Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05016/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05016-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sexual Harassment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

WILLIAM J. DOMINIC PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-5016

DeVILBISS AIR POWER COMPANY DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Now on this 2nd day of March, 2006, comes on to be considered

plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment (Doc. 35) and plaintiff’s

Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 32). The Court, being well and

sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows with respect

thereto:

1. Plaintiff instituted this action against his former

employer asserting sexual harassment and retaliation claims under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et

seq. and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), 16-123-101, et

seq. Plaintiff also asserted state-law claims for wrongful

discharge, negligent hiring and negligent supervision. 

2. The case proceeded to trial before a jury on November 29,

2005, and concluded as follows on December 2, 2005:

* the Court granted defendant a directed verdict on

plaintiff’s negligent-hiring claim;

* the jury found in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s

wrongful discharge claim; and

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* the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on his

sexual harassment, retaliation, and negligent supervision

claims.

3. The jury awarded plaintiff $100,000.00 in compensatory

damages, $13,000.00 in lost wages and benefits, and $250,000.00 in

punitive damages.

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

4. In his Motion for Entry of Judgment (Doc. 35), plaintiff

asserts that the applicable damages cap under Title VII and the

ACRA is $300,000.00 because “[s]everal witnesses testified at trial

that the Defendant regularly employed more than 500 employees at

the relevant time periods.” (Doc. 36 at pg. 2.) Plaintiff also

argues that the Court should allocate the $50,000.00 excess damages

to plaintiff’s state law negligent supervision claim, which is not

subject to any statutory cap, so as to maximize plaintiff’s

recovery and preserve the jury’s verdict.

Defendant responds that “not only did plaintiff fail to

establish the applicable employee levels of this defendant to

support a $300,000.00 verdict pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)

and/or A.C.A. § 16-123-107[(c)](2)(A), but negligent supervision is

not a cause of action for which apportionment applies.” (Doc. 37

at pg. 1.) 

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5. The combined total of compensatory damages (excluding lost

wages and benefits) and punitive damages awarded by the jury in

this case was $350,000.00. 

Title VII and the ACRA place a cap on the amount of

compensatory and punitive damages that may be awarded to a

plaintiff. The statutes do not limit the recovery of back pay and

lost benefits. 

The amount of the cap on compensatory and punitive damages is

dependent upon the number of employees the defendant has employed

“in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding

calendar year.” Under Title VII and the ACRA, the combined total

of compensatory damages and punitive damages awarded may not

exceed:

* $50,000.00 for defendants having between 15 and 100

employees;

* $100,000.00 for defendants having between 101 and 200

employees;

* $200,000.00 for defendants having between 201 and 500

employees; and

* $300,000.00 for defendants having more than 500

employees.

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-107(c)(2)(A).

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(a) The Court first addresses the issue regarding the number

of employees employed by the named defendant in this case,

DeVilbiss Air Power Company (“DeVilbiss”).

(1) At trial, Larry Hoover, defendant’s human resource

manager during the time in question, testified:

Q. Describe for me the different facilities that

DeVilbiss had at the time that you were employed.

A. DevilBiss Air Power had two facilities. They had a

facility in Jackson, Tennessee and a facility in

Decatur, Arkansas.

Q. Okay. Just prior to that, was there also a

facility in Mississippi?

A. There ... was a Porter Cable facility in

Mississippi, which was a sister company.

Q. What is the relationship between DeVilbiss Air

Power and Pentair?

A. Pentair was the parent company of the Pentair Tools

Group. Devilbiss Air Power was a company within

the Pentair Tools Group. 

Q. Who was your immediate supervisor while you were

working for DeVilbiss as the Human Resources

Manager?

A. I believe on my organizational chart, our Board of

Director was Claude Kelly ....

Q. And what was Mr. Kelly’s title?

A. Mr. Kelly was Vice President of Human Resources for

the Porter Cable Tools Group.

Q. Okay, and so there was a sufficient enough

relationship between DeVilbiss Air Power and

Pentair Tools Group for you to report directly to

Mr. Kelly?

A. Yes, sir.

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Q. All right. How many employees did DeVilbiss Air

Power regularly employ during the time that you

were there?

A. At the Decatur facilities [where plaintiff worked]?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Seasonally, ... [a]bout six months of the year,

you’d have about three hundred and ten employees.

The rest of the year, you’d have around two

hundred.

Q. Okay, and how many employees did DeVilbiss Air

Power regularly employ at the other facilities?

A. I’m really speculating. I’d say they had like four

or five hundred permanent employees, and then

seasonally, they may hire two or three hundred

temporaries.

Q. Is it fair to say that DeVilbiss Air Power had at

least four hundred employees on a regular basis,

full-time employees?

A. Yes, sir.

(Tr. 101-03.) 

