Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01300/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01300-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

----oo0oo---- 

LOUIS MOCETTINI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

KENWORTH TRUCK COMPANY, A 

DIVISION OF PACCAR, INC., AND 

DOES 1 THROUGH 25, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants. 

CIV. NO. 2:13-01300 WBS DAD 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

----oo0oo---- 

 Plaintiff Louis Mocettini brought this action against 

defendant Kenworth Truck Company, a division of PACCAR, Inc., 

after a grab handle he used to enter and exit a truck 

manufactured by defendant allegedly rolled in his grip and caused 

him to fall from the vehicle. Plaintiff seeks damages for his 

resulting injuries under parallel theories of negligence and 

strict products liability. Defendant now moves for summary 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

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I. Factual and Procedural History 

 On April 7, 2011, plaintiff was employed by Reliable 

Trucking (“Reliable”) as a driver of commercial trucks. 

(Mocettini Dep. at 29:8-10 (Docket No. 42-1).) Because his 

regularly assigned truck was being serviced, Reliable assigned 

plaintiff to drive truck 15039 for the first time that day. (See 

id. at 29:11-30:6.) Reliable had purchased truck 15039 in March 

2006 from defendant, who manufactured it in January 2006. 

(Lalley Dep. at 14:24-25 (Docket No. 42-14); Ferderer Dep. at 

38:24-39:1 (Docket No. 42-9).) The truck featured a grab handle 

located next to the driver’s door to aid truck operators in 

entering and exiting the cab of the vehicle. (Ferderer Dep. at 

57:16-58:4.) The grab handle’s design consisted of three 

elements: (1) a long, cylindrical steel tube, (2) two aluminum 

brackets located at either end of the tube, and (3) set screws 

that ran through the brackets and pressed against the tube. 

(Id.; see Perlee Decl. Ex. 10 (Docket No. 42-10).) When fully 

tightened, the screws were designed to hold the tube in place by 

pushing against it and creating a friction bond. They did not 

penetrate it. (Id.) 

 That day, plaintiff allegedly used the grab handle to 

enter and exit the vehicle three times without incident. (See 

Mocettini Dep. at 50:6-52:2, 99:4-17.) On the fourth time, 

however, the driver’s side grab handle allegedly spun in his 

hand, causing him to lose his grip and fall backwards. (Id. at 

65:1-14, 67:4-25.) 

 After plaintiff reported what had happened, two 

Reliable employees checked the grab handle and found that they 

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were able to spin the steel tube in their hands. (See Lalley 

Dep. at 31:10-32:2; Maesetto Dep. at 24:20-24 (Docket No. 42-

15).) To prevent future spinning, one employee drilled holes 

through the mounting brackets and the tube, then inserted 

additional sheet metal screws to affix the tube to the brackets. 

(See Lalley Dep. at 31:10-32:18; Maesetto Dep. at 12:12-16:9, 

18:17-19:16, 23:10-24:24.) 

 Two years later, on November 13, 2013, experts employed 

by both parties disassembled and examined the grab handle in 

anticipation of this action. (See Frederer Dep. at 18:8-13, 

66:9-67:14 (Docket No. 36-4); Buske Dep. at 51:7-52:24 (Docket 

No. 42-3); Kelkar Dep. at 31:4-32:10 (Docket No. 42-12).) They 

found marks on the steel tube suggesting that it had rotated more 

than once. (See id.) The parties dispute whether these marks 

show that the tube had rotated prior to the day of plaintiff’s 

fall or were made thereafter. (See Def.’s Mem. at 1 (Docket No. 

34); Pl.’s Opp’n at 6 (Docket No. 39).)1 The parties also found 

that one of the handle’s set screws was missing at the time of 

inspection. (See Buske Dep. at 32:17-20.) Plaintiff does not 

know whether the screw was missing at the time of his injury. 

(Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s First Req. for Admis. No. 4.) 

 On April 3, 2013, plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging 

negligence and strict products liability claims against defendant 

in the Superior Court of the State of California. (Notice of 

 1

 Plaintiff claims that defendant’s expert, Jake 

Ferderer, testified that it was impossible to tell whether the 

marks were made before or after plaintiff’s fall. (Pl.’s Opp’n 

at 6-7.) Ferderer appears to say that the marks were made before 

the accident, but said he could not determine how long before. 

(See Frederer Dep. at 67-68.) 

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Removal ¶ 1 (Docket No. 1-1); Compl. at 1-3.) Defendant removed 

the action to federal court on the basis of diversity 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, certifying that it 

meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because plaintiff is a 

resident of California, defendant is a Delaware corporation with 

its principal place of business in Bellevue, Washington, and the 

action exceeds the amount-in-controversy requirement. (Notice of 

Removal ¶¶ 3, 6-8). Defendant seeks summary judgment on each of 

those claims. 

