Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00287/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00287-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SARA OSWALD STODDARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-0287-CG-M

)

TRACY HAWSEY and JOHN GREENE, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

 This matter is before the court on motions by defendants, Tracy Hawsey, Sheriff of

Conecuh County, and John Greene, Deputy Sheriff of Conecuh County, to dismiss plaintiff’s

amended complaint (Docs. 16, 18), plaintiff’s responses thereto (Docs. 26, 27), and defendants’

replies (Docs. 28, 29). Upon consideration of all matters presented, and for the reasons stated

herein, the court concludes that defendants’ motions to dismiss are due to be GRANTED. 

I. THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Sara Oswald Stoddard, a/k/a Sally Stoddard, filed her complaint against

defendants Tracy Hawsey, Sheriff of Conecuh County, and John Greene, Deputy Sheriff of

Conecuh County, in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleges various unspecified federal and

particular state law claims arising out of an investigation conducted by the Conecuh County

Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. 20.). In plaintiff’s first cause of action, she generally avers that

defendants Greene and Hawsey violated the constitutional and/or statutory rights afforded the

plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s second cause of

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 The claims articulated in plaintiff’s second cause of action appear to be directed at

Sheriff Hawsey alone.

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action seems to assert federal and/or state law claims for negligent supervision and training.1

Although not at all clear, the third cause of actions seems to set forth three more federal and/or

state law claims: (1) illegal arrest; (2) false imprisonment; and (3) malicious prosecution. 

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the amount of $500,000.00, as well as $4,000,000.00 in

compensatory damages. 

An investigation conducted by the Conecuh County Sheriff’s Department provides the

genesis for plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff indicates that the sequence of events giving rise to her

claims began on or about December 20, 2003, and continued through March 2004. Plaintiff was

a licensed attorney practicing in Conecuh County, Alabama. Tracy Hawsey was the elected

Sheriff of Conecuh County and John Greene was one of Hawsey’s deputies. Sheriff Hawsey was

Deputy Greene’s supervisor. Deputy Greene claimed that he had been “an employee” of the

New York Police Department. Sheriff Hawsey and Deputy Greene were acting under the color

of state law.

Plaintiff alleges that, as part of an investigation, Deputy Greene sent an informant to the

plaintiff’s law office. The plaintiff contends that the informant planned to ask plaintiff to

perform legal services in exchange for drugs and/or “plant” drugs in plaintiff’s office. The

informant was wearing a recording device. Sheriff Hawsey knew of and supported Deputy

Greene’s actions.

After the informant left plaintiff’s office, Sheriff Hawsey and Deputy Greene participated

in the execution of a search warrant. The plaintiff was ultimately arrested, and the defendants

notified the Alabama State Bar. As a result, the Alabama State Bar suspended plaintiff from the

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practice of law. 

The complaint goes on to allege that defendants “withheld from the prosecutor and the

Alabama State Bar portions of the recordings that indicated that the [p]laintiff had rejected the

offer of the informant to pay for legal services with drugs.” (Id. at ¶ 17). After an investigation,

the Alabama Attorney General’s Office dismissed the charges against the plaintiff. Additionally,

the Alabama State Bar lifted the interim suspension after conducting hearings. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. A court may dismiss

a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be

proven consistent with the allegations. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984);

see also Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2004). In other words, a motion

to dismiss only requires a court to determine whether a plaintiff’s allegations, if proven, are

sufficient to state a recognized claim at law upon which relief can be granted. In analyzing a

motion to dismiss, the court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984) (The court must, “[a]t this stage of the litigation, . . . accept [plaintiff’s] allegations as

true.”); Stephens v. HHS, 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990); cf. South Florida Water Mgmt.

Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 409 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1996) (conclusory allegations and

unwarranted deductions of fact are not deemed true on a motion to dismiss). The rules of

pleading require only that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The court’s inquiry at this stage

focuses on whether the challenged pleadings “give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

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 In responses in opposition to the motions to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that defendants

are not entitled to relief through defenses relating to Eleventh Amendment immunity and Heck v.

Humphrey. (See Docs. 26, 27). Because defendants have not even asserted either of these

defenses as grounds for their motions, the court will not assess their merits here. Also, the court

notes that plaintiff’s response claims that the motions to dismiss are premature because

“jurisdictional issues are intertwined with the merits.” Id. at 2. After consideration of plaintiff’s

argument on that point, the court finds no valid reason to defer analysis of the legal sufficiency

of the amended complaint. Here, the jurisdictional issues are not inextricably bound up with the

merits and the purported legal defects identified by defendants’ motions can and should be

resolved at this time. 

4

(1957). 

