Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01256/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01256-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

August 6, 1996 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 95-1256 Double J. Land & Cattle v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, et al. 

June 26, 1996 by The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision: 

The footnotes which were referenced by double asterisk(**) have been changed to 

numerals 1 and 2. 

Enclosed please find a revised copy. 

encl. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, Clerk 

Beth Morris 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 95-1256 Document: 01019279508 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 1 
PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

llolted States Court of Appeals 

Ttnth CJrcuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DOUBLE J. LAND & CATTLE CO. and 

PETER A. JAFFE, 

Plaintiff- Appellants, 

V. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND 

MANAGEMENT, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

JUN 2 6 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-1256 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 93-C-1306) 

Peter A. Jaffe, Jaffe and Asher, Vail, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Tamara N. Rountree, Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, Washington, D.C., Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, Robert D. 

Clark, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, David C. Shilton, Dep't of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., with her on the brief; Lowell J. Madsen, Regional Solicitor's 

Office, Dep't oflnterior, Denver, Colorado, of counsel), for Defendants- Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, ALARCON* and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

• The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth 

Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-1256 Document: 01019279508 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 2 
LUCERO, Circuit Judge. 

This case presents a novel issue. Appellants, who openly concede that they are 

trespassing on public land, nevertheless seek to estop the United States Government, 

acting through the Department oflnterior's Bureau of Land Management, from ordering 

them to remove a dam and pond constructed on federal land in December 1988. 

Underlying their argument is the belief that they are entitled to base a claim of estoppel 

upon a naked reliance on asserted government misrepresentation, without any underlying 

claim of title to the land itself. We conclude that the government may not be estopped 

from evicting a trespasser who has not attempted to establish a colorable claim of title to 

public land. 

I 

This is the second lawsuit between Double J. Land & Cattle Co. ("Double J"), a 

cattle ranching operation, and BLM, arising from a land exchange in western Colorado. 

Prior to the exchange, Double J owned two separate parcels in northern Eagle County: a 

main ranch of 1, 125 acres, and a 55 5 acre parcel known as the "little place." In the 

exchange, the government obtained title to the "little place," and by so doing removed an 

impediment to access to 12,000 acres of public lands. In return, Double J received 

parcels adjacent to the main ranch totaling approximately 489 acres, and 60 additional 

acres in Garfield County. One of Double J's interests in the exchange was to "cure'' 

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trespasses on public lands it had occupied and enclosed by acquiring title to those lands. 

The land exchange was completed on June 3, 1987 although a lawsuit regarding the 

legality of an easement reserved by BLM was not resolved until 1990. 

While the easement litigation was still pending, BLM learned that Double J had 

constructed a dam and pond on public land fenced in by prior owners of the ranch, just 

beyond the western edge of the property. The dam and pond are located in the northwest 

quarter of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 84 West, Sixth Principal Meridian and 

will be referred to in this opinion as the "Section 29 trespass." BLM issued a Notice of 

Trespass addressed both to Double J and to appellant Peter A. Jaffe, counsel of record and 

apparently a corporate officer ofDouble J. See 43 C.P.R. § 2801.3(b). Double J 

immediately filed a Rule 60(b) motion, seeking to void the settlement ofthe easement 

litigation on the grounds of fraud or mistake, and raising several of the same objections to 

the Notice of Trespass appellants raise today. The magistrate judge assigned to hear the 

motion recommended that it be denied, and the district court accepted the 

recommendation. 

While the Rule 60(b) motion was pending, Double J and Jaffe appealed the Notice 

of Trespass to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). BLM then forwarded its case 

file to the IBLA as required by Utah Chapter Sierra Club, 114 I.B.L.A. 172 (1990). BLM 

did not, however, serve appellants with copies of the case file. Appellants requested an 

evidentiary hearing before the IBLA, but were denied. Appellants contended that BLM 

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Appellate Case: 95-1256 Document: 01019279508 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 4 
represented that the 1987 land exchange would cure all trespasses on public land by 

Double J, that the BLM concealed the existence of the trespass on the western boundary 

of its property, and that Jaffe is not a proper party. 

