Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01070/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BILBO TOMAS,

CDCR #G-51177,

Civil No. 09cv1070 BTM (NLS)

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)

AND 42 U.S.C. § 1997e

[Doc. No. 11]

vs.

GEORGE NEOTTI, Warden; PAT

COLSTON, Community Resource

Manager; E. FRANKLIN, Appeals

Coordinator; BILL BROWN, Chaplain,

Defendants.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tomas Bilbo (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California, proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants Neotti, Colston, Franklin and Brown (“Defendants”) have filed a Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b) and 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 11].

Plaintiff filed his Opposition on October 30, 2009 [Doc. No. 18] to which Defendants have filed

their Reply [Doc. No. 19].

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The Court has determined that Defendants’ Motion is suitable for disposition upon the

papers without oral argument and that no Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge

Nita L. Stormes is necessary. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(d)(1), 72.3(e). 

II. PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Upon Plaintiff’s arrival at Donovan on March 12, 2009, he informed the Facility Sergeant

that he is a practicing Rastafarian, and as such, his religious beliefs required a vegetarian diet.

See Compl. at 3. Plaintiff further informed the Sergeant that the vegetarian diet was also helpful

for his diabetes. Id. Later that day, Plaintiff was interviewed by a prison doctor who informed

him that if he wished to have a vegetarian diet for medical reasons, he must go through “proper

channels, because Donovan only allowed for specialized diets for prisoners who were on

dialysis. Id. Plaintiff asked the prison doctor to speak with the facility chaplain to facilitate the

diet for religious reasons as well. Id.

On April 26, 2009, Sergeant Bracomantis interviewed Plaintiff and told Plaintiff he was

“checking into how I get my diet.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff told Sergeant Bracomantis that his

religious beliefs prohibit him from eating meat and a vegetarian diet helps to control his diabetes.

Id. Plaintiff claims that since he has been forced to go without the vegetarian diet he has been

unable to regulate his blood sugar levels which causes him to experience “migraine headaches,

blurred vision, dizziness, severe cramps” and pain in his extremities. Id. Plaintiff submitted

several requests to meet with the prison chaplain in order to facilitate obtaining a vegetarian diet

but his requests never received a response. Id. Plaintiff also wrote requests to Defendant

Colston, Community Resource Manager, and Defendant Franklin, Appeals Coordinator. Id. 

Captain B. Morris came to visit Plaintiff on May 7, 2009 and issued Plaintiff a

“temporary handwritten diet permit.” Id. He further informed Plaintiff that the Supervisors and

Sergeants in his facility had been “apprised as to my dietary needs.” Id. However, two days

later, Plaintiff was again denied his vegetarian diet. Id. On May 9, 2009, Plaintiff went to the

“chow hall” and provided the note written by Captain Morris to Correctional Officer Thomas.

Id. at 5. 

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Thomas refused to provide Plaintiff with the vegetarian meal and told Plaintiff “I don’t

care about your diet, I don’t know or work for Captain [Morris], so if you don’t want what is

served get the hell out of the kitchen.” Id.

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)

The Court will first consider Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be

dismissed for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

A. Standard of Review per FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

Defendants claim Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) before bringing this suit, therefore, they seek dismissal under the “nonenumerated” provisions of FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b). The Ninth Circuit has held that “failure to

exhaust nonjudicial remedies is a matter of abatement” not going to the merits of the case and

is properly raised pursuant to a motion to dismiss, including a non-enumerated motion under

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b). See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) It is also well

established that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

is an affirmative defense which defendant prison officials have the burden of raising and

proving. See Jones v. Bock, 594 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. However,

unlike under Rule 12(b)(6), “[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial

remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Wyatt,

F.3d at 1120.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies per 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to provide

that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Once within the discretion of

the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory.” Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) has been construed broadly to “afford

[ ] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing

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 the initiation of a federal case, id. at 525-26, and to encompass inmate suits about both general

circumstances and particular episodes of prison life--including incidents of alleged excessive

force. Id. at 532. Finally, “[t]he ‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint

under § 1983 may be entertained,” “regardless of the relief offered through administrative

procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738, 741 (2001); see also McKinney v. Carey,

311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that prisoner’s civil rights action must be

dismissed without prejudice unless prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before

he filed suit, even if he fully exhausts while the suit is pending).

The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to administratively

appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those individuals

as adversely affecting their welfare.” CAL.CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust

available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several

levels: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3)

second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director

of the California Department of Corrections. Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D.

Cal. 1997) (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3084.5). 

C. Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to Plaintiff’s Case

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing

this lawsuit. In support of their claim, Defendants provide the Declaration of G. Pederson,

Appeals Coordinator at Donovan. See Defs.’ Mot, Pederson Decl. In this Declaration, Pederson

claims that he searched Donovan’s “Inmate/Parolee Appeals Tracking System for appeals filed

by Bilbo Thomas.” Id. at ¶ 6. This search found two appeals filed by Plaintiff that were

“screened-out (i.e. rejected) because Plaintiff failed to attempt to resolve the issue at the informal

level of review, which is required by Title 15 regulations.” Id. at ¶ 7. These “rejections”

included “written instructions on how to cure the defect.” Id. 

While this appears to be an accurate representation of the initial attempts by Plaintiff to

exhaust his administrative grievances, Plaintiff attaches additional CDCR 602 Inmate/Parolee

forms which appear to be further attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies in regard to the

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 issues in this action. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 43, 46. In both of these grievances, one is stamped

received on March 26, 2009 and the other is stamped received on April 13, 2009, it appears that

Plaintiff was attempting to rectify his initial procedural errors and resolve these grievances at

the informal level of review.

Both of these forms contain a staff response that indicate Plaintiff’s request is “Granted”

at the informal level of review on May 25, 2009. While the Court would typically find that this

“grant” has exhausted Plaintiff’s administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this action too soon.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 11, 2009, which is two weeks prior to the prison’s response

to his administrative grievances. As stated above, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) has been construed

broadly to “afford [ ] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally

before allowing the initiation of a federal case. Porter, 534 U.S. at 525-26; see also Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (A prison may “initiate litigation in federal

court only after the administrative process ends and leaves his grievances unredressed,” as it

would be “inconsistent with the objectives of [42 U.S.C. § 1997e] to let him submit his

complaint any earlier than that.”). 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that Plaintiff must “properly exhaust” his

administrative remedies before filing a prison conditions action. In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 91 (2006), the Supreme Court held that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an

agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can

function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 91. The Court further held that “[proper exhaustion] means ... a prisoner

must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural

rules ... as a precondition to bring suit in federal court.” Id.

Plaintiff has failed to rebut Defendants’ showing that he failed to properly exhaust his

administrative grievances prior to bringing this action. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies as

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This dismissal is without prejudice to permit Plaintiff to file

a separate action once he has properly exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court will

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not address the remainder of Defendants’ Motion as dismissal of the entire action without

prejudice is warranted at this time. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This

dismissal is without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 8, 2009

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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