Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00629/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00629-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTO NAVARRETE QUINONEZ, Civil No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF No.

25]; 

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR WRIT OF

MANDAMUS [ECF No. 21]; AND

(3) FOR DISMISSAL OF

DEFENDANT U.S. MARSHAL

MARK

v.

PIONEER MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Sixto Navarrete Quinonez, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at the

Victorville Federal Correctional Complex (“FCC Victorville”) in Adelanto, California,

and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his initial Complaint in this case on

March 12, 2012. (ECF No. 1.) The operative complaint is now the Second Amended

Complaint, filed on November 1, 2012, in which Plaintiff alleges civil rights violations

by four named defendants pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403

U.S. 388 (1971). (ECF No. 15.) 

/ / /

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On March 12, 2013, Plaintiff also filed a motion for writ of mandamus in which

he seeks an order compelling Defendants to refer Plaintiff to a medical specialist. (ECF

No. 21.)

On April 8, 2013, Defendants Lilia Castillo, Salvador Villalon and Jacqueline

Machimo, each of whom are medical personnel at FCC Victorville, filed a motion to

dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on grounds that (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust

available administrative remedies; and (2) the Second Amended Complaint fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 25.) Alternatively, Defendants

Castillo, Villalon and Machimo move to transfer venue to the Central District of

California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). (Id.)

On April 8, 2013, counsel for Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo also filed

a request that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant U.S. Marshal Mark be dismissed

without prejudice as a result of the U.S. Marshal’s Office’s inability to effectuate service

on Defendant Mark due to the insufficiency of facts pled against him in the Second

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 24.)

After a thorough review of the pleadings, the parties’ papers, and all supporting

documents, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that (1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be GRANTED; (2) Defendants Castillo

and Villalon’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be DENIED; (3) Defendant

Machimo’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be GRANTED; (4) Defendants’

motion to transfer venue to the Central District of California be GRANTED (only in the

event the motion to dismiss is denied as to Defendants Castillo, Villalon and/or

Machimo); (5) Defendants’ counsel’s request for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant Mark be GRANTED; and (6) Plaintiff’s motion for writ of mandamus be

DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

A. Underlying Hernia Surgery Complications

The allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint initially stem from a

February 2010 hernia repair surgery performed on Plaintiff by Dr. Mark Whyte at 

Pioneer Medical Center prior to Plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration.1

 Plaintiff alleges that

in the days following the surgery he experienced abnormal levels of pain and he was

unable to walk. (ECF No. 15 at 3-4.) When Plaintiff ultimately returned to see Dr.

Whyte to complain that his right leg was still in pain, Dr. Whyte indicated that Plaintiff’s

tendon/nerve was sewn or stapled and that he would need to undergo another surgery to

release the entrapped nerve. (Id. at 5.) However, Dr. Whyte informed Plaintiff that he

would need to wait six to eight months before undergoing another operation due to the

effects that additional anesthesia would have on Plaintiff’s heart. (Id.) Plaintiff was

prescribed painkillers and released. (Id.) 

B. Allegations Against Defendant U.S. Marshal Mark

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mark (last name unknown) intentionally worsened

his injury on September 10, 2010 while Plaintiff was being transported into the San

Diego federal courthouse for a change of plea hearing. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Mark was searching inmates for possible contraband or dangerous weapons

when he intentionally pulled Plaintiff’s right leg beyond the limited angle that his sewn

tendon would allow due to the nerve entrapment. (Id. at 2, 9.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Mark did this because he believed Plaintiff was only using a walker to gain

sympathy from the judge, and that he believed Plaintiff was faking his injury. (Id. at 9.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mark’s actions resulted in severe pain which caused

Plaintiff to urinate and defecate. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that since this incident he

has been required to use a wheelchair. (Id. at 10.) 

1As discussed in Section III, infra, the Court dismissed Defendants Dr. Whyte and Pioneer Medical Center because they were not acting under color of state law. Although these claims have been dismissed, the Court briefly summarizes them to provide context for the pending claims against the federal actors.

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C. Allegations Against Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo

Following the incident involving Defendant Mark, Plaintiff pleaded guilty. 

Plaintiff arrived at FCC Victorville on April 13, 2011, and since that time, Plaintiff

alleges the prison medical staff’s refusal to perform surgery to release the entrapped

nerve demonstrates deliberate indifference to his serous medical needs and reckless

disregard for his pain and suffering, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 2, 8.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Castillo is his direct medical service provider and that

she is responsible for screening patients and their needs. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff further

alleges Defendant Castillo is aware of Plaintiff’s pain and suffering but chooses to ignore

his requests for an operation to release his entrapped nerve. (Id.) Defendant Castillo

refuses to classify Plaintiff’s condition as serious, which would result in making his

condition a priority and would require the Utilization Review Committee (“URC”) to

allocate funds for the surgery. (Id.) Defendant Castillo has refused to consider Plaintiff’s

requests to be seen by a specialist, despite the fact that Plaintiff’s condition has resulted

in multiple falls. (Id.) Instead, Plaintiff has been provided increasing doses of

painkillers. (Id.) Defendant Castillo also refuses to accept from Plaintiff a copy of Dr.

