Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03957/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03957-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

JUAN HERNANDEZ, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 16-CV-03957-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR CLASS 

CERTIFICATION 

Re: Dkt. No. 125 

This case arises out of the June 2, 2016 rally for then-presidential candidate Donald J. 

Trump that took place at the McEnery Convention Center in downtown San Jose, California (the 

“Rally”). ECF No. 35 (“FAC”) ¶ 63. Twenty named plaintiffs bring this putative class action on 

behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against The City 

of San Jose and various individual officers of the San Jose Police Department (“SJPD”) 

(collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages, declaratory judgment, and 

injunctive relief stem from Defendants’ handling of the protest that occurred in response to the 

Rally. Id. ¶¶ 290-91, 295-96, 310. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Having considered the parties’ briefing, the 

relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for class 

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certification. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

This action has substantially narrowed over the course of the litigation. The First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) sets forth the basic allegations relevant to the remaining claims as 

follows: 

Plaintiffs are individuals who attended the Rally in June 2016. FAC ¶ 273. Defendants 

are The City of San Jose (the “City”) and SJPD officers Loyd Kinsworthy, Lisa Gannon, Kevin 

Abruzzini, Paul Messier, Paul Spagnoli, Johnson Fong, Jason Ta, and Does 1-15. FAC ¶¶ 281, 

293, 304. The SJPD was responsible for securing the area around the Rally site in order to ensure 

the safety of the presidential candidate, the Rally participants, and the general public. On the night 

of the Rally, a violent anti-Trump protest allegedly broke out in response to the Rally. See, e.g., 

id. ¶ 92. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ suit is that Defendants’ crowd control tactics following the 

Rally subjected the Rally participants to physical harm and/or property damage by the protestors. 

See id. ¶ 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference, 

reckless and/or conscious disregard of a known and obvious danger by directing Plaintiffs into the 

mob, preventing Plaintiffs from leaving the event through other, safer paths, and by failing to 

intervene in the many attacks perpetrated on Plaintiffs and the Class members.” Id. ¶ 287. 

As Plaintiffs were leaving the Rally, SJPD and other law enforcement officers directed 

Plaintiffs to use the east-northeast exit of the Convention Center. Id. ¶ 89. A police line outside 

the exit “directed the Trump supporters to turn north and to proceed along Market Street, into [a] 

crowd of violent anti-Trump protesters.” Id. ¶ 90. “The police also actively prevented the . . . 

Rally attendees from proceeding south along Market Street, away from the anti-Trump protesters, 

or from leaving the convention center through alternative exits.” Id. ¶ 91. In so doing, Plaintiffs 

claim, the officers “affirmatively direct[ed] the Class members through the violent mob of antiTrump protestors.” Id. ¶ 288. Plaintiffs further allege that violence had been reported as early as 

6:00 p.m. on the night of the Trump Rally, and yet the officers continued to force Plaintiffs to 

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follow this route even after they realized that doing so placed Plaintiffs in serious danger. Id. ¶ 1. 

As a result, Plaintiffs were allegedly subjected to acts of “violence, harassment, and intimidation” 

on the part of the protestors. Id. at 19. According to Plaintiffs, officers witnessed many of these 

attacks but failed to intervene, despite “pleas for help from several of the Trump supporters.” Id. ¶ 

95. Defendants allegedly refused even to “allow individuals . . . to simply step past the police 

lines to safety.” Id. ¶ 288. 

Plaintiffs specifically identify fourteen individual incidents in which protestors allegedly 

attacked one or more Rally participants. Id. ¶¶ 119-272. Each involved a different attacker or 

group of attackers. Although Plsaintiffs allege all the attackers were protestors, that is a disputed 

issue of fact. 

Kinsworthy, Gannon, Abruzzini, Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, and Ta (collectively, the “OnDuty Officers”) were allegedly among the SJPD officers on duty that night. Id. ¶ 284. 

Kinsworthy was allegedly the “primary point of contact for all units deployed at the Rally.” Id. ¶ 

72. Fong was allegedly the “sub-commander at the Trump Rally” and acted as the “Commander 

for the skirmish line.” Id. ¶¶ 45, 74. The FAC does not specifically identify the roles of Gannon, 

Abruzzini, Messier, Spagnoli, Ta, or Does 1-15. 

After the Rally, Chief Garcia allegedly praised officers for their “discipline and restraint” 

because “additional force can incite more violence in the crowd.” Id. ¶ 102. Plaintiffs claim that 

the City thus ratified the actions of the SJPD officers and are liable for the officers’ actions. Id. ¶ 

293. 

B. Procedural History 

1. Original Complaint and First Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on July 14, 2016. ECF No. 1 (“Original 

Complaint”). In the Original Complaint, fourteen plaintiffs asserted 28 claims for relief on behalf 

of themselves and others similarly situated. Id. Those claims fell into two categories: (1) state 

law and federal law claims against the City, Mayor Sam Liccardo (“Liccardo”), Chief of Police 

Edgardo Garcia (“Garcia”), and fifteen Doe Defendants, as the individual SJPD officers were not 

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yet named, id. ¶¶ 153-185; and (2) state law claims against various private citizens who had 

allegedly committed acts of aggression and violence against the plaintiffs, id. ¶¶ 186-336. 

On August 4, 2016, the City, Liccardo, Garcia, and the Doe officers filed a motion to 

dismiss the four claims against them pursuant to Federal of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 6. 

The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss on October 13, 2016. ECF No. 

30. The Court granted leave to amend for all the claims that it dismissed and noted that failure to 

cure the deficiencies identified in its order would result in dismissal with prejudice. Id. at 26. 

2. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

On November 14, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the FAC, which is now the operative complaint in 

this case. ECF No. 35. The FAC added six more named plaintiffs, for a total of twenty: Juan 

Hernandez, Nathan Velasquez, Frank Velasquez, Rachel Casey, Mark Doering, Mary Doering, 

Barbara Arigoni, Dustin Haines-Scrodin, Andrew Zambetti, Christina Wong, Craig Parsons, the 

minor I.P., Greg Hyver, Todd Broome, Martin Mercado, Christopher Holland, Theodore Jones, 

Donovan Rost, Michele Wilson, and Cole Cassady (collectively, “Named Plaintiffs”). Id. Like 

the Original Complaint, the FAC contains two categories of claims: those against defendants 

associated with the City and those against private citizens. In the FAC, the claims in the first 

category are against the City, Garcia, seven named SJPD officers—Loyd Kinsworthy, Lisa 

Gannon, Kevin Abruzzini, Paul Messier, Paul Spagnoli, Johnson Fong, and Jason Ta—and fifteen 

Doe police officers (collectively, “FAC City Defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 280-310. Plaintiffs bring four 

causes of action against the FAC City Defendants: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Garcia and the individual SJPD officers for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count 1”), 

id. ¶¶ 280-291; (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City for violations of the 

Fourteenth Amendment (“Count 2”), id. ¶¶ 292-96; (3) a claim under the Bane Act against all 

FAC City Defendants (“Count 3”), id. ¶¶ 297-302; and (4) a California common law negligence 

claim against the City (“Count 4”), id. ¶¶ 303-310. 

In addition, the FAC contains 39 claims against 46 private citizens, 40 of which are Doe 

defendants (collectively, “FAC Individual Defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 311-556. These claims arise from 

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the various distinct incidents in which a protestor or group of protestors allegedly attacked one or 

more Named Plaintiffs. Id. ¶¶ 119-272. Criminal proceedings have been brought against a 

number of these individual attackers. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 139, 157-159, 171. 

3. Second Motion to Dismiss 

On December 22, 2016, the FAC City Defendants moved to dismiss the four claims 

against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 44. The Court granted in part and denied in part 

this motion on March 14, 2017. ECF No. 72. 

As to Count 1, Plaintiffs alleged that the SJPD had violated Plaintiffs’ substantive due 

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in two ways: (1) by devising a crowd-control plan 

for the Rally that created or exposed Plaintiffs to danger, and (2) by executing the crowd-control 

plan on the evening of the Rally, even after it became clear the plan was subjecting Plaintiffs to 

danger. FAC ¶¶ 280-291; see ECF No. 72 at 15. The SJPD prepared the so-called Incident Action 

Plan in preparation for the Rally. See ECF No. 126-3 (“Kinsworthy Deposition”) Ex. 5. Garcia 

was only alleged to have been involved in devising the Incident Action Plan, and not in policing 

on the night of the Rally. ECF No. 72 at 18. The Court held the first theory (based on devising 

the Incident Action Plan) was insufficient to support a Fourteenth Amendment claim and therefore 

dismissed Count 1 with prejudice to the extent it relied upon that theory. Id. at 13-14, 16. The 

Court permitted Plaintiffs to proceed with their Fourteenth Amendment claim on the basis of the 

second theory (executing the Incident Action Plan at the Rally), however. Id. at 18. In so doing, 

the Court rejected the FAC City Defendants’ argument that qualified immunity foreclosed 

Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 20. 

Count 2 alleges that the City is vicariously liable for the legal violations of the individual 

SJPD officers under Count 1. The Court found that Plaintiffs had stated a claim that the City had 

ratified the SJPD officers’ allegedly unconstitutional actions on the night of the Rally. Id. at 25. 

