Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02010/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02010-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12188 Americans With Disabilities Act - Civil Enforcement Actions

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FILED 

JUN 1 9 2018 

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BY c;. ,'r DEPUTY 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

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11 MICHAEL PALLAMARY, 

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individual, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ELITE SHOW SERVICES, INC., 

a California corporation; CITY OF 

SAN DIEGO, a municipal 

corporation; OFFICER 

ZACHARY DIGIOIA, an 

individual; SERGEANT 

JENNIFER ATWOOD, an 

individual; DETECTIVE JULIE 

ADAMS, an individual; 

QUALCOMM STADIUM 

MEDICAL STAFF 1-3, 

individuals; the CHARGERS 

FOOTBALL COMPANY, LLC, a 

California limited liability 

company; BARBARA JOHNSON, 

an individual; DANIEL 

JOHNSON, an individual; and 

DOES 1 through 30, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

28 HA YES, Judge: 

CaseNo.: 17cv2010-WQH-BGS 

ORDER 

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1 The matters before the Court are the motion to dismiss by Defendants City of San '' 

2 Diego ("Defendant City"), Officer Zachary Digioia, Sergeant Jennifer Atwood, and 

3 Detective Julie Adams (collectively, "the City Defendants") (ECF No. 37); the motion to 

4 strike (ECF No. 44) and motion to dismiss (ECF No. 45) filed by the Chargers Football 

5 Company, LLC ("Defendant Chargers"); and the motion to strike (ECF No. 41) and motion 

6 to dismiss (ECF No. 42) filed by Defendants Elite Show Services, Inc. ("Elite"), Barbara 

7 Johnson, and Daniel Johnson (collectively, "the Elite Defendants"). 

8 I. BACKGROUND 

9 On December 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint ("F AC"), the 

10 operative pleading in this action, against Defendants City of San Diego, Officer Zachary 

11 Digioia, Sergeant Jennifer Atwood, Detective Julie Adams, the Chargers Football 

12 Company, LLC, Barbara Johnson, Daniel Johnson, Elite Show Services, Inc., Qualcomm 

13 Medical Staff 1-31, and doe defendants. (ECF No. 32). 

14 On January 2, 2018, the City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 37). 

15 On March 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 52). On March 15, 

16 2018, the City Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 53). 

17 On January 5, 2018, the Elite Defendants filed a motion to strike and a motion to 

18 dismiss. (ECF Nos. 41, 42). On March 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed responses in opposition. 

19 (ECF Nos. 54, 55). On March 22, 2018, the Elite Defendants filed replies. (ECF Nos. 58, 

20 59). 

21 On January 5, 2018, Defendant Chargers filed a motion to strike and motion to 

22 dismiss. (ECF Nos. 44, 45). On March 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed responses in opposition. 

23 (ECF Nos. 56, 57). On March 22, 2018, Defendant Chargers filed replies. (ECF Nos. 60, 

24 61). 

25 II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

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1 Defendant Qualcomm Medical Staff 1-3 has not yet appeared in this action and Plaintiff has not filed 

any proof of service as to this Defendant. 

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1 Plaintiff Michael Pallamary is a 63 year-old male with Type II diabetes and 

2 numerous other medical conditions and recent surgeries on his legs. (ECF No. 32 at ~~ 

3 14-16). On November 6, 2016, Plaintiff attended a Chargers football game with his wife 

4 and another couple. Id. ~ 18. At the time, Plaintiff was suffering various mobility 

5 impairments and was disabled. Id. ~ 17. Plaintiff's seat during the game was located below 

6 a seating area reserved for "persons with mobility impairments." Id. ~ 19. 

7 "During the first half of the Game, Plaintiff experienced extraordinary pain in his 

8 left leg and uncontrollable spasms." Id. ~ 20. Assisted by an employee of Elite, Plaintiff 

9 "proceeded to the rear wall of the seating marked for persons with mobility [impairments] 

10 where he tried to alleviate his pain and stop the spasms." Id. ~ 21. The Elite employee 

11 "made no objections" to Plaintiff leaning against the rear wall in this area and further 

12 informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff "could sit down in the adjoining seating immediately 

13 adjacent to the location for 'persons with mobility impairments."' Id.~~ 21, 22. Plaintiff 

14 sat down in one of the handicapped seats. Id. After the pain subsided, Plaintiff returned to 

15 his seat. Id. ~ 24. 

16 "During the second half of the Game, Plaintiff experienced another painful, bout of 

17 muscle spasms[.]" Id. ~ 25. "Plaintiff returned to the prior location marked for 'persons 

18 with mobility impairments."' Id.~ 26. Relying upon signage and the prior authorization 

19 by the Elite employee, Plaintiff returned to the area marked for "persons with mobility 

20 impairments" and attempted to stretch his leg to abate the spasms. Id. ~~ 26-27. Although 

21 he was unaware at the time, Plaintiff was "in the midst of a diabetic crisis" in which his 

22 blood pressure was elevated and his blood sugar had risen to 400. Id. ~ 28. Plaintiff sat 

23 down in one of the disabled seats in an attempt to alleviate the pain in his leg and back. Id. 

24 ~ 29. Defendant Barbara Johnson, an Elite employee, approached Plaintiff and asked ifhe 

25 had a ticket for the seat. Id. ~ 30. "Plaintiff explained that his seat was 18 inches away and 

26 that he sat in the otherwise empty mobility impaired patron area to attempt to alleviate his 

27 medical issue as permitted by the sign." Id. Plaintiff explained that he was in extraordinary 

28 pain and "was diabetic in distress." Id. Defendant Barbara Johnson ordered Plaintiff out 

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1 of his seat and refused to listen or look when he stated that he was disabled and offered to 

2 show her paperwork establishing his disabled status. Id. 

3 Plaintiff walked to the rear wall to perform stretches and physician-advised 

4 movements to alleviate his pain. Id. ii 31. Barbara Johnson approached Plaintiff again and 

5 "informed him he could not stand against the wall, located at the place reserved for persons 

6 with mobility impairments." Id. Plaintiff requested to see her supervisor and Barbara 

7 Johnson returned with Defendant Daniel Johnson, another Elite employee. Id. ii 31-32. 

8 "Plaintiff explained to Defendant [Daniel Johnson] that Plaintiff was diabetic and in 

9 extraordinary pain due to a number of medical problems" and that a prior Elite employee 

10 "had previously given him consent and authorization to be in the area for persons with 

11 mobility impairments." Id. ii 33. Daniel Johnson was unsympathetic and informed 

12 Plaintiff that he could not stand against the back wall in the area. Id. ii 34. During this 

13 conversation, Barbara Johnson "verbally assault[ed]" Plaintiff which caused him great 

14 stress and worsened his diabetic-related medical problems. Id. 

