Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08052/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alex Eishoo,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.

Respondent.

CV-11-8052-PCT-NVW (JFM)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

on Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on April 8, 2011 (Doc. 1). On June 22, 2011 Respondents filed their Response 

(Doc. 12). Petitioner has not filed a reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following factual background is a summary of the facts recited by the 

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Arizona Court of Appeals in denying Petitioner’s direct appeal:

On July 13, 2000, the victim and his girlfriend and her daughter had traveled to 

Laughlin, Nevada, to gamble. The next day they separated to different casinos. And the 

victim never returned.

The victim appeared later that evening at the club “Dream Girls” in Bullhead 

City, Arizona, where he showed Petitioner and the club’s cashier (Barajas) $10,000 in 

cash. Later, Petitioner arranged to take the club’s shuttle, driven by an employee, 

Anthony Jackson, back to Laughlin. Petitioner also went in the shuttle. 

Along the way, Petitioner suddenly strangled the victim, and had Jackson drive 

off on a dirt road. The victim’s cash and wallet were taken and Petitioner and Jackson 

left his body in the desert. Petitioner gave $3,500 to Jackson, and threatened to kill 

Jackson’s wife if he told anyone.

Jackson and Petitioner returned to Dream Girls. Petitioner told Barajas he had 

strangled the victim with a wire and had taken his money. Petitioner and Barajas then 

traveled to Las Vegas, staying several nights at the Venetian resort, and spending some 

$2,000 shopping. 

The victim’s body was eventually found. Barajas reported Petitioner’s confession 

and their subsequent trip to Las Vegas. 

Jackson identified Petitioner as the murder, but after his own conviction, asserted 

in a letter (Exhibit W, PCR Resp., Exhibit 3) that his own wife was the murderer.

Petitioner told police that he had been in Los Angeles on the dates of the murder, 

but his parents told police he was not. Petitioner told a high school friend that he had 

murdered the victim and he had his wallet. Petitioner told a fellow inmate that he had 

strangled someone and taken $10,000 from them, but claimed Jackson had done the 

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killing. (Exhibit P, Mem.Dec. at 1-6.)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On August 17, 2000, Petitioner was indicted in Mohave County Superior Court on 

counts of first degree murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

The state initially filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, but subsequently 

withdrew the notice. (Exhibit B, Notices.)

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial on January 28, 2002. In the interim, the 

prosecution and defense entered into a stipulation (Exhibit NN) concerning the 

admission of various hearsay statements by Jackson, including the letter claiming 

Jackson’s wife was the murderer, as well as the autopsy, casino surveillance video, and 

statements by Petitioner’s parents. Jackson did not testify at trial. (See generally

Exhibits F through J, Record. Transcript of trial.) 

After a five day trial, Petitioner was found guilty on all counts. (Exhibit PP, M.E. 

2/1/02 and verdicts.) 

On March 22, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to life, with the opportunity for 

parole after 25 years on the murder charge, a concurrent, aggravated sentence of 13 years 

on the kidnapping charge, and an aggravated 3 year sentence on the robbery charge, 

which was made consecutive to the kidnapping charge. (Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. at 6-7; 

Exhibit l R..T. 3/22/02 at 24-26.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, raising the following claims:

(1) the trial court erred in denying the motion for acquittal on the kidnapping 

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count;

(2) the trial court erred in denying the motion for acquittal on the robbery count; 

and

(3) the trial court erred in sentencing him to a consecutive sentence on the robbery 

count. (Exhibit M, Opening Brief.)

Petitioner made no reference to any federal authorities or constitutional principles 

in his Opening Brief (id. at ii-iii and generally) or his Reply Brief1(Exhibit O at ii and 

generally). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the appeal, and affirmed the convictions 

and sentences, finding sufficient evidence to support the kidnapping and robbery 

charges, and that the consecutive sentence was authorized. (Exhibit P, Mem. Dec.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit Q) by the Arizona Supreme Court, 

attacking only the decision on the failure to acquit on the kidnapping charge, and again 

citing no federal authority. The state filed a Notice of Acknowledgement (Exhibit R), 

relying on its response before the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

On September 11, 2003, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Exhibit S, 

Order.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On October 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro per Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit T). Counsel was appointed, who on November 9, 2007, filed a PCR Petition 

 

1

 Petitioner’s Table of Authorities in his Reply Brief did assert a reference to “9th

Circuit Rules” “32(3)(4). However, the identified page was his certificate of compliance 

with Arizona formatting rules and certificate of mailing, and contained no citation to the 

referenced 9th Circuit rule. The 9th Circuits rules 32-3 and 32-4 concern the formatting 

of briefs and excerpts. 

