Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01963/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01963-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH W. JONES, Sr., aka JOSEPH

JONES-BEY, CDCR #D-41658,

Booking #2694589,

Civil No. 11-1963 DMS (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF No. 2] 

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR LACK OF PROPER VENUE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) 

AND § 1406(b)

 vs.

JOHN DOE, Director of CDCR;

JOHN DOE, Receiver of CDCR,

Defendants.

 

Plaintiff, currently detained at the Los Angeles County Jail in Los Angeles, California for

unspecified reasons, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. While difficult to decipher, it appears Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to hold

officials at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) responsible for

“fail[ing] to detox [him]” and releasing him on parole sometime in 2009 while he was still

addicted to pain medication. (Compl. at 3.)

/ / / 

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Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to pursue civil

litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the

privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.”

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “Andrews”). “Pursuant to

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v.

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the PLRA,

“[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP

status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the

congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers,

128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were

dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,”

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles

such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of

the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has

accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP

action in federal court unless he can show he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical

injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception

for IFP 

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/ / /

complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of

serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”).

II. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and has

ascertained that there is no “plausible allegation” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger

of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). It appears Plaintiff seeks to sue the Director and a Receiver of the CDCR

for failing to properly treat his addiction to pain medication after he was released on parole in

September of 2009. (Compl. at 3.) While he is currently detained at the Los Angeles County

Jail, Plaintiff does not challenge any current condition of his confinement and does not include

any allegation of imminent harm. Cf. Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055.

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias

v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d

801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, this Court takes judicial

notice that Plaintiff Joseph W. Jones, Sr., Booking No. 2694589, aka Joseph Jones-Bey, CDCR

#D-41658, has had four prior prisoner civil actions dismissed in the Central, Southern and

Eastern Districts of California on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

 They are: 

1) Jones-Bey v. Baca, et al., Civil Case No. 2:08-cv-02986-UA-FMO (C.D. Cal.

Western Div., May 23, 2008) (Order denying request to proceed IFP and

dismissing complaint for failing to state a claim) [ECF No. 2] (strike one);

2) Jones-Bey v. Harrahs Rincon Hotel & Casino, et al., Civil Case No. 3:08-cv00680-L-CAB (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2008) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP

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and Dismissing Action for failing to state a claim per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

and 1915A(b)) [ECF No. 3] (strike two); 

3) Jones-Bey v. Tilton, et al., Civil Case No. 2:08-cv–00289-FCD-CMK (E.D. Cal.

Nov. 13, 2008 Findings and Recommendations (“F&Rs”) re dismissal per 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and FED.R.CIV.P. 8)[ECF No. 17]; (Jan. 6, 2009 Order

Adopting F&Rs & Dismissing Action) [ECF No. 18] (strike three); and 

4) Jones-Bey v. Tilton, Civil Case No. 2:08-cv-00148-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal. June

30, 2010 Order re dismissal with leave to amend per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and

FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)) [ECF No. 14]; (Sept. 22, 2010 F&Rs re dismissal for failing

to amend) [ECF No. 17]; (Nov. 9, 1010 Order Adopting F&Rs & Dismissing

Action) [ECF No. 18] (strike four). 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than the three

“strikes” permitted pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055;

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners

from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system

from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d

1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege

and not right.”).

III. Venue

Even if Plaintiff were entitled to proceed IFP, however, his Complaint was filed in the

improper venue. Venue may be raised by a court sua sponte where the defendant has not yet

filed a responsive pleading and the time for doing so has not run. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d

1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on

diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a

judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a

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judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a

judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action

may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488; Decker Coal Co.

v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986). “The district court of a

district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or

if it be in the interests of justice, transfer such case to any district in or division in which it

could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

While Plaintiff’s Complaint is not at all clear, it appears to seek damages against two

CDCR officials in Sacramento and does not allege that any violation occurred in San Diego or

Imperial County. Sacramento is located in the Eastern District of California. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 84(b). Because no claim is alleged to have arisen in either San Diego or Imperial County and

no Defendant is alleged to reside here, the Southern District of California is the improper venue

for Plaintiff’s purported claims. Id. § 84(d).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP as

barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [ECF No. 2] and DISMISSES the action for lack of proper venue

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and § 1406(a).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 30, 2011

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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