Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01435/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01435-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-1- 05cv1435w

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO.

et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO: 05-CV-1435W(CAB)

ORDER DENYING DANIEL

DOLL’S MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO INTERVENE TO REQUEST

UNDERTAKING ON APPEAL

[DOC. NO. 213] 

vs.

ARENA GROUP 2000, L.P., et. al.,

Defendants.

On March 8, 2007, this Court issued an order granting Crum & Forster’s

summary-judgment motion against Arena Group 2000, L.P. The order was based on

the Court’s finding that Arena Group, an additional insured under Crum & Forster’s

Retained Amount Policy, is responsible for a $500,000 retention. 

On April 18, 2007, Arena Group appealed the Court’s March 8, 2007 ruling. 

On June 27, 2007, Daniel Doll filed the pending motion for leave to intervene to

request an undertaking on Arena Group’s appeal.

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d.1). For the reasons stated below, the

Court DENIES Doll’s motion. 

Case 3:05-cv-01435-JLS-CAB Document 260 Filed 09/18/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-2- 05cv1435w

I. BACKGROUND

On February 22, 2003, Daniel Doll and Shelby Olerich-Snow left the Black

Angus restaurant near the San Diego Sports Arena and walked under a large

marquee sign that collapsed on them without warning. Both Doll and Snow suffered

severe personal injuries as a result and filed separate state-court actions against

Arena Group and a host of other defendants. 

Arena Group tendered the claim to its various insurers, including Crum &

Forster, which had issued a Retained Amount Policy to American Restaurant Group,

Inc. Arena Group is covered as an additional insured under the policy. The limit of

liability is $1,000,000 per occurrence, subject to a $500,000 retention. Crum &

Forster agreed to participate in Arena Group’s defense. However, the two parties

disagreed on whether Arena Group must satisfy the policy’s $500,000 retention.

Eventually, the underlying personal-injury lawsuit settled for $11,000,000. 

Arena Group’s primary and excess carriers, among others, contributed $10 million.

Crum & Forster contributed $500,000. The Settlement Agreement between Doll,

Arena Group and Crum & Forster addresses who is responsible for paying the

remaining $500,000. Under Settlement Agreement’s terms, Arena Group and Crum

& Forster agreed to “litigate solely the issue of whether Arena Group is obligated . . .

to pay the” $500,000 retention. (Doll’s Ex. 1, ¶ 12.3.) “In the event of a final and

non-appealable judgment determining that Arena Group is obligated to pay,” Arena

Group must pay Doll the remaining $500,000 in various installments. (Id.) If, on

the other hand, Arena Group is found not to be obligated for the retention, Crum &

Forster must pay the balance. 

On November 28, 2005, Arena Group filed a Third-Party Complaint against

Crum & Forster seeking a declaration regarding the parties’ respective rights and

obligations under the Retained Amount Policy. Thereafter, Arena Group and Crum

& Forster filed cross-motions for summary judgment seeking a determination of

whether Arena Group is responsible for the retention. 

Case 3:05-cv-01435-JLS-CAB Document 260 Filed 09/18/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-3- 05cv1435w

On March 8, 2007, this Court issued an order granting Crum & Forster’s

motion and finding that Arena Group is responsible for the retention. On April 18,

2007, Arena Group filed a Notice of Appeal. On June 27, 2007, Daniel Doll filed

this motion. He requests that the Court grant him leave to intervene, and require

Arena Group to provide a supersedeas bond safeguarding his interest in the

underlying Settlement Agreement.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 24(a)(2) permits anyone to intervene who is “so situated that the

disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s

ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately

represented by existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit applies

a four-prong test when weighing a Rule 24(a)(2) intervention motion:

(1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant

must have a ‘significant protectable’ interest relating to the property or

transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so

situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter,

impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4)

the applicant’s interest must not be adequately represented by the

existing parties in the lawsuit.

Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 817-18 (9th Cir.

2001). In applying this standard, courts should broadly construe the rule in the

proposed intervenor’s favor. U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397-98 (9th

Cir. 2002). However, the applicant “bears the burden of showing that all the

requirements for intervention have been met.” U.S. v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d

915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). 

