Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08036/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08036-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

- 1 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Timothy Paul Olmos,

Plaintiff

-vsWell Path, et al.,

Defendants.

CV-19-8036-PCT-GMS (JFM)

Report and Recommendation

Under consideration is Plaintiff's Motion to Amend filed December 2, 2019 (Doc. 

55). This matter is before the undersigned magistrate judge on referral for pretrial 

proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Because the appropriate resolution of 

screening of the amended plea may be dispositive of some of Plaintiff’s claims, the 

undersigned proceeds by way of a Report & Recommendation to the referring district 

judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

A. BACKGROUND

Original Complaint - Plaintiff commenced this action on February 4, 2019 by 

filing his original Complaint (Doc. 1), naming as defendants WellPath/CCS, Dentist Dr. 

Taylor, Dental Assistant Crystal Bitz, and Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) 

Director Charles Ryan. That Complaint included three counts: (1) Fifth Amendment Due 

Process relating to a denial of access to transition services while paying from them through 

payroll deductions; (2) Equal Protection violations from his classification as sex offender; 

and (3) denial of a right to dental care. 

On screening, the Court ordered Ryan to answer Counts One and Two, 

WellPath/CCS and Taylor to Answer Count Three, and dismissed Defendant Bitz and 

various portions of Count Three. (Order 5/7/19, Doc. 5.) The Court also found no valid 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 1 of 16
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

section 1983 claim for state law violations, and that Plaintiff did not adequately plead a 

supplemental jurisdiction claim. (Id. at 6 and n. 1.) 

Defendants have since been served and answered. Defendant WellPath has filed a 

Motion for Summary Judgment re Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 25), 

which is full briefed.

The Court has entered a Scheduling Order (Doc. 24) which, inter alia, set a deadline 

of December 2, 2019 for motions to join or amend. Dispositive motions are due by March 

2, 2020. 

Previous Attempted Amendment - On September 30, 2019 Plaintiff filed a “First 

Amended Complaint” (Doc. 35). Because the deadline for amendments as a matter of 

course had expired, the Court construed this filing as a motion for leave to amend, and 

denied it without prejudice for failure to comply with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1 

(redlined complaints). (Order 10/3/19, Doc. 36.) 

B. MOTION TO AMEND

1. Briefs

Motion – On December 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Amend (Doc. 

55) seeking leave to file his First Amended Complaint attached as Exhibit A, incorporating 

changes reflected in the redline copy attached as Exhibit B. 

In general, Plaintiff has: named Defendant Ryan in his official capacity, as well as 

his individual capacity; deleted dismissed Defendant Bitz; updated information on other 

suits; made a variety of insignificant terminology modifications to Counts 1, 2, and 3; 

deleted allegations regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies on Counts 1, 2, and 3 

(other than to assert exemption from exhaustion requirements); deleted Eighth 

Amendment allegations against WellPath/CCS; reasserted state law claims in Count 3

including both negligence and “rendition”;

1

and added a new Count 4 asserting a takings 

1 Plaintiff’s “rendition” claim is based on Arizona state law that appears to hold “that a 

public service corporation is under a legal obligation to render adequate service impartially 

and without discrimination to all members of the general public to whom its scope of 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 2 of 16
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claim based upon the taking of a portion of Plaintiff’s inmate trust funds for the repair of 

ADOC buildings and infrastructure. 

WellPath/Taylor Response - Defendant WellPath has responded (Doc. 70) 

arguing that Plaintiff’s new claim in Count 4 has nothing to do with WellPath, most of the 

changes to the existing counts are cosmetic with the exception of the deletions of the 

Eighth Amendment allegations in Count 3 (which Defendant paints as “incongruent[]”). 

Defendant argues the real reason for Plaintiff’s amendments to Counts 1, 2 and 3 is to 

eliminate the false allegations in the original Complaint of having exhausted 

administrative remedies, as a response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Defendant notes that the proposed amendment asserts in a footnotes that in light of 

Plaintiff’s intervening release exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. Thus, 

Defendant argues, the amendment is a bad faith attempt to overcome a false representation 

to the Court. 

Defendant WellPath argues that the amendment is futile because Plaintiff has 

attempted to simply restate the common law negligence claims that were dismissed from 

the original Complaint on screening, and the subsequent amendment does not cure 

Plaintiff’s exhaustion problem, because they are not new claims arising after release.

