Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-00515/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-00515-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gerald M. Calmese,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-18-0515-PHX-DGC (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Doc. 1). On June 3, 2019, the Court rejected in part Magistrate Judge Bade’s Report & 

Recommendation on the Petition, and again referred the matter for reconsideration on the 

merits of Ground 5. Judge Bade having been elevated to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the 

matter was then assigned to the undersigned to address Ground 5.

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PRIOR FINDINGS ADOPTED

The Court has already made substantial findings on the factual and procedural 

background, first in Judge Bade’s Report & Recommendation (Doc. 15), and in the Order 

(Doc. 17) thereon. The undersigned adopts the findings of the Order (Doc. 17), and except 

as modified by the Order, the Report & Recommendation (Doc. 15). However, for ease 

of reference, the undersigned summarizes the factual and procedural background as 

previously found by the Court. 

Petitioner was convicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court on charges of 

fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class 2 felony (Count 1); five counts of theft of a credit 

card or obtaining a credit card by fraudulent means (Counts 3-4, 6-8); and aggravated 

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taking of the identify of another, a class 3 felony (Count 5). A mistrial was declared with 

regard to Count 2. Petitioner was sentenced to a combined, effective 20 years in prison.

Petitioner’s direct appeal was denied. He filed an amended, first petition for postconviction relief (Exh. J) raising, inter alia, his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

such as those asserted in Ground 5 of the instant habeas Petition.1 The trial court denied 

the petition. (Exh. M.) Petitioner also filed a second PCR proceeding (Exh. P) which was 

denied by the trial court (Exh. Q). Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on September 19, 

2016 (Exh. S) challenging rulings on both petitions, which was granted review but denied 

on October 5, 2017 (Exh. T). Petitioner also filed a petition for special action over which 

the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction, and the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied review. 

Petitioner then filed the instant Petition (Doc. 1), in Ground 5 of which Petitioner 

asserts claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (Doc. 1 at 16.) Based 

on a conclusion that Petitioner’s first Petition for Review (Exh. S) sought review only of 

the second PCR petition (Exh. P), Judge Bade concluded that Petitioner’s statute of 

limitations had expired and he had procedurally defaulted on his claims. The Court found 

instead that the Petitioner for Review (Exh. S) also timely sought review of the first PCR, 

including various ineffective assistance claims, and thus the Petition was timely and 

Petitioner’s state remedies on Ground 5 were not procedurally defaulted on the basis of 

lack of a petition for review. (Doc. 17.) 

B. UNDERLYING FACTS

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the factual background as follows:

Calmese was charged with one count of fraudulent schemes 

and artifices, six counts of theft of a credit card or obtaining a credit 

card by fraudulent means, and one count of aggravated taking the 

1 Exhibits A to EE to the Answer (Doc. 13) and Exhibits FF to II to the Supplemental 

Answer (Doc. 20), are referenced herein as “Exh. ___.”

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identity of another. The charges were based on Calmese's interactions 

with victims V.R., R.D., J.C., M.S., B.M., and R.F. The State's theory 

was that Calmese developed relationships with women he met online 

or in bars to gain access to their bank cards, which he would steal and 

use, and that he used aliases to prevent the victims from "track[ing] 

him down." 

All six victims testified at trial. B.M. told the jury she met 

Calmese at a nightclub and saw him several times and that he came 

to her house to help her move. Once inside her home, Calmese said 

he was going to the store and would be right back, but he never 

returned. B.M. later discovered her ATM card was missing from her 

wallet. 

R.F. and Calmese had lunch one day and returned to her home. 

R.F. left the room and returned to find Calmese looking through her 

book bag, where she kept her wallet. After Calmese left, R.F. learned 

her bank card had been used to rent a movie. She also discovered 

other unauthorized charges. According to R.F., Calmese acted 

"charming," saying she was a "great student" and acting "like he was 

so interested in what [she] was doing with [her] life." 

R.D. also discovered a missing bank card after Calmese visited 

her home; her billing statement included charges she did not make. 

R.D. confronted Calmese, who admitted taking her card and making 

the purchases; he agreed to pay the charges. R.D. threatened to call 

the police if he did not follow through. Calmese responded, "Good 

luck finding me. Do you think I had ever given you my real name?"

J.C. testified that his sister, M. C., kept his bank cards while 

he was hospitalized. Unauthorized charges appeared on J.C.'s account 

after Calmese visited M.C.'s home. A drugstore employee identified 

Calmese as the individual who used the card. 

M. S. met Calmese online, where they "chatted online for 

several months." They also talked on the phone and met in person for 

the first time at a park. M. S. left her purse in Calmese' s vehicle while 

they took a walk. Calmese returned to the truck without M.S. and then 

said he had to leave. A short time later, M.S. was alerted to suspicious 

activity on her account. She discovered several unauthorized charges. 

When she checked her purse, her bank card was gone. Police officers 

obtained evidence linking Calmese to the use of M.S.'s card. 

A detective testified that Calmese admitted making 

unauthorized charges to V.R.'s account. When asked "why he keeps 

doing this," Calmese responded that he "likes to take the easy way 

out."

(Exh. E, Mem. Dec. 4/23/13 at ¶¶ 2-8.) 

C. SUPPLMENTAL BRIEFING

Following referral for consideration of the merits of Ground 5, because the original 

Answer (Doc. 13) was limited to procedural defenses, the Court ordered supplemental 

briefing on the merits of Ground 5. (Order 6/4/19, Doc. 19.) Ground 5 generally asserts 

a series of claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and directs: “(See 

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Exhibit D pg 8-14 and Exhibit)”.2 (Petition, Doc. 1 at 16.) 

The Order for supplemental briefs liberally construed Ground 5 as asserting as 

asserting the following individual claims:

5A. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to mount a defense;

5B. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to investigate the

prosecution’s evidence;

5C. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to interview witnesses;

5D. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to assert the claims 

in Ground 1 (insufficient evidence);

5E. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to assert the claims 

in Ground 2 (defective and duplicitous indictment);

5F. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to assert the claims 

in Ground 3 (due process rights);

5G. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to assert the claims 

in Ground 4 (subject matter jurisdiction/special action proceedings); and

5H. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to assert the claims 

in Ground 6 (juror bias).

(Id. at 3-4.) The parties have not challenged that construction. 

Respondents’ Supplemental Answer (Doc 20) argues that: (1) the last reasoned 

decisions on Grounds 5A to 5F were the PCR courts’ rulings (Exhs. M & Q) which were 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law (Doc. 20 at 2-19); 

and (2) Grounds 5G and 5H are unexhausted but without merit (id. at 19-21). 

2 Exhibit D to the Petition is a copy of Petitioner’s Petition for Review to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals (dated 9/8/16) seeking review of the denial of his PCR petitions (with a 

letter from PCR counsel dated 6/24/13 attached as an exhibit) (Doc. 1 at 123-139), and 

copies of an unfiled PCR petition (id. at 140-151), the PCR court’s ruling on the second 

PCR petition (dated 8/1/16) (id. at 152-155), the PCR court’s ruling on reconsideration 

(dated 8/22/16) (id. at 156), and the Arizona Court of Appeals ruling (dated 10/5/17) on 

the petition for review (id. at 157-158.) The undersigned has construed the reference in 

Ground 5 to be to pages 8-14 of the Petition for Review (id. at 130-136) arguing ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and to the attached letter from PCR counsel (id. at 139). 