With respect to the fourth element – adequate representation – courts should

consider several factors. Specifically, an applicant is adequately represented if “(1)

the interests of a present party to the suit are such that it will undoubtedly make all

of the intervenor’s arguments; (2) the present party is capable of and willing to make

Case 3:05-cv-01435-JLS-CAB Document 260 Filed 09/18/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4- 05cv1435w

such arguments; and (3) the intervenor would not offer any necessary element to the

proceedings that the other parties would neglect.” County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622

F.2d 436, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954-55 (9th

Cir. 1977)); United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Doll does not have a significant protectable interest.

An applicant has a significantly protectable interest in the subject of the

litigation “if the interest is protected by law and there is a relationship between the

legally protected interest and the plaintiff’s claims. [Citations omitted.]” Alisal

Water Corp., 370 F.3d at 919. In order to trigger a right to intervene, “an economic

interest must be concrete and related to the underlying subject matter of the action.” 

Id. 

Here, Doll asserts an economic interest in the litigation. Although he does

not specifically identify the interest, it appears to be his contractual right under the

Settlement Agreement to receive $500,000 from Arena Group “in the event of a

final and non-appealable judgment determining that [Arena Group] is obligated to

pay the SIR. . . .” (Doll’s Ex. 1, ¶ 12.3, emphasis added.) Doll argues that the

Court’s March 8, 2007 order constitutes a “final and non-appealable order” that

triggers Arena Group’s obligation to pay, presumably giving rise to Dolls’ interest. 

Doll further asserts that Arena Group does not intend to pay, and thus seeks

intervention to protect his contractual right. The Court is not persuaded by Doll’s

argument. 

The Settlement Agreement’s use of the term “final and non-appealable” is

clear and unambiguous. It means that Doll’s contractual right to receive payment

ripens when the judgment is no longer subject to appeal. Because Arena Group

(either now or later) has the right to seek appellate review of this Court’s March 8,

Case 3:05-cv-01435-JLS-CAB Document 260 Filed 09/18/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

To the extent Doll’s interest is in pursuing an undertaking, the Court also finds that he is not

entitled to an undertaking under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d). By its terms, Rule 62(d)

applies in the case of a money judgment. Doll does not have a money judgment against Arena Group.

Rather, he has a contractual right to receive $500,000 from either Arena Group or Crum & Forester,

once a “final and non-appealable” judgment has been entered. (See, Doll’s Reply, 5:4 (recognizing

that Arena Group has a “contractual obligation.”).)

-5- 05cv1435w

2007 order, Doll does not yet have an economic interest against Arena Group.

Moreover, the Court agrees with Arena Group that the cases Doll relies upon

do not support intervention in this case. In each case Doll cites, the litigation had

the potential of directly impacting the intervenor’s right to a specific fund. For

example, in Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377

(7th Cir. 1995), the litigation had the potential of eliminating the availability of

insurance proceeds. In contrast, here, the litigation will determine which party is

responsible for paying Doll.1

 

B. Doll has not established that his interests are not being adequately

protected.

Even if Doll established a significant protectable interest, he has failed to

establish that his interests are not being adequately represented. 

Doll concedes that before this Court issued the March 8, 2007 order, his

interests were being adequately protected: “Until now, his interest have been

adequately protected.” (Doll’s P&A, p.4:6–7.) Doll argues, however, that because

of the order, “the interests of the parties have become adverse.” (Id., p.4:12.) The

Court disagrees. 

Doll’s argument assumes that Arena Group’s interests have changed. Not

only has Doll failed to cite evidence supporting this contention, but it also makes no

sense. Before the March 8, 2007 order, Arena Group’s interest was in convincing

this Court that it is not responsible for the $500,000 retention. Following that order,

Arena Group’s interest remains the same: convincing the Ninth Circuit that

Case 3:05-cv-01435-JLS-CAB Document 260 Filed 09/18/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-6- 05cv1435w

it is not responsible for the retention. Accordingly, to the extent Doll’s and Arena

Group’s interests were aligned before the March 8, 2007 order, they remain aligned.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Daniel Doll’s motion to

intervene [Doc. No. 213]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 18, 2007

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-01435-JLS-CAB Document 260 Filed 09/18/07 Page 6 of 6