Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00125/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00125-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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08cv125-JM (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST J. BROOKS,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Case No. 08cv125-JM (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR HABEAS

CORPUS, AND ORDER DENYING

MOTIONS FOR EVIDENTIARY

HEARING AND APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Jeffrey Miller pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. 

On January 22, 2008, Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing pro se,

filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus currently before this

Court. Doc. No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner challenges the validity of the

sexual molestation convictions for which he is incarcerated, arguing

that the state trial court improperly admitted evidence of prior,

similar acts. Pet. at 6-23. In June 2008, Respondent Ken Clark, warden

of the facility in which Petitioner is held, filed an answer and

accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, requesting that the

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Petitioner also named the California Attorney General, Edmund G. Brown, as a

respondent. Rule 2 of the Rules following § 2254 provides that the state officer

having custody of the petitioner shall be named as respondent. Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C.

foll. § 2254. The structure of the California penal system places prisoners in the

custody of both the Director of Corrections and the warden of the California prison

where the petitioner is incarcerated. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 895

(9th Cir. 1996). Thus, Ken Clark, the warden of the prison where Petitioner currently

is incarcerated, is a proper respondent, whereas Brown, the Attorney General of the

State of California, is not. Unfortunately, the attorneys for Respondents neither

moved to dismiss Respondent Brown as an improper party, nor filed an answer on his

behalf. See Answer at 1. This Court therefore refers only to Respondent Clark

throughout this Report and Recommendation. Because the Attorney General is an improper

respondent, however, this Court RECOMMENDS that the allegations against him be

DISMISSED and that he be terminated as a respondent in this case. 

2 08cv125-JM (BLM)

petition be denied.1 Doc. Nos. 9 (“Answer”) & 9-2 (“Resp. Mem.”).

Petitioner filed a traverse in August 2008 (Doc. No. 14, “Traverse”),

accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities (Doc. No. 14-2,

“Traverse Mem.”). In both the petition and traverse, Petitioner

requests an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel. Pet. at

8; Pet. Mem. at 2, 4, 10. This Court has carefully considered the above

documents, as well as the record as a whole. Based thereon, and for the

reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED. Petitioner’s requests for

an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel are DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was actively involved in his community’s youth program

and, in 2001, coached little league baseball and participated in a

program where he helped teen and pre-teen boys sell raffle tickets to

fund anti-drug programs. Lodg. 6 at 2 (opinion of California Court of

Appeal). After these activities, Petitioner frequently would invite the

children over for “sleepovers,” at which he would have boys sleep in his

bed and sexually molest them. Id. at 2-5. 

On March 12, 2002, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged

Petitioner with eight counts of committing lewd acts upon four children

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Lodgments 1 & 2 comprise the Clerk’s Transcript and Reporter’s Transcript,

respectively, of Petitioner’s trial. Hereafter, the Court cites these as “CT” and

“RT.”

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between May and September of 2001, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 288.

CT at 11-14.2 Before trial, the prosecutor moved to permit three adults

to testify that Petitioner had used his position as a youth leader in

the 1980's and 1990's to bring two of them, who were boys at the time,

to his house and molest them during similar, frequent “sleepovers.” RT

at 5-15. The prosecutor also sought to introduce testimony from a third

witness, who was a ward of the Court in Petitioner’s custody, that

Petitioner frequently molested him. Id. at 5-15, 597. The prosecutor

argued that the three witnesses’ testimony was relevant to show a

pattern of behavior by Petitioner and an awareness of wrongdoing, and

was therefore significantly more probative than prejudicial under Cal.

Evid. § 352. RT at 7-10. The defense argued that the proposed

testimony was highly prejudicial, because the prior acts alleged sodomy

and masturbation, while the current charges alleged “at most fondling.”

Id. at 6. 

Holding that the proposed testimony was “highly relevant, highly

probative,” the trial court agreed to allow the testimony under Cal.