(2) Claude Kelly also testified during the trial as

follows:

A. I am Director of Human Resources for the Industrial

Products Group of Black and Decker.

Q. And I don’t want to get into too much detail. How

is that entity related to DeVilbiss?

A. DeVilbiss is one division of the Industrial

Products Group that Black and Decker purchased

October 4 of 2004. th

Q. Mr. Kelly, would you kind of help me out with some

of these changes that took place with the corporate

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structure? You were the Human Resources Manager

for Pentair Tools Group. Is that right?

A. I was, yes, up until the purchase of the company by

Black and Decker.

Q. Okay. What was the effective date of the purchase

by Black and Decker?

A. It was either October 2 , 2004 or October 4 , 2004. nd th

I’m not sure which.

Q. Okay, and what was it that Black and Decker

purchased?

A. They purchased the entire Pentair Tools Group,

which was a portion of the Pentair company.

Q. Okay, and so before October 2 , ‘04, you were nd

employed by Pentair Tools Group. Is that right?

A. That is correct, as -- as Vice President of Human

Resources.

Q. Okay.

A. The title was different.

Q. Now, tell me -- and this is prior to October 2 of nd

‘04 -- what divisions, what facilities, what

operations Pentair Tools Group had.

A. The Tools Group had the DeVilbiss division, which

was the DeVilbiss facility in Jackson, Tennessee

and the DeVilbiss facility in Decatur, Arkansas.

There was also a Porter Cable Delta operation in

Jackson, Tennessee. There was one that was closed

in Tupelo, Mississippi. It was closed in early

2004, I believe. There was a very small operation

in Mesa, Arizona, and the name of that operation

was Beesmeyer. Twenty-five people. There was a

small warehousing facility in Canada, and a small

facility in Germany. They were all under the

Porter Cable name.

Q. Porter Cable Delta in Jackson, Mississippi?

A. Jackson, Tennessee.

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Q. Jackson, Tennessee. How many employees did that

company have at that location?

A. I’m going to say approximately twelve hundred.

Twelve to fourteen hundred.

Q. Twelve to fourteen hundred employees, and you were

the Human Resources Director also in charge of that

facility?

A. That is correct.

(Tr. 616, 648-49.)

(b) The above testimony regarding defendant DeVilbiss’s

corporate structure and the number of its employees is somewhat

confusing, but the Court discerns from it that DeVilbiss had two

facilities with a combined total of more 500 employees: 

* the Decatur, Arkansas facility had up to 310 employees (200

permanent employees and 110 temporary employees); and

* the Jackson, Tennessee facility had up to 800 employees

(400 to 500 permanent employees and 200 to 300 temporaries).

Any employee who works for a defendant for “20 or more

calendar weeks” is considered the defendant’s employee under Title

VII and the ACRA. The testimony in this case indicates that

defendant DeVilbiss hired temporary employees to work for

approximately six months of the year. Accordingly, the Court has

included the temporaries in its calculation of defendant’s total

employees.

(c) While it is unnecessary to do so in order to decide the

issue, the 1200 to 1400 employees of the Porter Cable Delta

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facility in Jackson, Tennessee may also be considered in

calculating defendant DeVilbiss’s total employees, as the testimony

indicates that the Porter Cable facility and the DeVilbiss

facilities were all part of the Pentair Tools Group and were under

common management and control. See Artis v. Francis Howell North

Band Booster Ass’n, Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1184 (8 Cir. 1998) (under th

Title VII, separate entities can be treated as consolidated based

on a consideration of the following factors: interrelations of

operations, common management, centralized control of labor

relations, and common ownership or financial control).

6. Defendant asserts that plaintiff failed “to establish the

applicable employee levels of this defendant.” This conclusory

assertion is not explained by defendant nor does it point to any

proof in the record to support it -- despite the fact that it is

the defendant (and not the plaintiff) who has the burden of

establishing the number of defendant’s employees. See Hamlin v.

Charter Township of Flint, 965 F. Supp. 984, 988 (E.D. Mich. 1997).

Based on the testimony detailed above and the Court’s analysis of

it, the Court concludes that defendant had more than 500 employees

during the relevant time period and that the applicable statutory

damages cap is $300,000.00.

7. The Court next addresses plaintiff’s argument that the

Court should allocate the $50,000.00 in excess compensatory and

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The jury was instructed that plaintiff could only succeed on his negligent 1

supervision claim if he first established that he was subjected to sexual harassment

and/or retaliation. 

Plaintiff was not entitled to recover lost wages and benefits on his other claims. 2

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punitive damages to plaintiff’s state law negligent supervision

claim. 

A district court has discretion to allocate a damage award

between state and federal claims in cases such as this where the

standards of liability are the same and the jury has not been 1

asked to distinguish between claims in assessing damages. See

Madison v. IBP, Inc., 257 F.3d 780, 801 (8 Cir. 2001), vacated on th

other grounds, 536 U.S. 919 (2002). 

