Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01483/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01483-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kevin Rochon Blaise, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-13-01483-PHX-NVW (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Kevin Rochon Blaise (Petitioner) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed an Answer asserting that 

Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally barred or lack merit. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner filed 

a reply. 1 (Doc. 14.) For the reasons below, the Petition should be denied.2

 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On February 8, 2007, the Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for one 

count of first-degree murder, a class one dangerous felony (Count 1), four counts of 

aggravated assault, each a class three dangerous felony (Counts Two-Five), and one 

 

1

 In his Reply, Petitioner “ask[s] the court to appoint him counsel” (Doc. 14 at 3), 

but he did not file a separate motion for the appointment of counsel. Petitioner’s request for the appointment of counsel should be denied because he does not have a 

constitutional right to counsel in this section 2254 case and he has not meet the standards 

for appointing counsel in this matter. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). 

2

 This matter was transferred to the assigned magistrate judge on June 30, 2014. (Doc. 15.) 

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count of misconduct involving weapons, a class four felony (Count Six).3 (Doc. 10, Ex. 

D.) 

 After a trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. (Doc. 10, Ex. P; 

Ex. HHH at 105-09.) Petitioner then stipulated “to the one aggravating circumstance of 

physical, emotional, and financial harm to the victim and/or victim’s family” for each 

count of aggravated assault, and the trial court found that Petitioner “knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily waived his right” to a jury determination of these 

aggravating circumstances. (Doc. 10, Ex. Q at 2; Ex. III at 10-19.) The trial court also 

found that Petitioner was on parole at the time of the offenses, and that he had five prior 

felony convictions. (Doc. 10, Ex. R at 2; Ex. JJJ at 14-17.) 

 On August 8, 2008, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment with 

the possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years for Count One, presumptive 

11.25-year prison sentences for Counts Two through Five, and a presumptive ten-year 

prison sentence for Count Six. (Doc. 10, Ex. R, at 4–5; Ex. JJJ at 39-40.) The trial court 

ordered the sentences on Counts One through Five to run consecutively to each other, and 

the sentence for Count Six to run concurrently with the sentence for Count Five. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. R at 4-5; Ex. JJJ at 40.) 

B. Summary of the Facts 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts underlying Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences as follows. (Doc. 10, Ex. A.) Around midnight on March 5, 

2006, five women, D.H., Ty.R., Ta.R., M.R., and L.H., went out for the evening.4

 

 

3

 Petitioner was indicted in 2006 for one count of second-degree murder, four counts of aggravated assault, and one count of misconduct involving weapons. (Doc. 10, Ex. A.) After receiving additional evidence, the State returned to the grand jury on January 30, 2007 and indicted Petitioner for one count of first-degree murder, four counts of aggravated assault, and one count of misconduct involving weapons. (Doc. 10, Exs. C, G.) The State later realized that two counts of aggravated assault had been charged under the wrong subsection of the statute and, on February 8, 2007, indicted Petitioner for the 

charges on which he was later convicted. (Doc. 10, Exs. D, G.) The trial court 

subsequently dismissed the first two cases without prejudice. (Doc. 10, Exs. F, G, H.) 

4

 The Court refers to the five women by the initials that the appellate court used in its decision. (Doc. 10, Ex. AA at 2.) 

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(Doc. 10, Ex. AA at 2.) They ended up at Amvets nightclub, which was fairly crowded. 

(Id.) D.H. saw Petitioner inside, near the back of the club. (Id. at 3.) The club closed 

soon after the women arrived because a fight broke out. (Id.) People exited the club, 

crowding the parking lot, and making it hard for cars to leave. (Id.) The five women 

eventually made their way to their car and prepared to leave. (Id.) Petitioner and a 

woman, L.P., were standing next to a car that was parked ten to fifteen feet from the 

women. (Id.) L.P. pointed at their car and told Petitioner, “[T]here they go, right there.” 

She then walked to the other end of the parking lot. (Id.) The five women got into their 

car and started to leave. (Id.) A man later identified as S.R. was standing next to 

Petitioner and drew a gun. (Id.) One of the women, L.H. shouted: “Let’s go. [S.R.] has a 

gun.” (Id.) “S.R. fired several shots into the air.” (Id.) Petitioner also had a gun. He 

crouched down and shot several times into the car in which the women were riding. (Id.) 

“L.H. suffered a gunshot wound to her head above her right eye, and she was also shot in 

the back and foot.” (Id.) D.H. and M.R. were both shot in the foot. (Id.) “Ty.R. drove 

the women to the hospital. L.H. died from the gunshot wound to her head.” 5 (Id.) 

C. Direct Appeal 

 On August 15, 2008, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Doc. 10, Ex S.) Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating there was “no arguable question of law that is 

not frivolous” to raise on direct appeal, and requesting permission for Petitioner to file a 

supplemental brief. (Doc. 10, Ex. W.) With the appellate court’s permission, Petitioner 

later filed an opening brief, raising the following issues: (1) insufficient evidence 

supported the convictions; (2) his “Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights [were] violated 

when [he] was denied critical evidence,” specifically the “medical records of two 

 

5

 The appellate court’s factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of 

correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) (“In habeas proceedings in federal court, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct.”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(rejecting argument that the statement of facts in an Arizona Supreme Court opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness). 

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victims,” and the denial of this evidence violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 

(3) appellate counsel was ineffective; (4) he was “indicted three times on charges arising 

out of the same events” and requested that the appellate court “look into this just to see if 

those three indictments [were] in the guidelines of the law”; (5) the prosecutor committed 

misconduct; (6) the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony at trial; (7) the trial 

court was “vindictive” and “pro-state”; (8) a juror broke the admonition by speaking to 

the prosecutor; (9) the jury was “unduly biased or improperly influenced” in violation of 

the Sixth Amendment when “several of the victims family and friends started crying and 

yelling” during a State witness’s testimony; (10) the trial judge improperly granted 

immunity to all of the State’s witnesses; (11) the trial court should have imposed 

concurrent sentences because the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating 

circumstances; (12) “[t]he jury alternates were selected in an unlawful manner’’; and 

(13) the trial court erred by failing to strike the entire jury panel. (Doc. 10, Ex. Y.) 

 In a memorandum decision, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences. (Doc. 10, Ex. AA.) The appellate court issued an order and mandate on 

February 22, 2010. (Doc. 10, Ex. BB.) Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to 

file a petition for review. The appellate court granted the motion and vacated the order 

and mandate. (Doc. 10, Exs. CC, DD.) Petitioner later filed a petition for review in the 

Arizona Supreme Court (Doc. 10, Ex. EE), which was summarily denied on July 7, 2010. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. GG.) 

D. Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On March 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction review pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6

 (Doc. 10, Exs. II & JJ.) The trial court 

appointed counsel. (Doc. 10, Ex. KK.) Because Petitioner’s direct appeal was still 

pending, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction proceeding, with leave to re-file 

after the issuance of the order and mandate on direct appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. LL.) 

 

6

 Petitioner filed two notices of post-conviction review, one pro se and one through counsel. (Doc. 10, Exs. II, JJ.) 

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 The Arizona Court of Appeals issued an order and mandate for the direct appeal 

on August 25, 2010, and Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court on September 16, 2010. (Doc. 10, Exs. HH, MM.) The trial court appointed 

counsel who later filed a notice stating that she was “unable to find a tenable issue to 

submit to the court pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,” and 

asking for an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se petition. (Doc. 10, Exs. NNQQ.) 

 With the court’s permission (Doc. 10, Ex. SS), Petitioner filed a petition raising 

the following issues: (1) Petitioner was improperly indicted three times for the same 

charges arising from the same events; (2) the State violated his speedy trial rights by 

indicting him three times; (3) the trial court erred by not dismissing the entire jury panel 

or several individual members of the jury panel; (4) trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by (a) failing to strike a particular juror from the original jury panel, (b) failing 

to move for a mistrial when a juror talked to the prosecutor, (c) failing to move for a 

mistrial when the victim’s family cried during the testimony of a state’s witness, 

(d) failing to adequately explain “the Blakely rule” before Petitioner stipulated to an 

aggravating circumstance, (e) failing to fully explain to the trial court why the defense 

needed the victims’ medical records, (f) failing to give discovery to Petitioner to facilitate 

his participation in his defense, (g) failing to argue self-defense and failing to hire an 

expert witness, (h) failing to inspect the victim’s car, infringing on his speedy trial rights 

by continuing the trial over Petitioner’s objection, and failing to request evidentiary 

hearings, (i) filing an untimely motion for a new trial, (j) failing to object to the 

prosecutor’s improper cross-examination of a defense witness, (k) failing to ask for a plea 

bargain, (l) failing to file timely motions to suppress evidence, and (m) failing to object to 

jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred in not enforcing the admonition and declaring a 

mistrial when a juror talked to the prosecutor; (6) the trial court erred by extending the 

last trial date in violation of Rule 8 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure; (7) the 

trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the “state’s victims/witnesses” had been 

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granted immunity; (8) the trial court improperly selected alternate jurors; (9) the trial 

court erred in calculating Petitioner’s presentence incarceration credit; (10) the trial court 

erred by suppressing the “victims/witnesses medical records or toxicology reports”; 

(11) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence exhibit 80, a photograph of the crime 

scene; (12) the trial court erred by presenting a jury question to the investigating 

detective; (13) the trial court erred by not inquiring why Juror 14 was sick; (14) the trial 

court’s bias effected the ruling on the Rule 20 motion; (15) the trial court erred by having 

extra security in the courtroom; (16) the trial court erred by imposing “unconstitutional 

multiple sentences for committing a single act”; (17) the prosecutor committed 

misconduct for various reasons; (18) the State used “false testimony” or failed to correct 

“perjured” testimony in violation of Petitioner’s right to due process; (19) the trial court 

and the prosecutor suppressed two victims’ medical records in violation of Brady; 

(20) the State violated the “Arizona Rules of Court” by showing a state witness 

transcripts and police reports before trial; (21) the prosecutor violated Petitioner’s due 

process rights by reading his “entire criminal history” to the jury; (22) the prosecutor 

failed to produce three witnesses at trial; (23) there was insufficient evidence to support 

Petitioner’s convictions; (24) appellate counsel was ineffective; (25) Petitioner was 

“convicted on the basis of an identification that was unconstitutionally suggestive”; 

(26) crime-scene evidence was not DNA tested and latent fingerprints were not tested; 

(27) the State destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence; and (28) Petitioner’s 

convictions were based on perjured testimony. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT.) 

