Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03312/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03312-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 13-3312 

RENARDO CARTER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

TIMOTHY DOUMA, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 11-cv-320-wmc — William M. Conley, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2014 — DECIDED AUGUST 6, 2015 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Renardo Carter challenges his Wisconsin conviction for possessing between five 

and fifteen grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. At 

Carter’s trial, a police officer testified about his work with an 

informant who had said Carter was involved in distributing 

drugs. The officer’s testimony relayed the substance of the 

identification as well as the fact that he requested and heard 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
2 No. 13-3312 

the informant call Carter to order cocaine. Carter’s lawyer 

did not object to the testimony about the informant’s out-ofcourt statements and actions. During closing argument, the 

State referred to the informant’s statements and actions to 

support its argument that Carter possessed cocaine with intent to deliver, again without objection from Carter’s lawyer. 

Carter sought post-conviction relief in state court. He argued that the officer’s testimony about his out-of-court conversation with the informant violated his Confrontation 

Clause right to cross-examine an adverse witness and that 

his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for failing to object to that testimony. 

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected both claims, finding no plain error in admission of the evidence and concluding that Carter’s lawyer was not ineffective for failing to object. The state court explained that admitting the testimony 

posed no Confrontation Clause problem because it was offered not to show the truth of what the informant said but to 

explain why the police investigated Carter as they did. 

Carter filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 asserting the same Confrontation Clause and 

ineffective assistance theories. The district court denied the 

petition, and we affirm that denial. While there is a good argument that Carter’s trial lawyer should have objected to 

some of the officer’s testimony about the informant and its 

use during closing argument, we need not determine whether his lawyer rendered constitutionally deficient assistance 

because Carter has not shown that the failure to object prejudiced him. The evidence shows that Carter possessed at 

least twelve bags of the sort commonly used to redistribute 

controlled substances and that each of those bags would 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 3

have held at least 1.75 grams of cocaine. Though Carter’s 

dramatic efforts to flee the police and then to dispose of the 

bags while standing in a river in view of officers prevented 

the State from proving more definitively what those bags 

contained, the state court’s finding of no prejudice was not 

unreasonable. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Events Leading to Arrest

On November 18, 2004, police narcotics investigator Michael Webster went to a motel parking lot to meet a confidential informant with a lead on a person distributing controlled substances. Officer Webster had hoped to get enough 

information to justify a stop of the suspected man’s vehicle 

or otherwise to secure his arrest. After hearing about this 

suspicious man, Officer Webster asked the informant to 

point out the vehicle the man was using. During their conversation, Officer Webster saw that man leave a motel room 

and walk toward the vehicle. The man was Carter. 

At that point, Officer Webster asked the informant to call 

Carter and say that he wanted to buy cocaine “teeners,” onesixteenth ounce quantities of cocaine. The informant complied, and Officer Webster made sure he could hear what the 

informant was saying and could observe Carter’s actions in 

response to the informant’s requests. He saw Carter pick up 

his phone when the informant called, and when the informant hung up, so did Carter. Shortly after the conversation 

ended, Carter drove away. 

Officer Webster then enlisted an Officer Starks to follow 

and stop Carter. Carter refused to stop. This prompted a car 

chase—involving Officer Starks and later Officer Webster—

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
4 No. 13-3312 

that ended only when Carter stopped his car and ran into 

the Wisconsin River near a dam. Officers Webster and Starks 

pursued Carter on foot. They saw from a distance that Carter 

was holding a large plastic bag that they thought contained a 

mixture of powder and crack cocaine. Officer Webster estimated that the bag was about the size of a 14-inch softball 

and could have contained in excess of two ounces of the 

powdery substance. 

Officers Webster and Starks caught up with Carter in the 

river and arrested him there. Before they reached him, other 

officers on top of a nearby dam saw Carter pull small packets of a white, powdery substance out of his pockets, tear the 

packets open with his teeth, and dump the bags and their 

contents into the water. When the officers reached Carter, the 

bag they had seen previously was now empty, and Carter 

had a white, powdery substance around his mouth. At one 

point, Carter indicated he had ingested all of the substance, 

but he later said he had not swallowed any of it. Officer 

Webster also observed a fair amount of white residue floating on the water. Officer Starks testified that his narcoticsdetection dog indicated for the presence of an odor of an illegal substance in the water near Carter. 

