Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03429/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03429-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1 Finding these motions suitable for resolution without oral argument,

the court denies the parties’ request in this regard.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adeshina O. Oshilaja; Rebecca

S. Indermaur, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Ms. Yvonne Watterson; Gateway

Community High School; Gateway

Community College; Maricopa

County Community College

District, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-3429-PHX-RCB

O R D E R

Currently pending before the court is a motion for summary

judgment brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by defendants,

Yvonne Watterson, Gateway Community High School, Gateway

Community College, and Maricopa County Community College District

(doc. 21); and a cross-motion for summary judgment by plaintiffs,

Adeshina O. Oshilaja and Rebecca S. Indermaur (docs. 24 & 25).1

Case 2:05-cv-03429-RCB Document 34 Filed 09/30/07 Page 1 of 31
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2 These facts are taken from the pleadings and from plaintiffs’

depositions which “for purposes of this motion only,” defendants “agree” are

“true and accurate.” Mot. (doc. 21) at 4. 

- 2 -

Having reviewed the parties’ extensive submissions, including

over 500 pages of deposition testimony, and supporting affidavits

(doc. 22, 23, and 26-29), the court rules as follows.

Background2

Plaintiffs, Adeshina Oshilaja and Rebecca Indermaur, were

employed by the defendant Maricopa County Community College

District where they worked as math/science teachers at Gateway

Community High School (“the High School”), another defendant. 

The High School is a charter school operating on the campus of

defendant Gateway Community College in Phoenix, Arizona. The

High School principal and plaintiffs’ immediate supervisor,

Yvonne Watterson, also is named as a defendant herein.

Plaintiff Oshilaja was hired, on a one year contract, as a math

and science teacher on July 29, 1995. Doc. 22 (Def. SOF), exh. 1

thereto (Dep’n of Adeshina Oshilaja (7/21/06)) at 49-50. 

Thereafter, until May 2004, he continued to be employed on an

annual basis. As he agreed during his deposition, from 1995

until the spring of 2004, roughly two or three months before the

annual contracts were to end, another contract would be placed in

his school mailbox. Id. If Mr. Oshilaja decided to continue

teaching at the High School, he would sign the contract for the

next academic year. Id. Plaintiff Indermaur described the

annual contract process similarly, agreeing “in essence” that she

was “working at the school on a year by year contract.” Id.,

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exh. 2 thereto (Dep’n of Rebecca Indermaur (8/11/06)) at 39. 

The High School’s population consisted of “at risk” students. 

Id., exh. 2 thereto at 33. Some of the students were

“dropout[s]” from other, more traditional high school settings,

for example. Id., exh. 1 thereto at 31. Prior to Ms. Watterson

becoming principal, the High School had a number of problems,

such as low attendance rates and declining enrollment. Id., exh.

2 thereto at 34-35. When Ms. Watterson became principal, the

model for the High School changed. Among other things, the

School became “more structured.” Id. at 33. Part of that change

was that the School adopted an “early college” model where

students could take college as well as high school classes, thus

allowing more students to attend college. Id. at 30 and 41. 

Transition to this early college model was to occur during the

2004-2005 academic year. Id. at 41. Prior to that, at a January

16, 2004, faculty meeting, defendant Watterson announced that all

teachers needed to reapply for their positions for the next

academic year (2004-2005). Id., exh. 1 thereto at 192-93. When

asked about this announcement, plaintiff Oshilaja emphatically

replied that “one thing we all remember” is that we were told

that “[a]ll teachers need[] to reapply for their job.” Id. at

193 (emphasis added). He reiterated, “We all need to reapply for

our job.” Id. (emphasis added). When asked if he remembered the

exact words, plaintiff Oshilaja again stated, “We all need to

reapply for our job, all of the staff, all the teaching staff.” 

Id. (emphasis added). 

The explanation for requiring all teachers to reapply was, as

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plaintiff Oshilaja understood it, because of “[d]uty change[.]”

Id. To him that meant that instead of teaching a combined

math/science class, those subjects would be taught separately. 

See id. Plaintiff Oshilaja further testified that that

explanation “ma[d]e sense[]” to him. Id. Although there may

have been more said during this meeting, Mr. Oshilaja repeated

that the “one important thing . . . [he] remember[ed]” was “a

statement being made that all the teaching staff was going to

have to reapply for their jobs[.]” Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 

During her deposition plaintiff Indermaur was also questioned

about this January 16, 2004 faculty meeting. She “remember[s]

Ms. Watterson telling [her] and all the faculty who attended that

. . . . meeting that because of the transformation that the

school was going to go through in adopting this early college

high school model, . . . job descriptions. . . were being changed

and she encouraged all of [them] to reapply[.]” Id., exh. 2

thereto at 244. As plaintiff Indermaur readily admitted,

however, she chose not to reapply. Id. Plaintiff Indermaur

further agreed that she was “never” advised in writing or

otherwise that she was “terminated” from job at the high school. 

