Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03015/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03015-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 4/27/06*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DONALD HUDSON, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. C-05-03015 RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Donald Hudson alleges that three San Jose Police officers subjected him to

excessive force following a routine traffic stop. Each officer moves for summary judgment,

contending that the evidence shows that his use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. 

The City of San Jose moves for summary judgment on the additional grounds that there is no basis

to hold it liable even in the event there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the individual officers

used excessive force. The matter has now been fully briefed and on April 26, 2006 the parties

presented oral argument.

Because material facts are in dispute as to how the incident unfolded, the motion will be

denied as to the individual defendants. As there is no evidence, on the other hand, that would

support a finding of liability on the part of the City under the applicable legal principles, the motion

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will be granted on those claims averred against it.

II. BACKGROUND

Shortly before midnight on July 11, 2004, Donald Hudson was stopped by San Jose police

officer Joseph Freitas for driving a vehicle with an expired registration. There is no dispute that the

stop itself was lawful. According to Hudson’s version of events, the following then took place: 

Hudson exited his vehicle and walked to the front of the police car, near its front right tire. Officer

Freitas informed Hudson that he was going to search him for weapons, and asked Hudson to put his

hands on the hood of the police car. Hudson complied. Officer Freitas searched Hudson, pulling

various items from his pockets. Freitas threw a matchbook (apparently from Hudson’s pockets) in

front of Hudson.

Officer Freitas at that point had not informed Hudson he was under arrest, but Hudson

believed that he “probably was going to jail,” because Freitas had mentioned something about

Hudson having a “restricted suspended license.” Hudson picked up the matchbook in order, he

contends, to see the phone number of the bail bondsmen advertised on its cover.

Hudson denies that he was attempting to put the matchbook close to his mouth, but Officer

Freitas apparently believed otherwise. Hudson heard Freitas say, “He is going for his mouth.” At

that point, Freitas began to “choke” Hudson. In Hudson’s words: “He put me in a choke and I

thought I was going to die . . . . he was behind me . . . he put his arm around me and was squeezing

hard.” Hudson acknowledges that he then “grabbed ahold of [Freitas’s] arm” in an attempt “to stop

the choke hold” and that he “never took his hands off of [Freitas’s] arm.”

Hudson recounts that Officer Freitas continued to choke him, pulling him backwards in the

process. The two men tripped on a curb and fell. Freitas turned as they fell, and landed on top of

Hudson, who ended up face down. Hudson was then tased by Officer Ryan Brennan, who had

arrived on the scene. Hudson contends he then “lost his ability to breathe.” Hudson testified that he

has no real recollection of subsequent events, but there is no dispute that he was tased twice by

Officer Brennan and that a third officer, Pete Gonzalez, who arrived in the course of the incident,

then struck Hudson more than once with a baton.

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Brian Matoba, a friend of Hudson, testified that he witnessed the incident and saw that

Hudson was not struggling after he and Officer Freitas hit the ground, because Freitas “pretty much

had him detained.” To Matoba, it appeared as if Hudson “was trying to grasp for air” and that he

was “pretty much incapacitated.” Matoba described an officer striking Hudson with a baton “about

ten” times. Matoba used the phrase “wailing on him” to describe the baton blows and offered the

rhetorically descriptive characterization that it looked like the officer “went psycho.” Mark Riller,

another friend of Hudson, testified that he too witnessed the incident, and recalled telling an officer

at the scene, “I saw Donny [Hudson] getting the crap beaten out of him.”

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary

judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986).

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Id. at 323. If it meets this burden, the moving party is then entitled to judgment as a matter of

law when the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his

case with respect to which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23.

The non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party cannot defeat the moving party’s properly

supported motion for summary judgment simply by alleging some factual dispute between the

parties. To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party must bring forth

material facts, i.e., “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .

Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

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1

 Hudson also asserts a claim for assault and battery, a freestanding claim for “excessive

force,” and a negligence claim against the individual defendants. For purposes of this motion, the

viability of the assault and battery claim stands or falls with the section 1983 claim, because the core

issue of whether there was excessive force underlies both. Defendants point out that the claim for

“excessive force” does not appear to be a viable independent cause of action, but agree that it should

be treated together with the section 1983 claim. Defendants do not address the negligence claim

alleged against the individual officers. 

4

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,

475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, including

questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence. Masson v. New Yorker

Magazine, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2434-35 (1991) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). It is the court’s responsibility “to determine

whether the ‘specific facts’ set forth by the nonmoving party, coupled with undisputed background

or contextual facts, are such that a rational or reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor

based on that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Service, 809 F.2d at 631. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if

the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, “[w]here the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there

is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Triable Issues of Fact Exist as To Whether The Individual Defendants Used Excessive Force

Hudson contends that the individual defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by exercising

unreasonable and excessive force against him, in contravention of his rights under the Fourth And

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.1

 The basic premise behind the individual

defendants’ motions for summary judgment is that because Hudson was resisting arrest, the force

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they each employed cannot be found objectively unreasonable or excessive. 

