Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-01714/USCOURTS-ca4-06-01714-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 

INCORPORATED; CITIZENS LOCAL

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION NETWORK,

INCORPORATED,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,  No. 06-1714

v.

GASTON COPPER RECYCLING

CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(3:92-cv-02574-MJP)

Argued: September 22, 2010

Decided: January 5, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and

KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published

opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Chief

Judge Traxler and Judge Davis joined.

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 1 of 27
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jeffrey M. Gaba, GARDERE, WYNNE &

SEWELL, LLP, Dallas, Texas, for Appellant. Kathleen L.

Millian, TERRIS, PRAVLIK & MILLIAN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stacy R. Obenhaus,

GARDERE, WYNNE & SEWELL, LLP, Dallas, Texas, for

Appellant. Bruce J. Terris, Carolyn Smith Pravlik, Aamra S.

Ahmad, TERRIS, PRAVLIK & MILLIAN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

OPINION

KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider whether Friends of the Earth,

Inc. (FOE) and Citizens Local Environmental Action Network, Inc. (CLEAN), (collectively, the plaintiffs), maintained

standing to prosecute a citizen suit asserting violations of the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, against Gaston

Copper Recycling Corporation (Gaston). Before the district

court’s entry of a final judgment order, William Shealy, a

CLEAN member who had established standing on behalf of

CLEAN, passed away. In 2008, we ordered a limited remand

of this case for factual findings relating to whether the plaintiffs continued to maintain standing through other group

members after Shealy’s death. After reviewing these findings,

we now conclude that the plaintiffs established standing to

sue through FOE and CLEAN member Guy Jones.

We also consider in this appeal Gaston’s argument challenging the district court’s imposition of penalties. Gaston

argues that the district court erred: 1) in imposing penalties

against Gaston for violations not contained in the plaintiffs’

pre-suit "notice letter" required by 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b); and

2) in imposing penalties against Gaston for violations alleg2 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 2 of 27
edly "wholly past," contrary to the requirement set forth in

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,

484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987), that citizen suits brought under the

Clean Water Act may only assert ongoing violations. We hold

that the district court erred in imposing certain penalties

against Gaston. We affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s judgment, and remand the case.

I.

A.

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from a "point source" into navigable waters without a

permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c)(2)(A), 1362(7),

1362(12), 1362(14). The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) authorizes the issuance of permits for

the discharge of limited amounts of effluents.1 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342. Permit holders must comply with effluent limits and

also must comply with various monitoring, testing, and

reporting requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1318. In South Carolina,

the Department of Health and Environmental Control

(DHEC) is authorized to issue NPDES permits. See S.C. Code

Ann. § 48-1-100.

The Clean Water Act provides a mechanism for private citizen and public agency enforcement. The Act authorizes citizen suits, stating that "any citizen may commence a civil

action on his own behalf" "against any person . . . who is

alleged to be in violation of [ ] an effluent standard or limitation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). A violation of an "effluent stan1Although the Clean Water Act does not define "effluent," it does define

"effluent limitation" as "any restriction established by a State or the

Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point

sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the

ocean, including schedules of compliance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). 

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 3

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 3 of 27
dard or limitation" includes a violation of any term or

condition of an approved permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(6).

Remedies available in a citizen suit include an injunctive

award and the imposition of civil penalties. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(a).

Under the Clean Water Act, no citizen suit "may be commenced" "prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given

notice of the alleged violation" to the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the state, in which

the alleged violation occurred, and the alleged violator. 33

U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). Also, no citizen suit "may be commenced" if the EPA or the state has begun and is diligently

prosecuting an action for a violation. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(b)(1)(B).

The notice required in citizen suits "shall be given in such

manner as the Administrator [of the EPA] shall prescribe by

regulation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). The corresponding regulation states that the notice must include sufficient information

to allow the recipient 

to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order

alleged to have been violated, the activity alleged to

constitute a violation, the persons or person responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the

alleged violation, the date or dates of such violation,

and the full name, address, and telephone number of

the person giving notice.

40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a).

B.

The detailed facts of this case are set forth in two of our

prior opinions. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 263 F. App’x 348 (4th Cir. 2008)(Gaston II); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling

4 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 4 of 27
Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000)(en banc)(Gaston I). We

summarize those facts and the relevant procedural history

below.

Gaston owns a metals smelting facility in Lexington

County, South Carolina, which Gaston operated until 1995.

After 1995, Gaston continued to treat contaminated storm

water at the facility and to release this treated water into Lake

Watson, which is located on Gaston’s property. Lake Watson’s water overflow discharges into Boggy Branch, a tributary of Bull Swamp Creek. The water in that creek flows into

the North Fork of the Edisto River. The pollutants entering

the waterway from Gaston’s facility result from the contact of

rainwater with scrap metal stored by Gaston on its property.

