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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 08-35794

STATE OF WASHINGTON; SWINOMISH D.C. Nos.

TRIBAL COMMUNITY; LUMMI 2:01-sp-00002-RSM

NATION; UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN 2:70-cv-09213-RSM

TRIBE; THE TULALIP TRIBES; PORT

GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBE; ORDER DENYING  MOTION FOR JAMESTOWN S’KLALLAM TRIBE;

CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND CLARIFICATION

BANDS OF THE YAKAMA INDIAN AND AMENDING

NATION, OPINION AND

Defendants-Appellees, AMENDED

OPINION

v.

SAMISH INDIAN TRIBE,

Movant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 22, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed December 11, 2009

Amended January 27, 2010

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Mary M. Schroeder,

William C. Canby, Jr., Stephen Reinhardt,

Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

William A. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon,

Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

1629

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Opinion by Judge Canby

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COUNSEL

Elizabeth Ann Peterson, Attorney, Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C., for the plaintiff-appellee.

Mason D. Morisset, Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & McGaw,

Seattle, Washington; James M. Jannetta, Swinomish Indian

Tribal Community, La Conner, Washington; Harold Chesnin,

Office of the Tribal Attorney Upper Skagit Indian Tribe,

Sedro Woolley, Washington; for defendant-appellee Treaty

Tribes.

Craig J. Dorsay, Dorsay & Easton, LLP, Portland, Organ, for

the movant-appellant.

Alexandra K. Smith, Lane Powell, PC, Seattle, Washington,

for the amicus curiae.

ORDER

The opposed motion of the Samish Indian Tribe for clarification of the opinion filed in this matter on December 11,

2009, is DENIED.

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* * * *

The opinion filed in this matter on December 11, 2009, slip

op. 16399, is amended as follows:

At slip op. 16410, first full paragraph, line 4: Insert “,

according to Greene III,” after “Samish Tribe’s history

which.”

At slip op. 16410, first full paragraph, line 7: Delete “id.

§ 83.7(a)” and substitute therefor “25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a).”

At slip op. 16410, first full paragraph, line 14: Delete “25

C.F.R. § 83.7(e)” and substitute therefor: “id. § 83.7(e).” 

* * * *

No petitions for rehearing, rehearing en banc, or rehearing

before the full court are pending.

No subsequent petitions for rehearing, rehearing en banc, or

rehearing before the full court may be filed.

OPINION

CANBY, Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

This appeal presents one more chapter in the litigation over

Indian treaty fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest. The

appellant Samish Tribe claims to be a successor to a tribe that

entered the Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (1855), with

the United States. In 1974, the Samish Tribe intervened in the

foundational treaty rights case of United States v. Washington,

384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (“Washington I”), aff’d,

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520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), in order to establish its entitlement to treaty fishing rights. At that time, the Samish Tribe

had not been recognized by the federal government. The district court rejected the Tribe’s claim to treaty rights, finding

that the Samish Tribe had not “lived as a continuous separate,

distinct and cohesive Indian cultural or political community”

and was not “descended from any of the tribal entities that

were signatory to the Treaty of Point Elliott.” United States

v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 1979)

(“Washington II”), aff’d, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981).

Nearly twenty years later, in connection with separate litigation, the Samish Tribe succeeded in obtaining federal recognition.1

See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment

of the Samish Tribal Organization as an Indian Tribe, 61 Fed.

Reg. 15,825 (Apr. 9, 1996) (“Samish Recognition”); Greene

v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (“Greene

III”). The Tulalip Tribes, which possessed treaty fishing rights

and feared their dilution, were denied intervention in the

Samish recognition proceedings on the ground that recognition could not affect treaty rights. Greene v. United States,

996 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Greene I”). In 2002, the

Samish Tribe returned to the Washington litigation and

sought, on the basis of its federal recognition, relief under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) from the 1979 judgment in Washington II. The district court denied relief. We

reversed, holding that the intervening federal recognition was

an extraordinary circumstance permitting the reopening of the

1979 decision under Rule 60(b)(6). United States v.

Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Washington III”). 

On remand, the district court again denied Rule 60(b)

1Federal recognition is now referred to as federal “acknowledgment”

under the regulatory scheme of the Department of the Interior. See 25

C.F.R. pt. 83 (2009). For simplicity, we continue to refer to “recognition,”

which was the phrase in use at the time of Washington I and II. 

