Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02264/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02264-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDDIE SALAZAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

SULLIVAN, et al., 

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-02264-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND

(ECF No. 10)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN

THIRTY (30) DAYS

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 31, 2009, Plaintiff Eddie Salazar, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No.

1.) Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) was screened and dismissed, with leave to amend,

on October 4, 2011, for failure to state a cognizable claim. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint is now before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 10.)

///

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II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983

is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating

federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The Complaint alleges the following named Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights: (1) Sullivan, former Warden, California Correctional Institution,

Tehachapi (“Tehachapi”); (2) Gonzales, current Warden, Tehachapi; (3) T. Schwartz,

Deputy Director; (4) M. Carrasco, Chief Deputy Warden; (5) Pierce, Correctional

Counselor; (6) Dailo, Correctional Counselor; (7) John Doe # 1, Institution Gang

Investigator (“IGI”) Sgt.; (8) John Doe # 2, Correctional Counselor; (9) John Doe # 3,

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Facility Captain; (10) John Doe # 4, Facility Captain; and (11) John Doe # 5, Chief

Classification Services Unit. 

Plaintiff alleges the following:

On December 5, 2006, after being attacked, Plaintiff was placed in segregated

housing pending a hearing. (Compl. at 4.) On December 10, 2006, Plaintiff attended a

committee hearing discussing whether he needed to stay in segregated housing. (Id.)

Plaintiff opined that the attack resulted from a simple misunderstanding. Defendant

Carrasco, a committee member, asserted that the attack was related to illicit activity. (Id.)

Carrasco issued Plaintiff an ultimatum: Plaintiff could either voluntarily enter protective

custody and provide information regarding illegal activity at Tehachapi (i.e., debrief) or

remain in segregated housing and likely be transferred to the Security Housing Unit

(“SHU”). Plaintiff’s desire to be placed back into the general prison population was not an

option. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant John Doe # 1, IGI Sgt. on December 14,

2006. When Plaintiff continued to maintain that the attack was merely an incidental fight,

Doe # 1 stated that unless Plaintiff debriefed, Doe # 1 would report Plaintiff as

uncooperative and “negative consequences” would result. (Id. at 5, 6.)

On March 15, 2007, Plaintiff attended a committee hearing and pled his case. He

felt that further retention in administrative segregation would be unhealthy. He argued that

he could function at other facilities without incident. Carrasco informed Plaintiff that he was

being “referred to the Departmental Review Board (DRB) for an indeterminate [SHU]

program for refusing to coorperate [sic] with investigation and not desiring protective

custody.” (Id. at 7.) The committee stated that approval of a SHU term would take place

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at the Departmental Review Board and could take some time. (Id.)

Plaintiff thereafter attended at least three more committee hearings. Defendants

Carrasco, John Doe # 3, and John Doe # 2 verbally abused Plaintiff by repeatedly

referring to their authority and implying that Plaintiff was withholding information of illicit

activity. (Id. at 8.) These Defendants advised Plaintiff that his objections should be

forwarded to another agency because the committee no longer had Plaintiff’s “case factor.”

(Id.) 

On or about October 31, 2007, Plaintiff was transferred to the SHU and went before

its committee for orientation. “During the orientation committee hearing the members

addressed Plaintiff that he was issued a indeterminate SHU term by Departmental Review

Board (DRB) on grounds of potential gang activity, disciplinary history behind being

assulted [sic] and hispanic culture ideoligies [sic] that the assault will be exploiting the

inmate to these activities to gain back favor with hispanics.” (Id. at 9.) The committee

refused to hear Plaintiff’s protest because a final decision had been made by the

Departmental Review Board and the SHU hearing was for orientation purposes only. (Id.)

Defendant Dailo, Plaintiff’s housing counselor in the SHU, repeatedly rebuffed

Plaintiff’s objections to his continued housing in the SHU and told Plaintiff to stop

complaining. (Id. at 10, 11.) Plaintiff attended a committee hearing on April 30, 2008, and

attempted to address the basis relied upon by the DRB for his indeterminate SHU term.

John Doe # 4 had Plaintiff removed from the hearing because he was not prepared to

debrief. (Id. at 11.) Defendant Pierce later informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff had upset

someone because it appeared Plaintiff would remain in the SHU. (Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff does not specifically identify which of his constitutional rights were violated.