Whyte’s post-surgery consultation notes indicating that Plaintiff should be scheduled for

a nerve release surgery if his pain and numbness persists. (Id. at 7, 11.) Rather, Dr.

Castillo informed Plaintiff that Dr. Whyte would have to directly send her his

consultation notes. (Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Villalon treated Plaintiff one month after his arrival at

FCC Victorville and determined that Plaintiff was experiencing terrible pain. (Id. at 13.) 

However, Defendant Villalon only increased Plaintiff’s painkillers, told Plaintiff that the

problem would go away quickly and informed Plaintiff that the prison medical staff

would need to verify whether Plaintiff’s claim of an entrapped nerve was in fact true prior

to determining whether to perform surgery. (Id.) Defendant Villalon also refused to

accept Dr. Whyte’s consultation notes directly from Plaintiff. (Id.)

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Plaintiff alleges Defendant Machimo is a member of the URC and that he has

approached her several times complaining about the nurse and doctor’s refusal to refer

him to a specialist to determine why he is experiencing pain. (Id.) Defendant Machimo

told Plaintiff several times that she would speak directly with his direct health provider;

however, Plaintiff only encountered increased antagonism from Defendants Castillo and

Villalon. (Id.) 

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in this action on March 12, 2012. (ECF No. 1.) 

The Court dismissed the Complaint for failure to pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1914(a) and/or failing to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) 

Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on June 12, 2012. (ECF

No. 5.) On July 10, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis but dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 7.) 

On August 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, which the Court

subsequently dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

(ECF Nos. 8, 13.) 

On November 1, 2012, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint. 

(ECF No. 15.) The Second Amended Complaint contains allegations against various

defendants, including Pioneer Medical Center, the U.S. Marshal’s Service, the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), Dr. Whyte, U.S. Marshal Mark, FCC Victorville, MLP

Castillo, Dr. Salvador Villalon and Machimo. However, on January 9, 2013, the Court

sua sponte dismissed Pioneer Medical Center and Dr. Whyte without leave to amend

because neither of these defendants acted “under of color of state law” for purposes of

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 16 at 3:15-4:8.) The Court also sua sponte dismissed the

U.S. Marshal’s Service, the BOP and FCC Victorville without leave to amend because

Bivens does not authorize actions for monetary relief against federal agencies. (Id. at

4:10-5:3.) However, the Court found that the Second Amended Complaint was

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sufficiently pleaded as to Defendants Mark, Castillo, Villalon and Machimo to survive

the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). (Id. at 5:4-

6.)2

 As a result, the Court directed the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon these four

Defendants. (Id. at 5:21-6:4.)

On March 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion for writ of mandamus requesting the

Court order Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo to provide an outside specialist

to examine his nerve injury. (ECF No. 21.) 

On April 8, 2013, Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo responded to

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint by filing a motion to dismiss or, in the

alternative, to transfer venue to the Central District of California. (ECF No. 25.) On that

same date, Defendants’ counsel also filed a response to the Court’s order requiring the

U.S. Marshal to effect service. (ECF No. 24.) Defendants’ counsel requests dismissal

of all claims against Defendant Mark because Plaintiff did not provide sufficient

identifying information for the U.S. Marshal to effectuate valid service. (Id.)

On April 19, 2013, the Court provided Plaintiff with notice of Defendants’ motion

to dismiss pursuant to Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2012). (ECF

No. 28.) The Court also set a June 7, 2013 deadline for Plaintiff to file an opposition to

Defendants’ motion. (Id. at 2:27-3:2.) However, Plaintiff failed to oppose or otherwise

respond to Defendants’ motion by this deadline. In light of Plaintiff’s status as a pro se

prisoner, on June 27, 2013 the Court sua sponte extended Plaintiff’s deadline to oppose

Defendants’ motion until July 19, 2013. (ECF No. 29.) In that order, the Court expressly

warned Plaintiff that “[i]f Plaintiff does not file an opposition on or before July 19, 2013,

the Court must presume he has no opposition to the Court deciding the motion on the

2 Although Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges Defendants Mark, Castillo, Villalon and Machimo are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because these

Defendants are federal actors the Court construed Plaintiff’s civil rights claims against them as arising under Bivens. (ECF No. 16 at 4:10-12.) “Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement of a state actor § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991); see also

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254, 255 n.2 (2006) (a suit brought pursuant to Bivens

is the “federal analogue” to a § 1983 suit) (citations omitted).

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papers currently before it.” (Id. at 1:26-28.) To date, Plaintiff has failed to oppose or

otherwise respond to Defendants’ motion. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

1. Legal Standards

a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under the PLRA

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PLRA”), federal prisoners

must exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a Bivens action

complaining about prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). Exhaustion is “mandatory.” 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739

(2001)); see also Panaro v. City of N. Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“[F]ederal courts may not consider a prisoner’s civil rights claim when a remedy was not

sought first in an available administrative grievance procedure.”); McKinney v. Carey,

311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (recognizing congressional intent

of “[r]equiring dismissal without prejudice when there is no pre-suit exhaustion.”).

