Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01880/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01880-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-1880

TOMMY R. PRUITT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RON NEAL, Superintendent, 

Indiana State Prison,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:09-cv-00380-RLM — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 9, 2014 — DECIDED JUNE 2, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. Tommy R. Pruitt appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

A jury in Indiana state court convicted Pruitt of murdering a 

deputy sheriff and he was sentenced to death. His petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raises four claims: (1) he is intellectually disabled and therefore categorically and constitutionally 

ineligible for the death penalty; (2) his trial counsel rendered 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
2 No. 13-1880

ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth Amendment 

rights by failing to present evidence to support his claim of 

intellectual disability; (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present at the 

penalty phase mitigating evidence regarding his schizophrenia and its effects; and (4) the prosecutor violated 

Pruitt’s right to due process by reciting a poem about the 

death of a police officer and comparing Pruitt to notorious 

murderers in the closing argument of the penalty phase of 

trial, and appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise 

this as an error on appeal. With regard to the second ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim ((3) above), Pruitt challenges 

only counsel’s presentation of evidence at the penalty phase 

of trial; he is not asserting ineffectiveness in failing to seek a 

determination of guilty but mentally ill or in otherwise presenting mental health evidence at the guilt phase of trial.

We conclude that Pruitt has established that he is intellectually disabled and categorically ineligible for the death 

penalty and that trial counsel were ineffective in their investigation and presentation of evidence that Pruitt suffered 

from schizophrenia. We therefore reverse the district court’s 

judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Crime

These facts are taken from the Indiana Supreme Court 

decision affirming Pruitt’s conviction and sentence. Pruitt v. 

State, 834 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. 2005) (Pruitt I), cert. denied, Pruitt v. 

Indiana, 548 U.S. 910 (2006). 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 3

On June 14, 2001, Morgan County Deputy Sheriff Daniel 

Starnes stopped Pruitt’s vehicle. Starnes obtained Pruitt’s 

driver’s license and registration, called that information in, 

and was told that a recent robbery report suggested Pruitt 

might be in possession of stolen weapons. When Starnes approached Pruitt’s vehicle a second time, Pruitt emerged with 

a handgun, and the two exchanged gunfire. Starnes was 

struck by five shots. He was taken to the hospital and underwent surgery. He later developed an infection and died.

The state ultimately charged Pruitt with murder, attempted murder (Pruitt also shot Ryan Starnes, Deputy 

Starnes’s son, who was accompanying his father as part of a 

college internship), and related offenses. The state sought the 

death penalty because Starnes was a law enforcement officer 

killed in the line of duty. 

B. State and Post-Conviction Proceedings

The trial court appointed attorneys William Van Der Pol, 

Jr. and Douglas Garner to represent Pruitt. Before trial Pruitt 

sought a determination of intellectual disability in a death 

sentence case, requesting that the court order an evaluation 

and dismiss the death penalty. The court ordered an evaluation of Pruitt and appointed forensic psychologist Dr. 

George W. Schmedlen, Ph.D., J.D., for that purpose.

The trial court conducted a week-long evidentiary hearing at which Pruitt presented two expert witnesses, clinical 

neuropsychologist Dr. Bryan A. Hudson, and clinical neuropsychologist and professor of psychology Dr. Charles J.

Golden, Ph.D., as well as non-expert testimony and other evidence in an effort to establish his intellectual disability. 

Pruitt’s experts testified that Pruitt is intellectually disabled 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
4 No. 13-1880

based on his IQ test scores and their assessment of his adaptive functioning. However, Dr. Schmedlen and the state’s 

expert, psychologist Dr. Martin G. Groff, Ph.D., testified that 

Pruitt was not intellectually disabled. The trial court found 

that Pruitt “does not have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning,” Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d at 103, noting that at 

most, “Pruitt’s functioning would be considered borderline—not [intellectually disabled],” id. at 104. The trial court 

also found “that the defense has failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that Mr. Pruitt has substantial impairment of adaptive behavior.” Id. at 108. The trial court was 

“particularly impressed with Mr. Pruitt’s ability to function 

as a carpenter, obtain a commercial driver’s license, perform 

duties of an over the road truck driver and fill out applications for employment.” Id. at 108–09. Therefore, the court

denied Pruitt’s motion to dismiss the death penalty. 

At the guilt phase of the trial, the jury convicted Pruitt of 

murder, attempted murder, and related offenses. At the 

penalty phase, the defense presented evidence of Pruitt’s 

background and intellectual disability. Drs. Hudson and 

Golden again testified that Pruitt is intellectually disabled, 

and Dr. Golden also testified about Pruitt’s mental illness. 

The jury found that Deputy Starnes was a law enforcement 

officer acting in the course of his duty at the time he was 

murdered and that this aggravating circumstance outweighed any and all mitigating circumstances, and recommended a sentence of death. In imposing sentence for the 

convictions other than murder, the trial judge considered the 

“possible mitigating factors as presented in the[] proceedings” and found that none of them “constitute a mitigating 

circumstance.” Trial Tr. 6455. The judge also concluded that 

“Pruitt does not have a mental condition which would justiCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 5

fy his actions or in any way mitigate for purposes of sentencing” and that the “aggravating factors outweigh any possible mitigating factors.” Id. at 6455–56. The judge sentenced 

Pruitt to a total of 115 years on the other offenses. In imposing sentence for murder, the judge found that the jury determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt the aggravating circumstance that Starnes was a law 

enforcement officer acting in the course of his duty, that this 

aggravating circumstance outweighed any and all mitigating 

circumstances, and that a sentence of death should be imposed. The judge accordingly sentenced Pruitt to death.

Pruitt appealed his murder conviction and sentence directly to the Indiana Supreme Court; the court affirmed. 

Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d 90. Although that court concluded that 

the trial court’s standard for assessing adaptive behavior 

was too restrictive and that the record did not support the 

trial court’s conclusion with respect to adaptive behavior, id.

at 109-110, it decided that the evidence supported the trial 

court’s conclusion with respect to the intellectual functioning. The court explained:

While some of Pruitt’s scores suggest significantly 

subaverage intellectual functioning, others do not. In 

addition to this data, the trial court found that Pruitt 

was able to fill out applications for employment and 

to have the capacity, if not the will at all times, to 

support himself. In light of the inconsistent IQ scores 

and the other evidence cited by the trial court, the trial court’s finding that Pruitt did not meet the statutory test is consistent with this record. 

Id. at 106. The Indiana Supreme Court therefore upheld the 

trial court’s conclusion that Pruitt was not intellectually disCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
6 No. 13-1880

abled. Id. at 106, 110. Justice Rucker dissented, concluding 

that Pruitt had shown that he is intellectually disabled and 

therefore a death sentence was unconstitutional and statutorily impermissible. Id. at 123–26.

Next, Pruitt petitioned for post-conviction relief. At the 

hearing on his petition, he presented testimony from newly 

retained experts as well as from psychologist Dr. Dennis 

Olvera, Ph.D., who had been retained by trial counsel to 

conduct IQ testing of Pruitt but had not testified at trial. 

Pruitt also presented evidence from his trial attorneys and 

appellate attorney, family, and educators. The postconviction court denied Pruitt’s petition and motion to correct errors, finding as to the intellectual disability claim that 

Pruitt’s “additional evidence ... presented at the postconviction hearing was largely cumulative of the evidence 

developed before and [during] trial and is entirely unpersuasive.” PCR App. 688. (The court also found the claim 

barred by res judicata. Id.) 

The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Pruitt, 903 

N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 2009) (Pruitt II), reh’g denied, 907 N.E.2d 973 

(Ind. 2009). The court found that “Pruitt has offered no evidence undermining the correctness of the trial court’s and 

this Court’s findings that he is not [intellectually disabled]” 

and therefore concluded that his death sentence was not unconstitutional under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 

Pruitt II, 903 N.E.2d at 938 (quotation omitted). Justice Rucker again dissented on the basis of Pruitt’s intellectual disability. Id. at 940.

Pruitt petitioned for writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 

in the United States District Court for the Northern District 

of Indiana. The district court heard oral argument and then 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 7

denied the petition. Pruitt v. Wilson, No. 3:09cv380RLM, 2012 

WL 4513961 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 2, 2012). Pruitt moved the court 

to alter or amend its decision; the motion was denied. The 

district court granted Pruitt a certificate of appealability. 

C. Pretrial and Guilt-Phase Evidence

1. Intellectual Functioning

Before he turned 18, Pruitt took two Lorge-Thorndike 

group-administered IQ tests. In March 1973, he scored a verbal IQ of 64, and a non-verbal IQ of 65. In December 1976, he

scored a verbal IQ of 64 and a non-verbal IQ of 63. These 

scores fall within the intellectually disabled range. However, 

the state’s expert Dr. Groff testified that he would give little 

weight to these scores; Dr. Hudson agreed that individually 

administered tests are better indicators of an individual’s

ability. Nonetheless, the Lorge-Thorndike test is designed to 

measure general intelligence, and Dr. Hudson explained that 

the research demonstrates an “extremely high correlation” 

between the Lorge-Thorndike and Weschler series of intelligence tests. Both Drs. Groff and Golden agreed that since 

Pruitt obtained essentially the same scores on the two tests, 

he gave his best effort. Dr. Golden indicated that these scores 

suggested that Pruitt’s IQ was “fairly stable” at that point in 

time. Trial Tr. 1550. Both Drs. Hudson and Golden stated 

that the IQ scores obtained as a child would most accurately 

measure Pruitt’s intelligence before age 18. Id. at 1355–56

(Hudson stating that “IQ is meant to be diagnosed in childhood.”); id. at 1551 (Golden stating that in assessing IQ,

scores obtained before age 18 are “absolutely” more important than scores obtained after that age). 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
8 No. 13-1880

Pruitt took two academic achievement tests while in 

school. In March of 1975, he took the Otis-Lennon School 

Ability Test and scored 81. Dr. Schmedlen testified that this 

score was inconsistent with intellectual disability. However, 

Dr. Schmedlen was unaware that the Otis-Lennon was 

known as the “Otis-Lennon School Ability Test” and that the 

Otis-Lennon score was not given as an IQ score. He also 

acknowledged that the Otis-Lennon test was not of the same 

quality as a Weschler or Stanford-Binet intelligence test. Dr. 

