Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01555/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01555-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Abraham Barrera Moreno, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-1555-PHX-PGR (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (the “Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction in the

Yuma County Superior Court, State of Arizona, Case No. S1400 CR200600996. (Doc. 1)

Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Answer”), but

Petitioner has not filed a reply. (Doc. 12) As explained below, this undersigned Magistrate

Judge recommends the Petition be denied as untimely. 

I. Background

A. Competency Proceedings, Plea Agreement and Sentencing

On August 16, 2006, a Yuma County grand jury indicted Petitioner on one count of

First Degree Murder, a class one felony (Count One), and four counts of Aggravated Assault,

class three felonies (Counts Two through Five). (Doc. 12, Exhibit (“Exh.”) A) Soon

thereafter, on September 11, 2006, Petitioner’s appointed counsel moved for a mental health

evaluation of Petitioner pursuant to Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id.,

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1

 The Honorable Andrew W. Gould presided over Petitioner’s change of plea and

sentencing hearings.

2

 Under Arizona law, by pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal.

See A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). 

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Exh. B, C) The trial court granted the motion and ordered a screening evaluation. (Id., Exh.

F) After the initial evaluation was completed, Petitioner’s counsel moved for additional,

more comprehensive evaluations, which the trial court granted. (Id., Exhs. L, M and N) At

a status hearing on May 29, 2007, the trial court, after considering the reports of the two

doctors appointed to examine Petitioner, found Petitioner was not competent to stand trial.

(Id., Exhs. Q, R) The trial court further found there was a reasonable likelihood Petitioner

could be restored to competency. (Id.) As a result, the trial court ordered Petitioner sent to

the Arizona State Hospital for restoration of competency. (Id.) 

After several months of treatment, evaluations and competency hearings, the trial

court held a status hearing regarding Petitioner’s competency on February 14, 2008. (Doc.

12, Exhs. S-X) After the hearing, the trial court issued an Order Re: Competency finding

that, based on the competency reports submitted and expert testimony regarding Petitioner’s

mental health status, Petitioner’s competency had been restored and he was competent to

stand trial. (Id., Exhs. X, Y)

On March 13, 2008, Petitioner entered a plea agreement, in which he pled guilty to

amended Count One, Second Degree Murder, a class one dangerous felony. (Doc. 12, Exhs.

Z, AA and EE) On July 8, 2008, the trial court1

 sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term

of twenty-two years in prison. (Id., Exhs. DD, II) 

B. State Post-Conviction Proceedings2

 On September 12, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 12,

Exh. JJ) On July 2, 2010, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a Notice of No Colorable

Claims in which she stated that, after reviewing the file in its entirety, researching potential

legal issues, and discussing the matter with Petitioner and his previous attorney, she could

find no colorable claim to raise in a post-conviction petition. (Id., Exh. KK) Pursuant to

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3

 The docket reflects the Petition was actually filed on July 19, 2012. (Doc. 1) The

July 13, 2012 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the Petition, doc. 1 at 11, and reflects

the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.

2 (9th Cir. 2003).

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counsel’s request, the trial court then granted Petitioner approximately forty-five days to file

a pro se post-conviction petition. (Id., Exh. LL) When Petitioner failed to file a pro se

petition, the trial court dismissed the Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in an order issued on

September 14, 2010. (Id., Exh. MM) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 3) 

C. Federal Habeas Petition

On July 13, 2012, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

District Court.3

 (Doc. 1) Petitioner raises two grounds for relief in the Petition. (Doc. 1 at

6-7) In Ground One, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level in

violation of the Sixth Amendment. Petitioner claims his attorney disregarded his severe

mental illness and coerced him into accepting the plea agreement. In Ground Two, Petitioner

alleges ineffective assistance of counsel during his of-right post-conviction proceedings.

Petitioner claims his post-conviction counsel failed to raise ineffective assistance of his trial

level counsel and instead filed a notice of no colorable claims. On October 31, 2012,

Respondents filed their Answer. (Doc. 12) As noted above, Petitioner has not file a reply.

