Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-40/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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Following grants of extensions of time to respond, the 1

parties filed their respective objections and replies thereto on

July 17, 2006 (Docket #s 736, 737 [respondent’s objections and

petitioner’s objections]), July 26, 2006 (Docket #740

[respondent’s reply]) and August 18, 2006 (Docket #752

[petitioner’s reply]). 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GERALD F. STANLEY,

NO. CIV. S-95-1500 FCD GGH P

Petitioner,

DEATH PENALTY CASE

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EDDIE YLST, Acting Warden

of the California State

Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the parties’ objections1

to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations (“F&R”) of

May 31, 2006, finding respondent’s attorney Raymond Brosterhous

(“Brosterhous”) “engaged in overreaching (misconduct) in

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The undersigned set the matter for hearing on September 2

29, 2006; however, after review of the papers, and finding that

oral argument would not be of material assistance, the court

vacated the hearing and ordered the matter submitted on the

briefs (E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h)). (Minute Order, filed Sept.

26, 2006.) 

The effect of the magistrate judge’s recommended 3

exclusion of evidence is presently unknown, as the magistrate

judge has not yet issued findings and recommendations with

respect to petitioner’s habeas petition and specifically his

juror misconduct claim. (Id. at 31:10-12.)

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conducting interviews with jurors, aka the 2000 interviews, and

that such overreaching was prejudicial in the case of [one] juror

[Mitts].” (F&R, filed May 31, 2006, at 3:1-3.) On the basis of 2

that finding, the magistrate judge recommended that with respect

to juror Mitts, “all statements, declarations, and testimony

procured commencing with the 2000 Brosterhous interview, and

continuing to the present, should be excluded. The matter of

juror misconduct should be decided on the Mitts’ 1997 declaration

pursuant to appropriate legal standards.” (Id. at 31:16-19.)3

By his objections, respondent challenges the procedure used

by the magistrate judge to render his findings, the asserted

basis for jurisdiction over these proceedings, and the ultimate

findings of misconduct, arguing they are not supported by the

evidence. Respondent contends that this court must perform a de

novo review of the F&R and under that standard of review, the

magistrate judge’s findings must be reversed. Petitioner, on the

other hand, asks this court to find additional misconduct by

respondent based on alleged suppression of evidence,

misrepresentations to the court, and further misconduct during

juror interviews in 2006; petitioner also contends that

additional remedies are warranted with respect to jurors Herbert

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Unless otherwise noted, all further references to a 4

“Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The facts leading up to this motion are set forth in 5

detail in the court’s March 28, 2006 order and are incorporated

herein by reference.

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and Robinson. In opposing respondent’s objections, petitioner

argued the applicable standard of review is “clearly erroneous or

contrary to law,” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (Docket #752

at 25-28); however, in his own objections, petitioner asks the 4

court to “consider [his arguments] de novo.” (Docket #737 at

2:7.) Obviously, petitioner cannot have it both ways.

For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the

correct standard of review is that of Rule 72(a). 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A). Under that standard, the court need only ask

whether the magistrate judge’s findings of fact are clearly

erroneous or his conclusions contrary to law. Id. Applying that

inquiry here, the court finds no error in the magistrate judge’s

findings of fact or conclusions of law. Ultimately, his findings

of fact were based on credibility determinations, following an

extensive hearing, and those determinations are well-supported by

the record (namely, the audiotapes and transcripts of the juror

interviews by Brosterhous), and provide sufficient justification

for the exclusion of evidence as to juror Mitts.

BACKGROUND

On March 28, 2006, this court granted respondent’s request

for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s January 5, 2006

order. In that order, the magistrate judge: (1) permitted 5

petitioner to call Brosterhous as a witness at an April 17, 2006

hearing on petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct motion and

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habeas claim of juror misconduct and (2) barred Brosterhous from

conducting the examination of the juror-witnesses to be called on

petitioner’s habeas claim of juror misconduct. (Docket #672.) 

