Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01572/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01572-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS R. LEACH

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1572 GEB DAD P 

vs.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, 

et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

This proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule

72-302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651

F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The court must also construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.

411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). 

“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Supervisory

personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory

of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the

causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. 

See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441

(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). 

In the present case, plaintiff identifies as defendants Arnold Schwarzenegger,

Governor of the State of California; James Tilton, Secretary of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); John Dovey, Director of the CDCR; and Martin Veal,

Warden at the California Medical Facility.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants have violated his Eighth Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment. More specifically, he alleges that defendants have been

negligent as well as deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, which stem from a torn anterior

cruciate ligament (“ACL”) and a torn medial meniscus.

On April 18, 2003, plaintiff was playing basketball at High Desert State Prison

when the heel of his state-issued boot came off, causing plaintiff to fall and twist his knee. 

Plaintiff went to the emergency room where Dr. John Doe 1 provided plaintiff with mild pain

medication and crutches. Plaintiff claims he was in extreme pain, could not sleep for three days,

and could barely get off the top bunk bed to use the bathroom. Plaintiff went to see Dr. John Doe

1 again and received additional mild pain medication. Dr. John Doe 1 also ordered an MRI for

plaintiff’s knee. Plaintiff alleges that he was still in constant pain after taking the additional

medication, but Dr. John Doe 1 refused to help him further until the results of the MRI came

back. 

Plaintiff underwent an MRI in July 2003. The results demonstrated that plaintiff

had a torn ACL and a torn medial meniscus. Dr. John Doe 1 scheduled an appointment for

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plaintiff to meet with an outside orthopedist, Dr. Polasca. Plaintiff saw Dr. Polasca in November

2003, and had surgery for his torn ACL and torn meniscus on December 23, 2003. Plaintiff

alleges he woke up from surgery vomiting as a result of the anesthesia, but officers immediately

brought him back to the outpatient housing unit, claiming the watch commander would be mad if

they ran into “overtime.” 

Upon return to the outpatient housing unit, plaintiff alleges that he did not receive

any of the pain medication prescribed by Dr. Polasca because officials stated they needed to go

into town to have the order filled. The doctor on duty, instead, provided plaintiff with a different

pain medication. Plaintiff alleges he was in so much pain that he began vomiting again and

urinating on himself. Plaintiff called for help, and nurse John Doe 2 arrived at plaintiff’s cell. 

Plaintiff asked for the pain medication prescribed by Dr. Polasca but was denied pain medication. 

Plaintiff also requested a sleeping pill but that too was denied. Plaintiff alleges that this type of

disregard to his serious medical condition continued for two weeks. 

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Polasca also ordered physical therapy at his clinic where

there are machines and weights designed to help individuals like plaintiff get their range of

motion back. However, plaintiff was unable to go to the clinic and instead, completed physical

therapy at the institution. Plaintiff alleges the “therapist” gave him a walker and aerobic ankle

weights. Plaintiff also alleges the “therapist” opined that plaintiff’s knee had healed “good

enough” even though plaintiff was still in pain. (Compl. at 8). 

Plaintiff was later transferred to CSP-Solano, where he tried to obtain help from

Dr. Naku and Dr. Roar, but both of them denied plaintiff physical therapy, vitamins, and

adequate pain medicine. Plaintiff alleges that he began having severe complications with his

knee, and the pain became so intense that he could not walk. Officers carried him to the clinic

emergency room. Nurse John Doe 3 provided plaintiff with Demerol to get him through the

night, but plaintiff woke up the next morning experiencing the same complications with his knee. 

Plaintiff alleges he suffered through the same complications for days. He also alleges that Dr.

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Naku wrote false information in plaintiff’s medical chart, suggesting that plaintiff was “medseeking” to get high and not to mitigate pain. 

On August 27, 2004, plaintiff received a transfer to California Medical Facility. 

He alleges that his pain continued, but no one there would help him because they assumed he

wanted pain medication to get high. On February 25, 2005, Dr. Allcheck ordered 10 days of pain

medication for plaintiff and informed him that another doctor had ordered an MRI of plaintiff’s

knee. After plaintiff experienced several “man-downs” due to knee pain, plaintiff requested and

Dr. Allcheck ordered additional pain medication for 25 more days. 

Plaintiff alleges that after visiting the Department of Mental Health for a day to

get assistance with mental problems, he found out that all of his medication was discontinued. 

As a result, plaintiff alleges he experienced additional pain, breathing problems, and chest pain. 

On April 20, 2005, plaintiff alleges he went “man-down” again for knee

complications and pain. He saw Dr. Steever, who informed plaintiff that his blood pressure was

dangerously high at 155/102. Dr. Steever then ordered blood pressure medication and additional

pain medication for 30 days. 

Plaintiff alleges that he went “man-down” on several more occasions, and officers

had to bring him to the emergency room on what seemed like a daily basis. On one of the

occasions, he saw Nurse D. Tayo-Samoni and explained that he still had not received an MRI for

his knee, so Nurse D. Tayo-Samoni re-ordered the MRI. 

On November 17, 2005, plaintiff underwent an MRI, and on December 19, 2005,

plaintiff learned that his December 23, 2003 surgery “failed,” and a “multitude of serious

problems” resulted from plaintiff walking on his knee. (Compl. at 10) On December 19, 2005,

orthopedist Dr. Kofoed ordered standard x-rays and recommended an arthroscopy under

anesthesia. (Compl. at 10). Dr. Kofoed also ordered pain mitigating vitamins, but plaintiff

alleges he never received them. 

