Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05466/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05466-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

METROPOLITAN DIRECT PROPERTY

AND CASUALTY INSURANCE

COMPANY, a Rhode Island Corporation, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

MALCOLM M. SYNIGAL SR., an individual,

ANGELA M. SYNIGAL, an individual, and

DANITA KING, an individual,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-05466 WHA

ORDER DENYING 

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING

MOTION TO STAY

INTRODUCTION

In this declaratory relief action, defendants Malcolm M. Synigal, Sr., and Angela M.

Synigal move to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay this action pending related state civil and

criminal actions. This order DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss and GRANTS defendants’

motion to stay this action. 

STATEMENT

This declaratory relief action was filed on October 26, 2007, by Metropolitan Direct

Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Metropolitan”) seeking a judicial determination

under 28 U.S.C. 2201 that coverage does not exist under a homeowners insurance policy issued

by Metropolitan to Malcolm and Angela Synigal for claims asserted in a wrongful-death action

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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in state court. The wrongful-death action involves claims brought by Danita King on the theory

that Malcolm and Angela Synigal’s son, Marlin Synigal, intentionally assaulted and/or

negligently accosted King’s daughter, Nadawn Brown, thus causing her death. In the instant

action, Metropolitan asserts that Marlin intentionally injured and killed Brown, and thus the

resulting injuries were not covered by the policy. 

On March 24, 2006, a criminal complaint was filed against Marlin Synigal in

Contra Costa County Superior Court for murder and burglary (Compl. Exh. A at 1). 

The complaint alleged that on March 22, 2006, Marlin unlawfully entered Nadawn Brown’s

dwelling with the intent to commit larceny, murder, and a felony, and that Marlin unlawfully

and with malice aforethought murdered Brown. The complaint further alleged that Marlin used

a deadly and dangerous weapon, a dumbbell bar, in the commission of these offenses. It was

further alleged that Marlin was a minor who was at least 16 years of age at the time of the

offenses. Marlin never entered a plea (Opp. 4). Proceedings remain suspended because Marlin

was deemed incompetent to stand trial due to developmental disabilities (Sebransky Decl.

Exh. 1 at 1). As of October 18, 2007, Marlin apparently remained incarcerated in Contra Costa

County, awaiting space in the Porterville State Hospital (ibid.). At hearing, defense counsel

represented that Marlin has since been transferred to a psychiatric hospital. 

Danita King filed a wrongful-death action against Malcolm, Angela, and Marlin Synigal

in Contra Costa County Superior Court on August 29, 2007 (Compl. Exh. B at 1). The civil

action asserted causes of action for negligence and intentional tort on the theory that Marlin

intentionally assaulted and/or negligently accosted Brown, and that Malcolm and

Angela Synigal negligently supervised their son. 

In the instant declaratory relief action, Metropolitan concedes that Marlin, Malcolm, and

Angela were all insured under the policy on or about March 22, 2006, the date of Brown’s death

(Compl. ¶¶ 16–27). Metropolitan asserts that claims arising from her death were not covered by

the policy because her death was not an “occurrence” within the definition of the policy and

was the result of Marlin’s intentional and/or criminal acts, which were excluded from coverage

under the policy. The policy provided coverage for bodily injury arising from an “occurrence”

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For the Northern District of California

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(Compl. Exh. C at 21), which is defined as an “accident” (id. at 7). The policy explicitly

excluded coverage for bodily injury that was the “result of [the insured’s] intentional and

criminal acts” (id. at 22), and the policy provided that such exclusion was applicable even if the

insured lacked the “mental capacity, for whatever reason, to govern [his] conduct” (ibid.).

Marlin, Malcolm, and Angela Synigal tendered Danita King’s wrongful-death action to

Metropolitan for defense and indemnity. Metropolitan agreed to defend the Synigals in the

wrongful-death action, but also issued a reservation of rights letter on October 18, 2007,

advising the Synigals that the claims asserted in the wrongful-death action did not appear to be

covered by the policy, and that Metropolitan reserved the right to commence an action for

declaratory relief to determine the liabilities of the parties (Sebransky Decl. Exh. 2).

ANALYSIS

Determination whether to stay an action for declaratory relief over which a federal court,

as here, has statutory jurisdiction is a discretionary question for the district court:

Consistent with the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district

court is authorized, in the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay

or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment before trial

or after all arguments have drawn to a close.

Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995). 

The Ninth Circuit articulated the relevant factors for a court to consider in making the

discretionary determination whether to retain jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief in

Government Employees Insurance Company v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc). As a touchstone, a court should look to the so-called Brillhart factors: avoiding

needless determination of state-law issues, discouraging forum shopping, and avoiding

duplicative litigation. The court held that the Brillhart factors are not exhaustive and suggested

the following additional factors a court may consider:

. . . whether the declaratory action will settle all aspects of the

controversy; whether the declaratory action will serve a useful

purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; whether the

declaratory action is being sought merely for the purposes of

procedural fencing or to obtain a “res judicata” advantage; or

whether the use of a declaratory action will result in entanglement

between the federal and state court systems. In addition, the

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district court might also consider the convenience of the parties,

and the availability and relative convenience of other remedies.

Id. at 1225 n.5 (internal citation omitted).

