Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00559/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Isaac V. Popoca, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0559-PHX-SRB (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Isaac V. Popoca filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court 

challenging his convictions and sentences for attempted burglary, burglary, and theft. 

Popoca alleges various errors by the trial court, the prosecutor, and his trial and appellate 

counsels. Respondents argue that most of his claims are not properly before the Court 

and that his remaining claims are without merit. As described below, the Court 

recommends that Popoca’s Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

 At the conclusion of a five-day trial in the Maricopa County Superior Court, a jury 

found Popoca guilty of one count of attempted burglary in the third degree, two counts of 

burglary in the third degree, and two counts of theft. (Doc. 10, Ex. D) The jury also 

found aggravating factors. (Id.) 

 The Superior Court, after finding that Popoca had prior felony convictions and 

after considering the presentence report, sentenced him to aggravated, concurrent 

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sentences, the longest of which was 20 years. (Doc. 10, Exs. E, F, EEEE, FFFF) At 

sentencing, Popoca signed to acknowledge his receipt of a Notice of Rights of Review. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. G) 

 Direct Review. Popoca, through counsel, timely initiated a direct appeal arguing 

that he was prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct, that his request to represent himself 

should have been granted, and that he was entitled to additional presentence incarceration 

credit. (Doc. 10, Exs. H, I1

) After full briefing, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected 

his first two claims and adjusted his presentence incarceration credit. (Doc. 10, Exs. J, K, 

L) The Court of Appeals subsequently denied Popoca’s pro per motion for 

reconsideration. (Doc. 10, Exs. M, N) Popoca’s attorney informed him that she would 

not petition for review; she then requested and received an extension for Popoca to do so 

himself. (Doc. 10, Exs. O, P, Q, R) The Arizona Supreme Court denied Popoca’s 

petition for review. (Doc. 10, Ex. S) 

 Post-Conviction Relief. Popoca timely filed a notice of post-conviction relief in 

Maricopa County Superior Court.2 (Doc. 10, Ex. DD) Popoca’s first petition was struck 

for failure to comply with Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.5. (Doc. 10, Exs. EE, 

FF, GG, HH, II, JJ, KK, LL, MM) After an extensive motions practice, he filed a 

compliant petition arguing, as relevant here, that his rights had been violated because of 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, double jeopardy, pre-indictment 

delay, excessive restraints during trial, prosecutorial misconduct, denial of his request to 

represent himself, and denial of his request to change counsel. (Doc. 10, Exs. NN, OO, 

PP, QQ, RR, SS, TT) 

 At the conclusion of briefing, the Superior Court dismissed and denied his 

petition. (Doc. 10, Exs. UU, VV, WW, XX, YY) Specifically, the Court found that his 

 

1

 The record contains two Exhibit Hs but no Exhibit I; the Court will refer to the 

second Exhibit H as Exhibit I. 

2

 This was Popoca’s second notice of post-conviction relief. Popoca filed his first notice during the pendency of his direct appeal and so it was dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 10 at Exs. U, V, W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC) 

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claims of prosecutorial misconduct and the denial of his request to represent himself3

were issues that had been adjudicated on direct appeal and, thus, were now precluded 

from post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(2). (Doc. 

10, Ex. YY) The Court also found that his claims of double jeopardy, pre-indictment 

delay, and excessive restraints during trial were issues that could have been adjudicated 

on direct appeal but were not and, thus, were precluded from post-conviction review 

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(1). (Id.) Finally, the Superior Court 

provided a detailed explanation of why Popoca’s claims for ineffective assistance of trial 

and appellate counsel failed. (Id.) 

 After the Superior Court denied his motion for reconsideration, Popoca timely 

petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. (Doc. 10, Exs. ZZ, AAA, BBB, 

CCC, DDD, EEE, FFF, GGG) The Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. HHH) In so doing, the Court noted that Popoca had repeated the same 

arguments he raised in the Superior Court but had abandoned his claim of excessive 

restraints. (Id. at n.2) After the Court of Appeals denied his motion for reconsideration, 

Popoca petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review. (Doc. 10, Exs. III, JJJ, KKK, 

LLL, MMM, NNN, OOO) On April 17, 2014, the Supreme Court denied review.4

 (Doc. 

10, Exs. PPP) 

 On March 27, 2015, Popoca filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court alleging violations of his rights to self-representation and to substitute counsel, 

prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, preindictment delay, double jeopardy, and excessive trial restraints. (Doc. 1) Respondents 

 

3

 It appears that the Superior Court combined Popoca’s arguments about prosecutorial misconduct into one and also combined his arguments about the denial of his request to represent himself and denial of his request for new counsel. 

