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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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' : 

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unitro States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

OCT 0 2 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Catherine A. Heggy, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

-vs- ) 

) 

T. L. Heggy, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

) 

No. 90-6122 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 88-1185R) 

stephen Jones (Carol Hambrick, of Jones & Hambrick, Enid, 

Oklahoma, with him on the briefs) of Jones & Hambrick, Enid, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

John C. McMurry (Gomer Smith, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him 

on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, and WINDER, 

District Judge.* 

WINDER, District Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant Tom Heggy appeals from the final 

judgment of the district court in favor of plaintiff-appellee 

Catherine A. Heggy and against appellant for violation of Title 

III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 

(''Title III"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521. Appellant's central 

argument is that the district court erred in ruling that Title 

III applies to interspousal wiretapping within the marital home. 

Additionally, appellant contends the district court erred in 

instructing the jury and in excluding certain evidence. We hold 

that Title III does apply to interspousal wiretapping within the 

marital home. 1 We also find that the district court's 

instructions and evidentiary rulings were not in error. We 

therefore affirm the judgment of the district court and remand 

this case for a determination of attorney's fees and costs on 

appeal. 

1 The holding in this case decides the issue of the 

applicability of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 

Streets Act of 1968 to interspousal wire tapping within the 

marital home. This court, however, has previously decided that 

18 u.s.c. § 2510(5) (a) (i) does not apply to wiretapping the 

conversations of a minor child by a custodial parent. See 

Newcomb v. Ingle, F.2d , No. 90-5068 (lOth Cir. filed 

August 28, 1991). In the Newcomb decision, this court 

specifically noted that the type of situation addressed in this 

opinion is "qualitatively different from a custodial parent 

tapping a minor child's conversations within the family home." 

Newcomb slip op. at 4. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 2 
I. Background 

During the last three years of his marriage to 

Catherine, Tom repeatedly told her he wanted a divorce. About 

six months before that divorce was granted, Tom placed a 

recording device on an extension telephone located in a barn 

adjacent to the marital home. At the time he installed the 

wiretap, Tom and Catherine were living together as husband and 

wife. Also at that time, Tom was Director of the Oklahoma Bureau 

of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. 

There was no court order authorizing Tom to place a 

wiretap on the marital phone. Tom did not inform Catherine of 

the wiretap nor did Catherine consent to it. Tom instructed the 

Bureau of Narcotics agent who installed the tap at his direction 

not to disclose its existence to any Bureau co-workers or to 

members of the Reggy household. The agent reminded Tom that the 

consent of one of the parties was necessary to record a telephone 

call. 

For nearly three months, Tom used the wiretap to record 

catherine's telephone conversations. He played at least one of 

those conversation for his secretary. Tom then catalogued the 

recorded interceptions and labeled them by date and content of 

conversation. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 3 
Following their divorce in 1987, Catherine brought this 

action against Tom under the civil damages provision of Title 

III, 18 u.s.c. § 2520, seeking both compensatory and punitive 

damages. Tom filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) on grounds that Title III does not apply 

to a spouse's placement of a recording device on a phone within 

the marital home. The district court denied the motion. 

At trial, Tom claimed he installed the wiretap because 

he had been receiving death threats by telephone and wanted to 

record them. The jury rejected this explanation and returned a 

verdict in Catherine's favor for $75,000 in compensatory damages 

and $140,000 in punitive damages. The district court entered 

judgment on the verdict. 

II. Discussion 

A. Applicability of Title III to Interspousal Wiretaps 

Appellant contends Title III does not apply to 

interspousal wiretaps2 and thus the trial court erred in denying 

2 We use the phrase "interspousal wiretaps'' as a 

shorthand description for electronic surveillance directed by one 

spouse against another. The phraseology is imperfect, as the 

court in Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 468 n.lO (E.D. Penn. 

• 1979) noted, because it does not describe the snooping spouse's 

interception of the communications of third parties with the 

targeted spouse. "[Catherine Heggy], of course, was not talking 

to herself on the telephone.'' Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 468 n.lO. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 4 
his motions to dismiss and for directed verdict. The district 

court's construction of a federal statute is a question of law 

that we review de novo. In Re Thompson, 894 F.2d 1227, 1228 

(lOth Cir. 1990). De novo review means we make an independent 

determination of the issues. United States v. Irvin, 906 F.2d 

1424, 1426 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Whether Title III provides a remedy for interspousal 

wiretapping within the marital home is a question that has 

divided the federal courts of appeal. 3 The Fourth, Sixth and 

Eighth Circuits have held that such wiretapping is actionable 

under Title III. See Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 

1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984); 

United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, ~73 (6th Cir. 1976). The 

Second and Fifth Circuits have held that Title III does not apply 

to interspousal wiretaps. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 

677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 810 

3 The question has divided the federal district courts 

and state courts as well. See, ~' Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. 