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Petitioner’s Supplemental Reply (Doc. 21) argues the merits of his claims. In 

addition, Petitioner summarily argues that any fact finding in his PCR proceeding was 

unreasonable and contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Standard of Review

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every error justifies relief. 

Errors of Law – Where the state court has rejected a claim on the merits, to justify 

habeas relief, a state court’s decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States” before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). In such instances, “a federal 

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). Rather, statutes limiting habeas review of 

custody under such judgments “reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against 

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary 

error correction through appeal.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011). 

The Supreme Court has instructed that a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law 

set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless 

arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 

(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To show an unreasonable application, “a state prisoner must show that the state 

court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification 

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

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possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Errors of Fact and Evidentiary Hearings – Similarly, the habeas courts may 

grant habeas relief in state cases only where the state-court merits decision “was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may 

not second-guess a state court's fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court 

record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). “Moreover, implicit findings of fact 

are entitled to deference under § 2254(d) to the same extent as explicit findings of fact.” 

Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008). See also Watkins v. Rubenstein, 

802 F.3d 637, 649 (4th Cir. 2015).

De Novo Review – Where there is no state-court merits-based decision or the 

standards of § 2254(d) have been met, the habeas court reviews the state judgment de novo.

But even where the habeas court is reviewing a claim de novo, there is a wellestablished presumption of correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption 

has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual 

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the 

burden of proof to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." This 

presumption of correctness applies not only to the explicit factual findings by the state 

court, but to the implicit factual findings as well. See Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 

(9th Cir.1990) (implicit factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness in 

appropriate circumstances); see also Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 433 (3d Cir.2007) 

(“Implicit factual findings are presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1) to the same extent as 

express factual findings.”).

Evidentiary Hearings - Further, when a claim is reviewed de novo, the petitioner 

may not obtain an evidentiary hearing or otherwise introduce new evidence if he has 

“failed to develop” the record in the state courts, unless he meets certain stringent 

showings related to justification for the delay in developing the record, 28 U.S.C. § 

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2254(e)(2)(A), and that the new evidence will show a lack of evidence to convict, 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). 

Finally, even where an evidentiary hearing is permissible, the petitioner “must meet 

one of the Townsend [v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)] factors and make colorable allegations 

that, if proved at an evidentiary hearing, would entitle him to habeas relief." Insyxiengmay 

v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2004).

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas court 

looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 

F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may 

reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the 

claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 

(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 

(9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made reasonable judgments 

and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th 

Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

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professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged from 

counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the circumstances. 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 679 

F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 

572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

B. GROUND 5A – IAC TRIAL: FAILURE TO MOUNT DEFENSE

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 5A, Petitioner argues that trial counsel “failed to put up any defense.” 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 16.) In the referenced portions of his PCR Petition for Review, he 

argues:

Mr. Mercer stated to the court that he was ready [to] proceed forward 

with trial (R.T. 1/11/12 pp 8 at 16-18 Id.) With what strategy? ...Mr. 

Mercer presented no defense at trial (RT 1/25/12 pp 16 at 19-24 Id.) 

Defense rest[s]. Mr. Mercer stated on records (RT. 9/12/11 pp 23 at 

5-11 Id.) “I will do everything I can to make that be the out-come of 

trial. To be acquitted.”

(Pet. Exhibit D, Doc. 1 at 133.) 

Respondents argue that the PCR court’s rejection of these claims was not contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Moreover, they argue: 

“Regarding counsel’s failure to mount a defense (Ground 5A), Calmese failed to identify 

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any defense that Mercer was allegedly deficient for failing to present. Instead, he vaguely 

alleged that counsel failed ‘to put up any defense’ and ‘failed to call any witnesses.’ (Exh. 

J, at 11.)” (Supp. Ans. Doc. 20 at 8.) And, they argue the claim is refuted by the record

and no viable defense has been shown: 

Regarding Ground 5A (failure to mount a defense), Mercer argued at 

trial that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Calmese committed fraudulent schemes and artifices, theft of a credit 

card against numerous victims, and aggravated taking the identity of 

another. (Exh. Y, at 35–38 [opening statement]; Exh. BB, at 55–68 

[closing argument].) The record confirms that this case was “pretty 

straightforward” (Exh. FF, at 10), particularly in light of: (1) video 

recordings of Calmese “using [the victims’] credit cards in several 

different instances” (id. at 8); and (2) Calmese’s confession to a 

sergeant that he “just likes to take the easy way out” after the sergeant 

confronted him about his repeated use of others’ credit cards. (See 

Exh. Y, at 146–51; see also Exh. E, at ¶ 2 [Arizona Court of Appeals’ 

memorandum decision explaining “[t]he State’s theory [of the case] 

was that Calmese developed relationships with women he met online 

or in bars to gain access to their bank cards, which he would steal and 

use, and that he used aliases to prevent the victims from ‘track[ing] 

him down’”].) Mercer recognized that given the State’s compelling 

evidence, which included Calmese’s own admission, it would be 

difficult to convince a jury to acquit him. (See Exh. FF, at 23 

[encouraging Calmese to accept the State’s plea offer and remarking, 

“I can give you my best, honest opinion that the scenario under which 

you do better than this plea agreement is a crazy hail Mary pass”].) It 

was therefore reasonable under the circumstances for counsel to 

emphasize weaknesses in the State’s case instead of presenting a 

more specific defense.

(Supp. Ans. Doc. 20 at 9-10.)

Petitioner replies that counsel failed to prepare a defense because he was convinced 

the trial court would grant a “Rule 20 motion,” as demonstrated by his promise to obtain 

an acquittal. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 21 at 4-5.) 

2. State Court Ruling

Petitioner raised claims of ineffective assistance only in his PCR proceedings. The 

Arizona Court of Appeals issued a summary decision (Exhibit T) in those proceedings, 

making the PCR court’s rejection of the claim the “last reasoned decision” on his 

ineffectiveness claims, and the one this Court reviews. 

In his Amended PCR Petition, Petitioner argued: “Trial counsel failure to put up 

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any defense...Counsel’s failure to put up any defense was unreasonable.” (Exh. J at 11.) 

However, the PCR court did not acknowledge or rule on this claim. Rather, it 

considered only the related claims “that trial counsel failed to properly investigate, that he 

was denied the right to counsel of his choice, that counsel should have filed a motion to 

suppress evidence, and that counsel failed to object to an allegedly biased juror.” (Exh. 

M, M.E. 5/16/16 at 6.) 

“When the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was 

inadvertently overlooked in state court, § 2254(d) entitles the prisoner to an unencumbered 

opportunity to make his case before a federal judge.” Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 

303 (2013). Respondents posit no reason, and the undersigned discerns none, to conclude 

anything other than that the PCR simply overlooked Plaintiff’s “failure to mount a 

defense” claim, and focused instead on the more specific claims of failure to investigate, 

etc. The PCR court did not enumerate it as a claim, and did not discuss any of the relevant 

case law, e.g. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (no prejudice showing 

required where counsel failed “to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial 

testing”). 

Therefore, the AEDPA limits of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) do not apply (e.g. contrary to 

or unreasonable determination under Supreme Court law, unreasonable determination of 

the facts). Rather, this habeas court reviews the claim de novo. Johnson, 568 U.S. at 302-

303. In doing so, however, the Court is still bound by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), including its 

directives that the state court’s factual findings be presumed correct and limitations on 

expansion of the record in the habeas proceeding. 

3. Application of Law

On the same day that Strickland was handed down, the Supreme Court also 

established an exception to the deficient and prejudicial performance standard in 

Strickland by holding that certain circumstances in a criminal trial are so likely to prejudice 

the accused that no actual showing of prejudice need be made; ineffective assistance is 

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presumed. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, the Court identified 

two circumstances as being presumably prejudicial: the accused being denied criminal 

counsel at a critical stage of his trial or counsel entirely failing to subject the prosecution's 

case to meaningful adversarial testing. 466 U.S. at 659.

However, while complete failure to defend a criminal case is ineffective assistance, 

the constitution does not require counsel to manufacture a defense where none exists. See 

U.S. v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1986), disapproved of on other grounds by United 

States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579 (9th Cir. 1997). “The sixth amendment does not require 

counsel to invent a defense.” Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757, 764 (5th Cir. 2001), rehr’g 

granted on other grounds, 284 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2002).

In many cases, the law and facts will be so overwhelmingly in favor 

of the government that defense counsel can do little more than try to 

poke holes in the government's case in cross-examination. The 

hopelessness of some cases may even relegate the most competent 

defense counsel to the role of official hand-holder. The Sixth 

Amendment does not hold an attorney responsible for the difficulty 

of the case he inherits. The choice to pursue a bad strategy makes no 

comment on an attorney's judgment where no better choice exists.

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9

th Cir. 1995).

Here, the transcripts make clear that defense counsel did not fail to subject the 

prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, but instead:

• actively participated in jury voir dire challenging potentially biased 

jurors (Exh. X, R.T. 1/18/12 at 23-24, 26-27, 125-128, 132-133, 136-

137, 139-167);

• made an opening statement directed to the duties of the jurors in 

evaluating evidence, applying the reasonable doubt standard, and 

asserting the prosecution would not meet their burden (Exh. Y, R.T. 

1/19/12 at 35-38);

• argued in opposition to the prosecution’s motion in limine (id. at 39-44);

• engaged in substantial cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses

(id. at 50-51, 57-59, 72-80, 88-89, 102-106; Exhibit Z, R.T. 1/23/12 at 

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21-25, 34-37, 55-58, 63-64, 85-87, 94-98, 109-111, 136-140, 151-156; 

Exhibit AA, R.T. 1/24/12 at 11, 18-19, 50-55);

• argued over jurors’ questions (Exh. Y, R.T. 1/19/12 at 83-84; Exhibit Z, 

R.T. 1/23/12 at 158);

• objected to or otherwise challenged various evidence (Exh. Y, R.T. 

1/19/12 at 85-86, 90, 98-99, 160-161; Exhibit Z, R.T. 1/23/12 at 20, 26-

27, 80, 83, 161; Exhibit AA, R.T. 1/24/12 at 59);

• argued over closing jury instructions and forms of verdict (Exhibit Z, 

R.T. 1/22/12 at 70-79; Exhibit AA, R.T. 1/24/12 at 34-36, 86-87; Exhibit 

BB, R.T. 1/25/12 at 14-16, 79-83; Exhibit CC, R.T. 1/16/12 at 5-6); 

• argued a motion for judgment of acquittal (Exhibit AA, R.T. 1/24/12 at 

61-78; Exhibit BB, R.T. 1/25/12 at 3-8); 

• argued to be able to present an undisclosed witness (Exhibit AA, R.T. 

1/24/12 at 88-90); 

• argued for a privileged conversation with Petitioner (Exhibit BB, R.T. 

1/25/12 at 9-14); 

• argued to the jury for acquittal based on lack of proof of false pretense, 

lack of evidence of fraudulent scheme, witness inconsistencies, failure of 

a witnesses to identify Petitioner, investigative bias and deficiencies, 

evidence suggesting permission to use the cards, etc. (Exhibit BB, R.T. 

1/25/12 at 55-68);

• argued for a mistrial based on a hung jury on one count (Exhibit BB, R.T. 

1/25/12 at 8-9);

• negotiated stipulations on aggravating factors (Exhibit BB, R.T. 1/25/12 

at 10-11, 18-20); 

• argued a judgment for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict (Exhibit BB, 

R.T. 1/25/12 at 26-27; Exhibit CC, R.T. 1/26/12 at 3-8, 11-12); 

• argued over restitution (Exhibit CC, R.T. 1/26/12 at 12); and 

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• and argued for a reduced sentence below the prosecution’s 

recommendation of 30 years in prison (id. at 16-19).

Plaintiff ignores all of these actions except the motion for acquittal which he 

dismisses as ineffectual. But counsel is not rendered “ineffective” simply because he is 

unsuccessful. Moreover, counsel did achieve significant results for Petitioner, including a 

hung jury on a count and a 20 year sentence rather than the 30 years sought by the 

prosecution. Under these facts, Petitioner has failed to show that counsel failed to mount 

a defense within the meaning of Cronic. 

Therefore, even reviewed de novo, Ground 5A is without merit and must be denied. 

C. GROUNDS 5B– IAC TRIAL: FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 5B, Petitioner argues that trial counsel “failed...to investigate 

prosecution’s evidence,” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 16), “never investigated anything pertaining 

to Defendant’s case” (Pet. Exhibit D, Doc. 1 at 133.) 

Respondents again rely on the state court’s rejection of this claim, and the 

deferential standards of review in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and further argue that these claims 

are conclusory, and the record reflects that counsel had conducted pretrial work and 

interviews. (Supp. Ans, Doc. 20 at 7-11.) 

Petitioner replies counsel failed to investigate that Sergeant Carrie Miaso’s 

testimony to the Grand Jury regarding his confession was false, rendering his confession 

inadmissible.3 

/ /

3 Petitioner further argues in reply on Ground 5B that counsel failed to move to suppress 

various evidence, failed to interview witnesses, and Petitioner was denied his right to 

counsel of his choice. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 21 at 6-8.) Petitioner offers no facts to show 

any of these arguments support a failure to investigate. To the extent they are part of the 

other claims raised in Ground 5, they are addressed herein. To the extent they are not so 

raised, they are raised for the first time in the Reply and will not be addressed herein. “The 

district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Zamani 

v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007).

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2. State Court Ruling

In disposing of the claim in Grounds 5B, the PCR court ruled:

Defendant claims that trial counsel failed to properly 

investigate...However, Defendant fails to support any of these claims 

with any substantial evidence. Defendant's claims are both 

conclusory and speculative...None of Defendant's claims identifies 

an act that falls below objectively reasonable standards or outside 

reasonable tactical decisions, nor is there any demonstration that but 

for the alleged deficient performance, the outcome would have been 

different. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to show either a failure 

of performance or prejudice.

(Exh. M, M.E. 5/16/16, at 6.) 

3. Application of Law

Although in his introduction to his Supplemental Reply Petitioner asserts a 

conclusory argument that an unreasonable determination of the facts and contrariness to 

or unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, Petitioner offers no specifics to support 

those assertions. 

