Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01108/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01108-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMIE LEE JACKSON, Civil No. 07-cv-1108-L (POR)

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS BE DENIED IN PART AND

GRANTED IN PART

[Doc. Nos. 14 and 15.]

v.

R.M. HOUSTON, Associate Warden; COOK,

Administrative Segregation Unit Lieutenant;

J.C. MARTINEZ, Adminsitrative Segregation

Unit Sergeant; H. MENDEZ, Administrative

Segregation Unit Sergeant; RODRIGUEZ,

Administrative Segregation Unit Sergeant;

CLARK, Adminsitrative Segregation Unit

Sergeant; D. BARRETO, Correctional Officer;

L. CORDOVA, Correctional Officer; DOES 1-

8 ,

Defendant.

 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge M. James

Lorenz pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.3 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the California State Prison in High Desert State

Prison in Susanville, California, and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is proceeding with

this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that, while he was

incarcerated at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”), the various prison officials named as Defendants in

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1

 Defendant Martinez was served after the Defendants who submitted the Motion to Dismiss

listed as Docket Number 14. Defendant Cook has not yet been served as of the date of this Report and

Recommendation.

2

Plaintiff does not state in his complaint whether or not he refused to accept a cell mate.

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his Complaint deprived him of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual

punishment by suspending his outdoor recreation privileges for six weeks (forty-two days). See

Compl. at 7-8. Plaintiff also alleges CEN officials violated his due process rights by failing to

schedule him for a hearing before the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) within ten days

of restricting his outdoor recreation privileges. See id. at 7. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 8.

On December 10, 2007, Defendants R. Houston, D. Barretto, Bl. Clark, H. Mendez, and J.

Rodridguez filed a motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 14.] On December 24, 2007, Defendant Martinez

filed a separate motion to dismiss in which he incorporated by reference all of the defenses of the

December 10, 2007 motion to dismiss.1

 [Doc. No. 15.] Collectively, Defendants assert Plaintiff (a)

has failed to meet the objective and/or subjective elements of his Eighth Amendment claim and (b)

has failed to show a violation of procedural due process. Alternatively, Defendants seek qualified

immunity as to both of Plaintiff’s claims. Per this Court’s May 22, 2008 Order, Plaintiff’s Response

was due by June 16, 2008. See Doc. No. 28. Plaintiff did not file a Response. 

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

On September 15, 2004, Defendant Houston allegedly loudly chastised the Administrative

Segregation Unit (“ASU”) supervisor and demanded that extra bed-space be provided for incoming

Administrative Segregation inmates. Compl. at 3-4. Defendant Houston then advised the inmates,

including Plaintiff, who was an inmate in ASU at the time, that failure to accept a cell mate would

result in a Rule Violation Report and immediate yard suspension. Id. at 4. Upon Defendant

Houston’s departure, Defendants Cook, Mendez, Cordova, and Reyes ordered the prisoners to

accept cell mates. Id. At this point, Defendant Mendez placed a sign above Plaintiff’s cell door that

read “Yard Suspended Pending ICC.”2

 Id. 

On September 20, 2004, Plaintiff received a Rule Violation Report (“Report”) dated

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September 15, 2004. Id. In the Report, it is noted that, upon a direct order by Defendant Mendez to

accept a cell mate, Plaintiff replied, “I am not taking a cellie.” See Doc. No. 14, Decl. Of D.

Hanlon. On September 23, 2004, Plaintiff attended a hearing concerning the rule violation. Id. At

the hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of the rule violation and given a thirty-day forfeiture of

behavior credits. Id. 

Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiff summoned Defendant Mendez to his cell door and

asked why Plaintiff had not gone to ICC. Compl. at 4. Defendant Mendez replied, “Call me when

you’re ready to accept a cellie” and purportedly walked away. Id. On October 9, 2004, Plaintiff

contacted Defendants Rodriguez and Barretto requesting that they review his file to determine

whether Defendant Mendez had scheduled Plaintiff for ICC. Id. During the subsequent weeks,

Plaintiff attempted to speak to Defendant Mendez by calling his name aloud as he passed Plaintiff’s

cell, whereupon Defendant Mendez would say, “Call me when you’re ready to accept a cellie.” Id.

at 5. 

On October 28, 2004, Plaintiff was summoned before ICC. Compl. at 5. There, Plaintiff

notified Defendant Houston that he had been denied his outdoor recreation privileges for forty-two

days. Id. Defendant Houston subsequently ordered Defendant Martinez to remove the yard

suspension sign from Plaintiff’s cell door. Id. 

