Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00425/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00425-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kenneth Scott Machado, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Chuck Ryan; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 09-425-TUC-FRZ (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Kenneth Scott Machado’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. 1). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice

of this Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report and

Recommendation. For the following reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court dismiss in part and deny in part the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. State Proceedings

1. Conviction

A brief summary of pertinent portions of the record of pre-trial and trial proceedings

follows. 

Petitioner was charged with Sexual Assault, a class two felony (Count One);

Administering Intoxicating Liquors/ A Narcotic Drug/ A Dangerous Drug, a class six felony

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1

At the time of Petitioner’s September 2004 trial, the children were six and four years

of age. (Answer, Exh. E, p.5).

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(Count Two); Attempted First Degree Murder, a class two felony (Count Three); Solicitation

of a class one felony (Count Four); and Interfering With Judicial Proceedings, Domestic

Violence, a class one misdemeanor. (Answer (Doc. 7), Exh. A). 

A. State Proceedings

1. Conviction

A brief summary of pertinent portions of the record of pre-trial and trial proceedings

follows. 

The victim of the sexual assault was Petitioner’s wife who married Petitioner in 1994.

(Answer, Exh. E, p.5; Petition, Exh. B, p.2). The couple have two children together.1

(Answer, Exh. E, p.5). In 2003, the couple separated, and the victim moved out of their

residence and rented her own apartment. (Id. at p. 12). During the separation, the couple

went to marriage counseling through their church. (Id. at p.11). As part of their counseling,

the couple entered into an agreement wherein, inter alia, there would “be no forms of

physical contact, i.e. holding hands, kissing, until mutually wanted by both...” parties and

there would be no sexual contact. (Id. at pp. 14-15). During the separation, the victim, who

retained her keys to the family home, would occasionally visit the family home, where

Petitioner remained, to collect her belongings. (Id. at pp. 17, 76). During the separation,

Petitioner and the victim shared a single checking account into which both of their paychecks

were deposited. (Id. at p. 75). They shared expenses including those associated with the

residence where Petitioner remained and the victim’s apartment. (Id. at pp. 13, 55, 75-76).

Petitioner and the victim shared custody of the children who would stay with one parent or

the other depending on the day of the week. (Id. at p.12). The victim also went to the

residence because it was easier for their son’s speech therapist to at that location for therapy

sessions. (Id. at p. 17).

Both the Petitioner and the victim worked as nurses. (Id. at pp. 7, 10). On December

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13, 2003, the victim went to Petitioner’s home to study for an important nursing examination

that she was to take the following day. (Id. at p. 19). The victim was nervous about the test,

and Petitioner, who had taken the test previously, invited her to the home for dinner and to

help her study while the children slept. (Id. at pp. 22-23). The victim testified that Petitioner

told her that he would prepare an intravenous (hereinafter “IV”) solution for her with

dextrose and water to give her “energy to study....” (Id. at p. 27). During their separation,

the victim had not gone to the home for dinner and she was hesitant about going on

December 13, 2003. (Id. at p. 22). Nonetheless, the victim decided to go to Petitioner’s

home to help put their children to bed, study, and then return to her apartment. (Id.; see also

(Id. at p. 27 (“because I had to start at 8:00 o’clock in the morning, I probably wanted be to

be home around 10:00 o’clock to go home and get some sleep.”)). 

During dinner, the victim had two sodas, one of which Petitioner prepared outside her

presence. (Id. at pp. 23-24). After dinner, the victim helped get the children to bed. (Id. at

p.24). Once the children were in bed, Petitioner and the victim sat at the kitchen table while

the victim studied for the examination. (Id. at pp. 25-26). After approximately, thirty

minutes, Petitioner told the victim that he had a present for her and he presented her with a

“little emerald ring” and a letter. (Id. at p.26). The victim testified that she told Petitioner

“that I did not know what to say to him and he told me not to say anything....I tried to redirect

to studying because that’s why I came there.” (Id.). Thereafter, Petitioner administered the

IV to the victim at the kitchen table with the victim’s permission. (Id. at pp. 29-30). The

victim testified that she did not see Petitioner prepare the IV and its fluids. (Id. at p.29). 

The victim understood that the IV contained dextrose water. (Id.). After approximately ten

minutes, the victim began to feel dizzy and light headed, asked Petitioner to stop the IV, and

lost consciousness. (Id. at p. 30). The victim awoke briefly and found herself lying on

Petitioner’s bed unable to move and lost consciousness again. (Id. at pp. 31-32). 

The victim testified that the next time she awoke, she was in the hospital emergency

room. (Id. at p. 32; Petition, Exh. B, p. 3). Subsequent tests revealed that the victim’s blood

alcohol concentration was .20 and that she was suffering from benzodiazepine (Valium)

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poisoning. (Id.). Hospital staff also found what was determined to be Petitioner’s semen in

the victim’s vaginal area. (Id.). Hospital staff informed the victim that Petitioner told them

she had overdosed. (Answer, Exh. E, p. 38).

At trial, Petitioner testified that prior to the victim’s arrival at his home on December

13th, he and the victim had not discussed Petitioner administering an IV to her. (Answer,

Exh. I, pp. 30-31). Instead, the topic came up while the victim was studying at the kitchen

table when she told him she felt “a little headache coming on,...” and requested the IV. (Id.

at pp. 35-36). Petitioner “went and got all the things to do the I.V. on her and I brought them

to the kitchen table...” and he administered the IV to the victim. (Id. at pp. 35-38).

Approximately ten minutes later, the victim stated she did not “feel good...”, Petitioner

“turned the I.V. off”, and, upon the victim’s request, walked her to the bedroom to lie down

while the IV bag was still attached to the victim. (Id. at pp. 38-39). In the bedroom, the

victim asked Petitioner to prepare her a drink and he made her a mixed drink, which the

victim sipped. (Id. at pp. 39-42). At some point, Petitioner “switched out” the IV from

“sugar water” to “normal saline....” (Id. at p. 41). In the bedroom, the victim began to cry,

Petitioner kissed her on the forehead, and the two engaged in sexual intercourse. (Id. at pp.

42-44). Afterwards, Petitioner went to the bathroom and when he returned, he found the

victim ironing her clothes and acting oddly. (Id. at pp. 45-46). Observing the victim have

what looked like a seizure, he led her to the bed to lie down and gave her a Valium. (Id. at

pp. 46-49). Petitioner left the victim lying on the bed. (Id. at p. 49). The bottle of Valium

was on the night stand next to the bed. (Id.). Petitioner later heard a noise from the bedroom,

“kicked in the door,” and discovered the victim “purple and puked and not breathing.” (Id.

at pp. 50-51). Petitioner performed CPR on the victim and called paramedics. (Id. at p. 51).

