Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00367/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00367-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHARON ELIZABETH DUKE, )

 )

PLAINTIFF, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO.: 1:05-cv-367-MEF

 )

HOUSTON COUNTY, ALABAMA, et al., ) (WO- Not Recommended for Publication)

 )

DEFENDANTS. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

A woman who alleges that she was arrested and jailed improperly after she reported

a sexual assault by a man employed by the Houston County Sheriff’s Department brings suit

against the county, its sheriff, and a deputy sheriff. Those defendants seek dismissal of all

claims against them in the Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

(Doc. # 28) filed on May 17, 2006, which motion is now under submission and ready for a

ruling. For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the motion is due

to be GRANTED with all federal claims being dismissed with prejudice and all state law

claims being dismissed without prejudice. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1343(a)(4), and 1367. Additionally, defendants have not argued that the court does not have

personal jurisdiction over each of them. There is no dispute over whether venue pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) is appropriate as alleged. 

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 1 of 29
 In paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint, Duke identifies McCallister as having 1

“served as a Houston County police officer at all times material to this action.” Doc. # 21

at ¶ 9. Other allegations in the Amended Complaint seem to indicate that McCallister was

actually an officer with the Houston County Sheriff’s Department. Doc. # 21 at ¶¶ 13, 21,

& 29.

2

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 20, 2005, Sharon Elizabeth Duke (“Duke”) filed this action against Houston

County, a Houston County sheriff’s deputy named Susan Seay (“Seay”), a Houston County

“police officer” or deputy sheriff named Jason McCallister (“McCallister”) , and the Houston 1

County Sheriff’s Department. 

The Houston County Sheriff’s Department filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it

was not a entity that could be sued. Duke conceded that was the case and moved to dismiss

that entity as a defendant. Thereafter, the Court granted the motion to dismiss, and the claims

against the Houston County Sheriff’s Department were dismissed. See Doc. # 18. The other

defendants named in the Complaint also moved to dismiss. Because the Court found that the

Complaint failed to comport with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ requirement that

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against individual defendants satisfy a “heightened pleading”

standard, the Court required Duke to amend her complaint. 

On April 10, 2006, Duke filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. # 21). In the Amended

Complaint, Duke sets forth the following claims: (1) malicious prosecution in violation of

the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); (2) violation of her

Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 2 of 29
3

(Count II); (3) assault and battery pursuant to Alabama law (Count III); (4) malicious

prosecution pursuant to Alabama law (Count IV); (5) “intentional infliction of emotional

distress” pursuant to Alabama law (Count V); and negligent supervision, training, and

retention pursuant to Alabama law (Count VI). The Amended Complaint made it plain that

it only contained claims pursuant to Alabama law against McCallister. The Court declined

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Duke’s claims against McCallister and dismissed

them without prejudice. See Doc. # 34. 

Thus, the only claims now pending before the Court are Duke’s claims against

Houston County, Alabama (“Houston County”), Lamar Glover the Sheriff of Houston

County Alabama (“Glover”), and Seay. Duke brings claims against Glover and Seay in both

their individual and their official capacities. Duke seeks compensatory and punitive

damages, declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that her rights were and continue to

be violated by the actions of these defendants, a permanent injunction enjoining the

defendants from continuing to violate the Fourth Amendment, attorneys fees, costs, and

expenses. Houston County, Glover, and Seay contend that all claims against them are due

to be dismissed. Duke disagrees. 

FACTUAL PREDICATE ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

The following is a summary of the factual basis for the lawsuit as set forth by the

allegations of the Amended Complaint (Doc. # 21). Duke alleges that she is a licensed

paramedic who at the time of the events giving rise to this action was working for Care

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 3 of 29
 McCallister was at that time employed by the Houston County Sheriff’s Office. He 2

was also Duke’s ex-boyfriend.

4

Ambulance and volunteering at Rehobeth Fire and Rescue. She also alleges that she was

previously employed by the Dothan Police Department. 

Duke alleges that on August 12, 2003, she fell ill at her home. She had a prior history

of passing out and had medicine which she took to prevent it. When she began to feel faint,

nauseous, and sweaty, she called a female friend and asked the friend to bring a cardiac

monitor to her house. The friend did so and ran a cardiac test on Duke. The results were

irregular. The friend urged Duke to go to the hospital, but Duke declined. 

