Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02713/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02713-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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FILED 

SEP 1 '3 2018 

CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

SOU l!RN DiSTRir.;T OF CAl.IFORNIA 

BY l)l!PUTY 

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UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRlCT OF CALIFORNIA 

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11 COLUMBUS ALLEN, JR., II, Case No.: 16cv2713-MMA(KSC) 

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13 v. 

14 JEFFREY BEARD, et al., 

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Plaintiff, ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S 

REQUEST FOR THE 

APPOINTMENT OF A MEDICAL 

EXPERT AND VOLUNTARY 

Defendants. COUNSEL 

[Doc. No. 53] 

18 Plaintiff Columbus Allen, Jr., II, a state prisoner proceeding prose, filed this 

19 action pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, alleging that prison 

20 officials and medical staff violated his constitutional rights. [Doc. No. l .] Before the 

21 Court is plaintiffs Request for a Court Appointed Expert and Request for Voluntary 

22 Counsel Assistance. [Doc. No. 53.] For the reasons outlined more fully below, the 

23 Court finds that plaintiffs requests for the appointment of counsel and a medical expert 

24 must be DENIED. [Doc. No. 53.] 

25 Background 

26 Plaintiffs Section 1983 Complaint alleges that a number of prison officials and 

27 medical staff violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights beginning in July 

28 2015 by acting with deliberate indifference to his wrist pain. The Complaint also 

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1 includes alleged violations of state law. In an Order filed on September 13, 2017, the 

2 District Court dismissed claims against the other defendants served in the action, but 

3 permitted plaintiff to re-attempt service of process on Dr. Lai, and one other named 

4 defendant. [Doc. No. 38, at p. 3.] 

5 Currently pending before the District Court is Dr. Lai's Motion for Judgment on 

6 the Pleadings. [Doc. No. 56.] In this Motion, Dr. Lai argues that plaintiffs Complaint 

7 is time barred by the one-year statute of limitations in California Code of Civil 

8 Procedure Section 340.5. [Doc. No. 56, at p. l .] 

9 The Complaint alleges that plaintiff began to suffer pain and swelling in his wrists 

10 in July 2015 and consulted with his primary care physician. X-rays ordered by his 

11 primary care physician were negative for fractures. Plaintiff was given a wrist brace, 

12 referred to an orthopedist, and directed to restrict his physical activities for ten days 

13 before returning to work. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 7.] On September 10, 2015, plaintiff claims 

14 he consulted with Dr. Lai, who is contracted to provide orthopedic health care to 

15 inmates. Dr. Lai initially diagnosed plaintiff with "tenosynovitis." [Doc. No. 1, at p. 7.] 

16 To treat the pain and swelling, Dr. Lai gave plaintiff a "shot" and denied plaintiffs 

17 request for an MRI to obtain "a definite diagnosis." [Doc. No. 1, at p. 7.] Plaintiff 

18 alleges that Dr. Lai failed to disclose the consequences and possible side effects of the 

19 shot and other available options and did not obtain his informed consent to proceed with 

20 the injection. [Doc.No. 1, at pp. 7-10.] 

21 On September 11, 2015, plaintiff alleges he became ill and sought medical care. 

22 One of his symptoms was a "deformity" at the injection site. At this time, a nurse 

23 disclosed that plaintiff had been given a "steroid shot" by Dr. Lai, and this was the 

24 "possible cause" for his symptoms. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 8.] 

25 On September 24, 2015, plaintiff claims that he returned to Dr. Lai. This time, 

26 Dr. Lai ordered an MRI, which revealed "mild arthritis." [Doc. No. 1, at p. 8.] Plaintiff 

27 obtained from Dr. Lai a directive for "modified duty" in the hope of "obtaining 

28 accommodations at work." [Doc. No. 1, at p. 8.] Dr. Lai also recommended referral to a 

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1 hand specialist. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 8.] Despite Dr. Lai's recommendation, plaintiff was 

2 advised by prison officials that he "could report to his assigned area and perform his 

3 regular tasks." [Doc. No. 1, at p. 8.] Later, in 2016, plaintiff consulted with a hand 

4 specialist, who performed a "release procedure" and "administered a steroid shot" with 

5 no resulting illness or deformity. [Doc. No. 1, at pp. 12-13.] 

