Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01964/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01964-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sabina Francois, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Jeh Johnson, et al.,1

Defendants. 

No. CV-13-01964-PHX-PGR

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff filed a 

response opposing the motion, together with a cross-motion for summary judgment. 

(Doc. 23.) Defendants responded with a motion to hold Plaintiff’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment in abeyance. (Doc. 26.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court 

grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The other motions will be denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, states that she lawfully 

entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor on August 12, 1983. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 11, 

12.) Plaintiff married Randolph Barclay, a U.S. citizen, on February 1, 1992. (Id., ¶ 13.) 

 

1

 Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson is substituted for former Acting Secretary Rand Beers. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) 

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On March 15, 1993, Barclay filed a spousal visa petition (Form I-130) with the 

Immigration and Nationalization Service (“INS”), seeking to classify Plaintiff as his 

spouse for immigrant visa purposes. (Id., ¶ 14.) On the same day, Plaintiff filed an 

adjustment application (Form I-485) with the INS, seeking to adjust her status to that of a 

lawful permanent resident and obtain a green card. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff was unable to produce her passport and her Form I-94, evidencing that 

she was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1983. (Id., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff attempted to 

establish that she lawfully entered the United States by submitting affidavits, but the INS 

deemed the affidavits insufficient because they did not clearly establish the date of her 

entry. (Id., ¶ 19, 20.) The INS advised Plaintiff and Barclay to withdraw their pending 

documents and to re-file new documents that would not require Plaintiff to prove her 

lawful entry. (Id., ¶ 21.) On July 23, 1993, Plaintiff withdrew her pending adjustment 

application and Barclay withdrew his pending spousal visa petition. (Id., ¶ 23.) 

 On July 8, 1994, Barclay filed a second spousal visa petition for Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 

22.) The INS approved that petition on August 18, 1994. (Id., ¶ 24.) On October 1, 1994, 

8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) became effective. (Id., ¶ 25.) Pursuant to that statute, Plaintiff filed a 

new application and paid the $1,000 fee on December 6, 1994. (Id., ¶ 26.) The INS 

interviewed Plaintiff and Barclay regarding the adjustment application on May 4, 1995. 

(Id., ¶ 27.) 

 Following the interview, the INS determined that Plaintiff’s marriage to Barclay 

was not legitimate such that it could confer immigration benefits to Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 28.) 

The INS did not notify Plaintiff of its intent to revoke the petition before the actual 

revocation occurred. (Id., ¶ 30.) It did, however, issue a Notice of Intent to Revoke 

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(“NOIR”) to Barclay on September 25, 2000, informing him of the reasons it intended to 

revoke the approved petition.2

 (Doc. 14, Ex. A at 4.) On March 20, 2001, the INS 

revoked Barclay’s approved spousal visa petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). (Doc. 1, 

¶ 28.) Plaintiff alleges that Barclay appealed that revocation to the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) on April 3, 2001. (Id., ¶ 32.) On July 16, 2001, the INS denied 

Plaintiff’s second adjustment application because there was no approved spousal visa 

petition. (Id., ¶ 33.) On January 1, 2002, Barclay and Plaintiff divorced. (Id., ¶ 36.) 

 Plaintiff then married a second U.S. citizen, James Earl Voice. (Id., ¶ 37.) Voice 

filed a spousal visa petition for Plaintiff with the United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (“USCIS”)3

 on October 19, 2006, and Plaintiff filed a third 

adjustment application on the same date. (Id.) On July 6, 2007, USCIS denied Voice’s 

spousal visa petition under section 1154(c) based on its conclusions that Voice and 

Plaintiff had failed to establish the legitimacy of their marriage, as well as that of 

Plaintiff’s marriage to Barclay. (Id., ¶ 39; see Doc. 14, Ex. B at 3.) USCIS denied 

Plaintiff’s third adjustment application on the same date, again because there was no 

approved spousal visa petition. (Id., ¶ 40.) Voice appealed the denial of his spousal visa 

petition to the BIA. (Id.; see also Doc. 14, Ex. B at 3.) On October 7, 2009, the BIA 

vacated the denial because USCIS had failed to issue Voice a Notice of Intent to Deny 

(“NOID”) before it denied his petition, and remanded the matter to USCIS for further 

action. (Doc. 14, Ex. B at 4.) 

 

2

 The NOIR cited Plaintiff’s statements at the May 1996 interview indicating that she and Barclay had never established a residence together; he resided in Iowa with another woman and her son while Plaintiff resided in Arizona. (Doc. 14, Ex. A at 4.) 

3

 On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an independent agency. Some of its functions were transferred to USCIS. 

