Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663-33/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTRAL VALLEY CHRYSLER CASE NO. CV-F-04-6663 AWI LJO

VALLEY JEEP, INC., et al., 

 ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ AND 

DEFENDANT’S DISCOVERY MOTIONS

Plaintiff, (Doc. 299, 300, 317, 318, 318 and 330)

vs.

CATHERINE E. WITHERSPOON, 

Defendants.

 /

Several motions came on regularly for hearing before the Court on August 25, 2006 in

Department 8:

(1) Defendant’s motion for protective order re deposition of Thomas Cackette;

(2) Defendant’s motion for protective order re deposition of Catherine Witherspoon;

(3 ) Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-intervenors’ motion to modify the scheduling order to allow plaintiffs

to file a motion to compel further answers to their interrogatories. The Court granted an ex parte only

to address whether the scheduling order should be modified to permit the motion to compel and directed

plaintiffs to supplement the issue of their “diligence;”

(4) Defendant’s motion to compel interrogatory responses;

(5) Plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order to prevent Attorney Pawa and Attorney Krass from

viewing confidential documents. 

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Plaintiffs appeared by telephone by counsel Timothy Jones, Andrew Clubok, and Derek Benston.

Plaintiff-Intervenors appeared by telephone by counsel Charles Haake. Defendant appeared by telephone

by counsel Mark Melnick and Kathleen Kenealy. Having considered the moving and opposition

arguments in the joint statements, and the exhibits attached thereto, as well as the arguments of counsel

and the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

(1) and (2) Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order re 

Deposition of Thomas Cackette and of Catherine Witherspoon

Plaintiffs issued their notices of depositions on July 7, 2006 for Catherine Witherspoon and for

Thomas Cackette. Catherine Witherspoon (“Witherspoon”) is the Executive Officer for the California

Air Resources Board. Thomas Cackette (“Cackette”) is the Chief Deputy Executive Officer of the

California Air Resources Board. Defendant moves for a protective order to preclude their depositions

on the basis that Witherspoon and Cackette are high government officials.

Protective Orders

The court has very wide discretion, even in the context of high government official depositions,

in handling pretrial discovery. Kyle Engineering Co. v. Kleppe, 600 F.2d 226, 231 (9 Cir. 1979) th

(reserving deposition of the executive of the Small Business Administration until the end of discovery).

Under F.R.Civ.P. 26©, this Court “may make any order which justice requires to protect a party

or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including:

1. Prohibiting disclosure or discovery;

2. Conditioning disclosure or discovery on specified terms, “including a designation of the

time or the place”;

3. Permitting discovery be had by a method other than selected by the party seeking

discovery; or

4. Limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.

To enforce the limit on discovery, a parties may seek a protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P.26( c) or the

court may act upon its own initiative. 

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To obtain a protective order, the party resisting discovery or seeking limitations must show “good

cause” for its issuance. F.R.Civ.P. 26( c); Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd, 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th

Cir. 1994). Generally, a party seeking a protective order has a “heavy burden” to show why discovery

should be denied and a strong showing is required before a party will be denied the right to take a

deposition. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9 Cir. 1975). “If the motion for th

protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just,

order that any party or other person provide or permit discovery.” F.R.Civ.P. 26( c).

Alternatively, a court may limit the “extent of use of discovery methods” if it determines “the

party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information

sought.” F.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(ii).

Top Ranking Government Status

The parties dispute whether Witherspoon and Cackette are “high level government officials” so

as to preclude their depositions altogether. In United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421-22, 61 S.Ct.

999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941), the Court stated that a deposition of a high government official threatened

to undermine the "integrity of the administrative process." 

Defendant argues that both Witherspoon and Cackette are top ranking governmental officials,

and their depositions are precluded absent exceptional circumstances to depose top governmental

officials. U.S. v. Reno, 197 F.3d 310, 314 (8 Cir. 2000) (quashing subpoena for Janet Reno); Nagel v. th

Superior Court, 28 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1467 (1994) (treating state executive officers as the same).

Plaintiffs argue that defendant Witherspoon and Cackette are not top ranking officials. Plaintiffs argue

that there is a limit to who is a “high government official.” Witherspoon does not head the Air Resources

Board, rather the Board consists of 11 members and Witherspoon is under the direction and control of

the Board. Cackette is a staff member.

