Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00302/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00302-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY CASTILLO,

 Petitioner,

v.

F. B. HAWS, Warden,

 Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00302-LJO-BAM HC

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE

Doc. 38

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed his petition on February 16, 2012. Following 

dismissal of certain claims following Respondent's motion, Respondent answered on July 1, 2013; 

Petitioner filed a traverse on September 12, 2013. On February 19, 2015, Petitioner moved for an 

order of stay and abeyance to permit him to exhaust a new claim arising from People v. Chiu, 59 

Cal.4th 155 (2014). Because Petitioner's new ground seeks to vindicate rights under California state 

law, but not federal constitutional or statutory rights, the undersigned recommends that the Court 

deny the motion for stay and abeyance.

DISCUSSION

Although the motion for stay generally refers to the new claim under Chiu as "a new 

constitutional claim," it never identifies any specific federal constitutional right as having been 

violated. See Doc. 38 at 2. Nor does Petitioner specifically explain the nature of the new claim, 

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except to describe the Chiu ruling as "regarding aider and abettor, and probable consequences 

doctrin[e]." See Doc. 38 at 2. Respondent opposes the motion, contending that since Chiu holding 

did no more than interpret state-law doctrine, it did not give rise to a cognizable ground for a 

federal habeas petition. Petitioner replies that Chiu would give rise to a federal claim when 

interpreted in accordance with Rosemond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1240 (2014).

In Chiu, the California Supreme Court addressed for the first time "how to instruct the jury 

on aider and abettor liability for first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine." 59 Cal.4th at 162. Under California law, "[a] person who knowingly aids 

and abets criminal conduct is guilty not only of the intended crime (target offense) but also of any 

other crime the perpetrator actually commits (nontarget offense) that is a natural and probable 

consequence of the intended crime." Id. at 161 (citations and quotation marks omitted). An aider 

and abettor's liability for the non-target offense does not depend on whether he or she actually 

foresaw the non-target offense, but on "whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position 

would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable 

consequence of the act aided and abetted." Id. The Chiu court held that "a defendant cannot be 

convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine." Id. at 167. The court applied neither state nor federal constitutional doctrines in 

construing the statute under applicable California law.

Rosemond does not bring Chiu into the ambit of federal constitutional law. In Rosemond, 

the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the nature of the affirmative act required under 18 U.S.C. § 2 to 

establish that a defendant aided or abetted a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 942(c), which prohibits using 

or carrying a firearm in the course of a violent or drug-trafficking crime. 134 S.Ct. at 1243. The 

Court held that to aid or abet a violation of § 942(c), a participant in a violent or drug-trafficking 

crime must have advance knowledge that one or more of his confederates intends to use or carry a 

firearm in the course of criminal venture. It reversed Rosemond's conviction because the District 

Court's instruction to the jury failed to direct the jury to determine when Rosemond knew that a 

confederate intended to use a firearm. 134 S.Ct. at 1252. The Court construed § 942(c) without 

conducting any constitution analysis. See also Hughes v. Epps, 561 Fed.Appx. 350, 354 n. 4 (5th

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Cir. 2014) (distinguishing Rosemond, which (1) arose under federal, not state law, and (2) did not 

address whether the charged crime was a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime).

"[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

prisoner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a). The stay motion does not allege a specific violation of the U.S. Constitution or federal 

laws or treaties, but only refers generally to "a new constitutional claim" arising from the Chiu

analysis of California's aider and abettor law and the probable consequences doctrine. Doc. 38 at 2. 

When a petition includes no mention of any federal grounds, a district court may appropriately 

dismiss it. Burkey v. Deeds, 824 F.Supp. 190, 193 (D.Nev. 1993); Zihir v. Ryan, 2011 WL 

6211159 (D.Ariz 2011). 

"[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (citations omitted). "[E]rrors of state law do not concern us unless they rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation." Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 

1989). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") imposes "a highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings," requiring "that state-court decisions be 

given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (quoting Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997). The California Supreme Court's analysis of California law 

governing aiders and abettors of first degree murder is a state matter over which this Court does not 

have habeas jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Petitioner's having alleged no federal constitutional or statutory basis for the grounds for 

which he seeks an order of stay and abeyance, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the

motion for stay and abeyance, and direct that the existing petition proceed to resolution. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J. 

O'Neill, the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C ' 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and 

Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document should be 

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captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to 

challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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