Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04336/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04336-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allen James Robinson,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 19-04336-PHX-SRB (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On May 31, 2019, Petitioner Allen James Robinson, who is confined in the Arizona

State Prison, Winslow - Kaibab Unit, Winslow, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereinafter “habeas petition”). (Doc. 1.) On

October 1, 2019, Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 13). On December 30, 2019, Petitioner

filed a Reply (Doc. 16). 

STATE PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was indicted by an Arizona Grand Jury on May 8, 2012, on one count of

First Degree Murder, one count of Drive-By Shooting, and one count of Aggravated Assault.

(Doc. 13, Exh. A.) Petitioner proceeded to trial, and after seven days of testimony, was

convicted on all three counts. (Id., Exh. C.) The facts presented in support of the charges,

taken from the record, were as follows:

In May, 2012, 19-year-old Luis Galeana met and became friends with Francisco

Juarez while they worked together at Burger King. (Doc. 13, Exh. T at 41.) On the night of

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

May 5th, Galeana was at his girlfriend’s house to watch a boxing match and to celebrate

Cinco de Mayo. (Id.) Galeana had something to eat and drank two beers. (Id. at 42.) His

friend Juarez arrived around midnight, and soon after Juarez drove himself and Galeana to

Circle K to buy cigarettes. (Id.)

Galeana waited in the car while Juarez went to get the cigarettes. (Doc. 13, Exh. T

at 43-45.) A few people were in line at the store window (the interior of the store closed at

a certain hour), and a white car was parked in the lot. (Id. at 45-46.) While Galeana was in

the car, two men, one in a white shirt and one in a black shirt approached him and started

talking to him. (Id.) The man in the black shirt was identified by Galeana as Petitioner. (Id.

at 46-47.) Petitioner told Galeana that the clerk would not sell him alcohol and asked if

Galeana would purchase alcohol for him. (Id.) Galeana said he couldn’t as he wasn’t old

enough, but told Petitioner about a liquor store up the street that Petitioner could go to. (Id.)

They began talking about the boxing match and Galeana did not want to tell Petitioner where

his girlfriend’s party was located when asked. (Id. at 47-48.) When Juarez returned to the

car, they told Petitioner the party was full, and that they needed to leave. (Id. at 49.)

As Juarez drove away from the store, Galeana noticed another vehicle driving near

them. (Doc. 13, Exh. T at 52.) The car approached very fast, went into the oncoming traffic

lane in order to pull up to Juarez’s car, and got very close. (Id. at 53.) Galeana identified

Petitioner in the passenger seat and the driver as the man with Petitioner at the gas station

wearing the white hat. (Id. at 53-54.) Petitioner leaned out the passenger window and “said

something about the party and then [Juarez] said again, we have a full house.” (Id. at 54-55.)

Petitioner then screamed something about Galeana and Juarez being racist. (Id.) Petitioner

then pointed a gun and started shooting at them. (Id.) Two shots were fired, and at least one

hit Juarez, as he grabbed his side and told Galeana to call the police. (Id. at 56.) Petitioner

fired three more shots and hit both Juarez and Galeana whereupon Juarez lost consciousness

and the car crashed. (Id. at 58-59.) After the crash, Galeana saw Juarez “leaning” and knew

he was dead. (Id.) Galeana, although struck by a bullet in his back, ran to his girlfriend’s

house and stayed until police arrived and took him to the hospital. (Id. at 60-61.) 

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

A clerk at the Circle K witnessed the interaction between Petitioner, Brown and the

“kids,” and corroborated Galeana’s account as far as the description of Petitioner and his

companion, their attempt to purchase alcohol, and the color of their car. (Doc. 13, Exh. T

at 24-26.) A surveillance camera also recorded the interaction between the clerk and the two

men, and that the man in the white hat was the one who drove their car up to the Circle K.

(Id. at 22-25.) 

Petitioner’s girlfriend at the time, Susan Gonzalez, testified that she was living with

Petitioner, and had been at work the evening of the shooting. (Doc. 13, Exh. U at 38-42.)

