Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03597/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03597-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD E. GRAY, 

Petitioner,

 v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Warden,

Respondent. ____________________________

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No. C 05-3597 CW (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Richard E. Gray, a state prisoner incarcerated at

the California State Prison - Folsom at Represa, California, filed

this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging on several grounds the validity of his

conviction. 

Respondent has filed an answer. Petitioner has filed a

traverse. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court DENIES the petition on all claims.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

According to the allegations in the petition, on May 21, 2003,

an Alameda County jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of

first degree murder. The jury found true the enhancements for

discharging a firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

On August 22, 2003, Petitioner's trial counsel filed a motion

for a new trial. On the same day, he withdrew as trial counsel

after Petitioner filed a state habeas petition alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel on his part. 

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1

 California's Three Strikes law was enacted by the Legislature

and became effective March 7, 1994. One provision of the law

prescribes increased terms of imprisonment for defendants who have

previously been convicted of certain "violent" or "serious" felonies.

Cal. Penal Code § 667(d),(e). Specifically, § 667(e)(1) states that

a second strike defendant, such as Petitioner, having one prior felony

conviction, receives "twice the term otherwise provided as punishment

for the current felony conviction." Here, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to twenty-five years to life on the murder, and then

doubled that as a second strike to fifty years to life. The trial

court then imposed a twenty-five years to life sentence for personal

use of a firearm, which ran concurrent to the punishment for

possession of a gun by a felon. The trial court also imposed a five

year enhancement for the prior conviction of aggravated assault, for

a total of eighty years to life. (CT 401-403, 414.) However, the

parties state that Petitioner was sentenced to eighty-three years to

life. (Pet. at 2; Answer at 2.)

2

On November 13, 2003, Petitioner's newly-appointed trial

counsel filed another motion for a new trial.

On November 14, 2003, both motions for new trial were denied. 

On that same date, the trial court found true Petitioner's prior

strike allegation, and sentenced Petitioner to state prison for

eighty years to life pursuant to California's Three Strikes law.1

Petitioner's direct appeal was denied by the California Court

of Appeal on December 9, 2004 in a reasoned unpublished opinion. 

(Resp't Ex. B.) On that same date, the appellate court issued a

separate order denying Petitioner's state habeas petition. (Id.)

Petitioner then filed two separate petitions for review with

the California Supreme Court, one addressing his direct appeal and

the other addressing the habeas petition. Both petitions for

review were denied summarily on March 16, 2005. (Resp't Exs. C,

E.) 

On September 7, 2005, Petitioner filed the present federal

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He raises the same claims

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for relief raised on direct appeal and in his state habeas

petition: (1) claims related to CALJIC No. 4.50, the alibi

instruction, including (a) ineffective assistance of trial counsel

for failing to request the instruction and (b) trial court error

for failing sua sponte to provide the instruction to the jury;

(2) a claim of a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), because the prosecutor and state judge concealed the result

of the favorable plea bargain given to the jailhouse informant,

Christopher Brown; and (3) a claim of trial court error in

improperly excluding bad character evidence regarding the victim,

Mario Edwards.

On November 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a request to amend his

petition to add a declaration that in October, 2005, he received

newly-discovered evidence from Brown, who had testified against

him, as well as a statement and other records which show that the

prosecutor forced Brown to testify falsely at trial. In an Order

dated September 25, 2006, the Court denied Petitioner's motion to

amend. The Court found that habeas relief was unwarranted based

upon an actual innocence claim or any other claim relating to the

newly-discovered evidence. (Sept. 25, 2006 Order at 3.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition, and Petitioner

filed a traverse. The Court now addresses the merits of

Petitioner's claims. 

II. Statement of Facts 

In its written opinion, the California Court of Appeal

summarized the factual background as follows:

Keisha Dorsey testified that she lived with the victim,

Mario Edwards, and his parents in Oakland. She stated

that they intended to move to Oregon, but Edwards

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violated his parole and he went to jail for five

months. When she first moved to Oakland, Edwards

introduced her to defendant, known as "Little Rick." 

After that, she saw defendant several times, "riding

through the 'hood.'"

