Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00903/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00903-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Guadalupe Ramon Ortiz, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-00903-TUC-BPV

ORDER

Plaintiff, Guadalupe Ray Ortiz, filed this action for review of the final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff presents 

three issues on appeal: (1) whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by 

giving “no weight” to the examining and treating mental health practitioners’ opinions; 

(2) whether the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible was based 

on substantial evidence; and (3) whether Plaintiff is entitled to a finding of disability if 

his mental and nonexertional impairments are properly included in the residual functional 

capacity determination and hypothetical posed to the vocational expert (“VE”). (Doc. 18.) 

Pending before the court is an Opening Brief filed by Plaintiff (Doc. 18), and the 

Commissioner’s Opposition (Doc. 25). Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. 

The United States Magistrate Judge presides over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636 (c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, having received the written consent of both parties. 

The Defendant’s decision denying benefits is reversed and remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

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I. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) in February 

2008, alleging an onset of disability beginning December 22, 20021

, due to morbid 

obesity, chronic pain, diabetes, high blood pressure, knee injuries, shoulder injury, back 

pain and sleep apnea. Transcript/Administrative Record (“Tr.”) 204-06, 231, 235. The 

application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 87-88, 108-11, 113-15. 

Following an administrative hearing held on September 29, 2009, the ALJ issued a 

decision finding Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 

29-68, 92-99. The Appeals Council granted a request for review and vacated the hearing 

decision and remanded the case to the ALJ for additional evidence and further evaluation. 

Tr. 105-107. 

On remand, a second administrative hearing was held before the ALJ on August 9, 

2011. Tr. 43-68. The ALJ issued a decision on October 26, 2011, finding Plaintiff not 

disabled. Tr. 22-31. This decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the 

Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1-3. Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial 

review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1) 

II. The Record on Appeal 

a. Plaintiff’s Background and Statements in the Record 

Plaintiff was age 53 on his December 22, 2002 alleged onset date, and age 60 on 

December 31, 2009, Plaintiff’s date last insured. Tr. 204, 211. Plaintiff graduated from 

college with a Bachelor’s degree in business management and worked for a telephone 

company for 27 years as a regulatory director. Tr. 72, 236, 240, 689. 

Plaintiff testified at a hearing before the ALJ on September 9, 2009 that he was 

laid off from his employment with the phone company in December 2002. Tr. 73-74. 

Prior to that, while he was working, Plaintiff started having problems with pain and with 

 

1

 Plaintiff alleged an onset date of January 2, 2006 in his initial filing. Tr. 204. Plaintiff alleged an onset date of December 22, 2002 in his Disability Report. Tr. 231. This earlier date was utilized in determining Plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits throughout the administrative proceedings below. See Tr. 24. 

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sleep apnea. Tr. 74-75. When Plaintiff stopped taking Advil due to kidney problems, it 

became more difficult for Plaintiff to do a lot of the things he used to do. Id. Plaintiff 

hoped to get a career in real estate, but was unable to complete real estate school because 

he “just couldn’t follow up.” Tr. 74, 76. 

Plaintiff began taking Lyrica for pain after his doctor diagnosed him with 

fibromyalgia in the year before the hearing. Tr. 75-76. Plaintiff has a lot of back pain, 

can’t sit for long periods of time and his back goes out. Tr. 76. Plaintiff also has a lot of 

pain with his knees and shoulders, and has had surgery on both. Id. Plaintiff had good 

results from two separate knee surgeries, but has to be careful and can’t get on his knees 

anymore. Tr. 77. After the surgeries on both shoulders, he still has a little pain and has to 

be careful with what he does. Tr. 82. 

In addition to the pain and sleep apnea, Plaintiff has depression and sometimes 

spends days in bed. Tr. 76. Plaintiff testified initially that his “mind is fine” but later 

testified that his pain takes away a lot of his concentration Tr. 81-82. 

Plaintiff doesn’t do much as much at home as he wants to, and if he does a project, 

“maybe within 45 minutes that’s it for the rest of the day.” Tr. 78. He can barely get 

home after going shopping for groceries, and gets tired very easily. Id. Plaintiff testified 

he has difficulty getting up in the morning and getting dressed. Tr. 80-81.Sitting for long 

periods of time hurts his back, and typing would hurt his fingers. Tr. 81. Plaintiff testified 

that he counted up to 90 visits in the last year for doctor’s appointments. Tr. 83. 

Plaintiff testified at the second hearing, on August 9, 2011 that his problems with 

sleep apnea started before he was laid off and that the problems affected his work 

performance. Tr. 60. Plaintiff tried using a CPAP (Continuous Positive Airway Pressure) 

machine for sleep apnea “at least eight times” but couldn’t sleep with it. Tr. 61-62. 

Plaintiff tried lap band surgery for his obesity, but it didn’t work as he had a horrible 

feeling in his throat after eating. Tr. 66. 

A vocational expert (“VE”) testified that Plaintiff’s past relevant work was highly 

skilled, with a specific vocational preparation (“SVP”) score of 8. Tr. 73. The VE 

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testified that Plaintiff’s skills would be considered transferable, but doubted it would be a 

very easy lateral transfer. Tr. 58. 

