Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02377/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02377-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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( 

BOB GRAHAM, 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED ·. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

OCT 1 J 1988 

ROBERT L. HO'ECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 86-2377 

CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA; 

LLOYD A. GRAMLING, Individually and 

in his official capacity as Chief of 

Police for the City of Oklahoma City, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

R. V. WILDER, Individually and in his ) 

official capacity as Assistant Chief ) 

of Police for the City of Oklahoma ) 

City; WILLIAM R .. CHAMBLESS, ) 

Individually and in his official ) 

capacity as Major, Oklahoma City Police) 

Department; WALT WILHELM, Individually ) 

and in his official capacity as Major, ) 

Oklahoma City Police Department; ) 

JEFF BARNETT, Individually and in his ) 

official capacity as Master Patrolman, ) 

Oklahoma City Police Department; JO ANN) 

RANDALL, Individually and in her ) 

official capacity as Detective, ) 

Oklahoma City Police Department; ) 

CAROLYN LYON, Individually and in her ) 

official capacity as City Manager, ) 

Oklahoma City, ) 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 84-1756-R) 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 1 
Steven M. Angel, (Carl D. Hughes with him on the brief), of Hughes 

& Nelson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jonathan D. woods and Geralds. Rakes (Robert D. Allen, Municipal 

Counselor, and Wiley L. Williams, Assistant, were with Jonathan D. 

Woods on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantsAppellees. 

Before MOORE and BALDOCK, Ci~cuit Judges, and BURCIAGA, District 

Judge* 

*The Honorable Juan G. 

District Court for the 

designation. 

PER CURIAM. 

Burciaga, District Judge, United States 

District of New Mexico, sitting by 

This appeal is taken from the order of the district court 

granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. Appellant, Bob 

Graham, bro~ght this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) claiming 

defendants deprived him of his liberty and property interest 

without due process. Mr. Graham also brought a claim under 42 

u.s.c. § 1985 alleging he was a victim of a discrimination 

conspiracy. We reverse in part and affirm in part. 

Mr. Graham was terminated from his position as a police 

officer because he allegedly falsified a police report regarding 

the death of Donald Edwards. The record indicates plaintiff, Mr. 

Graham, responded to a police call of "trouble unknown'' and 

proceeded to Mr. Edwards' residence. There, Mr. Graham observed 

the body of Mr. Edwards lying on the kitchen floor. Several other 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 2 
officers and civilians were present including Lt. Lawrence Jarrett 

and Sgt. John Campbell, a friend of the Edwards family. It was 

subsequently determined that a Mr. Churchill had found the 

deceased in the garage with the car's engine running and had 

dragged the body into the house. Mr. Graham later proceeded to 

the police station to file a report on the incident when he was 

requested by radio to call Sgt. Campbell at a private number, 

which he did. Sgt. Campbell specifically instructed Mr. Graham 

not to put anything in his report about the domestic problems of 

the Edwards family and to indicate that the body was found in the 

dining room, not the garage. Sgt. Campbell further requested that 

Lt. Jarrett and he be given a copy of the report. Mr. Graham 

claims that because Sgt. Campbell was a superior officer, he filed 

the report as instructed. 

The incorrect information in the report was later discovered. 

Mr. Graham was requested to file a supplemental report which 

accurately reflected the activities at the Edwards' residence and 

which explained the incorrect information in the first report. 

Internal Affairs officers of the Police Department conducted an 

investigation 9f the circumstances surrounding the false report 

incident. Mr. Graham was notified by letter that he was requested 

to appear and to testify at a hearing, but he was not notified 

that there were any charges pending against him. Instead, he was 

given the impression prior to and throughout the hearing that he 

was needed as a witness against Sgt. Campbell and Lt. Jarrett. On 

April 26, 1984, Mr. Graham was terminated for "knowingly 

falsifying an official police report." The following day, the 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 3 
Daily Oklahoman published an article about the dismissals of 

Officer Graham, Lt. Jarrett, and Sgt. Campbell. The article 

included an explanation that Mr. Graham had written a false report 

concerning the Edwards case, and that Sgt_. ~ampbell had instructed 

Mr. Graham to submit the false report. 

Mr. Graham filed suit against the City of Oklahoma City and 

its Chief of Police, Lloyd Gramling, claiming his termination 

implicated his liberty and property interest without due process 

and for injury caused by a conspiracy to commit racial 

discrimination under§ 1985. Defendants moved for partial summary 

judgment, alleging Mr. Graham did not have a property interest 

protected under the fourteenth amendment and failed to state a 

claim under§ 1985. The district court concluded plaintiff not 

only had no constitutionally. protected property interest nor a 

valid claim ~nder § 1985 but also determined he had no liberty 

interest to assert. The court, therefore, granted the motion for 

summary judgment. 