Evid. § 1108, which permits evidence of prior sexual acts. RT at 12-13.

However, because the instant charges did not allege penetration of the

victims, and were thus of a lesser degree than those acts to which the

three witnesses might testify, the court prohibited the prosecutor from

making “any reference to sodomy.” Id. at 13. Nonetheless, one of the

adult witnesses testified that petitioner had sodomized him. RT at 473,

475. 

On April 15, 2002, the jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of

committing lewd acts on children under fourteen years old, in violation

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Petitioner initially filed a petition for habeas corpus in state superior court

during the pendency of his direct appeal. Lodg. 9 at E23-24. Because the direct

appeal was not yet final, the superior court denied the petition without prejudice for

lack of jurisdiction. Id. 

4

It appears that Petitioner omitted from the record in this case portions of his

second superior court petition and the court’s denial, both of which are part of the

record Petitioner attached to his habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal.

Lodg. 9. The superior court petition and denial begin at the section labeled E-1, and

are numbered consecutively until E-6, which is in the middle of the petition. Id. The

next page is numbered E-16, and is the second-to-last page of the superior court’s

denial. Id. Despite this gap, the Court finds the record to be complete for the

purpose of this order. 

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of Cal. Pen. Code § 288(a), and one count of committing lewd acts on a

child of fifteen years, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 288(c)(1), and

made a special finding that the offenses were committed against more

than one victim, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 667.61(b)(c)(e). CT

at 121-123. The court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of 33

years to life and then dismissed the remaining counts on which the jury

could not agree. Id. at 401-403, 449, 454; RT at 1408-1409, 1416(A)-

1418(C). The California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s direct

appeal in December 2003 (Lodg. 6), and the California Supreme Court

denied the petition for review in February 2004 (Lodg. 8). 

Petitioner filed his first valid3 petition for writ of habeas corpus

in state superior court on April 4, 2004, which the court denied on June

4, 2004. Lodg. 9 at E-16 to E-17.4

 On June 3, 2005, Petitioner filed

a habeas petition in the California court of appeal, which, in a brief

but reasoned opinion, that court denied on July 15, 2005. Lodg. 10. On

May 8, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the California Supreme Court. Lodg. 11. The supreme court summarily

denied the petition on January 17, 2007, with a citation to In re Dixon,

41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953). Lodg. 12. Petitioner filed the instant petition

for writ of habeas corpus on January 22, 2008. Pet. 

///

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This Court specifically instructed Respondent to address all “grounds upon which

Respondent contends dismissal without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s claims”

(i.e., a statute of limitations defense) in a motion to dismiss, not an answer. Doc.

No. 8. Although Respondent failed to heed this Court’s instructions, the Court

nonetheless addresses the statute of limitations. See Bryan v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499

F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (in habeas context, court may consider AEDPA statute

of limitations defense raised in respondent’s answer). 

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DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues that the San Diego Superior Court violated

California law and his right to a fair trial when it admitted testimony

concerning Petitioner’s prior acts of sexual molestation. Pet.;

Traverse. Therefore, Petitioner contends, the Court should grant the

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. Petitioner also requests an

evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel. Id. Respondent argues

that Petitioner’s claim does not sufficiently implicate questions of

federal law, such that the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the

petition. Resp. Mem. at 17-19. Respondent also argues that the

petition is time-barred by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act’s (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), “AEDPA”) statute of limitations (id.

at 4 n.3), which Petitioner does not contest. Respondent does not

address the request for an evidentiary hearing other than to say that it

should be denied (id. at 10, 19), and does not address Petitioner’s

request for appointment of counsel. 

A. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s petition is time-barred under

the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations. Resp. Mem. at 4 n.3.5

Timeliness under the statute of limitations is a “threshold issue” that

must be determined before consideration of a petition’s merits. White

v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002). Untimely petitions

are barred from federal review and must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). 

