Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00331/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00331-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 315
Nature of Suit: Airplane Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

D.F., a minor, by and through his 

Guardian Ad Litem, TASHINA 

AMADOR, individually and as successor 

in interest in Alexis Fontalvo, deceased; 

and TANIKA LONG, a minor, by and 

through her Guardian Ad Litem, 

TASHINA AMADOR,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT 

CORPORATION; SIKORSKY 

SUPPORT SERVICES, INC.; UNITED 

TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; 

DUPONT AEROSPACE CO.; E.I. 

DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND 

COMPANY; AND DOES 1 through 100, 

Inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION 

TO EXCLUDE, AND MOTION TO 

STRIKE

[ECF Nos. 146, 160, 164, and 196-3]

(Redacted version filed publicly)

Before the Court are four motions. There are two motions for summary judgment,

one filed by Defendant E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. (“DuPont”) (ECF No. 160), and 

the other filed by Defendants Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Sikorsky Support Services, Inc.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of

 51
2

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“SSSI”), and United Technologies Corp. (collectively, “Sikorsky”) (ECF No. 164). 

Both motions are fully briefed. With respect to Sikorsky’s motion, Plaintiffs filed an 

opposition on July 6, 2017 (ECF No. 173), and Sikorsky filed a reply on July 21, 2017

(ECF No. 190). With respect to DuPont’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs and 

Sikorsky filed separate oppositions on July 7, 2017. (ECF Nos. 176 (Plaintiffs), 179 

(Sikorsky).) DuPont filed separate replies to each opposition on July 21, 2017. (ECF 

Nos. 194 (Plaintiffs), 196 (Sikorsky).) 

Along with its reply to Sikorsky’s opposition, DuPont filed an “objection and 

motion to strike,” in which it asks the Court to disallow Sikorsky’s opposition to 

DuPont’s summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 196-3.) That motion is fully briefed. 

Sikorsky filed an opposition to DuPont’s objection and motion to strike on July 28, 2017 

(ECF No. 204), and DuPont filed a reply on August 1, 2017 (ECF No. 206).

The fourth motion before the Court is Sikorsky’s motion to exclude two of 

Plaintiffs’ experts, Arthur Lee Coffman and John Bloomfield. (ECF No. 146.) That 

motion is also fully briefed. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on June 23, 2017 (ECF No. 

168), and Sikorsky filed a reply on July 21, 2017 (ECF No. 192).

On October 19, 2017, the Court issued a tentative ruling on these motions. (ECF 

No. 212.) The Court heard argument from the parties the following day. (ECF No. 214.) 

The Court now issues its final order on the motions. Based upon a review of the moving 

papers, the applicable law, and for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS 

DuPont’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 160), DENIES DuPont’s objection 

and motion to strike (ECF No. 196-3), DENIES Sikorsky’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ 

experts (ECF No. 146), and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Sikorsky’s motion 

for summary judgment (ECF No. 164).

I. Introduction

This case arises from a tragic and fatal accident that occurred at the Miramar 

Marine Corps Air Station on March 17, 2011. That day, U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant 

Alexis Fontalvo (“Fontalvo”) was serving as an aerial observer for a CH-53E Super 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of

 51
3

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Stallion helicopter that was being used for a training flight. Fontalvo’s role included the

responsibility of removing chocks and safety pins from the helicopter prior to flight. One 

of these safety pins was set in the left landing gear and served as a mechanical lock that 

prevented the landing gear from retracting. To remove this pin, Fontalvo got under the 

aircraft’s left sponson. Under normal circumstances, the pin should come out of its slot 

easily. When Fontalvo attempted to remove pin, however, it resisted. 

Without removing the left landing gear pin, Fontalvo moved to the left auxiliary 

fuel tank and removed a different safety pin. He then returned to the left landing gear, 

got under the left sponson again, and tried, for a second time, to remove the pin. This 

time Fontalvo was successful. But as soon as he removed the pin, the left landing gear 

retracted and the helicopter fell on top of Fontalvo. He died immediately.

Plaintiff D.F. is Fontalvo’s son. Plaintiff T.L. is the daughter of Tashina Amador,1

who was in a relationship with Fontalvo at the time of the accident. Amador and T.L. 

began living with Fontalvo around December 2007. (ECF No. 173-24 at ¶ 7.) On 

October 9, 2014, D.F. and T.L.—through Amador, as their guardian ad litem—filed the 

operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) in which they assert claims of strict 

product liability (as to design and manufacturing defects), negligent product liability (as 

to design and manufacturing defects), and negligence against Sikorsky and DuPont2

relating to the companies’ involvement in the design and manufacture of the CH-53E 

helicopter that killed Fontalvo.3 (ECF No. 71.) Generally, the SAC alleges that Sikorsky 

is liable as the designer and manufacturer of the CH-53E helicopter, and that DuPont is 

 

1 The parties’ filings indicate that Tashina’s last name at some point during the relevant period was 

Peshlakai. For purposes of consistency, the Court refers to her as “Amador.” 

2 The SAC also asserts claims against G.E. Aviation Systems, LLC (“GE”), and PKL Services, Inc. 

(“PKL”). On June 20, 2016, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against G.E. 

(ECF No. 129), and on May 23, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of PKL (ECF No. 

144). 

3 The SAC also asserts as a separate cause of action a survivor action by D.F. under Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 377.11 et seq.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of

 51
4

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

liable as the manufacturer of “Kapton” wiring insulation that was used in the landing gear 

system.

II. Relevant Evidence

A. CH-53E Design and Development

The CH-53E is a successor version of the CH-53A, CH-53D, and RH-53D Navy 

helicopters. (ECF No. 164-11 at 3 ¶ 4.) In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Navy 

began to develop what would become the CH-53E when they sought to build a heavy-lift 

helicopter “in order to increase tactical mobility and provide much greater payload 

capacity.” (Id.) A Navy Development Plan issued in 1972 stated that the CH-53E should

“retain maximum commonality with the existing CH-53D helicopter.” (ECF No. 164–12, 

Ex. 2, at 12.)

NAVAIR—the Navy authority that handles the design, development, and 

production of Navy and Marine Corps aircrafts—awarded Sikorsky several contracts to 

design and produce prototypes of the CH-53E. (ECF No. 164-11 at 4–6 ¶¶ 6–7.) In 

developing the CH-53E, “NAVAIR officials and engineers held hundreds of meetings 

with Sikorsky engineers and program management personnel on all aspects of the design 

specification, including items that would be changed from the CH/RH-53D.” (Id. at 6 ¶ 

8.) NAVAIR “reviewed all the engineering drawings, test plans and test reports in 

detail,” including “technical interchange meetings” to ensure compliance with 

NAVAIR’s specifications. (Id.)

In 1978, the Navy and Sikorsky began signing production contracts, under which 

Sikorsky would build the helicopters according to NAVAIR’s master design instructions 

called “detail specifications.” (Id. at 7–8 ¶ 13.) Sikorsky eventually produced 229 

helicopters in total, separated into 21 production “lots.” (Id.) 

The helicopter involved in Fontalvo’s accident—referred to as “BUNO 163077”—

was part of Lot 12, and was manufactured according to the designs set forth in Detail 

Specification SD-552-3-9. (Id. at 8 ¶ 14; see ECF Nos. 155-19, 155-20.) SD-552-3-9 

incorporated MIL-W-5088F, the specification for wiring in military aerospace vehicles. 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of

 51
5 

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(ECF No. 164-11 at 8 ¶ 14; see ECF No. 155-21, Ex. 11 (copy of MIL-W-5088F.) 

 (ECF No. 155-18 at SIK006938.)

The Navy closely monitored Sikorsky’s production process by reviewing and 

approving all pre-production drawings and flight tests, conducting quality inspections, 

reviewing the “build file,” ensuring compliance with the detail specifications, and 

stationing on-site personnel who inspected and tested the completed aircrafts. (ECF No. 

164-11 at 8–9 ¶ 16.) On September 30, 1990, NAVAIR accepted BUNO 163077 into its 

fleet. (Id. at 9 ¶ 18.) 

i. BUNO 163077’s Landing Gear System 

The CH-53E landing gear system—which operates a front gear and two side 

gears—includes five “interlocks” designed to prevent inadvertent gear retraction: two in 

the cockpit (a landing gear control handle and a mechanical lock), two independent 

“weight-on-wheels” switches (one on the left and right landing gears, which prevent gear 

retraction if they sense the weight of the aircraft), and a series of “separate mechanical 

landing gear safety pins, one for each landing gear.” (Id. at 3–4 ¶ 5; see also ECF No. 

173-8 at 3–5 ¶¶ 10–12.) Wiring runs from the cockpit’s landing gear control system to 

the gear’s hydraulic utility module, which, when activated with a power source of 

28VDC, retracts the gear. (ECF No. 173-8 at 5–6 ¶ 15.) The mechanical landing gear 

safety pins are “downstream” of the other interlocks. In other words, once the utility 

module is activated electronically, the only interlock that can prevent gear retraction is 

the landing gear safety pin. (Id.) 

According to Manning Stelzer—Sikorsky’s engineering investigator—when the 

utility module for the BUNO 163077 was fabricated, there were short segments of wire 

already connected to the module’s plug connectors. (ECF No. 173-12 at 118–19.) 

Stelzer refers to these pieces of wire as “pigtails.” (Id. at 119.) The pigtails connected to 

BUNO 163077’s utility module are made of “Spec-55” wire. (ECF No. 173-9 at 2.) At

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of

 51
6

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the opposite end of the pigtail, the wire is spliced into “Kapton” wire, the common name 

for polyimide-insulated wire manufactured by DuPont. (ECF No. 183-8 at 6.) Kapton 

wire then runs from its splice with Spec-55 through the aircraft, into a relay point on an 

electronics bay referred to “J677,” and into the landing gear control panel in the cockpit. 

(See ECF No. 183-1.) Thus, the wire that runs from “P494”—the point of connection to 

the utility module for the up-command wire—to the landing gear control consists of 70 

inches of Spec-55 and 367 inches of Kapton. (ECF No. 155-26 at 2; ECF No. 173-10 at 

MIL073203 (indicating that P494 connects to the “Up Landing Gear Control Valve”).) 

Kapton wire is identifiable as an “amber” color, and Spec-55 wire is white. (See 

ECF No. 173-14 at 38–39 (photos of Spec-55), 44 (photo of Kapton); ECF No. 183-8 at 

6.) Spec-55 contains no Kapton. (ECF No. 173-12 at 254.)

ii. Development of the Landing Gear System

According to Navy representative Leslie Leigh, as Sikorsky developed its design 

for the CH-53E, it would provide NAVAIR with all wiring schematics, which NAVAIR 

would in turn review and, if needed, demand changes. (ECF No. 164-5 at 98–100.)

According to John Wakefield—Sikorsky’s “CH/MH-53E Program Manager”

between 1988 and 2000—NAVAIR and Sikorsky conducted hundreds of hours of flight 

tests, during which “all aspects of the helicopters were tested, including sub-system 

evaluations.” (ECF No. 164-11 at 2 ¶ 1, 7 ¶ 10.) In Wakefield’s deposition, however, he 

conceded that he did not observe any correspondence between NAVAIR “concerning the 

development of the interlock system of the landing gear of the CH-53E.” (ECF No. 173-

6 at 82.) Wakefield also admitted that he had no documentary evidence that (1) 

NAVAIR reviewed or approved “any detail of the landing gear wiring harness of the CH53E”; (2) that “Sikorsky ever provided engineering data to the Navy with respect to the 

risk of an inadvertent landing gear retraction in the event of a short circuit”; (3) that the 

“Navy’s test pilots or aerospace engineers ever contributed to the development of the 

landing gear wiring harness”; or (4) that the Navy flight test center ever provided 

deficiencies “relating to the landing gear or its wiring harness.” (Id. at 136–41.)

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of

 51
7

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a. Kapton Wiring

Wakefield states that, in the mid-to-late 1970s, NAVAIR altered its Detail

Specification for the CH-53E by requiring that Kapton wire be incorporated into all CH53E electrical harnesses. (ECF No. 164-11 at 7 ¶ 12.) To demonstrate that NAVAIR

prompted this switch to Kapton, Wakefield points to a “Production Helicopter SubSystem Design Report” prepared by Sikorsky on September 9, 1977, which is labeled 

“SER-13300.” (ECF No. 155-16.) The report’s introductory section explains that the 

document contains a summary of the “system differences” from Sikorsky’s previouslyproposed CH-53E prototype that had been “agreed to by NAVAIR and Sikorsky Aircraft 

personnel,” and that it also “presents a brief description of those options that may be 

procured.” (Id. at SIK013513.) Wakefield points to a section—which appears to be in 

the portion describing changes agreed to by NAVAIR—stating that all electrical wiring

should be replaced with Kapton wire in accordance with MIL-W-81381. (Id. at 

SIK013611.) MIL-W-81381 is the military specification for polyimide insulation. (See

ECF No. 183-8 at Appendix C.) Plaintiffs dispute the assertion that NAVAIR requested 

the switch to Kapton, and point out that the report, which was prepared by Sikorsky,

demonstrates at most that Sikorsky proposed these changes. (ECF No. 173-1 at 16 ¶ 24.)