On August 14, 2001, Edwards, Dorsey, defendant and

others were near a liquor store at 105th Avenue and

Edes, across the street from a park. They were

talking, smoking marijuana and drinking. Defendant,

Edwards and another man were arguing about something

that happened in jail. Dorsey heard them talking about

selling fake drugs and the nature of the drugs in the

neighborhood. When Dorsey next looked over, the three

men were "playing and wrestling and stuff." Dorsey

heard defendant tell Edwards if he needed a gun, he had

one over in the park. Defendant pointed to a small bag

by a trash can in the park. 

After about 30 minutes, defendant and Edwards moved to

the middle of the street and started arguing. Dorsey

saw defendant push Edwards and Edwards punched

defendant about three times. Defendant walked towards

the trash can, and Edwards followed him saying, "[S]o,

what, are you going to get your gun now?" Defendant

turned around in the middle of the street and walked

out of sight.

Later, Dorsey and Edwards saw defendant again in his

car in front of the house where Dorsey and Edwards were

sitting in the yard. Edwards asked defendant if he

could smoke one of defendant's cigars and they shared a

cigar. Defendant was acting normally, and left after

that incident.

Dorsey and Edwards then walked up the street and saw

defendant in a blue Honda with a girl. Defendant

swerved and almost hit them. Defendant made a U-turn

and came back. Defendant stopped and got out of his

car. Edwards told Dorsey to keep walking because he

wanted to talk to defendant.

Defendant walked up to Edwards and said: "I love you,

man, but you was out of pocket for that shit you pulled

earlier." Dorsey saw defendant facing Edwards and

pointing a gun at his head. She described the gun as

"kind of long" and "like an old-time gun." Dorsey

said, "Little Rick, please don't shoot him." Defendant

looked at Dorsey and shot Edwards in the head. Dorsey

testified that she saw the bullet come out the back of

Edwards' head and saw "guts and blood" hit the fence

behind him. Defendant shot Edwards again, Edwards fell,

and Dorsey turned to run. As she ran screaming toward

Edwards' grandmother's house, she heard three more

shots. She heard defendant drive off. Edwards' uncle,

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Cameron, confirmed that when Dorsey got to the house,

she told him that defendant shot Mario. Dorsey ran

back to Edwards and stayed there until the police came.

Oakland Police Sergeant Christopher Shannon arrived at

the scene of the shooting at 12:48 a.m. on August 15. 

He saw Edwards lying on his back with his head towards

a fence and Dorsey, who was kneeling over him and

crying. He observed blood and what appeared to be brain

matter on the ground and the fence. Police pulled

Dorsey off the victim and placed her in a patrol car. 

Shannon interviewed her, but she was distraught and

hysterical. He asked her individual questions like: 

"The person that did this was white, Black, Hispanic?" 

She said the shooter was a Black male wearing a plaid

shirt and light blue jeans, who left in an '80s

compact, four-door dark blue [car].

Autopsy evidence showed that Edwards died of multiple

bullet wounds. He had been shot in the back of the

head, the left side of his back, his abdomen, and above

his pubic bone. None of those bullets exited his body. 

He also had a bullet graze on his right thumb, and a

group of what looked like bullet fragments in his left

leg.

Defendant was charged with the murder of Edwards, with

enhancements for discharge of a firearm, and personal

discharge of a firearm which proximately caused great

bodily injury. (§§ 187, 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d).)

Count two charged possession of a firearm by a felon. 

(§ 12021, subd. (a)(1).) The information also alleged

three prior convictions and one prior strike. 

(§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 667.5, subd. (b).)

Defendant's friend, Christopher Brown, was in jail for

a May 4, 2001 burglary. Brown saw defendant in jail

and asked one of the sheriffs to put him in the same

cell with defendant. After talking with defendant,

reading his preliminary hearing transcripts and police

reports, and listening to Dorsey's taped statement,

Brown contacted the police department to offer

information about the shooting of Edwards.

. . . .

Brown testified that defendant told him that he shot

Edwards three or four times because they had an

argument. After Edwards punched him, defendant left

and got a .357 caliber revolver at his cousin's house

and returned to shoot Edwards. After the shooting,

defendant called a friend of his father's named

Screwdriver to come and get the gun. Brown supplied

details of the crime that were not in the written

documents, such as the fact that defendant loaded the

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gun with .38 caliber bullets.