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AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for

writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Section 2244(d)’s one-year limitations period applies to all habeas

petitions filed by persons in “custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court.” Id. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period runs

from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Here, Petitioner challenges his trial and conviction, and the

statute of limitations thus began to run on “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2241(d)(1)(A).

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review of

his direct appeal on February 18, 2004. Lodg. 8. The statute of

limitations thus began ninety days later on May 18, 2004, after the time

expired during which Petitioner could have filed for certiorari in the

United States Supreme Court. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (9th

Cir. 1999) (confirming ninety-day rule). Accordingly, the AEDPA

limitations period expired one year later, on May 18, 2005. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition

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until January 22, 2008, it is untimely absent tolling.

1. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute of limitations

is not tolled, however, “from the time a final decision is issued on

direct state appeal [to] the time the first state collateral challenge

is filed.” Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. Similarly, the limitations period

is not tolled after state post-conviction proceedings are final and

before federal habeas proceedings are initiated. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2).

Here, Petitioner filed his first valid state habeas petition in

superior court on April 4, 2004 (Lodg. 9 at E-2), prior to the

commencement of the AEDPA limitations period so no time expired.

However, Petitioner waited 386 days after the California Supreme Court

denied his habeas petition on January 1, 2007 (Lodg. 12) to file his

federal habeas petition on January 22, 2008 (Pet.). Accordingly, under

even this basic analysis, the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations bars

Petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Phelps v. Alameda, 366

F.3d 722, 724 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (no tolling between time California

Supreme Court denies habeas petition and time petition is filed in

federal court).

Petitioner engaged in additional, unwarranted delay in presenting

his habeas claims by waiting lengthy periods of time between his state

habeas filings. Although the superior court denied Petitioner’s habeas

petition on June 4, 2004 (Lodg.9 at E-17), Petitioner did not file a

petition in the court of appeal until June 3, 2005, 364 days later. The

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 Under California’s collateral review system, an original habeas petition

challenging a lower court’s adverse decision is the equivalent of a notice of appeal.

See Carey, 536 U.S. at 221.

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court of appeal denied Petitioner’s petition on July 15, 2005 (Lodg. 9),

and 297 days later, on May 8, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court (Lodg. 11). 

In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Supreme Court

determined that the time an application for state post-conviction review

is “pending” includes the interval between the lower state court’s

adverse decision and the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal in the

higher state court, provided that the filing of that notice is timely

under state law. See Carey, 536 U.S. at 222-23. Under California’s

system of collateral review, a request for review6 is considered timely

if it is filed within a “reasonable time.” Id. at 222. The Carey Court

explained that where a state’s law, like California’s, fails to clarify

what constitutes a “reasonable time,” federal courts must examine the

reasonableness of any delay in filing for successive state collateral

review on a case by case basis. Id. at 222, 226-27. 

The Supreme Court revisited this “reasonable time” problem in Evans

v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). The Court affirmed the Carey reasoning

and then provided guidance on how to conduct the required analysis.

Specifically, the Court instructed that, until California courts provide

otherwise, federal courts reviewing habeas petitions must assume that

California’s timeliness law does not differ significantly from those

states with determinate appeal periods. Id. at 199-200. The Court

underlined that most states provide determinate appeal periods of thirty

to sixty days. Id. at 201 (repeating this assertion from Carey). From

this, the Court held that the Evans petitioner’s unjustified and

unexplained six-month delay in filing was more than the California

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 The Supreme Court has “never squarely addressed the question whether equitable

tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418 n.8

(assuming without deciding that equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA’s limitations

period).

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courts would consider reasonable. Id. As such, the Court concluded

that an unexplained delay of six months is presumptively unreasonable.

Id. (emphasizing that it could not “see how an unexplained delay of this

magnitude could fall within the scope of the federal statutory word

‘pending’ as interpreted in [Carey]”).

