Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06121/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06121-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE COMMITTEE CONCERNING CASE NO. CV-F-04-6121 LJO DLB

COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT, et al,

Plaintiffs, AMENDED ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY

 vs. ADJUDICATION ON SEWERS

CITY OF MODESTO, et al,

Defendants.

 /

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief by plaintiffs seeking to “end the severe

harm to their health, safety and dignity caused by Defendants’ unlawful discrimination based on race,

ethnicity, color, ancestry, or national origin.” Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) ¶ 1. Plaintiffs are

individual residents of predominantly Latino neighborhoods in unincorporated areas of Stanislaus

County and two community groups representing their interests–the Committee Concerning Community

Improvement and South United Neighbors. Defendants are the City of Modesto (“City” or “Modesto”),

the County of Stanislaus (“County”) and the Stanislaus County Sheriff (“Sheriff”). In this motion, the

City seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that the City has deprived them of sewer services in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1962 th

(42 U.S.C.§ 200d), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. For the following reasons,

the City’s motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

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A sphere of influence is defined as "a plan for the probable physical boundaries and service area of a local agency." 1

Placer County Local Agency Formation Com'n v. Nevada County Local Agency Formation Com'n, 135 Cal.App.4th 793,

806,(Cal.App. 3 Dist.,2006), citing Govt. Code 56076. "A sphere of influence is a flexible planning and study tool to be

reviewed and amended periodically as appropriate." City of Agoura Hills v. Local Agency Formation Com., 198 Cal.App.3d

480, 490 (1988). 

Defendant City of Modesto (“City”) contends that nine unincorporated islands, rather than ten, are majority white.

2

The dispute is over an island named “Scenic Claus.” This dispute is immaterial to the instant claim. 

 As indicated above, the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) further alleges other violations not pertinent to the 3

instant motion.

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II. BACKGROUND

The Stanislaus County Local Agency Formation Commission (“LAFCO”) approved a sphere of

influence for the City of Modesto in 1984. Modesto’s sphere of influence (“SOI”) consists of 26 1

unincorporated County islands partly or wholly surrounded by City incorporated territory and other

unincorporated areas. The SOI contains 28,451 people, 55% of whom are Latino. (SOI demographics,

Mc.D. Decl., Ex. D). Of the 26 unincorporated islands, ten are majority white and the rest are either 2

majority or equal Latino or minority. (Galvez Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, Ex.A). As of the 2000 census, the 26

unincorporated County islands were 61.5% Latino. (Mc.D. Decl. ¶ 24, Ex. W) The individual Plaintiffs

reside in four unincorporated County islands within the City’s SOI, formally and informally known as

“Bret Harte,” “Rouse-Colorado” (also known as “the Garden”), “Hatch-Midway” (also known as “No

Man’s Land”) and “Robertson Road.”

Plaintiffs allege that these Latino neighborhoods receive fewer and poorer public services than

other neighborhoods in Modesto with predominantly white populations. The complaint alleges that

because of discriminatory practices, Plaintiffs’ neighborhoods lack sidewalks and street lights (TAC ¶38-

41), lack effective law enforcement (TAC ¶¶42-43), lack bilingual services (TAC ¶¶44-45), have

inadequate storm drainage and sewage disposal (TAC ¶¶46-50),and are used as dumping grounds (TAC

¶¶51-52). 

The Third Amended Complaint, filed on February 16, 2007, alleges the City violated plaintiff’s

rights by : 3

(1) denial of Equal Protection and Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. §1983) based

on Defendants’ denial of services that are available to others in the City

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in a way that intentionally discriminates against Plaintiffs on the basis of

race, ethnicity etc. (¶70); 

(2) violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. §

2000d and 42 U.S.C. §1983 based on the City of federal funds in

providing services in a discriminatory manner (¶74);

(3) violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act,

Govt.Code §12955(l) based on Defendants’ use of public land use

practices in providing pubic services (¶77); and

(4) violation of California Govt Code §11135 and 22 CFR §98000-98413

based on Defendants’ use of State funds in providing services in a

discriminatory manner (¶80-81)

