Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02514/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02514-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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SRM

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

George Medina,

Petitioner

-vsJudy Friego, et al.,

Respondent(s)

CV-05-2514-PHX-JAT (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August

22, 2005 (#1). On April 17, 2006, Respondents filed their Response (#16). Petitioner has

not filed a reply. 

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the

evidence as follows:

Appellant dated the victim, Jessie, and fathered her child, Emily.

When the parties ceased dating in March 2001, Jessie and Emily moved

out of appellant’s parents’ house where they had been residing with

appellant and moved into Jessie’s parents’ house. Appellant and Jessie

were in regular contact because appellant often visited with Emily.

 Jessie testified at trial that after the parties broke up, appellant

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 Exhibits to the Answer (#16) are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___”.

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made several attempts to get back into a romantic relationship with her.

She recalled one specific attempt shortly before she was shot in which

appellant phoned her and told her that he wanted to marry her and that he

planned on joining the Marines. She testified, “I told him that I didn’t

want to get together with him and that I was tired of his abuse.” Jessie

also testified that she had begun dating another man after she broke up

with appellant, and that she had been concerned about appellant’s

reaction.

Jessie’s friend’s husband, Juan Encinas Hernandez, testified that

he had had a conversation with appellant weeks before the shooting in

which appellant asked him if Jessie had a new boyfriend. Juan said that

he did not know whether Jessie was dating anyone. Appellant told Juan

that he did not want his child to have a stepfather, and that if he saw

Jessie with another man he would kill them. Appellant also asked Juan if

he had an ID that appellant could borrow to buy a gun, ostensibly for

self-protection. Juan told appellant he did not have an ID.

Over the Labor Day weekend of August 31—September 3, 2001,

Jessie and her boyfriend arranged to be out of town. Appellant agreed to

watch Emily while Jessie was away. When he questioned her regarding

with whom she was leaving, she told him she was going with a coworker.

When Jessie arrived home late at night at the conclusion of the

weekend, she put her sleeping daughter to bed and returned outside to

lock the gate. After she locked the gate and headed back towards the

front door of the house, she heard a rustling noise that caused her to

pause and look around. She testified that she saw appellant running

towards her and aiming a gun in her direction. She heard numerous gun

shots, and she knew that she had been hit by the bullets. Jessie was

rendered a paraplegic as a result of the shooting.

(Exhibit WW, Memorandum Decision at 2-3.)1

 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was charged alternatively with one count of attempted first-degree murder,

and one count of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

Counsel John Taradash was appointed to represent Petitioner at trial. Petitioner filed a motion

to dismiss the indictment as duplicitous (Exhibit C), and a motion to strike the allegation of

premeditation on the basis that the Arizona courts had previously ruled that the provision

defining premeditation was unconstitutionally vague (Exhibit D.) The state moved to amend

the indictment to allege the charges in the conjunctive as well as the disjunctive. (Exhibit E.)

Petitioner proceeded to trial on March 25, 2002, but Petitioner’s first trial ended in a

mistrial when the jurors were unable to agree on a verdict. (Exhibit F, M.E. 3/25/02; Exhibit

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V, M.E. 4/4/02; Exhibit W, R.T. 4/4/02 at 22-23.) 

Petitioner returned for retrial beginning on April 17, 2002. (Exhibit AA, M.E.

4/17/02.) During voir dire, trial counsel moved to strike juror Amy Baratta for cause, based

upon her objections to guns. (Exhibit BB, R.T. 4/17/02, at 140-141.) The trial court denied

that motion. (Id.) 

The jury returned guilty verdicts on both the attempted first degree murder and the

aggravated assault counts. (Exhibit MM, Verdicts; Exhibit OO, R.T. 4/25/02 at 4-5.) A

Presentence Investigation Report was prepared (Exhibit PP), and Petitioner was sentenced to

concurrent sentences of 21 years on the attempted murder charge, and 15 years on the

aggravated assault charge. (Exhibit QQ, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and was represented on appeal by attorney Karen Noble,

deputy public defender, who raised the following three issues for review:

1. Since Venire Person Amy Baratta voiced serious concerns

about remaining fair in a case such as this, involving guns, did the judge

abuse his discretion in failing to strike Ms. Baratta for cause?

2. The only difference between first-degree murder and knowing

or intentional second-degree murder is premeditation. The legislature

has redefined premeditation so that it no longer requires actual

reflection. Does this obliterate any meaningful difference between first

and second-degree murder, requiring the striking of premeditation from

the indictment, in effect dismissing the charge of first-degree murder?

