Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00532/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00532-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The Court provided Plaintiff notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960

(9th Cir. 1998), regarding his obligation to respond. (Doc. 78.)

SVK

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Danny Monts, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-0532-PHX-FJM (ECV)

ORDER

Plaintiff Danny Monts filed this pro se civil rights action against employees of the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO). (Docs. 13, 79.) Plaintiff’s action arose out of

the denial of his request for a kosher diet (Count I) and an incident of alleged excessive force

(Count IV). The remaining Defendants—Gregory Millard, Commander; Howard Tabaknek,

Cantor; and Tim Burke, Detention Officer—move for summary judgment.1

 (Doc. 75.) 

The Court will deny the motion as to Count I and grant it as to Count IV.

I. Count I—Kosher Diet (Defendants Millard and Tabaknek)

A. Legal Standards

1. Free Exercise

To prevail on a First Amendment, free-exercise-of-religion claim, a plaintiff must

show as a threshold matter that a defendant burdened the practice of plaintiff’s religion by

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The screening Order identifies claims under RLUIPA and the First Amendment;

however, in his response, Plaintiff does not make an argument under RLUIPA, although he

disputes that Defendants meet a least-restrictive-means test, which is a RLUIPA standard.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). (Doc. 94 at 11.) 

- 2 -

preventing him from engaging in conduct that is rooted in a sincerely held religious belief.

Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). Regulations that impinge on the

First Amendment right to free exercise will be upheld if they are reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To determine

whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, we

consider (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the regulation and the

legitimate governmental interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the

right that remain open to inmates; (3) the impact of the desired accommodation on guards,

other inmates, and prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives. Id. at 90. An

inmate need not show that the regulation impinges on a central tenet of his faith; he need only

show that it impedes the exercise of a sincerely held religious belief. Shakur, 514 F.3d at

885. 

2. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)2

The Court need not consider a claim under RLUIPA. Plaintiff is not entitled to

injunctive relief because he is no longer in the custody of MCSO. See Rhodes v. Robinson,

408 F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, damages are not available under RLUIPA

against Defendants in their individual capacity, and Plaintiff makes no official-capacity

claim. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1660 (2011). 

B. Parties Contentions

In November 2009, while an inmate in MCSO jails, Plaintiff first requested a kosher

diet, asserting that he is an Orthodox Jew. (DSOF ¶¶ 1, 2, 12, 14.) Although Plaintiff had

been previously incarcerated in MCSO jails, he had never before declared his faith as Jewish

or requested a kosher diet. (DSOF ¶¶ 6, 7; PSOF ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff claims that he became

interested in the Jewish religion after his father passed away in October 2006. (DSOF ¶¶ 13,

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

14, 15; PSOF ¶12.) He began to look into the Jewish faith in 2007 or 2008. (DSOF ¶ 12;

PSOF ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff believes that, although he is not a member of a synagogue, he is Jewish

because his father was Jewish. (DSOF ¶¶ 18, 46, 51, 61; PSOF ¶¶ 18, 46, 51.) He asserts

that his father was not a member of a synagogue, but he practiced Judaism, although not

regularly. (PSOF ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was not raised Jewish, but instead was raised by his

mother, a southern Baptist. (DSOF ¶ 19.) 

When Plaintiff requested a kosher diet, he was asked to provide information to support

the sincerity of his belief in Judaism. (DSOF ¶ 16; PSOF ¶ 16.) Under MCSO policy,

sincerity of belief can be established in a number of ways, including confirmation from a

rabbi, affidavit of a family member who affirms the practice of the Jewish faith, or heredity

as recognized by birth from a Jewish woman. (DSOF ¶ 17.) Defendant Millard, the MCSO

volunteer rabbi, made an effort to confirm Plaintiff’s faith. (DSOF ¶ 22.) Millard contacted

an independent rabbi, Marc Shipkin, to interview Plaintiff. Rabbi Shipkin determined that

Plaintiff was not Jewish under Jewish Law. (DSOF ¶ 22; PSOF ¶ 22.) Plaintiff contacted

Rabbi Damsky and Rabbi Rosenberg to assist him in obtaining a kosher diet. (DSOF ¶¶ 25,

35; PSOF ¶¶ 25, 35.) Rabbi Damsky learned that Plaintiff was not born into the Jewish faith,

and though he had some Jewish learning, he had never converted. (DSOF ¶¶ 29, 30, 31, 32.)