15 Defendants Officer Zachary Digioia and Detective Julie Adams, officers of the San 

16 Diego Police Department, next arrived at the scene. Plaintiff explained his condition to the 

17 Adams and Digioia. Adams asked if Plaintiff needed a paramedic and Plaintiff responded 

18 that he did not think so. Id. ii 35. Digioia "informed Plaintiff he could not sit or stand 

19 anywhere except his seat, located thirteen inches away." Id. ii 36. During this 

20 conversation, Barbara Johnson continued to interrupt the conversation "in a belligerent 

21 manner" and tried to "agitate and provoke" Plaintiff, Adams, and Digioia. Id. ii 37. 

22 Barbara Johnson "went to extraordinary efforts to badger, harass, and vex Plaintiff, despite 

23 his repeated pleas for her to stop." Id. ii 38. 

24 The paramedics were called to the scene and spoke with Plaintiff but "did not feel 

25 Plaintiff needed immediate care[.]" Id. ii 40. They advise that Plaintiff should call them if 

26 he needed additional care. Id. "Shortly after the paramedics left, Plaintiff felt light-headed 

27 and unstable. He returned to the disabled seat and tried to relax." Id. ii 41. Plaintiff later 

28 learned that he was experiencing hypoglycemia at the time and that his blood sugar was 

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dangerously elevated. Id. Defendant Adams and Defendant Barbara Johnson agam 

informed Plaintiff that he had to leave the area and that they were going to escort him out. 

Id. iJ 45. 

"Plaintiff feared that he would be assaulted by [Defendant Adams] if he did 

not move as ordered. Plaintiff stood up, under protest, and followed the police 

officers to the exterior ring of the stadium. During this walk, Plaintiff 

reiterated ... his medical conditions. The POLICE and the staff of Defendant 

ELITE SHOW SERVICES forcibly escorted Plaintiff from the area, all the 

while attempting to goad Plaintiff into physical action." 

9 Id. iJ 47. "Plaintiff was told by [Defendant Adams] to stand against the wall, and was 

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ordered to remain there. Plaintiff was not free to leave, and was thereby under arrest." Id. 

iJ 48. "Plaintiffs condition continued to worsen and Plaintiff explained that he needed to 

lay down as he was afraid he would collapse." Id. iJ 49. Defendants Barbara Johnson, 

Digioia, Adams, Atwood, and the staff of Defendant Elite refused to provide Plaintiff with 

care or allow him to move. Defendant Sergeant Jennifer Atwood, an officer of the San 

Diego Police Department, told Plaintiff he could sit on the floor. Defendant Atwood 

informed Plaintiffs wife that he was being detained but did not respond when Plaintiffs 

wife asked if Plaintiff was being arrested. Id. iii! 49-50. Plaintiff informed Defendants 

Digioia, Adams, and Atwood that his condition was worsening and that he needed 

immediate medical help but the defendants "refused to let him leave or lie down." Id. iJ 

51. Defendant Barbara Johnson continued "badgering" and "taunting" Plaintiff. Id. iJ 53. 

Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood observed this mistreatment but failed to 

intervene. Id. Another police officer eventually ordered Defendant Barbara Johnson to 

leave. Id. iJ 54. 

The paramedics arrived and "informed Plaintiff that he should be taken to the 

hospital right away." Id. iii! 56-57. 

Plaintiff consented to the proposed medical evacuation and asked for a 

stretcher on which he could lay down, for fear of fainting or collapsing and 

causing himself further injury. Instead, another individual arrived with a 

wheelchair and Plaintiff stated he was in exceptional pain and needed a bed 

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or stretcher. Unheeding his requests or explanations, Plaintiff was required to 

ride in the rickety wheelchair and then rolled down, bouncing and jarring the 

whole time, half a dozen ramps, to the lower level, further aggravating his 

medical conditions. Rather than evacuate Plaintiff to a hospital, consistent 

with the recommendations of the paramedics and the scope of Plaintiffs 

consent, Defendants brought Plaintiff to a physician employed by the 

Defendants for evaluation. 

Id. if 57. At the Qualcomm medical office, the Qualcomm Medical Staff doctor refused 

Plaintiffs requests for a bed, an ambulance, and pain medication. Id. iii! 58-60. 

"Defendant physician detained Plaintiff without his consent." Id. if 60. 

Plaintiff was wheeled outside where he observed several parked ambulances 

directly in front of them. Plaintiff asked the QUALCOMM MEDICAL 

STAFF doctor pushing him about the ambulances. Plaintiff also started 

filming the encounter, fearful he might pass out. The QUALCOMM 

MEDICAL STAFF doctor swatted at Plaintiff, trying to take his camera, 

placing Plaintiff in fear of an immediate, unconsented physical contact. 

14 Id. if 61. Plaintiff was transported via golf cart to his car and Plaintiff and his wife 

15 "struggled through post-Game traffic" to get Plaintiff to the emergency room. Id. if 61-63. 

16 Plaintiff was hospitalized for three days in serious condition. Id. if 63. 

17 Plaintiff brings the following causes of action: (1) violation of Title II of the 

18 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 ("ADA"); (2) denial of civil rights 

19 under the Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh Act"); (3) violation of the California Disabled 

20 Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54, 54.3; (4) negligence; (5) negligent infliction of 

21 emotional distress; (6) negligent hiring; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) 

22 false imprisonment; (9) false arrest; (10) assault; and (11) battery. Id. at 16-32. 

23 III. LEGAL ST AND ARD 

24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for "failure to state a 

25 claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b )(6). Federal Rule of Civil 

26 Procedure 8(a) provides that "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a 

27 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. 

28 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "All factual allegations set forth in the complaint are 'taken as true and 

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1 construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs."' Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 

2 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

3 Cir. 1996)). "A district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

4 Civil Procedure 12(b )( 6) is proper if there is a 'lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

5 absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory."' Conservation Force 

6 v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep 't, 

7 901F.2d696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

8 "[A] plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief 

9 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

10 cause of action will not do." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting 

11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

12 factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' 

13 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim 

14 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

15 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. 

16 (citation omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations 

17 contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 

18 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." 

19 Id. (citation omitted). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non20 conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly 

21 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. US. Secret Serv., 572 F .3d 

22 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). 

23 IV. MOTION TO DISMISS BY ELITE, BARBARA JOHNSON, AND DANIEL 

24 JOHNSON 

25 A. Age Discrimination Under the Unruh Act 

26 Plaintiff brings the cause of action for a denial of civil rights under the California 

27 Unruh Act against Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson. (ECF No. 32 

28 atl7-18). 

