Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01787/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01787-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN E. GLENN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DONALD RUMSFELD, et al.

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-01787 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR

HEARING

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR THE HEARING SCHEDULED ON

FEBRUARY 17, 2006:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and does not

wish to hear argument summarizing the positions taken in those briefs. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at

the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the

citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. Cf. N.D. Civil Local

Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance

on such authority. The parties shall not file written responses to the questions posed in this

notice.

The Court tentatively GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s

motion. The parties shall be prepared to address the following questions at the hearing:

1. To the extent Glenn’s claims are based on the assertion that the USMC did not

follow the correct procedures before decertifying him, if the Court concluded it

could not review the substantive aspect of the decision, would such a finding bar

consideration of any challenge to the procedures used in reaching the decision? 

If not, why should this issue not be resolved after discovery is complete?

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2. a. Glenn argues that “the implementing regulations from the Military

Department Secretaries give ample criteria for judging the continuing

certification of a JROTC instructor.” What are these criteria?

b. If the Defendants’ decision had been based on criteria set forth in

MCJROTC SOP § 3002.1, it seems that the Court would have a

“meaningful standard” by which to review the decision. However,

Defendants’ decision was based on the “best interests” language. How

does Plaintiff distinguish the holding of Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592

(1988), in which the Supreme Court said substantially similar language

did not provide a meaningful standard for a Court to review an agency

decision? Does Glenn have any authority supporting the proposition that

“in the best interests” language provides a “meaningful standard” by

which this Court could review Defendants’ decision? 

c. In Webster, the Supreme Court appeared to find significant the fact that

the provision of the National Security Act at issue allowed termination of

an employee whenever the Director “‘shall deem such termination

necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States,’ not simply

when the dismissal is necessary or advisable to those interests.” Webster,

486 U.S. at 600 (emphasis in original). MCJROTC SOP § 3002.1 does

not contain similar “shall deem” language. Do Defendants have any

authority, other than Webster, in which a court has found language similar

to section 3002.1 to render an agency action non-reviewable? 

d. Does Defendants’ Ex. 4 provide any further guidance on criteria used in

the certification and decertification process. The Court requests that

Defendants provide a complete copy of this Exhibit at the hearing.

3. Can Glenn raise a challenge to the decertification decision to the appropriate

Board of Military Corrections? If so, how would this affect the Court’s

evaluation of Defendants’ motion?

4. a. The Court presumes that the allegations with respect to the Privacy Act

violations are set forth in paragraph 22.A-Q of the Complaint. It is

unclear to the Court, however, whether the chronology relates to multiple

privacy act requests or renewed requests to the Defendants to respond to

the original request dated June 16, 2003. Accordingly, at the hearing, as

to each Privacy Act request made, Glenn shall be prepared to set forth the

date it was made, the date it was denied, the date it was appealed, and the

date the appeal was made final, either by a formal denial or by inaction.

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b. Does Glenn dispute that he did not appeal the March 1, 2005 response by

Captain Korzilius, which was made in compliance with Captain

Whitaker’s response to Glenn’s August 9, 2004 appeal? If not, what is

Glenn’s best argument that he has exhausted his administrative remedies

for purposes of his Privacy Act claim?

c. To the extent Glenn’s Privacy Act claim seeks correction of his records,

in addition to production of records, is there a meaningful difference

between what Glenn would be required to do to exhaust administrative

remedies for purposes of his Privacy Act claim and the requirement in

Mindes of “exhaustion of intraservice remedies” with respect to his APA

claim? If so, what is that difference?

5. a. Defendants cite Norris v. Lehman, 845 F.2d 283 (11th Cir. 1988), for the

proposition that the decision to decertify is a military decision and the

Mindes test applies to preclude review of Glenn’s APA claim. In Norris,

however, the Court applied the Feres doctrine to bar a Bivens claim based

on facts analogous to this case. In Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit applied to the Feres doctrine to bar tort and

constitutional claims brought by a member of the Alaska national guard

based on the termination of his tour of duty. Are Defendants asking the

Court to apply the Feres doctrine to Glenn’s due process claims?

b. How would Glenn distinguish the holding in Bowen that because the

plaintiff’s discharge in that case “implicate[d] ‘inherently military

concerns,’” the decision to discharge him was non-justiciable?

c. If the Feres doctrine does not apply to bar Glenn’s due process claims,

what is Defendants’ best argument that there is no due process violation,

given the allegations that led to the decertification? See, e.g., Llamas v.

Butte Community College Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001)

(recognizing that due process protections can apply if a plaintiff is

subjected to “stigma plus, i.e. if the state makes a charge against [a

plaintiff] that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the

community,” and “1) the accuracy of the charge is contested, 2) there is

some public disclosure of the charge, and 3) it is made in connection with

the termination of employment or the alteration of some right or status

recognized by state law”).

6. Under the MCJROTC SOP, certification of an instructor takes place every four

years. Do Defendants’ contend that Glenn had no legitimate claim of entitlement

to certification even during a given four year period, because MCJROTC SOP §

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3002.1 states that “in addition, instructor certification may be withdrawn at the

discretion of the CG, MCCDC C 46), if revocation of the certification is in the

best interest of the Marine Corps?” See, e.g., Greenwood v. Federal Aviation

Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that because there was no

automatic renewal of benefit in question, no property interest existed).

7. Are there any other issues the parties wish to address?

Dated: February 16, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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