Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05152/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05152-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL I. BROWN-SEALS, A-44915,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SHERIFF TOM ALLMAN, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. C 14-5152 CRB (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff, an African-American prisoner at the Mendocino County Jail

(MCJ), filed a pro se complaint for damages in Mendocino County Superior Court

alleging that MCJ officials have taken no steps to stop other inmates at MCJ from

repeatedly using racial slurs to refer to him. In that complaint, plaintiff claimed

that this failure to act amounted to a violation of his federal civil rights and

specifically named as defendants Mendocino County Sheriff Tom Allman, various

other officials at MCJ, various members of the Mendocino County Board of

Supervisor (BOS), and the clerk of BOS. 

Defendants removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441

on the ground that this court has original jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal civil

rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Per order filed on April 1, 2015, the court

dismissed the complaint with leave to amend “to allege, if possible, facts showing

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that other inmates’ use of racial slurs was coupled with conduct infringing on

plaintiff’s right to personal safety so that it could be said that MCJ officials knew

that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by

failing to take reasonable steps to abate it.” Dkt. #23 at 4. The court also advised

plaintiff that he “also must allege specific facts showing how each individual

defendant actually and proximately caused the deprivation of plaintiff’s federal

civil rights of which he complains.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff promptly filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) claiming that:

(1) MCJ officials violated his federal civil rights by not taking steps to stop other

inmates from repeatedly using racial slurs to refer to him; (2) MCJ officials

violated his federal civil rights by destroying some of the inmate grievances he

filed; (3) BOS and Sheriff Allman are liable for failing to implement a policy to

stop and prevent racial discrimination; (4) MCJ officials retaliated against him for

exercising his First Amendment right to file inmate grievances and a court action;

and (5) MCJ officials denied him legal supplies and photocopy services in

violation of his right of access to the courts. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which

prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable

claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint

“is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,”

or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

§ 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Although a pretrial detainee’s claims are subject to scrutiny under the Due Process

Clause, the Eighth Amendment serves as a benchmark for evaluating those claims. See

Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996) (Eighth Amendment guarantees

provide minimum standard of care for pretrial detainees). 

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two

essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a

person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it

permit inhumane ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The

treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993).1 In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual

punishment,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may

not, for example, use excessive force against prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The Eighth Amendment also imposes duties on these

officials, who must provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 832; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). 

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendent only when two requirements

are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively sufficiently serious; and

(2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834. In prison-condition cases, the necessary state of mind is one of

deliberate indifference – a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he

knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that

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risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. Negligence is not

enough to establish liability under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 835–36 & n.4. 

An “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived

but did not, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” 

Id. at 838.

The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other

inmates may violate the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 832–33; Hearns v.

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). But the failure of prison officials to

protect inmates from verbal harassment and abuse is different because it is well

established that allegations of verbal harassment and abuse fail to state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir.

1997) overruled in part on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878,

884–85 (9th Cir. 2008); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353

(9th Cir. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983). This is so

even if the verbal harassment is racially motivated. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at

1252 (federal court cannot order guards to refrain from using racial slurs to harass

prisoners); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 101 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986) (use of

racial slurs in prison does not offend the Constitution). But verbal harassment

coupled with conduct implicating the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against

cruel and unusual punishment may present a cognizable claim under § 1983. Id. at

101 n.1 (racially derogatory language coupled with conduct infringing on

prisoner’s right to security of his person may present a cognizable claim). 

Although regrettable, plaintiff’s allegations that MCJ officials ignored other

inmates’ use of racial slurs against him, and that some of the officials even laughed

at the use of racial slurs, are not enough to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. 

See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1252; Burton, 791 F.2d at 101 n.1. Plaintiff was

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afforded an opportunity to amend to possibly state a cognizable claim of deliberate

indifference to his safety, but the facts set forth in the FAC, even under liberal

constructions, do not show that the racial slurs were coupled with conduct that

infringed on plaintiff’s right to personal safety so that it could be said that MCJ

officials knew that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Plaintiff’s 

racial slurs allegations accordingly are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 

 Plaintiff alleges that on several occasions MCJ officials destroyed his

inmate grievances and/or the supporting evidence he attached to the grievances. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are dismissed for failure to state a claim under § 1983

because it is well established that there is no constitutional right to a prison

administrative appeal or grievance system, see Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,

860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), and that

the creation of a prison administrative appeal or grievance system does not

implicate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, see Antonelli v.

Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494,

495 (8th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiff’s claim that BOS and Sheriff Allman are liable under § 1983 for

failing to implement a policy to stop and prevent racial discrimination also must be

dismissed under the authority of § 1915A(b). In its April 1, 2015 order of

dismissal with leave to amend, the court explained that in order to impose local

government liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the plaintiff

possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the local

government had a policy, practice or custom; (3) that this policy, practice or

custom amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights;

and (4) that the policy, practice or custom was the moving force behind the

constitutional violation. Dkt. #23 at 4 n.2 (citing Plumeau v. School Dist. #40

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County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff cannot satisfy the

first requirement because his racial slurs allegations are not enough to state a claim

under § 1983 for violation of a constitutional right. 

