Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02215/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02215-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEKOU HARRIS

Plaintiff,

v.

J. TIM. OCHOA

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 10-2215 BTM (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. No. 1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Sekou Harris ("Petitioner") is a California prisoner serving a prison term of eight

years, following his conviction for one count of selling cocaine base (Cal. Health & Safety Code §

11352(a)) and one count of possession of cocaine base for sale (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11351.5). 

Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the

trial court's decision to exclude a defense witness due to violation of the discovery rules. The Petition

puts forth seven grounds for habeas relief regarding the trial court's exclusion of the defense witness. 

Although Petitioner does not specify which rights he claims were violated, the due process right to a

fair trial under the Fifth Amendment and the right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment can

be affected by the exclusion of evidence. The seven grounds listed in the Petition are: 

1) The trial court violated state law and appellant's constitutional right to present a

defense when it precluded a critical defense [sic] from testifying without finding a willful

violation of the discovery rules; 2) The trial court should not have considered prejudice

to the codefendant in deciding whether to preclude the testimony of appellant's witness;

3) Appellant did not wilfully violate the discovery rules by notifying the people during

trial of his intent to call Adams as a witness; 4) The people would not have been

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1

"CT” refers to the Clerk’s Transcript of trial proceedings, contained in Lodgment 1, and“RT” refers

to the Reporter’s Transcript of trial proceedings, contained in Lodgment 3.

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irremediably or significantly prejudiced by notice during the trial from appellant of his

intent to call Adams as a witness; 5) In either case, the trail [sic] court erronously [sic]

weighed the harm the codefendeant [sic] might suffer if Adams was allowed to testify; 6)

The trial court violated appellant's constitutional rights by precluding Adams from

testifying; and 7) Preclusion of Adams' testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt because Adams' testimony, if believed by the jury, would have raised reasonable

doubt in the jury,s [sic] mind. 

[Petition, Docket No. 1.]

 Respondent asserts that Petitioner has neither shown that the state courts unreasonably applied

clearly established federal law, nor shown that the state court decisions were based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Accordingly, Respondent requests that this court deny the petition.

This Court has reviewed the Petition ("Pet."), Respondent's Answer, and all supporting

documents. Petitioner did not file any documents in response to Respondent's Answer. After a through

review of the record, the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and

RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 20, 2008, a San Diego County jury found Petitioner guilty of selling cocaine base (Cal.

Health & Safety Code § 11352(a)) and possession of cocaine base for sale (Cal. Health & Safety Code §

11351.5). (CT 27-28.)1

 The trial court found true the allegation that Petitioner had been previously

convicted of drug sales (Cal Pen. Code § 11370.2(a)) on two occasions. (CT 138-40; 3 RT 517-19.) 

Petitioner admitted a prison prior (Cal. Pen. Code§ 667.5(b)) and a strike prior (Cal. Pen. Code § 667(b),

(I)). (3 RT 487-89, 498-99.) He was tried with co-defendant Marcus Costner. Costner was also found

guilty of both counts. (3 RT 472-73.) On October 6, 2008, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to eight

years in prison. (CT 102; 3 RT 555.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One. On September 4, 2009, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal denied

Petitioner’s appeal. (Lodgment 7.) The Court of Appeal held: "We need not determine whether the

trial court abused its discretion or violated Harris's constitutional rights because we conclude that the

preclusion of Adams's testimony did not prejudice Harris, even under the heightened standard of

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This statement of the facts is taken verbatim from the unpublished opinion of the California Court

of Appeal. (Lodgment 7.) 

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prejudice we must apply to claims of constitutional error." (Lodgement 7 at 10.) The Court of Appeal

applied the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18

(1967) and determined that, if the exclusion was in error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Id.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8.) The

California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on December 17, 2009, in a summary order

without citation or explanation. (Lodgment 9.) Petitioner did not seek further review from the United

States Supreme Court or collateral relief in the state courts. Petitioner filed the current Petition on

October 25, 2010.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts of the Arrest2

At approximately 11:00 p.m. on January 3, 2008, San Diego Police Detective Michael Day took

part in a narcotics sting operation on C Street in San Diego. Detective Day, working undercover,

walked along C Street between Seventh and Eighth Avenues. Day encountered Costner and told

Costner that he wanted to buy drugs. Costner asked, “Do you have a pipe?” When Day responded that

he did not have a pipe, Costner said, “Give me your money, I’ll get it for you if you share it with me.” 

