Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05637/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05637-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAINT DEJUAN MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.14-cv-05637-JSC 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 64, 69

This case arises out of the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff Saint Dejuan Moore following 

a fatal traffic accident during a police chase. In the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officer Sean Deise and City of 

Oakland Police Department (“OPD”) Officer Daniel Tirapelli falsely identified Plaintiff as the 

driver of the car. He alleges that Officer Deise is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for subjecting him 

to false arrest and that both officers are liable for malicious prosecution for murder and other 

charges resulting from the collision. Plaintiff further alleges that the City of Oakland is liable for 

its failure to train its officers to conduct criminal investigations to prevent malicious prosecution. 

(See Dkt. No. 44.) Defendants now move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. 

(Dkt. No. 64, 69.) Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the entire record of this 

case, and the arguments of counsel at a hearing held on February 23, 2017, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ motions as set forth below.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

I. The Initial Car Chase, Collision & Arrest

On December 27, 2012 at around 11:20 p.m., CHP Officer Sean Deise and his partner were 

on patrol in Oakland. (Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 2.) The officers were performing a traffic stop on the 

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northbound side of 90th Avenue when they saw a silver BMW with no license plates speed past 

them in the southbound lane—both violations of the California Vehicle Code. (Id. ¶ 2.) The 

officers finished their traffic stop then got back in their car to stop the BMW. (Id. ¶ 3.) Officer 

Deise made a U-turn so the officers were directly behind the BMW and activated the police car’s

lights to signal the BMW to stop. (Id.) The BMW pulled over. (Id.) As Officer Deise and his 

partner got out of their car, the BMW accelerated and made a U-turn. (Id. ¶ 4.) When the rear 

wheels began to spin out during the U-turn, the BMW slowed down to regain control. (Id.; see 

also Dkt. No. 65-2 at 49.) 

There is no dispute that Plaintiff—who had been smoking marijuana and drinking that 

evening—was in the BMW wearing a black jacket. (See Dkt. No. 65-2 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 65-10.) 

But the parties dispute what Officer Deise saw when the car drove past him. Officer Deise avers 

that he had a “clear and unobstructed view into” the driver’s side window, which was about 10-15 

feet away from him, and that he saw a black male adult with short black hair wearing black 

rimmed glasses and a black jacket or sweatshirt driving the car. (Id.) He did not notice if anyone 

was in the passenger seat. (Id.) But Plaintiff testified that he was asleep in the passenger seat 

when the BMW made the U-turn. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 20-21.) He further testified it would have 

been impossible for Officer Deise to notice anything about the driver at that time because it was 

too fast, too dark, and the angle did not permit observation. (Id. at 52-53.) Plaintiff has also 

submitted the declaration of private investigator Timothy J. O’Brien in support of his contention 

that Officer Deise could not have seen enough about the driver to identify him. (Dkt. No. 71-2.)

In any event, it is undisputed that the BMW then drove off in the northbound lane of 90th 

Avenue. (Id. ¶ 4.) The officers made a U-turn to follow the BMW and called into dispatch to 

report the car. (Id. ¶ 5.) As the BMW sped away, it failed to stop at a number of stop signs. (Id.) 

Going even faster—Officer Deise estimated that it was going 60 mph in a 30-mph zone—the 

BMW turned right onto MacArthur Boulevard then left onto 98th Avenue, when an Oakland 

Police Department vehicle joined the chase. (Id. ¶ 6.) Officer Deise lost sight of the BMW after 

watching it fail to stop at a red light on 98th Avenue. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.)

After cresting a hill at 98th Avenue and reaching the on-ramp to the 580 freeway at Las 

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Vegas Street (see Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 69-2 at 15), Officer Deise saw that the BMW had 

been involved in a traffic collision: there was heavy damage to the front of the car, which came to 

rest on the concrete median. (Id. ¶ 7.) A passenger in the car that the BMW struck died as a result 

of the collision. (Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 3.) Officer Deise watched two black men run from the driver’s 

side of the BMW to the northwest towards Las Vegas Avenue; the man closest to the driver’s side 

wore jeans, a black jacket or sweatshirt, and sneakers, and the other wore jeans and a white t-shirt. 

(Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff admits that he exited the BMW on the driver’s side wearing a black 

jacket. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 25, 29, 54-55.)

Officer Deise stopped the car on Las Vegas Avenue, and he and his partner searched the 

area on foot. (Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 8.) Officer Deise found Plaintiff hiding behind a house; “[b]ased 

on his facial features and black jacket,” Officer Deise identified Plaintiff as the man he had 

observed driving the BMW as it passed him during the U-turn, so he brought Plaintiff into 

custody. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Officer Deise lied when he identified him as the driver at 

that time and at all points going forward. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 41-42.) As the Court must draw all 

factual conflicts in Plaintiff’s favor, it must assume that Plaintiff was not the driver and thus that 

Officer Deise was either mistaken when he stated he observed Plaintiff in the driver seat or lied 

when he identified him as such. 

Plaintiff told Officer Deise that his glasses were still in the BMW and he needed them. 

(Id.; Dkt. No. 65-2 at 36, 38.) After Officer Deise read Plaintiff his rights and placed Plaintiff in 

the backseat of the CHP patrol car, Plaintiff repeatedly stated that he was not driving the BMW 

and was asleep in the passenger seat. (Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 65-2 at 36-39.) He told Officer 

Deise that he ran from the car because he was on probation. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 38-40; Dkt. No. 65-

2 at 55; Dkt. No. 65-3 (Plea and Probation Documents for 2011 Felony Conviction).