There is not much authority on the type of positions which qualify as “high level government

official.” The parties have cited most of the cases. None is directly or close to the instant government

positions. The cases which found the official was a “top ranking government official” came to the

conclusion without any analysis or consideration of factors. The cases relied upon the “title” of the

officer as a controlling factor. Examples include the director of the Small Business Administration

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regarding loans to a corporation, the Governor of California regarding crowding at San Quentin, the

Attorney General of California regarding attorneys' fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in an

action against the StateBoard of Pharmacy, a State Governor, the Attorney General of the United States,

and the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, which they had no personal knowledge.

Detoy v. City and County of San Francisco, 196 F.R.D. 362, 369 (N.D.Cal. 2000) (citing relevant cases);

Alexander v. F.B.I., 186 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1998) (White House staff).

The Air Resources Board was created by the Legislature to oversee air pollution resulting from

vehicles. Cal.Health & SafetyCode § 39002. The State Air Resources Board is the state agency charged

with coordinating efforts to attain and maintain ambient air quality standards, among other things.

Cal.Health & Safety Code § 39002. Witherspoon, as the Executive Officer, is appointed by the Board

“who shall serve at the pleasure of the state board and, except as provided in subdivision (d), may

delegate any duty to the executive officer that the state board deems appropriate. §39515. The California

Legislature declares as follows: “The intention of the Legislature is hereby declared to be that the

executive officer shall perform and discharge, under the direction and control of the state board, the

powers, duties, purposes, functions, and jurisdiction vested in the state board and delegated to the

executive officer by the state board.” Cal.Health & Safety Code § 39515(b). The executive officer may,

in turn, delegate some of her duties. “The executive officer may redelegate to his subordinates unless,

by state board rule or express provision of law, the executive officer is specifically required to act

personally.” Cal.Health & Safety Code § 39516.

By Legislative declaration, Witherspoon is a top ranking government official. The policy behind

precluding depositions of high ranking officials is present. Because "[h]igh ranking government officials

have greater duties and time constraints than other witnesses ... [they] 'should not, absent extraordinary

circumstances, be called to testify regarding their reasons for taking official actions.' " In re United States

(Kessler), 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir.1993). Cackette is not a top ranking government official. He has

not been so declared by the Legislature, nor is his title indicative of a high official. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Witherspoon is a top ranking government official, while Cackette is not.

 For a deposition of high level government official, case law consensus is that something close

to “exceptional circumstances” or compelling reasons are necessary for the deposition. In re F.D.I.C.,

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58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5 Cir. 1995) (error for the court not to consider the high-ranking status of the th

deponents, the potential burden that the depositions would impose upon them, or the substantive reasons

for taking the depositions.);see also Nagle v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.App.4th 1465, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 281

(1994) (holding that the directors of the California Employment Development Department and the

California Department of Health Services were not subject to deposition where plaintiff made no

showing that either director had personal knowledge of matter at issue or that information could not be

obtained through less burdensome means); see Kyle Eng. Co. v. Kleppe, 600 F.2d 226, 231-32 (9th

Cir.1979) ("Heads of government agencies are not normally subject to depositions and the district court's

order directing [the Administrator of the Small Business Administration] to answer interrogatories in

lieu of a deposition does not appear unreasonable") There is no definite Ninth Circuit authority on the

point. 

Plaintiffs’ offer of “compelling” or “exceptional” reasons for the deposition of Witherspoon is

that there is correspondence with Witherspoon’s name on it and no others and that persons already

deposed have identified Witherspoon as the “official position” person. These reasons have not been held

to overcome the “exceptional circumstances” to preclude a deposition of high ranking official. In re

F.D.I.C., 58 F.3d at 1061 (rejecting reasons that a deposition was necessary to “probe the

decision-making processes and the reasons for their decisions. Agency leaders often send and receive

correspondence relative to their actions. Their official conduct frequently affects-sometimes

adversely-the property rights of private parties. This does not of itself subject them to the burdens of

litigation discovery.”) The Court does not find these reasons exceptional. Other Rule 30(b)(6)

depositions remain to be taken, and now, the deposition of Cackette.

Order on Motion for Protective Order for the Deposition of Witherspoon and Cackette

The motion for a protective order for the deposition of Thomas Cackette is DENIED.

The motion for a protective order for the deposition of Catherine Witherspoon is GRANTED.

The protective order is granted without prejudice to plaintiffs to show exceptional circumstances, at the

conclusion of the 30(b)(6) depositions and Cackette’s deposition, for a limited deposition of Catherine

Witherspoon.

