Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00948/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00948-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISAAC KIGONDU KINITI,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 07cv0948 J (RBB) 

 

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28

v. U.S.C. § 2241 

ALBERTO GONZALES, United States

Attorney General, et al., 

Respondents.

Now pending before this Court is Petitioner Isaac Kigondu Kiniti’s (“Petitioner”), a

prisoner held by the Department of Homeland Security, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 1.] Petitioner’s Petition challenges his

removal proceedings and detention pending removal proceedings. The Petition has been fully

briefed by the parties. After a careful consideration of the pleadings and the relevant exhibits

submitted, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES the Petition in its entirety.

Background

Petitioner is a Kenyan citizen who came to the United States as a student in 1998. (See

Pet. at 5.) On May 10, 2004, Petitioner was taken into custody by the Department of

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1

The BIA acknowledged that a remand to determine whether Petitioner’s crime was a

“particularly serious crime” would have been warranted had Petitioner made a prima facie claim for

withholding of removal, but Petitioner did not, so no remand was necessary. (See Pet. Ex. A at 4.)

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Homeland Security (“DHS”) based on his conviction for possession of a controlled substance

for sale, and removal proceedings were initiated. (See id. at 7.) On July 13, 2004, Petitioner

appeared before an immigration judge (“IJ”) and petitioned for a withholding of removal. (See

id. at 8.) The IJ denied Petitioner’s request, holding that his controlled substance conviction

was a “particularly serious crime” that rendered Petitioner ineligible for withholding of

removal. (See id. Ex. A at 2.) 

Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).

Petitioner argued that the IJ acted improperly by conducting independent research regarding

Petitioner’s family and by threatening Petitioner. See id. Petitioner also asserted that the IJ

erred in finding that Petitioner’s controlled substance conviction was a “particularly serious

crime.” (See id. Ex. A at 3.) The BIA held that even if Petitioner’s crime was not considered

a “particularly serious crime,” Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof of establishing

eligibility for withholding of removal.1 (See id. at 4.) Ultimately, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s

decision to remove Petitioner. (See id.) 

On January 25, 2005, Petitioner petitioned for review by the Ninth Circuit and obtained

a stay of removal. (See Pet’r Pet., Kiniti v. Gonzales, No. 05cv70411 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2005).)

On January 24, 2006, Respondent filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit requesting that the case

be remanded back to the BIA and held in abeyance. (See Resp’t Mot. to Remand to the BIA,

Kiniti v. Gonzales, No. 05-70411 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2006).) The Ninth Circuit denied

Respondent’s motion on May 23, 2006. (See Order Deny. Resp’t Mot. to Remand to the BIA,

Kiniti v. Gonzales, No. 05-70411 (9th Cir. May 23, 2006). 

Petitioner remained in custody during these proceedings. DHS conducted custody

reviews on April 10, 2005, August 21, 2006, and July 12, 2007. (See id. at 13, Ex. L at 1-3.)

 At these hearings, DHS determined that Petitioner should remain detained pending his petition

for review because he was both a flight risk and a danger to the community. (See id.) 

On July 17, 2006, Respondent requested and obtained from the Ninth Circuit an

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The Ninth Circuit construed Petitioner’s Motion to Deny any Late-Filed Brief by Respondent

as a Motion to Hold Respondent in Default. 

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extension for filing his opposition to Petitioner’s Petition for Review. (See Resp’t Mot. for

Ext. of Time to File, Kiniti v. Gonzales, No. 05-70411 (9th Cir. July 17, 2006).) Respondent

again filed a Motion to Remand the case to the BIA on August 21, 2006. (See Resp’t Mot. for

Remand to BIA, Kiniti v. Gonzales, No. 05-704211 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2006).) Petitioner filed

an Opposition to Respondent’s Motion on September 1, 2006, alleging that any further delay

was prejudicial to him, and that remanding the case to the BIA would be improper since the

government did not demonstrate that it intended to produce any new evidence. (See id. Ex. G

at 4-7.) The Ninth Circuit denied Respondent’s Motion on December 1, 2006, and ordered that

Respondent file his opposition by February 2, 2007. (See Order Deny. Resp’t Mot. to Remand

to the BIA, Kiniti v. Gonzales, No. 05-70411 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2006).) 

On February 21, 2007, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Expedite”2

 in the Ninth Circuit.

(See Pet. Ex. H). The Ninth Circuit denied the Motion, and ordered Respondent’s Opposition

Brief due by March 28, 2007. (See Order Den. Pet. Mot. Expedite, Kiniti v. Gonzales, No. 05-

70411 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2007).) On March 28, 2007, Respondent filed an Opposition brief.

