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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL9l.Jnlte4Sta1el0.!Pr\ofA;pvellt Tenthcircult 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 1119.SZ 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

RICHARD H. STEINBERG; SANDRA STEINBERG; ) Clerk 

PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT, LTD., a Colorado ) 

corporation; PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT, CO., ) 

a Colorado corporation, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

KEN ALLEN, a/k/a KEN A. ALLEN, a/k/a 

KEN M. ALLEN; JUDY ALLEN; LINCOLN 

THEATRE PRODUCTION, INC.; JERRY F. 

JAGER, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

THOMAS 0. MURPHY, III, and X-1 through 

X-10, 

Defendants. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 91-8033 

(D.C. No. 90-158B) 

(D. Wyo.) 

Before MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,** Senior 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit , 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3 . 

Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs brought suit to obtain redress for substantial 

financial losses incurred in connection with various entertainment 

promotions, allegedly as the result of defendants' fraudulent 

activities. They now appeal from a district court order granting 

summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees and dismissing 

the action (the other defendants were never served). 

Jurisdictional Considerations 

Although the notice of appeal refers only to the summary 

judgment order that concluded the proceedings in district court, 

plaintiffs' appellate briefs also challenge earlier adverse 

rulings compelling production of their tax returns, denying their 

motion for prejudgment remedies, and dismissing six of the seven 

claims asserted in the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b) (6). The notice of appeal must designate, among other 

things, the "judgment, order or part thereof appealed from." 

Fed. R. App. P. 3(c). The requirements of Rule 3(c) are 

jurisdictional, Nolan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 

843, 846 (10th Cir. 1992), so failure to designate a particular 

ruling may bar appellate review, see, e.g., Scaramucci v. Dresser 

Indus., Inc., 427 F.2d 1309, 1318 (10th Cir. 1970). However, the 

degree of technical compliance demanded by the different 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 2 
provisions of Rule 3(c) varies, Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 

926 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 112 

s. Ct. 3019-20 (1992), and, for present purposes, plaintiffs' 

omissions shall not preclude appeal if it is sufficiently clear 

from the record that they always intended to appeal the challenged 

interlocutory rulings. Perington Wholesale. Inc. v. Burger King 

Corp., 631 F.2d 1369, 1379 (10th Cir. 1979). Compare Dupree v. 

United Parcel Serv .• Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 220 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992) 

with Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d 431, 444 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

Accordingly, we recognize jurisdiction over the discovery and 

prejudgment a t.tachment rulings, which were specifically identified 

in plaintiffs' docketing statement filed shortly after the notice 

of appeal. The dismissal order, unmentioned until plaintiffs' 

appellate briefs, presents a closer question. However, in light 

of the rule favoring jurisdiction in ambiguous circumstances, see 

Perington, 631 F.2d at 1380, and the fact that the summary 

judgment order properly appealed from at least references, albeit 

obliquely, the earlier dismissal order, see Dupree, 956 F.2d at 

220 n.1, we exercise jurisdiction over this matter as well. 1 

1 We also note that the disposition effected by the appealed 

order was not recorded on a separate document in accordance with 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, and the order does not itself meet the 

requirements of the rule, compare Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 

185 (10th Cir. 1992) with Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1390 

(10th Cir. 1990). Under the circumstances, however, we deem this 

technical noncompliance with Rule 58 waived. Clough, 959 F.2d at 

185-86; see also Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management Inc. Employee 

Sav. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 655-56 (10th Cir. 1990). 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 3 
Rule 12(b) (6) Dismissals 

The first five of the seven claims pled by plaintiffs 

consisted of alleged violations of particular federal criminal 

statutes. App. Vol. 1 at 28-33. The seventh claim asserted more 

generally that defendants had, by such conduct, subjected 

plaintiffs to the "criminal violation of their civil rights." Id. 

at 34-35. The district court dismissed these claims, noting that 

the cited criminal statutes do not provide for independent civil 

relief. Id. at 213, 217. See generally Diamond v. Charles, 476 

U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986) (private individuals have no standing to 

compel enforcement of federal criminal statutes). Plaintiffs' 

belated attempt on appeal to invoke 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 

