Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-00223/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-00223-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 James Walker is the warden who has custody over petitioner and is substituted in as 1

respondent in the place of S.L. Hubbard pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES W. MARTIN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-99-0223 WBS GGH P

vs.

JAMES WALKER, Warden,1

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction and Summary

This procedurally complex case was remanded from the Ninth Circuit to

determine whether, for only several remaining claims in the petition, the timeliness procedural

bar, aka procedural default, was well established and regularly applied. “On remand, in order to

be able to maintain its affirmative defense of procedural default, the government must show that

cases after In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 2003), had sufficiently clarified the rule and that it has

been consistently applied.” 

For the reasons that follow, the undersigned answers both issues in the

affirmative, although not completely based upon the rationale of respondent.

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Procedural History

On August 21, 1995, petitioner was convicted of murder and robbery, and

sentenced on September 18, 1995 to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus a one

year consecutive sentence for use of a specified weapon in the crimes. The conviction and

sentence were affirmed by the California Court of Appeal on January 29, 1997. A petition for

review raising one issue (concerning admission of a taped statement) was denied on April 16,

1997. Thereafter, petitioner filed a round of habeas petitions in the state court, raising a number

of issues along the way. The California Supreme Court denied the last petition (of that round) on

procedural grounds citing In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 225 (1965) and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d

756, 759 (1953) (denial dated January 27, 1999). Neither of those cited cases are presently at

issue now.

Petitioner Martin thereupon filed in federal court adding unexhausted claims –

this despite three rounds of habeas petitions in the state courts. The undersigned sees no present

need to dissect the federal petitions; suffice it to say that ultimately, petitioner was directed to

exhaust the new claims. When petitioner attempted to exhaust newly formulated claims in the

California Supreme Court, the petition was denied on September 11, 2002 citing In re Clark, 5

Cal. 4th 750 (1993), In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998). Petitioner returned to federal

court soon to be faced with respondent’s combined statute of limitations/procedural bar (both

Dixon and Clark/Robbins ) motion which resulted in dismissal of the entire petition. In pertinent

part, relying on Bennett v. Mueller,322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2003), the district court found that

petitioner had not articulated specific facts regarding the inadequacy of the timeliness procedural

bar such that the burden of proving adequacy shifted to respondent. The Ninth Circuit

determined on the basis of the then newly decided King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963 (9th Cir.

2006), that where Circuit precedent had previously found a particular bar inadequate, 

petitioner’s only Bennett burden was to object to the bar; no specific allegations as to the bar’s

inadequacy had to be made. The Ninth Circuit remanded only those claims whose dismissal

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 “The state procedural bar must be ‘independent’ of the federal question and “adequate 2

to support the judgment.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729, 111 S. Ct. 2546. A state procedural rule

constitutes an “adequate” bar to federal court review if it was ‘firmly established and regularly

followed’ at the time it was applied by the state court. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-424,

111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir.1999). A

state procedural rule constitutes an ‘independent’ bar if it is not interwoven with federal law or

dependent upon a federal constitutional ruling. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75, 105 S.Ct.

1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77

L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir.2001).

Under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bennett, 322 F.3d 573, once the state raises the

existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as a defense, the petitioner

must then raise ‘specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state

procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule.’

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 584, 586(quoting Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir.1999)).

Otherwise, Petitioner must establish cause and actual prejudice to avoid imposition of the bar.

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1999).” Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 924

(9th Cir. 2007).

3

depended on the Clark/Robbins timeliness bar; dismissal of the other claims was affirmed. The

particular claims remanded were: Claim 3: (ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to

investigate claims of third party culpability), Claim 4: ineffective assistance of counsel for failure

to object to admission of the Permenter taped interview, and subparts 2 and 3 of Claim 6:

(ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise admission of the Permenter taped

interview and failure to raise insufficiency of evidence before the state supreme court on direct

review). As set forth in the summary above, the remand specifically directed the adjudication of 

whether respondent had met his burden to prove the clarity and consistency of the timeliness bar.

Discussion

A. “Clearly Defined” and “Well Established”

In terms of the adequacy of a procedural bar, generally three aspects are

referenced: whether the bar was clearly defined in state law, the related, even nearly synonymous,

aspect of whether the bar was well established at the pertinent time for its imposition, and finally,

whether the bar was regularly followed by the state courts, i.e., the consistency of its application.2

The first item to be discussed is a description of the bar. 

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4

(1) Pursuant to policies adopted by this court in June 1989, a

habeas corpus petition is not entitled to a presumption of timeliness

if it is filed more than 90 days after the final due date for the filing

of appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal. In such a case, to

avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the

petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial

delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls

within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.

