Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01317/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01317-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Hubert Washington, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 13-01317-TUC-BPV 

ORDER 

 

 Petitioner has filed a pro se Petition under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254 for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. (Doc. 1). Respondents initially filed a “Limited Answer” wherein they argued 

that Petitioner’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and, alternatively, were 

procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 12). This Court determined that the Petition was timely 

filed, but dismissed Ground One (b) and Grounds Two and Three as procedurally 

defaulted and directed Respondents to file an answer addressing the merits of Ground 

One (a) and (c).1

 (Doc. 18). Respondents have now filed their Supplemental Answer 

 

1

 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c)(1), all parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for any and all further proceedings in this case, including trial and entry of a final judgment, with direct review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals if an appeal is filed. (Docs. 15, 16). 

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(Doc. 19) and Petitioner has filed a Reply to Respondents’ Supplemental Answer. (Doc. 

20). Petitioner has also filed a Motion Requesting Release from Prison Pending the 

Court’s Ruling (Doc. 21) which Respondents oppose (Doc. 22). For the reasons discussed 

below, the Court: (1) denies Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; and (2) 

denies Petitioner’s Motion Requesting Release from Prison Pending the Court’s Ruling. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 Petitioner stands convicted of two counts of sexual assault. (See Doc. 12, Exh. J at 

2). He was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling twelve years and three months. 

(Doc. 12, Exh. J at 2). The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows: 

[Petitioner] gave the victim, his cousin, a ride and engaged in a series of 

sexual acts with him. The acts took place in a van and at an apartment, in 

the shower and on the bed. The victim repeatedly told [Petitioner] that he 

did not want to engage in the behavior and tried to push him away. After 

[Petitioner] dropped him back off near his place of work, the victim called 

the police and reported the attacks. [Petitioner] was charged with three 

counts of sexual assault, and a jury found him guilty on two of those 

counts. 

Id. 

 As discussed in further detail in this Court’s January 22, 2015 Order, Petitioner, 

through counsel, filed an appeal raising three issues. (Doc. 18 (citing Doc. 12, Exh. G)). 

The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentences and the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for review. (Doc. 12, Exhs. G, J, M). 

 Additionally, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Rule 32 Petition for PostConviction Relief (“PCR Petition”) alleging that he was deprived of his state and federal 

constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel because: (1) trial counsel failed to 

object to the jury instruction that defined sexual assault incorrectly by eliminating the 

mens rea as to the lack of consent, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise this issue as fundamental error; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to improper vouching by the prosecutor during closing argument. (Doc. 12, Exh. 

Q). The trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (Doc. 12, Exh. U.). 

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Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for rehearing, which the trial court denied. 

(Doc. 12, Exhs. V, W). 

 Through counsel, Petitioner filed a petition for appellate court review of the trial 

court’s denial of his PCR Petition. (Doc. 12, Exh. X). After permitting Petitioner to file 

supplemental authority in support of his argument that the jury instruction given by the 

trial court constituted fundamental error, the appellate court granted review, but denied 

relief. (Doc. 12, Exh. CC). The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review. (Doc. 12, Exh. FF). 

 As discussed in this Court’s January 22, 2015 Order, at issue are Petitioner’s 

claims raised in his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that: (1) “the Prosecutor 

misled the jury on the law she claimed I violated by leaving out, Intentionally or 

Knowingly, from [A.R.S. §] 13-1406, any variation on what’s already written is a 

violation of my fifth and fourteenth Amendment rights, and my attorney, knew the 

Prosecutor was going to do this because it was discussed between the judge, Prosecutor, 

and Mr. Kingston my defence [sic] attorney[]” (Ground One (a)); and (2) trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor vouching for the 

victim by invoking the victim’s call to the 911 operator during closing argument (Ground 

One c)). (Doc. 1 at 6). The Court directed the parties to address the merits of these 

claims in their supplemental briefing.2

 (Doc. 18 at 13). 

 

2

 Although Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondent’s Supplemental Answer (Doc. 20), the majority of Petitioner’s comments address his contention that PCR counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements regarding the victim’s inability to consent to the sexual acts due 

to mental impairment, as alleged in Ground One (b) of his federal habeas petition. This Court previously held that Ground One (b) is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 18 at 11–12). To the extent Petitioner is alleging the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as a new claim, he 

has failed to seek leave to amend his Petition to include such a claim. Further, 

amendment would be futile as the claim is untimely and Petitioner cannot raise ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as a freestanding constitutional claim. See Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756–57 (1991) (“a criminal defendant has no right to counsel beyond his first appeal in pursuing state discretionary or collateral review[.]”); Martinez 

v. Ryan, U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). Moreover at this point in the proceeding, any argument about PCR counsel’s conduct is not properly before the Court given that the parties were granted leave to file supplemental briefing to address Ground One (a) 

and (c) only. (Doc. 18 at 13). 