Defendant argues the new takings claim in Ground 4 can be asserted in a new cause 

of action, and adding it to this action prejudices WellPath and Taylor. 

Defendants Taylor (Doc. 73) and Ryan (Doc. 81) have joined in WellPath’s 

response. 

Notice of Errata – After WellPath’s Response, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata 

(Doc. 75) seeking to: (1) amend his proposed amendment to invoke supplemental 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367; (2) amend his motion to argue for the exercises of 

supplemental jurisdiction; (3) amend his proposed amendment to add allegations about 

available administrative remedies; and (4) amend his proposed amendment to excise only 

operation extends.” Travaini v. Maricopa Cty., 9 Ariz. App. 228, 229, 450 P.2d 1021, 

1022 (1969) (quoting Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967)). 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 3 of 16
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the failure to train portion of his Eight Amendment allegations against WellPath.

Reply – At the same time, Plaintiff filed his Reply (Doc. 76) to WellPath’s 

Response, arguing that the modifications under the Notice of Errata did not affect the 

grounds urged for denying his motion. Plaintiff argues that his amendment is not futile 

because he adequately not states a state, common-law, rendition claim in Count 3, and 

does not simply restate a Seventh Amendment claim. Plaintiff argues there is no improper 

purpose to his amendment because he is no longer is required to establish exhaustion, 

particularly for his “corrected” common law claim in Count III and his new Takings 

Clause claim in Count IV. He further argues no improper purpose because administrative 

remedies were not available. He argues that the potential for a statute of limitations 

defense on his common law claim and the expense of a new action on Count IV justify 

allowing the amendment. 

Plaintiff then filed a Reply (Doc. 85) to Ryan’s response. Plaintiff replies that the 

arguments on exhaustion are even more inappropriate coming from Ryan because ADOC 

policies preclude grievances on state law claims, or challenges to the state laws at issue in 

his proposed Count IV. Plaintiff asserts that no prejudice can result to Ryan from the 

addition of Count IV because the statute of limitations on this claim will not expire until 

December 2020. 

Order for Further Briefing – In an Order filed January 2, 2020 (Doc. 87) the 

Court observed that Plaintiff’s Notice of Errata (Doc. 75) “appears to make substantive 

modifications to not only the arguments offered in the Motion to Amend, but in the 

proposed amended pleading as well.” Rather than striking the Notice of Errata, the Court 

accepted it and ordered additional briefing.

WellPath/Taylor Surresponse - In their Surreponse (Doc. 93), Defendant’s 

WellPath and Taylor argue: (1) the addition of a citation to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 did not cure 

the deficiencies in pleading supplemental jurisdiction and state law medical negligence 

claims; (2) the additional language regarding Plaintiff’s state law “rendition” claim, 

including allegations about complaints to WellPath, do not add justification for granting 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 4 of 16
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the motion; (3) the addition of allegations about the complaint to WellPath and lack of 

remedies do not resolve exhaustion issues; and (4) the corrected deletion of the dismissed 

failure to supervise/train claim is unnecessary.

Plaintiff replies (Doc. 95) that the Surresponse is an improper second bite at 

responding to the motion, the Notice of Errata only effected technical pleading errors, and 

there is nothing improper in trying to perfect his claims, including correcting drafting 

errors in his proposed amendment.

Ryan Surresponse – In his Surresponse (Doc. 94), Defendant Ryan argues the 

motion should be dismissed because: (1) it is made in bad faith because (a) the inmate trust 

account claim has long been known to him (and raised in Olmos v. Ryan, 2:17-cv-03665-

GMS-JFM), as has the fact that the total amount involved is only $14.30, and (b) it is a 

veiled attempt to avoid the non-exhaustion defense; (2) he has engaged in undue delay in 

raising the trust funds claim; (3) the trust fund claim is subject to qualified immunity and 

thus futile; (4) and Plaintiff has previously attempted to amend and failed to follow 

through.

Plaintiff replies (Doc. 96) that the surresponse is an improper and untimely second 

bite at responding to the motion, the Arizona Attorney General is not authorized to 

represent a private corporation and thus have no interest in the changes to Count 3, Ryan 

has not shown excusable neglect for the delayed response, and his delay in pursuing his 

trust fund claim was not in bad faith, he can properly seek nominal damages, and qualified 

immunity does not apply to his request for declaratory relief and the argument is without 

merit, and he is entitled to amend his complaint. 

