Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00088/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD EDWARD MONTIJO, SR.,

Petitioner,

v.

THOMAS HOFFMAN, Director,

Respondents.

 

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Civil No.08cv88-WQH(NLS)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

[Doc. No. 2]

Ronald Edward Montijo, Sr. (“Petitioner”) is a California prisoner serving an aggregate term of

four years for preparing false documentary evidence in violation of California Penal Code section 134. 

He has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing

insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and unconstitutional vagueness of the statute

under which he was convicted [Doc. No. 2]. Respondent filed an answer to the petition and supporting

documents [Doc. No. 7]. Petitioner did not file a traverse. After a thorough review, the Court finds that

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that his petition be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The following factual background is derived from the appellate court opinion denying

Petitioner’s habeas petition. [Lodgment No. 6, People v. Ronald Edward Montijo, Sr., No. D046391,

slip op. at 2-11 (Cal.Ct.App. June 15, 2006).] This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact. 

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (stating that deference is owed to factual findings of both

state trial and appellate courts). 

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Petitioner is a former drug addict with six prior felony convictions, including a manslaughter

conviction and multiple drug convictions. As a result of these convictions, Petitioner was incarcerated

at various times between 1980 and 1996. After his release from prison in 1996, Petitioner rehabilitated

and became a drug and alcohol counselor. In 2003, Petitioner worked at the Occupational and Health

Services (“OHS”) office in San Marcos, California, where he provided individual and group counseling,

and assisted convicted DUI offenders with the completion of their court-ordered OHS programs. 

Petitioner was assigned as an individual and group counselor to Caroline Carmichael after she pled

guilty to a DUI charge and was ordered to complete an eighteen month counseling program offered by

OHS. The program included group and individual counseling with Petitioner, as well as attendance at

Alcohol Anonymous (“AA”) meetings. 

Carmichael did not attend the required AA meetings. Petitioner counseled her about her

absences initially, explaining that she needed to attend the meetings to complete the program. However,

Petitioner then started forging her AA attendance record to show that Carmichael was attending the

meetings as required by the program. Petitioner advised Carmichael that if she didn’t compensate him

for falsifying the records, she would return to court and be sent to jail. Carmichael paid Petitioner $200

the first time he forged her attendance record. At every subsequent individual counseling session with

Petitioner, he asked for money in exchange for falsifying her AA attendance records. After months had

gone by and the situation continued, Carmichael told Petitioner that she could no longer afford to pay

him. Petitioner indicated that there were other ways in which Carmichael could compensate him. 

Carmichael assumed he meant sexual favors because he touched her as he made the suggestion. 

At every individual counseling session thereafter, Petitioner in some way touched Carmichael

and/or made lewd comments. It started as hugging, and escalated to groping inappropriate private areas

through her clothing. Carmichael allowed it to continue because she wanted to complete the eighteen

month program successfully. Carmichael also missed group counseling sessions, for which Petitioner

forged her attendance records. In September 2004, Carmichael completed the portion of the program

that required Petitioner to be her counselor. Petitioner falsified her records to reflect that she attended

the required 52 AA meetings and all required group counseling sessions. She attended an exit interview

conducted by Petitioner where she signed her name to the forged documentation. Petitioner then asked

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for directions to her house and indicated he would be there on Tuesday. 

Carmichael gave Petitioner directions to her home, but became scared and called the Sheriff’s

department, as well as the OHS office, to report Petitioner’s actions during the period of time he served

as her counselor. The Sheriff’s office conducted surveillance on Petitioner the Tuesday he planned to

go to Carmichael’s house. Officers observed him driving on the freeway erratically. Once Petitioner

exited the freeway and came to a stop, detectives detained him and informed him that he was under

arrest for sexual assault. Petitioner spoke to the detectives on the scene, stating that “she” was lying,

and that “she” was a drunk and a drug addict. At the police station, Petitioner waived his Miranda

rights and spoke with the detectives. He identified Carmichael as his accuser. Petitioner denied

falsifying her OHS program records. After initial denials, Petitioner admitted that something had gone

on between him and Carmichael during her exit interview. Petitioner claimed that she had offered to be

his “woman on the side” if he would continue to be her counselor. He claimed he told her no, but that

he and Carmichael flirted with each other. 