Here, the periods between petitioner’s state court filings (364

days and 297 days) significantly exceed the six-month threshold of

presumptive unreasonableness. Petitioner does not attempt to justify or

explain these lengthy and excessive delays. Pet.; Traverse; Traverse

Mem. Because the delays are presumptively unreasonable and Petitioner

has not provide justification for them, Petitioner is not entitled to

statutory tolling for the delays between state court habeas filings

which exceed 180 days. Accordingly, 301 days (184 days between superior

court and appellate court filings plus 117 days between appellate court

and California Supreme Court filings) of the 365-day limitations period

were expended during Petitioner’s leisurely progression through the

state court habeas system. That delay, coupled with Petitioner’s delay

after the California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition,

significantly exceeds the AEDPA statute of limitations and renders the

petition time-barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, unless Petitioner

establishes an entitlement to equitable tolling, the instant petition is

untimely.

2. Equitable Tolling

In the Ninth Circuit, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations

is subject to equitable tolling.7

 See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970

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(9th Cir. 2006). While equitable tolling is “unavailable in most

cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), it is

appropriate where a habeas petitioner demonstrates two specific

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544

U.S. at 418. “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under the AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing an

entitlement to equitable tolling. Id. at 1065. Petitioners face such

a high bar in order to effectuate the “AEDPA’s statutory purpose of

encouraging prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the

federal system from being forced to hear stale claims.” Guillory v.

Rose, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at

226). 

Here, Petitioner does not argue that he is entitled to equitable

tolling and the Court sees no basis for such an argument. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s delay is not subject to equitable tolling. As a result,

Petitioner’s federal petition is barred by the AEDPA’s one-year statute

of limitations and this Court RECOMMENDS that it be DENIED as untimely.

B. Petitioner’s Evidentiary Claim

In his federal petition, Petitioner presents the sole claim that

his “right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court admitted,

without limitation, evidence of alleged prior acts” in violation of Cal.

Evid. § 352 and the court’s own pre-trial order. Pet. at 7. Respondent

argues that Petitioner’s claim does not present a federal question, and

that the petition must therefore be dismissed. Resp. Mem. at 17-19.

For the following reasons, Petitioner does not present a federal claim

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and, assuming arguendo that he does, that claim fails on the merits. 

The prosecutor moved in limine to admit testimony of three adults

whom Petitioner allegedly had molested when they were children. RT at

4-14. The prosecutor argued that the alleged prior acts were similar to

those with which Petitioner was charged, and were thus relevant to show

“patterns” of “getting access to these children by his job choices” and

of having “boys this age in his house, in his bed very consistently

throughout the years.” Id. The prosecutor also pointed to similarities

between the charged crimes and prior acts, stating that in both

situations Petitioner “fondled [the victims’] penises and made attempts

to try and sodomize them.” Id. at 9. The prosecutor argued that in

addition to demonstrating a pattern of behavior, this testimony would

refute Petitioner’s arguments that “the acts that happened with these

current four victims could have either been accidental or these boys

were mistaken or that [Petitioner] touched them without any sexual

intent.” Id. at 10. The defense argued that the adult witnesses’

testimony was unduly prejudicial, particularly because the “current

allegations are at most fondling. And even some of them are less than

that.” Id. at 6. The defense also contended that the proposed

testimony would be unreliable, and overly time-consuming. Id. at 7, 11-

12. 

The court held that “in a case such as this the ruling is very

clear, and that is that the evidence is highly relevant, highly

probative ... It goes to intent. It goes to plan. It goes to scheme.”

Id. at 12-13. However, because the adult witnesses alleged that

Petitioner had sodomized them, and because the case before the court

only alleged attempted sodomy, the court warned the prosecutor “I don’t

want any reference to sodomy. There is evidence in the case in chief

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based on your offer of proof that sodomy ultimately might have been the

goal” but “as to those individuals that you’re going to be permitted to

testify regarding prior acts, you should advise them, and they should

testify, if it is the fact, that he touched their rear ends with his

penis. We’re not going to talk about penetration.” Id. at 13-14. The

judge further instructed the prosecutor that “you ought to be prepared

to tell your witnesses that if they’re asked point-blank was there

penetration, they’ll be permitted to respond. But in your case in chief

it is going to be limited to touching.” Id. at 15.

