Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02767/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02767-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

HOMER W. DOUGHTY, . ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

FILED 

United Stat.es Court of Appeals 

'r"nth Circuit ~ 

FEB081988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) No. 85-2767 

) 

OTIS R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary ) 

of Health and Human Services, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 83-1407 

Johns. Koppel, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, Department of Justice (Richard K. Willard, Assistant Attorney General, 

and William Kanter, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, 

Department of Justice; and Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., United States 

Attorney for the District of Kansas, with him on the briefs), 

Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellant. 

Dennis L. Phelps, Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BOHANON, District 

Judge*. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

*Honorable Luther L. Bohanon, United States Senior District Judge 

for the Districts of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 85-2767 Document: 010110017260 Date Filed: 02/08/1988 Page: 1 
The question presented on appeal is whether a district court 

may order interim benefit payments to a claimant pending his appeal from an initial denial of disability benefits under Title II 

of the Social Security Act. 

On November 18, 1981, plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. 

The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff suffered 

only exertional limitations and, after applying the grid regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (1982), denied plaintiff 

any benefits. Plaintiff exhausted his administrative appeals and 

on April 29, 1983, filed an action with the district court seeking 

review of the Secretary of Health and Human Service's (the Secretary's) denial of benefits. On October 5, 1984, the district 

court concluded that "there was substantial evidence of several 

non-exertional limitations" and reversed the Secretary's decision, 

remanding the case for further proceedings. Record, vol. 1, doc. 

19, at 3. 

The Secretary remanded the case to the ALJ and requested a 

new recommendation based on additional medical records and the 

testimony of vocational experts. In a revised recommendation 

dated June 25, 1985, the ALJ found the plaintiff to be disabled. 

However, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff became disabled in 

July 1983 when he turned fifty and not in July 1981 as plaintiff 

claimed. Plaintiff contested this recommendation before the 

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Appeals Council, claiming that the ALJ had applied the grid regulations too rigidly. The Appeals Council agreed with plaintiff, 

and on August 29, 1985, remanded the case to the ALJ with directions to apply the grid regulations less stringently and to hear 

testimony from a vocational expert. 

On September 16, 1985, plaintiff moved the district court to 

(1) direct the Secietary to comply with the court's remand order 

and (2) impose sanctions on the Secretary for creating unnecessary 

delays. The district court found that "the case was still pending 

before the ALJ [and that there was] no final determination of the 

Secretary ••• to review." Record, vol. 1, doc. 23, at 2. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that it was authorized to 

order the Secretary to pay interim benefits until there was a 

final judicial resolution. The court ordered not only prospective 

interim payments but also retroactive interim payments from the 

date of plaintiff's application for benefits, November 18, 1981. 

The Secretary objected to the order to pay interim benefits 

and filed a m6tion on November 19, 1985, to vacate the court's 

ruling, under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

On November 21, 1985, the Secretary appealed the interim payment 

order to this court. The Rule 60(b) motion is still pending in 

district court: and while the Secretary has made prospective 

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interim payments, he has not made retroactive payments. All 

administrative proceedings have been stayed pending resolution of 

this appeal. 

I • 

We first consider whether this court has jurisdiction to hear 

an appeal from a district court order to remand for further proceedings and to pay interim benefits. "This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of the district court." 

Blondin v. Winner, 822 F.2d 969, 973 (10th Cir. 1987); see 28 

u.s.c. § 1291 (1982). A final decision of the district court is 

an order that "end[s) the litigation and leave[s] nothing to be 

done except execute the judgment." First Bank v. Albuquerque 

Nat'l Bank (In Re Glover, Inc.), 697 F.2d 907, 909 (10th Cir. 

1983) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). 

Generally, an order remanding a case to the Secretary for 

further proceedings does not end the litigation. Rather, it is a 

non-final, collateral order and therefore is not appealable under 

28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1982). Beach v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1399, 1401 (8th 

Cir. 1986); Huie v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 699, 701 (11th Cir. 1986); 

Memorial Hospital System v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 1043, 1044 (5th Cir. 

1985); Biddle v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1983). However, a remand order is appealable if it comes within an exception 

to the final-order rule. The Supreme Court established the 

exception in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 

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541, 545-47 (1949); and in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 

463, 468-69 ·(1978), the·Court explained that the Cohen exception 

applies to non-final collateral orders that (1) "conclusively 

determine a disputed question,'' (2) "resolve an important issue 

completely separate from the merits of the action," and (3) are 

"effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment." 

Recently, in Huie v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 698, 701-02 (11th Cir. 

1986), the Eleventh Circuit examined whether a remand order to the 

Secretary to pay interim benefits satisfies the Cohen requirements. The court found that all three elements of Cohen were satisfied: ( 1) "whether a court may order the Secretary to pay retroactive benefits prior to the determination of whether the claimants were improperly taken off the rolls is separable from the 

issue of whether the claimants have experienced a medical improvement''; (2) the case involves unsettled and "significant interests 

of the Secretary in protecting the public fisc" and important 

interests of the claimant in protecting his "financial well-being 

and, perhaps, survival''; and (3) "a review at a later time [would] 

be meaningless" if the parties had to wait. Huie, 788 F.2d at 

703. 

