Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01313/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01313-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA GRIGGS, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

WAYNE STRUMPFER, acting )

California Corporations )

Commissioner, )

 )

Defendant. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-05-1313 REC SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO RULE 12(b)(6) AND

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE

A THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT.

(Doc. 25)

On Monday, May 15, 2006, the Court heard Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim

on which Relief Can Be Granted (the “Motion”). Upon due

consideration of the written and oral arguments of the parties,

the Court GRANTS the Motion, as set forth herein. 

I. The Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) alleges as

follows. Plaintiff Brenda Griggs was married to Brian Griggs.

On August 20, 2001, they purchased a parcel of real property at

1136 West Bullard Avenue, Fresno, California (the “Property”),

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

for $141,300 and held it as community property.

Eventually, Plaintiff and Mr. Griggs faced marital problems

and physically separated. On October 27, 2001, they entered into

a property settlement whereby Mr. Griggs transferred his share of

the Property to Plaintiff. 

At some point, Mr. Griggs agreed to pay restitution of

$500,000 to the California Department of Corporations (“CDC”) 

based on certain alleged misconduct which did not involve

Plaintiff. On November 18, 2001, CDC recorded an Abstract of

Judgment with the Fresno County Recorder. After the Abstract of

Judgment was recorded, the Property became subject to a $500,000

administrative lien. 

On May 31, 2005, Plaintiff sent a written request to the CDC

requesting notice and an opportunity for a hearing challenging

the validity and enforceability of the lien. See SAC Ex. D. On

June 10, 2005, Defendant Wayne Strumpfer, Acting California

Corporations Commissioner (“Defendant”), sent Plaintiff a letter

denying her request for notice and a hearing.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2

L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint

against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” N. Star Int’l v.

Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). The Court

need not, however, “accept legal conclusions cast in the form of

factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be

drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network,

18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

Court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979). 

The Court may consider the complaint itself along with any

material properly considered as part of the complaint. 

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542,

1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1989). Where the complaint fails to state a

claim on which relief can be granted, leave to amend “shall be

freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment bars a claim for damages against a

state in federal court. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167,

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985). A suit against a state

official in his official capacity is “no different from a suit

against the state itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989). The

Supreme Court recognized an exception to this rule in Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908). The

doctrine of Ex parte Young provides that the Eleventh Amendment

does not bar “federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state

official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief

in order to ‘end a continuing violation of federal law.’” 

Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134

L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996)).

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in this action,

specifically “release of the lien.” SAC 7:17. Plaintiff is

essentially alleging that Defendant, a state official sued in his

official capacity, is violating her Due Process rights by

continuing to hold the lien against her. Provided she states a

claim for a constitutional violation entitling her to injunctive

relief, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such claims. Her

claims for money damages, however, cannot not fall within the Ex

parte Young exception. Amending her complaint cannot resuscitate

any claim for money damages against a state official sued in his

official capacity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for money

damages are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

C. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff seeks relief based on 28 U.S.C. section 1983

(“Section 1983”) for alleged violations of her constitutional

rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the

United States Constitution. Defendant contends that Plaintiff

fails to state a claim for deprivation of any constitutional

right. 

1. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s refusal to give Plaintiff

notice of its judgment lien and to grant her a hearing violates

her due process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the

deprivation of property without procedural due process. Koepping

v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 120 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir.

1997); see generally Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct.

1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978). 

The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part

analysis for due process challenges to state deprivation of

property rights. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92

S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). The first

inquiry is whether the statute results in the deprivation of a

“significant” property interest. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86. If

the interests affected are “significant,” then the court must

examine what process is due under the particular circumstances. 

“[E]ven the temporary or partial impairments to property rights

that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

sufficient to merit due process protection.” Connecticut v.

Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1991). 

In considering what process is due, the court is guided by

the three-factor balancing test articulated in Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).