 The trial court found that “most of the many claims raised by [Petitioner] in his 

PCR [were] precluded pursuant to Rules 32.2 and 32.6(c) as these claims were either 

litigated already or were waived either at trial or on appeal.” (Doc. 10, Ex. WW at 1.) 

However, it found that Petitioner’s claims of “ineffective assistance of counsel (both trial 

and appellate) and newly discovered evidence” were not precluded. (Id. at 2.) The court 

concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that his counsel’s representation fell below 

the prevailing objective standard or that there was “a reasonable probability that but for 

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counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” (Id.) The 

court also found that many of trial counsel’s challenged actions were “clearly strategy 

decisions that cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,” and 

noted that Petitioner described trial counsel’s decisions as a “failed strategy.” (Id. 

(emphasis omitted).) The court further found that Petitioner “failed to establish the 

requirements necessary to demonstrate newly discovered evidence” as required by Rule 

32.5. (Id.) 

 On September 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to move for a 

mistrial after a juror spoke to the prosecutor; (2) failing to object or move for a mistrial 

when a juror and spectators started crying during a state witness’s testimony; (3) denying 

Petitioner access to “the case documents, discovery, and police reports”; (4) not raising a 

self-defense theory; (5) letting “key evidence disappear without even inspecting it”; 

(6) not hiring a “key expert witness”; (7) failing to object to Petitioner being indicted 

three times; (8) failing to object to the jury panel; (9) failing to object when the trial 

court changed the trial date; (10) failing to request a jury instruction on the “state’s 

witnesses’ immunity deal”; (11) miscalculating Petitioner’s presentence incarceration 

credit; (12) failing to ask the trial court for MR’s and DH’s medical records; (13) failing 

to request TyR’s and TaR’s medical records; (14) failing to request that the trial court 

remove a sick juror from the jury; (15) failing to object when a “third party witness 

testified as if he was a first party witness”; (16) failing to object to the extra courtroom 

security; (17) failing to investigate the state’s witnesses’ criminal backgrounds; 

(18) failing to move to strike DH’s testimony; (19) failing to call three key witnesses to 

testify at trial; (20) failing to have latent fingerprints tested and failing to have other 

crime scene evidence DNA tested; (21) failing to investigate what happened to a “second 

gun the witnesses/victims had with them” the night of the shooting; (22) failing to move 

for a mistrial “when the State fail[ed] to call witnesses that w[ere] the center piece of 

their [theory of] motive”; (23) failing to tell Petitioner that “the victim had a gun on her 

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lap after the event”; (24) asking the court for “countless continuances”; (25) failing to 

object during the State’s cross-examination of a defense witness; (26) allowing the State 

to introduce irrelevant and misleading evidence; (27) filing an untimely Rule 24 motion; 

(28) failing to object to the “unconstitutional suggestive photo array/line ups”; 

(29) failing to object to the verdict forms; and (30) failing to object to the presence on the 

jury panel of jurors who knew each other. (Doc. 10, Ex. XX; Doc. 10-3 at 44-46)7

 

 Petitioner also asserted that appellate counsel was ineffective (Id. at 55-56); and 

that newly discovered evidence existed including “17 latent prints” that were taken from 

the victim’s car, DNA evidence, gunpowder residue from the victim’s car, a statement 

made by another man to one of the victims before the shooting, and evidence that the 

victims had two guns in the car. (Id. at 59-60.) On April 5, 2013, the appellate court 

denied review. (Doc. 10, Ex. AAA.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 10, Ex. KKK.) 

E. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On July 16, 2013, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

raising the following claims for relief: 

Ground One: Trial counsel was ineffective for (a) denying Petitioner’s “right to a 

fast and speedy trial by continuing [his] trial dates numerous times,” (b) failing to 

conduct pretrial investigation and failing to obtain an expert witness for “crime scene 

reconstruction,” (c) failing to give Petitioner “any police reports or discovery” until after 

trial, (d) failing to object or move for a mistrial when a juror spoke to a prosecutor, 

(e) failing to object or request a mistrial when “jury members and spectators started 

crying when state witness [M.R.] was on the stand testifying,” (f) failing to raise the 

defense that someone else committed the crime, and (g) failing to object to the State 

indicting him “three times for the same act.” (Doc. 1 at 6-7.) 

 

7

 Because Exhibit XX includes three documents and the page numbers on that exhibit are obscured, the Court refers to Exhibit XX by the CM/ECF document and page numbers. (Doc. 10-3 at 40-62.) 

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Ground Two: “The prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony to obtain a 

conviction” in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights. (Id. at 8.) 

Ground Three: Petitioner’s convictions “resulted from state court errors which, 

taken together denied Petitioner a fair trial” and violated the Fifth Amendment. 

Petitioner specifically asserts that (a) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel 

access to the “witnesses/victim’s medical records,” (b) the trial court erred by ordering 

excessive courtroom security, (c) the trial court failed to instruct the jury that all of the 

State’s witnesses were granted immunity, (d) the trial court erred by allowing the State to 

indict Petitioner three times and by not producing transcripts of the three grand jury 

proceedings, and (e) the trial court erred by failing to remove a juror who was sick and 

cried during a State witness’s testimony. (Id. at 10.) 

Ground Four: Petitioner’s convictions were “obtained as the result of evidence 

that is insufficient to persuade a properly instructed jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt [in] violation of the U.S. Constitution Fifth Amendment.” (Id. at 11.) 

Ground Five: Petitioner “was convicted on the basis of an identification that was 

unconstitutionally suggestive [in] violation of the U.S. Constitution Fifth and Sixth 

Amendment.” (Id. at 16.) 

Ground Six: The trial court imposed “unconstitutional multiple sentences for 

committing a single criminal act [in] violation of the U.S. Constitution Eighth 

Amendment.” (Id. at 17.) 

 Respondents argue that Grounds One (a), (f), and (g), Grounds Three (b), (c), (d), 

and (e), Ground Four, and Ground Five are procedurally barred from federal habeas 

corpus review and that Grounds Three (d) and Four also lack merit. (Doc. 10 at 17.) 

Respondents further argue that Petitioner’s remaining claims lack merit. (Doc. 10 at 27.) 

Petitioner argues that his claims are properly before the Court and that he is entitled to 

habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 14.) 

/// 

/// 

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II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731 32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

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returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

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not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

III. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar Applied to Grounds One (a), (f), (g), Three (b)-(e), Four, and Five 

A. Grounds One (a), (f), and (g)

 In Ground One, Petitioner raises seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Doc. 1 at 6.) See Gulbrandson v. Ryan, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 5779188, at *12 (9th 

Cir. Oct. 28, 2013) (“As a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [] of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.”) (quoting Moormann v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005)). Respondents argue that Grounds One (a), 

(f), and (g) are barred from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 10 at 18.) As discussed 

below, Petitioner properly exhausted Ground One (a) and it is properly before the Court 

on habeas corpus review. However, Grounds One (f) and (g) are procedurally barred 

from federal habeas corpus review. 

 1. Ground One (a) was Properly Exhausted 

 In Ground One (a), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in violation 

of the Sixth Amendment because she requested numerous trial continuances in violation 

of Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner presented this claim to the 

trial court on post-conviction review. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT.) Respondents argue that 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim because he did not present it to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 10 at 18-19); See Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-

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33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (stating that, in Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, 

the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal 

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or postconviction proceeding.). 

 However, upon review of Petitioner’s appellate brief for review of the trial court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, the Court finds that Petitioner did raise his 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for requesting numerous continuances in violation 

of his right to a speedy trial. (Doc. 10, Ex. XX; Doc. 10-3 at 46, 53) Specifically, 

Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for asking the court “for countless 

continuations” (Doc. 10-3 at 46), and argued that trial counsel continued his case “time 

after time” without asking him in violation of Petitioner’s “fast and speedy rights.” (Id.

at 53.) 

 Because Petitioner presented the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised 

in Ground One (a) to the trial and appellate courts on post-conviction review, he properly 

exhausted state remedies on that claim and it is properly before this Court on habeas 

corpus review. See Crowell, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 931-33. Accordingly, the Court 

addresses the merits of Ground One (a) in Section IV. 

