Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00887/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00887-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CROSSFIT, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATRIX SOLUTIONS, LLC et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-887-CAB-BLM

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 

DAGOBAH, LLC’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 35]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Dagobah, LLC’s (“Dagobah”) 

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 35.] The motion has been fully 

briefed, and the Court finds it suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 

without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below,

Dagobah’s motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 10, 2019, Plaintiff CrossFit, Inc. filed its complaint for breach of contract 

and trademark infringement against Defendants Matrix Solutions, LLC, Progenex 

Holdings, LLC, Fitness Trade sp. z o.o, Fitness Trade sp. z o.o sp. k., and ABC Corp. [Doc. 

No. 1.] On December 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) joining 

as Defendants The Conclave, LLC and Dagobah, LLC. [Doc. No. 28.]

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The FAC alleges that Matrix Solutions, LLC, Progenex Holdings, LLC, The 

Conclave, LLC, and Dagobah, LLC, all Wyoming limited liability companies with a 

principal place of business in Utah, are collectively doing business as “Progenex.” [Id. at 

¶ 10.1] Plaintiff alleges breach of contract and unauthorized use of Plaintiff’s intellectual 

property and brand in a manner confusing to the public. [Id. at ¶ 1.] 

The FAC alleges the Court has personal jurisdiction over Dagobah because it has 

purposefully directed branding and other activities toward Plaintiff in California and is 

jointly responsible for Progenex’s activities which are purposefully directed to California. 

[Id. at ¶ 21.] The FAC also alleges that Dagobah is closely affiliated with or an alter ego 

of Matrix Solutions and the several Progenex entities are all alter egos of one another. [Id. 

at ¶¶ 9, 14.] The FAC mentions Ryan Page only once, as CEO of Defendant Matrix 

Solutions, in relation to his response to Plaintiff’s demand letter from July 2017. [Id. at ¶ 

118.]

On January 17, 2020, Dagobah moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 35.]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a district court to dismiss an action 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. “Where defendants move to dismiss a complaint for lack 

of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is 

appropriate.” Dole Foods Co. Inc. v. Watts, 303 F. 3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002). “The 

court may consider evidence presented in affidavits to assist in its determination and may 

order discovery on the jurisdictional issues.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Ass’n, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977)).

A court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is

limited by two independent constraints, namely the applicable state personal jurisdiction 

 

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statute and the constitutional principles of due process. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 

1361 (9th Cir. 1990); see also In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 

F.3d 716, 741 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is 

proper if permitted by a state’s long-arm statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does 

not violate federal due process.”). “Under California’s long-arm statute, California state 

courts may exercise personal jurisdiction ‘on any basis not inconsistent with the 

Constitution of this state or of the United States.’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 

125 (2014) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 410.10 (West 2004)). Thus, “the 

jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same.”

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800-801 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the defendant must have “certain minimum 

contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 

Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 

(1945) (internal quotations omitted)). This minimum contacts jurisdiction may be either 

“general or all-purpose jurisdiction,” or “specific or case-linked jurisdiction.” Id. at 919

(citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). “The

strength of contacts required depends on which of the two categories of personal 

jurisdiction a litigant invokes: specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.” Ranza v. Nike, 

Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

Dagobah contends it is a Wyoming limited liability company that does not conduct 

business in California to be subject to general jurisdiction in this Court. Dagobah also 

denies that it has availed itself of the benefits of the laws of California and states it has no 

contacts with California to support a finding of specific jurisdiction. Dagobah avers it is 

only a holding company and has never sold any products or provided any services 

anywhere.

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Plaintiff argues Dagobah has sufficient minimum contacts with California to support 

specific jurisdiction and suggests there may be general jurisdiction because Dagobah is an 

unincorporated association and California may be its home. Primarily, Plaintiff contends 

that Dagobah is closely affiliated with or an alter ego of Defendant Matrix Solutions and 

the “Progenex” enterprise, such that Dagobah should also be responsible for the past and 

ongoing trademark infringement by Progenex in California.