6 As a result of his alleged failure to obtain plaintiffs informed consent for the 

7 injection, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Lai breached various duties under California statutory 

8 law. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 14.] Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Lai's "wrongful actions" 

9 violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments. [Doc. 

10 No. 1, at pp. 7, 14-15.] According to the Complaint, Dr. Lai' s actions demonstrate 

11 "deliberate indifference" to plaintiffs rights, because he should have known there was 

12 an "unreasonable risk of detriment to plaintiff." [Doc. No. 1, at pp. 14-15.] 

13 I. 

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Plaintiff Request (or the Appointment ofa Medical Expert. 

Plaintiff believes his case involves "complex medical and scientific matters." 

15 [Doc. No. 53, at p. 2.] He argues that expert testimony is "required" to assist the Court, 

16 because he has no other means to provide the Court with the standard of care that applies 

1 7 to medical professionals in circumstances similar to those alleged in this case against 

18 Dr. Lai. [Doc. No. 53, at p. 2.] Plaintiff also contends that an expert is needed to 

19 interpret and authenticate medical evidence contained in documents "reflecting an 

20 independent's doctor's observance of the physical injury alleged" as a result of the 

21 injection. [Doc. No. 53, at p. 3.] In addition, plaintiff argues that expert testimony is 

22 needed about the standard of care "relative to informed consent disclosure and 

23 documenting obligations established under a vast amount of statutes and regulations 

24 which may or may not be applicable .... " [Doc. No. 53, at p. 3.] 

25 The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment," imposes 

26 a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement and to take 

27 reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Helling v. McKinney, 509 

28 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993). "However, every injury suffered by an inmate does not 

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1 necessarily translate into constitutional liability for prison officials." Osolinsk i v. Kane, 

2 92 F.3d 934, 936-937 (9th Cir. 1996). The U.S. Constitution "does not mandate 

3 comfortable prisons." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). 

4 To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for the deprivation of humane conditions of 

5 confinement, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective. 

6 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the objective requirement, the 

7 plaintiff must allege a deprivation or risk that is "sufficiently serious." Id. "[A] prison 

8 official's acts or omissions must result in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of 

9 life's necessities."' Id. The risk that the prisoner complains of must be "so grave that it 

10 violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a 

11 risk." Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. 

12 The subjective requirement relates to the state of mind of prison officials because 

13 "only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment." 

14 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834. Facts alleged must be sufficient to show 

15 "deliberate indifference " to the health or safety of an inmate. Id. "Deliberate 

16 indifference " exists when a prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 

17 inmate health and safety; the official must be both aware of facts from which the 

18 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

19 draw the inference." Id. at 837. "[P]rison officials who act reasonably cannot be found 

20 liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Id. at 845. 

21 "A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 

22 or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if ... the expert's 

23 scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 

24 understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... " Fed.R.Evid. 702(a). The in 

25 forma pauperis statute, Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915, does not authorize 

26 the expenditure of public funds for expert witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, under 

27 Federal Rule of Evidence 706, a District Court does have discretion to appoint an expert 

28 witness on its own motion or on the motion of any party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 702(a). In 

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1 addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 706 specifies the means by which an appointed 

2 expert must be compensated. A court-appointed expert "is entitled to a reasonable 

3 compensation, as set by the court .. . payable ... by the parties in the proportion . .. that 

4 the court directs-and the compensation is then charged like other costs." Fed.R.Civ.P. 