* * *

1. UNNECESSARY AND DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION.

The real question, with respect to the Brillhart factors, is to what degree this action

invites unnecessary, duplicative litigation. This order finds that allowing this declaratory relief

action to proceed at this time would result in unnecessary and duplicative determination of

state-law issues, and thus staying this action pending resolution of the underlying state court

actions is proper. The question whether Marlin deliberately and intentionally injured and

thereby killed Brown is central to the question of coverage under the policy, as well as to the

resolution of both the state criminal and civil actions. 

In order to resolve this declaratory relief action, it must be determined whether the

bodily injuries incurred were the result of an “occurrence” under the terms of the policy, and

also whether the injuries were the result of Marlin’s “intentional” or “criminal” acts. Both of

these questions require the factual determination whether Marlin deliberately and intentionally

injured Brown, and the related factual determination whether Marlin injured Brown through

criminal actions. Metropolitan contends that it is undisputed that Marlin deliberately and

intentionally injured Brown, and that these injuries caused Brown’s death (Opp. 7). There is no

evidence before this Court, however, that Marlin intentionally or deliberately injured Brown. 

Metropolitan offers as evidence merely the criminal complaint (Compl. Exh. A) and the state

civil action complaint (Compl. Exh. B). The bare allegations in these complaints are

insufficient to reach a finding with respect to Marlin’s intent for the purpose of determining

coverage under the policy. Indeed, Metropolitan even asserts that discovery will be needed

concerning “Marlin’s conduct leading to Ms. Brown’s death” (Joint Case Management

Conference Statement 12).

Although the complaint in the instant action asserts that Brown’s death was the result of

Marlin’s “intentional or criminal act,” and thus came within the intentional and criminal acts

exclusion in the policy (Compl. ¶ 29), Metropolitan does not contend that the issue whether

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Marlin committed a criminal act for the purposes of the exclusion can be resolved in the instant

declaratory relief action. Metropolitan instead bases all arguments on the erroneous contention

that Marlin’s intent is undisputed (Metropolitan’s Request for Oral Argument ¶ 5).

Admittedly, the issues of intent in the underlying state criminal and civil actions are

distinctly different legal questions from the issue of intent for the purpose of coverage under the

policy. However, this order finds the court’s reasoning in Allstate Insurance Company v.

Harris, 445 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1978), to be persuasive and on point. There, the district

court found it proper to stay the declaratory relief action regarding insurance coverage until the

related state court action was resolved where, as here, both actions turned on factually related,

but legally distinct, questions of intent. The court found that where the factual issue of intent

was in dispute, to resolve the issue in a separate federal court action when a “similar issue

involving the same evidence and essentially the same parties is pending in state court, and when

all parties other than the insurance company are citizens of California, causes this Court grave

concern.” Id. at 850. The court noted that, because the legal question of intent for the purpose

of insurance coverage would not necessarily be resolved in the related state court action, the law

under Brillhart did not require the court to decline diversity jurisdiction over the declaratory

relief action. Id. at 850–51. For this reason, the court found that it would be an abuse of

discretion for the court to dismiss the declaratory relief action altogether. Ibid. The court

looked to additional considerations of the interests of the parties involved and the potential

effects of collateral estoppel, and despite the fact that the declaratory relief action would clarify

the legal relations at issue, was persuaded that a stay of the declaratory relief action was

appropriate. Id. at 851–52. The court found that proceeding with the declaratory relief action

before the resolution of the related state court action would result in an “unwarranted

interference” with the state court’s adjudication of state-law issues. Ibid. 

Metropolitan seeks to distinguish Allstate v. Harris on the ground that claims of

imperfect self-defense in that action brought into question application of the intentional acts

exclusion (Opp. 7). This argument, however, is based on Metropolitan’s erroneous contention

that Marlin’s intent is undisputed. Allstate v. Harris is clearly analogous to the current action in

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that the factual question of intent is in dispute in both the declaratory relief action and the

related state court action. 

2. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.

As discussed above, the court’s decision to stay the declaratory relief action in Allstate

v. Harris was based in part on principles of collateral estoppel. Id. at 851–52. The court found

that while collateral estoppel principles are clear that the insurer would not be bound by the

outcome of the underlying civil action to which it was not a party, the insured could well be

collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of intent in the subsequent state action. Ibid.

Although Metropolitan has not named Marlin Synigal as a defendant in the current action, it is

clear that determination of Marlin’s intent in this action could have the effect of precluding

insureds Malcolm and Angela Synigal from relitigating the issue of Marlin’s intent. 

Thus, staying this action is proper to protect insureds Malcolm and Angela Synigal from being

bound by this Court’s determination of Marlin’s intent.

Thus, allowing this declaratory relief action to proceed at this time would result in

unnecessary and duplicative litigation of disputed factual issues. A stay of proceedings pending

resolution of the underlying state court actions is proper. 

3. CLARIFICATION OF LEGAL RELATIONS.

This order agrees with Metropolitan that this declaratory relief action would “serve a

useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue” by determining the relationships and

liabilities of the parties. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5. After careful consideration of the relevant

factors, however, this order finds that determination of these legal relations at this juncture,

when related issues of Marlin’s intent are in dispute in the underlying state actions, would be

imprudent.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED and

defendants’ motion to stay is GRANTED. It is hereby ordered that this action is stayed until the

civil action now pending in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of 

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Contra Costa is resolved, or until such earlier time as the Court may, on good cause shown,

allow. A further case management conference will be held on July 17, 2008, at 11:00 a.m. to

determine whether the stay should be lifted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2008. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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