Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00359/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00359-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ELNORA A. KELLEY, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-00359-CB-B

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Elnora A. Kelley (“Plaintiff”) brings this action

seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner

of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social

Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-411. This action was

referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for report and

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Oral

argument was held on June 20, 2005. Upon careful consideration

of the record, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the

decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her first application for disability

insurance benefits on March 17, 2000, alleging that she became

disabled on July 2, 1999 because of asthma, heart problems,

hypertension, and depression. (Tr. 32-33). Plaintiff’s

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1

The application was treated as a prototype case and as such, the

reconsideration stage was eliminated pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.906.

2

application was denied at the initial level on July 3, 2000,

and she did not appeal that decision. (Id. at 32-36, 39-43).

Plaintiff protectively filed a second application for disability

insurance benefits on April 6, 2001, alleging that she had been

disabled since July 2, 1999 due to asthma, exhaustion, heart and

high blood pressure problems, stress, arthritis, a nervous

breakdown and leg and knee pain. (Id. at 17, 64-67, 85, 98,

123). Plaintiff’s application was denied on September 27, 2001,

and she filed a Request for Hearing on November 19, 2001.1 (Id.

at 17, 44-49). 

On March 13, 2002, Administrative Law Judge David R.

Murchison (“ALJ Murchison”) conducted a hearing, which was

attended by Plaintiff, her attorney Gilbert B. Laden, Esq., and

a vocational expert, James N. Cowart. (Id. at 315-332). On

July 17, 2002, ALJ Murchison entered an unfavorable decision

wherein he found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity for work at the light exertional level and could return

to her past relevant work as an insurance agent. (Id. at 14-25,

Findings 3, 5). On April 9, 2004, Plaintiff’s request for

review was denied by the Appeals Council, thus making the ALJ’s

decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

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3

Security under 20 C.F.R. § 404.955. (Tr. 1A-4). The parties

agree that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is

properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on November 9, 1942, and was 59 years old

at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 19, 64). Plaintiff has a

twelfth grade education and completed a two year culinary arts

program at Carver State Technical School. (Id. at 265, 318).

She has past relevant work experience as an insurance agent.

(Id. at 24, 319, 326-327). Plaintiff worked as an insurance

agent for 25 years, and in so doing, did door to door sales,

discussed policies with people who came to the office, and used

the telephone to talk with clients. (Id. at 326-327).

Plaintiff testified that when she worked, she traveled and had

a lot of interaction with people. (Id. at 323). According to

Plaintiff, she left her job because she “just couldn’t handle it

anymore;” she was under “so much stress and pressure.” (Id. at

319). Plaintiff testified that she is unable to work because

she has had a nervous breakdown, has bad nerves, has had to cope

with the death of several family members, has high blood

pressure, and low potassium. (Tr. 318-322). Plaintiff also

reported problems sleeping and eating irregularities. (Id. at

324-325). She further testified that she sometimes experiences

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4

problems concentrating, remembering and staying focused. (Id.

at 331). 

Concerning her daily activities, Plaintiff testified that

she spends her days “[m]ostly in bed[,]” but also indicated that

she listens to the radio, visits with a couple of her friends,

talks on the telephone and goes to church on Sunday. (Id. at

319, 323-324). Plaintiff also indicated that she does some

driving, grocery shopping, and prepares some of her meals. (Id.

at 323-324). According to Plaintiff, her adult daughter, who

resides with her, also shops and prepares meals for her. (Id.)

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of

disability of July 2, 1999. (Tr. 24, Finding 1). The ALJ

additionally found that Plaintiff suffers from the severe

impairments of hypertension, hypokalemia, obesity,

gastroesophageal reflux disease, borderline cardiomegaly and

arthritis of the knee. (Id. at 24, Finding 2). The ALJ also

determined that while Plaintiff alleges a disabling mental

impairment, the record evidence does not establish the

impairment was severe. (Id. at 23). Next, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination of

impairments listed in or medically equal to one listed in 20

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Regulations No. 4. (Id. at

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2

Lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or

carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted

may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of

walking or standing or when it involves sitting most of the time with some

pushing and pulling of arm of leg controls. To be considered capable of

performing a full or wide range of light work, an individual must have the

ability to do substantially all of these activities. If an individual can do

light work, there is a determination that she can also do sedentary work

unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or

inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).

5

24, Finding 2). The ALJ then determined, based on the medical

evidence and Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, that she retains

the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work

at the light exertional level2 which is not compromised by any

significant nonexertional limitations. (Id. at 24, Findings 3-

4). Thus, he found that Plaintiff can return to her past

relevant work as an insurance agent. (Id. at 24, Finding 5). 

III. Issues On Appeal

A. Whether the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s

depression is a non-severe impairment and thus, also erred

in rejecting the opinion of Dr. Welsh?

B. Whether the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility?

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this court’s role

is a limited one. The court’s review is limited to determining

1) whether the decision of the Secretary is supported by

substantial evidence, and 2) whether the correct legal standards

were applied. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir.

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3

This court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal

principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

6

1990).3 A court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the

evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.

Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986). The

Commissioner’s findings of fact must be affirmed if they are based

upon substantial evidence. Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235

(11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th

Cir. 1983) (holding that substantial evidence is defined as “more

than a scintilla but less than a preponderance,” and consists of

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

adequate to support a conclusion[]”). In determining whether

substantial evidence exists, the court must view the record as a

whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as

unfavorable to the Commissioner’s decision. Chester v. Bowen, 792

F. 2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist.

Lexis 10163 (S.D. Ala.). 

B. Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability

benefits must prove her disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; 20

C.F.R. § 416.912. Disability is defined as the “inability to do

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

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4The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity. The second step requires the claimant

to prove that he or she has a severe impairment or combination of

impairments. If, at the third step, the claimant proves that the

impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed

impairment, then the claimant is automatically found disabled

regardless of age, education, or work experience. If the claimant

cannot prevail at the third step, he or she must proceed to the

fourth step where the claimant must prove an inability to perform

their past relevant work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th

Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,

the examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective

medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining

physicians; (3) evidence of pain; (4) the claimant’s age, education

and work history. Id. at 1005. Once a claimant meets this burden,

it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the fifth step that

the claimant is capable of engaging in another kind of substantial

gainful employment which exists in significant numbers in the

national economy, given the claimant’s residual functional capacity,

age, education, and work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834

(11th Cir. 1985). If the Commissioner can demonstrate that there are

such jobs the claimant can perform, the claimant must prove inability

to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel,

190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Hale v. Bowen, 831

F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d

1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)).

