Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05176/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05176-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 13, 2010 Decided August 6, 2010 

No. 09-5176 

MICHAEL BOARDLEY, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-01986) 

Nathan W. Kellum argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs was Heather G. Hacker. Jordan W. Lorence

entered an appearance. 

Robin M. Meriweather, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney. 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 1 of 29
2 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, BROWN and 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

 BROWN, Circuit Judge: It is unlawful to engage in 

expressive activities within any of this country’s 391 national 

parks unless a park official first issues a permit authorizing 

the activity. Michael Boardley argues this licensing scheme is 

overbroad and therefore unconstitutional on its face. We 

agree. The regulations in their current form are antithetical to 

the core First Amendment principle that restrictions on free 

speech in a public forum may be valid only if narrowly 

tailored. Because these regulations penalize a substantial 

amount of speech that does not impinge on the government’s 

interests, we find them overbroad and therefore reverse the 

district court. 

I 

 In 1916, Congress created the National Park Service 

(NPS), within the Department of the Interior, to “promote and 

regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, 

monuments, and reservations . . . by such means and measures 

as conform to the fundamental purpose . . . to conserve the 

scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life 

therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such 

manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for 

the enjoyment of future generations.” 16 U.S.C. § 1. The 

Secretary of the Interior was authorized to “make and publish 

such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or 

proper for the use and management of the parks . . . and any 

violation of any of the rules and regulations authorized by this 

section . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 2 of 29
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or imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or both.” Id.

§ 3. 

 The two regulations challenged here govern “[p]ublic 

assemblies, meetings,” 36 C.F.R. § 2.51, and the “[s]ale or 

distribution of printed matter,” id. § 2.52, within the national 

parks. Both regulations are substantially the same. First, they 

call for the designation of what the government calls “free 

speech areas.” See Appellees’ Br. at 15. Subsections (e) 

require park superintendents to “designate on a map, [which] 

shall be available for inspection in the office of the 

superintendent,” the locations in the park available for public 

assemblies or the distribution of printed matter. 36 C.F.R. 

§§ 2.51(e), 2.52(e). “Locations may be designated as not 

available only if” expressive activities would injure or 

damage park resources, “[u]nreasonably impair the 

atmosphere of peace and tranquility maintained in wilderness, 

natural, historic or commemorative zones,” interfere with 

programmatic or administrative activities, substantially impair 

the operation of public facilities or services, or “[p]resent a 

clear and present danger to the public health and safety.” Id.

 Second, the regulations prohibit “[p]ublic assemblies, 

meetings, gatherings, demonstrations, parades and other 

public expressions of views” and “[t]he sale or distribution of 

[non-commercial] printed matter” within park areas, unless “a 

permit [authorizing the activity] has been issued by the 

superintendent.” Id. §§ 2.51(a), 2.52(a). An application for a 

permit must include the applicant’s name; the name of his or 

her organization (if any); the date, time, duration, and location 

of the proposed event or distribution; an estimate of the 

number of participants; and a statement of the equipment and 

facilities to be used. Id. §§ 2.51(b), 2.52(b). The regulations 

require the superintendent to issue a permit “without 

unreasonable delay” unless a prior application for the same 

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time and place has been (or will be) granted; the event is of a 

nature or duration that it cannot reasonably be accommodated 

without damaging the park or interfering with, or impairing, 

other programs or facilities; or it “reasonably appears that the 

event will present a clear and present danger to the public 

health or safety.” Id. §§ 2.51(c), 2.52(c).1

 Finally, “[i]f a 

permit is denied, the applicant shall be so informed in writing, 

with the reason(s) for the denial set forth.” Id. §§ 2.51(d), 

2.52(d). In sum, the NPS regulations erect two layers of 

restrictions on speech in national parks: first, they confine 

specified expressive activities to “free speech areas”; and 

second, they require a permit to be obtained before engaging 

in such activities, whether in a “free speech area” or 

elsewhere. 

II 

 In 2007, appellant Michael Boardley and some associates 

attempted to distribute free tracts discussing the Gospel of 

Jesus Christ within a “free speech area” of Mount Rushmore 

National Memorial. A park ranger stopped them because they 

lacked a permit. Boardley returned home, requested a permit 

by phone, but never received a permit or an application. He 

then filed this action, seeking a declaration that the NPS 

regulations are unconstitutional and violative of the Religious 

Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, on 

 

1

 Section 2.52 includes two additional grounds for denying a 

permit: “The location applied for has not been designated as 

available for the sale or distribution of printed matter” or “[t]he 

activity would constitute a violation of an applicable law or 

regulation.” 36 C.F.R. § 2.52(c). 

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their face and as applied to him.2

 Shortly thereafter, he 

received the permit he had requested. 

 The district court dismissed Boardley’s as-applied claims 

on grounds of mootness and failure to state a claim. Boardley 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 605 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13–14 (D.D.C. 

2009). We summarily affirmed the dismissal of these asapplied challenges. Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Nos. 

09-5176, 09-5186, 2009 WL 3571278, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 

19, 2009) (per curiam). 