Regardless of who first proposed the switch to Kapton, it is undisputed that SD552-3-9 required that BUNO 163077 contain Kapton wiring. (ECF No. 155-20 at 

SIK007125 ¶ 3.16.5.)

b. Wiring Configuration

According to Wakefield, the landing gear control system in the CH-53E is the 

“same design” as the CH-53A, CH-53D, and RH-53D because the cockpit and weighton-wheels interlocks are “wired into the same electronic wiring system” and there are 

separate mechanical safety pins. (ECF No. 164-11 at 4 ¶ 5.) Wakefield concedes, 

however, that there are “minor differences due to the size of the aircraft and use of 

Kapton wire and a hydraulic utility module in the CH-53E.” (Id.) 

According to Sikorsky’s expert James M. Knox, the “basic design” of the CHCase 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of

 51
8

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

53E’s landing gear control system between is “virtually identical from a systems 

standpoint” to the CH-53D’s. (ECF No. 164-9 at 3 ¶ 8.) Knox states that the “wire 

routing, bundling, and securement of the landing gear control wires is substantially 

identical in the CH-53D and CH-53E with minor differences due to the different size of 

the helicopters and not the routing or securement of the electrical wire bundles.” (Id. at 4 

¶ 12.) One difference Knox notes is that while the CH-53E’s utility module is a “single 

assembly,” the CH-53D “had these components but separated and mounted to a panel, 

rather than a single module.” (Id. at 3 ¶ 9.) Whereas the CH-53E module “is one big 

unit,” Knox explains, the CH-53D “has several subsections, all mounted more or less 

together, but [it wasn’t] one unit.” (ECF No. 173-7 at 50.) As a result, in the CH-53D

landing gear harness the wires were “spread out more because they’re different pieces of 

this module.” (Id. at 51.) Knox noted, however, that the landing gear “up and down 

valve” was still one “sub-assembly” in the CH-53D. (Id. at 52.) In sum, according to 

Knox, the main difference in the CH-53E was that “a number of different hydraulic 

systems or hydraulic valves” were placed into a single module. (Id. at 52–53.) 

Plaintiffs dispute that the CH-53E’s landing gear design is the same as its 

predecessors’ designs. They offer a declaration by John Bloomfield, who identifies a 

difference beyond what Knox described above. According to Bloomfield, whereas the 

CH-53D and RH-53D had both up- and down-command landing gear controls connected 

to the utility manifold “via a single plug, designated ‘P499,’” the CH-35E has its up- and 

down-command wires connected to the utility manifold “via separate plugs, designated 

‘P494’ and ‘P495.’” (ECF No. 173-4 at 2 ¶ 5.)4 Bloomfield asserts that the CH-53E’s 

“unique” wiring configuration is what caused the accident, “because the wire strands 

leading to plugs P494 and P495 became denuded due to friction and charging, permitting 

 

4 Bloomfield depicts this difference by attaching copies of the wiring schematics for the CH-53D and 

RH-53D (ECF No. 183-2) and the CH-53E (ECF No. 183-3). In each, the utility manifold is highlighted 

in yellow. The CH/RH-53D vehicles’ single-plug is depicted in pink (see ECF No. 183-2), whereas the 

CH-53E’s double-plug is depicted in green and pink (see ECF No. 183-3).

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of

 51
9

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a short-circuit.” (Id. at 3 ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs also offer the declaration of former Marine 

Corps Colonel William Lawrence, who asserts that there are “discernible” differences 

between the schematics of the landing gear systems wiring in the CH-53D and CH-53E. 

(ECF No. 173-3 at 4 ¶ 11.) The only specific differences Lawrence identifies, however, 

is the one noted by Knox; that is, the consolidation of the “hydraulic manifold 

components into a single unified ‘module.’” (Id. at 4 ¶ 10.) 

More generally, Lawrence notes that the CH-53E has one more engine than the 

CH-53D (the CH-53D had two engines; the CH-53E has three), and as a result there must 

have been a “significant overhaul of the physical and functional configurations of both 

the wiring and hydraulic systems.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 9.) He asserts that NAVAIR had no input 

into “how any these changes would be accommodated”; rather, “the design and 

implementation of these substantial changes was specifically left entirely to the discretion 

of Sikorsky.” (Id.) But the only specific change Lawrence points to in his declaration is 

the shift to a unified module, discussed above. (Id. at 4 ¶ 10.)

Sikorsky asserts that any departures from the design of the CH-53D was “reviewed 

and approved by NAVAIR.” (Def.’s SOF, ECF No. 164-2 at 11–12 ¶ 32.) In support of 

that assertion, Sikorsky points to Wakefield’s description of the interactive process 

between NAVAIR and Sikorsky on all issues of design, during which “[r]esolution and 

design decisions were always made by NAVAIR.” (ECF No. 164-11 at 7 ¶ 10.) As with 

the switch to Kapton, Sikorsky also points to SER-13300 (Sikorsky’s report to NAVAIR 

discussed above), which states that Sikorsky would “study” ways to reduce the airframe 

weight. (ECF No. 155-16 at SIK013664.) Sikorsky also points to a statement in SER13300, in which Sikorsky asserts that it will provide NAVAIR with approximately 90 

“wiring installation drawings to show clamping, routing and mounting.” (Id. at 

SIK013611.)

Plaintiffs dispute Sikorsky’s assertion that NAVAIR reviewed and approved the 

new design of the CH-53E’s landing gear wiring, and point out that neither Wakefield’s 

description of the development process nor SER-13300 actually prove that NAVAIR 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of

 51
10

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

spent any significant amount of time reviewing Sikorsky’s design decisions. (ECF No. 

173-1 at 21–22 ¶ 32.) In fact, Lawrence asserts in his declaration that after reviewing 

Sikorsky’s “documentary productions,” he could “confidently say that there is no 

evidence there was any back-and-forth deliberative process between the Navy and 

Sikorsky in which the government exercised any design decisions regarding how the 

landing gear control system would be configured and implemented in the CH-53E, or, for 

that matter, in the CH-53D.” (ECF No. 173-3 at 3 ¶ 6.) According to Lawrence, there 

was no Navy discretion “regarding the placement or routing of the wiring harness, the 

schematics of the landing gear control system, the interconnections with the hydraulic 

utility module, [or] the safety interlock system.” (Id.) Lawrence points specifically to 

the absence of a signature in the block reserved for a “government” official on the CH53E’s landing gear schematic discussed in Bloomfield’s declaration (see note 4, supra) as 

evidence that NAVAIR was not involved in developing the wiring harness. (ECF No. 

173-3 at 5 ¶¶ 13–14; see ECF No. 183-1). 

iii. Wiring in BUNO 163077 

 According to Wakefield, Navy personnel inspected and confirmed that BUNO 

163077 met all of SD-552-3-9’s requirements. (ECF No. 164-11 at 9 ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs 

dispute this assertion. They contend that the wiring in the landing gear did not conform 

to MIL-W-5088F’s requirement 

 

 (ECF No. 155-21 at MIL210472.) 

In support of their contention that BUNO 163077 did not conform to SD-552-3-9, 

Plaintiffs point to three pieces of evidence. First, the Navy Air Mishap Board’s report, 

 

5

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 51
11

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

which states that

 (ECF No. 183-4 

at MIL073523 ¶ 50.) Next, they point to the report of Staff Sargeant Robert Wuthrich—

who was asked to troubleshoot and identify potential issues in the aircraft (ECF No. 183-

8 at 8)—in which he notes that “the wires on the Down Control were tight and without 

proper strain relief.” (ECF No. 173-10 at 1.) Finally, Plaintiffs point to Bloomfield’s 

deposition, in which he states that in his view Sikorsky did not comply with MIL-W5088F because the wires in the harness were not “supported properly” in order to avoid 

chafing.6

 (ECF No. 173-22 at 192.)

iv. Issues with Kapton 

While Kapton was “widely hailed for its insulating properties” when first 

developed by DuPont, it turns out “that Kapton insulation suffers substantial degradation 

when subjected to abuse, moisture, heat, and acidic environmental contaminants.” (ECF 

No. 173-14 at 26–27.) Soon after the Navy began operating CH-53Es—but prior to 

BUNO 163077’s production—it became clear that Kapton degradation was causing 

widespread electrical interconnection issues in military aircrafts. (ECF No. 164-11 at 9 ¶ 

22.) A 1981 NAVAIR letter noted that “[t]he maintainability and durability aspects of 

our current aircraft wiring systems have been compromised by the use of polyimide type 

wire.” (ECF No. 155-21 at MIL259031.) In December 1981 and November 1986, 

Sikorsky issued requests to NAVAIR that Sikorsky be permitted to propose a plan to 

replace Kapton wiring with Spec-55 wire. (Id. at MIL259030–32, MIL247341–42.) The 

Navy declined these requests because replacement would be too costly. (ECF No. 164-

11 at 9–10 ¶ 22.) In November 1998, Sikorsky again proposed replacing the wiring in all 

aircrafts; in response, the Navy decided to further explore the issue. (ECF No. 155-22 at 

 

6 As a fourth piece of evidence, Plaintiffs cite a report prepared by their expert Arthur Lee Coffman. 

But the cited portion of Coffman’s report just repeats Wuthrich’s conclusion that the wires exhibited 

improper strain relief. (See ECF No. 173-9 at 3.) 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 51
12

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

MIL127080.) 

In 1989, the Navy issued a new detail specification, SD-552-3-10, which 

prohibited the use of Kapton wire. (ECF No. 155-22 at SIK018366–67.) This meant that 

all CH-53Es produced in Lots 13 and above would not have Kapton. (ECF No. 164-11 at 

10 ¶ 23.) BUNO 163077, however, was part of Lot 12, and thus was still subject to SD552-3-9’s requirement that Kapton be used. (Id.) At the time it issued its new SD-552-3-

10, the Navy did not approve any program to replace the Kapton wiring in existing 

aircrafts from Lots 1 through 12. (Id. at 10 ¶ 24.) 

On February 6, 1989, the Navy issued a memorandum calling for the use of nonKapton wiring in “repair[s], modification[s], engineering changes and replacements” of

existing aircrafts. (ECF No. 155-22 at MIL000006 ¶ 2.) The memorandum also stated 

that it was acceptable to mix wire types in the same “bundle, cable, or harness.” (Id. ¶ 4.) 

Sikorsky relies on the February 1989 memorandum to suggest that the portion of Spec-55 

in BUNO 163077 that was involved in Fontalvo’s accident was the result of Navy 

maintenance performed after Sikorsky delivered the aircraft. In response, Plaintiffs insist 

that the Spec-55 portion was part of the original aircraft as a pigtail. They point to the 

Mishap Board’s report, which states 

 

(ECF No. 183-4 at MIL073523 ¶ 45.) 

According to Wakefield, even if Spec-55 wire was part of BUNO 163077’s 

original production, the Navy approved this variance from the Kapton requirement 

because at the time there was a shortage of Kapton wiring. (ECF No. 164-11 at 11 ¶ 25; 

see ECF No. 155-22 at SIK003880–82 (Navy approval).) Plaintiffs dispute that 

assertion, pointing to Stelzer’s deposition in which he states that Kapton-Spec-55 splice 

was “specified that way by the designers.” (ECF No. 173-12 at 118–19.) 

The Navy later initiated a Kapton Replacement Program, but insufficient funding 

has delayed the project. (ECF No. 164-6 at 78.) The replacement plan includes three 

phases; the CH-53E’s wiring harness is in the third phase. (ECF No. 155-24 at 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 51
13

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

MIL073016 ¶¶ 70–73.) The current target date for full replacement is fiscal year 2017. 

(Id. at ¶ 71; ECF No. 164-6 at 102.) 

