Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02578/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02578-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christopher Todd Olson, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-02578-PHX-SMM (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Christopher Todd Olson (Petitioner) has filed a timely Amended Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus raising five grounds for relief. (Doc. 5.) Respondents have filed an 

Answer asserting that four of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred 

from federal habeas corpus review, and that the fifth claim, while not procedurally 

barred, lacks merit. (Doc. 16.) Petitioner has filed a reply arguing that his procedural 

default should be excused and that he should prevail on the merits of his claims. 

(Doc. 19.) For the reasons below, the Petition should be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 In August 2009, the State of Arizona (the State) charged Petitioner with one count 

of aggravated assault, a class two dangerous felony. (Doc. 16, Ex. A.) The charge arose 

from an incident at a convenience store on June 27, 2009. (Doc. 16, Ex. H.) On that 

date, Phoenix Police Officer Alfonso Flores (Officer Flores) responded to domestic 

violence incident at the convenience store. (Id. at 2-3.) Upon Officer Flores’ arrival, loss 

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prevention officers at the store advised him that Petitioner had shoplifted from the store. 

(Id. at 3.) Officer Flores approached Petitioner’s car and directed him to stop. Petitioner 

drove toward Officer Flores, and he was forced to jump out of the way. (Doc. 16, Ex. H 

at 3.) Officer Flores later realized he had been struck by the car when he noticed a 

“stinging” in his left hand that continued to hurt “even the day after” the incident. (Id.) 

 On April 7, 2010, a jury in the Maricopa County Superior Court (trial court) found 

Petitioner guilty of aggravated assault and found that the offense was a dangerous 

offense. (Doc. 16, Ex. W at 3-4.) At his sentencing hearing, Petitioner admitted that he 

had been convicted of four prior felonies. These convictions were for theft, a class five 

felony, on September 3, 1985, two burglaries in the third degree, class four felonies, on 

November 15, 1990 and March 6, 1991, and forgery, a class four felony, on October 1, 

2002. (Doc. 16, Exs. D, Z at 13-14.) The trial court found that Petitioner had “two 

allegeable prior felony convictions” and sentenced him to the presumptive term of 15.75 

years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 16, Exs. D at 1-2, X at 3-14.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on May 17, 2010. (Doc. 16, Ex. E.) In 

his opening brief, Petitioner argued that the trial court violated his Due Process and 

Confrontation Clause rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by 

denying a continuance of trial based on Petitioner’s illness during the trial. (Doc. 16, 

Ex. F at 7-11.) On June 23, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

conviction and sentence. (Doc. 16, Ex. H.) Petitioner did not file a petition for review in 

the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 16, Ex. Q.) 

C. Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On August 4, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 16, Ex. I.) On July 16, 2012, 

counsel filed a notice of review stating that she was “unable to find a tenable issue to 

submit” on post-conviction review. (Doc. 16, Ex. L.) On July 3, 2012, the trial court 

granted Petitioner leave to file a pro per petition. (Doc. 16, Ex. M.) On August 15, 2012, 

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Petitioner filed a petition asserting that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing 

to argue that the victim/police officer “perjured himself” at trial, and that the trial court 

“used priors over 10 years old” at sentencing. (Doc. 16, Ex. N.) The trial court denied 

post-conviction relief on November 15, 2012. (Doc. 16, Ex. O.) 

 In denying post-conviction relief, the trial court concluded that Petitioner’s first 

claim, in which he asserted ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, “essentially 

relate[d] to the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial based on [Petitioner’s] belief 

that a witness’ trial testimony differs from the other evidence presented at trial.” 

(Doc. 16, Ex. O at 2.) The trial court noted that “[t]here is nothing other than 

Defendant’s belief that a witness was untruthful and that there was not sufficient 

evidence for the jury to find Defendant guilty,” and that “Defendant’s belief is merely 

speculation.” (Id. at 3.) The trial court further found that “sufficiency of the evidence is 

an issue for appeal, not a petition pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.” (Id.) Thus, 

the court found that Petitioner’s first claim was “precluded from relief” under Rule 32 

because the issue “was not raised on appeal and [w]as not properly raised” on postconviction review. (Id.) 