After the victim’s release from the hospital, she and Petitioner met with their

marriage counselor to discuss the incident. (Answer, Exh. E at pp. 44-45). The victim

testified that after the meeting, she noticed Petitioner was following her. (Id. at p. 51-52).

The following day, December 19, 2003, the victim obtained an order of protection against

him. (Id. at pp.51-53). Despite the protective order, Petitioner visited the victim’s apartment

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on January 14, 2004, and left a letter and flowers in her vehicle. (Petitioner, Exh. B, p. 3).

The victim, called the police and reported Petitioner’s violation of the protective order. (Id.).

Additionally, as summarized by the appellate court opinion: 

In January 2004, [Petitioner] contacted Richard Corey, his cousin, and

asked him to help “get rid of” his wife. [Petitioner] told Corey he planned to

rent a van and when his wife finished work on the morning of January 31, he

would shock her using an electroshock gun, put her in the van, and drive away.

[Petitioner] asked Corey to pick up his wife’s car after [Petitioner] had

abducted her. Corey said he would “think about it,” but later mentioned

[Petitioner’s] plan to several people, including Corey’s mother. His mother

warned [Petitioner’s] wife her “safety was in danger,” and [Petitioner’s] wife

called the police. On January 31, the day of the planned abduction,

[Petitioner] voluntarily committed himself to the psychiatric unit at Kino

Hospital.

A police investigation ensued and subsequently showed [Petitioner] had

purchased an electroshock gun on January 29. The police also discovered

[Petitioner] had rented a van and a hotel room during that same time period.

A search of [Petitioner’s] bedroom closet produced a bag containing the

electroshock gun, a stethoscope, instruction manuals, and batteries. [Petitioner]

was arrested and charged with sexual assault, administering intoxicating

liquors or a narcotic or dangerous drug, attempted first-degree murder,

solicitation of a class one felony, and interfering with judicial proceedings. 

(Petition, Exh. B, pp. 3-4). The trial court directed a verdict on the count regarding

administering intoxicating liquors or a narcotic or dangerous drug, i.e. Count Two. (Id. at

p. 4). The jury acquitted Petitioner on the attempted first-degree murder charge but found

him guilty of the remaining counts. (Id. at p.4; see also Answer, Exh. K, pp. 14-16).

2. Direct Appeal

Petitioner sought direct review of his conviction and sentences arguing that the:

1. trial court erred “in denying [Petitioner’s] request for a jury instruction on the

spouse defense to sexual assault, and/or the definition of ‘spouse’ and/or

‘cohabitation,’ thus denying [Petitioner] his constitutional right to present a

defense, his right to a jury, his right to due process to have a fair trial and to

have the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt”;

2. trial court erred in failing to permit Petitioner to testify about his statement to

Detective Ridgeway and to allow Petitioner to call Detective Ridgeway as a

witness;

3. the prosecution’s “repeated characterization of its burden of proof as ‘firmly

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convinced,’ was a fundamental error the prejudice of which was compounded

by the reasonable doubt jury instruction based on State v. Portillo”; and

4. the imposition of presumptive consecutive sentences was an abuse of

discretion.

(Petition, Exh. A (Petitioner’s Brief on Direct Appeal)) (all capitalization omitted). 

On May 10, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences. (Petition, Exh. B).

On February 9, 2007, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for

Review. (Petition, Exh. C).

3. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On October 16, 2007, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief (hereinafter “PCR Petition”). (Petition, Exh.D). Therein, Petitioner argued that:

1. trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the Court instruct the

jury that, when deciding the sexual assault count, it could not consider

evidence that Petitioner criminally administered alcohol and/or drugs;

2. trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise several constitutional violations

related to the trial court’s refusal to give a spousal defense jury instruction; and

3. the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s request for a Willits instruction for

the lost IV bag.

(Id).

On January 31, 2008, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (Petition, Exh.

D).

On August 26, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted Petitioner’s request for

review of the trial court’s denial of his PCR Petition, but denied relief. (Answer, Exh. B).

B. Petitioner’s Federal Petition for Writ for Habeas Corpus

On July 29, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition. Petitioner raises

the following claims:

1. that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction that

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the jury was not to consider “allegations...” that Petitioner administered

alcohol and/or drugs to the victim without her knowledge (Petition, p. 6)

(Ground I);

2. Petitioner’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment was violated

based upon: (a) the trial court’s denial of his request for a jury instruction

based on spousal defense to sexual assault “and not giving the jury the legal

definition of ‘spouse’ and/or ‘cohabitation’....”; (b) the trial court’s granting

of defense counsel’s request that the jury not be instructed to disregard the

charge that Petitioner administered drugs and/or alcohol without the victim’s

consent; and (c) the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt, which

according to Petitioner, relieved the State of its burden of proof “especially

where the prosecution was allowed to argue to the jury that they ‘only’ had to

be firmly convinced” to find him guilty. (Petition, p.7) (Ground II).

Respondents concede that Petitioner’s Petition is timely filed. (Answer, p. 8).

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition should be denied on the merits and/or dismissed.

Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondents’ Answer. (Doc. 28).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Petitioner filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (hereinafter

“AEDPA”).

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies and Procedural Default

1. Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner provide the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

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before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as the petitioner has a right under state law to raise the claim by available

procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have “‘fairly present[ed]’ his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal bases

for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the...[petitioner is] asserting

claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. See also Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Mere similarity between a claim raised

in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at

365-66.

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those

concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on appeal of the

conviction or through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

529 U.S. 1124 (2000). Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court

for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the

proper forum..., (2) through the proper vehicle..., and (3) by providing the proper factual and

legal basis for the claim....” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

2. Procedural Default

In some instances, a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court

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2

The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there are exceptions

to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies remain available for claims

that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d

614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1172 (2006). The issue of waiver must be

affirmatively raised by the petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir.

2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

3

Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his sentence

has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there

has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's conviction

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did not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion;

there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). A claim is procedurally

defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons

such as waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Franklin

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). A higher court’s subsequent summary denial

reaffirms the lower court’s application of a procedural bar. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

Additionally, procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state

court and it is clear the state court would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for

procedural reasons. Id. Thus, if a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal

habeas court may determine whether state remedies remain available.2

 See Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination

often involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

governing post-conviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies

when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal

constitutional challenges to convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on

any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief,

with the exception of certain claims3

 which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition.

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if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile when it is timebarred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997)

(recognizing untimeliness under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of Arizona

petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)).

