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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2012 Decided January 11, 2013

No. 11-5352

JEFFERSON WAYNE SCHRADER AND SECOND AMENDMENT 

FOUNDATION, INC.,

APPELLANTS

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01736)

Alan Gura argued the cause for appellants. With him on 

the briefs was Thomas M. Huff. 

Anisha S. Dasgupta, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief 

were Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Michael S. Raab, 

Attorney, and Jane M. Lyons and R. Craig Lawrence, 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Due to a conviction some forty 

years ago for common-law misdemeanor assault and battery 

for which he served no jail time, plaintiff Jefferson Wayne 

Schrader, now a sixty-four-year-old veteran, is, by virtue of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), barred for life from ever possessing a 

firearm. Together with the Second Amendment Foundation, 

Schrader contends that section 922(g)(1) is inapplicable to 

common-law misdemeanants as a class and, alternatively, that 

application of the statute to this class of individuals violates

the Second Amendment. Because we find plaintiffs’ statutory 

argument unpersuasive and see no constitutional infirmity in 

applying section 922(g)(1) to common-law misdemeanants, 

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.

I.

Enacted in its current form in 1968, section 922(g)(1) of 

Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits firearm 

possession by persons convicted of “a crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). Section 921(a)(20)(B), however, exempts “any 

State offense classified by the laws of the State as a 

misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of 

two years or less.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). This case 

concerns the application of these provisions to convictions for 

common-law misdemeanors that carry no statutory maximum 

term of imprisonment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession 

applies, with some exceptions not relevant here, for life. The 

statute, however, contains a “safety valve” that permits

individuals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of 

their firearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 

n.1 (2007). Specifically, section 925(c) provides that the 

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Attorney General may grant such individuals relief “if it is 

established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding 

the disability, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are 

such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner 

dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief 

would not be contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 925(c). But since 1992, “Congress has repeatedly barred the 

Attorney General from using appropriated funds to investigate 

or act upon relief applications,” leaving the provision 

“inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted); see also United States v. 

Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002).

In 1968, while walking down the street in Annapolis, 

Maryland, plaintiff Jefferson Wayne Schrader, then twenty 

years old and serving in the United States Navy, encountered 

a member of a street gang who, according to the complaint,

had assaulted him a week or two earlier. Second Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 9–10; see also Wagener v. SBC Pension Benefit Plan-Non 

Bargained Program, 407 F.3d 395, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(explaining that, in reviewing district court’s grant of motion 

to dismiss, the court must assume that facts alleged in the 

complaint are true). “A dispute broke out between the two, in 

the course of which Schrader punched his assailant.” Second 

Am. Compl. ¶ 10. As a result, Schrader was convicted of 

common-law misdemeanor assault and battery in a Maryland 

court and fined $100. Id. ¶ 11. The court imposed no jail time. 

Id. Schrader went on to complete a tour in Vietnam and 

received an honorable discharge from the Navy. Id. ¶ 12.

Except for a single traffic violation, he has had no other 

encounter with the law. Id.

According to the complaint, “[o]n or about November 11, 

2008, Schrader’s companion attempted to purchase him a 

shotgun as a gift,” and some two months later, “Schrader 

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ordered a handgun from his local firearms dealer, which he 

would keep for self-defense.” Id. ¶ 14. Both transactions 

“resulted in . . . denial decision[s] by the FBI when the 

National Instant Criminal Background Check (‘NICS’) 

computer system indicated that Mr. Schrader is prohibited 

under federal law from purchasing firearms.” Id. ¶ 15. The 

FBI later “advised Schrader that the shotgun transaction was 

rejected pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on the basis of his 

1968 Maryland misdemeanor assault conviction.” Id. ¶ 16. In 

a letter to Schrader, the FBI explained that he had “been 

matched with the following federally prohibitive criteria 

under Title 18, United States Code, Sections 921(a)(20) and 

922(g)(1): A person who has been convicted in any court of a 

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year or any state offense classified by the state as a

misdemeanor and . . . punishable by a term of imprisonment 

of more than two years.” 

At the time of Schrader’s conviction, “[t]he common law 

crimes of assault and battery [in Maryland] had no statutory 

penalty.” Robinson v. State, 728 A.2d 698, 702 n.6 (Md. 

