Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01774/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01774-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 07CV1774 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCE VIANE MISA,

Petitioner,

v.

V.M. ALMAGUER,

Respondent. 

 

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Civil No. 07-1774-LAB(LSP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Vince Viane Misa, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

(“Petitioner”), has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior

Court conviction in case number SCN179647 for committing torture,

two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and enhancement

allegations. Respondent, V.M. Almager, Warden (“Respondent”), has

filed an Answer to the Petition. Petitioner has filed a Traverse to

the Answer.

The Court has considered the Petition and Exhibits, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse and all the supporting

documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents, and

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for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the California

Court of Appeal opinion, People v. Vince V. Misa, No. SCN179647.

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct. 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2254(e)(1); see also

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 25-26 (1992) (holding findings of

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such

facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The

facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are substantially as

follows:

In the early morning hours of April 25, 2004, Misa, Billy

Newton, Joe Salazar, Kevin Hoock, Isaiah Coates and Dale Logie were

smoking methamphetamine (with the exception of Logie, who was

“shooting up”) in Logie’s Oceanside apartment. After they ran out

of drugs, Logie left the apartment to get more; shortly after his

return, Misa, Newton and Salazar left, taking some of the drugs with

them. Just after dawn, Misa, Newton and Salazar returned to Logie’s

apartment. Salazar and Misa were each upset with Hoock who had

apparently stolen some items belonging to them.

Misa, who is of Samoan descent, is 6 foot, 3 inches tall and

weighs approximately 300 pounds, talked to Logie in the garage, where

he picked up a golf club (driver) and started swinging it around.

Sometime between 7:15 and 7:30 a.m., Misa went into the apartment and

approached Hoock from behind. Hoock was sitting on a couch in

Logie’s living room. Misa used the golf club to strike Hoock

forcefully on the top of the head. Hoock fell to the floor and began

to convulse; his skull was “cracked like an egg,” exposing brain

tissue, and he was bleeding profusely.

Misa was very angry, yelling at Hoock and saying “you don’t

steal from me or my old lady,” “you’re going to pay for this” and

“I’m going to teach you a fucking lesson.” He taunted Hoock as he

poked and prodded Hoock with the club and swung it near Hoock. After

Hoock raised his hands to protect his head, Misa accused Hoock of

trying to grab the golf club and either hit, or threatened to hit,

Hoock again. The testimony of more than one witness suggested that

Misa continued to harass Hoock in this manner for 15 to 30 minutes.

Misa used the same club to hit Coates, who was sitting across from

Hoock, solidly in the chest, knocking the wind out of Coates. Misa

then gave up the club to Newton.

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Thereafter, Misa and Logie went between the apartment and

garage numerous times over the next 20 to 45 minutes, eventually

leaving the apartment to go to the grocery store to buy breakfast

food. Although Salazar, Newton and Coates each believed Hoock needed

to be taken to the hospital, none of them called 911 out of fear of

retribution from Misa. Instead, Newton and Salazar, who had some

emergency medical training, tended to Hoock’s wound and tried to keep

him awake.

By the time Misa and Logie returned with the groceries,

Hoock’s condition had worsened. He was still bleeding quite a bit,

vomiting intermittently and lapsing in and out of consciousness.

Salazar told Misa that Hoock needed to go to the hospital, but Misa

responded “he’s not going anywhere . . . [h]e still has questions to

answer.” Misa started to harass Hoock again until Salazar agreed to

cook breakfast; Misa and Logie sat across from Hoock as the two ate.

After Misa and Logie finished eating, they left the apartment,

sometime during the noon hour. After they left, Salazar and Newton

took Hoock for medical treatment.

At that time, Hoock was incoherent, almost unconscious and

could not walk on his own. He had a six-centimeter laceration on the

top of his head and suffered from intracranial hemorrhaging. His

injuries were such that the treating physician thought he was likely

to have permanent impairment as a result of the attack. Hoock was

comatose for ten days and remained in the hospital for more than two

weeks.

