Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01084/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01084-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ROMERO,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. S. ELLERY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-01084-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 83

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Michael Romero alleges Pelican Bay State Prison correctional officers S. Ellery 

and P. Harman used excessive force against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

defendants1 move for summary judgment, arguing that on this record there is no Eighth 

Amendment violation and that the officers are also protected by qualified immunity. Defendants 

present strong arguments that, at a minimum, qualified immunity should apply. However, a 

genuine dispute of material fact exists, created by the difference in testimony between Romero and 

the defendants about the incident. Crediting Romero’s version of events, Ellery’s multiple blasts 

of pepper spray without warning constituted excessive force that caused unnecessary and wanton 

pain and suffering under clearly established law. As a result, defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2011, Romero was an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison in the Security 

Housing Unit (“SHU”). First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) at p. 3-4 [Dkt. No. 7]; Romero Depo. 

 

1 Although the motion was brought on behalf of Ellery, Harman, and Grenert, Grenert was 

previously dismissed with prejudice from the action. Dkt. No. 90. Therefore, this Order focuses 

only on the remaining two defendants, Harman and Ellery.

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at 18:6-8 [Dkt Nos. 84-1, 93-6]. The SHU is organized into at least two “sides,” a C-side and a Dside, and each side is divided into multiple pods. Harman Depo. at 64:3-8 [Dkt. Nos. 84-3, 93-9]. 

A pod is a single corridor of cells, with an upper and lower tier. Id. at 30:25-31:5.

“Pod raids,” or searches of numerous cells, are performed periodically in the SHU. Ellery 

Depo. at 106:20-107:20 [Dkt. Nos. 84-2, 94-7]. Generally, during a pod raid, multiple officers 

enter the pod and shout variations of “lights on,” “cuff up,” and “shirt, shorts and shower shoes.” 

Harman Depo. at 68:21-69:7; Ellery Depo. at 93:9-96:4. Officers typically expect an inmate to 

respond by turning the cell’s light to “bright” (the light can be off, dim, or bright and is controlled 

by a switch in the cell) and presenting himself in his shorts, t-shirt, and shower shoes in front of 

the cuff port. Harman Depo. at 48:9-23, 62:12-63:16; Ellery Depo. at 95:6-25. The inmate is then 

expected to remove his clothing and pass it through the cuff port so that the officers can search it, 

after which the inmate puts the clothing back on and submits his wrists in order to be “cuffed up.” 

Ellery Depo. at 95:15-21. The cell door is only opened after the occupants are cuffed. Id. at 93:9-

96:4.

At approximately 6:15 p.m. on April 23, 2011, correctional officers Ellery and Harman 

participated in a pod raid of two of the SHU pods. Id. at 36:10-24; Harman Depo. at 63:17-25. 

The SHU houses inmates who have been “validated” as gang member by the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or have a history of violence. Pickett Depo. at 

66:21-68:19 [Dkt. No. 93-13]; Ellery Depo. at 86:14-87:8. The D4 unit, where Romero was 

located, houses the validated gang members. Harman Depo. at 99:20-24. Ellery and Harman 

were not regularly assigned to the pod. Ellery Depo. at 88:11; Harman Depo. at 64:4-8.

As Ellery and Harman approached Romero’s cell, they ordered him to turn on his cell 

lights, to submit to a search, and to cuff up. Ellery Depo. at 106:8-107:24. Other officers were 

yelling similar orders for the other inmates. Jones Depo. at 26:11-27:25 [Dkt. No. 93-10]. This 

procedure is standard for any cell search or pod raid and Romero was familiar with it. Romero 

Depo. at 95:19-97:10. At the time the pod raid started, Romero was taking a “bird bath” in his cell 

sink. Id. at 27:12-19; 28:20-31:8. When Ellery arrived at Romero’s cell, Ellery opened the cuff 

port so that Romero could submit to cuffing. Ellery Depo. at 110:7-20. 

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Romero’s light, which had been on, went to off at some point around the time the officers 

approached the cell. Id. at 104:14-105:2; Romero Depo. at 32:3-12, 39:14-41:17. According to 

Romero, he had the light on dim and it malfunctioned to off when he tried to turn it to bright. 

