Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01916/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01916-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Julie Vawter, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Recontrust, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-1916-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Julie Vawter’s Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc.

22). For the reasons given below, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

On January 4, 2012, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original complaint and granted

her leave to amend, noting that “[t]he Court will not permit the filing of any proposed

amended complaint that does not comply with the requirements of this Order, or that seeks

to reassert claims that have been dismissed.” (Doc. 13 at 6). Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint that did not comply with the local rules and which was stricken. (Docs. 14, 16).

On February 17, 2012, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint that sought

to reassert the claims that had been dismissed. (Doc. 17-1). In addition, in the amended

complaint Plaintiff alleged for the first time that she had never in fact received any loan from

the Defendants, without explaining how she had bought the house that is now subject to

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foreclosure or why she had made five years of loan payments on money she had never

received. The Court denied her leave to amend the complaint because the only new claims

she had asserted were not “plausible” under the standard set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). It therefore found that allowing the amendment would be “nothing

more than an exercise in futility.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff has filed a motion to reconsider. (Doc. 22).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A motion for reconsideration may be granted only on one of four grounds, “1) the

motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is

based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;

3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice or 4) there is an intervening change

in controlling law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir.

2003) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). Motions for reconsideration are disfavored

and are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs and

arguments. SeeNorthwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26

(9th Cir. 1988). Nor should such motions ask the Court to “rethink what the court has

already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” See United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp.

2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc.,

99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied. Plaintiff claims that she “was under

the impression that her claims in the original complaint were dismissed for missing some

facts or legal reasoning—and not because those claims were improper.” (Doc. 22 at 2). As

the original Order noted, the claims were dismissed because they lacked merit, and she was

instructed not to re-assert them. Plaintiff claims that the court “chose to use Plaintiff’s

misunderstanding to amend the dismissed claims from the original complaint as justification

for dismissal of the whole amended complaint.” (Doc. 22 at 2). In fact, the Court considered

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 In fact, the Court relied on cases, including appellate cases, demonstrating that the

theory has no legal merit in Arizona.

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the new allegations and found that they were fanciful, and that granting Plaintiff leave to

amend and assert them would be “nothing more than an exercise in futility.” Bonin, 59 F.3d

at 845. Plaintiff continues to assert that Defendants have failed to offer satisfactory proof that

they have the power to foreclose on her property, and writes that “the citations supporting1

the show-me-the-note doctrine that the district judge principally relied upon to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims and complaint is [sic] a sham and should not stand on appeal.”(Doc. 22 at

3). The Arizona Supreme Court has recently confirmed that foreclosures in Arizona are

governed by the deed of trust statutes, and that these statutes “impose no obligation on the

beneficiary to ‘show the note’ before the trustee conducts a non-judicial foreclosure. The

only proof of authority the trustee’s sales statutes require is a statement indicating the basis

for the trustee’s authority.”Hogan v. Washington Mut. Bank, N.A., __ P.3d __, 2012 WL

1835540, at *2 (2012) (citing Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 33-808(C)(5)).

Plaintiff’s claim is not legally cognizable in Arizona.

Plaintiff also faults the Court for not crediting her newly-invented claim that she never

received any money from her lender. (Doc. 22 at 3). Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the

Court did not rely on presumptions or inadmissible evidence in its ruling. Plaintiff does not

deny that she filled out loan paperwork, that she moved into a home which she now claims

to own, and that she made payments on the alleged loan for some time before bringing this

action. She alleges only that she never actually received any money from the lender, claiming

that somehow the lender defrauded her into believing that she was lent money. Although

such a fraud may explain why she would have made the payments, it does not explain how

she obtained the house. Plaintiff has never claimed that she paid for the house with money

other than that received from the lender. She has not offered any explanation as to how she

paid for the house. A court is required, in reviewing a complaint, “to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal 556 U.S. at 679. Ms. Vawter’s complaint was based

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on discredited legal theory and fanciful facts, and it was proper for the Court to deny her

leave to amend. Her motion for reconsideration is nothing more than a demand to “rethink

what the court has already thought through,” which in this instance, the Court thought

through properly the first time. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d at 1116.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 22) is

denied. This matter shall remain closed.

DATED this 31st day of May, 2012.

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