Both of these instances of procedural default provide an independent and adequate

state-law ground for the conviction and sentence and thus prevents federal habeas corpus

review. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine prevents state prisoners from obtaining

federal review by allowing the time to run on available state remedies and then rushing to

federal court seeking review. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-732 (1991).

a. Cause and Prejudice

A petitioner may be relieved from a procedural default on a showing of cause and

prejudice. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996); see also Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 485-495 (1986); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Generally, “cause” sufficient “to

excuse a default exists if the petitioner ‘can show that some objective factor external to the

defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’” Cook v.

Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Examples

of cause sufficient to excuse a procedural default include “‘a showing that the factual or legal

basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel,’ or that ‘some interference by

officials’ made compliance impracticable.’” Id. (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488).

Additionally, in certain circumstances, ineffective assistance of counsel may also constitute

cause sufficient to excuse a default. Id. (citing Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451

(2000); Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). 

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby

v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must

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demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimension.” United States

v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). If the petitioner fails to establish cause sufficient to

excuse a procedural default, the court “need not consider whether he suffered actual

prejudice.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 n.13. 

b. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

A habeas petitioner “may also qualify for relief from his procedural default if he can

show that the procedural default would result in a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). This exception

to the procedural default rule is limited to habeas petitioners who can establish that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. See also Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; Cook, 538 F.3d at

1028. “‘To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,

trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence–that was not presented at

trial.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

3. Conclusion

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default/bar are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required

to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner

fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id.

In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show

cause and prejudice for the default [or a fundamental miscarriage of justice]...the district

court dismisses the petition because the petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id.

at 1231.

B. Review of a Claim on the Merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the AEDPA, the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus

only if the state court proceeding:

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4

“[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999), only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original).

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the

question whether a state court erred in applying the law is a different question from whether

it erred in determining the facts. Rice v. Collins 546 U.S. 333 (2006). 

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the “contrary to” test and the

“unreasonable application” test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court’s “decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.

2003)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-14 (2000)). Additionally, a state court’s

decision is “‘contrary to’ Supreme Court case law if the state court ‘applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in’ Supreme Court cases.”4 Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347

F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). “Whether a

state court’s interpretation of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a

question of federal law as to which [the federal courts]...owe no deference to the state

courts.” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original)(distinguishing deference owed

under the “contrary to” test of section (d)(1) with that owed under the “unreasonable

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Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial. Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011). In such circumstances, the petitioner

can satisfy the “unreasonable application” prong of section 2254(d)(1) “only by showing that

‘there was no reasonable basis for’ the...” state court’s decision. Id. (quoting Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011)).

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application” test). 

Under the second test, “‘[a] state court’s decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle...but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Van

Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the “unreasonable

application clause...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly...[r]ather that application must be

objectively unreasonable.’” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63 (2003)). When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable

application of federal law, “[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court

interpretations of federal law....” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929.5

 

Further, a federal habeas court can only look to the record before the state court in

reviewing a state court decision under section 2254(d)(1). Cullen, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct.

at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas

petitioner must overcome the limitation of §2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that

state court.”)(footnote omitted); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004)(“[W]e have

made clear that whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light

of the record the court had before it.”)(citations omitted).

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, “the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978: see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

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Under the AEDPA “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(e). The “AEDPA spells out what this presumption

means: State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence presented for the

first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof

that the state-court finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of correctness and the

clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once...” it is found that the state

court reasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

proceeding. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

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cert. denied 543 U.S. 1038 (2004)(“a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.”). Section (d)(2) “applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted). In

examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court “must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues...[M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court’s

findings of fact is insufficient; ‘we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court’s fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’” Lambert. 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000)(emphasis in original). 

Once the federal court is satisfied that the state court’s fact-finding process was

reasonable, or where the petitioner does not challenge such findings, “the state court’s

findings are dressed in a presumption of correctness, which then helps steel them against any

challenge based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal

court.”6 Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000: see also 28 U.S.C. §2254(c). Factual and credibility

determinations by either state trial or appellate courts are imbued with a presumption of

correctness. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002);

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1078 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.

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2001). Furthermore, factual assertions made in support of properly exhausted claims in state

court cannot be altered or expanded upon without permission of the federal habeas court. See

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions “receive similarly mixed review; the state

court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under section 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1).” Lambert, 393 F.3d at

978.

III. Analysis

A. Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing

In his Reply, Petitioner requests, for the first time, an evidentiary hearing pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2). Section 2254(e) “substantially restricts the district court’s discretion

to grant an evidentiary hearing” on a habeas claim. Baja, 187 F.3d at 1077. A liberal

reading of the Reply suggests that Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on a litany of

ineffective assistance of counsel claims with regard to several of the attorneys who

represented him during the course of the state proceedings. However, Petitioner’s Reply

does not specifically address the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in Ground

I of his Petition. Instead, Petitioner asserts claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on

factual predicates that were not raised in his federal Petition, or in the state proceeding. A

reply is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief. See Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994); Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 930

n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Arguments raised for the first time in petitioner’s reply brief are deemed

waived.”); Woolridge v. Gonzales, 2010 WL 1994874 (C.D. Cal. April 29, 2010) (declining

to consider arguments raised for first time in reply to petition for writ of habeas corpus).

Because the claims for which Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing were not properly

raised in this proceeding, Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing should be denied.

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 B. Ground I: Ineffective affective assistance of counsel regarding failure to

request jury instruction

1. The state court proceeding

In Count Two of the Indictment, Petitioner was charged with administering

intoxicating liquors and/or a narcotic drug and/or a dangerous drug to his wife. (Answer,

Exh. A). After argument on Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 20 at the close of the Government’s case, the trial court found no substantial

evidence to submit Count Two to the jury and directed a verdict of acquittal on that Count.

(Answer, Exh. H, p. 38; see also Answer, p. 10 (“because [the victim]...testified that she had

no memory of how she ingested the alcohol and benzodiazepine, the court directed a verdict

on that count.”)).

Later, during the settlement of jury instructions, the prosecutor requested that the court

advise the jury “that Count Two for legal reasons will not be sent back to the jury for their

determination so they are aware of which one it was and that they are not going to be hearing

that and deliberate.” (Answer, Exh. I, p. 178). Defense counsel stated that he disagreed and

further stated: “I think they ought not to be told anything because once you start, I mean, they

kind of fuel the speculation once you make a comment on it, so my preference is either four

counts for your consideration and the instructions cover those four counts.” (Id. at pp. 178-

179). It was agreed that the jury would be advised that the State had charged Petitioner with

four counts, and the Court would omit reference to the crime charged in Count Two. (Id. at

p. 179).

In his PCR Petition, Petitioner argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to request an instruction advising the jury that they could not consider the State’s allegations

against Petitioner with regard to Count Two. (Petition, Exh. D (PCR Petition, pp. 10-14)).