3. In a prosecution for first-degree murder, does the Arizona

statute defining premeditation, A.R.S. § 13-1101(1), violate due process

of law and the presumption of innocence by excusing the state from

proving “reflection”?

(Exhibit SS, Opening Brief at 7.) 

In arguing the first issue (juror strike), Petitioner relied upon the Fifth Amendment’s

Due Process clause, and the 6th and 14th Amendments, as well as the Arizona constitution.

(Id. at 9.) In his Reply Brief, Petitioner responded to arguments by the prosecution that

attacked state law holding that juror strike claims are not subject to harmless error analysis,

and noted that the state courts had rejected the Supreme Court’s reasoning applying harmless

error analysis to similar federal claims. Petitioner noted that Arizona, unlike the Federal

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courts, recognized peremptory strikes as a “substantial important right” and that such holdings

are based on state procedural law, not federal constitutional law. (Exhibit UU at 5-8).

In arguing the second issue (premeditation in indictment), Petitioner relied upon

“Due Process” and quoted from the Arizona case, State v. Thompson, 201 Ariz. 273, 34 P.3d

382, 390 (App. 2001) which quotation refers to the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process

decision in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). (Exhibit SS at 13-14.) Petitioner

also relied on the Supreme Court’s harmless error standard in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

275 (1993). (Exhibit SS at 17.) (See also Exhibit UU, Reply Brief at 12.)

Finally, Petitioner argued with regard to the third issue (definition of premeditation)

that the asserted errors resulted in a violation of “Due Process of Law under the 14th

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Exhibit SS at 19.) In his Reply Brief,

Petitioner relied upon a number of federal cases, including Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

275 (1993) and Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals found that the juror, Ms. Baratta, had not indicated she

could not remain impartial, and concluded that the trial court’s acceptance of that statement

in deciding not to strike her was within the court’s discretion. (Exhibit WW, Memorandum

Decision at 6.) The Court of Appeals collapsed Petitioner’s two issues based upon

premeditation into a challenge to the jury instruction, and found that the trial court’s

premeditation instruction was erroneous because it provided that “proof of actual reflection

is not required.” However, the court found any error to be harmless based upon the substantial

evidence of actual reflection. (Id. at 8-9.) 

The court found sua sponte that allowing the conviction on the lesser included crime

of aggravated assault resulted in a violation of the Arizona Rules concerning the joinder of

charges in the alternative. (Id. at 10-11). Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction and sentence

on the aggravated assault charge was vacated, and his conviction and sentence on the attempted

murder were affirmed. (Id.)

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit ZZ), which was

summarily denied on November 24, 2003 (Exhibit AAA). The Order and Mandate issued

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December 26, 2003 (Exhibit BBB).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

1. First PCR Petition

On December 29, 2003, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, and

counsel was appointed to represent him. (Exhibit CCC, Notice and M.E. 1/8/04.) The public

defender’s office moved to withdraw based upon the conflict of interest from an anticipated

ineffective assistance claim (Exhibit DDD). The motion was granted, and substitute counsel

was appointed. (Id.) PCR counsel filed a notice indicating the completion of his review and

inability to find a colorable claim (Exhibit EEE, Motion). Counsel was ordered to remain in

an advisory capacity, and Petitioner was granted an extension to file a pro per petition. (Id.

M.E. 5/3/4.)

On May 26, 2004, Petitioner filed pro se his first PCR Petition (Exhibit FFF).

Petitioner argued: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue copies of video

and audio tapes of Petitioner’s interview; and (2) that a juror was sleeping during testimony and

his attorneys were aware of it but did nothing. Petitioner’s PCR petition was summarily denied

by an Order filed October 14, 2004 (Exhibit KKK). 

Petitioner he did not seek review of that decision. (Petition, #1 at 2.)

2. Second PCR Petition

On June 28, 2005, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief seeking

relief on the basis of Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296 (2004). On June 29, 2005, the

trial court summarily dismissed the notice, on the basis that Petitioner’s conviction was final

at the time of Blakely, and Blakely was not retroactive on collateral review. (Exhibit OOO.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on October 6, 2005 (Exhibit SSS, Petition), seeking

review of his Blakely claim. That Petition was summarily denied on July 28, 2006.

(Supplemental Answer, #20, Exhibits.)