In accordance with its holding regarding Count 1, the Court allowed Count 2 to proceed only to 

the extent it was based upon this ratification theory and the actions of the SJPD officers on the 

night of the Rally. Id. at 26. To the extent the claim was based upon alternative theories of 

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vicarious liability, the Court dismissed the claim with prejudice. Id. at 31. Similarly, as to Count 

4, the Court permitted a negligence claim against the City based upon the SJPD officers’ actions 

on the night of the Rally but not upon the devising of the Incident Action Plan. Id. at 32. 

Finally, the Court dismissed Count 3, the Bane Act claim, with prejudice. Id. at 31. 

Because the Court had dismissed all of the claims against Garcia with prejudice, the Court also 

dismissed Garcia from the case. Id. at 35. 

4. Appeal, Stay, and Severance 

On March 28, 2017, the remaining FAC City Defendants (i.e., those other than Garcia) 

filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit to seek interlocutory review of the Court’s finding that 

the individual SJPD officers were not entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiffs’ § 

1983 claims. ECF No. 80; see ECF No. 82 at 2. These defendants also filed a motion to stay the 

entire action pending resolution of the appeal. ECF No. 82; see ECF No. 96 at 7. Then, on March 

30, 2017, the same defendants moved to sever misjoined parties. ECF No. 84. On May 15, 2017, 

the Court issued an order resolving both motions. ECF No. 96. First, the Court denied the motion 

for severance but nevertheless severed the claims sua sponte into 12 separate actions. Id. at 11, 

20. Action #1 comprised the claims against the FAC City Defendants, whereas Actions #2 

through #12 concerned the Individual Defendants. Id. at 21-22. The Court then found that it 

lacked jurisdiction over Actions #2 through #12—which only alleged state law claims—and 

therefore dismissed them without prejudice for refiling in state court. Id. at 23. In its order, the 

Court noted that criminal proceedings were ongoing in state court as to six of the Individual 

Defendants. Id. at 18. At the December 5, 2018 case management conference, however, Plaintiffs 

indicated they had chosen not to pursue any of the eleven civil actions in state court. See ECF No. 

106. 

The Court retained jurisdiction over Action #1 and granted the motion to stay the case. 

ECF No. 96 at 28. On July 27, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision, ECF No. 

100, and the Court reopened the case on December 5, 2018, ECF No. 107. 

5. Summary of Plaintiffs’ Remaining Claims 

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Thus, although the FAC is the operative complaint in this case, the FAC has been 

significantly narrowed by the Court’s previous orders. The Named Plaintiffs are Juan Hernandez, 

Nathan Velasquez, Frank Velasquez, Rachel Casey, Mark Doering, Mary Doering, Barbara 

Arigoni, Dustin Haines-Scrodin, Andrew Zambetti, Christina Wong, Craig Parsons, the minor I.P., 

Greg Hyver, Todd Broome, Martin Mercado, Christopher Holland, Theodore Jones, Donovan 

Rost, Michele Wilson, and Cole Cassady—all of whom attended the Rally in June 2016. FAC ¶ 

273. The current Defendants are the City and SJPD officers Kinsworthy, Gannon, Abruzzini, 

Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, Ta, and Does 1-15. Id. ¶¶ 281, 293, 304. 

Three claims for relief remain: Counts 1, 2, and 4. Count 1 is the § 1983 claim against the 

individual SJPD officers, and Count 2 is the § 1983 claim against the City. As to these two 

claims, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees and/or costs, compensatory damages, and injunctive 

relief. Id. ¶¶ 290-91, 295-96. Count 4 is the negligence claim against the City for compensatory 

damages. Id. ¶ 310. All three claims are predicated on the alleged actions of the SJPD officers on 

the night of the Rally and not on the devising of the Incident Action Plan in advance of the Rally. 

6. Motion for Class Certification 

On May 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification. ECF No. 125. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs move to certify the following Class as an injunctive relief class pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2): 

Class: All persons who attended the June 2, 2016 Donald J. Trump 

campaign Rally (the “Rally”) at the South Hall of the McEnery 

Convention Center in San Jose, California, and who, upon exiting the 

Rally, were either (1) directed, or otherwise required, by agents of the 

City of San Jose to leave in the direction of, or along a route toward, 

anti-Trump protestors, and/or (2) were prevented by agents of the City 

of San Jose from leaving by any alternate route. Excluded from the 

Class are the City of San Jose’s officers, directors, agents, legal 

representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns that attended the Rally 

in his, her, or their capacity as such. Also excluded from the Class 

are counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants (the “Class”); 

Mot. for Class Cert. at 1. Plaintiffs move to certify the following Subclass as a damages class 

pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), 

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Subclass: All members of the Class who sustained injury to their 

persons or damage to their property upon leaving the Rally (the

“Subclass”). 

Id. Plaintiffs also move to (1) certify Plaintiffs as named representatives of the Class; (2) certify 

Plaintiffs as named representatives of the Subclass; (3) appoint Dhillon Law Group as class 

counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g); and (4) authorize notice of the pending action and of Subclass 

members’ right to opt out. Id. Defendants oppose the motion. See ECF No. 135 (“Def. Opp.”). 

The motion has now been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 135, 137. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Class actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. To certify a class under 

Rule 23, Plaintiffs must show that the proposed class satisfies all four requirements of Rule 23(a) 

and at least one subsection of Rule 23(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). Rule 23(a) provides that a district court may certify a class only 

if: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are 

questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These requirements 

are commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, 

respectively. See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Turning to Rule 23(b), there are three possible types of class actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(1)-(3). For certification of the Class, plaintiffs rely upon subsection (b)(2), which permits 

class treatment for the purpose of injunctive relief. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 

970, 986 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate only where the 

primary relief sought is declaratory or injunctive.”). A class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) 

when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to 

the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting 

the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible 

nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that 

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it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” 

Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360. 

In addition, Plaintiffs seek to certify the Subclass as a damages class under subsection 

(b)(3). On top of the four prerequisites under Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes must 

meet the requirements of predominance and superiority. Just Film, Inc. v. Buono, 847 F.3d 1108, 

1115 (9th Cir. 2017). That is, the moving party must establish “that the questions of law or fact 

common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and 

that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of 

the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphases added). 

In deciding whether to certify a class under Rule 23, a court must undertake a “rigorous 

analysis” of whether the requirements of the Rule have been satisfied. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 

351.” Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.” Id. at 350. Rather, the party seeking 

class certification “bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating through evidentiary proof that 

the class meets the prerequisites of Rule 23(a).” Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 909 F.3d 996, 

1003–04 (9th Cir. 2018). Hence, a court may look beyond the pleadings to any “material 

sufficient to form a reasonable judgment on each Rule 23(a) requirement,” including evidence that 

would be inadmissible at trial. Id. at 1005 (“[A] district court should analyze the persuasiveness

of the evidence presented at the Rule 23 stage.”). 

In many cases, this rigorous analysis “may entail some overlap with the merits of the 

plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 

466 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, the United States Supreme 

Court has instructed courts not to “engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification 

stage.” Id. “Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they 

are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” 

Id. For instance, a court may “consider the substantive elements of the plaintiffs’ case in order to 

envision the form that a trial on those issues would take.” Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 

574 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2009). Ultimately, whether the moving party has met the prerequisites 

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of Rule 23 is a matter within the “broad discretion” of the trial court. See Zinser v. Accufix 

Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186, amended by, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs move to certify the Class as a damages class under Rule 23(b)(2) and the 

Subclass as an injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(3). 

For the reasons below, the Court denies certification of the Subclass as a damages class 

because Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)’s 

predominance requirement. The Court also denies certification of the Class as an injunctive relief 

class because the Named Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief.1 

A. Subclass: Damages Class under Rule 23(b)(3) 

Plaintiffs move to certify the Subclass of “[a]ll members of the Class who sustained injury 

to their persons or damage to their property upon leaving the Rally” as a damages class pursuant to 

Rule 23(b)(3). Mot. for Class Cert. at 1. Plaintiffs request damages as to Counts 1, 2, and 4, 

which are brought under theories of state-created danger and negligence. Defendants oppose 

certification on the grounds that none of the requirements of either Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b)(3) are 

satisfied. The Court agrees that neither Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement nor Rule 

23(a)’s commonality have been met. Therefore, without deciding that Plaintiffs’ have satisfied 

Rule 23’s other prerequisites, the Court concludes that class certification is not appropriate and 

denies Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the Subclass. 

1. Predominance and Commonality 

The Court first reviews the legal standards for predominance and commonality before 

considering the individualized issues that defeat both prerequisites in the instant case. “The class 

action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the 

individual named parties only.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (internal 

 

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 As a result, the Court need not reach the other class certification requirements under Rule 23(a), 

Rule 23(b)(2), or Rule 23(b)(3). The Court also need not decide whether to certify the Named 

Plaintiffs and their counsel as Class Representatives and Class Counsel, respectively. 

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quotation marks omitted). What is more, of the three types of classes provided for by Rule 23, the 

(b)(3) damages class is the most extraordinary. The United States Supreme Court has called it an 

“adventuresome innovation, . . . designed for situations in which class-action treatment is not as 

clearly called for,” id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted), but “may nevertheless be 

convenient and desirable,” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997). In other 

words, the “notion that the adjudication of common issues will help achieve judicial economy” is 

integral to the Rule 23(b)(3) class. In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d 

953, 958 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the purpose of the predominance requirement is to “test[] 

whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Id. 

at 623. 