Mona Wilson testified that she lived near the scene of

the shooting and knew Edwards and Dorsey. She had seen

defendant and knew him as Little Rick. She was home on

August 14, and heard three or four shots. She waited

for the shooting to stop and opened her door. She saw

a person who looked Hispanic run to a brown Datsun, get

in and drive off. She called the police. When asked

if she was sure the person was Hispanic, she testified: 

"That's what it looked like to me; didn't look like no

Black person." She testified that she was positive the

person she saw was not defendant. She remembered

saying previously that the person could have been

Hispanic or Black. In her taped statement, she was

asked if it was defendant, and said, "I couldn't tell

you." She denied describing the shooter as a

light-colored person with slicked-back hair.

Wilson was impeached with her statement to the police

on several points including whether she had purchased

crack from defendant or someone else that day. In the

statement, she told police she saw defendant with a gun

that day and told him to leave. Also, she testified

that she had never seen defendant wear his hair slicked

back, but admitted that the picture of defendant she

picked from a photo lineup showed him with his hair

slicked back.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied

having a gun the day of the shooting and denied

shooting Edwards. He testified that he was in the park

waiting for his girlfriend Alfreda to pick him up. She

was supposed to arrive around 5 p.m., but did not show

up until 9:00 p.m. Defendant sold some drugs while he

was waiting. When Alfreda picked him up around 9:00

p.m., they drove to her house and "kicked back" for the

rest of the night. He denied ever discussing his case

with Brown.

Alfreda Nunnery testified that she picked defendant up

around 9:00 p.m. in her gray Honda that night. They

spent the night at her house. She was no longer

defendant's girlfriend and testified that she did not

like him enough to lie for him.

The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder,

possession of a weapon by a felon, and found the

enhancements to be true. The court found the prior

convictions to be true.

(Resp't Ex. B at 1-5 (brackets in original).)

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DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally

in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their

confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies,

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by

presenting the highest state court available with a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek

to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry

v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). It is undisputed that

Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies as to the claims

raised in his petition.

II. Standard of Review

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claims: 

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the 'unreasonable

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application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The

only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the relevant state court decision. Id. at 412. 

In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the

merits issued a summary opinion which does not explain the

rationale of its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is

of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v.

Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this

case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner's claims is the opinion of the California Court of

Appeal. 

If no reasoned decision exists, an independent review of the

record is the only means of deciding whether the state court's

rejection of the claim was objectively reasonable. See Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson,

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

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2

 Petitioner relies on his state court briefing in support of his

petition. Attached to his "Memorandum of Points and Authorities and

Facts of Law in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" is the

opening brief filed by his appellate attorney with the California

Court of Appeal.

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619, 638 (1993)).

III. Legal Claims

A. Claims Regarding CALJIC No. 4.50

Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel because his trial counsel failed to request CALJIC No.

4.50. (Memorandum in Supp. of Pet. (Pet.) at 18.)2 The appellate

court identified the relevant portions of the alibi instruction as

follows: 

[T]he standard instruction on alibi states: the

defendant in this case has introduced evidence for the

purpose of showing that [he][she] was not present at

the time and place of the commission of the alleged

crime for which [he][she] is here on trial. If, after a

consideration of all the evidence, you have a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the

time the crime was committed, you must find [him][her]

not guilty. 

(Resp't Ex. B at 5.)

Petitioner also argues that the trial court's failure sua

sponte to provide the alibi instruction to the jury was per se

reversible error. (Pet. at 16.)

1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

a. Background

As a threshold matter, the appellate court found that

Petitioner's trial counsel's failure to request the alibi

instruction did not prejudice Petitioner. (Resp't Ex. B at 6.) 

The court applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in

denying Petitioner's claim:

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Trial counsel did not request an alibi instruction. 

His failure was the basis of the new trial motion filed

in the superior court. In support of that motion,

counsel admitted that he did not request the

instruction. The trial court confirmed that it would

have given the instruction had it been requested.

A defendant claiming that counsel was inadequate must

show that the challenged conduct was below the standard

of care to be exercised by a reasonably competent

attorney acting as a diligent advocate. (People v.

Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 288; Strickland v.

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland).) 

Even when counsel's error is clearly shown and there is

no justification for the action, a defendant "must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome." (Strickland, supra, 466

U.S. at pp. 693-694.) Absent a demonstration of

prejudice, we need not consider whether counsel's

performance was deficient to reject defendant's claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2

Cal.4th 924, 945.)