Later that afternoon, Duke was still not feeling any better so she called another female

friend and asked her to take her to the hospital. A few minutes later, McCallister arrived at 2

Duke’s house to take her to the hospital. McCallister took Duke to the hospital where she

was given tests and medications including Adavan, morphine and Lorcet Plus. McCallister

brought Duke home from the hospital. She told him to leave, but he insisted on staying at

her home. Duke fell asleep and was in and out of consciousness due to the medications she

had been given at the hospital. At various points, Duke woke up to find McCallister

performing various sexual acts with her. She protested and told him to stop and leave each

time she awoke, but then she “passed out” again. Duke did not consent to the sexual acts

with McCallister. At some point, McCallister left Duke’s home. 

Duke awoke the next afternoon. Her body was very sore. She did not feel safe in her

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 4 of 29
5

own home. She went to stay with a female friend. While at the friend’s house, Duke saw

McCallister repeatedly drive by the house and slow down as if watching the house. Duke

was scared. She told a friend’s mother Ann Baxter (“Baxter”) about what had happened. 

Baxter, who at the time was a city magistrate, recommended that Duke file a police

report and seek a protective order against McCallister. Baxter scheduled an appointment for

Duke to speak with Scott Langley (“Langley”), a deputy sheriff with the Houston County

Sheriff’s Department. On August 14, 2003, Duke gave a statement to Langley complaining

of sexual assault by McCallister. Langley told Duke that because McCallister was employed

by the Houston County Sheriff’s Department, he would have to pass the information on to

other officers of the Houston County Sheriff’s Department. 

Seay, a Deputy Sheriff with the Houston County Sheriff’s Department with the rank

of Lieutenant, called Duke in for an interview regarding the police report. On August 19,

2003, Duke met with Seay. Seay instructed Duke to write a statement. Duke did so. Duke

included first hand knowledge and second hand knowledge in her written statement. Seay

then required Duke to submit to a video recorded interview. Seay instructed Duke to only

provide first hand knowledge during this interview. During this interview, Duke alleges that

Seay refused to listen to her, cut her off when she tried to explain what happened, and

accused her of “using” McCallister. Seay repeatedly instructed Duke that she would not

listen to “hearsay” about the incidents. Seay also allegedly insisted repeatedly that the sex

was consensual even though Duke was unconscious. 

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 5 of 29
 It is alleged that Seay had interviewed McCallister regarding Duke’s complaint 3

about him prior to her interview with the plaintiff. The Amended Complaint is devoid of

allegations regarding how Seay treated McCallister during her interview of him. 

 Duke has not alleged any information concerning the results of either her polygraph 4

examination or McCallister’s polygraph examination.

6

The interview upset Duke a great deal. At one point she had to take a break and go

to the rest room to cry. At the end of the interview, Seay told Duke that McCallister had

agreed to take a polygraph. Seay asked Duke to take one as well. Duke did so. Upon 3 4

leaving the polygraph test, Seay told Duke that Duke’s police report was “unfounded” and

cautioned her not to be surprised when charges were pressed against her because “the Sheriff

didn’t like people filing reports on his deputies.”

On August 20, 2003, Seay filed a complaint against Duke for alleged false reporting

in which she represented to the District Court of Houston County that she had probable cause

to believe that Duke unlawfully and knowingly made a false report on August 14, 2003.

Seay served as the complainant and as an identified witness. Duke also alleges that Seay

swore out an arrest warrant against Duke for the alleged false reporting of a crime.

On August 21, 2003, Seay executed the arrest warrant against Duke on behalf of

Glover, by placing Duke under arrest at her place of employment and taking her to jail in a

Houston County Sheriff’s Department vehicle. Duke was placed in the Houston County jail

until her release on bond. She was subsequently prosecuted on the charge. She plead not

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 6 of 29
 Duke also alleges that she was acquitted on the charge against her. See Doc. # 21 5

at ¶ 35.

Duke relies heavily on Conley and its progeny and never addresses the new standard 6

announced by the United States Supreme Court in Twombly. Indeed, Twombly repudiates

the reading of Conley on which Duke relies and clarifies that Conley merely describes “the

breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint contains, not the minimum

standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.” 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69 &

n.8.

7

guilty to the charge and that charge was eventually “thrown out.” Duke alleges that the 5

defendants acted with malice or deliberate or reckless indifference to her federally protected

rights causing her emotional distress, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of

enjoyment of life, physical injury, pain, and suffering. She also alleges that the defendants

discriminated against her on the basis of her gender in that they discounted her statements

and allegations of sexual assault choosing instead to rely upon the McCallister’s allegations.

