Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03284/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03284-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Airline Crash

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANA HUDSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-03284-PJH 

FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER

Pursuant to Rule 16(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this final pretrial 

order is hereby entered and shall control the course of the trial unless modified by a 

subsequent order. 

A. Plaintiff’s Daubert Motion

1. Legal Standard

A witness who has been qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may give an opinion on scientific, technical, or otherwise 

specialized topics if (1) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, (2) the 

testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (3) the testimony is the product of reliable 

principles and methods; and (4) the witness has reliably applied the principles and 

methods to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of establishing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements are met. See Fed. R. 

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Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes. Although relevant evidence enjoys the 

presumption of admissibility, the trial court is obliged to act in a “gatekeeping role” with 

regard to the admission of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702. Daubert, 509 U.S. 

at 597; see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). “This 

entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 

testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly 

can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93. 

Thus, Daubert requires a two-part analysis. Id. The court first determines whether 

an expert's testimony reflects “scientific knowledge,” whether the findings are “derived by 

the scientific method,” and whether the work product is “good science”—that is, whether 

the testimony is reliable and trustworthy. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 & n.9, 593. The court 

then determines whether the testimony is “relevant to the task at hand.” Id. at 597.

Scientific evidence is reliable if it is grounded in methods of science—the focus is 

on principles and methodology, not on conclusions. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 

F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001). In determining whether an expert's reasoning or 

methodology is scientifically valid, the district court can consider “many factors” including 

(1) whether a scientific theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the 

theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether there 

is a known or potential error rate; and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally 

accepted in the relevant scientific community. See Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 841; Daubert, 

509 U.S. at 593–95.

Nevertheless, depending on the type of expert testimony offered, these factors 

may not be appropriate to assess reliability. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150. Other factors 

that might be considered to assess reliability include whether an expert has unjustifiably 

extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion, or whether an expert 

has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations. See General Elec. Co. v. 

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 

Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing 

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data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too 

great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”); Claar v. Burlington 

Northern R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the trial court should 

ensure the expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 

characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 

152. 

Rule 702's second prong concerns relevancy, or “fit.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 

591. Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it has a “valid 

scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry.” Id. at 591–92. As Rule 702 requires, it 

must “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 

Id. at 590–92. But “scientific validity [and relevance] for one purpose is not necessarily 

scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.” Id. at 591.

2. Analysis 

No party disputes Ravani’s qualifications in the field of biomechanics. Defendant 

argues that only a medical doctor can qualify to offer an opinion about injury causation. 

Although some courts have held otherwise, the weight of authority supports the 

conclusion that “the fact that a biomechanical expert is not a medical doctor does not 

mean that he is not qualified to offer an opinion as to specific causation.” Allen v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:15-CV-0019-HRH, 2016 WL 9086966, at *4 (D. Alaska 

Aug. 2, 2016) (collecting cases); see also Yu-Santos v. Ford Motor Co., No. 

1:06CV01773AWI-DLB, 2009 WL 1392085, at *13 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2009); Ream v. 

United States, No. 2:17-CV-1141-RAJ, 2019 WL 2578600, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 24, 

2019). 

Plaintiff argues that Ravani’s opinions are not the product of reliable principles and 

methods, and that he has not reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 

the case. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. Specifically, plaintiff 

primarily challenges Ravani’s opinions that “[t]ypically, a value of 1000 HIC is determined 

to be the threshold for a head injury. For mild TBI, HIC values as low as 400 in one study 

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[1] and 160 in another study [4] are considered as the beginning levels for such injuries.”; 

and “[t]he lowest peak G-forces or linear acceleration to be consistent with TBI are 

reported to be 60g’s or higher. In this incident even the upper limit values . . . are far 

below what has been observed to be consistent with TBI.”; and “there is no reasonable 

probability that the forces and motions imparted to Ms. Hudson’s head in the subject 

incident to [sic] have any potential for brain injuries.” Dkt. 38-1 at ECF pp. 21–22. For 

the following reasons, those opinions are EXCLUDED.

The court finds that the evidence before it does not show that these opinions are 

the product of reliable principles and methods, or that Ravani has reliably applied the 

principles and methods to the facts of the case. Although Ravani reliably calculates the 

various forces that a bag of a certain weight would impose on an individual when falling 

from a certain height, there is no indication that Ravani has applied a generally-accepted, 

peer-reviewed, scientific theory or technique with a known error rate for determining 

whether such a force can cause mTBI. The studies Ravani cites in his report in fact 

suggest that no such generally-accepted standard establishing a force threshold for mTBI 

exists. Furthermore, even if defendant had demonstrated that Ravani relied upon sound 

principles and methods, the court finds that Ravani did not reliably apply the principles 

and methods to the facts of the case, because the report did not incorporate plaintiff’s 

particular characteristics (for example, her age or physical condition) when assessing the 

minimum threshold of force that could have caused mTBI.