1

) Plaintiff

 

1 Officer Deise requests that the Court take judicial notice of three documents filed in connection 

with his motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 67.) Exhibit C to the declaration of Rohit 

Kodical is a copy of Plaintiff’s Plea and Probation Documents regarding his prior felony 

conviction for violating Health and Safety Code § 11359 relating to Alameda County Superior 

Court Case No. 165421. (Dkt. No. 65-3.) Exhibit E are the felony complaints that the Alameda 

County District Attorney’s Office filed against Plaintiff in April and October 2013 relating to the 

December 2012 collision—i.e., the allegedly malicious prosecution at issue in this case. (Dkt. No. 

65-5.) Exhibit H is the Superior Court’s Order Holding to Answer and Commitment regarding the 

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also volunteered to the officer that he had been drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana that day;

Officer Deise smelled marijuana and alcohol on Plaintiff and noticed signs of intoxication, and an 

alcohol screening indicated that his blood alcohol content was .025%. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

Plaintiff was taken into custody, and the police never found the second man in the car. 

(Dkt. No. 74-2 at 5.)

II. The Investigation & Prosecution

Although CHP Officer Deise was the arresting officer, OPD took over the investigation. 

OPD Officer Daniel Tirapelli, now retired, was on duty as Acting Sergeant in the Traffic 

Investigation Unit in December 2012. (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 2; Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 2; id. at 15.) Officer 

Tirapelli responded to the accident scene at around 3:00 a.m. and became the on-scene supervisor. 

(Id. ¶ 4.) Officer Tirapelli—who has experience investigating over 100 fatal collisions—

conducted the investigation the way he normally did: he looked at the evidence, directed the 

technician to take photographs and process the car for evidence, searched the car for proof of 

identification, and fingerprinted and swabbed the car for DNA. (Id. ¶ 5.) Officer Tirapelli also 

had the technician remove the airbags. (Id.)

Back at the police station, Officer Tirapelli and his partner interviewed Plaintiff—who 

arrived at the police station following a hospital visit to address his injuries from the collision—

after reading him his Miranda rights. (Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶¶ 6-7.) Officer Tirapelli wrote a Narrative 

Report describing the incident. (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 2-12.) According to the report, Plaintiff told the 

officers that he understood he had been identified as the driver, but he was not the driver, did not 

know who the driver was, and had never seen him before. (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 69-2 

¶ 7.) The report reflects that Plaintiff told the officers that an older man at the bar whose name he 

did not know had arranged the ride for him because Plaintiff realized he was in danger of violating 

his parole curfew. (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 65-2 at 6, 8-9; Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 7.) He repeated 

 

felony charges against Plaintiff connected with the December 2012 collision. (Dkt. No. 65-8.) A 

“court may take judicial notice of court filings and matters of public record,” Reyn’s Pasta Bella, 

LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006), including court records in underlying 

criminal cases. See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, 

the Court GRANTS Officer Deise’s request for judicial notice.

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as much at his deposition in this case. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 7.) Plaintiff testified that he told the man 

who called the ride for him where he was going, and that man must have told the driver his 

address. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 12, 15.) According to Officer Tirapelli’s narrative report and 

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, Plaintiff said that had never seen the BMW or its driver before, 

did not have a conversation with the driver, looked at the driver for less than ten seconds when he 

got in the car before falling asleep, did not know what the driver was wearing, and described the 

driver as a “light-skinned male black, 24 – 34 years old, clean cut.” (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 5; see also 

Dkt. No. 65-2 at 15-16, 19, 22, 62.)

Plaintiff told the officers and testified at his deposition that he fell asleep in the car on the 

way home and only woke up when the car did a “donut[,]” at which point Plaintiff turned around 

and saw the police car with sirens on following them. (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 65-2 at 8, 

19 (testifying that he woke up when “the car jerks and I hear skidding” and the police are behind 

him); id. at 20 (“I didn’t wake up until the car did the U-turn and passed by [the officers].”); id. at 

49 (testifying that a “fishtail burning rubber” that woke him up).) According to Plaintiff, he asked 

the driver to let him out of the car, but the driver did not let him.

2

 (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 5; Dkt. No. 

65-2 at 22.) 

Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he exited on the driver’s side because he had taken 

his seatbelt off when he saw the police behind him so he could get out and run, so when the 

collision happened he slid in front of the seat beneath the dashboard and wiggled free when he saw 

the open door, not knowing if the door on his side was still able to open after the collision. (Dkt. 

No. 65-2 at 25, 29, 54-55.) His glasses flew off his face at the time of the collision and he did not 

stop to put them on because he needed to run from the police. (Id. at 29-30.)

Officer Tirapelli, then a 25-year veteran of OPD with significant interviewing experience,

did not believe Plaintiff’s story. (Id. ¶ 8.) Based on Officer Deise’s identification, Plaintiff’s 

admission that he had been in the car, and Plaintiff’s glasses found in the car, Officer Tirapelli

 

2

Plaintiff reportedly told the officers that the driver did not respond until after the collision, saying 

“get out if you can!” (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 5; see also Dkt. No. 65-2 at 24-25.) But at his deposition, 

Plaintiff testified that the driver responded earlier, refusing to let Plaintiff out of the car. (Dkt. No. 

65-2 at 23.) 

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recommended charging Plaintiff with a probation violation, driving under the influence, evading a 

police officer, duty to stop at a scene of an accident, and gross vehicular manslaughter while 

intoxicated. (Dkt. No. 65-1 at 10-12;Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 9.) OPD arrested Plaintiff for vehicular 

manslaughter under California Penal Code § 192(c)(1), causing serious bodily injury during flight 

from a peace officer under California Vehicle Code § 2800.3, failing to stop at the scene of an 

accident resulting in injury under California Vehicle Code § 20001, and driving under the 

influence of alcohol under Vehicle Code § 23153. (Dkt. No. 65-4 at 2.) Plaintiff was taken to 

Santa Rita jail where he spent the next 17 months. (Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 16.)

In April 2013 the Alameda County District Attorney charged Plaintiff with murder and 

four other felonies related to causing injury while evading officers and leaving the scene of the 

collision. (Dkt. No. 65-6 at 2-6.) The District Attorney amended the complaint to add another 

felony evasion count in October 2013. (Id. at 7-11.)