When Gaston purchased the facility in 1990, the prior

owner had obtained a NPDES permit, which was reissued to

Gaston and was effective through March 1, 1991. Gaston was

issued a new permit (1991 permit), which contained two

phases of effluent limits. The Phase I limits were effective

beginning March 1, 1991, and the Phase II limits initially

were effective from June 1, 1992 until the permit expired.

The Phase I limits in the 1991 permit were substantially the

same as those contained in the previous permit. Those limits

applied to numerous specified pollutants. The Phase II limits

imposed more severe restrictions for specified pollutants.

The 1991 permit contained monitoring and reporting

requirements, and included a three-part schedule of compliance for Gaston to meet its Phase II effluent limits. This

schedule required that Gaston: 1) submit a preliminary engineering report by March 31, 1991; 2) submit final plans and

specifications by September 1, 1991 for any upgrade to its

wastewater treatment plant necessary to comply with the

Phase II discharge limits; and 3) begin complying with the

Phase II limits on June 1, 1992.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 5

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 5 of 27
Gaston failed to meet the September 1, 1991 deadline for

submitting final plans for the necessary plant upgrade, and

requested an extension until November 15, 1991. On September 17, 1991, DHEC, relying on Gaston’s representation that

the extension would not affect the compliance date of June 1,

1992 for Phase II limits, modified Gaston’s permit by granting the extension until November 15, 1991. In October 1991,

Gaston requested another extension, and DHEC granted an

extension until December 15, 1991, but did not modify Gaston’s permit. On December 23, 1991, Gaston submitted plans

detailing its intended improvements to the treatment plant.

In March 1992 and again in April 1992, Gaston requested

an extension of the June 1, 1992 deadline for complying with

the Phase II effluent limits. On June 15, 1992, DHEC issued

a public notice discussing Gaston’s proposal to extend that

deadline until March 14, 1993. On March 13, 1993, DHEC

modified Gaston’s permit to require that Gaston comply with

the Phase II limits by April 2, 1993. In mid-July 1992, Gaston

began construction on the upgrade of its wastewater treatment

plant.

On July 13, 1992, the plaintiffs sent Gaston a letter (the

notice letter), as required by 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), asserting

that Gaston had violated and continued to violate its permit

requirements "in at least the instances set forth in [an]

attached chronological list of permit violations." The attached

list identified eight violations of effluent limitations for flow,

mercury, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), between July

1990 and September 1991.

The plaintiffs also asserted in the notice letter that "there

appear to be instances in which the facility has failed to comply with the monitoring and reporting requirements of the permit. However, the extent of these violations cannot be

determined from the information available." The letter also

contained the plaintiffs’ allegation that Gaston failed to meet

the requirements of the schedule of compliance when Gaston

6 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 6 of 27
did not submit its final plans and specifications by September

1, 1991.

The plaintiffs further asserted that based on reports from

January 1991 through April 1992, Gaston’s facility "is not in

compliance with the Phase II limits [in effect as of June 1,

1992] because (1) the facility’s discharges have consistently

exceeded the Phase II limits and (2) the facility has not yet

implemented remedial measures which would lower the pollution levels." Therefore, the plaintiffs asserted, in "June

1992, the facility will have violated its permit limits at least

as to pH, copper, PCBs, and mercury."

The plaintiffs also stated in the notice letter that the "facility’s history of noncompliance" indicated "a strong possibility

that the facility will not comply" with any potentially revised

schedule of compliance. Thus, the plaintiffs stated that they

intended to file a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act to

ensure Gaston’s compliance with the conditions of its permit.

On September 14, 1992, the plaintiffs filed their complaint

in the district court. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged

that Gaston had discharged pollutants into a waterway in violation of its permit by failing to comply with discharge limits,

failing to monitor and report its discharge properly, and failing to adhere to its compliance schedule. The plaintiffs also

appended their notice letter to the complaint. The plaintiffs

sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as civil penalties and costs. In its answer, Gaston asserted several arguments, including that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring

the action.

After discovery was completed, the plaintiffs filed a motion

for summary judgment. In that motion, the plaintiffs asserted

that Gaston committed 349 pollutant discharge violations, 239

monitoring violations, 493 reporting violations, 54 days of

violation for failing to timely submit final improvement plans

in accordance with the schedule of compliance, and 334 violaFRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 7

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 7 of 27
tions of the schedule of compliance date for meeting the

Phase II limits. Gaston opposed the motion for summary judgment on numerous grounds but did not raise an objection to

the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ notice letter.

Although the record does not indicate that the district court

ruled directly on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the case proceeded to a bench trial in July 1995. During

this trial, the district court received evidence and heard argument regarding Gaston’s alleged violations of its permit

requirements. Gaston did not raise any objection during trial

regarding the adequacy of the plaintiff’s notice letter.

Over two years later, but before the district court entered its

judgment, the district court permitted the parties to file supplemental findings of fact. On August 27, 1997, Gaston filed

a "supplemental proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law," asserting for the first time that the district court lacked

authority to assess penalties for permit violations not alleged

in the plaintiffs’ notice letter.