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Prior to the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), a

motion to dismiss could only be granted if a plaintiff could prove “no set of facts . . . which

would entitle him to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964,

967 (11th Cir. 1986). Now, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 6

claim, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. While the factual allegations of a complaint need not

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 7 of 29
 Section 1983 provides in relevant part: 7

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

8

be detailed, a plaintiff must nevertheless “provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’

and a formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 1965.

The plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a

speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id. It is

not sufficient that the pleadings merely “le[ave] open the possibility that the plaintiff might

later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery.” Id. at 1968 (internal

quotation and alteration omitted). In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a district

court will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057

(11th Cir. 2007). Accord, Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 640 (2004) (where a court is

considering dismissal of a complaint at the pleading stage, it must assume the allegations of

the complaint are true).

The federal claims in this action are brought against defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Section 1983 provides a remedy when person acting under color of state law

deprives a plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 7

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 8 of 29
other proper proceeding for redress.

Duke’s allegations of the basis of Houston County’s liability with respect to her 8

claims pursuant to Alabama law is somewhat different than this, but the Court will address

only the basis alleged in the Amended Complaint with respect to her federal claims in this

section. 

9

393-94 (1989) (“§ 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred”) (internal quotes omitted);

Cummings v. DeKalb County, 24 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11 Cir. 1994). To state a claim pursuant th

to § 1983, a plaintiff must point to a violation of a specific federal right. See, e.g., Whiting

v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 583 (11th Cir. 1996). 

DISCUSSION

A. Liability of Houston County for Duke’s Federal Claims

As previously stated, Duke brings her claims pursuant to § 1983 alleging that Seay and

Glover violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that Houston County is

liable for those violations either because Seay and Glover were agents of Houston County

by virtue of their employment with the Houston County Sheriff’s Department or because

Glover or Seay were insufficiently trained.8

With respect to all claims against it pursuant to federal law, Houston County has

moved to dismiss on the ground that Glover and Seay are not policymakers for Houston

County. Local governmental entities, like Houston County, may be held liable under § 1983

only where the allegedly unconstitutional acts implement a policy of the local governmental

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 9 of 29
 Defendants correctly assert that Monell and its progeny make it plain that Houston 9

County may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior for Duke’s claims

pursuant to § 1983. Duke concedes this legal point but contends that she has not alleged

respondeat superior as the basis for Houston County’s liability. The Court is not certain that

Duke is correct. The allegations of the Amended Complaint do refer to the fact that Glover

and Seay were employed by the Houston County Sheriff’s Department. Nevertheless, given

that Duke admits that such allegations would be fruitless as a matter of law (Doc. # 32 at

pp.8-9), the Court will assume any such claims, to the extent that the could be found in the

Amended Complaint are due to be DISMISSED based on Duke’s concession and the

applicable law. Additionally, the Court notes that it is frankly puzzled by Duke’s argument

concerning allegations in her Amended Complaint that Houston County “condoned,

authorized, and/or ratified the conduct of the individual defendants.” This allegation is not

found anywhere in the portions of Amended Complaint which set forth her claims pursuant

to federal law. This allegation is only made in Count III (assault and battery under Alabama

law), Count IV (malicious prosecution under Alabama law), and Count V (intentional

infliction of emotional distress under Alabama law). Moreover, even if this basis had been

properly alleged, the Court is not satisfied that Duke has offered legal authority which

supports holding a county liable in an action brought pursuant to § 1983 for condoning,

authorizing or ratifying conduct which violated a party’s rights. Thus, this argument cannot

defeat Houston County’s motion to dismiss.

10

body. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1987);

Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). Thus, with respect to 9

the § 1983 claims, this Court must “identify those officials or governmental bodies who

speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the

action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.”

McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). “In other

words, the Court must determine whether the person or entity that made the policy at issue

speaks for the governmental entity being sued.” McClure v. Houston County, Ala., 306 F.

Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (Thompson, J.). This inquiry requires an analysis

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 10 of 29
These pertinent law enforcement activities Duke has identified are: executing of 10

warrants and conducting a criminal investigation.

11

under state law of whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local

government in a particular area or on a particular subject. McMillan, 520 U.S. at 785–86;

McClure, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1163. In this case, the specific question before this Court is

whether Glover, the Houston County sheriff, or Seay, one of his deputy sheriffs, are

“policymakers” for Houston County in the area of training employees of the Houston County

Sheriff’s Department or in the area of the Sheriff’s Department’s law enforcement

activities.10

It is well-settled that under Alabama law, sheriffs and their deputies are state, and not

county, officers. The Alabama Constitution includes sheriffs among the enumerated officers

of the state executive department. Ala Const. Art. V, § 111 (“The executive department shall

consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, attorney-general..., and a sheriff for each

county.”). Under Alabama law, deputies are the alter egos of the sheriff for whom they work.