Hudson stated that the Otis-Lennon test was an achievement 

test normed by grade rather than age. He explained that 

Pruitt’s score was compared to the scores of children two 

years younger than Pruitt because he had been held back in 

school twice by the time he took the test. Dr. Golden similarly testified that an academic achievement test is not an appropriate substitute for an IQ test: although an achievement 

test “roughly correlate[s] somewhat with IQ, it is not an IQ 

test at all.” Trial Tr. 1546. He stated that the Otis-Lennon 

score overestimated Pruitt’s IQ score by 15 to 25 points because the test was an achievement test comparing scores 

among students in the same grade. See id. at 1518–19. In 

April 1975, Pruitt took the Iowa Basic Test, another academic 

achievement test. His score on that test was consistent with 

his Otis-Lennon score; but again, his scores were normed by 

grade rather than age. Had his achievement test scores been 

adjusted for his age, Dr. Golden testified that they would fall 

within the range for intellectual disability. 

At the age of 19 while incarcerated on another matter, 

Pruitt took a Revised Beta intelligence test and scored 93. 

The test is group-administered in fifteen minutes. Trial Tr. 

672. Dr. Schmedlen testified that such a score was inconsistent with having significantly subaverage intellectual 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 9

functioning; instead, the score fell within the average intellectual functioning range. However, Dr. Schmedlen 

acknowledged that individually administered tests are considered more reliable than group administered tests. Trial 

Tr. 659–60. While Dr. Schmedlen testified that he believed 

the test was reliable, he did not actually determine whether 

the Revised Beta was a reliable test. Id. at 672. And he 

acknowledged that the test was not as reliable as the Weschler series or Stanford-Binet intelligence tests. Furthermore, 

Drs. Hudson and Golden testified that the Revised Beta is a 

non-verbal test developed by the Army in World War II for 

testing non-English speaking persons. It was normed on 

prisoners, not on the average population. Thus, Dr. Golden

stated that the Revised Beta “is not an accurate test, it is not 

well regarded in the field, and it is not well accepted in the 

field as a general test of intelligence.” Id. at 1541. According 

to Dr. Golden, a Revised Beta score “severely overestimates” 

an individual’s IQ; if a Revised Beta is the only score available in a forensic file, Dr. Golden subtracts 20 to 30 points 

from the score to obtain what he would consider to reflect 

actual intellectual functioning. Id. at 1543.

In April 2002, Pruitt obtained a full-scale IQ score of 76 

on the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, Third Edition 

(WAIS) administered by his own expert Dr. Olvera. Trial 

counsel had sought Dr. Olvera’s evaluation because they intended to pursue a determination that Pruitt is intellectually

disabled and not eligible for a death sentence. The WAIS has 

a standard error of measurement (SEM) of five points that 

placed Pruitt’s score within the range of 71 to 81. However, 

Dr. Olvera advised trial counsel that Pruitt’s full-scale IQ 

score of 76 did not meet the intelligence functioning prong of 

intellectual disability. Dr. Schmedlen stated that this score 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
10 No. 13-1880

placed Pruitt in the “borderline range.” Dr. Hudson said 

there was a one-point error in scoring the test and that Pruitt 

was taking an antipsychotic medication (Trilafon) that Hudson believed enhanced Pruitt’s abilities. Dr. Golden agreed, 

stating that if a person with a psychiatric disorder is given 

antipsychotic medication, his IQ scores “may go up significantly.” Trial Tr. 1500. In addition, the medical literature 

supports the conclusion that an antipsychotic drug could 

enhance Pruitt’s performance on an IQ test because of improvements in attention and focusing. The trial court found 

that the 76 on the WAIS placed Pruitt above the intellectually disabled level of intellectual functioning. The Indiana Supreme Court noted that the trial court had found insufficient 

evidence to show what, if any, effect the Trilafon may have 

had on Pruitt’s performance on the test. Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d 

at 105.

In February 2003, Dr. Golden administered a StanfordBinet (4th ed.) individually administered IQ test to Pruitt; he

obtained a full-scale IQ score of 65. The test has an SEM of 

six points, placing Pruitt’s IQ score within the 59-71 range.

Subaverage intelligence is measured by the Stanford-Binet as 

a score below 69. Dr. Schmedlen testified that Pruitt’s score 

indicated that he is intellectually disabled. Trial Tr. 668. Dr. 

Golden testified that alternative scoring methods for the test 

could have produced scores of 67 or 69. Both Drs. Golden 

and Hudson stated that the Stanford-Binet was more sensitive and accurate than the WAIS in assessing individuals 

with very high or very low IQs.

In July 2003, Dr. Schmedlen administered the WAIS to 

Pruitt; Pruitt scored a full-scale IQ of 52. That score, Dr. 

Schmedlen testified, was not an accurate measure of Pruitt’s 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 11

intellectual functioning because he did not believe that Pruitt 

gave his full effort on the test. Drs. Golden and Hudson 

agreed that the score likely underestimated Pruitt’s IQ because of malingering. They also noted that Pruitt was no 

longer being administered antipsychotic medication and had 

been in solitary confinement just before taking the test, both 

of which could have increased the likelihood of psychotic 

symptoms that would lower his performance on the test. As 

support, they indicated that Pruitt’s scores varied from the 

prior WAIS on subtests that were particularly sensitive to 

anxiety, depression, or psychosis, but showed little variance

on those subtests that were more stable.

Dr. Schmedlen testified at the pretrial hearing that Pruitt 

was not intellectually disabled, relying on IQ tests, achievement tests, an assessment of his adaptive functioning, and 

Pruitt’s ability to hold jobs and perform other tasks. Dr. 

Schmedlen believed that at most Pruitt would be in the borderline range of intellectual functioning. He took into account Pruitt’s 93 on the Revised Beta, a score that Dr. 

Schmedlen thought was inconsistent with intellectual disability. He also thought that Pruitt’s 81 on the Otis-Lennon 

test should be interpreted as an IQ score. 

Dr. Groff also testified at the pre-trial hearing that Pruitt 

was not intellectually disabled. However, Dr. Groff did not 

meet or test Pruitt; nor did he interview anyone about Pruitt. 

Based only on his review of records in the case, Dr. Groff 

stated that his impression was that Pruitt was “probably 

within the borderline intellectual functioning range.” Tr. 

1463. Yet Dr. Groff conceded that he could not address 

Pruitt’s intellectual functioning “with certainty.” Id.

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
12 No. 13-1880

2. Adaptive Functioning

The American Association on Mental Retardation 

(AAMR) (now the American Association on Intellectual and 

Developmental Disabilities) defined a “substantial impairment in adaptive functioning” as limitations in two or more 

of the adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home 

living, social, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Dr. Schmedlen

administered an objective test of adaptive functioning and 

concluded that Pruitt met the adaptive behavior prong under the AAMR definition. Specifically, Dr. Schmedlen stated 

that Pruitt qualified under two adaptive skill areas: work 

and self-direction. According to Dr. Golden, because the test

was normed against individuals with intellectual disability, 

it made Pruitt appear higher functioning then he actually 

was. Dr. Hudson testified based on his review of Pruitt’s social, educational, and work history as well as two clinical 

evaluations that Pruitt showed significant deficits in six 

adaptive skills areas: communication, home living, social 

skills, functional academics, health and safety, and work. 

In addition to the expert testimony, Pruitt presented lay 

testimony that supported the experts’ opinions as to his

adaptive functioning. Pruitt was slow to develop as a child 

in terms of such abilities as walking, talking, and pottytraining. He had difficulty following instructions, playing 

board games and participating in sports because he had 

trouble understanding the rules. Pruitt encountered difficulty in school beginning in the second grade. He was held 

back twice in the first three grades of elementary school; he 

was placed in special education classes; and he was socially 

promoted. He dropped out of school at the age of 16 while in

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 13

the eighth grade. He was described as mentally slow. Other 

children made fun of him, calling him retarded and dumb, 

but he did not seem to understand that he was being teased.

As an adult, he was unable to live on his own; his parents 

and family members took care of him. For example, they 

took care of his money and made doctor and dental appointments for him.

The evidence established that Pruitt has held many jobs, 

but none of them required high intellectual functioning. In 

the 1980s, he worked at a fast food restaurant, a truck stop, 

and in construction. In 1990, Pruitt received a union carpenter’s card; he was a member of the union for almost eight 

years. During the 1990s, he worked briefly as a carpenter's 

pre-apprentice for Carlino Construction and he worked a 

few years as a long-distance truck driver. Pruitt also worked 

for several different construction companies. His father got 

him a job in construction, but he was hired only because the 

employer considered his father a valued employee. Pruitt 

worked primarily in demolition and clean-up work. He had 

obtained a journeyman’s card but he did not go through an 

apprenticeship program. The employer, Pete Carlino, testified that Pruitt “really didn’t have carpentry skills,” did not

learn carpentry skills, and needed to “have his dad right 

there ... to tell him what to do continually.” Trial Tr. at 951. 

Pruitt did not do a good job. When Pruitt’s father retired, 

Pruitt was fired because he was unable to do basic work 

without constant supervision, and he could not communicate well with other workers.

As noted, Pruitt also worked as a truck driver. In order to 

do so, he obtained a commercial driver’s license with several 

endorsements that required him to score at least an 80% on 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
14 No. 13-1880

several written tests. He was discharged from his first trucking job after he left one of the company’s trucks on the scales 

at a weigh station and walked home. Pruitt’s employment at 

another trucking job was terminated when he was caught 

selling a load of copper wire to a scrap dealer rather than delivering it to the intended destination. While working as a 

truck driver on another occasion, Pruitt drove his semi-truck 

to California and visited his cousin. He parked the semi in 

the middle of the street. When his cousin told Pruitt he could 

not park there because he was blocking the street, Pruitt responded that there were no signs saying that he could not 

park there. Pruitt also complained that his vehicle was a 

piece of junk, but it was brand new; and according to his 

cousin, an experienced truck driver who had ridden in the 

vehicle, there was nothing wrong with it. 