In 2009, the Navy issued a report documenting the history of Kapton-related 

problems. (ECF No. 155-28.) The report described issues such as

 (Id. at MIL230432.) The report author found 54 incidences 

attributable to Kapton wiring. (Id. at MIL230430.) Most notable of those incidence was 

an accident in 2005 when a Kapton-wiring malfunction caused a CH-53E to inadvertently 

retract its landing gear while the helicopter was taxiing. (Id. at MIL230435–36.) Despite 

the report’s determination that Kapton-related risks were “serious” and its explicit 

warning that Kapton could cause “an inadvertent landing gear retraction while the aircraft 

is on the ground,” Navy leadership responded to the report by “accepting” these risks. 

(Id. at MIL230430–31, MIL230434.).

B. Accident Investigations 

The parties appear to agree that the landing gear’s retraction was the result of an 

inadvertent energization of a degraded portion of the up-command control wire. (See

ECF No. 190-1 at 12 ¶ 38 (Sikorsky not disputing this assertion in its responsive 

statement of facts).) How that occurred, however, is the primary dispute in this case. 

Seeking to capitalize on the military’s insistence on the usage of Kapton—so as to utilize 

the military contractor defense—Sikorsky argues that it was Kapton wire that 

inadvertently energized the up-command wire. Plaintiffs contend there is at least a 

genuine dispute as to whether that was the case. 

i. Military Investigations 

The Navy’s Air Mishap Board investigated Fontalvo’s accident and issued a Safety 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 51
14

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Investigation Report (the “SIR”). (ECF No. 183-4.) The Marine Corps issued a 

“Command Investigation” with findings of fact and opinions as to the cause of the 

accident.7

 (ECF No. 155-24.) NAVAIR also issued an “EI Final Report” on September 

29, 2011.” (ECF No. 183-10.) 

The SIR offers five relevant findings: 

The Command Investigation report author noted that Fontalvo’s accident appeared 

to be similar to the 2005 incident. (ECF No. 155-24 at 11 ¶ 66 (relying on ECF No. 155-

25 at MIL073216–266).) The report author found that there was degradation on “both 

sections of the length wire in question.” (Id. at 11 ¶ 63.) 

 The Command Investigation relied on a narrative prepared by Staff Sergeant 

Wuthrich. (ECF No. 173-10.) Wuthrich noted that “the tension of the wires on the 

 

7

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 51
15

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Down Control were tight and without proper strain relief and pin A of 495 had two wear 

through spots w[h]ere the wires came in contact with the Up Landing Gear Control Valve 

Cannon Plug.” (Id. at 1.) 

ii. Parties’ Experts and Other Non-Military Reports 

 After the military inspected BUNO 163077, it removed the damaged wires and 

repaired the aircraft. (ECF No. 173-14 at 27–28.) The military permitted the parties’ 

experts to examine the repaired aircraft and damaged wiring. (Id. at 27–28, 35.) 

a. Plaintiffs’ Experts and Related Evidence

Plaintiffs offer the opinions of two experts in support of their position that Kapton 

was not responsible for Fontalvo’s accident: Arthur Lee Coffman and John Bloomfield. 

Coffman suggests in his report that the damage to the Kapton wire, which was 

“consistent with scraping and tearing due to being removed from the helicopter after the 

accident,” did not exist at the time of the accident. (ECF No. 173-9 at 2.) In fact, 

Coffman reports, the Kapton wiring “exhibited a very low degree of age related 

deterioration as compared to the wire sections inspected during the 2005 [Kapton-related] 

accident.” (Id.) By contrast, the Spec-55 pigtails at pins P494 (the “up” landing gear 

valve) and P495 (the “down” valve) “exhibit[ed] signatures consistent with chaffing” 

because “[t]he damaged wire coating of the Spec-55 wire ha[d] smooth appearing edges 

with a lack of tearing and ripping signatures.” (Id. at 3.) Coffman notes that “[t]he 

chaffed areas were worn through the coating exposing the bare wires,” which in turn

exhibited signatures “consistent with chaffing and some areas of electrical arcing.” (Id.) 

Such “arcing would have created an intermittent unpredictable electrical signal being sent 

to the main landing gear hydraulic retraction system.” (Id.) 

Coffman also asserts that the “installation of the main landing gear hydraulic 

wiring” did not comply with MIL-W-5088F ¶ 3.11.7 (Id.) That provision requires 

 (ECF No. 155-21 at MIL210477.) Thus, “[t]o a reasonable degree 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 51
16

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of probability,” Coffman opines, “the non-compliant installation and damage to the 

subject Spec-55 wires, due to chaffing, caused an intermittent fatal short, arcing, and 

uncommanded activation of the main landing gear retraction system.” (ECF No. 173-9 at 

3–4.) 

 Bloomfield offers a similar opinion. In his report, Bloomfield states that “the only 

sections of wire showing damage sufficient to allow a short like the one that occurred[] 

were segments of non-Kapton wire leading immediately to the plugs energizing the ‘up’ 

and ‘down’ solenoids.” (ECF No. 173-8 at ¶ 16.) He explains that the “up” and “down” 

solenoids 

are immediately adjacent to each other, and the wire terminus for each is 

simply a loose strand of isolated wire, meaning that the loose wires intended 

to energize the ‘up’ and ‘down’ solenoids are permitted, by virtue of the 

design of the wiring harness and utility module, to come in direct contact 

with the metal features of the utility module, as well as with each other. 

(Id. at ¶ 17.) This configuration, according to Bloomfield, “allowed stray 28VDC 

electrical power to pass directly from the ‘down’ wire path into and to energize the ‘up’ 

wire to the ‘up’ solenoid in the hydraulic utility module.”8

 (Id. at ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiffs also point to the report of Joseph R. Reynolds, a principal forensic 

engineer hired by DuPont. Reynolds asserts that 

 and

 

8 With respect to the wire bundling in the CH53E, Bloomfield states that “[i]t is foreseeable to the point 

of inevitability that any single wire path will become compromised during the lifespan of an aircraft, due 

to the normal vibration and chafing that occur during normal aircraft operation,” (id. at ¶ 22), and that 

“the wires energizing the ‘up’ and ‘down’ valves of the hydraulic utility module should have been 

physically separated, especially considering that both wire paths use the same voltage (28 VDC) and 

command opposite functions” (id. at ¶ 23). He also suggests that Sikorsky could have connected a radio 

altimeter to the landing gear to prevent inadvertent retraction when the aircraft was below a certain 

altitude (id. at ¶ 24), and, to avoid what happened to Fontalvo, configuring the safety pins to have a 

longer cable so that the servicemember would not have to come under the aircraft in order to remove the 

safety pin (id. at ¶ 25). 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 51
17

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 (ECF No. 183-8 at 16–17 ¶¶ 8, 9.) 

In contrast to Sikorsky’s assertions that Kapton wire was involved in arcing, 

 (Id.

at 15; see id. at 12–15.)

In a Materials Engineering Report dated May 13, 2011, a Sikorsky representative 

indicated that, except for specific sites, the Kapton wiring in BUNO 163077 was “in very 

good general condition.” (ECF No. 155-25, “Enclosure 41,” at 3.) “Notably,” the report 

states, “none of the radial cracking associated with aging” found in the helicopter 

involved in the 2005 accident was found. (Id.) The report author did, however, note 

specific instances where the Kapton wiring was damaged, and that a few of these 

damaged portions demonstrated evidence of arcing. (Id. at 3–8.) The author concluded 

that, in such damaged areas, “a path may [have] be[en] created for conductive moisture 

between the conductor of a powered wire and that of another wire where power would 

ordinarily not be present.” (Id. at 8–9.) 

b. Sikorsky’s Expert and Related Evidence 

In Knox’s Rule 26 report, he notes that there were “several small nicks” in the 

Spec-55 wire connected to P494-A, two of which “were visibly damaged into the 

conductive strands.” (ECF No. 173-14 at 37.) He also notes that along the Kapton 

segment of the up-command wire there were sections where the outer insulation had 

deteriorated and the inner insulation had been “delaminated, with clear signs of intrusion 

by foreign liquids,” and two areas where the insulation was missing entirely. (Id. at 42–

 

9

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 51
18

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43.) As for those two areas, however, Knox cannot say whether they were the remains of 

a “previous splice to another circuit, or a chafed portion.” (Id. at 43.) Knox examined

the wires under a Scanning Electron Microscope, which permitted an Energy Dispersive 

S-Ray Analysis (“EDX”). (Id. at 48.) He concludes that “while several areas may or 

may not have been representative of arcing, none were confirmed by the EDX.” (Id. at 

52.) Knox also put the larger wire segments through a “leakage test,” in which he 

immersed the wire in water and measured any penetration of the water to the surface of 

the conductive material, which indicates “reduced resistance.” (Id. at 52.) The Spec-55 

wires connected to P494 and P495 and the Kapton portion of the up-command wire tested 

positive for leakage. (Id.) 

Knox offers three possibilities of how the inadvertent energization of the upcommand wire could have occurred. The first option is direct contact between a bare 

spot on the up-command wire and “another conductor, either a contact pin or a bare spot 

on another adjacent wire, which was energized (either correctly or incorrectly).” (Id.) 

Knox notes that while the Spec-55 wire connected to P494-A had no arc marks or 

material transfer, direct contact with the “interior strands of another wire would not be 

expected to produce such signs, unless such contact were repeatedly made, or under 

much higher power than is required to activate the [utility module].” (Id.) Because the 

military investigators could not determine whether the bare wire spots “could be forced to 

come into contact with any energized wires at the time of the accident,” Knox 

“reasonably exclude[s]” that possibility. (Id.) The second option is arcing “through a 

normal or compromised insulation [such as air] if the potential is high enough or the 

insulating material is poor enough.” (Id. at 55.) While it is unlikely that a “free air arc” 

occurred because the electrical system is only 28 volts, Knox explains, other conductors 

could have caused arcing. (Id.) Knox points specifically to the possibility of a 

“flashover” caused by salt spray, mist, fog, and high humidity. (Id.) Third, Knox 

suggests that leakage could have caused an electrical current or, in the case of hydraulic 

fluids leakage, an inadvertent mechanical retraction. (Id. at 56–58.) As an aside, Knox 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 51
19

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

states that there is a possibility that a three-wire connection was made in which an 

energized wire came into contact with a second, previously-non-energized wire, which 

then connected to the up-command wire. (Id. at 59.) 

Knox also offers an opinion on “whether the relevant insulation damage was more 

likely to be in the Kapton or the Spec-55 wire.” (Id. at 59.) Because both sections of 

wire were damaged, Knox states he can offer only probabilities as to which section was 

responsible. (Id.) Knox finds Spec-55 to be an unlikely culprit because a “cam limit

switch” would have prevented electricity from running through the down-command wire 

while the helicopter was resting on the ground with the gear was down and locked. (Id.

at 59–60; see also ECF No. 164-9 at 4–5 ¶ 13 (Knox further explaining the function of 

the cam limit switch and citing the government’s CH-53E manual, which states “[w]hen 

all gears are down and locked, each associated cam lock limit switch . . . deenergizes 

[and] establish[es] a hydraulic lock for the landing gear in the down position”).) Knox 

then reiterates Kapton’s long history of deterioration and causing accidents. (ECF No. 

173-14 at 59.) “Given the history of the Kapton wiring,” Knox concludes, “and given 

that there is much more Kapton insulated wiring in the suspect circuitry than there is 

Spec-55 . . . , it is more likely than not that the piece of damaged wiring which allowed 

energy into the P494-A circuit was insulated with Kapton.” (Id.) 

C. Fontalvo’s Training

Fontalvo was an Airframe Collateral Duty Quality Assurance Representative. This 

qualification required “significant exposure and a working mechanical knowledge of the 

landing gear system.” (ECF No. 155-24 at 7 ¶ 30.) Fontalvo was trained, at least in part, 

by CH-53 crew chief division instructor Jeremiah Wilcox when the two servicemen were 

stationed in Okinawa. (ECF No. 164-4, Ex. B, at 15–17.) According to Wilcox, he 

instructed Fontalvo during training that if a landing gear safety pin in a CH-53E 

helicopter offers resistance, “you should not try to force it out or pull it out.” (Id. at 17–

18; see also id. at 35–36, 56.) 

According to the Command Investigation, however,

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 51
20

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Moreover, according to the NCIS report, 

While the crew chief 

 The Command Investigation author nonetheless concluded that 

Plaintiffs deposed many of Fontalvo’s peers who were on active duty at the time of 

the accident. All indicated that, at the time of the accident, they were never instructed 

about the danger of a resisting landing gear safety pin. (See ECF No. 173-15 (Captain 

Micah Hamilton) (stating that he “would have kept pulling” on a resisting pin and would 

not have notified a crew chief); ECF No. 173-16 (Lance Corporal Charles William 

Coffin) (testifying that he was never “taught or trained on what to do” if the safety pin 

resisted); ECF No. 173-17 (Sergeant Christopher A. Danley) (same); ECF No. 173-18 at 

117 (Sergeant and crew chief Evan Reid Shelton) (discussing a time he forced out a 

safety pin); ECF No. 173-19 (Captain Justin Brown) (indicating he was never taught what 

to do with a resisting pin).) 