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relief, and the Samish Tribe again appeals. For reasons we

now set forth, we affirm the judgment of the district court. In

doing so, we resolve a conflict in our precedent between

Washington III, which held that recognition was an extraordinary circumstance justifying the reopening of Washington II,

and our cases holding that federal recognition is an independent process that has no effect on treaty rights. See Greene I,

996 F.2d at 977; Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d 1266, 1270-71

(9th Cir. 1995) (“Greene II”). We resolve the conflict in favor

of the Greene proposition: recognition proceedings and the

fact of recognition have no effect on the establishment of

treaty rights at issue in this case.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

1. Off-Reservation Treaty Fishing Rights

During the 1850s Governor Stevens of Washington Territory negotiated a number of treaties with Northwest Indian

tribes. The Treaty of Point Elliott was typical of those treaties

in guaranteeing the signatory tribes “[t]he right of taking fish

at usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common

with all citizens of the Territory.” 12 Stat. at 928. In Washington I, the seminal case construing this clause, the district court

held that, with small exceptions, the treaty clause reserved to

the Indians the right to take fifty percent of the annual harvestable runs of salmon and steelhead trout.2

 384 F. Supp. at

343. It further held that fourteen tribes or bands, not including

the present Samish Tribe, were entitled to off-reservation

treaty fishing rights as political successors to tribes that had

signed treaties guaranteeing tribal fishing rights. Id. at 406.

Two of the tribes so entitled, the Stillaguamish and Upper

Skagit Tribes, were not federally recognized. Id. at 378-79.

2This division of the fishery was ultimately upheld by the Supreme

Court in Washington v. Washington State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 

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2. Initial Denial of Samish Tribe Treaty Status

Shortly thereafter, the Samish Tribe intervened in the

Washington litigation and sought to establish its entitlement

to treaty fishing rights. At that time, the Samish Tribe was not

federally recognized.3 The district court denied relief. Washington II, 476 F. Supp. at 1106. The district court found that

the Samish Indians, then numbering between 98 and 150 persons, were a party to the Treaty of Point Elliott. Id. at 1105-

06. They were not named in the Treaty, but were signed for

by the Lummi Tribe representative. Id. at 1106. The court further found:

Pursuant to the treaty most of the Samish people initially moved to the Lummi Reservation. Later others

moved to the Swinomish Reservation. The presentday Lummi and Swinomish Reservation tribes

include descendants of the 1855 Samish Indians.

Id. The court held, however, that “[t]he Intervenor Samish

Tribe is not an entity that is descended from any of the tribal

entities that were signatory to the Treaty of Point Elliott.” Id.

The court noted the Samish’s lack of federal recognition and

further stated:

The Intervenor’s membership roll contains 549 persons many of whom are of only 1/16th degree Indian

blood. Two have only 1/32nd Samish blood. The

tribe does not prohibit dual membership and at least

one member is an officer of the Lummi Tribe.

[ ] The members of the Intervenor Samish Tribe and

their ancestors do not and have not lived as a contin3Four other federally unrecognized tribes intervened along with the

Samish Tribe: the Duwamish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie, and Steilacoom

Tribes. All were unsuccessful in establishing entitlement to treaty fishing

rights. Washington II, 476 F. Supp. at 1111. 

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uous separate, distinct and cohesive Indian cultural

or political community. The present members have

no common bond of residence or association other

than such association as is attributable to the fact of

their voluntary affiliation with the Intervenor entity.

Id. (internal citations omitted). The court accordingly concluded that the Samish Tribe was not “at this time a treaty

tribe in the political sense” within the meaning of Washington

I and did not “presently hold[ ] for itself or its members fishing rights secured by any of the Stevens treaties identified in

[Washington I].” Id. at 1111. The district court also concluded

that “[o]nly tribes recognized as Indian political bodies by the

United States may possess and exercise the tribal fishing

rights secured and protected by the treaties of the United

States.” Id. This last conclusion was surprising because it was

wholly inconsistent with the district court’s ruling in Washington I that two unrecognized tribes were entitled to treaty

fishing rights. 384 F. Supp. at 378-79, 406.

