Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01984/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01984-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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See Doc. #8, Exh D, M.E. 5/3/05.

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542 U.S. 296 (2004).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allan Frank Dailey, Sr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro; Terry Goddard, Attorney

General of the State of Arizona, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 06-1984-PHX-SRB (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Allan Frank Dailey filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 16, 2006,

challenging his conviction for aggravated driving under the influence following a guilty plea,

and the trial court's imposition of a stipulated1

 term of 6 years' imprisonment. He raises three

grounds for habeas relief, alleging the unconstitutionality of his aggravated sentence,

imposed in violation of Blakely v. Washington2

 and beyond the statutory guidelines contained

in Titles 13 and 28 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. Respondents argue that Dailey's

petition, filed two years after his conviction became final, is untimely. Respondents further

contend that his untimely Rule 32 petition, filed one year and eight months after his

sentencing, did not statutorily toll the limitations period. Finally, they maintain that Dailey

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is not entitled to any equitable tolling. The Court agrees and recommends that his petition

be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

On June 5, 2003, Dailey pleaded guilty to aggravated driving under the influence and

admitted one prior felony DUI conviction (Doc. #8, Exh A). He was sentenced on July 3,

2003 (Id., Exh B). On March 11, 2005, Dailey filed a post-conviction petition, alleging a

Blakely violation (Id., Exh C). On May 3, 2005, the trial court dismissed his petition as

untimely, finding as follows:

Defendant filed on March 11, 2005 an untimely Notice of Post

Conviction Relief. He now seeks relief pursuant to Rule 32.1(g), Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

__, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), is a significant change of law that applies to his

case.

In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court, held that pursuant to its

decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), a defendant is entitled to a jury's determination of any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed maximum.

However, in Schririo v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (2004), the

Court also held that although Ring and Apprendi constitute a significant

change in the law, this change is procedural, but not a watershed procedural

rule, and does not apply retroactively to convictions that are final. The

Arizona appellate courts also have declared that Ring and Apprendi do not

apply retroactively to convictions that are final. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz.

386, 64 P. 3d 828 (2003); State v. Sepulveda, 201 Ariz. 158, 37 P.3d 432 (App.

2001), review denied.

A conviction becomes final when the time for filing the Rule 32 of-right

proceeding has passed. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 390. The defendant was

sentenced on July 3, 2003 following his guilty plea which stipulated to an

aggravated sentence of six years. The defendant did not timely file a Rule 32

of-right notice. His conviction is therefore final and he is not entitled to relief

under Rule 32.1(g). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED dismissing defendant's Notice of PostConviction Relief.

(Id., Exh D).

Dailey was required to file his federal petition within one year of the time his

conviction became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). As a result of his guilty plea, his

conviction became final when he was sentenced on July 3, 2003. Dailey was required to file

his habeas petition by July 4, 2004. However, "the time during which a properly filed

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application for post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation." See §

2244(d)(2). A review of the Maricopa County Superior Court docket indicates that Dailey

had nothing pending in state court from July 3, 2003 until he filed his petition for postconviction relief on March 11, 2005 - ten months past the one-year limitations period. The

trial court dismissed his petition as untimely, and therefore it was not "properly filed" within

the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). See Pace v. DiGiguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). In addition,

once the limitations period lapsed, Dailey could not "restart" the period by filing a state court

action that would have tolled the limitations period, had it been timely filed. See Ferguson

v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, Dailey is not entitled to equitable

tolling. He has not shown extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made it

impossible for him to timely file: that he diligently pursued his rights and that some

"extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Allan Frank Dailey's petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

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appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 14th day of February, 2007.

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