Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00349/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00349-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SPENCER PETERSON III, CASE NO. CV F 06-0349 LJO TAG

Plaintiff, ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S

RECONSIDERATION MOTION

(Doc. 53.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, 

et al,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Spencer Peterson III (“Mr. Peterson”) seeks reconsideration of summary adjudication

that one his employment discrimination claims was not timely exhausted and sufficiently described in

an administrative claim. Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDC”)

contends that Mr. Peterson fails to meet foundational requirements to warrant reconsideration of

summary adjudication. This Court considered Mr. Peterson’s reconsideration motion on the record and

VACATES the July 23, 2007 hearing, pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons

discussed below, this Court DENIES Mr. Peterson reconsideration of his employment discrimination

claim.

Case 1:06-cv-00349-LJO -SMS Document 64 Filed 07/17/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

BACKGROUND

Mr. Peterson is black and since 1986 has worked for CDC as a corrections officer. Mr. Peterson

was promoted to corrections sergeant in 1999.

Prior to summary adjudication in CDC’s favor, Mr. Peterson pursued a cause of action under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., to allege that CDC

discriminated against him on the basis of race by refusing to promote him to correctional lieutenant.

This Court summarily adjudicated that all but one alleged CDC discriminatory act were barred due to

Mr. Peterson’s failure to timely exhaust and sufficiently describe the acts in an administrative complaint.

More specifically, this Court’s May 15, 2007 decision (“May 15 decision”) summarily adjudicated that

Mr. Peterson’s claims arising prior to December 29, 2004 are time barred and not sufficiently described

in his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge to exhaust them. 

With his reconsideration motion, Mr. Peterson challenges only summary adjudication of his

claim that on December 6, 2004, Mr. Peterson interviewed for but was denied promotion to correctional

lieutenant (“December 6, 2004 interview claim”). Mr. Peterson’s grounds for reconsideration are that:

1. One of CDC’s undisputed facts was misconstrued unfavorably to Mr. Peterson;

2. A memo produced by CDC after the May 15 decision demonstrates that Mr. Peterson’s

December 6, 2004 interview claim is not time barred; and

3. A U.S. Supreme Court decision issued 14 days after the May 15 decision supports Mr.

Peterson’s December 6, 2004 interview claim.

CDC responds that Mr. Peterson “merely rehashes and reconstitutes the same argument” he made

to oppose summary adjudication. CDC argues that Mr. Peterson fails to demonstrate new or different

facts or circumstances to meet threshold requirements for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

Reconsideration Standards

Either the moving or opposing party may seek reconsideration of a summary

judgment/adjudication ruling. Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 868, th

110 S.Ct. 192 (1989). Reconsideration is appropriate when the district court is presented with newly

discovered evidence, committed clear error, or there is an intervening change in controlling law. School

Case 1:06-cv-00349-LJO -SMS Document 64 Filed 07/17/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

District No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. A C and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9 Cir. 1993), cert. th

denied, 512 U.S. 1236, 114 S.Ct. 2742 (1994). A motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment

ruling is restricted:

Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors

of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Such motions cannot in any case

be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during

pendency of the summary judgment motion. . . . Nor should a motion for reconsideration

serve as the occasion to tender new legal theories for the first time.

Publisher’s Resource, Inc. v. Walker Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7 Cir. 1985) (quoting th

Keene Corp. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp. 656, 665-666 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d, 736

F.2d 388 (7 Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original)); see Novato Fire Protection Dist. v. United States, 181 th

F.3d 1135, 1142, n. 6 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1129, 120 S.Ct. 2005 (2000). th

Reconsideration should not be used “to argue new facts or issues that inexcusably were not presented

to the court in the matter previously decided.” See Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239,

1240 (D. Del. 1990). Under this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(k), a party seeking reconsideration must

demonstrate “what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or

were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion” and “why the facts

or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.”

Misconstrued Undisputed Fact

With its summary adjudication moving papers, CDC proffered its Undisputed Material Fact No.

9 (“UMF No. 9"), which states: “On December 6, 2004, plaintiff interviewed for promotion to

correctional lieutenant but, because of racial discrimination, was denied promotion.” CDC’s supporting

evidence for UMF No. 9 was a corresponding allegation in Mr. Peterson’s complaint. Mr. Peterson did

not dispute UMF No. 9. 

Mr. Peterson asserts that this Court “read into” UMF No. 9 that on December 6, 2004, CDC

decided not to promote Mr. Peterson and communicated such decision to Mr. Peterson or Mr. Peterson

learned of such decision. Mr. Peterson claims that this Court so misconstrued UMF No. 9 because his

complaint, the support for UMF No. 9, alleges that after December 6, 2004, “candidates other than

plaintiff, who were not African-American, and who were in truth less qualified for the position than was

plaintiff, were promoted instead of plaintiff.” Mr. Peterson notes that the complaint’s “allegations make

Case 1:06-cv-00349-LJO -SMS Document 64 Filed 07/17/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

no reference to any date that either the decision was communicated to plaintiff, or that plaintiff learned

of the decision.” Mr. Peterson claims that he did not dispute UMF No. 9 because he “did not interpret

the fact as either expressly including any mention or implication of what date the promotional decision

was made, or of any date on which the decision was communicated to plaintiff or that he came to learn

of it.”

