Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00480/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00480-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY IVAN COGSWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO 

COUNTY, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-0480-AJB-NLS

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Henry Ivan Cogswell (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard 

J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) brought pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff has prepaid the initial civil filing fee 

required to commence a civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). (ECF No. 4.) 

/ / /

/ / /

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I. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

Even though Plaintiff paid the filing fee, the Court can conduct a sua sponte review 

of Plaintiff’s Complaint because he is “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] is 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). Section 1915A, enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”), requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints, or any portions 

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A similar screening provision of the PLRA would apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint even if 

he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

B. Heck bar

In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he alleges that his defense counsel in his state criminal 

proceedings, and later his appellate counsel, provided “ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

(Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against all the named 

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Defendants. (Id. at 8.) However, because Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against 

these Defendants, who are his appointed trial and appellate counsel, under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights, his claims amount to an 

attack on the validity of his underlying criminal conviction, and as such, are not

addressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless he also alleges that his conviction has been 

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 

F.3d 850, 855-856 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has 

fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983 . . . .’”) 

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489). 

Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-

87. A claim challenging the legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so 

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 

643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the district court 

must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint 

must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 

sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines 

that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the 

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the 

action should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). 

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An action barred by Heck should be dismissed for failure to state a claim without 

prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he succeeds in invalidating his 

conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, to the extent Plaintiff intends to raise claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, such claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal conviction and 

continued incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In other words, were Plaintiff to succeed 

in showing that he was provided ineffective assistance of either trial or appellate counsel, 

an award of damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction and/or 

sentence. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to succeed on 

ineffective assistance claim petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below 

objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s errors the result of the trial 

would have been different).

In addition, Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in the form of DNA testing and 

“contends that the prosecutor in this case had a continuous duty to disclose information 

favorable to the defense, which the prosecution refused to disclose in violation of Brady 

v. Maryland.” (Compl. at 5.) However, a claim that involves allegations of a 

constitutional violation under Brady v. Maryland is also clearly barred by Heck. See 

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536 (2011) (“Brady claims have ranked within the 

traditional core of habeas corpus and outside the province of § 1983).

C. State actor

Moreover, even if Plaintiff could show that his conviction has already been 

invalidated, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must also allege that his 

appointed trial and appellate counsel acted “under color of state law” to deprive him of a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988). A person “acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983] only when 

exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 

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wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 

312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 

Attorneys who represent criminal defendants generally do not act under color of 

state law because representing a client “is essentially a private function . . . for which 

state office and authority are not needed.” Dodson, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De 

Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). When attorneys perform as advocates,

i.e., meet with clients, investigate possible defenses, present evidence at trial, or make 

arguments to a judge or jury, they do not act under color of state law for section 1983 

purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Dodson, 454 U.S. at 320-

25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that 

public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 because, so long as she 

performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “h[er] function,” no matter how 

ineffective, is “to represent h[er] client, not the interests of the state or county.”).

D. Immunity

1. Judicial immunity

In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages against Superior 

Court Judge Kirkman for rulings that he made in Plaintiff’s criminal matters, this 

Defendant is absolutely immune. “Judges and those performing judge-like functions are 

absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.” 

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, as a Superior Court 

Judge, Defendant Kirkman has absolute immunity from civil proceedings relating to 

these actions, which were performed within his judicial discretion.

2. Prosecutorial immunity

As a prosecutor, Defendant Trevino is likewise entitled to absolute prosecutorial 

immunity. Id. at 1076 (“Where a prosecutor acts as an advocate ‘in initiating a 

prosecution and in presenting the state’s case,’ absolute immunity applies.” (quoting 

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Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 

F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Prosecutors performing their official prosecutorial 

functions are entitled to absolute immunity against constitutional torts.”).

II. Conclusion

For all the reasons set out above, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim and for seeking monetary damages against 

immune defendants. However, Plaintiff is granted forty five (45) days leave from the 

date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete 

in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. 

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be 

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 

1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

(2) The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form civil rights complaint to 

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2017

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