Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01319/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01319-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRUDY G. HEMPHILL, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF )

THE ESTATE OF JAMES J. )

RYSKAMP, JR., et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-1319 OWW/SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(Doc. 65) 

On October 18, 2005, Plaintiff Trudy G. Hemphill filed a

Complaint in this court and proceeds under a Second Amended

Complaint (SAC) against the Personal Representative of the Estate

of James J. Ryskamp, Jr. (Ryskamp Estate); Ryskamp Inc.; Ryskamp

Plan; James J. Ryskamp, Jr., M.D., Inc. Money Purchase Pension

Plan (“Ryskamp MP Plan”); James J. Ryskamp, Jr., M.D., Inc.

Profit Sharing Plan (“Ryskamp PS Plan”), and Judith Dickison

Ryskamp, individually and as Trustee of the James J. Ryskamp, Jr.

and Judith Dickison Ryskamp Living Trust (“Ryskamp Trust”). The

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SAC alleges in pertinent part:

9. Defendant Judith Dickison Ryskamp (‘Mrs.

Ryskamp’) is an individual and surviving

spouse of Ryskamp. Upon information and

belief, Mrs. Ryskamp is a ‘party in

interest,’ within the meaning of ... ERISA,

29 U.S.C. § 1002(4). Upon information and

belief, Plaintiff further alleges that Mrs.

Ryskamp was named in Ryskamp’s Last Will and

Testament as the executor of the Ryskamp

Estate and that Mrs. Ryskamp has petitioned

for appointment as the personal

representative of the Ryskamp Estate from the

California Superior Court for Fresno County

in the probate of the Ryskamp Estate. Upon

information and belief, Plaintiff alleges

that Mrs. Ryskamp and Ryskamp had a revocable

living trust for which Mrs. Ryskamp is the

trustee. Plaintiff further alleges, upon

information and belief, that Mrs. Ryskamp was

a beneficiary of Ryskamp’s benefits under the

Defendant Plans and received Ryskamp’s

benefits from the Defendant Plans following

Ryskamp’s death. Thus, Plaintiff sues Mrs.

Ryskamp individually as well as in her

capacity as the personal representative of

the Ryskamp Estate and the trustee of the

Ryskamp Trust. ....

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication in her favor on the

First Claim for Relief for declaratory relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2201 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), the Second Claim for

Relief for benefits, to enforce her rights and clarify her rights

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and the Fourth Claim for

Relief for injunctive relief and nondisclosure penalties pursuant

to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). Specifically, by this motion

Plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) compel the James J.

Ryskamp, Jr., M.D.C, Inc. 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (“Ryskamp

Plan”) to provide an accounting of Plaintiff’s benefits under the

Ryskamp Plan and its predecessor plans; (2) order James J.

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Ryskamp, Jr., M.D., Inc. (“Ryskamp Inc.”), as administrator of

the Ryskamp Plan and its predecessor plans, to pay statutory

penalties of $110 per day from September 3, 2003 to the date

Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication is granted; and (3)

declare as to all defendants that Plaintiff has the right to

receive certain plan documents and an accounting of all of her

benefits. 

Following the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for summary

adjudication, the parties were ordered to file supplemental

briefs concerning the availability of declaratory relief against

Mrs. Ryskamp because of the provisions of California Probate Code

§ 9351. All briefing is now complete.

A. Factual Background.

1. Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts.

In moving for summary judgment, Plaintiff sets forth the

following facts as undisputed. 

UMF No. 1. Plaintiff is a participant and

beneficiary of the Ryskamp Plan. 

Defendants denies this fact, referring to Paragraph 8 of the

Declaration of Clarissa A. Kang, plaintiff’s attorney, in support

of the motion for summary adjudication. Paragraph 8 avers in

pertinent part:

On July 26, 2006, Ryskamp Inc. served its

Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories, Set

One. In response to Interrogatory Number 4,

Ryskamp Inc. stated, ‘The amount of the

benefits Plaintiff was entitled to are

described in the QDRO and in the order of the

Superior Court of the State of California for

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the County of Fresno dated August 11, 1994

described in Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint. Plaintiff was entitled to the

benefits, as described in those orders, and

Respondent is informed and believes the

benefits were tendered to Plaintiff and

Plaintiff never signed the forms required for

distribution to her.’

Defendants focus on the term “entitled” in denying this fact. As

will be discussed in more detail below, defendants assert that

Plaintiff is not a participant or beneficiary of the Ryskamp Plan

because her entitlement to benefits is time-barred.

UMF No. 2. The Ryskamp Plan is an employee

pension benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §

1002(2).

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 3. 

Plaintiff was a vested participant in the Ryskamp MP Plan,

the Ryskamp PS Plan, and the Ryskamp-Pollock Pension and Profit

Sharing Plan (“Ryskamp-Pollock Plan”).

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 4. The Ryskamp MP Plan and the Ryskamp PS

Plan merged into the Ryskamp-Pollock Plan in 1989.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 5. The Ryskamp-Pollock Plan terminated

and its assets were transferred to the Ryskamp-Takayama 401(l)

Profit Sharing Plan (“RT Plan”) in 1994.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 6. The Ryskamp Plan was the successor

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plan to the RT Plan.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 7. The court in the marital dissolution

proceeding between Plaintiff and James J. Ryskamp, Jr.

(“Ryskamp”) entered a Stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations

Order on August 11, 1994 (“Proposed QDRO”).

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 8. The Proposed QDRO provided for the

creation and assignment to Plaintiff, as an alternate payee, the

right to $50,000 of Ryskamp’s interest in the RT Plan.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 9. The Proposed QDRO also stated that

Plaintiff would be entitled to all of the rights and election

privileges afforded to active participants under the RT Plan.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 10. The Proposed QDRO required the RT

Plan to provide Plaintiff with copies of all notices and

information regarding her benefits under the RT Plan, including

but not limited to annual reports, annual accounts, and any new

or revised retirement booklets or bulletins.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 11. The court in the marital dissolution

proceeding between Plaintiff and Ryskamp also entered another

order on August 11, 1994 which confirmed Plaintiff’s vested

interests in the Ryskamp MP Plan, the Ryskamp MS Plan, and the

Ryskamp-Pollock Plan (“Dissolution Order”).

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This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 12. Plaintiff was entitled to the

benefits described in the Proposed QDRO and the Dissolution

Order.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 13. Ryskamp Inc. is the plan

administrator of the RT Plan, the Ryskamp Plan, and their

predecessors.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 14. On September 18, 1994, Ryskamp, as

plan administrator and trustee of the RT Plan, certified the

Proposed QDRO as a qualified domestic relations order and

approved the distribution of benefits to Plaintiff in accordance

with the Proposed QDRO.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 15. Ryskamp was the principal of Ryskamp

Inc.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 16. On May 6, 1996, Plaintiff’s

accountant requested information from David N. Price, whose firm

was the third party administrator for Rykamp’s benefit plans,

regarding the whereabouts and amount of Plaintiff’s benefits

under the RT Plan, the Ryskamp PS Plan, and the Ryskamp-Pollock

Plan.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 17. In response to the inquiry made by

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In Defendants’ Reply to Statement of Undisputed Facts of 1

Plaintiff (Doc. 75), Defendants neither admit nor deny this fact.

The same is true with respect to UMF Nos. 20-26 and 32. Therefore,

these facts are admitted by failure to deny them.

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Plaintiff’s accountant, Ryskamp and David N. Price failed to

provide information regarding the then-current value of

Plaintiff’s benefits and documents by which Plaintiff could

obtain a distribution of her benefits.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 18. On or before June 21, 2002, Plaintiff

contacted Philip Price of Price Reinhardt Price to obtain account

statements of her benefits in the Ryskamp Plan and information

regarding the whereabouts and amount of her benefits under the

Ryskamp Plan.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 19. While Philip Price provided some

older account benefit statements (years 1999 and prior), he

failed to give Plaintiff information about the current

whereabouts and value of her benefits.1

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 20. On June 21, 2002, Philip Price

informed Ryskamp that Plaintiff had contacted Price for

information needed to take a distribution of her benefits from

the Ryskamp Plan, including account statements of her benefits,

but Ryskamp did not make any efforts to contact Plaintiff with

the information she needed.

This fact is admitted.

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UMF No. 21. On August 4, 2003, Plaintiff sent a

letter to Ryskamp in which she requested information sufficient

to obtain a distribution of benefits from the Ryskamp Plan,

including copies of annual statements of her benefits since 1990.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 22. Ryskamp failed to respond to

Plaintiff’s August 4, 2003 request.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 23. On November 24, 2003, the Ryskamp

Plan acknowledged that Plaintiff was entitled to a distribution

of vested benefits.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 24. On December 3, 2004, Plaintiff

requested orally and in writing to Philip Price, copies of

account statements of her benefits, summary annual reports, the

current summary plan description and summary of material

modifications, and the latest Form 5500 Annual Return/Reports for

Ryskamp’s retirement plans.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 25. Philip Price informed Ryskamp of

Plaintiff’s December 3, 2004 request and forwarded to Ryskamp a

copy of Plaintiff’s letter dated December 3, 2004.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 26. Plaintiff received no information or

documents regarding her benefits in response to her December 3,

2004 letter.

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This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 27. On February 3, 2005, Plaintiff

requested, through Ryskamp’s attorney Donald Lescoulie, that

Ryskamp provide her with summary plan descriptions, summaries of

material modifications, summary annual reports, Form 5500

return/reports, individual account statements showing her plan

benefits, and banking and brokerage statements that reveal where

her plan benefits were being held and have been held from 1990 to

the date of her letter.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 28. Mr. Lescoulie acknowledged receipt of

Plaintiff’s February 3, 2005 letter but failed to provide any

documents responsive to Plaintiff’s February 3, 2005 requests.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 29. On March 29, 2005, Plaintiff’s

lawyers sent a letter to Mr. Lescoulie, requesting an accounting

of Plaintiff’s interest in the RT Plan and Ryskamp Plan and their

predecessors from August 1994 to the date of the letter, copies

of the Summary Plan Descriptions, Summaries of Material

Modifications, Summary Annual Reports, Form 5500s, and account

benefit statements for Plaintiff’s interests in the plans.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 30. On April 29, 2005, Ryskamp, through

Mr. Lescoulie, provided a limited set of old documents that were

responsive only to a small portion of Plaintiff’s March 29, 2005

request. Ryskamp provided no documents for any year later than

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1999 and provided no accounting of Plaintiff’s benefits.

