Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02229/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02229-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

TOM SCOTT PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 04-2229

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tom Scott appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

January 3, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 11). Plaintiff now moves for an award on

$1,956.25 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 15.65 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $125.00. (Doc. # 12-13). The defendant has filed a response, expressing no

objection to this award. (Doc. # 14).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

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proceedings is a prevailing party. 

The Commissioner does not oppose the award of a reasonable attorney's fee under the

EAJA, does not object to the hourly rate requested by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees and

does not dispute the number of hours expended by counsel. (Doc. # 14). The court construes this

lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the government's

decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

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resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for the EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the

EAJA at an hourly rate of $125.00. We find plaintiff's attorney entitled to compensation at this

rate. 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

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the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's counsel seeks compensation for 15.65 hours of work before this court. We find

that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to be compensated under the EAJA for 15.65 hours of work that

he indicates he expended on this case at the district court level.

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 15.65 attorney hours, at the rate of $125.00 per hour, for a total attorney's fee award of

$1,956.25. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits

which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten days from receipt of our

report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal

questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and

specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

Dated this 12 day of May 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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