“The benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is

given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will not

have such an opportunity unless the grievant complies with the system’s critical

procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 95 (2006). “[T]o properly exhaust

administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in

accordance with the applicable procedural rules.’” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218

(2007) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). The applicable rules “are defined not by the

PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Id. “Proper exhaustion demands

compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on

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the course of its proceedings.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91; see also Moore v. Bennette,

517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A] prisoner does not exhaust all available remedies

simply by failing to follow the required steps so that remedies that once were available

to him no longer are.”); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the

prisoner causes the unavailability of the grievance process by simply not filing a

grievance in a timely manner, the process is not unavailable but rather forfeited.”). 

The PLRA “requires exhaustion before the filing of a complaint and . . . a prisoner

does not comply with this requirement by exhausting available remedies during the

course of the litigation.” McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199 (emphasis added); see also Vaden

v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he PLRA requires that a

prisoner exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers to the federal

courts.”); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] prisoner may not

proceed to federal court while exhausting administrative remedies.”).

Failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies that are not jurisdictional should be treated

as a matter in abatement, which is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather

than a motion for summary judgment “based on the general principle that ‘summary

judgment is on the merits,’ whereas ‘dismissal of an action on the ground of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies is not on the merits.’” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (quoting

Stauffer Chem. Co. v. FDA, 670 F.2d 106, 108 (9th Cir. 1982); Heath v. Cleary, 708 F.2d

1376, 1380 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

“[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and . . . inmates

are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones,

549 U.S. at 216. Rather, a defendant bears the burden of proving that a plaintiff failed

to exhaust administrative remedies by demonstrating “that administrative remedies were

available and unused.” Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012). If the

defendant satisfies this burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the

administrative remedies were unavailable.” Id. at 1031 (citing Hilao v. Estate of

Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 1996); Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249,

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1254 (9th Cir. 2011).3 

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

courts may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (per

curiam). If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted administrative

remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice. Id. at 368 & n.3.

b. Federal Bureau of Prisons Grievance Process

The BOP’s grievance process is set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 542.13-.15. In Nunez, the

Ninth Circuit summarized the process as follows:

As a first step in this process, an inmate normally must present his

complaint informally to prison staff using a BP-8 form. If the informal complaint does not resolve the dispute, the inmate may make an

“Administrative Remedy Request” concerning the dispute to the prison Warden using a BP-9 form. The BP-8 and BP-9 are linked. Both forms

involve a complaint arising out of the same incident, and both forms must

be submitted within 20 calendar days of the date of that incident. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). An extension of time is available upon a showing of valid reason for delay. Section 542.14(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of reasons that justify an extension of time. Valid reasons “include . . . an

extended period in-transit during which the inmate was separated from documents needed to prepare the Request or Appeal.” Id.

If the Warden renders an adverse decision on the BP-9, the inmate may appeal to the Regional Director using a BP-10 form. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). The BP-10 must be submitted to the Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the date of the Warden’s decision. Id. As with the time period for filing a BP-9, an extension of time is available upon a showing of a valid

reason. Id. Section 542.15(a) provides that “[v]alid reasons for delay include those situations described in § 542.14(b).” Id.

The inmate may appeal an adverse decision by the Regional Director to the Central Office (also called the General Counsel) of the BOP using a BP-11 form. Id. The BP-11 must be submitted to the Central Office within 30

calendar days from the date of the Regional Director’s decision. Id. As

with the time period for filing a BP-9 and a BP-10, an extension is available

3 “[T]he PLRA . . . does not require exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies ‘effectively unavailable.’” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also

Brown, 422 F.3d at 936 (“[A] prisoner need not press on to exhaust further levels of review once he has either received all ‘available’ remedies at an intermediate level of

review or been reliably informed by an administrator that no remedies are available.”). “[A] good-faith effort on the part of inmates [is required] to exhaust a prison’s administrative remedies as a prerequisite to finding remedies effectively unavailable.” Albino, 697 F.3d at 1035 (citing Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823; Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1224).

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upon the showing of a valid reason as described in § 542.14(b). Id.

591 F.3d at 1219-20 (footnote omitted).

2. Analysis

Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo initially contend Plaintiff’s claims

against them in the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff

failed to exhaust available administrative remedies by not completing the applicable

administrative appeals process. (ECF No. 25-1 at 4:27-5:13, 9:16-10:18.) In support of

their motion, Defendants rely on the declaration of Sarah Schuh, a Senior Attorney with

the BOP. (ECF No. 31.) Ms. Schuh states that she has access to the BOP database that

maintains information on all administrative remedies sought by federal prisoners. (Id.

at 2:10-14.) Defendants contend that the documents pertaining to Plaintiff’s efforts to

obtain administrative relief demonstrate that he has failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies. The Court agrees.

Defendants have provided documents indicating that Plaintiff commenced

administrative proceedings on three separate occasions after arriving at FCC Victorville. 