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1 Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson contend that the cause of 

2 action under the Unruh Act should be dismissed with regard to any allegations of age-based 

3 discrimination because the F AC contains no factual allegations of age-based discrimination 

4 by these Defendants. Plaintiff contends that the Unruh Act claim for age discrimination 

5 should remain until discovery can be completed because Plaintiff was 62 years of age at 

6 the time of the incidents in the F AC and Plaintiff "was-and is still-unaware of whether 

7 the Defendants of whom the Elite Defendants conduct business-discriminated against 

8 him based on his disability, his age, or both." (ECF No. 55 at 13). Plaintiff contends that 

9 he will be prejudiced by premature dismissal of this claim prior to any discovery. Id. 

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California's Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, 

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no 

matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, 

medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, 

citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full 

and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 

business establishments of every kind whatsoever. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 5l(b). The protections of the Unruh Act are "not confined to the 

enumerated categories in the statute." Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 P .3d 

1212, 1219 (Cal. 2005). Rather, these enumerated categories are "'illustrative rather than 

restrictive."' Id. (quoting In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1970)). California courts have 

recognized that age discrimination is prohibited by the Unruh Act. Ingels v. Westwood 

One Broad. Servs., Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 933, 946 (Ct. App. 2005); Javorsky v. W. Athletic 

Clubs, Inc., 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 706, 712 (Ct. App. 2015). 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants have harassed and discriminated 

against him on the basis of his age and/or disability in violation of his rights under 

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1 California Civil Code section 51.52 and section 5l(f).3 (ECF No. 32 at ilil 85, 86). The 

2 Court is not required to accept this legal conclusion as true for purposes of a motion to 

3 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff alleges that, at the time 

4 of the incidents included in the F AC, he was 62 years of age. (ECF No. 32 at il 15). 

5 However, the F AC contains no factual allegations to support any inference that any Elite 

6 Defendant discriminated him on the basis of his age. In his opposition to the motion to 

7 dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that he "was-and is still-unaware of whether the 

8 Defendants-of whom the Elite Defendants conduct business-discriminated against him 

9 based on his disability, his age, or both." ECF No. 55 at 13; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

10 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."). 

11 Plaintiff requests that his age discrimination claims be permitted to proceed to the 

12 discovery stage prior to any dismissal "because the facts at issue are within the sole control 

13 of the Defendants." (ECF No. 55 at 13). However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and 

14 the United States Supreme Court have both determined that a plaintiff must satisfy the 

15 pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) before proceeding to 

16 discovery. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 ("Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of 

17 discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions."); Twombly, 550 U.S. 

18 at 559 ("It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, 

19 if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful case 

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2 "No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott or blacklist, or 

refuse to buy from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person in this state on account of any 

characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or ( e) of Section 51, or of the person's partners, members, 

stockholders, directors, officers, managers, superintendents, agents, employees, business associates, 

suppliers, or customers, because the person is perceived to have one or more of those characteristics, or 

because the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those 

characteristics." Cal. Civ. Code§ 51.S(a). 

3 "A violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 

(Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section." Cal. Civ. Code§ 5l(f) (footnote 

omitted). 

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1 management."); Mujica v. AirScan, Inc., 771F.3d580, 593 (9th Cir. 2014) ("The Supreme 

2 Court has stated, however, that plaintiffs must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8 

3 before the discovery stage, not after it."). Plaintiffs claim of age discrimination under the 

4 Unruh Act is speculative and unsupported by factual allegations. The Unruh Act cause of 

5 action is dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel 

6 Johnson to the extent it alleges discrimination on the basis of Plaintiffs age. 

7 B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 

8 Plaintiff brings the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress 

9 against Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson. (ECF No. 32 at 22-23). 

10 Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson contend that negligent infliction 

11 of emotional distress is not an independent tort under California law. Plaintiff contends 

12 that courts have recognized that freedom from negligent infliction of emotional distress is 

13 entitled to independent legal protection and that the F AC alleges sufficient facts to support 

14 the cause of action. 

15 In California, "there is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional 

16 distress." Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 808 (Cal. 1993). "The tort 

17 is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element." Id.; 

18 see also Ragland v. US. Bank Nat. Assn., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41, 61 (Ct. App. 2012). The 

19 Supreme Court of California has allowed recovery for negligent infliction of emotional 

20 distress for "serious emotional distress ... [caused by] a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff 

21 that is 'assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that 

22 arises out of a relationship between the two."' Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P .2d 1197, 

23 1201 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 

24 278, 282 (Cal. 1989)); see also Lawson v. Mgmt. Activities, Inc., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 748 

25 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[I]t is more in keeping with the fact that NIED is not a separate doctrine 

26 to ask: What are the circumstances under which a plaintiff can recover damages for 

27 emotional distress as a matter of the law of negligence?"). 

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1 In this case, Plaintiff pleads a negligence cause of action against all Defendants. 

2 (ECF No. 32 at iii! 100-109) and pleads negligent infliction of emotional distress against 

3 all Defendants as a separate cause of action (ECF No. 32 at if2 110-119). Because negligent 

4 infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort under California law, the Court 

5 dismisses the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action as to Defendants 

6 Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson. However, Plaintiff is not precluded from 

7 seeking to recover emotional distress damages within a negligence cause of action. 

8 C. Negligent Hiring 

9 Plaintiff brings a negligent hiring cause of action against Defendant Elite. (ECF No. 

10 32 at 23-24). Defendant Elite contends that the negligent hiring claim fails because the 

11 F AC lacks factual allegations to establish that any misconduct by Daniel Johnson and 

12 Barbara Johnson, employees of Elite, was foreseeable. Further, Defendant Elite contends 

13 that the negligent hiring is duplicative of the negligence cause of action. Plaintiff contends 

14 that the negligent hiring cause of action is separate from the general negligence cause of 

15 action. Further, Plaintiff contends that the FAC pleads that Barbara Johnson and Daniel 

16 Johnson "displayed a shocking and disturbing willingness to discriminate against and 

17 harass a visibly, elderly, disabled patron" and argues that it is "likely-although 

18 unknowable without discovery" that they previously displayed similar conduct. (ECF No. 

19 55at24). 

20 "California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable to a third 

21 person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee." Doe v. Capital 

22 Cities, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 132 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Evan F. v. Hughson United 

23 Methodist Church, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748 (Ct. App. 1992)). "Liability is based upon the 

24 facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a 

25 particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes." Id.; see also Federico v. 