A. Measure A, Measure M advisory votes and Measure M Policy

In 1979, City voters passed a citizens initiative known as the Modesto Citizens Advisory Growth

Management Act or “Measure A.” This initiative prohibited the City Council from authorizing any

sewer trunk extensions to unincorporated territory without first holding an advisory election. (Britton

Decl., ¶3 Ex. A). In 1997, City voters passed another citizens’ initiative known as the Modesto Citizens

Advisory Growth Management Act of 1995 or “Measure M.” This initiative extended the requirement

of an advisory election to all sewer improvements in unincorporated areas. Measure M’s stated purpose

is “to ensure the voters have a direct voice in City decisions concerning whether to allow expansion of

urban development.” (Brosnahan Decl. Ex. WW). Measure M exempted developments previously

subject to a Measure A election from the advisory vote requirement. It also exempted existing sewer

facilities, sewer improvements to serve not more than 5 dwelling units or less than 5 acres, and

developments consisting solely of non-residential uses. Id. In 1998, the City Council approved

a resolution adopting a policy to implement Measure M. (Modesto City Council Resolution No. 98-

411). According to the “Policy to Implement the Modesto Citizens’ Advisory Growth Management Act

of 1995 (Measure M) (“Measure M Policy”) adopted by the City Council in 1998, “Before the City

Council approves, authorizes, or appropriates funds for sewer improvements to any development

project...an advisory election shall be held at the City’s sole discretion, as provided for in Measure M.”

(Brosnahan Decl., Ex. WW). The Measure M Policy further contains the following requirements before

the City will, in its discretion, hold an advisory election:

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The term “substantial” is not defined in the policy and is left to the “sole discretion” of the City Council (Brosnahan

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Decl., Ex. WW). 

Plaintiffs contend that Measure M Policy’s requirement for an infrastructure agreement applies only to islands, not 5

to unincorporated areas. Johnson Suppl. Report, p.4 (Brosnahan Decl., Ex. S). 

4

The most substantial Infill Areas will not be scheduled until negotiations with the 4

County regarding fiscal issues are complete. There needs to be significant preparation

in advance of scheduling Measure M votes for Infill Areas. A successful Measure M

vote may lead to public expectations that annexation will immediately follow, with

corresponding expectations that existing deficient infrastructure will be upgraded.

Therefore, the fiscal impacts of serving unincorporated areas may vary from area to area,

irrespective of whether the City/County property tax agreement is in effect for those

areas. The impacts of tax increment financing through the Redevelopment Agency

should also be examined.

***

The City will schedule a Comprehensive Measure “M” vote for the most substantial Infill

Areas or logical groupings of such Areas. Since urban services are generally available

or nearby...and the “urban pattern” is fundamentally established, this approach provides

significant time savings toward the ultimate annexation of all Infill Areas.

***

“Infill Areas” which are not “substantial”: The City Council, at its sole discretion, may

determine that certain Infill areas are not “substantial,” and therefore, would not need to

be dependent on negotiations with the County. (Underline in original).

Measure A, Measure M, and the Measure M Policy apply to the City’s entire SOI, including the 26

unincorporated islands. 

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B. Measure M votes authorized

There have been six (6) unincorporated islands partly or wholly surrounded by the City

incorporated territory that have received advisory Measure M votes: Rosemore-Cox, Carpenter-Shaddox,

Emerald Elm, North Briggs, Shackelford, and Robertson Road. 

1. “Insubstantial” infills

In 1999, the City Council deemed two islands to be “insubstantial” and approved them for

Measure M votes without further negotiations with the County–Rosemore-Cox (71% White, 28%

Latino) and Carpenter-Shaddox (68% White, 30% Latino). These two islands were deemed

“insubstantial,” because they were under 75 acres and completely surrounded by the City. In 2001, the

City Council approved Measure M votes on islands that met the criteria of 75 acres or less and

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completely surrounded by the City. After the Measure M vote, the resolution listed only two of the three

eligible islands. These islands were Emerald Elm (59% White, 31% Latino) and North Briggs (72%

Latino). The four islands deemed “insubstantial” have 818 people combined, 58% of whom are Anglo.