The Mathews Court held that in determining the sufficiency of the

process provided by the state, the court should consider:

first, the private interest that will be

affected by the official action; second, the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the

probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute safeguards; and finally, the

Government’s interest, including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail.

Id. at 335.

In order to establish a due process claim under Section

1983, Plaintiff must show that the lien deprived her of a

property interest. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not

alleged a “taking” of property as defined in Kelo v. City of New

London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439 (2005). That case is

inapposite because it concerned the permissibility of the

government’s actions under the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, not under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2658. 

Based on the broad definition of property deprivation under

the Due Process Clause that the Supreme Court recognized in

Doehr, a person need not be totally deprived of his property for

due process rights to attach. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12. Plaintiff

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

has contended that the lien has prevented her from alienating her

property without incurring a total loss of equity. SAC 6:24-25. 

Even this “temporary or partial impairmen[t]” potentially

triggers Plaintiff’s entitlement to due process. Doehr, 501 U.S.

at 12.

Plaintiff appears to concede that Defendant properly

recorded the Abstract of Judgment: “The legality of the

recording of the Abstract of Judgment is not being challenged by

the plaintiff . . . .” Opp’n 5:3-5. The Abstract of Judgment,

as Defendant filed it with the Fresno County Recorder, does not

mention Brenda Griggs or the Property. Compl. Ex. B. It appears

that filing the Abstract of Judgment resulted in a lien on the

Property only through the actions of the Fresno County Recorder.

Plaintiff claims that, under the property laws of

California, the lien does not properly attach to her property. 

Plaintiff cites California Family Code section 1000(a), which

provides: “A married person is not liable for any injury or

damage caused by the other spouse except in cases where the

married person would be liable therefor if the marriage did not

exist.” While this passage does establish that Plaintiff cannot

herself be liable solely on the basis of her husband’s wrongful

acts, it is not dispositive as to how community property may be

used to satisfy debts incurred by those wrongful acts.

Whether community property can be reached to satisfy one

spouses debts turns on whether the activity was undertaken to

benefit the community:

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

The liability of a married person for death

or injury to person or property shall be

satisfied as follows:

(1) If the liability of the married person is

based upon an act or omission which occurred

while the married person was performing an

activity for the benefit of the community,

the liability shall first be satisfied from

the community estate and second from the

separate property of the married person.

(2) If the liability of the married person is

not based upon an act or omission which

occurred while the married person was

performing an activity for the benefit of the

community, the liability shall first be

satisfied from the separate property of the

married person and second from the community

estate.

Cal. Fam. Code § 1000(b). 

The face of the SAC does not establish whether Mr. Griggs’s

liability was incurred performing an activity for the benefit of

the community. Under a conceivable set of facts, Mr. Griggs was

not acting for the benefit of the community. In such a case, his

separate property should be used to satisfy the debt before

community property is used. Such a circumstance would not

prevent community property from being used to satisfy any

remaining debt.

Plaintiff also contends the lien is improper on the basis

that the Property was her separate property at the time the

Abstract of Judgment was filed, based on the property settlement

agreement she and Mr. Griggs entered on October 27, 2001. She

claims that she should hold the Property free of the lien under

California’s Recording Act. She argues that she was a subsequent

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

California Civil Code section 1214 provides, in full: 1

Every conveyance of real property or an estate

for years therein, other than a lease for a

term not exceeding one year, is void as

against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee

of the same property, or any part thereof, in

good faith and for a valuable consideration,

whose conveyance is first duly recorded, and

as against any judgment affecting the title,

unless the conveyance shall have been duly

recorded prior to the record of notice of

action.

9

purchaser for value who took the Property without notice of the

lien. See Cal. Civil Code § 1214; Gates Rubber Co. v. Ulman, 1

214 Cal. App. 3d 356, 364 (1989) (“The elements of bona fide

purchase are payment of value, in good faith, and without actual

or constructive notice of another’s rights.”). Plaintiff does

not allege, however, that she recorded this transaction prior to

the filing of the Abstract of Judgment. See Chalmers v. Raras,

200 Cal. App. 2d 682, 686 (1962) (“[R]ecordation will protect a

subsequent purchaser in good faith against an unrecorded

instrument executed prior to this recordation.”)

