Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00280/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed Question: Fed Communications Act of 1934

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KINGVISION PAY-PER-VIEW, LTD.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALFONSO ROCCO MANENTE, and MARY

CATHERINE MANENTE, individually

and d/b/a MANENTE SPORTS BAR,

Defendants.

________________________________

ALFONSO ROCCO MANENTE, and MARY

CATHERINE MANENTE, individually

and d/b/a MANENTE SPORTS BAR,

Cross-Complainants,

v.

DISH NETWORK Service

Corporation, a Division of

EchoStar Satellite, L.L.C., and

DOES 1 through 10,

Cross-Defendants.

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1:05-cv-00280 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE CROSS-DEFENDANT

DISH NETWORK’S MOTION TO

DISMISS (DOC. 14)

I. INTRODUCTION

Cross-Defendant DISH Network Service L.L.C. (f/k/a DISH

Network Service Corporation) (“DISH”) moves to dismiss the crossCase 1:05-cv-00280-OWW -SMS Document 33 Filed 10/05/05 Page 1 of 11
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1 A cross-complaint, a procedure recognized under California

state law to join a party, not presently a party to an existing

party, is not authorized under federal law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

7, 13, and 14 regarding third-party practice.

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claims of defendants and cross-complainants ALFONSO ROCCO

MANENTE, and MARY CATHERINE MANENTE, individually and d/b/a

MANENTE SPORTS BAR (“Defendants”). Defendants oppose the motion.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of the complaint of Plaintiff

KingVision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. (“KingVision”), that defendants and

cross-complainants Alfonso and Mary Manente (d/b/a Manente Sports

Bar) unlawfully exhibited a televised pay-per-view boxing match

in violation of two federal statutes, the Communications Act of

1934 (47 U.S.C. § 605) and the Cable & Television Consumer

Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (47 U.S.C. § 553), and

state law (conversion). (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 11-23)

On May 17, 2005, Defendants filed a “cross-complaint”

against DISH, their satellite service provider, for

indemnification.1 (Doc. 8, Cross-Compl. ¶¶ 8-15, 16-18, 19-21) 

DISH filed a motion to dismiss all claims in the cross-complaint

on June 10, 2005. (Doc. 14, DISH’s Mem.) Defendants filed

opposition on July 1, 2005. (Doc. 20, Defs.’ Opp.) DISH replied

on July 21, 2005. (Doc. 23, DISH’s Reply)

Oral argument was heard on September 19, 2005. Thomas P.

Riley, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff KingVision. David

C. Mathias, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants. Joseph

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Marchini, Esq., appeared on behalf of DISH.

II. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

Plaintiff KingVision alleges that Defendants unlawfully

exhibited a televised pay-per-view boxing match in violation of

the Communications Act of 1934 and the Cable & Television

Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C.

§§ 605, 553 (“Acts”). Defendants brought several cross-claims

against their satellite service provider, DISH, alleging that

Defendants are entitled to complete indemnity from DISH. First,

Defendants base their claim on allegations that DISH was

“negligent or otherwise responsible for and proximately caused”

the exhibition of the boxing match. (Doc. 8, Cross-Compl. ¶ 11) 

Second, Defendants allege that DISH “breached [its] contract with

Plaintiff [i.e., KingVision]” and caused the exhibition of the

boxing match. (Id. at ¶ 12)

Defendants bring three cross-claims against DISH: 

(1) Indemnification; (2) Apportionment of Fault; and (3)

Declaratory Relief.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to attack a

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is

disfavored and rarely granted: “[a] complaint should not be

dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

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no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In deciding whether to

grant a motion to dismiss, the court “accept[s] all factual

allegations of the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” TwoRivers v. Lewis,

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“The court need not, however, accept as true allegations

that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For

example, matters of public record may be considered under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 201, including pleadings, orders and other papers filed

with the court or records of administrative bodies. See Lee v.

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be

accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Federal Claims.

Defendants allege that they are entitled to indemnity from

DISH for their claims under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. These

sections “prohibit receiving, viewing, and publishing

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misappropriated signals acquired via satellite.” Don King, 950

F. Supp. at 289. DISH argues that Defendants’ federal law claims

should be dismissed because indemnity for these causes of action

is not permitted as a matter of law. In support of its argument,

DISH relies solely on a case decided by a district court in the

Eastern District of California, Don King Prods./KingVision v.