1999). Although Maryland later codified these offenses, see

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §§ 3-201, 3-202, 3-203, when 

Schrader was convicted “[t]he maximum term of 

imprisonment [for these offenses] was ordinarily limited only 

by the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland 

Declaration of Rights,” Robinson, 728 A.2d at 702 n.6. As the 

FBI explained in a declaration filed in the district court, 

because “[a]t the time of Schrader’s 1968 assault conviction, 

Maryland law did not set a maximum sentence for 

misdemeanor assault,” the FBI “determined that the 

conviction triggered 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), which prohibit firearm possession by an 

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individual convicted of a state offense classified by the state 

as a misdemeanor that is punishable by a term of 

imprisonment of more than two years.” 

Schrader and the Second Amendment Foundation—an 

organization that conducts “education, research, publishing 

and legal action focusing on the Constitutional right to 

privately own and possess firearms, and the consequences of 

gun control,” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 2—sued the Attorney 

General and the FBI in the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia, raising two claims. The first is statutory. 

Plaintiffs argued that Schrader’s “conviction for misdemeanor 

assault cannot be the basis for a firearms disability under 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), because Schrader was not actually 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding two years.” 

Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiffs further alleged that “Maryland’s failure to 

codify a statutory penalty for a simple common law 

misdemeanor does not create a firearms disability under 

federal law for conviction of such common law misdemeanor 

offense.” Id. Second, presenting an as-applied constitutional 

claim, plaintiffs asserted that “barring possession of firearms 

by individuals on account of simple common-law 

misdemeanor offenses carrying no statutory penalties . . . 

violates the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.” 

Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiffs sought “[i]njunctive relief commanding 

Defendants to withdraw their record pertaining to Plaintiff 

Schrader from NICS” and an order enjoining defendants 

“from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on the basis of simple 

common-law misdemeanor offenses carrying no statutory 

penalties.” Id. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-2.

The government moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 

plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment. The district 

court, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to state either a 

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statutory or constitutional claim for relief, granted the motion 

to dismiss and denied the cross-motion for summary 

judgment. With respect to the statutory claim, the district 

court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Schrader’s actual 

sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment was 

dispositive, noting that “only the possibility of punishment of 

more than two years for a misdemeanor matters for purposes

of § 922(g)(1).” Schrader v. Holder, 831 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310

n.4 (D.D.C. 2011). Thus, the district court found Schrader’s 

offense ineligible for the misdemeanor exception for offenses 

“punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less,” 

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B), because the absence of a statutory 

maximum punishment meant that the Maryland court could 

have sentenced Schrader to more than two years’ 

imprisonment, Schrader, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 310. Finally, the 

district court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that “uncodified 

common-law offenses are not ‘punishable’ by any particular 

statutory criteria and, therefore, do not fall within the purview 

of § 922(g) at all.” Id. at 309. 

In rejecting plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, the district 

court relied on the Supreme Court’s observation in District of 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), that “ ‘the right 

secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,’ ” as 

well as the Court’s inclusion of “ ‘longstanding prohibitions 

on the possession of firearms by felons’ ” within a list of 

“ ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures.’ ” Schrader, 

831 F. Supp. 2d at 311–12 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–

27 & n.26) (emphasis omitted). The district court found “no 

constitutional impediment” to including common-law 

misdemeanants like Schrader within the federal firearms ban. 

Id. at 312.

Plaintiffs appeal, reiterating the statutory and 

constitutional claims raised in the district court. We consider 

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each in turn, reviewing de novo the district court’s dismissal

of the complaint. Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

II.

Recall the statutory language at issue. Section 922(g)(1) 

prohibits firearm possession by persons convicted of “a crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Section 921(a)(20)(B) exempts “any 

State offense classified by the laws of the State as a 

misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of 

two years or less.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(B).

As an initial matter, plaintiffs no longer appear to be 

arguing, as they did in their complaint, that section 

921(a)(20)(B) exempts Schrader’s offense from the federal 

firearms ban “because Schrader was not actually sentenced to 

a term of imprisonment exceeding two years.” Second Am. 