However, the district court agreed with Boardley that 36 

C.F.R. § 2.51(a) was facially unconstitutional to the extent 

that it required park visitors to obtain a permit before 

engaging in “other public expressions of views.” Boardley, 

605 F. Supp. 2d at 15–16. But the court held that this 

provision was severable from the overall regulation, and 

concluded the remainder of 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.51 and 2.52 was 

facially valid. Id. at 16–19. The court therefore granted in 

 

2

 The record does not disclose whether Boardley was ordered to 

obtain a “[p]ublic assemblies, meetings” permit, 36 C.F.R. § 2.51, 

or a permit for the “[s]ale or distribution of printed matter,” id.

§ 2.52. See Compl. ¶ 26 (referring generally to a “free speech 

permit”). Conceivably, Boardley ran afoul of both regulations 

because he engaged in the “distribution of printed matter” by 

handing out the gospel tracts, 36 C.F.R. § 2.52(a), and participated 

in a “[p]ublic assembl[y], meeting[], [or] gathering[]” by 

congregating with his associates in the same location of the park to 

convey his religious views, id. § 2.51(a). In addition, Boardley 

alleges that he and at least one of his associates “desire[] to return 

to Mt. Rushmore to exercise [their] First Amendment rights . . . .” 

Compl. ¶ 41; see id. ¶ 55. In any event, the government has not 

argued that Boardley lacks standing to challenge either of these 

regulations, and we conclude such an argument would be without 

merit. 

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part and denied in part both Boardley’s and the government’s 

motions for summary judgment. Id. at 19–20. Both parties 

appealed, but the government voluntarily dismissed its appeal. 

See Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 09-5186, 2010 WL 

1255986, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2010). Thus, the sole issue 

before us is whether the NPS regulations—excluding the 

provision in § 2.51 regarding “other public expressions of 

views”—are facially unconstitutional under the First 

Amendment. 

We review the district court’s determination de novo. 

See Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

III 

 The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no 

law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Boardley claims 

the NPS regulations are unconstitutional on their face. “It is 

well established that in the area of freedom of expression an 

overbroad regulation may be subject to facial review and 

invalidation, even though its application in the case under 

consideration may be constitutionally unobjectionable.” 

Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 

(1992). The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]his 

exception from general standing rules is based on an 

appreciation that the very existence of some broadly written 

laws has the potential to chill the expressive activity of others 

not before the court. Thus, . . . a party [may] challenge an 

ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine in cases where 

every application creates an impermissible risk of suppression 

of ideas, such as an ordinance that delegates overly broad 

discretion to the decisionmaker, and in cases where the 

ordinance sweeps too broadly, penalizing a substantial 

amount of speech that is constitutionally protected.” Id. at 

129–30 (citations omitted). 

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 Claims under the Free Speech Clause of the First 

Amendment are analyzed in three steps: First, “we must . . . 

decide whether [the activity at issue] is speech protected by 

the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further.” 

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 

788, 797 (1985). Second, assuming the activity “is protected 

speech, we must identify the nature of the forum, because the 

extent to which the Government may limit access depends on 

whether the forum is public or nonpublic.” Id. And third, we 

must assess whether the government’s justifications for 

restricting speech in the relevant forum “satisfy the requisite 

standard.” Id. In this case, the first step requires no lengthy 

discussion. The activities prohibited in the absence of a 

permit by the NPS regulations are unquestionably “speech” 

within the meaning of the First Amendment. See Watchtower 

Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 

150, 161 (2002) (finding “hand distribution of religious 

tracts” to be protected speech) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & 

Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995) 

(“Parades are . . . a form of expression, not just motion.”). 

The NPS regulations clearly implicate the First Amendment; 

the question is whether they violate it. 

A 

 “Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all 

places and at all times. Nothing in the Constitution requires 

the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to 

exercise their right to free speech on every type of 

Government property without regard to the nature of the 

property or to the disruption that might be caused by the 

speaker’s activities.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799–800. 

Rather, the extent of scrutiny given to a regulation of 

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speech—in effect, how we examine the directness with which 

it promotes the government’s goals and the degree to which it 

burdens speech—depends on whether the regulation applies 

in a public or nonpublic forum. “Traditional public fora are 

those places which by long tradition or by government fiat 

have been devoted to assembly and debate.” Id. at 802 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Another type of public 

forum is the “designated public forum,” which exists when 

“government property that has not traditionally been regarded 

as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose.” 

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 

(2009). A nonpublic forum is by contradistinction “[p]ublic 

property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for 

public communication.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 

Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 

 Boardley contends all national parks are traditional public 

forums. As support for this proposition, he argues the 

Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that “parks” are 

quintessential examples of traditional public forums. This 

premise is unassailable, see, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y 

Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, No. 08-1371, slip op. 

at 12 n.11 (U.S. June 28, 2010) (referring to “traditional 

public forums, such as . . . parks”); Pleasant Grove City, 129 

S. Ct. at 1129 (noting “a park is a traditional public forum”), 

but Boardley’s conclusion does not follow. The protections 

of the First Amendment do not rise or fall depending on the 

characterization ascribed to a forum by the government. 

