Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_14-cv-00415/USCOURTS-alsd-2_14-cv-00415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE WESTRY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:14-00415-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Willie Westry brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 

seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The parties have 

consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by, and this case has been ordered referred 

to, the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings in this Court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Docs. 18, 20. The parties have waived oral 

argument. Docs. 17, 19.

Upon consideration of the administrative record (“R.”) (Doc. 12), Plaintiff’s 

Brief (Doc. 14), and the Commissioner’s Brief (Doc. 15), the Court has determined 

that the Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff’s benefits should be 

AFFIRMED.1

 1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and simultaneously entered separate 

judgment may be made directly to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Doc. 23.

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I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on July 8, 2008 (see R. 340-342), alleging 

a disability onset date of June 17, 2008. See R. 340. His application was initially 

denied. See R. 145-149. Hearings were conducted before Administrative Law Judge

David L. Horton (“the ALJ”) on February 26, 2010. See R. 99-123. On April 22, 2010, 

the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. R. 125-38. The Appeals 

Council reviewed the case and remanded it to the ALJ because the original records 

considered by the ALJ included information that did not pertain to the Claimant. R. 

139-43. Further hearings were conducted before the ALJ on September 17, 2012. See

R. 79-98. On November 29, 2012, the ALJ issued a second decision, now before this 

Court, finding Plaintiff not disabled. R. 57-78. The Appeals Council issued a decision 

declining to review the ALJ’s determination on July 15, 2014 (see R. 1-7), rendering 

the Commissioner’s decision final for purposes of judicial review (see 20 C.F.R. § 

404.981). Claimant timely filed a complaint in this Court on September 5, 2014. See 

Doc. 1.

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a resident of Pinehill, Alabama (Doc. 1 at 1), born January 17, 

1970. R. 340. He was 42 at the time of the second hearing before the ALJ. R. 79, 340.

He completed ninth grade and does not have a GED. See R. 602. His past relevant 

work experience includes positions as a floor maintenance worker, dump truck 

driver, diesel tractor operator, and road grader. R. 70; 381-401. He has not worked 

since before the alleged onset date of June 17, 2008. R. 340. Plaintiff suffers from a 

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number of medical issues, including irritable bowel syndrome, sleep apnea, 

hypertensive cardiovascular disease, obesity, a history of right wrist fracture, and a 

history of gallbladder surgery. R. 63.

On June 19, 2008, Plaintiff was prescribed a CPAP machine by Walid W. 

Freij, M.D., to treat severe obstructive sleep apnea syndrome. R. 527-40. He has 

been treated by Roseanne Cook, M.D., for irritable bowel syndrome, hypertension, 

sleep apnea, and a number of other conditions. R. 562-617. On February 28, 2012, 

Dr. Cook completed a Medical Source Statement stating that Plaintiff could work an 

8-hour workday with a number of limitations. R. 605. On March 15, 2012, Dr. Freij 

completed a Medical Source Statement indicating that Plaintiff could not maintain a 

regular 8-hour workday. R. 607.

III. Claims on Appeal

On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff asserts that the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits is in error (i.e., not supported by substantial evidence) on the following 

ground:

The ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of the treating physician, 

Roseanne Cook, M.D., and the treating neurologist, Walid W. Freij, 

M.D., and in giving greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Carmichael, a 

non-examining non-treating reviewing DDS physician who completed a 

checkbox form after reviewing only four medical exhibits, did not 

consider sleep apnea, and rendered his opinion over four years before 

the ALJ’s decision.

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Doc. 14 at 1-2.

IV. Standard of Review

In all Social Security cases, a plaintiff (sometimes referred to as a claimant) 

bears the burden of proving that he or she is unable to perform his or her previous 

work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether 

that burden has been met, and thus a claimant has proven that he or she is disabled, 

the examiner (most often an ALJ) must consider the following four factors: (1) 

objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; 

(3) evidence of pain; and (4) the plaintiff’s age, education, and work history (see id); 

and, in turn,

uses a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether the 

claimant is disabled, which considers: (1) whether the claimant is 

engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the severe impairment 

meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments in the 

regulations; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the [residual functional 

capacity, or] RFC[,] to perform her past relevant work; and (5) if not, 

whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work 

experience, there are other jobs the claimant can perform.

Watkins v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 457 Fed. Appx. 868, 870 (11th Cir. 2012) (per 

curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (c)-(f), 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(f); Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)).

If a plaintiff proves that he or she cannot do his or her past relevant work, it 

then becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove that the plaintiff is 

capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Id.; 

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Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 

836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, but importantly, although “the [plaintiff] bears the 

burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, 

the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair 

record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

The task for this Court is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny a plaintiff benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial 

evidence is defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, and 

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) 

(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “In determining whether 

substantial evidence exists, [a court] must view the record as a whole, taking into 

account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” 

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Courts are precluded, however, 

from “deciding the facts anew or re-weighing the evidence.” Davison v. Astrue, 370 

Fed. App’x 995, 996 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (per curiam) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 

395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)). “Even if the evidence preponderates against 

the Commissioner’s findings, [a court] must affirm if the decision reached is 

supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Crawford v. Commissioner of Soc.

Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added).

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V. Analysis

A. The ALJ properly considered the treating and non-treating 

physicians’ opinions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work.

The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of treating 

physicians, Roseanne Cook, M.D., and Walid W. Freij, M.D., while giving greater 

weight to a consulting physician, R. Glenn Carmichael, M.D. Doc. 14 at 1-2. Dr. Cook

issued two separate opinions regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations, one in 

October 2009 (R. 562-68) and one in February 2012. R. 605-06. Dr. Freij issued an 

opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations in March 2012. R. 607.

Evidence considered by the Commissioner in making a disability 

determination may include medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2) & 

416.927(a)(2). “ ‘Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists 

or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and 

severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, 

diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and 

[the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.’ ” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 

631 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 

416.927(a)(2)). “There are three tiers of medical opinion sources: (1) treating 

physicians; (2) nontreating, examining physicians; and (3) nontreating, 

nonexamining physicians.” Himes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 585 F. App'x 758, 762 

(11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(1)-(2), 416.927(c)(1)-(2)). “In assessing medical opinions, the ALJ must 

consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each 

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medical opinion, including (1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; (2) 

the length, nature, and extent of a treating physician's relationship with the 

claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician’s 

opinion; (4) how consistent the physician’s opinion is with the record as a whole; and 

(5) the physician’s specialization. These factors apply to both examining and 

non-examining physicians.” Eyre v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 586 F. App'x 521, 

523 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) & (e), 416.927(c) & (e)). 

The ALJ “may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports 

a contrary conclusion.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240. Accord, e.g., Anderson v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 427 F. App'x 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 

(unpublished). However, 

the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different 

medical opinions and the reasons therefor. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 

278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). “In the absence of such a 

statement, it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether 

the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and 

supported by substantial evidence.” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 

735 (11th Cir. 1981). Therefore, when the ALJ fails to “state with at 

least some measure of clarity the grounds for his decision,” we will 

decline to affirm “simply because some rationale might have supported 

the ALJ's conclusion.” Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th 

Cir.1984) (per curiam). In such a situation, “to say that [the ALJ’s] 

decision is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication 

of the court's duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine 

whether the conclusions reached are rational.” Cowart, 662 F.2d at 735 

(quoting Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir. 1979)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179.

“A ‘treating source’ (i.e., a treating physician) is a claimant's ‘own physician, 

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psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides[], or has provided[],[ 

the claimant] with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an 

ongoing treatment relationship with [the claimant].’ ” Nyberg v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 179 F. App'x 589, 591 (11th Cir. May 2, 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). “Absent ‘good cause,’ an ALJ is to give the medical 

opinions of treating physicians ‘substantial or considerable weight.’ ” Winschel, 631 

F.3d at 1179 (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). That is so because treating sources 

are likely in a better position “to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a 

claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the 

medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone 

or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or 

brief hospitalizations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). “Good cause 

exists ‘when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; 

(2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was 

conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.’ With good cause, 

an ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he ‘must clearly articulate 

[the] reasons’ for doing so.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d 

at 1240-41) (internal citation omitted). See also, e.g., Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 

(“[T]he opinion of a treating physician may be rejected when it is so brief and 

conclusory that it lacks persuasive weight or where it is unsubstantiated by any 

clinical or laboratory findings. Further, the Secretary may reject the opinion of any 

physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” (citation omitted)).

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The ALJ concluded that Dr. Cook’s medical source statements were due “little 

weight.” R. 69. The ALJ stated that this was because Dr. Cook’s statement that 

“sleep apnea would prevent [the Plaintiff from] maintain concentration, persistence 

or pace” was “inconsistent with the claimant report to Dr. Freij that he was feeling 

refreshed when he awakened in the morning, using his C-pap machine.” Id. compare 

R. 609. The ALJ also reasoned that there were no test results or symptoms present 

in Dr. Cook’s treatment notes that supported Plaintiff’s complaint of pain. R. 69. The 

ALJ chose to give “greater weight” to Dr. Cook’s “treatment notes, clinical findings, 

and diagnostic tests” due to her relationship with the Plaintiff as a treating 

physician, but chose not to accept Dr. Cook’s medical source statements. Id. Because 

the ALJ determined that the physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence 

(see id. compare R. 609), the ALJ had “good cause” to disregard Dr. Cook’s

evaluations. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. The ALJ’s statement of the reasons for 

disregarding the evaluations comport with the standard set by Winschel. See id.

Thus, the ALJ properly considered Dr. Cook’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s sleep apnea 

and pain.

The same evaluation may be applied to the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Freij’s 

evaluation. The ALJ concluded that Dr. Freij’s medical source statement was due 

“little weight” because the opinion that Plaintiff “could not maintain concentration, 

persistence, or pace for periods of at least 2 hours” was “not consistent” with 

Plaintiff’s statement that he was awakening feeling refreshed while using the C-pap 

machine. R. 69 compare R. 609. The ALJ again chose to give “greater weight” to Dr. 

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Freij’s “treatment notes, clinical findings, and diagnostic tests” due to his

relationship with the Plaintiff as a treating physician, but also chose not to accept 

Dr. Freij’s medical source statement. Id. Because the ALJ determined that the 

physician’s opinion was inconsistent with his own treatment records (see id. compare

R. 609), the ALJ had “good cause” to disregard Dr. Freij’s evaluation. See Winschel, 

631 F.3d at 1179. The ALJ’s statement of the reasons for disregarding the 

evaluations comport with the standard set by Winschel. See id. Thus, the ALJ 

properly considered Dr. Freij’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s sleep apnea.

The ALJ also gave “greater weight” to the opinion of R. Glenn Carmichael,

M.D., that Plaintiff could perform light work activities because this opinion was 

“consistent with the available medical evidence that was reviewed in rendering the 

opinion.” R. 70. The ALJ must evaluate all medicals opinions before him or her. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Evaluating an opinion such as Dr. Carmichael’s based on 

consistency comports with the requirements for evaluating all medical evidence. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the 

record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion.”).

Generally, “[t]he opinions of nonexamining, reviewing physicians, such as 

those of Dr[]. [Carmichael], when contrary to those of the examining physicians, are 

entitled to little weight, and standing alone do not constitute substantial evidence.” 

E.g., Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987). However, where an 

ALJ has properly articulated good cause to give less than substantial weight to a 

treating physician’s opinion, an ALJ does not err in assigning more weight to the 

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opinion of a non-examining physician, so long as other substantial evidence supports 

it. Here, the ALJ articulated good cause to assign “little weight” to the treating 

physicians’ opinions but gave “greater weight” to their objective treatment notes, 

which the ALJ found to be “consistent with” his RFC assessment. R. 69. The ALJ 

also found Dr. Carmichael’s opinion to be “consistent with the available medical 

evidence that was reviewed in rendering the opinion.” R. 70. Thus, the ALJ 

properly considered and weighed the opinion of Dr. Carmichael, along with the rest 

of the medical evidence available. Compare Crow v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 571 

F. App'x 802, 807 (11th Cir. July 7, 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[T]he 

non-examining physician's assessment, indicating that Crow was capable of the full 

range of light work, was consistent with the record, as the ALJ noted. The ALJ 

provided specific reasons for discounting his treating physician's opinion, and those 

reasons are supported by the record such that the ALJ did not err. The ALJ also 

provided specific reasons for giving greater weight to the non-treating physician's 

assessment. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in weighing the medical opinion 

evidence.” (citations omitted)), and Forrester v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 455 F. App'x 

899, 902-03 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[T]he ALJ had 

‘good cause’ to not give Dr. Goss's opinion considerable weight and did not err[, and] 

the ALJ did not err by relying on the opinions of the non-treating physicians, taken 

alone, in a way that left its decision unsupported by substantial evidence. The 

evidence supported a contrary conclusion to Dr. Goss's opinion, and the ALJ was not 

prohibited from reaching that conclusion simply because non-treating physicians 

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also reached it. Therefore, the ALJ properly explained the weight it gave to various 

medical opinions, clearly articulated its reasons, and did not err by crediting the 

opinions of non-treating sources over a treating one.” (citation omitted), with 

Johnson v. Barnhart, 138 F. App'x 266, 271 (11th Cir. June 29, 2005) (per curiam) 

(unpublished) (“Maloy’s RFC evaluation is not dispositive, as its conclusions are 

from a non-treating, non-examining physician, and the other medical records 

express no indication of Johnson’s ability to perform her past work.”).

B. The ALJ relied on substantial evidence in making the RFC 

assessment and in finding that the Plaintiff could perform past work.

Finally, the ALJ’s RFC determination and his subsequent determination that 

the Plaintiff can perform light work at a reduced level are supported by substantial 

evidence as required by Jones (190 F.3d at 1228) and Crawford (363 F.3d at

1158-59). In making the decision, the ALJ considered and relied on the opinions, 

assessments, and treatment notes of Roseanne Cook, M.D.; Walid W. Freij, M.D.; R. 

Glenn Carmichael, M.D.; Gary R. Kania, D.O.; and Ninna E. Tocci, Ph.D. 

(psychology). R. 64-70. The ALJ also relied on the testimony of a vocational expert, 

Joshua S. Tilton, Ph.D.; the testimony of a physical medical expert, William B. 

Whatley III, M.D.; and the testimony of a psychological medical expert, Sydney H. 

Garner, Psy.D. Id. As required by the Eleventh Circuit, the evidence relied upon is 

“more than a scintilla” and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would 

accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s] conclusion.” See Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F. 

2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). In the last analysis, the 

record evidence does not support Plaintiff’s assignments of error. Rather, the record 

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as a whole reflects that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

VI. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying Plaintiff benefits is AFFIRMED under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

DONE and ORDERED this the 16th day of March 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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