Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02553/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02553-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JDDL-K

WO RP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leonard L. Manning, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-2553-PHX-SMM (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Leonard L. Manning, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexLewis (ASPC-Lewis), has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Doc. #1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #3). The Court will

dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $5.22. The remainder of the fee will be

collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the amount

in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate

Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according

to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

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a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the

allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint

before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc). 

The Court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type

of advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v.

Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide

whether the court was required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s Complaint

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend because the Complaint may

possibly be saved by amendment.

III. Complaint

Named as Defendants in the Complaint are: (1) Dora Schriro, Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections (ADOC); (2) D. Edwards, Deputy Warden, Morey Unit, ASPCLewis; (3) A. Bradley, Associate Deputy Warden, ASPC-Lewis, Morey Unit; (4) Stuart,

Captain, Disciplinary Officer, ASPC-Lewis, Morey Unit; (5) Banes, Correctional Officer II

(CO II), ASPC-Lewis, Morey Unit; (6) Vargas, Sergeant, ASPC-Lewis, Morey Unit; (7)

Anita Nugent, GED Facilitator, ASPC-Lewis, Morey Unit; and (8) Carbajal, CO, ASPCLewis, Morey Unit.

Plaintiff alleges three counts in the Complaint. In Count I, Plaintiff claims that his

rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

have been violated with regard to disciplinary proceedings, access to the courts, and the free

exercise of religion. In Count II, Plaintiff claims that his rights under Article 4 and the First

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution have been violated with

regard to his access to the courts. In Count III, Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment

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Plaintiff has ignored the instruction on the court-approved complaint form to check

only one issue.

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right to the exercise of religion has been violated.

Plaintiff seeks a jury trial, injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive monetary

damages.

IV. Failure to State a Claim

A. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution have been violated with regard to disciplinary

proceedings, access to the courts, and the free exercise of religion.1

 However, Plaintiff only

tangentially makes access-to-the-court allegations in Count I as part of disciplinary

proceedings allegations. He makes no allegations in Count I with reference to the free

exercise of religion. Accordingly, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s claim in Count I as only

being made as a disciplinary proceedings claim. 

Plaintiff complains about two separate disciplinary proceedings in Count I. The first

was for using obscene language towards staff, and the second was for disobeying a verbal

or written order and threatening a person with harm. 

In the first disciplinary proceeding, Plaintiff alleges that he was found guilty based on

“un[]corroborated ‘hear[]say’ evidence,” despite Plaintiff’s contention that a disciplinary

report cannot lawfully be based on “un[]corroborated hear[]say evidence, that is not

supported by personal knowledge.” 

In the second disciplinary proceeding, Plaintiff alleges that he was found guilty of

failing to shave as ordered. Plaintiff contends that prison officials cannot subject him to

disciplinary punishment for failing to shave, “in reckless disregard of his permanent medical

rec[o]mmendation (waiver) that excuses him from shaving.”

Although Plaintiff brings Count I under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments, he does not explain how the actions he complains about violate any of these

Amendments. Because the First and Eighth Amendments do not appear to be implicated by

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the disciplinary proceedings in this matter, the Court will construe Count I as being brought

solely under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must first decide whether Plaintiff was

entitled to any process, and if so, whether he was denied any constitutionally-required

procedural safeguard.

Liberty interests which entitle an inmate to due process are “generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected

manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless

imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, to determine whether an inmate is entitled to the procedural protections

afforded by the Due Process Clause, the Court must look to the particular restrictions

imposed and ask whether they “‘present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which

a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.’” Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). 

To determine whether the sanctions are atypical and a significant hardship, courts look

to prisoner’s conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the

sanction will affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996). “Atypicality” requires not merely an empirical comparison,

but turns on the importance of the right taken away from the prisoner. See Carlo v. City of

Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472 (30 days’

disciplinary segregation is not atypical and significant); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151

(3rd Cir. 2002) (four months in administrative segregation is not atypical and significant);

 Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of year sentence reduction is not an

atypical and significant hardship); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998) (two and

one-half years of administrative segregation is not atypical and significant); Griffin v.

Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-708 (3rd Cir. 1997) (fifteen months’ administrative segregation

is not atypical and significant); Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997) (six

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months of confinement in especially disgusting conditions that were “more burdensome than

those imposed on the general prison population were not “atypical . . . in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.”).

In Count I, Plaintiff has not alleged or shown that sanctions imposed as a result of his

disciplinary convictions violated a liberty interest he had under the Due Process Clause itself,

or imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” on him. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. In fact,

Plaintiff has not identified any of the sanctions that were imposed on him as a result of his

disciplinary convictions. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to identify a liberty interest that would

require due process protections. Accordingly, Count I will be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that his rights under Article 4 and the First and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution have been violated with regard to his access

to the courts. Plaintiff alleges that: (1) ADOC officials do not maintain a law library at the

place of Plaintiff’s confinement; (2) there is no legal assistant or attorney located at the place

of Plaintiff’s confinement to assist him with legal concerns; (3) the prison library contains

a “scanty collection” of legal resource materials that is inadequate for legal research; (4) the

library contains no state or federal court reporters and does not make them available “via”

a legal assistant or attorney; (5) due to a high rate of prison lockdown and library closures,

Plaintiff is often forced to pay for legal materials and copies of materials; (6) the library does

not contain ADOC’s administrative rules as required by law; (7) the library does not contain

the names or addresses of state and federal courts, or the addresses of the Governor’s Office,

the Attorney General’s Office, the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, the ADOC’s

relevant department heads, including their “alleged” legal assistant; and (9) the library is

often not available for use by prisoners and legal materials are not delivered to inmates’ cells

or available to be checked out from the library.