Mount Rushmore does not become a public forum merely by 

being called a “national park” any more than it would be 

transformed into a nonpublic forum if it were labeled a 

“museum.” The dispositive question is not what the forum is 

called, but what purpose it serves, either by tradition or 

specific designation. What makes a park a traditional public 

forum is not its grass and trees, but the fact that it has 

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“immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 

time out of mind, ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly, 

communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 

public questions.” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 

U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (plurality) (cautioning that “[t]he mere 

physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum 

analysis” and holding that sidewalk abutting a Post Office 

was not a public forum). Thus, to establish that a national 

park (in whole or part) is a traditional public forum, Boardley 

must show that, like a typical municipal park, it has been held 

open by the government for the purpose of public discourse. 

 The record before this court is woefully inadequate to 

determine the forum status of the hundreds of national parks 

governed by the NPS regulations. Common sense tells us 

they are not all identical. See United States v. Doe, 968 F.2d 

86, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Th[e] [First Amendment] test . . . 

must be applied in a realistic manner which takes into account 

the nature and traditional uses of the particular park involved. 

Lafayette Park is not Okefenokee National Wildlife Refuge, 

even if both are under the Park Service’s supervision.”). 

Presumably, many national parks include areas—even large 

areas, such as a vast wilderness preserve—which never have 

been dedicated to free expression and public assembly, would 

be clearly incompatible with such use, and would therefore be 

classified as nonpublic forums. But at the same time, many 

national parks undoubtedly include areas that meet the 

definition of traditional public forums. See, e.g., ISKCON of 

Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(“The Park Service concedes, as it must, that the Mall is a 

traditional public forum for purposes of the First 

Amendment.”). This is a fact-intensive question which 

cannot be answered in the absence of evidentiary 

submissions. “As heretofore emphasized, the decision as to 

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whether a forum is public usually invokes a factual inquiry. 

The forum doctrine itself is not a taxonomy of ideal types; it 

is virtually impossible in most cases to identify a public forum 

by legal inquiry alone.” Stewart v. Dist. of Columbia Armory 

Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (remanding to 

district court to develop a factual record on forum status). 

Yet, the record on this appeal gives no hint as to the history 

and tradition, or lack thereof, of expressive activities in the 

various national parks. 

 Fortunately, we have a basis for resolving this appeal 

without deciding the forum status of all 391 national parks. 

The government concedes the “free speech areas” made 

available within national parks pursuant to subsections (e) of 

the NPS regulations are “designated public forums.” See 

Appellees’ Br. at 15–16; see also 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.51(e), 

2.52(e). These areas are subject to the same permit 

requirement as all other locations within the national parks. 

See 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.51(a), 2.52(a) (prohibiting specified 

expressive activities in the absence of a permit anywhere in a 

national park). Thus, at least with respect to these “free 

speech areas,” the NPS regulations must be analyzed as 

restrictions on speech in public forums, and we need not 

(indeed, cannot) decide whether the same analysis would 

apply to the diverse range of other areas within the national 

parks.3

 Having determined that the NPS regulations target 

 

3

 Of course, some or all of these “free speech areas” might be 

traditional public forums anyway. In accepting the government’s 

concession that these areas are designated public forums, we do not 

imply that if they had not been so designated they would be 

nonpublic forums, or that the government can simply revoke their 

designation and thereby alter their forum status. Nor do we suggest 

that these are the only public forums within the national parks; they 

are simply the only ones cognizable on the sparse record before us. 

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protected “speech,” and that these restrictions apply in public 

forums, we proceed to consider whether they “satisfy the 

requisite standard.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797. 

B 

“[T]he core abuse against which [the First Amendment] 

was directed was the scheme of licensing laws implemented 

by the monarch and Parliament to contain the ‘evils’ of the 

printing press in 16th- and 17-century England.” Thomas v. 

Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002). Thus, “[a]ny 

system of prior restraints of expression . . . bear[s] a heavy 

presumption against its constitutional validity.” Bantam 

Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Regulatory 

schemes “conditioning expression on a licensing body’s prior 

approval of content ‘present[] peculiar dangers to 

constitutionally protected speech’” and require “extraordinary 

procedural safeguards” in order to survive constitutional 

scrutiny. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 321, 323 (quoting Freedman v. 

Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965)). However, “a contentneutral permit scheme regulating speech in a public forum . . . 

differs toto coelo” from a “licensing standard which gives an 

official authority to censor the content of a speech.” Id. at 

322 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because 

“[r]egulations of the use of a public forum that ensure the 

safety and convenience of the people” do not raise the same 

kinds of “censorship concerns” as content-based prior 

restraints, their presumption of invalidity is more easily 

rebutted. Id. at 323. 

 Thus, in assessing the constitutionality of a prior 

restraint, it must be determined at the outset whether the 

regulation is content-based or content-neutral. This 

determination is critical, not because it might end the inquiry, 

but because it will direct its path. Here, the NPS regulations 

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are indisputably content-neutral on their face. They prohibit 

certain forms of expressive conduct—public assemblies, 

meetings, gatherings, demonstrations, parades, and the sale or 

distribution of printed matter—in the absence of a permit, 

regardless of the message the speaker wishes to convey. 36 

C.F.R. §§ 2.51(a), 2.52(a). Nor is there any evidence the NPS 

was motivated to adopt these regulations by its agreement 

with or hostility toward any particular message or speaker. 