In light of the foregoing authorities, the Court finds it

appropriate to allocate the damage award so as to preserve the

entire $350,000.00 award of compensatory and punitive damages, as

well as the $13,000.00 award of lost wages and benefits.

Accordingly, a separate judgment will be entered awarding

plaintiff:

* on his negligent supervision claim - $50,000.00 in

compensatory damages; 

* on his sexual harassment and retaliation claims -

$50,000.00 in compensatory damages and $250,000.00 in

punitive damages; and

* on his retaliation claim only , $13,000.00 in lost wages 2

and benefits.

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MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

8. In his Motion for Attorney’s Fees, plaintiff requests an

award of $51,232.73, representing:

* $5,432.73 in costs; and

* $36,600.00 in fees for 228.75 hours of non-trial work

performed by counsel at an hourly rate of $160.00; and

* $9,200.00 in fees for 46 hours of trial work at an hourly

rate of $200.00.

Defendant does not contest the rates charged by plaintiff's

counsel, but does object that certain hours claimed are not

compensable.

9. Under both Title VII and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act,

prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees

and costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Ark. Code Ann. § § 16-123-

107(c)(1)(A) & 16-123-108(c). With these principles in mind, the

Court now turns to an examination of the parties’ contentions.

(a) Defendant objects that plaintiff is not entitled to

recover attorney’s fees on his negligent hiring and wrongful

discharge claims, as he did not prevail on these claims. Defendant

asserts that it is “impossible to tell” from plaintiff’s counsel’s

affidavit and billing records the time and costs attributable to

the unsuccessful claims.

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When a plaintiff has prevailed on some, but not all, of his

claims, the court should consider the potential impact of partial

success on the fee award:

If any issues on which the plaintiff lost are unrelated

to those on which he won, the unrelated issues must be

treated as if they were separate cases and no fees can be

awarded.... If, however, the claims on which the

plaintiff lost are related to those on which he won, the

court may award a reasonable fee.... The most important

factor in determining what is a reasonable fee is the

magnitude of the plaintiff’s success in the case as a

whole.... If the plaintiff has won excellent results, he

is entitled to a fully compensatory fee award, which will

normally include time spent on related matters on which

he did not win.... If the plaintiff’s success is

limited, he is entitled only to an amount of fees that is

reasonable in relation to the results obtained. 

Jenkins v. State of Mo., 127 F.3d 709, 716 (8 Cir. 1997) th

(citations omitted).

Here, while plaintiff was not successful on his negligent

hiring and wrongful discharge claims, these claims were based on

the same facts and related to plaintiff’s Title VII sexual

harassment and retaliation claims. Plaintiff’s Title VII claims

were the heart of his case and plaintiff obtained a substantial

verdict in the amount of $363,000.00. 

Given plaintiff’s significant success on his core claims, the

Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to fees for time spent

on his related, yet unsuccessful, negligent hiring and wrongful

discharge claims. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Barton, 223 F.3d

770, 772-73 (8 Cir. 2000) (district court did not abuse its th

discretion in refusing to reduce attorney’s fees based on fact that

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plaintiff did not prevail on her negligent retention and other

state law claims, as plaintiff obtained a substantial verdict

($25,000.00) on her Title VII sexual harassment claim).

Accordingly, this objection will be overruled.

(b) Defendant also argues that even though plaintiff was

successful on his negligent supervision claim, this is a state law

claim for which he is not entitled to attorney’s fees. 

The Supreme Court has noted that, in some cases,

the plaintiff’s claims for relief will be based on

related legal theories. Much of counsel’s time will be

devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it

difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-byclaim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series

of discrete claims. Instead the district court should

focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained

by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably

expended on the litigation. 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 435, 436 (1983).

Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim shared a common core

of facts with his Title VII claims, all of which arose from the

alleged instances of sexual harassment and retaliation.

Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument and will not reduce

the attorney’s fee award for time spent on the negligent

supervision claim. See Barton, 223 F.3d at 773-74 (district court

did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees for time related to

state-law claims for which fees were not recoverable, as state law

claims shared a common core of facts with Title VII claims and all

claims arose from alleged sexual harassment).

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(c) Defendant next objects concerning two time entries that

predate the drafting of the complaint. These entries total 2.3

hours plaintiff’s counsel spent reviewing correspondence and

information from plaintiff, preparing a letter to defendant

regarding the possible transfer of plaintiff prior to plaintiff

terminating his employment, and making a telephone call to Joel

Abrahamson, an attorney defendant hired to investigate plaintiff’s

allegations. 

This objection is without merit and will be overruled. In the

Court’s view, these hours are compensable, as they relate to

counsel’s review of the facts of plaintiff’s case and his attempt

to avoid having to file suit by seeking to have plaintiff

transferred. Cf. Brinn v. Tidewater Trans. Dist. Comm’n, 105 F.