The island of Maze-Spencer, the island with the largest number of Latino residents, also fit the

definition of “insubstantial” informally adopted by the City Council, but was not granted a Measure M

vote. Maze-Spencer is 56% Latino and approximately 78% minority in 2000. 

2. Robertson Road and Shackleford

 Public Improvement Agreements were signed with the County prior to Measure M elections for

the Robertson Road, a Plaintiff unincorporated island, and Shackleford, an incorporated island in

Southwest Modesto that is predominantly Latino. The Public Improvement Agreement for Robertson

Road requires the County to complete infrastructure upgrades after the City extends sewer service to

Robertson Road. (Britton Decl., ¶ 25; Mc.D. Decl, Ex. G). Pursuant to the Public Improvement

Agreements, and in its discretion, the City approved a Measure M vote for Robertson Road in November

2003 and Shackleford in November 2004. Both received positive Measure M votes. 

A breakdown of the statistics for the six neighborhoods receiving Measure M votes is below:

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Plaintiffs and Defendants dispute to what extent the City assisted El Vista No. 4. Because El Vista was not an

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island area, was not covered by the County, was not granted monetary assistance by the City for improvements, and provided

for improvements through resident taxation, El Vista No. 4 is sufficiently distinguishable from the Plaintiff neighborhoods.

Therefore, any dispute is immaterial to this motion. 

Statement of Undisputed Facts 9-11. 

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 The Court explains in great detail and rules on the Master Tax Share Agreement in “Order on Defendants’ Motions

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for Summary Judgment or In the Alternative Summary Adjudication” (Doc. 329). 

On a limited basis, the City has a policy of approving individual sewer extensions to residents next to city sewer

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pipes running through unincorporated areas, for those willing to pay for it and who agreed to be annexed on the City’s request.

SUF 12. Numerous residents, including Latinos, in unincorporated areas have obtained individual sewer extensions, including

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C. Pelandale-McHenry CPD and EL Vista No. 4

El Vista No. 4, a non-island area (which did not receive County funding) sought sewer service

from Modesto in 1986, before Measure M was in place. The City offered to arrange financing for sewer

improvements required by individual landowners and excepted the neighborhood from other

infrastructure requirements. Ultimately, an improvement district was created that taxed residents for 6

infrastructure. Second Osner Decl. ¶ 5. Thus, the residents of El Vista No. 4 funded the improvements

themselves through this tax scheme. El Vista No. 4 was only 17% Latino as of the 1990 Census. 

Pelandale-McHenry CPD contained a large mobile home community that was on septic tanks

in 1999. Pelandale-McHenry CPD was approximately 95% White in 1999. The City held a Measure

M vote for the Pelandale-McHenry CPD in 1999 without an infrastructure condition, as described more

fully below. Pelandale-McHenry is not an island community.

D. Plaintiff Neighborhoods

The four neighborhoods in which Plaintiffs reside were residential developments originally built

in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1980, the four neighborhoods were majorityAnglo. By 1990, Bret Harte and

Hatch-Midway were majority Latino, while Robertson Road and Rouse-Colorado were still majority

Anglo. In the census of 2000, all neighborhoods were majority Latino. Of the four neighborhoods in

which Plaintiffs reside: (1) Bret Harte has sewer ; (2) Robertson Road was approved for sewer; (3) 7

Rouse-Colorado is covered by the Master Tax Sharing Agreement (“MTSA) ; and (4) no property tax 8

sharing agreement exists regarding Hatch-Midway. Two plaintiffs residing in Rouse-Colorado–David

Cano and Salvador Martinez Gutierrez–have access to the City’s sewer system. 

