Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01940/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01940-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO VERA, Civil No. 10-1940 LAB (BLM)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: 

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF No. 10]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION TO AMEND

THE FINDINGS [ECF No. 22];

(3) DENYING MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [ECF

No. 35]; and

(4) DENYING MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER [ECF No. 37]

vs.

DARRIL ADAMS, et al.,

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Guillermo Vera, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenges a

disciplinary proceeding in which he was found guilty of a rules violation and assessed loss

of credits.1

 Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, contending it violates Rule

1 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to

those imprinted by the Court's electronic case filing system.

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2(c) of the Rules Following 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is untimely, is procedurally defaulted, and is

unexhausted. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 2-11, ECF No. 19.) Vera filed an

Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on March 22, 2013 [ECF No. 44].

The Court has reviewed the pertinent portions of the record and has considered the

legal arguments presented by both parties. For the reasons discussed below, it is

recommended that the Motion to Dismiss the Petition be GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part.

Petitioner Vera has also filed a Motion to Amend Findings, a Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (See ECF Nos. 22, 35, 37.) 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends those motions be DENIED.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

It is not entirely clear what disciplinary proceeding Vera is challenging. He does not

clearly identify a disciplinary proceeding he is challenging in his petition, and he has

submitted a large number of documents pertaining to different proceedings. The Court

agrees with Respondent, however, that Vera appears to be challenging an October 24, 2003,

rules violation report for battery on a peace officer. (Pet. at 51, ECF No. 10.)2 Immediately

following the October 24, 2003, incident, Vera was placed in administrative segregation. (Id.

at 57.) He postponed his initial hearing date on the rules violation report because the matter

had been referred to the District Attorney’s Office for possible prosecution. (Id.) On

February 2, 2004, the District Attorney’s Office rejected the matter for prosecution, and the

hearing on the rules violation report took place on February 28, 2004; Vera was assessed

150 days forfeiture of credits. (Id. at 57, 145.) On April 15, 2004, Vera was given a secure

housing unit (SHU) term of 12 months and was recommended for a transfer to the SHU at

either California Correctional Institution or California State Prison, Corcoran. (Id. at 57.) 

That recommendation was later rescinded because Vera’s minimum eligible release date was

too short to allow the transfer. (Id. at 52.)

2

 Indeed, this is the only instance identified in the documents supplied by Vera in which he

suffered a loss of credits, and which could therefore form the basis for a habeas corpus petition. See

28 U.S.C. 2254(a); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

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According to documents Vera has submitted, he asked for an extension of time to

appeal the hearing decision on April 22, 2004, and again on May 6, 2004. (Id. at 27, 62-63.) 

According to an undated handwritten note on a document entitled “Translation of Inmate

Request for Interview dated May 6, 2004,” Vera was told by prison officials the rules

violation report was being processed and he could not appeal until he received a copy of the

decision. He would then have 15 days in which to appeal the findings. (Id. at 27.) 

According to another handwritten note on that document dated May 26, 2004, Vera had

received a copy of the decision on April 5, 2004. (Id. at 27.) 

On July 21, 2004, Vera requested, via a 602 form, that the October 24, 2003, rules

violation report be dismissed and that he be released from the SHU. (Id. at 47, 49.) On July

27, 2004, Vera sent an inquiry about a May 6, 2004, appeal of the October 24, 2003, rules

violation report. (Id. at 50.) He then received four letters dated August 3, 2004, from the

appeals coordinator. Three of the letters informed Vera his appeal had been “screened out”

for various procedural deficiencies. (Id. at 45, 46, 48.) One letter was an “appeal abuse

notice.” (Id. at 44.) 

