Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00577/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00577-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Damon Shane Tucker, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

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CIV 13-0577-PHX-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Damon Shane Tucker, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex-Eyman, Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(hereinafter “habeas petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an

Limited Answer on June 17, 2013 (Doc. 10). On July 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc.

12). On July 14, 2013, in response to this Court’s Order, Respondents filed a

Supplementation with Inadvertently Omitted Exhibit (Doc. 14).

BACKGROUND

In January, 2003, Petitioner was charged by the State of Arizona with thirteen counts

of sexual exploitation of a minor. (Doc. 10-1, at 3, 17.) These charges came as a result of

a search warrant served by Mesa police officers on Petitioner’s home, during which

computer-generated photographic images of nude females appearing to be between eight and

ten years old and posing in sexually explicit positions were found on Petitioner’s computer

and in a black binder. (Id., at 3-4.) Petitioner admitted that the images were his. (Id., at 4.)

Petitioner was tried on six of the counts charged. (Id.) During his trial Petitioner denied

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downloading the images or ownership and knowledge of the images in the binder. (Id.)

Petitioner was convicted on all counts, all class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against

children, and sentenced to six consecutive ten-year terms of imprisonment. (Id., at 2, 4.)

On appeal, Petitioner’s court-appointed counsel filed a brief in accordance with

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no colorable claims to raise on appeal.

(Doc. 10-1, at 25.) Petitioner thereafter filed a pro se supplemental opening brief raising the

following claims on appeal: (1) that the sexual exploitation of a minor statute is

unconstitutional; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement

to police; (3) that his sentence was excessive and unconstitutional; and (4) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 10-2, at 3; Doc. 10-3, 17-27.) On September 13, 2005, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, finding the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim non-cognizable on direct appeal, and finding the other

claims meritless. (Doc. 10-1, at 2-12.) Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme

Court, and on June 5, 2006, that court summarily denied review. (Doc. 10-4, at 2.)

On October 4, 2005, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

(“PCR”). (Doc. 10-4, at 4.) Petitioner’s counsel thereafter filed a Notice of Completion of

Post-Conviction Review by Counsel; Request for Extension of Time to Allow Defendant to

File Pro-Per Supplement to Petition for Post Conviction Relief, indicating that he had

reviewed the record for fundamental errors pursuant to Anders, and found no claims to raise

in post-conviction proceedings. (Doc. 10-4, at 11-12.) Petitioner then filed a pro se

supplemental PCR petition, raising the following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial

counsel; (2) insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (3) his convictions otherwise

violated ex-post-facto principles; and (4) his sentences were excessive. (Doc. 10-4, at 14-

23.) On August 28, 2007, the trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s PCR, pursuant to

Rule 32-6(C), Ariz.R.Cim.P., “for the reasons stated in the State’s Response.” (Doc. 11-1,

at 14.) Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and on December 29, 2008,

that court denied review without comment. (Id., at 16.)

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On May 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a second PCR notice. (Doc. 11-1, at 22-24.) In his

pro se PCR petition, Petitioner claimed that a jury instruction omitted an essential element

of the charged offense, and that his failure to raise this claim in his previous PCR petition

was due to the “lack of law libraries.” (Doc. 11-2, at 2-4.) Petitioner also claimed that the

faulty jury instruction constituted fundamental error, and that his trial counsel’s failure to

object to the instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id., at 5.) On

November 30, 2009, the trial court summarily denied relief, finding that Petitioner’s claims

were untimely:

[A]n untimely notice may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (f), (g),

or (h). Rule 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition,

defendant is precluded from relief on these claims pursuant to Rule 32(a),

Ariz. R. Crim. P., because these claims either were or could have been raised

on appeal or in a prior Rule 32 proceeding.

(Id., at 14.) 

The Court also found that Petitioner’s faulty jury instruction claim was not “newly

discovered,” because it “could have reasonably been discovered prior to [Petitioner]’s

sentencing,” and, in any event, Petitioner had “not shown that a different jury instruction

would have changed the verdict.” (Id., at 15.) Although Petitioner claims that he sought

review of the trial court’s decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, counsel for Respondents

avows that the record of that court does not reflect that filing. (Doc. 10, at 4 n.3.)

On February 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a third PCR notice, and in his pro se PCR

petition he raised numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims, reurged his jury

instruction challenge, and challenged his enhanced sentences. (Doc. 11-2, at 17-19; Doc. 14,

at 2-11.) The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that “[t]his is [Petitioner]’s third Rule

32 proceeding and it has been initiated in an untimely manner.” (Doc. 11-3, at 2.) Petitioner

filed a petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and on September 21, 2011, that

court denied review without comment. (Id., at 5.) 

On October 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a fourth PCR notice, and in it, claimed that a

significant change in the law, specifically the holding in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309

(2012), had occurred that probably would overturn his conviction or sentence. (Doc. 11-3,

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at 7, 9-10.) On October 31, 2012, the trial court denied relief, holding that “[t]he Martinez

holding does not apply to the defendant nor does it provide relief at the state court level.”

(Id., at 13-14.) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, and, on February

27, 2013, that court denied review without comment. (Id., at 16.)

On March 20, 2103, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, in which he raises

three claims: (1) that he was entitled to new counsel in state court pursuant to Martinez; (2)

that the sexual exploitation of a minor statute is unconstitutional; and (3) that he is actually

innocent and is thus entitled to present any unexhausted claims pursuant to the gateway

exception articulated in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). (Doc. 1, at 6-9.) In their

Limited Answer, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s petition is untimely and should be

dismissed, as it was filed past the 1-year deadline imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). 

DISCUSSION

The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

“[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period

within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly

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filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state

petition that is not filed, however, within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed”

and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that

[is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for

post-conviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period.

See Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (The

petitioner was “not entitled to tolling during the interval between the completion of one

round of state collateral review and the commencement of a second round of review.”).

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

Applying the law to the facts of this case, Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely.

Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 2, 2006, 90-days after the Arizona

Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner filed a timely PCR petition, which was denied by

the trial court and, on December 29, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed his

timely-filed Petition for Review. Petitioner then filed three subsequent PCR petitions. More

than 2-and-a-half years of non-tolled time elapsed in the interim between each of Petitioner’s

subsequent PCR proceedings. Specifically, (1) more than 4 months of non-tolled time

elapsed between the December 29, 2008 decision denying appellate review in the first PCR

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proceeding and the May 11, 2009 filing of the second PCR notice (2) an additional 14

months of non-tolled time elapsed between the November 30, 2009 order denying postconviction relief in the second PCR proceeding and the February 9, 2011, filing of the third

PCR notice; and (3) an additional 12 months of non-tolled time elapsed between the

September 21, 2011 decision denying appellate review in the third PCR proceedings and the

October 18, 2012 filing of the fourth PCR notice. This calculation does not even take into

account the time that elapsed while Petitioner’s second, third and fourth PCR proceedings

were pending (approximately 17 months). Those proceedings arguably did not toll the

statute of limitations because the second, third and fourth PCR petitions were not properly

filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Pace, 544 U.S. at 413 (a state petition not filed within the

state’s required time limit is not properly filed and, therefore is not entitled to statutory

tolling). 

Although Petitioner is not entitled to sufficient statutory tolling to render his habeas

petition timely, the statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, ––– U.S. –––, –––; 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).

However, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his

way’” and prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S.

at 418).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s]

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969

(9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)

(stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high,

lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citation omitted). “When external forces, rather than

a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). Petitioner must also establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary

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1

 In Lee, the Ninth Circuit did not foreclose the possibility that, to qualify for an

“actual innocence” exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations, a petitioner must

demonstrate that he acted “diligent[ly].” See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934 n.9. The Court stated, in

pertinent part, “[b]ecause this case does not present the question, we need not – and do not

– decide what diligence, if any, a petitioner must demonstrate in order to qualify for the

actual innocence exception recognized in this opinion.” In reserving the issue, the en banc

court compared the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir.

2010) (requiring no showing of diligence) and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Flanders v.

Graves, 299 F.3d 978, 978 (8th Cir. 2002) (requiring a petitioner to show either that a statecreated barrier prevented his timely discovery of relevant facts or that a “reasonably diligent

petitioner” could not have discovered such facts in time to file within the limitations period).

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circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney

General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, Petitioner has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify

equitable tolling. In his Reply, Petitioner concedes that his habeas petition is untimely under

the AEDPA. (Doc. 12, at 1.) Petitioner argues, however that he is innocent, and that “the

precedent case of Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) contains a ‘Gateway’ exception for

fundamental miscarriage of justice.” (Id.) First, the Court finds that Petitioner has not

pursued his claim of innocence diligently, because the facts and law he cites in support of his

claim of innocence were available to him such that he could have filed a timely petition.

In Lee v. Lampert, the Ninth Circuit held that a credible showing of “actual

innocence” under Schlup, excuses the statute of limitations period established by the

AEDPA. 653 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011).1

 “[A] petitioner who makes such a showing may

pass through the Schlup gateway and have his otherwise time-barred claims heard on the

merits.” Id. at 932. To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the

new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. This standard “permits review only in the

‘extraordinary’ case, but it ‘does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner’s guilt or

innocence.’” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). The “petitioner must produce

sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him ‘within the narrow class of cases ...

implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Lee, 653 F.3d at 937 (quoting Schlup,

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513 U.S. at 314-15). “The evidence of innocence must be ‘so strong that a court cannot have

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free

of nonharmless constitutional error.’” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). As noted in

Lee, “Schlup requires a petitioner ‘to support his allegations of constitutional error with new

reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory, scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at trial.’” Id. (quoting

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). The habeas court considers all the evidence, both old and new,

incriminating and exculpatory, admissible at trial or not, and based on the complete record,

“the court makes a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed

jurors would do.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 938 (internal quotations omitted).

Petitioner does not present any new facts or law, but argues that “there was no specific

elements of a criminal act alleged in the indictment,” because the “charging of file names and

no documentation establishing the identity or age of the participants, nor any statement of

fact and all counts are multiplicitous as they were contained in a single storage unit (the hard

drive).” (Doc. 12, at 2.) Petitioner’s argument that the charging document was deficient

because it did not identify sufficiently the identify or age of the children depicted in the

pornographic images, or that the counts charged are multiplicitous is a claim of legal error,

not a claim of actual innocence. Furthermore, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered the

issue raised by Petitioner of the constitutionality of the child pornography statute and found

that the statute was not overbroad and upheld its constitutionality. (Doc. 10-1, at 5.) The

Court also found that the children involved in the images Petitioner possessed “were clearly

under fifteen years of age,” and noted that Petitioner had “admitted that the images were his”

and “acknowledged” that they provided him with a “sexual outlet.” (Id., at 7.) 

The Court finds that Petitioner’s “new evidence” does not approach the

“extraordinary” showing contemplated by Schlup, and thus, Petitioner cannot pass through

the Schlup actual innocence gateway. Furthermore, Petitioner has not pursued his claim

diligently such that he would be entitled to equitable tolling of his claim. His habeas petition

is, therefore, untimely.

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CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s claims in his habeas petition are untimely under

the AEDPA, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and because the dismissal of the

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 7th day of August, 2013.

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