Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01060/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01060-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS HENDON

Plaintiff,

v.

RAMSEY, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 06CV1060 J (NLS)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION;

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS [DOC. NO.

28]; and

(3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT [DOC.

NO. 46].

Plaintiff Carlos Hendon (“Plaintiff”), a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), in which he alleges

that prison medical staff (“Defendants”) forcibly drugged him in violation of his civil rights. 

[Doc. No. 1.] On September 22, 2006, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint. [Doc. No. 28.] Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of

Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. [Doc. No. 36.] On November 17, 2006,

Case 3:06-cv-01060-CAB Document 49 Filed 04/12/07 Page 1 of 10
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Defendants filed their Objections to the R&R. [Doc. No. 43.] For the reasons set forth below,

the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES IN PART AND GRANTS IN PART Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss. Further, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. 

Background

Plaintiff is an inmate committed to the custody of the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”), and the events giving rise to the causes of action herein occurred when Plaintiff

was housed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”). (See Compl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff

named multiple Defendants in his Complaint, including Homer Ramsey, a psychiatrist at

RJDCF, Margo Parker, a psychologist at RJDCF, several registered nurses employed at the

prison, an unnamed medical contractor, a medical technical assistant, and various named RJDCF

correctional officers. (Id. ¶¶ 4-8.) 

According to the Complaint, Defendants Ramsey and Parker diagnosed Plaintiff as being

suicidal, psychotic, and a potential danger to others. As a result, Plaintiff received “mental

health crisis bed treatment.” (Id. ¶12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ramsey and Parker

prescribed psychotropic drugs and ordered the drugs to be forcibly administered to Plaintiff

against his will. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) Plaintiff alleges that these activities occurred during the

following periods: (1) November 14, 2003, to November 26, 2003; (2) May 7, 2004, to at least

July 13, 2004; and (3) other unknown dates. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant medical

contractor created or allowed the continuance of a policy that permitted physicians to forcibly

administer medication to an inmate with no immediate indications of violence. ( Id. ¶¶ 13, 22.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that the remaining Defendants, all part of the prison staff, aided in

forcibly medicating Plaintiff by extracting him from his cell and/or administering the medications to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff asserts that he suffered side effects from the administered

medications, including stiffness, a shuffling gait, weight gain, high blood pressure and cholesterol, dry mouth, hallucinations, and symptoms akin to having Parkinson’s disease. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was not afforded protections required by CDC policy, which mandates

that a prisoner be given notice and a hearing prior to the administration of long-term, involuntary

psychotropic drugs. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 16.) 

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Plaintiff alleges that the failure of Defendants Parker and Ramsey to follow CDC policy

before ordering the forcible administration of drugs constitutes a violation of Plaintiff’s right to

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and negligence under state law. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant medical contractor’s policy or custom permitting

physicians to determine when a nonviolent inmate should be forcibly drugged constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment, a violation of Plaintiff’s right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and negligence under state law. (Id. ¶ 22.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that

Defendants’ actions in forcibly drugging Plaintiff or in failing to prevent such drugging

constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a violation of Plaintiff’s right to due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment, and negligence under state law. (Id. ¶ 23.) 

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 

(See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 1.) Defendants further

argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed for failure to file a timely government

claim as required under California law. (See id.) 

Legal Standard

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth

in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).

Dismissal of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate only

where “ ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A complaint may be

dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2)

insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.

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2001). In reviewing the motion, the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and

must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Gompper v. VISX,

Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Discussion

Plaintiff contends in this Section 1983 action that Defendants forcibly 

drugged him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and state

negligence law. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) In response, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims should

be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff failed in

several respects to properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his Complaint. 

(See Defs.’ Mem. at 1.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims should be

dismissed for failure to file a timely government claim pursuant to the California Tort Claims

Act (“CTCA”). (See Defs.’ Mem. at 1.) For the reasons stated below, the Court ADOPTS the

R&R and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

Further, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint.

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The PLRA imposes an exhaustion requirement on prisoners bringing claims under 

Section 1983 or any other federal law “until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); Lira v.

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and

Defendants “have the burden of raising and proving exhaustion.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust non-judicial

remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. See id. at

1120. If the court determines that a plaintiff has failed to exhaust, dismissal without prejudice is

the appropriate remedy. See id.

