Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01459/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01459-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kelly Dean Osborn, )

) No. CIV 04-1459 PHX RCB 

Petitioner, ) 

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Dora Schriro, et al., )

)

Respondents. ) )

On August 27, 2001, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of

misconduct involving weapons, on count of forgery and one count of

theft in Arizona state court. Exs. B & V (doc. 23). He timely

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 16, 2004,

advancing five claims for relief. Pet. (doc. 1). Magistrate Judge

Verkamp issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) (doc. 28) and

Petitioner filed objections, which were construed as timely by the

Court. Objs. (doc. 32); Order (doc. 31). The Court has reviewed

the record, the R&R, Petitioner's objections, and all other

pertinent information and now rules. 

. . .

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I. Background Facts

For purposes of this order only, the Court shall adopt the

factual and procedural background described in the R&R. 

On May 9, 2001, Petitioner was indicted in the Superior Court

of Arizona in Maricopa County, case number CR2001-06840, on one

count of possession of dangerous drugs and one count of misconduct

involving weapons, each classified as a class 4 felony. Ex. A

(doc. 23). On August 27, 2001, Petitioner pled guilty to the

weapons misconduct charge, pursuant to a plea agreement

acknowledging that he had previously been convicted of theft. Ex.

B (doc. 23). Thereafter, on November 16, 2001, Petitioner was

sentenced to a total of eight years in prison pursuant to his

conviction in CR2001-06840. Ex. G (doc. 23). The trial court

ordered that this sentence be served concurrently with the sentence

imposed pursuant to Petitioner's conviction in case number CR2001-

09112. Id.

On June 14, 2001, Petitioner was indicted in the Superior

Court in Maricopa County case number CR2001-09112 on one count of

forgery, a class 4 felony, and one count of theft, a class 5

felony. Ex. U (doc. 23). On August 27, 2001, Petitioner pled

guilty to the forgery charge in a plea agreement that acknowledged

a prior felony theft conviction. Ex. V (doc. 23). Petitioner was

sentenced to a total of eight years in prison for his conviction in

CR2001-09112 on November 21, 2001. Ex. AA (doc. 23). The sentence

imposed was to run concurrently with Petitioner's sentence in

CR2001-06840. Ex. J (doc. 23). In each of these cases the trial

court imposed a six-year sentence for the substantive conviction,

and further imposed a consecutive two-year sentence, pursuant to

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Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-604(R), because Petitioner was on

release on bond in CR2001-18030 when he committed the substantive

offenses in CR2001-09112 and CR2001-06840. Ex. G (doc. 23); Ex. J

(doc. 23).

In the plea agreement entered in CR2001-06840, the prosecution

agreed not to allege five of Petitioner's six prior felony

convictions and agreed not to file any further drug charges or

weapons misconduct charges arising from a City of Glendale

investigation and a Maricopa County Sheriff's Office investigation. 

Ex. B (doc. 23). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecution

agreed to dismiss a criminal case against Petitioner, i.e., CR2000-

018030, which alleged weapons misconduct and felony possession of

marijuana. Ex. B (doc. 23). 

II. Procedural Background

On July 9, 2002, Petitioner filed a Rule 32 Petition for PostConviction Relief, raising ten issues for relief, including a claim

that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel and a

claim that his guilty pleas, convictions, and sentences violated

his federal constitutional rights. Ex. I (doc. 23). On October

10, 2002, the Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed

Petitioner's action, concluding that his claims regarding the trial

court's alleged lack of jurisdiction, ineffective assistance of

counsel, and improper sentencing were without merit. Ex. L (doc.

23). Petitioner filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Ex. M (doc. 23). On January 5, 2004, the Arizona Court

of Appeals denied the petition for review. Ex. N (doc. 23). 

Petitioner filed another Rule 23 Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief on April 24, 2004, again seeking review of his conviction

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and sentence in both CR2001-06840 and CR2001-09112. Ex. S (doc.