D. T.L.’s Relationship to Fontalvo

 On November 10, 2000, Tashina Amador gave birth to T.L. (ECF No. 164-6, Ex. 

H, at 43.) T.L.’s biological father is Delvin Long. (Id.) Amador and T.L. began living 

with Fontalvo around December 2007. (ECF No. 173-24 at ¶ 7.) In her 2010 federal tax 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 51
21

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

return, Amador indicated that she was the head of her household and that T.L. was her 

qualified dependent. (ECF No. 164-6, Ex. H, at 138–39.) When asked at her deposition 

to estimate the percentage of T.L.’s support that Fontalvo provided, Amador answered 

“about 60 percent.” (Id. at 81; see also id. at 141 (Amador indicating that she paid about 

40 percent of T.L.’s support in 2010).) In 2010, Fontalvo made $30,046.30 (ECF No. 

173-27 at DF-000693), and Amador made $28,766 (ECF No. 173-28).

Sikorksy contends that T.L. was not dependent upon Fontalvo for 50% or more of 

her support in the 180 days prior to Fontalvo’s death. (ECF No. 164-2 at 21 ¶ 63.) It 

points to three pieces of evidence. First, it cites Amador’s deposition, in which she says 

that Delvin Long did not support T.L. financially before 2006 or after August 2006. 

(ECF No. 164-6, Ex. H, at 45–46.) Second, Sikorsky points to the deposition of David 

Todd Fractor, Ph.D., in which Fractor states that he “believed”—without looking at 

Amador’s “earnings and housing allowance in relation to what she spent on” T.L.—that 

if Amador was not in a relationship with Fontalvo, she would have been able to provide 

for T.L.’s support. (ECF No. 164-6, Ex. K, at 65–66.) Third, Sikorsky cites Amador’s 

2010 tax return, described above.

E. Plaintiffs’ Complaint

Plaintiffs allege that Sikorsky defectively designed and manufactured the landing 

gear system by configuring it such that “the wiring harness and wire path leading from 

the landing gear controls to the landing gear assembly, which juxtaposed a crucial wire

bundle and pin 494 . . . in a position downstream of any and all interlocks and failsafes 

capable of preventing gear retraction in the event of unplanned energization.” (Id. at 6 ¶ 

13, 9–10 ¶¶ 25–27, 13–14 ¶ 37, 16 ¶ 43, 18–19 ¶ 50.) They also allege that DuPont 

defectively designed and manufactured the Kapton wiring insulation used in the CH-53E 

in light of “its susceptibility to corrosion, degradation, deterioration, wear, alteration 

upon contact with water, carbonization upon exposure to heat, and disintegration,” which 

“rendered the wiring leading from the landing gear controls prone to arcing events, arc 

tracking, flashover, deflagration, and other unplanned conduction and energizing events.” 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 51
22

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Id. at 6–7 ¶ 14, 10–11 ¶¶ 28–29, 14 ¶ 38, 16–17 ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs pursue theories of strict 

products liability with respect to design and manufacturing, negligent products liability 

with respect to design and manufacturing, and general negligence.

III. DuPont’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Plaintiffs’ Non-Opposition Entitles DuPont to Summary Judgment

DuPont moves for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) DuPont’s actions did 

not cause Fontalvo’s death because it was degradation in the Spec-55 wire—not Kapton 

wire—that caused the inadvertent landing gear retraction, and DuPont did not 

manufacture Spec-55; (2) even if there is a dispute as to whether DuPont-made wiring 

caused the accident, the military contractor defense shields DuPont from liability; and (3) 

T.L. lacks standing to assert a wrongful death claim in this case because she cannot 

satisfy Cal. Civ. Code § 377.60(c)’s requirement that she depended on Fontalvo for onehalf or more of her support. (ECF No. 160-1.)

In their response brief, Plaintiffs state the following: “Plaintiffs take no position on 

[DuPont’s causation argument] for purposes of the Motion, and submit this Opposition as 

to” DuPont’s military contractor defense and § 377.60(c) arguments only. (ECF No. 176 

at 1.) In other words, Plaintiffs offer no opposition to DuPont’s assertion that it is 

entitled to summary judgment on the ground that DuPont’s actions did not cause 

Fontalvo’s death. 

In light of Plaintiffs’ non-opposition, DuPont is entitled to summary judgment. 

There is no longer a dispute between Plaintiffs and DuPont over the issue of whether

DuPont’s actions caused Fontalvo’s death. Causation is an essential element of 

Plaintiffs’ tort actions against DuPont. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc., 11 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 807, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“In the context of products liability actions, the 

plaintiff must prove that the defective products supplied by the defendant were a 

substantial factor in bringing about his or her injury.”). Because “there is no genuine 

dispute as to [the] material fact [of causation] and [DuPont] is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law,” this Court “shall grant summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 51
23

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Sikorsky Cannot Prevent Summary Judgment to DuPont

Sikorsky objects to DuPont’s summary judgment. In an opposition to DuPont’s 

motion, Sikorsky contends that the Court should not grant DuPont summary judgment 

because there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether DuPont’s Kapton wire caused the 

accident that killed Fontalvo. (ECF No. 179) According to Sikorsky, regardless of 

whether Plaintiffs oppose DuPont’s motion, if a reasonable jury could disagree with 

DuPont’s contention that Kapton did not cause Fontalvo’s death, the Court cannot grant 

summary judgment. DuPont, in response, argues that Sikorsky lacks “standing” to object 

to DuPont’s summary judgment motion because Sikorsky is not an adverse party to 

DuPont. (ECF No. 196-3.) 

This issue—whether the opposing-co-defendant10 can prevent the Court from 

granting summary judgment to the moving-co-defendant on the plaintiff’s claims when 

the plaintiff offers no opposition—has arisen in many district courts11 by now, and the 

outcomes are split. Courts that have concluded that the opposing-co-defendant cannot 

prevent summary judgment have relied on the idea that forcing a plaintiff to prosecute a 

trial, against that plaintiff’s wishes, is “contrary to the principle of Rule 56 that trials (or 

 

10 For ease of discussion, the Court refers to the party in Sikorsky’s position (that is, a co-defendant who 

has not filed a crossclaim against another co-defendant but opposes that co-defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims) as the “opposing-co-defendant,” and the party in DuPont’s 

position (that is, the co-defendant that has filed a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims 

and the plaintiff does not opposed that motion) as the “moving-co-defendant.”

11 It appears that no federal court of appeals has addressed this issue. The closest opinion this Court is 

able to find is Hoover v. Switlik Parachute Co., 663 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1981). There, the Ninth Circuit 

held that an opposing-co-defendant had standing to appeal a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to a moving-co-defendant. But in Hoover, the opposing-co-defendant had asserted a crossclaim against 

the moving-co-defendant, and the district court had made an explicit determination that the moving-codefendant had not manufactured the defective product at issue. Id. at 966. Moreover, after granting the 

moving-co-defendant summary judgment, the district court dismissed with prejudice the opposing-codefendant’s crossclaim against the moving-co-defendant. Id. Because the district court’s decisions 

clearly “aggrieved” the opposing-co-defendant, the court concluded the opposing-co-defendant had 

standing to appeal. This case differs from Hoover because (1) Sikorsky has not asserted a crossclaim 

against DuPont, (2) there is no indication in Hoover that the plaintiff did not oppose summary judgment, 

and (3) here, as discussed below, granting summary judgment in light of Plaintiffs’ non-opposition will 

not serve as a legal determination that Kapton wiring was not a cause of the accident.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

 51
24

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

portions thereof) should be avoided when appropriate.” Blonder v. Casco Inn Care, Inc., 

No. Civ. 99-274-P-C, 2000 WL 761895, at *1 (D. Me. May 4, 2000); accord Hawes v. 

Blast-Tek, Inc., Civ. No. 09-365 (RKH/AJB), 2010 WL 2680778, at *2–3 (D. Minn. July 

2, 2010); Eckert v. City of Sacramento, No. 2:07-cv-00825-GEB-GGH, 2009 WL 

3211278, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). These courts have also noted that, in light of 

the absence of any crossclaim between the co-defendants, the opposing-co-defendant has 

no “standing” to prevent summary judgment in this scenario. Rosenbaum v. Freight, 

Lime & Sand Hauling, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-287, 2012 WL 4832248, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 

10, 2012); Eckert, 2009 WL 3211278, at *3; Brewer v. Dodson Aviation, No. C04-2189Z, 

2006 WL 3231974, at *4 n.5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2006); C.F. Bean Corp. v. Clayton 

Indus., Ltd., No. Civ. A. No. 95-0161, 1996 WL 470644, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1996).

By contrast, the courts that have concluded that the opposing-co-defendants may

prevent summary judgment to the moving-co-defendant have focused on the opposingco-defendant’s interest in keeping the moving-co-defendant in the case. The best 

example appears in Stone v. Marten Transport, LLC, No. 3:12-cv-0396, 2014 WL 

1666420, at *3–5 (M.D. Tenn. April 25, 2014), where the plaintiff and the moving-codefendant stipulated that the moving-co-defendant was “0% liable.” On that basis, the 

moving-co-defendant sought summary judgment, which the plaintiff did not oppose. The 

court ruled that the opposing-co-defendants could prevent summary judgment because 

not permitting them to do so “could have adverse consequences for [the opposing-codefendants], who might be forced to shoulder any blame that might otherwise be assigned 

to [the moving-co-defendant].” Id. at *4. Because the opposing-co-defendants “certainly 

‘have a dog in this fight,’” the court explained, they “have standing to challenge the

[summary judgment] motion.” Id. The Stone court explicitly rejected the argument that 

the absence of a crossclaim between the co-defendants meant that the opposing-codefendants lacked standing to oppose the summary judgment motion. It explained that 

because Tennessee law had adopted a comparative negligence regime, the opposing-codefendants could never have asserted a crossclaim against the moving-co-defendant in 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

 51
25

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the first place. Id. at *5. “It would make little sense,” the court said, “to penalize [the 

opposing-co-defendants] for ‘failing’ to assert cross-claims that they never held and did 

not need to assert to vindicate their right under Tennessee law to be liable to [the 

plaintiff] only for their proportionate fault.” Id. Other courts have reasoned similarly. 

E.g., Wood v. Millar, No. CIV 13-0923 RB/CG, 2015 WL 12661926, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 

19, 2015) (“[T]he better rule allows defendants to opposed motions for summary 

judgment if they could be aggrieved by the outcome of the decision.”).

This Court concludes that, under the circumstances of this case, Sikorsky cannot 

prevent DuPont from receiving summary judgment. By choosing not to oppose DuPont’s 

summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs have consented to DuPont’s dismissal from the 

case. “[T]he present situation is no different than if [Plaintiffs] had stipulated to the 

dismissal of [DuPont] under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41; or had moved to amend 

[their] Complaint to drop [their] claims against [DuPont] under Rule 15; or had requested 

that [DuPont] be dropped as Defendants under Rule 21.” Hawes, 2010 WL 2680778, at 

*2. It would be unfair—and perhaps unwise—to force Plaintiffs to prosecute a trial

against DuPont in the face of Plaintiffs’ wishes not to do so. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 

482 U.S. 386, 389–99 (1987) (explaining that if courts allowed a defendant to turn a 

state-law claim into a federal question, it would transform the plaintiff from “the master 

of the complaint” into “the master of nothing”).

Most importantly, unlike the situation in Stone, the Court can find no reason to 

believe that dismissing DuPont would impact Sikorsky’s ability to limit its liability to the 

proportion of its own fault. Under California law, joint tortfeasors’ liability for noneconomic damages is “several only,” Cal. Civ. Code § 1431.2, meaning that Plaintiffs 

may only recover from Sikorsky the proportion of their non-economic damages for which 

Sikorsky is responsible, regardless of whether DuPont is a part of the case. As for 

economic damages, while tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, “a defendant may 

pursue a comparative equitable indemnity claim against other tortfeasors either (1) by 

filing a cross-complaint in the original tort action or (2) by filing a separate indemnity 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

 51
26

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

action after paying more than its proportionate share of the damages.” Evangelatos v. 

