Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03655/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03655-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Court also sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Willits 

Unified School District without leave to amend. That ruling remains in full force. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WILLITS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et

al., 

Defendants.

 /

No. C 09-03655 JSW

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

On March 8, 2010, this Court granted Defendant Willits Charter School (“WCS”) and

Defendant Sally Rulison’s (collectively “Defendants”) motion for judgment on the pleadings

primarily on the basis that a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds and the

school would therefore be considered an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity

purposes.1

 On March 16, 2010, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a motion for

reconsideration of the order based on Plaintiff’s discovery of the Willits Charter School

Memorandum of Understanding which indicated that use of the general purpose entitlement

funding was restricted to the provision of educational services for school-age children and that

WCS operated as a California non-profit 501(c)(3) corporation with its own assets. In response,

WCS submitted a declaration from one of its founders and current business manager indicating

that the source of 92% of the WCS general fund comes from the State and that the general fund

covers the school’s costs and operating expenses, including inter alia, any general liabilities

Case 3:09-cv-03655-JSW Document 50 Filed 04/14/10 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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incurred by WCS. (Declaration of Jason Erlick at ¶¶ 1, 3, 6.) According to the holding in

Belanger v. Madera Unified School District, this funding from the State, if used to satisfy a

potential judgment, would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements for Eleventh Amendment

immunity. 963 F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1992).

As general rule, the Court may not consider matters beyond the pleadings in ruling on a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c). See Heliotrope General, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d

971, 981 n.18 (9th Cir. 1999). If however, a party submits materials that are beyond the

pleadings and the Court does not exclude the materials, the motion should be treated as a

motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and all parties

“must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the

motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides that if a party opposing summary

judgment demonstrates a need for further discovery in order to obtain facts essential to justify

the party’s opposition, the trial court may deny the motion for summary judgment or continue

the hearing to allow for such discovery.” Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998). 

When a summary judgment motion is filed early in the litigation, district court “should grant

any Rule 56(f) motion fairly freely.” Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assinibone & Sioux

Tribes of Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, (9th Cir. 2003); see also Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v.

Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although Rule 56(f) facially gives judges

discretion to disallow discovery when the non-moving party cannot yet submit evidence

supporting its opposition, the Supreme Court has restated the rule as requiring, rather than

merely permitting, discovery ‘where the non-moving party has not had the opportunity to

discover information that is essential to its opposition.’”) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986)). However, the party requesting that a court stay a motion

for summary judgment pending further discovery must submit “(a) a timely application which

(b) specifically identifies (c) relevant information, (d) where there is some basis for believing

that the information sought actually exists.” VISA Int’l Serv. Assoc. v. Bankcard Holders of

Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Case 3:09-cv-03655-JSW Document 50 Filed 04/14/10 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In her reply on the motion for reconsideration of the original order granting Defendants’

motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff somewhat obliquely refers to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(f) while claiming that it would be premature to rule on the charter school’s

funding issue as the matter is “currently in discovery.” (Reply at 2.) 

Here, the Court finds that it must convert Defendants’ original motion for judgment on

the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56. Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s passing reference to Rule 56(f) does not suffice to

constitute a formal request to continue ruling on the motion and for permission to conduct

discovery. Accordingly, the Court issues this order to show cause to Plaintiff why the motion

for summary judgment should not be granted without permitting Plaintiff to conduct further

discovery. If Plaintiff wishes to conduct further discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) , Plaintiff

must respond by no later than April 23, 2010 by submitting an application which specifically

identifies relevant information she would seek in discovery if given leave, with some basis for

believing that the information sought exists. See VISA Int’l, 784 F.2d at 1475. Based solely on

the current record, the Court is inclined to grant summary judgment in favor of WCS and

Rulison on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, because the Court must

convert the motion for judgment on the pleadings to one for summary judgment and because

Plaintiff has made an, albeit oblique, request to conduct discovery, the Court will grant Plaintiff

an opportunity to identify with specificity what she seeks to find in discovery which could

defeat the pending motion for summary judgment. Once it has received Plaintiff’s submission,

the Court will adjudicate whether there is cause to open discovery on the State funding and the

charter school’s operational issues or whether to grant summary judgment on the current

record.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-03655-JSW Document 50 Filed 04/14/10 Page 3 of 3