Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00216/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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06cv0216-J (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social

Security,

Defendant. 

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Case No. 06cv0216-J (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[DOC. NO. 11] AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. NO. 14]

Sean Anderson brought this action to obtain judicial review of

the Social Security Commissioner’s final decision denying his claim

for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income

under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§

401-33 (as amended on March 2, 2004, by Pub. L. No. 108-203).

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to

Plaintiff’s motion, and Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s crossmotion.

These motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Major for the

issuance of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). This Court

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1 The ALJ’s decision and Plaintiff’s moving papers list August 1, 2003

as the date on which Plaintiff filed for disability benefits, but the

administrative record shows the filing date to be August 28, 2003. See AR at 74-

76, 118, 299-301.

2 06cv0216-J (BLM)

found the motions appropriate for submission on the papers and

without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Doc. No.

10. For the reasons set forth herein, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Plaintiff’s motion be GRANTED and Defendant’s cross-motion be

DENIED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 28, 20031, Plaintiff filed an application for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under

Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act alleging that he had

been disabled due to post traumatic stress disorder, anxiety

disorder, and food addiction since November 26, 2002.

Administrative Record (hereinafter “AR”) at 13, 74-76, 118, 299-301.

The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration (AR at

23-33), resulting in Plaintiff’s request for an administrative

hearing. AR at 34.

On June 22, 2005, a hearing was held before Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) Edward Steinman. AR at 307-33. Plaintiff, Dr. Sidney

Bolter (a medical expert), and Bonnie Sinclair (a vocational expert

(“VE”)) testified at the hearing. AR at 307-33. By written

decision dated August 6, 2005, ALJ Steinman found that Plaintiff

could perform his past relevant work and, therefore, was not

disabled. AR at 9-19. Plaintiff requested administrative review.

See AR at 5-8. On December 2, 2005, the Appeals Council found no

basis for disturbing the ALJ’s ruling and the decision became final.

AR at 5-8.

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3 06cv0216-J (BLM)

On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking

judicial review by the federal district court. Doc. No. 1. On May

17, 2006, Plaintiff filed the motion for summary judgment at issue

in this report and recommendation. Doc. No. 11. Defendant filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s

motion on July 3, 2006. Doc. Nos. 14, 16. Plaintiff timely opposed

Defendant’s cross-motion. Doc. No. 18. Neither party filed a

reply.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Educational and Employment History

Born on September 18, 1970, Plaintiff was thirty-four at the

time of the ALJ’s decision. Pl.’s Mem. at 1; AR at 74-76.

Plaintiff has a high school education, has completed about four

years of collegiate study, and states that he is a member of MENSA.

AR at 13, 115, 314-15. Prior to the onset of his alleged

disability, Plaintiff held employment positions including cashier,

taxi driver, mail handler, sailor in the United States Navy (on two

separate occasions with different duties), truck driver, custodian,

mechanic, phone operator, cook, and school bus driver — all for

relatively short durations between 1989 and August 2003. AR at 95,

111, 143. Plaintiff reported being fired from many of these

positions. See AR at 241, 271, 279, 310-11.

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History

The medical records indicate that Plaintiff has actively sought

treatment and made use of rehabilitative services from several

providers over the years. 

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4 06cv0216-J (BLM)

1. Treatment at Phelps Memorial Hospital Center

The earliest medical records included in the administrative

record cover the period from May to August of 2001. AR at 152-71.

Upon initial presentation at Phelps Memorial Hospital Center,

Plaintiff indicated that he had been sober for three years and was

active in Alcoholics Anonymous, but was not able to achieve

vocational goals. AR at 171. Plaintiff also described additional

symptoms of sadness, violent tendencies, and long-term memory loss

and inquired as to whether he might have post-traumatic stress

disorder (“PTSD”) attributable to (1) a history of alcohol and drug

abuse on both sides of his family, (2) a bipolar father who molested

his step-sisters and disowned Plaintiff, (3) his paternal

grandfather, who was a pedophile, (4) the fact that his grandmother

was beheaded in a car accident when he was four (Plaintiff was not

in the car), (5) the constant emotional, verbal and physical

violence to which he was subjected as a child, and (6) the fact that

he had been drinking alcohol since the age of 6. AR at 167-68. He

was diagnosed with dysthemia, alcohol and cocaine dependence in

remission, and borderline personality disorder and assigned a Global

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 55. AR at 170. After

examining him, the treating therapist also diagnosed chronic PTSD.

AR at 164.

Therapy records indicate a goal of teaching Plaintiff to

modulate his thoughts and feelings so that he could maintain close

and non-intrusive relationships with others. AR at 156. Follow-up

records suggest that Plaintiff attempted to employ the techniques he

learned in therapy, with some success. AR at 152-54. 

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5 06cv0216-J (BLM)

2. Dr. Mounir Soliman’s Psychiatric Evaluation

At the Department of Rehabilitation’s request, Dr. Soliman

evaluated Plaintiff and issued a report dated March 3, 2003. AR at

172-76. Plaintiff presented with nightmares, flashbacks,

depression, and occasional hyper-vigilance. AR at 173. According

to Dr. Soliman, “[t]he patient indicated that he is motivated to be

enrolled with the Department of Rehabilitation so he can learn new

skills to get new jobs.” Id. 

Dr. Soliman found that Plaintiff appeared anxious, but was

pleasant and cooperative and had normal abilities for abstract

thinking and insight. AR at 174. He noted no looseness of

associations and no evidence of auditory or visual hallucinations,

though he did find that Plaintiff’s neurovegetative signs and

symptoms were significant for decreased energy. Id. Upon

completing his examination, Dr. Soliman diagnosed Plaintiff as

suffering from PTSD and having a history of substance abuse (in

remission) and borderline personality disorder. AR at 175. He

assigned a GAF score of “about 60.” Id. As to whether Plaintiff

could adapt to work situations, Dr. Soliman opined as follows:

From a psychiatric standpoint, the patient is able to

understand, carry out, and remember simple and complex

instructions. The patient is able to interact with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public. The patient

is able to withstand the stress and pressures associated

with an eight-hour workday, and day-to-day activities. 

Id. However, Dr. Soliman further noted that “[u]nfortunately,

[Plaintiff] has never been treated by a psychiatrist and has never

been under any psychiatric treatment ...,” though “he would benefit

from ... group psychotherapy and medication if the patient agrees to

take them to help him with the post-traumatic stress disorder

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2 Many of the records reference Areta Crowell Center. This center is

affiliated with County Mental Health. See e.g., AR at 218. 

3 The signature and title are illegible. 

6 06cv0216-J (BLM)

symptoms.” Id.

