Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01301/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01301-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOPHAON SOM,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-1301 GEB DAD P

vs.

MIKE S. EVANS, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered

against him in 2003 in the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Based on the recent decision of

the United States Supreme Court in Cunningham v. California, ___U.S.___,127 S. Ct. 856

(2007), petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated by the sentencing court’s

reliance on facts not found by the jury in his case. (Pet. at 6.) Respondent has filed a motion to

dismiss the petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Petitioner opposes the

motion.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The record before this court reflects the following chronology. In 2003, petitioner

was found guilty of shooting into an occupied motor vehicle (count one), discharging a firearm

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In advancing this latter argument, counsel for petitioner relied upon the decisions in 1

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

(Lod. Doc. No. 4.)

2

from a motor vehicle (count two) and attempted murder (count four). (Lodged Documents filed

Oct. 15, 2007 (Lod. Doc.) No. 1.) The jury found to be true the firearm enhancement allegations

with respects to counts one, two and four. (Id.) The jury found petitioner guilty of attempted

involuntary manslaughter as charged in counts three, five and six. (Id.) On June 2, 2003,

petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of 25 years to life to be served

consecutive to a determinate term of 36 years and 4 months. (Id.)

 On September 7, 2004, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate

District, reversed petitioner’s involuntary manslaughter convictions and vacated the related

enhancements. (Lod. Doc. No. 2.) The state appellate court directed the trial court to prepare an

amended abstract of judgment. (Id.) As a result, petitioner’s sentence was reduced to 25 years to

life in prison with that sentence to be served consecutive to the determinate term of

imprisonment of 30 years and 8 months. (Lod. Doc. No. 3.) 

On October 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court. (Lod. Doc. No. 4.) Therein his counsel challenged an evidentiary ruling of the

trial court, the sufficiency of the evidence and argued that petitioner was denied his federal

constitutional right to have the jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally

essential to the sentence imposed. (Id.) The petition for review was denied on November 17, 1

2004, with the court stating:

Petition for review denied without prejudice to any relief to which

defendant might be entitled after this court determines in People v.

Black, S126182, and People v. Towne, S125677, the effect of

Blakely v. Washington (2004) U.S. 124 S. Ct. 2531, on

California law.

(Lod. Doc. No. 5.)

/////

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Petitioner did not seek the granting of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court nor

did he file any petition for writ of habeas corpus collaterally challenging his judgment of

conviction. 

On March 23, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit received

petitioner’s erroneously titled application for leave to file second or successive petition (Case No.

07-71115) which was signed by petitioner on March 18, 2007. On June 14, 2007, the Court of

Appeals ruled that the application was in fact an original, not second or successive, federal

petition for a writ of habeas corpus which must be made to the district court. Accordingly, the

Ninth Circuit transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of

California. Subsequently, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District determined that

petitioner was challenging a judgment of conviction entered in the San Joaquin County Superior

Court and on June 27, 2007, ordered that the case be transferred to this court. On July 2, 2007,

the case was transferred and filed in this court.

PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

I. Respondent’s Motion

Respondent argues that the pending petition is time-barred. In this regard,

respondent argues that a habeas petitioner must file his federal petition within one year from the

date when his judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review, or the expiration of time

for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondent contends that petitioner’s

petition for review to the California Supreme Court was denied on November 17, 2004, and that

the time to seek direct review ended on February 15, 2005, when the time for filing a petition for

writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157 (9th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 1998). Thus, respondent

argues, this action is barred since the one-year statute of limitations expired on February 15,

2006.

/////

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Respondent also points out that petitioner is not entitled to any period of statutory

tolling of the limitations period because he did not file any post-conviction state habeas actions

collaterally challenging the judgment of conviction.

II. Petitioner’s Opposition

Petitioner contends that when he filed his petition for review with the California

Supreme Court, the only U.S. Supreme Court precedent that was available to support his claim

was the decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). He argues that because

Cunningham v. California, ___U.S.___, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), is a “new case” based on “older

precedent,” the statute of limitations is inapplicable and does not bar his federal habeas petition. 

(Opp’n at 5.) Petitioner asserts that in Whorton v. Bockting, ___U.S.___, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007)

the U.S. Supreme Court held that a petitioner “should be afforded the benefit of any newly

decided cases being handed down by the courts.” (Opp’n at 2.) 

