Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02290/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02290-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEEPAKKUMAR HIMATLAL SONEJI and

KINNARI DEEPAKKUMAR SONEJI,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

Department of Homeland Security,

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary;

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

ROBERT MUELLER, Director; U.S.

Attorney General, ALBERTO GONZALES;

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services, ROBERT DIVINE, Acting

Director; U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services Nebraska

Service Center, GERARD HEINAUER,

Director,

Defendants.

 

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Case No. 07-2290 SC

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Deepakkumar Himatlal Soneji and Kinnari

Deepakkumar Soneji ("Plaintiffs") filed a Petition for Mandamus to

Compel Adjudication of Applications for Adjustment of Status

("Petition") on April 27, 2007. Docket No. 1. In this Petition,

Plaintiffs seek to compel adjudication of their I-485 Applications

to Adjust to Lawful Permanent Resident Status ("Applications"). 

See Pet. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs' Applications have been pending for

more than 3 and one half years. Id. Now before the Court is

defendants' Michael Chertoff, et al. ("Defendants"), Motion to

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Dismiss. See Docket No. 7. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition and

Defendants submitted a Reply. See Docket Nos 27, 32. For the

following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are married citizens of India currently residing

legally in the United States. Pet., Ex. 2. Plaintiff Deepakkumar

Himatlal Soneji ("Mr. Soneji"), a software engineer, came to the

United States on June 18, 1999, on a non-immigrant H1-B visa. Id.

On February 26, 2001, Mr. Soneji was hired by Flextronics

International, U.S.A., Inc. ("Flextronics"), as a temporary nonimmigrant worker. Id. at ¶ 6; Ex. 3. Mr. Soneji was subsequently

hired as a permanent employee and has worked at Flextronics for

the last seven years. Id. at ¶ 12; Exs. 4, 11. On February 2,

2004, Flextronics filed an I-140 immigrant visa petition for Mr.

Soneji. Id. at ¶ 14. On November 2, 2004, this I-140 petition

was approved. Id. at Ex. 4. This petition serves as the basis

for Mr. Soneji to adjust his immigration status to legal permanent

resident. Id. at ¶ 14. 

Mr. Sonjeji's wife, Kinnari Deepakkumar Soneji ("Mrs.

Soneji") is co-plaintiff in the Petition. Pet. ¶ 1. Mrs. Soneji

and Mr. Soneji were married in India on November 28, 2002. Pet.,

Ex. 2. Mrs. Soneji came to the United States to join her husband

on February 28, 2003. Id. at ¶ 13. Mrs. Soneji lawfully entered

the United States on an H-4 visa. Id. at Ex. 2. Mrs. Soneji is

currently a pharmacist at Safeway. Id. at ¶ 6.

On February 11, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their I-485

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1

 Mrs. Soneji is eligible for adjustment of her status to

legal permanent resident based only on her status as an

accompanying spouse to Mr. Soneji. Therefore, even though Mrs.

Soneji's "background check has been completed," her application

3

Applications. Pet., Ex. 1. Mr. Soneji's adjustment eligibility

is based on his pending I-140 immigrant visa petition. Id. at ¶

15. Mrs. Soneji's adjustment eligibility is based on her marriage

to Mr. Soneji and is derivative of his adjustment eligibility. 

Id. Mr. and Mrs. Soneji gave birth to their first child in Walnut

Creek, California, on January 13, 2006. Id. at ¶ 13. This child,

needless to say, is a citizen of the United States. Plaintiffs

both have employment authorization to remain in the United States

until March 28, 2008. Mot. to Dismiss at 5. Defendants do not

contest any of these facts.

Before applications to adjust status may be adjudicated, the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") conduct various

security and background checks. Mot. to Dismiss at 3. On March

4, 2004, less than one month after Plaintiffs submitted their

Applications, USCIS requested that the FBI conduct name checks of

both Plaintiffs. Id. at 5. Defendants, in a declaration

submitted with the Motion to Dismiss, state that the FBI name

check for Mrs. Soneji was completed on the very same day, March 4,

2004, that the request was received by the FBI. See Cannon Decl.

¶ 23, Mot. to Dismiss. Mr. Soneji's name check, however, which

was submitted at the same time as Mrs. Soneji's, is, some three

and one half years later, still pending. Id. at ¶ 22., Mot. to

Dismiss at 5.1

 Defendants concede that Mr. Soneji's FBI name

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cannot be independently adjudicated. Mot. to Dismiss at 5. 

