Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02670/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02670-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALBERT ERVING, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CDCR, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-2670 AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, is incarcerated at the California Health Care 

Facility (CHCF) in Stockton. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has 

requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was 

referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). 

 Examination of the in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford 

the costs of suit. However, because it is unclear whether petitioner’s pleading was properly 

framed as a civil rights complaint, rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the filing 

costs associated with each pleading are different, the court will defer ruling on the application to 

proceed in forma pauperis. 

 Review of the complaint and attached exhibits appears to demonstrate the following. 

Plaintiff, who is now 65 years of age, was committed to the California Department of Corrections 

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and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 1970 for an indeterminate life sentence following his conviction 

for first degree murder. Plaintiff now has several physical health problems, including dilated 

cardiomyopathy and implacement of an automatic implantable cardioverter defibrillator (AICD), 

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), diabetes and hypertension. He is also a 

participant in CDCR’s Mental Health Services Delivery System, recently at the Mental Health 

Crisis Bed (MHCB) level of care. Plaintiff also has a verified learning disability. It appears that 

plaintiff was denied parole in 1982, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2006 and 2009. 

ECF No. 1 at 20, 24-5. 

 The instant complaint, against defendants CDCR and Brian Duffy, CHCF Warden, alleges 

the following, ECF No. 1 at 3: 

The Eighth Amendment Right to the U.S. Constitution to be Free 

from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, by False Imprisonment of 

close case without Abstract of Judgment when I was incarcerated 

on 1-11-76 and never appeared in court for Case Number A520896 

during proceedings and is still being held kidnap for over 37 years 

past my release date of 7-19-76. (Sic) 

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and damages. Attachments to the complaint include a copy of 

the February 10, 2014 Three-Judge Court order in the class action Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 

2:90-cv-00520 KJM DAD P, in which plaintiff draws the court’s attention to the following two 

provisions, ECF No. 1 at 10: 

Defendants shall also immediately implement the following 

measures: 

. . . (d) In consultation with the Receiver’s office, finalize and 

implement an expanded parole process for medically incapacitated 

inmates; 

(e) Finalize and implement a new parole process whereby inmates 

who are 60 years of age or older and have served a minimum of 

twenty-five years of their sentence will be referred to the Board of 

Parole Hearings to determine suitability for parole. . . . 

 Review of this and the other attachments to the complaint fails to clarify whether plaintiff 

is challenging his underlying conviction, ongoing incarceration or the quality of his current 

medical care. Plaintiff recently filed a “Petition for Rehearing,” which seeks habeas review. See 

ECF No. 6. This filing states that plaintiff is unlawfully incarcerated on the following grounds: 

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Petitioner could not in anyway shape or form be guilty of a 187 

crime with no abstract of judgment, arrest records or trial records 

pointing to Petitioner’s culpability in this accused of 187 murder 

charge. Further, Petitioner was incarcetated at the time of said 

crime being incarcerated for possession of substance abuse 

(marijuana). (Sic) 

ECF No. 6 at 2. The petition requests certification of this matter for transfer to the Court of 

Appeal “to settle important questions of law.” Id. at 2-3. Petitioner states that he “believes that 

this Court has taken advantage of a mentally ill petitioner which is demonstrated by the evidence 

included in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Id. at 3. 

 Review of plaintiff’s filings in the California courts1 indicates that an original habeas 

petition was filed by petitioner in the California Supreme Court on November 10, 2014, and 

denied on January 21, 2015. However, plaintiff has submitted no exhibits that clarify the 

substance of his state court petition. 

 Plaintiff is initially informed that this court has no authority to order that an inmate be 

released under the guidelines set forth in Coleman. As another magistrate judge in this district 

has opined: 

A plea for compassionate release is not one which federal courts, 

sitting in habeas, or any other situation, are entitled to act upon. 

“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to 

be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional 

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). “[N]either § 2241 nor § 2254 vest 

this Court with habeas corpus jurisdiction to order a compassionate 

release.” Fox v. Warden Ross Correctional Inst., 2012 WL 

3878143, *2 (S.D. Ohio Sep.6, 2012). California’s law authorizing 

a court to recall a sentence is not mandatory, but only permissive, 

and contains no language permitting, let alone mandating, a 

compassionate release. Gonzales v. Marshall, 2008 WL 5115882, 

*5 (C.D .Cal. Dec.4, 2008), citing Cal.Penal Code § 1170(d). 

