Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03713/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03713-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

F. PENITANI PUAMAU,

Petitioner,

 v.

DAVID N. STILL, et al.

Respondents.

 /

No. C 05-03713 SI

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR

HABEAS CORPUS 

On October 7, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on this petition for release from detention. For

the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of

jurisdiction to the extent the petition challengesthe finalorder ofdeportation, and DISMISSES the petition for

writ of habeas corpus as moot to the extent it challenges petitioner’s detention because petitioner is no longer

detained.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Fisifetapa Penitani Puamau is a married woman who is a native and citizen of Tonga. On

June 21, 1996, an ImmigrationJudge (“IJ”) found petitioner excludable pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)

of the Immigration and Nationality Act and ordered petitioner deported from the United States. Deiss Decl.

Ex. C. Petitioner appealed, and on May 16, 1997, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued a

decision denying petitioner’s application forterminationofproceedings and remand, and dismissed the appeal.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 On March 1, 2003, the INS was transferred from the United States Department of Justice into the

United States Department of Homeland Security. The INS was abolished and its functions were divided into

three different bureaus:the Bureau ofCustoms and Border Protection; the Bureau ofImmigrationand Customs

Enforcement; and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.

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Id. at Ex. B. The same day the Immigrationand NationalizationService (“INS”)1issued a I-296 Form Notice

to Alien Ordered Removed/Departure Verification (“Notice to Alien”) informing petitioner that she had been

ordered deported. Id. Petitioner did not seek review of the BIA’s decision.

On November 3, 1997, the INS directed petitioner to appear for deportation to Tonga on December

8, 1997. Id. at Ex. A. Petitioner failed to appear for her deportation. Id. On September 7, 2005,

Department of Homeland Security officials detained petitioner. 

On September 14, 2005, petitioner filed the instant habeas petition alleging that her due process rights

have been violated. Specifically, petitioner contends that the May 16, 1997 Notice to Alienwas “inaccurate,

open-ended, and woefully incomplete” and that the IJ’s June 21, 1996 exclusion and deportation order is

invalid because it “has expired, and is null and void due to the passage of time.” Id. Petitioner also claimed

that her September 7, 2005 detention was illegal, and that her impending deportation “without judicialreview

of the wrongfully implemented and expired deportation order” deprives her of due process of law. Id. at 3.

The parties filed a joint status report on October 27, 2005 informing the Court that petitioner was

released from detention on October 26, 2005 pursuant to the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program. 

LEGAL STANDARD

As a general rule, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers jurisdiction upon the district court to entertain petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus brought by any individual claiming to be held “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(3). Absent a specific statutory

provision limiting the scope ofits habeas jurisdiction, a district court has the authority to entertain constitutional

questions raised by aliens detained by federal immigration officials. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314

(2001); Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1995). However, as a prudential

matter,the NinthCircuit generally requires aliens who are detained to exhaust available administrative remedies

before seeking habeas corpus relief. See Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001). 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION

1. Petitioner’s Challenge to the Final Order of Deportation

Petitioner has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petition for release/bond hearing

determination, and an application for temporary restraining order. Petitioner seeks an order (1) staying her

deportation pending a determination on the merits of her petition for writ of habeas corpus, and (2) releasing

petitioner on her own recognizance or alternatively setting a bond determination hearing. Petitioner also seeks

review of the underlying exclusion and deportation orders.

This Court lacks jurisdiction to review petitioner’s challenges to the IJ’s 1996 decision, the Notice to

Alien, or the BIA’s 1997 decision ordering petitioner excluded and deported. To the extent petitioner

challenges the IJ’s 1996 decision, petitioner’s appeal of that decision to the BIA rendered the IJ decision not

final and not subject to judicialreview. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1996), as amended by IIRIRA § 309(c); see

also Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1997). Petitioner’s argument that the 1996 IJ decision

is “final” because the BIA’s 1997 decision “dismissed” the appeal lacks merit. See id. 

To the extent petitioner challengesthe Notice to Alien or the BIA’s 1997 decision ordering petitioner

excluded and deported, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review these claims after the REAL ID Act of 2005.

See 8.U.S.C. § 1252;see also Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]he

Act makes circuit courts the ‘sole’ judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation,

exclusion, or removal.” Alvarez-Barajas, 418 F.3d at 1052 (citing REAL ID Act § 106(a)). The Act

eliminated habeas jurisdiction over final orders of deportation, exclusion or removal. Id. The jurisdictional

provisions of the REAL ID Act were effective May 11, 2005, and apply to any “final administrative order of

removal, deportation, exclusion” that was “issued before, on, or after the date of enactment.” REAL ID Act

§ 106(b). 

Petitioner argues that this Court must have habeas jurisdiction over her challenge to the final orders of

exclusion and deportation because the orders were issued so long ago, and the REAL ID Act states that

petitions forreview of final orders must be filed within 30 days after the date ofthe finalorder ofremoval. See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Petitioner argues that if this Court does not have jurisdictionto review the final order
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 On October 7, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review, along with an accompanying motion for

stay, in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. That petition is docketed as 05-75796. 

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of exclusion and deportation, she will be without any judicial recourse. However, the question whether there

is any judicial review over the 1997 final order of exclusion and deportation is a question for the Court of

Appeals, as the REAL ID Act makes clear that the court of appeals is the “sole and exclusive means forjudicial

review of an order ofremoval,” and that the terms “‘judicialreview’ and ‘jurisdictionto review’ include habeas

corpus review pursuant to section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision . . . .” 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(5).2 Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of petitioner’s challenges to the

exclusion and deportation order, the Court also lacks jurisdiction to review petitioner’s request for a stay of

deportation.

2. Petitioner’s Challenge to Detention

The parties’ joint status report, filed October 27, 2005, states that petitioner was released from

detention on October 26, 2005. Accordingly, petitioner’s challenge to her detention and request for release

on bond is moot. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, to the extent petitioner challenges a final order

of exclusion or deportation, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of

jurisdiction. To the extent petitioner challenges her detention, the Court DISMISSES the petition as moot

because petitioner is no longer detained. All pending motions are denied as moot. 

[Docket Nos. 1, 7, 10, 19]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge