Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03558/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03558-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIMBERLY C. SWAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-03558-JCS 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 21

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kimberly Swan seeks review of the final decision of Defendant Carolyn Colvin, 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), denying her

applications for disability insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits under Titles II 

and XVI of the Social Security Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and 

DENIES in part Swan’s Motion for Summary Judgment in part, DENIES the Commissioner’s 

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and REMANDS the case to the Commissioner for further 

proceedings consistent with this Order.1

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Swan worked from May 2004 to September 2011, providing laundry services for a 

nonprofit homeless shelter. Administrative Record (“AR,” dkt. no. 13) at 247. In May 2009 and 

December 2010, Swan injured to her lower back, hips, and knees while working. See id. 

at 367, 382. Following her 2010 injury, Swan was placed on temporary disability and retained 

that status until she was discharged. See id. at 398, 438. Swan was also treated for mental health 

 

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The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)

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issues during that period. See id. at 280–342. Swan was terminated by the nonprofit in September 

2011 and she applied for Social Security benefits three months later. See id. at 209–24.

From September to October 2012, Swan worked part-time as a cashier at a Kentucky Fried 

Chicken. See id. at 37, 225–29. She stopped working as a cashier due to pain. See id. at 37–38.

1. Evaluation of Swan’s Physical Injuries

Following her 2010 workplace injury, Swan received treatment from Dr. John Maki. 

See AR at 441–76. Dr. Maki observed that Swan had experienced back, hip, and knee injuries. 

See id. He further noted that Swan’s injuries required modifications and limitations to her work. 

See id. Dr. Maki also referred Swan to Dr. Fred Naraghi for evaluation of her back injuries. 

See id. at 382–88.

Dr. Diokson Rena evaluated Swan for her back, hip, and knee injuries on March 3, 2011, 

and diagnosed her with right hip pain and capsulitis, a right sacroiliac joint sprain with 

arthropathy, and lumbar disc disease. See id. at 367–70. Dr. Rena opined that Swan was limited 

to “modified duty” and, if no modified duty was available, she was temporarily totally disabled. 

Id. at 369.

Dr. Naraghi evaluated Swan’s for back injuries on March 7, 2011. Id. at 382–88. Dr. 

Naraghi diagnosed her with worsening back and right leg pain accompanied by numbness in her 

right lower extremity. Id. at 439. He also diagnosed her with right leg radiculopathy and 

radiculitis. Id. at 439. He further noted that he needed an MRI of Swan’s spine to complete his 

evaluation and stated that she was unable to return to work until his evaluation was completed. 

Id. at 439–40.

Dr. Naraghi evaluated Swan again in April 2011. See id. at 374–79. Dr. Naraghi noted 

that he had not yet reviewed an MRI of Swan’s spine because his MRI request had not been 

approved by Swan’s insurance provider. Id. at 374–76. He also stated that he needed an x-ray to 

complete his evaluation. Id. He transferred Swan back to Dr. Maki until he could review the 

requested MRI and x-ray, but reiterated that Swan was “unable to return to work until further 

evaluation.” Id.

In May 2011, Swan saw Dr. Rena for a follow-up evaluation. See id. at 362–64. Dr. Rena 

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again noted Swan’s ailments, which had not changed since her March evaluation. Id. at 363. 

Regarding Swan’s work status, Dr. Rena stated, “I will transition the patient to return to regular 

duty on a trial basis until the next follow-up.” Id. Dr. Rena also noted that Swan’s injuries were 

slowly improving. Id. at 364.

Dr. Rena conducted another follow-up evaluation on September 2, 2011. See id. at 352–

56. The only ailment noted by Dr. Rena from this examination was lumbar disc disease. Id.

at 354. Dr. Rena further observed, “Permanent work preclusions are not indicated. [¶] I feel 

[Swan] can continue in her usual and customary work as a service coordinator.” Id. at 355.

Dr. Rena again evaluated Swan in January 2012. Id. at 346–48. After observing that Swan 

had lumbar disc disease and a right sacroiliac joint sprain, Dr. Rena stated that Swan’s work status 

remained “the same as per her final report. She is on regular duty and is to continue with the 

regular duty status.” Id. at 347.

On January 10, 2013, Dr. Brenden P. Morley conducted an in-person qualified medical 

evaluation of Swan’s physical and psychological health. Id. at 421–24. Dr. Morley diagnosed 

Swan with bilateral knees featuring internal derangement and opined that she likely had a lumbar 

herniated disc with radiculopathy. Id. at 424. Two months later, Dr. Morley supplemented this 

evaluation with an extensive review of Swan’s medical history and a report in which he opined 

that Swan’s lumbar spine had reached a point of maximum medical improvement. Id. at 410–17. 

He also explained that Swan’s case was “complex and extraordinary because [her] symptoms are 

greater than what one would find related to a simple and straightforward diagnosis.” Id. at 416.

Dr. Morley opined that Swan “will not be able to return to her pre-injury occupation.” Id. at 415–

16. Dr. Morley also recommended that Swan receive orthopedic treatment for her bilateral knees. 

Id. at 416.

On January 26, 2013, Dr. Todd Nguyen conducted a consultative examination of Swan’s 

spine and joints. Id. at 403–06. Dr. Nguyen observed, “Objectively the range of motion in the 

lumbar spine is moderately reduced. Neurological exam is with normal strength . . . .” Id. at 406.

