Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01380/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01380-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 Local Rule 270(f)(1) (“Participation of a Principal) provides that “counsel shall be

accompanied in person by a person capable of disposition, or shall be fully authorized to settle

the matter at the settlement conference on any terms. When settlement must be approved by a

vote of a party’s governing body, unless specifically permitted otherwise by the Judge or

Magistrate Judge conducting the settlement conference, counsel shall be designated or shall be

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RYAN A. BARNES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-1380 GGH P

vs.

COUNTY OF SUTTER, et. al., 

Defendants. ORDER

 /

This case was before the court for a settlement conference on April 15, 2010. As recited

in the Court’s Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) filed on that same date, defense counsel appeared

for the conference without authority to enter into a monetary settlement, of any amount, and

without the individually named defendants. The court ordered the defendants to show cause why

they should not bear the expense of plaintiff’s counsel’s preparation for, travel to, and attendance

at the futile conference. See Local Rule 270(f)(1).1

 Defendants’ response to the OSC asserts

Case 2:07-cv-01380-GGH Document 160 Filed 06/22/10 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

accompanied in person by a representative designated by the body who shall have learned the

body’s preconference disposition relative to settlement.”

2

that they did not violate Local Rule 270 because the appearance at the settlement conference was

mandatory and because they included in their settlement statement the fact that the defendants

had no authority to settle for any amount.

Defendants’ characterization of the settlement conference as “mandatory” is simply

mistaken. This district does not have mandatory settlement conferences. Rather, Local Rule

270(a), which governs settlement conferences in this district, provides that settlement

conferences shall be held unless otherwise ordered on objection of a party or for good cause. 

Accordingly, had counsel for plaintiff been informed that the defendants had already determined

that no monetary settlement authority, of any amount, would be approved by the defendants,

plaintiff’s counsel would have had the opportunity to object to preparing for and traveling to

Sacramento to attend a conference that offered no meaningful opportunity to settle the case.

Defendants’ response to the OSC seems to suggest that it was the responsibility of the

court, not counsel, to assure that opposing counsel was informed that the defendants no longer

wished to enter meaningful settlement negotiations. Defendants stated the following on the last

page of their ten-page confidential settlement statement under the “conclusion” heading: “Prior

to the Pretrial Conference, representatives from the County of Sutter authorized the participation

in the court’s Settlement process. Subsequently, the Sutter County Board of Supervisors

unfortunately did not authorize payment of any monetary amounts for settlement out of concern

for potential precedent and potential public reaction.” Defendants argue that because they

included this language, they should not have to reimburse plaintiff’s counsel for a wasted court

appearance. Including this language in the confidential settlement statement does not excuse

defendants from having present at the conference a person with authority and capable of making

decisions. Moreover, this language in a confidential settlement statement does nothing to alert

plaintiff’s counsel that they would be traveling to attend a conference in which defendants had

Case 2:07-cv-01380-GGH Document 160 Filed 06/22/10 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 Nor does it ensure that the court will see the language and actually learn of defendants’

new position (that it would not enter into a monetary settlement) in time to cancel the conference

and prevent the needless cost of counsel’s preparation and travel.

3

 Neither the court’s staff nor counsel for plaintiffs received a call from defense counsel

suggesting in advance of the conference that the conference be cancelled in light of the

defendants’ “no monetary settlement” position. 

4

 Plaintiff’s counsel are attorneys with the San Francisco office of Latham & Watkins. 

3

no intention of making or accepting an offer of settlement.2

More fundamentally, entering a settlement conference with a predetermined position that

a settlement of any amount will not be authorized, knowing that counsel for the opposing side is

traveling from out of town to attend the conference, and not informing that party of the

predetermined position is not negotiating in good faith. Nor is it a good faith effort to comply

with Local Rule 270(f) which is designed to prevent the very occurrence that resulted here. Had

defendants informed the court at the final pretrial conference that no settlement would be

authorized the conference would not have been set. Moreover, had defense counsel called either

opposing counsel or the court to timely alert counsel and the court that defense counsel lacked

settlement authority the conference could have been avoided.3 Failing to inform plaintiff’s

counsel of that material fact and appearing at the conference without the individually named

defendants and with instructions from the County Board of Supervisors that a settlement would

not be authorized did not comply with Local Rule 270(f)(1) and put plaintiff’s counsel to

unnecessary expense. Accordingly, defendants shall reimburse plaintiff’s counsel for their

expense in preparing for, traveling to and attending the conference.

