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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0037p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

KATHRYN POLLARD, Individually and as the 

Executrix of the Estate of Abram Bynum, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO; NATHAN AMSTUTZ;

EMANUEL EDWARDS; WILLIAM EDWARDS; JAMES 

ESTEPP; TIMOTHY O’DONNELL; MICHAEL YINGER, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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No. 13-4142 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. 

No. 2:11-cv-00286—Algenon L. Marbley, District Judge. 

Argued: January 16, 2015 

Decided and Filed: March 5, 2015 

BEFORE: McKEAGUE and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.*

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Paula J. Lloyd, CITY OF COLUMBUS, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. J. Eric 

Holloway, ERIC HOLLOWAY LAW GROUP, LLC, Dublin, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: 

Paula J. Lloyd, Pamela J. Gordon, CITY OF COLUMBUS, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. J. 

Eric Holloway, ERIC HOLLOWAY LAW GROUP, LLC, Dublin, Ohio, for Appellee. 

 *

The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, 

sitting by designation. 

>

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No. 13-4142 Pollard v. City of Columbus, et al. Page 2 

_________________ 

OPINION

_________________ 

 McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. On July 7, 2009, a rape suspect led Columbus, Ohio 

police officers on a highway car chase before crossing the median, accelerating the wrong 

way, and ramming head on into a semitrailer. Officers surrounded the suspect’s car and 

fatally shot the suspect after he reached down into the car, despite police commands to “show 

his hands,” and then clasped his hands into a shooting posture, pointing them at the officers. 

The suspect’s mother, Kathryn Pollard, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the officers, 

alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We reverse the district 

court’s denial of qualified immunity because the suspect’s conduct gave the officers probable 

cause to believe the suspect had a gun and thereby posed a threat of serious physical harm. 

I.

 During the summer of 2007, Abram Bynum became a suspect in several rapes around 

Los Angeles, California. A swab of Bynum’s DNA matched samples from five different 

crime scenes, and a warrant was issued for Bynum’s arrest on several charges, including 

forcible rape, assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and kidnapping. Because Bynum had 

moved to Columbus, Ohio, where his twin brother lived, the Columbus Division of Police 

(CPD) was called to assist with the arrest. 

 On the morning of July 7, 2009, a team of Columbus officers, including Michael Yinger 

and John O’Donnell, began surveillance on Bynum. L.A. detectives were scheduled to arrive in 

Columbus that afternoon, and the plan was to arrest Bynum following their arrival. The team set 

up outside the brothers’ apartment and tracked the brothers as they drove around Columbus 

before returning to their apartment at 3:35 PM. While the brothers were in the apartment, Yinger 

and another officer phoned supervisor Sergeant Terry McConnell. McConnell told the officers to 

arrest Bynum and detain his brother if they left again. Moments later, the brothers left the 

apartment, driving in separate vehicles and in different directions. 

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 The surveillance team split up and Yinger and O’Donnell began following Bynum from 

their unmarked vehicle. As they drove, McConnell radioed for a marked cruiser to make the 

arrest. The arrest charges, McConnell explained, were out of the sexual abuse squad and Bynum 

was potentially armed. Nathan Amstutz, driving in Cruiser 91, responded and drove behind 

Bynum’s Cadillac, his lights and siren activated. Bynum refused to stop, leading Amstutz 

through several streets and running five stop signs. Two other cruisers, Cruiser 144 carrying 

James Estepp and Curtis Kinney and Cruiser 143 carrying William Edwards and Emanuel 

Edwards, later joined the pursuit. At this point, a total of four vehicles were following Bynum—

the surveillance car with Yinger and O’Donnell and the three cruisers with Amstutz, Estepp, 

Kinney, W. Edwards, and E. Edwards. 

Around 3:55 PM, Bynum entered I-70 East, zigzagging through highway traffic. Bynum 

drove for some time before eventually crossing the median. But instead of making a U-turn, 

Bynum drove against traffic down I-70 West and accelerated toward a semitrailer in the center 

lane. The semitrailer swerved to avoid Bynum but Bynum swerved to meet it, leading to a headon collision. The Cadillac spun to a halt on the inside shoulder. The car’s front end was badly 

damaged, the car’s hood was jammed upward, the doors were smashed in, and the windows were 

shattered. 

