Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00356/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00356-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VALENCIA ANN THOMPSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CITY OF FRESNO, N. ROBEY (F.P.D. )

Badge No. P1303), CAMPOS (F.P.D. )

Badge No. 1067), LOPEZ (F.D.P. Badge )

No. 1309), M. GEBHART (F.D.P. Badge )

No. 1245), EDROZO (F.D.P. Badge No. )

1111), A. ROBLES (F.D.P. Badge No. )

5142), GOMEZ (F.P.D. Badge No. UNK.), )

D. LAMBERT (F.D.P. Badge No. P742), )

In their Official Capacities, and in their )

Individual Capacities, and DOES 1 )

through 50, )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F 06-00356 AWI LJO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PURSUANT TO

F.R.C.P. 12(B)(6)

[Document # 15]

This is an action for general and special damages that arises from an alleged

unwarranted search of the residence of plaintiff Valencia Ann Thompson (“Plaintiff”) by the

following individual officers of the Fresno Police Department: Campos, Lopez, Gebhart,

Edrozo, Robles, Gomez, and Lambert (the “individual Defendants”). Entity defendant City

of Fresno (“Fresno”) is alleged to be co-liable as to each of the ten claims for relief set forth

in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In the instant motion Fresno and the individual

Defendants (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first, third, and fourth

claims for relief. These claims for relief allege violation of 42 U.S.C., section 1983,

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California Civil Code, section 52.1, and California Civil Code, section 51.7, respectively. 

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C., sections 1331, 1343 and

1367. Venue is proper in this Court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are summarized from the FAC and are taken as true for purposes

of this motion. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). 

At the time of the events alleged in the FAC, Plaintiff was a 25-year-old AfricanAmerican woman. On January 6, 2005, at approximately 9:00 p.m., individual Defendants

arrived at Plaintiff’s home to investigate a report of domestic violence. At the time, Plaintiff

was hosting a birthday party in her home for her minor daughter. Individual Defendants

conducted a warrantless search of the premises for the person allegedly involved in the report

of domestic violence. It is not clear from the FAC whether consent for the search was given

or not.

When individual Defendants finished searching, Plaintiff told them the person(s)

suspected of the domestic violence were no longer at the residence. At about this time,

Plaintiff alleges one or more of the individual Defendants reported smelling marijuana

smoke. Plaintiff alleges she rose from her chair to escort individual Defendants from her

home, whereupon she was grabbed at the arm by defendant Robey. The FAC alleges Robey

used “excessive physical contact” without provocation. Defendant Robles ordered defendant

Robey to “take her down.” Defendant Robey threw Plaintiff to the floor, using a “leg

sweep,” inflicting “serious violence and harm upon Plaintiff’s person.”

The FAC alleges officer defendants Robey, Gomez, and Lopez then jumped on

Plaintiff while she lay in a prone position on the floor. Individual Defendants then “bound

Plaintiff’s person, using garments to tie her legs.” The FAC alleges all acts carried out by

individual Defendants were carried out “violently and maliciously.” Individual Defendants

then completed the search of the residence for marijuana and found none. 

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The FAC alleges the actions of individual Defendants during the search caused severe

physical injuries requiring immediate treatment. Plaintiff alleged individual Defendant

conduct also caused severe emotional distress. Plaintiff was taken into custody and

transported to University Medical Center by ambulance. She was thereafter charged with

violation of California Penal Code, section 148(a)(1) [obstruction of a police officer]. The

issue was brought to trial on June 16, 2005, and Plaintiff was acquitted.

Plaintiff alleges individual Defendant’s unlawful conduct was the result of “a policy

and custom of negligent hiring, training and supervising of its officers” by defendant Fresno.

Plaintiff submitted a claim for damages to Fresno on July 21, 2005. An amended

claim for damages was submitted on August 10, 2005. The amended claim was rejected on

or about September 30, 2005. A complaint was filed in this court on March 30, 2006. The

currently-operative FAC was filed on June 27, 2006. The instant motion to dismiss was filed

on August 4, 2006. An amendment to the motion to dismiss was filed on August 8, 2006. 

Plaintiff’s opposition was filed on September 11, 2006, and Defendants’ reply was filed on

September 13, 2006. On September 21, 2006, the court vacated the hearing date for oral

argument and took the matter under submission.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

the claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal can be based on

the failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a

cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th

Cir.1984). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co., 425 U.S. at 740, construe the pleading in the

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light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's

favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). In

deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts do not "assume the truth of legal conclusions merely

because they are cast in the form of factual allegations." Western Mining Council v. Watt,

643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981). 

“If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be

granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distributing Co. v.

Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9 Cir. 1986). th

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Fresno Pursuant to 42 U.S.C., section 1983

Plaintiff’s first claim for relief alleges unreasonable search and seizure in violation of

the Fourth Amendment, and seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C., section 1983. Plaintiff’s first

claim for relief is alleged against both individual Defendants and Fresno. Although

Defendants’ motion gives the impression it seeks dismissal of the entirety of Plaintiff’s first

claim for relief, it appears to the court that Defendants’ argument is directed to the allegations

against Fresno only. In short, Defendants’ argument is directed at Plaintiff’s claim that

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated because Fresno negligently hired, trained

and supervised individual Defendants. Defendants do not address Plaintiffs’ allegations, also

contained in the first claim for relief, that individual Defendants each violated Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment rights and/or ratified the violation of those rights by other individual

Defendants. The court therefore assumes Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to

Plaintiff’s first claim for relief, is for dismissal of Plaintiff’s first claim for relief only as

against defendant Fresno.

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United State Code provides, in pertinent part”

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage , of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

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subjects, or causes to be to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress, . . . .