In denying Petitioner’s PCR Petition, the trial court stated:

Defense counsel was presented with a dilemma following his successful

advocacy which resulted in the granting of the motion for directed verdict as

to count one [sic]. He could request an instruction telling the jury to disregard

the evidence related to that count, thus calling further attention to it. Or he

could choose not to have such an instruction given. Mr. Richard Jones was

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counsel for defendant at trial. He is an experienced and skilled criminal

defense attorney. It is apparent from the record that Mr. Jones considered the

issue carefully, and chose to not request the instruction. He said, “I think they

ought not to be told anything because once your [sic] start, I mean, they kind

of fuel the speculation once you make a comment on it....” Trial transcript,

p.179. This is definitely trial strategy, and not ineffective assistance.

(Petition, Exh. D (January 31, 2008 order denying PCR Petition, pp. 1-2)). The Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court as follows:

In a thorough, well-reasoned minute entry, the trial court denied relief

on all claims [Petitioner] had raised in his petition for post-conviction relief.

The court clearly identified the claims and resolved them correctly, permitting

review by this or any other court. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶47,

166 P.3d 945, 959 (App. 2007). Although we see “no purpose in rehashing the

court’s order here” and “adopt its ruling”, id., we briefly state why [Petitioner]

has not persuaded us the trial court abused its discretion by denying relief on

the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

As the trial court correctly noted, [Petitioner] was required to establish

that counsel’s performance had been both deficient, based on prevailing

professional norms, and prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). Because a defendant must establish both elements of this test

in order to be entitled to relief, the trial court need not consider the second if

it finds the defendant has not sustained his burden as to the first. See State v.

Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 541, 707 P.2d 944, 945 (1985). “To avoid evaluating

past conduct with the magnifying glass of hindsight, we evaluate counsel’s

performance in the context of the circumstances surrounding the offense and

the prevailing professional norms in the legal community at the time” of the

alleged ineffective assistance. State v. Ysea, 191 Ariz. 372, 377, ¶16, 956 P.2d

599, 504 (1988).

In rejecting [Petitioner’s claim]..., the trial court found counsel had

made a tactical decision not to request the instruction so as not to call

additional attention to the fact that [Petitioner] had also been charged with

having given his wife intravenous drugs or alcohol before engaging in sex with

her. The court based that finding not only on the strong presumption that

counsel’s decisions were tactical or strategic, but on counsel’s brief comments

at trial as well. [Petitioner] has not established that the court abused its

discretion in so concluding.

(Answer, Exh. B, pp. 4-5). 

2. Discussion

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984), the Supreme Court established

a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To establish that his

trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, a petitioner must show: (1) that his trial

counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that trial counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).

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 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made errors

so serious...that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. The relevant inquiry

is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the decisions made by

defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998).

In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.’” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting

Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The reasonableness of counsel’s

performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and

in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential.”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Additionally, “[a] fair assessment of

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct , and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Even where trial counsel’s performance is deficient, Petitioner must also establish

prejudice in order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To establish

prejudice, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694;

Under the prejudice factor, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does

not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on

the judgment.” Id. at 691. Because failure to make the required showing of either deficient

performance or prejudice defeats the claim, the court need not address both factors where one

is lacking. Id. at 697-700.

It is well-settled that a defendant has the ultimate authority to make fundamental

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decisions regarding whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in his or her own

behalf, or take an appeal. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n. 1 (1977)(Burger, C.J.

concurring). However: 

[no decision of the Supreme Court] suggests,...that the indigent defendant has

a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points

requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment,

decides not to present those points.

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). To require otherwise would “seriously

undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s

professional evaluation.” Id. The professional judgment and evaluation every defendant is

entitled to is an examination of the record, research of the law, and the marshaling of

arguments on behalf of the defendant. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court’s review of the state court’s

decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689-699 (2002).

In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional showing that

the state court’s ruling that counsel was not ineffective constituted an unreasonable

application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); see also Cullen, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct.

at 1403 (federal habeas court’s review of state court’s decision on ineffective assistance of

counsel claim is “doubly deferential.”); Harrington, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 788

(“Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under

Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is

not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.”); West v.

Schriro, 2007 WL 4240859, *7 (D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007).

The state court, in applying Strickland, applied the correct law to the issue. In

applying Strickland, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s determination that defense

counsel’s decision was strategic or tactical, and did not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. (Id.).

“In determining whether the defendant received effective assistance of counsel, we

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‘will neither second-guess counsel’s decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision of

hindsight,’...but rather we will defer to counsel’s sound trial strategy.” Murtishaw v.

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Further,

“‘[b]ecause advocacy is an art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires

deference to counsel’s informed decisions, strategic choices must be respected in these

circumstances if they are based on professional judgment.’” Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d

1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681). 

The record is clear that defense counsel considered whether the instruction was

appropriate, and declined the instruction after determining that it would only “fuel the

speculation....” (Answer, Exh. I, p. 179). As Respondents point out, “[t]he suspicion that

Machado had administered these substances to [the victim] was clearly damaging to his claim

that the sex was consensual. When the administering charge disappeared from the case, the

cloud it cast upon the consent issue diminished.” (Answer, p.10). If the instruction had been

given, then the jury would have been reminded about the charge that Petitioner unlawfully

administered alcohol and/or drugs to the victim before the sexual assault thus, as defense

counsel pointed, out “fuel[ing] the speculation....” (Answer, Exh. I, p. 179). Instead, defense

counsel’s decision to omit the instruction ensured that there would be no reminder about the

charge whatsoever. 

Defense counsel weighed the plausible impact of the instruction on the jury and

exercised his professional judgment to make the strategic decision to decline the instruction.

On this record, Petitioner has not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s

decision was sound trial strategy. Consequently, the state court’s decision on this issue was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland as determined by the United

States Supreme Court. Nor did the state court’s proceeding result in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the evidence presented.

3. Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny Ground I on the

merits.

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7

In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to due process under the

Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the

Fifth Amendment that protects a person against deprivations of due process by a state. See

U.S. Const. amend XIV, §1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law.”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons

of due process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without

due process by the several States.”). The record is clear that Petitioner properly argued to

the State Court that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated. Further,

Respondents have not challenged Petitioner’s Ground II on this issue.

