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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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.. FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Uflired Sc=~~! Appeals 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

HORACE PERKINS, JR. , ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

DARELD KERBY, Warden, ) 

) 

Respondent-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

t\.UG 6 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2228 

(D.C. No. CV 88-234-JC) 

(D. N.M.) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th · Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner Horace Perkins appeals the district court's denial 

of his habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2254. 

He asserts the same claims on appeal that were ultimately 

dismissed by the district court, namely: 1) a harsher sentence 

following appeal violated his due process rights, 2) the state 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2228 Document: 010110130256 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 1 
court lacked jurisdiction because the crime occurred on Indian 

land, 3) the state trial court's denial of his motion to suppress 

in-court identifications was error amounting to a violation of his 

due process rights, 4) his conviction on two false imprisonment 

counts was not supported by sufficient evidence and, therefore, 

was a violation of his due process rights, 5) the district court's 

summary dismissal of certain of petitioner's original habeas 

claims violated his due process rights, and 6) cumulative error 

denied petitioner a fair trial. We affirm. 1 

The facts pertinent to this appeal are few. Petitioner was 

convicted three times of various charges brought in connection 

with a robbery of the Griswold family on the Navajo reservation. 

His first two convictions were reversed and remanded following 

appeals to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. The presiding and 

sentencing judge in petitioner's first two trials was Judge Brown. 

The third trial was conducted before Judge Eastburn. Petitioner 

appealed his third conviction up to the New Mexico Supreme Court, 

without success, and also filed two state habeas petitions which 

were denied. Appellant's Brief in Chief at 3-7. 

On petition to the federal district court, prose, petitioner 

presented eight issues for review. The district court summarily 

dismissed six of those issues. Following appointment of counsel, 

petitioner was granted leave to amend his petition to include four 

additional claims. The resulting six claims were ultimately 

considered de nova by the district court, which adopted the 

1 We grant petitioner's 

cause. 

motion 

2 

for certificate of probable 

Appellate Case: 90-2228 Document: 010110130256 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 2 
magistrate judge's proposed findings 

dismissed the petition with prejudice. 

I 

and recommendations 

Id. at 7-8. 

and 

Petitioner's first claim is that he received a more severe 

sentence following appeal in violation of his due process rights. 

Id. at 2. This issue is a mixed question of law and fact, which 

we review de novo. See Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388, 1393 

(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 1490 (1990). 

Due process requires that vindictiveness "play no part" in a 

new sentence following retrial. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 

U.S. 711, 725 (1969). Pearce has been construed to apply a 

presumption of vindictiveness when a judge imposes a harsher 

sentence on a defendant after a new trial. See United States v. 

Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982). The Pearce presumption has 

been applied sparingly, however, limited to circumstances where 

there is a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness by the ultimate 

sentencing judge. See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799-800 

(1989)(citing Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984)). 

Cases subsequent to Pearce have held that where the sentence 

being challenged was meted out by a different sentencing 

authority, the presumption does not generally apply, because the 

ultimate sentencing authority "will have no personal stake in the 

prior conviction and no motivation to engage in self-vindication." 

Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27 (1973); ~ United States 

v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1482 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 

488 U.S. 1004 (1989). The Pearce presumption may apply when the 

ultimate sentencing authority and original sentencing authority 

3 

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.. differ if it is shown that the ultimate sentencing authority knew 

of the original sentence, see Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26; United 

States v. Lippert, 740 F.2d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 1218 (1985). 

Petitioner argues that the sentences to be compared are his 

first and second sentences, both imposed by Judge Brown. We 

reject this contention. The sentences arising out of petitioner's 

first and second trials are void, having been "wiped clean" 

following petitioner's successful appeals of those convictions. 

Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 25; ~ State v. Peters, 366 P.2d 148, 149 

(N.M. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 831 (1962). Petitioner's 

third sentence, which he is currently serving, is the only 

remaining valid sentence and the sentence being challenged in this 

appeal. Petitioner's third sentence was imposed by Judge 

Eastburn. Petitioner has not alleged, nor does the record 

reflect, that Judge Eastburn knew of the earlier sentences imposed 

by Judge Brown. The facts of this case, viewed together, do not 

support a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, and, therefore, 

do not give rise to the- Pearce presumption. See United States v. 

Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1521 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Where the presumption of vindictiveness is inapplicable, a 

defendant can still prevail by establishing actual vindictiveness 

on the part of the ultimate sentencing authority. Alabama, 490 

U.S. at 799-800 (citing Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569). Petitioner has 

neither established nor alleged that Judge Eastburn was motivated 

by vindictiveness in imposing his current sentence. Petitioner 

claims that Judge Brown was the "architect" of his sentence, and 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-2228 Document: 010110130256 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 4 
that Judge Eastburn "exercised no discretion," but "merely 

reimposed" Judge Brown's earlier sentence. Appellant's Brief in 

Chief at 28. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, as 

noted above, petitioner has not shown that Judge Eastburn had 

knowledge of the previous sentences; therefore, we cannot say that 

Judge Eastburn "reimposed" an earlier sentence. Second, we will 

not assume that Judge Eastburn has abrogated his discretionary 

authority, and petitioner has presented no evidence that would 

support such an assumption. See State v. Atencio, 513 P.2d 1266, 

1268 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 513 P.2d 1265 (N.M. 1973). 

Absent evidence of actual vindictiveness, petitioner's due process 

claim must fail. See Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 (1970). 

In light of the above analysis, we need not address 

petitioner's claim that his current sentence is more severe than 

his previous sentences. 

Pearce was not written with a view to protecting against 

the mere possibility that, once the slate is wiped clean 

and the prosecution begins anew, a fresh sentence may be 

higher for some valid reason associated with the need 

for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing 

process. The possibility · of a higher sentence · was 

recognized and accepted as a legitimate concomitant of 

the retr~a.l. pux:esa _ 

Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 25 (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723). 

II 

Petitioner next contends that the state court lacked 

jurisdiction over his case because the Griswold robbery occurred 

on Indian land and involved Indian interests. Petitioner does not 

allege, however, nor does the record reflect, that any person 

involved in the robbery is an Indian. Petitioner asserts that the 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-2228 Document: 010110130256 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 5 
offense involved Indian interests, 

statement in any way. We agree with 

but 

the 

does not support this 

district court that, 

under these facts, jurisdiction was proper in the state court. 

See Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2055 n.1 (1990); United States 

v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144, 1146 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1990). 

III 

Petitioner claims that the state trial court erred when it 

denied his motion to suppress any in-court identifications of him 

at trial, and that such error violated his due process rights. 

While the ultimate determination of constitutionality of 

identification procedures is subject to de novo review, Archuleta 

v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 709, 710 (10th Cir.)(citing Sumner v. Mata, 455 

U.S. 591, 597 (1982)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989), we must 

presume the underlying factual findings to be correct unless 

clearly erroneous, United States v. Berryhill, 880 F.2d 275, 280 

(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 853 (1990); Archuleta, 

864 F.2d at 711; 28 u.s.c. S 2254(d), and must view the evidence 

in a light most favorable to the government, Berryhill, 880 F.2d 

at 280. 

The test 

constitutionality 

issues: 

in this circuit for determining 

of identification procedures involves 

the 

two 

1) was the identification procedure unnecessarily suggestive; 

and 

2) if so, looking at the totality of the circumstances, was 

the identification reliable. 

Archuleta, 864 F.2d at 711. 

6 

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• 

We agree with the district court that petitioner has not 

shown that the identification procedures he challenges were 

unnecessarily suggestive. See Berryhill, 880 F.2d at 281; cf. 

Archuleta, 864 F.2d at 711 (state conceded procedure was 

unnecessarily suggestive). Accordingly, we need not examine 

petitioner's arguments about the second issue, reliability of the 

identifications. See Archuleta, 864 F.2d at 711. 

