Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00086/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00086-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 17:504 Copyright Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL HENRY SMITH, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 16-0086-CG-C

ALPHABET INC., et al., :

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The pro se plaintiff originally filed a 35-page complaint in this Court on February 

26, 2016, against multiple defendants, both identified and unidentified (see Doc. 1), and 

given the contents of the complaint the undersigned set the matter down for a hearing on 

March 21, 2016 (Doc. 3). During the hearing, the plaintiff readily admitted that there were 

numerous deficiencies in his complaint (Doc. 6, at 1) and, therefore, the undersigned 

instructed plaintiff to file an amended complaint, solely against those defendants that he 

can identify and who can be readily served, specifically identifying all relevant facts in 

support of his claims and identifying the claims asserted against each defendant and his 

right to exercise each claim (and his right to recovery as to each claim) based on the 

relevant facts (id.). Compare Gregory v. McKennon, 430 Fed.Appx. 306, 308 (5th Cir. Jun. 22, 

2011) (per curiam) (recognizing that a district court generally must afford a pro se plaintiff 

an opportunity to amend his complaint before dismissing for failure to state a claim) with, 

e.g., Vaughn v. Postal Employees, 2014 WL 3540575, *3 (S.D. Ala. Jul. 17, 2014) (“Plaintiff 

was given an opportunity to correct these deficiencies and was specifically instructed to 

provide additional facts in his amended complaint regarding the basis for his claims and 

for the Court’s jurisdiction.”). In short, plaintiff was instructed to comply with Rule 8(a) 

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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (id. at 1-2) and was informed that his amended 

pleading would be the operative pleading in this case (id. at 2). Plaintiff filed his amended 

complaint on April 22, 2016 (Doc. 7) and, on May 2, 2016, the Court granted his motion to 

proceed without prepayment of costs and fees (Doc. 8). However, service was withheld 

pending this Court’s screening of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B). (Id. at 4.) The undersigned has screened Smith’s amended complaint and 

now enters this report and recommendation, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) 

and General Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R) & (S), that this action be dismissed, for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and, in part, as frivolous in accordance 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2016, Michael Henry Smith filed a 35-page complaint against 

approximately 40 defendants for theft and dissemination of his intellectual property, that

is, his short story related to the Waco, Texas biker massacre, and also, apparently, for 

“CYBER BULLYING, CYBER STALKING, CYBER HARASSMENT, LIABLE (sic), 

SLANDER AND DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER, THE USE OF HATE LANGUAGE 

IN THE PURSUIT OF THESE ACTIONS and/or FOR PROVIDING A SAFE HAVEN 

[FOR] THE DEFENDANTS CONDUCTING [] THESE ACTIVITIES and/or FOR 

FAILING TO PROTECT [HIS] WORKS FROM THESE ACTIVITIES[.]” (Doc. 1, at 1-2.) 

The undersigned set this cause down for a pretrial conference on March 21, 2016, so that 

the Court could make certain inquiries about the complaint. (See Doc. 3.) Mr. Smith 

appeared before the undersigned on March 21, 2016, and readily admitted that his 

complaint was deficient in several respects. (See Doc. 6, at 1.) Accordingly, the 

undersigned extended to plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint not later 

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than April 22, 2016 (id.), which he was advised would be the operative pleading in his 

case (id. at 2), “against those defendants he can identify and who can be readily served[.]” 

(Id. at 1.)

As specifically discussed with plaintiff, he need identify all relevant facts in 

support of his claims in separately-numbered paragraphs and also 

specifically identify the claims raised with respect to each defendant and 

his right to exercise each claim (and his right to recovery as to each claim) 

based on the relevant facts. In short, Mr. Smith must comply with Rule 

8(a), which reads, as follows:

A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 

court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has 

jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional 

support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include 

relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)-(3).

(Doc. 6, at 1-2.)

Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on April 22, 2016 (Doc. 7), and though the 

undersigned specifically instructed Mr. Smith to list therein as defendants only those 

individuals/entities he could identify and who can readily be served (see Doc. 6, at 1), he 

included in his amended complaint no less than fourteen (14) defendants shielded by 

aliases (see Doc. 7, at 1) who this Court has no hope of serving with the complaint. 