In late May, Salazar had Newton turn over the golf club to

police. In June, officers searched Logie’s apartment; although some

of the furniture had been removed and other items had been moved to

cover areas where Hoock had laid bleeding, the officers found specks

of dried blood, later identified as Hoock’s on other furniture, walls

and the pad underneath the carpeting. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at 2-4.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2001, the District Attorney for the County of San

Diego filed an Information charging Petitioner with one count of

torture (Cal. Penal Code sec. 206) and two counts of assault with a

deadly weapon by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury

[Cal. Penal Code sec. 245(a)(1)]. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 9 at 1-2.)

It was further alleged that Petitioner suffered probation denial

priors [Cal. Penal Code § 1203(e)(4)], two prison priors [Cal. Penal

Code sec. 667.5(b)], a serious felony prior [Cal. Penal Code sec.

667(a)(1)], and a strike prior [Cal. Penal Code sec. 667(b)-(I) and

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Cal. Penal Code sec. 1170.12.] (Id. at 1, 156.)

On March 7, 2005, a jury found Petitioner guilty on the count

of torture and both counts of assault with a deadly weapon likely to

produce great bodily injury. (Id. at 75-77; Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at

4.) On April 22, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for a New Trial,

which was denied on April 29, 2005. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 9 at 149,

243.)

On April 29, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate life term plus six years and a determinate term of 12 years.

(Id. at 244.)

On October 26, 2005, Petitioner appealed his convictions to

the California Court of Appeal. (See Resp’t Lodgment No. 1.)

Petitioner argued (1) the torture conviction was based on insufficient evidence, (2) Cal. Penal Code sec. 206 is so vague that its

application to him violated his due process right to fair warning

and notice of the proscribed conduct, and (3) the court erred in

imposing the serious felony prior enhancement twice, because this

case was not a third strike case in which an indeterminate term must

be imposed for all current felonies. (Id. at 19, 32, and 42.) On

April 23, 2006, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 4.)

On July 21, 2006, Petitioner sought review of the Court of

Appeal’s decision in a Petition for Review to the California Supreme

Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 7.) On October 11, 2006, the California

Supreme Court denied the Petition without comment. (Resp’t Lodgment

No. 8.)

On April 16, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) On September 8, 2008, Respondent

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filed an Answer (“Answer”) to the Petition. On October 27, 2008,

Petitioner filed a Traverse to Respondents Answer. 

IV. DISCUSSION

28 United States Code, sec. 2254(a), sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2254(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added).

The current petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(d)(1)-(2)(emphasis added)

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy

either sec. 2254(d)(1) or sec. 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 403 (2003). The Supreme Court interprets sec. 2254

(d)(1) as follows: 

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

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6 07CV1774 

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Id. at 412-13; Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the states highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a

state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a

habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” Id., the state

court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal

law. Id.

A federal habeas corpus petition must allege a deprivation of

one or more federal rights to present a cognizable claim pursuant to

sec 2254. A state’s interpretation of its laws or rules provides no

basis for federal habeas corpus relief because no federal constitutional question arises. Estelle c. McGuire, 502 U.S.62, 68 (1991)

(federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law,

and federal courts may not reexamine state court determinations on

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state law issues). As amended, § 2254(e)(1) provides: “[A]

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2254(e)(1). 

Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights to due

process, fair warning and notice of the proscribed conduct were

violated, and that there was an unreasonable application of

controlling precedent regarding his sentencing enhancement. Thus,

this federal court may only grant habeas relief where the state

court arrived at a decision with regard to Petitioner’s claims that

were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law.

 Analysis

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: (1) the torture

conviction was based on insufficient evidence; (2) Cal. Penal Code

sec. 206 is so vague that its application to him violated his due

process right to fair warning and notice of the proscribed conduct;

and (3) the court erred in imposing the serious felony prior

enhancement twice, because this case was not a third strike case in

which an indeterminate term must be imposed for all current

felonies.

Respondent contends the state court’s decision, which found

substantial evidence to support Petitioner’s torture conviction, was

reasonable and is entitled to deference. Respondent argues that the

state court’s decision that Cal. Penal Code sec. 206 is not

unconstitutionally vague is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, United States Supreme Court authority. Respondent

also argues Petitioner’s third ground for relief fails to state a

cognizable basis for habeas corpus relief and the state court’s

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decision is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

controlling precedent.

1. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction for torture under Cal. Penal Code sec. 206.