Accordingly, adjudication of both Plaintiffs' Applications hinges

on Mr. Soneji's background check. 

4

check is all that currently prevents adjudication of Plaintiffs'

Applications. See Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (stating "USCIS is

presently unable to adjudicate Plaintiffs' I-485 applications

because it has not yet received the results of [Mr.] Deepakkumar

Soneji's FBI name check. Once USCIS receives the name check

results from the FBI, it will promptly adjudicate Plaintiffs'

applications").

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' Petition pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs, as the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction

of the Court, have "the burden of proving the actual existence of

subject matter jurisdiction." Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352,

353 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Plaintiffs offer two origins

for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, pursuant to the Administrative

Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; and (2) the

Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

Defendants assert that the Court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction for essentially three reasons: (1) 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips the Court of jurisdiction; (2) the APA

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exempts discretionary agency actions from judicial review; and (3)

Plaintiffs cannot show, as they must to prevail on a mandamus

action, that they have a clear right to immediate adjudication or

that Defendants have a clear ministerial duty to act within any

particular time frame. The Court addresses each argument in turn

and finds, for the following reasons, that the Court has

jurisdiction under both the APA and the Mandamus Act.

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) 

Defendants' assert that section 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the

Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"), codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), precludes federal jurisdiction. Mot. to

Dismiss at 6. Section 1252 states that "[n]otwithstanding any

other provision of law . . ., and regardless of whether the

judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no

court shall have jurisdiction to review" any discretionary action,

other than granting asylum, by the Attorney General or the

Secretary of Homeland Security. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

Defendants argue that by seeking to compel adjudication of

their I-485 Applications, Plaintiffs seek federal judicial review

of a discretionary action, which is precluded by § 1252. 

Defendants, however, misunderstand the scope of § 1252. By its

own language, the statute applies to "judgment[s], decision[s], or

action[s] . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). Plaintiffs are not

seeking judicial review of a judgment, decision, or action. 

Instead, Plaintiffs are seeking to compel the government to take

some action on a decision that has been languishing for more than

three years.

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The authority cited by Defendants does not support their

position. First, Defendants cite Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d

1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006), for the proposition that "Section

242(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the INA removes jurisdiction over all

challenges to discretionary determinations." Mot. at 6. Freeman,

however, merely cited with approval the proposition articulated in

Wong v. INS, 373 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that

the "'[§ 1252(a)(2)(B) bar on review of discretionary decisions

does not apply to cases] rais[ing] only constitutional or purely

legal, nondiscretionary challenges to the decisions in question.'" 

Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1037 (citing Wong, 373 F.3d at 963)

(alterations in original).

Rather than articulating a broad definition of § 1252, as

Defendants suggest, Freeman held, inter alia, that § 1252 was not

a jurisdictional bar to the narrow issue of whether "the district

director [of the Department of Homeland Security] violated [the

plaintiff's] due process rights by improperly interpreting §

1151(b)(2)(A)(i) to determine that she was no longer the 'spouse'

of a U.S. citizen and therefore not entitled to adjustment of

status." Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1037.

More importantly, Freeman and Wong addressed the issue of

what types of "decisions" may be reviewed by federal courts. 

Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1037 (citing Wong, 373 F.3d at 963). In the

present case, there has been no decision. Thus, Freeman and Wong

are inapposite.

Defendants also cite Spencer Enters. v. United States, 345

F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). Spencer, however, like Freeman, dealt

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2

 Although 5 U.S.C. section 551(13) of the APA states that

agency action includes "failure to act," the statute is clear that

this definition applies only "[f]or the purpose of this

subchapter." 5 U.S.C. § 551. The subchapter in question is titled

"Administrative Procedure." See 5 U.S.C. § 551. There is nothing

to indicate, and Defendants do not argue, that this definition also

applies to INA section 242, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

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with federal judicial review of determinations made by immigration

agencies. See id. at 688 (stating "[t]he question before us,

then, is whether any statute has deprived the federal courts of

jurisdiction to review the particular agency action at issue here: 

INS's denial of an immigrant investor visa petition") (emphasis

added). In the present case, there has been no action taken by

USCIS. Thus, as there has been no "judgment, decision, or action"

by the government, § 1252 is inapplicable and is therefore not a

bar to jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).2

2. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701

For federal question jurisdiction under the APA, Plaintiffs

must show that Defendants unreasonably delayed in processing their

applications. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (stating "with due regard for

the convenience and necessity of the parties or their

representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall

proceed to conclude a matter presented to it"); see also 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(1) (stating that courts "shall compel agency action

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed").

