Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03387/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03387-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

 The factual background of the consolidated actions is set forth in the Court’s order dated 2

December 19, 2006 and will not be repeated here.

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 11/20/2007**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARY HELEN WOODSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES,

INC.,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 05–3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 1

MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

[re: docket nos. 88, 93, 95]

I. BACKGROUND2

This case involves two separate actions. Action One is based on allegations that IBM

improperly removed Plaintiff from her former position on or about June 24, 2002, forcing her to

find another position in the company. Plaintiff filed her complaint in case number C 05-337 JF

(“Action One”) in the Santa Clara Superior Court on May 10, 2005, and filed a first amended

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

complaint (“FAC”) in that Court on July 8, 2005. The FAC asserted claims for: (1) age

discrimination; (2) disability discrimination; (3) religious discrimination; and (4) breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. IBM removed the action to this Court on the basis of

diversity of citizenship on August 19, 2005. 

On November 8, 2005, this Court granted IBM’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff’s claim for religious discrimination was

dismissed without leave to amend because Plaintiff conceded that the claim was time-barred. 

Plaintiff’s claims for age and disability discrimination were dismissed with leave to amend

because Plaintiff did not allege any facts demonstrating that her transfer to the new position

resulted in a substantial adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment. 

Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract was dismissed with leave to amend because Plaintiff did

not allege how her transfer within the company breached any of the terms of employment recited

in the FAC. Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant, which asserted that IBM’s

breach of contract was in bad faith, was dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege adequately a

breach of contract.

On December 5, 2005, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”). The SAC

asserted the following claims: (1) age discrimination in violation of California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.; (2) disability

discrimination in violation of FEHA; (3) breach of employment contract; and (4) breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On December 22, 2005, IBM moved to dismiss

the SAC for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff opposed the

motion, and the Court heard oral argument on April 28, 2006. On May 2, 2006, the Court denied

IBM’s motion to dismiss and ordered it to answer the SAC within twenty days. IBM filed its

answer on May 22, 2006.

Case number C 05-3939 JF (“Action Two”) involves allegations that IBM terminated

Plaintiff’s employment unlawfully in October 2003. On or about October 10, 2003, and again on

or about September 28, 2004, Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination complaint with the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). In a right-to-sue letter dated

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

September 28, 2004, the DFEH informed Plaintiff that she had the right to bring a civil action

under FEHA within one year. On September 28, 2005, exactly one year later, Plaintiff filed

Action Two, naming IBM as a defendant. The complaint asserted claims for (1) disability

discrimination, (2) breach of employment contract, and (3) breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing. Plaintiff did not serve the complaint until April 26, 2006, 211 days after it was

filed. 

On May 16, 2006, IBM moved to dismiss the complaint in Action Two for untimely

service or, alternatively, for a more definite statement of Plaintiff’s first two claims for relief. 

Plaintiff opposed the motion, and the Court heard oral argument on July 21, 2006. On July 25,

2006, the Court denied the motion to dismiss but granted the motion for a more definite

statement (“July 25th Order”). The Court directed Plaintiff to clarify her statement of

jurisdiction, her first claim for disability discrimination, and her second claim for breach of

contract. The Court also formally consolidated the two actions under the earlier case number. 

The Court directed Plaintiff to file any amended complaint before August 25, 2006. 

On September 22, 2006, Plaintiff filed an administrative motion for extension of time to

file an amended complaint, attaching her proposed pleading. On October 2, 2006, the Court

granted this motion and accepted the proposed amended complaint. This pleading of the First

Amended Complaint After Consolidation (FACC) asserts three claims for relief: (1) disability

discrimination; (2) breach of employment contract; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and

fair dealing. 

On October 19, 2006, IBM moved to dismiss the FACC for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted (“motion”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or,

alternatively, for a more definite statement. On December 19, 2006, the Court issued an order

denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and granting the motion for a more

definite statement, setting a deadline of January 18, 2007 for any amendment. The Court

thereafter extended the deadline at Plaintiff’s request and on July 20, 2007 Plaintiff filed the

operative Second Amended Complaint After Consolidation (“SACC”). 

The SACC contains the following claims: (1) age discrimination; (2) disability

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

discrimination; (3)violations of the family medical leave act and California Government Code;

(4) breach of employment contract; and (5) breach of covenant the covenant of good faith and

fair dealing. On August 8, 2007, Defendant again filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative

for a more definite statement. On September 21, 2007, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief

requesting further leave to amend. The Court heard oral argument on October 11, 2007.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, and the

Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the

complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections,

66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). When amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be

ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King &

Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s

allegations are taken as true, and the Court must construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The pleading of a

pro se litigant is held to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney, and is to

be afforded the benefit of any doubt. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Karim-Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, a pro se litigant

must be given leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint

cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir.