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 On July 6, 2007, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued a 

Notice to Appear (“NTA”) against Plaintiff, thereby initiating removal proceedings 

against her. (Doc. 1, ¶ 41; Doc. 14, Ex. A at 1.) Pursuant to Plaintiff’s motion, the 

immigration judge dismissed those proceedings as premature because Voice’s appeal to 

the BIA was still pending. (Doc. 14, Ex. A at 10.) ICE then issued a new NTA on 

February 4, 2011, re-initiating removal proceedings. (Id., Ex. C at 1.) ICE amended its 

NTA to add additional charges against Plaintiff on August 29, 2012. (Id. at 1; see Doc. 1, 

¶ 46.) 

 Plaintiff moved to terminate her removal proceedings on the basis that she became 

a lawful permanent resident pursuant to her 1993 adjustment application. (Doc. 14, Ex. C. 

at 2.) In support of this defense Plaintiff produced a document that had been stored in her 

alien file and which her counsel had received in response to a FOIA request. (Id. at 5.) 

The document, an undated notice with the rubber-stamped signature of former INS 

District Director Ruth Anne Myers, states that Plaintiff’s 1993 adjustment application 

was granted. (Id.; see Doc. 1, ¶ 43.) 

 ICE and Plaintiff disputed the legal effect of this document during Plaintiff’s 

removal proceedings. (Id. at 5–11.) On May 11, 2012, the immigration judge denied 

Plaintiff’s motions to terminate. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff moved the immigration judge to 

reconsider that order. (Id.) On December 6, 2012, the immigration judge rejected 

Plaintiff’s argument that this notice constituted evidence that she was lawfully admitted 

for permanent residence pursuant to her 1993 application. (Id. at 11.) The immigration 

judge explained that “clear and convincing evidence supports the DHS argument that 

respondent’s 1993 application for adjustment of status was not approved, notwithstanding 

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the existence of the undated and unissued approval notice in the respondent’s file.” (Id.) 

The immigration judge therefore concluded that Plaintiff “is not a lawful permanent 

resident of the United States” and held her removable. (Id.) 

 On July 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed an application to naturalize (Form N-400) with 

USCIS, seeking U.S. citizenship. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 55, 81.) USCIS rejected the filing on the 

same date for “residency issues.” (Doc. 14, Ex. D.) Plaintiff filed this action on 

September 26, 2013. 

DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff’s complaint raises six causes of action, alleging claims under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706; the Declaratory Relief Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 2201; and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges 

that she is entitled to relief because USCIS unlawfully revoked Barclay’s I-130 petition 

and unlawfully denied Plaintiff’s I-485 applications. She seeks an order compelling 

USCIS to register her status as a lawful permanent resident. Defendants contend that the 

complaint must be dismissed under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. 4 (Doc. 14.) 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

 4 Error! Main Document Only.Defendants have attached to their motion to dismiss 

the December 6, 2012, decision of the Immigration Judge and a USCIS N-400 printout. (Doc. 14, Ex’s. C, D.) These materials, supporting a factual attack on jurisdiction, do not, as Plaintiff contends, convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“With a factual Rule 12(b)(1) 

attack, however, a court may look beyond the complaint to matters of public record without having to convert the motion into one for summary judgment. It also need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs’ allegations.”) In support of their argument under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants refer to the October 7, 2009, decision from the Board of 

Immigration Appeals. (Doc. 14, Ex. B.) District courts may consider facts extraneous to the complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting it into a motion for summary judgment if the facts are judicially noticeable. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

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 Defendants contend that the Court “lacks jurisdiction over every cause of action 

except [Plaintiff’s] claim that USCIS improperly denied her most recent adjustment 

application.” (Doc. 14 at 17.) Specifically, they argue that the REAL ID Act bars the 

Court from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s mandamus and declaratory judgment 

claims. (Id. at 15; see Doc. 25 at 10.) They contend that Plaintiff’s claims concerning 

INS’s failure to provide her notice before revoking her former husband’s spousal visa 

petition are either time-barred or there is no final agency action that could confer APA 

jurisdiction. (Id. at 8–10, 12.) Finally, Defendants assert that the Court cannot consider 

Plaintiff’s claim seeking an order compelling USCIS to adjudicate her 2009 application 

for naturalization because no such application is pending. (Id. at 15.) As set forth below, 

the Court agrees that Plaintiff has not established that this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over her claims. 

 Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must dismiss an action if the court lacks jurisdiction 

over the subject matter of the suit. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 

burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 

(9th Cir. 1986). The Court presumes a lack of jurisdiction until the party asserting federal 

jurisdiction proves otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 

375, 377 (1994); see Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Kashkool v. Chertoff, 553 F.Supp.2d 1131, 1134 (D.Ariz. 2008). 