Supp. 851, 855-56 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (Title III provides no civil 

remedy for interspousal wiretapping); Nations v. Nations, 670 F. 

Supp. 1432, 1436 (W.D. Ark. 1987); (civil remedy provided); 

People v. Otto, 226 Cal. App.3d 1630, 1649, 277 Cal. Rptr. 596, 

607 (Cal. ct. App. 1991) (no remedy), pet. rev. granted, 280 Cal. 

Rptr. 91, 808 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1991); Ransom v. Ransom, 253 Ga. 

656, 324 S.E.2d 437, 439 {1985) (remedy provided). 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 5 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). 

After reviewing these authorities, and others, the 

district court below held that Title III, specifically 18 u.s.c. 

§ 2520 thereof, does apply to interspousal wiretaps. See Reggy 

v. Reggy, 699 F. Supp. 1514, 1517 (W.D. Okla. 1988). We agree 

with the district court, and join the majority of federal circuit 

courts in holding that Title III does provide a remedy for such 

wiretapping. We believe this conclusion is compelled first and 

foremost by the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. 

At the time Tom placed the wiretap on the phone, Title 

III provided in relevant part: 

(1) Exceot as otherwise specifically 

provided in this chapter any person who--

(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to 

intercept, or procures any other person to 

intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, 

oral, or electronic communication; ... 

(b) willfully uses, endeavors to use, or 

procures any other person to use or endeavor 

to use any electronic, mechanical, or other 

device to intercept any oral communication . 

(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to 

disclose, to any other person the contents of 

any wire or oral communication, knowing or 

having reason to know that the information 

was obtained through the interception of a 

wire or oral communication violation of this 

subsection; or 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 6 
(d) willfully uses, or endeavors to use, 

the contents of any wire or oral 

communication, knowing or having reason to 

know that the information was obtained 

through the interception of a wire or oral 

communication in violation of this 

subsection; ... 

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 

imprisoned not more than five (5) years, or 

both. 

18 u.s.c. § 2511(1) (emphasis added) . 4 

A civil cause of action for violation of § 2511 is 

provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2520 which, at the time the wiretapping 

in this case began, provided in part: 

Any person whose wire or oral communication 

is intercepted, disclosed, or used in 

violation of this chapter shall (1) have a 

civil cause of action against any person who 

intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures 

any other person to intercept, disclose or 

use such communications, and (2) be entitled 

to recover from any such person--

4 After the wiretap was placed on the Heggy phone on 

November 25, 1986, but before it was removed on February 16, 

1987, an amendment to the statute became effective. Among other 

things, the amendment clarified the mental state required to 

violate the statute by substituting "intentionally" for 

"willfully" in subsections (a)-(d) of § 2511(1). See Electronic 

Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-508, § 101(f), 

100 Stat. 1853 (1986) (effective Jan. 21, 1987); Senate Report, 

1986 Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3577. The parties implicitly 

agree that the controlling statute is the one in effect at the 

time the violation commenced. The subsequent amendment of the 

statute, however, does not alter our holding that §§ 2511 and 

2520 apply to interspousal wiretapping. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 7 
(a) actual damages but not less than 

liquidated damages computed at the rate of 

$100 a day for each day of violation or 

$1,000, whichever is higher; 

(b) punitive damages; and 

(c) a reasonable attorney•s fee and other 

litigation costs reasonably incurred. 

18 u.s.c. § 2520 (emphasis added) . 5 

As would seem clear from the emphasized language, Tom•s 

wiretapping of the household phone is proscribed, and Catherine•s 

5 This section of the statute was amended, effective 

January 21, 1987, as follows: 

(a) In general.--Except as provided in 

section 2511(2) (a) (ii), any person whose 

wire, oral, or electronic communication is 

intercepted, disclosed or intentionally used 

in violation of this chapter may in a civil 

action recover from the person or entity 

which engaged in that violation such relief 

as may be appropriate. 

(b) Relief.--In an action under this 

section, appropriate relief includes--

(1) such preliminary and other equitable 

or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; 

(2) damages under subsection (c) and 

punitive damages in appropriate cases; and 

(3) a reasonable attorney•s fee and other 

litigation costs reasonably incurred. 

18 U.S.C.A. § 2520(a)-(b) (Supp. 1991). 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 8 
recovery is allowed, because § 2511(1) prohibits the 

interception, use or disclosure of wire communications by any 

person except as specifically provided in the statute. And, 

furthermore, § 2520 provides a cause of action to any person who 

is the victim of a § 2511 violation. The statute defines 

"person" as "any individual," 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6), thus including 

Tom and Catherine. Finally, appellant makes no claim that any of 

the specific exceptions provided in 18 u.s.c. § 2511(2) are 

applicable. 