After the collision, the cruisers and surveillance car approached the Cadillac as it was 

radioed that the Cadillac’s driver had a concealed-carry permit, information which later proved 

false as the permit was possessed by Bynum’s brother. Video from Cruiser 91’s dashboard 

camera shows that Kinney and Estepp were the first on the scene (15:59:121

). Seconds later, 

Amstutz exited his cruiser and approached as well (15:59:15). Amstutz and Estepp stood on the 

driver’s side while Kinney stood on the passenger’s side (15:59:23). The video shows the 

officers peering into the Cadillac and two officers unsuccessfully trying to open the car doors 

(15:59:28). One officer can also be seen sticking his hands through the passenger-side window 

(15:59:28). 

 1

The clock on Cruiser 91’s dashboard camera was not adjusted for Daylight Savings Time. Appellant Br. 

14 n.3. As a result, the times on the video are one hour behind the actual times. The times used in this opinion are 

the actual times, not the times on the video. 

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Yinger and O’Donnell next approached while Amstutz radioed that Bynum appeared 

unconscious and that Amstutz would leave to check on the semitrailer driver (15:59:33). Then 

the video shows the officers surrounding the Cadillac all take a pronounced step away from the 

Cadillac (15:59:52), in apparent response to Bynum moving inside. The inside of the Cadillac 

and any movement from Bynum are not visible from the video. 

According to the officers’ testimony and eyewitness reports, after Bynum regained 

consciousness, he reached down into the Cadillac. Several described Bynum appearing to reach 

toward the floorboard as though searching for something. (See R. 33-5, Page ID # 338, ¶ 29; R. 

33-8, Page ID # 349, ¶ 25; R. 51-15, Page ID # 1383.) The officers ordered Bynum to “show his 

hands.” But instead of showing his open palms, Bynum extended his arms and clasped2 his 

hands into a shooting posture, pointed at the officers. Several officers called out “Don’t do it” 

and a civilian eyewitness heard one officer order Bynum to “Drop it.” Bynum responded by 

reaching down into the Cadillac again before making the same shooting posture. (See R. 33-5, 

Page ID # 338, ¶ 30; R. 33-8, Page ID # 350, ¶ 29.) At 16:00:06, roughly eight seconds after 

Bynum’s initial movement, Yinger and O’Donnell shot at Bynum. The volley lasted roughly 

three seconds. 

After the volley, Amstutz, E. Edwards, and W. Edwards raced in, weapons drawn. 

(16:00:20.) According to the officers and eyewitnesses, Bynum again reached down into the 

Cadillac and pointed his hands in the clasped shooting posture. (See R. 33-13, Page ID # 385.) 

A second volley of shots was then fired at 16:00:21 by Yinger, Estepp, Amstutz, E. Edwards, 

and W. Edwards.3

In total, the officers fired 80 shots at Bynum, killing him. The autopsy report states that 

23 of the bullets struck Bynum. No gun was ever recovered from the Cadillac. 

 2

The district court refers to Bynum as pointing a set of “cupped hands” at the officers. However, the 

officers all describe Bynum’s hands as being “clasped” with several adding that Bynum’s hands were clasped “as if 

he had a gun,” “in a shooting posture,” or “like when we’re practicing shooting.” One officer, Estepp, does state 

that Bynum’s “left hand cupped his right hand” but also explains that the hands were “clasped together in a shooting 

posture.” 

3

The district court states that only four officers (Yinger, Amstutz, E. Edwards, and E. Edwards) fired in the 

second volley. (R. 66, Page ID # 2165.) However, Estepp clearly states in his affidavit that he fired in the second 

volley, (“I fired my service weapon to eliminate that threat,” (R. 33-8, ¶ 30)), but not in the first volley, (“I did not 

shoot.” (R. 33-8, ¶ 28)). 

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 Kathryn Pollard, Bynum’s mother, brought this § 1983 claim as administrator of her 

son’s estate. Pollard also brought a Monell claim against the City of Columbus and state-law 

claims against the officers, including wrongful death. The officers and the City moved for 

summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as to all state-law claims except for 

wrongful death and denied the motion on the § 1983 and Monell claims, declining to grant 

qualified immunity. This interlocutory appeal followed. 

II.

A. 

The threshold question we face is whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the 

officers’ interlocutory appeal. Pollard claims we do not and has filed a motion to dismiss 

this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Ordinarily, the denial of summary judgment is not a 

“final order” and thus not immediately appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But under the 

“collateral order” doctrine, any summary judgment order denying qualified immunity is 

immediately appealable to the extent it is “based on a pure issue of law.” Leary v. Livingston 

Cnty., 528 F.3d 438, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2008). 

The district court denied the officers summary judgment, finding a “genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether Defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable.” We, however, are 

not bound by a district court’s findings when deciding the availability of our own jurisdiction. 

See Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2009). Pollard disagrees. 