However, because the second and third administrative appeals, which commenced on

January 2, 2013 and March 13, 2013, respectively (ECF No. 31 at 3:22-5:4; ECF No. 31-

1 at 10-11, 18, 21), commenced after the start of this litigation, they are clearly

unexhausted. See Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1048; Brown, 422 F.3d at 929-30; McKinney, 311

F.3d at 1199. Thus, the Court turns its focus to Plaintiff’s first administrative appeal,

which commenced on June 10, 2011. (ECF No. 31-1 at 13.)

Plaintiff’s June 10, 2011 Request for Administrative Remedy claims that he filed

a BP-8 on June 2, 2011 complaining that he had been in severe pain resulting from his

prior surgery since his arrival at FCC Victorville, but that the prison’s medical staff

“refuses to properly treat my medical problem.” (Id.) In response to Plaintiff’s BP-8 he

received a reply from the counselor indicating that he should discuss the issue with his

medical provider. (Id.) Plaintiff stated in his Request for Administrative Remedy,

however, that his provider’s refusal to discuss his medical condition was the reason for

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seeking administrative relief. (Id.) Plaintiff contended that his severe pain and swelling

in his left foot are leading to mental problems, depression and loss of appetite and sleep. 

(Id.) Plaintiff requested that he be properly treated for his medical problems. (Id.)

On June 30, 2011, the Warden issued a response indicating that Plaintiff arrived

at FCC Victorville on April 12, 2011, and since that time he had been seen a total of ten

times for his medical condition. (ECF No. 31-1 at 14.) The Warden further responded

that Plaintiff had underwent a Nerve Conduction Velocity Test and Electromyography

(NCV/EMG) on May 27, 2011, and that the results of these tests were negative. (Id.) 

Further medical treatment was pending results of an MRI. (Id.) The Warden advised

Plaintiff that any further concerns should be addressed to Plaintiff’s assigned Physician’s

Assistant in the Health Services Department, and that if Plaintiff was not satisfied with

the Warden’s response, he could appeal to the Western Regional Director within twenty

days of the June 30, 2011 response. (Id.)

On July 13, 2011, Plaintiff timely responded to the Western Regional Director by

filing a Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff reiterated that he

was receiving inadequate medical care. (Id.)

On September 12, 2011, the Regional Director issued a response indicating, like

the Warden’s earlier response, that Plaintiff had been seen by a specialist on May 27,

2011. (Id.) The Regional Director also indicated that Plaintiff saw an outside care

provider on July 15, 2011, but that the provider noted negative findings following an

exam of Plaintiff’s left hip. (Id.) Plaintiff was also seen on July 21, 2011 at which time

he was informed of the normal results from his neurological exam and he was requested

to have Dr. Whyte’s medical records relating to Plaintiff’s surgery forwarded to FCC

Victorville’s medical staff. (Id.) Based on his review of Plaintiff’s medical records, the

Regional Director concluded that Plaintiff had been receiving appropriate treatment and

care while incarcerated at FCC Victorville, and that the institution would continue to

monitor Plaintiff’s condition. (Id.) The Regional Director advised Plaintiff that if he was

not satisfied with this response, he could appeal to the BOP’s Office of General Counsel

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withing thirty days of the September 12, 2011 response. (Id.)

The declaration of Ms. Schuh indicates that although Plaintiff’s appeal to the

Office of General Counsel was due on November 18, 2011,4

 the appeal was not received

until December 7, 2011. (ECF No. 31 at 3:3-11.) Accordingly, the Office of General

Counsel rejected Plaintiff’s appeal as untimely. (Id.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust

administrative remedies with respect to his claims against Defendants Castillo, Villalon

and Machimo. Indeed, two of Plaintiff’s administrative appeals were not commenced

until after the instant litigation ensued. Moreover, the only appeal that Plaintiff

commenced prior to filing this lawsuit was not properly exhausted because he did not

timely appeal to the BOP’s Office of General Counsel. 

Thus, Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating “that administrative

remedies were available but unused.” Albino, 697 F.3d at 1035. Accordingly, the burden

now shifts to Plaintiff “to show that the administrative remedies were unavailable.” Id.

at 1031 (citing Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 n.5; Tuckel, 660 F.3d at 1254). However, Plaintiff

fails to satisfy this burden.5

Absent a showing that administrative remedies were unavailable, Plaintiff’s failure

to comply with the BOP’s procedural rules, including deadlines, requires dismissal for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91 (“Proper

4 Plaintiff’s thirty-day deadline to appeal to the Office of General Counsel was apparently extended until November 18, 2011 due to a prison lockdown. (See ECF 31-1

at 10.)

5 Despite receiving multiple extensions of his deadline to oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss and introduce evidence to counter Defendants’ exhaustion argument

(see ECF Nos. 29, 32), Plaintiff failed to do so. Plaintiff’s only references to exhaustion are found in his Second Amended Complaint, where he states in a conclusory manner that “they denied all 8-9-10-11 BP’s” (ECF No. 15 at 15), and in his First Amended

Complaint, where he states that his appeal to the Regional Director was denied because

he had been receiving medical attention. (ECF No. 8 at 8.) However, neither of these references dispute the evidence submitted by Defendants, namely, that Plaintiff’s appeal to the BOP’s Office of General Counsel was rejected as untimely. Moreover, Plaintiff makes no argument that would allow the Court to conclude that his untimeliness was due

to administrative remedies being unavailable.

