Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02152/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02152-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INLANDBOATMEN'S UNION OF THE PACIFIC,

MARINE DIVISION, ILWU,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRAN MAINELLA, in her official

capacity as DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK

SERVICE, and the UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK

SERVICE,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-2152-CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF IBU'S

MOTION TO MODIFY

PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION

Plaintiff Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, Marine

Division, ILWU (IBU) moves to modify the preliminary injunction

issued by the Court on May 1, 2006. Defendants Fran Mainella and

United States Department of Interior, National Park Services (NPS)

oppose the motion. Intervenor Alcatraz Cruises LLC also opposes

the motion. The matter was decided on the papers. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court denies

Plaintiff IBU's motion. 

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The factual background of this case is described in the

Court's May 26, 2006 order. 

2

BACKGROUND

This case concerns a NPS concession contract. Plaintiff IBU

and the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots,

Pacific Maritime Region (MM&P) filed separate suits in this

district, both bringing motions for a preliminary injunction.1

MM&P sought to enjoin Defendants from awarding a new concession

contract to Intervenor that violates the SCA by allowing Intervenor

to pay less than the wages and benefits specified in MM&P's

collective bargaining agreement with the Blue & Gold Fleet. 

Plaintiff IBU, however, sought a broader injunction. It sought to

enjoin Defendants (1) from awarding any NPS concession contracts,

the principle purpose of which is to furnish transportation

services, in response to a solicitation that does not expressly set

forth the applicability of the SCA; and (2) from allowing any

contractor on any concession contract, the principle purpose of

which is to provide transportation services, to pay its employees

wages and fringe benefits lower than those required by the SCA. 

On May 1, 2006, the Court ordered: 

Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from awarding a

contract, for the continuation of water transportation

services between the City of San Francisco, California and

Alcatraz Island and related services, that permits any

contractor or subcontractor under it to pay its employees

providing services under such contract less than the wages and

fringe benefits specified in Plaintiffs' collective bargaining

agreements with Blue & Gold Fleet, LLP, including any

prospective increases in wages and fringe benefits specified

in such collective bargaining agreements. 

The Court stayed the case pending the Department of Labor's

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

determination of whether the Service Contract Act applies to the

concession contract at issue. On May 26, 2005, the Court issued an

opinion explaining its reasoning for issuing the preliminary

injunction.

Four days after the Court's order, Defendant NPS sent a letter

to Blue & Gold Fleet, requesting that it continue service under the

concession contract through and including September 24, 2006. Blue

& Gold agreed to continue service.

On May 8, 2006, Defendant NPS sent a letter to Intervenor. 

The letter advised Intervenor that section 5 of the concession

contract states that the concessioner must comply with all

applicable laws in fulfilling its obligations under the contract

and that the applicable law includes this Court's May 1, 2006

preliminary injunction. Intervenor counter-signed the letter,

acknowledging that the Court's order was part of the applicable law

with which it must comply. The next day, Defendant NPS fully

executed the Alcatraz concession contract, thus awarding it to

Intervenor within the meaning of 36 C.F.R. Part 51.

Since being awarded the contract, Intervenor has developed and

implemented a ticket-sales structure. In July, 2005, it began to

sell tickets for the Alcatraz ferry service and collect money from

future passengers. It has hired eight management-level employees

to run its infrastructure and to prepare for operation under the

contract, and engaged various consultants and developed visitor 

services. Intervenor states that to date it has spent over

$6,000,000, responding to Defendant NPS' solicitation and preparing

to begin service on September 25, 2006. As of the date it filed

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

MM&P has not brought a similar motion.

3

Because the Court does not grant the relief requested,

Defendants' argument that Plaintiff IBU lacks standing under the

1998 Concessions Act is moot. 

4

its opposition, however, Intervenor had not hired employees for

positions covered by the collective bargaining agreements in place

at Blue & Gold Fleet.

Almost three months after Defendant NPS executed the contract,

Plaintiff IBU filed this motion to modify the preliminary

injunction.2

 It contends that, although the award of the contract

complied with the Court's preliminary injunction, it violated the

1998 Concessions Act because the concessions contract materially

amends the proposed terms and conditions of the contract as set

forth in the prospectus. See 16 U.S.C. § 5952(4)(D). Plaintiff

IBU requests that the Court modify the May 1, 2006 preliminary

injunction to include the following language: 

Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from awarding any NPS

concession contract, the principle purpose of which is to

furnish transportation service to and from Alcatraz, or

allowing the performance of any recently awarded concessions

contract having that principle purpose, unless the

solicitation therefore as well as the draft contract set forth

in that solicitation expressly set forth the applicability of

the Service Contract Act and the fact that the contractor

would be required to pay the wages and benefits required by

the Service Contract Act.

DISCUSSION

Before the Court addresses the merits of Plaintiff IBU's

motion to modify the preliminary injunction, it first addresses

Defendants' argument regarding jurisdiction.3

I. Jurisdiction

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994). They enjoy the power to hear cases only to the extent

authorized by the Constitution and Congress. Id. Therefore, the

Court must resolve any challenge to its jurisdiction before it

proceeds to the merits of a claim. See, e.g., Galvan v. Fed.