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(Exhibit U) asserting a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a

result of trial counsel’s stipulation to the admission of the out-of-court statements by 

Jackson. That Petition also summarily asserted ineffective assistance as a result of trial 

counsel’s: (1) failure to object to hearsay testimony by the victim’s girlfriends’ daughter; 

(2) hearsay by the detective’s recitation of the daughter’s statements; and (3) hearsay 

about statements by Jackson’s wife. (Id. at 20.) Petitioner requested an evidentiary 

hearing on his claims. (Exhibit Y.)

On June 9, 2008, the PCR court denied the Petition without conducting a hearing, 

finding neither deficient performance nor prejudice. (Exhibit Z.) Petitioner sought 

reconsideration (Exhibit AA, Motion), which was denied (Exhibit CC Order 7/7/08). 

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, again raising his 

ineffective assistance claim based on the admission of the Jackson statements. (Exhibit 

DD, PFR.) On November 23, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied 

review (Exhibit II, Order). 

Petitioner then sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court, again raising this 

same claim. (Exhibit II, PFR.) On June 2, 2010, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily 

denied review. (Exhibit LL, Order.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 8, 2011 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following six grounds for relief:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel re tape recorded interview (id. at 6);

(2) ineffective assistance of counsel re parents statements (id. at 7);

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(3) ineffective assistance of counsel re autopsy (id. at 8);

(4) insufficient evidence re kidnapping (id. at 9);

(5) insufficient evidence re robbery (id. at 9.1);

(6) due process violation in consecutive sentence (id. at 9.2);

(7) due process violation from presumption of guilt (id. at 9.3).

Service and a response was ordered on April 12, 2011 (Doc. 5.)

Response - On June 22, 2011, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Docs. 12 and 13). Respondents concede the timeliness of the Petition, argue that 

Grounds 2 through 7 are procedurally defaulted, and that Ground 1 is without merit.

Reply - Petitioner has not filed a reply, and the time to do so ran on July 22, 2011.

Attempted Amendment - On June 20, 2011, Petitioner filed a "Notice to File 

Amended Petition (Doc. 11). The Court noted the apparent intent to file an amended 

petition, and gave Petitioner through August 30, 2011 to file a motion to amend the 

Petition. (Order 8/16/11, Doc. 14.) Petitioner did not do so.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Other than his Ground 1 (ineffective assistance re taped interview), Respondents 

argue that Petitioner’s claims were never fairly presented to the state courts, his state 

remedies were not properly exhausted and are now procedurally defaulted, and thus his 

claims are barred from habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

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available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Forum/Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).2

/ / 

/ /

 2 Here, Petitioner was sentenced to life. However, Swoopes was based upon earlier 

versions of Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 12-120.21 or 13-4031, which were subsequently amended 

to limit the Arizona Supreme Court’s general jurisdiction to death penalty cases. 

Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes for purposes of this 

Report & Recommendation that presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court, as well as 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, was required for Petitioner to properly exhaust his state 

remedies. 

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 b. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, 

but must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a

"fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his 

constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 

(1971). A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has 

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is 

based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, 

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007).

c. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Ground 1: IAC re Taped Interview - In his Ground 1, Petitioner argues “that 

trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to admission of Anthony Jackson’s tape 

recorded interview with police” in violation of his rights under “Amendment 6 of the 

U.S. Constitution.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) As Respondents concede, this was the same 

issue raised by Petitioner in his PCR proceeding, and it was fairly presented in the PCR 

court, the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the Arizona Supreme Court, and disposed of on 

its merits. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s state remedies on 

this ground for relief were properly exhausted.

Ground 2&3: IAC re Parents’ Statements and Autopsy – In his Ground 2, 

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission 

of hearsay testimony about statements his parents made to a police detective. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner does not indicate whether he presented this claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, but asserts it was raised in his First Petition, and was presented to the 

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Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.)

