Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03047/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03047-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHERICE BARNES,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-3047 DMS (WVG)

ORDER (1) DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND (2) 

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

On December 16, 2016, Plaintiff Cherice Barnes filed a complaint pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), requesting judicial review of the final 

administrative decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security. On May 8, 

2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the Court to reverse 

Defendant’s decision or remand the case for further proceedings. On June 9, 2017, 

Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a response in opposition 

to Plaintiff’s motion. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment is denied and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment

is granted.

/ / /

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I.

BACKGROUND

On July 25, 2013, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for supplemental 

security income (“SSI”) benefits, alleging a disability onset date of January 16, 2010. 

(Administrative Record (“AR”) at 11, 180.) Plaintiff alleged she was disabled due 

to anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, prolapsed bladder, post-traumatic stress 

disorder, and diabetes. (Id. at 203.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration, after which she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 75–106, 112–17, 120–22.) 

On July 10, 2015, ALJ Donald Cole held a hearing. (Id. at 34–69.) Attorney 

Nichole Mendoza represented Plaintiff at the hearing. (Id.) The ALJ heard 

testimony from Plaintiff, impartial vocational expert Katie T. Macy-Powers, M.D., 

and social worker Matthew Stephens. (Id.) On August 21, 2015, the ALJ issued a 

written decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Id. at 11–25.) The ALJ first 

determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 

25, 2013. (Id. at 13.) The ALJ next determined Plaintiff has the following severe 

impairments: diabetes mellitus, urinary tract disorder, peripheral neuropathy, 

affective disorder, anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, and alcohol 

addiction disorder. (Id.) The ALJ, however, found that Plaintiff’s impairments did 

not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. 

Part P, Appendix 1. (Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff has the residual functional 

capacity to perform a range of light work. (Id. at 15.) Although the ALJ determined 

Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work, he found that there were jobs 

that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could 

perform. (Id. at 23–24.) The ALJ therefore concluded Plaintiff was not disabled as 

defined in the Social Security Act since July 25, 2013. (Id. at 24.)

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Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which 

the Appeals Council denied on October 17, 2016. (AR at 1–3.) Thereafter, Plaintiff 

filed the present case on December 16, 2016.

II.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises three arguments in her motion for summary judgment. First, 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony. Second, Plaintiff 

argues the ALJ erred by according little weight to her treating psychiatrist’s opinion. 

Lastly, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of three 

social workers. Defendant disputes there was anything improper about the ALJ’s 

analysis, and urges the Court to affirm the ALJ’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request 

for SSI benefits.

A. Legal Standard

Under the Social Security Act, “disability” is defined as the: 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be so severe that the claimant “is 

not only unable to do his previous work but cannot ... engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the impairment 

must result “from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which 

are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques.” Id. 

at § 423(d)(3).

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the Commissioner’s 

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in 

the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 

(9th Cir. 1989); Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. 

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Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 

749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. 

Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s 

decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the 

decision of the ALJ. Walker v. Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A 

court may not affirm the Commissioner’s decision simply by isolating a specific 

quantum of supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 

1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that supports the Commissioner’s 

conclusions and that which does not. Martinez, 807 F.2d at 772.

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the ALJ, the decision 

must be upheld even when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v. Secretary, 602 

F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979), and even when the evidence is susceptible to more 

than one rational interpretation. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 

1984). If supported by substantial evidence, the findings of the Commissioner as to 

any fact will be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710, 712 

(9th Cir. 1981).

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony

The ALJ is required to make “‘a credibility determination with findings 

sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

discredit claimant’s testimony.’” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002)). To 

determine whether a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is 

credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). First, “‘the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

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has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Ghanim 

v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 

586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009)). If the claimant satisfies this first step, “and there is no 

evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of the symptoms if [he] gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for 

the rejection.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.

2007)).

“In weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider his reputation for 

truthfulness, inconsistencies either in his testimony or between his testimony and his 

conduct, his daily activities, his work record, and testimony from physicians and 

third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which he 

complains.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996)). Even if one or more reasons 

listed by the ALJ are invalid, so long as the ALJ provides some valid reasons, the 

ALJ’s credibility determination will be upheld. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008).

