Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01554/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01554-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Civil Remedies: Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTON EWING,

Plaintiff,

v.

PATRICK McCARTHY, an individual 

also known as FLYNN McCARTHY; 

BRYAN DAVID MINCEY; SKY 

SIREWEST; DOES 1-10; ABC 

CORPORATIONS 1-10; and XYZ LLC's 

1-10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01554-GPC-RBB 

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

[ECF Nos. 8, 16, 19]

 Before the Court are three motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendant 

McCarthy, appearing pro se, filed a motion to dismiss on August 30, 2017 (ECF No. 8), 

and Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a response on August 31, 2017 (ECF No. 14). 

Defendants Mincey and Sirewest, both also appearing pro se, filed motions to dismiss on 

September 5 and 7, 2017, respectively. (ECF Nos. 16, 19.) Pursuant to the Court’s 

order, Plaintiff filed a joint response to Mincey’s and Sirewest’s motions on October 1, 

2017. (ECF No. 21.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motions to 

dismiss. 

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I. Background 

 In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have violated California Penal 

Code §§ 632 and 637.2(a)-(b); the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 

Organization (“RICO”) statute; and the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 

(See ECF No. 1 at 36–43.) Generally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants operate a 

telephonic marketing network that advertises fraudulent loans to residents of California. 

(E.g. id. at 6–8.) Plaintiff alleges that despite his name being placed on the Federal Trade 

Commission’s Do-Not-Call registry, Defendants called and texted Plaintiff on his cellular 

phone. (Id. at 8–9.) 

 The three motions to dismiss are virtually identical. Each contains a “verified” 

statement by the corresponding defendant in which they assert the following: (1) the 

Defendants are residents of Florida; (2) during the period relevant to this case, they were 

not in California; and (3) Defendant have no business address in California.1

 (ECF Nos. 

8, 16, 19.) The complaints also each assert that “[p]roper jurisdiction and venue for this 

cause lies in the Federal courts within the State of Florida and not in California.” (Id.) 

Each is signed by the corresponding defendant and notarized by a notary public. (Id.) 

 Despite the fact that Defendants’ motions are titled “Verified Motion to Dismiss 

for Improper Venue,” they also assert that “proper jurisdiction and venue” lie in Florida. 

The Court therefore construes Defendants’ motions to seek dismissal on the grounds of 

venue and personal jurisdiction. See United States v. Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 

in U.S. Currency, 860 F.2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We have consistently held in 

this circuit that courts should liberally construe the pleadings and efforts of pro se 

litigants . . .”). 

//

 

1 The motions also assert that Plaintiff is a “convicted felon and serial litigator who has filed many 

actions similar to this cause and brings this suit in bad faith and without cause.” (ECF Nos. 8, 16, 19.) 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that such assertions are irrelevant to the question of whether this Court 

may resolve Plaintiff’s claims.

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II. Discussion 

 Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3), a defendant may 

move to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint on the respective grounds that the court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over that defendant and that the district in which the complaint has 

been filed is an improper venue. 

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

 While “the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is 

appropriate” in response to Rule 12(b)(2) motion, when there is no evidentiary hearing on 

the issue,2 “the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts”; 

“[a]ll uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are deemed true, and factual disputes 

are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.” Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., ___ 

F.3d ___, 2017 WL 4766888, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2017) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their 

jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014). 

“California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full 

extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution.” Id.; see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10. 

The Court therefore must inquire whether personal jurisdiction in this Court “comports 

with the limits imposed by federal due process.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753. 

“Constitutional due process requires that defendants have certain minimum 

contacts with a forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Morrill, 2017 WL 4766888, at *3 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Minimum contacts are shown if the defendant has 

continuous and systematic general business contacts with a forum state (general 

jurisdiction), or if the defendant has sufficient contacts arising from or related to specific 

 

2 Defendants have not requested an evidentiary hearing. 

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transactions or activities in the forum state (specific jurisdiction).” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Plaintiff does not contend that Defendants are subject to general 

jurisdiction in California; the proper analysis for the Court, therefore, is whether 

Defendants are subject to specific jurisdiction in this forum. 

To determine whether a defendant has sufficient contacts to be subject to specific 

personal jurisdiction, a three-part test is applied: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or 

perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conduct activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits 

and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of 

or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise 

of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it 

must be reasonable. 

The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the 

test. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these prongs, personal 

jurisdiction is not established in the forum state. If the plaintiff succeeds 

in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the 

defendant to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction 

would not be reasonable. 

Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has satisfied the first two prongs of 

this test, and Defendants offer no evidence that the Court exercising jurisdiction here 

would be unreasonable. 

 As to the first inquiry, the Court “generally appl[ies] the purposeful availment test 

when the underlying claims arise from a contract, and the purposeful direction test when 

they arise from alleged tortious conduct.” Id. Because there is no contract-related claim 

in this case, the purposeful direction test applies. “Purposeful direction requires that the 

defendant . . . have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum 

state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum 

state.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While “actions may be directed at the 

forum state even if they occurred elsewhere,” “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts 

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are insufficient to create the requisite connection with the forum.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 According to Plaintiff, Defendants called and texted Plaintiff to market a 

fraudulent loan while Plaintiff was in California. (ECF No. 14-1, Ewing Dec., at 2 ¶ 11.) 