7

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); 20 C.F.R. §

416.905(a). 

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step

sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has

proven her disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; 20 C.F.R. §

416.920.4 In case sub judice, the ALJ applied the five-step

process in evaluating Plaintiff’s claim, and as noted supra, he

determined that Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity

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to perform a full range of light work, and thus can return to her

past relevant work as an insurance agent. (Tr. 17-25). 

1. No de facto reopening occurred.

At oral argument, Plaintiff asserted for the first time, that

the ALJ effectively de facto reopened her first disability claim

by considering and relying upon evidence submitted in conjunction

with that claim. Defendant, on the other hand, argued that the

ALJ simply reviewed some of the medical evidence from the prior

claim in connection with assessing Plaintiff’s instant claim;

thus, no de facto reopening occurred, and res judicata precludes

a finding of disability prior to July 3, 2000, the date on which

Plaintiff’s initial claim was denied.

When a final decision is made with respect to a Social

Security claim, the doctrine of res judicata ordinarily bars a

claimant from filing a later application reasserting the same

claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1). However, the Commissioner has

discretion to reopen the previous claim for any reason within

twelve months of the date of the notice of the initial

determination, or for good cause after one year but within four

years. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988. The Commissioner’s determination

that a claim is barred on res judicata grounds is subject to

review by the District Court, but the District Court lacks

jurisdiction to review the denial of a request to open a

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previously decided case because such a denial is not a “final

decision” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 405. 

There are, however, two ways in which a case may be reopened.

The ALJ may make an express determination pursuant to 20 C.F.R.

404.988 that the case should be reopened, or the ALJ may

“constructively” or de facto reopen the case by reconsidering the

prior claim on its merits. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d

1072, 1078-1079 (11th Cir. 1996) (reopening occurred when an ALJ,

considering a third application for benefits, reexamined the

merits of a determination on the first and second applications

concerning a claimant’s educational level). A prior disability

claim is not deemed to have been reconsidered on the merits merely

because the evidence reviewed by the ALJ included evidence of the

claimant’s condition at the time of the previous application. Id.

at 1079 (stating that the ALJ’s examination of the conflicting

vocational expert testimony from the prior two hearings was

appropriate and did not constitute a reopening of the prior

decision). See also Rohrich v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1030, 1031 (8th

Cir. 1986) (holding that an ALJ’s review of a prior medical

examination from a prior application did not amount to a

reconsideration of the prior application on its merits). An ALJ

is “entitled to consider evidence from a prior denial for the

limited purpose of reviewing the preliminary facts or cumulative

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10

medical history necessary to determine whether the claimant was

disabled at the time of his second application.” Frustaglia v.

Secretary of Health and Human Services, 829 F.2d 192, 193 (1st

Cir. 1987). Furthermore, it may be necessary to consider evidence

regarding the claimant’s condition at the time of the previous

denial in order to determine whether the second claim is the same

as the first claim for res judicata purposes. See Cash v.

Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2003)(finding that the

ALJ must be allowed some leeway, however, to evaluate how newly

presented evidence relates back to the prior application, to

decide whether or not to reopen the case under 20 C.F.R. §§

404.988 and 404.989). If simply reviewing evidence relating to

a previous claim is viewed as a reconsideration on the merits, the

previous case would be reopened virtually every time a successive

claim is filed. Girard v. Chater, 918 F. Supp. 42, 45 (D.R.I.

1996) (holding that the ALJ did not constructively reopen a

claimant’s application by considering evidence regarding

claimant’s physical condition during the period preceding the

original application).

Plaintiff herein never requested that her prior decision be

reopened; however, at oral argument, her counsel asserted, in

response to Defendant’s res judicata argument, that the ALJ had

de facto reopened the earlier decision because in the instant

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5In the ALJ’s decision, he referenced the following evidence

from Plaintiff’s prior claim (i.e., evidence on or before July 3,

2000): 1) a undated Disability Report (Tr. 84-95); 2) a March 22,

2000 Daily Activities Questionnaire (id. at 108-117); 3) a March 27,

2000 Pain Questionnaire (id. at 95-96); 4) a May 24, 2000

consultative examination (id. at 194-195); and 5) a July 3, 2000

residual functional capacity form (id. at 197-204). (Id. at 20-21).

11

decision, he referenced evidence submitted in the first case, but

did not address res judicata at all. Based upon a review of the

record, the undersigned finds that while the ALJ considered

medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s condition at the time of

the previous application,5 there is nothing to suggest that he

reviewed the merits of Plaintiff’s first application. Instead,

it appears clear, that the ALJ reviewed some of the medical

evidence from the application for the limited purpose of gaining

insight into Plaintiff’s medical history, to aid him in

determining whether she was disabled at the time of her second

application. Accordingly, no de facto reopening occurred and res

judicata precludes a finding of disability prior to July 3, 2000.

2. Plaintiff’s depression does not meet the severity and

duration requirements.

A review of the administrative record reveals the presence

of medical reports and data from a number of sources. The records

reflect that Plaintiff was treated by Henrietta Kovacs, M.D.,

(hereinafter “Dr. Kovacs”), during the July 1999-2001 time frame

for hypokalemia, chest pain, hypertension and depression. (Tr.

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12

188-193, 208-228, 297). The notes indicate that May 29, 2000 was

the first instance in which Dr. Kovacs diagnosed Plaintiff with

depression. (Id. at 189-190, 220-221). She noted that Plaintiff

appeared “quite distraught,” and complained that she could not

sleep and was depressed. (Id.) According to Dr. Kovacs,

Plaintiff was alert, oriented, crying off and on, and appeared

depressed. (Id.) She was given Aciphex, and prescribed Celexa.

(Id.) She was also instructed to continue taking Cardura, Diovan

HCT, and K-Dur 20 m.g., which had been prescribed earlier for her

other ailments. (Id.)