See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 

(1994). 

 Content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or manner 

of speech in a public forum are analyzed under a familiar 

multipart test: First, the regulations may not delegate overly 

broad licensing discretion to a government official. Second, 

the scheme must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant 

governmental interest. And third, it must leave open ample 

alternatives for communication. See Forsyth County, 505 

U.S. at 130.4

1 

Even a content-neutral licensing scheme may raise 

significant censorship concerns if it vests government 

officials with unrestricted freedom to decide who qualifies for 

a permit and who does not. “It is offensive—not only to the 

values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very 

notion of a free society—that in the context of everyday 

public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of 

her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit 

 

4

 The scheme also “must not be based on the content of the 

message,” id., but of course this requirement is satisfied since the 

content-neutrality of the regulations is the precondition that led us 

to the time, place, or manner test in the first place. 

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to do so.” Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 165–66. Thus, such 

schemes must “contain adequate standards to guide the 

official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial 

review,” thereby eliminating the “risk that he will favor or 

disfavor speech based on its content.” Thomas, 534 U.S. at 

323. Compare id. at 324 (upholding scheme that provided 

several “reasonably specific and objective” grounds for 

denying a permit and did “not leave the decision to the whim 

of the administrator”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with

Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 133 (striking down scheme that 

contained “no articulated standards” and did “not require[] . . . 

rel[iance] on any objective factors”), and City of Lakewood v. 

Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769 (1988) (plurality) 

(striking down licensing scheme that allowed officials to 

subject permit applications to “such other terms and 

conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the Mayor” 

because “the face of the ordinance itself contain[ed] no 

explicit limits on the mayor’s discretion”). 

Boardley argues the NPS regulations vest government 

officials with overly broad discretion, allowing a permit to be 

denied if “[i]t reasonably appears that the event will present a 

clear and present danger to the public health or safety.” 36 

C.F.R. §§ 2.51(c)(2), 2.52(c)(2). Before the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Thomas, this argument might have been plausible. 

But in Thomas, the Court upheld a licensing scheme for 

Chicago parks that allowed a permit to be denied if the 

intended activity “would present an unreasonable danger to 

[public] health or safety.” Thomas, 534 U.S. at 318 n.1, 324. 

Boardley distinguishes the NPS regulations because they 

allow NPS officials to decide whether the proposed event 

“reasonably appears” to present a public danger, as opposed 

to deciding simply whether the event “would present” such 

danger. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 12–17. If this is indeed a 

distinction, it is one wholly without constitutional 

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significance. An official tasked with forecasting whether a 

proposed event might endanger the health or safety of the 

public must necessarily make a predictive judgment based on 

the facts as she knows them and her expertise in the field. 

Few licensing schemes would survive constitutional scrutiny 

if certainty were a prerequisite. It is not fatal to the NPS 

regulations that they endow park officials with some measure 

of discretion. The “clear and present danger” standard is 

sufficiently unambiguous and objective to guard against the 

possibility of it serving as a backdoor artifice for contentbased censorship. Of course, a future as-applied challenge 

could argue that the NPS’s denial of a permit on “clear and 

present danger” grounds was, in fact, pretext for contentbased discrimination. But Thomas forecloses this argument 

as a facial matter. 

Next, Boardley contends the NPS regulations vest park 

officials with overly broad discretion because—although they 

require permits to be granted or denied “without unreasonable 

delay”—they set no specific time period. Most circuits have 

held content-neutral licensing schemes need not contain 

explicit timeframes for processing permit applications. See 

H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 624 

(6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument “that content-neutral 

licensing ordinances [must] contain a brief, specified time 

limit”); S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 

1138 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Because it is content-neutral, the Act 

need not contain . . . a deadline for consideration by the 

governing body.”); Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City 

of St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278, 1282 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(“[W]e . . . hold time limits are not per se required when the 

licensing scheme at issue is content-neutral.”); Griffin v. Sec’y 

of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 

(same). These courts relied on Thomas’s holding that 

content-neutral licensing schemes need not contain the 

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“extraordinary procedural safeguards” imposed on contentbased schemes. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323. Compare

Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59 (holding that licensing schemes 

must contain a “specified brief period” for officials to decide 

whether or not to issue a permit), with Thomas, 534 U.S. at 

322–23 (explaining that Freedman applies only to contentbased censorship regimes). 

Boardley focuses on United States v. Frandsen, where 

the Eleventh Circuit held one of the NPS regulations at issue 

here (36 C.F.R. § 2.51) to be unconstitutional because the 

“without unreasonable delay” standard “fail[ed] adequately to 

confine the time within which the decision maker must act.” 

212 F.3d 1231, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000). But this decision lacks 

persuasive force for two reasons: first, it relied on Freedman

and predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas, which 

clarified that Freedman does not apply to content-neutral 

schemes; and second, the Eleventh Circuit itself declined to 

follow Frandsen in its post-Thomas decision in Granite State 

Outdoor Advertising, cited above. Boardley points us to no 

post-Thomas decision holding that a content-neutral licensing 

scheme must contain an explicit timeframe for official action 

in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 

We find that the “without unreasonable delay” standard is 

“adequate . . . to guide [a park] official’s decision and render 

it subject to effective judicial review.” Thomas, 534 U.S. at 

323. For one, this standard places the NPS regulations on 

significantly firmer ground than the licensing schemes upheld 

by other circuits, which contained no timeliness standard at 

all. It also takes into account the fact that not all applications 

can, or should, be processed with equal speed; what 

constitutes “unreasonable delay” could vary depending on 

such factors as the complexity of the application and the 

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resources of the park to which it is directed.5

 In any event, as 

the district court found, all national parks “appear to have” 

adopted “short and definite deadlines” of “between three and 

ten days.” Boardley, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 17. Given that the 

scheme upheld in Thomas required applications to be 

processed within fourteen days (and could be extended an 

additional fourteen days), see 534 U.S. at 318, we have no 

trouble finding deadlines between three and ten days to be 

reasonable. This case does not require us to proclaim what 

the outer limit might be. Lastly, we are sensitive to 

Boardley’s concern that park officials could engage in 

content-based discrimination by “sit[ting] on a speaker’s 

application without granting or denying it and without 

explaining the basis for delay.” Appellant’s Br. at 43. But 

while this sort of abuse likely would form the basis of a 

successful as-applied challenge, here we need not go beyond 

the regulations’ facial requirements to speculate about 

hypothetical cases. 

2 

Boardley argues the NPS regulations are not a narrowly 

tailored means of achieving the government’s substantial 

interests. A content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation 

is narrowly tailored “so long as the . . . regulation promotes a 

 

5

 The government points us to a memorandum from the Director of 

the Department of the Interior to the Regional Directors and 

Superintendents of the national parks. It states, “NPS Management 

Policies ¶ 8.6.3 (2006) . . . provides that a permit request under 36 

CFR § 2.51 will be issued or denied within two business days after 

receipt of a proper application.” Oddly, the actual Management 

Policies do not appear to be part of our record. It is unclear what 

effect, if any, park superintendents have given to this memorandum, 

and we therefore decline to rely on it. 

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substantial government interest that would be achieved less 

effectively absent the regulation.” Ward v. Rock Against 

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But while the regulation “need not be the least 

restrictive or least intrusive means,” the regulation may not 

“burden substantially more speech than is necessary” to 

achieve the government’s substantial interests. Id. at 798–99; 

see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (noting 

that a content-neutral ordinance banning picketing in front of 

private residences “is narrowly tailored if it targets and 

eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks 

to remedy”); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 

U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (upholding a content-neutral zoning 

ordinance because it was “‘narrowly tailored’ to affect only 

that category of [adult] theaters shown to produce the 

unwanted secondary effects”). Although a content-neutral 

restriction will not be struck down “simply because there is 

some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on 

speech,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 797 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), the existence of “numerous and obvious lessburdensome alternatives . . . is certainly a relevant 

consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends 

and means is reasonable,” City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 

Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993). Thus, “the 

court must closely scrutinize the regulation to determine if it 

indeed promotes the Government’s purposes in more than a 

speculative way.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 

Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

The government asserts the NPS regulations further its 

interests in “protect[ing] the national parks’ natural and 

cultural resources; protect[ing] park facilities and property 

from damage; ensur[ing] that locations are not populated 

beyond their capacity; protect[ing] visitors to the parks; 

avoid[ing] interference with the parks’ activities and the 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 17 of 29
18 

operation of park facilities; and preserv[ing] peace and 

tranquility in the parks.” Appellees’ Br. at 25. Boardley does 

not appear to question the substantiality of these interests, and 

indeed, he would have little basis for doing so. See Clark v. 

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984) 

(finding a “substantial interest in maintaining the parks in 

[D.C.] in an attractive and intact condition”); Heffron v. Int’l 

Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 

(1981) (“[I]t is clear that [the government’s] interest in 

protecting the safety and convenience of persons using a 

public forum is a valid governmental objective”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 

1179, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding a “substantial interest . . 

. [in] promot[ing] an atmosphere of calm, tranquility and 

reverence in the vicinity of” a war memorial) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); White House Vigil for ERA Comm. 

v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 

government has a substantial interest in the preservation and 

enhancement of the human environment; aesthetics are a 

proper focus of governmental regulation.”) (footnote omitted). 

Boardley argues the NPS regulations are not narrowly 

tailored to the advancement of these interests because the 

permit requirement applies not only to large groups, but also 

to small groups and even lone individuals. His argument 

draws considerable support from this and other circuits. The 

Sixth Circuit, for instance, has found that “[p]ermit schemes 

and advance notice requirements that potentially apply to 

small groups are nearly always overly broad and lack narrow 

tailoring.” Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of 

Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 2005) (striking down 

licensing scheme for public parades because the city’s 

“significant interest in crowd and traffic control, property 

maintenance, and protection of the public welfare is not 

advanced by the application of the [o]rdinance to small 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 18 of 29
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groups”). The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion in 

Cox v. City of Charleston, where a lone protestor challenged 

an ordinance barring “any person” from participating in “any 

parade, meeting, exhibition, assembly or procession . . . on the 

streets or sidewalks of the city” without a permit. 416 F.3d 

281, 283 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The court held that the “application of the [o]rdinance to 

groups as small as two or three renders it constitutionally 

infirm” because the city failed to “establish[] why burdening 

such expression is necessary to facilitate its interest in 

keeping its streets and sidewalks safe, orderly, and 

accessible.” Id. at 285–86. The Ninth Circuit relied on 

similar grounds in striking down an ordinance requiring street 

performers at a public park to obtain permits before 

performing. See Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 

1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The court explained: 

[T]he Supreme Court has consistently struck 

down permitting systems that apply to 

individual speakers—as opposed to large 

groups—in the . . . context [of] solicitation of 

private homes. . . . Although the Supreme 

Court has not addressed the validity of singlespeaker permitting requirements for speech in 

a public forum, it stands to reason that such 

requirements would be at least as 

constitutionally suspect when applied to 

speech in a public park, where a speaker’s First 

Amendment protections reach their zenith, 

than when applied to speech on a citizen’s 

doorstep, where substantial privacy interests 

exist. It is therefore not surprising that we and 

almost every other circuit to have considered 

the issue have refused to uphold registration 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 19 of 29
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requirements that apply to individual speakers 

or small groups in a public forum. 

Id. at 1038–39 (citations omitted); see also Knowles v. City of 

Waco, 462 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Other circuits have 

held, and we concur, that ordinances requiring a permit for 

demonstrations by a handful of people are not narrowly 

tailored to serve a significant government interest.”). 

 Our own precedent points in the same direction. In 

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, we held 

unconstitutional a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA) regulation requiring individuals to 

obtain permits before engaging in “free speech activities” 

within subway stations. 893 F.2d 1387, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 

1990). After finding that the stations were public forums, we 

held the “permit requirement fails the ‘narrow tailoring’ 

inquiry.” Id. at 1392. We agreed WMATA’s interest in 

promoting safe and convenient access to transportation was 

substantial, but concluded the permit requirement swept too 

broadly: “While the [r]egulation arguably eliminates the 

‘sources of evil’ that allegedly threaten WMATA’s ability to 

provide a safe and efficient transportation system, it does so at 

too high a cost, namely, by significantly restricting a 

substantial quantity of speech that does not impede [its] 

permissible goals.” Id. A crucial problem with the regulation 

was that it applied to groups of all sizes, even when “two or 

more individuals speaking or otherwise proselytizing . . . 

would not interfere meaningfully with WMATA’s asserted 

interests.” Id.

 We are not persuaded by the district court’s attempt to 

distinguish these cases on the ground that the NPS regulations 

at issue here 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 20 of 29
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do not cover city streets, or subway entrances, 

or the local public park; they cover places of 

immense historical significance . . . and great 

natural beauty . . . . Unlike people walking in 

the city center or entering the subway, visitors 

to a national park expect a peaceful and 

tranquil environment, and the government has 

a legitimate interest in providing that 

experience to them. Even a small 

demonstration, or a lone pamphleteer, can 

disrupt that experience, particularly in some of 

the smaller parks. 

Boardley, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (citations omitted). This 

analysis amounts to an argument that the national parks are 

not public forums. But as discussed above, without deciding 

the forum status of every part of every national park, it is at 

least clear that the locations designated as “free speech areas” 

pursuant to subsections (e) of the regulations are public 

forums. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.51(e), 2.52(e). Therefore, by 

definition, these are not areas where the government has a 

paramount interest in maintaining a “peaceful and tranquil 

environment,” Boardley, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 18. See Doe, 968 

F.2d at 89 (rejecting governmental interest in tranquility at 

Lafayette Park and noting that “the very concept of a situs 

being designated as a ‘public forum’ for First Amendment 

purposes presupposes that the situs has been used for 

purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 

citizens and discussing public questions”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In fact, the NPS regulations expressly 

provide that park superintendents may decline to designate a 

location as a “free speech area” if expressive activities would 

“[u]nreasonably impair the atmosphere of peace and 

tranquility maintained in wilderness, natural, historic or 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 21 of 29
22 

commemorative zones.” 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.51(e)(2), 2.52(e)(2).6

 

Thus, within “free speech areas,” the government has 

exceedingly little basis for hushing “lone pamphleteer[s],” 

Boardley, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 18, in the name of peace and 

tranquility. 

 Nor are the remainder of the government’s interests 

substantially furthered by imposing the licensing requirement 

on small groups and individuals. Restrictions on free speech 

must “promote[] the Government’s purposes in more than a 

speculative way.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 865 F.2d 

at 390. It is not sufficient that a “regulation . . . contributes 

marginally to [the government’s] interest.” Id. The 

government asserts interests in preventing overcrowding, 

protecting park facilities, protecting visitors, and avoiding 

interference with park activities. See Appellees’ Br. at 25. 

But why are individuals and members of small groups who 

speak their minds more likely to cause overcrowding, damage 

park property, harm visitors, or interfere with park programs 

than people who prefer to keep quiet? See Lederman v. 