In May 1998, the district court entered judgment dismissing

the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing to bring the suit. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 589, 601

(D.S.C. 1998). The plaintiffs appealed to this court.

On appeal, Gaston argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing

because they failed to establish "environmental degradation"

to the waterway and, therefore, had not demonstrated an

injury in fact. A divided panel of this court agreed with Gaston and affirmed the district court’s judgment. See Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d

107 (4th Cir. 1999)(vacated). We granted rehearing en banc,

vacated the panel’s decision, reversed the district court’s

judgment, and remanded the case. Gaston I, 204 F.3d at 155-

64.

8 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 8 of 27
On remand, the district court determined that Gaston violated its Phase I and Phase II effluent limitations for a period

of 91 days. The district court concluded that Gaston violated

Phase I discharge limits for levels of pH, cadmium, zinc, and

iron. The district court also concluded that Gaston violated

Phase II discharge limits for pH, cadmium, zinc, iron, copper,

and oil and grease. Because DHEC had delayed the effective

date of the Phase II effluent limitations, the district court held

that Gaston was not required to comply with those stricter

limits until April 2, 1993, and, therefore, was not liable for

any Phase II violations prior to that date.

The district court found that Gaston had committed 396

monitoring violations, which included monitoring frequency

violations, failure to complete required tests and periodic

sampling, "holding time violations," and other methodological

violations. The district court also found that Gaston committed 323 reporting violations, which included the failure to

report exceeded Phase I limits for pH and Phase II limits for

zinc, and failure to report monitoring violations. The district

court further found that Gaston violated its schedule of compliance for 54 days.

On July 21, 2003, the district court entered judgment

imposing a civil penalty of $2,340,000, and ordering Gaston

to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs. The district

court declined to include a penalty enhancement requested by

the plaintiffs, because the court found that Gaston had made

a good faith effort to comply with the permit requirements

and did not enjoy an economic benefit based on its noncompliance.

After the district court entered judgment, Gaston moved to

amend the judgment asserting that the court erred in imposing

penalties for "matters not covered by the notice letter." The

plaintiffs opposed this motion and asserted that Gaston had

forfeited any argument regarding the adequacy of the notice

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 9

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 9 of 27
letter by failing to raise the argument until two years after the

trial had concluded.

The plaintiffs also moved to amend the judgment to reflect

that Shealy had died prior to the judgment date, asserting that

they continued to maintain standing through members Guy

Jones and William McCullough, Jr. Gaston opposed the plaintiffs’ motion and argued that the plaintiffs no longer had

standing to prosecute the case.

In September 2005, the district court granted the plaintiffs’

motion to amend the judgment to reflect that Shealy had died,

and held that the plaintiffs had maintained standing through

Jones and McCullough. In May 2006, the district court

entered a final order, denying Gaston’s motions challenging

the plaintiffs’ demonstration of standing and the amount of

the civil penalty. The district court modified one portion of its

findings of fact by reducing the number of reporting violations from 323 to 317.

Gaston filed an appeal to this court asserting several arguments. Gaston contended that the district court did not have

jurisdiction to enter its final judgment because the plaintiffs

did not satisfy the constitutional requirements for standing

after Shealy died. Gaston also asserted that the district court

erred in imposing penalties for violations not identified in the

notice letter and for violations that were not ongoing at the

time the complaint was filed.

After considering the parties’ arguments, we entered an

unpublished per curiam opinion ordering a limited remand.

Gaston II, 263 F. App’x at 356. We ordered the remand

because the record was insufficient to determine whether the

plaintiffs had maintained standing through Jones or McCullough. Id.

On remand, the district court made additional factual findings and concluded that the plaintiffs established standing

10 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 10 of 27
based on Jones’ membership in FOE and CLEAN and his use

of the affected waters. We now consider the merits of Gaston’s appeal to this court.

II.

We first address Gaston’s argument that the plaintiffs have

failed to establish standing through their member, Jones. To

inform our discussion, we recite a brief summary of this

court’s previous consideration of the plaintiffs’ standing and

the district court’s most recent factual findings.

A.

In the district court’s initial holding in 1998 dismissing the

plaintiffs’ complaint, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to

demonstrate the requisite injury to establish standing. Gaston

Copper Recycling Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d at 601. The district

court concluded that the plaintiffs did not present evidence

concerning the chemical content of the waterways affected by

the facility’s pollutants, an increase in the salinity of the

waterways, or other negative change to the ecosystem of the

water. Id. at 601.

In Gaston I, we explained that under the recently-released

opinion in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528

U.S. 167, 181 (2000), a plaintiff is not required to show environmental harm to establish an injury in fact. Gaston I, 204

F.3d at 160-61. We concluded that CLEAN member Shealy

established an injury in fact by asserting a reasonable fear and

concern about the effects of the facility’s discharge on his use

and enjoyment of his lake, which is located four miles downstream of Gaston’s facility. Id.