Dr. Kovacs’ June 12, 2000 treatment notes reflect that

Plaintiff appeared alert, oriented, and depressed, and that during

the visit, she burst into tears but did not explain why she was

crying. (Tr. 188, 218). Plaintiff advised Dr. Kovacs that she

could not afford any medication, and that she had been taking

samples of Cardura, Divan and Celexa. (Id.) Dr. Kovacs diagnosed

hypokalemia, chest pain, hypertension, and marked depression.

(Id.) Plaintiff was continued on Celexa for her depression and

was provided with medication samples. (Id.) 

Dr. Kovacs’ June 28, 2000 treatment notes reflect that

Plaintiff appeared just a little bit less depressed, and was

directed to continue taking the Celexa and her other medication.

(Id. at 219). She was diagnosed with hypokalemia, depression,

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 12 of 43
6This referral was in connection with Plaintiff’s initial

application.

13

severe, and hypertension. (Id.) Plaintiff was also provided with

more medication samples. (Tr. 219). The notes reflect that on

August 25, 2000, Plaintiff was again provided with medication

samples. (Id.) Dr. Kovacs’ September 13, 2000 notes reflect that

Plaintiff reported that she had been without her medication for

several days, and in response thereto, was provided with more

samples. (Id. at 216-217). Dr. Kovacs listed her impressions as

persistent hypokalemia, hypertension (not yet under control), and

depression/anxiety. (Id.) She also noted noncompliance due to

financial reasons. (Id.) Plaintiff was provided with a six week

supply of her medications and was encouraged to apply for Medicaid

due to her financial situation and the fact that the doctor would

not always be able to supply her with samples. (Id.)

At the request of the State Agency, Plaintiff underwent a

consultative psychological evaluation with Clinical Psychologist

Annie Formwalt, Psy. D., (hereinafter “Dr. Formwalt”), on May 10,

2000.6 (Tr. 171-173). Plaintiff reported sleep disturbances,

erratic appetite patterns, feelings of sadness, social withdrawal

and hopelessness. (Id.) She denied any suicidal or homicidal

ideations. (Id.) Dr. Formwalt observed that Plaintiff’s affect

was sad and tearful, that she cried throughout the majority of the

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7This referral was in connection with Plaintiff’s initial

application.

14

interview, her dress and grooming were appropriate, she was

oriented in all four spheres, her concentration appeared impaired,

she had no problems with change-making and simple arithmetic, she

had no problem with immediate memory, her thought processes were

intact, she did not appear anxious; however, her mood seemed

depressed, her insight and understanding of herself were fair, her

judgement was fair, and she could likely manage her own funds.

(Id. at 171-173). Dr. Formwalt concluded that Plaintiff would

likely receive some benefit from treatment within the next six to

twelve months. (Id. at 173).

At the request of the State Agency, Plaintiff underwent a

consultative physical examination on May 24, 2000 by John Lowery,

M.D., (hereinafter “Dr. Lowery”).7 (Tr. 194-195). He observed

that Plaintiff was alert, but her effect was very flat, and she

did not maintain eye contact. (Id. at 194). Dr. Lowery opined

that neurologically, Plaintiff was essentially normal other than

her effect. (Id. at 195). His diagnosis was asthma,

hypertension, depression, cardiomegaly (by history), and chest

pain. (Id.)

At the request of the State Agency, Donald E. Hinton, Ph.D.,

(hereinafter “Dr. Hinton”), prepared a Psychiatric Technique

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8This referral was in connection with Plaintiff’s initial

application.

15

Review Form on May 18, 2000 (Tr. 174-187), and a Functional

Capacity Assessment dated July 3, 2000 (id. at 197-204), following

a review of Plaintiff’s medical records.8 On the Psychiatric

Form, Dr. Hinton noted that Plaintiff takes care of her personal

needs, cooks, shops, does some laundry, watches TV, reads, goes

to church and the store, gets along with others, visits, talks on

the phone, and with appropriate health treatment and compliance,

significant progress in her depression should be noted. (Id. at

175). He diagnosed affective disorder as evidenced by major

depression. (Id. at 175-177). He also concluded that Plaintiff’s

general report of limitations appeared inconsistent with the

findings and her symptoms were felt to be partially credible.

(Id. at 183). With respect to Plaintiff’s physical limitations,

Dr. Hinton opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift 50 pounds

and frequently lift 25 pounds. (Id. at 198). He also opined that

Plaintiff could stand and/or walk about six hours in an eight hour

work day, could sit about six hours in an eight hour workday, and

her ability to push and or pull was unlimited. (Tr. 198).

In December 2000, Plaintiff’s blood pressure was “sky high”

and she reported to Dr. Kovacs that she had been out of her

medicine for one and one-half months. (Id. at 215). She was

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16

given samples of Diovan; however, Dr. Kovacs did not have any

Celexa samples to give her. (Id.) Dr. Kovacs diagnosed

escalating hypertension, hypokalemia, and “[g]ross noncompliance

with medical advi[c]e, partially related to financial situation

but partially I think it’s the patient’s negligence and depression

. . . .” (Id.)

Plaintiff saw Dr. Kovacs again, more than three months later,

on April 25, 2001. (Id. at 213-214). Dr. Kovacs noted that

Plaintiff was “always in a depressed mood” and that her affect was

“flat.” (Id. at 213). She also questioned Plaintiff’s efforts

to occasionally pay for her own medication, and diagnosed her with

hypertension, hypokalemia, depression, and non-compliance of

medical therapy for financial reasons. (Tr. 213). Plaintiff was

provided with samples and directed to return in three months.

(Id. at 213-214). 

Dr. Kovacs completed a Request for Medical Information form

for the Department of Human Resources Food Stamp Program dated May

10, 2001, in which she opined that Plaintiff was mentally and

physically unable to work because of hypertension and depression.

(Id. at 297). She also indicated that the condition was expected

to be permanent. (Id.) 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Kovacs on June 8, 2001 requesting

medication samples. (Id. at 211-212). She indicated that she

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17

could not afford medicine because of her husband’s illness, but

did not voice any particular complaints. (Id. at 211). Dr.