Predominance means that “the questions of law or fact common to the members of the 

class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(3). “The predominance inquiry asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in 

the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual 

issues.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016). To meet the 

predominance requirement, “common questions must be a significant aspect of the case that can 

be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication.” Berger v. Home Depot USA, 

Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014). For the purposes of Rule 23, a “common” question is 

one that is “capable of classwide resolution.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. In contrast, an 

“individual” question is one for which “members of a proposed class will need to present evidence 

that varies from member to member.” Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). 

Of particular relevance here, “Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement takes into 

account questions of damage.” Just Film, 847 F.3d at 1120. Although “the amount of damages is 

invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action treatment,” Leyva v. Medline 

Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013), plaintiffs must show that “damages are capable of 

measurement on a classwide basis.” Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34. In other words, Plaintiffs must 

establish “that their damages arise from a course of conduct that impacted the class.” Just Film, 

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847 F.3d at 1120. In Comcast, for instance, the plaintiffs had to show “that the existence of 

individual injury resulting from the alleged antitrust violation . . . was capable of proof at trial 

through evidence that [was] common to the class rather than individual to its members.” 569 U.S. 

at 30. 

In undertaking the predominance analysis, “the Court must consider how a trial on the 

merits would be conducted if a class were certified.” Moore v. Apple Inc., 309 F.R.D. 532, 543 

(N.D. Cal. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the Court’s analysis “entails 

identifying the substantive issues that will control the outcome, assessing which issues will 

predominate, and then determining whether the issues are common to the class, a process that 

ultimately prevents the class from degenerating into a series of individual trials.” Herskowitz v. 

Apple, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 460, 469 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Common issues cannot predominate where 

“individualized inquiries” are necessary that “go to key elements of the class’s claims.” Andrews 

v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., No. 18-55850, 2019 WL 2880970, at *1 (9th Cir. July 3, 2019).

In some cases, the need for individualized inquiries will defeat not only predominance, but 

also Rule 23(a)’s threshold requirement of commonality. It is often said that “even a single 

common question” can satisfy the commonality requirement. Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 

737 F.3d 538, 544 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the United States 

Supreme Court has, in recent years, propounded more specific guidance as to the commonality 

standard, because “any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common ‘questions.’” 

Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349 (internal citation omitted). Rather, “[w]hat matters to class 

certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but, rather the 

capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the 

litigation.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (internal quotations omitted). “Commonality requires the 

plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury.” Id. at 349–50. It is 

not enough that the class members “have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Id. 

at 350. Instead, this requirement is usually met when the putative class members “challenge 

policies or practices that apply to all members of the class.” 5–23 Moore's Federal Practice—Civil 

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§ 23.23 n.7.5.1; accord Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Properties Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 

1105 (9th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter CREEC]. 

2. Analysis 

Plaintiffs move to certify the Subclass as to Counts 1, 2, and 4—all three remaining causes 

of action. Analysis of predominance “begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause 

of action.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011). Counts 1 and 

2 are both brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for constitutional 

violations committed “under color of state law.” Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1082 

(9th Cir. 1998). As this Court explained in a previous order, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims rely upon 

the “state-created danger” doctrine. See ECF No. 72; Mot. for Class Cert. at 12. Under this 

doctrine, a plaintiff’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment have been 

violated where “state action affirmatively places the plaintiff in a position of danger, that is, where 

state action creates or exposes an individual to a danger which he or she would not have otherwise 

faced.” Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). The danger, furthermore, must be “known or obvious” to the state 

actor. Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). That is because the state action 

doctrine requires a “culpable mental state” of “deliberate indifference” on the part of the state 

actor, which means “the state actor must recognize an unreasonable risk and actually intend to 

expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the plaintiff.” Campbell v. 

State of Washington Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 845-46 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the FAC, Plaintiffs contend that the On-Duty Officers created a dangerous situation on 

the night of the Rally by (1) requiring Rally participants to leave the Rally via a particular route 

and (2) refusing to intervene in altercations amongst Rally participants and protestors, even after it 

became clear those actions were exposing Plaintiffs to harm at the hands of the protestors. See 

FAC ¶¶ 292-302. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim the designated route led them directly into a mob 

of violent protestors, who then attacked Plaintiffs while the officers stood idly by. 

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Plaintiffs further contend that this same conduct amounted to negligence, which is Count 4. 

Plaintiffs claim Defendants “had a duty of care to avoid placing Plaintiffs . . . in unreasonably 

dangerous situations” and then “acquired the duty to affirmatively provide aid and prevent 

Plaintiffs . . . from being injured” by “placing Plaintiffs . . . in harm’s way.” FAC ¶ 306. 

Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that these causes of action satisfy the 

predominance requirement. That requires Plaintiffs to show that each Subclass member’s 

damages “arise[s] from a course of conduct that impacted the class.” Just Film, 847 F.3d at 1120. 

As the Plaintiffs acknowledge, however, the Subclass members’ injuries arose from separate 

altercations with different private individuals. The FAC describes fourteen distinct incidents 

involving the Named Plaintiffs alone. In order to establish predominance, Plaintiffs must tie these 

incidents together with a unified theory of harm. 

Plaintiffs cannot do so. As discussed at length below, the Subclass members have little in 

common except their attendance at the Rally and their alleged inability to proceed south on Market 

Street upon exiting the Rally. They took myriad different paths to varying destinations, at variable 

times, and encountered distinct groups of private individuals. Their encounters with private 

individuals culminated in a multitude of different injuries—to the extent they suffered any injury 

at all. As a result of these differences, the individual Subclass members will need to present 

evidence tailored to them in order to identify each class member’s injury and demonstrate that 

injury resulted from Defendants’ classwide conduct. Plaintiffs effectively conceded this point in 

the March 15, 2017 joint case management statement, when Plaintiffs “agree[d] to consider the 

possibility of conducting the trial in phases, including by trying the Class claims (concerning 

alleged violations of civil rights) separately from the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims (concerning 

personal injuries and other damages).” ECF No. 74 at 8. Although the claims against the 

Individual Defendants are no longer in this case, the same individual factual inquiries are 

necessary to establish Plaintiffs’ injuries for purposes of the class claims. 

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have not shown that common questions of 

law or fact predominate over individual questions. In fact, due to the lack of a classwide theory of 

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injury, the Court is not even persuaded that Plaintiffs’ have met Rule 23(a)’s less demanding 

commonality requirement, see Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34. The Court begins its analysis by 

summarizing the fourteen incidents involving the Named Plaintiffs and then examining six 

illustrative Plaintiffs in detail. The Court then lays out, in turn, (1) Plaintiffs’ failure to identify a 

classwide course of conduct, which defeats commonality; (2) the individualized inquiries 

necessary to establish Defendants’ liability to each member of the Subclass, which defeats 

predominance; and (3) the impossibility of calculating damages on a classwide basis, which 

defeats predominance. Last, the Court briefly considers the implications of the foregoing on the 

typicality and numerosity requirements. 

a. The Individual Incidents 

The Court begins with the FAC, which describes the following fourteen incidents 

involving the twenty Named Plaintiffs. Below are the FAC’s titles and causes of actions for each 

incident. 

(1) “Hernandez and Haines-Scrodin are repeatedly struck in the face by Victor Gasca.” 

See FAC ¶¶ 119-126. Gasca was indicted for the crime of battery against Haines-Scrodin in state 

court. Id. ¶ 126. In addition to the class claims, Hernandez and Haines-Scrodin asserted against 

Gasca a claim for assault, a claim for battery, and a claim for violation of the Ralph Act; these are 

claims #5- #7 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court severed these state law claims and 

dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. Although the dismissal was without 

prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to refile. 

(2) “Frank and Nathan Velasquez are assaulted; Nathan is struck by Anthony Yi.” See 

FAC ¶¶ 127-139. Although the FAC states Frank was assaulted, Frank testified in his deposition 

that only Nathan was assaulted. ECF No. 126-15 (“Pl. Frank Velasquez Dep.”) at 63-65. Yi 

pleaded nolo contendere to criminal charges in state court for the theft and battery against Nathan. 

Id. ¶ 139. In addition to the class claims, Frank and Nathan Velasquez asserted against Yi a claim 

for assault and a claim for violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #14 and #16 in the FAC. 

Nathan also asserted against Yi a claim for battery, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

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distress, and a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; these are claims #15, #17, and 

#18 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court severed these state law claims and dismissed them 

for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. Although the dismissal was without prejudice for 

refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to refile. 

(3) “McBride, Gasca, and Arciga confine Casey while protestors throw objects at her.” 

See FAC ¶¶ 140-159. Anthony McBride was indicted in state court for falsely imprisoning Casey 

and other unrelated crimes. Id. ¶ 157. Victor Gasca was indicted in state court for falsely 

imprisoning Casey. Id. ¶ 158. Daniel Arciga was indicted in state court for battery against Casey. 

Id. ¶ 159. In addition to the class claims, Casey asserted against McBride, Gasca, Arciga, and 

Does 17-35 a claim for assault, a claim for battery, a claim for false imprisonment, and a claim for 

violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #19-#22 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court 

severed these state law claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. 