Regarding her functional capacity, he opined that Swan was able to walk, stand, and sit for six 

hours if she had a break every two hours; she was able to lift twenty pounds frequently and fifty 

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pounds occasionally; she should be able to bend and stoop occasionally, and no modification to 

her environment or assistive device was required for her to work. Id.

On January 30, 2013, Dr. Timothy Lo conducted an electrodiagnostic examination of 

Swan’s lower extremity symptoms. Id. at 418–20. Dr. Lo opined that the results of his evaluation 

constituted a “grossly normal electrodiagnostic study.” Id. at 420. Dr. Lo further noted that, while 

there was no electrodiagnostic evidence of it, Swan’s history suggested that she likely suffered 

from right lumbar radiculopathy. Id.

2. Evaluation of Swan’s Mental Health

Dr. Lynne Mc Innes psychiatrically evaluated Swan on September 1, 2011. Id. at 329–30. 

Dr. Mc Innes noted that she had treated Swan in the past and observed that Swan was suffering 

from recurrent depression and panic attacks. Id. Although Swan had been prescribed Citalopram

in the past, she had stopped taking it after experiencing improvement in her depression symptoms. 

Id. Dr. Mc Innes resumed Swan’s prescription for Citalopram and also prescribed Ambien. Id.

In May 2012, clinical psychologist Dr. Jennifer Eggert conducted a consultative 

examination of Swan. See id. at 391–94. Dr. Eggert diagnosed Swan with chronic posttraumatic 

stress disorder (“PTSD”) and major depressive disorder (“MDD”) that was recurrent and 

moderate. Id. at 392. She assigned Swan a global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score of 53

and observed that her prognosis was fair. Id. Dr. Eggert also specifically addressed Swan’s workrelated abilities, noting several moderate impairments in Swan’s ability to function. Id. at 393. 

Dr. Eggert further opined that Swan:

should be able to respond appropriately to coworkers, supervisors, 

the public, and any safety issues that might arise in a work situation. 

However, at present, [her] ability to tolerate the mental demands 

associated with work, or work-like settings, without deterioration or 

decompensation is not likely. Consequently . . . although she 

appears able to be successful at maintaining the skills required to 

carry out tasks in a work setting, her overall performance and ability 

to maintain relationships at work may be negatively impacted by her 

mental health.

Id.

Swan also received a consultative examination from Dr. Elizabeth Welchel in December 

2012. See id. at 396–401. Dr. Welchel diagnosed Swan with MDD that was moderate and 

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recurrent, PTSD, and personality disorder. Id. at 400. She assigned Swan a GAF score of 55 and

observed that Swan:

is a depressed and traumatized woman who has some significant 

entitlement issues. . . . She is currently able to work in a fast food 

restaurant 25 hours per week, but is suffering some social interaction 

problems there . . . . [She] was previously in psychotherapy and on 

psychiatric medication to good effect.

Id. Dr. Welchel expected that Swan would “improve in the next twelve months with active 

psychotherapy and medication management.” Id.

Dr. Welchel also functionally assessed Swan, determining that she was able to follow

simple and complex job instructions. Id. at 401. She further determined that Swan had the 

following moderate impairments: relating and interacting with coworkers and the public;

maintaining concentration and attention, persistence and pace; associating with day-to-day work 

activity; maintaining regular attendance in the work place and performing work activities on a 

consistent basis; and performing work activities without special or additional supervision. Id. Dr. 

Welchel also opined that Swan’s ability to accept instructions from supervisors was mildly 

impaired. Id.

B. Legal Background

1. Five-Step Analysis for Determining Physical Disability

Disability insurance benefits are available under the Social Security Act when an eligible 

claimant is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(a)(1). The Commissioner has established a sequential, five-part evaluation process to 

determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act. See Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). The claimant bears the burden 

of proof for steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id. “If 

a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need 

to consider subsequent steps.” Id.

At step one, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) considers whether the claimant is 

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presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If she is, the 

ALJ must find that she is not disabled. Id. If she is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the 

ALJ continues the analysis. See id.

At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has “a severe medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment,” or combination of such impairments, which meets the 

regulations’ twelve-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An 

impairment or combination of impairments is severe if it “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant

does not have a severe impairment, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

If the ALJ determines that one or more impairments are severe, the ALJ proceeds to the next step. 

See id.

At step three, the ALJ compares the medical severity of the claimant’s impairments to a 

list of impairments that the Commissioner has determined are disabling. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If one or a combination of the 

claimant’s impairments meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment, she is disabled. Id. 

Otherwise, the analysis continues. See id.

At step four, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) in light 

of her impairments and whether she can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)). If the she can perform past relevant work, 

she is not disabled. Id. If she cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the final 

step. See id.

At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant, in 

light of her impairments, age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs in the 

national economy. Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997); see also 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). Conversely, she is disabled and entitled to benefits if there are not a 

significant number of jobs available in the national economy that she can perform. Id.

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2. Determining Disability Where There Is Evidence of Mental Impairment

The Commissioner issued 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a to supplement the five-step evaluation 

process where, as here, the claimant alleges that one or more mental impairments prevents her 

from working. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a; see also Maier v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

154 F.3d 913, 914–15 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Clayton v. Astrue, 2011 WL 997144, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011). These regulations direct an ALJ to evaluate a claimant’s pertinent 

symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings to determine whether she has a medically determinable 

mental impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). In conducting this inquiry, the ALJ must 

consider all relevant and available clinical signs and laboratory findings, the effects of the 

claimant’s symptoms, and how her functioning may be affected by factors that include, but are not 

limited to, chronic mental disorders, structured settings, medication, and other treatment. See 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)–(c)(1). The ALJ then assesses the degree of the claimant’s functional 

limitations based on those medically determinable mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520a(c)(2).