On November 12, 2004, Plaintiff filed an Administrative Appeal regarding the

aforementioned incidents. See Compl. at 5. On December 1, 2004, Defendant Houston denied the

complaint at the First level. Id. On January 2, 2005, Plaintiff processed the complaint at the Second

level. Id. On February 9, 2005, the complaint was denied at the Second level. Id. On February 22,

2005, Plaintiff processed the complaint at the Third level. Id. On May 25, 2005, the complaint was

granted in part at the Director’s level. Id. CEN was ordered to conduct and document further

investigation into Plaintiff’s allegations and to report the disposition to Plaintiff. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the

legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. A claim cannot be dismissed unless it “appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

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him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see Daniel v. County of Santa

Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 2002); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc, 232 F.3d 979,

984 (9th Cir. 2000). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “allege overt acts with

some degree of particularity such that his claim is set forth clearly enough to give defendants fair

notice of the type of claim being pursued.” Ortez v. Washington County, 88 F.3d 804, 810 (9th Cir.

1996).

The court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasoned

inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of

Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). The court looks not at whether the

plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Display Research Laboratories, Inc. v.

Telegen Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must construe

the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.

1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Vague or conclusory allegations are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss in civil rights violations. Id.; see also Jones v.

Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 th Cir. 1984) (conclusory allegations

unsupported by facts are insufficient to state a claim under section 1983). “The plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the

plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted). 

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may not

generally consider materials outside the pleadings. Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corrections,

151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

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complaint.” Id. at 1197 n.1. However, the court may consider documents or exhibits “whose

contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions.” Branch v. Tunnell,

14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

(9th Cir. 1990); Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W. Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Where a pro se litigant’s claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend

should be granted unless “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be

cured by amendment.” Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007)(quoting Schucker

v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988)). Prior to a final dismissal of a claim, “a pro

se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend.” Lucas

v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).

A. EIGHTH AMENDMENT 

a. Deprivation of Outdoor Exercise

Defendants seek dismissal of this claim on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to meet the

objective and/or subjective elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. Alternatively, Defendants

seek qualified immunity as to this claim.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and

“embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Hutto

v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978). “No static ‘test’ can exist by which courts determine whether

conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment ‘must draw its meaning

from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).

“The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). Even so, “[d]eprivation of outdoor exercise

violates the Eighth Amendment rights of inmates confined to continuous and long-term

segregation.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Spain v. Procunier, 600

F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979)), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of confinement,

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a prisoner must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious[;]’ a prison official’s

act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’ . . .

The second requirement follows from the principle that ‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’ To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a

prison official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Id. That state of mind is shown

when Plaintiff can prove “deliberate indifference.” See id. “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced

only when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the

official must be both aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Id. at 837. 

Plaintiff alleges the various prison officials named as Defendants in his Complaint deprived

him of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by suspending his

outdoor recreation privileges for six weeks. See Compl. at 7-8. To present an Eighth Amendment

claim, Plaintiff must show, first, that the deprivation was, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’ See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, Plaintiff must show that the deprivation was committed with

deliberate indifference. See id.

i. Objective Element

The Ninth Circuit has held that outdoor exercise is “one of the basic human necessities

protected by the Eighth Amendment.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). Not

all deprivations of outdoor privileges, however, constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See

Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (“the deprivation of outdoor exercise could

constitute cruel and unusual punishment”) (emphasis added). That is, only ‘substantial deprivations’

of outdoor exercise privileges constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000).

The issue before the Court, then, is whether Plaintiff’s forty-two day denial is a ‘substantial

deprivation’ for purposes of his Eighth Amendment claim. In determining what can be held a

‘substantial deprivation,’ the Ninth Circuit has distinguished those denials of outdoor privileges that

are “long-term” from those that are “temporary.” See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133. Under May v.

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Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that “a temporary denial of

outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial deprivation.” There, the deprivation

was twenty-two days. Id. In Allen, the Court of Appeals held that a six-week denial of outdoor

privileges constituted a ‘substantial deprivation.’ 48 F.3d at 1088. 

The Court in Lopez distinguished May and Allen. 203 F.3d at 1132-33. There, the Court

was asked to determine whether a six-and-one-half-week denial of outdoor exercise was a

‘substantial deprivation.’ Id. at 1132. Noting the relevance of the duration of deprivations of

prisoners’ outdoor privileges, the Court of Appeals held that a twenty-two-day denial, as in May,

was “temporary” and, thus, by itself not a ‘substantial deprivation,’ whereas a six-week denial was

“long term,” as in Allen, and was a ‘substantial deprivation’ without any additional showing. See

203 F.3d at 1133 fn.15. As a result, the Lopez Court held a six-and-one-half week deprivation was

‘substantial.’ Id. at 1133.