See, e.g., Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990) (Alabama law

deems acts of a deputy sheriff to be those of the sheriff); Mosely v. Kennedy, 17 So. 2d 536,

537 (Ala. 1944). The Alabama Supreme Court has repeatedly held that sheriffs and deputy

sheriffs are state officials and not county officials. See, e.g., Hereford v. Jefferson County,

586 So. 2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1991); Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 44, 442 (Ala. 1987). The

United States Supreme Court has itself held that in Alabama sheriffs do not act as

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 11 of 29
12

“policymakers” for the county in the area of law enforcement for § 1983 purposes.

McMillan, 520 U.S. 793. Furthermore, the county and its commissioners have no authority

to manage the sheriff’s employees under Alabama law. See, e.g., Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1289;

Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 379 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that county commissioners have

no authority to hire or fire sheriff’s deputies under Alabama law); Raspberry v. Johnson, 88

F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1325-26 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Dowdell v. Chapman, 930 F. Supp. 533, 547-

49 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (finding that a county could not be liable for sheriff or deputy’s law

enforcement actions under § 1983, nor could it be liable for failing to train the sheriff or his

deputies). Based on these and similar cases, this Court has held also that the sheriff of

Houston County was not a policymaker for Houston County with respect to his hiring,

training and supervising of deputy sheriffs. See, e.g., McClure, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. 

Thus, as a matter of law, it is clear that neither Glover, nor Seay can be a policymaker

for Houston County. Houston County simply has no legal authority under Alabama law for

training and supervision of the sheriff and his employees or for the sheriff’s law enforcement

activities. All of Duke’s allegations against Houston County arise out of areas in which it

is clear as a matter of law that the sheriff and his deputies are not exercising county authority,

but rather they are exercising authority as arms of the State of Alabama. To the extent that

the Amended Complaint seeks to impose liability against the Houston County for acts

relating to the training of employees of the Houston County Sheriff’s Department or for acts

relating to law enforcement investigations or execution of law enforcement functions such

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 12 of 29
13

as execution of warrants, the claims are due to be DISMISSED. 

To the extent that Duke’s claim is that Houston County, itself, failed to train Glover,

Seay, or McCallister, the federal claims against it are also due to be DISMISSED. A county

“can be held liable on a failure-to-train claim only if those in supervisory positions fail to

supervise subordinates in such a manner as to demonstrate ‘deliberate indifference’ to the

constitutional rights of citizens.” Thomas v. City of Clanton, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1282

(M.D. Ala. 2003) (Thompson, J.) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989)). Accord, McClure, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. As discussed above, Houston County

did not supervise Glover, Seay or McCallister.

Even assuming arguendo that Houston County could be said to have some supervisory

responsibility for Glover, Seay or McCallister, Duke has not alleged, as she must, an

adequate factual grounds for her entitlement to relief. Specifically, she has failed to allege

an adequate factual basis for a plausible conclusion that Houston County was deliberately

indifferent to the need for greater training. 

A plaintiff can show that a [county] was deliberately indifferent to the need for

increased [training or supervision] by demonstrating: (1) a pattern of

constitutional violations such that the [county] knows or should know that

corrective measures are needed, or (2) that the violation of federal rights was

a highly predictable consequence of the failure to equip law enforcement

officers with specific tools [or training] to handle recurring situations. 

Id. Duke has not alleged any such pattern of constitutional violations showing the need for

corrective training. Duke has not alleged a factual basis from which one could argue that

the violation of federal rights was a highly predictable consequence of the failure to provide

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 13 of 29
 There is no indication that Alabama has waived its sovereign immunity. 11

14

specific training to handle recurring situations. For these reasons, all federal claims against

Houston County are due to be DISMISSED.

B. Duke’s Federal Claims Against Glover and Seay in Their Official Capacities

1. Compensatory and Punitive Damages Are Not Available

A suit against a government official in his official capacity is considered a suit against

the official’s office itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). When that

office is an arm of the state government, the Eleventh Amendment “protects the sovereignty

of the state by prohibiting suits when recovery would be paid from state funds.” Robinson 11

v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 638-39 (11th Cir. 1992); see Edelman v. Jordan,

415 U.S. 651 (1976) (defining scope of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment). 

Under Alabama law, it is well-settled that sheriffs are executive officers of the state,

and, as a result, suits against a sheriff are considered suits against the state. Parker v.

Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 442-43 (Ala.1987) (“A sheriff is an executive officer of the State

of Alabama ....”); see also McMillan v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 789 (1997)

(holding that, based on an analysis of Alabama law, sheriffs are state officers and suits

against them in their official capacity are suits against the state). This immunity also

extends to the sheriff’s deputies. Carr v. City of Florence, Alabama, 916 F.2d 1521, 1526

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 14 of 29
 These two footnotes contain the same text. That text is as follows: 12

For clarification purposes, these defendants are sued in their official capacities

for injunctive relief only as a result of violations of the plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment rights to procedural due process. The plaintiff does not seek

compensatory or punitive damages against these defendants in their official

capacities only. 

See Doc. # 21 at n.1 & n.2 (emphasis in bold in original; emphasis in italics added). Because

this identical “clarification” is in both Count I and Count II, the Court must assume that Duke

intended to limit her request for relief as she has indicated. This means that her prayer for

relief against Glover and Seay for prospective injunctive relief is not barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. However, this also means that the only injunctive relief requested is that

specified in the clarification notes which is injunctive relief directed at preventing violations

of Duke’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, namely her

malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the Court finds that the allegations of the

Amended Complaint against Glover and Seay do not include a request for any injunctive

relief in connection with Count II of the Amended Complaint (Fourteenth Amendment

violation claim). That claim, which was brought against Houston County, Glover, and Seay,

15

(11th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, this court must consider a suit against Glover in his official

capacity as sheriff of Houston County, Alabama and against Seay in her official capacity as

a deputy sheriff as a suit against the State of Alabama. Because the Eleventh Amendment

bars suits against the state in federal court, in the absence of consent, this Court has no

jurisdiction to hear any claims for monetary damages against Glover or Seay in their official

capacities. 

Perhaps recognizing this bar to her seeking claims for damages from Glover or Seay

in their official capacities, Duke has carefully alleged in the Amended Complaint that she has

only sued Glover and Seay in their official capacities for “injunctive relief.” See Doc. # 21

at n.1 & n.2. Indeed, Duke specifies that she does not seek either compensatory damages 12

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 15 of 29
refers in ¶¶ 52 and 53 to a request for injunctive relief, but given the limiting specification

in footnote 2 this request for injunctive relief this can only be read an a claim for injunctive

relief against either Houston County or against Glover or Seay only in their individual

capacities. Footnote 2 precludes any reading of the Amended Complaint as containing a

claim for injunctive relief against either Glover or Seay in their official capacities for a claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the Court further finds that the allegations

of the Amended Complaint against Glover and Seay do not include any request for

declaratory relief in connection with either Count I or Count II of the Amended

Complaint. While the Amended Complaint purports to seek declaratory relief, it does not

do so against Glover and Seay in their official capacities. See Doc. # 21 at n.1 & n.2.

16

or punitive damages from either Glover or Seay in their official capacities. 

2. Viability of Request for Injunctive Relief

While, the Eleventh Amendment has been construed to bar suits against a state

brought by that state’s own citizens, absent the state’s consent, there exists a well-recognized

exception to this general rule “for suits against state officers seeking prospective equitable

relief to end continuing violations of federal law.” McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health,

261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.2001) (emphasis in original). See also Ex parte Young, 209

U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). 

In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh

Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry

into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and

seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’ Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene

Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 138 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1997)

(O'CONNOR, J., joined by SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., concurring in part and

concurring in judgment); see also id., at 298-299, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (SOUTER,

J., joined by STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., dissenting). 

Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). In

Case 1:05-cv-00367-MEF-TFM Document 47 Filed 03/31/08 Page 16 of 29
Plaintiff ask for a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants, their agents, 13

successors, employees, attorneys and those acting in concert with the defendants and at the

defendants’ requests from continuing to violate the Fourth Amendment. Doc. # 21 at p. 15.

However, the Fourth Amendment violation alleged wasthatshe was maliciously prosecuted,

but that she was later acquitted on the charge of making a false police report. Crediting the

allegation that she was acquitted requires this Court to find that the violation of her Fourth

Amendment rights actually alleged was completed as of the date on which she was acquitted

and was not continuing in nature. 