3. Treatment by County Mental Health2 and Dr. Mills

During Plaintiff’s initial assessment by a Mental Health

Services evaluator3

 on June 5, 2003, he reported essentially the same

history of family abuse and trauma that was previously discussed,

though he added that his mother’s treatment of him constituted

“covert incest” (such as treating him as a spouse but without sexual

contact) and that he had a restraining order against her. AR at

178-86. He also clarified that he had been abusing alcohol since

age four and that he had actually witnessed his father molesting his

step-sisters (though he reported that he does not recall it). AR at

178, 180. Plaintiff indicated that he wanted referrals to PTSD

groups. AR at 181, 183.

The evaluator noted that Plaintiff’s thought processes were

grossly intact and that Plaintiff was cooperative, attentive to all

questions asked, and of above-average intelligence. AR at 181. He

or she diagnosed PTSD, alcohol dependence in sustained full

remission, and a GAF score of 35. AR at 181. The only treatment

note offered by this evaluator was that Plaintiff “would benefit

from coping skills training.” AR at 183. 

During the latter half of 2003, Plaintiff attended group

sessions geared towards (1) anxiety and phobias, (2) anger

management, and (3) depression and anxiety. AR at 287-88, 290. In

2004, Plaintiff began receiving individual therapy. AR at 247-80.

During one session, the therapist noted that “clt [client] has a hx

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4 Notes from July 21, 2003, appear to be signed by Dr. Mills. AR at

177.

5 Though the content of this medical record is discernible, as both

parties and the reviewing physicians have expressed, many of Dr. Mills’ notes are

illegible.

7 06cv0216-J (BLM)

[history] of presenting better than he actually is” and, therefore,

administered a personality inventory to help differentiate the

diagnosis. AR at 275. During another session, the therapist noted:

Client spoke about his difficulties in maintaining

employment. He was discharged from the military after 9

months as being mentally ill, but not disabled. He spoke

about 4 jobs that lasted no more than 4 months. In

addition, he drove a taxi for a year and a half and really

liked it and left in good standing ... Client is aware

that he has difficulties dealing with bosses, but is not

really sure what is wrong with him.

AR at 271. In November of 2004, a therapist observed that Plaintiff

believed he had ESP (extrasensory perception), that he skipped from

topic to topic, that he was overly rigid in social interactions, and

that he should be evaluated for medications to reduce his anxiety

and mood difficulties. AR at 259-60. Plaintiff continued in group

therapy through at least 2005, attending the interpersonal

effectiveness group, the self esteem and boundaries group, and the

anger management group during April and May of 2005. AR at 220-21,

225.

Dr. Donna Mills was Plaintiff’s primary treating physician at

County Mental Health from about July 21, 20034, to at least May 19,

2005. AR at 177, 217, 227, 231, 236, 243, 246, 254, 258. When Dr.

Mills evaluated Plaintiff on November 16, 2004, she noted anxiety,

an inability to relax (hyper-vigilence), and episodic tearfulness

and prescribed Paxil CR.5 AR at 258. During examinations in January

and March of 2005, Dr. Mills again noted that Plaintiff experienced

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8 06cv0216-J (BLM)

“episodic anxiety” (AR at 231, 243) and “difficulty focusing” (AR at

231). On May 23, 2005, Dr. Mills switched Plaintiff from Paxil CR

to Pexeva. AR at 231. Subsequently, Dr. Mills observed that

Plaintiff’s mood was better and he had decreased anxiety. AR at

227. 

On June 8, 2005, Dr. Mills completed a psychiatric review form

based on her “weekly contact” with Plaintiff since his June 5, 2003

admission. AR at 294-97. Therein she diagnosed him with PTSD and

assigned a GAF score of 35, noting that he also had “problems with

primary support group, social environment, occupational, housing,

economic.” AR at 294. She reported that “[c]lient has been in

individual therapy with minimal progress. Medications therapy since

3/18/04 with no adverse reactions.” AR at 295. Having administered

the MMPI-2 (a written psychiatric inventory used to diagnose mental

disorders), she found Plaintiff in the clinical range in

“masculinity/feminity, paranoia, and, schizophrenia.” AR at 296. 

In reference to work, Dr. Mills anticipated that Plaintiff’s

impairments or treatment would cause him to miss work more than

three times a month and she opined that he would have difficulty

working at a regular job on a sustained basis. AR at 296. Dr.

Mills explained the basis for this assessment, stating:

Client has attempted to sustain work with no success. His

symptoms restrict ability to perform, obtain, and maintain

employee (sic). Interpersonal, intrapsychic, and

consequential function is impaired.

Id. She further noted marked limitations in Plaintiff’s functional

ability to engage in the activities of daily living, to maintain

social functioning, and to maintain concentration, persistence, or

pace, though she only reported one or two episodes of

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decompensation. AR at 297. Finally, Dr. Mills commented that:

Client has odd beliefs that are inconsistent with cultural

norms, as well as unusual perceptual experiences,

including bodily illusions. He demonstrates

suspiciousness and paranoid idea with inappropriate

affect. Deficit in interrelational function.

Id.

4. Dr. Richard Hicks’ Psychiatric Evaluation

On October 30, 2003, Dr. Richard Hicks performed a psychiatric

evaluation of Plaintiff. AR at 187-93. He found that there is “no

loosening of associations” or “tangentiality” or

“circumstantiality,” though Plaintiff “does at times say a lot about

certain topics where he is sort of intellectualizing.” AR at 190.

Under “thought content,” Dr. Hicks reported:

There are no obsessions except that he is a little bit

upset that that (sic) rules do not work for him anyway.

There is a slight paranoid flavoring to this but it is not

really well organized. It is not really delusional.

There is a little bit of grandiosity mixed in. There are

no ideas of reference.

Id. Dr. Hicks noted the presence of some outbursts of anger,

impulsiveness, and sleep disturbance, but did not find Plaintiff to

be particularly anxious, hopeless or depressed. Id. Accordingly,

Dr. Hicks diagnosed Plaintiff as having alcohol abuse in remission

for six years, a mild adjustment disorder, a mild personality

disorder, and a GAF score of about 75 or 80. AR at 192. He opined

that Plaintiff could do simple and repetitive tasks and even more

detailed and complex ones, but would have trouble taking simple

instructions from supervisors. Id. More specifically, he explained

that:

He does irritate people. He just does not take

instructions well. His interactions with coworkers and

the public would be limited by his being a perfectionist.

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His consistency and regularity would be ok. 

Id. Dr. Hicks concluded that Plaintiff would need ongoing

psychotherapy. Id. 

