Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00092/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00092-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

 J.C., A Minor, By and Through 

 J.C., His Guardian Ad Litem, 

NO. CIV. S-05-0092 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 VACAVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL 

 DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for

attorney fees pursuant to § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415.1

Plaintiff, J.C. was a student within the educational

jurisdiction of defendant Vacaville Unified School District (the

“District”). Plaintiff is, and had been at all relevant time,

eligible for special education services pursuant to the IDEA due

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

to a diagnosis of Autism. This case arose out of a dispute

between plaintiff’s parents and defendant District regarding the

program and related services necessary to provide plaintiff with

a free, appropriate public education (“FAPE”) during certain

school years. On January, 14, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint

in this court, asking the court, inter alia, (1) to direct the

District to provide certain compensatory education services by

placing the cash value of such services in a special needs trust;

(2) to declare plaintiff the prevailing party on the issue of

whether he was denied a FAPE from February 9, 2001 through the

2002 extended school year; and (3) to award plaintiff reasonable

attorney fees under the IDEA. 

On September 14, 2006, after reviewing the submissions of

the parties and hearing oral argument, the court issued a

Memorandum and Order directing the District to pay $37,706.00

into a special needs trust in order to implement the full

compensatory education package that should have been included in

the hearing officer’s order. The court also found that under

federal law, plaintiff was the prevailing party on the issue of a

denial of a FAPE from February 9, 2001 through the end of the

2000-2001 school year, including the 2001 extended school year,

and for the 2001-2002 school year, including the 2002 extended

school year. The court retained jurisdiction over the issue of

attorneys fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

The IDEA provides that “the court, in its discretion, may

award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the

parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing

party.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). However, the IDEA also

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Based upon the arguments made in its opposition to

plaintiff’s motion, the District incorrectly interprets §

1415(i)(3)(D)(i) to pose a complete bar to attorneys’ fees. 

However, the statute clearly provides that attorneys’ fees may

not be provided subsequent to the time of the written offer if

all three conditions are met. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). 

(continued...)

3

places restrictions on the award of attorney fees in certain

circumstances.

Attorneys’ fees may not be awarded and related costs

may not be reimbursed in any action or proceeding . . .

for services performed subsequent to the time of a

written offer of settlement to a parent if –

(I) the offer is made with the time

prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case

of an administrative proceeding, at any

time more than 10 days before the

proceeding begins;

(II) the offer is not accepted within 10

days; and

(III) the court or administrative hearing

officer finds that the relief finally

obtained by the parents is not more

favorable to the parents than the offer

of settlement.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). As such, the statute prevents the

award of attorneys fees after the written offer of settlement if

three factors are present: (1) the offer is made ten days before

the applicable hearing; (2) the offer is not accepted within ten

days; and (3) the court finds that the relief ultimately obtained

is not more favorable than the settlement offer. Id.; M.L. v.

Fed’l Way Sch. Dist., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1164 (W.D. Wash.

2005). 

The District argues that plaintiff faces a statutory bar to

attorneys’ fees because the District made numerous more favorable

settlement offers prior to the due process hearing.2 Plaintiff

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2(...continued)

However, this section does not prevent the award of attorneys’

fees for costs incurred prior to the settlement offer. Because

of this erroneous presumption, defendant fails to discuss with

specificity which settlement offer satisfies the requirements of

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) and thus, sets the date after which fees may

not be awarded. The court, therefore, has conducted an

independent review of the settlement offers submitted by

defendant in order to answer this necessary inquiry. 

3 Plaintiff also objects to the admission of all

settlement communications between the parties on the grounds of

confidentiality. Plaintiff’s objection is OVERRULED. Any

written settlement offer extended to plaintiff more than ten days

before the administrative hearing is directly relevant to the

issue of the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded, an issue

raised by plaintiff in bringing this motion. 

4

argues that the court should only look at the May 26, 2004 letter

sent by the District because it provides that it is the “ten-day

offer of settlement” pursuant to federal law. (Ex. Q to Decl. of

Jan E. Tomsky in Supp. of Def. District’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Opening

Brief (“Tomsky Decl.”), filed June 23, 2006). Plaintiff’s

contention that the May 26 letter is the only ten-day offer of

settlement for purposes of the IDEA is mistaken. To accept

plaintiff’s argument would to impose a new requirement in §

1415(i)(3)(D)(i) that any written settlement offer must

explicitly provide that it is the “ten-day settlement offer for

purposes of § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).” Such a requirement is clearly

absent from the statute as written. Further, if the court were

to implicitly derive such a restrictive measure from this

section, it would defeat the statute’s broader goal of promoting

settlement.3 As such, the court is not constrained to compare

the relief obtained to only the May 26 letter.

The court previously held that as the result of defendant

District’s concession on the record at the administrative

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 The court calculates this number based upon a regular

school year of approximately nine months or 36 weeks. 

5 Plaintiff offers no analysis on the issue of whether

any of the settlement offers were more favorable than the relief

ultimately obtained.