D. Penalty Phase Evidence

The guilt-phase evidence was incorporated for the jury’s 

consideration at the penalty phase. The state’s only witness 

was the former Morgan County Sheriff who testified as to 

Deputy Starnes’ duties as a warrant officer.

At the penalty phase, Pruitt’s counsel presented the expert testimony of Dr. Golden, who testified about Pruitt’s 

intellectual disability and neuropsychological problems. Dr. 

Golden had interviewed Pruitt only once, when he administered his intellectual disability testing. Counsel asked Dr. 

Golden to go through Pruitt’s prison records and discuss 

Pruitt’s prior diagnoses. Dr. Golden stated that in 1996 while 

Pruitt was incarcerated for another crime, the federal Bureau 

of Prisons (BOP) had diagnosed him with “schizotypal personality disorder . . . an Axis II mental illness.” Trial Tr. 

6042–43. Dr. Golden testified that “psychotic episodes 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 15

should be the exception rather than the rule” for persons suffering from schizotypal personality disorder, and that if such 

episodes “were the main symptoms, then you would be diagnosing him as schizophrenic or something similar to that,”

id. at 6045–46.

Dr. Golden further testified that in August 2001, about 

two months after Pruitt was arrested for killing Officer 

Starnes, an Indiana Department of Corrections (DOC) psychiatrist diagnosed Pruitt as suffering from “schizophrenia, 

chronic undifferentiated type compensated residual.” Trial 

Tr. 6053, 6221–22 (explaining that a psychologist worked on 

Pruitt’s case but a psychiatrist made the actual diagnosis). 

Dr. Golden said that the symptomatology for that diagnosis 

were “actually similar to what the other psychologist was 

saying when he diagnosed [Pruitt] as schizotypal.” Id. at 

6054. Dr. Golden explained that this diagnosis means that 

the provider

thinks that at one time that [Pruitt] was actually 

schizophrenic . . . but that right now most of those 

serious symptoms are not showing and . . . [Pruitt

is] somewhere now in between a personality disorder and the Axis I schizophrenia. 

He [is] not suggesting [Pruitt is] actively schizophrenic, but he is expressing his belief that 

[Pruitt] is capable of easily becoming schizophrenic at some time in the future. 

Id. at 6054–55. Dr. Golden said that Pruitt was prescribed 

Trilafon, an antipsychotic, explaining that “[t]hey were obviously very concerned of his ability to become psychotic.” 

Id. at 6056. According to Dr. Golden, the DOC psychiatrist 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
16 No. 13-1880

who diagnosed Pruitt did a “detailed evaluation and screening,” seemed to have “check[ed] out [Pruitt’s] past,” id. at 

6223, and must have been “pretty certain” since he prescribed medication for schizophrenia.

Dr. Golden concluded that Pruitt’s mental illness was “in 

the schizophrenia spectrum of disorders.” Trial Tr. 6057. He 

said that one “can have psychotic episodes if you’re schizoid 

or schizotypal.” Id. He opined based on Pruitt’s history that 

his illness was “not severe enough to be called schizophrenic, so I go with the schizotypal or the schizoid diagnosis.” Id.

Dr. Golden testified about the symptoms of schizoid personality disorder and its debilitating effects, stating that Axis II 

personality disorders “can decompensate into a psychosis, 

into acute psychosis, where the effects are identical” as those 

of an Axis I mental illness. Id. at 6062. According to Dr. 

Golden, individuals with such a personality disorder will 

“start kind of going off the deep end,” and when they do, 

you have to intervene “before something bad happens to 

them or to somebody else.” Id. at 6063. Dr. Golden said

Pruitt had decompensated for at least six months before the 

crime, becoming increasingly paranoid: “They cross over 

that line between adequate reality contact and inadequate 

reality contact.” Id. at 6076–77. Dr. Golden stated that “clearly ... [Pruitt], for at least six months if not longer, had been 

decompensating” and given “the degree of paranoia that he

was developing ... something bad was eventually going to 

happen ....” Id. at 6093. The jury asked Dr. Golden whether 

he had any firsthand knowledge of Pruitt’s thought processes, including his thinking while committing the crime. Id. at 

6247–48. Dr. Golden responded that they “talked a little bit 

about that” and Pruitt “said to me basically what’s already 

in the record.” Id. at 6248–49.

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 17

E. State Post-Conviction Evidence

1. Intellectual Disability

In his state post-conviction proceeding, Pruitt presented 

evidence from two psychologists with expertise in intellectual disability, Dr. Denis Keyes and Dr. Dennis Olvera. Dr. 

Keyes, who had thirty-two years’ experience evaluating and 

working with the intellectually disabled, reviewed all of the 

testing since Pruitt’s childhood and conducted his own intelligence testing of Pruitt. In 2006 Dr. Keyes administered the 

Stanford-Binet (5th ed.) intelligence test; Pruitt obtained a 

full-scale IQ score of 65, representing a score between 61 and 

69, which Dr. Keyes said was within the range of intellectual 

disability. He said that the testing indicated that Pruitt’s intelligence was “significantly subaverage.” However, Dr. 

Keyes conceded that it was safe to assume that Pruitt was 

aware while taking this test of the potential ramifications of 

his score.

In Dr. Keyes’s opinion, one IQ score above 75 does not 

necessarily mean that a person is not intellectually disabled. 

Dr. Keyes emphasized the importance of clinical judgment 

in assessing intellectual disability, stating that persons with 

intellectual disability try to hide it because of the stigma associated with it. He conducted a test of Pruitt for malingering; the result suggested that Pruitt was not malingering. Dr. 

Keyes also said that there were signs to look for when testing to determine whether an individual might be malingering, and none of those signs appeared with Pruitt. Addressing Pruitt’s Revised Beta score of 93, Dr. Keyes explained 

“that test is not considered a valid intelligence indicator by

any professional psychologist who knows the literature 

and/or the test.” PCR App. 773.

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
18 No. 13-1880

Dr. Keyes administered three standardized tests to assess

Pruitt’s adaptive functioning. He also interviewed Pruitt’s 

parents, sisters, two of his special education teachers, and 

family friends, and reviewed records as well as the trial testimony. Dr. Keyes concluded that Pruitt’s adaptive functioning was significantly impaired in virtually all skill areas and 

estimated that his overall adaptive functioning was at about 

the level of a child between six and eight years of age. Id. at 

774. Based on his examination of Pruitt, his review of Pruitt’s 

school records including test scores, and his own testing, Dr. 

Keyes opined that Pruitt is intellectually disabled and had 

been since birth or at least early childhood.

Dr. Olvera, who had forty years’ experience working 

with the intellectually disabled and extensive experience 

working with the mentally ill, testified that he was contacted 

by Pruitt’s trial counsel in 2002 and administered the WAIS

to Pruitt. At that time, based on Pruitt’s full-scale IQ score of 

76, Dr. Olvera concluded that Pruitt did not meet the intellectual disability standard. However, Dr. Olvera had not 

been provided with Pruitt’s other test scores. Dr. Olvera 

stated that had he known of the other lower IQ scores, he 

would have wanted to know why his results were higher. 

He explained that Pruitt’s score of 76 had to be viewed in 

context with his other test scores. Dr. Olvera also said that 

when he administered the WAIS in 2002, Pruitt was taking 

Trilafon, an antipsychotic drug. Olvera opined that “[t]here 

is a good possibility that the fact that [Pruitt] was medicated 

when I tested him produced the scoring pattern that was 

considerably higher than would have been produced had he 

not been medicated.” PCR Tr. 41. Dr. Olvera also testified 

that Pruitt’s score on the WAIS should be interpreted in light 

of the “Flynn Effect,” which accounts for gains in IQ scores 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 19

over time.1 If taken into account, Pruitt’s score was reduced 

to approximately 74.

Dr. Olvera also testified that the Revised Beta is not an 

acceptable measure of intelligence in forensic cases because 

it is not a multifactorial intelligence test. He agreed that the 

Otis-Lennon is not an acceptable measure of intelligence either, explaining because it is a group-administered test. According to Dr. Olvera, the Wechsler series of intelligence 

tests and the Stanford-Binet test are considered the gold 

standard in forensic cases. Dr. Olvera conducted two malingering screens; both indicated that Pruitt did not malinger. 

Dr. Olvera opined that Pruitt met the intellectually disabled 

criteria and that there was a reasonable clinical certainty that 

he was functioning in that range at the time of the crimes.

Pruitt presented the affidavit of Mary Mann, Director of 

Special Education Services for the school district he had attended as a child. The affidavit established that Pruitt was 

returned to special education classes in the eighth grade and 

that this was the last grade he attended. He dropped out of 

school at the age of 16.

Dr. Mary Jo Dare, an associate professor teaching courses 

on special education, testified at the post-conviction hearing.

She had experience teaching children with cognitive disabilities since 1967, and she was the former Director of Special 

Education for Indianapolis Public Schools. Dr. Dare re1 Dr. Olvera explained that the gradual increase of IQ scores over long 

periods of time, known as the “Flynn Effect,” causes IQ test norms to 

become obsolete. To counter this effect, IQ tests are periodically “renormed” (made harder) by resetting the mean score to 100 to account 

for the gains in IQ scores. The WAIS was normed in 1995 and published in 1997. Pruitt took the test in 2002.

 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
20 No. 13-1880

viewed Pruitt’s school records related to his special education and resource class placements. She explained that when 

Pruitt was in school, it was not uncommon to place children 

with special education needs in general education classes, 

without adequate support, and with very little understanding on the part of teachers as to how to teach such students. 

She saw no rational explanation for withdrawing Pruitt from 

special education classes and testified that the records 

showed that he was socially promoted. Dr. Dare concluded 

that Pruitt’s “school records overall, both his IQ testing as 

well as his functioning in society and in school, they clearly 

point to a student who qualifies under the special education 

category of mild [intellectually disabled].” PCR Tr. 329. 