5. Consultative Reviews by Non-Examining Physicians

In a functional capacity assessment dated November 17, 2003,

Dr. Herbert Hurwitz, a psychiatrist, provided a consultative

assessment of Plaintiff based on his review of Plaintiff’s medical

records from November 2002 to November 2003. AR at 194-211. Dr.

Hurwitz concluded that Plaintiff’s abilities to (1) carry out

detailed instructions, (2) maintain attention and concentration for

extended periods, (3) make simple work-related decisions, (4)

interact appropriately with the general public, and (5) set

realistic goals or make plans independently of others were

“moderately limited.” AR at 194-95. Contrary to Dr. Mills’

assessment, Dr. Hurwitz opined that only moderate limitations on

Plaintiff’s ability to maintain social functioning and to maintain

concentration, persistence, or pace existed, though he too reported

one or two episodes of decompensation. AR at 208. Otherwise, Dr.

Hurwitz did not find Plaintiff’s work-related abilities to be

significantly limited. Id. As a result, he concluded that

Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive work tasks for a normal

workday and work week, could relate in an appropriate and socially

effective manner with coworkers and supervisors but not the general

public, and could adapt appropriately to a variety of work setting

situations and changes. AR at 196. 

Dr. Ed O’Malley, another psychiatrist, reviewed Dr. Hurwitz’s

assessment and affirmed his conclusions on March 22, 2004. AR at

212. 

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11 06cv0216-J (BLM)

C. Evaluation Submitted by Plaintiff’s Friend, James Nichols

On September 23, 2003, Plaintiff’s friend, James Nichols,

completed and signed a form issued by the Social Security

Administration entitled “Function Report Adult - Third Party.” AR

at 121-29. Therein he indicated that he had known Plaintiff for two

years and spent from six to eight hours per week with Plaintiff. AR

at 121. In section B, entitled “information about daily

activities,” Mr. Nichols provided information (in narrative and

checkbox format) about Plaintiff’s daily activities, meal habits,

house and yard work chores, ability to get around, management of

money, hobbies and interests, and social activities. AR at 121-26.

Section C of the Function Report, requesting “information about

abilities,” required Mr. Nichols to “[c]ircle any of the following

items the disabled person’s illness, injuries, or conditions

affect.” AR at 126. Mr. Nichols circled “completing tasks,”

“concentration,” “following instructions,” and “getting along with

others.” Id. As a follow up question, the Function Report asks

“[p]lease explain how his/her illness, injuries or conditions affect

each of the items you circled.” Id. In response, Mr. Nichols

wrote:

(1) Following instructions - takes them as a personal

threat - will do something different (2) Completing tasks

- become (sic) easily distracted & forgets about what he

was doing (3) Concentration - has a short attention span -

usually has his own ideas about things [4] Getting along

[] with others - is easily hurt by others - feels that

other people have wronged him - don’t care or have

deceived him - has trouble listening to other people’s

point of view - thinks everyone else is crazy but himself.

AR at 126, 128. To the question “[h]as he/she ever been fired or

laid off from a job because of problems getting along with other

people,” Mr. Nichols replied “yes” and wrote “[h]e told me about

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various jobs he had & it usually evolves (sic) around him telling

them how the job should be done.” AR at 127. In response to the

next question, “[h]ow well does the disabled person handle stress,”

Mr. Nichols wrote “[t]his is one of his biggest problems - if he

feels any type of pressure - he becomes fearful - disorientated

(sic) - trouble taking care of himself - unreasonable ideas &

demands on others - to the point of not making sense.” Id.

D. June 22, 2005 Hearing Testimony

At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff, Dr.

Bolter (the medical expert), and a VE. Plaintiff testified that he

had worked in a number of jobs, but was unable to sustain work -

frequently because he was fired after a short period of time. AR at

310-16. For instance, he last worked as an assistant warehouseman

in December of 2004 but was laid off after a month “due to lack of

work and due to political issues on the job.” AR at 310. When the

ALJ inquired as to why Plaintiff thought he was unable to sustain

work, Plaintiff repeatedly launched into extended explanations that

tended to veer off topic. AR at 313-16. In three instances, the

ALJ responded by interrupting Plaintiff and presenting him with a

new question. AR at 315-16. 

Plaintiff further testified that he was currently taking

Pexceva to help him “kind of settle down [his] reactions to things.”

AR at 316. While it helped him become cognizant of how angry and

frustrated he gets, he said his interpersonal relationships had not

really improving as a result of the medication. AR at 317. The ALJ

commented that this seemed in accord with Dr. Mill’s assessment that

Plaintiff’s interpersonal skills were impaired. AR at 317. When

the ALJ inquired as to whether Plaintiff’s PTSD disrupted his

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ability to function, Plaintiff responded “Yeah. I have what I call

episodes of the situations where I’ll kind of shut down, not know

where I am, just really close down.” AR at 318. Finally, Plaintiff

testified that he feels anxious, his mood changes frequently, he has

trouble concentrating after he has been interrupted, he thinks about

suicide regularly, and he is able to read people’s minds. AR at

321-23. 

The ALJ then elicited testimony from Dr. Bolter. Having

reviewed the medical records, Dr. Bolter concluded (referencing

diagnostic codes):

I would add it up to this. That he has a dystemia of

1204, other. He’s got a 1206 PTSD and he has a very

strong 1208, early, it’s 1208 which is a personality

disorder. I’d say it’s mixed with schizotype features ...

[a]nd borderline features.

AR at 327. Because of these disorders, Dr. Bolter opined that

Plaintiff could do complex tasks, but would have to be “in a very

restrictive environment” that was “docile” and non-public and in

which he had “minimal contact with peers and supervisors.” AR at

328-29. When the ALJ asked if Plaintiff would be able to sustain

work, Dr. Bolter responded, “I’m not really sure. I think it’s a

lot of – there would be difficulties if people ‘cross him’, but

again, if he’s in a proper environment that’s not going to happen

very often. It’s hard to compare with the jobs he’s had.” AR at

329. 

In reference to Dr. Mills’ assessment, Dr. Bolter commented

that while there were “no notes that you can read,” Dr. Mills’ notes

on April 21, 2005, and May 19, 2005, seem to indicate that Plaintiff

was “okay” and “[didn’t] have any particular problems there.” AR at

329-30. He disagreed with Dr. Mills that Plaintiff had a GAF score

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of 35, noting that while he did not examine Plaintiff, all of the

other assessments placed Plaintiff at least a 55. AR at 329-30. 

