Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07243/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 13, 1997 Decided December 19, 1997 

No. 96-7242

VALERIE THOMAS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

v.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

Consolidated with

No. 96-7243

-

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 91cv03332)

Joseph A. Yablonski argued the cause for appellant/crossappellee, with whom Charles R. Both and Richard A. Berthelsen were on the briefs.

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David L. Rose argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellees/cross-appellants.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, GINSBURG, Circuit Judge

and BUCKLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: A principal claim in this case is that 

the defendant, acting pursuant to "mixed motives," unlawfully 

retaliated against the plaintiffs in violation of Title VII, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994). The issues on appeal require 

us to delimit the requirements of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and Price Waterhouse 

v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), with respect to a plaintiff's 

prima facie case, a defendant's burden of production, and the 

ultimate burdens of persuasion, in a retaliation/mixed-motives 

case.

The actions giving rise to this law suit occurred when 

Eugene Upshaw, Executive Director of the National Football 

League Players Association ("NFLPA"), first laid off, then 

terminated employees Valerie Thomas and Rita Raymond on 

the stated grounds that they had been disloyal in criticizing 

NFLPA staff and policies in an anonymously distributed 

document and in several legally taped telephone calls. Julie 

Taylor-Bland (Bland at the time of the events) resigned in 

the aftermath of the firing of the other two. Before leaving 

the employ of the NFLPA, Thomas and Bland had suggested, 

in conversations with management, that NFLPA promotion 

policy discriminated against African-American women. The 

three women subsequently sued the NFLPA, charging that 

the lay-off and discharge of Thomas and Raymond, and the 

alleged constructive discharge of Bland, came in retaliation to 

their opposition to discriminatory employment practices, and 

hence violated Title VII.

After trial, the District Court granted judgment as a 

matter of law to the NFLPA on the plaintiffs' claim that 

there existed a pattern and practice of discrimination at the 

NFLPA. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 902-09. It then found that 

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Thomas had been unlawfully fired, that Raymond had not 

made out a prima facie case of retaliation, and that Bland 

had not been fired at all. The trial court granted Thomas 

back pay and prejudgment interest, but declined to reinstate 

her. Thomas, et al., v. National Football League Players 

Ass'n, No. 91-3332 (D.D.C. Jul. 24, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 

279. In a subsequent order, the District Court refused the 

NFLPA's request for costs, declaring Thomas the prevailing 

party. Thomas, et al., v. National Football League Players 

Ass'n, No. 91-3332 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 1996), reprinted in J.A. 

326. The NFLPA now appeals the decisions adverse to it; 

Thomas, Raymond, and Bland cross-appeal the decisions adverse to them.

We affirm the District Court's judgment on the merits as to 

Thomas, Raymond, and Bland's claims. The District Court 

properly considered the evidence before it and correctly 

apportioned burdens of production and persuasion in this 

mixed-motives case. We reverse and remand the District 

Court's complete denial of the NFLPA's request for costs and 

remand the grant of prejudgment interest to Thomas. On 

remand, the District Court should apportion costs in line with 

the final disposition of the case; the trial court should also 

reconsider the grant of prejudgment interest for the period of 

delay during which the plaintiffs repeatedly amended their 

complaint. Finally, the District Court apparently erred in 

computing "fringe benefits" in connection with back pay 

awarded to Thomas; we therefore remand for reconsideration 

on this point.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1988, Thomas, Raymond, and Bland worked for the 

NFLPA and belonged to Office and Professional Employees 

International Union, Local 2 ("Local 2"). After the NFLPA's 

unsuccessful strike against the owners during the 1987 season, the NFLPA's finances suffered, and NFLPA Executive 

Director Upshaw devised a new budget for the NFLPA which 

sought to reduce personnel costs through attrition. J.A. 281. 

The board of directors of the NFLPA met during the first 

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week of March 1988, and elected George Martin president 

and Mike Davis vice president. The board declined to adopt 

Upshaw's proposed budget, instead demanding a ten percent 

reduction in personnel costs by lay-off. Id.