Pruitt also presented expert testimony from Marie 

Dausch, the long-time director of an organization that provides programs and services for adults with developmental 

disabilities. Dausch explained that individuals with mild intellectual disability are able to find employment in a variety 

of fields and are able to obtain a driver’s license, even a 

commercial driver’s license.

2. Mental Health

At the post-conviction hearing, Dr. Olvera testified that 

when he conducted his clinical interview of Pruitt, he observed signs of possible psychosis and learned that Pruitt 

was taking anti-psychotropic medication. Dr. Hudson also 

had noticed during his pre-trial testing of Pruitt that some of 

Pruitt’s responses to questioning were not “clearly lucid.” 

Trial Tr. 1215. Prior to the start of trial, Dr. Olvera had recommended that trial counsel contact an expert “in dealing 

with psychosis, such as schizophrenia.” PCR Tr. 37. But trial 

counsel did not do so.

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 21

Also at the post-conviction hearing, Pruitt presented testimony from three other experts regarding his mental health:

forensic psychiatrist Dr. Philip Coons, clinical and forensic 

psychiatrist Dr. James Ballenger, and forensic clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist Dr. David R. Price. Dr. 

Coons had over thirty years’ experience evaluating the mentally disturbed. Based upon an evaluation of Pruitt, interviews with his family members, the reports written by 

Pruitt’s other post-conviction experts, and a review of 

Pruitt’s social history, Dr. Coons opined that Pruitt suffered

from Axis I paranoid schizophrenia, which is characterized 

by delusions, hallucinations, and thought disorder. Dr. 

Coons testified that at the time of the crime, Pruitt was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and intellectual disability, he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distress, and his capacity to conform his conduct to 

the law was substantially impaired because of mental illness. 

Dr. Coons stated that prior to developing schizophrenia, 

Pruitt had a personality disorder, described as a thought 

disorder without the psychotic symptoms of hallucinations 

and delusions. According to Dr. Coons, “all of the symptoms 

[of] schizotypal personality disorder are included under 

schizophrenia.” PCR Tr. 458. Dr. Coons found no signs of 

malingering, although he performed no tests to guard 

against malingering.

Dr. Ballenger had approximately thirty-five years’ experience working with the mentally ill and lectured medical 

students on schizophrenia. He interviewed Pruitt twice. 

Based on information from Pruitt, his family members, and 

prison records, Dr. Ballenger concluded that Pruitt suffered 

from paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Ballenger also opined that 

Pruitt has borderline intellectual disability. According to Dr. 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
22 No. 13-1880

Ballenger, his examination showed that Pruitt met “every 

single one of the diagnostic criteria” for schizophrenia, including delusions and hallucinations, PCR Tr. 552–56, and 

had “a very positive family history” for schizophrenia. Id. at 

563. Dr. Ballenger said that Pruitt had two delusional systems, one involving super beings from outer space and the 

other involving a giant conspiracy of police and judges 

somehow getting lots of money by arresting people. Id. at 

553–54. Although there are relatively effective tests for malingering, Dr. Ballenger did not test Pruitt for malingering. 

Nonetheless, Dr. Ballenger found no evidence of malingering in his examinations of Pruitt. Dr. Ballenger said that

Pruitt “works very hard to hide that he’s schizophrenic, he 

works very hard to hide that he has [intellectual disability].” 

Id. at 567.

Dr. Ballenger stated that the diagnosis of “schizotypal 

personality disorder” is “either the first two, three steps of 

schizophrenia, or is actually the beginning of schizophrenia. 

Schizotypal personality is just quarter-strength schizophrenia.” Id. at 587–88. He testified that Dr. Golden’s diagnosis of 

“a decompensated psychotic state of somebody with a 

schizotypal personality” was “only a hair different from 

what I would have said.” Id. at 589. Dr. Ballenger stated that 

Dr. Golden described the same behaviors that he and Drs.

Coons and Price used to diagnosis Pruitt with Axis I schizophrenia; Dr. Golden just used “slightly” different terminology. Id.

According to Dr. Ballenger, in the months before the 

crime Pruitt became increasingly paranoid, to the point 

where he was convinced his mother was trying to poison 

him. Pruitt told Dr. Ballenger that at the time of the shooting, 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 23

he wanted guns because “I’m afraid of people and they 

make me feel safer.” Id. at 597. Pruitt believed the police 

“were watching him all the time” and he was “ready to go to 

Montana to fully withdraw.” Id. Dr. Ballenger testified that it 

was “grandiose psychotic logic” to “point a gun at Officer 

Starnes, and expect the officer to give his gun up and walk 

away.” Id. at 598. Dr. Ballenger said that Pruitt believed the 

aliens “planned the whole thing” and “were controlling both 

his and Officer Starnes’ mind,” and that “it couldn’t be 

stopped.” Id. Pruitt’s schizophrenia, Dr. Ballenger opined, 

“substantially interferes with his thinking, feeling, and action.” Id. at 596. Dr. Ballenger stated that Pruitt was under 

the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance 

at the time of Deputy Starnes’ murder, id. at 596–99, and as a 

result of mental disease, his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, id. at 599. 

Dr. Price diagnosed Pruitt with schizophrenia, schizotypal personality disorder, and mild intellectual disability. He

testified that Pruitt “showed odd signs, ... magical thought, 

[and] paranoia” that progressed into the active phase with 

delusions and hallucinations. PCR Tr. 702. Dr. Price thought 

that Pruitt “had a schizotypal personality disorder that developed into schizophrenia.” Id. at 705. When asked whether 

his diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder premorbid 

meant that Dr. Golden was right, Dr. Price answered, “Very 

often people that develop schizophrenia have a premorbid 

and actually coexisting schizotypal personality disorder.” Id.

Pruitt was not malingering his mental illness or intellectual disability, Dr. Price opined. He explained that because 

of his intellectual ability, Pruitt would not have the sophistiCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
24 No. 13-1880

cation to portray schizophrenia during their interaction. Dr. 

Price said that Pruitt’s school history, work history, and IQ 

test results supported his conclusion. Dr. Price believed that 

Pruitt was in an active phase of schizophrenia at the time of 

the crime and that “he had a significant psychiatric disorder 

that significantly impaired his ability to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.” PCR App. 826. Dr. Price 

testified that Pruitt was under the influence of an extreme 

emotional or mental disturbance at the time of the crime and 

that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 

or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was 

substantially impaired because of mental disease or defect. 

PCR Tr. 708–09.

Letitia Haywood, a clinical therapist and licensed social 

worker, investigated and prepared an extensive social history of Pruitt. The parties stipulated to the admission of her 

social history for the purpose of showing what could have 

been prepared at the time of trial. Haywood’s social history 

concluded that Pruitt has mental disabilities, including delusional, disorganized, and disturbed thought processes.

3. Defense Theories

At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel Van Der Pol, 

who was primarily responsible for the mitigation part of the 

case, testified about the defense theory at the penalty phase. 

Van Der Pol described the theory as “number one” that 

Pruitt is intellectually disabled, which would entitle him “to 

great mitigating weight,” PCR Tr. 214–15; “[n]umber two” 

that Pruitt “was suffering a serious mental illness at or 

around the time of the crime,” id. at 215; and “[f]inally” that 

Pruitt “had serious brain damage, brain injury, [or] brain 

dysfunction.” Id. Based on all these things, counsel attemptCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 25

ed to prove that Pruitt did not deserve the death penalty. Id.

at 215–16. Trial counsel Garner testified at the postconviction hearing that the defense theory was that because 

of his intellectual disability, Pruitt should not be held responsible to the same extent as an individual with normal 

intelligence. Id. at 513. 

Trial counsel Van Der Pol testified that Dr. Schmedlen 

had reported seeing symptomology consistent with schizophrenia, but then for unknown reasons, Dr. Schmedlen decided that Pruitt did not have schizophrenia. PCR Tr. 180. 

Counsel also said that in 2003 Dr. Golden concluded that no 

additional neuropsychological testing was necessary or appropriate. Id. at 196. Yet counsel also recalled that Dr. Golden had testified he did not have enough information to make 

a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Id. at 200. Counsel did not consider asking Dr. Golden if he believed Pruitt met the criteria 

for the statutory mitigating factors related to mental illness. 

Dr. Golden, an expert in intellectual disability, had no experience in the assessment or treatment of individuals with 

psychotic disorders.

4. Post-Conviction Rulings

After considering Pruitt’s new evidence, the postconviction court reaffirmed its prior rulings on the intellectually disability issue, concluding that Pruitt is not intellectually disabled. PCR App. 682. The court found that “Pruitt’s 

post-conviction [mental health] evidence is substantially 

cumulative of the testimony and opinion presented at trial.” 

Id. at 665. Discussing the evidence relating to mental illness, 

the court noted that a DOC psychologist had “diagnosed 

Pruitt as suffering from schizophrenia, chronic undifferentiated residual uncompensated.” Id. at 671. The court also notCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
26 No. 13-1880

ed that Dr. Golden “explained that this diagnosis means the 

psychologist believed at one time Pruitt was schizophrenic 

but that at the time of diagnosis he was not actively schizophrenic” and that “Dr. Golden had concluded that a diagnosis of schizophrenia was inappropriate for Pruitt, and that he 

actually suffered from either schizoid or schizotypal personality disorder.” Id. The court referred to the post-conviction 

hearing testimony from Drs. Coons, Ballenger, and Price that 

Pruitt suffered from schizophrenia. Id. at 673. Based on the 

evidence presented at trial and post-conviction, the court 

concluded “that trial counsel were not ineffective in selecting experts and preparing mental health evidence for use in 

the penalty phase or sentencing.” Id. at 674. The court did 

“not find that the quality of evidence presented at postconviction was more credible or persuasive than that presented at trial”; therefore, it found that Pruitt did not show a 

“reasonable probability of a different sentence.” Id.

Pruitt appealed. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded

that “’Pruitt has offered no evidence undermining the correctness’ of the trial court’s and this Court’s findings that he 

is not [intellectually disabled].” Pruitt II, 903 N.E.2d at 938

(quoting PCR App. 689). Justice Rucker again dissented. Id.

at 939. The court stated that it had “addressed Pruitt’s claims 

that he presented previously undiscovered evidence of [intellectual disability] at the PCR hearing and found the evidence to be cumulative” of that presented at trial. Id. at 938.