In this case, counsel's inaction was minor in light of

the circumstances of the case and the other

instructions given to the jury. The court instructed

the jury that defendant was presumed innocent and was

entitled to a not guilty verdict unless the prosecution

met its burden of proving him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. (CALJIC No. 2.90.) The court also

gave the instructions on how to weigh credibility of a

witness, including the close scrutiny given to an

informant's testimony (CALJIC Nos. 2.20, 2.20.5,

2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27), burden of proof (CALJIC

No. 2.90), and the factors to consider in assessing

eyewitness testimony (CALJIC No. 2.92). The court also

instructed with CALJIC No. 2.91, regarding the burden

of proving identity based solely on eyewitnesses. That

instruction states: "The burden is on the People to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is

the person who committed the crimes with which he is

charged."

"For the purpose of instructing with respect to an

alibi defense, it is sufficient that the jury be

instructed generally to consider all the evidence, and

to acquit the defendant in the event it entertains a

reasonable doubt regarding his or her guilt. 

[Citation.] Because the jury was so instructed in the

present case . . . defendant's contention lacks merit." 

(People v. Alcala, (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 804.)

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Moreover, the jury necessarily understood that "alibi"

was the defendant's defense. Defendant testified that

he was elsewhere, and defense counsel argued that

defense to the jury.

Defendant's jury was able to properly assess and weigh

the testimony of the various witnesses and knew that it

must acquit if it found defendant was not present at

the scene of the shooting. Defendant suffered no

prejudice from the absence of the alibi instruction. 

Accordingly, any failure by counsel to request CALJIC

No. 4.50 was not prejudicial.

(Resp't Ex. B at 6-7.)

b. Applicable Federal Law 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The benchmark for judging

any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that

the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. 

Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

counsel claim, a petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that is,

it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. The relevant

inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather

whether the choices made by defense counsel were reasonable. See

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). Judicial

scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a

court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 

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See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Because trial counsel's

competence is presumed, the petitioner must rebut this presumption

by demonstrating that counsel's performance was unreasonable under

prevailing professional norms and was not the product of sound

strategy. See id. at 688-89. 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel's deficient performance, that is, "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered as the result of

the alleged deficiencies. Id. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52

F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124

(1996). 

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance

of counsel claims is considered to be "clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" for

the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams, 529 at

404-08. 

c. Analysis

Petitioner cannot establish that counsel was ineffective

because he has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that

absent counsel's alleged error the result of the proceeding would

have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Williams, 52

F.3d at 1470 & n.3.

The appellate court carefully analyzed Petitioner's claim and

determined that "any failure by counsel to request CALJIC No. 4.50

was not prejudicial" because Petitioner "suffered no prejudice from

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the absence of the alibi instruction." (Resp't Ex. B, at 7.) 

Under the circumstances of this case, and for the reasons explained

below, the appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's ineffective

of assistance of counsel claim was objectively reasonable.

The appellate court was reasonable in finding that, but for

counsel's failure to request CALJIC No. 4.50, the result of the

proceeding would not have been different. As the appellate court

explained, counsel's failure to request the alibi instruction "was

minor in light of the circumstances of the case and the other

instructions given to the jury." (Id. at 6.) Alfreda Nunnery

testified that she picked Petitioner up around 9:00 p.m. and that,

after picking him up, they spent the night at her house. Mona

Wilson testified that the man she saw running from the scene of the

shooting was not Petitioner. Petitioner also testified in his own

defense, and denied shooting Edwards. Additionally, Petitioner's

counsel argued at the close of trial that the prosecution's

witnesses should not be believed and that Petitioner was not

present at the scene of the crime. RT 1056-1092. The appellate

court also noted that the trial court instructed the jury on how to

weigh the credibility of a witness, on the presumption of

Petitioner's innocence, and on the prosecution's burden of proving

Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury nevertheless

determined that there was neither exculpatory information nor any

evidence that raised a reasonable doubt of Petitioner's guilt. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the appellate court's

decision was not "contrary to," or "an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States" nor was it "based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner has

failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas relief on the

basis of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

2. Trial Court's Failure to Instruct the Jury Sua

Sponte on CALJIC No. 4.50

a. Background

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury sua sponte on the defense theory of the case, or,

more specifically, CALJIC No. 4.50. (Pet. at 17.) He relies on

United States v. Washington to support his allegation that the

trial court's failure to provide the alibi instruction was per se

reversible error. 819 F.2d 221, 225 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The district

court must give an instruction regarding any legitimate theory of

defense that is supported by the evidence, and a failure to do so

is reversible error.").