United States, 291 F.3d 36, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“‘Freedom of 

expression . . . would rest on a soft foundation indeed if 

government could distinguish’ between demonstrators and 

pedestrians on ‘a wholesale and categorical basis,’ without 

providing evidence that demonstrators pose a greater risk to 

identified government interests than do pedestrians.”) 

(quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 

 

6

 We note that Boardley raises no challenge to subsections (e) of the 

NPS regulations. 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.51(e), 2.52(e). In other words, he 

does not argue that it is unconstitutional to confine specified 

expressive activities to “free speech areas” and does not challenge 

the grounds provided for declining to designate a location as a “free 

speech area.” Rather, he attacks only the permit requirement. Id.

§§ 2.51(a), 2.52(a). 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 22 of 29
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(1972)). We fail to see why an individual’s desire to be 

communicative is a strong proxy for the likelihood that she 

will pose a threat to park security or accessibility. No doubt 

some individuals and small groups will cause these problems, 

but many will not; and the government has not explained why 

those engaged in free expression are more likely to be 

problematic than anyone else. “[T]he Constitution does not 

tolerate regulations that, while serving their purported aims, 

prohibit a wide range of activities that do not interfere with 

the Government’s objectives.” Id. at 44 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

The fit between means and ends is far more precise when 

the NPS regulations are applied to large groups. The most 

important function of a permit application is to provide park 

officials with the forewarning necessary to coordinate 

multiple events, assemble proper security, and direct groups 

to a place and time where interference with park visitors and 

programs will be minimized. These needs arise routinely with 

large-scale events, but only rarely with small ones. For 

example, the government argues that it requires advance 

notice to determine whether to summon a Special Events and 

Tactical Team (SETT). Appellees’ Br. at 36. But according 

to the Chief Park Ranger for Mount Rushmore National 

Memorial, SETTs are “[m]ost often” deployed for “major 

events” such as “large scale demonstrations; presidential, 

other VIP, or dignitary visits; major disasters; special 

ceremonies requiring crowd control; special law enforcement 

investigations and emergency law enforcement operations.” 

Third Decl. of Mike Pflaum ¶ 24. Similarly, the NPS’s 

“potential need to arrange for additional parking, traffic 

control, sanitary facilities, water fountains, and/or first aid 

stations,” Appellees’ Br. at 36–37, will arise much more 

frequently when a large group plans to hold an event than 

when a few people wish to speak freely or hand out 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 23 of 29
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pamphlets. Imposing the permit requirement on individuals 

and small groups promotes the government’s need for 

forewarning only marginally, if at all. 

To be sure, the government suggests examples of small 

groups that “can attract a significant crowd or otherwise strain 

the resources of a park”—such as the “Westboro Baptist 

Church,” a “neo-Nazi white supremacist group,” or a “small 

group of Ku Klux Klan members.” Id. at 41–42. But the 

government has failed to show that most individuals and small 

groups who engage in free speech pose such problems. In 

order to be narrowly tailored, the regulations must “target[] 

and eliminate[] no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ 

[they] seek to remedy.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485; see Initiative 

& Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 

1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that ban on signature 

solicitation on Postal Service sidewalks was not narrowly 

tailored because “the problems the government identifies arise 

only occasionally” and “much solicitation . . . is not 

disruptive”). The NPS regulations target much more than 

necessary. If a Girl Scouts leader musters her scouts onto a 

pavilion in a “free speech area” of Glacier National Park and 

proceeds to lecture them about the effects of global warming, 

she will have conducted both a “meeting” and a “gathering” 

(perhaps also an “assembly”) for which a permit would have 

been required. 36 C.F.R. § 2.51(a). An elementary school 

teacher who leads eight students on an excursion to the 

Canyon de Chelly National Monument and, within a “free 

speech area,” shows off her best imitation of a traditional 

Navajo dance presumably has hosted an unlawful 

“demonstration.” Id. If a believer in Creationism visits the 

Hagerman Fossil Beds National Monument and, within a 

“free speech area,” quietly hands out literature disputing the 

theory of evolution, he is guilty of “distribut[ing] . . . printed 

matter” without a permit. Id. § 2.52(a). Under a plain reading 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 24 of 29
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of the NPS regulations, all of this speech is banned unless a 

permit is first acquired, even though none of it remotely 

threatens any of the government’s interests. Thus, it is not 

dispositive that there may be a few circumstances in which 

the permit requirement could validly be applied to small 

groups. Even if application of the permit requirement to 

individuals and small groups “arguably eliminates [some] 

‘sources of evil’ that allegedly threaten” the government’s 

various interests, “it does so at too high a cost, namely, by 

significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that 

does not impede [the NPS’s] permissible goals.” Turner, 893 

F.2d at 1392. 

Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the NPS 

regulations are far more burdensome when applied to 

individuals and small groups than when applied to large 

groups. For one, the permit requirement effectively forbids 

spontaneous speech. See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 167–

68. Large groups, of course, generally cannot speak 

spontaneously. Obligating a large group to apply for a permit 

simply creates one more step in the already-lengthy process of 

planning a large-scale event. Individuals and small groups, 

by contrast, frequently wish to speak off the cuff, in response 

to unexpected events or unforeseen stimuli. For example, if 

an individual comes upon a (duly licensed) antiwar protest at 

a national park and wishes to don a “support the troops” pin in 

response, must he first apply for a permit or otherwise risk 

being penalized for engaging in an unlicensed 

“demonstration”? See 36 C.F.R. § 2.51(a). This is a major 

deprivation of free speech, and it falls almost exclusively on 

individuals and small groups. See Shuttlesworth v. City of 

Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J., 

concurring) (“[W]hen an event occurs, it is often necessary to 

have one’s voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at 

all.”). 

