Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02495/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02495-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

THOMAS WHITE, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-02495 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

SANDRA WALKER, ARIZONA ATTORNEY ) 

GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Petitioner filed this action on November 17, 2010.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) on March 17, 2010. See Doc. 13. Petitioner

filed a reply to the answer on or about April 1, 2011. See Doc.

14. 

I Background

On March 31, 2005, Petitioner was charged by indictment

with four counts arising out of a “hit and run” accident that

resulted in the death of an individual on or about September 1,

2004, in Coolidge, Arizona. See Answer, Exh. A. The indictment

charged Petitioner with second-degree murder, leaving the scene

of an accident, aggravated DUI (driving under the influence)

with a suspended driver license, and aggravated DUI while

impaired with a drug metabolite (cocaine). Id., Exh. A. The

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state had previously charged Petitioner, on September 9, 2004,

with manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident. Id.,

Exh. B. (CR2004–01248 Indictment). Those charges were dismissed

on May 6, 2005, after the state obtained the new indictment

against Petitioner. Id., Exh. C. 

The state later further amended the indictment to

allege six prior convictions as historical prior felony

convictions, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated §

13–604(D), and to reflect Petitioner committed the offenses

while released from confinement, pursuant to Arizona Revised

Statutes Annotated § 13–604(R), and to allege aggravating

circumstances other than prior convictions, pursuant to Arizona

Revised Statutes Annotated § 13–702(C). Id., Exh. D.

On May 23, 2006, Petitioner entered into a plea

agreement with the state. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner agreed to

plead guilty to manslaughter with two prior felony convictions,

and also agreed to a stipulated sentence of 18 years

imprisonment. Id., Exh. G. In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty

plea to the top count of the indictment, the state agreed to

dismiss all other charges in the indictment, and also agreed to

dismiss an indictment in Pinal County Cause Number CR

2004–00476, for destruction of jail property. Id., Exh. G. 

On May 30, 2006, Petitioner sent a letter to the state

trial court asserting that he failed to understand how the state

could offer him a plea of 18 years for manslaughter when it had

earlier offered him a plea offer of 18 years on two separate

cause numbers. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner also indicated that the

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two priors referenced in the plea agreement did not constitute

historical prior felony convictions. Id., Exh. H.

On June 26, 2006, the trial court imposed the

stipulated 18-year sentence. Id., Exh. I. On September 6,

2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The

state trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in

his Rule 32 proceedings on October 11, 2006. Id., Exh. J. On

December 26, 2006, Petitioner’s appointed counsel notified the

trial court that she could find no colorable claim to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner filed a pro se

petition on May 3, 2007. In his pro se brief Petitioner

asserted that a 1990 conviction for criminal trespass was

improperly used to enhance his sentence. Petitioner argued that

he would have received a lesser sentence if sentenced with only

one prior conviction and that his counsel was ineffective for

encouraging him to accept a plea agreement with this error.

Id., Exh. L. Petitioner argued his counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective and that his sentence violated

his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Id., Exh.

L at 9.

The trial court denied relief and dismissed

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action in a decision entered October 5,

2007. Id., Exh. C. Nonetheless, on November 30, 2007,

Petitioner filed a motion for enlargement of time to file a

reply to the State’s response to his petition for Rule 32

relief. Id., Exh. P. On December 14, 2007, the trial court

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notified Petitioner that it had ruled in his Rule 32 action on

October 5, 2007. Id., Exh. C. 

On December 22, 2009, Petitioner filed a request for

preparation of records in his Rule 32 action and indicated that

he had not received the trial court’s ruling on his petition for

post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. Q. On January 6, 2010, the

trial court advised Petitioner that it had ruled on the PCR on

October 5, 2007. Id., Exh. C.

On January 25, 2010, Petitioner filed a second notice

of post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. S. The trial court

dismissed the notice on grounds of successiveness. Id., Exh. C.

The trial court later vacated the order dismissing the 2010

notice, accepted as true Petitioner’s assertions that he had not

been served with the 2007 order dismissing his first Rule 32

proceedings, and again ruled that Petitioner had failed to

present colorable claims for relief. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s denial of

relief and on October 27, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals

denied relief. Id., Exh. V.

 In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts he

is entitled to relief because he was improperly sentenced as a

twice-convicted repetitive offender. Petitioner contends that,

because his criminal history only supports conviction as a

first-time repetitive offender, sentencing him pursuant to a

state statute applicable to someone with two prior convictions

violated his right to due process of law. Petitioner also

contends he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

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counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise him that one

of the two priors designated as a “historical prior felony

conviction” could not properly be classified as a prior felony.

Respondents contend Petitioner’s first claim for relief

was not properly exhausted and that it does not state a

cognizable habeas claim. Respondents also argue that the state

court did not err in determining that Petitioner was not denied

his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

II Analysis

Petitioner asserts that his right to due process of law

was violated because a 1990 conviction for trespassing was used

as a prior historical felony with regard to his sentence.

Respondents contend that the Court may not grant relief

on this claim because Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust it in

the state courts and because Plaintiff has not shown cause for,

nor prejudice arising from this default. Respondents also

assert that this is not a claim cognizable in an action pursuant

to section 2254.

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). Prior to 1996, the federal

courts were required to dismiss a habeas petition which included

unexhausted claims for federal habeas relief. However, section

2254 now states: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus may

be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the

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applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2009).

Accordingly, the Court may deny habeas relief on the merits of

a claim regardless of the petitioner’s failure to exhaust the

claim. 

A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 15 (2010), quoting

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. 2010). See also Swarthout v.

Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

119, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1567 (1982). “We have stated many times

that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of

state law.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S. Ct.

475, 479-80 (1991), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780,

110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102 (1990).

Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged

errors in the interpretation or application of state law,

including a state’s statutes regarding imposition of sentences.

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 112 S. Ct. at 480; Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Federal habeas

relief must be predicated on a violation of the United States

Constitution or a federal statute; to be entitled to habeas

relief based on an error of state law, the state court’s

decision must be so fundamentally unfair or unjust as to violate

due process, a condition rarely satisfied. See Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42, 104 S. Ct. 871, 874-75 (1984). “[A]

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mere violation of state law is not the automatic equivalent of

a violation of the federal Constitution.” Chambers v. Bowersox,

157 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

To the extent that Petitioner is requesting habeas

relief on the basis of the trial court’s violation or

misapplication of Arizona statutes in and of themselves, “he

fails to state a basis for federal habeas relief because

‘alleged errors in the application of state law are not

cognizable in federal habeas corpus.’” Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d

658, 661 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1369 (2010),

quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To the extent that Petitioner asserts his sentence

violated his right to due process because it was improper

pursuant to Arizona statutory law, Petitioner has not stated a

claim for federal habeas relief. See Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d

616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002). Although Petitioner asserts that his

right to due process was violated because the state allegedly

did not follow its sentencing statutes, the characterization of

this claim in this fashion does not render it cognizable on

federal habeas review. See Cacoperdo v. Demonsthenes, 37 F.3d

504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994); Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 765

(7th Cir. 2002).

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Petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to

assert or inform Petitioner that one of the historical prior

convictions alleged by the state and used to “enhance” his

sentence could not properly be classified as a prior felony.

Respondents allow that Petitioner exhausted this claim

in the state courts and that the state courts’ decision denying

relief on this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law.

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2010); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74-75, 127 S. Ct. 649,

653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir.

2009). 

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004); Brown v. Payton,

544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Williams v.

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Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). For

example, a state court’s decision is considered “contrary to

federal law” if the state court erroneously applied the wrong

standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles

v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008).

“A state determination may be set aside under

[“unreasonable application”] standard if, under clearly

established federal law, the state court was unreasonable in

refusing to extend the governing legal principle to a context in

which the principle should have controlled.” Ramdass v.

Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (2000).

However, the state court’s decision is an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law only if it can be

considered objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409,

120 S. Ct. at 1521; Carey, 549 U.S. at 74-75, 127 S. Ct. at 653.

An unreasonable application of law is different from an

incorrect one. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S. Ct.

1843, 1850 (2002); Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th

Cir. 2005). Furthermore, only United States Supreme Court

holdings, and not dicta or concurring opinions, at the time of

the state court’s decision are the source of “clearly

established federal law” for the purpose of the “unreasonable

application” prong of federal habeas review. Williams, 529 U.S.

at 412, 120 S. Ct. at 1523; Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, 127 S. Ct. at

653. Unless United States Supreme Court precedent has clearly

established a rule of law, the writ will not issue based on a

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claimed violation of that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d

1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), because federal courts are “without

the power” to extend the law beyond Supreme Court precedent.

See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000). 

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id.

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford, 537 U.S. at

25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations omitted). “A fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context

of cases wherein the defendant did not go to trial are governed

by the doctrine of Strickland. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474

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U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369-70 (1985); Fields v. Attorney

General, 956 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1992). When a

defendant challenges a conviction resulting from a plea

agreement the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is

modified; the defendant must show there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not

have pled guilty to the charges against him, but instead would

have insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106

S. Ct. at 370. Accord Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297.

To succeed on a claim that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.

Ct. at 370.

“[A] defendant has the right to make a

reasonably informed decision whether to

accept a plea offer.” In McMann v.

Richardson, the seminal decision on

ineffectiveness of counsel in plea

situations, the Court described the question

as not whether “counsel's advice [was] right

or wrong, but ... whether that advice was

within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann, 397

U.S. at 771. Thus, for the petitioner to

establish a claim of ineffective assistance,

he “must demonstrate gross error on the part

of counsel....” Id. at 772. The Third Circuit

has interpreted this standard as requiring a

defendant to demonstrate that the advice he

received was so incorrect and so insufficient

that it undermined his ability to make an

intelligent decision about whether to accept

the plea offer.

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (some

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internal citations and quotations omitted).

Additionally, “[c]onclusory allegations [of ineffective

assistance of counsel] which are not supported by a statement of

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24

F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690 (a petitioner “making a claim of ineffective assistance must

identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not

to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment”).

Petitioner has not established that his counsel’s

advice to accept the plea agreement and to accept a stipulated

sentence of 18 years imprisonment was so incorrect and so

insufficient that it undermined Petitioner’s ability to make an

intelligent decision about whether to accept the plea offer.

The state alleged six prior felony convictions, and that

Petitioner committed the offense charged while on release, and

that there were aggravating circumstances other than prior

felony convictions. Additionally, Petitioner was charged with

three counts that were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.

Other than his conclusory statements, Petitioner offers no

evidence that, had his counsel not failed to identify one of the

two prior felonies to which Petitioner acquiesced as not

eligible for that designation, he would have chosen to go to

trial on all of the counts against him and face an even greater

sentence.

III Conclusion

The state’s alleged failure to sentence Petitioner in

conformity with the state’s sentencing statutes does not state

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a cognizable claim for habeas relief. Additionally, the state

court’s decision that Petitioner was not denied the effective

assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. White’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1

A habeas petitioner’s assertion of a claim must

make a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d

563, 567 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir.

1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To

make this showing, [the petitioner] “must

demonstrate that the issues are debatable among

jurists of reason; that a court could resolve

the issues [in a different manner]; or that the

questions are adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463

U.S. 880, 893 n. 4, 103 S. Ct. 3383, [] (1983)

... Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 770-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130

S. Ct. 509 (2009).

-14-

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).1

DATED this 7th day of April, 2011.

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