In his Ground 3, he argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

admission of the autopsy report. Petitioner asserts he raised this claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals on his first and second petitions, and to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

(Id. at 8.)

Petitioner did not assert these claims on direct appeal, which was limited to his 

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the consecutive sentence. (See 

generally Exhibits M, Opening Brief; O, Reply Brief; and Q, Petition for Review.)

Nor did Petitioner raise these claims in his PCR Petition. Petitioner did make a 

passing reference, in his “Procedural Background” to the stipulations to admit the 

autopsy and his parents’ statements. (Exhibit U, PCR Pet. At 4.) And, he did challenge 

counsel’s failures with regard to Jackson’s statements in his PCR proceedings. (See 

generally Exhibits U, PCR Pet.; DD, PFR; and II PFR.) He also made a passing 

reference to trial counsel’s: (1) failure to object to hearsay testimony by the victim’s 

girlfriends’ daughter; (2) hearsay by the detective’s recitation of the daughter’s 

statements; and (3) hearsay about statements by Jackson’s wife. (Exhibit U at 20.) He 

did not, however, make any allegations concerning ineffectiveness of counsel as a result 

of the statements by his parents or the autopsy.

Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate somewhat the claims made 

in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on 

other grounds by Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal 

claim must have been “fairly presented” in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 

6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Tamapua, 796 F.2d 

at 262. Thus, a petitioner may not broaden the scope of a constitutional claim in the 

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federal courts by asserting additional operative facts that have not yet been fairly 

presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not fairly presented in the state courts are 

not considered in a federal habeas petition. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 

1995).

A shift from the very specific claims raised by Petitioner in his PCR proceeding to 

the instant, entirely new claims of deficient performance, is too great for this Court to 

find that Petitioner fairly presented the instant claims to the state courts.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s federal claims in 

Grounds 2 and 3 were not fairly presented to the state courts.

Grounds 4&5: Insufficient Evidence re Kidnapping and Robbery – In his 

Grounds 4 and 5, Petitioner complains that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

him on the, respectively, kidnapping and robbery counts. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9, 9.1.) 

Petitioner alleges these claims were presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct 

appeal, and to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.) 

Petitioner did challenge on direct appeal the trial court’s denial of his motions to 

acquit on these two charges. However, in doing so, Petitioner relied solely upon state 

law, and made no reference to any federal law or constitutional principles. (See 

generally Exhibits M, Opening Brief; O, Reply Brief; and Q, Petition for Review.)

 While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,” 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 

F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the 

federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state law claim 

was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

It is true that "a citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue 

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serves the same purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue." 

Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). However, none of the cases 

relied on by Petitioner before the Arizona Court of Appeals analyzed sufficiency of the 

evidence under federal law. (See Exhibit M, Open. Brief at ii.) See generally, State v. 

Carlisle, 198 Ariz. 203, 8 P.3d 391 (App. 2000); State v. Doss, 192 Ariz. 408, 966 P.2d 

1012 (App. 1998); State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. 55, 579 P.2d 559 (1978); State v. 

Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P.2d 97 (1994); State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 778 P.2d 

1204 (1989); State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 967 P.2d 106 (1998); State v. Lewis, 169 

Ariz. 4, 816 P.2d 263 (App. 1991);3State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 796 P.2d 866 (1998); 

State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 865 P.2d 765 (1993); and State v. Tinghitella, 108 Ariz. 1, 

491 P .2d 834 14. 

Respondents note that State v. Mathers, cited by Petitioner in his Opening Brief 

on direct appeal, does contain a reference to Jackson v. Virginia, 442 U.S. 307 (1979), 

the sentinel case on the constitutional requirement for sufficient evidence. (Answer Doc. 

12 at 16.) However, Mathers was ultimately a determination whether, under 

Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 20 (motions for acquittal) and Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-115(A) (burden of 

proof), there was sufficient evidence to convict. Mathers discussed Jackson only to 

reference its standard based on a “rational juror” rather than the actual jury in the case. 

Even if that reference indicated a reliance upon federal law in Mathers (as opposed to the 

use of Jackson as persuasive authority), such a citation to a federal case is not sufficient.

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

 

3

Improperly cited in the Opening Brief as “168 Ariz. 4, 816 P.2d 262 (App. 1991.” [sic] 

Exhibit M at i .