Kovacs’ notes reflect that the Celexa helped with Plaintiff’s

anxiety; however, Dr. Kovacs did not think Plaintiff’s depression

was resolved. (Tr. 211). She observed that Plaintiff appeared

to be “very bitter.” (Id. at 212). Plaintiff was diagnosed with

poorly controlled hypertension, resolved electrolyte imbalance,

monitoring of high risk medications, depression, and questionable

noncompliance. (Id.) She was given medication samples and a

prescription for K-Dur. (Id.) She was advised to follow-up in

two months. (Id.) A July 25, 2001 entry reflects that Plaintiff

was seen for lab work and a blood pressure check. (Id.) There

is also a notation that Plaintiff had visited ER the preceding

Sunday for depression and anxiety. (Tr. 212). 

On July 19, 2001, Plaintiff, at the request of the State

Agency, underwent a psychological examination conducted by

Clinical Psychologist Patricia G. McCleary, Ph.D., (hereinafter

“Dr. McCleary”). (Id. at 205-207). Plaintiff reported to Dr.

McCleary that she had been hospitalized in 1976 for emotional

problems, but she was not currently in treatment. (Id. at 205).

She also reported that she left her insurance job after 25 years

because she could not take the pressure anymore. (Id. at 205-

206). Additionally, she stated that she lives with her adult

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 17 of 43
18

daughter, she is independent in activities of daily living, she

has no hobbies, but attends church on a regular basis. (Id. at

206). Plaintiff also reported that her husband was in the

hospital and might be dying, and that she has experienced

depression over the loss of family members throughout the years,

including five deaths between 1996 and 1998. (Id.) 

Dr. McCleary observed that Plaintiff’s grooming and hygiene

were adequate, she was alert and attentive, she was oriented to

time, place and person, her recent and remote memory were intact,

her affect was stable, her thinking was clear and coherent, her

mood appeared mildly depressed, she did not exhibit any delusional

ideation, she had no difficulty following simple and complex

verbal commands, and her thinking was concrete. (Tr. 206). Dr.

McCleary determined that Plaintiff had a restricted lifestyle,

that she was independent in her daily activities, that she helps

to maintain her home, can manage her own financial benefits, and

can understand, carry out and remember simple and complex verbal

instructions. (Id. at 207). She diagnosed Plaintiff with mild

depression related to the hospitalization of her husband and the

deaths of family members over the last 40 years. (Id.) She

opined that Plaintiff would benefit from therapy sessions at the

Mobile Mental Health Center for help with coping with her

husband’s illness, her physical restrictions and her changed life

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 18 of 43
19

circumstances. (Id.)

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Kovacs on August 6, 2001. (Id. at

210). She reported that her husband had died the prior night, and

that she had a severe throbbing headache. (Id.) Dr. Kovacs

observed that Plaintiff was crying, her blood pressure was

elevated and she was not “feeling well at all.” (Tr. 210).

According to Dr. Kovacs, Plaintiff was alert, but she could not

get much information out of her. (Id.) Dr. Kovacs’ diagnosis was

anxiety/depression, crying, hypertension (escalating), headache

(most probably related to anxiety), and electrolyte imbalance

(resolved). (Id.) She was given Klonopin for anxiety and

insomnia, Demerol 50, and Phenergan 25 IM for the severe headache.

(Id.) Plaintiff was also directed to continue on Serzone as

previously ordered, and was given a prescription for Tylenol #3

#30 for headaches. (Id.)

On August 13, 2001, Plaintiff underwent a consultative

examination performed by Eric Becker, D.O., (hereinafter “Dr.

Becker”), and his staff, at the request of the State Agency. (Id.

at 229-233). Plaintiff reported that she was unable to work due

to stress, heart problems and “lots of things.” (Id. at 229).

Plaintiff also reported arthritis of the right leg, knee and foot,

left hip pain, problems with her nerves, an enlarged heart and

hypertension. (Tr. 229). A physical examination revealed a

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 19 of 43
20

supple neck with no adenopathy, clear lungs, a normal heart

rhythm, and no edema or synovitis of her extremities. (Id.)

Plaintiff was unable to squat, heel-to-toe walk, or walk on her

tip toes, due to her sedation. (Id.) Although Plaintiff

complained of pain over her entire back, when it was palpated, her

straight leg raising tests were negative and her neurological

examination was intact. (Id.) Dr. Becker diagnosed Plaintiff with

sedation (questionable over medication), uncontrolled

hypertension, left ventricular dysfunction, a history of

osteoarthritis, depression, and borderline cardiomegaly. (Id. at

230). 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Kovacs on August 28, 2001 for a

reevaluation of her hypertension and headaches. (Tr. 208-209).

She complained about cervical pain. (Id. at 208). She was

diagnosed with hypertension (still poorly controlled), cervical

strain and pain, depression, noncompliance, and obesity. (Id.)

Plaintiff was provided with samples of Diovan HCT and Serzone as

well as given a prescription for Flexaril 10 m.g. and Celebrex 200

m.g. for her neck and back pain. (Id. at 209). Plaintiff

subsequently advised Dr. Kovacs’ office by telephone, on September

25, 2001, that she had not filled her prescriptions because she

had no money or insurance. (Id.) She was given samples of

Norvasc, and advised to contact Catholic Social Services. (Id.)

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 20 of 43
21

In September 2001, William H. Simpson, Ph.D., (hereinafter

“Dr. Simpson”), a State Agency psychologist, reviewed Plaintiff’s

medical records and completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form.

(Tr. 242-255). He concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairment

was not severe and would not cause her more than mild restrictions

with respect to her activities of daily living, her ability to

maintain social functioning, and her ability to maintain

concentration, persistence and pace. (Id. at 252). He further

concluded that Plaintiff’s impairment would cause no episodes of

decompensation. (Id.)

In October 2001, Plaintiff sought treatment from the Franklin

Primary Health Center. (Id. at 256-260). She reported that she

fell on her left hip when her right leg gave way. (Id. at 259).