Romero Depo. at 32:3-12, 40:17-41:7-17. He testified that when a switch is wet, it sometimes 

malfunctions by going to off and not to bright. Id. at 41:7-17. Exactly when the light was turned 

off is unclear. Romero does not remember if the light was still on when the officers were at his 

cell door. Id. at 54:10-55:14. Harman and Ellery testified that the light was on when they arrived 

and, after Romero was instructed to turn the bright light on, he turned the light off. Harman Depo. 

at 70:24-71:4; Ellery Depo. at 104:3-105:2.

After the light malfunctioned, Romero says that he attempted to dry off and retrieve his tshirt and shower shoes from his locker located in the back of his cell. Romero Depo. at 49:14-22, 

58:17-20. Defendants observed him rummaging around in the back of his cell. Ellery Depo. at 

108:16-109:2, 116:4-12; Harman Depo. at 108:16-109:2. Defendants testified that upon observing 

these actions, they were immediately concerned because they had never experienced an inmate 

turn the light off during a pod raid. Ellery Depo. at 108:2-15; Harman Depo. at 70:17-23. The 

officers were especially concerned that Romero was going to “gas” or spear them. 2 Harman Depo. 

at 83:15-25. Ellery and Harman testified they shouted repeated commands to Romero, including 

instructing him to let them see his hands, to stop what he was doing, and to turn the light on. 

Ellery Depo. at 109:4-17, 113:6-5; Harman Depo. at 73:4-7. 

Romero does not recall hearing orders that were specifically directed at him. Romero 

Depo. at 71:13-18. But Romero does remember one of the officers say something along the lines 

of “can I spray him?” Id. at 69:11-72:24. He recalls another officer say “yes” and then feeling the 

first blast of oleoresin capsicum (“O.C.”) spray. Id. at 83:8-17. He testified that he did not recall 

receiving any warning that his behavior was going to lead to being pepper sprayed. Id. at 101:22-

103:2, 105:24-106:11. At the time of the first blast, he was squatting in the lower right portion of 

 

2

“Gassing” occurs when an inmate mixes bodily fluids and waste, such as feces, urine, and saliva, 

and throws it onto another person. Ellery Depo. at 40:22-44:9. Spearing occurs when an inmate 

throws or stabs someone with a manufactured spear or weapon. Id. at 43:9-13. 

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his cell with his left side facing the cell door. Id. at 84:11-22. After being sprayed the first time, 

Romero testified he repeatedly told the guards that he was “not doing anything.” Id. at 102:23-24; 

105:20. The officers testified that Romero made “no response” and “completely ignored” them. 

Ellery Depo. at 115:12-17.

After repeating orders to cuff up and receiving no response, Ellery dispensed another burst 

of O.C. spray. Ellery Depo. at 115:21-116:12. Romero has no recollection of the time between 

the blasts because it all happened so quickly. Romero Depo. at 101:22-102:8. Ellery recalls a 

delay between five to ten seconds, Ellery Depo. at 115:24-116:3, whereas Harman testified that he 

did not recall exactly but it “could have been around 30 seconds or so,” Harman Depo. at 81:3-9. 

After the second spray, Ellery testified that Romero continued to “totally ignore[]” them and did 

not comply with their verbal orders. Ellery Depo. at 116:13-20. Romero stated that at this time he 

was blinded and trying to feel his way to the door. Romero Depo. at 99:1-101:21. He repeatedly 

tried to tell the officers that he was “not doing nothing.” Id. at 102:22-23; 105:19-20.

Romero was sprayed a third time. Ellery Depo. at 118:21-23. None of the blasts hit him 

straight on; most hit his side. Romero Depo. at 127:24-128:8. After the third blast, Romero 

reached the front of the cell and was handcuffed. Ellery Depo. at 118:24-119:4. According to 

Ellery, the whole incident lasted less than a minute. Id. at 114:23-25.

The duration of the blasts is in dispute. Defendant Harman testified that each burst of 

pepper spray lasted approximately two seconds. Harman Depo. at 130:4-13. Romero stated that 

each blast lasted approximately five to ten seconds. Romero Depo. at 89:8-21, 92:16-20, 93:25-

94:1.

As a result of the incident, Romero felt as though his body was “on fire” and he was 

“drowning” in his own saliva. Id. at 126:24-127:4. After the three rounds of spray, he had to get 

extra boxers because the ones he had on were “soaked.” Id. at 127:19-23. At some point after the 

incident, he was escorted out of his cell to the shower in the pod. Id. at 136:2-11. He stood under 

the shower for a “few minutes” until he told the officer he was finished. Id. at 136:20–137:10. 

