Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02445/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02445-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 The proceedings were assigned to this Court, but have been referred to Magistrate Judge

Anthony J. Battaglia by Local Rule 72.3(e), “Assignment of § 1983 Prisoner Civil Cases to United

States Magistrate Judges,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MUHAMMED ABID AFRIDI aka

SAIFULLAH DURRANI,

BOP #90278-022,

Civil No. 06-2445 JM (AJB)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL

PARTIAL FILING FEE AND

GARNISHING BALANCE FROM

PRISONER’S TRUST ACCOUNT

[Doc. No. 2]; 

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at Federal Corrections Institution

in Adelanto, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).1

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that

a United States District Judge, a federal prosecutor and his criminal defense attorney all

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conspired to coerce him to plead guilty in his criminal proceedings. (Compl. at 5-7.)

Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but

has instead submitted a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, filed after April 8, 2006,

must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite

a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir.

1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the

entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any

reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six

months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months,

whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1);

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must collect

subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

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The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account

statement shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing

feel. Based upon this financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to

Proceed IFP and assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

The $350 balance shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to

the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) as set forth at the

end of this Order.

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must

subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory

screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious,

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from

a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254

F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not

limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua

sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

However, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an

action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own

motion to dismiss before directing the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte

screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of process is made on the

opposing parties”).

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“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren,

152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty

to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.”

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation

to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential elements

of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

First, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim as to any

named defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no valid basis for a claim under

section 1983, in that Plaintiff’s allegations are against federal and “private” officials

acting under color of federal law. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivation

of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law. See Daly-Murphy v.

Winston, 837 F.3d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, when a plaintiff seeks damages for

violation of his constitutional rights by a federal actor, “the only possible action is an

action under the authority of Bivens.” Id. In Bivens, the Supreme Court granted victims

of constitutional violations by federal agents the right to recover damages in federal court.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 

In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he claims that United States District Judge Lorenz

conspired with prosecutors and defense attorneys in his criminal matter to coerce Plaintiff

into pleading guilty. (Compl. at 5a.) Plaintiff’s allegations that his constitutional rights

were violated during his criminal proceedings which led to his incarceration are not yet

cognizable. In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction,

Plaintiff must show that his criminal conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a

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showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause

of action under § 1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.

2388 (2004). The Ninth Circuit has held that the Heck rationale applies to Bivens actions.

 See Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that

the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512

U.S. at 486-87. A claim for damages challenging the legality of a conviction or sentence

that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the

district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if

successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new

action if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” of

his criminal conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Cabrera v. City of Huntington

Park, 159 F.3d 374 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Heck barred false arrest and false

imprisonment claims until conviction was invalidated). Accordingly, because Plaintiff

seeks damages for an allegedly “unlawful imprisonment,” and because he has not alleged

that his conviction has already been invalidated, a Bivens claim for damages has not yet

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accrued. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claims against United States District Judge Lorenz are

barred by absolute immunity. “Judges and those performing judge-like functions are

absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.”

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). In his Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that Judge Lorenz “agreed” with prosecutors that he should be placed in

“isoloation” while he was held in a correctional facility pending his plea agreement.

(Compl. at 5a.) “[A]bsolute immunity insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts

or irregular action, even when it is alleged that such action was driven by malicious or

corrupt motives.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Forrester v.

White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which show

how or why an order to place Plaintiff in administrative segregation was not judicial in

nature, or how it was one taken “in absence” of jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 356-57, 360 (1978)

Therefore, as a United States District Court Judge, Lorenz has absolute immunity

from civil proceedings relating to these actions, which were performed within his judicial

discretion. Moreover, judicial immunity also bars declaratory and injunctive relief

against federal judges in a Bivens action. See Atkinson-Baker & Assocs. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d

1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993).

To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that he was denied his right to due process

when he was placed in administrate segregation (“Ad-Seg”), he has failed to state a claim.

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may

grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly

limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due

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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement

that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the

Constitution because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the

conditions or consequences of his placement in Ad-Seg which show “the type of

atypical, significant deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at

486. For example, in Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining

whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1)

the disciplinary versus discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted

conditions of the prisoner’s confinement and whether they amounted to a “major

disruption in his environment” when compared to those shared by prisoners in the general

population; and (3) the possibility of whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by

his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the

deprivation imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to

allege any facts from which the Court could find there were atypical and significant

hardships imposed upon him as a result of the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege

“a dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of his confinement that would give rise

to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due process. Id. at 485; see also

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th

Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a

liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-Seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486

(holding that placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not

present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably

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create a liberty interest.”).

Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “To

state a cause of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) to

deprive any person or a class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in

furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage or a deprivation

of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d

637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971);

Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he language

requiring intent to deprive equal protection . . . means that there must be some racial, or

perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege membership in a protected class and fails to allege

that any Defendant acted with class-based animus, both of which are essential elements

of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02; Schultz

v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that conspiracy plaintiff must

show membership in a judicially-designated suspect or quasi-suspect class); Portman v.

County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993). 

III. Conclusion and Order

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No.

2] is GRANTED.

2. The Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution, or his designee, is

ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account $350.00 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount

equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account

and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account

exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS

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ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on Warden,

FCI Victorville Medium II, Federal Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 5800, Adelanto,

California 92301.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) &

1915A(b)(1). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty (30) days leave from the date this

Order is stamped “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete

in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S. D. CAL. CIVLR. 15.1.

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be

deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may

hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84

F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a form civil rights Complaint to

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 16, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

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