 The Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s challenges to the denials of 

her I-485 applications. Determinations regarding such applications are made pursuant to 

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a),5

 and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) expressly states that “no court shall 

 

5

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have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [8 

U.S.C. § ] 1255.” Therefore, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) eliminates district court jurisdiction to 

review the denial of an I–485 application. See Ruiz v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 269, 276 n.4 (2d 

Cir. 2009); Ayanbadejo v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 273, 276–77 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining 

that under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) courts “lack jurisdiction over determinations made with 

respect to an I–485 application for permanent resident status under § 1255.”); Aguilera v. 

District Director, 423 Fed.Appx. 916, 919 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Hassan v. 

Chertoff, 593 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2010) (reiterating that “judicial review of the denial 

of an adjustment of status application—a decision governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1255—is 

expressly precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)”); Kashkool, 553 F.Supp.2d at 1137. 

 Moreover, the judicial review provisions of the APA do not apply where statutes 

preclude judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). As just described, 8 U.S.C. 

1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “specifically closes the door to judicial review of certain discretionary 

agency decisions, including the denial of an application for adjustment of status.” Lee v. 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 592 F.3d 612, 619 (4th Cir. 2010); see Mann 

v. Holder, No. 12-CV-4712-YGR, 2012 WL 6002730, at *3 n.2 (N.D.Cal. November 30, 

2012). 

 In addition, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the standard for the “extraordinary remedy” of 

mandamus relief, which “is available to compel a federal official to perform a duty only 

if: (1) the individual’s claim is clear and certain; (2) the official’s duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3) no 

 admitted or paroled into the United States “may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . ” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 

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other adequate remedy is available.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1998). First, the USCIS does 

not have a clear duty to rule favorably on her I–485 applications. Aguilera, 423 

Fed.Appx. at 919. In addition, Plaintiff still has remedies available, as she is in removal 

proceedings where she can pursue this and any other application for relief. See Ibarra v. 

Swacina, 628 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2010) (an adjustment of status decision is a final 

agency action only when “there are no deportation proceedings pending in which the 

decision might be reopened or challenged.”); see also Cacaccang v. USCIS, 627 F.3d 

1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “district courts lack jurisdiction to review 

denials of status adjustment if removal proceedings are simultaneously pending.”). 

 For similar reasons, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the APA. The USCIS 

did not unlawfully withhold action on Plaintiff’s I-485 applications, see 5 U.S.C. § 

706(1), and its denial of the applications is not a final agency action, 5 USC § 704. 

Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider these claims under the APA.6 See 

Cacaccang, 627 F.3d at 1315; Gupta v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 439 Fed.Appx. 858, 860–61 

(11th Cir. 2011). 

 Finally, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide an independent basis for 

subject matter jurisdiction. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 678 (1960); see Aguilera, 

423 Fed.Appx. at 919; Beshir v. Holder, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2014 WL 284886, at *4 

(D.D.C. 2014). To consider a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal court 

 

6

 If the immigration judge ultimately orders Plaintiff removed, she may seek recourse in 

federal court only after she brings her claims for relief to the BIA and the BIA rules on 

her appeal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). As Defendants note, at that point Plaintiff may seek 

relief in the Ninth Circuit through a petition for review. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5), 

(b)(9), (g). 

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must have jurisdiction under another federal statute. Schilling, 63 U.S. at 678. As 

explained above, other federal statutes do not provide jurisdiction. 

 Jurisdiction also fails because, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s claim 

challenging the denial of her second I-485 application is time-barred. There is a six-year 

statute of limitations for claims against the United States government. 28 U.S.C. § 

2401(a). The INS denied Plaintiff’s application on July 16, 2001 (Doc. 1, ¶ 33.) Plaintiff 

filed her complaint on September 26, 2013, more than 12 years later. Therefore, the sixyear statute of limitations precludes jurisdiction over the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a); 

Offiiong v. Holder, 864 F.Supp.2d 611, 629 (S.D.Tex. 2012). 

 Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim based on the INS’s failure in 2001 to provide her notice 

before revoking her former husband Barclay’s spousal visa petition is time-barred. 

Alternatively, if, as Plaintiff contends (Doc. 1, ¶ 32), Barclay has appealed that decision, 

the appeals remains pending and there is no final agency action that could confer APA 

jurisdiction. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (holding that an action is 

final where it marks the “consummation of the agency’s decision-making process”); see 

also Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 501 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the decision to 

deny spousal immigration petition of alien’s husband was not final agency action under 

the APA where husband filed administrative appeal from that decision). 

Finally, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s mandamus claim asking the 

Court to order USCIS to adjudicate her I-400 application for naturalization filed in July 

2009. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 73–75, 81.) USCIS rejected the application for “residency issues” (Doc. 

14, Ex. D), so there is no pending application for USCIS to adjudicate. USCIS has no 

duty to adjudicate an application that is not before the agency, and in the absence of a 

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duty there can be no claim for mandamus relief. Patel, 134 F.3d at 931. 