Superior Ct., 753 P.2d 585, 119–98 (Cal. 1988); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1431. If

Sikorsky is held liable to Plaintiffs after trial, it may seek contribution from DuPont.12 In 

other words, granting summary judgment to DuPont as a result of Plaintiffs’ nonopposition has no effect on the merits of this case. In fact, even Sikorsky asserts in its 

brief that DuPont’s dismissal will not alter Sikorsky’s ability to defend its position: in its 

opposition to DuPont’s summary judgment motion, it states, “[i]t is Sikorsky’s position 

that even if Du[P]ont prevailed on this argument, it would not preclude the trier of fact 

from allocating a percentage of liability to Du[P]ont, the U.S. Government, Navy and 

Marine Corps.” (ECF No. 179 at 5.) The Court agrees. See Dailey v. J.B. Call & Co., 

Inc., No. 04-4114-RDR, 2006 WL 616634, at *2 (D. Kan. March 9, 2006) (explaining 

that, if the court “did limit the arguments and evidence on summary judgment to plaintiff 

and [the moving-co-defendant], we could not apply any finding made in our decision 

against” the opposing-co-defendant).

DuPont also argues that Sikorsky lacks constitutional standing to oppose DuPont’s 

summary judgment in the face of Plaintiffs’ non-opposition. But the issue of Article III 

standing has no application here. That analysis determines whether a federal court 

possesses the jurisdiction necessary to resolve a legal action brought by a particular party. 

See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–62 (1992). Because Sikorsky 

is not pursuing a claim against DuPont, the doctrine of Article III standing is irrelevant to 

this analysis.13 The Court notes, however, that it would provoke a different jurisdictional 

 

12 To the extent Sikorsky is prejudiced by having to pay full damages to Plaintiffs before it seeks 

contribution or indemnity from DuPont, that is the result of Sikorsky’s choice not to file a crossclaim 

against DuPont.

13 Because DuPont asserts that Sikorsky lacks standing to oppose DuPont’s motion, DuPont “objects” to 

and ask the Court to strike Sikorsky’s opposition. (ECF No. 196-3.) The Court finds this unnecessary. 

Despite Sikorsky’s inability to prevent DuPont from being dismissed from this case, Sikorsky does have 

the ability—particularly, as a party in this case—to file briefing on a particular issue if it feels another 

party’s actions will affect its interests. The Court therefore DENIES DuPont’s objection and motion to 

strike.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 26 of

 51
27

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

problem by requiring Plaintiffs to litigate their claims against DuPont despite Plaintiffs’ 

wish not to: the result would be a trial over claims for which there is no existing legal 

dispute between the claimant and defendant. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 

n.10 (1974) (“The rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must be extant at all 

stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”). This even further 

supports the Court’s conclusion that Sikorsky cannot prevent summary judgment to 

DuPont under these circumstances.

In sum, Plaintiffs’ non-opposition to DuPont’s summary judgment motion entitles 

DuPont to dismissal from this action. The Court emphasizes, however, that the

dismissal of DuPont from this case does not amount to a finding of fact or a legal 

determination as to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court’s decision on this issue 

is strictly procedural: by choosing not to oppose DuPont’s motion for summary 

judgment, Plaintiffs have forfeited their right to assert their claims against DuPont, and

DuPont is entitled to exit this litigation. At trial, Sikorsky will be free to argue that 

DuPont-manufactured Kapton insulation caused the accident, and Plaintiffs may not rely 

on today’s decision to make any factual assertion to the contrary.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS DuPont’s motion for summary 

judgment.

IV. Sikorsky’s Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts

Sikorsky asks the Court to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts Arthur Lee Coffman and 

John Bloomfield. (ECF No. 146.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the 

motion to exclude.

A. Coffman’s Compliance with Rule 26

Sikorsky first argues that Coffman’s report does not comply with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)(i)’s requirement that a report include “a complete statement 

of all opinions the witness will express and basis and reasons for them.” In Coffman’s 

report, he sets forth his analysis and opinions as to the issues in this case, but concludes 

with the following statement:

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 27 of

 51
28

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I reserve the right to make changes as new information is obtained. 

Although these are the main categories of my opinions, there are related 

opinions and sub-opinions which opposing counsel will be able to obtain 

during my deposition. Further, I expect to have counter-opinions to defense 

experts’ opinions once those opinions are fully disclosed. Again, I believe 

defense counsel will have an opportunity to inquire as to these counteropinions at the time of my deposition.

(ECF No. 173-9 at 4.) Sikorsky argues that this statement violates Rule 26 because it 

suggests that Coffman is omitting opinions that should have been disclosed. (Def.’s 

Mem., ECF No. 146-1 at 5.) It therefore asks the Court to exclude any opinions offered 

by Coffman not included in his Rule 26 report.

To the extent that Coffman has withheld any material opinions, Sikorsky is correct 

that they should be excluded. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (“If a party fails to provide 

information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) . . . the party is not allowed to use that 

information . . . to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the 

failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”). But Sikorsky has not identified for 

the Court any opinion not included in Coffman’s Rule 26 report that Plaintiffs seek to use 

in opposing Sikorsky’s summary judgment. In other words, there is nothing to exclude. 

As a result, the Court DENIES this portion of Sikorsky’s motion. 

Without suggesting how the Court would rule on such a motion, the Court notes 

that this ruling would not affect Sikorsky’s ability to enforce Rule 26’s requirements at 

some point later in this litigation. If, for example, Plaintiffs attempt to offer at trial an 

opinion by Coffman that was not disclosed in his Rule 26 report, Sikorsky may at that 

time seek exclusion under Rule 37(c)(1).

B. Coffman’s Qualifications and Opinions

Sikorsky also argues that Coffman is unqualified to offer his opinions, and that his 

opinions are unreliable and should be excluded.14 The Court disagrees.

 

14 Sikorsky argues that Coffman’s and Bloomfield’s opinions should be excluded “under Daubert.” But 

other than naming Daubert at the beginning and end of the respective sections of its memorandum, 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 28 of

 51
29

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

First, Coffman’s qualifications are sufficient to enable him to opine on the cause of 

a wiring failure in an aircraft. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 “contemplates a broad 

conception of expert qualifications.” Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 

(9th Cir. 1994). So long as the expert’s testimony remains “within the reasonable 

confines of his subject area,” it is admissible. Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 

633 F.3d 828, 839 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 

275 F.3d 965, 969–70 (10th Cir. 2001) (examining precedent that states “[a]s long as an 

expert stays within the reasonable confines of his subject area, our case law establishes a 

lack of specialization does not affect the admissibility of [the expert] opinion, but only its 

weight”)). Even if a purported expert admits that she lacks specialized knowledge on the 

exact scenario being investigated, she may serve as an expert so long as she has 

experience in that general area. For example, in United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 

889–90 (9th Cir. 1993), the court held that despite an expert’s admission that she was 

“not an expert on the trauma a child would face from testifying in court or testifying on a 

two-way closed circuit TV,” she was still qualified to opine on that issue in light of her 

experience working as a counselor for a Native American tribe and counseling children 

who had been sexually abused. As the court explained, a “lack of particularized

expertise goes to the weight accorded her testimony, not to the admissibility of her 

opinion as an expert.” Id. at 890 (emphasis added).

Coffman is a “certified airframe and powerplant mechanic” and has “been 

extensively educated, trained, and ha[s] experience installing, inspecting, repairing, and 

troubleshooting aircraft wiring systems and issues with landing gear.” (ECF No. 168-10 

at 2 ¶ 4.) This makes Coffman’s qualifications more suitable for expert opinion on the 

CH-53E’s landing gear wiring than the experts at issue in the cases cited by Sikorsky. 

(See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 146-1 at 8.) In Avila, the court held that it was not an abuse 

 

Sikorsky offers no explanation for why either expert’s methodology fails to satisfy any of the Daubert

factors. 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 29 of

 51
30

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of discretion when the district court excluded the opinions of a “physician/

scientist/attorney” with expertise in “cancer immunology and biology, basic and clinical 

immunology, and medical toxicology” from testifying on whether a particular type of 

metal work created dioxins. 633 F.3d at 839. There, the expert’s expertise was 

completely outside of the field of the opinion offered: the expert was a doctor attempting 

to opine on the kind of waste a particular chrome-plating method would cause. The same 

beyond-the-field-of-expertise standard was applied in Samuels v. Holland Am. Line-USA, 

Inc., 656 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2011), where the court held that it was not an abuse of

discretion for the district court to exclude an expert who had experience in the “travel 

industry for over 30 years,” from opining on the dangerousness of a particular area of 

water. Avila and Samuels suggest the unremarkable proposition that an expert must have 

expertise in the general area of the subject matter upon which she is testifying.

Sikorsky also cites Bunker v. Ford Motor Co., 640 Fed. App’x 661, 662 (9th Cir. 

2016), which presents a closer case, but is nonetheless distinguishable. There, the court 

held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to exclude an expert who 

lacked “experience with brake shift interlock systems” from opining on whether a 

“truck’s brake shift interlock system allowed the transmission to be shifted out of park 

without someone applying pressure to the brake pedal.” Id. The court explained that the 

expert admitted at his deposition that “he did not know the history of such systems”; had 

testified on transmission issues only a few times before; and had never testified on 

matters of brake shift interlock systems. Id. The court concluded that the expert “had 

virtually no familiarity with brake shift interlock systems.” Id. As an initial matter, 

Bunker is an unreported decision and is not controlling on this court. Ninth Cir. Rule 36-

3(a). But even if it were controlling, the Court would still find Coffman’s qualifications 

suitable for expert opinion on the wiring of the CH-53E’s landing gear and a hypothesis 

as to how the accident occurred because Coffman, unlike the expert in Bunker, has actual 

experience with the subject of his inquiry, i.e., the installation and inspection of aircraft 

wiring systems.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 30 of

 51
31

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Sikorsky specifically attacks Coffman’s opinions as to the cause of the accident. It 

asserts that Coffman fails to identify the wire that provided the inadvertent energy to the 

up-command wire, and fails to cite “any manual, publication, schematic, diagram or test 

result that demonstrates or supports his causation theory.” (Def.’s Mem. at 8.) As a 

result, Sikorsky argues, Coffman’s opinion is unreliable and should be excluded. The 

Court disagrees. Coffman explains in his report that it was most likely the downcommand wire that provided the inadvertent energy because of the chaffing and arc 

signatures found on the Spec-55 portions of the down- and up-command wires. While 

Sikorsky can offer evidence tending to discredit Coffman’s theory by suggesting, for 

example, that the down-command wire was not energized at the moment of the accident, 

that is a matter of the weight of Coffman’s opinion, not its admissibility. See, e.g., 

Humetrix, Inc. v. Gemplus S.C.A., 268 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To the extent 

Gemplus sought to challenge the correctness of Humetrix’s experts’ testimony, its 

recourse is not exclusion of the testimony, but, rather, refutation of it by crossexamination and by the testimony of its own expert witnesses.”).

The same analysis applies to Sikorsky’s challenge to Coffman’s opinion as to 

whether Sikorsky complied with MIL-W-5088F when it manufactured BUNO 163077’s 

landing gear wiring. Coffman has experience in installing and inspecting wiring in 

aircrafts, and he relied on military investigation reports to conclude that the excess slack 

and improper strain relief was the result of defective manufacturing. Sikorsky also 

argues that Coffman’s opinion is unreliable because it is more plausible that military 

maintenance is to blame for BUNO 163077’s wiring issues rather than its own 

manufacturing in the 1980s. Again, that is a matter of the weight of Coffman’s opinion, 

not its admissibility.

C. Bloomfield’s Qualifications and Opinions

Sikorsky offers similar arguments in its attack against Bloomfield’s opinions. It 

first contends that Bloomfield’s qualifications are inadequate because he has never 

designed or installed wiring in a landing gear system. Bloomfield is an expert in robotics 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 31 of

 51
32

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and engineering, and his experience includes designing (1) accelerometers that 

determined whether an aircraft had made a hard “heavy landing” so that the appropriate 

maintenance could be determined and (2) sensors inside aircrafts that monitor real-time 

total electrical consumption. (ECF No. 168-9 at 65–68.) This work involved drawing the 

electrical schematics of “14,000 parts.” (Id. at 69.) This experience is sufficiently 

relevant to enable Bloomfield to offer opinions on the wiring configuration of the CH53E. Cf. United States v. Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530, 548 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that it 

was an abuse of discretion to exclude a stock market expert who had experience of the 

industry, but not the particular type of stocks at issue in the case); see also 4-702 Jack B. 

Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 702.04(1)(a) (2017)

(“[I]t is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony solely on the 

ground that the witness is not qualified to render an opinion because the witness lacks 

expertise in specialized areas that are directly pertinent to the issues in question, if the 

witness has educational and experiential qualifications in a general field related to the 

subject matter of the issue in question.”).