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exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural

rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some

orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” ); Moore, 517 F.3d at 725; Kaba, 458

F.3d at 684.

In conclusion, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants Castillo, Villalon and

Machimo’s motion to dismiss the claims against them in the Second Amended Complaint

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be GRANTED.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

1. Legal Standards

a. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because

Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the sufficiency of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive

merits, “a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a [Rule

12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977,

980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984)). “All allegations of material fact are taken as true

and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Espy, 45 F.3d

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1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Court need not, however, “accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Clegg v.

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on

motion to dismiss, court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.”). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require

‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555).

Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “The plausibility standard is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570 (when plaintiffs have not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”)).

“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory

‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly

suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv.,

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

b. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Rights Actions

“In a civil rights case where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe

the pleadings liberally and must afford [the] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” 

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Karim–Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of

liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil

rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v.

Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations

unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 1983).

Nevertheless, a court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint

“unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of

other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation

omitted) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)). Thus, before a

pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the Court must provide the plaintiff with

a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. Karim–Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623–24. But

where amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to

amend is appropriate. James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

2. Analysis

As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo

deliberately delayed treatment on Plaintiff’s entrapped nerve, causing him substantial and

unnecessary pain. (ECF No. 15 at 11, 13.) In response, Defendants contend Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint fails to state a cognizable Bivens claim of inadequate

medical treatment. (ECF No. 25-1 at 10:21-12:2.)

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that involves the “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting Gregg

v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). This principle “establish[es] the government’s

obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id. 

The Supreme Court has noted that “[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat

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his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Id.; see

also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988).

Prison officials violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment if they are deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response

to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to

medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless

of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states

a cause of action under § 1983 [or Bivens].” Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (footnotes

omitted). To establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, the Ninth Circuit

requires a two-step inquiry. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

First, the prisoner must have a serious medical need. Id. “A ‘serious’ medical

need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). In

making this determination, courts should consider whether “a reasonable doctor or patient

would find [the prisoner’s condition] important and worthy of comment or treatment; the

presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities;

or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990); Hunt, 865 F.2d at 200-01).

Second, the prisoner must establish that prison officials exhibited deliberate

indifference to the serious medical need. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This requirement “is

satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or

possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial;

inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to

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a constitutional violation. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. A showing of

medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation

under the Eighth Amendment.”) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002) (“Mere medical malpractice does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”);

Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334 (stating that even gross negligence is insufficient to establish a

constitutional violation)).

The deliberate indifference standard includes a subjective intent requirement and

is not met “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order to show deliberate indifference,

an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate that prison officials acted with a

culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). Courts must focus

on the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical needs and the nature of the defendants’

response to those needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Differences in judgment

between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis

and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild,

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be established when “prison officials deny, delay or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which

prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. However, a mere

delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, unless the

delay or denial was harmful. Id. at 1060 (quoting Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); Hunt, 865 F.2d at 200

(“[D]elay in providing a prisoner with dental treatment, standing alone, does not

constitute an [E]ighth [A]mendment violation.”). While the harm caused by delay need

not necessarily be “substantial,” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 & n.12, the Eighth

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Amendment is violated if “delays occurred to patients with problems so severe that

delays would cause significant harm and that Defendants should have known this to be

the case,” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 746, and “a finding that the inmate was seriously harmed

by the defendant’s action or inaction tends to provide additional support to a claim that

the defendant was ‘deliberately indifferent’ to the prisoner’s medical needs: the fact that

an individual sat idly by as another human being was seriously injured despite the

defendant’s ability to prevent the injury is a strong indicium of callousness and deliberate

indifference to the prisoner’s suffering.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Gamble,

429 U.S. at 106). Further, “allegations that a prison official has ignored the instructions

of a prisoner’s treating physician are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate

indifference.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, as an initial matter, the Court believes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged

that his medical needs were “serious.” Indeed, Plaintiff alleges the failure to approve

surgery to release his entrapped nerve resulted in chronic and substantial pain and

affected his “daily life and normal activities.” (ECF No. 15 at 2, 11.) For example,

Plaintiff alleges that he is unable to move around without a wheelchair, and he has fallen

several times in the shower. (Id. at 11.) Such allegations are sufficient to plead a

“serious” medical need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60 (recognizing that “serious”

medical needs exist when “the presence of a medical condition . . . significantly affects

an individual’s daily activities” or there exists “chronic and substantial pain.”). 

Moreover, the fact that Dr. Whyte recognized that Plaintiff would need an additional

surgery if his pain persisted further supports the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has

adequately alleged a “serious” medical need. See id. (“The existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment

. . . [is an example] of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical

treatment.”).

Next, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately alleged Defendants Castillo

and Villalon were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. However,

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the Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a deliberate indifference

claim against Defendant Machimo.

As to Defendants Castillo and Villalon, Plaintiff alleges that attempted to submit

to them Dr. Whyte’s consultation notes, which explain his condition and the need for an

additional surgery, but that they refused to accept the document from Plaintiff. (ECF No.