The court found that petitioner had not demonstrated a compelling

need to call Brosterhous as a witness, and that disqualification

of Brosterhous from the hearing would be improper until a

judicial finding of prosecutorial misconduct was made. (Id. at

12:11-13.) In that regard, the court directed that the issue of

“prosecutorial misconduct must be decided [by the magistrate

judge] in advance of an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s

habeas claims.” (Id. at 12:14-16.) With regard to the

procedures to be employed by the magistrate judge, the court

directed that:

[T]he magistrate judge should entertain a proffer by

petitioner of the evidence of prosecutorial misconduct 

by DAG Brosterhous. The magistrate judge, in his

discretion, may decide what is sufficient evidence for 

said proffer and allow rebuttal by respondent. 

After due consideration of the proffer, respondent’s

rebuttal, and other evidence the magistrate judge considers

relevant and necessary, he shall exercise his sound

discretion and make a finding he deems appropriate. 

Such a finding could include a denial or grant of

petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct motion or other

findings including the need for an evidentiary hearing on

the issue.

(Id. at 12:17-13:1.) The court noted that it “makes no findings

. . . regarding the nature of such a hearing; the magistrate

judge shall decide what evidence is necessary and admissible for

any such proceeding.” (Id. at 13 n.6.) 

After consideration of petitioner’s proffer, the magistrate

judge determined that an evidentiary hearing was required on the

prosecutorial misconduct motion in order to hear from the jurors

themselves. The magistrate judge found that:

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“The jurors had undergone interview after interview, 6

and had executed declaration after declaration; if the court

piled atop these interviews and declarations a requirement that

they testify twice in court, an untoward burden would have been

placed on the jurors, some of whom had to travel great distance

to the court house.”

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the transcript and tapes of the Brosterhous interviews 

were insufficient to determine the motion. While the 

tapes and transcripts clearly showed the ‘what’ of the

changes [in testimony], the ‘whys’ remained elusive. . . . 

Moreover, the reasons why the jurors changed/modified/

clarified their declarations were pertinent to the 

prejudice issue . . . i.e., whether actions of 

Brosterhous, if found to be misconduct, had a substantial,

prejudicial effect on the jurors such that their

declarations were changed afterwards. 

(F&R at 4:7-9, 11-14.) The testimony of the jurors, however, was

also required for the evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s juror

misconduct claim. As such, on April 17, 2006, at the

commencement of the evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s habeas

claims (including among other claims, his juror misconduct

claim), the magistrate judge indicated that he did not want to

require the jurors to testify twice to the identical facts. (Id.

at 5:5-8.)6

Thus, the magistrate judge ordered that the testimony to be

taken on petitioner’s juror misconduct claim would “do double

duty” for petitioner’s lawyer misconduct motion. (F&R at 5:11-

12.) During the consolidated evidentiary hearing, the magistrate

judge permitted Brosterhous to be present at all times, to argue

the case, and to conduct the examination of non-juror witnesses,

but he precluded Brosterhous from conducting the examination of

the juror witnesses. (Id. at 5:12-15.) During the hearing, both

parties voiced various objections to the process, some of which

were based on this court’s March 28, 2006 order, but the

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While the Ninth Circuit has not specifically ruled that 7

a sanction excluding evidence which is not dispositive of a claim

is reviewed under Rule 72(a), other courts have so held. See

e.g., Benedict v. Zimmer, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 305, 313 (N.D. Iowa

2005) (order excluding evidence should be reviewed under Rule

72(a) even where it could effect decision on summary judgment);

Magee v. Paul Revere Life Insur. Co., 178 F.R.D. 33, 37 (E.D.

N.Y. 1998) (discovery sanction precluding use of expert testimony

should be reviewed under Rule 72(a) “unless the sanction itself

can be considered dispositive of a claim”). 

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magistrate judge denied the objections, finding that “no better

procedures [were] suggested.” (Id. at 5:14-15.) 

STANDARD

As the magistrate judge expressly recognized in the F&R, the

exclusion of evidence relating to juror Mitts is not dispositive

of petitioner’s juror misconduct claim, and it does not preclude

respondent from defending against the claim. (F&R at 31:4-12

[declining to strike respondent’s answer and leaving the “effect

of the court’s exclusion to be set forth in the [F&R] on the

merits of the juror misconduct claim”].) Thus, in resolving a

non-dispositive pre-trial matter, the magistrate judge’s instant

order is governed by the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law”

standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Maisonville v.