Petitioner’s remaining arguments in opposition to the motion to dismiss are

unclear and confusing. However, it appears that petitioner is attempting to argue that the

Cunningham decision provided a factual predicate for his federal constitutional claim and thus

the AEDPA statute of limitations as to this claim did not begin to run until Cunningham was

decided. (Opp’n at 5.) Finally, it appears petitioner is suggesting that the decision in

Cunningham constitutes an extraordinary circumstance which tolls the AEDPA statute of

limitations. (Id.)

III. Respondent’s Reply

Respondent argues that the statute of limitations for petitioner’s filing of his

federal habeas petition had already expired long before the decision in Cunningham. Respondent

also contends that the commencement of limitations period applicable here was certainly not

delayed until the date of the Cunningham decision and that the decision cannot be characterized

as a factual predicate for petitioner’s federal constitutional claim within the meaning of §

2244(d)(1)(D).

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Respondent argues that petitioner is not entitled to a delayed start of the

limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(C) which provides for the commencement of the

limitations period based on the date on which a constitutional right is recognized and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. In this regard, respondent contends that the

Supreme Court did not indicate that Cunningham should be applied retroactively and the case 

fails to satisfy the standards for retroactive application set forth in Teague v. Lane, 542 U.S. 348,

353 (2004). Specifically, respondent argues that Cunningham did not decriminalize any primary

conduct or remove a class of defendants from punishment and was more of a “fine tuning of

sentencing procedure than a ‘groundbreaking occurrence.’” (Reply at 3.)

Finally, respondent argues that petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable

tolling. Although the California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review without

prejudice to any relief to which he might be entitled after the effect of Blakely v. Washington on

California law was determined, respondent argues that the court’s order did not extend or

otherwise effect the date on which direct review of petitioner’s conviction became final. 

Respondent contends that the outcome of the two state court decisions, Black and Towne, did not

favor petitioner. Moreover, petitioner failed to file a new application for state post-conviction

review based on those California Supreme Court decisions. As for equitable tolling, respondent

argues that petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that he has diligently pursued his

rights and that he has faced extraordinary circumstances preventing him from timely filing his

federal habeas petition.

ANALYSIS

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

one-year period of limitation applies to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in federal court

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The

statute of limitations applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after the statute was enacted on

April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). Because this action was

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

commenced in 2007, the AEDPA period of limitations is applicable to the petition. Specifically,

that statute now provides in relevant part:

 (d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Liberally construed, petitioner’s opposition to the pending motion to dismiss

suggests three possible theories in support of his claim that his petition is not time-barred. First,

plaintiff suggests that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date the U.S.

Supreme Court issued its decision in Cunningham because under § 2244(d)(1)(C), the limitations

period begins to run on the date the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court. Thus, plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should not bar his habeas

action because his Blakely claim was “undecided by the California Supreme Court until the

recent United States Supreme Court decided on Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 

/////

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

(2007).” (Opp’n at 1.) Petitioner’s reliance on § 2244(d)(1)(C) is misplaced and must be

rejected. 

 Second, petitioner suggests that the decision in Cunningham provided the factual

predicate for his constitutional claim thereby delaying the commencement of the statute of

limitations. Under § 2244(d)(1)(C), the commencement of the running of the statute of

limitations is delayed until the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review [.]” (emphasis added). The

decision in Cunningham has not been applied retroactively. See Jordan v. Evans, No. 07CV466-

J (NLS), 2007 WL 2703118, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2007); Beyett v. Yates, No. C 06-7598

WHA (PR), 2007 WL 2600745, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007); Zimmeth v. Hernandez, No.

05CV1695 JAH (RBB), 2007 WL 2556771, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2007); Lopez v. Campbell,

No. 1:05-cv -00481 LJO-TAG HC, 2007 WL 2500424, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2007);

Marquez v. Evans, No. C 06-0913 CRB (PR), 2007 WL 2406867, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20,

2007); Bouie v. Kramer, No. CIV S-06-1082 GEB GGH P, 2007 WL 2070330, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

July 13, 2007). Thus petitioner’s argument fails since “the limitations period cannot be

calculated from when Cunningham was decided in 2007.” Beyett, 2007 WL 2600745, at *2. 

