Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05891/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05891-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 25:640 Indian Tribal Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSELIND QUAIR and CHARLOTTE )

BERNA, )

)

)

)

Petitioners, )

)

v. )

)

DENA BEGA, et al., )

)

)

Respondents. )

 )

CV F 02 5891 REC DLB

ORDER GRANTING SANTA ROSA

RANCHERIA TACHI-YOKUT TRIBE’S

MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION

SUBPOENA

[DOC #177]

On March 29, 2005, the Santa Rosa Rancheria Tachi-Yokut Tribe (“Tribe”) filed the

instant motion to quash a deposition subpoena and subpoena for production of documents issued

by Petitioners on November 23, 2004. The motion was heard on April 22, 2005, before the

Honorable Dennis L. Beck. Laurie L. Quigley and Kirsten Zumwalt appeared on behalf of

Respondents. Robert Rhoan, Patrick Guillory and Leah Castella appeared on behalf of

Petitioners. 

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the June 1, 2000, disenrollment and banishment of Petitioners

Roselind Quair and Charlotte Berna (“Petitioners”) from the Tribe. On February 3, 2003,

Petitioners, pursuant to Section 1303 of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.,

(“ICRA”), filed amended petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners allege that because the

Case 1:02-cv-05891-LJO-DLB Document 189 Filed 04/29/05 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

proceedings which resulted in their disenrollment as members of the Tribe and banishment from

the Tribe’s Rancheria were in violation of their rights guaranteed under ICRA, these actions

constituted an unlawful detention and restraint of liberty.

On July 26, 2004, the Honorable Robert E. Coyle denied in part and granted in part the

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Pursuant to the order, the issues remaining in this

action are: (1) whether Petitioners were denied due process; and (2) whether Petitioners were

denied a fair trial.

In August 2004, Petitioners filed a motion to reopen discovery. A hearing was held on

September 24, 2004, before the undersigned. Ruling on the motion was deferred pending the

outcome of a re-hearing held by the Tribe on Petitioners’ disenrollment and banishment. A rehearing was held on October 1, 2004, and the Tribe again voted to disenroll and banish

Petitioners. 

On October 29, 2004, the Court held a scheduling conference to consider Petitioners’

request to re-open discovery. An Amended Scheduling Order was issued on December 22, 2004,

allowing the re-opening of discovery. 

Pursuant to the amended scheduling order, Petitioner’s noticed a number of depositions,

including a deposition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) of the Tribe’s person most

knowledgeable (PMK) on seven topics. The PMK notice also included fifteen document

requests.

The Tribe filed the instant motion on March 29, 2005, and argues that the Tribe’s

sovereign immunity shields it from this Court’s process. The Tribe contends there has been no

waiver of tribal immunity under the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) and therefore Petitioners

cannot pursue discovery against the Tribe. On April 19, 2005, the parties filed a joint statement

regarding the discovery dispute. Petitioners argue the Tribe’s sovereign immunity has been

waived under the ICRA for the limited purpose of discovery in a habeas suit. 

DISCUSSION

Tribal immunity from suit remains intact “absent express and unequivocal waiver of

immunity by the tribe or abrogation of tribal immunity by Congress.” Burlington N. R.R. Co.

Case 1:02-cv-05891-LJO-DLB Document 189 Filed 04/29/05 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

v.Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212, 112 S.Ct. 3013,

120 L.Ed.2d 887 (1992). Petitioners concede that Section 1303 does not provide an "express and

unequivocal waiver of immunity.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has held, “[t]he provisions of

habeas relief in Section 1303 did not constitute a general waiver of sovereign immunity.” Santa

Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Instead Petitioners urge this Court to find an

implied waiver of tribal immunity in section 1303 for the limited purpose of permitting the

gathering the information necessary to determine whether the procedural protections provided by

the Tribe comport with those required by the ICRA. Petitioners argue that without such implied

waiver, the ICRA is rendered unenforceable. The Court rejects Petitioners argument.

The Court does not find and Petitioner has not cited any binding authority finding an

implied waiver of tribal immunity under the ICRA. The decisions in this circuit tend to support

the opposite conclusion. See United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir, 1992), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 838 (1993) [Tribe was immune from process as they possessed tribal immunity at the

time the subpeona was served, thereby affirming the district’s court’s decision to quash the

subpoena and request for production of documents]; see also Bishop Paiute v. County of Inyo,

291 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2002)[“this court reaffirms James and holds that the Tribe is possessed of

sovereign immunity which bars the execution of the warrant”], vacated and remanded on other

grounds 538 U.S. 701 (2003). 

Petitioner’s argue, unpersuasively, that tribal immunity renders ICRA unenforceable. The

Tribe is not and cannot be a Respondent in an ICRA case. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,

436 U.S. 49 (1978). As stated by Judge Coyle in his order granting in part cross motions for

summary judgment, the members of the Tribal Council are the proper respondents in this case

because they are empowered to end Petitioner’s banishment. The document requests issued to

the Tribe with the deposition subpeona are virtually identical to the document requests issued to

the individual Respondents. As the members of the Tribal Council, Respondents represent that

they have “combed through their personal files, and the files of the Tribal Council so as to

produce documents to Petitioners.” Respondents represent that all documents sensitive to

Petitioner’s document requests have been produced. If there are issues regarding the adequacy of

Case 1:02-cv-05891-LJO-DLB Document 189 Filed 04/29/05 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the document production, Petitioners can, as they have done, seek Court intervention in the

discovery process. Petitioners have failed to identify any relevant information Petitioners could

obtain from the Tribe that they cannot obtain from the Respondents. Petitioners’ insistence that

obtaining discovery from the Tribe itself is essential to their case simply has no merit.

Accordingly, because there is no express waiver of immunity by the tribe or abrogation of

tribal immunity by Congress under the ICRA and there is no support for an implied waiver of

immunity, the Court finds that the Tribe was possessed of tribal immunity at the time the subject

subpeonas were served. The Tribe’s motion to quash the subject subpoenas is therefore

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:02-cv-05891-LJO-DLB Document 189 Filed 04/29/05 Page 4 of 4