On appeal, we affirmed the denial of treaty rights. United

States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981). We

pointed out the district court’s error in stating that federal recognition is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of treaty rights:

“[t]his conclusion is clearly contrary to our prior holding

[affirming Washington I] and is foreclosed by well-settled

precedent.” Id. at 1371. We nevertheless held that the district

court’s factual findings supported the denial of relief:

[T]he district court specifically found that the appellants had not functioned since treaty times as “continuous separate, distinct and cohesive Indian

cultural or political communit[ies].” 

After close scrutiny, we conclude that the evidence

supports this finding of fact. Although the appellants

now have constitutions and formal governments, the

governments have not controlled the lives of the

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members. Nor have the appellants clearly established

the continuous informal cultural influence they concede is required.

Id. at 1373 (internal citation omitted) (second alteration in original).4

3. Federal Recognition of the Samish Tribe; Treaty Tribes

Denied Intervention to Oppose Recognition

The Samish Tribe first sought federal recognition in 1972,

but no action was taken on the application. In 1978, the

Department of the Interior adopted rules establishing a process for tribes to achieve federal recognition, known in the

regulations as federal “acknowledgment.” Procedures for

Establishing That an American Indian Group Exists as an

Indian Tribe, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,361, 39,363 (Sept. 5, 1978).5

The Samish Tribe then filed a revised application. 

On February 5, 1987, the Department of the Interior published a “Final Determination That the Samish Indian Tribe

Does Not Exist as an Indian Tribe.” 52 Fed. Reg. 3709. A

major reason for the denial was that the Tribe had failed to

meet two mandatory requirements for recognition: (1) “that a

substantial portion of the petitioning group inhabits a specific

area or lives in a community viewed as American Indian and

distinct from other populations in the area, and that its members are descendants of an Indian tribe which historically

inhabited a specific area”; and (2) “that the petitioner has

maintained tribal political influence or other authority over its

members as an autonomous entity throughout history until the

4One judge (the present writer) dissented from our decision, contending

that the district court’s erroneous conclusion of law requiring federal recognition tainted its factual findings, id. at 1374-76 (Canby, J. dissenting),

but the majority clearly did not accept that view. 

5The current version of the acknowledgment regulations may be found

at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2009). 

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present.” 43 Fed. Reg. at 39,363.6

 The Department’s decision

was made on the papers; the regulation did not provide for a

hearing and gave the applicant no right to see the submissions

of others.

The Samish Tribe then brought an action in district court

challenging the administrative denial of recognition. The

Tulalip Tribes, which had treaty fishing rights, attempted to

intervene on the ground that recognition of the Samish Tribe

would threaten the Tulalips’ treaty fishing rights. See Greene

I, 996 F.2d at 975. The district court ruled that the Samish

Tribe could not, in its challenge to denial of recognition, relitigate Washington II’s denial of treaty fishing rights. See id.

The district court then denied intervention, and the Tulalip

Tribes appealed. See id. at 976.

We upheld the denial of intervention, rejecting the

Tulalips’ argument that the factual inquiries underlying recognition were so similar to the inquiries underlying treaty rights

that recognition was bound to affect treaty rights. We stated:

We recognize that the two inquiries are similar. Yet

each determination serves a different legal purpose

and has an independent legal effect. Federal recognition is not a threshold condition a tribe must establish to fish under the Treaty of Point Elliott . . . . 

Similarly, the Samish need not assert treaty fishing

rights to gain federal recognition . . . . Even if they

obtain federal tribal status, the Samish would still

have to confront the decisions in Washington I and

II before they could claim fishing rights. Federal recognition does not self-execute treaty rights claims.

6These requirements continue in slightly modified form today. See 25

C.F.R. § 83.7(b) & (c) (2009). 

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Id. at 976-77.

Meanwhile, the district court had ruled that the Samish had

been denied due process in the administrative proceeding, and

remanded for a formal adjudication under the Administrative

Procedure Act. See Greene v. Lujan, No. C89-645Z, 1992 WL

533059 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 1992). The Secretary of the

Interior appealed that decision. The Tulalip Tribes, as amici

curiae, again argued that recognition of the Samish was barred

by Washington II. We rejected that contention and affirmed

the district court in Greene II. We stated:

Our decision in Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d

973 (9th Cir. 1993), can leave no serious doubt that

our court regards the issues of tribal treaty status and

federal acknowledgment as fundamentally different.