Ferreira, 950 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d sub. nom.,

Doherty v. Wireless Broad. Systs. of Sacramento, Inc., 151 F.3d

1129 (9th Cir. 1998).

In Don King, the defendant admitted it exhibited a program

he was not entitled to view in violation of 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and

605. The defendant cross-claimed for indemnity against his

satellite service provider. The defendant argued he was entitled

to indemnity because the satellite company was obligated “to

provide him with properly functioning equipment to block his

receipt of programs he was not authorized to view....” Id. at

289. Similarly, Defendants here cross-claim for indemnity

against DISH, arguing that the satellite company should indemnify

them because it was obligated to take measures to ensure

Defendants did not receive programs they were not authorized to

view.

Whether a party has a right to indemnity for federal claims

is governed by federal law. Don King, 950 F. Supp. at 288

(citing Mortgages, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Nev. (Las

Vegas), 934 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also Doherty, 151

F.3d at 1130-31. “A defendant held liable under a federal

statute has a right to contribution or indemnification from

another who has also violated the statute only if such right

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arises (1) through the affirmative creation of a right of action

by Congress, either expressly or implicitly, or (2) via the power

of the courts to formulate federal common law.” Mortgages, Inc.,

934 F.2d at 212; see also Doherty, 151 F.3d at 1130-31. 

Applying this principle to alleged violations under the

Communications Act and the Cable & Television Act (47 U.S.C.

§§ 553 and 605), the court in Don King held there was no right to

indemnity under either Act, reasoning that: (1) nothing in

either Act mentions or implies a right to indemnity; and (2)

there was no reason to create a federal common law right to

indemnity under either Act. The Don King court based its

reasoning on provisions of the Acts themselves. First, the court

noted that because “Congress has established a comprehensive

remedial scheme” to deal with violations of these statutes, there

was little reason to create a federal common law right to

indemnity interfering with this scheme. Id. at 289.

Second, the court noted that each Act provides for a minimum

level of statutory damages even for those violators who are not

aware that they violated the statute. 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(C)

(“In any case where the court finds that the violator was not

aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted a

violation of this section, the court in its discretion may reduce

the award of damages to a sum of not less than $100”); 47 U.S.C.

§ 605(c)(3)(C)(iii) (“In any case where the court finds that the

violator was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts

constituted a violation of this section, the court in its

discretion may reduce the award of damages to a sum of not less

than $250.”).

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Defendants offer no persuasive basis upon which to

distinguish Don King. Defendants are not entitled to indemnity

for the federal claims under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. DISH’s

Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ federal claims is GRANTED WITH

PREJUDICE.

B. State Claims.

Defendants also claim they are entitled to indemnity for

their state law conversion claim. Whether a party has a right to

indemnity for state law claims is governed by state law. 

Don King, 950 F. Supp. at 288. Indemnity “may be defined as the

obligation resting on one party to make good a loss or damage

another party has incurred.” 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law

§ 112 (10th ed. 2005) (quoting Rossmor Sanitation v. Pylon, 13

Cal. 3d 622, 628 (1975)). 

“The right of indemnity is either express or implied

(equitable).” 5 Witkin at § 112 (citing Bay Dev., Ltd. v. Super.

Ct., 50 Cal. 3d 1012, 1030 (1990)). Express indemnification

arises “by virtue of express contractual language....” Id. 

Implied or equitable indemnification may arise by the equities of

the particular case, or impliedly by contractual language that

does not specifically deal with indemnification. Id. Under

California law, “comparative equitable indemnification” exists to

correct potential injustice, and is applied to multiple tortfeasors to apportion loss in relation to their relative

culpability. Baird v. Jones, 21 Cal. App. 4th 684, 689-90

(1993).

Defendants make two arguments supporting their entitlement

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to equitable indemnification for their conversion claim. First,

they argue that they are entitled to indemnity based on DISH’s

negligence, specifically that DISH was negligent in allowing the

signal for the unauthorized boxing match to be transmitted to

Defendants’ restaurant in the first place. (Doc. 8, CounterComplaint at § 11) Second, they argue they are entitled to

indemnity by virtue of DISH’s alleged breach of a contract it had

with Plaintiff KingVision. (Id. at ¶ 12)

1. Indemnity Based on Negligence.

The first issue is whether Defendants state a claim for

indemnity against DISH for Plaintiff’s conversion claim based

upon DISH’s purported negligence.

California law provides that a strictly liable or reckless

party is entitled to indemnity from a negligent party. Allen v.