With regard to the law, the state court’s decision comported with federal law. A

defendant may not leave a court to speculate what evidence the deficient investigation 

would have discovered. In order to prevail on an allegation that defense counsel conducted 

an insufficient investigation resulting in ineffective assistance, the defendant must show 

specifically what that investigation would have produced. And, he may not simply

speculate about what evidence might have been, but must adduce evidence to show what 

it would have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, Petitioner 

failed to even identify the specific evidence to the state court. (See Exh. J, Amend. PCR 

Pet. at 11-12.) 

Petitioner now, for the first time in his Supplemental Reply, references a failure to 

investigate Miaso’s grand jury testimony and asserts it was false. He asserts no recording 

of the interrogation was made. But Petitioner did not argue these facts to the state court. 

A state court does not make an unreasonable determination when it fails to consider facts 

not presented to it. Under § 2254(d), a habeas court’s review of an issue decided on the 

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merits “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim 

on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

Moreover, even if somehow Petitioner could now rely on his asserted facts despite 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and avoid the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) on new evidence, 

the only specific he asserts is that Miaso’s interrogation of him was not recorded. But, at 

trial, Miaso testified that she had a conversation with Petitioner that was not recorded. 

(Exh. Z, R.T. 1/23/12 at 21-22.) Petitioner fails to identify the nature of the falseness, 

how it was relevant to this case, or how pursuit of it would have altered the outcome at 

trial.

Whether reviewed under the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) or de novo, 

Petitioner’s Ground 5B is conclusory and without merit.

D. GROUND 5C – IAC TRIAL: FAILURE TO INTERVIEW WITNESSES

In Ground 5C, Petitioner argues that trial counsel “failed to...interview witnesses 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 16), and did not “conduct any interviews of state’s witnesses” (Pet. 

Exhibit D Doc. 1 at 133). 

Respondents again rely on the state court’s rejection of this claim, and the 

deferential standards of review in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and further argue that these claims 

are conclusory, and the record reflects that counsel had conducted pretrial work and 

interviews. (Supp. Ans, Doc. 20 at 7-11.) 

Petitioner does not explicitly reply in support of Ground 5C (interview), and instead 

skips to Ground 5D. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 21 at 9 and surrounding.) However, he does 

reply as part of his discussion on Ground 5B, asserting counsel “failed to interview 

witnesses stated in an email sent by prosecutor (Exhibit KK).” (Id. at 8.) And, he 

summarily asserts it shows ineffectiveness. (Id. at 16.)

The PCR court did not identify or address a claim of ineffective assistance based

on a failure to interview witnesses. (Exh. M, M.E. 5/16/16, at 6.) Accordingly, this habeas 

Court reviews the claim de novo. Johnson, 568 U.S. at 302-303.

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Even so, this claim is devoid of any specifics. It fails to identify what witnesses 

were not interviewed, nor how interviewing them would have altered the outcome of trial. 

At most, Petitioner now, for the first time in his Supplemental Reply, references emails 

between trial counsel and the prosecution about various witnesses and anticipated 

interviews. But he fails to identify which of those witnesses were not interviewed, or how 

that affected the trial. Moreover, as Respondents argue, “counsel need not interview every 

possible witness to have performed proficiently.” Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1318 

(9th Cir. 2003). 

It is well-settled that “[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a 

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 

(9th Cir.1994). 

Thus, this claim is without merit.

E. GROUND 5D – IAC APPEAL: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE RE SCHEME

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 5D, Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to raise an argument of insufficient evidence, as set forth in Ground 1 which relies on trial 

counsel’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the absence of evidence of fraudulent 

schemes and artifices. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 16 (Ground 5), and 6 (Ground 1).) 

Addressing this claim with Ground 5F, Respondents again rely on the state court’s 

rejection of this claim, and the deferential standards of review in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and 

further argue that any claim of insufficient evidence would have been without merit. 

(Supp. Ans, Doc. 20 at 11-14.) 

Petitioner replies by restating his claim. (Supp. Reply, Co. 21 at 9-10.) 

2. State Court Ruling

At trial, after the prosecution rested, counsel made an oral motion for judgment of 

acquittal under Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 20. 

As to Count 5 (identity theft), counsel argued that the statute required proof of theft 

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of a written document or electronic data file, and that credit cards are neither. (Exh. AA, 

R.T. 1/24/12 at 61-66.) As to Count 1 (fraudulent scheme), counsel argued that 

Petitioner’s abusing the trust of his victims to gain access to steal their credit cards did not 

amount to engaging in deceit to have property surrendered, and his only falsehood was his 

name on which no victim relied. (Id. at 66-72.) Although counsel had requested a 

judgment of acquittal on other counts, he conceded they were not expected to prevail.

Petitioner challenged appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness regarding insufficient 

evidence in his first PCR petition. The PCR court rejected Petitioner’s appellate IAC 

claims, reasoning: 

As to appellate counsel, Defendant claims that such counsel 

was deficient because she raised only a single claim on appeal 

(pertaining to the Court’s denial of Defendant’s Rule 20 motion 

regarding the fraudulent schemes and artifices charge). The Court 

finds that Defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is 

barred under State v. Herrera, 183 Ariz. 642, 905 P.2d 1377 (Ct. App. 

1995). As the court there held: 

Appellate counsel is not ineffective for selecting some 

issues and rejecting others. Once the issues have been 

narrowed and presented, appellate counsel’s waiver of other 

possible issues binds the defendant, and those waived issues 

cannot be resurrected in post-conviction proceedings. Alford, 

157 Ariz. at 102–03, 754 P.2d at 1377–78. ‘To consider 

[these] claims on their merits would be to afford the defendant 

a second appeal. Any defendant could present some claims on 

the appeal. Then, having lost his appeal, a defendant could 

argue ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, alleging 

counsel failed to raise other claims.’ Id. at 103, 754 P.2d at 

1378. 

Herrera, 183 Ariz. at 647, 905 P.2d at 1382. 

Even on the merits, Defendant fails to state a colorable claim 

for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, as he fails to identify

any other claims that should have been raised on appeal. Defendant 

attaches as an exhibit to his petition a June 24, 2013 letter from his 

appellate counsel regarding exhaustion of remedies, but fails to offer 

any explanation as to how the letter demonstrates ineffective 

assistance. Finally, Defendant fails to demonstrate “a reasonable 

probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome 

of the appeal would have been different.” Herrera, 183 Ariz. at 647, 

905 P.2d at 1382.

(Exh. M, M.E. 5/16/16 at 6.)

3. Application of Law

Petitioner fails to show any unreasonable determination of the facts or contrariness 

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to or unreasonable application of Supreme Court law in this determination. 

Appellate counsel raised this claim of insufficient evidence, and the Arizona Court 

of Appeals rejected it on the merits. (Exh. E, Mem. Dec. 4/23/13 at ¶ 11-15.) 

Moreover, Petitioner points to no deficiency in appellate counsel’s presentation of 

the claim. At most, in his Supplemental Reply, he seems to suggest for the first time that 

the claim should have been brought under federal law. But, as argued by Respondents, 

the insufficient evidence standard is essentially the same under federal law as it is under 

Arizona law. “‘Substantial evidence,’ Rule 20’s lynchpin phrase, ‘is such proof that 

‘reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. West, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191, ¶ 16 

(Ariz. 2011) (quoting State v. Mathers, 796 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. 1990)). Under federal 

law, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979). Petitioner points to no functional difference in those standards. The Arizona 

courts appear to have found none. See e.g. State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, 357, 174 P.3d 265, 

269 (2007) (relying on both the Arizona “substantial evidence” standard and the Jackson

standard to resolve Rule 20 motion); and State v. Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 407, 296 P.3d 54, 

70 (2013) (same). Thus, Petitioner proposes, and the undersigned discerns, no reason 

why the outcome would have been different had appellate counsel proceeded under federal 

law. 

