Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02333/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02333-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD LEE MILLER

Plaintiff,

v.

L.S. MCEWEN, et. al

Defendants.

 

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Civil No.11-2333-JLS(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

(DOC. NO. 40)

Plaintiff Gerald L. Miller (“Plaintiff”) sues

Defendants L. McEwen (“McEwen”)1/, G. Janda (“Janda”), C.

Paramo (“Paramo”), M. Castro (“Castro”), R. Lizarraga

(“Lizarraga”), H. Amezcua (“Amezcua”), S. Hardman

(“Hardman”), T. Alvarez (“Alvarez”), B. Dominguez

(“Dominguez”), J. Flores (“Flores”), M. Vitela (“Vitela”),

Dr. R. Kornbluth (“Dr. Kornbluth”), J. Zamora (“Zamora”),

and C. Villalobos (“Villalobos”)(collectively “Defen1/

 Defendants refer to McEwen as both “McEwen” and “McEwan.” Plaintiff

spells McEwen’s name as “McEwen.” The Court will use the Plaintiff’s spelling as

that is how the name appears in the case title.

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dants”)2/ for alleged violations of his constitutional

rights that occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at

Calipatria State Prison (“CSP”). Pending before the Court

is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint (“Motion”). In the Motion, Defendants

contend that several of Plaintiff’s causes of action

against them fail to state a claim.3/ Having considered

the Motion, Plaintiff’s Response and Opposition, the

evidence presented, and the relevant law, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part. 

I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On February 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging that Defendants

violated his constitutional rights. 

On February 21, 2013, Defendants filed the Motion

before the Court. On March 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed an

Opposition to the Motion.

2/

 In the SAC, Plaintiff also includes an Alvarez (other than T. Alvarez)

as a Defendant. Plaintiff does not provide this Defendant Alvarez’s first initial

in the SAC. The Court believes this Alvarez to be the same Alvarez that the

District Court Judge assigned to this case terminated from the docket on October

22, 2012. (Order Dismissing Defendant Alvarez at 4, ECF no. 17.) Plaintiff

contends that a summons and the SAC were served on an M. Alvarez, which is

actually the first initial of this Defendant Alvarez. [Plaintiff’s Response and

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss SAC (“Opposition”) at 13.] But the

District Court Judge assigned to this case rejected Plaintiff’s attempt to serve

an M. Alvarez. (See Notice of Document Discrepancy, ECF no. 41.) Therefore, the

Court will not address Plaintiff’s claims against M. Alvarez, and when the Court

refers to an Alvarez in the Report and Recommendation, it is referring to T.

Alvarez.

3/

 Defendants also concede that, as currently pled, some of Plaintiff’s

claims do survive beyond this stage of the litigation. 

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B. Factual Background4/

The events alleged in the SAC occurred while

Plaintiff was as an inmate incarcerated at CSP. (SAC at

2.)5/ Plaintiff alleges the following:6/

i. Allegations Regarding Defendant McEwen

On July 7, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to CSP. 

(Id. at 6.) On August 1, 2010, Plaintiff informed Warden

McEwen that he wanted to file an administrative grievance

because he was missing personal and legal property. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that McEwen did not respond to his

request, and instead, on August 2, 2010, sent him to

another prison yard littered with racial tension. (Id.)

On August 5, 2010, a District Court Judge Ordered

CSP and McEwen to turn over Plaintiff’s missing property. 

(Id. at 7.)7/ On August 8, 2010, in retaliation for the

District Court Judge’s Order, Plaintiff was set up to be

4/

 Since Plaintiff has many causes of action against many different

Defendants, the Court will recite the facts of the case as they pertain to each

Defendant, not in chronological order. Naturally, some of the allegations pertain

to multiple Defendants. The Court apologizes in advance for any redundancy that

appears in the Report and Recommendation, but believes that this approach is the

most efficient way to present Plaintiff’s claims against the various Defendants.

5/

 All page references to documents contained in the Court’s docket are to

the Court Clerk’s ECF pagination, not the document’s native, pre-filing,

pagination.

6/

 Since Defendants present a Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts all

material facts alleged in the SAC as true, and recites the factual background 

from the SAC. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

7/

 In the SAC, Plaintiff does not list the case number in which this order

was issued. However, in the Opposition, Plaintiff states that he was involved in

civil litigation on September 10, 2010 in case number 1:08-cv-1233, but does not

specify anything more. (Opposition at 11.) The Court viewed the docket report

in that case. An order was issued on August 6, 2010 directing the litigation

coordinator at CSP to turn over Plaintiff’s legal property. [Order: (1) Following

Status Conference; and (2) Setting Forth First Amended Scheduling Order, No. 1:08-

cv-1233 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2010), ECF No. 87.] The Court believes that the August

6, 2010 order was issued in case number 1:08-cv-1233.

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attacked by a group of white prisoners.8/ (Id.) As a

result of the attack, Plaintiff was given an undeserved

rules violation report and sent to the Administrative

Segregation Unit (“ASU”). (Id.) On September 12, 2010

Plaintiff was found guilty of a Division D offense arising

from the rules violation report and assessed a ninety-day

forfeiture of good time credits. (Id.)

On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff appeared before

McEwen and the Internal Classification Committee (“ICC”)

to explain that he was illegally being detained in the ASU

for more than ninety days in violation of his due process

rights and in violation of California Code of Regulations

8/

 It is unclear whether Plaintiff alleges that McEwen was responsible for

setting up the attack.

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Title 15, Sections 3335(d) and (e).9/ [(“Section 3335(d)”

or “Section 33335(e)”].10/ (Id.) 

Plaintiff explained to McEwen and the ICC that he

had been held in the ASU six months past his scheduled

9/

 The relevant part of Section 3335(d) states:

When, pursuant to this section, an [Internal Classification

Committee] retains an inmate on segregation status, the case

shall be referred to a Classification Staff Representative

(CSR) for review and approval. Unless otherwise directed by

the CSR, subsequent [Internal Classification Committee]

reviews shall proceed in accordance with the following

timeline[] until the inmate is removed from segregation

status:

(1) At intervals of not more than 90 days until pending

Division C, D, E, or F rules violation report is

adjudicated. Upon resolution of such matters, an

[Internal Classification Committee] shall review the

inmate’s case within 14 calendar days. At that time, if

no further matters are pending, but continued

segregation is required pending transfer to a general

population, [Internal Classification Committee] reviews

shall be within at least every 90 days until the

transfer can be accomplished.

Section 3335(e) states:

Inmate retention in administrative segregation beyond the

initial segregation [Internal Classification Committee]

hearing shall be referred for CSR review and approval within

30 days and then thereafter in accordance with subsection (d)

above. In initiating such reviews an [Internal Classification

Committee] shall recommend one of the following possible

outcomes:

(1) Transfer to another institution in accordance with

section 3379.

(2) Transfer to a Segregated Program Housing Unit in

accordance with section 3341.5

(3) Retention in segregation pending completion of an

active investigation into an alleged violation of the

rules/disciplinary process, and investigation of other

matters, or resolution of criminal prosecution. In such

instances an [Internal Classification Committee] shall

offer a reasonable projection of the time remaining for

the resolution of such matters.

10/

 Throughout the SAC, Plaintiff cites to various sections of California

Code of Regulations Title 15. The Court is unsure whether Plaintiff is stating

separate claims, along with his Constitutional claims, for violations of

California Code of Regulations. If he does so intend, the Court will not address

these separate, private causes of action because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only provides

redress for violations of the U.S. Constitution and federal laws. See Lovell v.

Poway Unified School District, 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To the extent

that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created

interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section

1983 offers no redress.”).

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release date. (Id.) Moreover, he told the ICC that this

prolonged stay was in violation of Section 3335(d) and

Section 3335(e) because nobody referred his case to a

classification staff representative (“CSR”). (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that these actions were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff’s pending civil litigation.11/ (Id.)

