Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02573/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02573-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL SCOTT JONES, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

MARGARITA PEREZ, Warden, 

Respondent.

 

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No. C 05-2573 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, currently incarcerated at the

Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, filed a habeas corpus petition

(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the Board of Prison Terms’

(“BPT”) denial of parole during parole suitability proceedings in 2004. This Court

ordered Respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue. Respondent filed an

answer, memorandum and exhibits in support thereof. Petitioner has not filed a traverse. 

For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder in Ventura County Superior

Court and was sentenced to fifteen years-to-life in state prison in 1989. In this habeas

action, Petitioner does not challenge his conviction, but instead alleges that his due

process rights were violated by the denial of parole during his third parole suitability

hearing on February 2, 2004. Petitioner received a one-year denial of parole at that

proceeding. Petitioner’s minimum parole eligibility date was September 1, 2000. 

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At the February 2, 2004 hearing, Petitioner appeared with counsel before a BPT

panel for a subsequent parole consideration hearing. At the hearing, the Board relied

upon the California Court of Appeal’s opinion dated March 21, 1991 regarding

Petitioner’s commitment offense. Petitioner testified that the statement was an accurate

reflection of what happened, and the Court includes that summary here: 

On the night of the commitment offense, Petitioner had been drinking at 

a bar in Ventura, then went to a friend’s house across the street where he 

played cards with his friend and other persons for a considerable period of time. 

Later that night, Petitioner and these individuals traveled to his home where they

continued to play cards. At approximately 3:00 a.m. or 3:30 a.m., the victim, one

of Petitioner’s roommates, exited a room and asked Petitioner to “knock it off

because he and his friends were too noisy.” As a result, the party traveled back to

Petitioner’s friend’s house. The victim, however, asked Petitioner to stay behind,

which he did. A witness, another of Petitioner’s roommates, then recalled the

victim telling Petitioner “[t]hirty days and you’re out of here.” The witness then

heard several gunshots and saw blood on the victim. By this time, Petitioner had

already left his home. Petitioner had taken a bicycle from his neighbor’s garage

and was subsequently arrested riding it with a gun. 

(See, Tr. of Subsequent Parole Consideration Hr’g Pet. (“Transcript”) at 8:27-9:20). The

BPT found that Petitioner was not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety. The presiding Commissioner

explained that, in deciding to deny parole, the panel considered Petitioner’s commitment

offense, prior criminal and social history, his programming and behavior since

commitment, including progress made and his parole plans. 

Petitioner challenged the BPT’s February 2, 2004 decision in the California Court

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. The California Court of Appeal issued the

last reasoned opinion denying Petitioner’s claims on March 21, 1991. After the Supreme

Court of California summarily denied his final state habeas petition on June 10, 1991,

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The parties do not

dispute that state judicial remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in this petition.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified

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under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state

prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002,

1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this court may entertain a petition for habeas

relief on behalf of a California state inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any claim on

the merits: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, federal habeas relief will

not be granted “simply because [this] court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 411 (2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining whether the

state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the only

definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT’s February 2, 2004

decision finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent hearing for

one year, on the ground that the decision does not comport with due process. Petitioner

claims that the BPT’s decision is not supported by some evidence in the record having an

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“indicia of reliability” that Petitioner is currently a threat or unreasonable risk to society. 

(See Petition at viii.) Petitioner also claims that the BPT possesses an “anti and/or no

parole policy” that is systemically biased because it fails to provide uniform terms for

offenders with crimes of similar gravity and magnitude and, therefore, it violates his

state and federal constitutional rights. (Id. at 7.) 

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date unless

it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing

and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of

the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and

that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code §

3041(b). In making this determination, the board considers various factors, including the

prisoner’s social history, past criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses,

including behavior before, during and after the crime. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§

2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due process protections. 

Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion

v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The determination does not depend on

whether a parole release date has ever been set for the inmate because “[t]he liberty

interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the

inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that “some evidence” support the parole

board’s decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125 (holding that

the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions in § 2254 habeas petition);

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d at 904 (same). The Ninth Circuit

has recently clarified that “California courts have made clear that the ‘findings that are

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necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole’ are not that a particular factor or

factors indicating unsuitability exist, but that a prisoner’s release will unreasonably

endanger public safety.” Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted) (quoting Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007)). The

relevant criteria under which the BPT ordinarily determines whether a prisoner is too

dangerous to be found suitable for parole are set forth in the California Code of

Regulations at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402. Id. This Court must therefore determine

whether the state court decision finding the BPT’s decision was supported by “some

evidence the parolee’s release unreasonably endangers public safety.” Id. (citation

omitted.)

The “some evidence” standard is minimally stringent and ensures that “the record

is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were without support or

otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining whether this requirement is

satisfied “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of

the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass,

461 F.3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board’s decision

have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. 

Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to appear

before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v. California Dep't of Corrections,

16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). In

sum, if the parole board’s determination of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process,

there must be some evidence, with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. 

Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows that the BPT panel afforded Petitioner and his counsel an

opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to review

Petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents, and provided them

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with a reasoned decision in denying parole. The panel concluded that Petitioner “is not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to

public safety if released from prison.” (Transcript at 52:10-13). The panel explained

that it found that the commitment offense “was carried out in an especially violent and

brutal manner,” that the “victim was shot five times in the back at very close range,” and

the “offense was carried out in a callous manner which demonstrates an [sic] callous

disregard for human life, and the motive for the crime is inexplicable and very trivial in

relation to the offense.” (Id. at 52:14-21.) The panel also found that Petitioner has ”an

escalating pattern of criminal conduct.” (Id. at 53:20-21.) The panel further found that

Petitioner has an “unstable social history . . . .” (Id.)

The panel commended Petitioner for all of the positive things he has done while in

prison, including completing Vocational Screening and Process Printing in 1991,

participating in Alcoholics Anonymous, participating in the second of a series of 45

education videos, recently enrolling in two additional classes from Coastline Community

College, and already completing 15 units at that same college. (Id. at 54:10-20.) 

 The panel found that while Petitioner’s behavior has “positive aspects,” they “do

not outweigh the factors of unsuitability.” (Id. at 54:21-22.) In addition, the panel found

that “[t]he prisoner needs to continue to participate in self-help in order to face, discuss,

understand, and cope with stress in a nondestructive manner. Until progress is made, the

prisoner continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others.” (Id. at 54:6-10.) 

Moreover, the panel recommended that Petitioner “remain disciplinary-free and continue

to participate in any self-help.” (Id. at 54:22-24.) 

The Ventura County Superior Court denied the Petition on October 15, 2004. 

(See Petition at 4.) The California Court of Appeal also denied the Petition on January

13, 2005, and the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition For Review on

March 30, 2005. (See id.) The Superior Court’s and Court of Appeal’s rejection of

Petitioner's due process claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the

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The victim also had contact wounds.

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Hill standard, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s February 2, 2004 decision to deny Petitioner parole is

supported by some evidence in the record and that evidence bears some indicia of

reliability. See, e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole based on

gravity of offense and psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (upholding denial of

parole based solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior to imprisonment); Morales,

16 F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole based on criminal history, cruel nature of

offense, and need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry under Hill is simply

“whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the [BPT].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). 

In this case, the panel found that the crime was carried out in a callous manner

which demonstrates a callous disregard for human life, and the motive for the crime is

inexplicable and very trivial in relation to the offense. Petitioner was also found to have

an unstable social history and prior criminality. Under California law, these are

appropriate factors to consider in determining whether Petitioner poses an unreasonable

risk to public safety. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2402(c) & (d) (listing circumstances

tending to show unsuitability for parole and circumstances tending to show suitability). 

Specifically, petitioner shot the victim five times in the back1

 over a dispute about an

apartment rental. (Transcript at 52:15-17.) Petitioner was drunk at the time, and there

was evidence that Petitioner had a long history of alcohol abuse since age 15; in addition,

he had two prior arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id. at 23:24.) This

amounted to “some evidence” in support of the BPT’s decision that Petitioner, if released

from prison, would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, including the

risk that Petitioner would return to alcohol abuse and become violent again after his

release. Therefore, the state courts’ determination that there was some evidence to

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support the BPT’s decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

established Supreme Court precedent. 

The Ninth Circuit has noted that continued reliance on the unchanging factors of

Petitioner’s commitment offense and prior history will “at some point violate due

process” unless the unchanging circumstances reliably establish that Petitioner presents

an unreasonably public safety risk. See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545 (citing Irons, 505 F.3d

at 854). The Ninth Circuit has also stated, however, that "[u]nder AEDPA it is not our

function to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129. In any event, the concern raised in Hayward is not present in this case because

Petitioner had not served in excess of his minimum term of fifteen years when the

challenged parole denial took place. Cf., e.g., Irons, 479 F.3d at 661 (upholding reliance

upon commitment offense to deny parole at fifth parole hearing after petitioner had

served 16 years in prison, which was less than the minimum term); Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129 (same, for second and third parole hearings after petitioner had served 11 and 12

years in prison).

Petitioner further argues that the BPT possesses an “anti-parole policy” that is

biased and violates his constitutional rights. Petitioner has set forth no evidentiary

support for his bias claim. But even if he had, there is no evidence in the record

indicating that this alleged bias affected the BPT’s decision or served as the basis for

denying Petitioner parole. To the contrary, the transcript from Petitioner’s February 2,

2004 parole hearing demonstrates that he received an individualized assessment of his

potential parole suitability. Petitioner’s reliance on the high percentage of parole denials

for life inmates provides no proof of the BPT’s alleged bias against parole. Cf.

California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1995) (citing that 90

percent of all California inmates are found unsuitable for parole as evidence that

deferring annual parole suitability hearings was lawful and reasonable). The state courts’

rejection of Petitioner's claims cannot be said to be objectively unreasonable. See 28

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U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 21, 2008 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PEREZ et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-02573 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on April 21, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Michael Scott Jones E-40401

P.O. Box 689

G-Wing 319L

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: April 21, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

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