Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01463/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEELE CLARKE SMITH III, 

an Individual, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 vs. 

SAN DIEGO AMERICANS FOR SAFE 

ACCESS et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No.: 3:13-cv-01463-BTM-BGS 

ORDER GRANTING 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

Barry Ted Moskowitz, C.J. 

Defendants/Counterclaimants San Diego Americans for Safe Access and San 

Diego Americans for Safe Access Foundation (the “Movants” or “ASA”) seek a 

preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Steele Clarke Smith, III (“Smith” or “Plaintiff”). 

For the reasons stated herein, ASA’s motion is GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Facts 

Steph Sherer founded Americans for Safe Access in 2002, and began using its title 

as a word mark at that time. Sherer created ASA to “share what I had learned about the 

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medical benefits of marijuana with others, particularly in connection with the federal 

prosecution of Edward Rosenthal. I selected the name ‘Americans for Safe Access’ in 

large part due to its acronym, ASA, which was the first name of the then-Administrator 

of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Asa Hutchinson.” Sherer Decl. ¶4. Sherer also 

registered the web domain safeaccessnow.org. ASA provides education and legal 

materials/assistance in support of marijuana legalization and use for medical treatment. 

Sherer Decl. ¶15. It now has a national presence with six local chapters and over 50,000 

members. Since 2006, ASA has used two logos—the “molecule” logo (attached here as 

Exhibit 1), and the “ASA” logo (the initials) (attached here as Exhibit 2). Sherer Decl. 

¶¶5-8. In 2007, ASA formed an Orange County chapter. Sherer Decl. ¶16. 

 In 2009, the Plaintiff (Smith) lost an election for the presidency of the ASA Orange 

County chapter. Sherer Decl. ¶17. In 2011 he started his own organization, Americans 

for Safe Access National (“ASAN”) and registered the web domain: ASANational.org. 

Sherer Decl. ¶¶18-19. He also applied to register the ASA word mark. Sherer Decl. ¶27. 

ASA objected to his registration of the mark. The record does not indicate that the PTO 

has adjudicated the application. 

 Since 2011, but mostly recently, Smith has sent emails to ASA members that refer 

to a change in ASA leadership and imply that Sherer is no longer ASA President. Sherer 

Decl. ¶¶22-3; Duncan. Decl. ¶4, Ex. D1. Smith uses ASA’s marks on ASAN’s website 

and in several emails soliciting donations. Sherer Decl. ¶¶27-36; Duncan Decl. Ex. D2. 

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Sherer alleges that Smith’s deceptive website and deceptive emails harm recruiting 

efforts, intimidate ASA staff members, and aim to divert potential donations intended for 

the ASA by misleading donors. 

B. Procedural History 

Plaintiff Steele Clarke Smith, III (“Smith” or “Plaintiff”) brought this action 

alleging trademark infringement in May 2013. He obtained a TRO in Superior Court 

(ECF 1-8), which was dissolved on June 6, 2013. The case was then removed here. 

ASA filed counterclaims and an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order 

(“TRO”) against Smith. Notice of the application was duly provided to Plaintiff (Docs. 

24, 26). On February 11, 2014, the Court held a hearing on the application. Plaintiff, 

pro se, did not appear at the hearing, and the Court issued a TRO covering the marks at 

issue (Doc. 27).1

 The TRO scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing and ordered 

Plaintiff to show cause as to why an injunction should not issue. A copy of that order 

was immediately served upon Plaintiff (Docs. 29, 30, 35, 36) at the last address provided 

to the Court. At the April 1, 2014 hearing, ASA’s counsel stated that they had also 

forwarded the TRO and Scheduling Order to Smith via email. Smith filed no response 

and did not appear at the preliminary injunction hearing. 

                                                             1

 ASA’s proposed order included an injunction against use of the ASANational.org 

domain. The TRO does not enjoin use of any web domain. At the April 1, 2014 

hearing, ASA’s counsel clarified that ASA does not request any change in the scope of 

the injunction. Therefore, this injunction does not enjoin the lawful use of any website. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to “issue a 

preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” “A preliminary injunction is 

an extraordinary remedy” that is “never awarded as of right.” Winter v. NDRC, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008)). A 

preliminary injunction will only be granted “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 

(1997)). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish four elements: 

(1) “that he is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor,” and (4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20 (citations omitted). 

The requirement that irreparable harm be likely is significant; a mere possibility of 

harm will not suffice. Id. at 22; Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 

F.3d 989, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2011) (criticizing Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos 

Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2009)). See also ConocoPhillips Co. v. 

Gonzalez, 2012 WL 538266, at *2, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20972, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 

17, 2012); Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Coast Cutlery Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 

1157 (D. Or. 2011). Moreover, the irreparable injury must be imminent. Caribbean 

Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988); Midgett v. TriCounty Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846, 850-851 (9th Cir. 2001). 

