Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01804/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01804-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROBERT WILLIAM MARSHALL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-01804 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On September 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Petitioner filed an amended petition on March 17, 2008.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 10) on June 5, 2008. Respondents

argue the action for habeas relief was not timely filed and,

therefore, that the petition must be denied and dismissed with

prejudice. 

I Procedural History

On June 19, 1997, in CR2006-90796, pursuant to a plea

agreement and his prior entry of a guilty plea, judgment was

entered and Petitioner was sentenced on one count of attempted

sexual conduct with a minor and one count of child molestation,

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1 At the time of the hearing the state court noted it had

previously denied Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel and that the hearing was only in regard to whether Petitioner

knew at the time he entered his guilty plea to Count III that any

prison term imposed would be served as “flat” time. See Answer, Exh.

C.

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involving a child under the age of 15 years old, his biological

daughter, over a period of one and a half years. Answer, Exh.

A & Exh. B (respectively Count I and Count III of the four-count

indictment). Petitioner was sentenced to a term of ten years

imprisonment on the charge of child molestation, the mandatory

minimum sentence, followed by lifetime probation pursuant to his

conviction for attempted sexual conduct with a minor. Id., Exh.

B. 

On February 9, 2000, in an action seeking

post-conviction relief after conducting an evidentiary hearing,

the Arizona trial court vacated Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences and remanded his case for trial. Id., Exh. C.1

Petitioner was released on bond pending his re-trial. Id., Exh.

C. 

On August 25, 2000, Petitioner entered a guilty plea in

CR2006-90796 to one count of child molestation and one count of

attempted sexual conduct with a minor. See id., Exh. D. On

January 17, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 13 years

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for child molestation

and to a consecutive term of lifetime probation pursuant to his

conviction for attempted sexual conduct with a minor, with

credit for 1,328 days of pre-sentence incarceration. Id., Exh.

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2

 An excerpted transcript of Petitioner’s re-sentencing was

attached to Petitioner’s action for state post-conviction relief

stating a Blakely claim. See Answer, Exh. J. The transcript reveals

the sentencing judge indicated they were considering as an additional

aggravating factor the fact that Petitioner was the victim’s father.

As establishing a basis for the increased sentence, the re-sentencing

court also found that the known impact on the victim was greater than

original perceived and that it had become apparent that Petitioner had

lied about the “relationship.” The sentencing court stated these

additional aggravating factors were not known to the original

sentencing court.

3

 The petition asserts it is premised on a change in the

law. The petition asserts a claim that Petitioner’s guilty plea was

not knowing and voluntary because he was not informed of his right to

have a jury determine the facts regarding his guilt and that his

sentence was improper because it was based on facts not found by a

jury. The petition for Rule 32 relief also asserts Petitioner was

entitled to post-conviction relief because his counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective.

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D.2

On April 6, 2001, Petitioner initiated an action for

state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner’s appointed

post-conviction counsel filed a pleading in the state court

averring that he could find no colorable claims to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. F. The state trial court

extended the time allowed Petitioner to file a pro per petition

in his Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. G. When no petition was filed

by the time allowed by the court, it dismissed the Rule 32

proceeding for Petitioner’s failure to prosecute his claims.

See id., Exhs. H-I.

Petitioner filed another action for state postconviction relief on July 19, 2005,3 which was dismissed by the

state trial court as untimely. Id., Exhs. J & K. The state

court rejected Petitioner’s claim that Blakely rendered his

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petition timely-filed. Id., Exh. K. 

Petitioner also filed a state Rule 32 action on

February 14, 2006, which was dismissed pursuant to his motion on

May 12, 2006. Id., Exh. L. On June 18, 2007, Petitioner filed

yet another action seeking state post-conviction relief, which

the state trial court dismissed on July 12, 2007, noting it was

Petitioner’s fifth Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. M. The state

trial court found that action for post-conviction relief to be

untimely and also stated Petitioner’s claims, including claims

of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, were precluded as

waived by his failure to raise them earlier. Id., Exh. M. 

One week later, on July 19, 2007, Petitioner again

filed another Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. N. In a decision

issued August 28, 2007, the state trial court dismissed that

action as untimely and as stating precluded claims. Id., Exh.

