Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02696/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02696-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Danielle Owens, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Recontrust Company, NA, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-2696-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion requesting multiple relief from the trial

court (Doc. 34). Part of that motion demands that James E. Teilborg “recuse himself” for

“conflict of interest and judicial misconduct” That motion has been assigned to this Court

for the limited purpose of determining whether Judge Teilborg’s removal from this case is

required (Doc. 34). Having carefully considered that question, the Court denies the motion

in all respects referred. 

Two statutes govern the removal of a district judge from a case on which he or she is

sitting: 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. 

Section 144 applies when a party to a proceeding believes that the district judge “has

a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party[.]” 28 U.S.C.

§ 144. A motion properly brought pursuant to § 144 “must be referred to another judge for

a determination of its merits.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Section 144 further requires that an affidavit be filed in support of the motion that

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must state “facts and the reasons for the belief” “sufficient” to demonstrate “that the judge

before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him [or her]

or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. Although Plaintiff styles her motion as

a verified motion, it is not, in fact, verified and is not accompanied by an affidavit. It is

therefore deficient on its face. Section 144, “expressly conditions relief upon the filing of

a timely and legally sufficient affidavit.” Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867. Id. at 868 (“Of course, if

the motion and affidavit required by section 144 is not presented to the judge, no relief under

section 144 is available.” (emphasis added)).

Even if this Court were to evaluate the bare assertions of Plaintiff’s motion, however,

it is insufficient to suggest that Judge Teilborg has demonstrated bias or prejudice under

section 144. Plaintiff asserts that comments made by Judge Teilborg during a hearing on her

Motion to Sequester the Genuine Note Until Final Adjudication of This Matter, Doc. 16,

establish his bias or prejudice. 

She asserts that, during the hearing, Judge Teilborg stated that he doubted that

Plaintiff could succeed on the merits, and that after reading Plaintiff’s Motion and complaints

it seemed that what she was requesting was contrary to law. Judge Teilborg then asked

Plaintiff to step to the podium and tell him why she was likely to succeed on the merits.

Plaintiff indicated that she was confused by Judge Teilborg’s request and indicated at the

time that she was not waiving her right to a jury trial, but apparently presented no facts or

argument to Judge Teilborg demonstrating that she was likely to succeed on the merits. She

merely asked him what he meant by his questions. 

She further asserts that Judge Teilborg’s bias was evidenced when he told her that she

could not make objections during the presentation of the Defendant. And, finally, she asserts

that bias was evidenced when the defense counsel was not sworn in. 

These statements and actions lead Plaintiff to believe without any other asserted basis

that Judge Teilborg may have received “pecuniary gain from Defendants”, or perhaps he is

biased against Plaintiff because she is female, African-American, a pro se litigant, and/or all

of the aforementioned. Plaintiff’s motion to recuse is without merit. 

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Plaintiff’s Motion to Sequester the Genuine Note sought preliminary injunctive relief

from the Court. In such a motion, by its very nature, Plaintiff requested that the Court grant

her emergency relief before both sides have a fair chance to present all of the evidence to a

jury at a full trial on the case. As a result, that law requires that Plaintiff establish both that

she has at least some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of her case at trial, and that she

will suffer irreparable injury if she does not obtain the relief she requests before both sides

can present a trial to the court. “The traditional equitable criteria for granting preliminary

injunctive relief are (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of

irreparable injury to the plaintiff if the preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of

hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases).”

Id. at 1200 (citations omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. “In this circuit, the moving party may

meet its burden by demonstrating either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits

and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.” Id. at 1201; see GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt

Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Sardi’s Rest. Corp., 755 F.2d at

723).

When Judge Teilborg indicated to the Plaintiff that, after reading her complaint and

motion he did not believe that the law authorized the relief she was seeking, and provided

her with the opportunity to demonstrate why she was likely to prevail upon her complaint,

he was not doing anything other than following a fairly standard procedure for hearings in

which a Plaintiff requests the type of emergency relief that Plaintiff sought here. To the

extent that Judge Teilborg’s inquiry expressed a tentative legal conclusion on his part, a

judge’s adverse ruling is not a basis on which his removal can be sought.” United States v.

Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). 

As for Judge Teilborg’s statement that Plaintiff was not allowed to object during

defense counsel’s oral argument, such a role is a standard rule of protocol in any court.

Plaintiff is allowed to interrupt defense counsel at trial when he is asking questions of a

witness that Plaintiff believes to be inappropriate under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

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Nevertheless, as a standard matter of courtesy, Plaintiff is not generally allowed to interrupt

opposing counsel when he is making his argument to the Court.

To the extent that defense counsel was not sworn into evidence, this also does not

depart from usual procedure. Persons or parties are sworn in only if they are going to testify

before the Court. A lawyer for a party need not be sworn in, because, except in rare

circumstances, a lawyer does not testify to the Court. A lawyer’s argument of his client’s

position to the Court does not constitute testimony. By contrast, when a party is representing

herself, her presentation to the Court may include both argument and testimony. In such

cases it does not demonstrate bias or prejudice to have the pro se party sworn in. 

 Thus, none of the matters asserted by Plaintiff establish, let alone suggest, that Judge

Teilborg is biased or prejudiced either against Plaintiff or in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff’s

speculation that Judge Teilborg is biased against Plaintiff because Judge Teilborg either

accepted a bribe from Defendants, or is prejudiced against her because of her gender, race

or pro se status is wholly unsupported by any asserted facts and is wholly inadequate to result

in his removal. United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1340 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding that

affidavit containing merely conclusory statements or opinion need not be credited in

considering a motion to recuse.). 

The mere filing of an affidavit of disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1944 does

not automatically disqualify a judge. A judge ruling on the motion has both the authority,

and the duty, to decide whether a claim of bias is legally sufficient. In doing so the statute

“must be given the utmost strict construction to safeguard the judiciary from frivolous attacks

on its dignity and integrity and to prevent abuse and insure the orderly functioning of the

judicial system.” Rademacher v. City of Phoenix, 442 F. Supp. 27, 29 (D. Ariz. 1977)

(citations omitted). 

To the extent that Plaintiff’s motion is based on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), that statute

requires that “any justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] of the United States shall

disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The statute also provides additional bases on which a

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judge might also disqualify himself or herself. The statutory “is self-enforcing on the part

of the judge.” Sibla. at 867-68. “[I]t includes no provision for referral of the question of

recusal to another judge; if the judge sitting on a case is aware of grounds for recusal under

section 455, that judge has a duty to recuse himself or herself.” Id. at 868. In ordering that

the instant motion be reassigned, this Court thus interprets Judge Teilborg’s request to be

limited to ruling on section 144. (Doc. 36). Nevertheless, to the extent Judge Teilborg has

also referred any aspect of Plaintiff’s motion that might implicate section 455 to this Court,

for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has not set forth any basis for reasonably questioning

the impartiality or the disqualification of Judge Teilborg.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 34) in all respects

referred to this Court for ruling.

DATED this 31st day of March, 2011.

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