 2. Ground One (f) was not Properly Exhausted 

 In Ground One (f), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

presenting the defense that “somebody else committed the crime.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Petitioner did not exhaust this claim. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner 

raised a similar claim, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing selfdefense at trial. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT; Doc. 10-2 at 111 (“defense counsel did not want the 

burden of proving self-defense and relied on the insufficient evidence of the state 

case”).)8

 That similar, but different, claim was not sufficient to exhaust the specific claim 

of ineffective assistance that Petitioner asserts in Ground One (f). See Gulbrandson, 

 

8

 Because the page numbers on Exhibit TT are obscured, the Court refers to 

Exhibit TT by the CM/ECF docket and page numbers. (Doc. 10-2 at 86-187.) 

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2013 WL 5779188, at *12. Accordingly, Petitioner did not properly exhaust Ground One 

(f). See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1068 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring exhaustion in 

state court of the factual basis of each distinct ineffective-assistance claim), overruled on 

other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 3. Ground One (g) was not Properly Exhausted 

 In Ground One (g), Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to challenge the three indictments “for fundamental error.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) In his petition 

for post-conviction relief, Petitioner argued that the State improperly indicted him three 

times for “charges arising out of the same events,” and alleged that his appellate counsel

was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT; Doc. 10-2 at 

91-32.) Petitioner, however, did not argue in his petition for post-conviction relief, as he 

does now, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the three indictments. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. TT; Doc. 10-2 at 109-115.) 

 Rather, Petitioner raised the claim he asserts in Ground One (g) for the first time in 

his petition for review to the court of appeals, which he filed challenging the trial court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 10, Ex. XX; Doc. 10-3 at 44.) 

Raising a claim for the first time to an appellate court on discretionary review does not 

constitute fair presentation of that claim for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion 

requirement. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989) (raising a new claim 

to a state court that has discretionary review does not constitute fair presentation); Casey 

v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-919 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “under Castille, [the 

petitioner] did not fairly present his federal law claims when he raised them for the first 

and only time upon petitioning for discretionary review to the [state supreme court].”). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals has only discretionary jurisdiction over petitions for 

review from the denial of post-conviction relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(f) (stating 

that the “appellate court may, in its discretion, grant review and order oral argument if 

deemed necessary . . . .”) Accordingly, Petitioner did not properly exhaust Ground One 

(g). 

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 4. Grounds One (f) and (g) are Procedurally Barred 

 As stated above, Petitioner did not fairly present Grounds One (f) and (g) to the 

state courts. It would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state court to exhaust 

Grounds One (f) and (g) because a successive petition for post-conviction relief would be 

untimely, and these claims would be precluded from Rule32 review because they could 

have been raised in Petitioner’s prior post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a general 

rule, when ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, 

in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will 

be deemed waived and precluded.”) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, Grounds 

One (f), and (g) are technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. See McKinney v. 

Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding claims procedurally defaulted 

because petitioner was barred from exhausting his claims in the first instance by Rules 

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)); see also Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848. As discussed in Section 

III(E), Petitioner has not established any basis to excuse the procedural bar to habeas 

corpus review of Grounds One (f) and (g). 

B. Grounds Three (b), (c), (d), and (e) 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner raises several claims of trial court error. (Doc. 1 at 

10.) Respondents argue that Grounds Three (b), (c), (d), and (e) are barred from federal 

habeas corpus review. As set forth below, the Court finds that Grounds Three (b) and (e) 

are procedurally barred, and Grounds Three (c) and (d) were not properly exhausted and 

are procedurally barred. 

 1. Ground Three (b) is Procedurally Barred 

 In Ground Three (b), Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his Fifth 

Amendment right to a fair trial by ordering excessive security in the courtroom during 

trial. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. Y.) Rather, he raised it in his petition for post-conviction relief, and the trial court 

found it precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3) because Petitioner had not presented it 

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previously. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT; Doc. 10-2 at 99; Ex. WW at 1); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3) (stating a defendant is precluded from post-conviction relief on any ground 

that was “waived . . . on appeal”); Stewart v. Smith, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Ariz. 2002). 

Because the state court found that Petitioner’s failure to comply with a state procedural 

rule precluded consideration of the claim asserted in Ground Three (b), federal habeas 

corpus review of that claim by this Court is barred because Rule 32.2(a)(3) is an 

independent and adequate state ground. See Smith, 536 U.S. at 860 (finding Rule 

32.2(a)(3) determinations independent of federal law); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 

932 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly followed and adequate). 

 2. Ground Three (e) is Procedurally Barred 

 In Ground Three (e), Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his Fifth 

Amendment right to a fair trial by failing to remove a juror who was biased against 

Petitioner and cried during the testimony of a witness. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Petitioner did not 

present this claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. Y.) Rather, he raised it in his petition 

for post-conviction relief (Doc. 10-2 at 98-99), and the trial court found the claim 

precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3) because Petitioner had not previously presented it 

to the state court. (Doc. 10, Ex. WW); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(1) and (3) (stating 

that a defendant is precluded from post-conviction relief on any ground “raisable on 

direct appeal” and any ground that was “waived . . . on appeal”); Stewart, 46 P.3d at 

1070. Because the state court determined that Petitioner’s failure to comply with a state 

procedural rule precluded consideration of his claim asserted in Ground Three (e), federal 

habeas corpus review of that claim is barred because Rule 32.2(a)(3) is an independent 

and adequate state ground. See Smith, 536 U.S. at 860; Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932. 

 3. Ground Three (c) was not Properly Exhausted 

 In Ground Three (c), Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury that “all [of the] state[’s] witnesses were granted immunity.” (Doc. 1 at 

10.) Petitioner did not raise this claim in his opening brief on direct appeal. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. Y.) Rather, he raised it for the first time in his petition for discretionary review to the 

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Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 10, Ex. Y, Ex. EE at 2.) Raising a claim for the first time 

to a state court on discretionary review does not constitute fair presentation to satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement. See Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38 (“Submitting a new claim to the 

state’s highest court in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered 

absent special circumstances does not constitute fair presentation.”); see also Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 31.19(c)(1) (providing petitions for review are limited to issues first presented 

on direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals); State v. Sepahi, 78 P.3d 732, 735 n.3 

(Ariz. 2003) (noting that an issue raised for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court 

“was not preserved for . . . review”). 

 Additionally, although Petitioner presented Ground Three (c) to trial court in his 

petition for post-conviction review (Doc. 10, Ex. TT; Doc. 10-2 at 96), he did not present 

that claim in his petition for review to the appellate court. (Doc. 10, Ex. XX; Doc. 10-3 

at 42-60.) Thus, he did not properly exhaust Ground Three (c). See Crowell, 483 

F. Supp. 2d at 931-33 (stating that, in Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to 

death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his 

federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or 

post-conviction proceedings). 

 4. Ground Three (d) was not Properly Exhausted 

 In Ground Three (d), Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his Fifth 

Amendment right to a fair trial by allowing the State to “re-indict[] [him] three separate 

times . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 10.) On direct review, Petitioner asked the Arizona Court of 

Appeals to “look into” the fact that he was indicted three times, “to see if those three 

indictments was [sic] in the guidelines of the law.” (Doc. 10, Ex. Y; Doc. 10-1 at 159.)9

 

Petitioner did not cite the Fifth Amendment. (Id.) The appellate court reviewed 

Petitioner’s challenge to the three indictments for fundamental error, and found that no 

error, “fundamental or otherwise” occurred. (Doc. 10, Ex. AA at 6-7.) 

 

9

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 Although Petitioner challenged the three indictments on direct review, he did not 

fairly present his current Fifth Amendment claim to the state court because he did not 

“clearly state the federal basis and federal nature of the claim, along with relevant facts.” 

Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, Petitioner did not 

properly exhaust Ground Three (d).10 

 5. Grounds Three (c)-(d) are Procedurally Barred

 As set forth above, Petitioner did not properly present Grounds Three (c) and (d) 

to the state courts and it would be futile for Petitioner to return to state court to try to 

properly exhaust these claims because a successive petition for post-conviction relief 

would be untimely, and these claims would also be precluded because they could have 

been raised in a Petitioner’s prior post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006). Accordingly, Grounds 

Three (c) and (d) are technically exhausted and procedurally barred from federal habeas 

corpus review.11 See McKinney, 730 F.3d at 913 n.6; Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848. 

C. Ground Four is Procedurally Barred 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 11.) On direct appeal, 

Petitioner asserted that insufficient evidence supported his convictions, but he cited only 

Arizona case law and did not present a federal claim. (Doc. 10, Ex. Y; Doc. 10-1 at 170-

171.) The appellate court rejected the claim on state law grounds. (Doc. 10, Ex. AA at 

4-6.) Petitioner did not fairly present a federal sufficiency of the evidence claim to the 

 

10 Respondents alternatively argue that this claim is not cognizable on habeas corpus review and that it lacks merit. (Doc. 10 at 49-50.) Having already found Ground Three (d) barred from federal habeas corpus review, the Court does not reach 

Respondents’ alternative argument. 

11 In Ground Three, Petitioner also generally argues that the trial court’s errors cumulatively denied him a fair trial. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Petitioner did not exhaust this claim 

because he did not present a claim of cumulative error to the state courts (Doc. 10, 

Exs. Y, TT), and he cannot return to state court to properly exhaust this claim. See 

Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding cumulative error claim procedurally defaulted because it was not presented to the highest state court on appeal). Accordingly, federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claim of cumulative 

trial error asserted in Ground Three is procedurally barred. 