1985(2), (3) does not remedy the problem. Criminal offenses do 

not in and of themselves give rise to enforceable civil rights 

claims unless the criminal statutes in question create privately 

enforceable rights. Winslow v. Romer, 759 F. Supp. 670, 673-74, 

676, 677 (D. Colo. 1991). While criminal conduct otherwise 

remediable as unconstitutional under the civil rights laws is not 

insulated from such redress by virtue of its doubly wrongful 

character, here the essential allegations of action under color of 

state law(§ 1983), obstruction of justice (§ 1985(2)), racial or 

other class-based animus (§ 1985(3)), and state action are lacking 

in any event. On de novo review, see Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 877 

F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 1989), we conclude these claims were 

properly dismissed. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 4 
Summary Judgment 

Plaintiffs' remaining claim, realleged singly in the amended 

complaint, sought relief under the Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 u.s.c. §§ 1961-1968. 

Plaintiffs asserted that defendants' alleged fraudulent dealings, 

criminalized by 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud), § 1343 (wire 

fraud), § 2314 (interstate transportation of stolen money), and 

§ 2315 (receipt of stolen money through interstate 

transportation), constituted a pattern of racketeering activity 

prohibited under § 1962(a), (b), (d), and remediable under 

§ 1964(c). Defendants moved for summary judgment on this claim, 

submitting detailed affidavits denying any wrongdoing in their 

financial transactions with plaintiffs. After concluding that 

defendants' materials indicated the absence of a factual basis for 

the claim, the district court assessed plaintiffs' responsive 

evidentiary showing as deficient: 

After nine months, during which time they could 

have conducted extensive discovery, plaintiffs have not 

deposed the alleged conspirators, or anyone else for 

that matter. . . . Plaintiffs have merely reiterated 

the allegations contained in their amended complaint, 

which at best amount to only a "mere scintilla of 

evidence" insufficient to overcome defendants' motion. 

[Manders v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Mental Health, 875 

F.2d 263, 265 (10th Cir. 1989) (following Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 251 (1986) .] 

In addition to their affidavits, plaintiffs refer 

the Court to documents in the pleadings which they 

assert support their theory of the case. 

Plaintiffs have not elucidated for the Court, nor can 

the Court divine on its own, exactly how these 

documents, which appear to be perfectly legal, support 

their case. The Court also cannot fathom how a jury 

could reasonably find in plaintiffs' favor solely on the 

bases of these documents and plaintiffs' allegations. 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 5 
Plaintiffs have provided no other evidence upon which 

the Court could rely to deny defendants' motion. 

The affidavits and "supporting documentation" quite 

possibly raise questions regarding the wisdom of 

plaintiffs' business decisions and defendants' business 

ethics. The question before the Court, however, is 

whether these questions have anything to do with 

defendants' motion for summary judgment in this RICO 

case. The Court does not believe that losses occasioned 

by plaintiffs' naivete and/or ill-advised business 

decisions are losses which can be redressed through a 

civil RICO cause of action. 

App. Vol. 2 at 654, 655-56. Accordingly, the district court held 

that defendants had carried their burden on summary judgment, 

unrebutted by plaintiffs, and granted their motion. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., 

Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). Rule 56(c) directs us 

to determine whether the record shows "that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." More specifically, 

our review in this case is guided by the principle that "summary 

judgment is mandated, after an adequate time for discovery and 

upon motion, against a party who 'fails to make a showing to 

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial.'" Aldrich Enters .• Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1134, 

1138 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986)). 

The several subsections of § 1962 make it unlawful "to 

acquire or maintain any interest 'through a pattern of 

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Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 6 
racketeering activity' in an enterprise engaged in interstate 

commerce." Berg v. First Am. Bankshares. Inc., 796 F.2d 489, 501 

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting§ 1962); see H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern 

Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1989). To establish the 

requisite "racketeering activity," plaintiffs must present 

evidence of conduct indictable under the federal criminal statutes 

they relied on for the predicate acts in the complaint. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1961(1); see Sedima. S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481, 

488 (1985). 