Officer Tirapelli did not immediately request DNA testing of the evidence taken from the 

scene of the accident. (See Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶¶ 12, 19.) According to Officer Tirapelli, that was 

consistent with his usual practice: he frequently did not immediately request DNA testing from 

traffic accidents because it would take about three months to get results because homicides are 

given priority. (Id. ¶ 12.) He averred that this case would have been treated like a traffic accident 

even though there was a fatality. (Id.) In late summer 2013, the Deputy District Attorney 

assigned to the case asked Officer Tirapelli to have the DNA evidence processed. (Dkt. No. 69-2 

¶ 13.) Based on the DA’s request, Officer Tirapelli submitted the DNA evidence for testing. (Id.

¶¶ 13, 19.)

At some point, the police learned that the BMW was registered to Joshua Ford, an alias for 

Elton Flenaugh, who Plaintiff concedes is his uncle. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 17-18.) Mr. Flenaugh is a 

black man who was 33 years old at the time of the collision. (Dkt. No. 64 at 10 n.1.) Plaintiff 

testified that he first learned that Mr. Flenaugh owned the BMW during discovery in his criminal 

case. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 26.) When asked whether Mr. Flenaugh might have been driving the 

BMW, Plaintiff noted that it was possible that the man inside the bar had called Mr. Flenaugh to 

pick up Plaintiff, but stated that he was not in touch with Mr. Flenaugh at the time of the collision 

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and did not know who the driver was, adding that “[i]f I tell you it was [Mr. Flenaugh], then I 

would have to tell you I [saw Mr. Flenaugh] driving the car.” (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 27.)

Plaintiff had a preliminary hearing in Alameda County Superior Court on October 29, 

2013. (Dkt. No. 65-6 at 2; Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 14.) The Superior Court had previously granted 

Plaintiff’s attorney’s request to continue the preliminary hearing to allow time to receive the 

results of the DNA analysis, but the presiding judge eventually let the preliminary hearing go 

forward without the DNA results because the Deputy District Attorney was not introducing DNA 

evidence at the hearing. (See Dkt. No. 69-1 at 7-8; see also Dkt. No. 65-2 at 59.) Officer Deise 

testified that he was 90 to 95 percent certain that Plaintiff was driving the BMW. (Dkt. No. 74-2 

at 4-6.) He noted that he has a heightened sense of awareness during a pursuit, which contributed 

to his confidence about the identification. (Id. at 6.) Aside from his testimony at the preliminary 

hearing, Officer Deise was not involved in Plaintiff’s prosecution. (Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff 

insists that Officer Deise was lying at his preliminary hearing, highlighting an inconsistency about 

whether the officer called dispatch to report one black male or two running from the car, and 

otherwise stating that the officer must have been lying because it was more than merely a mistaken 

identification. (Dkt. No. 65-2 at 41-47.) 

Officer Tirapelli also testified at the preliminary hearing. (Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 14; id. at 11-

44.) He described the evidence he collected at the scene and his search to determine the owner of 

the car; he was not asked and did not testify about any DNA analysis. (See id.) He avers that, 

“[t]o the best of [his] knowledge, the results of the DNA analysis had not yet been returned by the 

lab.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff concedes that Officer Tirapelli testified truthfully. (Dkt. No. 69-1 at 20-

21.)

Ultimately, the judge held Plaintiff to answer on all charges, finding probable cause to 

believe he was the driver despite agreeing that there was “certainly some room to question the 

accuracy of the officer’s identification, given the brevity of the observation and the somewhat 

equivocal testimony on some other points[.]” (Dkt. No. 65-6 at 10-11; see also Dkt. No. 65-7 at 2 

(order holding Plaintiff to answer).) On November 8, 2013, the District Attorney filed a Criminal 

Information against Plaintiff as to the same six felony counts—one count of murder and five 

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counts relating to evasion and leaving the scene of an accident after causing injuries. (Dkt. No. 

65-8.) 

In late November or early December 2013 Officer Tirapelli received the DNA results from 

the lab by interoffice mail. (Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 15.) He forwarded a copy to the Deputy District 

Attorney. (Id.) The lab analyzed the airbags and the glasses from the BMW. (See Dkt. No. 69-2 

at 32.) The test results did not implicate Plaintiff.3(Dkt. No. 69-2 ¶ 15; id. at 35.)

The Deputy District Attorney requested to have the DNA reprocessed. (Dkt. No. 69-2

¶ 16.) In December 2013 or January 2014, Officer Tirapelli submitted a request to have all 

available DNA evidence tested—not just the airbags included in the first DNA analysis, but the 

steering wheel, gear shifter, center console, and driver and passenger head rests and arms. (Id.

¶ 16; id. at 39.) The District Attorney’s investigator also obtained a DNA sample from Plaintiff 

for the purposes of comparison in the lab. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Officer Tirapelli and the Deputy District Attorney received the results of the second DNA 

analysis on May 10, 2014. (Id. ¶ 17.) The results did not implicate Plaintiff. (Id.; id. at 39-44.) 

On May 15, 2014, the Deputy District Attorney advised Officer Tirapelli that he had dropped all 

charges against Plaintiff the prior week due to the results of the second DNA test. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiff was released from custody on May 9, 2014. (Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff filed this action in December 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) As Plaintiff proceeded in forma 

pauperis, the Court reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and dismissed it with leave to 

amend several times.