This fact is admitted.

UMF No. 31. Plaintiff’s requests for information

about her benefits and the RT Plan, the Ryskamp Plan, and their

predecessors remain unfulfilled to date. 

Defendants deny this fact, contending that Plaintiff admits

receipt of a number of items. 

In her Declaration in support of this motion, Ms. Kang avers

in pertinent part:

4. Donald Lescoulie, by letter dated April

29, 2005, provided only very few of the

documents requested by Ms. Hemphill’s

attorneys. He provided account benefit

statements for Ms. Hemphill from the RT Plan

for plan years 1994 through 1999, but none

for any ... other plan or for any years from

2000 to 2005. Mr. Lescoulie also provided a

limited number of outdated Form 5500s - Form

5500-C/R for plan year 1994 of the RyskampPollock Plan which was designated as a final

return and Form 5500s and 5500 C/R for the RT

Plan from 1996 to 1999. No more recent Form

5500s and no annual reports were produced. 

Finally, Mr. Lescoulie produced a summary

plan description for the RT Plan dated July

1993 but no other summary plan descriptions

and no summaries of material modifications. 

While Mr. Lescoulie stated in his letter that

other, more recent documents would be

produced shortly, no additional documents

followed the April 29, 2005 letter.

5. On May 24, 2006, in the course of this

action, Ms. Hemphill served Requests for

Production of Documents to ... Ryskamp Inc.,

Judith Dickison Ryskamp, the RT Plan and ...

the Ryskamp Plan ... Among the Defendants’

responses, served on July 26, 2006, the

Defendants provided a summary annual report

for plan year 1999 for the RT Plan. Of the

documents produced in the July 26, 2006

discovery responses, this 1999 summary annual

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report was the only document which was both

(1) responsive to Ms. Hemphill’s prelitigation requests for documents and

information and (2) not previously produced

by Mr. Lescoulie.

6. To date, Ms. Hemphill has never received

from Ryskamp Inc. the following documents

which she has requested in writing for years:

account statements of her benefits from 2000

to the present, an accounting of her

benefits, summary annual reports from 1990 to

1998 and from 2000 to present, Form 5500

annual returns from 1990 to 1993, 1995, and

from 2000 to present, summary plan

descriptions from 1990 to present (except for

one summary plan description for the RT Plan

dated July 1993), and summaries of material

modifications from 1990 to present.

2. Defendants’ Statement of Disputed Facts.

In opposing this motion, Defendants have submitted a

Statement of Disputed Facts. 

DMF No. 1. On or about September 15, 1994,

Plaintiff asked the administrator of the plans for paperwork to

enable her to request distribution of the $50,000, the $5,668 and

the $4,600. She was told by the administrator she would not

receive distribution paperwork.

In so asserting, Defendants refer to paragraph 24 of the

SAC. Plaintiff correctly responds that this statement of fact

does not completely describe the allegations in paragraph 24 of

the SAC:

24. On or about September 15, 1994, Ms.

Hemphill received papers from the Defendant

Plans’ third party administrator (the ‘TPA’)

regarding her right to elect distribution of

the smallest of the four benefit amounts -

the $2,661 - specified in the August 11, 1994

Orders. She did not receive any papers

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regarding distribution of the three larger

amounts - the $50,000, the $5,668 and the

$4,600. When Ms. Hemphill asked the TPA

about distribution of the three larger

amounts, the TPA informed her that she would

not receive distribution paperwork for the

three larger amounts until the forms for the

smallest amount were completed and returned. 

[Emphasis added]. Plaintiff contends that Defendants have not

raised a genuine issue of material fact because the extrapolation

from paragraph 24 of the SAC is incomplete and provides a false

inference.

DMF No. 2. In mid-1996, Plaintiff’s accountant

requested on Plaintiff’s behalf, distribution and accounting of

the $50,000, the $5,668, the $4,600 and the $2,661. Ryskamp did

not provide the distribution election form to her.

This fact is admitted that Plaintiff does not dispute she

did not receive benefit distribution forms in 1996.

DMF No. 3. Plaintiff contacted the TPA directly

in 2002 to request distribution of her benefits in the Defendant

Plans and the TPA told her she could not receive a distribution

at that time.

In so asserting, Defendants refer to paragraph 26 of the

SAC. Again, as Plaintiff correctly notes, this statement of

disputed fact does not correctly describe the allegations in

paragraph 26 of the SAC:

26. Ms. Hemphill contacted the TPA directly

in 2002 to request distribution of her

benefits in the Defendant Plans. The TPA

referred Ms. Hemphill to make her inquiries

to the Ryskamp, Inc. ‘plan administrative

committee’ but did not inform her how to

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contact the plan administrative committee. 

The TPA further informed Ms. Hemphill that

she could not receive a distribution from the

Defendant Plans because Ryskamp had not yet

filed tax forms for year 2001 and that she

would have to wait until his tax forms were

filed before she could receive any benefits.

[Emphasis added]. Plaintiff contends that Defendants have not

raised a genuine issue of material fact because the reference to

paragraph 26 is incomplete and because Ryskamp never filed the

tax forms. 

DMF No. 4. The Probate Court of the Superior

Court of California for Fresno County appointed Judith Ryskamp as

the executor of the Estate of James J. Ryskamp, Jr., M.D.,

deceased. The Court issued to her letters testamentary on March

23, 2006.

This fact is admitted by Plaintiff.

DMF No. 5. Until receipt of the summons and a

complaint in this matter, Judith Ryskamp had never heard of a

James J. Ryskamp, Jr. and Judith Dickison Ryskamp Living Trust. 

She is not aware of a trust by that name or any other trust

concerning James J. Ryskamp, Jr. and her, or her. Judith Ryskamp

is not the trustee of any such trust and has never been the

trustee of any such trust involving James J. Ryskamp, Jr. and

her, or her. She is not aware of being a beneficiary of any such

trust.

Plaintiff responds that this does not raise a genuine issue

of material fact because it is irrelevant to resolution of her

Motion for Summary Adjudication.

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DMF No. 6. The Creditor’s Claim of Plaintiff

includes a copy of the Second Amended Complaint in this action

and it was written under penalty of perjury by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff not dispute this fact.

DMF No. 7. Judith Ryskamp has not received any

benefits of James J. Ryskamp, Jr., M.D. under the plans described

in the SAC in any capacity, without limitation hereby, as an

individual, as the executor of the Estate of James J. Ryskamp,

Jr., M.D., or as the trustee of any trust.

Plaintiff responds that this does not raise a genuine issue

of material fact because it is irrelevant to resolution of the

Motion for Summary Adjudication.

DMF No. 8. Judith Ryskamp has never been and is

not now an employee, officer, director or shareholder in James J.

Ryskamp, Jr., M.D., Inc. As the executor of the Estate of James

J. Ryskamp, Jr., M.D., she expects to be stakeholder of the

shares of James J. Ryskamp, Jr., M.D., Inc. until the Probate

Court authorizes the payment of creditor claims and distribution,

if any, of the proceeds of liquidation of the assets of James J.

Ryskamp, Jr., M.D., Inc. or a distribution in kind of the stock.

Plaintiff responds that this does not raise a genuine issue

of material fact because it is irrelevant to resolution of the

Motion for Summary Adjudication.

DMF No. 9. Judith Ryskamp has never had any

discretionary authority over James J. Ryskamp, Jr., M.D., Inc. or

any of the plans mentioned in the SAC until she was issued

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letters testamentary by the Probate Court on March 23, 2006. She

has no documents described in the SAC except for some of those

that were already provided to Plaintiff according to the SAC.

Plaintiff again responds that this does not raise a genuine

issue of material fact because it is irrelevant to resolution of

the Motion for Summary Adjudication.

B. Standards Governing Resolution of Motion for Summary

Adjudication.

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir.1987). Materiality is determined by the substantive law

governing a claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all

inferences drawn from it must be construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to defeat

summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. The nonmoving

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party “may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in

order to preclude summary judgment,” but must set forth by

affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific facts showing

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The nonmoving party

may not simply state that it will discredit the moving party’s

evidence at trial; it must produce at least some “significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Id. The

question to be resolved is not whether the “evidence unmistakably

favors one side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury

could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence

presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom, Inc.,

52 F.3d 810, 815 (9 Cir.1995). This requires more than the th

“mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

plaintiff’s position”; there must be “evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment.” Id. As explained in Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.

Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-1103 (9 Cir.2000): th

The vocabulary used for discussing summary

judgments is somewhat abstract. Because

either a plaintiff or a defendant can move

for summary judgment, we customarily refer to

the moving and nonmoving party rather than to

plaintiff and defendant. Further, because

either plaintiff or defendant can have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, we

refer to the party with and without the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial rather

than to plaintiff and defendant. Finally, we

distinguish among the initial burden of

production and two kinds of ultimate burdens

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of persuasion: The initial burden of

production refers to the burden of producing

evidence, or showing the absence of evidence,

on the motion for summary judgment; the

ultimate burden of persuasion can refer

either to the burden of persuasion on the

motion or to the burden of persuasion at

trial.

A moving party without the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial - usually, but not

always, a defendant - has both the initial

burden of production and the ultimate burden

of persuasion on a motion for summary

judgment ... In order to carry its burden of

production, the moving party must either

produce evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s claim or

defense or show that the nonmoving party does

not have enough evidence of an essential

element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial ... In order to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion,

the moving party must persuade the court that

there is no genuine issue of material fact

....

If a moving party fails to carry its initial

burden of production, the nonmoving party has

no obligation to produce anything, even if

the nonmoving party would have the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial ... In such a

case, the nonmoving party may defeat the

motion for summary judgment without producing

anything ... If, however, a moving party

carries its burden of production, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence to

support its claim or defense ... If the

nonmoving party fails to produce enough

evidence to create a genuine issue of

material fact, the moving party wins the

motion for summary judgment ... But if the

nonmoving party produces enough evidence to

create a genuine issue of material fact, the

nonmoving party defeats the motion.