Compl. ¶ 19. Indeed, other courts of appeals have uniformly 

rejected the argument that the actual sentence imposed is 

controlling for purposes of triggering the federal firearms ban. 

See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 203–04

(4th Cir. 1998) (en banc); United States v. Horodner, 993 

F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Instead, plaintiffs argue more broadly that section 

922(g)(1) is inapplicable to common-law offenses because 

such offenses “are not ‘punishable by’ any particular statutory 

criteria.” Appellants’ Br. 17. Given the nature of common-law 

offenses, this argument fails. Although the category of 

“common-law offenses” is rather broad, varying widely from 

state to state, when Congress enacted section 922(g)(1) in 

1968, many common-law crimes involved quite violent 

behavior. In Maryland, for example, attempted rape and 

attempted murder were common-law misdemeanors that 

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carried no statutory maximum sentence. See Hardy v. State, 

482 A.2d 474, 476–77 (Md. 1984); Glass v. State, 329 A.2d 

109, 112 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). The offense for which 

Schrader was convicted—common-law assault and battery—

provides another example. Before Maryland codified the 

crime of common-law assault in 1996, the offense included all 

forms of assault with the exception of certain narrow 

categories of statutory aggravated assaults that were defined 

as felonies. See Walker v. State, 452 A.2d 1234, 1247 & n.11 

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982). As a result, the offense 

“embrace[d] an almost infinite variety of fact patterns.” 

Simms v. State, 421 A.2d 957, 965 (Md. 1980). Many of these 

fact patterns involved serious, violent conduct, and many 

offenders received sentences of ten or twenty years’ 

imprisonment. See Thomas v. State, 634 A.2d 1, 8 & nn. 3, 4 

(Md. 1993) (collecting cases). In one case, for example, a 

defendant was sentenced to fifteen years for common-law 

assault where he forced a man “into a car, stabbed him twice 

in the neck and three times in the chest, dragged him out of 

the car and left him bleeding in a street gutter.” Sutton v. 

Maryland, 886 F.2d 708, 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc). As 

one Maryland court explained:

[S]tatutory assaults have not preempted the field of 

all serious and aggravated assaults. Our Legislature 

has cut out of the herd for special treatment four 

assaults where the aggravating factor is a special 

mens rea or specific intent. This by no means 

exhausts the category of more grievous and 

blameworthy assaults. The aggravating factor in a 

particular case might well be the modality of an 

assault, and not its mens rea—assault with a deadly 

weapon, assault by poison . . ., assault by bomb. . . . 

Even where . . . there simply has been no specific 

intent, a brutal beating that leaves its victim blinded, 

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crippled, disfigured, in a wheelchair for life, in a 

psychiatric ward for life, is severely aggravated. . . . 

Maryland has not dealt with this form of aggravation 

legislatively but has left it to the discretion of 

common law sentencing. 

Walker, 452 A.2d at 1247–48; see also Simms, 421 A.2d at 

965 (“Some ‘simple assaults’ may involve more brutal or 

heinous conduct than may be present in other cases falling 

within one of the statutory aggravated assaults.”). 

Significantly, moreover, the earliest version of the federal 

firearms ban, which applied to certain “crime[s] of violence,” 

specifically included among such crimes “assault with a 

dangerous weapon,” Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, 

§§ 1(6), 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250-51 (1938)—a crime that 

Maryland, at the time of section 922(g)(1)’s enactment, 

punished as a common-law misdemeanor, see Walker, 452 

A.2d at 1248 (noting that Maryland punished assault with a 

deadly weapon as a common-law misdemeanor rather than as 

a statutory offense). We doubt very much that when Congress 

expanded the firearms prohibition to cover, as the statute now 

does, all individuals convicted of a “crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” see An Act to 

Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, § 2, 

75. Stat. 757, 757 (1961), it intended to exclude all commonlaw offenses, even those that previously fell within the ambit 

of the federal firearms ban. 