Sundean, 137 Cal. App. 3d 216, 225-26 (1982); see Baird, 21 Cal.

App. 4th at 690 (recognizing that comparative equitable indemnity

is applied among negligent defendants and strictly liable

defendants); In re Nat’l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool

Certificates Sec. Litig., 682 F. Supp. 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1987)

(recognizing that under California law, comparative equitable

indemnity is available between a negligent tortfeasor and a

reckless tortfeasor); Cal. Jur. 3d, Contribution and

Indemnification § 90 (2005) (same).

However, a party who commits an intentional tort is not

entitled to indemnity from a negligent party. Sundean, 137 Cal.

App. 3d at 225-26; Weidenfeller v. Star and Garter, 1 Cal. App.

4th 1, 6 (1991) (recognizing that comparative equitable indemnity

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2 The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff’s

ownership or right to the property; (2) defendant’s conversion by

a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff’s property rights; and

(3) damages. Burlesci v. Peterson, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1062,

(1998). 

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does not allow intentional tortfeasor to shift loss to negligent

tortfeasor); Cal. Jur. 3d Contribution and Indemnification at

§ 90; 3 Cal. Transactions Forms § 20:18 (2005) (noting that an

intentional tortfeasor may obtain indemnity from another

intentional tortfeasor, but that no cases hold that an

intentional tortfeasor may obtain indemnity from a negligent

tortfeasor).

Whether Defendants can state a claim for indemnity against

DISH depends upon whether conversion is an intentional tort.

California case law refers to conversion as both a strict

liability tort and an intentional tort.2 Irving Nelkin & Co. v.

South Beverly Hills Wilshire Jewelry & Loan, 129 Cal. App. 4th

692, 699 (2005) (“Conversion is a species of strict liability in

which questions of good faith, lack of knowledge and motive are

ordinarily immaterial.”); Oakdale Village Group v. Fong, 43 Cal.

App. 4th 539, 544 (1996) (“[c]onversion is a...strict liability

tort.”); Burlesci v. Peterson, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1066 (1998)

(“Conversion is a strict liability tort.”); 5 Witkin at § 713

(“The act constituting conversion must be knowing or

intentional.”); Collin v. Amer. Empire Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 4th

787 (noting that “conversion is an intentional tort.”). 

Conversion is an intentional tort in the sense that the

defendant’s action must be willful, although the tortfeasor need

not intend the consequences. See 18 Am. Jur. 2d Conversion § 3

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(2005). Relying on the rule that an intentional tortfeasor may

not obtain indemnity from a negligent tortfeasor, the court in

Don King held that the defendants could not obtain indemnity for

their conversion claim based on a theory of negligence against

the satellite service provider. Don King, 950 F. Supp. at 290. 

Here, like in Don King, Defendants bring an indemnity claim

against their satellite service provider based on a negligence

theory. DISH’s motion to dismiss Defendants’ state law

conversion claim on the basis that an intentional tortfeasor

cannot obtain indemnity against a negligent tortfeasor is GRANTED

with LEAVE TO AMEND.

In the alternative, DISH argues that Defendants’ cross-claim

does not allege sufficient facts to state a negligence claim. 

Defendants’ cross-complaint contains very few facts. Defendants

allege that DISH was “negligent or otherwise responsible for and

proximately caused” the exhibition of the boxing match. (Doc. 8,

Cross-Compl. ¶ 11) Defendants allege no facts to describe DISH’s

negligence. DISH’s motion to dismiss Defendants’ conversion

cross-claim is GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND on the grounds that

Defendants fail to allege facts to support a negligence claim.

2. Indemnity Based on Breach of Contract.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to indemnity from

DISH based on DISH’s breach of a purported sub-licencing

agreement DISH had with Plaintiff KingVision. Defendants’ crossclaim contains no factual allegations regarding this contract. 

Defendants’ cross-claim contains no facts that support a claim

for explicit (contractual) indemnity or for implied contractual

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indemnity. See 5 Witkin at § 112. DISH’s motion to dismiss

Defendants’ conversion cross-claim is GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND

on the grounds that Defendants fails to allege facts to support

contractual or implied contractual indemnity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the forgoing reasons, DISH’s motion

to dismiss Defendants’ federal-based crossclaims is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE; and

DISH’s motion to dismiss Defendants’ statebased cross-claims is GRANTED with LEAVE TO

AMEND.

Any amended complaint shall be filed within

ten (10) days of electronic service of this

order.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October _5__, 2005. 

/s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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