C. Merits of Motion.

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1), the plan administrator

“shall furnish to each participant, and each beneficiary

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receiving benefits under the plan, a copy of the summary plan

description, and all modifications and changes referred to in

section 1022(a)(1) of this title” “within 90 days after he

becomes a participant, or (in the case of a beneficiary) within

90 days after he first receives benefits” and “shall furnish to

each participant, and each beneficiary receiving benefits under

the plan, every fifth year after the plan becomes subject to this

part an updated summary plan description described in section

1022 of this title which integrated all plan amendments made

within such five-year period” unless no amendments have been made

during the five-year period. Section 1024(b)(1) further provides

in pertinent part that, “[i]f there is a modification or change

described in section 1022(a)(1) of this title ..., a summary

description of such modification or change shall be furnished not

later than 210 days after the end of the plan year in which the

change is adopted to each participant, and to each beneficiary

who is receiving benefits under the plan.” Section 1024(b)(3)

provides that, “[w]ithin 201 days after the close of the fiscal

year of the plan, the administrator shall furnish to each

participant, and to each beneficiary receiving benefits under the

plan, a copy of the statements and schedules, for such fiscal

year, described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section

1023(b)(3) of this title and such other material (including the

percentage determined under section 1023(d)(11) of this title) as

is necessary to fairly summarize the latest annual report.” The

statements and schedules described in Section 1023(b)(3)(A) and

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(B) are “a statement of the assets and liabilities of the plan

aggregated by categories and valued at their current value, and

the same data displayed in comparative form for the end of the

fiscal year of the plan” and “a statement of receipts and

disbursements during the preceding twelve-month period aggregated

by general sources and applications”. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §

1024(b)(4), “[t]he administrator shall, upon written request of

any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest

updated summary plan description, and the latest annual report,

any terminal report, the bargaining agreement, trust agreement,

contract or other instruments under which the plan is established

or operated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a) provides:

Each administrator of an employee pension

benefit plan shall furnish to any plan

participant or beneficiary who so requests in

writing, a statement indicating, on the basis

of the latest available information -

(1) the total benefits 

accrued, and

(2) the nonforfeitable pension

benefits, if any, which have accrued, or the

earliest date on which benefits will become

nonforfeitable.

Section 1132(c)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part:

Any administrator ... (B) who fails or

refuses to comply with a request for any

information which such administrator is

required by this subchapter to furnish to a

participant or beneficiary (unless such

failure or refusal results from matters

reasonably beyond the control of the

administrator) by mailing the material

requested to the last known address of the

requesting participant or beneficiary within

30 days after such request may in the court’s

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discretion be personally liable to such

participant or beneficiary in the amount of

up to $100 a day from the date of such

failure or refusal, and the court in its

discretion order such other relief as it

deems proper. ....

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2570.502c-1, the maximum daily liability

has been increased to $110 a day.

Plaintiff argues that there is no genuine dispute that she

is a participant and beneficiary under the Ryskamp Plan entitled

to the documents and information described above. 

29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) defines the term “participant” as “any

employee or former employee of any employer ... who is or may

become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee

benefit plan which covers employees of such employer ....” In

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Burch, 489 U.S. 101, 118 (1989),

the Supreme Court held:

[T]he term ‘participant’ is naturally read to

mean ... former employees ... who have ‘a

colorable claim’ to vested benefits ... In

order to establish that he ‘may become

eligible for benefits,’ a claimant must have

a colorable claim that ... he will prevail in

a suit for benefits ....

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(J) provides that “[a] person who is an

alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order shall

be considered for purposes of any provision of this chapter a

beneficiary under the plan.”

Plaintiff argues that she has demonstrated more than a

“colorable claim” to benefits. Defendants have admitted that she

was a vested participant in several of the plans that eventually

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merged into the Ryskamp Plan and have admitted that she is

entitled to the benefits described in the Proposed QDRO and the

Dissolution Order. Defendants admit that Ryskamp certified the

Proposed QDRO as a qualified domestic relations order on

September 8, 1994. Furthermore, on November 24, 2003, the

Ryskamp Plan acknowledged that Plaintiff was entitled to a

distribution of vested benefits.

Defendants argue that there is a triable issue of fact

whether Plaintiff is a beneficiary or participant in any of the

plans: “If her claims for benefits have been barred by any

statute of limitations, she no longer is eligible to receive

benefits nor is she entitled to a benefit.” Because, defendants

contend, there is an issue of fact whether Plaintiff is a

participant or beneficiary, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary

adjudication as requested in this motion.

In Chuck v. Hewlett Packard Co., 455 F.3d 1026 (9th

Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit addressed “an issue of first

impression in this circuit: whether ERISA’s statute of

limitations may bar a claim for benefits [under 29 U.S.C. §

1132(a)(1)(B) notwithstanding a plan’s failure to fulfill its

disclosure and review obligations under ... 29 U.S.C. § 1133

[requiring plans to provide adequate notice in writing that a

claim for benefits has been denied, the specific reasons for the

denial and providing a reasonable opportunity for full and fair

review by the fiduciary of the decision denying the claim for

benefits].” 455 F.3d at 1029. Chuck had worked for Hewlitt

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Packard (HP) from 1968 to 1972 and again from 1974 to 1980. In

1978 and 1979, HP calculated Chuck’s pension credit and provided

him with annual benefit statements as if there had been no break

in service with HP. Shortly before Chuck’s retirement from HP in

December 1980, HP recalculated Chuck’s accrual of benefits in

light of the break in service, which resulted in a significant

decrease in the benefits vested to Chuck under the Plan. Chuck

promptly brought to HP’s attention his dispute with the benefits

recalculation, contending that he was entitled to the original,

higher benefits calculation as a condition of his agreement to

return to HP in 1974. In late December 1980, soon after Chuck’s

retirement, HP sent Chuck a “Retirement Benefit Claims Form” with

instructions regarding the election of a method for pension

benefit payment. The option to receive a lump sum payment had

been pre-selected for Chuck, and every other option had been

crossed out. The form also noted that “[o]nce a lump sum benefit

payment has been elected or approval for lump sum payment

obtained, the choice is irrevocable.” Chuck never returned this

form because instructions on the form signaled that an annuity

commencing at age 65 would be the default method of payment to

Chuck if no timely election were made. 

Chuck then wrote a letter to an HP administrator asking that

the amount of his vesting as announced on that form be corrected

to reflect his original hire date with HP in 1968. A Plan

administrator sent a letter to Chuck dated January 28, 1981, in

which she re-affirmed the decrease in Chuck’s vested benefits and

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explained that the change was due to the break in service. The

letter also declared that corrected trust statements for 1978 and

1979 were attached and that Chuck would be receiving shortly his

final trust statement for the October 31, 1980 quarter. Chuck

admitted that he was aware at this time that HP was going to take

the position that he was not eligible for any further pension

benefits. Soon afterward, Chuck received a lump sum payment

which in HP’s view constituted a full and complete distribution

of Chuck’s benefits under the Plan. 

In late 1991 and early 1992, Chuck sent a series of letters

to HP seeking clarification of the benefits he could anticipate

receiving when he retired. HP replied in a letter dated March 6,

1992 that Chuck had been paid his benefits in 1981 and that no

further retirement benefits were payable under the Plan. For the

next several years, and then again starting in 2001, Chuck sent

numerous letters to HP seeking to reestablish his entitlement to

a benefits calculation based on continuous service with HP. Some

of these letters also requested basic Plan documentation, which

HP had never given Chuck. HP did not respond to many of these

letters and did not provide Chuck with the Plan documentation. 

Chuck filed his complaint in the district court on December 5,

2003. HP’s motion for summary judgment was granted, the district

court ruling that ERISA’s statute of limitations barred Chuck’s

benefits claim and related fiduciary duty claims and that

consequently Chuck lacked standing under ERISA to bring his

claims for plan documents and information. Id. at 1030-1031.

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In the Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss filed on 2

July 5, 2006, amended nunc pro tunc by Order filed on July 11, 2006

(hereinafter referred to as the July 5 Order), it was ruled that

the California’s four-year statute of limitations for suits on

written contracts (CCP § 337) applies to an ERISA cause of action

based on a claim for benefits under a written contractual policy,

citing Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac, 222 F.3d 643, 646-648 (9th

Cir.2000).

24

Chuck appealed. The Ninth Circuit selected the statute of

limitations governing claims for benefits under an ERISA as the

most analogous state statute. Accrual of the cause of action 2

for benefits is determined by Federal law:

We have earlier established that ‘an ERISA

cause of action accrues either at the time

benefits are actually denied or when the

insured has reason to know that the claim has

been denied.’ ... A participant need not file

a formal application for benefits before

having ‘reason to know’ that his claim has

been finally denied ... Instead, a cause of

action accrues when a pension plan

communicates ‘a clear and continuing

repudiation’ of a claimant’s rights under a

plan ... such that the claimant could not

have reasonably believed but that his

benefits had been ‘finally denied.’ ....

455 F.3d at 1031. In affirming the district court, the Ninth

Circuit concluded that HP had not complied with the requirements

of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1133(1) and (2) or the regulations set forth in

29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-(f). Id. at 1032-1033. Noting that an

earlier case, White v. Jacobs Eng’g Group Long Term Disability

Plan, 896 F.2d 344 (9 Cir.1989), held that a Plan’s th

noncompliance with these obligations prevented a statute of

limitations period from beginning to run. The Ninth Circuit

concluded that White had addressed only whether the Plan’s

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inadequate notice could prevent the start of a contractual

limitations period, i.e., a limitations period defined in the

Plan itself. Id. The Ninth Circuit held:

Although many considerations remain constant

across both contexts, we are persuaded of

three slight but relevant distinctions

between statutory and contractual time bars

in the ERISA context. Because of these

distinctions, we hold that a plan’s violation

of § 1133 does not always prevent the

triggering of ERISA’s statutory limitations

period.

