and Hernandez

could not move without assistance. The Nurse Manager for

Cermak responded to Hernandez’s grievance, saying that

Cermak staff had assisted Hernandez “in getting ready

(washedup,dressed, andtransfer[red][betweenthe jerry chair

and the bed]).” Hernandez received this response on

September 11, 2013, and appealed on September 17, 2013.

On February 19, 2014, Hernandez filed this suit in federal

district court. Hernandez amended his complaint multiple

times, and presently asserts two claims: (1) excessive force

arising from his shackling while at Thorek, Cermak, and

Stroger; (2) deliberate indifference to his medical needs for

failing to help him move between his jerry chair and his bed on

August 2, 2013.

On December 30, 2014, Defendants moved for summary

judgment only on the issue of exhaustion. Pursuant to Pavey v.

Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008), the district court ordered

an evidentiary hearing to determine if Hernandez had

exhausted his administrative remedies. The hearing was on

June 18, 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district

court stated that Hernandez’s oral complaints about the

shackling constituted a proper grievance, but ultimately held

that Hernandez had not exhausted his administrative

remedies. The district court granted summary judgment for

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No. 15‐2493 5

Defendants, orally dismissing the case without prejudice. The

corresponding docket entry, dated July 2, 2014, states that

Hernandez had “failed to exhaust administrative remedies,”

that his claim was dismissed without prejudice, and that the

case was “terminated.”

II.  DISCUSSION

We disagree with the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Defendants for failure to exhaust, and

hold that the district court should hear both of Hernandez’s

claims on the merits. First,regarding the excessive force claim,

the grievance process was unavailable to Hernandez during

the relevant period. This lifts the PLRA exhaustion

requirement entirely and provides immediate entry into

federal court. Second, regarding the deliberate indifference

claim, Hernandez followedthe CCDOC grievanceprocess, and

therefore properly exhausted his administrative remedies

under the PLRA. Both claims are properly in federal court.

A. Standard of Review

We review dismissals for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies de novo. E.g., Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093,

1098–99 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “Failure to exhaust

is an affirmative defense,” and Defendants have the burden of

proof. King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing

Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005), and Massey

v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999)). Further, at the

summary judgment phase, we construe the facts in the light

most favorable to the non‐moving party—here, Hernandez.

Rahn v. Bd. of Trustees of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir.

2015) (citation omitted); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 681 (7th

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Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Here, Defendants have failed to

produce evidence that Hernandez did not exhaust his

administrative remedies.

B. District Court’s Dismissal Was Final

As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that because the

district courtdismissed Hernandez’s claims withoutprejudice,

its order was not final and we have no jurisdiction over the

appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (federal courts of appeal have

jurisdiction over appeals “from allfinal decisions ofthe district

courts of the United States”). Defendants are correct in a

general sense, because “[n]ormally, a dismissal without

prejudice is not a final order for purposes of appellate

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Kaba, 458 F.3d at 680

(citing Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003)).

But this generalrule does not apply in this case.Instead, we

deem thedistrict court’sdismissal withoutprejudice to be final

for the purposes of § 1291 jurisdiction. There are two grounds

for finality. First, it would be impossible at this point for

Hernandez to exhaust his administrative remedies and

thereafter amend his complaint. See Hoskins, 320 F.3d at 763

(noting that “if an amendment would be unavailing, then the

case is dead in the district court and may proceed to the next

tier”). The inability to amend is particularly meaningful in

dismissals for failure to exhaust, where timeliness under

respective agency procedure is so critical. See Kaba, 458 F.3d at

680 (where it is no longer possible for prisoner plaintiff “at [so]

late [a] date” to exhaust and “no amendment could resolve the

problem,”dismissal withoutprejudice forfailure to exhaust “is

effectively a final order”). The incidents of which Hernandez

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No. 15‐2493 7

complained in this case occurred in 2013 and required a

written grievance within fifteen days. Those respective

deadlines have long since passed, such that an amendment

would be unavailing and would not resolve the problem.