26 Superior Court (Jenry G.), 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 374 (Ct. App. 1997), as modified on denial 

27 of reh 'g (Dec. 8, 1997) ("[A ]n employer's duty ... is breached only when the employer 

28 knows, or should know, facts which would warn a reasonable person that the employee 

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1 presents an undue risk of harm to third persons in light of the particular work to be 

2 performed."). "Liability for negligent hiring ... is based upon the reasoning that if an 

3 enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or 

4 other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its 

5 incompetent or unfit employees." Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 

6 868 (2009). 

7 Under California law, Defendant Elite may be held liable for negligent hiring if it 

8 knew or should have known that Defendants Barbara Johnson or Daniel Johnson were 

9 unfit. See Evan F., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758 ("[A]n employer can be held liable for negligent 

10 hiring ifhe knows the employee is unfit, or has reason to believe the employee is unfit or 

11 fails to use reasonable care to discover the employee's unfitness before hiring him."). In 

12 this case, Plaintiff alleges "Defendants knew or should have known that Defendants 

13 BARBARA JOHNSON, DANIEL JOHNSON, QUALCOMM MEDICAL STAFF 1-3, 

14 and the Defendants OFFICER ZACHARY DIGIOIA, DETECTIVE JULIE ADAMS, and 

15 SERGEANT JENNIFER ATWOOD were unfit for their positions because of their clear 

16 lack of training in managing a customer in severe medical and emotional distress." (ECF 

17 No. 32 at~ 122). However, Plaintiff fails to plead facts in support of this legal conclusion. 

18 The allegations of the F AC are limited to the incident between Defendants and Plaintiff at 

19 a football game in November 2016. 4 Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support a 

20 reasonable inference that Defendant Elite knew or should have known that Defendants 

21 Barbara Johnson and Daniel Johnson would act in a certain manner with respect to Plaintiff. 

22 In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that he "lacks knowledge 

23 regarding ... the extent to which Defendant Elite Inc. knew about the Johnson Defendants' 

24 unfitness for their position." (ECF No. 55 at 24). Plaintiff has not pied factual allegations 

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27 4 In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that it is "unlikely" that the incident with Plaintiff 

28 was the first time Defendants Barbara Johnson and Daniel Johnson "engaged in aggressive conduct 

towards individuals subject to their authority as security guards." (ECF No. 55 at 22). 

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1 sufficient to raise a "right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

2 Further, Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery on Defendant Elite's liability for negligent 

3 hiring without first stating a claim under Rule 8. See supra Part IV.A; Mujica, 771 F.3d at 

4 593. The negligent hiring cause of action is dismissed without prejudice as to Defendant 

5 Elite. 

6 D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

7 Plaintiff brings an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against 

8 Defendants Barbara Johnson and Daniel Johnson. (ECF No. 32 at 25-27). Defendants 

9 Barbara Johnson and Daniel Johnson contend that the intentional infliction of emotional 

10 distress cause of action must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts 

11 to establish that their conduct was outrageous or "beyond all reasonable bounds of 

12 decency." (ECF No. 42-1 at 13). Plaintiff contends that the factual allegations about the 

13 "constant harassment" from the Elite Defendants demonstrate extreme and outrageous 

14 conduct sufficient to support this cause of action. (ECF No. 55 at 27). 

15 To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must 

16 allege: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, 

17 or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's 

18 suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of 

19 the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 

20 963, 976 (Cal. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Conduct is "outrageous" 

21 if it is "so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized 

22 community." Id. Behavior may be considered outrageous ifthe defendant "(l) abuses a 

23 relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the 

24 plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or 

25 unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental 

26 distress." Fermina v. Fedco, Inc., 872 P.2d 559, 565 (Cal. 1994) (internal quotations and 

27 citations omitted). 

28 

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1 Defendants Barbara Johnson and Daniel Johnson both challenge the intentional 

2 infliction of emotional distress cause of action on the ground that their alleged conduct was 

3 not outrageous or extreme. The Court concludes that the F AC does not allege sufficient 

4 facts to support a plausible inference that Defendant Daniel Johnson's behavior was 

5 outrageous or extreme. The intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action as 

6 to Defendant Daniel Johnson is dismissed without prejudice. 

7 However, with respect to Defendant Barbara Johnson, Plaintiff alleges that she went 

8 to "extraordinary efforts to badger, harass, and vex Plaintiff, despite his repeated pleas for 

9 her to stop." (ECF No. 32 at if 36). Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly conveyed to 

10 Defendant Barbara Johnson that he was experiencing "extraordinary pain" and was in 

11 diabetic distress, but that she continued to harass him. Id. if 30. Plaintiff alleges that 

12 Defendant Barbara Johnson continued to harass him throughout the incident and did not 

13 cease until a police officer ordered her to leave. Id. iii! 34, 37-39, 43, 53-54; see also id. 

14 iii! 129-135. Assuming the factual allegations of the FAC to be true and viewing the FAC 

15 in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the F AC alleges sufficient facts to support a 

16 reasonable inference that Defendant Barbara Johnson exhibited extreme and outrageous 

17 conduct. The motion to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of 

18 action as to Defendant Barbara Johnson is denied. 

19 E. False Imprisonment and False Arrest 

20 Plaintiff brings causes of action for false imprisonment and false arrest against 

21 Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson. (ECF No. 32 at 27-29). 

22 Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson contend that the causes of action 

23 for false imprisonment and false arrest are redundant. Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, 

24 and Daniel Johnson contend that the F AC lacks factual allegations to establish that they 

25 took any action which "confine[ d] [Plaintiff] to a particular location at the stadium." (ECF 

26 No. 42-1 at 15). Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson contend that the 

27 false imprisonment/arrest claims fail because the alleged confinement took place after the 

28 paramedics initially interviewed Plaintiff and shortly before they returned. Plaintiff 

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1 contends that pleading in the alternative is acceptable under California and federal law. 

2 Further, Plaintiff contends that Barbara Johnson and Daniel Johnson assisted the defendant 

3 police officers in confining Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Elite is vicariously 

4 liable for the actions of Defendants Barbara and Daniel Johnson. 

5 Under California law, "false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts. 

6 False arrest is but one way of committing a false imprisonment .... " Asgari v. City of Los 

7 Angeles, 937 P.2d 273, 277 n.3 (Cal. 1997) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Collins 

8 v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 123 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526 (Ct. App. 1975)). To state a 

9 claim for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must allege that he was intentionally confined 

10 without consent, without lawful privilege, and for an appreciable period of time, however 

11 brief. See Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 323 (Ct. App. 2000). To 

12 state a claim of false imprisonment based on unlawful arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate 

13 that "there has been an unlawful arrest followed by imprisonment." City of Newport Beach 

14 v. Sasse, 88 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480 (Ct. App. 1970); see also Watts v. Cty. of Sacramento, 256 

15 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001 ). "All who take part in or assist in the commission of a false 

16 imprisomnent are joint tort-feasors, and may be joined as defendants without an allegation 

17 or proof of a conspiracy." Oppenheimer v. City of Los Angeles, 232 P.2d 30, 31 (Cal. Ct. 

