Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00091/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00091-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shawn D. Catz, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Susan R. Chalker, et al.,

Defendants. 

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CV 03-91-TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Defendant TIAA-CREF's Motion for Award of Attorneys'

Fees filed on October 2, 2006. (Doc. No. 125.) Plaintiff Robert Catz (“Catz”) filed a response

on October 17, 2006 (Doc. No. 131) in which Plaintiff Jason Catz (“J. Catz”) joined. (Doc.

No. 132.) Defendant TIAA-CREF timely replied. (Doc. No. 137.)

Also pending before the Court is Defendants Karp & Everlove and Susan Chalker's

("Chalker Defendants") Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees filed on October 5, 2006. (Doc.

No. 129.) Plaintiff Robert Catz filed a response on October 17, 2006 (Doc. No. 131) in

which Plaintiffs Shawn Catz (“S. Catz”) and J. Catz joined. (Doc. Nos. 133, 134.) The

Chalker Defendants timely replied. (Doc. No. 138.)

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was assigned to Magistrate

Judge Guerin for a report and recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends the

District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order granting the motions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The preliminary facts of this case are set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Catz v. Chalker,

142 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 1998), as amended in 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001):

Case 4:03-cv-00091-FRZ Document 154 Filed 08/30/07 Page 1 of 16
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2

Catz and Chalker, lawyers and former law professors, were married in 1980

and they had one child born of this marriage. On April 10, 1989, while Catz

was living in Ohio and Chalker was living in Florida, Catz filed for divorce in

Ohio. When Chalker did not answer, Catz was awarded a judgment of divorce

by default. Chalker alleges that she was never served with the divorce

summons and complaint because Catz sent them to a mailing address in

Florida where they would be intercepted by Catz's friend and not delivered to

her. She asserts that she did not learn of the Ohio divorce decree until late

1994. Whatever accounted for Chalker's absence, the Ohio court, after

determining that the couple had not intermingled their personal property,

awarded Catz his personal property located in Ohio and awarded Chalker her

personal property then in her possession. (The judgment entry contained no

mention of the financial assets now at issue.) The court declined to adjudicate

custody of the child.

After the Ohio divorce decree, Catz and Chalker continued to see one another,

and, according to Chalker, comported themselves as a married couple by

applying as such for insurance and club memberships. Catz, however, alleges

that during this period Chalker indicated that she was divorced on tax and

student-loan forms. Whatever their marital status, in 1993 they moved to

Arizona together.

On November 4, 1994, Chalker filed for divorce in the Pima County, Arizona,

Superior Court, and on December 1, moved ex parte for a temporary

restraining order barring the transfer of funds, claimed by her as community

property, that were invested with entities including (to name those that are

parties to the present actions) TIAA/CREF, Waterhouse Securities, and a

number of mutual funds in the Fidelity group. In support of the motion,

Chalker filed affidavits by herself and by a friend of the couple averring that

Catz had vowed to put the assets out of Chalker's reach. The court granted

Chalker's motion the same day the affidavits were filed.

Catz claims that he did not receive notice of Chalker's divorce action until

December 14, 1994, over five weeks after it was filed and two weeks after the

TRO. He then immediately filed an “emergency motion” to dismiss in the

same court, on the grounds that the Ohio divorce decree, including its division

of property, had to be given full faith and credit. Catz further alleged that the TRO freezing his assets would cause him severe hardship, including the

destruction of his business as a concert promoter and bar owner, and render

him unable to pay rent and other personal obligations.

The Arizona court initially scheduled a hearing on Catz's motion for December

19, 1994, but then-according to Catz, as a result of collusion between the

court's chief judge and Chalker's counsel, a pro tempore judge of the

court-continued the hearing until an January 11, 1995.

On December 19, Catz filed a notice of removal of the divorce action in the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging federal

jurisdiction based on the divorce action's purported collateral attack, on federal

equal protection and due process grounds, on the Ohio divorce decree. On

January 12, 1995, that federal court remanded the case to state court, reasoning

that it was a domestic relations controversy over which it would be

inappropriate to exercise federal jurisdiction. (On March 14, 1995, Catz filed

a second notice of removal in the district court; on March 31, the court

remanded and ordered the clerk not to accept further pleadings from Catz

without permission of the court.)