The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the finding that trial 

counsel were not deficient in their presentation of evidence 

of Pruitt’s mental illness. Pruitt II, 903 N.E.2d at 919, 921. The 

court agreed with the post-conviction court that “trial counsel presented evidence of a schizotypal personality disorder, 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 27

a diagnosis different more in degree of severity than of character, than the one advanced by experts” at the postconviction proceeding, and that a “different diagnosis does 

not show that trial counsel were deficient.” Id. at 921 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Given trial counsels’ testimony at the post-conviction hearing, the Indiana 

Supreme Court made the determination that counsels’ “first 

priority” was to show that Pruitt is intellectually disabled 

and their “second priority” was to prove that he was suffering from a serious mental illness around the time of the 

crime. See id. at 922. The court also found that “trial counsel 

made a deliberate strategic decision to concentrate the jury’s 

attention on Pruitt’s claim of [intellectual disability]” and 

“this strategy might well have been undermined by greater 

emphasis on the much weaker mental illness evidence.” Id. 

The court determined that trial counsel were not ineffective 

in selecting experts and preparing mental health evidence 

for use at trial. Id. at 921.

II. ANALYSIS

Pruitt contends that his execution is barred by the Eighth 

Amendment because the evidence establishes that he is intellectually disabled. He argues that the state court’s contrary 

decision is objectively unreasonable and based on a definition of intellectual disability that is an unreasonable application of Atkins. Pruitt’s second claim is that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present evidence to support his claim of intellectual disability. 

Third, Pruitt claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to investigate and present at the penalty 

phase mitigating evidence regarding his schizophrenia, and 

that the state court’s contrary conclusion is an unreasonable 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
28 No. 13-1880

application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

Finally, he argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise the claim that the prosecutor violated Pruitt’s Eighth Amendment and due process rights by 

reciting a poem about the death of a police officer and comparing Pruitt to notorious murderers in the closing argument 

of the penalty phase of trial, and that appellate counsel was 

ineffective in failing to raise this as an error on appeal.

A. Standard of Review

A petitioner in state court custody is entitled to a writ of 

habeas corpus “only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a 

federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus on a claim 

that a state court has adjudicated on the merits only if the 

state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1)–(2); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 

1388, 1398 (2011). “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to 

federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been 

adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 

(2013). However, AEDPA deference applies “only to those 

issues the state court explicitly addressed.” Makiel v. Butler, 

782 F.3d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Quintana v. Chandler, 723 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2013)). “If no state court has 

squarely addressed the merits of a habeas claim, we review 

the claim de novo under the pre-AEDPA standard of 28 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 29

U.S.C. § 2243.” Ruhl v. Hardy, 743 F.3d 1083, 1091 (7th Cir. 

2014). Thus, we “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2012)

(quotation and citation omitted).

A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established 

federal law “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [a Supreme Court case], or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court but reaches a different result.” 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). A state-court decision unreasonably applies federal law if it “applies [the Supreme] Court’s precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. An “unreasonable application of” 

federal law means “objectively unreasonable, not merely 

wrong; even ‘clear error’ will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 

134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). “[A] state prisoner must show that the state court’s 

ruling on the claim ... was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 

When reviewing a state court decision under § 2254(d)(1), 

“we presume that the court’s factual determinations are correct unless [the petitioner] rebuts the presumption by clear 

and convincing evidence.” Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 

921, 928 (7th Cir. 2013) (quotation and citation omitted). 

“A petitioner’s challenge to a state court decision based 

on a factual determination under § 2254(d)(2) will not succeed unless the state court committed an ‘unreasonable error.’” Morgan v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 2011). Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision is “based on an unreaCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
30 No. 13-1880

sonable determination of the facts if it rests upon factfinding that ignores the clear and convincing weight of the 

evidence.” Newman, 726 F.3d at 928 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “[E]ven if ‘[r]easonable minds 

reviewing the record might disagree’ about the finding in 

question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s ... determination.’” Wood v. Allen, 558 

U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–

42 (2006)) (second brackets and ellipses in original).

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254

petition. Ford v. Wilson, 747 F.3d 944, 949 (7th Cir. 2014).

“[A]lthough we technically hear this appeal from the district 

court,” id., we review the decision of the last state court to 

address the merits of the petitioner’s claim, id. (quoting

McNary v. Lemke, 708 F.3d 905, 913 (7th Cir. 2013), reviewing 

that decision with deference, Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 

948 (7th Cir. 2012). 

B. Intellectual Disability

Pruitt’s principal argument is that he is intellectually disabled and therefore is categorically and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. He seeks to have his death sentence vacated and his case remanded for resentencing to a 

sentence of years. 

In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the 

Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the intellectually disabled. 536 U.S. at 321. The Court did not define intellectual disability for purposes of ineligibility for the death 

penalty, but rather left to the states the task of developing

appropriate ways for determining intellectual disability. Id.

at 317. The Court offered the states guidance by referring to 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 31

the clinical definitions provided by the AAMR and the 

American Psychiatric Association (APA), id. at 308 n.3, and 

noting that the state statutory definitions “generally conform 

to the clinical definitions,” id. at 314 & 317 n.22.

In Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), the Supreme 

Court again declined to set forth a legal definition of intellectual disability. The Court held that Florida’s strict IQ test 

score cutoff “create[d] an unacceptable risk that persons 

with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.” Id. at 1990. The Court again turned to the 

views of the states and medical experts for guidance in determining intellectual disability, id. at 1993–94, noting that 

“[t]he legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct 

from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical 

community’s diagnostic framework,” id. at 2000. The Court 

concluded that in determining intellectual disability, sentencing courts must take into account an IQ test’s standard 

error of measurement. Id. at 2001.

Indiana law defines an individual with intellectual disability as “an individual who, before becoming twenty-two 

(22) years of age, manifests: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning; and (2) substantial impairment of 

adaptive behavior; that is documented in a court ordered 

evaluative report.” Ind. Code § 35-36-9-2. In Pruitt I, 834 

N.E.2d at 108, the Indiana Supreme Court decided that the 

statutory definition was constitutional under Atkins. Indeed, 

the Atkins Court had noted that Indiana’s statutory definition “generally conform[s] to the clinical definitions.” 536 

U.S. at 314 & 317 n.22; see also McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634, 

650 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that Indiana’s definition of intellectual disability “is consistent with the clinical standards”);

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
32 No. 13-1880

State v. McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 785 (Ind. 2007) (noting that 

in determining what is “significantly subaverage intellectual 

functioning” the court refers to the definitions provided by 

the AAMR and the APA). The state court’s finding as to each 

prong of the statutory definition of intellectual disability is a 

factual determination. See McManus, 779 F.3d at 654 (“[T]he 

Indiana Supreme Court’s factual determination that [petitioner’s] intellectual functioning is not significantly subaverage is solidly grounded in the record and thus is not objectively unreasonable.”); id. at 656 (“[T]he Indiana Supreme 

Court made an objectively reasonable factual determination 

that [petitioner] is not intellectually disabled....”).

Intellectual functioning can be measured with an IQ test. 

See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual for Mental Disorders 37 (4th ed.-Text Rev. 2000) 

(DSM-IV) (“Intellectual functioning is typically measured 

with individually administered and psychometrically valid, 

comprehensive, culturally appropriate, psychometrically 

sound tests of intelligence.”); id. at 41 (stating that “general 

intellectual functioning” is defined by the IQ score “obtained 

by assessment with one or more of the standardized, individually administered intelligence tests”); American Ass’n 

on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual Disability, http://aaidd.org/intellectualdisability/definition# (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). In Indiana, 

“a person is considered to meet the subaverage intellectual 

functioning component if the person’s full-scale IQ test score 

is two standard deviations below the mean; i.e., an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower.” McManus, 868 N.E.2d at 785

(quoting Woods v. State, 863 N.E.2d 301, 304 (Ind. 2007) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3)); see cf. DSM-IV, at 41 (“Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is defined as an 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 33

IQ of about 70 or below (approximately 2 standard deviations below the mean).”). The five-point range accounts for 

the standard margin of error in IQ testing. McManus, 779 

F.3d at 646 n.3. The Indiana Supreme Court has determined

that “IQ tests are only evidence; they are not conclusive on 

either the subject’s IQ or the ultimate question of [intellectual disability].” Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d at 106. Thus, the state supreme court held that “courts may consider IQ scores together with other evidence of mental capacity,” including 

“work history, school history, and life functioning.”

McManus, 868 N.E.2d at 785.

As for adaptive functioning, we recently recognized that:

[t]he medical community measures adaptive behavior 

across three domains: conceptual, social, and practical. To satisfy this component of the definition, a person’s adaptive functioning in at least one domain 

must be “sufficiently impaired that ongoing support 

is needed in order for the person to perform adequately in one or more life settings at school, at work, 

at home, or in the community.” Moreover, the deficits 

must be caused by the person’s intellectual impairment [and must] ... appear during childhood or adolescence. 

McManus, 779 F.3d at 650–51 (footnote omitted; quoting Am. 

Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 

Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) 38 (2013) and citing DSM-5 at 

33, 38).

The Indiana Supreme Court rejected Pruitt’s claim of intellectual disability based solely on the intellectual functioning prong; it did not determine whether the evidence satisCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
34 No. 13-1880

fied the adaptive functioning prong. However, the court 

concluded that the trial court applied a “too restrictive” 

standard for adaptive functioning and therefore that the trial 

court’s finding as to that prong was “not supportable.” 

Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d at 110. 

Pruitt argues that the Indiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that he did not establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is based on an unreasonable determination that: 1) his IQ scores were “inconsistent”; and 2) “more 

importantly,” his IQ scores were not determinative given the 

evidence that he could “fill out applications for employment” and had “the capacity, if not the will at times, to support himself.” Pet’r-Appellant’s Br. 28 (quoting Pruitt I, 834 

N.E.2d at 106). We conclude that the Indiana Supreme 

Court’s finding that Pruitt did not meet the intellectual functioning prong was an unreasonable factual determination. 