Plaintiffs’ argument also runs counter to the commonsense meaning of the term “punishable,” which refers to any 

punishment capable of being imposed, not necessarily a 

punishment specified by statute. See Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 1843 (1993) (defining “punishable” 

as “deserving of, or liable to, punishment: capable of being 

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punished by law or right”). Because common-law offenses 

carry no statutory maximum term of imprisonment, they are 

capable of being punished by a term of imprisonment 

exceeding one year and thus fall within section 922(g)(1)’s 

purview. And because such offenses are also capable of being 

punished by more than two years’ imprisonment, they are 

ineligible for section 921(a)(20)(B)’s misdemeanor exception.

The sparse case law interpreting the term “punishable” in 

the context of uncodified common-law offenses reinforces our 

conclusion that the term refers to the maximum potential 

punishment a court can impose, whether or not set by statute. 

In United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1998) (en 

banc), the defendant argued that his Maryland conviction for 

common-law misdemeanor assault should not trigger the 

Armed Career Criminal Act sentence enhancement which, 

like section 922(g)(1), turns on whether a predicate conviction 

qualifies as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), (e)(2)(B). 

The defendant asserted that “because he actually received a 

sentence of 18 months imprisonment, . . . his conviction 

should fit within the [section 921(a)(20)(B)] misdemeanor 

exclusion.” Coleman, 158 F.3d at 203. In rejecting this 

argument, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled an 

earlier panel opinion which had held that, for convictions of 

common-law simple assault in Maryland, “the actual sentence 

imposed should control whether or not a conviction for such a 

crime should be” deemed an offense “punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” United States v. 

Schultheis, 486 F.2d 1331, 1332, 1335 (4th Cir. 1973). The 

court instead defined “punishable” in relation to the maximum 

potential punishment a defendant could receive. “While a 

Maryland conviction for common-law assault is classified as a 

misdemeanor,” the court explained, “the offense carries no 

maximum punishment; the only limits on punishment are the 

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Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the Maryland and 

United States Constitutions. As such, a Maryland commonlaw assault clearly is punishable by more than two years 

imprisonment . . . .” Coleman, 158 F.3d at 203 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Rejecting the argument 

that the absence of statutory sentencing criteria compelled a 

different reading of the statute, the court explained that “[t]he 

plain wording of the statute applies equally when the potential 

term of imprisonment is established by the common law and 

limited only by the prohibition on cruel and unusual 

punishments as when the range of possible terms of 

imprisonment is determined by a statute.” Id. at 204. 

Plaintiffs insist that their interpretation of the statute is 

“compelled by the federal scheme’s structural reliance on the 

judgment of the convicting jurisdiction’s legislature” 

regarding the seriousness of an offense. Appellants’ Br. 19. 

According to plaintiffs, because “[t]he State chooses how 

harshly to punish its own crimes, and Congress defers to the 

wisdom of that localized judgment,” to permit the federal 

firearms ban “to encompass state common law crimes for 

which no legislative judgment has been expressed would 

grant the federal government a power that has been statutorily 

entrusted to the States.” Appellants’ Br. 20. As the district 

court pointed out, however, “the choice of a State legislature 

to rely on judicial discretion at sentencing on certain common 

law misdemeanors represents a legislative choice just as the 

adoption of a statute would.” Schrader, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 

310. With respect to common-law assaults, for example,

Maryland courts have observed that the State, through its 

legislature, decided to “trust[] the wide discretion of the 

common law sentencing provisions to deal appropriately 

with” the broad range of “severely aggravated assaults” that 

were at the time uncodified in Maryland. Walker, 452 A.2d at 

1248. We see no basis for thinking that Maryland, having left 

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such sentencing to the discretion of common-law judges, had 

somehow signaled its view that these offenses were 

insufficiently serious to trigger the federal firearms ban. 

“Rather than trying to list by statute every circumstance that 

might make an assault more ‘grievous and blameworthy,’ ” 

the Fourth Circuit has explained, “Maryland wisely left 

common law assault in place and trusted its trial judges to 

fashion an appropriate punishment within constitutional 

limits.” Sutton, 886 F.2d at 711. Indeed, when codifying the 

offense in 1996, Maryland demonstrated the seriousness with 

which it views common-law assaults by authorizing 

imprisonment of up to twenty-five years for felony First 

Degree Assault and up to ten years for misdemeanor Second 

Degree Assault. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §§ 3-202, 3-203.