Nonetheless, during the prosecutor’s examination of one adult

witness, the following exchanges occurred:

Q: At any time during the times that you spent the

night with [Petitioner], did anything unusual

happen?

A: I got molested.

Q: What do you mean by that?

A: He put his butt – I mean he put his penis in my 

buttocks.

...

Q: And what did [Petitioner] do?

A: He just slide his penis, I mean, into me. And I

didn’t know what to do. I just froze up.

Id. at 473, 475.

After the witness finished testifying, and outside the presence of

the jury, Petitioner’s attorney objected to the testimony:

Attorney: Your Honor, I asked to talk to you. The

witness mentioned evidence of anal

penetration which was supposed to be kept

out of the evidence. It was a pre-trial

order. And --

The Court: That’s not the way I heard it, but what

are you – 

Attorney: He said he slid his penis into his butt.

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8

Petitioner contends that this witness also testified that Petitioner sodomized

him. Pet. at 12. He does not, however, specify which testimony leads him to that

conclusion. Although the witness stated that Petitioner “slid in behind” him (RT at

599), in context it appears that this just refers to Petitioner laying behind the

witness. See id. at 597 (same witness’ earlier testimony that Petitioner “slid up

behind” him as meaning that petitioner lay down behind him in bed). 

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The Court: No. That’s not what he said. He said he

touched his butt with the penis. At one

point he said he put it in, but that was

about as close as it got.

Id. at 481.

Later in the trial, another adult witness, who as a child had been

removed from his home and placed in Petitioner’s legal custody,

described the time as the “year of hell,” and recounted that Petitioner

frequently had masturbated and attempted to sodomize him. Id. at 594-

600.8 Petitioner objects to this evidence as well, arguing that it was

unduly prejudicial. Pet. at 12. 

1. Federal Question

Petitioner contends that admission of the above evidence was unduly

prejudicial, and therefore violated Cal. Evid. § 352. Pet.; see Cal.

Evid. § 352 (permitting a court “in its discretion” to exclude evidence

whose probative value is “substantially outweighed” by, inter alia, a

“substantial danger of undue prejudice”). Petitioner also contends that

admission of the evidence violated his “right to a fair trial” (Pet. at

7) and his “constitutional right to be judged solely on the

circumstances of the instant case” (id. at 13). 

However, Petitioner does not specify the source of the allegedly

violated rights, whether it be state or federal law. Although

Petitioner cites state cases in support of his claim that the trial

court improperly applied the California Evidence Code, he fails to cite

a single federal case, statute, or constitutional provision. In fact,

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the only reference to federal law in any of Petitioner’s briefing is the

statement in his traverse that “[t]he Federal question now before this

Honorable Court is whether Petitioner received due process and/or a fair

trial after the trial court allowed the jury to hear testimony of anal

penetration, from an 1108 witness, that was previously prohibited,

pursuant to a [Cal. Evid.] 352 analysis.” Traverse Mem. at 4. This is

insufficient to present a federal claim. 

The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that it is “not the province

of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on

state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is

limited to deciding whether a conviction violated [federal law].”

Estelle v McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (federal

courts may only address a petitioner’s legal claim that the state

courts’ adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”). 

Petitioner’s claim is exclusively concerned with the state court’s

application of Cal. Evid. §§ 352 (balancing probative value against

prejudice) and 1108 (admission of sexual propensity evidence). Pet.

The United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the question

of whether “evidence was incorrectly admitted ... pursuant to California

law ... is no part of a federal court’s habeas review of a state

conviction.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (citations and quotations

omitted); see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir.