Plaintiff next contacted Rabbi Rosenberg and spoke about his beliefs; Plaintiff asked the

rabbi to help him obtain a kosher diet and Matzah. (DSOF ¶ 35; PSOF ¶ 35.) According to

Defendants, Rabbi Rosenberg concluded that Plaintiff was not Jewish, so he refused to assist

Plaintiff with his request for Matzah for Passover. (DSOF ¶¶ 37, 38.)

Plaintiff also asked Cantor Tabaknek about becoming Jewish, and Cantor Tabaknek

explained to Plaintiff that he could not convert while he was incarcerated. (DSOF ¶ 44;

PSOF ¶ 44.) To convert to Orthodox Jew takes considerably more study than either Reform

Movement or Conservative. The rigorous process of conversion can take up to two years.

(DSOF ¶¶ 45, 58, 59; PSOF ¶¶ 8, 59.) 

C. Analysis

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

a. Sincerely Held Beliefs

If the request for a particular diet is not the result of a sincerely held religious belief,

the First Amendment imposes no obligation on the prison to honor the request. Plaintiff

contends that he sincerely adheres to the beliefs of Judaism, one of which is that an orthodox

Jew must only consume kosher food.

Defendants counter that Plaintiff has failed to establish a sincerely held belief in the

religious necessity of eating a kosher diet. They assert that three independent rabbis

interviewed Plaintiff and determined that he is not Jewish. Defendants are correct that First

Amendment protection requires a sincerely held belief rooted in religion, but Defendants

conflate the sincerity of belief with Plaintiff’s membership in a congregation or with an

ecclesiastical question—whether Plaintiff is a Jew under Jewish law. It is only the sincerity

of one’s belief that is relevant to the free-exercise inquiry. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. 

In Jackson v. Mann, the Second Circuit rejected a district court’s reliance on a rabbi’s

determination that an inmate was not Jewish for purposes of a prison’s kosher-diet program.

The Second Circuit reasoned that whether an inmate’s beliefs are entitled to First

Amendment protection turns on whether those beliefs are sincerely held, not on an

ecclesiastical question whether the inmate is a Jew under Jewish law. 196 F.3d 316, 320-21

(2nd Cir. 1999); see also Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593-94 (2d Cir. 2003) (the role

a religious feast played in a prisoner’s practice of Islam determined whether there had been

a substantial burden to his religious practice, not the testimony of Muslim clerics as to the

proper celebration of the feast); Kroger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding

that “clergy opinion has generally been deemed insufficient to override a prisoner’s sincerely

held religious belief”); Reiss v. Stansel, 2011 WL 2111999, * 5 (D. Ariz. May 26, 2011).

Here, it appears that the rabbis were not assessing the sincerity of Plaintiff’s belief

but rather, reaching an ecclesiastical determination under Jewish Law. While membership

in an organized religion is relevant to the question of sincerity of beliefs, it is not

determinative. As the Supreme Court has stated “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to

question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Hernandez v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 490

U.S. 680, 699 (1989). “The right to the free exercise of religion is . . . the right of a human

being to respond to what that person’s conscience says is the dictate of God.” Ward v.

Walsh,1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993). 

In addition to the statements of the rabbis and the lack of an affidavit from a

synagogue, Defendants cite Plaintiff’s repeated purchases of non-kosher foods from the

prison canteen, smuggling of non-kosher meat, and his failure to repent his sins to a cantor

or rabbi. (Doc. 103; ref. Doc. 76, DSOF ¶¶ 65-66, 68.) Plaintiff counters that he did not

purchase non-kosher food for his own consumption, and that he has repented his sins and

asked for forgiveness on numerous occasions, including Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur

2009. Id. ¶¶ 21-23. In addition, Plaintiff offers evidence that he has attended classes of

Torah and Bible study offered by Tabaknek, id. ¶ 20, that he asked Rabbi Damsky to study

Judaism with him, id. ¶ 13; Doc. 76, Ex. E. Damsky Decl. ¶ 12, and that he asked Tabaknek

to assist him in completing the conversion process. (DSOF ¶ 44.) Thus, Plaintiff offers

evidence that he has repeatedly requested a kosher diet, he has studied Judaism, and he has

attempted to undertake the studies that the rabbis consider necessary for conversion.