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II. DISCUSSION 

 A. STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF HABEAS CLAIMS ON THE MERITS

 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), this Court 

may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the 

merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim 

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. at § 2254(d)(2). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first 

identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the 

claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court which existed at the time the petitioner’s state court 

conviction became final. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citing Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778–79 (2010)); 

see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2006). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the 

Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle 

advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. Williams,

529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77. Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court 

authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law 

is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark v. 

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 

 Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas 

court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from 

[the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . 

case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

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new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to 

a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to 

find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 

2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely 

incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

 The Supreme Court has emphasized that “an unreasonable application of federal 

law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 

(emphasis in original). Under AEDPA, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the 

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. Accordingly, to obtain 

habeas relief from this Court, Petitioner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the 

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103; see Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1225–1226 

(10th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f all fairminded jurists would agree the state court decision was 

incorrect, then it was unreasonable . . . If, however, some fairminded jurists could 

possibly agree with the state court decision, then it was not unreasonable and the writ 

should be denied.”). 

 With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual 

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable 

in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding[.]” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). A “state-court factual determination is not unreasonable 

merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the 

first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Even if “[r]easonable minds 

reviewing the record might disagree” about the finding in question, “on habeas review 

that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s . . . determination.” Rice v. Collins, 546 

U.S. 333, 341–342 (2006); see Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) 

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(explaining that on habeas review a court “cannot find that the state court made an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in this case simply because [the court] would 

reverse in similar circumstances if th[e] case came before [it] on direct appeal”). 

 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, to find that a factual determination is 

unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2), the court must be “convinced that an appellate panel, 

applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the 

finding is supported by the record.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 

2004), abrogated on other grounds as discussed in Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 

999–1000 (9th Cir. 2014). “This is a daunting standard—one that will be satisfied in 

relatively few cases.” Id.

 The petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the state court's factual findings “by 

clear and convincing evidence.” § 2254(e)(1). The Supreme Court has not defined the 

precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1), but has clarified “‘that a 

state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas 

court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.’” See Burt v. Titlow, 

__ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (quoting Wood, 558 U.S. at 293, 301). 

 Significantly, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before 

the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 

170, 182; see Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d at 998 (“Along with the significant deference 

AEDPA requires us to afford state courts’ decisions, AEDPA also restricts the scope of 

the evidence that we can rely on in the normal course of discharging our responsibilities 

under § 2254(d)(1).”). The Ninth Circuit has observed that “Pinholster and the statutory 

text make clear that this evidentiary limitation is applicable to § 2254(d)(2) claims as 

well.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993 n. 6 (2013) (citing § 2254(d)(2) and 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 184 n. 7). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit has explained: 

[F]or claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court, petitioners 

can rely only on the record before the state court in order to satisfy the 

requirements of § 2254(d). This effectively precludes federal evidentiary 

hearings for such claims because the evidence adduced during habeas 

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proceedings in federal court could not be considered in evaluating whether 

the claim meets the requirements of § 2254(d). 

Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 993–94 (internal citation omitted). 

B. STANDARD FOR ASSESSING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, the 

petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687–88. 

 To satisfy Strickland’s first prong, the petitioner “must overcome the presumption 

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action []might be considered sound trial 

strategy.[]” Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to Strickland’s

second prong, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice by “show[ing] that there is 

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

 The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be 

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 

counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at 

the time.” Id. at 689; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) 

(“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.”); Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 

893 (9th Cir. 2010). When the standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) apply in 

tandem, review is “doubly” deferential. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations and quotations 

omitted). “[T]he question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable . . . [but] 

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard.” Id. See also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

 1. GROUND ONE (A)

 In Ground One (a), Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

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to object to the jury instruction on sexual assault, A.R.S. ' 13-1406, which omitted 

“Intentionally or Knowingly”. (Doc. 1 at 6). 

 a. THE STATE COURT PROCEEDING

 In his PCR Petition, Petitioner claimed that the jury instruction defining sexual 

assault under A.R.S. § 13-1406(A) was deficient because it did not state that a person 

must know that the other person did not consent to the sexual conduct. (Doc. 12, Exh. Q 

at 2–3). A.R.S. ' 13-1406(A) provides that: “A person commits sexual assault by 

intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any 

person without consent of such person.” (Doc. 12, Exh. U at 3). In Petitioner’s case, the 

trial court instructed the jury as follows: 

 The crime of sexual assault requires proof of the following: 

1. The defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in either sexual 

intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person; and 

2. The sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact was without the 

consent of such person. 