F2 America, Inc., 902 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding Rule

11 sanctions a non-dispositive pre-trial matter). As such, the 7

magistrate judge’s order cannot be set aside or modified unless

the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or the conclusions are

contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Grimes v. San Francisco,

951 F.2d 236, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1991). The order should be

modified or set aside only if the reviewing court is left “‘with

the definite and firm conviction,’ that the [magistrate judge’s]

key findings are mistaken.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,

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The court notes that it previously reviewed the 8

magistrate judge’s related order of January 5, 2006 under the

same standard. (Docket #672.) 

As he did before the magistrate judge, petitioner 9

attempts in his objections to again expand the grounds for a

finding of misconduct. Specifically, petitioner asks this court

to find additional misconduct by respondent based on alleged

suppression of evidence, misrepresentations to this court in

briefing and further misconduct by Deputy Attorney General Whalen

during juror interviews in 2006. The magistrate judge did not

consider these arguments, finding them outside the parameters of

petitioner’s original motion which only challenged Brosterhous’

“juror interview techniques” in 2000. (F&R at 2:1-13.) This

court agrees that the arguments are outside the scope of the

motion, and accordingly, does not consider the arguments herein. 

(Docket #737 at 7-13.)

7

243 (2001) (citation omitted).8

ANALYSIS

The court preliminarily discusses below the magistrate

judge’s finding that he has jurisdiction to issue the subject

sanction. While neither party raised the issue, the magistrate

judge began his order discussing the relevant law as it pertained

to the court’s authority to sanction parties or attorneys for

conduct which took place during state court proceedings. As this

court agrees with the magistrate judge that jurisdiction lies to

exclude the evidence at issue, the court next considers

respondent’s substantive objections. Finally, the court

considers certain of petitioner’s objections.9

I. Jurisdiction

Not surprisingly, now that the magistrate judge raised the

question of the court’s jurisdiction to issue a sanction for

Brosterhous’ alleged misconduct, which originated in the state

appeal proceedings, respondent argues in his objections that the

court is without jurisdiction to sanction Brosterhous. 

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Petitioner argues respondent has waived this argument because he

did not raise the argument before the magistrate judge; however,

a jurisdictional challenge is never waived and thus, the court

considers respondent’s argument herein.

In the F&R, the magistrate judge found that under the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Western Systems, Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d

864 (9th Cir. 1992), this court has jurisdiction to sanction

conduct that occurred in the state proceedings in this case. The

subject conduct in this case occurred during the state court

exhaustion process. Indeed, the declarations obtained as a

result of the Brosterhous’ interviews were initially filed in

response to an order from the California Supreme Court directing

respondent to file an informal answer to allegations of juror

misconduct raised by petitioner. (Docket #672 at 3-5.)

In Ulloa, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a sanctions order

levied by the federal district court against a party for

activities that occurred in a Guamanian court. The magistrate

judge disagreed with the decision, arguing that the Ninth Circuit

misapplied relevant United States Supreme Court authority

(Chambers [see F&R at 8]) and decided the case contrary to other

circuits, but noted nonetheless that the case was binding

authority and must be applied. Respondent argues in his

objections that the magistrate judge was not bound to apply Ulloa

because it is distinguishable as it involved a civil action, not

a habeas case, and/or subsequent United States Supreme Court

authority has called Ulloa into question. 

Neither of respondent’s arguments are persuasive. First,

that Ulloa is not a habeas case is not determinative of the

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issue; the question here involves attorney misconduct which is

not impacted by the type of case at issue. Second, respondent’s

additional Supreme Court authorities, Degen and Kokkonen (Docket

#736 at 34:15-25), do not effect the analysis as they did not

involve the instant question, whether the court may sanction a

party for conduct occurring in other proceedings. Degen v.

United States, 517 U.S. 820, 822 (1996); Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Insur. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994). Only Ulloa

speaks directly to that issue, and the magistrate judge properly

applied it as binding authority permitting jurisdiction over this

matter.