The sincerity of beliefs is often a question of fact not appropriate for decision at

summary judgment. In Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second

Circuit reasoned that scrutiny of a prisoner’s sincerity is a means of “differentiating between

beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are animated by motives of

deceptions and fraud.” Id. 

While Plaintiff’s case is weak, his repeated efforts to obtain a kosher diet, his studies,

and his requests for conversion to satisfy jail officials create a triable issue of fact as to the

sincerity of his beliefs. See Reiss, 2011 WL 2111999, * 7.

b. Legitimate Penological Justification

Defendants argue that, even if it is assumed that Plaintiff has met his threshold burden

of showing that a defendant has burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from

engaging in conduct that is rooted in a sincerely held religious belief, they have met the

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Turner factors. They assert that the jail has a compelling governmental interest in running

a simplified food service and a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its religious

diet program and avoiding the appearance of favoritism which could cause security problems,

including risk to the safety of the Chaplains, officers, and inmates. (Doc. 75 at 11.)

Defendants’ justification for refusing to provide Plaintiff a kosher diet is that they reasonably

restrict kosher meals to those inmates with a sincerely held religious belief. But, as

discussed, the Court will deny Defendants’ summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff’s

sincerely held belief. Moreover, Defendants offer only conclusory statements from Millard

as evidence of risk to anyone’s safety. (See Doc. 76, Ex. 2, Millard Decl. ¶ 5.) In addition,

it is undisputed that Defendants already offer a kosher diet. If Plaintiff’s request for such a

diet is a sincerely held religious belief, denying Plaintiff’s request cannot be justified by an

interest in running a simplified food service or the integrity of the religious diet program.

As to the alternative means of practicing his religion—the second Turner factor,

Defendants assert that Plaintiff could study the Torah, wear a Yarmulke, engage in Bible

study, observe Jewish holy days, and receive a vegetarian diet. (Doc. 75 at 11.) But the

evidence cited by Defendants shows only that Plaintiff was permitted to wear a Yarmulke

in his cell and to fast when he asked to do so. (DSOF ¶ 23, Ex. 2, Millard Decl. ¶14.)

Plaintiff claims that Tabaknek had Plaintiff’s Torah confiscated and that without the Torah,

wearing the Yarmulke is “void” because Plaintiff could not study his Torah. (Doc. 94 at 9,

Doc. 97, Ex. 20, Inmate Grievance.) Thus, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, there is a disputed issue of fact as to the availability of some of the alternative

means to practice his religion. 

Regarding the third Turner factor–the impact an accommodation will have on guards,

other inmates, and prison resources–Defendants argue that providing a kosher meal to a nonJewish inmate will arouse jealousy and envy among other inmates who might perceive the

prison as showing favoritism. But the favoritism argument has been discounted because the

argument “is present in every case that requires special accommodations for adherents to

particular religious practices.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 886. Defendants present no other

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

evidence or argument to support the third Turner factor. 

The fourth factor—the absence of ready alternatives—also does not weigh in

Defendants’ favor. Plaintiff suggests, for example, that he could provide his own affidavit

of sincerity. (Doc. 94 at 11, citing Kroger, 523 F. 3d at 801 (indicating that written

verification need not be from a clergy member and could be from the prisoner but that prison

officials could require that such a verification be accompanied by other indicia of a sincerely

held belief)).

Finally, contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, a plaintiff in a § 1983 need only show a

municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the plaintiff’s injury if the plaintiff seeks to

impose liability on a municipality. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 403.

On the record before us, we must deny Defendants’ request for summary judgment

on Count I. 

II. Count IV—Excessive Force (Defendant Burke)

A. Legal Standard

The Fourth Amendment establishes the constitutional parameters for claims of

excessive force during pretrial detention. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th

Cir. 2003) (citing Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002)). The

relevant question is whether the force used “was objectively reasonable ‘in light of the facts

and circumstances confronting [the officers], without regard to their underlying intent or

motivation.’” Gregory v. County of Maui, 523 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). 