4

 In March 2015, Popoca filed another notice of post-conviction relief in Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 10, Ex. SSS) Neither party has moved to stay these proceedings during the pendency of this subsequent post-conviction proceeding and the Court does not find good cause to do so. 

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argue that most of his claims cannot be reviewed by the Court and that the remaining 

claims are meritless. (Doc. 10) As described below, the Court agrees. 

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100.

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

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 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986);

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

Claims that are unexhausted and subject to procedural bars. 

 Several of the claims raised by Popoca in his Habeas Petition are unexhausted and, 

because he cannot now return to state courts, subject to a procedural bar. Moreover, as 

described below, Popoca has not shown cause and prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice. 

Accordingly, the Court cannot review Grounds Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Ten, and Eleven 

of Popoca’s Habeas Petition. 

 Pre-Indictment Delay (Ground Six) and Double Jeopardy (Ground Eight). 

Popoca’s Petition alleges that he was subjected to pre-indictment delay (Ground Six) and 

double jeopardy (Ground Eight). These two claims were raised in his post-conviction 

relief (“PCR”) proceedings but were precluded because the Superior Court found that 

these were “issues that were raisable on direct appeal but were not,” and, therefore, were 

“precluded from being raised in a Rule 32 petition pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(1) of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (Doc. 10, Ex. YY at 3) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals adopted this conclusion. (Doc. 10, Ex. HHH) Because Ground Six and Ground 

Eight are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, the Court cannot now review them. 

 Prosecutorial Misconduct (Ground Five and Ground Ten). In his PCR 

proceedings and again in his Petition, Popoca argued that his right to a fair trial was 

violated by the State’s intentional conduct (Ground Five) and when the prosecutor 

vouched for a witness (Ground Ten). (Doc. 1 at 18, 31 & Doc. TT at 14-17, 31-33) 

Popoca’s direct appeal included a related claim of prosecutorial misconduct; that claim is 

properly before this Court and discussed below. 

 However, as Popoca acknowledged in his Petition, Ground Five and Ground Ten 

were not included in his direct appeal. (Doc. 1 at 18, 31) Because this expanded version 

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of his prosecutorial misconduct claim was not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner and no state remedies remain available to 

do so, Ground Five and Ground Ten are unexhausted and now subject to a procedural 

bar. 

 Self-Representation (Ground Seven). In his direct appeal, Popoca argued that the 

trial court impermissibly denied his right to self-representation. (Doc. 10, Ex. H) To the 

extent that Popoca raises the same argument in his Petition, the Court will address it 

below. However, here, as in his PCR proceedings, Popoca has impermissibly attempted 

to expand that argument into several sub-categories. It appears that Grounds One and 

Nine are, when viewed together, the argument that Popoca raised on direct appeal about 

self-representation; to the extent that Popoca exhausted this claim, it is addressed below. 

 However, a close review of the record shows that Ground Seven is an argument 

about self-representation that Popoca never raised on direct appeal. Accordingly, Ground 

Seven is unexhausted and now subject to a procedural bar; it cannot be considered by the 

Court. 

 Excessive Restraints (Ground Eleven). In his PCR, Popoca alleged that he had 

been subjected to excessive restraints during trial. (Doc. 10, Ex. YY) Popoca did not 

present this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 10, Ex. HHH at n.2) In his 

Petition to this Court, Popoca has again raised this claim. (Doc. 1 at 33) Because Popoca 

never presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals no state remedies remain 

available for Popoca to do so, Ground Eleven is unexhausted and subject to a procedural 

bar. 

 Popoca cannot overcome bars. The Court has reviewed all of the motions and the 

extensive exhibits that Popoca has filed in support of his Petition. (Docs. 1, 9, 22) In his 

reply, Popoca argues that Respondents have waived both the exhaustion and procedural 

default defenses and that the Court should be more lenient because of his status as a pro 

per litigant. (Doc. 22 at 11-12) This argument is not persuasive. Respondents 

appropriately raised these defenses in the Answer to his Petition. And Popoca’s status as 

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a pro per litigant is not enough to overcome procedural bars. See Robinson v. Kramer, 

588 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Popoca also argues that his change in trial counsel combined with his appellate 

counsel’s inadequate knowledge of the facts is sufficient to establish cause for any 

default. (Doc. 22 at 16) However, Popoca does not explain which facts his trial or 

appellate counsel did not know. Similarly, he argues that he received ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel and that this is enough to overcome any default under 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). (Doc. 22 at 15) As described below, the Court 

does not find that Popoca received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and so the 

Martinez exception is not available to Popoca. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318 (As part 

of a successful claim, a habeas petitioner must “demonstrate that the underlying 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that [he] 

must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.”) See also Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 

362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014). 