18 App. 1951); see also Ramsden v. W Union, 138 Cal. Rptr. 426, 430 (Ct. App. 1977) 

19 (citations omitted). 

20 Because false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts, the Court treats 

21 these allegations as one claim. See Asgari, 93 7 P .2d 273; see also Lowry v. Metro. Transit 

22 Sys. Bd., No. 09CV898 BTM(WVG), 2010 WL 2382326, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2010). 

23 Plaintiff alleges that the false imprisonment occurred after a police officer detained him 

24 and ordered him to remain standing against a wall in the exterior ring of the stadium. ECF 

25 No. 32 ilil 48, 49, 50, 137. Plaintiff alleges that he was not free to leave and was therefore 

26 under arrest at this point. Id. i! 48. Plaintiff does not allege any facts connecting Defendant 

27 Daniel Johnson to the alleged confinement. With respect to Defendant Barbara Johnson, 

28 Plaintiff alleges only that Barbara Johnson "refused to provide Plaintiff with the requested 

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1 care and liberty of movement" after he informed her and unidentified staff of Defendant 

2 Elite that he needed to lay down. Id. if 49. Although Plaintiff alleges an intentional 

3 confinement occurred, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support an inference that 

4 Defendants Barbara and Daniel Johnson took part in or assisted in the alleged confinement 

5 by the police officers. Accordingly, the false imprisonment/false arrest cause of action is 

6 dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Barbara Johnson, Daniel Johnson, and Elite. 

7 v. MOTION TO STRIKE BY THE ELITE DEFENDANTS (ECF No. 41) 

8 Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson move to strike portions of 

9 the FAC requesting punitive damages pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(£) 

10 and California Civil Code§ 3294. Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson 

11 contend that punitive damages are not available for negligence-based actions under 

12 California law. Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson contend that 

13 Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead oppression, fraud, or malice as required under California 

14 Civil Code § 3294(a) to claim punitive damages. Further Defendant Elite contends that 

15 Plaintiff has not properly alleged punitive damages against Defendant Elite, a corporate 

16 employer, pursuant to California Civil Code§ 3294(b). 

17 Plaintiff contends that his punitive damage claims in the F AC are properly supported 

18 by facts alleging "truly abhorrent" conduct by Defendant Barbara Johnson and Daniel 

19 Johnson. (ECF No. 54 at 6). Plaintiff contends that he alleges malice and oppressive 

20 conduct in support of punitive damages under California Civil Code section 3294. Plaintiff 

21 contends that the "clear and convincing standard" for pleading "oppression, fraud, or 

22 malice" for purposes of seeking punitive damages is not applicable here. Id. at 10. Plaintiff 

23 contends that Rule 12(£) does not authorize district courts to strike claims for damages on 

24 the grounds that such claims are precluded as a matter of law. Plaintiff contends that, 

25 although rare, punitive damages can be recoverable in some negligence cases where 

26 conscious disregard is alleged. Plaintiff contends that a decision on punitive damages 

27 should be left to the trier of fact. Plaintiff contends that a motion to strike is improper 

28 where it challenges the sufficiency of factual allegations. 

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1 Rule 12(±) provides that "a court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense 

2 or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(±). 

3 "The function ofa 12(±) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that 

4 must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial ... 

5 ." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Fantasy, 

6 Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)). Motions to strike are generally 

7 disfavored and "should not be granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could 

8 have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation." Neveau v. City of Fresno, 

9 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 

10 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339) (N.D. Cal. 1991)). The decision to grant or deny a motion to 

11 strike under Rule 12(±) is within the discretion of the court. See Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1528. 

12 On a motion to strike, a court views the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non13 moving party. See, e.g., Cal. Dep 't of Toxic Substances Control, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1033. 

14 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "Rule 12(±) does not authorize 

15 district courts to strike claims for damages on the ground that such claims are precluded as 

16 a matter oflaw." Whittlestone, 618 F.2d at 974-75 (determining that an argument that lost 

17 profits and consequential damages should be stricken as precluded under the law "was 

18 really an attempt to have portions of [the] complaint dismissed or to obtain summary 

19 judgment"). In this case, Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson do not 

20 move to strike on the grounds that the material in the F AC is "redundant, immaterial, 

21 impertinent, or scandalous." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(±). Instead they argue that punitive 

22 damages are precluded as a matter oflaw and that Plaintiff fails to properly plead his claims 

23 for punitive damages. Accordingly, the motion to strike punitive damages is procedurally 

24 improper under Whittlestone. To the extent these Defendants aim to challenge the legal 

25 sufficiency of the FAC, that challenge is properly asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.5 See 

26 

27 

28 

5 In this case, the Court declines to exercise any discretion it may have to construe this motion as a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion. See Consumer Sols. REO, LLC v. Hillery, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 

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1 Whittlestone, 618 F.2d at 974-75. Because Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel 

2 Johnson do not demonstrate that Plaintiffs claims are redundant, immaterial, impertinent, 

3 or scandalous, the motion to strike under Rule 12(t) is denied. See also Pena v. City 

4 Chevrolet, No. 09-CV-2554-IEG RBB, 2010 WL 1172249, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010). 

5 VI. MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE CITY DEFENDANTS (ECF No. 37) 

6 A. Age Discrimination 

7 Plaintiff brings causes of action for a denial of civil rights under the Unruh Act, 

8 negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Digioia, 

9 Atwood, Adams, and the City. (ECF No. 32). As pleaded by Plaintiff, each of these causes 

10 of action are premised in part on allegations that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the 

11 basis of his age. Defendants Digioia, Atwood, Adams and the City contend that Plaintiff 

12 fails to support an age discrimination claim under any cause of action and specifically 

13 request that Plaintiffs allegations of age discrimination are struck from Plaintiffs second, 

14 fourth, and fifth causes of action. Defendants Digioia, Atwood, Adams, and the City 

15 further contend that the Unruh Act does not support a claim for age discrimination. 

16 Plaintiff asserts that he was 62 years old at the time of the events alleged in the F AC 

17 and that age "is a highly relevant factor in analyzing Defendants' discriminatory conduct 

18 towards Plaintiff." (ECF No. 52 at 12). Plaintiff asserts that he was and remains unaware 

19 of whether Defendants discriminated against him based on his disability, age, or both and 

20 that these allegations should not be dismissed until Plaintiff can conduct discovery. 

