Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00204/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00204-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Mark Tillery, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

J.T. Shartle, 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 16-0204-TUC-CKJ (LAB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2241, filed on April 11, 2016, by David Mark Tillery, an inmate confined in the U.S.

Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona. (Doc. 1) 

Also pending is a motion for summary judgment filed by the petitioner on September 23,

2016. (Doc. 17)

Pursuant to the Local Rules, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Bowman for

report and recommendation. LRCiv 72.2(a)(2).

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order denying the petition. Tillery’s claims arising out of his conviction

by military court-martial were “fully and fairly” considered by the military courts. Any claim

not previously raised has been waived. 

Summary of the Case

Staff Sergeant (SSG) Tillery was found guilty after a trial by general court-martial of

premeditated murder, sodomy, and adultery. (Doc. 31-5, pp. 18-19); (App’x 692-93) The court

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sentenced Tillery to life with the possibility of parole, reduction of rank, forfeiture of pay, and

dishonorable discharge. Id.

Tillery had been conducting an affair with the victim’s wife, Mrs. Adams. (Doc. 31-1,

pp. 128-130); (App’x 365-367) The affair began in late 1997 or early 1998 when Mrs. Adams

was living with her husband on the McChord Air Force Base near Tacoma, Washington. Id.

When Tillery received orders to move to Ft. Benning, GA, he asked Mrs. Adams to move with

him. Id. She refused because she did not want to leave her husband. Id. Nevertheless, Tillery

continued to speak with Mrs. Adams every day. Id. They drew “cards showing the ‘Tillery

Family,’ which included . . . Mrs. Adams, and their future children.” Id. “He told her there

were times where he felt like knocking down the door and killing her husband.” Id. 

In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Adams and her husband were transferred to Fayetteville, NC.

(Doc. 31-1, p. 131); (App’x 368) On several occasions, Tillery traveled to Fayetteville to visit

Mrs. Adams. Id. Mrs. Adams showed Tillery where she lived with her husband. Id.

“[W]henever she tried to break the affair off, he persisted in keeping their relationship alive.”

Id.

 On the morning of April 13, 2000, Tillery rented a green Dodge Stratus from Budget Car

Rental at the Atlanta airport. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 131-132); (App’x 368-369) Accompanied by his

brother, Tillery drove from Atlanta to Fayetteville, NC. Id. That same morning, Tillery

received two calls on his cell phone. Id. He told his coworker that he was driving around

Atlanta waiting for his brother to arrive. Id. In fact, cell tower data showed that he was in

Fayetteville, NC when he received the calls. Id.

Tillery and his brother drove to Mrs. Adams’s house. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 132-4); (App’x

369-71) A neighbor, Jerry Lester, saw a green Dodge parked in the middle of the street. Id.

“He saw two black males walking up the steps toward the porch of one of the houses.” Id.

Another neighbor, Stephanie Berry, also noticed the green Dodge Stratus. Id. She saw two men

in the car. Id. She testified that the man in the passenger seat looked like the rapper Biggie

Smalls, a husky African-American male like Tillery’s brother. Id. The man in the backseat

“was a black male with a low-top haircut and a basketball jersey.” Id. She testified that man

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looked like Tillery. Id. Her identification was somewhat problematic however. Id. The first

time she was shown a photo lineup, she failed to recognize Tillery. Id. She did recognize him

later, but that was after seeing his picture in the newspaper. Id.

When the husband returned home, Tillery and his brother entered the house, tied the

husband hand and foot, and shot him in the head. (Doc. 31-1, p. 134); (App’x 371) Tillery

drove back to Atlanta and returned the rental car. Id. The vehicle had been driven 844 miles.

Id. Fayetteville is approximately 405 miles from Atlanta. Id. 

Investigators became convinced that Tillery was responsible for the murder. (Doc. 31-1,

p. 135); (App’x 372) In May of 2000, they had Mrs. Adams contact Tillery and ask him to pick

her up in Lumberton, NC. Id. When he arrived, he was arrested. Id. 

Shortly afterwards, Staff Sergeant Ronnie Slack informed the authorities that in midApril, Tillery had given him a briefcase to hold for safe-keeping. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 135-136);

(App’x 372-373) The case contained Tillery’s correspondence with Mrs. Adams, naked

pictures of the two, and a video that supported the sodomy charge. Id.

Tillery was first tried for murder by the state of North Carolina. (Doc. 31-1, p. 137);

(App’x 374) On May 22, 2002, the ninth day of trial, the trial court dismissed the charge for

insufficient evidence. Id.

