Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00762/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00762-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARYL DWIGHT GRAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

PIERCE, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0762 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 18, 2015, the undersigned ordered the original complaint 

served on defendants Berg, Jackson, Martin, Millsap, Palagummi, Pierce and Zaragoza. (ECF 

No. 28.) On July 7, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to amend and a proposed first amended 

complaint. (ECF No. 33.)

On September 1, 2015, defendants filed a request for clarification. (ECF No. 36.) In this 

request, defendants request that the court issue an order clarifying the claims on which this action 

is proceeding.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted and defendants’ request for 

clarification of the original complaint is denied. However, the undersigned herein screens the 

amended complaint.

Case 2:15-cv-00762-GEB-KJN Document 39 Filed 09/24/15 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The amended complaint names the same defendants as named in the original complaint, 

although plaintiff clarifies the names of defendants Pierce and Berg as defendants Price and 

Lieberg. Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to drink contaminated water at the Deuel Vocational 

Institution (“DVI”), which made plaintiff sick and caused liver damage. Plaintiff alleges that 

defendant Palagummi denied his administrative appeal requesting a medical transfer based on the 

allegedly contaminated water. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Zaragoza promised to have 

plaintiff transferred away from DVI if he would agree to drop his administrative appeal. Plaintiff 

dropped his appeal but was not transferred away from DVI. 

Plaintiff alleges that he wrote defendant Price a letter “explaining my problem.” Plaintiff 

alleges that in response, defendant Martin informed plaintiff that, “I am just waiting for 

endorsement from the CSR...that’s who endorse you to a mainline prison.” Plaintiff then wrote to 

defendant Lieberg. In response, defendant Lieberg informed plaintiff that he would remain at 

DVI for four more months. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint states a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment claim for 

relief against defendants Palagummi and Zaragoza based on their alleged failure to transfer 

plaintiff away from DVI and the allegedly contaminated water. 

Plaintiff alleges that he then brought “his problem” to the attention of defendants Price, 

Martin and Lieberg. However, plaintiff does not identify the problem he brought to the attention 

of these defendants. Attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s amended complaint is a grievance filed 

by plaintiff alleging that he should not be housed at DVI because it is a reception center. (ECF 

No. 33-1 at 13.) Defendant Lieberg responded to this grievance by informing plaintiff that once 

his “RC” was processed, plaintiff would be transferred to a mainline. (Id.) This grievance does

not mention the allegedly contaminated water. Also attached as an exhibit is a memorandum 

addressed to plaintiff from defendant Martin. (Id. at 12.) In this memorandum, defendant Martin 

addresses plaintiff’s request to be transferred to a mainline institution. (Id.) This memorandum 

also does not mention the allegedly contaminated water. 

////

Case 2:15-cv-00762-GEB-KJN Document 39 Filed 09/24/15 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned cannot determine the grounds of 

plaintiff’s claims against defendants Price, Martin and Lieberg. Plaintiff pleads no facts 

demonstrating that these defendants had knowledge of his exposure to the allegedly contaminated 

water. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are dismissed with leave to file a 

second amended complaint. 

The amended complaint contains no allegations against defendants Jackson and Millsap. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Congress did not intend § 1983 

liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no 

affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy 

demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’ another 

to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) 

(no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 

438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal participation), cert. 

denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of 

official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 

Case 2:15-cv-00762-GEB-KJN Document 39 Filed 09/24/15 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of personal 

participation is insufficient).

Because plaintiff has failed to link defendants Jackson and Millsap to the alleged 

deprivations, the claims against these defendants are dismissed with leave to amend. 

Finally, the undersigned observes that plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that 

defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The grounds of plaintiff’s 

Fourteenth Amendment claims are not clear. However, it appears that plaintiff may be claiming 

that defendants violated his right to due process, under the Fourteenth Amendment, by failing to 

properly process his administrative appeals. “[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right 

only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 

494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (D.C. Ill. 1982)). A 

prisoner does not have a claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure. Mann v. Adams, 855 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Ramirez v. Galarza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed.

In conclusion, plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed but for the Eighth Amendment 

claims against defendants Palagummi and Zaragoza. Plaintiff is granted thirty days to file a 

second amended complaint. If plaintiff files a second amended complaint, plaintiff is informed 

that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint 

complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without 

reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists because, as a general rule, an amended 

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the first amended complaint no longer serves 

any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, each claim and the involvement of 

each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 33) is granted;

2. Defendants’ request for clarification (ECF No. 36) is denied;

////

Case 2:15-cv-00762-GEB-KJN Document 39 Filed 09/24/15 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

3. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed but for the Eighth Amendment claims 

against defendants Palagummi and Zaragoza; plaintiff is granted thirty days to file a second 

amended complaint; if plaintiff files a second amended complaint, defendants shall not file a 

response until ordered by the court; if plaintiff does not file a second amended complaint, 

defendants Palagummi and Zaragoza shall file a response to the amended complaint within fortyfive days of the date of this order.

Dated: September 24, 2015

Gr762.scr

Case 2:15-cv-00762-GEB-KJN Document 39 Filed 09/24/15 Page 5 of 5