Mr. Graham first argues that the judgment was improperly 

entered because defendant& failed to renew their motion for 

summary judgment after he filed an amended complaint naming 

additional defendants. Mr. Graham correctly contends that an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint unless it is 

specifically incorporated therein. Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 

F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986). The amended complaint in this case, 

however, is practically identical to the original complaint except 

for the inclusion of additionally named defendants. The Supreme 

Court has recently stated "district courts are widely acknowledged 

4 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 4 
to possess the power to enter summary judgments, sua sponte, so 

long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come 

forward with all her evidence." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

UoS. 317, 326 (19?6); _ see also 28 Federal Procedure, L. Ed. 

§ 62:583 at 71 (1984); cf. Williams v. City of St. Louis, 783 F.2d 

114, 116 (8th Cir. 1986). The complaints in the present case are 

substantially identical. The motion for summary judgment directed 

towards the original complaint was fully briefed by both parties 

and provided Mr. Graham with adequate notice that defendants 

claimed he did not have a constitutionally protected property 

interest or a§ 1985 claim. We conclude the district court had 

the power to enter the summary judgment on these two claims 

because Mr. Graham had adequate notice and sufficient opportunity 

to meet defendants' arguments contained in the initial motion for 

summary judgm·ent • 1 

Mr. Graham's second contention of error concerns the district 

court's entry of summary judgment upon his liberty interest claim 

when the issue was never raised in defendants' motion. Although 

defendants had not challenged the liberty claim in their summary 

judgment motion, Mr. Graham presented a general argument in 

support of that claim in his response brief. The district court 

determined that Mr. Graham's liberty claim failed because he had 

not contested the truthfulness of the charges in his brief or by 

1 We are mindful of the public interest in prompt resolution of 

insubstantial claims against public officials, see Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 820 n.35 (1982), and conclude strict 

observation of inconsequential technicalities would thwart the 

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 

5 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 5 
affidavit. 2 The district court also observed that Mr. Graham's 

rendition of the facts was essentially identical to those reported 

by the newspaper. Because of the finding that plaintiff did not 

dispute the underlying facts_of the reasons for his discharge, the \ 

district court concluded that Mr. Graham was not entitled to the 

relief sought. 

Mr. Graham was discharged for "knowingly" falsifying an 

official police report. Contrary to the district court's 

observation, however, he specifically alleged in his complaint 

that defendants' accusations were "false" and "without substance." 

On appeal, Mr. Graham clarifies that he contests defendants' 

allegation that he acted knowingly or intentionally, that is with 

the intent to deceive. 3 He does not dispute that the report was 

incomplete but he does contest the allegation that the report was 

"false." Because the court granted summary judgment sua sponte on 

the liberty interest issue, however, Mr. Graham was not given 

notice that his liberty interest claim was challenged. Mr. Graham 

simply did not have sufficient notice of or opportunity to respond 

to the argument that he could not establish a liberty interest and 

the trial court acted prematurely in disposing of the claim. 

"Failure of the trial court to comply with the notice and hearing 

2 For an employee to make a successful liberty 

he must show that his dismissal resulted in 

information which was false and stigmatizing. 

States, 744 F.2d 1418, 142°1(10th Cir. 1984); 

Authority of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1503 

Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 638 n.11 (1977). 

deprivation claim, 

the publication of 

Sipes v. United 

Asbill v. Housing 

(10th Cir. 1984); 

3 In order to establish a liberty interest under this argument, 

Graham must also prove that information concerning his alleged 

motivation in writing the incorrect report was published. 

6 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 6 
requirements of [Fed. R. Civ. P. 56] is error, and deprives the 

court of authority to enter a summary judgment order." Mustang 

Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607, 608 (10th 

Cir. 1973). Because of the lack of proper notice to the 

plaintiff, summary judgment was improper as to the liberty 

interest. 4 

Mr. Graham's third contention of error concerns the district 

court's finding that he did not have a constitutionally protected 

property interest. The district court concluded that Mr. Graham 

did not possess a property interest under Oklahoma law because the 

Oklahoma City Charter, which governs the terms of city employee 

dismissals, did not create a property interest. 5 We agree. 

In order to invoke the protections of the fourteenth 

amendment, Mr. Graham must first eitablish that he has a protected 

interest at stake. 

A public employee facing discharge is entitled to the 

safeguards of procedural due process only if he can 

demonstrate that the termination implicates a property 

or liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause; 

if a property or liberty interest is not implicated, "he 

must settle for whatever procedures are provided by 

statute or regulation." 

Sipes v. United States, 744 F.2d 1418, 1420 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Determination of whether a plaintiff has a property interest is a 

question of state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976). 

