Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-00976/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-00976-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY A. MONTES (a.k.a. RAYMOND

MONTEZELLO) ,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER P.

RAFALOWSKI, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. C 09-0976 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; REFERRING CASE TO

PRO SE PRISONER SETTLEMENT

PROGRAM

 

 Plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the instant civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants on March 06, 2009. Defendants filed their

motion for summary judgment on September 11, 2009, arguing that there is no genuine issue of

material fact and that they are entitled to the judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff filed an

opposition on September 24, 2009. Having carefully considered the papers submitted,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was formerly a prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”). In his complaint,

plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at PBSP, Correctional Officer Rafalowski used excessive

and unnecessary force against him. (Compl. at 4.) Additionally, plaintiff alleges that by failing

to take action, Correctional Officers Clemons and Ramey were deliberately indifferent to his 

safety. (Id. at 6.)

*E-FILED - 8/2/10*

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1

 Officer Rafalowski denies making any such gesture. (Decl. Rafalowski at 4.)

2

 Officer Rafalowski asserts that Plaintiff kicked him twice, once above and once below

his right knee (Decl. Rafalowski at 2.). Plaintiff claims he only kicked once and missed. 

(Compl. at 4.) 

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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On May 26, 2008, at approximately 2:00 p.m., an altercation occurred between

Correctional Officer Rafalowski and plaintiff in the second tier shower stall. Plaintiff alleges

that the incident began when Officer Rafalowski made a sexually derogatory gesture with his

mouth while plaintiff showered.1

 (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff felt “angry and humiliated” as a result

and in the process of being escorted from the shower room back to his cell and while handcuffed,

plaintiff attempted to kick Officer Rafalowski in the right leg.2 (Id.) In response, Officer

Rafalowski used force to take plaintiff to the ground. (Decl. Rafalowski at 2.) The parties

dispute the amount of force used by Officer Rafalowski during the incident. 

According to plaintiff, after attempting to kick Officer Rafalowski, Officer Rafalowski

threw plaintiff against the second tier rail and continuously punched him on the right side of his

face. (Compl. at 5.) After being taken to the ground and while handcuffed, Officer Rafalowski

continued punching plaintiff in the face and “slammed” plaintiff’s head several times against the

ground. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that, “at no time, other than the attempted kick,” did he resist

prison officials. (Id.) 

According to defendants, Officer Rafalowski used minimal force to restrain plaintiff. 

Officer Rafalowski states that in response to plaintiff’s attack he “was able to reach around

[plaintiff’s] chest with [his] left arm, and [plaintiff’s] back with [his] right arm,” and then used

“physical force and [his] body weight to take [plaintiff] to the ground.” (Decl. Rafalowski at 2.) 

Officer Rafalowski asserts that plaintiff continuously “kick[ed] and flail[ed] his body around in

an erratic manner,” despite his orders to stop resisting. (Id.) Officer Rafalowski placed his knee

on plaintiff’s left shoulder and held his head down on the ground attempting to subdue him.

(Id.at 2-3.) Officer Clemons intervened to assist and eventually an unidentified officer placed

leg restraints on plaintiff’s ankles. (Id. at 3.) 

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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Following the incident plaintiff was treated by prison medical staff who noted a one inch

laceration and an abrasion over his right eye, and that plaintiff had defecated. (Decl. Pl., Ex. A.) 

No other injuries were documented. (Id.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate

that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute

as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no

reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the

opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need

only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

at 325. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only concerned with disputes over

material facts and “factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the court to scour the record in search

of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The

nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that

precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the 

 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party: if evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set

forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152,

1158 (9th Cir. 1999).

II. Legal Claims and Analysis

A. Correctional Officer Rafalowski

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Rafalowski used excessive force against him, in violation of

his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. (Compl. at 4.) Officer

Rafalowski argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because on the undisputed facts he

did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and alternatively, he is entitled to qualified

immunity. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 8-14.) 