Next, plaintiffs claim that “[s]ection 922’s overarching 

design reveals no intent to impose a blanket firearms ban on 

common law misdemeanants.” Appellants’ Br. 22. In support, 

plaintiffs point out that Congress subjected a specific category 

of misdemeanor convictions to the federal firearms ban when 

it enacted the 1996 Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun 

Control Act of 1968, which prohibits firearm possession by 

any person convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence.” Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 

1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 

to -372 (1996). According to plaintiffs, “Congress’s explicit 

reference to this special category of misdemeanor convictions 

shows that when it wants to reach beyond traditional felonies, 

it does so clearly.” Appellants’ Br. 23. But Congress did reach 

beyond felonies when it enacted section 921(a)(20)(B), which 

expressly provides that certain State misdemeanors—those 

punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment—fall 

within the scope of section 922(g)(1). Plaintiffs’ argument, 

then, boils down to the proposition that common-law 

misdemeanors should be viewed differently from other State 

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misdemeanors punishable by more than two years’ 

imprisonment. This contention, however, flows not from any 

insight gleaned from the statute, but rather from plaintiffs’ 

flawed belief that all common-law offenses are trivial.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that the canon of constitutional 

avoidance requires us to adopt an alternative construction of 

the term “punishable by” that would exclude common-law 

misdemeanants from section 922(g)(1)’s purview. See 

Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. 

Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204, 207 (2009) (reading statute to 

avoid deciding “serious constitutional questions”). As 

explained below, however, section 922(g)(1)’s application to 

common-law misdemeanants as a class creates no 

constitutional problem that we need to avoid. 

III.

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated 

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 

right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 

infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In Heller, the Supreme 

Court held that the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the 

individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 

confrontation,” and struck down District of Columbia laws 

banning handgun possession in the home and requiring that 

citizens keep their firearms in an inoperable condition. 554 

U.S. at 592, 635. In doing so, the Court made clear that the 

right guaranteed by the Second Amendment “is not 

unlimited.” Id. at 626. “From Blackstone through the 19thcentury cases, commentators and courts routinely explained 

that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon 

whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever 

purpose.” Id. Instead, at the core of the Second Amendment is 

“the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 

defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 635. Although declining

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to “undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full 

scope of the Second Amendment,” the Court made clear that

nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 

on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 

firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 

forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 

places such as schools and government buildings, or 

laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 

commercial sale of arms. 

Id. at 626–27. The Court emphasized that it identified “these 

presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples” 

and that its list did “not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at 627 

n.26; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 

3047 (2010) (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did 

not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as 

‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 

mentally ill’ . . . . We repeat those assurances here.” (quoting 

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626)).

After Heller, the District of Columbia adopted new gun 

laws that were challenged in Heller v. District of Columbia, 

670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Heller II”). There we 

adopted, as have other circuits, a “two-step approach” to 

analyzing Second Amendment challenges. Id. at 1252 

(collecting cases). Given that “[u]nder Heller, . . . there are 

certain types of firearms regulations that do not govern 

conduct within the scope of the Amendment,” we first ask 

whether the activity or offender subject to the challenged 

regulation falls outside the Second Amendment’s protections.

Id. If the answer is yes, that appears to end the matter. Id. If 

the answer is no, “then we go on to determine whether the 

provision passes muster under the appropriate level of 

constitutional scrutiny.” Id.

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Courts of appeals have unanimously rejected Second 

Amendment challenges to section 922(g)(1), typically relying 

on the Supreme Court’s warning in Heller that nothing in its 

opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” Heller, 

554 U.S. at 626; see United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 

316–17 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). Seeking to 

distinguish these cases, plaintiffs here argue that common-law 

misdemeanants differ from felons and fall within the scope of 

Second Amendment protection at the first step of the analysis. 

Moreover, they assert, banning firearm possession by 

common-law misdemeanants fails under the appropriate level 

of constitutional scrutiny. The government disagrees on both 

points. We need not resolve the first question, however, 

because even if common-law misdemeanants fall within the 

scope of the Second Amendment, the firearms ban imposed 

on this class of individuals passes muster under the 

appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny. See Heller II, 670 

F.3d at 1261 (declining to resolve the scope inquiry “because 

even assuming [the challenged regulations] do impinge upon 

the right protected by the Second Amendment, we think 

intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review 

and the prohibitions survive that standard”).