Id. at 249; and at 66-67 In fact, when asked if she was “ever

actually fired or terminated[,]” Ms. Indermaur replied, “No[;]

[m]y contract came to an end[]” in May 2004. Id. at 66. 

Unlike plaintiff Indermaur, Mr. Oshilaja decided to reapply for

his teaching position. He filled out the job application and was

interviewed by the screening committee – an interview which

lasted 45 minutes to an hour. Id., exh. 1 thereto at 197 and

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198. Defendant Watterson was one of the five members on that

committee. Id. Others were also interviewed, but Mr. Oshilaja

was not present as those interviews were conducted separately. 

Id. at 198. Based upon his own estimation from the District’s

disclosures, Mr. Oshilaja testified that he was “the second to

the lowest” of “maybe[] five applicants[.]” Id. at 227. 

Subsequently Mr. Oshilaja received a letter advising him that the

screening committee had decided to hire someone else. Id. at

199. 

When specifically asked who was hired instead of him, plaintiff

could not identify anyone. Instead, he responded, “[p]robably

not black and not old as I am.” Id. at 226. Following up,

plaintiff was asked if that response was “base[d] on any personal

knowledge, or [was] [it] simply based on a suspicion[.]” Id. He

answered that from his “personal knowledge[,]” the people that

were interviewed for “his position” were “not black” and were

“younger” than him. Id. Plaintiff Oshilaja did not elaborate as

to the source of his knowledge; nor did he provide any further

details, such as the ages of the persons interviewed or their

qualifications. When he was not rehired, his last day of

employment at the High School was May 14, 2004. Id. at 18. Like

plaintiff Indermaur, Mr. Oshilaja was never advised in writing or

otherwise that he was terminated. Id. at 56-57; and 225. His

2003-2004 contracted ended, by its own terms; and he was not

rehired. 

Shortly thereafter, in June 2004, plaintiffs each filed a

“Charge of Discrimination” with the Equal Employment Opportunity

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Commission (“EEOC”) and with the Arizona Attorney General’s Civil

Rights Division (“CRD”). Those Charges were based solely on

allegations of age discrimination in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, (“ADEA”), 29 U.S. C. § 621 et

seq. See Doc. 23, exh. 1, parts 5 and 7 thereto. Following an

investigation, those Charges were dismissed and plaintiffs were

issued “Notice of Right to Sue” letters by the Arizona Attorney

General’s CRD. Id., exh. 1 thereto. 

The following year, on June 22, 2005, plaintiffs filed the

present action in Arizona Superior court, Maricopa County. 

Defendants timely removed to this district court on October 26,

2005. 

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©, a party is entitled to

summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” It is beyond dispute that “[t]he moving

party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact.” Horphag Research Ltd. v.

Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

“The criteria of ‘genuineness’ and ‘materiality’ are distinct

requirements.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912,

916 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The requirement that an issue be

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‘genuine’ relates to the quantum of evidence the plaintiff must

produce to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” 

Id. “There must be sufficient evidence ‘that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “As to materiality, the substantive

law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. Here, as will be seen, the substantive law is the ADEA. 

 “Once the moving party meets its initial burden, . . . , the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth, by affidavit

or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). This “[e]vidence must be concrete

and cannot rely on ‘mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’”

Bates v. Clark County, 2006 WL 3308214, at * 2 (D.Nev. Nov. 13,

2006) (quoting O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d

1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986)). Similarly, “a mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence” is not sufficient “to defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment; instead, the nonmoving party must

introduce some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support

the complaint.’” Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125

F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249, 252). Thus, in opposing a summary judgment motion it is not

enough to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations

omitted). 

By the same token though, when assessing the record to

determine whether there is a “genuine issue for trial,” the court

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must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor.”

Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1035 (citation omitted). “This is true even

though[,]” as here, “the court is presented with cross-motions

for summary judgment[.]” High Tech Gays v. Defense Ind. Sec.

Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation

omitted). “Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the

air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a

factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn.” Yang

v. Peoples Benefit Ins. Co., 2007 WL 1555749, at *7 (E.D.Cal. May

25, 2007) (citations omitted). 

On a summary judgment motion, the court may not make

credibility determinations; nor may it weigh conflicting

evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Thus, as framed by the

Supreme Court, the ultimate question on a summary judgment motion

is whether the evidence “presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.

The fact that a plaintiff is appearing pro se, as are the

plaintiffs herein, does not alter the applicability of these

general summary judgment rules. See Semper v. JBC Legal Group,

2005 WL 2172377, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (“Although the rule

requires that the allegations of a pro se complaint be liberally

construed in determining whether a viable claim has been asserted

and that strict compliance with procedural/technical rules will

not be expected of pro se litigants, it does not alter the

summary judgment standard or otherwise give pro se non-prisoner

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litigants multiple opportunities to present their evidence.”). 