The shower cooled down the burning sensation he was feeling but he was still coughing and 

choking and his vision was blurry. Id. at 137:13-17. After his shower, Romero was placed in a 

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holding cell until a nurse came to see him. Id. at 138:5-10. When he returned to his cell, it was 

not fully decontaminated and so he spent most of the night cleaning it. Id. at 148:13-149:11. He 

was prescribed artificial tears and Aller-chlor, an antihistamine, to treat the effects of the pepper 

spray. Id. at 158:3-11. It took approximately six days for the burning to subside and Romero had 

difficulty sleeping for at least ten days afterward. Id. at 149:12-17; 150:12-13. To this day he still 

worries about being sprayed again and feels like he has to be “on guard” every time his cell door 

opens. Id. at 158:12-159:18.

LEGAL STANDARD

A party is entitled to summary judgment where it “shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 

dispute is genuine if it could reasonably be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material where it could affect the 

outcome of the case. Id.

The moving party has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion 

and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of 

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Once the movant has 

made this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify specific evidence showing 

that a material factual issue remains for trial. Id. The nonmoving party may not rest on mere 

allegations or denials from its pleadings, but must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the 

record” demonstrating the presence of a material factual dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The 

nonmoving party need not show that the issue will be conclusively resolved in its favor. See 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. All that is required is the identification of sufficient evidence to 

create a genuine dispute of material fact, thereby “requir[ing] a jury or judge to resolve the parties’

differing versions of the truth at trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the nonmoving 

party cannot produce such evidence, the movant “is entitled to...judgment as a matter of law 

because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of 

her case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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On summary judgment, the court draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the 

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a 

judge.” Id. However, conclusory and speculative testimony does not raise a genuine dispute and 

is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 

F.2d 730, 738-39 (9th Cir. 1979).

DISCUSSION

I. EXCESSIVE FORCE VIOLATION

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison is subject to scrutiny under the Eighth 

Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A prison official violates the Eighth 

Amendment when: (1) “the deprivation alleged [is] sufficiently serious;” and (2) the prison official 

possesses a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. at 834. The state of mind required for an 

excessive force claim is fulfilled if a prison official applies force “maliciously and sadistically” so 

as to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). Five Hudson factors are 

generally considered in determining whether a violation occurred: “(1) the extent of injury 

suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need 

and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and 

(5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 

1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). 

A. Extent of Injury

“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the 

use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation, or instead 

evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a 

knowing willingness that it occur.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Following the incident, Romero experienced considerable physical and psychological 

effects. After the first blast of O.C. spray, Romero began coughing and feeling as though he was 

blinded and could not breathe. Romero Depo. at 100:5-11. He closed his eyes after being pepper 

sprayed the first time, but he continued to cough and choke during the following two blasts. Id. at 

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101:6-16. As a result of the three blasts of O.C. spray, Romero was sprayed “all over” his face 

and body. Id. at 103:10-13; 127:19-23. Everything he had on was “soaked.” Id. at 127:23. 

After he submitted to being handcuffed, he was required to wait in his cell for what seemed 

like a “long time.” Id. at 126:6-7. He felt like his body was “basically on fire.” Id. at 127:15. He 

was worried he was going to “drown in [his] saliva and mucus” so, while he waited, he tried to 

lean over the toilet and blow out his nose while his hands were still in handcuffs. Id. at 125:1-

126:15. He was allowed to shower after the incident. Following the shower, he was returned to 

his cell where he used a washcloth to clean it because it was not decontaminated following the 

incident. Id. at 148:13-149:11. He did not get “any kind of sleep” for approximately ten days 

following the incident because his body was so swollen and burned that any time he tried to lay

down, the contact with his skin would wake him up immediately. Id. at 149:12-25. Although he 

gave himself a “birdbath” every day, it took at about six days for the burning in his eyes to stop. 

Id. at 150:12-13. He was given medicine by the medical staff to ease his symptoms, but the pain 

did not go away for about twenty days. Id. at 150:19-22. He reported to medical staff that he felt 

“queasy, headaches, [and] loss of appetite.” Id. at 155:12-21. The incident left him with lasting 

nervousness every time his cell door opens and he is “constantly worried” about whether it will 

happen again. Id. at 158:12-159:18.