23). Petitioner asserted in this petition that the government had

violated the plea agreements by imposing concurrent eight-year

sentences when he believed the plea agreement provided for

concurrent, consecutive six-year and two-year sentences. Id. In

addition, Petitioner alleged that his sentences exceeded the

maximum penalty allowed by law. Id. Petitioner also argued that

the plea agreement required the prosecution to return seized

property and, therefore, that the government breached the plea

agreement because it did not return at least one of Petitioner's

guns to Petitioner's wife. Id. Petitioner further asserted that

there had been a significant change in the law that warranted

reconsideration of his sentence. Id. 

The Superior Court dismissed the action on May 5, 2004,

concluding that the issues raised were precluded because they were

not raised in Petitioner's prior petition and because the claims

did not fit any of the exceptions to the state's procedural rule

regarding issue preclusion. Ex. T (doc. 23). The court rejected

Petitioner's assertion that there had been a significant change in

the law that affected his conviction and sentence. Id. 

On July 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Pet. (doc. 1). In his petition, Petitioner alleges that:

(1) he was denied his constitutional right to the effective 

assistance of counsel because the trial court refused to 

appoint his preferred counsel and because his advisory counsel

encouraged him to accept the government's plea agreements; 

(2) the trial court violated his First Amendment right to petition

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the government and his right to due process by refusing to 

hear Petitioner's motion challenging the trial court's 

jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims;

(3) he was searched and his property was seized in violation of 

his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment;

(4) his sentences are greater than the statutory maximum in 

violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel 

and unusual punishment; and

(5) the plea agreements violated his constitutional rights and the

government has breached a plea agreement. 

Pet. (doc. 1). Respondents filed their answer on November 12,

2004. (doc. 23). On December 29, 2004, Magistrate Judge Verkamp

recommended that this Court enter an order denying habeas corpus

relief with prejudice on all of Petitioner's claims. R&R (doc. 28)

at 26. 

III. Exhaustion of Claims

A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before

petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66

(1995). To properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must

fairly present his claims to the state's highest court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 842-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present

his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing

them through the state's direct appeal process or through

appropriate post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38

(9th Cir. 1994). The exhaustion requirement will not be met where

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the Petitioner fails to fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33

F.3d at 38. In order for a claim to be fairly presented the

petitioner must describe both the operative facts and the federal

legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000);

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). 

If a petition contains claims that were not exhausted, the

federal court must determine whether state remedies remain

available to the petitioner. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297

(1989). If remedies are available in state court, then the federal

court may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the

exhaustion of state remedies. Id. However, if the court finds

that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return to

the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally

defaulted. Id. at 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599,

602-03 (9th Cir. 1989).

When habeas claims have been procedurally defaulted, "federal

habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result

of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that

failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750

(1991); see also, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986). "'Cause' is a legitimate

excuse for the default and 'prejudice' is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation." Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741

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F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Here, Respondents contend that Petitioner's Fourth Amendment

claim was not raised at the lower courts and, thus, is not

exhausted. Answer (doc. 23) at 17. In the R&R, Judge Verkamp

elected to review the merits of all of Petitioner's claims, and,

finding that each should be denied on the merits, concluded that an

analysis of the exhaustion argument was unnecessary. R&R (doc. 28)

at 8. This Court agrees. 

IV. Legal Standard for Reviewing Exhausted Claims

This Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state

prisoner on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state reviewing court's decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court's decision [] involve[s] an "unreasonable

application" of federal law if it either 1) correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new

set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or

2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal

principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable.

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). A

federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's

factual findings regarding the petitioner's claims and must also

presume that the state court's decisions on witness credibility

were correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 936 (9th Cir. 1998).

. . .

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V. Petitioner's Claims 

a. Inadequate Assistance of Counsel

In Ground I of his petition, Petitioner asserts that his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. 

Pet. (doc. 1) at 6-13. Specifically, Petitioner challenges the

trial court's refusal to appoint a particular private attorney,

James Tinker, as his counsel, and alleges that he was forced to

defend himself, with advisory counsel. Id. at 8. In addition,

Petitioner alleges that his plea was not voluntary because his

public defender misled him into pleading guilty to the charges

against him. Id. at 7. Lastly, Petitioner argues that he was

"forced to choose between his constitutional right to be

represented by counsel, and his right to a speedy trial." Id. at

10. 