Also in Gaston I, we explained that the record demonstrated that the discharges from Gaston’s facility affected or

could affect the water "a significant distance downstream" of

the facility. Id. at 158. We cited as "objective evidence," a

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 11

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 11 of 27
written response by a DHEC official to a property owner’s

question raised during the comment period for Gaston’s permit, in which the official stated:

the runoff will go to Boggy Branch to Bull Swamp

to the Edisto River. The confluence of Bull Swamp

and [the] Edisto River is 16.5 miles [from the Gaston

facility].

Id. at 158, 162.

We concluded that "the clear implication of DHEC’s

response is that [the facility’s] discharges can impact the

receiving waterway for a good distance downstream – well

past Shealy’s property and on down to the Edisto River

itself." Id. at 158. We stated that the discharge "affects or has

the potential to affect the waterway for 16.5 miles downstream" from Gaston’s facility. Id. We also observed that

Shealy’s lake was more than four times closer to the facility

than "the acknowledged outer perimeter of the discharge

zone." Id. Thus, we concluded that the district court improperly required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that "the chemical

content of the waterway was affected" by the facility, or that

there was "other negative change in the ecosystem of the

water." Id. at 159.

After the district court entered judgment on the merits

against Gaston and after Shealy’s death, we considered in

Gaston II whether the plaintiffs continued to have standing

through Jones or McCullough. Gaston II, 263 F. App’x at

353. In Gaston II, we reiterated that the plaintiffs were not

required to present evidence of actual harm to the environment so long as a direct nexus existed between the plaintiffs

and the "area of environmental impairment." Id. (quoting

Gaston I, 204 F.3d at 159). We concluded, however, that the

plaintiffs were required to show that their members Jones or

McCullough used the area affected by the challenged activity,

and that use of "an area roughly in the vicinity" of the affected

12 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 12 of 27
area was insufficient. Id. at 355 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1992)).

In describing the affected area, we noted that in Gaston I,

we described the "confluence" of Bull Swamp Creek and the

North Fork of the Edisto River as the "outer perimeter of the

discharge zone" acknowledged by DHEC. Id. at 356 (quoting

Gaston I, 204 F.3d at 158). However, in Gaston II, we

explained that this outer perimeter was not necessarily the farthest point that the runoff reached. Id. We concluded that we

were unable to determine whether Jones or McCullough 

had the requisite connection to the waters in the

affected area without knowing either that they used

the waters at the confluence of Bull Swamp Creek

and the Edisto’s North Fork, or knowing how much

farther beyond the confluence that the runoff proceeded and where, in relation to this point, the

waters that Jones and McCullough used and planned

to use were. 

Id. We therefore ordered a "limited remand" for the district

court to resolve those specific factual issues. Id.

On remand in the district court, the plaintiffs filed a motion

for summary judgment, asserting that Jones used the water in

the area of the confluence and the affected water farther

downstream from the confluence. The plaintiffs filed several

affidavits from Jones describing his use of the waterways.

After considering the parties’ pleadings and conducting a

hearing, the district court made numerous factual findings,

which included the following determinations. Since 1983,

Jones has been the president of River Runner Outdoor Center

(River Runner), a company that provides guided canoe and

kayak trips on the Edisto River and elsewhere. Jones has

guided trips on a route that begins upstream of the confluence

and continues through the waters at the confluence and farther

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 13

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 13 of 27
downstream. In recent years, River Runner has decreased the

number of trips it takes near the confluence, in part because

of concern that runoff from the Gaston facility is polluting the

area waters.

The district court also found that a substantial portion of

certain pollutants discharged by Gaston’s facility reaches the

confluence and travels the Edisto River at least 105 miles

downstream of the confluence. Jones has made many canoe

or kayak trips on the Edisto River within 105 miles downstream of the confluence.

B.

In this factual context, we now consider Gaston’s argument

that the district court erred in holding that the plaintiffs established standing through their member, Jones. We observe that

Gaston does not dispute the district court’s findings of fact

made pursuant to our limited remand. Instead, Gaston argues

that the plaintiffs failed to prove an injury in fact necessary

to establish standing because they failed to show that Jones

used an area of the water affected by the discharge. In particular, Gaston asserts that the plaintiffs did not show that the

water at the confluence of Bull Swamp Creek and the North

Fork of the Edisto River is affected by the facility’s discharge.

In response, the plaintiffs contend that they established

standing based on the district court’s factual finding that

Jones used the water at the confluence of Bull Swamp Creek

and the North Fork of the Edisto River. According to the

plaintiffs, this court previously determined that the water at

the confluence was impacted by the discharge from Gaston’s

facility. We agree with the plaintiff’s arguments.

Article III of the Constitution restricts federal courts to the

adjudication of cases and controversies. The requirement of

standing is "perhaps the most important" condition of justiciability. Gaston I, 204 F.3d at 153 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468

14 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 14 of 27
U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). This requirement ensures that a plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of a dispute, and that

judicial resolution of the dispute is appropriate. Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd., 432 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 2005).