(RT 1/30/09 at 25).3

 

 Petitioner argued in his PCR petition that the instruction allowed the jury to find 

him guilty so long as it found that the victim had not consented to the sexual contact, 

regardless of whether Petitioner knew of the lack of consent. (See Doc. 19 at 5; Doc. 12, 

Exh. Q at 3). Petitioner went on to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the instruction that Petitioner contended resulted in relieving the prosecution of 

its burden of proving all elements of the offense. (See Doc. 19 at 5; Doc. 12, Exh. Q at 

4). Petitioner also argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 

issue on direct appeal. (See Doc. 19 at 5; Doc. 12, Exh. Q at 5). 

 The trial court, citing Strickland among other cases, summarily denied Petitioner’s 

claim. The court pointed out that the instruction given “was nearly verbatim[] to the 

elements of A.R.S. '13-1406 as described by the Arizona Supreme Court, including 

 

3

 The trial transcripts cited in this Order are in the record as exhibits to 

Respondents’ Supplemental Answer (Doc. 19). 

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keeping the ‘consent’ element separate from the ‘knowingly’ element.” (Doc. 12, Exh. U 

at 5). The court went on to state: 

 Further, there is no factual issue that the contact was without the 

consent of the victim. In fact, the Court of Appeals [on direct appeal] 

specifically found that Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the acts 

were consensual, and that the victim had specifically testified that the acts 

were not consensual. Petitioner’s Petition, Exh. E at 8: &16. The Court of 

Appeals stated clearly: “beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would not 

have accepted the consent defense in any event . . . id. Therefore, even if 

the instruction issue . . . was improper, the error was certainly harmless, and 

did not prejudice the Petitioner . . . .Thus, trial and appellate counsel were 

neither ineffective, nor caused the petitioner prejudice. . . .” 

(Id.). 

 While Petitioner’s petition for review of the trial court’s denial of his PCR Petition 

was pending, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the same sexual 

assault instruction that was given in Petitioner’s case did not “properly instruct on the 

mens rea applicable to the consent element of the crime. . . .The instruction thus 

improperly relieved the State of its burden of proving an element of the offense, in 

violation of [defendant’s] constitutional right to have a jury determine his guilt as to 

every element of the crime.” State v. Kemper, 229 Ariz. 105, 106–07, 271 P.3d 484, 

485–86 (App. 2011). Petitioner’s PCR counsel filed a motion to permit supplemental 

citation of legal authority on review to inform the appellate court about the Kemper

decision, and the appellate court granted the motion. (Doc. 12, Exhs. Y, Z). 

 The appellate court granted review but denied relief. In doing so, the court 

pointed out that the instruction was “nearly identical to the instruction contained in the 

Revised Arizona Jury Instruction (Criminal) (‘RAJI’)...” at the time of Petitioner’s trial. 

(Doc. 12, Exh. CC at 4). The court also acknowledged that in light of the Kemper

decision, Petitioner’s “trial and appellate counsel had available an apparently meritorious 

claim that the jury instruction incorrectly stated the law.” (Id.). However, the court went 

on to state that the “mere fact that counsel forgoes a meritorious claim does not establish 

that counsel’s conduct fell below prevailing professional norms. The Sixth Amendment 

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does not entitle a defendant to mistake-free representation.” (Id.) (citations omitted). 

The court held that Petitioner failed to establish that his attorneys’ conduct fell below 

prevailing professional norms given that Petitioner did not present any support for his 

allegation “that counsel’s failure to object to, or raise on appeal an argument related to, a 

standard RAJI instruction that is clearly applicable to the case falls below prevailing 

professional norms.” (Id. at 5). The court also pointed out that “[a]t the time of trial and 

during his appeal, [Petitioner’s] counsel did not have the benefit of Kemper’s direct 

holding that an identical instruction was fundamental error. Cf. [State v. Febles, 210 