Petitioner testified in his own defense at trial. He disputed Carmichael’s version of events, and

claimed that to his knowledge Carmichael attended all required AA meetings and group counseling

sessions because she presented him with documentation of her participation. He claimed that in

September 2004 Carmichael offered to pay him or provide sexual favors if he helped her get out of her

remaining requirements for the program. Petitioner denied falsifying any documents or records on

Carmichael’s behalf. 

On January 14, 2005, a jury found Petitioner guilty of preparing false documentary evidence for

fraudulent purposes, in violation of California Penal Code section 134. [Lodgment No. 1, 145.] 

Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and admitted a “strike prior” under California law. [Lodgment

No. 2, 633.] On March 11, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to a total term of four years incarceration,

consisting of the statutorily preferred middle term of two years, doubled under California’s three strikes

law. [Id. at 830.] 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, raising seven claims: (1) insufficient evidence to support the

conviction; (2) conviction pursuant to an unconstitutionally vague statute; (3) trial court error by failing

to sua sponte instruct the jury on the definitions of various terms used in the statute; (4) trial court error

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by instructing the jury under CALJIC No. 2.01 instead of CALJIC No. 2.02; (5) trial court error by

instructing the jury under CALJIC No. 2.62; (6) abuse of the trial court’s discretion by denying his

motion to strike his prior strike conviction at sentencing; and (7) cumulative error warranting reversal of

the judgment. [Lodgment No. 6, 2.] The state appellate court rejected these claims and affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. [Id. at 24.] Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review in

the California Supreme Court, which was denied without comment on September 27, 2006. [Lodgment

No. 8.] 

On December 27, 2007, Petitioner filed the pending federal petition, raising two claims: (1)

insufficiency of the evidence at trial to prove intent to produce a false record or to prove actual

production of a false record; and (2) violation of his due process rights based on his conviction pursuant

to an unconstitutionally vague statute. [Petition, 9.] Respondent has answered the Petition, and argues

that the California Court of Appeal reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claims. [Answer, 9.] 

ANALYSIS

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will

not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). A federal habeas court may grant relief under the

“contrary to” clause if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in

Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle

from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. 

Id. Additionally, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct, and the petitioner carries

the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

/ / /

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1 Preparing False Documentary Evidence: “Every person guilty of preparing any false or antedated

book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it to be

produced for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceedings, or inquiry

whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of felony.” CA Penal Code § 134.

2

 Where, as here, the highest state court to consider Petitioner’s claims issued a summary opinion which

does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal review under § 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to

reach the merits. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71,

973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of Petitioner’s claim is the

opinion of the California Court of Appeal. [Lodgment No. 6.]

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1. Claim One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner first contends that his federal Constitutional right to due process was violated because

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. [Petition, 9.] Specifically, Petitioner argues

that the prosecution failed to put on sufficient evidence at trial to prove he possessed the intent to

produce false documentary evidence at a trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law, a required

element of the charge.1 [Id] Respondent contends that habeas relief is unavailable as to this claim

because the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim was neither contrary to nor involved an

unreasonable application of the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). [Answer,

11-13.]

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. [See Lodgment No. 3; Lodgment No. 6.] The

appellate court rejected Petitioner’s argument,2

 concluding that sufficient evidence supported

Petitioner’s conviction for preparing false records. [Lodgment No. 6, 12-13.] Specifically, the appellate

court stated:

“There is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Montijo prepared

the false documents stating that Carmichael had complied with the terms of her probation

for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose. Carmichael testified that she was threatened, both at

orientation and by Montijo, that if she did not attend the required meetings, she would be

kicked out of the program, would be sent back to court, and would go to jail. The evidence

shows that Montijo put false information on the documents tracking her compliance for the

purpose of defrauding the court with a representation that Carmichael had complied with the

court-ordered program. [emphasis in original]