On August 29, 2004, Vera again submitted a “602 Appeal Notice,” which was returned

to him because he did not specify what log number he was referring to. (Id. at 43.) Vera

next filed an appeal on January 18, 2005. (Id. at 31-36.) On February 16, 2005, Vera

received a letter from the appeal coordinator, regarding “screening at the second level.” (Id.

at 28.) The letter informed Vera there had been too great a time lapse between the hearing

and his appeal. He received another letter on June 8, 2005, telling him his appeal had been

referred to a staff member for review, although it is not clear from the document whether

the letter refers to an appeal of the October 24, 2003, rules violation. (Id. at 23.)3

Beginning in 2005, Vera began filing habeas corpus petitions in state court challenging

his disciplinary hearing. Vera filed a habeas corpus petition in the Monterey County Superior

Court, which was denied in a written, unpublished opinion. (Lodgment Nos. 2-3.) Vera next

3

 Vera has submitted 97 pages of additional documents in his Traverse. A close review of

those records, however, reveals they relate to health care confiscation of property appeals, not the

October 24, 2003, rules violation report that is the subject of Vera’s petition.

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filed a habeas corpus petition the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 4.) The court

of appeal denied the petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 5.) Vera filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which that court denied citing In re

Robbins, 19 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998) and In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921 (1979). (Lodgment

Nos. 6-7.)

On September 16, 2010, Vera filed a document entitled “Application for Extension of

Time” in this Court. The matter was given case number 10cv1940 LAB (BLM). (ECF No. 1.) 

On September 21, 2010, this Court issued an Order informing Vera that it was without

jurisdiction to extend AEDPA’s statute of limitations and further informing him that he had

“not filed a Petition for writ of habeas corpus in this action.” (See Order dated September

21, 2010, ECF No. 2.) Thereafter, Vera filed two “Motions to Amend the Findings,” which

were denied. (ECF Nos. 3-7.) Vera was again informed that he had not initiated habeas

proceedings, and that the timeliness of his petition would be adjudicated once he had done

so.

On July 6, 2012, Vera filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 and a motion to proceed in form pauperis. (ECF No. 10.) The motion was granted,

and an order setting a briefing schedule was issued. (ECF Nos. 12-13.) Respondent filed

a Motion to Dismiss on November 15, 2012. (ECF No. 19.) Vera then filed another Motion

to Amend the Findings, a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and a Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order. (ECF Nos. 22, 35, 37.) He filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss

on March 22, 2013. (ECF No. 44.)

II. DISCUSSION

In his Petition, Vera contends he was denied his due process rights during the

adjudication of the October 24, 2003, serious rules violation report. Specifically, he claims

false accusations were made against him, prison authorities refused to adjudicate his

appeals, he was not afforded contact with consular officials, and the hearing officer excluded

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evidence at the hearing. (Pet. at 6-8, ECF No. 10; Traverse at 1-2, ECF No. 44.)4

Respondent contends the petition is untimely, procedurally defaulted, and unexhausted. 

(Mot. to Dismiss at 9-16, ECF No. 19.)5

A. Timeliness

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), applies

to a petition challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164,

1171-72 (9th Cir. 2012); Shelby v. Barlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth

Circuit has held that “when a habeas petitioner challenges an administrative decision

affecting the ‘fact or duration of his confinement,’ AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations

runs from when the ‘factual predicate’ of the habeas claims ‘could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.’” Mardesich, 668 F.3d at 1172 (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D).) “As a general rule, the state agency’s denial of an administrative appeal

is the ‘factual predicate’ for such habeas claims.” Id. (citing Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066); see

also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003).)

As Respondent notes, even if the Court were to use the latest possible date, the June

8, 2005, appeal screening letter which is the last letter Vera received relating to the October

24, 2003 rules violation report, his habeas corpus petition would be untimely. Assuming

Vera’s statute of limitations began on June 8, 2005, he had until June 8, 2006, to file his

federal habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). He did not do so until July 9,

2012. Accordingly, Vera’s petition is untimely unless he is entitled to sufficient statutory or

equitable tolling to make it timely.

4

 Vera also alleges prison officials seized his legal materials, including a petition, which

prevented him from timely filing a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of California. (Pet. at 8, ECF No. 10.) He gives a case number of 07-70241. (Id.) 