After a banquet held in conjunction with the board meeting, Martin convened an informal gathering in his hotel room 

that included Thomas and Bland. Thomas and others 

complained about promotional opportunities for AfricanAmericans and women in the Local 2 bargaining unit. J.A. 

282. Some time after March 10, 1988, Martin organized a 

second meeting, which Thomas and Bland also attended. 

Similar concerns were raised, and someone present accused 

Upshaw of racism. Id.

In the weeks that followed, Martin and Davis conducted 

personal and telephone interviews with staff on a range of 

employment-related subjects. Interviewees were assured of 

confidentiality. In their interviews, Thomas and Bland expressed views on race and sex discrimination at the NFLPA. 

Davis also interviewed Raymond. J.A. 283. Around the 

same time, Upshaw implemented the NFLPA board's directive to lay off some employees to cut costs. Prior to the 

lay-offs, Upshaw heard from Davis that Thomas and Raymond had criticized various employees in telephone conversations with Davis, and were suspected of producing and circulating a document harshly critical of the NFLPA. The 

document was headed and referred to as "What every player 

should know about the NFLPA." It included, among other 

allegations, a variety of claims about unfair promotion practices at the NFLPA. J.A. 285-86. It did not include allegations of racial discrimination.

On March 18, 1988, Upshaw laid off six employees, among 

whom were Thomas and Raymond. When Thomas returned 

to her office after learning of the lay-offs, she discovered 

workers changing the locks on her door and shutting down 

her computer. J.A. 284. At a time proximate to the lay-offs, 

Martin undertook to investigate the employees' allegations of 

misconduct at the NFLPA, and asked Upshaw about minority 

issues at the NFLPA. Martin told Upshaw that Thomas had 

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called him a racist and had complained about promotion of 

African-Americans and women. Id. Martin and Davis each 

gave copies of the "What every player should know" memorandum to Upshaw. Davis told Upshaw about his telephone 

conversations with Thomas and Raymond and that Raymond 

had mailed him a copy of the memorandum. Id.

On March 23, 1988, Davis gave Upshaw tapes of his telephone conversations with Thomas and Raymond. According 

to Upshaw's uncontradicted testimony, the conversations included ad hominem attacks on various NFLPA employees, 

including Upshaw. On the tapes, Raymond promised to send 

a copy of the "What every player should know" memorandum 

to Davis. Upshaw concluded that Thomas and Raymond had 

written the memo.

On April 12, 1988, five of the six employees laid off on 

March 18 were fired for cause. Upshaw sent each employee 

an identical letter explaining the firing on the grounds that 

the employees had libeled and slandered NFLPA personnel; 

had violated confidentiality; and had shown disloyalty towards and intentionally embarrassed the NFLPA. J.A. 286. 

Upshaw later testified that he fired Thomas and Raymond for 

what he believed they had said and written about the NFLPA 

employees. Some weeks later, Bland asked Upshaw about a 

newly open paralegal/secretary position, and Upshaw told her 

that he "did not see her in the job"; on May 20, 1988, Bland 

resigned. J.A. 287.

Local 2 pursued grievances against the NFLPA on behalf 

of Thomas and Raymond. The grievances were appealed to 

arbitration and an arbitrator ruled that the two had been 

dismissed without just cause. The arbitrator's award ordered 

reinstatement, Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibits ("P.X.") 77, but the 

NFLPA failed to comply. Thomas, Raymond, and Bland also 

filed timely charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission ("EEOC"), which, after some delay, issued "no 

cause" determinations on all their claims. At trial, the District Court dismissed as a matter of law plaintiffs' claim of a 

pattern and practice of discrimination. J.A. 902-09. It found 

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ment, with prejudgment interest for twenty-one months after 

her firing, based on expert testimony that estimated the time 

it should have taken Thomas to find new employment. The 

District Court found against Raymond, who did not appear at 

trial. Finally, the District Court found that Bland had not 

been constructively discharged. The District Court declined 

to award costs to the NFLPA, determining that Thomas was 

the prevailing party.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Burdens of Pleading, Production, and Persuasion Under Title VII

Title VII makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee 

who "has opposed any practice made an unlawful practice" by 

the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The legal framework 

for analyzing retaliation claims under Title VII is as follows.

