Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00960/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00960-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID R. PECK, TRUSTEE OF THE

TAMALPAIS PROPERTY TRUST,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PER BESSING, ANTON C. POGANY, JEAN

C. POGANY, EDWARD J. FOTSCH, GOLDEN

GATE NATIONAL RECREATION AREA,

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, GOLDEN GATE

BRIDGE AND HIGHWAY DISTRICT and

DOES ONE through THIRTY, 

Defendants. 

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No. 05-0960 SC

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS NATIONAL

PARK SERVICE'S AND

GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL

RECREATION AREA'S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

ON THE PLEADINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff David Peck ("Plaintiff" or "Peck") filed this

action on March 7, 2005, alleging five causes of action against

various defendants as a result of a landslide that occurred on

March 7, 2002, causing damage to two properties that Plaintiff

owns in Sausalito, California. Defendants National Park Service

("NPS") and Golden Gate National Recreation Area ("GGNRA";

collectively, the "Federal Defendants") now move this Court for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure ("FRCP") 12(c). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court hereby GRANTS the Federal Defendants' motion and DISMISSES

the Federal Defendants from this action. 

//

Case 3:05-cv-00960-SC Document 52 Filed 01/27/06 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the trustee of the Tamalpais Property Trust,

which owns and manages two properties located at 1 and 7 Alexander

Avenue in Sausalito, California. Complaint ¶ 4 ("Compl."). On

March 7, 2002, a landslide originating in the GGNRA slid into

Plaintiff's properties, allegedly causing damage to the properties

and rendering the residence at 1 Alexander Avenue uninhabitable

until the slide zone is fully repaired. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 30. Peck

alleges that the unstable conditions that contributed to

triggering the landslide were caused, at least in part, by the

diversion of water runoff onto GGNRA land by the individual

Defendants in this action that live uphill from Plaintiff's

Alexander Avenue properties. Id. ¶¶ 33-35. Plaintiff has further

alleged that the GGNRA was negligent in allowing the individual

defendants to divert water runoff onto GGNRA land and in failing

to maintain GGNRA land in a manner that would prevent landslides. 

Id. ¶¶ 64-88. Finally, Peck asserts that the GGNRA breached a

statutory duty to maintain the park land in a manner that would

protect Plaintiff's downhill properties. Id. ¶¶ 90-95.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under FRCP 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but

within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for

judgment on the pleadings." Courts considering such motions must

accept the allegations of the non-moving party as true, and must

assume that allegations made by the moving party that have been

denied are false. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner and Co.,

Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). Judgment on the

Case 3:05-cv-00960-SC Document 52 Filed 01/27/06 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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pleadings is inappropriate unless the moving party clearly

establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be decided

and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doleman

v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1984).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Sovereign Immunity and The Federal Tort Claims Act

The Federal Defendants assert that they are entitled to

judgment on the pleadings because, as agencies of the federal

government, they enjoy sovereign immunity from suits sounding in

tort except as provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1346, 2671-2680 ("FTCA"). See Defendants' Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings at 3 ("Def. Mot."). The Federal Defendants

further contend that because the United States has not

"unequivocally expressed" a waiver of sovereign immunity, and

because Peck has not complied with the procedural requirements of

the FTCA, that sovereign immunity divests this Court of subject

matter jurisdiction over Peck's claims against the GGNRA and NPS. 

Id.

In response, Peck contends that the FTCA does not apply to

actions seeking equitable relief because, by its terms, the FTCA

speaks only to "claims[s] against the United States for money

damages...." See Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings at 4 ("Pl.'s Opp."); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Plaintiff

argues that the procedural requirements imposed by the FTCA are

therefore inapplicable to his causes of action against the Federal

Defendants that seek only injunctive relief. See id.