II. Respondent’s Objections

A. The Evidentiary Hearing

As an initial matter, respondent objects to the procedure

used by the magistrate judge to resolve petitioner’s

prosecutorial misconduct motion and juror misconduct habeas

claim; namely, the consolidated hearing on the issues in which

Brosterhous was not permitted to examine the juror-witnesses. 

Respondent contends the consolidated hearing violated this

court’s March 28, 2006 order.

The court disagrees. While said order contemplated the

potential resolution of the motion without an evidentiary

hearing, the court also recognized that the magistrate judge may

find that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. (Docket #672 at

12:16-13:1.) He did. (F&R at 4-5.) The court’s order did not

impose any requirements with respect to that hearing. (Docket

#672 at 13 n.6 [“the magistrate judge shall decide what evidence

is necessary and admissible for any such proceeding”].) 

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The magistrate judge determined that he could not properly

rule on the prosecutorial misconduct motion without hearing from

the jurors themselves. Because the jurors’ testimony was also

required for the evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s juror

misconduct claim, the magistrate judge considered the issues at

one consolidated hearing in order to prevent the jurors from

having to testify twice to the same facts. The court cannot find

this procedure in error. 

Admittedly, the court previously envisioned the possible

resolution of the prosecutorial misconduct motion prior to the

evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s habeas claims; however, once

the magistrate judge determined an evidentiary hearing was

necessary on the motion, he was, indeed, faced with a “quandary.” 

On the one hand, the magistrate judge sought to comply with both

the “letter and spirit” of the court’s prior order but at the

same time, he was rightfully weighing the interests of the jurorwitnesses. Although ultimately, under the procedure employed by

the magistrate judge, Brosterhous was precluded from examining

the juror witnesses himself (in a sense, a “disqualification”),

the court finds significant that he was able to be present during

the jurors’ testimony (and presumably assisted respondent’s

counsel examining the witnesses during their testimony), was

permitted to examine the non-juror witnesses, and he made

arguments to the magistrate judge. Under the circumstances, this

was a reasonable procedure which did not violate the express

provisions of the court’s order.

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B. Misconduct Findings

The magistrate judge found that with respect to some of the

jurors (both guilt/penalty and competency trial jurors)

Brosterhous “exceeded the bounds of propriety in his interviews.”

(F&R at 15:18.) Respondent does not object to the magistrate

judge’s description of the relevant law (id. at 9-15) but rather

contends that the evidence does not support a finding of

misconduct under that law. After four days of hearing testimony

on the issue, the magistrate judge concluded: (1) in light of the

circumstances of the interviews (“the sobriquet of juror

misconduct brought about by the jurors’ previous statements to

petitioner’s investigators”), Brosterhous knew, or should have

known, that his interviews had the high potential, if done

improperly, to influence jurors; (2) it was not Brosterhous’ tone

in the interviews that exceeded the bounds of propriety, rather

it was his “setting up” of the jurors with gratuitous

characterizations; and (3) finally, his comments “would make the

ordinary person feel guilty, foolish, or fearful, or all three

about what they had stated previously.” (Id. at 15-16.) The

magistrate judge provided several examples of such conduct in the

F&R. (Id. at 16-20 [describing interview-questioning of jurors

Mitts, Forbes and Robinson].)

He summarized his findings as follows:

[E]specially with respect to juror Mitts, the inference 

to be drawn is that Brosterhous knew he needed to have 

the jurors retract parts of their declarations (he

essentially told Mitts that her declaration, if its facts

were accepted at hearing, would cause a new trial) and was

not willing to simply see if that would happen without

lengthy, designed-to prejudice preambles, and without

non-loaded questions. Certainly, he should have known 

that his preambles and questions were directed towards

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unduly influencing the jurors/witnesses. Brosterhous also

should have known that his government position and that of

those persons who accompanied him made it imperative that he

zealously guard against his introductions and questions

having a biasing effect on the witnesses. Even Investigator

Hagan [who accompanied Brosterhous to many of the

interviews] related at evidentiary hearing that he did not

believe it to be a good idea to offer opinions when

conducting a juror misconduct investigation.

(Id. at 21:3-13.)