15 at 11, 13.) Instead, Defendants Castillo and Villalon took the position that they would

not accept Dr. Whyte’s notes unless they were received directly from Dr. Whyte. (Id.) 

Rather than authorizing the surgery that Plaintiff’s private doctor recommended should

occur if pain persisted, Defendants Castillo and Villalon merely treated Plaintiff with

painkillers. (Id.) Based on these facts, if viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged Defendants Castillo and Villalon exhibited deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. See Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1165

(“[A]llegations that a prison official has ignored the instructions of a prisoner’s treating

physician are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference.”).

As to Defendant Machimo, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a finding

that she acted with a culpable state of mind, see Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, nor has Plaintiff

alleged facts to support a finding that Defendant Machimo disregarded an excessive risk

to Plaintiff’s health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff’s only allegations

with respect to Defendant Machimo is that she may be a member of the URC responsible

for allocating funds for inmate’s surgeries, that Plaintiff complained to her several times

about the actions of Defendants Castillo and Villalon, and that Defendant Machimo

informed Plaintiff that she would speak directly with his health providers. (ECF No. 15

at 13.) However, there are no facts that suggest any delay in treatment is attributable to

Defendant Machimo.

In conclusion, the Court RECOMMENDS (1) Defendants Castillo and Villalon’s

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be DENIED, and (2) Defendant Machimo’s

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be GRANTED.

/ / /

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C. Counsel’s Request for Dismissal of Defendant U.S. Marshal Mark

1. Legal Standards

If a defendant is not served within 120 days of the date the complaint is filed, the

court “must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that

service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the

failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 4(m). “A prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis is entitled to rely on

the United States Marshal for service of the summons and complaint, provided the

plaintiff has furnished the information necessary to identify and serve the defendant.” 

James v. Murphy, No. 09-4413 ABC (AJW), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18932, at *42 (C.D.

Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (citing Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994),

abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Puett v.

Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir.1990); Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 602,

603 (7th Cir.1990)); see also Pierce v. Woodford, 416 F. App’x 660, 661 (9th Cir. 2011)

(holding it is not abuse of discretion that a prisoner’s failure to provide U.S. Marshal with

necessary information to effectuate service is proper grounds for dismissal without

prejudice); cf. Dodson v. Rocha, No. 07cv0869-W (RBB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

123858, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2008) (finding the full name, badge number and place

of employment of defendant was sufficient identifying information to establish a good

cause exception to the service of process requirements).

2. Analysis

Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on November 1, 2012. (ECF No.

15.) On January 9, 2013, the Court ordered the U.S. Marshals to effect service on

Defendants Mark, Castillo, Villalon and Machimo. (ECF No. 16 at 5:21-6:4.) In that

order, the Court directed Plaintiff to complete the provided blank U.S. Marshal Form

285s for each Defendant as completely and accurately as possible. (Id. at 5:26-6:1.) 

Additionally, the instructions provided by the Clerk of Court specifically instructed

Plaintiff to complete one Form 285 for each defendant to be served. (ECF No. 17-1 at

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1.)

Notwithstanding the Court’s instructions, it appears Plaintiff listed all four

Defendants on a single Form 285. (ECF No. 18.) This error was compounded when the

U.S. Attorneys’ Office accepted service on behalf of all four Defendants. (Id.) 

Rather than properly file a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), Defendants’ counsel filed a “Response

to Court Order and Notice of Service Defect.” (ECF No. 24.) In the response,

Defendants’ counsel states that “despite a good faith effort to identify and locate

[Defendant Mark], the [U.S. Marshal] was unable to do so to any reasonable degree of

certainty based upon the insufficiency of the facts as pled. Personal service on U.S.

Marshal Mark has proven to be unfeasible and therefore, proper service of process as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 has not, and cannot be, effected.” (Id. at 3:3-7.) 

Defendants’ counsel therefore requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s lawsuit against

Defendant Mark for lack of personal jurisdiction, and/or lack of sufficient process, and/or

insufficient service of process. (Id. at 3:8-11.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint, and the information provided on the Form 285, is insufficient to allow the

U.S. Marshal to effect service on Defendant Mark. To date, Plaintiff has not provided

any further identifying information beyond a first name.6

 Without more, Plaintiff fails

to provide necessary information to permit the U.S. Marshal to effectuate service. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mark

be DISMISSED without prejudice. See James, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18932, at *44-45

(“If service cannot be accomplished due to the pro se plaintiff’s ‘neglect’ or ‘fault,’ such

as failing to provide sufficient information to identify or locate the defendant after being

put on notice, dismissal [without prejudice] is appropriate.”) (citing Walker, 14 F.3d at

6Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint suggests that Defendant Mark’s first name might also be Marcos. (See ECF No. 15 at 10.)

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1421-22; Pierce, 416 F. A’ppx at 661).7

D. Motion to Transfer Venue

Although this Report and Recommendation concludes that dismissal of this entire

action without prejudice is appropriate in light of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and failure to provide the U.S. Marshal with sufficient

information to enable proper service on Defendant Mark, the Court nevertheless

addresses Defendants’ alternative motion to transfer venue to the Central District of

California in the event the District Judge declines to dismiss this case in its entirety.