The summary judgment rules apply with equal force to pro se

litigants because they “must follow the same rules of procedure

that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th

Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (“Although we construe pleadings

liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the rules

of procedure.”) In fact, in Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th

Cir. 1986), the Court rejected the argument that pro se nonprisoner litigants are entitled to notice from the court

regarding the requirements of Rule 56. In so doing, the Court

unequivocally stated that “pro se litigants in the ordinary civil

case should not be treated more favorably than parties with

attorneys of record.” Id. at 1364. Accordingly, although

plaintiffs are appearing pro se, they are held to the same

standards as any other represented party on a motion for summary

judgment. 

II. Discrimination Claims

 Plaintiffs’ complaint can be read as asserting claims under

 the ADEA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), and two pendent state law claims. 

For now the court will focus on plaintiffs’ discrimination

claims. 

A. Title VII

Plaintiffs explicitly assert four separate claims under Title

VII: (1) “hostile work environment[;]” (2) “disparate

treatment[;]” (3) “discriminatory seniority system[;]” and (4)

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“constructive discharge[.]” Co. (Doc. 6-2) at 5, ¶¶ 10-14; at 6,

¶¶ 15-17 and ¶¶ 18-19; and at 7-8, ¶¶ 25-27. In moving for

summary judgment, defendants assumed that the court has subject

matter jurisdiction over these claims; so they addressed the

merits. As will be seen though, because the court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction to consider these Title VII claims, it will

not and, indeed, cannot address the merits of such claims. 

Under Title VII it is “an unlawful employment practice for an

employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2003) (emphasis added). As the plain

language of that statute indicates, an essential element of a

claim thereunder is a showing that the plaintiff comes within the

protected class. See Pullom v. U.S. Bakery, 477 F.Supp.2d 1093,

1100 (D. Or. 2007) (“To establish a prima facie case of

discrimination . . . , a plaintiff must offer proof that[,]”

among other things, that “he or she belongs to a class of persons

protected by Title VII[.]”) 

Before a plaintiff may proceed with a Title VII action in

federal court, they must first exhaust their administrative

remedies. This is done by “filing a timely charge with the EEOC

or the appropriate state agency.” Howard v. Kiewit Pacific

Corp., 2006 WL 278603, at *3 (D. Hawai’i 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(f); and Freeman v. Oakland Unified School District, 291

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F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002)). This is a jurisdictional

prerequisite. See id. The purpose of this administrative charge

is to “giv[e] the charged party notice of the claim and narrow[]

the issues for prompt adjudication and decision.” Freeman, 291

F.3d at 636. “Subject matter jurisdiction extends over all

allegations of discrimination that fell within the scope of

either the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation

which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.” Brooks v. ATC/Vancom, Inc., 2007 WL 1063059, at

*3 (D. Nev. April 4, 2007) (citing B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept.,

276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that EEOC charges must be

construed “with utmost liberality since they are made by those

unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.” Lyons v.

England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kaplan v.

Int’l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354,

1359 (9th Cir. 1975)) (other citation omitted). “In determining

whether the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied, the court

may consider such factors as the alleged basis of the

discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts specified within the

charge, and any locations at which discrimination is alleged to

have occurred.” Howard, 2006 WL 278603, at *3 (citing Freeman,

291 F.3d at 636). When examining these factors, the Ninth

Circuit deems “[t]he crucial element of a charge of

discrimination” to be “the factual statement contained therein.” 

Freeman, 291 F.3d at 636 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

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3 For ease of reference, hereinafter these documents will be referred

to as “the Charges.”

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The plaintiffs each timely filed a “Charge of Discrimination”

with the Arizona Attorney General’s CRD and with the EEOC.3

Significantly, however, those Charges are confined to allegations

of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. Nowhere in

either Charge do plaintiffs even hint at the possibility that

they were discriminated against on any basis other than age. For

example, in the space designated “discrimination because of[,]”

plaintiffs had a choice of marking the following boxes: “Race,

Color, Sex, Religion, National Origin (15/+), Age, Retaliation,

Disability, and/or Other (Specify)[.]” See Doc. 23, exh. 1

thereto at parts 5 and 7. They each checked only the box marked

“Age[.]” Id. Alone that might not be determinative of whether

plaintiffs’ EEOC Charges included Title VII claims. That fact

combined with the factual statements contained in their

respective EEOC Charges, however, clearly shows that age is the

sole basis for plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.

Plaintiffs’ Charges are replete with references to age, and

conspicuously silent as to any other type of alleged basis for

discrimination. To illustrate, under the section entitled

“DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT[]” both plaintiffs unequivocally

stated: “I believe I have been discriminated against because of

my Age[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff Indermaur then gave

her age as “64 years old (12/05/39)[]” and plaintiff Oshilaja

gave his age as “49 years old[.]” Id., exh. 1 thereto at Part 7

thereto at 28; and Part 5 thereto at 25. Further, they both

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claim to have been “subjected to different terms and conditions

of employment than younger teachers under age 40[.]” Id.