Finally, the ALJ called a VE to testify as to Plaintiff’s work

limitations. In his first three hypotheticals to the VE, the ALJ

adopted Dr. Hurwitz’s assessment (exhibit 5f in the record before

the ALJ), Dr. Hicks’ assessment (exhibit 4f), and Dr. Soliman’s

assessment (exhibit 2f), respectively. AR at 331. The VE testified

that, given each of those sets of limitations, Plaintiff could

perform his prior work as a warehouseman or custodian. AR at 332.

For the fourth hypothetical, the ALJ used Dr. Mills’ assessment

(exhibit 10f). AR at 332. Under those limitations, the VE

testified that Plaintiff would be unable to work. AR at 332. Next,

the ALJ said his fifth hypothetical matched the assessment of Dr.

Bolter, which he defined as “non-public, minimal contact with peers

and supervisors, no cognitive restrictions, can sustain work.” AR

at 332. The VE responded that under those limitations, the

custodial job would be appropriate, but not the warehouseman because

“the co-worker interaction could be problematic.” AR at 332-33.

Lastly, the VE concluded that Plaintiff could not work under

Plaintiff’s own professed limitations since he testified that he

could not sustain full-time work. AR at 333.

E. The ALJ’s Decision

On August 6, 2005, the ALJ issued a written decision in which

he determined that Plaintiff was not disabled because he could

perform his past relevant work as a custodian. AR at 18-19. The

ALJ summarized the various medical opinions submitted and then noted

that he had called upon a medical expert witness (Dr. Bolter) to

“resolve the discrepancies in the medical opinion.” AR at 16. He

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summarized Dr. Bolter’s conclusions as follows:

Dr. Bolter was of the opinion that diagnoses of post

traumatic stress disorder, dysthymia, adjustment disorder,

and mixed personality disorder were appropriate. He also

noted that the claimant had a history of alcohol addiction

disorder and borderline personality disorder, which were

no longer present. He stated that Dr. Mills’ reported

global assessment of functioning of 35 was simply

unsupported by ongoing progress records or other

examinations, noting that a patient with such impaired

functioning would be expected to be hospitalized. Based

on the clinical record, he estimated that a global

assessment of functioning of 55 or 60 would be a more

accurate reflection of the clinical findings in the

record. He stated that there was no evidence of cognitive

deficit. However, he stated that the claimant’s

psychiatric pathology had resulted in moderate restriction

of activities of daily living, and marked difficulties

maintaining social functioning. Dr. Bolter also stated

that one to two episodes of decompensation in a work-like

setting were documented. He was of the opinion that the

claimant remained able to maintain attention and

concentration for extended periods, but would be precluded

from jobs requiring public contact, or more than minimal

interaction with coworkers and supervisors. 

AR at 16. Based upon this assessment, which the ALJ found

persuasive, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained “the residual

functional capacity to perform simple or complex tasks in a nonpublic setting with minimal peer and supervisory contact.” AR at

17.

The ALJ then considered the VE’s testimony. He specifically

noted that:

Based upon a residual function capacity as described

above, the vocational expert stated that the claimant

would be unable to work as a warehouseman because of the

requirement of minimal peer interaction. However, he

would be able to perform duties required by his past work

as a custodian.

AR at 17. Because the ALJ found the VE’s testimony persuasive, he

adopted it and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because he

could return to his past relevant work as a custodian. Id.

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Lastly, the ALJ provided the following “clear and convincing

reasons” for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of

limitation:

First, the evidence fails to establish the presence of a

mental impairment which may result in limitation to a

degree which would preclude sustained, entry level work,

at any exertional level. While the claimant has

complained of nightmares, flashbacks, sadness, decreased

energy, and hypervigilence, repeated examinations have

revealed intermittent complaints, with reported relief

with medication. His primary problem has been difficulty

interacting with other people. There is no objective

evidence to establish that the claimant’s alleged

impairments would result in significant non-exertional

limitations that would preclude work with minimal interpersonal interaction. Second, the claimant’s allegations

of significant limitations are not borne out in the

evidence. The claimant is able to use public

transportation, attend daily NA/AA meetings, and has

passed tests of high intellect for MENSA. Third, the

claimant’s medications have not imposed disabling side

effects. Fourth, the claimant has complained of a “food

addiction.” However, he has not reported an eating

disorder to examining psychiatrists, and there is no

clinical evidence of any eating disorder or of significant

weight gain. In fact, one consulting psychiatrist has

described him as “reasonably well-built” and “in good

condition” (Exhibit 4F). Fifth, the claimant’s activities

of daily living, which include attending school, shopping,

and using public transportation, are inconsistent with the

presence of significant subjective limitations. The

claimant advised Dr. Solimon in March 2003, that he is

able to cook, shop, do cleaning, and do errands (Exhibit

2F). Sixth, there is no statement by a physician there is

no statement by a physician (sic) with respect to

significant subjective limitations. Consequently, the

claimant’s allegations of disabling subjective limitations

are not credible to the extent alleged. 

AR at 17-18. 

LEGAL STANDARD

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, an applicant must show that: (1) he suffers from a medically

determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death or

that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of twelve months or more; and (2) the impairment renders the

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applicant incapable of performing the work that he previously

performed or any other substantially gainful employment that exists

in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A). An

applicant must meet both requirements to be considered “disabled.”

Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920. Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in

“substantial gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are

denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the

decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the

claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of

impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c)), 416.920(c)).

Where the claimant does not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. Where

the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step,

which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a

number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If

the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the

claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment

is not one that is conclusively presumed to be disabling, the

evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the

impairment prevents the claimant from performing work he has

performed in the past. A claimant who is able to perform his

previous work is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),

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416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform his previous work, the

fifth and final step of the process determines whether he is able to

perform other work in the national economy in view of his age,

education, and work experience. The claimant is entitled to

disability benefits only if he is not able to perform other work.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).

Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to

seek judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s final

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review is

limited. The Commissioner’s denial of benefits will not be

disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence and contains no

legal error. Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193

(9th Cir. 2004).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but may

be less than a preponderance.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509

(9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). It is “relevant evidence that,

considering the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted); see also

Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir.