This claim is without merit and must be denied. 

F. GROUND 5E – IAC APPEAL: INDICTMENT

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 5E, Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 

raise the claim in Ground 2 that the indictment was insufficient because: (1) it failed to 

allege the essential elements, i.e. the identity of all the victims; and (2) was duplicitous or 

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multiplicitous because it alleged multiple offenses in a single count. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

16 (Ground 5, and 7-9 (Ground 2).) 

Respondents argue this claim was raised in Petitioner’s Second PCR petition, and 

was rejected on state grounds as waived and alternatively on the merits (because the 

underlying challenge to the indictment was waived by failure to raise it at trial, and because 

there was no double jeopardy violation). Respondents again rely on the state court’s 

rejection of this claim, and the deferential standards of review in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and 

further argue that any challenged to the indictment would have been without merit. (Supp. 

Ans, Doc. 20 at 15-19.) 

Petitioner replies by summarily denying he had failed to present the claim, citing 

Exhibit J. He argues there was no waiver because at trial he filed a motion to amend the 

indictment (citing Exhibit GG). He argues the merits of his challenge to the indictment.

(Supp. Reply, Co. 21 at 10-13.) 

2. State Court Ruling

In disposing of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his second 

PCR petition, the PCR court ruled:

Moreover, to the extent that Defendant raised Rule 32.l(a) and 

Rule 32.l(c) claims in the previous Rule 32 proceeding, relief is 

precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). To the extent that 

Defendant is raising new Rule 32.l(a) and Rule 32.l(c) claims that 

could have been raised in the previous Rule 32 proceeding, relief is 

also precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); see also State v. 

Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 2, ,r 4, 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) ("Our basic rule 

is that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or 

could have been raised, in a Rule 32 postconviction relief proceeding, 

subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived 

and precluded") ( emphasis in original). Because Defendant could 

have raised his double jeopardy issue and any preserved objection 

concerning the indictment on appeal and failed to do so, relief is 

barred on those grounds as well. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3).

Nevertheless, Defendant claims that his Rule 32 attorney and 

appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and that 

he is entitled to relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.l(a). Petition Att., at 1. The Court disagrees...Defendant's claim of 

ineffective assistance from his appellate counsel also fails. This Court 

rejected that claim in its Order filed on May 16, 2016, and relief on 

that basis is precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). 

Even if Defendant's claims were not precluded, they would fail 

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on the merits. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that 

insufficiency of the indictment or information is an issue subject to 

waiver. See State v. Maldonado, 223 Ariz. 309, 311, 313, ¶¶ 22-25, 

223 P.3d 653, 655, 657 (2010); accord United States v. Cotton, 535 

U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (holding that "defects in an indictment do not 

deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case"). Any attack on the 

indictment after filing "is not based on the lack of the court's subject 

matter jurisdiction" but instead is "on the basis of its insufficiency or 

on a technical defect in its contents." State v. Buckley, 153 Ariz. 91, 

93, 734 P.2d 1047, 1049 (App. 1987). Properly characterized, a 

defect in the indictment is one that must be raised in a Rule 16 pretrial motion, not in post-conviction relief proceedings. See State v. 

Fullem, 185 Ariz. 134, 136, 912 P.2d 1363, 1365 (App. 1995) 

(finding that a defendant waived a challenge to an indictment by 

failing to object prior to trial); see generally Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.5(e) 

(defects in charging documents must be raised in accordance with 

Rule 16's pre-trial motion procedures).

(Exh. Q, M.E. 8/2/16 at 2-3.) 

3. Availability of Habeas Review

Respondents argue the state court applied a waiver bar under Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 

32.2(a)(3) to Ground 5E, and thus it is not subject to habeas review. (Supp. Ans. Doc. 20 

at 15 (citing Exhibit Q at 2). 

Revisiting Procedural Defense - Ordinarily, in light of the limited nature of the 

referral (to address the merits of Ground 5), the undersigned would by-step this defense 

and proceed to the merits. However, the defense resolved in Judge Bade’s Report & 

Recommendation (Doc. 15) and in Judge Campbell’s Order (Doc. 17) was “that the claims 

for relief in ground 5 are [not] procedurally defaulted.” (Order 6/3/19, Doc. 17 at 7) That 

determination was based on the Court’s rejection of the finding that Petitioner failed to 

seek review in his first PCR proceeding. The argument now it that they were procedurally 

barred in the second PCR proceeding. 

Moreover, it was made without the benefit of the Court having construed the nature 

of the appellate counsel claims in Ground 5 with any particularity. (See Service Order 

5/25/18, Doc. 4 at 2 (“the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel”); R&R 

4/1/19, Doc. 15 at 4 (“trial and appellate counsel were ineffective”); id. at 16 (describing 

appellate counsel claim as “fail[ing] to raise all issues in direct appeal”; Order on R&R 

6/3/19, Doc. 17 at 6 (“ineffective trial and appellate counsel”).) 

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Here, in contrast, the parties have had the benefit of the construction of Ground 5 

in the order for supplemental briefing (Doc. 19), and in particular the identification of 

specific claims found to be referenced by Petitioner’s assertions of “all issues in direct 

appeal.” With the benefit of that construction, Respondents now assert (not procedural 

default in the first PCR proceeding) an application of an independent and adequate state 

procedural bar in the second PCR proceeding.

Procedural Bar Prevents Review - Related to the concept of procedural default is 

the principle of barring claims actually disposed of by the state courts on state 

grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be 

unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] declined to address a prisoner's federal claims 

because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state 

judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 

562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011).

a. Procedural Bar of Ground 5E(2) (Double Jeopardy)

Only Ground 5E(2) Subject to Procedural Bar - In his Second PCR Petition, 

Petitioner asserted that appellate counsel (as well as trial and PCR counsel) were 

ineffective in failing to raise the substantive claims raised in that petition. (Exh. P, PCR 

Pet., Memo. at 6 (Doc. 13-1 at 211).) However, the only substantive claims raised in that 

petition were: (a) double jeopardy claims based on multiplicity (id. at 1-3) and duplicity 

(id. at 3); and (b) sentencing error (id. at 3-6). Thus, Petitioner did not present his claim 

in Ground 5E(1) (appellate ineffectiveness based on defect), only that presented in his 

claim on Ground 5E(2) (appellate ineffectiveness based on double jeopardy). Thus, only 

Ground 5E(2) (and not Ground 5E(1)) could have been procedurally barred in that 

proceeding.

In addressing this Petition, the PCR Court disposed of the substantive claims on 

waiver grounds (Exh. Q, M.E. 8/2/16 at 2), and on the merits (id. at 2-3). However, the 

court concluded that his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was “precluded,” 

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citing Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 32.2(a)(2) because “[t]his Court rejected that claim 

in its Order filed on May 16, 2016.” (Id. at 2.) 