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state court on direct appeal because he did not “clearly state the federal basis and federal 

nature of th[is] claim” in state court. See Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. His similar state law 

claim was insufficient to fairly present a federal claim on direct appeal, even if the federal 

basis of the claim was “self-evident.” See Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668; Lacy v. Belleque, 2010 

WL 3866719, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2010) (the petitioner’s presentation of a state law 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal did not fairly present a federal 

sufficiency of the evidence claim and such a claim was barred from § 2254 review). 

 Petitioner presented a federal challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in his 

petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT, Doc. 10-2 at 108.) The trial court, 

however, found that Petitioner had waived review of that claim by failing to raise it on 

direct appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. WW); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(1), (a)(3); Stewart, 46 

P.3d at 1070 (explaining that for most trial error, the “State may simply show that the 

defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding” 

for preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3)) (internal quotation omitted). Because the state 

court found that Petitioner’s failure to comply with a state procedural rule precluded 

consideration of the claim asserted in Ground Four, habeas corpus review of that claim in 

this Court is barred because Rule 32.2(a)(3) is an independent and adequate state 

grounds.12 See Smith, 536 U.S. at 860 (finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations 

independent of federal law); Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932. 

D. Ground Five is Procedurally Barred 

 In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts that he was “convicted on the basis of an 

identification that was unconstitutionally suggestive.” (Doc. 1 at 16.) Petitioner did not 

raise this claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. Y.) Rather, he raised it in his petition for 

post-conviction relief. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT; Doc. 10-2 at 117.) The trial court found that 

 

12 Respondents alternatively argue that Petitioner’s claim in Ground Four lacks 

merit. (Doc. 10 at 50-57.) Having already found Ground Four barred from federal 

habeas corpus review, the Court does not reach Respondents’ alternative argument. Although the Court need not reach the merits of Ground Four, upon review of the record 

and the discussion in Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 10 at 50-57), the Court finds that 

sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s convictions. 

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Petitioner had waived Rule 32 review of that claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. WW); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(1) and (3); Stewart, 46 P.3d at 107. 

Because the state court determined that Petitioner’s failure to comply with a state 

procedural rule precluded consideration of the claim asserted in Ground Five, federal 

habeas corpus review of that claim is barred because Rule 32.2(a)(3) is an independent 

and adequate state ground. See Smith, 536 U.S. at 860; Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932. 

E. Petitioner has not Established a Basis to Overcome the Procedural Bar 

 Because Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One (f) and (g), Grounds Three 

(b), (c), (d), and (e), Ground Four, and Ground Five are procedurally barred, federal 

habeas corpus review is unavailable unless Petitioner establishes “cause and prejudice” or 

a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to overcome the procedural bar. See Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 749. For the reasons set out below, the Court finds that Petitioner has not 

established a basis to overcome the procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of 

Grounds One (f) and (g), Grounds Three (b)-(e), Ground Four, and Ground Five. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that habeas corpus review of those claims be denied 

and does not consider the merits of those claims. 

 1. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

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at 327. Although Petitioner generally asserts that failure to consider the merits of his 

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice (Doc. 14 at 2), he has not met 

Schlup’s high standard. Accordingly, this exception does not excuse the procedural bar. 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 a. Indigence, Lack of Legal Knowledge, Loss of Transcripts 

 In an attempt to establish cause, Petitioner first argues that he is indigent and that 

he is not represented by counsel. (Doc. 14 at 3.) Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of 

legal knowledge and assistance, and limited legal resources do not establish cause to 

excuse the procedural bar. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to 

cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 

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1988) (petitioner’s mental health issues and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not 

constitute cause). 

 Petitioner also argues that during a prison move, he “lost most of his court and 

legal transcripts which limits his ability to present proof.” (Doc. 14 at 3.) Petitioner 

claims that he cannot afford copies of the lost transcripts. (Id.) Although Petitioner 

contends that he lost certain transcripts, he does not state when he lost the transcripts, 

identify which “court and legal transcripts” he lost, or explain how the alleged lack of 

transcripts prevented him from properly exhausting his claims in state court. See United

States v. Lewis, 605 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that prisoner does not have an 

absolute right to transcripts to collaterally attack his sentence). 

 Additionally, even if Petitioner lost his transcripts during direct and collateral 

review, he was able to file extensive petitions for review raising numerous claims with 

the trial court and court of appeals (Doc. 10, Exs. Y, TT, XX), and he has not explained 

how the alleged absence of his transcripts prevented him from fairly presenting all of his 

claims to the state courts. Accordingly, the alleged loss of transcripts does not establish 

cause to overcome the procedural bar. 

 b. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

 Petitioner also argues that he “cannot be held responsible for having ineffective 

appeal counsel.” (Doc. 14 at 2.) To the extent that this statement can be construed as 

arguing that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel constitutes cause to overcome 

the procedural bar, that claim fails. Although in some circumstances the ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel may establish cause for a procedural default, “a claim of 

ineffective assistance must be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before 

it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89; 

see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-53 (2000) (“ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be 

procedurally defaulted”); Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381 (same). 

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 The only claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that Petitioner fairly 

presented to the state trial and appellate courts on post-conviction review are his claims 

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to review the three grand jury 

indictments, failing to raise the issue of jury tampering or influence, failing to challenge 

the unlawful taking of Plaintiff’s fingerprints, and failing to raise the issue of a “verdict 

form that was in question at trial.” (Doc. 10-2 at 116; Doc. 10-3 at 55-56.) 

 Petitioner does not present those claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel as a ground for relief in the pending Petition. (Doc. 1.) Although Ground 

Three (d) asserts a Fifth Amendment violation based on the fact that Petitioner was 

indicted three times (Doc. 1 at 10), Petitioner did not exhaust a claim that appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Fifth Amendment challenge to his three 

indictments. Rather, he exhausted a general claim that appellate counsel was ineffective 

for “failing to review three grand jury indictments.” (Doc. 10-3 at 56.) Thus, the 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not establish cause to overcome the 

procedural bar to habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s procedurally barred claims. 

 c. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel 

 Finally, Petitioner attempts to establish cause based on the alleged ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel. (Doc. 14 at 1-2.) Generally, any errors of counsel 

during the post-conviction proceedings cannot serve as a basis for cause to excuse a 

petitioner’s procedural default of other claims. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. However, 

in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), the Supreme Court 

established a limited exception to this general rule. The Court held that the ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings” — 

while not stating a constitutional claim itself — may establish cause to excuse procedural 

default of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when a post-conviction 

proceeding represents the first opportunity under state law for a petitioner to litigate such 

claims. Id. at 1315. 

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 “Cause” is established under Martinez when: (1) the claim of “ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there 

being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review 

proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding 

with respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and (4) state law 

requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim] . . . be raised in an initialreview collateral review proceeding. Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 

(2013) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19, 1320-21). 

 The Martinez exception applies only to the ineffectiveness of post-conviction 

counsel in the initial post-conviction review proceeding. It “does not extend to attorney 

errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a 

claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1320. Martinez is concerned that, if 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not brought in the collateral proceeding that 

provided the first occasion to raise such claims, then the claims could not be brought at 

all. Id. at 1316. Therefore, a petitioner may not assert “cause” to overcome the 

procedural bar based on attorney error that occurred in “appeals from initial-review 

collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for 

discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts.” Id. at 1320. 

 Because the Martinez cause standard applies only to defaulted ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, the only claims to which it might apply in this case are 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel asserted in Grounds One (f) 

and (g). Accordingly, the Court considers whether Petitioner has shown a “substantial” 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in Grounds One (f) and (g).13 

 A “substantial” claim “has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Like the 

standard for issuing a certificate of appealability, to establish a “substantial” claim, a 

 

13 The third and fourth prongs of the Martinez test are not at issue because an 

Arizona petitioner cannot bring a claim of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel until the “initial-review state court collateral proceeding . . . .” See Nguyen v. 

Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2013). 

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petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition 

should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were 

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 

1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, a claim is 

“‘insubstantial’ if it does not have any merit or is wholly without factual support.” Id. 

Determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial requires a 

district court to examine the claim under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984).

 i. Establishing an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Claim 

 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient under prevailing professional 

standards, and that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Id. at 

687-88. To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must show “that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 699. A 

petitioner’s allegations and supporting evidence must withstand the court’s “highly 

deferential” scrutiny of counsel’s performance, and overcome the “strong presumption” 

that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 689-90. A petitioner bears the 

burden of showing that counsel’s assistance was “neither reasonable nor the result of 

sound trial strategy,” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2001), and 

actions by counsel that “‘might be considered sound trial strategy’” do not constitute 

ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 

 To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Courts should not presume prejudice. 

Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, a petitioner must 

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affirmatively prove actual prejudice, and the possibility that a petitioner suffered 

prejudice is insufficient to establish Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Cooper v.

Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A petitioner] must ‘affirmatively prove 

prejudice.’ . . . This requires showing more than the possibility that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s errors; he must demonstrate that the errors actually prejudiced him.”) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693) (emphasis in original). However, the court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if the court can reject the claim 

of ineffectiveness based on the lack of prejudice. See Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155 n.3 (the 

court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong). 

 ii. Ground One (f) 

In Ground One (f), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

presenting the defense that “somebody else committed the crime.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) The 

record, however, reflects that trial counsel did pursue a defense of mistaken identity and 

argued that someone other than Petitioner shot the victims. (Doc. 10, Ex. HHH at 4-6.) 