Presumably, plaintiff included these “individuals” because they are the defendants—

putatively protected by the named defendants—who “openly engaged in Cyber Bullying, 

Cyber Stalking, Harassment, Defamation of Character, Slander and Liable (sic)[,]” (id. at 

8), which are apparently claims Smith seeks to pursue herein (see id. at 1-2 (“FIRST 

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AMENDED COMPLAINT IN THE LAWSUIT FOR THE INTENTIONAL 

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS,1 THEFT AND DISSEMINATION OF MY 

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, FOR CYBER BULLYING, CYBER STALKING, CYBER 

HARASSMENT, LIABLE (sic), SLANDER AND DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER, 

THE USE OF HATE LANGUAGE IN THE PURSUIT OF THESE ACTIONS and/or 

FOR PROVIDING A SAFE HAVEN [FOR] THE DEFENDANTS CONDUCTING OF 

THESE ACTIVITIES[.]”)). As for the defendants identified by plaintiff who can be 

served, approximately twenty-five in number (compare id. at 1 with id. at 14-41), it appears 

that Smith is claiming that these defendants are guilty of the theft and/or illegal 

dissemination of his intellectual property by providing the “alias” defendants with a safe 

haven to carry out their nefarious activities “and/or that they have practiced a willful 

ignorance that has advanced the theft and dissemination of [his] intellectual property 

and/or that their negligence has given rise to that theft.” (Id. at 2.) 

Smith’s statement of facts in support of his claims, though not separately 

numbered, as requested (compare id. at 8-11 with Doc. 6, at 1), consist of the following:

On the 4th of July, 2015, I listed the first volume of my short story 

series “The Waco, Texas, Biker Massacre” on the Kindle Direct Publishing 

service provided by Amazon; and paperback version “The Waco Biker 

Massacre” on the CreateSpace service provided by Amazon. Within weeks 

of publishing these titles, persons listed as Defendants and protected by 

aliases, and others not named here, started offering my work for free 

through the named defendants. This was part of a campaign of Intentional 

Infliction of Emotional Distress by some of the defendants. Over the next 

seven months I tried in vain to have the named defendants stop the 

harassment and bullying and stalking and dissemination of my works.

 1 One page of the amended complaint is dedicated to the tort of outrage or the 

intentional infliction of emotional distress and Alabama’s recognition of this legal theory of 

recovery. (See Doc. 7, at 7.)

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The defendants that are named but their identities are protected by 

the other defendants have openly engaged in Cyber Bullying, Cyber 

Stalking, Harassment, Defamation of Character, Slander and Liable (sic). 

They have used Hate Speech amongst other methods to harm me. See. 

Exhibit ‘B-1’ and ‘B-2’.

These anonymous defendants investigated me. They cited personal 

details of my identity and my life in online posts. These defendants were 

indefatigable in their pursuits. Their conduct over a seven month, or 

longer[,] period[] meets the criteria of excessive. They intentionally 

inflicted emotional harms onto me. 

In that period the anonymous defendants tried to gain entry into my 

Facebook account[,] and other accounts. They cloned my name and created 

false postings claiming to be me.

Every time I posted anything remotely relating to the Massacre or 

my short story, they pounced upon me.

The names of these anonymous defendants are a red flag as to their 

true nature: “Peter Will Harden,” “Long Dong,” “Long John,[”] and 

“Whistle Dick” are not the nom de plumes of normal people. Yet, when 

reported to Facebook, Facebook refused to take action against these 

criminals. The same for Google and Box.

Numerous legitimate hosting services, file sharing services, and 

social media services responded immediately to my complaints. The time 

to take down the offending material was never more than a few hours. 

Some of the legitimate sites are located in Europe where even the time 

differential did not create much delay in their immediately snatching down 

these posts. 

The industry standard, as revealed by my personal experience here, 

is that the legitimate sites do not tolerate these offenses[] once it has been 

reported to them.

The named defendants have agreed to totally obscure the names 

and addresses of the people carrying out these crimes. Some have agreed 

to obscure the names and addresses of those defendants providing first 

person services to those that are carrying out these crimes. Some have 

attempted to remain passive in the light of these crimes and/or pretended 

ignorance.

Make no mistake that the named and identified defendants are 

directly profiting from the theft of my intellectual property. These are not 

passive gateways to the Internet.