Because Plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Allen, was deprived of his outdoor exercise privileges

for six weeks, that deprivation is “long-term” and thus constitutes a ‘substantial deprivation’ for

purposes of his Eighth Amendment claim Therefore, Plaintiff has met the objective element of such

a claim.

ii. Subjective Element

Plaintiff alleges all Defendants acted with deliberate indifference with respect to the

deprivation of his outdoor privileges. As noted earlier, “deliberate indifference” is found when a

prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Here,

Defendant Mendez placed a sign over Plaintiff’s cell door that read “Yard Suspended Pending ICC”

after Plaintiff refused to accept a cell mate as ordered. For six weeks thereafter, Defendant Mendez

was both aware of Plaintiff’s denied outdoor privileges and was able to draw the inference that his

behavior would perpetuate the risk of serious harm. Although Defendant Mendez may assert he was

acting based upon a disciplinary need, such an argument is not appropriate within the context of a

motion to dismiss.

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Defendants assert Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed as to Defendants

Houston, Rodriguez, Clark, Martinez, Barreto and Cordova because Plaintiff has not alleged that

these defendants knew the reason for the yard suspension and/or could not be expected to monitor

the scheduling of Plaintiff’s ICC hearing. See Doc. No. 14 at 10. In the Complaint, however,

Plaintiff alleges “Supervisory Defendant’s [sic] knew that plaintiffs [sic] yard had been suspended,”

that they “knew that plaintiffs [sic] yard wouldn’t be restored unless he was seen by ICC,” and that

they “wilfully ignored plaintiff’s Suspended Yard Status.” Compl. at 6. Plaintiff further alleges

“Subordinate Defendant’s [sic] knowingly and wilfully enabled the arbitrary abrogation of plaintiffs

[sic] right’s [sic] by failing to notify other Supervisory personnel.” Id. at 7. Reading the Complaint

liberally and taking it in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it can reasonably be inferred that

Defendants were either responsible for or aware of the alleged constitutional deprivation and did

nothing to prevent it. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to

allege an Eighth Amendment claim be DENIED.

b. Qualified Immunity

Defendants further claim they are entitled to dismissal based on their qualified immunity. 

The entitlement to qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). “Qualified immunity” protects

“government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This standard “‘gives ample room for

mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 343 (1986); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) (“The concern of the immunity

inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on

particular police conduct.”); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2001).

i. Step One - Constitutional Violation

The required first step in a qualified immunity analysis is, “taken in the light most favorable

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to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right?” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787,

791 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that because qualified immunity is “‘an entitlement not to stand trial’ . . .

courts, not juries, ‘must’ settle the ultimate questions of qualified immunity”) (quoting Mitchell, 472

U.S. at 526). “If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established,

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

“Although a defendant’s subjective intent is not relevant to the qualified immunity defense,

his mental state is relevant where it is an element of the alleged constitutional violation.” Jeffers,

267 F.3d at 911 (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)). When a prisoner’s cause

of action arises under the Eighth Amendment, the defendant’s subjective intent comprises an

essential element of an affirmative case. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). Thus, in

an Eighth Amendment case, such as this one, while the court must accept his factual allegations as

true, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, Defendants’ assertion of a qualified immunity defense requires

Plaintiff to further put forth “specific, nonconclusory allegations that establish improper motive.” 

Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in judgment)); Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 911. In Jeffers, the Ninth Circuit noted that

Crawford-El “applied the specificity requirement in reviewing summary judgment on a plaintiff’s

affirmative case,” but found “no principled reason why [the court] should use a different standard in

reviewing ... the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 907. 

Therefore, in cases like this one, where subjective intent is an essential element of the cause

of action, the qualified immunity analysis still begins with an examination of whether, taking the

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a constitutional violation has been alleged. Saucier, 533

U.S. at 201; Jackson, 268 F.3d at 651. However, as part of that showing, the plaintiff must “put

forth specific, nonconclusory factual allegations” that establish improper motive in order to defeat

the defendant’s claims to qualified immunity. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598; Jeffers, 267 F.3d at

907.

Here, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that each of the Defendants acted with

“deliberate indifference” by denying him outdoor exercise for forty-two days in order to establish, as

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a matter of law, that each Defendant violated the Eighth Amendment. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 738 (2002); Jeffers, 267 F.3D at 907. If, in answering this threshold question, the Court finds

that “no constitutional violation would have occurred were [Plaintiff’s] allegations established, there

is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201;

Haynie, 339 F.3d at 1078. As stated above, this Court has found that Plaintiff has adequately

alleged an Eighth Amendment claim as to each Defendant for the denial of outdoor exercise for a

period of forty-two days.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s allegations survive the first prong of qualified immunity

analysis, the Court must turn to the next: whether “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that [t]his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.

ii. Step Two - Clearly Established Law

For the reasons discussed above, the Court has found that Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient

to show a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (noting that often

“[i]n course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a

court might find it necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for holding that a

right is clearly established.”). Therefore, the Court must next decide whether the “contours” of the

right are “‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). In that

particular case, Defendants should have been aware of the legal standards as set forth by the Ninth

Circuit regarding an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference based on the deprivation

of outdoor exercise for a lengthy period of time. See Spain, 600 F.2d at 189. 

Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of any outdoor exercise for forty-two days with a sign hanging

over his cell door during that period reading “Yard Suspended Pending ICC.” Although a temporary

denial of outdoor exercise in response to a genuine emergency does not violate the Eighth

Amendment, it was clearly established at the time the alleged deprivation took place that an

extended period of time without outdoor exercise violates the Eighth Amendment. Here, Plaintiff

has alleged that Defendants made no attempt to allow yard release for forty-two days. 

This Court finds it is clearly established that the denial of outdoor exercise for prison inmates

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for an extended period of time is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Spain, 600 F.2d at 189. 

Any reasonable official would understand that the denial of outdoor exercise for an extended period

of time would constitute deliberate indifference. Further, the “clearly established” inquiry focuses

on whether “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted,” see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, or whether the state of the law at the time gave “fair

warning” to Defendants that the denial of outdoor exercise was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002). “This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Officials, however, “can still be on notice

that their conduct violates established law, even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope, 536 U.S. at

741. Specificity only requires that the unlawfulness be apparent under pre-existing law. Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

As discussed above, the general law regarding outdoor exercise for prisoners was clearly

established in 2004, when the alleged deprivation occurred. Thus, even if “a resolution of the

factual issues may well relieve the prison officials of any liability in this case,” Clement v. Gomez,

298 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2002), Saucier instructs the Court at this stage of the proceedings to

presume the Plaintiff’s version of events as true. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

For these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss based on qualified

immunity be DENIED. 

B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Defendants also seek dismissal of this claim on the ground that Plaintiff received procedural

due process. Alternatively, Defendants seek qualified immunity as to this claim.

The procedural guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses

apply only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. See Ingraham v.

Wright, 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Liberty interests can arise both from the Constitution and from

state law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). A liberty interest being found, the court

then seeks to determine what process is due to an inmate. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

224-25 (2005). Rather than establishing rigid rules, the Court has elected the consideration of three

distinct factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): 

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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,

and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;

and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the

fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.

The initial question before the Court is whether Plaintiff has asserted a cognizable liberty

interest. Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a prisoner is entitled to certain

due process protections when he is charged with a disciplinary violation. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 564-71 (1973). These healthy procedural protections, however, adhere only when the

disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest in some “unexpected matter” or imposes an

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (2003)

(“If the hardship is sufficiently significant, then the court must determine whether the procedures

used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.”) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has

identified few protected liberty interests. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980)

(identifying the freedom from transfer to a mental hospital as a protected liberty interest);

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (identifying the freedom from the involuntary

administration of psychotropic drugs as a protected liberty interest).

Rather than invoking a single standard for determining whether a prison hardship is atypical

and significant, the Court relies on a “condition or combination of conditions or factors [that]

requires case by case, fact by fact consideration.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir.

1996). Specifically, the Court looks to three guideposts by which to frame the inquiry: (1) whether

the challenged condition “mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative

segregation and protective custody,” and thus comported with the prison’s discretionary authority;

(2) the duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and (3) whether the state’s

action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner's sentence. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87;

Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1089.

Under Sandin, the Court cannot say that the deprivation of Plaintiff’s outdoor privileges

constitutes “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Plaintiff’s] ... sentence.” 515 U.S. at

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486. As the Sandin Court noted, “[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of

misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Id.

Plaintiff here was deprived of his outdoor privileges for forty-two days due to his refusal to comply

with orders to accept a cell mate. The deprivation comports with the prison’s discretionary

authority, Plaintiff was aware that he could end his deprivation of outdoor privileges at any time by

accepting a cell mate, and the condition complained of would not extend the duration of Plaintiff’s

sentence. As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 

In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court need not address Defendants’ qualified immunity

defense.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to

assert a due process violation be GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that:

1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be DENIED with respect to the Eighth Amendment

claim as to all Defendants.

2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED with respect to the Procedural Due

Process claim as to all Defendants.

3) Defendants be directed to answer the remaining claim within thirty (30) days of the

Court issuing an order on the Motion to Dismiss.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 25, 2009 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

//

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//

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 26, 2009

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc The Honorable M. James Lorenz

All parties

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