b. Applicable Federal Law

A federal criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction

concerning his theory of the case if it is supported by law and

some foundation in the evidence. See United States v. Mason, 902

F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has held that

even if the alibi evidence is "weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or

of doubtful credibility," the instruction should be given. United

States v. Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569, 570 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing

Washington, 819 F.2d at 225). An alibi instruction is critical

because a juror, unschooled in the law's intricacies, may interpret

a failure to prove the alibi defense as proof of the defendant's

guilt. See Zuniga, 6 F.3d at 570. To avoid this possibility,

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where alibi is the defense, a suitable instruction must be given

when requested. See id. (citing United States v. Hoke, 610 F.2d

678, 679 (9th Cir. 1980)).

"No case, however, requires the trial court to give a sua

sponte instruction on alibi; on the contrary, [Ninth Circuit]

precedent establishes that failure to give an alibi instruction is

not error if the defendant did not request such an instruction." 

See United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483, 1493-94 (9th Cir. 1987)

(holding that the district court's instruction that the jury need

not find the crimes were committed on a certain date did not affect

the fundamental fairness of the trial, despite defendants' evidence

of alibi, where defendants did not request an alibi instruction);

Lewis v. United States, 373 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1967) ("The

last error alleged is that no instruction on alibi was given. The

short answer is that none was offered and none requested. . . . An

exception exists in certain cases where the court, of its own

volition, must deliver certain instructions; but this is not such a

case.").

c. Analysis 

In rejecting Petitioner's claim regarding the trial court's

failure to instruct sua sponte, the appellate court reasoned: 

In People v. Freeman (1978) 22 Cal.3d 434, 437, 149

Cal. Rptr. 396 (Freeman), our Supreme Court made it

clear that CALJIC No. 4.50 is not an instruction that a

trial court must give sua sponte. As defendant

recognizes, we (and the trial court) are bound by the

decision in Freeman. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 20 Cal. Rptr.

321.) Although we recognize that alibi was the only

defense, that fact does not generate a sua sponte duty

in light of Freeman. 

(Resp't Ex. B at 6.)

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Petitioner argues that Freeman should be reconsidered, and

that CALJIC No. 4.50 should be deemed an instruction which must be

given sua sponte. (Pet. at 16.) This argument is unavailing. A

state prisoner can only seek the writ of habeas corpus on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In

other words, habeas relief is unavailable for violations of state

law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of

state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Thus,

Petitioner's claim runs afoul of the rule that "it is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court

determinations on state-law questions." Id. at 67-68. 

As noted above, it is likewise not reversible error under

Ninth Circuit law for a trial court to fail to give an alibi

instruction absent a defense request.

Further, the record indicates that Petitioner was not deprived

of the legal framework needed to argue his only apparent defense. 

See Zuniga, 6 F.3d at 571-72. The trial court gave instructions

regarding reasonable doubt, burden of proof, and the factors in

regards to eyewitnesses. 

Accordingly, the appellate court's rejection of this claim was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas

relief on the basis of this claim.

B. Brady Violation

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor violated Brady by

concealing the result of Brown's favorable plea bargain. (Pet. at

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25.) Petitioner also alleges that the state judge violated

Petitioner's Fifth Amendment due process rights when "he, too,

failed to disclose these facts and he failed to cause the

prosecutor to disclose these facts." (Id. at 29.) 

Petitioner did not raise his Brady claim on direct appeal. 

The appellate court did not provide a reasoned opinion regarding

Petitioner's Brady claim but stated in a footnote:

[Petitioner] filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in case number A106749 raising issues concerning his

trial. The petition fails to state a prima facie case.

Concurrently with the filing of this opinion in the

instant case, we have filed an order denying

appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(Resp't Ex. B at fn. 2.) 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied the claim. 