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During the time of this unrelenting assault I have solely had the 

burden of caring for my handicapped sister and my 85 year old mother. I 

have been particularly susceptible to the machinations of the defendants.

As of today, it is my estimation that some 100,000 copies of my work 

have been distributed without my receiving a single Sioux in 

compensation.

I have not been able to finish writing and release[] Volume Two of 

this work as the defendants have decimated my mental, physical and 

emotional strengths, and eviscerated any income that I would have 

received from Volume One. The revenues from the sales of this series of 

short stories was one of my only sources of income to care for my family.

Just to write this civil action was an onerous burden d[ue] to the 

severe fear, emotional and psychological distress caused by the actions of 

the defendants. I have nightmares every night that the criminal enterprises 

connected with these crimes will retaliate against my family.

My physical health has suffered seriously during these months. I 

have taken to grinding my teeth in my sleep and broken several teeth that I 

cannot afford to have repaired. I suffer that pain every day.

(Doc. 7, at 8-11.) Immediately following the recitation of these facts, plaintiff makes 

reference to 47 U.S.C. § 230 and about what it purportedly means (id. at 11-13), as well as 

Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed.Cir. 2014) (id. at 13-14), as a prelude 

to his conclusory argument that “the named defendants are not just the passive 

conveyances of media on the internet, they are actively seeking and promoting material[,] 

both legal and illegal[, in order] to drive the profits of their main businesses.” (Id. at 14.) 

The vast majority of plaintiff’s 42-page amended complaint is relegated to 

identifying the defendants who may be served with process and the claim or claims he is 

asserting against each such defendant (see id. at 14-41), as follows: (1) Alphabet, Inc., the 

parent of Google, has aided and abetted the alias defendants in stealing his short story by 

providing a safe haven “for these internet criminals” (id. at 14-15); (2) Attractsoft GMBH, 

a hosting service, provides “anonymity to various criminal enterprises whilst they go 

about their nefarious industries,” including the theft and distribution of his intellectual 

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properties, and refuses to reveal the identities of the “criminals” to plaintiff or stop the 

distribution of his “works[;]” (id. at 15-16); (3) Beam.To, a vagabond and “prime” in the 

theft and distribution of his works, and, therefore, a criminal enterprise, “gives direct 

aid” to the defendants shielded by their aliases who steal and distribute his works (id. at 

16-17); (4) Bessemer Venture Partners, is a partner of Box, Inc., and then Smith simply 

describes what practices Box has engaged in that have purportedly injured him (id. at 17-

18); (5) Box, Inc.,2 a hosting service, provides anonymity to “criminal enterprises whilst 

they go about their nefarious industries[,]” including the theft and distribution of his 

intellectual properties, and refuses to reveal the identities of the “criminals” to plaintiff or 

stop the distribution of his “works[;]” (id. at 18-19)3; (6) Coatue Management, DFJ 

Growth, General Atlantic, Itochu Technology Ventures, New Enterprise Associates, SAP 

Ventures, Macnica Networks USA, Inc., Mitsui & Co., Scale Venture Partners, Social & 

Capital Partnership, Telefonica Digital, Telstra and Telstra Ventures Group, and TPG 

Capital, thirteen additional entities sued by plaintiff simply for being partners of Box, Inc.

who sit on its Board of Directors (id. at 19-21, 25-26, 28-35 & 35-40); (7) Ezinecentre, a 

hosting service “plus”, markets stolen works and provides anonymity “to the various 

criminal enterprises promoting [the distribution of] stolen works[,]” including his 

intellectual properties (id. at 21-22); (8) Facebook, a corporation and online social 

networking service, has refused plaintiff’s many requests to remove the “alias” 

defendants as subscribers or to reveal their identities and, therefore, is guilty of 

 2 According to plaintiff, this defendant is also known simply as Box, but also as 

Open Box and MEDXT. (Id. at 18.) 

3 Plaintiff alleges that he has asked Box, Inc. to remove his short story from its 

services but that this defendant has refused to follow its own published rules and has made 

“getting any relief a convoluted ordeal.” (Id. at 19.)