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residents of the plaintiff Latino unincorporated neighborhoods, including Plaintiffs Cano and Guitierrez. City also argues

that those Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a sewer claim. The Court does not reach the merits of that motion, having decided

this question on substantive grounds. 

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Septic systems in Rouse-Colorado and Hatch-Midway are failing, causing untreated sewage to

be released into the groundwater or to the surface due to population density, soil condition, and the age

of the septic systems in these neighborhoods. The County has stated that installing sewer in

neighborhoods such as Rouse-Colorado and Hatch-Midway is the County’s most important

infrastructure need. 

D. The City’s “Infrastructure Condition” and the County Policy/Implementation

For some of the unincorporated islands, the City has imposed a precondition on a Measure M

vote. For these areas, the City will not allow a Measure M vote unless the County agrees to install all

non-sewer infrastructure, including storm drains, curbs and gutters, sidewalks, street lighting, and streets,

to City standards (“infrastructure condition”). (Brosnahan Decl., Ex. J). The infrastructure condition

was applied to the Shackleford (78% Latino, 2000) and Robertson Road (70% Latino, 2000)

neighborhoods. 

As applied to the Shackelford Redevelopment Area, which includes Hatch-Midway, the County

considered installation of sewer and above-ground infrastructure for the entire area. The County

ultimately determined that it could not afford to complete all of the infrastructure needs of the entire

area. Due to these restraints, the County postponed the installation of sewer in Hatch-Midway and opted

instead to install sewer and above-ground infrastructure in the portion of Shackleford north of Hatch

Road. Thus, Hatch-Midway did not receive any above-ground or under-ground improvements, including

sewer. That agreement further requires “[a]s near as possible after completion of sewer improvement

in [Robertson Road], COUNTY shall improve all existing public improvements, or construct new public

improvements, to fully comply with all requirements of the Modesto Municipal Code and all current City

standards.” (Bros. Decl, Ex. H). 

As applied to Robertson Road, the County did not have the funds needed to build full

infrastructure for both above- and underground improvements when the Measure M vote was taken in

2003. The City made a qualified exception to the infrastructure condition for Robertson Road in 2004,

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28 For a more detailed procedural history, see MTSA Order. 

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because of the severity of the public health crisis in Robertson Road. Accordingly, the City and the

County entered into a Public Improvement Agreement that required the County to proceed only with

sewer infrastructure in 2004. 

In March 2004, the County adopted a policy calling for the construction of underground

improvements throughout the County before any neighborhood will get underground improvements.

(Brosnahan Decl., Ex. L). In contradiction to the City’s infrastructure requirement for these

neighborhoods, the County favors a phased approach that addresses the more urgent needs of sewer and

drainage first, postponing construction of above-ground infrastructure Sewer Provision.

D. Procedural History

On April 6, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). By stipulation,

Plaintiffs withdrew the FAC and filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on May 24, 2005. The

SAC does not contain a Fair Housing Act claim, a discriminatory annexation claim, or a claim that the

City is obligated to provide the same services to unincorporated areas that it provides to incorporated

areas. Plaintiffs’ remaining claims were framed as discrimination in the provision of voluntary municipal

services in White unincorporated areas compared to Latino unincorporated areas. The parties

subsequently entered into an Agreement (“the Agreement”) on August 31, 2005, limiting Plaintiffs’ case

to three services voluntarily provided to unincorporated areas sewers, police service and bilingual

assistance in police service. 

Thereafter, Plaintiffs sought leave to file a Third Amended complaint, to among other things,

clarify failure to provide municipal services in a non-discriminatory manner, including through the

addition of details concerning the City’s implementation of its “Measure M” policy, the City and

County’s failure to provide infrastructure in the Plaintiff Neighborhoods, and the role played by the

exclusion of the Plaintiff Neighborhoods from the “Master Tax Sharing Agreement.” The Honorable

Dennis L. Beck permitted the filing of the Third Amended Complaint to make these allegations.