(emphasis added). Likewise, in their “discrimination

statements,[,]” both plaintiffs stated: “In or about January

2004 older teachers including myself were told we had to reapply

for our positions and that contracts would no longer be renewed

automatically for the next contract year.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs concluded those statements by indicating that they

“believe[d] and therefore allege, that but for my age, I would

not have been subjected to unequal terms and conditions of

employment[.]” Id. (emphasis added). In the case of plaintiff

Indermaur, she further stated that “but for [her] age” she “would

not have been forced to constructively terminate [her]

employment.” Id., exh. 1 thereto, Part 7 at 28. In a similar

vein, plaintiff Oshilaja stated that “but for [his] age” he

“would not have been terminated through failure to renew [his]

contract and rehire [him].” Id., exh. 1 thereto, Part 5 at 25.

As is abundantly clear by now, neither EEOC Charge mentions or

even alludes to the fact that plaintiffs may be members of a

protected class for purposes of establishing liability under

Title VII. There is, for example, no mention of plaintiffs’

race, color or national origin. Consequently, “[n]othing in

th[ose] EEOC charge[s] would have indicated to investigators that

the investigation should address race, color, or any type of

discrimination other than age . . . discrimination.” Howard,

2006 WL 278603, at *4 (citing Freeman, 291 F.3d at 637 (“where

allegations in EEOC charge refer to discrimination in relation to

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a specific election, allegations of discrimination in other

contexts, such as class size or teaching assignments, would not

have been necessary to, or addressed in, the scope of the EEOC

investigation”)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,

as in Howard, plaintiffs have not come forth with any evidence

that the agency investigations included any type of

discrimination other than age. See id. (citation omitted). 

Thus, because plaintiffs’ claims for any type of discrimination

other than age “were not within the scope of the [agencies’]

actual investigation and could not reasonably be expected to grow

out of the factual allegations of discrimination contained on the

face of [their] respective charges of discrimination[,]” such

claims were not administratively exhausted. See Brooks, 2007 WL

1063059, at *4 (citations omitted). Consequently, this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all allegations of

discrimination in the complaint which are premised upon

violations of Title VII. See id. The court must, therefore, 

grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to these claims,

albeit not for the reasons defendants proffered. See United

Investors Life Ins. Co. V. Waddell & Reed, 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (“[T]he district court ha[s] a duty

to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action

sua sponte, whether the parties raise the issue or not.”); see

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion

of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of

the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”) In

light of the foregoing, the only remaining federal claims are

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those based upon alleged violations of the ADEA, which the court

will next address. 

B. Individual Liability

Liberally construing this pro se complaint, it can be read as

asserting claims against defendant Watterson, the High School

principal and plaintiffs’ immediate supervisor, in both her

official and individual capacities. Defendant Watterson is

seeking summary judgment on the basis that as an “individual

supervisor[]” she cannot be held liable under that statute. Mot.

(doc. 21) at 12. 

Ms. Watterson’s position is well taken, and the plaintiffs do

not argue to the contrary. To the extent the plaintiffs are

asserting ADEA claims against defendant Watterson in her

individual capacity, she is entitled to summary judgment. See

Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.

1993) (no individual liability under the ADEA). Likewise,

because any ADEA claims against defendant Watterson in her

official capacity merge with those against her employer, the

defendant High School, she is entitled to summary judgment as to

those claims as well. See Daniels v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1140401,

at * 6 (D. Ariz. April 17, 2007) (citations omitted) (dismissing

Title VII claim against defendant employees in their official

capacities “because it merge[d] with Plaintiff’s claims against

his employer”). Thus, the only remaining defendants are the

institutional defendants.

C. ADEA

It is difficult to discern from their complaint the exact

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4 “‘Disparate impact’ claims are those where the identified employment

practices are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but ‘in

effect fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by

business necessity.’” Wagner v. Pacific Maritime Association, 2007 WL 2407093,

at *4 (D.Or. Aug. 21, 2007) (quoting Int’l Broth. Of Teamsters v. United States,

431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 10 (1977)). “The Supreme Court has not clearly addressed

whether plaintiffs may bring disparate impact claims under the ADEA[,] but” the

Ninth Circuit “permits such claims.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Pottenger v.

Potlach Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Defendants discuss disparate impact in their memorandum. The court need

not address this theory of liability, however, because regardless of how

liberally it reads plaintiffs’ complaint, there are no allegations to support a

disparate impact theory of ADEA liability. As defendants accurately note, the

complaint does not allege “facially neutral . . . specific practices that are

allegedly responsible for [an] adverse impact.” See id. (citing Smith v. City

of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005)). Thus, consistent with the allegations in

the complaint, the court will not consider an additional theory of ADEA liability

based upon disparate impact.

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nature of plaintiffs’ ADEA claims. Broadly stated, they appear to

be alleging disparate treatment and constructive discharge. 