Plaintiff also explained to McEwen and the ICC that

his son was shot five times, and because Plaintiff was in

the ASU, he was unable to call his son. (Id. at 8.) 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s mail was withheld from him while he

was in the ASU. (Id.) This resulted in the severance of

family ties. (Id.) Further, during his time in the ASU

Plaintiff was denied access to the law library, television, a package, and job opportunities. (Id.) Consequently, Plaintiff suffered more than the normal hardships

associated with incarceration. (Id.) 

Additionally, just three days after Plaintiff was

released from the ASU, prison officials sent the same

inmate who attacked him previously to do so again. (Id.) 

This was also done in retaliation for Plaintiff’s pending

civil lawsuit. (Id.) In turn, Plaintiff was sent back to

the ASU. (Id.)

After February 17, 2011, Plaintiff presented a

number of inmate appeals to McEwen requesting relief from

11/

 Plaintiff repeatedly references a civil litigation or civil lawsuit to

which he was a party, that was pending while the events alleged in the SAC took

place. Plaintiff does not list a case number in the SAC. However, in the

Opposition, Plaintiff identifies two different case numbers, 1:08-cv-1233 and

2:07-cv-1646, without specifying which one is the civil lawsuit he continuously

points to in the SAC. (See Opposition at 11-12.) The Court is unable to decipher

which case is the “civil lawsuit,” and declines any invitation to guess.

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retaliatory action taken by other prison officials. (Id.) 

McEwen denied all of these appeals. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges several causes of action against

McEwen. Plaintiff alleges that McEwen violated his First

Amendment rights by retaliating against him for filing

prison grievances and the civil lawsuit.12/ (Id. at 31.) 

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights

were violated when he was kept in the ASU for a total of

fourteen months while awaiting transfer to another prison. 

(Id. at 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that his Eighth

Amendment rights were violated when McEwen failed to

“intervene and stop retaliatory action made by other

[D]efendants.” (Id.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated when McEwen declined to

follow the procedures delineated in Section 3335(d) and

Section 3335(e), and when he was subjected to a prolonged

stay at the ASU, which resulted in the loss of family

ties, television, jobs, a package, and library access. 

(Id. at 8, 33-34). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when McEwen

discriminated against him for being African-American, and

when McEwen failed to intervene on his behalf to prevent

other prison officials from retaliating against him. (Id.

at 9, 34.)

12/

 Plaintiff does not list appeal log numbers for these prison grievances.

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ii. Allegations Regarding Defendant Villalobos

Plaintiff alleges that on September 10, 2010,

library technical assistant Villalobos terminated his

access to the law library. (Id. at 10-11.) This caused

Plaintiff to miss a discovery cutoff in the civil lawsuit,

and therefore, his opponents did not produce documents to

him. (Id. at 11.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Villalobos told Plaintiff

that he did not have a right to discovery because only

defendants have a right to discovery during litigation. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that each time he had a court

deadline to meet, Villalobos denied him access to the law

library. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered harm when

Villalobos denied him access to the library because he

could not retrieve his court mail, which only was delivered to the law library. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff could

not conduct discovery on one of the defendants in the

civil lawsuit. (Id.) 

Plaintiff states that Villalobos violated California

Code of Regulations Title 15, Section 3123(b)

(“Section3123(b)").13/ (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff says

that Villalobos violated his First Amendment rights when

13/

 Section 3123(b) states:

All inmates, regardless of their classification or housing status,

shall be entitled to physical law library access that is sufficient

to provide meaningful access to the courts. Inmates on PLU status

may receive a minimum of 4 hours per calendar week of requested

physical law library access, as resources are available, and shall

be given higher priority to the law library resources. Inmates on

GLU status may receive a minimum of 2 hours per calendar week of

requested physical law library access, as resources are available.

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she deliberately terminated Plaintiff’s access to the law

library and to the courts in retaliation to the civil

lawsuit. (Id. at 31.)

iii. Allegations Regarding Defendants Flores and

Vitela

Plaintiff alleges that on November 5, 2010, correctional officers Flores and Vitela took outgoing mail that

Plaintiff addressed to his daughter. (Id. at 12.) Flores

and Vitela then made copies of the letters and sent them

to the prison investigative services. (Id.)

After the prison investigative services received

copies of Plaintiff’s mail, they went to his daughter’s

house and took all of the letters Plaintiff had sent her. 

(Id.) As a result, Plaintiff’s daughter’s heart was

broken, and she stopped writing to him. (Id.) Flores and

Vitela repeated this same process with Plaintiff’s other

family members. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Flores and Vitela were acting

in retaliation for Plaintiff’s civil lawsuit, which

violated his First Amendment rights. (Id. at 13, 31.) 

iv. Allegations Regarding Defendant Hardman

Plaintiff alleges that on November 7, 2010, he was

given an old pair of boxer shorts with the seat ripped

out. (Id. at 13.) When Plaintiff sought to exchange the

boxer shorts, correctional officer Hardman gave him a

“bogus” rules violation ticket for destruction of property. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Hardman violated his First

Amendment rights because he issued a baseless rules

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violation report in retaliation for the civil lawsuit. 

(Id. at 14, 31.) Plaintiff also claims that Hardman

violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights because the rules

violation ticket forced Plaintiff to go to the ASU, where

security is more stringent than in the prison’s general

population. (Id. at 34.) 

v. Allegations Regarding Defendant Alvarez

Plaintiff alleges that on October 28, 2010,

correctional officer Alvarez refused to give Plaintiff his

incoming mail until Plaintiff dropped the civil lawsuit. 

(Id. at 14.) Alvarez then walked away from Plaintiff with

Plaintiff’s mail in his hand. (Id.)

In response, Plaintiff tried to file a motion with

the courts,14/ so that he could get his mail back from

Alvarez. (Id.) Then, after picking up Plaintiff’s

outgoing mail, Alvarez removed pages from Plaintiff’s

motion in order to prevent Plaintiff from filing it. 

(Id.) Plaintiff later found out from the court that pages

from his motion were missing.15/ (Id.) The court told

Plaintiff to inform it if Plaintiff’s ability to litigate

that case was being hindered. (Id. at 14-15.)

In retaliation for Plaintiff’s inmate appeals16/ and

the court’s order, Alvarez entered Plaintiff’s cell and

removed legal material, court documents, and a personal

picture. (Id. at 15.)

14/

 Plaintiff does not specify in which court he wanted to file the motion.

15/

 It is unclear which court notified Plaintiff that pages from the motion

were missing.

16/

 Plaintiff does not specify the inmate appeals he is referring to.

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Plaintiff alleges that Alvarez violated California

Code of Regulations Title 15, Section 3130 (“Section

3130")17/ when he refused to give Plaintiff his mail. 

(Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Alvarez violated

California Code of Regulations Title 15, Section

3287(a)(3) (“Section 3287(a)(3)"),18/ when he inspected

Plaintiff’s cell without notice. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiff

asserts that Alvarez violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment

right when Alvarez refused to turn over to Plaintiff 

legal and personal mail in retaliation for prison grievances and the civil lawsuit. (Id. at 31.)

vi. Allegations Regarding Defendant Amezcua

Plaintiff alleges that on December 6, 2010, after

returning from the exercise yard, he found his cell in

disarray. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff’s bedding was pulled

from his bed and thrown on the floor. (Id.) Plaintiff

also found his legal papers scattered all over the cell. 

(Id.) Additionally, some of Plaintiff’s papers were

17/

 Section 3130 states:

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

encourages correspondence between inmates and persons outside the

correctional facility. The sending and receiving of mail by inmates

shall be uninhibited except as specifically provided for in this

article. The Regulations contained in this article shall provide for

the orderly processing of inmate mail and to give direction to staff,

inmates, and their correspondents concerning facility mail

requirements. Mail shall be delivered to inmates, regardless of

housing, unless it is contraband pursuant to section 3006, or is

disturbing or Offensive Correspondence pursuant to Section 3135.