In its challenge to the reliability of Bloomfield’s opinions, Sikorsky first argues 

that Bloomfield cannot opine on the cause of the inadvertent energization of the upcommand wire because he “did not have the opportunity to inspect” the wires “as 

installed,” but instead examined the wiring after it was removed by military inspectors. 

(Def.’s Mem. at 12.) But that cannot be a basis for excluding Bloomfield’s opinions—if 

it were, all the non-military experts in this case (including Sikorsky’s own expert) would 

have to be excluded. Sikorksy also points to Bloomfield’s admission that he could not 

“match” the wires or their bare spots to determine exactly where the inadvertent 

connection may have occurred, as well as his assumptions that the down-command wire 

must have provided the energy and that the cam limit switch must have accordingly 

malfunctioned. (Id. at 12–15.) It also criticize various proposals that Bloomfield offers 

at the end of his report of mechanisms that Sikorsky could have placed in the CH-53E to 

prevent an accident like Fontalvo’s (see note 8, supra) as being unfeasible. (Def.’s Mem. 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 32 of

 51
33

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 15–19.) As with above, however, these arguments serve only as criticisms of the 

veracity of Bloomfield’s opinions. No one who investigated the accident was able to 

determine the exact source of the energy. Just as Sikorsky’s own expert does in his 

report, Bloomfield is offering his best explanation as to what occurred, and what could 

have prevented the accident.

In sum, Sikorsky’s challenges to Coffman and Bloomfield as experts offer reasons 

to disbelieve their opinions, but not to prevent them from offering those opinions. As a 

result, the motion to exclude is DENIED.

V. Sikorsky’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). “An issue of material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 

1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015)). “The 

deciding court must view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in favor of 

the non-moving party.” Id. 

B. Plaintiffs’ Non-Opposition to Summary Judgment for SSSI

Plaintiffs do not contest Sikorsky’s assertion that SSSI was not involved in the 

design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of the CH-53E. (See ECF No. 173-1 at 41 ¶ 70.) 

Because there is no dispute that SSSI’s actions did not cause Fontalvo’s accident, SSSI is 

entitled to summary judgment. Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 858.

C. Remaining Summary Judgment Issues

1. Military Contractor Defense

Sikorsky’s primary argument is that the military contractor defense shields 

Sikorsky from liability resulting from its development and production of BUNO 163077. 

Under the military contractor defense, “[l]iability for design defects in military equipment 

cannot be imposed pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 33 of

 51
34

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

precise specification; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the 

supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were 

known to the supplier but not to the United States.” Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 

U.S. 500, 512 (1988). The purpose of this federal common law defense is to protect the 

military’s discretion in selecting “the appropriate design for military equipment,” which 

requires “the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, 

including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat 

effectiveness.” Id. at 511. By shielding the contractor from liability in this scenario, the 

doctrine ensures that the military does not face increased costs as a result of a 

contractor’s liability stemming from the design choices of the military. See id. at 512 (“It 

makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment 

that . . . equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but 

not when it contracts for the production.”).

Sikorsky contends that it is protected by the military contractor defense because 

the military insisted on using and keeping Kapton wire in BUNO 163077. But Plaintiffs 

offer sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of fact that preclude summary judgment 

on this basis: (1) whether Spec-55 wire—not Kapton wire—was responsible for the 

accident, (2) whether the military used its discretion in approving the designs of the nonKapton-related portions of the landing gear wiring configuration, and (3) whether 

Sikorsky complied with MIL-W-5088F when it produced BUNO 163077. 

a. Genuine disputes of fact preclude a determination that, as a 

matter of law, Fontalvo’s accident was the result of a militaryspecified design.

Sikorsky’s primary theory is as follows: the military has known of the risks of 

Kapton deterioration since before BUNO 163077 was produced, and nonetheless not only 

insisted that Sikorsky fit BUNO 163077 with Kapton, but also refused to replace the 

Kapton with less dangerous wire insulation when the dangers became even more 

apparent. As a result, Sikorsky argues, Sikorsky cannot be held liable for BUNO 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 34 of

 51
35

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

163077’s Kapton-caused accident. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the military chose to use 

Kapton for BUNO 163077 despite knowing that wire degradation was likely. Nor do 

they dispute that Sikorksy had no choice but to continue using Kapton as a result of 

NAVAIR’s specifications. Thus, if there is no genuine dispute that Kapton caused 

Fontalvo’s accident, Sikorsky is entitled to summary judgment under the military 

contractor defense. See Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 

that the military contractor defense shielded defendant from liability for failing to include 

a continuous ignition relight function in an aircraft when “the government was well 

aware of the availability” of such a function “but chose to forego that technology”).

But that is not the case. There is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury’s 

determination that Spec-55 wire alone caused the accident.15 And because there is also 

sufficient evidence enabling a reasonable conclusion that the Navy merely “rubber 

stamped” the design of the relevant portion of the utility module beyond the Kapton 

requirement, the Sikorsky is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the 

military contract defense.

i. A jury could reasonably determine that Kapton wire did 

not cause the inadvertent energization of the upcommand wire.

Several pieces of evidence in the record would enable a reasonable jury to 

conclude that Kapton was not responsible for Fontalvo’s accident. The SIR found that 

the “non-Kapton wire” connected to the “up” solenoid connection pin had multiple points 

 

15 In its reply brief, Sikorsky accuses Plaintiffs of improperly altering their theory of liability from what 

is alleged in the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 190 at 1.) 

The Court disagrees. Sikorsky argues that the SAC “explicitly blames Kapton” (id.) and cites Paragraph 

28, which alleges that DuPont is liable as a result of its production of defective Kapton (SAC, ECF No. 

71 at 10–11 ¶ 28.) But Paragraphs 26 and 27—which allege that Sikorsky is liable as a result of its 

design of the landing gear wiring configuration—are silent as to the type of wire that may have caused 

the accident. (Id. at 9–10 ¶¶ 26, 27.) In other words, the SAC raises alternative theories of liability: 

(1) in the event that Kapton is responsible, DuPont and Sikorsky are liable; and (2) in the event that 

Kapton is not responsible, Sikorsky is liable.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 35 of

 51
36

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of exposed wire approximately a foot from the pin, and that “excessive slack” on the wire 

“allowed the points of exposed wire to come in contact with the utility hydraulic module 

mount frame.” (ECF No. 183-4 at MIL073523 ¶¶ 48, 50.) The SIR also noted that 

“hydraulic fluid and water from a recent aircraft wash left significant water and hydraulic 

fluid moisture on and around the utility hydraulic module.” (Id. at ¶ 51.) In light of 

Knox’s discussion of the possibility of inadvertent energization caused by electrical 

leakage (see ECF No. 173-14 at 56), a jury could reasonably conclude that either physical 

contact or hydraulic fluid facilitated an inadvertent connection between an energized area 

of the utility module and a bare spot on the Spec-55 wire connected to the P494 pin.

Staff Sergeant Wuthrich’s report also supports a reasonable conclusion that Spec55 wire caused the accident. He found improper tension in the down-command wires and 

“wear through spots” on P495-A where “the wires came in contact” with the upcommand cannon plug. (ECF No. 173-10 at MIL073203.) Based on these findings, 

particularly in connection with the hydraulic fluid and water found in the area, a jury 

could reasonably conclude that bare spots in Spec-55 portions of the down-command 

wire inadvertently energized the up-command wire.

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ and DuPont’s expert reports enable a reasonable conclusion 

that Spec-55 wire caused the accident. Coffman noted chaffing on the Spec-55 sections 

of both the up-command and down-command wires, and signatures of electrical arcing. 

(ECF No. 173-9 at 3.) Bloomfield also concludes that, in light of the proximity of the upand down-solenoids, the wiring could come in direct contact with “the metal features of 

the utility module” and each other. (ECF No. 173-8 at ¶ 17.) Reynolds concluded that 

arcing damage appeared only on the Spec-55 wire connected to pin P494-A. (ECF No. 

183-8 at 16 ¶ 8.) These analyses could lead to a reasonable conclusion that Kapton wire 

degradation was not involved in the inadvertent retraction of BUNO 163077’s landing 

gear. See, e.g., Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1270 (“Expert opinion evidence is itself sufficient to 

create a genuine issue of disputed fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment 

motion.”).

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 36 of

 51
37

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Sikorsky relies heavily on the function of the “cam limit switch” to suggest that no 

reasonable juror could conclude that Kapton wiring was not involved in Fontalvo’s 

accident. As discussed above, the cam limit switch is a mechanism that terminates the 

power to the down-command wire once the landing gear is fully down and locked. (See

ECF No. 164-9 at 4–5 ¶ 13.) If the cam limit switch was functioning properly at the time

of the accident, Sikorsky argues, the down-command wire could not have been the source 

of the inadvertent energization of the up-command wire. This fact has the potential to 

refute Plaintiffs’ theory that bare spots on the Spec-55 portion of the down-command 

wire energized the Spec-55 portion of the up-command wire (or the P494 pin itself). But 

the role of the cam limit switch does not render a conclusion that Spec-55 caused the 

accident unreasonable. First, the evidence involving the cam limit switch does not 

preclude the conclusion that another part within the relevant area of the utility module 

was energized at the time of the accident. Sikorsky’s own expert also suggests the 

possibility that an “indirect” three-way connection occurred. Based on that possibility, a 

jury could reasonably infer that an energy source inadvertently connected to the downcommand wire, which then connected to the up-command wire. (ECF No. 173-14 at 59.) 

Second, if the cam limit switch was functioning properly at the time of the accident, that 

fact also would refute Sikorsky’s theory that the Kapton portion of the down-command 

wire caused the inadvertent retraction. If that is the case, the Court is left with no 

evidence that might suggest the source of the electricity that caused the retraction. 

Because Sikorsky is seeking summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense, it 

is Sikorsky’s burden to prove that Kapton wire caused the accident. See, e.g., Adobe Sys 

Inc. v. Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The burden of proof for an 

affirmative defense to a civil claim generally falls on the party asserting the defense.”). 

In sum, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Kapton wire caused Fontalvo’s accident.

//

//

//

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 37 of

 51
38

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ii. A jury could reasonably determine that the Navy merely 

“rubber-stamped” Sikorsky’s design of the CH-53E’s 

landing gear wire configuration.

Even if Kapton was not responsible for Fontalvo’s accident, Sikorsky could still be 

entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the military contractor defense if it can 

show that there is no genuine dispute that the military used its discretion in developing 

the CH-53E’s landing gear wiring configuration design. 

The first element of the military contractor defense requires that the military 

“approve reasonably precise specifications” for a particular piece of equipment. Boyle, 

487 U.S. at 512. Government approval “requires more than a rubber stamp.” Snell v. 

Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Trevino v. 

General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989)). “Rather, approval must 

result from a ‘continuous exchange’ and ‘back and forth dialogue’ between the contractor 

and the government.” Getz, 654 F.3d at 861 (quoting Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 

89 F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1996)). “When the government engages in a thorough review 

of the allegedly defective design and takes an active role in testing and implementing that 

design, Boyle’s first element is met.” Id.; see also id. at 863 (requiring that “the United 

States make[] ‘a significant policy judgment’ in approving the design”). In other words, 

to meet this element, Sikorsky must prove that “the government exercised its discretion 

with respect to the design feature in question”—in this case, the way the landing gear

wiring in the CH-53E was configured. Snell, 107 F.3d at 748. 

Plaintiffs allege that Sikorsky defectively designed and manufactured the “landing 

gear system and appurtenant apparatus, including the wiring harness and wire path 

leading from the landing gear controls to the landing gear assembly, which juxtaposed a 

crucial wire bundle and pin 494 . . . in a position downstream of any and all interlocks 

and failsafes capable of preventing gear retraction in the event of unplanned 

energization.” (ECF No. 71 at 6 ¶ 13.) In response, Sikorsky contends that the military 

was heavily involved in developing all specifications for the wiring configuration of the 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 38 of

 51
39

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CH-53E.16 But the military specifications Sikorsky points to are not specific enough to 

trigger summary judgment on this issue. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[w]hen 

only minimal or very general requirements are set for the contractor by the United 

States[,] the [contractor defense] rule is inapplicable.” McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 

704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983). That is the case here. 

Sikorsky points first to various provisions of SD-552-3-9 and MIL-W-2008F in 

support of its assertion that the military used its discretion in developing the design of the 

landing gear’s wiring configuration. But those provisions do not establish, as a matter of 

law, that the military was involved in the configuration’s design. 