On June 1, 2007, Petitioner filed a reply brief. As of this date, Petitioner’s case is still pending

review by the Ninth Circuit. 

Legal Standard

I. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

A federal court has jurisdiction to review a habeas petition brought by a person “held

in violation of the Constitution or laws and treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3). While this statute allows a person in custody to file a habeas petition if he alleges

that such custody violates the Constitution or federal law, habeas petitions challenging “purely

discretionary (yet arguable unwise) decisions made by the executive branch that do not involve

violations of the Constitution or federal law” are impermissible. Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298

F. 3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In the context of immigration, the scope of habeas jurisdiction is “limited to claims that

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allege constitutional or statutory error in the removal process.” Sing v. Ashcroft, 351 F. 3d

435, 439 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Gutierrez-Chavez, 298 F. 3d at 829-30). Discretionary

decisions made by the Attorney General are generally unreviewable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).

Section 1226(e) states:

The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment

regarding the application of this section shall not be

subject to review. No court may set aside any action

or decision by the Attorney General under this section

regarding the detention or release of any alien or the

grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. 

8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Accordingly, if the decision in question was an exercise of the Attorney

General’s discretionary judgment, a district court does not retain jurisdiction to review the

issue. 

Discussion

Petitioner raises the following arguments in his Petition: (1) Petitioner must be

afforded an individualized hearing to determine whether his ongoing detention is justified;

(2) the length of Petitioner’s custody is unreasonable and he should be released pursuant to

the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006); and

(3) the procedures used in determining whether Petitioner should be released pending his

appeal violate his right to due process. For the reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES

the Petition. 

I. Petitioner’s Request for an Individualized Hearing

Petitioner specifically requests that this Court order a hearing before an IJ at which

the government must demonstrate that Petitioner’s detention pending Ninth Circuit review

is justified. (See id. at 32.) However, the decision to detain Petitioner pending Ninth

Circuit review was a discretionary decision made by the Attorney General, and thus this

Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the merits of Petitioner’s claim. 

The authority of DHS to detain an alien pending judicial review is set forth in 8

U.S.C. 1226(a), which provides in pertinent part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release. On a warrant issued by the

Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained

pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed

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from the United States. Except as provided in subsection

(c) of this section [mandatory detention] and pending such

decision, the Attorney General–

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on– (A) bond of at least $1,500...

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). Petitioner cites to Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241

(9th Cir. 2005), and Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), for the

proposition that immigration detention without a meaningful custody hearing is not

permissible. (See Pet. at 33.) However, as Respondent correctly noted, both Tijani and

Nadarajah concern the duration of mandatory detention pending administrative removal

proceedings pursuant to section 1226(c). (Gov’t Return Brief at 4.) Section 1226(c)

mandates detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 517-18 (2003). Because of aggravated

felony conviction, Petitioner’s detention was mandated while he awaited an administrative

decision by the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, after the BIA issued its opinion,

Petitioner’s detention was no longer mandatory. Because Petitioner’s detention pending

judicial review was based on the Attorney General’s discretionary function pursuant to

section 1226(a) and not section 1226(c), Petitioner’s reliance on Nadarajah and Tijani is

misplaced. Section 1226(e) divests this Court of jurisdiction to review the merits of the

BIA’s decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226. To the extent that Petitioner seeks a new hearing to

replace the decision of the BIA, his claim fails. This Court DENIES this claim of the

Petition. 

II. Petitioner’s Claim that His Custody Violates Due Process

Petitioner alleges that, regardless of what procedures were employed, the sheer

length of his detention violates due process. (See Pet. at 35.) Petitioner also claims that his

detention is unconstitutional because it is prolonged and indefinite, and removal is not

likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. (See id. at 15.) 

A. Nadarajah and Zadvydas are Inapplicable to Petitioner’s Case

Petitioner argues that no statute authorizes his continued detention. (See id. at 16.) 

Petitioner points to the six-month presumptively reasonable limit on detention pending

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Petitioner was detained during administrative removal proceedings for more than six months.

Petitioner was detained from the start of his custody on May 10, 2004, until the BIA issued its decision

on January 6, 2005, a period of approximately eight months. This, however, does not affect this

Court’s analysis. (See Pet. at 9.) While Petitioner’s eight-month detention may be presumptively

unreasonable, the six month presumption does not require that an alien held longer than six months

be automatically released. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (“An alien may be held in confinement until

it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.). 