She complained of hip pain and depression. (Id.) Her mood was

sad, and she reported that her husband had recently died and that

she was experiencing insomnia. (Tr. 259). A physical examination

revealed normal neurological findings and no musculoskeletal

abnormalities, except pain. (Id. at 260). Treatment notes

reflect that Plaintiff’s hypertension was not well controlled and

her potassium level was borderline low. (Id.) She was referred

to the Mobile Mental Health Center for further evaluation and

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 21 of 43
9Subsequent treatment notes from the Franklin Center reflect

that as of November 12, 2001, Plaintiff’s mood was sad and her affect

was flat; she was diagnosed with depression, and it was noted that

“hopefully somatic complaints will improve when depression better

controlled.” (Tr. 286-287). The December 7, 2001 treatment notes

reflect that Plaintiff reported that her depression was getting a

little better, and that she was less depressed. (Id. at 284-285). 

The February 5, 2002 treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff was

reporting some insomnia, but the depression was better. (Id. at 282-

283). 

22

treatment.9 (Id.) 

On October 19, 2001, Plaintiff was initially treated at the

Mobile Mental Health Center. (Id. at 278-281). Her chief

complaints were depression, poor sleep, increased anxiety and

crying spells. (Id. at 278). She reported a longstanding history

of depression since childhood. (Tr. 278). The treatment notes

reflect that she was tearful, neatly groomed, her affect was

constricted, her thought process was non-delusional and goal

directed, she reported hearing voices sometimes, her memory was

intact, her insight and judgment were fair. (Id. at 280). She

was diagnosed with major depressive DO, recurrent, severe. (Id.

at 281). Plaintiff was to be waned off Serzone and was directed

to stop Celexa. (Id.) She was prescribed Paxil. (Id.) 

Between October 22, 2001 and December 5, 2001, Plaintiff was

treated at the Mobile Mental Health Center. (Tr. 272-277).

Treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff’s memory and concentration

were unimpaired and her thought process was logical, coherent and

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 22 of 43
23

within normal limits. (Id.) Plaintiff reported feeling sad and

helpless, but her appetite and sleep were fair. (Id.) While

Plaintiff had initially presented with a sad and tearful mood,

treatment notes dated November 15, 2001 indicate that Plaintiff’s

depressive symptoms were better, and she reported that she was

feeling better. (Id. at 276). She was continued on Paxil. (Id.)

On December 5, 2001, Plaintiff reported that she was crying less

and sleeping better. (Id. at 272). Her Paxil was increased to

40 m.g. and she was directed to return in one month. (Tr. 272).

On December 19, 2001, Plaintiff underwent a psychological

evaluation by D. Kent Welsh, Ph.D, (hereinafter “Dr. Welsh”), at

the request of her attorney. (Id. at 264-267). Plaintiff

reported that pain in her back, legs and feet, as well as her

depression, interfered with her ability to function. (Id. at

264). She also reported that she retired from her insurance job

because she had given “out.” (Id. at 265). Her nerves were bad,

and she was on “edge” all the time. (Id.) She reported that from

1995 to present, many close family members and friends had died,

including four aunts in the 1995-1996 time frame, her

granddaughter in 1996, three of her sisters-in-laws from 1999-

2001, her husband in August 2001, and a close friend in September

2001. (Id. at 265). Plaintiff also reported that she spent most

of her time at home, that she slept a lot, that she occasionally

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 23 of 43
24

helped her daughter with laundry, cooking and shopping, and that

she attended church on a regular basis. (Tr. 265). 

Dr. Welsh observed that Plaintiff was alert and oriented as

to time, place, person and situation, and was extremely depressed

and teary. (Id. at 266). Plaintiff acknowledged some suicidal

thoughts, but no current plans. (Id.) She also reported sleep

interruption, and that she was currently taking Diovan, D-Dur20,

Flexeril, Paxil and Norvasc. (Id.) Dr. Welsh found that

Plaintiff could complete simple math problems, her immediate,

recent and remote memory function was somewhat impaired, she

demonstrated difficulty concentrating and paying attention to

information, and her judgment was adequate to make work decisions

and manage her own financial affairs. (Id.) The MMPI-2 was not

administered due to Plaintiff’s difficulty with attention and

concentration as well as the slowness of her performance. (Id.)

Dr. Welsh opined that treatment thus far had been unsuccessful,

and that Plaintiff could not complete tasks in a timely manner due

to problems with concentration, pace and persistence. (Tr. 267).

He also opined that Plaintiff had withdrawn from contact with most

people and was unable to maintain her previous level of social

functions. (Id.) He diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive

disorder, and assigned her a current GAF score of 40, as well as

a 40 for the prior year. (Id.)

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 24 of 43
25

On January 7, 2002, Dr. Welsh completed a Mental Residual

Functional Capacity Questionnaire, in which he determined that

Plaintiff had: moderate limitations in activities of daily living;

marked limitations in maintaining social functioning; extreme

deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace; and four or

more episodes of decompensation at work or in a work-like setting.

(Id. at 268-270). He also rated Plaintiff as moderately impaired

in her ability to understand, carry out and remember instructions

and respond appropriately to supervision and co-workers and

perform simple and repetitive tasks. (Id.) Additionally, he

rated Plaintiff as extremely limited in her ability to respond

appropriately to customary work pressures, and opined that she was

extremely depressed and that her medication (Paxil) was not

effective in managing her depression. (Id.) 

During the January through March 2002 time frame, Plaintiff

was treated at the Mobile Mental Health Center. (Tr. 289-292,

298-299). In early January 2002, Plaintiff reported that she

spent the Christmas holidays relaxing at her son’s house in

Georgia. (Id. at 291). She reported that she was feeling better,

and that she was not crying as much. (Id.) She also reported

feeling tired, and the therapist suggested that Plaintiff have her

thyroid hormones checked and restart her medicine for anemia.

(Id.) The therapist noted that Plaintiff’s appearance was

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 25 of 43
26

appropriate, her mood was normal, her affect was flat, her speech

was vague, her appetite and sleep were fair, she did not have any

suicidal or homicidal thoughts, her memory was unimpaired, her

thoughts were logical and coherent, her concentration was

unimpaired, and she was compliant with her medication. (Id.)

Treatment notes from another early January 2002 visit reflect

that Plaintiff reported that she was sleeping well most nights,

except when she had muscle spasms. (Id. at 292). During that

visit, the therapist noted that Plaintiff’s appearance was

appropriate, her mood was normal, her affect was appropriate to

situation, her speech was unimpaired, her appetite/sleep were

fair, she did not have any suicidal or homicidal thoughts, her

memory was unimpaired, her thoughts were logical and coherent, her

concentration was unimpaired, and she was compliant with her

medication. (Id.) Plaintiff was continued on Paxil. (Tr. 292).