Id. The first distinction, the Ninth Circuit ruled, is the

trigger for ERISA’s statute of limitations on a claim for

benefits requires examination whether a claimant “could have

reasonably believed his benefits had not been finally denied” or

whether instead he had “reason to know” of a “clear and

continuing repudiation” of his claim for benefits. Id. The

Ninth Circuit concluded with regard to this distinction:

A plan’s failure to comply with its

disclosure and review obligations under §

1133 is highly relevant to this inquiry, to

be sure. It is indisputable that the clarity

and apparent finality of a benefits denial

are easily affected by whether the plan

discloses its justifications for the denial

and by whether there has been a reasonable

opportunity for full and fair review of that

denial. In this vein, for example, it is

clear that the statute of limitations does

not begin to run if a plan’s disclosure was

so inadequate that a claimant did not even

have reason to know about the denial. See

Price v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 2

F.3d 986, 988 (9 Cir.1993). Even where a th

claimant does have reason to believe that

benefits might have been denied, a plan’s

compliance with § 1133 serves crucial

information-providing and signaling functions

that lend certainty to a claimant’s

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understanding whether a given denial is final

or appealable. A plan’s failure to comply

with § 1133, conversely, deprives claimants

of a congressionally mandated means of

knowing the proper import of, and response

to, a benefits denial. Even in cases in

which a denial might otherwise seem final, a

plan’s failure to comply with § 1133 could

deprive a claimant of ‘reason to know’ that

the denial was final.

Nevertheless, in unusual circumstances, a

claimant may well have reason for such

knowledge notwithstanding a plan’s violation

of its notification and review obligations

under § 1133. In particular, a claimant’s

own actions or knowledge might serve to

obviate the need for § 1133 information. A

claimant with actual knowledge of his

internal appeal rights under a plan, for

example, could not contend that a benefits

denial was non-final simply because the plan

did not remind him of these rights. Cf.

Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393

F.3d 318, 326 (2 Cir.2004)(noting that ‘a nd

plaintiff with actual knowledge of the right

to bring a judicial action challenging the

denial of her benefits may not rely on

equitable tolling notwithstanding inadequate

notice from her pension plan’); I.V. Servs.

of America, Inc. v. Inn Dev. & Mgmt., Inc.,

182 F.3d 51 (1 Cir.1999)(refusing to st

equitably toll a contractual limitations

period and finding ‘critical’ the fact that

the claimants had had actual knowledge of the

accrual of their cause of action). Although

this class of cases may not be vast, its

existence counsels us that a plan’s § 1133

violation cannot create a per se bar against

application of ERISA’s statute of

limitations.

Id. at 1033-1034. The second distinction between the enforcement

of contractual and statutory limitations periods noted by the

Ninth Circuit “relates to the policies underlying these

limitations periods”:

With regard to a contractual limitations

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period, we have determined that ‘holding that

inadequate notice does not trigger a ... time

bar will not create a significant problem of

stale claims,’ for plan administrators would

have just as much capacity and incentive ‘to

avoid the contingent liability of stale

claims by ceasing to rely on benefit

termination form letters and giving adequate,

specific notice.’ White, 896 F.2d at 352. 

To a large extent, this reasoning is

applicable in the statutory context as well,

for plans have the identical capacity and

incentives to avoid stale claims. But it is

also apparent that the ongoing passage of

time elevates both the burden imposed by a

stale claim and the difficulty in resolving

it. This effect is why, despite ERISA’s goal

of providing ready access to courts, and

despite the absence of any express statute of

limitations for benefits claims under ERISA,

the federal courts have long applied a

statute of limitations to such claims as a

matter of federal common law ... We have

found that the ‘policy of finality and

repose’ has particular traction against

allowing ERISA claims after potentially

extreme delays, given their increased

‘negative effects on the availability of

witnesses and evidence.’ ....

Thus, there is at least some difference

between allowing a claim to be filed several

years after the expiration of a plan’s time

bar but before the expiration of ERISA’s

statute of limitations (at least in cases in

which ERISA’s limitations period ends later),

and allowing a claim to be filed in

perpetuity. While plan administrators have

the capacity and the incentive to avoid stale

claims of either sort, perpetual liability

opens a door more widely to claims whose

underlying events have long passed, elevating

concerns regarding the plan’s abilities to

anticipate its financial obligations

adequately. Cf. Veltri, 393 F.3d at 325 (‘We

share the ... concern that to allow tolling

of the statute of limitations “in

perpetuity,” would thwart actuarial

prediction of plan liability and thereby

threaten the ability of pension plans to

prepare in advance to meet financial

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obligations simultaneously to both

beneficiaries and adverse litigants.’). Most

significant, such concerns are particularly

elevated once a claimant has clear reason to

know that denial of benefits is final, for at

that point there is diminished justification

for indefinitely allowing the claimant to sit

on the matter rather than bring his suit in

federal court.

Id. at 1034. The third distinction between contractual and

statutory limitations periods identified by the Ninth Circuit is 

the claimants’ access to meaningful remedies:

Clearly, ensuring the availability of both

administrative and judicial remedies is a

central purpose of the ERISA regime. We have

previously noted that adequacy of notice is

‘important to [claimants’] ability to obtain

full and fair reviews of their claims,’ and

the statute and regulations ‘reveal a purpose

to aid claimants in avoiding the obstacles a

plan may place in their paths to the appeals

board.’ White, 896 F.2d at 351. ERISA

likewise reveals a purpose of removing

obstacles in claimants’ paths to the courts. 

Indeed, Congress expressly declared that a

central policy goal in creating ERISA was to

protect participants’ interests ‘by requiring

the disclosure and reporting to participants

and beneficiaries of financial and other

information with respect thereto ... and by

providing for appropriate remedies,

sanctions, and ready access to the Federal

courts.’ 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). In keeping

with Congress’ goal of providing ‘ready

access to the Federal courts,’ we must remain

mindful that ‘ERISA is remedial legislation

which should be liberally construed in favor

of protecting participants in employee

benefit plans.’ ....

One of the most significant remedial concerns

regarding the enforcement of contractual

limitations periods, however, is somewhat

mitigated in the context of enforcing ERISA’s

statute of limitations. If, despite a plan’s

insufficient notification to the claimant,

ERISA’s limitations period is enforced -

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unlike the enforcement of contractual

limitations periods - plan boards still would

not be entirely capable of ‘deter[ring]

claimants from timely appealing by sending

vague and inadequate appeal notices.’ White,

896 F.2d at 351; cf. Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of

America, 232 F.3d 719, 726 (9th

Cir.2000)(noting that missing the deadline

for invoking a plan’s administrative

procedures would ‘entirely foreclose[]’

judicial review). After all, a claimant

could still potentially seek a remedy in

federal court by filing a timely claim under

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) to enforce the

notification and review requirements of §

1133 - a claim for which the exhaustion of

internal dispute procedures would not be

required ... Such a suit would remove ‘the

obstacles a plan may place in [claimants’]

paths to the appeals board,’ White, 896 F.2d

at 351, for the usual remedy for a violation

of § 1133 is ‘to remand to the plan

administrator so the claimant gets the

benefit of a full and fair review.’ ....

Granted, the availability of federal courts

to hear such suits provides only a very

limited safety valve for claimants. After

all, these suits effectively require

claimants to learn independently of their

internal appeal rights, when Congress and the

Department of Labor have, to the contrary,

explicitly placed the burden of plans of

informing claimants of those rights. See 29

U.S.C. § 1133; 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. 

Nevertheless, it is a safety valve that is

most likely to be meaningful for the

occasional claimant who had not basis other

than the ERISA statute itself for learning of

his internal appeal rights but who had

received unmistakable notification from a

plan that its decision was final. 

Id. at 1034-1036. The Ninth Circuit held:

We recognize that, as between the enforcement

of contractual and statutory time bars, these

distinctions are not great. Nevertheless, we

find it significant that they are all

relatively salient in the case of a claimant

who, despite the § 1133 violation, still has

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clear reason to know that the plan’s denial

of benefits is final. We are therefore

persuaded that a plan’s noncompliance with §

1133 does not prevent per se the triggering

of ERISA’s statute of limitations. Instead,

we hold what, while a great deal of caution

is necessary before finding a claim barred by

ERISA’s statute of limitations

notwithstanding a plan’s violation of § 1133,

an investigation of the facts of each case is

necessary to determine whether a plan

nevertheless foreclosed a claimant from any

reasonable belief that the plan had not

finally denied benefits.

Id. at 1036. The Ninth Circuit then ruled that under the facts

before it, the claim for benefits was time-barred under ERISA’s

statute of limitations notwithstanding HP’s failure to notify

Chuck of his appeal rights or of the full justification for its

denial of benefits “because a number of factors ..., taken

together, close off any possibility that Chuck could have

reasonably believed the denial of his benefits was not final

....” Id. at 1036-1038. 

These factors were Chuck’s knowledge before he resigned in

1980 that HP was going to take the position that he was not

eligible for further pension benefits beyond those to which he

was entitled at the decreased vesting rate; the Plan did

consistently communicate to Chuck that it was taking this

position; Chuck had actual notice that a lump sum payment, if

made, would constitute his only payment option; Chuck had notice

that his acceptance of the lump sum payment would be irrevocable;

Chuck accepted the lump sum payment in the amount set by HP

without conditioning the acceptance of that lump sum payment on

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the reservation of his claim to greater benefits; HP’s letter to

Chuck in 1992 noting that the Plan had paid the benefits in 1981

and unequivocally announcing that no further retirement benefits

were payable. Id. The Ninth Circuit then addressed Chuck’s

claims for statutory damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) for the

Plan’s failure to provide him with Plan-related documents:

If Chuck is not a ‘participant or

beneficiary’ of the Plan, however, he lacks

standing to bring these claims under §

1132(a)(1). See Crotty v. Cook, 121 F.3d

541, 544 (9 Cir.1997). As Chuck does not th

claim to be a beneficiary, the issue here is

whether Chuck is a ‘participant,’ a term that

ERISA defines in relevant part as ‘any ...

former employee ... who is or may become

eligible to receive a benefit of any type

from an employee benefit plan ....’ 29

U.S.C. § 1002(7). 