The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or

refuse to hire or to discharge any individual [who is at least 40

years old] or otherwise discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 623(a)(1). In general two theories of liability are available

to an ADEA plaintiff: (1) disparate treatment and (2) disparate

impact.4 Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d

802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). “Disparate treatment is demonstrated

when the employer simply treats some people less favorably than

others because of their race, color, religion [or other protected

characteristics].” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). 

“To establish a violation of ADEA under a disparate treatment

theory of liability, [a plaintiff] must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232

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F.3d 1271, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “A disparate treatment age discrimination

claim may be proved by direct, statistical, or circumstantial

evidence that gives rise to an inference of age discrimination.” 

Silva v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1795786, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 20,

2007) (citations omitted). “When a plaintiff alleges disparate

treatment based on direct evidence in an ADEA claim,” there is no

need to “apply the burden-shifting analysis set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 . . . (1973) in

determining whether the evidence is sufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment. Enlow, 389 F.3d at 812. “Direct evidence,

in the context of an ADEA claim, is defined as evidence of

conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-making

process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged

discriminatory attitude . . . sufficient to permit the fact

finder to infer that that attitude was more likely than not a

motivating factor in the employer’s decision.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Here, despite a lengthy record, plaintiff Oshilaja has not

pointed to any direct evidence of conduct or statements by

defendant Watterson or others involved in the decision-making

process “that may be viewed as directly reflecting” age

discrimination against him. See id. No mention is made in his

supporting affidavit of any such evidence. Nor has plaintiff

Oshilaja shown where in his 295 page deposition such evidence can

be found. 

Plaintiff Indermaur is in a similar, although not identical

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position. In her supporting affidavit she avers that an unnamed

defendant, presumably Ms. Watterson, “constantly” called her

“‘Veteran’ . . . instead of calling [plaintiff] by [her] name.” 

Doc. 29 (Aff. of Rebecca Indermaur (March 25, 2007)) at 22. 

Assuming the veracity of this statement, it does not constitute

direct evidence that the decision to require all teachers to

reapply for the 2004-05 academic year was motivated by age,

especially when taken in the context of the record as a whole. 

Given the lack of direct evidence of age discrimination,

plaintiffs must resort to the by now familiar three step burdenshifting analysis under McDonnell Douglas, which applies when an

ADEA plaintiff is relying on circumstantial evidence of

discrimination. Enlow, 389 F.3d at 812. The initial burden

under that framework is one of production; plaintiff must

establish a prima facie case here, of an ADEA violation based

upon disparate treatment. See Silva, 2007 WL 1795786, at *5. “A

mere showing that there was disparate treatment is not

sufficient; rather [plaintiffs] must show that the alleged

disparate treatment was the result of intentional discrimination

based upon [their] protected class characteristics.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

Generally, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must

show that “(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was

performing according to her employer’s legitimate expectations,

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other

employees with qualifications similar to her own were treated

more favorably.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217,

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1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). As will become

apparent, plaintiffs’ evidence is sorely lacking with respect to

nearly all of these factors.

1. Protected Class

There is no dispute that the first element of a prima facie

case is met here. Both plaintiffs were, as the ADEA mandates,

“at least 40 years of age” during the relevant time frame. See

29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (West 1999). Plaintiff Oshilaja was

approximately 49 years old, and plaintiff Indermaur was 64 years

old. Doc. 23, exh. 1 thereto at Parts 5 and 7. 

2. Performance

Although plaintiffs have easily met the first element,

they have not pointed to any evidence to support the second

element of a prima facie case -- that they were “performing”

their jobs “according to [their] employer’s legitimate

expectations[.]” See Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220 (citations

omitted). Their complaint alleges that they were “consistently

superior according to previous evaluations.” Co. (doc. 6-2) at

9, ¶ 32. Even if that is the legal applicable standard, which it

is not, this conclusory allegation in the complaint is

insufficient on a motion for summary judgment. It is

insufficient because plaintiffs are relying upon their pleadings,

rather than “set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

To be sure, the defendants are not asserting that plaintiffs

were not performing to the defendants’ legitimate expectations. 

But that is of no consequence because the moving party need not

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disprove matters, such as this, on which the opponent has the

burden at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323-24 (1986). Conversely, when the “moving party will have the

burden of proof at trial,” as will the plaintiffs on this

particular issue, their “showing must be sufficient for the court

to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than

for the moving party.” In re Feature Realty Litigation, 2007 WL

2703002, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2007) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Clearly, plaintiffs’ proof in the

present case falls far short of that standard. Thus, because

plaintiffs have not made a “showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an essential element” of their ADEA disparate

treatment claim, an element “on which [they will bear the burden

at trial[,]” summary judgment is proper. See id. at 322.

 3. “Adverse Employment Action”

Because plaintiffs have not met their burden as to one of the

four elements of a prima facie case, the court could end its

analysis here. For the sake of completeness, however, and giving

some deference to plaintiffs’ pro se status, the court will

address the remaining two elements -- adverse employment action

and more favorable treatment. 

