Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01833/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01833-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD GATHRIGHT, No. CIV S-02-1833-DFL-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

T.L. ROSARIO, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 69). Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

I. BACKGROUND

Dr. Frishman, a prison staff psychiatrist, interviewed plaintiff in his holding cell on

October 22, 2001. Dr. Frishman noted that plaintiff was exhibiting signs of grandiosity and

paranoia consistent with plaintiff’s schizophrenia. Dr. Frishman recommended that plaintiff be

admitted to the prison infirmary in order to change his medications. Because plaintiff would not

voluntarily leave his cell to go to the infirmary, an extraction team was assembled at 2:30 p.m. to

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forcibly extract plaintiff from his cell if he continued to refuse to cooperate. Due to plaintiff’s

history of prior assaults on prison staff, and in light of his deteriorating condition, all efforts were

made to persuade plaintiff to submit to handcuffs before opening his cell door. As plaintiff

continued to resist, defendant Akin, a correctional officer, admonished plaintiff that he would be

sprayed with pepper spray if he did not cooperate. Plaintiff continued to resist.

Throughout the next forty-five minutes, defendants Akin and Walker continually

attempted to get plaintiff to leave his cell. Plaintiff was intermittently sprayed with pepper spray

during this period. At 3:15 p.m., defendant Rosario recommended the use of tear gas to gain

plaintiff’s cooperation. After being exposed to tear gas, plaintiff finally submitted to handcuffing

and was immediately escorted to a decontamination shower.

Plaintiff took a 9-minute shower, but continued to refuse to go to the infirmary. 

After his shower, plaintiff attempted to kick correctional officers. Plaintiff was eventually

physically restrained and taken to the infirmary. 

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

always bears thUe nindietira slu rmesmpoanrysijbuidligtym oefn itn pfroarcmtiicneg, the mdiostvrinctgcpoaurrttyof the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment

motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

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sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in

Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations

or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of

affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On July 3, 2003, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel

and unusual conditions of confinement as a result of the October 22, 2001, cell extraction. In their

motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that there is no evidence of the use of excessive

force. Specifically, defendants assert that the force used was justified and not applied maliciously

for the purpose of causing harm to plaintiff. Defendants also assert that they are entitled to

qualified immunity. 

/ / /

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A. Excessive Force

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth

Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,

and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission

must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly

for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth

Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial

inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992);

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as

opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, is

applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect on

their actions in the fact of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at

320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following factors:

(1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship between the

need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably perceived by

prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See Hudson,

503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force was applied

maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 

The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, because the use of

force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining security and order, the

court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22. 

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An analysis of these factors in light of the facts of this case clearly shows that

defendants did not act maliciously or sadistically in the course of the October 22, 2001, cell

extraction. First, given plaintiff’s medical condition, there was a need to remove plaintiff to the

infirmary. Second, plaintiff was given every opportunity to be taken to the infirmary voluntarily

and without the use of force. Third, after plaintiff resisted, there was a need for the use of force in

order to get plaintiff to the infirmary. Fourth, the amount of force used was reasonable in light of

plaintiff’s resistance. In short, force in this case was applied in a good-faith effort to both

maintain order and obtain for plaintiff the medical attention he needed. 

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims. 

B. Qualified Immunity

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their

conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In general, qualified immunity

protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs,

475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is

whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the

defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established. See id. This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not

as a broad general proposition . . . .” Id. “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must

have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202 (citation omitted). Thus, the final step in the analysis is to

determine whether a reasonable officer in similar circumstances would have thought his conduct

violated the alleged right. See id. at 205. 

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When identifying the right allegedly violated, the court must define the right more

narrowly than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than the factual

circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Kelly v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995).

For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand [that] what [the official] is doing violates the right.” See

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Ordinarily, once the court concludes that a right

was clearly established, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonably

competent public official is charged with knowing the law governing his conduct. See Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). However, even if the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a

clearly established right, the government official is entitled to qualified immunity if he could have

“. . . reasonably but mistakenly believed that his . . . conduct did not violate the right.” Jackson v.

City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 

The first two steps in the qualified immunity analysis involve purely legal questions.

See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). The third inquiry involves a legal

determination based on a prior factual finding as to the government official’s conduct. See Neely v.

Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). In resolving these issues, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of

plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In this case, as discussed above, the facts do not establish that defendants violated any

of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, qualified immunity does not apply. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be granted and that judgment be entered accordingly.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, any partymay file written objections with the court.

The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and

Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time maywaive the right to appeal

the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 24, 2005.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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