We must, therefore, decide whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

4 We tak~ no position on the merits of this issue. 

5 We note that other federal district court judges have concurred 

with the district court's determination on the property interest 

issue in this case. Meder v. City of Oklahoma City, 672 F. Supp. 

500 (W.D. Okla. 1987); Swinney v. City of Oklahoma City, No. 

84-439W (W.D. Okla. filed May 21, 1984). 

7 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 7 
would find a property interest under the facts of this case. 

Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 432 (10th Cir. 1984). 

"[A] property interest is determined by whether the terms of 

employment created by contract, federal.statute, city charter or 

an employee manual create a sufficient expectancy of continued 

employment to constitute a property interest which must be 

afforded constitutionally guaranteed due process." Id., 728 F.2d 

at 432. The terms of employment of a police officer employed by 

the City of Oklahoma City are controlled by the city charter. 

Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196 (Okla. 1980); Gobdwin v. Oklahoma 

City, 182 P.2d 762 (Okla. 1947). The city charter grants all 

power to discipline and discharge city employees to the city 

manager and specifically states "removals and demotions shall be 

made solely for the good of the service." The Oklahoma Supreme 

Court has held that similar language governing the administration 

of employees of the City of Tulsa did not create a 

constitutionally protected property interest. Hall v. O'Keefe, 

617 P.2d at 198-201. Therefore, under Oklahoma law, the Oklahoma 

City Charter is not sufficient to create a legitimate expectation 

of entitlement to cont~nued employment absent cause for discharge. 

Mr. Graham also claims a property interest exists by virtue 

of the city personnel policy established by the city personnel 

director which outlines circumstances constituting cause for 

discharge of employees and under the Police Department Operations 

Manual which states permanent employees may only be discharged for 

cause. Taken alone, the personnel policy or employee manual might 

create a property interest. Mr. Graham fails, however, to 

8 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 8 
persuade us that the Oklahoma Supreme Court's ruling in Umholtz v. 

City of Tulsa, 565.P.2d 15 (Okla. 1977) is not controlling in this 

case. In Umholtz, the court held that discipline procedures set 

out by the Tulsa police department did not legally affect the 

specific powers granted under the city charter. "Municipal 

officials empowered to perform certain acts, cannot themselves 

limit their powers by imposing restrictions upon the exercise of 

their power in such a manner as to effect the legality of their 

actions." Id. at 22. The court thereby concluded the chief of 

police had the power to discipline officers and employees without 

deference to procedures set out in the employee manual. 

Under Oklahoma law, where certain terms of employee 

dismissals are explicitly stated in the city charter, the city 

manager or other city officials are not authorized to alter or 

otherwise re~trict those terms so as to legally bind the city. 

Because the Oklahoma City charter specifically designates that 

"removals and demotions shall be made solely for the good of the 

service," the city manager, personnel department, or police 

department was not authorized to legally bind the city to any 

other terms or reasons for dismissal. Rather, the city manager 

has the discretionary authority to determine when and under what 

circumstances disciplinary action will be for the good of the 

service. See Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d at 199. Under these 

circumstances, we believe the Oklahoma Supreme Court would not 

find a property interest in continued employment protected by the 

fourteenth amendment. 6 We therefore conclude summary judgment is 

6 Graham also argues for the first 

9 

time on appeal a property 

Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 9 
appropriate. 

Finally, Mr. Graham contends the district court erred in 

dismissing his § 1985 claim for the reason that he did not prove 

that he had a liberty or property interest. As the district court 

noted, the § 1985 claim would have failed for the alternative 

reason that Mr. Graham did not allege membership in a protected 

class. He merely claims that he was a victim of an attempt to 

cover-up a conspiracy to discriminate on the basis of race. 

Because Mr. Graham fails to allege he. was a member of a protected 

class, he has not stated a cause of action under § 1985. Dotson 

v. Mountain Mission School, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 583, 587 (W.D. Va. 

1984), aff'd sub nom., Bloch v. Mountain Mission School, 789 F.2d 

915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 27'9 (1986); accord 

Galloway v. Louisiana, 817 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1987); Brown v. 

Reardon, 770 F.2d 896, 906 (10th Cir. 1985); Skadegaard v. 

Farrell, 578 F. Supp. 1209 (D.C. N.J. 1984); Schneider v. Bahler, 

564 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ind. 1983). 

We affirm the district court's order granting summary 

judgment on Mr. Graham's property interest and§ 1985 claims. We 

reverse the judgment entered on the existence of his liberty 

interest. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this decision. 

interest exists under the Police Pension and Retirement Act, Okla. 

Stat. tit. 11, § 50-123 (1978 & Supp. 1988) and under a collective 

bargaining agreement approved by the city council. We will not 

consider issues which were not raised before the district court. 

Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 

1152 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983); 

Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 540 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 

1976). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2377 Document: 010110019157 Date Filed: 10/13/1988 Page: 10