Petitioner raised this claim on direct review to the California

Court of Appeal and the court denied it in a reasoned decision.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 4.) Petitioner again raised the claim in his

Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court and the court

denied the petition without comment or citation. (Resp’t Lodgment

No. 8.) 

Respondent asserts that the state court’s decision finding

substantial evidence to support Petitioner’s torture conviction was

reasonable, as the court reached this decision after considering the

totality of the circumstances. (Answer at 7.) 

Accordingly, this Court must look through to the opinion of

the Court of Appeal, as it was the last reasoned state-court

decision, to determine whether the state court’s determination of

the merits of the claim was contrary to, or involved an objectively

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as set

forth by the United States Supreme Court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797 (1991).

In denying the claim, the court stated:

Misa challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

his torture conviction. He contends, in part, that the evidence

introduced at trial does not support the jury’s findings that he

acted with the specific intent to cause cruel or extreme pain or

that he acted for revenge, persuasion or any sadistic purpose. We

conclude that under the standards for establishing torture as set

forth by the California Supreme Court precedents, Misa’s argument is

not well-taken.

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The court continued its analysis by stating:

Section 206 provides that “[e]very person who, with the

intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose

of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose,

inflicts great bodily injury . . . upon the person of another, is

guilty of torture.” The intent necessary for torture, that is, to

cause cruel or extreme pain, does not require that the defendant

acted with premeditation or deliberation or had the intent to

inflict prolonged pain. Direct evidence of specific intent is

rarely available, although the circumstances surrounding the offense

or other circumstantial evidence may permit an inference that one

acted with the intent to inflict cruel or extreme pain. Here, the

circumstantial evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable trier

of fact to conclude that Misa acted with “the cold-blooded intent to

inflict pain for personal gain or satisfaction,” as necessary to

support a conviction for torture. (citations omitted.)

In a sufficiency of evidence claim, clearly established law

requires the court determine whether “any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979);

Mikes v. Borg, 847 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1991). In making this

determination, the Court is not “to ask itself whether it believes

that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318. Rather this Court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and must

presume the trier of fact resolved the conflicting evidence in favor

of the prosecution. Id. at 316, 326; Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907,

908-09 (9th Cir. 1994). Under Jackson, this Court must look to the

state criminal law in determining whether a fact finder could have

found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443

U.S. at 324.

California Penal Code sec. 206 requires proof that:

(1) A person inflicted great bodily injury upon the person of

another; and

 (2) The person inflicting the injury did so with the specific

intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the

purpose of revenge or for any sadistic purpose.

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“Great bodily injury” means a significant or substantial

physical injury.

The crime of torture does not require any proof that the perpetrator intended to kill the other person or the person upon whom the

injury was inflicted suffered pain.

California Jury Instructions - Criminal (“CALJIC”) No. 9.90; see

also Resp’t Lodgment No. 9 at 53.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict, a reasonable juror could have found Petitioner guilty of

violating sec. 206 beyond a reasonable doubt. The state court found

the use of a golf driver with a substantial head, to strike Hoock in

the head, inflicted great bodily injury. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at

6.) The great bodily injury consisted of a blow with sufficient

force to crack Hoock’s skull at a location where the skull was close

to half an inch thick, Hoock lapsing in and out of consciousness,

and Petitioner’s callous refusal to allow others to take Hoock to

the hospital for treatment. (Id. at 6-7.) Additionally, the state

court noted Hoock’s treating physician thought Hoock was likely to

suffer permanent impairment as a result of the strike to the head by

the golf club. (Id. at 3-4.) Since great bodily injury is defined

as a significant or substantial physical injury, this Court cannot

conclude that these facts are insufficient for a reasonable juror to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner inflicted great

bodily injury upon the person of another as defined by CALJIC No.

9.90.

The great bodily injury must be inflicted with the specific

intent to cause cruel or extreme pain or suffering for the purpose

of revenge or for any sadistic purpose. Cal. Penal Code sec. 206.

