Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00156/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981cv Civil Rights

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JAMES JOSEPH CAPERS, Case No.: 3:17-cv-00156-BEN-NLS

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER:

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(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED INFORMA PAUPERIS;

14 UNITED STATES JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT, 15

Defendant. (2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; 16

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(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 18

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On January 26, 2017, PlaintiffJanies Joseph Capers filed a civil Complaint, a

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), and a Motion for Appointment of

Counsel. (Docket Nos. 1-3.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Proceed IFP is

GRANTED, the Motion for Appointment ofCounsel is DENIED, and the Complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice.

Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action in a district court must pay a filing fee. 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to prepay the entire

fee only ifthe plaintiffis granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),

any court ofthe United States may authorize the

commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or

proceeding . .. without prepayment offees or security therefor,

by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement

of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to

pay such fees or give security therefor.

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Plaintiffindicated that she is homeless, unemployed and receives no income other

than food stamps in the amount of $198.00 per month. (Docket No. 2 at 1-2, 8.) Thus,

Plaintiffhas sufficiently stated that she cannot afford to pay the filing fee. (Docket No. 2

at 111.) Accordingly, the Motion to File IFP is GRANTED.

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff has moved for the appointment of counsel, on the sole grounds that she

does not have the money to pay an attorney. (Docket No. 3.)

Courts have discretion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (1996), to appoint

counsel for indigent civil litigants upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. “A

finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of

success on the merits and the ability ofthe petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in

light ofthe complexity ofthe legal issues involved.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,

1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). “Neither ofthese factors is dispositive

and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (internal citations

omitted).

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At i this time, the Court cannot say there is any likelihood ofsuccess on the merits.

Moreover, Plaintifffails to demonstrate an inability to represent herself beyond the

ordinary burdens encountered by plaintiffs representing themselvespro se, or that she has

even attempted to obtain counsel to represent him. See Garcia v. Smith, No. 10-cv-l 187,

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As will be described in further detail below, Plaintiffs Complaint does not contain

sufficient facts to state a claim for relief.

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2012 WL 2499003, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (“Merely alleging indigence is

insufficient to entitle him to appointed counsel; he must also demonstrate that he made a

good faith effort, but was unable, to obtain counsel”). Therefore, the Court finds that the

exceptional circumstances required for the appointment of counsel are not present.

Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED.

Section 1915 Screening

A. Legal Standard

Under section 1915(e) oftitle 28 ofthe United States Code, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious,

fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)). “[T]he provisions ofsection 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

are not required, but “[tjhreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679; see Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that section 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language ofFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility ofmisconduct” falls short ofmeeting this

plausibility standard. Id.’, see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009).

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While a plaintiffs factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doelv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler,

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents ofthe Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Discussion

Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which

reliefmay be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). In the Complaint, Plaintiff “accuses the

United States Government Administration” ofthe following actions:

Sexual Assault, Verbal Harassment, Bulling [sic], interstate

Slaking [sic], discrimination and prejudice to Transgender

Violations ofCivil Rights [sic], undercover operations,

unwarranted phone taps, video and personal surveillance. This

also includes Religious Persecution an direct attacks [sic]

regarding beliefs and practices. Lastly, blocking and stopping

open Business Services and communications, refusal to provide

US Pass Port [sic] with proper documentation as required by

Federal Regulations ...

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(Docket No. 1 at 2.) The remainder ofthe 4-page Complaint consists ofnonsensical and

seemingly irrelevant assertions regarding Plaintiffs “creations and inventions,”

groundless accusations ofmisconduct by “the government,” and vague conclusions that

“the government” discriminated against him for being transgender. (Id. at 2-5.)

Even construing the documents liberally, the Court finds Plaintiffhas failed to state

any claim for relief as the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to support any of

the asserted claims.

In short, Plaintiffs Complaint falls well below the requirement to include “a short

and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED. However, the Court grants

Plaintiffleave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies noted above.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion for

Appointment ofCounsel is DENIED. The Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice for failing to state a claim. Plaintiffis granted thirty (30) days from the date

ofthis Order to file a first amended complaint (“FAC”) that cures the deficiencies

identified in this Order. IfPlaintiff does not file an FAC, this action shall remain closed

without further order ofthe Court.

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10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: February 2017

"TBENITEfe

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HON.

13 United States District Judge

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