Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01129/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01129-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE TYLER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

RON BARNES, Warden, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:12-cv—01129-SKO-HC

ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH LEAVE

TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED PETITION

NO LATER THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS

AFTER THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS

ORDER (DOC. 1)

ORDER DISMISSING AS MOOT

PETITIONER’S MOTIONS FOR STAY AND

ABEYANCE AND HIS REQUEST TO

RESUME THE PROCEEDINGS 

(DOCS. 3, 9, 12)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO SEND

PETITIONER A BLANK PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1),

Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the United States

Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case,

including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting consent in

a signed writing filed by Petitioner on July 26, 2012 (doc. 7). 

Pending before the Court is the petition; Petitioner’s motions

for a stay, which were filed on July 11, 2012, and August 2,

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2012; and Petitioner’s motion to resume the proceedings, filed on

October 9, 2012. 

I. Screening the Petition 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” 

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; the petition must state facts

that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule

4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski v. Maass,

915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75

n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague,

conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary

dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

The Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus

either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001). A petition for habeas corpus should not be

dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no

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tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. 

Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the High Desert

State Prison (HDSP) at Susanville, California, serving a sentence

of twenty-five years to life for convictions of second degree

murder and assault causing serious harm sustained in the Superior

Court of the State of California for the County of Kern. (Pet.,

doc. 1, 1.) Petitioner alleges the following claims in the

petition: 1) the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s

Batson/Wheeler motion violated Petitioner’s rights under the

Sixth Amendment; 2) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated

by the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence

which was not accompanied by clear and appropriate factual

findings on the record; 3) trial counsel’s failure to move to

dismiss the prosecution as a constitutionally barred reprosecution after a mistrial constituted ineffective assistance

of counsel; 4) trial counsel’s failure to submit exculpatory

evidence that negated guilt (and prompted the mistrial)

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; 5) trial counsel’s

failure to investigate prosecution witnesses before they

testified constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; 6) trial

counsel’s failure to present witnesses whose testimony could show

perjury on the part of a witness for the prosecution who had been

at Petitioner’s mother’s home constituted ineffective assistance

of counsel; and 7) trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to

dismiss the criminal charges or to seek a mistrial on the basis

of the absence of evidence to support the charges constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel; and 8) appellate counsel’s

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failure to present issues of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 4-8.)

The Court notes that pursuant to the Court’s earlier order,

on August 9, 2012, Petitioner submitted a signed declaration to

cure the absence of a signature and verification in the original

petition.

II. State Law Claims 

A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a state court only on the ground that the custody is in violation

of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28

U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. –, -, 131 S.Ct. 13,

16 (2010) (per curiam). Federal habeas relief is not available

to retry a state issue that does not rise to the level of a

federal constitutional violation. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.

at 16; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Thus,

alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable

in federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623

(9th Cir. 2002). In a habeas proceeding, this Court is bound by

the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of California law

unless the interpretation is deemed untenable or a veiled attempt

to avoid review of federal questions. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255

F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001).

As to some of Petitioner’s claims, the legal basis is

unclear. This Court will construe a petition from a pro se

petitioner liberally and with deference. Maleng v. Cook, 490

U.S. 488, 493 (1989); Belgarde v. State of Montana, 123 F.3d

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1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997). However, generalized references to

concepts such as due process, double jeopardy, fundamentally fair

trial, bias, prejudice, etc., as well as similarly generalized

references to a constitution or unconstitutionality are

insufficient to set forth a federal legal basis for a claim

because such terms are also descriptive of state law grounds.

Here, it is unclear whether Petitioner’s second claim, which

refers to “due process rights” (doc. 1 at 4), is based on the

state or federal constitution. It is also uncertain whether

Petitioner’s third through eighth claims, which refer to the

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, are

intended to refer to the right to counsel guaranteed by the

Federal Constitution as distinct from the state constitution. 

As the claims now stand, it is not clear that Petitioner is

invoking federal law, as distinct from state law, as the legal

basis for the claims. However, it is possible that Petitioner

could allege federal claims if given the opportunity file a first

amended petition.

Accordingly, these claims will be dismissed with leave to

file a first amended petition. If Petitioner intends to state

federal law claims, Petitioner should augment his statement of

the claims in the first amended petition with a reference to a

specific provision of the Federal Constitution or a specific

federal statute or treaty.

III. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies and Petitioner’s 

 Motions Regarding a Stay and Abeyance of the Petition 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

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must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis for the claim. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.

1, 9-10 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

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we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001).

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Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154. 

Here, Petitioner indicated that he had presented his first

claim concerning the Batson motion to the California Supreme

Court in a petition for review, which was denied. (Doc. 1, 2.) 

However, Petitioner stated that the remainder of his claims were

raised in petitions for habeas corpus filed in the trial court

and the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth

Appellate District. Petitioner admitted that he had filed a

petition in the California Supreme Court and that it was pending,

but he did not indicate that the court had ruled upon it. (Id.

at 2-3.)

Likewise, in his motions for stay and abeyance of the

petition, Petitioner stated that his habeas petition was pending

in the state’s highest court, and he requested a stay until the

California Supreme Court issued a judgment. (Doc. 3, 1.) Thus,

Petitioner’s original petition constitutes a “mixed” petition

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. 

However, in a request filed on October 9, 2012, Petitioner

requested that the habeas proceedings resume because the

California Supreme Court rendered a decision on Petitioner’s

habeas petition on September 26, 2012. 

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In view of the fact that the present petition will be

dismissed with leave to file a first amended petition, and

considering Petitioner’s request for the proceedings to resume,

Petitioner’s motions for a stay of the present petition and his

request to resume the proceedings are moot and thus will be

dismissed. 

Petitioner is INFORMED that he will have an opportunity to

allege exhaustion of state court remedies in the first amended

petition.

IV. Leave to File a First Amended Petition 

The instant petition must be dismissed for the reasons

stated above. Petitioner will be given an opportunity to file a

first amended petition to cure the deficiencies. Petitioner is

advised that failure to file a petition in compliance with this

order (i.e., a completed petition with cognizable federal claims

clearly stated and with exhaustion of state remedies clearly

stated) within the allotted time will result in dismissal of the

petition and termination of the action. Petitioner is advised

that the amended petition should be entitled, “First Amended

Petition,” and it must refer to the case number in this action. 

Further, Petitioner is informed that Local Rule 220 provides that

unless prior approval to the contrary is obtained from the Court,

every pleading as to which an amendment or supplement is

permitted shall be retyped or rewritten and filed so that it is

complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded

pleading.

///

///

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V. Disposition

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED with

leave to amend; and

2) Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of

service of this order to file a first amended petition in

compliance with this order; and

3) Petitioner’s motions for a stay of the proceedings and

for resumption of the proceedings are DISMISSED as moot; and

4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send Petitioner a

form petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 6, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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