(Resp't Ex. E.) Because there is no reasoned decision on this

claim, the Court will conduct an independent review of the record

to determine whether the state court's rejection of the claim was

objectively reasonable. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

1. Background

The appellate court summarized the facts relating to Brown's

plea bargain and testimony at trial as follows:

Brown knew he was facing a 19-year sentence for the

burglary and his prior felony convictions. He reached

an understanding with the prosecutor that if he

testified and pled guilty to burglary, the prior

convictions and probation violation would be dropped

and his maximum sentence would be six years. He agreed

to testify against defendant in an attempt to get a

sentence less than six years. He knew it was possible

that he could be sentenced to six years in prison or

placed on probation. Brown admitted that he testified,

not because he was trying to be a good citizen or was

concerned about the victim, but only to "get home

sooner." He knew that his agreement with the

authorities depended on his testimony at the trial and

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acknowledged that it was a good incentive.

(Resp't Ex. B at 3-4.)

Petitioner claims that Brown was sentenced on "the 'morning

session' of Wednesday, May 21, 2003, while Petitioner's jury was

deliberating next door." (Pet. at 26.) 

The record shows that Brown received a suspended sentence of

seven years and four months in state prison. (Pet'r Ex. B,

Reporter's Transcript of Sentencing in People v. Brown, Alameda

County Superior Court Case Nos. 137409, 142239, at 5.) Brown was

placed on probation for five years, conditioned on serving one year

in the county jail and paying $640.00 restitution to the victims. 

(Id. at 6.) 

Petitioner states that, "Because Brown's time served exceeded

the probationary sentence of one year in county jail, Brown was

released from jail that day or the next day." (Pet. at 26.) 

Petitioner claims that Brown's testimony showed that he "expected a

significant prison sentence of up to six years." (Id. at 25.) 

Petitioner argues that Brown testified that he did not expect to be

sentenced to straight probation. (Id.) Therefore, Petitioner

claims that the prosecutor "deliberately concealed, and

deliberately failed to disclose, that Brown was given a lesser

sentence than he told the jury." (Id. at 28.)

In support of the prosecutorial misconduct claim, Petitioner

argues that he "should have been able to argue to the jury" that: 

(1) the prosecutor caused Brown to believe all along

that he would most likely receive probation as part of

his plea agreement; (2) Brown lied when he denied any

expectation of probation and testified that he would

probably serve six years in prison; (3) the prosecutor

committed misconduct when she caused and allowed Brown

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to testify falsely that he would probably get six years

in prison and when she failed to correct his testimony;

and (4) these lies case [sic] serious doubt on the

veracity of Brown's testimony implicating Petitioner. 

(Id. at 28-29.)

Petitioner also argues that "the trial court judge similarly

violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights" because he failed

"to cause the prosecutor to disclose these facts." (Id. at 29.) 

In essence, Petitioner alleges that the state judge committed

judicial misconduct by violating Brady when he failed to disclose

the result of the favorable plea bargain given to Brown. (See id.)

2. Applicable Federal Law 

Due process requires the prosecutor to disclose information

that might create a reasonable doubt, that is, information that

might lead to discovery of favorable evidence "material either to

guilt or to punishment." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. "Evidence is

material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also United

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-07 (1976) (holding constitutional

standard of materiality imposes higher burden on defendant than

ordinary harmless error standard). 

A violation will be found under Brady if the favorable

evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a

different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. See

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). 

There are three components of a Brady violation: "'[t]he

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evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because

it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must

have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.'" Banks v. Dretke,

540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.

263, 281-82 (1999)). Such evidence is material "'if there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" 

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682); see

also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34. 

A claim of judicial misconduct by a state judge in the context

of federal habeas review does not simply require that the federal

court determine whether the state judge committed judicial

misconduct; rather, the question is whether the state judge's

behavior "rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate

federal due process under the United States Constitution." 

Duckett, 67 F.3d at 740 (citations omitted). A state judge's

conduct must be significantly adverse to a defendant before it

violates constitutional requirements of due process and warrants

federal intervention. See Garcia v. Warden, Dannemora Correctional

Facility, 795 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1986). 

c. Analysis

Based on an independent review of the record, the Court finds

that Petitioner has not shown that the prosecutor or the state

judge violated Brady or denied him his fundamental right to present

a defense. 