 Finally, he argues that he was prejudiced because his trial contained multiple 

constitutional errors that have never been addressed. (Doc. 22 at 19-20) “Arguments 

raised for the first time in petitioner’s reply brief are deemed waived.” Delgadillo v. 

Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 930 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Court will not address 

any of these arguments. 

 Because he has not demonstrated either cause for the default and actual prejudice 

to excuse the default, or a miscarriage of justice, the Court cannot review Grounds Five, 

Six, Seven, Eight, Ten, and Eleven. 

HABEAS CLAIMS 

 On habeas review, this Court can only grant relief if the petitioner demonstrates 

prejudice because the adjudication of a claim either “(1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

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presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d). This is a “‘highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ which demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)). 

Prosecutorial Misconduct (Ground Two). 

 In his direct appeal and again in his Habeas Petition, Popoca claims that the 

prosecutor misstated information about the codefendant’s plea deal and his prior 

convictions in order to bolster the witness’ credibility with the jury. (Doc. 1 at 6-8; Doc. 

10, Ex. H; Doc. 22 at 25-27) During the trial, a co-defendant who testified against 

Popoca did so pursuant to the testimonial agreement in his plea deals. Popoca’s objection 

is to the prosecutor’s description of the consequences of that plea agreement. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. CCCC at 20-23) The Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed this claim for fundamental 

error and found none. (Doc. 10, Ex. L at ¶¶ 14) 

 On habeas review, “the relevant question is whether the prosecutor’s comments 

‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). “In other words . . . the first issue is whether 

the prosecutor’s remarks were improper and, if so, whether they infected the trial with 

unfairness.” Tak Sun Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 The Court has reviewed all of the trial transcripts in the record. (Doc. 10, Exs. 

ZZZ, AAAA, BBBB, CCCC, DDDD; Doc. 24, Ex. 1) Even assuming that the 

prosecutor’s comments were improper, the Court cannot conclude that the prosecutor’s 

remarks rise to the level of infecting the trial with unfairness. Any inference from the 

prosecutor’s description of the testifying co-defendant’s plea deals was more than 

balanced out by the lengthy and detailed cross-examination of the witness by Popoca’s 

counsel which reviewed the details and consequences of the witness’ plea agreements. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. CCCC at 29-53) Accordingly, Popoca is not entitled to habeas relief on his 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 

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Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel (Ground Three and Ground Four). 

 Under clearly established Federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel 

(“IAC”), Popoca needs to show that his trial counsel’s performance was both (a) 

objectively deficient and (b) caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). This results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s performance. 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011). The Court has discretion to determine 

which Strickland prong to analyze first. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th

Cir. 1998). A habeas court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 

determine “whether there is a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s 

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th

Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, this Court’s 

“pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was 

unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

 In PCR proceedings, the Superior Court found that Popoca’s trial and appellate 

attorneys satisfied both of Strickland’s requirements: competency and an absence of 

prejudice. (Doc. 10, Ex. YY) The Superior Court found that Popoca’s trial attorney 

“showed substantial familiarity with the facts and circumstances of the case in his 

opening and closing statements, vigorously cross-examined the State’s witnesses on 

relevant points, and made a logical argument on his client’s behalf at sentencing.” (Id. at 

3) The Superior Court noted that Popoca was “sentenced to prison time concurrent with 

longer sentences he was already serving in the Department of Corrections.” (Id. at 4) 

Further, the Superior Court noted that Popoca “failed to present any competent evidence 

that his counsel’s performance prejudiced the outcome of his trial or sentencing,” 

including his attorney’s failure to raise arguments about pre-indictment delay or double 

jeopardy. (Id. at 4) Next, the Superior Court found that Popoca’s arguments about his 

appellate counsel were either frivolous or meritless because they had been raised on 

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direct appeal, were duplicative of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, were 

requests for something that he had already received, or failed to demonstrate prejudice. 

(Id. at 4-5) On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the Superior Court’s ruling 

in its entirety. (Doc. 10, Ex. HHH) The Court has reviewed Popoca’s entire record and 

cannot say that the state court’s application of the Strickland standard for Popoca’s trial 

or appellate attorney was unreasonable. 

 In his Petition, Popoca argues that his trial and appellate counsels were ineffective 

but does not provide any specific examples of how his trial, sentencing, or appeal would 

have been different but for his attorneys’ actions. (Doc. 1 at 11-17) Popoca’s reply 

alleges prejudice but is similarly devoid of details. (Doc. 22 at 28-38) In other words, 

Popoca does not explain what prejudice he suffered; this is required under Strickland. 

Accordingly, Popoca has not established that he is entitled to relief for his claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

Sixth Amendment Right to Self-Representation (Grounds One and Nine). 