Beyond seeing traces of the powder, Officer Webster also 

recovered from the river twelve “baggie corners,” a type of 

bag smaller than the larger bag they previously saw Carter 

holding. In the officer’s experience, people packaging controlled substances often make little bags like these by placing 

the substance in the corner of a sandwich bag, tying it off, 

and cutting away the excess bag material. Officer Webster 

testified that all of these smaller baggies would have fit easily within the larger bag he had seen earlier. 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 5

After Carter disposed of the substance in the river, the 

police were unable to recover much of it for testing. They 

were not able to test the baggies or powdery residue in the 

river, but they did test one rock found in the river and other 

rocks found in Carter’s car. Both samples contained cocaine. 

The total weight of recovered cocaine was just 0.2 grams. 

B. Trial

The State charged Carter with possessing between fifteen 

and forty grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. Carter’s 

actions in the river ensured that the State had little physical 

evidence at trial, so the State relied primarily on the testimony of Officers Starks and Webster. Then other officers testified about the arrest, including seeing Carter in possession 

of bags containing a white, powdery substance and trying to 

dispose of the bags in the river. Officer Webster estimated 

that Carter had possessed at least 21 grams of cocaine before 

he disposed of it in the river. Officer Webster also testified 

that carrying that many baggie corners is strong evidence of 

intent to distribute the cocaine to others. 

The State had planned to call the informant at trial but 

had waited until right before trial to disclose the informant’s 

identity. This left Carter little time to investigate the informant’s background. At Carter’s request, the trial court barred 

the State from calling the informant as a witness. The trial 

court said it would permit the State to ask witnesses about 

their interactions with the informant so long as their testimony complied with hearsay rules. 

Officer Webster testified about the informant’s role in the 

investigation. He explained the circumstances of the meeting 

and said the reason they met was so that the informant could 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
6 No. 13-3312 

“direct [him] to an individual that was involved in distributing controlled substances.” It later came out that the person the informant referred to was Carter. Officer Webster also described what the informant said on the call with Carter 

and made clear that he heard the informant order “teeners” 

of cocaine from Carter. At no point did Carter’s lawyer object 

to Officer Webster’s discussion of the informant. 

Though the State had said it would not use any of the informant’s statements for their truth, the State relied on those 

statements in closing argument: 

Why do I feel that possession with intent has 

been shown here? It has been shown because 

you heard the testimony by Investigator Webster of a confidential informant, someone that 

the officer uses in drug investigations as part of 

a tactic that they use. I mean they have people 

out there who are aware of drug activity going 

on. They don’t want to necessarily come here 

and divulge their name or get involved, because they might be used in continuing investigation, more than one person. 

But with that CI, he was directed to a place 

where that CI was. The CI came in the vehicle 

with him, pointed out Mr. Carter; that they 

went over to Econo Lodge. And as he is pointing him out, the officer said, okay, if what you 

are saying is true here, order some up for me. 

So the CI gets on the line, makes the phone call. 

Mr. Carter is out there answering the phone all 

observed by the officer. He hears him order 

four teeners, which he has testified is 1/16 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 7

ounce of cocaine. The CI hangs up, the defendant hangs up. He then keeps surveillance the 

officer does on the defendant until he becomes 

mobile after the deal had been set up. 

Later the State asked the jury to look at the facts and find 

that possession with intent to deliver had been shown because: 

You had the officer indicating that the CI said, 

get me at least four teeners, 16th ounce. You 

have 12 packages, not that we know that this is 

all he had, but we have 12 packages that we 

were able to find. And the officer said, those 

could have been packages teeners, eight balls, 

they could have been higher amounts of cocaine, but I know he ordered teeners. CI ordered teeners, I heard him. 

The jury found Carter not guilty of possessing between fifteen and forty grams of cocaine with intent to deliver but 

convicted him of the lesser offense of possessing between 

five and fifteen grams of cocaine with intent to deliver.1

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings

Carter sought post-conviction relief in state court. He argued that Webster’s testimony about his conversation with 

the informant denied him a fair trial. Recognizing that he 

did not object at trial, he argued the testimony violated his 

 1 Carter was also charged with three other offenses. He was convicted of two (eluding an officer and resisting or obstructing an officer) and 

acquitted of the third (recklessly endangering safety). Those charges are 

not at issue in this appeal. 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
8 No. 13-3312 

right of confrontation because it was offered for its truth and 

its admission amounted to plain error. Alternatively, Carter 

argued that his lawyer’s failure to object to the testimony 

denied him effective assistance of counsel. 