5 706( c )(2). Thus, a District Court may in its discretion apportion all of the costs of an 

6 appointed expert to one side in an appropriate case. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 

7 1500, 1511 (9th Cir. 1991 ), overruled on other grounds by Helling v. McKinney, 502 

8 U.S. 903 (1991). 

9 Rule 706 "only allows a court to appoint a neutral expert." Gorton v. Todd, 793 

10 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1177 (E.D� Cal. 2011). In other words, a party may not seek 

11 appointment of an expert witness by the Court "for his own benefit. ... " Id. at 1177 n.6. 

12 "Expert witnesses are rarely appointed under Rule 706 because the adversary system is 

13 usually sufficient to promote accurate factfinding." Id. at 1182. However, a District 

14 Court "should consider appointing an expert witnesses when, through the course of 

15 litigation, it becomes apparent that unbiased expert testimony will aid the trier of fact in 

16 making an accurate factual determination ... " on a central issue in the case. Id. at 1182 

17 n.10. "The Rule is drafted to avoid [the] situation where the only reason why a case 

18 would not proceed to trial is the presence or absence of an expert witness rather than the 

19 merits of a plaintiffs claim." Id. at 1181 n.9. 

20 For example, it would be appropriate for a District Court to appoint an expert "to 

21 avoid a wholly one-sided presentation of opinions " when an indigent prisoner plaintiff 

22 raises a complex and potentially viable claim of deliberate indifference to a serious 

23 medical need, but cannot, despite diligence, obtain a medical expert to present evidence 

24 of the appropriate standard of care. Id. at 1179-1186. Appointment of a neutral expert 

25 would also be appropriate when a material issue in the case requires consideration of 

26 complex scientific evidence. Id. at 1179. 

2 7 On the other hand, a jury in the usual case is capable of evaluating whether prison 

28 officials were deliberately indifferent without the aid of an expert. Id. at 1180. 

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1 "[D]eliberate indifference" does not typically "demand that the jury consider probing, 

2 complex questions" that would require the assistance of an expert with specialized 

3 knowledge. Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1997). "[W]hether a prison 

4 official acted with deliberate indifference depends on that official's state of mind," so an 

5 expert would not be able to testify that a prison official was "deliberately indifferent" 

6 without giving "a false impression" that the expert knows the answer, when it is the trier 

7 of fact that must decide the issue. Woods v. Lecureaux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1221 (6th Cir. 

8 1997). Nor is there any requirement that a prisoner plaintiff present expert testimony in 

9 order to prevail on a constitutional claim under Section 1983. McCabe v. Prison Health 

10 Services, 117 F.Supp.2d 443, 451-452 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (acknowledging that expert 

11 testimony could be necessary on the issue of severity of a medical need if the trier of fact 

12 would not be able to decide whether a medical condition is "serious" enough to 

13 implicate the Eighth Amendment but stating that "[n]o expert needs to tell a layperson 

14 that four years of suffering from chronic and severe leg pain is serious"). 

15 Based on plaintiffs arguments and the allegations in the Complaint, it is apparent 

16 that plaintiff does not seek the appointment of a neutral expert to aid the Court in making 

17 an accurate factual determination on material issues in his case. Rather, plaintiff seeks 

18 appointment of a medical expert by the Court to act as an advocate to help him to 

19 prepare and present his case. As outlined above, plaintiff is not entitled to a Court20 appointed expert to advocate his case. 

21 There is also nothing to indicate that testimony by a medical expert is needed at 

22 this time to make an accurate factual determination on a key issue in the case. At this 

23 time, the only substantive matter being considered by the Court is Dr. Lai's Motion for 

24 Judgment on the Pleadings, which argues that plaintiffs Complaint is barred by the 

25 applicable statute of limitations. No medical evidence is necessary to resolve this 

26 Motion. Nor is there anything thus far to indicate that plaintiffs allegations against 

27 Dr. Lai raise "probing, complex questions" or "consideration of complex scientific 

28 evidence." Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d at 359. Rather, the factual allegations raised in 

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1 the Complaint, if proved, do not appear to be so complex that they are beyond a lay 

2 person's grasp. Plaintiffs allegations against Dr. Lai involve only a single steroid 

3 injection that allegedly injured plaintiff. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs 

4 request for the appointment of a medical expert witness must be DENIED at this time. 