Although some of Pruitt’s test scores may appear inconsistent, the reliable IQ scores were consistently within the 

range of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. 

Beginning when he was an adolescent and long before his 

crimes, Pruitt achieved verbal scores of 64 on two LorgeThorndike tests and nonverbal scores of 65 and 63. These 

scores suggest that he had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The state’s expert Dr. Groff and Dr. Golden 

agreed that Pruitt gave his best effort on these two tests. Dr. 

Golden stated that these scores suggested that Pruitt’s IQ 

was “fairly stable” at that point in time. These LorgeThorndike tests were taken when Pruitt was an adolescent; 

thus, the scores reflect his intellectual functioning before the 

age of 22, which is the critical age for the third prong of Indiana’s statutory definition—age of onset—and long before 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 35

the crimes at issue and before Pruitt had any motive to malinger in order to defeat the death penalty. Both Drs. Hudson 

and Golden testified that the IQ scores obtained as a child 

would most accurately measure Pruitt’s intelligence before 

age 18. Trial Tr. 1355–56 (Hudson stating that “IQ is meant 

to be diagnosed in childhood.”), id. at 1551 (Golden stating 

that scores before age 18 are “absolutely” more important 

than scores after that age in assessing IQ). 

After Deputy Starnes’ murder, consistent with his scores 

on the Lorge-Thorndike tests, Pruitt achieved full-scale IQ 

scores of 65 on not one, but two Stanford-Binet tests. The 

scores on these four intelligence tests were consistent: all of 

them fell well within the range for intellectual disability. Dr. 

Hudson explained that the research demonstrates an “extremely high correlation” between the Lorge-Thorndike and 

Weschler, the latter of which, along with the Stanford-Binet, 

is considered the gold standard in forensic cases. (We note 

that Pruitt scored a full-scale IQ score of 52 on the WAIS in 

2003, but we discount that score based on the experts’ 

agreement that it underestimated Pruitt’s intellectual functioning due to lack of effort.) 

Granted, Pruitt obtained a full-scale IQ score of 76 on the 

WAIS in 2002, but Dr. Olvera explained that Pruitt was taking antipsychotic medication at the time he took the test and 

this may have produced a higher score than he would have 

obtained without the medication. Dr. Hudson agreed that 

the drug would have increased Pruitt’s accuracy on the test 

and improved his score. Dr. Hudson believed that absent the 

drug, Pruitt’s score probably would have been closer to 70. 

Likewise, Dr. Golden thought that the drug could increase 

Pruitt’s score “significantly” because it would improve his 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
36 No. 13-1880

attention and ability to focus. Given these experts’ testimony, the state court’s determination that there was insufficient 

evidence to show what effect, if any, the antipsychotic medication may have had on Pruitt’s IQ score “ignore[d] the clear 

and convincing weight of the evidence.” Taylor v. Grounds, 

721 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Furthermore, according to every expert who expressed an opinion 

on the issue—Drs. Hudson, Golden, Olvera, and Keyes—

Pruitt’s score of 76 was not inconsistent with significantly 

subaverage intellectual functioning. These experts explained 

that a single score has to be viewed in the context of the other test scores and other information in the record. Cf. DSM-5

at 37 (“Individual cognitive profiles based on neuropsychological testing are more useful for understanding intellectual 

abilities than a single IQ score.”).

While Pruitt scored a 93 on the Revised Beta, Drs. Golden, Hudson, and Keyes were quite critical of that test. The 

test is group-administered in fifteen minutes. See DSM-5 at 

37 (“Invalid scores may result from the use of brief intelligence screening tests or group tests.”). According to Dr. 

Golden, the Revised Beta is not accurate, not well-regarded 

in the field, and not well-accepted as a general test of intelligence. Dr. Hudson likewise questioned the reliability of the 

Revised Beta. And Dr. Keyes stated that the Revised Beta “is 

not considered a valid intelligence indicator by any professional psychologist who knows the literature and/or the 

test.” PCR App. 773. Dr. Schmedlen believed that the Revised Beta test was reliable, but he acknowledged that the 

Revised Beta was not as reliable as the Weschler series or 

Stanford-Binet tests. And to the extent that the state court 

relied on Pruitt’s scores on the Otis-Lennon and Iowa basic 

academic achievement tests, all of the experts save one 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 37

agreed that academic achievement tests do not test for intelligence. The one exception was Dr. Schmedlen, and he was 

unaware that the Otis-Lennon was known as the “OtisLennon School Ability Test” and that the Otis-Lennon score 

was not given as an IQ score. Thus, his opinion was not wellinformed. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that the OtisLennon test was not of the same quality as a Weschler or 

Stanford-Binet intelligence test.

Four highly qualified experts with extensive experience 

with the intellectually disabled—Drs. Hudson, Golden, 

Olvera, and Keyes—all agreed that Pruitt’s IQ scores 

demonstrated significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and that Pruitt is intellectually disabled. The only evidence in the record to counter their opinions were the opinions of Drs. Schmedlen and Groff. As noted, Dr. Schmedlen 

erred in thinking that Pruitt’s scores on achievement tests 

were equivalent to IQ scores. Dr. Groff acknowledged that 

he could not give an opinion about Pruitt’s intellectual functioning “with certainty,” but rather, could only give his impression. Trial Tr. 1463. On top of that, Dr. Groff never met 

or tested Pruitt. Dr. Groff just reviewed records and relied 

on Dr. Schmedlen’s report. The state courts’ reliance on these 

two experts went against the clear and convincing weight of 

the evidence. 

Even when viewed through AEDPA’s deferential lens, 

the Indiana Supreme Court’s determination that Pruitt failed 

to demonstrate significantly subaverage intellectual functioning based on inconsistent test scores was objectively unreasonable and ignored the clear and convincing weight of 

the evidence. Some of the test scores upon which the state 

courts relied were not IQ scores; other scores were unreliaCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
38 No. 13-1880

ble. The record establishes that Pruitt’s reliable IQ scores 

consistently demonstrated significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.2

Pruitt challenges the Indiana Supreme Court’s consideration of his ability to fill out job applications, obtain a commercial driver’s license, and work as evidence that he did 

not meet the intellectual functioning prong. He asserts that 

the court characterized this evidence other than intelligence 

test scores as “the most important” evidence bearing on his 

intellectual functioning. The court wrote: “More importantly, IQ tests are only evidence; they are not conclusive on either the subject’s IQ or the ultimate question of mental retardation.” Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d at 106. Our Supreme Court 

made similar comments in Hall where it observed that

“Courts must recognize, as does the medical community, 

that the IQ test is imprecise. This is not to say than an IQ test 

score is unhelpful. It is of considerable significance, as the 

medical community recognizes.” 134 S. Ct. at 2001. Nothing 

in Hall or Atkins directs the states to give conclusive effect to 

IQ scores, or precludes a state’s use of circumstantial evidence of mental capacity other than IQ scores in assessing a 

2 We reach this conclusion without consideration of the “Flynn Effect.” 

Dr. Olvera testified that application of the Flynn Effect was contentious 

in the professional community, PCR Tr. 57–58, and he has never adjusted 

an IQ score in the clinical setting to account for the effect. We agree that 

“[t]he state courts had no obligation to accept and apply the Flynn Effect 

in the face of conflicting expert testimony about its acceptability and reliability.” Pruitt v. Wilson, 2012 WL 4513961, at *14. And “nothing in Atkins 

suggests that IQ test scores must be adjusted to account for the Flynn Effect in order to be considered reliable evidence of intellectual functioning.” McManus, 779 F.3d at 653.

 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 39

defendant’s intellectual functioning. Recently in McManus, 

we gave our nod of approval to the state court’s use of circumstantial evidence as additional support for its determination that the petitioner did not demonstrate significantly 

subaverage intellectual functioning, 779 F.3d at 653–54 (rejecting argument that in assessing petitioner’s intellectual 

functioning, state court should not have given any weight to 

evidence that petitioner graduated from high school, successfully worked three jobs, and cared for his disabled 

child), though we noted that the “court mentioned this evidence only in passing....” Id. at 654. 

The problem arises where, as here, the state court relies 

on inaccurate assumptions and select pieces of the evidence 

in making its factual determination. Cf. McManus, 779 F.3d at 

654 (“We do not doubt that intellectually disabled people 

graduate from high school (with or without the assistance of 

special-education programming) and also hold down jobs.”).

In concluding that Pruitt had not shown that he is intellectually disabled, the Indiana Supreme Court explained:

While some of Pruitt’s scores suggest significantly 

subaverage intellectual functioning, others do not. In 

addition to this data, the trial court found that Pruitt 

was able to fill out applications for employment and 

to have the capacity, if not the will at all times, to 

support himself. In light of the inconsistent IQ scores 

and the other evidence cited by the trial court, the trial court’s finding that Pruitt did not meet the statutory test is consistent with this record. 

Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d at 106. The other evidence cited by the 

trial court was Pruitt’s “functioning, work history, school 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
40 No. 13-1880

history, and all other evidence presented regarding [his] intellectual functioning.” Id.

Pruitt asserts that there is no evidence that activities such 

as filling out job applications are relevant to an intellectual 

disability determination. Indeed, the record contains evidence that mildly intellectually disabled individuals can obtain driver’s licenses, fill out job applications, and obtain and 

maintain employment. Dr. Hudson testified at trial that the 

nature of the application, the extent to which it was completed independently, and its accuracy would be important considerations. For example, Pruitt completed a job application 

in 1999, but it contained spelling errors, incomplete sentences, inaccurate punctuation, inappropriate responses to some 

questions, and omitted responses to other questions. It 

would be unreasonable to conclude that this job application 

demonstrates that Pruitt’s IQ is higher than that reflected by 

the reliable IQ scores. 

