Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00765/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00765-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN CRENSHAW,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

SUNHAM HOME FASHIONS, LLC, KAM 

HING ENTERPRISES, INC., MACY’S, INC 

and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

 Defendants.

1:16-CV-00765-LJO-BAM

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO REMAND (Doc. 7)

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 28, 2016, Plaintiff John Crenshaw (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in the Superior Court 

of California for the County of Fresno against Defendants Sunham Home Fashions, LLC (“Sunham”), 

Kam Hing Enterprises, Inc. (“KHE”), and Macy’s, Inc. (“Defendant”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and 

Does 1-50, for the injuries he sustained after he slipped and fell while using a mat he had purchased at a

Macy’s retail store. Doc. 3, Ex. A, Complaint (“Compl.”). 

In an attempt to remove this matter to federal court, on May 31, 2016, Defendant filed a civil 

cover sheet in this Court, which he labeled a “Notice of Removal.” Doc. 8 at 2. On June 1, 2016, the 

Clerk of Court notified Defendant that the filing was defective. Doc. 2 (“CLERK'S NOTICE to Attorney 

Alexandra Seibert re Notice of Removal: Your filing is entitled Notice of Removal, however, the actual 

document attached is a Civil Cover Sheet. Please file your Notice of Removal.”). In response, Defendant 

filed a Notice of Removal of the case to this Court on May 3, 2016, asserting jurisdiction exists because 

the parties are completely diverse and Plaintiff seeks more than $75,000 in damages. See Doc. 3 at 2; 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441; Doc. 3, Ex. B. Defendant asserts that it is a New York corporation with its 

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principal place of business in Cincinnati, Ohio; Sunham is a New York corporation with its headquarters 

and principal place of business in New York City, New York; and KHE is a New Jersey corporation, 

which does not have its principal place of business or headquarters in California. Doc. 3 at 2. 

On June 13, 2016, Plaintiff moved to remand this case to the Superior Court. Doc. 7 at 1. 

Plaintiff argues that (1) Defendant’s notice of removal was untimely; (2) all Defendants have not 

consented to removal; and (3) complete diversity of all parties is not evident on the face of the 

complaint. Id. Plaintiff therefore moves for fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendant contends its 

removal was proper. See Doc. 12 at 6.

The Court took the matter under submission on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). Doc. 

17. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand and corresponding 

request for attorney’s fees.

II. STANDARD OF DECISION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove an action to federal court if the district 

court has original jurisdiction. Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). If at 

any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 

shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The removal statute is strictly construed in favor of remand and 

against removal. Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant 

always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 

375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Federal jurisdiction therefore must be rejected if there is any doubt as 

to the right of removal in the first instance. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant’s Removal Was Timely.

Plaintiff bases his motion to remand primarily on the ground that Defendant’s removal notice 

was untimely filed and therefore failed to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Doc. 7 at 4.

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant’s removal, if timely, would have been proper. Doc. 14 at 4. 

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Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s motion was untimely filed because Defendant was served with the 

complaint on April 29, 2016, the 30-day removal deadline provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) fell on June 

1, 2016, and Defendant filed a sufficient notice of removal on June 2, 2016. Doc. 7 at 3.

Section 1446(b)(3) provides: 

Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a 

notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or 

otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may 

first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.

To trigger this thirty-day period, the facts supporting removal must appear on the face of the 

complaint. Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. “To avoid saddling defendants with the burden of investigating 

jurisdictional facts . . . the ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading in 

order for the first thirty-day clock under § 1446(b) to begin.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 

707 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harris, 425 F.3d at 695).

Here, grounds for removal are not apparent on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff 

did not allege that the parties are completely diverse.

1 Doc. 3, Ex. A, Compl; 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Specifically, Plaintiff failed to allege facts regarding KHE’s citizenship. Plaintiff only alleged KHE “is 

. . . a corporation, which does business in California, and throughout the United States.” Compl. at ¶ 3. 

Because the complaint lacked grounds for removal on its face, it did not trigger § 1446(a)’s 30-day 

deadline for removal. See Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1139. 

“[A] defendant ‘who has not lost the right to remove because of a failure to timely file a notice 

of removal . . . may remove to federal court when it discovers, based on its own investigation, that a case 

is removable.’” Calloway v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-01648-KJM, 2014 WL 

791546, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (quoting Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 

1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013)). Through its own investigation, Defendant determined on May 18, 2016 that 

 

1 There is no dispute that diversity is the only ground for this Court’s jurisdiction.

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Sunham is a New Jersey corporation. Doc. 12 at 4. Accordingly, Defendant’s removal was timely. See 

Harris, 425 F.3d at 697; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (defendant may remove case within 30 days of 

determining it is removable). 

B. Consent by All Defendants Is Not Required for Removal.

Plaintiff claims Defendant’s removal nonetheless was improper because Sunham and KHE did 

not consent to removal. Doc. 8 at 2. Defendant argues it was not required to obtain KHE’s or Sunham’s 

consent to remove this case because neither had been served with Plaintiff’s complaint at the time of 

Defendant’s removal. Plaintiff has failed to dispute this.

2 All defendants who have been “properly . . . 

served in the action” must join a petition for removal. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 

1193 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). “[A] party not served need not be 

joined” in a removal petition. Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass’n, 731 F.2d 1423, 1429 (9th Cir. 

1984). Because Sunham and KHE had not been properly served at the time of Defendant’s removal,

Defendant was permitted to remove this case without their consent. See id.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 7). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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Plaintiff’s attorney testifies that: “Both Sunham . . . and [KHE] were served on or about May 29, 2016, but as of the filing 

of this document, I do not have the copies of the proof of service on either.” Doc. 8, Declaration of Andrew Magwood, at ¶ 8. 

As of June 28, 2016, counsel for Defendant had not been served with the proofs. Doc. 13, Declaration of Matthew Noel, at ¶ 

6. To date, Plaintiff has not provided proofs of service of his complaint on KHE or Sunham.

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