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 In two previous orders, the District Court took judicial notice of the pleadings, briefs,

memoranda and motions filed in the underlying and related litigation. (Doc. Nos. 122 & 123.)

3

Also on December 19, 1994, Catz filed in the district court a § 1983 complaint

(“the first Arizona federal action”) alleging that Chalker's resonantly-named

divorce attorneys, Annette Everlove and Leonard Karp, had deprived him of

due process “by invoking the machinery of the State of Arizona to effect an ex

parte seizure of his property after they were aware of the possible existence of

a prior controlling state court judgment.” Catz's complaint also alleged that

Chalker and her lawyers had fraudulently concealed the existence of the Ohio

divorce decree from the Arizona court. In April 1995, for reasons unexplained,

Catz filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action.

On December 20, 1994, Catz separately filed, in the same court, an action

(“the second Arizona federal action”) against Chalker seeking a declaratory

judgment that Chalker had been properly served in the Ohio divorce

proceeding. This action also included a § 1983 claim against Chalker similar

to the one alleged in the first Arizona federal action against Chalker's

attorneys. On April 10, 1995, he filed a motion for voluntary dismissal without

prejudice in the second action, too. Chalker, however, filed a brief in

opposition, and the district court, adopting by reference the reasons stated in

Chalker's brief, dismissed the case with prejudice on June 8, 1995.

Meanwhile, claiming that the freezing of his accounts had left him destitute and homeless, Catz left Arizona in early 1995 for Nashville, Tennessee, to take

refuge with his sons, Shawn and Jason. Thus, he was not in Arizona during the

remainder of the ongoing divorce proceedings in Pima County Superior Court.

Catz claims that he sent a change of address form to that court, showing that he had moved to Nashville, but that the court refused to receive this form,

which Catz suggests contributed to his receiving notices of deposition and

hearing dates only after they occurred. After Catz failed to appear at a

February 9, 1995 deposition, Chalker moved for sanctions. Catz claims that the

hearing on that motion was held without notice to him. Nevertheless, the court

found that Catz's failure to appear was part of a pattern of “unreasonable,

groundless, abusive, or obstructionist conduct,” held him in contempt, and

barred him from filing further pleadings, answers, or from introducing

evidence.

On March 14, 1995, the Pima County court, again with Catz absent, ruled that

Catz had fraudulently obtained his Ohio divorce, and refused to give the Ohio

divorce decree full faith and credit. In light of Catz's failure to appear, the

court granted Chalker's petition of divorce by default. The decree awarded

Chalker all the funds frozen by the TRO, $1,000 per month in maintenance,

and $700 per month in child support. Catz submitted a motion to vacate these

orders, but the clerk did not file his motion, and returned it to Catz only after

the time to file a notice of appeal had expired. He attempted to file a special

appeal, but the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction, and

the Arizona Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Catz filed a petition for

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Catz v.

McDonald, 520 U.S. 1168, 117 S.Ct. 1433, 137 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997).1

Id. at 281-83. 

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2

 Plaintiffs’ action consists of two complaints which were consolidated in the Tennessee

district court and remained consolidated upon transfer to this jurisdiction; the complaints are

essentially identical but for the fact that one complaint seeks damages and one complaint seeks

equitable relief. (Doc. Nos. 51, 52.) 

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On July 27, 1995, Catz filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio against the Chalker Defendants and sought a temporary restraining

order against the financial institutions holding the assets awarded to Chalker by the Pima

County court to bar them from disbursing those funds. Catz, 142 F3d. at 283-84. The Ohio

district court dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at 284. Catz also filed an action in the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee; that action was also

dismissed. Id. at 290. Catz appealed both dismissals, which were consolidated before the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 282. The Sixth Circuit affirmed

in part and reversed in part the decision of the Ohio district court, and reversed and remanded

the decision of the Tennessee district court. Id. at 290, 295. Following remand, the

Tennessee action was transferred to this Court on February 4, 2003, giving rise to the present

action. (Doc. No. 1, 31.)