Defendants, citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542

U.S. 55 (2004), argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to compel

adjudication of Plaintiffs' I-485 Applications because Norton

requires that "the only agency action that can be compelled under

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the APA is action legally required." Id. at 63 (emphasis in

original). Refining this caveat, the Court stated that "a claim

under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an

agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required

to take." Id. at 64 (emphasis in original). In essence,

Defendants assert that USCIS is not required to act on Plaintiffs

I-485 Applications and therefore the APA is not a source of

federal jurisdiction. 

This argument is not convincing. Defendants urge that

because USCIS has discretion to grant or deny an I-485

application, USCIS must therefore also have the discretion to do

nothing with an I-485 application. Such an interpretation not

only pushes the bounds of common sense but is also contradicted by

a wealth of authority from this and other districts. See, e.g.,

Rzaq v. Poulos, No. 06-2461, 2007 WL 61884, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan.

8, 2007) (stating that "[w]hile the substance of the decision

whether to grant or deny a petition obviously is discretionary,

the duty to process the application is just as obviously

ministerial"); Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (N.D.

Cal. 2006) (holding "the Court finds this duty to act is not

discretionary"); Aboushaban v. Mueller, No. 06-1280, 2006 WL

3041086, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2006) (stating "respondents

have a clear duty to adjudicate the plaintiff's change of status

application"); Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 932 (D.N.M. 1999)

(holding that "[a]ll other courts addressing this question have

held that INS has a non-discretionary duty to process applications

for LPR [Legal Permanent Resident] status"); Iddir v. I.N.S., 301

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3 In Singh, the Government even conceded that it has a

nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate I-485 applications. See Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (stating that "[a]t the hearing . . .

Respondents conceded that they have a mandatory duty to act on

[Petitioner's I-485] applications").

4 As noted above, section 706(1) of the APA states that

courts "shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

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F.3d 492, 500 (7th Cir. 2002); Razik v. Perryman, No. 02-5189,

2003 WL 21878726, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 07, 2003); Fu v. Reno, No.

99-0981, 2000 WL 1644490, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 01, 2000);

Agbemaple v. I.N.S., No. 97-8547, 1998 WL 292441, at *2 (N.D. Ill.

May 18, 1998). The Court agrees that while the relevant statutes

and regulations give the agency the discretion to choose how to

decide an application, they nevertheless impose on it a

nondiscretionary duty to make such a decision.3

Finally, Defendants argue that because the APA does not

provide a standard against which to measure the time it takes

USCIS to process an application, the APA cannot be a source of

federal jurisdiction.4

 Mot. at 8. Defendants cite Heckler v.

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), for the proposition that judicial

review under the APA "is not to be had if the statute is drawn so

that the court would have no meaningful standard against which to

judge the agency's exercise of discretion." Id. at 830. However,

"[e]ven where statutory language grants an agency unfettered

discretion, its decision may nonetheless be reviewed if

regulations or agency practice provide a meaningful standard by

which this court may review its exercise of discretion." Spencer

Enters., 345 F.3d at 688 (internal quotation marks and citations

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omitted).

Defendants assert that because there is no standard for

determining what is a reasonable amount of time, "in order to

determine that the Government has 'unreasonably delayed'

adjudication of Plaintiffs' applications, this Court would have to

create a temporal standard from thin air." Mot. at 8. The Court

disagrees.

Section 55(b) of the APA states: "With due regard for the

convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives,

and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to

conclude a matter presented to it." 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (emphasis

added). "This prescription applies when Congress imposes a duty

but does not articulate a specific time frame within which that

duty must be honored." Rzaq, 2007 WL 61884, at *4. Numerous

other courts have reached this same conclusion. See, e.g.,

Aboushaban, 2006 WL 3041086, at *2 (stating "the government has a

duty to adjudicate plaintiff's application within a reasonable

time"); Yu, 36 F. Supp. at 931-32 (holding that "Defendants fail

to comprehend that the APA itself imposes on them the duty to

complete Plaintiff's application within a reasonable time");

Iddir, 301 F.3d at 500 (stating "[t]he relevant statutes and

regulations confirm that the INS did have the duty to adjudicate

the appellants' applications in a reasonable time period"); Razik,

2003 WL 21878726, at *2; Fu, 2000 WL 1644490, at *5; Agbemaple,

1998 WL 292441, at *2 (stating that "as a matter of law,

[Plaintiff] is entitled to a decision within a reasonable time").