In order to establish that counsel's poor performance

constituted a violation of the constitutional right to adequate

assistance, a petitioner must establish both that counsel's

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and

that as a result the petitioner was prejudiced. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In reviewing whether

counsel's performance was deficient, "a court must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id.

at 689 (quotation omitted). 

The test has nothing to do with what the best

lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what

most good lawyers would have done. We ask only

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whether some reasonable lawyer at trial could have

acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.

Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), judgment

rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). 

When a petitioner challenges a conviction entered after a

guilty plea, the "prejudice" prong of this test is modified; the

petitioner must show the there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pleaded to the

charges against him and instead would have insisted on going to

trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59, 106 S. Ct. 366,

369-70 (1985). A lawyer's advice to plead guilty in the face of

strong inculpatory evidence does not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel. See United States v. Cassidy, 428 F.2d 383,

384 (9th Cir. 1970). 

On May 22, 2001, Petitioner filed a motion for dismissal of

counsel in case number CR 2001-006840, arguing that his appointed

counsel, Jerald Schreck, was legally conflicted because his office,

the Maricopa County Public Defenders Office, was also representing

Petitioner's co-defendant, Keri Winters, in that case. Ex. II

(doc. 23). In addition to asking for the dismissal of counsel,

Petitioner asked the trial court to allow him to proceed in propria

persona. Id. On May 31, 2001, the trial court discharged Schreck,

permitted Petitioner to proceed pro per, and appointed the Legal

Defender's Officer to serve as advisory counsel to Petitioner. Ex.

JJ (doc. 23). At some point, James Tinker of the Office of Court

Appointed Counsel was appointed to represent Petitioner. On July

9, 2001, Tinker filed a motion to withdraw as the attorney of

record, citing a conflict of interest. Ex. KK (doc. 23). On July

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19, 2001, the court granted Tinker's motion and ordered the Office

of Court Appointed Counsel to appoint new counsel. Ex. LL (doc.

23). Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to proceed without

counsel, which the trial court granted. Ex. MM (doc. 23). 

However, the trial court appointed John Justin McGuire to serve as

advisory counsel. Id. At the time petitioner entered into his

plea agreement on August 27, 2001, Petitioner represented himself

with the assistance of advisory counsel, John McGuire. Ex. B (doc.

23). 

In the R&R, Judge Verkamp notes that it is arguable whether

Petitioner is barred from bringing an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, because Petitioner represented himself, with

advisory counsel, throughout his plea negotiation and sentencing

proceedings. R&R (doc. 28) at 15-16 (citing Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806, 835, n.46, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 n.46 (1975) ("a

defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter

complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial

of 'effective assistance of counsel.'")). However, in any event,

Judge Verkamp determines that the claims may be denied on the

merits. R&R (doc. 28) at 17-19. 

Here, the plea agreement entered into by Petitioner negated

sentencing implications of five of his six prior felony convictions

and resulted in the dismissal of criminal charges involving weapons

misconduct and felony possession of marijuana. Petitioner offers

nothing more than his own statements to support his claims that his

guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing, and that his advisory

counsel's advice to accept the plea agreement was not within the

range of competence demanded by an attorney in his counsel's

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position. Because Petitioner has not demonstrated that his

counsel's performance was deficient or that, but for his counsel's

advice, he would not have plead guilty, Petitioner's claim that he

was deprived of ineffective assistance of counsel for the above

described reasons fails.

Moreover, Petitioner's claim that his plea agreements are not

valid because the court denied his motion to appoint a specific

attorney to represent him also fails. "The denial of a motion to

substitute counsel implicates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right

to counsel" and can be raised in a federal habeas proceeding. 

Bland v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th

Cir. 1994). However, Petitioner does not have an absolute right to

counsel of his choice. See United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964

F.2d 993, 1015 (10th Cir. 1992). The Court concludes that

Petitioner was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

when the trial court did not grant his motion to substitute

counsel. 