Because trial counsel pursued a mistaken identify theory of defense, Petitioner’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel raised in Ground One (f) is not substantial. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not presented a “substantial” claim of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel in Ground One (f) to establish “cause” under Martinez to overcome the 

procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of Ground One (f). 

 iii. Ground One (g) 

 In Ground One (g), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to challenge the three indictments for fundamental error. (Doc. 1 at 7.) On direct appeal, 

Petitioner asked the appellate court to consider whether the three indictments complied 

with “the guidelines of the law.” (Doc. 10, Ex. Y.) On review of that claim, the appellate 

court explained that the State twice re-filed the criminal case to correct the charges 

against Petitioner. The first time, the State alleged first-degree, rather than second-degree 

murder. (Doc. 10, Ex. AA at 7.) The second time, the State added allegations of 

aggravating factors. (Id.) The appellate court found “no error,” “fundamental or 

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otherwise,” with the three indictments. (Id.) Petitioner has not presented any legal 

argument to support his assertion that State improperly indicted him three times. 

 Because the State did not err in re-filing the case two times to correct the charges 

against Petitioner, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the 

indictments for “fundamental error.” See Chippolla v. Valdez, 2008 WL 656033, at *13 

(D. Idaho Mar. 6, 2008) (concluding that because the underlying Brady claim lacked 

merit, the petitioner’s “corresponding ineffective assistance of counsel claim has no merit 

for lack of showing prejudice to [the petitioner’s] defense.”). Therefore, Petitioner has 

not presented a “substantial” claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in Ground 

One (g) to establish “cause” under Martinez to overcome the procedural bar to federal 

habeas corpus review of Ground One (g). 

IV. Merits Review of Grounds One (a) – (e), Two, Three (a), and Six

 Petitioner properly exhausted Grounds One (a)-(e), Two, Three (a), and Six, and 

these claims are properly before the Court on habeas corpus review. However, as set 

forth below, these claims lack merit. 

A. Federal Review of Claims Adjudicated in State Court 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ 

U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” 

such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts” in light of the record before the state court.14 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington 

 

14 When applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the district court considers that “last 

reasoned state court opinion” of the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 979, 803 

(1991). When a higher state court denies the claim summarily, the federal court looks through to the last reasoned decision. See Avila v. Gomez, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 

2002). Because the Arizona Supreme Court summarily affirmed the appellate court’s decision on direct review (Doc. 10, Ex. GG), the appellate court’s decision is the last reasoned decision of the state court on direct appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. AA.) (cont’d). 

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v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes 

in case-by-case determinations.” Id.

 When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

 

Because the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the trial court’s ruling on post-conviction review (Doc. 10, Ex. AAA), the trial court’s decision (Doc. WW) is 

the last reasoned decision on post-conviction review. Moreover, even if the state courts’ 

decisions are unaccompanied by an explanation, Petitioner’s “burden must still be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 

S. Ct. at 784. 

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relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

 When a habeas petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard applies and the court does not 

engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 

911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (stating that the court “need not conduct harmless error review of Strickland 

violations under Brecht . . . because ‘[t]he; Strickland prejudice analysis is complete in 

itself; there is no place for additional harmless-error review.”)). 

B. Grounds One (a) – (e) 

 In Ground One, Petitioner raises seven claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. As previously discussed, Grounds One (f) and (g) are procedurally barred. See

Section III. Petitioner’s remaining claims in Ground One lack merit. The clearly 

established federal law governing Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

is Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. See Section III(E)(2)(c)(i). Therefore, the Court considers 

Plaintiff’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. 

 1. Ground One (a) 

 In Ground One (a), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for 

requesting numerous trial continuances in violation of Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. 

(Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner presented this claim to the trial and appellate courts on postconviction review. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT, XX.) The state court rejected this claim on the 

ground that trial counsel’s requests for continuances were a matter of trial strategy and 

thus, did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 10, Ex. WW at 

2.) “In determining whether the defendant received effective assistance of counsel, ‘[the 

court] will neither second-guess counsel’s decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty 

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vision of hindsight,’ but rather, will defer to counsel’s sound trial strategy.” Murtishaw, 

255 F.3d at 939 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “Because advocacy is an art and 

not a science, and because the adversary system requires deference to counsel’s informed 

decisions, strategic choices must be respected in these circumstances if they are based on 

professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681. 

 Petitioner has not presented any evidence indicating that trial counsel’s decision to 

request several continuances of the trial date was not “sound trial strategy” based on trial 

counsel’s professional judgment. Accordingly, Petitioner’s assertion that trial counsel 

requested numerous continuances does not support a claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel, and Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s rejection of that claim was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based 

on an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 2. Ground One (b)

 In Ground One (b), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because she 

“neglect[ed] to do any pre-trial investigation,” and did not hire an expert witness to do a 

“crime scene reconstruction.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner raised these claim on postconviction review. (Doc. 10, Ex. TT.) The state court rejected Ground One (b) finding 

that counsel’s alleged actions were strategic decisions (Doc. 10, Ex. WW at 2), and 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. 

 “Counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation so that he can make an 

informed decision about how best to represent his client.” Frierson v. Woodford, 463 

F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“[C]ounsel has a duty 

to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary.”)) “Thus, counsel may render ineffective assistance ‘where 

he neither conducted a reasonable investigation nor made a showing of strategic reasons 

for failing to do so.’” Id. (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994)). 

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 Other than asserting that trial counsel failed to obtain an expert witness for crime 

scene reconstruction, Petitioner does not describe the pretrial investigation that trial 

counsel should have conducted. (Id.) Additionally, Petitioner does not describe the 

specific information that counsel would have obtained upon further investigation. The 

“Joint Case Management Plan” details trial counsel’s preparation of the case (Doc. 10, 

Ex. J), and indicates that trial counsel conducted sufficient pretrial investigation, 

including interviewing several witnesses and securing eyewitnesses to testify on 

Petitioner’s behalf. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that, but for counsel’s failure 

to conduct further investigation, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his 

trial would have been different. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that trial 

counsel’s pretrial investigation was deficient or that he was prejudiced by that allegedly 

deficient performance. See Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“cursory and vague [ineffective assistance of counsel claim] cannot support habeas 

relief.”); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which 

are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

 Petitioner also fails to establish that trial counsel was deficient for failing to hire 

an expert to reconstruct the crime scene. At trial, the State’s expert testified that the 

bullet trajectories showed that the bullets that hit the victims’ car were shot “from a very 

level . . . angle, meaning the shooter would have been low to the vehicle to be such deadon to the door,” which supported eyewitness testimony that Petitioner shot at the car from 

a crouched position. (Doc. 10, Ex. EEE at 147, 71-74, 138-47.) The investigating 

detective opined that the bullet that hit L.H. above her right eye and caused her death was 

fired from a standing position and likely went through an open window. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. DDD at 139, 146; Ex. FFF at 134.) The detective testified that this theory was 

consistent with eyewitness accounts that Petitioner was initially standing and then 

assumed a crouching position. (Doc. 10, Ex. FFF at 134.) Trial counsel argued there 

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could have been two shooters because of the two different angles of the bullets.15 

(Doc. 10, Ex. HHH at 60.) 

 As the state court found, whether to hire an expert to reconstruct the crime scene 

was a matter of trial strategy. (Doc. 10, Ex WW.) Trial counsel’s theory of defense was 

mistaken identity and she argued that someone other than Petitioner shot the victims. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. HHH, at 44-63.) This theory of defense did not require trial counsel to 

challenge the State’s ballistic evidence. Additionally, pursuing a mistaken identify 

defense was a reasonable trial strategy because the victims initially called the shooter 

“Steven,” they gave inconsistent statements about the shooting, and a defense witness 

testified that Petitioner was not at Amvets the night of the shooting. (Doc. 10, Exs. DDD 

at 113-15, Ex. EEE at 32, 177-79; Ex. FFF at 50-53; Ex. GGG, at 58, 65, 67, 109, 112.) 

 Trial counsel’s reasonable, strategic decision not to pursue a defense based on the 

ballistics evidence in favor of a different theory of defense does not constitute ineffective 

assistance. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that “it 

was within the broad range of professionally competent assistance for trial counsel to 

choose not to present psychiatric evidence which would have contradicted the primary 

defense theory.”); see also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789 (finding it was reasonable for state 

court to conclude “defense counsel could follow a strategy that did not require the use of 

[blood evidence] experts,” noting “[c]ounsel was entitled to formulate a strategy that was 

reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial 

tactics and strategies”); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 793 (1987) (finding no ineffective 

assistance when counsel did not present evidence of the defendant’s violent tendencies 

 

15 Trial counsel also elicited favorable evidence from the State’s experts. On cross-examination of the firearm expert, trial counsel established that several different 

caliber casings were found near the scene of the shooting, and later argued that individuals other than Petitioner could have fired weapons that caused the victims’ injuries. (Doc. 10, Ex. EEE at 153-54, 158; Ex. FFF at 28-32; Ex. GGG at 4-10; 

Ex. HHH at 61.) Trial counsel also introduced evidence that the two .9 mm bullets that 

were recovered from L.H.’s head and D.H.’s foot could have been fired from separate guns. (Doc. 10, Ex. FFF at 143-45, 156-57; Ex. GGG at 10.) 

