Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00126/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00126-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARVEY CURTIS BAKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES A. YATES,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00126-LJO-SAB

ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT AND REQUIRING PLAINTIFF 

EITHER TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 

OR TO NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS 

TO PROCEED ONLY ON CLAIMS 

IDENTIFIED HEREIN

(ECF NO. 50)

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff Harvey Curtis Baker (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil 

rights action against Defendants James A. Yates and Unidentified Correctional Officer Jane Doe 

#1 (“Defendants”). The operative complaint in this matter is the “State Tort Complaint” filed by 

Plaintiff on March 14, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the “Complaint”). (ECF No. 50.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff states some cognizable 

claims and will order Plaintiff either to amend his complaint or to notify the Court that he wishes 

to proceed only on the claims identified herein.

I.

SCREENING

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 

“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to 

survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual 

detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, 

and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was a prisoner within the custody of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and incarcerated at California 

State Prison-Pleasant Valley (“PVSP”). (Compl. ¶ 8.) Defendant James A. Yates is the warden 

at PVSP. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Defendant Unidentified Correctional Officer Jane Doe #1 (“Jane Doe 

#1”) is a correctional officer at PVSP. (Compl. ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff alleges that PVSP had been on a “lock-down modified program” for two years 

prior to the incident alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Under this program, all 

“Bulldog Prisoners” were to be placed in restraints before exiting any cell or holding tank and be 

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escorted. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that it was well known that Bulldog Prisoners were 

assaulting any and all “white unaffiliated prisoners” on sight at any opportunity. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-

15.) Plaintiff alleges that Bulldog Prisoners were to be segregated from white prisoners at all 

times during the lock-down modified program. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was a white unaffiliated 

prisoner. (Compl. ¶ 17.)

On March 19, 2010, Plaintiff was being escorted to the correctional treatment center for a 

surgery appointment. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Upon his arrival at the treatment center, Plaintiff was 

placed inside a “B-yard holding tank” which consisted of a main cell and three small adjacent 

cells attached to the main cell. (Compl. ¶ 20.) In an adjacent cell, there were three Bulldog 

Prisoners. (Compl. ¶ 21.)

Fifteen minutes after Plaintiff’s arrival, Jane Doe #1 went to the adjacent cell holding the 

three Bulldog Prisoners and opened the cell without placing restraints on the prisoners. (Compl. ¶ 

23.) Jane Doe #1 then yelled “BULLDOGS” and the three Bulldog Prisoners ran past her and 

into the main holding tank where Plaintiff was held. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Jane Doe #1 did nothing to 

stop the Bulldog Prisoners, who proceeded to attack Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 25.) At some point in 

time, other correctional officers arrive at the scene and began to beat all the prisoners involved in 

the scuffle, including Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff was also pepper sprayed. (Compl. ¶ 27.) 

Plaintiff was not fighting back or resisting the correctional officers. (Compl. ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant James A. Yates and Jane Doe #1 “knew or should of 

known CDCR policies, procedures and protocal[sic] of a lock-down modified program of 

prisoners on B-Yard at Pleasant Vally[sic], and took cautionary measures to protect plaintiffs[sic] 

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” (Compl. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff alleges that James 

A. Yates “failed to properly train defendant Jane Doe #1 ... in CDCR policies, procedures and 

protical[sic] of a lock-down modified program ... and failed to ensure that ... Jane Doe #1 

performed her job as trained.” (Compl. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff further alleges that Jane Doe #1 “failed to 

follow CDCR policies, procedures and protocal[sic] at Pleasant Valley [in] the preformance[sic] 

of her job duties for a lock-down modified program of prisoners as trained.” (Compl. ¶ 44.)

/ / /

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III.

DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim

Plaintiff raises claims under Section 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and 

unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s 

claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official 

deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison 

official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). 

In order to find a prison official liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane 

conditions of confinement within a prison, the official must know “that inmates face a substantial 

risk of serious harm and disregard[] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Jane Doe #1. Plaintiff 

alleged facts that plausibly support the conclusion that Jane Doe #1 allowed the three Bulldog 

Prisoners to attack Plaintiff despite knowing that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm 

by allowing the Bulldog Prisoners to enter the main cell area where Plaintiff was held without 

restraining them.

However, Plaintiff does not state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against James A. 

