Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01811/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01811-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 09CV1811 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARNULFO ZEPEDA,

Petitioner,

v.

DOMINGO URIBE, Warden,

Respondent.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 09-1811-JM(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Arnulfo Zepeda (hereafter “Petitioner“) has filed

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254

(hereafter “Petition”). Respondent Domingo Uribe (hereafter

“Respondent”), has filed an Answer to the Petition. Petitioner has

filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer. The Court, having reviewed

the Petition, Opposition, Traverse, and the documents attached

thereto and/or lodged therewith and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, HEREBY

RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be GRANTED.

 I

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 29, 1985, a judgment of conviction was entered

against Petitioner for first degree murder and second degree murder

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 1 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 09CV1811 

by use of a firearm. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1).

On December 8, 2006, officials at Pleasant Valley State

Prison held a disciplinary hearing regarding Petitioner’s alleged

participation in a riot. Petitioner was found guilty as charged.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2). 

On September 25, 2008, Respondent filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the Imperial County Superior Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6). On June 2, 2008, the Imperial County

Superior Court granted the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7).

On September 24, 2008, Respondent appealed the decision of

the Imperial County Superior Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8).

On March 4, 2009, the California Court of Appeal reversed the

decision of the Imperial County Superior Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 10).

On March 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in

the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 11). On

June 10, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition for

Review without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 12).

On August 19, 2009, Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus now pending before this Court.

 II

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

This Statement of Facts is taken substantially from the

California Court of Appeal unpublished opinion, In re Arnulfo

Zepeda, No. D053475 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. Div. 1, March 4,

2009)(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10). This Court relies on these

facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Park v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,

35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 2 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 09CV1811 

inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness).

According to prison staff, on November 3, 2006, while

there were approximately 300 inmates in the prison

yard, two fights broke out in the early afternoon

between two Fresno bulldogs (apparently a prison gang)

and three Southern Hispanic (apparently another prison

gang) inmates. Petitioner was not named as one of the

combatants. The fight between inmates Carrillo (a

member of the Fresno Bulldog gang) and Aguirre (a

member of the Southern Hispanic gang) moved from the

front of the Facility C Building 2 toward the soccer

goal on the recreation yard. The fight involving

inmates Luscano, Chavez (members of the Fresno Bulldog

gang) and Royzman (a member of the Southern Hispanic

gang) took place near the corner of Facility C

Building 2.

Correctional Officer Martinez used the public address

system to order all inmates in the yard to get down.

All inmates complied except Carillo and Aguirre.

Sergeant Steele instructed staff to form a skirmish

line, and then ordered Carillo and Aguirre to “prone

out.” Both complied.

Correctional Officers escorted the five named combatants, as well as inmates Leon and Petitioner, to

holding tanks for medical evaluations and interviews.

Correctional Officer Worth prepared a schematic map of

the incident. The schematic map showed Leon and

Petitioner standing in front of Facility C Building 2,

but did not indicate specifically how far they were

from Luscano, Chavez and Royzman. 

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10 at 2)

On November 16, 2006, Petitioner was charged with a Rules

Violation which alleged that he participated in a riot.

On December 8, 2006, at the disciplinary hearing

before the Senior Hearing Officer (hereafter “SHO”),

Correctional Officer DeShazo testified that Petitioner

was not an active participant in the riot. DeShazo

said that he relayed his observation that Petitioner

was not involved in the riot to Correctional Officer

Worth, who prepared the schematic map of the scene

which included where the inmates were when they were

ordered to get down. Worth did not recall DeShazo’s

comment. Correctional Lieutenant Henderson stated that

“(it had) been determined that the Southern Hispanic

inmates attacked the Fresno Bulldogs, which resulted

in (the) riot. Both Petitioner and Leon (were) known

Southern Hispanic inmates, of which it is believed

they were also participants in the fighting due to

(their) placement on the schematic map.”

After the SHO determined that a riot took place, the

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 3 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 09CV1811 

SHO defined “participation” for purpose of the

disciplinary proceedings:

“Participation means the inmate knows he is part of

the group of two or more intent upon riot, rout or

unlawful assembly. Usually this means he failed to

leave when the opportunity (sic) or when violence

began.” “Participation in a riot does not necessarily

mean that an individual identified on the schematic

map, in a location had to receive injury or produce

injury to another, it simply means acting with or

supporting another or others with the intent to commit

the aforementioned offense. If an individual has

allegiances and/or links to a specific group, which is

engaged in the riot and the individual fails to

disperse or get down at a riot location after instructed to do so and has been identified on the

schematic map in the riot location, it is presumed the

individual participated in the riot with or without

staff observing the individual act of participation.”

