Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02304/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02304-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GLASSMAN, MORRIS JACOBS,

MICHAEL HALL, IGNACIA REYES,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SAN FRANCISCO CITY & COUNTY,

ELSON HAO, JIM WACHOB, ALAN

DeGUZMAN, TOM HIDAYAT,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-02304 WHA

ORDER GRANTING 

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination action, defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’

twice-amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants,

the City and County of San Francisco and four city employees, again move on the grounds that

plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations. This order finds that plaintiffs’ claims

accrued well more than one year prior to the filing of their complaint, and that plaintiffs have

still not alleged sufficient facts to support a theory of equitable estoppel of the time bar. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. As plaintiffs have been given ample

opportunity to cure the deficiencies in their complaint, this dismissal is with prejudice.

STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Richard Glassman, Morris Jacobs, Michael Hall and Ignacia Reyes were

applicants for positions as electrical transit system mechanics (“7371 positions”) in the

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 35 Filed 09/14/06 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

maintenance division of the San Francisco’s Municipal Transportation Agency (“MUNI”). 

Plaintiff Glassman applied for a 7371 position in June 2000 and was disqualified in November

2000, purportedly on grounds that he failed to provide a written verification of his prior work

experience (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff Jacobs’ application for a 7371 position was

similarly rejected in October 2000 on grounds that he failed to provide a written verification of

his work history (id. at ¶ 7). Plaintiff Reyes’ application for a 7371 position was also allegedly

rejected in November 2000 for failure to provide a written verification of work experience

(id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff Hall applied for a 7371 position in October 2000 and allegedly never

received notification that his application was rejected (id. ¶ 8).

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants discriminated on the basis of race by giving

preferential treatment to Asian and Filipino applicants for the7371 positions. In 2001,

defendants purportedly hired several Asian and Filipino applicants who did not meet the

minimum qualifications for the job. Plaintiffs also contended that defendants modified the

requirements for 7371 positions in late 2000, purportedly to make it easier for candidates who

were Asian or Filipino. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants failed to provide sufficient

information about the 7371 positions and the requirements for the positions to non-Asian and

non-Filipino candidates.

This action is related to and contains similar allegations to an earlier-filed action,

Lukovsky, et al. v. City of San Francisco, et al., Case No. C 05-00389 WHA. On January 17,

2006, this Court issued an order in that action denying class certification in the Lukovsky action. 

The claims were thus to proceed individually. The January 17 order, however, allowed the

Lukovsky plaintiffs’ counsel to send letters to other individuals who would potentially have

similar claims against the city and county, so that all such claims could be tried by the same

judge. The Lukovsky action was terminated on August 14, 2006, pursuant to the parties’

stipulated dismissal and judgment.

The four plaintiffs in this action responded to the letters of Lukovsky counsel, and chose

to be jointly represented by her. Plaintiffs here have identified the letter from Lukovsky counsel

as the event that notified them of the potential for an action.

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 35 Filed 09/14/06 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 In addition to the July 31 order issued in this action, this Court also issued an order in the Lukovsky

action on July 17, 2006, granting partial summary judgment with respect to similar limitations issues. That

order is useful as a reference, but does not control the outcome in this separate action.

3

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 31, 2006, alleging the above acts of

discrimination under 42 U.S.C 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an

amended complaint on June 14, 2006. On July 31, 2006, this Court issued an order dismissing

plaintiffs’ action without prejudice. The July 31 order found that all four of plaintiffs’ claims

were time-barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations under these civil-rights

statutes. The July 31 order concluded (July 31 Order at 7):

Plaintiffs must allege more to avoid dismissal of claims that

accrued five years before the filing of their complaint. This order

grants plaintiffs a further opportunity to amend the complaint so

as to plead sufficient allegations of equitable estoppel. This will

be plaintiffs’ final opportunity to amend.

On August 8, 2006, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The second amended

complaint only added two paragraphs to the first amended complaint, expanding on their

contention that they relied on defendants’ misrepresentations about the qualifications for the

7371 positions in failing to bring this action for over five years (Second Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 22,

39). Defendants now move to dismiss the second amended complaint.1

ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) tests for legal sufficiency of the claims

alleged in the complaint. A complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). On the other hand, “conclusory

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). A

court has discretion to grant dismissal without leave to amend if “it determines that the pleading

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). That discretion is “particularly broad” where, as here, a court

has previously given a party the opportunity to amend. Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992,

1003 (9th Cir. 2002).

