Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-00539/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-00539-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

DANIEL STEWART, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANOFI AVENTIS U.S., LLC, 

Defendant.

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Case No.: 4:13-CV-539-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Daniel Stewart, Jr. (“Mr. Stewart”) initiated this products liability

action in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama, on July 26, 2012. (Doc. 1 ¶

1). Defendant Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC (“Sanofi”) removed the lawsuit to federal

court on March 21, 2013. (Doc. 1 at 1). The case was reassigned to the undersigned

on March 26, 2013. (Doc. 9). Sanofi filed an amended removal petition on April 5,

2013. (Doc. 14).

Pending before the court is Sanofi’s Motion To Dismiss (Doc. 12) (the

“Motion”) filed on March 28, 2013. (Doc. 12). Mr. Stewart has filed no opposition

to the Motion, which under Appendix III to the court’s uniform initial order was due

on April 11, 2013. (See Doc. 2 at 23 ¶ B.2 (“The opponent’s responsive brief shall

FILED

 2013 Apr-30 PM 01:56

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:13-cv-00539-VEH Document 18 Filed 04/30/13 Page 1 of 14
be filed no later than fourteen (14) calendar days thereafter.”)). Accordingly, the

Motion is now ready for disposition, and, for the reasons explained below, is

GRANTED IN PART and is otherwise DENIED. 

II. Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency ofthe complaint. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the

complaint provide “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8

does not mandate the inclusion of “detailed factual allegations” within a complaint. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). However at the same

time, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[O]nce a claim has

been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent

with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 

“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying

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pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “While legal conclusions can

provide the framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations.” 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to

an entitlement to relief.” Id. (emphasis added). “Under Twombly’s construction of

Rule 8 . . . [a plaintiff’s] complaint [must] ‘nudge[] [any] claims’ . . . ‘across the line

from conceivable to plausible.’ Ibid.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51. 

A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

B. Mr. Stewart’s Failure to Oppose

Mr. Stewart’s failure to file any opposition does not automatically mean that

the Motion is due to be granted. As explained by Judge Steele in Branch Banking

and Trust Co. v. Howard, No. 12–0175–WS–N, 2013 WL 172903, *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan.

16, 2013):

As noted, Churchill and Howard elected not to be heard in

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response to BB & T’s Amended Motion to Dismiss. Notwithstanding

that omission, BB & T (as Rule 12(b)(6) movant) bears the initial

burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to dismissal of the

counterclaims. Churchill’s and Howard’s lack of response to the Rule

12(b)(6) Motion does not trigger the kneejerk granting of such Motion

on an abandonment theory. See Gailes v. Marengo County Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 2013 WL 81227, *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2013) (“the Court will not

treat a claim as abandoned merely because the plaintiff has not defended

it in opposition to a motion to dismiss”). Rather, it remains BB & T’s

burden as movant to establish its entitlement to relief under Rule

12(b)(6). In light of these circumstances, the Court scrutinizes BB &

T’s Motion to Dismiss in accordance with the following legal standard:

“the Court will review the merits of the [movant]’s position and, if it is

clearly incorrect or inadequate to satisfy the [movant]’s initial burden,

will deny the motion despite the [nonmovant]’s failure to respond. If,

however, the [movant]’s presentation is adequate to satisfy its initial

burden, the Court will not deny the motion based on arguments the

[nonmovant] could have made but by silence elected not to raise.” Id.

Branch Banking, 2013 WL 172903, *1 (footnotes omitted).

III. Analysis

Mr. Stewart’s second amended complaint indicates that he is suing Sanofi in

its capacity as a designer, manufacturer, and seller of the prescription drug named

Ambien. (Doc. 12-1 at 1 ¶ 1). Mr. Stewart claims that his use of zolpidem, the

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generic form of Ambien, as a sleeping aid on the night of October 3, 2011,caused him

to engage in bizarre and erratic acts of misconduct while he was out of town in

Indiana on a business trip, which culminated in his arrest and the loss of his job. (Id.

The page references to Doc. 12-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF 1

numbering system.

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at 3 ¶ 5; id. at 4 ¶¶ 7, 10). 

Mr. Stewart does not allege Sanofi is a designer, manufacturer, or seller of

zolpidem. (Doc. 12-1 at 3 ¶ 5). Instead, he contends that other former defendants

(that were dismissed during the course ofthe state court proceedings) are responsible 2

for the production and supply of zolpidem as a generic drug on the market. (Id.). Mr.