A. General Jurisdiction

“A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant, even 

if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State.” Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (emphasis in 

original) (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). “But ‘only a limited set of affiliations with a 

forum will render a defendant amenable to’ general jurisdiction in that State.” Id. (quoting 

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). “Because the assertion of judicial authority over a defendant is 

much broader in the case of general jurisdiction than specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff 

invoking general jurisdiction must meet an ‘exacting standard’ for the minimum contacts

required.” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1069 (citing CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 

F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011)). “‘[G]eneral jurisdiction requires affiliations so 

continuous and systematic as to render the foreign corporation essentially at home in the 

forum State, i.e., comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.’” Id. (quoting Daimler, 

571 U.S. at 133 n.11). “Such contacts must be ‘constant and pervasive.’” Id. (citing 

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122). “The paradigmatic locations where general jurisdiction is 

appropriate over a corporation are its place of incorporation and its principal place of 

business.” Id. (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). “Only in an ‘exceptional case’ will 

general jurisdiction be available anywhere else.” Id. (some internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

Limited liability companies are considered citizens of each state where its owners or 

members are residents. See Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 

899 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Plaintiff’s argument for general jurisdiction involves Dagobah’s possible citizenship 

in California because it is a limited liability company. [Doc. No. 41 at 25.] Plaintiff points 

out that Dagobah only states that its sole member is a private trust established under, and 

governed by, the laws of Utah, but Dagobah failed to identify the citizenship of any trustee. 

The citizenship of a traditional trust is the citizenship of its trustee or trustees. See 

Demarest v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 920 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2019). In response to 

the Court’s order for a supplemental declaration on this issue, Dagobah declared the private 

trust has two trustees, Ryan and Lindsay Page, both citizens of Utah. [Doc. No. 45.] 

Dagobah is a Wyoming limited liability company with its principal place of business in 

Wyoming. Dagobah’s sole member is a private trust established under the laws of Utah 

with two trustees who are both citizens of Utah. Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Court has 

general jurisdiction because Dagobah might be a citizen of California is therefore 

unsupported. Besides its argument under the alter ego theory, which is discussed further 

below, Plaintiff does not assert any additional reason to adequately invoke general 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court does not find that Dagobah has any affiliations with 

California that are so continuous and systematic to invoke general jurisdiction over 

Dagobah.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test to determine whether a district court can 

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities 

in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws (the 

“purposeful availment” requirement);

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and

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(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 

i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 

1987)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test.” Id. 

“If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to 

the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be 

reasonable.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).

a. Purposeful Availment

Plaintiff contends that because liability here sounds in tort, the “purposeful 

direction” analysis derived from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), is appropriate. A

defendant purposefully directed his activities at the forum if he: “1) committed an 

intentional act; 2) expressly aimed at the forum state; 3) causing harm that the defendant 

knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1214 

(9th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “the 

plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” Walden v. Fiore, 

571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). “Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the 

necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him.” 

Id. As the Court explained, “[r]egardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is 

jurisdictionally relevant only in so far as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact 

with the forum state. The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular 

injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a 

meaningful way.” Id. at 290.

Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Dagobah committed any intentional act 

expressly aimed at California. Plaintiff argues that Dagobah provides CEO services to 

Progenex through Ryan Page which supports personal jurisdiction. The Court is not 

convinced that even if true, this forms the necessary connection with Dagobah and 

California. Dagobah providing CEO services to Progenex, without any other intentional 

act on the part of Dagobah, does not result in a meaningful connection between Dagobah

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and California. Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument is largely based on allegations without

factual support. To support a meaningful connection between Dagobah and California 

through some type of complex scheme as Plaintiff suggests would require sufficient factual 

support beyond mere allegations. The Court is also not convinced by Plaintiff’s assertion 

that Dagobah’s ongoing participation in a California JAMS arbitration is a sufficient 

contact to establish personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff states that Dagobah was named as a 

defendant in the arbitration action. The Court does not find that Dagobah choosing to 

defend itself and assert counterclaims in the arbitration action equates to deliberately 

engaging in significant activities in California. In the absence of reliable evidence to the 

contrary, Dagobah has not purposefully directed its activities to California.