D. Factual Summary

The following factual summary is taken from the Presentence Report prepared by the

Yuma County Adult Probation Department:

Investigation revealed that on July 16, 2006, deputies were dispatched

to Curry Farms in Dateland, Arizona, regarding a shooting. They found victim

Victor Guillermo Arias in the cafeteria lying on the floor under a picnic table

in a puddle of blood. He did not appear to be breathing or moving and medics

examined the victim and contacted a doctor at Yuma Regional Medical Center

(YMRC), who pronounced the victim deceased. While marking the scene, a

subject approached who was later identified as juvenile O.A. O.A. was

detained for further investigation. A short time later, Martin Arias (the

deceased’s brother) and his son, Martine Arias Jr., arrived on the scene after

being contacted by the Curry Farms foreman. The foreman also arrived on

scene and reported a farm truck (2001 Ford F250) missing.

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4

 The Presentence Report contains additional witness statements which need not be

included here.

5

 The AEDPA, which was signed into law on April 24, 1996, governs federal habeas

petitions filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327

(1997).

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Meanwhile at YRMC, deputies interviewed two of the shooting victims,

Jorge and Israel Arias, who provided suspect information. They described a

Hispanic male using the alias of Mariano Lopez, aka “Chinaloa,” who was

later identified as the defendant. Jorge Arias explained that he and his

relatives, O.A., Israel Arias, Victor Guillermo Arias (deceased), and Juan

Lozano were living at Curry Farms where they worked. That night they all

arrived back at the farm and sat down to eat in the cafeteria. The defendant (a

coworker) arrived shortly thereafter and was soaking wet. They asked the

defendant why he was wet, to which the defendant replied, “you all should

know.” The defendant walked out the door, returned, pulled a handgun from

the back of his pants, and started to shoot at them. The defendant first shot

Victor Guillermo Arias in the body as he sat in the chair and then shot Israel

Arias in the left leg as he attempted to get up from the table. He himself (Jorge

Arias) was then shot in the left shoulder by the defendant as he also got up

from the table. Israel and Jorge Arias dropped to the ground and pretended to

be dead in order to keep the defendant from shooting at them again. The

defendant left and attempted to take the truck. Jorge Arias and Israel Arias ran

out of the cafeteria and ran down a dirt road to an irrigator, who drove them

to a rest stop for help. Israel Arias gave the same story.

(Doc. 12, Exh. CC)4

 Petitioner was subsequently arrested on August 5, 2006 in El Mirage,

Arizona. (Id.) 

II. Discussion

Respondents argue the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred because it was not

filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Alternatively, Respondents contend Ground

One is procedurally defaulted and fails on the merits. Respondents further argue Ground Two

is not a cognizable claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Because the information

presented clearly establishes the Petition was filed after the limitations period expired, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge finds the Petition is barred and recommends it be denied on

that basis. It is, therefore, unnecessary to address Respondents’ alternative arguments.

A. Legal Standards

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”5

) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

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See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of

“direct review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Summers v. Schriro, 481

F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding or upon the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review. Id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An application for post-conviction relief remains

“pending” for purposes of the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) until it achieves final

resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedure. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

219-220 (2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state

court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921,

925 (9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of postconviction relief is filed even though the petition itself may not be filed until later. Isley v.

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6

 Because October 15, 2011 was a Saturday, the limitations period extended to the

following Monday. See Rule 6(a)(1)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P.

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Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that

Isley’s state petition was “pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and he was

entitled to tolling from the date when the Notice was filed. The district court erred in

dismissing his petition as untimely.”).

The AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner

must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way” that prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562

(quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Analysis

1. Limitations Period

Here, after Petitioner was sentenced on July 8, 2008, he filed a timely Notice of PostConviction Relief on September 12, 2008. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (providing that a

petitioner has ninety days from the entry of judgment and sentence to file an “of-right”

petition for post-conviction relief). The trial court dismissed the Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief more than two years later on September 14, 2010. Petitioner then had thirty days to

seek review of the trial court’s decision, which he failed to do. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c)

(providing that a petitioner has thirty days from the trial court’s decision to file a petition for

review). Thus, the judgment of conviction became final, and the limitations period began to

run, on October 15, 2010, the day after the thirty-day period for seeking review expired. See

Summers, 481 F.3d at 711 (holding that a judgment of conviction pursuant to a guilty plea

becomes “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) upon the conclusion of a Rule 32 of-right

proceeding and review of that proceeding or upon the expiration of the time for seeking such

proceeding or review). The limitations period ran uninterrupted until it expired one year later

on October 17, 2011.6

 Petitioner filed his habeas petition on July 13, 2012, nearly nine

months after the limitations period expired. The Petition is, therefore, untimely.