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///

///

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

On summary judgment, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material

fact.” F.R.Civ.P. 56( c);see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Poller v. Columbia

Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 (9 Cir. 1985); th

Loeh v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9 Cir. 1984). The criteria of th

“genuineness” and “materiality” are distinct requirements. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). The requirement that an issue be “genuine” relates to the quantum of evidence the

plaintiff must produce to defeat the defendant’s summary judgment motion. There must be sufficient

evidence “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. 

“As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial,” and in such circumstances, summary judgment

should be granted “so long as whatever is before the . . . court demonstrates that the standard for entry

of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56 ©, is satisfied.” Celotex Corp. v. Catarett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). “If the party moving for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying for the

court those portions of the material on file that it believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine

issues of material fact,” the burden of production shifts and the nonmoving party must set forth “specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987)(quoting F.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). th

To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material

issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to

require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First National Bank

of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968) T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. The opposing

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.

. . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted). The

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opposing party’s evidence is to be believed and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255;

Matasushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

B. Equal Protection Clause and Civil Rights

Plaintiffs filed a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983"), alleging a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a

private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate federal

constitutional or statutory rights.” Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 943 (9

th

Cir. 2004). “The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the

prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,

239, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). 

 To state a viable Equal Protection claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must show that the

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership

in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.2001) (citations omitted).

Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 188, 194, 123

S.Ct. 1389, 1394 (2003). Thus, proof of discriminatory intent is required to show that state action

having a disparate impact violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Village of Arlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). 

Plaintiffs point to three categories of evidence which they contend establishes a prima facie claim

intentional discrimination based on race. First, Plaintiffs contend that the City’s imposition of the

infrastructure condition as a prerequisite to a Measure M vote is discriminatory as applied, because the

City only imposes the condition on Latinos. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the history of prior Measure

M votes give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination against Latinos. Plaintiffs contend that

the evidence that the City imposed the infrastructure condition on predominately Latino neighborhoods

like Robertson Road and Shackleford, but not predominatelyWhite neighborhoods like Rosemore-Cox,

Carpenter-Shaddox, Emerald-Elm, Grecian-McHenry and Pelandale-McHenry, gives rise to an inference

of discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs further contend that the City cites statistics from the 1990 census to

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argue that at the time of Measure M policy was adopted in 1998, the 26 county islands were not majority

Latino and therefore Measure M did not become discriminatory because the “demographics changed.”

Third, Plaintiffs argue that the census statistic from 1990 and 2000, confirm that the composition of the

islands at the time Measure M was adopted in 1998 is, at the very least, an unresolved material question

of fact that would preclude granting summary judgment. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the City has

unbridled discretion to impose the infrastructure condition. The infrastructure condition was imposed

on Shackleford in 2003, 78% Latino and was imposed on Robertson Road in 2003 when the composition

of the neighborhood was 70% Latino. Based on these assertions, Plaintiffs argue that they have

established a prima facie case for a violation of equal protection and the City has not cited case law to

support its claim that, as a matter of law, discriminatory intent can not be inferred where the

discrimination at issue affects an area that is less than 50% minority at the time the action is taken.

In its motion for summary judgment, the City contends that three facts prove that Plaintiffs can

not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race. First, the City provides sewer service

or has approved sewer service to only 3 of the 26 unincorporated islands wholly or partly surrounded

by the City. SUF 9-11, 32-33. All three of those islands are predominantly Latino. The population of

these islands is 76% Latino. By contrast, the City does not provide sewer services to any predominantly

Anglo unincorporated islands or areas. SUF 8. Second, the combined population of the six islands

receiving Measure M votes is 67% Latino and 74% minority. SUF 35. Third, while Modesto’s SOI is

55% Latino as a whole, the portion of the SOI that has sewer or has received an advisory vote is 61%

Latino, while the portion of the SOIthat does not have sewer or has not received an advisory vote is only

49% Latino. Thus, the City concludes, its sewer and sewer access favors Latino unincorporated

neighborhoods. 