8

Petitioner also asserts that: “[T]he possibility that one or more reasonable jurors could

have interpreted the instruction requiring the prosecution to prove every element of the

crime, i.e., statutorily required proof of ‘without consent’; ‘immediate or threatened use of

force’.” (Petition, p.7). The record reflects that Petitioner acknowledged that the State opted

not to charge him with Sexual Assault of a Spouse under A.R.S. §13-1406.01, which has

since been repealed, and which “would have required the State to prove not only that the act

occurred ‘without consent’ of the spouse, by [sic] that such lack of consent be ‘by the

immediate or threatened use of force against the spouse....The State did not pursue an

indictment on that basis because it reasoned it could not prove any ‘immediate or threatened

use of force’ by...” Petitioner against his wife. (Petition, Exh. A, (Petitioner’s Brief on Direct

Appeal, p. 23)). Instead, the State charged Petitioner pursuant to A.R.S. §13-1406, “a statute

that did not require it to prove any ‘immediate or threatened use of force’” and under which

Petitioner argued on direct appeal that he should have been permitted to present the spousal

defense. (Id.) (emphasis in original). Consequently, Petitioner’s reference to the elements

of A.R.S. §13-1406.01 a statute under which Petitioner was not charged, is not considered

a separate claim herein but, instead, informs his argument challenging the trial court’s denial

of his request for a jury instruction on the spousal defense.

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C. Ground II: “Denial of Due Process” (Petition, p. 7)

Petitioner claims that he was denied his constitutional right to due process7 when the

trial court: (1) denied his request for a jury instruction on the spousal defense8

; (2) granted

defense counsel’s request to omit instruction regarding Count Two; and (3) instructed the

jury on reasonable doubt.

1. Sub-claim 1: Spousal defense

a. The state court proceeding

Petitioner was indicted, inter alia, for sexual assault pursuant to A.R.S. §13-1406. At

the time of Petitioner’s trial, A.R.S. §13-1407 provided, in pertinent part, that:

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9

A.R.S. §13-1407 has since been amended to repeal the spousal defense to sexual

assault. (See Petition, Exh. B, p. 5 n.1 (citing 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 185, §4)).

10Petitioner’s requested instruction read: “It is a defense to prosecution of sexual

assault that the person was the spouse of the other person at the time of the commission of

the act.” (Answer, Exh. D). 

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It is a defense to prosecution pursuant to...[§] 13-1406 that the person was the

spouse of the other person at the time of the commission of the act.

A.R.S. §13-1407(D).9

 Arizona law defines a spouse as “a person who is legally married and

cohabiting.” A.R.S. §13-1401(4).

During the settling of jury instructions, Petitioner requested the trial court to instruct

the jury based on the spousal defense enunciated in A.R.S. § 13-1407(D).10 The State

objected on the ground that Petitioner did not meet the definition of spouse in A.R.S. §13-

1401(4). (See Answer, Exh. I, pp. 159-173). The appellate court correctly and succinctly

summarized the proceedings before the trial court as follows:

Both parties agreed that [Petitioner] and his wife were married at the time of

the offense. The state argued, however, that, because [Petitioner] and his wife

did not live in the same residence, they were not cohabiting, and thus,

[Petitioner] could not be a spouse under §13-1401(4). [Petitioner] countered

that whether two people were cohabiting is based on many factors other than

just living together; therefore, this issue was a question of fact for the jury.

The state responded that the court should first determine whether there were

sufficient facts to support a finding that [Petitioner] and his wife had been

cohabiting. Without making any express findings, the court denied

[Petitioner’s] requested instruction.

(Petition, Exh. B, p.5). 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of

discretion and violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See

Petition, Exh. A (Petitioner’s Brief on Direct Appeal, pp.13-25)). Petitioner argued “that

whether two people are cohabiting can have ‘various meanings and interpretations’ and that

the term is ‘a flexible and broad one.’” (Petition, Exh. B, p.5). The appellate court, after

determining that the Arizona legislature did not “attach any special meaning or definition

to...” the word “cohabiting” in section 13-1401(4), looked to dictionary definitions to hold

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11Although fundamental error is a concept that arises under Arizona state law, the

Arizona Supreme Court has recognized that “‘[i]t usually, if not always, involves the loss of

federal constitutional rights.’” State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 155, 812 P.2d 626, 628

(1991) (citation omitted). Fundamental error is “error going to the foundation of the case,

error that takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such

magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.” State v.

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, 115 P.2d 601, 607 (2005) (citation omitted). The instant

record reflects that in finding no fundamental error, the Arizona Court of Appeals necessarily

considered the merits of Petitioner’s claim, albeit pursuant to a higher standard. 

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that “the common meaning of the term ‘cohabit’ is a couple who is living together and

behaving as married partners.” (Id. at pp. 6-7). Relying on this definition, the appellate court

rejected Petitioner’s appeal as follows:

[Petitioner] argues that the facts adduced at trial suggested he and his

wife were cohabiting. He first notes he and his wife had been sharing the rent

and mortgage payments at both residences and his wife’s personal belongings

had remained at the family residence. He also said his wife would visit the

family residence and go for walks with their children. [Petitioner] further

notes he and his wife were attending counseling and making attempts to

reconcile.

Although these facts may indicate an ongoing relationship, none

demonstrates that [Petitioner] and his wife were cohabiting in the normal sense

of the word. Furthermore, the record shows [Petitioner’s] wife had moved out

of the family residence and into a separate apartment three months before

[Petitioner] assaulted her. And [Petitioner’s] wife testified she had not

engaged in any sexual activity with [Petitioner] since she had moved out. She

further testified that the couple had drafted a separation agreement in which

[Petitioner] had agreed not to ask for or attempt to have any physical contact

with his wife. Because no evidence reasonably supported a finding that

[Petitioner] and his wife were cohabiting, [Petitioner] was not entitled to the

spousal defense instruction. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to give one.

(Id. at p. 7). The appellate court reviewed Petitioner’s claims of constitutional violations for

fundamental error because he did not raise such claims below. (Id. at p.8 (“To prevail in a

fundamental error review, a defendant must show that error occurred, the error was

fundamental, and the error prejudiced the defendant.”)). The court held that Petitioner was

unable to establish fundamental error in light of its conclusion that the trial court did not error

by refusing to give the spousal defense jury instruction.11 (Id.).

 The Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review on this issue.

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(Petition, Exh. C). Thus, the appellate court’s decision is the last-reasoned state court

decision on this issue. 

b. Discussion

In resolving Petitioner’s claim, the Arizona court did not cite U.S. Supreme Court case

law. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the state courts are not required to cite U.S.

Supreme Court cases nor are they required to have an “awareness of our cases so long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537

U.S. at 8 (emphasis in original). 

The Supreme Court of the United States “has held that ‘[a]s a general proposition, a

defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists

evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.’” Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d

1091, 1098 (9th Cir., 2002) (quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988)).

Moreover, the failure to so instruct the jury may violate a petitioner’s due process right to

present a full defense:

The Supreme Court has held: “Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of

fundamental fairness. We have long interpreted this standard of fairness to

require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104

S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) (emphasis added). 