III. ANALYSIS

The motions to dismiss seek dismissal of plaintiff’s federal claims pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 16, 18). In addition, defendants seek

dismissal of plaintiff’s remaining state law claims under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. (Id.). At the outset, the court will address the grounds for dismissal of

plaintiff’s federal claims.2

A. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims Under § 1983 are due to be Dismissed

The plaintiff’s amended complaint bases her federal cause of action on alleged violations

of Title 42, United States Code § 1983. Section 1983 serves as the basic vehicle for federal court

review of alleged state and local violations of federal law. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,

239 (1972). “Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely

federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by

the Constitution and laws of the Nation.” Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 239. It does not, however,

create federal court jurisdiction, nor does it confer any substantive rights. See Almand v.

DeKalb County, 103 F.3d 1510, 1512 (11th Cir. 1997). Rather, it creates a cause of action, a

legal entitlement to relief, against those whom, acting pursuant to state government authority,

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 In plaintiff’s amended complaint, she specifies that “all claims [] are made against

[defendants] in [their] individual capacity and any claims against [defendants] in [their] official

capacity are due to be and should be stricken.” (Doc. 20 at 1-1). The only difference between a

§ 1983 claim against an individual, in his official capacity, as an agent or employee of a

municipality or local government entity and one against the municipality or local government

entity itself is in name. Brown v. Neumann, 188 F. 3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999). 

4

 Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the motions to dismiss, although not the proper

vehicle in which to assert claims, provides that, “[d]efendants conspired to violate [p]laintiff’s

civil rights under §1983 . . . [and] [conspired] to illegal[ly] entrap, falsely charge and falsely

prosecute.” (Doc. 26 at 7; Doc. 27 at 7). 

5

 The characterization of plaintiff’s federal claims is derived from defendants’ briefs in

support of their motions to dismiss. (See Docs. 17, 19). In its present form, the amended

complaint sets forth little more than unspecified claims and conclusory allegations. Even after

defendants pointed out the vagueness of the allegations concerning federal claims, plaintiff failed

to clarify those claims. Neither the court nor the defendants should have to guess as to the

constitutional basis for plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. 

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violate federal law. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 239.

Plaintiff’s vaguely-worded amended complaint states a conclusory claim that defendants,

in their individual capacities3, “violated the constitutional and/or statutory [sic] afforded the

[p]laintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Doc. 20 at 4). Although

the court cannot determine from the complaint what specific federal violations plaintiff claims

defendants committed, the complaint might be construed as stating claims for unlawful arrest, as

well as for conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights.4

 (Id. at 4-6). In addition, plaintiff

appears to advance state and/or federal claims, against Hawsey only, for negligent hiring,

negligent supervision and failure to implement policies. (Id. at 4-5).5

Defendants proffer the following grounds for dismissal of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims:

(1) failure to meet the heightened pleading standard for § 1983 actions implicating qualified

immunity; (2) qualified immunity as to § 1983 claims; and (3) the intracorporate conspiracy

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 Because of the court’s ruling on the first two grounds, the court does not reach the

question of whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would bar plaintiff’s § 1983

conspiracy claim. 

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doctrine.6

 The court will consider the first two grounds in turn. 

1. Heightened Pleading Standard

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to satisfy the applicable

heightened pleading threshold. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, a heightened pleading

requirement attaches to § 1983 claims involving qualified immunity, such that a § 1983 plaintiff

must “allege with some specificity the facts which make out its claim . . . Some factual detail in

the pleadings is necessary to the adjudication of § 1983 claims.” GJR Investments, Inc. v.

County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Gonzalez v. Reno, 325

F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing with approval authority from other jurisdictions holding

that complaint must include specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact enabling district court to

determine that those facts, if proved, will overcome defense of qualified immunity). “[A]

complaint will be dismissed as insufficient where the allegations it contains are vague and

conclusory.” Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). “[U]nsupported

conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been recognized not to prevent a Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Having reviewed the amended complaint, the court finds that it does not go beyond

“mere conclusory notice pleading,” in that if fails to allege “with some specificity the facts

which make out [plaintiff’s] claim,” as required by Eleventh Circuit precedent. Gonzalez, 325

F.3d at 1235; GJR, 132 F.3d at 1367. The following claims comprise the substantive content of

plaintiff’s allegations:

8. Defendant Hawsey negligently failed to determine whether or not

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[d]efendant Greene was actually a properly trained or certified police

officer . . . .

9. Defendant Hawsey negligently failed to supervise the activities of

[d]efendant Greene and negligently failed to train, or assure the training

of, [d]efendant Greene.