Ariz. 589, &24, 115 P.3d 629, 636 (App. 2005)] (‘There is a difference between 

ignorance of controlling authority and the failure of an attorney to foresee future 

developments in the law’).” (Id.) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The court 

stated that based on the existing case law at the time, “counsel might have determined 

that an objection or appellate argument based on the jury instruction would not have been 

successful.” (Id. at 5–6). The court also recognized that the decision to winnow out 

weaker arguments on appeal to focus on those more likely to prevail is an acceptable 

exercise of professional judgment. (Id. at 6) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the 

appellate court held that that Petitioner failed to “establish a colorable claim that his 

counsels’ conduct fell below prevailing professional norms. . . .” (Id.). 

 b. ANALYSIS

 In Petitioner’s case, the trial and appellate courts cited Strickland when evaluating 

the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Doc. 12, Exhs. U, CC). The state 

court, in applying Strickland, applied the correct law to the issue. See Dows v. Wood, 211 

F.3d 480, 484–85 (9th Cir. 2000) (Strickland “is considered in this circuit to be ‘clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ for 

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) review.”). Moreover, the state court’s adjudication of 

Petitioner’s claim was not an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. 

 As the state court recognized, under the Strickland analysis, the issue is whether 

“counsel made errors so serious . . .” that “counsel’s representation fell below an 

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objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687–688. The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, 

but, rather, whether the decisions made by defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. 

Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering this factor, counsel is 

strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

690. “The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s 

perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the 

standard of review is highly deferential.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 

(1986). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every 

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 

 In following Strickland’s direction to evaluate counsel’s conduct at the time of 

alleged error, the state court reasonably concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that 

either trial counsel’s or appellate counsel’s conduct was deficient. At the time of 

Petitioner’s trial and appeal, Kemper had not yet been decided. There is no dispute that 

the instruction given in Petitioner’s case was virtually identical to the standard instruction 

set out in the RAJI. Nor is it disputed that Petitioner failed to submit any evidence or 

authority that would support a conclusion that counsel’s performance falls below 

professional prevailing norms when counsel fails to challenge a standard RAJI instruction 

that is clearly applicable to the case. Additionally, as the state court pointed out, at least 

one other Arizona case had already “rejected an argument that a jury instruction arguably 

similar to the one given [in Petitioner’s case] . . . was defective in part because the jury 

was instructed that ‘knowingly’ applies to the ‘conduct or circumstances constituting the 

offense.’” (Doc. 12, Exh. CC at 6 (citing State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305, 309, 856 P.2d 

1183, 1187 (App. 1993)).4

 Thus, even had counsel perceived a potential claim related to 

 

4

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the instruction, it was reasonable for counsel to determine that such a challenge would 

not be successful in light of the status of the law at the time. Indeed, the trial court when 

denying Petitioner’s PCR Petition, prior to issuance of the Kemper decision, rejected 

Petitioner’s argument that mens rea should have been included in both elements of the 

sexual assault instruction. (Doc. 12, Exh. U at 4–5 (citing Witwer, 175 Ariz. at 308, 856 

P.2d at 1186, among other cases)). 

 On the instant record, the state court ruling on this issue was not contrary to, nor 

an unreasonable application, of Strickland. Nor did the state court’s ruling result in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented during the state court proceeding. 

 2. GROUND ONE (C)

 Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the 

prosecutor vouched for the victim during closing argument with reference to the victim’s 

911 call. (Doc. 1 at 6). 

 a. THE STATE COURT PROCEEDING

 The victim, whose first name is Marcus, testified that after he was sexually 

assaulted, Petitioner dropped him off at “First and Grant” [a location near Marcus’s place 

of employment], and Marcus then “called the cops.” (RT 1/28/09 at 82; see also id. at 

81, 87). When asked whether he told “the cops what happened[]”, Marcus answered 

“Yes.”5

 (Id. at 82–83). Marcus also testified that he gave the 911 operator Petitioner’s 

 not adequate, and that the judge should also have [instructed that:] . . . ‘Without consent’ 

means that the Defendant was aware or believed that the other person was coerced by the immediate or threatened use of force . . . .” Witwer, 175 Ariz. at 308, 856 P.2d at 1186.

In later determining that the sexual assault RAJI was erroneous, the Kemper court noted 

that “[t]he superior court was not asked to instruct jurors about the ‘without consent’ 

definition contained in A.R.S. ['] 13–1401(5). Whether such an instruction would have 

cured the deficiency in the sexual assault RAJI is a question we need not decide. Standing alone, the RAJI was clearly inadequate and legally erroneous.” Kemper, 229 Ariz. at 107 

n.2, 271 P.3d at 486 n.2. Respondents assert that because Petitioner’s jury received an additional instruction on the definition of “without consent” that was not given in 

Kemper, Petitioner’s situation is not identical to that in Kemper. (Doc. 19, at 6; see also RT 1/30/09 at 25). 

