Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35952/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35952-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DUANE RONALD BELANUS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PHIL CLARK; RAYMOND POTTER;

CORY OLSON; LARRY PLATTS;

ALLEN HUGHES; PAT HURLEY; LEO

DUTTON; LEO GALLAGHER; MELISSA

BROCH,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-35952

D.C. No.

6:12-cv-00051-

DLC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Dana L. Christensen, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 7, 2015—Seattle, Washington

Filed August 5, 2015

Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Callahan;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge

Fernandez

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2 BELANUS V. CLARK

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a

prisoner civil rights complaint alleging constitutional

violations as a result of searches of plaintiff’s home, storage

shed, and workplace in 2008, that were made in connection

with his criminal prosecution. 

The panel held that the district court properly noted that

to the extent plaintiff asserted that the evidence collected

during the searches caused his conviction, his claim was

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). To the

extent the claims were not barred by Heck, the panel held that

the district court also properly determined that the complaint

was barred by Montana’s three-year statute of limitations and

that equitable tolling did not apply because plaintiff knew of

the searches when they occurred and that they might be

warrantless. The panel further held that the district court

properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend

because it was clear that no amendment could overcome the

statute of limitations bar.

The panel held that the district court acted within its

discretion in assessing a strike against plaintiff pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g), even though he had paid the docket fee. 

Determining that plaintiff had standing to challenge the

imposition of a strike pursuant to § 1915(g), the panel

concluded that applying a strike to a paid case was consistent

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BELANUS V. CLARK 3

with the plain language of the statute, furthered the purposes

behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and accorded with

the rulings of four of other sister circuits.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge

Fernandez stated that it was not absolutely clear that the

deficiencies in plaintiff’s complaint could not be cured by

amendment and that plaintiff should have been given an

opportunity to plead a basis for equitable tolling. Judge

Fernandez also stated that the district court’s order that the

dismissal of plaintiff’s action counted as a strike did not have

any binding effect upon him, and therefore plaintiff had not

suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish a case or

controversy. 

COUNSEL

Thomas Christoph Keller (argued) and Britta Stamps

(argued), certified law student representatives, University of

Arkansas Federal Appellate Litigation Project, Fayetteville,

Arkansas; Lindsey C. Lien and Colin Seaborg, certified law

student representatives, Gregory C. Sisk, supervising

attorney, University of St. Thomas School of Law Appellate

Clinic, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Rebekah J. French, Special Assistant Attorney General,

Helena, Montana, for Amicus Curiae State of Montana.

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4 BELANUS V. CLARK

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Montana state prisoner Duane Ronald Belanus filed this

§ 1983 action asserting claims based on the alleged violation

of his rights under the United States and Montana

constitutions as a result of searches of his home, storage shed,

and workplace in 2008, that were made in connection with his

criminal prosecution. The district court dismissed his

complaint with prejudice at the screening stage and held that

Belanus’s complaint constituted a “strike” against him

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We affirm, holding that

Belanus cannot assert a cognizable claim for equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations, and that the district court could

determine that his complaint constitutes a “strike.”

I. Background

On August 3, 2008, Belanus returned to his home to find

the police searching his home. Belanus was detained and

later arrested. Belanus was charged “with kidnapping [his

girlfriend], raping her, inflicting bodily injury upon her in the

course of the rape, unlawfully tampering with physical

evidence of the rape, burglarizing [the girlfriend’s] residence,

and committing a theft therein.” State v. Belanus, 240 P.3d

1021, 1022–23 (Mont. 2010). Belanus was tried in June

2009, convicted, and, in August 2009, sentenced to life

without the possibility of parole. Belanus appealed to the

Montana Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction. Id.

at 1025.

On June 5, 2012, Belanus, proceeding pro se, filed a civil

complaint in the United States District Court of the District of

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BELANUS V. CLARK 5

Montana. He alleged that the police had conducted

warrantless searches of his home, his shed, and his workplace

between August 3 and August 8, 2008, in violation of his

rights under the United States and Montana constitutions. He

named as defendants officers with the Lewis and Clark

County Sheriff’s Department and attorneys with the County. 