17

this case, the injury Duke alleges as her Fourth Amendment violation was the failure of

Glover and Seay to believe her claim that McCallister had sexually assaulted her and her

prosecution on a charge of false reporting of a crime. Clearly, she has not alleged an ongoing violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free from malicious

prosecution. Moreover, the Court is not convinced that the permanent injunction Duke seeks

is actually prospective relief. 

13

Federal courts have jurisdiction only over concrete cases and controversies. U.S.

Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. A plaintiff will generally have standing only where (1) he

experienced injury in fact, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and (3)

his harm is likely to be redressed should the court order relief. A plaintiff seeking injunctive

or declaratory relief, however, must prove not only an injury, but also “a real and immediate

threat of future injury in order to satisfy the ‘injury in fact’ requirement.” City of Los Angeles

v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-05 (1983) (holding that because injunctions regulate future

conduct, a party has standing to seek injunctive relief only if he alleges a real and immediateas opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical-threat of future injury); Nat'l Parks

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Conservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003); Cotterall v. Paul, 755

F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985). Where, as here, the threat of future harm dissipates, the

plaintiff’s request for prospective injunctive relief becomes moot. See, e.g., Adler v. Duval

County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477-78 (11th Cir. 1997); Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d

1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985). Accord,

Rhoden v. Randall, No. 96-6137, 1997WL570346 at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 1997) (holding

that injunctive relief requested for malicious prosecution was rendered moot when underlying

conviction was vacated); Berry v. South Carolina Dep’t of Social Servs., No. 95-2678, 1997

WL499950 at *4-*5 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 1997) (affirming dismissal of claims for injunctive

relief to prevent future malicious prosecution on ground that claims were moot when

prosecution against plaintiff had been terminated long before suit). 

Here, with respect to the alleged actions giving rise to her claims that her rights under

the Fourth Amendment were violated, Duke alleges that the charges against her were

“thrown out” and that she “was acquitted on all charges.” Doc. # 21 at ¶¶ 24 & 35. Thus,

there is no factual basis alleged in the Amended Complaint that could plausibly support her

conclusion that she is suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable injury unless the Court

grants the requested injunctive relief. For this reason, the Court finds that the claims against

Glover and Seay in their official capacities for injunctive relief are due to be DISMISSED.

3. Adequacy of Allegations of Basis for Official Capacity Liability

Under § 1983, there is no respondeat superior liability; a municipality or county may

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not be sued under § 1983 for the acts of others. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94; see also City

of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988); Brown, 188 F.3d at 1290 (“A

governmental entity is not liable under § 1983, merely as a matter of respondeat superior,

for constitutional injuries inflicted by its employees.”); Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350 (municipality

may not be liable for the wrongful actions of its police officers pursuant to a respondeat

superior theory of liability). “Instead, a municipality [or county] may be held liable for the

actions of a police officer only when municipal [or county] ‘official policy’ causes a

constitutional violation.” Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff seeking

to hold a municipality or county liable pursuant to § 1983 to identify the municipal or county

policy or custom that he contends caused his injury to be inflicted. Id. 

In Brown v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh

Circuit explained that a plaintiff can establish governmental entity liability under §1983 in

either one of two ways. First, liability may attach if a plaintiff demonstrates “a widespread

practice that, ‘although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, causes a

constitutional deprivation and is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom and

usage with the force of law.’” Id. at 1481 (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127). Second, a

plaintiff can establish the liability of a municipality or county by showing that his or her

alleged constitutional injury was caused by a person who “possess[ed] ‘final authority to

establish municipal [or county] policy with respect to the action ordered.’” Id. at 1480

(quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)); see also Jett v. Dallas

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Ind. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337

(11th Cir.1994).

Duke’s factual allegations make no mention whatsoever of any written official policy.

She fails to include in the Amended Complaint any factual allegations of any widespread

practice so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of

law. Duke makes no allegation whatsoever regarding Seay or Glover as a policymaker of any

sort. To the extent that Seay and Glover are sued in their official capacities, these failures

to plead requisite factual grounds in support of Duke’s claims require the Court to dismiss

the claims as insufficient. For this additional reason, the motion to dismiss these claims is

due to be GRANTED. 

C. Duke’s Federal Claims Against Glover and Seay in Their Individual Capacities

1. Legal Paradigm

While the Eleventh Amendment shields state officers from damage suits in their

official capacities, these officials are individually amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violations of the United States Constitution and federal law. See Graham, 473 U.S. at

165-67. However, a government official sued in his individual capacity under § 1983 may

assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense if he was performing a discretionary

function. Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). “Once the

official has established that he was engaged in a discretionary function, the plaintiff bears the

burden of demonstrating that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. If the

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plaintiff fails to furnish sufficient factual allegations at this stage, the defendant officer is

entitled to judgment. See Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir.

