Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-02-03331/USCOURTS-ca10-02-03331-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

ELKE DUNLAP, 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 1 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 02-3331 

V. 

STATE OF KANSAS, DEPARTMENT 

OF HEAL TH AND ENVIRONMENT, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

(D.C. No. 00-CV-4185-RDR) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HARTZ, HOLLOWAY and McKAY, Circuit Judges. 

Plaintiff-appellant Elke Dunlap sued her employer, the State of Kansas Department 

of Health and Environment, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 

2000e-2000e(l 6), alleging discrimination based on gender and national origin and unlawful 

retaliation. The district judge granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and 

Dunlap now appeals. 

• This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of 

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the 

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under 

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 1
I 

The facts, as viewed through the prism of the defendant's summary judgment motion, 

are set out in detail in the district court's thorough opinion, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (D. Kan. 

2002), and we will present here only a summary. Plaintiff was born in 1944 in Germany and 

lived there until she was 19 years old. She then married an American and moved to this 

country in 1963. She still speaks with an accent. She is a naturalized citizen of the United 

States. She has been employed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment since 

1992. In October 1997, she began working at a location called Forbes Field in the Office of 

Infom1ation Systems. 

In the spring of 1998, she was placed under the supervision of Phil Breedlove, and 

most of her allegations come from that time. Plaintiff testified that she often overheard 

Breedlove make fun of female employees who spoke with accents. Breedlove would gather 

with other men after teaching a computer class and use a Spanish accent to mock questions 

that women had asked during the class. This would often occur close to plaintiffs work 

station where she could hear the conversation. 

Plaintiff said that after trying to ignore this for awhile, she asked Breedlove to stop 

it. When that failed to stop the behavior, she approached Breedlove's supervisor, Pam 

Tierce. However, nothing was done and the practice continued until plaintiffs desk was 

moved away from where this was going on. 

It is not clear how frequently this had occurred. Plaintiff testified that it would occur 

-2-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 2
at least weekly and sometimes three times in a single day, depending on the number of 

classes Breedlove had and the number of foreign born speakers in the classes. Breedlove 

never attempted to mimic a German accent, nor did he make any remarks about persons of 

German ancestry. Plaintiff did testify in deposition, however, that Breedlove would 

sometimes pretend not to understand her accent in order to force her to repeat words that he 

knew were difficult for her to pronounce. 

In February 1999 plaintiff became involved in a "cowboy hat incident." A former 

high level employee who habitually wore a cowboy hat had retired. One day soon afterward, 

Tierce and Breedlove saw a cowboy hat at plaintiffs work station with a note on it saying 

"RIP." They interpreted this as a celebratory note. The suggested inference was that the 

retired supervisor was not popular and other supervisors knew it. 

Plaintiff was not at work that day (although the district court indicated that the hat 

with the note had been at her station for some days by this time) and denied knowing 

anything about the hat and note. Tierce immediately called and reported the "incident" to a 

personnel officer. Plaintiff received a letter, which she now contends was a reprimand but 

which defendant characterized as a letter of concern, from the Secretary of the Department. 

The letter said that the display was "disrespectful" and had caused "undue disruption to the 

workplace." The letter was not placed in plaintiffs personnel file. 

Plaintiff contended that Breedlove knew that the hat did not belong to her and knew 

that she was not at work that day. Therefore, she alleged, he had lied to implicate her in the 

-3-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 3
incident. She also contended that she was disproportionately punished over it. The owner 

of the cowboy hat, a male, and two American -born female receptionists, who in April 1999 

had cowboy hats with RIP on them, were not reprimanded at all, Dunlap maintains. 

On June 22, 1999, plaintiff Dunlap was delayed by traffic and was late returning from 

lunch. She put a leave slip in Breedlove's box as a result. She said that he became infuriated 

about it, for unexplained reasons. However, he approved the leave, which was at his 

discretion. 

Plaintiff also alleged two instances of disparate treatment related to leave or 

"rearranged time." First, plaintiff testified that her request for leave to care for her seriously 

ill husband was scrutinized more closely than the request of a male employee whose pet 

ferret became mortally ill. Plaintiff testified that an American-born male was given two days 

off either to care for his sick pet ferret or to grieve over the animal's passing, without any 

question. In contrast, when plaintiffs husband was seriously ill and she requested leave to 

care for him, she was questioned about the need for it. 