According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s web page, that case number

refers to an application for leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus

petition which Vera filed in the Ninth Circuit on January 20, 2007.(See

https://ecf.ca9.uscourts.gov/cmecf/servlet/TransportRoom?servlet=CaseSummary.jsp?caseNum=

07-70241&dktType=dktPublic&incOrigDkt=Y&incDktEntries=Y.) The request was denied on March

21, 2007. (Id.)

5 Because the Court has concluded the petition is untimely, it declines to address

Respondent’s argument that the petition violates Rule 2(c).

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i. Statutory Tolling

The one-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to statutory

tolling for the time during which a properly filed state post-conviction or other collateral

review is pending. Id. Respondent contends Vera constructively filed his first state habeas

corpus petition in Monterey Superior Court on December 15, 2005, presumably using the

earliest date noted on the letter directed to the court clerk asking for the state habeas

petition to be filed. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 11, ECF No, 19; Lodgment

No. 2 at 2.) Vera signed the petition, however, on October 19, 2005. (Lodgment No. 2 at

8.) In an abundance of caution, the Court will use the date the petition was signed to

calculate the statute of limitations. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Anthony

v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a petition is deemed filed when

it is handed to prison authorities for filing). 

By October 19, 2005, 143 days had passed, and there were 222 days remaining in

Vera’s 365-day statute of limitations. The statute was tolled while his state habeas corpus

petition was pending in Monterey Superior Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The state court

denied his petition on June 21, 2006. The statute began running again the next day, June

22, 2006, and expired 222 days later on January 20, 2007. Id. Vera did not file his next

state habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal until November 26, 2008 — 

676 days after the statute of limitations expired.6

 Thus, Vera is not entitled to any further

statutory tolling unless he is entitled to “gap tolling,” that is, the period between the denial

of his Monterey County Superior Court habeas corpus petition and the filing of his habeas

corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court has stated that “an application is pending as long as the ordinary

state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’ – i.e., ‘until the completion of’ that

process.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002). “Gap tolling” refers to the time

6

 The Court cannot locate the filing date used by Respondent, November 26, 2008, in either

the habeas corpus petition itself or in the Order denying the petition. The petition was filed on

December 2, 2008, and there is no date next to the signature line on the petition itself. (See

Lodgment No. 4.) Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court will use the November 26,

2008, date for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations.

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during which a petition is being considered by a state court and, generally speaking, is the

time between filings, unless the petitions filed in the state courts were untimely. See Stancle

v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing tolling in the context of two successive

state superior court filings); see also Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 199-200 (2006). 

California does not have a bright-line rule regarding timeliness, and neither Saffold nor Evans

sets one. The Supreme Court has, however, developed some guidelines for this Court to

consider in determining whether a petitioner’s state petitions were timely.

Addressing California’s unique system of collateral review, the Supreme Court held

in Evans that in the absence of a defined time limit for determining whether a state court

filing is timely, a federal court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether a state court

petition was filed within a reasonable time. In so doing, the court must keep in mind that

the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) applies to the period of time between state

court filings “on the assumption that California law in this respect [does] not differ

significantly from the laws of other States,” which the Court defined as “30 to 60 days.” 

Evans, 546 U.S. at 199-201 (citing Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-23).

As Respondent correctly argues, Vera is not entitled to gap tolling for the 888-day

period between the denial of his Monterey County Superior Court habeas petition and the

filing of his habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal. To determine whether

a petition is filed within a reasonable time, “[u]nder California law, a petitioner must provide

an explanation for any significant delay in applying for habeas relief.” Maxwell v. Roe, 628

F.3d 486, 496 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 3d 750, 765 (1993)). Evans suggests

that anything up to a 60-day delay between filings is reasonable since most states provide

for a 30 to 60 day window for filing appeals. Evans, 546 U.S. at 200-01. Under any

measure, an 888 delay is unreasonable. Indeed, delays on the order of 100 days or more

have been found “significant” and “unreasonable” by the Ninth Circuit. See Banjo v. Ayers,

614 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that delay of 146 days was not justified when

evidence should have been discovered earlier); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th

Cir. 2010) (holding that unexplained delays of 101 and 115 days were not justified). 