As in all Title VII cases, the plaintiff must first make out a 

prima facie case of unlawful employment action. McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Where 

retaliation is alleged, a prima facie case requires a showing 

that (1) plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) plaintiff 

was subjected to adverse action by the employer, and (3) 

there existed a causal link between the adverse action and the 

protected activity. Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 

(D.C. Cir. 1985). A rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination arises when a plaintiff makes out a prima facie

case. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 

U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The defendant may rebut the presumption by asserting a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 

its actions. The defendant's responsibility at this stage has 

been characterized as a "burden of production," because the 

ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. See 

id. at 255.

When a defendant satisfies the burden of production, the 

presumption of discrimination dissolves; however, the plaintiff still has the opportunity to persuade the trier of fact that 

the defendant's proffered reason was not the actual or sole 

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basis for the disputed action. The plaintiff may aim to prove 

that a discriminatory motive was the only basis for the 

employer's action, or the plaintiff may seek to show that the 

employer was motivated by both permissible and impermissible motives. The plaintiff often willquite reasonably

argue both alternatives. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,

490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (Brennan, J.) ("Nothing in this opinion 

should be taken to suggest that a case must be correctly 

labeled as either a 'pretext' case or a 'mixed-motives' case 

from the beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect 

that plaintiffs often will allege, in the alternative, that their 

cases are both."). Where a plaintiff argues that discriminatory motivation constituted the only basis for the employer's 

action, the plaintiff may persuade the trier of fact of the 

pretextual nature of the defendant's asserted reason "either 

directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason 

more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 

that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of 

credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

Where, on the other hand, the plaintiff argues that the 

action resulted from mixed motives, a slightly different model 

operates. A plaintiff asserting mixed motives must persuade 

the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that 

unlawful retaliation constituted a substantial factor in the 

defendant's action. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 

(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). 

When the plaintiff successfully shows that an unlawful motive 

was a substantial factor in the employer's action, the defendant may seek to prove in response that it would have taken 

the contested action even absent the discriminatory motive. 

See id. at 244-45 (Brennan, J.). If the defendant fails to 

persuade the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence 

that it would have taken the action even absent the discriminatory motive, the plaintiff will prevail. See id. at 276 

(O'Connor, J., concurring).

This burden on a defendant in a mixed-motives case has 

been characterized both as an affirmative defense, id. at 246 

(Brennan, J.) and as a shifting burden of persuasion, id. at 

274 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The question of characterization is "semantic," and need not be definitively resolved. See 

id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). What is noteworthy, 

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however, is that under Price Waterhouse a defendant who is 

guilty of acting pursuant to an unlawful motive may nonetheless escape liability by proving that it would have made the 

same decision in the absence of the unlawful motivation.1In 

short, the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the facts 

constituting the defense properly falls on the defendant in a 

mixed-motives case, because the plaintiff has proven that 

unlawful motivation constituted a substantial factor in the 

defendant's action. "[W]here a plaintiff has made this type of 

strong showing of illicit motivation, the factfinder is entitled 

to presume that the employer's discriminatory animus made a 

difference to the outcome, absent proof to the contrary from 

the employer." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

B. Appellant's Claims

1. Meaning and Requirement of Direct Evidence

Appellant NFLPA, the defendant below, argues that, under 

Price Waterhouse, the burden of persuasion shifts to the 

defendant only where the plaintiff has provided "direct" 

rather than "inferential" evidence of discriminatory animus. 

