Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04237/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ANNA ZBITNOFF,

Plaintiff,

-vNATIONSTAR DEED OF TRUST, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

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16-CV-2947 (JMF)

MEMORANDUM 

OPINION AND ORDER

JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge: 

On May 10, 2016, the Court issued an Order To Show Cause why this case — involving 

pro se Plaintiff’s claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. 

§ 2614, the Consumer Credit Protection Act (“CCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and state law

— should not be transferred to the Northern District of California. (Docket No. 3). In particular, 

the Court’s Order noted that “a plaintiff may bring an action under RESPA only in the district 

where the property involved is located or in the district where the alleged violation occurred” and 

that, under both prongs, the only proper venue for Plaintiff’s RESPA venue claim appeared to be

the Northern District of California. (Id.). In response, Plaintiff indicated that she would 

voluntarily dismiss the RESPA claim, and proceeded to brief her opposition to the Court’s 

transferring the case pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1404(a). (Docket No. 12). 

In reply, Defendants argue that transfer under Section 1404(a) is warranted. (Docket No. 13). 

For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with Defendants that both the convenience of 

the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice call for transfer under Section 1404(a).

07/18/2016

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In considering whether to transfer a case pursuant to Section 1404(a), a court must first 

establish that the case could have been filed in the transferee district and, if so, determine 

whether convenience and the interests of justice favor transfer. See, e.g., Bossom v. Buena Cepa 

Wines, LCC, No. 11-CV-6890 (VB), 2011 WL 6182368, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011); Fuji 

Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Lexar Media, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 370, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The latter 

inquiry is guided by a non-exhaustive list of factors, including: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of 

forum, (2) the convenience of witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease 

of access to sources of proof, (4) the convenience of the parties, (5) the locus of operative facts, 

(6) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, (7) the relative 

means of the parties, (8) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law, and (9) trial efficiency 

and the interest of justice. See, e.g., N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 

F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010); Larew v. Larew, No. 11-CV-5771 (BSJ) (GWG), 2012 WL 87616, 

at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2012). 

As a general matter, “a plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be disturbed unless the 

balance of the factors tips heavily in favor of a transfer.” Rush v. Fischer, 923 F. Supp. 2d 545, 

556-57 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Sugarman, 272 

F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1959) (“[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the 

plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). At 

the same time, “[t]here is no rigid formula for balancing” the factors and “no single one of them 

is determinative.” Larew, 2012 WL 87616, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). “District 

courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and 

notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.” D.H. Blair & Co. 

v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 

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616 (1964) (noting that “the purpose of [Section 1404(a)] is to prevent the waste of time, energy 

and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience 

and expense” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Weighing those factors here, the Court concludes that transfer to the Northern District of 

California is appropriate. As an initial matter, venue in that District is plainly proper, as the 

underlying property is in that District and the allegedly improper assignment occurred in that 

District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). As for the Section 1404 factors, the locus of operative facts is 

plainly in the Northern District of California, not here. As a result, moreover, at least some of 

Plaintiff’s claims are likely to be governed by California law, and at least some of the key

documents and witnesses are likely to be located in California. Perhaps most significant to the 

convenience factors, however, is the fact that Plaintiff herself resides in California, and allowing 

her to proceed — pro se — in a Court on the other side of the country would pose complications 

for her participation in conferences and depositions. Cf. Herbert Ltd. P’ship v. Elec. Arts Inc., 

325 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he plaintiff's choice of forum receives less 

deference when that forum is not the plaintiff’s home district and there is no material connection 

between either the plaintiff or the underlying transactions and the chosen forum.”). On these

grounds alone, transfer to the Northern District of California would be appropriate. 

Were there any doubt, however, transfer is surely appropriate in light of the prior, 

substantially similar litigation filed by Plaintiff in the Northern District of California, see Zbitnoff 

v. NationStar Mortgage LLC, No. C 13-05221 (WHA), 2014 WL 2119875 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 

2014), and that Court’s familiarity with these claims. See Adams v. U.S. Bank, NA, No. 12-CV4640 (KAM) (LB), 2013 WL 5437060, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (“Where another court 

has familiarity with the parties and issues, it is in the interest of justice to transfer the case to that 

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tribunal in order to alleviate the concerns of ‘wastefulness of time, energy and money that 

§ 1404(a) was designed to prevent.’” (quoting Cont’l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL–585, 364 U.S. 19, 

26 (1960)); see also Cali v. East Coast Aviation Servs., Ltd., 178 F. Supp. 2d 276, 295 (E.D.N.Y.

2001) (“The interest of justice component of the Section 1404(a) analysis may be determinative 

in a particular case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the case is transferred to 

the Northern District of California pursuant to Section 1404(a). 

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer the case to that District, to close the case in this 

District, and to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 18, 2016

New York, New York

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