18/

 Section 3287(a)(3) states:

An inmate’s presence is not required during routine inspections of

living quarters and property when the inmate is not or would not

otherwise be present. During special inspections or searches

initiated because the inmate is suspected of having a specific item

or items of contraband in his or her quarters or property, the inmate

should be permitted to observe the search when it is reasonably

possible and safe to do so. 

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missing along with his legal books. (Id.) Plaintiff

asked Amezcua what happened, and Amezcua told Plaintiff

that his legal books and material were unauthorized, and

that his legal mail was trash. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges

that Amezcua was responsible for the destruction of the

materials in Plaintiff’s cell. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that Amezcua violated California

Code of Regulations Title 15, Section 3287(a)(2) (“Section

3287(a)(2)”)19/ when he took Plaintiff’s legal books and

destroyed Plaintiff’s other legal material. (Id.) 

Plaintiff also asserts that Amezcua violated his First

Amendment rights because Amezcua was retaliating in

response to Plaintiff’s prison grievances and the civil

lawsuit. (Id. at 17, 31.)

vii. Allegations Regarding Defendant Janda

On June 16, 2011, Plaintiff appeared before Associate Warden Janda. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff explained to

Janda that correctional officer Paramo set Plaintiff up to

fight another prisoner and deliberately moved this prisoner to the cell adjacent to Plaintiff’s cell in order to

accomplish the task. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he explained to Janda that he

overheard the prisoner tell a floor officer that Paramo

placed the prisoner into the cell adjacent to Plaintiff in

19/

 Section 3287(a)(2) states:

Cell and property inspections are necessary in order to detect and

control serious contraband and to maintain institution security. 

Such inspections will not be used as a punitive measure nor to harass

an inmate. Every reasonable precaution will be taken to avoid damage

to personal property and to leave the inmate’s quarters and property

in good order upon completion of the inspection. 

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order to “deal with [Plaintiff].” (Id.) And when the

prisoner returned from the prison canteen, correctional

officer Castro opened Plaintiff’s cell door, which allowed

the prisoner to attack Plaintiff. (Id.)

Plaintiff asked Janda to conduct a complete investigation regarding these allegations, and told Janda that

the set-up was another attempt to improperly hold Plaintiff in the ASU. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff alleges that

Janda told him that he would be released from the ASU “on

his next committee.” (Id.)

On July 28, 2011, Plaintiff again appeared before

Janda and the ICC to explain that he was illegally being

held in the ASU, and that the ICC was in violation of

Section 3335(d) and Section 3335(e). (Id.) 

On September 1, 2011, Plaintiff told Janda that he

thought Janda was conspiring with McEwen to hold Plaintiff

in the ASU. (Id.) Plaintiff based this conclusion on the

fact that he was only at CSP for thirty-three days before

he was set up to be attacked by the white prisoners on

August 8, 2010. (Id.) Also, Plaintiff pointed out to

Janda that it took a court order to get his legal property

back. (Id.)

Plaintiff told Janda that Janda was being

deliberately indifferent to his safety because he failed

to intervene and stop all of these retaliatory actions. 

(Id. at 19.) Plaintiff also informed Janda that he

believed Janda was personally involved in this retaliatory 

scheme because Janda denied Plaintiff’s inmate appeals. 

(Id.)

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Plaintiff alleges that Janda violated Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment rights when Janda and the ICC failed

to follow Section 3335(d) and Section 3335(e). (Id. at

19, 34) (Id.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Janda violated his First

Amendment rights when Janda took retaliatory action

against Plaintiff for filing prison grievances and the

civil lawsuit. (Id. at 20, 31.) 

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Janda violated

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to intervene and stop retaliatory action taken by other defendants. (Id. at 32.)

viii. Allegations Regarding Defendant

Dominguez

Plaintiff alleges that on March 20, 2011,

correctional officer Dominguez deliberately gave Plaintiff’s mail to the prisoner that was incarcerated in the

cell adjacent to Plaintiff. (Id. at 20.) When Plaintiff

tried to address the issue with Dominguez, Dominguez

pointed to her badge and told Plaintiff to write her up. 

(Id.)

A few weeks later, Plaintiff received information

from a family member who was the addressee of the intercepted mail. (Id.) The family member told Plaintiff that

she was receiving mail from another prisoner now, and some

of the mail contained sexual content and threats. (Id.) 

Moreover, the family member told Plaintiff that she would

no longer write to him. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff asserts that Dominguez violated Section

3130 when she intercepted Plaintiff’s mail. (Id.) 

Plaintiff also claims that Dominguez violated his First

Amendment rights because she was acting in retaliation to

Plaintiff’s prison grievances and the civil lawsuit. (Id.

at 20, 31.)

ix. Allegations Regarding Defendant Paramo

Plaintiff alleges that on April 21, 2011,

correctional officer Paramo deliberately placed a prisoner

in the cell adjacent to Plaintiff’s, even though Plaintiff

had previously been attacked by this prisoner. (Id. at

21.) That same day, Castro opened Plaintiff’s cell door

so the other prisoner could enter Plaintiff’s cell and

attack Plaintiff after returning from the prison canteen. 

(Id. at 22.) Plaintiff’s thumb was injured and he was

taken to the medical clinic for treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff states that Paramo was aware of the existing racial

tension between both inmates, and nonetheless, set up the

attack. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Paramo knew that Plaintiff

had been retaliated against because Paramo was advised of

a pretrial conference that took place in the District

Court for the Eastern District of California, in which

Plaintiff complained about being attacked by white inmates

and about deliberately being held in the ASU. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Paramo was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s health and safety in violation

of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 32.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Paramo violated Plaintiff’s First

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Amendment rights because he set Plaintiff up in

retaliation for Plaintiff’s prison grievances and the

civil lawsuit. (Id. at 31.)

x. Allegations Regarding Defendant Castro

Plaintiff alleges that on the morning of April 22,

2011, correctional officer Castro deliberately opened

Plaintiff’s cell door allowing the inmate incarcerated in

the cell next to Plaintiff to enter Plaintiff’s cell and

attack Plaintiff. (Id. at 23.) Castro did this with

knowledge that the other inmate had attacked Plaintiff in

the past. (Id.) Additionally, prior to the attack,

Plaintiff told the men’s advisory chairman20/ that he

wanted to be moved because he feared that a problem could

arise. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that Castro violated his First

Amendment rights because he opened Plaintiff’s cell door

in retaliation for Plaintiff’s prison grievances and the

civil lawsuit. (Id. at 31.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges

that Castro violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights

when he opened Plaintiff’s cell door as to allow the

attack. (Id. at 32.)

xi. Allegations Regarding Defendant Lizarraga

Plaintiff alleges that on July 13, 2011, correctional officer Lizarraga deliberately gave Plaintiff a

food tray that was contaminated with a concoction of

bodily fluids. (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff became very sick

after eating the food. (Id.) Plaintiff knew his food was

20/

 Plaintiff does not provide the name of the men’s advisory chairman. 

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poisoned because the inmate in the cell next to Plaintiff

told Plaintiff that he helped Lizarraga contaminate the

food. (Id.)

Additionally, on August 30, 2011, while escorting

Plaintiff to a broken and dirty shower, Lizarraga deliberately slammed Plaintiff into a guard rail. (Id. at 25.) 

Plaintiff required medical care as a result. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Lizarraga slammed him after Plaintiff confronted him regarding the food poisoning. (Id.) 

Plaintiff also states that he did not provoke Lizarraga. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that Lizarraga violated his First

Amendment rights because he acted in retaliation for

Plaintiff’s prison grievances and the civil lawsuit. (Id.

at 25, 31.) Plaintiff also states that Lizarraga violated

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right when he poisoned

Plaintiff’s food and slammed him into the guard rail for

no reason. (Id. at 25, 33.)

xii. Allegations Regarding Defendant Zamora

Plaintiff alleges that on July 15, 2011 he had an

appointment with nurse Zamora because he was feeling ill

from the food poisoning. (Id. at 26.) Zamora took

Plaintiff’s vital signs and told Plaintiff that he would

get him medication for his fever and diarrhea. (Id.) But

Plaintiff also claims that Zamora wrote Plaintiff’s

symptoms down on a paper towel, and then threw the paper 

towel away, in order to discard of any record that the

appointment took place. (Id.)