5

 Marcus testified as follows: 

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license plate number. (Id. at 125). Samuel Thompson, who was a police officer at the 

time of the incident, testified that he responded to Marcus’s 911 call reporting a sexual 

assault. (Id. at 138–39). 

 In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 

 Some of you may be thinking that it couldn’t be rape because we 

heard from Marcus. We saw him testify. And he was confused in some 

[sic] his answers. And, gee, it sounds like he will say whatever the person 

who is asking him the questions wants him to say. And I want to address 

that, ladies and gentlemen. 

 I want to address that and remind you of the very first call that 

Marcus made, the 911 call. In that call, he reports the rape. He reports the 

acts, the oral sex, the anal sex, and he reports that his cousin was the 

perpetrator. 

 He also gives the 911 operator the defendant’s license plate number 

and tells that operator where the defendant lives, the location. 

 Now, in that call, ladies and gentlemen, there was nobody asking 

him leading questions. There was nobody suggesting answers to him. He 

provided that information because that was based on the experience that he 

had just had with his cousin, the defendant. 

(RT 1/30/09 at 29). 

 Later in the closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 

Marcus finally has a chance to get away from that apartment, and, within an 

hour, we heard Marcus makes that call to 911. He makes that call to 911, 

and he gives the operator those details that I just recounted for you. And 

the event was fresh in his mind. It wasn’t almost a year-and-a-half later as 

it was when you heard him testify. The event was fresh. He recounted 

 

Q. [prosecutor:] So once you get back in the van, he drops you 

 off at First and Grant? 

A. [Marcus:] Yes. 

Q. When he drops you off, what is the very next 

 thing you do? 

A. I called the cops. 

Q. Do you tell the cops what happened? 

A. Yes. 

(RT 1/28/09 at 82). Marcus went on to testify that when he was interviewed by the 

police, he told them where Petitioner lived and described Petitioner’s apartment and van. 

(RT 1/28/09 at 82–83). 

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those details because that is what he had experienced at the hands of the 

defendant, his cousin. 

(Id. at 31–32). 

 In his PCR Petition, Petitioner asserted that the prosecutor’s argument was 

improper because the victim’s statements to the 911 operator had not been admitted into 

evidence. Petitioner argued that the prosecutor’s statements “informed the jury that the 

prosecutor knew of evidence that, in her opinion, corroborated [the victim’s] testimony.” 

(Doc. 12, Exh. Q at 10). Petitioner further argued that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object on the grounds of prosecutorial vouching. (Id. at 11). 

 The trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim, finding “counsel was not ineffective as 

there was no prosecutorial vouching....” (Doc. 12, Exh. U at 8). In so holding, the trial 

court stressed that the victim 

testified that he called 911 and conducted an interview with the police 

where he described the details of what happened. . . .The Prosecutor 

prefaced the quoted “vouching” by referring to the victim’s testimony and 

how “he was confused in some [of] his answers.”. . . . By emphasizing the 

closeness in time between the assaults and the phone call to police in 

closing argument, the Prosecutor was simply addressing the issue of the 

victim’s memory problems, and the facts surrounding the phone call the 

victim made to police. 

(Id. at 7–8). The court also pointed out that the jury had been instructed that the anything 

said during closing arguments was not evidence. (Id. at 7). 

 On review, the appellate court denied relief, holding that “even assuming the 

prosecutor’s statements were improper, [Petitioner] has not demonstrated that his trial 

counsel’s performance fell below prevailing professional norms when he failed to 

object.” (Doc. 12, Exh. CC at 7). The court pointed out that counsel could have had 

strategic reasons for not objecting such as a belief that interrupting the prosecutor’s 

closing argument would distract the jury or draw attention to the purportedly improper 

comments. (Id.). 

 

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 b. ANALYSIS

 Generally, a prosecutor may not express his opinion of the defendant’s guilt or his 

belief that in the credibility of government witnesses. United States v. Necoechea, 986 

F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th 

Cir. 1991). Prosecutorial “[v]ouching consists of placing the prestige of the government 

behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that 

information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted); see also State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 423, 768 P.2d 150, 155 (1989). 