Although analysis under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a includes an assessment of the claimant’s 

limitations and restrictions, it is not an RFC assessment. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184. 

Rather, it is a component of analyzing the severity of mental impairments at steps two and three of 

the sequential evaluation process. Id. The mental RFC assessment used at steps four and five 

requires a more detailed assessment in which the ALJ must address the various functions that are 

contained in the broad categories found in Paragraphs B and C of the adult mental disorders listed 

in Listing 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

C. Procedural History

Swan applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security 

Income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. AR at 209–224. She alleged that 

PTSD, depression, insomnia, and injuries to her back, neck, knees, and hips had rendered her 

disabled on September 16, 2011. Id. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied these 

applications initially and on reconsideration. Id. at 95–150. An ALJ convened a hearing at 

Swan’s request and, as described below, determined that she was not disabled. Id. at 11–94, 166–

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75. Swan requested review of the ALJ’s determination by the SSA Appeals Council. See id. at 1–

9. After the Appeals Council denied her request, Swan initiated this action for review under 

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). See id.; Complaint, dkt. no. 1.

1. The Hearing

The ALJ convened the hearing on December 6, 2013. See AR 30–94. Four witnesses 

testified: Swan, medical expert Dr. Eric Schmitter (an orthopedic surgeon), medical expert Dr. 

Herbert Tanenhaus (a psychiatrist), and vocational expert Malcom Brodzinsky (the “VE”). 

See AR 31.

a. Swan’s Testimony

Addressing her work history, Swan testified that she was a full-time homemaker from 

1998 to 2004. Id. at 78–80. In 2004, she started working in a laundry for a nonprofit 

organization. Id. After she experienced a back injury while working, she transitioned to a servicecoordinator role. Id. at 80.

Most recently, Swan had worked as a part-time cashier, working twelve to sixteen hours 

per week. Id. at 37–38. She left the job in October 2012 because it required too much standing, 

which caused pain to the right side of her body, and she did not receive enough break time to take 

her pain medication. Id. Working more than four or five hours caused her extreme pain that made

her unable to walk the following day. Id. Swan did not seek other work after leaving the cashier 

position. Id. at 38–39.

After leaving the cashier position, Swan spent her time addressing her health. Id. at 39. 

Her physical issues occasionally caused her pain that prevented her from walking and leaving her 

home. Id. Swan’s knee problems also caused her leg to “give out.” Id. at 41. Swan also saw a 

psychiatrist and a therapist, although she acknowledged while testifying that those appointments 

did not prevent her from working. Id. at 40.

Swan testified that she was not working because “some days I can walk and some days I 

can’t.” Id. She explained that employers would not accommodate her need to rest her knee for 

twenty-four hours after a day of work. Id. She also explained that constant lower back pain and 

recurring pain in her knees and ankles contributed to her inability to work. Id. at 45–46.

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Swan’s mental health issues consisted of depression, insomnia, PTSD, bipolarity, and 

agoraphobia. Id. at 47. Her depression occasionally caused her to stay in bed all day. Id. at 51. 

Her PTSD had originated after from events in 2005 and 2006. During that period, her boyfriend 

abused her, her mother died in her presence, her brother was murdered, and her father and 

grandmother died. Id. at 49–50. Her bipolarity and agoraphobia had been recently diagnosed and 

were related to her depression. Id. at 47. These mental health issues and the violence in her 

neighborhood often prevented her from leaving her apartment. Id. at 50.

At the time of the hearing, Swan’s medication included Norco, muscle relaxers, Motrin, 

Vicodin, and medication for her insomnia. Id. at 42, 50.

b. Dr. Eric Schmitter’s Testimony

After noting that he had received few orthopedic records, Dr. Schmitter started his 

testimony by discussing Swan’s back pain. Id. at 58–59. He explained that Drs. Naraghi and 

Nguyen had conflicting opinions and noted that the MRIs that both doctors discussed were not in 

the record. Id. at 59–60.

Dr. Schmitter opined that Swan had a mild to moderate form of degenerative disc disease 

without demonstrable neurologic deficits. Id. at 62. He also testified that he had not found 

anything in the record regarding Swan’s knees or ankles. Id. Dr. Schmitter concluded that Swan’s 

medical issues did not meet or equal a listing in the Social Security Act. Id. He specifically noted 

that Swan had no record of joint or motor problems, could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten 

pounds frequently, and could sit or walk for four-to-six hours in an eight-hour workday if she 

received typical breaks. Id. at 62–63, 65.

On cross-examination, Dr. Schmitter addressed Swan’s knees, explaining that he had not 

been provided enough evidence to agree with a diagnosis of bilateral knees featuring internal 

derangement. Id. at 67–69. He acknowledged that it was possible that she suffered from the 

condition. Id. He further explained that her knee injuries could not be severe because a doctor 

had recommended acupuncture as treatment. Id. at 68.

c. Dr. Tanenhaus’s Testimony

Dr. Tanenhaus testified that Swan suffered from the medically determinable mental 

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impairments of MDD of moderate severity and PTSD. Id. at 71. He opined that these 

impairments did not separately or in combination render her disabled. Id. He explained that Swan 

had a minor impairment in her daily-living activities and moderate impairments in her ability to 

relate socially and maintain concentration, persistence, and pace. Id. at 72–74. Dr. Tanenhaus 

also testified that Swan was capable of complex work. Id. at 73.