Thus, the Court finds that Defendants are required to

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adjudicate Plaintiffs' application within a reasonable time. It

is worth emphasizing that the FBI received background check

requests for both Plaintiffs at the same time. Cannon Decl. ¶ 23,

Mot. to Dismiss. Mrs. Soneji's was processed the same day it was

received. Id. Mr. Soneji's background check, however, has still

not been processed after more than three years of waiting. Pet. ¶

42. As Defendants have provided no meaningful explanation for the

disparity in the treatment of the two background checks, this

scenario seems to be the epitome of an unreasonable delay. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have a

nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate Plaintiffs' Applications and

this duty must be undertaken within a reasonable amount of time. 

Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs'

Petition pursuant to the APA. 

3. Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361

The Mandamus Act states: "The district courts shall have

original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to

compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency

thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. §

1361. Relief under the Mandamus Act is "available to compel a

federal officer to perform a duty if: (1) the individual's claim

is clear and certain; (2) the official's duty is nondiscretionary,

ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt;

and (3) no other adequate remedy is available." Patel v. Reno,

134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1998).

Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Plaintiffs' claims are

clear and certain. They seek to compel Defendants to adjudicate

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their I-485 applications. In addition, as discussed above,

Defendants' duty to adjudicate the applications is

nondiscretionary. Finally, Plaintiffs convincingly argue that

there is no other adequate remedy available to them. Nor do

Defendants propose any alternative remedies. Plaintiffs' work

visas are set to expire in March, less than six months away. 

Plaintiffs have already waited more than three years for a

decision and, outside of their Petition, have no other recourse

other than to continue waiting. As another court has noted,

however, "[w]aiting for an agency to act cannot logically be an

adequate alternative to an order compelling the agency to act." 

Fu, 2000 WL 1644490, at *4.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

have satisfied the requirements to bring a mandamus action. Thus,

the Court finds that it has jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act.

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Legal Standard

A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Dismissal pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where it "appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief." Levine v. Diamanthuset,

Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). In reviewing the motion, a

court must assume all factual allegations made by the nonmoving

party to be true and construe them in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. North Star Int's v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720

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F.2d 578, 590 (9th Cir. 1993).

2. Analysis

Defendants, as discussed above, have a non-discretionary duty

to adjudicate Plaintiffs' Application within a reasonable time. 

The Court's determination whether Defendants have violated this

duty is guided by what are known as the “TRAC factors”: 

(1) the time agencies take to make

decisions must be governed by a “rule of

reason”[;] (2) where Congress has

provided a timetable or other indication

of the speed with which it expects the

agency to proceed in the enabling

statute, that statutory scheme may supply

content for this rule of reason [;] (3)

delays that might be reasonable in the

sphere of economic regulation are less

tolerable when human health and welfare

are at stake [;] (4) the court should

consider the effect of expediting delayed

action on agency activities of a higher

or competing priority[;] (5) the court

should also take into account the nature

and extent of the interests prejudiced by

the delay[;] and (6) the court need not

“find any impropriety lurking behind

agency lassitude in order to hold that

agency action is unreasonably delayed.”

Independence Min. Co., Inc. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 n. 7

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Telecomms. Research & Action v. F.C.C.,

750 F.2d 70, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (modifications in original). 

See also Rzaq, 2007 WL 61884, at *6; Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at

1069 (quoting an analogous standard articulated in Yu, 36 F. Supp.

2d at 934). 

It is also relevant to "look to the source of the

delay--e.g., the complexity of the investigation as well as the

extent to which the defendant participated in delaying the

proceeding." Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (quoting Saleh, 367

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F. Supp. 2d at 512) (internal modifications omitted).

It appears possible that Plaintiffs could prove a set of

facts that would lead this Court to conclude that the delay in

adjudication of their Applications was unreasonable. Therefore,

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is

DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 22, 2007 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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