To meet the constitutional requirement for standing, a

plaintiff must prove that: 1) he or she suffered an "injury in

fact" that is concrete and particularized, and is actual or imminent; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action

of the defendant; and 3) the injury likely will be redressed by

a favorable decision. Gaston I, 204 F.3d at 154 (citing Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). As we

explained in Gaston I, in addition to the above constitutional

standing requirements, an individual also must satisfy any

applicable statutory requirements for standing. Id. at 155.

The Clean Water Act confers standing on any "person or

persons having an interest which is or may be adversely

affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g). If a plaintiff asserting an

interest under the Clean Water Act meets the constitutional

standing requirements to satisfy Article III, then that plaintiff

satisfies the statutory threshold as well. Gaston I, 204 F.3d at

155.

An organization may have standing to sue based on an

injury to the organization itself or as a representative of its

harmed members. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

511 (1975)). To have representational standing, as asserted by

the plaintiffs in this case, an organization must show that one

of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own

right. Id. (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n,

432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).

In this case, Gaston challenges only the plaintiffs’ ability to

establish an injury in fact through their member, Jones. Therefore, we will focus our analysis on this aspect of the standing

inquiry.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 15

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 15 of 27
Injury in fact is alleged adequately by "environmental

plaintiffs" when they "aver that they use the affected area and

are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of

the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity." Laidlaw

528 U.S. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.

727, 735 (1972)). However, a plaintiff "claiming injury from

environmental damage must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly ‘in the vicinity’ of it."

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565-66 (citation omitted).

We determined in Gaston I that the objective evidence

showed that discharges from Gaston’s facility impacted the

waterway "on down to the Edisto River itself," including the

confluence of Bull Swamp Creek and the North Fork of the

Edisto River (the confluence), 16.5 miles from the Gaston

facility’s discharge point. See Gaston I, 204 F.3d at 158. In

Gaston II, we explained that we were unable to determine

whether Jones had the requisite connection to the affected

waterway because the record showed only that Jones used the

water "downstream" of Bull Swamp Creek and of the confluence. Gaston II, 263 F. App’x at 356. We particularly noted

that the record did not show whether Jones used the waters at

the confluence. Id. at 355-56.

On remand, the district court found that Jones and other

River Runner employees have conducted canoe and kayak

trips on a route beginning slightly upstream of the confluence,

continuing through the waters at the confluence, and then farther downstream. The district court found that Jones began

using the waters at the confluence for canoeing and kayaking

in the 1980s, and continued to use those waters throughout the

next two decades. The district court also found that River

Runner has decreased the number of trips it takes near the

confluence, in part because of concern that runoff from Gaston’s facility is polluting the waters in that area.

We hold that these uncontested factual findings establish

Jones’ direct connection to the use of the waters slightly

16 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 16 of 27
upstream of the confluence on Bull Swamp Creek, and

through the waters of the confluence where Bull Swamp

Creek enters the North Fork of the Edisto River. Based on our

determination in Gaston I that these waters were impacted by

the discharges from Gaston’s facility, we are now able to conclude that Jones used "area affected by the challenged activity" rather than "an area roughly in the vicinity of it." See

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565-66. In view of Jones’ use of the waters

in this area, and his reasonable concern that runoff from Gaston’s facility is polluting the waters in that area, we hold that

the plaintiffs asserted an injury in fact through their member

Jones and established standing to prosecute this suit.

III.

We next consider Gaston’s argument that the district court

erred in imposing penalties for violations of the Clean Water

Act not identified in the plaintiffs’ notice letter. Gaston asserts

that the notice letter did not allege violations of the Phase I

limits for pH, cadmium, zinc, and iron. Gaston also contends

that because it ultimately received an extension of time until

April 1993 to comply with the Phase II limitations, the plaintiffs could not have provided notice of Phase II violations at

the time they sent their notice letter in July 1992.

Additionally, Gaston asserts that the allegations in the

notice letter relating to violations of monitoring and reporting

requirements were inadequate, because those allegations did

not refer to the specific permit condition violated or to the

dates of those violations. Based on these various omissions,

Gaston contends that the plaintiffs’ notice letter did not

include sufficient information to permit Gaston to identify the

specific standard, limitation, or order violated, as required by

40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a). Therefore, according to Gaston, the district court lacked jurisdiction or otherwise erred in imposing

penalties based on the court’s finding of those violations.

In response, the plaintiffs assert that Gaston’s argument,

which essentially presents a legal defense, is not a true chalFRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 17

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 17 of 27
lenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The

plaintiffs argue that, therefore, Gaston forfeited its right to

raise this argument, because Gaston waited until two years

after the district court heard the evidence in this case to raise

the matter before the district court.

Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that they provided adequate notice to Gaston based on the information available at

the time they sent the notice letter in July 1992. Regarding the

Phase I limits, the plaintiffs assert that the notice letter

informed Gaston of a likely violation of "at least" mercury,

flow, and PCBs. The plaintiffs contend that because Gaston

had failed to report pH violations and because Gaston’s violations for cadmium, zinc, and iron occurred after the plaintiffs

filed their complaint, the plaintiffs were unable to include

these violations in the notice letter.