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Plaintiff then went to see Dr. Kornbluth, but was

denied medical treatment because Dr. Kornbluth did not

have any record of Plaintiff’s medical condition. (Id.) 

On October 21, 2011, Plaintiff again saw Zamora to

tell him that he was still feeling ill. (Id. at 26-27.) 

Plaintiff told Zamora that Dr. Kornbluth was unable to

render him treatment because Zamora threw away the paper

towel. (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff asked Zamora not to write

his symptoms down on a paper towel during this visit. 

(Id.)

Zamora told Plaintiff that this was just business. 

(Id.) Zamora explained to Plaintiff that he wanted

Plaintiff to die so that they “could test his body for

this disease.” (Id.) Therefore, Zamora again wrote down

Plaintiff’s symptoms on a paper towel instead of on an

inmate request form. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Zamora violated his First

Amendment rights because he was retaliating against

Plaintiff’s prison grievances and the civil lawsuit (Id.

at 28, 31.) Plaintiff also states that Zamora violated

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights because he was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. 

(Id. at 27, 33.) 

xiii. Allegations Regarding Defendant Dr.

Kornbluth

Plaintiff alleges that on July 17, 2011, he had an

appointment with Dr. Kornbluth regarding the food poisoning. (Id. at 28.) Dr. Kornbluth refused to examine

Plaintiff or listen to Plaintiff’s problems. (Id.) 

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Rather, Dr. Kornbluth wanted to discuss grievances Plaintiff had filed against somebody else. (Id.) Kornbluth

also told Plaintiff that he would order blood tests that

he knew would not be Plaintiff’s, so the tests would come

out negative. (Id.) Kornbluth refused to treat Plaintiff

for the stomach pain, vomiting, or diarrhea on this day. 

(Id.) 

On August 9, 2011, Plaintiff again saw Dr. Kornbluth

and told him that his stomach, back, kidney, and liver

were hurting and that he had a “rusty taste on his tongue

and his stomach was extremely hot.” (Id.) Dr. Kornbluth

denied Plaintiff medical treatment. (Id.) He told

Plaintiff that his blood tests were negative and that “he

was not going to do anything for the [P]laintiff because

of his inmate appeals.” (Id.) Dr. Kornbluth told

Plaintiff that Plaintiff was deliberately being denied

medical treatment because of the civil lawsuit. (Id. at

29.) Plaintiff then asked Dr. Kornbluth for a biopsy

because CSP does not have a procedure that could detect

all stomach infections. (Id.) Dr. Kornbluth replied that

he would not allow Plaintiff to see anybody else, but

would instead order more blood tests and have other staff

members give blood at Plaintiff’s expense. (Id.) 

On August 17, 2011, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr.

Kornbluth because he was still very sick. (Id.) Plaintiff told Dr. Kornbluth that the negative blood test

results must have been a mixup. (Id.) Dr. Kornbluth

pretended that Plaintiff had actually had a biopsy examination and the appropriate treatment, even though Plain11cv2333 19

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tiff had not. (Id.) Dr. Kornbluth then told Plaintiff

there was nothing he could do for Plaintiff, and had the

guards escort Plaintiff back to his cell. (Id.) 

On September 20, 2011 Plaintiff again saw Dr.

Kornbluth because of the same illness. (Id. at 30.) Dr.

Kornbluth told Plaintiff that there was nothing he could

do for him and left the room. (Id.)

Upon hearing Dr. Kornbluth’s diagnosis, head nurse

Gray21/ (“Gray”) told Dr. Kornbluth that he was wrong, and

that other tests should be given to Plaintiff. (Id.) Dr.

Kornbluth then became very angry and ordered Gray to leave

the room. (Id.) Dr. Kornbluth said he would not treat

Plaintiff no matter what. (Id.) Dr. Kornbluth then

walked out of the room and had sergeant E. Uribe (“Uribe”)

escort Plaintiff back to his cell. (Id.) As Plaintiff

was leaving the room, Dr. Kornbluth told Plaintiff “that

his treatment of... [P]laintiff is how to train an elephant.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Kornbluth violated

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights because he acted in

retaliation for Plaintiff’s prison grievances and the

civil lawsuit. (Id. at 30, 31.) Additionally, Plaintiff

states that Dr. Kornbluth violated his Eighth Amendment

rights by acting deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs. (Id. at 33.)

21/

 Plaintiff does not provide head nurse Gray’s first name or initial.

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II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “can be

granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim.” 

Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.

1980); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Therefore, a plaintiff must plead more than labels,

conclusions, or just the elements of a cause of action. 

Id. Additionally, courts construe all allegations of

material fact in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th

Cir. 1996). Thus, the Court will take all well-pleaded

facts as true. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School

District, 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994).

Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2)

allows the trial court to grant leave to amend “when

justice so requires.” Unless the complaint cannot be

cured by allegations of additional facts, the Court should

grant leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127

(9th Cir. 2000). The Court’s discretion to freely grant

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leave to amend is particularly relevant when a litigant is

proceeding pro se. Id. at 1131. 

Additionally, so a pro se litigant does not repeat

the errors, “before dismissing a pro se civil rights

complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court

must give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Department, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However,

courts should refrain from giving a pro se litigant the

essential elements of a claim, which were not originally

pled. Soffer v. City of Costa Mesa, 798 F.2d 361, 363

(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

III. Discussion

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Amezcua, Hardman,

Alvarez, Dominguez, Villalobos, Castro, Flores, Vitela,

and Zamora retaliated against Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s prison grievances and the civil lawsuit. (SAC at

31.)

Defendants state that Plaintiff cannot simply allege

“that unspecified orders or grievances were a defendant’s

motivating purpose in the illegal activity” to support his

retaliation claim. [Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Motion to

Dismiss”) at 20.].22/ Defendants move to dismiss the

22/

 Defendants do not move to dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claims

with respect to Defendants Lizarraga, Paramo, or Kornbluth at this stage of the

litigation. (Motion to Dismiss at 13 n.2.) Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claims against Defendants McEwen and Janda are addressed later in the

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retaliation claims against Villalobos, Flores, Vitela,

Hardman, Alvarez, Amezcua, Dominguez, Castro, and Zamora. 

(Id. at 21.)

A prisoner has a fundamental right to file prison

grievances. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th

Cir. 2004). “[B]ecause purely retaliatory actions taken

against a prisoner for having exercised those rights

necessarily undermines those protections, such actions

violate the Constitution quite apart from any underlying

misconduct they are designed to shield.” Id.

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An

assertion that a state actor took some adverse against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal.” Id. at 567-68.

Plaintiff does not need to show that his First

Amendment rights were actually chilled, but only that

Defendants’ actions were intended to interfere with

Plaintiff’s exercising of his First Amendment rights, and

would deter an ordinary person from exercising those

rights. Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino

County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, “a

retaliation claim may assert an injury no more tangible

Report and Recommendation.

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than a chilling effect on First Amendment rights.” Gomez

v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s allegations

against Villalobos, Amezcua, Dominguez, Castro, and Zamora

do “not allege any specific protected speech in which

[Plaintiff] engaged, nor does he allege how these

[D]efendants were involved or knew about the protected

speech.” (Motion to Dismiss at 21.) Rather, “Plaintiff

only includes conclusory language in his summary of claims

that [these Defendants] were retaliating against him for

maintaining lawsuits and prison grievances at [CSP].” 

(Id.)

