Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08037/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08037-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Zane Dickinson, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

NO. CV-18-8037-PCT-DJH (DMF) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Zane Dickinson filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), challenging 

his conviction and sentence in Mohave County Superior Court relating to his attempted 

second degree murder conviction. (Doc. 1)1

 After a Limited Answer was filed by 

Respondents (Doc. 6), and reply (Doc. 8), this Court concluded that Martinez v. Ryan, 566 

U.S. 1 (2012), likely applied here and ordered supplemental briefing on the merits of the 

Petition’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. (Doc. 10) On Petitioner’s request, 

this Court also appointed counsel for Petitioner. (Docs. 11, 12, 13) Supplemental briefing 

has concluded. (Docs. 16, 21) As detailed below, this Court recommends granting 

Dickinson’s Petition on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Ground II, regarding 

his conviction for attempted second degree murder (Doc. 1 at 6). 

 

1

 Petitioner was convicted of multiple charges, but he only seeks habeas review of his 

attempted second degree murder conviction. (Doc. 1 at 5, 6) 

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I. BACKGROUND 

Dickinson was indicted in Mohave County Superior Court for attempted second 

degree murder and other, less serious felonies, based on the following events described at 

trial. (Doc. 6-4 at 31-34, Ex. G) C.H. and Dickinson had known each other for over 20 

years, their families had been neighbors, and they had been “friends.” (Doc. 6-2 at 51, Ex. 

C) By July 2011, they “were associates,” and sometimes drove to work together. (Doc. 6-

2 at 51-52, Ex. C) Their relationship had become strained because C.H. had loaned 

Dickinson some work tools and wanted them returned but Dickinson had refused. (Doc. 

6-2 at 51. Ex. C) 

On July 2, 2011, C.H. and Dickinson had a confrontation at someone’s house and 

Dickinson told C.H. he was “going to kill” him, “and he cussed [at C.H.] and called [him] 

names.” (Doc. 6-2 at 56:11-13, Ex. C) The homeowner thought that “they were both 

threatening each other” and he broke up the fight. (Doc. 6-2 at 94:12, Ex. C) Later, 

Dickinson told the homeowner that he was going to run over C.H. (Doc. 6-2 at 98:24, Ex. 

C) The homeowner testified that the statement was made “jokingly.” (Doc. 6-2 at 110:19, 

Ex. C) 

C.H. rode off on his bike and shortly thereafter, he was hit by a truck that he 

recognized at Dickinson’s. (Doc. 6-2 at 56-60, Ex. C) C.H. testified that Dickinson smiled 

at him and the “next thing I know, he revved up his motor and he shot towards me. And I 

remember what happened. He hit the back of my bike, he had spun me all the way around 

about ten feet in the dirt. I landed on the dirt.” (Doc. 6-2 at 60:11-14, Ex. C) When the 

truck hit C.H.’s bike, the bike spun. (Doc. 6-2 at 61:6-8, Ex. C) If the truck had “turned 

two or three feet,” Dickinson “would have totally hit [C.H.]; but he didn’t do that.” (Doc. 

6-2 at 61:9-10, Ex. C) 

C.H. got back on his bike and rode towards his house. (Doc. 6-2 at 61:15-16, Ex. 

C) Dickinson found C.H. again and drove so close that there was “maybe a foot” between 

Dickinson’s truck and his bike. Dickinson was laughing while driving, and then Dickinson 

turned his wheel, hit the bike, “and that’s the last thing [C.H.] remembered” before waking 

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up in the hospital. (Doc. 6-2 at 62, Ex. C) C.H. “felt threatened, seriously threatened, 

because—because you know, at first I thought he was going to drive by, you know what I 

mean; but the first time he clipped me and he had that look in his face like, you know, he 

was going to kill me, man, he was going to kill me, and I seen that on his face.” (Doc. 6-2 

at 68-69, Ex. C) C.H. was knocked unconscious and woke up in the hospital with a broken 

ankle, his elbow was bleeding, he had a concussion, and 13 stitches over his eye. (Doc. 6-

2 at 63-64, Ex. C) 

Dickinson did not testify, his counsel called no witnesses. (Doc. 6-3 at 121, 137-

138, Ex. E) During the discussion about jury instructions, conducted without the jury 

present, the Superior Court described attempted second degree murder to counsel as 

“conduct [that] will cause death or serious physical injury.” (Doc. 6-3 at 112:11-13, Ex. 

E) The lawyers did not disagree with the Judge. 