IV 

Petitioner alleges a due process violation in connection with 

his conviction of false imprisonment of the Griswolds' sons, Terry 

and Gary. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict him of these counts because neither son testified at his 

third trial. Therefore, · he claims, the trial court erred in 

failing to grant him a directed verdict of acquittal. "In 

reviewing for sufficiency, we must examine the evidence, both 

direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the 

government and determine whether a reasonable jury could find the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Petitioner argues that, lacking actual testimony from Terry 

and Gary, "no rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Griswold sons personally felt that they were confined 

against their will ..•• " Appellant's Brief in Chief at 35. 

Under New Mexico law, false imprisonment is defined as 

"intentionally confining or restraining another person without his 

consent and with knowledge that he has no lawful authority to do 

so." N.M. Stat. Ann. S 30-4-3. Petitioner essentially contends 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-2228 Document: 010110130256 Date Filed: 08/06/1991 Page: 7 
that testimony from the victim is necessary to establish these 

elements. We disagree. The jury could find petitioner guilty of 

confining the boys without their consent from evidence in the 

record of his participation in physically restraining the boys by 

tieing and gagging them and by his use of threats of violence. 

See State v. Bachicha, 808 P.2d 51, 54 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. 

denied, 807 P.2d 227 (N.M. 1991). Petitioner does not contest the 

evidence against him in any way. The evidence is sufficient to 

support the jury's finding that petitioner was guilty of false 

imprisonment of Terry and Gary Griswold. 

V 

Petitioner's fifth claim is that the district court violated 

his due process rights .when it summarily dismissed four of his 

original claims. The magistrate judge recommended that six of 

petitioner's original claims be summarily dismissed. Rec. vol. I, 

doc. 6. When petitioner failed to object within the allowable 

time period, ten days, the district court adopted the magistrate 

judge's recommendations and summarily dismissed the six claims. 

Four months later, petitioner was appointed counsel; five months 

later, petitioner filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b)(6) for reconsideration of four of the original claims, which 

the district court denied. Rec. vol. I, doc. 19. 

We review de nova the district court's decision to summarily 

dismiss claims from petitioner's original habeas petition. See 

O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 986 (1991). Petitioner contended that his 

constitutional right to confrontation was violated when a 

8 

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co-conspirator's statements were admitted at trial without a prima 

facie showing of the underlying conspiracy. Petitioner failed to 

raise this as a federal constitutional issue in his original 

petition. See Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105, 1109 n.3 (10th 

Cir. 1989). Petitioner also claimed that the prosecutor knowingly 

presented false evidence at his trial. However, the facts alleged 

in his original petition, even if true, do not support that claim. 

A habeas petition "is expected to state facts that point to a 

'real possibility of constitutional error.'" O'Bremski, 915 F.2d 

at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 

(1977)). See United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1543 (10th 

Cir. 1989)(Ebel, J., dissenting). 

Petitioner complained that a gun was improperly admitted at 

trial, in violation of Rule 11-901 of the New Mexico Rules of 

Evidence. This allegation does not state a federal habeas claim, 

~ 28 u.s.c. S 2254(a), and does not allege prejudice resulting 

from the purported error. See McFadden v. Cabana, 851 F.2d 784, 

788 (5th _Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989). Finally, 

petitioner asserted that he was deprived of the right to an 

effective appeal because tapes of the preliminary hearings were 

destroyed. However, he alleged no prejudice resulting from his 

contention that he could not cross-examine witnesses on the basis 

of their preliminary hearing testimony. See id. 

For these reasons, the above four claims from petitioner's 

original habeas petition were properly dismissed by the district 

court. 

9 

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• VI 

Petitioner's final claim is that these alleged errors, taken 

together, constitute cumulative error amounting to a violation of 

his due process rights to a fair trial. We again agree with the 

district court. Because we find no error in petitioner's 

individual claims, there can be no cumulative error. 

States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990). 

See United 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

10 

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