Using this definition of participation, the SHO

expressly found that Petitioner was identified as a

member of the Southern Hispanic gang, “was identified

as being involved in the riot and placed on the

schematic map as #7,” and failed to disperse. The SHO

acknowledged that the fact Petitioner was “not

observed by staff actively participating in the riot”

was a mitigating circumstance, but concluded it did

not outweigh the preponderance of the other evidence

received at the hearing. The SHO found Petitioner

guilty of participating in a riot.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10 at 3-4)

Petitioner was assessed a forfeiture of ninety days of good

time credit. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2) 

 III

 GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Petitioner claims that the findings of the disciplinary

committee were insufficient to find him guilty of participating in

a riot. Specifically, he asserts that one factor relied upon by the

disciplinary committee (his alleged gang affiliation) is unsupported

by the record. Further, Petitioner contends that the California

Court of Appeal neglected to address the uncontroverted exculpatory

evidence in the record that he did not participate in the riot.

 

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 4 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 09CV1811 

 IV

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction over a

petition for writ of habeas corpus to lie, the petition must allege

that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. The

current petition was filed on August 19, 2009 and is therefore

governed by the AEDPA. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner

must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). 

Section 2254(d) states:

An application for a writ of habeas

corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(Emphasis added).

The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)and (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the unreasonable appliCase 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 5 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 09CV1811 

cation” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court’s decision may be found to be “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme court precedent: (1) “if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from the [the

court’s] precedent.” Id. at 405-406; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 72-75 (2003). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case,” or, “if the state court either unreasonably

extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where

it should not apply or unreasonably extends a legal principle from

our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where

it should apply.” Williams, 539 U.S. at 407; Andrade, 538 U.S. at

76. 

Under §2254(d)(2), a petitioner may obtain relief by showing

that the conclusion of the state court was “an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” Therefore, the court must presume that the

state court’s factual findings to be sound unless a petitioner

rebuts the “presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 6 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 09CV1811 

evidence.” §2254(e)(1). Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240

(2005)

Section 2254(e)(1) states:

In a proceeding instituted by an

application for writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to a judgment of

a State court, a determination of a factual

issue shall be presumed to be correct. The

applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.

(Emphasis added).

“This standard is demanding but not insatiable... deference

does not by definition preclude relief.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Factual findings may be infected with

substantive legal error where the fact-finding process itself is

defective. The state court fact-finding process is undermined where

the state court has before it, yet apparently ignores, evidence that

supports a petitioner’s claim. Id. at 346, Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled in part by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74-77). 

\\

\\

\\

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 7 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 09CV1811 

 V

THE DECISION OF THE CLAIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL INVOLVED AN 

 UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF U.S SUPREME COURT LAW

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 12). Therefore, the Court “looks through” to the California

Court of Appeal’s decision. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10).

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief because the

California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied U.S. Supreme Court

law in its decision denying his claim. Respondent argues that in

denying Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal used the

correct legal standard.

When an inmate challenges the revocation of good conduct

credits on federal due process grounds, a reviewing court must apply

the standard of review set forth in Superintendent v. Hill 472 U.S.

445, 454 (1985). Pursuant to Hill, a prison disciplinary action

will not be disturbed so long as “some evidence” supports the action

taken. Id. at 455.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the “some evidence” standard

of Hill is clearly established federal law for AEDPA purposes

applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings, “because the

(decision rendered) directly affect(s) the duration of the prison

term.” Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006) [quoting Jancsek v. Oregon Board of Parole,

833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)]. 

Hill’s “some evidence” standard assures that “the record is

not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary

board were without support or otherwise arbitrary...The fundamental

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 8 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 09CV1811 

fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require

courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have

some basis in fact.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 456-457; Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129.

Nonetheless, there must be some indicia of reliability of the

information that forms the basis for prison disciplinary actions.

Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987); Zimmerlee v.

Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987); Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d

481, 488 (2nd Cir. 2004); Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.3d 1171, 1175-1176 (7th

Cir. 1989); Aquiar v. Tafoya, 95 Fed. Appx. 931, 935 (10th Cir.

2004).