In response to Dickinson’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge told the 

lawyers, “I wouldn’t be shocked if they didn’t find [Dickinson guilty of attempted second 

degree murder]; but I believe there’s sufficient evidence to allow the case to go forward on 

the charge of attempted second degree murder.” (Doc. 6-3 at 113:1-4, Ex. D) 

Subsequently, the trial judge informed the parties that he had drafted the jury 

instructions. (Doc. 6-3 at 127-129, Ex. E) During that conversation, the trial judge told 

counsel that he had drafted an instruction “defining the elements of attempted second 

degree murder.” (Doc. 6-3 at 128, Ex. E) The trial judge cited to the governing case, State 

v. Ontiveros, 81 P.3d 330 (Ariz. App. 2003), but incorrectly read it to stand for the 

proposition that attempted second degree murder can be based on intent to cause serious 

physical injury. (Doc. 6-3 at 129, 128-137) Ontiveros actually holds that “there is no 

offense of attempted second-degree murder based on knowing merely that one’s conduct 

will cause serious physical injury. The offense of attempted second-degree murder requires 

proof that the defendant intended or knew that his conduct would cause death.” 81 P.3d at 

333, ¶ 14 (emphasis added). 

. . . 

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Dickinson’s trial counsel did not object to the proposed, incorrect attempted second 

degree murder jury instruction (Doc. 6-3 at 127-137, Ex. E), and the trial judge read the 

following to the jury: 

The crime of attempted second degree murder has three elements. In order 

to find the defendant guilty of attempted second degree murder, you must find that, number one, the defendant intentionally did some act; and number 

two, the defendant believed such act was a step in the course of conduct 

planned to culminate in the commission of the crime of second degree murder; and number three, the defendant did so with the mental state required for the commission of the crime of second degree murder. 

It is not necessary that you find that the defendant committed the crime of 

second degree murder; only that he attempted to commit such crime. 

The crime of second degree murder has the following elements: Number 

one, the defendant caused the death of another person; and number two, the 

defendant either, A, did so intentionally or, B, knew that his conduct would 

cause death or serious physical injury. 

(emphasis added). (Doc. 6-3 at 144-145, Ex. E) 

In closing, the state reiterated to jury that Dickinson should be convicted of 

attempted second degree murder if he knew that his conduct would result in death or serious 

physical injury. (Doc. 6-3 at 156:16-19, Ex. E) Dickinson’s counsel argued that it was a 

case of mistaken identity. (Doc. 6-3 at 164-188, Ex. E) Dickinson’s counsel also 

repeatedly argued reasonable doubt, including about the existence and extent of C.H.’s 

injuries, but never argued that Dickinson intending, or C.H. sustaining, serious physical 

injury would not be enough to convict Dickinson of attempted second degree murder. (Id.) 

At the end of the three-day trial in Mohave County Superior Court, a jury found 

Dickinson guilty of multiple felonies, including attempted second degree murder. (Doc. 

6-3 at 211, Ex. E) The jury form did not give the jury an opportunity to explain the basis 

for finding Dickinson guilty of attempted second degree murder. Subsequently, Dickinson 

was sentenced to terms of imprisonment totaling 14 years, the longest sentence of which 

was 12 years for the attempted second degree murder conviction. (Doc. 6-4 at 18-26, 21, 

Ex. F)2

 

2

 The terms of imprisonment for aggravated assault, Counts 1 and 2, were nine years and seven years, respectively (Doc. 6-4 at 22, Ex. F), to be served concurrently with the attempted second degree murder sentence in Count 4 (Doc. 6-4 at 18, Ex. F). For the 

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 On direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Dickinson was represented by 

counsel who argued only that the attempted second degree murder jury instruction was 

incorrect as a matter of law and that the proper analytical framework was to review this 

claim for fundamental error because Dickinson’s trial counsel had not objected. (Doc. 6-

4 at 76, Ex. L) The court of appeals agreed, and noted that it “is the rare case in which an 

improper jury instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection 

has been made in the trial court.” (Doc. 6-4 at 149, Ex. O at ¶ 10 (citations omitted)) Under 

fundamental error analysis, Dickinson had “the burden to establish that “(1) error exists, 

(2) the error is fundamental, and (3) the error caused him prejudice.” (Doc. 6-4 at 149, Ex. 

O at ¶ 10) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals further wrote that it had previously “stated that 

instructing a jury on a non-existent theory of criminal liability is fundamental error” and 

concluded that, “under the facts and circumstances of this case, the error complained of 

was fundamental because it goes to the foundation of the case.” (Doc. 6-4 at 150, Ex. O at 

¶ 12) Then, the court turned to the prejudice prong. Under Arizona law, Dickinson had to 

“affirmatively prove prejudice and [could] not rely upon speculation to carry his burden. 

