Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-18-01924/USCOURTS-ca3-18-01924-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-1924

__________

CHAD J. McCLOSKEY,

Appellant

v.

BUREAU CHIEF JAMES WELCH; 

DR. LOUISE DEROSIERS; CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00030)

District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect,

Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 19, 2020)

___________

OPINION*

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Chad McCloskey, an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC), appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in this civil 

rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because this appeal does not present a 

substantial question, we will summarily affirm.

In 2014, McCloskey filed a civil rights action against James Welch, the former Chief 

of the Bureau of Correctional Healthcare Services for the Delaware Department of Corrections (DOC); Correct Care Solutions (CCS), the former medical service care provider for 

the DOC; and CCS employee and the JTVCC’s medical director, Dr. Louise Desrosiers.

1

McCloskey alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the complaint2 included claims 

alleging delay of medical treatment and inadequate medical treatment. The District Court 

granted each of the defendants’ summary judgment motions,

3 and this appeal ensued. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a 

grant of summary judgment. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 

1995). Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no 

1 Dr. Desrosiers’s name was misspelled in the complaint and in the caption throughout this 

action. We use the correct spelling in this opinion. 

2 McCloskey twice amended his complaint. The District Court treated the operative complaint as those pleadings filed at District Court Docket Nos. 3, 20, and 58. 

3 CCS filed cross-claims against its co-defendants for contribution or indemnification, but 

it voluntarily dismissed those cross-claims. See D.C. Dkt. Nos. 109, 110.

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genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422–23 (3d Cir. 2006). 

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to provide medical care to 

inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). To establish a violation of this 

duty, a plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Id. at 

106. “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard 

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). For 

instance, a plaintiff may make this showing by establishing that the defendants “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] medical care.” Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05). However, “[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the 

adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical 

judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” United States ex 

rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (quoting 

Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)).

The facts underlying McCloskey’s complaint were fully set forth by the District Court,

so we only briefly recite them here. In 2005, McCloskey fractured his right shoulder in a

severe motor vehicle accident. His right humerus was surgically repaired with an intramedullary rod. On June 3, 2013, McCloskey injured that same arm while doing push-up exercises in his prison cell. An x-ray taken on June 14, 2013, showed that he had fractured 

the intramedullary rod, and that he had a preexisting humeral (nonunion) fracture. McCloskey was seen by an outside orthopedic specialist, Dr. Richard P. DuShuttle, who performed 

reconstructive surgery on McCloskey on July 29, 2013. McCloskey’s claims stem from the 

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eight-week delay between the time of his injury and his surgery, and the allegedly inadequate post-surgery follow-up care, both of which he alleges resulted in substantial harm in 

violation of his constitutional rights.4

McCloskey first alleges that defendant Dr. Desrosiers was deliberately indifferent to 

his serious medical needs by delaying his medical care.

5 As we have observed, “[a]ll that 

is needed” to establish a delay of care claim is evidence that the delay “was motivated by 

non-medical factors.” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 537 (3d Cir. 2017). 

The summary judgment record belies this claim. Within a few hours of the injury, Defendant Desrosiers was contacted by CCS medical personnel who had examined McCloskey 

and believed that he had pulled a muscle in his arm.6 Based on the information she was 

provided, Desrosiers gave a verbal order for ice packs and Tylenol, and she requested to

examine McCloskey within a week. Desrosiers examined him three days later, on June 6, 

2013. Her notes indicate that she was aware of the prior injury to the shoulder, but unsure

as to the extent of the present injury.7 Contrary to McCloskey’s allegations, on that same 

day, Desrosiers ordered an x-ray and referred McCloskey for a consult with a specialist. 

4 We agree with the District Court that McCloskey exhausted his administrative remedies 

with respect to his claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 5 Although the District Court did not directly address it, we are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that McCloskey had a serious medical 

need.

6 In his initial sick call request, McCloskey maintained that his arm was broken and that 

an x-ray on file would show that he had nerve, muscle, and bone damage from the 2005 

injury. Notably, he did not report pain, and the personnel’s assessment indicated only that 

the upper arm was tender.

7 In her notes, Desrosiers questioned whether the injury could be a strain or partial rupture 

of the biceps tendon.

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McCloskey was x-rayed about a week later on June 14; he had a follow-up appointment 

with Desrosiers on June 25 to discuss the results. Desrosiers made a second request on that 

date for an outside consult, with the notation “ASAP please.” Once McCloskey was scheduled to be seen by Dr. DuShuttle, Desrosiers faxed his office indicating that McCloskey

should be seen earlier. And when a scheduling conflict prevented McCloskey from being 

seen by DuShuttle on July 9 as scheduled, Desrosiers requested another consult that same 

day. On July 11, McCloskey was seen by DuShuttle who confirmed the fractured intramedullary rod and recommended reconstructive surgery.8 Desrosiers had a follow-up appointment with McCloskey the next day, the same day that she completed an “Outpatient Referral Request” for surgery with the notation, “please schedule ASAP.” Dr. DuShuttle performed surgery on McCloskey on July 29, 2013.