While Romero sustained no severe or permanent physical damage, the incident caused him

at least moderate injuries. See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(characterizing burns, blisters, and skin irritation that persisted for three or four days after being 

pepper sprayed as moderate injuries); Williams v. Young, No. 2:12-cv-0318, 2015 WL 4617985, at

*12 (E.D. Cal. July 31, 2015) (“The extent of injury allegedly suffered by plaintiff was moderate; 

in addition to suffering pain and burning in his eyes, plaintiff claims the effects lasted for about a 

week, and that he had to deal with a period of dizziness and had real bad blurriness.”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

B. Need for Force and Amount of Force Used

“Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, corrections officers must 

balance the need to maintain or restore discipline through force against the risk of injury to 

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inmates.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Not every instance of 

inmate resistance justifies the use of force, and use of pepper spray will not be justified every time 

an inmate questions orders or seeks redress for an officers actions.” Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 

868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).

Ellery and Harman responded to Romero’s non-complaint behavior by pepper spraying 

him three times. As discussed above, the length of each blast of pepper spray is contested.

Romero testified each blast lasted between five and ten seconds, whereas Harman testified that 

each blast lasted approximately two seconds. Romero Depo. at 89:14-16; Harman Depo. at 130:4-

13. The time between each blast is unclear. Romero testified “everything happened so fast” that 

he could not recall the time between the blasts. Romero Depo. at 101:22-102:8. Ellery’s 

recollection is that five to ten seconds elapsed between the first and second blast. Ellery Depo. at 

115:24-116:3.

According to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Department Operations 

Manual in place at the time of the incident, when immediate force is necessary for inmates 

confined in their cells, O.C. spray is the preferred option for carrying out the immediate use of

force. AGO00860. Defendants argue Ellery’s use of the O.C. spray was “necessary to squelch 

Romero’s actions and restore order and security.” Mot. at 11 [Dkt. No. 83]. However, the manual 

specifically instructs that “a verbal warning shall be given before force is used unless the 

circumstances require immediate force that precludes a verbal warning.” Id. In this case, Romero 

testified that at no time was he given a warning that O.C. spray would be used against him,

Romero Depo. at 101:22-103:2, and Ellery does not recall giving one, Ellery Depo. at 114:14-18. 

The officers testified that they repeatedly commanded Romero to cuff up, but Romero does not 

recall hearing them. Romero Depo. at 101:6-102:8. Despite his efforts to “find a bunk or a wall 

in order to get [himself] to the door” following the first blast of O.C. spray, he was pepper sprayed 

twice more. Id. at 101: 13-21.

Taking all factual inferences in Romero’s favor, as I must, three blasts of O.C. spray, each 

lasting between five and ten seconds, is not a de minimis amount of force. Ellery saw that the first 

blast had hit Romero in the head. Ellery Depo. at 115:4-17. A reasonable officer would know that 

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spraying someone with O.C. spray in the face or head area can be disorienting and lead to 

impaired vision. Even if the first blast was justified, which is not clear on this record, considering 

that the second and third blasts came in quick succession with no warning, a reasonable jury could 

find that this conduct constituted a significant use of force. A triable issues exist whether

defendants should have allowed Romero more time to comply with their commands and provided 

a clear warning that (further) force would be used. 

C. Perceived Threat

A court must take into account “the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, 

as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them.” 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). In this case, a triable dispute of material fact exists 

as to whether the perceived threat warranted the force imposed.

Instead of encountering the cell light on and Romero ready to be handcuffed, as per pod 

raid instructions, the officers observed Romero’s cell light going off and Romero rummaging in 

the back of his cell. Ellery Depo. at 108:16-109:2. The officers repeated their verbal orders but 

Romero remained at the back of his cell. At the time force was used, Romero was approximately 

six feet away from the officers and the cuff port was open. Id. at 110:2-6. It is undisputed that 

Romero did not have a weapon or gas in his cell, he did not verbalize any threat to the officers, nor 

did he make any actively aggressive gestures. Nevertheless, given that the cell light was off and 

Romero was seemingly reaching for something in the back of his cell, a juror could certainly find 

that the officers’ fears of being gassed or speared were reasonable. 