The VE testified that Plaintiff would not be able to perform his prior relevant work 

as the VE had outlined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) when Plaintiff’s 

attorney posed the following hypothetical: marked limitations in his ability to perform 

activities within schedule, maintain regular attendance, complete a normal work day and 

work week without interruption from psychologically-based symptoms, and to perform 

with a consistent pace without unreasonable number and length of rest periods; and 

moderate limitations in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended 

periods, ask simple questions or request assistance, and accept instruction and respond 

appropriately to criticism from supervisors. Tr. 67-68. 

b. Relevant Medical Evidence Before the ALJ2

i. Treating Sources 

 Plaintiff was treated from 2005 to 2008 at West Horizons Medical Center, Tucson, 

Arizona, by Surekha Bandlamuri, M.D. Dr. Bandlamuri’s treatment notes reflect 

Plaintiff’s history and reports of depression, and the prescribed treatment of 

antidepressants, fluoxetine (Prozac), and bupropion (Wellbutrin). Tr. 433-42. Dr. 

Bandlamuri completed two physicals of Plaintiff, one in October 2005, and another in 

November 2007, in which she noted in a check box form that Plaintiff’s “[j]udgment and 

insight are within normal limits”, “[r]ecent and remote memory intact”, and “[n]o mood 

disorders noted, calm affect.” Tr. 395, 397. Nonetheless, Dr. Bandlamuri’s more detailed 

treatment notes indicate that throughout the treatment period she continued to assess and 

treat Plaintiff for depression. Tr. 385. 

 In August 2008, Dr. Bandlamuri completed a disability form noting that Plaintiff 

has a history of depression, that he does not currently have a significant mental 

 

2

 Plaintiff raises no issues regarding the findings of the ALJ in respect to the evaluation of physical or exertional limitations by treating sources, thus the Court 

summarizes in this section only the evidence related to Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ 

erroneously assessed his mental impairments. 

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impairment, but that his mental condition causes significant interference with functioning 

in usual daily activities as it “may cause lack of motivation to shower, take med[ication]s, 

etc.” Tr. 568. 

ii. Examining Sources 

 Susan Courtney, M.D., a specialist in family practice and occupational medicine, 

performed a disability evaluation of Plaintiff on June 8, 2008. Tr. 512-514. Dr. Courtney 

noted Plaintiff is on antidepressants for depression. Tr. 512. Dr. Courtney reported that 

Plaintiff stated that if his job were still available, he would “go back in a second.” Tr. 

513. Dr. Courtney did not address Plaintiff’s mental limitations as they might affect his 

ability to work. See Tr. 514. 

 John T. Beck, Ph.D., completed a neuropsychological evaluation of Plaintiff on 

March 30, 2010. Tr. 688-92. Dr. Beck reviewed Plaintiff’s records, conducted a clinical 

interview, and administered numerous tests for purposes of the evaluation. Tr. 688-89. 

Dr. Beck explained that, while it can often be problematic to obtain test results which 

accurately represent a person’s true level of ability because financial compensation may 

be at stake, there was “no indication in this evaluation that [Plaintiff] was not fully 

cooperating or putting forth his best effort.” Additionally, Plaintiff “was administered 

instruments specifically designed to measure his motivation and cooperation” and the 

“results indicate that [Plaintiff] was adequately motivated during testing and that the 

scores reported ... should be considered valid.” Tr. 691. 

 Dr. Beck concluded that Plaintiff test results demonstrated “moderate deficits in 

higher cortical function with significant impairments in abstract reasoning, judgment, 

insight, memory, planning ability, organizational skills, and skills requiring concentration 

and attention.” Tr. 691. Additionally, there were “significant signs of attentional deficits” 

and abnormal memory. Id. Dr. Beck’s diagnostic impressions and conclusions were as 

follows: 

In his interactions with me, the examinee’s behavior was not normal. He 

displayed an agitated depression, fine motor tremor, and looked quite 

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impaired. On today’s testing, he demonstrates a clear loss of neurocognitive efficiency, coupled with significant pain guarding behavior. 

... 

On neuropsychological exam, the examinee demonstrated objective 

moderate deficits in diffuse brain function. 

It is important to note that there was no objective or subjective indication of 

poor cooperation or lack of effort. 

The examinee clearly seems unable to return to work at this juncture. 

Limitations would include any type of new learning, difficulty with 

sustained concentration and attention, problems with planning and thinking. 

Tr. 692. 

iii. Non-Examining State Agency Medical Sources 

 Randall J. Garland, Ph.D., completed a Psychiatric Review Technique assessment 

for the period from March 2002 to May 2008, based on Plaintiff’s diagnosis of 

depression. Tr. 498-511. In the Paragraph “B” Criteria of the Listing of Impairments (20 

C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1), Dr. Garland rated Plaintiff’s functional 

limitations, finding mild restriction of activities of daily living, in maintaining social 

functioning and in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and no episodes of 

decompensation. Tr. 508. Dr. Garland noted that Dr. Barker’s opinion that Plaintiff had 

minimal adaptation and inability to engage in social interaction was inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s own report of his functionality. Tr. 510. 