We there held that the Tulalip Tribe was not entitled

to intervene in this very litigation. We did so because

the Tulalip’s interest in preventing the Samish from

gaining treaty fishing rights was not affected by this

litigation, involving federal tribal recognition or, as

it is termed in the applicable regulation, “acknowledgment.”

Greene II, 64 F.3d at 1270. We further observed that we had

denied intervention by the Tulalip Tribes in Greene I “because we disagreed with their position that Samish success in

the [recognition case] would undermine the finality of the

Washington II decision.” Id. at 1271. After further consideration of the merits, we then upheld the district court’s ruling

that due process entitled the Samish Tribe to a hearing on its

application for recognition. Id. at 1275.

In administrative proceedings that followed, an Administrative Law Judge held that the Samish Tribe was entitled to federal recognition. The judge included several findings tracing

the Samish Tribe’s history which, according to Greene III,

supported the mandatory recognition criteria that: (1) the

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group “has been identified as an American Indian entity on a

substantially continuous basis since 1900,” 25 C.F.R.

§ 83.7(a); (2) the group “comprises a distinct community and

has existed as a community from historical times until the

present,” id. § 83.7(b); (3) the tribe has “maintained political

influence or authority over its members,” id. § 83.7(c); and

(4) “[t]he petitioner’s membership consists of individuals who

descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical

Indian tribes which combined and functioned as a single

autonomous political entity,” id. § 83.7(e). See Greene III,

943 F. Supp. at 1283-84. The Assistant Secretary of the Interior, however, after an ex parte conference with a government

lawyer and expert witness, approved the recognition of the

Samish Tribe but deleted several of the crucial findings of the

Administrative Law Judge underlying the determination that

the Samish had met the regulatory requirements. See id. at

1282-83; Samish Recognition, 61 Fed. Reg. at 15,825.

The Samish Tribe thereupon returned to district court,

objecting to the deletion of the Administrative Law Judge’s

findings. The district court held the ex parte contacts to be

unlawful, and reinstated the disputed findings of the Administrative Law Judge. Greene III, 943 F. Supp. at 1288-89.

7

4. The Samish Tribe Moves to Reopen the Treaty Rights

Denial; Washington III.

In 2002, armed with its federal recognition, the Samish

Tribe filed a motion in district court to reopen Washington II.

See Washington III, 394 F.3d at 1156. The motion was filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which pro7The Treaty Tribes contend that the Samish Tribe misled the district

court into mistaking the text of the disputed findings of the Administrative

Law Judge. We are satisfied, however, that the district court here was correct in holding that the district court in Greene III reinstated the actual

findings of the Administrative Law Judge, not some inaccurate description

thereof. 

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vides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment

for certain specified reasons or, in a catchall provision, for

“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(6). Several tribes that currently hold treaty fishing

rights (“the Treaty Tribes”) opposed the motion. Washington

III, 394 F.3d at 1156. The district court denied relief.

The Samish appealed, and we reversed. We recognized that

the catchall provision of Rule 60(b) “ ‘has been used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice’

and ‘is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances

prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.’ ” Id. at 1157 (quoting United

States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049

(9th Cir. 1993)). We held that, in light of the circumstances

of the earlier denial of treaty rights for the Samish Tribe, its

subsequent federal recognition was an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying Rule 60(b) relief. Id. at 1161. The key point

was not the recognition itself, but the factual findings underlying the recognition, notably the findings that the Samish Tribe

“ ‘has been continuously identified throughout history as

Indian or aboriginal, has existed as a distinct community since

first sustained European contact, has maintained political

influence within itself as an autonomous entity and that 80

percent of its members are descendants of the historical

Samish tribe.’ ” Id. at 1160 (quoting 61 Fed. Reg. 15825,

15826).

We noted that, if the Samish Tribe had been recognized at

the time it first sought an adjudication of treaty rights, it “almost certainly” would have succeeded. Id. at 1159. We further stated:

In light of the government’s “excessive delays and

. . . misconduct” in withholding of recognition from

the Samish, a circumstance beyond their control; the

government’s position in Washington II that federal

recognition was necessary and that future federal

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recognition might justify revisiting the treaty rights

issue; and the district court’s erroneous conclusion

that nonrecognition was decisive and wholesale

adoption of the United States’ boiler-plate findings

of fact in Washington II, we conclude that the

Samish were effectively prevented from proving

their tribal status “in a proper fashion.”