To determine whether Carter’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object, the state trial court held a hearing 

pursuant to State v. Machner, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. App. 

1979). Carter’s trial counsel testified that he did not think Officer Webster’s testimony that the informant had directed 

him to a person involved in distributing controlled substances was offered for its truth. He thought this statement 

served to explain why the officers were interested in investigating Carter. Similarly, the testimony regarding what the 

informant said on the call to Carter was offered not to prove 

it was true but to show the effect those statements had on the 

other party to the drug transaction—Carter—as viewed by 

Officer Webster. The trial court denied relief, agreeing that 

the testimony about the informant was not offered for its 

truth. 

Carter appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Turning first to whether Carter’s counsel was ineffective, the 

court concluded that “the officer’s testimony about what he 

actually observed and overheard while with the informant 

was not offered to establish that Carter was selling drugs 

but, rather, provided background information for the jury to 

understand why the police tried to stop Carter’s vehicle and 

chased him when he sped away.” On this view, admitting 

the testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause and 

the failure to object was not deficient performance by counsel. The court also found that any claimed deficiency would 

not have resulted in prejudice, finding “no reasonable probCase: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 9

ability that absent this testimony, the result would have been 

different.” The state appellate court also concluded that admitting the testimony had been neither a plain error nor a 

reason for a new trial in the interest of justice. In fact, the 

court was “not convinced that admission of the challenged 

testimony constituted error, much less plain error.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied further review. 

Carter then filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the validity of his state court 

conviction. The district court denied the petition, concluding 

that the state court had not unreasonably applied Strickland

in finding that counsel was not deficient and that Carter was 

not prejudiced by any possible deficiency. The district declined to issue a certificate of appealability. 

Carter appealed. We granted his request for a certificate 

of appealability as to: (1) whether Officer Webster’s testimony concerning the informant violated the Confrontation 

Clause; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to that testimony. Carter raises both of these 

grounds on appeal. 

II. Habeas Corpus Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Carter must satisfy two statutory requirements to prevail on his federal habeas petition. First, he 

must establish that “he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a). Second, since the state appellate court ruled on the 

merits of his claims, he must also go further and show that 

his detention is the result of a state court decision that was 

(1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
10 No. 13-3312 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

To prevail in federal court, Carter must show that the 

state appellate court’s ruling on either claim was “objectively 

unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not 

suffice.” Campbell v. Smith, 770 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2014), 

quoting White v. Woodall, 572 U.S.—, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 

(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the ruling 

must have been “so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). The district court 

reviewed these claims under that standard and concluded 

that the state court’s rejection of Carter’s claims was not objectively unreasonable. We review that conclusion de novo. 

Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 2011). 

A. Confrontation Clause 

Carter challenges directly the State’s use of the informant’s statements on Confrontation Clause grounds. He argues that the state court unreasonably applied Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The State argues that Carter’s 

procedural default, in the form of the failing to object at trial, 

provides an independent and adequate state law ground for 

denying relief on this claim. We agree with the State. 

If a state court denies relief “by relying on a state law 

ground that is both independent of the federal question and 

adequate to support the judgment, federal habeas review of 

the claim is foreclosed.” Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 11

591 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

729 (1991). A procedural failure to raise the federal claim as 

required by state procedural rules, often called a procedural 

default, is a common example of such an independent and 

adequate state ground. Id. at 591–92. 

When the state presents this as an affirmative defense in 

federal court and the defense is found to apply to a petitioner’s claim, the federal court cannot entertain the claim unless 

the petitioner persuades the federal habeas court to excuse 

the default. Petitioner can do so by establishing cause for 

failing to follow the state procedural rules and a resulting 

prejudice from his failure to do so. See id. at 591; Wrinkles v. 

Buss, 537 F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir. 2008), citing Wainwright v. 

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 90 (1977). A procedural default may 

also be excused if a failure to consider the claim would result 

in a “fundamental miscarriage[] of justice” because “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of 

one who is actually innocent.” Wrinkles, 537 F.3d at 812 n.3 

(alteration in original), quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 496 (1986). 

The state court declined to give full review to Carter’s 

Confrontation Clause claim because he failed to comply with 

Wisconsin’s contemporaneous objection requirement at trial. 

