Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00682/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00682-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW S. HODGINS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0682 MCE GGH P

vs.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, et al., ORDER &

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court are: 1) plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, filed on June 19,

2006, to which defendants filed opposition on July 3, 2006; plaintiff filed a reply on July 17,

2006; and 2) defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on October 2, 2006, to which plaintiff filed an

opposition on October 25, 2006. 

Background

By order filed on April 12, 2006, the court found that this case proceeded on the

April 8, 2005, original complaint, which defendant Campbell had answered, and directed that the

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The court found that plaintiff sought to add defendants in the amended allegations but 1

failed to present “the specific factual basis for a constitutional deprivation by any defendant. His

amended complaint consists of some 127 pages, wherein plaintiff purports to set forth the legal

basis for his claims without adequately stating the factual allegations as to each named defendant. 

In addition, plaintiff has attached a large number of exhibits to the amended complaint. While

plaintiff may append exhibits to a complaint (or amended complaint), the allegations on which he

seeks to proceed must be set forth within the complaint itself. Plaintiff’s amended complaint

does not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 

 Fed. R. Civ. P 8 sets forth general rules of pleading in the federal courts. Complaints are

required to set forth (1) the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction rests, (2) a short and

plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief

plaintiff seeks. All that is required are sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of

the claims against them. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d

80 (1957); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1202 (2d ed. 1990). Rule

8 requires “sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.” 

McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991)). Accord Richmond v. Nationwide

Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1995) (amended complaint with vague and scanty

allegations fails to satisfy the notice requirement of Rule 8.) 

Plaintiff expends effort in citing case law and pronouncing legal theory in his amended

complaint rather than setting forth in specific terms how each named defendant is involved in

events or conditions giving rise to a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional right. See Ellis v.

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The lack of adequate factual allegations requires this

court to deny plaintiff’s request for leave to amend and to strike the amended complaint.” Order,

filed on April 12, 2006, pp. 2-3. 

2

January 13, 2006, amended complaint be stricken as violative of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The non- 1

answering defendants had brought a motion to dismiss, filed on December 29, 2005, and plaintiff

was directed to file his opposition to that motion in the April 12, 2006, order. 

On August 28, 2006, the court granted defendant’s December 29, 2005, motion to

dismiss, allowing plaintiff leave to amend and directing all but the answering defendant to file a

response thereto (defendant Campbell, the answering defendant, was permitted to proceed on her

previously filed answer or to replead). Plaintiff subsequently filed a second amended complaint,

on September 18, 2006, to which defendants Burruel, Grannis, Kernan and Woodford, filed the

present motion to dismiss, on October 2, 2006. 

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on September 18, 2006, consisting of

97 pages, largely consisting of exhibits, which, if anything, is more defective than the original

complaint which was dismissed by the August 28, 2006, order. In that order, the moving

defendants were found to be correct in contending that the roles of each of those defendants in

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

allegedly depriving plaintiff of his constitutional rights had not been stated. See, Order, filed on

August 28, 2006, p. 3. Plaintiff was informed that because he sought monetary damages, the

deprivations of which he complains had to be “spelled out,” stating, inter alia, 

 

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983,

if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do

that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson

v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Id. 

Plaintiff was also informed that supervisory personnel generally are not liable in a

§ 1983 action for the conduct of their employees under a respondeat superior theory and that

plaintiff must frame allegations setting forth the causal link between a named defendant in a

supervisory capacity and a specific alleged constitutional violation; the order cited applicable

authority. Id. Plaintiff was cautioned that vague and conclusory allegations regarding the

involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations were insufficient. Id.

Further, plaintiff was advised that to the extent injunctive relief was being sought,

that, inter alia, he need not name multiple defendants in their official capacity but only need

“name that official who has some cognizance over the policy at issue and who could effectively

issue orders within CDCR if the court were to rule in plaintiff’s favor.” Order, filed on August

28, 2006, p. 4. 

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

In addition, the undersigned stated:

Moreover, plaintiff should reconsider his attempt to sue defendants

simply because they participated in an inmate appeals process. 

Defendants sued in their individual capacity must be alleged to

have: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; known of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them; or implemented a policy that repudiates

constitutional rights and was the moving force behind the alleged

violations. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th

Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642 (9 Cir. 1989); Taylor th

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040 (9 Cir. 1989). “Although a § 1983 claim th

has been described as ‘a species of tort liability,’ Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S. Ct. 984, 988, 47 L.Ed.2d 128,

it is perfectly clear that not every injury in which a state official has

played some part is actionable under that statute.” Martinez v.