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E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner commenced this federal proceeding by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (#1) on August 22, 2005. Petitioner’s Petition is framed with two grounds for relief:

A. Denial of due process based upon:

1. the elimination of the distinction between first and second degree

murder by removal of the reflection requirement from premeditation;

2. dismissal of the lesser charge by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

following Petitioner’s conviction on both, was a violation of double

jeopardy;

3. trial court’s denial of motion to strike premeditation language from

indictment; 

4. trial court’s denial of motion to strike juror Amy Baratta for cause,

requiring the use of peremptory strike;

5. a defective definition of premeditation;

6. ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to pursue evidence, i.e.

surveillance of Petitioner’s interrogation;

7. jury misconduct;

8. factors used to aggravate Petitioner’s sentence were elements of the

crime; and

9. factors used to aggravate Petitioner’s sentence were not found by the

jury, as required by Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296 (2004).

B. Violation of the Sixth Amendment based upon the prosecution’s suppression of

surveillance tapes of Petitioner’s interrogation.

The Petition included a Ground III, listing an Eighth Amendment, Cruel and Unusual

Punishment, claim based upon: (1) the aggravating factors being an element of the crime; (2)

the aggravated sentence was improper; and (3) the trial court determined the aggravating

sentence and imposed the aggravating sentence. However, that Ground III was submitted with

a large “X” through the page. In the Court’s Screening Order (#6) and Respondents’ Answer

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(#13), this ground was apparently treated as being deleted and was ignored. Petitioner has not

taken exception to the Order or the Answer. To the extent that Petitioner intended to continue

to assert these claims, parts 1 and 3 are repetitive of Grounds A-8 and A-9, but for the

reference to the Eighth Amendment. Part 2 is conclusory, and fails to identify the nature of

the impropriety. Conclusory allegations that are not supported by specific facts do not merit

habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

Respondents filed their Answer (#16) on April 17, 2006. Respondents argue that

grounds A-1, A-3, and A-5 are interrelated attacks on the premeditation element, and they

concede these claims were properly exhausted by presentation in Petitioner’s appellate brief

on direct review. Respondents argue that ground A-2 (dismissal of lesser count) was never

presented to the Arizona courts, and is thus not properly exhausted. Respondents argue that

ground A-4 (juror strikes) was originally presented by Petitioner as a federal claim in his

appellate opening brief, but he shifted to reliance on the more stringent state ground in his

reply brief, and therefore it is not properly exhausted. Respondents argue that ground A-6

(ineffective assistance) was not presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, although it was

included in Petitioner’s first PCR petition, and therefore is not properly exhausted.

Respondents assert that ground A-7 (jury misconduct) is either a conclusory allegation, or

if it refers to his claim in his first PCR petition that a juror was sleeping, then it was not

properly exhausted by presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Respondents argue that

ground A-8 (aggravation with element of offense) was never presented to the Arizona

courts, and is thus not properly exhausted. Respondents concede that Ground A-9 (Blakely

claim) was raised in Petitioner’s second PCR Petition and was presented to the Arizona Court

of Appeals, but argued that the appeals on that claim are still pending. Respondents argue that

Ground B (suppression of evidence) was not presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

although it was included in Petitioner’s first PCR petition, and therefore is not properly

exhausted. Respondents argue that all unexhausted claims are now procedurally defaulted and

therefore subject to dismissal with prejudice.

Respondents address the merits of Petitioner’s grounds A-1, A-3 and A-5

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(premeditation), and grounds A-4 (juror strike) and A-9 (Blakey claim). Respondents assert

that these claims are without merit, and must be denied.

Petitioner sought (#17) and obtained (#18) an extension until June 16, 2006 to reply

in support of his Petition. To date, Petitioner has not replied to the Respondents’ Answer.

Supplemental Briefing re Absention - As of the filing of the Respondents’ Answer,

the Arizona Court of Appeals had not yet ruled on Petitioner’s Petition for Review on his

second PCR petition. Accordingly, the Court directed the parties to supplement their

pleadings to address whether this Court should abstain from ruling on this federal habeas

petition in light of the still pending state proceedings. (Order 7/18/6, #19.) On August 3,

2006, Respondents filed a Supplemental Answer (#20), relating that the Arizona Court of

Appeals had since denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review. On August 28, 2006, Petitioner

filed a response (#22) asking for a ruling on the merits.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Grounds A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-8 and B were never

properly exhausted, are now procedurally defaulted, and must be dismissed with prejudice.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to show

that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir.

1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

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 Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in

federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing constitutional issues

are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner

v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases

not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are

exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on

them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett,

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but must

be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has been

fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Petitioner has failed to properly present his Grounds A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-8 and

B. Two of Petitioner’s claims, Grounds A-2 and A-8, have never been presented to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner asserts in his Ground A-2 that dismissal of the lesser

charge by the Arizona Court of Appeals, following Petitioner’s conviction on both, was a

violation of double jeopardy. Petitioner has never presented this claim to the Arizona courts.

Likewise, Petitioner has never presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals his claims in

Ground A-8 that the factors used to aggravate Petitioner’s sentence were elements of the

crime. Because these claims were never presented to the Arizona courts, they are not properly

exhausted. 

Three of Petitioner’s claims in this habeas case were raised in his first PCR Petition,

i.e. Grounds A-6, A-7, and B. Petitioner’s argument in his Ground A-6, that counsel was

ineffective in failing to pursue evidence, i.e. surveillance of Petitioner’ interrogation, was

raised in the PCR petition. Petitioner asserts in his Ground A-7 a conclusory claim of jury

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misconduct. Assuming arguendo that this refers to his claim in his first PCR petition that a

juror was sleeping, then this claim was also raised in Petitioner’s first PCR Petition. (Exhibit

FFF.). Otherwise, it was not presented at all. Petitioner asserts in his Ground B a violation

of the Sixth Amendment based upon the prosecution’s suppression of surveillance tapes of

Petitioner’s interrogation. This claim was also raised in his first PCR petition. However,

because Petitioner never sought review of the denial of his first PCR petition, none of these

claims were properly exhausted by presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly,

Grounds A-6, A-7, and B are not properly exhausted

One of Petitioner’s claims, Ground A-4 (juror strikes) was originally presented by

Petitioner as a federal claim in his appellate opening brief. However, Respondents argue that

Petitioner shifted to reliance on the more stringent state ground in his reply brief, and

therefore this claim is not properly exhausted. (#16 at 13-15.) 

Indeed, Petitioner’s opening brief relied upon his due process rights under “U.S. Const.,

Amends. V (due process clause)”, and cited federal authorities, including Irvin v. Dowd, 366

U.S. 717 (1961), United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936), and Smith v. Phillips, 455

U.S. 209 (1982), as well as state authorities. However, Petitioner also argued that harmless

error analysis was not applicable, citing State v. Huerta, 175 Ariz. 262, 264, 855 P.2d

776,778 (1993). (Exhibit SS, Opening Brief, at 9.) In its responsive brief, the state argued that

Huerta was wrongly decided, and thus harmless error analysis should apply. (Exhibit TT,

Answering Brief, at 14-15.) In his Reply Brief, Petitioner argued that the harmless error

question was controlled by state law, as determined by the binding precedent in Huerta, not

withstanding the holding in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 317 (2000) that

a right to peremptory challenges was not denied when a peremptory challenge had to be used

to remove a juror who should have excused for cause. (Exhibit UU, Reply Brief, at 5-8.) The

Arizona Court of Appeals did not address the harmless error issue, because they found no clear

error in the failure to strike the juror.

Respondents’ arguments confuse the presentation of the standard of review for a claim

with the presentation of the claim itself. Here, the claim presented for habeas review is not

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whether harmless error applied to juror strikes, but whether the juror should have been

stricken. Petitioner presented that claim to the state courts. 

Moreover, a reply brief which simply acknowledges opposing arguments should not be

read as a withdrawal of the claim. Adopting such an approach would preclude a party from

exercising candor with the courts about claims which are not viable under then binding

precedent, but which they may be presenting solely for purposes of preserving the claim for

subsequent review. Indeed, Respondents did precisely that in arguing in their Answering Brief

that the Huerta decision was decided incorrectly. 

Finally, the fact that the claim may have never been viable under controlling federal law

does not render its presentation ineffective. All that is required for exhaustion purposes is the

presentation of the claim - - viable or otherwise. Else, the exhaustion of the claim would be

subsumed in a determination of whether the claim was meritorious. Accordingly, the

undersigned finds that Ground A-4 was fairly presented.

Respondents concede that Grounds A-1, A-3, A-5, and A-9 were properly exhausted.

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust Grounds A-2, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-8 and B.

2. Procedural Default

Respondents argue that all unexhausted claims are now procedurally defaulted and

therefore subject to dismissal with prejudice.