On November 19, 2002, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory C. Kane preferred charges against

Tillery. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 137-140); (App’x 374-377) His recommendation was sent to special

court-martial convening authority Colonel Gordon Mereness. Id. Mereness was informed that

the state court had dismissed the charges against Tillery, and he knew that there was an Army

policy against successive prosecutions. Id. Nevertheless, he “recommended a general courtmartial based on his assessment of the evidence.” Id. Mereness forwarded the charge sheet to

Major General Paul Eaton. Id. Eaton referred the case to a general court-martial on March 7,

2003. Id. He knew that successive prosecutions were out of the ordinary, but he believed

administrative action was inadequate to resolve an allegation of murder. Id. 

On April 21, 2003, Tillery “filed a motion to dismiss for double jeopardy and selective

prosecution.” (Doc. 31-1, pp. 140-141); (App’x 377-378) The motion was dismissed.

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Tillery was found guilty after a trial by general court-martial of premeditated murder,

sodomy, and adultery. (Doc. 31-5, pp. 18-19); (App’x 692-93) The court sentenced Tillery

to life with the possibility of parole, reduction of rank, forfeiture of pay, and dishonorable

discharge. Id. 

Tillery filed an appeal with the Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) arguing,

among other things, that his prosecution violated Double Jeopardy and the evidence was legally

and factually insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 205, 251-284); (App’x

442, 488-521) The ACCA affirmed the “findings of guilt and the sentence.” (Doc. 31-1, p.

123); (App’x 360)

Tillery then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF).

(Doc. 31-1, p. 52); (App’x 289) He argued, among other things, that he was denied due process

when he was court-martialed contrary to Army procedural requirements for successive

prosecutions, his prosecution violated Double Jeopardy, there was a bar to prosecution because

he had been granted de facto immunity by his chain of command, counsel was ineffective for

failing to argue Tillery had been granted immunity, and the military waived its jurisdiction over

the murder charge. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 59-61); (App’x 296-298) The CAAF affirmed the decision

of the ACCA on April 1, 2008. (Doc. 31-1, p. 52); (App’x 289)

Tillery’s petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court was denied on June

23, 2008. (Doc. 31-1, p. 30); (App’x 267) He filed petitions for writ of mandamus and writ

of habeas corpus, but they were denied by the ACCA on July 22, 2008. (Doc. 31, p. 177);

(App’x 171) The CAAF denied the petitions on November 5, 2008. (Doc. 31, pp. 17-18);

(App’x 11-12)

On April 11, 2016, Tillery filed in this court the pending petition for writ of habeas

corpus. (Doc. 1) He claims (1)(a) his conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, (b) his

conviction violates Paragraph 153(a) of the Manual for Courts-Martial because it was based on

uncorroborated testimony, (c) the government waived jurisdiction to the State of North

Carolina, (d) he was not permitted to introduce the testimony of Linwood Ramsey to impeach

Stephanie Berry’s testimony, (e) Stephanie Berry listened to other witnesses’ testimony, (f)

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Stephanie Berry’s eyewitness identification was of little evidentiary value and (2) defense

counsel was ineffective pursuant to Strickland for (a) failing to file a subpoena to secure

testimony from Linwood Ramsey to impeach the testimony of Stephanie Berry, (b) failing to

argue waiver of jurisdiction, and (c) failing to argue the conviction was based on uncorroborated

testimony under Paragraph 153(a). (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5) 

On September 23, 2016, Tillery filed the pending motion for summary judgment. (Doc.

17) The court construes this filing as a supplemental brief in support of his petition for writ of

habeas corpus. See, e.g., Seehausen v. Van Buren, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (D. Or. 2002)

(construing request for partial summary judgment “as memorandum in support of the petition”).

The respondent filed an answer on October 18, 2016. (Doc. 29) He argues that

“Petitioner is not entitled to relief as his claims were fully and fairly considered by the military

courts, and any claim not previously raised has been waived.” (Doc. 29, p. 2)

On November 7, 2016, Tillery filed a reply brief in which he argues that his claims are

meritorious. (Doc. 35) He does not address the respondent’s arguments concerning this court’s

standard of review.

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Review is

limited, however, if the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a judgment imposed by a military

court-martial. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139-42, 73 S. Ct. 1045, 1047-48 (1953). Military

law is a separate area of jurisprudence with its own specialized system of rights and procedures.

Id. And civilian courts must show deference to “the fair determination of the military

tribunals.” Burns, 346 U.S. at 142, 73 S. Ct. at 1048. “[W]hen a military decision has dealt

fully and fairly with an allegation raised in that application [for habeas corpus], it is not open

to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence.” Burns, 346 U.S.

at 142, 73 S. Ct. at 1049.

