Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01946/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01946-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332oc Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS 

COMPANY, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

JB COLLISION SERVICES, INC. d/b/a 

J & M AUTOBODY d/b/a EL DORADO 

COLLISION et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 13-CV-1946-LAB(WVG) 

ORDER ON THIRD PARTY 

INTERVENOR Z-BEST BODY AND 

PAINT SHOPS, INC.’S MOTION 

FOR ORDER TO INTERVENE TO 

MODIFY JUNE 20, 2014 

PROTECTIVE ORDER 

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

[ECF No. 354.]

Z-Best Body and Paint Shops, Inc. (“Z-Best”) is the plaintiff in a lawsuit currently 

pending in the Central District of California against The Sherwin-Williams Company. (ZBest Body and Paint Shops, Inc. v. The Sherwin-Williams Company, et al., C.D. Cal. No. 

16-CV-2398.) Z-Best now seeks to intervene in the instant case to request that this Court 

modify the Protective Order that remains in effect in this case. (ECF No. 354.) SherwinWilliams opposes the motion. (ECF No. 356.) Having considered the matter on the papers, 

Z-Best’s Motion to intervene to modify the Protective Order is GRANTED. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. The Instant Case 

In the underlying litigation, Plaintiff Sherwin-Williams and Defendant JB Collision 

entered into a supply agreement in September 2008 whereby JB Collision agreed to buy 

all of its paints and coatings from Sherwin-Williams until the amount of its purchases 

equaled $1,300,000. (Sherwin-Williams Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 1.) In return, SherwinWilliams agreed to sell its products to JB Collision at a discount with a $275,000 advance. 

(Id. at ¶ 8.) 

 In early 2013, JB Collision stopped buying all of its paints and coatings from 

Sherwin-Williams. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.) As a result, Sherwin-Williams brought suit against 

JB Collision for breach of contract on August 20, 2013. (Id.) JB Collision counterclaimed 

contract and tort causes of action that in essence alleged Sherwin-Williams’ products were 

subpar. (See JB Collision Countercl., ECF No. 7.) 

 During the discovery process, the parties jointly requested and this Court enter a 

general protective order (“Protective Order”) which provides “no document . . . produced 

pursuant to FRCP 26, in response to FRCP 33 Interrogatories, FRCP 34 Requests for 

Production, or any non-party in response to a party subpoena, which is designated as 

‘Confidential,’ shall be disclosed . . . .” (ECF No. 35 at 2.) Accordingly, neither SherwinWilliams nor JB Collision could disclose covered documents without observing the terms 

of the Protective Order. Z-Best was not a party to the Protective Order. 

During a four-day trial in November 2015, a number of protected documents were 

marked as trial exhibits. (Notice of Subpoena 2, ECF No. 350.) Following the trial, the 

Court ordered the return of the exhibits and ordered that the parties continue to comply 

with the Protective Order. On August 8, 2016, judgment was entered in favor of SherwinWilliams for $373,448.70, and in favor of JB Collision for $3,250,000. (ECF No. 282.) 

B. The Case in the Central District of California 

Z-Best, which is also a body shop that entered into a supply agreement with 

Sherwin-Williams, claims to have relied on Sherwin-Williams’ misrepresentations 

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regarding the quality of its paint and was damaged as a result. (ECF No. 354-1 at 6.) On 

November 21, 2016, Z-Best sued Sherwin-Williams in the Central District of California 

for breach of a supply agreement. (Walker Decl. Ex. 1, at 2, ECF No. 354-3.) Many of the 

pleadings filed by Z-Best are virtually identical to those filed by JB Collision in the instant 

case. (Opp’n at 2.) 

 On August 2, 2017, Z-Best served a subpoena on counsel for JB Collision seeking 

“any and all records and documents produced by [Sherwin-Williams] in related Case No. 

13-CV-1946-LAB(WVG) and received by [JB Collision] during discovery, including but 

not limited to, all sets of [Sherwin-Williams’] documents produced.” (ECF No. 350-1 at 

6.) JB Collision gave notice to this Court of the subpoena and requested instruction on 

how to proceed. (ECF No. 350 at 1.) This Court affirmed the continued application of the 

Protective Order and declined to issue an advisory opinion or otherwise intervene in 

proceedings in another District or interfere with a subpoena issued by a sister court. (ECF 

No. 352 at 1-2.) 