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In the section of the Petition that directs Petitioner to explain why the statute of

limitations does not bar the Petition, Petitioner cites a recent United States Supreme Court

case, Martinez v. Ryan, claiming it authorizes him to raise ineffective assistance in an initial

collateral review proceeding. (Doc. 1 at 11) The case to which Petitioner is referring,

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), held:

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must

be raised in an initial review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will

not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel at trial, if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding,

there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.

Id. at 1320. Thus, Martinez involved a procedural default defense and addressed the issue

whether “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial collateral proceedings may establish

cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at

1315. The Martinez case does not address the statute of limitations. Petitioner’s citation to

Martinez as an explanation for the Petition’s untimeliness is misplaced.

In that same section of the Petition, Petitioner cites §§ 2244(d)(1)(C) and (D),

suggesting that he is claiming the limitations period did not begin to run from the date on

which the judgment became final, but rather when the Supreme Court identified a newly

recognized constitutional right, or when the factual predicate of his claims could have been

discovered. (Doc. 1 at 11) If he is claiming Martinez identifies a newly recognized

constitutional right under § 2244(d)(1)(C) that affects the limitations period, Petitioner

presents no argument or support for such a claim. He also fails to present any argument or

support for the application of § 2244(d)(1)(D). The undersigned Magistrate Judge finds no

basis to change its determination, as set forth above, that the limitations period began to run

on the date the judgment became final.

2. Equitable Tolling

As referenced above, the limitations period set forth in § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling where a petitioner shows he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that

extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition. Holland, 130 S.Ct.

at 2562. Equitable tolling is applied sparingly, as reflected by the “extraordinary

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circumstances” requirement. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.

2009). Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”) (citation omitted). An “external

force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely ‘oversight,

miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part.’” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at

1011(quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)). A pro se petitioner’s

ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication do not constitute “extraordinary

circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006) (collecting cases from other circuits and holding that “a pro se petitioner’s lack

of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance”); see also Johnson v.

United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (in the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 context, rejecting

movant/prisoner’s attempt to justify his lack of diligence on his pro se status and lack of legal

sophistication and stating: “we have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural

ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for

promptness”); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n. 4 (“a pro se petitioner’s confusion or

ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling”), cert. denied,

558 U.S. 897 (2009). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of demonstrating

it is warranted in his habeas case. Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing,

inter alia, Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562).

Here, Petitioner fails to explicitly request equitable tolling in the Petition. Even after

Respondents addressed the issue in their Answer, Petitioner failed to submit a reply. In the

section of the Petition that provides a place to explain why the statute of limitations does not

bar the Petition, however, Petitioner raises two issues that the undersigned Magistrate Judge

construes as requests for equitable tolling. 

Petitioner first claims he was delayed from filing the Petition until the “protective

custody yard supplied Spanish/English legal information.” (Doc. 1 at 11) Petitioner,

however, says nothing more about that issue, including when the yard first provided legal

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information in a language he could understand. Petitioner has, therefore, failed to show this

alleged delay provides a basis to apply equitable tolling.

Petitioner next contends he “was able to receive his psychiatric medications” in

August 2011. (Doc. 1 at 11) Petitioner appears to be arguing he could not have filed his

habeas petition before receiving his psychiatric medication. He fails to explain, however,

why he waited nearly a year after receiving his medication to file his habeas petition. If what

he claims is true, Petitioner still had two months after receiving his medication, until October

17, 2011, to file his habeas petition before the limitations period expired. Petitioner has,

therefore, failed to show that the delay in receiving his medication provides a basis to apply

equitable tolling. 

The undersigned Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner has failed to show that

extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented him from filing a timely petition.

For these reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. 

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner filed the Petition after

the limitations period expired, and the circumstances do not support the application of

equitable tolling. Consequently, the Petition is barred by the AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 1, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

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to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

DATED this 5th day of August, 2013.

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