The City further argues that Plaintiffs’ sewer claims are quite limited. Two of the four plaintiff

neighborhoods already have or are approved for sewer. The only named plaintiffs in the RouseColorado island are already connected to City sewer. Thus, Plaintiffs’ sewer claim is limited to one

unincorporated County island: Hatch-Midway. Finally, the City argues that the sewer claims are barred

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28 This Court has twice considered the issue of statute of limitations. See MTSA Order, pp. 20-24. 

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by the statute of limitations. 

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Plaintiffs seek to prove the invidious discriminatory intent element of a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause claim through disparate impact. “Where the challenged governmental policy is

‘facially’ neutral,’ proof of its disproportionate impact on an identifiable group can satisfy the intent

requirement only if it tends to show that some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy.”

Lee, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (citing Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252, 264-66) (citing Washington

v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242). “[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the

totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race

than another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243. “But our cases have not embraced the

proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory

purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”) (emphasis in

original). Id. at 239. The impact of the official action whether it “bears more heavily on one race than

another,” may provide an important starting point in the analysis. Village of Arlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. at 264-265, 266.

It is undisputed that Rouse-Colorado and Hatch-Midway need sewers. The existing septic tanks

are failing and untreated sewage is backed up. The County acknowledges that installing sewer in these

neighborhoods is the County’s most important infrastructure need. Further, the infrastructure condition

imposed by the City is an impediment or “road block” to the County’s efforts to provide sewer service.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the City has intentionally discriminated against

them on the basis of race by imposing the infrastructure condition. While Plaintiffs argue that the City

has “only” applied the infrastructure condition on Latino islands, the evidence shows Shackleford and

Robertson Road were the only “substantial” unincorporated county islands to be considered for a

Measure M vote. The other neighborhoods cited by the Plaintiffs are either not unincorporated islands,

determined to be “insubstantial” because of their size, or were annexed before Measure M took affect.

Therefore, these neighborhoods, and the City’s treatment of these neighborhoods is distinguishable from

the Plaintiff unincorporated County islands. 

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28 These statements were also considered in a previous order of this Court. See MTSA Order, pp. 19-20. 

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 The City admits that Shackleford and Robertson Road, both predominantly Latino, have been

subject to the infrastructure condition. However, the evidence also shows that “No Anglo islands have

sewer or been the subject of infrastructure agreements to fund sewer infrastructure.” (City Mem at 10:6-

7.) Statistically, the combined population of the six island receiving Measure M votes is 67% Latino

and 74% minority. 

The history of Measure M votes and its application do not prove discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs

argue that the vote in 2001exempting “insubstantial” unincorporated areas from the infrastructure

condition proves disparate impact; however, the 2001 vote benefitted the predominantly-Latino

neighborhood of Briggs. Rosemore-Cox, Carpenter-Shaddox, and Emerald-Elm were exempted from

the infrastructure condition, not because these neighborhoods were predominantly Anglo, but because

they were 75 acres or less. While it is undisputed that the predominantly-Latino island of Maze-Spencer

was excluded, the reason for that exclusion is in dispute. What is clear, however, is that because the

predominantly Latino neighborhood of Briggs was benefitted by that action in 2001, without more,

Plaintiffs can not prove the type of invidious discriminatory intent against Latinos necessary to establish

a prima facie case of an Equal Protection Clause violation. Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence that

the City did not impose the infrastructure condition on any “substantial” unincorporated islands that

were predominatelyAnglo after Measure M came into existence or after the Measure M policy. As such,

they have not offered proof of an invidious intent or purpose to discriminate against majority-Latino

unincorporated County islands within the SOI in Modesto.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the comments made by the former mayor show discriminatory intent.

Those statements are broad and it is questionable whether they could properly be considered evidence .

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Also, “[t]he bigoted comments of a few citizens, even those with power, should not invalidate action

which in fact has a legitimate basis.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253.