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Moreover, like the six-month delay found to be unreasonable in Evans, Vera’s delay

is unexplained. The only justification Vera provides is his claim that his federal habeas

corpus petition was seized by prison authorities in September of 2009, and not returned until

July of 2012. (Traverse at 3, ECF No. 44.) Thus, the evidence presented by Vera is

insufficient to establish that the 888-day gap between the denial of his habeas corpus

petition by the Monterey Superior Court and the filing of his petition in the California Court

of Appeal was reasonable and does not constitute significant delay. Accordingly, the Court

concludes Vera had no state court petition “pending” between the Monterey Superior Court

denial and the filing of his habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal, and he

is therefore not entitled to “gap tolling.”

ii. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 530

U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010). “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Petitioner]

must show, ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented him from filing.” Lawrence v.

Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).) 

Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases, and “the threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d

1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original).

Although Respondent notes Vera claims he is entitled to equitable tolling, as the Court

reads his petition, Vera is simply alerting this Court to the circumstances under which

equitable tolling should be considered: 

A court should consider whether to grant equitable tolling when petitioner is

proceeding pr se, has little education, or is illiterate; the claim is novel or the

statute in question is new; Petitioner’s mental incompetence or placement in

administrative segregation can justify the grant of equitable tolling, lack of

access to legal materials is grounds for relief.

(Pet. at 8.)

/ / /

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Vera provides no specific factual support for how he suffers from any of these

impediments, much less how any of them rendered it impossible for him to file his petitions

in a timely manner. In his Traverse, Vera similarly cites many cases in which courts have

found petitioners to be entitled to equitable tolling, but he cites no specific facts as why he

is entitled to it. (See Traverse at 5-7, ECF No. 44.) He has provided no evidence he has

been pursuing his rights diligently, and, indeed, has provided no explanation for the 888-day

delay between the denial of his state habeas petition by the Monterey Superior Court and

his filing of a state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal. Nor has he cited any

“‘extraordinary circumstance [that] stood in his way and prevented him from filing.’” 

Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that Vera is entitled to

any equitable tolling.

iii. The Petition is Untimely

Vera’s one-year statute of limitations began running on June 8, 2005, and did not

stop until October 19, 2005, when he filed his first state habeas petition in Monterey

Superior Court. By that time, 143 days of the 365 days had passed, and 222 days of the

statute remained. Vera’s superior court petition was denied on June 21, 2006, and the

statute of limitations began running the next day, June 22, 2006; it expired 222 days later

on January 30, 2007. Vera’s next state habeas filing did not occur until November 26, 2008,

and he is not entitled to any “gap tolling” for the period between the denial of his superior

court habeas corpus petition and the filing of his habeas corpus petition in the California

appellate court. He did not file his federal habeas corpus petition in this case until July 9,

2012, nearly 2000 days later.7

 His petition in this Court is untimely, and the Court

RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED on that ground.

B. Procedural Default

Respondent contends Vera’s petition is procedurally defaulted because the California

Supreme Court denied his habeas corpus petition by citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770,

7

 The Court notes that even if his “Application for Extension of Time,” filed in this Court on

September 16, 2010, were to be construed as a habeas corpus petition, it, too, would be untimely.

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780 (1998) and In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921 (1979). (See Lodgment No. 7; Mem. of P. &

A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 14-16, ECF No. 19.) 

Procedural default is an affirmative defense, and Respondent must first “adequately

[plead] the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground . . . .” 

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to place the defense at

issue, Vera must then “assert[] specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy

of the state procedure . . . .” Id. The “ultimate burden” of proving procedural default,

however, belongs to the state. Id. If the state meets its burden under Bennett, federal

review of the claim is foreclosed unless Vera can “demonstrate cause for the default and

actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure

to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).

A state procedural rule is “independent” if the state law basis for the decision is not

interwoven with federal law. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989). A ground is “interwoven” with federal law if the state has

made application of the procedural bar dependent on an antecedent ruling on federal law

such as the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed. See

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). “To qualify as an ‘adequate’ procedural ground,

a state rule must be ‘firmly established and regularly followed’.” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S.

__, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127-28 (2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 61 (2009).) The

United States Supreme Court has concluded that the untimeliness rule of Robbins is an

independent and adequate state procedural rule. Id. at 1128-30. 

Respondent argues the state court’s citation to In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921 (1979)

is also an independent and adequate state procedural bar. Dexter stands for the proposition

that a prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus

petition in state court. See In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d 464, 468 (1985); In re Estevez, 165

Cal. App. 4th 1445, 1457 (2008) (stating that prisoners are required to exhaust their

administrative remedies before bringing a grievance to state court); Wright v. State, 122 Cal.

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App. 4th 659, 665 (2004) (stating that “[u]nder state law, exhaustion of the administrative

remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the courts”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

It is not clear, however, that a citation to Dexter precludes a petitioner from presenting his

claims in a subsequent petition once he has exhausted his administrative remedies and

therefore stands as a procedural bar to Vera’s claims. While the Court has been unable to

locate any published Ninth Circuit cases on the issue, at least one California district court has

concluded that a citation to Dexter is not sufficient to render a claim procedurally barred, see

Conner v. Lewis, 2013 WL 557179 (N.D. Cal. 2013), and at least three decisions from the

Eastern District of California have concluded Dexter is an independent and adequate state

procedural bar. Patterson v. Mendoza-Powers, 2009 WL 277502 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Parks v.

Sullivan, 2008 WL 3409909 (E.D. Cal. 2008); McCullock v. Woodford, 2007 WL 2318105

(E.D. 2007). Other cases have concluded the citation is simply “an indication that the claim

is unexhausted.” Davis v. Swarthout, 2012 WL 244211 (E. D. Cal. 2012); McCann v. Hill,

2011 WL 6750056 (E. D. Cal. 2011). 

The California Supreme Court’s citation to Dexter indicates Vera’s claims were not

exhausted administratively, but that he would not be precluded from resubmitting them once

they are exhausted. The citation to Robbins, however, indicates that were the claims to be

resubmitted, they would be untimely. In addition, it is unclear whether a citation to Dexter

is an independent and adequate state procedural ground upon which the petition was

denied, or whether it is simply an indication that the claims are unexhausted. 

When a court does not specify which procedural rule it is applying to which claim(s),

the order is ambiguous. Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Eastern Dist. of Cal., 96

F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996). “[A] procedural default based on an ambiguous order that

does not clearly rest on independent and adequate state grounds is not sufficient to preclude

federal collateral review.” Id. (quoting Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir.

1996)). Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude Respondent has met his

burden under Bennett. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS the

Motion to Dismiss be DENIED on the ground that Vera’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

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C. Exhaustion

Finally, Respondent contends Vera’s claims are unexhausted. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Mot. to Dismiss at 16-17, ECF No. 19.) Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their

state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust

state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34

(1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must “‘fairly present[]’

his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it, or . . .

demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829

(9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

Again, neither the Court nor Respondent has located any published Ninth Circuit cases

on the question whether a Dexter citation means the claims are unexhausted in federal

court. As Respondent correctly argues, several unpublished district court cases have so

concluded, specifically that the California Supreme Court’s citation to Dexter means the court

has not addressed the claim or claims on the merits because they have not been

administratively exhausted, and therefore the court has not had a “fair opportunity” to rule

on the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Davis, 2012 WL 244211 (E.D. Cal. 2012); McCann,

2011 WL 6750056 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Gaston v. Harrington, 2009 WL 3627931 (E.D. Cal.

2009); Rodriguez v. Yates, 2009 WL 3126317 (E.D. Cal. 2009). It is clear, however, that

were Vera to administratively exhaust his claims and return to the California Supreme Court

with a habeas corpus petition the state court would deny it as untimely. See Robbins, 18