Defendants are correct that the reasonableness of their conduct must be measured under an

objective standard “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). As such, defendants

are correct that the subjective belief and intent Hudson may have held during the course of the

incident is irrelevant to the analysis.

What does not follow, however, is that the objective test is to be applied only to defendants’

version of events. Defendants’ recitation of the facts is drawn largely from their own testimony

regarding what happened, including the sequence of events, and the level of force used. Defendants

turn to Hudson’s version of events only when, and only to the extent that, “it corroborates many of

the facts testified to by Freitas.” Defendants’ Brief at p.10 (emphasis added).

Were a trier of fact to accept defendants’ rendition and characterization of events as accurate,

it might very well be found that defendants did not exercise excessive force under the circumstances,

or at least that they are entitled to qualified immunity. But the gulf between what defendants say

happened, and what Hudson and third party witnesses say happened, is significant.

In defendants’ version of events, the application of force began because Hudson “stepped

back towards Freitas and bumped his back into Freitas’ chest area [giving] Freitas the impression

that plaintiff was trying to prevent him from taking him into custody.” Defendants’ Brief at p.10

(emphasis added). In contrast, as set forth above, Hudson’s testimony is that Officer Freitas

initiated the force by beginning to choke him, shortly after stating “he is going for his mouth.” 

Defendants stress that under an “objective” evaluation of the facts, Hudson’s state of mind that he

“thought” he was being subjected to a choke hold is irrelevant. While that may be so, independently

of what Hudson was thinking, his testimony suggests that a particularly strong application of force

may have be applied to his throat, inhibiting his ability to breath. Hudson’s version of events also

suggests that this occurred in the absence of any conduct by him that would give rise to a reasonable

belief that he was trying to flee or that would otherwise warrant the level of force employed. Thus,

while defendants portray what might have been an officer reasonably trying to control a resisting

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2

 Defendants’ motion states that Officer Freitas was attempting to control Hudson through

use of a “cartoid restraint.” Defendants’ Brief at p.10. In fact, Freitas expressly disavowed that he

was attempting to apply such a restraint. Freitas Tr., 27:16. Whatever Officer Freitas’s own intent

may have been, it does not eliminate the factual disputes that preclude the Court from determining

on summary judgment whether this was a reasonable use of force against a resisting suspect or

something else.

3

 As defendants appear to understand, the testimony that Gonzalez struck Hudson with a

baton “around ten”times is particularly difficult to reconcile with the notion that there are no factual

disputes as to whether the level of force was consistent with the level needed to end the resistance. 

Whether that many baton blows were actually employed, and if so, whether that many blows were

appropriate given Hudson’s conduct, are questions of fact.

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suspect, Hudson describes something more akin to an unprovoked application of excessive force.2 It

is for a trier of fact to judge credibility and to ascertain the facts.

Similarly, defendants paint a picture that the force used thereafter by Officers Brennan and

Gonzalez was only such as was reasonably necessary to restrain a suspect who was continuing to

struggle and resist. Once again, however the evidence is in conflict. Hudson’s admission that he

never stopped trying to pull Officer Freitas’s arm from his neck does not compel a conclusion that

his resistance was such that any level of force was thereafter acceptable, nor does it establish the

level of force actually used. While the opinions reflected in the language used by Hudson’s friends

to describe what they saw (e.g. “wailing”) are to some degree conclusory, they imply a degree of

force potentially inappropriate for the level of resistance also described. 

Defendants assert that it necessarily was not excessive for Brennan to discharge his taser gun

at Hudson twice, given that he was struggling on the ground with an armed fellow officer, who

requested that the taser be used. There are insufficient undisputed facts, however, to reach such a

conclusion on summary judgment. While Hudson’s admission that he never let go of Freitas’s arm

might be sufficient to conclude that he was continuing to “resist arrest” within the meaning of the

penal code, it does not mean that he was necessarily resisting with sufficient force and efficacy that

it was reasonably necessary to use a taser–or a baton–on him.3

 Even in defendant’s version of

events, it appears that Hudson was at all times pinned underneath Officer Freitas. More importantly,

there is Brian Matoba’s testimony that suggests that even though Hudson may have been continuing

to tug on Freitas’s arm, Freitas “pretty much had him detained,” and Hudson was “pretty much

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4

 Defendants object to the declaration of Frank H. Saunders, submitted by Hudson with his

opposition, but not cited in his briefing, on grounds that the Court’s order permitting Hudson to

designate its expert witnesses after the deadline limited the use of such a witness to rebuttal. At the

same time, there is no prohibition against offering expert declarations in opposition to summary

judgment motions even from persons who have not yet been designated as expert trial witnesses. In

any event, this issue is moot, because as reflected by the preceding analysis, the Court has not

reached or relied on Saunders declaration, which neither adds nor detracts from the factual record

relevant for purposes of summary judgment. 