Finally, any claims Petitioner intends to raise regarding a

violation of his rights to a speedy trial are not viable. 

Allegations of violations of state speedy trial statutes are

matters of state law and do not raise a constitutional question. 

See Favors v. Eyman, 466 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1972). 

b. Claimed Violations of First Amendment Right to Petition 

and Right to Due Process

In Ground II of his petition, Petitioner asserts that his

First Amendment rights to be heard and to seek redress from the

government, and his right to due process, were violated because the

Arizona courts did not consider his motions challenging the state's

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subject matter jurisdiction. Pet. (doc. 1) at 14-16. However, the

record reflects that the trial court heard oral arguments and

considered motions regarding Petitioner's claims that the police

officers involved in his arrest were not properly certified,

pursuant to Arizona state law, and, thus, the trial court lacked

personal and subject matter jurisdiction over him. Exs. EE & FF

(doc. 23). The trial court repeatedly denied Petitioner's motions

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and it also denied his

petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised this issue. 

Exs. L & GG (doc. 23). Therefore, the Court agrees with the Judge

Verkamp's conclusion that Petitioner's constitutional rights were

not violated, because, as a matter of fact, his motions regarding

the trial court's jurisdiction were heard and decided by the trial

court, and were subsequently considered by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. 

Additionally, the Court agrees that Petitioner's criminal

proceedings were not a "complete miscarriage of justice," making

his claim not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Wright v.

Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1998); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930

F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner was allowed the

opportunity to question the arresting officers' law enforcement

certification, thus, he was not deprived of his federal right to

due process. 

c. Claimed Violations of Fourth Amendment

In Ground III of his petition, Petitioner asserts violations

of his Fourth Amendment rights. Pet. (doc. 1) at 16-21. 

Basically, Petitioner argues that his conviction must be reversed

because he was unlawfully arrested, searched and his property

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seized. Id. at 20. Petitioner asserts that these acts were

unlawful because "[t]he [arresting] officers were all operating

with full knowledge that their certification requirements were not

up-to-date[.]" Id. 

A claim that the petitioner's arrest violated his Fourth

Amendment rights does not provide a basis for granting federal

habeas relief if the petitioner had the opportunity "for full and

fair litigation" of the claim in the state courts. Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976). The

relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner was provided an

opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so

or whether the state court reached a correct decision regarding the

legitimacy of the search and seizure. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez,

81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996).

As Judge Verkamp noted in the R&R, Petitioner filed several

motions in the trial court regarding the trial court's purported

lack of jurisdiction resulting from an illegal search and seizure. 

Ex. EE (doc. 23). The trial court held a hearing regarding

Petitioner's motions and, on October 26, 2001, denied such motions.

Ex. FF (doc. 23). Petitioner raised his claim for a second time in

the Arizona Court of Appeals, which ultimately denied review of

this claim. Ex. N (doc. 23). Consequently, the Court agrees with

Judge Verkamp's conclusion that Petitioner's federal habeas claim

that his arrest was improper is foreclosed, because he was provided

the opportunity to litigate this claim in the state courts. See

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997). 

d. Claimed Violations of Eighth Amendment

In Ground IV of his petition, Petitioner argues that his

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1

A person who is convicted of committing any felony

offense, which felony offense is committed while the

person is released on bail or on the defendant's own

recognizance on a separate felony offense or while the

person is escaped from preconviction custody for a

separate felony offense, shall be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment two years longer than would otherwise be

imposed for the felony offense committed while released

on bond or on the defendant's own recognizance or while

escaped from preconviction custody...

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-604(R) (2001).

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sentence was illegal because, as previously described, the trial

court did not have jurisdiction over his crimes and, therefore, the

sentence imposed pursuant to the plea agreement is illegal because

the plea agreement itself is a "nullity." Pet. (doc. 1) at 23. 

This issue has already been discussed and resolved by the Court. 