 Hubert Estes, M.D., reviewed Dr. Bandlamuri’s opinion and affirmed the initial 

mental assessment, noting that Dr. Bandlamuri did not note “any significant limitation in 

functioning.” Tr. 569. 

iv. Other sources 

 William T. Barker, Ed.D., wrote a letter on May 5, 2008, stating that he treated 

Plaintiff weekly from May 1991 through September 1992. Tr. 481. Plaintiff suffered 

mixed anxiety-depressive symptoms which were clinically significant and impaired his 

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social and occupational functioning. Id. Since that time Dr. Barker reported Plaintiff 

continued to receive psychotherapy semi-monthly for continued symptoms of Dysthymic 

Disorder, and that Plaintiff suffers from depressed mood, over eating, insomnia, low 

energy, fatigue, low self-esteem, poor concentration and feelings of hopelessness. Id. Dr. 

Barker noted that Plaintiffs co-morbid conditions have a serious impact on Plaintiff’s 

emotional health, and that he has become increasingly depressed, suffering diminished 

self-esteem, and feelings of hopelessness. Id. Dr. Barker concluded that Plaintiff’s use of 

anti-depressants has had limited results. Id. Finally, Dr. Barker opined that “with 

[Plaintiff’s] current physical limitations and mental diagnosis he has minimal adaptation 

and [is] unable to engage in social interaction. His prognosis is guarded.” 

 Dr. Barker completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment on 

September 2, 2009. Tr. 678-679. Dr. Barker noted that Plaintiff would be moderately 

limited in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, to ask 

simple questions or request assistance, accept instructions and respond appropriately to 

criticism from supervisors, and to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. 

Dr. Barker noted that Plaintiff would be markedly limited in his ability to perform 

activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance and be punctual within 

customary tolerances, and to complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace 

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. Id. Dr. Barker noted Plaintiff 

suffers from moderate symptoms of disorientation to time and place, emotional lability 

and impairment in impulse control and thoughts of suicide. Tr. 679. Dr. Barker noted 

marked symptoms of change in personality, disturbance in mood, emotional withdrawal 

and/or isolation, appetite disturbance with change in weight, sleep disturbance, or 

pervasive loss of interest in almost all activities, decreased energy, feelings of guilt or 

worthlessness, difficulty concentrating or thinking, and recurrent obsessions or 

compulsions. Id. 

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 In December 2011, Dr. Barker, having reviewed Dr. Beck’s evaluation, concurred 

with Dr. Beck’s evaluation from the test results provided, and opined that he believed that 

the neuropsychological test results adequately represented the cognitive impairments and 

limitations that Dr. Barker had observed during the time he treated Plaintiff between 2002 

and 2009. Tr. 701. 

c. The ALJ’s Findings 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from 

the alleged onset date of December 22, 2002 through his date last insured, December 31, 

2009. Tr. 24 ¶ 2. The ALJ found that through the date last insured Plaintiff has the severe 

impairments of obesity, obstructive sleep apnea, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 

spine, degenerative joint disease of the shoulders and right knee, and osteoarthritis of the 

right hip. Tr. 25, ¶ 3. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments, including his mental 

impairment, do not meet or equal a listed impairment. Tr. 27, ¶ 4. The ALJ further found 

that in considering Plaintiff’s mental impairment, the “paragraph B” criteria were not 

satisfied because Plaintiff had only mild restrictions in his activities of daily living; mild 

difficulties in social functioning, mild difficulties with regard to concentration, 

persistence or pace; and no episodes of decompensation which have been of extended 

duration, and thus Plaintiff’s mental impairment was nonsevere Tr. 26. The ALJ stated 

that the RFC determination reflected the degree of limitation the ALJ found in the 

“paragraph B” mental function analysis. Tr. 26. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC 

to perform a full range of sedentary work. Tr. 27, ¶ 5. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was 

capable of performing past relevant work as a director of regulatory agency/director of 

compliance/director of licensing and regulations, and concluded that Plaintiff was not 

under a disability from December 2, 2002 through December 31, 2009. Tr. 30, ¶¶ 6-7. 

III. Discussion 

a. Standard of Review 

 The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, 

a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

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Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits “should be upheld unless it is based on legal 

error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 

1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). In determining whether the decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not 

affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Id. (quoting 

Robbins v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. 

To establish disability, the claimant must show (1) he has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, (2) he has a severe impairment, and (3) his impairment meets or 

equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (RFC) precludes him 

from performing his past work. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the 

claimant is able to perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a). 

b. Analysis 

i. Treating Sources 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving no weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Bandlamuri. (Doc. 18, at 16.) The Commissioner responds that the ALJ reasonably 

assigned Dr. Bandlamuri’s opinion “no weight” because it was inconsistent with the 

record evidence regarding Plaintiff’s mental health treatment. (Doc. 25, at 13.) The Court 

finds that the ALJ erred in giving Dr. Bandlamuri’s opinion no weight. 

 The ALJ acknowledged Dr. Bandlamuri as Plaintiff’s treating physician. Tr. 29. 