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that conflicted with the defense strategy of characterizing defendant’s actions as the result 

of his co-defendant’s strong influence on his will). 

 Even assuming that trial counsel was deficient for failing to hire an expert on 

crime scene reconstruction, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails 

because he has not shown prejudice. Petitioner speculates that an expert would have 

testified about alternative theories of the shooting based on the ballistic evidence. 

(Doc. 1 at 22.) However, Petitioner does not describe the testimony that an expert would 

have given, or establish that an expert witness would have been available and willing to 

testify at his trial. Thus, he has not established that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 

failure to hire an expert. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 

F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding “speculation” about whether counsel could have 

retained an expert is “insufficient to establish prejudice”); Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 

365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Speculation about what an expert could have said is not 

enough to establish prejudice.”); Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 

1998) (finding that the petitioner did not establish prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to 

hire a ballistic expert because petitioner did not identify an “expert witness available to 

testify on his behalf or the type of testimony such witness would have provided beyond 

that elicited at trial,” or “how any expert testimony would affect the outcome of the 

trial”). 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

conduct further investigation or for failing to hire an expert. Accordingly, he has not 

shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim of ineffective assistance was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 3. Ground One (c) 

 Petitioner next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not giving him police 

reports and “discovery,” which impeded his ability to participate in his defense. (Doc. 1 

at 6.) Petitioner, however, does not identify the police reports or discovery that trial 

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counsel withheld from him. (Id.) Additionally, he does not explain how, but for trial 

counsel’s failure to give him police reports and discovery, there is a reasonable 

probability that the result of his trial would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 691-94. Petitioner’s conclusory assertions do not support a claim for habeas corpus 

relief. See Greenway, 653 F.3d at 804; James, 24 F.3d at 26. Accordingly, Petitioner has 

not shown that the state court’s rejection of his claim (Doc. 10, Ex. WW) was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable application of, Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, he is not 

entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

 4. Ground One (d) 

 In Ground One (d), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request that a juror be removed from the jury panel, or to move for a mistrial based on 

that juror’s communication with the prosecutor. (Doc. 1 at 6.) The trial court rejected 

this claim on post-conviction review (Doc. 10, Ex. WW), and Petitioner has not shown 

that the state court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, 

Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 “In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or 

indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for 

obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial . . . .” Remmer v. United States, 347 

U.S. 227, 229 (1954). This presumption, however, is “not conclusive” and the 

government has the burden of establishing, “after notice to and hearing of the defendant, 

that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.” Id. 

 The record reflects that after lunch on the fourth day of Petitioner’s trial, and 

before the jury returned to the courtroom, the prosecutor informed the trial court that 

“When I was in the elevator on the way back from lunch, one of the jurors was in the 

elevator with me. I don’t know his name, but I knew his face. [B]ut when we got to the 

13th floor I looked at my watch and he made a comment, ‘You are more nervous than I 

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am.’ I didn’t respond.” (Doc. 10, Ex. FFF at 70.) The prosecutor asked the trial court to 

“remind the jury” to not “have contact with the lawyers.” (Id.) Defense counsel agreed 

that it was appropriate for the trial court to remind the jurors not to communicate with the 

lawyers. (Id.) When the jurors returned to the courtroom, the trial court reminded them 

“not to talk to any of the lawyers.” (Id. at 70-71.) 

 Thus, the record reflects that a juror made a comment to the prosecutor that did not 

relate to the specifics of Petitioner’s case. The prosecutor did not respond, and 

immediately reported the incident to the trial court and defense counsel. Considering the 

trial court’s and the parties’ agreement that the situation could be adequately addressed 

by reminding the jury of the admonition against talking to the lawyers, the trial court 

likely would have denied any motion to remove the juror or to grant a mistrial based on 

the juror’s limited comment to the prosecutor. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to move for removal of the juror or for a mistrial based on that juror’s comment to the 

prosecutor. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (counsel cannot be 

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection); see also James, 24 F.3d at 27 

(“Counsel’s failure to make a futile motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel.”). Petitioner also has not shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based 

on an unreasonable application of, Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, he is 

not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

 5. Ground One (e) 

 In Ground One (e), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to move “for a mistrial when jury members and spectators started crying when state 

witness [M.R.] was on the stand testifying.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) The trial court rejected this 

claim on post-conviction review (Doc. 10, Ex. WW), and Petitioner has not shown that 

state court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

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facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, Strickland. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Ground One (e) apparently refers to M.R.’s testimony describing how she was 

shot in the foot and discovered that other people in the car with her were also shot and 

then asking the trial court if she could “take a minute.” (Doc. 10, Ex. EEE, at 22.) After 

excusing the jury, the trial court told M.R. that the court would “give [her] a moment.” 

(Id.) Defense counsel requested that the trial court remove “the other individuals [who 

were] crying in the courtroom” because it was “distracting for the jurors to listen to 

[M.R.’s] testimony when other people [were] making noises in the back of the 

courtroom.” (Id. at 23.) The trial court instructed the spectators that the jurors needed 

“to be able to hear everything” that was being said in the courtroom and that they could 

not hear if there were loud or distracting noises in the courtroom. (Id.) The trial court 

directed that “[i]f anybody believes that they can’t listen to the testimony and stay 

composed, then they should step outside. If you are able to stay composed, you are free 

to remain.” (Id.) After the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court had a discussion 

at the bench with counsel during which the prosecutor confirmed that the victim witness 

advocate could escort a victim out of the courtroom “if she starts to cry again.” (Id. at 

23-24.) 

 Although “a defendant’s due process rights include a right to an unbiased and 

impartial jury, . . . not every outburst or disruption warrants a new trial.” Byers v.

Basinger, 610 F.3d 980, 988 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 

(1982) (stating that “due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been 

placed in a potentially compromising situation” and that “it is virtually impossible to 

shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote”). 

Here, the trial transcript suggests that several spectators cried during M.R’s testimony. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. EEE at 23.) Petitioner’ trial counsel immediately addressed the issue of 

crying spectators with the court, asking for the removal of the disruptive individuals from 

the courtroom. (Id.) In response to trial counsel’s request and outside of the presence of 

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the jury, the trial court instructed the spectators to leave if they could not listen to the 

testimony and “stay composed.” (Id.) Under these circumstances, Petitioner has not 

shown that trial counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial based on the 

crying during M.R.’s testimony. 

 Additionally, Petitioner has not alleged, or shown, that he was prejudiced by trial 

counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. In addition to instructing the spectators to 

either compose themselves or to leave the courtroom, the trial court twice instructed the 

jury that it should not “be influenced by sympathy or prejudice.” (Doc. 10, Ex. DDD at 

13; Ex. HHH at 21.) See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is 

presumed to follow its instructions.”); see also Kinnamon v. Scott, 40 F.3d 731, 734 (5th 

Cir. 1994) (finding that the emotional outburst of the victim’s daughter directed at the 

defendant in jury’s presence was not “prejudicial error of constitutional magnitude,” 

noting, “[t]hat the young girl was upset and angry at the person accused by the state as 

the murderer of her father communicated nothing new to the jury.”). 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of Ground 

One (e) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary 

to, or based on an unreasonable application of, Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Therefore, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

C. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that the “prosecutor knowingly used perjured 

testimony to obtain a conviction.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Petitioner contends that four of the 

State’s witnesses (TyR, MR, DH, and the investigating detective) committed perjury and 

that the prosecution knowingly used that perjured testimony at trial. (Id.) A criminal 

defendant’s right to due process is violated when false testimony is used to convict him. 

See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). To prevail on a false testimony claim, 

the petitioner must show that: “(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the 

prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the 

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false testimony was material.” Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation omitted). 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the prosecution either knowingly used, or 

failed to correct, false testimony because the victims testified inconsistently at trial. 

(Doc. 10-1 at 167-69.) The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim as 

“unsubstantiated,” and unsupported by the record. (Doc. 10, Ex. AA at 5.) Petitioner has 

not shown that state court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable 

application of, controlling Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also 

Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16 (“A state court’s decision is not ‘contrary to . . . clearly 

established Federal law’ simply because the court did not cite [Supreme Court] 

opinions.” (quoting Early, 537 U.S. at 8)). 

 Petitioner has not presented any support for his assertion that the testimony of the 

State’s witnesses was false — rather than merely inconsistent — and that the prosecutor 

knew the testimony was false. See Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 717 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(finding that even if a state’s witnesses testimony was false, a petitioner’s Napue claim 

failed because there was no evidence that the state “knew or should have known that [the 

witness]’s testimony was false”). Additionally, as the state court found, the state court 

record does not support Petitioner’s claim that his conviction was based on false 

testimony. 

 1. Ty.R’s Testimony 

 At trial, Ty.R. testified that she saw S.R. fire a shot in the air, and that she saw 

Petitioner shoot at the car in which she was a passenger. She testified that “[a]fter the 

first shot[,] he immediately squatted down and fired towards the car.” (Doc. 10, Ex. EEE 

at 73.) She also described where S.R. and Petitioner were standing in relation to the car. 

