Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02509/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02509-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MERCEDES PADILLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; CALIFORNIA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION; DEPARTMENT OF 

YOUTH AUTHORITY; DIVISION OF 

JUVENILE JUSTICE; DAN VALDEZ; 

ERIN BROCK; DONNIE ALEXANDER; 

DOE 1; DOE 2; DOE 3; DOE 4; 

DOES 5-25,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-02509-JAM-CKD

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 

GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff and alleged whistleblower Mercedes Padilla 

(“Padilla”) claims that her employers at the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations (“CDCR”) retaliated 

against her for reporting the misuse of federal grant money. 

Defendants seek dismissal of each of Padilla’s eight claims for 

relief. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part 

and denies in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1

 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for August 21, 2013.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts, alleged by Padilla, are assumed to be 

true for the purposes of this motion.

Padilla was employed at the Department of Youth Authority 

(“DYA”) and Division of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) of the CDCR for 

approximately thirty-three years. Compl. ¶ 13. At the end of 

her career, she was “a Volunteer Program Manager and 

Supervisor/Foster Grandparent Program.” Id.

Padilla is a Caucasian female who is over forty years old. 

Id. ¶ 14. She brings this claim against DYA, DJJ, and CDCR 

(collectively “Institutional Defendants”); Dan Valdez (“Valdez”), 

Erin Brock (“Brock”), and Donnie Alexander (“Alexander”) 

(collectively “Individual Defendants”), who were her supervisors 

at Institutional Defendants; and the State of California.

Padilla reported to the federal government that the CDCR, 

DYA, and DJJ were improperly using federal grant money to pay off 

state debt. Id. ¶ 14(a). In response, Individual Defendants 

ordered Padilla to cease communicating with the federal 

government and to continue with her grant activities, despite the 

fact that such activities were fraudulent. Id. ¶¶ 14(b)-(c). 

Individual Defendants reprimanded and retaliated against Padilla 

for blowing the whistle on the misuse of federal funds. Id.

¶ 14(d). Specifically, defendants overworked her; altered her 

work; refused to respond to her complaints; accused her of 

shredding federal documents, taking keys, and embezzling money; 

denied her health benefits and workers’ compensation benefits; 

and refused to allow her to enter the grounds of her work 

facility. Id. ¶ 14(e). Defendants also subjected Padilla to 

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verbal and physical abuse, denied her promotions and pay raises, 

and refused to fully investigate Padilla’s complaints or 

acknowledge her psychological suffering. Id. ¶¶ 14(f)-(i). When 

Padilla sought reassignment, Defendants refused to accommodate 

her. Id. ¶ 14(g). In light of these events, Padilla was forced 

to quit her job. Id. ¶ 14(j).

Padilla then filed the operative complaint in San Joaquin 

County Superior Court of California on November 13, 2015. Id. at 

1. The first cause of action alleges violation of Article 1, 

Section 8 of the California Constitution. Id. at 7. The second, 

third, and fifth causes of action allege, respectively, 

employment discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, in 

violation of 42 United States Code sections 2000e through 2000e17 (“Title VII”), 42 United States Code section 1981 (“Section 

1981”), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act 

(“FEHA”), California Government Code (“Government Code”) Section 

12900, et. seq. Id. at 8, 13, 14. The fourth cause of action 

alleges a failure to provide an environment free from harassment, 

in violation of Government Code section 12940(k). Id. at 13. 

Finally, causes of action six, seven, and eight respectively 

allege violations of public policy, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. Id. at 16, 18, 19. Each claim is submitted against 

all of the defendants. Padilla seeks general, incidental, and 

punitive damages. Id. at 20.

Defendants removed the case to federal court (Doc. #1) and 

moved to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, for a more 

definite statement (Doc. #5). Specifically, Defendants move to 

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dismiss all of the counts alleged against the State of 

California, arguing that Padilla failed to bring specific fact 

allegations against the state. Mot. at 3-4. Defendants further 

move to dismiss counts two, four, and five as against Individual 

Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. Id. at 4-6. Defendants move to dismiss claims for 

relief two, three, four, and five, arguing that the Court does 

not have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims because 

Padilla did not plead that she filed a timely administrative 

claim. Id. at 6-8. Finally, Defendants move to dismiss claims 

one, two, seven, and eight as against all defendants for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction because Padilla failed to plead 

compliance with the claim presentation requirements of the 

California Government Claims Act. Id. at 8-11. Alternatively, 

Defendants ask that the Court order Padilla to submit a more 

definite complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 

12(e). Id. at 11.