The Supreme Court has held that, ‘[i]n order

to establish that he or she “may become

eligible” for benefits, a claimant must have

a colorable claim that (1) he or she will

prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2)

eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in

the future.’ Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. ...

Chuck does not contend that he fits into the

second category, so the issue we face is

whether Chuck had a colorable claim that he

would prevail in a suit for benefits. Our

examination concerns Chuck’s status as of the

time he filed his complaint. See McBride v.

PLM Int’l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 749-750 (9th

Cir.1999).

As a preliminary matter, we note that Chuck

cannot bootstrap standing based on this same

claim for statutory damages under § 1132(c),

because awards for damages under ERISA do not

qualify as a possible ‘benefit’ for which a

participant may become eligible under 29

U.S.C. § 1002(7). See Kuntz v. Reese, 785

F.2d 1410, 1411 (9 Cir.1986), abrogated on th

other grounds by Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51

F.3d 1449, 1455 (9 Cir.1995). Instead, th

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In Astor v. International Business Machs. Corp., 7 F.3d 533, 3

538 (6 Cir.1993), cited with approval in McLeod v. Oregon th

Lithoprint Inc., 46 F.3d 956, 958 n.3 (9 Cir.1995), vacated on th

other grounds, 517 U.S. 1116 (1996), the Sixth Circuit held:

In determining who is a ‘participant,’ for

purposes of standing, the definition found in

29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) must be read in the

context of traditional concepts of standing,

32

Chuck must rely on his claim under §

1132(a)(1)(B), which challenged directly the

Plan’s denial of pension benefits.

As we have discussed above, however, Chuck’s

claim for benefits was clearly time-barred

when he filed this suit, in light of Chuck’s

own actions and understandings. In agreeing

with the district court’s decision on summary

judgment that Chuck’s benefits claim is timebarred, we have necessarily concluded that no

reasonable trier of fact could have decided

the issue in Chuck’s favor ... Accordingly,

it is certain that Chuck’s claim is timebarred, and a claim that is clearly timebarred because of the claimant’s own actions

is not ‘colorable’ for the purposes of

establishing ERISA standing. See Adamson v.

Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 654 (8 Cir.1995). th

At the time he initiated this lawsuit, Chuck

therefore was not a plan ‘participant’ under

§ 1002(7), and thus he lacks standing to

bring his claims under the Plan under §

1132(a)(1)(A). 

Id. at 1039. 

Here, because the SAC also sets forth a claim for

distribution of benefits under Section 1132 in the Second Cause

of Action, Chuck is authority that Plaintiff’s standing as a

participant or beneficiary must be determined as of the date this

action was filed and that, if there is a question of fact whether

the statute of limitations on her claim for benefits has run, her

motion for summary adjudication must be denied.3

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not in the context of adjudicating the

ultimate issue of the merits of plaintiffs’

claim that they are not receiving the full

extent of the benefits to which they are

entitled from the employee benefit plan ...

The doctrine of standing is concerned with

whether a person is the proper party to

request adjudication of a particular issue,

whether a person has alleged such a personal

stake in the outcome of a justiciable

controversy that [she] should be entitled to

obtain its judicial resolution. Standing

focuses on a person’s efforts to get [her]

complaint before a court and not on the issue

[she] wishes to have adjudicated.

The Ninth Circuit’s citation of the Sixth Circuit case does not

appear to contradict the holding in Chuck because Chuck only looked

to the statute of limitations, not the merits of the claim for

benefits.

33

Recognizing this possibility, Plaintiff, in her reply brief,

attempts to distinguish Chuck. First, she contends that, in

Chuck, Chuck’s status was the same at the time his action was

filed as it was when he requested documents from the plan

administrator. Furthermore, Plaintiff notes that Chuck relied on

McBride v. PLM Intern., Inc., 179 F.3d 732 (9 Cir.1999), as th

authority that standing is determined by the status of the

plaintiff at the time the action is commenced. Plaintiff asserts

that McBride “acknowledged that the determination of ERISA

standing at the time the action is filed is not appropriate for

all cases and then proceeded to measure participant or

beneficiary status as of a time prior to the filing of the

complaint.” 

Chuck’s citation to McBride was to the dissenting opinion. 

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The majority opinion in McBride addressed standing of a

participant or beneficiary who brings a claim under 29 U.S.C. §

1140 making it illegal to discharge an employee (whistleblower)

for exercising his or her rights under the benefit program or

ERISA. In pertinent part, the Ninth Circuit held:

The concept of measuring ERISA standing at

the time an action is filed is a judicially

created requirement which is appropriate for

most circumstances, but not for the situation

we face in this case. Section 1140 forbids

employers and other ERISA entities from

interfering with certain protected rights and

is enforceable through ERISA’s civil

enforcement mechanism in section 1132. 

Depriving a plaintiff of standing to sue

under ERISA for the employer’s clear

violation of section 1140 would, in effect,

make standing contingent upon the occurrence

of subsequent events entirely within the

control of the employer ....

When an individual alleges ... that he was

discharged in violation of ERISA’s

whistleblower provisions, his employer cannot

be allowed to evade section 1140

accountability simply by terminating the plan

and distributing the benefits. Nothing in

Firestone commands such a result ... If an

employee is a participant at the time of the

alleged ERISA violation and alleges that he

was discharged or discriminated against

because of protected whistleblowing

activities, we hold that such an employee has

standing to sue under ERISA. To require that

the claimant be a participant at the time of

filing suit would undermine the very purpose

of ERISA’s whistleblower provision: to

provide a federal remedy for discrimination

against plan participants for exercising

their protected rights under ERISA.

179 F.3d at 743. The dissent in McBride, cited with approval in

Chuck, stated in pertinent part:

It is the settled law of this Circuit that a

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person’s standing as a plan participant ‘must

be decided as of the time of the filing of

the lawsuit.’ ....

Because the Plans had terminated before

McBride’s complaint was filed, he did not

have a reasonable expectation of returning to

covered employment. Nor did he have a

colorable claim to vested benefits: McBride’s

benefits under the Plan had already been

distributed to him ... Because he had neither

a reasonable expectation of returning to

covered employment nor a colorable claim to

vested benefits, McBride was not a

participant in an ERISA plan at the time he

filed suit. He therefore lacked standing to

bring a claim under § 1132.

179 F.3d 749-750. 

The Ninth Circuit’s position on determination of standing is

clear. Unless the complaint alleges a violation of Section 1140,

not here alleged by Plaintiff, whether she is a participant or

beneficiary is determined as of the time the complaint is filed. 

The threshold issue in resolving this motion is whether there is

a genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff’s claim for

benefits is time-barred. The statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense that Defendants bear the burden of

establishing. See Entous v. Viacom Intern., Inc., 151 F.Supp.2d

1150, 1154 (C.D.Cal.2001).

Defendants contended at the hearing that the 1994 QDRO

provided that the distribution of benefits to Plaintiff should be

made as soon as feasibly possible. Thereafter, Defendants

argued, Plaintiff requested distribution in 1994 and did not get

it, requested distribution in 1996 and did not get it, and

requested distribution in 2002 and did not get it. Defendants

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contend that the Plan’s failure to make those requested

distributions to Plaintiff, constitutes a clear and continuing

repudiation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Plan such that

Plaintiff could not have reasonably believed other than that her

benefits had been finally denied. 

The allegations of Paragraph 24 of the SAC do not constitute

such evidence. Defendants mischaracterize the allegation,

contending that Plaintiff was then told by the TPA that she would

not receive distribution paperwork. Defendants ignore the

averment that Plaintiff was told in September 1994 by the TPA

that she would not receive distribution paperwork for the three

larger distributions to which she was entitled until the forms

for the smallest amount were completed and received. This is a

conditional denial, not a clear repudiation. Paragraph 25 of the

SAC alleges that Plaintiff’s accountant requested distribution

and accounting of Plaintiff’s benefits in mid-1996 but Dr.

Ryskamp did not provide the distribution election forms to her. 

Although Defendants characterize Paragraph 26 as evidence that

Plaintiff was told by the TPA in 2002 that Plaintiff could not

receive a distribution of benefits at that time, Defendants

ignore the allegation in Paragraph 26 that Plaintiff was told

that “she could not receive a distribution from the Defendant

Plans because Ryskamp had not yet filed tax forms for year 2001

and that she would have to wait until his tax forms were filed

before she could receive benefits.” 

The July 5 Order concluded that the averments in Paragraphs

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24-26 did not demonstrate as a matter of law a clear and

continuing repudiation of rights under the plans which was made

known to Plaintiff. Defendants’ reliance on the same averments,

as mischaracterized by defendants, does not change this result. 

Defendants rely on these same averments, made under penalty of

perjury in Plaintiff’s Creditor’s Claim, to contend that a

genuine issue of material fact is raised concerning the bar of

the statute of limitations. However, there is no evidence that

Dr. Ryskamp or the Ryskamp Plan ever unequivocally told Plaintiff

either orally or in writing that she would not receive the

benefits. 

There is no evidence that the Plan complied with the

statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 29 U.S.C. §

1133 and 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503 for denial of benefits and

provided notification of appeal rights. The evidence establishes

that Plaintiff was given either partial information and/or

excuses or was simply ignored. In fact, Defendants admit that

the Ryskamp Plan acknowledged that Ms. Hemphill had a right to

vested benefits in November 2004. This is sufficient to revive

the statute of limitations, if arguendo, it had expired. There

is no dispute by Defendants that ERISA was violated by their

failure to provide the requested documents and information and,

absent the issue of the statute of limitations, that Plaintiff is

entitled to the benefits. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that discovery

is on-going concerning what happened between the 1996 failure by

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Dr. Ryskamp to provide distribution election forms and the

contact of Dr. Ryskamp on June 21, 2002 by Philip Price,

informing Dr. Ryskamp that Plaintiff needed information to take a

distribution of her benefits. Also at the hearing, Defendants

asserted that their discovery was not complete and that they

would like an opportunity to depose accountants at Price

Reinhardt Price. 

Rule 56(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in

pertinent part:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a

party opposing the motion that the party

cannot for reasons stated present by

affidavit facts essential to justify the

party’s opposition, the court may refuse the

application for judgment or may order a

continuance to permit affidavits to be

obtained or depositions to be taken or

discovery to be had or may make such other

order as is just.