Prison Indus., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Jurisdiction

must be established before a federal court may proceed to any other

question.”).

Defendants argue that the Administrative Dispute Resolution

Act (ADRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1491, deprives this Court of jurisdiction. 

But, as the Tenth Circuit concluded, "the Administrative Dispute

Resolution Act did not affect the district court's ability to hear

cases challenging the government's contract procurement process so

long as the case is brought by someone other than an actual or

potential bidder. The district court retains subject matter

jurisdiction over cases brought by non-bidders under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 and the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative

Procedure Act." City Of Albuquerque v. U.S. Dept. Of Interior, 379

F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir. 2004). See also Nat'l Treasury Employees

Union v. IRS, 2006 WL 416161, *3 (D. D.C. 2006) (holding that the

ADRA did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over parties that

are not actual or prospective bidders or offerers). Defendants'

attempts to distinguish City of Albuquerque are not successful. 

The Court finds the reasoning in City of Albuquerque persuasive and

that it has jurisdiction.

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

II. Merits 

The Court may modify a preliminary injunction if a change in

circumstances requires it. Anderson v. Central Point Sch. Dist.

No. 6, 746 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit

instructs that the "party seeking modification or dissolution of an

injunction bears the burden of establishing that a significant

change in facts or law warrants revision or dissolution of the

injunction." Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff IBU, however, does not address this standard. Rather, in

its moving papers, it cites the standard for whether a preliminary

injunction should be granted in the first instance. Even in its

reply, after Defendants and Intervenor pointed out the correct

standard, Plaintiff IBU did not address this standard. 

Nonetheless, applying either the standard for modification of an

injunction or the standard for an initial preliminary injunction,

Plaintiff IBU's motion fails. 

According to Plaintiff IBU, Defendant NPS's post-injunction

conduct, specifically, executing the Alcatraz contract, violates

the 1998 Concessions Act, requiring the Court to modify the

preliminary injunction. Title 16 U.S.C. § 5952(4)(D) provides: 

The Secretary may not execute a concessions contract which

materially amends or does not incorporate the proposed terms

and conditions of the concessions contract as set forth in the

applicable prospectus. If proposed material amendments or

changes are considered appropriate by the Secretary, the

Secretary shall resolicit offers for the concessions contract

incorporating such material amendments or changes. 

Plaintiff IBU contends that Defendants materially amended the

proposed terms of the contract when they incorporated the Court's

preliminary injunction order into the proposed contract and thus

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

Defendant NPS should be required to re-solicit offers for the

contract. 

But Plaintiff IBU does not show that this was a "significant

change in facts" warranting modification of the preliminary

injunction. As Intervenor notes, the preliminary injunction

authorized Defendant NPS to award the contract as long as

Intervenor agreed to pay the wage and benefit levels set forth in

the collective bargaining agreements. See April 28, 2006 Hearing

Transcript at 41:20-24. Intervenor agreed to do so by accepting

the Court's preliminary injunction as part of the applicable law it

was required to follow. This is not a significant change, but

rather an expected result, as Plaintiff IBU concedes, permitted by

the preliminary injunction. Furthermore, as Intervenor points out,

and Plaintiff IBU does not deny, Plaintiff IBU was aware that an

amendment to the contract, agreeing to pay the wage and benefit

levels set forth in the collective bargaining agreements, could

violate the 1998 Concessions Act. Yet, Plaintiff IBU did not raise

this until now, seeking relief that it previously requested and

that the Court denied. 

Plaintiff IBU also fails to show that it is likely to succeed

on the merits of its claim under the 1998 Concessions Act. Whether

Defendant NPS violated the 1998 Concessions Act by interpreting

this Court's order as part of the applicable law turns on whether

that modification materially changed the scope of the original

contract. Cardinal Maintenance Serv., Inc. v. United States, 63

Fed. Cl. 98, 106 (Fed. Cl. 2004). Thus, the question is whether

the original contract, as modified, calls for “essentially the same

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

performance.” Id. In addition, courts have determined whether

modifications to government contracts are material by looking to

"the extent of any changes in the type of work, performance period

and costs between the contract as awarded and modified." Id. 

Defendants note that, here, the performance remains exactly the

same, the performance period remains exactly the same and the

financial return to the government remains exactly the same. The

only change that Plaintiff IBU points to is that the contracting

party is now required to pay no less than the wage and fringe

benefits specified in the collective bargaining agreement with Blue

& Gold Fleet. That single change, however, does not change the

performance of the contract. It will be difficult for Plaintiff

IBU to show that there was a material modification that changed the

scope of the original contract. Thus, Plaintiff IBU cannot show a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility

of irreparable injury, nor can it show that serious questions are

raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. 

Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 120 (9th Cir.

2005). 

Plaintiff IBU does not meet its burden of showing that the

preliminary injunction should be modified under any test; its

motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff IBU's

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4To the extent that the Court relied upon evidence to which

Intervenor objected, its objections are overruled. To the extent

that the Court did not rely on such evidence, its objections are

overruled as moot. 

9

Motion to Modify Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 53).4 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/7/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-02152-CW Document 93 Filed 09/07/06 Page 9 of 9