Generally, “more weight is given to the opinion of a treating source than the opinion of a 

doctor who did not treat the claimant.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). Medical opinions and 

conclusions of treating physicians are accorded special weight because these physicians 

are in a unique position to know claimants as individuals, and because the continuity of 

their dealings with claimants enhances their ability to assess the claimants’ problems. See 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988); Winans, 853 F.2d at 647; see 

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also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A 

treating physician’s opinion is entitled to ‘substantial weight.’”). If a treating doctor’s 

opinion is not contradicted by another doctor (i.e., there are no other opinions from 

examining or nonexamining sources), it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198; 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

 Clear and convincing reasons are also required to reject a treating doctor’s 

ultimate conclusions. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embry v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 

(9th Cir. 1988)). Although the ALJ “‘is not bound by the uncontroverted opinions of the 

claimant’s physicians on the ultimate issue of disability, . . . he cannot reject them 

without presenting clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 

F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Montijo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 729 

F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 

725 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that “reasons for rejecting a treating doctor’s credible opinion 

on disability are comparable to those required for rejecting a treating doctor’s medical 

opinion”); Lester, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ can meet this " 'burden by 

setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical 

evidence, stating [her] interpretation thereof, and making findings.' " Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

751 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Social Security Administration has explained that an ALJ's 

finding that a treating source medical opinion is not well-supported by medically 

acceptable evidence or is inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record means only 

that the opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, not that the opinion should be 

rejected. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing SSR 96-2p at 4, 

available at 61 Fed.Reg. 34,490, 34,491; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Treating source medical 

opinions are still entitled to deference and, “[i]n many cases, will be entitled to the 

greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the test for controlling 

weight." Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; see also Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 

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1983) ("If the ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating physician, he or she 

must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based 

on substantial evidence in the record."). 

 The ALJ rejected Dr. Bandlamuri’s opinion because “[t]reatment for his 

depression was limited to medication and apparently psychotherapy. There is no evidence 

of psychiatric admissions or emergency visits for his symptoms. Hence, her opinion is 

given no weight.” Tr. 29-30. Dr. Bandlamuri’s opinion that Plaintiff was suffering from 

depression is uncontradicted in the medical record. To the extent Dr. Bandlamuri’s 

disability opinion, or conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental condition causes significant 

interference with functioning in usual daily activities because of a lack of motivation to 

care for himself differ from those of the state agency non-examining physician’s, the 

conclusions of the non-treating physician are not “substantial evidence.” See Orn, 495 

F.3d at 632 (“When an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a 

treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the 

examining physician are not ‘substantial evidence.’”). 

 The ALJ’s reliance on lack of psychiatric admissions or emergency visits is 

insufficient to support the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Bandlamuri’s opinion no weight. As 

the ALJ noted in his opinion, the agency considers four broad functional areas set out in 

the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders. See Tr. 26. One of these areas 

involves activities of daily living. See generally the Listing of Impairments, supra. Dr. 

Bandlamuri opined Plaintiff’s mental condition would cause some limitations due to lack 

of motivation. A separate area of limitation set out in the regulations involves episodes of 

decompensation. Id. Dr. Bandlamuri did not opine that Plaintiff had suffered or would 

suffer any episodes of decompensation. Thus, the ALJ’s decision to reject Dr. 

Bandlamuri’s opinion in its entirety based on the lack of medical evidence of any 

episodes of decompensation is error, as it relies on the lack of evidence of one category 

of functional limitation to disregard evidence of another. Additionally, the ALJ’s 

conclusion that Plaintiff’s limitations are inconsistent with his prescribed treatment is an 

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impermissible interpretation of the medical evidence. “[W]hile an [ALJ] is free to resolve 

issue of credibility as to lay testimony or to choose between properly submitted medical 

opinions, he is not free to set his own expertise against that of a physician who [submitted 

an opinion to or] testified before him.” McBrayer v. Secretary of Health & Human 

Servs., 712 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102-

03 (9th Cir. 1999)(ALJ improperly relied on his interpretation of Plaintiff’s testimony 

over medical opinions); Gonzalez Perez v. Health & Human Servs, 812 F.2d 747, 749 

(1st Cir. 1987) (“The ALJ may not substitute his own layman's opinion for the findings 

and opinion of a physician....”). There is no evidence in the record that supports the 

ALJ’s conclusion that in the absence of hospitalization or emergency room visits a 

mental condition may not cause significant functional limitations. This is an 

impermissible interpretation of the medical evidence in the record. 

ii. Examining Source 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed by giving no weight to the opinion of 

consultative examiner Dr. Beck. (Doc. 18, at 19.) The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ 

reasonably rejected Dr. Beck’s opinion for multiple reasons. (Doc. 25, at 16.) 

 Dr. Beck assessed Plaintiff with limitations including any type of new learning, 

difficulty with sustained concentration and attention, and problems with planning and 

thinking. Tr. 692. Dr. Beck opined that Plaintiff would be unable to return to work. Tr. 

692. 

 The ALJ gave this opinion no weight because Dr. Beck’s evaluation occurred in 

March 2010, “well after the date last insured” and Dr. Beck did not opine that Plaintiff’s 

condition existed prior to December 2009. Tr. 30. Additionally, the ALJ found that the 

evidence did not support such restrictive limitations “given that his treatment was limited 

to medication, and, if true, psychotherapy.” Tr. 30. 

 The Ninth Circuit has stated that “reports containing observations made after the 

period of disability are relevant to assess the claimant's disability.” Smith v. Bowen, 849 

F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988)(citing Kemp v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 

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1975)). “Medical reports are inevitably rendered retrospectively and should not be 

disregarded solely on that basis.” Id. (citing Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th

Cir. 1985)). The medical evidence of record indicates that Plaintiff underwent mental 

health treatment beginning in 1991 and continued through at least 2008. See Tr. 385, 433-

442, 481. Dr. Beck’s evaluation, a mere three months after Plaintiff’s date last insured, 

relates to a medical condition that unquestionably existed during the period of disability 

and is relevant in the analysis of the case. The ALJ erred by giving the opinion no weight. 