II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 

 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine dispute is one that could permit a 

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id. 

 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 

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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 

324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, 

the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 252. 

 In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 

255. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, 

and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment . . . .” Id. 

III. Discussion 

 Defendant makes three basic arguments in support of its 

motion for summary judgment: (1) plaintiff cannot prove the grab 

handle’s design caused his injury, (2) plaintiff cannot prove 

this particular risk was “known or knowable” at the time it 

distributed the handle, and (3) plaintiff cannot prove the handle 

differed from its intended design at the time it was made. (See 

Def.’s Mem. at 8-14.)2

 2

 Plaintiff objects to the use of two pieces of evidence 

in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment. First, 

plaintiff contests any use of the “Preliminary Report of Phil 

Smith,” (Docket No. 36-8), on the ground that this report is 

inadmissible hearsay. (Pl.’s Objections at 2-3 (Docket No. 41).) 

Defendant appears to rely on this report solely for the 

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A. Whether Defendant’s Design Caused Plaintiff’s Injury 

 Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated its duty of 

care by negligently designing the truck’s grab handle, (Compl. 

¶¶ 1-8.), and that the distribution of defendant’s defective grab 

handle design supports strict products liability, (Compl. ¶¶ 9-

13). Defendant seeks summary judgment on both these claims for 

essentially the same reason: plaintiff cannot prove that any 

alleged negligence or defective design defect caused his 

injuries. (Def.’s Mem. at 9-10, 13-14.) 

1. California’s Substantial Factor Test 

 As an element of both negligence and strict liability 

claims, California law requires the plaintiff to prove that the 

defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing a 

plaintiff’s injury. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal. 

4th 953, 968 (1997) (stating that California has adopted the 

substantial factor test for cause-in-fact determinations); see 

also Altman v. HO Sports Co., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1193 (E.D. 

 

proposition that the three-piece grab handle design is not unique 

to defendant’s trucks. (See Def.’s Separate Statement in Supp. 

of Mot. for Summ. J. at 6 (Docket No. 35).) Because the court 

finds that other genuine disputes of material fact exist as to 

plaintiff’s design defect and failure to warn theories, the court 

need not consider the report or this specific proposition in 

reaching its ruling. Second, plaintiff objects to the use of 

certain portions of the deposition of V. Paul Herbert on the 

basis that the subject matter of the testimony was not within 

Herbert’s expertise. (Pl.’s Objections at 3-4.) The relevant 

portion discusses Herbert’s opinion of markings found on the grab 

handle’s tube. (Herbert Dep. at 61:12-63:11 (Docket No. 36-6).) 

Herbert’s testimony may lend support to defendant’s case, but it 

is not dispositive in summary adjudication because it does not 

negate the genuine disputes of material fact found elsewhere in 

the record. Even assuming this testimony was proper, it would 

not affect the court’s ruling. 

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Cal. 2011) (Ishii, J.) (“[A] manufacturer is liable only when a 

defect in its product was a legal cause of injury, that is, when 

the defect is a substantial factor in producing the injury.” 

(citing Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 572 (1994)). 

“The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, 

requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be 

more than negligible or theoretical.” Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. 

Co., 21 Cal. 4th 71, 79 (1999) (quoting Rutherford, 16 Cal. 4th 

at 978). 

 Experts employed by both parties testified that the 

screws used in defendant’s grab handle design will eventually 

loosen over time as a consequence of the handle’s use. (See 

Buske Dep. at 30:19-31:25; Kelkar Dep. at 15:2-10.) Plaintiff’s 

expert, Scott Buske, testified in particular that “[defendant] 

should anticipate that the truck is going to be driven down the 

road and experience vibration and whatnot, and that a set screw 

. . . might come loose and come out.” (Buske Dep. at 34:3-7.) 

Loose set screws will allow the handle’s tube to rotate--the 

alleged cause of plaintiff’s injury. (Ferderer Dep. at 57:8-

58:4.) At a minimum, this testimony raises a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendant’s design contributed as a 

substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury. 

2. Reliance’s Negligence, If Any, Does Not Supersede 

 Despite this evidence, defendant maintains that summary 

judgment is still appropriate because a third party’s 

“superseding” actions absolve it of liability. (Def.’s Mem. at 

9-10.) This argument requires the court to consider the 

traditional distinction between the intervening and superseding 

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actions of a third party: “[A]n actor . . . is not relieved of 

liability because of the intervening act of a third person if 

such act was reasonably foreseeable at the time of his negligent 

conduct.” Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 411 (1976) (quoting 

Vesely v. Sager 5 Cal. 3d 153, 163 (1971)). However, a 

superseding cause of injury breaks the chain of causation that 

would otherwise flow from an initial actor’s conduct, clearing 

that initial actor of liability. Hardison v. Bushnell, 18 Cal. 