4

 (Dkt. No. 9.) In December 2015, the Court reviewed and ordered service 

of the Third Amended Complaint on all Defendants. (Dkt. No. 48.) Defendants moved for 

summary judgment at the close of discovery. (Dkt. Nos. 64, 69.) Following oral argument, at the 

Court’s instruction the parties filed supplemental briefing further addressing probable cause and 

 

3

Plaintiff contends that the DNA results confirmed that he was not, in fact, the driver of the 

BMW, but Officer Deise argues that the results were merely inconclusive as to Plaintiff—i.e., that 

there was not enough DNA material to reach a conclusion. (See Dkt. No. 64 at 19.) Drawing all 

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court assumes for the purposes of this motion that the DNA 

analysis established Plaintiff’s factual innocence and confirmed that he was not the driver. 

4 Although Plaintiff proceeded in forma pauperis, he has been represented by counsel since this 

lawsuit began.

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qualified immunity. (Dkt. Nos. 75, 76, 77.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. In his oppositions, 

Plaintiff dismisses or withdraws a number of claims. Specifically, he abandons the false arrest

claim against Officer Deise (Dkt. No. 71 at 7), the malicious prosecution claim against Officer

Tirapelli, and the municipal liability claim against the City of Oakland (Dkt. No. 70 at 6). The 

Court therefore dismisses these claims. As there are no remaining claims against the City of 

Oakland, the Court dismisses the City from this action. 

The Section 1983 claims at issue include a claim of delayed DNA testing against Officer 

Tirapelli and a malicious prosecution claim against Officer Deise. To prevail on his remaining 

Section 1983 claims, Plaintiff must show that the alleged conduct both occurred “under color of 

state law” and deprived Plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. 

City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 85, 887 (9th Cir. 2003). The first element is met, as the claims arise 

out of defendants’ actions in their role as police officers who act under color of state law. Thus, 

the only question before the Court is whether there are any constitutional violations.

II. Delayed DNA Testing Claim against Officer Tirapelli

A. Whether Plaintiff can Bring a Due Process Claim for Delayed DNA Testing

In the TAC, Plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution claim against Officer Tirapelli. 

(Dkt. No. 44 ¶¶ 28-34.) The gravamen of the claim was that Officer Tirapelli “deliberately 

ignored the DNA evidence that existed from the steering wheel of the car in which the Plaintiff 

was a passenger that would have immediately proven that Plaintiff was not the driver of the car.” 

(Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleged that Officer Tirapelli acted with the scienter required to state a 

plausible malicious prosecution claim because “he knew that there existed exculpatory DNA 

evidence that in fact established a lack of probable cause to prosecute Plaintiff for murder” but 

“deliberately ignor[ed]” it during his criminal investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.) In his opposition to 

Officer Tirapelli’s motion, Plaintiff abandons the malicious prosecution claim and argues instead

that Officer Tirapelli is “liable for failing to conduct a DNA test of the apparently exculpatory 

evidence from December 2012 to November 2013” in violation of Plaintiff’s right to due process. 

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(Dkt. No. 70 at 4 (emphasis omitted).)

A plaintiff may bring Section 1983 claims in the same action based on both malicious 

prosecution as well as any other federal rights allegedly violated. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 

368 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). A claim for failure to preserve potentially exculpatory 

evidence can constitute a due process violation where the plaintiff can establish bad faith on the 

part of the police. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); United States v. Cooper, 

983 F.2d 928, 933 (1993). But it is a different claim from the malicious prosecution claim alleged 

in the TAC. Thus, rather than oppose the City Defendants’ motion on its merits, Plaintiff attempts 

to rewrite the TAC by asserting a new claim. When appropriate, courts deem new claims in an 

opposition to a motion for summary judgment as a motion to amend the pleadings under Federal 

Rule of Civil procedure 15(b). Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 1994)). And 

indeed, here Plaintiff invokes Rule 15 and urges the Court to consider the claim. (See Dkt. No. 70 

at 5.) Courts take five factors into account to determine whether to grant leave to amend: bad 

faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the 

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

There is no evidence of bad faith. But there has been undue delay: Plaintiff initiated this 

action in 2014 and the underlying facts have remained the same since then. This is not a case in 

which Plaintiff did not understand the facts giving rise to the newly alleged claim until late in 

discovery. Cf. Desertrain, 754 F.3d at 1154. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s initial complaint alleged 

that “[a]fter over a year of confinement in jail, DNA tests confirmed that the Plaintiff was not 

driving” the car. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 10.) In his opposition, Plaintiff merely asserts the claim and thus 

does not offer any explanation for the undue delay. Further, Plaintiff has already amended the 

complaint three times, and did not raise a due process claim for failure to preserve or test DNA 

evidence in any iteration of the pleadings. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 10, 22, 44.) 

On the other hand, despite the undue delay, there is no prejudice to Officer Tirapelli. Since 

filing his initial complaint Plaintiff has challenged Officer Tirapelli’s failure to have the DNA 

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evidence tested. Thus, the DNA testing claim comes as no surprise to the officer. The same 

discovery underlying the other claims is relevant. Indeed, Officer Tirapelli actually addressed the 

failure to test DNA in his motion for summary judgment. Thus, there is no prejudice, and Officer 

Tirapelli does not argue otherwise. (Dkt. No. 73 at 4.)

Finally, Officer Tirapelli contends that leave to amend would be futile because “any delay 

in testing potentially exculpatory evidence in this case is not a due process violation.” (Id. at 4.) 

In his view, Plaintiff’s allegations that Officer Tirapelli failed to conduct a DNA test until Plaintiff 

was in custody for nearly a year does not state a due process claim. (Id. at 2-3.) Failure to 

preserve potentially useful evidence—which could include possible DNA evidence—does not 

constitute a denial of due process unless the plaintiff can show bad faith on the part of the police. 

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). In that context, the bad faith “requires some 

intent to withhold evidence that may have value to the defense.” Story v. Martel, No. 10-CV00566-LHK, 2011 WL 90112, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011); see also Phillips v. Woodford, 267 

F.3d 966, 987 (9th Cir. 2001) (in the post-conviction context, finding no due process violation 

where the petitioner failed to show that the state destroyed the evidence to prevent disclosure of it 

favorable to the defense). Plaintiff cites no authority establishing an obligation of the police to test 

DNA evidence in advance of a preliminary hearing or even trial. Indeed, in Youngblood the 

Supreme Court noted that the “police do not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular 

tests.” Id. at 59. 