Additionally, Dr. Barker, Plaintiff’s treating counselor since 1991, opined that he had 

reviewed Dr. Beck’s evaluation, and believed that the test results adequately represented 

the cognitive impairments and limitations that Dr. Barker had observed during the time 

he treated Plaintiff between 2002 and 2009, lending further relevancy to Dr. Beck’s 

report. See Tr. 701. The ALJ also erred by rejecting Dr. Beck’s opinion in its entirety 

based on treatment consisting of medication and psychotherapy, as explained above in 

addressing Dr. Bandlamuri’s opinion. 

iii. Other source 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving the opinion of Dr. Barker, Plaintiff’s 

treating counselor, no weight. (Doc. 18, at 22.) The Commissioner contends that the 

ALJ provided the requisite germane reasons for discounting Dr. Barker’s opinion. (Doc. 

25, at 17.) 

 Dr. Barker’s opinion is “not entitled to the same deference” as acceptable medical 

sources. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“only licensed 

physicians and certain other qualified specialists are considered ‘[a]cceptable medical 

sources.’”)(footnote omitted). The ALJ may discount testimony from “other sources” if 

the ALJ “‘gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so.’” See Turner v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 

511 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

 The ALJ rejected Dr. Barker’s summary evaluation of Plaintiff’s limitations 

because “absent the treating notes, it is not possible to compare his evaluation with the 

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objective findings to determine whether the record adequately supports his opinion.” Tr. 

30. As the Commissioner correctly explains, an ALJ can discount the opinion of even a 

treating source when it is unsupported by the provider’s own treatment notes. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to 

support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight 

we will give that opinion.”); Bray, 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (an ALJ “need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is 

brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Mr. Barker’s inability to support his own 

opinion with treatment notes and clinical findings certainly constituted a germane reason 

for the ALJ to discount his opinion. 

iv. Plaintiff’s Credibility 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not credible 

regarding his symptoms and limitations is not based on substantial evidence. (Doc. 18, at 

24.) Plaintiff testified that he has back pain and can’t sit for long periods of time and 

additionally has pain in his knees and shoulders. Plaintiff also testified he has sleep apnea 

and depression, and sometimes spends days in bed, and has difficulty getting up in the 

morning and getting dressed. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning his 

symptoms are “not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual 

functional capacity assessment.” Tr. 27 

 When assessing a claimant’s credibility, the “ALJ is not required to believe every 

allegation of disabling pain or other non-exertional impairment.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 635 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here, the claimant has 

produced objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably 

give rise to the symptoms and there is no affirmative finding of malingering by the ALJ, 

the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s symptom testimony must be specific, clear 

and convincing. Garrison v. Colvin, --- F.3d --- , 2014 WL 3397218, *16 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; Orn, 495 F.3d at 635; Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883. “The 

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ALJ must state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in 

the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); 

see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 635 (the ALJ must provide specific and cogent reasons for the 

disbelief and cite the reasons why the testimony is unpersuasive). In assessing the 

claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider ordinary techniques of credibility 

evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements about 

the symptoms, and other testimony from the claimant that appears less than candid; 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek or follow a prescribed course of 

treatment; the claimant’s daily activities; the claimant’s work record; observations of 

treating and examining physicians and other third parties; precipitating and aggravating 

factors; and functional restrictions caused by the symptoms. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 

F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. See also Robbins, 466 F.3d at 

884 (“To find the claimant not credible, the ALJ must rely either on reasons unrelated to 

the subjective testimony (e.g., reputation for dishonesty), on conflicts between his 

testimony and his own conduct; or on internal contradictions in that testimony.”) 

 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to produce the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 

credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity.” 

Tr. 20. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explains, the manner in which this 

“boilerplate language” is used in the Commissioner’s credibility analysis “gets things 

backwards.” Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (Addressing identical 

language and finding that the “problem is that the assessment of a claimant's ability to 

work will often ... depend heavily on the credibility of her statements concerning the 

‘intensity, persistence and limiting effects’ of her symptoms, but the passage implies that 

ability to work is determined first and is then used to determine the claimant's 

credibility.”) 

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 As the Court found in Bjornson, the statement by the ALJ that Plaintiff’s 

statements were “not entirely credible” yields no clue to what weight the ALJ gave that 

testimony, and “fails to inform us in a meaningful, reviewable way of the specific 

evidence the ALJ considered in determining that claimant’s complaints were not 

credible.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 If, however, “the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to 

disbelieve an allegation ... and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in 

the record, our role is not to second-guess that decision.” Morgan v. Comm’r Social Sec. 

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). Several courts in this Circuit have found that 

the mere use of the meaningless boilerplate language is not cause for remand if the ALJ’s 

conclusion is followed by sufficient reasoning. See e.g. Jones v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., 2012 

WL 6184941, at * 4 (D.Or. 2012) (boilerplate language is a conclusion which may be 

affirmed if the ALJ’s stated reasons for rejecting the plaintiff’s testimony are clear and 

convincing); Bowers v. Astrue, 2012 WL 2401642, at *9 (D.Or. 2012)(concluding that 

this language erroneously reverses the analysis, but finding such error harmless because 

the ALJ cited other clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony). 