Later, after the shooting, Petitioner called her and told her that he shot someone. (Id. at 46,

49.) After he returned home, they saw on the news a report that one of the young men died,

and showed Petitioner’s photograph from the Circle K surveillance camera, so Petitioner and

Gonzalez discussed what to do. (Id. at 50-52.) The next morning they went to the house of

Ramona Fulton, Petitioner’s cousin, and Petitioner was carrying a backpack, which he

dropped off after he went inside. (Id. at 56-58.) When he came back to the car, he did not

have the backpack and Petitioner told Gonzalez that his shirt was dirty from placing the

backpack in the attic. (Id. at 58.) The next morning Petitioner and Gonzalez decided to leave

the state. (Id. at 59.) 

Later, after Petitioner and Gonzalez were apprehended in Colorado, Gonzalez was

questioned by police, and at first tried to cover for him. (Doc. 13, Exh. U at 68.) Gonzalez

was originally charged with hindering prosecution, and later accepted a plea agreement in

which she agreed to cooperate and testify in exchange for probation. (Id. at 68-69.)

Petitioner’s cousin Ramona Fulton testified that on May 5th, she and Petitioner and

his companion Brown had been hanging out at her house, and that the two men left at around

1:00 a.m. (Doc. 13, Exh. E at 13.) They had been drinking and drove away in her cousin’s

Lincoln. (Id.) Two or three days later, Petitioner came to her house and told her he messed

up and he might have killed somebody. (Id.) A few days later, police searched Fulton’s

house and located a grey backpack in the attic. (Id. at 13.) 

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

In the backpack, police located boxes of ammunition, live rounds, and a magazine

with four cartridges in it, and a Smith and Wesson handgun. (Doc. 13, Exh. E at 17.) A

Phoenix crime lab specialist testified that he could not exclude the bullet from the autopsy

of the victim as having been fired from the gun found in the backpack, and also that the bullet

cartridges from the crime scene came from the handgun. (Id. at 19-20.) 

After conviction on all charges, on October 17, 2013, Petition was sentenced to 25

years to life on the murder count, 10.5 years on the drive-by shooting count, and 7.5 years

on the aggravated assault count. (Doc. 13, Exh. D.) The former two terms were ordered to

run concurrently and the 7.5 year sentence was ordered to run consecutively. (Id.)

Petitioner’s was appointed appellate counsel, who filed an opening brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding “no arguable question of law that is not

frivolous.” (Doc. 13, Exh. E at 22.) Petitioner filed a Supplemental Brief in Propria Persona

on August 8, 2014. (Id., Exh. F.) In his brief, he raised the following issues: (1)

prosecutorial misconduct, (2) violation of civil rights - due process, (3) suppression of

evidence, (4) illegal and excessive sentence, (5) fabricated evidence, (6) perjury, (7)

wrongful conviction, (8) malicious and vindictive prosecution, (9) defamation of character,

(10) invalid prior convictions, (11) failure of burden of proof, (12) fabricated and perjured

police reports, (13) inconsistent testimony, (14) insufficiency of the evidence, (15)

ineffective assistance of counsel, and (16) suggestive identification. (Id. at 2.) As the Court

of Appeals noted, Petitioner listed several issues in his brief, but only offered argument on

“a handful of those issues.” (Id. at 3.) The appellate court proceeded to analyze those issues,

finding no reversible error had occurred:

First, Robinson argues his prosecution runs afoul of Article 2, Section

30, the Arizona Constitution, because he did not have a preliminary hearing

and was “never given the grand jury transcripts.” Because Robinson was

indicted by a grand jury, however, a preliminary hearing was not required. See

State v. Meeker, 143 Ariz. 256, 265, 693 P.2d 911, 920 (1984) (“Either

indictment by a grand jury or information after a preliminary hearing is a

constitutionally proper method of bringing an accused felon to trial.”)