Following the transfer of Plaintiffs’ action to this Court, Plaintiffs were ordered to file

amended complaints2

 that eliminated allegations and claims that were barred in light of the

Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Catz. (Doc. No. 50.) On February 7, 2005, Plaintiffs filed

amended complaints against the Chalker Defendants, TIAA-CREF, Fidelity Investments, and

Waterhouse Securities alleging a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim as well as claims

for negligence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

abuse of process, wrongful attachment and “constructive trust for equitable disgorgement of

misbegotten grossly excessive attorneys fees.” (Doc. Nos. 51 & 52.) The District Court

dismissed Plaintiffs’ action on September 19, 2006 on the ground that Plaintiffs’ claims were

precluded by previous litigation, with the exception of a Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim. (Doc. No. 123.) The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., on the ground that

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Defendants were not state actors. Shortly after the judgment was entered, Defendants

moved for award of their fees incurred in defending the action. 

DISCUSSION

1. Defendant TIAA-CREF’s motion for attorneys’ fees

a. TIAA-CREF is not entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Defendant TIAA-CREF argues that it is entitled to its attorneys’ fees pursuant to the

Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The case construction of § 1988

indicates that, in a § 1983 action, a prevailing party defendant can recover fees if it

demonstrates that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, vexatious or meritless. See

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). This argument cannot

succeed, however, because the district court has already construed Plaintiffs' complaint as

alleging a § 1983 claim only against the Chalker Defendants. (Doc. No. 123, pgs. 12-17.)

The district court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the Chalker Defendants in part on the

ground that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim failed because Plaintiff did not allege that the Chalker

Defendants were state actors. (Id.) The district court then concluded Defendant TIAACREF's motion for summary judgment was moot because the dismissal resolved the entire

case against the real parties in interest. (Id. at n.12.) Specifically, the Court stated:

TIAA-CREF, like Waterhouse Securities and Fidelity Investments, are simply

disinterested stakeholders of various securities accounts who have withheld

distributing all of the funds in question because the real parties in interest have

both asserted that they are the rightful owners. As this Order has conclusively

found that the private Defendants are not liable to Plaintiffs, and this case has

been dismissed with prejudice as to all parties, the Court need not address

TIAA-CREF's motion for summary judgment. 

Review of the amended complaint does not reveal that Plaintiffs asserted a § 1983 claim

against TIAA-CREF. Accordingly, § 1988 is not a proper basis from which TIAA-CREF

can seek attorneys’ fees.

b. TIAA-CREF is entitled to an award of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Defendant TIAA-CREF also argues that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1927, which provides that "any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases

in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings

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3

 TIAA-CREF also argues the reasonableness of its fees in compliance with LRCiv 54.2,

the local rule which governs claims for attorneys’ fees. LRCiv 54.2 does not apply, however, to

claims for attorneys’ fees and related expenses for violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See LRCiv

54.2(a).

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in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally

the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."

Section 1927 sanctions may be awarded against a pro se plaintiff who is a lawyer. See

Sassover vs. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1992). Section 1927 is “concerned only with

limiting the abuse of court processes” and is “indifferent to the equities of a dispute and to

the values advanced by the substantive law.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,

762 (1980). The law of this circuit requires that imposition of costs and fees under § 1927

may be made only on a finding that the attorney acted “‘recklessly or in bad faith.’” United

States v. Associated Convalescent Enters., 766 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1985) (quoting

United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.1983) and Barnd v. City of Tacoma,

664 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir.1982)). The “mere fact that a [pleading] is frivolous does not

of itself establish bad faith.” United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.1983).

Hence, the “bad faith” factor in part distinguishes § 1927 from other sanction provisions,

such as Fed.R.App.P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982), which permit imposition of damages

and costs on parties for frivolous appeals.