Even though Pruitt has had numerous jobs, they did not 

require high intellectual functioning: dishwasher, truck 

driver, carpenter, and laborer. He was unable to maintain 

any job for any length of time without assistance. His father 

got him a job in construction, but he was hired only because 

the employer considered his father a valued employee, and 

Pruitt worked in demolition and clean-up work. Pruitt did 

not learn the carpentry skills, and he needed to have his father there constantly telling him what to do. When Pruitt’s 

father retired, Pruitt was fired because he was unable to do 

basic work without constant supervision and could not 

communicate well with others. Pruitt’s employment as a 

truck driver demonstrated similar challenges that provides 

additional support for the conclusion that he has significantCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 41

ly subaverage intellectual functioning, For example, Pruitt 

once parked his semi in the middle of a street and when he 

was told he could not park there, he responded that there 

were no signs saying that he could not park there.

Pruitt further challenges the state court’s reliance on his 

work history as a basis for finding that he did not satisfy the 

intellectual functioning prong, given the evidence that he 

satisfied the adaptive functioning prong, specifically in the 

skill area of work. Drs. Hudson, Schmedlen, and Keyes all 

thought that Pruitt showed substantial impairment in work. 

We agree with Pruitt that it is illogical and irreconcilable for 

the state court to find that his work history outweighs his IQ 

scores when all experts expressing an opinion on the issue 

agree that he is substantially impaired in this area of adaptive functioning. We conclude that the state court erred in 

finding that Pruitt’s work history supported the determination that Pruitt did not meet the intellectual functioning 

prong and was not intellectually disabled.

Moreover, Pruitt’s school history does not support the 

conclusion that he failed to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. Within the first three years of 

elementary school, Pruitt was held back twice; he was placed 

in special education classes; and he was socially promoted. 

At the age of 16, Pruitt dropped out of school without advancing past the eighth grade. As Dr. Dare explained, 

Pruitt’s school records “clearly point to a student who qualifies under the special ed[ucation] category of mild [intellectually disabled].” PCR Tr. 329. And the record evidence established that Pruitt was unable to function on his own as an 

adult; he lived with and depended on his family to take care 

of him. 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
42 No. 13-1880

The Indiana Supreme Court made an unreasonable determination of fact in concluding that Pruitt’s work history, 

school history, and other evidence supported the finding 

that Pruitt failed to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. Rather, the clear and convincing weight 

of the evidence establishes that Pruitt suffers from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. 

Turning to the second prong of the definition of intellectual disability, Pruitt argues that he has established that his 

adaptive behavior is substantially impaired. We agree. The 

Indiana Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s use of a 

heightened standard to prove the adaptive-behavior prong. 

While the court noted that “the evidence on the adaptive behavior prong is at least conflicting,” Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d at 

110, it did not actually conclude that Pruitt failed to establish 

substantial impairment of adaptive behavior. Thus, we review this prong de novo. Ruhl, 743 F.3d at 1091.

The state court record contains unrebutted evidence that 

Pruitt satisfies the adaptive behavior prong of intellectual 

disability. Court-appointed expert psychologist Dr. Schmedlen administered an objective test of adaptive functioning 

and determined that Pruitt met the adaptive behavior prong 

under the AAMR definition because he was substantially 

impaired in two areas of adaptive functioning: work and 

self-direction. Defense expert psychologist Dr. Hudson testified, based on his review of Pruitt’s history and two clinical 

evaluations, that Pruitt showed significant deficits in six 

adaptive skills areas: communication, home living, social 

skills, functional academics, health and safety, and work.

Based on standardized testing to assess adaptive functioning, interviews with Pruitt’s family, special education teachCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 43

ers, and family friends, and review of records and trial testimony, defense expert Dr. Keyes concluded that Pruitt’s 

adaptive functioning skills were significantly impaired in 

virtually all areas, even estimating his overall adaptive functioning at about the level of a six- to eight-year-old child. No 

expert offered any contrary opinion regarding Pruitt’s adaptive functioning. In addition, Pruitt presented extensive lay 

testimony regarding his development, school and work history, and functioning that supported these experts’ unrebutted opinions as to his adaptive functioning. And significantly, the state does not even argue on appeal that the evidence 

failed to establish that Pruitt suffers from substantially impaired adaptive functioning. 

In sum, the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision that Pruitt 

has not shown that he is intellectually disabled was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts. Pruitt has 

demonstrated with clear and convincing evidence that he is 

intellectually disabled. Therefore, he is categorically and 

constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty and his 

death sentence must be vacated.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Pruitt raises three alleged errors in support of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, but we need address only 

one—whether trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty 

phase in investigating and presenting evidence that Pruitt 

suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Under the familiar 

test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Pruitt

first must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, 

which means that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. He also “must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” id. at 687, which 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
44 No. 13-1880

means “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. at 694.

“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Courts “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant 

must overcome the strong presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 

sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

When a petitioner challenges a state court’s application of 

Strickland under § 2254(d), our review is “doubly deferential”: “[w]e take a highly deferential look at counsel’s performance, through the deferential lens of 2254(d).” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned federal courts to 

“guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness 

under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d).” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable,” but 

whether “there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. Id.; see Campbell v. 

Reardon, 780 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 2015).

“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations

or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 

measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691. We have explained that “[r]esources are limited, 

and trial counsel must eventually shift from pretrial investiCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 45

gation to trial preparation.” Campbell, 780 F.3d at 765. “There 

comes a point where a defense attorney will reasonably decide that another strategy is in order, thus ‘mak[ing] particular investigations unnecessary.’” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1407

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). “[S]trategic choices 

made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant 

to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; strategic choices made after less than 

thorough investigation are reasonable only “to the extent 

that reasonable professional judgments support the limitation on investigation,” id. at 691.

Pruitt argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the penalty phase in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence that he suffered from paranoid 

schizophrenia which causes hallucinations and paranoid delusions. He asserts that two statutory mitigating circumstances applied because of his schizophrenia: he “was under 

the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 

when the murder was committed,” and his capacity to “conform [his] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect. Ind. 

Code § 35-50-2-9-(c)(2), (6).

The Supreme Court has decided several cases in which it 

concluded that counsel’s failure to investigate and present 

mitigation evidence constituted ineffective assistance under 

Strickland. In Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), for example, although counsel were aware of the defendant’s criminal record, they did not examine the file on his prior conviction. And although counsel knew from police reports that 

the defendant had been drinking heavily at the time of the 

crime and one of the three mental health experts had recCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
46 No. 13-1880

ommended investigation into his alcohol use, “counsel did 

not look for evidence of a history of dependence on alcohol 

that might have extenuating significance.” Id. at 382. Had 

counsel investigated further they would have discovered 

that the defendant had a serious drinking problem. Id. at 

391–92. And had counsel examined the file on the defendant’s prior conviction, they would have found test results 

that defense mental health experts thought suggested 

“schizophrenia and other disorders, and test scores 

show[ed] a third grade level of cognition.” Id. at 391. The 

Supreme Court concluded that “reasonably diligent counsel 

may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste,” id. at 383, but counsel 

“could not reasonably have ignored mitigation evidence or 

red flags,” id. at 391 n.8.

As another example, in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 

(2001), counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating 

evidence of the defendant’s dysfunctional background, and 

relied instead on the argument that the defendant was not 

directly responsible for the murder. Id. at 523-24, 535. The 

state court denied post-conviction relief, concluding that 

“counsel had made a deliberate, tactical decision to concentrate their effort at convincing the jury that [petitioner] was 

not directly responsible for the murder.” Id. at 518 (quotation 

omitted). The Supreme Court said that the issue “was not 

whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case” 

but “whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision 

not to introduce mitigating evidence of [petitioner’s] background was itself reasonable.” Id. at 523. The Court concluded 

that the state court’s “strategic decision” rationale was a post 

hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct and that counsel’s 

decision not to present a mitigation defense was based on an 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 47

unreasonable investigation and thus that decision “was also 

objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 527–28. 

Similar to counsel’s shortcomings in Rompilla and Wiggins, Pruitt’s trial counsel’s failure to investigate Pruitt’s 

mental illness fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Trial counsel knew that shortly after Pruitt was arrested for killing Deputy Starnes, a DOC psychiatrist had 

diagnosed Pruitt with “schizophrenia, chronic undifferentiated type compensated residual,” which meant that he had 

been schizophrenic “at one time” but was not “actively 

schizophrenic” at the time of the diagnosis. Counsel knew 

that the psychiatrist had prescribed Pruitt Trilafon, an antipsychotic medication. Counsel also knew from Dr. Hudson’s 

testimony at the pretrial hearing that Dr. Hudson noted 

some of Pruitt’s responses to his questioning were not 

“clearly lucid.” And counsel was aware that Dr. Schmedlen 

had seen symptomology consistent with schizophrenia during his evaluations of Pruitt. If this were not enough to 

prompt a competent lawyer to further investigate Pruitt’s 

mental health, the defense’s own expert Dr. Olvera had recommended that counsel contact an expert “in dealing with

psychosis, such as schizophrenia.” But trial counsel did not 

contact such an expert to have Pruitt evaluated, and counsel 

offered no reason for failing to do so. As in Rompilla, counsel 

ignored the “red flags” pointing to potential mitigation evidence, and counsel acted unreasonably in failing to investigate further.

The record establishes that counsel had every reason to 

follow through on Dr. Olvera’s recommendation, and no 

good reason not to have Pruitt evaluated by an expert in 

psychosis. After all, counsel testified at the post-conviction 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
48 No. 13-1880

hearing that the defense strategy was to prove that Pruitt did 

not deserve the death penalty because of his intellectual disability, his serious mental illness, and his brain damage. Since

the stated strategy included showing that Pruitt had a serious mental illness, a reasonably competent attorney would 

have realized that investigating Pruitt’s mental health further was necessary to prove the defense. It was unreasonable 

for counsel to fail to contact an expert in psychosis, such as 

schizophrenia, particularly given that the defense’s own expert Dr. Olvera had recommended that they contact such an 

expert. And given the evidence already known to counsel, 

they had no reason to think that contacting an expert in psychosis “would have been counterproductive, or that further 

investigation would have been fruitless.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. 

at 525.