The arbitrary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). When prison

officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core

judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Id. at 6-7. In

determining whether the use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline,

or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for

application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent

of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. at 7. In reviewing these factors,

courts must accord prison administrators wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution

of polices and practices to further institutional order and security. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d

895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Taking the evidence in the complaint as true, and drawing all inferences therefrom in 

plaintiff’s favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Rafalowski’s use 

of force was excessive. According to plaintiff, “after a brief period of being swayed and 

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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continuously punched,” Officer Rafalowski “slammed” plaintiff against a cell door and then

“intermittently slamm[ed] his head against the pavement.” (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff was

handcuffed and after the initial kick, did not physically resist “since it would only make matters

worse.” (Id.) Accepting this account as true, an inference could certainly be drawn that even if

plaintiff was the initial aggressor and needed to be restrained, Officer Rafalowski could have

done so without continuously punching plaintiff or slamming his head into the ground after

plaintiff was on the ground and handcuffed. 

Defendants argue that the extent of plaintiff’s injuries reflect the minimal amount of force

used to subdue him. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 9.) While prison medical staff noted that plaintiff

had received only a small laceration and an abrasion above his right eye, plaintiff contends he

suffered undocumented injuries including other “cuts to his face,” “swelling,” and an “abrasion”

on his right arm. (Pl’s Opp’n at 4.) While the extent of the injury may indicate the amount of

force applied, a significant injury is not a threshold for stating an excessive force claim. Hudson,

503 U.S. at 7. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue

an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious

injury. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) (per curiam). Therefore, taken as

true, plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with regards to whether

Officer Rafalowski used excessive force for the purpose of causing plaintiff harm.

Having concluded that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Officer

Rafalowski used excessive force against plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the

court next addresses whether he is entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of qualified

immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A

court considering a claim of qualified immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged

the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and whether such right was clearly established

such that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). Regarding the first prong,

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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the threshold question must be: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The inquiry of whether a constitutional right was clearly

established must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition. Id. at 202. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. 

The court finds granting summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is

improper in this case. A dispute of fact exists as to whether plaintiff resisted Officer Rafalowski

and whether Officer Rafalowski continuously punched plaintiff and slammed his head into the

ground without resistance from plaintiff. Resolving all factual disputes in favor of plaintiff, the

court concludes Officer Rafalowski violated plaintiff’s clearly established right to be free from

excessive force. See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (“the law

regarding a prison guard’s use of excessive force was clearly established by 1994”). Granting

summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is “improper if, under the plaintiff’s

version of the facts, and in light of the clearly established law, a reasonable officer could not

have believed his conduct was lawful.” Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir.

2000). Here, based on plaintiff’s version of the facts, no reasonable officer could believe that

continuously punching, and slamming an inmate’s head against a concrete floor while he lay

prone on the ground was permitted under the Eighth Amendment. 

In sum, accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, there is a genuine issue of fact as to

whether Officer Rafalowski violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, Officer

Rafalowski is not entitled to summary judgment. 

B. Correctional Officer Clemons

Plaintiff claims that Officer Clemons failed to intervene and prevent Officer Rafalowski’s

use of excessive force. (Compl. at 6.) Defendants contend that because Officer Rafalowski used

minimal force, Officer Clemons had no duty to intervene and in the alternative that Officer 

Clemons is entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 8-14.) 

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials intervene on behalf of a prisoner if 

he has knowledge that other officers are violating the prisoner’s constitutional rights. See

Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995). In the context of police officers, this

duty extends only to an officer that is aware of a specific risk of harm to the plaintiff and if he

has a reasonable opportunity to intervene. Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The Ninth Circuit has clarified that the opportunity to intervene is also necessary in the context

of prison guards. See Robins, 60 F.3d at 1442. Thus, to prevail on a motion for summary

judgment, the moving party carries the burden of demonstrating that the officer had no

reasonable opportunity to intervene. Id. (denying motion for summary judgment because

“officers failed to carry their burden” of showing that they could not have prevented use of

excessive force). 

Here, all parties agree that Officer Clemons assisted in escorting plaintiff from the

showers back to his cell and was present immediately before and after plaintiff’s initial attack. 

