Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01024/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01024-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHAUNCEY REENE SIMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. SATHER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-01024-WHO (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Dkt. No. 43

INTRODUCTION 

Chauncey Simpson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, alleges in this federal civil 

rights action that his jailors at Soledad State Prison rendered constitutionally inadequate 

dental care. Defendants assert that this 42 U.S.C. section 1983 suit is barred by Simpson’s 

failure to exhaust his claims through the prison’s administrative grievance process. 

Simpson does not dispute the material facts showing that he did not complete the 

exhaustion process as required by prison regulations. Instead, he asserts that his failure to 

exhaust should be excused. 

A prerequisite to exhaustion of the administrative grievance procedure of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is that the grievant sit for 

a face-to-face interview on his claim. 15 C.C.R. § 3084.7(e). Simpson refused to do so on 

both claims. Accordingly, he failed to exhaust, and his failure to do so cannot be excused. 

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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Background 

 The following factual allegations are undisputed unless specifically noted 

otherwise. 

Simpson alleges that in 2007 and 2008 employees of Soledad State Prison 

(defendants K. Sather, David Varela, and Nguyen-Dinh) failed to provide him with 

constitutionally adequate dental care. He filed two inmates grievances containing such 

allegations, one in 2010 (HCARTS Log # CTF HC 10002597/CTF HC 11034792), and the 

other in 2011 (HCARTS Log # CTF HC 11034998). (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ”) at 

3, 4.) 

In the first, he alleged that defendant Nguyen-Dinh caused him unnecessary pain 

when he extracted two teeth. He also alleged that dental staff failed to treat his swollen 

gums. As part of the grievance review, the Health Care Appeals Office scheduled an 

interview between Dr. Marlais and Simpson. (MSJ, Robinson Decl. ¶ 7.) Simpson refused 

to participate in the interview, and his appeal was consequently cancelled. (Id. ¶ 8.) He 

was informed of the cancellation, the reasons for it, and given instructions that he had to 

file a new grievance to challenge the cancellation before he could appeal the merits of his 

health care claims. He was later sent a letter which incorrectly informed him that he could 

appeal the cancellation by completing a certain section of the form and submitting it to the 

second level of review. (Id.) The second level reviewer rejected the appeal because the 

grievance had been cancelled at the first level. (Id. ¶ 9.) After Simpson was informed that 

his appeal had been rejected, he was correctly informed that he had to file a new and 

separate grievance in order to appeal the cancellation. (Id.) Rather than doing so, he sent 

his cancelled and rejected appeal to the Office of Third Level Appeals, which rejected it 

because it had been cancelled at the first level. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

In the second grievance, filed a year later, Simpson alleged that since 2007, he had 

received inadequate dental care. (Id. ¶ 13.) He again refused to agree to an interview (this 

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one with Nguyen-Dinh, who was the subject of his prior grievance), and his appeal was 

again cancelled. (Id.) He did not pursue the grievance or file another grievance to appeal 

the cancellation. (Id.) 

II. Motion for Summary Judgment on Grounds of Exhaustion 

Defendants assert that Simpson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior 

to filing this federal civil rights action. Defendants have properly raised this issue through 

a motion for summary judgment, Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), 

and have given Simpson the required warnings about opposing such a motion (Docket 

No. 45). 

A. Summary Judgment Standard 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits 

demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those 

which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of 

a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the 

moving party. On an issue for which the opposing party by contrast will have the burden 

of proof at trial the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence 

to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. 

The Court is only concerned with disputes over material facts and “factual disputes 

that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is 

not the task of the Court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. 

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden 

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of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary 

judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

B. Exhaustion Standard 

Prisoners must exhaust properly their administrative remedies before filing suit in 

federal court. “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 

U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and is no longer left to the 

discretion of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 

An inmate’s obligation to exhaust persists as long as some remedy is available; 

when that is no longer the case, the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance. Brown 

v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prison’s requirements define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The 

exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise 

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Ngo, 548 U.S. at 84. 

The State of California provides its prisoners the right to appeal administratively 

“any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the [CDCR] or its staff that the 

inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, 

safety, or welfare.” 15 C.C.R. § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative 

remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: 

(1) informal review, submitted on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form; (2) first formal level 

appeal, to an institution appeals coordinator; (3) second formal level appeal, to the 

institution warden; and (4) third formal level appeal, to the Director of the CDCR. See 

15 C.C.R. § 3084.7; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1264–65 (9th Cir. 2009). A final 

decision from the Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under 

§ 1997e(a). Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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At least one face-to-face interview with the inmate is required at the first level of 

review. 15 C.C.R. § 3084.7(e). If the inmate refuses to be interviewed or to cooperate 

with the interviewer, the appeal may be cancelled. Id. § 3084.6(c)(8). Although a 

cancelled appeal may not be submitted for further review, the inmate may separately 

appeal the cancellation. Id. § 3084.6(e). A cancelled appeal does not exhaust 

administrative remedies. Id. § 3084.1(b). 

