Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01813/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01813-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RHONDA BASLER, et al.,

NO. CIV. S-06-1813 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

CITY OF SUSANVILLE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

This is a survival and wrongful death action arising from a

fatal shooting by police. Pending before the court is a motion

for summary judgment filed by defendants County of Lassen and

various law enforcement officials (Steven W. Warren, Dean

Growdon, and Nathan Mendes) against only one of the plaintiffs,

Rhonda Basler, who was at one point in time married to the

decedent. Defendants argue that Rhonda Basler lacks standing to

sue because she legally separated from the decedent prior to the

shooting. Defendants do not contest the standing of the other

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 The relevant facts are undisputed. The court references

the complaint only to provide context.

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plaintiffs in the action, who include the decedent’s children. 

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

I. Facts1

A. Alleged Shooting

According to the complaint, the decedent James Basler was

at his residence in Susanville, California at approximately

11:00 p.m. on July 25, 2005 when defendant law enforcement

officials surrounded his residence with the intention of

arresting him. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14. The decedent had a dog

chained in the back of the property that started barking when

law enforcement began to descend around the house. Compl. ¶ 14.

Upon hearing the barking, the decedent exited his residence and

asked, “Who’s there?” Compl. ¶ 15. At that moment, one of the

defendants allegedly started firing his automatic weapon over 30

times at decedent, resulting in his death. Compl. ¶ 15. 

Although there has been no evidence submitted on the issue, the

parties appear to agree that Mr. Basler died intestate.

B. Relationship between Rhonda Basler and James Basler

Rhonda Basler (“plaintiff”) married James Basler on August

19, 1988. Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Fact (“SUF”) ¶ 1. On

November 30, 1992, Rhonda Basler filed a Petition for Legal

Separation in the Humboldt County Superior Court. SUF ¶ 2. In

that petition, she requested adjudication of child custody and

visitation, spouse support, and determination of marital

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property rights. Id. On September 22, 1993, the court entered

a Judgment of Legal Separation, which included a final

determination as to all community property rights and assets. 

SUF ¶ 4. As part of that separation, Rhonda Badler was awarded,

as separate property, household goods, furnishings, appliances,

and an automobile. Defs.’ Ex. A. at 3. The court also ordered

James Basler to pay monthly child support. Id.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of "the

pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any," which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for

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discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A]

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at

323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts

in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material,

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First

Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954

(9th Cir. 1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect

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the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local

No. 169, Ass’n of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347,

355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g

& Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv.,

809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to

'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's

note on 1963 amendments); see also Int’l Union of Bricklayers &

Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752

F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

Rule 56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d

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1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party

is to be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party,

see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also

Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121,

1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn

out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp.

1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial."

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue

her survival and wrongful death actions because she legally

separated from the decedent prior to his death. Whether a

“particular party has standing to pursue a claim naturally

precedes the question of whether that party has successfully

stated a claim.” Moreland v. City of Las Vegas, 159 F.3d 365,

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 § 1988 provides that where federal civil rights laws “are

deficient . . . to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses

. . . [state law] so far as the same is not inconsistent with the

Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and

govern.”

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369 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that

standing exists. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power

Admin., 117 F.3d 1520, 1528 (9th Cir. 1997).

A. Survival Action

1. Relationship to § 1983

As a general rule, Fourth Amendment rights are personal and

may not be vicariously asserted. Alderman v. United States, 394

U.S. 165, 174 (1969). In § 1983 actions, however, “survivors of

an individual killed as a result of an officer’s excessive force

may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that individual’s behalf

if the relevant state’s law authorizes a survival action.” 

Moreland, 159 F.3d at 369. Survival actions are permitted

because, to the extent that federal civil rights laws such as §

1983 are “deficient” with respect to particular issues, or

otherwise contain gaps, a federal court applies the state law of

the forum so long as it is not “inconsistent” with the

constitution and other federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.2

Although survival actions are not expressly permitted by § 1983,

state law may permit them (by way of § 1988).

2. California Law

Under California law, a survival action “may be commenced

by [1] the decedent’s personal representative, or, if none, by

[2] the decedent’s successor in interest.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

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3 Plaintiff argues that the definition of “surviving spouse”

set forth in the Probate Code is not relevant to ascertaining

whether plaintiff should be entitled to bring a survival action.

