Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00072/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00072-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Stephen Walker, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00072-PHX-ROS (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On January 14, 2015, Petitioner Michael Stephen Walker filed a Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting several grounds for relief. 

(Doc. 1.) The Court dismissed the original petition with leave to amend using a courtapproved form. (Doc. 7.) On April 22, 2015, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition 

asserting ten grounds for relief challenging his convictions and sentences in Maricopa 

County Superior Court Case Nos. CR1992-000157 and CR2011-165590. (Doc. 9.) In 

their answer, Respondents assert that Grounds Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Nine, 

and Ten should be dismissed as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides the statute of limitations applicable to state 

prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 14 at 10.) Respondents 

alternatively argue that Ground Two is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

(Id. at 18.) Respondents also argue that federal habeas corpus review of Ground One and 

Grounds Three through Ten is procedurally barred. (Id. at 21.) Petitioner has filed a 

reply in support of his Amended Petition and a motion for an evidentiary hearing. 

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(Docs. 19, 20.) As set forth below, the Court recommends that the Amended Petition be 

dismissed and the motion for an evidentiary hearing be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Maricopa County Case No. CR1992-00157 (the 1992 Case) 

 1. Charges, Trial, Sentence, and Direct Review 

 On January 27, 1992, Petitioner was charged in Maricopa County Superior Court 

with one count of kidnapping, a class two felony and dangerous crime against children. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. A.) The charge alleged that Petitioner threatened to hurt his girlfriend’s 

baby with a knife if police approached him. (Doc. 14, Ex. I.) A jury found Petitioner 

guilty as charged. (Doc. 14, Ex. B.) On July 10, 1992, the trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to twelve years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 14, Ex C.) 

 Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 14, Exs. E, F.) Petitioner raised the following claims in his opening brief: (1) the 

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for kidnapping because (a) he did not 

restrain the child, and (b) his intoxication prevented him from having the requisite mental 

state for the crime; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to use prior felony 

convictions for impeachment; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to use an 

unrelated knife for demonstrative purposes; (4) the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a 

Native American jury panel member violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); 

(5) the trial court erred by failing to give an instruction pursuant to State v. Willits, 393 

P.2d 274 (Ariz. 1964), regarding the State’s failure to preserve the knife used during the 

incident; (6) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the legal effect of 

voluntary intoxication; (7) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could only 

consider a lesser-included offense if it unanimously acquitted Petitioner of kidnapping; 

(8) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that “reasonable doubt” does not include 

“possible doubt”; and (9) the trial court erred by failing to give Petitioner additional 

presentence incarceration credit. (Doc. 14, Ex. G.) On May 27, 1993, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and modified his sentence to include three 

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additional days of presentence incarceration credit. (Doc. 14, Ex. I.) The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied review on January 13, 1994. (Doc. 14, Ex. J.) 

 2. Post-Conviction Review 

 On December 20, 1994, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the 

trial court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.1

 (Doc. 14, 

Ex. L.) Petitioner was appointed counsel who filed a notice stating that he could not find 

any claims to raise on post-conviction review. (Doc. 14, Ex. M.) The trial court gave 

Petitioner an opportunity to file a pro per petition. (Doc. 14, Ex. N.) On October 19, 

1995, after the deadline for Petitioner to file his petition passed, the trial court dismissed 

the post-conviction proceeding based on Petitioner’s failure to file a petition. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. O.) 

 On January 30, 1998, Petitioner filed petition for post-conviction relief in a second 

post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 14, Ex. P.) On March 2, 1998, the trial court 

dismissed the second post-conviction proceeding because Petitioner “fail[ed] to set forth 

any facts or circumstances that would bring him within any of the exceptions to the rule 

of preclusion under Rule 32.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure or [Ariz. Rev. 

Stat.] § 13–4232.” (Doc. 14, Ex. Q.) 

 On November 21, 2006, Petitioner commenced a third post-conviction proceeding 

by filing a notice of post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel and challenging the admission of evidence at trial. (Doc. 14, Ex. R.) 

On December 14, 2006, the trial court dismissed the notice and found that Petitioner’s 

claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a) because they either were or should have been 

raised on direct appeal or in the first Rule 32 proceeding, and because “ineffective 

 

1

 Pursuant to the prison mailbox rules, Respondents consider Petitioner’s pro se filings to be filed on the date Petitioner signed the document and delivered it to prison authorities for mailing. (Doc. 14 at 5 n.2); see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-74 

(1988) (discussing mailbox rule in federal proceedings). Respondents also assume that Petitioner delivered his filings to prison authorities for mailing on the date he signed them, unless the filings indicate the mailing date. (Doc. 14 at 5 n.2); see Butler v. Long, 752 F.3d 1177, 1178 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (assuming federal habeas petitioner “turned his petition over to prison authorities on the same day he signed it”). The Court also applies the mailbox rule in this fashion. 

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assistance of Rule 32 counsel [was] not a cognizable claim in a collateral Rule 32 

proceeding.” (Doc. 14, Ex. S.) Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. T.) On November 2, 2007, the appellate court denied review. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. U.) 

 On September 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a fourth notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. V.) Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred by admitting certain 

evidence, and that trial and post-conviction counsel were ineffective. (Id.) Petitioner’s 

claims related to the admission of a knife during his trial. (Id.) On October 1, 2012, the 

trial court dismissed the notice because it was untimely under Rule 32.4(a) and Petitioner 

had not asserted any ground for relief that could be asserted in an untimely Rule 32 

proceeding. (Doc. 14, Ex. W.) On October 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for 

reconsideration, which the trial court denied on March 11, 2013. (Doc. 14, Exs. X, Y.) 

Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing the fourth notice of 

post-conviction relief without giving him the opportunity to file a petition. (Doc. 9-1 at 

4-8.) On September 4, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied 

relief, concluding that the notice was untimely under Rule 32.4 and that Petitioner’s 

claims were precluded by Rule 32.2(a). (Doc. 9-1 at 9-11.) 

 On January 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a “motion to supplement [fourth] petition for 

review,” and on January 28, 2014, he filed another notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 9-1 at 12–14.) The trial court denied review on April 7, 2014, stating that: 

[t]he Court has reviewed Defendant’s Motion to Supplement Petition for Review filed January 13, 2014, and Notice of Post-Conviction Relief filed 

January 31, 2014. The order and mandate on direct appeal was issued on 

February 1, 1994. This is defendant’s fourth Rule 32 proceeding; it is both untimely and successive. 

The defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g), that there has been a significant change in the law that, if applied retroactively to the defendant’s case, it would probably affect the outcome of the defendant’s 

convictions or sentences. Specifically, the defendant refers to the Ethical 

Rule 3.8. The defendant provides no factual or legal basis to support a finding that the rule change is applicable retroactively. Further, even if the change was applicable to the prosecutor at the time of the trial, there is no 

basis to find the outcome of the conviction or sentence would have been 

affected. 

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Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(g). In addition, defendant’s conviction was final before the rule change. Defendant is therefore not entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(g). 

(Doc. 9-1 at 15.) 

B. Maricopa County Case No. CR2011-165590 (the 2011 Case) 

 1. Charges, Plea, Sentencing, and Direct Review 

 On January 25, 2012, Petitioner was charged in Maricopa County Superior Court 

case No. CR2011-165590 with one count of aggravated assault against a police officer. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. AA.) The charge alleged that Petitioner bit a police officer on the neck. 

(Doc. 14, Exs. AA, EE.) The State alleged that Petitioner had five historical nondangerous felony convictions, including his 1992 kidnapping conviction. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. BB.) On April 19, 2012, Petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with one 

prior felony conviction, the 1992 kidnapping conviction. (Doc. 14, Exs. CC, DD.) The 

plea agreement specified the following terms of imprisonment: four-and-one-half years’ 

for the presumptive sentence, three years for the minimum sentence, 2.25 years for the 

mitigated sentence, six years for the maximum sentence, and seven-and-one-half years 

for the aggravated sentence. (Doc. 14, Ex. CC.) The plea agreement stipulated to a 

sentence of five years’ imprisonment. (Id.) The State agreed to allege only one of 

Petitioner’s five prior felony convictions, and not to file additional charges of aggravated 

assault and resisting arrest. (Id.) The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea and, on 

May 22, 2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to five years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 14, 

Exs. DD, FF.) 

 2. Post-Conviction Review 

 On July 16, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32. (Doc. 14, Ex. II.) The court appointed Deputy Public Defender Mikel Steinfeld 

to represent Petitioner in the post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 14, Ex. JJ.) On February 

22, 2013, Steinfeld filed a notice stating that he could not “find any colorable claims for 

relief to raise on [Petitioner’s] behalf.” (Id.) The court ordered Steinfeld to serve as 

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advisory counsel and allowed Petitioner to file a pro per petition for post-conviction 

relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. KK.) 

 On May 22, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting the 

following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations because his 

inadequate advice led to Petitioner’s failure to timely accept an alleged plea offer from 

the State stipulating to a sentence of 2.25 years’ imprisonment; (2) trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate Petitioner’s claim that police officers beat Petitioner 

after his arrest; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for waiving Petitioner’s preliminary 

hearing. (Doc. 14, Ex. LL.) After Petitioner filed his petition, Steinfeld moved to 

withdraw as advisory counsel, stating that he had discovered a conflict of interest. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. MM.) The court granted the motion, appointed the Office of the Legal 

Advocate to represent Petitioner, and ordered appointed counsel to investigate potential 

claims for relief. (Doc. 14, Ex. NN.) Appointed counsel, Deputy Legal Advocate Kerri 

Chamberlin, later filed a notice stating that she was “unable to find any claims for relief 

to be raised in post-conviction relief proceedings.” (Doc. 14, Ex. QQ.) After Chamberlin 

filed her notice, Petitioner moved to reinstate his pro per petition. (Doc. 14, Ex. RR.) 

 On January 10, 2014, the trial court dismissed the petition for post-conviction 

relief for failure to state a colorable claim for which relief could be granted. (Doc. 14, 

Ex. TT.) The court noted that Petitioner entered the plea agreement intelligently, 

knowingly, and voluntarily, and that he had agreed at sentencing that his attorney 

performed well in securing an agreement for a sentence of five years’ imprisonment. 

(Id.) The court concluded that Petitioner failed to prove ineffective assistance under 

either prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and found that Petitioner 

had not raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) Petitioner did 

not appeal that decision. 

 Over a year later, on January 13, 2015, Petitioner filed in the trial court a “Notice 

of Oversight and Application to Correct Judgment Accordingly,” arguing that his 1992 

kidnapping conviction was too old to be alleged as a prior felony conviction for 

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sentencing purposes in the 2011 case. (Doc. 14, Ex. UU.) On February 23, 2015, the 

trial court denied relief, concluding that “[t]he Sentencing does not contain any error with 

regard to sentencing enhancement.”2

 (Doc. 14, Ex. VV.) 

 On March 23, 2015, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the trial court challenging 

the trial court’s February 23, 2015 ruling. (Doc. 14, Ex. WW.) On May 15, 2015, 

Petitioner filed a “Notice and an Application of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis” in the trial 

court raising multiple claims.3

 (Doc. 14, Ex. XX.) 

C. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings 

 On January 14, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court asserting that: (1) his due process rights were violated because his sentence in the 

2011 case was enhanced with a conviction that was nineteen years old (the 1992 

kidnapping conviction) (Ground One); (2) the state courts refused to allow Petitioner to 

present his first Rule 32 petition to challenge his conviction in the 1992 case (Ground 

Two); (3) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to present a substitute knife for 

demonstrative purposes during his trial in the 1992 case (Ground Three); (4) Petitioner 

was arrested without probable cause or a warrant in the 1992 case (Ground Four); and 

(5) trial counsel was ineffective during the 1992 case (Ground Five). (Doc. 1.) 

 On April 22, 2015, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition asserting the following 

claims: (1) his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in the 2011 case 

when his sentence was enhanced by his nineteen-year-old conviction in the 1992 case 

(Ground One); (2) the trial and appellate courts violated his First and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights when they refused to allow him to present Petitioner’s first Rule 32 

petition challenging his conviction in the 1992 case (Ground Two); (3) his Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when a police officer presented a “forged” 

 

2

 The court’s order is dated February 19, 2015 and filed February 23, 2015. (Doc. 14, Ex. VV.) 

3

 The record does not contain information about the disposition of these proceedings, but the absence of that information does not preclude resolution of this 

matter. 