To prove prejudice Dickinson [had to] show that a reasonable, properly instructed jury 

could have reached a different result.” (Doc. 6-4 at 150, Ex. O at ¶ 13) After a detailed 

review of the parties’ theories, the evidence received at trial, and the parties’ arguments to 

the jury, the court of appeals concluded that Dickinson had not been prejudiced by the error 

and, therefore, was not entitled to relief: 

The State’s theory was that Dickinson intended to kill the victim; 

Dickinson’s defense was mistaken identity and that he was not

involved in the charged conduct in any respect. Neither of these 

competing views suggests that Dickinson intended to cause serious 

injury to the victim (as opposed to kill him), which is the fundamental 

error in the jury instructions. Based on the particular facts of this case—

including the State’s theory, Dickinson’s defense, the evidence and the parties’ arguments to the jury—Dickinson has failed to prove resulting prejudice from the fundamental error in the jury instruction. Henderson, 

210 Ariz. at 568, ¶¶ 23-24, 26, 115 P.3d at 608. Accordingly, 

 

leaving the scene of the accident conviction, Count 3, Dickinson was sentenced to a 

consecutive two years of imprisonment. (Doc. 6-4 at 25, Ex. F)

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Dickinson’s claim of fundamental, prejudicial error fails.

(Doc. 6-4 at 154, Ex. O at ¶ 22). The Arizona Supreme Court denied the cross-petitions 

for review filed by the state and by Dickinson. (Doc. 6-4 at 155-222, Exs. P, Q, R, S, T) 

It appears that neither side petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. (Doc. 

1 at 3) 

 Dickinson timely initiated post-conviction relief and, through counsel (“PCR 

counsel”), alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial 

counsel had not called Dickinson to testify on his own behalf and because trial counsel had 

not addressed statements made by the victim. (Doc. 6-5 at 1-18, Exs. U, V) In other words, 

PCR counsel did not raise any ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims related to the 

incorrect attempted second degree murder jury instruction, nor did PCR counsel raise a due 

process claim related to the incorrect attempted second degree murder jury instruction. The 

superior court concluded that Dickinson had “not made a colorable claim for relief” on 

either of these claims and denied relief. (Doc. 6-5 at 22, 23, Ex. W) 

 Dickinson then filed a second, pro se notice of post-conviction relief that alleged 

PCR counsel was ineffective for “failing to file any meritorious claims” but did not explain 

what the meritorious claims would have been. (Doc. 6-5 at 29-20, Ex. X) The superior 

court denied relief concluding that Dickinson “was not entitled under [Arizona] law to 

effective assistance of counsel on his first Rule 32 proceeding.” (Doc. 6-5 at 34, Ex. Y) 

 Dickinson filed two Petitions for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, one 

for each of his denied notices of post-conviction relief. In both cases, the court of appeals 

granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 6-5 at 37-69, Exs. Z, AA, BB, CC) 

II. HABEAS PETITION 

 It is undisputed that Dickinson timely initiated habeas relief (Doc. 6 at 7-9). His 

Petition raises two grounds for relief: (1) his due process rights were violated by the 

incorrect attempted second degree murder jury instruction and (2) he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel because trial counsel had not objected to the flawed attempted second 

degree jury instruction (“IATC claim”). (Doc. 1 at 5, 6) Respondents contend that the 

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Petition contains only claims that cannot be reviewed because they are unexhausted and 

subject to a procedural default without exception. (Doc. 6) In his reply, Dickinson explains 

that he filed his second PCR “in hopes of trying to preserve [the] claim of ineffective trial 

counsel” under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 

(9th Cir. 2013). (Doc. 8 at 4) 

 Following an initial review of this matter, this Court ordered supplemental briefing 

on the merits of the Petition’s IATC claim for trial counsel’s failure to object to the 

incorrect attempted second degree murder jury instruction. (Doc. 10) Dickinson requested 

and received appointed counsel for the supplemental briefing. (Docs. 11, 12, 13) 

Respondents filed a supplemental response, Dickinson filed a reply, and this matter is now 

fully briefed. (Docs. 16, 21) 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. The Petition’s Grounds are procedurally defaulted. 