Detective Day handed Costner a prerecorded $20 bill. Costner took the money and walked

across the trolley tracks to the other side of the street, while Day followed behind. Costner approached a

tan Chevrolet Impala. Stacey Adams was seated in the driver’s seat, and Harris was in the passenger

seat. An individual identified as Issa was sitting in the backseat. Costner knelt down near the passenger

side of the car and spoke with Harris through the open car window. 

Day witnessed Harris place a small object in Costner’s hand. Costner walked to a lit area and

inspected the object. He then returned to the Impala and handed Harris a $20 bill. Costner returned to

Day and handed him the object, which Day recognized as cocaine base. After Costner handed him the

cocaine base, Day gave the prearranged arrest signal. 

 The car in which Harris was riding drove away. However, a uniformed officer stopped the car a

few blocks away from the scene. The officer searched Harris and found his cellular telephone and three

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$20 bills, one of which was the prerecorded $20 bill that Day had given to Costner. While officers

were in the process of arresting Harris, his cellular telephone rang seven times. 

A uniformed officer arrested Costner and found a cocaine pipe and $2.00 in his possession.

Officers later searched the Impala and Harris’s nearby motel room. They found a small piece of

rock cocaine in the vehicle, and $794 in cash in the motel room. (Lodgment 7 at 3-4.)

B. Facts of the Trial and the Exclusion of Testimony

At the end of the first day of trial, while discussing scheduling, the trial court asked both defense

counsel if they planned to present any affirmative evidence. Petitioner’s counsel said that due to a “late

development” he may have one witness. The prosecutor objected that she had not received any

discovery about a defense witness. Defense counsel said: "It's so – it's substantial – now, I can't say

anything more than I have, Your Honor. I regret that. But that's where we are." (1 RT 173.) The next

morning, the trial court asked again if the defense intended to call a witness and the following colloquy

took place:

Mr. Berman: Your Honor, just as of late yesterday, I have finally learned that the other

original arrestee, Stacy Adams, is available and willing to testify. And I have her under

subpoena. . . . I gave copies of [the investigator's] one page report on his interview of Ms.

Adams to the attorneys. And the report, somewhat, I think is self-explanatory that this is

something that we had been working on for a while but didn't come to fruition to the

point where we learned that she was available and willing to testify until just late

yesterday, and that – therefore, I offer that as an explanation of the late stage of the trial

in which this comes up. . . .

The Court: Thank you. So as the Court understands it, the witness became available just

within the last day or so?

Mr. Berman: That's Exactly Right

(2 RT 176.) The Court then asked the prosecutor if she had any concerns and she responded that she

was very concerned and wanted to know whether counsel had been diligent in pursuing Ms. Adams as a

witness. The prosecutor noted that Ms. Adams was listed on the police report and told the police that

she was the girlfriend of Mr. Harris. The people objected to the late evidence and pointed out that

defense counsel had been deliberately vague the day before in not informing the people that he was

searching for Ms. Adams. Finally, the prosecutor asked to be able to speak with Ms. Adams prior to any

testimony. (2 RT 177-79.) 

The Court again addressed the issue of testimony from Ms. Adams the next day. Mr. Berman

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Mr. Berman insisted that, despite what the investigators reported to the other attorneys, they had

informed him that Ms. Adams had been uncooperative and had been unwilling to meet with his

investigators. (2 RT 288.) Mr. Berman concluded that "apparently there's just some misunderstanding" and

affirmed "I stand by my previous representation as to my understanding of Ms. Adams's initial

uncooperativeness and now willingness to testify." (2 RT 289.)

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represented to the court that Ms. Adams had not been Petitioner's girlfriend for "some time"; that he

"had trouble even locating her" and had "been informed that she was uncooperative." (2 TR 232-233.) 

