Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00251/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00251-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kelly F. Riehle, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Bank of America, N.A., et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-13-00251-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Defendant Bank of America’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11), 

Defendant EverBank’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) and Request for Judicial Notice 

(Doc. 14-1), Plaintiff’s Response, and the Replies. For the following reasons, both 

Motions will be granted, and Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed without prejudice. 

I. Background 

In June 2009, Plaintiff Kelly Riehle (Ms. Riehle) purchased a property in 

Glendale, Arizona, financed by a loan in the amount of $191,422 from Security National 

Mortgage Company. The loan was secured by a deed of trust. Defendant Bank of 

America, N.A. (Bank of America) acquired the loan in August 12, 2010, and serviced the 

loan from that time until December 2011. Defendant EverBank acquired the loan from 

Bank of America on December 5, 2011. At some point, Ms. Riehle, allegedly at the 

invitation of Bank of America, stopped making her mortgage payment and defaulted on 

the loan. EverBank substituted David W. Cowles as the trustee on October 1, 2012, and 

the trustee noticed a trustee’s sale on October 5, 2012, to be held on January 7, 2013. 

Ms. Riehle filed an application for a temporary restraining order without notice to halt the 

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trustee’s sale on January 4, 2013. At a hearing held on January 7, 2013, the state court 

denied Ms. Riehle’s application for temporary restraining order. The trustee’s sale was 

held on January 9, 2013, at which EverBank purchased the property. Ms. Riehle filed 

this lawsuit, along with a notice of lis pendens, in Maricopa County Superior Court. 

Bank of America then removed the action to this Court. 

II. Legal Standard 

To state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a plaintiff must make “‘a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in 

order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 

omitted). This “short and plain statement” must also be “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 679. A claim is plausible if it contains “[f]actual allegations 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555, and to permit a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct 

alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all 

of Plaintiffs’ plausible factual allegations as true and construes the pleadings in a light 

most favorable to them. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). The 

principle that a court accepts as true all of the allegations in a complaint does not, 

however, apply to legal conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 

678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Rather, the plaintiff must at least “allege 

sufficient facts to state the elements of [the relevant] claim.” Johnson v. Riverside 

Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Fraud claims must meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 9(b), which requires enough specificity to give a defendant notice of the 

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particular misconduct to be able to defend against the charge. Bly–Magee v. 

California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). To satisfy 

this specificity requirement, “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the misconduct 

must be alleged. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, factual 

allegations must include “the time, place, and specific content of the false representations 

as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG 

LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff must set forth what is false or 

misleading about a statement, and why it is false. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 

1541, 1548 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc). Where the allegations in support of a claim fail to 

satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), the claim is subject to 

dismissal. Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). 

On a motion to dismiss, a court generally does not look beyond the pleadings. In 

addition to the complaint itself, a court may consider material which is properly 

submitted as part of the complaint on a motion to dismiss without converting the motion 

into one for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th 

Cir. 2001). However, a court may consider material beyond the pleadings on a motion to 

dismiss when documents are described in a complaint, the documents’ authenticity is not 

contested, and the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies on them. Id. A court may also 

take judicial notice of matters of public record under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, and 

consider those public records on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 689. Courts do not have to 

accept alleged facts as true when they contradict those matters subject to judicial notice. 

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engraver, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1956). 

III. Analysis 

A. EverBank 

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege the acts of each individual involved in 

the alleged events so that it is clear which defendant must answer each of the allegations. 

A plaintiff may not collectively accuse multiple defendants of committing misdeeds 

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through the expedience of the title “Defendants.” Such group pleading is not allowed.

Ms. Riehle’s Complaint lumps together EverBank and Bank of America without 

clearly defining allegations of EverBank’s wrongs or distinguishing the alleged actions of 

EverBank from those of Bank of America. The only allegations in the Complaint that 

could pertain to EverBank are those that refer to “Defendants” generally. (Doc. 1-1 ¶23, 

26-28, 31-32, 34-36, 39-41.) As a result, the proposed amended complaint fails to 

comply with Rule 8(a)(2) with respect to EverBank because it fails to give fair notice of 

the claims against EverBank with requisite specificity. In addition, for the reasons 

described below, Ms. Riehle fails to state a claim against EverBank even if the Court 

were to allow her group pleading. As a result, EverBank’s Motion will be granted. 

B. Count I: Violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act 

Ms. Riehle alleges that Bank of America and EverBank violated Arizona’s 

Consumer Fraud Act, A.R.S. § 44-1522(A). That Act prohibits the use of “any 

deception, deceptive act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise, 

misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact with 

intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection 

with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise.” A.R.S. § 44-1522(A). To establish a 

violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, a plaintiff must show a false promise or 

misrepresentation made in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise and 

consequent and proximate injury resulting from the false promise. Kuehn v. Stanley, 208 

Ariz. 124, 129, 91 P.3d 346, 351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). An injury occurs when a 

consumer relies, even unreasonably, on false or misrepresented information. Id. Because 

a claim brought under the Consumer Fraud Act is a fraud claim for the purposes of Rule 

9, discussed above, such a claim must state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake. Bergdale v. Countrywide Bank FSB, CV-12-8057-PCTGMS, 2013 WL 105295 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2013). 