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piece of evidence (a knife) during his trial in the 1992 case (Ground Three); (4) he was 

arrested in the 1992 case without probable cause or a warrant in violation of his Fourth, 

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Ground Four); (5) trial counsel in the 1992 case 

was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment (Ground Five); (6) his Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was sentenced in the 1992 case to a 

class two felony, instead of a class four felony (Ground Six); (7) his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated when he was denied a timely preliminary hearing in the 

2011 case (Ground Seven); (8) Petitioner’s counsel in the 2011 case was ineffective in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment for failing to object to the sentencing enhancement 

(Ground Eight); (9) his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in the 2011 

case when he received “improper legal advice regarding the state’s first plea offer [and 

when] counsel failed to communicate the expiration date of the plea, [which] resulted in 

the uninformed forfeiture of the 2.25-year plea offer” (Ground Nine); and (10) his Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when trial counsel in the 2011 case 

refused to “investigate allegations that the police officers brutally beat [him] during the 

ride from the arrest location to the police station” (Ground Ten). (Doc. 9.) Respondents 

assert several defenses to these claims which the Court addresses below. (Doc. 14.) The 

Court also considers Petitioner’s reply. (Doc. 20.) 

II. Ground Two is Not Cognizable on Federal Habeas Corpus Review 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the state courts violated his First and 

Fourteenth Amendments rights by refusing “to allow [him] to present his first [postconviction] Rule 32 Petition to the government so to redress his grievances [related to the 

1992 case] in their courts.” (Doc. 9 at 12.) Petitioner challenges the trial court’s 

dismissal of his first post-conviction proceeding based on his failure to file a petition, and 

the state courts’ dismissal of his subsequent post-conviction proceedings on procedural 

grounds. (Id.) Petitioner states that he has a limited education and did not understand the 

procedures related to Rule 32 proceedings. (Doc. 20 at 3-15.) He asserts that during his 

first post-conviction proceeding related to his 1992 case, he did not understand that he 

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was required to file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief after his attorney notified 

the trial court that he could not find any issues to raise. (Id. at 8.) Respondents argue that 

Ground Two presents state law issues that are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus 

review. (Doc. 14 at 18-19.) Petitioner, however, contends that Ground Two does not 

pertain to state law, but to his “civil rights.” (Doc. 20 at 15.) As discussed below, the 

Court concludes that Ground Two presents state law issues that are not cognizable on 

federal habeas corpus review.4

 

 

4

 Liberally construing the Amended Petition and the Reply, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during his first post-conviction proceeding because, after counsel notified the court that he could not find any issues to raise, he did not notify Petitioner that he needed to file a pro se petition. (Doc. 9 at 12, Doc. 20 at 6.) Petitioner also argues that he expected the assistance of counsel during his subsequent post-conviction proceedings. (Doc. 20 at 3-15.) 

To the extent Petitioner’s claims are based on an entitlement to post-conviction counsel under Arizona law, such claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 939 (an alleged violation of Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c) 

based on the trial court’s failure to appoint the petitioner counsel in a post-conviction proceeding was not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review). Additionally, as discussed below, Petitioner did not have a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in his post-conviction proceedings related to his 1992 case. 

 A criminal defendant has no federal constitutional right to counsel in state post- conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). Absent such a right, “a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in 

such proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); see also Martinez 

v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct 1309, 1320 (2012) (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction proceedings”); Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 

1271 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court has “concluded there is no Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during state or federal habeas corpus proceedings”). 

 However, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel applies to the first appeal of right in the courts. Evitts v. 

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Thus, courts in the District of Arizona recognize that a pleading defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel in a Rule-32 of right proceeding in Arizona, because that proceeding is a form of direct review. See Summers 

v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717-18 (9th Cir. 2007); Ree v. Ryan, 2015 WL 3889360, at *1 

(D. Ariz. June 23, 2015); Ramon v. Ryan, 2010 WL 3564819, at *11 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2010) (Arizona pleading defendant had a right to counsel in his Rule 32 of-right post conviction proceeding). 

 Here, in the 1992 case, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial. Thus, Petitioner’s first post-conviction proceeding was not an of-right proceeding and, therefore, Petitioner did not have a right to counsel in that proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. 

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 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, habeas corpus relief is only available for “a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Id. Defendants 

argue that Ground Two is not cognizable under § 2254 because it is based on an alleged 

violation of state, not federal, law. (Doc. 14 at 18-19.) The Ninth Circuit has held that 

procedural errors arising during post-conviction relief proceedings are not cognizable in 

habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 

26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam ) (holding that “a petition alleging errors in the state postconviction review process is not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.”); see 

also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the post-conviction 

court’s failure to appoint petitioner counsel in his second post-conviction proceedings did 

not constitute a basis for a federal habeas claim); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 

1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that errors in the post-conviction proceeding were not 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings). 

 As previously stated, Ground Two asserts that the state courts erred in dismissing 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings based on state procedural grounds and, thus, it does not 

assert a federal claim. Although Ground Two also cites the First Amendment and Due 

Process Clauses, Petitioner cannot “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely 

by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1389, 1389 (9th Cir. 

1996). Accordingly, Petitioner’s challenge to the state court’s dismissal of his postconviction proceedings fails to state a cognizable claim and, therefore, Ground Two 

should be dismissed.5

 

III. Statute of Limitations

The Court next considers Respondents’ assertion that several of Petitioner’s claims 

are barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 14 at 10.) The AEDPA provides a one-

 

5

 Respondents alternatively argue that Ground Two is untimely under the AEPDA statute of limitations. (Doc. 14 at 16.) Because the Court concludes that Ground Two is 

not cognizable on § 2254 review, it does not consider this argument. Likewise, the Court does not consider Petitioner’s arguments regarding why the Court should excuse his untimely presentation of Ground Two. (Doc. 20 at 3-15.) 