Plaintiffs did not specifically articulate the adverse

employment action which forms the basis for their ADEA causes of

action. Based upon the complaint, presumably the alleged adverse

employment action took three forms. The first is “involuntary

termination” which from plaintiffs’ standpoint occurred, in large

part, because they were required to reapply for their teaching

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5 Plaintiffs make much of the fact that supposedly had they been

rehired, it would have been at a lower salary. This assertion is baseless.

Plaintiff Oshilaja, as a teacher at the High School for nine years, did have

concerns about his salary if rehired. To alleviate those concerns, he contacted

the human resources representative who assured him that if rehired, he would be

“grandfathered[,]” so that he would continue to make the same salar. Doc. 23,

exh. 1 thereto at 221-224. As plaintiff Oshilaja understood it, defendants had

“no choice but to pay” him the same salary. Id. at 224. Given this concession,

plaintiffs’ attempt to introduce salary as a basis for an ADEA claim is

misplaced.

6 Plaintiff Indermaur readily concedes that she did not reapply.

Therefore, in contrast to plaintiff Oshilaja, she cannot claim an adverse

employment based upon failure to rehire. See Silva, 2007 WL 1795786, at *9

(unable to find adverse employment action based upon failure to promote where

plaintiff did not apply for promotion)(citing Pejic v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc.

840 F.l3d 67, 673 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

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positions for the 2004-2005 academic year. See Co. (doc. 6-2) at

8, ¶ 26. According to their complaint, plaintiffs “inferred”

from this requirement “that [they] were all fired[.]” Id. 

Plaintiffs further “inferred” from this requirement that “if 

. . . rehired, it would be at a lower salary scale.”5 Id.

Second, in the case of plaintiff Oshilaja, the alleged adverse

employment action arises from the fact that he was not rehired

despite reapplying.6 The third alleged adverse employment action

is plaintiffs’ “reassignment to menial duties[.]” Id. at 7. For

the reasons set forth below, with the possible exception of not

rehiring plaintiff Oshilaja, the court finds that none of these

allegations support a finding of adverse employment action.

a. Re-application Requirement

Generally the Ninth Circuit takes an “expansive view of the

types of actions that can be considered adverse employment

actions.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing cases). That “expansive view” is not without limits

however. The following undisputed facts persuade the court that

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requiring plaintiffs to reapply for their teaching positions for

the 2004-2005 academic year did not amount to an adverse

employment action so as to support a prima facie case of

disparate treatment based on age. First of all, the court must

view the re-application requirement in context. It occurred

during a transition period for the High School, when the School

was changing. The decision to require plaintiffs, as well as

all other current teachers, to reapply is consistent with that

restructuring. 

Second, and more significant, as plaintiffs repeatedly

acknowledged, is the fact that all of the teachers had to

reapply, regardless of age. For example, plaintiff Indermaur

testified that all teachers were “encouraged . . . to

reapply[.]” Doc. 23, exh. 2 thereto at 244. Not only that,

plaintiffs were employed on a year-to-year contractual basis. In

light of the foregoing, even assuming arguendo the existence of

the other prima facie elements, the court is hard pressed to find

that plaintiffs sustained an adverse employment action when they,

like all other faculty members, were required to reapply to be

considered for a position for the next academic year. 

b. “Involuntary Termination”

Plaintiffs fare no better with their involuntary termination

argument. Termination is a form of adverse employment action. 

See Hedenburg v. Aramark American Food Services, Inc., 476

F.Supp.2d 1199, 1207 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (“She was terminated and

thus suffered an adverse employment action, in satisfaction of

the third element.”) Here, the uncontroverted facts do not

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support a finding of involuntary termination though. 

During her deposition, plaintiff Indermaur was questioned quite

closely as to plaintiffs’ allegations that they were terminated. 

Plaintiff Indermaur admitted that she was “never . . . terminated

by anybody, . . . from [her] job at the high school[.]” Doc. 23,

exh. 2 thereto at 249. She further admitted that defendant

Watterson “did not fire” her or plaintiff Oshilaja. Id. at 251. 

Plaintiff Indermaur continued, “She [defendant Watterson] did not

willfully terminate us according to our contract. She did that

correctly.” Id. This testimony is consistent with the nature of

plaintiffs’ employment contracts; they were annual, for one

academic year. Plaintiff Oshilaja similarly testified,

acknowledging that he was never informed in writing or verbally

that he was terminated. Id., exh. 1 thereto at 225. 