 Popoca’s Petition claims that the Superior Court’s denial of his request for selfrepresentation amounted to a violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment. (Doc. 1 

at 29-30; Doc. 22 at 48-49) In his reply, Popoca argues that his request was unequivocal. 

(Doc. 22 at 23-24) 

 The facts, as described in the record before the Court, are as follows. Popoca 

submitted several hand-written motions during a pre-trial hearing and, although the Court 

accepted the motions and the State received copies of the motions, the motions were 

never entered into the record. (Doc. 10, Ex. WWW at 4-5) According to Popoca, these 

motions included an unequivocal request for self-representation. (Doc. 1 at 29) 

 During a later pre-trial hearing, the Court addressed Popoca’s motions as follows: 

THE COURT: I understand that Commissioner Lynch had taken some motions that would be-I can’t remember the case, Mr. Popoca, but you’re not entitled to hybrid representation. So if you have an attorney, the attorney has to be the one filing the motions. 

THE DEFENDANT: I filed motions pursuant to State v. Cornell. I am 

waiving counsel. 

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THE COURT: It is not an on/off switch. You’re either representing yourself or you’re not. So if there’s any motions, they have to be filed by Mr. Wallin and if there is any response obligations, they’re only going to be for motions filed for (sic) Mr. Wallin. 

MR. WALLIN [defense counsel]: Perhaps the Court would like to ask him 

does he want to represent himself. 

THE COURT: He has to raise that on his own. I am not going to raise that for him. 

MR. WALLIN: He said he was waiving counsel for the purpose of the motion. 

THE COURT: No such thing. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. YYY). It appears that Popoca never raised his request for selfrepresentation again with the Court. 

 On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that Popoca’s request for selfrepresentation in the above colloquy was equivocal and, therefore, insufficient to invoke 

his right of self-representation. State v. Popoca, 2010 WL 2332143 at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. June 10, 2010). (Doc. 10 at Ex. L) 

 The question of whether Popoca sufficiently invoked his Sixth Amendment right 

to self-representation depends on the particular facts of his case. See Randolph v. Cain, 

412 F. App’x 654, 657 (5th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases confirming that invocation of 

right to self-representation is a factual determination). On habeas review, “a decision 

adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (opinion of 

O’Connor, J.)). Put another way, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the 

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) 

(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 Applying this standard of review, the Court cannot say that the Court of Appeals’ 

decision was objectively unreasonable. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court 

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“reasonably construed” Popoca’s statements to indicate that he wanted to waive counsel 

for the limited purpose of arguing his motions, not for his entire case. Popoca, 2010 WL 

2332143 at ¶ 6. This is not an objectively unreasonable interpretation of the conversation 

between Popoca and the Court as quoted above. 

 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted that Popoca never attempted to clarify the 

scope of his request. Id. at ¶ 7. Similarly, this Court notes that Popoca did, and does, file 

numerous motions in his various cases and he could have, but did not, file any subsequent 

motions that could have invoked his right to self-representation. Thus, it was not 

objectively unreasonable to conclude that Popoca’s request was not unequivocal. 

Accordingly, Popoca is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

PETITIONER’S MOTIONS 

 Popoca has also filed two motions, both of which seek additional information. 

First, Popoca moved to expand the record to include the transcript of a trial management 

conference because, according to Popoca, Respondents are relying on the Donald hearing 

mentioned in that minute entry to argue that Popoca did not receive ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel. (Doc. 16 at 1-2) This request will be denied: Respondents’ Answer did 

not discuss any Donald hearing and, more importantly, Popoca’s decision to forgo a plea 

is not at issue in his Habeas Petition. Next, Popoca asks the Court to expand the record to 

include the video of the pre-trial hearing where he submitted his now-lost motions. (Doc. 

16 at 2) This video is not necessary because the transcript clearly demonstrates that he 

submitted motions. (Doc. 10, Ex. WWW at 4) The remainder of Popoca’s motion 

appears to be an impermissible attempt to expand his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims and, therefore, will be denied. 

 Popoca’s second motion asks the Court to order his trial counsel to provide 

Popoca with his file. (Doc. 17) Based on Popoca’s rely brief, it appears that he has 

received what he was seeking. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 9-B) Accordingly, the Court will deny 

this motion as moot. 

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 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Isaac V. Popoca’s Motion to Expand the 

Record will be denied. (Doc. 16) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Isaac V. Popoca’s Motion to Order Trial 

Counsel to Provide Petitioner the Attorney File will be denied as moot. (Doc. 17) 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Isaac V. Popoca’s petition for writ 

of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 18th day of December, 2015. 

Case 2:15-cv-00559-SRB Document 25 Filed 12/18/15 Page 13 of 13