2003) (finding substantial evidence in the record despite ALJ’s

failure to discuss every piece of evidence). Where the evidence can

reasonably be construed to support more than one rational

interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Batson,

359 F.3d at 1193. This includes deferring to the ALJ’s credibility

determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis,

236 F.3d at 509.

Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the

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decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in

weighing the evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Batson,

359 F.3d at 1193. Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand

the matter to the Social Security Administration for further

proceedings. Id.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that he has been disabled from approximately

November 26, 2002 to the present and, as a result, is entitled to

receive disability benefits and supplemental social security income.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously denied his

claim for such benefits by failing to (1) rate the limitations on

Plaintiff’s mental function within each of the required four

categories, (2) specifically evaluate in his written decision the

credibility of a lay witness’s evaluation of Plaintiff, and (3)

provide clear and convincing or specific and legitimate reasons for

rejecting the assessment rendered by Plaintiff’s treating physician,

Dr. Mills. Pl.’s Mem. at 9-11, 14-20. Additionally, Plaintiff

contends that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s due process rights and

the Social Security Administration’s own regulations when ALJ

Carletti signed the decision “for” ALJ Steinman. Id. at 11-14.

For these reasons, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed legal

error and that his opinion was not supported by substantial

evidence. Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the ALJ’s decision

and immediately award Plaintiff disability benefits. Alternatively,

Plaintiff requests that the Court remand the case for a new hearing.

///

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Defendant counters that the ALJ’s decision was based upon

substantial evidence and free from error. First, Defendant asserts

that the ALJ did properly rate the degree of Plaintiff’s mental

functional limitations by virtue of having incorporated the medical

expert’s assessment into his decision (the medical expert’s

assessment having been based, in part, upon his review of the entire

record, which included the Psychiatric Review Technique Form

completed by Dr. Hurwitz). Def.’s Opp’n at 5-6. Second, Defendant

argues that the ALJ was not required to discuss the credibility of

the lay witness’s testimony because it was not “significant

probative evidence” and, regardless, it fundamentally duplicated

Plaintiff’s testimony, which the ALJ properly discredited. Id. at

6-7. Third, because the ALJ adopted Dr. Bolter’s opinion, which

contradicted Dr. Mills’ assessment on several points, Defendant

contends that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Mills’ medical opinion.

Id. at 7-8. Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was not

denied due process when ALJ Carletti signed the decision “for” ALJ

Steinman. Id. at 6. In conclusion, Defendant maintains that the

ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence and testimony presented

and issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability

benefits that was supported by substantial evidence and free from

reversible legal error.

In his opposition to Defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s contention that the ALJ

complied with the regulations by incorporating Dr. Bolter’s findings

and the psychiatric review form completed by Dr. Hurwitz into his

decision. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-3. Likewise, Plaintiff argues that Mr.

Nichols’ (lay witness) testimony was “significant probative

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evidence” because it corroborated and substantiated Plaintiff’s

testimony and was consistent with Dr. Mills’ assessment of

Plaintiff’s inability to work. Id. at 4. As to Dr. Mills’ opinion,

the degree of reasoning necessary to reject a treating physician’s

opinion depends upon whether or not the opinion was contradicted by

other medical evidence in the record. See id. at 6. Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for

rejecting Dr. Mills’ assessment under either possible standard. Id.

Plaintiff then reiterates his argument that his due process rights

were violated. Id. at 5-6. Finally, to the extent Defendant

asserts that the ALJ properly relied on Dr. Bolter’s testimony,

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record in order

to clarify some ambiguity in Dr. Bolter’s testimony. Id. at 9-10.

A. The ALJ Failed to Provide Clear and Convincing or Specific

and Legitimate Reasons for Rejecting the Treating

Physician’s Opinion and Erred in Relying Solely on the

Medical Expert’s Testimony

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly rejected Plaintiff’s

treating physician’s opinion. Pl.’s Mem. at 4. The rationale for

affording greater weight to treating physicians is set forth in

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996):

Because treating physicians are employed to cure and thus

have a great opportunity to know and observe the patient

as an individual, their opinions are given greater weight

than the opinions of other physicians. Therefore, an ALJ

may not reject treating physicians’ opinions unless he

“makes findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons

for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the

record.” In addition, if the treating physicians’

opinions are uncontroverted, those reasons must be clear

and convincing. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285 (internal citations omitted). Where a

conflict in medical opinions exists, the contrary opinion of another

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22 06cv0216-J (BLM)

medical expert (even a non-examining one) may constitute substantial

evidence if it is consistent with other independent record evidence.

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Further,

a treating physician’s conclusory or unsupported medical findings

need not be automatically accepted as true in the face of

contradictory clinical opinions. Id.

In this case, the ALJ not only failed to provide reasons for

rejecting Dr. Mills’ assessment, he did not directly respond to Dr.

Mills’ assessment at all. Instead, he almost entirely subrogated

his role in evaluating the credibility of the medical testimony to

the medical expert. In his report, the ALJ summarized the medical

evidence and Dr. Bolter’s testimony6 and then laid out the entirety

of his findings on the medical evidence:

The undersigned is persuaded by the testimony of the

medical expert witness. Considering the degree of

limitation of mental function as stated by Dr. Bolter, the

undersigned finds that the claimant’s psychiatric

pathology has resulted in mild to moderate limitations of

work-related mental functioning, which restrict him to

non-public work activity, with minimal peer and

supervisory interaction. Frequent oral communication is

precluded. There are no exertional limitations.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds the claimant retains

the residual functional capacity to perform simple or

complex tasks in a non-public setting with minimal peer

and supervisory contact.

AR at 17. Nowhere in this brief analysis does it explain his

reasons for crediting or discrediting the testimony of any of the

other physicians whose reports were included in the record. Most

notably absent is any direct consideration of the evaluation

provided by Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Mills, in which she

offered her opinions that Plaintiff’s symptoms “restrict [his]

ability to perform, obtain, and maintain employment” and that

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Plaintiff would “have difficulty working at a regular job on a

sustained basis.” AR at 296. 

In rejecting a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ must first

explain whether the opinion is controverted. This determines which

standard (“clear and convincing” or “specific and legitimate”) the

ALJ must meet in explaining his reasons for rejecting the treating

physician’s opinion. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285. Here, the ALJ

did not expressly state in his decision whether or not Dr. Mills’

opinion was controverted by other substantial evidence in the

record. 

Whether or not Dr. Mills’ opinion was, in fact, controverted,

the ALJ did not provide any reasons for discrediting it. As

previously stated, an ALJ must provide specific and legitimate

reasons, based on substantial evidence in the record, for

discrediting a treating physician’s opinion where that opinion

contradicts other record evidence. Id. Where the opinion is

uncontradicted, the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons

for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. Id. Even if the

treating physician’s opinion is “conclusory and brief and

unsupported by clinical findings,” the ALJ must provide sufficient

reasons for rejecting the opinion. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1149. Here, the ALJ did not provide any reasons for rejecting Dr.

Mills’ extensive opinion, which was supported by her notes in the

medical records and buttressed by other evidence. 

