Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00462/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00462-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEVIN TREVONE LAMAR III,

Plaintiff,

v.

SONN, TOON, T. LEWIS, and FRANCO.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-00462-HBK (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR LAW LIBRARY ACCESS

(Doc. No. 6)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR 

FAILURE TO EXHAUST 

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 

AUGUST 8, 2023 DEADLINE

Devin Trevone Lamar III is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil rights action. (Doc. Nos. 1, 5). Plaintiff’s Complaint is pending screening under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A. (Doc. No. 5). As set forth below, the undersigned directs Plaintiff to show 

cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Also pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Law Library Access. (Doc. No. 6). For the reasons set 

forth below, the undersigned denies Plaintiff’s Motion.

MOTION FOR LIBRARY ACCESS

On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed an untitled document addressed “to whom if may 

concern” in which he states, “I need . . . to be allowed access to the law library here at the County 

Jail. I need an order to show cause or a request for an informal response on the case.” (Doc. No. 

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6 at 1). Notably, the document does not contain a caption, i.e., neither the names of the parties 

nor the case number appears at the top of the document. The document fails to comport with this 

Court’s procedural rules and local rules. (See Doc. No. 3 at ¶¶ C, E, F advising pro se prisoner of 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, Local Rules 131, 133). Plaintiff is cautioned that any future deficient pleadings 

will be stricken. Nonetheless, the Court will address the document, which liberally construed, 

requests court-ordered access to the prison’s law library. 

As a prisoner, Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected right of access to courts guaranteed by 

the Fourteenth Amendment. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). Implicit within this right of 

access to the courts is the prisoner’s right to have access to adequate law libraries or legal assistance 

from trained individuals. “[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires 

prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by 

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the 

law.” Id. at 828 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Precedent “does not dictate a minimum number 

of hours or any other requirement for satisfying the right of access.” Witkin v. Swarthout, 2013 WL 

6054451, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013). “[T]he Constitution does not guarantee a prisoner 

unlimited access to the law library; prison officials of necessity must regulate the time, manner and 

place in which library facilities are used.” Harris v. Yates, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3829, *4 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) (citing Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. Of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). “The 

fact that a prisoner must wait for a turn to use the library does not necessarily mean that he has been 

denied meaningful access to the courts.” Harris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *4-5 (citing Lindquist, 

776 F.2d at 858). Because there is no established minimum requirement for satisfying the access 

requirement; “a reviewing court should focus on whether the individual plaintiff before it has been 

denied meaningful access.” Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir.1989) (internal quotations 

omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that for a prisoner to establish that his access to the courts was 

violated “because of inadequate access to a law library [he] must establish two things: First, he must 

show that the access was so limited as to be unreasonable. Second, he must show that the inadequate 

access caused him actual injury, i.e., show a ‘specific instance in which [he] was actually denied 

access to the courts.’” Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Sands v. Lewis, 886 

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F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff does not plead facts sufficient to establish that he is suffering from inadequate 

access to a law library. He states only that “need[s] to be allowed access to the law library here at 

the County Jail.” (Doc. No. 6 at 1). He also does not plead any facts showing injury from his 

allegedly inadequate law library access. Additionally, Plaintiff is no longer confined in the 

Fresno County Jail, so any claims for injunctive relief to jail officials as mooted by his transfer. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s construed motion for law library access is denied.

PLAINTIFF’S EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Plaintiff acknowledges on the face of his Complaint that he has not exhausted his

administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 1 at 3-5). Indeed, Plaintiff admits he did not appeal his 

claims to the highest level, stating “I was transferred to C.D.C.R.” (Id.).

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with 

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a condition precedent to filing a 

civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 

F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a 

precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to 

suit.” (citations omitted)). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison 

life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the nature of the relief sought by the 

prisoner or the relief offered by the prison’s administrative process is of no consequence. Booth 

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And, because the PLRA’s text and intent requires 

“proper” exhaustion, a prisoner does not satisfy the PLRA’s administrative grievance process if 

he files an untimely or procedurally defective grievance or appeal. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. A 

prisoner need not plead or prove exhaustion. Instead, it is an affirmative defense that must be 

proved by defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). A prison’s internal grievance 

process, not the PLRA, determines whether the grievance satisfies the PLRA exhaustion 

requirement. Id. at 218. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the 

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face of the complaint. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Plaintiff appears to suggest that his failure to exhaust is excused because he was 

transferred. There is general agreement among the courts that a prisoner's transfer to another 

institution does not, by itself, render the grievance procedure unavailable to excuse exhaustion.

Falls v. Perez, No. 5:19-02311-JWH (ADS), 2023 WL 2558551, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2023), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19-02311 JWH (ADS), 2023 WL 3821160 (C.D. Cal. 

June 5, 2023) (citing Beckwith v. McCullough, No. EDCV16662MWFMRW, 2017 WL 1377732, 

at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) (“[a] prisoner's transfer to another institution ordinarily does not 

excuse the failure to exhaust or render the grievance procedure unavailable”); Howard v. Baca, 

No. CV 10–5081 JFW (OP), 2011 WL 55770086 at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (similar); Flournoy v. 

Navarro, No. CV 05–7708 PA (FFM), 2008 WL 4184650 at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (similar)).

Based on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff admits he did not exhaust his administrative 

remedies prior to filing this case. Accordingly, within fourteen days of the date of service of this 

Order, Plaintiff shall show cause in writing why this action should not be dismissed for failure to 

exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff is warned that if he commenced this action before 

exhausting his administrative remedies, a dismissal on this basis counts as a strike under 1915(g). 

El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2016).

1 Alternatively, to avoid a strike, 

Plaintiff may file a notice to voluntarily dismiss this action without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 41. Plaintiff may then refile his claim a new complaint after he fully exhausts his 

administrative remedies. Failure to respond to this Order will result in the recommendation that 

this action be dismissed for failure to exhaust and/or failure to comply with a court order. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s construed motion for law library access (Doc. No. 6), is DENIED.

2. No later than August 8, 2023, Plaintiff shall deliver to correctional officials for 

1 Under § 1915(g), prisoners who have brought unsuccessful suits may be barred from bringing a civil 

action and paying the fee on a payment plan once they have had on prior occasions three or more cases 

dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 

1723 (2020); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.2d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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mailing his response to this Order to Show Cause and explain why this action should not be 

dismissed for his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. In the 

alternative, Plaintiff may file a notice of voluntarily dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 to avoid a 

strike by the same date. 

3. Plaintiff’s failure to timely to respond to this order may result in the recommendation 

that this action be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to 

initiating this action and/or failure to comply with a court order. 

Dated: July 13, 2023 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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