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the first step. (AR at 23) (“After careful 

consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms[.]”). The ALJ, however, found that Plaintiff did not meet the second step 

because her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

[her] symptoms [were] not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this 

decision.” (Id.) Because there is no evidence in the administrative record to suggest 

malingering on Plaintiff’s part, the Court will evaluate whether the ALJ articulated 

specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. 

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Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not set forth clear and convincing reasons for 

discrediting her subjective complaints. Defendant, on the other hand, contends the 

ALJ provided the following reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony: (1) 

inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and daily activities, (2) 

inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s prior statements, (3) noncompliance with medication, 

and (4) improvement of Plaintiff’s symptoms with sobriety.

Initially, Defendant argues the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s daily activities to 

establish that her testimony about her limitations was not as severe as she claimed.

An adverse credibility determination may be made if either Plaintiff’s activity 

contradicts her testimony or her activity meets the threshold for transferable work 

skills. Phillips v. Colvin, 61 F. Supp. 3d 925, 944 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 625 (9th Cir. 2007)). In discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, the 

ALJ stated the following: 

The claimant’s statements are not fully credible. She says she has made 

one friend, someone in one of her groups. On the other hand, she claims 

inability to go out alone, and says she “tries” to get a friend to go every 

time she goes out. She goes to the store three times a week. She goes 

to AA meetings every week. She goes to church. She goes to group 

meetings; she goes to medical and to mental health appointments. She 

travels only by public transportation.

(AR at 18.) 

The ALJ, however, does not explain how Plaintiff’s description of her daily 

activities is inconsistent with her complaints. He also failed to make any specific 

findings as to how Plaintiff’s daily activities could be transferred to a full-time job. 

Thus, without further explanation, the ALJ has failed to provide a specific, clear and 

convincing reason for relying on Plaintiff’s daily activities to discount her 

credibility. 

Next, the ALJ found that the inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s statements

undermined her credibility. In making a credibility determination, the ALJ may rely 

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on ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. A strong 

indicator of credibility is the consistency of the individual’s own statements made in 

connection with the claim for disability benefits and statements made to medical 

professionals. Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–7p. Further, conflicting or 

inconsistent testimony concerning alcohol or drug use can contribute to an adverse 

credibility finding. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002); 

Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the ALJ noted 

inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s prior statements to medical professionals regarding her 

alcohol use. On December 3, 2013, Plaintiff “denied consumption of alcohol during 

the last year, but members of her treatment team suspected continued drinking. One 

smelled alcohol on her breath on the same day she vomited in the waiting room.” 

(AR at 20, 635–36.) On May 20, 2014, Plaintiff reported “she was alcohol free, but 

has admitted she was not clean and sober until July 2014.” (Id. at 23, 873.) The 

Court finds that the ALJ reasonably considered these inconsistent statements in 

assessing Plaintiff’s credibility.1

 This constitutes a specific, clear and convincing 

reason supported by substantial evidence. 

The last two reasons cited by the ALJ in discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony are 

Plaintiff’s noncompliance with medication and improvement of Plaintiff’s 

symptoms with sobriety and compliance with medication. It is well-established that 

unexplained noncompliance with treatment reflects on a claimant’s credibility. See 

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (the ALJ may properly consider 

plaintiff’s “unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to ... follow a prescribed 

 1 The ALJ also considered inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s statements in her function 

report in assessing her credibility. In the report, Plaintiff stated she does not take 

care of any pets, whereas, she testified at the hearing that she keeps a dog in her 

apartment. (AR at 16.) Moreover, although Plaintiff stated “[s]he feeds herself once 

a week[,] [i]nconsistently, she said she prepares her own meals daily, frozen dinners 

and sandwiches.” (Id.) 