TIAA-CREF argues that Plaintiffs’ actions unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied

the proceedings because (a) TIAA-CREF’s actions challenged in this matter were at the

direction of a previous Pima County Superior Court order to which Plaintiffs did not object,

(b) Plaintiffs’ action sought relief which Plaintiffs knew could not be granted, and (c)

Plaintiffs initially indicated that they would dismiss TIAA-CREF from the lawsuit, but then

reneged on that agreement.3

 In response, Plaintiffs contend that the Sixth Circuit’s decision

in related proceedings gave them a good faith basis for filing the present action against

TIAA-CREF in this Court.

As the District Court noted in its Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ action on September 19,

2006, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 1998), as

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amended in 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001), is the most important precedent in this longstanding case, as the Sixth Circuit finally had the opportunity to review in one proceeding

the numerous claims stemming from the cases that had been dismissed in Arizona, Ohio, and

Tennessee. (Doc. No. 123.) In that case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that each of Plaintiffs’

claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata with one exception: Catz's claim that

actions of the Pima County Superior Court taken or discovered subsequent to April 10, 1995,

were in contravention of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 289,

290. Catz presented only two factual allegations against the Pima County Superior Court

which occurred or were discovered by Catz subsequent to April 10, 1995: (1) a due-process

violation in the failure of the Pima County court clerk to file motions for post-judgment relief

that Catz mailed on March 29, 1995, followed by the clerk’s delay in mailing the unfiled

motions back to Catz prior to expiration of the time for direct appeal, and (2) an alleged

“clandestine, ex parte ” meeting between Chalker's attorney, Karp, and the chief judge of the

Pima County Superior Court on December 16, 1994, which Catz did not discover until Karp

filed an application for attorney fees on May 5, 1995, in which Karp itemized that meeting

as billable time. Id. at 288. The Sixth Circuit expressly held that Plaintiffs did not have a

viable claim against the Chalker Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Plaintiffs’ due process

claim would lie only against the Pima County Superior Court. Id. at 289. 

Plaintiffs’ amended complaints failed to name the Pima County Superior Court or its

agents as Defendants, instead alleging a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim as well

as claims for negligence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, abuse of process, wrongful attachment and “constructive trust for equitable

disgorgement of misbegotten grossly excessive attorneys fees” against the Chalker

Defendants and naming TIAA-CREF and other financial institutions as disinterested

stakeholders. (Doc. Nos. 51 & 52.) Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the Sixth Circuit’s

decision did not give them a good faith basis for filing the present action against TIAACREF in this Court, as Plaintiffs’ amended complaints were completely unrelated and outside

the scope of the one surviving claim that the Sixth Circuit identified for Plaintiffs: a due

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process claim against the Pima County Superior Court. As the District Court noted in

dismissing Plaintiffs’ action, Plaintiffs acted “in dereliction of this Court’s Order” by

asserting countless allegations and claims that were barred by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion.

(Doc. No. 123.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ actions required Defendants to defend a patently meritless

lawsuit clearly foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata.

It is especially appropriate to impose sanctions in situations where the doctrines of res

judicata and collateral estoppel plainly preclude re-litigation of the suit. McLaughlin v.

Bradlee, 602 F.Supp. 1412, 1417 (D.C. Dist. 1985) (collecting cases). The imposition of

sanctions is one of the few options available to a court to deter and punish people who

relitigate cases hopelessly foreclosed. Id. In the present case, the Court’s finding that

Plaintiffs’ claims were precluded by previous litigation could not have been a surprise to

Plaintiffs, since the Sixth Circuit had already reached the same conclusion. In addition, the

district court essentially warned Plaintiffs not to re-assert claims barred by previous litigation

when it ordered Plaintiffs to file amended complaints that eliminated allegations and claims

that were barred in light of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Catz. (Doc. No. 50.) Plaintiffs’

actions in pursuing clearly barred claims supports an award of sanctions pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1927.