// 

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Trademark Infringement 

 A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof 

. . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 

“To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 

1114, a party ‘must prove: (1) that it has a protectable ownership interest in the mark; 

and (2) that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.’” 

Network Automation, Inc. v. Adv. Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Dep't of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 

1124 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

1. Protectable Ownership Interest 

 Ownership interests in a trademark accrue to the first party to actually use the 

mark in commerce. See Sengoku Works LTD v. RMS Int'll, LTD, 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 

Competition § 16.03 (3d ed. 1996)). The first to use a mark (the “senior” user) may 

enjoin “junior” users from using confusingly similar marks in the same market or within 

the senior user’s “natural zone of expansion.” Church & Dwight Co. v. Mayer Labs., 

Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35969, 66-67 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) (citation omitted). A 

plaintiff’s federal registration of a trademark is prima facie evidence of an ownership 

interest, but a defendant may rebut the presumption by proving their own prior use of the 

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mark in commerce. See Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 448 F.3d at 1124; 15 U.S.C. 

§§ 1057(b), 1115(a). 

 According to Sherer, ASA has used the ASA word mark since 2002, and has used 

the “molecule” logo and the ASA logo since 2006. Sherer Decl. ¶¶4-5. ASA uses the 

marks to identify itself and its members to the public. Sherer Decl. ¶¶9, 15. To that end, 

each mark has been used, e.g., on ASA’s website, correspondence, conference materials, 

and litigation materials. Id. ASA has thus satisfactorily demonstrated its ownership 

interest in the marks sub judice. ASA has not registered the marks, but can, according to 

its supporting declarations, establish an ownership interest in them as of 2002 (word 

mark) and 2006 (logos). Sherer Decl. ¶¶4-9. 

2. Likelihood of Consumer Confusion 

 The Ninth Circuit applies a flexible, multi-factor test to gauge the likelihood of 

confusion caused by an allegedly infringing mark. See Network Automation, Inc., 638 

F.3d at 1145. Eight “Sleekcraft” factors are typically considered: “similarity of the 

conflicting designations; relatedness or proximity of the two companies' products or 

services; strength of [the plaintiff’s] mark; marketing channels used; degree of care 

likely to be exercised by purchasers in selecting goods; [the defendant’s] intent in 

selecting its mark; evidence of actual confusion; and likelihood of expansion in product 

lines.” Brookfield Commc’ns., Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 

1053-54 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); accord AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 

F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). It bears noting, however, that this list is not 

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exhaustive, no single factor is dispositive, and that the relative importance of each factor 

will vary from case to case. See Brookfield Commc’ns., Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054. 

a. Similarity of the Marks 

“[T]he more similar the marks in terms of appearance, sound, and meaning, the 

greater the likelihood of confusion.” Brookfield Commc’ns., Inc., 174 F.3d at 1054-55. 

Moreover, “similarities are weighed more heavily than differences.” GoTo.com, Inc. v. 

Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. ASA’s exhibits indicate that their three marks and those used by 

Smith are identical or virtually identical to (i.e., identical in structure and appearance 

excepting, in some instances, slight variations in size and coloring). Compare, e.g., 

Sherer Decl. Exs. 1-3 with ¶¶22-33, Exs. 4-6, 12-15 (describing Smith’s uses of the 

marks). Duncan Decl. Ex. 2. As it is impossible to get more similar than identical, this 

factor weighs heavily in favor of injunctive relief. See Network Automation, Inc., 638 

F.3d at 1144. 

b. Relatedness or Proximity of the Products 

The mission of each organization is very similar, as evidenced by a side-by-side 

comparison of mission statements in the table below. Moreover, according to Don 

Duncan, ASA’s California Director, Smith’s organization has sought donations from the 

same people and is opening chapters in the same locations as ASA. Duncan Decl. ¶4, 

Ex.2. This factor thus weighs in favor of an injunction. 

// 

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ASA Mission Statement 

 (Sherer Decl. ¶34, Ex. S11) 

ASAN Mission Statement 

(Sherer Decl. ¶35, Ex. S12) 

Americans for Safe Access (ASA) and 

Americans for Safe Access Foundation 

(ASAF) share the mission of ensuring safe 

and legal access to cannabis (marijuana) for 

therapeutic uses and research. ASA works 

with our grassroots base of over 50,000 

members to effect change using public 

education and direct advocacy at the local, 

state, and federal level. ASAF trains and 

educates patients, advocates, health care 

professionals and other stakeholders. 

ASAF also provides direct legal support 

and uses impact litigation to protect and 

expand patients’ rights. 

Americans for Safe Access® is the largest 

National organization of patients, medical 

professionals, scientists and concerned 

citizens. Our mission is to realize safe, 

legal access to cannabis for medical and 

therapeutic purposes, and to provide 

resources and support to medical cannabis 

patients, their associations, and to the 

medical cannabis industry through local 

chapters and grassroots action. 

c. Strength of the Marks 

At this stage, a mark’s strength is typically gauged by its conceptual strength. 