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On pages thirteen through seventeen of the First Amended Complaint each of three counts

incorporate the factual allegations of the amended complaint. The Court interprets

Plaintiff’s pleading as intending to allege violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and

rights to Due Process and Equal Protection.

IV. ANALYSIS

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243,

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its

face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant

committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal

conclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50.

A. Section 1983 Linkage Requirement

Plaintiff alleges that Wardens Sullivan and Gonzales were responsible for, and had

general knowledge of, prison operations. Their failure to investigate “incidents” and

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discipline other Defendants is the basis for their alleged liability. (Compl. at 13.) 

In the prior screening order, Plaintiff was advised that supervisory personnel are

generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory

of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory

position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948; Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658 (1978).

To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory

liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory

defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights,

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them, or promulgated or “implemented

a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the

moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.

1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff alleges that the Wardens had “common knowledge of the operations of the

prison,” (Compl. at 13) but does not claim that either Sullivan or Gonzales knew of, or

participated in, the specific alleged violations. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendants Sullivan and Gonzales are dismissed. Since Plaintiff was advised of what

would be necessary to pursue supervisorial liability and was unable to amend to properly

so plead, no useful purpose would be served in granting further leave to amend in this

regard. Accordingly, the dismissal as to these two Defendants is with prejudice.

B. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

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punishment was violated. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from “cruel and

unusual punishment.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To constitute cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must

provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1107; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from

physical abuse. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1250-51; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833

(1994). To establish a violation of this duty, the inmate must establish that prison officials

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate's safety.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and

a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently

serious . . . .” Id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the

prison official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety

. . . .” Id. at 837.

The Court cannot with certainty identify the bases for any cognizable Eighth

Amendment claim. At times it appears that Plaintiff is asserting that Defendants Carrasco,

Dailo, Pierce, and Does one through four “intentionally harass[ed]” Plaintiff as evidenced

by their “statements to Plaintiff during committee hearings, interviews, and in contact with

Plaintiff . . . .” (Id. at 13, 14). 

“‘Verbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional

deprivation . . . .’” Whitley v. Lopez, 2011 WL 5101944, *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011)(citing

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Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987)). Verbal harassment is not a

sufficiently serious deprivation to satisfy the first element of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff wishes to assert such a claim, it can not stand and is

hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Later in his pleading, Plaintiff seems to renew his allegations that conditions in the

SHU amount to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 14). The Court is unable to find

therein any basis for a constitutional violation. Plaintiff was instructed in the Court’s

previous screening order that SHU conditions alone do not satisfy the sufficiently serious

element of an Eighth Amendment claim. “Merely being housed in the SHU will not sustain

a claim.” (ECF No. 9 at 13.) Even a prolonged sentence in administrative segregation

does not in of itself constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. See, e.g., Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995)

(no contact with any other inmate in administrative segregation, either for exercise, day

room access or otherwise not cruel and unusual punishment); Toussaint v. Yockey, 722

F.2d 1490, 1494 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984) (more than usual hardships associated with

administrative segregation required to state 8th Amendment claim). Even the admittedly

harsh conditions in the SHU do not impose cruel and unusual punishment on ordinary

prisoners such as Plaintiff. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

Plaintiff does not allege that he is experiencing anything other than standard SHU

conditions. He has not satisfied the first element of an Eighth Amendment claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed, and, for the same reasons as given in

connection with the preceding calim, it is dismissed with prejudice.

///

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C. Due Process

Count two alleges that Defendants Carrasco and John Doe # 4 deprived Plaintiff of

fair and impartial hearings leading up to his indeterminate SHU sentence. (Compl. at 15.)

The Court will analyze these claims as if designed to assert due process violations. 

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without

the procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545

U.S. 209, 221 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. Id.

Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause or from state law. Id. The Due

Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding more

adverse conditions of confinement, id. at 221–22 (citations and quotation marks omitted),

and under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is

determined by focusing on the nature of the condition of confinement at issue. Id. at

222–23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–84 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted).

Liberty interests created by prison regulations are generally limited to freedom from

restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at 221 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) (quotation

marks omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).