2. Preliminary Matters

Substitution of Shinn – In his proposed amendment, Plaintiff adds allegations that 

Ryan is sued in his official capacity. In his Reply (Doc. 85) to Ryan’s Response on the 

motion to Amend, Plaintiff appears to substitute the new Director of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections, David Shinn, for Ryan. In his Surresponse (Doc. 94), 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 5 of 16
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant Ryan appears to presume adoption of Plaintiff’s amendment, and substitutes in 

Shinn for Ryan in his official capacity.

Because Plaintiff’s amend is not a fait accompli, and his existing complaint only 

seeks relief from Ryan in his individual capacity, the Court does not deem Shinn 

substituted in at this juncture. 

Designation of Proposed Amendment – Plaintiff designates his proposed 

amendment as a “Second Amended Complaint.” However, as noted above, Plaintiff has 

not previously successfully amended. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s proposed amended 

complaint, if allowed, would serve as his first amended complaint. 

Propriety of Errata and Briefing - The parties spend some energy addressing 

whether Plaintiff’s Notice of Errata was appropriately made, the surresponses are 

appropriately tailored and timely, etc. In the interests of a just, speedy, and inexpensive 

determination of the matter, and because the parties have been afforded expansive 

opportunities to brief the issues, the Court deems the Motion to Amend and the proposed 

amended complaint modified by the Notice of Errata, and considers each of the briefs on 

the motion. 

In so doing, however, the Court need not simply merge the Motion to Amend and 

proposed amendment with the Notice of Errata’s changes. Rather, the Court must remain 

cognizant of the changes offered in the Notice of Errata and what they demonstrate about 

the nature of Plaintiff’s amendment.

3. Standard for Subsequent Amendments

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides that “[a] party may amend its 

pleading once as a matter of course,” provided it is timely. Because it was not timely 

made, the instant amendment requires leave of the Court. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that the “court should freely give 

leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” “In assessing the propriety of a motion for 

leave to amend, we consider five factors: (1) bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 6 of 16
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously 

amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004).

4. Application to Current Motion

a. Prejudice

In Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit 

stated that “[p]rejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor” in determining 

whether to grant leave to amend. Id. at 1387. Accordingly, the undersigned addresses 

prejudice first. 

Here, the undersigned finds that prejudice would result from the proposed 

amendment. It would insert new claims and a new defendant in the middle of the litigation, 

when the parties have already invested substantial time and resources in briefing 

dispositive motions and planning and conducting discovery, and the case is now over a 

year old. It would insert a wholly unrelated claim (the takings claim) and greatly expand 

the relevant issues and discovery in Count III, including the need for addressing the 

Plaintiff’s rendition claim.

Finally, allowing the amendment would (as discussed hereinafter) unfairly 

eviscerate Defendants’ exhaustion defense.

b. Bad Faith

Defendants argue that the amendment is made in bad faith. 

“While cases construing Rule 15 recognize that a court may deny amendment when 

a party has acted in bad faith, the number of decisions addressing bad faith in the Rule 15 

context are relatively few and far between.” ecoNugenics, Inc. v. Bioenergy Life Sci., Inc., 

355 F. Supp. 3d 785, 791 (D. Minn. 2019). A leading case is from a district court in this 

circuit, Wizards of the Coast LLC v. Cryptozoic Entm't LLC, 309 F.R.D. 645, 651 (W.D. 

Wash. 2015). See Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Bad faith in seeking to file an amended 

pleading, 6 Annotated Patent Digest § 39:48.50 (Feb. 2020 update). 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 7 of 16
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the context of a motion for leave to amend, “bad faith” means 

acting with intent to deceive, harass, mislead, delay, or disrupt. Cf. 

Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir.2006); In re 

Ezzell, 438 B.R. 108, 117–18 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.2010). As it has been 

defined in other contexts, “bad faith” means more than acting with 

bad judgment or negligence, but “rather it implies the conscious 

doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.... 

[I]t contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive 

design or ill will.” United States v. Manchester Farming P'ship, 315 

F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir.2003).

Wizards of the Coast LLC v. Cryptozoic Entm't LLC, 309 F.R.D. 645, 651 (W.D. Wash. 

2015). 

Given the liberal policy favoring amendment of pleadings so as to 

decide cases on their merits, the burden of demonstrating bad faith 

falls upon the party opposing amendment. The Court therefore 

indulges all reasonable inferences in favor of allowing the 

amendment and imputes benign motives to the moving party 

whenever it is plausible to do so. 

ecoNugenics, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 791 (citing Wizards). 