During Plaintiff’s January 24, 2002 visit, she related that

her sister was in the hospital and that her prognosis was not

good. (Id. at 290). The treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

was distraught by the loss of so many of her family members.

(Id.) The therapist noted that Plaintiff’s appearance was

appropriate, her mood was sad, her affect was tearful, her speech

was unimpaired, her appetite was fair, her sleep was good, she did

not have any suicidal or homicidal thoughts, her memory was

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 26 of 43
27

unimpaired, her thoughts were logical and coherent, her

concentration was unimpaired, and she was compliant with her

medication. (Id.)

During Plaintiff’s February 7, 2002 visit, she reported that

she was not doing well because her sister was now in the

psychiatric ward at Mobile Infirmary following an incident with

her boyfriend and police officers. (Id. at 289). Plaintiff was

encouraged to plan some activities that would give her some good

memories of her sister. (Id.) The therapist noted that

Plaintiff’s appearance was appropriate, her mood/affect were sad,

her speech was unimpaired, her appetite/sleep were good, she did

not have any suicidal or homicidal thoughts, her memory was

unimpaired, her thoughts were logical and coherent, her

concentration was unimpaired, and she was compliant with her

medication. (Tr. 289). 

Plaintiff was treated again on February 22, 2002. (Id. at

299). During this visit, Plaintiff reported problems sleeping at

night, and indicated that she feels tired and depressed “some

during the day.” (Id.) The therapist noted that Plaintiff’s

appearance was appropriate, her mood was sad, her affect was

tearful, her speech was unimpaired, her appetite/sleep were fair,

she did not have any suicidal or homicidal thoughts, her memory

was unimpaired, her thoughts were logical and coherent, her

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 27 of 43
28

concentration was unimpaired, and she was compliant with her

medication. (Id.) Plaintiff was continued on Paxil, and

prescribed Wellbutrin (an anti-depressant). (Id.)

During her March 1, 2002 visit, Plaintiff indicated that she

still felt depressed and tired during the day, but that the

Wellbutrin seemed to help her during the day. (Id. at 298). The

therapist noted that Plaintiff’s appearance was appropriate, her

mood was normal, her affect was appropriate to the situation, her

speech was unimpaired, her appetite was good, her sleep was fair,

she did not have any suicidal or homicidal thoughts, her memory

was unimpaired, her thoughts were logical and coherent, her

concentration was unimpaired, and she was compliant with her

medication. (Tr. 298). She was continued on Paxil, and her

Wellbutrin was increased to 150 m.g. (Id.)

William Bell, M.D., (hereinafter “Dr. Bell”), authored a oneline written opinion, dated March 29, 2002, that stated that

Plaintiff was emotionally disabled. (Id. at 314). At the request

of the State Agency, Dr. Bell also examined Plaintiff on May 3,

2002, and completed a written evaluation on May 10, 2002. (Id.

at 306-313). Plaintiff’s chief complaint was stress. (Id. at

306). She reported that she quit her insurance job because of

severe stress and bad nerves. (Id.) She indicated that she had

a history of depression, that she was hospitalized for a nervous

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 28 of 43
10Dr. Bell also completed a Medical Source Opinion (Physical) in

which he opined that within an eight hour day, Plaintiff could stand

three hours, walk two hours and sit four to six hours. (Tr. 309-

313). He further opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and

carry 25 pounds. (Id. at 309).

29

breakdown in 1976, that she was depressed over the deaths of

multiple relatives and close friends, and that the recent death

of her husband had caused her to become very withdrawn. (Tr.

306). She also reported non-specific problems such as pain in her

legs, shoulders, ankles and feet. (Id.) During his physical

examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Bell found that her motor and

sensory functions were intact, she was able to ambulate without

assistance and she did not have any edema, clubbing or cyanosis.

(Id. at 307). He also noted that Plaintiff was unable to squat

and kneel because of alleged pain in her legs, and was unable to

flex beyond 60 without complaining of pain in her back. (Id.)

He further found that Plaintiff has hypertension, a history of

recurrent chest pain and arthritis in her knees which tends to

interfere with her normal activities. (Id.) He also found that

Plaintiff was oriented to time, place and person and answered

questions appropriately, but appeared “rather despondent” and

somewhat10 withdrawn. (Id.) Dr. Bell opined that Plaintiff was

“obviously depressed.” (Tr. 307). 

Plaintiff also underwent a consultative psychological

examination with Psychiatrist C.E. Smith, M.D., (hereinafter “Dr.

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 29 of 43
30

Smith”), on May 10, 2002. (Id. at 300-302). Plaintiff reported

her medical problems as asthma, hypertension, “nerves,” tension,

depression and stresses. (Id.) She also reported that her

regular medications included Wellbutrin and Paxil,

antidepressants. (Id.) Dr. Smith observed that Plaintiff was

appropriately dressed, she was alert and in good contact, her

speech articulation was good, she was coherent and showed no

thinking disorder, she gave no indication of delusion or

hallucinations, she appeared depressed, her affect was adequate

and appropriate, she was tearful at times and began screaming in

distress near the end of the interview, as she relayed that “my

big sister died the other day in my arms.” (Id. at 301).

Dr. Smith diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder,

by history, and bereavement. (Id. at 302). He also noted that

although Plaintiff was in the “throws of acute bereavement” during

the interview, she was alert, performed well, showed no thinking

disorder and gave no indication of organicity. (Tr. 301). He

further found that Plaintiff understood, remembered and carried

out complex instructions, she appeared able to manage her own

finances, and she showed a good response to the treatment that she

received at the Mobile Mental Health Center. (Id.) 

As noted supra, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in

finding that she does not suffer from a severe mental impairment.