The IBLA treated appellants' primary contention as one of equitable estoppel 

against the government and rejected it. Double J Land and Cattle Co., 126 I.B.L.A. 101, 

106-07 ( 1993 ). The IBLA assumed that a trespasser on public lands may invoke estoppel 

against the government upon a showing of"affirmative misconduct." Id. at 107. It noted 

that BLM had never represented that the land exchange would cure all trespasses, nor did 

it conceal the existence of the trespass at issue from Double J. The IBLA did not address 

the question of whether Jaffe was a proper party to the action. 

Appellants then filed this suit in the district court under 5 U.S.C. § 702. They 

claimed that BLM's failure to serve copies of the entire case file on appellants violated 

agency procedures and resulted in severe prejudice to them. See 43 C.F .R. § 4.22(b) 

(requiring service on opposing parties of"each document" presented to the IBLA). 

Further, appellants alleged that the IBLA abused its discretion by denying them an 

evidentiary hearing. Appellants did not request, as Double J had in the easement 

litigation, that the land exchange be set aside, nor did they seek reformation of the 

exchange to conform to Double J's expectations. 1 Instead, they conceded that only 

1 Double J's decision not to seek reformation of the land exchange in this litigation 

is somewhat perplexing considering that if it had, it would have a stronger claim of 

entitlement to the land in question. Double J did not seek reformation, yet BLM raised 

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Appellate Case: 95-1256 Document: 01019279508 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 5 
"three of the four trespasses were cured by the exchange. The fourth trespass [became] 

the subject of the Notice [of Trespass]." Complaint at 132. Double J reasserted its main 

contention that the BLM was estopped from complaining about the Section 29 trespass, 

and Jaffe reasserted his claim that he is not a proper party. 

In its final order, the district court rejected appellants' claims. Like the IBLA, the 

district court assumed that an estoppel defense is available to a trespasser on public lands 

who has not attempted to establish a colorable claim to the property. The district court 

found that BLM had indeed failed to follow its own procedures in not serving the case 

file, but as the error was harmless, no denial of due process occurred. It found no abuse 

of discretion in the denial of an evidentiary hearing. Finally, noting the absence of 

evidence in the administrative record relating to Jaffe's relationship with Double J, it 

found no abuse of discretion in the IBLA's failure to dismiss him from the case. 

On appeal, Double J claims that it was deprived of the opportunity to prove BLM's 

affirmative misconduct by BLM's failure to serve the case file and the IBLA's refusal to 

allow an evidentiary hearing. Double J "does not claim that the trespass was cured by the 

land exchange." Appellants' Reply Br. at 2. Double J argues only that estoppel may lie 

against the government because, even though the company has no patent or other 

collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense to reformation. The district court rejected 

BLM's argument in an interlocutory order. Although this order paved the way for 

Double J to argue that it had a contractual entitlement to the land, it elected to rely on its 

estoppel defense alone. 

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document suggesting that it is entitled to occupy the Section 29 trespass, it detrimentally 

relied upon BLM's alleged misrepresentations that the trespass would be cured by the 

exchange. We affirm the district court's judgment as to Double J, although on different 

grounds than those relied upon below. See United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 

n.6 (lOth Cir. 1994) (appellate court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record). 

We reverse the district court's finding that IBLA did not abuse its discretion in declining 

to dismiss Jaffe as a party. 

II 

Both sides focus on whether the IBLA afforded appellants due process. 

The Due Process Clause protects against the improper deprivation of a significant 

property interest. 'Consideration of what procedures due process may require 

under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the 

precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private 

interest that has been affected by governmental action.' 

Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Office ofThrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1471 (lOth Cir. 

1994) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 

(1961)) (further quotation and internal brackets omitted). In order to trigger the 

protections of the Due Process Clause, Double J must show that it has a "legitimate claim 

of entitlement" to remain on the Section 29 trespass. Richman v. Straley, 48 F .3d 1139, 

1143 (lOth Cir. 1995) (quoting Board ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 

Before we determine whether appellants' due process rights were protected, we must 

inquire as to whether Double J has a protected interest in estopping the government from 

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Appellate Case: 95-1256 Document: 01019279508 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 7 
complaining of its acknowledged trespass on public lands. We cannot simply assume that 

an interest protected by the Due Process Clause exists and then inquire as to whether the 

parties have received the process due to them. Id.; Franklin Savings, 35 F.3d at 1471. 