As explained in Harris v. Duty Free Shoppers Limited Partnership,

940 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9 Cir. 1991): th

Ordinarily, summary judgment should not be

granted when there are relevant facts

remaining to be discovered, but the party

seeking discovery bears the burden of showing

what specific facts it hopes to discover that

will raise an issue of material fact.

Here, Defendants have not satisfied these standards in seeking to

foreclose summary adjudication because their discovery is not

complete. This case had been pending for over a year before

Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication was heard. 

Defendants do not refer to any specific facts that they hope to

discover that will raise an issue of fact that the Ryskamp Plan

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or Dr. Ryskamp communicated a clear and continuing repudiation of

Plaintiff’s rights to the benefits. No justification is shown

for a Rule 56(f) continuance. 

Defendants have not raised a genuine issue of material fact

that Plaintiff was not a participant and beneficiary when this

action was commenced on October 18, 2005. Even if Plaintiff is

entitled to summary adjudication that she is a participant or

beneficiary within the meaning of ERISA, Defendants note that

their Answer to the SAC plead the affirmative defenses that

California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 337, 337.5 and 683.020 and

29 U.S.C. § 1113 bar all of the claims in the SAC. Defendants

assert: “Plaintiff has offered no facts to contest the statutes

of limitation nor has even offered a stated that The [sic]

Defendants have no facts to support the bars.”

In the July 5 Order Defendants’ arguments that the ERISA

claims in the SAC are subject to the statutes of limitations set

forth in California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 337.5 and 683.020

were rejected, ruling that “Plaintiff’s ERISA claims alleged in

the SAC are subject to ERISA statutes of limitations.” 

Consequently, the affirmative defenses based on California Code

of Civil Procedure §§ 337.5 and 683.020 are not applicable or

relevant to resolution of the motion for summary adjudication. 

Furthermore, as ruled in the July 5 Order, the statute of

limitations set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1113 applies only to the

Third Claim for Relief in the SAC. The motion for summary

adjudication is directed only to the First, Second and Fourth

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Because of this conclusion, it is not necessary to address 4

Plaintiff’s alternative contention that she is entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

“Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), only the plan ‘administrator’ can 5

be held liable for failing to comply with the reporting and

disclosure requirements.” Cline v. Industrial Maintenance Eng. &

40

Claims for Relief. 

Plaintiff is entitled to summary adjudication that she was a

participant and beneficiary within the meaning of ERISA when this

action was commenced and that her claims under the First and

Second Claims for relief are not time-barred. Plaintiff is 4

entitled to summary adjudication of the right to request and

receive plan information and benefits required by ERISA §§ 104

and 105, 29 U.S.C. § 1024 and 1025 Plaintiff’s motion for summary

adjudication is GRANTED as to these claims.

With regard to the Fourth Claim for Relief, the Ninth

Circuit applies California’s three-year statute of limitations

set forth in CCP § 338(a) to claims for nondisclosure penalties

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58

F.3d 434, 439 (9 Cir.1995). Plaintiff made requests for an th

accounting and other information and documents required by ERISA

on August 4, 2003, February 5, 2005 and March 29, 2005. The

statutory penalties requested by Plaintiff start on the 31 day st

following August 4, 2003. Therefore, because Plaintiff is

entitled to summary adjudication that she is a participant or

beneficiary within the meaning of ERISA, the Fourth Claim for

Relief is not time-barred.

D. Statutory Penalties Against Ryskamp, Inc.5

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Contracting, 200 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9 Cir.2000), citing Moran v. th

Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 296, 299 (9 Cir.1989). th

41

Plaintiff seeks an award of statutory penalties against

Ryskamp Inc. in the amount of $110 per day from September 3, 2003

(the 31 day after Plaintiff submitted a written request for an st

accounting and an account benefit statement statements to Ryskamp

on August 4, 2003) to the date of the order granting Plaintiff’s

motion for summary adjudication. Plaintiff represents that, as

of October 16, 2006, this amount is $125,180.00.

Whether to impose statutory penalties and the amount of

those penalties (up to $110 a day) is discretionary. In Romero

v. SmithKline Beecham, 309 F.3d 113, 120 (3 Cir.2002), the rd

Third Circuit held:

Appropriate factors to be considered ...

include ‘bad faith or intentional conduct on

the part of the administrator, the length of

the delay, the number of requests made and

documents withheld, and the existence of any

prejudice to the participant or beneficiary.’

... Other circuits have studied the role of

prejudice or damages to the inquiry and have

concluded that although they are often

factors, neither is a sine qua non to a valid

claim under [Section 1132(c)(2)]. 

Brown v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 341 F.3d 822, 825 (8th

Cir.2003), holds:

Although an ‘employer’s good faith and the

absence of harm are relevant in deciding

whether to award a statutory penalty,’ ...,

‘neither [a defendant’s] good faith nor the

absence of actual injury to [the plaintiff]

precludes the award of a statutory penalty.’

... [A]lthough Brown did not suffer any loss

of health benefits due to the delay, she was

forced to invest time, effort, and money in

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hiring an attorney to gain access to

information that she was legally entitled to. 

Thus it was not an abuse of discretion for

the district court to award maximum damages.

Plaintiff argues that the statutory maximum penalty as

requested should be imposed:

Ryskamp Inc.’s failure to provide here with

required documents and information forced Ms.

Hemphill to (a) make numerous requests over

the course of a decade, (b) retain a law firm

to help her compel Ryskamp Inc. to provide

the required information and documents, and

(c) bring this action for enforcement of her

ERISA rights. Ms. Hemphill’s document

requests remain outstanding today, and she

has already incurred significant attorney’s

fees in attempting to obtain documents and

information about her benefits and in

bringing this action against Defendants for

their failure to provide her with the

required information and documents. Morever,

maximum penalties are owed here because Ms.

Hemphill was prejudiced by Ryskamp Inc.s’

failure. Ryskamp Inc. deprived her of the

information necessary to obtain a

distribution of her benefits, which was the

stated purpose for each of her requests for

information and documents, and deprived her

of information that would have potentially

revealed the mismanagement of her plan

account over the years since the date of her

first request. Unable to obtain a

distribution of her benefits because of

Ryskamp Inc.’s failure to provide information

necessary for such distribution, Ms. Hemphill

was left with little choice but to commence

this lawsuit to enforce her rights under

ERISA.

Defendants argue that no statutory penalties under Section

1132(c)(2) should be awarded:

Since the principal of James J. Ryskamp, Jr.,

M.D., Inc., is deceased there is little

purpose in penalizing his estate nor [sic]

his medical corporation. The specific facts

of the lack of participation of Defendant

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Judith Ryskamp in the matter of plans

indicates there should be a trial on the

issue of the appropriateness of penalties. 

Plaintiff’s only evidence submitted is the

conduct of the deceased fiduciary. Plaintiff

offers no evidence that any of the other

defendants committed misconduct.

Only the plan administrator is liable for the penalties. It

is undisputed that Ryskamp Inc. is the plan administrator. 

Although its principal has died, Ryskamp Inc., as a distinct

legal entity, is asserted by Plaintiff to continue to exist. The

lack of participation of Judith Ryskamp or the other defendants

is not relevant to a determination of statutory penalties against

the Plan administrator. Because the award of such penalties is a

discretionary decision for the Court, the amount of the

penalties, fixed by statute, does not present an issue of fact.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of statutory penalties

against the Plan administrator. Plaintiff has been attempting

since 1994 to obtain plan documents and information. Plaintiff

has had to hire counsel and file a lawsuit to obtain her ERISA

rights and benefits. However, some documents were provided. 

Further, Plaintiff’s requests for plan documents and information

were made at widely spaced intervals and not followed up with

diligence when no response or limited response was made. The

death of Dr. Ryskamp on September 25, 2005 is also a factor

negating an award of statutory penalties in the amount sought by

Plaintiff because, at his death, compliance with Plaintiff’s

demands and ERISA rights became tied up in the courts. In the

exercise of discretion, statutory penalties in the amount of

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$50.00 per day from June 6, 1996 to September 25, 2005 is

awarded. Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED

to this extent.

E. Relief Against Judith Dickison Ryskamp.

Defendants argue that Judith Dickison Ryskamp should not be

liable for any part of an order granting the relief sought by

Plaintiff’s motion in any capacity. Defendants rely on their

Statement of Disputed Facts as indicating there are specific

facts which support trial on the issue of whether there is a

trust, contending that no declaratory relief should apply to

Judith Dickison Ryskamp if it is determined at trial that there

is no revocable living trust of which she is the trustee. 

Defendants further argue that their Statement of Disputed Facts

show “that in her individual capacity it could be determined at

trial that she had nothing to do with the plans or the

administration of the plans as an individual.” As to Ryskamp’s

Estate, Defendants contend that the “handling of the Estate is

governed and ultimately covered by the Probate Court in terms of

the payment of claims.”

Plaintiff responds that, because Judith Ryskamp is the

executor of the Ryskamp Estate, she is a proper party to this

action and, as such, is responsible for the relief sought by this

motion. Whether or not Judith Ryskamp is properly named as a

party as a trustee or an individual, Plaintiff contends, is a red

herring. Plaintiff asserts that her “avenue of legal recourse”

for Ryskamp’s breaches of fiduciary duty lie against Mrs. Ryskamp

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as the executor of his estate. On September 11, 2006, Judith

Ryskamp, as executor of the estate, rejected Plaintiff’s

creditor’s claim filed in the Superior Court. Citing California

Probate Code § 9351, Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to

declaratory relief against Judith Ryskamp as well as the other

defendants.

California Probate Code § 9351 provides:

An action may not be commenced against a

decedent’s personal representative on a cause

of action against the decedent unless a claim

is first filed as provided in this part and

the claim is rejected in whole or in part.

Plaintiff filed this action on October 18, 2005. Named as a

defendant in the initial Complaint was the personal

representative of Dr. Ryskamp’s estate. Judith was issued

letters testamentary by the Fresno County Superior Court on March

23, 2006. The Second Amended Complaint naming Judith as a

defendant was filed on March 29, 2006. Plaintiff filed her

creditor’s claim against the estate in the Fresno County Superior

Court on May 10, 2006 and was denied by Judith thereafter.