Therefore, § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply here.

As noted above, under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations begins to run on

the date when the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise

of reasonable diligence. Petitioner appears to argue that the Cunningham decision provided the

factual predicate for his Sixth Amendment claim. Petitioner is incorrect in this regard as well. A

court decision does not establish a factual predicate for a constitutional claim. Rather, it is when

the petitioner became aware of important facts underlying his claims that controls. Shannon v.

Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] state-court decision establishing an abstract

proposition of law arguably helpful to the petitioner’s claim does not constitute the ‘factual

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the time during which a properly filed state application 2

for post-conviction review is pending is not counted for the limitations period. “[A]n application

is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’ - - i.e., ‘until

the completion of’ that process. In other words, until the application has achieved final

resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains ‘pending.’” 

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002). 

8

predicate’ for that claim.”), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1171 (2006); Hebbe v. Kane, No. Civ. S-06-

0074 LKK DAD P, 2006 WL 2434205, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2006); see also Hansan v.

Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the statute of limitations begins

“when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the

prisoner recognizes their legal significance.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, many

years before the Cunningham decision was issued, petitioner was certainly aware that the trial

judge in his case made factual findings that resulted in the imposition of an enhanced sentence. 

Thus, petitioner’s argument for a delayed commencement of the AEDPA statute of limitations

based upon § 2244(d)(1)(D) is also unpersuasive.

Lastly, petitioner suggests that the decision in Cunningham constitutes an

extraordinary circumstance presumably tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations. The court

agrees with respondent that petitioner is entitled to neither statutory and nor equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations in this case. Statutory tolling is not available to petitioner because he

admittedly did not pursue any state collateral review. The fact that the California Supreme 2

Court denied petitioner’s petition for review without prejudice, does not toll the statute of

limitations.

Likewise, equitable tolling is not available here. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Here, petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing either

element. Petitioner took no action to pursue his claims for three years after his petition for

review was denied by the California Supreme Court. Moreover, there is no authority supporting

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As noted above, the petition was erroneously filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for 3

the Ninth Circuit and later transferred to the District Court.

9

the proposition that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions which are found not to apply

retroactively, constitute an extraordinary circumstance preventing a petitioner’s timely filing and

therefore justifying equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations. See Eisenmann v.

Bartos, No. CV 06-1066-PHX-ROS, 2007 WL 951960, *8 (D. Ariz. March 27, 2007) (“The

Court is unaware of any federal court opinion concluding a change in the law entitles a petitioner

to equitable tolling of the relevant statute of limitations and, therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling based on the decision in Blakely.”); Smith v. United States, CRIM.A.4:02CR24,

Civ.A. 4:05CV129, 2005 WL 2657386, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2005) (“[T]he petitioner’s

reliance on a recent Supreme Court decision does not constitute grounds for equitable tolling.”);

see also Valladares-Helguera v. United States, No. 3:05CV380-3-V, 3:00CR130-3-V, 2005 WL

2544306, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 10, 2005) (“Petitioner fails to establish that his attorney’s failure

to advise him about recent Supreme Court decisions is a situation which qualifies as

extraordinary, out of his control and which prevented him from filing his § 2255 motion on

time.”).

The court concludes that the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run in

petitioner’s case on the date his judgment of conviction became final by the conclusion of the

expiration for the time for seeking direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In this regard,

petitioner’s petition for review to the California Supreme Court was denied on November 17,

2004. The AEDPA statute of limitations therefore began to run after the expiration of the ninety

days petitioner had to file a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court on February 16, 2005. 

See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute of limitations expired one

year later on February 16, 2006. Petitioner signed his federal habeas petition on March 18,

2007. Even if the court were to apply the mailbox rule and use March 18, 2007 as the filing 3

/////

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

date, petitioner filed his federal petition over a year after the AEDPA statute of limitations had

expired.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s August 14, 2007 motion to dismiss this action as filed beyond

the one-year statute of limitations, be granted; and

2. This action be dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 18, 2008.

DAD:4

som1301.mtd

Case 2:07-cv-01301-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 01/18/08 Page 10 of 10