The Court agrees with Defendants. In the Statement

of Facts in the SAC, Plaintiff follows the same pattern in

the allegations against Defendants Villalobos, Amezcua,

Dominguez, Castro, and Zamora. In sum, Plaintiff alleges

facts, and then states that Defendants’ “conduct would

deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from vindicating his

constitutional rights through the court system, and these

retaliatory actions place[d] a chill[ing] effect upon the

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.” (See, e.g., SAC at

17.)

Plaintiff must allege facts showing causation

between the allegedly retaliatory acts taken by

Villalobos, Amezcua, Dominguez, Castro, and Zamora and the

exercising of his First Amendment rights. The pleading

standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For

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example, Plaintiff could plead that Defendants knew that

Plaintiff engaged in protected speech, how they knew, and

thereafter did something that led Plaintiff to the inference that Defendants were acting in retaliation for his

protected speech. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807-

808 (9th Cir. 1995) (indicating that Plaintiff must show

probative evidence to prove the imperative link of causation in a retaliation claim, and that timing alone is not

sufficient to establish that connection).

If Plaintiff wants his Third Amended Complaint to

survive the pleading stage as against Defendants

Villalobos, Amezcua, Dominguez, Castro, and Zamora, he

must allege facts that support causation between their

adverse actions and the exercising of his First Amendment

rights. He cannot simply list all of the allegedly

adverse actions taken against him at CSP, and then conclude that these must have been in retaliation for prison

grievances and the civil lawsuit. 

As to Defendants Flores, Vitela, Hardman, and

Alvarez, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff again only

alleges generally that these defendants were retaliating

against him for unspecified court orders and grievances.” 

(Motion to Dismiss at 21.)

The Court agrees with Defendants regarding Plaintiff’s allegations against Flores, Vitela, and Hardman. 

In his allegations against these Defendants, Plaintiff

simply alleges an adverse action or actions that were

taken against him, and then asserts that these actions

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were taken in retaliation to unspecified court orders,

court litigation, and/or prison grievances.

However, Plaintiff does a better job of stating a

cause of action for retaliation against Alvarez. In the

allegations against Alvarez, Plaintiff specifically states

that Alvarez told Plaintiff that Plaintiff would not get

his mail until he dropped the civil lawsuit. These

allegations at least show that Alvarez could have known

about the protected speech, and how Plaintiff could have

known that Alvarez was aware of the protected speech.23/

But to survive the pleading stage, Plaintiff is advised to

provide more details about the civil lawsuit he continuously references and also more details regarding the

prison grievances. Such details may include the case

number of the civil lawsuit, the date the civil lawsuit

was commenced, the court in which the civil lawsuit was

filed, and the appeal log numbers to the prison grievances.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

retaliation claims against Villalobos, Flores, Vitela,

Hardman, Alvarez, Amezcua, Dominguez, Castro, and Zamora

be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),

the Court will not accept vague or conclusory allegations.

In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must allege a

causal connection between the adverse actions taken

against him and his exercising of protected speech. In

23/

 The Court also directs Plaintiff to the allegations in the SAC against

Dr. Kornbluth as an example of the proper way to plead a retaliation claim.

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other words, Plaintiff must plead facts to support the

contention that Defendants were retaliating against

Plaintiff for filing prison grievances and the civil

lawsuit; not just that Defendants took adverse action

against him and that he had unidentified prison grievances

and a civil lawsuit pending at the time. 

B. Plaintiff’s Access to the Courts Claims

i. Access to the Courts Claim Against Defendant Villalobos

Plaintiff alleges that Villalobos terminated his

access to the prison law library in violation of Section

3123(b). (SAC at 11.) Plaintiff contends that

Villalobos’ actions caused him to miss a discovery cutoff

deadline in a civil lawsuit. (Id.)

Defendants argue that “Plaintiff does not allege

that the civil suit with which... Villalobos interfered

with related to his sentence or conditions of confinement.” (Motion to Dismiss at 22.) Moreover, “[e]ven if

Plaintiff had described the nature of the suit, he does

not allege an actual injury necessary to support a claim

for access to court.” (Id. at 23.)

Prisoners have a constitutional right to access the

courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). This

fundamental right “requires prison authorities to assist

inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal

papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries...” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). And

prison officials are prohibited “from actively interfering

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with inmates’ attempts to prepare legal documents...” 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. 

To establish a cause of action for denial of access

to the courts, Plaintiff must show that an inadequacy in

the prison’s legal access program caused him actual

injury. Id. at 350-55. “[A]n inmate cannot establish

relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his

prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar

in some theoretical sense.” Id. at 351. “[T]he inmate...

must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged

shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program

hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”24/ Id.

As previously mentioned, Plaintiff provides the

Court with two case numbers in his Opposition. (Opposition at 11, 12.) In both case number 08cv1233 and

07cv1646, filed in the District Court for the Eastern

District of California, Plaintiff sued at least one prison

official regarding the conditions of his confinement. [See

generally Second Amended Complaint for Civil Rights

Violation Under Color of State Law 42 U.S.C. § 1983, No.

1:08-cv-01233 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009), ECF No. 37;

Second Amended Complaint for Civil Rights Violation Under

24/ The Supreme Court gave examples of what might constitute actual injury.

[The inmate] might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared

was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement

which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance

facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had suffered

arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts,

but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was

unable even to file a complaint. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.

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Color of State Law 42 U.S.C. § 1983, No. 07cv1646 (E.D.

Cal. Apr. 28, 2008), ECF no. 12.] The Court’s review of

those lawsuits shows that they pertained to Plaintiff’s

conditions of confinement.25/

However, Defendants also contend that Plaintiff

“does not allege an actual injury necessary to support a

claim for access to the courts” because Plaintiff was not

‘shut out of court.’” (Motion to Dismiss 23.) 

Plaintiff states that as a result of Villalobos’

actions, he missed a court deadline, which resulted in the

dismissal of a defendant in one of the civil lawsuits. 

(Opposition at 11.) The Court interprets this to mean

that Plaintiff alleges he was denied access to the courts,

and suffered actual injury, because his causes of action

against that defendant were dismissed. 

Plaintiff does not specify which defendant was

dismissed from which civil lawsuit and how missing the

discovery deadline resulted in dismissal of that defendant. See Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir.

2009) (indicating that, in an access to the courts claim,

there is a causation requirement, and the plaintiff must

show that prison officials impeded his efforts to proceed

with nonfrivolous claims). Also, Plaintiff does not

identify “a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but

not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be

25/

 The Court also notes that Plaintiff appears to point to case number 08-

cv-01233 as the case he is referring to regarding the access to the courts claim

against Villalobos. 

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brought.”26/ Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415. “There is, after

all, no point in spending time and money to establish the

facts constituting denial of access, when a plaintiff

would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler

case without the denial-of-access element.” Id.

As currently pled, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim does not state a cause

of action against Villalobos. Therefore, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim

against Villalobos be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with

leave to amend. In the Third Amended Complaint, to state

of cause of action for denial of access to the courts

against Villalobos, Plaintiff should state the civil

lawsuit’s case number, name the dismissed defendant, and

allege facts showing that he missed the discovery deadline, which caused a nonfrivolous lawsuit against that

defendant to be dismissed. For example, Plaintiff should

explain what the sought discovery would have shown, and

why the discovery would have prevented the court from

dismissing the unnamed defendant from the civil lawsuit. 

ii. Access to the Courts Claim Against Defendant Alvarez

Plaintiff alleges that Alvarez refused to give

Plaintiff his mail until Plaintiff dropped the civil

lawsuit. (SAC at 14.) In hopes of getting his mail,

26/

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v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). A backward-looking access claim involves

allegations of a previously lost or impaired claim caused by a defendant’s

inappropriate conduct. Id. at 414. 