The second incident occurred after Tierce became plaintiffs direct supervisor instead 

of Breedlove, and this incident involves "rearranged time." Although we have not been 

given a definition of this term, from the context it clearly seems to mean a flexibility in an 

employee's hours provided for the employee's convenience. Thus, for example, an employee 

who was an hour late for work because of a dental appointment could, we infer, make up the 

time by staying one hour later than usual, avoiding the necessity of using accumulated leave 

-4-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 4
for such a minor contingency. One day when Dunlap was late to work because of traffic, she 

requested "rearranged time" but this was refused by Tierce. In contrast, males "got away 

with anything they wanted to," according to plaintiffs testimony. 

Plaintiff filed her first administrative complaint with the Kansas Human Rights 

Commission on March 22, 1999. She complained about the mocking of females with accents 

and that she had been harassed and discriminated against based on her gender and ancestry 

with regard to the cowboy hat incident. Plaintiff contended in the district court that 

Breedlove began retaliatory conduct after she filed the charge. She cited the leave slip 

incident and also said that Breedlove began taking duties away from her. She alleged that 

he drafted a job description for her that appeared designed to demote her from Office 

Assistant IV to Office Assistant II. Breedlove made about five requests to have her removed 

from his supervision. 

Plaintiff filed an amended administrative charge on August 19, 1999, adding two 

instances of allegedly discriminatory treatment based on gender and ancestry. The first of 

these two alleged discriminatory acts is not discussed on appeal. The second was the June 

22nd incident described supra. 

Plaintiff allegedly suffered severe mental distress with accompanying physical 

symptoms. These include anxiety attacks, depressions, headaches, crying spells, vomiting, 

shaking and other symptoms. She could not pinpoint the onset of her ailments but said that 

it got "out of hand" after she received the letter of reprimand about the cowboy hat. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 5
II 

Ms. Dunlap first argues that the district court erred in detem1ining that defendant was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her claim of a hostile work environment. In 

evaluating a discrimination claim based on an allegedly hostile work environment, a court 

must inquire whether "the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, 

and insult, . . . that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's 

employment and create an abusive working environment . .. " ' Harris v. Forklift Systems, 

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). Further, we 

also examine whether the harassment was based on a protected characteristic. Thus we 

inquire whether the alleged harassment was based on Ms. Dunlap's gender or national origin. 

See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551(10th Cir. 1994) ("General harassment if not racial 

or sexual is not actionable."). 

The district judge concluded that the incidents where Breedlove would pretend not to 

understand Dunlap's accent were the only ones that were based on her national origin or her 

gender. We agree with the district court that these incidents were insufficient to show an 

atmosphere of severe or pervasive bias. 

Incidents which the judge found not probative of forbidden bias included the handling 

of the cowboy hat incident, the leave slip incident, and Breedlove' s reduction of plaintiffs 

duties. These, the judge found, and we agree, do not appear related to Ms. Dunlap's gender 

or national origin. (Although we return to some of these incidents infra in discussing 

-6-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 6
plaintiffs claim of disparate treatment.) The district judge also found that the repeated 

instances of Breedlove mocking other females with Spanish accents were not gender based. 

This observation is dubious. 

Nevertheless, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs evidence fell short of 

showing that the offensive conduct was severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile 

environment. We note that in spite of the observation that most of the incidents cited by 

plaintiff to support her claim were not targeted at her because of her ancestry or gender, the 

district judge did not ignore the evidence but considered it carefully. In particular, the judge 

took another look at the evidence of Breedlove' s mocking of his female students who had 

Spanish accents. The judge did not reject this evidence out of hand but observed that "in an 

appropriate case mimicking of accents could serve as indirect evidence of discrimination . 

. . . " 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. But in this case, the judge went on, because the accents being 

mocked were not similar to plaintiffs, and because that conduct was not aimed at her (but 

merely overheard by her), "the causal link is simply too weak to give rise to an inference that 

plaintiffs German ancestry or gender was somehow being targeted." Id. We agree with this 

analysis. 

In sum, plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to show that she was subjected to a work 

environment of severe or pervasive hostility, and some of the meager evidence she proffered 

was of questionable relevance because it did not show a connection to her gender or national 

ongm. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 7
III 

On plaintiffs disparate treatment claim, the district judge acknowledged that our 

circuit has a liberal standard as to what constitutes an adverse employment action, but 

concluded that plaintiff failed to meet even this low threshold. 1 The letter of concern or of 

reprimand was not enough, the judge found. On that point, the judge cited Krause v. City of 

La Crosse, 246 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2001), which held that a reprimand alone is not 

enough but must be accompanied by a demotion or some other job action. The judge also 

noted that a similar conclusion had been reached in Robleado v. Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 

136 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan. 2001), ajf'd, 33 Fed. Appx. 480 (10th Cir. 2002). He found 

these authorities persuasive and held that because there were no other consequences and the 

letter was not put in plaintiffs personnel file, the letter did not constitute adverse 

employment action. 