1995). 

III. DISCUSSION

1. First Claim

Plaintiff’s first claim alleges age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act and state law. Defendant argues that this claim should be dismissed because

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies as required by 29 U.S. C. § 2617 and Cal

Gov’t Code § 12960, 12965(b). Defendant has provided the Court with documents indicating

that the claims filed by Plaintiff with the EEOC related only to alleged disability discrimination

and made no mention of age discrimination. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument in her

opposition to the motion. However, at oral argument Plaintiff asserted that she did follow the

appropriate administrative procedures. Because the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend her

other claims, Plaintiff may address this issue in an amended pleading.

2. Second Claim

a. Prima Facie Case

Plaintiff’s second claim alleges discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) and the FEHA. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA the plaintiff must show

that she: (1) suffered from a disability; (2) was otherwise qualified to do her job; and (3) was

subjected to adverse employment action because of her disability. 42 U.S.C. § 1112(a); see also

Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002). The showing required

under FEHA overlaps with, but requires less than, the ADA. Under the FEHA, “a plaintiff need

only show that she (1) suffers from a disability and (2) is a qualified individual.” Roberts, 2006

WL 4704616 at *10. Defendant challenges two elements of Plaintiff’s prima facie case,

contending that the SACC does not allege adequately that Plaintiff is disabled or that she has

been subjected to an adverse employment action. These issues are discussed in turn below. 

b. Disability

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim that she was able to perform her job precludes a

finding that she is disabled. Without citing any authority, Defendant asserts, “[i]f plaintiff was

able and willing to perform her job, she was not disabled.” Motion to Dismiss SACC at 10. This

argument is not consistent with the definition of “disability” in either the ADA or FEHA.

Both the ADA and FEHA define disability as a physical or mental impairment that

“limits a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 1202(2)(A); Cal. Gov’t Code § 1292(k)(B)(ii). Under

FEHA,“major life activities shall be broadly construed and includes physical, mental and social

activities and working.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 1292(k)(B)(iii). The ADA provides a more specific

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 At least one California court has held that the FEHA does not require a “substantial”

3

limitation. Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc., 29 Cal 4th 1019 (Cal. 2003). 

Conversely, another California court has explained “we may look to the cases from the

Americans with Disabilities Act when interpreting the FEHA.” Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74

Cal. App. 4th 215, 224 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1999). At this juncture it is not necessary for

the Court to reach this question. 

6

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

definition, explaining that “major life activities” include “walking, seeing, hearing, and

performing manual tasks.” 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii). Additionally, the Supreme Court has

explained that the ADA requires a substantial (not a total) limitation upon one’s life activity:

To qualify as disabled, a claimant must further show that the limitation on the

major life activity is substantial. . . . According to the EEOC regulations,

substantially limited means unable to perform a major life activity that the average

person in the general population can perform; or significantly restricted as to the

condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular

major life activity as compared to the condition manner, or duration under which

the average person in the general population can perform that same major life

activity.

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 690 (2002). In sum, to establish 3

disability Plaintiff must identify some life activity she is unable to perform. To proceed with her

ADA claim, she must demonstrate further that she is either completely unable to perform or can

do so in a significantly restricted manner when compared to the general population.

Defendant’s argument does not fit within this framework. Plaintiff’s admission that she

was able to perform her job does not preclude her claim of disability if she can allege some other

limitation on life activity. Plaintiff has alleged:

Plaintiff has had a back problems affecting the musculoskeletal system and

making it difficult for her to perform the major life activities of standing, walking,

or sitting for extended periods. These difficulties in turn limited her ability to

perform the major life activity of working, using standard office furniture and

equipment. 

SACC at ¶ 13. Plaintiff has identified specific major life activities that she is unable to perform. 

Her allegations suggest that she is unable to reach the level of performance expected among

members of the general population. The Court thus concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied her

burden of pleading a disability under both the ADA and FEHA.

c. Adverse Employment Actions

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 It is not clear from Defendant’s papers whether its accommodations argument was 4

advanced in support of the position that the entire second claim should be dismissed. Because

the three adverse actions alleged by Plaintiff violate separate provisions of state and federal law,

two of the claims would survive dismissal of Plaintiff’s accommodation claim. The Court

recognizes that the organization of Plaintiff’s SACC makes it difficult for Defendant to respond. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff should amend her SACC so that each of the three current claims

constitutes a separate claim for relief. This organization is necessary to comport with Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(e)(2). See Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 75 F. Supp. 303, 304

(reasoning that under Rule 8(e)(2) a complaint setting forth several claims should state each

claim in a separate count). 

