Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02482/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02482-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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KM 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ralph John Chapa, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 12-2482-PHX-DGC (DKD) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Ralph John Chapa, who is confined in Maricopa County Fourth Avenue 

Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an 

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 

I. “Three Strikes Provision” of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), enacted on April 26, 1996, 

provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma 

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the 

United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Because § 1915(g) is a 

procedural rule that does not raise retroactivity concerns, cases that were dismissed 

before the effective date of § 1915(g), i.e., April 26, 1996, may be counted as qualifying 

dismissals or “strikes.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311 12 (9th Cir. 1997). A 

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prisoner barred from proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to § 1915(g) may proceed 

under the fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1911 and 1914 applicable to everyone else. 

Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir.1996). 

At least three of the prior actions Plaintiff has filed in federal courts have been 

dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or as failing to state a claim: 

(1) Chapa v. Hackwell, CIV 03-1364-PHX-RCB (DKD), March 5, 2004 Order 

(Doc. 16) and Judgment of Dismissal (Doc. 17) dismissing the action for 

failure to state a claim and noting the dismissal may fall within the purview 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); 

(2) Chapa v. Cullhane, CIV 03-2256-PHX-RCB (DKD), April 9, 2004 Order 

(Doc. 4) and Judgment of Dismissal (Doc. 6) dismissing the action for 

failure to state a claim and noting the dismissal may fall within the purview 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and July 20, 2005 Mandate from the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals affirming dismissal; and 

(3) Chapa v. Steinhauser, CIV 03-1336-PHX-RCB (DKD), May 17, 2004 

Order (Doc. 14) and Judgment of Dismissal (Doc. 15) dismissing the action 

for failure to state a claim and noting that the dismissal may fall within the 

purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The Court has reviewed the above Orders of dismissal and finds that each counts 

as a “strike” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Accordingly, Plaintiff may not 

bring a civil action without complete pre-payment of the $350.00 filing fee unless he is in 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

II. Allegations of Imminent Danger of Serious Physical Injury 

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his Eight Amendment rights are violated by 

poor ventilation and unsanitary conditions in the Fourth Avenue Jail that allow the 

circulation of dust, pollen, and “human pathogens.” Plaintiff claims he suffers from 

watery eyes, numerous respiratory problems, and is being monitored for exposure to 

tuberculosis. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to meet the imminent danger 

requirement. See Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F. 3d 962 (3d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court 

will allow Plaintiff to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. 

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III. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The 

statutory fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s 

income each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to 

collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 

IV. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

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specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 1951. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

V. Complaint 

 Plaintiff names the following Defendants in the Complaint: Maricopa County 

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio; Maricopa County Board of Supervisors; Maricopa County 

Supervisors Fulton Brock, Don Stapley, Max Wilson, and Mary Rose Wilcox; Arizona 

Governor Janice K. Brewer; MCSO External Referee C.J. Beddome; Sergeant Beddome; 

Captain Campanaro; Senator John McCain; Sergeant Sanchez; Unknown Lieutenant; 

Sergeant A5105; and MCSO Maintenance Supervisors. 

 Plaintiff raises one claim for relief in which he alleges that his Eighth Amendment 

rights are violated by poor ventilation and unsanitary conditions in the Maricopa County 

Fourth Avenue Jail. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Arpaio was made aware of the 

conditions and serious detriment to Plaintiff’s health and the health of other inmates, but 

failed to act. Plaintiff further claims that Defendants Beddome, Sergeant Beddome, 

Campanaro, Sanchez, Unknown Lieutenant, and Sergeant A5105 failed to adequately 

respond to his grievances on the issue. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Board of 

Supervisors and the individual members of that Board, along with Governor Brewer, 

failed to respond to his letters about the issue. 

 Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money damages. 

VI. Failure to State a Claim

A. Defendants Board of Supervisors, Individual Supervisors, and Brewer 

 The Maricopa County Board of Supervisors and the individual members of that 

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Board are not proper Defendants and must be dismissed. Local government bodies, such 

as Arizona counties, are persons under § 1983 and may be sued for constitutional injuries. 