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Plaintiff then “filed a motion with the courts about this

matter.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Alvarez tried to prevent

Plaintiff from filing the motion. (Id.) To accomplish

this, Alvarez removed pages from the motion after he

picked up Plaintiff’s outgoing mail. (Id.) When the

court received the motion, Plaintiff was notified that

some of the pages were missing. (Id.) The court told

Plaintiff that if Alvarez continued to hinder his ability

to litigate, then Plaintiff should inform the court.27/

(Id. at 14-15.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s access to the

courts claim against Alvarez should be dismissed. (Motion

to Dismiss at 22.) Again, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

was not denied access to the courts and that Plaintiff did

not suffer actual injury. (Id. at 23.) Rather, all that

resulted from Alvarez’s alleged conduct was that Plaintiff

had to re-allege that he had exhausted all of his administrative remedies. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff received an

invitation from the court to notify it if Villalobos

continued to hinder his ability to litigate. (Id.) 

Plaintiff responds that the materials Alvarez took

were “essential to court access and are not just property.” (Opposition at 15.) 

27/

 The Court is unsure whether Plaintiff is alleging that Alvarez denied him

access to the courts. The Court views Plaintiff’s claim against Alvarez as

another First Amendment retaliation claim. Since Defendants move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim against Alvarez, the Court examines the

arguments.

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The Court agrees with Defendants. Plaintiff fails

to explain how Alvarez’s actions denied him access to the

courts. Plaintiff does not allege that he was never able

to file the motion from which Alvarez allegedly removed

pages. If Plaintiff wants to assert that Alvarez denied

him access to the courts, in the Third Amended Complaint,

he must explain how Alvarez’s actions effectively denied

him access to the courts. 

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

claim against Alvarez for denying Plaintiff access to the

courts be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to

amend.

C. Plaintiff’s Substantive Due Process Claims

Against Defendants Paramo, Castro, Zamora,

Lizarraga, and Kornbluth

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Paramo, Castro,

Zamora, Lizarraga, and Kornbluth violated his Eighth

Amendment rights. (SAC at 32-33.) 

“Out of an abundance of caution, Defendants move to

dismiss any due process claims arising from these allegations as duplicative of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

Claims.” (Motion to Dismiss at 24.)

Plaintiff responds that he has alleged racial

discrimination as applying generally to his entire complaint, and therefore, any due process claim would not be

excessive. [Opposition at 18 (“Plaintiff alleges racial

discrimination over his overall complaint under the

Fourteenth Amendment...”)]. Plaintiff also states that

“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to deny any

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person within its jurisdictions the equal protection of

the law.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff misconstrues Defendants’ argument. 

Plaintiff’s response is grounded in the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants move to

dismiss substantive due process claims arising from

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. (Motion to Dismiss

at 24.)

“[T]he Eighth Amendment, which is specifically

concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source

of substantive protection to convicted prisoners... where

the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and

unjustified.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327

(1986). 

The Court does not find allegations in the SAC

regarding violations of Plaintiff’s due process rights

arising out of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against

Paramo, Castro, Zamora, Lizarraga, and Kornbluth. If

Plaintiff seeks to assert due process claims against these

Defendants, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against

Paramo, Castro, Zamora, Lizarraga, and Kornbluth are more

appropriately analyzed under the Eighth Amendment, not the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28/ See

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) [“After

conviction, the Eighth Amendment ‘serves as the primary

28/

 The Court declines to comment on whether Plaintiff might allege a

substantive due process claim if he can allege that Defendants were reckless or

grossly negligent. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986).

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source of substantive protection...in cases...where the

deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and

unjustified.’ Any protection that ‘substantive due

process’ affords convicted prisoners against excessive

force, we have held, at best redundant of that provided by

the Eighth Amendment.” (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327) 

(internal citations omitted)]. 

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that any due process

claims arising out of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims

against Paramo, Castro, Zamora, Lizarraga, and Kornbluth

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, without leave to amend.

D. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claims

Against Defendants Alvarez, Amezcua, and

Dominguez

Plaintiff alleges that on October 28, 2010, Alvarez

refused to give him his legal and personal mail in violation of Section 3130. (SAC at 14-15.) Plaintiff alleges

that, on that same date, Alvarez took Plaintiff’s legal

material and personal picture in violation of Section

3287(a)(3). (Id. at 15.) In response, Plaintiff filed a

motion with a court to seek an order for the turn over of

his property, but Alvarez removed pages from the motion. 

(Id. at 14.) Plaintiff asserts that Alvarez was retaliating against Plaintiff’s civil lawsuit. (Id.)

Also, Plaintiff alleges that on December 6, 2010,

Amezcua destroyed Plaintiff’s legal material and legal

books in violation of Section 3287(a)(2) while Plaintiff

was exercising on the prison yard. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff asserts that this too was a retaliatory action that

chilled his First Amendment rights. (Id. at 17.)

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Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that on March 20,

2011, Dominguez deliberately gave Plaintiff’s personal

mail to the prisoner in the cell located adjacent to

Plaintiff, which violated Section 3130. (Id. at 20.) 

This was also done in retaliation to “court litigation and

inmate appeals.” (Id.) 

Defendants argue that to the extent that Plaintiff

“is seeking to proceed on a claim of having been deprived

of certain items of personal property,” he cannot do so. 

(Motion to Dismiss at 25.) Defendants reason that Plaintiff already has a remedy for the deprivation of his

property. (Id.) Namely, California Government Code,

Sections 900, et seq., which provide a remedy for tort

claims against public officials. (Id.)

In response, Plaintiff rehashes the allegations

against Amezcua and Dominguez and emphasizes the validity

of the First Amendment retaliation claims. (Opposition at

14, 15.) Regarding Alvarez, Plaintiff contends that the

legal material was not “just property,” but was also

essential for him to access the court.29/ (Id. at 15.) 

The Court does not believe that Plaintiff sought to 

allege that Defendants Alvarez, Amezcua, or Dominguez 

violated his procedural due process rights. However,

because Defendants proceed out of caution, the Court will

address the arguments.

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being

deprived of property without the due process of law. 

29/

 The Court has already addressed Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim

against Alvarez.

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Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Intentional

deprivation of property is actionable under the Due

Process Clause, but a negligent or unauthorized

deprivation is not. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

532 n.13 (1984); see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31). 

“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by

a state employee does not constitute a violation of the

procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation

remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at

533. An unauthorized deprivation is one “in which the

state administrative machinery did not and could not have

learned of the deprivation until after it had occurred.” 

Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff does not argue that Alvarez, Amezcua, and

Dominguez were authorized to take his property. To the

contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiff implicitly

acknowledges that Alvarez, Amezcua, and Dominguez acted

randomly because he alleges that they violated sections of

California Code of Regulations. Alvarez, Amezcua, and

Dominguez were not acting under the State’s procedures,

regulations, or statutes, and therefore, if a postdeprivation remedy is available, Plaintiff cannot state a

claim for violation of his due process rights. See King

v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1986) (without

a showing of deprivations occurring due to deliberate,

non-random state procedures, no procedural due process

claim exists).

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California law provides an adequate post-deprivation

remedy. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§810-895; see also Barnett

v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (“California law provides

an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property

deprivations.”). In the event that Plaintiff is asserting

a due process violation against Alvarez, Amezcua, and

Dominguez, the Court RECOMMENDS that these claims be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, without leave to amend. 

E. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim Against Defendant

Hardman

Plaintiff alleges that Hardman violated his due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when Hardman

issued Plaintiff an unwarranted rules violation ticket for

the destruction of state property. (SAC at 34.)

Defendants argue that prisoners do not have a

constitutional right to be free from wrongfully issued

disciplinary reports. (Motion to Dismiss at 26.)

Plaintiff responds that Hardman violated his “due

process and liberty interest by subjecting [Plaintiff] to

a higher security level.” (Opposition at 12.)

 The Second Circuit held that “the prison inmate has

no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely

or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the

deprivation of a protected liberty interest.” Freeman v.

Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986); see also

Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal.

1997) (adopting the Second Circuit’s conclusion). Due

process only requires that Plaintiff be granted a hearing 

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regarding the rules violation report that Hardman issued. 