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year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file petitions for writ of habeas corpus in 

federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “Section 2244(d)(1) ‘contain[s] multiple 

provisions relating to the events that trigger its running.’” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 

933 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Holland v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 

2561 [ ] (2010)) (alteration in original). “The triggering events are the dates on which: 

direct review becomes final, an unlawful state-created impediment to filing is removed, a 

new constitutional right is made retroactively available, or the factual predicate of the 

claim(s) presented could have been discovered with ‘due diligence.’” Lee, 653 F.3d at 

933 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D)). The one-year statute of limitations begins 

running on the latest of those dates. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 

F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 When a § 2254 petition advances multiple grounds for habeas corpus relief, the 

“AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1) applies to each claim in a 

habeas application on an individual basis.” Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th 

Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Court considers the limitations period as it applies to 

Petitioner’s claims.6

A. Timeliness of Grounds Three, Four, Five, and Six 

 Grounds Three, Four, Five, and Six relate to Petitioner’s 1992 case. Respondents 

argue that § 2244(d)(1)(A) supplies the starting date for the limitations period on those 

claims and that Petitioner did not file his § 2254 petition until after the AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations expired as to Grounds Three through Six. (Doc. 14 at 11-14.) 

The statute of limitations commences on the latest of the dates determined by applying 

§§ 2244(d)(1)(A) through (D). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Petitioner does not 

make any allegations indicating that subsections (B), (C), or (D) should apply, or that 

 

6

 Petitioner argues that the AEDPA does not apply to the Court’s consideration of 

his claims related to his 1992 conviction because that conviction occurred before the 

AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. (Doc. 20 at 3.) This argument lacks merit because Petitioner filed his original petition in January 2015, and the Supreme Court has held that the AEDPA applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after the AEDPA’s April 24, 1996 effective date. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206, 210 (2003). 

Accordingly, the AEDPA applies to this matter. 

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application of any of these subsections would result in a starting date for the statute of 

limitations that is later than the date determined under § 2244(d)(1)(A). (Docs. 9, 20.) 

Accordingly, the Court finds that § 2244(d)(1)(A) applies. 

 On January 18, 1994, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction 

and sentence in the 1992 case. (Doc. 14, Ex. J.) Petitioner did not file a petition for writ 

of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction 

became final ninety days later, on April 18, 1994, upon the expiration of the time for 

filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See Bowen v. 

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (the time for seeking direct review under 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) “includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a 

writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner 

actually files such a petition”); see also Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (a petition for writ of certiorari 

to review a judgment entered by a state’s highest court must be filed in the United States 

Supreme Court with ninety days after entry of the judgment). 

 State prisoners, like Petitioner, whose convictions became final before the April 

24, 1996 effective date of the AEDPA, had a one-year grace period, until April 24, 1997, 

to file federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (“AEDPA’s one-year grace period for challenging convictions 

finalized before AEDPA’s enactment date is governed by Rule 6(a) and ended on April 

24, 1997 in the absence of statutory tolling.”). Petitioner did not present Grounds Three, 

Four, Five, and Six in a federal habeas corpus petition until January 14, 2015, when he 

filed his original petition, which included the claims asserted in Grounds Three through 

Six of the Amended Petition. (Compare Doc. 1 at 10-17 with Doc. 9 at 15-22.) 

Therefore, absent tolling or an exception to the limitations period, Grounds Three, Four, 

Five, and Six are barred by the statute of limitations. 

 1. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

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respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 As previously stated, the limitations period for Petitioner’s claims asserted in 

Grounds Three through Six expired on April 24, 1997. Thereafter, on January 30, 1998, 

Petitioner commenced the first of several state post-conviction actions pursuant to Rule 

32 challenging his conviction and sentence in the 1992 case. (Doc. 14, Exs. P, R. V; 

Doc. 9 -1 at 12.) Additionally, on May 15, 2015, Petitioner filed a “Notice and an 

Application for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis” in the trial court. Even assuming that the 

application for writ of error coram nobis constitutes an “application for State postconviction or other collateral review,” because the AEDPA statute of limitations as to 

Grounds Three through Six had expired before Petitioner commenced his Rule 32 postconviction actions and before he sought coram nobis relief, those proceedings could not 

toll the limitations period.7

 See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 

2003) (holding that “section 2244(d) does not permit re-initiation of the limitations period 

that has ended before the state petition was filed.”). 

 Thus, the deadline for Petitioner to file a § 2254 petition raising the claims 

asserted in Grounds Three, Four, Five, and Six was April 24, 1997. Petitioner did file his 

original Petition until January 14, 2015, more than ten years after the limitations expired 

on those claims. Accordingly, the Petition is untimely as to Grounds Three, Four, Five, 

and Six unless Petitioner establishes that equitable tolling or an exception to the statute of 

limitations applies. 

 

 

7

 In his Reply, Petitioner argues that his claims are not barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations because the coram nobis proceeding is still pending in state court. 

(Doc. 20 at 12.) Because the coram nobis proceeding cannot toll the AEDPA limitations 

period, whether it is still pending does not change the analysis of the statute of limitations 

issue. 

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 2. Equitable Tolling

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply 

the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 a. Extraordinary Circumstances 

 Here, although Petitioner asserts that he had some difficulty presenting his claims 

related to the 1992 case to the state courts during post-conviction proceedings (Doc. 20 at 

3-15), he does not specifically address his untimely presentation of Grounds Three, Four, 

Five, and Six in this § 2254 proceeding.8

 Rather, to excuse any procedural or time bars to 

his claims, Petitioner generally argues that he is incarcerated, has a limited education, and 

lacks legal knowledge. (Doc. 20 at 3, 3, 4, 8, 15.) These factors do not constitute 

extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. See Waldron–

Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1112-1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (the petitioner’s 

confusion about the AEDPA does not justify equitable tolling); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, 

 8

 The reply could be construed as arguing that the lack, or ineffective assistance, 

of post-conviction counsel resulted in the untimely presentation of Grounds Three through Six. (Doc. 20 at 3-15). However, the lack, or ineffective assistance, of counsel 

during state post-conviction proceedings related to the 1992 case does not excuse his 

failure timely to file a federal habeas corpus petition. As discussed in Section II n.4, 

Petitioner had no federal constitutional right to counsel during those post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, the absence or ineffectiveness of counsel does not warrant 

equitably tolling the limitations period. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir.1998) (ineffective representation in post-conviction proceeding does not constitute cause for procedural default). 

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by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”); Ballesteros v. 

Schriro, 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, 

ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and 

temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). A petitioner’s lack 

of education is also not grounds for equitable tolling. See Hughes v. Idaho Bd. of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1986) (a petitioner’s pro se status and 

illiteracy did not constitute cause to excuse procedural default). 