1. Legal Standards

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district

court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have

been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. F. & P. S.p.A., 899 F. Supp. 465, 466 (E.D.

Cal. 1994) (“Three factors are in the inherently broad discretion of the Court, allowing

the Court to consider the particular facts of each case: convenience of the parties,

convenience of the witnesses, and interests of justice.”) (citations omitted). Because a §

1404(a) transfer may only be made to a district where the action “might have been

brought,” the transferee court must have subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants would

have been subject to personal jurisdiction in the transferee court and venue would have

been proper. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960).

/ / /

7 The Court notes that a recent Ninth Circuit decision held that a district court

abuses its discretion when it dismisses a pro se prisoner’s complaint under Rule 4(m) without providing the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to show good cause for failure to effect timely service. See Crowley v. Bannister, No. 12-15804, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22087, at *16-21 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2013). Here, Plaintiff was arguably put on notice of the defective service when Defendants’ counsel filed the April 8, 2013 response (ECF No. 24), yet Plaintiff has not attempted to show good cause. Moreover, given that Plaintiff will have an opportunity to object to this Report and Recommendation prior to any dismissal of Defendant Mark, the Court believes he will have received sufficient

notice and an opportunity to show good cause in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s

recent Crowley decision. 

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“A motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) requires the court to weigh multiple

factors in its determination whether transfer is appropriate in a particular case.” Jones

v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). Such factors include: 

(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the

forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof.

Id. at 498-99 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-31 (1988); see

also Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986)

(balancing § 1404(a) factors). The party seeking to transfer venue carries the burden of

demonstrating that transfer is appropriate. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.

Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).

2. Analysis

Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo contend this Court should transfer

venue to the Central District because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving

rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred” in that district. (ECF No. 25-1 at 12:5-7.) Defendants

also contend that of all the factors relevant to a § 1404(a) transfer, Plaintiff’s decision to

file this action in the Southern District of California is the only factor weighing against

transfer, but that Plaintiff’s choice of forum is outweighed by the remaining factors. (Id.

at 12:5-13:24.)

As an initial matter, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s action could have initially

been brought in the Central District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which provides, in

relevant part:

A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority . . . may . . . be brought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no

real property is involved in the action. 

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Here, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim

occurred at FCC Victorville, which is located in the Central District. Moreover, Plaintiff

himself is incarcerated in that district and no real property is involved in the action. 

Accordingly, this action could have been brought in the Central District.8

Next, the Court finds that, independent of whether Plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed for any of the reasons discussed above, for the convenience of parties and

witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the relevant factors compel transfer to the Central

District. The only factor clearly weighing in Plaintiff’s favor is Plaintiff’s choice of

forum. Thus, Defendants “must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant

upsetting the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843. The Court

believes Defendants have made that showing.

First, the majority of the parties are located in the Central District, including

Plaintiff, Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo. Defendant Mark is the only party

located in the Southern District and, as discussed above, he has not been identified

sufficiently to allow Plaintiff’s claims against him to proceed.

Second, the majority of witnesses are likely located in the Central District. For

example, FCC Victorville medical staff work and presumably live in the Central District. 

Additionally, the BOP’s attorney declarant, Sarah Schuh, works in Los Angeles. (See

ECF No. 31 at ¶ 1.) However, any potential witnesses to the incident involving

Defendant Mark are likely located in the Southern District. Moreover, the private

medical providers that performed Plaintiff’s pre-arrest hernia surgery, including Dr.

Whyte, are located in the Southern District. Although witnesses are located in both

districts, on balance, the Court believes that the convenience of witnesses and the

interests of justice would better be served by transfer to the Central District, particularly

8 Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo might reside within the Central District, although their motion does not confirm their residency. Given the relatively close proximity of FCC Victorville to Kern County and Inyo County, which are located in the Eastern District of California, the Court would be required to speculate as to their place of residence. In any event, Plaintiff’s action could have been initially brought in the Central District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(B) and (C).

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in light of the difficulty in locating Defendant Mark and the fact that the majority of

Plaintiff’s allegations surround actions or inactions occurring at FCC Victorville. 

Similarly, on balance, ease of access to sources of proof would be better served by

transfer of the action to the Central District.

Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that, in the event this action

is not dismissed in its entirety for the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to

transfer venue to the Central District of California be GRANTED. That being said, if

the District Judge determines that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mark should not

be dismissed but that the claims against Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo

should be dismissed for failure to exhaust and/or failure to state a claim, transfer to the

Central District would not be warranted.

E. Motion for Writ of Mandamus

1. Legal Standards

A plaintiff may request that a district court issue a writ of mandamus to compel an

officer or employee of the United States, or any agency thereof, to perform a duty owed

to the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1361. However, mandamus is a drastic remedy only to be

used in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426

U.S. 394, 402 (1976).

