Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04889/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04889-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Miguel Angel Nieves,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 19-04889-PHX-SPL (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On July 23, 2019, Petitioner Miguel Angel Nieves, who is confined in the Arizona

State Prison Complex-Safford in Safford, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc.

6), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 10).

BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2016, Petitioner was convicted by jury trial in Maricopa County

Superior Court, case #CR 2016-110410, of aggravated assault and unlawful discharge of a

firearm. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longer of which is 7.5

years. See State v. Nieves, 2018 WL 414474 (Ariz. Ct. App. January 16, 2018); (Doc. 3;

Doc. 6, Exh. B).

Petitioner filed a direct appeal pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). (Exh. I.) In her brief, appointed

counsel advised the court that, after searching the entire record, she had been unable to

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discover any arguable questions of law and filed a brief requesting the court conduct an

Anders review of the record. (Exh. I.) Counsel also requested leave for Petitioner to file a

supplemental brief in propria persona. (Exh. I.)

Petitioner filed a pro per supplemental brief on October 13, 2017. (Exh. J.) On January

16, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See

Nieves, 2018 WL 414474. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or petition for

review, and the mandate was issued on March 2, 2018. (Exh. K.)

Petitioner initiated post-conviction relief proceedings on May 10, 2018, by filing a

notice of post-conviction relief (PCR). (Exh. L.) On June 7, 2018, the trial court dismissed

the PCR proceedings, finding that Petitioner’s “Rule 32 proceeding is [] untimely by more

than one month,” and that Petitioner “fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted in

an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” (Exh. M.)

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a “Motion to File a Delayed Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief,” which was denied on July 16, 2018. (Exhs. N, O.) Petitioner then filed a petition for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on July 24, 2018. (Exh. P.) On July 30, 2018, the

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as untimely. (Exh. Q.)

Petitioner filed another petition for review in the Court of Appeals on August 9, 2018.

(Exh. R.) The appellate court considered the filing as a motion for reconsideration and denied

it “without prejudice to the filing of a motion in superior court seeking appropriate relief.”

(Exh. S.)

On August 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Exh. T.) The court denied the petition on December 31, 2018, and the mandate issued

on January 23, 2019. (Exhs. U, V.)

In his amended habeas petition, Petitioner raises five grounds for relief (Docs. 3, 1 at

6-23):

1. Petitioner claims his Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

because he was arrested without a warrant and held without probable cause for more

than 48 hours. He alleges that pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

he was required to be released if a complaint was not filed within 48 hours of his

initial appearance, but he was not released and was not appointed counsel.

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2. Petitioner alleges his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

because he was denied a preliminary hearing.

3. Petitioner contends his constitutional rights were violated because of prosecutorial

misconduct. He alleges the prosecutor lied to the court and the jury during trial,

improperly influenced the jury with “fake evidence,” held onto exculpatory evidence,

provided edited video to defense counsel less than a week before trial, submitted a late

complaint, and “removed all ‘blacks’ and only had one Hispanic [on the] jury.”

4. Petitioner asserts his rights were violated because of “judicial ethics violations.”

5. Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s amended habeas petition is

untimely and must be dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

“[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period

within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending Petitioner not be counted toward” the limitations

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period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A

state petition that is not filed, however, within the state’s required time limit is not “properly

filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When a postconviction petition is untimely under

state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state court, but

before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th

Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction

relief is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department

of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period.

See Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (The

petitioner was “not entitled to tolling during the interval between the completion of one

round of state collateral review and the commencement of a second round of review.”).

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate

cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for equitable tolling

to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented him from filing a

timely petition. See id. at 648-49 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

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The Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely. After trial and

sentencing, Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on January

16, 2018, and his convictions and sentences became final 30 days later – on February 15,

2018. See, e.g., Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1609, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (in Arizona,

a direct appeal is final upon the expiration of the time for seeking review of the court of

appeals’ decision in the Arizona Supreme Court, rather than upon the issuance of the

mandate); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.21(b) (an Arizona litigant must file a petition for review by

the Arizona Supreme Court within thirty days after the court of appeals files its decision).

The statute of limitations began running and expired one year later – on February 15, 2019.

Petitioner did not initiate his habeas proceedings until July 23, 2019. Accordingly, absent any

tolling, his habeas petition is over five months too late.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Petitioner’s commencement of his PCR

proceeding on May 10, 2018, did not toll the limitations period. The state court dismissed

these proceedings for failing to timely file a PCR petition and failing to provide a sufficient

factual or legal basis to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32

proceeding. Thus, the PCR proceeding (as well as any subsequent petition for review filed

in the Arizona Court of Appeals) was not “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See,

e.g., Pace, 544 U.S. at 414-17; Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005)

(recognizing and applying Pace).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

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external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Petitioner attempts to explain his untimeliness in his habeas petition by simply listing

the dates of the state court filings and decisions. In his Reply, Petitioner reargues the merits

of his case and attempts to correct the “erroneous facts” set forth in Respondents’ Answer.

Petitioner also states that, for reasons related to his pro se prisoner status and limited access

to resources, his failure to timely file his state court documents was not his fault, but that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The Court finds that Petitioner fails to demonstrate his entitlement to equitable tolling.

Other than his self-serving, conclusory statements, there is nothing in the record suggesting

that an external force prevented Petitioner from timely filing the Petition. And, a petitioner’s

pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, or lack of

representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154

(9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). To the extent Petitioner claims

that he is entitled to equitable tolling based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court

is not persuaded. Although an attorney’s behavior can establish the extraordinary

circumstances required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice is

insufficient. See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). A “‘garden variety

claim of excusable neglect,’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a

filing deadline does not warrant equitable tolling.’” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,

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651-652 (2010) (internal citations omitted). Rather, the attorney’s misconduct must rise to

the level of extraordinary circumstances. See id. Petitioner has failed to show grounds for

equitable tolling on this basis.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any tolling and his habeas petition is

untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72,

6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within

which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the

Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure timely

to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further review.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file

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objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2020.

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