Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00649/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00649-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOREN LAMONTE’ QUALLS,

Plaintiff,

v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

CALIFORNIA et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00649-LJO-SMS

SCREENING ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RE: SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Doc. 10)

Screening Order

Plaintiff Loren L. Qualls (“Plaintiff”) filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on October 

7, 2013. Doc. 10. The six individual Defendants are Mark Yudof, President of the Regents of the 

University of California; Steve Kang, Chancellor of UC Merced; Sam Traina, Executive ViceChancellor of UC Merced; Robert Oschner; and (new to this pleading) Tom Hothem and Anne 

Zanzucchi. The suit also names the Regents of the University of California, UC Merced, and Does 1-

10 inclusive.

Plaintiff may proceed on all claims except for the claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (IIED). As to this claim, the undersigned recommends that this be dismissed, without 

prejudice but without leave to amend. Should these Findings and Recommendations be adopted by 

the district judge assigned to this case, the Court will then provide Plaintiff with instructions for 

assisting the Court with serving the SAC on Defendants.

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I. Screening Standard

Under 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen all complaints brought in forma 

pauperis or by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court must

dismiss the complaint or any portion of it that is “frivolous,” “malicious,” “fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

A complaint is frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the 

wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). A complaint is malicious if not pled in good faith. 

Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915). A complaint’s failure to state a claim 

is defined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), in that it does not satisfy the pleading standards in Fed.R.Civ.P. 

8. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). This screening for failure to state a claim is 

cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may 

choose to bring. Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

II. Pleading Standards

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a pleading that states a claim for a relief must include a statement 

demonstrating the Court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader 

is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative 

or different types of relief.” It must give the defendant fair notice of the claims against him and state 

their elements plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th 

Cir. 1984); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but 

it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A 

pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions 

devoid of further factual enhancement. ... [¶] [A] complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ... allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Although a court assumes the truth of well-pled factual allegations, legal conclusions are not entitled 

to the same assumption of truth. Id.

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If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim, the Court may 

grant leave to amend to the extent the deficiencies can be cured. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (the “rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is 

particularly important for the pro se litigant”) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th 

Cir.1987)). Only if it is “absolutely clear” that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment 

should the Court dismiss a pro se complaint with prejudice. Noll at 1448.

III. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is an African-American male. SAC at ¶2.1 Beginning January 1, 2008, he was 

employed as a Lecturer in the Merritt Writing Program, a part of the School of Humanities at UCM. 

¶12. The terms of his employment were governed by a personal services agreement between himself 

and the Board of Trustees at UCM; the “Unit 18 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between 

UCM and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)”; the UCM faculty handbook; and “various 

other written and oral terms and conditions of employment” and applicable state law. Id.

During his employment, Defendants harassed and discriminated against Plaintiff. ¶¶15-16. 

(These allegations are summarized at greater length in Court’s screening of the original complaint; 

that pleading, however, is no longer operative.) According to the SAC, Plaintiff’s office window was 

not repaired for over a year; he was referred to as the “BFA” (Black Faculty Association); he was 

ostracized and referred to by the names of black rappers by colleagues and superiors; and he was 

denied the right to teach certain courses and receive grant support, rights which were granted to 

other white faculty members. ¶¶15-16. Ultimately, Plaintiff was terminated on the basis of his race, 

as described below.

On or about May 31, 2012, Plaintiff and nine other lecturers (all Caucasian) were advised by 

their supervisor, Defendant Oschner, that their contracts would not be renewed. ¶¶12-13. Oschner 

explained that this was due to a $600,000 budgetary shortfall that the Merritt Writing Program was 

having at the time. Id. When he received this notice, Plaintiff was not offered a transfer to other 

departments at UCM. ¶14.