(Id. at 73-74.) On cross examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that Ty.R. 

previously told the police that she “didn’t know who fired any shots” and that she “saw 

the first shot fired” by “a guy squatting by the car” who she had “never seen . . . before.” 

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(Id. at 82-86.) Ty.R. explained that she learned S.R.’s and Petitioner’s names after the 

shooting, but she did not know their names at the time of the shooting. (Id. at 86.) 

Petitioner also presented the testimony of the detective who had interviewed Ty.R. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. GGG at 29-34.) This detective testified that although Ty.R. said that she 

did not know S.R.’s and Petitioner’s names at the time of the shooting, during the 

investigation, Ty.R. told him that she saw two individuals holding guns, one standing and 

shooting a gun in the air, and the other squatting and firing a gun at the car. (Id. at 43-

46.) She said that she later learned these individuals’ names. 

 Petitioner alleges that Ty.R. committed perjury at trial because she “could not 

have seen anyone shooting” based on her location in the car, she changed her story “after 

discussing the case with the prosecutor,” and she did not actually “see the shooter” and 

“only heard from a friend it was [Petitioner].” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Petitioner has not cited any 

evidence to support his assertion that the prosecutor influenced Ty.R.’s testimony. (Id.) 

Additionally, at trial and during her interviews with the police, Ty.R. said she saw 

Petitioner shooting at the car. (Doc. 10, Ex. EEE at 72-74.) She explained that although 

she did not know Petitioner’s name until after the shooting, she saw him shooting at the 

car. (Doc. 10, Ex. EEE at 72-74; Ex. GGG at 43-46.) 

 Although Ty.R. made some inconsistent statements, which defense counsel 

pointed out at trial, inconsistent statements are “not enough for a Napue violation.” See 

United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We cannot presume that 

the prosecutor knew that the prior [inconsistent] statement was true but elicited perjured 

testimony anyway.”) (internal quotation omitted). The record does not support a finding 

that Ty.R.’s trial testimony was false or that the prosecutor knew it was false. See United 

States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The record does not show and 

we do not presume that the prosecutor used false testimony.”). 

 2. M.R.’s Testimony 

 Petitioner also claims that M.R. gave false testimony at trial. (Doc. 1 at 8.) On 

direct-examination, M.R. testified that she saw S.R. with a gun, heard “gunfire,” “brought 

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[her] legs up towards [her] chest area and put [her] head down [on her] chest,” and was 

then shot in the left foot. (Doc. 10, Ex. EEE at 21-22, 24-25.) On cross-examination, 

M.R. testified that she saw Petitioner fire a gun, and that he was “squatted down at that 

time.” (Id. at 37-40.) M.R. also testified that she told detectives that she saw Petitioner 

with a gun. (Id.) 

 On re-direct examination, M.R. testified that she “probably” saw Petitioner with a 

gun. (Id. at 54-55.) In response to questions from the jury, M.R. testified that she saw 

Petitioner with a gun, that it was “probably” pointed towards the floor of the car, and that 

she did not see who fired shots into the car. (Id. at 57-58.) The prosecutor then asked 

follow-up questions and M.R. clarified that although she saw Petitioner with a gun, she 

did not see anyone shoot at the car but only heard the gunfire. (Id. at 62-63.) 

 Although M.R. gave inconsistent testimony at trial, inconsistent testimony alone 

does not support a Napue violation. See Bingham, 653 F.3d at 995. Additionally, M.R.’s 

testimony that she saw Petitioner shoot at the car was elicited by defense counsel on 

cross-examination, not by the prosecutor. (Doc. 10, Exhibit EEE at 37-40.) The 

prosecutor clarified that M.R. did not see who shot at the car. (Id. at 62-63.) Thus, the 

record does not indicate that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. 

 3. D.H.’s Testimony 

 Petitioner also claims that D.H. gave inconsistent testimony at trial and that on redirect examination, the prosecutor “persuade[d] [D.H] into perjured statements by leading 

her to say that she [saw Petitioner] fire [a] gun” even though she had testified that her 

eyes were closed. (Doc. 1 at 8.) On direct examination, D.H. testified that she saw that 

Petitioner “had a gun” and that she saw another “gentlemen shooting in the air.” 

(Doc. 10, Ex. DDD at 101.) She described where Petitioner stood, stated that he had a 

gun in his hand, that he pointed it at the car, and that she saw “sparks from the gun” 

“about four or five times.” (Id. at 103-04, 109-10.) On cross-examination, D.H. testified 

that she “leaned back” during the shooting, but that she kept her “head up.” (Id. at 121.) 

She said she “looked out for a moment,” and then “leaned back” and “closed [her] eyes.” 

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(Id. at 122.) On re-direct examination, D.H. testified that she saw Petitioner shoot at the 

car and that she closed her eyes “[i]n the middle of the shooting,” after she saw the 

“muzzle flashes” from Petitioner’s gun. (Id. at 122-23.) 

 Petitioner has not shown that D.H.’s testimony was false or that the prosecutor 

knew it was false. Additionally, D.H.’s testimony was consistent. She testified that she 

saw Petitioner shoot a gun at the car in which she was a passenger. On re-direct 

examination, D.H. clarified that she closed her eyes and leaned back after she saw 

Petitioner fire the gun. 

 4. The Investigating Detective’s Testimony 

 Finally, Petitioner claims that the investigating detective testified falsely by stating 

that Petitioner was standing upright and then moved into a crouching position when he 

shot at the car. (Doc. 1 at 9.) In response to a jury question, the detective opined that the 

bullet that hit L.H. above her right eye came through an open car window, which was 

consistent with the “description being given that . . . the suspect began firing and then 

continued to slide down the back or the side of the car he was leaning up against.” 

(Doc. 10, Ex. FFF at 133-34.) Petitioner does not cite any evidence to support his 

assertion that the detective’s testimony was false, and the record contains testimony that 

support the detective’s testimony. D.H. testified that she saw Petitioner “standing” and 

holding a gun. (Doc. 10, Ex. DDD at 10-03.) Ty.R. testified that after Petitioner fired 

“the first shot[,] he immediately squatted down and fired towards the car.” (Doc. 10 

Ex. EEE at 73.) 

 As set forth above, Petitioner has not shown that the prosecutor knowingly 

presented any false testimony. Accordingly, his false testimony claim fails. Petitioner 

also has not shown that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s due process claim based 

on the prosecutor’s alleged presentation of false testimony at trial was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable application of, Napue. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief based on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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D. Ground Three (a) 

 In Ground Three (a), Petitioner asserts that the trial court improperly denied 

defense counsel access to the medical records of M.R., Ty.R., D.H., and L.H in violation 

of his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. (Doc. 1 at 10.) On direct appeal, the 

appellate court considered this claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and 

rejected it. (Doc. 10, Ex. Y; Doc. 10-1 at 173, 175-76; Doc. 10, Ex. AAA at 7.) 

Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Before trial, defense counsel moved to compel the production of the “complete 

and unredacted medical records” of M.R, D.H., and L.H.16 (Doc. 10, Ex. K.) The State 

opposed the motion, arguing that the records were irrelevant and protected under the 

doctor-patient privilege. (Doc. 10, Ex. L.) In her reply, defense counsel argued that due 

process required disclosure of the records, and that the records were relevant because 

they contained “information concerning the condition of each individual upon arrival to 

the hospital,” “reflect[ed] the ability of these individuals[] to perceive, recall and/or 

accurately relate the events that brought them to the hospital[] that morning,” and were 

needed to “effectively cross examine, and/or impeach these witnesses at trial.” (Doc. 10, 

Ex. M; Doc. 10-1 at 93.) 

 The trial court concluded that Petitioner had “demonstrated [the] possible 

relevance of the documents sought” and ordered that the complete medical records of 

L.H., D.H., and M.R. be sealed and provided to the court for an in camera review. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. N.) After the in camera review, the trial court found the records contained 

“nothing exculpatory” and did not “contain any statements relating to identification or 

 

16 Petitioner’s motion to compel the production of medical records at trial did not 

request medical records for Ty.R. (Doc. 10, Ex. K.) The record reflects that Ty.R. was not shot, and there is no indication that there are any medical records for Ty.R. related to the shooting. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that the trial court denied the production of medical records for Ty.R lacks merit. 

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statements of witnesses.” (Doc. 10, Ex. O.) The trial court ordered that “none of the 

medical records [were] to be disclosed,” and sealed the records. (Id.) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner argued the trial court’s order sealing the medical 

records violated his constitutional rights and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

(Doc. 10, Ex. Y; Doc. 10-1 at 173, 175-76.) The court of appeals ordered the medical 

records unsealed for its review, and then resealed the records. (Doc. 10, Ex. Z.) The 

court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim, stating, “[w]e have reviewed these records on 

appeal and agree with the trial court’s conclusion that they contain nothing exculpatory. 