(1). Amendment to Avoid Exhaustion

Plaintiff explicitly argues that his amendment will cure any failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies because he is no longer a prisoner, citing Jackson v. Fong, 870 

F.3d 928, 934-37 (9th Cir. 2017). (Plaintiff was released in approximately August 2019.) 

He has not been furtive about his desire to invoke Jackson.

In Jackson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the exhaustion requirement under the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) is determined at the time of the filing 

of a complaint, not an action, and thus a prisoner who first raises unexhausted claims while 

incarcerated, but is subsequently granted leave to file an amended complaint for damages 

after his release from prison, is not subject to the exhaustion requirement. “Exhaustion 

requirements apply based on when a plaintiff files the operative complaint, in accordance 

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Jackson, 870 F.3d at 935. 

But Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s amendment is solely to gain the benefit of 

escaping the exhaustion requirement under Jackson, and thus is made in bad faith. They 

point to his filing of this action on the eve of the expiration of the statue of limitations, 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 8 of 16
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with knowledge of his release date, and seeking to amend to assert Jackson upon the filing 

of the motion for summary judgment, just after his release.

The Jackson court addressed just such concerns. “A district court, however, need 

not give leave to amend a complaint where a plaintiff appears to be gaming the courts, or 

otherwise exploiting an impending release from custody.” Jackson, 870 F.3d at 936. In 

finding no such gamesmanship in that case, the Jackson court noted that the affected 

claims were not subject to a statute of limitations defense, leaving the plaintiff free to 

dismiss the existing action and refile, and thus no purpose would be served by forcing such 

action at the expense of judicial economy. Id. at 936-937.2 And, in Jackson, the postrelease amended pleading was filed following the granting of a motion to dismiss with 

leave to amend based on improper joinder. In effect, Jackson had no choice but to amend, 

and thus could hardly have been said to be gaming the system by amending. 

In this case, for the reasons discussed hereinafter, the undersigned concludes that 

Plaintiff’s only true motive for amending his complaint is to trigger Jackson and avoid 

Defendants’ exhaustion defense, and that he is being furtive about the reason for his 

amendments.

Plaintiff’s amendments are largely plainly superficial (e.g. referring to himself as 

“Tim” rather than “Olmos,” altering authority citations, accounting for tense and time 

changes, conforming to dismissals on screening, etc.). As discussed hereinafter, even the 

substantive changes made are a subterfuge to justify triggering Jackson.

/ /

/ /

2 Defendants argue that Jackson only applies where the amendment is a supplement 

asserting new claims arising after release. It is true that the Jackson court plainly 

characterized the amended pleading as one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) 

(supplemental pleading on events after date of pleading to be amended). 870 F.3d at 934 

(“we analyze Jackson’s third amended complaint as a supplemental complaint within the 

meaning of Rule 15(d)”). But there is nothing to indicate any new event in that case other 

than Jackson’s intervening release from prison, which is the same facts as this case. 

Moreover, the holding in Jackson was not limited to supplemental pleadings, but generally 

applied to any new “operative complaint.” 870 F.3d at 937. 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 9 of 16
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(2). De Minimis Nature of Trust Account Claim

The gamesmanship in Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is highlighted by his 

inclusion of a claim that is about a dispute concerning less than $15 in damages. While 

clearly Plaintiff is entitled to maintain a civil rights action for nominal damages, see Carey 

v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978), the purpose for allowing such suits is to “recognize[]

the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed.” The 

purpose is not to allow civil rights claims to be used to game the system on other, unrelated 

claims. Thus, the fact that Plaintiff may have the right to maintain such a claim does not 

preclude the conclusion that the claim is being brought for an improper, bad faith purpose. 

And the limited dollar amount in question, and the fact that Plaintiff is not subject to 

ongoing losses, demonstrates that his purpose in bringing this claim is to trigger Jackson.

The timing of the assertion of this claim adds to the calculus. Plaintiff does not 

suggest that he only recently discovered this claim. He has long been a student of the 

charges against his inmate trust account and the Takings Clause implications, having an 

existing claim on these types of issues in Olmos v. Ryan, CV-17-3665-PHX-GMS(JFM). 

Rather, he first raised such a claim when he filed his earlier proposed First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 35), some three weeks after Defendants filed their Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 25) asserting the exhaustion defense, in which he also relied on Jackson.