The judge found that the allegations of disparate treatment based on denial of 

plaintiffs requests for leave time and rearranged time failed for the same reason. Being 

questioned about leave requests and having one request for rearranged time denied are too 

'To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in violation of Title VII in 

the circumstances of this case, Ms. Dunlap was required to show that she is a member of 

a protected class by virtue of being female and of German national origin; that she was 

subjected to an adverse employment action; and that employees who were not members of 

the protected class or classes were treated more favorably. See, e.g., Cole v. Ruidoso 

Mun. Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1994). The elements of the prima facie case 

are flexible, depending on the circumstances of the case. See EEOC v. Horizon/CMS 

Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1192-95 & nn.6-7 (10th Cir. 2000). 

-8-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 8
trivial, he found, noting that other courts have held that transfer and scheduling decisions of 

more significance than these were insufficient. He cited among other cases Amro v. Boeing 

Co., 232 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2000). 

As the district judge noted, we liberally define the phrase "adverse employment 

action." See, e.g., Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004). As we have 

applied the term, adverse employment actions "are not simply limited to monetary losses in 

the form of wages or benefits. Instead, we take a case-by-case approach, examining the 

unique factors relevant to the situation at hand." Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Denver Public 

Schools,, 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998)). However, "a mere inconvenience or an 

alteration of job responsibilities," does not satisfy even our liberal standard. Sanchez, 164 

F.3d at 532. 

We think it quite clear that being questioned about a request for leave is, at least in the 

circumstances of this case, "a mere inconvenience" that does not constitute an adverse 

employment action. The same is true for the plaintiff having had to use a trivial amount of 

leave time on the one occasion that she was denied the convenience of "rearranged time." 

The letter of concern is not quite so easily dismissed as a trivial inconvenience. But 

with our focus on the specifics of this case, and particularly in view of two circumstances -

that the letter was not made a part of plaintiffs personnel file and that no allegation (much 

less showing) is made of adverse consequences following from the incident- we agree with 

the district judge that this did not constitute an adverse employment action. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 9
IV 

The final issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that 

plaintiffs retaliation claim was barred by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 2 

We affirm the district court's ruling although we reach our conclusion on different reasoning, 

basing our holding on National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 

As we have previously noted, that case "has effected fundamental changes to the doctrine 

allowing administratively unexhausted claims in Title VII actions." Martinez v. Potter, 34 7 

F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs argument in this case is based on our preMorgan case law which recognized a "narrow exception" to the exhaustion requirement -

permitting a claim for incidents not listed in the original administrative charge to be included 

in the lawsuit if the incidents are "like or reasonably related to the allegations" of the 

administrative charge. See Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc., 111 F.3d 794, 799 (10th Cir. 

1997). We had also held that "an act committed by an employer in retaliation for filing of 

an EEOC complaint is reasonably related to that complaint, obviating the need for a second 

EEOC complaint." Ingels v. Thiokol Co,p., 42 F.3d 616,625 (10th Cir. 1994). 

2 As noted by the district court, the alleged retaliatory conduct consisted of the 

incident mentioned supra in which Breedlove became angered about plaintiffs 

submission of a leave slip; Breedlove' s reduction of plaintiffs responsibilities; 

Breedlove's attempt to "silently demote" plaintiff by preparation of a job description 

reflecting reduced duties; and Breedlove's requests to have plaintiff placed under another 

supervisor. 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. We express no opinion on the merits of these 

contentions. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 10
/ 

As we noted in Martinez: "Morgan abrogates the continuing violation doctrine as 

previously applied to claims of discriminatory or retaliatory actions by employers, and 

replaces it with the teaching that each discrete incident of such treatment constitutes its own 

'unlawful employment practice' for which administrative remedies must be exhausted." 34 7 

FJd at 1210.3 

Plaintiffs argument is simply untenable in the wake of Morgan. The incidents which 

she alleges to have been retaliatory conduct by the employer are discrete incidents of 

allegedly unlawful employn:ient practices and subject to the requirement of administrative 

exhaustion, unrelieved by our prior doctrine which excused the exhaustion requirement for 

acts reasonably related to the acts included in the administrative charge. The judgment is 

AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

William J. Holloway, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

3

We note that the district judge did not have the benefit of Martinez when he 

issued his opinion. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 11
Appellate Case: 02-3331 Document: 010110533882 Date Filed: 04/01/2005 Page: 12