Ms. Riehle alleges in her Complaint that Bank of America told her “that in order 

to modify her loan Plaintiff would need to cease making her mortgage payment and 

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afterward could submit a modification package for [Bank of America’s] review and 

approval.” (Doc. 1-1 ¶18.) Taking all of the allegations in her complaint as true and 

drawing all inferences in her favor, Ms. Riehle’s first claim is based on allegations that 

Bank of America misrepresented that she needed to stop making payments to qualify 

under one of the federal loan modification programs and that she stopped making 

payments based on that advice. (Doc. 17 at 5-6.) Ms. Riehle also alleges that Bank of 

America did not inform her that if she defaulted on the loan, that Bank of America would 

foreclose on the loan. 

Ms. Riehle has not alleged that Bank of America made a false promise or 

representation on which she relied to her detriment. None of Ms. Riehle’s fraud 

allegations even approach the heightened pleading standard required by Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 9(b). Far from alleging “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the 

fraudulent misconduct, Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997), Ms. Riehle 

provides only conclusory allegations that Bank of America’s representations with respect 

to loan modifications were deceptive. But she does not explain what makes Bank of 

America’s statement that she could submit a loan modification application package after 

she stopped making payments a false promise or representation. According to the 

Complaint, Ms. Riehle did submit an application for modification of her loan, following 

Bank of America’s guidance. (Doc. 1-1 ¶20.) Nothing in the Complaint suggests that 

Bank of America affirmatively promised she would be granted a loan modification, so the 

fact that Bank of America did not approve her application does not state a claim. 

To the extent that her Complaint is based on allegations that Bank of America 

failed to approve that modification after promising one, Ms. Riehle has also failed to state 

a claim. Bank of America was under no obligation under the Home Affordable Mortgage 

Program (HAMP) to provide a loan modification to Plaintiffs, and no private cause of 

action exists against a lender for failing to modify a loan. Cleveland v. Aurora Loan 

Services, LLC, C 11-0773 PJH, 2011 WL 2020565 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2011). Ms. 

Riehle therefore cannot state a claim based on Bank of America’s alleged failure to 

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modify her loan after suggesting that she stop making payments and submit a 

modification package. 

The core of Ms. Riehle’s Complaint seems to be that Bank of America entered 

into a Consent Judgment with the State of Arizona in which Bank of America agreed not 

to simultaneously attempt foreclosure proceedings if it was negotiating a modification, 

and violated that Consent Judgment with her loan. These allegations fail to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted for two reasons. First, Ms. Riehle does not have 

standing to bring an action to enforce the Consent Judgment, which explicitly set forth 

that it did not confer on any third party any right or remedy. (Doc. 11 at 4.) Second, 

Bank of America did not foreclose on Ms. Riehle’s loan. According to the allegations in 

her Complaint and to the public records that describe her loan, EverBank acquired her 

loan in December 2011. The Notice of Trustee’s Sale was not recorded until October 5, 

2012. Bank of America therefore played no role in Ms. Riehle’s foreclosure, and her 

loan modification negotiations with Bank of America could not have been grounds for 

any delay of EverBank’s independent decision to foreclose on the loan based on Ms. 

Riehle’s default. 

Finally, to the extent that Ms. Riehle has based her first claim on Bank of 

America’s alleged failure to inform her that her loan was subject to foreclosure if she 

stopped making her payments, she has also failed to state a claim. Nothing in the 

Complaint, however, suggests that Bank of America made any representation that 

foreclosure would not be a consequence of her default. Ms. Riehle does claim that Bank 

of America breached its agreement with Arizona (Doc. 1-1 ¶31), but for reasons 

described above that cannot state a claim. There is no allegation that Bank of America 

agreed with Ms. Riehle herself not to foreclose on the loan if she defaulted. Indeed, the 

Deed of Trust Ms. Riehle signed is clear that foreclosure is one possible consequence of 

default. (Doc 14-2 at 5.) Bank of America’s alleged failure to remind Ms. Riehle of this 

possible consequence does not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. For all 

of the reasons, Count I will be dismissed. 

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C. Count II: Injunctive Relief 

In her second count, Ms. Riehle requests an injunction “requiring Defendants to 

stop the trustee’s sale.” (Doc. 1-1 at 25.) The Complaint states no basis for an injunction 

apart from the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, which does not state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. In any event, the request for an injunction preventing the trustee’s 

sale is moot because the trustee’s sale has already occurred. 

D. Leave to Amend 

Leave to amend a complaint that fails to state a claim should be freely given 

“when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). And the Ninth Circuit has instructed 

district courts to grant leave to amend when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim 

“unless the court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegations of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Ms. Riehle will be granted leave 

to amend her Complaint, if she chooses, to address the deficiencies identified in this 

order. Any such amended complaint must be filed by May 3, 2013. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDRED that Defendant Bank of America’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 11) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant EverBank’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

14) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant EverBank’s Request for Judicial 

Notice (Doc. 14-1) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with leave to 

file an amended complaint by May 3, 2013. 

// 

// 

// 

// 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff elects not to file an amended 

complaint by May 3, 2013, her claims will be dismissed with prejudice, and the lis 

pendens in Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CV2013-050171 quashed, and the 

Clerk shall terminate this action without further order of the Court. 

 Dated this 17th day of April, 2013. 

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