See Kaczmarek, 627 F.3d at 592 (“A state law ground is independent when the court actually relied on the procedural bar 

as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.”). Under Wisconsin law, a defendant waives an objection—

whether based on state law or an alleged violation of a constitutional right—when it is not made at the time the alleged 

error takes place. See Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(a); State v. Erickson, 596 N.W.2d 749, 754–55 (Wis. 1999) (declining to excuse 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
12 No. 13-3312 

waiver and instead reviewing unobjected-to claim as claim 

for ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Hansbrough, 799 

N.W.2d 887, 896 (Wis. App. 2011). 

Here the state court recognized this failure to object and 

said that it considered the merits of the Confrontation 

Clause claim only as a basis for Carter’s ineffective assistance 

claim or under plain-error or interest-of-justice review. That 

more limited review is not a decision on the merits that allows us to consider the claim on federal habeas review. See 

Kaczmarek, 627 F.3d at 592; Gray v. Hardy, 598 F.3d 324, 329 

(7th Cir. 2010); cf. Malone v. Walls, 538 F.3d 744, 756–57 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (when state court makes clear that it is resolving a 

federal issue despite procedural problems, federal courts can 

consider merits). The state court concluded that Carter was 

not entitled to relief under any of these more limited forms 

of relief. 

In Wisconsin, it is common for state courts to analyze a 

failure to object as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Doing so does not mean that the state court resolved the 

merits of the underlying waived claim. See Erickson, 596 

N.W.2d at 754 (“[T]he normal procedure in criminal cases is 

to address waiver within the rubric of the ineffective assistance of counsel.”); State v. Hayes, 681 N.W.2d 203, 223–24 

(Wis. 2004) (Sykes, J., concurring); State v. Benson, 822 

N.W.2d 484, 489 (Wis. App. 2012). In Wisconsin, then, there 

is strong support for what we already presume under federal habeas practice: a state court’s rejection of the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim does not constitute a decision on 

the merits of the underlying claim. See Lewis v. Sternes, 390 

F.3d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A meritorious claim of attorney ineffectiveness might amount to cause for the failure to 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 13

present an issue to a state court, but the fact that the ineffectiveness claim was raised at some point in state court does 

not mean that the state court was given the opportunity to 

address the underlying issue that the attorney in question 

neglected to raise.”). 

Accordingly, Carter has procedurally defaulted his Confrontation Clause claim. He has not tried to show either 

“cause and prejudice” or that a failure to consider his Confrontation Clause claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Carter is not entitled to relief on that 

claim. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

In Carter’s view, his lawyer’s failure to object to use of the 

informant’s out-of-court statements for their truth means 

that his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 

within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). He argues the State’s use of those statements was 

clearly barred by the rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004), that out-of-court testimonial 

statements cannot be admitted against a criminal defendant 

unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a 

prior chance to cross-examine the declarant. Although this 

claim is framed in terms of whether Carter’s lawyer was ineffective rather than the Confrontation Clause itself, the 

Crawford issue is nonetheless integral to the Strickland analysis here. See Campbell v. Smith, 770 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 

2014) (addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

based on an embedded constitutional issue). Carter argues 

that the state court unreasonably applied both Crawford and 

Strickland in denying him post-conviction relief. 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
14 No. 13-3312 

Under Strickland’s familiar two-pronged standard, Carter 

must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient 

and that he was prejudiced as a result. Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). Here, the state court decided that 

counsel’s performance was not deficient and that even if it 

had been, Carter was not prejudiced. Our review of each 

prong of the Strickland analysis is subject to AEDPA’s deferential standard of review under § 2254(d)(1). Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 F.3d 329, 350–51 (7th Cir. 2011). Once AEDPA applies, “[t]he bar for establishing that a state court’s application of the Strickland standard was ‘unreasonable’ is a high 

one, and only a clear error in applying Strickland will support a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 

To argue his trial lawyer’s performance was deficient, 

Carter relies on his counsel’s failure to object to two portions 

of Officer Webster’s testimony and the prosecution’s use of 

them in closing argument. First, he asserts that Officer Webster should not have been able to testify that he instructed 

the informant to call Carter to request “teeners” and that the 

informant did so. This theory has no merit. The officer’s instruction and the informant’s request for “teeners” were not 

hearsay because they were not “statements” making any factual assertions. See, e.g., Schindler v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Statements that constitute verbal acts 

(e.g., words of contract or slander) are not hearsay because 

they are not offered for their truth.”); United States v. Moreno, 

233 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2000). Nor were they testimonial 

for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S. 

at 59 n.9. That portion of Officer Webster’s testimony merely 

described verbal acts, his own instruction, and the informant’s offer to buy, all of which Webster made and/or saw and 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 15

heard himself. Such verbal acts are not statements offered to 

prove the truth of their contents. 