Previous cautions by a court and/or sanctions against a plaintiff also constitutes

evidence of vexatious intent. See McLaughlin, 602 F.Supp. at 1418. Catz has received

numerous such warnings by this Court and others during the course of this litigation. In

March of 1995, after Catz filed duplicative lawsuits in this Court, the Court resorted to

issuing an order directing the Clerk of the Court not to accept further pleadings from Catz

without the Court’s permission. See Catz, 142 F.3d at 283. In June of 1995, this Court

dismissed with prejudice a lawsuit filed by Catz against Chalker arising from the same facts

which form the basis of this lawsuit on the ground that Catz was abusing the federal legal

system in order to intimidate Chalker. Id. at 287. Also in 1995, the Pima County Superior

Court found that Catz had engaged in “unreasonable, groundless, abusive or obstructionist

conduct,” held him in contempt, and barred him from filing future pleadings. Id. at 283. In

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1998, the Sixth Circuit admonished Plaintiffs for making misrepresentations to the Sixth

Circuit: Plaintiffs stated to the Sixth Circuit that this Court had dismissed one of Catz’s

previous actions for want of a federal question, when in fact this Court dismissed the action

on the ground that Catz was abusing the federal legal system. Id. at 287, n.7. Plaintiffs’

conduct, in the face of abundant warnings from the courts, further supports a finding that

Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against TIAA-CREF in bad faith.

Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith because it agrees with TIAACREF’s assertion that Plaintiffs deliberately reneged on their initial offer to dismiss TIAACREF from the lawsuit after acknowledging that dismissal of TIAA-CREF was appropriate.

See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 768 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that

district court did not err in assessing costs and attorney fees against plaintiffs and their

attorney under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 because plaintiff’s attorney, in bringing action against

former dealer service representative of automobile manufacturer without grounds and

continuing to assert claims for liability against him with knowledge that there was no factual

or legal basis for claim of liability long after it would have been reasonable and responsible

to have dismissed the claims, acted to multiply the proceedings in an unreasonable and

vexatious manner). In its initial attempts to streamline this litigation, the district court

ordered the parties to file a joint status report. (Doc. No. 50.) In the joint report, Plaintiffs

indicated that they would stipulate to a dismissal of all claims against TIAA-CREF if TIAACREF would stipulate to a consent decree that it would abide by any future order of this

Court regarding the voidness of the Arizona state court’s Qualified Domestic Relations Order

(QDRO). (Id.) Following the filing of Plaintiffs’ amended complaints, TIAA-CREF sent

a letter to Plaintiffs reminding them of this proposed stipulation and requested that it be

dismissed from the action. (TIAA-CREF Motion, Ex. 3.) Plaintiffs failed to respond.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs acted with vexatious intent toward TIAACREF in filing the present action against them, and recommends that TIAA-CREF be

awarded its attorneys’ fees incurred herein.

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4

 Pursuant to prior orders of the Pima County Superior Court, in 1996 TIAA-CREF transferred all funds from Catz’s accounts into accounts in Chalker’s name; of the $515,011.08

transferred from Catz to Chalker in 1996, only $54,000 remained in Chalker’s TIAA-CREF

account in 2005.

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c. TIAA-CREF is entitled to an award of its total fees

Plaintiffs argue that TIAA-CREF should not be entitled to recover the entirety of their

fees incurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 permits a prevailing party to recover only the excess costs,

expenses and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of vexatious conduct by the

opposing party. According to Plaintiffs, TIAA-CREF has not distinguished between the

costs that it would ordinarily incur as a stakeholder defendant in any case and the costs it

incurred as a result of specific acts by Plaintiffs that multiplied the proceedings. In so

arguing, Plaintiffs wrongly assume that some portion of the present litigation against TIAACREF was justified and reasonable. In fact, the entire lawsuit against TIAA-CREF within

this jurisdiction constitutes vexatious conduct by Plaintiffs. As explained in Section 1(b)

above, no portion of Plaintiffs’ amended complaints against TIAA-CREF was justified by

the Sixth Circuit’s holding. TIAA-CREF should not have been forced to defend any portion

of the pending action; accordingly, all of TIAA-CREF’s fees were excess fees incurred

because of Plaintiffs’ conduct.

