Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01079/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Major William P. Fay 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Army National Guard, an agency 

of the State of Arizona; Major General 

Hugo Salazar, Arizona Adjutant General; 

Colonel Ellen Reily, Deputy Chief of Staff; 

LTC Jennifer Fadley, Deputy MILPO; SFC 

Fredrick Irvine 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-1079-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant Arizona Army National Guard (“National Guard”) filed a motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff Fay’s “Petition for Injunction or Writ of Mandamus.”1

 Doc. 3; see Doc. 

1. The motion has been fully briefed and no party has requested oral argument. Docs. 4, 

5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

I. Background. 

In May of 2011, the National Guard reviewed Plaintiff’s personnel file. Doc. 1 at 

3. The reviewing officers determined that Plaintiff had been wrongly awarded credit for 

service between June 1986 and December 1989, and deleted service time points from his 

 

1

 Defense counsel notes that Major Fay “did not commence this lawsuit by filing a Complaint” as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 3 at 2; Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 3. Despite the lack of formalities, the Court will construe Major Fay’s “Petition” as a Complaint for the purposes of this Order. 

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file. Doc. 1 at 3. As a result of the deletion, the National Guard does not believe that 

Plaintiff has completed the twenty years of service required for retirement. Doc. 3 at 3. 

 Plaintiff disputed the removal of the service time points. Doc. 1 at 3. On May 23, 

2012, Plaintiff filed this action seeking to enjoin the deletion and compel the National 

Guard to deliver his “Notification of Eligibility for Retired Pay at Age 60” letter. Doc. 1 

at 1. On July 5, 2012, the National Guard sent a letter to Plaintiff informing him that his 

“appeal” of the removal of retirement points had been denied. Doc. 3 at 3. The letter 

also informed Plaintiff that he may have a case for consideration by the Army Board for 

Correction of Military Records (“ABCMR”) and “strongly encouraged” Plaintiff to 

appeal to that body. Doc. 3 at 3; Doc. 3-1 at 2. Plaintiff has not appealed the decision to 

the ABCMR. Doc. 3-1 at 4. On August 7, 2012, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is not justiciable because he has failed to exhaust 

available administrative remedies. Doc. 3 at 1. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 The Ninth Circuit has adopted the Mindes test to determine whether review of a 

military decision is proper. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971); see Wallace 

v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Chappell v. 

Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). Under that test, “[a]n internal military decision is 

unreviewable unless the plaintiff alleges (a) a violation of [a recognized constitutional 

right], a federal statute, or military regulations; and (b) exhaustion of available 

intraservice remedies.” Wallace, 661 F.2d at 732-33. 

 The Ninth Circuit recognizes four exceptions to the exhaustion requirement: (1) if 

the intraservice remedies do not provide an opportunity for adequate relief; (2) if the 

petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to seek administrative relief; (3) if 

administrative appeal would be futile; or (4) if substantial constitutional questions are 

raised. Muhammad v. Secretary of Army, 770 F.2d 1494, 1495 (9th Cir. 1985). 

A claim that fails to satisfy the second element of the Mindes test is subject to a 

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies. Such a motion “should be 

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treated as a matter in abatement, which is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion 

rather than a motion for summary judgment.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 

(9th Cir. 2003). “In deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust nonjudicial 

remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” 

Id. at 1119-20 (citation omitted). 

III. Discussion. 

 Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s claim does not satisfy the second element of 

the Mindes test because he has not exhausted the administrative remedies available before 

the ABCMR. Doc. 3 at 1. Plaintiff does not dispute his failure to avail himself of the 

ABCMR appeal process, but contends that his claim should be exempt from the 

exhaustion requirement because it satisfies the first and third exceptions to the exhaustion 

requirement as recited in Muhammad, 770 F.2d at 1495. Specifically, he claims an 

appeal to the ABCMR will not provide an opportunity for adequate relief and that such 

an appeal would be futile. Doc. 4 at 5. 

 The ABCMR is governed by 32 C.F.R. § 581.3 pursuant to statutory authority 

granted in 10 U.S.C. § 1552. The statute provides that the “Secretary of a military 

department may correct any military record . . . when the Secretary considers it necessary 

to correct an error or remove an injustice . . . acting through boards of civilians.” 10 

U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). Members of the board are charged with the responsibility to 

“review all applications that are properly before them to determine the existence of error 

or injustice” and, if persuaded that an error exists, to “direct or recommend changes in 

military records to correct the error or injustice.” 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(b)(4)(i-ii). The 

regulation states that the ABCMR’s jurisdiction applies to “any military record of the 

[Department of the Army]” which includes, “in certain cases, [soldiers of] the Army 

National Guard of the United States and other military and civilian individuals affected 

by an Army military record.” 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(d)(1)(i-ii). 

 Plaintiff concedes that the ABCMR has authority to correct some records, but 

seizes on the regulation’s language that limits ABCMR jurisdiction over National Guard 

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officers to “certain cases.” 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(d)(1)(ii). Plaintiff suggests, without 

citation, that the cases in which the ABCMR has jurisdiction over the complaint of a 

National Guard officer are limited to situations in which “the National Guard officer is 

acting in a federal capacity or on active duty orders and under the command of the federal 

military.” Doc. 4 at 6. 

 Federal courts have not recognized this limitation, but instead have applied the 

exhaustion requirement to members of the National Guard. In Navas v. Vales, the First 

Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a claim by a member of the Puerto Rico National Guard 

because he had not exhausted the ABCMR remedy. 752 F.2d 765, 766, 769 (1st Cir. 

1985). Similarly, in Williams v. Wilson, the Fourth Circuit required a member of the 

West Virginia National Guard to exhaust administrative remedies through the ABCMR. 

762 F.2d 357, 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1985). In light of these decisions, the Court cannot 

conclude that an appeal to the ABCMR would not provide adequate relief or would be 

futile. The language of the regulation cited by Plaintiff is too thin a reed upon which to 

conclude that the ABCMR’s jurisdiction is limited in ways not recognized by federal 

courts. 

 Finally, Plaintiff argues that Wenger v. Monroe demonstrates that the ABCMR 

does not have the power to grant him the relief he seeks. 282 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In Wenger, the Ninth Circuit excused the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies because he sought reinstatement in the National Guard and the ABCMR has no 

power to force reinstatement. Id. at 1073. Plaintiff does not seek reinstatement; he seeks 

a correction to his service record. Such a correction is within the scope of the ABCMR’s 

powers as noted above. 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(b)(4)(i-ii). 

 Plaintiff has not exhausted his nonjudicial remedies, nor has he demonstrated that 

his case should be exempted from the exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, he has 

failed to satisfy the second element of the Mindes test, Mindes 453 F.2d at 201, and the 

Court need not consider the additional factors. 

 

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 IT IS ORDERED 

1. Defendant National Guard’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) is granted 

2. The clerk is directed to terminate this action 

 Dated this 28th day of September, 2012. 

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