He paid the filing fee.

The gist of Belanus’s complaint is that the police:

(1) searched his residence on August 3 and 4, 2008, prior to

the issuance of a warrant on August 5, 2008; (2) searched his

shed on August 5, 2008, prior to the issuance of a warrant on

August 12, 2008; and (3) between August 3 and 15, 2008,

searched his workplace without a warrant.

Belanus alleged that the “illegally obtained evidence was

knowingly used against me in court proceedings. I was

convicted of a crime that I still profess my innocence.” 

Belanus sought “monetary damages in excess of $75,000

from each defendant for just causes of: physical, emotional,

mental, loss of freedom, and financial stress and anguish.”

Belanus’s complaint was reviewed by a Magistrate Judge,

who concluded that the complaint should be dismissed. He

reasoned that if Belanus was challenging his conviction, his

claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

and that it was otherwise barred by the applicable three-year

statute of limitations. The Magistrate Judge further found

that the dismissal of Belanus’s action would count as a strike

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Belanus filed objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations, and the

District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations, dismissed Belanus’s complaint with

prejudice, and held that the dismissal would count as a strike

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6 BELANUS V. CLARK

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Belanus filed a timely

notice of appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of an

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown,

630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). In determining whether a

complaint states a claim, “a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. at 892–93

(quoting Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.

2000)). Also, questions of statutory interpretation, such as

the applicability of the strike provision of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g), are reviewed de novo. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d

1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005).

III. The Heck Bar

Because Belanus’s pro se complaint alluded to his

conviction and his assertion of innocence, the district court

properly noted that to the extent he asserted that the evidence

collected during the searches caused his conviction, his claim

was barred by Heck.1512 U.S. at 487. The district court also

 

1

 The Supreme Court held:

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,

the district court must consider whether a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already

been invalidated. But if the district court determines

that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not

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BELANUS V. CLARK 7

recognized that if a determination of the constitutionality of

the searches did not necessarily imply the invalidity of

Belanus’s conviction, there was no Heck bar. As the thrust of

Belanus’s complaint did not appear to challenge his

conviction, the district court properly proceeded to consider

whether it was barred by the statute of limitations.

In Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th

Cir. 1995), we stated that where a defendant’s claims are

Heck-barred, the dismissal should be without prejudice “so

that [the plaintiff] may reassert his claims if he ever succeeds

in invalidating his conviction.” Accordingly, we construe the

district court dismissal of Belanus’s action to be without

prejudice as to any Heck-barred claim that he might assert at

some time in the future.

IV. The Statute of Limitations

As the district court and Belanus agree, the applicable

statute of limitations is Montana’s three-year statute of

limitations governing personal injury actions, Mont. Code

Ann. § 27-2-204(1). See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280

(1985) (holding “that § 1983 claims are best characterized as

personal injury actions,” and that the lower court correctly

applied the state’s three-year statute of limitations governing

actions “for an injury to the person or reputation of any

person”).

demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal

judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be

allowed to proceed, in the absence ofsome other bar to

the suit.

512 U.S. at 487 (footnotes omitted).

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8 BELANUS V. CLARK

Federal law determines when a cause of action accrues

and when the statute of limitations begins to run for a § 1983

claim. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (noting

that “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question

of federal law”); Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th

Cir. 2012) (stating that “[f]ederal law determines when a

cause of action for a Section 1983 claim accrues and, hence,

when the statute of limitations begins to run”).

Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the

basis of the action. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th

Cir. 1996); Pouncil, 704 F.3d at 574. Thus, “[a]n action

ordinarily accrues on the date of the injury.” Id.

Here, Belanus’s causes of action accrued on August 3,

2008, and on whatever dates over the next week that the

police searched his home, shed, and workplace. Belanus does

not deny that he knew of the searches. He states that when he

came home on August 3, 2008, the police were in his home. 

Furthermore, the documents attached to his complaint

confirm that he was aware of the searches and the possible

lack of timely search warrants by the time of his trial in June

2009. Accordingly, on its face, Belanus’s June 5, 2012

complaint appears to be untimely and barred by Montana’s

three-year statute of limitations.