He candidly admitted to the court: "I'm not particularly desirous of calling her in any event because I

feel that there's more to lose than gain in doing so. But I'm doing it at my client's insistence." (2RT 

233.) The Court indicated that it was not inclined to exclude Ms. Adams because he did not find a

violation of the discovery requirements. (2 RT 234.) At that point, Ms. Vandenbosch, counsel for codefendant Costner, joined the prosecutor's motion to exclude the testimony. Ms. Vandenbosch argued

that the new report contained facts different from Ms. Adam's statement to the police and inconsistent

with the evidence as Ms. Vandenbosch represented in her opening statement. (2 RT 235.) The trial

judge indicated that he would have consider the argument that Defendant Costner's due process rights

would be infringed by allowing Ms. Adams to testify. (2 RT 236.) 

After lunch that day, the court again returned to the question of Ms. Adams after all counsel had

spoken with Ms. Adams. The prosecutor stated that she had learned from Ms. Adams that she has lived

at the same address, was willing to testify at all times, was never uncooperative, and had not been

contacted until the day before. (2 RT 284.) Based on these facts, the prosecutor argued that Petitioner

had not been diligent in seeking Ms. Adams' testimony and the testimony should, therefore, be excluded. 

Ms. Vandenbosch told the court that the only prior effort to contact Ms. Adams was by an

investigator who spoke to a family member of Ms. Adams. The family member stated that Ms. Adams

might not want to testify. The investigator apparently made no further efforts to see if Ms. Adams

would testify until after the start of trial. (2 RT 285.)3

 Ms. Vandenbosch argued that Ms. Adams should

not be allowed to testify in a manner inconsistent with her prior statement and the evidence as relied

upon in opening statements and cross examination. Ms. Vandenbosch also argued that she would have

made a motion to sever the trials of the two defendants if she had known they would have inconsistent

defenses. 

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Ms. Adams told the police on the day of the incident that she had been starting the car and did

not see what happened between Mr. Harris and Mr. Costner because she was not paying attention. The

investigator's report, however, indicated that Ms. Adams was going to testify that Mr. Harris had given

Mr. Costner two one dollar bills. Ms. Vandenbosch argued that the inference from Ms. Adams'

testimony was that Mr. Costner had the drugs all along, leading the two defendants to have inconsistent

defenses. (2 RT 287-88.) Ms. Vandenbosch concluded that allowing the testimony would violate Mr.

Costner's due process right to a fair trial.

The prosecutor agreed that the two statements were inconsistent. Mr. Berman would not

concede that the statements were inconsistent, but he did admit that the new statement "added a lot of

information." He did admit: 

I recognize that in proffering Ms. Adams as a witness, I am in a position of vouching for

her testimony, and I'm uncomfortable, frankly, doing that. I feel I'm kind of in a position

of the theoretical lawyer who is asked to put his client on the stand to give an account

that the lawyer does not believe is true and has to do it as a narrative.

(2 RT 290-91.) Mr. Berman also stated that he was unsure as to whether Ms. Adams would testify that

Mr. Harris had given Mr. Costner two dollars because he thought she would testify that Harris had given

Costner change for a twenty. Mr. Berman then said:

Of course, it's obvious that he didn't have change for a twenty on him when he was

arrested. So that's problematic, to put it mildly. Which I explained to Mr. Harris and

said 

that I would – really would prefer not to call her, but Mr. Harris has instructed me to call

her, so I don't have any – any option, as I see it.

(2RT 291-92.) 

The trial judge decided that the witness statement disclosed after the start of trial was contrary to

the statement given by Ms. Adams to the police and provided as discovery. The judge also found that

this statement, if disclosed in a timely manner, would have been grounds for a motion to sever and was

grounds for Costner to change his theory of the defense. The judge then found, based upon the close

relationship between Mr. Harris and Ms. Adams and the fact they lived at the same address, that

Petitioner had information about Ms. Adams sooner than the second day of trial. The Court found:

based on a violation of 1054, based on the due process argument as submitted by the

defense for Mr. Costner, as well as assessment made as to the value of this testimony and

the request made by Mr. Harris without his counsel’s support, but through his counsel,

the Court finds that the evidence of and the proffered testimony must be excluded. 

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Therefore, the Court does sustain the objection and grants the motion to exclude as to

both the People and as to the defendant Mr. Costner.

(2 RT 327.)

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Unreasonable Application of Law or Determination of Facts

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs this Petition. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-337 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court will not grant habeas

relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the decision was (1)

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). 

A case is "contrary to" federal law if it either: (a) applies a rule different from the governing law

set forth in Supreme Court cases; or (b) decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A case involves an

“unreasonable application” of federal law if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal

principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applies those decisions to the facts at issue. 