In this case, the Court of Appeal found, inter alia,

Petitioner participated in the riot because the schematic drawing of

the prison yard where the riot occurred, placed him in the location

of the riot. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10 at 7-8, Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 13)

The schematic drawing is a depiction of the prison yard where

the combatants in the riot, Petitioner, and inmate Leon were

standing when they were ordered to “get down.” Combatants Carrillo

and Aguirre are identified on the schematic drawing as nos. 1 and 2,

respectively. Combatants Luscano, Chavez and Royzman are identified

on the schematic drawing as nos. 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Inmate

Leon is identified on the schematic drawing as no. 6. Petitioner is

identified on the schematic drawing as no. 7. The schematic drawing

is not drawn to scale. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 13)

“(Petitioner) was not named as one of the combatants (in the

riot)... The fight involving inmates Luscano, Chavez and Royzman 

took place near the corner of CFB2 (Facility C Building 2)... The

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 9 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1/ The word “not” does not appear after the word “did” in the Court of

Appeal’s opinion. However, a fair reading of the sentence suggests

that the word “not” was erroneously omitted. As this Report and

Recommendation discusses infra, the schematic map does “not”

indicate specifically how far Petitioner was from combatants

Luscano, Chavez and Royzman.

10 09CV1811 

schematic map showed (inmate) Leon and (Petitioner) standing in

front of CFB2, but did1/ indicate specifically how far they were from

Luscano, Chavez and Royzman.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10 at 2)

The Court’s review of the schematic drawing (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 13) shows that the person who was standing closest to

Petitioner was inmate Leon, who was not identified as a combatant in

the riot. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that

Petitioner and inmate Leon were actively involved in the riot. In

fact, the contrary is true. The Court of Appeal noted, “(Correctional Officer R. DeShazo) testified that (Petitioner) was not an

active participant in the riot.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10 at

3). The Rules Violation Report states, “...(Petitioner) was not

observed by staff actively participating in the riot...”

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 4).

Further, the schematic drawing is not drawn to scale.

Therefore, it is impossible for this Court (or, for that matter, any

other tribunal) to determine how “near” Petitioner was to the

rioting combatants Luscano, Chavez and Royzman. Consequently, the

evidence that Petitioner was in the location of the riot is, at

best, inconclusive, and is unsupported by evidence in the record.

Moreover, since the schematic drawing is not drawn to scale, there

is no indicia of reliability that the drawing depicts how near or

far Petitioner was from the rioting combatants, or if he was even in

the location of the riot. As a result, the Court finds that the

Court of Appeal’s reliance on the “fact” that the schematic drawing

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 10 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 09CV1811 

placed Petitioner in the location of the riot is not “some evidence”

that Petitioner was guilty of participation in a riot. Consequently,

the Court of Appeal’s opinion involved an unreasonable application

of Hill and its progeny, with regard to finding Petitioner’s

placement on the schematic drawing as being in the location of the

riot.

Additionally, the Court of Appeal stated: “We also note that

Officer DeShazo’s statement in the hearing that (Petitioner) was not

an active participant in the riot contradicts Lieutenant Henderson’s

stated belief that (Petitioner’s) proximity to the fighting...

showed he participated in the riot.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10

at 8-9)(emphasis added). However, Officer DeShazo’s statement is a

first-hand eye-witness account of the riot. He had first-hand

knowledge of where Petitioner was standing at the time of the riot.

Therefore, Officer DeShazo’s statement is “some evidence” that

Petitioner did not participate in the riot.

On the other hand, Lieutenant Henderson was not an eyewitness to the riot nor does it appear that he had first-hand

knowledge of the riot. His statement simply reports what other

prison personnel did in response to the riot. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 2 at 6, Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3 at 2). 

Lieutenant Henderson’s Incident Report indicates that

Petitioner was a “suspect.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3 at 2).

Further, his statement reads in pertinent part, “(i)t has been

determined that the Southern Hispanic inmates attacked the Fresno

Bulldogs, which resulted in this riot... (Petitioner )... (is a)

known Southern Hispanic inmate, of which it is believed (he) also

(was a) participant in the fighting due to (his) placement on the

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 11 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 09CV1811 

schematic map.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 6).