(2) Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his

or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the

information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for

the claim. A petitioner must allege, with specificity, facts showing

when information offered in support of the claim was obtained, and

that the information neither was known, nor reasonably should

have been known, at any earlier time. It is not sufficient simply to

allege in general terms that the claim recently was discovered, to

assert that second or successive postconviction counsel could not

reasonably have discovered the information earlier, or to produce a

declaration from present or former counsel to that general effect. A

petitioner bears the burden of establishing, through his or her

specific allegations, which may be supported by any relevant

exhibits, the absence of substantial delay.

(3) A claim or a part thereof that is substantially delayed

nevertheless will be considered on the merits if the petitioner can

demonstrate good cause for the delay. Good cause for substantial

delay may be established if, for example, the petitioner can

demonstrate that because he or she was conducting an ongoing

investigation into at least one potentially meritorious claim, the

petitioner delayed presentation of one or more other known claims

in order to avoid the piecemeal presentation of claims, but good

cause is not established by prior counsel’s asserted uncertainty

about his or her duty to conduct a habeas corpus investigation and

to file an appropriate habeas corpus petition.

(4) A claim that is substantially delayed without good cause, and

hence is untimely, nevertheless will be entertained on the merits if

the petitioner demonstrates (i) that error of constitutional

magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that

absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted

the petitioner; (ii) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the

crime or crimes of which he or she was convicted; (iii) that the

death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority that had such

a grossly misleading profile of the petitioner before it that, absent

the trial error or omission, no reasonable judge or jury would have

imposed a sentence of death; or (iv) that the petitioner was

convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute. When we apply

the first three of these exceptions, we shall do so exclusively by

reference to state law. When we apply the fourth exception, we

apply federal law in resolving any federal constitutional claim.

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In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780, 781, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 159-160 (1998).

As is well known, the precise capital habeas standards above with respect to

presumed time limits do not apply to regular habeas cases. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d at 583.

Yet, it is also well established that the remainder of the policies do apply in principle, if not the

letter, to non-capital habeas petitions. As respondent observes, In re Clark , at 783, 21 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 531, expressly so held (emphasis added):

The [capital case] Policies[ FN18 omitted] did not create or modify

the timeliness requirements applicable to all habeas corpus

petitions except insofar as they (1) establish a presumption of

timeliness if a petition by a capital defendant is filed within 90

days of the final due date for the filing of an appellant's reply brief

(Policies, std. 1-1.1); and (2) take into account this court’s decision

in In re Stankewitz, supra, 40 Cal.3d 391, 220 Cal.Rptr. 382, 708

P.2d 1260, when evaluating the timeliness of a habeas corpus

petition in a capital case (Policies, std. 1-1.3).

See also In re Sodersten, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1222, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 612-613 (2007). If

this were not so, it would make little sense for the California Supreme Court to cite the cases of

Clark and Robbins, both capital cases, when determining a timeliness bar in ordinary habeas

actions – a ruling and citation which occurs perhaps thousands of times a year. It would make

little sense for the intermediate appellate courts to cite the capital cases in non-capital habeas

actions if they had no application. If the California Supreme Court believes the capital habeas

timeliness standards are applicable in the main to non-capital habeas cases, the federal courts are

not permitted to determine that the state supreme court is misciting its cases on this matter of

state law. Moreover, Bennett v. Mueller, supra had no difficulty in analyzing its non-capital

habeas procedural bar issue relying on the Clark holding in that capital case. Indeed, the whole

purpose of the Bennett opinion is to set up a procedure to judge the adequacy of the Clark

procedural bar for its non-capital habeas case. This would be a curious opinion if Clark really

had nothing to do with non-capital habeas cases.

Thus, the application and citation of Clark/Robbins rule is well established for

non-capital habeas cases. Even the small sampling of cases provided by the parties demonstrates

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the frequency with which the bar is imposed.

The related aspect to well established – “clearly defined” – is easily satisfied in

the present case despite petitioner’s insistence that the California “undue delay” standard is ill

defined. Again, the undersigned relies on Bennett. There is no discussion in Bennett about a

lack of clarity in the rule; rather Bennett easily distilled the rule to its essence: “Significant,

unjustified delay in presenting habeas corpus claims to California state courts will bar

consideration of the merits of the claim.” Id. at 581. “Delay ‘is measured from the time the

petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in

support of the claim and the legal basis of the claim.’” Id, citing Clark and Robbins. Indeed, in

terms of clarity, the state rule is identical to one of the commencement dates for the AEDPA

limitations period: “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). If this

principle of requiring due diligence is clear enough for federal practice, and it is, it is clear

enough for state practice as well. 