Robinson did not request the grand jury transcripts prior to his convictions and

so has waived any right he might have had to them. See State v. Casey, 10

Ariz. App. 516, 518, 460 P.2d 52, 54 (1969) (“grand jury testimony must be

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

made available to a defendant when a request therefore is made during the

course of trial”) (emphasis added).

Robinson next challenges the adequacy of a search warrant, alleging

that “even if [the State] had one it contained insufficient facts to justify

probable cause.” Robinson does not specify which search warrant he believes

was defective, however, and presents no argument as to why the facts

supporting that warrant were not sufficient. See State v. Crowley, 202 Ariz.

80, 83, ¶ 7, 41 P.3d 618, 621 (App. 2002) (“A reviewing court must presume

a search warrant is valid; it is the defendant’s burden to prove otherwise.”).

Robinson contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by knowingly

using “false evidence and argument to obtain a criminal conviction” and by

collaborating with witnesses to aid “the perjury.” He points to inconsistencies

in the testimony of certain witnesses as evidence they lied and also argues that

some witnesses were confused and did not tell the truth. But inconsistent

testimony is not necessarily false or perjured; the credibility of a witness is for

the jury to determine. See State v. Ferrari, 112 Ariz. 324, 334, 541 P.2d 921,

931 (1975). In any event, Robinson has not established that the prosecutor

knowingly used any alleged false testimony. See id.

Robinson also argues the prosecution improperly coerced his girlfriend

to testify against him by offering her a plea bargain that would allow her to reestablish contact with her children. His argument fails because the State may

offer a witness a favorable plea deal in exchange for testimony. See State v.

Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 401, 783 P.2d1184, 1193 (1989) (“[N]o prosecutorial

misconduct occurs where the prosecutor merely arranges a favorable plea

agreement with one of the several witnesses testifying against the defendant

. . . .”), disapproved on other grounds by State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 235 P.2d

240 (2010).

Robinson argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.

To the contrary, the evidence was sufficient. For example, the surviving

victim identified Robinson as the person shooting from the car, two witnesses

testified Robinson told them he shot and might have killed someone; and the

doctor who treated the deceased victim testified that the multiple gunshot

wounds were the cause of death. Robinson argues police failed to take

fingerprints from the alleged murder weapon and complains that the State

failed to offer DNA evidence tying him to the gun. He fails to cite any legal

authority, however, for the proposition that the State is required to offer such

evidence when sufficient other evidence exists to support a conviction.

Robinson challenges the pretrial identification procedures and certain

of the jury instructions. Because he failed to raise these issues at trial, we

review them only for fundamental error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz.

561, 567, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). Robinson offers no facts or

legal argument to support his contention that the pretrial identification by the

victim was improper or the product of unduly suggestive procedures.

Although he argues the superior court erred by failing to instruct the jury on

premeditation, he can show no prejudice from the absence of such an

instruction, given that he was convicted of felony murder. He offers no facts

or reasoning to support his contention that the court erred by failing to instruct

the jury on circumstantial evidence.

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Robinson argues the officer who stopped him in Colorado wrongfully

detained him for an excessive amount of time. But he offers no facts or legal

argument to support that proposition.

Robinson further argues the prosecutor failed to introduce evidence that

would have proved him innocent, specifically, phone records supposedly

demonstrating he was not present during the shooting. This argument fails

because the State has no obligation to offer exculpatory evidence at trial.

Robinson complains that certain exhibits were not furnished to him

before the trial, but he does not identify those exhibits. He argues that the

exhibits did not establish the identity of the shooter and that the jury should

have been asked to determine who shot the victim. Because the jury was

properly instructed on accomplice liability, however, it did not need to

determine whether Robinson or the other individual in his vehicle fired the

shots.