Brief for Appellant 26. We reject this contention. Under 

Price Waterhouse, the burden of persuasion shifts to the 

defendant when the plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of 

"any sufficiently probative direct or indirect evidence" that 

unlawful discrimination was a substantial factor in the employment decision. White v. Federal Express Corp., 939 F.2d 

157, 160 (4th Cir. 1991).

Appellant's suggestion results from confusion that has arisen regarding the meaning of the word "direct" in Justice 

O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 

at 275, 276, 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As an initial 

matter, it should be noted that Justice O'Connor's concurrence was one of six votes supporting the Court's judgment 

__________

1

In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to provide that, in the 

situation where there is a finding of discriminatory motive and also 

a finding that the firing would have occurred even absent discrimination, the trial judge has discretion to grant some limited forms of 

relief: injunctive or declaratory relief, and attorney's fees, but not 

damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).

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(four Justices comprised the plurality, and Justice White filed 

a separate concurrence), so that it is far from clear that 

Justice O'Connor's opinion, in which no other Justice joined, 

should be taken as establishing binding precedent. Justice 

White's concurring opinion makes no mention of "direct" 

evidence, see 490 U.S. at 258-60, nor does the plurality 

opinion written by Justice Brennan. Furthermore, and more 

importantly, Justice O'Connor's opinion clearly indicates that 

the crucial prerequisite for burden-shifting is that the evidence adequately establish that discriminatory motive played 

a "substantial" role in the employment decision. The opinion 

repeatedly describes the required impact of the discrimination as "substantial." See 490 U.S. at 271, 272, 274, 276, 277, 

278. Justice White, in his concurrence, also focuses on the 

substantial factor requirement. See id. at 259 ("As Justice 

O'Connor states, [plaintiff's] burden was to show that the 

unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse 

employment action."). The emphasis of Justice O'Connor's 

opinion is on the substantial factor requirement, not on the 

distinction between types of evidence.

In our view, Justice O'Connor's invocation of "direct" evidence is not intended to disqualify circumstantial evidence 

nor to require that the evidence signify without inference. In 

context, the notion of "direct" evidence in Justice O'Connor's 

concurrence means only that the evidence marshaled in support of the substantiality of the discriminatory motive must 

actually relate to the question of discrimination in the particular employment decision, not to the mere existence of other, 

potentially unrelated, forms of discrimination in the workplace. Indeed, Justice O'Connor relies on circumstantial 

evidence in Price Waterhouse to show that the employer's 

discriminatory motive played a substantial role in the disputed employment decision. The decisionmakers who denied 

Ann Hopkins a partnership never admitted or stated expressly that the action was based on her gender. Rather, the 

Court cites gender-related, stereotyping evaluations and comments made by some partners as suggesting to the factfinder 

that gender played a role in the denial. See 490 U.S. at 235-

37.

In dicta in her concurrence, Justice O'Connor describes 

several pieces of evidence that, taken alone, would not show 

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that discrimination had formed a substantial factor in the 

employment decision, including "stray remarks in the workplace," statements by people who did not participate in the 

decisionmaking process, or expert testimony that an illegitimate factor "play[ed] a role" in the decision. Id. at 277. In 

contrast to such evidence, Justice O'Connor says, "[w]hat is 

required is what Ann Hopkins showed here: direct evidence 

that decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on 

an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision." Id. The 

word "direct" in this sentence simply distinguishes evidence 

that shows that an unlawful consideration constituted a substantial factor in the particular employment decision from 

evidence insufficiently related to the particular event.

The "direct" evidence to which Justice O'Connor alludes 

certainly may be circumstantial in nature, so long as it 

establishes that discriminatory motive played a substantial 

role in the employment decision. See Griffiths v. CIGNA 

Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3rd Cir. 1993) (circumstantial evidence may shift burden if it "directly reflect[s]" the alleged 

discriminatory attitude). Furthermore, such evidencelike 

all evidence short of outright admission of discriminatory 

motiverequires the factfinder to draw inferences. See Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2nd Cir. 