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 30 of 43
31

Plaintiff bases her argument largely on the opinions expressed by

her treating physician, Dr. Kovacs, and the residual functional

capacity assessment completed by Dr. Welsh at the request of her

counsel. The undesigned is aware of the standard for a non-severe

impairment as set forth in Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920

(11th Cir. 1984), which states that an impairment is severe if it

causes more than just a slight abnormality which has such a

minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to

interfere with the ability to work without regard to the

plaintiff’s age, education or work experience. However, the

undersigned also recognizes the standard for review, i.e., is

there substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s

finding. Substantial evidence which is defined as “more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance,” consists of “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate

so support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971); Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. The “reasonable

person” standard dictates that if there is pertinent and adequate

evidence supporting a decision, it must be upheld. Martin v.

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Additionally,

this Court may neither substitute its own judgment for the

Commissioner’s nor reevaluate the evidence unless the decision is

clearly illogical and unsubstantiated. Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 31 of 43
32

1239. See also Powell v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir.

1985). Therefore, even when the evidence appears to weigh against

the Commissioner’s decision, this Court must affirm the decision

if there is sufficient supporting evidence. Martin, 894 F.2d at

1529; Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239.

Upon consideration of the entire administrative record and

Plaintiff’s testimony at the administrative hearing, the

undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, that Plaintiff

does not suffer from a severe mental impairment, is supported by

substantial evidence. In concluding that Plaintiff’s mental

condition does not rise to the level of a severe impairment, the

ALJ found that although she had been diagnosed with, and treated

for, depression, there is no evidence that her condition satisfies

the severity or duration requirements. 

The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s treatment records from the

Mobile Mental Health Center which consistently indicate that she

has no concentration impairments, that her thoughts were logical

and coherent, and that her memory was unimpaired. Additionally,

these records reflect that Plaintiff’s behavior was consistently

described as normal and her affect as appropriate to situation.

The ALJ also found that Dr. Smith’s psychological evaluation of

Plaintiff, which was conducted a mere two days after the death of

her sister, also determined that she had no limitations of

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 32 of 43
33

functions. As discussed by the ALJ, Dr. Smith found that

Plaintiff had no limitations in the areas of understanding,

remembering, or carrying out simple or complex instructions. The

ALJ also determined that Plaintiff has only mild restrictions in

her ability to respond appropriately to supervisors, co-workers,

customers or other members of the general public, use judgement

in making simple or complex work-related decisions, and maintain

attention and concentration for at least two hour intervals.

In reaching his decision, the ALJ also relied upon the

September 2001 Psychiatric Review Technique Form that was

completed by the State Agency Examiner in September 2001. As

noted supra, the examiner specifically found that Plaintiff had

only mild restrictions in her activities of daily living and in

her abilities to maintain social functions and concentration,

persistence and pace. As correctly noted by the ALJ, while the

Form was completed prior to Plaintiff’s treatment at the Mobile

Mental Health Center, “those treatment records “actually reinforce

that . . . [her] condition was not creating significant

limitations.” (Tr. 23). 

Although Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give

proper weight to the opinion of her treating physician, the

undersigned finds that the ALJ was correct in not according full

evidentiary weight to the opinion of Dr. Kovacs with respect to

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 33 of 43
34

Plaintiff’s mental impairment. Generally, the opinion of a

treating physician must be given substantial weight, or credit,

unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary. Crawford v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159-1160 (11th Cir. 2004); Phillips

v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004); Lewis v.

Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); Hillsman v. Bowen,

804 F.2d 1179, 1181-1182 (11th Cir. 1986). However, an ALJ may

properly discount the opinion of a treating physician if the

opinion is conclusory, inconsistent with their own medical

records, or if the evidence supports a contrary finding. Edwards

v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Schnorr v.

Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581-582 (11th Cir. 1987)); Lewis, 125 F.3d at

1440. See also Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159-1160 (finding that a

physician’s opinion that a claimant is permanently and totally

disabled was inconsistent with his own treatment notes,

unsupported by medical evidence and based primarily on the

claimant’s subjective complaints of pain). See also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2) (providing that if medical evidence is internally

inconsistent, the Commissioner may weigh all the evidence and make

a decision if he can do so on the available evidence); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(d)(4) (stating that generally, the more consistent an

opinion with the record as a whole, the greater weight it will be

given). If the ALJ discounts the opinion of a treating physician,

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 34 of 43
35

he must clearly articulate his reasons. Lewis, 125 F.2d at 1440;

MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986). Also,

the ALJ’s reasons must be legally correct and supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159-

1560; Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703-704 (11th Cir. 1988).

In concluding that little evidentiary weight should be

afforded to Dr. Kovacs’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s mental

impairment, the ALJ observed that although Dr. Kovacs opined that

Plaintiff was disabled because of her hypertension and depression,

she “did not complete the [food stamp] form” and is not a

psychiatrist. (Tr. 20). Additionally, a review of Dr. Kovacs’

treatment notes fails to reveal any functional limitations caused

by Plaintiff’s depression. For example, other than to observe

that Plaintiff was tearful, crying and depressed, Dr. Kovacs’

treatment notes provide no information regarding Plaintiff’s

concentration, persistence or memory, nor is there any information

regarding Plaintiff’s ability to respond appropriately to

supervision and co-workers, or her ability to understand, remember

and carry out simple or complex instructions. Accordingly, the

ALJ was correct in not according persuasive weight to Dr. Kovacs’

conclusory opinion regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment. This

is particularly true in light of the treatment records from the

Mobile Mental Health Center and Dr. Smith’s evaluation.

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 35 of 43
36

Likewise, the ALJ was correct in discounting the opinion of

Dr. Bell regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment. In rejecting

Dr. Bells’s opinion, the ALJ observed that “Dr. Bell is not a

psychiatrist, and he performed no medically accepted laboratory

or diagnostic techniques to reach his conclusion.” (Tr. 20). A

review of Dr. Bell’s assessment reveals that aside from his

conclusory opinion that “claimant is disabled emotionally,” his

assessment contains no findings regarding Plaintiff’s

concentration, persistence or memory, nor is there any finding

regarding Plaintiff’s ability to respond appropriately to

supervision and co-workers, or her ability to understand, remember

and carry out simple or complex instructions. In short, Dr.

Bell’s assessment did not list any specific limitations caused by

Plaintiff’s mental conditions. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err

in discounting his opinion.

Similarly, the ALJ did not err in determining that Dr.