Defendants argue that the amount sought by plaintiff’s counsel is unreasonable, both as

to the hourly rate and the number of hours expended for the conference. The documentation

from plaintiff’s attorneys shows rates of $575 and $500. Defendants initially argue that these

rates are too high for attorneys practicing in the Eastern District of California.4

 A similar

“locality” based argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Moreno v. City of Sacramento,

Case 2:07-cv-01380-GGH Document 160 Filed 06/22/10 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008). While rates charged by other firms in a relevant locality

for similar cases is a factor in determining a reasonable lodestar amount, there is no presumption

that the rates charged by large firms based in another locality are unreasonable for this case. Id. 

Defendants also argue that the rate for fees in this case is capped by the Prisoner

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, at 150 percent of the rate established under

the Criminal Justice Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1). The PLRA caps the hourly rate of

fees authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that a court has discretion to award the

prevailing party in § 1983 cases reasonable attorney fees as part of the costs. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e (d) (no award of attorney fees authorized under section 1988 in an action brought by a

prisoner shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established

under the Criminal Justice Reform Act).

Defendants’ argument fails to take account of the point that the fees being awarded here

are by way of sanctions rather than simply an award of prevailing party fees. Defendants cite to

Webb v. Ada City, 285 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), in support of their argument that any sanctions

against them are capped at the PLRA rate. In Webb, the district court had, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988, awarded the plaintiff attorney fees after he prevailed on the merits in his § 1983 action. 

Id. at 833. Plaintiff’s attorneys brought postjudgment motions for contempt and for discovery

sanctions. Id. at 837. The district court awarded attorney fees, capped at the PLRA rate, for the

time spent on these motions as well. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by applying the PLRA rate to the postjudgment attorney fees because the

“contempt and discovery motions were directly related to [the plaintiff’s] underlying § 1983

cause of action.” Id. In contrast, in this case the sanctions against defendants are not directly

related to the underlying cause of action. Instead, the sanctions are related solely to defendants’

failure to comply with the Local Rules and the unnecessary expenses and efforts incurred by

plaintiff’s counsel as a result. Thus, the court declines to hold that the PLRA rate cap limits the

amount of sanctions the court may award in this instance.

Case 2:07-cv-01380-GGH Document 160 Filed 06/22/10 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

 Defendants state that the applicable rate is $113. For services performed from January

1, 2010 until the present, the CJA non-capital hourly rate is $125.

5

Nonetheless, the court’s task is to award attorney fees at a reasonable rate. It finds that

the rate set by the PLRA (150% of $125,5 that is, $187.50) is a reasonable hourly rate for the

work performed in this particular case.

Defendants argue that the 3.4 hours plaintiff’s attorneys spent preparing and submitting a

settlement conference statement is not recoverable, as plaintiff would have been required to

submit a settlement conference statement even if the settlement conference itself had been

cancelled. Plaintiff’s counsel billed 3.1 hours on April 6 and .3 hours on April 8 preparing the

statement. According to defendants’ counsel’s declaration, the decision not to authorize

settlement funds was made on April 6. Had defendants’ counsel told plaintiff’s counsel of this

decision after the meeting, plaintiff’s counsel would not have spent .3 on April 8 on the

settlement conference statement. Thus, fees for .3 of the 3.4 hours are recoverable.

Defendants also argue that 6.3 hours claimed to prepare for and travel to Mule Creek to

meet with the plaintiff and prepare him for settlement conference is unreasonable. The hours

expended for this task are not unreasonable. Nor was the performance of the task. 

Communication with the client is, of course, a necessary function of preparation for a settlement

conference. Indeed, as defendants must concede, they expended time meeting and consulting

which ultimately resulted in the Board’s instructions to their attorneys not to enter into a

monetary settlement.

The court finds that the hours sought by plaintiff’s attorneys were reasonably and

necessarily incurred to prepare for and attend the settlement conference in this case. The court

therefore awards plaintiff’s attorneys 11.3 times $187.50 for a total amount of $2118.75. The

court further awards out of pocket expenses of $193.87.

////

////

Case 2:07-cv-01380-GGH Document 160 Filed 06/22/10 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that within fourteen days of the date of this order,

defendants shall pay plaintiff’s attorneys $2,312.62.

Dated: June 22, 2010.

Case 2:07-cv-01380-GGH Document 160 Filed 06/22/10 Page 6 of 6