Adjudicated Bar (not Waiver Bar) Applied – Respondents argue that the PCR 

court found the claims in Ground 5E waived by failure to raise it in an earlier proceeding 

under Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Supp. Ans. Doc. 20 at 15.) The PCR court did not refer to a 

waiver, or Rule 32.2(a)(3). Instead the PCR court explicitly cited to “Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(2)” and asserted that the claim was “precluded”4 because “that claim” had been 

decided in the earlier proceeding. (Exh. Q, M.E. 8/2/16 at 2.) 

The Arizona rule provided at that time: 

(a) Preclusion. A defendant is precluded from relief under Rule 

32.1(a) based on any ground: 

(1) still raisable [sic] on direct appeal under Rule 31 or in a 

post-trial motion under Rule 24; 

(2) finally adjudicated on the merits in an appeal or in any 

previous collateral proceeding; or 

(3) waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding. 

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32.2.

While Petitioner had raised claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel in his

first PCR proceeding, he had not asserted ineffectiveness based on appellate counsel’s 

failure to pursue double jeopardy challenges to the indictment. 

Under Arizona law, claims of ineffective assistance are considered fungible for 

purposes of preclusion under Arizona’s waiver rule, Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3).

5

 “Our 

4 This Court and others have often referred to Rule 32.2(a)(2) as a rule of “preclusion,” 

and Rule 32.2(a)(3) as a rule of “waiver.” However, the Rule identifies all three of the 

circumstances ((a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)) as “preclude[ing] from relief” and captions the 

entire portion of the Rule as “(a) Preclusion.” 

5 This is far different from the standard applied by federal habeas courts in resolving 

whether a petitioner has fairly presented a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the 

state courts. See Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982)

(presentation of “additional facts of attorney incompetence” transformed claim into one 

not presented to state court); and Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992)

(rejecting argument that presentation of any claim of ineffectiveness results in fair 

presentation of all claims of ineffective assistance).

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basic rule is that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have 

been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of 

ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.” State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 

1, 2, 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) (Az. Sup. Ct., en banc) (emphasis added). 

With some petitions, the trial court need not examine the facts. For 

example, if a petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of counsel at 

sentencing, and, in a later petition, asserts ineffective assistance of 

counsel at trial, preclusion is required without examining facts. The 

ground of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised 

repeatedly. There is a strong policy against piecemeal litigation.

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, 46 P.3d 1067, 1071 (2002) (discussing standard to 

be used when applying waiver under Rule 32.2(a)(3)). 

Here, however, the PCR court did not find this claim “waived” under Rule 

32.2(a)(3). The PCR court’s reference to Rule 32.2(a)(2) might be deemed a 

typographical error, intended to be 32.2(a)(3). But the PCR court did not simply reference 

the “adjudicated” rule in 32.2(a)(2), but explicitly stated “this Court rejected that claim in 

its Order filed on May 16, 2016.” (In so doing, the PCR court applied a rule not recognized 

by the holdings of Spreitz and Smith, i.e. that a ruling on any ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim is a ruling on all ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and found the 

claims all previously denied.) 

“A claim that has been found to be ‘precluded’ under subsection (a)(2) appears to 

be a classic exhausted claim and may therefore be subject to consideration in federal 

habeas.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1999). “Preclusion does not 

provide a basis for federal courts to apply a procedural bar.” Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 

1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (utilizing the terminology of “preclusion and waiver”). Thus, 

habeas review of Ground 5E(2) is not barred by application of Rule 32.2(a)(2).

Procedural Bar Based on Waiver at Trial – It is true the PCR court alternatively 

found that the claim was waived by failure to challenge the indictment at trial. Applicaitn 

of this procedural rule would normally preclude habeas review. But in the face of the 

state court’s binding holding that the claim had been denied on the merits in the first PCR 

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proceeding (which resulted in exhaustion), the application of a procedural bar when the 

claim is (purportedly) raised again does not defeat the earlier exhaustion. See Greene v. 

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (“exhaustion does not require repeated 

assertions if a federal claim is actually considered at least once on the merits by the highest 

state court”).

Accordingly, this Court must address the merits of Ground 5E2. 

b. Procedural Default of Ground 5E(1) (Defective Indictment)

Petitioner has never presented his claim in Ground 5E(1) to the state courts. His 

presentation of other claims of appellate counsel is not fair presentation of this claim. See 

Pappageorge, 688 F.2d at 1295; and Carriger, 971 F.2d at 333-34. Thus, Petitioner has 

not properly exhausted his state remedies on this claim. 

Applying the waiver portion of Rule 32.2(a)(3), such claim is now procedurally 

defaulted. Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply shows 

"that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral 

proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 1069 

(2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in prior 

PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel). 

For others of “sufficient constitutional magnitude,” the State “must show that the 

defendant personally, “'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground 

or denial of a right.” Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, ¶ 8, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002). 

That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a 

defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 

2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme 

Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, 

and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as 

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among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 

1071. Claims based upon ineffective assistance of counsel are determined by looking at 

“the nature of the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id. 

Here, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance does not have at its core the kind 

of claim requiring a personal waiver.

It is also true that Rule 32.2 also does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the 

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(b). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his 

claims. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply. Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired 

sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona prisoner who is simply attacking the 

validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a claim is based on "newly discovered 

evidence" that has previously been presented to the state courts, the evidence is no longer 

"newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application. Here, Petitioner’s claim may be 

based on newly discovered legal theories, but not newly discovered evidence. Paragraph 

(f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction 

relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in the 

law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual 

innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts in this 

proceeding.

Petitioner has not asserted any cause or his actual innocence to excuse his 

procedural defaults. (See R&R 4/1/19, Doc. 15 at 17-18.)6 

Accordingly, Ground 5E(1) must be dismissed with prejudice. Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

6 Although Respondents have argued this claim was procedurally barred rather than 

procedurally defaulted, a habeas court may raise procedural default sua sponte so long as 

the parties have been afforded an opportunity to address the issues. Boyd v. Thompson, 

147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the parties have had, both in the original 

Answer and Reply and in the supplemental briefs, an opportunity to address the procedural 

posture of Petitioner’s claims. There appears no reason to believe that the shift by this 

R&R from Respondents’ asserted procedural bar to a procedural default requires 

additional briefing for a fair adjudication of the defense. 

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4. Merits of Ground 5E(2)

Ground 5E(2) argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a 

claim that the indictment violated double jeopardy because it was duplicitous and 

multiplicitous. Because the undersigned find that the claim is without merit even under 

de novo review, the undersigned does not address whether the 2nd PCR court’s designation 

of this claim as denied amounts to a decision on the merits subject to deferential review 

under § 2254(d). 

“An indictment is duplicitous where a single count joins two or more distinct and 

separate offenses.” U.S. v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2005). “An indictment is 

multiplicitous if it charges a single offense in more than one count.” United States v. 

Awad, 551 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, however, the Petition offers no facts to support the contentions that the 

indictment was duplicitous or multiplicitous. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9; Supp. Reply, Doc. 21 

at 10-13.) Instead, he only argues facts to support his contention in Ground 5E(1) that the 

indictment was defective for failing to list the names of all victims. (Id.) 

On this basis alone, Petitioner’s claim in Ground 5E(2) should be denied as

conclusory and thus without merit.

In his second PCR petition, Petitioner argued:

Knowingly controlled the credit card is charged in Counts: 3, 

4, 6, 7 & 8. All five (5) charges theft of credit card are multiplicitous 

because none of them contain proof that the others do not. 