In addition, the plaintiffs assert that they sufficiently

addressed Gaston’s Phase II limit violations in the notice letter by stating that the facility consistently had exceeded those

limits and had not yet implemented remedial measures to

lower these pollution levels. Therefore, in their notice letter,

the plaintiffs concluded that in June 1992, Gaston will have

violated its limits "at least" as to pH, copper, PCBs, and mercury.

Finally, the plaintiffs assert that because Gaston’s monitoring and reporting data were unavailable to the plaintiffs when

they sent the notice letter, the plaintiffs’ general allegation

that Gaston failed to comply with the monitoring and reporting requirements of the permit was sufficient. The plaintiffs

contend that they were not required to wait until additional

information became available, or until Gaston committed

additional violations of its permit, to give notice and file suit

under the Clean Water Act.

In considering the parties’ arguments, we are presented

with several issues, including the alleged mandatory nature of

18 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 18 of 27
the Clean Water Act’s notice requirement, the information

that notices given under the Act must contain, and the timing

of Gaston’s challenge to the plaintiffs’ notice. We begin our

analysis by examining the plain language of the Clean Water

Act that a citizen suit may not "be commenced" before 60

days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to the EPA, to the state in which the violation occurred,

and to the alleged violator. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).

We note that the Supreme Court, in Hallstrom v. Tillamook

County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989), considered an identical statutory

notice requirement found in the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1). The Supreme

Court held that the plain language of that RCRA provision

created a mandatory condition precedent to the commencement of a citizen suit under the RCRA. Hallstrom, 493 U.S.

at 31.

In Hallstrom, the defendants asserted before trial that the

district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the

plaintiff failed to provide the required statutory notice to the

EPA and to the state of Oregon. Id. at 24. The Supreme Court

declined to decide whether the notice provision in the RCRA

was a jurisdictional or a procedural requirement, but concluded that a district court may not disregard the notice

requirements at its discretion and ordered that the case be dismissed. Id. at 31.

In addressing the RCRA statutory notice requirement, the

Supreme Court emphasized that maintaining strict compliance

with such requirements serves Congress’ goals in permitting

citizen suits for the enforcement of environmental regulations.

Id. at 29. By authorizing such citizen suits, Congress sought

to balance the benefit of encouraging citizen enforcement of

environmental regulations against the problems encountered

when excessive numbers of citizen suits are filed in the federal courts. Id.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 19

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 19 of 27
The Supreme Court further observed that statutory notice

and delay provisions like the ones found in the RCRA serve

two other important legislative objectives. Id. These provisions allow governmental agencies to take responsibility for

the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, eliminating the need for multiple citizen suits. Id. The notice and

delay requirements also provide an alleged violator the opportunity to attempt compliance with its permit restrictions,

thereby avoiding litigation based on the alleged violations.

Id.; see Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.

These legislative objectives cannot be met, however, if citizen plaintiffs are excused from providing adequate information in their pre-suit notice to enable the recipients of such

notices to identify the specific alleged violations. Thus, the

Supreme Court held in Hallstrom that the notice and delay

requirements of the RCRA are "mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit" under that statutory scheme. 493

U.S. at 31.

Applying this same reasoning, we conclude that compliance with the notice and delay provisions of § 1365(b)(1)(A)

of the Clean Water Act is a mandatory condition precedent to

the commencement of a suit under this Act. This statute

explicitly requires that "[n]otice under this subsection shall be

given in such manner as the Administrator [of the EPA] shall

prescribe by regulation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). Thus, to ensure

evenhanded application of the Clean Water Act, we further

conclude that compliance with the requirements of 40 C.F.R.

§ 135.3(a) is a mandatory condition precedent to filing suit

under the Act. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31.

We observe that our conclusion is in accord with a decision

of the Second Circuit concerning the required content of a

notice letter for citizen suits brought under the Clean Water

Act. In Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc.

v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 487-88 (2d Cir. 2001), the

court held that the notice letter must inform the alleged viola20 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 20 of 27
tor of each violation that will be targeted in the citizen suit,

and must differentiate one pollutant from another.

Although the notice requirements for citizen suits brought

under the Clean Water Act are strict and specific, we nevertheless agree with the cautionary reasoning of other circuits

warning against an overly technical application of regulatory

requirements. As these other decisions have emphasized, the

requirement of adequate notice does not mandate that citizen

plaintiffs "list every specific aspect or detail of every alleged

violation." Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995); accord

Waterkeepers N. Cal. v. AG Indus. Mfg., Inc., 375 F.3d 913,

917 (9th Cir. 2004).

Based on our holding that compliance with 40 C.F.R.

§ 135.3(a) is a mandatory condition precedent to filing suit

under the Clean Water Act, the issue of the sufficiency of the

plaintiffs’ notice letter, at its core, presents a legal defense to

the plaintiffs’ claim. However, before we examine the merits

of Gaston’s challenge, we first must decide whether Gaston

timely asserted this defense in the district court.