In Nicolaas v. Pace, No. C12-1357RAJ, 2013 WL 4519603, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 

2013), the plaintiff brought a due process claim for failure to test DNA evidence to corroborate an 

eyewitness identification. There, the court noted that “[s]o far as [it] is aware, no court has 

entertained the notion that police must test DNA evidence.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court 

continued to note that if the police perform tests and the results are exculpatory, a prosecutor has a 

constitutional obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) to disclose the results, but 

“[n]either Brady nor any other precedent of which the court is aware requires DNA tests.” Id. 

Further, “[a]t least one appellate court has squarely rejected the notion that a defendant can require 

the government to investigate a case as the defendant prefers.” Id. (citing United States v. Tadros, 

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310 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 2002)). But the Nicolaas court did not hold that a plaintiff could 

never bring a due process claim for failure to test DNA evidence. Instead, it noted it “does not 

purport to decide that police never have the obligation to test DNA evidence; it decides only that 

they had no obligation in this case” because there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the 

police. Id. at *4. The court explained that “[i]n a different case, where there was evidence that 

police chose in bad faith not to perform DNA tests that they believed would be exculpatory, the 

court might inquire more deeply into what the Constitution requires.” Id. at *4. Construing 

Plaintiff’s opposition as a motion to amend and considering the request in conjunction with the 

TAC allegations that Officer Tirapelli “acted with malice because he knew that [there] existed 

exculpatory DNA evidence” (Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 32), Plaintiff’s proposed amendment presents the bad 

faith situation that the Nicolaas court envisioned might be a constitutional violation. Accordingly, 

viewing the proposed amendment with extreme liberality, see Morongo Band of Mission Indians 

v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990), and accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the 

Court cannot say that leave to amend would be futile. Thus, despite the undue delay and 

Plaintiff’s failure to raise this claim in any of the three amended complaints, the Court will 

construe Plaintiff’s opposition as a motion for leave to amend the TAC and consider the due 

process claim below.

B. Officer Tirapelli is Entitled to Summary Judgment

Assuming without deciding that Youngblood and Nicolaas can be read to create a right to 

pretrial DNA testing, Officer Tirapelli is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity, which 

shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow).

To determine whether qualified immunity applies, the Court decides whether “(1) the 

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right which was violated was clearly 

established at the time of the violation.” Espinosa v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 

532 (9th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court has instructed that district courts may “exercise their 

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sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 

addressed first.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The officer is entitled to immunity if he did not 

violate a constitutional right or if he violated a constitutional right that was not clearly established. 

Id.

“[C]learly established law [is not to be defined] at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. 

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). Instead, in deciding whether a constitutional right was clearly 

established at the time of the alleged violation, a court must ask “whether the violative nature of 

particular conduct is clearly established.” Id. (emphasis added). “The plaintiff bears the burden 

to show that the contours of the right were clearly established.” Clairmont v. Sound Mental 

Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011). “This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken 

in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier v. Katz, 

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. In making 

this determination, courts consider the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation and the 

information that the official possessed to determine whether a reasonable official in a particular 

factual situation should have been on notice that his or her conduct was illegal. Inouye v. Kemna, 

504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007). “[W]here there is no case directly on point, ‘existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” C.B. v. City of Sonora, 

769 F.3d 1005, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). An official’s subjective beliefs are 

irrelevant. Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712.

Here, Plaintiff has not established that Officer Tirapelli violated his right to due process by 

delaying DNA testing of the evidence from the BMW. First, Plaintiff has not identified exactly 

what the violation is. Is it failing to test the DNA immediately? Failing to test it within a certain 

number of months after Plaintiff’s arrest? Failing to have the results of the DNA testing returned 

before Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing? Whatever the timing, even if a due process right to pretrial 

DNA testing exists, Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact

could conclude that Officer Tirapelli acted in bad faith in delaying the DNA testing and thus that 

Officer Tirapelli violated his right. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58; Nicolaas, 2013 WL 4519603, 

at *4. 

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Plaintiff argues that Officer Tirapelli is liable because he “had knowledge of the apparent 

exculpatory value of th[e DNA] evidence” because Defendant repeatedly told him he was not the 

driver. (Dkt. No. 70 at 5.) In Nicolaas, the court held that a positive eyewitness identification was 

enough to prosecute the plaintiff, so it was not bad faith for the police to fail to test DNA evidence 

to corroborate the identification. 2015 WL 4519603, at *4. So too here, where the prosecution 

was based on more than the identification alone: putting aside Officer Deise’s identification, 

which will be discussed in more detail below, Plaintiff was arrested based on Officer Deise’s 

observation of him fleeing the car, his concession that he was in the car, his statement that his 

glasses were in the car, and the discovery of his glasses on the driver’s seat. Thus, Officer 

Tirapelli had more than the identification alone to place Plaintiff in the driver’s seat. Like 

Nicolaas, “[i]t is regrettable that [the] identification was mistaken, but [the] identification was 

more than sufficient grounds to prosecute [Plaintiff,]” 2015 WL 4519603, at *4, so the failure to 

immediately seek DNA testing to corroborate the identification was not bad faith.