5 However, this decision is without prejudice to another request by plaintiff at a point in 

6 the litigation where evidence is being evaluated if plaintiff is able to show that testimony 

7 by a neutral medical expert is necessary for the trier of fact to comprehend a material 

8 issue in the case. See, e.g., Gorton v. Todd, 105 F.3d at 1185. 

9 II. Plaintifrs Request for Assistance of Counsel. 

10 Plaintiff requests that the court appoint counsel, because it "would substantially 

11 increase the Court's ability to understand the medical and scientific evidence relative to 

12 the applicable informed consent statutes and regulations .... " [Doc. No. 53, at p. 4.] In 

13 addition, plaintiff argues that counsel should be appointed because he has no other 

14 means "to pursue the factual investigation with the degree of expertise necessary to 

15 promote a fair trial. ... " [Doc. No. 53, at p. 5.] This is plaintiffs second request for the 

16 appointment of counsel in the case. [Doc. Nos. 31, 3 7.] 

17 An indigent's right to appointed counsel has been recognized to exist "only where 

18 the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation." Lassiter v. 

19 Department of Social Services of Durham County, NC., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). District 

20 Courts generally lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in 

21 Section 1983 cases. Mallard v. US. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in 

22 certain "exceptional circumstances, " the Court may request the voluntary assistance of 

23 counsel. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). 

24 "A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the 

25 likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims 

26 pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved." Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017 

27 (internal citations omitted). "Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be 

28 viewed together before reaching a decision." Id. (internal citation omitted). 

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1 In this case, there is no basis to support a finding of exceptional circumstances at 

2 this time. First, the record is not sufficiently developed so that the Court can make a 

3 determination on the likelihood of success on the merits. 

4 Second, a pro se prisoner's inability to afford an attorney, standing alone, is not 

5 enough to show exceptional circumstances. This and other hardships imposed by 

6 plaintiffs incarceration "are difficulties which any litigant would have in proceeding pro 

7 se; they do not indicate exceptional factors." Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 

8 1335-1336 (9th Cir. 1990). 

9 Third, there is nothing from which the Court could conclude plaintiff lacks the 

10 ability to articulate and prosecute his claims p ro se. The allegations in the Complaint are 

11 clearly stated and they survived initial screening. [Doc. No. l; Doc. No. 3, at pp. 5-6.] 

12 Numerous exhibits are also attached to the Complaint to assist the Court in evaluating 

13 plaintiffs allegations. [Doc. No. 1, at pp. 25-135.] In addition, the District Court noted 

14 in its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration that plaintiff is a "seasoned 

15 litigant who has prosecuted multiple previous federal civil rights actions." [Doc. No. 49, 

16 at pp. 3-4.] Thus far, plaintiff has shown an ability to effectively articulate his claims and 

1 7 communicate with the Court in this action. 

18 Fourth, the allegations in the Complaint are not complex. Plaintiff alleges that 

19 defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, because 

20 they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. [Doc. No. l .] 

21 Finally, pro se litigants are afforded some leniency to compensate for their lack of 

22 legal training. "In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must 

23 construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt." 

24 Jackson v. Carey , 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). This also 

25 applies to motions. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County , 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). 

26 Accordingly, plaintiffs pro se status will be taken into consideration by the Court when 

27 his filings are reviewed. 

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1 CONCLUSION 

2 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs Request for a 

3 Court Appointed Expert is DENIED. Plaintiffs Request for Voluntary Counsel 

4 Assistance is also DENIED. [Doc. No. 53.] 

5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

6 Dated: September Jk_, 2018 

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Hon. 8 United States Magistrate Judge 

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