 Petitioner also asserts that he had difficulty presenting his claims during state postconviction proceedings because he did not have records from his 1992 criminal case, and 

did not know that he was entitled to a copy of the record until September 2013. (Doc. 20 

at 7-8.) The Ninth Circuit has observed that a petitioner’s inability to obtain transcripts 

or access to legal files may warrant equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances, but 

only when the record shows that such inability actually prevented a prisoner from seeking 

habeas relief. See United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004); Lott v. 

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner does not explain what steps he 

took before September 2013 to obtain the records from his 1992 case. (Doc. 20 at 8.) 

Additionally, he does not explain why his alleged lack of records prevented him from 

presenting grounds Three, Four, Five, and Six in a timely habeas corpus petition. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling based on his alleged lack of 

records. 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not articulated, and the record does not reveal, any 

extraordinary circumstance that prevented Petitioner from filing a timely federal habeas 

corpus petition asserting the claims included in Grounds Three, Four, Five, and Six. 

 b. Diligent Pursuit of Claims 

 Even if Petitioner were able to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, he is not 

entitled to equitable tolling because the record reflects that he failed to exercise diligence 

in pursuing his claims. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (finding 

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conviction proceedings until three years after judgment was entered and twenty-one 

months after the AEDPA’s effective date); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 

1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating 

grounds for equitable tolling); Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(finding that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling due to his lack of diligence); 

Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 565–66 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that petitioner 

did not exercise diligence because he had no motions or cases pending in state or federal 

court during three intervals totaling 364 days). 

 Although Petitioner sought post-conviction relief multiple times, there were 

significant gaps between those proceedings. The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s first 

post-conviction proceeding on October 14, 1995. (Doc. 14, Ex. O.) Petitioner waited 

nearly three years before commencing a second post-conviction action in January 1998. 

(Doc. 14, Ex. P.) After the trial court dismissed that proceeding in March 1998, 

Petitioner waited over eight years before he filed another notice of post-conviction relief 

on December 14, 2006. (Doc. 14, Exs. Q, R.) After that proceeding was denied on 

appeal in November 2007, Petitioner waited nearly five years before he pursued his 

claims in a post-conviction proceeding in September 2012. (Doc. 14, Exs. V, U.) 

Petitioner explains that the intervals between his post-conviction proceedings occurred 

because he would become frustrated and “g[i]ve up,” because he did not understand the 

post-conviction process. (Doc. 20 at 7.) The extended periods of inactivity between 

Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings illustrate his lack of diligence. Petitioner’s 

frustration with Arizona’s post-conviction procedures does not excuse his lack of 

diligence. See Waldron–Ramsey, 556 at 1112-1113 (the petitioner’s confusion about the 

AEDPA does not justify equitable tolling). 

 Because Petitioner has not shown that he “has been pursuing his rights diligently” 

and that “some extraordinary circumstance” stood in the way of his raising his claims in a 

timely § 2254 Petitioner, equitable tolling does not apply to Grounds Three through Six. 

See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. 

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 3. Actual Innocence Exception to the Limitations Period 

 To avoid a time bar to federal review of his claims in Grounds Three, Four, Five 

and Six, Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent of the 1992 conviction. (Doc. 9 at 

12; Doc. 20 at 12, 14.) As discussed below, Petitioner has not established that he has a 

credible claim of actual innocence that constitutes an equitable exception to the one-year 

statute of limitations applicable to these claims. In McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 

133 S. Ct. 1924, (2013), the United States Supreme Court recognized an exception to the 

AEDPA statute of limitations for a claim of actual innocence. The Court adopted the 

actual innocence gateway previously recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 

(1995), for excusing the bar to federal habeas corpus review of procedurally defaulted 

claims. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 937-38.) 

 The rule announced in McQuiggin does not provide for an extension of the time 

statutorily prescribed, but instead is an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin, 

133 S. Ct. at 1931. Actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to address 

the merits of a petitioner’s otherwise time-barred constitutional claims; the Supreme 

Court has not yet addressed whether “a freestanding claim of actual innocence” provides 

a separate basis for granting habeas relief. Id. To pass through the Schlup gateway, a 

“petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Schlup

requires a petitioner ‘to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.’” Lee v. 

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

 In his Reply, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to subpoena witnesses to 

substantiate his claim of actual innocence in the 1992 case. (Doc. 20 at 14.) However, 

he does not identify the witnesses he would subpoena or describe the nature of their 

testimony. Thus, he has not shown that, based on this alleged new evidence, “it is more 

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likely than not that no reasonably juror would have convicted him . . . .” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 316. 

 Petitioner also argues that “the testimony of Alexia Colter the eye witness to the 

alleged crime shows by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable jury could have 

found [Petitioner] guilty of the offense.” (Doc. 20 at 5.) Petitioner does not describe 

Alexia Colter’s testimony or explain why it is new evidence. (Id.) However, in an 

abundance of caution and in view of Petitioner’s pro se status, the Court has reviewed the 

record and found a letter that Colter submitted to the trial court before sentencing in 

which she explained that she was the victim’s mother and that Petitioner did not threaten 

to hurt her baby. (Doc. 14-1 at 31-34.) She explained that Petitioner had been using a 

knife to fix his stereo speakers and that he was holding the knife when he picked up the 

baby. (Id. at 33.) She stated that Petitioner held the baby tight so he would not drop her, 

but he did not hurt the baby. (Id.) 

 Even assuming this is new evidence for purposes of Schlup, Petitioner has not 

shown that, based on this evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted him. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Colter’s testimony contradicted the 

police officers’ testimony that Petitioner held the baby and threatened to hurt the baby 

with a knife if police took him to jail. (Doc. 14, Ex. L.) However, a reasonable juror 

could have credited the police officers’ testimony rather than Colter’s. Thus, Petitioner 

has not met Schlup’s high standard and this exception does not excuse his untimely 

presentation of his claims. 

B. Timeliness of Grounds One, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten 

 Respondents assert that Grounds One and Eight are timely, but Grounds Seven, 

Nine, and Ten are untimely. As set forth above, the Court agrees with Respondents’ 

assertion. Grounds One, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten pertain to Petitioner’s conviction 

and sentence in the 2011 case. As previously stated, the statute of limitations commences 

on the latest of the dates determined by applying §§ 2244(d)(1)(A) through (D). See 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). As with the other grounds asserted in the Amended 

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Petition, Respondents argue that § 2244(d)(1)(A) supplies the starting date for the 

limitations period on Grounds One, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten. (Doc. 14 at 14.) 