Additionally, Petitioner alleges that he was sentenced to an

illegal sentence of 8 years in prison. Id. at 27. He argues that

the "plea was beyond the statutory maximum prescribed by law, and

it was an illegal plea agreement." Id. Specifically,

Petitioner contends that his sentencing to two concurrent six-year

terms of imprisonment followed by two concurrent two-year terms of

imprisonment violated his plea agreement's stipulation to two

concurrent eight-year sentences. Id. at 24, 28-29. He argues that

he could not be sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-604(R)1 because he was

never indicted and convicted under this statute. Id. at 28-29. 

Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in

the interpretation or application of state law, including a state's

sentencing statutes. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68,

112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085

(9th Cir. 1985). Consequently, Petitioner's assertion that his

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sentence was improper pursuant to Arizona statutory law is not a

cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. 

e. Claimed Violations of Plea Agreements

In Ground V of his petition, Petitioner claims that he was

denied due process because the government breached the plea

agreements. Pet. (doc. 1) at 23-30. Basically, Petitioner asserts

that many of his constitutional rights were violated because the

trial court did not have jurisdiction over him and erred in denying

his motion to withdraw from the plea agreement on October 26, 2001. 

Id. at 23-24. Additionally, Petitioner argues that his rights to

due process were violated because the prosecution breached the plea

agreements by not returning his seized property to his wife. Id.

at 24-25. 

Due process requires that a defendant be allowed to withdraw a

guilty plea when the plea is not voluntary and intelligent, or when

the government breaches the agreement. See Stone v. Cardwell, 575

F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 1978). Petitioner bears the burden of

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the

prosecution breached the contested plea agreements. See Bellew v.

Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976). 

A state court's findings relating to whether a defendant

knowingly and intelligently entered a guilty plea is a question of

fact to which a federal habeas court must accord a presumption of

correctness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(d). See Marshall v.

Longberger, 459 U.S. 422, 435-37 (1983). This presumption "obtains

unless one of the circumstances listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(d)(1) to

(7) exists, unless the determination is not fairly supported by the

state court record, or unless the petitioner shows by convincing

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evidence that the factual determination by the state court is

erroneous." Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Here, the trial court concluded that Petitioner's claim that

his plea was not voluntary and intelligent lacked merit. Ex. L

(doc. 23); see also Ex. N (doc. 23). The Court finds this

determination not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

federal law because Petitioner, at the time of his guilty plea,

stated that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Exs. B & V (doc.

23); see also Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987)

("In assessing the voluntariness of the plea, statements made by a

criminal defendant contemporaneously with his pleas should be

accorded great weight.").

In addition, the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea

provides a basis for habeas relief only if the denial resulted in a

complete miscarriage of justice or the denial was inconsistent with

the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See United States v.

Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783, 99 S. Ct. 2085, 2087 (1979). The

Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim, because he has failed to demonstrate that he had a "fair and

just" reason for withdrawing his guilty pleas. See Shah v. United

States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Lastly, the Court finds Petitioner's claim regarding the

return of his property to be not cognizable. Petitioner asserts

that his due process rights were violated because the State

violated the plea agreement by not returning his gun to his wife. 

Such a claim, however, has nothing to do with whether Petitioner's

conviction violated a federal constitutional or statutory right. A

state prisoner must claim he is in custody in violation of a

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federal constitutional or statutory right before he may receive

relief through a writ of habeas corpus. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68,

112 S. Ct. at 480. Consequently, the Court must reject this claim

as not cognizable under habeas review. 

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that Judge Verkamp's Report and Recommendation

(doc. 28) is ADOPTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Osborn's petition for writ of

habeas corpus (doc. 1) is DENIED. The clerk is directed to enter

judgment in favor of Respondents and to terminate this case.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Osborn's filings entitled "Motion

for: Disposition" (doc. 38), "Motion for: Judgment" (doc. 39),

"Motion for: Status of Case and Request for Ruling" (doc. 40), and

"Motion to Set and Certify Case for a Ruling" (doc. 41) are all

DENIED as moot. 

DATED this 30th day of August, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record and Petitioner, pro se

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