 First, as previewed in the Court’s earlier Order (Doc. 10), this Court concludes, as 

Respondents argue, that both of the Petition’s grounds are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 6 

at 14) A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before this Court can 

grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999);

Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To be fairly presented, a claim must 

include a statement of the operative facts and the specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

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975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

 The Court’s review of Dickinson’s post-conviction papers indicates that his PCR 

counsel never raised the Petition’s due process claim (Doc. 1 at 5) or Petitioner’s IATC 

claim, namely that trial counsel should have objected to the attempted second degree 

murder jury instruction (Doc. 1 at 6). Because these claims were never raised, they were 

not exhausted. The claims are now subject to an implied procedural bar because they were 

not fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain available to Dickinson 

because he is now precluded or time-barred from raising his claims in a successive and 

untimely Rule 32 petition under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

& (b), or 32.4(a). 

B. Martinez excuses the procedurally defaulted IATC claim. 

Dickinson argues that the Court should review the merits of his IATC claim under 

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 3 (Doc. 8 at 4) As detailed below, this Court agrees.4

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Martinez, Dickinson could demonstrate cause 

and prejudice sufficient to excuse his procedurally defaulted IATC claim if he can 

 3

 The Petition’s due process claim in Ground I of the Petition is also subject to a procedural bar but there is no avenue for the Court to review this claim. The Martinez 

exception to procedural default applies only to claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel; it has not been expanded to other types of claims. Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 

1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has “not allowed petitioners to substantially expand the scope of Martinez beyond the circumstances present in 

Martinez”); Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that only the Supreme Court can expand the application of Martinez to other areas); see Davila v. 

Davis, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2062-63, 2065-66 (2017) (explaining that the Martinez exception does not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). 

4

 Respondents argue that the Court is improperly considering granting relief based on “its interpretation of state law.” (Doc. 15 at 5: 21) This argument misstates Strickland 

and the Court’s role in reviewing trial counsel’s performance and any subsequent prejudice. 

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demonstrate “two things: (1) ‘counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where 

the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that 

the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 14 (2012)); see Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th

Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “PCR counsel would not be ineffective for failure to 

raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to trial counsel who was not 

constitutionally ineffective.” Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Like the standard for issuing a certificate of appealability, to establish a 

“substantial” claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate 

whether ... the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues 

presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Detrich v. Ryan, 

740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, a claim 

is “‘insubstantial’ if it does not have any merit or is wholly without factual support.” Id. 

Determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is “substantial” requires a 

court to examine the claim under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). 

Here, as explained below the Court concludes that not only has Dickinson shown 

that his claim is “is substantial” or “has some merit” but Dickinson has also shown that he 

did, in fact, receive constitutionally deficient representation by trial counsel regarding the 

failure to object to the jury instruction for attempted second degree murder. 

1. Objectively deficient performance of trial counsel 

Strickland requires a showing that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness” at the time of the trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Defense 

counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

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690. Although “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-

91, “[t]he label of ‘trial strategy’ does not automatically immunize an attorney’s 

performance from sixth amendment challenges.” U.S. v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir. 

1996) (internal quotations omitted). Instead, deference to counsel is owed only to strategic 

decisions made after “thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible 

options.” Strickland, 466 U.S.at 690. 

It is undisputed that Dickinson’s trial counsel never objected to the legally erroneous 

jury instruction for attempted second degree murder. Because Respondents have not 

provided any explanation from trial counsel, we must “entertain the range of possible 

reasons [that] counsel may have had for proceeding as he did.” Leavitt v. Arave, 646 F.3d 

605, 609 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Respondents argue that, hypothetically, Dickinson’s counsel was silent because the 

incorrect jury instruction was consistent with his defenses of “alibi, mistaken identity, third 

party liability, and general denial.” (Doc. 6 at 22:17-18) In other words, Respondents 

argue that trial counsel did not need to object to any instructions because all of the 

instructions were inconsistent with Dickinson’s trial theory of innocence. (Doc. 6 at 24; 

Doc. 16 at 5:17-19) The Court has found no cases, and Respondents cite to none, that 

support Respondents’ argument that a trial counsel can satisfy a defendant’s Sixth 

Amendment rights by knowingly permitting a legally erroneous jury instruction. Instead, 

case law has consistently reached the opposite conclusion. As the United States Supreme 

Court has noted, “[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case 

combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential 

example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 

263, 274 (2014) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000); Kimmelman v. 

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986)). Indeed, it may have been trial counsel’s lack of 

knowledge of the correct governing law that led to the defense trial strategies employed. 