Respondent contends that in reaching these findings the

magistrate judge ignored other important facts which weigh

against a finding of misconduct. First, respondent points to

numerous examples of alleged bad acts by petitioner’s

investigators in interviewing the subject jurors. Certain of

those jurors testified that petitioner’s investigators did not

correctly identify themselves as working for petitioner when they

interviewed them, and several jurors testified that they believed

petitioner’s investigators acted dishonestly and engaged in

questionable tactics when interviewing them. (Docket #736 at

25.) The conduct of petitioner’s investigators, however, is not

relevant to resolution of the instant motion. Indeed, as this

court noted previously, respondent has not moved for sanctions

against petitioner. The focus of the inquiry here is on

Brosterhous’ conduct.

In that regard, respondent argues the magistrate judge’s

factual findings are not well-supported because none of the

testifying jurors stated they felt intimidated by Brosterhous or

that his questioning influenced the statements they made in their 

declarations. According to respondent, the “record simply does

not support [the magistrate judge’s] findings.” (Docket #736 at

26:20; 27.) 

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However, the F&R amply cites those portions of the record

that do support the magistrate judge’s findings. (see generally,

Docket #714.) Moreover, respondent ignores that the magistrate

judge’s findings were influenced by the totality of the jurors’

testimony at the hearing. Their credibility was assessed in

light of their previous declarations and their present

explanations for their change in testimony. In the end, the

magistrate judge determined that in the case of all jurors,

except Mitts, Brosterhous’ misconduct “either did not ultimately

relate to a cognizable issue of juror misconduct, or did not

appreciably cause changes in the jurors’ declarations, or did not

unduly influence the juror when they did make changes,” and as

such, sanctions with respect to these jurors was not warranted. 

(F&R at 22:8-11, 22-27.)

Respondent maintains that the result should have been the

same for juror Mitts. Regarding juror Mitts, the magistrate

judge found, after hearing her testimony and that of petitioner’s

investigator Ballew, that: (1) Mitts volunteered, without

influence from petitioner’s investigators, the facts in her

original declaration giving rise to the juror misconduct claim

(i.e., she had not disclosed during voir dire that she had been a

victim of rape; at the time of the trial, she hated men; she lied

during voir dire when she said she could be fair and impartial;

she discussed the case proceedings with other persons prior to

deliberations; and she read newspaper accounts of the

proceedings); (2) to the contrary, her statements to Brosterhous

recanting her prior concessions to misconduct, were pressured by

Brosterhous’ comments as demonstrated by the text of the 2000

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For example, when Brosterhous told her of an inevitable 10

hearing in Butte County at which she would be the “star witness”,

Mitts asked: “so what am I supposed to do about all of this.” 

When Brosterhous told her that ceratin “explanations” might get

her off the hook, she immediately retracted or did not recall

every previously conceded aspect of misconduct. The magistrate

judge found that while “[o]f course, Brosterhous did not tell

Mitts to make up the retractions . . . The point . . . is that

after improperly setting [her] up to fear the consequences of her

own misconduct, what did [Brosterhous] expect? Mitts was under a

powerful compulsion to disavow everything and avoid the

misconduct hearing.” (Id. at 28:16-19.)

The court notes that respondent has cited no authority 11

for his passing argument that the AEDPA precludes exclusion of

the subject evidence. While the AEDPA confines this court’s

review of petitioner’s habeas petition to the record before the

(continued...)

14

interview (F&R at 28:3-18) ; and (3) at the hearing, Mitts 10

proffered no legitimate reason for the changes in her initial

declaration (id. at 29:1.), and any reasons she did provide, the

magistrate judge found incredible (id. at 29, 30 [finding

“overall Mitts testimony at evidentiary hearing lacked complete

credibility”). Under the applicable standard of review, the

court cannot second-guess this credibility determination. See

United States v. Bergera, 512 F.2d 391, 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1975). 

Moreover, the court finds sufficient support in the record for

the magistrate judge’s ultimate finding that “Brosterhous

overreached with [respect to juror Mitts] to the point where the

pressure involved substantially prejudiced petitioner in that

testimony favorable to petitioner was changed for illegitimate

reasons.” (Id. at 30:12-14.)