Yates. Plaintiff does not allege that Yates was present during the incident, but attempts to hold 

Yates liability on the theory that Yates failed to properly train Jane Doe #1 or ensure that Jane 

Doe #1 performed her duties as trained. Plaintiff’s claim against Yates fails because Plaintiff 

failed to allege any facts that plausibly support the conclusion that Yates actually knew that Jane 

Doe #1 was not properly trained or that she would not perform her duties as trained or that Yates 

actually knew of a specific risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that Jane Doe #1 

deliberately allowed the Bulldog Prisoners to attack Plaintiff, suggesting that Jane Doe #1’s 

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actions were not the result of improper training but were instead deliberate actions she took on 

her own accord. Since Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that plausibly support the conclusion 

that Yates knew that there was a substantial risk that Jane Doe #1 would act in this manner.

Per Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011), a supervisory official may be 

liable for their own acquiescence or culpable indifference toward constitutional violations 

committed by others. However, here, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish 

“culpable indifference.” Plaintiff’s complaint is distinguishable from the complaint in Starr

because the plaintiff in Starr included “many allegations ... detailing what [the supervisory 

official] knew or should have known, and what Sheriff Baca did or failed to do.” Id. at 1209. 

Here, Plaintiff has done nothing more than allege boilerplate legal conclusions that are 

inconsistent with his allegation that Jane Doe #1 deliberately (i.e., in conscious disregard of her 

training) chose to release the three Bulldog Prisoners without any restraint. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief against Yates for failing to train Jane 

Doe #1 or ensure that she performed her duties properly. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against 

Yates.

B. State Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated Article 1, Section 17 of the California 

Constitution, which states that “[c]ruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive 

fines imposed.” However, there is no private right of action for damages arising out of a violation 

of the Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause of the California Constitution. Giraldo v. California 

Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 253 (2008). Accordingly, to the 

extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages stemming from the alleged violation of Article 1, 

Section 17 of the California Constitution, his claim fails. Moreover, as discussed below, since 

Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that he is no longer housed at PVSP, Plaintiff’s claim for 

declaratory relief for the violation of the California Constitution will be dismissed as moot.

Plaintiff’s complaint also references California Government Code § 844.6(d). However, 

Section 844.6(d) merely states that “[n]othing in this section exonerates a public employee from 

liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission.” Section 

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844.6(d) does not establish an independent cause of action for any of the conduct alleged in 

Plaintiff’s complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s “claim” under Section 844.6(d) fails.

C. Claims for Equitable Relief

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks declaratory relief. However, Plaintiff’s complaint indicates 

that Plaintiff is no longer housed at PVSP but is now housed at the California Medical Facility in 

Vacaville, California. A prisoner’s transfer to another institution will generally moot claims for 

equitable relief such as declaratory relief or injunctive relief. Edmundson v. MacDonald, 415 

Fed. Appx. 838, 838-839 (9th Cir. 2011); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief will be dismissed and this action will 

proceed solely on Plaintiff’s claims for damages.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendant Unidentified Correctional Officer 

Jane Doe #1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff fails to state any other claims.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing 

the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints).

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only 

on the Eighth Amendment claim against Jane Doe #1, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing, 

and the Court will issue a recommendation for dismissal of the other claims and defendants, and 

will forward Plaintiff one (1) summons and one (1) USM-285 form for completion and return.1 

Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of 

process.

 

1

It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to ascertain the identity of Jane Doe #1 and provide sufficient information to the Court 

to locate and identify Jane Doe #1 and facilitate proper service of the complaint upon her.

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If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Plaintiff must identify how each individual defendant caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional or other federal rights: “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and 

focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are 

alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 

1988). With respect to exhibits, while they are permissible if incorporated by reference, Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 10(c), they are not necessary in the federal system of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

In other words, it is not necessary at this stage to submit evidence to prove the allegations in 

Plaintiff’s complaint because at this stage Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true.

Although Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true and “the pleading standard 

Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” “a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Forsyth 

v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th 

Cir. 1987). The amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in 

an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 

F.2d at 567 (citing London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord

Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. In other words, even the claims that were properly stated in the 

original complaint must be completely stated again in the amended complaint.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that, should he choose to amend, he may not bring unrelated 

claims in the same action.

/ / /

/ / /

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court 

in this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and wishes to proceed only against Defendant Unidentified 

Correctional Officer Jane Doe #1; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 8, 2013 _ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

i1eed4

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