To the extent Defendant argues that the ALJ implicitly rejected

Dr. Mills’ assessment by virtue of his reliance on Dr. Bolter’s

opinion, this argument lacks merit. Dr. Bolter never listed the

grounds on which his opinion contradicted Dr. Mills’ or the reasons

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7 The only reference to Dr. Mills in the ALJ’s recitation of Dr.

Bolter’s testimony is the portion of the decision that reads “[h]e [Dr. Bolter]

stated that Dr. Mills’ reported global assessment of functioning of 35 was simply

unsupported by ongoing progress records or other examinations, noting that a

patient with such impaired functioning would be expected to be hospitalized.” AR

at 16. Even then, while Dr. Bolter did disagree with the GAF score assessed by

Dr. Mills (AR at 330), it was the ALJ, not Dr. Bolter, who opined that an

individual with a GAF of 35 would need to be hospitalized. See AR at 330. The

ALJ also did not reference Dr. Bolter’s next statement on the record, which was

that he could not really read Dr. Mills’ notes. See AR at 330. 

24 06cv0216-J (BLM)

he felt that Dr. Mills’ testimony lacked credibility.7 Because these

are the types of findings the ALJ is required to make in rejecting

a treating physician’s opinion (see Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285), Dr.

Bolter’s opinion does not adequately stand in the place of the ALJ’s

required findings. Moreover, fundamental to Defendant’s argument

that the ALJ properly relied upon the opinion of Dr. Bolter over

that of Plaintiff’s treating physician (Def.’s Opp’n at 7-8) is the

assumption that the ALJ may call upon a medical advisor to stand in

the ALJ’s shoes - i.e. evaluate the medical evidence and credit or

discredit certain physicians. This is not the case. Evaluating the

medical evidence and making a decision as to the credibility of the

examining and non-examining physicians is not the medical expert’s

proper role. “Medical advisors are, by definition, non-examining

physicians. Their function is ‘to explain complex medical problems

in terms understandable to lay examiners.’ Their function is not to

offer opinions as to whether claimants, whom the medical advisors

have never examined, are capable of working.” Kubitschek, Carolyn.

Social Security Disability Law and Procedure in Federal Court, §§

2:25-2:26 (Thompson/West 2006). In discussing the appropriateness

of using medical advisors during disability claim hearings, the

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Supreme Court has explained that:

The trial examiner is a layman; the medical adviser is a

board-certified specialist. He is used primarily in

complex cases for explanation of medical problems in terms

understandable to the layman-examiner. He is a neutral

adviser. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408 (1971). While a nontreating medical advisor’s opinion may serve as substantial evidence

if it is supported by other evidence in the record, “[w]hen a

nontreating physician’s opinion contradicts that of the treating

physician-but is not based on independent clinical findings, or

rests on clinical findings also considered by the treating

physician-the opinion of the treating physician may be rejected only

if the ALJ gives ‘specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are

based on substantial evidence in the record.’” Morgan v. Comm’r

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Andrews

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) and Magallanes v.

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1989)). Thus, Dr. Bolter’s

opinion should have been accorded no more weight that those of other

non-examining, consultative physicians and Dr. Bolter’s review of

the medical evidence did not excuse the ALJ from his duty to set

forth reasons for rejecting Dr. Mills’ opinion. See Lester v.

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a

“nonexamining medical advisor’s testimony does not by itself

constitute substantial evidence that warrants a rejection of either

the treating doctor’s or the examining psychologist’s opinion”).

Dr. Bolter’s testimony also did not contradict Dr. Mills’

assessment that Plaintiff would have difficulty “sustaining”

employment. See Pl.’s Mem. at 17. When the ALJ asked Dr. Bolter

whether Plaintiff would be able to sustain work, Dr. Bolter

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8 Additionally, given both Dr. Mills and Dr. Bolter’s statements about

Plaintiff’s ability to sustain employment, the ALJ should have analyzed whether

Plaintiff would be able to sustain work long enough for it to constitute

“substantial gainful employment” under the regulations. In reviewing this issue

in a case involving very similar facts, the Ninth Circuit held:

We are persuaded by the reasoning of our sister circuits that

substantial gainful activity means more than merely the ability to

find a job and physically perform it; it also requires the ability to

hold the job for a significant period of time. It requires no leap to

conclude that two months is not a significant period. Indeed, the SSA

considers jobs that end within three months because of the claimant's

impairments to be "unsuccessful work attempts," and does not consider

such short-term jobs as evidence of an ability to engage in

substantial gainful activity. SSR 84-25; see also Andler v. Chater,

100 F.3d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The 'unsuccessful work attempt'

concept was designed as an equitable means of disregarding relatively

brief work attempts that do not demonstrate sustained substantial

gainful employment."). If a job of less than three months does not

constitute substantial gainful activity when considering the

claimant's past work history, the same holds true with regard to

prospective employment.

Gatliff v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 172 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir. 1999). While

neither party specifically addressed this issue, the record in this case reflects

that Plaintiff has held at least thirteen jobs over the last ten years. AR at 95,

111, 143. Plaintiff reports having been fired from many of them. Because the

ALJ, Dr. Mills, Dr. Hicks, and Dr. Bolter generally acknowledge that Plaintiff’s

mental illness manifests in Plaintiff being unable to interact well with

supervisors (AR at 17, 192, 296-97, 328-29), it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s

mental limitations interfere with his work. On remand, should the ALJ determine

at step four or five of the social security administration’s sequential analysis

(after having properly considered the treating physician’s and lay witness’s

opinions) that Plaintiff is able to work, the ALJ also must consider whether

Plaintiff can sustain “substantial gainful employment.” See Gatliff, 172 F.3d at

694.

26 06cv0216-J (BLM)

responded “I’m not really sure. I think it’s a lot of - - there

would be difficulties if people ‘cross him’, but again, if he’s in

the proper environment that’s not going to happen very often. It’s

hard to compare with the jobs he’s had.” (emphasis added) AR at

329. This equivocal response hardly stands out as a stark

contradiction to Dr. Mills’ opinion and it does not provide a clear

and convincing reason for rejecting it.8 

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9 Plaintiff lodged the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Stout v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) with this Court after the

parties had already completed briefing on their cross-motions for summary

judgment. While the Stout case was decided after the Social Security

Administration and ALJ’s decisions in this case, it does not establish new law on

27 06cv0216-J (BLM)

In sum, the ALJ erred by relying solely on the medical expert’s

opinion, by not specifically addressing the treating physician’s

opinions, by not giving the treating physician’s opinions the

deferential weight to which they are entitled, and by not providing

sufficient reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinions.