Supp. 2d 500, 505 (E.D. Va. 2000) (prevailing party may recover

attorney’s fees incurred in attempting to negotiate a settlement

prior to filing suit).

(d) Defendant also objects to two hours claimed by

plaintiff’s counsel for “[r]eceipt and review of EEOC materials.”

(Doc. 32 at pg. 6.) Defendant asserts that plaintiff “has no

explanation indicating what those materials were or how they

related to this action.” (Doc. 33 at pg. 2.) 

Plaintiff responds that the EEOC materials reviewed by counsel

prior to suit were plaintiff’s EEOC charge, questionnaire, and

information submitted by plaintiff to the EEOC, all of which were

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obtained and reviewed by defense counsel as well. Further,

plaintiff points out that defendant introduced a portion of the

EEOC file into evidence. 

The Court sees no merit to defendant’s objection, as the time

counsel spent reviewing the EEOC materials was reasonable and is

compensable. 

10. With regard to the costs claimed by plaintiff’s counsel,

defendant objects that counsel’s billing statement does not set

forth an “adequate disclosure regarding how [certain] costs qualify

for reimbursement.” (Doc. 33 at pg. 2.)

(a) Defendant objects to $27.24 in costs claimed for

obtaining copies of medical records from plaintiff’s physicians.

Defendant asserts that “the only medical records introduced as

evidence in this matter were records provided to defendant directly

from the medical care providers ..., which defendant, not

plaintiff, paid for.” (Id.) Plaintiff responds that counsel also

obtained the records directly from plaintiff’s physicians and

incurred costs for these records.

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs incurred for

“copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28

U.S.C. § 1920(4). It is irrelevant that defendant’s copies of the

medical records, and not plaintiff’s, were the ones introduced at

trial. See U.S. v. Merritt Meridian Constr. Corp., 95 F.3d 153,

173 (2d Cir. 1996) (photocopying costs may be recovered even though

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underlying document was not admitted at trial). The Court

therefore sees no merit to defendant’s objection.

(b) Defendant next objects to $200.00 claimed on July 13,

2004, before the lawsuit was filed, for “Copying of Audiotapes,”

and another $284.67 claimed on August 12, 2005, for “Copy of audio

tapes.” (Doc. 32 at pg. 11.) Defendant asserts that these costs

appear duplicative and the audiotapes were never provided to

defendant. 

Plaintiff does not respond to this objection, but the Court’s

review of the trial transcript reveals that defense counsel

acknowledged being provided two packets of audiotapes plaintiff

made of conversations he had with defendant’s employees. (Tr.

294.) Further, on cross-examination of plaintiff, defense counsel

questioned plaintiff extensively about these tapes. Accordingly,

the Court finds that the costs associated with copying the

audiotapes are compensable.

(c) Defendant also objects to $109.35 in Federal Express

charges claimed by plaintiff’s counsel. Defendant asserts that

plaintiff has offered no explanation as to “why or how the costs

are related and/or necessary to this action.” Plaintiff does not

respond to this objection. 

It is not the Court’s role to second-guess every cost decision

counsel might make. The Federal Express charges are not

substantial, which tends to show that plaintiff’s counsel was not

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engaged in wasteful spending. The Federal Express charges will

therefore be allowed. See Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga., 151 F.

Supp.2d 1364, 1378-79 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that Federal Express

costs were compensable).

(d) Finally, defendant objects to $268.22 claimed by

plaintiff’s counsel for conducting West Law research. The Eighth

Circuit has held that “computer-aided research, like any other form

of legal research, is a component of attorney’s fees and cannot be

independently taxed as an item of cost in addition to the

attorney’s fee award....” Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College,

702 F.2d 686, 695 (8 Cir. 1983). Accordingly, this objection will th

be sustained and the West Law charges will not be allowed as costs.

CONCLUSION

11. Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of

Judgment (Doc. 35) is GRANTED and a separate judgment will be

entered awarding plaintiff $363,000.00 in damages, allocated as

follows:

* $50,000.00 in compensatory damages on his negligent

supervision claim; 

* $50,000.00 in compensatory damages and $250,000.00 in

punitive damages on his sexual harassment and retaliation

claims; and

* $13,000.00 in lost wages and benefits on his retaliation

claim.

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12. Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 32) is also

GRANTED and plaintiff’s counsel will be awarded $50,964.51 in fees

and costs, allocated as follows:

* $5,164.51 in costs, which reflects a deduction of $268.22

for West Law research from the total $5,432.73 in costs

claimed; 

* $36,600.00 in fees for 228.75 hours of non-trial work at

an hourly rate of $160.00; and

* $9,200.00 in fees for 46 hours of trial work at an hourly

rate of $200.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED on the date first above-written.

/s/JIMM LARRY HENDREN 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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