To determine the “reasonableness” of a particular action, a court must balance the

nature and quality of the intrusion against the countervailing governmental interests.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the use of reasonable

force. Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006).

Moreover, [t]he “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Id. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97

(citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has clarified the summary judgment standard for excessive-force

claims, rejecting the argument that the question of objective reasonableness is “a question

of fact best reserved for a jury.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007). “At the

summary judgment stage . . . once we have determined the relevant set of facts and drawn

all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record . . . the

reasonableness of [the defendant’s] actions . . . is a pure question of law.” Id.

B. Parties’ Contentions

Some of the events are captured on video, which Defendants provide to the Court.

(Doc. 76, Ex. 11.) The DVD shows five scenes. (DSOF ¶ 81; PSOF ¶ 81.) Plaintiff asserts

that Burke used excessive force when he cuffed Plaintiff, slammed him into a wall twice, and

when he took the cuffs off. (PSOF ¶ 82.) 

Plaintiff was housed at Towers Jail when he was ordered moved to a new unit. (DSOF

¶¶ 71, 72; PSOF ¶ 72.) Plaintiff was ordered to “roll up” his belongings for the move. He did

not comply, stating he had a medical issue with his back. (DSOF ¶ 72-73; PSOF ¶¶ 72-73.)

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff used foul language and told the officers that they would have

to move the items. (Doc. 76, Ex. 10, Burke Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was

agitated. (DSOF ¶ 78.) Plaintiff claims that he was upset because he was being told to

jeopardize his health in order to move. (PSOF ¶ 78.) When Plaintiff continued to refuse the

order, Defendant approached him, ordered him to get his belongings, and when Plaintiff did

not comply, Defendant took Plaintiff by the wrist and moved Plaintiff to the Pod wall to hand

cuff him. (DSOF ¶¶ 74, 77, 88.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant “slammed” him into the wall

and cuffed him. (PSOF ¶ 77.) 

Plaintiff further asserts that after being removed from the pod, he was “slammed” into

the wall in the core area and that this is not captured on the video. (PSOF ¶ 89.) Defendant

attests that he placed Plaintiff against the wall and instructed him not to move. (Doc. 76, Ex.

10, Burke Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant also attests that he was concerned for the safety of the

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

officers because of Plaintiff’s agitated behavior. Id. Plaintiff claims that as Defendant

escorted him through the breezeway, Defendant jerked Plaintiff from side to side. (PSOF ¶

93.) Plaintiff also claims that when he was placed in a holding cell, Defendant kneed him in

the back. (PSOF ¶ 95.) Defendant attests that he placed Plaintiff against the wall in the

holding cell in order to safely remove the cuffs and that after removing one cuff, Plaintiff

pulled his other arm away, so Defendant pushed Plaintiff against the wall more firmly to

regain control and remove the cuff. (Doc. 76, Ex. 10, Burke Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.) 

Plaintiff contends that he suffered head injuries, bumps and bruises, shoulder pain, and

further injury to his back, and he was not seen by medical staff for three days. (PSOF ¶ 97.)

3. Analysis

The Court will grant summary judgment to Defendant. Insofar as the relevant events

are captured on video, the video surveillance footage shows that no excessive force was used

on Plaintiff, and Plaintiff fails to create a triable issue of fact that the remainder of the alleged

force was unreasonable.

As noted, Fourth Amendment analysis of excessive force requires a court to balance

the “nature and quality of the intrusion” on a person’s liberty with the “countervailing

governmental interests at stake” to determine whether the use of force was objectively

reasonable under the circumstances. Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343

F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The objectivereasonableness inquiry under Graham involves a three-step analysis. Miller v. Clark County,

340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). First, the court must evaluate the type and amount of force

used. Next, it must assess the importance of the governmental interests at stake by

considering the factors set out in Graham—the severity of the crime, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

resisting or attempting to evade arrest. Finally, the court must balance the “gravity of the

intrusion on the individual against the government’s need for the intrusion.” Id. The need for

force is at the heart of Graham. Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1057 (citation omitted). 

a. Type and Amount of Force

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

The Court has reviewed the video surveillance footage. (See Doc. 76, Ex. 11.) During

the initial encounter, Defendant does not “slam” Plaintiff into the wall nor does he jerk

Plaintiff’s arms in applying the hand cuffs; rather, Defendant pulls Plaintiff out of his chair

and moves him toward the wall. There is no incident as Defendant escorts the Plaintiff out

of the pod and down a hallway. It does not appear to the Court that Defendant jerks Plaintiff

from side to side but rather that Plaintiff pulls away. In sum, insofar as the events are shown

on the video, Plaintiff’s version of events is not supported by the video tape evidence. See

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. 