State of California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S. Ct. 553, 559 (1980). 

“Without proximate cause, there is no § 1983 liability.” Van Ort v.

Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9 Cir. 1996). th

The search, which was performed in accordance with this

constitutionally valid strip search policy, was subsequently ratified

by the School Board when Mr. Williams filed a grievance. 

Therefore, Williams’ only grasp at evoking municipal liability

under § 1983 is to show that this subsequent ratification is

sufficient to establish the necessary causation requirements. Based

on the facts, the Board believed Ellington and his colleagues were

justified in conducting the search of Williams. There was no

history that the policy had been repeatedly or even sporadically

misapplied by school board officials in the past. Consequently, the

School Board cannot be held liable for the ratification of the search

in question, because this single, isolated decision can hardly

constitute the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional

deprivation.

Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884-885 (9 Cir. 1991). th

This court is unwilling to adopt a rule that anyone involved in

adjudicating grievances after the fact is per se potentially liable

under a ratification theory. However, this is not to say that persons

involved in adjudicating administrative disputes, or persons to

whom complaints are sometimes made, can never be liable under a

ratification theory. If, for example, a reviewing official’s rejections

of administrative grievances can be construed as an automatic

whitewash, which may have led other prison officials to have no

concern of ever being reprimanded, a ratifying official may be

liable for having put a defective policy in place.

Id., at 4-5.

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As to defendant Campbell, the answering defendant, there appears to be some confusion 2

by defendants. In the notice portion of their motion, defendants make clear that the motion is

made on behalf of defendants Burruel, Grannis, Kernan and Woodford, but include defendant

Campbell as a defendant moving to dismiss on the ground that no affirmative act is alleged as to

her participation in a constitutional injury visited upon plaintiff. The court will assume that the

omission of defendant Kernan was inadvertent and perhaps Campbell was included mistakenly in

the place of defendant Kernan. On the other hand, as to the second amended complaint, it is true

that as to both defendants Kernan and Campbell, plaintiff has failed to set forth adequate

allegations. 

5

The court has set forth its prior orders in some detail so as to make clear that

plaintiff has been informed with specificity as to how he should proceed in filing a further

amended complaint. Nevertheless, plaintiff has proceeded to file a wholly defective second

amended complaint. 

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move for dismissal on the ground that there are no allegations that 1)

defendants Burruel, Campbell, and Woodford engaged in any affirmative act that caused

2

plaintiff constitutional injury; and 2) that there is no § 1983 liability as to defendant Grannis for

her participation in the administrative grievance process. 

Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts consistent with his allegations which

would entitle him to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 

(1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957), Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990);

see also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

\\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The court will “‘presume that general

allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” NOW, 510

U.S. at 256; 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 561, 112 S.

Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972). A

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may disregard

allegations in the complaint if they are contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to

the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as true allegations that contradict facts which

may be judicially noticed. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). The court need not accept as true conclusory

allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). The court

need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). 

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

Discussion

Plaintiff appears to believe that his exhibits may substitute for factual allegations

in his complaint. He continues to violate the most fundamental precept of Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, that is, he fails wholly to set forth “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing entitlement to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff goes to great lengths to

describe what constitutional rights he believes have been violated, occasionally naming a

defendant or two. Plaintiff adds two unserved defendants, Mule Creek State Prison Facility-A

Captain J. Arceo and Correctional Lieutenant M. Cherry. Second Amended Complaint (SAC), p.

4. What he fails to do, however, is to allege a factual basis for a colorable claim against any of

the defendants within the body of his second amended complaint. He fails once again altogether

to state what it is that each defendant has done that constitutes a deprivation of his constitutional

rights. Instead, plaintiff apparently intends to have the court and the parties sort through his

exhibits and put together the factual predicate of his claims. 

