Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00176/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00176-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORENZO GREGGE, JR., No. CIV S-09-2561-GEB-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following supervisory personnel as defendants: Susan

Hubbard, the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”);

Matthew Kate, the Secretary of the CDCR; and James Yates, the warden of Pleasant Valley State

Prison. Plaintiff also names the CDCR as a defendant. 

Plaintiff alleges generally that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

health and safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he claims that he was

exposed to and eventually contracted “Valley Fever” while at Pleasant Valley State Prison. As to

defendant Hubbard, plaintiff claims that she is liable because “[s]he is legally responsible for the

overall operation of the Department and each institution under its jurisdiction, including Pleasant

Valley State Prison.” He asserts that, upon learning of the existence of Valley Fever at the

prison, defendant Hubbard should have shut down the institution. As to defendant Kate, plaintiff

alleges he is liable because “[h]e is legally responsible for the care, custody, treatment, training,

discipline, and employment of inmates. . . .” As to defendant Yates, plaintiff claims that he is

liable by virtue of his role as prison warden. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the individual

defendants personally participated in any constitutional deprivation. 

/ / /

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II. DISCUSSION

At the outset, the court observes that the CDCR is not a proper defendant. The

Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against a state both by

its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley

Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition extends to suits against states

themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248

(9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A state’s

agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state agency for purposes of

the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v.

Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th cir. 1993) (en banc).

As to the remaining defendants – who are all supervisory personnel – the court

finds that plaintiff has not stated a claim. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under

§ 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only

liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant

can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct

because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for

his or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. 

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Here, plaintiff has not alleged any actual conduct by any of the individual

supervisory defendants. Rather, plaintiff’s allegations assert the garden variety respondeat

superior theory of liability. As discussed above, such a theory is insufficient in civil rights

actions. Specifically, plaintiff’s theory that defendants were aware of constitutional violations

but failed to act has been rejected by the Supreme Court. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. This action be dismissed;

2. All pending motions be denied as moot; and

3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 24, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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