The Court adopts this reasoning, and, despite the use of the boilerplate language which 

implies improper analysis, considers whether the ALJ’s conclusion in this case is 

nonetheless supported by clear and convincing evidence. 

 The ALJ first found that Plaintiff’s alleged limitations and restrictions are not 

supported by the evidence and, specifically in terms of Plaintiff’s obesity, Plaintiff has 

not followed through with medical recommendations to lose weight. Tr. 27. The Social 

Security Agency has explained that a “ ‘prescribed treatment’ is a term of art”, meaning 

that the “treatment must be prescribed by a treating source, ... not simply recommended. 

A treating source’s statement that an individual ‘should’ lose weight or has ‘been 

advised’ to get more exercise is not prescribed treatment.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 637 (citing 

S.S.R. 02–1p at 9, 67 Fed.Reg. at 57,864). There is no evidence that, aside from the lap 

band surgery, Plaintiff was ever prescribed treatment for obesity. 

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 Even if the medical records suggesting or advising Plaintiff to lose weight were a 

prescribed treatment, a finding of a “failure to follow prescribed treatment” would be 

inappropriate unless the record also suggests that there was any chance of such a 

prescription succeeding in eliminating or ameliorating Plaintiff's obesity, let alone “clear 

evidence” that the treatment would be successful. See id. There is no evidence in the 

record that the mere “medical recommendations” to lose weight cited by the ALJ stood 

any chance of succeeding in treating Plaintiff’s obesity. There is evidence in the record, 

however, that when Plaintiff’s treating sources provided more than a recommendation, 

but a comprehensive weight loss program in which Plaintiff’s weight loss attempts were 

supported by weekly medical monitoring, group support, exercise and education, he was 

successful in losing 90 pounds. Tr. 315. 

 Finally, although a failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed treatment when 

a Plaintiff has complaints of disabling pain may be used as the basis for finding a 

Plaintiff’s complaints unjustified or exaggerated, in the case of obesity, “where medical 

treatment is very unlikely to be successful, the approach to credibility makes little sense” 

and “... the failure to follow treatment for obesity tells us little or nothing about a 

claimant’s credibility.” Id. at 638. Thus, there is no reason to conclude from Plaintiff’s 

failure to lose weight that he is not telling the truth about his symptoms. 

 The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff was noncompliant with treatment for his diabetes 

and sleep apnea. Tr. 28. The ALJ’s conclusion is supported, in part, by substantial 

evidence in the record. Dr. Bandlamuri’s progress notes indicated that Plaintiff was not 

checking his blood sugar levels, although there is no indication that he was not taking 

prescribed medication for diabetes. See Tr. 358, 385-86. Nonetheless, as noted by the 

ALJ, his lab results suggested that his blood sugar levels remained largely uncontrolled 

through the time at issue. See eg. Tr. 362, 382-83, 405-07, 410, 411, 414-15. The ALJ 

also mischaracterizes Plaintiff’s “refusal” to use a CPAP machine to alleviate his sleep 

apnea. Tr. 28. Plaintiff testified, and progress notes from Dr. Bandlamuri as well as John 

R. Harris, M.D., indicated that Plaintiff had difficulty sleeping with the CPAP machine 

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for treatment of his sleep apnea. Tr. 61-62, 578, 590. It remains unclear however, despite 

the disabling symptoms Plaintiff attributed to sleep apnea, why he did not pursue the 

surgical options suggested by Dr. Harris. See Tr. 578. 

 Next, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s complaints of back and hip pain, and found 

that “the evidence of mild to moderate degenerative changes ... were not severe enough 

to account for his alleged symptoms and limitations.” Tr. 28. The ALJ, however, may not 

discredit Plaintiff’s allegations of pain solely on the ground that the allegations are 

unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell, 947 F.2d 345, 347-48 

(declining to conclude that Congress intended to require objective medical evidence to 

fully corroborate the severity of pain while aware of the inability of medical science to 

provide such evidence.) In addition to consideration of the objective medical evidence, 

the ALJ also considered that Plaintiff “received little to no treatment for his complaints as 

[t]he claimant admitted he only sought chiropractic treatment for his back pain.” Tr. 28. 

This statement is not supported by substantial evidence. 

 Though there is little evidence that Plaintiff sought treatment for his back pain 

throughout most of the period at issue, in May 2008, Plaintiff did seek medical attention 

for severe pain in his lower back which went down his right leg and he was unable to sit 

down. Tr. 531. Dr. Bandlamuri diagnosed Plaintiff with low back pain and sciatica and 

prescribed Vicodin, Neurontin, and Flexeril and administered a Toradol injection. Tr. 

531. In June 2008, Plaintiff reported pain in his whole body, at times being unable to 

move at all upon waking. Tr. 533. Dr. Bandlamuri diagnosed Plaintiff myalgia, arthralgia 

and low back pain, and prescribed Lyrica and Plaintiff was again given a Toradol 

injection. Tr. 533-34. An MRI of the lumbar spine demonstrated multilevel degenerative 

changes including disc bulges and foraminal narrowing, and mild spinal canal stenosis. 

Tr. 537. Dr. Bandlamuri again assessed Plaintiff with low back pain in July 2008, but 

prescribed nothing further and performed no procedures. Tr. 535. In October 2008, 

Plaintiff again reported back problems. Tr. 663. Dr. Bandlamuri recommended Tylenol 

for his pain. Tr. 664. Dr. Bandlamuri completed a physical RFC assessment on 

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September 1, 2009, and noted limitations due to “Obesity, (R) hand pain, low back pain.” 