 In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case for a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the existence and application of the

infrastructure condition as a prerequisite to a Measure M advisory vote. The evidence does not show

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28 Plaintiffs do dispute the materiality, relevance or admissibility of these facts. 13

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the discriminatory intent necessary to sustain such a claim. The majority of Plaintiffs have sewer or have

been approved by the City to obtain sewer benefits. The neighborhood of Bret Harte already has sewer.

 Poignantly, 75% of the Plaintiffs, or 3 out of the 4 Plaintiff neighborhoods can not assert a harm based

on the infrastructure condition. Two were exempted from the condition and the individually-named

Plaintiffs in a third were also granted an exemption by the City. Thus, the experience of Plaintiffs

themselves disproves the claim that Latino neighborhoods are being treated in a discriminatory way. 

Moreover, in determining discrimination, departures from the normal procedural sequence and

the legislative or administrative history are relevant in determining whether official action was taken for

an invidious purpose. Arlington Heights, 429 at 268. The evidence shows that the City has departed

from the practice of imposing the infrastructure condition, to the benefit of Latinos. While the City

originally imposed the infrastructure condition on Robertson Road, ultimately Robertson Road was

approved for sewer services after the City determined that an exemption from the infrastructure

condition was necessary in the interest of public health. The only two Plaintiffs representing RouseColorado also have access to sewer, as provided by the City, because of an exemption made for them

by the City. Furthermore, the exemption for the “insubstantial” neighborhoods in 2001 also included

the predominantly-Latino unincorporated area ofBriggs. Plaintiffs do not dispute or refute these facts.13

Nor do they offer any evidence that a single “substantial” predominantly Anglo island has received any

benefit after Measure M was passed. 

Plaintiffs do live in poor conditions, including failing septic tanks. The County and the City have

put unincorporated County islands in a difficult situation–the County’s policy focuses on sewer repair

before above-ground improvements, while the City’s policy favors an above-ground infrastructure

improvement approach before a Measure M advisory vote on sewers. It is undisputed that the City and

County policy are at odds. It is further undisputed that most of Rouse-Colorado and Hatch-Midway are

in need of new or upgraded sewer systems. Notwithstanding these considerations, the Court does not

find evidence of discrimination based on race. Accordingly, Defendant City’s motion for partial

summary judgment on the Equal Protection relating to the issue of sewers in GRANTED.

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See MTSA Order, p. 20. 

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This Court has already considered and ruled on the application of the California statute of limitations and well as

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Plaintiffs’ Fair and Equal Housing Act (“FEHA”) claim. See MTSA Order. 

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C. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,

color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” As previously

discussed by this Court , the Supreme Court has held that private parties may not invoke Title VI 14

regulations to obtain redress for disparate-impact discrimination because Title VI prohibits only

intentional discrimination. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517

(2001). Because the Court finds no evidence of intentional discrimination in the infrastructure condition

and no invidious denial of sewer on the basis of race, the Plaintiff can not sustain a Title VI claim.

Accordingly, Defendant City’s motion for summary judgment as to sewers on Title VI is GRANTED.

D. California Government Code Section 11135

Plaintiffs’ Count 4 claim alleges a violation of Cal. Gov. Code Section 11135 (“Section 11135").

Section 11135(a) reads:

No person in the State of California shall, on the basis of race, national origin, ethnic

group identification, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, color, or disability, be

unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to

discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered

by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any

financial assistance from the state. 

Plaintiffs rely on a “disparate impact” theory to prove that they have been unlawfully denied full and

equal access to benefits on the basis of race, in violation of Section 11135. Defendants claim that

Plaintiffs have no material evidence of any disparate impact in the City’s voluntary provision of sewer

and sewer access to Latino and white unincorporated areas. Defendants also claim that the state law

claims are time barred under California’sstricter discovery rule . Finally, Defendants ask that the state 15

claims be remanded to state court. 