Plaintiff’s other objections to Ravani’s testimony are denied. In particular, Ravani’s 

calculations based on exemplar physical models are permissible so long as a foundation 

for those measurements is entered into evidence. Of course, plaintiff may cross-examine 

Ravani in an attempt to elucidate the proper weight the jury should afford his testimony 

given its factual underpinnings. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 1

Plaintiff’s first motion in limine to preclude defendant from introducing expert 

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testimony not disclosed in its expert disclosures is DENIED. Plaintiff has not specified 

any particular evidence she seeks to exclude, but rather refers to unbounded, broad 

categories of evidence. Although the opinions experts testify to must be limited to the 

contents of their reports, this issue is better addressed during trial as particular questions 

of admissibility arise.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2

Plaintiff’s second motion in limine to preclude defendant from introducing rebuttal 

expert testimony that exceeds the scope of rebutting plaintiff’s expert testimony is 

DENIED. As with her first motion in limine, plaintiff has not specified any particular 

evidence she seeks to exclude, but rather refers to broad potential categories of 

evidence. Although the opinions rebuttal experts testify to must be intended solely to 

contradict or rebut evidence identified by another party’s expert, this issue is better 

addressed during trial as particular questions of admissibility arise. Moreover, plaintiff’s 

argument that rebuttal experts must be of the same academic discipline as the expert 

they are rebutting is unavailing.

Additionally, plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. McIntire’s testimony as cumulative of 

Dr. Hooker’s testimony is DENIED. Because no evidence has been admitted as of yet, 

the court will not exclude hypothetical, unspecified testimony as cumulative.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 3

Plaintiff’s third motion in limine to preclude defendant from introducing evidence, 

testimony, or argument that plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages is DENIED. Again, 

plaintiff has not identified any discernable item of evidence she is seeking to exclude by 

this motion. Moreover, plaintiff has not sought to strike, dismiss, or otherwise preclude 

defendant from asserting this affirmative defense prior to this motion in limine. A motion 

in limine to exclude unspecified items of evidence is not the proper mechanism at this 

point to adjudge the merits of defendant’s affirmative defense.

4. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 4

Plaintiff’s fourth motion in limine to preclude defendant from introducing evidence 

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of plaintiff’s past traumas experienced more than five years prior to the incident is 

DENIED. The quality of plaintiff’s life both prior to and following her alleged injury is 

highly relevant to the questions that will be presented to the jury at trial. However, 

certainly not all details about plaintiff’s life and traumas sustained prior to the incident are 

relevant, and even some relevant details would likely be unfairly prejudicial or confusing. 

Defendant is cautioned to use discretion in this regard, and the court will entertain 

objections at trial to exclude such evidence.

5. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 5

Plaintiff’s fifth motion in limine to preclude testimony or evidence from Monica 

Grant is DENIED. Plaintiff objects to defendant’s untimely disclosure of Grant, but as an 

impeachment witnesses, she did not need to be disclosed.

C. Defendant’s Motions In Limine

1. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 1

Defendant’s first motion in limine to exclude evidence of amounts billed for 

plaintiff’s medical care is GRANTED as unopposed. By plaintiff’s admission, she will not 

seek to introduce billed amounts for medical care when a provider has accepted less 

than the total billed amount as full payment, or as themselves evidence of the reasonable 

value of the services.

2. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 2

Defendant’s second motion in limine to exclude plaintiff’s claims for lost wages and 

economic damages is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff will be 

permitted to testify about her claim for lost earning capacity, so the motion is denied to 

the extent it seeks to exclude such evidence. However, this court will not allow the jury to 

calculate plaintiff’s lost earning capacity if such a calculation would require the jury to 

base its calculation on speculation.

3. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 3

Defendant’s third motion in limine to exclude certain testimony from Dawn Brown, 

D.O. is DENIED. Defendant’s argument that Brown’s testimony will generally be 

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cumulative is speculative at this point. Additionally, because Brown is licensed and 

certified by the state, defendant’s argument that she is not as expert as plaintiff’s other 

witnesses is not availing. 

4. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4

Defendant’s fourth motion in limine to prohibit plaintiff’s counsel from referencing, 

suggesting, or asking questions about specific dollar values during voir dire or jury 

selection or in plaintiff’s opening statement is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART. According to this court’s regular practice, all counsel will be prohibited from 

referencing amounts of money during jury selection. However, counsel are permitted to 

argue that plaintiff is or is not entitled to a particular damages award during their opening 

statements, so long as they have a good-faith belief that admissible evidence will support 

their arguments.