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removal proceedings established by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and

Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). (See id.) However, the six-month

presumption applies only to detention pending administrative removal proceedings. See

Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1080. The specific proceeding at issue in Nadarjah was under the

discretionary review of the Attorney General. See id. Nadarajah and Zadvydas make no

mention of a reasonable length of detention pending judicial review, nor can the Court

locate any authority addressing detention pending judicial review. Because the detention

Petitioner challenges occurred after the conclusion of the administrative removal

proceedings, the six-month presumption of reasonableness is inapplicable.3

 

B. Petitioner is Unable to Prove that there is No Significant Likelihood of His

Removal in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future

Petitioner also argues that he should be released pending Ninth Circuit review

because his removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. (See Pet. at

16.) However, the standard articulated in Zadvydas for demonstrating that removal is

unlikely is used to prove that a detention longer than the presumptively reasonable sixmonth period is unlawful. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. As noted above, the six-month

presumption is inapplicable in Petitioner’s case because he is being detained pending

judicial review, rather than administrative review. Petitioner’s reliance on Zadvydas is

therefore misplaced. 

Even if the above standard applied to Petitioner’s detention, Petitioner’s claim

would still fail. The decision as to whether Petitioner will be removed has a definitive

endpoint since review of Petitioner’s case is already pending in the Ninth Circuit. 

Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that it is unlikely that he will be removed to Kenya, noting

that Kenyan authorities have refused to issue a travel document to him without an adverse

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decision from the Ninth Circuit. (See Pet. at 27.) Petitioner’s custody review by DHS,

however, states that all that is needed upon adverse decision by the Ninth Circuit are

passport-sized photographs, a $50 money order, a Fed Ex return envelope, and travel

documents from the Kenyan government that are “readily available.” (Pet. at Ex. L.3-4.) 

Because removal is likely if the Ninth Circuit issues an adverse decision, and because

review is currently pending in the Ninth Circuit, Petitioner is unable to prove that there is

no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 

The remainder of Petitioner’s detention following the BIA’s decision is not due to

any delay in the administrative removal process, but to Petitioner’s pending Ninth Circuit

review. Petitioner assigns fault to the government for the delay in the Ninth Circuit. (See

Pet. at 36-37.) While this delay is unfortunate, there is no remedy available to Petitioner

from this Court. Petitioner has already raised the issue of delay with the Ninth Circuit in

his briefing papers, and the Ninth Circuit has ruled accordingly. (See Pet. Ex. C at 3-4; Ex.

E at 6-7; Ex G at 9-10; Ex. H at 2.) In furtherance of judicial economy, this Court cannot

review decisions made by the Ninth Circuit. 

Because this Court can only consider Petitioner’s detention pending administrative

removal proceedings, and because Petitioner is unable to prove that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, Petitioner’s claim that the

duration of his detention violates due process fails. The Court DENIES this claim of the

Petition. 

III. Petitioner’s Claim for a Violation of Procedural Due Process

Petitioner additionally claims that the procedures used in determining whether he

should be released pending Ninth Circuit review violate his right to procedural due process. 

(See Pet. at 29.) Specifically, Petitioner points to the potential for bias in the decisionmaking process, and actual bias in his case, through the behavior of both the deportation

officer and the IJ. (See id.) While section 1226(e) strips this Court of jurisdiction to review

purely discretionary decisions, it does not divest this Court of jurisdiction to hear claims

that “[the agency] somehow failed to exercise discretion in accordance with federal law or

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did so in an unconstitutional manner.” Gutierrez-Chavez, 298 F.3d at 829. A petitioner’s

allegation of a violation of the Constitution or federal statute in a section 2241 habeas

petition should not be denied review simply because the case involves a discretionary

determination. See id. Consequently, Petitioner’s claim that the discretionary process was

constitutionally flawed fits comfortably within the scope of section 2241. See id. 

Petitioner has, however, raised this issue in his appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (See

Kiniti v. Gonzales, No. 05-70411, 2007 WL 1374767 at *8 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2007).) For

reasons of judicial economy, “‘[a] district court should not entertain a habeas corpus

petition while there is an appeal pending in [the appellate court] or in the Supreme Court.’” 

United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Deeb,

944 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1991). While Pirro, involved a petitioner bringing a section

2241 petition to the district court in lieu of properly bringing a 2255 petition, the reasoning

still applies. If this Court granted Petitioner review of this claim, Petitioner would

simultaneously obtain review in both this Court and the Ninth Circuit. “This result would

eviscerate our goal of judicial economy by engaging the attention of two courts on the same

case at the same time.” Id. As such, this Court DECLINES review of Petitioner’s bias

claim, pending Ninth Circuit review. 

Conclusion

Petitioner’s claims are either without merit or are not appropriate for review by this

Court. For the reasons set forth above, this Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 6, 2008

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Brooks

 All Parties of Record

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