Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00303/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00303-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Torrance Derrick Mincey, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-0303-PHX-GMS (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Torrance Derrick Mincey, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex, North Unit, in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the Court dismissed for failure to state a claim with leave to amend.

(Doc. 1, 8.) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, which the Court dismissed for failure

to state a claim with leave to amend. (Doc. 12, 13.) Plaintiff has filed a Second Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 14.) The Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure

to state a claim and this action. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

II. Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges four counts for “involuntary servitude,”violation of due process, and

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and denial of access to the court. Plaintiff sues

Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio; Maricopa County; John or Jane Doe employed

in classification at the Fourth Avenue Jail; and XYZ corporations “for Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office”. Plaintiff seeks compensatory relief.

Background

The Maricopa County Superior Court ordered Plaintiff to pay child support in case#

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1

 See http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/FamilyCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?

caseNumber=DR1999-010063 (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). Minute entries for specific dates

can be viewed at http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/JONamesearch.asp.

2

 See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Lower%20Court/082008/m333

0630.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 

3

 See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Lower%20Court/092008/m334

7753.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 

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DR1999-010063.1 However, Plaintiff has only sporadically paid child support and has

accrued substantial arrears. Since at least 2007, the court has held repeated review hearings

concerning payment of child support by Plaintiff and has repeatedly found Plaintiff in

contempt for failure to pay child support, to purge amounts owed, and/or for failing to appear

for review hearings or otherwise comply with court orders by documenting efforts to seek

work. Further, the court has issued several child support arrest warrants, resulting in

Plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration by MCSO for failure to pay child support or to

demonstrate his efforts to find work as ordered by the court. During his various

confinements, the court has sometimes ordered that Plaintiff participate in work release

programs, if otherwise eligible. At other times, the court has found him ineligible for work

release participation. According to Plaintiff, he was not assigned to work release until June

16, 2010, and by that time, had become depressed and discouraged at the amount of his

arrearage and not having been previously placed on work release. On at least one occasion,

Plaintiff absconded from work release and on another he returned to the jail under the

influence of drugs or alcohol.

 In August 2008, Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case# LC2008-

000465, which the court treated as a special action.2

 The court described Plaintiff’s claims

in that action as alleging that despite being ordered into work release in connection with his

child support obligations, MCSO had failed to comply and that he was being jailed for an

unpaid debt in violation of the state constitution.3

 On August 29, 2008, the court denied

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4

 Id., n. 2. 

5

 Id.

6

 Id.

7

 Id.

8

 See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/112007/m2942720.pdf

(last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 

9

 See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/032008/m3118924.pdf

(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).

10 See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/062011/m4764998.pdf

(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).

11 See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/032012/m5131372.pdf

(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).

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jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s special action.4 In its minute entry, the court explained that it had

only ordered Plaintiff into work release “if otherwise eligible” and that responsibility for

determining eligibility rested with MCSO; the court noted that Plaintiff’s propensity for

violence and drug use resulted in his designation as a maximum security inmate who was not

allowed to participate in work release programs.5

 The court further stated that Plaintiff’s

confinement for contempt of court for non-payment of child support did not violate the state

constitution.6

 Finally, the court found that MCSO had not abused its discretion in denying

Plaintiff work release status.7

In addition to the above, Plaintiff has twice been arrested for criminal offenses. On

November 16, 2007, Plaintiff was arraigned in case# CR2007-157276,8

 but on March 28,

2008, that case was dismissed based on the lack of probable cause for the arrest.9

 On June

13, 2011, Plaintiff was arraigned on new charges in case# CR2011-101886.10 On February

13, 2012, Plaintiff was sentenced to five years in prison after he pleaded guilty to aggravated

driving or actual physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs,

with a prior felony conviction for possession of marijuana.11

///

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III. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional

claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of

a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the

conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

In addition, to state a claim against an individual defendant, “[a] plaintiff must allege

facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the

deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

For an individual to be liable in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the official

acted as a result of a policy, practice, or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294

F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under §

1983, so a defendant’s position as the supervisor of a someone who allegedly violated a

plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not make him liable. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor in his individual capacity, “is only

liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or

directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor,

880 F.2d at 1045. 

A. Fictitiously-Identified Defendants

Plaintiff sues John Doe, a classification officer with the MCSO, and XYZ

Corporations. Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to

include the names of the parties in the action. As a practical matter, it is impossible in most

instances for the United States Marshal or his designee to serve a summons and complaint

or amended complaint upon an anonymous defendant.

The Ninth Circuit has held that where identity is unknown prior to the filing of a

complaint, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the

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12 Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that anyone intentionally mis-classified him

or intentionally falsified his criminal history, much less that such actions rose to the level of

a constitutional violation.

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unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that

the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d

1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)).

In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that XYZ Corporations in any way

violated his constitutional rights and they will be dismissed. As to John Doe, Plaintiff merely

makes conclusory assertions that Doe mis-classified Plaintiff to deny him placement in work

release.12 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v.

Board of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against

Doe and he will be dismissed.

B. Statute of Limitations

The failure to state a claim includes circumstances where a defense is complete and

obvious from the face of the pleadings. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.

1984) (applying former § 1915(d) now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Further, in

the absence of waiver, a court may raise the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte. See

Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Hughes v.

Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (appropriate to dismiss prisoner’s complaint sua

sponte as time-barred under § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr.,

64 F.3d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (same); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.