Because the reach of the statute appears clear on its 

face, resort to legislative history would seem unnecessary. 

Appellant, however, urges the court to adopt the view in simpson 

v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 

(1974), where the Fifth Circuit carved out an exception for 

interspousal wiretapping because it could find no specific 

indication in the legislative history that Congress intended the 

statute to reach that far. The Simpson court reached this 

conclusion despite the frank recognition that the "naked 

language" of Title III covered interspousal wiretapping. 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 9 
Simpson, 490 F.2d at 805. 6 

The Simpson court's approach to statutory construction 

has been criticized by courts and commentators. See, ~' Kempf 

v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970, 972-73 (8th Cir. 1989); Kratz v. Kratz, 

477 F. Supp. 463, 468-69 (E.D. Penn. 1979); Comment, Wiretapping 

and the Modern Marriage: Does Title III Provide a Federal Remedy 

for Victims of Interspousal Electronic Surveillance? 91 Dick. L. 

Rev. 855, 872, 876 (1987) (hereinafter "Wiretapping and Modern 

Marriage"). 

We reject not only the simpson court's method of 

statutory analysis but also its interpretation of the legislative 

history. 7 Instead, we agree with the district court that the 

legislative history of Title III evinces a congressional 

6 Perhaps in light of this recognition, the Simpson 

court candidly expressed "considerable doubt" about its holding, 

Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir. 1974), and 

limited the holding to the specific facts of its case, id. at 

810. 

7 This criticism of Simpson is distinguishable from 

this court's previous citation to Simpson with approval in 

finding parental immunity from civil claims under Title III in 

Newcomb, slip op. at 5 (quoting Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809). In 

Newcomb this court placed the language from Simpson describing 

congressional intent to abstain from interference in the 

interrelationship of family members in the context of a House 

Judiciary Committee Comment concerning the right of a father to 

supervise his teenage daughter. See Newcomb, slip op. at 5 n.5. 

10 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 10 
awareness of the widespread use of electronic eavesdropping in 

domestic relations cases and an intent to prohibit such 

eavesdropping. See Remarks of Sen. Long, Hearings on Invasions 

of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure 

of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., part 5 

at 2261 (1965-66) ("The three large areas of snooping in this 

[non-governmental] field are (1) industrial (2) divorce cases, 

and (3) politics. So far, we have heard no real justification 

for continuance of snooping in these areas."). 

Professor Robert Blakey, generally credited as the 

architect of Title III, testified that "private bugging in this 

country can be divided into two broad categories, commercial 

espionage and marital litigation." Hearings on the Right to 

Privacy Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and 

Procedure of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st 

Sess., part 2 at 413 (1967). Senator Hruska, a co-sponsor of the 

bill, commenting on the scope of the statute, noted that "[a] 

broad prohibition is imposed on private use of electronic 

surveillance, particularly in domestic relations and industrial 

espionage situations." S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 

reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2112, 2274. 

Moreover, and in light of the split of judicial 

11 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 11 
authority, had it been the intent of Congress to keep 

interspousal wiretapping beyond the reach of Title III, Congress 

could have expressly excluded such wiretapping when it overhauled 

Title III in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 

Pub.L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848. Although the Privacy Act 

amendments touched nearly every section of Title III, Congress 

did not codify the judicially created exception for interspousal 

wiretapping found in Simpson. 

Finally, we reject appellant's contention that 

interpreting Title III to reach interspousal wiretapping results 

in unwarranted federal intrusion into the law of domestic 

relations, a subject traditionally left to state regulation. As 

the court stated in Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 476 (E.D. 

Penn. 1979): 

Title III regulates electronic eavesdropping, 

not marital relations. It proscribes one 

method of gathering evidence for use in, 

inter alia, domestic relations cases, but in 

no manner deals with the merits of such 

cases .... The evils of electronic 

surveillance are not peculiar to the marital 

relationship, and there is no more reason to 

permit husbands and wives to perpetrate these 

evils upon each other with impunity than 

there is to permit them legally to commit any 

other crimes against each other. 

Kratz, 477 F. supp. at 476. It is highly unlikely, as some 

12 

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courts have suggested, see Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. supp. 529, 533 

(E.D.N.Y. 1986), that applying Title III to interspousal 

wiretapping will result in increased federal regulation of 

domestic relations. Rather, the more likely result is a decrease 

in interspo~sal wiretapping. 8 See Wiretapping and Modern 

Marriage, 91 Dick. L. Rev. at 882-83. 