 On August 29, 2017, the United States District Court for the Central District of 

California granted Sherwin-Williams’ motion to quash the subpoena. (Walker Decl. Ex. 

1, at 6.) Citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 

2003), the court reasoned that “the court that issued the order is in the best position to 

make the relevance assessment for it presumably is the only court familiar with the 

contents of the protected discovery.”1

 (Walker Decl. Ex. 1, at 5.) Similarly, it found that 

                                                                

1

 To clarify, this Court’s relevance assessment is only the limited context of modifying the 

Protective Order—not generally deciding whether future requested discovery is relevant in 

the litigation pending in the Central District. That determination is wholly separate and will 

be made, if necessary, on a case-by-case basis by that court. The case in this District has 

been closed for nearly two years and is not the proper forum in which to wage battles over 

the relevancy of specific items of discovery in an active case pending in another district. 

The narrow issue before this Court is whether the Protective Order should be modified such 

that such a battle can even be waged or whether the Protective Order should remain 

unmodified and thus serve as a barrier to requests for protected discovery. 

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“because the JB Collision Litigation is still pending . . . it would not require significant 

additional burden and expense for [Z-Best] to seek modification of the [P]rotective [O]rder 

before the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.” (Id.) The 

court also suggested that the subpoena was overbroad because “it would necessarily 

encompass documents relating to [Sherwin-Williams’] business relationship with JB 

Collision, who is not a party to the instant action.” (Id. at 5-6.) 

 Now before the Court is Z-Best’s motion to intervene to modify the June 20, 2014 

Protective Order. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Permissive Intervention 

 “On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who . . . (B) has a 

claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(b). Third parties seeking access to a judicial record or modification of 

a protective order in a civil case may do so by seeking permissive intervention under Rule 

24(b)(2). San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Beckman Indus. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992) (approving permissive 

intervention as a method for challenging protective order under Rule 26(c)). 

 Generally, permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) requires “(1) an independent 

ground for jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact 

between the movant’s claim or defense and the main action.” Beckman, 966 F.2d at 473. 

An independent ground for jurisdiction and a common question of law and fact are not 

required, however, where the intervenor merely seeks to challenge a protective order. 

Beckman, 966 F.2d at 473-74 (reasoning independent jurisdictional grounds and strong 

nexus of fact or law unnecessary because party seeks to intervene only for the purpose of 

modifying a protective order and district court retained the power to do so). A motion for 

permissive intervention is directed to the sound discretion of the district court. Beckman, 

966 F.2d at 472. 

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 The Court finds that the motion was timely filed, and permissive intervention is the 

appropriate method by which to challenge a protective order. The Court GRANTS ZBest’s motion to intervene. 

B. Access to Sealed Documents 

The Ninth Circuit strongly favors access to discovery materials to meet the needs 

of parties engaged in pending collateral litigation. Beckman, 966 F.2d at 475. “Allowing 

the fruits of one litigation to facilitate preparation in other cases advances the interests of 

judicial economy by avoiding the wasteful duplication of discovery.” Foltz v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003); Beckman, 966 F.2d at 475; see 

also United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1990); 

Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[W]here an appropriate 

modification of a protective order can place private litigants in a position they would 

otherwise reach only after repetition of another’s discovery, such modification can be 

denied only where it would tangibly prejudice substantial rights of the party opposing 

modification.”). So long as “reasonable restrictions on collateral disclosure will continue 

to protect an affected party’s legitimate interests in privacy, a collateral litigant’s request 

to the issuing court to modify an otherwise proper protective order so that collateral 

litigants are not precluded from obtaining relevant material should normally be granted.” 

Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1132 (citing Beckman, 966 F.2d at 475). 

 That being said, modification of a protective order will not be automatically 

granted. Collateral litigants will not be allowed access to discovery materials merely as a 

means to subvert the limitations of the discovery process in the collateral litigation. Id.

Collateral litigants seeking to modify a protective order must demonstrate the relevance 

of the protected discovery to the collateral litigation and its general discoverability in that 

case. Id. Once a relevance determination has been made, the court that issued the 

protective order must weigh the policy of avoiding duplicative discovery against the 

countervailing reliance interest of the party opposing modification. Id. at 1133. 

