Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01217/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01217-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM S.

Plaintiff,

v.

LASSEN COUNTY; MELODY BRAWLEY;

KEVIN MANNEL; LYNNE MARGOLIES;

KIM PERKINS; and RONALD

VOSSELOR,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-05-1217 DFL CMK

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Defendants move to dismiss William S.’s (“William”)

Fourteenth Amendment and ADA claims. In addition, defendants

move to strike: (1) William’s allegations that defendants failed

to hire him because of his alleged disability; and (2) William’s

claim that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to

privacy by posting his medical condition on the internet. 

For the reasons stated below, the court: (1) GRANTS

defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s first claim; (2) GRANTS

defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s ADA claim against

Margolies; (3) DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s ADA

claim; (4) DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s

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retaliation claim under the ADA; (5) GRANTS defendants’ motion to

strike references to a failure to hire in the second amended

complaint (“SAC”); and (6) DENIES defendants’ motion to strike

William’s allegation that defendants violated his Fourteenth

Amendment right to privacy by posting his medical condition on

the internet. 

I. 

William makes the following allegations in the Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”):

In 1999, William applied for positions with Lassen County. 

(SAC ¶ 7.) Lassen County’s personnel director refused to place

William on a list of employees eligible for hiring because of

William’s medical condition. (Id. ¶ 9.) Because of the

personnel director’s actions, William filed a claim with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id. ¶ 10.) 

The parties resolved that claim by placing William on a list of

people eligible to take the qualifying examination. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

On February 23, 2004, Lassen County hired William as a

social worker. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14-15.) The personnel director

attempted to retract the employment offer because: (1) of

William’s medical condition; and (2) William had filed a

complaint with the EEOC. (Id. ¶ 12.) On August 16, 2004, William

discovered that his name and medical condition had been posted on

a cubicle in the Department of Social Services for Lassen County. 

(Id. ¶ 13.) 

On August 18, 2004, William complained about the posting to

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the Deputy County Administrative Officer and William’s Social

Work Supervisor, but he received no response. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

Because he received no response, William filed a claim with the

Board of Supervisors of Lassen County (“Board”). (Id. ¶ 16.) 

After William filed a claim with Lassen County, his medical

condition was disclosed on the internet. (Id. ¶ 36.) On March

10, 2005 the Board denied William’s claim. (Id.) On June 3,

2005, the EEOC issued William a “notice of right to sue.” (Id. ¶

23.) 

On June 18, 2005, William filed this suit. On September 8,

2005, William filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”). On

December 16, 2005 the court: (1) granted defendants’ motion to

dismiss defendants Vossler, Perkins, and Brawley from the FAC;

(2) granted defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s claim for

failure to hire under the ADA; (3) granted defendants’ motion to

dismiss defendants Margolies and Mannel from William’s claim

under the ADA; and (4) granted defendants’ motion to dismiss

William’s claim for violation of the First Amendment rights to

privacy and freedom of speech with leave to amend. (12/16/2005

Order at 6-7.)

On January 9, 2006, William filed the SAC, asserting the

following claims: (1) violation of rights guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violation of the First Amendment right

to privacy; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4)

violation of the ADA; (5) violation of rights guaranteed by the

California Constitution; and (6) violation of the Confidentiality

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of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 56 et seq. 

On February 16, 2006, the parties stipulated to dismiss

defendant Kevin Mannel (“Mannel”) from the SAC. (2/16/2006

Order.)

II. 

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint are

accepted as true. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733

(1964). The complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state

a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99

(1957).

1. Motion to Dismiss First Claim

Defendants move to dismiss William’s first claim for

“violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 

William contends that his first claim “states that the Plaintiff

was deprived of his right to privacy without due process of law.” 

(Opp’n at 2.) In addition, he claims that “plaintiff has alleged

sufficient evidence to indicate that Lassen County violated his

constitutional right to privacy.” (Id.) William appears to

argue that his first claim raises a right to privacy claim under

the Fourteenth Amendment. However, William titles his second

claim “violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy.” 

Because William does not distinguish these claims, and because it

appears that the first two claims are duplicative, the court

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GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s first claim. 

2. ADA Claim

Defendants argue that: (1) Margolies should be dismissed

from William’s ADA claim; (2) William’s failure to hire claim

should be dismissed; and (3) William’s ADA claim should be

dismissed in its entirety. (Mot. at 3-6.) 

a. Margolies

Defendants argue that Margolies should be dismissed from

William’s ADA claim because supervisors cannot be held personally

liable under the ADA. (Id. at 3.) William responds that he has

not alleged that Margolies violated the ADA. (Opp’n at 3.) 