In light of the above, the Court concludes that Dagobah’s actions do not connect it 

with California in a way sufficient to support the assertion of personal jurisdiction over it. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to establish that Dagobah purposefully availed 

itself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, the Court need not address 

whether the claim arises out of or resulted from Dagobah’s forum related activities or 

whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 

453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that because plaintiff’s claim failed the 

first prong of the minimum contacts test “we need not address whether the claim arose out 

of or resulted from Caddy’s forum-related activities or whether an exercise of jurisdiction 

is reasonable per the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 

462, 476-77 [] (1985).”); Attilio Giustio Leombruni S.p.A v. Lsil & Co., Inc., Case No. CV 

15-002128 BRO (Ex), 2015 WL 12743878, at * 10 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2015) (declining to 

address the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to demonstrate 

purposeful availment).

C. Alter Ego Theory

Plaintiff primarily argues that jurisdiction is proper under an alter ego theory. 

Plaintiff contends that Dagobah is an alter ego of the Progenex enterprise which consists 

of the other defendant entities, Matrix Solutions, Progenex Holdings, and The Conclave. 

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Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that Ryan Page has orchestrated some type of tax-evasion 

scheme where Dagobah is controlling both the CEO and managing member, himself, of 

the other Progenex entities and Progenex is using Dagobah to concentrate its assets while 

leaving the liabilities to the remaining defaulted defendant entities.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s alter ego theory is unsupported. Plaintiff has not provided 

any concrete evidence that Ryan Page is concentrating the assets of Progenex using 

Dagobah or that Dagobah is directly involved with any of the actions of the other entities. 

As stated previously, Plaintiff’s argument is based largely on unsubstantiated allegations

and speculation, which are insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of alter ego. 

See Davis v. Metro Prods. Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because the corporate 

form serves as a shield for the individuals involved for purposes of liability as well as 

jurisdiction, many courts search for reasons to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ in jurisdictional 

contexts parallel to those in liability contexts.”). See also Katzir’s Floor & Home Design, 

Inc. v. M-MILS.com., 394 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding “mere fact of sole 

ownership and control does not eviscerate the separate corporate identity that is the 

foundation of corporate law,” noting, “[e]ven if the sole shareholder is entitled to all of the 

corporation’s profits, and dominated and controlled the corporation, that fact is insufficient 

by itself to make the shareholder personally liable”); Leek v. Cooper, 194 Cal. App. 4th 

399, 414 (2011) (finding an “allegation that a person who owns all of the corporate stock 

and makes all of the management decisions is insufficient to cause the court to disregard 

the corporate entity.”). As a result, the Court cannot assert jurisdiction over Dagobah

simply because of its association with Progenex and Ryan Page. See Davis, 885 F.2d at 

520 (“mere association with a corporation that causes injury in the forum state is not 

sufficient in itself to permit that forum to assert jurisdiction.”).

D. Jurisdictional Discovery

Plaintiff requests that should the Court be inclined to grant Dagobah’s motion, it 

should stay ruling on the motion to allow Plaintiff to conduct jurisdictional diversity 

otherwise it would cause substantial prejudice.

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“[T]he question of whether to allow discovery is generally within the discretion of 

the trial judge.” Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Grp., Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 801 (9th Cir. 1989). 

A decision “to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that 

the denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining 

litigant.” Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 

citations omitted). While “purely speculative allegations of attenuated jurisdictional 

contacts” are insufficient to warrant jurisdictional discovery, Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 

852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011), “discovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent facts 

bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory 

showing of the facts is necessary.” Laub, 342 F.3d at 1093 (citing Butcher’s Union Local 

No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir.1986); Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 

F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008)).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden of demonstrating that there are 

“pertinent facts” that are controverted or needing a more satisfactory showing in order to 

determine the issue of jurisdiction over Dagobah nor has Plaintiff clearly shown any “actual 

or substantial prejudice” would result by denying discovery as Dagobah will be dismissed 

without prejudice in this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional 

discovery is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Dagobah’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction is GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Dagobah, LLC are 

DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in a court that has personal jurisdiction over 

Dagobah, LLC.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2020

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