Tr. 680. Additionally, Plaintiff reported that he stopped chiropractic treatments due to a 

lack of financial ability to pay for them. Tr. 249. Thus, there is no support in the record 

for the ALJ’s belief that Plaintiff received little to no treatment for his pain throughout 

the entire period in question. 

 The ALJ also asserted that as to the left shoulder condition the Claimant “refused 

to even try cortisone injections.” Tr 28-29. Again, the ALJ’s statement mischaracterizes 

the record. In August 2007, upon observing a positive impingement and slight weakness 

in Plaintiff’s left shoulder, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Slagis “advised him that 

cortisone [injection] is the standard of care.” Tr. 428. Plaintiff explained that “...he does 

not want to do that since it did not last him previously and he simply wants to have 

something more definitive done.” Tr. 428. Plaintiff wanted to “proceed immediately with 

something more aggressive.” Tr. 428. The treatment note continues with the doctor 

recommending an MRI be done before surgical intervention and the Plaintiff “very much 

wants to go in that direction.” Tr. 428. The doctor indicates that he will obtain the MRI. 

Tr. 428. Subsequently, however, in September 2007, Plaintiff reported that his shoulder 

felt “fine” and he did not want a cortisone injection as his shoulder was not bothering him 

at that time. Tr. 427. Plaintiff was advised to return for cortisone injections if the problem 

got worse in the future. Tr. 427. Thus, despite the ALJ’s mischaracterization of the record 

regarding Plaintiff’s refusal to treat his shoulder condition, there is nonetheless 

substantial evidence in the record that supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s left 

shoulder was not bothering him significantly. 

 Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s level of functioning is inconsistent with his 

alleged limitations. Tr. 29. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had little difficulty performing 

personal care tasks, was able to prepare simple meals, wash dishes, do laundry, and clean 

up. Id. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff was able to drive and shop for groceries, manage 

his finances, met with friends for meals and movies, and denied difficulty with social 

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interactions. Id. Plaintiff correctly notes that the ALJ erred by mischaracterizing the 

record and ignored Plaintiff’s most recent record of activities of daily living. 

 Plaintiff submitted a function report on April 18, 2008, stating that he was able to 

do light house chores such as washing clothes and dishes, grocery shopping, and watering 

plants. Tr. 242. Plaintiff stated that he occasionally went to the theatre. Tr. 242. Plaintiff 

did report difficulty walking, concentrating, putting on socks and shoes, and sleeping, due 

to pain in his leg. At that time Plaintiff also reported trouble rising from a sitting position. 

Tr. 243. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff did not report using any assistive device at that 

time. Tr. 29. 

 By June 2008 however, Dr. Susan Courtney, a consultative examiner, reported that 

Plaintiff was in fact using an assistive device to walk, which she felt was necessary at that 

time for Plaintiff for balance and pain.3

 Tr. 514. In July 2008, Plaintiff submitted a 

disability report noting that he was having difficulty driving, dressing, cooking and 

eating. Tr. 255. Plaintiff reported chronic pain making it difficult to shower, shave, get 

dressed, and to go grocery shopping. Tr. 260. Plaintiff reported limited use of his hands 

due to intense pain which interfered with his ability to cook. Tr. 260. Plaintiff also 

reported that it was difficult to sit for more than 30 minutes. Tr. 260. 

 The ALJ erred by ignoring this supplemental report and relying solely on the 

previous report to discredit Plaintiff’s allegations of limitations. This Court cannot rely 

on only the evidence that supports the ALJ’s conclusion to affirm the ALJ’s decision, but 

must consider all of the evidence. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“a reviewing court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well 

as supporting evidence.”) The Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed “simply by 

isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. (citing Jones v. Heckler, 760 

 

3

 The ALJ also relied on the absence of an assistive device to give little weight to the State agency medical consultant’s physical assessment, as the consultant noted 

Plaintiff used a crutch to walk and Plaintiff had not reported using a cane, and none had been prescribed. Tr. 29. As evidenced by Dr. Courtney’s examination, however, Plaintiff 

was using an assistive device for walking and Dr. Courtney felt that it was necessary for him. Tr. 514. 

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F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985)). This is especially true when Plaintiff’s complaints involve 

degenerative diseases. 

 At least as to Plaintiff’s supplemental report, Plaintiff’s described activities do not 

contradict his testimony regarding his limitations. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in 

pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work 

setting, a specific finding as to this fact may be sufficient to discredit an allegation of 

disabling excess pain.”). Additionally, the limitations in daily activities evidenced by the 

most recent statements of pain and loss of capacity to perform ADL’s clearly show an 

inability to engage in activities “easily transferable to what may be the more grueling 

environment of the workplace...[.]” Id. at 603. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that his 

inability to dress himself and to sit for more than 30 minutes would be inconsistent with 

an ability to engage in most forms of work. See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1454 

(9th Cir. 1984) (When the medical evidence and claimant’s testimony depict an individual 

who cannot sit, stand or walk for over one hour without pain the individual “does not 

have the capacity to do most jobs available in the national economy.")(quoting Delgado 

v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 An ALJ's error may be harmless where the ALJ has provided one or more invalid 

reasons for disbelieving a claimant's testimony, but also provided valid reasons that were 

supported by the record. See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227; Carmickle v. Comm’r Social Sec. 