7

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

Plaintiff has alleged the following adverse employment actions: (1) failure to provide

adequate accommodations and failure to respond to requests for accommodations; (2) wrongful

termination; and (3) wrongful request for a medical examination. The motion to dismiss argues

that Plaintiff has not adequately pled the first of these alleged adverse actions. 

4

Under both the ADA and FEHA, an employer’s accommodation of disabled employees

involves two separate responsibilities. Both § 12112(b)(5)(a) of the ADA and Cal. Gov’t Code §

12940(m) create a duty to provide “reasonable accommodations . . . unless [the employer] can

demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the

business of the [employer].” 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(a); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m). 

Additionally, under California law the employer must “engage in a timely, good faith, interactive

process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if

any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation . . .” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n)

(emphasis added). Plaintiff states claims under all three of these provisions.

Plaintiff alleges the following violation of 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(a) and Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 12940(m): “Plaintiff was able, within the thirty days allowed her, to find another position, but

when she requested accommodation, Defendant refused repeatedly and did not show that

accommodation for Plaintiff would impose an undue hardship on him . . . .” SACC at ¶ 114. 

Plaintiff’s reference to a request suggests that this claim should be brought under Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12940(n); however, given the ambiguity of the SACC, this is not entirely clear. Because

no context provided for the statement there is no way to tell what accommodation Plaintiff

sought or when she sought it. Plaintiff’s a claim does not provide Defendant with sufficient

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Parties also dispute the cut-off point for Defendant’s duty to Plaintiff. Defendant 5

argues that it did not owe a duty to Plaintiff after she was terminated. Plaintiff responds that after

she was terminated Defendant had a duty prohibiting it from making her ineligible for rehire. 

The Court cannot address these arguments Plaintiff has amended her Complaint to more clearly

state the alleged behavior.

8

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

notice as to the conduct she is alleging.5

Plaintiff next claims that “Defendant refused to engage in an interactive process with

Plaintiff to find an effective and reasonable accommodation for her disabilities.” Id. at ¶ 115. 

Defendant has argued that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not identified any

specific accommodations that were requested and refused. Plaintiff responds that she is not

required to identify specific requests in her pleadings. Opposition at 10. The Court agrees with

Defendant that a boilerplate statement is insufficient; Plaintiff must allege specific facts to

support her argument that Defendant did not engage in the requisite interactive process. 

Elsewhere in the SACC, Plaintiff alleges that she asked that she be able to telecommute to work

on a full time basis, but this request was denied (instead Plaintiff was permitted to telecommute

on a part-time basis). FACC at ¶ 66. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts for the first time in her

opposition papers that she requested a recliner along with other accommodations. Opposition at

10. Again, Plaintiff must allege specific facts to support her claim. 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff in fact was accommodated because she was permitted

to telecommute part-time and paid leave subsequently was made available. The Court cannot

analyze this argument until Plaintiff has provided clearer allegations regarding her requests. The

Ninth Circuit has explained: 

[T]he duty to accommodate is a continuing duty that is not exhausted by one

effort. . . . [I]f a reasonable accommodation turns out to be ineffective and the

employee with a disability remains unable to perform an essential function, the

employer must consider whether there would be an alternative reasonable

accommodation that would not pose an undue hardship. Thus, the employer’s

obligation to engage in the interactive process extends beyond the first attempt at

accommodation and continues when the employee asks for a different

accommodation or where the employer is aware that the initial accommodation is

failing and further accommodation is needed.

Hummphrey . Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F. 3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under both the ADA and FEHA, “in appropriate circumstances, reasonable

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

accommodation can include providing the employee accrued paid leave or additional unpaid

leave for treatment.” Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215, 226 (Cal. Ct. App.

1999) (emphasis added). However, leave is sufficient only if other accommodations would be

ineffective:

[T]he leave accommodation is qualified. As long as a reasonable accommodation

available to the employer could have plausibly enabled a handicapped employee

to adequately perform his job, an employer is liable for failing to attempt that

accommodation. In sum, a finite leave of absence has been considered to be a

reasonable accommodation under the ADA, provided it is likely that following the

leave the employee would be able to perform his or her duties.

Id. 

3. Third Claim

Plaintiff’s statement of her third claim is as follows:

Both the FMLA and the CFRA provide that an employer may not refuse the

request of an employee to take leave if that employee meets the requirements of

these laws. But Plaintiff did not request to take leave, although Defendant

fraudulently attempted to make it appear that she had. These statutes nowhere

allow the employer to require an employee to take leave in lieu of providing an

accommodation which will enable the employee to continue work.