1995) (same); Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Johnson v.

Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 107-08 (1st Cir. 1991) (same). 

In § 1983 actions, the Court applies the statute of limitations of the forum state for

personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 274-76 (1985); TwoRivers v.

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Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.

1991). The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See A.R.S.

§ 12-542 (1); Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997);

Vaughan, 927 F.2d at 478. Arizona law also provides for the tolling of the statute of

limitation after a cause of action accrues for the period during which a plaintiff was less than

18 years old or of unsound mind. A.R.S. § 12-502.

Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on February 14, 2012. (Doc. 1.) For his federal claims

to be timely, they must have accrued no earlier than February 14, 2010, two years before his

Complaint was filed. “[A] claim generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to

know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159

F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Plaintiff primarily complains of events that occurred prior to February 14, 2010 of

which he had contemporaneous knowledge. In Count I, he alleges that on April 23, 2008,

the state court ordered that he participate in work release, but that Doe and Arpaio knowingly

interfered or failed to comply with that order. Instead, Plaintiff was required to work at a jail

job, although he had not been convicted of a crime, and for which he was not paid. These

events occurred prior to February 14, 2010, and Plaintiff had contemporaneous knowledge

of them. Accordingly, Count I is facially time-barred and will be dismissed.

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges in part that: the state court ordered an investigation into

whether MCSO could supercede a court order regarding placement in work release based on

a defendant’s prior criminal history. Subsequently, on June 25, 2009, the court ordered that

Plaintiff participate in work release, but Doe and Arpaio deliberately delayed and rejected

Plaintiff from such participation without affording him an opportunity to be heard or appeal.

As a result, Plaintiff lost an outside job he had. Again, these events took place prior to

February 14, 2010, and Plaintiff had contemporaneous knowledge of them. Accordingly,

Count II is also facially time-barred and will be dismissed.

In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges the following: on April 30, 2008, he filed a state petition

for writ of habeas corpus, which was treated as a special action, which was dismissed on

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August 19, 2008, after the state court deferred to jail administrators to implement policies

regarding placement in work release based on an inmate’s criminal history. The MCSO

submitted findings which falsely reflected that Plaintiff had been convicted of sexual assault,

“although it had been dropped.” (Doc. 14 at 6.) Plaintiff contends that MCSO should have

known their information was “inadequate,” but the damage was done and Plaintiff was

denied work release and the special action dismissed. Plaintiff lost his job and home. Again,

these events took place prior to February 14, 2010, and Plaintiff had contemporaneous

knowledge of them. According, Count IV is facially barred by the statute of limitations. 

C. Conditions of Confinement

In Count III and part of Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that he was held in unconstitutional

conditions of confinement. A prison inmate’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of

confinement arises under the Eighth Amendment, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),

while a pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions arises under the Fourteenth

Amendment, Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998), the same standard is

applied. See Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of

confinement, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant’s acts or omissions have deprived the

inmate of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and that the defendant acted

with deliberate indifference to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Allen v. Sakai,

48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); see Estate of Ford v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether conditions of

confinement rise to the level of a constitutional violation may depend, in part, on the duration

of an inmate’s exposure to those conditions. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089, 1091 (9th

Cir. 1996) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)). “‘The circumstances,

nature, and duration of a deprivation of [] necessities must be considered in determining

whether a constitutional violation has occurred.’” Hearns v. Terhune, 413, F.3d 1036, 1042

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)).

To adequately allege deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege facts to support

that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate safety. Farmer, 511

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13 It is unclear whether Plaintiff is quoting a public statement made by Arpaio or a

response personally made by Arpaio to Plaintiff. Regardless, absent more, that statement is

insufficient to support that Arpaio knew that any condition to which Plaintiff was subjected

posed an excessive risk to Plaintiff and that Arpaio nevertheless failed to act to alleviate such

condition. 

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U.S. at 832–33. That is, “the official must both [have been] aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must also

[have] draw[n] the inference.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges the following: while confined in Maricopa County Jails, he was

subject to unsafe conditions that jeopardized his health. The Jails were overcrowded, poorly

ventilated, and the showers and toilets were unsanitary and there was mold and human waste

on the walls and floors. Plaintiff suffered from colds and rashes as a result. When Plaintiff

complained, Arpaio said “stay out of my jails”.13 (Doc. 14 at 5.) Plaintiff contends that he

was denied of all minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities” with “the intent to

purposely inflict hardship upon inmates, which caused [him] such emotional and physical

trauma injuries as to constitute torture.” (Id.) 

To the extent that Plaintiff complains of conditions while he was held in MCSO jails

prior to February 14, 2010, his allegations are facially time-barred. To the extent that his

allegations regarding his conditions of confinement are not time-barred, Plaintiff fails to

allege facts to support that Arpaio acted with deliberate indifference to such conditions. That

is, Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that Arpaio knew or should have known of any

unconstitutional conditions and that he nevertheless failed to act to alleviate such conditions.

Arpaio’s mere statement not to come to jail or be a deadbeat parent, absent more, is not

sufficient to establish that he acted with deliberate indifference towards allegedly

unconstitutional conditions. Accordingly, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 

IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Second Amended Complaint, the

Court will dismiss his Second Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given if

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a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc.,

885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is

particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint.

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Repeated

failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice

requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

Plaintiff has made three efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable to

do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further opportunities

to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will dismiss Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 14) and this action are dismissed

for failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(3) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2012.

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