Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03348/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03348-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

E.J. MCELROY,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY ADAM, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-03348-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST REQUEST

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TRO; 

DENYING HIS REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENT 

OF COUNSEL; GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND 

DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO FILE RESPONSE 

TO SECOND REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION AND REPLY TO OPPOSITION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against prison officials at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”). It seems that Plaintiff claims 

that he was not provided with adequate medical and dental care at PBSP. 

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s requests for appointment of counsel (dkts. 38, 44), and his 

two motions which are construed as requests for a preliminary injunction and temporary 

restraining order (“TRO”), entitled as follows: “Motion for Specific Conduct Orders Along the 

Lines of Grievance Log #’s Along With Notice/Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Ex Parte 

Medical Injunction Accord Stipulation” (hereinafter “First Request for Preliminary Injunction and 

TRO”) (dkt. 29); and “Motion for TRO Until There Can Be Permanent Enjoining of Department 

Regulations in ‘Good Order/Conduct’ – Order of Injunctive Relief – in Two Part with Effective 

Assistance of [Familiar] Counsel . . . .” (hereinafter “Second Request for Preliminary Injunction

and TRO”) (dkt. 37). Also before the Court are Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma 

pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and dismiss the case without prejudice (dkt. 43), and 

their motion for an extension of time to file their motion for summary judgment (dkt. 45). The 

Court notes that Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to revoke (albeit late), but Defendants 

did not file a reply, and therefore that motion is currently not yet submitted. In any event, the 

Court directs Defendants to file a reply addressing whether Plaintiff meets the imminent danger 

exception to section 1915(g).

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Requests for Appointment of Counsel

First, Plaintiff requests for appointment of counsel are DENIED without prejudice for lack 

of exceptional circumstances. See Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997); Terrell 

v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th 

Cir. 1986). The decision to request counsel to represent an indigent litigant under section 1915 is 

within “the sound discretion of the trial court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). Neither the need for discovery, nor the 

fact that the pro se litigant would be better served with the assistance of counsel, necessarily 

qualify the issues involved as complex. See Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (9th Cir. 1997). Appointment 

of counsel for a pro se prisoner is not required, even if the prisoner’s ability to prepare has been 

limited. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of 

appointment of counsel at trial, despite fact that plaintiff’s ability to prepare for trial limited by 

pain from surgery). The Court notes that Plaintiff’s first motion was previously denied. See Dkt. 

26. Plaintiff’s previous request for appointment of counsel contained the same factual basis for 

appointment of counsel as the current requests. Compare Dkt. 21 with Dkts. 38, 44. The Court 

finds that Plaintiff has not presented any changed circumstances which would warrant the Court to 

appoint counsel at this time. 

B. Plaintiff’s Requests for Preliminary Injunction and TRO

Second, as mentioned, Plaintiff has filed two requests for a preliminary injunction and 

TRO. Dkts. 29, 37. The Court first points out that Plaintiff’s motions are difficult to decipher, 

but, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court construes them as requests for a preliminary 

injunction and TRO. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) restricts the power of 

the court to grant prospective relief in any action involving prison conditions. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3626(a); Oluwa v. Gomez, 133 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998). Section 3626(a)(2) applies 

specifically to preliminary injunctive relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). In civil actions with 

respect to prison conditions, it permits the court to enter a temporary restraining order or 

preliminary injunction “to the extent otherwise authorized by law” but also requires that such an 

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order “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court 

finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 

Id. “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be 

granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” Lopez v. 

Brewer, et al., 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). “A 

plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, 

that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural 

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 

The Court has reviewed both requests, and it finds that Plaintiff’s First Request for 

Preliminary Injunction and TRO is more difficult to decipher than his second request. In addition, 

Plaintiff’s First Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO seems to address grievances and 

possible exhaustion issues. Plaintiff has filed a document entitled, “Supplemental Motion in Full 

Support and Attachment for Satisfaction” (dkt. 30), in which he requests to file numerous 

grievances as exhibits in support of his First Request for Preliminary Injunction. At this time, 

however, the action is at an early stage and no motion has been filed addressing whether or not 

Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, to the extent that the First Request 

for Preliminary Injunction and TRO addresses issues of exhaustion of his claims, that request is 