App. 4th 22, 27 (5th Dist. 1993). 

 An intervening force becomes a superseding cause if it 

“is highly unusual or extraordinary, not reasonably likely to 

happen and hence not foreseeable.” Jackson v. Ryder Truck 

Rental, Inc., 16 Cal. App. 4th 1830, 1848 (3d Dist. 1993) 

(quoting 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law § 975 (9th ed. 1988)). It 

is not enough to simply label a third party’s intervening 

behavior negligent; that negligence must be “highly 

extraordinary.” Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 864 (1961) 

(“[T]he fact that an intervening act of a third person is done in 

a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause if a 

reasonable man . . . would not regard it as highly extraordinary 

that the third person so acted . . . .”); see also Perez v. VAS 

S.p.A., 188 Cal. App. 4th 658, 685 (2d Dist. 2010) (“[P]roduct 

misuse may serve as a complete defense when the misuse was so 

unforeseeable that it should be deemed the sole or superseding 

cause.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); 

Martinez v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 4th 695, 701 

(2d Dist. 1998) (“[F]oreseeable intervening ordinary negligence 

will not supersede but such negligence, if ‘highly 

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extraordinary,’ will supersede.”). 

 Under California law, superseding cause is an 

affirmative defense, and defendant has the burden of proving that 

an intervening act was extraordinary enough to supersede. See, 

e.g., Maupin v. Widling, 192 Cal. App. 3d 568, 578 (2d Dist. 

1987) (“[Defendant] had the burden to prove that Carlson’s 

behavior in accelerating was ‘highly extraordinary’ in order to 

cut off liability.” (quoting BAJI No. 3.79 (7th ed. 1986))). 

 Defendant argues that Reliable failed to ensure the 

grab handle’s screws remained tightened and that this failure 

constitutes a superseding cause of plaintiff’s injury because 

“[i]t is not reasonable or foreseeable.” (Def.’s Mem. at 9-10.) 

As its sole explanation for why the failure to tighten screws is 

unforeseeable, defendant points to state and federal laws and 

industry standards requiring owners to properly maintain their 

vehicles. (Id. at 9-10.) But the fact that Reliable may have 

violated some law or notion of professional conduct does not make 

that violation per se unusual or extraordinary as a matter of 

law.3 See Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. and Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 58 

 3

 Defendant’s contention that Yamaha Motor Corp. v. 

Paseman, 219 Cal. App. 3d 958 (4th Dist. 1990), stands for this 

idea is simply incorrect. (See Def.’s Reply at 5.) Yamaha dealt 

with superseding cause in the context of comparative fault and 

comparative indemnity. Comparative fault and comparative 

indemnity deal with the apportionment of loss between multiple 

defendants who have been found jointly liable for a particular 

injury. See Yamaha, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 966 (quoting Jaffe v. 

Huxley Architecture, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1191 (4th Dist. 

1988)). The Yamaha court stated that superseding causation 

premised on a third party’s negligence may be considered in the 

comparative indemnity context. Id. at 966-72. It did not hold 

that a third party’s negligence will absolve a tortfeasor of 

liability, as defendant appears to suggest. (See Def.’s Reply at 

5 (“This holding applies to this case.”).) 

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(1983) (“If the likelihood that a third person may act in a 

particular manner is the hazard . . . which makes the actor 

negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally 

tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being 

liable for harm caused thereby.”) (emphasis added). 

 And defendant has not otherwise shown as a matter of 

law that the failure to tighten the grab handle’s screws was so 

unforeseeable or extraordinary that a reasonably thoughtful 

person would not take it into account. See id. at 57. 

Accordingly, the court cannot conclude that negligence or misuse 

on Reliance’s part, if any, constitutes a superseding cause, and 

it must deny defendant’s request for summary judgment on these 

claims. 

B. Whether this Particular Risk was “Known or Knowable” at 

the Time of Distribution 

 To prevail on a failure-to-warn claim in negligence or 

strict products liability, plaintiffs must prove “that the 

defendant did not adequately warn of a particular risk that was 

known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and 

prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the 

time of manufacture and distribution.” Anderson v. Owens-Corning 

Fiberglas Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 1002 (1991); see also Rosa v. 

Taser Int’l, Inc., 684 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 2012) (“California 

law places a duty on manufacturers to warn of a ‘particular risk’ 

if it is ‘known or knowable . . . at the time of manufacture and 

distribution.’” (quoting Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 4th 

89, 85 (1st Dist. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Under the 

“knowable” element of this approach, “[a] manufacturer is held to 

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the knowledge and skill of an expert in the field; it is obliged 

to keep abreast of any scientific discoveries and is presumed to 

know the results of all such advances.” Carlin v. Superior 

Court, 13 Cal. 4th 1104, 1113 n.3 (1996). 