 

1 All citations are to paragraphs of the Second Amended Complaint unless otherwise noted.

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In fact, there had never been a budgetary problem. ¶13. The nine other lecturers were either 

reappointed as lecturers or were offered other positions at UCM. ¶¶12-13. On August 27, 2011, 

Plaintiff emailed Oschner to ask for a “review of the decision not to reappoint him.” ¶12. He 

received no reply. Id. Later, after Plaintiff had filed a claim with the EEOC, Plaintiff learned that 

UCM was citing his “lack of performance” as the reason for his non-reappointment. Id. Plaintiff

states, however, that this was mere pretext. He was qualified for reappointment and “similarly 

situated” to the other lecturers. ¶¶12-14. During his employment, Plaintiff “performed his job 

responsibilities as a Lecturer in an exemplary fashion, received favorable performance reviews ... 

and otherwise performed each and every condition of employment.” ¶12. Specifically, his 

performance reviews were “rated 3 out of 4, 4 being the highest possible rating.” Id. Rather, 

Oschner “conspired with others in making up a negative performance evaluation,”and the real 

reason for Plaintiff’s non-reappointment (as well as for the decision not to offer him a transfer in 

May 2012) was because of his race. ¶13-14. Plaintiff adds that the UCM School of Humanities 

currently has no African-American faculty, and that UCM has a “proportionately small number” of 

African-American faculty. ¶14.

Additional allegations appear in the SAC’s “Fourth Cause of Action” for defamation.

Defendants Oschner, Hothem, and Zanzucchi (as well as Does 1-10) made untrue statements about 

Plaintiff, including to colleagues and prospective employers. They indicated “that [Plaintiff] was 

unprofessional, incompetent and dishonest, indicating e.g. that without Oschner’s knowledge or 

approval, plaintiff submitted a UC Pacific Rim grant proposal under his name and he had not granted 

approval for same.” ¶34. The SAC, like the FAC, does not allege these facts in relation to its first 

three claims (the Title VII, FEHA, NIED and IIED claims).

IV. Analysis

A. Employment Discrimination (Title VII)

Plaintiff alleges Title VII employment discrimination by all defendants because of his race, 

color, and national origin. To establish federal subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff must exhaust 

his administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC, thereby allowing the agency 

time to investigate the charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1103-

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04 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff alleges that he has done this, and has enclosed his right-to-sue letter 

from the EEOC. ¶23; see Exhibit A.

In screening the original complaint, the Court found that Plaintiff had stated cognizable 

claims for discrimination under two theories, hostile work environment and wrongful termination.

Here, Plaintiff re-alleges similar facts. Plaintiff may proceed with this claim.

B. Employment Discrimination (FEHA)

To state a claim for discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) he was a 

member of a protected class, (2) he ... was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he 

suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, ... and (4) some other circumstance 

suggests discriminatory motive.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 355, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 

352, 8 P.3d 1089 (2000) (citation omitted). A plaintiff who seeks to bring a FEHA action must first 

exhaust his administrative remedies. Romano v. Rockwell Int’l Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, 492 (1996); Cal. 

Gov’t Code §§ 12960(b) & (d), § 12965(b). Here, the SAC alleges that Plaintiff has done so. ¶23; 

see Exhibit A.

As the Court stated in its screening of the FAC, Plaintiff has stated the elements of a claim 

for employment discrimination under FEHA.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff alleges IIED by the six individual defendants only, and by Does 1-10. The elements 

of an IIED claim are: (1) defendant’s outrageous conduct; (2) defendant’s intention to cause, or 

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) plaintiff’s suffering severe or 

extreme emotional distress; and (4) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious 

(outrageous) conduct and the emotional distress. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 

148, 155, n. 7 (1987). To be “outrageous,” the conduct must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds 

of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 

209 (1982) (quoting Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 593 (1979)). Liability does not 

extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Fisher 

v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 617 (1989). “Severe emotional distress” means 

“emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in 

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civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 1004. It means “highly 

unpleasant mental suffering or anguish ‘from socially unacceptable conduct’ . . . , which entails such 

intense, enduring and nontrivial emotional distress that ‘no reasonable [person] in a civilized society 

should be expected to endure it.’” Schild v. Rubin, 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762-763 (1991) (citations 

omitted).