 Likewise, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Montijo intended the false

documents to be produced ‘upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry.’ The program Carmichael

attended was a condition of her probation. Montijo was responsible for keeping track of

Carmichael’s compliance with the program. If there was a lack of compliance, OHS would

notify the court. Similarly, OHS would have to provide the court with proof that Carmichael

had successfully completed the program. This could only be done based upon Montijo’s

false recording and reporting of Carmichael’s compliance with the program. Montijo’s

understanding that what he recorded on Carmichael’s compliance documents determined

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whether or not she would successfully complete that term of probation is sufficient to show

his intent that the documents would be produced ‘upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry

whatever.’ Substantial evidence supports Montijo’s conviction.”

[Lodgment No. 6, 12-13.]

The clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims in the criminal

context is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In Jackson, the Supreme Court

held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, and an applicant is entitled to

habeas corpus relief, “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of

fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. In making

this determination, habeas courts must respect the province of the jury to determine the credibility of

witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming

the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict. Id. at 319. Once a state court fact

finder has found a defendant guilty, federal habeas courts must consider the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the prosecution.” Id. Federal habeas courts must also analyze Jackson claims “with

explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 324

n.16.

The Ninth Circuit has recently stated that: “After AEDPA, we apply the standards of Jackson

with an additional layer of deference.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005). In Allen,

the Ninth Circuit first reviewed the standard of review applied by the state appellate court to a

sufficiency of the evidence claim, and found that although the state court did not cite to the relevant

federal case law, “such a citation is not required ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts’ Supreme Court precedent.” See id. at 1274 n.12, quoting Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The state appellate court here applied the Jackson standard and this Court

must determine whether the state appellate court opinion here “reflected an unreasonable application of

Jackson . . . to the facts of this case.” Allen, 408 F.3d at 1275. 

Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to produce any probative evidence at trial that he

falsified Carmichael’s OHS program records with the intent to have the records produced at a “trial,

proceeding, or inquiry.” [Petition, 9.] A review of the record demonstrates that Petitioner’s claim is

without merit. The prosecution presented Carmichael as their primary witness at trial. She testified that

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Petitioner prepared the false records of her completion of the OHS program requirements, in return for

which she paid him because he told her that without the falsified documentation she could be kicked out

of the program, sent back to court, and possibly go to jail. [Lodgment No. 2, 50.] Carmichael testified

at length regarding Petitioner’s threats that without OHS records chronicling her successful completion

of all the program requirements she would have to return to court for failing to meet the terms of her

probation. Carmichael told the jury that she complied with Petitioner’s monetary demands and sexual

advances for months and remained silent because Petitioner constantly threatened her with the legal 

consequences if he chose to stop forging her participation records. [Id. at 52.] 

Carmichael’s former co-worker and friend, Sandy LaPrade, corroborated her testimony. 

LaPrade testified that Carmichael confided in her about Petitioner’s behavior, but was afraid to tell

anyone else or report it to the police because she didn’t want to go to jail. [Id. at 217-18.] The

prosecution also called Adelina Olmos as a witness. [Id. at 227.] Olmos met and became friendly with

Carmichael during their participation in the OHS program. They were both assigned to Petitioner’s

group and individual counseling sessions. [Id. at 228.] Olmos testified that Petitioner made sexual

comments to her during one of their individual counseling sessions. [Id. at 231.] He also warned Olmos

during group and face-to-face sessions that if she didn’t complete the program requirements she could

be dismissed from the program, sent back to court, and possibly go to jail. [Id. at 246.] Detective

Daniel Deese, the arresting officer in the case, testified regarding Petitioner’s post-Miranda admissions

in the police station. [Id. at 270.] Specifically, Petitioner told the detectives that he had called

Carmichael fifteen times on the day he was arrested because he allegedly was concerned there was a

problem or she was in trouble when administrators came and pulled her file from his case files.

Petitioner testified at trial on his own behalf. [Id. at 342.] On direct examination, Petitioner

stated that he documented Carmichael’s performance in the OHS program by keeping a case file and

using a DUI tracking sheet. [Id. at 353.] He testified regarding Carmichael’s absences, her three

suspensions from the program, and her completion of multiple phases of the program. [Id. at 354.] On

cross examination, Petitioner testified in detail regarding his duty as an OHS counselor to keep

documentation of his assigned clients’ participation in the program:

/ / /

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[Prosecutor]

Q: What is the purpose of the documentation?