21 Plaintiff contends that the Unruh Act includes protection against age discrimination. 

22 Plaintiff is not prohibited from bringing an Unruh Act claim on the basis of age 

23 discrimination. See Ingels, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 946 ("Based on the foregoing authority, we 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

("However, where a motion is in substance a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but is incorrectly denominated as a 

Rule 12(f) motion, a court may convert the improperly designated Rule 12(f) motion into a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion."). Defendants Elite, Barbara Johnson, and Daniel Johnson have filed a motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6) in which they do not challenge the claims for punitive damages. Further, no party has 

requested that the Court analyze this motion under Rule 12(b)(6). 

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1 have no trouble concluding that arbitrary age discrimination is prohibited by the [Unruh] 

2 Act."); Javorsky, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 712 ("[T]here is no dispute that California courts 

3 have applied the Unruh Act to discrimination based on age."). However, Plaintiffs 

4 allegations of age discrimination in the F AC are legal conclusions unsupported by 

5 sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim to relief. See ECF No. 32 at iii! 85, 

6 86, 94, 101, 111. Further, Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery if the FAC fails to state 

7 claim to relief that satisfies the pleading standards of Rule 8. See supra Part IV.A; 

8 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559; Mujica, 771 F.3d at 593. The negligence, the negligent 

9 infliction of emotional distress, and Unruh Act cause of action are dismissed without 

10 prejudice as to Defendants Digioia, Atwood, Adams, and the City to the extent they are 

11 premised on allegations of age discrimination. 

12 B. Common Law Torts 

13 Defendant City moves to dismiss the negligence, negligent infliction of emotional 

14 distress, and negligent hiring causes of action against Defendant City. Defendant City 

15 assert that under California law a governmental entity can only be sued in tort pursuant to 

16 statutory authority. Defendant City contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against 

1 7 Defendant City for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 

18 hiring because he fails to allege any statutory duty. 6 

19 Plaintiff contends that he provided sufficient statutory support for his common law 

20 tort claims against Defendant City. Plaintiff asserts that he brings his claims under 

21 California Government Code section 12948 and does not bring his claims under common 

22 law. Plaintiff contends that Defendant City is liable to Plaintiff pursuant to California 

23 Government Code 815.2 and 815.4 because "in exercising ownership and operational 

24 control over Qualcomm Stadium, Defendant City is vicariously responsible for the conduct 

25 

26 

27 6 Plaintiff brings the negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action against 

28 Defendants Adams, Atwood, and Digioia as well. Defendants Adams, Atwood, and Digioia do not move 

to dismiss the common law torts claims against them on the grounds discussed in this subsection. 

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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

of its employees at Qualcomm, such as the Defendant Officers." (ECF No. 52 at 14). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant City may be liable for failing to perform duties under the 

ADA, the Unruh Act, and the California Disabled Persons Act pursuant to California 

Government Code section 815 .6. Plaintiff contends that Defendant City owed Plaintiff a 

duty to provide medical aid and is vicariously liable for the Defendant Officers failure to 

do so. 

The California Tort Claims Act provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute: 

(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or 

omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." Cal. Gov't Code 

§ 815(a). "[T]he intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential liability, not expand 

it." Eastburn v. Reg. Fire Prat. Auth., 80 P.3d 656, 658 (Cal. 2003) (citing Zelig v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 45 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2002)). 

Government Code section 815.6 provides, 

Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment 

that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the 

public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its 

failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it 

exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty. 

Cal. Gov't Code§ 815.6. Accordingly, "all governmental tort liability is dependent on the 

existence of an authorizing statute or 'enactment."' Searcy v. Hemet Unified High Sch. 

20 Dist., 223 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208-09 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Gov. Code §§ 815(a), 815.6). 

21 "[T]o state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must 

22 be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty." Id. at 212. 

23 "Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or 'enactment,' 

24 the statute or 'enactment' claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified." 

25 Id. "To qualify for the exception, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of an 

26 enactment that imposes a mandatory, not discretionary, duty on the public entity and (2) 

27 that the enactment is intended to protect against the particular kind of injury the plaintiff 

28 suffered." Tuthill v. City a/San Buenaventura, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 820, 828 (Ct. App. 2014) 

20 

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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

(citing Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. 2000)). "Section 815.6 

'requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or 

permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely 

authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken."' Id. (quoting Haggis, 

993 P.2d at 987). 

California Government Code section 815.2 provides, 

(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission 

of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the 

act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of 

action against that employee or his personal representative. 

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an 

injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity 

where the employee is immune from liability. 

Cal. Gov't Code§ 815.2. Section 815.4 provides, 

A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by a tortious act or 

omission of an independent contractor of the public entity to the same extent 

that the public entity would be subject to such liability if it were a private 

person. Nothing in this section subjects a public entity to liability for the act 

or omission of an independent contractor if the public entity would not have 

been liable for the injury had the act or omission been that of an employee of 

the public entity. 

Cal. Gov't Code§ 815.4. 

In this case, Defendant City moves the Court for an order dismissing Plaintiffs 

causes of action for negligence, negligent hiring, and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress because they are common law tort claims from which Defendant City is immune 

in the absence of an authorizing statute or enactment. Plaintiff first argues that section 

815(a) has no application because he brings his claims under California Government Code 

section 12948 rather than the common law. (ECF No. 52 at 13). However, the FAC does 

26 not reference section 12948 in connection to these three challenged causes of action. See 

27 ECF No. 32 at iii! 90-128. The negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and 

28 

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1 negligent hiring cause of action seek to hold Defendant City liable in tort. The California 

2 Tort Claims Act is applicable. 

3 Under section 815.6 of the California Government Code, Defendant City is not 

4 immune from tort liability if there is an authorizing statute or enactment which imposes a 

5 mandatory duty on Defendant City and is intended to protect against the type of injury 

6 suffered by Plaintiff. See Tuthill, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 828. However, Plaintiff must plead 

7 every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability and specifically identify the 

8 statutory duty in order to fall within this exception. See Searcy, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09. 