d. Vocational Expert Malcom Brodzinsky’s Testimony

Early in the VE’s testimony, the ALJ asked him to assume the following hypothetical

person:

[A] hypothetical person [of the] same age, education, and experience 

as [Swan], essentially at the light level where the person’s . . . able 

to lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds 

occasionally; should be able to sit for up to 6 out of 8 hours, also 

with normal breaks in each position; posturals are occasional; 

however, reaching and manipulation are unlimited at all, but there is 

a preclusion from climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; from work 

at unprotected heights; or around hazardous, moving machinery; and 

finally, there’s a precautionary restriction from exposure to extreme 

cold. And then from a mental perspective, the hypothetical person is 

able to engage in the full range of simple, repetitive through 

complex work; and can engage on a frequent basis with coworkers; 

may also be able to do frequent contact with the public, but where 

it’s limited to non-confrontational work . . . ; supervisory contact 

can also be frequent but without major confrontation or . . . major 

correction.

Id. at 87–88. The ALJ then asked the VE if Swan would be capable of performing her past work

or any other work in the national economy. Id. at 88, 90–91.

The VE opined that Swan was incapable of returning to her prior work as a cashier, 

suggesting that it required too much interaction with the public. Id. at 89. He also opined that 

Swan could perform the work of her past positions as a laundry worker and a laundry supervisor. 

Id. Turning to other work, the VE testified that Swan could “perform the full range of unskilled, 

light bench work,” which included the work of a bench assembler and a small products assembler. 

Id. at 90–91.

On cross-examination, Swan’s counsel asked to the VE to add a limitation to the ALJ’s 

hypothetical: being off task for twenty percent of each workday due to pain. Id. at 92. The VE 

responded that being off task for an hour and a half during an eight-hour workday would preclude 

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that hypothetical person from obtaining employment. Id. at 93. 

D. The ALJ’s Decision

As required by the Commissioner’s regulations, the ALJ applied the sequential five-step 

analysis to evaluate Swan’s applications for disability benefits. AR at 11–29. The ALJ decided 

that Swan had “not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from 

September 16, 2011, through” December 31, 2013 (the date of his decision), and outlined his fivestep analysis as follows. Id. at 15–25.

1. The First Three Steps

The ALJ first found that Swan had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

alleged onset date of September 16, 2011. AR at 16. The ALJ acknowledged that Swan had 

worked in October 2012, but determined that it did not constitute substantial gainful activity. Id.

At step two, the ALJ found that Swan had the following severe impairments: (1) lumbar 

spine degenerative disc disease with right lower extremity radiculopathy; (2) moderate major 

depressive disorder; (3) PTSD; (4) and obesity. Id. at 16–17. He explained that these impairments 

caused more than minimal limitation to Swan’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. at 17. 

He observed that the medical experts had testified that Swan’s impairments were not severe. Id. 

He also observed that the psychiatric medical expert had testified that the medical record did not 

support a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder. Id.

Turning to the third step, the ALJ determined that Swan’s impairments, considered 

separately or in combination, did not meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in the 

Commissioner’s regulations. Id. The ALJ reasoned that the medical experts’ testimony supported 

this finding. Id. The ALJ further found that Swan’s mental impairments were not disabling under 

the criteria provided in Paragraphs B and C of the applicable listings in the Listing of 

Impairments. Id.

2. Step Four: Residual Functional Capacity and Past Work

The ALJ found at step four that Swan had the RFC to perform light work. AR at 18 (citing 

20 CFR §§ 404.967(b), 404.1567(b)). He outlined Swan’s work limitations as follows:

lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

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frequently, standing and walking 4-6 hours each in an 8 hour day, 

sitting 6 hours in an 8 hour day, all with normal breaks; occasional 

postural activities except no climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolds. No 

exposure to extreme cold and no work at unprotected heights or 

around hazardous moving machinery. She is capable of the full 

range of simple tasks through complex work, is limited to frequent 

interactions with coworkers and the public in non-confrontational 

work, and with supervisors frequently in work without major 

confrontations or corrections, and may perform low stress work, 

defined as few changes in the work or its setting.

Id.

The ALJ explained that he had determined Swan’s RFC according to a two-step process. 

Id. at 19. At the first step, he found that Swan’s alleged impairments—PTSD, depression, 

insomnia, and injuries to her back, neck, knee, and hip—could cause the symptoms that she had 

described in her testimony. Id. At the second step, he found that Swan’s “statements concerning 

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible.” Id. 

The ALJ concluded that the record supported “a finding that [Swan’s] impairment-related 

limitations and pain would not preclude her from performing the limited range of light work 

outlined in the residual functional capacity.” Id.

Explaining that conclusion, the ALJ addressed Swan’s physical impairments. Id. He 

summarized the records and clinical findings in Swan’s medical history, specifically describing

Dr. Morley’s findings, Dr. Nguyen’s opinion (which he gave significant weight), and the 

testimony of medical expert Dr. Eric Schmitter (which he gave great weight). Id. at 20–21. The 

ALJ also mentioned that there were references to MRIs conducted in 2009 and 2011 that were 

absent from the record, but suggested that those MRIs would support his decision. Id. at 19–20.

Addressing Swan’s mental impairments, the ALJ observed aspects of Swan’s outpatient 

therapy and psychiatric treatment, including her complaints of recurring panic attacks, stress, and 

depression that resulted from the abuse of her daughter; her prescriptions for Citalopram and 

Ambien; and her November 2011 diagnosis of MDD, accompanied by a GAF range of 50 to 55. 