Plaintiff protests that in light of his indigency he should not be precluded from 

bringing this claim in an existing action. But even Plaintiff acknowledges that he has since 

been able to bring another suit, Olmos v. Cimino, No. CV 20-00034-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz.). 

Further, during the pendency of this case Plaintiff was able to bring a third suit (against 

inter alia Defendant Ryan, on the conditions of his probation), Olmos v. Borderick, et al., 

CV-19-4832-PHX-GMS-JFM(PS). He offers no reason why this unrelated claim was not 

brought in those actions. 

Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider the filing of his new suit 

challenging the conditions of his probation, because of the urgency of the claims raised 

therein. (Surreply, Doc. 86 at 7, n. 1.) But regardless of the nature of the claims in such 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 10 of 16
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

action, they demonstrate his ability to file a separate suit. And Plaintiff offers no 

explanation for not having joined his trust account claim in that action or the earlier action. 

(3). Amendment to Exhaustion Allegations

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s purpose is not merely to avoid the exhaustion 

requirement, but to avoid the consequences of misrepresentations in the original 

Complaint about having exhausted administrative remedies. The undersigned does not 

find an amendment designed to cure misrepresentations to be a “bad faith” purpose for 

amending. First, it is questionable whether (despite the bromide that an amendment 

renders a prior pleading non-existent) that perjury could actually be avoided solely by a 

subsequent amendment. See e.g. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 576 (1937) (“the 

telling of a deliberate lie by a witness completes the crime defined by the law” and thus 

retraction does not avoid criminal liability). Second, this argument would leave litigants 

in the anomalous position of having to leave uncorrected (intentionally or unintentionally) 

perjurious assertions in a pleading. 

But Plaintiff’s continued protestations of the propriety of his original allegations 

shows that the purpose of the amendment is avoiding the exhaustion defense, and no other, 

and thus is in bad faith.

(4). De Minimis Efforts to Salvage State Law Claims

Another substantive amendment proposed by Plaintiff is his attempt to resurrect his 

state law claims by citing the Fourteenth Amendment. In his Notice of Errata, he has 

expanded his changes to cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction) and to make 

vague references to unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants. 

In arguing for these changes, Plaintiff asserts that his state law claims were 

dismissed on screening based solely on his apparent reliance on the Seventh Amendment, 

which governs the right to jury trials in civil proceedings, and that he has now corrected 

the reference to be to the Fourteenth Amendment and cited the supplemental jurisdiction 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 11 of 16
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

statute. (Reply, Doc. 76 at 5.) 

Plaintiff misrepresents the screening Order. In rejecting Plaintiff’s “rendition” 

claim, that Order reasoned: (a) the Seventh Amendment was inapplicable to the facts 

alleged (which did not assert a denial of a jury trial); (b) section 1983 does not provide a 

remedy for violations of state law; and (c) “Plaintiff does not invoke this Court’s 

supplemental jurisdiction and any possible state law claim is too vague for the Court to 

construe such a jurisdictional basis.” (Order 5/7/19, Doc. 5 at 6 and n.1.) 

Thus, the inapplicability of the Seventh Amendment was only the first step in the 

analysis, and necessary only because of the specific reference by Plaintiff to that 

constitutional provision. 

The curing of that reference and the additional citation to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does 

not address the Court’s screening order. Because Plaintiff is pro se, the court was 

obligated to liberally construe his original Complaint. (See Screening Order 5/7/19, Doc. 

5 at 2.) The liberal construction rule requires the Court to read a filing as asserting legal 

theories suggested by the facts alleged, Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: 

Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented Litigants, 27 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 97, 

124-125 (2007), and not to dispose of claims on technicalities such as a failure to cite to 

the correct statute. Indeed, the instructions on the approved form indicate that claims can 

be stated “without citing legal authority or arguments.” 

Thus, it was not Plaintiff’s failure to cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 that ultimately resulted 

in the dismissal of his state law claim, but his failure to adequately state non-vague facts 

showing a claim subject to supplemental jurisdiction. That is because the exercise of 

supplemental jurisdiction does not derive from merely asserting federal and state claims. 

The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of 

operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or 

state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily 

be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming 

substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to 

hear the whole.