Based on Plaintiff's general allegations regarding harsh SHU conditions, the Court

will assume, at the screening stage, the existence of a liberty interest in being free from an

indeterminate SHU term. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223–24 (finding a liberty interest in

avoiding indefinite confinement in Ohio's “Supermax” facility). The inquiry then becomes

what process is due. Id. at 224.

Assignment to the SHU is an administrative measure rather than a disciplinary

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measure and is “essentially a matter of administrative discretion.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d

1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.

1997)). As a result, prisoners are entitled to the minimal procedural protections of

adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and periodic review. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287

(citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part

on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472). In addition to these minimal protections,

there must be “some evidence” supporting the decision. Id. (citing Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)). Although discussed in the context of a disciplinary hearing, the

Ninth Circuit has stated that under the Hill standard, the evidence should have some indicia

of reliability. Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987).

Liability under section 1983 requires a showing of personal involvement, Iqbal, 129

S.Ct. at 1949. Only the critical decision makers in a process depriving Plaintiff rights may

be held liable for denial of due process. See e.g., Perez v. Woodford, 2010 WL 3943536,

*7 (E.D. Cal. Oct.1, 2010); Avina v. Medellin, 2010 WL 3516343, *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3,

2010); Madrid, 889 F.Supp. at 1276.

Defendant Carrasco and John Doe # 4 were not the critical decision makers in the

process assigning Plaintiff to the SHU. Defendant Carrasco presided over approximately

five hearings between December 10, 2006 and Plaintiff’s transfer to the SHU on October

31, 2007. Plaintiff’s alleges that Carrasco referred his case to the Departmental Review

Board, the body that approved SHU assignments. (Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff was informed

by the SHU orientation committee that the Departmental Review Board had in fact made

the decision to assign Plaintiff to the SHU. (Id. at 9.) John Doe # 4 was a committee

member assigned to periodically review Plaintiff’s housing status. Plaintiff does not allege

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that either Carrasco or John Doe # 4 was a member of the Departmental Review Board.

The previous screening order instructed Plaintiff that given such facts, only

members of the Departmental Review Board could be proper defendants. Thus Plainitff

can not assert a claim for violation of his due process rights against Carrasco and John

Doe # 4. Such claims are dismissed with prejudice. Again, Plaintiff was advised as to

what needed to be pled to enable him to proceed on a claimed due process violation.

Even though he took the opportunity to amend and had the Court’s guidance in doing so,

he has again failed to state a claim. No useful purpose would be served in allowing yet

another amendment.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be

treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

A plaintiff can establish an equal protection claim by showing that the defendant has

intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of the plaintiff’s membership in a

protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001);

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005).

Equal protection claims alleging disparate treatment or classifications are subject

to a heightened standard of scrutiny when they involve a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect”

class, such as race or national origin, or when they involve a burden on the exercise of

fundamental personal rights protected by the Constitution. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The

heightened standard of strict scrutiny requires the State to show that the classification is

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.

306, 326 (2003).

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Plaintiff alleges that he is Hispanic and that the Defendants T. Schwartz and John

Doe # 5 are discriminating against him based on his race. (Compl. at 16). Race and

ethnicity are suspect classes that trigger strict scrutiny. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

556 (1974) (“Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race”). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants T. Schwartz and Doe # 5 based their decision to

send Plaintiff to the SHU because Plaintiff is Hispanic and they assume as a result that

the altercation he was involved in was gang related. (Compl. at 16.) . This is pled as mere

conclusion and/or speculation on Plaintiff’s part; neither is enough to state a cognizable

claim. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. Plaintiff will be given one final opportunity to amend his

equal protection claim and attempt to assert factual allegations, if any exist, which

demonstrate that Defendants T. Schwartz and Doe # 5 acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against him based upon his membership in a protected class. Lee, 250 F.3d

at 686. Plaintiff’s apparent belief that they did so is insufficient; he must set out the facts

that support his belief so the Court can determine whether they are sufficient to state a

claim under the law. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not state a claim for relief under section

1983. The Court will grant Plaintiff one final opportunity to file an amended complaint

addressing only his Equal Protection claims against Defendants T. Schwartz and Doe #

5. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he

must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state

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a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each named Defendant personally

participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.

2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing

the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55,

57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “Second Amended Complaint,”

refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury.

Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although accepted as

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form

and (2) a copy of his First Amended Complaint, filed November 1, 2011;

2. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted;

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3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure to comply

with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2011 /s/Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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