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 929

F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his

available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no longer available

because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted" and is generally

barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a procedurally barred or

procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of justice” which

would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

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appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Further, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within

ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of

the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185

Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that

first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). While

Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of claims specified

in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions

are applicable to him. 

Nor does it appears that such exceptions in Rule 32.1 would apply to Petitioner. The

rule defines the excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed

has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly discovered

material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered

after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the

newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely

cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment

evidence substantially undermines testimony which was of critical

significance at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed

the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief

of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault

on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined

to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that

no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

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2

 Moreover, it is likely that Petitioner’s claims are barred under Arizona’s rules of

preclusion. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). Because of the limited development of Arizona law

on the exception for claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude”, see Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856 (2002), and the applicability of other clear procedural bars, the undersigned does not

reach Respondents’ argument on the preclusion bar.

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Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction. Where a claim is based on

"newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state courts, the

evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application. Paragraph (f)

has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and the notice of

post-conviction relief of-right applies only to petitions filed following a guilty or nolo

contendre plea. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 (defining when petition of-right). See also Moreno

v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998) (on certified question holding that “notice

of appeal” in 32.1(f) is direct appeal only, and not appeal from denial of post-conviction

relief). Paragraph (g) has no application where the petitioner has not asserted a change in the

law. Finally, paragraph (h) has no application because Petitioner’s claims are not based upon

an assertion of facts establishing his innocence, but merely upon various procedural errors.

Accordingly, review through Arizona’s post-conviction relief process is no longer possible.2

Therefore, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his Grounds A-2, A-6, A-7, A-8 and

B., and as to these Grounds, the Petition must be dismissed with prejudice absent a showing

of cause and prejudice or actual innocence. 

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse the

default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Petitioner has failed to file a reply to the

Respondents’ Answer, and has not offered any basis for a finding of cause and prejudice. The

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undersigned finds none.

4. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800

F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of

one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis

added). Petitioner makes no assertion of actual innocence to excuse his procedural default.

5. Summary re Procedural Default

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s Grounds A-2, A-6,

A-7, A-8 and B are procedurally defaulted, and must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. PREMEDITATION: GROUNDS A-1, A-3, and A-5

Petitioner’s Grounds A-1, A-3, and A-5 all center upon the element of premeditation.

In Ground A-1, Petitioner attacks the statute. In Ground A-3, Petitioner attacks the

indictment. In Ground A-5, Petitioner attacks the jury instructions. Respondents argue that

these claims are all without merit.

Ground A-1: Attack on Statute - In Ground A-1, Petitioner alleges that he was

denied due process by the elimination of the distinction in the statutes between first and

second degree murder by removal of the reflection requirement from premeditation. In

rejecting Petitioner’s challenge to the Arizona statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on

the decision in State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 65 P.3d 420 (2003). (Exhibit WW at 8.)

In Thompson, the Arizona Supreme Court resolved a dispute whether 1998 amendments to the

Arizona murder statutes had eliminated the requirement for premeditation to prove first

degree murder. Some Arizona courts had interpreted the statute as simply requiring a passage

of time between formulation of the intent and execution, without any requirement for

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reflection. The Thompson court concluded that such a construction would render first degree

murder the equivalent of second degree murder, and thus the statute would have been vague and

therefore a violation of due process. However, the Thompson court concluded that the

amendments to the statute continued to require reflection. Thus, in Petitioners’s case, the

Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the statute, as construed by the Thompson decision,

was not unconstitutional. The Petitioner offers no arguments to explain why that decision was

incorrect .

To the extent that Petitioner simply asserts that this decision is wrong under Arizona

law, he fails to state a basis for habeas relief. A state court determination of state law is not

subject to review in a federal habeas court. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir.

2000) ("federal court is bound by the state court's interpretations of state law"). Federal

habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991).

Moreover, it is not sufficient that a state court decision simply be incorrect under

Federal law. Rather, to be entitled to habeas relief, the Petitioner must show that the state

court’s decision was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(d)(1). Petitioner offers no argument or basis for this Court to conclude that the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to or an reasonable application of such

Supreme Court law. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground A-1.

Ground A-3: Attack on Indictment - In Ground A-3, Petitioner argues that he was

denied due process by the trial court’s denial of the motion to strike premeditation language

from the indictment. At trial, counsel argued that the indictments’s allegations of first degree

murder were improper, because the Arizona Court of Appeals had determined in State v.