Lieutenant Henderson’s statement simply states beliefs that

Petitioner was involved in the riot based on the unsupported

contention of Petitioner’s membership in a rival gang and his

placement on the schematic drawing. Lieutenant Henderson’s beliefs

cannot be considered “some evidence” that Petitioner participated in

the riot. First, they are simply beliefs. It is unclear from the

record whose beliefs they are. Even if they are Lieutenant

Henderson’s beliefs, they are not evidence that Petitioner participated in the riot. Second, as the Court has previously found, the

schematic drawing, upon which Lieutenant Henderson relied, is not

“some evidence” that Petitioner participated in the riot. As a

result, the Court of Appeal’s opinion involved another unreasonable

application of Hill and its progeny with regard to its finding

Petitioner’s placement on the schematic drawing as being in the

location of the riot.

 VI

THE DECISION OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL WAS

BASED ON AN UNREASONABLE DETERMINATION OF FACTS IN 

 LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED

1. Definition of “Participation In A Riot”

The Court of Appeal stated that the Senior Hearing Officer

(hereafter “SHO”) used the following definition of “participation in

a riot:”

‘Participation’ means the inmate knows he is part

of the group of two or more intent upon riot, rout or

unlawful assembly. Usually, this means he failed to

leave when the opportunity (sic) or when violence

began... Participation in a riot does not necessarily

mean that an individual indentified (sic) on the

schematic, in a location had to receive injury [or]

produce injury to another, it simply means acting with

or supporting another or others with intent to commit

the aforementioned offense...

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 12 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2/ Petitioner was cited for violation of CCR 3005(c) (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 2 at 2) However, it is obvious that §3005(c) does not

apply in this case. §3005(c) states:

Refusing to Accept Assigned Housing. Inmates

shall not refuse to accept a housing assignment

such as but not limited to, an integrated housing

assignment or a double cell assignment, when case

factors do not preclude such.

The Court finds that Petitioner’s alleged offense was that he

violated §3005(d)(3).

13 09CV1811 

(If) an individual has allegiances and/or links to (a)

specific group, which is engaged in a riot and the

individual fails to disperse from or get down at a

riot location after instructed to do so and has been

identified on the schematic in the riot location, it

is presumed the individual participated in the riot

with or without staff observing the individual act of

participation.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10 at 3)(emphasis added)

Petitioner was charged and found guilty of violating

California Code of Regulations (hereafter “CCR”) §3005(d)(3)2/ which

states: “Inmates shall not participate in a riot, rout or unlawful

assembly.” The SHO cited California Penal Code §§ 404 and 409 as

the law which was to be applied to Petitioner’s charge. California

Penal Code § 404 states:

Riot; elements.

(a) Any use of force or violence, disturbing the

public peace, or any threat to use force or violence

if accompanied by immediate power of execution by two

or more persons acting together, and without authority

of law, is a riot.

(B) As used in this section, disturbing the public

peace may occur in any place of confinement. Place of

confinement means any state prison...

(Emphasis added)

California Penal Code §409 states:

Riot, rout or unlawful assembly; 

remaining present after warning to disperse.

Remaining present at a place of riot, etc. after

warning to disperse. Every person remaining present at

the place of any riot, rout or unlawful assembly,

after the same has been lawfully warned to disperse...

is guilty of a misdemeanor.

(Emphasis added)

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 13 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 09CV1811 

While the SHO’s definition of “participation in a riot”

generally comports with California law as noted above, the Court of

Appeal’s determination of the facts as they apply to the SHO’s

definition and California law was unreasonable:

2. “Intent Upon Riot”

The SHO used in his definition of “participation in a riot,”

the following phrase: “Participation means that the inmate knows he

is part of a group of two or more intent upon riot.” The Court of

Appeal did not comment on this part of the SHO’s definition.

However, the Court’s review of the record presented shows

that there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever to even suggest,

much less find, that Petitioner “knew” he was part of a group of two

or more “intent upon riot.” Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s tacit

acceptance of this definition and its application to the facts of

Petitioner’s case is simply unreasonable because there is no

evidence upon which it could have relied to find this element of

“participation in a riot.”

3. “Acting With Or Supporting Another Or Others”

The SHO used in its definition of “participation in a riot,”

the following phrase: “... acting with or supporting another or

others with intent to commit the aforementioned offense.” While

this phrase generally comports with California law, the Court of

Appeal did not comment on this part of the SHO’s definition. 

 However, the Court’s review of the record presented shows that

there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever to even suggest, much

less find, the Petitioner was “acting with or supporting another or

others with intent...” to riot. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s

tacit acceptance of this definition and its application to the facts

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 14 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 09CV1811 

of Petitioner’s case is simply unreasonable because there is no

evidence upon which it could have relied to find this element of

“participation in a riot.”

