Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_19-cv-00304/USCOURTS-alnd-4_19-cv-00304-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

RONEICE LAGAIL VAUGHN 

NEWMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

PATRICIA BRADLEY,

Respondent.

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Civil Action Number

4:19-cv-00304-AKK-HNJ

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Roneice Lagail Vaughn Newman, proceeding pro se, filed this 

action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. Newman 

challenges an August 2, 2018, disciplinary action she received for using the phone 

account of another inmate. Id. On January 23, 2020, the magistrate judge to whom 

the case was referred entered a report and recommended that this petition be 

dismissed with prejudice. Doc. 19. The petitioner filed timely objections to the 

report and recommendation. Doc. 20. 

Although the petitioner challenged the disciplinary action based upon both 

due process and equal protection grounds, her objections concern only findings of 

fact and conclusions of law concerning her equal protection claim. Doc. 20. 

Specifically, the petitioner asserts her equal protection claim based on a “class of 

FILED

 2020 Feb-28 PM 01:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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one” should not be dismissed. She states she and the other inmate involved in the 

incident should have been treated the same. Id. 

A “class of one” equal protection claim alleges that a plaintiff “has been 

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no 

rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 

1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 

(2000)). The same strict “similarly situated” standard applies whether an equal 

protection claim is brought under a “class of one” theory or a traditional theory of 

unlawful discrimination. Id. at 1204–05; see also Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. 

Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009).

Newman points only to inmate Allredge-Cryar to demonstrate she received 

less favorable treatment than another inmate. However, Newman fails to show she 

was similarly situated in all relevant respects to Allredge-Cryar. While Newman 

claims in her objections that funds were placed on Allredge-Cryar’s account in 

Newman’s name, still missing is any evidence that Allredge-Cryar committed 

substantially the same violation as Newman—using another inmate’s account to 

circumvent phone regulations. Newman states code violation 297, of which she was 

found guilty, encompasses the behavior Allredge-Cryar undertook.1

 Doc. 20. While 

 1 Newman does not assert the BOP erred in disciplining her. Rather, she contends that AllredgeCryar should have received the same punishment she received. Doc. 20. Missing from the record, 

however, is any evidence that Allredge-Cryar willingly participated in the phone scheme, that 

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Allredge-Cryar may have been complicit in Newman’s wrongful actions, the record 

before the court is devoid of evidence that Allredge-Cryar committed the same 

infraction as Newman. Thus, Newman fails to produce evidence that she and 

Allredge-Cryar were in fact similarly situated in all respects. 

Even if Newman had produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate she and 

Allredge-Cryar were similarly situated, she fails to point to any evidence concerning 

intent. Merely alleging Allredge-Cryar received more favorable treatment does not 

state an equal protection claim. See GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 

132 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1998). Newman fails to show that any BOP 

individual involved in the disciplinary decision acted with the intent to discriminate. 

To establish a “class of one” claim, Newman must demonstrate that she was 

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, and that there was no 

rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 

260, 264 (11th Cir. 1996) (requiring both evidence that a petitioner was treated 

differently than similarly situated persons; and that difference was “for the purpose 

of discriminating” against the petitioner); Snyder v. Gaudet, 756 F.3d 30, 34 (1st 

 

prison officials knew Allredge-Cryar did so, and that Allredge-Cryar received no disciplinary 

action. According to a statement by case manager Bell, Allredge-Cryar “stated she did not know 

who (sic) voice it was on the phone . . . ,” doc. 12-4 at 4, and that she stated, “I don’t know who 

used my phone . . . ,” id. at 5. 

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Cir. 2014) (“the plaintiff ordinarily must also show that the defendant's differential 

treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by ‘bad faith or malicious intent to injure.’”).

At best, Newman has argued that Allredge-Cryar aided Newman’s own 

violation of prison rules. Because the actions of Newman and Allredge-Cryar are 

not identical, prison officials had a rational basis for treating the two inmates 

differently. See e.g., Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1216 

(10th Cir. 2011) (requiring a plaintiff show “this difference in treatment was without 

rational basis, that is, the government action was ‘irrational and abusive,’ . . . and 

‘wholly unrelated to any legitimate state activity.’”) (citation omitted); Decker v. 

Bell, 772 F. App’x 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A class-of-one claim cannot succeed 

if the prison treated [the petitioner] differently than his cellmate for a rational 

reason.”). Therefore, even if Newman’s arguments could be considered as 

establishing that she and Alledge-Cryar received different treatment, she wholly fails 

to set forth any argument, much less evidence, that the differing treatment was the 

result of any discriminatory animus. Mere inconsistencies in prison management do 

not, by themselves, establish an equal protection claim. Clapper v. Wisc. Dept. of 

Corr., 946 F.Supp. 672, 680 (E.D.Wisc. 1996) (citing Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 

1091, 1103–05 (7th Cir. 1982).

Having carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the 

court file, including the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, and 

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Newman’s objections, the court OVERRULES the petitioner’s objections, 

ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s report and ACCEPTS his recommendation. 

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is due to be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

A separate Final Order will be entered.

DONE the 28th day of February, 2020.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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