Moreover, Officer Tirapelli testified that he acted in accordance with his usual protocol for 

testing DNA evidence in this type of case—that is, he waited until the DA requested DNA 

analysis. He further testified that he submitted requests for analysis as soon as the DA requested 

them, which occurred seven months into Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff has not offered any evidence 

showing that Officer Tirapelli purposefully delayed the submission once the DA requested testing, 

hid the results from the DA once they were returned, or otherwise engaged in bad faith by 

purposefully delaying testing. All Plaintiff relies on is his statements to the arresting officer and 

Officer Tirapelli that he was not the driver. While there is no factual dispute that Plaintiff made 

such statements, a reasonable trier of fact could not find bad faith based on the statements alone; 

such a theory of bad faith would establish a constitutional right to DNA testing whenever a 

criminal defendant protests his innocence. To do so would be contrary to the well-established 

precedent that police have no constitutional duty to perform any particular tests and goes far 

beyond the recognized right to be free from bad faith destruction of evidence. Youngblood, 488 

U.S. at 59. Plaintiff’s failure to establish that Officer Tirapelli acted in bad faith is fatal to his due 

process claim.

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Moreover, even if Plaintiff had established a constitutional violation, he fails to show that 

the right he invokes was clearly established in “the specific context of [this] case[,]” Saucier, 533 

U.S. at 201—that a reasonable official would have understood that his conduct violated those 

rights. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Plaintiff identifies no precedent clearly 

establishing a right to pretrial DNA testing, let alone pretrial DNA testing within a certain number 

of months of pretrial detention or prior to the preliminary hearing. In fact, Plaintiff does not cite a 

single case about delayed testing in his opposition to Defendants’ qualified immunity argument, 

instead relying on California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984) and United States v. Cooper, 

983 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1993)—both cases involving destruction of evidence altogether before trial. 

Nor did Plaintiff identify any authority at oral argument. As discussed above in the context of 

whether leave to amend would be futile, the only case to have touched on this issue is Nicolaas, a 

district court case that expressed doubt about whether the right exists at all even when there is bad 

faith. Thus, it would not be clear to a reasonable officer in Officer Tirapelli’s position that his 

failure to submit the evidence for DNA testing until the DA requested it months after Plaintiff’s 

arrest would be unlawful. 

Because Plaintiff cannot show that he had a clearly established right to have DNA 

evidence tested at some earlier point in time, Officer Tirapelli is entitled to qualified immunity on 

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against him. See Nicolaas, 2013 WL 4519603, at *5 (granting 

summary judgment to the defendant officers who were only sued in their official capacity and 

noting that the same result would follow if they were sued in their personal capacity because even 

if the plaintiff “had a constitutional right to pretrial DNA testing, that right was not clearly 

established”).

III. Malicious Prosecution Claim against Defendant Deise

The elements of a malicious prosecution claim brought under Section 1983 incorporate 

state law. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1987). Under 

California malicious prosecution law Plaintiff must prove that the underlying prosecution: “(1) 

was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in 

his, plaintiff’s, favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” 

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Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Yousefian v. City of 

Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (“The absence of probable cause is a necessary element of § 1983 

false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.”) (citations omitted). In addition, Plaintiff must 

overcome the presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment in prosecuting the 

charge; “[i]n the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption, the presumption [is] sufficient to 

require summary judgment.” Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Smiddy 

II”).

The criminal action was indisputably resolved in Plaintiff’s favor. And for purposes of this 

motion the Court will assume the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of malice. The 

malicious prosecution claim nevertheless fails because Defendants have established as a matter of 

law that there was probable cause and, even if that were not the case, it is reasonably arguable that 

there was probable cause, which is sufficient for qualified immunity.

1. Probable Cause

“If the court determines that there was probable cause to institute the prior action, the 

malicious prosecution action fails, whether or not there is evidence that the prior suit was 

maliciously motivated.” Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 875 (1989); see 

also Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 944 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[P]robable cause is an absolute defense 

to malicious prosecution.”) (citation omitted). When the claim is based on a criminal prosecution, 

“the question of probable cause is whether it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to 

suspect the plaintiff had committed a crime.” Johnson v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 204 Cal. App. 4th 

1097, 1105-06 (2012) (citations omitted). “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, 

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 

Instead, the inquiry turns on whether “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge [ ] 

are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the 

circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an 

offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). Put another way, there is probable 

cause for the initiation of a criminal prosecution if “it was objectively reasonable for the defendant

to suspect the plaintiff had committed a crime.” Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 600 F.3d 1156, 1164 

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(9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

“What facts the defendant knew is an issue of fact for the jury, but only to the extent the 

scope of the defendant’s knowledge is disputed.” Roberts, 660 F.3d at 1164. When the state of 

the defendant’s knowledge is “undisputed, it is the court which decides whether such facts 

constitute probable cause or not.” Sheldon Appel Co., 47 Cal. 3d at 881; see also Roberts, 660 

F.3d at 1164 (“Whether probable cause existed on the facts known to the defendant is a question 

of law for the court[.]”) (citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff—who carries the burden of proof—argues that there are factual disputes 

that preclude summary judgment on the existence of probable cause. But there are either no such 

disputes or, to the extent that there are, the evidence, even when construed in Plaintiff’s favor, is 

insufficient to negate probable cause. As discussed below, the Court concludes, as a matter of 

law, that even absent Officer Deise’s observations of the BMW driver on 90th Avenue, there was 

sufficient probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was the driver for the criminal prosecution 

against Plaintiff to be initiated and maintained after his arrest.