7

incapacitated.” 

To be sure, “pretty much” detained or incapacitated does not mean that the officers were

thereafter precluded from using any force to bring Hudson fully into control, but it precludes

defendants from establishing as a matter of law that only reasonable force was exercised here. 

Again, the credibility of the witnesses and their conflicting stories must be weighed by a fact finder,

and cannot be considered on summary judgment.

As defendants point out, under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) a finding that there is a

jury question as to whether police officers used excessive force does not automatically dispose of the

officers’ contention that they are entitled to qualified immunity. In Saucier, the court concluded that

even though there was a triable issue as to whether the level of force used was excessive by

constitutional standards, under all the circumstances of that case (including the relatively low level

of force that undisputedly had been used), it was not a matter of “clearly established law” that the

conduct was improper. 533 U.S. at 208-209.

In this case, however, there are no undisputed facts sufficient to conclude that even if the

level of force used was unlawful, defendants might have reasonably thought otherwise. Although

defendants have emphasized the two-step inquiry required by Saucier, they have not articulated any

basis on which it could be said as a matter of law on summary judgment that the force was

excessive, but not so excessive that it did not violate a “clearly established right.” Rather,

defendants simply argue that the force was not excessive at all. As that argument depends on only

one version of the facts, the individual defendants’ motions must be denied.4

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5

 It is undisputed that Officer Brennan had been trained in taser use. Hudson challenges the

adequacy of the training program, but only by arguing that a properly trained officer would not have

used a taser in these circumstances.

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 B. The City of San Jose Is Entitled to Summary Judgment

Under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and its

progeny, “[a] municipality or government entity cannot be found liable under section 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory; such liability can be imposed only for injuries inflicted pursuant to an

official government policy.” Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 582 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Here, defendants adequately demonstrated in their moving papers that no evidence exists to

support a finding that the City may be held liable for the alleged conduct of the officers, thereby

shifting the burden to Hudson to demonstrate the existence of triable issues of fact to the contrary. 

See Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 322-23.; Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Hudson has offered

no evidence whatsoever that the alleged conduct of the individual defendants was undertaken

pursuant to or as the result of any official governmental policy or the lack thereof. Instead, Hudson

merely argues, in essence, that the individual officers should have been better trained, or subject to

additional general use of force policies, or additional policies specific to the use of tasers and batons. 

Under the factual scenario alleged by Hudson, however, the arguments he makes as to the City’s

liability would, in effect, reestablish respondeat superior liability and would entirely eliminate the

limitations established in Monell. 

Hudson places particular emphasis on the City’s policies and training procedures for taser

use, which were in transition shortly before this incident. This is not a case, however, where use of

a taser allegedly caused some special injury or was particularly inappropriate as a result of some

characteristic of tasers. The essence of Hudson’s claim is that the officers should not have used a

taser at all, because it inflicts significant pain that was not necessary under the circumstances. 

Hudson does not suggest, nor could he, that the officers were so untrained as to believe that the taser

is painless.5

 Thus, the issues surrounding the use of the taser in this particular case are no different

conceptually or substantively than the use of the baton. In both instances, Hudson’s claim is only

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6

 Hudson’s request for a continuance to permit him to obtain an admissible copy of a

superceded policy on taser use is denied. The arguments Hudson makes regarding that policy do not

change the analysis.

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that it was unreasonable for the officers to use such force under the circumstances.

In essence, Hudson is saying that because the officers exercised excessive force (under his

version of the facts), it is possible to infer that the City’s policies and training procedures are

deficient. Standing alone, however, that inference is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact,

because the same inference would exist in every excessive force case, and liability for the

municipality would automatically flow from liability of the officers. That is not the law. See Monell,

436 U.S. 658. Even if Hudson succeeds in persuading a trier of fact that these officers exercised

excessive force, there is no evidence that would support a finding that this was anything other than

individual officers acting unlawfully.6

V. CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to individual defendants Freitas, Brennan,

and Gonzalez. The motion is GRANTED as to the City of San Jose.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: April 27, 2006 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Michael J. Dodson cao.main@sanjoseca.gov

Anthony E. Pagkas pagkas@yahoo.com, cdanjou@gmail.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 4/27/06 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

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