Stewart’s alleged damages include “much humiliation, embarrassment and chagrin

. . . psychological and mental pain and suffering . . . .” (Doc. 12-1 at 11 ¶ 13). 

Mr. Stewart asserts three separate counts against Sanofi: count one for

negligently, wantonly, and/or willfully failing to adequately warn; count two for

fraudulent concealment; and count three for breach of implied warranty for a

particular purpose. (Doc. 12-1 at 11-12).

A. Applicable Law

As a threshold matter, Sanofi asserts in its Motion that this court should apply

Indiana law when evaluating the ability of Mr. Stewart to state a claim against it.

More specifically, following Alabama’s choice of law principles asthis is a diversity

Specifically, first the state court granted Defendant Generics Bidco I, LLC’s

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partially contested motion to dismiss on February 5, 2013. (Doc. 14 ¶¶ 5-6; Doc. 1

at Ex. 6). Second, one day later–on February 6, 2013–the state court granted Mr.

Stewart’s motion to dismiss Defendant Propst Distribution, Inc. d/b/a Qualitest

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Doc. 14 ¶¶ 6-7; Doc. 1 at Ex. 7).

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case, Sanofi maintains that because Mr. Stewart “was injured in Indiana . . . Indiana

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law applies to his claims against [it].” (Doc. 12 at 3). The court agrees.

As the Supreme Court of Alabama has articulated:

Lex loci delicti has been the rule in Alabama for almost 100 years.

Under this principle, an Alabama court will determine the substantive

rights of an injured party according to the law of the state where the

injury occurred. Norris v. Taylor, 460 So.2d 151, 153 (Ala.1984);

Mullins v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., 239 Ala. 608, 195 So. 866

(1940); Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Alabama

Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). The

plaintiff contends that the doctrine of lex loci delicti is outmoded and

unfair. He urges Alabama to adopt the approach of the Restatement

(Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). . . . 

After careful consideration, we are not convinced that we should

abandon the lex loci delicti rule for the approach of the Restatement

(Second) on the facts of the present case. Professor Kay and other

commentators tell us that the adoption of the approach of the

Restatement (Second) has not brought certainty or uniformity to the law:

“Some state courts routinely list [the Restatement’s]

relevant sections in their opinions and try to follow them;

this task is easiest when the case is controlled by one of the

Restatement Second’s specific narrow rules. Other state

courts have not been consistent in their terminology about

what approach they are following, and others have retained

primary emphasis on the place of the wrong in tort cases,

even while abandoning the lex loci delicti for the

Restatement Second. . . . This review of the cases suggests

that, if the original Restatement was unsuccessful because

See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S. Ct. 817, 822, 82 L. Ed. 3

1188 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of

Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”).

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of its dogmatic rigidity and its insistence on the uncritical

application of a few specific rules, the Restatement Second

may fail to provide enough guidance to the courts to

produce even a semblance of uniformity among the states

following its method. In the drafters' attempt to mollify

their critics, they have created an umbrella for traditionalist

and modern theorist alike: a fragile shelter that may prove

itself unable to survive any but the most gentle of

showers.” 

We find that we agree with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The

newer approaches to choice of law problems are neither less confusing

nor more certain than the traditional approach. “Until it becomes clear

that a better rule exists, we will adhere to our traditional approach.”

General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, supra, 252 Ga. at 96, 311 S.E. 2d at 462.

We also see no need for any special exception in this particular

case on public policy grounds, as the plaintiff requests. The plaintiff

knew the law of Alabama at the time he filed the suits, and chose to file

in Alabama. The judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.

Fitts v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 823 (Ala. 1991) (footnotes

omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, consistent with Fitts, the court will address

Mr. Stewart’s claims under Indiana law.

B. Plausibility of Mr. Stewart’s Claims Under Indiana Law

1. The Indiana Product Liability Act

Sanofi suggests that all of Mr. Stewart’s claims are governed by the Indiana

Product Liability Act (the “IPLA”). The IPLA provides in relevant part that:

Sec. 1. This article governs all actions that are:

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(1) brought by a user or consumer;

(2) against a manufacturer or seller; and 

(3) for physical harm caused by a product;

regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the

action is brought.

Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1 (emphasis added). Sanofi has not cited to any Supreme Court

of Indiana decisions in support of its Motion. Instead, Sanofi relies upon opinions

issued by the Indiana Court of Appeals and several federal district courts. (Doc. 12

at 5-6).