Petitioner taunted, poked and prodded Hoock for 30 minutes after he

struck Hoock on the head. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at 6.) Petitioner

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intended to inflict cruel and extreme pain and suffering, which is

evidenced by his callous behavior when he would not allow others to

take Hoock to the hospital for treatment. (Id. at 3, 7) Petitioner

proceeded to eat breakfast while Hoock lay on the floor bleeding,

convulsing, and vomiting. (Id. at 2, 7) Petitioner yelled profanities at Hoock, including statements such as, “you don’t steal from

me or my old lady,” “you’re going to pay for this,” and “I’m going

to teach you a fucking lesson.” (Id. at 2, 6) This Court cannot

conclude that these statements failed to provide the court with

sufficient evidence that Petitioner intended that Hoock suffer cruel

or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, as

Petitioner inflicted the injuries in response to Hoock stealing from

him and his girlfriend. (Id. at 2, 6-7.)

These facts, coupled with those discussed above, lead this

Court to conclude that a jury had sufficient evidence to convict

Petitioner on the count of torture, as defined by the elements of

Cal. Penal Code sec. 206. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Therefore,

the state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of clearly established law. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254. Petitioner is

not entitled to relief as to this claim. As a result, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim be DENIED.

2. Challenge to sec. 206 as Vague

Petitioner claims Cal. Penal Code sec. 206 is so vague that

its application to him violates his federal due process right to

fair warning and notice of the proscribed conduct, under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments. (Petition at 15.) Specifically,

Petitioner argues the phrases “cruel or extreme pain or suffering,”

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1 Petitioner cites a number of California cases which define the

various elements of Cal. Penal Code sec. 206. However, this Court

is not bound by California law and therefore any precedent set by

the California Courts interpreting the meaning of the phrases called

into question by the Petitioner is inapplicable in considering a

federal Petition for Writ for Habeas Corpus.

12 07CV1774 

“revenge,” “any sadistic purpose,” and “torture” are vague provisions within Cal. Penal Code sec. 206.1 (Id. at 15-22.) 

Respondent asserts Petitioner’s vagueness claim does not

warrant federal habeas relief because the California Court of

Appeal’s decision that the state torture statute provides adequate

notice of the conduct prohibited by the statute, is not contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of United States authority. (Answer

at 11.)

If a statute fails to provide adequate notice to ordinary

people of the kind of conduct prohibited or if the statute authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, then it is void for

vagueness. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). A statute

will not be enforced if it is deemed that the terms are “so vague

that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its

meaning and differ as to its application.” United States v. Lanier,

520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997.) In the absence of a statutory definition

of terms, courts construe the statutory term in accordance with its

ordinary or natural meaning. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476

(1994); Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993.)

Here, Petitioner argues that the phrase “cruel or extreme

pain or suffering” is vague, yet offers no Supreme Court authority

interpreting the phrase. It is incumbent on Petitioner to establish

the vagueness and its relation to federal authority. Looking at the

ordinary meaning of each word and the words collectively, a person

of common intelligence would have no trouble understanding either

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2 In Mishkin v. State of N.Y., 383 U.S. 502 (1966), the court stated

the term sadistic is synonymous with the term obscene for purpose of

a criminal obscenity statute and held the term “sadistic” was not

vague. However, as the issue in Mishkin was a criminal obscenity

statute, the case and the court’s interpretation of the word

‘sadistic’ is not applicable here.

13 07CV1774 

the meaning of the words or the conduct prohibited. “Cruel” means

“disposed to inflict pain especially in a wanton insensate or

vindictive manner.” [Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

546 (3d ed. 1968)] (“Webster’s”). “Extreme” means “existing in the

highest or greatest possible degree.” (Id. at 807). “Pain” means “a

state of physical or mental lack of well-being or physical or mental

uneasiness that ranges from mild discomfort or dull distress to

acute often unbearable agony, may be generalized or localized and is

the consequence of being injured or hurt physically or mentally.”

(Id. at 1621). “Suffering” means “the endurance of or submission to

affliction, pain, loss.” (Id. at 2284) Consequently, considering the

ordinary meaning of these words, when taken together in context, a

person of common intelligence would not have to guess at its

meaning, nor would it differ in its application. Lanier, 520 U.S. at

266. Therefore, this phrase is not unconstitutionally vague.

Petitioner claims the phrase “any sadistic purpose” is vague

within Cal. Penal Code sec. 206, because “sadism”is defined in terms

of sexual gratification. (Petition at 21.) Petitioner fails to cite

to any federal authority to support his argument. The meaning of

“sadistic” is not defined in any Supreme Court case in connection

with torture2, so the Court looks to the ordinary meaning of the

word. “Sadistic” means “of or characterized by sadism.” (Webster’s

at 1998). One meaning of sadism is “delight in physical or mental

cruelty.” (Id.) Taking the meaning in the context of the statute,

a person of ordinary intelligence would not have to guess at the

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3 However, had Petitioner asserted the that word “revenge” was vague,