See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557-58 (concluding that a hearing

is required when a prisoner’s liberty interests are at

stake); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333

(1976) (“This Court consistently has held that some form

of hearing is required before an individual is finally

deprived of a property interest.”)

 The Court agrees with the Second Circuit’s conclusion. The Court presumes that Plaintiff received a

hearing on the rules violation report because he does not

state any allegations that he did not. If Plaintiff did

not receive a hearing on the rules violation report for

destruction of property, then he may present a due process

claim. However, Plaintiff’s due process rights were not

violated just because he was issued an unwarranted rules

violation report. (See SAC at 13.)

 Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

claim against Hardman for violation of his due process

rights be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to

amend. 

F. Plaintiffs Claims Against McEwen and Janda

Plaintiff brings claims against McEwen and Janda for

violating his First Amendment rights, his Eighth Amendment

rights, and his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 31-

34.) 

Defendant contends that “[b]ecause Plaintiff does

not state a claim under the First, Eighth, or Fourteenth

Amendment against McEwen and Janda, these two Defendants

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should be dismissed from the case.” (Motion to Dismiss at

19.)

i. Plaintiff’s Allegations That Defendants

McEwen And Janda Failed to Supervise Their

Subordinates

Plaintiff alleges that McEwen and Janda failed “to

intervene and stop retaliatory action made by other

[D]efendants...” (SAC at 32.) 

Defendants contend that McEwen and Janda cannot be

liable for failing to supervise their subordinates. 

(Motion to Dismiss at 14.)30/

Defendants correctly assert that there is no

respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). But

“[a] supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s

constitutional violations ‘if the supervisor participated

in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations

and failed to act to prevent them.’” Maxwell v. County of

San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045).

However, if the supervisor is not directly involved

in the improper conduct, then he is only liable if there

is “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” 

Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1995)

30/ The Court is unsure whether Plaintiff brings a claim against McEwen and

Janda for their alleged failure to supervise. The Court believes that Plaintiff

intended to bring an Eighth Amendment claim against McEwen and Janda arising out

of the allegations that they failed to intervene. That claim is addressed in the

next section of the Report and Recommendation. Since Defendants seek to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims against McEwen and Janda for failing to supervise their

subordinates, the Court examines Defendants’ arguments. Further, the Court is

unable to locate Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ arguments on this point.

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[quoting Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,

1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks

omitted)]; see also Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915

(9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff alleges that he told McEwen about retaliatory actions taken against him by other Defendants, but

McEwen failed to intervene. (SAC at 9.) The Court is

unsure whether Plaintiff is alleging that he told McEwen

that other Defendants were retaliating against him, and

Defendants continued to do so while McEwen idly stood by,

or whether Plaintiff only notified McEwen after all of the

retaliation took place.31/ 

If Plaintiff alleges the former, the Court believes

that McEwen could be liable for failing to supervise the

other Defendants. See, e.g., Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1046

(stating that deputy attorney general who told the court

that he would talk to prison officials about misconduct

had to know “of specific instances of misconduct by prison

officials and fail[] to act to prevent them” in order to

preclude summary judgment); Strong v. Woodford, 428 F.

Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“A supervisor may be

held liable when he is put on notice of wrongful conduct

and fails to investigate or correct the violation.”). 

However, if Plaintiff alleges the latter, then a

causal connection between McEwen’s conduct and the retaliatory actions taken by other officials does not exist. 

31/

 Plaintiff states that on February 17, 2011, he submitted inmate appeals

to McEwen requesting relief from the retaliation. (SAC at 8.) However, some of

the retaliatory actions took place before this date, and some took place after

this date. 

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It would be impossible for McEwen to prevent others’

impermissible conduct if he did not learn about that

conduct until after it occurred. Therefore, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against McEwen be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend. Plaintiff may only allege retaliatory actions that took place

after Plaintiff put McEwen on notice that these or similar

actions might occur, and present facts that show McEwen

disregarded Plaintiff’s warning.

Plaintiff also alleges that Janda “failed to intervene and stop these retaliatory actions and that [Janda]

was personally involved because he had already denied

[nine] of [Plaintiff’s] inmate appeals pointing out these

retaliatory efforts made by the above [D]efendants.” (SAC

at 19.) 

As currently pled, the Court believes that Plaintiff

put Janda on notice after the retaliatory actions had

taken place. Plaintiff must show that Janda knew of the

alleged constitutional violations, and failed to investigate or correct the conduct. Therefore, like Plaintiff’s

failure to supervise claims against McEwen, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against Janda be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend. 

ii. Plaintiff’s Allegations That Defendants

McEwen And Janda Violated His Eighth

Amendment Rights When They Failed To Intervene

Plaintiff alleges that he spoke directly to McEwen

and Janda and addressed administrative appeals to both of

them. (Id. at 9, 32.) Plaintiff further alleges that

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these Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment when they acted

deliberately indifferent to retaliatory actions taken by

other Defendants. (Id. at 9, 32.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot plead a

violation of the Eighth Amendment unless he has a “constitutional right to something such as medical care, or food

and water...” (Motion to Dismiss at 17.) Defendants

state that “McEwen and Janda were not providing medical

care or otherwise supervising Plaintiff’s conditions of

confinement,” and therefore cannot be held liable for

violating his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendants have failed to

apply the standard that the Supreme Court announced in

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). (Opposition at

4.)

“The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual

punishment of a person convicted of a crime.” Johnson v.

Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). Prison officials “must provide humane conditions of confinement;

prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate

food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.’” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. “In particular... prison officials have a duty... to protect prisoners from violence at 

the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833 (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is

also true that a prison official can violate a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment rights by failing to intervene.” Robins

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v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because they did

not provide affidavits stating that they did not have the

opportunity to intervene). 

Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim arising from the standpoint of failure to

intervene. Rather, Defendants argue that Plaintiff had no

constitutional right to his appeal, and therefore, no

Eighth Amendment violation took place. The Court believes

that the crux of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim

against McEwen and Janda is their failure to intervene. 

[See SAC at 32 (“Defendants L.S. McEwen and G.J. Janda

violated [Plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment by refusing to intervene

and stop retaliatory action made by other [D]efendants...) 

Since Defendants only address Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claims in the supervisory context, the Court declines to

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims sua sponte. 

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, 

as they pertain to McEwen and Janda’s failure to intervene

be DENIED. 

iii. Plaintiff’s Allegations That Defendants

McEwen And Janda Violated His Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights

When They Failed To Hear His Appeals

Plaintiff alleges that on July 7, 2010, he wrote to

McEwen to alert him that Plaintiff sought to exhaust his

administrative remedies in order to have his legal and

personal property returned. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff

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alleges that McEwen did not respond to Plaintiff’s appeal. 

(Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Janda denied nine of

Plaintiff’s inmate appeals regarding retaliatory actions

taken by other Defendants. (Id. at 19.)

Defendants contend that “[r]egardless of whether

these Defendants did or did not hear the appeals, a

defendant cannot be liable for his participation in the

appeals process.” (Motion to Dismiss at 16.)

Plaintiff contends that “[g]rievances filed through

an official grievance procedure are constitutionally

protected.” (Opposition at 5.)

Courts engage in a two-step analysis when determining whether the Due Process clause has been violated. 

Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011). “[The

Court] first asks whether there exists a liberty or

property interest of which a person has been deprived, and

if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State

were constitutionally sufficient.” Id. (recognizing that

the Ninth Circuit creates a liberty interest in parole)

[(citing Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)].

“Inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement

to a specific grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) [citing Mann v. Adams,

855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)]. Plaintiff has no

cause of action against McEwen or Janda under the Fourteenth Amendment arising from the prison appeals process

because he lacks a protected liberty interest. See

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“The

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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons

against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and

those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must

establish that one of these interests is at stake.”). 

