Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01767/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01767-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

,- \ 

'12 MAR -5 AM 9: 2b I 

. !j.$. DISTRICT ct,~!lT. h~"!,j t;;SlR1CI Of Churl"tOl., 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KOHLER COMPANY; and ANN SACKS 

TILE AND STONE, INC., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

DOMAINJET, INC.; JACK SUN; and DOES 

1 through 10, Inclusive, 

Defendants. 

CASE NO. 11-cv-1767 - ~EN (MDD) 

ORDER: . 

(1) GRANTING MOTIdN FOR 

LEAVE TO SERVE CtPLAINT 

AND SUMMONSES ON 

DEFENDANTS BY AL .ERNATIVE 

MEANS AND FOR AN EXTENSION 

OF TIME TO COMPLEIrE 

SERVICE, [Doc. No.5]; and 

! 

(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 

TO SHORTEN TIME, [Illoc. No.7]. 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for leave to serve complaint ~d summonses 

on Defendants by alternative means, namely bye-mail, and for an extension oftime tl! complete such 

service. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

On August 8, 2011, Plaintiffs Kohler Company and Ann Sacks Tile aJ!ld Stone, Inc. 

commenced the instant action against Defendants Domainjet, Inc., Jack Sun, and DoJs I through 10. 

I 

The Complaint alleges claims under Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 1ct, 15 U.S.c. 

§ 1125(d), and Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114. (See Compi. [Doc. No.1].) Plaintiffs allege, inter 

alia, that Defendants registered, used, and trafficked in the following dtmain names: 

<kohlerinteriors.info>, <kohlerinteriors.us>, <kohlerpower.info>, <koh1erco.in>, and annsacks.us>, 

with a bad faith attempt to profit from Plaintiffs' marks. (Compi. ~~ 22-33.) I 

- 1 ­ llcvl767 

Case 3:11-cv-01767-BEN-KSC Document 11 Filed 03/05/12 Page 1 of 4
5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

2 

3 

4 

6 

7 

8 

9 

11 

12 

13 

14 

16 

17 

18 

19 

21 

22 

23 

24 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiffs allege that they have been unsuccessful in their efforts to serve Def~ldants with the 

Complaint and respective Summonses. Plaintiffs first used a process server to attempt service at the 

physical address that Defendants provided when registering several of the above fomain names. 

Plaintiffs also attempted searching publicly available records for the alternative addre.sses associated 

with Defendants. When neither ofthe above worked, Plaintiffs engaged a private idvestigator, Mr. 

Frias, to assist in locating and serving Defendants. Mr. Frias conducted an exhausti~e investigation 

of the initial address associated with Defendants, including physically inspectinjg the address, 

interviewing neighbors, reviewing property records, searching records ofthe Califonha Secretary of I 

State, and conducting a name search for individuals named "Jack Sun" living in the ~an Diego area. 

I 

(Frias Affidavit, attached as Exh. A to PI. Mot. [Doc. No. 5-1 ].) Mr. Frias's investigatijn revealed that 

the provided address was invalid or non-existent. (Id.) Mr. Frias next investigated a different address 

provided by Defendants, but similarly discovered that it was invalid or non-existent. \ (Id.) Finally, 

Plaintiffs conducted a search using Google Maps for another address (supposedly locafd in Shuyang, 

Jiangsu, China) listed by Defendants when registering two oftheir domain names, only 10 discover that 

the address was also invalid or non-existent. (See PI. Mot., Exh. B.) \ 

I 

Plaintiffs now seek leave to serve Defendants via e-mail and also request an extension oftime 

to effect such service. The Court decides the motion without oral argument. See CIV. ~.R. 7.1 (d)( 1). 

DISCUSSION· 

Pursuant to Rule 4(e)(l) ofFederal Rules ofCivil Procedure, service upon an i~dividual may 

i 

be effected in any judicial district ofthe United States by "following state law for servirg a summons 

in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or 

where service is made." The goal ofRule 4 is "'to provide maximum freedom and fltibility in the 

procedures for giving all defendants ... notice of commencement of the action anf to eliminate 

unnecessary technicality in connection with service ofprocess.'" Elec. Specialty Co. v. Road & Ranch 

Supply, Inc., 967 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). To comply with dJe process, the ! 

service of notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprse interested 

parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present the1r objections." 