Thus, the state court’s failure to correctly instruct the jury on the

defense may deprive the defendant of his due process right to present a

defense.....This is so because the right to present a defense ‘would be empty

if it did not entail the further right to an instruction that allowed the jury to

consider the defense. Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 1995).

Id. at 1098-1099. However, “[b]ecause an omitted instruction is less likely to be prejudicial

than a misstatement of the law, a petitioner seeking habeas relief based on a failure to give

a particular instruction bears an especially heavy burden.” Lamb v. Adam, 2010 WL

5598523, *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154

(1977); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997)). Even where the failure to

give a jury instruction violates a petitioner’s right to due process, “he may obtain habeas

relief only if the instructional error was not harmless, that is, had a substantial or injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

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U.S. 619, 637 (1993)); see also Bradley, 315 F.3d at 1099 (applying Brecht harmless error

standard to due process violation because the failure to instruct on the defense was a trial

error).

 Key to the state court’s analysis in Petitioner’s case was the definition of “cohabiting”

as used in A.R.S. §13-1401(4). This Court is bound by the Arizona court’s interpretation of

its state law. See Holgerson v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The question

before us is not whether the California Supreme Court was correct. We are bound by

California’s interpretation of its state law.’); Mendez v. Small, 298 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.

2002) (“A state court has the last word on the interpretation of state law.”). 

Once the Arizona appellate court determined the definition of “cohabiting”, it

examined the trial court’s ruling in light of the evidence to conclude that “no evidence

reasonably supported a finding that [Petitioner] and his wife were cohabiting.” (Petition,

Exh. B, p.7). Petitioner contends that the evidence supported a jury’s application of the

spousal defense. He argues that: during their separation, his wife had keys to the house,

came and went as she pleased, and received her mail there (Reply, p. 6 (citing Answer Exh.

G, pp. 13, 76-77, 118-119; Answer, Exh. E, p.76; Answer Exh. I, pp. 27-28)); Mr. Douglas

Lalime testified that the victim had told him she slept on the couch at the home one night (Id.

at pp. 5-6 (citing Answer, Exh. G, p.95)); Petitioner and the victim had not filed for legal

separation (Id. at p.6 n.6); the victim testified that she and Petitioner had one sexual

encounter during the separation period (Id. at p. 5 (citing Answer, Exh. E, p.18)); the victim

testified that she and Petitioner “were having ‘sex, using condoms’” (Id. (citing Answer, Exh.

E, p. 95)) and “[o]n the evening of December 13, 2003, [the victim] and [Petitioner] had been

having more frequent contact, sexual contact, taking walks together, taking trips together,

and overall positive resumption of their marriage relationship.” (Id. at p. 7). Petitioner also

cites the victim’s testimony at trial that she and Mr. Lalime had sex during the separation.

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12According to Petitioner, the letter was lost before his trial. (Reply, p. 17). Petitioner

testified that the letter informed the victim that he acquiesced to demands she had made and

he offered her a ring “as a sign of our renewed vows, and she took the ring....She put it on.”

(Answer, Exh. I, p.35).

13Petitioner also contends that at the “initial stage of [his] incarceration,...” his mother

recorded telephone conversations with the victim who told his mother, among other things,

that “‘we cohabitated’ until the night of the alleged sexual assault,....” (Reply, p. 11; see also

Reply, Exh. R10 (referring to recorded calls between the victim and Petitioner’s mother

“[a]fter the trial....”)). Petitioner asserts that transcripts of the recordings exist as part of the

record in Petitioner’s and the victim’s divorce proceeding. (Reply, p.12). Review of the

record supports the conclusion that the victim’s alleged statement was not submitted in the

state proceedings relating to Petitioner’s conviction. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2) (discussing

consideration of new evidence in habeas proceeding); see also Cullen, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct.

at 1400. The Court need not determine whether such new evidence should be considered

herein because the victim’s alleged opinion as to whether she and Petitioner had

“cohabitated” until December 13, 2003, has nothing to do with the application of Arizona

law to the facts in evidence at trial on that issue. 

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(Id. at p. 5 n.5). Petitioner opines that the victim’s acceptance of his letter12 and ring on

December 13, 2003 resulted in revoking their separation period. (Id. at p. 25; see also Id. at

p. 17 (referring to the letter as a “reconciliation letter”)).13 In sum, Petitioner disagrees with

the state court’s factual determination that he and the victim were not cohabiting under

Arizona law, i.e., “a couple who is living together and behaving as married partners.”

(Petition, Exh. B, p. 7). 

The state court was not “required to address every jot and tittle of proof suggested to

[it]...nor...” was it required to “‘make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before...’”

it. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 347 (2003)). The

state court recognized that Petitioner and the victim were legally married at the time of the

offense and much of the evidence cited by the state appellate court is the same evidence

relied upon by Petitioner. While the state court did not specifically state that the victim had

keys to the home or that she received mail there, the court acknowledged that her personal

belongings were at the home, she visited the home, and she would go for walks with the

children and Petitioner. (See Petition, Exh. B, p.7). Although the victim testified that before

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14Although Mr. Lalime admitted to kissing the victim, he denied having sexual

intercourse with her. (Answer, Exh. G, pp. 115, 127).

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she moved out she had stopped taking the birth control pill and, therefore, she and Petitioner

used condoms (Answer, Exh. E, p. 19), there is nothing in the record to suggest that they had

sexual intercourse with or with condoms after she moved out and prior to the December 13,

2003 sexual assault of which Petitioner stands convicted. Instead, the victim was clear that

the last time she and Petitioner had intercourse was several weeks before she moved out.

(See id. at pp. 18, 95). Nor does the record reflect testimony from Petitioner, who testified

in his own behalf, that he and the victim engaged in sexual intercourse after the victim moved

out of the family home and prior to the night of December 13, 2003. (See Answer, Exh. I).