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course of treatment [in] cast[ing] doubt on the sincerity of [Plaintiff]’s pain 

testimony.”). Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff was chronically noncompliant with her 

treatment as she failed to take her diabetes medication. In support of his findings, 

the ALJ referred to several portions of the record where Plaintiff reported to medical 

professionals that “she was chronically non-compliant with her diabetic medication” 

and using alcohol. (AR at 22.) Neither Plaintiff’s testimony nor the record reveals 

Plaintiff’s reasons for her noncompliance with her course of treatment.

The ALJ further explained Plaintiff’s recent medical records reveal that 

“[w]hen clean and sober, the claimant ... is able to comply with medical advice and 

prescriptions[,]” and “she has functioned well.” (AR at 14, 21.) An impairment 

that can be effectively controlled with treatment is not disabling. Warre v. Comm’r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). As such, the effectiveness 

of a claimant’s medications is a proper reason to evaluate the credibility of a 

claimant’s allegations concerning her subjective symptoms. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 

947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing SSR 83–13). The ALJ referred to specific 

portions of the medical record in support of his findings:

A history states that the claimant had been sober since July 2014, and 

was in treatment and AA (Exhibit B16F, p. 14). An entry of November 

12, 2014, states that the claimant’s glucose was previously uncontrolled 

due to alcohol abuse, medication noncompliance. She was now in 

treatment and had been in treatment and AA She had been clean and 

sober for 120 days. (This is consistent with a July 2014 sobriety date). 

She was taking medication as prescribed (Exhibit B16F, p. 22). On 

January 16, 2015, the clinical note states that “... Sugars have improved 

over the last 6-9 months because the patient stopped drinking. Feeling

great” (Exhibit B16F, p. 30) (This is consistent with a July 2014 

sobriety date). On January 19, 2015, notes indicate the claimant’s 

hypertension is benign (Exhibit Bl6F, p. 31). 

Shortly after the claimant’s sobriety began, clinical notes show that she 

presented in an upbeat mood, with congruent affect. She was groomed 

and wearing clothing appropriate for the weather. She had no recent 

stressors. She participated in meetings, offering feedback and 

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suggestions and sharing in reading. She was cooperative and had an 

elevated mood. She was a quick learner and easily engaged. She was 

a hard worker, and she was taking action toward personal change. Her

mood was cheerful, her affect bright. She participated actively, and 

obtained bus directions to church. She agreed to act as an example of 

a success story, and allowed mention of her name in the newsletter. She 

reported her AA meetings, her church, and a desire to become a peer 

support specialist. She reported, “One thing I enjoy about being sober 

is that I can help other people” (Exhibit B17F, pp. 6-11). In December 

2014, she was going to church weekly; she had made a friend in a group 

(Exhibit Bl8F, pp. 33-34). In 2015, case manager Jackie Kamrin noted

significant improvement since the claimant’s sobriety date, July 6, 2014 

(Exhibit Bl8F, p. 71.)....

(AR at 22–23.) The ALJ properly inferred from such evidence that “Plaintiff’s 

symptoms are not as disabling as alleged, because they improved during periods 

where she was compliant with treatment and sobriety.” Burdo v. Colvin, No. C13-

0763-JCC, 2013 WL 6008500, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2013); see Murray v. 

Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-3122-FVS, 2014 WL 1233141, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 

2014) (the ALJ properly considered the fact that “plaintiff’s symptoms improve[d]

with medication and sobriety” in discrediting her credibility). Accordingly, the ALJ 

properly relied on evidence of Plaintiff’s noncompliance with medication and 

improvement with sobriety in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. As a result, these 

constitute specific, clear and convincing reasons supporting his decision to discount 

Plaintiff’s credibility. 

In sum, the ALJ has set forth “findings sufficiently specific to permit the 

reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s 

testimony.” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Bunnell, 947 

F.2d at 345–46). Because the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, 

this Court may not engage in second-guessing. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 

Accordingly, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s testimony based on specific 

credibility findings that are supported by the record.

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C. Treating Physician’s Opinion

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for 

rejecting the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Ronit Chernobelsky, M.D. To 

evaluate this claim, the Court must look to the law governing the evaluation of 

physician opinions in disability cases. The Ninth Circuit case law and Social 

Security Administration regulations distinguish the opinions of three types of 

physicians: “(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who 

examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who 

neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 830; 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. Generally, greater weight will be given to an opinion 

of a treating physician than a nontreating physician. ).” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing 

Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). In other words, the opinion 

of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than a nonexamining 

physician. Id.