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). i 

\ 

-2- i llcv1767 

I 

Case 3:11-cv-01767-BEN-KSC Document 11 Filed 03/05/12 Page 2 of 4
5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

1 Pursuant to Rule 4( e)( 1), the Court looks to California law, the state in whic~ this Court sits, 

2 to determine the sufficiency of the proposed service of process. California law pe$its service by 

3 pUblication in certain circumstances: 

4 (a) A summons may be served by publication if upon affidavit it appeaI]s , 

to the 

satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the PaI1Y to be 

served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified 

in this article and that ... : \ 

6 

(1) A cause of action exists against the party upon whom service ,is to be 

7 made or he or she is a necessary or proper party to the action. \ 

8 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 415.50(a)(1). While the California Code includes no explicit provision for 

9 service bye-mail, it provides a broad framework for alternative means of service: \ 

Where no provision is made in this chapter or other law for the service of smhmons, 

the court in which the action is pending may direct that summons be servbd in a 

11 manner which is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be' served 

and that proof of such service be made as prescribed by the court. \ 

12 

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.30. "To be sure, the Constitution does not require any particular means 

13 I 

ofservice ofprocess, only that the method selected be reasonably calculated to provide notice and an 

14 

opportunity to respond." Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int 'I Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1 01719th Cir. 2002) 

(concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing service by rd~ular mail and 

16 I 

e-mail after initial attempts at service failed). . 

17 

In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the Complaint adequately alle~es a cause of 

18 

action against Defendants and that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that Defendan~ "cannot with 

19 ~I reasonable diligence be served in another manner." See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §i 415.50(a)(l). 

Accordingly, the only remaining question is whether service of the Complaint ~d respective 

21 i 

Summonses bye-mail will be "reasonably calculated to give actual notice" to Defendrts. See CAL. 

22 

CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.30; see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; Rio Props., 284 F.3d ~t 1017. 

23 

The Court is satisfied that in this case, service bye-mail will be reasonably cal4ulated to give 

24 i 

actual notice to Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that although they have been unable to serre Defendants 

I 

at any ofthe three physical addresses that Defendants used in registering their domain names, Plaintiffs 

26 have communicated with Defendant Jack Sun in the past using the following e-bail address: 

27 

<domainjet@foxmail.com>.(SeeMcGradyDecl.,attachedasExh. D to PI. Mot.; see\also PI. Mot., 

28 

Exh. E.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants listed this e-mail address when registering several of 

- 3 - 11 cvl 767 \ 

Case 3:11-cv-01767-BEN-KSC Document 11 Filed 03/05/12 Page 3 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

11 

10 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

their domain names. (See PI. Mot., Exh. C.) Based on the foregoing, it appears Defe~dants regularly 

check the above e-mail address and should also expect to be contacted at that addrest Accordingly, 

i 

service at the above e-mail address will be reasonably calculated to give actual notic1 to Defendants. 

See Rio Props., 284 F 3d at 1017 (concluding that service of process bye-mail was not only proper, 

but also "the method of service most likely to reach" defendant, where defendantl "structured its 

business such that it could be contacted only via its email address"); Balsam v. Angele~ Tech. Inc., No. 

C 06-04114 JF (HRL), 2007 WL 2070297, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 17,2007) ("Defendrts should also 

expect to be contacted at the [e-mail] address they provided to the domain name regi~trar and to the 

email address provided to individuals who sign up for the website's services."); see alto Aevoe Corp. 

i 

v. Pace, No. C 11-3215 MEJ, 2011 WL 3904133, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (permitting 

alternative service under Rule 4(e)(I) and allowing plaintiff to serve defendants by e1il1ail, as well as 

by publication in the local newspaper, where traditional means of service failed). I 

I 

CONCLUSION 

I 

F or the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to serve Defendants by alternative means 

is GRANTED. [See Doc. No.5.] Plaintiffs are granted leave to serve Defendants e-mail at the I 

following address: <domainjet@foxmail.com>. Finding good cause, the Court ~so GRANTS 

Plaintiffs' request for an extension oftime to complete service. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4fm). Plaintiffs 

shall have until April 16, 2012 to effectuate service upon each Defendant. : 

Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time is DENIED AS MOOT. [See qoc. No.7.] 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: March~012 

-4- llcv1767 

Case 3:11-cv-01767-BEN-KSC Document 11 Filed 03/05/12 Page 4 of 4