Appellants' complaint filed in the district court merely contends that "the BLM 

should be equitably estopped from enforcing the Notice [of Trespass]." Complaint at ~ 

35. Double J does not allege statutory adverse possession or ownership of the property, 

nor does it seek reformation of the contract to conform to its alleged expectations. In 

short, Double J offers no legal theory to support its claim to the Section 29 trespass other 

than its bald belief that an estoppel defense is appropriate to preclude enforcement of a 

Notice of Trespass if the government has affirmatively misled the trespasser into 

believing it properly occupied the land -- even if the trespass is not under a claim of right. 

Based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697 

(9th Cir. 1978), the IBLA assumed that an estoppel defense was available to Double J and 

Jaffe. However, Ruby Co., like our decision in Sweeten v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 684 F.2d 

679, 682 (lOth Cir. 1982), dealt with a claim that the government's erroneous survey of 

the boundaries between private and public land estopped it from denying the private 

landowners' interpretation of the boundaries established by land patents. Ruby Co., 588 

F .2d at 701. In these cases, the parties seeking to estop the government did not concede 

that they were trespassers. 

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Appellate Case: 95-1256 Document: 01019279508 Date Filed: 07/26/1996 Page: 8 
Estoppel against the government is disfavored. We have said that '"[i]t is far from 

clear that the Supreme Court would ever allow an estoppel against the government under 

any set of circumstances."' DePaolo v. United States (In re DePaolo), 45 F.3d 373, 376 

(lOth Cir. 1995) (guotin~ F.D.I.C. v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1490 (lOth Cir. 1994)). 

Nevertheless, we have countenanced application of the estoppel doctrine against the 

government when doing so would not "frustrate the purpose of the statutes expressing the 

will of Congress or unduly undermine the enforcement of the public laws." Id. (guotin~ 

Hulsey, 22 F.3d at 1489). The estoppel requested in this case fails both of these tests. 

BLM's mandate to manage public lands is found in the Federal Land Policy and 

Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84. In passing FLPMA, Congress 

expressed its intent that "the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a 

result of the land use planning procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that 

disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national interest." 43 U.S.C. § 170l(a)(l); 

see also id. at (a)(9) (Congressional policy that government should receive "fair market 

value of the use of the public lands and their resources"). To estop the government from 

complaining of a trespass would effectively permit the trespasser to enjoy the use of those 

lands without color of title, without reference to FLPMA's land use planning procedure, 

without payment of fair market value, and without any determination that such transfer 

would be in the national interest. Moreover, it would prevent the government from 

effectively enforcing the laws against trespassing on the public lands. See. e.~., 18 U .S.C. 

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§ 1863 (making trespass on certain public lands a crime); 43 U.S.C. § 1061 (prohibiting 

inclosures ofpublic lands); see also United States v. Brown, 672 F.2d 808, 810 (lOth Cir. 

1982) (occupants of unpatented mining claims are "subject to trespass claims and 

ejectment actions by the United States if the land cannot be patented"). 

The Supreme Court has held: 

The Government, which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the 

people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed 

particularly for private disputes over individually owned pieces of property; and 

officers who have no authority at all to dispose of property cannot by their conduct 

cause the government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or 

failure to act. 

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947). See also Utah Power & Light Co. v. 

United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404 (1917) (interests in public lands may be acquired only 

through procedures established by Congress); United States v. Osterlund, 671 F.2d 1267, 

1268 (lOth Cir. 1982) ("courts have no power to adjust the parties' equities in 

determining title to federal lands" because Congress alone determines how public lands 

will be managed). BLM officials do not have authority to dispose of public lands except 

through statutory procedures. To allow a trespasser on public lands to estop the 

government from remedying the trespass would be contrary to the policy underlying the 

Supreme Court's California decision, the laws against trespass on public lands, and 

Congress' clearly expressed policy to dispose of interests in public lands only through 

statutory procedures. 

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We have found only one case, United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 

1975), holding the government estopped from complaining of a trespass, not supported by 

a colorable claim of title, on public lands. In Wharton, the IBLA denied a patent under 

the Color of Title Act, which authorizes adverse possession claims under limited 

circumstances against the United States if possession began prior to 1901. See 43 U.S.C. 