Thompson, 201 Ariz. 273, 34 P.3d 382 (Ariz.App. Div. 1 2001), that the 1998 amendments

to the statute had eliminated premeditation from the elements of first degree murder. (Exhibit

D.) We now know that not only was counsel’s argument wrong, but the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision in Thompson was also wrong, as subsequently determined by the Arizona

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Supreme Court in overturning the lower court in Thompson. 

Although Petitioner addressed this claim in his direct appeal, the Arizona Court of

Appeals did not expressly address Petitioner’s attack on the indictment in issuing its opinion.

Thus, this Court looks to the decision of the Arizona trial court as the “last reasoned decision

“ subject to review. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Arguably, the trial court erred when it rejected trial counsel’s argument, given that the

lower court’s decision in Thompson remained binding precedent at the time. The Arizona

Supreme Court decision in Thompson would not be authored for another year, in 2003.

However, this would only render the trial court’s decision an error under state law. As

discussed above, an error of state law does not form the basis for habeas relief. Estelle, 502

U.S. 62. Moreover, Petitioner offers nothing to show that the trial court’s decision was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground A-3.

Ground A-5: Attack on Jury Instructions - In his Ground A-5, Petitioner argues that

he was denied due process because the trial court employed a defective definition of

premeditation in issuing jury instructions. 

The fact that a jury instruction is allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for

federal habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. Instructional error will not support a petition

for federal habeas relief unless it is shown "not merely that the instruction is undesirable,

erroneous, or even `universally condemned,' " but that by itself the instruction"so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.

141, 146-147 (1973). Moreover, even in federal prosecutions, errors in jury instructions are

subject to harmless-error analysis, including "the omission of an element from jury

instructions.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999).

When rejecting this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals agreed that the jury

instructions issued by the trial court were erroneous because, relying on the lower court

opinion in Thompson, they provided that “proof of actual reflection is not required.” (Exhibit

WW at 8.) However, the court went on to conclude that the error in the instruction was

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harmless, because there was ample evidence that Petitioner had, in fact, premeditated his

attempt at murder. (Id. at 9.) 

A witness testified that appellant threatened to kill Jessie if he

saw her with another man and, in the same conversation, asked the

witness if he could borrow the witness’ ID to buy a gun. Moreover,

Jessie testified at trial that after she locked the gate outside her house

late at night and headed back towards the front door, she heard a "rustling

noise" coming from the side of the house that made her stop and look

around. Through the darkness, Jessie saw appellant running towards her

and pointing a gun in her direction.

(Id.) These factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness, and may not be

rejected by this habeas court absent clear and convincing new evidence, or a showing that they

were an unreasonable determination in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); and Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner offers nothing in the way of new evidence, Nor does he

point to anything in the record to show that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ factual

determination was unreasonable. 

 Similarly, Petitioner offers nothing to show that the conclusion, based on these factual

findings, that any instructional error was harmless, was erroneous or was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Having concluded that the evidence in the trial

was sufficient for a finding of premeditation, the Arizona Court of Appeals properly concluded

that the instructional error harmless. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground A-3.

Summary re Premeditation - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes

that Petitioner’s Grounds A-1, A-3 and A-5 are all without merit, and must be denied.

C. JUROR STRIKE: GROUND A-4

In his Ground A-4, Petitioner argues that he was denied due process when the trial court

denied his motion to strike juror Amy Baratta for cause, requiring the use of a peremptory

strike. Respondents argue that this claim is without merit because, under United States v.

Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000), counsel’s use of a peremptory strike to remove Ms.

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Baratta cured any error, and under Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86-90 (1988), there is no

due process right to peremptory challenges, which are a creature of statute and are not required

by the Constitution. 

In denying this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that, contrary to Petitioner’s

arguments, “Ms. Baratta did not indicate that she was unwilling to remain impartial.” (Exhibit

WW, Mem. Dec. at 6.) Consequently they concluded that the trial court did not err by failing

to excuse her. Therefore, they never reached the issue of what effect such error would have had

on Petitioner’s peremptory challenges.

The question whether a juror was impartial “is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it

is plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could set aside any opinion he might

hold and decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality

have been believed.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-1037 (1984).As a question of

fact, the state court’s determination is entitled to the presumption of correctness under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1985). Petitioner offers

nothing from the record to show that the Arizona court’s factual conclusion about the juror’s

impartiality was clearly erroneous, nor does he proffer any clear and convincing extrinsic

evidence to show that it was wrong. 