Cal. 4th at 814-15. Indeed, the state court has already deemed Vera’s claims to be

untimely. In cases like Vera’s, the Ninth Circuit has held such claims are “technically

exhausted,” but procedurally defaulted if the procedural rule that would be imposed is

independent and adequate. Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011). As

discussed above, the United States Supreme Court found California’s timeliness rule

independent and adequate in Walker, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. at 1128. Thus, the claims are

procedurally defaulted unless Vera has established cause for the default and prejudice

resulting from it, or

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/ / /

that “failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Cause is satisfied if Vera can demonstrate some “objective factor” that precluded him

from raising his claims in state court, such as interference by state officials or constitutionally

ineffective counsel. McClesky, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991). The reason Vera was unable

to raise his claims in state court in a timely manner is that he failed to administratively

exhaust them. Thus, he has not established cause for his default. McClesky, 499 U.S. at

493-94.

“Prejudice [sufficient to excuse procedurally barred claims] is actual harm resulting

from the alleged error.” Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). Vera has not

shown he suffered any prejudice from the state court’s refusal to address the merits of his

unexhausted claims. None of the documents Vera has provided to the Court establish he

was denied his due process rights at the hearing on rules violation report. 

Finally, Vera has not demonstrated that failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The Supreme Court has

limited the “miscarriage of justice” exception to petitioners who can show that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). “Actual innocence” means factual

innocence, not simply legal insufficiency; a mere showing of reasonable doubt is not enough. 

See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1997). Vera has not presented any evidence

sufficient to establish he is actually and factually innocent of the rules violation report. 

In accordance with the above-discussion and pursuant to Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327,

the Court finds that Vera’s claims are “technically exhausted” and therefore RECOMMENDS

the Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that it is unexhausted be DENIED.

8

8 As Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327, and the analysis in this section establish, Plaintiff’s claim is

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted pursuant to Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 780. However,

as discussed in the prior section, the Court cannot recommend dismissal on procedural default

grounds because the California Supreme Court cited two cases in support of its denial; one of which

does not clearly support a procedural bar. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the Motion to

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D. Motion to Amend Findings

On November 19, 2012, Vera filed a document entitled “Motion to Amend Findings

Opposition.” (See ECF No. 22.) In the motion, Vera states as follows:

Petitioner hereby moves the Court for an Order that may be adjudged

against Respondent in favor of Petitioner. 

I’ve received both motions doc. 14, 15, on about 26 Oct. 2012 on a

maneuver of tactical advantage FRCP 6, 60(b), by A.G.

Furthermore, doc. 14 cannot be extended of time FRAP 26(b), 27(b). 

The motion is unfounded FRAP 30(e), Evidence Code 401, 2254(c)7. Plus the

designated person of the Petition responder was not a paralegal is not made

a party to this action because he/she is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. See doc 12, FRCP 56(g).

Matthew Cate who responded in the name of Connie Gipson/Kathy Allison FRCP 11(d), 52

Wherefore for the above stated reasons, the relief sought in the petition should be granted FRCP 57(a)(2)(e).

(Pet’rs Mot. to Amend at 1, ECF No. 22.)

Vera appears to be objecting to Respondent’s Motion for Leave to File a Late Motion

to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), which the Court granted (ECF No. 15). Respondent asked for

permission to file a late motion to dismiss because the file had not been properly opened. 

(ECF No. 14 at 3-4.) The Court granted Respondent until November 15, 2012, to file a

motion to dismiss, and gave Vera a new date upon which to file his opposition to the motion,

December 17, 2012. (ECF No. 15 at 1-3.) This was well within the Court’s discretion, and

Vera makes no reliable allegations as to how such an Order prejudiced him. Accordingly,

the Court RECOMMENDS the motion to amend the findings (ECF No. 22) be DENIED.

E. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

On January 2, 2013, Vera filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. (ECF No.

37.) The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo before a

preliminary injunction hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed

merely to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. Sierra On-Line, Inc. v.

Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). Under Federal Rule of Civil

Dismiss the Petition be granted solely on the grounds that it is untimely under AEDPA.

