Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00253/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00253-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MATTHEW ANDERSON, 

individually and on behalf of others 

similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

KIMBALL, TIREY & ST. JOHN 

LLP, and CHRISTINE RELPH, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:13-CV-253-JM (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH 

PREJUDICE 

 On January 13, 2013, Plaintiff Matthew Anderson filed a class action 

complaint against Kimball, Tirey & St. John LLP (“KTSJ”), a law firm, and 

Christine Relph, a KTSJ associate attorney, (together, “Defendants”) alleging four 

claims related to Defendants’ allegedly unfair debt collection practices. On April 

5, 2013 and again on July 9, 2013, the court granted Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss with leave to amend. On August 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed a second 

amended class action complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants. On August 12, 

2013, Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the 

following reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with 

prejudice.

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I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Matthew Anderson is an individual residing in San Diego, 

California. SAC ¶ 3. On March 27, 2007, he secured an Adjustable Rate 

Mortgage with a principal balance of $450,000 from World Savings Bank to 

purchase a home located at 4001 Shadow Rock Court, Bonita, CA 91902-3039. 

Id. ¶. As evidence of the loan, Anderson has provided the court with a Deed of 

Trust to the aforementioned house. Id. Exh. 2. 

As in the initial and first amended complaints, Anderson claims that his 

loan was improperly assigned through a practice called “robo-signing,” rendering 

the foreclosure of his home and other homes allegedly invalid. Anderson alleges 

that Defendants knew “of the non-traceability of the legal holder of the note(s) 

used to foreclosure [sic] and thereby knew or should have known that each and 

every purported [plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action] had no legal standing 

to foreclosure [sic] thereby depriving [prospective plaintiffs, such as Anderson], 

with the legal right to evict and take possession of the properties because, inter 

alia, said plaintiff could not show standing.” Id. ¶ 18.

After providing a brief history of the financial crisis and the merger of 

Wells Fargo and Wachovia, Anderson explains that the original trustee for his 

loan was improper. Id. ¶ 42. Anderson also alleges that the two different pen 

thicknesses appear on the “Declaration of Wachovia,” a document informing 

Anderson that he was in default is evidence, indicating that two people signed the 

document, though he does not explain the significance of the document. Id. ¶ 44 

and Exh. 12. He further “is informed, believes or thereon alleges that his 

handwriting expert witness will testify to a reasonable degree of expert certainty 

that the pens are different and the signatures are NOT from the same hand to show 

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that the Assistant Vice President, who he or she purported themselves to be at the 

time, had no clue what minion Lluvia Sanchez purportedly did or did not do, to 

seemingly comply with a Declaration from a non-existent entity.” Id. Anderson 

concludes that this alleged practice constitutes robo-signing. Id. 

Next, Anderson alleges that the title company, NDEX, LLC, substituted the 

trustee of his non-traceable loan/note with the intent to defraud him. Id. ¶ 45. He 

further claims that NDEX, LLC is related to a Texas law firm named Barrett, 

Daffin, Frappier, Turner & Engle LLP that handles real property and foreclosure 

cases because they are located at the same address. Id. ¶ 45. Even if true, the 

basis for Anderson’s belief that a fraud targeting him was perpetuated by one of 

these entities is unclear from the complaint. Id. ¶ 45.

After Wells Fargo foreclosed his home, Anderson claims that he was 

evicted from his home with the help of KTSJ. Id. ¶ 10. Anderson claims that the 

foreclosure and Defendants’ subsequent eviction were improper because 

Defendants acted under an invalid assignment of the Note or DOT. Id. ¶ 34.

Notably, however, Anderson never alleges that he had kept up with the payments 

on his loan. 

Anderson alleges that KTSJ and its associate, Relph, “had an affirmative 

duty to investigate, verify and secure such information and documentation that a 

reasonably prudent law firm and associate attorney with represented ‘expertise’ in 

the area of real estate, foreclosure, post foreclosure [sic] evictions, ad nauseam, to 

confirm with reasonable certainty that WELLS FARGO was in fact a ‘person’ 

entitled to enforce the note initially taken out by plaintiff such that it had 

‘standing’ to foreclose on plaintiff and to hire said experienced firm and its 

attorneys to evict the hapless victims, plaintiff herein included.” Id. ¶ 50.

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Anderson has asserted one federal law claim: violation of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Anderson has also alleged three state law 

claims: (1) violation of the Rosenthal Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1788), (2) violation of 

California Business & Professions Code § 17200 for unfair and/or fraudulent 

business practices, and (3) negligent misrepresentation. Defendants filed a motion 

to dismiss all of Anderson’s claims. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In evaluating the motion, the court 

must construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

accepting as true all material allegations in the complaint and any reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom. See, e.g., Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th 

Cir. 2003). The court should grant Rule 12(b)(6) relief only if the complaint lacks 

either a “cognizable legal theory” or facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal 

theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

A facial challenge to a law does not require further facts to be developed because 

it only constitutes a question of law. See Fortuna Enters. L.P. v. Los Angeles, 673 

F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 

However, allegations of fraud must meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 

standards, which requires allegations pertaining to “the who, what, when, where, 

and how” of the misconduct charged. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 