Finally, Robinson argues that when a defendant is convicted of two

crimes based on the same acts, the court is obligated to impose concurrent

sentences. Although Robinson does not elaborate, the superior court did in

fact impose concurrent sentences on the convictions for felony murder and for

drive-by shooting, the predicate felony; the court properly exercised its

discretion to impose a consecutive sentence on the separate crime of

aggravated assault (the victim of the aggravated assault was a second occupant

of the vehicle who survived the shooting). Robinson also asserts the

presentence report was inaccurate, but does not explain how it was inaccurate

or how he was prejudiced by the court’s reliance on it.

Due Process Review.

The record reflects Robinson received a fair trial. He was represented

by counsel at all stages of the proceedings against him and was present at all

critical stages, except when counsel waived his presence. The court also held

appropriate pretrial hearings.

The State presented both direct and circumstantial evidence sufficient

to allow the jury to convict. The jury was properly comprised of 12 members

with two alternates. The court properly instructed the jury on the elements of

the charges, the State’s burden of proof and the necessity of a unanimous

verdict. The jury returned a unanimous verdict, which was confirmed by juror

polling. The court received and considered a presentence report, addressed its

contents during the sentencing hearing and imposed legal sentences for the

crimes of which Robinson was convicted.

(Doc. 13, Exh. G).

On July 13, 2015, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Doc.

13, Exh. I.) Appointed counsel subsequently filed a Notice of Completion of PostConviction Review by Counsel; Request for Extension of Time to Allow Defendant to File

Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction relief, indicating therein that he had reviewed trial

counsel’s file, trial court documents and transcripts, and correspondence from Petitioner and

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

telephonic conferences, but was unable to find meritorious or colorable claims to raise. (Id.,

Exh. J.) The trial court ordered that counsel remain in an advisory capacity, and gave

Petitioner additional time to file a pro per PCR. (Id., Exh. K.) Petitioner then filed a PCR

petition raising the following claims:

1. Due process requires that the defendant be given “notice of the

specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues

raised by that charge.” The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were

violated.

2. The prosecutor committed misconduct by portraying a key witness

during her testimony and in closing arguments in a false and

misleading light. It has been established that the prosecutor

knowingly used false testimony. The trial court should have

declared a mistrial and the misconduct violated Defendant’s right to

a fair trial and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

4. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

(Doc. 13, Exh. L.)

The trial court denied relief, finding that claims 1 and 2 were precluded under Rule

32.2(a)(2) and (3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, as issues that were or should have

been raised on direct appeal, and found that claims 3 and 4 lacked merit. (Id., Exh. O.) On

March 21, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals,

raising similar arguments. (Id., Exh. P.) On January 25, 2018, the court granted review but

summarily denied relief. (Id., Exh. R.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied

Petitioner’s petition for review on July 30, 2018, and the court of appeal’s mandate issued

on August 30, 2018. (Id., Exh. S.)

Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner timely filed his habeas petition. In his

petition, Petitioner advances the following four claims:

Ground 1: Petitioner was denied the right to personally decide whether to testify and

his attorney’s failure to advise him of this right denied Petitioner a fair trial and the effective

assistance of counsel, in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Ground 2: Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because

of prosecutorial misconduct that “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a violation of due process.” Petitioner alleges the prosecutor’s comments during

the trial and summation were improper and prejudicial and denied him a fair trial.

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Ground 3: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, for trial counsel’s failure to do the following:

A. Obtain medical records of Luis Galeana;

B. Obtain fingerprint evidence from the gun, bullets and a baseball cap;

C. Produce witnesses, obtain phone records;

D. Move to suppress his confession;

E. File pre-trial motions, investigate, and provide discovery.

Ground 4: Petitioner was denied due process and his right to counsel, in violation of

his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, because the cumulative effect of individually

harmless errors and omissions “rendered the defense far less persuasive than it otherwise

would have been.”

(Doc. 1.) Respondents assert that Grounds 1, 2 and 4 are procedurally defaulted and Ground

3 fails on the merits. (Doc. 13.)

DISCUSSION

Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 A state procedural default rule is “independent” if it does not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002).

2

 A state procedural default rule is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” Johnson

v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-53 (1982)).