Id. “Clearly established federal law,” for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003).

The state court decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief the

state court’s application of “clearly established federal law” must be “objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. “Objectively unreasonable” differs from “clear error” in that a federal court

cannot grant habeas relief merely because it believes that the state court erroneously or incorrectly

applied “clearly established federal law;” the application must be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 75-76

(internal citation omitted). Even a "firm conviction" that the state court was "erroneous" is insufficient;

a federal habeas court can only issue the writ when the state court's application of federal law was

"unreasonable." Id.; see also Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005)("It is an

'unreasonable application' of precedent if it is 'objectively unreasonable,' which is more than being

merely, or even clearly, incorrect.")

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 If the state supreme court silently denies a petitioner’s appeal with a summary dismissal, the

reviewing federal habeas court must look through to the last reasoned state court opinion in making a

decision. See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the "last reasoned" state

court decision was written by the California Court of Appeal. [Lodgement 7.]

B. Substantial and Injurious Effect on Verdict

Even if exclusion of the evidence amounts to constitutional error, in order to justify federal

habeas relief the erroneous exclusion must have had “a substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict.

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). "To grant relief where a state court has determined

that a constitutional error was harmless, we must both determine (1) that the state court's decision was

“contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court harmless error precedent, and (2) that

the petitioner suffered prejudice under Brecht from the constitutional error." Inthavong v. Lamarque,

420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005). Because both tests must be satisfied before any relief can be

granted, courts are free to take either issue first. Id. at 1061. 

V. DISCUSSION

The California Court of Appeal declined to reach the question of whether the trial court

wrongfully excluded the testimony of Ms. Adams. Instead, the court found that any error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. The California Court of Appeal's decision is not contrary to federal law,

does not constitute an unreasonable application of federal law, and is not an unreasonable determination

of the facts. 

A. The Exclusion of Evidence Did Not Have a Substantial and Injurious Effect

Because the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming, the exclusion of Ms. Adams'

testimony did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict. As the Court of Appeals

noted, “overwhelming evidence that Harris took part in a drug sale with Costner” was presented at trial. 

(Lodgment 7 at 10.) Detective Day witnessed Petitioner sell Costner $20 worth of cocaine base. 

Detective Day gave Costner a marked $20 bill in order to buy cocaine. (1 RT 95.) He then watched

from 30 to 35 feet away as Costner approached Petitioner. (1 RT 103.) Petitioner handed Costner a

small object that appeared consistent with a rock of cocaine. (1 RT 109.) Costner walked about ten

feet and inspected the object under better light. (1 RT 109.) Costner then walked backed to Petitioner

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and gave him the marked $20 bill. (1 RT 111.) Costner then gave Detective Day $20 worth of cocaine

base. (1 RT 115.) When appellant was searched immediately after the transaction, he had the marked

$20 bill in his pants pocket. (2 RT 239.) Petitioner also had other indications of drug sales in his car

and motel room, including almost $800 in cash, a cell phone which recorded seven missed calls while 

police officers were present, and a small but usable amount of narcotics referred to as "kibbles" or

"crumbs." (2 RT 198, 241, 260, 277, 280.)

Moreover, Adams' proposed testimony was inconsistent with both her prior statement and the

evidence. As the state appellate court noted:

On the night of the incident, Adams told police that she did not know what had happened

because she had not been paying attention. However, according to Harris’s investigator’s

report of his interview with Adams, Adams intended to testify at trial that Harris had

given Costner money, not drugs. Although it is not totally clear from the record,

Adams’s new version of events seemed to be either that Harris had given Costner change

for a $20 bill, or that Harris gave Costner two $1 bills. Either story was inherently

suspect, particularly in view of Day’s testimony that Costner stepped into the light to

view whatever Harris had given him before he returned to give Harris the marked $20

bill, and that the object Harris handed to Costner was much smaller than paper bills. 

Further, neither version was plausible in light of what police found in the defendants’

possession immediately after the incident: Costner did not have change for a $20 bill in

his possession, and although Costner did have two $1 bills, Harris had in his possession

the marked $20 bill that Day had given Costner.