Further, although the victim testified that Petitioner requested to and did perform oral sex on

her during the early stages of the separation period, she also testified that the act made her

feel uncomfortable and “pressured” and resulted in the written agreement that, among other

things, “there will be no forms of physical contact, i.e., holding hands, kissing, until mutually

wanted by both of us.” (Answer, Exh. E, pp. 14, 18; see also id. at p. 16 (the agreement was

made “early on...” in the separation period)). While there is testimony that the victim

engaged in sexual intercourse with her co-worker and friend Mr. Lalime in early December,

which was during the separation period, (Id. at p. 118)14, there is no evidence in the record

to support Petitioner’s contention that he and the victim engaged in same during the

separation period. Evidence that the victim minimally exchanged kisses with and/or engaged

in sexual contact with a man other than her husband after she had moved out of the family

residence and after she and her husband had ceased sexual relations, tends to support the

conclusion that Petitioner and the victim were not “living together and behaving as married

partners.” Further, Mr. Lalime’s testimony that the victim “might have mentioned that she

slept on the couch” at the family home (Answer, Exh. G, p.119) does not undermine the state

court’s finding given the court’s recognition that while the evidence “may indicate an

ongoing relationship...” it did not “demonstrate[] that [Petitioner] and his wife were

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cohabiting in the normal sense of the word.” (Petition, Exh.B, p.7). Nor does Mr. Lalime’s

reference to a trip Petitioner and his wife made to Las Vegas undercut the state court’s

finding given that Mr. Lalime testified that he was uncertain whether the trip occurred before

or during the separation period. (Answer, Exh. G, pp. 119, 123). Moreover, the evidence

is equivocal that the victim’s receipt of Petitioner’s letter and the ring on December 13, 2003

altered the status of their separation in any way. The victim testified that upon receipt of the

letter and ring, she told Petitioner she “did not know what to say to him and he told me not

to say anything. That I didn’t need to say anything.” (Answer, Exh. E p.26). Thereafter, the

victim “tried to redirect to studying because that’s why I came there.” (Id.). Petitioner’s

testimony about the victim’s receipt of the letter was consistent with the victim’s: Petitioner

testified that at the time he gave the letter and ring to the victim, there was no conversation

regarding the content of the letter; instead, the victim told him she did not know what to say

and he told her she didn’t have to say anything. (Answer, Exh. I, p.35). Petitioner testified

that after he had administered the IV to the victim and she had fallen ill and laid down, she

mentioned “going to West Virginia and where we [sic] put the kids into school....” (Id. at

p.40). Petitioner believed that his marriage was “fixed...my wife had just come back to

me....I thought she was crying because of everything we had been through through the

separation....” (Id. at p. 43). The victim testified that once she began to feel ill, she was in

and out of consciousness. (Answer, Exh. E, pp. 31-33). The Petitioner’s opinion that he and

the victim had reconciled, does not establish as fact that the two were “living together and

behaving as married partners.” Further, “[w]hen an issue involves credibility of witnesses

and an evaluation of demeanor, there are ‘compelling and familiar justifications for leaving

the process of applying law to fact to the trial court and according to its determination

presumptive weight.’” Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Miller

v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 (1985)). On the instant record, an appellate panel, applying

the normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the state court’s

finding is supported by the record. In sum, the finding of the state court herein is reasonable

based upon the evidence of record and has not been shown to be incorrect. See 28 U.S.C.

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§2254(d)(2) & (e)(1). See Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under

applicable federal habeas law, state court findings of fact are presumed correct unless

rebutted by clear and convincing evidence or unless based on an unreasonable evidentiary

foundation.”).

According full deference to the state court’s factual findings, the Court now turns to

the issue of whether the state court’s conclusion as to the ultimate legal issue, i.e. whether

Petitioner was entitled to the spousal defense under Arizona law, is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978

(“Fact-finding underlying the state court’s decision is accorded the full deference of §§

2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), while the state court’s conclusion as to the ultimate legal issue-or the

application of federal law to the factual findings-is reviewed per §2254(d)(1) in order to

ascertain whether the decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)”).

 The Arizona court herein, consistent with Federal precedent, examined whether the

evidence reasonably supported a finding that Petitioner and his wife were cohabiting under

Arizona law and determined that because the evidence did not reasonably support such a

finding, Petitioner was not entitled to the spousal defense instruction. See Trombetta, 467

U.S. at 485 (the Due Process Clause requires that criminal defendants be afforded a

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense); Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63 (“a

defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists

evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor”). As discussed supra, the state

court’s findings are supported by evidence which showed that although Petitioner and the

victim had an ongoing relationship, they were not living together and behaving as married

partners at the time of the offense. Therefore, the state appellate court’s determination that

the refusal to give the spousal defense instruction did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional

right to present a defense was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

controlling Supreme Court precedent. Nor did the state court’s determination result in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

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presented in the state court. Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on this ground.

2. Sub-claim 2: Trial court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding the

dismissed charge

Petitioner’s statement of his Ground II claim includes reference to denial of due

process and the assertions that the prosecution’s burden of proof was impermissibly eased

and “erroneous jury instruction: ‘Firmly Convinced.’” (Petition, p.7). The supporting facts

portion of Petitioner’s Ground II contains several disjointed paragraphs. (See Id. at p.7). In

the second paragraph, Petitioner states:

As set forth in Ground One, trial counsel, Mr. Jones objected to the instruction,

and the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to include said instruction,

in spite of the court’s directed verdict to acquit on Count II (administering

alcohol/drugs). 

(Id.).

Defense counsel’s request that the court not refer to the dismissed charge during jury

instructions is addressed supra, at III.B. To any extent that Petitioner is attempting to argue

that a due process violation resulted from the trial court’s granting of defense counsel’s

request to omit reference to the dismissed charge in the jury instructions, any such claim is

procedurally defaulted given that Petitioner did not raise the issue on direct appeal. (See

Petition, Exh. A, B). Although Petitioner argued in his PCR Petition that defense counsel’s

decision to forego instruction on this issue constituted ineffective assistance, he did not argue

that the trial court’s decision to grant his own counsel’s request violated the Due Process

Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (See Petition, Exh. D). Therefore, Petitioner failed to fairly

present his claim to the state court. Moreover, Petitioner’s return to state court to raise such

a claim would be futile given that the claim is precluded as waived under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a)(3) because it was not presented on direct appeal or in Petitioner’s PCR Petition.

Further, presentation of such claim in a second post-conviction relief proceeding would be

untimely under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4. See Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a state post-conviction

action is futile when it is time-barred). Nor does the claim qualify for any of the timeliness

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15Because this claim is procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 32.4(a),

Ariz.R.Crim.P., this Court need not determine whether the claims are of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver such that

the claims are precluded pursuant to Cassett. Moreover, the procedural timeliness bar of Rule

32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., is clear, consistently applied, and well established. Powell v.

Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.2004); see e.g., Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 987 P.2d 226 (where

petitioner did not raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (g), the petition could be

summarily dismissed if untimely); Moreno, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (timeliness

provision of Rule 32.4(a) became effective September 20, 1992); Jones, 182 Ariz. at 434,

897 P.2d at 736 (Rule 32.4(a) was amended “to address potential abuse by defendants caused

by the old rule's unlimited filing periods”); see also Wagner v. Stewart, 2008 WL 169639,

*9 (D.Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008).

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exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). Thus, any additional petition would be subject

to summary dismissal. See State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.

1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734 (App. 1995); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192

Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998) (timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion).

