Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00963/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00963-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The court granted Grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this cause of action. Court Doc. No. 3. A 1

prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis will have his complaint screened under the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) which requires this court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it

determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE FRANK GRANT. JR., )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09-CV-963-TMH

) [WO]

)

OFFICER LUCAS, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Willie Frank Grant,

Jr. [“Grant”], a city inmate, in which Grant alleges constitutional violations related to his arrest on

September 28, 2009 and his resulting confinement in the Montgomery City Jail. Grant names

officers Lucas, Huffman and Clark, members of the Montgomery Police Department, Janice

Hopkins, warden of the city jail, and the City of Montgomery, Alabama as defendants in this cause

of action. 

Upon thorough review of the complaint, the court concludes that this case is due to be

summarily dismissed upon application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).1

 DISCUSSION

A. Pending Criminal Charges

Grant argues there is no valid basis for the criminal charges pending against him as such

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charges are the result of malicious prosecution. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 2. Under

the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971),

a federal court must refrain from interfering with pending state criminal proceedings “when the

moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable

relief.” The Younger abstention doctrine is premised upon a fundamental “public policy against

federal interference with state criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 43. In this case, Grant has an adequate

remedy at law because he may pursue any of his federal constitutional issues through the state court

system. See generally Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405 (11 Cir. 1985). Specifically, Grant can seek th

relief via pre-trial motions in the trial court and may pursue reconsideration of and/or appeal any

adverse decision issued by the trial court. Thus, he may attack the constitutionality of the

prosecution throughout the on-going state criminal proceedings, including post-conviction

proceedings. Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged the existence of any special circumstances

which create a threat of irreparable harm. The mere fact that Grant must endure state criminal

proceedings fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. This court must

therefore abstain from considering themerits of Grant’s claims which challenge the constitutionality

of the criminal charges pending against him as such claims are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action at this time. Id. at 43-44. Consequently, summary dismissal of the malicious prosecution

claim is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. September 28, 2009 Arrest

Grant complains that during his arrest defendant Lucas “push & elbow me in the chest while

I was handcuffed.” Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 3. He also asserts Lucas rubbed his

“brand new T-shirt on the wall & guard rail.” Id. Grant maintains defendants Clark and Huffman

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Regardless of Grant’s status at the time of his arrest, the applicable standard of review remains the same.

2

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th

Cir. 1997); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11 Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (“Claims involving the th

mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by

convicted prisoners.... However, the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates

applies equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees.”); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574

(11 Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096, 106 S.Ct. 1492 (1986) (For analytical purposes, there is no meaningful th

difference between the analysis required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that required by the Eighth Amendment.);

Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11 Cir. 1994) (observing that “[w]hether the alleged th

violation is reviewed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial.”).

3

observed these actions and failed to intervene on his behalf. Id. After review of the facts presented

in the complaint, it is clear that the arresting officers did not violate Grant’s constitutional rights.

2

“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures

encompasses the plain right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course

of an arrest.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109

S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). The question is whether [the arresting

officer] behaved reasonably in the light of the circumstances before him. Vinyard v.

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11 Cir. 2002). th

We have said that “Graham dictates unambiguously that the force used by a

police officer in carrying out an arrest must be reasonably proportionate to the need

for that force, which is measured by the severity of the crime, the danger to the

officer, and the risk of flight.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. “‘Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory

stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or

threat thereof to effect it.’” Id. at 1197 (quoting Graham, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-72).

“Use of force must be judged on a case-by-case basis from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11 2003) (emphasis added). 

th

The law is well settled that “[n]ot every push or shove ... violates a prisoner’s or [arrestee’s]

constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2 Cir. 1973), cited with approval nd

in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). An excessive force claim “necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not a

sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10, quoting Whitley v.

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Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505 (11 Cir.1996) (the th

application of de minimis force, without more, does not present a claim cognizable under the Eighth

Amendment). The Eleventh Circuit has likewise “established the principle that the application of

de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the

Fourth Amendment.” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11 Cir.2000) (arrest where suspect was th

grabbed from behind, thrown against van, kneed in back, uncomfortably searched in groin area, and

bruised on forehead, wrists, and chest was de minimis and not constitutionally actionable). 

The physical contact about which Grant complains alleges, at best, a “de minimis use[] of

physical force” which is excluded from “[t]he [Constitution’s] prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’

punishments” as such contact “is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson,

503 U.S. at 9-10; Rodriguez v. Farrell, 294 F.3d 1276, 1278-1279 (11 Cir. 2002) (no use of th

excessive force where officer continued to handcuff suspect after he alerted officer to arm injury);

Anderson v. Sullivan, 702 F.Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (officer who pushed prisoner into a bar and

put his hands behind his back to apply handcuffs did not administer excessive force). Moreover,

Lucas did not use any where near the amount of force in arresting Grant that the officer used in

Nolin. Thus, the use of force by Lucas against Grant clearly constitutes “a ‘de minimis’ amount of

force” in effectuating the arrest and Grant has therefore failed to set forth a cognizable excessive

force claim. Sullivan v. City of Pembroke Pines, 161 Fed.Appx. 906, 910 (11 Cir. 2006); Nolin,

th

207 F.3d at 1257.

To the extent Grant argues defendants Huffman and Clark acted with deliberate indifference

to his safety in failing to protect him from the force used by officer Lucas, he is likewise entitled to

no relief. Although “an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to

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protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force can be held personally liable for his

nonfeasance[,]” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11 Cir. 2002), the force utilized by th

Lucas was not excessive and, therefore, no liability attaches regarding the failure of Huffman and

Clark to intervene. 

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Grant’s claims related to the force used

against him during his arrest fail to state claims on which relief is due to be granted and such claims

are therefore subject to dismissal in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

C. Lack of Grievance Responses

Grant maintains defendant Hopkins violated his constitutional rights due to her failure to

provide responses to grievances he filed. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 3. In the

context of a jail setting, “an inmate grievance procedure is not constitutionally required.” Spencer

v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (citations omitted). “A prison grievance procedure is

a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not

give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the

fourteenth amendment.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8 Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v.

th

DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Thus, an official’s failure to respond to grievances

filed by an inmate provides no basis for relief in this cause of action. Brown v. Dodson, 863 F.Supp.

284 (W.D. Va. 1994); Azeez, supra. Consequently, this claim is due to be dismissed as frivolous

pursuant to the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

 CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case be

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dismissed with prejudice prior to service of process in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). It is further 

ORDERED that on or before November 9, 2009 the parties may file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v.

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661

F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former

Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 26 day of October, 2009. th

/s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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