Although not raised by Defendants in opposition to the

motion for adjudication, the parties were ordered to file

supplemental briefs discussing the effect, if any, of these facts

on Plaintiff’s ability to obtain relief against Judith as the

personal representative of Dr. Ryskamp’s estate. 

Plaintiff, contending that the only claim in the Second

Amended Complaint against Judith as the Personal Representative

with respect to which Plaintiff moved for summary adjudication is

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the claim for declaratory relief. A “claim” for purposes of

creditor’s claims under the California Probate Code is defined in

pertinent part in Section 9000:

(a) ‘Claim’ means a demand for payment for

any of the following, whether due, not due,

or contingent, and whether liquidated or

unliquidated:

(1) Liability of the decedent, whether

arising in contract, tort, otherwise.

“Only claims enforceable against the decedent during his lifetime

by ordinary personal actions for the recovery of money are

required to be presented to the estate for satisfaction.” Borba

Farms, Inc. v. Acheson, 197 Cal.App.3d 597, 602 (1988). Because

the claim for declaratory relief the subject of the motion for

summary adjudication does not demand monetary relief, Plaintiff

argues that it is not a claim subject to Section 9351.

The First Claim for Relief in the Second Amended Complaint

is for declaratory relief against all defendants pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The Third Claim for Relief is against the

Ryskamp Estate as well as Ryskamp, Inc. for breach of fiduciary

duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3) and prays for imposition of

a constructive trust “on any ill-gotten profits resulting from

the breaches of fiduciary duty committed by Ryskamp and Ryskamp,

Inc., and held by any of the Defendants”, disgorgement from the

Ryskamp Estate, Ryskamp Trust, and Ryskamp Inc. of any ill-gotten

profits resulting from their breaches of fiduciary duty,

“restoration from the Rykamp Estate, Ryskamp Trust, and Ryskamp

Inc. of any losses from the Defendant Plans resulting from their

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breaches of fiduciary duty” as well as declaratory and injunctive

relief. The Fifth Claim for Relief is for equitable and

injunctive relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) against

Ryskamp, Inc., Ryskamp Estate, Ryskamp Trust, and “Mrs. Ryskamp”

and seeks, inter alia, imposition of a “constructive trust on the

benefits to which Ms. Hemphill is entitled, of which Ms. Hemphill

was wrongfully deprived, and which are being held by Ryskamp,

Inc., Mrs. Ryskamp, the Ryskamp Estate, and/or the Ryskamp Trust,

and any ill-gotten profits on those benefits.” 

Because the Second Amended Complaint contains claims that

appear to be described in Section 9000, the fact that plaintiff’s

motion for summary adjudication relates only to a claim for

declaratory relief does not, of itself, bring this action outside

the scope of Section 9000. 

Plaintiff further argues that Probate Code § 9351 does not

apply to her claims alleged in the Second Amended Complaint

because Section 9351 is preempted by ERISA.

In Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. H.F. Johnson, 830 F.3d

1009 (9 Cir.1987), cited by Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit th

addressed whether ERISA preempted the provision in the Montana

Probate Code that claims arising before death against a decedent

“are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and

the heirs and devisees of the decedent unless presented ...

within 4 months” after publication of notice to creditors. Id.

at 1016. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Pension Trust Fund

that ERISA preempts the Montana statute:

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With limited exceptions not relevant to this

discussion, ERISA ‘supersede[s] any and all

State laws insofar as they ... relate to any

employee benefit plan ...’ 29 U.S.C. §

1144(a). A law ‘relates to’ an ERISA plan if

it ‘has a connection with or reference to

such a plan.’ Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463

U.S. 85, 98 ... (1983). ERISA preemption is

to be construed broadly, and is not limited

to state laws designed specifically to affect

employee benefit plans. Pilot Life Insurance

Co. v. Dedeaux, ___U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1549,

15552-53 ... (1987); Shaw, 463 U.S. 85 ... As

the Court stated in Pilot Life, ‘The question

whether a certain state action is preempted

by federal law is one of Congressional

intent. The purpose of Congress is the

ultimate touchstone.’ 107 S.Ct. at 1522 ....

That Congress expressly provided a period of

limitations governing actions to collect

withdrawal liability (29 U.S.C. § 1451(f))

indicates that Congress considered the period

of limitations applicable to such actions

essential to enforcement of employer

obligations under [the Multiemployer Pension

Plan Amendments Act (MPPAAA)]. Montana

Probate Code § 72-3-803, as it applies to

this case, adds a condition not contemplated

by Congress to collection of withdrawal

liability. Montana’s non-claim statute

plainly ‘relates to’ the Fund, and is

preempted under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 

The Fund’s suit against Robert Mithcell’s

Estate was timely.

Our conclusion is consistent with the general

law concerning federal preemption of state

statutes of limitation: ‘[I]t is well

established that federal claims are subject

to state statutes of limitations unless there

is a federal statute of limitations or a

conflict with federal policy.’ South

Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476

U.S. 498 ... (1986) ... ‘If Congress

explicitly puts a limit upon the time for

enforcing a right which it created, that is

the end of the matter. The Congressional

statute of limitation is definitive.’ 

Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392m 395 ...

(1946).

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Id. at 1016-1017. See also Evanson v. Price, 2006 WL 2829780

(E.D.Cal.2006), discussing California’s decedent statute of

limitations in California Civil Code § 366.2 requiring any claim

against a decedent’s estate to be brought within one year after

the date of death:

The Supreme Court held in Boggs that when a

‘direct clash [exists] between state law and

the provisions and objectives of ERISA, the

state law cannot stand.’ Boggs v. Boggs, 520

U.S. 833, 844 (1997). ‘We can begin, and in

this case end, the analysis by simply asking

if state law conflicts with the provisions of

ERISA or operates to frustrate its objects.’ 

Id. at 841. Where this conflict exists,

analysis ends, and inquiry is unnecessary as

to ‘whether the [ERISA] statutory phrase

“relate to” provides further and additional

support for the pre-emption claim. Nor need

we consider the applicability of field

preemption.’ Id. ‘In enacting ERISA,

Congress set out to protect the participants

in employee benefit plans by establishing

standards of conduct, responsibility, and

obligations for fiduciaries of employee

benefit plans, and by providing for

appropriate remedies.’ Arizona State

Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Citibank,

125 S.Ct. 715, 719 (9 Cir.1997). The th

California decedent statute of limitations,

by shortening the time period within which a

cause of action can be brought against an

ERISA fiduciary, conflicts with the ERISA

statute of limitations at issue and would

operate to limit available remedies under

ERISA and thereby frustrate its purpose. To

the extent that California’s decedent statute

of limitations conflicts with ERISA’s statute

of limitations, it is pre-empted.

Plaintiff argues that application of the claim

presentation/rejection requirement of Section 9351 to this action

clashes directly with ERISA by not only limiting the time period

for Plaintiff to bring her action against the Personal

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Representative but also by precluding Plaintiff from bringing any

ERISA action against the Personal Representative without first

following claim procedures in the state probate court. Plaintiff

contends that Section 9351 imposes a condition precedent to the

commencement of an action, not merely a statute of limitation. 

Thus, Plaintiff argues, Section 9351 “adds a condition not

contemplated by Congress” because it requires exhaustion of an

administrative process established under state law in order to

vindicate rights that are governed by ERISA.

Defendants respond that Section 9351 is not preempted by

ERISA. Defendants refer to California Probate Code § 9353:

(a) Regardless of whether the statute of

limitations otherwise applicable to a claim

will expire before or after the following

times, a claim rejected in whole or in part

is barred as to the part rejected unless,

within the following times, the creditor

commences an action on the claim or the

matter is referred to a referee or to

arbitration:

(1) If the claim is due at the time the

notice of rejection is given, three months

after the notice is given.

(2) If the claim is not due at the time the

notice of rejection is given, three months

after the claim becomes due.

(b) The time during which there is a vacancy

in the office of the personal representative

shall be excluded from the period determined

under subdivision (a).

Citing Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997), that ERISA

preemption analysis “can begin ... by simply asking if state law

conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate

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its objects”, Defendants refer to the holding in Wetzel v. Lou

Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d

643 (9 Cir.2000). th

In Wetzel, the Ninth Circuit held that, because there is no

specific federal statute of limitations governing claims for

benefits under an ERISA plan, the most analogous California

statute of limitations for suits on written contracts set forth

in California Code of Civil Procedure § 337 applied. Id. at 646-

648. Defendants, noting that California Probate Code § 9000

defines a claim for purpose of the Probate Code to include

liability of the decedent arising in contract, argues:

The rule from Wetzel would apply [to] Probate

Code § 9153 in the event of a death where a

contract issue was pending, since ERISA is

silent on the issue of the death of persons

involved in the claims for benefits and no

facts submitted on this motion conflict with

ERISA provisions.

Defendant’s position is without merit, given the Ninth

Circuit’s holding in Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, supra. 

Section 9351 is essentially the same as the Montana statute there

in dispute. 

Plaintiff further argues that the delay in opening the

probate of the Ryskamp Estate has seriously interfered with

Plaintiff’s ability to vindicate her ERISA rights. Plaintiff

notes that she was required to apply for an extension of time for

service of process because of the delay in appointing the

Personal Representative of the Ryskamp Estate. (Docs. 16-19). 

Plaintiff argues that she had to commence this action in order to

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meet any applicable statutes of limitation, but, at that time, a

creditor’s claim could not have been filed in the Ryskamp Estate

probate because of the absence of a personal representative. 

Plaintiff refers to the comment in Radar v. Rogers, 49 Cal.2d

243, 248 (1957):

At the time the complaint in the case at bar

was filed, ... the claim here had not, and

could not have been, presented to the

personal representative of decedent’s estate

because no personal representative had been

appointed, and no claim had or could then

have been filed ‘in the office of the clerk

of the court from which letters issued’

(Prob. Code, § 700), for no letters had

issued. Nevertheless, the cause of action

was extant. ‘A thing in action arising out

of a wrong which results in physical injury

to the person ... shall not abate by reason

of the death of the wrongdoer.’ (Civ. Code,

§ 956.) The cause of action against the

decedent is the cause of action which

survives against the personal representative

... Realism requires us to recognize the

practical problem which plaintiffs faced. 