Although the dismissal was without prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to 

refile. 

(4) “I.P. is assaulted and denied assistance by the San Jose Fire Department.” See FAC ¶¶ 

160-171. Plaintiffs did not name the San Jose Fire Department or any individual employees of the 

San Jose Fire Department as defendants in this case. Two minors, H.A. and S.M., pled guilty in 

state court to misdemeanor criminal charges for attacking I.P. FAC ¶ 171. In addition to the class 

claims, I.P. asserted again H.A. and S.M a claim for assault, a claim for battery, and a claim for 

violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #11-#13 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court 

severed these state law claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. 

Although the dismissal was without prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to 

refile. 

(5) “Zambetti is beaten with a bag of rocks.” FAC ¶¶ 172-75. In addition to the class 

claims, Zambetti asserted against Doe 16 a claim for assault, a claim for battery, and a claim for 

violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #8-#10 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court 

severed these state law claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. 

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Although the dismissal was without prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to 

refile. 

(6) “Mark and Mary Doering, Wilson, and Arigoni are assaulted.” FAC ¶¶ 176-201. In 

addition to the class claims, Arigoni and Wilson asserted against Does 36–38 a claim for assault 

and a claim for violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #23 and #25 in the FAC. Arigoni 

asserted against Does 36–38 a claim for battery; this is claim #24 in the FAC. Mark and Mary 

Doering asserted against Does 36–38 a claim for assault and a claim for violation of the Ralph 

Act; these are claims #26 and #28 in the FAC. Mark Doering asserted against Does 36–38 a claim 

for battery; this is claim #27 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court severed these state law 

claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. Although the dismissal was 

without prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to refile. 

(7) “Christina Wong and her son are assaulted.” FAC ¶¶ 202-212. Although the FAC 

states that Christina Wong was assaulted and that an unnamed individual “shoved Wong’s son in 

the shoulder,” FAC ¶ 211, Wong testified in her deposition that she was not assaulted and that an 

unnamed individual “bumped” her son “kind of on the shoulder” as the individual passed her son, 

ECF No. 126, Ex. 9 (“Pl. Wong Dep.”) at 65. Wong and her son did not assert any claims other 

than the class claims. 

(8) “Hyver dashes for his car to escape the danger.” FAC ¶¶ 213-19. Hyver claims that 

unnamed individuals “taunted and jeered” at him as he passed. FAC ¶ 216. Hyver did not assert 

any claims other than the class claims. 

(9) “The Police direct Broome, his wife, and three-year-old son into the mob.” Id. ¶¶ 220-

24. Broome did not assert any claims other than the class claims. 

(10) “Martin Mercado is battered by protestors.” FAC ¶¶ 225-231. In addition to the class 

claims, Mercado asserted against Does 39-40 a claim for assault, a claim for battery, and a claim 

for violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #29-#31 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court 

severed these state law claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. 

Although the dismissal was without prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to 

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refile. 

(11) “Christopher Holland is assaulted and battered.” FAC ¶¶ 232-239. In addition to the 

class claims, Holland asserted against Doe 41 a claim for assault, a claim for battery, and a claim 

for violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #32-#34 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court 

severed these state law claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. 

Although the dismissal was without prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to 

refile. 

(12) “Theodore Jones is assaulted and battered.” FAC ¶¶ 240-251. Rafael Medina was 

later indicted for assault with a deadly weapon. Id. ¶ 250. Daniel Arciga was later indicted for 

battery. Id. ¶ 251. In addition to the class claims, Jones asserted against Gasca a claim for assault, 

a claim for battery, and a claim for violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #35-#37 in the 

FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court severed these state law claims and dismissed them for lack of 

jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. Although the dismissal was without prejudice for refiling in state 

court, Plaintiffs chose not to refile. 

(13) “Donovan Rost is assaulted and battered.” FAC ¶¶ 252-261. In addition to the class 

claims, Rost asserted against Does 42-43 a claim for assault, a claim for battery, and a claim for 

violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #38-#40 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the Court 

severed these state law claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 23. 

Although the dismissal was without prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to 

refile. 

 (14) “Cole Cassady is assaulted, battered, and robbed.” FAC ¶¶ 262-272. In addition to 

the class claims, Cassady asserted against Does 44-55 a claim for assault, a claim for battery, and a 

claim for violation of the Ralph Act; these are claims #41-#43 in the FAC. On May 15, 2017, the 

Court severed these state law claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 96 at 

23. Although the dismissal was without prejudice for refiling in state court, Plaintiffs chose not to 

refile. 

Looking just at the face of the FAC, no common issues of law or fact are readily apparent. 

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On the contrary, each of the fourteen incidents constitutes a distinct nucleus of facts. To name just 

a few differences, the incidents involved different victims, different attackers, and different harms. 

Prior to severance, the FAC contained 43 claims by twenty individual plaintiffs against seventeen 

named defendants and 55 Doe defendants. No more than three Named Plaintiffs were involved in 

the same incident. There were at least 46 different attackers named as Individual Defendants in 

the various incidents, not to mention the numerous attackers who were not sued as named or Doe 

defendants. 

Accordingly, “fact-intensive, individual analysis,” Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, 

Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2009), will be necessary to prove or disprove the allegations as to 

each Plaintiff. To further demonstrate the need for individual analysis, the Court examines in 

detail the incidents of six Plaintiffs. 

Christina Wong and her son. According to her deposition, Wong parked in the Convention 

Center garage, which is located directly north of the Rally site. ECF No. 126, Ex. 9 (“Pl. Wong 

Dep.”) at 26. Wong claims that after the Rally, a police barricade prevented her and her eighteenyear-old son from entering the garage from Market Street. Id. at 39, 44-45. She asked an 

unidentified police officer for permission to cross the barricade, but the officer said no. Id. at 45. 

Wong therefore started walking east on San Salvador. Id. at 47. Wong says that she then avoided 

the “crowd of people” that she saw to the north and made her way to the area south of the 

Convention Center, on Almaden Boulevard. Id. at 50; see also id. at 54, 65. Once there, she 

waited some distance away from the garage where her car was parked for twenty minutes, until 

“[i]t looked like the commotion had died down.” Id. at 63. When Wong resumed walking toward 

the garage, she encountered individuals she believed to be protestors, who “heckled” her and her 

son. Id. at 65. Although the FAC states that Christina Wong was assaulted and that an unnamed 

individual “shoved Wong’s son in the shoulder,” Wong testified in her deposition that she was not 

assaulted and that an unnamed individual “bumped” her son “kind of on the shoulder” as the 

individual passed her son. Id. Wong and her son did not assert any claims other than the class

claims. She attributes her psychological injury from being heckled to the officer who would not 

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let her cross the barricade. Id. at 77, 83. She does not allege that an SJPD officer was present 

during or witnessed the encounter with the hecklers. Wong ignored the hecklers and ran into the 

garage, where she got into her car without incident. ECF No. 135-3, Ex. 6 (“Def. Wong Dep.”) at 

65, 70-71. 

Donovan Rost. Rost took the light rail to the Rally. ECF No. 135-3, Ex. 9 (“Def. Rost 

Dep.”) at 20. Rost’s plan was to use the light rail to leave the Rally as well. ECF No. 137-6 (“Pl. 

Rost Dep.”) at 35-36. When he exited the Rally onto Market Street, however, a line of police 

officers apparently prevented him from going north on Market Street, id. at 36, so he walked one 

or two blocks east on San Salvador and then proceeded north on First or Second Street. Id. at 38-

40. Rost arrived at the Convention Center light rail station on San Carlos Street without incident. 

Id. Rost also did not see any police officers at the station. Id. at 46. While he was waiting at the 

station, Rost saw an assault occurring across the street. Id. at 45. Rost crossed the street and 

helped the man being attacked, at which point a group of “30-50 people” attacked him. Id. at 45-

46, 49-50. Rost says he was punched several times, but that he was not injured by the punches. 

Id. at 50-51. Rost and the man he helped ultimately managed to run away. Id. at 51. After 

waiting for some time, Rost was able to take a train home from a different light rail station. Id. at 

63-64. 

Rachel Casey. Casey took an Uber to the Rally. ECF No. 126-6 (“Pl. Casey Dep.”) at 64. 

Casey says she “just wanted to check [the Rally] out,” so she only stayed at the Rally for “about 

an hour.” Id. at 64. Then-candidate Trump was still speaking when she left. Id. at 74. Upon 

exiting the Convention Center, officers apparently directed her to walk north on Market Street, 

which she did. Id. at 88. Casey was hungry, so she was looking for a restaurant. Id. at 96. She 

recalls that as she walked, anti-Trump protestors were following her and shouting at her. Id. 

Casey admits that she showed her middle finger to two of those protestors. ECF No. 135-3, Ex. 2 

(“Def. Casey Dep.”) at 92-94. She further admits that she told protestors “to go back to Mexico.” 

Id. at 94. Casey claims that at some point, near the Marriott Hotel, she became surrounded by a 

group of protestors. Pl. Casey Dep. at 96-97. Those protestors allegedly threw eggs and other 

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objects at her. Id. at 97-98, 109. Casey says she did not see any police officers near her as she 

was surrounded by protestors, although she had seen officers earlier on. Id. at 109. Casey was 

ultimately able to escape into the hotel and later take an Uber home. Id. at 113, 115. Although 

she had no physical injuries, Casey claims she had “fears” and “emotional . . . ups [and] downs” 

which caused her to lose sleep and miss work. Id. at 141-42. 