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 35 Filed 09/14/06 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Section 1981 was amended in 1990 so as to include a four-year limitations period for certain actions. 

This limitations period, however, does not apply to those actions which were cognizable under the pre-1990

version of Section 1981. Id. at 974 n. 5 (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004)). 

Plaintiffs’ Section 1981 claim for failure to hire would have been cognizable under the pre-1990 version. 

See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180–82 (1989).

3

 To be clear, there is no question that the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred in 2000. This is a

separate issue from when plaintiffs’ claims accrued, which is discussed infra.

4

Defendants move to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims on grounds that the claims are

time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations. Much of this analysis is similar to that

contained in the July 31 order, given that plaintiffs’ second amended complaint added little to

the first amended complaint.

“Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) ‘only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.’” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987,

991 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

1. APPLICABLE LIMITATIONS PERIOD.

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is one year. Where, as here,

the relevant statutes do not contain their own statutes of limitations, “courts borrow the most

appropriate state statute of limitations.” Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974

(9th Cir. 2004).2

 Accordingly, the appropriate California statute of limitations must be adopted

for plaintiffs’ claims under Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. Courts have deemed the

statute of limitations for personal-injury claims to be appropriate for these civil-rights statutes. 

See Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 1993) (“California’s

one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs claims brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985”); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2006). 

California amended its statute of limitations for personal injury claims from one to two years in

January 2003. Compare Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(3) with Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 355.1. The

modified statute, however, applies only to acts occurring after January 2003. See, e.g.,

Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 705 n. 32.3

 Plaintiffs’ claims, therefore, must satisfy the one-year statute

of limitations provided for in Section 340(3).

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 35 Filed 09/14/06 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Plaintiffs appear to have dropped their argument from the earlier motion to dismiss that under

Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1991), federal courts use state law for the question of when a

plaintiff should have known of the existence of their claims. As explained in the July 31 order, under Olsen, it

is an inaccurate statement of law that the accrual analysis in federal court “borrows” from state law. In any

event, the distinction is academic. Federal law builds in this “discovery rule,” as was explained clearly by the

Seventh Circuit in Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990), a case that has been

relied upon by both parties.

5

2. WHEN PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ACCRUED.

The remaining issues are whether plaintiffs’ claims accrued more than one year before

they filed their initial complaint on March 31, 2006 and, if so, whether defendants are

nevertheless equitably estopped from relying on the limitations defense.

“Although state law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law

determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916,

926 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). “[A] claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or

has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Ibid. (internal citation

omitted). “Under federal law, ‘a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know

of the injury which is the basis of the action.’” Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir.

2002) (quoting Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also

Aronsen v. Crown Zellerbach, 662 F.2d 584, 593 (9th Cir. 1981) ( “inquiry for purposes of

determining when the limitations period begins to run must center on the date when the

employee has notice of the unlawful act”).4

Plaintiffs argue that their claims did not accrue until February 3, 2006, the date that they

received a letter from counsel in the Lukovsky action about the nature of those proceedings. 

This order again finds otherwise.

The claims of plaintiffs Glassman, Jacobs and Reyes all accrued in October or

November 2000. Each of these plaintiffs was formally notified of the rejection of their

application at that time. All three of these plaintiffs were told the basis for rejection during at

that time, which was failure to provide a written verification of relevant work history. The

notification letters served as a final statement of Muni’s position with respect to these plaintiffs’

job applications. See, e.g., Olsen, 363 F.3d at 927 (“We hold that Olsen’s claim accrued when

she received the February 4, 1999 letter notifying her of the Board’s proposal to deny her

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 35 Filed 09/14/06 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

license reinstatement. The letter was ‘adequately final and represented the [Board’s] official

position’”) (internal citation omitted).

Although there is less precision as to the date on which plaintiff Hall’s claims accrued,

there is no doubt that they accrued years before plaintiffs’ initial complaint in this action. As

stated above, Hall alleged that he never received any notification from MUNI that his 7371

application was rejected. The lack of a formal notification letter, however, does not yield a

meaningfully different accrual date than the other plaintiffs. It is reasonable to assume that Hall

was aware that MUNI selected another candidate for the 7371 position by 2001, the time by

which a successful candidate for the 7371 position would have begun working for MUNI. 

Plaintiff Hall knew or should have known by early 2001 that MUNI had taken the final position

of denying his application.