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has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 (9

th Cir. 2004). In the instant case, Petitioner’s brief 

made no indication that he intended to rely upon whatever portion of Mathers could be 

said to be founded upon federal law. (Exhibit M, Opening Brief at 9-10.) Accordingly, 

the undersigned concludes that a citation to Mathers was not sufficient to fairly present 

Petitioner’s federal claim.

Petitioner did not assert any claims based on the sufficiency of the evidence in his 

PCR proceedings. 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s federal claims in 

Grounds 4 and 5 were not fairly presented to the state courts.

Ground 6: Due Process and Consecutive Sentence – In his Ground 6, Petitioner 

asserts that he was denied his right “to a fair verdict as guaranteed by the Amendments 5, 

6 & 14 of the U.S. Constitution” by making his sentence on the robbery count 

consecutive to his sentence on the kidnapping charge. Petitioner argues he presented this 

claim on direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.2.)

While Petitioner complained about the consecutive sentence in his direct appeal, 

he did so solely on the basis that the consecutive sentence was not authorized under Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-116, which prohibits double punishments for a single act, and related 

state cases defining when a series of related crimes constitute one act. (Exhibit M, 

Opening Brief at 14-16.) The Arizona Court of Appeals resolved the claim on the basis 

of its application of that statute. (Exhibit P, Mem. Dec. at 12-14.) Presentation of a 

related state law claim is not fair presentation of a federal claim. Anderson, 459 U.S. at 

6.

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Petitioner did not reassert the claim to the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit Q, 

Petition for Review), nor did he raise it in his PCR Proceeding (see generally Exhibits U, 

PCR Pet.; DD, Pet. Rev.; II, Pet. Rev.).

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s federal claim in Grounds 

6 was not fairly presented to the state courts.

Ground 7: Due Process and Presumption of Guilt- In his Ground 7, Petitioner 

argues that the trial court improperly adopted a presumption of guilt: (1) when the judge 

stated “proof is not evident but the presumption is great that the defendant committed 

this crime;” and (2) because there was insufficient evidence to convict. Petitioner 

concedes he did not present this claim to the state courts. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.3.) 

As discussed supra with regards to Grounds 4 and 5, the only claims of 

insufficient evidence raised by Petitioner to the state courts were his claims with regard 

to the kidnapping and robbery convictions, and neither of these was asserted as a federal 

claim. No federal or state law claim was made on direct appeal or in his PCR proceeding 

that a presumption of guilt was applied.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s federal claims in Ground 

7 were not fairly presented to the state courts.

Summary re Exhaustion - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner has established fair presentation and proper exhaustion of his state remedies 

only on his Ground 1 (ineffective assistance re taped interview). The balance of his 

claims, including Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, were not properly exhausted.

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

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Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper 

absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner is “procedurally barred” from presenting his 

unexhausted claims to the state courts. Respondents do not specifically identify the 

procedural rules upon which they rely. However, it appears that Arizona’s preclusion 

bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time bars, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 

31.3 and 32.4(a) both would bar presentation of the unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for review of 

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a 

subsequent PCR Petition. Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction 

process, a claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post conviction relief that 

"has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the 

State simply shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a 

previous collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 

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1070 (2002) (quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient 

constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, 

''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." 

Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by 

a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 

(App.Div. 2, 2007). In coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona 

Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a 

jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona 

Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 

46 P.3d at 1071.8

Here, Petitioner’s unexhausted claims do not fit within the list of claims identified 

as requiring a personal waiver. Nor are they of the same character. Therefore, it appears 

that Petitioner’s claims would be precluded by his failure to raise them in an earlier 

proceeding.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

 8

 Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type of 

waiver required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz. 

at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission), 

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived 

by omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy 

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal 

sentence (waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge 

conflict of interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 

2008).

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State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed 

has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts 

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the 

trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly 

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative 

or used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence 

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical 

significance at trial such that the evidence probably would have 

changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without 

fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined 

to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's 

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence 

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish 

that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of 

the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court 

would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1(d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner, like Petitioner, who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or 

sentence.

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Petitioner asserts no newly discovered evidence, and his factual assertions have 

all been previously argued to the state courts. Where a claim is based on "newly 

discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state courts, the evidence 

is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application.

Paragraph (f) has no application because Petitioner's appeal was timely.

Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in 

the law since his last PCR proceeding. 

Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application 

to Petitioner’s procedural claims. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404, 166 P.3d 

945, 959 (App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where petitioner had “not established that 

trial error ...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”). 

Summary - Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that review through 

Arizona’s direct appeal and post-conviction relief process is no longer possible for 

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims, and that the unexhausted claims are now procedurally 

defaulted, and absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence, must be 

dismissed with prejudice.

3. Cause and Prejudice; Actual Innocence

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123. 

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can occur, the 

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Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. Barton, 894 

F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 

832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily 

turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Moreover, both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural 

default, although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner 

fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Accordingly, this Court need not examine the 

merits of Petitioner's claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and 

prejudice. 

Here, Petitioner does not proffer any good cause to excuse his failures to exhaust. 

The only pretense Petitioner makes of establishing cause is his assertion in Ground 7 that 

he brought the claims in Ground 7 to counsel’s attention, counsel failed to raise them, 

and because of Petitioner’s handicaps as a pro se prisoner dependent upon other inmates 

he could not raise it himself.

Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly 

exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel showing 

“cause” is itself subject to the exhaustion requirements. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 492 (1986); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). Accordingly, “[t]o the 

extent that petitioner is alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause for 

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the default, the exhaustion doctrine requires him to first raise this ineffectiveness claim 

as a separate claim in state court.” Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 

1988). Petitioner has not exhausted state remedies on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel. Rather, his PCR petition was clearly limited to arguing that “his trial 

lawyers clearly were ineffective.” (Exhibit U, PCR Pet. at 16.) 

Nor has Petitioner shown that his disabilities prevented him from asserting to the 

State courts the claims he now asserts. The “cause and prejudice” standard is equally 

applicable to pro se litigants, Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990); 

Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986), whether 

literate and assisted by “jailhouse lawyers”, Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381; illiterate and 

unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 

F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989). 

Thus, the undersigned must conclude that Petitioner has failed to show “cause” to 

excuse his procedural defaults.

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion 

intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a 

“miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the 

Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion 

outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & 

Proc., §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly 

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limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

Here, Petitioner makes no pretense of asserting his actual innocence. It is true 

that a number of Petitioner’s grounds for relief (4, 5, and 7) assert an insufficiency of 

evidence to convict, such a claim (even if established) does not amount to a showing of 

actual innocence. 

Rather, a petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must 

show "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the 

light of the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 327 (1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new 

evidence is not sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror 

would have found the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. 

Moreover, a finding of "actual innocence" is not to be based upon a finding that 

insufficient evidence to support the charge was presented at trial, but rather upon 

affirmative evidence of innocence. See U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank robbery case, without evidence that 

insurance did not exist, not sufficient to establish actual innocence). 

[T]he prisoner must “show a fair probability that, in the light of all 

the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted 

(but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably 

claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available 

only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a 

reasonable doubt of his guilt.” 

Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 455 n. 17 (1986) (quoting Friendly, Is Innocence 

Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)).

Petitioner offers no new, affirmative evidence to establish his actual innocence.

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Summary re Procedural Default – Petitioner fails to show “cause” or actual 

innocence to excuse his procedural defaults. Accordingly, Petitioner's procedurally 

defaulted claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. GROUND 1: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE RE TAPED INTERVIEW

For his Ground 1, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

stipulating to the admission of the taped interview of Anthony Jackson (the shuttle driver 

who assisted him in disposing of the body and with whom he split the money taken from 

the victim). (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents argue that the PCR court’s rejection of this claim was not “contrary 

to” nor an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court law. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 20-

21.)

State Court’s Decision - The Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme 

Court issued summary denials of Petitioner's Petitions for Review in his PCR 

proceeding. (Exhibits HH, Order 11/23/09, and LL, Order 6/2/10) Because it was the 

last reasoned decision, this Court looks through to the decision of the PCR Court, as 

embodied in its order issued June 9, 2008 (Exhibit Z). Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Court does not find a colorable claim has been presented for 

relief: Although the Court will never know why the jury concluded 

beyond a reasonable doubt this Defendant was guilty, it is fair to say

that Anthony Jackson's hearsay statement was equivocal at best. It is 

not reasonable to conclude it was the critical evidence of conviction. 