[Petitioner]

A: To ensure the client completes the program.

Q: What if the client doesn’t complete the program?

A: Then they are dismissed from the program and referred back to court.

Q: And referred back to the court by the OHS program administrators, correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And that comes as a basis of your telling your supervisors this is a client that I

have who is not in compliance; is that correct?

A: No.

Q: How do OHS administrators find out if somebody is not in compliance?

A: If they had broken any of the certain rules that apply to dismissal, we dismiss

them and turn in the file.

Q: Okay. Who dismisses them?

A: The counselor that’s in charge of them.

( . . . )

Q: All right. So once somebody gets dismissed based on the files that you create as a

counselor they get sent back to court?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Correct?

A: Yes.

[Id. at 392-93; 397.]

 The recurring theme throughout all of the testimony at Petitioner’s trial was the significance of

the OHS records due to their classification as official documentation of a criminal defendant’s

mandatory participation in a court-ordered program. Carmichael and her co-participant, Olmos, both

believed that Petitioner kept detailed records of their program participation for the primary purpose of

using the records to inform the court either of their successful completion at the end of their probation

period, or to advise the court of their non-compliance. Petitioner himself testified that client case files

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were kept by OHS counselors to track program completion and to use as a basis for dismissal and return

of the client to court for a probation violation. Based on this testimony, combined with evidence of

Petitioner’s position at OHS and his reliance upon the records to manipulate and cajole Carmichael, the

prosecution presented sufficient evidence at trial that Petitioner falsified Carmichael’s records with the

intent to produce them at a court proceeding (i.e., Carmichael’s final probation hearing) or OHS

administrative inquiry as genuine documentation of Carmichael’s successful participation in the

program. 

A rational trier of fact could have relied on the facts and testimony above to support Petitioner’s

conviction. The appellate court relied on this same evidence to conclude that substantial evidence

supported Petitioner’s conviction. Such reliance does not appear to be “objectively unreasonable” or

speculative because these facts, taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, support the

conviction for the charged crime. Therefore, the state court decision did not contradict or unreasonably

apply “clearly established federal law” as determined by the United States Supreme Court and did not

rely on an unreasonable determination of facts. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

first claim for habeas relief be DENIED. 

2. Claim Two: Constitutionality of California Penal Code Section 134

In his second ground for relief, Petitioner argues that California Penal Code section 134 fails to

provide adequate notice as to what conduct the statute prohibits, and therefore should be deemed void

for vagueness in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. [Petition, 9.] Respondent

contends that the state appellate court employed the correct standard under Kolender v. Lawson, 461

U.S. 352, 357 (1983), in rejecting Petitioner’s argument. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim on direct appeal, citing the standard set forth

by the Supreme Court in Graynard v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972), whether the

challenged statute provides “a person of ordinary intelligence” with a “reasonable opportunity to know

what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly.” The appellate court concluded that the California

legislature clearly intended for section 134 to prohibit the preparation of false evidence of any sort for

production at a full scale trial, as well as administrative hearings and inquiries and other court

proceedings, so long as the proceeding is authorized by the state legislature. [Lodgment No. 6, 14-15.] 

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The appellate court also determined that section 134 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied in

Petitioner’s case. Specifically, the court held:

“Here, the falsified documents were to be used to determine Carmichael’s compliance

with a term of her probation. Thus, they were to be used with regard to a formal court

proceeding, not an “inquiry” outside formal court process ( . . . ) Falsifying documents

that track a probationer’s compliance with a condition of probation is a serious matter

that any reasonable counselor would realize is both unethical and illegal, and which

seriously harms the integrity of the court-ordered probation system.”

[Id. at 15.]

Petitioner argues that section 134 is vague because under its terms “every document ever created

could be subject to CPC section 134 because any document could become the basis for a subsequent

court document.” Petitioner also claims that the appellate court decision encourages the arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement of the statute. [Petition, 9.] 