Plaintiffs further argue that TIAA-CREF over-litigated its defense of this action, filing

a Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment and an opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment when it should have simply filed a Motion for Interpleader

pursuant to Rule 22, Fed. R. Civ. P. While the Court agrees that interpleading the funds

remaining in Chalker’s TIAA-CREF accounts4

 would have been a possible litigation strategy

for TIAA-CREF, the Court will not punish TIAA-CREF for adopting a more zealous defense

strategy in light of Plaintiffs’ conduct. As discussed above, Plaintiffs reneged on an offer to

dismiss TIAA-CREF from this action; TIAA-CREF was then justified in filing a Motion to

Dismiss and for Summary Judgment on the merits of why that dismissal should have

occurred at the outset. The Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment was a concise six

pages. (Doc. No. 67.) TIAA-CREF’s opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary

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Judgment was a one-page document that essentially reiterated the arguments presented in

TIAA-CREF’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 86.) Accordingly,

the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that TIAA-CREF’s fees in this case were excessive.

d. Plaintiffs Catz, J. Catz and S. Catz should be jointly and severally liable for payment of TIAA-CREF’s fees

Section 1927 sanctions may be awarded solely against the attorney who pursues the

vexatious litigation, not his/her clients. See F.T.C. v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., 799 F.2d

507, 510 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, district court could not assess

sanctions against non-attorney). Section 1927 sanctions may, however, be awarded against

a pro se plaintiff proceeding in his/her own right, unrepresented by counsel. See Wages v.

I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to a non-lawyer

pro se litigant); see also Sassover vs. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying 28

U.S.C. § 1927 against a plaintiff who, though acting pro se, was a lawyer). 

Plaintiff Catz, as a pro se litigant who is also a lawyer, was clearly the driving force

behind this litigation, drafting and filing most of Plaintiffs’ pleadings. Catz argues that he

“functionally represented Shawn Catz and Jason Catz” (Opposition to Chalker Defendants’

Motion, pg. 10) and therefore his sons should not also be held liable for fees. However, a

review of the record indicates that J. and S. Catz condoned and in fact supported their

father’s conduct in this matter: J. and S. Catz signed both amended complaints following the

Court’s order that the complaints be amended to omit any claims which were barred by

previous litigation (Doc. Nos. 51, 52); participated in discovery requests (Doc. Nos. 53-56);

filed, with Catz, a motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. No. 57, 62); and filed, with

Catz, a motion to treat Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. No. 72.). S. Catz also joined in Catz’s responses to the Chalker Defendants’ motion

to dismiss and motion for attorneys’ fees, kept the Court apprised of his new address,

inquired as to the status of pending motions, and joined Catz in appealing the Court’s order

dismissing the case (Doc. Nos. 91, 92, 114, 134, 139, 151.) J. Catz also joined in Catz’s

responses to the motions for attorneys’ fees filed by TIAA-CREF and the Chalker

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 In addition, the Court notes that J. Catz graduated from law school in 2002 and was

admitted to practice in 2003. (Opposition to Chalker Defendants' Motion, pg. 10.) The present

action was removed to this Court on February 4, 2003, and therefore the bulk of this litigation

occurred following J. Catz's admission to the practice of law. It can therefore be presumed that

J. Catz was not blindly led into litigation that he did not understand. 

6

 Plaintiffs argue, incorrectly, that the Chalker Defendants’ Motion was not timely filed

pursuant to LRCiv 54.2(b)(1). LR Civ 54.2(b)(1) requires a motion for award of attorneys’ fees

to be filed within fourteen days of the entry of judgment in the action with respect to which the

services were rendered. LRCiv54.2(b)(4) provides that the time periods prescribed in the rule

are to be computed in accordance with Rule 6, Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 6(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., adds

three days to a prescribed time period whenever a party must act after service made pursuant to

Rule 5(b)(2)(B, (C) or (D) (service by mail, clerk of the court or other means consented to by the

party being served). Judgments must be served by the clerk of this Court pursuant to Rule 5(b). 