Frank and Nathan Velasquez. Frank and his son parked in a lot across the street from the 

Convention Center parking garage, on Almaden Boulevard. ECF No. 126-15 (“Pl. Frank 

Velasquez Dep.”) at 22-24. After the Rally, they were “steered out” through an exit onto Market 

Street. Id. at 38. Frank wanted to go south and take Balbach Street to the car, but the officers 

guided them north toward San Salvador Street. Id. at 44. Frank and Nathan continued north on 

First Street until they reached San Carlos. Id. at 56. Frank and Nathan were apparently walking 

westbound on San Carlos Street when Anthony Yi, an anti-Trump protestor, stole Nathan’s “Make 

America Great Again” hat. Id. at 62-63; FAC ¶ 127-29. Frank did not see any police officers in 

the area at that time. Pl. Frank Velasquez Dep. at 63. Nathan then ran after Yi, and Frank 

followed, even though Frank “knew that would create trouble.” Id. Yi tripped and fell, at which 

point Nathan attempted to take back his hat. Id. Yi then punched Nathan in the head. Id. at 63-

64. Frank helped Nathan up and the two walked toward a large group of police officers they saw 

in the distance. Id. at 67, 69. They were followed by the protestors. Id. at 69. The protestors 

eventually dispersed, and Frank and Nathan were able to run to their car. Id. at 70, 72. 

Putting aside any disputed issues of fact, the many differences across the experiences of 

these six Plaintiffs are glaring. For a start, the altercations took place at different locations in the 

vicinity of the Rally site. After being forced to walk east on San Salvador, Rost and Wong 

proceeded in opposite directions: Wong proceeded south of the Convention Center and Rost 

headed north. Their respective incidents then occurred in those disparate places. 

Time is another factor that differentiates the Named Plaintiffs’ experiences. Casey, for 

one, left the Rally after about an hour and during then-candidate Trump’s speech, so her alleged 

assault likely occurred earlier than others. In addition, as a likely consequence, she was able to 

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proceed north on Market Street, unlike Rost, Wong, and others. 

As a consequence of the attacks being dispersed geographically and temporally, the Named 

Plaintiffs encountered different groups of attackers and different SJPD officers—to the extent they 

interacted with an officer at all. None of the six Named Plaintiffs asserted that an officer 

witnessed the altercation and yet refused to intervene. Plaintiffs also do not claim that any of the 

On-Duty Officers were involved in more than one of the fourteen incidents alleged in the FAC. 

The alleged attackers, meanwhile, were private citizens with no apparent affiliation to the City or, 

according to Plaintiffs, to one another. Notably, Plaintiffs do not allege that the protestors 

coordinated these alleged attacks. In fact, it is not even clear that all of the attackers were part of 

the anti-Trump protest at the Rally. 

Due to this lack of coordination, the shape of each “attack” was different. Wong’s 

interaction with her attackers was relatively brief, and primarily verbal. She was able to quickly 

return to her car. By contrast, Casey was apparently followed by the group of protestors for some 

time and ultimately trapped by them in front of a hotel. Casey and the protestors exchanged words 

throughout, and the protestors threw objects at her. 

Of particular relevance, the Named Plaintiffs’ behavior leading up to and during the 

altercations differed. Wong says that she tried to avoid the protestors. However, other Plaintiffs 

actively interacted with the protestors. Rost deliberately intervened in an ongoing attack, and 

Casey showed protestors her middle finger and told them to go back to Mexico. Nathan 

Velasquez ran after Yi when Yi took his hat, and Frank Velasquez followed suit. 

Finally, considering the manifold ways in which the altercations unfolded, it is 

unsurprising that Plaintiffs’ ultimate injuries also span a wide range. Frank does not allege any 

injury. Wong’s injury was essentially psychological, from having been heckled. Casey likewise 

alleges mostly psychological injuries, but she also claims to have lost sleep and been unable to 

work. Wong’s son was bumped on the shoulder by an alleged protestor walking passed Wong’s 

son, but Wong’s son experienced no lasting harm. The same was true of Rost, who was not 

wounded by the punches he sustained. By contrast, Nathan Velasquez apparently suffered a 

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concussion when Yi punched him. FAC ¶ 132. 

b. Plaintiffs Fail to Identify a Classwide Course of Conduct 

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs declare that predominance is satisfied because members of the 

proposed Subclass “assert the same causes of action, and they will confront the same affirmative 

defenses, if any.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 21. This argument is not only general and conclusory, 

but also inadequate. Again, it is not enough for commonality, much less predominance, that the 

would-be class members assert violations of the same law, viz. the Fourteenth Amendment and 

common law negligence. “[M]erely pointing to a pattern of harm, untethered to the defendant’s 

conduct” is similarly “insufficient” for commonality. CREEC, 867 F.3d at 1104. Instead, the 

requirement that the class members have suffered the “same injury” means that the entire class 

must have experienced a common course of illegal conduct at the hands of the defendant. Wal–

Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. 

As the FAC demonstrates, it is far from obvious that the Subclass members assert the 

“same causes of action.” Because each of the fourteen incidents in which the Named Plaintiffs 

involved different individuals and acts, Plaintiffs’ bear a heavy burden to show that they have 

experienced the same illegal conduct and thereby suffered the same injury. Moreover, as 

explained infra in Part III.A.2.C, there may well be affirmative defenses such as assumption of the 

risk or comparative negligence that are applicable only to some members of the Subclass. 

To prevail on commonality, Plaintiffs must unite these fourteen incidents with a common 

question that “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 

stroke.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The classwide contention Plaintiffs offer is that 

“Defendants, negligently and with deliberate indifference, placed them in harms’ way by forcing 

them into an ongoing riot.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 21. 

Significantly, Plaintiffs appear to have abandoned their original theory of liability, as 

alleged in the FAC. In the FAC, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants “fail[ed] to intervene in the 

many attacks perpetrated on Plaintiffs.” FAC ¶ 44; see also FAC ¶ 275(e). Now, in their briefing 

on the instant motion, Plaintiffs do not attempt to argue that Defendants failed to intervene in the 

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protestors’ attacks on a classwide basis. See Mot. for Class Cert. at 16-17, 21. This concession 

was necessary because Plaintiffs’ original theory based upon failure to intervene cannot support 

class-action treatment. All of the class members’ injuries must be traceable to Defendant’s 

classwide conduct, and not to conduct that is peculiar to particular incidents. See Comcast, 569 

U.S. at 35 (analyzing only plaintiffs’ “damages resulting from reduced overbuilder competition, 

since that is the only theory of antitrust impact accepted for class-action treatment”); see also 

Doyle v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 663 F. App’x 576, 579 (9th Cir. 2016) (“There is . . . no way to 

determine whether the proposed damages model measures damages that are solely attributable to 

the theory of liability.”). Here, Defendants’ alleged failure to intervene in the protestors’ attacks 

did not extend to the entire Subclass. As detailed below, several of the subclass members—the 

Wongs, Rost, Casey, and the Velasquezes, for a start—have acknowledged that no SJPD officers 

were present to witness the attack that he or she experienced. Hence, no SJPD officers could have 

stood idly by or failed to intervene in those situations. It follows that Defendants’ alleged failure 

to intervene was not a “course of conduct that impacted the class,” Just Film, 847 F.3d at 1120, as 

necessary for class certification. 

That leaves only the allegation that Defendants forced Rally participants to leave the Rally 

via a designated route. Here, too, Plaintiffs fall short. The Court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ 

claims that were predicated on the SJPD’s devising of the Incident Action Plan. The only theory 

that remains, then, is that the On-Duty Officers should not have followed the Incident Action Plan 

on the night of the Rally. But the On-Duty Officers are not a monolith, they are individual 

officers making independent judgments and decisions. Their individual actions thus do not 

automatically constitute a classwide course of conduct. Plaintiffs fail to specify how or even 

whether the On-Duty Officers acted in concert, such as through some sort of centralized decisionmaking. Nor do Plaintiffs indicate at what point Plaintiffs believe the danger became “known or 

obvious” to each of the individual On-Duty Officers, such that following the Incident Action Plan 

was no longer appropriate. 

Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ briefing does not identify any common issues of law or fact with 

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particularity. As it is Plaintiffs’ burden to “affirmatively demonstrat[e]” that the class meets the 

predominance requirement, Sali, 909 F.3d at 1003, Plaintiffs’ failure to show that the Subclass 

members suffered “the same injury” defeats commonality and thus class certification. 

c. Individualized Inquiries are Necessary to Establish Defendants’ Liability 

for Each Plaintiff’s Injury 

Even if the Court assumes for the moment that Plaintiffs have articulated a course of 

conduct that impacted the class—namely, refusing to allow Rally participants to exit the 

Convention Center by walking south on Market Street—predominance requires that Plaintiffs 

establish through common proof that this course of conduct caused each of the Subclass members’ 

injuries. The differences across the separate incidents in which the Subclass members were 

involved makes classwide proof of Defendants’ liability all but impossible. Due to the pervasive 

dissimilarities across the Subclass members’ incidents, evidence common to the class is few and 

far between. 