F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). When there are multiple defendants, “a plaintiff 

must, at a minimum, ‘identif[y] the role of [each] defendant[] in the alleged 

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fraudulent scheme.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 765 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citations omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Claim 

As explained in past orders, FDCPA was passed to prevent abusive debt 

collection practices, including the use of “false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692e. Under the FDCPA, debt collectors are prohibited from engaging in 

certain inappropriate communications with consumers, harassing or abusing 

consumers, or engaging in other unfair practices, such as collecting fees not 

specified in the agreement creating the debt. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c,1692d, and 

1692f. The FDCPA defines debt collectors as those who collect or attempt to 

collect a debt owed to another entity, although the definition carves out several 

exceptions to the definition. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. And as discussed in the 

court’s previous orders granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court agrees 

that KTSJ and Relph meet the FDCPA’s definition of debt collector. See Heintz 

v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995) (holding that the FDCPA “applies to 

attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when 

that activity consists of litigation”). 

However, the court again finds that Anderson has not adequately plead a 

violation of the FDCPA by either KTSJ or Relph because he has not asserted any 

facts establishing that the Defendants used “any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692e. Anderson’s allegations attack the validity of the underlying foreclosure, 

claiming that the note was improperly assigned. However, Anderson’s allegations 

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fail to allege any inappropriate debt collection practices by KTSJ or Relph. This 

failure to detail any unfair or fraudulent practices by KTSJ or Relph is fatal to 

Plaintiff’s claim because non-judicial foreclosures are “presumed to have been 

conducted regularly, and the burden of proof rests with the party attempting to 

rebut this presumption.” Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 198 Cal. App. 4th 

256, 271 (2011) (citing Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830 (1994)). In 

other words, KTSJ and Relph were correctly entitled to presume that the 

foreclosure of Anderson’s home was proper and failure to further analyze the 

foreclosure cannot alone constitute the basis for a claim under the FDCPA.

Defendants were not, as Anderson contends, ignoring the law; they were properly 

relying on it.

The cases cited by Anderson are inapplicable here. For example, in Alicea 

v. GE Money Bank, 2009 WL 2136969 (N.D. Cal. 2009), the court granted the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim alleging fraudulent debt practices 

on all counts. Similarly, in Marques v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage 

Corporation, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173988 (S.D. Cal. 2012), the court dismissed 

the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 

Corporation because it did not count as a debt collector, but does not engage in 

further instructive analysis. The FDCPA claims in In re MERS Litigation, 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117107 (D. Ariz. 2011), and Silving v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 

2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5287 (D. Ariz. 2012), both were dismissed for failing to 

state a claim and took place in Arizona, where applicable state foreclosure law 

differs. Without additional allegations of accompanying fraud or deceptive acts or 

inappropriate debt collection practices to bring the action under the scope of the 

FDCPA, this challenge amounts to nothing more than a challenge of the Note’s 

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assignment. Such challenges of assignment belong in state court, not federal 

court.

Anderson also lacks standing because he has again failed to allege “a 

‘concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged 

assignment.’” Silving v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5287, at 

*3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 18, 2012) (quoting In re MERS Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

117101 (D. Ariz. 2011)); see also Marques v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173988, at *12-13 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012) (concluding 

that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the foreclosure of their property based 

on the validity of the assignment because it only affected to whom the borrower 

was obliged); Fontenot, 198 Cal. App. at 271 (“[A] plaintiff in a suit for wrongful 

foreclosure has generally been required to demonstrate the alleged imperfection in 

the foreclosure process was prejudicial to the plaintiff's interests.”). Nor does a 

plaintiff “have standing to challenge the securitization of his loan because he is 

not a party to the [agreement securitizing the loans].” Halajian v. Deutsche Bank 

Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20341, at *21-22 (citing Junger v. Bank 

of Am., NA., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23917, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2012)).

The assignment and securitization of Anderson’s loan affects whether 

Anderson owed money due to his failure to fulfill his payment obligations under 

the terms of the loan; they only affected whom he was obligated to pay. See 

Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 198 Cal. App. 4th at 272 (“As to plaintiff, an 

assignment merely substituted one creditor for another, without changing her 

obligations under the note. Plaintiff effectively concedes she was in default, and 

she does not allege that the transfer . . . interfered in any manner with her payment 

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of the note.”). Anderson’s FDCPA claim is therefore dismissed for failing to 

validly plead a claim or assert standing. 

B. State Law Claims 

As no federal claims remain, the court has discretion to dismiss or retain 

Anderson’s remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Lacey

v. Maricopa Cnty., 649 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir.2011); Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 

938 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should consider judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity, and these considerations usually “will point 

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” 

Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 

Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold 

and Easement in the Cloverly Subterranean Geological Formation, 524 F.3d 1090, 

1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it 

had original jurisdiction). But here, no substantial factors favor retaining 

jurisdiction, and comity concerns dictate that these claims should be heard in state 

court. The court therefore declines to address the remaining three state law 

claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

As there appear to be no further allegations that may be advanced to cure to

/ / / 

/ / /

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the fatal defects now set forth in three orders, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED 

without leave to amend. The clerk of court is instructed to close this matter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 16, 2013 

 _________________________ 

Jeffrey T. Miller 

 United States District Judge

_________________________

Jeffrey T. Miller 

United States District Judge

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