Id. (alteration in original). We also noted:

Although we have previously held that federal recognition is not necessary for the exercise of treaty

fishing rights by a signatory tribe, we have never

held that federal recognition is not a sufficient condition for the exercise of those rights. Indeed, our precedent leads us to the inevitable conclusion that

federal recognition is a sufficient condition for the

exercise of treaty rights.

Id. at 1157-58. The reason, we said, was that treaty rights

require that a signatory group has maintained an organized

tribal structure from treaty times to the present, and recognition requires that a group be a distinct community that has

existed from historical times to the present and maintained

political influence or authority over its members during that

time. Id. at 1158. Because the Samish were parties to the

treaty, recognition of the Samish Tribe established that they

were successors to the treaty status. Id. at 1160.

Finally, we ruled that the district court’s concerns for the

finality of judgments did not justify denial of the Samish’s

motion to reopen Washington II: “Unlike a judgment between

private parties, the allocation of natural resources between

treaty tribes and others cannot help but be an ongoing venture.” Id. at 1162. We accordingly reversed the district court’s

order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with

our opinion. Id.

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5. The District Court’s Decision on Remand, Now Under

Review

On remand after our decision in Washington III, the district

court again denied the Samish Tribe’s motion to reopen

Washington II. It recited at length the findings of Washington

II that the present Samish Tribe had not maintained an organized tribal structure and was not a successor to the Samish

Tribe that had secured treaty rights in 1855. The district court

also noted that reopening on the ground of the intervening

recognition of the Samish Tribe would conflict with the

Greene cases in which we denied intervention of treaty tribes

in the Samish recognition proceedings because recognition

would have no effect on treaty rights. The district court reiterated its original view that considerations of finality supported

denial because reopening would be hugely disruptive to the

regime of treaty fishing that had been established in the wake

of Washington II.

8

The Samish Tribe again appealed.

DISCUSSION

In ruling on remand that considerations of finality required

it to deny reopening of Washington II, the district court

clearly violated the mandate of Washington III. The considerations of finality cited by the district court had all been considered and rejected by our court in Washington III, as had

our decisions in the Greene cases. We do not condone devia8The district court also added two new grounds for denial of reopening.

The first was untimeliness, reflected in the delay between the federal recognition of the Samish Tribe in 1996 and its motion to reopen filed in

2002. The second ground was inequitable conduct by the Samish Tribe in

misstating and manipulating the findings of the Administrative Law Judge

during the district court’s review of the reinstatement proceedings. Our

disposition of this appeal makes it unnecessary for us to address these rulings. 

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tion from our mandates because of a disagreement with this

court’s reasoning.

That having been said, this appeal presents us with a clear

conflict in our precedent that gave difficulty to the district

court here and would give difficulty to other district courts in

the future if we did not address it. For that reason, we voted

to convene this en banc court to resolve this appeal in the first

instance.9

The nature and severity of the conflict in our precedent

should be apparent from our perhaps-too-lengthy recital

above of the history of this litigation. On the one hand, we

have Greene I and II, which denied treaty tribes the right to

intervene in the Samish Tribe’s recognition proceedings

because recognition could have no effect on treaty rights. On

the other hand, we have Washington III, which ruled that the

fact of recognition of the Samish Tribe was an extraordinary

circumstance that justified reopening Washington II. Washington III further opined that recognition of the Samish Tribe

was a sufficient condition for the establishment of treaty fishing rights.

Each of these two conflicting lines of authority has something to be said for it, but the two cannot coexist. We con9This appeal was initially argued to a three-judge panel, but the conflict

in our precedent led us to rehear the matter en banc without awaiting a

three-judge decision. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d

1477, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc). This step was necessary because,

even if the panel could have revisited Washington III under one of the

exceptions to law of the case, see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1489

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), it still would have been bound by that published

opinion as the law of the circuit, see, e.g., Old Person v. Brown, 312 F.3d

1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have no discretion to depart from precedential aspects of our prior decision in Old Person I, under the general

law-of-the-circuit rule.”). 

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clude that Washington III must yield, and we overrule that

decision.10 We address the conflicting decisions in turn.

Washington III

[1] A primary reason why Washington III decided to permit

reopening of Washington II was that the Samish Tribe had

been effectively prevented from proving its tribal treaty status

“ ‘in a proper fashion.’ ” 394 F.3d at 1159 (citation omitted).