1992) (burden shifting requires "evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that 

may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude, and that ... is sufficient to permit the factfinder 

to infer that the attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision") (emphasis added); 

Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th 

Cir. 1993) (quoting Ostrowski).

As this court recently noted, "the distinction between direct 

and circumstantial evidence has no direct correlation with the 

strength of [a] plaintiff's case." Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 

F.3d 813, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 65 

U.S.L.W. 3817, 3825 (U.S. June 16, 1997) (No. 96-827). The 

purported distinction between "circumstantial" or "inferential" and "direct" evidence urged here does not make logical 

sense, because the decision to shift the burden of persuasion 

properly rests upon the strength of the plaintiff's evidence of 

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discrimination, not the contingent methods by which that 

evidence is adduced. Such a distinction is incompatible with 

both the facts and the logic of Price Waterhouse.

Burden-shifting under Price Waterhouse requires "evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the 

alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the 

contested employment decision." Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 

1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995). This formulation should be read 

carefully; evidence may "bear directly" on a decision without 

referring to it specifically. Nonetheless the quotation from 

Fuller correctly clarifies that "direct" describes a relationship 

between proof and incidents and not a characterization of the 

proof itself.

A number of other circuits have concluded, correctly in our 

view, that there is no bar on using circumstantial or inferential evidence to shift the burden of persuasion under Price 

Waterhouse. See Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 470 (3rd Cir. 1993); 

Radabaugh, 997 F.2d at 449 (8th Cir. 1993); Ostrowski, 968 

F.2d at 182 (2nd Cir. 1992); White, 939 F.2d at 160 (4th Cir. 

1991). Some have understood "direct" evidence as a requirement of Price Waterhouse, and have remained silent as to the 

precise meaning of the term, never expressly construing it as 

the opposite of circumstantial or inferential evidence. See, 

e.g., Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 

1990); Gagné v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 

315 (6th Cir. 1989). Several circuits have both taken Justice 

O'Connor's concurrence as the rule of Price Waterhouse and 

have interpreted "direct" to mean non-inferential or noncircumstantial. See, e.g., Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. 

Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993); Heim v. 

Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Alton 

Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 923 (11th Cir. 1990). For the 

reasons set forth above, we believe that the few circuits that 

have taken Justice O'Connor's use of the word "direct" to 

mean non-inferential or non-circumstantial have misread her 

concurring opinion and misconstrued the rule of law to be 

drawn from Price Waterhouse.

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2. Defendants Notice of the Shifting Burden of Persuasion

The NFLPA next argues that a defendant must somehow 

receive "notice" before the District Court that the burden of 

persuasion has shifted to it under the mixed-motives model of 

the case. Appellant's claim depends on a mistakenly formalistic conception of the order and allocation of proof in Title 

VII cases. It is true that a written synthesis of the case law 

describing tests and burdens for assessing a Title VII retaliation claim gives the appearance of an algorithm. The law has 

developed in this way for good reason: when a district court 

articulates its reasoning in a Title VII case, it benefits from 

conscientiously completing the analytic steps required by the 

Supreme Court. The steps of the analysis aim to assure 

compliance with the law and uniformity in its application. 

This is not to say, however, that the case law aims to stifle 

the parties in the course of litigation. It is quite the contrary.

Pleadings in the alternative, vagaries of evidence, and the 

general disorderliness of testimonial narrative all ensure that 

various elements of proof do not present themselves to the 

trial court in a regimented fashion. For this reason, the Title 

VII algorithm need only govern the trial court's assessment 

of the evidence, not the precise order in which that evidence 

is presented. What the Supreme Court has said of the prima 

facie case approach of McDonnell Douglas applies as forcefully to the entire Title VII framework: it was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely 

a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of 

common experience as it bears on the critical question of 

discrimination." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 

567, 577 (1978). The Title VII algorithm was designed to 

clarify the question of whether discrimination occurred, not 

"to make [courts'] inquiry even more difficult." United 

States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 

716 (1983). Thus, it is ridiculous to suggest, as the NFLPA 

does here, that a trial court must give some kind of "notice" 

to a defendant during the course of a trial as soon as it 

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sional football games may be played in clearly defined "quarters," but we do not litigate Title VII claims in this way.