§ 1068. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the IBLA's denial, but reversed nevertheless because 

it concluded that the government had deliberately misled the appellants into believing that 

the time had expired for filing a claim under the Desert-Land Entry Act. Wharton, 514 

F.2d at 410. In that case, decided before Congress passed FLPMA, the Ninth Circuit 

gave effect to Congress' policy preferences expressed through statutory enactments. We 

do the same today. Wharton retains its vitality in cases where the government's 

misconduct deprives a party of the opportunity to establish a colorable claim of title. 

BLM's alleged misconduct in this case does not parallel the misconduct supporting 

estoppel in Wharton. Double J was represented by counsel that had full opportunity to 

satisfy himself of all aspects of the exchange prior to closing. Having failed to do so, he 

complains that he was misled. A careful review of the record reveals that the misconduct 

alleged, even if proven to be true, could not have deprived Double J of any opportunity to 

cure the Section 29 trespass. First, the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the 

exchange, signed by Jaffe as President of Double J, clearly indicates that the government 

did not offer any land in Section 29. Second, BLM found, and the IBLA agreed, that 

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curing that trespass "would have unbalanced the value" of the lands exchanged. Double J 

Land, 1261.B.L.A. at 108-09; see also Notice ofRealty Action, 51 Fed. Reg. 15388 

(April 23, 1986) (description oflands offered to Double J accompanied by BLM 

statement that "[t]he values of the land to be exchanged have been determined to be 

approximately equal"). Double J does not contest this finding; it remains free to propose 

another land exchange. From the record we conclude that Double J has not been deprived 

of an opportunity to acquire title to the land in question; rather, it seeks to gain through 

estoppel what it failed to obtain through the FLPMA exchange process. 

Because Congress' policy choice would be thwarted by the application of estoppel 

in this case, we cannot recognize the possibility of estoppel against the government here. 

In re DePaolo, 45 FJd at 376; Hulsey, 22 FJd at 1489. Double J elected to rely entirely 

on its estoppel argument. It did not seek any other potential remedy. We conclude that 

Double J has alleged no interest requiring due process protection.2 The IBLA and district 

court did not err in rejecting Double J's estoppel and due process claims. 

2 Our resolution of this question is in no way foreclosed by our statement in 

Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1565 (lOth Cir. 1994) that, when 

due process is raised in an administrative appeal, we may affirm "only on the grounds 

articulated by the agency itself." In Olenhouse, there was no question that appellants, 

farmers participating in a government subsidy program, had a property interest in the 

benefits provided by the program. See id. at 1567-68. A question of due process is not 

raised when, as here, the party claiming a violation cannot show a constitutionally 

protected interest. Richman, 48 FJd at 1143. Olenhouse does not prevent us from 

inquiring, as a threshold matter, whether appellants have an interest protected by due 

process. 

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• III 

The only question remaining is whether Peter Jaffe is a proper party to this action. 

He argues that as a corporate officer of Double J, he may not be held personally liable for 

its actions. Although the IBLA did not address the question, it affirmed the Notice of 

Trespass, which named Jaffe, in full. The district court addressed the issue and affirmed, 

noting that Jaffe had presented no evidence showing that he is not a proper party. This 

was error. 

When an agency makes a decision, "the grounds upon which the agency acted 

must be clearly disclosed in, and sustained by, the record." Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1575. 

Here, the agency has provided no explanation whatsoever of its decision to keep Jaffe in 

the case, and the record, as the district court noted, is devoid of facts supporting the 

conclusion that Jaffe, as an individual, is trespassing on federal land. The burden is not 

on the petitioner to show that beneath the agency's silence lies an arbitrary and capricious 

conclusion. It is impossible to conclude from the IBLA's silence, and the absence of 

evidence linking Jaffe personally to the trespass, that its decision not to dismiss Jaffe was 

the product of reasoned decisionmaking. The district court erred in affirming its decision 

on a silent record. See id. In the absence of any evidence that Jaffe was properly named 

in the Notice of Trespass, it was arbitrary and capricious for the IBLA to keep him in the 

case. 

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• CONCLUSION 

We REVERSE the judgment of the district court with regard to the status of Peter 

Jaffe as a party in this case, and REMAND with instructions to vacate the Notice of 

Trespass as to him. In all other respects, we AFFIRM. 

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