See Rule 77(d), Fed. R. Civ. P. Thus, the fourteen-day time period set forth in LRCiv 54.2(b)(1)

was enlarged by three days pursuant to the Federal Rules. The judgment was entered on

September 19, 2006. (Doc. No. 124.) Defendants’ Motion was timely filed on October 5, 2006. 

(Doc. No. 129.) 

7

 Claims for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by LRCiv 54.2, which states that a

party seeking an award of attorneys' fees must file a motion for an award of attorneys' fees along

with a supporting memorandum. The memorandum must specifically discuss the moving party's

eligibility for fees, entitlement to fees and the reasonableness of the fee request. The

memorandum must also include supporting documentation, including a task-based itemized

statement of fees and expenses. In the present case, the Chalker Defendants submitted a

memorandum and a task-based itemized statement of fees and expenses in compliance with

LRCiv 54.2. (Doc. No. 129, Ex. A.) A party opposing a motion for an award of attorneys' fees is

required to file a responsive memorandum which identifies with specificity all disputed issues of

material fact and separately identifies each and every disputed time entry and/or expense item. 

See LRCiv 54.2(f). In the present case, Plaintiffs did not comply with LRCiv 54.2(f)'s

requirement that they submit a responsive memorandum which separately identifies each and

every disputed time entry and/or expense item. It is unclear why Plaintiffs elected not to comply

with the requirements of LRCiv 54.2. Plaintiffs were clearly aware of LRCiv 54.2's

requirements, given that Plaintiffs cited to the Local Rule in their Response to the Chalker

Defendants' Motion in support of their claim that the Motion was not timely filed. (Doc. No.

131, pg. 2.)

12

Defendants.5 (Doc. Nos. 132, 133.) Given this active participation by J. Catz and S. Catz in

the pending matter, the Court recommends that all three Plaintiffs be held jointly and

severally liable for TIAA-CREF’s fees in this matter.

2. The Chalker Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees6

a. The Chalker Defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 1983

The Chalker Defendants move for payment of their attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1988, which permits a prevailing party defendant in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to

recover fees if it demonstrates that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, vexatious or meritless.7

See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. 

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The Chalker Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ action was frivolous and meritless

because Plaintiffs knew, or should have known, based upon rulings by this Court and others,

that their claims were barred by res judicata, issue preclusion and failure to state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs counter that the pending action was not meritless because

the Sixth Circuit’s decision left open the possibility that Plaintiffs could pursue a due process

claim against the Chalker Defendants, despite the fact that they were not state actors, under

a judicial collusion theory. 

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs’ claim that the Sixth Circuit’s decision left them with

a valid due process claim against the Chalker Defendants does not begin to explain why

Plaintiffs felt justified in also bringing claims against the Chalker Defendants for negligence,

fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process,

wrongful attachment and “constructive trust for equitable disgorgement of misbegotten

grossly excessive attorneys fees.” (Doc. Nos. 51 & 52.) Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiffs’

assertion, the Sixth Circuit’s decision did not leave a door open for their judicial collusion

theory. As the District Court has already noted, that claim was clearly barred by the Sixth

Circuit’s decision in Catz: 

[Plaintiffs are] reasserting the judicial collusion theory for state action already

rejected by the Sixth Circuit ...The Sixth Circuit was acutely aware of Catz’s

judicial collusion theory for state action as it went into great detail discussing

his alleged due process violations and the allegations of conspiracy between

Karp and a Pima County Superior Court judge ... [nevertheless] the court

addressed Catz’s allegations of constitutional deprivations under 42 U.S.C.§

1983 and § 1985 on the merits, and concluded that the private Defendants in

question could not be liable for the alleged constitutional deprivations as they

were not state actors acting under color of state law.

(Doc. No. 123, pgs. 13-15.) 