As a general matter, a “treating physician’s medical opinion as to the nature 

and severity of an individual’s impairment must be given controlling weight if that 

opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in 

the case record.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

SSR 96–2p). Where the treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another 

doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 830. If the opinion of a treating physician is contradicted, the ALJ may reject that 

opinion provided “specific and legitimate reasons” are given which are supported by 

substantial record evidence. Id. The ALJ can satisfy this latter burden “by setting 

out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 

stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 

751.

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Initially, the ALJ accorded little weight to Dr. Chernobelsky’s opinion 

because it was premised on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ had 

properly discredited. The Ninth Circuit has explained that rejection of a treating 

physician’s opinion constitutes a specific and legitimate reason when the opinion is 

premised on a claimant’s own subjective complaints that the ALJ had properly 

discredited. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989); see Tommasetti, 533 

F.3d at 1041 (“An ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion if it is based ‘to a 

large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as 

incredible.”) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th 

Cir. 1999)). The ALJ explained he has given less weight to Dr. Chernobelsky’s 

opinion because “[he] appeared to accept at face value the claimant’s reported 

symptoms; objective findings and the record was a whole do not however support 

the degree of limitations opined.” (AR at 18.) This constitutes a specific and 

legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Chernobelsky’s opinion. 

The ALJ also discredited Dr. Chernobelsky’s opinion because it was 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s daily activities. Dr. Chernobelsky opined “the 

claimant’s functional limitations were generally in the marked or even extreme 

level.” (AR at 21.) However, the ALJ found that “[u]ltimately, the record reflects 

that when the claimant has been clean and sober, as she appears to have been 

throughout the majority of the adjudication period in this case (see below), she has 

functioned well.” (Id.) The ALJ explained Plaintiff was “able to function socially,

having attended AA meetings and church functions[,]” to live alone, “to get about 

on public transportation[,]” maintain family relationships, “to obtain assistance she 

needs or wants by choosing and applying to the organization or entity who can fill 

the need she has.” (Id.) The Court finds the ALJ articulated sufficiently specific 

and legitimate reason to discount Dr. Chernobelsky’s opinion. See Stewart v. Colvin, 

674 F. App’x 634, 635–36 (9th Cir. 2017) (“substantial evidence supported the 

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ALJ’s decision to give little weight to [treating physician’s] opinion regarding 

[claimant’s] functional limitations[,]” because “it was inconsistent with [claimant’s] 

own testimony regarding his daily activities”); Hensley v. Colvin, 600 F. App’x 526, 

527 (9th Cir. 2015) (permitting rejection of a medical opinion that is inconsistent 

with claimant’s reported daily activities).

Moreover, the ALJ noted the record did not support Dr. Chernobelsky’s 

opinion that “the claimant had four or more repeated episodes of decompensation, 

each of extended duration.” (AR at 12.) The ALJ explained as follows:

Since the Title 16 application date, the claimant has had one four-day 

hospital admission (July 2014) and one emergency room visit (April 

2015) for psychological reasons, in the context of the entire record these 

are isolated and do not reflect the claimant’s normal level of functioning 

longitudinally over any 12-month period. In fact, at least the April 2015 

emergency room visit did not reflect substantial mental status deficits.2

(AR at 12.) Therefore, the ALJ found, “Certainly, the record provides no discernible 

basis for Dr. Chernobelsky’s claim that there have been four episodes of 

decompensation of extended duration.” (Id.) This constitutes a sufficient and 

legitimate reason to discount Dr. Chernobelsky’s opinion. See Bray, 554 F.3d at 

1228 (stating that an ALJ is not required to accept any medical opinion that is “brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by” the record) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to Dr. 

Chernobelsky’s opinions.