However, in William’s ADA claim, he alleges that “defendants”

committed a number of acts. (SAC ¶¶ 50-55.) Because William

does not define “defendants,” it is unclear if this term includes

Margolies. Therefore, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to

dismiss William’s ADA claim against Margolies.

b. Failure to Hire Claim

Defendants argue that William’s ADA claim for failure to

hire should be dismissed in light of the court’s previous ruling

which plaintiff did not oppose. (Mot. at 4.) In its December

16, 2005 order, the court dismissed this claim. (12/16/2005

Order at 4.) Therefore, to the extent that the SAC re-alleges a

failure to hire claim, the motion to dismiss is granted. 

c. ADA Claim

Defendants argue that William’s ADA claim should be

dismissed because: (1) he fails to allege a physical or mental

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impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; and

(2) he fails to plead a retaliation claim under the ADA. (Mot.

to Dismiss at 6; Reply to Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4.) The

ADA’s employment-related provisions protect “qualified

individuals with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA

defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of

such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the

ADA, an employee must show that: (1) he or she engaged in a

protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) there was a causal link between the two. Pardi v. Kaiser

Found. Hosp., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth

Circuit has held that pursuing one’s rights under the ADA

constitutes a protected activity. Id. at 850.

William fails to specifically allege how he is mentally or

physically impaired and what the major life activity his

disability substantially limits. Instead, he states that he has

a “medical condition.” (SAC ¶ 50.) Although William fails to

specifically plead his mental or physical impairment, defendants

know he is HIV positive because he asserted this on a California

Torts Claim Act form. In addition, requiring William to

specifically plead the major life activity that his disability

substantially limits is beyond the requirements of Rule 8(a). 

The court finds that William has pleaded sufficient facts to

state a claim. Therefore, the court DENIES defendants’ motion to

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dismiss William’s ADA claim. 

Although William does not mention retaliation in his fourth

claim for a violation of the ADA, he states under the general

allegations that “Defendants have retaliated against the

Plaintiff because he filed a claim with the EEOC and because of

his medical condition.” (SAC ¶ 20.) This statement also meets

the requirements of Rule 8(a) because William alleges that he

engaged in a protected activity -- filing a claim with the EEOC -

- and that defendants retaliated against him because he filed the

claim. Therefore, the court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss

William’s claim for retaliation under the ADA. 

B. Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), “the court may

order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Also,

“[a] motion to strike may be used to strike any part of the

prayer for relief when the damages sought are not recoverable as

a matter of law.” Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1479

(C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Tapley v. Lockwood Green Eng’rs, Inc.,

502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1974)). Rule 12(f) aims to prevent

“the expenditure of time and money that must arise from

litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior

to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885

(9th Cir. 1983). However, courts generally disfavor motions to

strike because litigants often use them to delay proceedings and

because pleadings have limited importance in federal practice. 

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Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D.

Cal. 1991). 

1. Failure to Hire

Defendants move to strike William’s allegation that

defendants failed to hire him based on his alleged disability. 

(Mot. to Strike at 2.) Although the court dismissed William’s

failure to hire claim in the December 16, 2005 order, he still

alleges that “defendants had a mandatory duty to consider the

application of the plaintiff for employment because of his

experience, education and competence unrelated to his medical

condition which was not an impairment to his ability to complete

the duties of the employment description for which he applied.” 

(SAC ¶ 51.) 

William responds that he retained this allegation because it

is evidence of defendants’ pattern or practice of discriminating

against people with disabilities. (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at

2.) Because this claim has been dismissed, to avoid confusion,

the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to strike references to a

failure to hire in William’s SAC. Whether the court will permit

evidence of a failure to hire is a distinct question that may be

addressed by way of an in limine motion prior to trial.

2. Internet Posting

Defendants move to strike William’s allegation that

defendants retaliated against him by posting his medical

condition on the internet. (Mot. to Strike at 2.) Defendants

argue that William has no right to privacy in his medical

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condition because he included that information on his California

Tort Claims Act form. (Id.; ex. A to Request for Judicial

Notice.) 

To state a viable § 1983 claim, William must allege a

violation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or

the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

constitutional right to privacy includes the “individual interest

in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Whalen v. Rose, 429

U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869 (1977); see also Doe v. Attorney

General, 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that the

right to privacy encompasses medical information). 

Defendants do not dispute that William had a privacy

interest in his medical status. Instead, they seem to argue that

he waived this privacy interest by filing a tort claim, which is

available to the public. However, factual issues preclude the

court from ruling on this issue. For example, defendants have

not presented evidence that William’s claim was available to the

public or that he knew that by filing a claim he was placing his

medical condition in the public record. Nor is it clear that the

county may condition the filing of the claim upon a waiver of a

constitutionally protected privacy interest. These issues cannot

be resolved on a motion to strike. Therefore, the court DENIES

defendants motion to strike William’s allegation that defendants

retaliated against him by posting his medical condition on the

internet.

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III.

For the reasons stated above, the court: (1) GRANTS

defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s first claim; (2) GRANTS

defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s ADA claim against

Margolies; (3) DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s ADA

claim; (4) DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss William’s

retaliation claim under the ADA; (5) GRANTS defendants’ motion to

strike references to a failure to hire in William’s SAC; and (6)

DENIES defendants’ motion to strike William’s allegation that

defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy by

posting his medical condition on the internet. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2006

/s/ David F. Levi

DAVID F. LEVI

U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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