Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07128/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07128-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 In support of their special motion to strike, Defendants submitted a request that the

Court take judicial notice court documents relating to the temporary restraining order. 

Because the Court did not need to consider these document in reaching its decision,

Defendants’ request to take judicial notice is DENIED on that basis. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS LUTGE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ESKANOS & ADLER, P.C., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-07128 JSW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL

MOTION TO STRIKE

Now before the Court is the Special Motion to Strike plaintiff Thomas Lutge’s fourth

and sixth causes of action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16 filed by

defendant Eskanos & Adler, P.C. (“Eskanos & Adler”), Irwin Eskanos (“Eskanos”), and Ryan

White (“White”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Having considered the parties’ arguments,

relevant legal authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby grants in

part and denies in part Defendants’ motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Thomas Lutge (“Lutge”) alleges that Defendants attempted to collect a debt

that he did not owe and that Defendants used improper methods to attempt to collect the money. 

(First Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 10, 13-15, 23-26, 31.) Lutge also alleges that Defendants improperly

obtained a temporary restraining order against him. (Id., ¶¶ 19-22, 26-29.)1

 Based on such

allegations, Lutge filed an action and brings claims against Defendants under the following

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For the Northern District of California

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statutes: (1) the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b-1692j; (2) the

California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 

1788, et seq., and (3) California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (“Section 17200”). 

Defendants move to strike Lutge’s claims under the Rosenthal Act and Section 17200. The

Court will address additional specific facts as required in the analysis.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Special Motion to Strike.

California’s anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) statute

provides a mechanism for a defendant to strike civil actions brought primarily to chill the

exercise of free speech. Cal. Code Civil Proc. § 425.16(b)(1); see also Metabolife

International, Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1221 (S.D. Cal. 2002). The California

Legislature passed the statute and explicitly recognized “the public interest to encourage

continued participation in matters of public significance ... and [found] that this participation

should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process.” Metabolife, 213 F. Supp. 2d at

1221 (citations omitted). Thus, to deter such chilling, a prevailing defendant on a special

motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Id.,

citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c). 

Section 425.16 provides, in relevant part, that 

A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in

furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the

United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue

shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines

that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff

will prevail on the claim.

As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or

free speech under the United States or California Constitution in

connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement

or writing made before a ... judicial proceeding, or any other official

proceeding authorized by law....

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 425.16(b)(1); 425.16(e).

A special motion to strike a SLAPP suit involves a two-step analysis. First, the court

must decide whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of

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action is one “arising from” protected activity. See, e.g., City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th

69, 76 (2002). The defendant may meet this threshold burden by showing that the act which

forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action was a written or oral statement made before a

judicial proceeding. See Church of Scientology of California v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th

628, 646 (1996). Courts examine the “principal thrust or gravamen” of the claims at issue to

determine whether they arise from protected activity. Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.,

120 Cal. App. 4th 90, 103 (2004). “Where a cause of action alleges both protected and

unprotected activity, the cause of action will be subject to section 425.15 unless the protected

activity is ‘merely incidental’ to the unprotected conduct.” Id. (quoting Scott v. Metabolife

Int’l., Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 404, 419 (2004)).

If the defendant establishes a prima facie case that the claims arise from protected

activity, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability that the plaintiff will

prevail on the claim. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 646; see also Cotati, 29 Cal. 4th at 76. 

In making its determination, the trial court is required to consider the pleadings and supporting

and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which liability or defense is based. See Cal. Code

Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b). 

B. Defendants’ Motion.

1. Defendants Have Met Threshold Burden of Demonstrating Challenged

Cause of Actions Arise From Protected Activity.

The right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the

government for redress of grievances. See Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 647. The

constitutional right to petition includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking

administrative action. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106,

1115 (1999). By logical extension, the right to petition also necessarily includes participation

in the litigation as well. See id. Therefore, a cause of action arising from a defendant’s

litigation activity may properly be the subject of a section 425.16 motion to strike. See

Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 648. In addition, in interpreting the scope of a section 425.16

motion to strike, courts have “adopted a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigationCase 3:06-cv-07128-JSW Document 34 Filed 05/24/07 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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related activities.” Kashian v. Harriman, 98 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908 (2002). The scope of

protected litigation activities broadly includes communication, including statements to the court

and other, non-speech conduct. See, e.g., Susan S. v. Israels, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1290, 1300-01

(1997). 

In this matter, Lutge’s complaint includes allegations relating to an action Defendants

initiated in state court to obtain a temporary restraining order against him. He alleges, in

pertinent part:

19. Eskanos & Adler are lawyers that apparently went into court without

notifying plaintiff and obtained a three year restraining order dated

September 1, 2006.