Contributing to that view was the litigating posture of the

United States in Washington II, which asserted that federal

recognition was essential to the establishment of treaty rights

and that, if the Samish were later recognized, the treaty rights

issue might be revisited. See id. Those conclusions of Washington III, however, were inconsistent with this court’s earlier

ruling in the appeal of Washington II. 

[2] This court in affirming Washington II flatly rejected the

ruling of the district court that federal recognition was

required for treaty status. 641 F.2d at 1371 (“This conclusion

is clearly contrary to our prior holding and is foreclosed by

well-settled precedent.”). We held, however, that the crucial

finding of fact justifying the denial of treaty rights was the

district court’s finding “that the [Samish] had not functioned

since treaty times as ‘continuous separate, distinct and cohesive cultural or political communit[ies].’ ” Id. at 1373 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). As the district

court in the present case pointed out, this factual finding had

been made by a special master after a five-day trial, and had

been made again by the district judge de novo after an eviden10The decision of Washington III does not bind us as the law of the case.

It is “clearly established” that a three-judge panel decision that is the law

of the case for subsequent three-judge panels “does not bind the en banc

court.” Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d

987, 995 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

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tiary hearing. On appeal, “[a]fter close scrutiny, we conclude[d] that the evidence supports this finding of fact.” Id.11

Nor was there any reason why the Samish Tribe lacked

incentive to present in Washington II all of its evidence supporting its right to successor treaty status. The Stillaguamish

and Upper Skagit Tribes had been found to have treaty rights

in Washington I, despite their unrecognized status. There was

no reason for the Samish Tribe to hold back any evidence at

that time, nor do they now offer any underlying evidence that

was subsequently brought to light and could not have been

known at the time of Washington II.

[3] Instead, the Samish Tribe now seeks reopening under

Rule 60(b) on the ground that an administrative body has

come to a conclusion inconsistent with the factual finding

finally adjudicated by this court in Washington II. We have

been directed to no authority upholding relief from judgment

under Rule 60(b) on such a ground. 

[4] There are good reasons why reopening under Rule

60(b)(6) is permitted only on a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.,

486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988). In United States v. Alpine Land &

Reservoir Co., for example, we denied Rule 60(b)(6) relief

from a complex decree adjudicating water rights to a river.

984 F.2d at 1050. We stated that “[p]articipants in water adjudications are entitled to rely on the finality of decrees as much

as, if not more than, parties to other types of civil judgments.”

Id. Similar considerations of finality loom especially large in

11In 1993, three of the tribes, not including the Samish Tribe, that had

been denied treaty rights in Washington II sought relief from the judgment

on the ground that the district judge may have been impaired by

Alzheimer’s disease at the time of the decision. In denying relief on

grounds of finality and insufficient evidence to support the claim, we

noted that the magistrate judge and this court had both examined the evidence in Washington II and found that it supported the ruling. United

States v. Washington, 98 F.3d 1159, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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this case, in which a detailed regime for regulating and dividing fishing rights has been created in reliance on the framework of Washington I. The district court has twice made

compilations of substantive orders entered in the wake of

Washington I. See United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp.

1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978); United States v. Washington, 626

F. Supp. 1405 (W.D. Wash. 1985). By 1985, seventy-two substantive orders had been entered. Although such a complex

regime does not preclude a new entrant who presents a new

case for recognition of treaty rights, it certainly cautions

against relitigating rights that were established or denied in

decisions upon which many subsequent actions have been

based.

The potential disruption and possible injury to existing

treaty rights that might follow from reopening the denial of

the Samish Tribe’s treaty claims in Washington II is not confined to mere across-the-board dilution of the shares of total

harvest of all treaty tribes. The treaties guarantee the right to

take fish at “usual and accustomed . . . stations” of each treaty

tribe. The claims of the Samish Tribe necessarily compete

with those of treaty tribes held to be successors of the treaty

Samish, who now fish at the customary stations of the Samish

at treaty times. The impact of new claims asserted as Samish

claims will have a particularly severe impact on such treaty

tribes.12

[5] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the Samish

Tribe is not entitled to reopening of Washington II because of

12In an effort to minimize disruption, the Samish Tribe at one point

asserted that it “would agree to exercise treaty fishing rights under the

orders in the case that apply to these three tribes [who are successors to

Samish treaty rights], and under the regulatory authority and framework

of the three tribes.” Washington III, 394 F.3d at 1161. This concession,

however, was withdrawn on remand following Washington III. In any

event, it would potentially disturb treaty fishing of the tribes now exercising Samish treaty rights to have the newly recognized Samish Tribe join

them. 