The administrative appeals process for California inmates is set forth in Title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations, which provides that “[a]ny inmate . . . may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy received by those individuals as adversely affecting

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their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a) (2006). The process consists of four steps. 

First the inmate must attempt to informally resolve his or her problem with the staff member

involved. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5(a) (2006). Next, if unsuccessful, the inmate can

submit a formal grievance on the CDC inmate appeal form, called a 602 form. Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, § 3084.5(b). If denied at that level, the inmate can appeal to the second level of formal

review, which is conducted by the institution head or his or her designee. Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.5(c). The third and final level of formal review, called the “Director’s Level,” is

conducted by the Director of CDC or his or her designee. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. Operations

Manual § 54100.11 (1995); Nichols v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2004).

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff pursued his administrative remedies through the

third and final level of formal review. (See Objections to R&R at 3.) However, Defendants

argue that Plaintiff still failed to exhaust his federal claims because (1) his administrative

grievances did not name all of the Defendants presently named in the Complaint, and (2) his

administrative grievances did not contain all of the dates of alleged illegal conduct presently

listed in the Complaint. (See id. at 4-9.) 

A. Plaintiff was Not Required to Name All Defendants in His Administrative

Grievance to Satisfy the PLRA Exhaustion Requirement

Plaintiff alleged in his 602 form that he was forcibly drugged with anti-psychotic 

medications by Defendants Ramsey and Parker. (See Compl. App. A.) Plaintiff names an

additional seventeen Defendants in his Complaint. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6-8.) Defendants claim that

because Plaintiff named only Ramsey and Parker on his 602 form, he failed to properly exhaust

his administrative remedies against the seventeen other Defendants named in his Complaint. 

(See Objections to R&R at 4.) As such, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be

dismissed as to the seventeen additional individuals. (See id.)

 To “properly” exhaust his administrative remedies, a prisoner must “complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules.” Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006). Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to “properly exhaust.”

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With respect to the level of specificity required in a prisoner grievance, the Supreme

Court recently held that a prisoner need not identify all of the defendants named in his lawsuit

during the administrative grievance process. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-

23 (2007); see also Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005). Following denial of

his prison grievances for inadequate medical care, the plaintiff in Jones, an inmate of the

Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), filed a Section 1983 action, naming as

defendants several individuals not named during the grievance process. Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 917.

 The district court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

because he had not identified any of the defendants named in his lawsuit during the grievance

process; the Sixth Circuit upheld the ruling. The Supreme Court, however, held that in the

absence of a prison grievance procedure mandating the naming of each individual, the Sixth

Circuit rule imposing such a prerequisite to proper exhaustion was unwarranted. Id. at 923. The

MDOC grievance form did not require a prisoner to identify a particular responsible party. 

Because the administrative appeals system did not require the prisoner to identify all potential

defendants by name, his failure to do so was not fatal to his attempts to satisfy 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(a). See id. at 922-23. As stated by the Court, “it is the prison’s requirements, and not

the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. at 923. 

Similar to the grievance form in Jones, the 602 form used to initiate a CDC grievance

does not require an inmate to name or identify specific persons. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §

3085.2(a)(1). The 602 form requires an inmate only to describe the problem and the action

which is requested. See id. Thus, because the CDC’s own regulations do not require the

prisoner to identify all potential defendants by name in the grievance, the PLRA cannot impose

such a requirement as a prerequisite to exhaustion. See Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 923. As such, the

Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as to all Defendants other

than Ramsey and Parker.

//

//

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B. Plaintiff was Not Required to Identify All Dates in His Administrative Grievance to Satisfy the PLRA Exhaustion Requirement

In his original 602 form, Plaintiff alleged that he was forcibly drugged with anti-psychotic

drugs from May 7, 2004, through July 13, 2004. (See Compl. App. A.) However, in his

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was forcibly drugged on additional occasions at RJDCF,

including November 14, 2003, to November 26, 2003, and other periods of “indeterminate

lengths beg[inning] on March 25, 2004; April 6, 2004; and other unknown dates.” (Compl. ¶

14.) Defendants claim that because Plaintiff identified only the period of May 7, 2004, through

July 13, 2004, on his 602 form, he did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies with

regard to the additional periods of time listed in his Complaint. (See Objections to R&R at 9.) 