* **

12. At all times [d]efendant Hawsey knew and supported [d]efendant

Greene’s actions, knowing or having reason to believe that the actions of

Greene were illegal and knowing that his, Hawsey’s, actions were

likewise illegal. 

***

17. Both [d]efendants withheld from the prosecutor and the Alabama State

Bar the portions of the recordings that indicated that the [plaintiff] had

rejected the offer of the informant to pay for legal services with drugs. 

This illegal failure to reveal this information allowed the process of the

criminal prosecution and the suspension of her license to practice law to

continue.

18. Defendants Greene and Hawsey did conspire together to falsely charge

[plaintiff] with a drug offense, knowing their actions to be illegal and

contrary to the laws of Alabama and the United States.

19. Defendants did conspire together to falsely make complaints to the

Alabama State Bar in an illegal and improper effort to have the license of

[plaintiff] suspended or revoked.

***

22. That as a consequence of the willful and negligent actions of [d]efendants

Greene and Hawsey, [p]laintiff Stoddard was caused to suffer false arrest,

interim suspension of her license to practice law, loss of income, false

imprisonment, public humiliation and embarrassment. 

***

27. . . . [d]efendants Greene and Hawsey violated the constitutional and/or

statutory [sic] afforded the [p]laintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment

and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc. 20). Beyond plaintiff’s own bold statements and legal determinations that defendants’ acts

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 Plaintiff neglected to provide any page numbers for any of the material quoted from

cases in her responses in opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss.

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were negligent, illegal, or part of a conspiracy, plaintiff fails to provide any specific, nonconclusory allegations of fact. 

In her response to defendants’ motions to dismiss, plaintiff suggests that the heightened

pleading requirement requires only that she identify where in the Constitution a right might be

found.7

 (Doc. 26 at 10; Doc. 27 at 10). Based on this mischaracterization of the applicable

standard, plaintiff argues that her amended complaint properly alleges that defendants “conspired

. . . to deprive [her] of constitutional and/or statutory rights afforded her under the meaning of

the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Doc. 26 at 10-11; Doc. 27 at 10-11). In fact, plaintiff’s

responses in opposition to the motions to dismiss mark the first time plaintiff mentions the Fifth

and the Fourth Amendments as grounds for her claims. Nonetheless, the factual allegations set

forth in the amended complaint are not sufficiently specific to allow a determination of whether

defendants’ acts, if proved, can overcome a defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly,

defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to satisfy heightened pleading requirements are due to

be granted.

2. Qualified Immunity as to § 1983 Claims

Even if plaintiff had met the heightened pleading standard, her claims would be subject to

dismissal under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Where, as here, government officials are

sued in their individual capacity for money damages based upon alleged civil rights violations,

they may assert an affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Swint v. City of Wadley,

Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 994 (11th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has held “that government officials

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 “Put another way, to pass the first step of the discretionary function test for qualified

immunity, the defendant must have been performing a function that, but for the alleged

constitutional infirmity, would have fallen with his legitimate job description.” Holloman, 370

F.3d at 1266. 

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performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

It follows that qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). To assess the

defendants’ qualified immunity defense, the court must examine whether the defendants can

demonstrate that they were performing discretionary functions, and, if so, whether plaintiff can

show that defendants’ conduct violated clearly established rights of which a reasonable person

would have known. Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (11th Cir. 2001)

a. The “Discretionary Function” Element

To establish the defense of qualified immunity, defendants must first demonstrate that

they were “acting within [their] discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.

2004). The types of acts that constitute discretionary functions are those which fall “within the

employee’s job responsibilities.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265

(11th Cir. 2004). In assessing whether an official engaged in a discretionary function, the court

must ask “whether the government employee was (a) pursuing a legitimate job-related function

(that is, pursuing a job-related goal),8

 (b) through means that were within his power to utilize.” 

Id. at 1265-66. 

There can be no dispute that the defendants acted within their discretionary authority.

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 “In a reverse sting, the government organizes the sale of contraband.” United States v.

Roper, 874 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1989). The Eleventh Circuit has rejected challenges to the

reverse sting method of police investigation on numerous occasions. See, e.g., United States v.

Savage, 701 F.2d 867, 869-70 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gianni, 678 F.2d 956, 960 (11th

Cir, 1982).

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Defendants’ participation in the reverse sting operation9

 and execution of a search warrant are

the types of activities that fall within the ambit of a discretionary function. The wrongful acts

that plaintiff attributes to the defendants relate to ordinary law enforcement functions, the

performance of their official duties, and actions within the scope of their authority. Therefore,

the court concludes that the defendants have satisfied their burden of demonstrating that they

were engaged in discretionary functions at all times material hereto. 

b. The “Clearly Established” Element

“Once the official has established that he was engaged in a discretionary function, the

plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.” 

Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). The court determines the

applicability of qualified immunity under the rubric set forth by the Supreme Court. First, the

court must inquire “whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional

violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If, in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, the evidence shows that the defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right, “the

next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326

F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 

Plaintiff attempts to satisfy her burden by identifying a wide range of claims based upon

purported violations of the Fourteenth Amendment claims. (See Doc 20). In plaintiff’s

responses in opposition to the motions to dismiss, plaintiff compounds her already muddled

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10 As discussed supra at Part III.A, the court construes plaintiff’s amended complaint to

assert claims for unlawful arrest, as well as conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights. (Am.

Compl. at 4-6). In addition, plaintiff appears to bring federal claims against defendant Hawsey

only, for deliberate indifference, negligent hiring, negligent supervision and failure to implement

policies. (Id. at 4-5). The court refuses to articulate plaintiff’s claims for her, but will address

what might be the constitutional grounds for some of the allegations in her complaint. 

To the extent that plaintiff may claim deprivation of liberty under the Fourteenth

Amendment, the set of facts plaintiff presents is insufficient to overcome defendants’ qualified

immunity defense. For instance, “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will

be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted . . . .” 

Baker, 443 U.S. at 145. Moreover, plaintiff does not allege any particularized allegations by

which this court might conclude defendants conspired to deny plaintiff of her civil rights. See

GJR, 132 F.3d at 1370 (A plaintiff claiming a conspiracy under § 1983 must make particularized

allegations that a conspiracy exists); see also Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-57 (Vague and

conclusory allegations suggesting a § 1983 conspiracy are insufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss). A “plaintiff attempting to prove such a conspiracy must show that the parties ‘reached

an understanding’ to deny the plaintiff [] her rights.” NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1563

(11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Finally: 

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claims:

Here, it is obvious that trained law enforcement officers would have been aware

that sexually and, otherwise improper violations-falsely arresting, charging and

making claims against the [p]laintiff, and the conspiracy to falsely charge the

[p]laintiff and by use of false claims deprive her of her law license though false

statements and false testimony would be unlawful and the [p]laintiff would be

protected against such abuse by statute-these are matters of common sense, not to

mention a violation of perjury & subornation of perjury laws. 

(Doc. 26 at 8; Doc. 27 at 8). As such, the court finds it difficult to glean from the vague

amended complaint exactly how defendants are alleged to have violated plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, or exactly what the alleged deprivation was. 

In order to allow the court to perform the highly fact-intensive qualified immunity

analysis, a § 1983 complaint must “isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the

defendant] is charged.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). Here, the plaintiff cites

the Fourteenth Amendment without any identification of the Fourteenth Amendment rights

claimed to have been violated.10 The court cannot be compelled to scour the entire constitutional

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Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not

for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of

injury must be in state court under traditional tort-law principles. Just as “[medical]

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner,” (citation omitted), false imprisonment does not become a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.” 

Baker, 443 U.S. at 146. Accordingly, any claims of negligence or false imprisonment are due to

be dismissed. 

Beyond those addressed herein, the court will not proceed to address any other throwaway claims plaintiff might load into her complaint. 

12

landscape to search for apposite foundational support for the plaintiff’s vague assertions and

accusations. Consequently, the plaintiff’s unspecified Fourteenth Amendment claims are

dismissed.

B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims are due to be Dismissed

The dismissal of all federal claims has important jurisdictional implications in the case,

where subject matter jurisdiction rested exclusively upon federal question jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The only subject matter jurisdiction issue [] is [defendants’] entitlement to

absolute immunity on the plaintiff’s state law claims.” (Doc. 28 at 3). As the court has

determined that all of the plaintiff’s federal claims are due to be dismissed, the court finds it

unnecessary to analyze the issues presented when examining the immunity of state officers under

Alabama law. 

Once all triable claims within a federal court’s original jurisdiction have been dismissed,

the district court has discretion to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c). Without any valid federal causes of action, the plaintiff’s complaint does not

contain a basis for the court to assert original jurisdiction over this cause. In consideration of

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11 The Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state

claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004). 

12 State courts should generally be the final arbiters of state law claims, particularly when

federal claims are dismissed before trial. The Supreme Court has declared that:

Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to

promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of

applicable law. Certainly if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not

insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.

United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

13

Eleventh Circuit precedent,11 as well as judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the parties,

and comity, the court believes that the plaintiff’s remaining claims are best left to the Alabama

courts.12 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions to dismiss are hereby GRANTED. 

DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of July, 2007.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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