Plaintiff appears to argue that because his cell phone number has a California area code, 

Defendants intended to reach someone in California by calling that number. (ECF No. 14 

at 10.) Other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have concluded that this fact is sufficient 

to establish purposeful direction. See, e.g., Ott v. Mortg. Invs. Corp. of Ohio, Inc., 65 F. 

Supp. 3d 1046, 1057 (D. Or. 2014); Rinky Dink Inc. v. Elec. Merchant Sys. Inc., No. C13-

1347-JCC, 2014 WL 5880170, at *3 (Sept. 30, 2014); Luna v. Shac, LLC, No. C13-

00607-HRL, 2014 WL 3421514, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2014). The Court agrees with 

these courts’ analyses. 

Defendants’ conduct satisfies the three elements of purposeful direction as 

described above: Defendants (1) intentionally called and texted a number with a 

California area code, (2) by doing so, expected to reach someone in California, and (3) 

assuming this conduct violated the TCPA, the injury caused by Defendants’ conduct 

occurred in California. The Court recognizes the fact that, in this day and age, many 

mobile telephone numbers may belong to someone who does not live in the area 

matching the number’s area code. But as the court in Ott explained, it is also true that 

many, and perhaps the majority, of the numbers with a particular area code belong to 

individuals who actually live in that area. 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1057. This Court also 

expresses concern that if it cannot infer intent to reach an area from the fact that an 

individual called an area code corresponding to that area, in most TCPA cases the only 

jurisdiction in which a claim can be brought will be wherever the defendant is located. 

That result is simply too unjust to accept. Without the benefit of any evidence to the 

contrary, the Court concludes that by contacting a California-based number, Defendants 

intended to reach someone in California. 

 As for the second prong of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, courts in the Ninth 

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Circuit apply a “but-for” test, which asks whether Plaintiff “would not have suffered an 

injury ‘but for’ [Defendants’] forum related conduct.” Myers v. Bennet Law Offices, 238 

F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). In this case, the answer to this inquiry is a clear yes: 

had Defendants not called and texted Plaintiff, he would not have incurred the harm for 

which he now seeks redress. 

 Because the first two inquiries in the personal jurisdiction analysis have been 

satisfied, the burden shifts to Defendants to show that jurisdiction here would be 

unreasonable. Morrill, 2017 WL 4766888, at *4. Defendants offer no evidence 

suggesting that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable, other than their assertions 

that they are residents of Florida and were not in California at the relevant period. They 

offer no evidence, for example, that their personal circumstances would make it very 

difficult for them to litigate this case in California. As a result, Defendants have failed to 

satisfy their burden. 

In sum, the Court concludes that it possesses personal jurisdiction over the 

Defendants. The Defendants purposefully directed intentional acts into this forum 

(which—according to the complaint—have caused the Plaintiff harm), and have not 

identified any reason to conclude that exercising jurisdiction here is unreasonable. 

B. Venue 

 Rule 12(b)(3) authorizes “dismissal only when venue is ‘wrong’ or ‘improper’” as 

determined generally by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 

134 S. Ct. 568, 576 (2013). “When venue is challenged, the court must determine 

whether the case falls within one of the three categories set out in § 1391(b).” Id. The 

Court finds that this district is a proper venue for this case. The case falls within 

§ 1391(b)(2), which states that “[a] civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in 

which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 

 According to Plaintiff, this court is a proper venue for this action because 

Defendants “purposefully directed [their] activities into California by calling Plaintiff at 

telephone area code 619, which i[s] entirely within California.” (ECF No. 14 at 3.) 

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Because Defendants have not submitted replies to Plaintiff’s oppositions to the motions 

to dismiss, the only relevant assertion from Defendants are their statements that they are 

residents of Florida and were not in California at the relevant time. 

 Based on the evidence before it, the Court concludes that this Court is a proper 

venue for this case. The events giving rise to the claim—Defendants’ calls and texts to 

Plaintiff—occurred in this district.3 See Sapan v. Dyanmic Network Factory, Inc., No. 

13-cv-1966-MMA-WVG, 2013 WL 12094829, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (finding 

the district where Plaintiff received the phone call to be a proper venue in a TCPA case); 

cf. Blair v. CBE Group Inc., No. 13-cv-134-MMA-WVG, 2013 WL 2029155, at *2 (S.D. 

Cal. May 13, 2013) (finding the opposite because the relevant calls were neither placed 

nor received in the Southern District of California).

 The Court concludes the venue in this district is proper. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 8, 16, 19) 

are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 25, 2017

 

3 While Plaintiff does not state explicitly that he was in this district when he received Defendants’ calls 

and texts, it is reasonable to infer—in the absence of any evidence to the contrary—that he was within 

this district at that time because he resides in San Diego (see, e.g. ECF No. 21-1 (listing Plaintiff’s 

address as within San Diego)). See Sapan v. Dyanmic Network Factory, Inc., No. 13-cv-1966-MMAWVG, 2013 WL 12094829, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (when resolving a motion to dismiss for 

improper venue, “the court must draw all reasonable inference and resolve all factual conflicts in favor 

of the non-moving party”). 

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