Belanus, however, argues that his complaint is not barred

because he can assert a viable argument for equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations. He notes that although federal

law determines the accrual of his cause of action, state law

governs the tolling of the statute of limitations in § 1983

cases. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394 (commenting “[w]e have

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BELANUS V. CLARK 9

generally referred to state law for tolling rules, just as we

have for the length of statutes of limitations”).

Citing Schoof v. Nesbit, 316 P.3d 831 (Mont. 2014),

Belanus argues that he has a viable argument that the statute

of limitations was equitably tolled under Montana law. In

Schoof, a county resident sought to challenge a decision by

the county commissioners to permit elected county officials

to receive cash payments in lieu of county contributions on

the officials’ behalf to a group health insurance program. Id.

at 833. Schoof did not file his action until several years after

the commissioners’ decision, and the defendants successfully

moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by

the applicable thirty-day statute of limitations. Id. at 833–34. 

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana determined that

Schoof’s complaint was timely under the equitable tolling

doctrine. Id. at 839–41.

Montana law provides that the period of limitation does

not begin until the claim has been discovered or should have

been discovered.2 Under Montana law, “[t]he doctrine of

2 The Montana Supreme Court noted that Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-

102(3) provides:

The period of limitation does not begin on any claim or

cause of action for an injury to person or property until

the facts constituting the claimhave been discovered or,

in the exercise of due diligence, should have been

discovered by the injured party if:

(a) the facts constituting the claim are by their nature

concealed or self-concealing; or

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10 BELANUS V. CLARK

equitable tolling arrests the running of the limitations period

after a claim has accrued, allowing in limited circumstances

for an action to be pursued despite the failure to comply with

relevant statutory filing deadlines.” Id. at 839–40 (quotation

marks and citation omitted). The Montana Supreme Court

favorablycompared its perspective to federal equitable tolling

rules, citing cases that held that: (1) equitable tolling is

limited to rare and exceptional circumstances where the

defendant is responsible for concealing the existence of

plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) equitable tolling “does not

require that the defendant’s conduct rise to the level of fraud,

or even be intentional, but only that the nature of the

defendant’s actions has concealed from the plaintiff the

existence of the claim”; and (3) equitable relief is only

available when the plaintiff is actually prevented from filing

on time despite exercising diligence. Id. at 840. The court

further noted that statutes of limitations “provide a reasonable

means of preventing stale claims and ensuring that claims are

filed before essential evidence disappears.” Id. at 841

(citation and quotation marks omitted). The Montana

Supreme Court concluded that Schoof’s allegations qualified

for equitable tolling because “neither he nor the public

learned or could have learned about the ‘cash in lieu’ policy

until four years after it had been adopted, at which time he

promptly filed suit.” Id. at 840.

Belanus argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling

because state and county officials did not respond to his

(b) before, during, or after the act causing the injury,

the defendant has taken action which prevents the

injured party from discovering the injury or its cause.

Schoof, 316 P.3d at 839.

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BELANUS V. CLARK 11

written requests for all warrants covering the searches. 

However, it appears that at the time of his criminal trial, or

sometime thereafter, Belanus did receive copies of the search

warrants that issued on August 5 and 12, 2008. Belanus

alleges that he asked the attorney who was representing him

in his criminal proceedings to investigate the search warrant

issue. Belanus also asked the state trial court, as early as

November 10, 2010, to provide him with the full record.

Belanus’s plea for equitable tolling fails because, taking

his allegations as true, as we must, Hamilton, 630 F.3d at

892–93, Belanus knew of his cause of action well within the

three-year statute of limitations. As noted, federal law

determines when his cause of action arose. Bagley v. CMC

Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Moreover, federal law holds that a cause of action for illegal

search and seizure accrues when the wrongful act occurs,

Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983),

even if the person does not know at that time that the search

was warrantless. See Kuan v. U.S. Customs Service, No. CV

08-1980-DDP (MAN), 2009 WL 6340016, at *5 (C.D. Cal.

