Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00290/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANTONIO RASHAD JOHNSON, ) 

#277 414, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-290-WHA

) [WO]

ANDY HUGHES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Easterling Correctional Facility in

Clio, Alabama, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on April 26, 2013, against Sheriff Andy

Hughes, Lieutenant Kirskey, and Sergeant Buchman. He complains that Defendants failed

to protect him from an inmate assault while he was incarcerated at the Houston County Jail

in June 2011. Plaintiffseeks trial by jury and requests damages, witness fees, attorneys fees,

and court costs. Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that dismissal of this

case prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

1

I. FACTS

Plaintiff brings this damages action against Defendants Hughes, Kirskey, and

Buchman, claiming that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights and acted negligently by

A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint 1

screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure

requires the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the

complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

Case 1:13-cv-00290-WHA-SRW Document 9 Filed 07/29/13 Page 1 of 4
housing him in a cell with a convicted inmate. According to the complaint, on June 15, 2011,

Plaintiff was placed in a cell with Tawuan Townes, a convicted death row inmate who was

waiting to be transferred to state prison. The next day, inmate Townes assaulted Plaintiff by

beating him about his head. Officer Pike noticed the altercation and proceeded to run into

the cell “and got Tawuan Townes off of [Plaintiff].” Plaintiff was then escorted out of the

cell and moved to another location in the jail. (Doc. No. 1.) 

II. DISCUSSION

Prison officials have a duty not to disregard a known risk to inmate safety. Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533 (11 Cir. 1990). “It is th

not, however, every injury suffered by one inmate at the hands of another that translates into

a constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834. A constitutional violation occurs only when a plaintiff establishes the existence

of “a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, . . . and

[that] the official does not respond[] reasonably to the risk’....” Marsh v. Butler County, 268

F.3d 1014, 1028 (11 Cir. 2001) (en banc), quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

th 2

It is not clear from the complaint whether, at the time the actions about which Plaintiff 2

complains occurred, he was incarcerated in the Houston County Jail as a pretrial detainee or a convicted

prisoner. If Plaintiff were a pre-trial detainee at the time of the incident, the Fourteenth Amendment,

rather than the Eighth Amendment provides the appropriate standard for assessing whether conditions of

confinement imposed upon him were violative of the Constitution. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99

S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997); Cottrell

th

v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11 Cir. 1996) (“Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or th

pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause....”). For

analytical purposes, however, there is no meaningful difference between the analysis required by the

Fourteenth Amendment and that required by the Eighth Amendment. Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d

1567, 1574 (11 Cir. 1985); Cottrell, 85 F3d at 1490 (“[T]he applicable standard is the same, so th

-2-

Case 1:13-cv-00290-WHA-SRW Document 9 Filed 07/29/13 Page 2 of 4
According to the factual allegations contained in the present action, Plaintiff was

unexpectedly assaulted by his cellmate. A jailer quickly responded to the incident, removed

Plaintiff from the cell, and placed himin another location. The facts alleged in the complaint

reflect that the incident in question was spontaneous, which thereby discharges defendants

of the Eighth Amendment duty to protect Plaintiff as he has not demonstrated that any named

defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff, therefore, fails to state a claimagainst

Defendants under the Eighth Amendment with regard to the June 16, 2011, incident.

Furthermore, any claim that jail officials should have done more, under the circumstances

presented, goes beyond the constitutional imperative against ignoring a potential threat and

amounts only to a claimthat jail staff were negligent. Negligence, however, is not actionable

in a complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The present matter is, therefore, due to be

dismissed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii). Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312 (4 Cir. 1991); th

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case

decisional law involving prison inmates applies equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial

detainees.”). Thus, this court relies on cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against

cruel and unusual punishment and not the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process when

addressing Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim because the standard for violations of the Eighth

Amendment applies to pretrial detainees through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11 Cir. 1994) (observing “[w]hether the

th

alleged violation is reviewed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial.”). 

-3-

Case 1:13-cv-00290-WHA-SRW Document 9 Filed 07/29/13 Page 3 of 4
be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii).

 It is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an objection to the Recommendation on or before

August 12, 2013. Anyobjection filed must specificallyidentifythe findings in the Magistrate

Judge's Recommendation to which Plaintiff objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. Plaintiff is advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and recommendations in

the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein th

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the th

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 29 day of July, 2013. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-4-

Case 1:13-cv-00290-WHA-SRW Document 9 Filed 07/29/13 Page 4 of 4