Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-00765/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-00765-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 28:1441 - Petition for Removal: Securities Fraud

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER S. BROOKS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK;

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; and

DOES 1–200, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 12-00765 WHA

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the final judgment entered in favor of defendants. For

the following reasons, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Peter S. Brooks’ amended complaint asserted that defendant JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A., engaged in predatory lending practices. Plaintiff sought $857.5 million in damages,

a moratorium on all trustee sales in Sonoma Country, an injunction enjoining nonjudicial

foreclosure proceedings on the property, and sanctions against Chase’s counsel for fraudulent

pleadings. The complaint was dismissed without leave to amend. The dismissal order found that

the complaint failed to state a cognizable claim and was time barred (Dkt. No. 69). Judgment

was entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff (Dkt. No. 70). Plaintiff timely filed this

motion to reconsider the dismissal order and entry of judgment against him. The time for

response has passed. Although defendants did not file an opposition, plaintiff’s motion is

nonetheless without merit and is accordingly DENIED. 

Case 3:12-cv-00765-WHA Document 72 Filed 01/02/13 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 FRCP 60(b) provides for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable

diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment

that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason

that justifies relief.

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ANALYSIS

Where a ruling has resulted in final judgment, a motion for reconsideration may be

construed either as a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to FRCP 59(e), or as a motion

for relief from judgment pursuant to FRCP 60(b). School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. AC

& S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff’s instant motion is best analyzed under

FRCP 59(e) as he does not contend there are any grounds for relief under FRCP 60(b).1

 FRCP

59(e) provides that a party may move to alter, amend or vacate judgment after entry of judgment. 

Relief under FRCP 59(e), however, is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the

interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of

Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Relief is appropriate under FRCP 59(e) if any of the

following conditions are met: (1) the district court is presented with newly-discovered evidence;

(2) there is an intervening change in controlling law; or (3) the district court committed clear

error or made a decision that was manifestly unjust. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d

734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff has identified no “unusual circumstances” justifying reconsideration. Instead,

plaintiff reasserts the allegations contained in the complaint. Because plaintiff is not now

asserting that there is newly-discovered evidence or an intervening change in controlling law,

this order assumes that plaintiff is arguing clear error. In reviewing a district court’s decision for

clear error, our court of appeals will find clear error only upon “a definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Ruiz–Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 693 (9th Cir.

2010). If a court “got the law right” and “did not clearly err in its factual determinations,” then

clear error was not committed — even if another reasonable judicial body “would have arrived at

a different result.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.

2011). 

Case 3:12-cv-00765-WHA Document 72 Filed 01/02/13 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3

Plaintiff’s instant motion does not clearly assert whether a legal or factual error occurred. 

Rather plaintiff repeatedly asserts that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 362(a), the automatic-stay provision

of the United States Bankruptcy Code, “[d]efendants are in contempt of court for bringing an

action in violation of the automatic stay” (Br. 8). This order assumes that plaintiff is arguing that

the dismissal order erred in its determination that the automatic stay provision is not applicable

in this action. Specifically, the dismissal order found that “the scope of the automatic stay is

limited to actions against the debtor which, in this case, is the plaintiff, not the defendant. As

plaintiff notes, ‘plaintiff does not allege that he has filed for bankruptcy’” (Dkt. No. 69). 

The dismissal order properly determined that plaintiff’s arguments regarding 11 U.S.C.

362(a) were not (and still are not) viable. First, plaintiff has never alleged that he filed for

bankruptcy. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to the protections under 11 U.S.C. 362(a) afforded

to “debtors.” Second, even assuming arguendo that the automatic-stay provision is applicable,

plaintiff’s argument fails. As held by our court of appeals, “the stay does not prevent a

plaintiff/debtor from continuing to prosecute its own claims nor does it prevent a defendant from

protecting its interests against claims brought by the debtor.” Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC v.

Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., 654 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2011). So too here. Plaintiff,

regardless of his “debtor” status, can commence an action against defendants. Defendants then

have the right to protect their interests and defend against the claims brought against them. 

Third, plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Washington Mutual Bank is a “debtor,” and therefore

cannot engage in litigation on account of 11 U.S.C. 362(a) is misplaced. Whether or not

defendant Washington Mutual is a “debtor” under the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 362(a) is not

relevant here. The purpose of the automatic stay provision is to provide a “debtor” relief to get

its affairs in order, not to tie the hands of a defendant so that it cannot litigate claims brought

against it. Based on the foregoing, the dismissal order’s determination that 11 U.S.C. 362(a) is

not applicable is not clear error, or any error at all. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration is DENIED. 

Case 3:12-cv-00765-WHA Document 72 Filed 01/02/13 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The next

stop for Mr. Brooks is the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2013. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:12-cv-00765-WHA Document 72 Filed 01/02/13 Page 4 of 4