Now Count One & Five were run concurrently. Count 2 was 

dismissed with prejudice. Counts 3, 4, 6, 7, & 8 were run concurrent 

with Counts One & Five. And multiplicity and duplicity. As well as 

double jeopardy. 

(Exh. P, PCR Pet, Mem. at 3.) Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner intended to rely 

on the same factual allegations in this habeas proceeding, his claim must be denied for the 

reasons discussed hereinafter.

State Court Decision- Respondents point to the PCR court’s rejection of the 

underlying double jeopardy claims to assert reliance on the deferential review under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Supp. Ans. Doc. 20 at 15-16.) The PCR court opined:

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Equally unpersuasive is Defendant's claim that his consecutive 

sentences for credit card theft/obtaining a credit card by fraudulent 

means violated his rights against double jeopardy. Defendant was 

charged with defrauding six different victims in separate incidents. 

The State charged Defendant with three distinct types of offenses. 

Contrary to Defendant's argument, he was not convicted for the same 

crime twice. Because Defendant premised his ineffective assistance 

claims on a flawed understanding of double jeopardy, the ineffective 

assistance claims also fail on the merits.

(Exh. Q, M.E. 8/2/16 at 3.) Petitioner proffers no unreasonable determination of the facts 

in this decision. Nor does he offer anything to show that it was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Standard for Appellate Effectiveness – “[A]ppellate counsel who files a merits 

brief need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from 

among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.” Smith v. Robbins, 

528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000). "In many instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue 

because she foresees little or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding 

out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate 

advocacy." Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, appellate 

counsel performs deficiently if unpresented claims were “clearly stronger than issues that 

counsel did present.” Smith, 528 U.S. at 288. 

Here, the PCR court rejected Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim because it had found 

that the double jeopardy claims were without merit. “The failure to raise a meritless legal 

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States,

692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Thus, Petitioner fails to show that this ineffectiveness part of the PCR court’s 

decision was erroneous.

Double Jeopardy – Petitioner further fails to show that the PCR court’s rejection 

of the underlying double jeopardy claim was erroneous. To the extent that the PCR court’s 

analysis may have been based on a state law double jeopardy claim, this habeas court is 

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not free to reconsider it. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000).7 

To the extent that it was based on a federal double jeopardy claim, Petitioner shows 

no error. 

Plaintiff fails to show multiplicity. “The test for multiplicity is whether each count 

‘requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.’” United States v. Garlick, 

240 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 

304 (1932)). As noted by the PCR court, each count required different facts. Count 1 

charged a “scheme or artifice to defraud.” Counts 2 through 4 and 6 through 8 all charged 

theft (“without consent...knowingly controlled) of credit cards but each one related to 

separate victims (2-Destefino; 3-Cordova; 4-Striplin; 6-Rzepecki; 7-Mortensen; 8-

Fletcher). Count 5 charged an ongoing scheme of misusing personal identifying 

information. (See Exh. A, Indictment.) Thus, each count required proof of at least one 

fact not required in the others. The fact that they may have arisen out of the same incidents 

or series of incidents is not controlling. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304

(1932). Thus Petitioner has failed to show any multiplicity.

Nor has Petitioner shown any duplicity. It is true that Counts 1 and 5 charged a 

series of crimes. “However, an indictment charging multiple acts in the same count, each 

of which could be charged as a separate offense, may not be duplicitous where these acts 

comprise a continuing course of conduct that constitutes a single offense.” United States 

v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 421 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, Petitioner was only convicted of 

a single violation of the fraudulent schemes and artifices statute (Count 1) and a single 

violation of the identity theft statute (Count 5). Thus, Petitioner has failed to show any 

duplicity.

Thus, Petitioner fails to show that the PCR court’s rejection of the underlying 

7 There are exceptions to this general rule, but none applicable here. See e.g. Peltier v. 

Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1994) (exception where interpretation is an obvious 

subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue); and Goldyn v. Hayes, 444 F.3d 1062 

(9th Cir. 2006) (although state court was final arbiter of elements of crime, it could not 

“define an element out of existence, or to ignore the element entirely when upholding a 

criminal conviction”).

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double jeopardy claim was erroneous. 

5. Summary re Ground 5E

Ground 5E(1) is procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed with prejudice. 

Ground 5E(2) was not procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state 

ground. Nonetheless, Petitioner fails to show error in the rejection of his double jeopardy 

claims (state or federal), and thus any such claim by appellate counsel would have been 

futile. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show error in rejecting his ineffectiveness claim, 

and Ground 5E(2) must be denied on the merits.

G. GROUND 5F – IAC APPEAL: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE RE VICTIMS

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 5F, Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 

present his claim in Ground 3 that he was denied due process when he was convicted with 

insufficient proof on Grounds 1, 2 and 8. Petitioner acknowledges that Ground 2 was 

dismissed after a mistrial, but argues that the same victim was named in the fraudulent 

schemes charge in Ground 1, which he casts as a lesser included offense. He argues that 

male victims R.P. and J.C. denied knowing Petitioner, and the prosecution’s evidence 

pointed to a scheme to befriend women to steal their credit cards. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 16 

(Ground 5), and 10-12 (Ground 3).) 

Addressing this claim with Ground 5F, Respondents again rely on the state court’s 

rejection of the Rule 20 claim, and the deferential standards of review in 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d), and further argue that any claim of insufficient evidence would have been without 

merit. (Supp. Ans, Doc. 20 at 11-14.) 

Petitioner replies by arguing the merits of his claim. (Reply, Doc. 21 at 13-14.)

2. No Merits Decision

Contrary to Respondents contention, there is no merits decision on the claim in 

Ground 5F. Although Petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

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regarding the Rule 20 motion for judgment of acquittal founded on absence of a fraudulent 

scheme (as discussed hereinabove regarding Ground 5D and the related Ground 1), 

Petitioner did not argue that appellate counsel should have argued insufficient evidence on 

the bases he asserts in Ground 3. 

Insufficient evidence claims (and motions for judgment of acquittal) are not 

fungible, but are different claims based on the elements on which the deficiency is 

asserted. And the differences between the claim in Ground 1 (which was presented) and 

Ground 3 which underlies Ground 5F are very different claims, with different elements 

asserted to have not been proven, different purported evidentiary deficiencies, and 

different counts of the indictment being challenged.

Moreover, in assessing the effectiveness of appellate counsel, the relative strength 

of the specific claim foregone is a key consideration. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 

288 (2000). Thus, a failure to present one insufficient evidence claim may not be defective 

performance or prejudicial, but the failure to present another may be both. 

Accordingly, despite having addressed a similar claim, the PCR court cannot be 

said to have rejected on the merits the claim asserted in Ground 5F.

3. Procedurally Defaulted 

On the other hand, because of the differences between the claims in Grounds 1 and 

3, the presentation of the appellate ineffectiveness claim based on the former is not fair 

presentation of the latter. See Pappageorge, 688 F.2d at 1295 (9th Cir. 1982); and 

Carriger, 971 F.2d at 333-34. As with Ground 5E, this unpresented claim is procedurally 

defaulted under Arizona’s waiver rule, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32.2(a)(3), the insufficient evidence 

claim does not require a personal waiver, no exception to the waiver rule would apply to 

this claim of ineffectiveness, and Petitioner has offered nothing to show cause and 

prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his procedural default. 

