Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01994/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01994-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 Although Defendant’s moving papers cite to Fed. R. Civ. P. 1

16(b), the Court presumes Defendant intended to move for

reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS JACQUES,

2:05-cv-01994-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s (“Allstate”) previous

Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part as to certain

claims, but denied as to Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation,

failure to accommodate, and punitive damages. Allstate now moves

this Court to reconsider its previous order, entered February 12,

2007, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) on the grounds of an 1

intervening change in controlling law, citing the recent

California Supreme Court decision in Green v. State, 

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 130 Filed 10/18/07 Page 1 of 8
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42 Cal. 4th 254, decided August 23, 2007. More specifically,

Defendant moves for reconsideration of the partial denial of

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation, failure

to accommodate, and punitive damages.

STANDARD

A court should be loathe to revisit its own decisions unless

extraordinary circumstances show that its prior decision was

clearly erroneous. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,

486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988). This principle is generally embodied

in the law of the case doctrine. That doctrine counsels against

reopening questions once resolved in ongoing litigation. Pyramid

Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 (9th

Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, under certain limited circumstances,

the court has discretion to reconsider its prior decisions. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) enumerates the grounds upon which a

motion for relief from an order or judgment may be made. It

specifies that:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the

court may relieve a party or a party’s legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence which by due diligence could not

have been discovered in time to move for a new trial

under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or

other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment

is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,

or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is

based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is

no longer equitable that the judgement should have

prospective application; or (6) any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

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3

Mere dissatisfaction with the court’s order, or belief that the

court is wrong in its decision, are not grounds for relief under

Rule 60(b).

Although not expressly provided for in the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, a court has the inherent

authority to reconsider its own orders. A motion for

reconsideration is appropriate if the court (1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence; (2) committed

clear error or the initial decision was manifestly

unjust or (3) decides that an intervening change in the

controlling law occurred.

School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the

trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441

(D.C. Cir. 1987). To succeed on a motion to reconsider, a party

must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to

induce the Court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., KernTulare Water District v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656,

665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other

grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Allstate contends the recent Green ruling requires Plaintiff

to prove he was a “qualified individual” in order to claim that

Defendant has in some way violated FEHA. Because Allstate argues

that an intervening change in the controlling law renders the

prior order incorrect, their Motion to Reconsider will be treated

as having been brought under Rule 60(b)(6). 

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4

This Court’s previous order stated that “[u]nlike the ADA, the

FEHA does not require that reasonable accommodation for

disability be made only where the person is ‘a qualified

individual’ able to perform the essential functions of the job.” 

Order at 19, n.2.

In Green, the court repeatedly cites California Government

Code section 12940(a), countering the plaintiff’s contention in

that case “that the employer bears the burden to prove that a

plaintiff employee is not qualified to sue under the FEHA.” 42

Cal. 4th at 257, 262, 264. This Court’s prior order, however,

addresses claims made under sections 12940 (m) and (n). 

Subdivision (m) “defines a separate and distinct unfair

employment practice independent of subdivision (a). Bagatti v.

Dep’t of Rehabilitation, 97 Cal. App. 4th 344, 361 (2002); Order

at 19, n.2. Subdivision (n) “provides an independent basis for

liability,” distinct from subdivision (a). Gelfo, 140 Cal. App.

4th at 61; Order at 19.

Subdivision (a) prohibits an employer from discharging or

refusing to hire any person due to reasons of physical disability

(among others), except where the employee is unable to perform

the essential duties even with reasonable accommodations. This

provision carries the implicit requirement that an employee must

show that he is a “qualified individual” capable of performing

his essential duties in order to avoid the permitted employer

action of termination or hiring refusal. In addition to placing

the burden of proof as to the qualification on the plaintiff,

this is the essential holding of Green. See Green, 42 Cal. 4th

at 267.

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Subdivision (m) of section 12940 mandates that the employer

make reasonable accommodations for the employee. Subdivision (n)

requires an employer to “engage in a timely, good faith,

interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine

effective reasonable accommodations, if any,” upon the request of

an employee with a known physical condition. An employer’s duty

under subdivision (m) “is inextricably linked” to its duty under

subdivision (n). Gelfo, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 61. An employer

must therefore “determine the extent of the individual’s

limitations, before an individual may be deemed unable to work.” 

Id. Requiring a plaintiff to show that they are a qualified

individual in order to seek relief for the employer’s failure to

engage in the interactive process runs counter to the demand of

subdivision (n), which dictates a proactive interchange between

employer and employee. Before a discharge or refusal to hire

occurs, and thus before the basis for a potential claim arises,

the employer must earnestly communicate with the employee to

determine qualification. Id.

It does not follow that an employer may successfully defend

its failure to comply with subdivisions (m) and (n) of section

12940 by asserting, long after the required bilateral dialogue

should have occurred, that the employee was not a qualified

individual. 

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 The distinction between an employee that is “known” to be 2

disabled per section 12940 (m)-(n) and one that is “merely

‘regarded as’” disabled per the discussion in Gelfo is not at

issue in this case.

6

Indeed, in Gelfo, the defendant’s argument, that “an employer

owes no duty to engage in a ‘futile’ discussion” with an employee

“to whom no duty of reasonable accommodation is or will be owed,”

was expressly rejected because of the essential nature of the

interactive process in accomplishing the goals underlying FEHA.2

Id. As a matter of policy, it is difficult to contemplate that

the California Legislature would have valued sparing employers

the relatively low cost of engaging in a “discussion” over the

much more substantial costs of potentially denying an entire

class of employees job opportunities for a lack of otherwise

reasonable accommodations. Therefore, it is not likely that the

holding in Green was intended to impose a “qualified individual”

requirement on actions brought under subdivisions (m) and (n) of

section 12940.

Further, in contrast to the numerous citations to

subdivision (a), the Green court discusses subdivision (m) of

section 12940 in only one paragraph of the entire opinion, and

then only to state that the Bagatti holding (which this Court

previously relied on) “provide[s] little guidance on the

qualification issue because it involved a cause of action for the

failure to accommodate under section 12940 subdivision (m).” 

Green, 42 Cal. 4th at 265. Indeed, the appellate court decision

reviewed in Green commented that “the parties focused solely on

the discrimination claim” pursuant to subdivision (a). 

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7

Green v. State, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 254, 264 (2005), rev’d, 42 Cal.

4th 254 (2007). Subdivision (n) of section 12940 is not

specifically addressed by the Supreme Court’s opinion.

Finally, Green makes no express effort to overrule,

disapprove, or otherwise negate the above cited precedents, nor

those cited in the prior Order. In fact, the court begins its

analysis by claiming that “California cases ... [have] nearly

unanimously presumed plaintiffs must prove ... that they are

qualified individuals under the FEHA in order to prevail.” 

Green, 42 Cal. 4th at 260. The contrasting opinions of Bagatti

and Gelfo regarding subdivisions (m) and (n) of section 12940 

provide further indication that the Supreme Court did not intend

to address failure to accommodate claims in Green.

Therefore, although the holding in Green contains

generalizations such as “we conclude that under the FEHA, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was qualified for the

position sought or held,” Id. at 267, given the court’s exclusive

treatment of subdivision (a) of section 12940, with no mention of

any other part save the one paragraph dismissing the relevance of

subdivision (m), it is far from clear that the ruling extends to

the entire section. Accordingly, this Court finds that it did

not commit clear error in its previous ruling, that no

intervening change in the controlling law occurred, and that the

reasons presented do not justify relief from the operation of its

judgment.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Allstate’s Motion for

Reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 18, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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