In any event, objecting to the erroneous jury instruction would not have impaired any 

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defense employed at trial. It would have been consistent for defense counsel to argue that, 

regardless of the identity of the driver, the lack of severity of the injuries did not support a 

conclusion that the driver intended to kill C.H. 

The superior court misstated, on the record, the applicable case law governing the 

most serious of the charges facing Dickinson. This misstatement, considered fundamental 

error by the court of appeals, permitted the jury to find Dickinson guilty under a theory of 

the law that had been explicitly prohibited nine years earlier. This was something trial 

counsel “could have learned” had he done “even minimal homework” like reading the 

governing case. Hernandez v. Chappell, 878 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2017). 

The inescapable conclusion is that trial “[c]ounsel’s errors with the jury instructions 

were not a strategic decision to forego one defense in favor of another. They were the 

result of a misunderstanding of the law.” U.S. v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1390 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citations omitted). See also Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 454–55 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(trial counsel did not understand the applicable law). Accordingly, the Court concludes 

that Respondents’ hypothetical justification is not a “plausible option[]” that could justify 

trial counsel’s silence in the face of this error. Strickland, 466 U.S.at 690. 

Because trial counsel apparently failed to understand or learn the law governing the 

most serious of the charges facing Dickinson, the Court concludes that Dickinson’s trial 

counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 688. 

2. Prejudice from trial counsel’s deficient performance 

Under Strickland, Dickinson must also show that he has a meritorious claim that he 

was prejudiced. To do this, Dickinson must show that trial “counsel’s errors were so 

serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687. Dickinson must “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, the Court must review whether there is a reasonable 

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probability that the jury would have had reasonable doubt regarding Dickinson’s guilt if 

the phrase “or serious physical injury” had not been included in the instructions. See Gray 

v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 269–70 (5th Cir. 1993). 

The Court reviewed all of the trial transcripts and concludes that very little of the 

received evidence indicated that Dickinson intended or knew that his conduct would cause 

the victim’s death. 5 (Doc. 10) In their supplemental briefing, Respondents and Dickinson 

both point to the same statements to bolster their differing conclusions. (Docs. 16, 21) 

Specifically, the testimony at trial was that Dickinson and C.H. were old friends who had 

driven to work together and fighting and that said he wanted to “kill” C.H. but also that he 

said it “jokingly.” Dickinson then drove his truck into C.H.’s bike twice and knocked him 

over. After C.H. had been knocked unconscious, Dickinson drove off. C.H.’s injuries 

were from falling off his bicycle after Dickinson’s truck hit the bicycle; there was no 

testimony that Dickinson’s truck hit C.H. directly. 

Respondents argue that the trial court’s denial of a directed verdict for the defense 

is indicative of sufficient evidence (Doc. 6 at 8), but the trial court was itself operating on 

the incorrect standard and elements of attempted second degree murder when it denied the 

directed verdict. Further, even the trial court commented that it would be no surprise if the 

jury found Dickinson not guilty of attempted second degree murder charge; that statement 

was made by the trial court while incorrectly considering intent of serious physical injury 

as sufficient for guilt of attempted second degree murder. 

Considering the facts presented at trial, there is at least “a reasonable probability” 

that at least one member of the jury could have voted to convict Dickinson of attempted 

second degree murder under the “serious physical injury” portion of the instruction. Cf. 

Martinez v. Garcia, 379 F.3d 1034, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Defendant’s verdict cannot stand 

when one element of jury instruction was legally untenable); Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 

933, 941, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003) (U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly found structural error in 

“cases [that] involved jury instructions for crimes based on facially invalid or legally 

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impossible theories, or ‘non-existent’ crimes.”); Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d 664, 669 (9th

Cir. 1993) (if one juror relied on the legally non-existent instruction, Defendant was 

improperly convicted); Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 1990). It is 

noteworthy that the prosecutor argued in closing to the jury that the state did not have the 

burden to prove Dickinson intended to kill C.H. but that intent of serious physical injury 

was enough. (Doc. 6-3 at 156:16-19; 189:25-190:4) 

Respondents have attempted to play out various hypotheticals: what if trial counsel 

had raised the objection and it had been sustained? What if it had been overruled? (Doc. 