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“Disorderly House” and “Misprision of Felony” (id. at 22-24); (9) Freehostingeu, a 

hosting service “plus”, markets stolen works and provides anonymity “to the various 

criminal enterprises promoting [the distribution of] stolen works[,]” including his 

intellectual properties (id. at 24); (10) Google, Inc., “an American multinational 

technology company specializing in Internet-related services and products[,]” provides 

“a content driven environment” to post his stolen short story and then directs users to the 

illegal content and is guilty of “Misprision of Felony and Disorderly House when they 

look away from obvious criminal conduct[]” (id. at 26-27);4 (11) Automattic Gravatar, 

another hosting service “plus”, who markets stolen works and provides anonymity “to 

the various criminal enterprises promoting [the distribution of] stolen works[,]” including 

his intellectual properties (id. at 27-28); (12) My Social Hub XP, a vagabond and “prime” 

in the theft and distribution of his works, and, therefore, a criminal enterprise, “gives 

direct aid” to the defendants shielded by their aliases who steal and distribute his works 

(id. at 35); and (13) Tucows Inc., another hosting service “plus”, who markets stolen 

works and provides anonymity “to the various criminal enterprises promoting [the 

distribution of] stolen works[,]” including his intellectual properties (id. at 40-41).

DISCUSSION

A. Review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a federal court may dismiss as frivolous a 

claim that “’lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 

1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008), quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 

 4 Smith claims he has contacted Google and its sub-entities to obtain the identities of 

the “criminals behind the theft and distribution” of his works and to petition the hosting services 

to stop distributing his works but has been met at all times with the proverbial cold shoulder. (Id. 

at 27.)

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1831-1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); see also Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 

1993) (finding an action frivolous when the district court concludes that it has “little or no 

chance of success,” because, based on the face of the complaint, the legal theories are 

“indisputably meritless,” or the factual allegations are “clearly baseless,”—that is, the 

complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 893, 114 

S.Ct. 254, 126 L.Ed.2d 206 (1993); see Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.) (a case is 

frivolous when it appears the plaintiff has little or no chance of success), cert. denied, 534 

U.S. 1044, 122 S.Ct. 624, 151 L.Ed.2d 545 (2001); Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons & Paroles 

Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A lawsuit is frivolous if the ‘plaintiff's realistic 

chances of ultimate success are slight.’”) (quotation omitted)). A claim is frivolous as a 

matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit, Neitzke, supra, 490 

U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, the claim seeks to enforce a right which clearly does not 

exist, id., or there is an affirmative defense which would defeat the claim, such as the 

statute of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or absolute immunity, Clark, supra, 

915 F.2d at 640 n.2. Judges are accorded “not only the authority to dismiss [as frivolous] a 

claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to 

pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose 

factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, supra, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833.

In addition to the foregoing, a complaint may be dismissed may be dismissed 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that the

language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include enough factual

matter—taken as true—to “’give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

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grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 

1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 

L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the allegations must 

show plausibility. Id. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . [This standard] asks for more than 

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and must be a “‘plain 

statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966 (second brackets in original). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In determining 

whether a claim is stated, the factual allegations are accepted as true, except for 

conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of action’s elements. See id.; Mitchell, supra,

112 F.3d at 1490.

In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, the Court takes the plaintiff’s allegations as true, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 

127 S.Ct. 910, 920, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007), and accords them a liberal construction, see 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (the allegations 

of a pro se plaintiff are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.”); Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing 

that when considering a pro se litigant’s allegations, the court holds them to a more 

lenient standard than those of an attorney); however, the court does not have “license . . . 

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to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an 

action.” GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 

1998), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(relying on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662 (2009)). Furthermore, a pro se litigant “is subject 

to the relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863, 110 S.Ct. 180, 107 

L.Ed.2d 135 (1989).

Therefore, leniency notwithstanding, with respect to screening pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim, a pro se litigant’s allegations must 

meet the Twombly standard for plausibility. See Hall v. Secretary for the Dep’t of Corrections, 

304 Fed.Appx. 848, 849 (11th Cir. Dec. 24, 2008) (unpublished)5 (applying Twombly 

standard to pro se prisoner complaint screened pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)), cert. denied, 

556 U.S. 1261, 129 S.Ct. 2440, 174 L.Ed.2d 233 (2009).

B. Smith’s Putative Claims Against the Named Corporate Defendants. 

Smith failed to follow the undersigned’s specific instructions to set forth in his amended 

complaint claims against those defendants he could specifically identify and who could 

be served with process by the Court and, in fact, he appears to assert the lion’s share of 

his claims—the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, theft and 

dissemination of his intellectual property, cyber bullying, cyber stalking, cyber 

harassment, libel, slander, defamation of character, and the use of hate language in the 

 5 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be 

cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.R. 36-2.