Padilla opposes dismissal and the motion for a more definite 

statement (Doc. #6).

II. OPINION

A. Analysis

1. Allegations Against the State of California

Defendants move to dismiss all claims against the State of 

California under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Defendants contend that Padilla 

has not alleged a “single fact allegation alleging wrongdoing on 

the part of the State of California, and therefore does not 

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state sufficient facts under any cognizable theory of recovery 

against the State.” Mot. at 3. In opposition, Padilla claims 

that the “State of California and its Agencies are identified 

individually” in the complaint. Opp. at 4. 

Padilla does, in fact makes multiple factual allegations 

against the State of California. Compl. ¶¶ 2-4, 10-11, 14-15, 

21, 26-29, 32, 34, 37, 39, 41, 44, 47-48. For example, Padilla 

alleges under her seventh cause of action that “Defendants and 

each of them abused their position of authority toward plaintiff 

and engaged in conduct intended to humiliate plaintiff.” Id. ¶

44. Under the third cause of action, Padilla alleges that 

“Defendants, and each of them, knew of these harassing actions . 

. . yet failed to take immediate or any appropriate corrective 

action.” Id. ¶ 34. The shorthand “defendants, and each of them” 

clearly includes the named defendant State of California. 

Defendants implicitly concede this point by not addressing 

Padilla’s argument in their Reply brief.

Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of 

the claims against the State of California because the Court 

finds that Padilla has sufficiently alleged facts against the 

State.

2. Individual Liability for Management Decisions

Defendants move for dismissal of the second, fourth, and 

fifth claims for relief as to the Individual Defendants on the 

basis that individual supervisors cannot be held liable for 

retaliation or for “discrimination based upon management 

decisions that they make as part of their job duties.” Mot. at 

4. Padilla opposes Defendants’ motion, arguing that “although 

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section 1981 does not directly state that retaliation claims are 

actionable, it is now settled law that section 1981 prohibits 

retaliation for filing a race discrimination claim (statutory or 

administrative) or opposing race discrimination.” Opp. at 5. 

In its Reply, Defendants clarify that “the second, fourth and 

fifth claims for relief should be dismissed as to the 

individually-named Defendants in as far as those claims are 

brought pursuant to the FEHA and/or Title VII.” Reply at 2 

(emphasis added). Thus, Defendants are moving to dismiss only 

the FEHA and Title VII claims brought against Individual 

Defendants in claims two, four, and five.

Defendants are correct that individual defendants cannot be 

found personally liable under FEHA or Title VII for 

discrimination or retaliation. With respect to FEHA, California 

law prohibits supervisors from being personally liable for 

discrimination or for retaliation. Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 

640, 663 (1998) (“[I]ndividuals who do not themselves qualify as 

employers may not be sued under the FEHA for alleged 

discriminatory acts.”); Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines P'ship, 

42 Cal.4th 1158, 1173 (2008) (finding that even if an the 

employer is liable for retaliation, “nonemployer individuals are 

not personally liable for their role in that retaliation.”). 

Similarly, employees “cannot be held liable in their individual 

capacities” for alleged violations of Title VII. Montero v. 

AGCO Corp., 19 F.Supp.2d 1143, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (granting 

summary judgment for plaintiff’s title VII claim against 

individual defendants); see also Ortez v. Washington Cty., State 

of Or., 88 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of 

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claims against individual employees because “employees cannot be 

held liable in their individual capacities under Title VII”).

Thus, the FEHA and Title VII claims brought against 

Individual Defendants in the second, fourth, and fifth causes of 

action are dismissed. The defects associated with the FEHA and 

Title VII claims against Individual Defendants cannot be cured 

by amendment, so dismissal is with prejudice. Eminence Capital, 

LLC v. Aspeon Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear on de novo review that the 

complaint could not be saved by amendment.”). 