“As with the First Amendment, the level of scrutiny 

applicable under the Second Amendment surely ‘depends on 

the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to 

which the challenged law burdens the right.’ ” Id. at 1257 

(quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 

2010)). “That is, a regulation that imposes a substantial 

burden upon the core right of self-defense protected by the 

Second Amendment must have a strong justification, whereas 

a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should be 

proportionately easier to justify.” Id. Plaintiffs urge us to 

apply strict scrutiny, arguing that section 922(g)(1), by 

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completely disarming a class of individuals, places a 

substantial burden on Second Amendment rights. In our view, 

strict scrutiny is inappropriate. Although section 922(g)(1)’s 

burden is certainly severe, it falls on individuals who cannot 

be said to be exercising the core of the Second Amendment 

right identified in Heller, i.e., “the right of law-abiding, 

responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 

home.” 554 U.S. at 635. Because common-law 

misdemeanants as a class cannot be considered law-abiding 

and responsible, supra at 7–9, we follow those “courts of 

appeals [that] have generally applied intermediate scrutiny” in 

considering challenges to “Congress’ effort under § 922(g) to 

ban firearm possession by certain classes of non-law-abiding, 

non-responsible persons who fall outside the Second 

Amendment’s core protections.” United States v. Mahin, 668 

F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). 

Intermediate scrutiny requires the government to show 

that disarming common-law misdemeanants is “ ‘substantially 

related to an important governmental objective.’ ” Heller II, 

670 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 

(1988)). Section 922(g)(1) easily satisfies this standard. 

First, the statute’s overarching objective is obviously 

“important.” As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he 

principal purpose of the federal gun control legislation . . . 

was to curb crime by keeping firearms out of the hands of 

those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, 

criminal background, or incompetency.” Huddleston v. United 

States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 

683–84 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Congress enacted the exclusions in 

§ 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of presumptively risky 

people. The broad objective of § 922(g)—suppressing armed 

violence—is without doubt an important one . . . .” (citations 

USCA Case #11-5352 Document #1414648 Filed: 01/11/2013 Page 16 of 21
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omitted)). The Supreme Court has also made clear that this 

“general interest in preventing crime is compelling.” United 

States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 

Second, the government has carried its burden of 

demonstrating a substantial relationship between this 

important objective—crime prevention—and section 

922(g)(1)’s firearms ban. Under intermediate scrutiny, “the fit 

between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective 

[need only] be reasonable, not perfect.” United States v. 

Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (collecting 

cases). In assessing this “fit,” we afford “substantial deference 

to the predictive judgments of Congress.” Turner 

Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994). 

“In the context of firearm regulation, the legislature is ‘far 

better equipped than the judiciary’ to make sensitive public 

policy judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the 

dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those 

risks.” Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 

(2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 

665). In enacting section 922(g)(1), Congress determined—

reasonably in our view—that in order to accomplish the goal 

of preventing gun violence “firearms must be kept away from 

persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes, who might 

be expected to misuse them.” Dickerson v. New Banner 

Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983), superseded by 

statute on other grounds, Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, 

Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986). Indeed, several 

courts of appeals have held that section 922(g)’s exclusions 

satisfy intermediate scrutiny, explaining that individuals with 

prior criminal convictions for felonies or domestic violence 

misdemeanors can reasonably be disarmed because such 

individuals pose a heightened risk of future armed violence. 

See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25–26 (1st 

Cir. 2011) (affirming section 922(g)(9)’s ban on firearm 

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possession by persons convicted of misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 

692–93 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming section 922(g)(1)’s ban on 

firearm possession by convicted felon); see also Mahin, 668 

F.3d at 123 (collecting cases). 