Opposition at 14. This is not a proper claim. Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of the

provisions grounding her claim and thus, has not shown that she is entitled to relief as required

under Rule 8(a)(2). Because Plaintiff was not denied a request for leave, she may not state a

claim under these provisions. 

4. Fourth and Fifth Claims

Finally, Plaintiff asserts claims for breach of her employment contract and breach of an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendant contends that because the conduct

alleged relates to disparate treatment during employment, it does not support either claim. 

However, Plaintiff has made additional allegations that may support her claims.

a. Termination for Reasons Other Than Good Cause

Under California Labor Code § 2922, “[a]n employment, having no specified term, may

be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.” However, the case law developed

under this statute has developed certain boundaries to its application; “while an at-will employee

may be terminated for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

terminate for an unlawful reason or a purpose that contravenes fundamental public policy.” 

Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 (Cal. 1992). Fundamental public policy is defined as

follows:

First, the policy must be supported by either constitutional or statutory provisions

or regulations enacted under statutory authority. Second, the policy must have

been articulated at the time of the discharge. Fourth, the policy must be

‘fundamental’ and ‘substantial.’ . . . The cases in which California courts have

recognized a separate tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of

public policy generally fall into four categories, where the employee is discharged

for: (1) refusal to violate a statute; (2) performing a statutory obligation; (3)

exercising (or refusing to waive) a statutory or constitutional right or privilege; or

(4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance.

Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1111-12 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2d Dist. 2000); see also Wells v. Bd. of Trs. Of Cal. State. Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 990, 997

(N.D. Cal. 2005). Although it she does not says so explicitly as part of her fourth claim, Plaintiff

has alleged that she was terminated because of her disability in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(A) and Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). SACC at ¶ 114. Such a termination would

constitute a violation of public policy. Accordingly, Plaintiff may amend her fourth claim to

incorporate the necessary allegations.

b. Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Under certain circumstances, California courts recognize that an employee is protected by

an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing:

California law recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in

certain contracts that neither party will do anything to deprive the other of the

benefit of the contract. . . . California courts have recently applied the duty created

by the implied covenant to the situation where the employee alleges no more than

long service and the existence of personnel policies or oral representations

showing an implied promise by the employer not to act arbitrarily in dealing with

its employees. 

Cancellier v. Federated Dep’t Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982). Specifically, “the

California courts [have] derived, from the implied- in-law covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, a requirement, under certain circumstances, that an at- will employee can only be

discharged for just cause.” Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076, 1077 (N.D.

Cal. 1982). 

Plaintiff alleges that she “was discharged from her positions for reasons extraneous to the

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

employment agreement, without good or sufficient cause, in violation of Defendant’s policy to

deal consistently and fairly with its employees . . . .” SACC at 146. Additionally, Plaintiff’s

fourth claim asserts the following:

During the entire course of Plaintiff’s implied-in-fact employment contract

between Plaintiff and Defendants, there existed an implied-in-fact employment

contract between Plaintiff and Defendants that . . . Plaintiff would not be demoted,

discharged or otherwise disciplined, nor would Plaintiff’s job functions be

reassigned for other than good cause with notice thereof. This employment

contract was evinced by various written documents, commendations, oral

representations to Plaintiff by Defendants’ (sic) agents and employees . . . .

SACC at 136. Plaintiff alleges that during her four years of employment, Defendant’s personnel

policies and oral representations led her to believe that her employment status would only change

for good cause. If proved this allegation would support a finding that an implied covenant of

good faith existed. Accordingly, Plaintiff may incorporate the necessary allegation in her fifth

claim.

IV. ORDER

As the discussion on pages 1-4 of this order suggests, the Court has been exceedingly

patient with Plaintiff’s attempts to plead her case, in large part because Plaintiff is proceeding

without counsel. However, there must be a limit to the number and scope of amendments

permitted. Each time leave to amend is granted, Defendant incurs additional costs of defense,

and the delay resulting from the necessity of motion hearings works to the detriment of both

parties. Accordingly, while leave to amend at this time will be granted, further requests for leave

will not be considered absent newly-discovered evidence. Plaintiff should assume that her next

amendment to her pleadings will be her last. Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED as set forth above. Any amended

complaint should be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.

DATED: November 20, 2007.

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Case No. C 05-3387

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Patrick C. Doolittle patrickdoolittle@quinnemanuel.com 

Scott G. Lawson scottlawson@quinnemanuel.com,

robertchang@quinnemanuel.com 

Notice will be delivered by other means to:

Mary Helen Woodson

475 Milan Drive, #102

San Jose, CA 95134

Case 5:05-cv-03387-JF Document 100 Filed 11/19/07 Page 12 of 12