 In considering Petitioner’s second claim that he was sentenced on the basis of a 

prior felony conviction that was over ten years old, the trial court first found that Plaintiff 

had admitted that he had four prior felony convictions and, therefore, under Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-105(22)(d) his prior convictions were properly considered at sentencing. 

(Doc. 16, Ex. O at 3.) The court further found that Petitioner should have raised the 

sentencing issue on appeal, not on post-conviction review, and therefore that claim was 

precluded from relief under Rule 32. (Id.) The trial court concluded that Petitioner failed 

to raise a colorable claim warranting an evidentiary hearing, and denied post-conviction 

relief. Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 16, Ex. P.) 

D. Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 In his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 5), Petitioner raises the 

following five claims asserting that: (1) he is innocent and his conviction violates the 

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Sixth Amendment because a “DVD video of the whole scene . . . prove[s] his innocence”; 

(2) Officer Flores committed perjury in violation of Petitioner’s Fourth and Sixth 

Amendment rights; (3) counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 

(4) Petitioner’s sentence is excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment because his 

sentence of “15.75 years does not fit” for his conviction; and (5) Petitioner’s Fourth, 

Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the trial court “had trial without 

[him] while [he] was sick.” (Doc. 5 at 6-11.) 

 Respondents assert that Grounds One through Four are procedurally defaulted and 

barred from habeas corpus review and that Ground Five lacks merit. (Doc. 16 at 2.) 

Petitioner opposes Respondents’ arguments. (Doc. 19.) As discussed below, the Petition 

should be denied. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

A. Limits on Federal Court Review 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 “A claim has been “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described both the 

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Baldwin, 541 

U.S. at 33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court 

must read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal 

claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” 

Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for 

purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the 

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proper forum, . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731 32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

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536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

B. Procedural Bar Applied to Grounds One through Four 

 1. Grounds One and Two 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that a “DVD video of the whole scene” shows 

that he is innocent. (Doc. 5 at 6.) In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that Officer Flores 

perjured himself during trial. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner did not present these claims on direct 

appeal. Rather, he presented them to the trial court on post-conviction review. (Doc. 16, 

Ex. N.) The trial court construed Petitioner’s claim raised in Ground One as a sufficiency 

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of the evidence claim, and found that Rule 32.2 precluded review of the claims raised in 

Grounds One and Two because they should have been raised on direct appeal. (Doc. 16, 

Ex. O); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (stating that a claim that could have been raised on 

direct appeal is precluded from relief under Rule 32). Petitioner did not seek review of 

the trial court’s ruling in the appellate court. (Doc. 16, Ex. P.) 

 Because Petitioner did not present these claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

he did not properly exhaust these claims. See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998 n.3. It would be 

futile for Petitioner to return to state court to exhaust these claims because the deadline 

for filing a petition for review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief has 

expired. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (a petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days after the final decision of the trial court). 

 Additionally, although Petitioner presented these claims to the trial court on postconviction review, these claims are nonetheless barred from federal habeas review 

because the state court applied an adequate and independent procedural bar to deny 

review. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (federal court is barred from 

considering a claim that state court denied on an adequate state-law ground independent 

of the merits of the federal claim); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (holding that 

Rule 32.2 is an adequate and independent procedural bar). 

 2. Grounds Three and Four 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that trial counsel Sonia Martinez (Nayeri)1

provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment because 

she “let the court[] have jury trial without [him when Petitioner] tried to get a day off 

because [he] was sick,” did not get a plea bargain for Petitioner, and “let the court[] use 

priors over 10 years old” at sentencing. (Doc. 5 at 9.) Petitioner also asserts that his 

initial post-conviction attorney, Pamela Eaton, “wasted a year of [his] time.” (Id.) Eaton 

was appointed as post-conviction counsel in September 2011. (Doc. 16, Ex. J.) The trial 

 

1

 At the time of Petitioner’s trial, his counsel went by the last name Nayeri. (Doc. 16, Exs. B-D.) She later went by the last name Martinez. (Id., Ex. E.) 

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court later removed her and appointed Janelle MacEachern to represent Petitioner. 