If Carter’s counsel had objected to this testimony on 

hearsay or Confrontation Clause grounds, his objection 

should have been overruled. His performance was not deficient by failing to make a futile objection. See Lambert v. 

McBridge, 365 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. 

Neeley, 189 F.3d 670, 684 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Obviously, counsel 

can not be considered ineffective for failing to make an objection to the introduction of evidence that was properly 

admitted.”). 

Carter’s second challenge has more substance. He argues 

that his lawyer should have objected to Officer Webster’s testimony that he was investigating Carter because the informant had identified Carter as someone involved in distributing controlled substances. Carter maintains that the State 

also impermissibly relied on this testimony during closing 

argument to establish that he was guilty of possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine. The prosecutor reminded the jury, albeit obliquely, that the informant had identified Carter 

as someone involved in drug dealing. The prosecutor asked 

the jury to infer from the evidence that a deal had been set 

up and that Carter had teeners on him as the police closed in 

to arrest him as he stood in the river. 

The state court held that counsel’s failure to object could 

not have been deficient performance because introducing 

this testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause.2 See 

 2 Carter argues in his reply brief that the state court failed to address 

the testimony regarding the informant’s identification of him as a drug 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
16 No. 13-3312 

Lambert, 365 F.3d at 564; Neeley, 189 F.3d at 684. Invoking the 

“course of investigation” gambit to avoid hearsay rules, it 

held this testimony was offered only to explain why the police stopped Carter and pursued him. 

When the reasons for the police’s actions are relevant, a 

witness can testify about what information prompted those 

actions. That is, when such a statement is offered only to 

show the effect it had on the police, it is used for a purpose 

other than the truth of its contents. E.g., United States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2006) (testimony is not for its 

truth where it is offered “only as an explanation of why the 

investigation proceeded as it did”). We have applied this 

“course of investigation” rationale in several cases to permit 

the government to introduce brief out-of-court statements 

designed to “bridge gaps in the trial testimony that would 

otherwise substantially confuse or mislead the jury.” See 

Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1046 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting 

cases). This approach is consistent with the Confrontation 

Clause, which “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 

matter asserted.” See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; United 

States v. Gaytan, 649 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2011) (testimonial 

statements of a witness did not violate the Confrontation 

Clause, because they “were not offered for their truth”). 

The problem, as we have explained time and again, is 

that the “course of investigation” gambit is so often abused 

and/or misunderstood that it is an evidentiary and constitutional minefield. See, e.g., Jones, 635 F.3d at 1046; United 

 

dealer, but this is not correct. The state court recognized that this was 

part of Carter’s argument. 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 17

States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing 

agents to narrate the course of their investigations, and thus 

spread before juries damning information that is not subject 

to cross-examination, would go far toward abrogating the 

defendant’s rights under the sixth amendment and the hearsay rule.”). To convict a defendant, after all, the prosecution 

does not need to prove its reasons for investigating him. 

United States v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1310 (7th Cir. 1978). 

When the prosecution offers out-of-court statements of nonwitnesses on the theory they are being offered to explain 

“the course of the investigation,” it runs a substantial risk of 

violating both the hearsay rules of evidence and the Confrontation Clause rights of the defendant under the Sixth 

Amendment. Both defense counsel and trial judges need to 

be on high alert when the prosecution offers what sounds 

like hearsay to explain “the course of the investigation.” 

Under circumstances like these, where the only reason 

counsel failed to object was his understanding that such testimony was not objectionable—and not some strategic 

judgment—counsel runs the risk of rendering performance 

that falls below the objective standard of reasonableness. See 

Barrow v. Uchtman, 398 F.3d 597, 605 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting 

that a lawyer’s failure to act based on his “erroneous understanding of state law” can render his performance deficient); 

Gardner v. United States, 680 F.3d 1006, 1011–12 (7th Cir. 