As the Supreme Court of Indiana explained when answering several certified

questions in Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981):

[I]t seems clear the legislature intended that the act govern all product

liability actions, whether the theory of liability is negligence or strict

liability in tort. This is what the legislature expressly said in section

one.

It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that the manner in which a person

can be negligent concerning a duty to warn in the context of product

liability is not peculiar to that field of law. The same type of negligence,

of course, can and does appear in other fields of tort law. However, an

action for damages resulting from the alleged failure of a manufacturer

or seller to warn a user of its product’s latently defective nature is

certainly a product liability action based on a theory of negligence, and,

ultimately, is one in which the claim is made that the damage was caused

by or resulted from the manufacture, construction or design of the

product. See Ind. Code s 33-1-1.5-2, supra. The Product Liability Act

expressly applies to all product liability actions sounding in tort,

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including those based upon the theory of negligence, and the legislature

clearly intended that no cause of action would exist on any such product

liability theory after ten years. It is not our office to question the

wisdom of the legislature’s enactments. As a reviewing court, we will

not substitute our judgment or opinion on such matters for that of the

legislature. 

Dague, 418 N.E.2d at 212 (emphasis added); see also Stegemoller v. ACandS,

Inc.,767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. 2002) (“In Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind.

520, 528, 418 N.E.2d 207, 212 (1981), we determined that it was‘clearthe legislature

intended that the [A]ct govern all product liability actions, whether the theory of

liability is negligence or strict liability in tort.’”).

Therefore, guided by Dague, the court finds that counts one and two of Mr.

Stewart’s complaint are governed by the IPLA and should be merged into one

productsliability count asserted under the IPLA. Cf. Atkinson v. P &G-Clairol, Inc.,

813 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (“Clairol argues that because Atkinson

can only bring one claim under the IPLA, Counts III and IV should be dismissed.”); 

id. (“However, Atkinson is correct that it is more proper for her claims of strict

liability and negligence to be merged into one claimunder the IPLA.”). Accordingly,

the Motion is DENIED as to counts one and two, but the court will require Mr.

Stewart to replead them as a merged IPLA count. 

However, the court reaches a different conclusion about whether Mr. Stewart’s

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breach of implied warranty claim is governed by the IPLA. Having studied the

opinions cited by Sanofi and in the absence of controlling precedent by the Supreme

Court of Indiana, this court is persuaded to follow the rule adopted by the Northern 4

District of Indiana in Atkinson with respect to warranty claims sounding in contract: 

“This court will follow the many state and federal decisions finding that the IPLA

supplants tort-based, but not contract-based claims for breach of implied warranty.” 

See also Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 153–54 (Ind. 2005) (“Indiana

law under the [IPLA] and under general negligence law is that damage from a

defective product or service may be recoverable under a tort theory if the defect

causes personal injury or damage to other property, but contract law governs damage

to the product or service itself and purely economic loss arising from the failure of

the product or service to perform as expected.”). 

As the court in Atkinson further explained:

In Count II, Atkinson has pleaded enough for a contract-based

claimof breach of implied warranty because she alleges that the product

was subject to an implied warranty and that the warranty was breached

because the product was unsuitable for the purpose for which it was

sold. See e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 2006 WL 299064, at *4, 2006 U.S.

See, e.g., Kovach v. Caligor Midwest, 913 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ind. 2009) (“This

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Court has never addressed whether the [I]PLA preempts warranty-based theories of

recovery for physical harm, but several federal district courts and other panels of the

Court of Appeals have held that tort-based breach-of-warranty claims have been

subsumed into the [I]PLA.”). 

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Dist. LEXIS 9807, at *12. Through a contract-based breach of implied

warranty claim, Atkinson can pursue damagesfor the cost ofthe product

and economic loss from the failure of the product. Hyundai Motor Am.,

Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 952 n.4 (Ind. 2005). In Count II,

Atkinson did not ask to recover for the cost of the product and she did

not limit her damages to economic loss. However, Atkinson was not

“required to delineate in the Complaint [her] damages to make it clear

that the sought after damages included the return of the purchase price

of the [product].” Id. Although Atkinson will only be able to recover

the cost of the product and pure economic loss under a contract—based

breach of warranty claim, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hennings, 827 N.E.2d

1244, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), the fact that she requested punitive

damages under this count does not automatically render the claim one

that sounds in tort when she has also pleaded a contract-based claim.

Atkinson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1025-26. Thus, Mr. Stewart’s third count is not necessarily

subsumed by the IPLA, so long as he only seeks “to recover the cost of the product

and pure economic loss under a contract-based breach of warranty claim.”