To begin with, the geographic differences pose a problem for classwide liability because 

the level of danger posed by the protestors may have been “obvious” in one location, but not in 

another. As a result, common proof cannot establish Defendants’ liability for the danger that 

existed at those locations. The same is true of temporal disparities. Because the crowd conditions 

were changing rapidly, see Mot. for Class Cert. at 4, proof of a state-created danger at the time of 

Casey’s alleged assault would not necessarily extend to any other plaintiffs. Instead, 

individualized inquiries will be necessary to establish the existence of a state-created danger at 

each time and location where an altercation took place. 

What utterly dooms Plaintiffs’ motion, though, is causation. Proximate cause is an 

element of both negligence, see S. Coast Framing, Inc. v. WCAB, 61 Cal. 4th 291, 298 (2015), and 

the state-created danger doctrine, see Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 

2018) (“[T]he ultimate injury to the plaintiffs must be foreseeable.”); Van Ort v. Estate of 

Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “traditional tort law defines intervening 

causes that break the chain of proximate causation” in section 1983 actions). The need for 

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individualized inquiries is especially salient where, as here, the defendant’s alleged misconduct is 

not the “sole cause of the injury.” Andrews, 2019 WL 2880970, at *1. Specifically, each alleged 

altercation involved one or more third-party attackers. Defendants are only liable for injuries 

perpetrated by the third-party attackers if Defendants’ alleged refusal to allow Plaintiffs to move 

freely proximately caused Plaintiffs to be attacked. Without a sufficiently strong connection, it 

cannot be said that Defendants’ actions proximately caused the incident that led to a particular 

class member’s injury. 

With such vast variations amongst the incidents in which Plaintiffs were involved, 

classwide proof of proximate cause is impossible. Each class member will need to offer proof 

describing what his or her attackers did and establishing a connection between that incident and 

the actions of the On-Duty Officers. Defendants, meanwhile, will be entitled to argue in each case 

that the particular plaintiffs’ injuries were not foreseeable, and therefore proximately caused only 

by the third-party attackers. For a start, Defendants may argue that some of the attackers were not 

protestors, making their connection to Defendants’ actions too attenuated. 

Common questions of law or fact do not predominate where an individualized case for 

proximate cause must be made for each member. The Ninth Circuit emphasized this point in 

Andrews, in which plaintiffs sought to certify a class of myriad individuals and business who 

allegedly suffered economic injury as a result of the shutdown of the defendants’ crude oil 

pipeline. 2019 WL 2880970 at *1. The court held that, due to the existence of “varying economic 

factors that could have caused” each class member’s injury, “individualized inquiries . . . 

predominate regarding causation and injury.” Id. at *2; see also Mazza, 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th 

Cir. 2012). 

Relatedly, Defendants may assert a defense of comparative negligence or assumption of 

risk as to some of the Plaintiffs. As described above, Plaintiff Rost deliberately intervened in an 

ongoing attack. “Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk.” Prosser on Torts 

§ 68 (5th ed. 1984) (citation omitted). After all, as the Supreme Court of South Dakota said of a 

plaintiff who interceded in a bar fight, “[n]o one can reasonably deny that there is a risk of injury 

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in stepping into the middle of a fight.”). Duda v. Phatty McGees, Inc., 758 N.W.2d 754, 759 (S.D. 

2008). The Court also notes that Nathan Velasquez ran after the man who stole his hat, and Casey 

pointed her middle finger at protestors and told them to go back to Mexico. Based upon Rost’s, 

Casey’s, and Nathan Velasquez’s actions, Defendants may argue that each of these plaintiffs 

played a part in precipitating the confrontation. The presence of defenses unique to individual 

class members further undermines any efficiency that may be gained through a class action. 

Gartin v. S & M NuTec LLC, 245 F.R.D. 429, 441 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 

For all these reasons, each Subclass member will need to present evidence peculiar to them 

in order to establish that his or her injury stemmed from Defendants’ classwide conduct. See, e.g.,

Andrews, 2019 WL 2880970, at *1 (“The disparity in class members’ connection to the facilities 

and to Plains will require individuals to present varying evidence as to whether they suffered any 

economic injury, whether Plains was liable for that injury, and whether the economic loss doctrine 

bars recovery.”); McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming 

district court’s denial of class certification of suit challenging arrests during a mass demonstration 

“where arrests were made in numerous locations in the District of Columbia and where the 

duration and conditions of confinement varied greatly”). These individualized inquiries, which 

strike at the heart of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant, would “degenerat[e] into a series of 

individual trials.” Gene And Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). Under 

these circumstances, Plaintiffs have failed to show that “judicial economy will be served” by class 

treatment. In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d at 958. 

d. Damages are Not Capable of Measurement on a Classwide Basis 

The measurement of damages poses a further obstacle to predominance. The Ninth Circuit 

has said that “[a] Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiff must show a class wide method for damages calculations 

as a part of the assessment of whether common questions predominate over individual questions.” 

Lambert v. Nutraceutical Corp., 870 F.3d 1170, 1182 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded on 

other grounds, 139 S. Ct. 710 (2019). In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege injuries that differ 

widely not only in degree but in kind. On one end of the spectrum is Nathan Velasquez, who 

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suffered a concussion when Yi punched him. On the other end is Christina Wong, whose injury 

was purely psychological. Casey’s injury, moreover, was also psychological, but she claims she 

experienced physical symptoms such as an inability to sleep. Plaintiffs have not offered a 

classwide method of measuring damages from these injuries, and the Court doubts that one exists. 

The attackers behaved differently in each case, so no model could predict a given Subclass 

member’s injury. What is more, the type and extent of the injury will often depend on factors 

idiosyncratic to the Subclass member. 

In addition, according to the FAC, several of the Named Plaintiffs’ individual attackers are 

the subject of criminal proceedings. Yi, for instance, pleaded nolo contendere to criminal charges 

for the theft and battery against Nathan Velasquez. FAC ¶ 139. The parties have not updated the 

Court as to the status of all criminal proceedings. If any Named Plaintiffs ultimately receive 

criminal restitution from their individual attackers, that Plaintiff’s eligibility for civil damages 

would be affected. That is, because a plaintiff may not be compensated twice for the same 

damages, any compensatory damages award may potentially be offset by the amount of restitution 

received. See, e.g., Safeco v. Rawstron, No. CV96-5139, 1999 WL 989740, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 

28, 1999). The potential for restitution to affect certain Subclass members’ damage calculations 

also thwarts the possibility of measuring damages on a classwide basis. 

Considering the extent of these differences, “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations 

will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” See Comcast, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013). 

Plaintiffs’ lack of a workable damages model further supports the Court’s conclusion that 

predominance has not been met. See id. (holding plaintiffs’ had not shown Rule 23(b)(3) 

predominance because their “model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of 

measurement on a classwide basis”). 

e. Typicality and Numerosity 

Finally, the Court notes that the factors that render Plaintiffs incapable of satisfying 

commonality and predominance also cast doubt on Plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy typicality and 

numerosity. 

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To demonstrate typicality, as required by Rule 23(a)(3), Plaintiffs must show that their 

claims are “typical of the claims . . . of the class.” Typicality means that the representative 

plaintiffs “must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as the 

absent class members. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n. 13 (1982) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that the interest 

of the named representative aligns with the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 

976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). The typicality inquiry focuses upon the “nature of the claim or 

defense of the class representative[s]” rather than “the specific facts” from which the claim arose. 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Nevertheless, commonality and typicality often overlap because “both serve as guideposts 

for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is 

economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that 

the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” 

Falcon, at 158 n. 13. First of all, Plaintiffs’ failure to identify a common course of conduct 

allegedly perpetrated by Defendants undercuts Plaintiffs’ ability to show that Named Plaintiffs 

“suffered the same injury” as the rest of the class. See Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. 

Properties Tr., 317 F.R.D. 91, 103 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (no typicality because plaintiffs “failed to 

identify any . . . policy across the 142 allegedly ADA-noncompliant, which policy could support a 

finding of commonality”), aff’d, 867 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, as just established, 

determining whether Defendants are liable for each Named Plaintiff’s injury will require highly 

fact-specific inquiries. Again, the Named Plaintiffs were injured in fourteen distinct incidents, 

each of which bears little discernable relationship or similarity to the next. Absent class members 

will presumably be injured in still other altercations, the facts of which could take many different 

shapes. It is therefore impossible to assure that the Named Plaintiffs will have concordant 

interests with the absent class members. 

In particular, the Ninth Circuit has held typicality is not satisfied where “there is a danger 

that absent class members will suffer if their representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to 

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it.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, as described above,

at least three Named Plaintiffs—Casey, Rost, and Nathan Velasquez—may face defenses of 

assumption of the risk or comparative negligence. Other Subclass members, by contrast, will not. 

Because the applicability of the defenses will turn on the particular facts of each incident, it is 

entirely possible that those representatives will be preoccupied with the unique defenses in their 

individual incidents. 