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If “a military decision has dealt fully and fairly” with the petitioner’s claim, then the

court’s inquiry is at an end, and the claim is denied. Id. The court will consider a claim de novo

only if “the military courts manifestly refused to consider” the petitioner’s claim. Id. 

The petitioner is responsible for giving the military a fair opportunity to address his issue

in the first instance. If the petitioner’s issue was properly briefed, it is presumed that the

military court dealt fully and fairly with it even if the court disposed of the issue summarily.

Armann v. McKean, 549 F.3d 279, 293 (3rd Cir. 2008); Roberts v. Callahan, 321 F.3d 994, 997

(10th Cir. 2003). If the petitioner failed to raise his issue before the military courts of appeals,

his issue is waived absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Davis v. Marsh, 876 F.2d 1446,

1448 (9th Cir. 1989).

In Claim (1)(a), Tillery argues his prosecution by military authorities violated double

jeopardy because he had previously been prosecuted in North Carolina state court. This claim

was raised in his appeal before the ACCA. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 205, 251-284); (App’x 442, 488-

521) The ACCA denied his appeal “[o]n consideration of the entire record, including

consideration of the issues personally specified by the appellant.” (Doc. 31-1, p. 123); (App’x

360) The issue was raised a second time before the CAAF. (Doc. 31-1, p. 59, 88-100); (App’x

296, 325-337) The CAAF denied his appeal “[o]n consideration of the petition for grant of

review.” (Doc. 31-1, p. 52); (App’x 289) Absent any evidence to the contrary, this court will

presume that those courts gave the claim full and fair consideration. Armann, 549 F.3d at 293;

Roberts, 321 F.3d at 997. Accordingly, Tillery is not entitled to relief on this claim.

In Claim (1)(c), Tillery argues the government waived jurisdiction to the State of North

Carolina. This claim was raised on appeal before the CAAF. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 61, 113); (App’x

298, 350) The CAAF denied his appeal “[o]n consideration of the petition for grant of review.”

(Doc. 31-1, p. 52); (App’x 289) Absent any evidence to the contrary, this court will presume

that the CAAF gave the claim full and fair consideration. Armann, 549 F.3d at 293; Roberts,

321 F.3d at 997. Accordingly, Tillery is not entitled to relief on this claim.

In Claim (2)(b), Tillery argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the

government waived its jurisdiction over this prosecution. He raised this claim before the

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CAAF. (Doc. 31-1, pp. 113, 119, 120); (App’x 350, 356, 357) The CAAF denied his appeal

“[o]n consideration of the petition for grant of review.” (Doc. 31-1, p. 52); (App’x 289)

Absent any evidence to the contrary, this court will presume that the CAAF gave the claim full

and fair consideration. Armann, 549 F.3d at 293; Roberts, 321 F.3d at 997. Accordingly,

Tillery is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Tillery’s other claims were not raised before the military courts. They are waived.

Tillery does not argue in his reply brief that these waivers should be excused by showing cause

for his failure and evidence of prejudice. (Doc. 35); see Davis v. Marsh, 876 F.2d 1446, 1448

(9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, these claims should be denied.

In the alternative, the court finds that if Tillery’s waivers were excused and the claims

were considered de novo, they would be denied on the merits. 

In Claim (1)(b), Tillery argues his conviction is improperly based on “uncorroborated

testimony in violation of the manual for Courts-Martial Paragraph 153(a).” (Doc. 1, p. 4) In

support of his argument, Tillery cites to United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct.

528, (1969). In that case, the Supreme Court discussed “the provision in paragraph 153(a) of

the Manual for Courts-Martial which states that the court-martial ‘cannot’ base a conviction

‘upon the uncorroborated testimony of a purported accomplice in any case, if such testimony

is self-contradictory, uncertain, or improbable.’” Augenblick, 393 U.S. at 352, 89 S.Ct. at 531

(emphasis added); see also United States v. Sanders, 34 M.J. 1086, 1090-93 (A.F.C.M.R. 1992)

(Although this section of the Manual was eliminated in 1984, the evidentiary rule remains good

law.). 

The provision of paragraph 153(a) that Tillery cites does not apply to his case because

no testimony was presented from a “purported accomplice.” Tillery’s argument that Stephanie

Berry’s testimony was “uncertain, uncorroborated and improbable” is misplaced. She was not

a “purported accomplice,” so her testimony did not violate this provision. This claim fails on

the merits.

In Claim (1)(d), Tillery argues he was not permitted to introduce the testimony of

Linwood Ramsey to show Stephanie Berry’s testimony was “uncorroborated, uncertain and

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improbable.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 13) According to Tillery, Ramsey would have testified that at 3:00

p.m. on April 13, 2000, when he went to his mailbox, he did not see Berry’s blue Toyota in her

driveway contrary to her testimony that she was at home between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.