Additionally, we find no support for [Petitioner’s] assertion that the assistant county 

attorney assigned to the case ‘took out the stuff about [the] victims/witnesses that was 

favorable to the defense.’” (Doc. 10, Ex. AA at 7.) Petitioner has not shown that the 

appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s Brady claim was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 A criminal defendant is entitled to discover evidence that is both “favorable to the 

accused and material to guilt or punishment.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 

(1987); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “the suppression by 

the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”). “Evidence is material 

only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable 

probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Ritchie, 

480 U.S. at 57 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). 

 In Ritchie, the Court approved the trial court’s in camera review of disputed 

documents, explaining that this procedure serves a petitioner’s interest in determining 

whether the documents contain favorable or material information, while protecting 

confidentiality interests. 480 U.S. at 61. Here, both the trial court and the court of 

appeals reviewed the sealed medical records and found they did not contain exculpatory 

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evidence. This factual finding by the state courts is “presumed to be correct” and 

Petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

 Petitioner asserts that the medical records contained “key evidence” (Doc. 1 at 10), 

but he does not describe the exculpatory or “key” information they might have contained, 

or provide any “clear and convincing” evidence to rebut the state courts’ factual findings 

based on the courts’ in camera review of the medical records. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (stating under habeas review, a federal court presumes “state 

courts know and follow the law”) (per curiam). Petitioner’s unsupported speculation that 

the medical records contained evidence that was both favorable to Petitioner and material 

to his defense does not establish a Brady violation. See Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 

758, 769-70 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]o state a Brady claim, [a petitioner] is required to do 

more than ‘merely speculate’ about what [a potential witness] told prosecutors.”); United 

States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1997) (“‘The mere possibility that an item 

of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the 

outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.’”) 

(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976)). 

 Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, if the medical 

records been disclosed to defense counsel, the result of his trial would have been 

different. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57. At trial, Petitioner requested M.R.’s, D.H.’s, and 

L.H.’s medical records to determine whether those records contained information that 

defense counsel could use to cross-examine or impeach the victims.17 Even without the 

medical records, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined D.H. and M.R. at trial. He 

pointed out inconsistent statements they made to police and challenged their perception 

 

17 At trial, defense counsel advised the trial court that L.H.’s autopsy report indicated that she had drugs and alcohol in her system when she died. (Doc. 10, Ex. DDD at 129-30.) Defense counsel tried to introduce that evidence, but the trial court 

precluded it as irrelevant. (Doc. 10, Ex. DDD at 130-34.) Therefore, it appears that evidence that drugs and alcohol were present in L.H.’s system was disclosed to Petitioner. 

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of the shooting based, in part, on the possibility that they had consumed alcohol that 

evening.18 (Doc. 10, Ex. DDD at 110-22; Ex. EEE at 27-45.) Petitioner has not 

established that there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of the medical records 

would have changed the outcome of his trial. See Mainiero v. Jordon, 105 F.3d 361, 364 

(7th Cir. 1997) (finding a state court’s decision to deny disclosure of the victim’s 

psychiatric records after reviewing the records in camera was a reasonable application of 

Ritchie when the petitioner did not establish the records would have affected the outcome 

of his trial. 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown the state court’s rejection of his claim in 

Ground Three (a) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was 

contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, controlling Supreme Court 

precedent. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on Ground 

Three (a). 

E. Ground Six 

 Finally, Petitioner claims that the trial court imposed “unconstitutional multiple 

sentences for committing a single act,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 

17.) He argues that consecutive sentences were improper because all of the acts upon 

which his convictions are based arose from a single act of shooting. (Id.) On direct 

appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. Y; Doc. 10-1 at 176.) The appellate court rejected the claim stating that 

Petitioner did not cite any legal authority to support his claim, and the court “[found] 

none.” (Doc. 10, Ex. AA at 10-11.) The court explained that “[e]ach offense constituted 

a single act, and we discern no issue of double punishment presented here. Imposition of 

consecutive sentences was therefore within the trial court’s discretion.” (Id.) Petitioner 

 

18 In response to defense counsel’s question, D.H. testified that she did not drink 

on the night of the shooting. (Doc. 10, Ex. DDD at 112.) M.R. testified on crossexamination that she did not drink on the night at issue because she did not have any money. (Doc. 10, Ex. EEE at 29.) She also testified that the other women “probably had one drink.” (Id.) She then testified that she “probably said no,” if anyone had offered to buy her a drink because “sometimes [she] drinks, and sometimes [she doesn’t].” (Id. at 

30.) 

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has not shown that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Although Petitioner cites the Eighth Amendment to support his sentencing claim 

in Ground Six, he appears to be making a Fifth Amendment claim — that his consecutive 

sentences constitute double punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.19 

The Double Jeopardy Clause, among other protections, “protects against multiple 

punishments for the same offense.” See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984) 

(citation omitted). To determine whether a double jeopardy violation has occurred, the 

court applies the same-elements test, also known as the Blockburger20 test, which 

“inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they 

are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive 

prosecution.” United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). However, even if 

multiple offenses constitute the “same offense” under this test, the imposition of 

cumulative punishments does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if the state 

legislature has authorized cumulative punishment. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 

366, 368-69 (1983) (“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the 

Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing 

greater punishment than the legislature intended.”). 

 The trial court imposed consecutive sentences on Counts One through Five for 

Petitioner’s convictions for the first-degree murder of L.H. (Count One), and the 

aggravated assaults of D.H., M.R., Ta.R., and Ty.R. (Counts Two through Five). 

(Doc. 10, Ex. D, Ex. R at 4-5; Ex. JJJ at 40.) Under the same-elements test, first-degree 

 

19 As Respondents argue (Doc. 10 at 58 n.35), to the extent that Petitioner raises 

an Eighth Amendment claim, it is technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner did not present an Eighth Amendment sentencing claim to the state courts. Thus, such a claim has not been properly exhausted. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 842; 

Cooper, 641 F.3d at 326-27. Petitioner cannot return to state court to properly exhaust this claim because of the preclusion and time bars. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & 

(b), 32.4(a). Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner makes a cruel and unusual punishment claim under the Eighth Amendment, that claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, and not subject to federal habeas corpus review. 

20 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 

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murder required proof of an element — that the victim died — that aggravated assault did 

not. Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105(A)(1) (defining first-degree premeditated 

murder), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1203(A)-1204(A) (defining aggravated assault). 

 Additionally, two of the aggravated assault counts were charged under Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-1203(A)(1), and the other two were charged under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

1203(A)(2). (Doc. 10, Ex. D.) These two types of assault required proof of different 

elements. Assault under § 13-1203(A)(1) required proof that the defendant 

“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caus[ed] any physical injury.” Assault under 

§ 13-1203(A)(2) required proof that the defendant “intentionally plac[ed] another person 

in reasonable apprehension of physical injury.” Thus, these two types of assault are not 

the “same offense” under the Blockburger test because each assault required proof of an 

element that the other did not. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 

 Finally, when determining whether multiple convictions arising from the same 

statutory section violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, a court determines whether the 

legislature intended to permit multiple convictions and punishments based on the 

violation of a single statute. See Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 173-79 (1958). 

“The test is whether the individual acts are prohibited, or the course of action which they 

constitute. If the former, then each act is punishable separately. If the latter, there can be 

but one penalty.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302 (internal quotation omitted). 

 Arizona courts have interpreted Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203 as focusing on the 

“result of the act.” See State v. Gunter, 643 P.2d 1034, 1038-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) 

(finding that a single act of throwing acid supported two assault charges when two 

victims were injured). In other words, each individual act of assault is defined by the 

result of the act and not by the defendant’s intent. Id. Because each assault in this case 

was committed against a separate victim, each constituted a separate offense. See 

Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302; see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) 

(stating that, except in “extreme circumstances,” a federal court is bound by state court’s 

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construction of state law); Gentry v. MacDougall, 685 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(same). Accordingly, each act of assault was properly punished separately. 

 Further, Arizona courts have construed Arizona’s “double punishment” statute, 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-116, as authorizing consecutive sentences when “a single act harms 

multiple victims.” See State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204, 1208 n.4 (Ariz. 1989) (noting 

that Arizona “courts have held that a single act that harms multiple victims may be 

punished by consecutive sentences”); State v. Henley, 687 P.2d 1220, 1222-23 (Ariz. 

1984) (finding that consecutive sentences were permissible when a single bullet hit two 

people), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Soliz, 219 P.3d 1045 (2009). Because 

the Arizona legislature has authorized the imposition of consecutive sentences under the 

circumstances present in Petitioner’s criminal case, the imposition of consecutive 

sentences did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366-69; 

see also Gentry, 685 F.2d at 323 (holding that Arizona law authorized consecutive 

sentences for two counts of manslaughter arising from the same act of driving while 

intoxicated, and rejecting the petitioner’s claim that the sentences violated the Double 

Jeopardy Clause). 

 Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s rejection of his claim that the 

trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences for convictions arising from a 

single act of shooting was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it 

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as 

determined by the Unites States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Ground Six.21

 

21 As Respondents note (Doc. 10 at 61 n.37), Petitioner also appears to argue that the trial court did not consider mitigating evidence at sentencing, and that it improperly considered aggravating circumstances. (Doc. 1 at 17.) The record does not support Petitioner’s claim because the trial court discussed the mitigating evidence that Petitioner 

presented and stated that it had “considered all of those factors, all of those 

circumstances,” when it sentenced Petitioner. (Doc. 10, Ex. JJJ at 39.) Additionally, the trial court did not impose aggravated sentences; rather, it imposed the presumptive sentence for each count of conviction. (Doc. 10, Ex. R at 4-5, Ex. JJJ, at 39-40.) 

Accordingly, these claims lack merit. 

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V. Conclusion 

 The Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of 

Grounds One (f) and (g), Grounds Three (b)-(e), Ground Four, and Ground Five is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the procedural 

ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right in his remaining claims for relief. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

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/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 18th day of September, 2014. 

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