Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01003/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01003-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 This case was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR WYATT; MARSHALL K. ) 2:06-cv-1003-GEB-DAD

MCMURRAY; CHARLES MITCHELL; )

EDGAR M. COLLINS; TERRANCE ) 

HALTIWANGER, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

COUNTY OF BUTTE and DEPUTY )

PATRICK McNELIS, )

 )

Defendants. )

 )

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint

(“Complaint”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiffs oppose the motion. For the following reasons, Defendants’

motion will be granted in part and denied in part. 

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BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs are Victor Wyatt (“Wyatt”), Marshall K. McMurray

(“McMurray”), Charles Mitchell (“Mitchell”), Edgar M. Collins

(“Collins”) and Terrance Haltiwanger (“Haltiwanger”) (collectively

“Plaintiffs”). Defendants are the County of Butte (“County”) and

Deputy Patrick McNelis (“McNelis”). Plaintiffs were arrested in 2004

or 2005 and incarcerated in the Butte County Jail. (Compl. ¶ 9.) 

Plaintiffs assert the County committed various

constitutional violations against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 during

their pre-trial detention and criminal trial proceedings, including a

denial of equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment, a violation of their right to counsel and speedy trial

under the Sixth Amendment, a violation of their right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment and to be free from excessive bail under

the Eighth Amendment and a violation of their right to due process

under the Fifth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 10-38.) Plaintiffs also allege

Defendants applied duress to harass or obtain a guilty plea; deprived

Plaintiffs of the right to a fair trial; systematically and

unreasonably deprived Plaintiffs of medical treatment during

incarceration; opened legal mail and withheld Plaintiffs’ other mail

in line with jail practice; limited their access to the jail library

and legal services (identified in the Complaint as “CLC”), also in

accord with jail practice; eavesdropped on confidential counsel

visits; and conspired with others to deprive Plaintiffs of their civil

rights. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 24, 25, 26, 33, 36.) 

Plaintiffs also allege in a vague and conclusory manner that

the County is liable for “its failure to supervise and train jail

personnel to be cognizant and respectful of the civil rights of jail

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 While the Complaint appears to assert an IIED claim against 1

the County (see Compl. ¶ 46-52), Plaintiffs state in their Opposition

that “[t]he only IIED claim is Collins versus McNelis as an

individual.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 9.) 

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detainees and to handle recurring situations which present an obvious

potential for constitutional violation in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.” (Id. ¶ 37.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert

it was “jail policy and practice . . . to disregard [civil] rights or

unevenly apply them to African American inmates.” (Id.)

Collins asserts against McNelis a § 1983 Fourth Amendment

excessive force claim and an intentional infliction of emotional

distress (“IIED”) claim. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs McMurray, Mitchell, 1

Collins and Haltiwanger allege claims against the County under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. ¶¶ 39-45.) 

DISCUSSION

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiffs

failed to (1) present a cognizable legal theory, or (2) plead

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When considering a motion to dismiss, all material allegations in the

Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).

In addition, Plaintiffs are given the benefit of every reasonable

inference that can be drawn from the allegations in their Complaint. 

Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Accordingly, a motion to dismiss must be denied “unless it appears

beyond doubt that [Plaintiffs] can prove no set of facts in support of

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[their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

I. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ claims are barred because they

failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants contend

“Plaintiffs do not allege that they have complied with the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, 42 USC § 1997e, (“PRLA”) which requires

exhaustion of jail administrative procedures prior to filing a Section

1983 claim.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 6.) Defendants also assert that

although Plaintiffs acknowledge the Butte County Jail offers a limited

avenue of redress, “[Plaintiffs] do not allege that they have

exhausted either the jail’s grievance procedures or the [State’s]

Consent Decree’s procedures to assert violations which occurred in

jail.” (Id.)

 “Section 1997e(a) creates a defense - defendants have the

burden of . . . proving the absence of exhaustion.” Wyatt v. Terhune,

315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). However, Defendants have not

proved that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See

id. at 1220 (explaining that defendants must produce adequate

documentary evidence when attempting to establish that administrative

remedies have been exhausted). Further, Defendants’ conclusory

argument about a consent decree’s procedures is insufficient to

support their motion. Accordingly, “Defendants have failed to meet

their burden of establishing that [Plaintiffs] did not exhaust

administrative remedies.” Id. 

II. County liability under Section 1983 

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim

against the County under § 1983. (Defs.’ Mot. at 2.) To state a

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claim of municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

that “his injuries were inflicted pursuant to an official county

policy or custom.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439,

1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978)). As a general rule, “a single incident of

unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under

Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused

by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be

attributed to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v.