Under such circumstances, the claim is procedurally defaulted.15 Park v. California, 202

F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas review is precluded where petitioner has

not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing so has expired). Petitioner has

not demonstrated cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. Nor has Petitioner

presented any evidence that would sustain application of the “fundamental miscarriage of

justice exception” to the procedural default rule on this issue.

3. Sub-claim 3: Reasonable doubt instruction

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s jury

instruction on reasonable doubt which utilized “firmly convinced” terminology resulting in

“impermissibly easing the prosecution’s burden of proof.” (Petition, p. 7). Petitioner also

points out that, in light of the court’s instruction, the prosecution argued to the jury that the

jury “‘only’ had to be ‘firmly convinced’” of his guilt. (Id.).

The trial court instructed the jury as follows in pertinent part:

The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more

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16The difference in the quoted language between the court’s version and Petitioner’s

version is that, three times, the court referred to the defendant as “him” or “he”, and

Petitioner’s requested instruction instead stated: “ the defendant.”

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likely true than not or that its truth is highly probable. In criminal cases such

as this, the State's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond

a reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly

convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that

we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases, the law does not

require proof that overcomes every doubt. If, based on your consideration of

the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime

charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there is a

real possibility that he's not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt

and find him not guilty.

(Answer, Ex. J, pp. 17-18). The pertinent portion of Petitioner’s requested jury instruction

on the “PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-REASONABLE DOUBT” includes essentially

the same language.16 (Answer, Exh. D).

The language used in the jury instruction is drawn from the reasonable doubt

instruction adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Portillo, 182 U.S. 592, 596 ,

898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995). “The Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the

constitutionality of the Portillo instruction and mandated that trial courts give it.” Ploof v.

Ryan, 2010 WL 5834801, *40 (D.Ariz. Sept. 2, 2010)(citing State v. Orendain, 188 Ariz. 54,

56, 932 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Ariz. 1997); State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 153, 42 P.3d 564, 584

(Ariz. 2002)), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 721629 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10,

2011). 

Petitioner argued on direct appeal that the trial court erred in giving the Portillo

reasonable doubt instruction and the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to use the

“firmly convinced” language in closing arguments to characterize the State’s burden. (See

Petition, Exh. A (Petitioner’s Brief on Direct Appeal, pp. 36-39); Petition, Exh. B, p.11). The

Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

because [Petitioner] requested the court give the Portillo instruction, he invited

any error in that instruction and is not entitled to appellate review of that issue.

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17Logan makes clear that the Arizona court has “repeatedly...held we will not find

reversible error when the party complaining of it invited the error.” Logan, 200 Ariz. at 565-

566, 30 P.3d at 632-633 (citations omitted).

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See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 546, ¶9, 30 P.3d 631, 632 (2001).[17]

(Petitioner, Exh. B, p. 11).

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim is barred from federal review by the

independent and adequate state ground doctrine which prohibits federal courts from

addressing habeas claims of state prisoners when a state-law default prevented the state court

from reaching the merits of the federal claim. (Answer, p. 14 (citing Thomas v. Lewis 945

F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 832-33 (9th Cir.

2004) (recognizing that the state court’s decision applying the invited error doctrine may be

an independent state ground that would bar consideration of the issue on federal habeas

review). On the instant record, Respondents are correct that the Arizona appellate court’s

ruling was independent of the merits of the claim and an adequate basis for the state court’s

decision. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260; see also Meza v. Schroeder, 2010 WL 1381095, *8

(D. Ariz. Mar. 9, 2010) (applying independent and adequate state ground doctrine where

state court ruled that the claimed errors were invited by petitioner).

Further, as Respondents point out, Petitioner cannot overcome this default because

he is unable to show cause and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation.

(Answer, p.14). Nor can he establish that this Court’s failure to consider his claim on the

merits will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Id.). This is so because the state

court’s use of the Portillo instruction is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. “Although the Constitution does not

require jury instructions to contain any specific language, the instructions must convey both

that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty and that he may only be convicted

upon a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 821

(9th Cir. 2004)(citing Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 4 (1994)), overruled on other grounds

by Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 (noting that

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the Constitution does not require courts to define reasonable doubt “as a matter of course,”

and stating, “[s]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s

guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,... the Constitution does not require that any

particular form of words be used in advising the jury on the government’s burden of proof.”)

(citations omitted)). 

 The Arizona Supreme Court, in Portillo, noted that the Federal Judicial Center

recommended the language at issue and that the instruction “most fairly and accurately

conveys the meaning of reasonable doubt....” Portillo, 182 Ariz. at 596, 898 P.2d at 974.

The Ninth Circuit has upheld the use of similar language. See United States. v. Velasquez,

980 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1257-59 (9th Cir.

1997). Moreover, Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion in Victor, wrote:

This [model] instruction plainly informs the jurors that the prosecution must

prove its case by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, yet not

necessarily to an absolute certainty. The “firmly convinced” standard for

conviction, repeated for emphasis, is further enhanced by the juxtaposed

prescription that the jury must acquit if there is a “real possibility” that the

defendant is innocent. This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in

stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.

Victor, 511 U.S. at 27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In sum, “the Portillo reasonable doubt

instruction given by the trial court does not violate any clearly established Supreme Court

authority.” Estrada v. Ryan, 2010 WL 2991566, *13 (D. Ariz. July 26, 2010) (citing Lopez

v. Ryan, 2009 WL 3294876, *1 (D.Ariz. Oct. 14, 2009)). See also Ploof, 2011 WL 587961

at *10-*12. Consequently, Petitioner’s claim regarding the Portillo instruction is

procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed.

4. Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court: (1) deny on the merits

Petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s refusal to give

the spousal defense instruction; and (2) dismiss as procedurally defaulted Petitioner’s claims

that: (a) the trial court violated his due process rights by granting defense counsel’s request

to omit instruction regarding the dismissed charge; and (b) the trial court violated his due

process rights by giving the Portillo instruction.

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be dismissed in part and denied in part.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate recommends that the District Court dismiss

in part and deny in part Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No. 1) as

follows:

1. The Petition should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted with regard to:

a. Ground II Sub-claim 2 that the trial court violated Petitioner’s due

process rights by granting defense counsel’s request to omit instruction

regarding Count Two which was dismissed; and 

b. Ground II Sub-claim 3 that the trial court violated Petitioner’s due

process rights by giving the Portillo instruction.

2. The Petition should be denied on the merits with regard to:

a. Ground I; and

b. Ground II Sub-claim 1 regarding the trial court’s refusal to give the

spousal defense instruction.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see also LRCiv 7.2(e)(3) (10-page limit for

objections). If objections are filed, then the parties should use the following case number:

CV 09-425-TUC-FRZ. Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination

of the Magistrate Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the

issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc)., cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 25th day of May, 2011.

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