Second,there are multiple indicia thatthe district court was

finished with the case. See Taylor‐Holmes v. Office of Cook Cnty.

Pub. Guardian, 503 F.3d 607, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Moore, 446 F.3d 725, 726 (7th

Cir. 2006)) (other citations omitted) (where there are indicia

that the district court is “‘finished with the case,’” a dismissal

without prejudice will “end[] the suit so far as the district court

is concerned”). The true test for determining finality under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 “is not the adequacy of the judgment[,] but

whether the district court has finished with the case.” Moore,

446 F.3d at 726; see also Luevano v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 722

F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 2013) (dismissal not final where

district court allowed “multiple amendments to the original

complaint, making it clear that it was not finished with the

case” (citation omitted)). Where a district court is not “merely

telling the plaintiff ‘to patch up the complaint, or take some

other easily accomplished step,’” we can impute finality to the

court’s dismissal and hear the appeal. Taylor‐Holmes, 503 F.3d

at 610 (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.

2002)).

Here, at the Pavey hearing, after saying that it was

dismissing the case, the district court repeatedly told

Hernandez to “take [the case] upstairs”—that is, to appeal the

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case to this court.1 In the corresponding docket entry, the

district court states, “Civil case terminated.” These actions

indicate that the district court was finished with the case, and

that if Hernandez wanted to pursue his claim further, he

needed to do so through the appellate process.

Thus, the district court’s dismissal without prejudice was

“effectively a final order.” Kaba, 458 F.3d at 680. We have

jurisdiction over the appeal.

C. Exhaustion of Grievances

Regarding exhaustion specifically, Hernandez properly

navigated the requirements of § 1997e(a) of the PLRA. A

prisoner cannot bring a cause of action under federal law

regarding prison conditions “until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);

see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006) (holding that

“complet[ing] the administrative review process” is “a

precondition to [a prisoner] bringing suit in federal court”).

Federal courts strictly enforce this requirement, and a prisoner

fulfills this duty by adhering to “the specific procedures and

deadlines established by the prison’s policy.” King, 781 F.3d at

893 (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93); see also Maddox v. Love, 655

F.3d 709, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.

199, 219 (2007) (noting that “‘the applicable procedural rules’

that a prisoner must properly exhaust are defined not by the

PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself”)). Therefore,

Hernandez needed to comply with the CCDOC grievance

1

   The Seventh Circuit is located on the top two floors of the same building

where the district court in this case is located.

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No. 15‐2493 9

process: he had to have filed any grievance within 15 days of

the alleged incident, and he had to have appealed within 14

days ofreceipt of any administrative response to the grievance.

Because Hernandez’s grievances involve different time frames

and address different conduct by CCDOC personnel, they are

not alike in kind, and we analyze each separately. See Kaba, 458

F.3d at 685 (noting that because “all grievances are not alike, ...

a more discriminating analysis is necessary” that itemizes and

analyzes each grievance separately).

1. Excessive Force Claim

Hernandez’s excessive force claim is not subject to the

PLRA exhaustion requirement because no administrative

remedies were “available” to him during the relevant

exhaustion period. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford, 548 U.S.

at 93. “If administrative remedies are not ‘available’ to an

inmate, then an inmate cannot be required to exhaust.” Kaba,

458 F.3d at 684; see also King, 781 F.3d at 896 (“Prisoners are

required to exhaust grievance procedures they have been told

about, but not procedures they have not been told about.”).

Administrative remedies are primarily “unavailable” to

prisoners where “affirmative misconduct” prevents prisoners

from pursuing administrative remedies. Dole v. Chandler, 438

F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (remedies unavailable where

prison officials “do notrespond to a properly filed grievance”);

see also Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2015)

(remedies unavailable where correctional officertells prisoner

that prisoner cannotfile grievance when in fact prisoner can do

so); Kaba, 458 F.3d at 680, 686 (remedies unavailable where

prisonerpresents evidence thatprisonpersonnel have “denied

[prisoner] grievance forms,threatenedhim, andsolicitedother

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inmates to attack him in retaliation forfiling grievances”); Dale

v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004) (remedies

unavailable where prison personnel prevent prisoner access to

grievance forms).