(Compl. at 6; Decl. Clemons at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Clemons “observed

Rafalowski’s use of excessive force.” (Compl. at 6.) The evidence, taken in the light most

favorable to plaintiff, indicates that Officer Clemons was with Officer Rafalowski as he

allegedly punched and slammed plaintiff’s head into the ground. Moreover, defendants do not

allege that Officer Clemons lacked the opportunity to intervene. Because Officer Clemons has

failed to carry his burden of showing that he could not have prevented Officer Rafalowski’s

conduct, plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Officer Clemons had an opportunity to intervene and failed to do so. Robins, 60 F.3d at

1442.

Having concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Officer

Clemons failed to intervene, the court next addresses whether he is entitled to qualified

immunity. It is clearly established that prison guards have a duty to stop constitutional

violations at the hands of other guards. Id. at 1442. Here, resolving all factual disputes in favor

of plaintiff, the court concludes that a reasonable officer would know that failing to intervene

while another officer continuously punched and slammed plaintiff’s head against a concrete floor

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3

 Defendants also contend that Officer Ramey is protected by the doctrine of qualified

immunity. Because the court finds that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on other

grounds, the court need not reach the question of qualified immunity.

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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was clearly unlawful. Accordingly, Officer Clemons is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

In sum, accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all inferences therefrom in 

his favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Clemons violated

plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights. Therefore, Officer Clemons is not entitled to

summary judgment either on the grounds of qualified immunity or on the grounds that he did not

violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

C. Correctional Officer Ramey

Plaintiff claims Officer Ramey acted with deliberate indifference to his safety by failing

to record the incident in question with the unit camcorder. (Compl. at 7.) At the time of the

altercation Officer Ramey was stationed in the control booth, an enclosed area above the unit. 

(Decl. Rafalowski at 3.) Defendants do not dispute that a camcorder was readily available. 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the

plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected

right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). “A person deprives another ‘of a

constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that

causes the deprivation of which [] the plaintiff complains []’”. Id. at 633 (internal citations

omitted). 

Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, fail to demonstrate a violation of his federally

protected rights. Plaintiff does not allege Officer Ramey failed to take action to stop the

altercation only that it was unreasonable for him not to record the incident. However, plaintiff

offers no evidence that Officer Ramey was under an obligation to record the event or that PBSP

has a policy of recording similar altercations. Because plaintiff has not alleged any facts, even if

true, that indicate Officer Ramey proximately caused his injuries or failed to take an action

which he was legally required to, summary judgment with respect to Officer Ramey is granted.3

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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III. Referral to Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program

Prior to setting this matter for trial and appointing pro bono counsel to represent plaintiff

for that purpose, the court finds good cause to refer this matter to Judge Vadas pursuant to the

Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program for settlement proceedings on the claims set forth above. 

The proceedings will consist of one or more conferences as determined by Judge Vadas. The

conferences shall be conducted with defendants Officer Rafalowski and Officer Clemons, or

their representatives, attending by videoconferencing if they so choose. If these settlement

proceedings do not resolve this matter, the court will then set this matter for trial and consider a

motion from plaintiff for appointment of counsel. 

CONCLUSION

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. The motion is granted as to all claims against defendant Officer Ramey. The motion is

denied as to all claims against defendants Officer Rafalowski and Officer Clemons. Plaintiff has

set forth a genuine triable issue as to whether defendant Officer Rafalowski’s use of force was

excessive and whether defendant Officer Clemons was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s

safety by failing to intervene. 

2. The instant case is REFERRED to Judge Vadas pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner

Settlement Program for settlement proceedings on the remaining claims in this action, as

described above. The proceedings shall take place within ninety (90) days of the filing date of

this order. Judge Vadas shall coordinate a time and date for a settlement conference with all

interested parties or their representatives and, within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the

settlement proceedings, file with the court a report regarding the prisoner settlement proceedings. 

If these settlement proceedings to do not resolve this matter, plaintiff can file a renewed motion

for appointment of counsel and the court will then set this matter for trial. 

 3. The clerk of the court shall mail a copy of the court file, including a copy of 

this order, to Judge Vadas in Eureka, California. 

 4. The instant case is STAYED pending the settlement conference proceedings. 

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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring Case to Pro Se

Prisoner Settlement Program 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _________________ RONALD M. WHYTE

 United States District Judge

7/30/10

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