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Secondly, the permit requirement infringes on 

individuals’ ability to engage in anonymous speech. A 

speaker’s “decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of 

the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” 

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 

(1995). This is not to say that the government never can 

establish a justification for mandating the disclosure of 

identifying information, see, e.g., Doe v. Reed, No. 09-559, 

slip op. at 8–10 (U.S. June 24, 2010),7

 but only that the 

burden of such disclosure falls harder on individuals and 

small groups than on large groups. Whereas members of 

large groups easily can remain anonymous—except, perhaps, 

for the leader who fills out the permit application—a lone 

individual has no choice but to put her own name on the 

application. Moreover, common experience reveals that large 

groups tend to seek as much publicity as possible; anonymity 

is more often prized by those operating outside an organized 

group. In sum, the permit requirement imposes substantial 

burdens on individuals and small groups—burdens which the 

government has failed to justify. Because “the means chosen 

are . . . substantially broader than necessary to achieve the 

government’s interest,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 800, the NPS 

regulations are overbroad and not narrowly tailored. 

Finally, we note that the government has myriad less 

intrusive means of achieving its interests. See City of 

 

7

 Indeed, as Boardley recognizes, see Appellant’s Br. at 34–35, with 

respect to large groups, the limited disclosure required by the NPS 

regulations is justified by the government’s substantial need to 

engage in communication with group leaders—to coordinate the 

timing and location of multiple events, to ensure adequate security 

is in place, and to assess financial responsibility for damage and 

other incidental expenses. 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 26 of 29
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Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 417 n.13 (noting that the existence of 

“numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives . . . is 

certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 

‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable”). It could, for 

example, promulgate separate regulations for different 

national parks, taking into account the vast differences in the 

sizes and uses of the various parks. Instead of subjecting 

individuals and small groups to a prior restraint on speech, the 

NPS could simply prohibit and punish conduct that harasses 

park visitors, interferes with official programs, or creates 

security or accessibility hazards. Or, rather than employing 

an identical prior restraint on speech no matter where it occurs 

in a park, the NPS could craft distinct regulations for 

wilderness areas, visitors centers, parking lots, and so forth. 

Whether any of these options would withstand constitutional 

scrutiny depends on the specifics, but they all surely would be 

more narrowly tailored than the all-encompassing regulations 

at hand. 

3 

Finally, a time, place, or manner regulation must “leave 

open ample alternatives for communication.” Forsyth 

County, 505 U.S. at 130. These alternatives must exist 

“‘within the forum in question.’” Initiative & Referendum 

Inst., 417 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655). 

Thus, we can easily reject the government’s argument that 

this requirement is satisfied because “[i]ndividuals can 

distribute pamphlets or engage in permitless demonstrations 

on other property near” the national parks. Appellees’ Br. at 

44 (emphasis added). “[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his 

liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the 

plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Reno v. 

ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). This case is analogous to Turner, where we held 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 27 of 29
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that WMATA’s licensing scheme for speech in subway 

stations failed to leave open ample alternatives for 

communication: 

[The] permit requirement completely excludes 

those desiring to engage in organized free 

speech activity . . . unless they have a permit. 

There are no [subway station] areas not 

covered by the permit requirement. Persons 

desiring to engage in any organized free 

speech activities in the . . . forum are subject to 

the permit requirement; it does not regulate 

only the volume, location, or duration of such 

expression. There is no intra-forum 

alternative. 

893 F.2d at 1393. 

These same problems plague the NPS regulations. As the 

government conceded at oral argument, for someone who 

wishes to distribute leaflets in a national park, there is no 

lawful alternative to a permit. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 30–31. The 

same is true for those desiring to host an assembly, meeting, 

gathering, demonstration, or parade. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.51(a). 

Given the breadth of these proscriptions, virtually anyone 

engaging in any permitless expressive activity in a national 

park risks a penalty. Thus, the NPS regulations not only lack 

narrow tailoring, they fail to leave open ample intra-forum 

alternatives for communication. 

IV 

 Requiring individuals and small groups to obtain permits 

before engaging in expressive activities within designated 

“free speech areas” (and other public forums within national 

USCA Case #09-5176 Document #1259328 Filed: 08/06/2010 Page 28 of 29
29 

parks) violates the First Amendment. Neither party has 

argued that we should sever the regulations in order to leave 

part of them intact, and we perceive no basis for doing so. 

And, of course, it is the prerogative of the agency (or 

Congress) to decide whether to rewrite the regulations to 

apply only to large groups, and to decide where to draw that 

line. We have no choice but to hold the regulations 

unconstitutional in their entirety. Accordingly, the judgment 

of the district court is 

Reversed. 

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