DENIED as unnecessary. Dkt. 29. In turn, Plaintiff’s “Supplemental Motion in Full Support and 

Attachment for Satisfaction” is also DENIED as unnecessary as Plaintiff need not supplement his 

motion for exhibits related to exhaustion. Dkt. 30. Meanwhile, it seems that Plaintiff also claims 

that Defendants have “interfere[d] and cause[d] other injuries to injuries and [affected] medical 

orders that already exist,” dkt. 29 at 1, thus to the extent that Plaintiff claims that he is being 

denied certain medical treatments, the Court notes that he has since filed a Second Request for 

Preliminary Injunction and TRO, which addresses more recent and specific denial of medical 

treatments. Thus, the Court finds that the First Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO has 

been made moot by his Second Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO. Compare Dkt. 29 

with Dkt. 37. Thus, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s First Request for Preliminary 

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Injunction and TRO because it has been made moot by his Second Request for Preliminary 

Injunction and TRO. Dkt. 29. The Court will not rule on Plaintiff’s Second Request for 

Preliminary Injunction and TRO (dkt. 37) at this time. Instead, Defendants’ counsel shall respond 

to the Second Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO (dkt. 37), and the parties shall abide by 

the briefing schedule outlined below. 

C. Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Summary 

Judgment

Defendants request for an extension of time to file their motion for summary judgment 

sixty days after the Court rules on the pending motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis

status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and dismiss the case without prejudice. Such a request is 

GRANTED. Dkt. 45. If necessary, the parties shall abide by the briefing schedule outlined 

below.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows:

1. Plaintiff requests for appointment of counsel are DENIED without prejudice for 

lack of exceptional circumstances. Dkts. 38, 44.

2. To the extent that Plaintiff’s First Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO

addresses issues of exhaustion of his claims, that request is DENIED as unnecessary. Dkt. 29. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s “Supplemental Motion in Full Support and Attachment for Satisfaction” is also 

DENIED as unnecessary as Plaintiff need not supplement his motion for exhibits related to 

exhaustion. Dkt. 30. In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff refers to a denial of medical 

treatments, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s First Request for Preliminary 

Injunction and TRO because it has been made moot by his Second Request for Preliminary 

Injunction and TRO. Dkt. 29.

3. The Court will not rule on Plaintiff’s Second Request for Preliminary Injunction 

and TRO at this time. Instead, Defendants’ counsel shall respond to the Second Request for 

Preliminary Injunction and TRO (dkt. 37), and the parties shall abide by the briefing schedule 

outlined below. As mentioned, Defendants shall also file a reply addressing whether Plaintiff is 

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entitled to the imminent danger exception. 

4. Defendants shall file their reply and response to Plaintiff’s Second Request for 

Preliminary Injunction and TRO (dkt. 37) no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date of 

this Order. The response to the Plaintiff’s Second Request for Preliminary Injunction and TRO 

shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and all papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on 

Plaintiff. Defendants are specifically directed to inform the Court of the medical care being 

offered to Plaintiff. Plaintiff may file a reply to Defendants’ response within twenty-eight (28) 

days of the date the response is filed. Plaintiff’s reply should be supported by factual 

documentation and should demonstrate why he satisfies the following standard: 

The standard for issuing a TRO is similar to that required for a preliminary injunction. See 

Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981). 

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the 

merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary 

relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the moving party’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is 

in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary 

remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such 

relief[.]” Id. at 22. 

5. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for an extension of time to file their 

motion for summary judgment sixty days after the Court rules on the pending motion to revoke

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and dismiss the case without 

prejudice. Dkt. 45. Defendant shall file the motion no later than sixty (60) days of the date of this 

Court’s ruling on pending motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) and dismiss the case without prejudice, and only if that motion is denied and the case is 

not dismissed. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court and 

served on Defendant no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date that Defendant’s motion is 

filed. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the date Plaintiff’s 

opposition is filed.

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6. As explained above, the Court cannot rule on Defendants’ pending motion to 

revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and dismiss the case without 

prejudice (dkt. 43) because Defendants’ reply (including an explanation of whether Plaintiff is 

entitled to the imminent danger exception) is still outstanding.

7. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 29, 30, 38, 44, and 45.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

January 9, 2019

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