(Doc. 1-1, pp. 13, 23) He argues this error violated the “due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 14) He also argues this error violated his Sixth Amendment right

to compulsory process. (Doc. 1-1, p. 26)

The record does not support Tillery’s claim. The government did try to secure Ramsey’s

testimony for trial, but he was unavailable. (Doc. 31-5, p. 200); (App’x 876) (Article 39(a)

hearing, May 9, 2003) The government did not prevent Tillery from presenting Ramsey’s

testimony. Furthermore, even of Ramsey’s testimony had been offered, it would not have

contradicted Berry’s testimony as Tillery argues. Berry saw the petitioner’s green vehicle when

she and her daughter were driving away from their house. (Doc. 31-5, pp. 207, 222); (App’x

883, 898) Ramsey saw the green vehicle when he went to his mailbox at 3:00 p.m. (Doc. 31-5,

p. 208); (App’x 884) He did not see Berry’s blue Toyota in the parking lot at that time. This

means that Ramsey saw the green vehicle just after Berry drove away with her daughter. It does

not mean that Berry’s testimony was false. This claim also fails on the merits.

In Claim (1)(e), Tillery asserts that after Stephanie Berry testified at his original trial in

state court, she remained in the court and listened to all the other witnesses testify. (Doc. 1-1,

p. 6) He argues that she could have unintentionally shaded her testimony at his court-martial

to conform with these other witnesses. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 6, 18) Tillery argues that his due process

rights were violated. (Doc. 17, p. 3) 

Tillery provides no evidence, however, that Berry’s testimony changed after she listened

to the testimony of the other witnesses. He has made no showing of prejudice. Accordingly,

this claim fails on the merits. See, e.g., United States v. Valencia-Riascos, 696 F.3d 938, 942-43

(9th Cir. 2012) (Trial court’s decision to allow law enforcement officer to sit at the

prosecution’s table and testify at the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief did not violate due

process without a showing of prejudice.).

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In Claim (1)(f), Tillery complains that Berry was unable to identify his picture the first

time she was shown a photographic line-up, but she identified him later after she saw his picture

in the newspaper. He argues Berry’s testimony was perjured, and the use of her testimony

violated due process. 

Tillery, however, has not provided any evidence that Berry’s testimony was perjured.

It is possible that she failed to recognize Tillery in the first photo line-up, but she had her

memory refreshed when she saw his picture in the newspaper. Inconsistency, by itself, is not

proof of perjury. But even if it was, the use of perjured testimony does not violate due process

unless the prosecution actually knows or believes the testimony to be false or perjured. Giglio

v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). And Tillery presents no evidence to prove that

the prosecution presented Berry’s testimony knowing it was false, assuming for the sake of

argument that it was. See, e.g., Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.

denied, 356 U.S. 978 (2002) (“[D]ue process is not implicated by the prosecution’s introduction

or allowance of false or perjured testimony unless the prosecution actually knows or believes

the testimony to be false or perjured; it is not enough that the testimony is challenged by another

witness or is inconsistent with prior statements.”). The court finds, in the alternative, that this

claim fails on the merits.

In Claim (2)(a) and (2)(c), Tillery argues counsel was ineffective in violation of

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Strickland sets the standard

for effective assistance pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Id. The Sixth Amendment right to

counsel, however, does not apply to trial before a court-martial. Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d

358, 359-360 (9th Cir. 1973). 

Here, Tillery was appointed counsel pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 827. The failure of counsel

to perform effectively would presumably violate the due process clause, but only if his trial was

so unfair that “the proceeding is more a spectacle . . . or trial by orde[]al . . . than a disciplined

contest.” United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356, 89 S. Ct. 528, 534 (1969). Tillery

does not allege facts to show his trial was so unfair as to violate due process.

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Tillery argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a subpoena to secure

testimony from Linwood Ramsey to impeach the testimony of Stephanie Berry. As the court

noted above, however, the underlying argument has no merit. Ramsey’s testimony does not

show Berry’s testimony was false. Counsel’s alleged failure did not prejudice Tillery’s case.

Tillery further argues that counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise the Paragraph

153(a) evidentiary issue. As the court noted above, however, the underlying evidentiary issue

has no merit. Counsel’s alleged failure caused no prejudice.

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DENYING the petition for writ of habeas corpus and DENYING

the motion for summary judgment filed on September 23, 2016. (Doc. 1); (Doc. 17)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Reply briefs are not permitted without permission

from the district court.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2016.

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