Pointing to Romo v. Largen, 793 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2013), she argues an appeals court must

accept a district court’s findings of genuine dispute. 

But in Romo, the dispute barring summary judgment was a classic factual dispute. That 

is, a dispute over which set of facts to believe: whether the officer saw the arrestee’s pickup pass 

a semitanker before arresting him or whether the officer made the story up. Id. at 674. Under 

those circumstances, the Romo court was properly bound by the district court’s finding that 

competing factual narratives existed and that it could not, at summary judgment, choose between 

them. Id. 

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Unlike in Romo, we are not presented with “dueling accounts of what happened.” Id. at 

670. Pollard asserts that, at the time the officers fired, Bynum was unarmed, injured, and trapped 

in the Cadillac. However, the officers do not dispute that account. See Appellant Br. at 20 

(Bynum in auto accident involving injury), 37 (no gun in the Cadillac), 51 (Bynum could not 

escape). They simply maintain that, despite being unarmed, injured, and trapped, Bynum was 

still a threat, first, because he appeared to have a gun and, second, because they had strong 

reason to believe he would use the gun. Because the officers “concede the facts in the light most 

favorable to [the appellee], they “raise a pure issue of law,” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479 

(6th Cir. 2010), which this court may entertain on appeal. Thus, we deny Pollard’s motion to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction with respect to the officer–defendants. 

B.

 Because a municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity, Owen v. City of 

Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980), the collateral order doctrine does not extend to 

summary-judgment orders on municipal-liability claims. Nevertheless, to the extent the 

issues raised in the City of Columbus’s appeal are “inextricably intertwined” with the 

officers’ claims of qualified immunity, we may exercise pendent jurisdiction over the appeal. 

See Meals v. City of Memphis, 493 F.3d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007). 

The deprivation of a constitutional right is a prerequisite to municipal liability under 

§ 1983. See Weeks v. Portage Cnty. Exec. Offices, 235 F.3d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus, 

there is a clear connection between the City’s appeal and the officers’ claims of qualified 

immunity. If the officers did not commit a constitutional violation, Pollard’s municipal-liability 

claim necessarily fails because the prerequisite for municipal liability is not met. Conversely, if 

the officers committed a constitutional violation, the prerequisite has been met and Pollard can 

proceed with her claim against the City. As such, the City’s appeal is “inextricably intertwined” 

with the officers’ appeal, and Pollard’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED 

with respect to the City. 

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III.

A. 

Turning to the merits, we review de novo a district court’s order denying qualifying 

immunity. Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996). “Qualified 

immunity gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly 

incompetent of those who knowingly violate the law.” Chappell, 585 F.3d at 907. The first 

step in a qualified immunity analysis is to ask whether the public official’s conduct violated 

a constitutional right. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). If a constitutional 

right was violated, the second step is to ask whether the right was clearly established at the 

time of the violation, such that “a reasonable officer confronted with the same situation 

would have known that using deadly force would violate that right.” Chappell, 585 F.3d at 

907. Because we conclude Bynum’s constitutional rights were not violated, we reach only 

step one of the analysis. 

B.

To start, “[e]ach defendant’s liability must be assessed individually based on his own 

actions.” Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010). “To hold an officer liable 

for the use of excessive force, a plaintiff must prove that the officer (1) actively participated 

in the use of excessive force, (2) supervised the officer who used excessive force, or 

(3) owed the victim a duty of protection against the use of excessive force.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). Here, the district court failed to conduct this individualized analysis, instead 

observing that the officers’ aggregate conduct could be found to violate the Fourth 

Amendment. (See R. 66, Page ID # 2168.) Although an individualized analysis does not 

make a difference on these facts, it must still be done to ensure that a defendant’s liability is 

assessed based on his own individual conduct and not the conduct of others. See Binay, 

601 F.3d at 650. 

Here, the individualized analysis shows each officer–defendant actively participated in 

the use of force. Each officer confirms, by affidavit or by deposition, that he shot at Bynum—

Yinger and O’Donnell during the first volley and O’Donnell, Estepp, Amstutz, E. Edwards, and 

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W. Edwards during the second. Moreover, each officer when deciding to shoot was operating 

under the same universe of facts regarding Bynum. The officers were all listening to the same 

police radio and following Bynum as he sped along I-70 and crashed into the semitrailer. Thus, 

each officer can be held liable if the force against Bynum was indeed excessive. 

C.

 Pollard alleges that the officers’ use of force was excessive and, specifically, that it 

violated a key teaching from Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985): that “a police officer 

may not use deadly force simply to prevent the escape of a felony suspect.” Id. at 1. 