- 9 -

fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

Additionally, a federal habeas court generally may not review a claim if the state

court’s denial of relief rests upon an independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the

rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court

could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run

around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-31. Thus, in order to prevent a petitioner from subverting the exhaustion

requirement by failing to follow state procedures, a claim not presented to the state courts in

a procedurally correct manner is deemed procedurally defaulted, and is generally barred from

habeas relief. See id. at 731-32.

If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner attempted to raise

the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both “independent”1

 and “adequate”2

– review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is ordinarily barred. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law default prevents the state court

from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in

federal court.”) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977) and Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)).

A procedural bar may also be applied to unexhausted claims where state procedural

rules make a return to state court futile. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (claims are barred

from habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now

find the claims procedurally barred”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

2002) (“[T]he procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim ‘applies only

when a state court has been presented with the federal claim,’ but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or ‘if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally

barred.’”) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989)).

Specifically, in Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either

direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt

to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of

claims for which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief),

32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s

decision). Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further

review of claims that were not raised on direct appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction

proceedings. See, e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (determinations made under

Arizona’s procedural default rule are “independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241

F.3d 1191, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is

regularly followed [“adequate”] in several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other

grounds, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-

32 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly

followed” Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz.

319, 334-36, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and preclusion rules strictly

applied in post-conviction proceedings).

The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless

a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Pursuant to the “cause and

prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented him from

following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim. “A showing

of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Ground 2 is also procedurally defaulted. Yet,

Petitioner raised a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal in so far as his assertion that

the prosecutor improperly presented false testimony. This Court will address that claim on

the merits. He has procedurally defaulted, however, any claim of prosecutorial misconduct

in the disparaging of defense counsel or vouching for a witness. 

- 11 -

external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government interference or reasonable

unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir.

2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The petitioner must also show actual

prejudice, not just the possibility of prejudice. U.S. v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th

Cir. 2007).

 Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court has made clear that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional violation has resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Additionally,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless claims regardless

of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court to allow claims to be

raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under § 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”).

Grounds 1 and 4: Right to Testify and Cumulative Error.

Petitioner’s claim in Ground 1 that he was denied the right to testify, and his claim in

Ground 4 of cumulative error are unexhausted as he did not raise these claims in state court

on direct appeal or in PCR proceedings.3

 Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are procedurally

defaulted, as a return to state court now to exhaust these claims would be futile in light of

Arizona State procedural rules. See, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (30-day

time limit; successive PCR petitions are limited to claims of being held in custody beyond

sentencing expiration, newly-discovered facts, requests for delayed appeal, significant

change in the law, and actual innocence). Claims filed outside the time limit, or not raising

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

an exception set forth in the Rules, are subject to summary dismissal. See, e.g., State v. Diaz,

269 P.3d 717, 719-21 (Ariz. App. 2012).

Petitioner does not demonstrate cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or that

a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Petitioner asserts

that he raised claim 4 in his supplemental brief on appeal and raised claim 1 in PCR

proceedings. (Doc. 16 at 8.) Petitioner never asserted a claim that he was prevented from

testifying in his defense, or a claim of cumulative error in those proceedings. (Doc. 13, Exhs.

F and L.) He argues however, that his appellate counsel was ineffective in filing an Anders

brief, instead of raising these issues. Petitioner was given an opportunity to file a

supplemental appellate brief and did so, but did not raise either claim in his opening brief.

Also, in his PCR petition, he did not identify these issues as issues his appellate counsel

should have raised.

The failure of an attorney to present a claim on direct appeal, without more, does not

constitute cause to excuse procedural default. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 486 (stating that “the

mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to

raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default”).

“[C]ause for a procedural default on appeal ordinarily requires a showing of some external

impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising a claim.” Id. at492.