They believed they had a cause of action and

in the exercise of diligence they wished to

have their complaint on file before any

question as to the running of an applicable

statute of limitations could arise. 

Accordingly, they filed this complaint ...

The desireability of the procedure followed

by plaintiffs is not a matter which requires

consideration or comment; we pass only on the

ultimate questions of law essential to

disposition of this appeal.

Plaintiff contends that, had she waited until the Personal

Representative had been appointed, a creditor’s claim filed and

rejected, before commencing this action, she would have assumed

the risk of not satisfying the ERISA statutes of limitations and

would possibly have had to rely on the tolling of these statutes

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of limitation. 

If California Probate Code § 9351 were found to apply to

Plaintiff’s claims alleged in the Second Cause of Action,

Plaintiff argues that bringing this action against Judith as the

Personal Representative of the Estate before presentation and

rejection of a creditor’s claim, was cured when Plaintiff timely

filed a creditor’s claim in the Superior Court and that claim was

rejected. In so arguing, Plaintiff cites Radar v. Roger, supra,

49 Cal.2d 243. 

Radar presented the issue whether an action was barred by

California Probate Code § 714:

When a claim is rejected either by the

executor or administrator ... written notice

of such rejection shall be given ... to the

holder of the claim or to the person filing

or presenting it, and the holder must bring

suit in the proper court against the executor

or administrator, within three months after

the date of service of such notice if the

claim is then due ... [or] the claim shall be

forever barred.

49 Cal.2d at 245. The plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages

for negligence of the decedent in the Superior Court. At that

time, no personal representative of the estate had been

appointed. The complaint for damages named Doe defendants as the

executor or administrator of the decedent’s estate. After the

personal representative was appointed, the plaintiffs filed

claims in the probate proceedings and those claims were rejected. 

More than three months after the claims were presented to the

personal representative and rejected, plaintiffs amended the

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complaint to add the true name of the personal representative. 

The California Supreme Court ruled:

[I]t would be highly technical to apply

section 714 to bar this complaint, which was

filed not too late but, at worst,

prematurely. The substantial rights of the

estate are not affected by the procedure

followed by the plaintiffs. The

administratrix had ample opportunity, before

the filing of the amended complaints, to

approve plaintiffs’ claims. The substance of

the defect that the action had been brought

before presentation and rejection of claim no

longer existed when defendant by general

demurrer to the amended and supplemental

complaint sought to raise the issue. We do

not believe that section 714 was ever

intended to bar the action in this situation. 

We again quote the language of Preston v.

Knapp (1890), supra, ‘The object of the

statutory requirement of presentation and

rejection of claims against estates, as a

condition precedent to the commencement of

suits upon them, is to save to estates of

deceased persons the costs and expenses of

useless suits - suits to recover what would

have been allowed and paid by the executor

... without suit.’ We add, ‘When the reason

of a rule ceases, so would the rule itself.’ 

(Civ. Code, § 3510.) Here, the reason of the

rule ceases because it appears from the very

pleading which defendant relies on to show

the facts which she invokes, that before she

raised the plea she had had, and had

rejected, every benefit the statute gave her. 

Id. at 249. 

Defendants respond that Radar is not controlling, citing

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992):

Over the years our cases have established

that the irreducible constitutional minimum

of standing contains three elements. First,

the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury

in fact’ - an invasion of a legally protected

interest which (a) concrete and

particularized ... and (b) ‘actual or

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imminent, not “conjectural” or

“hypothetical,”’ ... Second, there must be a

causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of - the injury has to be

‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged

action of the defendant, and not ... th[e]

result [of] the independent action of some

third party not before the court.’ ... Third,

it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely

‘speculative,’ that the injury will be

‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ....

Defendants contend:

Probate Code § 9351 expressly provides that

an action on a rejected claim must be brought

within three months following the rejection

of the claim. The simple and express

language of Probate Code §§ 9351 and 9353

together with the supremacy of Article III of

the United States Constitution trump the

California doctrine of abatement. The

Probate Code expressly provides that no suit

can be filed until a claim is rejected and

that once it is rejected the suit is barred

unless filed within three months of the

rejection. Plaintiff Hemphill filed the

Second Amended Complaint before a claim was

presented, before it was rejected and has

never filed a complaint against the personal

representative of the Ryskamp Estate within

the three months following the rejection.

The purpose of Section 9351, as articulated by the

California Supreme Court, is not served by Defendants’

contention, i.e., the prosecution of useless lawsuits when

presentation of a claim would have negated the need. Here, there

is no question that the personal representative of the Estate had

knowledge of this lawsuit before Plaintiff filed her Probate

claim, because all papers filed in this action by Defendants’

attorney include the personal representative of the estate as a

client. There was and is an actual case or controversy under the

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requirements of Article III. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

does not undermine this conclusion.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Judith has waived or is

estopped from arguing that Section 9351 bars Plaintiff’s claims. 

As support for this position, Plaintiff’s attorney, Clarissa

King, avers in pertinent part:

3. On April 17, 2006, I spoke with Donald

Lescoulie, counsel for Defendants, after the

Second Amended Complaint had been filed and

process served on Judith Dickison Ryskamp in

her capacity as Personal Representative of

the Estate of James J. Ryskamp, Jr. ... At

the time, the Defendants had not yet

responded to the Second Amended Complaint.

4. During that April 17, 2006 telephone

call, Mr. Lescoulie stated that he understood

that Ms. Hemphill had not yet filed a

creditor’s claim in the state court probate

proceeding for the Ryskamp Estate, and that

the Personal Representative could move to

dismiss Ms. Hemphill’s action on that ground. 

He further stated that if Ms. Hemphill were

to file a creditor’s claim, Ms. Hemphill

would thereby avoid having to defend against

a motion to dismiss brought by the Personal

Representative for any failure to file a

creditor’s claim.

5. Ms. Hemphill subsequently filed a

creditor’s claim on May 5, 2006, which was

rejected by the Personal Representative on

September 12, 2006.

Plaintiff notes that Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint on April 20, 2006, which motion did not

include as grounds for dismissal the failure to file a claim

under Section 9351 prior to commencing the action against the

Personal Representative. (Docs. 43-44). After the motion to

dismiss was denied, Defendants filed an Answer to the Second

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Amended Complaint on July 19 2006, which does not allege an

affirmative defense based on the failure to comply with Section

9351. (Doc. 60). In addition, Plaintiff notes that Defendants

did not oppose the pending motion for summary adjudication on the

ground that Plaintiff failed to comply with Section 9351, as the

issue was raised sua sponte by the court. Plaintiff argues that

Judith consented to the jurisdiction of this court over this

action and is therefore estopped from arguing that the action

should not proceed because this action was filed before

compliance with Section 9351. Plaintiff relies on Heywood v.

Municipal Court, 198 Cal.App.3d 1438 (1988). 

Heywood involved an action that was pending at the time of

the decedent’s death. Then Probate Code § 709 provided in

pertinent part:

If an action is pending against the decedent

at the time of his or her death, the

plaintiff shall in like manner file his or

her claim with the clerk or present it to the

executor ro administrator for allowance or

rejection, authenticated as required in other

cases. No recovery shall be allowed against

decedent’s estate in the action unless proof

is made of the filing or presentation ....” 

Heywood did not file a claim and eventually judgment for Heywood

was entered. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether

that judgment was void because a valid creditor’s claim was not

filed or presented as required by the Probate Code. 198

Cal.App.3d at 1444. The Court of Appeal held:

The two courts clearly had jurisdiction of

the parties. It is also clear that the

courts had subject matter jurisdiction, and

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were empowered to hear and determine the

cause. ‘Any jurisdictional concept that may

be involved in the cases holding the [courts

are] without power to grant a judgment

against an estate when a creditor’s claim has

not been filed is not lack of jurisdiction of

the cause but excess of jurisdiction. ...

‘When, as here, the [courts have]

jurisdiction of the subject, a party who by

his conduct consents to or permits action

which may be in excess of the [court’s] power

may be estopped to complain of the ensuing

action in excess of jurisdiction. ...

‘Whether a party shall be estopped from

claiming an excess of jurisdiction depends on

the importance of the irregularity not only

to the parties but to the functioning of the

courts and in some instances on other

considerations of public policy ....’ ....

The doctrine of finality of judgments is

premised upon the important public policy

that there must be an end to litigation ....

We conclude the courts did not lack

jurisdiction but at most acted in excess of

jurisdiction in awarding judgment against the

Executrix. For the reasons stated, the

Executrix is estopped to assert any such

excess of jurisdiction.

Id. at 1445.

Plaintiff argues that because Judith did not assert that

Section 9351 bars Plaintiff’s claims, Judith has waived the

defense. Plaintiff asserts that, at this juncture in this

litigation, where discovery has commenced and a motion for

summary adjudication briefed and submitted, requiring dismissal

of this action and its re-filing would force Plaintiff to go

through a needless exercise and elevate form over substance. In

this regard, if Plaintiff is required to dismiss this action and

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refile it to comply with Section 9351, she acknowledges that the

action might be barred by the limitation period set forth in

Section 9353. Judith gave notice to Plaintiff of the rejection

of her claim on September 12, 2006. The three month period

required by Section 9353 expired on December 12, 2006, two days

before this supplemental briefing was ordered. Plaintiff argues

that if she must dismiss this action and refile it, equitable

tolling should apply.

Defendants argue that the defense of failure to comply with

Section 9351 has not been waived because the limitation period of

Section 9353 did not expire until December 13, 2006. Defendants

contend that Judith properly could do nothing until the

affirmative defense ripened on December 14, 2006 and asserts that

Judith will move the court for permission to amend the Answer to

include the affirmative defense.

The rulings set forth above negate the parties’ respective

arguments concerning waiver or estoppel.

 CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED;

2. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare and lodge a form of

order setting forth the rulings in this Memorandum Decision

within five (5) days following the date of service of this

decision.

///

///

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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