First, as noted above, the Court assumes for the purposes of this motion that Plaintiff was 

not driving the BMW and instead was asleep in the passenger seat, as he testified. A reasonable 

inference to draw from this testimony is that Officer Deise falsely stated that he observed Plaintiff 

in the driver’s seat. In the context of cases alleging false arrest in which an arrest warrant was 

issued, the Ninth Circuit has held that an officer’s false statements in a warrant application are 

immaterial to the probable cause analysis if other evidence, without the false statement, is 

sufficient to establish probable cause to issue the warrant. See Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 

937-38 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that an officer’s false statements caused 

malicious prosecution because “even after correcting for the allegedly false and omitted 

information[,] . . . probable cause supported [plaintiff’s] arrest . . . [and] prosecution”) (citations 

omitted); see also Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding 

that an officer’s false statements in a warrant application about the plaintiff were not material 

because there was other evidence sufficient to establish probable cause); Lombardi v. City of El 

Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that an officer’s omissions in a 

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warrant application were not material because there was other evidence sufficient to establish 

probable cause). Materiality is a question for the court, and in that context “requires the plaintiff 

to demonstrate that the magistrate judge would not have issued the warrant with false information 

redacted, or omitted information restored.” See Smith, 640 F.3d at 937 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). The same reasoning applies to the probable cause analysis in the malicious 

prosecution context, as the standard for probable cause is the same in both scenarios. See, e.g., 

Scotti v. City of Phoenix, 609 F. App’x 386, 387-88 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to defendant officer on a malicious prosecution claim because 

“probable cause—independent of the false information conveyed by [the arresting officer]—

supported [plaintiff’s] arrest and prosecution.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court assumes that 

the identification is false and considers whether independent information available to the arresting 

officer supports probable cause as a matter of law.5 It does. 

Even absent the identification—that is, even if the arresting officer did not have an 

opportunity to observe who was in the driver’s seat—there is no genuine dispute that the totality 

of the evidence available to the arresting officer would lead a prudent person to conclude that there 

was a fair probability that Plaintiff was driving the BMW based on the following undisputed facts: 

(1) the officer observed two men running away from the car; (2) Plaintiff was running away from 

the driver’s side of the car; (3) Plaintiff admitted to being in the car; and (4) Plaintiff’s glasses 

were found on the driver’s seat of the car. These facts are more than sufficient to lead a person of 

reasonable caution to believe that Plaintiff was driving the BMW and thus to find probable cause 

for his arrest on the driving-related offenses. See People v. Windham, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1580, 

1589 (1987) (noting that there was probable cause to believe the defendant was driving the car and 

arrest him for driving-related offenses where there was no one else in the area, the driver’s seat 

was empty, and the officer observed the defendant standing 15 to 20 feet away even though the 

 

5 Because the Court does not consider Officer Deise’s identification in determining the existence 

of probable cause, the Court need not consider the other evidence Plaintiff offered to support his 

position that Officer Deise could not have observed the BMW driver—i.e., the O’Brien 

Declaration. The Court therefore overrules as moot Officer Deise’s evidentiary objection to the 

declaration. (Dkt. No. 74 at 7-11.)

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arresting officers never observed the defendant in the car); Noia v. Cozens, 34 Cal. App. 3d 691, 

694 (1973) (noting that there was probable cause to believe the defendant was driving the car and 

arrest him for driving-related offenses based on circumstantial evidence even though the arresting 

officer never observed the defendant in the car); see also People v. Thompson, 38 Cal. 4th 811, 

820 (2006) (holding that officers’ lack of certainty that the defendant was the driver did not 

preclude a finding of probable cause where an eyewitness gave a vague description of the suspect 

but the car was traced to a particular address where a man matching the description attempted to 

flee from the house when the police arrived). This is especially true given that flight is evidence 

of wrongdoing, and it is undisputed that Plaintiff fled the vehicle after the crash. See United States 

v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Flight together with other evidence g[ives] rise to 

probable cause.”).

Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. The Court asked the parties to address 

in supplemental briefing whether absent Officer Deise’s observation of the driver, there was 

sufficient probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was the driver of the car. In his submission, 

Plaintiff appears to contend that there is only probable cause to believe someone is the driver when 

the arresting officer observes the person seated in the driver’s seat. (See Dkt. No. 77 at 3-5

(citations omitted).) As the above-cited cases make clear, such is not the case. See Windham, 194 

Cal. App. 3d at 1589; Noia, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 694; Thompson, 38 Cal. 4th at 820. The authorities

Plaintiff cites do not hold otherwise. While the cases on which he relies hold that observations of 

an individual in the driver’s seat of a parked car are enough to find probable cause that the person 

had been driving because the state vehicle code defines “driver” broadly to include “a person who 

drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle,” Cal. Vehicle Code § 305 (emphasis added), 

they do not hold that observations of the driver are required. See Adler v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 

228 Cal. App. 3d 252, 258 (1991); Loharsingh v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 2d 

1080, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

6

 

At oral argument, Plaintiff urged that his glasses being found on the driver’s seat cannot 

 

6

Adler and Loharsingh are inapposite, as there it was undisputed that the plaintiffs were in the 

driver’s seat and the only dispute was whether they had been driving. The opposite is true here.

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contribute to probable cause because the car had just been in a major collision, so the glasses could 

have been thrown onto the driver’s seat from anywhere in the car. He repeats and readjusts that 

argument in his supplemental brief, contending that a reasonable officer in Defendant’s position 

also would have reasoned that the glasses fell as Plaintiff exited the car. (See Dkt. No. 77 at 4-6.) 

There, he suggests that absent Officer Deise’s false observation of the driver on 90th Avenue, the 

only evidence available to the arresting officer would be “the mere discovery of Plaintiff’s glasses 

on the driver’s seat” and contends that that alone is not enough to indicate that he was the driver. 

(Id. at 5-6.) Taking the argument a step further, he contends that “[i]f such reasoning were 

allowed, then anyone who inadvertently dropped their property on the driver’s seat of a vehicle . . . 

could be held accountable for being the driver . . . .” (Dkt. No. 77 at 6.)

But here the glasses were not the only evidence available to the arresting officer. There 

was also Plaintiff’s admission that he was in the car, the officer’s observation of Plaintiff fleeing 

the car on the driver’s side, and Plaintiff’s admission that the glasses were his. For the reasons 

described above, this is enough circumstantial evidence for a reasonable officer to believe that 

Plaintiff was the driver. At oral argument, Plaintiff likewise insisted that there was no probable 

cause because when the officers checked the car’s registration, they saw that Plaintiff was not the 

owner of the car. These facts may provide reasonable doubt about whether Plaintiff was the 

driver. But they do not undermine probable cause: based on the two men running from the car, 

there was a 50% chance that Plaintiff was the driver; his glasses on the driver’s seat tipped the 

scales to make it probable that Plaintiff was the driver. “[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is 

the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment[,]” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 

U.S. 79, 87 (1987), and these facts meet that standard.