As the foregoing makes clear, and as the District Court concluded, Dr. Desrosiers continually monitored McCloskey from the day of his injury through his discharge from surgery, and “at every turn” she sought to ensure his expeditious care. McCloskey v. Welch, 

No. 1:14-cv-00030, 2018 WL 1640592, at *5 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 2018). No reasonable jury 

could find that any delay was attributable to Desrosiers, let alone that it was motivated by 

non-medical factors. 

The record also does not support McCloskey’s claim that Dr. Desrosiers provided inadequate medical care in failing to diagnose the injury after the initial examination, failing

to prescribe pain medications or a sling prior to his surgery, and failing to provide proper 

8 Dr. DuShuttle noted that McCloskey had an apparent nonunion in 2005 as well as a radial 

nerve injury and that there were signs of atrophy of his upper arm muscles.

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pain management and physical therapy post-surgery. McCloskey did not present any proof 

that Desrosiers breached a professional standard of care in her treatment of him. See Pearson, 850 F.3d at 536 (noting that to create a triable issue of fact on an inadequate medical 

care claim, a prisoner must provide extrinsic proof that the medical treatment violated a 

professional standard of care). There is no circumstantial or extrinsic evidence that every 

“minimally competent professional” would have diagnosed the injury without benefit of 

an x-ray or directed McCloskey to wear a sling.

9 Johnson v. Rimmer, 936 F.3d 695, 707 

(7th Cir. 2019). And McCloskey refused to follow Desrosiers’s initial orders to ice the arm 

and to take Tylenol because he believed it would be ineffective. “[M]ere disagreement as 

to the proper medical treatment” is insufficient to demonstrate an adequacy of care claim. 

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987);

see also Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that deliberate 

indifference requires something “more than negligence”). 

Likewise, after surgery, McCloskey refused nearly all care during his twelve-day stay 

in the infirmary. At discharge, DuShuttle ordered an antibiotic and an opioid for pain; he 

also ordered that McCloskey’s arm be kept in a sling. The record indicates that McCloskey 

refused care to the site of surgery; refused dressings, antibiotics, and pain medication; and 

generally refused to wear the sling. Moreover, DuShuttle’s notes from an August 29, 2013

examination indicate that the only post-operative complication was weakness, which he 

9 The District Court erroneously stated that McCloskey was directed “to remain on pain 

medications and to keep his arm in a sling” on July 1, 2013, 2018 WL 1640592, at *2; that 

order was given post-surgery. Nevertheless, we note that Dr. DuShuttle, the orthopedic 

expert, did not prescribe a sling or pain medications prior to the surgery.

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explained McCloskey was always going to have in his arm because of previous nerve damage. DuShuttle noted no persistent pain and no medications were indicated; nor was there 

any physical therapy prescribed.

10 Based on the record, no reasonable jury could find that 

Desrosiers acted with deliberate indifference to McCloskey’s medical needs.

Next, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment was warranted on 

McCloskey’s claims against Welch. There is no evidence in the record that Welch had any 

responsibilities other than administrative oversight of inmates’ medical care. A § 1983 action cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 

F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Welch’s sole involvement appears to be in reviewing 

McCloskey's administrative complaints related to this suit. Merely responding to or reviewing an inmate grievance does not rise to the level of personal involvement necessary 

to allege an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. See id. at 1208. And although “[a] high-ranking prison official can expose an inmate to danger by failing to correct 

serious known deficiencies in the provision of medical care to the inmate population,” 

Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 324 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d per curiam on 

other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015), McCloskey failed to 

10 Desrosiers’s progress notes on September 5, 2013, indicate that McCloskey’s shoulder 

was well healed and that he was already exercising, including doing push-ups. He reported 

experiencing pain mostly at night but that he was otherwise fine. Desrosiers cautioned 

against over-exercising. As the District Court noted, in response to McCloskey’s sick call 

requests thereafter alleging continued pain at night and weakness in his arm and wrist, he 

was evaluated by the provider and advised to take Motrin (which he refused to take, complaining it was ineffective) and continue light exercise; he has also since been moved to a 

bottom bunk and provided a wrist brace.

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identify a supervisory policy, practice, or custom which directly caused him constitutional 

harm. 

Finally, we agree with the District Court that because McCloskey failed to demonstrate 

that he suffered a violation of his constitutional rights, CCS cannot be liable under a theory 

of municipal liability. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Moreover, McCloskey’s “vague assertions” that the medical provider had a policy of providing 

inadequate medical care, without more, are inadequate to state a claim for relief under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Groman, 47 F.3d at 637. 

Based on the foregoing, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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