/////

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(3) Plaintiffs’ motion to Modify the Scheduling Order to 

Permit the filing of a Motion to Compel

The Scheduling Order issued on September 20, 2005 states that motions to compel are to be

heard by the cut off date: “All nonexpert discovery and related discovery motions (including motions

to compel) shall be completed or heard no later than June 30, 2006.” (Doc. 140, P.14.) This Court

extended that date by order on April 4, 2006 to August 4, 2006. (Doc. 206.) That order also stated: “All

other provisions of this Court’s September 20, 2005 Scheduling Order shall remain in effect.” In the

most recent modification of the scheduling order on July 18, 2006, the Court extended the non-expert

discovery cut-off to September 22, 2006, but stated, “the Court will grant the request to continue the

non-expert discovery cut off, but only for the purposes of conducting depositions.” (Doc. 297 p. 4.)

Thus, the last date to have a motion to compel heard was August 4, 2006.

Plaintiffs and plaintiff intervenors (collectively “plaintiffs”) seek to modifythe scheduling order

to allow them to file a motion to compel defendant to provide adequate responses to their second set of

interrogatories. 

Scheduling orders “are the heart of case management,” Koplve v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15,

18 (3 Cir. 1986), and are intended to alleviate case management problems, Johnson v. Mammoth rd

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9 Cir. 1992). A “scheduling conference order is not a frivolous th

piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded without peril.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at

610. In Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

. . . Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily concerns the diligence of the party

seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot

reasonably bemet despite the diligence ofthe party seeking the extension.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment) . . . Moreover, carelessness is not

compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. . . . [T]he

focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. . . . If

that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Parties must “diligently attempt to adhere to that schedule throughout the subsequent course of

the litigation.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see Marcum v. Zimmer,

163 F.R.D. 250, 254 (S.D. W.Va. 1995). In addressing the diligence requirement, this Court has noted:

Accordingly, to demonstrate diligence under Rule 16's “good cause” standard, the

movant may be required to show the following: (1) that she was diligent in assisting the

Court in creating a workable Rule 16 order, see In re San Juan Dupont, 111 F.3d at 228;

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(2) that her noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur,

notwithstanding her diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of matters

which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16

scheduling conference, see Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609; and (3) that she was diligent in

seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that she could not

comply with the order.

Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608.

Here, plaintiffs and plaintiff intervenorsserved theirsecond set of interrogatories precisely thirty

days before the discovery cut off date. Plaintiffs elected to ask these questions at the end of discovery.

By waiting to precisely 30 days before the discovery cut-off, the risk plaintiffs chose was that the

responses would be inadequate and they could not bring a motion to compel. The scheduling order

means what it says. Hence, the reason to allow time to move to compel is inadequate. No good cause

has been shown.

Defendant argues that there is a “double standard” in that defendant’s similar motion was filed

within a week of the motion cut-off date. Since defendants’ motion will be heard, plaintiffs’ motion

should likewise be heard. The parties have always worked mutually toward resolution of discovery

disputes.

Here, the procedural posture of the two motions to compel, plaintiffs’ motion and defendant’s

(motion (4) below) is different. Defendant’s interrogatories were served in April 2006, to which

plaintiffs initially interposed objections and not substantive answers. The plaintiffs supplemented their

answers over the next several months, as the result of meet and confer, culminating in answers on July

28, 2006. Defendant then brought an ex parte in July 2006 to have defendant’s motion to compel heard,

and the ex parte was brought before discovery closed. The Court set the motion after the discovery cutoff solely because of a conflict in the Court’s schedule. (Doc. 321.) Contrary to a timely application,

plaintiffs have brought their motion to modify after the cut-off date. The parties may not unilaterally

alter the dates of the Scheduling Order.

Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order

Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-intervenors’ motion to modify the scheduling order to allow plaintiffs

to file a motion to compel further answers to their interrogatories is DENIED.

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(4) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiffs to Supplement Interrogatories

Interrogatory No. 15

This interrogatory asks about the changes the manufacturers have made to their vehicles during

the planning, design and productions process - including the cost of changes. Here’s the question:

“Separately for each automobile manufacturer (that you are or that is a

member of your association), for model year 2004 and any subsequent

model year, identify all changes to the characteristics of any vehicle

model that occurred less than 48 months before (or any date after) the

date when production of the first vehicle of that vehicle model for that

model year was completed. For each such change, provide a detailed

description of the change, the name or names of the relevant vehicle

model(s), the model year(s)applicable, the reason(s) for the change, your

best estimate of the cost per vehicle of the change, your best estimate of

the difference in the manufacturing cost of the vehicle due to the change,

any change in the price of the vehicle (either to retailers or the

manufacturers suggested retail price) due to the change, the date the

change was first proposed, the date it was decided to make the change,

and the date when production of the first vehicle of that vehicle model

was completed.”