The record shows that the jury was aware that Brown was

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testifying in hopes of a favorable sentence. RT 390-395. On

cross-examination, Brown never told the jury that he would not

receive probation; instead, he testified that he did not know what

sentence the state judge would give him:

Q [Defense Counsel]: And the deal you made for

yourself was you could even get straight probation,

isn't that part of the deal?

A [Brown]: No.

Q: Doesn't it say that the judge could give you

anything from probation up to the maximum of six years?

A: Oh, yes.

Q: Yes. You might even be hoping that you might get

probation; right?

A: I don't know what the judge is going to do.

RT 415-416.

Also during Brown's cross examination, the state judge made

clear that straight probation was a possible sentence for Brown

when explaining the plea bargain to the jury as follows:

[Brown] was facing two years, four years or six years

in prison for burglary. I'm taking judicial notice of

this. Having a strike prior, that made it a

possibility of four years, eight years or 12 years for

burglary; thus, because it was a strike prior, it could

go for 12 years in prison. Because he also had this

prior that was a strike, and a serious felony, that

could and would require adding five years to that for a

total of 17 years. He has indicated he thought it was

19 years. Any of the other priors that resulted in

State prison could add one year, for a total of 19

years in State prison. Because it is a strike, he

would have to do 80 percent of that prison time.

It is my understanding the District Attorney dismissed

all of the priors, therefore, he will not get twice the

time. He will not have to do this time at 80 percent. 

He can get up to six years in prison. It does not have

to be prison. Of course, no one can give him time back

that he's already done, which by his testimony, and I

believe close to the dates, he has already done over 20

months.

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So the most he can get is six years in State prison

now, and he can get up to half of that time good time,

work time off, and he goes to prison. He does not have

to go to prison. The District Attorney's Office, I do

not believe, would object to any sentence including

probation at this point as part of the deal. And it is

expected I am to consider whether or not he has been a

cooperative and a truthful witness.

RT 419-420.

Therefore, the Court finds that neither the prosecutor nor the

state judge committed a Brady violation. Petitioner has not

provided any specific exculpatory facts or evidence that he alleges

should have been timely disclosed in order to show that the state

appellate court's decision was objectively unreasonable. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

his Brady claim. The appellate court's summary rejection of this

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), nor was the

decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Strickler, 527 U.S. at 292. 

C. Exclusion of Evidence Regarding the Victim

Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment right to present a

meaningful defense was violated when the trial court prevented him

from introducing bad character evidence that Edwards, the victim,

was a drug dealer. (Pet. at 36.) 

1. Background

 Petitioner claims that the purported evidence would have

allowed the jury to infer that: (1) Edwards lived a violent drugdealing life; (2) he associated with similar drug-dealing

characters; and (3) his lifestyle created the potential motive for

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someone else to shoot the victim in the head. (Id.) 

The trial court excluded the evidence based on its speculative

nature and pursuant to California Evidence Code § 352, that the

evidence was more prejudicial than probative. California Evidence

Code § 352 provides as follows: "The court in its discretion may

exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed

by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue

prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." 

Cal. Evid. Code § 352.

On direct appeal, the appellate court rejected the claim. The

court summarized the factual findings and legal conclusion

regarding this claim as follows: 

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by

excluding evidence that crack cocaine was found near

Edwards' body and that Edwards made his living as a

crack cocaine dealer. He contends that this evidence

supports his defense that he was not the shooter by

showing that Edwards lived the violent life style of a

drug dealer, and could have been shot by some other

violent person related to drug dealing. Exclusion of

this evidence was within the court's discretion.

The court excluded the evidence based on its

speculative nature and under Evidence Code section 352,

stating that it was more prejudicial than probative. 

"[T]he application of ordinary rules of evidence like

Evidence Code section 352 does not implicate the

federal Constitution, and thus we review allegations of

error under the 'reasonable probability' standard of

[People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)]." 

(People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 227.) Under

Watson, supra, we affirm unless there is a reasonable

probability the verdict would have been more favorable

but for the error.

Defendant notes that cocaine was found on the sidewalk

"near" the victim. In fact, the court stated that it

had been told informally that the cocaine was one small

rock 20 feet away from the body. Defendant did not

indicate this information was inaccurate. Edwards had

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no drugs in his system when he was shot. The probative

value of a slight amount of cocaine so far from the

body is speculative. In addition, the jury was not

shielded from the fact that the victim was involved

with drugs.