(Doc. 16, Ex. K.) 

 Petitioner did not raise these claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and 

post-conviction counsel in any state court. Although he made some allegations that postconviction counsel MacEachern was “lazy” (Doc. 16, Ex. N, Doc. 16-1 at 118), he did 

not argue that trial counsel Martinez, or his initial post-conviction attorney Eaton, were 

ineffective on the grounds that he now asserts in his Amended Petition.2

 Even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s allegation that post-conviction 

counsel MacEachern was “lazy” as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim 

is not the same as the ineffective assistance of counsel claims that he now asserts in 

Ground Three of the Amended Petition. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 

highly fact-dependent. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, 

a petitioner’s assertion in state court that he received ineffective assistance does not 

satisfy the fair presentation requirement unless the petitioner alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel on the same grounds in his federal habeas petition. See Moorman v. 

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that the petitioner “did not present 

these claims of ineffective assistance in state court, and we cannot address them on 

habeas review”). Because Petitioner did not present the same claims of ineffective 

assistance in state court that he asserts in Ground Three, he did not properly exhaust those 

claims. 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner claims that his sentence is excessive and thus violates 

the Eighth Amendment because it “does not fit” his conviction because “no one got hit or 

hurt” and “murderers get 10 to 20 years.” (Doc. 5 at 9.) Petitioner did not raise this 

 

2

 Moreover, even if Petitioner’s claim that post-conviction counsel Eaton was ineffective was properly exhausted and could provide a basis for § 2254 relief, he would not be entitle to relief based on his allegation that Eaton “wasted a year of [his] time.” Petitioner’s unsupported, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for federal habeas relief. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that conclusory allegations with no reference to the record or other evidence do not 

warrant habeas relief). Even if Eaton wasted time, Petitioner has not shown that he was 

prejudiced because the trial court appointed Petitioner new post-conviction counsel, and Petitioner ultimately filed a pro per petition asserting his claims for review. 

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claim on direct appeal or on post-conviction review. Thus, he did not properly exhaust 

this claim. Under Arizona’s procedural rules, it would be futile for Petitioner to return to 

the state courts to present his claims asserted in Grounds Three and Four. See 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) (claims that could have been previously raised on direct appeal 

or previous PCR proceeding are precluded); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (notice of PCR 

must be filed within ninety days after conviction for a pleading defendant and thirty days 

in all other cases). Because no state remedies are currently available, the claims asserted 

in Grounds Three and Four are technically exhausted, but procedurally defaulted. See 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 838, 848 (1999) (when habeas petitioner was timebarred from presenting his claims in state court, claims were procedurally defaulted); 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (when a prisoner has failed to exhaust state remedies and is 

barred by procedural rules from raising the claim, “there is a procedural default for 

purposes of federal habeas” review); Teague, 489 U.S. at 297–99 (claim procedurally 

defaulted when it “is clear that collateral relief would be unavailable to [the] petitioner” if 

he returned to the state courts). 

 Thus, Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four are 

procedurally defaulted and barred from habeas corpus review unless Petitioner can show 

“cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to overcome the 

procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50; Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-98. As 

discussed in Section II(C)(1)(a)-(c), Petitioner has not provided a basis to overcome the 

procedural bar. 

C. Cause and Prejudice 

 To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor 

external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. 

Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally 

ineffective assistance of counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available” may constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 

(1986). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

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Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 1. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel 

 To establish “cause” to overcome the procedural bar of his claims, Petitioner 

argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on post-conviction review. 

(Doc. 19 at 5-7.) Petitioner relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 

___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), which held that the ineffective assistance of 

post-conviction counsel, while not stating a constitutional claim itself, can be a sufficient 

equitable reason, or a “cause,” to excuse defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel when a post-conviction proceeding represents the first opportunity under state 

law for a petitioner to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

 Thus, under Martinez, the procedural default may be excused if there is “cause” 

for the default. The Court in Martinez established a four-part test to determine whether 

the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel will excuse the procedural default of 

a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. “Cause” is established under Martinez

when: 

(1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was a 

“substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being 

“no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review 

proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and 

(4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel [claim] . . . be raised in an initial-review collateral 

review proceeding. 