Dec. 16, 2009).

Accordingly, because Belanus knew of the searches when

they occurred (or shortly thereafter), and that they might be

warrantless, the defendants’ alleged failures to respond to his

written inquiries, even if wrongful, do not provide a viable

basis for equitable tolling under Montana law. Defendants

did not conceal the existence of Belanus’s cause of action or

prevent him from filing his action within three years of the

search. To extend equitable tolling to Belanus’s claims

would be contrary to the purpose of the three-year statute of

limitations to ensure that claims are filed before essential

evidence disappears. See Schoof, 316 P.3d at 841.

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12 BELANUS V. CLARK

Belanus’s complaint also asserted claims against the

prosecutors. However, these claims are not independent of

his other claims. To the extent that Belanus’s challenge to the

prosecutors’ actions necessarily implicate the validity of his

conviction, Belanus’s claims are barred by Heck, 512 U.S. at

487. In essence, Belanus alleges that the prosecutors

concealed the lack of warrants for the searches. He does not

allege any injury or violation of federal law caused by the

prosecutors’ alleged actions that is distinct or separate from

the allegedly unlawful searches. Accordingly, because the

materials submitted by Belanus with his complaint show that

he was aware, at the time of his trial in 2009, that the searches

may have been improper, his claims against the prosecutors

are also barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Th district court properly dismissed Belanus’s complaint

without leave to amend for failure to state a cause of action

upon which relief could be granted. Based on all the

materials Belanus submitted to the district court, it is clear

that no amendment could overcome the statute of limitations

bar.

V. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in

Assessing a Strike Against Belanus Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

Belanus argues that the district court can only authorize

a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) when the prisoner

action that is dismissed was filed in forma pauperis

(sometimes referred to as IFP). Section 1915(g) was enacted

as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the PLRA) of

1995, and provides:

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BELANUS V. CLARK 13

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action

or appeal a judgment in a civil action or

proceeding under this section if the prisoner

has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility,

brought an action or appeal in a court of the

United States that was dismissed on the

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent

danger of serious physical injury.

(emphasis added).

Belanus argues that although the phrase “action or

appeal” may seem broad, when read in context, it does not

include fee-paid actions. He asserts that the same phrase is

used in the statute’s pre-screening provision, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), and we have held that the pre-screening

provision applies only to in forma pauperis proceedings. 

Belanus argues that Congress intended the phrase to have the

same meaning in both sections. Belanus further notes that we

held that the phrase “action or appeal” in § 1915(g) does not

include habeas proceedings. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1122

(noting that “dismissed habeas petitions do not count as

strikes under § 1915(g)”); Naddi v. Hill, 106 F.3d 275, 277

(9th Cir. 1997) (agreeing that dismissed habeas petitions do

not count as strikes under § 1915(g)).

Belanus urges that the broader context of § 1915,

including its title—“Proceedings in forma pauperis”—

indicates that fee-paid litigation does not qualify as an “action

or appeal.” He contends that a contrary interpretation would

produce absurd results as litigants like Belanus “would have

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14 BELANUS V. CLARK

absolutely no incentive to pay filing fees up front until after

they have already accrued three strikes.” He further argues

that the district court’s approach would increase the amount

of in forma pauperis litigation in federal court and that “the

indiscriminate assessment of strikes would discourage

prisoners from working to fund their litigation, and would

unfairly penalize those who do work.” Belanus concludes by

asking us to “decline to follow the few non-binding decisions

from other circuits that have held that the plain language of

§ 1915(g) extends to fee-paid actions.”

Before addressing the merits of Belanus’s arguments, we

must determine whether he has standing to raise them. In

other words, has he “suffered an injury in fact—an invasion

of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560–61 (1992) (footnote and internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal

Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999) (en

banc) (holding that issues presented must be “definite and

concrete, not hypothetical or abstract”—that plaintiffs “face

a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of

the statute’s operation or enforcement,” rather than an

imaginary or speculative injury).