5

hearing, plaintiff was entitled to a compensatory education

package consisting of (1) 420 hours of 1:1 direct instruction to

be provided by a trained Instructional Assistant, under the

supervision of a behavior analyst from a certified non-public

agency; (2) 5-10 hours per month of consultation by the behavior

analyst; (3) team meetings every six weeks, to include the

parent, behavior analyst, and Instructional Assistants; (4) case

management to ensure that the program is implemented; and (5) 5-

10 hours of training of any new Instructional Assistant to be

provided by the behavior analyst. In its May 26 letter, the

District offered plaintiff six hours per week of in-home ABA

services during the regular weeks of the school year (216

hours),4 ten hours per week for four weeks during the extended

school year (40 hours), and ten hours per week for two weeks

during the Fall 2004 intercession (20 hours). (Ex. Q to Tomsky

Decl.). Even without considering the other services included in

plaintiff’s relief, the May 26 letter offered plaintiff only 276

hours of in-home instruction as opposed to the 420 hours of 1:1

instruction ultimately obtained. Therefore, the May 26

settlement offer was not more favorable than the relief obtained

by plaintiff.5 

On June 4, 2004, defendant District faxed plaintiff another

written offer of settlement. (Ex. S to Tomsky Decl.). In this

communication, the District offered plaintiff the same number of

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 The court uses a market rate of $32/hr. for plaintiff’s

1:1 instruction. This rate is supported by the evidence and

analysis set forth in the court’s September 14, 2006 Memorandum

and Order. 

6

hours for in-home ABA instruction (276 hours). However, the

District also offered plaintiff $4000 to fund compensatory

education services. Even if the court were to assume that this

money could be used to supplement the hours of individual

instruction, plaintiffs could only obtain an additional 125 hours

of 1:1 education6

 for a total of 401 hours. Therefore, the June

4, 2004 settlement offer was not more favorable than the relief

obtained by plaintiff.

Subsequently, on June 18, 2004, the District again faxed

plaintiff a written settlement offer. (Ex. U to Tomsky Decl.). 

In this communication, the District offered plaintiff ten hours

per week of in-home ABA services during the regular weeks of the

school year (360 hours), ten hours per week for four weeks during

the extended school year (40 hours), and ten hours per week for

two weeks during the Fall 2004 intercession (20 hours). (Id.) 

As such, the 420 hours of in-home instructions offered mirror the

number of hours of 1:1 instruction ultimately obtained. The

District agreed to 5-10 hours of training of initial training for

one tutor and 10-15 hours of total training if two tutors were

hired. (Id.) The offer also included consultation by an

occupational therapist, speech therapist, and/or behavior

specialist, as identified in the IEP; supervision and

consultation of the in-home program for one hour every two weeks

during the regular school year, extended school year, and

intercession; two in-home program team meetings per month; team

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

meetings once per trimester for the parents, the behavior

consultant, resource specialist, general education teacher,

speech-language specialist, and the occupational therapist; one

hour per week of direct speech/language therapy and thirty

minutes per week of direct occupational therapy during the 2004

extended school year and Fall 2004 intercession; and an

additional 1⁄2 hour of speech/language services per week. (Id.) 

In addition to these services, the offer also included

reimbursement to the parents not to exceed $7500 for attorneys’

fees and payment of $10,000 to fund compensatory services. (Id.) 

The court finds that the June 18 settlement offer provided

substantially similar, if not more favorable, conditions to those

ultimately awarded to the plaintiff. In addition to the services

offered, plaintiff was also offered $10,000 to fund other

compensatory services. As such, the June 18 settlement offer

satisfies the requirements of § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i): (1) it was a

written offer made at least ten days prior to the July 13, 2004

administrative hearing; (2) it was not accepted by plaintiff; and

(3) the relief ultimately obtained by plaintiff was not more

favorable than the offer. Therefore, plaintiff may not be

awarded fees for services performed subsequent to June 18, 2004. 

Plaintiff argues that the June 18, 2004 written settlement

offer is invalid because the agreement provides that “[t]his

Agreement shall be effective after execution by the parties and

District Governing Board approval.” (Ex. U to Tomsky Decl.). 

Plaintiff contends that because the agreement is subject to

Governing Board approval, the District is not bound by its offer,

and thus, the written offer is invalid. Once again, plaintiff

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 Plaintiff relies primarily upon a district court

decision from the Central District of Illinois which held that a

defendant’s proposed offer is not a valid offer for the purposes

of Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the

offer would only become binding with City Council approval. 

Frazier v. Harris, 218 F.R.D. 173 (C.D. Ill. 2003). Unlike

Frazier, this case arises under the IDEA, not Rule 68. While §

1415(i)(3)(D)(i) and Rule 68 may share a similar goal of

promoting settlement, cases under the IDEA present different

circumstances, such as settlement offers made by school

districts, which receive state funding and are subject to various

restrictions, as opposed to private settlement agreements that

more often occur under Rule 68. 