To establish that he was denied meaningful access to the courts, a plaintiff must

submit evidence showing that he suffered an “actual injury” as a result of the defendants’

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actions. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice

with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing

deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348. “[A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual

injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is

subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. at 351. Moreover, the constitutional right of access

to a library or legal assistance extends only through the pleading stage. Cornett v. Donovan,

51 F.3d 894, 898-900 (9th Cir. 1995).

To show actual injury with respect to contemplated litigation, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the conduct of the defendants prevented him from bringing to court a

nonfrivolous claim that he wished to present. Lewis,518 U.S. at 352-53. That nonfrivolous

claim must be a direct or collateral attack on the inmate’s sentence, or a challenge to the

conditions of his confinement. Id. at 355. “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is

simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and

incarceration.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

In Count II, Plaintiff specifically alleges that the prison library was “almost

completely not available to prisoners for use” from about November 20, 2006 through

January 20, 2007, and was “available for use, by inmates, for no more than 20 minutes to an

hour per month” from about January 20, 2007 through July 31, 2007. Plaintiff further alleges

that “due to the library closures” from November 2006 to January 20, 2007, he was “unable”

to timely file a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court in his State criminal case

after the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his Petition for Review on December 20, 2006.

Plaintiff has failed to show actual injury in Count II because he does not explain how

the unavailability of the prison library prevented him from filing a petition for review. At

the very least, Plaintiff could have filed a petition for review explaining the problems that he

was currently experiencing with the closure of the prison library.

Moreover, to state a viable constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must

show an affirmative link between the alleged injury and the conduct of an individual

Defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). However, Plaintiff has not

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referred to any named Defendant in Count II.

Accordingly, Count II will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

C. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment right to the free exercise of

religion has been violated. Plaintiff alleges that his religious belief is “the Religion of

Shabazz,” which is based on the tenets of “the Honorable Elijah Muhammad,” and that he

has been deprived of the reasonable opportunity to practice his religion. Plaintiff further

alleges that the ADOC’s practice is to relegate inmate practitioners of the “Religion of

Shabazz, per the tenants the Wise God, Elijah Muhammad” to its Islamic religious service

contractors for assistance with religious matters and that these contracted Islamic chaplains

only assist inmates who are of the same religious denomination as they are. 

Prisoners retain the First Amendment right directing that no law shall prohibit the free

exercise of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Henderson v.

Terhune, 379 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2004). To state a First Amendment, free-exercise-ofreligion claim, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant burdened the practice of plaintiff’s

religion by preventing him from engaging in a sincerely held religious belief and that the

defendant did so without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff has failed to show how he has been prevented from engaging in a sincerely

held religious belief. Plaintiff’s conclusory and vague allegation that he has been denied the

opportunity to practice his religious belief is not sufficient to state a First Amendment, freeexercise-of-religion claim. Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of

action. Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982).

Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements

of the claim that were not initially pled. Id. at 268.

Also, Plaintiff has not shown an affirmative link between the alleged injury and the

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conduct of an individual named Defendant in Count III. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72, 377.

Indeed, Plaintiff has not referred to any named Defendant in Count III.

Accordingly, Count III will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. 

V. Leave to Amend

Because no claims now remain, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first

amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will mail

Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails

to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended complaint and dismiss this

action without further notice to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First

Amended Complaint.” The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its

entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original

Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count.

In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must write out short, plain statements telling the

Court (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of the person

who violated the right; (3) exactly what that individual did or failed to do; (4) how the action

or inaction of that person is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and

(5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that person’s conduct. See Rizzo, 423

U.S. at 371-72, 377. If the person named as a defendant was a supervisory official, Plaintiff

must either state that the defendant personally participated in the constitutional deprivation

(and tell the Court the five things listed above), or Plaintiff must state, if he can do so in good

faith, that the defendant was aware of the similar widespread abuses, but with deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights, failed to take action to prevent further harm

to Plaintiff (and tell the Court some facts to support this claim). King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987); see Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

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Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he names as a defendant. If Plaintiff

fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named defendant with the specific injury

suffered by Plaintiff, the claim against that defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a

claim. Conclusory allegations that a defendant or group of defendants have violated a

constitutional right are not acceptable and will be dismissed.

A first amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542,

1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat an original complaint as

nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original

complaint is waived if it is not raised in a first amended complaint. King, 814 F.2d at 567.

VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See

LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice

to Plaintiff.

D. Possible “Strike”

Because the Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, if Plaintiff fails

to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order, the

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dismissal will count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil

judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

E. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the

Court).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #3) is granted.

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $5.22.

(3) The Complaint (Doc. #1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has

30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in compliance with

this Order.

(4) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of

Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice

that states that the dismissal counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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(5) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a civil

rights complaint by a prisoner.

DATED this 28th day of April, 2008.

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