Admin, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162–63; Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 

1195–97 (9th Cir. 2004). In this context, an error is harmless so long as there remains 

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision and the error “does not negate the 

validity of the ALJ's ultimate conclusion.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197; see also Carmickle, 

533 F.3d at 1162. 

 The Court finds that the ALJ’s articulated reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

credibility were not clear and convincing. Specifically, the ALJ’s findings regarding 

Plaintiff’s noncompliance with treatment for obesity and Plaintiff’s failure to seek 

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treatment for back and hip pain after May 2008 are not supported by substantial evidence 

in the record. The ALJ’s findings of Plaintiff’s noncompliance with treatment for sleep 

apnea is also not supported in its entirety, and further, the ALJ’s findings regarding 

Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were also not entirely supported by substantial 

evidence, especially as to the Plaintiff’s supplemental report of ADL’s which was not 

addressed by the ALJ. 

IV. Remedy 

 Where the Commissioner fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the 

opinion of a treating or examining physician, or fails to provide specific, clear, and 

convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant’s testimony, this Court credits the opinion or 

testimony as a matter of law. Lester, 81 F.3d at 83; Varney v. Sec'y of Health & Human 

Servs., 859 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit has held that a court should 

remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits where three 

conditions are met: “(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally 

sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; 

and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Garrison, 2014 WL 3397218 

(citations omitted). Even when all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, a 

court should nonetheless remand for further proceedings when “an evaluation of the 

record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Id. A district 

court abuses its discretion, however, by remanding for further proceedings where the 

credit-as-true rule is satisfied and the record affords no reason to believe that the claimant 

is not, in fact, disabled. Id. 

 As discussed above, the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting the opinions of Dr. Bandlamuri and Dr. Beck. The ALJ also failed to provide 

legally sufficient reasons for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not credible in its entirety. 

 To be eligible for benefits, Plaintiff must have been disabled on or before his last 

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insured date, December 31, 2009. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.315. While the improperly 

rejected evidence strongly suggests that Plaintiff became disabled before his insured 

status lapsed, the determination of the date of onset remains unclear. 

 First, crediting Dr. Bandlamuri’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s mental health 

establishes that Plaintiff has significant difficulties with functioning in usual daily 

activities. This opinion was rendered in August 2008, but did not address specific 

limitations, nor did it address a time period prior to August 2008. Crediting Dr. 

Bandlamuri’s opinion as true establishes that at least as of August 2008, Plaintiff’s 

mental condition would cause significant interference with functioning in usual daily 

activities. Tr. 568. 

 It is also not clear from the record that crediting Dr. Beck’s opinion as true would 

establish disability. Though the ALJ erred in failing to give the opinion any weight, Dr. 

Beck’s opinion, rendered three months after the date last insured, did not address the 

period at issue in this case. Dr. Beck’s opinion, however, is legally relevant and entitled 

to some weight in establishing a date of onset, especially in light of Dr. Bandlamuri’s 

opinion. 

 On remand, the ALJ should re-examine his findings that Plaintiff’s depression was 

nonsevere and imposed no limitations. 

 Finally, it is not clear that crediting Plaintiff’s improperly discounted testimony as 

true would result in a finding of disability throughout the entire period at issue. Because 

extreme obesity alone does “not correlate with any specific degree of functional loss,” see

SSR 02-1p, crediting Plaintiff’s symptoms related directly to obesity do not result in a 

finding of disability. There was no testimony by Plaintiff that his obesity directly 

impacted his functional limitations, though the impact and complications from Plaintiff’s 

obesity no doubt contributes to both exertional and non-exertional limitations caused by 

his degenerative disc and joint disease, diabetes, sleep apnea, and osteoarthritis of his 

right hip, as well as his mental health condition. 

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regarding his back pain would result in a finding of disability throughout the entire period 

at issue. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff sought medical treatment for his 

back and hip pain until May 2008, and thus the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s claim of 

back pain was not credible because he received little to no treatment for his back pain is 

valid up until this date. As discussed above, however, crediting Plaintiff’s supplemental 

report (Tr. 255-262) as true, and considering Plaintiff’s difficulty with self-care and 

inability to sit for more than 30 minutes before he must stand and move around, Plaintiff 

has established that he does not have the capacity for even sedentary work. See Gallant, 

753 F.2d at 1454 ("A man who cannot walk, stand or sit for over one hour without pain 

does not have the capacity to do most jobs available in the national economy.")(citing to 

Delgado, 722 F.2d at 574). Plaintiff’s supplemental report dated July 9, 2008, indicates 

that his pain became worse and his physical limitations intensified in approximately 

2008, and he was diagnosed with fibromyalgia and depression in July 2008. Thus, there 

is substantial evidence that Plaintiff’s disability began before his insured status lapsed in 

December 2009. Remand for further proceedings is appropriate where there are 

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made and it is not 

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if all 

the evidence were properly evaluated. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 

2009). Since the determination of the onset date of disability is a factual issue, this matter 

should be remanded solely for a determination of the appropriate onset date and an award 

of benefits. 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s decision denying benefits is REVERSED 

and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. The 

Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Commissioner 

and shall terminate this case. 

Dated this 24th day of July, 2014. 

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