“A writ of mandamus is appropriately issued only when (1) the plaintiff’s claim

is ‘clear and certain’; (2) the defendant official’s duty to act is ministerial, and ‘so plainly

prescribed as to be free from doubt’; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” 

Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Fallini v. Hodel, 783 F.2d

1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986)). “An agency ‘ministerial act’ for purposes of mandamus

relief has been defined as a clear, non-discretionary agency obligation to take a specific

affirmative action, which obligation is positively commanded and ‘so plainly prescribed

as to be free from doubt.’” Independence Mining Co., Inc. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 508

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Azurin v. Von Raab, 803 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1986); United

States v. Walker, 409 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1969)).

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In the prison context, defendants have a non-discretionary duty to provide medical

treatment to the prison inmates under their control. See, e.g., Gamble 429 U.S. at 103

(holding the government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is

punishing by incarceration.”); Paniagua v. Moseley, 451 F.2d 228, 230 (10th Cir. 1971)

(indicating a “total denial of medical care” would be a sufficient basis justifying

mandamus).

However, a writ of mandamus has limits. The Tenth Circuit has held that a court

cannot use a writ of mandamus to order prison officials to provide more medical

treatment than is required by law. See Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225,

1235 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that mandamus is proper to order prison to provide basic

dental care proscribed by regulations, but not anything beyond such routine care);

Paniagua, 451 F.2d at 230 (holding that mandamus is not proper when a doctor uses his

discretion to prescribe medication instead of performing surgery).

2. Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for writ of mandamus requests that the Court order Defendants

Castillo, Villalon and Machimo to refer Plaintiff to a medical specialist to determine the

origin of the excruciating pain that keeps him confined to a wheelchair. The Court

recommends denial of Plaintiff’s request for several reasons.

First, the request seeks relief beyond that permitted by a writ of mandamus.

Certainly, Defendants have a ministerial duty to provide Plaintiff with basic medical care. 

However, Plaintiff concedes Defendants have provided him such care. In fact, he states

that Defendants “are providing me minimum medical attention to comply with the

policies.” (ECF No. 21 at 4.) Further, Plaintiff has visited the prison medical staff

numerous times and has been prescribed multiple medications. (Id. at 2, 6-10; see also

ECF No. 31-1 at 19.) However, referring Plaintiff to a specialist is discretionary and goes

beyond the ministerial duties of the prison medical staff. Plaintiff desires to meet with

a specialist other than “the General Surgeon that only asked me questions about my

medical history.” (ECF No. 21 at 5.) Such a decision is a prime example of the

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discretion prison medical staff have in determining treatment that is outside the reach of

a writ of mandamus.

Second, the proper manner in which Plaintiff should seek this relief is by way of

the prison’s administrative grievance procedures. However, based on the record before

the Court, Plaintiff has not completed this administrative remedy. In fact, the record

indicates that Plaintiff submitted a Request for Administrative Remedy on March 13,

2013 in which he requested that he be referred to a specialist to undergo an MRI to verify

that he is not faking his medical condition. (ECF No. 31-1 at 21.) However, as discussed

above, Plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies with respect to this grievance.

Third, Plaintiff’s request might arguably be construed as a motion for injunctive

relief. See Fraher v. Heyne, No. 1:10-cv-0951-LJO-MJS (PC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

13852, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (denial of motion for preliminary injunction

requesting that prisoner be referred to a medical specialist); Mester v. Kelso, No. CIV S10-2105 LKK EFB P, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6056, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011)

(same).

Injunctive relief “is an extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of right.” Winter

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A preliminary injunction

represents the exercise of a far reaching power not to be indulged except in a case clearly

warranting it.” Mester, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6056, at *4 (citing Dymo Indus. v.

Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964). To be entitled to preliminary

injunctive relief, a party must demonstrate “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance

of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Stormans,

Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 7). “In

cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary

injunction ‘must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm

the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the harm.’” Mester, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6056, at *5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §

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3626(a)(2)).

Here, even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s motion for writ of mandamus

as a motion for preliminary injunction, at a minimum Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first

prong of the test because his failure to exhaust administrative remedies against

Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo and his failure to sufficiently identify

Defendant Mark for purposes of effecting service mandates a finding that Plaintiff is not

likely to prevail on the merits.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s motion for

writ of mandamus be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local

Civil Rule 72.3. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

the District Judge issue an order:

1. Approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation;

2. GRANTING Defendants Castillo, Villalon and Machimo’s motion to

dismiss the claims against them for failure to exhaust available

administrative remedies;

3. DENYING Defendants Castillo and Villalon’s motion to dismiss the claims

against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;

4. GRANTING Defendant Machimo’s motion to dismiss the claims against

her for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;

5. DISMISSING Defendant U.S. Marshal Mark without prejudice for

insufficient service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

4(m);

6. GRANTING Defendants’ motion to transfer venue to the Central District

of California (only in the event the action is not dismissed in its entirety and

the claims against Defendants Castillo, Villalon and/or Machimo survive);

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and

7. DENYING Plaintiff’s motion for writ of mandamus.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than December 13, 2013, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply

to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 3, 2014.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 12, 2013

DAVID H. BARTICK

United States Magistrate Judge

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