The state appellate court did not unreasonably apply Strickland in concluding that 

that trial counsel was not ineffective on this point. “Although ‘[t]he right to effective 

assistance extends to closing arguments,’ Yarborough [v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003)]. . 

., failure to object during a closing summation generally does not constitute deficient 

performance. ‘[A]bsent egregious misstatements, the failure to object during closing 

argument and opening statement is within the wide range of permissible professional 

legal conduct.’ Cunningham v. Wong, 704 F.3d 1143, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).” Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2015); see 

also Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1281 (noting that “many lawyers refrain from objecting 

during opening statement and closing argument....”)). The Supreme Court has 

“admonish[ed] that ‘courts may not indulge post hoc rationalizations for counsel’s 

decisionmaking that contradicts the available evidence of counsel’s actions.’” Zapata,

788 F.3d at 1116 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 108) (holding that counsel’s conduct fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness where counsel failed to object to 

prosecutor’s repeated remarks during rebuttal closing that were “fabricated from whole 

cloth, designed to inflame the passions of the jury and delivered in the waning moments 

of trial” and were “egregious misstatements”). 

 As set out above, although the evidence presented at trial did not include the full 

contents of the 911 call, the evidence that was presented established that following the sexual 

assaults, the victim called “the cops”, provided Petitioner’s license plate number and enough 

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information for the responding officer to know that he was responding to a sexual assault 

call. Additionally, the court had already instructed the jurors that the lawyers’ statements in 

closing argument were not evidence. The state court opined that Petitioner’s trial counsel 

may not have objected because he “may have believed interrupting the state’s closing 

argument would distract the jury or draw attention to the prosecutor’s purportedly 

improper comments.” (Doc. 12, Exh. CC at 7). On habeas review, “[t]he question is not 

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 

562 U.S. at 105. On the instant record, trial counsel’s decision not to object to the 

prosecutor’s “statements possibly to avoid highlighting them, was a reasonable strategic 

decision.” See e.g. Cunningham, 704 F.3d at 1159 (“Under Necoechea, . . .[counsel’s] 

decision not to object to . . . [the prosecutor’s] comments [in closing argument], possibly 

to avoid highlighting them, was a reasonable strategic decision.”). Consequently, the 

state court’s ruling on this issue was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application, of 

Strickland. Nor did the state court’s ruling result in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented during the state 

court proceeding. Petitioner’s Ground One (c) is without merit. 

III. PETITIONER’S MOTION REQUESTING RELEASE FROM PRISON PENDING THE 

COURT’S RULING

 Petitioner requests release from prison pending the Court’s decision on his habeas 

petition. (Doc. 21). Respondents oppose the request, stressing that Petitioner is not 

entitled to any relief under his pending Petition. (Doc. 22). As discussed above, 

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is without merit. Consequently, 

Petitioner’s instant motion is moot. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, Grounds One (a) and One (c), which are the only claims 

raised in Petitioner’s habeas petition that may be addressed on the merits, do not warrant 

habeas relief because the state court decision addressing both issues did not “result[] in a 

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decision that was contrary to, or involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor has there been any showing that the state court decision on the 

issues here “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. Additionally, Petitioner’s 

Motion Requesting Release from Prison Pending the Court’s Ruling is denied as moot. 

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEABILITY

 In the event Petitioner appeals from this Court's judgment, and in the interests of 

conserving scarce resources that otherwise might be consumed drafting an application for 

a certificate of appealability to this Court, the Court on its own initiative has evaluated 

the claims within the Petition for suitability for the issuance of a certificate of 

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed.R.App.P. 22(b); Turner v. Calderon, 281 

F.3d 851, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) may 

issue only when a petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” This showing can be established by demonstrating that “reasonable 

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been 

resolved in a different manner” or that the issues were “adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For 

procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate whether the 

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether the court's 

procedural ruling was correct. Id.

 Upon review of the record in light of the standards for granting a certificate of 

appealability, the Court concludes that a certificate shall not issue as the resolution of the 

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instant Petition is not debatable among reasonable jurists and does not deserve further 

proceedings. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED as follows: 

 (1) Petitioner’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) is DENIED with prejudice. 

 (2) A Certificate of Appeability is DENIED and shall not issue. 

 (3) Petitioner’s Motion Requesting Release from Prison Pending the Court’s 

Ruling (Doc. 21) is DENIED as moot. 

 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to close the 

file in this matter. 

 Dated this 24th day of May, 2016. 

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