20. Plaintiff was never served with the request for a restraining order, or the

order setting a hearing for a restraining order.

21. The first time Plaintiff heard about the restraining order was during late

August 2006 when it was mailed to him. Plaintiff then sent it to counsel,

and instructed counsel to take steps to set it aside and file this lawsuit.

22. Plaintiff has now been charged by Eskanos & Adler with “annoying phone

calls to a residence” when the restraining order is for “threats to work.” ...

27. Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by improperly

misrepresenting the legal status of the debt, by filing false proofs of

service in the Contra Costa County Superior Court, Action No. N06-0869,

by pretending to that Court that [Lutge] is somehow hard to find when in

fact he is easily located in the phone book as residing in Marin County,

and by obtaining unfair court advantage in a restraining order process by

so filing a false and misleading proof of service, a violation of 15 U.S.C.

1692(e).

28. Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by improperly

misrepresenting the legal status of the debt, by filing false statements of a

need for a restraining order due to what they call work place violence,

filed by defendants in the Contra Costa County Superior Court, Action

No. N06-0869, a violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692(e).

29. Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by improperly

misrepresenting the legal status of the debt, by filing false statements with

the police of a need for a restraining order and harassing phone calls,

resulting in a criminal complaint against Mr. Lutge alleging harassing

phone calls in a residence [Cal. Penal Code Section 653m(b). See 15

U.S.C. 1692(e).

(First Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 19-22, 27-29.) Lutge then incorporates these allegations into his

state-law claims, the Rosenthal Act and Section 17200. (Id., ¶¶ 59, 66, 75.)

Lutge does not dispute that obtaining the restraining order was protected activity, but

argues that his allegations relating to the state-court litigation are merely incidental to his

claims. Upon review of the complaint, the Court finds that while his claims are based in part on

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unprotected activity, Lutge also alleges that Defendants’ conduct in the litigation to obtain the

restraining order violated the Fair Debt Practices Act, and, by incorporation, violates the

Rosenthal Act and Section 17200. The Court thus finds that Lutge’s state-law claims are based

on both protected and unprotected activity. Defendants have therefore met their threshold

burden of demonstrating that the challenged caused of action are ones “arising from” protected

activity. See, e.g., Cotati, 29 Cal.4th at 76. 

2. Lutge’s Burden of Demonstrating a Probability of Prevailing on Merits.

Once Defendants have reached the threshold showing, the burden shifts to Lutge to

establish a probability of prevailing at trial. See Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 646. Lutge

need not prove the challenged claims. “Rather, the court considers whether the plaintiff has

made a prima facie showing of facts based on competent admissible evidence that would, if

proved, support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.” Mann, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 105. A

plaintiff need only establish the challenged cause of action has “minimal merit.” Navellier v.

Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 (2002). Moreover, where “a plaintiff can show a probability of

prevailing on any part of its claim, the cause of action is not meritless and will not be subject to

the anti-SLAPP procedure. ... [O]nce a plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing on any part of

its claim, the plaintiff has established that its cause of action has some merit and the entire

cause of action stands.” Mann, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 106 (emphasis in original); see also

Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1073 (2001) (“a SLAPP motion, like a

summary judgment motion, pierces the pleadings and requires an evidentiary showing”)

(emphasis in original). 

i. Rosenthal Act Claim.

a. Eskanos & Adler and White.

The Rosenthal Act prohibits debt collectors from threatening or harassing debtors with

physical force or false criminal accusation, from defaming the debtor other than lawfully

disclosing the fact that the debtor has failed to pay a consumer debt, and from threatening

seizure or garnishment, unless such action is actually contemplated. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.10. 

It similarly prohibits using obscene language, failing to disclose the caller’s identity, and

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making calls with unreasonable frequency. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.11. It bars debt collectors

from making false or misleading representations and proscribes debt collection practices that

abuse the judicial system or disregard the attorney-client relationship. Cal. Civ. Code §§

1788.13-1788.16. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the following three specific provisions of the

Rosenthal Act: (1) Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.10(e) (which prohibits a “threat to any person that

nonpayment of the consumer debt may result in the arrest of the debtor or the seizure,

garnishment, attachment or sale of any property ..., unless such action is in fact contemplated by

the debt collector and permitted by law”); (2) Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.13(d) (which prohibits a

“representation that any debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, affiliated with, or is an

instrumentality, agent or official of any federal, state or local government or any agency of

federal, state or local government, unless the collector is actually employed by the particular

governmental agency in question and is action on behalf of such agency in the debt collection

matter”); and (3) Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.13(j) (which prohibits a “false representation that a

legal proceeding has been, is about to be, or will be instituted unless payment of a consumer

debt is made”). (First Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 61, 63.) 