Petitioner again does not make any allegations indicating that subsections (B), (C), or (D) 

should apply, or that application of any of these subsections would result in a starting 

date for the statute of limitations that is later than the date determined under 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, the Court finds that § 2244(d)(1)(A) applies. 

 To assess the timeliness of Grounds One, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, the Court 

first determines the date on which Petitioner’s conviction in the 2011 case became “final 

by the conclusion of direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). By pleading guilty, 

Petitioner was precluded from pursuing a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-4033(B). Rather, Petitioner could seek review in an “of-right” 

proceeding pursuant to Rule 32; the functional equivalent of a direct appeal. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4.; Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

2011 conviction became final upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the expiration of the time for seeking such 

proceeding or review.” See Summers, 481 F.3d at 711, 716-17 

 Petitioner commenced a timely Rule 32 of-right proceeding and the trial court 

denied relief on January 10, 2014. (Doc. 14, Ex. TT.) After the trial court denied relief, 

Petitioner had fifteen days to petition the trial court for a rehearing. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.9(a). Petitioner did not file a motion for rehearing by that deadline. Thus, Petitioner 

had thirty days from the date of the trial court’s final decision on the Rule 32 of-right 

petition to file an appeal of that decision. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). In their Answer, 

Respondents add five days to the thirty-day deadline by applying Rule 1.3, which 

provides that “whenever a party has the right or is required to take some action within a 

prescribed period after service of a notice or other paper and such service is allowed and 

made by mail, 5 days shall be added to the prescribed period.” (Doc. 14 at 14 (citing 

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Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3)); see also State v. Zuniga, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (Ariz. 1990) (Rule 1.3 

extends the time to file a notice of appeal by five days when the order appealed has been 

mailed to the interested party). Thus, Petitioner had until February 15, 2014 to file a 

petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner, however, did not file a 

petition for review in the appellate court. 

 Accordingly, his 2011 conviction became final on February 15, 2014, “[u]pon the 

expiration of the time for seeking” review of this Rule 32 of-right proceeding. See

Summers, 481 F.3d at 711, 716-17 Thus, the one-year limitations period started to run 

the next day, February 16, 2014, and ended one year later on February 15, 2015. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir. 

2001) (the limitations period begins to run on the day after the triggering event pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). 

 Long after the expiration of the deadlines for filing a motion for rehearing and for 

seeking appellate review of the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 of-right proceeding, on 

January 13, 2015, Petitioner filed in the trial court a “Notice of Oversight and Application 

to Correct Judgment Accordingly” (Motion to Correct Judgment). (Doc. 14, Ex. UU.) 

On February 23, 2015, the trial court denied relief on that motion. (Doc. 14, Ex. VV.) 

On March 23, 2015, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s February 2015 

ruling. (Doc. 14, Ex. WW.) 

 There is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court granted Petitioner 

leave to file a late motion for rehearing or a late notice of appeal, or that could otherwise 

be construed as reopening direct review of the trial court’s order denying relief in 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding. The trial court’s denial of the Motion to Correct 

Judgment does not indicate that direct review was reopened and thus the AEDPA 

limitations period should restart. See United States v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 889 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (when the state supreme court clerk labeled the petitioner’s petition for writ of 

certiorari as untimely, and denied the petition, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the 

Supreme Court’s denial of the untimely certiorari petition an indication that the Court 

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forgave the untimeliness of the petition, thus, the Supreme Court’s ruling did not provide 

a new date on which the judgment became final under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).)9

 

 Accordingly, Petitioner’s judgment of conviction in the 2011 case became final on 

February 15, 2014. Thus, the one-year limitations period started to run the next day, 

February 16, 2014, and ended one year later on February 15, 2015, unless the limitations 

period was tolled. 

 1. Statutory Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period is tolled during the time that “a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino, 183 F.3d at 

1006. 

 Here, as previously stated, the AEDPA limitations period as to Grounds One, 

Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten commenced on February 16, 2014 and expired on February 

15, 2015. After his Rule 32 of-right proceeding concluded, Petitioner did not commence 

another post-conviction action pursuant to Rule 32. However, on May 20, 2015, 

Petitioner filed a “Notice of Application of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis” in the trial 

court. (Doc. 14, Ex. XX.) Petitioner argues that his claims are not barred by the AEDPA 

statute of limitations because that proceeding is still pending in state court. (Doc. 20 at 

12.) Even if Petitioner’s application for a writ of error coram nobis constitutes an 

“application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” under § 2244(d)(2), 

because the AEDPA statute of limitations expired before Petitioner commenced that 

action, it could not toll the limitations period.10 Accordingly, once the AEDPA 

limitations period expires, a subsequently filed state post-conviction proceeding cannot 

 9

 Courts have interpreted the statute of limitation provisions of §§ 2244 and 2255 

as being consistent. See Lackawana Cty Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402 

(2001). 

10 Rule 32 consolidated several avenues for post-conviction relief, including writs of coram nobis, into a single comprehensive remedy. See Greathouse v. Songberg, 2008 

WL 686994, at * n.2 (discussing Rule 32); see also Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 

(9th Cir. 1994) (stating that Rule 32 was amended in 1975 to “consolidate several types of post-conviction writs, petitions, and motions into one comprehensive post-conviction remedy.”). 

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restart the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 

2003) (noting that an application for state post-conviction relief filed after expiration of 

the AEDPA statute of limitations did not reinitiate the limitations period). Accordingly, 

statutory tolling does not apply.11

 2. Timeliness of Petitioner’s Claims Related to the 2011 Case 

 As discussed above, because statutory tolling does not apply, the one-year 

limitations period as to Grounds One, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten expired on February 

15, 2015. Petitioner’s original petition, filed on January 14, 2015, was timely. However, 

Petitioner filed the Amended Petition on April 22, 2015, after the limitations period 

expired. Accordingly, unless the claims in the Amended Petition relate back to original 

petition in accordance with Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they are 

untimely. Respondents state that Grounds One and Eight relate back to the original 

petition and, therefore, are timely. However, Respondents argue that Grounds Seven, 

Nine, and Ten do not relate back to the original petition and, therefore, are untimely. As 

set forth below, the Court agrees with Respondents’ assertion. 

 Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an “amendment 

to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment 

asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out 

— or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading.”12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 

In Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), the Supreme Court explained relation back under 

Rule 15(c) as applied to the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. The Court held that 

new claims relate back to “timely” claims only when such claims are tied to a common 

core of operative facts. Id. at 665. The Court rejected the argument that a common core 

of operative facts could be interpreted to include all facts arising out of a petitioner’s trial, 

 

11 The Court considers whether equitably tolling applies in Section III.B.3. 

12 A petition for writ of habeas corpus “may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. In 

addition, Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that “[t]he Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules, may be applied, when appropriate, to the petitions filed under these rules.” 

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conviction, or sentence. Id. New claims supported by facts that differ in both “time and 

type” from those included in the original petition do not relate back. Id. at 650. In 

contrast, if a new claim merely clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory already in the 

original petition, it may relate back to the date of the original petition and avoid a time 

bar. See Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001). 

 Here, as Respondents acknowledge (Doc. 14 at 14), Petitioner’s allegations in 

Ground One of the Amended Petition, that his sentence in the 2011 case was improperly 

enhanced with his 1992 conviction, are essentially the same as his allegations in Ground 

One of the original petition. (Compare Doc. 1 at 8 with Doc. 9 at 11) Thus, Ground One 

of the Amended Petition relates back to the timely-filed original petition and is timely. 

 Ground Eight also relates back to the original petition. In Ground Eight, Petitioner 

asserts that trial counsel in the 2011 case was ineffective in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment for failing to argue that Petitioner’s sentence was improperly enhanced by 

his 1992 kidnapping conviction. (Doc. 9 at 24.) As Respondents concede (Doc. 14 at 

15), this claim relates back to the original petition because it arises from a common core 

of operative facts — Petitioner’s enhanced sentence in the 2011 case — that Petitioner 

asserted to support Ground One of the original petition. (Compare Doc. 1 at 8 with

Doc. 9 at 24.) Therefore, Ground Eight is timely. 

 However, as Respondents argue, Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds Seven, 

Nine, and Ten do not relate back to the original petition and, therefore, are untimely. 

(Doc. 14 at 14-16.) In Ground Seven, Petitioner asserts that his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated when trial counsel waived Petitioner’s right to a 

preliminary hearing in the 2011 case without his “informed and express consent.” 

(Doc. 9 at 23.) Ground One of the original petition is the only ground that relates to 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in the 2011 case. (Doc. 1 at 8.) In that ground for 

relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court in the 2011 case violated Petitioner’s Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by using his nineteen–year-old conviction in CR1992–

000157 to enhance his sentence in the 2011 case. (Doc. 1 at 8.) The Court finds the 

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claims in Ground Seven of the Amended Petitioner and Ground One of the original 

petition “differ both in time and type.” See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. Therefore, Ground 

Seven does not relate back to the original petition and it is untimely. See Mayle, 545 U.S. 

at 650. 

 In Ground Nine, Petitioner argues that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were violated when trial counsel in the 2011 case gave inadequate legal advice regarding 

the State’s alleged offer of a plea agreement stipulating to a 2.25–year sentence. (Doc. 9 

at 25.) Upon review of the original petition, the Court finds that it does not include a 

claim that related to the plea negotiation process or Petitioner’s entry of a guilty plea in 

the 2011 case. (Compare Doc. 1 with Doc. 9 at 25.) Therefore, Ground Nine does not 

relate back to the original petition and is untimely. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. 

 In Ground Ten, Petitioner asserts that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were violated because his trial counsel in the 2011 case failed to investigate his 

contention that police officers “brutally beat” him after his arrest. (Doc. 9 at 26.) Upon 

review of the original petition, the Court finds that it does not include a claim that relates 

to Petitioner’s arrest in the 2011 case, or to the performance of counsel in failing to 

investigate the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s 2011 arrest. (Compare Doc. 1 

with Doc. 9 at 26.) Therefore, Ground Ten does not relate back to the original petition 

and is untimely. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. 

 Therefore, Grounds One and Eight are timely. However, Grounds Seven, Nine, 

and Ten are untimely and not subject to habeas corpus review unless equitable tolling 

applies to those claims. 

 3. Equitable Tolling Related to Untimely Claims 

 As previously stated, the AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled 

because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland, 560 U.S. at 645. 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner does not argue that equitable tolling applies 

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such that Grounds Seven, Nine, and Ten should be considered timely. (Docs. 9, 20.) 

Petitioner has not articulated, and the record does not reveal, any extraordinary 

circumstance that prevented him from filing a timely federal habeas corpus petition 

including Grounds Seven, Nine, and Ten. Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law 

and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll 

the limitations period. See Ballesteros, 2007 WL 666927, at *5. Additionally, the record 

does not support a finding that Petitioner diligently pursued his rights regarding the 

untimely claims. Petitioner does not explain why he did not include the claims asserted 

in Grounds Seven, Nine, and Ten in his original petition. Because Petitioner has not 

shown that he “has been pursuing his rights diligently” and that “some extraordinary 

circumstance” stood in the way of his raising his claims in a timely § 2254 Petitioner, 

equitable tolling does not apply. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. 

C. Summary

 In summary, Grounds One and Eight, both of which pertain to Petitioner’s 

conviction and sentence in the 2011 case, are timely under the AEDPA limitations 

period. Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Nine, and 

Ten are untimely and Petitioner has not established a basis to extend or avoid the 

limitations period as to those claims. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Grounds 

Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Nine, and Ten be denied as untimely and does not consider 

Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying relief on those claims. 

IV. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Although Respondents acknowledge that Grounds One and Eight are timely, they 

argue that federal habeas corpus review of these claims is procedurally barred. (Doc. 14 

at 21-26.) As discussed below, the Court agrees. 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

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court in a procedurally appropriate manner.13 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

 

13 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

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the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

A. Procedural Bar Applied to Grounds One and Eight 

 Grounds One and Eight pertain to Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in the 2011 

case. Petitioner filed a Rule 32 of-right proceeding in the 2011 case. (Doc. 14, Ex. LL.) 

Petitioner, however, did not appeal that decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. In his 

Amended Petition, Petitioner admits that he did not present the issues raised in Grounds 

One and Eight to the appellate court. (Doc. 9 at 11, 23-26.) Additionally, Petitioner did 

not commence any post-conviction actions after the conclusion of this Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding. Accordingly, Petitioner did present Grounds One and Eight to the state 

courts on post-conviction review. 