Welsh’s evaluation was not supported by the record evidence. As

correctly noted by the ALJ, many of Dr. Welsh’s findings are

contradicted by Plaintiff’s treatment notes, or are internally

inconsistent. For instance, while Dr. Welsh found that Plaintiff

had “extreme deficiencies in concentration and persistence,”

neither Dr. Kovacs’ treatment notes nor the Mobile Mental Health

Center notes support such a conclusion. In fact, as noted supra,

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 36 of 43
37

the Mobile Mental Health Center notes consistently reflect that

Plaintiff does not have any concentration impairments. The Mobile

Mental Health Center treatment notes for the December to January

2002 time frame, which were recorded in close proximity to

Plaintiff’s examination by Dr. Welsh, reflect that Plaintiff was

sleeping better and was not as depressed. See supra. Likewise,

the December 7, 2001 treatment notes from the Franklin Primary

Health Center reflect that Plaintiff reported that her depression

was better. Additionally, while Dr. Welsh assigned Plaintiff a

GAF score of 40 during 2001 and 2002 and found that she had marked

limitations on her ability to maintain social functioning and

would experience four or more episodes of decompensation in a work

setting, there is nothing in Plaintiff’s treatment notes, her

daily activities questionnaires or her hearing testimony which

supports such a finding. 

The record evidence reflects that while Plaintiff was

hospitalized following some type of nervous breakdown in 1976, she

responded well to treatment and remained employed in the insurance

field until 1999. Moreover, the record reflects that while

Plaintiff reported sleeping and eating disturbances and complained

of depression during periods in which she was coping with the

illness and deaths of multiple relatives, there is no evidence of

any weight loss. The evidence instead reflects that she responded

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 37 of 43
38

well to medications and individual therapy, and was consistently

found by the Mobile Mental Health Center to have no suicidal or

homicidal thoughts, or any problems with concentrating,

remembering or staying focused. Additionally, her memory was

found to be unimpaired, and her thoughts were logical and

coherent. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that there is

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision that “while

there may have been a period during which the claimant’s mental

impairment significantly limited her work abilities, that period

was not long enough to meet the duration period.” 

3. The ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff’s

credibility. 

Plaintiff’s next assertion is that the ALJ erred in assessing

her credibility. In considering testimony of pain and other

symptoms, a claimant must show: (1) evidence of an underlying

medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence

confirming the severity of the alleged symptoms or (b) that the

objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be

expected to give rise to the alleged symptoms. Wilson v.

Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Holt v.

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, Social

Security Ruling 96-7p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and

XVI: Evaluation Of Symptoms In Disability Claims: Assessing The

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 38 of 43
39

Credibility Of An Individual's Statements, 1996 WL 374186,

requires the ALJ to determine whether the medically determinable

impairment could reasonably give rise to the symptoms alleged.

In Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995), the

Eleventh Circuit explained: 

A clearly articulated credibility finding with

substantial supporting evidence in the record will not

be disturbed by a reviewing court . . . . A lack of an

explicit credibility finding becomes a ground for remand

when credibility is critical to the outcome of the case

. . . . While an adequate credibility finding need not

cite “particular phrases or formulations . . . broad

findings that [a claimant] lacked credibility and could

return to her past work alone are not enough to enable

us to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical

condition as a whole.” . . . . If proof of disability is

based upon subjective evidence and a credibility

determination is, therefore, critical to the decision,

“the ALJ must either explicitly discredit such testimony

or the implication must be so clear as to amount to a

specific credibility finding.” Explicit credibility

findings are “necessary and crucial where subjective

pain is an issue.” . . . .

Id. (citations omitted). See also Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d

1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991). Additionally, when making a

credibility determination, the ALJ may consider plaintiff’s daily

activities. Macia v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987).

See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (providing that “[f]actors

relevant to your symptoms, such as pain, which we will consider

include: (i) Your daily activities[]”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).

Moreover, “[t]he credibility of witnesses is for the

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 39 of 43
40

[Commissioner] to determine, not the courts.” Carnes v. Sullivan,

936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Kelly v. Heckler, 736

F.2d 631, 632 (11th Cir. 1984)). 

In the case sub judice, the ALJ opined, with respect to

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and allegations of functional

limitations, as follows:

The claimant’s subjective complaints and allegations of

functional limitations are not supported by the credible

evidence of record. While it is credible that she has

limitations, the degree of limitation alleged was not

persuasive.

(Tr. 24). 

As noted supra, substantial medical evidence demonstrates

that while Plaintiff has reported some sleeping and eating

disturbances, and complained of depression in connection with the

illnesses and deaths of multiple relatives, she has responded well

to treatment and has not had suicidal or homicidal thoughts, nor

has she had any problems with her memory or concentration.

Moreover, while Plaintiff testified that she spends her days

“[m]ostly in bed[,]” she has also reported that she listens to the

radio, visits and talks on the phone to friends, regularly attends

church, shops, and prepares some of her meals. Additionally,

Plaintiff’s treatment records from Dr. Kovacs and the Mobile

Mental Health Center do not reveal any limitations in her daily

activities. Further, the ALJ noted “[i]nterestingly, while the

Case 1:04-cv-00359-CB-B Document 21 Filed 09/20/05 Page 40 of 43
41

claimant bases disability in large part on pain, Dr. Kovacs did

not even mention pain in . . . [her] report.” (Tr. 24). The ALJ

further noted that Plaintiff “has only sought and received

conservative medical treatment[,]” “has not been hospitalized for

pain or referred to a pain clinic” and “only uses pain medicine

intermittently[.]” (Id. at 22). Accordingly, upon consideration

of the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the ALJ did not err

in the weight afforded Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful

consideration of the administrative record, it is the

RECOMMENDATION of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that the

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying

Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits, be AFFIRMED.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to this Report and Recommendation.

DONE this 19th day of September, 2005.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); and Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out

in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides,

in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served

with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different

time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the

recommendation to which objection is made and the

basis for the objection. The objecting party shall

submit to the district judge, at the time of filing

the objection, a brief setting forth the party’s

arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition

made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the

original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted

or referred to and incorporated into the brief in

support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief

in support of the objection may be deemed an

abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment

can be appealed.

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2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10)

days of being served with a copy of the statement of objection.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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