Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01739/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01739-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN M. PARK and MICHELLE PARK,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 10-CV-1739-H (POR)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER

vs.

AURORA LOAN SERVICES; LEHMAN

BROTHERS BANK, FSB; QUALITY

LOAN SERVICES CORPORATION;

CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY;

ALLISON MCCLOSKEY ESCROW;

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC; and

DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

On August 19, 2010, Plaintiffs Sean and Michelle Park, proceeding pro se, filed a

complaint arising out of the origination of their home mortgage loan and the nonjudicial

foreclosure proceedings related to the property. (Doc. No. 1, Compl.) On September 29, 2010,

the Court granted Defendants Aurora Loan Services LLC, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB,

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and Allison McCloskey Escrow’s motions to

dismiss the complaint. (Doc. No. 22.) Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs waited until the eve of

foreclosure to bring this application to the Court. The case currently remains closed. On

November 8, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order in

this case, seeking to restrain Defendants from foreclosing on Plaintiffs’ residential property.

(Doc. No. 27.) On November 9, 2010, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause that they can

Case 3:10-cv-01739-H-POR Document 32 Filed 11/10/10 Page 1 of 3
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rescind the loan contract by tendering the loan proceeds. (Doc. No. 28.) Specifically, the

Court requested that Plaintiffs show that they paid back the loan proceeds or otherwise

complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). (Id.) The Court also allowed Defendants to respond to

the application for a temporary restraining order. (Id.) On November 9, 2010, Plaintiffs filed

their response to the Court’s order. (Doc. No. 31.) On November 10, 2010, Defendants

Aurora Loan Services LLC, Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, and Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc. filed their response in opposition to Plaintiffs motion for a

temporary restraining order. (Doc. No. 29.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES

Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order.

Background

On October 25, 2005, Plaintiffs borrowed $796,250 under a promissory note to

purchase a home located at 821, 823, 825 Deal Court, San Diego, California 92109. (Doc. No.

10-2, Ex. A.) The loan was secured by a Deed of Trust. (Id.) As of October 15, 2009,

Plaintiffs were in default. (Id., Ex. C.) When Plaintiffs defaulted on their loan, Defendants

commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure by recording a Notice of Default and Election to Sell

under Deed of Trust on October 16, 2009. (Id.) Over a year later, on August 19, 2010,

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this case. (Doc. No. 1.) The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’

complaint after concluding that Plaintiffs’ causes of action for violation of the federal Truth

in Lending Act and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act are time barred for their 2005 loan.

(Doc. No. 22 at 5-6.) 

Discussion

Temporary Restraining Orders (“TROs”) are reserved for emergency circumstances

where the rights of a party are in urgent need of protection. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd.

of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438 (1974). Apart from showing the necessity for immediate

relief, applicants for a TRO must meet the same standards as for a preliminary injunction. See,

e.g., Hunt v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir.1989). “A plaintiff seeking a

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely

to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips

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in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008); Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc, v. Mucos Pharma GmbH

& Co., 571 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, because the Court

previously dismissed their claims as time barred. The statute of limitations for damages under

TILA is one year. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). The statute of limitations for rescission under TILA

is three years. 15. U.S.C. § 1635(f). The limitations period for TILA claims starts at the

consummation of the transaction. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiffs claims arise out of the loan transaction consummated in 2005. However, Plaintiffs

did not file their complaint until August 19, 2010. Even if the claims were not barred, in a

rescission action under TILA, the party seeking rescission must restore to the non-rescinding

party all consideration received under the contract. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); Yamamoto v.

Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 1167, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiffs have not

tendered the loan proceeds to date. Instead, Plaintiffs offered to tender through a third-party

offer. (Doc. No. 27 at 9, ¶ 2.) Defendants respond that they have not received or agreed to any

offer. (Doc. No. 29.) In any event, there is no guarantee that this third party offer would be

consummated. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not established that they are likely to succeed on the merits

of their TILA rescission claim. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that there are inadequate grounds for issuance of a temporary restraining order. 

Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining

order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 10, 2010

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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