 The California Supreme Court has stressed the 

requirement that a risk be “known or reasonably scientifically 

knowable at the time of distribution,” Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 

999, because “eliminating the knowledge component had the effect 

of turning strict liability into absolute liability,” id. at 997 

(discussing the evolution of the failure-to-warn claim in 

California courts). To place an obligation on manufacturers to 

warn of unknown or unknowable risks would “recast the 

manufacturer in the role of an insurer.” Id. at 998 (quoting 

Oakes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 

650-51 (3d Dist. 1969)). 

 Defendant argues for summary adjudication on the basis 

that there is no evidence that it had “actual or constructive 

knowledge” that its grab handle could rotate. (Def.’s Mem. at 

14.) The court disagrees. Although the record contains no 

evidence that defendant actually knew that its handles might 

rotate, there is ample evidence to suggest that the risk was 

reasonably “knowable” at the time of manufacture. See Anderson, 

53 Cal. 3d at 1002. Defendant’s expert, Rajeev Kelkar, testified 

that set screws like those in defendant’s design will not remain 

tight over the life of a truck and that “the screws will at some 

point start to loosen.” (Kelkar Dep. at 15:2-10.) Plaintiff’s 

expert, Scott Buske, stated that “[defendant] should anticipate 

that the truck is going to be driven down the road . . . and that 

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a set screw . . . which is only frictionally holding it . . . 

might come loose and come out.” (Buske Dep. at 34:3-7.) Given 

that defendant has been using this grab handle design for 23 

years, (Def.’s Mem. at 14), a trier of fact might use this 

evidence to infer that defendant learned or could have reasonably 

learned that screws might come loose before January 2006, when it 

manufactured the truck in question. 

 The record also contains reason to conclude that the 

risk of a set screw coming loose or the grab handle rotating was 

“reasonably scientifically knowable.” Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 

1113 n.3. Buske testified that mechanical engineers prefer 

designs that hold handles in place using “positive contact”--

“where something actually has to break or fail”--rather than a 

frictional contact like the one employed in defendant’s design. 

(Buske Dep. at 31:18-25.) While this testimony does not 

conclusively establish what a mechanical engineer would have 

known in January 2006, it at least raises a genuine dispute of 

material fact on the question. 

 Because the record contains genuine disputes of 

material fact regarding whether defendant reasonably could have 

known that its grab handle design would rotate, the court must 

deny defendant’s request for summary judgment on these claims.4

 4

 Defendant also attempts to avoid liability by invoking 

the “‘sophisticated user’ doctrine.” (Def.’s Reply at 8.) The 

court does not address this contention because defendant raised 

this issue for the first time in its reply brief, depriving 

plaintiff of the opportunity to address its argument. See 

Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 250 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 1992) (refusing to address an issue raised for the first 

time in an appellant’s reply brief). 

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C. Whether Defendant’s Grab Handle Differed from its 

Intended Design 

 A manufacturing defect occurs when “the defective 

product is one that differs from the manufacturer’s intended 

result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same 

product line.” Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429 

(1978) (discussing differences between manufacturing defects and 

design defects). It requires a showing that the product did not 

conform to the manufacturer’s design at the time of manufacture. 

See Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 214 Cal. App. 4th 173, 

190 (2d Dist. 2013) (“[A] product has a manufacturing defect if 

the product as manufactured does not conform to the 

manufacturer’s design.”). 

 Nothing in the record establishes the existence of a 

manufacturing defect. (Def.’s Mem. at 11.) Summary judgment is 

appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “‘[S]o long as 

the losing party was on notice that [it] had to come forward with 

all of [its] evidence,’ summary judgment can properly be 

entered.” MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 

520 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326). 

 Plaintiff bears the burden of proving at trial that the 

grab handle differed from its design at the time it was made. 

Although the parties agree that one set screw was missing at the 

time they inspected the grab handle, (See Buske Dep. at 32:17-

20), plaintiff has produced no evidence that the screw was 

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missing at the time of manufacture and offers no reason for 

thinking that the grab handle, as manufactured, differs from its 

intended design. Plaintiff fails to even mention a manufacturing 

defect in its opposition, much less cite supporting materials 

from the record as required by Rule 56(c). To the extent 

plaintiff relies on a manufacturing defect theory to establish 

liability, no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and the 

court will grant defendant’s request for summary judgment with 

respect to these claims. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED with respect 

to plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claims and DENIED in all 

other respects. 

Dated: October 6, 2014 

 

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