Furthermore, the argument that a defendant might somehow suffer prejudice absent notice of burden-shifting makes 

little sense in light of the normal progress of Title VII 

litigation. If a defendant has evidence tending to show that it 

would have discharged the plaintiff notwithstanding any discriminatory motive, it would be foolish not to introduce this 

evidence under its Burdine burden of production to rebut the 

prima facie case of discrimination. The defendant would 

introduce this evidence regardless of whether the case fell 

under the Burdine rubric of single reason or the Price 

Waterhouse rubric of mixed motives. Where the factfinder 

concludes that the employer's decision resulted from mixed 

motives, it will consider the self-same exculpatory evidence as 

a proffered refutation of the argument that discrimination 

constituted a substantial factor in the employment decision. 

As a result, the parties will normally litigate the defendant's 

claim fully, as indeed occurred in the case before us. Accordingly, we conclude that no formal notice of burden-shifting is 

required under Price Waterhouse.

C. District Court Decision on the Merits

The District Court in the case at bar correctly followed the 

Title VII algorithm in assessing the evidence before it. It 

found that Thomas engaged in protected activity by participating in two conversations with Martin in which she raised 

the issue of discrimination against women and AfricanAmericans in promotion at the NFLPA, and by distributing 

the memo to Martin. J.A. 289-90. The District Court found 

that the NFLPA fired Thomas "immediately following" the 

protected activity, and permissibly concluded that Thomas 

had made out a prima facie case. Because it did not find 

evidence that Raymond engaged in protected conduct, the 

District Court correctly found that Raymond had not made 

out a prima facie case. J.A. 291-92. The District Court 

further found that Bland was not constructively discharged, 

because she had not presented evidence of aggravating factors making her work intolerable. J.A. 292-93; see Dashnaw 

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v. Peña, 12 F. 3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Neither of 

these conclusions was clearly erroneous; the legal framework 

for both was correct.

The District Court then assessed the evidence that served 

to refute the NFLPA's claim that it had non-discriminatory 

reasons sufficient to fire Thomas. It found that the way in 

which the firing followed Upshaw's learning of Thomas's 

taped comments; the unusual security measures surrounding 

the firing; and Upshaw's possession of the memorandum 

which he believed Thomas had co-authored sufficed to prove 

that Thomas's firing was motivated "in substantial measure" 

by her protected activity. J.A. 291. This constituted an 

acceptable finding of mixed motives, and was not clearly 

erroneous. Although the District Court did not cite Price 

Waterhouse, it correctly concluded that the burden of persuasion had shifted, and that as a result "it was NFLPA's burden 

to demonstrate that Thomas would have been discharged 

regardless of her protected activity." Id. In the District 

Court's view, "the NFLPA failed to sustain that burden" in 

that it did not successfully separate permissible from impermissible motives in its decision. Id. This conclusion was not 

clearly erroneous, either, but reflected the factfinder's assessment of the evidence surrounding the firing.

Appellant urges that even if the burden did shift to it, it 

established adequately that it would have fired Thomas regardless of her protected actions, because it fired other 

employees who did not engage in protected activity. This 

argument, which the NFLPA calls a "syllogism," Brief for 

Appellant 30, is thoroughly defective. It is a non sequitur to 

argue that if an employer fires several employees with legal 

motivation, all other firings that occur simultaneously also 

acquire the color of legality. The NFLPA could have retaliated against Thomas for protected activity, and then fired 

other employees at the same time either to mask its retaliation or in a corporate fit of pique.

D. Rejection of Statistical Evidence

The District Court correctly ruled as a matter of law that 

plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie statistical case of a 

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pattern and practice of discrimination on the part of the 

NFLPA. The crucial basis for this ruling was that plaintiffs' 

expert did not consider the relevant qualifications of those 

passed over or approved for promotion. J.A. 906-07. A 

prima facie case of statistical disparity must include the 

minimum objective qualifications of the applicants. Palmer v. 

Schultz, 815 F.2d 84, 91 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Segar v. Smith,

738 F.2d 1249, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Here, the expert did 

not account for minimum qualifications. Indeed, he could not 

have done so, because Appellees never specifically requested 

qualification standards from Appellant in discovery. We need 

not reach the District Court's other reasons for dismissal, 

because even if the trial court had found adequate sample size 

and statistical significance (which it did not, J.A. 906-07), a 

non-discriminatory, qualifications-based reason for the disparate impact could have existed. The District Court properly 

dismissed the statistical case as insufficient as a matter of 

law.

E. The Relief

The District Court awarded Thomas back pay from the 

date of her firing to December 1989, by which time, it found, 

she should have secured employment. J.A. 294-97. The 

District Court did not abuse its discretion in weighing expert 

testimony regarding job availability to arrive at this time 

period.

In computing the award on reconsideration, the District 

Court used a form prepared by plaintiffs' expert, labeled 

Attachment C3, which computed fringe benefits for 1988 and 

1989 as $6,173 and $8,305 respectively. J.A. 310. However, 

in his testimony, the expert certified a different version of 

this form, labeled Attachment C1, Version 3, J.A. 313, P.X. 

375, as accurate and as the basis for his estimates. See J.A. 

689-90, 752. This second form gives fringe benefits for 1988 

and 1989 as $2,685 and $3,767. The District Court apparently 

erred by using the wrong document in its damage computation; we remand for correct computation of damages or for 

explanation.

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The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining 

to reinstate Thomas. Although the acrimony of litigation 

alone probably would not suffice to rule out reinstatement, 

see Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 

281 (8th Cir. 1983), the District Court's denial of reinstatement reflected its own observation that some of Thomas's 

actions "might well have warranted discharge." J.A. 291. 

The District Court reasonably concluded that reinstatement 

would not serve the interests of justice where the employee 

engaged in behavior that could conceivably have given rise to 

a legitimate discharge under other circumstances.

The District Court awarded Thomas prejudgment interest 

on the back pay. The presumption strongly favors prejudgment interest, Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1278-79 

(D.C. Cir. 1995), but the trial court may disallow interest 

where attributable to substantial, unexplained delay by the 

plaintiff. See Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 

F.2d 1290, 1298 (7th Cir. 1987). Although Thomas reasonably 

awaited the EEOC's disposition of her request for a right to 

sue letter, which was delayed through no fault of her own, the 

same cannot be said of the three-year period during which 

Thomas and her co-plaintiffs repeatedly amended their complaint. The District Court must reconsider this issue on 

remand.

F. Costs

The District Court abused its discretion in finding Thomas 

alone to be the prevailing party and, therefore, declining to 

award any costs to the NFLPA. J.A. 326. In determining 

the prevailing party in mixed-outcome cases, the case must be 

"viewed as a whole." Fogelman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 278, 

285 (5th Cir. 1991). Although the NFLPA did violate Title 

VII with regard to Thomas, the NFLPA prevailed on twentyfour of the twenty-six counts before the trial court, including 

eight of the ten counts relating to Thomas. While statistical 

precision is not necessary in determining the prevailing party, 

the District Court should have apportioned costs in a manner 

that, at least approximately, reflected the success of the 

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NFLPA on the great majority of the claims brought against 

it. See Quaker Action Group v. Andrus, 559 F.2d 716, 719 

(D.C. Cir. 1977) (apportioning appeal costs by percentage and 

"contemplat[ing]" similar action by trial court).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 

Court is affirmed regarding Thomas, Raymond, and Bland. 

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded on the 

questions of computation of damages, apportionment of costs, 

and granting of prejudgment interest.

So ordered.

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