In the original complaint, the basis for the IIED claim was Defendant’s failure to repair a 

broken window. The Court dismissed this claim because it was ambiguous whether Plaintiff had to 

work “under, and in broken glass.” In the FAC, the amended IIED claim referred solely to the 

above-mentioned discriminatory termination of Plaintiff. The Court held that this, too, was 

insufficiently outrageous as a matter of law. Cf. Cochran v. Cochran, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 544-45 

(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“[M]ajor outrage is still essential to the tort [of IIED]; and the mere fact that 

the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feeling [sic] hurts, 

is not enough.”) (quotations and citation omitted); Hegelson v. American Int’l Grp., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 

2d 1091, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is 

tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his 

conduct has been characterized by ‘malice’, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the 

plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort”; for liability, conduct must be “so outrageous in 

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 

regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community”) (citing Cochran, 76 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d at 545) (quotations and citation omitted); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 496-

97 (Cal. 1970) (holding a black plaintiff’s IIED claim survives demurrer where plaintiff’s supervisor 

violently and repeatedly shouted an obscene racial epithet before firing him).

Plaintiff has not substantially expanded the allegations in support of his IIED claim. The 

allegations in the SAC are still insufficient as a matter of law. The Court dismisses this claim,

without prejudice but without leave to amend.

D. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff alleges NIED by the six individual defendants only, and by Does 1-10. NIED is a 

form of the tort of negligence, to which the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages 

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apply. Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc., 6 Cal.4th 124, 129 (1993). California law 

recognizes that “there is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress” in that 

“[t]he tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element.”

Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 984. The existence of a duty is a question of law. Marlene F. v. Affiliated 

Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.3d 583, 588 (1989). NIED includes “at least two variants of 

the theory” – “bystander” cases and “direct victim” cases. Wooden v. Raveling, 61 Cal.App.4th 

1035, 1037 (1998). A right to recover for emotional distress as a “direct victim” arises from the 

breach of a duty that is assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or 

that arises out of the defendant’s preexisting relationship with the plaintiff. Burgess v. Superior 

Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1073-1074 (1992); Marlene F., 48 Cal.3d at 590. In “direct victim” cases, 

“well-settled principles of negligence are invoked to determine whether all elements of a cause of 

action, including duty, are present in a given case.” Burgess, 2 Cal.4th at 1073. “[U]nless the 

defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an 

object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant’s breach of 

some other legal duty and emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty.” Potter, 6 

Cal.4th at 985.

In stating his claim for NIED, Plaintiff refers to the failure of these defendants to “exercise 

due care in the performance of their duties and obligations to Plaintiff, including their duty to follow 

the MOU in evaluating and determining plaintiff’s fourth-year reappointment, the failure of the 

Defendants to end the harassment of Plaintiff, as well as their specific participation in the 

harassment.” In screening the FAC, the Court stated that Plaintiff failed to include facts showing 

how he was “harassed,” as he had done in the original complaint. In response, Plaintiff in his SAC 

has again pled such facts. Plaintiff may proceed with this claim.

E. Defamation

Plaintiff’s next cause of action alleges defamation by Oschner, Hothem, Zanzucchi, and Does 

1-10. It claims that they made untrue statements about Plaintiff, including to colleagues and 

prospective employers, indicating “that [Plaintiff] was unprofessional, incompetent and dishonest, 

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indicating e.g. that without Oschner’s knowledge or approval, plaintiff submitted a UC Pacific Rim 

grant proposal under his name and he had not granted approval for same.” ¶34.

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional 

publication of a statement of fact which is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or 

which causes special damage.” Ringler Associates Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 80 Cal.App.4th 1165, 

1179 (2000). To state a claim for defamation, Plaintiff must show the intentional publication of a 

statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes 

special damage. Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal.App.4th 637 (1999). Defamation may be any 

publication which would “tend to injure [the] person in his or her business or profession, or 

otherwise cause actual damage.” Rothman v. Jackson, 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140 (1996).

The defamatory statement must be specifically identified, and the plaintiff must plead the 

substance of the statement. Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1216 (C.D.Cal. 