See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285. Absent a showing that these failures

constituted harmless error, the Court must remand for further review

or an award of benefits. Here, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s

disability claim so this Court finds that the error was not

harmless. See Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.4 (9th

Cir. 2006) (ALJ’s improper rejection of treating physician’s opinion

not harmless error where error led to an adverse disability

finding). Moreover, because the ALJ failed to provide reasons for

discrediting Dr. Mills’ opinions, this Court has no basis to

evaluate his reasoning. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the

case be remanded. 

B. The ALJ Failed to Discuss Competent Lay Witness Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also erred by not considering the

testimony of Plaintiff’s friend, James Nichols, in his decision.

Pl’s Mem. at 14-5. Defendant disagrees.

“In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must

consider lay witness testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to

work.” Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th

Cir. 2006)9 (citing Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.

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the issue of an ALJ’s duty to consider competent lay witness testimony. To the

contrary, Stout confirms case law in effect well before Plaintiff sought

disability benefits. Accordingly, this Court cites to the Stout case as a wellreasoned opinion that compiles applicable governing law on this issue.

10 As with the Stout case discussed at footnote 10, Robbins v. Social

Security Administration was decided after Plaintiff initiated this action, but

confirms precedent regarding the ALJ’s duty to consider lay witness testimony. 

28 06cv0216-J (BLM)

1993); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(4) & (e), 416.913(d)(4) & (e)). The

rationale for this is that “lay testimony as to a claimant’s

symptoms or how an impairment affects ability to work is competent

evidence ... and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.”

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations

omitted). Consequently, “[i]f the ALJ wishes to discount the

testimony of lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to

each witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; see also Robbins v. Soc.

Sec. Admin., __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 3041106 at *4 (9th Cir. 2006) (“the

ALJ is required to account for all lay witness testimony in the

discussion of his or her findings”)10. 

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) appears to encourage

lay testimony because it publishes an extensive questionnaire

entitled “Function Report Adult - Third Party” (form SSA-2280-BK).

In this case, Mr. Nichols filled out this exact form and in the

form, which was included in the record before the ALJ, Mr. Nichols

provided numerous narrative answers, described his personal

observations about Plaintiff’s symptoms, and stated how he believed

Plaintiff’s impairments impact his ability to work. AR at 121-29.

As Plaintiff points out, Mr. Nichols’ statements specifically

address one of the primary limitations at issue in assessing

Plaintiff’s ability to sustain employment - Plaintiff’s ability to

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work with other people. See Pl.’s Mem. at 14. Section C of the

Function Report asks the third-party to “[c]ircle any of the

following items the disabled person’s illness, injuries, or

conditions affect.” AR at 126. Mr. Nichols circled “completing

tasks,” “concentration,” “following instructions,” and “getting

along with others.” Id. As a follow up question, the Function

Report asks “[p]lease explain how his/her illness, injuries or

conditions affect each of the items you circled.” Id. In response,

Mr. Nichols wrote:

(1) Following instructions - takes them as a personal

threat - will do something different (2) Completing tasks

- become (sic) easily distracted & forgets about what he

was doing (3) Concentration - has a short attention span -

usually has his own ideas about things [4] Getting along

[] with others - is easily hurt by others - feels that

other people have wronged him - don’t care or have

deceived him - has trouble listening to other people’s

point of view - thinks everyone else is crazy but himself.

Id. at 126, 128. To the question “[h]as he/she ever been fired or

laid off from a job because of problems getting along with other

people,” Mr. Nichols replied “yes” and wrote “[h]e told me about

various jobs he had & it usually evolves (sic) around him telling

them how the job should be done.” AR at 127. In response to the

next question, “[h]ow well does the disabled person handle stress,”

Mr. Nichols wrote “[t]his is one of his biggest problems - if he

feels any type of pressure - he becomes fearful - disorientated

(sic) - trouble taking care of himself - unreasonable ideas &

demands on others - to the point of not making sense.” AR at 127.

These statements are highly relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to work

with others within the confines of a work environment. Regardless

of whether he decided to credit or discredit Mr. Nichols’, the ALJ

///

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11 To the extent that Defendant contends that Vincent v. Heckler, 739

F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) eliminates the need to consider lay testimony, she

is mistaken. Defendant cites to Vincent for the proposition that an ALJ does not

err by discounting “lay witness testimony that conflicted with the available

medical evidence.” Def.’s Opp’n at 6. However, as explained in Nguyen, the lay

witnesses in Vincent were making medical diagnoses, which “are beyond the

competence of lay witnesses and therefore do not constitute competent evidence.”

Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1467 (citing 20 CFR § 404.1513(a)). On the other hand, lay

witnesses can testify about their observations and knowledge of a claimant’s

symptoms and how the claimant’s impairments affect his or her ability to work.

Id. This latter information is just the type of assessment Mr. Nichols provided.

30 06cv0216-J (BLM)

was required to address Mr. Nichols’ opinions.11 See Lewis, 236 F.3d

at 511 (“Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent

evidence that an ALJ must take into account, unless he or she

expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons

germane to each witness for doing so”). The ALJ erred by failing to

do so. See Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1467. 

Defendant’s assertion that it was unnecessary to address Mr.

Nichols’ statements because they were duplicative of Plaintiff’s

testimony is incorrect. The fact that Mr. Nichols’ statements are

consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony serves only to further

corroborate Plaintiff’s disability claims. See Robbins, __ F.3d __,

2006 WL 3041106 at *4 (holding that ALJ erred by not considering

testimony of claimant’s son, which, if credited, added “substantial

weight” to testimony of claimant, his wife, and his daughter). In

fact, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p specifically acknowledges

that “[o]ne strong indication of the credibility of an individual’s

statements is their consistency, both internally and with other

information in the case record.” SSR 96-7p (July 7, 1996). “The

adjudicator must consider such factors as ... reports and

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12 Though Defendant did not expressly argue that the ALJ’s failure to

even discuss Mr. Nichols’ opinion was harmless error, the Court notes that

application of this standard would not alter this Court’s recommendation. As

noted in Stout and reconfirmed in Robbins, the Ninth Circuit “ha[s] never found

harmless an ‘ALJ’s silent disregard of lay testimony about how an impairment

31 06cv0216-J (BLM)

observations by other persons concerning the individual’s daily

activities, behavior, and efforts to work.” (emphasis added) SSR

96-7p (July 7, 1996). As such, the overlap between Mr. Nichols’

statements and Plaintiff’s testimony provided more, not less, of a

need for the ALJ to expressly explain his basis for apparently

discrediting Mr. Nichols.

Furthermore, while Defendant sets forth several reasons why the

ALJ could have discredited Mr. Nichols’ opinions, none of these

reasons were set forth in the ALJ’s decision. To the contrary, the

ALJ’s decision failed to even mention Mr. Nichols. This Court

“cannot affirm the decision of an agency on a ground that the agency

did not invoke in making its decision.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249

F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.

194, 196 (1947)). Defendant argues that Mr. Nichols’ opinion is not

particularly valuable, since Mr. Nichols only sees Plaintiff six to

eight hours per week, not on a daily basis. Def.’s Opp’n at 6.

Further, Defendant suggests that, because Mr. Nichols’ statements

were essentially cumulative of Plaintiff’s testimony, which the ALJ

considered, the ALJ need not have separately considered Mr. Nichols’

opinion. Def.’s Opp’n at 7. However, if Defendant asks this Court

to discredit Mr. Nichols’ by proxy, and “invites this Court to

affirm the denial of benefits on a ground not invoked by the

Commissioner in denying the benefits originally, then we must

decline.”12 See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Pinto, 249 F.3d at

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limits a claimant’s ability to work.’” Robbins, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 3041106 at

*4 (quoting Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055-56). “[W]here the ALJ’s error lies in a

failure to properly discuss competent lay testimony favorable to the claimant, a

reviewing court cannot consider the error harmless unless it can confidently

conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have

reached a different disability determination.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056. That is

not the case here where, if fully credited, Mr. Nichols’ statements support Dr.

Mills’ assessment and other evidence in the record showing that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments result in an inability to work with other people and to sustain

employment. A reasonable ALJ could find that this precludes Plaintiff from

working, particularly if the ALJ considered that the regulations require the

ability to sustain employment.

32 06cv0216-J (BLM)

847-48).

In sum, this Court finds that the ALJ’s silent disregard for

Mr. Nichols’ statements constituted legal error. See Stout, 454

F.3d at 1056 (concluding that ALJ’s silent disregard for lay

testimony was legal error because it left appellate court “with

nothing to review to determine whether the error materially impacted

the ALJ’s ultimate decision”). 

C. The ALJ Did Not Properly Rate the Degree of Plaintiff’s

Mental Function Limitations

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to make specific findings

as to his degree of functional limitations, as required by Social

Security regulations. Pl.’s Mem. at 9-11. Specifically, the ALJ

must rate the degree of functional limitation in the areas of

(a)daily activities, (b) social functioning, and (c) concentration,

persistence or pace as being either none, mild, moderate, marked, or

extreme, as well as report the number of episodes of decompensation

(choosing one of the following options: one, one or two, three, or

four or more). Pl.’s Mem. at 10; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. While the

regulations originally required the ALJ to provide these ratings on

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a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”) and append the form to

his or her decision (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a (2000)), the ALJ may now

incorporate the ratings into the text of the decision (20 C.F.R. §

404.1520a (2006)). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s failure to

rate his functional limitations is reversible error under Gutierrez

v. Apfel, 199 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000). Pl.’s Mem. at 10-11.

Defendant counters that a PRTF was completed and that the

medical expert, whose assessment the ALJ incorporated into his

decision, reviewed this form. Def.’s Opp’n at 5-6. This position

is problematic for two reasons. First, the PRTF to which Defendant

refers was completed by Dr. Hurwitz on November 17, 2003 - nearly

two years prior to the hearing before the ALJ. AR at 198-211. In

Gutierrez, the court specifically found that PRTFs completed by

someone other than the ALJ more than one year before the hearing did

not cure the ALJ’s violation. Gutierrez, 199 F.3d at 1051. Second,

while the ALJ does attribute ratings pertaining to these four

criteria to Dr. Bolter, not all of these statements or ratings are

actually present in Dr. Bolter’s testimony. As such, the ALJ’s

findings do not include the required “significant history, including

examination and laboratory findings, and the functional limitations

that were considered in reaching a conclusion about the severity of

the mental impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)(2).

Accordingly, this Court agrees with Plaintiff that Gutierrez

requires that the case be remanded. Gutierrez, 199 F.3d at 1051. 

D. Proceedings on Remand

In light of this Court’s recommendation that this case be

remanded, the Court must consider whether an immediate award of

benefits is appropriate or whether outstanding issues remain that

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34 06cv0216-J (BLM)

must be resolved on remand. Generally when a court reverses an

administrative determination, it should be remanded to the agency

for additional investigation or explanation. Benecke v. Barnhart,

379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S.

12, 16 (2002)); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 U.S. 871, 876 (9th Cir.

2003). However, before making this determination, the court should

consider the totality of the record:

Remand for further administrative proceedings is

appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful.

Conversely, where the record has been developed fully and

further administrative proceedings would serve no purpose,

the district court should remand for an immediate award of

benefits. More specifically, the district court should

credit evidence that was rejected during the

administrative process and remand for an immediate award

of benefits if (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally

sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there

are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to

find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.

Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593 (citations omitted). However, even where

the “crediting as true” doctrine is satisfied, the court retains

some flexibility in applying it. Connett, 340 F.3d at 876.

Here, the Court finds that it is appropriate to remand the case

for further administrative proceedings because the record is not

fully developed and there are outstanding credibility determinations

that need to be made by the ALJ. For example, as discussed above,

the ALJ failed to address and credit or discredit the opinions of

the treating physician and a relevant lay witness. Both of these

individuals were percipient witnesses who provided relevant

information relating to the Plaintiff’s disability claim. This

Court cannot properly review the denial without the ALJ’s statement

that those opinions were discredited and the reasons therefore.

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13 In regard to Plaintiff’s due process argument, because Plaintiff

presents no evidence that ALJ Steinman did not draft the decision signed “for” him

by ALJ Carletti, this Court finds insufficient basis for concluding that, by

having another ALJ sign “for” him instead of rubber-stamping his name, ALJ

Steinman’s actions rose to the level of a due process violation. Furthermore,

because this Court recommends that the case be remanded, the issue of who, in

fact, drafted the original decision becomes moot.

35 06cv0216-J (BLM)

Moreover, it is not clear from the existing record that even if both

opinions were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find

Plaintiff disabled. Therefore, this Court recommends that the case

be remanded for further review.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In light of the foregoing, this Court finds that the ALJ

committed legal error.13 See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193 (holding that

the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the

proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or

her decision).

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 14] be DENIED, Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 11] be GRANTED, and that the

case be REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

December 15, 2006. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

///

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than January

12, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: November 17, 2006

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

 COPY TO: 

HONORABLE NAPOLEON A. JONES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

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