But “unavailability” extends beyond “affirmative

misconduct” to omissions by prison personnel, particularly

failing to inform the prisoner ofthe grievance process. SeeKing,

781 F.3d at 895–96 (remedies unavailable where prisoner

transferred between two correctional facilities had no access to

grievance process and where later allotted time for filing

grievance was impracticable); White v. Bukowski, 800 F.3d 392,

397 (7th Cir. 2015) (remedies unavailable where prisoner was

“[u]ninformed about any deadline forfiling a grievance”). It is

not incumbent on the prisoner ”to divine the availability” of

grievance procedures. King, 781 F.3d at 896. Rather, prison

officials must inform the prisoner about the grievance process.

See Kaba 458 F.3d at 684; King, 781 F.3d at 896. The prison

cannot shroud the prisonerin a veil of ignorance and then hide

behind a failure to exhaust defense to avoid liability. See King,

781 F.3d at 893 (“Prison authorities cannot immunize

themselves from suit by establishing procedures that in

practice are not available.” (citation omitted)).

Here, Defendants failed to inform Hernandez of the

grievance process while he was hospitalized. This removes the

exhaustion requirement for his excessive force claim. Hernan‐

dez alleges that he was shackled to his hospital bed during his

stays at Thorek, Cermak, and Stroger from March 9, 2013, to

April 18, 2013. He states that no one gave him the Handbook

during this period, and that no one told him about the CCDOC

grievance process. The shackling ended when he was

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No. 15‐2493 11

dischargedfrom the hospital onApril 18. 2013. This means that

Hernandez had until May 3, 2013, to file his grievance. But

there is no evidence that he knew about the grievance process

during this time period, and Defendants have not produced

any evidence to the contrary. Because Defendants have failed

to carry their burden, we hold that the grievance process was

unavailable to Hernandez during the relevant period. The

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply.

A final note. The district court found that Hernandez’s oral

complaint about the shackling constituted a valid grievance.

This conclusion about the efficacy of an oral grievance was, in

the end, academic. The determinative issue is whether the

CCDOC informed or failed to inform Hernandez of the

grievance process. See King, 781 F.3d at 896. If the prison had

informed him of the process, he would have needed to exhaust

in the manner specified—that is, he must have filed in writing.

But CCDOC personnel did not inform him of the grievance

process. Accordingly, the grievance process was unavailable,

lifting the exhaustion requirement under the PLRA. Kaba, 458

F.3d at 684. The effect of the oral complaint is of no moment.

In conclusion, Hernandez’s excessive force claim is

properly in federal court, and the district court erred by

granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

2. Deliberate Indifference Claim

Hernandez’s deliberate indifference claim regarding the

refusal to help him move between his jerry chair and his bed

is also properly in federal court, simply because he exhausted

the available administrative remedies. Unlike the excessive

force claim, Hernandez was aware of the grievance process

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when the alleged incident with prison personnel occurred on

August 2, 2013. Thus, administrative remedies were

“available” to him, and he was required to exhaust these

remedies under the PLRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford,

548 U.S. at 93. Specifically, he had to file his original grievance

within fifteen days of the alleged incident, and had to file a

subsequent appeal within fourteen days of receipt of the

administrative response to the grievance.

Hernandez complied with this procedure. He filed his

grievance on August 3, 2013. In the grievance, he alleged that

the incident in question occurred on August 2, 2013. His filing

was well within the 15‐day period outlined in the CCDOC

grievance process. Further, he received the Cermak response

to his complaint on September 11, 2013, and filed his appeal

on September 17, 2013. This was also well within the allotted

period. Defendants have not produced evidence that

contradicts these facts and have not carried their burden of

demonstrating failure to exhaust. Hernandez exhausted his

administrative remedies andthedistrict court erredingranting

summary judgment for Defendants on the deliberate

indifference claim.

III.  CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of

the district court and REMAND the case for further

proceedings.

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