(Lodgment 7 at 11.) The state appellate court also noted that Ms. Adams was further subject to

impeachment by her admission, in connection with her guilty plea, that she unlawfully possessed drugs

on the night in question. Finally, the state court relied upon the fact that Harris' attorney did not believe

that the testimony would have been helpful. (Lodgement 7 at 12, 2 RT 233, 290-92.)

Petitioner argues that the exclusion of Adams' testimony "was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt because Adams' testimony, if believed by the jury, would have raised reasonable doubt in the

jury,s [sic] mind." [Pet. at Ground 7, p. 14.] Petitioner explains: "Precisely because Adams did not

testify, the People cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt her testimony would not have changed the

verdict." [Id.] Petitioner is mistaken. If Petitioner were correct, it would always be impossible to

prove that excluded testimony would not have changed the verdict. The Supreme Court, however, has

held that it is possible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that excluded testimony would not have

changed a verdict. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116-122 (2007)(applying Brecht standard to exclusion of

evidence); see also e.g. Cannedy v. Cate, 2010 WL 5464167 ©. D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2010)(exclusion of

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testimony found harmless error); Jackson v. Ryan 2009 WL 4042910 (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 2009)(exclusion

of prior crimes and bad acts by codefendant harmless error); Moore v. Cate, 2009 WL 559836 (March 4,

2009, S. D. Cal.)(exclusion of evidence did not have substantial and injurious effect); Peevy v. Harrison,

2007 WL 2758042 (E. D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2007)(exclusion of third party culpability evidence was harmless

error.) 

Petitioner also argues that the jury was prevented from hearing "substantial exculpatory

testimony" and that Adams' testimony that Petitioner gave Costner change would explain Petitioner's

possession of the prerecorded $20 bill. As described above, however, Adams' testimony was

inconsistent with the evidence because when Costner was arrested immediately after interacting with

Petitioner, he only had $2 on his person. Moreover, Adams' testimony was also inconsistent with her

prior statement to the police. Finally, any testimony that Petitioner merely made change for Costner

would also have been inconsistent with Officer Day's testimony that Costner examined the object

Petitioner gave to him before handing over the money. Officer Day testified that white males are often

sold "bunk" or fake narcotics, which causes the buyer to inspect the object they are being sold prior to

handing over the money. (1 RT 114.) 

Because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt as well as the limited value of the testimony

excluded, the state court's determination that any error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" was

not an unreasonable determination of federal law. The state court examined the alleged constitutional

error under the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18

(1967). The court applied the correct rule, reasonably applied the rule to the facts of the case, and made

a not unreasonable determination of facts. Moreover, the exclusion of Adams' testimony did not have a

"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict" under Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 

B. Alleged Violations of State Law

Petitioner asserts several claims that appear to assert violations of California law. In Ground 1

of the Petition, Petitioner claims that the trial court violated "state law and appellant's constitutional

right to present a defense" when it precluded Adams' testimony without finding a willful violation of the

discovery rules. [Pet. at 6.] Similarly, Petitioner asserts: in Ground 2, that the trial court should not

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have considered prejudice to his co-defendant [Pet at 9.]; in Ground 3, that he did not willfully violate

the discovery rules [Pet. at 10.]; in Ground 4, the People would not have been irremediably or

significantly prejudiced by the late notice of his intent to call Adams as a witness [Pet. at 11.]; and in

Ground 5 the trial court's weighing of the harm to his co-defendant was "improper under California law"

[Pet at 12.].

A violation of state law does not ordinarily provide a basis for habeas relief. "A federal habeas

court cannot review questions of state evidence law." Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.

1999). As the Supreme Court has stated: "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is

limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, (1991). Accordingly, the state court's evidentiary

ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it rendered the state proceedings so

fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, to the extent that Petitioner intended to assert claims for violations of California

law, such violations are not cognizable during habeas review. The only question before the federal

habeas court is whether a state court's evidentiary ruling was so fundamentally unfair as to violate due

process. As described in detail above, the exclusion of Adams' testimony was harmless and did not have

a substantial impact on the jury's decision and, therefore, could not have rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair.

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Case 3:10-cv-02215-BTM-NLS Document 13 Filed 03/10/11 Page 11 of 12
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be DENIED. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 1, 2011 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than April 11, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. 

See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 10, 2011

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:10-cv-02215-BTM-NLS Document 13 Filed 03/10/11 Page 12 of 12