9 In the FAC, Plaintiff does not reference section 815.6 in connection with any of these 

10 causes of action. Further, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts in the F AC to establish 

11 the existence of a statutory duty owed by Defendant City or identify with particularity the 

12 statute or enactment that establishes a duty and permits these tort causes of action against 

13 Defendant City. See Searcy, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09. 

14 Plaintiff additionally contends that Defendant City is liable to Plaintiff pursuant to 

15 California Government Code section 815.2 and section 815.4. (ECF No. 52 at 13). These 

16 codes generally provide that a public entity is liable for injury caused by the tortious acts 

1 7 or omissions of its independent contractors or employees to the same extent that the public 

18 entity would be subject to such liability if it were a private person. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 

19 815.2, 815.4; Lloyd v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872, 880 (Cal. 2009) ("We 

20 recognize that notwithstanding the elimination of common law tort liability for public 

21 entities, they remain liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the actions of their 

22 employees."). However, as currently pleaded, the FAC does not invoke California 

23 Government Code section 815.2 or section 815.4 and Plaintiff does not clearly plead his 

24 negligence claims under a theory of vicarious liability. The F AC fails to identify the 

25 statutory bases upon which liability is premised and lacks sufficient allegations to establish 

26 a cognizable theory of liability under section 815.2 or 815.4 against Defendant City. See 

27 CA. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 703 (Cal. 2012) ("[P]ublic 

28 entity tort liability is exclusively statutory."). 

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1 Defendant City relies on McCarty v. State of Cal. Dep't ofTransp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

2 777 (Ct. App. 2008) to contend that dismissal of the negligence cause of action should be 

3 with prejudice because "a claim of mere negligence will not lie against a public entity." 

4 (ECF No. 37-1at6). The court in McCarty stated that "a public entity cannot be held liable 

5 for common law negligence ... standing alone." Id. at 792. This is consistent with 

6 California Government Code section 815 which prohibits claims of common law 

7 negligence. However, Plaintiff is not precluded from attempting to bring a negligence 

8 claim against a public entity pursuant to statutory authority. Accordingly, the causes of 

9 action for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring are 

10 dismissed as to Defendant City without prejudice. 

11 C. False Imprisonment and False Arrest 

12 Plaintiff asserts false arrest and false imprisonment causes of action against 

13 Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood. (ECF No. 32 at 27-29). Defendants Digioia, 

14 Adams, and Atwood contend that, at a minimum, one of the false arrest and false 

15 imprisonment causes of action must be dismissed because they are duplicative. Further, 

16 the Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

17 false arrest or false imprisonment because "[t]emporarily waylaying Plaintiff to receive the 

18 medical services he requested does not demonstrate an unreasonable intrusion resulting in 

19 a de facto arrest." (ECFNo. 37-1 at8). 

20 Plaintiff contends that he properly pleads causes of action for false imprisonment 

21 and false arrest and Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood mischaracterize the sequence 

22 of events alleged in the FAC. Plaintiff contends that the alleged confinement lasted an 

23 appreciable length of time. Plaintiff contends that inconsistent claims or claims in the 

24 alternative are permitted. 7 

25 

26 

7 Plaintiff contends that Defendant City is "liable for the false arrest and imprisonment of Plaintiff by the 

27 Defendant Officers and the Johnson Defendants." (ECF No. 52 at 27). However, in the FAC, Plaintiff 

does not bring the false imprisonment and false arrest claims against Defendant City. (ECF No. 32 ~~ 

136-149). 28 

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1 To state a claim for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must allege that he was 

2 intentionally confined without consent, without lawful privilege, and for an appreciable 

3 period of time, however brief. Easton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316; see also Blankenhorn v. 

4 City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 486 n.15 (9th Cir. 2007)). To state a claim of false 

5 imprisonment based on unlawful arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "there has been 

6 an unlawful arrest followed by imprisonment." Sasse, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 480. 

7 Because false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts, the Court treats 

8 these allegations as one claim. See Asgari, 937 P.2d 273; see also Lowry, 2010 WL 

9 2382326, at *3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Adams told Plaintiff he had to leave the 

10 area of the stadium designated for individuals with disabilities and escorted him to the 

11 exterior ring of the stadium. Plaintiff alleges that he "feared that he would be assaulted by 

12 Defendant DETECTIVE JULIE ADAMS if he did not move as ordered" and "under 

13 protest" followed the police officers. (ECF No. 32 at iii! 45, 47). Plaintiff alleges that he 

14 was "told by Defendant DETECTIVE JULIE ADAMS to stand against the wall, and was 

15 ordered to remain there." Id. iJ 48. Plaintiff alleges that "he was not free to leave, and was 

16 thereby under arrest." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Atwood informed his wife that 

17 he was being detained. Id. iJ 50. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Digioia, Adams, and 

18 Atwood "refused to let him leave or lie down." Id. iJ 51. 

19 Assuming the factual allegations of the F AC to be true and viewed in the most 

20 favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he was arrested and confined 

21 without his consent for an appreciable period of time. The motion to dismiss the false 

22 imprisonment/false arrest cause of action by Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood is 

23 denied. 

24 D. Battery 

25 Plaintiff brings the battery cause of action against Defendants Digioia, Adams, and 

26 Atwood. (ECF No. 32 at 31-32). Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood contend that 

27 the battery cause of action must be dismissed because the F AC lacks factual allegations 

28 demonstrating "contact of any kind" between Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood 

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1 and Plaintiff. (ECF No. 37-1 at 9). Plaintiff did not address the motion to dismiss with 

2 respect to the battery cause of action. See ECF Nos. 52, 53 at 8. 

3 "The elements of civil battery are: ( 1) defendant intentionally performed an act that 

4 resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiffs person; (2) plaintiff did not 

5 consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss 

6 or harm to plaintiff." Brown v. Ransweiler, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801, 811 (Ct. App. 2009) 

7 (citing Piedra v. Dugan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 48 (Ct. App. 2004)). "A harmful contact, 

8 intentionally done is the essence of a battery." Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 903 

9 (Ct. App. 1991). 

10 In support of this cause of action, Plaintiff alleges, "Defendant QUALCOMM 

11 MEDICAL STAFF caused Plaintiff to be touched with her swatting at Plaintiff with the 

12 intent to hit him to stop recording her callous conduct in failing to treat or respond to his 

13 medical conditions." Id. if 157. No other defendant is mentioned with respect to the battery 

14 cause of action. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a battery cause of action 

15 against Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood. The battery cause of action is dismissed 

16 without prejudice as to Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood. 

1 7 E. Punitive Damages 

18 Defendant City moves to strike the request for punitive damages pursuant to 

19 California Government Code section 818. Plaintiff contends that he pleads sufficient facts 

20 to support a claim for punitive damages under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

21 Plaintiff acknowledges that Government Code section 818 prohibits a claim of punitive 

22 damages against a public entity. However, Plaintiff asserts that section 818 does not 

23 preclude punitive damages against public employees and contends that Defendant City 

24 "could be responsible for punitive damages levied against its employees" under 

25 Government Code section 825(b ). (ECF No. 52 at 31 ). 

26 Section 3294 of the California Civil Code defines the circumstances under which 

27 exemplary damages may be recovered. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. Section 818 of the 

28 California Government Code states, "Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw, a public 

25 

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1 entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other 

2 damages imposed primarily for punishing the defendant." Cal. Gov't Code§ 818. 