In the “Statement of Claim” portion of the Form Complaint, plaintiff duplicates

the claims set forth in the stricken complaint with the addition of one sentence wherein he names

the two new defendants, but again in allegations lacking adequate specificity. Nonetheless, this

portion of the SAC is arguably the most explicit plaintiff sets out:

The conduct complained of in this case was improper and illegal

and was committed by named defendants acting and under color of

state law. Their conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities, secured by the 1st, 5th, 8th, & 14th USCA’s, and the

laws of the U.S. and Calif., as stated in detail in the “cause of

action” section of this complaint. Named defendants acted in a

conspiracy to violate his USCA rights and retaliated against him

for exercising his right to file prison grievances and for trying to

practice his religious beliefs. Specifically, named defendants

denied plaintiff’s receipt of religious books, items, correspondence

courses, etc. Further, named defendants denied plaintiff receipt of

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

legal materials, periodicals, newspapers, magazine, paperback

books sent from publisher or bookstore, & other information. The

above effectively places a substantial burden on plaintiff, &

eliminates all sensory and environmental stimuli. It began with

named defendants Cherry and Arceo whom [sic] failed to

follow the law and the other named defendants above

subsequently condoned it and failed to remedy the wrongs. 

SAC, p. 4. 

The line typed in bold herein is the only portion of text in the “statement of claim”

portion of the Form Complaint in the second amended complaint that differs from the defective

proposed first amended complaint, previously stricken. See, footnote 1. The promise that

specific allegations against the defendants will be set forth in the “cause of action” portion is not

kept. Rather, plaintiff, within the second amended complaint, almost entirely duplicates the

stricken allegations of the first amended complaint, holding forth unhelpfully on the state of the

law as to retaliation, conspiracy, cruel and unusual punishment, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, etc., on page after page, without ever providing adequate allegations,

including specific dates and particular conduct engaged in by a specific defendant, that resulted

in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff has been cautioned and advised at least twice by this court as to how his

claims were deficiently set forth and how to properly frame his allegations. The court finds that

defendants’ motion to dismiss as to defendants Burruel, Grannis, Kernan and Woodford should

be granted and will recommend their dismissal without further leave to amend. “A pro se litigant

must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is ‘absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), quoting Noll [v. Carlson], 809 F.2d 1446, 1448

(in turn, quoting Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1980) (per

curiam)); accord Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir.1987). 

Liberality in granting a plaintiff leave to amend “is subject to the qualification that

the amendment not cause undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

futile.” Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting

Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir.1999). Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.,

261 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999)

(Liberality in granting a plaintiff leave to amend “is subject to the qualification that the

amendment not cause undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not

futile.”) 

“Under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only required to grant leave to

amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a

complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). See also,

Smith v. Pacific Properties and Development Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004), citing

Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497(9th Cir.1995) (“a district court should grant leave to

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading

could not be cured by the allegation of other facts.”). 

The court has liberally permitted plaintiff two opportunities to amend his

allegations with appropriate instructions which plaintiff simply appears unable to follow. 

Because defendant Campbell has answered the original complaint, and although it was

previously dismissed, this court now vacates its prior August 28, 2006, order, only to the extent

that the original complaint was dismissed. This action now proceeds only as to the original

complaint and only as to defendant Campbell. 

Motion to Compel

The court now construes plaintiff’s motion to compel further production as

directed only to defendant Campbell, the only defendant remaining in this action. With respect

to the operative allegations, plaintiff states that he was in administrative segregation at the time

of filing his original complaint. Plaintiff complains of the new CDCR policy (see Cal.Code

Regs. § 3190(a)) which prohibits Ad Seg inmates from receiving religious books, non-religious

books, correspondence course materials and periodicals. Only defendant Warden Campbell is

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

named in the substantive allegations of the complaint. Plaintiff seeks a temporary and permanent

repeal of the procedures which keep the above referenced items from being received in Ad Seg,

including a repeal of the aforementioned regulation. He also seeks compensatory and punitive

damages. See, Complaint, filed on April 8, 2005. 

The scope of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) is broad. Discovery may be

obtained as to any unprivileged matter “relevant to the claim or defense of any party....” Id. 

Discovery may be sought of relevant information not admissible at trial “if the discovery appears

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. The court, however,

may limit discovery if it “....is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,” or can be obtained from

another source “that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”; or if the party who

seeks discovery “has had ample opportunity by discovery ...to obtain the information sought”; or

if the proposed discovery is overly burdensome. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(i)(ii) and (iii). 

Plaintiff contends in his motion to compel production of documents that, as to 

requests nos. 5, 9, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 & 25, from among those he has propounded upon defendant,

defendant has failed to provide acceptable responses. Motion, p. 1. 