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pursuit of these actions—against these “defendants,” that is, the defendants shielded by 

aliases. (Compare Doc. 7, at 1-2 with id. at 8-11 & 14-41.) Therefore, besides noting (the 

obvious) that plaintiff nowhere sets out the elements of these putative causes of action, or 

how the relevant facts establish how each element is met, the undersigned simply notes 

that this Court should not delve with any depth into these causes of action—even 

assuming they are all proper civil causes of action—because they are brought solely 

against individuals who cannot be readily identified and served with process. Cf. 

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[F]ictitious-party pleading is not 

permitted in federal court.”). 

The clearly-identified and clearly identifiable corporate defendants can be 

separated into the following five groups: (1) the largest group, some fourteen in number,6

sued solely on the basis that they are partners of Box, Inc. and are on that entity’s Board 

of Directors; (2) hosting services—Attractsoft GMBH and Box, Inc.—who plaintiff alleges 

provided anonymity to criminal enterprises as they went about their nefarious industries, 

including the theft and distribution of his intellectual property (that is, his short story), 

and refused to reveal the identities of the “criminals” or stop the distribution of his 

works/intellectual property; (3) vagabonds—Beam.To and My Social Hub XP—who 

were/are intimately involved in the theft and distribution of his works—and, therefore, 

are themselves criminal enterprises—by giving direct aid to the defendants shielded by 

aliases who actually steal and distribute his works; (4) hosting services “plus”—

Ezinecentre, Freehostingeu, Automattic Gravatar, and Tucows, Inc.—who market stolen 

 6 These are defendants Bessemer Venture Partners, Coatue Management, DFJ 

Growth, General Atlantic, Itochu Technology Ventures, New Enterprises Associates, SAP 

Ventures, Macnica Networks USA, Inc., Mitsui & Co., Scale Venture Partners, Social & Capital 

Partnership, Telefonica Digital, Telstra and Telstra Ventures Group, and TPG Capital. 

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works and provide anonymity to the criminal enterprises promoting/distributing stolen 

works, including his intellectual property; and (5) Alphabet, Inc., the parent of Google, 

who has aided and abetted the “alias” defendants in stealing his short story by providing 

them a safe haven and Facebook and Google, both of whom are guilty of “Disorderly 

House” and “Misprision of Felony” by virtue of turning a blind eye to obvious criminal 

conduct and/or refusing to remove the “alias” defendants as subscribers and failing to 

reveal their identities to the plaintiff. 

As for the fourteen partners of Box, Inc., who allegedly sit on its Board of 

Directors, the plaintiff has simply set forth no theory for holding them liable for the 

conduct of Box, Inc. (See Doc. 7, at 17-18, 19-21, 25-26, 28-35 & 35-40.) Nowhere, for 

instance, does plaintiff make the argument that these fourteen defendants are “alter egos” 

of Box, Inc., much less set forth facts establishing the three elements essential to piercing 

the corporate veil under Alabama law. Compare Messick v. Moring, 514 So.2d 892, 894 & 

894-895 (Ala. 1987) (recognizing that three common situations—“1) inadequacy of capital; 

2) fraudulent purpose in conception or operation of the business; [and] 3) operation of the 

corporation as an instrumentality or alter ego[]”—justify piercing the corporate veil and, 

more importantly, finding that when “instrumentality or alter ego” is the basis for 

piercing the corporate veil, the following three elements are essential: (1) complete 

control and domination of the subservient corporation by the dominant party; (2) misuse 

of control by the dominant party; and (3) harm to the party proximately caused by that 

misuse) with, e.g., Heisz v. Galt Indus., Inc., 93 So.3d 918, 930 (Ala. 2012) (relying on the 

three elements identified in Messick—control, misuse and harm). Plaintiff’s factual 

allegations do not so much as reference, much less establish, any of the foregoing 

essential elements and, therefore, Smith’s amended complaint fails to state a claim against 