 In sum, Plaintiff has failed to show that the Court has jurisdiction to hear her 

challenges to the denials of her I-485 adjustment applications. 

B. Failure to State a Claim 

 Underlying Plaintiff’s APA claims is her contention that USCIS “unlawfully 

denied [her] second and third I-485 applications based on their unlawful revocation of 

Randolph Barclay’s approved I-130 application.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 63.) Specifically, Plaintiff 

contends that she was entitled to a NOIR before her former husband’s I-130 petition was 

revoked. In addition to the jurisdictional issues just discussed, the Court concludes this 

challenge to the revocation of Barclay’s I-130 petition fails to state a claim on which 

relief can be granted. 

 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a 

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged” under a cognizable 

legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 Under the APA, a court may set aside an agency action or decision if the court 

finds it to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 

with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). USCIS’s denial of Plaintiff’s adjustment application 

does not satisfy this standard. 

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 Plaintiff relies on Ilyabaev v. Kane, 847 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1173 (D.Ariz. 2012), to 

support her argument that she was entitled to notice before Barclay’s I-130 petition was 

revoked. The decision in Ilyabaev is distinguishable on both legal and factual grounds. 

 In Ilyabaev, the district court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction 

over a due process claim based on USCIS’s failure to provide notice to the beneficiary, 

Ilyabaev, prior to the revocation of the applicant-employer’s I-140 “skilled worker” visa 

and the denial of Ilyabaev’s I-485 application. The court rejected USCIS’s argument that 

only the applicant-employer was entitled to notice under 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i).7

 In 

the court’s view, Ilyabaev was also an “applicant” for purposes of the regulation and the 

lack of notice deprived him of an opportunity to rebut USCIS’s derogatory information 

that he lacked sufficient employment experience. Id. at 1177–78. 

 The Court has not located a case holding that a beneficiary is entitled to separate 

notice before the revocation of her spouse’s I-130 application. To the contrary, the 

regulations and the cases indicate that it is only the petitioner-applicant who must be 

notified of derogatory information. See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2, Matter of Calilao, 16 I. & N. 

Dec. 104, 106 (BIA 1977); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I. & N. Dec. 533, 536 (BIA 1988); 

Foul v. Mukasey, 256 Fed.Appx. 785, 789 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Matter of Ho, 19 I. & 

N. Dec. 582, 589 (BIA 1988) (“[T]he approval of a spousal visa petition vests no rights in 

the beneficiary of the petition.”). Moreover, only the petitioner has standing to appeal a 

 

7

 Section 103.2(b)(16)(i) provides that, “If the decision will be adverse to the 

applicant or petitioner and is based on derogatory information considered by the Service and of which the applicant or petitioner is unaware, he/she shall be advised of this fact and offered an opportunity to rebut the information and present information in his/her own behalf before the decision is rendered . . .” 

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visa petition denial to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(2); Matter of Sano, 19 I. & N. 

Dec. 299, 300 (BIA 1985). 

 In addition, in contrast to Ilyabaev, where Ilyabaev would have been able to rebut 

the derogatory information about his employment history if he had received notice, 

Plaintiff does not point to any derogatory information considered by USCIS of which she 

was unaware. See Nwauwa v. Holder, No. 120-C-2925, 2013 WL 842665, at *5 (N.D.Ill. 

March 6, 2013) (finding no due process violation because, “unlike in Ilyabaev [], plaintiff 

fails to allege that the decision was based on any information of which she was not 

aware.”). Moreover, as Defendants note, notwithstanding the INS’s failure to provide a 

NOIR before revoking Barclay’s I-130 petition on the grounds that the marriage was 

fraudulent, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to rebut those findings during her current 

husband’s proceedings, where the alleged fraudulence of her first marriage was also an 

issue. See Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 168, 1990 WL 385753 (explaining that 

where prior fraud is the basis for denying a subsequent I-130 petition, “the district 

director should not give conclusive effect to determinations made in a prior proceeding, 

but, rather, should reach his own independent conclusion based on the evidence before 

him.”). 

 Based on these circumstances, and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff does not 

state a claim under the APA based on USCIS’s failure to provide her notice before 

revoking Barclay’s I-130 petition. 

CONCLUSION 

 The Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for mandamus or 

declaratory relief or relief under the APA. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which 

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relief can be granted under the APA. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 

granted. Having granted the motion to dismiss, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s crossmotion for summary judgment. 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 14). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment (Doc. 23) and denying as moot Defendants’ motion to hold Plaintiff’s crossmotion in abeyance (Doc. 26). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this 

action. The Clerk is directed to close this case. 

 Dated this 21st day of April, 2014. 

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