B. Defense.of "Good Faith" Reliance on Mistake of Law 

Appellant argues he was entitled to raise a "good 

faith" defense to appellee's claim that he violated Title III. 

At trial, appellant's counsel asked whether he thought there was 

"anything illegal" about wiretapping his home phone. Tr. Vol. II 

8 We also reject the view that appellant is somehow 

shielded from liability under the doctrine of interspousal tort 

immunity. The short answer to the immunity defense is that Title 

III creates a federal cause of action that cannot be barred by 

any state law or policy. See Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp. 

1041, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 475. 

Moreover, the outdated common law rationale for the doctrine 

that a woman's legal existence merged into that of her husband 

upon marriage -- has resulted in a trend toward partial or total 

abrogation of the doctrine. See Comment, Wiretapping and the 

Modern Marriage: Does Title III Provide a Federal Remedy for 

Victims of Interspousal Electronic Surveillance? 91 Dick. L. Rev. 

855, 858-60 (1987); Note, Husband and Wife--Interspousal Immunity 

for Intentional Torts is Unconstitutionally Irrational--Moran v. 

Beyer, 58 Temp. L.Q. 709 n.1 (1985). Retention of the doctrine 

in the interspousal wiretapping context is particularly illfounded because whatever domestic tranquility, that may have been 

fostered by immunity surely has been lost by the time one spouse 

is conducting electronic surveillance upon the other. 

13 

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at 29. The court sustained an objection to the question. 

Through counsel, appellant offered to testify that it was his 

opinion, based on his understanding of the law, that he could 

place a wiretap on the phone without his wife's consent. Id. at 

31-32. 

Whether a 11 good faith11 defense based upon mistake of 

law exists under Title III is a question this court reviews de 

novo. In Re Thompson, 894 F.2d 1227, 1228 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Relying on Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 394-95 (1st Cir. 

1979), the trial court rejected appellant's proffered testimony 

as irrelevant because there is no 11 good faith 11 defense based on a 

misunderstanding of the law. Tr. Vol. II at 121. We agree with 

the district court. 

Title III expressly provides a good faith defense in a 

limited number of instances, such as reliance on a court warrant 

or order, grand jury subpoena or legislative or statutory 

authorization. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2520(d) (Supp. 1991). Good 

faith reliance on mistake of law is not listed among these 

defenses. The law's reluctance to allow testimony concerning 

subjective belief after the fact reflects an obvious concern with 

the reliability of such testimony. Accordingly, we find no such 

defense available under the statute. 

14 

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c. Willfulness/Intentional Instruction 

The district court instructed the jury that 

"intentionally ;willfuLLy" was defined as follows: "An act is done 

'intentionally or wilfully' if it is done knowingly and 

voluntarily as distinguished from accidentally; or is done with a 

bad purpose; or without justifiable excuse; or stubbornly, 

obstinately or perversr:dy." Rec. Vol. I, doc. 93. Appellant 

requested the following instruction: "An act is done 

'intentionally' or 'wilfully' if it is done without ground for 

believing it is lawful, or if it is done with careless disregard 

of whether or not the act is lawful." 

"When examining a challenge to jury instructions, we 

review the record as a whole to determine whether the 

instructions •state the law which governs and provided the jury 

with an ample understanding of the issues and the standards 

applicable.'" Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 

F.2d 1259, 1271 (lOth Cir. 1988) (quoting Ramsey v. Culpepper, 

738 F.2d 1092, 1098 (lOth Cir. 1984)). An error in jury 

instructions will mandate reversal of a judgment only if the 

error is determined to have been prejudicial. Id. at 1271 n.19. 

We believe the district court's instruction on the 

required mental state was a correct statement of the law, and, in 

15 

Appellate Case: 90-6122 Document: 01019290911 Date Filed: 10/02/1991 Page: 15 
any event, did not prejudice appellant. In addition to the 

willfulness/intentional instruction, the district court gave a 

punitive damages instruction that required a finding that 

appellant's wiretapping was done "maliciously," "oppressively," 

or "wantonly." Rec. Vol. I, doc. 93. The jury returned a 

verdict for both compensatory and punitive damages. Thus, 

assuming the district court should have given appellant's 

requested instruction, such refusal was not reversible error in 

light of the jury's implicit finding of recklessness in its award 

of punitive damages. 

We find appellant's remaining contentions regarding the 

admissibility of the illegally obtained tapes and the exclusion 

of evidence of appellee's suspicion that her phone was taped to 

be without merit. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district 

court's final judgment in favor of appellee and against appellant 

for violation of Title III. We REMAND to the district court for 

determination of attorney's fees and costs on appeal under 18 

u.s.c. § 2520. 

16 

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