Id. at 21–22. The ALJ specifically addressed the opinions of Drs. Eggert and Welchel, explaining 

that he gave both “significant weight because [their opinions are] consistent with the objective 

evidence.” Id. at 22. The ALJ also analyzed the testimony of psychiatrist medical expert Dr. 

Tanenhaus and explained that he gave “this opinion great weight because Dr. Tanenhaus had the 

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opportunity to review the full medical record and to listen to all of [Swan’s] testimony.” Id. at 23.

The ALJ next turned to the credibility of Swan’s testimony. Id. He explained that the 

conservative treatment that she had received was not typical of a disabled person and suggested 

that her subjective complaints of pain were overstated. Id. In reaching this finding, the ALJ noted 

that, regarding Swan’s physical impairments, there was no evidence that she had received 

treatment with particular pain control modalities. Id. He also reasoned that her use of prescribed

medication did not indicate that she suffered from an impairment “which is more limiting than 

found in the decision.” Id. Regarding Swan’s mental impairments, the ALJ reasoned that she had 

not been psychiatrically hospitalized, had reported improvement from medication, and 

independently performed basic daily-living activities. Id. The ALJ further stated that Swan “was 

able to work part-time with her impairments, which suggest [sic] those impairments were not as 

disabling as alleged.” Id. at 23.

The ALJ then determined that Swan retained the RFC to perform her past work as a 

laundry worker and a supervisor of laundry services. Id. at 23–24. The ALJ also noted that the 

VE had testified that Swan was unable to perform her past work as a cashier. Id. at 24.

3. Step Five: Other Work

The ALJ made the alternative determination that Swan also had the RFC to work in other 

jobs that existed in the national economy. AR at 24. In reaching this determination, the ALJ 

observed that Swan’s ability to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of light work 

was impeded by her limitations. Id. The ALJ reasoned that the VE had considered those 

limitations and testified that Swan remained able to perform the requirements of a bench work 

assembler and small parts assembler. Id. at 24–25. The ALJ concluded that Swan was “capable of 

making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy. A finding of ‘not disabled’ is therefore appropriate . . . .” Id. at 25.

E. The Motions

In her Motion for Summary Judgment, Swan initially contends that the ALJ erroneously 

failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the opinions of Drs. Maki, Rena, 

Naraghi, Morley, Eggert, and Welchel. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl. Mot.,” 

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dkt. no. 18) at 9–10. Swan argues that this alleged error rendered erroneous the ALJ’s assessment 

of her RFC. Id. at 10.

Swan next contends that the ALJ erred in determining that she had the mental RFC to 

perform simple and complex work and could frequently interact with coworkers, the public, and 

supervisors in nonconfrontational settings. Id. at 12. In support of this contention, she argues that 

the ALJ failed to consider her particular moderate impairments as determined by Drs. Eggert, 

Welchel, and Tanenhaus respectively, or include those impairments in the hypothetical questions 

that he posed to the VE. Id. She specifically notes that the ALJ did not address Dr. Eggert’s 

opinion “that it is not likely that Ms. Swan could tolerate the mental demands associated with 

work without deterioration or decompensation of mental health.” Id. (citing AR at 393). Swan 

also argues that the ALJ erroneously failed to include her limitations, as determined by two state 

agency psychologists who reviewed her medical records, that she was limited to one-to-two step 

instructions and should avoid public contact. Id. at 14.

Swan further contends that the ALJ erroneously determined that she retained the physical 

RFC to perform light-level work. Id. In support of this contention, she argues that the ALJ 

improperly relied on Dr. Schmitter’s testimony because it was not supported by the medical record

due to his failure to consider neurological deficits and bilateral knee impairments that were noted 

in the opinions of other doctors. Id. at 16–17. She also asserts that the ALJ’s failure to obtain the 

2009 and 2011 MRIs of her lumbar spine, which were missing from the record, constituted 

prejudicial error. Id. at 16 n. 7. She further argues that the ALJ erroneously failed to properly 

consider her limitations as found by Drs. Maki, Naraghi, Rena, and Morley and as she had 

described in her testimony. Id. at 18. Finally, she argues that the VE’s testimony has no 

evidentiary value because the ALJ’s RFC assessment and the hypothetical questions that he posed 

did not include all her limitations. Id. 

Lastly, Swan contends that the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear, and convincing 

reasons for rejecting her testimony. Id. She argues that the ALJ’s reasons for discrediting her fell 

short because it is “well settled that an ALJ may not discredit testimony because the degree of 

limitations are not supported by the medical evidence.” Id. at 19. She further asserts that the 

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ALJ’s finding that she did not receive medical treatment typical of a totally disabled individual is 

legally insufficient. Id. She also argues that none of the ALJ’s other reasons for discrediting her 

testimony met the clear and convincing standard. Id. at 19–22.

Swan concludes that the proper remedy for the ALJ’s alleged errors is a remand with 

instructions to award her benefits. Id. at 23–25. Alternatively, she requests a remand for further 

administrative proceedings. Id. at 25.

