Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00040/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00040-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SAMUEL K. ROUSE, *

 *

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION No. 04-00040-P-B

 *

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, *

Commissioner of Social *

Security, *

 *

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for

Attorney's Fees, and supporting memorandum (Docs. 32 & 33).

This action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for

report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and Local Rule 72.2(c)(3). Upon consideration of the pertinent

pleadings, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that

Plaintiff should receive a reasonable attorney's fee in the

amount of $1,762.50.

I. Findings Of Fact

1. Plaintiff commenced this action on January 16, 2004.

(Doc. 1). On February 22, 2005, the Court entered Judgment

pursuant to sentence four of § 205(g) of the Social Security

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and remanded this cause to afford the

Commissioner of Social Security an opportunity to locate missing

documents and thereby provide an accurate and complete record.

Case 1:04-cv-00040-P-B Document 36 Filed 11/23/05 Page 1 of 10
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(Doc. 31).

2. Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney's fees

on May 23, 2005. (Docs. 32 & 33). In the motion, Plaintiff

requests an attorney's fee award of $3,079.60. (Id.) The

attorney's fee award represents a total of 20 hours, at an

hourly rate of $153.98 per hour, for time spent representing

Plaintiff in this Court. (Id.)

3. The Commissioner of Social Security filed a Response

to Plaintiff's motion on June 13, 2005, wherein she objects to

both the requested hourly rate and the number of hours

submitted. (Doc. 35).

II. Conclusions Of Law

The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that "the most useful

starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Watford v. Heckler,

765 F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). See also Jean v. Nelson,

863 F.2d 759, 772-772 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing the

reasonableness of the hours expended in the context of

contentions by the government that the fee requests were not

supported by sufficient documentation and often involved a

duplication of effort), aff'd sub nom, Commissioner, I.N.S. v.

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On March 29, 1996, the EAJA was amended so as to increase the statutory

cap on EAJA fees from $75.00 per hour to $125.00 per hour. See, e.g, Ikner v.

Apfel, 2000 WL 1844704, *2 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2000). These amendments

apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of enactment; therefore,

the statutory cap of $125.00 per hour applies in this present action.

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Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990).

A. EAJA Hourly Rate

1. The EAJA (as amended)1 provides, in relevant part, as

follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall

be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and

quality of the services furnished, except that . . .

attorneys fees shall not be awarded in excess of

$125.00 per hour unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special factor,

such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a

higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added.) 

2. In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992),

the Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a twostep analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to be

applied in calculating attorneys fees under the Act: 

The first step in the analysis, . . . is to determine

the market rate for “similar services [provided] by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience,

and reputation.” . . . The second step, which is

needed only if the market rate is greater than

[$125.00] per hour, is to determine whether the court

should adjust the hourly fee upward from [$125.00] to

take into account an increase in the cost of living,

or a special factor. 

Id. at 1033-1034 (citations and footnote omitted). 

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See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571-572 (1987) (holding

that Congress determined that $125.00 per hour is "quite enough" public

reimbursement for Social Security counsel under EAJA); and Waller v.

Commissioner of Social Security, CV 01-0253-BH-L (Jan. 21, 2003). 

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3. Although Plaintiff argues that an increase in the cost

of living has occurred thus justifying a 23% fee increase, he

has cited no cases from this district in which a fee in excess

of the $125.00 cap was awarded. Moreover, the Court's own

research has revealed that $125.00 per hour is the going rate in

this District for social security awards. See, e.g., Boone v.

Apfel, CV 99-0965-CB-L (August 20, 2001) (adopted Magistrate

Judge's recommendation that the prevailing market rate be raised

from $117.00 to the EAJA cap of $125.00); Willits v. Massanari,

CV 00-0530-RV-C (same); and Boggs v. Massanari, CV 00-0408-P-C

(same). 

4. While the district court has authority to increase the

fee, it is not required to do so.2 Id.; Hall v. Shalala, 50 F.3d

367, 369 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'd., 50 F.3d 367, reh'g den., 62.

F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 1995). As aptly noted by the Fifth Circuit,

the statutory cap serves to "ensure an adequate source of

representation" and to minimize the cost of representation to

tax payers - the dual purposes of the EAJA. Id. at 369-370.

Based on the record before the Court, the undersigned finds that

the requested 23% fee increase is not justified, and that the

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current $125.00 rate is adequately ensuring that the purposes of

the EAJA are met. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends a

hourly rate of $125.00.