Plaintiff alleges that correctional deputies Cynthia De Los Santos, Wagner

and J. Uribe retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to file

inmate grievances and a court action. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that: (1) on

September 17, 2014, Correctional Deputy Cynthia De Los Santos filed a false

report against plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff filing an inmate grievance that

involved De Los Santos’ two inmate brothers; (2) on October 3, 2014, De Los

Santos filed another false report against plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff filing a

grievance against De Los Santos on September 26, 2014; (3) on December 13,

2014, Correctional Deputy Wagner encouraged an inmate to approach plaintiff “in

a homosexual manner” in retaliation for plaintiff filing inmate grievances and a

court action; and (4) on December 17, 2014, Correctional Deputy J. Uribe

intentionally wrote-up plaintiff for an unfounded minor infraction of possessing

Ajax cleaning supplies in retaliation for plaintiff filing inmate grievances and a

court action.

It is well established that prisoners may not be retaliated against for filing

prison grievances and appeals, or for filing court actions. See Rhodes v. Robinson,

408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th

Cir. 1995). Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations appear to state arguably

cognizable retaliation claims under § 1983 against previously unnamed defendants

correctional deputies Cynthia De Los Santos, Wagner, and J. Uribe, and will be

served on them. See, e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-18 (9th Cir.

2012) (cognizable claim under § 1983 where in retaliation for filing grievances,

inmate was issued false disciplinary charge by officer, denied parole in part due to

false statements made by another officer, threatened to be punched by third officer,

and deprived of food by fourth officer; however, no retaliation stemming from bare

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allegation of fifth officer’s harassing behavior). 

Plaintiff alleges that MCJ Inmate Services staff member Vicki Phillips

denied him legal supplies and photocopy services for his pending lawsuits outside

of Mendocino County in violation of his right of access to the courts. But

plaintiff’s denial of access to the courts claim against Phillips may not be brought

in the same federal court action as plaintiff’s retaliation claims against correctional

deputies Cynthia De Los Santos, Wagner, and J. Uribe. Under the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff may properly join as many claims as he has against

an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). But parties may be joined as defendants

in one action only “if any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally,

or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or

fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 

Put simply, claims against different parties may be joined together in one

complaint only if the claims have similar factual backgrounds and have common

issues of law or fact. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff’s denial of access to the courts claim against Phillips accordingly is

dismissed without prejudice to bringing in a separate court action. The instant

action will proceed as to plaintiff’s retaliation claims against De Los Santos,

Wagner, and Uribe only.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown,

1. The clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall

serve, without prepayment of fees, copies of the FAC (dkt. #24), all attachments

thereto, and copies of this order and all prior orders on MCJ correctional deputies

Cynthia De Los Santos, J. Uribe, and Wagner. All other defendants are dismissed. 

The clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on all parties. 

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the court orders as

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follows:

a. No later than 90 days from the date of this order, defendants

shall serve and file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A

motion for summary judgment must be supported by adequate factual

documentation and must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from the

events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a

Rand notice so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is

required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935

(9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th

Cir. 1998) must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies (where

such a motion, rather than a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust,

is appropriate) must be accompanied by a similar notice. Stratton v. Buck, 697

F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012); Woods, 684 F.3d at 935 (notice requirement set

out in Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other

grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), must

be served concurrently with motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available

administrative remedies). 

If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by

summary judgment or other dispositive motion, they shall so inform the court prior

to the date their motion is due. All papers filed with the court shall be served

promptly on plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff must serve and file an opposition or statement of

non-opposition to the dispositive motion not more than 28 days after the motion is

served and filed. 

c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

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Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary

judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no

genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that

would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party

you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by

declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in

[current Rule 56(c)], that contradicts the facts shown in the defendants’

declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact

for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary

judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154 F.3d at

962-63.

Plaintiff also is advised that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

available administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end

your case, albeit without prejudice. You must “develop a record” and present it in

your opposition in order to dispute any “factual record” presented by the

defendants in their motion to dismiss. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. You have

the right to present any evidence to show that you did exhaust your available

administrative remedies before coming to federal court. Such evidence may

include: (1) declarations, which are statements signed under penalty of perjury by

you or others who have personal knowledge of relevant matters; (2) authenticated

documents – documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came

from and why they are authentic, or other sworn papers such as answers to

interrogatories or depositions; (3) statements in your complaint insofar as they

were made under penalty of perjury and they show that you have personal

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knowledge of the matters state therein. In considering a motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust, the court can decide disputed issues of fact with regard to this

portion of the case. Stratton, 697 F.3d at 1008-09. 

(The Rand and Wyatt/Stratton notices above do not excuse defendants’

obligation to serve said notices again concurrently with motions to dismiss for

failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and motions for summary

judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935.)

d. Defendants must serve and file a reply to an opposition not

more than 14 days after the opposition is served and filed. 

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply

is due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later

date. 

3. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

4. All communications by plaintiff with the court must be served on

defendants, or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a

true copy of the document to defendants or defendants’ counsel.

5. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must

keep the court and all parties informed of any change of address and must comply

with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the

dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 20, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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