In opposition, the commissioner responds that the ALJ properly assessed the medical 

evidence in the record, stating that an “ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence” in a 

disability determination. Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to 

Plaintiff’s Motion (“Opp’n,” dkt. no. 21) at 2–3. The Commissioner specifically argues that Swan 

misrepresented the opinions of Drs. Rena and Naraghi in her motion. Id. at 4. The Commissioner 

also argues that the ALJ did not reject the opinions of Drs. Eggert, Welchel, and Tanenhaus, but 

rather gave them great weight. Id. The Commissioner further claims that these opinions support 

the ALJ’s RFC determination. Id. The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ’s failure to discuss 

Dr. Maki’s opinion was harmless, asserting that it was not supported by objective medical 

evidence and was contrary to the opinions of consultative examiner Dr. Nguyen and medical 

expert Dr. Schmitter. Id. at 5. The Commissioner also argues that Swan’s contention that the ALJ 

erroneously failed to adopt the state agency examiners’ severity analyses is legally incorrect and 

that an ALJ’s failure to discuss state agency opinions does not constitute reversible error. Id. at 6.

The Commissioner also contends that the ALJ properly found that Swan was not credible, 

arguing that the medical evidence in the record did not support the extent to which she alleged 

functional limitations that were more restrictive than the ALJ’s RFC determination. The 

Commissioner specifically asserts that three consultative doctors and two testifying medical 

examiners had opined that she was capable of working. Id. at 6–7 (citing AR at 19-20). The 

Commissioner also argues that the ALJ’s decision was properly supported by substantial evidence

in three respects: (1) Swan had little restriction in performing daily activities; (2) the treatment that 

she had received was conservative; and (3) she had worked part-time after her alleged disability 

onset date. Id. at 7–8.

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The Commissioner concludes that the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed. Id. at 8. 

Alternatively, the Commissioner argues that, should the Court determine the ALJ erred, remand 

for further proceedings is the appropriate remedy. Id.

In reply, Swan asks the Court to reject the Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ properly 

assessed the medical evidence in the record. Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Cross-Motion and 

Opposition (dkt. no. 22) at 2. She argues that the Commissioner’s assertion that Drs. Rena and 

Naraghi were one-time examiners is factually incorrect. Id. at 3. She also contests the 

Commissioner’s argument that the omission of Dr. Maki’s opinion from the ALJ’s analysis was 

harmless. Id. at 4–5. Finally, Swan asserts that the Commissioner’s relies on inapplicable 

authority to support the contention that the ALJ was not required to seek the missing MRI reports. 

Id. at 5–7.

Swan also asks the Court to reject the Commissioner’s argument that the “ALJ need not 

include an impairment in his . . . RFC finding that does not in combination with other 

impairments, significantly limit the claimant’s ability to work.” Id. at 8 (quoting Opp’n at 4). 

Swan asserts that this argument fails to address the ALJ’s disregard of part of Dr. Eggert’s opinion

and several of her moderate impairments. Id. at 8–9. She also asserts that the Commissioner is 

factually incorrect in arguing that the ALJ considered the state agency opinions and legally 

incorrect in asserting that the ALJ need not specifically address those opinions in his RFC 

analysis. Id. at 10–11.

Finally, Swan reiterates her contention that the ALJ failed to offer clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting her testimony. Id. at 12. Addressing the Commissioner’s arguments to the 

contrary, she first asserts that a lack of medical evidence supporting a claimant’s testimony may 

not serve as the sole basis for rejecting that testimony. Id. She next asserts that the Commissioner 

failed to cite to substantial evidence in the record in support of the ALJ’s findings. Id. at 13. She 

further asserts that there is no such evidence and that the ALJ did not find, as the Commissioner 

contends, that her daily activities were in fact transferrable to the workplace. Id. She responds to 

the Commissioner’s contention that she received conservative treatment for her impairments by 

asserting that her prescription for Vicodin is disruptive due to its side effects and supports her 

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testimony that she spends much of the day in bed. Id. at 13–14. She also asserts that her brief 

part-time job bolsters rather than undermines her credibility, pointing out that the one-month job 

was an unsuccessful attempt at working in a position that did not constitute substantial gainful 

activity. Id. at 14.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

When reviewing the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits, the Court “may set aside a 

denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 

1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)) (quotation marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial 

evidence must be based on the record as a whole and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 

401 (1971). Substantial evidence “must be ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but may be less than a 

preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Desrosiers v. 

Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). Even if the 

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, “the decision should be set aside 

if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision.” 

Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Court must review the record as a whole, considering the evidence that supports and 

the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 

1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985)). “Where 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that 

must be upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Courts “are constrained 

to review the reasons the ALJ asserts” and “cannot rely on independent findings” to affirm the 

ALJ’s decision. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 

194, 196 (1947)).

If the Court identifies defects in the administrative proceeding or the ALJ’s conclusions, 

the Court may remand for further proceedings or for a calculation of benefits. See Garrison v. 

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Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019−21 (9th Cir. 2014).

B. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment Contained Errors

1. Physical Residual Functional Capacity

Swan contends that that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of several doctors who 

evaluated her back, hip, knee, and ankle injuries. See Pl. Mot. at 9–11. Although it is unclear 

whether the ALJ in fact rejected those opinions, his failure to properly consider the opinions of at 

least two doctors rendered his RFC determination erroneous.

First, the ALJ failed to discuss the evaluations and opinions of Dr. Rena, who provided 

extensive treatment for Swan’s injuries—not a single examination as the Commissioner

incorrectly claims. See AR at 345–48, 357–59, 361–64, 367–70, 390; see also Comm’r Mot. at 4. 

“By rule, the [SSA] favors the opinion of a treating physician over non-treating physicians.” Orn 

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). It follows that an ALJ 

must address the opinion of a treating physician in a disability determination. See § 404.1527(c) 

(“Regardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive.”).