The parties indicate that the remaining disputed issue for interrogatory 15 is cost information and the

electronic format of such information. 

At oral argument, the parties indicated that they were continuing to meet and confer and were

confident they could resolve the issue. 

Based upon the representation that the meet and confer should resolve the issue, the Court will

deny the motion on interrogatory 15 without prejudice to renew the motion should the meet and confer

fail. If that were to occur, a Local Rule 37-251 statement would be required.

Interrogatory No. 18

Requests information of future gasoline prices:

State your best estimate of average gasoline prices in California for each

calendar year between 2008 and 2030, inclusive. Provide the source of the estimate(s),

and identify any documents which discuss the estimate(s).

Defendant argues that gasoline prices affect the marketplace’s demand for vehicles with

technologies that decrease greenhouse gas emissions. Plaintiff DaimlerChrysler’s response refers

Defendant to a website of the U.S. Department of Energy. Plaintiff General Motors’s response identifies

and attaches a specific document. However, defendant argues that plaintiffs then say that this document

“does not take account of all such factors” affecting gasoline prices. Defendant argues that this begs the

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question of whether this document reflects plaintiff General Motors’s best estimate of future gasoline

prices. 

Plaintiffs argue plaintiffs have directed the defendant to the forecasts they use for planning

purposes and disclose internal documents that include such forecasts.

Defendant asks theCourt to compel plaintiffs to say that the website and the documents provided

are plaintiffs’ “best estimates” of future gasoline prices. Each interrogatory must be responded to

'separately and fully.' F.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(1). In plaintiffs’ answering the question, “State your best

estimate . . .” the information provided is plaintiffs’ “best estimate.” The question does not ask plaintiffs

to identify all estimates for gasoline prices. Any further inquiry is the subject of deposition or cross

examination. The motion for a further response is denied.

Interrogatory No. 19

Asks about the support for plaintiffs’ foreign policy preemption claim:

In addition to any statements identified in response to interrogatory number 11

of defendant Witherspoon’s first set of interrogatories, identify all evidentiary facts that

you contend support Plaintiffs’ Count III (of foreign policy preemption).

Defendant argues that if Plaintiffs intend to rely on any facts to pursue this claim, they need to set forth

all of those facts in response to this interrogatory. Plaintiffs argue that the foreign policy of the United

States is not a question of evidentiary fact. Rather, the foreign policy of the United States “is expressed

by statutes and treaties in force.” 

An interrogatory is not necessarily objectionable because an answer would involve an opinion

or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact. F.R.Civ.P. 33( c). However, Rule 33

does not permit interrogatories directed to issues of “pure law.” O'Brien v. International Brotherhood

of Elec. Workers, (ND GA 1977) 443 F.Supp. 1182, 1187 (interrogatories seeking legal theory insofar

as they involved application of law to the facts of the case, but not insofar as they sought pure legal

conclusions related, not the facts).

The interrogatory ask for “facts” not legal authorities. To the extent plaintiffs did not provide

the facts which support their claim of foreign policy violation, plaintiffs will be compelled to do so.

Local Plaintiffs’ Responses

Defendant’s second set of interrogatories were served on all Plaintiffs. Defendant has only

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received an answer to interrogatory number 13, and that answer was not provided by plaintiff Tulare

County Farm Bureau. Moreover, Defendant has not received verifications from eight of the 14 local

plaintiffs. Plaintiffs acknowledge that there is no substantive disagreement. Therefore, the responses

and verifications will be compelled.

Order on Defendant’s Motion to Compel further Responses

For the foregoing reasons, the Court issues an order on Defendant’s motion to compel further

responses to interrogatories as follows:

1. DENIES as unripe the motion as to Interrogatory no. 15.

2. DENIES the motion as to Interrogatory no. 18.

3. GRANTS the motion as to Interrogatory no. 19.

4. GRANTS the motion as to the Local Plaintiffs’ responses and verifications.

Further answers shall be served within 15 days of the date of service of this order.

(5) Plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order to prevent Attorney

Pawa and Krass from viewing confidential documents

The parties did not file their joint statement re discovery dispute as required by Local Rule 37-

251. Therefore, the motion is dropped from calendar.

At oral argument, the parties indicated that additional time was needed to meet and confer.

Should they seek to refile the motion, the parties are directed to comply with Local Rule 37-251.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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