Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00916/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00916-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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17-CV-916-JLS (WVG)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANCE R. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. PATEL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-916-JLS (WVG)

ORDER DIRECTING U.S. 

MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE 

OF SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. 

R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) & 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d)

(ECF No. 13)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Lance R. Martin’s Second Amended 

Complaint. (“SAC,” ECF No. 13.) The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and has dismissed both Plaintiff’s Complaint and First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 

1915A(b). (ECF Nos. 7, 11.) The Court dismissed both Complaints without prejudice and 

allowed Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint on each occasion. Plaintiff has 

now timely filed a Second Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 13).

Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief 

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may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

“not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

that fails to state a claim”).

As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915 

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the Marshal to effect service 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Navarette 

v. Pioneer Med. Ctr., No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 

Jan. 9, 2013).

All complaints must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). “[D]etermining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw 

on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court 

must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see 

also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the 

language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

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“While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.” Hoagland 

v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) 

(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts cannot accept legal conclusions set forth in a 

complaint if the plaintiff has not supported her contentions with facts. Id. (citing Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679).

In addition, the Court’s duty to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992); see Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 

However, in giving liberal interpretation to a civil rights complaint filed pro se, the court 

may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand 

a motion to dismiss.” Id.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, seeking to hold several Defendants liable for their alleged deficient medical care 

of Plaintiff. (See generally SAC.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that these Defendants 

failed to properly treat him for two medical injuries: first, an alleged cervical injury causing 

extreme pain and suffering and partial paralysis; second, an internal injury causing constant

and bloody urine and abdominal pain. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claim because Plaintiff failed to explain 

how the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over state law medical malpractice claims. 

(ECF No. 7, at 4.) In his FAC, Plaintiff attempted to cure these deficiencies by pleading 

that each Defendant operated under color of state law by virtue of their “California State 

Medical Board” licenses. (FAC ¶¶ 5–8.) The Court found that state medical licenses do 

not qualify the Defendants are state actors and thus could not act under color of state law. 

(ECF No. 12, at 4.) Plaintiff now alleges Defendants acted under color of state law because 

they each have “a California state billing contract funded through Medi Cal to . . . El Cajon 

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neighborhood Health Clinic.” (SAC ¶¶ 5–8.) El Cajon neighborhood Health Clinic 

employs the Defendant doctors. (See id.)

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured 

by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged 

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of state law when she exercises 

power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 

clothed in the authority of state law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). 

If a defendant’s conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, then the defendant is considered to be acting under color of state law. West, 

487 U.S. at 49. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the clinic that employs the doctors is funded through a 

Medi-Cal billing contract. (SAC ¶¶ 5–8.) Medi-Cal is California’s version of the joint 

federal-state program known as Medicaid. Marquez v. Dep’t of Health Care Servs., 240 

Cal. App. 4th 87, 93 (Ct. App. 2015). It is plausible that there is state action present where 

a government funding relationship exists. The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient 

to survive this stage of the litigation, especially considering the Court’s duty to liberally 

construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings in civil rights cases. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to survive the sua sponte

screening required by section 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Accordingly, the Court finds 

Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The 

officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] 

cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United 

States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma 

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 . . . .”).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk SHALL ISSUE a summons as to Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 13) upon Defendants and SHALL FORWARD it to Plaintiff along 

with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk SHALL 

PROVIDE Plaintiff with a certified copy of the Order granting Plaintiff leave to proceed 

IFP (ECF No. 7), a certified copy of his Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13), and 

the summons so that he may serve each named Defendant. Upon receipt of this “IFP 

Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285’s as completely and accurately as 

possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according to the instructions 

provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. Upon receipt, the U.S. 

Marshal shall serve a copy of the Second Amended Complaint and summons upon each 

Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of service shall be 

advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

2. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (noting that while a defendant may 

occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the 

Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 

§ 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the 

pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the 

defendant is required to respond). 

3. Plaintiff SHALL SERVE upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been 

entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other 

document submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original 

paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true 

and correct copy of any document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, 

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and the date of service. Any paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the 

Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2018

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