D. Jury Instructions

1. Joint Instructions

At the pretrial conference, the parties indicated that they had erroneously filed an 

incorrect draft of their joint pretrial instructions, such that certain of the so-called joint 

instructions were in fact opposed. Additionally, other previously-agreed-upon instructions 

were omitted. The parties shall file final, joint jury instructions no later than September 

12, 2019. 

Regarding jury instructions related to damages, the parties dispute whether the 

Ninth Circuit model damages instructions or the CACI model damages instructions are 

more appropriate. The court finds that the CACI instructions are more specific and 

explicative than the Ninth Circuit model instructions with regard to this action’s state-law 

negligence claim, and the court therefore adopts the CACI model damages instructions. 

The court notes defendant’s objection to use of the CACI damages instructions rather 

than the Ninth Circuit model damages instructions. Nevertheless, the parties’ joint 

submission shall include all damages instructions the parties jointly believe are needed, 

taken from the CACI models, including CACI 3904.

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2. Plaintiff’s Separate Instructions

Regarding plaintiff’s first proposed instruction, CACI 431 regarding causation with 

multiple causes, the court will give the instruction if the evidence admitted at trial supports 

doing so.

The court will give plaintiff’s second and third proposed instructions, CACI 3901 

and CACI 3902. Defendant does not object to either, other than to the extent it prefers 

the Ninth Circuit model damages instructions. 

Regarding plaintiff’s fourth and fifth proposed instructions, CACI 3903 and CACI 

3903A, the court will give a version of this instruction, although plaintiff is ordered to 

resubmit a modified version. First, it must be combined with CACI 3903A and 3903D. 

Second, it must omit monetary amounts. 

Regarding plaintiff’s sixth and seventh proposed instructions, CACI 3905 and 

CACI 3905A, they must be combined as contemplated by the CACI instruction. The final 

optional paragraph of the CACI 3905 model addressing discounting to present cash value 

must be included. Finally, plaintiff is instructed to adjust her selection of noneconomic 

damages types and to reference them consistently throughout the instruction, as 

discussed at the pretrial conference.

Regarding plaintiff’s eighth and ninth proposed instructions, CACI 3927 and CACI 

3928, the court will give the instructions if the evidence admitted at trial supports doing 

so.

Regarding plaintiff’s tenth proposed instruction, CACI 3932, there is no objection 

and the court will give the instruction.

3. Defendant’s Separate Instructions

Regarding defendant’s first proposed instruction, Ninth Circuit model instructions 

5.1 and 5.2, the court declines to give these instructions in favor of the CACI model 

damages instructions.

Regarding defendant’s second proposed instruction, which is a custom instruction 

fashioned after a California statute regarding privileged publications made in a judicial 

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proceeding, the court declines to give the instruction. Plaintiff may not offer evidence or 

argue that this judicial proceeding is a compensable source of her damages, and

defendant may of course object if plaintiff deviates from this order.

Regarding defendant’s third proposed instruction, Ninth Circuit model 5.4, the 

court will instead use the analogous instruction CACI 3904.

E. Voir Dire

The court will conduct the voir dire orally and by using a questionnaire. The 

parties’ jointly-proposed questions will be incorporated into the court’s oral voir dire

and/or the written questionnaire. The court declines to adopt plaintiff’s proposed voir dire 

questions as argumentative. The questionnaire will be provided to counsel the week 

before trial.

After the court’s questioning, each side shall have fifteen minutes to question the 

panel, but may not use that time to argue their case. The parties must abide by this 

court’s rulings on the parties’ motions in limine when conducting voir dire.

The court will empanel eight jurors. Each side shall have three peremptory 

challenges.

F. Verdict Form

As discussed at the pretrial hearing, the parties are instructed to revise and 

resubmit the joint verdict form no later than September 12, 2019. In particular, the 

second question should specify that the jury will compute only damages caused by

defendant’s negligence. Additionally, the question describing non-economic loss should 

not include examples of non-economic loss.

G. Trial Schedule and Time Limits

There will be approximately 18 hours of trial time, which will be divided equally 

with each side allotted 9 hours for opening statements, presentation of evidence, crossexamination, and closing arguments. Jury selection, final jury instructions, and 

deliberations are not included within this allotment.

H. Other Matters

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Defendant requested that the court exclude witnesses from trial, and plaintiff did 

not object. There court hereby excludes witnesses who may testify from attending the 

trial, including those witnesses who may be called for rebuttal.

The parties are directed to meet and confer regarding objections to exhibits and 

deposition excerpts. If any objection cannot be resolved through the parties’ meet and 

confer process, the parties may file a joint letter brief concerning their unresolved 

disputes no later than September 16, 2019.

The parties must prepare and jointly submit a statement of undisputed facts to be 

read to the jury no later than September 16, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2019

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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