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claims against McEwen and Janda that

arise out of their failure to respond to Plaintiff’s

appeals be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, without leave to

amend.

iv. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation

Claims Against McEwen and Janda

Plaintiff alleges that he filed an inmate appeal on

August 1, 2010. (SAC at 6.) The next day, Plaintiff was

sent to a prison yard at CSP where racial tension existed

between black and white prisoners. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that McEwen did this in retaliation for the inmate

appeal. (Id.) Additionally, on August 8, 2010, in

retaliation for a court order and inmate appeals filed

against McEwen, Plaintiff was set up to be attacked by a

group of white prisoners. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also

alleges that he was held in the ASU six months too long in

retaliation for the civil litigation. (Id.) 

The Court is unable to find any specific factual

allegations against Janda pertaining to a potential First

Amendment violation. Rather, Plaintiff concludes that

various acts taken by Janda “would deter a prisoner of

ordinary firmness from vindicating his constitutional

rights through the court system,” and that Janda was

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acting for retaliation for Plaintiff’s prison grievances

and the civil lawsuit. (Id. at 20, 31.)

Defendants argue that “a plaintiff cannot state a

claim under the First Amendment arising out of the appeals

process.” (Motion to Dismiss at 17.) In essence, Defendants assert that McEwen and Janda cannot be held liable

for denying Plaintiff access to the courts because they

allowed him to exhaust his administrative remedies, and

now Plaintiff has filed the SAC in this Court. (See id.

at 18.)

Plaintiff responds that McEwen and Janda retaliated

against him, which threatened his exercise of protected

speech. (Opposition at 7.) 

To refresh, “[w]ithin the prison context, a viable

claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

adverse against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68.

As Plaintiff correctly points out, timing can

provide probative evidence of retaliation. (See Opposition at 8); see also Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“[T]iming can

properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of

retaliatory intent.”). Plaintiff alleges that he has

shown causation because “he has stated a chronology of

events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” 

(Opposition at 8.) 

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Plaintiff alleges that he was sent to another prison

yard in CSP that had racial tension just one day after he

filed an administrative appeal. Also, Plaintiff alleges

that he was set up to be attacked just three days after

obtaining a favorable court order. The Court believes

that the proximity of these events has some probative

value that could show McEwen was retaliating against

Plaintiff. 

Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 2010,

he informed McEwen of his intent to exhaust his administrative remedies. On August 5, 2010, a court order

directed McEwen to turn over Plaintiff’s property. The

Court believes that these events should have put McEwen on

notice that Plaintiff intended to file a grievance or that

Plaintiff had a pending civil lawsuit. 

However, Plaintiff fails to allege that McEwen knew

about the court order. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege

that McEwen’s actions did not advance a legitimate correctional goal. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege any

facts supporting the contention that McEwen was

responsible for Plaintiff’s being attacked. Moreover,

Plaintiff does not allege facts supporting his contention

that McEwen held him in the ASU for six months too long

because he was retaliating to the civil lawsuit. 

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims

against McEwen be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave

to amend.

Additionally, since Plaintiff failed to allege any

specific facts that would show Janda retaliated against

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him for engaging in protected speech, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Janda be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, without leave to amend.

v. Plaintiff’s Eighth And Fourteenth Amendment Claims Against Defendants McEwen And

Janda Arising From Their Work On The Classification Committee

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was kept

in the ASU for a total of fourteen months while awaiting

transfer to another prison. (SAC at 8-9, 18, 32.) 

Plaintiff states that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated when McEwen and Janda failed to comply with

Section 3335. (Id. at 33-34). Lastly, Plaintiff alleges

that McEwen and Janda conspired to hold Plaintiff in the

ASU. (Id. at 18.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “does not have a due

process right to a particular classification within the

prison system.” (Motion to Dismiss at 18.) Additionally,

Defendants argue that “administrative segregation is

simply not atypical or a significant hardship in retaliation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” (Id. at

19.)

Plaintiff argues that “prisoners have a liberty

interest in being released on time in conformity with the

sentence imposed,” and in excessive confinement cases,

“prison officials can’t just sit on [their] duff and not

do anything.” (Opposition at 9.) 

The Due Process Clause only protects interests that

arise from the Clause itself or state law. Chappell v.

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Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). The

Court engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether

Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff’s due process

rights. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). 

The Court asks, were Plaintiff’s protected interests

implicated? If so, what procedures constitute due process

of law? Id. 

Further, if the liberty interest was created by

state law, then the question is whether the law “imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (holding that disciplinary confinement of inmates does not itself implicate

protected liberty interests). 

California Code of Regulations Title 15, Section

3335(a) (“Section 3335(a)”) permits correctional staff to

place an inmate in the ASU “when an inmate’s presence in

an institution’s general inmate population presents an

immediate threat to the safety of others...” Once an

inmate is placed in the ASU, an ICC must review the

inmate’s placement and either “retain the inmate in

segregation or release [him] to general population.” Id.

§ 3335(c). If the ICC retains the prisoner in segregation, the prisoner’s placement shall be sent to a CSR “for

review and approval” within thirty days of the initial ICC

review. Id. § 3335(d). Then, the ICC shall review the

detention in segregation at least every ninety days until

the rules violation report is adjudicated. Id. §

3335(d)(1). And “[u]pon resolution of such matters, an

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ICC shall review the inmate’s case within 14 calendar

days.” Id. If no more matters are pending, but the

inmate is being held in segregation pending transfer to

general population, further reviews by the ICC must take

place at least every ninety days until transfer. Id.

As currently pled, the Court believes that Plaintiff

is alleging that he was placed in the ASU because of a

Division D offense. (SAC at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that

he was kept in the ASU for six months past his scheduled

release date because McEwen and Janda failed to comply

with Section 3335. (Id.) 

As Defendants correctly point out, “the Ninth

Circuit explicitly has found that administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d

557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, disciplinary confinement of inmates does not itself implicate a protected

liberty interest. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s

placement in the ASU and the conditions of the ASU alone

did not deprive Plaintiff of his due process rights. See

Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“[I]t is not [the inmate’s] administrative segregation

alone that potentially implicates a protected liberty

interest.”). The Court also does not believe that a

deprivation of telephone calls, television, or access to

the library, although unpleasant, amounts to a “major

disruption [in Plaintiff’s] environment.” Sandin, 515

U.S. at 486; see also Baumann v. Arizona Department of

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Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1985) (“General

limitation of jobs and educational opportunities is not

considered punishment.”); Bryant v. Cortez, 536 F. Supp.

2d 1160, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the loss of

telephone privileges does not implicate a liberty interest

because inmate can communicate by mail or in person). 

Since the Court does not believe that Plaintiff’s

liberty interests were impeded, it need not reach the

question as to whether Plaintiff was afforded a fair

hearing. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims against McEwen 

and Janda arising out of their work on the classification

committee be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to

amend. Plaintiff may allege hardships that were significant or atypical, if they did so exist.

IV. Conclusion

 The Court, having reviewed the SAC, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss, and all documents lodged therewith and attached

thereto, RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s retaliation

claims against Villalobos, Flores, Vitela, Hardman,

Alvarez, Amezcua, Dominguez, Castro, and Zamora be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend.

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s access to the

courts claims against Villalobos and Alvarez be dismissed

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend.

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The Court RECOMMENDS that any due process claims

arising out of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against

Paramo, Castro, Zamora, Lizarraga, and Kornbluth be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, without leave to amend.

The Court RECOMMENDS that any due process claims

against Alvarez, Amezcua, and Dominguez be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE, without leave to amend.

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claim against

Hardman for violation of his due process rights be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend.

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s failure to

supervise claims against McEwen and Janda be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend.

The Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against McEwen

and Janda arising out of their failure to intervene be

DENIED.

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims against McEwen and Janda that arise out

of their failure to respond to Plaintiff’s appeals be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, without leave to amend.

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim against McEwen be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with

leave to amend. As to Janda, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, without leave to amend.

Lastly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment claims against McEwen and Janda

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arising out of their work on the classification committee

be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 17, 2013, any

party to this action may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all

parties no later than May 31, 2013. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 19, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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