The procedures for petitioners to justify the delay as well as the exceptions to the

rule, i.e., what will excuse a seeming lack of diligence on its face, are spelled out in Clark and

Robbins and reiterated in subsequent cases. See Respondent’s Brief at 14-15. Except for one

consideration pertinent to the death penalty, the reasons why delay may be excused are generic

and apply to all cases. While it is true that the timeliness bar and its exceptions will be applied

on a case-by-case basis, this is no reason to find that the bar is not clear. Many rules regarding

timeliness require such a case-by-case adjudication. See e.g. AEDPA limitations cases involving

the doctrine of equitable tolling, e.g., Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a ‘fact specific’ inquiry.” See also Wood

v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997) (simply because a rule of state law requires discretion

in its application is no reason to find the rule unclear).

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 “Postcard denials” is the commonly used, but somewhat pejorative, term for the cryptic

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decisions of the state courts in habeas which simply deny the habeas petition without comment or

explanation. But this practice is in reality no different in effect from that employed by the

Supreme Court when it denies certiorari. 

7

In sum, if Bennett could succinctly state the rule without difficulty (as have the

numerous state court decisions set forth below), the undersigned cannot find the rule unclear.

B. Consistently Applied

The real problem to discuss here is whether the timeliness bar is consistently

applied. No case, to the undersigned’s knowledge, has set forth a definitive approach to explain

how the respondent meets his burden. Are we to use published cases only, unpublished, but

explicative opinions, postcard denials? Should we go behind the postcard denial to divine what 3

the court may have been thinking? Should state court officials be subject to discovery? Should

the district court go through this exercise time after time? None of this has been explained to

date. For the reasons provided below, the only realistic way to determine the consistency of

application of the timeliness bar in California is to explore published and unpublished explicative

opinions.

It takes no citation of authority to find that published appellate opinions applying

and/or explaining the Clark/Robbins should be reviewed. The Ninth Circuit has also held that

explicative, unpublished opinions should be considered as well. Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d

871, 879 (2004). The real issue here is whether the so called “postcard denials,” i.e., denials

without explanation, or with a mere citation but no explanation, qualify for review to determine

whether the state has met its Bennett burden. 

The answer is “no.” The unexplained denial, or unexplained determination to

review and deny on the merits, is of absolutely no analytical value. A mere decision to apply the

bar, or not to mention it relates nothing about the consistency of the bar’s application. For

example, a habeas petition, simply denied, indicates that the merits were reached. Assuming for

the moment that the date of filing the petition would indicate on its face a rather lengthy delay,

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 Moreover, even if one could obtain a multitude of explained trial court orders for 4

analytical purposes, something not done here, the amount of resources expended to determine the

propriety of not invoking a procedural bar approaches the absurd. 

8

the decision to reach the merits could mean one of several things: a rigorous timeliness review

was applied, including the exceptions which are part and parcel of the bar, and the court found

justification or a viable exception; it could mean that petitioner did meet his burden to explain

the delay; it could mean that the court didn’t even see the timeliness issue; it could mean that the

timeliness issue was so problematic that it was much easier in that case to reach the merits; it

could mean that the court arbitrarily determined that no bar would be imposed. On the other

hand, if the petition is denied on the basis of the bar with express citation to Clark or Robbins,

we know the ultimate decision reached by the court, but not its reasoning. The process of

reviewing the meaning of unexplained decisions with respect to the thinking of the court when

applying or not applying the bar is so speculative as to be worthless. The parties here come to

conflicting opinions on every case whose pleadings were reviewed to understand why the

Clark/Robbins bar was not imposed.

Both parties herein determine to dissect the pleadings in a sample of “silent

denial” cases for a snapshot of time to make their best guess about what was in the court’s mind

with respect to the procedural bar issue in those cases where it might have been applied, but was

not. However, Ninth Circuit precedent directs that no such divination take place. Bennett, 322

F.3d at 584. Furthermore, Bennett “suggested” that the review be limited to the language of the

state court opinions, Id. citing Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774-75 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus

it is pointless to review cases not containing any language explaining the determination. While

Valerio in passing referenced unpublished “orders” of the lower courts, nothing in Valerio gave

license to guess at the reasoning for imposing a bar, or not, in cryptic minute orders.

4

This is a different issue than arises in that part of the Bennett analysis where

petitioner must allege with specificity (except presently for the Clark/Robbins bar) that the bar is

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 It would be strange indeed that we indulge jurors with the presumption of following the 5

law as set forth in instructions, United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc), but employ a presumption to the opposite effect when speaking about a judge’s or court’s

practice in adhering to established state precedent. Some consideration should be in place that

state court judges too follow the law as given by the highest state court, and are not simply

lawless until the state proves otherwise. 

 Nothing said herein is meant to demean the impressive efforts of the parties to bring 6

before the undersigned their take on what the pleadings indicated in silent denial cases. They

performed much work. However, the parties’ conflicting speculations prove the undersigned’s

point. Each side presents a conflicting picture of what the pleadings mean. There should be no

requirement for the undersigned to review the pleadings of tens, or even hundreds of cases,

every time a procedural bar motion is made in order to make a judicial speculation of what was

in the mind of the state courts.