To prevail on a disparate impact theory, plaintiffs must present a prima facie case, which consists

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In applying the provisions of state claims, California courts often follow decisions construing federal 16

antidiscrimination statutes, as long as those decisions provide appropriate guidance. See Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler

& Marmaro, 35 Cal. App. 4th 620, 635 (1995); Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 56 Cal. App. 4th 138 (Cal. App. 2d

Dist. 1997); Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114 (9 Cir. 2001) . Where state courts have not determined state law, th

federal court must make reasonable interpretation thereof. Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9 Cir. 1985).

th

See also, Keith v. Vole, 858 F.2d 467 (9 Cir. 1988). th

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of “(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or

disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by the [Defendants’] facially neutral

acts or practices.” Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Pfaff v. U.S. th

Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9 Cir. 1996) (cited in Moua, 324 F. Supp.2d. 1132, th

1142). “If plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden of production then 16

shifts to defendants ‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action.’” Moua, 324

F.Supp.2d. 1132, 1142, quoting Harris, 183 F.3d at 1051. “If defendants rebut plaintiffs’ prima facie

case with such a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to at

least raise a genuine factual question as to whether this reason is pretextual.” Id. 

In order to establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must “prove the discriminatory impact at issue;

raising an inference of discriminatory impact is insufficient.” Gamble, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (quoting Pfaff,

88 F.3d at 745). The focus in a disparate impact case is usually "on statistical disparities, rather than

specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &

Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784-85, 101 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1988). “The point of the statistical

evidence is to establish whether Defendant’s specific [] action impacted members of a protect group

more than non-members.” Beale v. GET California, 999 F. Supp. 1312, 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1996).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs may prove causation by offering “statistical evidence of a kind and degree

sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the [plaintiff’ alleged harm] because of their

membership in a protected group.” Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9 Cir. 1990). The th

Ninth Circuit has warned district courts not to base a disparate impact finding on a statistical sample that

is too small. See Shut v. Santas Crop Protection Corp., 944 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9 Cir. 1991), cert. th

denied, 503 U.S. 937, 112 S.Ct. 1477 (1992). The statistical disparities “must be sufficiently substantial

that they raise such an inference of causation.” Rose, 902 F.2d 1417, 1424 (quoting Watson v. Fort

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Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2784-85 (1988). The “significance” or

“substantiality” of numerical disparities is judged on a case by case basis. Id. “A party charged with

discrimination may diffuse a prima facie case against him, and hence avoid the need to supply a legally

sufficient, nondiscriminatory reason in rebuttal, by successfully challenging the statistical basis of the

case.” Pfaff, 88 F.3d 739, 74l.

For the reasons discussed in the previous section, Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie

case under Cal. Gov. Code Section 11135 based on a disparate impact theory. The statistics and proof

offered by Plaintiffs do not establish that majorityLatino unincorporated island are denied equal and full

access to sewers and sewer based on racial discrimination due to the infrastructure condition. The islands

receiving Measure M votes are in total 67% Latino. Further, the City provides sewer service or has

approved sewer service to only 3 of the 26 unincorporated islands wholly or partly surrounded by the

City. All three of those islands are predominantly Latino. The total population of these islands is 76%

Latino. By contrast, no predominantly white substantial unincorporated islands have received sewer

access. Further, the City has diffused the prima facie case. Plaintiff neighborhood Bret Harte has sewer

access. Plaintiff neighborhood Robertson Road was granted a waiver and given access to the full

benefits to sewers. Plaintiffs representing the Rouse-Colorado neighborhood have also been granted a

waiver by the City for sewer access. Accordingly, Defendant City’s motion for summary judgment as

it relates to sewers on Cal. Gov. Code Section 11135 is GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS:

(A) City’s motion for partial summary judgment on Equal Protection Claim relating to

sewers is GRANTED in favor of the City; and

(B) City’s motion for partial summary judgment on Title VI Claim relating to sewers is

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GRANTED in favor of the City; and

(C) City’s motion for partial summary judgment on FEHA claims as they relate to sewers is

GRANTED in favor of the City.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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