C. Simpson’s Use of the Exhaustion Process

Simpson refused to sit for the face-to-face interview on either claim, which made it 

impossible for him to complete the exhaustion process. He contends that the exhaustion 

requirement should be excused because (1) appeals are never granted, (2) he and other 

inmates should not be required to challenge a cancellation, rather than pursuing a 

grievance on the merits, (3) the cancellations serve to exhaust his remedies, and (4) he 

objected to being interviewed by Nguyen-Dinh, who was the subject of one of his 

grievances. (Pl.’s Opp. to MSJ at 3, 4, 5.) None of these reasons has merit. 

Simpson’s first argument, that the process is futile, does not excuse a requirement 

firmly and clearly established by statute and reinforced by case law. Exhaustion is 

mandatory, regardless of Simpson’s belief about its efficacy. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 

Ngo, 548 U.S. at 84. 

Simpson’s opinion that he should not be required to pursue a cancellation, his 

second argument, cannot overcome the state regulations on point. Exhaustion is 

mandatory, and an inmate is obliged to pursue the process as long as some remedy is 

available. Brown, 422 F.3d at 934-35. 

His third ground is based on a misunderstanding of the regulations. A cancelled 

appeal does not exhaust administrative remedies, see 15 C.C.R. § 3084.1(b), and a 

cancelled appeal may not be submitted for further review, id. § 3084.6(e). Simpson’s 

resubmission of the first cancelled appeal (HCARTS Log # CTF HC 10002597/CTF HC 

11034792) did not meet the prison’s requirements for exhaustion. On his second grievance 

(HCARTS Log # CTF HC 11034998), Simpson filed no appeal of any kind. He did not 

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exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Finally, Simpson contends that no further administrative remedies were available to 

him once prison authorities told him that his cancelled grievance could not be appealed. 

(Opp. at 7.) He cites Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2010), but that case does 

not stand for the proposition for which Simpson wants to use it. 

In Harvey, prison authorities partially granted an inmate’s appeal. The inmate did 

not pursue his grievance because he was satisfied with the result. When the promised 

relief was not forthcoming, the inmate filed another grievance. It was rejected as untimely 

and with the following language: “The screening action may not be appealed.” The Ninth 

Circuit held that an inmate need not pursue an appeal that has been granted to his 

satisfaction. Id. at 685. 

Simpson’s case is distinguishable. Unlike the plaintiff in Harvey, Simpson was not 

granted partial (or any relief) and therefore he was not excused from completing the 

exhaustion process. Also unlike Harvey, though Simpson was told that the cancelled 

grievance could not be appealed, he was told that he could appeal the cancellation itself. 

Moreover, his fourth reason does not excuse the exhaustion requirement. Although 

Nguyen-Dinh was the subject of a prior grievance, he was not the interviewer for the 

investigation into that grievance. Simpson’s refusal to be interviewed by Nguyen-Dinh 

regarding the second grievance does not excuse the requirement. Meeting with an 

interviewer is required by prison procedure. 15 C.C.R. § 3084.7(e). Simpson could have 

easily complied with this requirement by meeting with Nguyen-Dinh and declaring his 

objection to such an interviewer. His failure to comply with this procedural requirement 

dooms any contention that he exhausted his claims. Id. § 3084.6(c)(8).

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, courts are to 

consider whether an administrative remedy is available in the prison involved, not whether 

the remedy is effective. Conception v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1353-54 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(remedy need not be formally adopted through regulations in order for it to be considered 

an “administrative remedy” under the PLRA); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 72 (3d Cir. 

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2000) (holding that there is no futility exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement); 

Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998) (prison required to exhaust 

claims even if the relief did not appear to be “plain, speedy, and effective”). Here, there is 

an administrative remedy available, and the process to obtain it starts with a face-to-face 

interview. Simpson’s refusal to consent to the interview means that he could never 

exhaust his administrative remedies. He had every opportunity to sit for the interview. He 

was told in writing at least three times on his first grievance that he was required to have 

the interview. (MSJ, Robinson Decl. ¶¶ 7-10, 13.) Because he did not, his claims cannot 

proceed. 

Defendants have presented undisputed evidence that Simpson failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies before filing suit. Simpson has not shown that the exhaustion 

requirement should be excused. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket 

No. 43) is GRANTED. The claims against David Varela are DISMISSED because he was 

never served with the complaint. (Docket No. 24.) 

The Clerk shall terminate Docket No. 43, enter judgment in favor of defendants 

K. Sather and Nguyen-Dinh as to all claims, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 11, 2015

_________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge

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