We note that Huie substantively differs from the present matter in that the Huie remand order ensues from the termination of 

benefits rather than from the initial denial of benefits. Despite 

this distinction, remand orders ensuing from the termination of 

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benefits and from the initial denial of benefits are proceduraliy 

similar since they both address the appealability of a remand 

order to the Secretary. The rationale underlying the application 

of the Cohen doctrine in Huie is applicable to the present case, 

and we find that the Cohen elements are established in the present 

case. First, whether the district court may order the Secretary 

to pay interim benefits prior to a final determination that the 

plaintiff is entitled to such benefits is a completely separate 

issue from whether the plaintiff is disabled. Second, the present 

matter involves important, unsettled interests in protecting the 

public fisc and the plaintiff's financial well-being. Third, 

review at a later time will not be effective. If the plaintiff is 

found to be disabled and is awarded benefits on remand to the Secretary, the Secretary will not subsequently address the interim 

payments issue. If the plaintiff is not found to be disabled, the 

Secretary will be unable to present the interim payment issue 

unless the plaintiff opts to appeal the new determination. See 

generally Huie, 788 F.2d at 703. 

We conclude that a remand order to pay interim benefits satisfies the Cohen doctrine and thus gives this court jurisdiction 

to hear the merits.* 

* We note that this court has previously assumed jurisdiction, 

without explanation, to hear a remand order to pay interim 

benefits pending a review of the termination of benefits. White 

v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1985). 

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II. 

Although a remand order to pay interim benefits in a case 

involving the termination of benefits and a remand order from the 

initial denial of benefits both satisfy the Cohen elements for 

appealability, the propriety of awarding interim benefits in these 

two types of cases is substantively distinct. In a termination 

case, the individual, at one time, necessarily received a final 

judgment pursuant to 42 u.s.c. 405(i) (1982) certifying his right 

to payment of benefits. In an initial denial case, the individual 

has never obtained a final judgment finding him disabled and 

entitled to benefits. 

Section 2(e) of the Social Security Disability Benefits 

Reform Act of 1984 and 42 u.s.c. § 423(9) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) 

expressly authorize an individual to elect to receive interim benefits pending the remand and resolution of whether benefits should 

have been terminated. This court has determined that these legislative directives allow a district court remedial power to direct 

payment of interim benefits during the remand of a termination 

case even if the individual has not elected to receive the 

benefits. White v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 994, 996-97 (10th Cir. 

1985); see also Huie, 788 F.2d at 704. However, whether a district court has sufficiently broad remedial powers under the legislative directives to direct payments of interim benefits when 

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the individual has never been certified disabled and entitled to 

benefits is a question of first impression for this court. 

At least two circuit decisions, Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19 

(2d Cir. 1982), vacated, 467 U.S. 104 (1984), and Taylor v. 

Heckler, 769 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1985), have considered whether a 

district court may award interim benefits to a person initially 

denied disabiiity benefits who is awaiting resolution of his claim 

on remand. In Day v. Schweiker, the Second Circuit affirmed a 

district court order that established reconsideration deadlines 

for the Secretary and that allowed interim benefits to claimants 

if the deadlines were not met. The order required a state agency 

to issue a reconsideration within ninety days of a claimant's 

request and the ALJ to provide evidentiary hearings within ninety 

days of a request. The Second Circuit determined that the district court had remedial power to order interim benefits to claimants who did not receive a reconsideration or a hearing within the 

mandatory deadlines. 

The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's mandatory 

deadline holding in Day v. Schweiker. See Heckler v. Day, 467 

U.S. 104 (1984). The Court noted "that Congress repeatedly has 

been made aware of the long delays associated with resolution of 

disputed disability claims and repeatedly has considered and 

expressly rejected suggestions that mandatory deadlines be imposed 

to cure that problem." Id. at 111. The Court then concluded that 

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"[i]n light of the unmistakable intention of Congress, it would be 

an unwarranted judicial intrusion into this pervasively regulated 

area for federal courts to issue injunctions imposing deadlines 

with respect to future disability claims." Id. at 119. Because 

the Supreme Court reversed on the mandatory deadline issue, the 

Court did not address the propriety of the interim payment order. 

The Fourth Circuit reached the interim payment issue the following year in Taylor v. Heckler, noting that Congress had specifically provided for interim benefits in termination cases but 

not in cases involving the initial denial of benefits. Taylor v. 

Heckler, 769 F.2d at 202; see 42 u.s.c. § 423(g) (1982 & Supp. III 

1985). Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. Day, 

and likening interim benefits to mandatory deadlines, the Fourth 

Circuit held that the district court could not use its remedial 

powers to order interim benefits when Congress had not so provided, in an area regulated so pervasively by Congress. 

We are convinced that the Fourth Circuit's rationale is correct. If a district court were allowed to order the payment of 

interim benefits in the initial denial of benefits cases, it would 

be doing something Congress has considered and has not provided 

for. Moreover, if a district court were allowed to order such 

payments, it would be establishing, if only indirectly, a deadline 

for reconsiderations. Although such payment orders would not 

impose an express deadline, they would generate behavior and 

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agency review that would run contrary to Congress' desire to allow 

. the Secretary broad authority to "ensure quality decisions in the 

face of heavy and escalating workloads and limited agency 

resources." Day v. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 112. 

In light of congressional intent and the authorities set 

forth above, we conclude that the district court cannot use its 

remedial power to order interim disability payments for a person 

initially denied benefits. 

REVERSED. 

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