As such, the court agrees with the magistrate judge that

exclusion of all evidence obtained subsequent to Mitts’ initial

1997 declaration is required as the “taint [of the 2000

Brosterhous interview] remained thereafter.” (Id. at 30:15- 11

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(...continued) 11

state court, it does not address whether any such evidence in the

record may be excluded or discounted in this court’s review.

15

16.)

III. Petitioner’s Objections

A. Juror Herbert

Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s no-prejudice

conclusion regarding juror Herbert because at the evidentiary

hearing Herbert testified, contrary to her prior declarations,

that she was unsure of when she learned of the competency

verdict, and she did not believe there had been any discussion of

the verdict in the deliberations. Previously, Herbert declared

that she learned of the competency verdict prior to resuming

deliberations in the penalty phase. 

Petitioner agrees with the magistrate judge that in her

subsequent declaration for Brosterhous Herbert did not recant her

original statements, but argues that her testimony at the hearing

(for the first time), that she may not have known about the

competency verdict until after the trial was over, was influenced

by Brosterhous’ interview techniques–-the very same techniques

the magistrate judge found unduly influenced juror Mitts’

testimony.

The magistrate judge indicated in the F&R that he may, in

later ruling on the merits of petitioner’s juror misconduct

claim, conclude based on Herbert’s testimony at the evidentiary

hearing, that she learned of the competency verdict after the

penalty phase had completed. The magistrate judge is free to

make this determination, as he heard Herbert’s testimony, and may

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find it more credible than the statements provided to either

petitioner’s investigators or Brosterhous. What is relevant to

this motion is that the magistrate judge determinated based on

Herbert’s failure to recant any of her original statements to

Brosterhous, that Brosterhous cannot be found to have prejudiced

petitioner as a result of the Herbert interview in 2000. Indeed,

at that point, Herbert continued to testify in a manner favorable

to petitioner. That Herbert changed her testimony at the

evidentiary hearing cannot be as a result of Brosterhous’ conduct

as he did not prepare her for her testimony or conduct her

examination.

B. Juror Robinson

Petitioner also objects to the magistrate judge’s noprejudice finding with respect to juror Robinson, arguing that

contrary to the magistrate judge’s findings, (1) his original

declaration did state a cognizable juror misconduct claim (with

respect to the alleged surveillance of jurors), and (2)

petitioner was prejudiced by Brosterhous’ interview of Robinson

because even if Robinson did not substantively change his

testimony in the declaration provided to Brosterhous, Brosterhous

turned Robinson, “a friendly witness” to petitioner into a

“hostile one.” (Docket #737 at 17-18.) Whether Robinson’s

testimony presents a cognizable juror misconduct claim is not for

determination on this motion; that substantive issue will be

decided in the first instance by the magistrate judge in his

findings and recommendations on petitioner’s habeas petition. 

Again, what is relevant to this motion is the magistrate judge’s

finding, which petitioner agrees with, that Robinson did not

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The magistrate judge did note that Robinson’s hostility 12

to petitioner and his counsel was in “no small part initiated by

Brosterhous.” (F&R at 22:15-16.) Thus, the magistrate judge

recognized Brosterhous’ impact on Robinson but for purposes of

measuring the legal effect on petitioner’s claims herein, there

was no basis for a sanction as Robinson’s substantive testimony

was not impacted.

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“change in substantial ways” his testimony from his first

declaration to the second declaration procured by Brosterhous. 

Accordingly, the court cannot find the magistrate judge’s noprejudice finding “clearly erroneous” as Brosterhous’

overreaching, to the extent there was any, did not have an

appreciable effect. That the process of this motion has

apparently turned Robinson into a “hostile” witness for

petitioner is not grounds to rule in petitioner’s favor on the

motion. To prevail, petitioner had to demonstrate a prejudicial

effect as a result of Brosterhous’ conduct. None is present with

respect to Robinson. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court cannot find the

magistrate judge’s decision finding Brosterhous engaged in

misconduct in the 2000 juror interviews and with respect to juror

Mitts that the misconduct caused a prejudicial effect

necessitating the exclusion of certain evidence, “clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.” The magistrate judge’s findings

of fact and conclusions of law are supported by the record and by

proper analysis, and accordingly, the court ADOPTS the May 31,

2006 F&R in full.

DATED: October 13, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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