Although a close question, we find that Belanus has

presented a sufficiently concrete harm to allow us to consider

the merits of his contentions. If we affirm the district court’s

decision, Belanus will have one strike against him pursuant

to § 1915(g). True, it is only one strike. But as every

baseball batter knows, taking a first strike changes your

approach to the next pitch. Here, the strike will inevitably

influence Belanus’s determinations to seek judicial review in

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BELANUS V. CLARK 15

a federal court on any number of issues that may arise during

his sentence of life without the possibility of parole. We

conclude that Belanus has standing to challenge the

imposition of a strike pursuant to § 1915(g).3

Turning to the merits of Belanus’s claim, we conclude

that the fact that a prisoner pays the docket fee is no barrier

to a court, when dismissing the case as frivolous, directing

that the dismissal count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Our starting point is the plain language of the statute, United

States v. Williams, 659 F.3d 1223, 1225 (9th Cir. 2011), and

here the language is clear. The words “an action or appeal”

are not modified and have an ordinary meaning. Where “the

statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to

enforce it according to its terms.” United States v. Ron Pair

Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we are constrained

by Congress’s choice of language to allow dismissals in “an

action or appeal,” to be designated as strikes under § 1915(g),

regardless of whether the filing fee was paid.

Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with and

furthers the statute’s purposes. The filing fee provisions of

§ 1915 “were enacted to deter the large number of frivolous

inmate lawsuits that were ‘clogging’ the federal courts and

‘draining’ limited judicial resources.” Taylor v. Delatoore,

281 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2002). A frivolous action clogs

the system and drains resources regardless of whether the

plaintiff pays the filing fee or proceeds in forma pauperis. 

We see no reason for allowing wealthy prisoners to clog the

3 Our conclusion is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s perspective. 

See Duvall v. Miller, 122 F.3d 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the

dismissal of a paid appeal could count as a strike under § 1915(g)).

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16 BELANUS V. CLARK

courts by paying the filing fees, when access would be denied

to an impecunious prisoner, particularly as filing fees do not

come close to covering the cost to the court of a frivolous

action. See Hyland v. Clinton, 3 F. App’x. 478, 480 (6th Cir.

2001) (noting that “imposition of sanctions is particularly

appropriate, because it appears that Hyland has the funds to

continue to prosecute suits without regard to § 1915(g)”).

In Duvall v. Miller, 122 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 1997), the

Seventh Circuit considered and rejected an argument similar

to that advanced by Belanus. It commented:

The only reason we can think of for

interpolating such a limitation is that a

prisoner who had paid for the previous suit or

appeal had by doing so manifested a greater

seriousness than one who had done so at no

cost to himself. We do not think this

speculative reason is sufficiently strong to

override the statutory language. The prisoner

who has brought three suits or appeals that

lacked sufficient merit to get beyond the

pleadings (or that were an outright abuse of

process) is not an appealing candidate for a

waiver of the filing fee in his fourth through

nth cases, even if he paid for the previous

suits. We therefore hold that a dismissal need

not, to qualify as a strike, be of an action or

appeal filed in forma pauperis.

Id. at 490. We agree with the Seventh Circuit. Neither the

purported “seriousness” of a paid filing, nor Belanus’s

speculation that applying § 1915(g) to paid filings would

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BELANUS V. CLARK 17

discourage paid filings, are sufficient to allow us to disregard

the plain language of the statute.

Belanus’s references to other similar language in the

PLRA and to our exclusion of habeas petitions from

§ 1915(g) coverage are not supportive of his position. 

Neither reference supports his reading of “action or appeal”

in § 1915(g). The reasons for holding that pre-screening

provisions apply only to IFP proceedings do not resonate

when interpreting “action or appeal” as used in § 1915(g).4

4 None of the cases cited by Belanus as holding that the pre-screening

provisions apply only to IFP proceedings are directly applicable to his

case. In Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494 (9thCir. 1996), we determined that

“[b]ecause section 1915(e)(2) does not impair any substantive rights of

prisoners, but instead merely affects the ability of prisoners to maintain

appeals in forma pauperis, we conclude that section 1915(e)(2) is a

procedural rule which raises no retroactivity concerns.” Id. at 496. This

holding has little relevance to § 1915(g).

In Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 109 n.10 (3d

Cir. 2002), the Third Circuit commented:

Although the language of § 1915(e)(2) does not

expressly limit the provision’s reach to in forma

pauperis claims, we believe Congress intended it to be

so limited. See Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014,

1016–17 (6th Cir. 1999). The provision is located

within § 1915, entitled “Proceedings in forma

pauperis,” and it replaces § 1915(d), which only

applied to in forma pauperis claims. Id. at 1016. 

Further, a contrary interpretation expanding

§ 1915(e)(2) to all suits would both alter radically the

process of civil litigation in federal courts and make

similar provisions of the PLRA superfluous. Id. at

1017. Indeed, we have previously stated that “Section

804 of the PLRA, which amends 28 U.S.C. § 1915,

redefines the rights and obligations of litigants who are

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18 BELANUS V. CLARK

We do not think that the provisions in the PLRA setting forth

the contours for proceeding in forma pauperis conflict in any

way with allowing § 1915(g) strikes to issue in paid actions

or appeals.

Our conclusion is supported by four of our sister circuits

that have held that strikes under § 1915(g) may be accrued

regardless of whether the prisoner has paid the filing fee or is

proceeding in forma pauperis. Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d

117, 124 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that “strikes may be accrued

in actions or appeals regardless of whether the prisoner has

prepaid the filing fee or is proceeding IFP”); Duvall, 122 F.3d

at 490 (holding “that a dismissal need not, to qualify as a

strike, be of an action or appeal filed in forma pauperis”);

Burghart v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 350 F. App’x 278, 279 (10th

Cir. 2009) (noting that the statute’s purposes “are achieved by

preventing a prisoner who has paid filing fees in past

frivolous law suits from proceeding IFP, just as they are

achieved by preventing a prisoner from proceeding IFP for

granted in forma pauperis status.” Santana v. United

States, 98 F.3d 752, 753–54 (3d Cir. 1996).

But the redefinition of the rights and obligations of individuals granted

leave to proceed IFP is not inconsistent with reading the plain language in

§ 1915(g) as covering both paid and IFP actions.

In Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth

Circuit held that pre-screening under § 1915(e)(2) applied only to IFP

cases because pre-screening all complaints: (a) would render the specific

prisoner complaint screening provision, § 1915A, largely superfluous; and

(b) “such a holding would completely negate the policy of this and several

other circuits that a plaintiff generally should be given notice and an

opportunity to respond prior to the district court's sua sponte dismissal of

the complaint.” Id. at 1017. Again these reasons provide little guidance

to our reading of § 1915(g).

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BELANUS V. CLARK 19

the fourth or fifth time”); Hyland, 3 F. App’x at 480 (noting

that “[t]he imposition of sanctions is particularly appropriate,

because it appears that Hyland has the funds to continue to

prosecute suits without regard to § 1915(g)”). No court of

appeal appears to have held that strikes may only be accrued

in IFP actions or appeals. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in assessing a strike against Belanus.

VI. Conclusion

Pursuant to the pre-screening procedures set forth in the

PLRA, the district court properly considered Belanus’s

complaint and summarily determined that he could not state

a cause of action. We affirm that decision. The materials

submitted by Belanus in support of his complaint show that

Belanus knew of the searches in August 2008. Under federal

law, his claims concerning the searches accrued at that time. 

See Pouncil, 704 F.3d at 574. Under the applicable Montana

law, his claims could only be equitably tolled if the

defendants had concealed the existence of his claim or

prevented him from filing a timely lawsuit. Schoof, 316 P. 3d

at 840–41. Taking Belanus’s filings as true, he has not, and

cannot, make such a showing. Accordingly, he has failed to

allege a viable claim for equitable tolling and we affirm the

district court’s dismissal of his action.

We also affirm the district court’s decision to count the

dismissal as a strike against Belanus for purposes of

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We conclude that applying a strike to

a paid case is consistent with the plain language of the statute,

furthers the purposes behind the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, and accords with the rulings of four of our sister circuits.

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20 BELANUS V. CLARK

The district court’s dismissal and award of a strike under

§ 1915(g) are AFFIRMED.