2004). Even under the liberal federal pleading standards, “general allegations of the defamatory 

statements” that do not identify the substance of what was said are insufficient. See Silicon Knights, 

Inc. v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 1303, 1314 (N.D.Cal.1997) (holding that “the words 

constituting a libel or slander must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim”).

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleged the substance of the defamatory statements with the words 

“poor performance,” “dishonesty,” and “insubordination.” However, the Court found that in other 

respects the defamation claim was insufficiently specific. In the SAC, Plaintiff has successfully pled 

more specific facts. This claim may proceed.

F. Section 1981 Claim

This claim is stated against Defendants Oschner, Hothem, and Zanzucchi. Section 1981 of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 

shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed 

by white citizens.” Johnson v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1005–08 (9th Cir.2011) 

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). A § 1981 claim is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if it 

alleges that plaintiff suffered discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Jones v. Bechtel,

788 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir.1986). Analysis of a § 1981 employment discrimination claim follows 

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the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII discrimination case. See Metoyer v. 

Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir.2007) (setting forth § 1981 discrimination requirements).

However, the Eleventh Amendment bars damages claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 

1983, 1985 and 1986 brought against the Regents, the University, and its employees acting in their 

official capacity. See Vaughn v. Regents of Univ. of California, 504 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (E.D. Cal. 

1981); Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir.2012) (stating that the law 

is well-settled that § 1981 does not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity); Pittman v. Oregon, 

Emp’t Dep’t, 509 F.3d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that § 1981 does not contain a cause of 

action against states); Mitchell v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.1988) (holding 

that the Los Angeles Community College District was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity 

from the plaintiff’s § 1981 claims).

In screening the FAC, the Court found that this claim could proceed with modifications. The 

SAC limits the claim to three defendants in their individual capacities. With this change, the claim 

may proceed as pled.

G. Section 1985 Claim

This claim is brought against Defendants Oschner, Hothem, Zanzucchi, and Does 1-10. A 

claim brought for violation of section 1985(3) requires “four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the 

purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal 

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in 

furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or 

deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 

F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). A racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 

invidiously discriminatory animus is an indispensable element of a section 1985(3) claim. Sprewell 

v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citation omitted). As 

stated above, the Eleventh Amendment limits any claim for damages to defendants in their 

individual capacity.

A claim for violation of section 1985(3) requires the existence of a conspiracy and an act in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Sever at 

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1536). The statute defines conspiracy as requiring “two or more persons.” A mere allegation of 

conspiracy is insufficient to state a claim. Holgate at 676-77.

The FAC merely alleged a conspiracy committed by “Oschner, and DOE 1-10.” FAC at ¶39. 

However, the FAC contained no specific allegations against any Doe defendants, and the Court 

concluded that Plaintiff could not state a claim of conspiracy. By contrast, the SAC alleges that 

Oschner, Hothem, and Zazucchi conspired “by refusing to abide by the MOU in evaluating and 

reappointing the plaintiff, to the UCM faculty and by refusing to grant to plaintiff a meaningful 

institutional remedy for the violation of his rights.” SAC at ¶39. Plaintiff may proceed with this 

claim.

H. Section 1986 Claim

This claim is stated against Defendants Yudof, Kang, and Traina. “Section 1986 imposes 

liability on every person who knows of an impending violation of section 1985 but neglects or 

refuses to prevent the violation.” Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th 

Cir.1988). A violation of section 1986 thus depends on the existence of a valid claim under 1985. 

Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1040 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the FAC, the Court rejected this claim because Plaintiff had not pled a conspiracy under 

1985.2In the SAC, Plaintiff does plead such a conspiracy. He also plead that these three defendants 

“had knowledge at all material times of the wrongs conspired to be done” yet “neglected and 

refused” to “prevent or aide in preventing the commission of these wrongs.” Plaintiff may proceed 

with this claim.