Plaintiffs maintain that two separate but related business 

ventures, initiated by defendants and financially ruinous for 

plaintiffs, satisfy this requirement. The first involved the 

promotion of rock music concerts, which over time necessitated 

repeated, substantial expenditures by plaintiffs to forestall 

cancellation and the consequent forfeiture of a relatively small 

initial investment. The only appreciable evidence of wrongdoing 

here related to defendants' solicitation of plaintiffs' investment 

using a brochure incorporating letters of endorsement from two 

state offices contrary to the latter's policy against use of such 

endorsements to procure investment. This violation of government 

office policy falls far short of the criminal fraud necessary to 

substantiate the RICO claim asserted in the complaint. Upon 

review of the record, we agree with the district court that 

plaintiffs' evidence failed to establish a triable issue of 

racketeering activity by defendants for their role in the parties' 

unsuccessful concert promotions. 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 7 
The second venture involved plaintiffs' later investment in 

the renovation of a theatre to serve as a forum for concerts and 

other entertainments. Plaintiffs alleged that their participation 

in this undertaking was fraudulently induced by documents falsely 

indicating that defendant Ken Allen already owned the theatre when 

in fact he did not acquire it until several months later. We 

agree with the district court that there is no indication of any 

illegality or falsity in these documents, which clearly showed 

that Allen possessed only an assignment of an as yet unexecuted 

contract for purchase of the theatre. See App. Vol. 1 at 94-109. 

Moreover, to the extent plaintiffs are claiming defendants 

misstated the import of these documents, defendants' alleged 

misrepresentation would, on our record, constitute nothing more 

than an unqualified legal opinion plainly contradicted by the 

documents themselves and, as such, would be insufficient to 

establish fraud. 

Plaintiffs thus failed to substantiate the allegations of 

fraud comprising the racketeering activity they sought to 

attribute to defendants. The district court properly rejected 

their RICO claim accordingly. See. e.g., Bacchus Indus .• Inc. v. 

Arvin Indus .• Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 892 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Preliminary Rulings 

In light of our affirmance of the judgment for defendants on 

the merits of the case, plaintiffs' challenge to the denial of 

their request for prejudgment attachment remedies is moot. See 

Hankins v. Temple Univ., 829 F.2d 437, 438 n.l (3d Cir. 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 8 
1987) (following American Postal Workers Union v. United States 

Postal Serv., 764 F.2d 858, 860 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). 

Plaintiffs object 

production of their tax 

to the 

returns 

discovery order 

(for confidential 

compelling 

review by 

opposing counsel), but it is not clear from the record whether the 

returns were ever produced before the case was dismissed by the 

district court. If they were produced, our review of the matter 

is precluded under the general principle that compliance with an 

order to produce materials moots an appeal therefrom. See, e.g., 

Richrnark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1479 

(9th Cir. 1992) (compliance moots appeal from discovery order), 

petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3060 (U.S. June 29, 

1992) (92-31); Office of Thrift Supervision Dep't of Treasury v. 

Dobbs, 931 F.2d 956, 957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (compliance moots 

appeal from subpoena enforcement order); see also Thournir v. 

Buchanan, 710 F.2d 1461, 1463 (10th Cir. 1983) (where act sought to 

be enjoined has occurred, appeal from order denying injunctive 

relief is moot). On the other hand, the issue is also moot if the 

returns were not produced, because, given our disposition of the 

appeal in all other respects, the action directed by the discovery 

order would never take place and, therefore, the order would have 

no legal consequences for this court to correct . See generally 

Thournir, 710 F.2d at 1463 (issue is moot if appellate court 

cannot grant any effective relief). 

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Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 9 
• 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 91-8033 Document: 010110148692 Date Filed: 11/17/1992 Page: 10