Similarly, although Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 may

indeed have prevented the introduction of the statements of Jackson. 

The stipulation of counsel to admit such evidence, at trial and now 

in these pleadings demonstrates clearly a strategic decision is at best

invited error. The Court does not find this record supports either 

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deficient performance by counsel or a prejudice to the Defendant.as

a result of deficient performance.

(Exhibit Z, Order 6/9/08.)

Standard on Ineffective Assistance - Generally, claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In 

order to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance -

counsel's representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) 

prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-88

Limits on Habeas Relief - While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to 

search for violations of federal law, not every error justifies relief. "[A] federal habeas 

court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly." Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24- 25 (2002) (per curiam). Ordinarily, to justify habeas relief, a 

state court's decision must be "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" 

before relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). Federal courts are also authorized 

to grant habeas relief in cases where the state-court decision “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Application to Ground 1 - Here, the PCR court found that counsel’s decision to 

stipulate to the admission of Jackson’s taped interview was a strategic decision and not 

deficient performance. Indeed, tactical decisions with which a defendant disagrees 

cannot form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Morris v. 

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California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992). "Mere 

criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of inadequate 

representation." Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Here, the tactical decision was a reasonable one. As pointed out by Respondents 

(Answer, Doc. 12 at 26), Petitioner’s counsel faced substantial damning evidence, 

including Petitioner's confessions to: the club cashier, his high school friend, and a cell 

mate. In addition, Jackson had already pled guilty based upon the story related in his 

taped interview, i.e. that Petitioner was the murder. (See Exhibit U, PCR Pet. at 9-11 

(summarizing interview and plea colloquy.) Without the stipulation, trial counsel could 

anticipate, at a minimum, Jackson’s live testimony to the same effect, if perhaps only by 

impeachment on his prior statements. Such impeachment would effectively introduce 

the taped interview. 

In exchange, the defense obtained a stipulation to admit Jackson’s letter recanting 

his blame of Petitioner and instead blaming Jackson’s wife. (See Exhibit NN, 

Stipulation.) To obtain admission of this, Petitioner would have first had to have 

Jackson testify to the contrary, i.e. that Petitioner was the murderer, which would have 

simply been a more potent version of the testimony allowed in under the stipulation.

By stipulating to the admission of all of the out of court statements by Jackson, 

the defense got to leave the jury with hearsay on conflicting stories by Jackson, without 

the risk that Jackson’s live testimony would be particularly convincing or damning, or 

that Jackson would successfully explain away his letter blaming his wife.

Petitioner has never offered anything to counter the reasonableness of this tactical 

decision. (See Petition, Doc. 1 at 6; Exhibit U, PCR Pet. at 18-22; Exhibit X PCR Reply 

at 2; Exhibit DD, Pet. Rev. at 14-15.) At best, Petitioner argued in his reply brief in his 

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Petition for Review that the value of the recantation was markedly less than the damage 

of the taped interview, and the introduction of the recantation may have been suborning 

perjury. (Exhibit GG, PFR Reply at 3-5.) However, Petitioner’s arguments ignore the 

likely outcome of a refusal to stipulate, i.e. that the State would have simply called 

Jackson to testify. (See Exhibit F, R.T. 1/18/02 at 27 (discussion of calling Jackson as 

witness).) 

Thus, the undersigned concludes that it was a reasonable tactical decision for 

counsel to stipulate to the admission of Jackson’s taped interview, and therefore it was 

not defective performance. Therefore, the undersigned cannot conclude that the PCR 

court’s rejection of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme 

Court law.

Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject a claim of 

ineffective assistance upon finding either that counsel's performance was not deficient or 

that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Because the 

undersigned finds a clear lack of deficient performance, the undersigned does not reach 

the prejudice prong. 

Having failed to establish deficient performance, Petitioner’s Ground 1 is without 

merit and must be denied.

C. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s Ground 1 is without merit, and must be denied. Petitioner’s state 

remedies on Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are procedurally defaulted and Petitioner has 

failed to excuse his procedural default, and thus these grounds must be dismissed with 

prejudice.

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IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

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Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. 

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under 

the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not 

“find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on the merits, under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the constitutional claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the 

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 8, 2011 (Doc. 1) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the remainder of Petitioner's Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 8, 2011 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

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However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: December 14, 2011

11-8052r RR 11 12 08 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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