Network Automation, Inc., 638 F.3d at 1149-50. “[C]onceptual strength depends largely 

on the obviousness of its connection to the good or service to which it refers." Id. at 

1149. Marks are often ranked "along a spectrum of generally increasing inherent 

distinctiveness as generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful." Id. 

Movant concedes that the ASA logo is descriptive, but argues it is entitled to 

protection nonetheless due to its secondary meaning. To determine whether a descriptive 

mark has a secondary meaning, the Court considers (1) whether actual purchasers of the 

product bearing the claimed trademark associate it with the producer, (2) the degree and 

manner of advertising under it, (3) the length and manner of its use, and (4) whether its 

use has been exclusive. Yellow Cab of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 

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419 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2005). ASA contends that the use of each mark was 

consistent (since 2002 for the ASA word mark and since 2006 for the others) and 

exclusive until Smith’s alleged infringements began in 2011. Sherer Decl ¶¶5-9, 19. Ms. 

Sherer’s declaration thus indicates that the ASA logo has a secondary meaning entitled to 

protection. Moreover, Smith has conceded the point, for present purposes, by failing to 

file a response. CivLR 7.1.f.3.c (Waiver by Opposing Party). Ardente, Inc. v. Shanley, 

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11674 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (“Plaintiff fails to respond to this 

argument and therefore concedes it through silence.”); Silva v. U.S. Bancorp, 2011 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 152817, 2011 WL 7096576, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 

 d. Marketing Channels Used by the Parties 

The parties share marketing channels, though the extent of overlap is unclear. The 

marketing channels described in ASA’s papers are primarily the internet and email. 

Marketing channel overlap on the internet is generally only regarded as posing a risk of 

confusion for consumers when “both parties use the Web as a substantial marketing and 

advertising channel.” Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1151 (9th Cir. 

2002). Here, the parties use each of the three marks at issue on their websites. Duncan 

Decl. ¶5. They also appear to have chapters in some of the same cities. Sherer Decl. ¶25. 

Additionally, to the extent member and donor solicitations by email constitutes 

marketing, ASA has provided evidence that the overlapping channel exacerbates 

confusion. Sherer Decl. ¶¶25-36; Duncan Decl. ¶4. This factor therefore weighs in favor 

of injunctive relief. 

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e. Degree of Care Used By Consumers

As no party has provided briefing as to this factor, the Court treats it as neutral. 

f. Intent in Selecting Mark 

“When an alleged infringer knowingly adopts a mark similar to another's, courts 

will presume an intent to deceive the public." Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 

1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, ASA has demonstrated that Smith used the marks at 

issue, beginning in 2011, with the first-hand knowledge, based on his time and 

experience with ASA, that each was ASA’s mark. See, e.g., Sherer Decl. ¶¶16-17. ASA 

has also indicated, via evidence of email solicitations and donation requests on the 

ASANational.org website, that Smith has used the marks in an effort to misappropriate 

donations intended for ASA. Sherer Decl. ¶¶27-33; Duncan Decl. 4, 5. This factor thus 

weighs in favor of injunctive relief. 

g. Evidence of Actual Confusion 

ASA members have expressed confusion over whether Smith remains involved 

with ASA. Sherer Decl. ¶26. Smith is ostensibly responsible for emails from ASAN 

soliciting money and discussing internal management that are confusing, as they appear 

to be masquerading as emails from ASA. Duncan Decl. ¶4, Ex. D2. This factor hence 

weighs in favor of injunctive relief. 

 h. Likelihood of Expansion in Product Lines 

 “The likelihood of expansion in product lines factor is relatively unimportant 

where two companies already compete to a significant extent.” Brookfield Commc’ns., 

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Inc., 174 F.3d at 1060. The record indicates that the parties share a common mission 

and target at least some of the same persons with informative materials and donation 

solicitations. It appears that the parties intend to further expand into each other’s 

product lines. See, e.g., Sherer Decl. ¶25, Ex. 4 (indicating that ASAN is forming “new 

chapters in San Diego and Maryland—locations in which ASA already has established 

substantial local chapters . . . .”). This factor does not apply precisely as it would in the 

product marketing context, since people may wish to be members of both organizations, 

and may even knowingly choose to donate to each, or to one over the other. The 

analogy holds, however, to the extent that people prefer to choose one, and have their 

attention or money diverted to ASAN when they intend it to go to ASA. On this record, 

the Court finds this factor to be neutral. 