Ellery testified that defendants were two of eight officers on the tier at that time, including 

at least one other officer within arm’s reach. Id. at 112:3-21. While the presence of other officers 

does not reduce the chance of being gassed or speared, it is notable that Ellery and Harman were 

not on their own and could have called on the other officers had the situation escalated. Of course, 

the officers’ perception of the situation is contrasted with Romero’s testimony that after he was 

pepper sprayed he repeatedly tried to tell the officers that he was “not doing nothing.” Romero 

Depo. at 102:23-24; 105:20. Although the defendants testified they did not hear Romero, Ellery 

indicated that if an inmate offers a reasonable explanation for a delay or inability to comply with 

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an order, the use of force such as O.C. spray can be avoided. Ellery Depo. at 116:15-117:12.

D. Efforts to Temper the Severity of the Response

This factor does not weigh heavily in favor of either side. The whole incident happened in 

less than a minute. As discussed above, it is undisputed that no warning was given regarding the 

use of O.C. spray or that failure to comply would result in additional uses of force. Nor does it 

appear that the officers attempted to otherwise change their response to the situation by backing

away from the perforated cell door to avoid any potential gassing or spearing or by engaging the 

assistance of the other officers who were present. On the other hand, Ellery stopped pepper 

spraying Romero once Romero presented himself for handcuffing at the cell door. Romero was 

also given access to a shower after the incident in order to ameliorate the effects of the O.C. spray.

In sum, applying the Hudson factors to Romero’s version of the facts, I find there are 

multiple triable issues of material fact that preclude granting summary judgment in favor of 

defendants. 

II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Even if a violation is established, qualified immunity shields government officials from 

civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

The determination of whether the law was clearly established “must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Courts may “not define 

clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 

(2011). Rather, at the time of the challenged conduct, case law must have established the contours 

of the right alleged to have been violated with sufficient clarity that a “reasonable official would 

have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 2083; see also Alston v. Read, 

663 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he right the officials are alleged to have violated must be 

clearly established in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense.”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). It is Romero’s “burden to show that the contours of the right were clearly 

established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 

1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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I focus my inquiry on cases decided prior to the date of the incident, April 2011. As 

multiple other district courts within this circuit have noted, prior to April 2011, the case law 

regarding the parameters of the permissible use of O.C. spray to address inmates who disobey or 

interfere with officers’ commands was not well defined. See, e.g., Jennings v. Hays, No. 10-cv8004, 2011 WL 1480038, at *9 (D. Ariz. Apr. 19, 2011) (“The law is unclear regarding the 

parameters of the permissible use of pepper spray to address inmates who disobey orders or 

interfere with officers in the performance of their duties.”); Brown v. Williams, No. 09-cv-00792, 

2011 WL 386852, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 09-cv00792, 2011 WL 1344564 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2011) (“There is little Supreme Court and Ninth 

Circuit published precedent that addresses the use of chemical agents to maintain prison 

discipline, let alone the use of chemical agents to establish compliance with a lawful 

order.”)(citations omitted); Howard v. Nunley, No. 06-cv-00191-NVW, 2010 WL 3785536, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2010), aff’d, 465 F. App'x 669 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Supreme Court and published 

Ninth Circuit precedent have little to say about the appropriate use of pepper spray or similar 

agents to enforce prison discipline.”). 

Relevant cases decided prior to the incident demonstrate that the administration of pepper 

spray to induce a prisoner “to follow directions falls within the wide-ranging zone of deference 

accorded to prison officials in shaping prophylactic or preventive measures intended to reduce the 

incidence of breaches of prison discipline.” Stewart v. Stewart, 60 Fed. App’x 20, 22 (9th Cir.

2003) (unpublished memorandum disposition) (internal quotation marks and modifications 

omitted); see also Rodriguez v. Elmore, 407 F. App’x 124, 125 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the correctional officer when the defendant

had administered pepper spray to the plaintiff and his cellmate after they repeatedly refused to 

comply with orders to exit their cell and be handcuffed) (unpublished memorandum disposition) 

(unpublished memorandum disposition); Allen v. Bosley, 253 F. App’x 658, 659 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(holding that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue that the correctional officers used excessive 

force when they administered pepper spray to induce another inmate to comply with orders to 

submit to handcuffing) (unpublished memorandum disposition); Robinson v. Okamoto, 26 F. 