Plaintiffs acknowledge that disarming felons and other 

serious criminals bears a substantial relationship to the 

prevention of gun violence. They emphasize, however, that 

they challenge the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1) as 

applied to common-law misdemeanants and insist that no 

substantial fit exists between disarming such individuals and 

preventing gun violence. But as explained above, at the time 

of section 922(g)(1)’s enactment, common-law misdemeanors

included a wide variety of violent conduct, much of it quite 

egregious. See supra at 7–9. And although the category of 

common-law misdemeanors has since been narrowed through 

codification, plaintiffs have offered no evidence that 

individuals convicted of such offenses pose an insignificant 

risk of future armed violence. To be sure, some common-law 

misdemeanants, perhaps even Schrader, may well present no 

such risk, but “Congress is not limited to case-by-case 

exclusions of persons who have been shown to be 

untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these limits be 

established by evidence presented in court.” United States v. 

Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Accordingly, because disarmament of common-law 

misdemeanants as a class is substantially related to the 

important governmental objective of crime prevention, we 

reject plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.

IV.

At several points in their briefs, plaintiffs appear to go 

beyond their argument that section 922(g)(1) is 

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unconstitutional as applied to common-law misdemeanants as 

a class and claim that the statute is invalid as applied to 

Schrader specifically. Were this argument properly before us,

Heller might well dictate a different outcome. According to 

the complaint’s allegations, Schrader’s offense occurred over 

forty years ago and involved only a fistfight. Second Am. 

Compl. ¶ 10. Schrader received no jail time, served honorably 

in Vietnam, and, except for a single traffic violation, has had 

no encounter with the law since then. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. To the 

extent that these allegations are true, we would hesitate to find 

Schrader outside the class of “law-abiding, responsible 

citizens” whose possession of firearms is, under Heller,

protected by the Second Amendment. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.

But we need not wade into these waters because plaintiffs 

never argued in the district court that section 922(g)(1) was 

unconstitutional as applied to Schrader. See Jicarilla Apache 

Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1117 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010) (explaining that arguments not raised before the 

district court are ordinarily waived). In their complaint, 

plaintiffs frame their constitutional claim with reference to 

common-law misdemeanants as a class, arguing that “barring 

possession of firearms by individuals on account of simple 

common-law misdemeanor offenses carrying no statutory 

penalties” violates the Second Amendment. Second Am. 

Compl. ¶ 22. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded at oral 

argument that an as-applied challenge with respect to 

Schrader was not “specifically elucidated in the complaint.” 

Oral Arg. Rec. 15:29–15:34. To be sure, the complaint seeks 

some relief on behalf of Schrader specifically, i.e., withdrawal 

of his record of conviction from the NICS. Second Am. 

Compl. Prayer for Relief ¶ 1. But given that the injunctive 

relief plaintiffs seek with respect to section 922(g)(1) is far 

broader—an injunction barring the statute’s enforcement “on 

the basis of simple common-law misdemeanor offenses 

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carrying no statutory penalties,” id. Prayer for Relief ¶ 2—and 

given that plaintiffs raised no as-applied challenge with 

respect to Schrader in their district court briefs, we view this 

more specific claim as simply derivative of the broader claim 

that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to common-law 

misdemeanants as a class. And although plaintiffs referred to 

the specific circumstances of Schrader’s offense, they did so 

in the context of arguing that common-law misdemeanants as 

a class can be expected to share Schrader’s sympathetic 

characteristics. 

Given this, we believe the wisest course of action is to 

leave the resolution of these difficult constitutional questions 

to a case where the issues are properly raised and fully 

briefed. “[A]ppellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards 

of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of 

legal questions presented and argued by the parties before 

them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 

1983) (Scalia, J.). This fundamental principle of judicial 

restraint is especially important where, as here, constitutional 

issues are at stake. See Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. 

McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (“If there is one 

doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of 

constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on 

questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is 

unavoidable.”).

Leaving these questions for their proper day has an added 

benefit: it gives Congress time to consider lifting the 

prohibition on the use of appropriated funds for the 

implementation of section 925(c), which, as explained above, 

permits individuals to obtain relief from section 922(g)(1) by 

demonstrating that they no longer pose a risk to public safety. 

Without the relief authorized by section 925(c), the federal 

firearms ban will remain vulnerable to a properly raised asUSCA Case #11-5352 Document #1414648 Filed: 01/11/2013 Page 20 of 21
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applied constitutional challenge brought by an individual 

who, despite a prior conviction, has become a “law-abiding, 

responsible citizen[]” entitled to “use arms in defense of 

hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S at 635.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of this action. 

 So ordered.

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