D. Social Workers’ Opinions

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide germane reason for discrediting the 

opinions of three social workers, Matthew Stephens, Jackie Kamrin, and Mandy 

 2 The ALJ noted, “The only portion of the medical record related to the July 2014 

visit is a brief discharge note (BI SF /66-68), which does not provide details as to 

the nature of the admission; it is noted that the claimant was ‘assessed, stabilized on 

meds, and referred to t/u.’” (AR at 12.)

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Stephens. Social workers are not considered “acceptable medical sources” under the 

regulations. Kelly v. Astrue, 471 F. App’x 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1513(a)). Rather, social workers are considered “other sources” of evidence,

and their opinions are not entitled to the same weight as those of “acceptable medical 

sources.” Id. As such, their opinions are reviewed under the same standard used to 

evaluate lay witness testimony. Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 

(9th Cir. 2010). To discount the opinion of a social worker, the ALJ need only 

provide “reasons germane to each witness for doing so.’” Kelly, 471 F. App’x at 

676 (quoting Turner, 613 F.3d at 1223–24). 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ rejected Mr. Stephens’s testimony at the hearing 

without sufficient reasoning. At the hearing, Mr. Stephens testified regarding the

diagnosis of Plaintiff’s mental conditions and her symptoms. The ALJ rejected Mr. 

Stephens’s testimony pertaining to the “identification of the claimant’s mental 

impairments,” because he determined that Mr. Stephens “is not an ‘acceptable 

medical source’ as defined in SSR 06-03p, whose opinions may establish the 

diagnosis of impairments.” (AR at 17.) Indeed, opinions from “other sources,” such 

as a social worker, cannot establish the existence of a medically determinable 

impairment. Hopkins v. Colvin, No. ED CV 14-0657-DFM, 2015 WL 4607876, at 

*6 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2015) (citing SSR 06–03p). The ALJ, however, recognized 

that Mr. Stephen’s opinions constitute “other sources” and considered his testimony 

as to Plaintiff’s “symptoms, ... in assessing [her] residual functional capacity.” (Id.) 

Therefore, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ considered Mr. Stephens’s 

testimony regarding Plaintiff’s symptoms and provided germane reasons for 

rejecting his testimony pertaining to Plaintiff’s medical diagnosis.

Next, the Court also finds that the ALJ did not err in according little weight to 

Ms. Karmin’s opinion. The ALJ rejected Ms. Karmin’s opinion in this case, in part, 

because it consisted of reiteration of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ

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found were not entirely credible. See Bolar v. Astrue, No. ED CV 10-1748 PJW, 

2011 WL 5036826, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011) (finding the ALJ provided 

germane reasons for rejecting social worker’s opinion “because it consisted of a 

reiteration of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints”). The ALJ explained Ms. Karmin’s 

third party function report “is worded in general, unquantified terms, and appears to 

be a repetition of the claimant’s subjective statements[,]” and “no objective basis for 

these claimed levels of impairment are provided[.]” (AR at 16.) Moreover, the ALJ 

declined to give substantial weight to Ms. Karmin’s report because it included 

statements that “amount[] to a medical or psychiatric opinion from one who is not 

an acceptable medical source ..., and impinges on an issue reserved for decision by 

the Social Security Administration[.]” (Id. at 17.) Accordingly, the ALJ provided 

germane reasons for discrediting Ms. Karmin’s opinion.

Lastly, the ALJ also provided germane reasons for according less weight to 

Ms. Stephens’s opinion. The ALJ found Ms. Stephens’s third party function report 

contained “recitation of the claimant’s reported symptoms.” (AR at 18.) The ALJ 

also noted Ms. Stephens’s observation of Plaintiff’s symptoms “do not, in the 

context of the ... record herein, suggest, much less establish, greater functional 

restrictions than found herein.” (Id.) Moreover, in discounting Ms. Stephens’s 

opinion, the ALJ noted the statements in her report “are not vocationally meaningful 

or helpful in determining claimant’s residual functional capacity.” (Id. at 17.) These 

reasons are germane to the witness and are supported by the record. Accordingly, 

the ALJ did not err in according little weight to the social workers’ opinions.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is 

denied, and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk 

shall enter judgment accordingly, and close this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2017

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