Plaintiff asserts that he received unspecified head injuries, bumps and bruises, and

shoulder pain, but he provides no evidence of the nature of the injuries or evidence of lasting

effect. The extent of injury can be evidence of the amount of force used. Schwenk v.

Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2000). Even assuming some bruising and pain,

the Court finds that the force used was minimal. 

b. Government Interest

Next, the Court considers the government’s interests, especially in light of the Graham

factors. Although Plaintiff asserts that he did not comply with the order because of a medical

issue, he admits his failure to comply. (PSOF ¶¶72-73.) The video shows that other inmates

were in the area when Plaintiff refused to obey the order. It is beyond dispute that

“maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential

goals” for jail officials and security personnel. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).

The need to restore order in a jail does not depend on an actual fight or obvious imminent

danger. Plaintiff does not deny that he used foul language, that he was upset, or that he

refused to move his belongings. The possibility that Plaintiff would continue to refuse to obey

the order and cause disruption was sufficient to justify the use of some force. 

The most important Graham factor is whether a suspect posed an immediate threat to

the safety of the officers or others. Miller, 340 F.3d at 964. Defendant attests that he was

concerned for officer safety due to Plaintiff’s agitated state. Although Plaintiff argues that

the safety of others was of no concern to Defendant and that Defendant acted for the sole

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

purpose of causing harm (Doc. 94 at 13), this is mere speculation by Plaintiff and insufficient

to defeat summary judgment. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989);

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Likewise, Defendant

asserts that when they were in the holding cell and he attempted to remove the cuffs, Plaintiff

pulled his arm away, which necessitated additional force to regain control. Plaintiff does not

deny pulling his arm away from Defendant. And Plaintiff’s suggestion that another officer

present did not use his radio because he knew that Defendant’s action was excessive is mere

speculation. Even assuming that Defendant kneed Plaintiff, the Court finds that this factor

weighs in favor of the government. 

The third Graham factor is whether Plaintiff was actively resisting. Plaintiff admits

that he refused the order to roll up his belongings and does not deny pulling his arm away as

Defendant attempted to remove the cuff. Thus, the third Graham factor weighs in the

government’s favor.

The Court finds that the government had a significant interest in maintaining order by

securing and removing Plaintiff and placing him in a holding cell.

c. Balancing the Force Against the Need for Force

Finally, the Court holds that the force used was reasonably necessary under the

circumstances. The required determination—balancing the force used against the

government’s interest—“must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . The calculus of reasonableness must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.

 As noted, the video does not support Plaintiff’s version of the force used, and Plaintiff

fails to show that the other alleged force was unreasonable. The force used was minimal, and,

balanced against the need for force, it was appropriate. Plaintiff complains that Defendant

could have acted differently when initially securing Plaintiff by securing the pod first and then

restraining Plaintiff. (Doc. 94 at 19.) But the appropriate inquiry is whether the officer acted

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

reasonably, not whether he had a less intrusive alternatives available to him. See Scott v.

Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994). The Fourth Amendment does not require that officers

use the least amount of force necessary. Mattos v. Agarano, 590 F.3d 1082, 1088-89 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citing Scott, 39 F.3d at 915). 

The Court will grant summary judgment to Burke and dismiss Count IV.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 75) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling (Doc. 104).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75) is granted in part and

denied in part as follows:

(a) granted as to the claim for excessive force; and

(b) denied in all other respects.

(3) Count IV and Burke are dismissed. 

(4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling (Doc. 104) is granted as set forth in this Order.

(5) The remaining claim is the First Amendment claim for damages regarding denial

of a kosher diet. It is exceedingly weak.

DATED this 18th day of January, 2012.

Case 2:10-cv-00532-FJM Document 105 Filed 01/19/12 Page 12 of 12