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 12 of 16
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).3 Plaintiff has maintained 

his state law “rendition” claim in his proposed amendment, but only after receiving 

Defendants’ response to the Motion to Amend has he alleged any additional facts to try to 

resolve the vagueness which led to the refusal to find supplemental jurisdiction. His failure 

to include such allegations in the originally proposed amendment may not render futile the 

current amendment (as modified by the Notice of Errata), but it supports the conclusion 

that his amendment is not an earnest attempt to resurrect his rendition claim, but a bad 

faith attempt to trigger Jackson.

(5). Addition of Official Capacity

Finally, Plaintiff has amended to add an “official capacity” allegation against 

Defendant Ryan. Plaintiff acknowledges that the purpose of this modification is to allow 

for declaratory relief. But Plaintiff asserts no reason for seeking declaratory relief from a 

process that no longer impacts him in light of his release from custody. This again shows 

the purpose for amending the complaint is to avoid the exhaustion defense.

(6). Conclusion re Bad Faith

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has undertaken the 

instant amendment in a bad faith attempt to avoid summary judgment on exhaustion. 

c. Undue Delay

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has engaged in undue delay by seeking to raise the

3 Plaintiff’s Count III (current and proposed) allege that Defendants have a state common 

law duty to render (“rendition”) adequate health care, and an Eighth Amendment duty to 

not engaged in deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Had Plaintiff simply alleged 

a state law medical malpractice claim base on the treatment provided, the Court might 

have been able to find a common nucleus of operative fact. But Plaintiff did not. Instead, 

he explicitly alleged a “rendition” claim which involved not general professional norms, 

but issues of whether the defendants were public service corporations, and whether they 

were failing to meet an obligation to treat everyone rendered service equally. See Town 

of Wickenburg v. Sabin, 68 Ariz. 75, 77, 200 P.2d 342, 343 (1948) (quoting McQuillin 

Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., Vol. 4, section 1829). 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 13 of 16
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

trust account claim that could and should have been raised in his 2017 complaint in Olmos 

v. Ryan, CV-17-3665-PHX-GMS(JFM). While the claims are related, and perhaps there 

is some element of laches, undue delay is concerned with delay in seeking an amendment 

in a given action, not in bringing a given claim.

Plaintiff’s motion to amend was brought within the deadline established by the 

Scheduling Order, and the undersigned is loath to penalize a litigant who relies on a 

deadline set by the Court. 

d. Prior Amendments

Defendants argue prior amendments.

“Repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed is another 

valid reason for a district court to deny a party leave to amend.” McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. 

Co., 845 F.2d 802, 809–10 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). See also Allen v. City of 

Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil 

Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir.1989) (“The district court's discretion to deny leave 

to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”).

But, here there have been no prior amendments allowed. If permitted, this would 

be Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.

e. Futility

Finally, Defendants argue the amendments would be futile.

“Futility alone can justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Nunes v. 

Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004). “Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify 

the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 

1995). Futility can be legal or factual in nature. AWhere the legal basis for a cause of 

action is tenuous, futility supports the refusal to grant leave to amend.@ Lockheed Martin 

Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). However, leave to 

amend should be denied as futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 14 of 16
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense. Barahona 

v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 881 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Plaintiff’s cosmetic amendments are futile simply because they effect no change in 

the claims or parties. But Plaintiff’s amendment cannot be said to be futile insofar as, if 

allowed, it would cure his non-exhaustion problem. 

Plaintiff’s amendment to reinstate his state law “rendition” claim may be arguably 

futile, inasmuch as Plaintiff still fails to provide anything more than conclusory facts to 

show that an unequal provision of public services had a common nucleus of facts with the 

deliberate indifference he asserts, thereby establishing a basis for supplemental 

jurisdiction. On the other hand, his addition of an official capacity allegation would 

permit declaratory relief, and would not be subject to Defendants’ qualified immunity 

defense. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Qualified immunity 

is only an immunity from a suit for money damages, and does not provide immunity from 

a suit seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.”). 

In sum, the amendment cannot, as a whole, be said to be futile. 

5. Conclusion

In sum, the Motion to Amend should be denied on the basis that it is made in bad 

faith, and will result in prejudice to Defendants. 

C. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file 

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 15 of 16
- 16 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

objections to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered 

a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver 

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 

1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Doc. 55) 

be DENIED.

Dated: February 5, 2020

19-8036-055o RR 20 02 03 on Motion to Amend.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:19-cv-08036-GMS-JFM Document 97 Filed 02/05/20 Page 16 of 16