N. 

Petitioner filed his federal petition for habeas corpus

relief on September 20, 2007. He filed his amended Petition on

March 17, 2008. Petitioner asserts his convictions and

sentences were entered in violation of his right to due process

of law, including judicial and prosecutorial misconduct in his

2000 and 2001 sentencing proceedings. Petitioner also alleges

he was denied his right to a speedy trial and his right to the

effective assistance of counsel. 

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II Analysis

Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). However, the AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 &

Supp. 2008). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.

Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053

(9th Cir. 2008).

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final on or about April 17, 2001, ninety days after his

re-sentencing, when the time expired for timely seeking state

post-conviction relief from this entry of judgment and resentencing. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir.

2007) (holding that, in Arizona, the statute of limitations

began to run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right

proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”).

Petitioner had one year from that date, i.e., until April 17,

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2002, to seek federal habeas relief, not counting any time

during which the statute of limitations was statutorily tolled

by the pendency of a properly-filed state action for postconviction relief. Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Petitioner filed a notice of his intent to seek state

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, on April 6, 2001. Accordingly, the statute

of limitations regarding Petitioner’s federal habeas action was

tolled until the conclusion of Petitioner’s proceedings

regarding his Rule 32 petition. See id. The action for postconviction relief concluded on October 9, 2001, when the state

Superior Court dismissed Petitioner’s action for post-conviction

relief. The statute of limitations was further tolled for a

period of thirty days, until November 8, 2001, when the time for

appealing the Superior Court’s dismissal of the Rule 32 action

to the Arizona Court of Appeals expired. See Gibson v. Klinger,

232 F.3d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, we hold today

that, regardless of whether a petitioner actually appeals a

denial of a post-conviction application, the limitations period

is tolled during the period in which the petitioner could have

sought an appeal under state law.”); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d

417, 420-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, because a judgment is

not final until the time for seeking review expires, the word

“pending” includes that time period, whether or not such review

is sought, and collecting cases so holding). See also

Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 266 (5th Cir. 2002)

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(collecting cases so holding). 

The one-year statute of limitations on Petitioner’s

federal habeas action ran from November 9, 2001, and expired on

November 9, 2002. Petitioner did not have any properly filed

action for state post-conviction relief pending in the Arizona

state courts throughout that time period. Petitioner’s 2005

action for state post-conviction relief could not and did not

re-start the expired statute of limitations regarding his

federal habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333

(11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th

Cir. 2000). A state-court petition that is filed after the

expiration of the statute of limitations under the AEDPA does

not revive the running of the limitations period. See Jiminez

v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson,

262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256

F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the untimely-filed

petition did not toll the statute of limitations because a state

petition that is not filed within the state’s required time

limit is not “properly filed.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12 (2005)

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Harris,

515 F.3d at 1053-54 & n.4; Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800

(9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

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determined that equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a

federal habeas petition is available only if extraordinary

circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055-56

(discussing standard and holding equitable tolling was warranted

when the petitioner had relied on prior Circuit Court of Appeals

precedent regarding the timely filing of his petition); Malcom

v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling

is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055 (stating a

petitioner’s “oversight, miscalculation,” or “negligence” would

not warrant equitable tolling); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

A federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling

must also act with “reasonable” diligence throughout the period

he seeks to toll. See e.g., Bryant v. Arizona Attorney Gen.,

499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007); Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d

111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d

Cir. 1999). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that

equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See Bryant, 499

F.3d at 1059-60 (holding the petitioner must establish a causal

connection between the cause of his delay and the delay itself).

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the cause for his failure

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to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace, 544 U.S. at

418-19; 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding that the petitioner was

not entitled to equitable tolling because he was misled or

confused about timing of exhausting his state remedies and

filing his federal habeas petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410

F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Each of the cases in which

equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful

conduct, either by state officials or, occasionally, by the

petitioner’s counsel.”). Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed.

App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333

(2006); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002).

 Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the

statute of limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the

filing of his federal habeas petition. A petitioner’s pro se

status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716

(5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s

“rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not

justify equitable tolling”). 

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

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this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Marshall’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

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recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 15th day of July, 2008.

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