Further, as noted earlier, plaintiffs are seeking to have this

court “infer” that they were involuntarily terminated in light of

the re-application requirement. This argument ignores a

fundamental principle of summary judgment. At this stage, the

court “need not draw all possible inferences in [plaintiffs’]

favor, but only all reasonable ones.” Villiarim v. Aloha Island

Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 n.10 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted) (emphasis in original). On this record where, inter

alia, all teachers were required to reapply regardless of age,

involuntary termination is not a reasonable inference; it is an

unreasonable inference. Thus, the court finds, as plaintiffs’

own testimony demonstrates, that there is no factual basis for a

finding of involuntary termination. In turn, there can be no

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7 Moreover, even if plaintiff Oshilaja had established a prima facie

case in this regard, defendants have met their burden under the by now familiar

framework of McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, of “articulating a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for [their] alleged discriminatory conduct.” See

Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003). In this

case that reason was plaintiff’s low score during the interview process relative

to the other candidates. What is more, plaintiff Oshilaja has not, as is his

burden at this juncture, shown that defendants’ reason for not rehiring him was

pretextual. See id. Plaintiff Oshilaja could have met that burden in one of two

ways. He could have shown “pretext directly, by showing that discrimination more

likely motivated [defendants], or indirectly, by showing that [defendants’]

explanation is unworthy of credence.” See id. He did neither. 

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adverse employment action in this regard. 

c. Failure to Rehire

Failure to rehire, under some circumstances, can constitute an

adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

804 (failure to rehire sufficient consideration of adverse

employment action). In the present case, however, because

plaintiff Oshilaja is unable to satisfy all four criteria

necessary to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, this

failure to rehire is not sufficient to withstand defendants’

summary judgment motion.7

d. “Assignment to Menial Duties”

As noted earlier, plaintiffs allege that they were assigned to

“menial duties” consisting of teaching subjects outside of math

and science “due to a shortage of staff[.]” Co. (doc. 6-2) at 7,

¶ 23. Even if this amounts to an “adverse employment action,” it

cannot be the basis of any ADEA claims herein because during

their depositions plaintiffs essentially abandoned this theory. 

They did so by agreeing that this reassignment was not menial,

and further conceding that they did not have to engage in what

are undisputably menial (but necessary) tasks, such as scrubbing

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toilets or cleaning scrubbing sinks. Doc. 23, exh. 1 thereto at

185-86; and exh. 2 thereto at 235-36. Moreover, plaintiffs’

depositions reveal that they were not singled out for this

reassignment based upon their age or for any other reason. 

“[A]ll of the four math/science teacher[s] remaining” were

reassigned in this way. Id., exh. 1 thereto at 189 and 190; and

exh. 2 thereto at 232-33. Indeed, as alleged in their complaint,

and as they testified to during their depositions, this

reassignment was necessitated by a staffing shortage. Id. Thus,

this supposed assignment to menial duties cannot form the basis

of a finding of adverse employment action necessary to support a

prima facie case under the ADEA.

4. More Favorable Treatment

Evidence of the fourth element of a prima facie case, that

“employees with qualifications similar to [plaintiffs] were

treated more favorably[,]” is wholly lacking here. See Godwin,

150 F.3d at 1220. Plaintiffs refer to one teacher by name, 

Amanda Patrie, whom they claim was unqualified and to whom

supposedly “favoritism” was shown. See Doc. 29 (Aff. Of Shelley

Schauberger (March 16, 2007)) at 7; see also Resp. (doc. 24) at

8, 15 and 19. Plaintiffs also broadly state, with no cites to

the record, “[i]n 2004 [they] were replaced by two younger white

females.” Resp. (doc. 24) at 12. These references fall far

short of the proof necessary to show that employees with similar

qualifications to plaintiffs were treated more favorably than

they were. 

Plaintiffs have not shown what their qualifications were, let

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8 This is how plaintiffs frequently describe themselves and “other

senior staff that had been with [the] high school before the defendant

[Watterson] became principal.” Co. (doc. 6-2) at 3-11.

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alone what they were in comparison to others, such as Ms. Patrie. 

Moreover, the evidence shows that Ms. Patrie was a language arts

teacher, and plaintiffs were both math and science teachers. 

Doc. 29 (Schauberger Aff.) at 5. Hence, on this basis alone

there can be no finding that Ms. Patrie and plaintiffs had

“similar qualifications.” What is more, plaintiffs have not

indicated where in the record it shows Ms. Patrie’s age. 

“Younger” and “older”8 are relative terms. Assuming Ms. Patrie 

and plaintiffs were similarly qualified, plaintiffs have not

pointed to any concrete evidence of Ms. Patrie’s age. Another

critical weakness in this proof is that despite what plaintiffs

would like this court to infer, Ms. Patrie was not hired as their

replacement. She was hired while both plaintiffs were still

employed at the High School. See id. Thus, as with the second

element of a prima facie, plaintiffs also have not met their

burden on this fourth element. 

 The court is keenly aware that “on summary judgment, [t]he

requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie

case . . . is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level

of a preponderance of the evidence[.]” Metoyer v. Chassman, 2007

WL 2781909, at *7 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); see also Nidds, 113 F.3d at 917 (citations

omitted) (“[V]ery little” evidence “is required[] in order to

show a prima facie case of discrimination.”) A summary of

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9 This holding obviates the need for the court to proceed to the next

step of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis. 