that argument would have failed. While there is no Supreme Court

authority interpreting the word “revenge,” the Court looks to the

ordinary meaning of the word. “Revenge” means “to avenge or seek

vengeance for a wrong done.” (Webster’s at 1942). A person of

common intelligence would not have to guess at the meaning of the

word “revenge,” and therefore, it is not vague. Lanier, 520 U.S. at

266.

14 07CV1774 

meaning of “any sadistic purpose.” Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266.

Therefore, this phrase is not unconstitutionally vague.

Petitioner argues that “torture” as used in Cal. Penal Code

sec. 206 is vague. Specifically, Petitioner argues that in order to

prove “torture,” a jury must find “infliction of extreme and

prolonged pain.” Since “infliction of extreme and prolonged pain”

was not part of the jury instructions in this case, the term

“torture” is vague. (Petition at 23.) The Supreme Court has not

interpreted Cal. Penal Code sec. 206 or any other similar state

torture statute. “Torture” means “the infliction of intense pain

(as from burning, crushing, wounding) to punish or coerce someone .

. . to cause intense suffering to inflict anguish on . . . subject

to severe pain.” (Webster’s at 2414). These various definitions of

“torture” are clear enough that people of ordinary intelligence

would not have to guess at the meaning of “torture.” Lanier, 520

U.S. at 266. Petitioner’s argument fails as this word is not

unconstitutionally vague.

Petitioner argues for exclusion of the word “revenge” from Cal.

Penal Code sec. 206. (Petition at 19.) However, Petitioner also

concedes the word has a settled meaning, and therefore discredits

his own argument that “revenge” is vague.3 (Id. at 20.) However,

Petitioner asserts that the inclusion of the word “revenge” in Cal.

Penal Code sec. 206 renders virtually any aggravated assault in

violation of Cal. Penal Code sec. 245 which results in great bodily

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injury as torture under sec. 206. (Id.) 

As defined in Cal. Penal Code sec. 240, “assault is an unlawful

attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury

on the person of another.” Cal. Penal Code sec. 240. The statute

Petitioner refers to Cal. Penal Code sec. 245, which establishes the

punishment for an assault which utilizes “a deadly weapon or

instrument other than a firearm or by any means of force likely to

produce great bodily injury.” Cal. Penal Code sec. 245. Neither of

these statutes uses the word “revenge,” unlike Cal. Penal Code sec.

206. Moreover, a person could not be charged with a violation of

Cal. Penal Code sec. 206 if he/she committed an aggravated assault

resulting in great bodily injury, thus violating Cal. Penal Code

sec. 245, “even including situations of mutual combat, where all

parties attempt to inflict counter blows.” (Petition at 20.) A

person could violate Cal. Penal Code sec. 245 through a single blow

with his/her fist to the face of another, yet not violate Cal. Penal

Code sec. 206 so long as the requisite intent of Cal. Penal Code

sec. 206 is not present. Therefore, Petitioners argument fails.

Therefore, the California Court of Appeal’s determination,

which rejected Petitioner’s contentions that an ordinary person

cannot understand the conduct prohibited by Cal. Penal Code sec.

206, is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. No such precedent exists

regarding Cal. Penal Code sec. 206 or any similar state torture

statute. 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2254(d)(1)-(2) Despite the lack of

precedent, the meaning of the words of Cal. Penal Code sec. 206 are

not such that a person of common intelligence would have to guess at

their meaning, whether taken individually as Petitioner challenges

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4 The court recognized that unlike the defendant in Williams,

Petitioner had two strikes. However, the court determined that

regardless of that fact, Petitioner was a recidivist, and therefore

the analysis of the applicable statutory scheme found in Williams

was applicable to Petitioner’s case.

5 Petitioner does not state if he is referring to the California

Constitution or some other authority when making this assertion.

16 07CV1774 

them or together as they appear in the language of the statute. As

a result, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s claims in this regard be

DENIED.

