Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05634/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05634-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Identified as Papinpus in the complaint. 1

 Identified as Perez in the complaint. 2

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN A. GAVINO,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. PAPINPUS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-05634-LJO-SMS PC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

AND DIRECTING CLERK OF THE COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

(Doc. 43)

I. Order Resolving Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff John A. Gavino (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s complaint filed

on March 22, 2004, against Defendants Pappenfus, Davis, and Perry (“Defendants”) for acting with 1 2

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

(Docs. 43, 53.) At the time of the events at issue in this action, Plaintiff was a state prisoner in the

custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and was housed

at Avenal State Prison (“ASP”) in Avenal, California. 

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Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on August 4, 2006. (Docs. 43-46.) After

being directed to do so by the Court and obtaining an extension of time, Plaintiff filed an opposition

on March 12, 2007. (Doc. 60.) Defendants filed a reply on March 9, 2007. (Doc. 59.) 

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

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U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the

pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the Court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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 Plaintiff neither filed his own separate statement of disputed facts nor admitted or denied the facts set forth 3

by Defendants as undisputed in compliance with Local Rule 56-260(b). Further, Plaintiff did not tender any

evidentiary objections in any other form. FDIC v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 1992)

(evidentiary defects waived absent objection). Therefore, Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts is accepted

except where brought into dispute by Plaintiff’s complaint. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004)

(verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit if it is based on pleader’s personal knowledge of specific

facts which are admissible in evidence). A verified opposition to a motion for summary judgment may also be

considered as an opposing affidavit for purposes of the summary judgment rule if it is based on facts within the

pleader’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998). 

4

C. Undisputed Facts3

1. Background Facts

1. Plaintiff John A. Gavino was at all times relevant an inmate in the custody of the CDCR and

housed at ASP.

2. Prior to his incarceration at ASP, Plaintiff was incarcerated at California State Prison,

Solano, where he alleges he was diagnosed with Hepatitis-C in 1999. 

3. At all relevant times,John Pappenfus, M.D. was a Physician and Surgeon, board certified in

Internal Medicine, employed at ASP.

4. At all relevant times, Ross Davis, M.D. was a Medical Doctor employed at ASP. 

5. At all relevant times, D. Michael Perry, M.D. was a Medical Doctor employed at ASP.

6. Plaintiff’s only complaint is with reference to the medical treatment he received at ASP.

7. The basis for Plaintiff’s lawsuit is that he was not administered Interferon Therapy for his

Hepatitis-C medical condition.

2. Facts Relating to Claim Against Defendant Davis

8. Defendant Davis never refused to treat Plaintiff. 

9. Plaintiff understood that Interferon could not be ordered for him by anyone, including

Defendant Davis, until he was evaluated by Defendant Pappenfus, the internist.

10. Plaintiff has no specific complaints of Defendant Davis.

3. Facts Relating to Claim Against Defendant Pappenfus

11. On March 10, 2003, Plaintiff was referred to Defendant Pappenfus, the liver internal

medicine specialist, to determine if he was a candidate for Interferon Therapy.

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 Plaintiff’s complaint and opposition are verified and shall be treated as affidavits for purposes of the 4

summary judgment rule where they are based on facts within Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of admissible evidence,

and not merely on Plaintiff’s belief. Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e). 

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12. Plaintiff saw Defendant Pappenfus only one time, on March 28, 2003, as a result of a referral

by Defendant Davis to determine if Plaintiff was a candidate for Interferon Therapy.

13. While employed at ASP, it was one of Defendant Pappenfus’s duties to evaluate all

Hepatitis-C patients before Interferon Therapy was prescribed.

14. Defendant Pappenfus evaluated Plaintiff’s Hepatitis-C condition on March 28, 2003, to

determine if he was a viable candidate for Interferon Therapy.

15. After evaluating Plaintiff on March 28, 2003, Defendant Pappenfus determined that due to

Plaintiff’s relatively young age and the fact that Plaintiff’s liver enzymes were normal,

Plaintiff was not a viable candidate for Interferon Therapy.

16. Based on Defendant Pappenfus’s medical opinion that the risk of Interferon Therapy greatly

outweighed its benefits in Plaintiff’s case, a decision was made by Defendant Pappenfus not

to treat Plaintiff with Interferon.

4. Facts Relating to Claim Against Defendant Perry

17. Plaintiff met Defendant Perry, and was not ever treated by him.

18. Plaintiff’s only basis for suing Defendant Perry is because of “his acknowledged signature

on a 602 ” and “because they all work in the same building,” referring to all the medical staff.