The Supreme Court has applied section 1983 to municipal subdivisions of the states:

The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the

conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government

units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. Local

governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's

officers. Moreover, although the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a

government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a

deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like

every other § 1983 "person," by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for

constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even

though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's

official decisionmaking channels. 

Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Thus, pursuant to Monell, to state a federal claim for relief against an municipal

entity, the claimant must allege either (1) the existence of an approved policy that caused a

constitutional violation; or (2) the existence of an established pattern or practice or custom,

whether approved or not; or (3) constitutional injury that was caused by a person with final

decision making authority. However, “[l]ocal governments have no liability under section

simply because their employees may have violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights; the

doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. Choate v. County of Orange, 86 Cal.App.4th

312, 328 (4 Dist. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 271; see also, Robinson v. Solano

County, 278 F.3d 1077, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002).

With respect to actions against municipal entities pursuant to section 1983, courts in

this circuit have held that “to impose municipal liability for a violation of constitutional

rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) that

the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounted to deliberate indifference of

plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy was the moving force behind the

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constitutional violation.” Sepatis v. City and County of San Francisco, 217 F.Supp.2d 992,

1001 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432,

438 (9th Cir. 1997). “A municipality's failure to train an employee who has caused a

constitutional violation can be the basis for § 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts

to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the employee comes into

contact.” Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Thus, at minimum, a claim for relief against a municipal entity for failure to

adequately train must allege deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth

Amendment. Plaintiff’s allegation with respect to Fresno, is that Fresno had “a policy and

custom of negligently hiring, training and supervising its officers.” (Complaint at ¶ 32,

emphasis added.) Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege the requisite deliberate indifference. 

Plaintiff’s allegation with respect to Fresno is therefore insufficient as a matter of law with

respect to Plaintiff’s first claim for relief. Plaintiff’s first claim for relief against Fresno only

will therefore be dismissed.

II. Violation of California Civil Code, Section 52.1 (Bane Act)

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief alleges violation of California’s Bane Act, California

Civil Code, section 52.1, which provides as follows, in pertinent part:

(b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or

attempted to be interfered with , as described in subdivision (a), may

institute or prosecute in his or her won name and on his or her own

behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to,

damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate

equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the

right or rights secured.

The predicate constitutional deprivations alleged by Plaintiff are violations of the First

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I, sections 7, and

13 of the California Constitution. Defendants’ motion to dismiss contends that an allegation

of violation of Article I, section 7(a) of the California Constitution does not state a violation

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of a liberty interest that can form the predicate of a claim pursuant to the Bane Act. 

Assuming for purposes of this discussion Defendants are correct, the argument is

misplaced as an argument for dismissal of the claim. Pursuant to Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure:

A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense

alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate

counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative

and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is

note made insufficient by the insufficiency of the one or more of the

alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or

defenses as the party has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal,

equitable, or maritime grounds.

Whether or not allegation of violation of Article I, section 7 states an adequate

predicate violation for purposes of the Bane Act, it is clear that allegations of violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution do. As provided in

Rule 8(e)(2), where one or more allegations within a claim alleging multiple alternative

statements is sufficient to state a claim for relief, the insufficiency of one statement does not

warrant dismissal of the claim. The fact that violation of Article I, section 7 of the California

Constitution does not support a claim under the Bane Act does not warrant dismissal of

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief. 

III. Plaintiff’s Claim Pursuant to California Civil Code, section 51.7

California Civil Code, section 51.7 provides, in pertinent part:

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free

from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against

their persons or property because of their race, color, religion, ancestry,

national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or

position in a labor dispute, or because another person perceives them to have

one or more of those characteristics.

With respect to Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief, the FAC simply states that the acts

of Defendants “were acts of violence and intimidation by threat of violence, committed

against Plaintiff’s person in violation of the California Civil Code, section 51.7.” Although

the requirements of modern notice pleading permit a range of pleading styles, it remains a

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requirement that each element of each claim for relief must be identified and facts alleged

that, if true, would be sufficient to support the claim. Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc.,

753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985) (claim for relief “will not survive a motion to dismiss if

not supported by the facts constituting a legitimate claim for relief”). A claim for relief

pursuant to California Civil Code, section 51.7 requires facts that demonstrate that the

claimant suffered violence or threat of violence because they possess, or are perceived to

possess one or more of the listed characteristics. 

Plaintiff has not pled facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that she suffered

violence because of any particular characteristic. Although it would be logical to assume that

Plaintiff might allege she suffered violence at the hands of the individual Defendants because

she is African-American, it is not up to the court or to opposing counsel to supply missing

elements of the pleading. The case of O’Toole v. Superior Court, 140 Cal.App.4th 488 (4

Dist. 2006), which is cited by Plaintiff for the proposition that it is sufficient for purposes of

Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief simply to allege violence or the threat of violence, does not

support Plaintiff’s contention. In O’Toole, the plaintiffs in that case sued college campus

police for violation of their First Amendment rights in violation of California Civil Code,

section 52.1. There was no allegation of violence in O’Toole, and Civil Code section 51.7,

which is at issue in Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief, was never mentioned. 

Because it is obvious that Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief pursuant to California

Civil Code section 51.7 could be restated so as to cure the noted deficiency, Plaintiff’s fourth

claim for relief will be dismissed with leave to amend. 

THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDERED

that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first claim for relief is GRANTED as to

defendant Fresno County only, and is DENIED as to all individual Defendants. Leave

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to amend is granted.

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim for relief pursuant to California

Civil Code, section 52.1 is DENIED as to all Defendants.

3. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief pursuant to California

Civil Code, section 51.7 is GRANTED as to all Defendants. Leave to amend is

granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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