The Court finds that Plaintiff, perhaps unwittingly, has

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Additionally, the Court notes, without deciding, that

because any claim for money damages Peck could potentially assert

would be subject to the two-year statute of limitations governing

tort actions against agencies of the federal government, pursuit of

an administrative claim at this point would likely be futile. See

28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 

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succinctly stated why its claims cannot proceed against the

Federal Defendants. Because the FTCA sets forth the sole

procedure under which a plaintiff may sue agencies of the United

States government absent a waiver of immunity, the fact that the

FTCA does not reference claims seeking equitable relief

establishes that such claims are not cognizible under the FTCA. 

See Westbay Steel, Inc. v. United States, 970 F.2d 648, 651 (9th

Cir. 1992); Smith v. Potter, 187 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y.

2001). Because Peck does not seek relief from the Federal

Defendants that is within the limited scope of actions

contemplated by the FTCA, sovereign immunity precludes this Court

from assuming jurisdiction over Peck's claims. See Jerves v.

United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992).

Perhaps realizing that his primary argument is entirely off

base, Peck asserts that, in the alternative, he should be granted

leave to amend his complaint so as to assert a claim against the

Federal Defendants that seeks money damages. See Pl.'s Opp. at 4. 

However, even if Peck were to assert a claim seeking money

damages, the Court could not assume subject matter jurisdiction

over that claim until it has been presented to the relevant

federal agency and denied or is deemed denied by the passage of

six months. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).1 The Court therefore declines

to grant Peck leave to amend his complaint because Peck cannot, at

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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this time, add any new claim over which this Court could assert

subject matter jurisdiction. 

B. Waiver of Immunity Under the Administrative Procedures

Act and the National Park Service Organic Act

Although Peck does not specifically reference the

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ("APA"),

that statute provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for

plaintiffs seeking equitable relief against the United States

government. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) & (2). Where a plaintiff seeks

to compel an agency to take action, the APA will effect a waiver

of immunity only where the "agency failed to take a discrete

agency action that it is required to take." Norton v. Southern

Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004). 

In his opposition papers, Peck asserts that the National Park

Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, provides the sort of mandatory

and specific guidance for agency action that would effect a waiver

of sovereign immunity with respect to plaintiffs seeking to compel

federal agencies to take such action. See Pl.'s Opp. at 4-6. The

National Park Service Organic Act directs the NPS to maintain the

National Parks in a manner consistent with the purpose of the

Parks, defined as:

to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects

and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of

the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them

unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.

16 U.S.C. § 1. 

Because allowing "the unnatural water flow and landslide

damage risk" is inconsistent with the purpose of the National

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United States District Court

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Parks, Peck argues, the United States has waived its immunity with

respect to plaintiffs in Peck's position who seek to compel the

Federal Defendants to restore the portion of the GGNRA that

allegedly continues to pose a danger of future landslides. See

Pl.'s Opp. at 6.

The Court disagrees. There is nothing in the National Parks

Organic Act that requires a federal agency to take discrete and

specific action. See 16 U.S.C. § 1; Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F.

Supp. 443, 448 (D.D.C. 1980)(noting that "nowhere in either [16

U.S.C. §§ 1 or 1a-1] is there a specific direction as to how the

protection of Park resources and their federal administration is

to be effected."). Rather, the statute speaks in general terms

that confer wide discretion upon the NPS in deciding how best to

fulfill the statute's mandate. Peck can identify no portion of 16

U.S.C. § 1--or of any other statute for that matter--that would

direct the NPS or GGNRA to take the sort of specific action sought

by Peck in this suit. Accordingly, the Federal Defendants have

not waived their sovereign immunity under the APA, and this Court

does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Peck's claims

asserted against the Federal Defendants.

//

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//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a waiver of sovereign

immunity by the Federal Defendants in this case, either under the

Federal Tort Claims Act or the Administrative Procedures Act. 

Accordingly, this Court may not assert subject matter jurisdiction

over Plaintiff's claims against the Federal Defendants. The Court

therefore GRANTS Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings

and DISMISSES the Federal Defendants from this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2006 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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