Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00087/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00087-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONOVAN PHIPPS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0087 WBS EFB P

vs.

MIKE EVANS, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner without counsel seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254. This action proceeds on the January 16, 2007, petition. Respondent moves to

dismiss upon the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust available state remedies. In response,

petitioner has moved to stay the proceedings and hold his petition in abeyance pending his

exhaustion of state court remedies. 

I. Procedural History 

A jury found petitioner guilty of second-degree murder (Cal. Pen. Code § 187(a)),

leaving the scene of an accident (Cal. Veh. Code § 20001(a)), and misdemeanor resisting a peace

officer (Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1)). Petitioner admitted that he had suffered a prior strike. 

(Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667, 1170.12.) The trial court sentenced him to a term of 30 years to life in

state prison. Resp.’s Mot. to Dism., Docs. Lodged in Supp. Thereof (“Lod. Doc.”) 1.

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1

 A wholly unexhausted petition is one in which petitioner has not exhausted any of the

claims raised. 

2

Petitioner appealed his conviction. On December 30, 2005, the California Court of

Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed petitioner’s conviction. Lod. Doc. 1. Petitioner filed

a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. Lod. Doc. 2. On March 15, 2006, the

petition was denied. Lod. Doc. 3. Petitioner has filed no other collateral actions in the

California state courts. 

II. Discussion 

Respondent argues that petitioner has failed to exhaust any of the claims raised in his

federal petition. In response, petitioner states that he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

Butte County Superior Court on September 21, 2007, which was denied on September 26, 2007. 

He also states that he intends to pursue his claims for relief in the Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court. He therefore requests the court stay the proceedings and hold his

petition in abeyance until his state remedies are exhausted. 

Respondent opposes a stay and abeyance, arguing that it is not available to a petitioner

who has filed a wholly unexhausted petition.1

 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991);

Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481

(9th Cir. 2001).

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir.1988).

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court.

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2

 AEDPA refers to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

3

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.1996).

A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear

a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim’s factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1 (1992) (factual basis).

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a district court has

discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present his unexhausted claims to the

state court in the first instance and then to return to federal court for review of his perfected

petition.

Nevertheless, stay and abeyance is available only in limited circumstances, because the

procedure frustrates the AEDPA’s2 objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to

delay the resolution of federal proceedings and undermines AEDPA’s goal of streamlining

federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his claims in

state court prior to filing his federal petition. Id. at 1535. The Supreme Court held that a stay

and abeyance is “only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for

the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id.

Petitioner has not argued that “good cause” exists here, although he represents that he

filed a state habeas corpus petition in the Butte County Superior Court on September 21, 2007. 

That petition was denied five days later. Petitioner does not represent that he has filed habeas

petitions in the California appellate or supreme courts in the intervening year, nor does he

provide the court with an explanation for his delay in seeking habeas relief in state court. 

Respondent states, however, that he will not contest good cause should the court find that a stay

and abeyance is available. The court does not find that it is.

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4

Unlike the petitioner in Rhines, the petitioner here has presented a completely

unexhausted petition, rather than a mixed petition. Thus, the petition before this court cannot

constitute a “protective” petition as discussed in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)

(citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278.) As discussed in Pace, the protective stays referred to in Rhines

involved a “mixed” petition, meaning that the petition included both exhausted and unexhausted

claims. The filing of the federal petition protects the petitioner’s ability to, ultimately, timely

seek relief on the exhausted claims and the claims yet to be exhausted in the state system. The

Court in Pace discussed the merits of granting a stay to allow petitioner to return to state court to

exhaust those claims that remained unexhausted rather than denying without prejudice a petition

that included exhausted claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. at 416. The basis of that Court’s ruling was premised on the fact that the petition was

“mixed,” not completely unexhausted.

Here, the court is not presented with a “mixed” petition. Petitioner has not exhausted any

of the claims now raised in this petition and the court has no jurisdiction. Accordingly, the stay

and abeyance procedure is unavailable. 

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s October 30, 2007, motion to dismiss be granted;

2. Petitioner’s October 15, 2007, motion to stay be denied; and

3. The Clerk be directed to close the case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

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within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 25, 2008.

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