As such, Defendants move to dismiss the portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint relating to any period

other than May 7, 2004, through July 13, 2004, for failure to properly exhaust. (See id.)

To “properly” exhaust, a prisoner must “complete the administrative review process in

accordance with the applicable procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. at 2386. Thus,

the “level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary

from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA,

that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 923; see also Holley v.

Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12683, at *20-21 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2007) (“[I]f an

administrative appeals system does not require a prisoner to itemize or specify the legal theories

under which he intends to proceed should he pursue a lawsuit, his failure to do so is not fatal to

his attempts to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.”). Here, the 602 form does not require a

prisoner to specify all dates for which he or she is seeking redress. The applicable regulations

instruct California prisoners to use the required form and to “describe the problem and action

requested,” but they do not require any specific content. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§

3084.2(a), 3085.2(a)(1). Thus, because the CDC’s own regulations do not require prisoners to

specify all incident dates in the grievance, the PLRA cannot impose such a requirement as a

prerequisite to exhaustion. See Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 923. 

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Defendants argue that “each occurrence is a separate and unique incident with its own set

of operative facts and circumstances,” and therefore Plaintiff should have specified the period of

time for each incident in his 602 form. (See Objections to R&R at 9.) However, the basic

premise of the exhaustion requirement is to put prison officials on notice of any potential Section

1983 claims to the extent consistent with what an administrative grievance procedure requires. 

See Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 923. All that the CDC’s regulations require is that Plaintiff “describe the

problem and action requested.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.2(a), 3085.2(a)(1). 

Regardless of the additional dates of injury alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff’s 602 form

and Complaint contain the same set of facts describing the official conduct at issue. Plaintiff’s

602 form therefore gave prison officials sufficient notice of the potential Section 1983 claims

that could arise from the alleged illegal conduct. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for any period other than May 7, 2004, through July 13,

2004. 

II. Compliance with the California Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligent under California state law. (Compl. ¶¶

19-20.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed for failure to file

a timely government claim pursuant to the CTCA, Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 900 et seq. (Defs.’ Mem.

at 1.) 

The CTCA provides that a plaintiff may not bring a state law tort claim against a public

entity for money or damages until “a written claim therefore has been presented to the public

entity and has been acted upon by the [governing body of the local public entity], or has been

deemed to have been rejected by the [governing body].” Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4 (West 2007). 

Further, a plaintiff is required to allege facts in his complaint sufficient to demonstrate or excuse

compliance with the claim presentation requirement as a condition precedent to the maintenance

of an action. See Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995);

California v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1240, 1243 (2004). 

A tort claim against a state public entity or its employees must be presented to the

California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board no more than six months after

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the cause of action accrues. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2 (West 2007). A cause of action

against a public employee for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his or her

employment is barred if an action against the employing public entity is barred. See Cal. Gov’t.

Code § 950.2 (West 2007).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not satisfy the CTCA with respect to his state law

negligence claims. Even when construed as liberally as possible by the Court, Plaintiff’s

statement in Paragraph 11 of his Complaint that “the time limit has elapsed for the State Board’s

Response to Hendon’s administrative tort claim” is insufficient to demonstrate compliance with

the CTCA. Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts establishing when the claim was made, nor

does he attach proof to his Complaint that any claim was filed. Accordingly, this Court

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismisses these claims

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

III. Leave to Amend the Complaint

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. [Doc. No. 46.] 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that leave to amend a complaint “shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Unless it is absolutely clear that

amendments to the complaint cannot cure its deficiencies, a pro se litigant must be given leave to

amend, and the district court must give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. 

See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Here,

Plaintiff can cure the deficiencies in his state law claim if he adds sufficient facts to his Complaint establishing the date on which he submitted an administrative claim, if he attaches proof

that such a claim was made, or if he alleges facts sufficient to excuse compliance with the claim

presentation requirement. Because there is at least some possibility that Plaintiff can correct the

defects in his Complaint, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS IN PART

AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff thirty

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(30) days from the date stamped “Filed” on this Order to file a First Amended Complaint which

addresses each pleading deficiency noted above. The Amended Complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to the original Complaint. See Local Rule 15.1. All claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 12, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Stormes

 All Parties

 

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