The Indiana Supreme Court surmised that trial counsel 

made a deliberate, strategic decision to concentrate on 

Pruitt’s intellectual disability rather than his mental illness. 

Yet nothing in the record suggested to counsel that the two 

diagnoses—intellectual disability and schizophrenia—were 

mutually exclusive. Indeed, “there is substantial comorbidity 

between schizophrenia and intellectual disability....” Owen, 

Michael J., et al., “Neurodevelopmental Hypothesis of 

Schizophrenia.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 198(3): 173–

175 (Mar. 2011), available at 

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3764497 (last visited May 8, 2015). Trial counsel did not have to concentrate on 

one defense or the other. And counsel never suggested that 

they made a decision to focus on Pruitt’s intellectual disability rather than his mental illness. They did not suggest that 

their “first priority” was to show that Pruitt is intellectually 

disabled and that showing he had a serious mental illness 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 49

was only secondary. Counsel testified that the strategy was 

to prove based on all of the things identified—intellectual 

disability, mental illness, and brain damage—that Pruitt did 

not deserve to die. This was a three-pronged approach. 

Merely listing the three as “one,” “two,” and “finally,” without more did not prioritize the prongs. The state court overstated the evidence in this regard. 

And even if we assume that counsel made a strategic decision to focus on intellectual disability, that choice was 

made after a less than thorough investigation, and as a result, the decision was not fully informed and was unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–1 (concluding that “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 

reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitation on investigation”). 

Thus, to the extent that counsel made a decision to focus the 

jury’s attention on Pruitt’s claim of intellectual disability rather than his mental illness, the evidence of mental illness 

was much weaker than the intellectual disability evidence 

only because counsel failed to investigate more fully Pruitt’s 

mental health. 

The state court’s determination that trial counsel were not 

deficient in their presentation of evidence of Pruitt’s mental 

health was unreasonable. While trial counsel investigated 

Pruitt’s mental state and presented evidence of his mental 

illness at the penalty phase of trial, their investigation and 

presentation of evidence were deficient. 

Because the Indiana Supreme Court did not assess 

whether Pruitt could satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong, our 

review is de novo. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390. We conclude that 

Pruitt can show prejudice. To establish prejudice, a petitionCase: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
50 No. 13-1880

er “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The likelihood of a different outcome “must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. “When a defendant challenges a 

death sentence ... the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... 

would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 695. When assessing that probability, a court 

should “consider ‘the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in 

the habeas proceeding—and ‘reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 

(2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397–98 

(2000)). 

Trial counsel presented evidence of Pruitt’s mental illness 

and its effects on Pruitt at the penalty phase. The jury heard 

testimony from Dr. Golden that two months after killing Officer Starnes, a DOC psychiatrist had diagnosed Pruitt with

“schizophrenia, chronic undifferentiated type compensated 

residual,” which meant that the psychiatrist thought that at 

one time Pruitt had been schizophrenic, but at that time, the 

most serious symptoms were not present. Dr. Golden said 

that the symptomatology for schizophrenia was similar to 

that for schizotypal personality disorder. Nonetheless, the 

jury heard only from Dr. Golden, not the DOC psychiatrist 

who had diagnosed schizophrenia, and the former testified 

that Pruitt’s illness was “not severe enough to be” schizophrenia; it was schizotypal personality disorder instead. 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 51

Although Dr. Golden testified about the symptoms and debilitating effects of schizoid personality disorder, he also told 

the jury that for someone with schizotypal personality disorder, “psychotic episodes should be the exception rather 

than the rule.”

We disagree with the district court that this is simply a 

“battle of the experts” over the severity of Pruitt’s mental 

illness. See Pruitt, 2012 WL 4513961, at *30. The sentencing 

judge referenced the jury’s finding that “the aggravating circumstances outweighed any and all mitigating circumstances.” Trial Tr. at 6460. Indeed, in imposing sentence, the sentencing judge determined that none of the possible mitigating factors presented “constitute a mitigating circumstance” 

and more specifically that “Pruitt does not have a mental 

condition that would justify his actions or in any way mitigate for purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 6455. However, the 

three post-conviction experts—Drs. Coons, Ballenger, and 

Price—all testified that Pruitt met two of the statutory mitigating factors: due to his schizophrenia, he “was under the 

influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when 

the murder was committed” and his capacity “to conform 

[his] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially 

impaired as a result of mental disease or defect,” Ind. Code § 

35-50-2-9(c)(2) and (6). (Drs. Ballenger and Price also testified 

that Pruitt’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired because of mental disease 

or defect.) But the jury never heard any of this testimony. 

Because this unrebutted testimony, from not one but three 

highly qualified mental health experts, supported a finding 

that Pruitt had evidence of two statutory mitigating circumstances, whereas the sentencing judge found that Pruitt did 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
52 No. 13-1880

not have a mental condition that was mitigating, there is a 

reasonable probability that this evidence might have affected 

the judge’s and jury’s assessment of Pruitt’s moral culpability, and that they might have concluded that death was not 

warranted. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 398 (concluding that 

counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing prejudiced the defendant where the undiscovered mitigating evidence “might well have influenced 

the jury’s appraisal of [the defendant’s] culpability”). It is 

significant that in considering the sentence, the jury wanted 

to know whether Dr. Golden had any knowledge of Pruitt’s 

thought processes, including his thinking, at the time of the 

crime. Their desire to know Pruitt’s thought processes 

strongly suggests that evidence of what was going on in his 

head at the time of the crime might have made a difference 

in his sentence.

Respondent argues that we have rejected the same basis 

for asserting ineffective assistance of counsel in Overstreet v. 

Wilson, 686 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2012), where we held the state 

court reasonably determined that counsel’s presentation of 

mitigation evidence was not constitutionally deficient and 

the petitioner failed to show prejudice. Id. at 408. Overstreet 

does not direct the conclusion that Pruitt’s ineffective assistance claim fails in this case.

In Overstreet, defense counsel presented expert testimony 

at sentencing that the defendant had a “schizotypal personality disorder”; a second expert testified at the postconviction hearing that he would have opined that the defendant had “schizoaffective disorder,” which was described 

as a combination of schizophrenia and depression. Id. At the 

post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified as to their 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 53

strategic reasons for having the first expert but not the second expert testify. Id at 409. The petitioner argued that his 

counsel should have called both experts, or should have 

called the second expert alone “because schizotypal personality disorder is just a ‘personality disorder’ on Axis II,” 

whereas schizophrenia was “a more serious, Axis I ‘clinical 

disorder.’” Id. at 408. The state court doubted that a jury 

would have appreciated the “subtle and nuanced distinction 

between a schizoaffective disorder and a schizotypal personality disorder.” Id. (quoting Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 

144, 156 (Ind. 2007)). 

In addressing the ineffectiveness claim, we observed that 

defense counsel had presented evidence that the petitioner 

had a serious mental abnormality and had argued that he 

was not blameworthy. Id. at 408. Indeed, counsel presented 

the first expert’s emphatic testimony that he believed the defendant’s ability to “conform his conduct to the requirements of law” was “significantly impaired.” Id. at 409. We 

concluded that “[t]o undermine counsel’s choices and the 

state judiciary’s findings about prejudice,” id., the petitioner 

needed evidence “that no reasonable lawyer would have 

thought [the first expert] the better witness, and that jurors 

would be less likely to recommend death for a defendant 

who has schizophrenia,” id. at 409–10, and that the state 

court’s contrary determination was unreasonable, id. at 410. 

The petitioner had no such evidence; therefore he could not 

upset the state court’s finding that the two experts would 

have made essentially the same impression on the jury. Id. at 

410.

In contrast with Overstreet, where trial counsel presented 

emphatic expert testimony that the defendant satisfied two 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
54 No. 13-1880

statutory mitigating circumstances, Pruitt’s case is not merely about different psychiatric terms and labels. The postconviction experts testified that Pruitt satisfied two statutory 

mitigating circumstances, whereas the trial experts did not 

give such an opinion. And, as discussed, Pruitt’s trial counsel did not conduct a thorough investigation into Pruitt’s 

mental health and therefore did not make “an informed 

choice” about what mental health evidence to present at sentencing. The failure to contact an expert in dealing with psychosis and schizophrenia left counsel ignorant about the potential mitigation evidence. In Overstreet, we emphasized 

that “trial counsel made an informed choice, quite unlike the 

situation in Wiggins,” id. at 409, and in this case as well. Perhaps most important, in contrast with Overstreet, here the 

state court did not make any finding as to prejudice to which 

we owe AEDPA deference. We conclude that there is a reasonable probability that with the presentation of the mitigating evidence regarding Pruitt’s mental illness, Pruitt’s sentence would have been different.

Although we recently recognized that “’it is difficult to 

establish ineffective assistance [of counsel] when counsel’s 

overall performance indicates active and capable advocacy,’” Makiel, 782 F.3d at 902 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 111), 

even “an isolated error” can establish ineffective assistance 

“if it is ‘sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.’” Id. (quoting 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). Counsel’s error 

with regard to investigation and presentation of Pruitt’s paranoid schizophrenia is such an error. The Indiana Supreme 

Court’s determination that trial counsel were not ineffective 

for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of

Pruitt’s mental illness was an unreasonable application of 

Strickland, and Pruitt has shown that he was prejudiced by 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55
No. 13-1880 55

counsel’s ineffectiveness. Accordingly, the district court’s 

judgment should be reversed and remanded for issuance of

a conditional writ remanding the case for a new penaltyphase proceeding.3

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s

judgment and REMAND with instructions to grant a conditional writ vacating Pruitt’s death sentence and remanding to 

the State for a new penalty-phase proceeding.

3 The conclusion that Pruitt established ineffective assistance of counsel 

under one of his theories makes it unnecessary for us to fully address his 

other theories. Nonetheless, we do not think that trial counsel rendered 

constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of evidence of Pruitt’s intellectual disability or in failing to object to 

alleged improper prosecutorial argument at trial. Nor do we think that 

appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising an ineffective-assistance claim based on trial counsel’s failure to object to the 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct.

 

Case: 13-1880 Document: 36 Filed: 06/02/2015 Pages: 55