Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01201/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01201-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL CARTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

W. BRODIE, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-01201-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 8)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has consented to Magistrate 

Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 10.) No other parties have appeared in the action. 

Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he was given 

leave to amend. (ECF No. 7.) His first amended complaint (ECF No. 8) is before the 

Court for screening. 

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

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relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison but complains of acts that 

occurred at Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran, California. He names the following 

defendants: Correctional Lieutenant W. Brodie in his official capacity, and Correctional 

Lieutenant Silva in his individual and official capacities. His allegations may be 

summarized essentially as follows:

Non-party psychologist Jack Alvord reported that Plaintiff had made threats 

against staff members. On September 21, 2015, Plaintiff was called to attend a Rules 

Violation Report (“RVR”) disciplinary proceeding before Defendant Brodie regarding the

allegations. Plaintiff was supposed to have a Staff Assistant, Correctional Officer I. 

Garza, present at the hearing. However, Garza was on vacation on September 21, 2015. 

Brodie nonetheless proceeded with the hearing and, afterward, falsely noted that Garza 

was present. During the hearing, Brodie refused to make Alvord available by phone for 

questioning, despite Plaintiff’s insistence that he do so. Brodie found Plaintiff guilty of the 

alleged violation and assessed Plaintiff a thirty day loss of credits. Plaintiff subsequently 

learned that Brodie included in his report fabricated statements attributed to Plaintiff and 

Garza.

Plaintiff appealed the result of his disciplinary proceeding. The appeal was 

partially granted and the guilty finding was overturned. 

The disciplinary charge was reissued and reheard by Defendant Silva. Plaintiff 

submitted questions to be posed to Alvord. The questions were not answered and Silva 

did not attempt to contact Alvord by phone, stating that he no longer worked at 

Corcoran. Plaintiff again was found guilty, resulting in a loss of good-time credits. 

Although Plaintiff submitted an appeal, he was transferred to another institution on July 

7, 2016, and has been unable to determine the status of his appeal. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his right to due process. He seeks money 

damages and a declaration that his rights were violated.

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IV. Analysis

A. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without 

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a 

cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish 

the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may 

arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 

460, 466 (1983). 

“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. 

at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in such proceedings 

are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner 

receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his 

defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and 

reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his 

defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional 

safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is 

illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. As long as the five 

minimum Wolff requirements are met, due process has been satisfied. Walker v. 

Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. 

Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

In addition, “some evidence” must support the decision of the hearing officer, 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), and the evidence must have some 

indicia of reliability, Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987). The “some 

evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and the relevant inquiry is whether “there 

is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. . . .” Hill, 472 

U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 

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1. Defendant Brodie

The facts alleged regarding Defendant Brodie are nearly identical to those alleged 

in Plaintiff’s initial pleading which the Court previously found were not cognizable.

The Court reiterates that Brodie may have denied Plaintiff the fourth and fifth 

protections announced in Wolff: the right to call witnesses in his defense and legal 

assistance that was determined to be appropriate for him. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s 

allegations fail to state a due process claim because his guilty finding later was 

overturned, and Plaintiff did not ultimately suffer any loss of credits as a result of the 

Defendant Brodie’s conduct. Nor does Plaintiff specify and other loss attributable to the 

procedural defects in his RVR hearing. In these circumstances, Plaintiff has not suffered 

any actual injury as a result of the violation. E.g., Brown v. Marshall, No. CIV S-07-0956 

MCE DAD P, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27241 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2012) (“[P]laintiff’s 

procedural due process claims related to either his first or second disciplinary 

proceedings have been rendered moot by the subsequent re-issuing and re-hearing of 

the rules violation charge against him”); Shotwell v. Brandt, No. C 10-5232 CW (PR), 

2012 WL 6569402, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012) (no due process violation where 

Plaintiff’s RVR was ordered reissued and reheard, the plaintiff was found not guilty at the 

second hearing, and the plaintiff suffered no credit loss or any other punishment); see 

also Horne v. Coughlin, 155 F.3d 26, 31, n. 3 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding the plaintiff’s due 

process claims with regard to his first hearing were rendered null after the findings and 

penalties were vacated and a new hearing ordered, and plaintiff suffered no loss of good 

time credits and no disciplinary record); Morissette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th

Cir. 1995) (court found no injury after a due process violation in the plaintiff’s first 

disciplinary proceedings was subsequently remedied on administrative appeal and 

plaintiff’s sentence was adjusted so that he served no additional time in segregation); 

Young v. Hoffman, 970 F.2d 1154, 1156 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting the plaintiff’s due 

process claims where he was granted a new hearing and was never penalized for the 

underlying charges); Harper v. Lee, 938 F.2d 104, 105 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the 

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plaintiff’s due process claims after he was granted a new hearing to cure the procedural 

violations and suffered no harm as a result of the initial violations).

Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to amend his complaint but was unable to 

cure noted defects. Further leave to amend appears futile. 

2. Defendant Silva

Plaintiff has amended his complaint to add new claims against Defendant Silva. 

Although Plaintiff was advised that leave to amend was not given for the purpose of 

adding new claims, this claim appears to arise out of the same transaction or occurrence 

as the claim against Defendant Brodie. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Accordingly, it is 

addressed.

However, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Silva appear premature because he 

was still in the process of pursuing his administrative remedies. Pursuant to the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison 

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required to exhaust the 

available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211

(2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is 

required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief 

offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion 

requirement applies to all suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532

(2002). Because exhaustion must precede the filing of the complaint, compliance with 

§ 1997e(a) is not achieved by exhausting administrative remedies while the lawsuit is 

pending. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199.

“[I]nmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their 

complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. However, “in those rare cases where a failure to 

exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint,” dismissal for failure to state a claim is 

appropriate, even at the screening stage. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 

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2014). In the instant case, Plaintiff states that he filed an administrative grievance 

regarding the conduct of Defendant Silva and received a tracking number for his 

grievance. However, it appears his grievance was still pending at the time he filed his 

amended complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust is plain from the face of the 

complaint.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If he chooses to file an 

amended complaint, he should plead facts to show that he has exhausted his 

administrative remedies or that such remedies were “effectively unavailable” to him. See

Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010). 

B. Declaratory Relief

In addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, but because his claims 

for damages necessarily entail a determination whether his rights were violated, his 

separate request for declaratory relief is subsumed by those claims. Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for 

declaratory relief will be dismissed.

C. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff sues Defendant Silva in his individual and official capacities. Plaintiff 

cannot recover money damages from state officials in their official capacities. Aholelei v. 

Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Official 

capacity suits may seek only prospective relief. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 

1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief and money 

damages. As stated above, his claim for declaratory relief will be dismissed. He therefore 

may not proceed against Silva in his official capacity.

Additionally, official capacity claims must allege that a policy or custom of the 

governmental entity of which the official is an agent was the moving force behind the 

violation. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 

166 (1985). Plaintiff must establish an affirmative causal link between the policy at issue 

and the alleged constitutional violation. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 

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385, 391-92 (1989); Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff identifies no 

policy or custom associated with the violation.

Plaintiff’s official capacity claims will be dismissed.

V. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not state a cognizable claim for relief.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with one final opportunity to file an amended 

complaint that cures the noted deficiencies. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff chooses to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of 

Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Although 

accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, Plaintiff is again 

reminded that he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012), and must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint (ECF No. 8) is DISMISSED for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form 

and (2) a copy of his first amended complaint filed September 29, 2016;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

file a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or notice of voluntary 

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dismissal, the undersigned will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure 

to comply with a court order and failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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