Trevino v. Thaler, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (alterations in original). 

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 Because Martinez applies only to defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims, it is potentially applicable only to Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel asserted in Ground Three. See Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 

1296 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “the Martinez standard for cause applies to all Sixth 

Amendment ineffective-assistance claims, both to trial and appellate, that have been 

procedurally defaulted by ineffective counsel in the initial-review state-court collateral 

proceeding.”). As discussed below, Petitioner has not established cause under Martinez. 

 2. Martinez Analysis of Ground Three 

 Under the Martinez test, Petitioner must first show a “substantial” underlying 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. A “substantial” claim is a claim that “has 

some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Similar to the standard for issuing a 

certificate of appealability, “substantially” requires the petitioner to demonstrate that 

“reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotations omitted). 

 Whether Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance are analyzed on the merits, or 

for substantiality under the first prong of Martinez, the result is the same: Petitioner’s 

claims have no substantial merit. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, Petitioner must (1) show that counsel’s performance fell below objective 

standards of reasonableness and was “outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance,” and (2) establish that counsel’s performance prejudiced him by creating “a 

reasonable probability that absent the errors the fact finder would have had a reasonable 

doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984). 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for “let[ting]” 

the court proceed with the jury trial in Petitioner’s absence. As discussed below in 

Section III(B), the trial court did not err in continuing trial when Petitioner absented 

himself due to an illness. Accordingly, any objection to the court’s decision to proceed in 

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Petitioner’s absence would have been futile. Failure to take futile action does not 

constitute deficient performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless 

legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United 

States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, Petitioner does not have a 

substantial claim that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged error in failing to 

object to the trial proceeding in his absence, and Martinez does not excuse his default of 

that ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

 Petitioner also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a plea 

bargain. The negotiation of a plea bargain is “‘a critical phase of litigation for purposes 

of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Missouri v. Frye, ___ 

U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___ 356, 

___, (2010)). If counsel has misadvised a defendant about the law during a plea 

negotiation, or improperly coerced a defendant to accept a plea bargain, counsel’s 

performance may be found deficient. See Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1384 (2012) (counsel’s erroneous legal advice about possibility of conviction that 

led to rejection of plea offer constituted deficient performance). Additionally, “[i]f a plea 

bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in 

considering whether to accept it.” Id. at 1387. 

 To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel “where a plea offer has 

lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient performance, [a petitioner] must 

demonstrate a reasonable probability” that (1) he “would have accepted the earlier plea 

offer,” and (2) “the plea would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or 

the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion 

under state law.” Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. Here, while Petitioner argues that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a plea bargain, he does not allege that a plea 

was offered, that counsel failed to communicate a plea offer, or that counsel gave him 

erroneous advice about any particular plea offer. (Doc. 5 at 9.) Petitioner’s “conclusory 

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suggestions that his trial . . . counsel provided ineffective assistance fall far short of 

stating a valid claim of constitutional violation.” See Jones, 66 F.3d at 205. 

 Finally, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

the court’s use of prior convictions that were over ten years old. As the post-conviction 

court found, Petitioner admitted that he had four prior felony convictions at the time of 

sentencing. (Doc. 16, Ex. X at 3-14.) Thus, he was sentenced under 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-105(22)(d), which defines “historical prior felony conviction” to 

include “[a]ny felony conviction that is a third or more prior felony conviction,” without 

regard to the date of those convictions. 

 Because Petitioner had four prior felony convictions, the trial court correctly 

assessed Petitioner with two historical prior felonies. See State v. Provenzino, 212 P.3d 

56, 58 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that the definition of a historical prior felony 

conviction includes any felony conviction that is a third or more prior felony conviction). 

Thus, the trial court properly considered Petitioner’s third and fourth prior convictions, 

even though they otherwise would have been too old to be considered as prior historical 

felonies under other subsections of the statute. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-105(22)(b) and 

(c). Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Petitioner’s sentence on 

that basis and Petitioner has not presented a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

 Accordingly, the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not excuse 

Petitioner’s procedural default of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Because Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Ground Three do not 

satisfy the first prong of the Martinez test, the Court does not address the remaining 

prongs of the test. 

