Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00638/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00638-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC MCDAVID,

No. 2:06-cv-0638-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. AMENDED ORDER

THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, LOU

BLANAS, Sheriff of Sacramento

County, an individual, UNITED

STATES MARSHALS SERVICE,

ANTHONY AMADOR, United States

Marshal of the Eastern

District of California, an

individual, and DOES 1 through

50,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

By Memorandum and Order filed June 27, 2006, this Court

granted the Motion to Dismiss brought be Defendants County of

Sacramento and Lou Blanas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). 

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Case 2:06-cv-00638-MCE -GGH Document 31 Filed 11/16/06 Page 1 of 6
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The only claim not subject to the Motion to Dismiss brought 1

by the County and by Blanas was that portion of Plaintiff’s Third

Cause of Action, for violation of the Eighth Amendment,

predicated on the argument that Sacramento Jail County personnel

failed to afford Plaintiff adequate opportunity to exercise.

While Federal Defendants’ Notice of Motion appears to 2

indicate in its first paragraph that judgment on the pleadings is

(continued...)

2

The Court determined that dismissal of certain claims was 1

warranted because Plaintiff was unable to state a cognizable

claim predicated on either the First Amendment (free exercise of

religion), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (“RLUIPA”), or the Eighth Amendment

(infliction of cruel and unusual punishment). No leave to amend

the above claims was accorded given the Court’s finding that the

deficiencies of Plaintiff’s Complaint could not be cured through

amendment.

In addition to the County of Sacramento and its Sheriff,

Defendant Blanas, Plaintiff also named as Defendants the United

States Marshal’s Service and Anthony Amador, United States

Marshal for the Eastern District of California (“Federal

Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that, as a pretrial detainee in

a federal criminal case, he is in the custody of the Federal

Defendants even though he is being housed at the Sacramento

County Jail as operated by the County and Mr. Blanas. (Pl.’s

Compl., 1:3-5, 3:11-22).

The Federal Defendants now move for Judgment on the

Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on

grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint shows on its face that

Plaintiff cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2

Case 2:06-cv-00638-MCE -GGH Document 31 Filed 11/16/06 Page 2 of 6
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(...continued) 2

sought only as to Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action

(for violations of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

RLUIPA, respectively, the remainder of the Notice makes it clear

that moving Defendants also seek judgment as to the remaining

claim premised on the Eighth Amendment (as stated in Plaintiff’s

Third Cause of Action). In addition, because the Bivens claim

alleged in the Fourth Cause of Action is specifically predicated

on the existence violations under RLUIPA and the First and Eighth

Amendments, it too hinges on whether the underlying violations

asserted in the preceding causes of action can be established. 

Consequently, the Court believes that the instant Motion is

directed to all claims asserted against the Federal Defendants

and will treat it accordingly.

3

The grounds asserted by the Federal Defendants for judgment on

the pleadings largely mirror the grounds upon which this Court

dismissed the above-referenced claims against the County of

Sacramento and Sheriff Blanas, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), in its

June 27, 2006 Memorandum and Order. The Federal Defendants go 3

one step farther, however, in arguing that Plaintiff’s claims

should be dismissed in their entirety, including the Eighth

Amendment lack of exercise claim not subject to the County

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Federal Defendants argue that

because the United States Marshal’s Service was authorized by

statute to contract with state or local correctional facilities

to house federal prisoners (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 4002, 4013), and

since the United States cannot be liable for the actions of

independent contractors providing such services (see U.S. v.

Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-14 (1976); Logue v. U.S., 412 U.S.

521, 530 (1973), the United States must be dismissed from this

lawsuit in its entirety.

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Case 2:06-cv-00638-MCE -GGH Document 31 Filed 11/16/06 Page 3 of 6
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The only procedural difference between the two motions is 4

that a motion for judgment on the pleadings, unlike a Rule 12(b)

motion cannot be brought until after the pleadings are closed. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Since an answer on behalf of the

Federal Defendants was filed on May 30, 2006, and since codefendants County of Sacramento and Lou Blanas have also answered

Plaintiff’s Complaint (on July 7, 2006), that requirement has

been satisfied.

In addition, Defendant Anthony Amador, United States 5

Marshal for the Eastern District of California, cannot by the

same token be individually liable for care he did not participate

in providing to Plaintiff. Moreover, in arranging to contract

with Sacramento County for the care of federal inmates, Amador

could not have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when

such delegation of care was specifically authorized by federal

statute as stated above. Therefore Amador is protected by

qualified immunity in any event under the rationale articulated

by the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-02

(2001).

4

A motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state

a claim is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Craigs, Inc.

v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993). 

4

That standard is set forth in the Court’s June 27, 2006

Memorandum and Order which is incorporated herein by reference as

if fully set forth.

Plaintiff has not opposed Federal Defendants’ Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, and does not take issue with

Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff’s day-to-day care was

delegated to the County of Sacramento by contract. The Court

agrees that the United States cannot be liable any mistreatment

at the Sacramento County Jail under the rationale of Orleans and

Logue.5

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 6

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

5

Dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, with the exception of his

Eighth Amendment failure to provide adequate exercise claim, is

also appropriate for the reasons explicated by this Court in its

prior June 27, 2006 Memorandum and Order. That Order concluded

that Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, state a claim under

the facts as alleged in his pleadings for violations of either

RLUIPA, the First Amendment, or the Eighth Amendment. These same

claims are posited against all Defendants, including the Federal

Defendants.

The only additional claim asserted against the Federal

Defendants is found within the Fourth Cause of Action, which

states a Bivens claim on grounds that the Federal Defendants

“deprived [P]laintiff of his First and Eighth Amendment rights

under the [United States] Constitution and applicable federal

statutes as set forth above...” (Pl.’s Compl., 10:7-9). Hence

the viability of the Fourth Cause of Action necessarily depends

on the viability of its three predecessor claims, and any such

viability is and has been rejected by this Court.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings brought by the Federal Defendants is GRANTED. 

6

No leave to amend will be permitted. The deficiencies of

Plaintiff’s claims against the Federal Defendants cannot be

rectified through amendment. 

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6

See DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th

Cir. 1992).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-00638-MCE -GGH Document 31 Filed 11/16/06 Page 6 of 6