Turning to numerosity, the Court observes that Plaintiffs do not claim all or even most of 

the people exposed to the danger Defendants allegedly created were personally injured or 

sustained property damage. Plaintiffs instead define the Subclass as only those Rally participants 

who “sustained injury to their persons or damage to their property.” “While there is no fixed 

number that satisfies the numerosity requirement, a class greater than forty often satisfies the 

requirement, while one less than twenty-one does not.” Ehret v. Uber Techs., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 

3d 884, 890 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, it is far from clear that any Rally participants other than the twenty Named Plaintiffs 

sustained such personal injury or property damage. Although numerosity is not usually difficult to 

demonstrate, “mere conclusory allegations as to the estimated class size are insufficient for 

plaintiff’s burden of proof.” Sueoka v. United States, 101 F. App’x 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

the instant case, none of Plaintiffs’ evidence meets their burden. Plaintiffs’ reference to sundry 

“[c]ity and criminal court records, news, accounts, videos, photographs, and eye witness 

testimony,” Mot. for Class Cert. at 15, is far too vague to support a finding of numerosity. The 

same is true of the “over 40 complaints relating to police conduct at the Rally” that the City 

received within eleven days. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs do not allege that these complaints came from 

persons who suffered personal injury or property damage, which is necessary for them to be 

members of the Subclass. 

Lastly, Plaintiffs emphasize that the broader injunctive relief Class comprises “no fewer 

than 3,000 individuals,” which is the SJPD’s estimate of attendance at the Rally. Id. at 3, 15. 

Even if the Court accepted Plaintiffs’ assertion as to the size of the injunctive relief Class, 

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Plaintiffs have offered no method for systematically identifying the plaintiffs who sustained injury 

to their persons or damage to their property for inclusion in the damages Subclass. Additionally, 

Courts have routinely denied class certification where individualized proof is necessary to 

establish which class members were in fact injured by the defendant’s conduct. See, e.g., Moore, 

309 F.R.D. at 549 (“Even if, on the merits, Plaintiff is correct that iMessage has systematic flaws 

that could result in the disruption of text messaging services, that determination does not assist the 

Court in determining whether iMessage actually caused the proposed class members to suffer any 

interference.”). On this record, then, the Court is doubtful that Plaintiffs have met their burden to 

show numerosity. 

f. Summary 

In sum, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have not met Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement 

or the “more demanding” predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3), see Abdullah v. U.S. 

Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court is also skeptical that typicality 

and numerosity have been satisfied, though the Court does not rest its decision on those grounds. 

The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the damages Subclass. 

B. Class: Injunctive Relief Class under Rule 23(b)(2) 

Plaintiffs move to certify the Class of “[a]ll persons who attended [the Rally] . . . and who, 

upon exiting the Rally, were either (1) directed, or otherwise required, by agents of the City of San 

Jose to leave in the direction of, or along a route toward, anti-Trump protestors, and/or (2) were 

prevented by agents of the City of San Jose from leaving by any alternate route,” pursuant to Rule 

23(b)(2). Mot. for Class Cert. at 1. Plaintiffs seek to certify the Class as to Counts 1 and 2, both 

of which include requests for injunctive relief. See FAC ¶¶ 291, 296. 

Defendants again oppose class certification on just about every possible score. To briefly 

review, an injunctive relief class may be certified only if Plaintiffs show that Rule 23(a)’s 

requirements of commonality, typicality, numerosity, and adequacy of representation are met and 

that certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(2). In the instant case, not only do Defendants 

contend that none of Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites are satisfied, they also challenge Plaintiffs’ 

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standing to seek an injunction under Rule 23(b)(2). Def. Opp. at 29-33. 

The Court is mindful that the individualized issues that defeated predominance as to the 

Subclass also impede certification of the injunctive relief class. “Rule 23(b)(2) ‘does not authorize 

class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of 

monetary damages.’” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 987 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360-61). That is 

because “[c]lass certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate only where the primary relief 

sought is declaratory or injunctive” rather than monetary. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1195. As 

established above, the Named Plaintiffs allege unique injuries and thus may be entitled to 

individualized monetary damages. 

However, the Court need not reach these issues, because Plaintiffs cannot advance past the 

threshold requirement of standing. As set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendants that 

Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing for prospective equitable relief and therefore denies the 

motion to certify the Class. 

1. Standing for Injunctive Relief 

As previously stated, Rule 23(b)(2) requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or 

refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or 

corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 

23(b)(2); see Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 686 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, a Rule 23(b)(2) 

class may only be certified if the named plaintiffs demonstrate their standing to seek injunctive or 

declaratory relief. See, e.g., Bruton v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. 12-CV-02412-LHK, 2018 WL 

1009257, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018). Allegations that a defendant’s conduct will subject 

unnamed class members to the alleged harm is insufficient to establish standing to seek an 

injunction on behalf of the class. Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044–45 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“Unless the named plaintiffs are themselves entitled to seek injunctive relief, they may 

not represent a class seeking that relief.”). 

In order to have standing for prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish a “real 

and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 

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946 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974)). “[P]ast 

wrongs do not in themselves amount to that real and immediate threat of injury.” City of Los 

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983). Instead, plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction 

against past illegal conduct unless he demonstrates “a sufficient likelihood that he will again be 

wronged in a similar way.” Id. at 111; see also Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“Once a plaintiff has been wronged, he is entitled to injunctive relief only if he can 

show that he faces a real or immediate threat that he will again be wronged in a similar way.”) 

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The threat of harm cannot be “speculative.” 

Lyons, 561 U.S. at 111. It must be a “prospect of immediacy and reality.” Id. at 104 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Munns v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402, 411–12 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“Despite being harmed in the past, the [plaintiffs] must still show that the threat of injury in the 

future is ‘certainly impending’ or that it presents a ‘substantial risk’ of recurrence for the court to 

hear their claim for prospective relief.”) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 

n.5 (2013)). 

In addition, the need for a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury” has particular 

force where, as here, a federal court is “asked to oversee state law enforcement authorities.” 

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that “the need for a 

proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions 

against state officers . . . in the absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate.” 

Id.; see also O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 499. 

Finally, “the burden of showing a likelihood of recurrence is firmly on the plaintiff.” 

Nelsen v. King Cty., 895 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990) (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

2. Analysis 

With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to the instant case. Plaintiffs seek to 

certify the injunctive relief class as to Counts 1 and 2, their § 1983 claims under the state-created 

danger doctrine. To briefly review, Plaintiffs maintain that the On-Duty Officers exposed the 

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Rally participants to violence at the hands of anti-Trump protestors by forcing them to use a 

designated route to leave the Rally and then failed to intervene when the protestors attacked Rally 

participants. As discussed above, Plaintiffs appear to have abandoned their claim that Defendants’ 

alleged failure to intervene in the protestors’ attacks is applicable to the entire Class. 

To establish a likelihood of future harm, a plaintiff must show two things: first, that the 

defendant will repeat his conduct and thereby violate similar rights, and second, that the plaintiff 

will himself suffer that violation of rights. See Baldwin v. Cate, No. C-08-03516 RMW, 2009 WL 

482283, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106). The analysis is 

“individualized and must consider all the contingencies that may arise in the individual case before 

the future harm will ensue.” Nelsen, 895 F.2d at 1251. Focusing for a moment on the first 

requirement, the case law is clear that the defendant must not only repeat his conduct, but that 

conduct must be rights-violative and it must inflict injury. 

In Lyons, for instance, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the “necessity that 

Lyons demonstrate that he, himself, will not only again be stopped by the police but will be 

choked without any provocation or legal excuse.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106 n.7. “If, for example, 

chokeholds were . . . used only to counter resistance to an arrest by a suspect, or to thwart an effort 

to escape,” there would be no real threat of future injury. Id. at 106. In other words, the Court 

said, “[i]f Lyons has made no showing that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of his 

experience of October 1976, then he has not met the requirements for seeking an injunction in a 

federal court.” Id. at 109. 

Here, the right Defendants allegedly violated is the substantive due process right under the 

Fourteenth Amendment not to be exposed to a state-created danger. Therefore, it is not enough 

that SJPD officers may, at another rally, direct participants to leave via a single pathway. For the 

officers’ conduct must be repeated under circumstances in which that conduct constitutes a statecreated danger. See Hightower v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 77 F. Supp. 3d 867, 886 (N.D. 

Cal. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Taub v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 696 F. App’x 181 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(no standing to seek injunctive relief because “Plaintiffs’ nudity only constitutes expressive 

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conduct when temporarily proximate to the passage” of a particular statute). What is more, the 

question whether a state actor “in fact affirmatively place[d]” the plaintiff in danger is highly factspecific. See, e.g., Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(examining precisely what the officers knew at the time of their actions). 

The upshot is that Defendants’ allegedly illegal conduct will recur only upon the 

fulfillment of four contingencies: (1) the Named Plaintiffs must attend a future rally or similar 

event; (2) a violent protest must break out at this rally and present a danger to the Named 

Plaintiffs; (3) the danger must be “known and obvious” to the SJPD officers on duty; (4) the SJPD 

officers must react in the same way, i.e., by sending participants into a mob of protestors and 

thereafter refusing to assist them. In the Court’s view, the confluence of these contingencies is 

simply too remote a possibility to constitute a “real and immediate threat.” 

The first contingency, that the Named Plaintiffs will attend another rally, is the easiest one 

for Plaintiffs to establish. Doing so would seem to be a straightforward matter of showing that 

another political rally is likely to take place in the San Jose area, and that the Named Plaintiffs 

would attend. Yet, Plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence to that effect. Plaintiffs say only that 

“[t]he country is gearing up for the 2020 presidential campaign cycle.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 1. 