3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants move to dismiss the second, third, fourth, and 

fifth claims for relief against all defendants under Rule 

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Padilla 

failed to plead that she filed her administrative relief claims 

in a timely manner. Mot. at 6-8. In opposition, Padilla argues 

that paragraph nine of the complaint, which states “Plaintiff 

filed her Government Claim against defendants and each of them 

and thereafter she filed a claim for violations of the FEHA with 

the Department of Fair Employment and Housing,” qualifies as 

pleading a timely filing of her administrative claims.

A plaintiffs’ FEHA claim must be filed with the Department 

of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) within one year from the 

date upon which the alleged unlawful action occurred. Cal. 

Gov’t. Code § 12960(d). If DFEH does not bring an action, it 

will provide the plaintiff with notice of his or her right to 

sue. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12965(b). The plaintiff must then bring 

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a private civil action within one year of receiving such notice. 

Id. Similarly, claims brought under Title VII must be filed 

within 180 after the alleged unlawful employment practice 

occurred or, if the plaintiff has initiated state proceedings, 

the earlier of 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice and 

thirty days after a state agency has terminated its review. 42 

U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(1).

Given these requirements, to properly plead a claim under 

Title VII and FEHA, plaintiff must plead that she timely filed an 

administrative claim. As it stands, the complaint does not 

allege that Padilla filed her administrative claims in a timely 

manner.

If Padilla filed her claims in a timely fashion, then the 

complaint can easily be amended to reflect the timeliness of her 

claims. Thus, the Court grants the motion to dismiss claims two, 

three, four, and five, with leave to amend. Eminence Capital, 

316 F.3d at 1052 (“Absent prejudice . . . there exists a 

presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to 

amend.”).

4. Compliance with the Government Claims Act

Defendants move to dismiss Padilla’s first, sixth, seventh, 

and eighth claims for relief for failure to comply with the 

Government Claims Act. Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 900 et. seq. 

Specifically, Defendants argue that the complaint does not set 

forth facts that show either that Padilla filed a timely 

complaint with the pertinent public entities or that she filed 

this lawsuit in a timely manner. Mot. at 8-10. In opposition, 

Padilla again argues that the allegation in paragraph nine of 

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the complaint, which sufficiently pleads compliance with the 

Government Claims Act. Opp. at 6.

California law requires that “no suit for money or damages 

may be brought against a public entity . . . until a written 

claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has 

been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been 

rejected by the board.” Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4. California 

law requires that tort claims made against a public entity must 

be presented to that entity “not later than six months after the

accrual of the cause of action.” Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2. If 

the entity rejects the claim, the plaintiff then has six months 

after notice of the rejection to file a claim in federal or 

state court. Cal. Gov’t. Code §945.6. “Failure to timely 

present a claim . . . to a public entity bars a plaintiff from 

filing a lawsuit against that entity.” City of Stockton v. 

Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 (2007).

The complaint contains no allegation that Padilla met the 

time requirements set out in the Government Claims Act. The 

Court thus grants the motion to dismiss claims one, six, seven, 

and eight, with leave to amend.

5. Section 1981 Claims

Finally, Defendants raised a new argument in their reply 

brief that Padilla’s second, third, fifth, and sixth causes of 

action should be dismissed insofar as they are based on Section 

1981 because employment in California is held by statute, not by 

contract. Reply at 3-4. New arguments cannot be raised in 

reply briefs, at least partly because it prevents the opposing 

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party from having an opportunity to respond. Zamani v. Carnes, 

491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not 

consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply 

brief.”). As such, the Court has not considered this argument.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court: DENIES

Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of the claims against the State 

of California; GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the FEHA and Title VII claims brought against Individual 

Defendants under the second, fourth, and fifth causes of action; 

GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims 

two, three, four, and five; and GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims one, six, seven, and eight. 

Padilla’s amended complaint must be filed within twenty (20) 

days from the date of this order. Defendants’ responsive 

pleadings are due within twenty (20) days thereafter. The Court 

advises that failure to cure the defects identified in this Order 

may be grounds for dismissal without further leave to amend. 

Dick v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., CIV. 2:13-00201 WBS, 

2013 WL 5299180, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2016

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