3 In this case, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Defendant City pursuant to 

4 California Civil Code section 3294. (ECF No. 32 iii! 109, 119). Under California 

5 Government Code section 818, Defendant City is not liable for punitive damages brought 

6 pursuant to Civil Code section 3294. Section 825 of the Government Code authorizes 

7 public entities to indemnify public employees for punitive damage awards under certain 

8 circumstances but does not allow to directly seek punitive damages against Defendant City. 

9 See Cal. Gov't Code§ 825(b). Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages against Defendant 

10 City are dismissed. 

11 VII. MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE BY DEFENDANT 

12 CHARGERS (ECF Nos. 44, 45) 

13 Plaintiff brings causes of action for violations of Title II of the ADA, violations of 

14 the Unruh Act, violations of the California Disabled Persons Act, negligence, negligent 

15 infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring against Defendant Chargers. (ECF No. 

16 32). Defendant Chargers move the Court for an Order dismissing this action with respect 

17 to Defendant Chargers on the ground that "there is not a single factual allegation attributing 

18 any conduct to the Chargers at all." (ECF No. 45-1at3). Defendant Chargers contend that 

19 the ADA claim is moot because the Chargers no longer play at Qualcomm Stadium. 

20 Defendant Chargers contend that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim 

21 against Defendant Chargers with respect to the remaining causes of action. Defendant 

22 Chargers contend that the declaration and exhibits attached to Plaintiffs response in 

23 opposition are improper and insufficient to establish any agency relationship. Further 

24 Defendant Chargers contend that Plaintiff fails to allege any fact to support an agency 

25 relationship and that discovery is inappropriate where the allegations of the complaint do 

26 not give rise to a plausible claim for relief. 

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8 

Plaintiff contends that the FAC "presume[s] an agency relationship between 

Defendant Chargers, Defendant City of San Diego, Defendants Elite Show Services, Inc .. 

.. and Defendants Barbara and Daniel Johnson." (ECF No. 57 at 7). Plaintiff asserts that 

Defendant City owns and operates Qualcomm Stadium, the Defendant 

Chargers leased the stadium from Defendant City owns, and the two had 

contractual relations with the Elite Defendants for security services during 

Defendant Chargers's football games. The Elite Defendants, and by agency, 

the Defendant Chargers are liable for the injuries Plaintiff suffered at their 

hands. 

9 Id. Plaintiff contends that it would be premature to dismiss Defendant Chargers before 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

discovery can be completed. Plaintiff contends that an agreement between Defendant City 

and Defendant Elite is available online and references another contract between Defendant 

Chargers and Defendant Elite. Further, Plaintiff asserts "when an employee of Defendant 

Elite, Inc. engaged in inappropriate conduct at a Chargers game in December 2016, 

Defendant Chargers issued a statement and apology regarding the employee's conduct." 

15 Id. at 12. Plaintiff contends that he has alleged an agency relationship between various 

16 

17 

18 

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defendants, including Defendant Chargers. 

Plaintiff attaches a declaration and exhibits to his response in opposition to the 

motion to dismiss. The Court's review is limited to the factual allegations of the F AC and 

any materials properly subject to judicial notice at this stage in the proceedings. See Lee 

20 v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) ("As a general rule, a district 

21 court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

22 motion."). Accordingly, the Court does not consider these documents in reaching its 

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24 

25 

conclusion. 

Defendant Chargers are identified as a defendant party in the F AC but the F AC 

contains no factual allegations in support of a theory of liability against the Chargers. See 

26 ECF No. 32 at iii! 11, 18. Plaintiff contends that he is proceeding on an agency theory to 

27 establish the Defendant Charger's liability. The FAC alleges, 

28 Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on the basis of that information and 

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2 

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belief, alleges that at all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendants were 

the agents and employees of their co-defendants, and in doing the things 

alleged in this complaint were acting within the course and scope of that 

agency and employment. 

(ECF No. 32 at iJ 13). This conclusory statement is insufficient to establish an agency 

theory under which Defendant Chargers could be held liable for the events alleged in the 

F AC. Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient factual content to support a plausible claim to 

relief against Defendant Chargers. Finally, the Court cannot ignore the deficiencies of the 

F AC in order to allow discovery on claims against Defendant Chargers; as previously 

stated, Plaintiff must first allege sufficient factual content such as to satisfy Rule 8. See 

10 supra Part IV.A; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559; Mujica, 771 F.3d at 593. The motion to 

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dismiss filed by Defendant Chargers is granted in its entirety.8 (ECF No. 45). The motion 

to strike filed by Defendant Chargers is moot. (ECF No. 44). 

VIII. CONCLUSION 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by the Elite Defendants 

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (ECF No. 42). The cause of action under 

the Unruh Act to the extent it is premised on age discrimination, the false arrest cause of 

action, the false imprisonment cause of action, and the negligent infliction of emotional 

distress cause of action are dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Barbara Johnson, 

Daniel Johnson, and Elite. The intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action 

is dismissed without prejudice as to Daniel Johnson. The negligent hiring cause of action 

is dismissed as to Defendant Elite. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike filed by the Elite Defendants 

is DENIED. (ECF No. 41). 

8 Plaintiff states, "Defendant Chargers correctly point out that Plaintiff failed to plead a violation of the 

ADA under the proper Title .... In that respect, Plaintiff request leave to amend the F AC, so that he may 

allege a cause of action against Defendant Chargers, and other defendants, for violations of the ADA under 

28 the appropriate Title III ... " (ECF No. 57 at 13). Any request for leave to file an amended complaint must 

be made by filing a motion on the docket pursuant to the Local Rules and Judge Hayes' Chamber Rules. 

28 

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1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by the City Defendants 

2 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (ECF No. 37). The negligence cause of 

3 action, the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action, and the cause of action 

4 under the Unruh Civil Rights Act are dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Digioia, 

5 Atwood, Adams, and the City to the extent they are premised on age discrimination. The 

6 causes of action for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 

7 hiring are dismissed without prejudice as to Defendant City. The battery cause of action is 

8 dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Digioia, Adams, and Atwood. The claims 

9 for punitive damages against Defendant City are dismissed. The motion is otherwise 

10 denied. 

11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Chargers 

12 is GRANTED. (ECF No. 45). The FAC is dismissed as to Defendant Chargers without 

13 prejudice. 

14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike filed by Defendant Chargers 

15 is DENIED as moot. (ECF No. 44). 

16 

17 DATED: 

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WILLIAM Q. HA YE 

United States District 

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