Regardless of the merits of Plaintiff’s claims that the lien

should not have attached to the Property under California law, it

is unclear how she is entitled to relief in this action. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are directed only at Defendant, the

judgment creditor. She claims that she was denied due process

based solely on the fact that Defendant did not give her notice

of the lien on the Property and that Defendant denied her request

for a hearing. Plaintiff does not contend that she has no means

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

to challenge the lien other than a hearing provided by Defendant. 

Nor does she contend that California law regarding recorded liens

provides inadequate notice or inadequate access to a hearing. 

She also does not contend that the Fresno County Recorder acted

improperly when it deemed the Abstract of Judgment against Mr.

Griggs to create a lien on the Property.

Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court is unaware of, any

requirement that a judgment creditor, who happens to be a

government entity, provide a means for a person against whose

property it holds a lien to challenge the validity or provide

notice to that person. It appears rather that Plaintiff’s proper

means of attacking the lien would be in a California court,

through an action to quiet title. See Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin.

Servs., Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 56 (1996) (action by nondebtor spouse

to set aside abstract of judgment recorded against community

property). Plaintiff does not contend that California law

inadequately protects her due process rights.

The Due Process Clause guarantees the right to be heard “at

a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews, 424 U.S.

at 333. This does not equate to Plaintiff’s right to a hearing

of her choice. Plaintiff’s claim fails if she had notice and an

opportunity to be heard prior to being deprived of property. Her

claim does not succeed merely on the basis that Defendant did not

provide her with those things. 

Plaintiff has not alleged that she was unable to challenge

Defendant’s lien through other channels, such as in California

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

state court. Nor has she cited any authority for the proposition

that Defendant, as judgment creditor, was required to provide her

notice and a hearing. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Count One based

on the Due Process clause is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires that “all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” Squaw Valley Dev.

Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004). This

protection can extend to individuals who claim that they

constitute a “class of one.” Id. Where the claim does not

implicate a fundamental right or suspect classification, the

plaintiff can establish an equal protection claim by

demonstrating that she “has been intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Id. (citing

Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct.

1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000)). “[D]iscrimination cannot exist

in a vacuum; it can be found only in the unequal treatment of

people in similar circumstances.” United States v. Aguilar, 883

F.2d 662, 706 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Attorney General v. Irish

People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459

U.S. 1172, 103 S. Ct. 817, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1015 (1983)).

Plaintiff claims that Defendant treated her differently than

it treated her neighbors when it subjected her property to a

lien. Plaintiff has not alleged that her neighbors are similarly

situated to her with respect to Defendant. The only allegation

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

is of similarity is that they are “property owners in her

neighborhood.” SAC 7:13-14. Plaintiff’s claim appears to be

that her neighbors are similarly situated merely by owning

property in the same neighborhood as her. She does not allege

that her neighbors have a relationship to Defendant that

indicates their circumstances are similar to hers. See, e.g.,

Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 944 (comparing defendant water quality

officials’ treatment of plaintiff to its treatment of other

property owners who discharged into subject waterways); Aguilar,

883 F.2d at 708 (treatment of accused illegal alien smugglers

complaining of equal protection violation was properly compared

to others prosecuted for smuggling illegal aliens). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Count Two is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiff’s claims for money damages are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

2. Plaintiff’s Count One based on the Due Process Clause is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. Plaintiff’s Count Two based on the Equal Protection Clause

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

4. Plaintiff shall file a third amended complaint within 30

days of the issuance of this order. Failure to comply will

result in dismissal of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01313-AWI -SMS Document 32 Filed 05/30/06 Page 12 of 12