Liability may be imposed on the county if a plaintiff establishes that his injuries were 

inflicted pursuant to an official county policy or custom. Thompson v. City of Los 

Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Official county policy 

may only be set by an official with “final policymaking authority.” Id. (citing Pembaur 

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-83 (1986) (plurality opinion)). To identify those 

officials with “final policymaking authority,” the Court looks to state law. Id. (citing City 

of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quotations 

omitted)). 

 In Arizona, the responsibility of operating jails is placed by law upon the Sheriff, 

not on the county’s Board of Supervisors. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-441(A)(5); Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 31-101. Therefore, the Board of Supervisors is not liable to Plaintiff under 

§ 1983 because it lacks authority to establish an official policy with respect to the 

operation of the jail. Further, the Board cannot be held liable for the actions of the 

Sheriff or his deputies on a theory of respondeat superior liability. See Thompson, 885 

F.2d at 1443. Accordingly, the Board and individual members of the Board will be 

dismissed. 

 Similarly, Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Brewer is that she failed to 

respond to Plaintiff’s complaints concerning conditions in the Jail. Plaintiff has failed to 

demonstrate that Defendant Brewer is responsible for the operation of the jail and state 

law makes clear that responsibility for operation jails lies with the Sheriff. The Court 

will therefore dismiss Defendant Brewer. 

B. Defendant McCain 

 Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against Defendant McCain nor has he 

explained how a United States senator is connected to the operation of a county jail. The 

Court will dismiss Defendant McCain. 

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C. Defendants Beddome, Sergeant Beddome, Campanaro, Sanchez, 

Unknown Lieutenant, and A5105 

 The mere denial of a grievance does not give rise to the inference of active 

unconstitutional behavior. Where a defendant’s only involvement in the allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative grievances, the failure to 

intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to remedy alleged unconstitutional behavior does not 

amount to active unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 

199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff claims that Defendants Beddome, Sergeant 

Beddome, Campanaro, Sanchez, Unknown Lieutenant, and A5105 denied his grievances 

relating to the conditions of his confinement; this is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim 

and the Court will dismiss these Defendants. 

D. Defendants Maintenance Supervisors 

 A pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement arises 

from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than from the Eighth 

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 

520, 535 and n.16 (1979). Nevertheless, the same standards are applied, requiring proof 

that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). To 

state a claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. First, the 

alleged constitutional deprivation must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious”; the 

official’s act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of 

life’s necessities.” Id. at 834. Second, the prison official must have a “sufficiently 

culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate indifference to inmate health or 

safety. Id. In defining “deliberate indifference” in this context, the Supreme Court has 

imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

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draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendants Maintenance Supervisors failed to ensure that the 

ventilation systems function properly and that cell and recreations areas are clean. 

Plaintiff demonstrates, at most, that these Defendants were negligent in supervising 

employees. Plaintiff has not shown they acted with deliberate indifference and the Court 

will therefore dismiss Defendants Maintenance Supervisors. 

VII. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 

conditions of confinement claim against Defendant Arpaio with respect to the ventilation 

system and cleaning of inmate housing areas. The Court will require Defendant Arpaio 

to answer these claims. 

VIII. Motions 

 A. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and 

Motion to Expedite Hearing/Ruling 

 Plaintiff filed, with the Complaint, a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 

Preliminary Injunction,” in which he asks that the Court issue an order “to ensure that 

[his] safety/health, and that of all other similarly situated pre-trial detainees, do[es not] 

have to suffer any respiratory diseases or possible lung cancer.” 

 A temporary restraining order can be issued without notice 

only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by 

affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant 

before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard 

in opposition, and (2) the applicant’s attorney certifies to the 

court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to 

give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that 

notice should not be required. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). See also LRCiv 61.1.1 (“Ex parte restraining orders shall only 

issue in accordance with Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Plaintiff has not 

certified what efforts, if any, he has made to give notice to Defendants. Accordingly, the 

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Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. 

 To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show “that he is likely 

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 

374 (2008). The moving party has the burden of proof on each element of the test. 