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their subsequent federal recognition. Reopening on this

ground is inconsistent with the considerations of finality that

have led the Supreme Court and this court to confine the

reach of Rule 60(b)(6). The Samish Tribe had a factual determination finally adjudicated against it in Washington II. The

fact that a subsequent administrative ruling for another purpose may have made underlying inconsistent findings is no

reason for undoing the finality of the Washington II factual

determinations. 

Nothing we have said precludes a newly recognized tribe

from attempting to intervene in United States v. Washington

or other treaty rights litigation to present a claim of treaty

rights not yet adjudicated. Such a tribe will have to proceed,

however, by introducing its factual evidence anew; it cannot

rely on a preclusive effect arising from the mere fact of recognition. In Greene II, we denied any estoppel effect of Washington II on the Samish Tribe’s recognition proceeding,

because treaty litigation and recognition proceedings were

“fundamentally different” and had no effect on one another.

Greene II, 64 F.3d at 1270. Our ruling was part of a two-way

street: treaty adjudications have no estoppel effect on recognition proceedings, and recognition has no preclusive effect on

treaty rights litigation.13 Indeed, to enforce the assurance in

Greene II that treaty rights were “not affected” by recognition

proceedings, the fact of recognition cannot be given even presumptive weight in subsequent treaty litigation. To rule otherwise would not allow an orderly means of protecting the

rights of existing treaty tribes on the one hand, and groups

seeking recognition on the other.

13Collateral estoppel would not apply in any event against an entity that

was not a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation. See Collins

v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 882 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover,

offensive collateral estoppel is a discretionary doctrine, see id. at 882, and

the circumstances here justify denying its effect. 

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Greene I and II

The nature of recognition proceedings in general and the

Samish recognition proceeding in particular make us especially reluctant to reopen an adjudicated treaty decision on the

strength of the subsequent recognition of the Samish Tribe.

As we have already recited, we denied the Tulalip Tribes

intervention in the Samish recognition proceedings on the

ground that the “Tulalip’s interest in preventing the Samish

from gaining treaty fishing rights was not affected by this litigation, involving federal tribal recognition . . . .” Greene II,

64 F.3d at 1270. We explained that, in Greene I, we had “denied the Tulalip the right to intervene in this [recognition] litigation because we disagreed with their position that Samish

success in the case at bar would undermine the finality of the

Washington II decision.” Id. at 1271. After these assurances,

it is surely improper for us to accord the recognition decision

the effect of reopening Washington II. 

[6] There are good reasons for adhering to the rule that

treaty tribes are not entitled to intervene in recognition decisions to protect against possible future assertions of treaty

rights by the newly recognized tribe, whether or not that tribe

has previously been the subject of a treaty rights decision.

Recognition, or “acknowledgment,” serves a host of purposes

for the group that succeeds in achieving it. It establishes a

“government-to-government relationship” between the recognized tribe and the United States. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2. It is a

“prerequisite to the protection, services, and benefits of the

Federal government available to Indian tribes by virtue of

their status as tribes.” Id. “Federal recognition brings its own

obvious rewards, not the least of which is the eligibility of

federal money for tribal programs, social services and economic development.” Greene I, 996 F.2d at 978. 

[7] It interjects unnecessary and distracting considerations

into recognition proceedings if treaty tribes find it necessary

or are permitted to intervene to protect against future assertion

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of treaty rights by the tribe seeking recognition. Such intervention has the potential to interfere unnecessarily with a

tribe’s establishing its entitlement to recognition because of

the speculative possibility that some administrative finding

might have an impact on future treaty ligitation. The best way

of avoiding such difficulties, we conclude, is to deny intervention by tribes seeking to protect their treaty rights, and to

deny any effect of recognition in any subsequent treaty litigation. That is the course we adopt.

CONCLUSION

[8] The judgment of the district court denying the Rule

60(b) motion of the Samish Tribe for relief from the judgment

in Washington II is affirmed. The conflict between Washington III and Greene I and II is resolved in favor of Greene I

and II; Washington III is overruled. 

AFFIRMED.

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