But this is the only colorable (even if ultimately unavailing)

means by which plaintiff might have succeeded to the decedent’s

cause of action.

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§ 377.30. Here, plaintiff does not argue, nor has she presented

evidence to suggest, that she was the decedent’s duly appointed

representative. Accordingly, in order to have standing to sue,

she must be the decedent’s “successor in interest.”

California law defines “successor in interest” as (1) the

beneficiary of decedent’s estate, or (2) any other successor in

interest who succeeds to a cause of action. Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 377.11. Plaintiff would qualify as a beneficiary of the

decedent’s estate under the first prong if she succeeded to a

cause of action under the rules of intestate succession. Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 377.10(b). Accordingly, the question is

essentially the same under either prong of the statute: did

plaintiff succeed to the decedent’s cause of action?

Under the rules of intestate succession, plaintiff would

succeed to the decedent’s cause of action if she was a

“surviving spouse.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.10(b); Cal.

Prob. Code §§ 6401, 7000. The probate code, however, expressly

states that a surviving spouse does not include those who were

party to marriages that were “dissolved or annulled,” Cal. Prob.

Code § 78(a), or who were “party to a valid proceeding concluded

by an order purporting to terminate all marital property

rights.”3 Cal. Prob. Code § 78(d). Accordingly, the legally

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4 This finality distinguishes plaintiff’s case from that cited

by plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument, People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.

2d 200, 209 (1954), where the court noted that a husband was the

surviving spouse of his deceased wife during the time that a

divorce decree was interlocutory.

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relevant question is whether the Judgment of Legal Separation

between plaintiff and decedent entered on September 22, 1993

“terminate[d] all marital property rights.” 

The court concludes that it did. Even though legal

separation does not terminate the marital status, the parties

remain “spouses” in name only. See In re Marriage of Von der

Nuell, 23 Cal. App. 4th 730, 736 (1994) (“[L]egal separation

requires not only a parting of the ways with no present

intention of resuming marital relations, but also, more

importantly, conduct evidencing a complete and final break in

the marital relationship.”); see also Cal. Fam. Code § 2310

(legal separation can be maintained on the same grounds as

dissolution of marriage, e.g., irreconcilable differences).

In Estate of Lahey, the court expressly held that “the

judgment of legal separation constitutes ‘an order purporting to

terminate all marital property rights.’” 76 Cal. App. 4th 1056,

1059 (1999). “[I]t is obvious that a surviving spouse for

purposes of intestate succession is distinct from the legal wife

or husband of the decedent.” Id. Furthermore, legal separation

“serves as a final adjudication of the parties' property rights

and is conclusive.”4 Id.

The act adjudicates issues such as support,

custody/visitation, and, of particular relevance here, community

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property rights. “After entry of a judgment of legal separation

of the parties, the earnings or accumulations of each party are

the separate property of the party acquiring the earnings or

accumulations.” Cal. Fam. Code § 772. Accordingly, except as

otherwise ordered by the court, at the point of legal

separation, parties do not accrue further community property. 

Because the Judgment of Legal Separation terminated the

parties’ marital property rights, plaintiff is not a “surviving

spouse” and did not succeed to decedent’s cause of action. She

therefore lacks standing to sue in a survival action under

California law. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 377.30, 377.10, 377.11.

3. Inconsistency with Federal Law

As noted earlier, state law may fill the gaps of § 1983 to

the extent it is not inconsistent with federal law. Here,

plaintiff argues that application of state law, to the extent

that it excludes parties to a legal separation from pursuing

survival actions, would frustrate the objectives of § 1983. 

Accordingly, she argues that the court should fashion federal

common law and permit a legally separated spouse to bring a

survival action on her deceased spouse’s behalf. The argument

is unavailing. 

In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1991), the plaintiff

died pending trial and was not survived by a spouse, children,

parents, or siblings. The Supreme Court held that Louisiana’s

survivorship statute, which did not permit the substitution of

the decedent with a decedent’s personal representative, was not

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5 As plaintiff correctly notes, the Court’s holding was

limited: “We intimate no view . . . about whether abatement based

on state law could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation

of federal rights caused death.” Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594. But

that is not the situation here either. The survival action would

not be abated by the court’s conclusion that Ms. Basler lacks

standing to sue, because the decedent’s children may still proceed

with suit.

