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Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 

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F ·I LL D 

United Statao Co~rt <?f Ap_pc:.b 

Tent.li C:rcu1~ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUL 13 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LEONE. BOOMERSHINE; ANN CRAMER, 

Individually and as Trustee of the 

Leon Eugene Boomershine Irrevocable 

Trust and the Gene Boomershine 

Irrevocable Trust; DUANE CRAMER; 

JACQUELINE HELSCEL; DENA HELSCEL; 

and TAMMY HELSCEL, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

MARY M. BOOMERSHINE, 

Defendant. 

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) No. 91-7107 

) (D.C. No. CIV-90-296-S) 

) (E.D. Okla.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,** Senior 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-7107 Document: 010110270399 Date Filed: 07/13/1992 Page: 1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

The United States brought this action against Defendants Leon 

Boomershine, Ann Cramer, individually and in her capacity as 

trustee of the Leon Eugene Boomershine Irrevocable Trust and the 

Gene Boomershine Irrevocable Trust, Duane Cramer, Jacqueline 

Helscel, Dena Helscel, and Tammy Helscel. 1 The government sought, 

pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7403, to reduce Boomershine's unpaid 

tax liability to judgment, to set aside as fraudulent his 

conveyances of real property to the other defendants, and to 

foreclose federal tax liens against the fraudulently transferred 

property. 2 

On December 27, 1983, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

notified Boomershine and his then wife, Mary Boomershine, 3 of tax 

deficiencies and additions to tax for the tax years 1975, 1976, 

1 Ann Cramer and Jacqueline Helscel are the daughters 

Boomershine. Duane Cramer is his son-in-law, and Dena 

Helscel are his grandchildren. 

of Leon 

and Tammy 

2 There are six parcels of real property which were in dispute. 

One parcel, previously transferred to Boomershine's son, Leon E. 

Boomershine II, has been determined fraudulently conveyed, and has 

been foreclosed. Defendants do not appeal this judgment. 

Consequently, five parcels remain at issue. 

3 Leon and Mary Boomershine were divorced in 1987. It appears 

that the IRS has not pursued Mary Boomershine in regard to the tax 

deficiency, and she is not a party to this appeal. 

2 

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and 1977 in the amount of $250,411.92. Supp. App. at 47-48. The 

Boomershines contested the deficiencies, and on October 9, 1987, 

the Tax Court entered an order finding the Boomershines deficient 

and owing additions to tax in the amount of $232,553.13. Id. at 

123. Following notice of the deficiencies in 1983, the 

Boomershines made various transfers of property to their children 

and to trusts for the benefit of their grandchildren. Several of 

these transfers involved the use of a "strawman." 

The district court determined that the transfers were 

fraudulent. The court granted the government's motion for summary 

judgment, entered judgment for the government in the amount of 

$1,182,542.40, upheld the tax liens on the disputed properties, 

and ordered the properties foreclosed and sold to satisfy the 

liens. Defendants argue that Boomershine's affidavit, submitted 

in opposition to the government's motion for summary judgment, 

creates a genuine issue of material fact, and therefore, summary 

judgment is inappropriate. We disagree. 

"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 

dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law." Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 

1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment is appropriate when 

the nonmoving party's evidence is "'merely colorable'" or short of 

"'significantly probative'" on a material issue. Mosier v. 

Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1524 (10th Cir. 199l)(quoting Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). 

A federal tax lien arises upon assessment for unpaid taxes, 

and attaches to all property belonging to the delinquent taxpayer. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-7107 Document: 010110270399 Date Filed: 07/13/1992 Page: 3
26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6322. Under ordinary circumstances, a tax lien 

will not attach to property which the taxpayer has transferred and 

no longer owns. However, if a taxpayer fraudulently transfers 

property in anticipation of the imposition of a tax lien, the 

government may seek relief under the applicable fraudulent 

conveyance laws of the state in which the property is located, in 

this case Oklahoma. See Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 44-45 

(1958). 

If a taxpayer attempts to avoid collection of a tax debt by 

transferring property into the names of third parties who act as 

nominees, straw parties, or alter egos of the taxpayer, the 

transfers will be considered fraudulent and the government will be 

allowed to go forward with foreclosure on the properties. See 

generally G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935, 

939-40, 942 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 338 

(1977)(accepting court of appeals determination that assessment 

and levies were valid and that petitioner was taxpayer's alter 

ego); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 

1036 (10th Cir. 1974). 

At issue then is whether Boomershine's transfers of various 

parcels of property amount to fraudulent conveyances under 

Oklahoma law. The applicable Oklahoma statute concerning 

fraudulent conveyances, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Okla. 

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Stat. tit. 24, § 116(A), 4 defines a fraudulent transfer as 

follows: 

A. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a 

debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the 

creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 

made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made 

the transfer or incurred the obligation: 

1. with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 

any creditor of the debtor; or 

2. without receiving a reasonably equivalent value 

in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the 

debtor: 

b. intended to incur, or believed or reasonably 

should have believed that he would incur, debts 

beyond his ability to pay as they became due . 

The indicia of fraud as to conveyances of real property are 

insufficient consideration; insolvency of the transferor; familial 

relationship, by blood or marriage, of the transferor and 

transferee; the pendency or threat of litigation; and the transfer 

of all of the transferor's estate. Ebey-McCauley Co. v. Smith, 

353 P.2d 23, 28 (Okla. 1960). The record indicates that a 

majority of these factors are present in this case. 

On appeal, Defendants argue only that Boomershine was solvent 

at the time of the transfers, and therefore, the transfers were 

not fraudulent conveyances. Defendants contend that Boomershine's 

affidavit, submitted in opposition to the government's request for 

4 Oklahoma's Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Okla. Stat. 

tit. 24 §§ 101-111, was repealed in 1986 and replaced with the 

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act herein referenced. The district 

court determined, and Defendants do not refute, that the minor 

language differences are irrelevant to the facts of this case. 

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summary judgment, was sufficient to create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to his solvency which precludes the grant of 

summary judgment. 

Whether a party's affidavit in opposition to summary judgment 

is "sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact must be 

evaluated in light of the principle that 'conclusory allegations 

without specific supporting facts have no probative value.'" 

Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 1990)(quoting 

Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 

1985)). Boomershine's 

cash on hand, or cash 

averment that he "had sufficient assets, 

flow that [he] should not be deemed 

insolvent or said transfers deemed fraudulent or invalid as a 

matter of law," Appellant's App. at 41, is a "conclusory statement 

of the ultimate issue" and is not adequate to avoid summary 

judgment. Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d at 1114. Boomershine 

further stated in his affidavit that in either "1986 or early 

1988" he had received an insurance settlement in excess of 

$160,000.00. Appellant's App. at 41-42. He failed, however, to 

attest to the existence or availability of these funds. See Atlas 

Corp. v. Devilliers, 447 F.2d 799, 805 (10th Cir. 197l)(in the 

face of evidence of insolvency, defendant's "bald statement in an 

affidavit that he was solvent" did not defeat summary judgment), 

cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972). Accordingly, Defendants' 

argument, that these funds should be considered in deciding 

Boomershine's solvency, must fail. 

We hold that Defendants did not make an adequate showing of 

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, 

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the district court properly entered swnmary judgment for 

Plaintiff, and the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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