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plaintiffs’ evidence herein quickly shows, however, that they

have not met even this minimal threshold of proof. The only

element which clearly they have met is the first; plaintiffs are

within the protected class under the ADEA. There is a complete

absence of proof as to the second element, their job performance. 

Likewise, there is no proof as to the fourth element, that

employees with similar qualifications to plaintiffs were treated

more favorably. Finally, of the three types of alleged adverse

employment action, only one is arguably supported by this record

and that is the fact that defendants did not rehire plaintiff

Oshilaja. Of course, without proof of each of the other three

elements of a prima facie case, that failure to rehire does not

allow Mr. Oshilaja to survive defendants’ summary judgment

motion. In short, at nearly every step of the prima facie

analysis, plaintiff’ evidence is legally insufficient for one

reason or another. Accordingly, because plaintiffs have failed

to meet their initial burden of establishing a prima facie case

of discrimination, their cross-motion for summary judgment as to

the ADEA disparate treatment claims is denied, and defendants’

motion for summary judgment is granted.9 

B. Constructive Discharge

As previously noted, plaintiffs specifically allege in

their complaint constructive discharge in violation of the ADEA. 

Plaintiffs misconceive the nature of a constructive discharge

claim however. The underlying factual predicate for such a claim

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is an employee’s decision to resign. See Poland v. Chertoff, 494

F.3d 1144, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Penn. State Police v.

Suders, 524 U.S. 129, 141 (2004))(emphasis added) (“‘Under the

constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s reasonable

decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is

assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes. The

inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so

intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position

would have felt compelled to resign?’”); see also Hardage v. CBS

Broad., Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis

added), as amended by, 433 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2006), 436 F.3d 1050

(“[T]o survive summary judgment on a constructive discharge

claim, a plaintiff must show there are triable issues of fact as

to whether a reasonable person in [his] position would have felt

that [he] was forced to quit because of intolerable and

discriminatory working conditions.”) In fact, in Poland, one of

the reasons the Ninth Circuit gave for reversing the district

court’s finding of constructive discharge was the fact that

plaintiff “never testified that he felt compelled or forced to

resign[.]” Poland, 494 F.3d at 1186. “Instead, [plaintiff]

testified that he decided to take early retirement[.]” Id.

Likewise, that factual predicate is missing here. There is no

evidence that either plaintiff resigned or was forced to quit. 

Rather, plaintiffs’ employment ended when their annual contracts

did, in May, 2004. When explaining the circumstances under which

she left her employment with the High School, plaintiff Indermaur

frankly explained that her “contract came to an end[.]” Doc. 23,

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exh. 2 thereto at 66. Even an extremely generous interpretation

of the constructive discharge doctrine does not, as plaintiffs

suggest, encompass a situation such as this where they were

required to reapply for a job after the expiration of their

annual contracts. 

The Ninth Circuit recently stated, albeit in a slightly

different context, that it “set[s] the bar high for a claim of

constructive discharge[.]” Poland, 494 F.3d at 1184. The

underlying rationale for that is that “federal antidiscrimination

policies are better served within their existing employment

relationship, rather than when the employee walks away and then

later litigates whether his employment situation was

intolerable.” Id. (footnote and citations omitted). In any

event, returning to the applicable summary judgment standard,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,

based on this record the court “cannot see how a reasonable trier

of fact could find that [plaintiffs] w[ere] “driven from the

workplace[]” so as to support a claim for constructive discharge. 

See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir.

2000). Thus, as with their disparate treatment claims, because

plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof, the court must

deny their cross-motion for summary judgment as to this ADEA

claim as well. On the other hand, defendants’s summary judgment

motion on this claim is granted. 

. . .

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10 After a discussion of the merits, almost as an afterthought the

institutional defendants assert, without any support or argument, that they “are

[not] jural entities capable of being sued.” Mot. (Doc. 21) at 13 (citation

omitted). There is no way to discern whether defendants are asserting Eleventh

Amendment immunity, or whether they are making some other related argument. The

court declines to speculate as to this nature of this argument which was not

briefed at all. 

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V. Supplemental State Law Claims10

For the reasons discussed above, defendants are entitled to

summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ federal law based

causes of action. The court therefore declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law

claims for defamation and for violation of A.R.S. § 38-531,

Arizona’s “Whistle blower” Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see

also Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.

1997)(quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. V. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350

n. 7 (1988)) (“The Supreme Court has stated and we have often

repeated that ‘in the usual case in which all federal law claims

are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will

point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the

remaining state-law claims.’”) 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 21) is

GRANTED; and 

(2) plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment (docs. 24 and

25) is DENIED.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor

of defendants Ms. Yvonne Watterson, Gateway Community High

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School, Gateway Community College, and the Maricopa County

Community College District; and to terminate this action.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2007.

Copies to plaintiffs pro se and counsel of record

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