Each of the plaintiffs’ claims, therefore, accrued at least five years prior to the filing of

their complaint — well in excess of the one-year limitations period. Plaintiffs’ argument that

they did not know until other related plaintiffs filed a complaint, flies in the face of the purpose

of having statutes of limitations. If claims did not accrue until similarly situated individuals

brought suit, the statute of limitations could be tolled virtually indefinitely until the first

plaintiff exerted marginal diligence in bringing the claims to light, rendering defendants

permanently subject to possible suit. Here, plaintiffs have not alleged that they exerted any

effort to investigate their purported claims, despite knowing for years of the rejection of their

7371 applications.

3. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

Thus, absent equitable repose, plaintiffs’ claims were time barred by late 2001 or early

2002. Plaintiffs are correct that “[i]n civil rights suits, this court applies state tolling rules as

long as they ‘are not inconsistent with federal law.’” Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706 n.

34 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). “Equitable estoppel, also termed fraudulent

concealment, halts the statute of limitations when there is ‘active conduct by a defendant, above

and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff’s claim is filed, to prevent the plaintiff

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 35 Filed 09/14/06 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

from suing in time.’” Id. at 706 (internal citation omitted). Under California law, the elements

of equitable estoppel are:

(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) that

party must intend that his or her conduct be acted on, or must so

act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it

was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be

ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) the party asserting the

estoppel must reasonably rely on the conduct to his or her injury.

Honig v. San Francisco Planning Dep’t, 127 Cal. App. 4th 520, 529 (2005); see also Lantzy v.

Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 383 (2003). Plaintiffs here pled insufficient facts in their

second amended complaint to support any possible application of equitable estoppel.

Plaintiffs did allege that defendants knew of the discrimination. Plaintiffs also alleged

that they were unaware of the purported discrimination until they received notice from counsel

in the Lukovsky action. They have thus satisfied the first and third factors of equitable estoppel

under California law.

Plaintiffs, however, still have not identified any relevant misrepresentations by

defendants upon which plaintiffs relied, or upon which defendants intended to induce reliance,

such that plaintiffs were inhibited from investigating and bringing the instant lawsuit sooner

than in five years.

Plaintiffs contend that defendants induced them not to sue by informing plaintiffs that

they had “no right to appeal” the negative hiring decisions. This is not the type of

misrepresentation that satisfies the test for equitable estoppel. Defendants’ misrepresentations

or conduct must have “actually and reasonably induced plaintiffs to forbear suing.” Lantzy, 31

Cal. 4th at 385 (emphasis in original). Even if plaintiffs could have appealed the hiring

determination, such an administrative appeal would not have “obviated the need for suit” on

grounds of racial discrimination. Ibid; see also Vu v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.,

26 Cal. 4th 1142, 1152 (2001) (“a denial of coverage, even if phrased as a ‘representation’ that

the policy does not cover the insure’s claim, or words to that effect, offers no grounds for

estopping the insurer from raising a statute of limitations defense”).

Plaintiffs also make the untenable argument that defendants are equitably estopped

because they misrepresented the “fact” that differential standards were applied to Asian and

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 35 Filed 09/14/06 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Filipino applicants as compared to non-Asian and non-Filipino applicants (Second Amd.

Compl. ¶¶ 22, 39). Of course defendants have denied this allegation and continue to do

so — that is, they have denied and continued to deny that they hired in a discriminatory fashion

in violation of the civil-rights statutes in issue. Plaintiffs’ latest argument is essentially that

because defendants denied liability, they are equitably estopped from relying on the statute of

limitations. This plainly contradicts well-established law. “The defendant’s statement or

conduct must amount to a misrepresentation bearing on the necessity of bringing a timely suit;

the defendant’s mere denial of legal liability does not set up an estoppel.” Lantzy, 31 Cal. 4th

at 384 n. 18 (emphasis in original). Defendants’ continued denial of racial discrimination in the

7371 hiring process amounts to nothing more than such a denial of legal liability.

* * *

As the Supreme Court has explained, “[s]tatutes of limitations are not simply

technicalities. On the contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered

judicial system.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487

(1980). Plaintiffs’ claims here are time barred. Plaintiffs apparently failed to do any

investigation into the 7371 hiring until after other plaintiffs already filed actions. They

essentially let their purported claims sit for five years without the slightest inquiry. Such delay

undoubtedly prejudices defendants ability to mount a defense, given the inevitabilities of fading

memories, loss of evidence, and changing personnel. To expect the City, County and their

employees to defend such a stale action would ignore the very value of a statute of limitations.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Judgment will

be entered accordingly. Finding no further argument necessary, the hearing on this motion is

hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2006. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-02304-WHA Document 35 Filed 09/14/06 Page 8 of 8