Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01541/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01541-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES R. RHORABOUGH, No. CIV S-05-1541-DFL-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1), filed on August 2,

2005. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 12), will be addressed if the

court determines that service of this action is appropriate. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This

means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: California Department of Corrections

and Tom Carey, the warden of California State Prison, Solano. Plaintiff also names “‘John Doe’

Agents.” While plaintiff refers to other correctional officers by name in his statement of claim,

such officers are not listed on the complaint as defendants. Plaintiff appears to attempt to state a

claim based on denial of access to religious services and, possibly, also based on retaliation. 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

II. DISCUSSION

The court notes several problems with plaintiff’s complaint. First, the California

Department of Corrections is immune from suit. Second, the complaint does not adequately

allege a claim against Tom Carey, who is a supervisory defendant. Third, plaintiff fails to

substantively state claims based either on denial of access to religious services or retaliation.

A. Defendant California Department of Corrections

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought

against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v.

Sulphar Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition

/ / /

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A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a 1

state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

(1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th cir. 1993) (en banc).

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 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t 1

of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). 

Here, plaintiff names as a defendant the California Department of Corrections,

which is immune under the Eleventh Amendment. By findings and recommendations issued

herewith, the court will recommend that the California Department of Corrections be dismissed as

a defendant to this action. 

B. Defendant Tom Carey

Tom Carey, the warden of the California State Prison, Solano, is named as a

defendant to this action. Because plaintiff does not specifically mention defendant Carey in his

statement of claims, the court must presume that he is being sued under a theory of supervisory

liability. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

employees. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat

superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of

subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations

and failed to act to prevent them. See id. When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the

causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. 

See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441

(9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory

personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

/ / /

/ / /

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Here, plaintiff’s complaint does not specifically allege anything with respect to

defendant Carey. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the complaint.

C. Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims

As indicated above, plaintiff’s complaint appears to attempt to state a claim based

on denial of access to religious services and/or retaliation. Substantively, plaintiff fails to state a

claim under either theory.

“In order to [allege] a free exercise violation, [plaintiff] must [state] the defendants

burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by

his faith.” Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),

invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and restored the “reasonableness test” as the

applicable standard in free exercise challenges brought by prison inmates). In this case, plaintiff

has not alleged that he was completely denied all religious services. Instead, plaintiff states that,

on three isolated occasions, he was not permitted to go to the prison chapel. In fact, plaintiff

states that, on one of these occasions, he nonetheless was able to speak with the chaplain. 

Moreover, plaintiff has not alleged that attending chapel services is something that is mandated

by his faith. 

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the prisoner must

allege that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory

action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional

security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting

this standard, the prisoner must allege a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the

exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995);

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also

allege that his constitutional right was actually chilled by the alleged retaliatory conduct. See

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must allege the

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following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse action against

the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in protected conduct; (3)

the adverse action actually chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the adverse

action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

568 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that adverse action (presumably, not

being allowed to attend chapel) was taken against him because he engaged in some protected

conduct. Additionally, plaintiff has not alleged that his First Amendment rights have been chilled

because of any alleged retaliation, or that any alleged adverse action did not actually serve a

legitimate penological purpose. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 15-220. An amended complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

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between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

(9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 11-110.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on August 2, 2005, is dismissed with leave to

amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

DATED: October 27, 2005.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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