Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07226/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07226-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 1997 Decided September 1, 1998

No. 96-7225

United States of America, ex rel. Daniel Yesudian,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee

v.

Howard University, et al.,

Appellees/CrossAppellants

Consolidated with

No. 96-7226

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv01791)

James L. Kestell argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant/cross-appellee.

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Timothy F. McCormack argued the cause and filed the

briefs for appellees/cross-appellants. Charles S. Fax entered

an appearance.

Before: Wald, Henderson and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Howard University terminated

Dr. Daniel Yesudian from his job in the University's Purchasing Department on May 1, 1992. The University said he was

terminated for insubordination; Yesudian claimed he was

discharged in retaliation for whistleblowing activities protected by the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. ss 3729-3733. Yesudian sued the University and three of his supervisors, alleging

submission of false claims in violation of the False Claims Act,

retaliation for reporting the alleged false claims, and breach

of contract. The jury returned verdicts for Yesudian on his

retaliation claim against one of his supervisors, Joseph Parker, and on his breach of contract claim against the University, and awarded $180,000 in back pay. It found against

Yesudian on his allegation that false claims were submitted in

violation of the Act, and on his allegations that the University

and the supervisors other than Parker had retaliated against

him.

After the verdicts, the district court granted Parker's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 for judgment as a matter of law

against Yesudian on the retaliation claim, but denied the

University's Rule 50 motion on the breach of contract claim.

See United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 946

F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1996). Both Yesudian and the defendants appealed. We conclude there was sufficient evidence to

support the jury's verdict on both claims. We therefore

reverse the grant of judgment as a matter of law on the

retaliation claim and affirm the denial of judgment as a

matter of law on the contract claim.

I

Yesudian began working at Howard in 1971. After several

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ment in 1983. From 1984 to 1992, Yesudian discovered and

repeatedly complained to upper-level University officials

about financial improprieties allegedly committed by the

Purchasing Department and its director, Joseph Parker.1

Specifically, Yesudian charged that Parker falsified time and

attendance records for his administrative assistant, provided

inside information to favored vendors to aid them in the

bidding process, accepted bribes from vendors, permitted

payments to vendors who did not provide services to the

University, and took University property home.

Yesudian brought these problems to the attention of the

University's Director of Accounting in 1984 and to the Executive Assistant to the Vice President for Business and Fiscal

Affairs in 1986. The latter told him: "You know, Dan, you

don't want to be the whistle-blower." App. 57. Beginning in

1987, Yesudian attempted to bring his complaints to Melvin

W. Jones, the University's Vice President for Business and

Fiscal Affairs. Yesudian finally met with Jones in the summer of 1989 to discuss his complaints. See Def.'s Ex. 44. On

May 11, 1990, Yesudian sent Jones a memorandum detailing

his charges, see id., and on May 16, Jones wrote back, noting

that Yesudian had "made a number of charges against the

Purchasing Department which are of serious concern to me."

Def.'s Ex. 43. Jones specifically listed Yesudian's allegations

of "cooperating in the cheating of the University with the

Time and Attendance Records," "[p]roviding 'Inside Information' to selected vendors," "[a]ccepting bribes from vendors,"

and "[t]aking University property home." Id.; see Trial Tr.

234-35. Meanwhile, on several occasions from 1987 through

1990, Parker and his deputy, George Varghese, took disciplinary action against Yesudian assertedly for misconduct and

various forms of insubordination.

In 1991, Yesudian sent a letter detailing his concerns to the

President of the University, whose executive assistant re-

__________

1 In reviewing a district court's decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party--here, Yesudian. See Smith v.

Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

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ferred him to the new Vice President for Business and Fiscal

Affairs, James Fletcher II. In March 1992, Fletcher met

with Yesudian. Yesudian told him of his findings, including

false entries on the attendance records of Parker's assistant

and payments to vendors who did not provide services to the

University. Yesudian also gave Fletcher a packet of documents he said supported the claims. See App. 74-75.

Fletcher told Yesudian he was interested in the allegations

and would investigate. On April 16, 1992, Parker called

Yesudian into his office and, with Varghese present, read him

verbatim the allegations Yesudian had made against Parker

in the documents Yesudian had given Fletcher. Parker

asked if Yesudian had made the allegations to Fletcher and,

when Yesudian admitted that he had, Parker became visibly

upset. Varghese then warned Yesudian, "[I]f you do this

kind of stuff, you're not going to be in this department."

App. 80. After the meeting, Yesudian sent Fletcher a letter

reporting that Parker and Varghese had "threatened [him]

with severe actions for inaccurately representing the efficient

operation of the department to [Fletcher]," App. 82-83, and

that he had "been told that somehow [he] would be 'gotten rid

of' because [he] brought to [Fletcher's] attention some of the

corrupt practices ... extant in the department." App. 220.

The day after the confrontation between Parker, Varghese,

and Yesudian, Parker told Yesudian to obtain from the General Services Administration (GSA) a copy of a contract

between the University and a fuel vendor. On the next

business day, Yesudian spoke with his contact at GSA, who

said she would send the contract over with two other Howard

employees who were scheduled to attend a fuel users' meeting at GSA the next morning, April 21. When Yesudian told

Varghese of these arrangements, Varghese insisted that Yesudian personally go that day to pick up the contract. Yesudian explained that he was without a car and had no way to

get to GSA. On the morning of April 21, Varghese gave

Yesudian a letter directing him to attend the fuel users'

meeting that day. Yesudian refused to open the letter and

told Varghese he felt sick. Yesudian requested permission to

go to the employee health clinic, which Varghese refused.

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Parker, however, authorized Yesudian to go to the clinic on

the understanding that Yesudian would attend the GSA meeting if cleared to return to work. The clinic found that

Yesudian had high blood pressure and advised him to go

home. Although Parker approved Yesudian's leaving for the

rest of the day, Yesudian remained at work.

On April 23, 1992, Varghese accused Yesudian of insubordination for not attending the fuel users' meeting and for

refusing to open the letter. Varghese recommended three

months' probation and threatened termination for future infractions. Parker, however, recommended that Yesudian be

fired, and Vice President Fletcher approved Yesudian's termination effective May 1. Yesudian appealed through the University's grievance procedure. Although the hearing officer

found Yesudian had failed to meet his burden of showing he

was terminated in retaliation for his complaints, she found the

charges of insubordination unsupported and Yesudian's termination "unfair." App. 217. She did not, however, recommend

reinstatement because of Yesudian's "lack of respect for the

abilities and commitment of [his superiors]." App. 218. Instead, she recommended that Howard remove the termination

from Yesudian's record if he agreed to accept an "early out"

or retirement. Yesudian refused the offer.

II

We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion for

judgment as a matter of law. See Smith v. Washington

Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Entry of such a

judgment is warranted only if "no reasonable juror could

reach the verdict rendered in th[e] case." Anderson v. Group

Hospitalization, Inc., 820 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "In

making that determination, a court may not assess the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence." Hayman v.

National Academy of Sciences, 23 F.3d 535, 537 (D.C. Cir.

1994). Moreover, "[b]ecause a judgment as a matter of law

intrudes upon the rightful province of the jury, it is highly

disfavored." Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d 1157, 1161 (D.C. Cir.

1994).

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III

The district court granted Parker judgment as a matter of

law on Yesudian's claim of retaliatory discharge under the

False Claims Act.2 The Act imposes a civil penalty and

treble damages upon any person who, among other things,

"knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer

or employee of the United States Government ... a false or

fraudulent claim for payment or approval." 31 U.S.C.

s 3729(a). Section 3730(b) provides that "private persons,"

commonly known as "relators," may bring a civil action for a

violation of s 3729 "in the name of the Government." 31

U.S.C. s 3730(b). The statute permits the government to

take over the action and conduct it itself, or to decline to take

over the action, in which case the relator has the right to

conduct it. See id. The relator is entitled to different

percentages of any recovery from a successful False Claims

Act suit, depending upon whether the relator or the government conducts the action. See 31 U.S.C. s 3730(d)(1)-(2).

Congress passed the precursor of the present statute, also

referred to as the "Lincoln Law," to combat widespread fraud

in defense contracts during the Civil War. See S. Rep. No.

99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,

5273; Anna M.W. Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for

Uncle Sam, 21 Nova L. Rev. 869, 872 (1997). The provision

for private actions, commonly known as qui tam suits,3 was

included to augment the government's own limited enforce-

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2 We note that the parties' fierce contest over this claim may be

much ado about nothing. The court below entered judgment for

Yesudian in the amount of $180,000 on his contract claim, which we

uphold infra. In the course of granting judgment against Yesudian

on the retaliation claim, the court suggested that Yesudian would

not have been entitled to an additional recovery on that claim in any

event. See Yesudian, 946 F. Supp. at 36 n.8.

3 "Qui tam" is an abbreviation of the phrase "qui tam pro

domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means

"[w]ho sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself." Black's

Law Dictionary 1251 (6th ed. 1990).

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ment resources. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 7, 23, 26, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272, 5288, 5291.

In 1986, in response to concern that employees who exposed false claims were being punished by their companies,

Congress amended the False Claims Act "to provide for

'whistleblower' protection." Id. at 34, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5299. The new subsection, s 3730(h), states:

Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended,

threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment

by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the

employee ... in furtherance of an action under this

section, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under

this section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to

make the employee whole....

31 U.S.C. s 3730(h). The purpose of the provision, the

Senate Judiciary Committee said, was to "assure those who

may be considering exposing fraud that they are legally

protected from retaliatory acts." S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 34,

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5299.

As s 3730(h) suggests, to make out a claim of retaliation,

an employee must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in

protected activity, that is, "acts done ... in furtherance of an

action under this section"; and (2) he was discriminated

against "because of" that activity. To establish the second

element, the employee must in turn make two further showings. The employee must show that: (a) "the employer had

knowledge the employee was engaged in protected activity";

and (b) "the retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the

employee's engaging in [that] protected activity." S. Rep. No.

99-345, at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5300. See

generally United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1997);

United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1269

(9th Cir. 1996).4

__________

4 According to the Senate Report, "[o]nce these elements have

been satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove

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The district court concluded there was no evidence from

which the jury could reasonably have found the first element

of a retaliation claim--that Yesudian had engaged in protected conduct--because "he never initiated a government investigation or a private qui tam suit" during the time he was

making his complaints. Yesudian, 946 F. Supp. at 33. The

court also concluded there was no evidence to support the

first part of the second element--that the defendant knew

Yesudian was engaged in protected activity--because Yesudian "never suggested to defendant that he intended to utilize

his allegations in furtherance of a False Claims Act action"

and "gave no suggestion that he was going to report the

alleged improprieties to government officials." Id. Defendant Parker asserts an additional reason in support of the

court's conclusion on the first element: because there was no

evidence that a false claim ever was presented to the U.S.

Government, Parker contends, Yesudian cannot establish that

he was engaged in protected conduct.

We consider each of these arguments below, beginning with

Parker's additional argument, which he raised in the district

court but upon which the court did not rely. See Dimond v.

District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("An

appellate court ... can consider any argument made on

appeal that supports the judgment of the District Court.").

We conclude that all of these arguments misapprehend the

requirements of a retaliation claim, and further conclude that

there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have

found those elements satisfied in this case.

A

Parker contends that Yesudian cannot establish he was

engaged in protected conduct because a viable qui tam action

requires that the alleged false claims be presented to the U.S.

Government, and not just to a grantee of federal funds like

Howard University. As there was no evidence that any false

__________

affirmatively that the same decision would have been made even if

the employee had not engaged in protected activity." Id.; see also

Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

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claim was transmitted by Howard to the United States,

Parker contends there was no viable False Claims Act case

here. Yesudian, on the other hand, argues that a False

Claims case can be made out by proof of the submission of

false claims to a grantee alone. Although we consider this

dispute about the requirements of a successful qui tam action

below, we conclude that we need not ultimately resolve it in

order to decide the retaliation case before us.

As Parker points out, s 3729(a)(1) requires that the alleged

false claim be "present[ed] or cause[d] to be presented, to an

officer or employee of the United States Government." Prior

to 1986, some courts did read this to exclude claims presented

only to grantees of federal funds from coverage under the

Act. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 21, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5286 (citing, inter alia, United States ex rel.

Salzman v. Salant & Salant, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y.

1938) (claim against the Red Cross)). But Congress amended

the Act in 1986 by inserting--in addition to the whistleblower

provision noted above--a new definition of "claim":

For purposes of this section, "claim" includes any request

or demand ... for money or property which is made to a

contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United

States Government provides any portion of the money or

property which is requested or demanded, or if the

Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or

other recipient for any portion of the money or property

which is requested or demanded.

31 U.S.C. s 3729(c).

The purpose of this new definition, both the Senate and

House Reports state, was to "clarif[y] that the statute permits the Government to sue under the False Claims Act for

frauds perpetrated on Federal grantees, including States and

other recipients of federal funds." S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 21,

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5286; see also id. at 10,

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275; H.R. Rep. No. 99-

660, at 21 (1986). The Senate Judiciary Committee indicated

that the new subsection was inserted in response to the

earlier court holdings that "a fraud against the grantee does

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not constitute a fraud against the Government of the United

States" where "once the United States has made the grant to

the State ... or other institution, it substantially relinquishes

all control over the disposition of the money." S. Rep. No.

99-345, at 21, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5286 (citing

Salzman, 41 F. Supp. 196). At the same time, the Committee

approvingly cited cases that appeared to cover claims against

grantees regardless whether those claims were retransmitted

to the United States. See id. at 10, 22, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275, 5287 (citing United States ex rel. Davis

v. Long's Drugs, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1144, 1146-47 (S.D. Cal.

1976)).

It is still possible, of course, to argue that Congress did not

quite achieve the objective of making all false claims to

grantees subject to the Act. The new subsection is merely

entitled "Claim defined," while for the Act's "liability" provision we still must look to s 3729(a). If we put the two

subsections together, we have a requirement that the defendant "knowingly present[ ], or cause[ ] to be presented, to an

officer or employee of the United States ... a false or

fraudulent .... request ... to a ... grantee ... if the

United States Government provides any portion of the money

... which is requested ..., or if the Government will reimburse [the] ... grantee ... for any portion of the money ...

which is requested." 31 U.S.C. s 3729(a), (c). This could be

read narrowly to mean that requests to a grantee which are

in turn presented by the grantee to the United States are

covered, but that Congress dropped a stitch if it also meant to

cover--as it indicated it did--the situation where the government already has given the money to the grantee but has

"relinquishe[d] all control over the disposition of the money"

before the false claim is made. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 21,

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5286.

Although it is possible to read the statute in this narrow

way, such a reading would leave intact those court opinions

Congress seemingly intended to overrule. As Yesudian suggests, it is also possible to read the language to cover claims

presented to grantees, but "effectively" presented to the

United States because the payment comes out of funds the

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federal government gave the grantee. Such a reading would

be in harmony with the legislative history. As the Senate

Judiciary Committee put it, without adding any "presentation" caveat, "a false claim to the recipient of a grant from the

United States or to a State under a program financed in part

by the United States is a false claim to the United States."

Id. at 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275.5

It may be that this reading--that a claim to a grantee is

effectively a claim to the United States--should not apply to

all grantees. It may not be appropriate, for example, where

the grantee's federal funds are an insubstantial percentage of

its total budget, where there is little likelihood that any of a

defendant's money actually came from the federal grant, or

where there is little continuing contact between the grantee

and the government once the grant is made.

Parker is correct in noting that the legislative history of the

False Claims Act amendments states that "a false claim is

actionable although the claims or false statements were made

to a party other than the Government, if the payment thereon

would ultimately result in a loss to the United States." S.

Rep. No. 99-345, at 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

5275 (emphasis added); see H.R. Rep. No. 99-660, at 21.6

__________

5 The Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel. Marcus

v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), cited approvingly by the Senate

Judiciary Committee, see S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 10, reprinted in

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275, includes dicta supportive of Yesudian's

reading. The Court said that "[federal] funds [granted to the

states] are as much in need of protection from fraudulent claims as

any other federal money, and the statute does not make the extent

of their safeguard dependent upon the bookkeeping devices used for

their distribution." 317 U.S. at 544 (footnote omitted). In Marcus,

however, estimates of the false claims were transmitted to the

government.

6 It is not necessary, however that a loss actually result; it is

sufficient that the defendant makes a false claim that would result

in a loss if it were paid. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 8, reprinted in

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5273 ("A forfeiture may be recovered from

one who submits a false claim though no payments were made on

the claim."); see also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148,

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Although the statute itself does not contain this requirement,

it may be another way of saying that before a claim on a

grantee can be considered a claim on the United States, there

must be a sufficiently close nexus between the two such that a

loss to the former is effectively a loss to the latter.

Such possible caveats are not relevant here, however, because Howard University is a relatively unique grantee in all

of these respects. According to the testimony at trial, over

80% of Howard's money comes from the federal government.7

Congress has authorized annual appropriations of federal

funds for Howard, see 20 U.S.C. s 123, and has authorized

the Secretary of Education to make matching grants for the

University's endowment, see id. s 130aa-1. Howard is also

authorized to make purchases through the General Services

Administration. See id. s 130. Moreover, the University is

required by federal statute "at all times [to] be open to

inspection by the Secretary of Education and shall be inspected by the said Secretary at least once each year." Id. s 123.

And each year, Howard must submit to the Secretary of

Education "a statement showing the receipts of the institution

and from what sources, and its disbursements, and for what

objects." Id. s 121 (emphasis added).

In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee made clear

that it intended the concept of loss to the United States to be

considered broadly. As the Committee noted, the Seventh

Circuit had held in United States v. Azzarelli Construction

Co., 647 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1981), that there was no loss to the

United States, and hence no viable False Claims Act suit,

where the federal government had contributed a fixed sum to

Illinois for highway projects and thus would have paid out the

__________

152-53 & n.5 (1956) (discussing United States ex rel. Marcus v.

Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943)).

7 Yesudian testified to this figure, based on his "personal

knowledge." Notwithstanding an invitation from the trial judge to

cross-examine Yesudian on this point, defendants failed to contest

the testimony at trial. See App. 62-63. At oral argument, defendants contended that 60% of Howard's budget is provided by the

federal government through a direct line-item appropriation.

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same amount regardless whether contractors submitted false

claims to the State. The Committee made clear it disapproved of this result, and expressly "intend[ed] the new

subsection ... to overrule Azzarelli and similar cases which

have limited the ability of the United States to use the act to

reach fraud perpetrated on federal grantees, contractors or

other recipients of Federal funds." S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 22,

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5287.

Congress, then, plainly regarded a false claim as causing a

loss to the United States in the Azzarelli situation, notwithstanding that the false claim would not lead to an additional

pay-out of federal funds. Much the same is true here.

Whether or not the United States Government would be out

additional money beyond that already appropriated for Howard, it would suffer a loss if the money appropriated for

legitimate purposes were instead wasted on a false claim.

And given the testimony that 80% of Howard's funds come

from the federal government, the likelihood is high that the

government would suffer this kind of loss if Howard were to

pay a false claim.

B

Although the above analysis suggests that a qui tam suit

brought against defendant Parker for submitting a false claim

to Howard University could prevail even without evidence

that the claim was resubmitted to the federal government, we

need not resolve that question today. We do not, after all,

have before us an appeal from a judgment against Yesudian

on his qui tam claim. The jury decided against Yesudian on

that claim and he has not appealed. Instead, the issue before

us is an appeal from a judgment as a matter of law against

Yesudian on his claim that Parker retaliated against him

because of his protected conduct. And the protected conduct

element of such a claim does not require the plaintiff to have

developed a winning qui tam action before he is retaliated

against. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 35, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5300; United States ex rel. Ramseyer v.

Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1522 (10th Cir.

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1996).8 It requires only that the plaintiff have engaged in

"acts ... in furtherance of an action under this section." 31

U.S.C. s 3730(h) (emphasis added).

There is nothing in that language to suggest that the

employee must already have discovered a completed case.

To the contrary, s 3730(h) expressly includes "investigation

for ... an action filed or to be filed" within its protective

cover. This manifests Congress' intent to protect employees

while they are collecting information about a possible fraud,

before they have put all the pieces of the puzzle together. See

Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1994).

Indeed, it is for this reason that courts have held employees'

activities protected although they have not filed qui tam suits.

See id. at 864-65; Childree v. UAP/GA AG Chem., Inc., 92

F.3d 1140, 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 1996); Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at

1522. And it is for this reason that the district court erred in

holding Yesudian's conduct was unprotected because "he never initiated ... a private qui tam suit." 946 F. Supp. at 33.

As even defendant concedes, therefore, it is sufficient that a

plaintiff be investigating matters that "reasonably could lead"

to a viable False Claims Act case. Def. Br. at 21. This view

is in accord with that of the other Circuits. See Childree, 92

F.3d at 1146 (11th Cir. 1996) (requiring only "distinct possibility" of suit); Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1269 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding

that "plaintiff must be investigating matters which are calculated, or reasonably could lead, to a viable FCA action");

Neal, 33 F.3d at 864 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that s 3730(h)

covers situation where litigation was a "distinct possibility" or

"could be filed legitimately"). Mere dissatisfaction with one's

treatment on the job is not, of course, enough. Nor is an

employee's investigation of nothing more than his employer's

__________

8 Cf. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. Department of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[A]n employee's non-frivolous

complaint should not have to be guaranteed to withstand ...

external review in order to merit protection under [the Clean Water

Act] for the obvious reason that such a standard would chill

employee initiatives in bringing to light perceived discrepancies in

the workings of their agency.").

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non-compliance with federal or state regulations. See Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1269; Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1523; see also

Zahodnick v. IBM Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 914 (4th Cir. 1997)

("Simply reporting his concern of a mischarging to the

government to his supervisor does not suffice to establish that

Zahodnick was acting 'in furtherance of' a qui tam action.")

(emphasis added). To be covered by the False Claims Act,

the plaintiff's investigation must concern "false or fraudulent"

claims. See 31 U.S.C. s 3729(a); see also McKenzie, 123

F.3d at 944; Childree, 92 F.3d at 1145; Hopper, 91 F.3d at

1269.

There was more than enough evidence for a reasonable

juror to conclude that Yesudian was engaged in such an

investigation. He repeatedly advised Parker's superiors that

he had evidence Parker falsified time and attendance records,

provided inside information to favored vendors to aid them in

the bidding process, accepted bribes from vendors, permitted

payments to vendors who did not provide services to the

University, and took University property home for personal

use. Vice President Jones asked him to provide "more

specific information regarding these charges ... so that they

can be properly investigated." Def's Ex. 43. Yesudian collected evidence from other employees to corroborate the

claim that Parker's assistant had not worked the days for

which she received credit. See App. 56-57, 161-62. He also

took photographs of University property he believed Parker

had taken for personal use. And he collected further documentation which he provided to Vice President Fletcher. See

App. 75.

Moreover, Yesudian knew that 80% of Howard's money

came from the United States Government. Hence, even if

resubmission of a false claim to the federal government were

required for a successful action, the 80% figure gave Yesudian

a good faith basis for going forward at the time of the

retaliation. Given the information he had about Howard's

finances, it would have been reasonable to conclude there was

a "distinct possibility" he would find evidence of resubmission

of the claims. Indeed, that is the kind of information a

plaintiff normally cannot acquire until he files a suit and

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obtains the benefits of court-sanctioned discovery. Yet, as we

have noted, such filing is not required to gain the protection

of the statute. See 31 U.S.C. s 3730(h) (providing protection

for an "investigation for ... an action filed or to be filed").

The fact that Yesudian may have failed to find such evidence in the end means only that--if such evidence were

necessary to prove a False Claims Act case--he ultimately

would not be entitled to recover on his qui tam claim.

Indeed, it is only one of many ways he could come up short.

But there is no requirement that to be protected, a plaintiff

must have gathered all of the evidence by the time of the

retaliation. Indeed, if there were, the failure of Yesudian's

contemporaneous qui tam claim would alone have warranted

judgment as a matter of law on his retaliation claim--yet

neither the district court nor the defendant have taken that

position.

Nor was it necessary for Yesudian to "know" that the

investigation he was pursuing could lead to a False Claims

Act suit. See Childree, 92 F.3d at 1143, 1145-46 (noting that

employee never considered bringing False Claims Act case

and had not heard of Act at time of discharge); Hopper, 91

F.3d at 1269 (protected activity does not require "[s]pecific

awareness of the FCA"); Neal, 33 F.3d at 864 (noting that

plaintiff was not informed that she could file a qui tam

action). An initial investigation may well further an action

under the Act, even though the employee does not know it at

the time of the investigation. Were that not the case, only

lawyers--or those versed in the law--would be protected by

the statute, as only they would know from the outset that

what they were investigating could lead to a False Claims Act

prosecution. There is no suggestion in the legislative history

that Congress meant to extend protection only to lawyers, or

to others only after they have consulted with lawyers.

It could be argued that the phrase "to be filed" in s 3730(h)

refers to the plaintiff's intent--i.e., that an action "to be filed"

means one contemplated at the time of the conduct. But the

courts have read the phrase to mean the equivalent of an

action that reasonably could be filed. See Childree, 92 F.3d

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at 1146 (where the filing of an action was a "distinct possibility"); Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1269 (where the plaintiff is investigating matters that "reasonably could lead" to an FCA action); Neal, 33 F.3d at 864 (where litigation is a "distinct

possibility" or "could be filed legitimately").

More importantly, the "to be filed" language in s 3730(h)

does not define protected conduct; it is simply part of the

language that describes examples of what is "includ[ed]"

within that category. See 31 U.S.C. s 3730(h) ("acts done ...

in furtherance of an action under this section, including

investigation for ... an action filed or to be filed") (emphasis

added). There is no indication that Congress intended the

examples to encompass the entire category. See McKenzie,

123 F.3d at 944 ("The statute provides examples of the types

of activity that are protected, including investigation, initiation of a suit, and testimony, but these examples are not

exclusive and the legislative history indicates that '[p]rotected

activity should ... be interpreted broadly.' ") (quoting S. Rep.

No. 99-345, at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5300)

(omission in original).9 The protected conduct itself is simply

"acts done ... in furtherance of an action under this section,"

and even an investigation conducted without contemplation

of--or knowledge of the legal possibility of--a False Claims

Act suit can end up being "in furtherance" of such an action.

__________

9 Indeed, several courts have said that internal reporting of

false claims is itself an example of a protected activity. See

McKenzie, 123 F.3d at 944; Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1523; Robertson,

32 F.3d at 951; Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 752. And many courts,

including this one, have held that internal reporting is sufficient to

bring an employee within the protection of the whistleblower provisions of other federal statutes. See, e.g., Phillips v. Interior Bd. of

Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 778, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1974)

(Mine Safety Act); Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 50 F.3d

926, 931-33 (11th Cir. 1995) (Energy Reorganization Act); Passaic

Valley, 992 F.2d at 478-79 (3d Cir. 1993) (Clean Water Act); see

also Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 479 ("[O]ur sister courts of appeals

have consistently construed [other] statutes to lend broad protective

coverage to internal complainants.") (citing cases).

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As our previous discussion makes clear, the district court

was wrong in suggesting that Yesudian's activity was unprotected because he had not initiated a private suit by the time

of his termination. The court was also wrong in suggesting

that Yesudian's conduct was unprotected because he had not,

as an alternative, "initiated a government investigation," Yesudian, 946 F. Supp. at 33. Although the statute does

require a qui tam relator to serve a copy of his complaint on

the government and to disclose material evidence and information to it, those requirements do not take effect until the

relator files a complaint with the court. See 31 U.S.C.

s 3730(b). Nothing in the statute suggests that any kind of

earlier communication with the government--or with anyone

outside of his employing institution--is required to satisfy the

"acts in furtherance" requirement. See McKenzie, 123 F.3d

at 944; see also supra note 9; cf. Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec'y

of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 932 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[T]his interpretation [of the Energy Reorganization Act] ... avoids the unwitting consequence of preemptive retaliation, which would allow

whistleblowers to be fired or otherwise discriminated against

with impunity for internal complaints before they have a

chance to bring them before an appropriate agency."). To

the contrary, as Judge Easterbrook put it, "s 3730(h) protects 'investigation' as well as reports of fraud, and an 'investigation' precedes communication." Neal, 33 F.3d at 865; cf.

NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121 (1972) (construing

National Labor Relations Act provision, protecting employee

who "has filed charges or given testimony," as including "the

investigative stage"). Indeed, in arguing the need for the

1986 whistleblower amendment, one of the prime examples

noted by the Senate Judiciary Committee was the harassment

of a Rockwell International employee after he told his supervisors he no longer would mischarge his time cards. See

S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

5270.

Nor would it be in the interest of law-abiding employers for

the statute to force employees to report their concerns outside the corporation in order to gain whistleblower protection.

Such a requirement would bypass internal controls and hotUSCA Case #96-7226 Document #378790 Filed: 09/01/1998 Page 18 of 33
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lines, damage corporate efforts at self-policing, and make it

difficult for corporations and boards of directors to discover

and correct on their own false claims made by rogue employees or managers. Cf. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v.

Department of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1993)

("Employees should not be discouraged from the normal

route of pursuing internal remedies before going public ....

[as this] facilitate[s] prompt voluntary remediation and compliance with the Clean Water Act."); Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 931-

33 (applying same analysis to Energy Reorganization Act).

In sum, we conclude that a reasonable juror could readily

have found that Yesudian satisfied the first element of his

retaliation claim against defendant Parker, by engaging in

activity protected by the whistleblower provision of the False

Claims Act.

C

The district court also concluded there was no evidence to

support the first part of the second element of Yesudian's

retaliation claim--that defendant Parker knew Yesudian was

engaged in protected activity.10 This was so, the court said,

because Yesudian "never suggested to defendant that he

intended to utilize his allegations in furtherance of a False

Claims Act action" and "gave no suggestion that he was going

to report the alleged improprieties to government officials."

Yesudian, 946 F. Supp. at 33.

But since there is no requirement that a plaintiff know his

investigation could lead to a False Claims Act action, there

likewise can be no requirement that he "suggest[ ] to defendant" that he is contemplating such an action. A plaintiff

who need not even have heard of the False Claims Act can

hardly be required to inform his supervisor that he "intend[s]

to utilize his allegations in furtherance of" an action under

that Act. Instead, the kind of knowledge the defendant must

__________

10 The district court did not find, and Parker does not contend,

that there was no evidence to support the second part of this

element: a showing that Yesudian was terminated in retaliation for

his activity.

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have mirrors the kind of activity in which the plaintiff must

be engaged. What defendant must know is that plaintiff is

engaged in protected activity as defined above--that is, in

activity that reasonably could lead to a False Claims Act case.

As already discussed, such activity includes the investigation

of "false or fraudulent claims" made to federal grantees like

Howard. But like the plaintiff, the defendant need not know,

or be advised, that such claims would violate the False Claims

Act itself. Cf. Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946

(1998) (charge of possession of unregistered machinegun requires proof that defendant knew weapon had the characteristics that brought it within statutory definition of machinegun,

but not proof that defendant knew such possession was

unlawful).

Indeed, requiring a plaintiff to advise his employer that he

has filed or is contemplating filing a qui tam complaint would

contravene the qui tam section of the Act itself, which dictates that such complaints be filed in camera, remain under

seal for at least sixty days (extendable upon government

motion), and "not be served on the defendant until the court

so orders." 31 U.S.C. s 3730(b). The purpose of these

provisions is to "protect the Government's interest in criminal

matters" by enabling the government to investigate the alleged fraud without " 'tip[ping] off' investigation targets" at

"a sensitive stage." S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 24, reprinted in

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5289. To require a plaintiff to advise

his employer of his intentions in order to enjoy whistleblower

protection would frustrate this congressional concern.

For much the same reasons, there also is no requirement

that a plaintiff tell, or threaten, his employer that he will

report his allegations to the government--or to anyone outside of the employing institution. As the statute does not

require the employee to make an outside complaint in order

to render his conduct protected, he cannot be required to

advise of or threaten such a complaint. Moreover, as with a

requirement that an employee tell his employer he is contemplating filing a qui tam suit, a requirement that an employee

announce he has gone outside the institution would undercut

the statutory purpose of encouraging employees to expose

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fraud. See id. at 4-5, 34, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

5269-70, 5299. Such an announcement necessarily creates

the kind of adversary confrontation that mere internal reporting does not. And even though it may protect the employee

from termination, it would also end any hopes he may have

for normal advancement as a "loyal" employee. Many an

employee may well decide that kind of protection is not worth

obtaining, and so forego an investigation altogether. See

Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("To

insist upon an express or even an implied threat of such

action would impose a requirement which is wholly unrealistic

in an employment context.").

Nonetheless, a plaintiff still must show that his employer

was aware of his protected activity. Merely grumbling to the

employer about job dissatisfaction or regulatory violations

does not satisfy the requirement--just as it does not constitute protected activity in the first place. Threatening to file a

qui tam suit or to make a report to the government, on the

other hand, clearly is one way to make an employer aware.

But it is not the only way.

The steps Yesudian took in this case were sufficient for a

reasonable juror to conclude that Parker was on notice Yesudian was engaged in protected activity. Yesudian repeatedly

told Parker's superiors that Parker had falsified time and

attendance records, accepted bribes from vendors, provided

inside information to favored vendors, permitted payments to

vendors who did not provide services, and taken University

property home for personal use. A juror could reasonably

conclude that Parker's superiors advised him of these

charges, particularly since they told Yesudian they intended

to investigate them. A juror could also conclude that the

charges--many in the form of letters from Yesudian to

University officials--would have been made available to Parker. And a reasonable juror could reach a similar conclusion

from the timing of at least one incident in which Parker

disciplined Yesudian, assertedly for insubordination, shortly

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after Yesudian made a complaint against him. See App. 58-

60.

Indeed, there was even some evidence that Parker may

have thought Yesudian actually was planning a qui tam case.

On December 20, 1989, Parker's deputy, Varghese, sent Yesudian a disciplinary letter, complaining that "during work

hours you went throughout the department taking photographs claiming that you may need these documents to

support your case." App. 310. Although the letter does not

explain which "case" Varghese was concerned about, the only

photographs otherwise mentioned in the record are ones

Yesudian took of University property he said Parker had

taken home for his personal use. See App. 536. A reasonable juror could conclude that Parker knew of his deputy's

letter and concerns.

Finally, the incident involving Yesudian's meeting with Vice

President Fletcher, and the subsequent confrontation Yesudian had with Parker and Varghese, provides direct evidence

that Parker was aware of Yesudian's protected activities. As

noted above, in March 1992 Yesudian met with Fletcher, told

him of his findings, and gave him a packet of documents he

said supported the claims. See App. 74-75. Within a month,

Parker called Yesudian into his office and read him verbatim

the allegations Yesudian had made against Parker in the

documents Yesudian had given Fletcher. Varghese then

warned Yesudian: "[I]f you do this kind of stuff, you're not

going to be in this department." App. 80. After the meeting,

Yesudian reported the threats to Fletcher. A reasonable

juror could readily have concluded from Yesudian's account of

these events, as well as from the other incidents discussed

above, that Parker knew his subordinate was engaged in

protected activity.

Neither United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d

1261 (9th Cir. 1996), nor Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948 (5th Cir. 1994), cited by Parker, is to

the contrary. The plaintiff in Hopper was a special education

teacher who complained that her school district was failing to

comply with federal and state laws pertaining to the handling

of special education children. But she made no allegations of

fraud. "[U]nless the employer is aware that the employee is

investigating fraud," the court said, "the employer could not

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possess the retaliatory intent necessary to establish a violation of s 3730(h)." Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1269.

The plaintiff's case in Robertson had both the same weakness as Hopper's and an additional one. The plaintiff in

Robertson, a contract administrator employed by Bell Helicopter, became concerned about a "lack of verification" for

maintenance and repair charges Bell was making on a government contract. See 32 F.3d at 949-50. He reported his

concerns to his superiors and sought to substantiate the

charges by requesting additional information from Bell managers. Although the court recognized that internal reporting

has been held to constitute protected activity, it distinguished

Robertson's internal reports because--like the plaintiff in

Hopper--he had not told his employer he was concerned

about possible fraud. See id.

Robertson also argued that his investigation into the substantiation for the maintenance charges constituted protected

activity. In response, Bell noted a second problem. It

contended it had no way to know Robertson's investigation

was protected activity because substantiating charges was

part of his job as a contract administrator. The court agreed.

Because "Robertson never characterized his concerns as involving illegal, unlawful, or false-claims investigations.... [,]

Robertson [never] expressed any concerns to his superiors

other than those typically raised as part of a contract administrator's job." Id. at 952.

The plaintiff in United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century

Healthcare Corp. also had both of the problems of the Robertson plaintiff. Like Robertson (and Hopper), Ramseyer complained to her employer only of regulatory "non-compliance"

and "shortcomings." And like Robertson, the weakness of

her case was exacerbated by the fact that "the monitoring

and reporting activities described in plaintiff's complaint were

exactly those activities plaintiff was required to undertake in

fulfillment of her job duties." 90 F.3d at 1523. As did the

Robertson court, Ramseyer "acknowledge[d] that intracorporate complaints may fall within the protective scope of section

3730(h)." Id. But given that those complaints were indistinUSCA Case #96-7226 Document #378790 Filed: 09/01/1998 Page 23 of 33
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guishable from the reporting expected as part of her job, the

court held she had to do something more to "make clear [her]

intentions of bringing or assisting in [a False Claims Act]

action in order to overcome the presumption that [she was]

merely acting in accordance with [her] employment obligations." Id. at 1523 n.7 (emphasis added).

Yesudian's case did not have these weaknesses. First, the

nature of Yesudian's charges could not have been mistaken

for a complaint about mere regulatory compliance. He asserted a classic false claim by contending that Parker was

"falsifying" time and attendance records so that his assistant

would be paid for work she did not do. He effectively

charged Parker with defrauding Howard by taking bribes

from vendors, providing them with inside information to aid

them in the bidding process, and permitting payments to

vendors who did not provide services to the University. He

further charged that Parker had converted University property to his personal use. Vice President Jones characterized

the false statement charge as a charge of "cooperating in the

cheating of the University with the Time and Attendance

Records." Def.'s Ex. 43. Yesudian himself characterized the

complaints as charges of "corruption" and "corrupt practices."

App. 220.

Second, Yesudian's duties at the University did not include

oversight of Purchasing Department operations, monitoring

of other employees' time and attendance records, or tracking

the use of University property. Thus, his investigation and

complaints regarding falsification, bribery, and corruption

could not have been mistaken for routine actions in accordance with his employment obligations. To the contrary, the

trial record indicates that Yesudian's supervisors knew of and

were distressed by his whistleblowing activities: according to

Yesudian, Parker and Varghese threatened him for bringing

to light "the corrupt practices and inefficiencies extant in the

department." App. 220. Hence, unlike the plaintiffs in Robertson and Ramseyer, he had no "presumption" to overcome.

We conclude that a reasonable juror could have found that

Yesudian engaged in activity protected by the False Claims

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Act, and that defendant Parker knew of that protected activity. We therefore reverse the grant of judgment as a matter

of law on Yesudian's retaliation claim.

IV

Yesudian also asserted claims against Howard based on

breach of contract and promissory estoppel. He alleged that

the Howard University Employee Handbook constituted a

contract between him and the University, that he had relied

upon it to his detriment, and that he had been fired in

derogation of its provisions limiting the bases upon which,

and the procedures through which, an employee could be

terminated. After the jury returned a verdict for Yesudian,

Howard moved for judgment as a matter of law on the

ground that there was no contract or reliance,11 arguing that:

(1) the Handbook contained a disclaimer which, as a matter of

law, prevented any statement it contained from rising to the

level of a binding obligation; and (2) even if it could constitute

a binding obligation, Yesudian had given no additional consideration for the promises he alleged it contained and had not

relied upon them to his detriment. The district court held

that "[g]iven the contradictory language of the manual provisions, ... the issue of whether the employee manual constituted a contract was an issue for the jury[,]" and that "the

jury was justified in finding that plaintiff reasonably relied on

the provisions of the employee handbook to his detriment in

that he followed the handbook grievance procedures at the

expense of much time and money." Yesudian, 846 F. Supp.

at 35-36. We concur with the conclusion of the district court

for these and additional reasons.

All parties agree that this issue is governed by District of

Columbia law. Last year, in Sisco v. GSA National Capital

Federal Credit Union, 689 A.2d 52, 55 (D.C. 1997), the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals summarized District

law on the subject. The presumption in the case of an

__________

11 Howard does not argue it was entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on the ground that it complied with the Handbook's

requirements.

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employee like Yesudian--who lacks an express employment

contract for a specified time--is that he is an employee at-will

who may be fired at the employer's discretion. See id. at 53;

Nickens v. Labor Agency, 600 A.2d 813, 816 (D.C. 1991). An

employee manual, however, overcomes the at-will presumption "where it set[s] forth a distinction between probationary

and permanent employees, providing that the first could be

discharged summarily but the latter only .... [after] 'specific

preconditions had [been] met.' " Sisco, 689 A.2d at 54 (quoting Washington Welfare Ass'n v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 613, 615-

16 (D.C. 1985)). "[S]uch manuals," the court said, "generally

create 'a factual question for the jury' as to the existence of a

contract." Id. (quoting Nickens, 600 A.2d at 817); see also

Washington Welfare Ass'n, 496 A.2d at 615.

The Handbook at issue here meets the Sisco test. As the

district court--writing before Sisco was handed down--found,

the Handbook expressly "distinguishes between temporary

and probationary employees on the one hand, and regular

employees, such as the plaintiff here, on the other." Yesudian, 946 F. Supp. at 35. The Handbook makes clear that the

latter can be discharged only for cause and after specified

procedures:

Temporary and Probationary Employees may be terminated at any time their services are found to be unsatisfactory, or not in the best interests of the University....

However, in the case of Regular employees, termination

on grounds of unsatisfactory work performance is in

order only when employees fail to make satisfactory

work improvement within thirty (30) calendar days after

their supervisors have given them written notice of warning.... Charges against an employee of serious neglect

of duty or conduct incompatible with the welfare of the

University must be substantiated by the supervisor.

Failure of the employee to refute successfully such

charges constitutes grounds for dismissal.

Howard University Employee Handbook (Non-Faculty)

s 1.11 (Apr. 1, 1980) (App. 638) (emphasis added). The

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Handbook also sets out a detailed grievance procedure to

which employees in Yesudian's status are "entitled" whenever

a complaint alleges "a violation, misapplication or misinterpretation of applicable rules, regulations, policies, laws, or

orders resulting in an actual or anticipated unfair or unreasonable personnel procedure." Id. s 1.16; see Yesudian, 946

F. Supp. at 35 & n.4. Indeed, the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals has twice held that juries could find Howard

University employee handbooks to constitute employment

contracts.12

Notwithstanding these provisions, the University contends

the Handbook cannot be considered a contract because it

contains two other provisions that constitute effective disclaimers of any binding obligations. First, the Handbook

states that "[t]he University reserves the right unto itself to

maintain exclusive discretion to exercise the customary functions of management including, but not limited to, the discretion to select, hire, promote, demote, ... [or] terminate...."

Handbook s 1.15. Second, the Handbook states that "[t]his

document is not to be construed as a contract." Id. at ii.

Sisco governs these contentions as well. It holds that

promises meeting the test described above--those "that are

clear enough in limiting the right to terminate to specific

causes or events"--effectively "reverse the normal presumption: to make them unenforceable at law, a manual purporting to restrict the grounds for termination must contain

language clearly reserving the employer's right to terminate

at will." Sisco, 689 A.2d at 55 (emphasis added).

The Handbook's reservation of management rights does not

satisfy the Sisco standard for rebutting the reverse presump-

__________

12 See Howard Univ. v. Baten, 632 A.2d 389, 390 (D.C. 1993);

Law v. Howard Univ., Inc., 558 A.2d 355, 356 & n.1 (D.C. 1989).

Because at oral argument both parties stated they were uncertain

whether the handbook at issue here was the same as that at issue in

Law, we do not consider whether the doctrine of offensive collateral

estoppel would otherwise be applicable. See generally Jack Faucett

Assocs. v. American Tel. & Tel., 744 F.2d 118, 124-26 (D.C. Cir.

1984).

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tion. The employee manual at issue there similarly reserved

management's rights "to discipline or discharge employees

for any other cause," yet the court found this provision

"insufficient to overcome the assurance conveyed by an objective reading of the entire document that termination will be

governed by its terms." Id. The Sisco court also rejected

the argument "that the employer's reserved right to modify

the manual's terms unilaterally tends to show that any 'offer'

made by the [employer] in distributing the manual was

illusory." Id. at 57 (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in

original). The employee's reasonable expectation of performance by the employer continues, the court said, "so long as

the employer does not revoke the manual or disclaim its

binding character." Id. As the district court found here,

"the provisions in the handbook relating to termination of

employment are phrased in such a manner as to lead an

employee to believe that the University does not have unfettered discretion in its termination decisions," despite the

reservation of rights clause. Yesudian, 946 F. Supp. at 35.

The Handbook's statement that "[t]his document is not to

be construed as a contract" also fails to meet the Sisco

standard. Although it states an ultimate conclusion, it does

not "contain language clearly reserving the employer's right

to terminate at will," which Sisco requires to make the

promises of a Handbook like this "unenforceable at law."

Sisco, 689 A.2d at 55. In fact, "[n]owhere does the manual

state that a 'Regular employee' may be terminated at will."

Yesudian, 946 F. Supp. at 35. In each of the District of

Columbia cases in which a disclaimer of contract status has

been held to negate the inference of a binding obligation from

an employee handbook, the disclaimer has stated both that

the manual is not a contract and that employees may be

terminated at will.13 Although the District of Columbia Court

__________

13 See Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624,

627 n.3 (D.C. 1997) ("The employee handbook expressly states that

it is not an employment contract and that 'nothing in this Handbook

is intended to affect the "at-will" employment relationship.' ") (emphasis added); Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265,

269 n.1 (D.C. 1993) ("This handbook is ... not an employment

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of Appeals has not yet decided a case involving a disclaimer

lacking the latter provision, numerous other courts have held

disclaimers insufficient to keep cases from juries where they

denied the existence of a contract but failed expressly to

advise employees they could be terminated at will.14 Given

__________

contract and does not guarantee any fixed terms and conditions of

employment.... Employment for management personnel is for no

definite period [and] is terminable at will...."); Goos v. National

Ass'n of Realtors, 715 F. Supp. 2, 4 (D.D.C. 1989) ("This handbook

does not constitute an employment contract.... As an employee

... you are considered to be an employee-at-will.").

14 See, e.g., Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d

783, 787-88 (Alaska 1989) (finding inadequate a disclaimer providing

that manual "is not a contract of employment," but "not appris[ing]

the employee that his or her job is 'terminable at the will of the

employer with or without reason' "); Perman v. Arcventures, Inc.,

554 N.E.2d 982, 985, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that "language

in [employer's] manual of personnel policies and procedures created

enforceable contractual rights despite its disclaimer" that the manual did "not constitute an employment contract"); Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, Ltd., 555 A.2d 12, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

Div. 1989) (finding inadequate a disclaimer stating that handbook

was "not intended to create, nor should [it] be construed to constitute, a contract of employment," and holding that "if [employer]

wished to advise its employees that they could be discharged at will,

such a warning should have been set forth expressly"); Russell v.

Board of County Comm'rs, 952 P.2d 492, 503 (Okla. 1997) ("While

the manual states that ... the personnel policies do not represent

an 'employment contract,' conflicting inferences may be drawn from

other statements made in the same handbook."); Johnson v. Nasca,

802 P.2d 1294, 1295-97 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (finding insufficient a

disclaimer providing that employee handbook "should not be considered a contract" and that employer "reserves the right at any time

to take any action it deems necessary in its sole discretion"). See

generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal

Effect of Disclaimers, 13 Indus. Rel. L.J. 326, 353 (1992) ("[S]uch a

disclaimer is unclear because it speaks in terms of the technicalities

of contract status without plainly stating the practical impact of the

disclaimer on apparent promises of job security contained elsewhere

in the handbook.") (citing Preston, 555 A.2d at 15).

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Sisco 's insistence that to overcome the reverse presumption

in a case like this, the disclaimer "must contain language

clearly reserving the employer's right to terminate at will,"

Sisco, 689 A.2d at 55, we conclude the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals would reach the same result.

Moreover, as the district court pointed out, the same

paragraph of the Handbook that says it is not to be construed

as a contract also says the Handbook is "intended to promote

a better understanding of what staff employees can expect

from the University and what the University can expect from

them in return." Handbook at ii (emphasis added). These

two statements are, as the district court found, "contradictory." Yesudian, 946 F. Supp at 35. When taken together

with the other provisions of the Handbook that clearly limit

Howard's right to terminate "to specific causes or events,"

Sisco, 689 A.2d at 55, the disclaimers asserted by Howard do

no more than produce the kind of ambiguity that creates a

jury question as to whether the Handbook constitutes "a

promise of continued employment to [regular] employees

terminable only for cause in accordance with its provisions,"

id. at 56.

We also cannot ignore the fact that in its answer to

Yesudian's complaint, Howard actually conceded that the

Handbook constituted a contract. Compare Compl. p 31 with

Answer p 31. Ordinarily, we would consider such a concession in a pleading to constitute a binding judicial admission

which Howard could not contradict either at trial or on

appeal. See Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8

(7th Cir. 1995); Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and

Procedure s 6726 (interim ed. 1992). Here, however, Yesudian failed to note Howard's admission or otherwise object

when Howard did contest the point at trial. Under such

circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has found one in Yesudian's

position to have waived the argument that the issue was

conclusively settled. See American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw

Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1988). Because Yesudian's

claim that the Handbook was a contract survives a motion for

judgment as a matter of law under Sisco in any event, we do

not need to decide whether there was a waiver here. We do

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note, however, that Howard's admission may have misled

Yesudian into thinking he did not need to put anything more

into evidence than the Handbook itself in order to establish

that he had a contract.

Howard also contends that because Yesudian gave no consideration for the Handbook's promises, no binding obligation

was created. This argument is also foreclosed by Sisco,

which held that "remaining with an employer after receipt of

a personnel manual promising job security supplies the necessary consideration to make the promise legally enforceable."

Sisco, 689 A.2d at 56.15 Because Yesudian testified that he

remained with Howard after receiving the Handbook, he

satisfied the Sisco requirement. Accordingly, even without

adding in Yesudian's detrimental reliance on the grievance

procedures noted by the district court, we conclude that the

Handbook's promises were supported by adequate consideration and that the district court properly denied Howard's

motion for judgment as a matter of law.

V

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's

grant of judgment as a matter of law on Yesudian's retaliation

claim and affirm the district court's denial of judgment as a

matter of law on Yesudian's claim for breach of contract.

__________

15 Under District of Columbia law, Yesudian did not need to

introduce evidence that he had read the Handbook. See Nickens,

600 A.2d at 817 n.2. The fact that Yesudian followed the Handbook's grievance procedures, however, suggests that he had in fact

read it.

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

The district court's Rule 50 judgment on Yesudian's False

Claims Act retaliation claim should be affirmed because Yesudian never produced evidence to show, as the majority acknowledges he must, "that his employer was aware of his

protected activity." Maj. Op. at 21. Such a showing requires

a plaintiff to have put the employer on notice not only that he

is investigating fraud but also that the fraud is against the

federal government, so as to potentially support a qui tam

suit or a direct suit by the government. See United States ex

rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 123

F.3d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1997) (" '[A]n employee must supply

sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude

that the employee was discharged because of activities which

gave the employer reason to believe that the employee was

contemplating a qui tam action against it.' ") (quoting Mikes

v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)) (alteration

by McKenzie court); Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron,

Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994) (employee must put the

employer on notice that he is "concerned about the company

defrauding the government"); United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1522 (10th Cir.

1996) ("When seeking legal redress for retaliatory discharge

under the FCA, plaintiff has the burden of pleading facts

which would demonstrate that defendants had been put on

notice that plaintiff was either taking action in furtherance of

a private qui tam action or assisting in an FCA action

brought by the government."); United States ex rel. Hopper

v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding

school principal who reprimanded teacher did not have requisite "retaliatory intent" because even if she knew of teacher's

complaints to California Department of Education, teacher

"never gave any indication she was investigating the School

District for defrauding the federal government"). Because

Yesudian offered no evidence that he put his employer on

such notice, I dissent from the majority's reversal of the

district court's False Claim Act judgment.

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