3. Imposition of the Serious Felony Prior Enhancement Twice

Petitioner asserts that the court erred when it imposed the

serious felony prior enhancement twice, since this case was not a

third strike case in which the court is required to impose an

indeterminate term for all current felonies. (Petition at 24.)

Petitioner claims that the court incorrectly relied on a California

Supreme Court ruling of People v. Williams, 34 Cal.4th 387 (2004).4

Id. Petitioner argues that he is only a two-strike defendant and is

therefore not subject to indeterminate terms for each of the current

felonies. Id. at 26-27. His arguments are based in a violation of

“due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and

similar state provisions under article I, sections 7 and 24.”5

(Petition at 24.)

Respondent argues that Petitioner fails to state a cognizable

basis for federal habeas relief. (Answer at 13.) Additionally,

Respondent states that the state court determination of the merits

of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling precedent. (Id.) Consequently, Respondent

argues that Petitioner has no justifiable claim to habeas corpus

relief.

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6 Cal. Penal Code § 667(a) provides: “[A]ny person convicted of a

serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony

. . . shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the

court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such

prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately. The terms

of the present offense and each enhancement shall run

consecutively.” 

17 07CV1774 

To receive federal habeas relief, the Petitioner must show (1)

the state court arrived at a decision opposite to a decision reached

by the U.S. Supreme Court on a question of law; or (2) the state

court identified the correct governing legal principle from the U.S.

Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applied the principle to

the facts of the present case. Williams, 259 U.S. at 412-13; Lockyer

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). “Whether a petition for writ

of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and

what allegations it must contain are questions for that court alone

to determine.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 379 (1999).

If a petitioner for habeas corpus relief wishes to claim a

violation of due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the

petitioner must do so in state court, in addition to doing so in

federal court. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)

Here, Petitioner generally alleges a violation of his due process

rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in both federal

court and in state court. (Petition at 24, Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at

42.) However, Petitioner fails to support his argument with any

federal authority. Instead, he only cites to California law. (Pet.

at 24-27)

Regardless, this Court is without jurisdiction to determine

whether the trial court’s sentencing of Petitioner violated Cal.

Penal Code sec. 667(a).6 A federal court may entertain a petition

for writ of habeas corpus only on the ground that the petitioner is

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“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. sec.2254(a) (emphasis added). A

state’s interpretation of its laws or rules provides no basis for

federal habeas corpus relief because no federal constitutional

question arises, unless there is a showing of fundamental unfairness. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, and federal

courts may not reexamine state court determinations on state law

issues); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1980)

(federal habeas courts must respect state court’s application of

state law; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990)

(federal courts have no authority to review state’s application of

state law.) 

The appellate court thoroughly analyzed Petitioner’s claim that

the trial court erred in applying the prior conviction enhancement

twice. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 4 at 9-13.) The court agreed with the

California Supreme Court decision in People v. Williams that People

v. Tassell, the case relied upon by Petitioner, utilized the

language of Cal. Penal Code sec. 1170.1 and not on Cal. Penal Code

sec. 667(a). (Id. at 10.) Cal. Penal Code sec. 1170.1 applies only

to determinate sentences. Here, Petitioner received indeterminate

sentences on the sentence enhancements. (Id.) Therefore, Petitioner’s argument was unpersuasive. Further, Petitioner fails to

make the requisite showing of a fundamental unfairness. Rather, he

only alleges that the court misapplied its own laws. Thus, this

Court gives deference to the state court determination.

Here, Petitioner bases his claim on a question of state law

rather than on a federal constitutional question. This Court finds

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19 07CV1774 

no United States Supreme Court precedent for which the state court’s

ruling could be considered to contradict or unreasonably apply

clearly established federal law. The reasoned decision from the

state court strictly interpreted its own laws. Therefore, Petitioner

has no basis for federal habeas corpus relief. As a result, the

decision of the state court will be given deference. The Court

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner be DENIED relief on this claim.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In sum, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED with prejudice on the merits.

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge Larry A. Burns under 28 U.S.C. sec. 636(b)(1)

and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined

above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1)

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2)

directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later then January 5, 2009, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

January 26, 2009. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

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F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 4, 2008

Hon. Leo S. Papas

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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