Here, the ALJ did not mention treating physician Dr. Rena in his decision. The ALJ

minimally cites to records of Dr. Rena’s evaluations for the purpose of describing some of Swan’s 

medical history. See AR at 20. However, such cursory citation does not constitute the 

consideration of Dr. Rena’s medical opinions, let alone the acceptance or rejection of those 

opinions, as the Commissioner’s regulations require. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (“We will 

always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your 

treating source’s opinion.”). Thus, the ALJ’s failure to address Dr. Rena’s opinions was error.

Notably, the Commissioner fails to affirmatively argue that the ALJ properly considered 

Dr. Rena’s opinion. The Commissioner merely asserts that Swan decontextualized sentences 

contained within Dr. Rena’s opinions and that records of Dr. Rena’s examinations ultimately 

suggest that Swan’s physical impairments are minor. See Comm’r Mot. at 4. Whether the records 

of Dr. Rena’s treatment ultimately support the ALJ’s decision is of no import. The Court cannot 

independently assess those records. Cf. Connett, 340 F.3d at 874 (holding that a reviewing district 

court “cannot rely on independent findings” to affirm an ALJ’s decision).

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Second, the ALJ recounted some of Dr. Morley’s observations, but conspicuously omitted 

vital aspects of his medical opinion. See AR at 20. Dr. Morley—who examined Swan in person 

and extensively reviewed her medical record—stated, “The patient will not be able to return to her 

pre-injury occupation.” AR at 410–17, 421–25. This statement does not constitute a medical 

opinion for the purpose of a disability review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (“Although we 

consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . 

the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”). However, it 

is the conclusion at which Dr. Morley arrived after thoroughly outlining his medical opinion. See

AR at 410–16. The ALJ was therefore obligated to accept or reject Dr. Morley’s opinion and

address the extent to which it conflicted with those of other physicians. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, 

Soc. Security Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ did not do so, failing to 

interpret Dr. Morley’s opinion and indicate whether he accepted or rejected it. See AR at 20–21.

Furthermore, Dr. Morley diagnosed Swan with internally deranged bilateral knees and 

recommended that Swan receive orthopedic treatment for the condition. Id. at 424. Dr. Morley 

also opined that Swan’s case was “complex and extraordinary,” featuring symptoms that exceeded 

those typical of a person with Swan’s diagnoses. Id. at 416. Although the ALJ noted the bilateral 

knee diagnosis in his decision, he failed to assess the extent to which Swan’s knee condition 

constituted an impairment. See id. at 20. He likewise did not address Dr. Morley’s opinion that 

Swan’s case was complex and extraordinary. It is therefore questionable whether the ALJ 

properly assessed Swan’s RFC.

Dr. Morley’s opinion also undermines Dr. Schmitter’s testimony, rendering it of 

questionable evidentiary value. Dr. Schmitter stated at the outset of his testimony that there were 

“little orthopedics in the record.” AR at 58. In contrast, Dr. Morley provided an extensive 

summary of Swan’s medical history, including the orthopedic treatment that she had received. See 

AR at 411–25. Dr. Schmitter also testified that there was no documentation of a knee impairment 

in the record. AR at 62, 66. On cross-examination, when he was directed to Dr. Morley’s 

diagnosis, he stated that it was possible Swan had a problematic knee condition. Id. at 66–70. He 

further testified that he “might decrease her standing and walking capacity if [he] knew that she 

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had significant problems in her knees.” AR at 66–70. The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. 

Schmitter’s opinion, finding that it was “consistent with the record as a whole.” AR at 21. 

However, Dr. Schmitter’s testimony is clearly inconsistent with Dr. Morley’s medical opinion, 

which was entitled to greater weight under the Commissioner’s regulations, and Dr. Schmitter’s

discussion of Swan’s knee condition was mere speculation. The ALJ therefore erred in relying on 

it without first reconciling Dr. Morley’s medical opinions with the record. Cf. Lester v. Chater, 81 

F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended 1996) (“[T]he opinion of an examining doctor, 

even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that 

are supported by substantial evidence in the record.”).

2. Mental Residual Functional Capacity

Swan contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider Dr. Eggert’s opinion regarding the 

effect that Swan’s mental impairments had on her RFC. Pl. Mot. at 12. While the Commissioner 

is correct that the ALJ did not in fact reject Dr. Eggert’s opinion, the ALJ’s omission of a crucial 

part of that opinion from his analysis was error.

The Commissioner’s regulations required the ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion in the 

record and, to the extent relevant evidence was inconsistent, weigh that evidence in determining 

whether Swan was disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b) (“If any of the evidence in your case 

record, including any medical opinion(s), is inconsistent, we will weigh the relevant evidence and 

see whether we can determine you are disabled based on the evidence we have.”). Here, the ALJ 

stated that Dr. Eggert’s opinion was consistent with the objective evidence contained in the record

and gave it significant weight in determining that Swan was not disabled. However, the ALJ did 

not discuss Dr. Eggert’s opinion that Swan’s “ability to tolerate the mental demands associated 

with work, or work-like settings, without deterioration or decompensation is not likely. 

Consequently . . . although she appears able to be successful at maintaining the skills required to 

carry out tasks in a work setting, her overall performance and ability to maintain relationships at 

work may be negatively impacted by her mental health.” AR at 393 (emphasis added). This 

statement clearly constituted evidence that Swan could be disabled. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 833 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Leidler v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 291, 292 n. 3 (5th Cir.1989); Poulin 

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v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 865, 875 (D.C.Cir.1987)) (“In evaluating whether the claimant satisfies the 

disability criteria, the Commissioner must evaluate the claimant’s ‘ability to work on a sustained 

basis.’ [Citation.] Occasional symptom-free periods—and even the sporadic ability to work—are 

not inconsistent with disability.”)