It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions

are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The

void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with “sufficient

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does

not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357

(1983). “Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, . . .

the more important aspect of [the] vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the requirement that a

legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Id. (citation omitted). If a statute

is not clear enough to guide citizens’ lawful conduct and provide authorities with principles governing

enforcement, a defendant cannot be punished for violation. United States v. Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 942 (9th

Cir. 2006).

California Penal Code section 134 provides: “Every person guilty of preparing any false or

ante-dated book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it,

or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial,

proceeding, or inquiry whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of felony.”

A statute will meet the certainty required by the Constitution if its language conveys sufficiently

definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. 

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See Panther v. Hames, 991 F.2d 576, 578 (9th Cir. 1993). In a facial vagueness challenge, the court

must look to the plain language of the statute, as well as construe the statute as it has been interpreted by

the state courts. See Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1997). The

state appellate court reasonably determined that section 134 is not unconstitutionally vague. An

ordinary person would understand that the statute prohibits a specific type of intentional behavior,

falsifying documentary evidence for the express purpose of presenting the sham documents at a court or

other authorized legal proceeding, or allowing someone to present the falsified documents on their

behalf, with the specific intent to deceive or defraud the proceeding. The California legislature

fashioned the statute using straightforward language, sufficiently specific to indicate clearly the conduct

prohibited by the statute. Other California Penal Code sections assist in defining key terms employed in

section 134. For instance, section 8 clarifies the specific intent to defraud, a required element of section

134: “Whenever, by any of the provisions of this Code, an intent to defraud is required in order to

constitute any offense, it is sufficient if an intent appears to defraud any person, association, or body

politic or corporate, whatever.” In addition, because the statute is clear as to the conduct prohibited, the

specific intent required, and the context in which the conduct is illegal, it establishes standards that

permit the police to enforce the law in a non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner. The Court finds no

plausible reading of the statute that mandates, encourages, or even suggests that the police enforce the

prohibition in any other way than in a non-arbitrary or non-discriminatory manner. 

The analysis does not end with the plain language of the statute, however. Federal courts must

construe the statute as it has been interpreted by the state courts. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355 n. 4, 103

S.Ct. at 1857 n. 4; McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 1989). California case law

interpreting section 134 is sparse. Several cases have reviewed the application of section 134 in specific

factual contexts, however this Court could not find a case that dealt directly with the issue of section

134's constitutionality, aside from the appellate court’s unpublished opinion denying Petitioner’s direct

appeal in this case. See, e.g., People v. Blaydon (1957) 154 C.A.2d 817, 823 (forging signature of

witness to will); People v. Laws (1981) 120 C.A.3d 1022, 1028 (preparation of false receipt to show

compliance with probation restitution condition). 

One California appellate court examined the statute thirty years ago, addressing the narrow

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question of whether a grievance procedure hearing is a ‘proceeding, or inquiry whatever, authorized by

law,’ and thus covered by section 134. People v. Clark (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 80. The Clark court

commented on section 134's purpose, stating that “interpretation of the Penal Code section shows that its

objective is to prevent the fraudulent introduction of material in a proceeding under the authority of law. 

To apply the Penal Code section to inquiry proceedings is necessitated by the purpose of discouraging

introduction of this material.” The court concluded that the plain import of the term “authorized by

law,” as it refers to proceedings within section 134, includes proceedings and inquiries held pursuant to

legislative authority, even though they occur outside a court of law. The court also determined that the

meaning of the statute is unambiguous. Id. at 84-85. 

This Court agrees with the California appellate courts’ assessment that Penal Code section 134 is

unambiguous on its face, and not void for vagueness in its application under the standard set forth by the

United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Section 134 provides

sufficient guidelines for citizens’ conduct and to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, as

required under the Kolender. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague, and the state appellate court’s

decision in Petitioner’s case was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s second claim for habeas relief be DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 22, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than August 29, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 22, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00088-WQH-NLS Document 8 Filed 07/22/08 Page 12 of 12