2001). In this case, there is no dispute as to whether Glover and Seay were engaged in

discretionary functions. 

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), the Supreme Court delineated a two-step

analysis for determining whether an officer, who was engaged in a discretionary function,

is eligible for qualified immunity. The initial inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff’s

allegations, if considered true, show that the officer violated a constitutional right. Id. The

absence of a constitutional violation ends the inquiry. Id. However, where a court does find

that an officer acted in an unconstitutional manner, the analysis turns to whether the right in

question was clearly established so that the officer had fair warning that his conduct was

constitutionally prohibited. Id.

“For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This

standard does not require a prior court decision to have declared the precise set of facts

presently alleged unlawful, “but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the

unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 438 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “The

salient question. . . is whether the state of the law . . . gave [the officers] fair warning that

their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. 

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The Eleventh Circuit has further refined the analysis of when the law is clearly

established. It has observed that “fair and clear” notice may be given by (1) the “obvious

clarity” of the pertinent federal statute or constitutional provision, such that qualified

immunity may be overcome in the “total absence of case law,” (2) the judicial determination

that certain conduct has been defined as unlawful without regard to particular facts, and (3)

holdings in specific cases that are tied to certain facts. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,

1350-51(11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis removed). Only the decisions of the Supreme Court, the

Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court in the state in which the case arose provide the case law

capable of clearly establishing the boundaries of rights in the qualified immunity analysis.

Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 2003).

2. Fourth Amendment / Malicious Prosecution Claim

Glover and Seay contend that Duke has failed to adequately alleged a claim pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of her right under the Fourth Amendment to be

free from malicious prosecution. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has identified

malicious prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and a viable constitutional tort

cognizable under § 1983. Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting

cases recognizing this). “To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and

(2) a violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”

Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). Accord, Wood, 323 F.3d

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at 881. The elements of malicious prosecution under Alabama common law are: “1) a

criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and

without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused

damage to the plaintiff accused.” Id. at 882 (citing Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So .2d

824, 831-32 (Ala. 1999)). 

Glover and Seay point out that the Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegation

and of any facts that plausibly suggest the required element that Glover and Seay acted

without probable cause. While Duke does allege facts that suggest that Glover and Seay

acted with malice and possibly with a retaliatory motive, these facts do not plausibly support

a lack of probable cause. As the United States Supreme Court long ago explained with

regard to a malicious prosecution claim, 

[m]alice alone, however, is not sufficient to sustain the action, because a

person actuated by the plainest malice may nevertheless prefer a well-founded

accusation, and have a justifiable reason for the prosecution of the charge.

Want of reasonable and probable cause is as much an element in the action for

a malicious criminal prosecution as the evil motive which prompted the

prosecutor to make the accusation; and though the averment is a negative one

in its form and character, it is nevertheless a material element of the action,

and must be proved by the plaintiff by some affirmative evidence, unless the

defendant dispenses with such proof by pleading singly the truth of the several

facts involved in the charge. Either of these allegations may be proved by

circumstances, and it is unquestionably true that want of probable cause is

evidence of malice, but it is not the same thing; and unless it is shown that both

concurred in the prosecution, or that the one was combined with the other in

making or instigating the charge, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in an

action of this description. According, it was held in Forshay v. Ferguson, 4

Den., 619, that even proof of express malice was not enough without showing

also the want of probable cause; and the court go on to say, that however

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innocent the plaintiff may have been of the crime laid to his charge, it is

enough for the defendant to show that he had reasonable grounds for believing

him guilty at the time the charge was made....It is true as before remarked, that

want of probable cause is evidence of malice for the consideration of the jury;

but the converse of the proposition cannot be sustained. 

Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 549-51 (1860). Accord, Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642

(1878); Delchamps, Inc. v. Larry, 613 So. 2d 1235 (Ala. 1992) (“Malice is an inference of

fact and may be inferred from the lack of probable cause or from mere wantonness or

carelessness.”) (emphasis added). The only allegation in the Amended Complaint

concerning probable cause is the allegation that Seay stated in a complaint in which she

stated that she had probable cause for believing that Duke unlawfully and knowingly made

a false report of a crime. Doc. # 21 at ¶ 22. The Court agrees that the Amended Complaint

fails to identify facts that are suggestive enough to plausibly render the actions of Seay and

Glover without probable cause. Duke’s failure to support this claim by adequate factual

allegations in support of all requisite elements constitutes failure to state a claim.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim is due to be GRANTED.