As an initial matter, the fact that the NAVAIR required Sikorsky to adhere to its 

Detail Specifications cannot itself satisfy Boyle element. The Detail Specification is the 

master reference for the CH-53E’s design. It does not demonstrate, however, the extent 

of NAVAIR’s involvement in the development of its contents. 

But even assuming that a detail specification contains solely discretionary 

decisions by the military, the SD-552-3-9 provisions that Sikorsky cite offer, at best, 

vague guidance as to how the wiring in the landing gear system should have been

configured. Paragraph 3.15.1 sets forth how the hydraulic system should operate, but the 

only mention of wiring is the statement 

 (See ECF No. 155-20 at SIK007116–20.) Paragraph 3.8.2 sets forth the 

landing gear design, but includes no direction about how the landing gear should be 

wired. (See ECF No. 155-19 at SIK007081–82.) Paragraph 3.16.5 discusses “wiring,” 

but the only relevant statement in this section is that the “[w]iring shall be in accordance 

 

16 Sikorsky chastises Plaintiffs for their word choice, stating: “[n]otably, there is no ‘landing gear wiring 

harness’ as stated by Plaintiffs in their opposition. Thus, it remains unclear what part of the CH-53E 

electrical interconnect system Plaintiffs allege is defective.” (Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 190, at 3 n.1.) 

While it may be true that there is no such thing as a landing gear “harness,” it is clear that Plaintiffs are 

referring generally to the placement of (1) wires running from the landing gear control panel to the 

utility module and (2) the points of connection between those wires and the utility module. 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 39 of

 51
40

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with MIL-W-5088F,” and that Kapton wiring shall be used. (See ECF No. 155-20 at 

SIK007125.) As for MIL-W-5088F, Sikorsky first cites Paragraph 3.8.8, but that 

paragraph states only 

 (ECF No. 155-21, Ex. 11 at MIL210466.) Next, while Paragraph 3.8.3.3 

discusses the “bundling” of wires, it only provides guidance as to the total amount of 

current that can be carried in a bundle. (Id.) Paragraph 3.10.1, dealing with arrangement 

of wire, instructs only that wire should be 

 (Id. at MIL210471.) 

Finally, Paragraph 3.10.2 provides no more configuration guidance other 

 (Id.) Other than citing 

these paragraphs, Sikorsky offers no explanation for how these instructions approved the 

specific design of the CH-53E’s landing gear wiring configuration.

 The ambiguity of the relevant provisions of the Detail Specification make this case 

much like Snell. There, the defendant also pointed to the detail specifications in an effort 

to prove that the military used discretion in developing how the drive shaft should be 

mounted. The detail specification stated “[t]he transmission shall be mounted on a 

suitable vibration isolator. A lift link shall be attached to the structure to carry rotor 

thrust loads,” and “[a] transmission input drive installation shall be provided. This 

installation shall consist of a shaft assembly to carry rotor thrust loads.” Snell, 107 F.3d 

at 748. The court held that these specifications were too vague to invoke the military 

contractor defense because they “left the design and placement of the drive shaft and its 

components to” the defendant. Id. Particularly in light of testimony by an employee of 

the defendant that there were “no discussions with the government about the design of the 

critical isolation mounts,” the court held that a “trier of fact could find that the 

government did not exercise judgment with respect to the design feature in question.” Id. 

Here, not only are the relevant portions of SD-552-3-9 vague as to how the landing 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 40 of

 51
41

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

gear wiring should be configured, but also there is no evidence of back-and-forth 

discussions about the landing gear wire configuration design. The best evidence 

Sikorsky offers is Wakefield’s assertions that NAVAIR officials held “hundreds of 

meetings” with Sikorsky during the CH-53E’s development. (ECF No. 164-11 at 6–7 ¶¶ 

8–12.) But as mentioned above, Wakefield admitted in his deposition that he had no 

evidence that NAVAIR reviewed or approved details of the landing gear wiring 

configuration. (See ECF No. 173-6 at 136–41.) In light of Lawrence’s statement that he 

could find no evidence of any “back-and-forth deliberative process” between the 

government and Sikorsky regarding the landing gear configuration (ECF No. 173-3 at 3 ¶ 

6), the record in this case closely resembles that in Snell.

Sikorsky next argues that the fact that NAVAIR continued to order the CH-53E for 

decades without ordering any change to the landing gear wiring configuration satisfies 

the first Boyle element. Sikorsky cites cases in which the Second, Fourth, and Eleventh 

Circuits have held that it is relevant to the first Boyle element that, after production of 

particular equipment begins, the government continued to purchase that equipment 

knowing that it had a serious defect. See Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd., 874 

F.2d 946, 950 (4th Cir. 1989); Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 

1993); Brinson v. Raytheon Co., 571 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2009). While such 

holdings likely get the law correct—continued purchases by the military in this context 

demonstrate a discretionary decision to accept certain risks—they do not apply to this 

case. As stated above, if Kapton was responsible for Fontalvo’s accident, the Navy’s 

insistence that Kapton be used in the CH-53E while knowing of its dangerous 

propensities would undoubtedly protect Sikorsky. But there is sufficient evidence to 

permit a jury to conclude reasonably that Kapton was not responsible for the accident, 

and Sikorsky offers no evidence that NAVAIR was aware of any similar risk with Spec55 or other wire used in the CH-53E.

Finally, Sikorsky relies heavily on the fact that the Navy instructed Sikorsky to 

design the CH-53E so as to retain “maximum commonality” with the CH-53D and RHCase 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 41 of

 51
42

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

53D. This fact, however, does not satisfy the first Boyle element for two reasons. First, 

the Navy’s instruction to maintain “maximum commonality” suffers from the same 

vagueness problem that exist with the cited portions of the Detail Specification: it does 

not show that the landing gear wiring configuration was the result of NAVAIR discretion. 

If, for example, NAVAIR instructed Sikorsky to design the CH-53E such that the landing 

gear wiring configuration remained exactly the same in the CH-53D, that would weigh in 

support of Sikorsky’s argument. But a vague instruction to maintain maximum 

uniformity among CH-53 helicopters does not demonstrate any type of “careful 

deliberation” by the military as to the design of any particular piece of equipment. Getz, 

654 F.3d at 862. 

Second, there is evidence that the landing gear wire configuration in the CH-53E is 

not the same as that in the CH-53D. Bloomfield opines that the switch from a single-plug 

system to a double-plug system “led to the mishap in this case, because the wire strands 

leading to plugs P494 and P495 became denuded due to friction and chafing, permitting 

short-circuit.” (ECF No. 173-4 at 3 ¶ 6.) To the extent that a jury could conclude that 

this alteration contributed to the accident, the lack of any evidence that NAVAIR 

carefully deliberated on this alteration prevents Sikorsky from relying on the “maximum 

commonality” instruction as a means of satisfying Boyle’s first element.

In sum, Sikorsky is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the military 

contractor defense because there are genuine disputes over (1) whether it was Spec-55 or 

Kapton wire that caused the inadvertent energization of the up-command wire, and (2) 

whether NAVAIR exercised discretion in approving the design of the CH-53E’s landing 

gear wiring configuration.

b. A genuine dispute also exists as to whether BUNO 163077 conformed 

to the military’s specifications.

Even if Sikorsky has demonstrated that there is no genuine dispute that NAVAIR 

approved reasonably precise specifications for the landing gear’s wiring configuration, it 

is not entitled to summary judgment because there is also genuine dispute as to whether 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 42 of

 51
43

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Sikorsky conformed to those specifications when manufacturing BUNO 163077. 

The second element of the military contractor defense requires a showing that the 

equipment at issue conformed to the specifications approved by the military. Boyle, 487 

U.S. at 512. “[T]he operative test for conformity with reasonably precise specifications 

turns on whether ‘the alleged defect . . . exist[ed] independently of the design itself.’” 

Getz, 654 F.3d at 864 (quoting Miller v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414, 421 (5th 

Cir. 2001)). This is “just another way of saying that it was defectively manufactured.” 

Id. (quoting Harduvel v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1231 (11th Cir. 1989)). 

MIL-W-5088F requires that wiring 

 There is evidence in the record enabling a reasonable 

conclusion that Sikorsky did not adhere to these provisions when it manufactured BUNO 

163077. For example, the SIR indicates that “excessive slack existed in the wire that 

allowed the points of exposed wire to come in contact with” the utility module, in 

violation of MIL-W-5088F ¶¶ 3.10.7 and 3.11.4. (ECF No. 183-4 at MIL073523 ¶ 50.) 

And Wuthrich’s report states that the down-command wire was tight and lacked “proper 

strain relief,” and that it appeared to have come in contact with the up-command cannon 

plug, in violation of ¶¶ 3.10.6, 3.11, and 3.11.4. (ECF No. 173-10 at 1.)

Sikorsky responds by offering evidence that the Navy inspected BUNO 163077 

prior to accepting it into the military fleet and found that it conformed to the detail 

specifications. (See, e.g., ECF No. 164-11 at 8–9 ¶¶ 16–17.) But this evidence only 

produces a factual dispute as to what condition the landing gear wiring was in after 

Sikorsky completed production. Sikorsky also argues that it is “not plausible” that the 

excessive slack and improper strain relief, found 21 years after Sikorsky manufactured 

BUNO 163077, existed at the time production was completed. Rather, Sikorsky suggests 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 43 of

 51
44

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that Marine Corps maintenance must be responsible for any wiring issues.17 (Def.’s 

Reply at 8–9.) Again, this only signals that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. 

While it would be reasonable to agree with Sikorsky on this fact, it would not be 

unreasonable to infer that these defects existed when BUNO 163077 was produced.

Because there is also a genuine dispute as to whether Sikorsky can meet Boyle’s 

second element, Sikorsky is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the military 

contractor defense.

2. Political Question Doctrine

Sikorsky asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment also because Plaintiffs’

claims present nonjusticiable political questions. In short, Sikorsky argues that this Court 

should not place itself in the position of adjudicating the wisdom of the military’s 

decision not to replace Kapton in light of funding limitations.

This argument, however, walks in lockstep with Sikorsky’s military contractor 

defense theory. In the context of this case, the concerns animating the military contractor 

defense would be the exact same concerns that animate the relevant aspects of the 

political question doctrine; that is, respecting another branch’s discretionary decisions. 

See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511–12. But the Court will be forced to decide a question in that 

area only if it is presented with a situation in which the military has actually used its 

discretion. Sikorsky’s argument is therefore just a mirror image of the military contractor 

defense: it arises only if the military actually engaged in a discretionary choice about the 

equipment that caused Fontalvo’s accident. If the military contractor defense applies, the 

case might present a political question; if the military contractor defense does not apply, 

no political question concern exists.

As with the military contractor defense, Sikorsky’s political question doctrine 

 

17 Sikorsky cites the deposition of Keith Sparks to suggest that the Spec-55 wire portions were replaced 

during Phase I of the wire replacement program. (See ECF No. 179-3, Ex. I, at 54–56.) But Sikorsky 

offers no evidence providing information about Mr. Sparks, what relationship he had to the wire 

replacement program, or when the replacement occurred.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 44 of

 51
45

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

argument relies on the assumption that Kapton was responsible for Fontalvo’s accident. 

(See Def.’s Reply at 18–19 (quoting a NAVAIR program manager’s statement that the 

military could not obtain sufficient funding for Kapton replacement)). And as discussed 

at length above, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Kapton was involved in the 

accident at all. Because the Court cannot say that, as a matter of law, Sikorsky is 

protected by the military contractor defense, it also cannot say at this point that this case 

is nonjusticiable.

3. Superseding Cause

Next, Sikorsky argues that the military’s decision not to replace Kapton in the CH53E is a superseding cause of Fontalvo’s accident that absolves Sikorsky from liability. 

Sikorsky argues that the military’s refusal to replace the Kapton, in the face of its own

reports warning that accidents like Fontalvo’s were likely to occur, was unforeseeable 

and thus broke the chain of causation between Sikorsky’s acts and Fontalvo’s death. 

(Def.’s Reply at 19–20.) See, e.g., Perez v. VAS S.P.A., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 681 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]hird party negligence which is the immediate cause of an injury may 

be viewed as a superseding cause when it is so highly extraordinary as to be 

unforeseeable.” (quoting Torres v. Xomox Corp., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 455, 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1996)). But this argument again relies on the assumption that Kapton caused Fontalvo’s 

accident. If Kapton had no role in Fontalvo’s accident, the military’s choice to use 

Kapton in the CH-53E was not even a cause-in-fact of Fontalvo’s accident. As explained 

above, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Kapton caused the accident. As a result, 

summary judgment on this ground is inappropriate.