Mr. Peterson points to nothing specific in the May 15 decision to support that this Court

misconstrued UMF No. 9 to the effect that on December 6, 2004, CDC communicated its decision not

to promote Mr. Peterson or Mr. Peterson learned of the decision. Mr. Peterson points to this Court’s

unrelated statement that “Mr. Peterson’s declaration provides no meaningful information to demonstrate

a lack of notice of unlawful acts, especially given he was thrice denied promotions in 2004 and claims

he realized that as early as July or August 2004, an inferior candidate had been promoted over him.”

Mr. Peterson attempts to convert his acceptance of UMF No. 9 into an unwitting concession. The

problem for Mr. Peterson is that this Court did not rely on UMF No. 9 for its decision, and Mr. Peterson

fails to demonstrate reliance on UMF No. 9 or this Court’s misconstruction of it. Mr. Peterson’s concept

of UMF No. 9 does not constitute newly discovered evidence, clear error or intervening change in

controlling law to warrant reconsideration.

December 10, 2004 Memorandum

For reconsideration, Mr. Peterson further relies on a December 10, 2004 memorandum

(“December 10 memorandum”) of a CDC legal assistant to a CDC sergeant and lieutenant to identify

four persons promoted to correctional lieutenant. The December 10 memorandum is not addressed to

Mr. Peterson, who does not authenticate the December 10 memorandum. Mr. Peterson extrapolates that

the December 10 memorandum “confirms that plaintiff could not possibly have been notified he was

not hired after the December 6, 2004 promotional interview, until December 10, 2004 at the very

earliest.” Mr. Peterson claims that his December 6, 2004 interview claim is revived because December

10, 2004 falls within 180 days from his June 6, 2005 memorandum (“June 6 memorandum”) to Fresno’s

EEOC. CDC responds that the December 10 memorandum makes no difference in that it “does not

support an inference that plaintiff was denied promotion based on his race.” 

CDC is correct. The December 10 memorandum merely identifies candidates promoted to

Case 1:06-cv-00349-LJO -SMS Document 64 Filed 07/17/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

correctional lieutenant. The December 10 memorandum does not constitute a new fact or evidence to

unwind summary adjudication. As it did with the May 15 decision, this Court questions the dubious

effect of Mr. Peterson’s unverified June 6 memorandum, which does not even mention race in

connection with alleged discrimination. According to the June 6 memorandum, the basis of Mr.

Peterson’ complaint is denial of “equal consideration for promotional advancement based on merit,

efficiency, and capabilities.” Mr. Peterson makes no attempt to demonstrate with admissible evidence

that the June 6 memorandum is a valid EEOC charge. There is no evidence that the June 6

memorandum was served on CDC. CDC’s December 10 memorandum does not transmute Mr.

Peterson’s June 6 memorandum into a valid EEOC race discrimination charge. Mr. Peterson rehashes

rejected arguments that the June 6 memorandum is a valid EEOC charge to attempt to revive his

December 6, 2004 interview claim. 

New Supreme Court Decision

Mr. Peterson points to the May 29, 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Ledbetter v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 2162 (2007). Mr. Peterson does not appear to contend

that Ledbetter is an intervening change in controlling law. Mr. Peterson appears to argue that Ledbetter

supports that the June 6 memorandum was “sufficient to constitute a charge of discrimination meeting

exhaustion requirements.” Mr. Peterson’s two references from Ledbetter fail to make his point,

especially given that Ledbetter addressed discriminatory pay decisions for which the plaintiff “should

have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made

and communicated to her. She did not do so, and the paychecks that were issued to her during the 180

days prior to the filing of her EEOC charge do not provide a basis for overcoming prior failure.”

Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at __, 127 S.Ct. at 2169. 

CDC points out that communication of pay decisions was not at issue in Ledbetter and that the

U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that a discriminatory act plus communication of it to an aggrieved

employee is necessary to trigger the EEOC charging period. The U.S. Supreme Court explained:

We have previously held that the time for filing a charge of employment discrimination

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) begins when the

discriminatory act occurs. We have explained that this rule applies to any “[d]iscrete

ac[t]” of discrimination, including discrimination in “termination, failure to promote,

denial of transfer, [and] refusal to hire.” National Railroad Passenger Corporation v.

Case 1:06-cv-00349-LJO -SMS Document 64 Filed 07/17/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). Because a paysetting decision is a “discrete act,” it follows that the period for filing an EEOC charge

begins when the act occurs.

Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at __, 127 S.Ct. at 2165.

Ledbetter does not warrant reconsideration of summary adjudication.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES Mr. Peterson reconsideration of summary

adjudication of his December 6, 2004 interview claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00349-LJO -SMS Document 64 Filed 07/17/07 Page 6 of 6