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these fourteen defendants upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

As for the remaining defendants, Smith’s claims can be distilled into two 

categories: (1) that certain of these defendants—in particular, Alphabet, Inc., Facebook, 

Google, Beam.To, and My Social Hub XP—have aided and abetted in the theft of his short 

story or are guilty of other crimes, such as “Disorderly House” and “Misprision of 

Felony;” (see Doc. 7, at 14-15, 16-17, 22-24, 26-27 & 35);

7 and (2) that these defendants have 

 7 The undersigned need note that plaintiff’s citation to (and discussion of) § 230 of 

the CDA (see Doc. 7, at 11-13) in no manner advances his arguments against the corporate

defendants inasmuch as it is clear that the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 

223, does not provide Smith with a private right of action. Doe v. Egea, 2015 WL 3917112, *2 (S.D. 

Fla. Jun. 25, 2015).

The CDA is a criminal statute that prohibits the making of “obscene or harassing” 

telecommunications. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a). Certainly a criminal statute may supply an 

implied right of action, but only if Congress so intended. See Thompson v. 

Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988). As the Eleventh 

Circuit recently explained in Rock v. BAE Systems, Inc., 556 F. App’x 869 (11th Cir. 

2014):

In this context, the Supreme Court has discussed four factors: (1) 

whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose especial 

benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any indication 

of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a 

remedy or to deny one; (3) whether an implied private remedy is 

consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; 

and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to 

state law. . . . However, while these four factors are relevant, the 

central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either 

expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.

Id. at 870-71 . . . .

As noted by the court in Viola v. A & E Television Networks, 433 F.Supp.2d 613, 618 

(W.D. Pa. 2006), “It appears beyond dispute that the CDA criminalizes certain 

activity and imposes criminal penalties, i.e., fines pursuant to Title 18, which is the 

criminal code, and imprisonment, for violations thereof.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Defendants cite to Ashland Hospital Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical 

Workers Local 575, 807 F.Supp.2d 633 (E.D. Ky. 2011), where the court noted it was 

“well settled” “the CDA does not authorize a private right of action.” Id. at 645 

(citing cases). Further, the court stated “[w]here plaintiffs have initiated civil suits 

(Continued)

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allowed the dissemination/distribution of his intellectual property—specifically, his 

short story on the Waco, Texas biker massacre—by providing the “alias” defendants with 

a safe haven to carry out their nefarious activities and have failed to heed his requests to 

stop these activities (see id. at 14-17, 18-19, 21-24, 26-28, 35 & 40-41).

As for plaintiff’s claim that certain corporate defendants have aided and abetted 

the “alias” defendants with respect to the theft of his short story/intellectual property,8

 

under this statute, courts have consistently refused to imply a private right of 

action.” Id. (alteration added’ citing additional cases). 

. . .

Plaintiff is not a grammarian, nor does her argument about the statute’s use of the 

disjunctive “or”—allowing either the Commission or an attorney employed by the 

Commission to assess fines—indicate anything about a Congressional intent to 

create an implied private right of action to an otherwise singularly criminal statute.

Id. at *2. 

8 Aiding and abetting in the theft of property is a criminal offense, whether 

consultation is made to Alabama law, see, e.g., Rutherford v. State, 563 So.2d 1, 2 & 3 

(Ala.Crim.App. 1989) (“[Pursuant to § 13A-8-2 of the Alabama Code] ‘[a] person commits the 

crime of theft of property if he: (1) Knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the 

property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his property; or (2) Knowingly obtains by 

deception control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his property.’ 

Pursuant to § 13A-8-4(e), Code of Alabama (1975), a person commits the crime of theft of property 

in the second degree if the property is ‘taken from or in a building where said property is sold or 

stored,’ and the value of the property exceeds $25.00 Pursuant to § 13A-2-23(2), Code of Alabama 

(1975), a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another if, with the intent to assist in the 

commission of a crime, he aids or abets such other person in the commission of the offense. ‘For 

the purposes of indictments and trials, there is no distinction between principals and accessories 

under Alabama law.’ . . . In this Court’s opinion, the prosecution clearly proved a prima facie case 

of theft of property in the second degree. The evidence showed that the two women took 

merchandise in excess of $25.00 from the Delchamps store, and that the appellant aided and 

abetted the women by assisting in their escape, and by helping them to dispose of the stolen 

property immediately prior to their apprehension. While the appellant argues that the record fails 

to show that he willfully associated himself with the criminal venture, and willfully participated 

in the theft, the great weight of the evidence indicates [] the contrary.”); Evans v. State, 508 So.2d 