4. Sophisticated User Defense

Sikorsky argues that, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims assert liability on the basis 

of failure to warn, Sikorsky is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Fontalvo 

was a “sophisticated user.” (Def.’s Reply at 20–21.) The Court agrees.

Under California law, manufacturers are liable for “their failure to warn of known 

or reasonably scientifically knowable risks.” Johnson v. Am. Std., Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 45 of

 51
46

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

910 (Cal. 2008). A manufacturer has an affirmative defense to this liability, however, if 

the plaintiff pursuing a failure to warn claim was a “sophisticated user.” To be a 

sophisticated user, the plaintiff must have “already [been] aware of should [have been] 

aware” of the risk. Id. “Because these sophisticated users are charged with knowing the 

particular product’s dangers, the failure to warn about those dangers is not the legal cause 

of any harm that product may cause.” Id. at 911.

Here, there is no genuine dispute that, prior to his accident, Fontalvo had been 

instructed not to pull on a landing gear safety pin if it resists. Jeremiah Wilcox testified 

unambiguously that he instructed Fontalvo that if a pin resists removal, “you should not 

try to force it out or pull it out.” (ECF No. 164-4, Ex. B, at 17–18.) Plaintiffs offer 

evidence suggesting that someone in Fontalvo’s position likely would not have been

trained on this fact, but none of the evidence creates a genuine dispute that Fontalvo 

actually knew that it was dangerous to pull a resisting pin. Plaintiffs cite evidence that 

there was no such instruction in any manual; that aircrewman or airframes mechanics 

were not “formally taught” not to pull a resisting pin; and that a large group of Fontalvo’s 

peers were never taught not to do so until after Fontalvo’s death. (See Pl.’s Response to 

Def.’s SOF, ECF No. 173-1 at 3–4 ¶ 5.) None of that evidence refutes the assertion that 

Fontalvo actually knew that he should never pull out a resisting safety pin because 

Wilcox told him so. Because there is no genuine dispute as to this fact, Sikorsky is 

entitled to summary judgment to the extent that Plaintiffs assert theories of failure to 

warn against Sikorsky.

5. T.L.’s Standing to Assert a Wrongful Death Action

Finally, Sikorsky argues that T.L. lacks “standing”18 to assert a wrongful death 

 

18 Sikorsky appears to place its “standing” argument within the doctrine of Article III standing. (See

Def.’s Mem. at 21–22.) It is clear, however, that T.L. has Article III standing to pursue her claims. It is 

undisputed that Fontalvo supported T.L. to some extent, and Fontalvo’s death resulted in an economic 

harm to T.L. Because she has experienced a concrete and particularized harm, T.L. has Article III 

standing to sue a defendant that caused that harm. See Jones v. Prince George’s Cty., 348 F.3d 1014, 

1018 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that a daughter of a shooting victim had Article III standing to pursue a 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 46 of

 51
47

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claim under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60(c). That provision states: “[a] cause of action 

for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted 

by . . . [a] minor, . . . if, at the time of the decedent’s death, the minor resided for the 

previous 180 days in the decedent’s household and was dependent on the decedent for 

one-half or more of the minor’s support.” It is undisputed that T.L. lived with Fontalvo 

during the 180 days prior to Fontalvo’s death. Sikorsky contends, however, that T.L. was 

not “dependent” on Fontalvo during that time for at least one half of her support. 

Sikorsky first points to the fact that in Amador’s 2010 tax return, she indicated that 

she was the “head of her household” and listed T.L. as a qualifying dependent. Sikorsky 

surmises that this filing suggests that Amador paid for more than half of T.L.’s support

because “[t]he filing status of ‘Head of Household’ requires that the filer have paid more 

than half the cost of the support for the qualifying dependent.” (Def.’s Mem. at 23.) To 

prove that assertion, Sikorsky offers a copy of page 7 of the Internal Revenue Service’s 

Publication 501. (See ECF No. 164-6, Ex. J.) However, Publication 501 does not 

support this claim. Instead, page 7 states that in order to claim “head of household” 

status, a filer must (1) be “unmarried or ‘considered unmarried’ on the last day of the 

year”; (2) have “paid more than half the cost of keeping up a home for the year”; and (3) 

have lived with a “qualifying person” for more than half the year. (Id.) Sikorsky 

provides no authority or analysis to establish that “half the cost of keeping up a home” 

under the tax laws is the equivalent of “one-half or more of minor’s support” under § 

377.60(c). 

The Court finds that this evidence does not make the conclusion that T.L. relied on 

Fontalvo for at least half of her support during the relevant period unreasonable. As an 

initial matter, whereas Amador’s 2010 tax return is based on her financial status during 

 

wrongful death claim because “the shooting deprived [her] of her father’s financial and emotional 

support, the shooting indisputably caused her loss, and a favorable decision would remedy this injury”). 

The closer question, rather, is if there is a genuine dispute as to whether T.L. satisfies the statutory 

prerequisites to bring a wrongful death claim under California law.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 47 of

 51
48

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the entire year of 2010, the period relevant to T.L.’s standing begins in September 2010. 

The tax return therefore carries limited weight; the majority of the period covered by the 

tax return is irrelevant to whether T.L. has standing to pursue her claim. 

Amador’s claim of “head of household” status offers, at best, circumstantial 

evidence that T.L. relied on Amador for more than half of her support. However, it does 

not foreclose a trier of fact from concluding that Fontalvo provided one-half of T.L.’s 

support based upon Amador’s testimony and Fontalvo’s greater earnings. Sikorsky’s 

argument is conclusory and provides little in the way of factual or legal analysis. See 

Paysinger v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 14-5509 PSG (RZX), 2014 WL 

7076290, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2014) (“Hall provides very limited support for his 

[legal] arguments absent referring to the statutes generally and the Court will not make 

Hall’s arguments for him.”).

Sikorsky also offers a copy of a notarized document labeled “Dependency 

Statement – Child Born out of Wedlock,” which Fontalvo completed with information 

about D.F. (ECF No. 164-6, Ex. I.) The document is dated October 27, 2010. (Id. at 4.) 

In the document, Fontalvo lists various household expenses “for all persons living in the 

home,” and also the total amount Fontalvo contributed to the child’s support. Fontalvo 

stated that he contributed $1,500.00 to D.F.’s support in each of September and October 

2010. (Id. at 3.) It also lists monthly expenses for D.F. totaling $1,300. (Id.) While this 

information offers the trier of fact an indication that Fontalvo spent a large portion of his 

salary on D.F.’s support, it does not establish, as a matter of law, that T.L. did not rely on 

Fontalvo for half of her support. The document does not indicate, for example, what 

T.L.’s expenses were, what Amador’s contributions to the family expenses were, or, 

perhaps most importantly, how Amador and Fontalvo split their household expenses. 

The absence of such information leaves a genuine dispute as to whether T.L. relied on 

Fontalvo for at least half of her support during the relevant period. 

Sikorsky also argues that even if Fontalvo provided at least half of T.L.’s financial

support during the relevant period, there is no evidence to demonstrate T.L. was 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 48 of

 51
49

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

dependent upon that support. It appears that the only case interpreting the meaning of

“dependent” in § 377.60(c) is Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 263

(Cal. Ct. App. 2015). There, family members of the decedent—including the decedent’s 

great-grandchild (the “minor”)—brought a wrongful death action against a manufacturer 

of asbestos-laden products. Id. at 268. Three years before the decedent’s death, the 

minor and his parents moved into the decedent’s mobile home. Id. at 273. The move 

was not the result of financial necessity; rather, it was simply to keep the decedent 

company. Id. The minor’s parents both worked and could cover their own expenses. Id. 

During the 180 days prior to his death, the decedent paid for rent and utilities except for 

the satellite television bill; often purchased food for the family and clothes, toys, and 

books for the minor; often watched the minor and picked him up from pre-preschool; and 

sometimes paid for the minor’s pre-preschool tuition. Id. at 273–74. After the decedent 

passed away, the minor’s parents bought a house and had a second child. Id. Without the 

decedent’s help, the parents would not have been able to purchase the house or continue 

the minor’s private education. Id. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment as a matter of law against the minor

because there was insufficient evidence at trial suggesting that the minor was 

“dependent” upon the decedent for at least half of his support 180 days prior to the 

decedent’s death. The court relied on case law interpreting subsections 377.60(a) and (b), 

in which those courts held that “dependent” means “actually dependent, to some extent, 

upon the decedent for the necessaries of life,” and not just “financial support . . . which 

merely makes . . . available . . . some of the niceties of life they might not otherwise be 

able to afford.” Id. at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, 

dependence means reliance on an individual for “obtaining the things, such as shelter, 

clothing, food and medical treatment, which one cannot and should not do without.” Id.

Turning to the facts of the case in Soto, the Court of Appeal held that the minor 

was not dependent on the decedent for at least half of his support. Id. at 282. The court 

explained that, except perhaps his pre-preschool tuition, the minor did not “rel[y] on [the 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 49 of

 51
50

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

decedent] for the necessaries of life.” Id. (emphasis in original). Instead, the decedent’s 

contributions to the minor’s family “enabled them to enjoy some of the niceties of life 

they might not otherwise be able to afford,” such as television and the ability to save for a 

house and future tuition. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found it 

particularly important that there was no testimony that the minor’s parents “could not 

afford to pay rent, buy groceries, provide clothes,” or otherwise make ends meet, and that 

the decedent’s contributions only enabled the minor to live a “more comfortable 

existence.” Id. The decedent’s “largesse toward [the minor] and his parents was laudable 

and improved their station in life,” the court concluded, “but it did not render [the minor] 

financially dependent upon him.” Id.

The Court finds that the record here, in contrast to Soto, permits a reasonable 

inference that T.L. was dependent upon Fontalvo for at least half of her support. Amador 

testified that Fontalvo paid for about 60 percent of T.L.’s financial support. (ECF No. 

173-23 at 81; compare ECF Nos. 173-27, 173-28.) This included food, clothing, braces, 

and a washer and dryer, all of which would fall within Soto’s description of life’s 

necessities. (ECF No. 173-23 at 79–80, 158–60.) Fontalvo’s salary in 2010 was 

approximately $30,000, and Amador’s was approximately $29,000. (See ECF Nos. 173-

27, 173-28.) Unlike in Soto, where it was undisputed financial need was not the reason 

the great-grandson’s parents moved in with the decedent, a jury could reasonably infer 

that Amador moved in with Fontalvo as a result of financial necessity. With that 

inference, a jury could conclude that T.L. relied upon Fontalvo not only for the “niceties” 

of life, but also her basic necessities.

Sikorsky suggests that Soto established a rule that if a surviving source of support 

for a dependent is able to provide fully for the dependent after the decedent’s death, the 

decedent did not provide “support” for the dependent for purposes of Cal. Code Civ. 

Proc. § 377.60(c). It then points to the fact that Amador was able to provide fully for 

T.L. prior to moving in with Fontalvo, and there is no evidence that Amador’s financial 

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 50 of

 51
51

3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

situation changed while cohabitating with Fontalvo.19 As a result, Sikorksy argues, T.L. 

was never “dependent” upon Fontalvo because Amador was always able to support T.L. 

Soto, however, creates no such brightline rule. Instead, it reiterated that standing under 

§ 377.60(c) will depend on the totality of the circumstances presented in each case. Soto, 

239 Cal. App. 4th at 282 (“Whether there is financial dependence is a question of fact 

that is assessed on a case-by-case basis. The extent of any financial dependence likewise 

presents a question of fact.” (citation omitted)). Here, the evidence differs from the facts 

of Soto sufficiently to enable a jury to reasonably conclude that during the 180 days prior 

to Fontalvo’s death, T.L. was dependent on Fontalvo for one-half or more of the her 

support. Summary judgment on this basis is therefore inappropriate.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court issues the following orders:

1. DuPont’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 160) is GRANTED;

2. DuPont’s objection and motion to strike (ECF No. 196-3) is DENIED;

3. Sikorsky’s motion to exclude (ECF No. 146) is DENIED;

4. Sikorsky’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 164) is GRANTED in 

part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is granted only as to 

(1) Plaintiffs’ claims against SSSI, and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims to the extent that 

they pursue a theory of failure to warn.

Dated: October 27, 2017

 

19 Sikorsky also offers the deposition testimony of Dr. Fractor, an economist, in which he explains his 

conclusion that Amador had the “resources” to support T.L. (ECF No. 164-6, Ex. K, at 65–66.) But 

Fractor concedes that he had not “looked at [Amador’s] earnings and household allowance in relation to 

what she spent” on T.L.

Case 3:13-cv-00331-GPC-KSC Document 216 Filed 10/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 51 of

 51