19. Plaintiff never communicated with Defendant Perry, other than the latter signing a 602

appeal.

20. Plaintiff has no other complaints of the Defendants.

D. Discussion4

1. Claim Against Defendant Davis

In 1999, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis-C while at California State Prison-Solano.

(Comp., ¶11; Undisputed Fact 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Interferon was medically necessary given his

condition, but Defendants refused to provide it for him, in violation of his rights under the Eighth

Amendment. (Comp., ¶14; U.F. 6, 7.) 

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Defendant Davis argues that he is entitled to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s claim

against him because he did not refuse to provide medical treatment to Plaintiff. (U.F. 8.) No one,

including Defendant Davis, could order Interferon for Plaintiff until he was evaluated by Defendant

Pappenfus, the internist. (U.F. 9.) Plaintiff had no specific complaints of Defendant Davis, and

testified during his deposition that he believed Defendant Davis was responsible because everybody

was the enemy, as they ate and worked together in the same environment. (U.F. 10, Depo., 34:13-

16.)

The Court finds that Defendant Davis has met his initial burden of informing the Court of

the basis for his motion, and identifying those portions of the record which he believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to establish

that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As stated above, in attempting to establish the

existence of this factual dispute, Plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747,

749 (9th Cir. 1973).

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

Plaintiff’s opposition is essentially a reiteration of the allegations set forth in the complaint.

It appears Plaintiff has confused the showing he must make at this stage with the initial showing he

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had to make to state a claim for relief. Although Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state a

claim for relief under federal notice pleading standards, at this stage in the litigation, Plaintiff must

come forth with evidence in support of his claims. Plaintiff has not done so.

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff’s mere allegations that he had a medical need for Interferon treatment and because

Defendant Davis was aware of this need, the failure to supply the treatment violated his rights are

insufficient to defeat Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff, as a lay witness, is not qualified to opine that

he had a medical need for Interferon treatment and that the failure to supply Interferon treatment was

“medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . .” and chosen “in conscious disregard of an

excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal

citations omitted). The record is utterly devoid of any evidence that Plaintiff had a medical need for

Interferon treatment and that by failing to prescribe Interferon treatment, Defendant Davis “[knew]

of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Accordingly, Defendant Davis is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim against

him.

2. Claim Against Defendant Pappenfus

Defendant Pappefus was the liver internal medicine specialist and while employed at ASP,

it was one of his duties to evaluate all Hepatitis-C patients before Interferon Therapy was prescribed.

(U.F. 11, 13.) On March 10, 2003, Plaintiff was referred to Defendant to determine if he was a

candidate for Interferon Therapy. (U.F. 11.) Defendant evaluated Plaintiff’s Hepatitis-C condition

on March 28, 2003, to determine if he was a viable candidate for Interferon Therapy, and determined

that due to Plaintiff’s relatively young age and the fact that Plaintiff’s liver enzymes were normal,

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28 Although Plaintiff misidentified Defendant Perry as Defendant Davis in his opposition, Plaintiff’s 5

allegations make clear that Plaintiff is referring to Defendant Perry, not Defendant Davis. 

8

Plaintiff was not a viable candidate for Interferon Therapy. (U.F. 14, 15) Because it was

Defendant’s medical opinion that the risk of Interferon Therapy greatly outweighed its benefits in

Plaintiff’s case, a decision was made by Defendant not to treat Plaintiff with Interferon. (U.F. 15,

16.)

“A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding

treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, Plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the

doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose this

course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90

F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff has not submitted any admissible evidence that he had a medical need for Interferon

treatment and that the failure to provide Interferon treatment constituted deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. Accordingly, Defendant Pappenfus is entitled to summary adjudication

on Plaintiff’s claim against him.

3. Claim Against Defendant Perry

Finally, Plaintiff never met Defendant Perry, and was not treated by him. (U.F. 17.)

Defendant’s only involvement was signing an inmate appeal, which Plaintiff asserts placed him on

notice of Plaintiff’s need for Interferon. (U.F. 18, 19; Opp., pg. 3. )

5

Defendants have submitted evidence that Plaintiff was evaluated as a candidate for Interferon

treatment and was deemed not to be a viable candidate for it. Plaintiff has submitted no admissible

evidence bringing any material facts into dispute. Accordingly, Defendant Perry is entitled to

summary adjudication on the claim against him. 

E. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, theCourtfinds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of setting forth

admissible evidence raising triable issues of material fact, and Defendants are entitled to judgment

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as a matter of law on the claims against them. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed August 4, 2006, is GRANTED,

thus concluding this action in its entirety; and

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for Defendants and against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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