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1. Relevance Analysis 

The court that issued the protective order should confirm that the protected 

discovery is sufficiently relevant to the collateral litigation such that “a substantial amount 

of duplicative discovery will be avoided by modifying the protective order.” Id. at 1132. 

Such a determination depends on the “degree of overlap in the facts, parties, and issues 

between the suit covered by the protective order and the collateral proceedings.” Id. This 

is to be a rough estimate; the issuing court is not to embroil itself in the specific discovery 

disputes applicable only to the collateral suit by deciding whether the collateral litigants 

will actually obtain the materials. Id. at 1133-34 (citing United Nuclear, 905 F.2d at 1428). 

Here, Z-Best is engaged in litigation against Sherwin-Williams with allegations 

substantially similar to those involved in the instant case. (Motion at 1.) Z-Best accuses 

Sherwin-Williams of fraudulently inducing it to continue purchasing Sherwin-Williams’ 

defective products beyond the term of the supply agreement during a period of time 

overlapping that involved in the instant case’s fraud and misrepresentation claims. (Opp’n 

Ex. B, ECF No. 356-2 at 5.) Both involve claims by body shops against Sherwin-Williams 

alleging misrepresentations made by Sherwin-Williams regarding the quality of its 

automotive paint products. Z-Best moved to modify the Protective Order to permit access 

to the instant case’s discovery materials for use in the collateral litigation, arguing that 

much of the discovery necessary in the Z-Best case has already been produced in the 

instant action. (P&A at 6.) Sherwin-Williams opposes modification on four grounds. 

First, Sherwin-Williams contends that Z-Best’s request should be denied because 

the motion failed to specify concrete changes to the Protective Order. (Opp’n at 4.) 

However, Z-Best was not required to specify concrete changes to the Protective Order. As 

the issuer of the Protective Order, this Court makes only a rough estimate of relevance in 

order to determine whether the order will bar the collateral litigant from gaining access to 

the discovery already conducted. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1132-33. Any disputes over the 

ultimate discoverability of specific materials covered by the Protective Order are to be 

resolved by the court handling the Z-Best case. Id. at 1133. 

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Second, Sherwin-Williams argues that because the Central District Court concluded 

that Z-Best’s Subpoena was overbroad, Z-Best is trying to “do indirectly that which it 

cannot do directly” and “deprive Sherwin-Williams of the discovery protections set forth 

in Rule 26.” (Opp’n at 5-6.) However, as Sherwin-Williams itself pointed out, this Court 

“does not decide whether the collateral litigants [here, the parties before the Central 

District] will ultimately obtain the discovery materials—a decision that is to be made by 

the collateral courts [here, the Central District of California].” (Id. at 5 (citing In re 

Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 4191780 at *1) 

(internal quotations omitted).) This Court decides whether the modifying order will 

eliminate the potential for duplicative discovery and, if the order is modified, the Central 

District Court may freely control the discovery process without running up against the 

Protective Order. See Foltz, 331 F.2d at 1133. Sherwin-Williams will not be deprived of 

its discovery protections. 

Third, Sherwin-Williams contends that any modification of the Protective Order, 

absent the specific consent of the Central District, would be an abuse of discretion. (Opp’n 

at 6.) However, as the Central District Court pointed out in its order granting SherwinWilliams’ motion to quash Z-Best’s Subpoena, the court that issued the Protective Order 

is in the best position to make the relevance assessment in order to modify the Protective 

Order because it is familiar with the contents of the Protective Order. (Walker Decl. Ex. 

1, at 5.) Indeed, the court acknowledged that modification of the Protective Order was 

properly administered by this Court, stating that “because the JB Collision Litigation is 

still pending . . . it would not require significant additional burden and expense for [ZBest] to seek modification of the [P]rotective [O]rder before the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of California.” (Id.) Modification is appropriate so long as 

a rough estimate of relevance is found and the policy of avoiding duplicative discovery is 

adequately weighed against the countervailing reliance interest of the party opposing 

modification. 