Defendant also argues that he should have been allowed

to establish that Edwards was a crack cocaine dealer. 

The testimony leading up to the question about Edwards

began with defendant admitting that he was in the park

selling rock cocaine. He stated that he never saw

problems between people in the park who sold drugs. 

When asked if there were others in the park doing the

same thing he said, "Yes." Counsel asked: "What about

Mario, do you know how he earned a living, if he earned

one?" The court sustained an objection. Counsel then

asked: "So when you were hanging out there in the park,

you told us there were other people similar to you out

there. Was Mario out there?" Defendant answered that

Mario was there "from time to time." Despite the

court's ruling on the previous question, the entire

exchange indicated the victim's drug connections.

In addition, the jury heard other evidence about the

victim's character. Dorsey testified that Mario

Edwards went to jail on a parole violation. Wilson

told police that Edwards sometimes sold drugs in the

park. A transcript of her statement was given to the

jury.

The evidence at issue involved a negligible amount of

cocaine found a distance away from the body, and was

offered for the speculative purpose of showing the

victim was engaged in drug dealing. Although the court

sustained one objection, the jury heard other evidence

of the victim's involvement with drugs. There was no

evidence that the shooting was drug related. There was

no evidence connecting an unknown assailant with a drug

purchase. Although we do not find that exclusion of

the evidence was error, we conclude from our review of

the entire record that a more favorable verdict was not

reasonably probable if the evidence had been admitted.

(Resp't Ex. B at 8-9 (brackets in original).)

2. Applicable Federal Law

The Due Process Clause does not guarantee the right to

introduce all relevant evidence. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.

37, 42 (1996). A defendant does not have an unfettered right to

offer evidence that is incompetent, privileged or otherwise

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inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. See id. The

exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless

it "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions

and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id.

at 43 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977))

(internal quotations omitted). Therefore, the defendant must

establish that his right to have the jury consider the excluded

evidence in the case was a "fundamental principle of justice." See

id.

One of the fundamental rules that may be violated by the

erroneous exclusion of critical, corroborative defense evidence is

the Sixth Amendment's right to present a defense. DePetris v.

Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 388

U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967)); Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

When deciding whether the exclusion of evidence violates this

right, a court balances the following five factors: (1) the

probative value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; 

(2) the reliability of the evidence; (3) the capability of

evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) the cumulativeness of the

evidence; and (5) the importance of the evidence in defendant's

attempted defense. Id. at 1004. The court also must give due

weight to the State's interests underlying its evidentiary rules on

which the exclusion was based. See id. at 1006. 

Even if exclusion of the evidence amounts to constitutional

error, in order to justify federal habeas relief, the erroneous

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exclusion must have had "a substantial and injurious effect" on the

verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.

3. Analysis

The probative value of the evidence was not central to the

issues. As the appellate court explained, Petitioner's assertion

that rock cocaine was found near Edward's body was incorrect

because there was only a slight amount of cocaine twenty feet away

from the body. (Resp't Ex. B at 8.) The evidence, even combined

with evidence that Edwards was a drug dealer, was not probative of

an otherwise unsupported theory that an unidentified drug dealer

other than Petitioner could have killed him. Further, evidence of

the victim's drug-dealing was not completely excluded because the

jury heard that Petitioner's alibi witness told police that the

victim sometimes sold drugs in the park. (Id.) And the jury heard

testimony from Petitioner that he was in the park selling rock

cocaine and that "from time to time" the victim also visited the

park to sell drugs. (Id.) 

 The exclusion of evidence did not violate Petitioner's

constitutional rights. Even if the exclusion of the evidence had

amounted to constitutional error, Petitioner would not be entitled

to federal habeas relief because it cannot be said that the

exclusion had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's

verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The excluded evidence would

have had little impact on the jury in light of the other

substantial evidence of guilt presented at trial. Petitioner has

failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas relief on the

basis of this claim.

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Accordingly, the appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, nor did it involve an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED as to all claims. The Clerk of the Court shall

terminate all pending motions, enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/14/08

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRAY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KERNAN et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-03597 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 14, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

John Raikes Vance

State of California Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Richard Gray P-12240

CSP-Folsom

P.O. Box 2900066

Repressa, CA 95671-0066

Dated: March 14, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-03597-CW Document 22 Filed 03/14/08 Page 28 of 28