 3. Other Grounds for Cause 

 Petitioner also argues “cause” based on his lack of legal knowledge and his limited 

access to legal materials as an inmate. (Doc. 19 at 8.) Petitioner’s lack of legal 

knowledge, status as an inmate, and limited legal resources do not constitute cause to 

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excuse the procedural bar. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to 

cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 

1988) (petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse 

lawyers did not constitute cause). 

 Petitioner further argues that his “legal materials” were “lost or confiscated by 

property room staff,” and that he submitted a “petition for review form” to Arizona 

Department of Corrections (ADC) staff for copying but it “was never returned.” (Doc. 17 

at 8, 15.) Petitioner, however, does not identify what legal materials were allegedly lost 

or confiscated, when they were lost or confiscated, or identify how he was prevented 

from asserting claims because of the alleged loss of his legal materials. Thus, Petitioner 

has not met his burden of showing that the loss of his legal materials was the cause of his 

failure to properly exhaust his claims in the state court. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 

978 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that to overcome procedural default based on claim of 

limited access to legal materials, a petitioner must provide “specificity regarding the 

alleged lack of access and the steps he took to diligently pursue his claims.”). 

 Additionally, even assuming that Petitioner did not receive the requested copies of 

his petition for review from ADC staff, Petitioner does not indicate that he inquired about 

the status of those copies or otherwise followed-up regarding the copies of his petition for 

review. See Miller, 141 F.3d at 879. Again, Petitioner has not met his burden of showing 

that the ADC’s failure to provide him with copies of his petition for review “impeded his 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rules.” See Teague, 489 U.S. at 298; Banes 

v. Schriro, 2008 WL 2668943, at *17 (D. Ariz. Jul. 1, 2008) (concluding that petitioner’s 

lack of legal education, lack of legal assistance, and intermittent lack of access to legal 

papers did not constitute cause to excuse procedural default.) 

 Because Petitioner offers no legitimate “cause” that precluded him from properly 

exhausting his state remedies, the Court need not consider whether he suffered any 

prejudice. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 

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527, 533 (1986) (when petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the 

court need not consider whether he has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

violation). 

D. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

 Liberally construing the Amended Petition, Petitioner argues that if the Court 

applies the procedural bar and does not reach the merits of his claim there would be a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” (Doc. 5 at 6.) To establish a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new reliable evidence — whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The petitioner bears 

the burden of demonstrating that “in light of all the evidence, including evidence not 

introduced at trial, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found 

[him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 327; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 

518, 539 (2006). 

 Petitioner has not presented new reliable evidence that satisfies this standard. 

Petitioner argues that a “DVD video” of the incident establishes that he did not hit 

Officer Flores and, therefore, he is innocent. (Id.) He further contends that Officer 

Flores “lied.” (Id.) The DVD is not “new” evidence because it was available at trial and 

was shown to the jury. (Doc. 16, Ex. U at 11-14; Ex. C.) Plaintiff’s allegation that 

Officer Flores lied is also not new evidence. A habeas proceeding is not a proper forum 

in which to re-litigate a case that has already been tried. “When confronted with a 

challenge based on trial evidence, courts presume the jury resolved evidentiary disputes 

reasonably so long as sufficient evidence supports the verdict.” House, 547 U.S. at 539. 

A persuasive claim of actual innocence must be based on new evidence that was not 

presented to the jury, and that is so compelling that the reviewing court concludes that it 

is probable that no rational juror would vote to convict the defendant. See id. at 538-39. 

Petitioner has not offered that type of evidence and therefore has not established that the 

miscarriage of justice exception applies in this case. 

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III. Ground Five – Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Claim 

 Respondents concede that that Petitioner properly exhausted his claim in Ground 

Five. (Doc. 16 at 13.) Accordingly, the Court considers the merits of Petitioner’s claim 

that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by conducting trial in his 

absence. 

A. Standard of Review 

 If the petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits on State court 

proceedings,” § 2254(d) limits the federal court’s review. Section 2254(d)(1) provides 

that a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the 

state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings 

of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v.

Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable 

application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts” considering the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This 

standard is “difficult to meet.” Id. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

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 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 

664 (2004)). “[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires 

considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.” Id. 

B. Petitioner’s Rights Under the Confrontation Clause 

 The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause was made applicable to the states 

through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Melendez Diaz v. 

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 (2009) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 

(1965)). The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant from unreliable hearsay evidence 

being presented against him during trial. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The Confrontation 

Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 

to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Id. The Confrontation Clause 

“provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right to physically face 

those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.” Pennsylvania 

v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987). “One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the 

Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage 

of trial.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 

U.S. 370 (1892)). 

 This right, however, is not absolute. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant 

may lose his right to personally confront witnesses “by consent or at times even by 

misconduct.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 290 U.S. 97, 106 (1934). A defendant can 

constitutionally waive his presence. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) 

(upholding the constitutionality of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43, which provides that a defendant’s 

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voluntary absence will not prevent trial from proceeding); Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 (holding 

that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial by engaging in disruptive behavior 

in the courtroom). “[A] voluntary absence constitutes an effective waiver of the right to 

be present at trial.” United States v. Bass, 40 M.J. 220, 222 (Ct. Military App. 1994) 

(citing United States v. Crosby, 506 U.S. 255, 258-62 (1993)). In Crosby, the Supreme 

Court held that an effective waiver of the right to be present at trial, one that is knowing 

and voluntary, is made when the defendant is intentionally absent once trial has begun. 

506 U.S. at 260-61. 

 Here, on post-conviction review, the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that a 

defendant “may voluntarily relinquish the right to attend trial,” and that “the finding of 

voluntary absence, and, therefore, the existence of a waiver of the right to be present, is 

basically a question of fact.” (Doc. 16, Ex. H at 6.) In concluding that Petitioner “failed 

to meet his burden of proving that his absence was involuntary,” the court explained that: 

Although [Petitioner] informed the trial court that he was 

feeling ill and stated he had a temperature of 103 degrees, he did not substantiate this claim with any evidence. Nor did [Petitioner] or his attorney assert that he was unable to 

participate in the proceedings or otherwise assist his attorney. Even though the record supports an inference that [his] 

appearance or demeanor suggested that his health was 

impaired (otherwise, the court would not have ordered him to 

submit to a drug test), we will not presume from this sparse record that any illness from which he may have been suffering was so substantial that he was compelled to forego his right to be present. We further note that [Petitioner’s] 

attorney did not join in [his] request for a continuance, and 

neither [Petitioner] nor his counsel objected to the trial proceeding in his absence. Finally, [Petitioner] never subsequently requested a hearing to determine whether his temporary absence from trial was involuntary. 

(Id. at 7.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ adjudication of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment 

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law. Consistent with the governing federal law, the court held that Petitioner voluntarily 

absented himself from trial, and that by doing so, he effectively waived his Sixth 

Amendment right to be present. The court’s decision was also based on a reasonable 

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determination of the facts. The record reflects that neither Petitioner nor his attorney 

objected to the trial proceeding in his absence. (Doc. 16, Ex. S at 4–6.) Moreover, when 

the trial court asked Petitioner if he “want[ed] to go home for today and allow the trial to 

go on in [his] absence,” he replied, “Yes ma’am.” (Id. at 6–7.) Petitioner explained that 

he would “like to go home” to “get better” and to avoid “spread[ing] a cold around 

because it’s pressure, it’s a head and chest thing.” (Id. at 5.) Later that afternoon, the 

trial court specifically found that Petitioner’s absence was voluntary. (Id. at 64–65.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals reasonably applied the law to these facts in holding that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s request for a continuance 

and finding that Petitioner voluntarily waived his right to be present. 

 Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not shown that the Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ rejection of his claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application” of federal law established by the Supreme Court, or that the decision “was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

IV. Conclusion 

 Because Grounds One through Four of the Amended Petition are procedurally 

barred, and Ground Five fails on the merits, the Amended Petition should be denied and 

dismissed. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 5) be DENIED and DISMISSED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of 

Grounds One, Two, Three and Four of the Amended Petition is justified by a plain 

procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable, and 

because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right in Ground Five. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 1st day of April, 2014. 

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