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). “[A] claim of municipal

liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss ‘even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare

allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official

policy, custom, or practice.’” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Shah v. County of Los

Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’

claims about the manner in which guards handled their mail, interfered

with their access to the library and CLC legal services and

eavesdropped on confidential counsel visits, fail to state sufficient

facts to allege § 1983 claims against the County. 

The bare allegation that guards opened Plaintiffs’ legal

mail and withheld other mail is insufficient to state a constitutional

violation. Furthermore, a prisoner is required to allege that the

asserted limitation to “the library or [to the CLC] legal [services]

hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim” since “inmates do not

have ‘an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal

[services].’” Diaz v. Turner, 2004 WL 2165374, at *3 (N.D. Tex.

Sept. 23, 2004) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, Plaintiffs’

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allegations concerning their limited access to the jail library and

“CLC” legal services do not state a claim. Finally, the assertion

that Defendants eavesdropped on confidential counsel visits fails to

state a claim because the allegation “that a party monitored the

accused’s conversations with his attorney does not necessarily

establish a Sixth Amendment violation. Rather, the accused must

[allege], in addition, that the substance of the overheard

conversation was of some benefit to enforcement officials. Absent

this [assertion], a monitoring allegation must be denied.” Mastrian

v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1977); see also United States

v. Hernandez, 937 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he Supreme

Court has twice held that government invasion of [the attorney-client

privilege] . . . is not sufficient by itself to cause a Sixth

Amendment violation. The defendant must have been prejudiced by some

actions. Our circuit has also explicitly held that prejudice is

required.”). Since Plaintiffs have not alleged how they have been

prejudiced as a result of the eavesdropping of confidential counsel

visits, they have not stated a constitutional violation. 

Plaintiffs have also made other conclusory allegations which

are insufficient to state a Monell claim. These include allegations

that physical abuse of African Americans during their arrest is a

common occurrence in the County of Butte (Compl. ¶ 5); that Wyatt was

the victim of excessive force by C.O. McBride, an individual who is

not a party to this case (id. ¶ 37); the failure to supervise and

train jail personnel to be aware of jail detainees’ civil rights

(id.); that it was jail policy and practice to disregard, or unevenly

apply to African Americans, a state consent decree concerning rights

deriving from custody (id.); and that evidence was mishandled or

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28 This includes Plaintiffs’ excessive bail allegations which 2

are insufficient to allege a Monell claim against the County. 

7

planted in Collins’ and McMurray’s cases (id. ¶ 25). In addition,

Plaintiffs also allege that the County conspired with “prosecutors,

defense attorneys, independent contractors, investigators and judicial

officials to deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights in ways not

fully revealed or discovered to date.” (Id. ¶ 36.) These allegations

are either so vague that it is not possible to ascertain what the

claimed wrong is or they are only allegations of a single incident of

a constitutional wrong that fails to specify that it was “caused by an

existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be

attributed to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City, 471

U.S. at 823-24. 

Nor do Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning public defenders,

the district attorney and state judges state a claim against the

County under Monell, because liability only attaches if the actor

responsible for the alleged actions is a county actor. See Brewster

v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The question is

whether [the actor] is a policymaker on behalf of the state or the

county; if he is a policymaker for the state, then the county cannot

be liable for his actions.”). Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning

public defenders are not attributable to the County since the

referenced public defenders were not acting on behalf of the County

when they performed “a lawyer’s traditional function[] as counsel to a

defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.

312, 325 (1981). Nor are Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the

district attorney attributable to the County. In California, a 2

district attorney acts as a state official when involved with criminal

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proceedings in state court. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara,

2006 WL 954182, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 12, 2006) (indicating that a

district attorney was a state actor when filing charges against and

criminally prosecuting the plaintiff) (citing Weiner v. San Diego

County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)). Finally, the state

judicial officers referenced in the Complaint are also state actors. 

Petty v. Petty, 2003 WL 21262369, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2003)

(stating “judges are . . . state actors, and thus plaintiff may not

maintain a claim against the County for the judges’ actions”). 

Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were deprived of necessary

medical treatment in the jail also fail to state claims against the

County. (See Compl. ¶ 26 (asserting Plaintiffs were “systematically

and unreasonably deprived of necessary medical treatment” and “were

denied access to and the delivery of necessary medical care”).) “In

order to state a cognizable claim [of medical mistreatment], a

prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to

evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference is only

evidenced when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety; the official must be both aware of the

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Clement

v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Furthermore, “mere negligence is

insufficient for liability.” Id. Plaintiffs have failed to allege

sufficient facts to show the County acted with deliberate

indifference. 

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Collins acknowledges he was taken to the hospital and seen

in the emergency room for treatment of injuries that allegedly

resulted from an altercation with an officer. Collins asserts,

however, that when he was taken to the jail, “he received inadequate

pain medication, little care for his medical condition and no

treatment for his emotional distress following a brutal attack upon

him by arresting officers.” (Compl. ¶ 27.) Although these

allegations may amount to a showing of negligence by the jailors, they

do not show that the jailors were deliberately indifferent. On the

contrary, the Complaint explicitly states that Collins received some

medication and care for his medical condition. (Id.)

McMurray concedes he “was provided little pain relieving

medicine” but alleges he was not provided physical therapy, and his

treatment for abscesses was either delayed or not received. (Id.

¶ 31.) These allegations are insufficient to show the County acted

with deliberate indifference. In addition, McMurray’s claim that his

repeated requests for “surgical relief” were denied does not amount to

a showing of deliberate indifference because this allegation does not

show that the jailors knew, yet disregarded, an excessive risk to

McMurray’s health. (Id.) Finally, the allegation that McMurray “was

unable to receive a healthy diet in strict conformance with [the]

requirements [of a practicing vegetarian]” does not amount to a

showing of deliberate indifference. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

Mitchell alleges he had a heart condition and that “[h]is

jailors failed to take him for an evaluation, failed to comply with

his outside physician’s monitoring prescriptions, and ignored urgent

requests for treatment in a manner which could have been fatal.” 

(Id.) Mitchell also states he did not receive “appropriate care for

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his heart condition”; however, he concedes he was taken to the

hospital on two separate occasions. (Id. ¶ 32.) These allegations do

not show that the jailors were made sufficiently aware of the severity

of Mitchell’s heart condition and yet chose to disregard Mitchell’s

requests for treatment. 

Wyatt and Haltiwanger allege “claims arising from their

mental health issues.” (Id. ¶ 35.) “Wyatt alleges that his capacity

was questioned and he was required to wait many months before he went

to [Napa State Hospital]. Soon after his arrival it was clear he was

competent to stand trial and he was returned to jail and soon

thereafter released.” (Id.) These allegations fail to meet the

deliberate indifference standard. 

Haltiwanger alleges he “was deprived of his prescription

medication upon his arrest.” (Id.) However, he also asserts that

“[e]ventually [his] bipolar aspect was satisfactorily regulated by

Lithium.” (Id.) These allegations indicate that Haltiwanger’s mental

illness was treated subsequent to his arrest. These allegations do

not allege a claim under the deliberate indifference standard. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ medical treatment claims are dismissed. 

III. ADA Claims

Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ claims under the ADA should be

dismissed since Plaintiffs “do not adequately allege an ADA” “cause of

action.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 6.) Plaintiffs counter that their ADA

claims are based on a lack of accommodation for their disabilities and

lack of access to community treatment programs in the area of mental

health. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 11.) Title II of the ADA prescribes: “[N]o

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the

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benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has held that “[s]tate

prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public

entity,’” and thus the provisions of the ADA apply. Pennsylvania

Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Accordingly,

“programs or services provided at jails, prisons, and any other

‘custodial or correctional institution’” come within the scope of the

ADA. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001). 

However, none of these Plaintiffs “allege that he was denied

[accommodation or access] because of his disability.” Mark v. Imberg,

2005 WL 1587797, at *10 (W.D. Wis. July 6, 2005). Accordingly, these

ADA claims are dismissed. 

IV. Excessive Force Claim against McNelis

McNelis also moves for dismissal of Collins’ § 1983

excessive force claim. (Defs.’ Mot at 5.) Collins alleges that at

the time of his arrest, McNelis used excessive force “in applying a

taser in multiple places” and the “tasering continued after Collins

was handcuffed and in custody.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) McNelis responds that

“no facts are [pled] to support an inference that [his] use of nonlethal force was unreasonable.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 5.) 

This claim is “analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its

‘reasonableness’ standard.” Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d

804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989)). It is obvious that Collins has pled sufficient facts to

state an excessive force claim against McNelis. Therefore, the motion

to dismiss Collins’ excessive force claim is denied. 

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CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in

part and denied in part. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a

Second Amended Complaint, in which they are authorized to cure the

deficiencies of the dismissed claims, provided that the Second Amended

Complaint is filed and served within ten days of the date on which

this Order is filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 22, 2006

 

 

 

 

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