4. “Failure To Disperse or Get Down”

The SHO used in his definition of “participation in a riot,”

the following phrase: “... the individual fails to disperse from or

get down after instructed to do so.” The Court of Appeal commented

on this part of the SHO’s definition by stating: “We agree with

(Petitioner) that there is no evidence he was ordered to disperse

and failed to do so.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10 at 7) However,

it did not comment further.

The Court’s review of the record presented shows that this

part of the SHO’s definition does not comport with California law,

nor was there any evidence that Petitioner failed to disperse.

As noted above, California Penal Code §409 requires that a

person who remains present at the place of a riot, after he/she has

been lawfully ordered to disperse, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

The objective of §409 is to enable law enforcement personnel

to diffuse a riotous situation by ordering persons to remove

themselves from the area without the need to distinguish between

rioters and bystanders. But, California courts require a clear and

present danger of imminent violence before bystanders can be

arrested along with participants in a riot. The Ninth Circuit has

held that “(a)bsent these compelling circumstances... the police are

at least required to differentiate between the participants and

innocent bystanders.” Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco 266

F.3d 959, 967-968 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 15 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 09CV1811 

Here, it is clear from the record that Petitioner was not

ordered to disperse. Rather, he was ordered to get down. He

complied with that order. To be guilty of participation in a riot,

it was required that Petitioner be warned or ordered to disperse.

Since Petitioner complied with the order to get down, it was

impossible for him to disperse. Therefore, there is no evidence in

the record, nor could there be any evidence in the record, that

Petitioner failed to disperse. As a result, the Court of Appeal’s

tacit acceptance of this definition and its application to the facts

to Petitioner’s case is simply unreasonable because there is no

evidence in the record upon which it could have relied to find this

element of “participation in a riot.”

Moreover, the Court of Appeal did not acknowledge nor address

the objective of California Penal Code §409, as discussed in Dubner,

supra. Had it done so, it would have found that prison personnel

present at the time and location of the riot did not make a

determination whether Petitioner was a participant in the riot or an

innocent bystander. Instead, they assumed he was a participant in

the riot. However, the record contains reliable clear and convincing

evidence that Petitioner was not a participant in the riot; rather,

he was a bystander. (Respondent’s Lodgments Nos. 2 at 7; 3 at 7 and

10 at 8-9)

5. Petitioner was Identified As A Member of One of the 

 Rioting Groups

The Court of Appeal found the following in finding that “some

evidence” supported that Petitioner “participated in a riot:”

(1) Petitioner was identified as a member of one of the rioting

groups; (2) the schematic drawing placed Petitioner in the location

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 16 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 09CV1811 

of the riot; (3) he was identified as being involved in the riot and

he failed to disperse. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10 at 7).

The Court has already found that the schematic drawing of the

prison yard was not “some evidence” under Hill because it had no

indicia of reliability and did not comport with other evidence in

the record. The Court has also found that Petitioner was not

ordered to disperse. Rather, he was ordered to get down and

complied with that order, making it impossible for him to disperse.

Therefore, the only reliable evidence, which could be

considered “some evidence” under Hill, is that Petitioner was

identified as a member of one of the rioting groups. While the

Court remains faithful to the United States Supreme Court’s

admonition in Hill that it should not reweigh the evidence or judge

the credibility of witnesses, this is the only evidence implicating

Petitioner in “participation in a riot.” However, simply being

identified as a member of one of the rioting groups is not “some

evidence,” as required by Hill. Whether or not Petitioner was a

member of one of the rioting groups does not show that Petitioner

participated in a riot involving that group. Therefore, the Court

finds that this evidence alone is insufficient to meet the standard

set forth in Hill. See Cato, 824 F.2d 705. As a result, the Court

finds that the Court of Appeal’s factual findings, as noted above,

were unsound. The record presented to the Court rebuts the presumption of correctness of the Court of Appeal’s factual findings by

clear and convincing evidence. §2254(e)(1); Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240.

Consequently, for the reasons set forth above, the California

Court of Appeal’s decision involved an unreasonable application of

U.S. Supreme Court law and was based on an unreasonable determinaCase 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 17 of 18
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18 09CV1811 

tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The Court

RECOMMENDS that the Petition be GRANTED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be GRANTED.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 5, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

April 5, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 2, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01811-JM-WVG Document 15 Filed 02/02/10 Page 18 of 18