Environmental Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 

2000). 

 First, the relief Plaintiff seeks is extremely vague. Plaintiff has not described 

precisely what relief he seeks or what actions he wants the Court to order Defendants to 

take. Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he will suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff attaches multiple grievances and medical 

records to his Complaint demonstrating that within the last 12 months, the medical staff 

has taken steps to rule out tuberculosis infection, including ordering a chest x-ray for 

Plaintiff that was “negative for active infiltrates.” (Exh. at 44.) Plaintiff’s records also 

demonstrate that the medical staff continues to monitor his claims of respiratory 

difficulty, that his most recent tuberculosis skin test was within normal limits for his 

ethnicity, his temperature was normal, there was no coughing present during the 

assessment, and Plaintiff was provided with a surgical mask. (Exh. at 43.) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s allegations show that the medical staff continues to treat his claims of 

respiratory difficulty and have taken steps to alleviate aggravating environmental factors 

by providing him with a surgical mask; Plaintiff’s facts do not demonstrate that he will 

suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction. The Court will 

therefore deny the Motion. 

 The Court will also deny as moot Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite Hearing/Ruling. 

B. Motion to Certify Class, Motion to Appoint Counsel, Motion to 

Suspend any Local Rules for Good Cause 

On December 5, 2012, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Certify Class, Motion to 

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Appoint Counsel, Motion to Suspend any Local Rules for Good Cause.” 

 First, there is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. 

See Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 

1982). In proceedings in forma pauperis, the court may request an attorney to represent 

any person unable to afford one. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Appointment of counsel under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is required only when “exceptional circumstances” are present. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A determination with respect to 

exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the 

merits as well as the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issue involved. Id. “Neither of these factors is dispositive and 

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 Having considered both elements, it does not appear at this time that exceptional 

circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counsel in this case. 

Plaintiff is in no different position than many pro se prisoner litigants. The Court will 

deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel. 

 The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s request to certify this case as a class action. 

Plaintiff is not an attorney. Accordingly, although Plaintiff may appear on his own 

behalf, he may not appear as an attorney for other persons in a class action. McShane v. 

United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966) (nonlawyer had no authority to appear 

as an attorney for other persons in a purported class action); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 

F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (plain error to permit an inmate proceeding pro se to 

represent fellow inmates in a class action). “This rule is an outgrowth not only of the 

belief that a layman, untutored in the law, cannot ‘adequately represent’ the interests of 

the members of the ‘class,’ but also out of the long-standing general prohibition against 

even attorneys acting as both class representative and counsel for the class.” Huddleston 

v. Duckworth, 97 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Ind. 1983). 

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 Further, Plaintiff has not adequately shown that the four prerequisites to a class 

action under Rule 23(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., i.e., numerosity, typicality, commonality, and 

adequacy of representation, have been met in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request 

that this action be certified as a class action will be denied. 

 Finally, the Court sees no reason to suspend the Local Rules of Civil Procedure in 

this action. The Court will also deny this portion of Plaintiff’s Motion.

IX. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

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for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial 

filing fee. 

(3) Defendants Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Brock, Stapley, 

Wilson, Wilcox, Brewer, Beddome, Sergeant Beddome, Campanaro, McCain, Sanchez, 

Unknown Lieutenant, Sergeant A5105, and MCSO Maintenance Supervisors are 

dismissed without prejudice. 

 (5) Defendant Arpaio must answer the Complaint. 

 (6) Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4) is denied. 

 (7) Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite Hearing/Ruling (Doc. 5) is denied. 

 (8) Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Class, Motion to Appoint Counsel, Motion to 

Suspend and Local Rules (Doc 7) is denied. 

 (9) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for 

Defendant Arpaio. 

 (10) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (11) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant within 120 days of the 

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, 

the action may be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (12) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

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 (13) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of 

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent 

by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of 

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court. 

 (14) If Defendant Arpaio agrees to waive service of the Summons and 

Complaint, he must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, 

not the Plaintiff.

 (15) Defendant must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate 

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (16) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

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authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 7th day of February, 2013. 

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