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Finally, Sherwin-Williams argues that the protected discovery materials are not 

sufficiently relevant because Z-Best’s claims have been narrowed to those that occurred 

after their agreement ended in September 2014—eighteen months after JB Collision 

stopped buying from Sherwin-Williams. (Opp’n at 7.) Relevance is assessed according to 

the “degree of overlap in the facts, parties, and issues between the suit covered by the 

protective order and the collateral proceedings.” Foltz, 331 F.2d at 1132. A lack of overlap 

in time does not necessarily amount to a lack of overlap in facts, parties, or issues. As 

Sherwin-Williams points out, “[m]any of the pleadings filed by Z-Best in the Central 

District Case . . . copy the pleadings that were filed by [JB Collision] in this matter.” 

(Opp’n at 2.) Z-Best lists numerous documents that are properly protected discovery in 

the instant case and relevant in the collateral suit: “misrepresentations made by SherwinWilliams to JB Collision regarding the AWX product line; all claims and complaints made 

by JB Collision regarding the AWX product line; all Product Quality Reports prepared by 

Sherwin-Williams regarding JB Collision’s claims and complaints regarding the AWX 

product line; the formulation of the AWX product line; and developmental testing of the 

AWX product line.” (Reply 4-5, ECF No. 357.) These documents appear to be relevant as 

to Sherwin-Williams’ knowledge of the defective paint, as to its misrepresentations 

regarding the quality of the paint, and that other body shops were having analogous 

problems with the paint. 

Z-Best has offered sufficient basis for this Court to find a rough estimate of 

relevance such that duplicative discovery may be avoided. The court overseeing the 

collateral litigation can settle any disputes as to whether particular documents are 

discoverable or admissible in that litigation. 

2. Reliance Interest 

Once a relevance determination has been made, the court that issued the protective 

order must weigh the policy of avoiding duplicative discovery against the countervailing 

reliance interest of the party opposing modification. Foltz, 331 F.2d at 1133. “[R]eliance 

will be less with a blanket [protective] order, because it is by nature overinclusive.” 

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Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476. This is because a party seeking protection of the court by means 

of a blanket protective order typically does not make the required Rule 26(c) “good cause” 

showing for any particular documents. Id. In such a case, “[a]ny legitimate interest . . . in 

continued secrecy as against the public at large can be accommodated by placing [the 

collateral litigants] under the same restrictions on use and disclosure contained in the 

original protective order.” United Nuclear, 905 F.2d at 1428; see also Beckman, 966 F.2d 

at 476. 

In a footnote, Sherwin-Williams argues that its “rights (1) to assert discovery 

challenges available under Rule 26 to Z-Best’s discovery requests in the Central District 

case, and (2) under the [P]rotective [O]rder entered in this case are placed at risk by this 

Motion.” (Opp’n at 5 n.3.) As noted above, if the Protective Order is modified, the Central 

District of California will decide whether Z-Best ultimately obtains the discovery 

materials without running up against the Protective Order in this case. See Foltz, 331 F.2d 

at 1133. Z-Best’s right to assert Rule 26 discovery challenges is not in peril. 

Sherwin-Williams did not make a particularized showing of good cause with respect 

to any individual document produced under the blanket Protective Order, therefore any 

argument of reliance on the Protective Order is an insufficient reason not to modify it. 

Particularly with regards to those records marked as trial exhibits in open court and which 

were the primary focus of argument to the jury, as the Ninth Circuit strongly favors access 

to such court records. Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(recognizing strong presumption in context of civil trial). Any information SherwinWilliams wants protected can be protected by placing Z-Best under the same use and 

disclosure restrictions contained in the Protective Order. As it appears that a protective 

order will be instituted in the collateral litigation, any documents subject to this Court’s 

Protective Order can also be protected by the protective order in that litigation. (Opp’n at 

4.) The Court finds the policy of avoiding duplicative discovery outweighs any 

countervailing reliance interest of Sherwin-Williams. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, Z-Best’s motion to intervene for modification of the 

Protective Order is GRANTED. The June 20, 2014 Protective Order (ECF No. 35) is 

hereby modified to allow access solely to the parties to Z-Best Body and Paint Shops, Inc. 

v. The Sherwin-Williams Company, et al. pending in the United States District Court for 

the Central District of California for the purposes of litigating that action. This Order is 

conditioned on the filing of a protective order in the collateral case and in no way limits 

the collateral court’s ability to decide whether the litigants before it should ultimately 

obtain the specific discovery materials. 

DATED: December 5, 2017 

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