 On May 15, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition writ of error coram nobis in the trial 

court. (Doc. 14, Ex. XX.) Even if presentation of a claim in a petition for writ of error 

coram nobis is sufficient to fairly present a claim to the Arizona courts for exhaustion 

purposes, Petitioner did not present the federal claims asserted in Grounds One and Eight 

in that petition. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989) (raising a new 

claim to a state court that has discretionary review does not constitute fair presentation). 

The petition for writ of error coram nobis asserts that the prosecutor violated Arizona law 

by using the 1992 conviction to enhance his sentence in the 2011 case. (Doc. 14, Ex. XX 

at 2.) However, Petitioner did not challenge his 2011 sentence on the federal grounds 

asserted in Ground One of the Amended Petition. Accordingly, he did not fairly present 

Ground One in that petition. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 28 (2004) (to fairly 

present a claims, it is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal 

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claim were before the state court or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was 

raised). Additionally, the petition for writ of error coram nobis does not include the 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in Ground Eight. Accordingly, 

Petitioner did not fairly present the federal claims asserted in Grounds One and Eight to 

the state courts. 

 It would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state courts to try to present 

Grounds One and Eight. Any attempt to present those claims to the court of appeals 

would be barred because a petition for appellate review would be untimely. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.9(c). Petitioner is also time-barred from a filing a petition for post-conviction 

relief under Rule 32. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a); McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 

913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding claims procedurally defaulted because petitioner was 

barred from exhausting his claims in the first instance by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)). 

 Rule 32 is an adequate and independent state procedural rule. See Simmons v. 

Schriro, 187 Fed. Appx. 753, 754 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Arizona=s procedural 

rules, including its timeliness rules, are “clear” and “well-established”). See also 

Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing requirement that 

state procedural rule must rest on an “independent” state law ground); Miloni v. Schriro, 

2006 WL 1652578, *5 (D. Ariz. Jun. 7, 2006) (concluding that a procedural ruling based 

on Rule 32.9(c) is adequate). 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s claims in Grounds One and Eight do not implicate any 

exceptions to the timeliness rules referred to in Rule 32.4(a) and Rule 32.2(b), including 

being held in custody after the imposed sentence expired, the presentation of newly 

discovered material facts that probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, the 

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief or a notice of appeal that was not 

the defendant’s fault, a change in the law, or the petitioner’s actual innocence. See Rule 

32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). Accordingly, federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s 

claims in Grounds One and Eight is procedurally barred. 

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 B. Petitioner has not Established a Basis to Overcome the Procedural Bar

 Because Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One and Eight are procedurally 

defaulted, federal habeas corpus review is unavailable unless Petitioner establishes 

“cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to overcome the 

procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. For the reasons below, the Court finds 

that Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome the procedural bar. 

 1. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 To establish cause Petitioner argues that he “couldn’t find legal help on the yard,” 

to assist with filing a petition for review of the denial of his Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding.14 (Doc. 9 at 11, 24.) Petitioner essentially argues his lack of legal 

 14 Petitioner does not argue that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

on appeal of his Rule 32 of-right proceeding. Even if asserted, such a claim would not 

excuse the procedural bar to review of Grounds One and Eight. The ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel in the initial post-conviction review proceeding 

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knowledge as cause to excuse the procedural bar to review of his claims. Petitioner’s 

status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge, and limited legal resources do not establish 

cause to excuse the procedural bar to review of his claims. See Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909 

(an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse 

a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause); see also Rasberry, 

448 F.3d at 1154 (“a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”). Therefore, Petitioner has not 

shown cause for the procedural default of his claims in Grounds One and Eight, and the 

Court does not consider whether Petitioner has shown prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 

477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 In addition, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted 

claim if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will 

result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

 may constitute cause to excuse a procedural bar to review of claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). 

Thus, even if Martinez applied, it would only excuse the procedural bar to Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 However, Martinez does not apply because the rule announced in that case “does 

not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1320. Rather, 

Martinez is concerned that, if ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not brought in the collateral proceeding that provided the first occasion to raise such claims, then the 

claims could not be brought at all. Id. at 1316. Therefore, a petitioner may not assert “cause” to overcome the procedural bar based on attorney error that occurred in “appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for discretionary review in a State's appellate courts.” Id. at 1320. 

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accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider his claims asserted in Grounds 

One and Eight will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Docs. 9, 20.) 

Additionally, Petitioner has not presented new evidence and has not shown that failure to 

consider his procedurally defaulted claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. Thus, he has not met Schlup’s high standard and this exception does not excuse 

the procedural bar. 

V. Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing in this matter. (Docs. 19, 20 at 27.) 

Petitioner requests a hearing to substantiate his assertion that there were multiple plea 

offers in the 2011 case. He also argues that he was denied the opportunity to develop the 

facts in the 1992 case. The Court considered similar assertions in Petitioner’s motion for 

discovery. (Doc. 18.) In the order denying Petitioner’s motion for discovery, the Court 

noted that the Answer was limited to procedural defenses and that Petitioner had not 

explained why discovery was necessary to respond to the Answer. (Id. at 3.) 

 An evidentiary hearing “is required when the petitioner’s allegations, if proven, 

would establish the right to relief.” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 

1998). It “is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court 

record.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[i]t is axiomatic that when issues can be 

resolved with reference to the state court record, an evidentiary hearing becomes nothing 

more than a futile exercise.” Id.; United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 

1986) (an evidentiary hearing not required if motion, files and records of case 

conclusively show petitioner is entitled to no relief) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). 

 Here, “[t]here is no indication from the arguments presented” by Petitioner “that 

an evidentiary hearing would in any way shed new light on the” grounds for federal 

habeas corpus relief raised in his petition. Totten, 137 F.2d at 1177. Additionally, the 

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Court resolved the Amended Petition on procedural or jurisdictional grounds and thus, an 

evidentiary hearing would serve no purpose. Accordingly, the motion for an evidentiary 

hearing should be denied. 

VI. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends that the Amended Petition 

be denied because Ground Two is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, 

Grounds Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Nine and Ten are untimely, and Grounds One and 

Eight are procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review and Petitioner has not 

established a basis to overcome that bar. The Court also recommends that the motion for 

an evidentiary hearing be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 9) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which 

to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

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any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 21st day of October, 2015. 

 

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