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

I agree with much of what the majority says. I

specifically agree with parts I, II and III of the majority

opinion. The parts with which I do not entirely agree are IV,

V and VI.

A. As to part IV, I think it is fair to assume that we all

agree that “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se

complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely

clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured

by amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th

Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121

(9th Cir. 2012).

So where do I diverge from my colleagues? Well, the

district court did not consider the fact that Montana allows

equitable tolling “where a plaintiff is substantially prejudiced

by a defendant’s concealment of a claim, despite the exercise

of diligence by the plaintiff.” Schoof v. Nesbit, 316 P.3d 831,

841, 373 Mont. 226, 239 (2014); see also Hardin v. Straub,

490 U.S. 536, 539, 109 S. Ct. 1998, 2000–01, 104 L. Ed. 2d

582 (1989); cf. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391–95, 127

S. Ct. 1091, 1097–99, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007). Belanus’

pleading does suggest that he was unable to determine the

illegality of the searches because the police officers testified

that there were warrants, and despite his requests, the

defendants failed and refused to supply him with copies of the

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BELANUS V. CLARK 21

alleged warrants, if any existed. In light of that, even though

he did not sufficiently plead his claims or his entitlement to

equitable tolling, at this point1I am unable to say that it is

absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by

amendment.

While I am not at all certain that Belanus can spell out a

basis for equitable tolling, I do believe that he should have

been given an opportunity to do so. For example, from what

we have in the record before us, he was not given a copy of

the receipt from the August 3, 2008, search of his home that

he came upon while the officers were there, and at his trial in

June 2009 the officers testified that a warrant was, indeed,

issued before the search took place. It was not until late 2009

or early 2010 that he discovered (suspected) that there was no

such warrant. Allegations along those lines might suffice to

spell out a period of equitable tolling sufficient to extend the

statute of limitations period to or after June 5, 2012. Of

course, I do not know that he can, or will be able to, so plead. 

I only say that giving him an opportunity so to do is not

chimerizing — the district court should have given him that

opportunity.

B. As to part V, while I do not disagree with the

majority’s discussion of the merits, I do not think that the

district court’s unnecessary order that the dismissal of

Belanus’ action “counts as a strike” has any binding effect

upon him or upon any future court. That is, Belanus has not

1

I recognize that Montana argues that Belanus will not be able to allege

sufficient facts, but that is best considered by the district court after

Belanus has an opportunity to amend the current complaint. See Gallardo

v. United States, 755 F.3d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 2014); Whalem/Hunt v.

Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam).

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22 BELANUS V. CLARK

suffered “an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct.

2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992) (footnote, citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). If and when Belanus does

file another case in federal court seeking redress for some

asserted wrong, and if and when he has insufficient funds and

files a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and if and when

a district court denies that motion because it has been

demonstrated that Belanus has previously accrued three

strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), that rejection order

will be appealable. See Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1118–19 (9th Cir. 2005). But at this point, any suggestions

“of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of

Art. III.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.

Ct. 1717, 1724, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1990). Thus, I would

determine that as to strikes no case or controversy within the

meaning of the Constitution exists at this time. See Thomas

v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).2It is tempting to issue an advisory

opinion on the strike question for future courts that might

have to struggle with deciding whether a previous piece of

litigation did result in a strike, but I think that the temptation

should have been resisted by the district court and should be

resisted by us.3See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1138; cf. Coleman

2

It matters not whether we view the issue “as one of standing or

ripeness.” Id.

3 Moreover, I fear that our holding, which makes district courts’

advisory rulings about whether dismissals are strikes binding and

appealable, will lead to a morass of procedural problems for plaintiffs,

defendants, and courts. Problems may arise when those rulings are made

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BELANUS V. CLARK 23

v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1765, __ L. Ed.

2d__ (2015) (the time to appeal “from a third-strike trialcourt dismissal” is when it occurs).

Therefore, Irespectfullyconcur in part and dissent in part.

and in the future when a prisoner seeks to take advantage of the provisions

of § 1915(a). See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1120.

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