Petitioner does not state any impediment that prevented appellate counsel from raising

his claims. The facts averred in support of his claims were not new, and were part of the

record at trial. Additionally, Petitioner raised numerous issues on appeal, and elected not to

present these issues. In PCR proceedings, he failed to identify these issues in his claim that

appellate counsel was ineffective. To the extent Petitioner is asserting as cause ineffective

assistance of PCR counsel, in not raising ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, such a

claim is foreclosed. See Davilla v. Davis, ___U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017).

With respect to Petitioner’s claim that he was prevented from testifying, the claim

lacks merit in any event, as the record he cites makes clear that was aware that he had the

right to testify, and elected not to. (Doc. 1 at 21.) Petitioner cites no authority that requires

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

the trial court to engage in any further inquiry as to a defendant’s election. Additionally, in

Petitioner’s PCR petition, he admitted to being aware of his right to testify, but claimed that

he didn’t trust his attorney, or that his attorney wanted him to “testify that he was present at

the crime scene.” (Doc. 13, Exh. P at 21.) Thus, as the aforementioned claims are

procedurally defaulted without excuse, and claim 1 fails, in any event on the merits, this

Court will recommend that the claims be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Merits

Pursuant to the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102

(2011). It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which

demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When

applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a

state court ... .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

Ground 2: Prosecutorial Misconduct.

The standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow one of

due process,” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (citation omitted.) “‘The

relevant question is whether the prosecutors’ [misconduct] so infected the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Id. (quoting

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). Prosecutorial misconduct must be

“of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”

Green v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (citation omitted). The misconduct is reviewed

in the context of the entire trial. Id. The Ninth Circuit employs a two-step inquiry: (1) were

the prosecutor’s actions improper; and (2) if so, was the trial rendered “fundamentally

unfair.” Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct at trial by presenting false

testimony. He claims that two witnesses, Ramona Fulton and Susan Gonzalez, lied during

their testimony and the prosecutor was aware of their perjury. Petitioner does not establish

however, that the witnesses lied. Both witnesses made inconsistent statements, although both

notified police of statements Petitioner had made implicating himself in the murder. Ms.

Gonzalez was Petitioner’s girlfriend at the time, and Ms. Fulton was a cousin. Both at some

point in time minimized, or backtracked from those statements, and Petitioner’s counsel and

the prosecutor made fair use of the implications of those inconsistencies during their

examination. 

Inconsistent statements standing alone do not prove a witness has lied, and much less

so here, where a reasonable explanation existed as to why the witnesses’ accounts wavered,

and particularly in light of the compelling other evidence implicating Petitioner. The Arizona

appellate court noted this point, concluding that “the credibility of a witness is for the jury

to determine.” (Doc. 13, Exh. G.) Petitioner does not establish that the prosecutor committed

misconduct in the presentation of the testimony of Gonzales or Fulton. The court’s denial

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

of the claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law, or based upon an unreasonable determination of fact, and this Court will recommend

denial of the claim.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must demonstrate

that counsel’s performance was deficient under prevailing professional standards, and that

he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must show

“that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 699.

A petitioner’s allegations and supporting evidence must withstand the court’s “highly

deferential” scrutiny of counsel’s performance, and overcome the “strong presumption” that

counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 689-90. A petitioner bears the burden of showing

that counsel’s assistance was “neither reasonable nor the result of sound trial strategy,”

Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2001), and actions by counsel that

“‘might be considered sound trial strategy’” do not constitute ineffective assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Id. Courts should not presume prejudice. See Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d

1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, a petitioner must affirmatively prove actual prejudice, and

the possibility that a petitioner suffered prejudice is insufficient to establish Strickland’s

prejudice prong. See Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A

petitioner] must ‘affirmatively prove prejudice.’ ... This requires showing more than the

possibility that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors; he must demonstrate that the errors

actually prejudiced him.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). However, the court need

not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if the court can reject the claim

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

of ineffectiveness based on the lack of prejudice. See Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155 n.3 (the

court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong).