I. Section 1983 Claim

This claim is stated against Oschner, Hothem, Zanzucchi, and Does 1-5. To establish a 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants acted under color of state law 

and deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

 

2 The Court mentions, but does not rule on, the statute of limitations. Section 1986 provides, in part, that “no action 

under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after its cause of action 

has accrued.” See Solis v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2008); Greenfield v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 

1988 WL 156768 (D.D.C. July 14, 1988) (one year begins when knowledge that cause of action accrued, despite filing 

EEOC claim).

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“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 

prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 

U.S.229, 239 (1976). A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause 

requires a showing of purposeful discrimination. See e.g., Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574

(1998). A plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate 

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 

1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–40).

As the Court previously concluded in screening the FAC, Plaintiff has pled that Defendants’

decision not to reappoint him was based impermissible extent on his race, color, and national origin. 

Plaintiff may proceed with this claim against the individual Defendants.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

In order to make out a claim of deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, a 

plaintiff must demonstrate first that he had been deprived of liberty or property in the constitutional 

sense and then that the procedure used to deprive him of that interest was constitutionally defective. 

Gibson v. Merced Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 799 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, a threshold 

requirement to a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff’s showing of a liberty or 

property interest protected by the Constitution. Stiesberg v. State of Cal., 80 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 

1996). In the SAC, Plaintiff indicates that the property interest in question is Plaintiff’s employment.

A plaintiff only has a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued 

employment if he has a “reasonable expectation or a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, rather than 

a mere unilateral expectation.” See Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1548 (9th Cir.1988). Legitimate 

claims of entitlement are created by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 

source such as state laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations or express or implied contracts. Roth, 408 

U.S. 577. The court must look to California law to determine whether Plaintiff had a legitimate 

claim of entitlement to his job that could give rise to a procedural due process claim under federal 

law. See San Bernardino Physicians’ Servs. Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Bernardino Cnty., 825 F.2d 1404, 

1408–09 (9th Cir.1987) (although the underlying substantive interest is created by an independent 

source such as state law, federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level 

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of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause); Regents of Univ. of Mich. 

v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 n. 9 (1985) (“Absent a state statute or university rule or ‘anything 

approaching a common law of re-employment,’ however, we held that [a university professor] had 

no property interest in the renewal of his teaching contract”) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 

564, 577 (1972)). Furthermore, “[P]rocedural requirements, without more, do not create 

constitutionally cognizable property interests.” Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1364–65 

(9th Cir.1985); Loehr v. Ventura Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984). Such 

an interest is created if the procedural requirements are intended to be a significant substantive 

restriction on decision making. Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th 

Cir.1994).

Plaintiff alleges that his term of employment was coming to an end, and the issue was 

whether his employment would be renewed. The FAC contains no allegations suggesting that 

Plaintiff had any “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the renewal of that contract. Cf. Brown v. 

Chinen, 2008 WL 2073496 (D. Haw. May 14, 2008) (“The terms of Plaintiff’s appointment secured 

no interest in re-employment for the next year. Thus, the terms of the Plaintiff’s appointment secured

no property interest in employment after the expiration of his contract.”) On the other hand, Plaintiff 

also refers to Defendants’ failure “to abide by [their] procedural requirements for a grievance appeal 

within the institution from an adverse decision on reappointment.” The SAC specifically adds 

allegations relating to the failure to follow “MOU procedures for assessing and evaluating Plaintiff 

for a fourth-year reappointment.” ¶37. In light of the Ninth Circuit opinion in Wedges, supra, it may 

be the case that such procedures were “intended to be a significant substantive restriction on decision 

making.” Wedges, supra at 56. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s due process claim may proceed.

V. Conclusion

It is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

The IIED claim shall be dismissed, without prejudice but without leave to amend. Plaintiff 

has attempted to allege this claim on three separate occasions yet has not been able to state sufficient 

facts on each occasion. Therefore, this action shall proceed only on the remaining claims alleged 

above.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen (14) 

days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings and 

recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge 

will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the district judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Should these Findings and Recommendations be adopted by the district judge assigned 

to this case, the Court will then provide Plaintiff with instructions for assisting the Court with 

serving the SAC on Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 30, 2013 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

icido34h

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