Failure to make a threshold showing that the Named Plaintiffs will again be present at a rally or 

similar event is fatal to Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction. See, e.g., Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d 

at 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (equitable relief not warranted because “it is not sufficiently likely that Mr. 

Lopez or Ms. Hodgers–Durgin will again be stopped by the Border Patrol”).

Assuming the Named Plaintiffs had properly established that they are likely to attend 

another rally, they still have not shown that a “violent mob,” FAC ¶ 1, is likely to develop. This 

second contingency is equally necessary to create the danger to which the Named Plaintiffs will 

allegedly again be exposed. Cf. Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 919, 927 

(N.D. Cal. 2012) (no standing for an injunction against Defendant’s debt collection practices 

because Plaintiffs failed to show they themselves would be involved in future debt collection 

suits). That is, protestors must congregate at the rally, and these protestors must again engage in 

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acts such as heckling, theft, and battery in order for the Named Plaintiffs to again suffer injury. 

Importantly, this step in the chain involves choices by independent, private individuals—the 

hypothetical protestors. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized its 

“reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of 

independent actors.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 (refusing to speculate about whether the 

Government will attempt to surveil communications to which respondents are parties). After all, a 

court-ordered injunction can have no effect upon “unfettered choices made by independent actors 

not before the courts.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

Plaintiffs have no affirmative evidence that violence will occur at a hypothetical rally, just 

an allegation in the FAC that “some violence ha[d] been reported” at “recent Trump rallies in 

other communities in California.” FAC ¶ 76. This allegation is not only vague but also lacking in 

any evidentiary support, and thus cannot give rise to an inference that numerous private 

individuals will choose to commit harmful acts. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104 (“Lyons’ assertion 

that he may again be subject to an illegal chokehold” is “hardly evidence” of a real and immediate 

threat.). Under these circumstances, violent attacks are not assured at a hypothetical future rally, 

even if protestors do appear. 

Moreover, the violence or similar danger at the rally would have to rise to the level of a 

“known and obvious danger” in order to support application of the state-created danger doctrine. 

That is, the extent of the danger would have to be great enough to threaten the safety of all Rally 

participants. In Lyons, the United States Supreme Court recognized that, “among the countless 

encounters between the police and the citizens of a great city such as Los Angeles, there will be 

certain instances in which strangleholds will be illegally applied and injury and death 

unconstitutionally inflicted on the victim.” Id. Yet, the chances that Lyons himself would again 

be a victim were “no more than speculation.” Id. So too here. If the violence consists only of a 

few isolated incidents, it would be “no more than speculation” that the Named Plaintiffs 

themselves “will again be involved in one of those unfortunate instances.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108. 

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On top of that, the events would have to unfold such that officers are able to actually “recognize 

[the] unreasonable risk,” Campbell, 671 F.3d at 845-46, before deciding on a course of action. 

Otherwise, the officers will not be acting with “deliberate indifference,” which is necessary under 

the state-created danger doctrine. Again, Plaintiffs have brought no evidence to bear on the 

likelihood of these circumstances arising. 

Turning to the fourth contingency, the SJPD would have to implement the same crowdcontrol plan in the same manner. As with the second contingency, predicting the reaction of the 

SJPD officers “require[s] guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will exercise their 

judgment.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 413 (refusing to speculate as to whether the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court will authorize certain surveillance). The Court again notes the United States 

Supreme Court’s admonition against engaging in such guesswork. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has said that “where . . . the harm alleged is directly traceable to a 

written policy, there is an implicit likelihood of its repetition in the immediate future.” Bates v. 

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 986 (9th Cir. 2007). (alterations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). But the Incident Action Plan to which the On-Duty Officers allegedly adhered is 

not a policy. Under Plaintiffs’ own allegations, the Incident Action Plan was an event-specific 

plan, tailored to the Trump Rally. See FAC ¶ 80-81; see also Kinsworthy Deposition Ex. 5. In 

fact, according to Plaintiffs, the no-interference approach practiced by the On-Duty Officers 

deviated from “the City’s normal ‘zero tolerance’ approach to violent protestors.” FAC ¶ 79; see 

also FAC ¶ 66. The Incident Action Plan thus contrasts sharply with the fixed “policies” that the 

Ninth Circuit has previously said give rise to an inference of repetition. See, e.g., Easyriders 

Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he CHP has a clear 

official policy of allowing officers to stop motorcyclists and issue citations for substandard 

helmets based on the officer's subjective opinion of whether the helmet would, if tested, conform 

to federal safety standards.”); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1326 n.12 (9th Cir. 1985), 

amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he agents testified that it was INS policy to conduct 

complete sweeps of all community residences, with or without information as to specific 

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residences.”). 

Plaintiffs nevertheless contend “the evidence shows that these officers can and will do the 

exact same thing under the same or similar circumstances.” ECF No. 137 (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 19. 

The evidence to which Plaintiffs refer comes from the depositions of two of the On-Duty Officers: 

Herr and Kinsworthy. First, Plaintiffs cite the following exchange from Herr’s deposition: 

Q: Knowing what you know now -- and I’m making space to look at

Exhibit 5 here -- would you have made any adjustments to the 

decisions you made on June 2nd? 

A: No. 

Q: Okay. Would you have placed the barricades in the same locations 

that they were placed? 

A: Yes. 

ECF No. 126-20 at 109-110. Second, Plaintiffs point to a similar exchange from Kinsworthy’s 

deposition: 

Q: Knowing what you know now, would you have done anything 

differently on the day of the rally? 

A: Knowing what I know now, yes, . . . I would have asked for more 

officers, and that way, I would have been able to position the officers 

differently. 

Q: In what way would you have positioned the officers differently? 

A: So I would have had more roaming officers along Almaden and 

San Carlos. 

Q: And by “roaming officers,” what do you mean? 

A: . . . . Teams of officers just like we had around the tent, same type 

of deployment in those areas. 

Q: Okay. Is there anything else you would have done differently on 

the day of the rally? 

A: Nothing I can think of right now. 

ECF No. 126-3 at 164-65. 

Plaintiffs apparently take the testimony to mean that Kinsworthy and Herr defend the route 

they allegedly required participants to take and the no-interference approach to violent 

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altercations. At the outset, the Court notes that the probative value of the responses is limited by 

the lack of context and the vagueness of the question, “would you have done anything 

differently?” After all, Defendants deny that they forced Rally participants to walk north into the 

crowd of protestors. Defendants claim the SJPD officers actually “advised people leaving the 

rally to take a different route, but most refused.” Def. Opp. at 5 (citing ECF No. 135-1 (“Herr. 

Decl.”) ¶ 12). According to Defendants, the officers then erected a barricade to “prevent[] 

rallygoers from walking north on Market toward protestors,” but “[t]he barricade did not prevent 

rallygoers from going in any other direction on any other street.” Id. (citing Herr Decl. ¶¶ 12-14, 

19). Herr and Kinsworthy’s stated lack of regret is therefore unsurprising considering Defendants’ 

version of the facts. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs’ questions did not specifically refer to a particular 

tactic. 

Taking the statements at face value, however, they would make the likelihood of the SJPD 

repeating its actions from the night of the Rally greater than if Herr and Kinsworthy had 

repudiated their decisions. Still, this evidence only goes so far. The statements of two individual 

officers are a far cry from a department-wide policy. That Plaintiffs lack a theory of centralized 

decisionmaking amongst the On-Duty Officers on the night of the Rally seriously undermines the 

proposition that innominate SJPD officers at a future rally will behave in the same way. Plaintiffs 

have not shown that Herr or Kinsworthy would likely be present at a future rally, let alone that 

they would be in a position to make decisions on behalf of the force. Without a “systematic 

pattern or policy,” then, the odds that all the SJPD officers will repeat their actions at the Rally are 

far too speculative. Nelsen, 895 F.2d at 1254. 

Finally, even if Plaintiffs had shown that each individual contingency was reasonably 

likely to occur, Plaintiffs have not established that the entire “string of contingencies necessary to 

produce an injury,” Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041, will transpire. All four contingencies 

discussed above are necessary for the Named Plaintiffs to experience a recurrence of their injury 

from June 2, 2016. “Both the Supreme Court and [the Ninth] [C]ircuit have repeatedly found a 

lack of standing where the litigant’s claim relies upon a chain of speculative contingencies.” 

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Nelsen, 895 F.2d at 1252; see also id. (“The ‘odds’ that Nelsen and Bullene will fulfill all the 

contingencies necessary to revisit the Center are . . . unlikely.”). Considering “the trend towards 

imposing tighter restrictions on claims of standing for injunctive claims predicated upon allegedly 

recurrent injuries,” id. at 1251, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show an 

immediate threat of harm here. Plaintiffs therefore lack standing for injunctive relief. 

The Court’s finding Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek injunctive relief is fatal to 

certification of the proposed Class. The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the 

Class as an injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2).2 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is DENIED with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 17, 2019 

______________________________________ 

LUCY H. KOH 

United States District Judge 

 

2

 As above, any discussion of the other class certification requirements or the suitability of the 

Named Plaintiffs and their counsel as Class Representatives and Class Counsel would not be 

necessary for the resolution of Plaintiffs’ motion. 

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