REQUEST NO. 5: “Any and all books, papers, documents,

photographs, receipts, physical items, or other tangible objects,*

which defendants hold as possible evidence, which defendants

intend to use in trial in this case, together with the property records

of such items, where applicable, as well as requests for any and all

reports of any criminalistic and/or other scientific examination of

such evidence where applicable, to include those obtained from, or

which belong to plaintiff. “American Bar Association Project on

Standards for Criminal Justice,” standards relating to discovery

procedure before trial, prosecutor’s obligations, approved draft,

hereinafter cited as “ABA Standards,” sec. 2.1(a)(v)(1); Walker v.

Superior Court, 155 C.A.2d 134; Ballard v. Superior Court, 64

Cal.2d 159;” [sic].

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 5: Defendant objects to this

request on the grounds that it is compound and over broad, and it is

not a proper request for production of documents. Defendant

further objects based on the grounds that the request potentially

seeks documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and

work-product doctrine.

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

In opposition, defendant argues that the request does not seek a readily

identifiable document; that the request is made at an early stage and that it is not yet known

which documents or items will be used at trial. Opposition (Opp.), p. 3. Further, defendant

points out that if and when such documents become identifiable, they will be listed in

defendant’s pretrial statement. Id., at pp. 3-4. 

The court notes that plaintiff’s citation to state court criminal cases is wholly

inapposite in the context of his dispute regarding a federal civil rights action. Further, the

undersigned finds the request to be overbroad to the point of unintelligibility and will deny the

motion as to this request. 

REQUEST NO. 9: “Any and all written, typewritten, and/or

computer-generated statements made by any and all witnesses,

informants, so-called informants, or other persons pertaining to the

misconduct/civil rights violations charged against defendants,

whether or not they will testify. Tupper v. Superior Court, 51

C.2d 263; People v. Riser, 47 C.2d 566; People v. Ruthford, 14

C.3d 399:”

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 9: Defendant objects to this

request on the ground that it is vague, ambiguous, compound, not

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence, and information regarding personnel records of

correctional staff is confidential pursuant to Title 15, California

Code of Regulations, Section 3321.

Defendant contends that the information plaintiff is seeking regarding personnel

records for correctional staff, in this case only defendant Campbell, is confidential pursuant to

Cal. Code Regs. tit.xv, § 3321, and that the request is vague and fails to identify any specific act

of alleged wrongdoing by defendant Campbell for which plaintiff seeks discovery. Opp., p. 4.

The court continues to be at a loss to discern the applicability of the state court

criminal cases plaintiff cites within his request. As the undersigned has noted, this case proceeds

only as to plaintiff’s allegations regarding a prison regulation prohibiting Ad Seg inmates from

receiving religious books, non-religious books, correspondence course materials and periodicals. 

Thus, the issue before this court is whether the regulation impermissibly infringes upon a federal

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

constitutional right of plaintiff’s. The court finds that plaintiff’s request concerning any

misconduct or civil rights violations alleged against defendant Campbell is not “reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The

motion will be denied as to this request. 

REQUEST NO. 19: “Results of any and all chemical blood tests

regarding defendants’ blood, by CDCR, or law enforcement.

People v. Lowe [,] 285 App.Div.207, 136 NYS.2d 454; Pinana v.

State, 76 Nev.274, 352 P.2d 824; People v. Smith, 70 C.A.3d 306,

138 Cal.Rptr.783;”

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 19: Defendant objects to this

request on the grounds that it is vague, not reasonably calculated to

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and not a proper

request for production of documents.

This document production inquiry is so wildly off the mark that the court

summarily denies the motion as to this request.

REQUEST NO. 20: Any and all handwriting exemplars, if any,

that have been provided to CDC or the court by defendants, to

include any expert examination, and/or reports of same. Corn v.

State Bar, 68 C.2d 461, 67 Cal.Rptr.401;

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 20:

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds that it is vague

and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence. 

As defendant argues in opposition, neither handwriting nor the identification of

anyone who may have authored any particular document is at issue in this case involving whether

or not plaintiff’s civil rights were violated by defendant Campbell’s not allowing him to receive

packages in the mail. Opp., p. 5. This request, therefore, simply is not reasonably 

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The motion as to this request will be

denied.