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App’x 749 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

defendant who sprayed the plaintiff after he refused to comply with the officer’s commands)

(unpublished memorandum disposition). 

Defendants argue that because the Ninth Circuit “regularly affirms” decisions where 

correctional officers use pepper spray to restore discipline, Ellery and Harman are entitled to 

qualified immunity. Mot. at 19. But, as Romero notes, in multiple cases that grant summary 

judgment in favor of defendants, inmates were given a verbal warning that O.C. spray would be 

used. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (“We think the record 

further indicates, however, that use of the substance in small amounts may be a necessary prison 

technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate warning to move from a cell or upon other 

provocation presenting a reasonable possibility that slight force will be required.”); Randle v. 

Miranda, 315 F. App’x 645, 645 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to the defendants when the inmate had been informed that the officer would use pepper 

spray if he failed to comply with her orders) (unpublished memorandum disposition); Howard v. 

Nunley, 465 F. App’x 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to defendant after the inmate had received a warning not to repeat his offensive behavior 

and that he would be pepper sprayed if he did) (unpublished memorandum disposition). 

Here, if one accepts Romero’s description of the case, defendants acted contrary to the 

direction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Department Operations Manual in 

place at the time of the incident because they failed to give a verbal warning. The Manual 

instructs that a verbal warning “shall be given” before the use of immediate force unless the 

circumstances “require immediate force that precludes a verbal warning.” AGO00860. 

Defendants testified that the darkened cell and Romero’s non-compliance with their commands 

caused them to be concerned for their safety. But they had time to repeatedly shout instructions 

during the incident, both prior to the use of the O.C. spray and between blasts. Romero testified 

that, prior to the first pepper spray blast, he heard an officer ask the other whether he should use 

O.C. spray and heard the individual say “yes.” Romero Depo. at 83:8-17. This testimony, if 

believed, indicates that the officers had time to deliberate regarding the appropriate use of force. 

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Taking all factual inferences in favor of Romero, the need for a warning was clearly established at 

the time of the incident and the circumstances did not preclude defendants from issuing a verbal 

warning that pepper spray would be used. 

The need to give a verbal warning prior to the application of immediate force is consistent

with clearly established law in the Ninth Circuit at the time. See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 

1021 (9th Cir. 2013). In that case, an inmate requested a vegetarian breakfast, was told he was not 

entitled to one and was given the option to accept a non-vegetarian meal or be marked as refusing 

it. 705 F.3d at 1025. 3 He attempted to speak with one of the officers by “squatting down and 

putting his fingertips on the bottom portion of the open food port” from where he intended to call 

out to the officer. Id. “Without warning, [an officer] sprayed Furnace with pepper spray.” Id. 

In considering whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit 

recognized that, as of the time of the decision, “very few of our cases deal with constitutional 

limits on the use of pepper spray on confined inmates.” Id. at 1028. Although the court went on 

to reason that the principles previously articulated with respect to tear gas also apply to pepper 

spray, it acknowledged that officers are not required to have the “legal knowledge culled by the 

collective hindsight of skilled lawyers and learned judges.” Id. It therefore focused its analysis on 

whether the use of force caused “unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering, as defined in 

Hudson, since that law was undoubtedly clear.” Id. In concluding that the officers were not 

shielded by qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit explained that it was not persuaded that the use 

of “violent force, prior to a verbal warning, was necessary to gain Furnace’s compliance.” Id. at 

1029. The court focused on the prison’s Operations Procedure which directed officers to issue a 

warning that a chemical agent will be used if an inmate takes control of a food port. Id. The court 

declared that, barring urgency or exigent circumstance, the interests protected by qualified 

immunity are “less compelling when the appropriate response to a situation has been prescribed by 

the prison’s own written policies.” Id. at 1030.

The combination of the lack of verbal warnings, the multiple blasts of pepper spray and the 

 

3 Although the Ninth Circuit’s decision was issued in 2013, the underlying events occurred in 

2005. See Furnace v. Sullivan, No. 07-cv-4441-MMC, Dkt No. 37 (N.D. Cal. March 31, 3010).

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difference in testimony between Romero and defendants about what happened during the incident 

creates a genuine dispute that prevents summary judgment. On this record, defendants have not 

established that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Romero’s excessive force claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2016

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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