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Procedure 65, a temporary restraining order may be granted “only if (1) it clearly appears

from the specific facts shown . . . that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will

result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in

opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent

harm sufficient to establish standing. He must also demonstrate immediate threatened

injury as a prerequisite to the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary

injunctive relief. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 634

F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).

Thus, in seeking a temporary restraining order, the movant must demonstrate that

the denial of relief will expose him to “some significant risk of irreparable injury.” Associated

Gen. Contractors of California v. Coalition of Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir.

1991). The threat of injury must be imminent and not merely speculative. Caribbean Marine

Services Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, where the

temporary restraining order is sought against actions by a governmental actor or agency

which has allegedly violated the law, then the movant must establish that the threat of injury

is both “real and immediate,” not just “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles

v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).

Here, Vera asks for a temporary restraining order to prevent prison authorities from

retaliating against him for filing his “complaint.” Specifically he alleges:

Upon my arrival at Corcoran, the government has been falsifying my

records and retaliating, harassing, punishing me due to my appeals. Neither

do they grant me access to the law library so I can marshal the facts for this

case. I’ve been deprived to the course of medical procedures, medicines and

medical equipment. All my 602's appeals I filed have either been delayed or

return unfiled. 42 U.S.C. 12012.

On the date 12/19/12, the corporation they did a statement of express

implication [sic], a “threat.”

The government plans to take action of retaliation through classification CCR title 15 3315(f)(5)(L)(M), Pen. Code 2657 double jeopardy.

Furthermore, starting the new year, new officers will be working here

to make their disguise much easier to hide their retaliatory actions produced

in [unintelligible]. 

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(Pet’rs Order to Show Cause and T.R.O., ECF No. 37.)

Vera’s allegations are both vague and speculative, and some are simply unintelligible. 

Moreover, they are unrelated to the claims or arguments set forth in the petition, motion to

dismiss, and opposition filed in this case. Thus, Vera has not met his burden of establishing

that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the

adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Vera’s motion for a temporary restraining order be

DENIED.

F. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

On January 2, 2013, Vera filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No.

35.) In it, he states his motion is “based on the application submitted [December 24],

2012.” (Id.) Vera appears to be referring to the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,

which he signed on December 24, 2012. (See id. at 1-3.) 

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo if the balance

of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to intervene to

secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of

Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). The burden of establishing entitlement to

equitable relief lies squarely with the Plaintiff. See, e.g., San Diego County Gun Rights

Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) (“As the part[y] invoking federal

jurisdiction, plaintiff[] bear[s] the burden of establishing [his] standing to sue ... [and if the]

plaintiff[] seek[s] declaratory and injunctive relief ..., there is a further requirement that [he]

show a very significant possibility of future harm.”). 

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008)

(citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.” Id. at 374 (citations omitted). An injunction “may only be awarded

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upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” See id. at 376 (quotation

omitted).

In addition to this traditional test, the Ninth Circuit has also applied an “alternative

standard,” whereby injunctive relief may issue when Plaintiff demonstrates “either a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury” or

that “serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.” 

Ranchers Cattleman Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. United States Dept.

of Ag., 415 F.3d 1078, 1092 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408

F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005)). “These two formulations represent two points on a sliding

scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success

decreases.” Prudential Real Estate Affiliates v. PPR Realty, Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir.

2000).

Under either formulation, however, Vera has not met his burden. For the same

reasons Vera is not entitled to a temporary restraining order, he is likewise not entitled to

a preliminary injunction. Vera’s allegations are vague, speculative, and do not establish

irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the Court

RECOMMENDS the motion for a preliminary injunction be DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge

Larry Alan Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS

HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Motion to Dismiss the Petition be GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Petitioner’s motion to amend

findings, motion for a preliminary injunction, and motion for a temporary restraining order

be DENIED, and for the court issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, (2) directing that judgment be entered granting in part and denying the

motion to dismiss the Petition; (3) denying Petitioner’s motion to amend findings [ECF No.

22]; (4) denying Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction [ECF No. 35]; and (5) denying

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Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order [ECF No. 37]. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than May 22, 2013, any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than June 12, 2013. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 29, 2013

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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