3. Conclusion 

 Having considered each of the Sleekcraft factors, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiff has clearly established a likelihood of consumer confusion. The marks are, for 

the most part, indistinguishable, such that a reasonably prudent consumer is likely to be 

confused by Smith’s use of them. Moreover, there is evidence of intent to deceive and 

that actual confusion has resulted. The Court thus moves on to consider the remaining 

factors in the preliminary injunction analysis. 

B. Irreparable Harm 

A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish a likelihood of 

irreparable harm. See Flexible Lifeline Sys., 654 F.3d at 997-98. Even showing a high 

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likelihood of success does not portend irreparable harm or otherwise create a right to 

preliminary relief. See id.; Winter, 555 U.S. at 20-22. A mere possibility of irreparable 

harm will not suffice; the alleged harm must be more than speculative. See Caribbean 

Marine Servs. Co., 844 F.2d at 674. The Court found a likelihood of irreparable harm to 

ASA’s at the TRO hearing. TRO (Doc. 27) at 3. As this finding has gone unrebutted, it 

stands. More specifically, the Court finds that ASA has provided sufficient evidence of 

harm to its reputation and threatened loss of prospective donors or members, as well as 

harm to goodwill and the diminished ability to control its reputation more generally. See 

Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding 

finding of irreparable harm based on “threatened loss of prospective customers” and 

“accompanying goodwill and revenue”). 

C. Balancing the Equities 

 Weighed against Smith’s interest in continued use of the marks for his 

organization are the costs, both monetary and reputational, that ASA has shown it faces 

in the absence of injunctive relief. As Smith has not appeared to place his interests on 

the scale, the Court finds that the balance of equities strongly favors the grant of a 

preliminary injunction in this case. 

D. The Public Interest 

Finally, a preliminary injunction ought to issue only where it is in the public 

interest. In this case, ASA has provided sufficient evidence that Smith is using the 

marks sub judice without permission in an attempt to, inter alia, divert attention and 

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funds toward his own organization. The public has a compelling interest in having a 

marketplace free of deceptive or misleading marketing. See generally CytoSport, Inc. v. 

Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 

With respect to the admittedly “descriptive” ASA word mark, the public has also 

has an interest in preventing the monopolization of common terms that can be used to 

describe a wide range of products. Estate of P. D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 

252 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1920). A trademark holder can adopt as its mark a word that is 

sufficiently artificial to enjoy a high degree of conceptual strength that is also 

sufficiently similar to a common descriptor, such that the mark will instantly evoke the 

common word and its meaning. But the trademark holder cannot, consistent with public 

policy, enjoin all use of that common word by competitors. See Door Sys., Inc. v. ProLine Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 170-171 (7th Cir. 1996). In this case, ASA has shown 

a secondary meaning for the ASA word mark, such that a preliminary injunction limited 

to Smith promotes the public interest with minimal risk of the monopolization of the 

descriptive mark. The Court accordingly finds that, for each of the marks sub judice, 

preliminary injunctive relief is consistent with the public interest. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the application and the evidence submitted (and for the 

reasons stated on the record at the April 1, 2014 hearing), the Court finds as follows: 

1. ASA is likely to succeed in demonstrating that it maintains a legally protectable 

ownership interest in the intellectual property depicted in Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 to 

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this Order. Exhibit 1 depicts the name “Americans for Safe Access,” hereinafter 

referred to as the ASA word mark. Exhibit 2 depicts the primary logo that ASA 

uses, hereinafter referred to as the ASA logo. Exhibit 3 depicts an alternative logo 

that ASA uses, hereinafter referred to as the ASA molecule; 

2. ASA is likely to succeed in demonstrating that Smith’s use of the ASA word 

mark, the ASA logo, and/or the ASA molecule is likely to cause confusion, or to 

cause mistake, or to deceive; 

3. ASA is likely to suffer irreparable harm if preliminary relief is not granted; 

4. The balance of equities tips in ASA’s favor; and 

5. A Preliminary Injunction is in the public interest. 

 WHEREFORE, THE COURT ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 

1. ASA’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED; 

2. Plaintiff (“Smith”), his agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in 

active concert or participation with Plaintiff, his agents, servants, employees, or 

attorneys are hereby enjoined from advertising, promoting, marketing, publishing, 

or otherwise using the ASA word mark, the ASA logo, the ASA molecule, or any 

other mark (as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127) that is confusingly similar to the ASA 

word mark, ASA logo, or “ASA molecule” including, but not limited to, on or in 

any website, newsletter, electronic mail, publication, letter or written material, or 

any other public medium, including but not limited to the domain 

<ASANational.org>; 

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3. Dispositive motions in this case shall be filed on or before July 11, 2014. The 

parties’ opposition and reply papers shall be filed in accordance with Local Civil 

Rule 7.1; 

4. ASA need not post security pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) because such a 

requirement would impose an undue hardship on this record. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 30, 2014 _____________________________ 

 6:22 p.m. Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge 

 San Diego, CA United States District Court 

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