8

seeks to introduce unwritten requirements into §

1415(i)(3)(D)(i). Plaintiff fails to cite to Ninth Circuit

authority or IDEA case law from any Circuit to support the

argument that § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) requires that the written

settlement offer become effective upon acceptance by plaintiff.7

Such a restriction would likely ignore the practicalities

presented by settlement offers made by any school district. 

Therefore, the court does not find that approval by the Governing

Board invalidates the settlement offer for purposes of §

1415(i)(3)(D)(i).

In determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee, courts employ

what is known as the “lodestar” method. See Morales v. City of

San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363-65 & nn. 8-12 (9th Cir. 1996). The

“lodestar” is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the

prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a

reasonable hourly rate. McGrath v. County of Nevada, 67 F.3d

248, 252 (9th Cir. 1995). After computing the lodestar figure,

the district court assesses whether it is necessary to adjust the

amount on the basis of any of the twelve Kerr factors which were

not already taken into account. Id.; Kerr v. Screen Guild

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 Defendant contends that the court should not consider

the detailed time sheets because they were untimely submitted. 

However, by Minute Order filed Nov. 28, 2006, the court allowed

defendant and plaintiff to submit a supplemental opposition and

reply in response to the belatedly filed time sheets. Defendant

also contends that plaintiff has not presented sufficient

evidence to ascertain reasonable attorneys fees. This court

disagrees.

9

Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975); Cunningham v.

County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1988). There

is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a

reasonable fee and “[o]nly in rare instances should the lodestar

figure be adjusted on the basis of other considerations.” See

Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 18 (1994); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954

F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In determining the reasonable hours expended, the party

seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden of submitting detailed

time records which justify the hours spent working on the claims. 

Id. at 434 (district court should exclude hours not “reasonably

expended”). “Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the

district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Id. at 433;

Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir.

1986). Here, plaintiff provided detailed time sheets attached to

Geralyn M. Clancy’s Supplemental Declaration filed with this

court on November 13, 2006.8 The time sheets reveal that up

until June 18, 2004, plaintiff’s counsel worked on this case for

a total of 56.5 hours. Based upon the description of the actions

taken in this case, the court finds that these hours are

reasonable. 

In order to decide what rate is “reasonable,” courts look at

“prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum, 465

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

U.S. at 895; Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545

(9th Cir. 1992)(a reasonable hourly rate should be determined “by

reference to the fees that private attorneys of an ability and

reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their

paying clients for legal work of similar complexity”). 

Determination of a reasonable hourly rate is not made merely by

reference to rates actually charged by the prevailing party or

rates charged in the prevailing party’s locale. See White v.

City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1983). Rather, the

rate assessed is based on the prevailing rate in the relevant

community for similar work. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1211; Blum,

465 U.S. at 895 n. 11. Generally, the relevant community is the

forum in which the district court sits. Davis v. Mason County,

927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff’s calculation of attorneys’ fees uses $350/hr. as

the “reasonable rate” for the partners, Bob N. Varma and Geralyn

M. Clancy, that worked on this case. Plaintiff present evidence

that the range of rates of other attorneys who represent special

needs children, during the times relevant to this matter, are

between $175/hr. to $395/hr.. (Decl. of Bob N. Varma in Supp. of

Mot. for Attorney Fees, filed Oct. 13, 2006, ¶ 11). Plaintiff

also presents the declarations of numerous practioners of special

education law throughout the state of California regarding their

rates. After review of this evidence, the court finds that the

reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel in this case is

$300 per hour billed. 

In Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th

Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit outlined twelve factors the court

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 Plaintiff does not dispute that he should be awarded

only 40% of fees prior to the administrative hearing. (Decl. of

(continued...)

11

should evaluate in determining whether to adjust the Lodestar:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty

of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the

legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by

the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary

fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the

amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience,

reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the

“undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases. Id.

The court finds that the most relevant Kerr factor in this

case is the degree of success achieved by plaintiff. In this

case, plaintiff brought several claims to the administrative

hearing. Specifically, plaintiff’s parents challenged the

education programs provided to J.C. (1) from February 9, 2001

through the end of the 2000-2001 school year, including the 2001

extended school year; (2) the 2001-2002 school year, including

the 2002 extended school year; (3) the 2002-2003 school year,

including the 2003 extended school year; (4) the 2003-2004 school

year, including the 2004 extended school year; and (5) the 2004-

2005 school year, including the 2005 extended school year. 

Plaintiff only prevailed on two of these claims, or, in other

terms, 40% of his claims.9 Thus, the court finds that plaintiff

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

(...continued)

Geralyn M. Clancy in Supp. of Mot. for Attorney Fees, filed Oct.

13, 2006, ¶ 15).

12

should be awarded only 40% of his claimed attorneys’ fees. As

such, the attorneys’ fees are calculated as follows:

56.5 hrs. x $300/hr. x 40% = $6,780 

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the court finds that

plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in part, and

plaintiff is entitled to $6,780 in fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 10, 2007

Case 2:05-cv-00092-FCD-KJM Document 63 Filed 01/10/07 Page 12 of 12