B. Reasonableness of Hours

5. The undersigned must also determine the reasonableness

of the hours claimed by Plaintiff's attorney, Ms. Rose A.

McPhillips, Esq., in light of Defendant's contention that the

requested 20 hours of time "is excessive in light of the brevity

and small number of pleadings Plaintiff filed in this matter[]"

and that only 13.8 of the hours should be compensated. (Doc. 35

at 5). Specifically, Defendant opposes Plaintiff's counsel

being compensated for 5.9 hours spent preparing an initial

summarization of the record and beginning to draft Plaintiff's

proposed report and recommendation, because "she should have

known, based on her itemization, that the record was incomplete

when she received and reviewed it [for some 1.8 hours] on

November 27, 2004." (Id.) Defendant also opposes Plaintiff's

counsel being compensated for 1.3 hours spent preparing the EAJA

petition, because this Court typically awards 1.0 hour for

preparation of the fee petition, and in this instance,

Plaintiff's counsel "used a modified version of a brief that has

been used and awarded time in other EAJA petitions in this

Court[]" and as such, should not be compensated for the .3

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hours. (Id.)

6. In the case sub judice, attached to Plaintiff’s motion,

is a time sheet detailing the description of work performed, the

time expended and the date on which the work was performed.

(Doc. 32 at Attachment 2). The undersigned has reviewed the

pleadings of the parties and the itemization and finds that some

of times attributed to the task are due to be reduced. 

7. First, the undersigned agrees with Defendant's claim

that Plaintiff's counsel should not be compensated for 5.9 hours

of time spent preparing an initial summarization of the records

(2.7 hours) and beginning to draft the proposed report and

recommendation (3.2 hours). (Doc. 35 at 2). Based on the time

sheet, it is clear that Plaintiff's counsel had already

completed an initial review of the transcript before commencing

these two tasks. Thus, this initial review should have alerted

Plaintiff's counsel to the fact that various standard documents

were missing from the transcript. Accordingly, the additional

5.9 hours spent summarizing the records and working on the

proposed report and recommendation should be deducted as

unreasonable. 

8. Second, Defendant's claim that Plaintiff's counsel

should not be compensated for .3 hours of the 1.3 hours

submitted for preparation of Plaintiff's EAJA documentation is

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without merit. (Doc. 35 at 5). The undersigned has compared the

motion and brief filed by Plaintiff's counsel in the present

case to other motions and briefs she has filed in different

cases, such as in Goodman v. Barnhart, CV-03-00669-C, and is

satisfied that the arguments have been sufficiently altered.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the 1.3 hours of

attorney work, listed as preparing EAJA documentation on May 21,

2005, be included in the total number of hours. 

9. In sum, under the circumstances and given the usual

number of hours billed by attorneys in similar actions, the

undersigned recommends a total reduction of time of 5.9 hours

such that Plaintiff's counsel is entitled to 14.1 hours of

attorney time expended representing Plaintiff in federal court.

See, e.g., Coleman v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1367992 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 30,

2000).

10. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff should be awarded

an attorney's fee in the amount of $1,762.50, based upon the

EAJA statutory cap and prevailing market rate of $125.00 for the

14.1 hours his attorney spent performing work traditionally

performed by attorneys in social security cases.

III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, upon consideration of the pertinent pleadings,

the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

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Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to

Justice Act be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, as follows:

the EAJA award should be limited to the EAJA rate of $125.00 per

hour, thereby resulting in an award of $1,726.50 for 14.1

attorney hours spent representing Plaintiff in connection with

this action. 

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to the undersigned's report and recommendation.

DONE this 23rd day of November, 2005.

 /s/ Sonja F. Bivins 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk

of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by

the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will

bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the

magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for

challenging the findings and recommendations of the magistrate

judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1,

1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served

with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different

time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the

recommendation to which objection is made and the

basis for the objection. The objecting party shall

submit to the district judge, at the time of filing

the objection, a brief setting forth the party’s

arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition

made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the

original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted

or referred to and incorporated into the brief in

support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief

in support of the objection may be deemed an

abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to

a Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment

can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10)

days of being served with a copy of the statement of objection.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

Case 1:04-cv-00040-P-B Document 36 Filed 11/23/05 Page 9 of 10
3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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