2012). Under AEDPA, however, the ultimate question is 

“whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,” and we must deny 

the writ if the state court offered a reasonable argument that 

counsel behaved competently. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
18 No. 13-3312 

We recently addressed the scope of the “course of investigation” theory in Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 

2011), when we determined that the state court unreasonably 

applied Crawford in determining that the government’s use 

of out-of-court informant statements fell within the “course 

of investigation” theory. But that finding does not dictate 

whether the state court’s use of the theory here was reasonable. First, the use of the informant testimony here was 

much narrower and more limited than in Jones, where the 

government misused the gambit to give the jury a detailed 

hearsay account that linked the defendant to four murders, 

explained how the murders were committed, and described 

what happened to the weapons afterwards. Id. at 1036–37. 

Second, in Jones, unlike here, we addressed the Confrontation Clause claim directly and were not encumbered by the 

need to give deference to counsel under Strickland. 

We need not resolve whether the failure to object here to 

the arguably hearsay identification was deficient performance, however. Even if Carter’s counsel might have been 

deficient in failing to object to Officer Webster’s testimony 

about the informant’s identification and its use during closing argument, Carter cannot show that the state court unreasonably determined that the problematic testimony did not 

prejudice him. See Taylor v. Bradley, 448 F.3d 942, 948–49 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (declining to resolve whether deficient performance when clear that no prejudice). 

For a petitioner to have been prejudiced by his counsel’s 

deficient performance, he must establish a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had counsel objected to the inadmissible testimony. 

See Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. A reasonable probability is one 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 19

that undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The likelihood of a different outcome “must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 112. A guilty verdict that is “overwhelmingly supported by the record is less likely to have been affected by 

errors than one that is only weakly supported by the record.” Eckstein v. Kingston, 460 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 2006), 

quoting Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 891 (7th Cir. 2001). 

A state court’s application of the prejudice prong of Strickland is reviewed under the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). 

In reviewing Carter’s conviction, the state court applied 

the appropriate standard and pointed to all the evidence of 

Carter’s guilt that made the court confident that the verdict 

was not affected by the use of hearsay. In light of that evidence, the state court reasonably determined that Carter was 

not prejudiced by the admission or later use of Officer Webster’s testimony about the informant. 

The evidence shows that Carter possessed at least some 

cocaine even if his efforts to dispose of the evidence ensured 

that only 0.2 grams of cocaine were recovered. On the disputed points—whether Carter possessed at least five grams 

of cocaine and whether he actually intended to deliver the 

cocaine he had—the State offered ample evidence of Carter’s 

guilt. As the state court explained, the police observed Carter 

holding a large bag containing a substance that looked like a 

mixture of cocaine and crack cocaine. The officer estimated 

that the large bag alone might have held a couple of ounces, 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
20 No. 13-3312 

or over fifty grams.3 Beyond that, the officers recovered 

twelve smaller baggies (or bag corners) in the river. Officer 

Webster testified that the recovered baggies were prepared 

in such a way that they could be expected to hold either onesixteenth or one-eighth of an ounce. Even if each contained 

only the smaller quantity, one “teener,” Carter was in possession of well over five grams. 

Carter resists using the baggies to infer that he was in 

possession of well over five grams, emphasizing that none of 

those baggies contained cocaine at the time of the arrest. But 

there was ample evidence that they did just before Carter 

was arrested. After Carter’s dangerous and desperate flight 

from police ended with him standing in the river, Officers 

Webster and Starks saw him holding a larger bag that contained a substance that looked like cocaine, and also saw that 

he had a white, powdery substance on his mouth. The little 

baggies that were recovered are often used to hold controlled substances and are specifically prepared for that purpose. Police officers actually saw him pulling those bags out 

of his pocket and dumping the bags, along with their white, 

powdery contents, into the water. He was seen churning the 

water to disperse the substance. He was not completely successful. A white, powdery residue remained on the water, 

and a police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the 

water. Carter also argues that absent the informant’s testimony there was no evidence that he intended to deliver cocaine. That is not correct. Officer Webster testified that the 

packaging and quantities indicated intent to distribute. 

 3 An ounce is equivalent to 28.35 grams. A “teener,” which is onesixteenth of an ounce, contains about 1.77 grams. Possession of just three 

“teeners” would have been sufficient to support the conviction. 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21
No. 13-3312 21

Given all of the evidence that Carter possessed at least 

five grams of cocaine and intended to deliver it, the state 

court did not apply federal law unreasonably in determining 

there would not have been a reasonable probability of a different result if Carter’s attorney had objected to the use of 

the informant’s hearsay identification of him as a person involved in distributing drugs. 

The district court’s judgment denying Carter’s petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. 

Case: 13-3312 Document: 33 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 21