Certainly, an officer may not ignore exculpatory evidence that would “negate a finding of 

probable cause.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003). But Plaintiff has not 

identified any such evidence or circumstances that an officer would have seen at the time of the 

incident. The mere existence of some evidence that could suggest Plaintiff was not the driver—

namely, his repeated statements that he was not the driver—does not negate probable cause to 

believe he was. To conclude otherwise would undermine probable cause whenever a defendant 

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protested his innocence. No reasonable jury could conclude that the facts known to an arresting 

officer—based on observations of the men fleeing the car and Plaintiff’s statements—were 

insufficient to establish probable cause.

Moreover, the Superior Court judge held Plaintiff to answer following his preliminary 

hearing, which constitutes “prima facie—but not conclusive—evidence of probable cause.” 

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff

can rebut a prima facie finding of probable cause “by showing that the criminal prosecution was 

induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken 

in bad faith.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff argues that Officer Deise’s fabricated observation 

and identification of him rebuts the prima facie showing of probable cause. But at the preliminary 

hearing, the Superior Court judge noted that there were reasons to question the accuracy of the 

officer’s identification given the short time he had to observe the driver and other inconsistencies, 

but nevertheless bound Plaintiff over for trial concluding there was probable cause to believe he 

was the driver based on the totality of the evidence. (Dkt. No. 65-6 at 10-11.) Thus, here too the 

conclusion that there was probable cause stands independently from Officer Deise’s fabricated 

identification, so Plaintiff has failed to establish a triable issue as to the absence of probable cause.

The inquiry could end here, as summary judgment is proper based on Plaintiff’s inability to 

establish a lack of probable cause for his arrest on the driving-related charges. See Yousefian, 779 

F.3d at 1015 (affirming summary judgment and, accordingly, declining to decide whether the 

magistrate’s probable cause determination at the preliminary hearing estopped re-litigation of the 

issue or whether the prosecutor exercised independent judgment in filing the charges). 

3. Qualified Immunity

Although Officer Deise did not argue in his opening brief that he was entitled to qualified 

immunity on this claim, he did so in his supplemental brief and the Plaintiff had an opportunity to 

respond, so the Court addresses the argument here. The question is “whether it is reasonably 

arguable that there was probable cause for arrest—that is, whether reasonable officers could 

disagree as to the legality of the arrest such that the arresting officer is entitled to qualified 

immunity.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in 

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original) (citation omitted); accord Sialoi v. City of San Diego, 823 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 

2016) (citation omitted). Thus, “[e]ven if the arrest was made without a warrant and without 

probable cause . . . the officer may still be immune from suit if it was objectively reasonable for 

him to believe that he had probable cause.” Rosenbaum, 663 F.3d at 1078 (emphasis in original) 

(citation omitted); see, e.g., Eberhard v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. 3:14-cv-01910-JD, 2015 WL 

6871750, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2015) (granting summary judgment to the arresting officers on 

plaintiff’s claim for unlawful arrest because the officers reasonably believed there was probable 

cause for his arrest). This standard is difficult to detangle from the probable cause inquiry, which 

itself turns on whether the circumstances would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the 

suspect has committed a crime; the difference is that the probable cause inquiry is about whether 

the officer’s belief is “objectively reasonable,” Roberts, 600 F.3d at 1164, whereas in the qualified 

immunity context it need only be “reasonably arguable” that the officer has that objective belief,

Rosenbaum, 663 F.3d at 1076.

Even viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, given the undisputed facts that the arresting 

officer saw Plaintiff fleeing from the driver’s side of the car, his admission that he was in the car, 

and his glasses were found on the driver’s seat, Officer Deise meets this standard: it is reasonably 

arguable that there was probable cause to believe he was the driver. Put another way, even if 

there was a question about why Plaintiff was running from the driver’s side of the car and how his 

glasses ended up on the seat, and even if there were an innocent explanation for those facts, the 

circumstances still make it reasonably arguable that a reasonable officer in Officer Deise’s 

position would have believed that Plaintiff was the driver. Plaintiff’s sole argument in opposition 

to qualified immunity is a non-starter: he contends that it is “clearly established well before 2012 

that a party is not a ‘driver’ of a vehicle unless they are driving the vehicle” and that “there mere 

location of someone’s personal property located inside a vehicle does not in and of itself lend to 

reasoning that the person is the driver . . . .” (Dkt. No. 77 at 10.) But Officer Deise, and a 

reasonable person in his position, was not faced only with personal property on the driver’s seat. 

Instead, Plaintiff’s glasses on the driver’s seat, flight from the driver’s side of the vehicle, and 

admission that he was in the car combined to make it reasonably arguable for the arresting officer 

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to believe he was the driver.

For each of these reasons, Officer Deise is entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment as follows. First, based on Plaintiff’s withdrawal, the Court dismisses the false arrest 

claim against Officer Deise, the malicious prosecution claim against Officer Tirapelli, and the 

municipal liability claim against the City of Oakland. As there are no remaining claims against 

the City of Oakland, the Court DISMISSES the City of Oakland from this action. 

As to the remaining claims, Officer Tirapelli is entitled to summary judgment on the 

failure to test exculpatory DNA evidence claim—which the Court considers construing Plaintiff’s 

opposition as a request to amend the complaint—on qualified immunity grounds. Officer Deise is 

likewise entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. The Court will enter a 

separate judgment.

This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 64 and 69.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2017

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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