1205, 1207 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987) (“It is hornbook law that one cannot be convicted of aiding and 

abetting the perpetrator of a crime unless it is first shown that a crime has actually been 

committed by another. . . . Evans could not have been guilty of aiding and abetting Saulter in a 

(Continued)

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and that Facebook and Google are guilty of “Disorderly House”9 and “Misprision of 

Felony,”10 Smith has not cited any statute (or case law) that affords him (either explicitly 

 

theft unless the State first proved that Saulter actually committed a theft.”); Robinson v. State, 432 

So.2d 518, 519 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983) (“The defendant argues that since no witness ‘could testify as 

to the number of items (except two sheets) taken by defendant on that occasion, . . . the jury had 

insufficient evidence by which to establish the aggregate value of $1,000 as needed for a First 

Degree Theft conviction. This argument ignores the principle of aiding and abetting as a basis for 

criminal culpability. . . . The ‘key elements of accomplice liability are encouragement or presence 

“with a view to render aid should it become necessary.”’ . . . Whenever ‘two or more persons join 

in an unlawful enterprise each is responsible for everything which may consequently and 

proximately flow from the unlawful purpose, whether committed by the accused or not . . . . All 

persons concerned in the commission of a felony . . . are equally guilty.’ . . . In this case, the 

defendant’s participation in the theft of some of the items renders her guilty for the theft of all the 

merchandise.”); Pennington v. State, 421 So.2d 1361, 1362 & 1363 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982) (“Any 

person who is present, encourages, aids, abets or assists another in any way, in the commission of 

a crime is equally as guilty as the one who directly commits the act, and the aider and abettor 

must be indicted, tried and punished as a principal. . . . A review of the record reveals that there 

was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of appellant’s participation in the theft.”) , 

or federal law, compare, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 170 Fed.Appx. 113, 114 (11th Cir. Mar. 13, 

2006) (aiding and abetting in the theft of government property is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 

and 2) with United States v. Sims, 398 Fed.Appx. 494, 494 & 495 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2010) (“Marcel 

Sims appeals his convictions for robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a), and 

carrying a firearm during that robbery, id. §§ 2, 924(c). Sims challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his convictions and the refusal of the district court to give his proposed jury 

instructions on robbery and aiding and abetting. . . . Sims argues he could not be convicted of 

robbery or the related firearm offense because the government failed to prove that he stole 

property ‘from the person or in the presence of another . . . by means of actual or threatened force 

. . . or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), but 

we disagree. Aided by the actual force used by Maurice Jenkins, his cohort, Sims was able to steal 

a package both in the presence of a delivery driver and when the driver was in the company of a 

private security guard. . . . The omission of Sims’s proposed language did not impair his ability to 

convey to the jury his defense that he aided and abetted Sims solely in a scheme to steal 

property.”), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1206, 131 S.Ct. 1057, 178 L.Ed.2d 874 (2011); see generally Gonzales 

v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185, 127 S.Ct. 815, 817, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) (“Immigration law 

provides for removal from the United States of an alien convicted of ‘a theft offense . . . for which 

the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)[]; § 1227(a)(2)(A). The 

question here is whether the term ‘theft offense’ in this federal statute includes the crime of ‘aiding 

and abetting’ a theft offense. We hold that it does.”).

9 “A disorderly house is defined, in general terms, as a house or other place to which 

people resort, to the disturbance of persons lawfully in the place, or the disturbance of the 

neighborhood.” Hickey v. State, 53 Ala. 514, 516, 1875 WL 1195, *2 (Ala. 1875), citing 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 

1046.