Upon review of Lutge’s complaint, it is not clear how the facts he alleges would

constitute a violation of any of the above provisions of the Rosenthal Act. Nevertheless, Lutge

also alleges more generally that Defendants violate the entire statute. (First Amend. Compl., ¶

58.) Section 1788.10(a) of the FDCPA prohibits: “The use, or threat of use, of physical force or

violence or any criminal means to cause harm to the person, or the reputation, or the property of

any person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.10(a). Section 1788.11 prohibits “[c]ommunicating, by

telephone or in person, with the debtor with such frequency as to be unreasonable and to

constitute ... harassment to the debtor under the circumstances.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.11(e). 

Lutge submitted a declaration in opposition to Defendants’ motion in which he states

that Eskanos & Adler “boasted to [him] that they were the best debt collectors in town, and that

they were going ‘to come and get [him]’ [He] did not take kindly to such threats... .” 

(Declaration of Thomas Lutge (“Lutge Decl.”), ¶ 9.) He further declares that between February

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 Defendants also move to strike Lutge’s claims related to the restraining order,

arguing that they are barred by California Civil Code § 47(b)(2). Because the Court finds

that Lutge has provided sufficient support for his Rosenthal Act claim based on alleged facts

that are independent from his allegations regarding the restraining order, the Court need not

address this argument at this procedural stage.

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and April 2006, Defendants “repeatedly call[ed] him twice a day demanding payment.” (Id., ¶

25.) Although Lutge did not submit much evidence in support of his claims, the Court finds

that he submitted evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish his Rosenthal Act claim

has “minimal merit.” Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at 94. A statement that Defendants were “going to

come and get” Lutge could be threatening and could be interpreted to mean Defendants were

going to come after him physically. Moreover, if the repeated phone calls occurred frequently

over a four month period, it could amount to harassment. While it would have been helpful if

Lutge had provided more detailed information supporting his contentions, the Court cannot find

that his evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support his Rosenthal Act claim. 

Therefore, with the exception of Eskanos, the Court denies Defendants’ special motion to strike

as to this claim.2

b. Eskanos.

Defendants move to strike the Rosenthal Act claim against Eskanos, arguing that he is

an attorney, and thus, not subject to the Rosenthal Act. Lutge alleges that “Eskanos & Adler are

lawyers” and does not dispute that Eskanos is an attorney. (First Amend. Compl., ¶ 19.) The

Rosenthal Act “does not apply to attorneys.” Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler, 2007 WL 549904,

*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c); Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin

& McIntyre, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1513, 1526 (1988) (“the Act applies only to ‘debt collectors’; it

specifically exempts attorneys from its coverage”). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’

motion as to Lutge’s Rosenthal Act claim against Eskanos.

ii. Section 17200 Claim.

Proposition 64, which was approved by California voters on November 2, 2004,

amended Section 17200 to limit the standing of private plaintiffs to bring such claims to those

who “suffered injury in fact and has lost money as a result of such unfair competition.” Laster

v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1193 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof.

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Code § 17204). Lutge’s sole statement in his declaration regarding any “lost money” is that

Defendants’ alleged violations of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act caused him to

“los[e] loan financing for house purchase.” (Lutge Decl., ¶ 33.) Lutge fails to provide any

explanation as to how the alleged threats or repeated phone calls could or did cause him to lose

financing for a house purchase. Notably, Lutge does not allege, let alone provide any evidence

of, any acts related to credit reporting by Defendants. Moreover, even if Lutge did submit

evidence to demonstrate that Defendants’ attempts to collect a debt caused him to lose financing

for a house purchase, he does not submit any evidence to establish that, but for Defendants’

alleged conduct, he would have purchased the house, i.e., that he had an offer accepted and

would have been able to obtain financing had it not been for Defendants’ conduct. Finally,

Lutge submits no evidence that he lost any money based on his alleged lost opportunity to

purchase a house. Therefore, the Court finds that Lutge fails to establish a prima facie showing

that he has standing to bring a Section 17200 claim, and thus, grants Defendants’ motion to

strike this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ special

motion to strike. The motion is granted as to Lutge’s Section 17200 claim and his Rosenthal

Act claim against Eskanos. The motion is denied as to Lutge’s Rosental Act claim against

Eskanos & Adler and White.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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