Tucker v. Department of Corrections, 2013 WL 1091282, *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2013) (Findings 

and Recommendations by Hollows, M.J.), adopted Apr. 25, 2013 (Mendez, D.J.). The 

 

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 This court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of other courts. See 

United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 631 

F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (court may take judicial notice of facts 

that are capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned). 

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appropriate avenue for seeking compassionate release appears to be set forth in California Code 

of Regulations, tit. 15, § 3076 et seq. (Recall of Commitment Recommendation Circumstances). 

However, claims that prison officials declined to follow this law are not cognizable in federal 

court. See Ransom v. Adams, 313 Fed. Appx. 948, 949, 2009 WL 498980, *1 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(affirming summary dismissal of petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to compassionate release 

under Section 3076(d), because the assertion that state officials failed to follow state law “is not 

cognizable” in federal court). 

 Amendment of the pleading is necessary, first and foremost to clearly frame the action as 

either a civil rights suit challenging the conditions of plaintiff’s confinement, or a federal habeas 

petition challenging the fact or duration of plaintiff’s confinement. A civil rights action brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenges the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement and may seek 

damages. By contrast, a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

challenges a prisoner’s conviction and/or sentence. Habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a 

prisoner seeking an immediate or speedier release from prison. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 

475, 500 (1973). On the other hand, “habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, 

where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s 

sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 The exhaustion requirements for each type of action are also different – a federal habeas 

claim must first be exhausted in the state courts, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), while a 

civil rights claim must first be exhausted through the institution’s administrative grievance 

system, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Thus, despite 

the liberality given pro se complaints, courts must be cautious in considering whether to convert a 

civil rights complaint into a habeas corpus petition if doing so would “undermine and effectively 

nullify the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 525 n.24. 

 The responding party is also different for each type of action. The only proper respondent 

in a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the state officer having custody of the petitioner (i.e., the 

warden of the prison in which petitioner is incarcerated). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Rule 2(a), Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases; Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). 

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On the other hand, a civil rights complaint may name any individual defendant with an allegedly 

direct role in the violation of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. Institutional defendants, like CDCR, are generally not proper defendants in a civil rights 

damages action because they are not “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983 and are 

generally immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, see Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 

782 (1978). However, in a civil rights action for prospective injunctive relief, the Secretary of 

CDCR, named in his official capacity, may be an appropriate defendant. See e.g. Lacano 

Investments, LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 

U.S. 123 (1908)). 

 To the extent that plaintiff may be attempting to pursue a Section 1983 claim based on the 

alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, he is informed of the following 

standards for stating a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim: 

In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of 

two parts. First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by 

demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result 

in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s 

response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This second 

prong . . . is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm 

caused by the indifference. 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations, punctuation and quotation 

marks omitted); accord, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Lemire v. 

CDCR, 726 F.3d 1062, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs, a prisoner must allege that a prison official “kn[ew] of and disregard [ed] 

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

 In addition, to state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must allege an actual 

connection or link between the challenged conduct of a specific defendant and plaintiff’s alleged 

constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a 

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constitutional right, within the meaning of [S]ection 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978); see also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988) (“The inquiry into 

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”) 

(Citations omitted.) 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court must dismiss the original pleading and grant plaintiff 

leave to file an amended pleading, framed either as an amended civil rights complaint or a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended civil rights complaint, 

he must demonstrate exhaustion of available administrative remedies, and name as defendants 

only individuals who personally participated in allegedly depriving plaintiff of his federal 

constitutional or statutory rights. If plaintiff chooses to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

he must demonstrate exhaustion of his state court remedies, and name as respondent only the 

warden of the facility in which he is incarcerated. The complaint or petition must also identify 

the specific relief sought. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. The court defers consideration of plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. 

 2. The complaint is dismissed. 

 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff the forms used by prisoners in this 

district for filing: (1) a civil rights complaint, and (2) a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

 4. Plaintiff may, within thirty days after the filing date of this order, submit an amended 

pleading, prefaced by one of the forms provided herein by the Clerk of Court, and clearly 

designated either an Amended Civil Rights Complaint or a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

 5. Alternatively, if plaintiff concludes that he does not meet the requirements for pursuing 

either a civil rights complaint or a petition for writ of habeas corpus, he may request the voluntary 

dismissal of this action. 

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 6. Failure to timely file an amended pleading will result in a recommendation that this 

action be dismissed without prejudice. 

DATED: April 23, 2015 

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