1991) (“[w]e are not a state supreme court of errors; we do not review

questions of state evidence law”). Petitioner’s arguments under the

California Evidence Code therefore fail to present a colorable federal

claim and the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition be DENIED on this basis

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as well.

2. Federal Constitutional Violation

Even if the Court construes the petition as arguing that admission

of the adult witnesses’ testimony rose to the level of a federal

constitutional violation, the argument fails. A trial court’s admission

of prejudicial evidence impermissibly compromises constitutional due

process only when “there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw

from the evidence,” and even then, the “evidence must be of such quality

as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920

(citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). 

In the instant case, the evidence to which Petitioner objects was,

as stated by the trial court “highly relevant, highly probative.” RT at

12-13. The state charged Petitioner with violating Cal. Pen. Code

§§ 288(a) & 288(c), which proscribe acting with the “intent of arousing,

appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the

defendant or the child.” CT at 11-14 (information). Petitioner stated

that he permitted boys to sleep with him, but argued that the acts for

which he was convicted were accidental, and that if he touched the

victims, he did so without sexual intent. RT at 986-1032, 1062-1080,

1105-1117; see, e.g., id. at 1022 (Petitioner’s testimony that he

“never molested nobody”). For example, in response to the prosecution’s

charge that Petitioner had rubbed one victim’s stomach and then reached

his hand into the victim’s pants, Petitioner testified that while he

“tickled him on his stomach,” he “never put [his] hand down his pants at

all. Period.” Id. at 1089. 

The adult witnesses’ testimony that Petitioner previously had

sodomized and/or masturbated them, or attempted to do so, speaks to

Petitioner’s intent and motives in touching the other boys or asking

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them to sleep in his bed. Because the testimony refutes Petitioner’s

arguments that his subsequent touching was non-sexual or accidental, it

presents a “permissible inference” that the acts for which Petitioner

was charged were not innocent in nature. See Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515

F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (when petitioner contended that he

innocently touched child victim during a “wrestling type of play,”

introduction of evidence of prior molestation raises “permissible

inference” that touching was with sexual intent); Mejia v. Garcia, 534

F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[petitioner] can point to no Supreme

Court precedent establishing that admission of propensity evidence, as

here, to lend credibility to a sex victim’s allegations, and thus

indisputably relevant to the crimes charged, is unconstitutional”). The

evidence also permits the jury to infer that contrary to Petitioner’s

arguments at trial, the victims of the crimes with which he was charged

were not fabricating their stories. See RT at 1316-1320 (argument that

victims of charged crimes invented stories of molestation); Martinez v.

People, 2008 WL 4447570, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (“[T]he

evidence of the prior sexual offense was probative of [sex victim’s]

credibility, as the evidence of the 1998 incident raised the inference

that petitioner had the disposition to commit sexual offenses.”). 

Furthermore, even if it was improperly admitted, the challenged

prior act evidence did not “so fatally infect[] the proceedings as to

render them fundamentally unfair.” Gonzalez, 515 F.3d at 1011 (citing

Jammal, 926 F.2d 920). The four victims of the charged crimes testified

at length and in some detail to the fact that Petitioner rubbed his

erect penis on them from behind and masturbated them. See, e.g., RT at

116-119, 121-31, 179-80 320-22, 393. Testimony from one adult witness

that Petitioner had molested him during the “year of hell,” (id. at 594-

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600), and two statements from another witness that Petitioner had put

his penis in the witness’ butt (id. at 472-75, 481), is not so

qualitatively different from the other four witnesses’ testimony that

it “necessarily” prevented a fair trial. As stated by the California

Court of Appeal: 

None of the prior crimes were substantially more inflammatory

than the current offenses. Although the prior conduct

included sexual acts not described by the current victims, the

conduct was fundamentally the same. While sleeping with young

boys, [Petitioner] touched the victims’ private areas with his

hands in a sexually explicit manner. 