The ALJ’s disregard of this part of Dr. Eggert’s medical opinion demonstrates that he did 

not “weigh” the relevant evidence. He considered those portions of Dr. Eggert’s opinion that 

supported his determination that Swan was not disabled, and failed to address the portion that 

detracted from that determination. The Commissioner’s regulations do not permit this selective 

interpretation of the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c), 404.1527(c).

C. The ALJ Improperly Determined that Swan’s Testimony Was Not Credible

Swan contends that the ALJ improperly determined that her testimony was not credible. 

See Pl. Mot. at 18–22. The Court agrees.

To reject a claimant’s testimony, an ALJ must provide specific and cogent reasons for 

determining that it lacks credibility. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. Furthermore, if a claimant produces 

medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ “may not discredit the claimant’s testimony as to 

subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective evidence.” Id. In such 

circumstances, “the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence 

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id. Here, the ALJ provided three reasons for determining

that Swan’s testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her mental 

impairments lacked credibility. However, each reason rested on erroneous considerations.

First, the ALJ improperly reasoned that Swan’s independence in basic activities of daily 

living supported his determination that her testimony lacked credibility. AR at 23. The ALJ 

found that Swan was only mildly restricted in her daily-living activities, citing the opinions of Drs. 

Eggert, Welchel, and Nguyen. Id. at 17. However, Dr. Eggert’s opinion on this subject was 

objective evidence to the contrary. See id. at 391–92. Specifically, she observed that Swan 

reported being “independent for basic activities of daily living such as dressing, bathing, light 

cooking, shopping, and light household chores. However, . . . she report[ed] that her mental health 

symptoms routinely interfere with her ability to carry out her daily tasks, and instead she often 

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remains in bed until her children are home.” Id. at 391–92. From these reports, Dr. Eggert opined 

that Swan’s “symptoms cause clinically significant distress and interfere with . . . activities of 

daily living.” Id. at 392. That opinion, in conjunction with Dr. Eggert’s opinion that Swan lacked 

“the ability to tolerate the mental demands associated with work,” constitutes objective evidence 

supporting Swan’s testimony. The conflicting objective evidence in the record required the ALJ 

to make specific findings and state clear and convincing reasons regarding Swan’s credibility. See 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283–84. The ALJ’s general, conclusory credibility determination was 

insufficient. See AR at 23.

Second, the ALJ improperly reasoned that Swan’s brief work as a cashier supported the

determination that she lacked credibility. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

It does not follow from the fact that a claimant tried to work for a 

short period of time and, because of [her] impairments, failed, that 

[she] did not then experience pain and limitations severe enough to 

preclude [her] from maintaining substantial gainful employment. 

Indeed, we have suggested that similar evidence that a claimant tried 

to work and failed actually supported [her] allegations . . . .

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1038. The record suggests and Swan testified that she 

attempted to work as a cashier for a brief period, but her impairments caused her to stop working. 

The ALJ also acknowledged in his decision that Swan’s work as a cashier did not constitute 

substantial gainful employment. AR 16. The ALJ further noted that the VE had opined Swan 

lacked the RFC to perform her past work as a cashier. Thus, the record does not support the ALJ’s 

inference that Swan’s short-lived, part-time job as a cashier constituted evidence that her 

testimony was not credible.

Third, the ALJ’s observations that Swan had not been psychiatrically hospitalized and had 

improved on her medication were not sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding. The 

Ninth Circuit has “emphasized . . . it is error to reject a claimant’s testimony merely because 

symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment. . . . Reports of ‘improvement’ in the context 

of mental health issues must be interpreted with an understanding of the patient's overall wellbeing and the nature of her symptoms.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). 

As described above, the other reasons supplied by the ALJ for discrediting Swan’s testimony were 

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legally erroneous. His observations that she had not been psychiatrically hospitalized and had 

improved on medication were therefore insufficient—standing alone—to support his 

determination that her testimony lacked credibility.

In sum, the ALJ erroneously determined that Swan’s testimony regarding her mental 

impairments lacked credibility. The Court therefore finds it appropriate for the ALJ to reconsider 

Swan’s testimony in its entirety.

D. The Case Must Be Remanded for Further Proceedings

Swan contends that, on the present record, the Court may reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision with instructions to calculate and award benefits. Pl. Mot. at 22–25. The Court is not 

persuaded. Further administrative proceedings would serve the following useful purposes. See 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020–21. First, the ALJ must reconsider Swan’s RFC in light of the 

medical opinions expressed by several doctors. Second, the ALJ must reassess the credibility of 

Swan’s testimony. Third, the ALJ should be permitted to reconsider the medical record in its 

entirety and determine whether it should be augmented with the missing MRIs or any other 

evidence relevant to the determination of Swan’s disability status. Fourth, the ALJ should be 

permitted to reconsider Dr. Schmitter’s testimony and determine whether additional expert 

testimony on Swan’s physical injuries would be relevant. Lastly, the ALJ should be permitted to 

reconsider whether Swan could perform other employment at step five of his analysis, which the 

Court was not required to consider due to the errors in the ALJ’s RFC analysis.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Swan’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and REMANDS the 

case for further proceedings consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19, 2016

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

Case 3:15-cv-03558-JCS Document 23 Filed 09/19/16 Page 23 of 23