Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01151/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01151-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JULIUS E. DANDRIDGE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-01151 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

On April 24, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) on September 18, 2006. Docket No. 13.

Respondents assert that the action for habeas relief was not

timely filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied

and dismissed with prejudice. On November 17, 2006, Petitioner

filed a Reply to Respondents Answer to Writ of Habeas Corpus.

See Docket No. 21.

I Procedural History

On February 18, 1992, Petitioner was indicted on four

counts of sexual assault (class 2 felonies), one count of

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kidnapping (a class 2 felony), and one count of aggravated

assault (a class 3 felony). See Answer, Exh. B. On July 9,

1992, Petitioner pled guilty to the four counts of sexual

assault charged in the indictment and the government dismissed

the kidnapping and aggravated assault charges. See id., Exh. C

& Exh. D.

On August 7, 1992, at a sentencing hearing, the trial

court found four aggravating circumstances regarding

Petitioner’s crimes. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner was sentenced to

aggravated, consecutive terms of 10 years imprisonment on each

count of conviction. See id., Exh. E. Petitioner filed a

notice of appeal on August 20, 1992, which was denied by the

Arizona Court of Appeals on September 23, 1993. Id., Exh. J.

On December 23, 1993, Petitioner submitted a petition for review

of this decision to the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied

review on March 4, 1994. Id., Exh. L & Exh. M.

Petitioner initiated an action for post-conviction

relief on April 23, 2004, by filing a “Delayed Petition [for]

Post-Conviction Relief” in Arizona Superior Court. Id., Exh. O.

Petitioner alleged he had received ineffective assistance of

counsel during his plea and appeal proceedings, that he had been

coerced into pleading guilty, that he had discovered unspecified

new evidence, and that he had been “sentenced and prosecuted

vindictively.” Id., Exh. O. Petitioner asserted his petition

for post-conviction relief was not filed sooner because his

counsel’s performance was deficient and because of the limited

legal resources available at the Arizona Department of

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Corrections. Id. 

The state trial court construed Petitioner’s pleading

as a notice of post-conviction relief, and appointed counsel to

represent him. See id., Exh. P. The Arizona Superior Court also

exempted Petitioner from the time limitations set forth in Rule

32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because he was

convicted in 1992 and had not previously filed a Rule 32 action,

and concluded Petitioner’s suit for post-conviction relief was

timely filed. Id., Exh. P.

On October 1, 2004, Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice

stating she had reviewed the record and was unable to find a

meritorious claim to raise in the action for post-conviction

relief. Id., Exh. Q. The trial court granted Petitioner an

extension of time to file a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief. Id., Exh. R. Petitioner filed his petition on January

4, 2005, asserting: (1) his guilty plea was not “voluntary,

knowing, or intelligent”; (2) his sentence was improperly

aggravated, pursuant to the holding in Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); (3) his counsel was

ineffective; (4) he “did not understand the consequences of the

plea”; and (5) the trial court sentenced him “other than in

accordance with the sentencing procedures established by rule

and statute.” Id., Exh. S.

The Arizona trial court concluded Petitioner had

“failed to show a colorable claim for post-conviction relief,”

and summarily dismissed the petition on March 31, 2005. Id.,

Exh. V. On May 18, 2005, Petitioner sought review of this

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decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. W. In his

petition for review, Petitioner conceded Blakely did not apply

to his sentences, and he asked the appellate court to “delete”

his Blakely claim from the record. Id., Exh. W. Additionally,

Petitioner sought to “amend the record” to add additional claims

for relief. Id., Exh. W. On March 3, 2006, the Arizona Court

of Appeals denied review of the trial court’s dismissal of the

Rule 32 petition. Id., Exh. AA. Petitioner did not ask the

Arizona Supreme Court to review this decision. Id., Exh. A at

2 & Exh. CC.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because: (1) he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel in that, inter alia, his counsel

“convinced” him to waive a sentencing mitigation hearing; (2) he

was denied his right to “fair and equal treatment,” pursuant to

the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments — Petitioner alleges he

needs mental health treatment and does not have access to this

treatment while incarcerated; (3) he has been deprived of his

right to due process of law because his counsel was ineffective

and because he has no access to mental health treatment; (4) he

is being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because he

was coerced into signing a plea agreement resulting in a flat

sentence of forty years imprisonment.

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

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statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences in his direct appeal on March 4, 1994.

Petitioner is, therefore, a state prisoner whose conviction

became final on or about June 2, 1994, when the time for

petitioning the United States Supreme Court for review of the

Arizona state courts’ direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59

(9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Petitioner’s state conviction

became final before April 24, 1996, the effective date of the

AEDPA. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). Additionally, the AEDPA required state prisoners whose

convictions became final before April 24, 1996, to file any

petition for federal habeas corpus relief from those convictions

prior to April 23, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Petitioner’s state

conviction became final prior to the effective date of the

AEDPA, the one-year statute of limitations on Petitioner’s

action for federal habeas relief began to run on April 24, 1996,

and expired on April 23, 1997, unless it was statutorily tolled

by any pending action for state post-conviction relief. See

Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246. 