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inconsistent with § 1983. The Court found that Louisiana’s law,

including its limitations on who could bring a survival action,

was a reasonable one. Id. at 592. The Court also cautioned

that “[a] state statute cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’ with

federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to

lose the litigation.”5 Id. at 893.

Like the law at issue in Robertson, California law draws a

reasonable line between those who may pursue survival actions

and those who may not. On one side of the line are those who

remain married to their spouses (or in domestic partnerships)

and whose property rights are intermingled. On the other side

of the line are those whose marriages have been annulled or

dissolved, and those whose marital property rights have been

terminated. Those with standing to sue are those who are

closest to the decedent, and although the line may not be

perfect in all cases, it is a reasonable one to draw. 

Indeed, plaintiff does not seem to argue that divorced

spouses should have standing to pursue wrongful death actions. 

It is difficult to conceive of a reason why it would be

consistent with federal law to exclude divorced spouses but

somehow inconsistent with federal law to exclude legally

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separated spouses. 

Although some courts have been tempted to depart from state

law and fashion federal common law, they have been primarily

motivated by a concern of insufficient deterrence. See, e.g.,

Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F.3d 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (noting

that because pain and suffering damages do not survive death,

officials who merely injure or maim a victim face a harsher

penalty than when officials kill the victim). Under the facts

of this case, however, application of state law would not

frustrate the objectives of § 1983. To the extent that

plaintiff is concerned about deterring police misconduct, that

purpose is already accomplished by the fact that the decedent’s

children possess standing to sue and are, in fact, plaintiffs in

this case. 

B. Wrongful Death

In contrast to a survival action, a wrongful death action

is an independent claim for damages personally suffered by

certain individuals as a result of the decedent’s death. The

wrongful death statute is intended to limit the right of

recovery to the class of persons who are presumed to be injured

by the decedent's death. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d

115, 119-20 (1974). California law provides that wrongful death

actions may be asserted by the decedent’s “surviving spouse,

domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased children.” 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60. Furthermore, the requirements

for filing a wrongful death action are strictly construed.

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6 Plaintiff argues that the class of individuals permitted to

bring wrongful death actions expanded when the legislature amended

the law. Plaintiff reasons that because a limitation on “heirs”

is no longer present, she is entitled to bring the present action

even if she was not entitled to inherit the decedent’s property by

intestate succession. This argument ignores the fact that while

the language of “heirs” may no longer be present, the relevant

statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60, nevertheless specifically

enumerates who is permitted to bring suit. Plaintiff does not fall

into any of those enumerated categories. See also Phraner v. Cote

Mart, 55 Cal. App. 4th 166, 169 (1997) (“The change in the language

was not a broadening of the statute, but a mere clarification.”).

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Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564 (1977). Accordingly, the

question again is whether plaintiff is a “surviving spouse”

under the wrongful death law.

For the same reasons that plaintiff is not a surviving

spouse for purposes of intestacy and survival actions, she is

also not a surviving spouse for purposes of the wrongful death

statute.6 See Cheyanna M. v. AC Nielsen, 66 Cal. App. 4th 855,

864 (1998) (“The statutory right to bring a wrongful death

action . . . is grounded in the right to inherit from the

decedent.”). Just as a divorced spouse lacks standing to pursue

a wrongful death action, see Villacampa v. Russell, 178 Cal.

App. 3d 906 (1986), and a child lacks standing to pursue a

wrongful death action for her mother after the termination of

parental rights, see Jackson v. Fitzgibbons, 127 Cal. App. 4th

329, 335 (2005), a legally separated spouse lacks standing to

pursue a wrongful death action for her deceased spouse.

Finally, although plaintiff maintains that application of

California’s wrongful death statute would frustrate the

objectives of federal law, wrongful death is purely a question

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 Although the survivor of a decedent may pursue an action for

loss of companionship based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due

process protection of familial relationships, Curnow v. Ridge Crest

Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991), plaintiff did not plead

such an action.

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of state law. Unlike plaintiff’s survival action, which relies

upon § 1983, the wrongful death action does not.7

 In any event,

to the extent that federal law might have any bearing upon the

wrongful death claim, the court rejects any alleged

inconsistency between federal and state law for the same reasons

discussed in the survival action context.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED against Rhonda Basler only.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 13, 2007.

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