In fact, the record supports the state court’s conclusion. At trial, defense counsel

questioned the jury panel regarding their feelings about guns. One juror, Terry Hehr, expressed

doubt about her ability to remain impartial in a case involving guns, stating "I think I will have

a problem [remaining impartial] .” (Exhibit BB, R.T. 4/17/02 at 116-117 When defense

counsel inquired whether anyone else felt likewise, the following dialogue ensued between

defense counsel and Juror Amy Baratta:

A. Amie [sic] Baratta. I agree with what she said.

MR. TARADASH [defense counsel] : Do you think you might

have a problem being fair in this case because of your feelings about

guns?

A. I think I would if you have a gun, yes. I think -- I don't know the

facts or whatever but I mean like I think I feel my understanding would

be impartial, yeah. But I think it's unnecessary.

MR. TARADASH: It may affect your ability to be fair?

A. I cannot say for sure.

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3

 Arguably, some egregious conduct by the court in denying the motion to strike could

result in a due process violation. Sec, e.g. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316 (distinguishing

cases where “the trial court deliberately misapplied the law in order to force the defendants

to use a peremptory challenge to correct the court's error”). Petitioner makes no such

allegations. 

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(Exhibit BB, R.T. 4/17/02 at 117.) Thus, although honest about her concern about the effect

of her feelings towards guns on her impartiality, Ms. Baratta did not affirmatively assert that

she could or would not be impartial.

Moreover, even if Petitioner could show that the Arizona Court of Appeals was in error

to uphold the denial of his motion to strike, Petitioner still would not be entitled to habeas

relief. In Martinez-Salazar, the Court found that “unlike the right to an impartial jury

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional

dimension.” 528 U.S. at 311. Rather, they are creations of the federal and state legislatures,

intended to effectuate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury by allowing a

defendant to strike a juror who has been improperly allowed to remain impaneled, despite their

partiality. Consequently, the Court concluded that “a defendant's exercise of peremptory

challenges ... is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory

challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.” ld. Nor is his right to

an impartial jury. In the instant case, by exercising a peremptory strike to remove Baratta,

Petitioner secured what the Constitution assures him: an impartial jury.3

Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that Petitioner’s Ground A-4 is without

merit. 

D. BLAKELY: GROUND A-9

In his Ground A-9, Petitioner argues he was denied due process when factors used to

aggravate Petitioner’s sentence were not found by the jury, as required by Blakely v.

Washington, 524 U.S. 296 (2004). Respondents concede that this claim is properly

exhausted, but properly argue that it is without merit “because the Supreme Court’s June 24,

2004 opinion in Blakely became the law of the land after Petitioner’s conviction became final

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on direct review on February 23, 2004, and the Ninth Circuit has held that Blakely cannot be

applied retroactively on a collateral review such as habeas corpus.” (Answer, #13, at 23 (citing

Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005)).) 

For retroactivity purposes, a conviction becomes final when the defendant’s time for

filing a petition for certiorari expires. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997).

Rule 13, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, establishes the time limit for filing

a petition for a writ of certiorari as being “within 90 days after entry of the order denying

discretionary review.” The Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on

November 24, 2003 (Exhibit AAA). The Order and Mandate was not issued until December

26, 2003 (Exhibit BBB). However, “[t]he time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs

from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the

issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice).” U.S.S.Ct. R. 13(3).

Accordingly, Respondents properly conclude that Petitioner’s conviction became final on

February 23, 2004, prior to the June 24, 2004 decision in Blakely. 

Moreover, as recognized in Schardt, the fact that Blakely creates a new rule precludes

it from being a “clearly established” rule under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 414 F.3d at 1027.

Accordingly, even if Blakely could be applied to Petitioner retroactively, it would not entitle

Petitioner to habeas relief under limitations of § 2254(d)(1)..

Accordingly, this claim is without merit and most be denied.

E. SUMMARY

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s Grounds A-2, A-6,

A-7, A-8 and B are procedurally defaulted, and must be dismissed with prejudice. Grounds A1, A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-9 are without merit, and must be denied,

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds A-2, A-6, A-7, A-8 and B of the

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed August 22, 2005 (#1) be DISMISSED

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WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder (Grounds A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5,

and A-9) of the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed August 22, 2005 (#1)

be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section

2254 proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: April 20, 2007 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\05-2514-001r RR 06 07 07 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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