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Petitioner did not have any pending action for state

post-conviction relief pending from April 24, 1996, until April

23, 1997. Petitioner did file a state action for postconviction relief on April 23, 2004. However, even if this

action was deemed timely filed because the state court deemed it

so and considered the merits of the claims, this action for

post-conviction relief could not and did not restart the

already-expired statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s

federal habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333

(11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th

Cir. 2000).

 Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the

filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only

if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Lott, 304

F.3d at 922 (concluding the petitioner was entitled to tolling

for the time period that the petitioner was denied access to his

legal files while being transferred); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d

951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

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1 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not squarely

addressed whether the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace

“lowered” the standard for equitable tolling set in Spitsyn. See

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 (9th Cir.

2005). See also Astorga v. Terhune, 130 Fed. App. 181, 183 (9th Cir.

2005); Boudette v. Schriro, 2006 WL 664364, at *3 (D. Ariz.).

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a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas

petitioner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’

were the but-for and proximate causes of his untimeliness.”

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding “at the

very least, the prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ were the but-for and proximate cause of his

untimeliness”).1

It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner contends the AEDPA’s statute of limitations should

not apply to his habeas petition because he did not commit a

“terrorist type of offense,” and because his counsel was

ineffective. Docket No. 21 at 10. Petitioner states “time

requirements should not apply to petitioner so he should be

afforded the opportunity of this action.” Id. at 11.

Petitioner further states he “will no longer [rebut the

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position] of the Respondent(s) regarding AEDPA’s [requirements]

concerning time limitations because they simply do not apply to

him as a non-capital, non classified terrorist litigant.” Id.

at 12. Petitioner also re-asserts his claims for relief in his

traverse to the answer to the habeas petition. In his traverse,

Petitioner also asserts he could not previously file his federal

habeas petition and that he is entitled to relief because of his

“mental condition,” i.e., his “psychosexual dysfunction.” See

Docket No. 21 (passim). In an affidavit filed with his reply to

Respondents’ answer to the habeas petition, Petitioner contends

he was unable to acquire adequate legal help to pursue postconviction relief and that he has been subjected to increasing

levels of custody. Docket No. 23. 

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law,

lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and

temporary mental incapacity do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Shoemate

v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that

petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s “rules, statutes, and

the time period set forth therein do not justify equitable

tolling”); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–16 (5th Cir.

1999). Additionally, at least one other federal court has

concluded “the difficulties attendant on prison life, such as

transfers between facilities, solitary confinement, lockdowns,

restricted access to the law library, and an inability to secure

court documents do not by themselves qualify as extraordinary

circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Corrigan v.

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Barbery, 371 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2005)

(concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable

tolling because he was misled or confused about timing of

exhausting his state remedies and filing his federal habeas

petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Each of the cases in which equitable tolling has been

applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state

officials or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”);

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068 (concluding that counsel’s errors in

miscalculating the statute of limitations and mis-advising the

petitioner did not warrant equitable tolling). Compare Sanchez

v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Faught v. Butler, 135 Fed. App. 92, 93

(9th Cir. 2005). “Equitable tolling applies principally where

the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the

cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from

asserting his rights.” United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d

927, 930-31 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Compare Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

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Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking

equitable tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence

“throughout the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219

F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d

153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999). Petitioner allowed approximately ten

years to pass, from mid-1994, when his conviction became final

after a direct appeal, through 2004, without pursuing any avenue

of federal, or state, post-conviction or habeas relief and,

therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner did not act with

the requisite reasonable diligence which would warrant equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. See Pace, 125 S. Ct. at

1814-15. Compare Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969-70 (9th Cir.

2006) (stating “A habeas petitioner ... should receive an

evidentiary hearing when he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that

would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’ [] [The

petitioner] must demonstrate that they have ‘been pursuing

[their] rights diligently ... [and] that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in [their] way.’”).

Although a state habeas petitioner’s demonstrated and

extended mental incompetence may warrant the equitable tolling

of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, Petitioner provides no

evidence he suffers from a demonstrable mental illness which

prevented him from timely filing his habeas petition or

diligently pursuing post-conviction relief. Compare Laws v.

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding the

district court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing

regarding equitable tolling where ongoing, if not consecutive,

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periods of mental incompetency were demonstrated by the

petitioner); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2001),

overruled in part on other grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

214 (2002). See also Woodburn v. Stewart, 154 Fed. App. 643,

645 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding a habeas petitioner is entitled

to a remand for further factual development of his claim of

equitable tolling due to mental incompetence whenever the

petitioner alleges “in a sworn pleading, against which the state

has offered no evidence at all, that he was incompetent in the

years when his petitions should have been filed,” quoting Laws,

351 F.3d at 923). 

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action

within the one-year period specified by the AEDPA and Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations regarding his federal habeas action.

See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir. 2000)

(concluding that the petitioner’s delays in seeking collateral

review of his conviction did not show reasonable diligence, and

that the AEDPA’s tolling provision already accommodated the

exhaustion requirements that prisoners faced, and that

petitioner’s pro se status during most of limitations period did

not merit equitable tolling); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978

(10th Cir. 1998).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Dandridge’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

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prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 28th day of November, 2006.

 

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