Pollard’s claim is “properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective 

reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 

 Ultimately, her claim fails because she assumes Bynum was shot to prevent his escape. 

But as the officers explain in affidavits and deposition testimony, their concern was not that 

Bynum would escape. To the contrary, the officers knew Bynum would not escape, given his 

injuries and the damage to the Cadillac. Appellant Br. at 51. They shot because, after Bynum 

repeatedly made a shooting gesture, they thought he had a gun and considered him a threat. As 

one officer explained, “I immediately fired my rifle at Bynum because I believed he posed a 

serious, immediate, deadly threat to me and the other officers.” (R. 33-5, Page ID # 338.) 

Garner establishes that “law enforcement officers may employ deadly force where the 

officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, 

either to the officer or to others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). Thus, if the record 

shows the officers had probable cause to believe Bynum posed a serious threat, their use of 

deadly force was constitutionally permissible. In making this assessment of probable cause, we 

must consider “the totality of the circumstances,” Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 467 (6th 

Cir. 2006), “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 

vision of hindsight,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

 Here, the totality of the circumstances clearly gave the officers probable cause to believe 

Bynum threatened their safety. The officers knew from police radio that Bynum was wanted on 

serious rape charges and was potentially armed, and they were told he had a concealed-carry 

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permit. That Bynum was actually unarmed and did not have a permit is beside the point; what 

matters is the reasonableness of the officers’ belief as they “did not and could not have known” 

otherwise. See Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1991). Additionally, the officers 

knew Bynum was determined to avoid arrest, even at the expense of others’ safety and his own 

life. In fact, Bynum was so determined to avoid arrest he chose to engage in a high-speed car 

chase and drive head-on into a semitrailer rather than surrender. Bynum “had proven he would 

do almost anything to avoid capture.” Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992). As 

such, the officers could reasonably “assume he would not stop at threatening others.” Id. 

 Pollard suggests Bynum did not “pose any threat after his vehicle collided head on with 

[the] tanker trailer, as he sat (apparently unconscious) in his disabled vehicle, without a weapon.” 

Appellee Br. at 41. But the officers did not shoot Bynum while he sat unconscious in the 

Cadillac. They shot after a dramatic change in circumstances—after Bynum regained 

consciousness and made gestures suggesting he had a weapon, gestures he continued to make 

even after officers told him to “Drop it” and “Don’t do it.” It is these facts immediately 

preceding the shooting which weigh most heavily in assessing the officers’ split-second decision 

to shoot. See Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 289, 792 (4th Cir. 1991), cited with approval in 

Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1162. 

The “tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving” nature of the altercation with Bynum is 

apparent from the video. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. When the officers think Bynum is 

unconscious, they approach without hesitation, peering through the windows and attempting to 

open the car doors. Then suddenly, the officers all take a pronounced step back, startled by 

something inside the Cadillac. As the officers attest, what startled them was Bynum’s sudden 

movement, forcing them to quickly assess the threat Bynum posed and to quickly conclude that 

Bynum posed a threat even in his injured, immobilized state. If Bynum had a gun, as the officers 

reasonably thought he did, they were at risk of serious injury or death and thus could reasonably 

consider Bynum a threat. See Freland, 954 F.2d at 347 (“[H]ad [the suspect] in fact retrieved a 

gun from his seat, he could have caused injury or death despite the presence of numerous police 

officers.” (quoting Reese, 926 F.2d at 501). 

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Because the undisputed record shows the officers had probable cause for believing that Bynum 

posed a threat of serious harm, the use of deadly force was constitutionally permissible. 

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. 

IV.

 We readily dispose of Pollard’s two remaining claims, starting with her claim of 

municipal liability. She alleges the City has a policy of authorizing deadly force against a 

suspect “based upon merely alleged failure to follow commands, when no weapon has been 

observed,” and that this policy is what led to Bynum’s death. But as the City correctly 

observes, the constitutional violation of a municipal official is a prerequisite to municipal 

liability. See Weeks, 235 F.3d at 279. Because the officers did not commit a violation of 

Bynum’s constitutional rights, Pollard’s claim of municipal liability must fail and the district 

court’s denial of summary judgment on that claim is reversed. 

 Lastly, Pollard brings a state-law claim for wrongful death against the officers. Ohio law 

grants immunity to an employee of a political subdivision if, inter alia, “[t]he employee’s acts or 

omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Ohio 

Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary 

judgment, holding that a jury could find the officers’ decision to shoot reckless. If the officers 

were objectively reasonable in shooting Bynum, it logically follows that they could not have 

been reckless in shooting Bynum. Accordingly, we reverse.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of the officers and 

the City’s motions for summary judgment. 

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