As previously stated, the Sixth Circuit’s decision left Plaintiffs with only one

surviving claim: a claim against Pima County Superior Court alleging that actions of the

Court taken or discovered subsequent to April 10, 1995, were in contravention of Plaintiffs’

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim was not presented by the

Plaintiffs when this matter was transferred to this Court. Instead, Plaintiffs elected to pursue

numerous claims that were clearly barred by previous decisions of this Court and the Sixth

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Circuit. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did so in direct contradiction to this Court’s order that their

complaints be amended to eliminate allegations and claims that were barred in light of the

Sixth Circuit’s opinion. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ action was

meritless and frivolous, and that the Chalker Defendants are entitled to their fees pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that

plaintiffs’ action was meritless and frivolous so as to warrant sanctions under 42 U.S.C. §

1988 where, had plaintiffs made a reasonable inquiry into the applicable facts and law before

filing their case, they would have discovered the insufficiency of their civil rights claim). 

Plaintiffs also argue that Chalker cannot invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because Plaintiffs

did not bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against her. The record belies this assertion. A

review of Plaintiffs’ amended complaints indicates that Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim

for damages was asserted against Karp and Everlove only. (Doc. No. 52, pg. 17.) However,

Plaintiffs also brought a claim for equitable relief against Chalker which was grounded in due

process theory: Plaintiffs claimed that prior orders of the Pima County Superior Court were

obtained by the Chalker Defendants in violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights. (Doc. No.

51.) The district court, in dismissing this action, suggested (but did not explicitly state) that

Plaintiffs had asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all of the Chalker Defendants. (Doc.

No. 123, pgs. 11-17.) Moreover, the dismissal was granted based upon a motion to dismiss

filed by the Chalker Defendants. That motion argued that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was

alleged against each of the Chalker Defendants; Plaintiffs’ response to the motion to dismiss

does not include any argument that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not alleged against Chalker.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that each of the Chalker Defendants is entitled to fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

b. The Chalker Defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Because the Court concludes that the Chalker Defendants are entitled to their

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, it need not consider whether the Chalker

Defendants are also entitled to their fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. However, for

reasons similar to those stated in Section 1(b) and 2(a), above, the Magistrate Judge

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recommends finding that the Chalker Defendants are also entitled to their attorneys’ fees

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Plaintiffs brought numerous claims against the Chalker

Defendants that were clearly barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,

conduct for which 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions are especially appropriate. See McLaughlin,

602 F.Supp. at 1417. Plaintiffs’ vexatious intent is further evidenced by the previous

cautions given to Catz by this Court and others. Id. at 1418. 

c. The Chalker Defendants are entitled to an award of their total fees

For the reasons stated in Section 1(c) above, Plaintiffs’ contention that the Chalker

Defendants should not be entitled to recover the entirety of their fees incurred is without

merit. All of the Chalker Defendants’ fees were excess fees incurred because of Plaintiffs’

conduct.

d. Plaintiffs Catz, J. Catz and S. Catz should be solely liable for payment of the Chalker Defendants’ fees

Plaintiffs argue that J. Catz and S. Catz should not be held liable for any fees owed

to the Chalker Defendants. Fee sanctions imposed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 may be

levied against an attorney or a pro se litigant. See Houston v. Norton, 215 F.3d 1172 (10th

Cir. 2000) (holding that a pro se plaintiff may be held liable for prevailing defendant’s

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988). For the reasons stated in Section 1(d), above,

J. Catz and S. Catz were actively involved in these proceedings. Accordingly, the Court

recommends that the three Plaintiffs be held jointly and severally liable for the Chalker

Defendants’ fees in this matter.

Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after

its independent review of the record, enter an order:

1. GRANTING Defendant TIAA-CREF's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees

filed on October 2, 2006 (Doc. No. 125);

2. GRANTING the Chalker Defendants’ Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees

filed on October 5, 2006 (Doc. No. 129);

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3. AWARDING attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $33,824.00 to TIAACREF against each Plaintiff jointly and severally.

4. AWARDING attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $66,126.00 to the

Chalker Defendants against each Plaintiff jointly and severally.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Any objections

filed should use the following case number: CV 03-91-TUC-FRZ. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived.

DATED this 30th day of August, 2007.

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