For the reasons expressed with regard to Ground 5E, e.g. prior extensive briefing 

on procedural default, the undersigned finds no prejudice to Petitioner in addressing the 

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procedural default of this particular claim sua sponte without prior notice. 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Ground 5F is procedurally defaulted 

and must be dismissed with prejudice. 

H. GROUND 5G – IAC APPEAL: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 5G, Petitioner argues counsel was ineffective in failing to present the 

claim raised in Ground 4, which asserts that Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona 

Supreme Court failed to properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction under Petitioner’s 

Petition for Special Action. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 16 (Ground 5), and 13-15 (Ground 4).) 

Respondents argue that this claim is unexhausted but should be denied on the merits 

because the special action proceeding was filed by Petitioner long after his direct appeal 

was concluded, and appellate counsels’ obligations had expired. (Supp. Resp., Doc. 20 at 

20-21.) 

Petitioner does not reply on Ground 5G, other than summarily asserting it shows 

ineffectiveness. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 21 at 16.)

2. Lack of Exhaustion

Although Respondents do not flesh out their argument that Petitioner’s state 

remedies on this claim (and Ground 5H) are unexhausted, the undersigned assumes 

arguendo they are unexhausted. 

Nonetheless, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) provides: "An application for a writ of habeas 

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust 

the remedies available in the courts of the State." However, the discretion to deny on the 

merits only applies in limited circumstances where the petitioner has no hope of prevailing 

on the merits of his claims. "[A] federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the 

merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable 

federal claim." Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-624 (9th Cir. 2005). 

For the reasons discussed hereinafter, the undersigned concludes that the claims in 

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Grounds 5G and 5H are not colorable.

3. No Merits

Ms. Droban represented Petitioner on direct appeal. Petitioner’s direct appeal was 

terminated on October 18, 2013, when the mandate was issued. (Exh. V, Appeal Docket 

at item 43.) His special action petition (Pet. Exh. B.) was not filed with the trial court 

until May, 2017, over three and one half years later. 

Even if Ms. Droban had some remaining professional obligation to Petitioner at the 

time (e.g. because she had been appointed or retained to represent Petitioner in such 

proceeding), there was no federal constitutional right to counsel (effective or otherwise) 

in such proceeding. Smith v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 356–57 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is wellestablished that criminal defendants have no constitutional right to counsel beyond their 

first appeal as of right”). 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to show what it was unreasonable for Ms. Droban to fail 

to anticipate a claim based on a 2017 proceeding, when representing Petitioner in an appeal 

proceeding that terminated in 2013.

Accordingly, Ground 5G is without merit.

I. GROUND 5H – IAC APPEAL: JUROR BIAS

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 5H, Petitioner argues appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 

assert a ground for appeal based on the claim in Ground 6 that juror 15 was biased because 

Juror 15 was in a pottery class with the trial judge. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 16 (Ground 5), and 

17 (Ground 3).) 

Respondents argue that this claim is unexhausted but should be denied on the merits 

because the underlying claim is without merit. Respondents argue the connection was 

disclosed and the mere fact that the judge and juror had been in an art class together did 

not create a presumption of bias, and the juror was questioned about it and indicated no 

bias. Respondents argue that, accordingly, appellate counsel was not ineffective in raising 

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this claim. (Supp. Resp., Doc. 20 at 20-21.) 

Petitioner replies generally that the claim had merit, was stronger than the claims 

presented on appeal, and thus counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it. (Supp. Reply, 

Doc. 21 at 15-17.) 

2. Factual Background

During voir dire, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: ...No. 15. 

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I was a housing supervisor for 

the City of Phoenix in public housing and various accounts. I 

had to testify on evictions, so ... 

THE COURT: Okay. Juror No. 15. Do you and I take a 

ceramics class at the Phoenix Art Center together? 

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: You look very familiar, yes. I 

was -- the robe threw me off, but I was going to - -

THE COURT: It throws a lot of people off, you seeing me 

outside of the court. Well, let me ask you. You and I don't know

each other well, but we have interacted? 

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, we have. 

THE COURT: Do you think that might impact in any way 

your ability to be fair in this case? 

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No. 

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

(Exh. X, R.T. 1/18/12 at 66.) Before opening instructions or statements, the following 

exchange occurred:

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I should have told you this before we 

brought in the jury. No. 15 and I are in a pottery class together that 

was disclosed.

I just wanted to let you know we saw each other Saturday, 

exchanged good mornings, did not discuss the case, of course. But I 

wanted to let you both know that has happened. 

MR. MERCER: That's fine. 

THE COURT: It is okay. 

MR. MERCER: The stipulation I discussed that with Mr. 

Lockhardt [sic] to call to see if he had any issue. But I have no reason 

to doubt that this is exactly what it says it is. 

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 

(Exh. Z, R.T. 1/23/12 at 4-5.)

3. Application of Law

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a verdict by an impartial 

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jury. Both actual and implied bias may be grounds for reversal, since '[t]he bias or 

prejudice of even a single juror is enough to violate' the Sixth Amendment guarantee." 

United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations 

omitted). Bias is analyzed under two theories: actual bias and implied bias. Fields v. 

Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir.), amended, 315 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002)

With regard, to actual bias, “[w]hether a jury was biased is a question of fact. The 

trial court’s finding on this question is entitled to a presumption of correctness.” Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). “A defendant who asserts that a juror was 

actually biased against him bears the burden of demonstrating both the bias itself, and the 

court’s erroneous refusal to strike the juror on the basis of that bias.” Martinez-Martinez, 

369 F.3d at 1081.

The Supreme Court has explained that

to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first 

demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material 

question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct 

response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 

cause. The motives for concealing information may vary, but 

only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be 

said to affect the fairness of a trial.

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 

556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (McDonough ). This 

standard applies in civil and criminal cases. See id.; United States v. 

Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc).

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1990).

Petitioner offers nothing to show a dishonest answer by Juror 15. Nor has he shown 

any actual bias from the answers given, i.e. “the existence of a state of mind that leads to 

an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” United States v. 

Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 

38, 43 (2nd Cir.1997)). 

With regard to implied bias, it is only those situations where “an average person in 

the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.” Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112. 

“Bias may be implied only in exceptional circumstances. We have been willing to presume 

bias in extreme situations where the prospective juror's lies give rise to an inference of 

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implied bias, and from the potential for substantial emotional involvement, adversely 

affecting impartiality, inherent in certain relationships.” Fields, 309 F.3d at 1104

(quotations and citations omitted). 

Here again, Petitioner fails to show any dishonesty by Juror 15, and proffers no 

reason to find substantial emotional involvement or any other reason to presume prejudice 

from the mere fact of being classmates with the judge in a pottery class. There is no 

indication of any peculiar affinity between the juror or the judge, or reason to believe that 

such affinity would have biased the decision the juror made on the verdict. The judge, 

unlike a litigant or their counsel, does not come into the courtroom clothed with a 

preference for a particular verdict. 

Ground 5H is without merit and must be denied. 

J. SUMMARY

Grounds 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E(2), 5G, and 5H are without merit and must be denied. 

Grounds 5E(1) and 5F are procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that 

in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention 

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in 

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a 

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

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(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 

or wrong. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as 

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds 5E(1) and 5F of 

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), including Grounds 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E(2), 5G, and 

5H, be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

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and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: March 16, 2020

18-0515r RR 20 02 27 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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