Ground 3: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in not obtaining Galeana’s

medical records, which Petitioner claims could have been used to impeach him regarding his

level of intoxication and state of mind. Petitioner fails to identify what the records would

reveal and how they would have been exculpatory. He generally claims that the records

“might contain further information on the state of Galeana’s intoxication.” (Doc. 16 at 19.)

Galeana admitted that, prior to the shooting, he and Juarez had been at a party, and that they

had consumed alcohol. Furthermore, Juarez’s toxicological report showed blood alcohol of

0.07%, which corroborated Galeana’s account. Petitioner offers only speculation as to what

Galeana’s medical records would show. Even if Petitioner could demonstrate that his trial

counsel’s performance was deficient in this regard, he can not show prejudice. 

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a fingerprint

analysis of the firearm, bullets and a baseball cap. Petitioner speculates at to what the

analysis would discover. In light of all of the other evidence implicating Petitioner in the

murder, it may have been sound trial strategy for counsel not to request such testing, in the

event Petitioner’s fingerprints were found on the evidence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690

(federal habeas courts presume that litigation strategy is objectively reasonable unless clearly

proven otherwise by petitioner). A decision by counsel not to pursue certain forensic testing

may amount to sound trial strategy when there exists a reasonable fear of what could be

discovered. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1997) (defendant, under

the circumstances, could not show a reasonable probability that the result would have been

different had his counsel requested the testing); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 108

(2011) (finding counsel not ineffective regarding blood tests because an “attorney need not

pursue an investigation that would be fruitless, much less one that might be harmful to the

defense.”). Additionally, Petitioner’s trial counsel impeached a witness at trial on the state’s

failure to test for prints on the firearm and bullets. (Doc. 1, Exh. 4.) Thus, Petitioner does

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

not demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective, or that any prejudice resulted from her

failure to request fingerprint testing on these items of evidence.

Next, Petitioner asserts his trial counsel was ineffective in not calling witness Keoni

Taylor as she had “information relating to Petitioner being home at the time of the alleged

incident.” He also states his additional witnesses, Patricia and Dustin Davidson, “had

information relating to Petitioner being at home but was not located.” Petitioner did not

mention these individuals in raising his claim in PCR proceedings, that trial counsel was

ineffective in not calling witnesses in his defense. (Doc. 1, Exh. L at 21-25.) Thus, he is

procedurally barred from raising this claim. Additionally, he does not provide witness

statements, affidavits, or even indicate the substance of what these witnesses would state on

his behalf. Thus, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective, or that he

has been prejudiced by the failure to call these witnesses at trial.

Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress his

confession. He does not identify what statements he made, that were introduced at trial,

other than his statement to his girlfriend, Susan Gonzalez, that he shot somebody. This

statement was not the result of law enforcement, or custodial questioning of Petitioner and

thus, his attorney was not ineffective in not filing a motion to suppress that statement.

Petitioner also references other statements made by Susan Gonzalez during her questioning

by law enforcement, but Petitioner does not identify any legal basis that exists to support a

motion to suppress statements made by third parties to law enforcement. Petitioner fails to

demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective, or that he was prejudiced by her failure to file

a motion to suppress his statements prior to trial.

Lastly, Petitioner asserts that his counsel was ineffective in failing to file pre-trial

motions, provide him with discovery, and investigate his case. Petitioner fails, however, to

specify what additional motions trial counsel should have filed, what discovery he was not

provided, and what investigation trial counsel failed to conduct. These conclusory assertions

are not sufficient to meet a petitioner’s burden of demonstrating deficient performance. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. 

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

The trial court, in ruling on Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

found that Petitioner failed to “provide sufficient facts that would have changed the verdicts,”

and that Petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that

he suffered prejudice by such alleged deficient performance. (Doc. 13, Exh. O.) Petitioner

has failed to show that the court’s rejection of his claim was contrary to Strickland, or was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s claims in his habeas petition are procedurally

defaulted without excuse, or lack merit, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s habeas

petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and because the dismissal of the

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 29th of May, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-04336-SRB Document 17 Filed 05/29/20 Page 19 of 19