REQUEST NO. 21: Any and all records of any and all defendants

and/or their witnesses, who are, and/or ever have been, narcotic

addicts, alcoholics, drug addicts, etc., and/or any defendants and/or

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

defense witnesses possibly having, or every [sic] having had,

distorted vision, memory, perception, and/or hallucinations, which

also may affect or cause a reason(s) that such witnesses may be

testifying for the defense. United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d 566,

fn.38, at page 574;

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 21: Defendant objects to this

request on the grounds that it is vague, infringes on third party

privacy rights, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant Campbell argues that any information sought pertaining to this request

has no bearing on the veracity of any potential witness. Opp., p. 6. The undersigned observes

that in this request plaintiff has at least cited to a federal case; however, the government’s

employment of drug-addicted informants, addressed in the cited case Kinnard, with regard to the

criminal convictions of two appellants is wholly irrelevant to the issues implicated by the instant

civil rights action. The motion as to this completely inapposite and vague request will be denied.

REQUEST NO. 23: List of all CDC inmates with CDC numbers

and current location, that were housed in C-12 AD-SEG, from

9-19-04 through 9-1-05;

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 23: Defendant objects to this

request on the grounds that it is compound, overly broad as to the

time frame, not relevant to this lawsuit, not reasonably calculated

to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and information

contained in the case records of inmates may not be accessed by

other inmates or parolees pursuant to Title 15, California Code of

Regulations, Section 3370.

Defendant contends that responding to this request would involve “the impossible

task of tracking down every inmate housed in a particular cell of the prison throughout an entire

year.” Opp., p. 6. It is not clear to the court whether C-12 Ad Seg is a “particular cell,” or a unit

or section involving a number of cells. If the request involved a particular cell, it would not

appear to be unduly burdensome to provide the name of such an individual (although probably

more appropriately in the context of an interrogatory response) as the prison surely keeps a

record of inmates who are retained in Ad Seg, particularly for such an extended period. 

However, plaintiff does not make any showing as to how such information could reasonably lead

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

to the discovery of admissible evidence. The names of other inmates does not address the

constitutionality of any policy concerning receipt of packages or publications in Ad Seg. 

Plaintiff has not alleged, for example, that some Ad Seg inmates were allowed access to

publications by defendant Campbell while others were not. The motion as to this request will be

denied. 

REQUEST NO. 24: Plaintiff hereby provided notice to defendants

and this honorable court, that he desires to present a meaningful

case against defendants in support of the civil rights complaint, and

would appreciated [sic] defendants’ early and timely attention to,

and response to, this request, and all motions, so that plaintiff does

not need to report to the court regarding his inability to obtain

defendants’ cooperation. Theodore v. Superior Court [,]8 C.3d 77,

104 Cal.Rptr 226, Saulter v. Municipal Court, 75 C.A.3d 231, 142

Cal.Rptr. 226;

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 24: Defendants object to this

request on the ground that it is not a request for production of

documents.

As defendant observes, this is not a request for any readily identifiable

document. Opp., p. 7. The motion as to this request will be denied.

REQUEST NO. 25: “Plaintiff notifies defendants that this order/”

[“]Request for the Production of Documents” and “Things”, is

continuing, and binds “the defendants and all parties named, or to

be named in this case, their deputies, employees and agents” to

inform plaintiff forthwith of any information covered or relevant to

this order/request, which comes to the attention of defendants,

and/or their agents, officers, investigators, deputies, and all parties

named, or to be named in this case, after the subject discovery

compliance. Based on the case law cited, plaintiff requests leave to

present additional evidentiary and/or discovery/disclosure motions,

based on the future necessity when the responses to this motion are

received by plaintiff and considered/processed. Hill v. Superior

Court [,]10 C.3d 812, 821; In Re Ferguson, 5 C.3d 525; Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 87; A.B.A.Standards, Section 4.2.”

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 25: Defendants object to this

request on the ground that it is not a proper request for production

of documents.

Defendant is correct in that this cannot be construed as a request for production of 

readily identifiable documents. Opp., p. 8. On that basis, the motion as to this request must be

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

denied.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The August 28, 2006, order be vacated only to the extent that the original

complaint was dismissed and this matter now proceeds only as to the answering defendant

Campbell and only as to the original complaint, filed on April 8, 2005;

2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, filed on June 19, 2006, is denied. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ October 2, 2006, motion to

dismiss the second amended complaint be granted, and that defendants Burruel, Grannis, Kernan

and Woodford, as well as unserved defendants Arceo and Cherry, be dismissed with prejudice

from this action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 3/21/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

hodg0682.mtd2

Case 2:05-cv-00682-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 03/21/07 Page 15 of 15