3. Fourteenth Amendment / Equal Protection Violation Claim

Glover and Seay contend that Duke has failed to adequately allege a violation of her

rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Duke has posited

that the Defendants’ treatment of her was motivated by an invidious gender animosity in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Specifically she alleges

that “defendants discriminated against [her] on the basis of her gender, female, in that they

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discounted her statements and allegations of sexual assault, choosing instead to rely upon the

allegations of a male, defendant McCallister.” Doc. # 21 at ¶ 45. 

“The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat similarly situated

persons in a similar manner.” Gary v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 311 F.3d 1334, 1337

(11th Cir. 2002). “To properly plead an equal protection claim, a plaintiff need only allege

that through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated disparately.” Thigpen

v. Bibb County, 233 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Because Duke has failed to allege

that the governmental agents whom she claims violated her rights treated similarly situated

persons in a disparate manner, she has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted

with respect to this claim. 

While the Amended Complaint also includes many allegations relating to the way that

Seay, a woman, treated Duke during the interview, it is devoid of any allegations that Seay

treated McCallister any differently when she interviewed him. It is alleged that Seay

interviewed both McCallister and Duke. It is also alleged that Seay asked both McCallister

and Duke to submit to a lie detector examination and that both of them agreed to do so.

Furthermore, Duke’s Amended Complaint does not contain any allegation that Seay, Glover

or Houston County had any official policy or custom of treating female crime victims, like

Duke, differently than male crime victims. Duke’s allegations in support of this claim are

limited to Seay’s alleged discounting of Duke’s allegations and statements and her alleged

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reliance upon McCallister’s account of the events leading up to Duke’s complaints against

him. With respect to Duke’s allegations, however, McCallister and Duke are not similarly

situated. She is a crime victim and he is the accused. Moreover, if Duke’s own allegations

are to be believed Seay’s own remark gives a gender neutral reason for any disparate

treatment, namely McCallister’s status as an employee of the Houston County Sheriff’s

Department. Having failed to allege disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals,

Duke has failed to allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation and this claim is due to be

DISMISSED. 

D. State Law Claims

In addition to Duke’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Duke bring a number of

claims pursuant to Alabama law. This Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction

over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The statutory provision addressing

supplemental jurisdiction provides that 

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided

otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts

have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Thus, Section 1367(a) provides a basis for this Court to exercise

jurisdiction over Duke’s claims against the remaining defendants in this action pursuant to

Alabama law because it has jurisdiction over Duke’s related claims against them pursuant

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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the requirement contained in § 1367(a) that this Court

exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Duke’s state law claims is subject to certain

enumerated instances in which it is appropriate for a federal court to decline to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction over a case. Those circumstances are set forth in Section 1367(c),

which provides that

The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim under subsection (a) if –

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over

which the district court has original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for

declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Court finds that claims before this Court pursuant to § 1367(a)

present novel or complex issues of Alabama law. Additionally, the federal claims over which

this Court had original jurisdiction have now been resolved against Duke. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) & (3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Duke’s claims pursuant to Alabama law. All of Duke’s claims pursuant to Alabama law will

accordingly be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This dismissal should not work to

Duke’s disadvantage should she elect to bring suit in state court because the period of

limitations for any of these claims is tolled during the pendency of this action. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(d). 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that all federal claims remaining in Duke’s

Amended Complaint over which this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction, are due

to be DISMISSED. Having disposed of these claims, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Duke’s remaining claims pursuant to Alabama. Moreover,

having disposed of all of Duke’s federal claims on the grounds articulated above, the Court

need not and does not address any of the other arguments made in the motion to dismiss.

This does not mean that the arguments are not correct; it simply means that the Court cannot

justify a further expenditure of scarce judicial research on a detailed discussion of matters

such as the viability of Duke’s claims for punitive damages when it has already found that

the causes of action by which the damages are claimed are due to be dismissed. Accordingly,

it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. The Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. # 28)

is GRANTED to the extent that it is directed to the claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and DENIED to the extent that it is directed to the claims brought pursuant to Alabama

law. 

2. All of Duke’s claims against Houston County, Glover, and Seay pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Duke’s claims

pursuant to Alabama law and such claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

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4. A separate final judgment will be entered consistent with this Memorandum

Opinion and Order.

DONE this the 31st day of March, 2008.

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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