Lodg. 9 at 11.

The allegedly objectionable evidence presented “permissible

inferences” for the jury (Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920), and did not “so

fatally infect the proceedings” as to render the trial unconstitutional

(Gonzalez, 515 F.3d at 1011). Therefore, insofar as Petitioner presents

a timely federal constitutional claim, this Court RECOMMENDS that it be

DENIED.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing

(Pet. at 7, 14; Traverse Mem. at 4-6), contending that the “fact-finding

procedure employed by the state Court did not adequately provided a full

and fair hearing.” Traverse Mem. at 5. He does not, however, specify

the nature of the facts he seeks to present or their relevance to his

claim. 

The purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to present disputed facts,

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988), and when there

are no disputed material facts, an evidentiary hearing is not

appropriate, McKnight v. Comstock, 445 F.3d 317, 317 (9th Cir. 1971).

Here, Petitioner’s sole claim concerns the admission of allegedly

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prejudicial testimony during trial. Pet.; Traverse. All evidence

presented to the jury, as well as the relevant motion in limine and the

defense’s objections to the testimony, are memorialized in the

Reporter’s Transcript. Lodg. 2. There are no new relevant facts to

discover and Petitioner has not proffered any. The authority Petitioner

presents in support of his request for an evidentiary hearing provides

general legal principles which do not pertain to the instant

circumstances. Traverse Mem. at 4-6. Petitioner’s motion for an

evidentiary hearing is therefore DENIED. 

D. Appointment of Counsel

Petitioner requests that the Court appoint counsel to assist him in

this case. Pet. at 7, 14 He does not, however, support his position

with facts or authority.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal

habeas corpus actions by state prisoners. See McClesky v. Zant, 499

U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir.

1996) (noting that there currently exists no constitutional right to

appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d

1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). However, courts may appoint counsel for

financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 where “the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. §

3006A(a)(2)(B); Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196. Whether or not to appoint

counsel is a matter left to the court’s discretion, unless an

evidentiary hearing is necessary. See Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d

722, 728-30 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the interests of justice

require appointment of counsel when the court conducts an evidentiary

hearing on the petition).

A court’s discretion to appoint counsel may be exercised only under

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“exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017

(9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an

evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success on the merits and the

ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of

the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues

is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a

decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1238, 1331 (9th

Cir. 1986)).

The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s filings thus far, including his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1), motion for extension of

time (Doc. No. 11), and traverse (Doc. No. 14). Each filing belies

Petitioner’s claims of an inability to understand the applicable law and

to respond to arguments presented by Respondents. For example, in his

Petition, Petitioner provides a thorough recitation of his habeas claims

with corresponding references to state law and the record. Doc. No. 1.

Similarly, in his traverse, Petitioner cogently summarizes and reasserts

his claims. Traverse; Traverse Mem. 

Thus, based on its review of Petitioner’s filings, the Court finds

that Petitioner not only has a sufficient grasp of his individual claims

for habeas relief and the legal issues involved in those claims, but

also is able to articulate those claims adequately without assistance.

See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming

district court’s denial of request for appointment of counsel where

pleadings demonstrated petitioner had “a good understanding of the

issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his

contentions”). Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, there is

minimal likelihood of success on the merits and an evidentiary hearing

is not required. Accordingly, the Court finds there are no exceptional

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circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel and the Court

declines to exercise its authority to do so. Petitioner’s request for

appointment of counsel is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s petition (1) is barred

by the AEDPA statute of limitations, (2) does not state a cognizable

federal claim, and (3) is without merit, even assuming it states a

federal claim. Petitioner’s arguments for an evidentiary hearing and

appointment of counsel are similarly without merit, and are therefore

DENIED.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order:

(1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and

(2) directing that judgment be entered denying the petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 3, 2008, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report

and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than December

24, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 12, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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COPY TO: 

HONORABLE JEFFREY T. MILLER

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

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