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Plaintiff requested to see a dietician because he had gained over 50 pounds as a

result of being bed-ridden due to pain. Plaintiff also alleges that he put in a sick slip to see why

he had not received the vitamins ordered by Dr. Kofoed. Plaintiff alleges he never was seen by

anyone pursuant to that request but received $5 in charges nonetheless. On April 10, 2006,

plaintiff requested to see Chief Medical Officer Dr. Andrieson. Plaintiff alleges he received a

$5.00 charge for this visit too even though it never took place. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, compensatory damages in the amount of

$2,000,000 against each defendant jointly and severally, and punitive damages in the amount of

$750,000 against each defendant jointly and severally.

This court will recommend that this action be dismissed without prejudice to

filing a new action after plaintiff exhausts administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits

about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether

they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal of an

action. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). On plaintiff’s complaint form, Question II.C. asks

“Is the grievance process completed?” Plaintiff has checked the “No” box. In addition, plaintiff

alleges in his complaint that on April 27, 2006, he filed a 602 appeal, explaining all of the

problems he had experienced as a result of his knee injury. On June 26, 2006, plaintiff received a

response stating, among other things, that they did not have the technology at California Medical

Facility or at Queen of the Valley Hospital to complete the arthroscopy Dr. Kofoed ordered. 

Defendants claimed that they were waiting for an appointment at UCSF. Plaintiff alleges that he

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In addition, unlike the plaintiffs in Lacey and Ford, the plaintiff in this action is seeking 1

monetary damages and injunctive relief, including orders for future action related to plaintiff’s

medical care, which the administrative appeals process may be able to help provide plaintiff. For

example, plaintiff has received a partial grant on his first level appeal, and officials are

apparently attempting to secure plaintiff an appointment at UCSF for an arthroscopic procedure. 

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit K.I.(3)(a)-(b)). 

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“filed a response to the first level stating that he would be filing a civil suit directly in court based

on how long it took the defendents [sic] just to respond at the first level, which was 2 months,

and how long plaintiff has been walking on an injured knee, about 3/1/2 years.” (Compl. at 12). 

Finally, in a section titled “Exhaustion of Legal Remedies,” plaintiff explains that he filed an

appeal and received a partial grant, but in no way did it help plaintiff. Plaintiff erroneously

claims that this should be sufficient for the court. (Compl. at 13). 

Plaintiff has cited Lacey v. C.S.P. Solano Medical Staff, 990 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.

Cal. 1997) and Ford v. Page, 169 F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ill. 2001), believing that he should be

allowed to proceed in this action without exhausting administrative remedies as the plaintiffs in

those cases did. In both of those cases, the courts held, among other things, that a plaintiff who

was only seeking monetary damages were not required to exhaust the available administrative

remedies because those administrative processes available did not provide for money damages. 

Lacey, 990 F. Supp. at 1205; Ford, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 838. Plaintiff is advised that Lacey and

Ford are no longer persuasive authority because the Supreme Court has held that exhaustion of

prison administrative procedures is mandatory regardless of the relief offered through such

procedures. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). A remedy is available for purposes of

§ 1997e(a) as long as the administrative process has authority to take some action in response to

the prisoner’s grievance, even if the action that might be taken is not the remedial action sought

by the prisoner. Id. at 736. Courts may no longer read futility or other exceptions into the

statutory exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. Id. at 741 n .6. 1

Plaintiff’s response to Question II.C. on his complaint form and his discussions

about his 602 appeal demonstrate that the plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies. 

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If a court concludes, as it does here, that a prisoner has not exhausted administrative remedies,

“the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

Accordingly, this court will recommend that this action be dismissed without prejudice. 

If plaintiff decides to file a new action after the grievance process is completed on

the claims alleged in his complaint, plaintiff is advised that he must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. There can be no

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a

defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v.

Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978). For example, plaintiff identified four defendants in the caption of his complaint, but

plaintiff did not mention any of them elsewhere in his complaint. Plaintiff must allege with

particularity the overt acts each defendant engaged in to support his claims. As noted above, the

court is generally unable to hold supervisory personnel liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

employees.

Plaintiff is also advised that Eighth Amendment claims related to inadequate

medical care must satisfy a certain legal standard. Specifically, the Supreme Court has required

that the plaintiff demonstrate that his medical treatment rose to the level of “deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). In applying

this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights

have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” 

Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. 

In addition, plaintiff must specify which defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs. In his complaint, plaintiff included a series of detailed allegations about

inadequate medical care for his knee but failed to specify which of the named defendants were

indifferent to his needs. Plaintiff also named a number of doctors, nurses, officers, and other

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individuals involved in his alleged inadequate care but failed to name any of them as defendants. 

If plaintiff elects to file a new action after exhausting administrative remedies with respect to the

claims presented in this complaint, plaintiff must link his legal claims together specific

defendants and specific conduct. 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that if he decides to file a new action, he should not

include this case number on the new complaint. In addition, the new complaint should be

accompanied by a new application to proceed in forma pauperis that is up-to-date and properly

completed.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s July 17, 2006 application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied;

and

2. This action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust available

administrative remedies before bringing the action.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file

written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 27, 2007.

DAD:9

leac1572.efr

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