 On another matter, the undersigned has thought conscientiously about whether to end 7

the discussion with a rejection of respondent’s methodology of proving consistency of the

procedural bar imposition. The undersigned is loath to travel a road not trod by the parties. 

However, because the issue of consistent application has been raised by both parties, the

undersigned will decide it in a manner in which the undersigned believes correct. The

undersigned is puzzled why the parties would ignore the explained opinions of the state supreme

court and appellate courts on the subject of the timeliness bar, and instead look to their own

speculation of pleadings in cases where the court explained nothing of its reasoning about

applying, or not applying, the bar. No matter how the issue would turn out, the undersigned will

9

not consistently applied. There, the mere number of times a bar was not applied when it could

have been could suffice for this de minimis burden. See Bennett (on remand) 364 F. Supp. 2d

1160 (C.D. Cal. 1160). However, it is then respondent’s burden to explain anomalies without

looking at pleadings underlying a silent denial and then speculating. As Bennett on remand put

it, the state there understandably declined such an impossible task. Id. at 1175 (n.15).

Finally, the Supreme Court and Bennett have stressed that the doctrine of

procedural bar has important constitutional considerations behind it. Bennett 322 F.3d at 582. 

Those important considerations should not be cast aside by application of a burden of proof on

the state so onerous, or so lacking in reason, that the doctrine, in effect, has been purposefully or

inadvertently stamped out of existence. 5

Accordingly, the undersigned will utilize the language in published or

unpublished explicative appellate opinions to determine whether the burden is consistently

applied. There is no other practical, reasoned way to determine the issue.67

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not ignore the explained opinions. In this case, the decision favors respondent.

 After hearing, the undersigned revised the computer search terms and discovered a 8

plethora of cases on the subject.

10

There can be no doubt that the California Supreme Court has in its published

decisions strongly adhered to the need to apply its timeliness bar, including its exceptions. In re

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993); In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 77 Cal. Rptr.

2d 153 (1998); In re Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 132 (1998); In re Sanders, 21 Cal.

4th 697, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (1999). See also, In re Hamilton, 20 Cal. 4th 273, 283 (fn5), 84

Cal. Rptr. 2d 403 (1999). The opinions are reasoned, and instructive. Although there may be

refinements of the procedural bar to reflect specific facts, nothing about those opinions smacks of

inconsistencies. The undersigned is not aware of further explicated state supreme court opinions,

published or unpublished, or orders on the subject, and none have been presented by the parties.

Having independently searched for lower appellate opinions, both published and

unpublished, the undersigned has found a significant number of opinions on the subject (at least

in part) of the Clark/Robbins timeliness bar. The undersigned has reviewed each case, and 8

although the undersigned will not increase the length of these Findings by discussing each case,

the reviewed cases are listed herein. The opinions clearly show the principled, consistent

adherence to the bar and its exceptions since the time In re Clark was issued.

In re Crockett, 159 Cal. App. 4th 751, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 637 (2008)

In re Sodersten, 146 Cal. App 4th 1163, 1220-1222, 53 Cal. Rptr.3d 572 (2007)

In re Bittaker , 55 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1012 (fn3), 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (1997)

People v. Senior, 33 Cal. App. 4th 531, 537-38, 41 C al. Rptr. 2d 1 (1995)

In re Little, 2008 WL 142832 (fn5) (Cal. App. 2008)

People v. Milsap, 2007 WL 3173572 *2 (Cal. App. 2007)

In re Navas, 2006 WL 3604350 *3, 4-5 (Cal. App. 2006)

People v. Pulley, 2006 WL 2501448 *6 (Cal. App. 2006)

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People v. Fairbanks, 2006 WL 950267 *2-3 (Cal. App. 2006)

Cooper v. Superior Court, 2005 WL 3507993 *6-7 (Cal. App. 2005)

People v. Molotla, 2004 WL 1068840 *7 (Cal. App. 2004)

People v. Pineda-Duque, 2003 WL 23002734 *1 (Cal. App. 2003)

In re Scott, 2003 WL 22272576 *3-4 (Cal. App. 2003)

People v. Drews, 2003 WL 42550 (Cal. App. 2003) (coram nobis)

The undersigned is at a loss to conceive of any other reasonably acquired proof

needed to demonstrate the consistency of application of the timeliness bar in state habeas corpus

practice. If the above is not enough, the federal courts should so state and abolish application of

this particular bar in federal habeas corpus actions.

ACCORDINGLY, the California timeliness bar as set forth in inter alia

Clark/Robbins is clearly defined, well established and consistently applied. The claims

remanded to this court for further analysis of the Clark/Robbins timeliness bar should be

dismissed. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (docket #98) is granted; there being no undismissed

claims, the action should once again be dismissed in its entirety.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 03/10/08 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:gh:035 - mart0223.fr

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