Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03668/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03668-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Upon Screening, the Court dismissed Durango Jail Captain Peterson and Arizona

Governor Janet Napolitano as Defendants (Doc. #4).

JDN

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ramiro Ramirez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al.

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-3668-PHX-DGC (LOA)

ORDER

In this civil rights action brought by a former county jail inmate, Defendant Arpaio

moved to dismiss for lack of exhaustion (Doc. #8). Plaintiff responded and Defendant

replied (Doc. ##10, 11). The Court will grant Defendant’s motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff sued Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and alleged that his constitutional rights were

violated by inadequate food, lack of medical care, and unsanitary conditions due to severe

overcrowding at the county jail1

 (Doc. #1 at 4-6). The Court ordered an answer, and

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. ##4, 8).

In his motion, Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

(Doc. #8). In support, he submits the affidavit of Zelean Tademy, a Sergeant assigned to the

Inmate Hearing Unit (Ex. 1, Doc. #8). Tademy attests that inmates are provided a copy of

the “MCSO [Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office] Rules and Regulations for Inmates” which

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outlines the grievance procedures (Tademy Aff. ¶ 4). She further attests that inmates may

grieve all issues concerning the conditions of confinement, and that detention officers pass

out grievances as part of their daily duties (Id. ¶ 5). According to the sheriff’s office records,

Plaintiff did not file any grievances during his confinement at the county jail (Id. ¶ 7). In

addition to the exhaustion argument, Defendant asserts that, as Sheriff, he is not responsible

for healthcare in the jails (Doc. #8 at 4). Also attached to the motion was a copy of the

Inmate Grievance Procedure, Policy DJ-3, and two pages from the “Rules and Regulations

for Inmates” (Exs. A-B, Doc. #8).

The Court issued an order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond and the

quantum of evidence necessary to successfully rebut Defendant’s contentions (Doc. #9).

Plaintiff filed a response in which he requests the appointment of counsel in this matter (Doc.

#10). He asserts that he was denied grievance forms, except once when he filed a grievance

that was not responded to, presumably because it was written in Spanish (Id.). Plaintiff

alleges that a medical request he submitted was ignored, as were his requests for an

interpreter to assist with the grievance process (Id.). In response to Defendant’s claim that

he is not responsible for medical care, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is liable if he prohibits

an inmate from receiving medical care when it is requested. Finally, Plaintiff argues that

since he is no longer in custody of the county jail, there are no remedies available to him.

In his reply Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to identify who denied his

requests for grievance forms, and that Plaintiff had numerous opportunities to obtain

grievance forms (Doc. #17 at 2). Defendant points out that Plaintiff’s medical request forms

seeking dental care were all responded to by jail staff.

II. Request for Appointment of Counsel

There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Ivey v.

Board of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982). The appointment

of counsel in a civil rights case is required only when exceptional circumstances are present.

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328 (9th

Cir. 1986). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both ‘the

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likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims

pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331

(quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Court must review both

of these factors together in deciding whether or not to appoint counsel. Id. Here, the Court

finds no exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s action is being dismissed for failure to

exhaust available administrative remedies prior to bringing this suit. The grounds for

dismissal would be the same if Plaintiff was represented by counsel. Appointment of counsel

is unnecessary and Plaintiff’s request will be denied.

III. Legal Standard

Plaintiff must first exhaust “available” administrative remedies before bringing this

action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir.

2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). He must complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v.Ngo,

126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the

administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

Defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of

abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to

decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the

method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). 

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the administrative exhaustion requirement does not

require dismissal of the entire action when a prisoner brings a § 1983 action containing both

unexhausted and exhausted claims. The “total exhaustion” rule was rejected by the Ninth

Circuit in Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1173-75 (9th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74

U.S.L.W. 3425 (2006). The validity of the “total exhaustion” rule is presently pending

before the Supreme Court in Williams v. Overton, 136 Fed. Appx. 859, 2005 WL 1514102

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(6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1463 (March 6, 2006). Until the

Supreme Court decides to the contrary, the binding precedent in this circuit is that only

unexhausted claims are dismissed, not the entire action. Lira, 427 F.3d at 1175-76.

IV. Analysis

Initially, Defendant’s argument that he is not responsible for healthcare in the jails is

unpersuasive, and is unrelated to the issue of exhaustion. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091,

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (deliberate indifference may be shown when a jail official denies,

delays, or intentionally interferes with treatment). 

As to the exhaustion of administrative remedies, Defendant bears the burden of

specifying what remedies were “available” to Plaintiff. Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37. Despite

Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to show that he was denied

access to the grievance process, Plaintiff asserted in his verified Complaint that he was told

by detention officers that his claims were not grievable (Doc. #1 at 4, 6). But Plaintiff only

provides general allegations that detention officers told him his claims were not grievable

(Id.; Doc. #10 at 2). He has not alleged exactly what transpired when he attempted to grieve,

nor has he specified who informed him that he could not submit grievances for his claims.

Without more, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to overcome Defendant’s

evidence showing that a grievance system was available at the jail for Plaintiff’s claims.

Defendant proffered the sworn statement of a Hearing Officer who established that officers

readily pass out grievances and that it is against department policy for a detention officer not

to accept an inmate grievance (Tademy Aff. ¶ 5, Doc. #8). Moreover, the DJ-3 Policy

provides that the Rules and Regulations are available in both English and Spanish (Ex. A,

Doc. #8). 

Plaintiff’s contention that he is not subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement

because he is no longer in the custody of the jail is without merit. Because Plaintiff was a

“prisoner” at the time he filed this action, he is subject to the exhaustion requirement of the

PLRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (providing that a § 1983 action shall not be brought “by

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

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remedies as are available are exhausted”); Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1050-51 (providing that a

prisoner must exhaust his remedies before filing suit). Subsequent release from confinement

does not terminate the exhaustion requirement.

 The record demonstrates that, despite the existence of a grievance system, Plaintiff

did not file any grievances while confined at the jail. Plaintiff was required to use the

available process. Had he done so and received a rejection, all available remedies would

have been exhausted. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendant’s claim that

administrative remedies were not exhausted.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel (Doc. #10) is denied.

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #8) is granted. Plaintiff’s action is

dismissed without prejudice for lack of exhaustion. The Clerk of Court shall enter a

judgment of dismissal accordingly.

DATED this 12th day of October, 2006.

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