2. Lack of Privity

However, Mr. Stewart’s potential contract-based warranty count suffers from

another deficiency–lack of vertical privity between him and Sanofi. “‘Vertical’

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privity typically becomes an issue when a purchaser files a breach of warranty action

against a vendor in the purchaser’s distribution chain who is not the purchaser’s

immediate seller.” Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 952

(Ind. 2005). “Simply put, vertical privity exists only between immediate links in a

 “Privity is not required for claims under the IPLA.” Atkinson, 813 F. Supp. 5

2d at 1027 n.4 (citing Ind. Code § 34-20-2-2).

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distribution chain. A buyer in the same chain who did not purchase directly from a

seller is ‘remote’ as to that seller.” Id. Here, Sanofi contends that, because Mr.

Stewart did not allegedly purchase and ingest any product manufactured or sold by

it, but instead by other former defendant(s), no vertical privity exists. 

Again, as the court reasoned in Atkinson:

 The second issue is whether Atkinson’s breach of implied and

express warranty claim should be dismissed due to her failure to plead

vertical privity between herself and Clairol. Vertical privity is not

required for a claimof breach ofthe implied warranty of merchantability

even if that claim sounds in contract. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d at 959. Still,

vertical privity is required for claims of breach of express warranty and

breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Pizel v.

Monaco Coach Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793 (N.D. Ind. 2005)

(stating that the holding in Goodin waslimited to abolishing the vertical

privity requirement for claims of breach of the implied warranty of

merchantability); Hunt v. Unknown Chem. Mfr. No. One, No. IP

02–389–C, 2003 WL 23101798, at *12, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20138,

at *34–35 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2003) (stating that “a plaintiff bringing a

breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claim

under Ind. Code § 26–1–2–315 must show privity of contract”);

Davidson v. John Deere & Co., 644 F. Supp. 707, 713 (N.D. Ind. 1986)

(finding that the plaintiff did not have a claim for breach of express

warranty because “[p]rivity has not been abrogated as a requirement in

contract actions for breach of warranty”); cf. In re 2005 United States

Grand Prix, 461 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860–61 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (dismissing

the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract because they were “neither

parties to nor in privity with any of the third-party contracts they

[sought] to enforce”).

Atkinson, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1026 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Comparable to Atkinson, this court finds that Mr. Stewart’s warranty claim is

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not plausibly stated under Indiana law because, as a fitness for particular purpose

contractual warranty claim, it requires vertical privity, and Mr. Stewart has alleged

that the generic drug which he ingested and which was allegedly unfit for its

particular purpose wasmanufactured by defendant(s) other than Sanofi. Cf. Atkinson,

813 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (“In order to have a claim for breach of express warranty or

of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, Atkinson would have had

to show that she was in privity of contract with the person or entity who purchased

the product from Clairol.”); id. (“Atkinson has not pleaded contract-based claims of

breach of express warranty or breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a

particular purpose because she has not pleaded facts indicating thatshe wasin privity

with Clairol.”). 

Here, Mr. Stewart has not pleaded any facts to show that he was in privity with

Sanofi in his purchase and use of the generic sleeping drug zolpidem. Therefore, the

Motion is GRANTED as to count three.

3. Other Issues Raised by Sanofi

Because, as Sanofi concedes, the status of its potential liability is still an open

question under the IPLA (Doc. 12 at 10), the court rejects Sanofi’s efforts to obtain

a complete dismissal of Mr. Stewart’s complaint at the pleadings stage on the basis

that “the manufacturer of a name-brand drug is not liable for damages allegedly

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caused by the use of another manufacturer’s generic-equivalent drug.” (Id. at 9). The

court also will not dismiss Mr. Stewart’s complaint on the grounds that he has failed

to meet the federal pleading standards. However, the court will require Mr. Stewart

to replead his surviving claims as a merged count under the IPLA as explained in §

III.B.1 above.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein the Motion is: (i) DENIED as to counts one and

two, but Mr. Stewart will be required to restate them as a merged count under the

IPLA, (ii) GRANTED as to count three, and (iii) otherwise DENIED. Further, Mr. 6

Stewart is HEREBY ORDERED to replead his complaint consistent with the court’s

ruling within 20 days of the entry date of this order.

DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 2013.

 

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

6 To the extent that count three is tort-based, then it is “merged into [his] claim

of products liability under the IPLA.” Atkinson, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.

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