There are other definitions, broader, and more descriptive of the places or houses 

denounced in the criminal law as disorderly. That given by Wood on the “Law of 

(Continued)

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or implicitly) a private right of action to pursue the defendants for such “crimes.” Stated 

somewhat differently, plaintiff has not established his standing to pursue these 

defendants civilly for singularly criminal offenses. Accordingly, in this respect, plaintiff is 

seeking to enforce a right that clearly does not exist and, therefore, it is recommended 

that this “group” of claims be dismissed as frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

What is left of plaintiff’s complaint is his claim against the remaining eleven 

identified corporate defendants—that is, all defendants other than the fourteen partners 

of Box, Inc.—that these defendants have allowed the dissemination/distribution of his 

intellectual property—specifically, his short story on the Waco, Texas biker massacre—by 

 

Nuisance,” taken from the case of State v. Williams, 30 N.J. 102, will, perhaps, 

embrace the character of houses recognized by judicial decisions as falling within 

the term disorderly: “A disorderly house is any place of public resort, in which 

unlawful practices are habitually carried on, or which becomes a rendezvous or 

place of resort for thieves, drunkards, prostitutes, or other idle, vicious and 

disorderly persons, who gather there to gratify their depraved appetites, or for 

any purpose; for such persons are regarded as dangerous to the peace and welfare 

of the community, and their presence at any place, in considerable numbers, is 

always a just cause of alarm and apprehension.” Wood on Nuisances, § 38. The 

general terms of this definition may need qualification; but we think it can be 

stated as a clear legal proposition, that if a house is a common resort for the 

commission of criminal offenses, it is indictable as a public nuisance. 

Id. at 516-517 (emphasis supplied); see also Cohn v. State, 110 Ala. 56, 57, 20 So. 380, 380 (Ala. 1896) 

(defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of keeping a disorderly house); Sparks v. State, 59 

Ala. 82, 1877 WL 1127 (Ala. 1877) (defendant was indicted for keeping a disorderly house); 

Wooster v. State, 55 Ala. 217, 218 & 221, 1876 WL 1141, *1 & 4 (Ala. 1876) (defendant was indicted 

as a keeper of a house of prostitution, a bawdy-house, a disorderly house).

10 Misprision of a felony, a rarely charged crime, requires proof of the following four 

elements: “(1) commission and completion of a felony offense by another; (2) actual knowledge by 

defendant of the commission of such felony; (3) failure by defendant to notify authorities; and (4) 

an affirmative act by defendant to conceal the crime.” United States v. Brantley, 2013 WL 452023, *3 

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2013), aff’d, 803 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, S.Ct. , 2016 WL 

1134760 (May 2, 2016); see United States v. Jacobs, 312 Fed.Appx. 238, 239 (11th Cir. Feb. 17, 2009) 

(referencing the defendant’s indictment for misprision of a felony).

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providing the “alias” defendants with a safe haven to carry out their nefarious activities

and have failed to heed his requests to stop these activities.

11 To be sure, the Supreme 

Court has made clear that “[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or 

encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct 

infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it[.] Although ‘[t]he 

Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by 

another,’ these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and 

are well established in the law[.]” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 

U.S. 913, 930, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2776, 162 L.Ed.2d 781 (2005) (citations omitted; emphasis 

supplied). The problem in this case, however, is that Smith’s amended complaint contains 

no reference to the Copyright Act, or that he registered his short story with the Copyright 

Office (or was refused such registration), a prerequisite to bringing an action for 

copyright infringement. Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012), 

cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 1810, 185 L.Ed.2d 812 (2013); see also id. (“Congress 

created a substantial incentive for copyright owners to register United States works: [N]o 

civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be 

instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in 

accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee 

required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and 

registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for 

infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of 

Copyrights. (emphasis supplied)). In the absence of any allegations that Smith registered 

 11 Plaintiff has stated this claim in slightly different ways against these defendants 

but, at bottom, this is an appropriate statement of his claim.

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his short story with the Copyright Office (or was refused such registration), plaintiff has 

not established his ability to initiate a civil action for infringement, more specifically, 

vicarious and/or contributory infringement in accordance with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 

Studios Inc., supra; therefore, in this regard, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted and this portion of his complaint is due to be dismissed under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss this 

action, prior to service, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 

and, in part (as explained above), as frivolous in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D.ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, 

“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained 

in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period 

for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a 

proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in 

the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify 

Case 1:16-cv-00086-CG-MU Document 9 Filed 05/23/16 Page 19 of 20
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the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 23rd day of May, 2016.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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