Although Gaston presented this defense about two years

after the evidence was heard by the district court, the determinative consideration nonetheless is whether Gaston raised its

defense before the trial was concluded in the district court.

Under Rule 12(h)(2), a legal defense challenging a claim may

be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule

7(a), or by motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule

12(c), or "at trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). Given the procedural posture of this case, the only applicable issue under

Rule 12(h)(2) is whether Gaston raised its defense "at trial."

This term is not ambiguous. In the context of a bench trial,

the term encompasses matters placed before the trial court up

to the point that the court has reached a decision on the merits

of the case. As the Third Circuit has observed, "[w]hile

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 21

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 21 of 27
authority is sparse as to what constitutes presenting a defense

‘at’ the trial, it would appear that the defense must be presented so that the court may consider whether there has been

a failure to state a claim before disposition on the merits."

Weaver v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1356, 1360 (3d Cir. 1981).

In the present case, although Gaston’s challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ notice letter was raised about two

years after the district court had concluded hearing evidence

in the case, Gaston nevertheless made this argument before

the district court disposed of the merits of the plaintiffs’ complaint. Therefore, Gaston did not waive this defense, but adequately preserved it under the requirement of Rule 12(h)(2)

that challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim must be

raised "at trial," if not before. See id.; see also Eberhardt v.

Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 871 (4th Cir.

1999.); Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 832 F.3d 1226, 1228

(10th Cir. 1987).

Because we conclude that Gaston’s defense was timely

raised, we need not determine whether the mandatory notice

requirement of § 1365(b)(1)(A) is "jurisdictional in the strict

sense of the term." See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31. Therefore,

we turn to consider whether the plaintiffs’ notice letter complied with the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a).

This regulation provides, in relevant part, that the notice

"shall include sufficient information to permit the recipient to

identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to

have been violated." 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a). Notice given by a

citizen plaintiff under the Clean Water Act thus must provide

the alleged violator with enough information to attempt to

correct the violation and avert the citizen suit. Natural Res.

Def. Council v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir.

2000); see Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting

Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir. 1997)(holding notice sufficient under Clean Water Act when notice asserted violation of

22 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 22 of 27
specific permit requirement but did not specify a particular

source point of non-compliance).

In the present case, none of the Phase I discharge violations

that the district court found concerned pollutants identified by

the plaintiffs in their notice letter. Therefore, because the

plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of 40 C.F.R.

§ 135.3(a) in their notice letter with regard to the Phase I limits, this portion of their claim cannot survive Gaston’s challenge to the adequacy of that notice.

With regard to the alleged Phase II violations, the notice

letter alleged violations for pH and copper but did not include

alleged violations for cadmium, zinc, iron, or oil and grease.

Thus, at the outset, the plaintiffs’ failure to allege Phase II

violations for cadmium, zinc, iron, or oil and grease in their

notice letter rendered their claims for these alleged violations

subject to Gaston’s attack on the adequacy of the notice letter,

and requires reversal of the Phase II violations that the district

court found involving these pollutants.

With regard to the alleged violations for pH and copper,

Gaston argues that these alleged violations of the Phase II

limitations were premature when the plaintiffs sent their

notice letter, because Gaston was given until April 1993 to

begin complying with the Phase II standards. We disagree

with Gaston on this point, because at the time the plaintiffs

sent their notice letter in July 1992, Gaston’s permit had not

been amended to extend the compliance date for the Phase II

standards. Rather, at the time the plaintiffs sent their notice

letter, Gaston still was operating under a permit that set June

1992 as the deadline for compliance with Phase II limitations.

The fact that the permit was amended about nine months

later in March 1993, to provide Gaston until April 2, 1993 to

comply with the Phase II limits, did not shield Gaston from

the specific Phase II violations alleged in the plaintiffs’ notice

letter. The sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ notice letter must be

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 23

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 23 of 27
assessed based on the facts that existed in July 1992, not on

facts that developed several months later. Therefore, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ notice letter sufficiently alleged violations of the Phase II limitations for pH and copper.2

The district court found that Gaston had violated its Phase

II permit limitations for copper on October 5, 1993 and on

March 22, 1994. The district court additionally found that

Gaston had violated its Phase II permit limitations for pH on

October 15, 1993. Because the plaintiffs’ notice letter sufficiently alleged ongoing violations relating to these pollutants,

the three particular violations identified above do not suffer

from the notice deficiency affecting the other Phase II violations that the district court found.

We next conclude that the allegations of the plaintiffs’

notice letter were insufficient to claim that Gaston had committed monitoring and reporting violations. As stated above,

the notice letter merely recited that "there appear to be

instances in which the facility has failed to comply with the

monitoring and reporting requirements of the permit." Thus,

in the absence of information indicating the nature or the

dates of such reporting and monitoring violations, Gaston was

not given adequate notice of those alleged violations.

Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that when the

plaintiffs sent their notice letter, they did not have access to

2Exhibits in the record demonstrate that in May 1992, DHEC informally

extended Gaston’s deadline for compliance with the Phase II limits until

October 1992. Later in May 1992, DHEC issued a draft modification of

Gaston’s permit extending the June 1992 compliance date until March

1993. However, this draft modification was not effective until DHEC

amended the permit in March 1993. While these facts led the district court

to hold Gaston not liable for violations of Phase II limits before April

1993, the informal extensions given by DHEC do not affect the adequacy

of the notice letter. That letter informed Gaston of current and ongoing

violations of its "approved permit" for Phase II limits regarding pH and

copper. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1), (f)(6). 

24 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 24 of 27
information that they later acquired in discovery in this case.

The plaintiffs’ lack of information before their suit was filed

cannot excuse the deficiencies in the notice letter, because

those deficiencies prevented attainment of the legislative

objectives of encouraging pre-suit governmental involvement

and securing violator compliance. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at

29.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in finding

violations that were not alleged specifically in the plaintiffs’

notice letter. These erroneous findings include all violations

of Phase I effluent limits that the district court found; all violations of Phase II effluent limits that the district court found

with the exception of three violations for pH and copper discussed above; and all the findings of reporting and monitoring

violations.

IV.

Finally, we turn to consider Gaston’s argument that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to assess penalties

for "wholly past" violations of Gaston’s permit. Gaston challenges the district court’s decision finding Gaston liable for

54 days of violations relating to its failure to timely submit its

final improvement plans. Gaston argues that because it submitted those plans on December 23, 1991, any violation of the

various deadlines had concluded before the plaintiffs filed

their complaint in September 1992.

The plaintiffs argue, however, that Gaston’s violations

were ongoing when the plaintiffs filed their complaint.

Addressing the content of the compliance schedule, the plaintiffs contend that the schedule required Gaston to meet the

Phase II limitations by June 1992, and that Gaston violated

these limitations until March 1993, several months after the

complaint was filed.

We disagree with the plaintiffs’ arguments. The arguments

are unresponsive to the issue raised by Gaston, because they

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 25

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 25 of 27
involve different alleged permit violations, rather than Gaston’s violation of the filing deadlines for submitting its schedule of compliance.

In considering the merits of Gaston’s argument, we observe

that a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims

in a citizen suit filed under the Clean Water Act that are based

on good-faith allegations of a defendant’s ongoing violation

of the Act. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64. We have instructed that

a citizen plaintiff can prove an ongoing violation:

(1) by proving violations that continue on or after the

date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could

find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations.

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,

890 F.2d 690, 693 (4th Cir. 1989). We also explained, however, that penalties may not be imposed for "wholly past violations" of one permit requirement even though violations of

a separate permit requirement are ongoing. Id. at 698.

The record before us shows that Gaston did not meet its

September 1, 1991 deadline for filing its final improvement

plans. Sixteen days later, on September 17, 1991, DHEC

granted Gaston’s request for an extension of that deadline,

and amended Gaston’s permit to reflect a new deadline of

November 15, 1991. DHEC later granted Gaston another

extension to submit its final improvement plans until December 15, 1991, but did not further modify the terms of Gaston’s

permit.

When Gaston submitted its final plans on December 23,

1991, Gaston was in violation of the November 15, 1991

deadline in the amended permit for 38 days. However, after

submitting those plans on December 23, 1991, Gaston was no

longer engaged in any ongoing violation relating to this sub26 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 26 of 27
mission requirement. Thus, at the time the plaintiffs filed their

complaint in July 1992, Gaston’s violation of this submission

requirement in the permit was "wholly past."

The fact that Gaston’s violation of the Phase II effluent limitations continued beyond the date that the complaint was

filed, and beyond the deadline imposed in the initial schedule

of compliance, does not affect our conclusion. Gaston’s

alleged violation of these effluent limitations constituted separate permit violations, which did not impact the "wholly past"

nature of Gaston’s violations for failing to timely submit its

schedule of compliance. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction

to impose penalties for the 54 days involving schedule of

compliance violations that were "wholly past" at the time the

plaintiffs filed their complaint.

V.

In conclusion, we hold that the plaintiffs maintained standing throughout their suit in the district court; that based on the

legal insufficiency of portions of the notice letter, the district

court erred in finding violations and imposing penalties for all

but the three violations for pH and copper discussed above;

and that the district court erred in assessing penalties for 54

days of violations that were "wholly past" when the plaintiffs

filed their complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the part of the

district court’s judgment relating to the Phase II violation for

pH occurring on October 15, 1993, and to the Phase II violations for copper occurring on October 5, 1993 and March 22,

1994, and the accompanying penalties imposed for those three

violations; we reverse the balance of the district court’s findings of violations and the court’s imposition of penalties for

those violations; and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, 

REVERSED IN PART, 

AND REMANDED

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH v. GASTON COPPER 27

Appeal: 06-1714 Doc: 153 Filed: 01/05/2011 Pg: 27 of 27