16 at 6) “Our precedent makes clear, however, that the relevant question is ‘not simply 

whether we can be reasonably certain that the jury could have convicted [Dickinson] based 

on the valid theory of [attempted second degree] murder,’ but whether ‘we can be 

reasonably certain . . . that the jury did convict [him] based on the valid [attempted second 

degree] murder theory.” Riley v. McDaniel, 786 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Babb v. Lozowsky, 719 F.3d 1019, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013)) (emphasis in original). As 

previously stated, “If it is clear that the jury relied on the correct portion of the jury 

instruction, namely conduct that would cause death, then the erroneous jury instruction 

would almost certainly satisfy the harmless error standard.” (Doc. 10 at 8:2-4) 

Here, the jury instructions included a correct and an incorrect statement of law and 

there is no evidence that the jury verdict form permitted the jury to indicate whether its 

decision was based on the correct or incorrect statement. Thus, there is no ability to discern 

whether the jury relied on “a legally inadequate theory” of the case to convict Dickinson. 

Griffin v. U.S., 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991). (Doc 6-3, Ex. E at 82-83) Accordingly, the Court 

“cannot tell what theory the jury used. In fact, because the jury did not need to be 

unanimous about the theory it used, [Dickinson] was improperly convicted if even one 

juror decided that the [incorrect attempted second degree murder] theory would be 

sufficient.” Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 1993). This, without more, 

means Dickinson has demonstrated prejudice. 

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3. PCR counsel’s performance was deficient and caused prejudice 

Because the Court has concluded that Dickinson has established ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, the Court will return to the first Martinez prong of Martinez and 

evaluate whether Dickinson has established “that both (a) post-conviction counsel’s 

performance was deficient, and (b) there was a reasonable probability that, absent the 

deficient performance, the result of the post-conviction proceedings would have been 

different.” Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694). 

Dickinson’s post-conviction counsel did not raise a claim for IATC for trial 

counsel’s failure to object to the fundamentally flawed attempted second degree murder 

jury instruction. Before PCR proceedings, this IATC claim had been flagged by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals when it noted that trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury 

instructions changed the standard of review which, in turn, changed the burden of 

persuasion on appeal. State v. Dickinson, 314 P.3d 1282, 1285-86, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. 2013). 

This was not an inconsequential change. Dickinson lost the opportunity for an appeal 

where the burden was “on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 

not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” State v. Henderson, 115 P.3d 601, 607, 

¶ 18 (Ariz. 2005). Instead, trial counsel did not object and so Dickinson had the burden 

and he had to establish both fundamental error and resulting prejudice. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. 

Respondents argue that PCR counsel was not ineffective because the Court of 

Appeals had already determined that Dickinson could not demonstrate prejudice under 

fundamental error version and this prejudice determination was binding. (Doc. 16 at 5) 

Respondents provide no citation to this argument and do not address the impact of the 

altered standard of review to make it more difficult to prevail on appeal. If trial counsel 

had objected, the court of appeals would have reviewed for harmless error which would 

have meant that the state had the burden “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 

did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.” State v. Henderson, 115 P.3d 601, 

607, ¶ 18 (Ariz. 2005). Instead, because trial counsel did not object, the court of appeals 

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reviewed the jury instruction claim for fundamental error and so the burden shifted to 

Dickinson to show that error existed, the error was fundamental, and the error caused him 

prejudice. Accordingly, Respondents’ argument is not well taken. 

If PCR counsel had raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, there is 

“a reasonable probability” that the Arizona Court of Appeals would have conducted the 

same analysis as this Court and concluded that Dickinson was entitled to relief for his IATC 

claim. In other words, Dickinson has demonstrated prejudice because his PCR counsel’s 

actions in not raising the IATC claim changed the outcome of post-conviction proceedings 

to Dickinson’s detriment. Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377.

C. Dickinson’s Petition Ground II is meritorious. 

Neither party has asked for an evidentiary hearing and, because there are no factual 

disputes, the Court concludes that none is warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Rule 8 of 

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. As detailed above, the Court concludes that 

Dickinson has satisfied Martinez. As also detailed above, Dickinson has demonstrated 

that, regarding his conviction for attempted second degree murder, he received 

constitutionally objectively deficient representation from his trial counsel, which caused 

him prejudice. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Dickinson’s Petition Ground II 

pertaining to his attempted second degree murder conviction be granted. (Doc. 1 at 6) 

Petition Ground I is procedurally defaulted, without excuse, and should be denied. (Doc. 

1 at 5) 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Zane Dickinson’s Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be granted as to Ground II of his Petition pertaining to his 

attempted second degree murder conviction, and Ground I, pertaining to the same 

conviction, be denied. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, should the District Court not accept 

the recommendations herein, a certificate of appealability be granted because Petitioner 

has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2), and jurists of reason could find the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s 

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constitutional claims “debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 20th day of December, 2018. 

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