Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00869/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00869-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES HENRY WASHBURN,

Plaintiff

 v.

ALEX FAGAN, JR., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 03-0869 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is San Francisco police officers Alex Fagan Jr. and Walter Contreras’

(collectively “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment (“Motion”) based on qualified immunity

in this § 1983 lawsuit arising from Plaintiff James Washburn’s arrest. Plaintiff opposes the Motion

in its entirety. Oral argument on Defendants’ motion was held on May 10, 2005. This Order reflects

the Court’s careful consideration of the parties’ briefs as well as the arguments proffered at the

hearing. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Just after midnight on January 27, 2002, Plaintiff was walking home with two roommates,

Suzanne and Sebastien Bacharach, while carrying a large base drum and wearing a sunflower hat. 

Earlier in the evening, Plaintiff had consumed “two or three” apple vodka martinis and half of a

large beer. (Washburn Depo. at 119:2-5, 17-18, 125:22.) As Plaintiff walked, he banged on the

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Plaintiff admitted that he continued singing and banging the drum after he returned to the

median. (Washburn Depo. at 134:9-13.)

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According to Defendants, the two-piece restraint was actually two different devices. One was

the “hobble,” a cord that wraps around the ankles. The other was a “wrap,” a nylon-mesh blanket that

wraps around the legs and straps and secures with Velcro fasteners. (Deposition of Brett Kaczmarczyk

at 32:2-12.)

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drum and was “signing [and] running around.” (Washburn Depo. at 128:5, 8-13.) Suzanne

Bacharach testified that Plaintiff was banging the drum very loudly and was “screaming at the top of

lungs.” (Suzanne Depo. at 43:9-10.) 

Plaintiff and his housemates approached the intersection of Oak and Divisadero Streets. As

Plaintiff crossed the intersection at Divisadero, and just after he passed the median in the center of

the intersection, the traffic lights changed. Plaintiff admitted that he was a “few steps” from the

median at the time oncoming traffic began moving towards him. (Washburn Depo. at 132:5-7.) 

Suzanne Bacharach testified that Plaintiff remained in the street for a “few minutes” before returning

to the median. (Suzanne Depo. at 53:7-8.) However, she also testified that Plaintiff was in the street

for a “few seconds.” (Suzanne Depo. at 56:6-7.) Sebastien Bacharach testified that Plaintiff took

“two steps” back to the median “really quick.”1

 (Sebastien Depo. at 31.) 

Defendants witnessed Plaintiff enter the intersection. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants exited

their police car and proceeded to tackle him from behind without warning. According to Sebastien

Bacharach, the take-down “was well executed and [Plaintiff] found himself on the ground without

even having time to think about it.” (Sebastien Depo. at 53:9-11.) Plaintiff was handcuffed and

placed in the back of a police car. Plaintiff testified that he thought he complained to the police

officers about the handcuffs being too tight. While in the back of the police car, Defendants allege

that Plaintiff kicked the car’s door. Suzanne Bacharach testified that she saw Plaintiff kick the door

of the police car. Plaintiff admitted that he spat onto the window of the police car. 

Police officers removed Plaintiff from the police car and placed him in a two-piece physical

restraint.2

 Plaintiff testified that he did not know what officers placed him in the restraint. 

(Washburn Depo. at 159:20-21.) After he was placed in restraints, Plaintiff was transported to the

county jail in the back of a police van. The leg restraints were removed at the jail. At the jail,

Plaintiff did not ask to see medical personnel. (Washburn Depo. at 169:10-11.) Plaintiff was cited

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for resisting arrest, public intoxication, and jaywalking. 

Two days after the incident, Plaintiff saw a private physician, Dr. Mark Oscherwitz. The

doctor observed a “bruise on the right inner arm, quarter of an inch by two inch” and a two-and-half

inch abrasion to the right check.” (Oscherwitz Depo. 11:2-6.) Dr. Oscherwitz concluded that

Plaintiff’s injuries were “superficial” and “would resolve spontaneously in a very short time.” 

(Oscherwitz Dep. at 14:10-14.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

The summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions. See FED.

R. CIV. PROC. 56. The judgment sought will be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. PROC.

56(c). “[A] moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial [] may carry its initial

burden of production by either of two methods. The moving party may produce evidence negating

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, after suitable discovery, the moving party

may show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its

claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,

Ltd., v. Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the movant meets its burden, the

nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts demonstrating a genuine factual issue for

trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,

“the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). In opposing summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on his

pleadings. He “must produce at least some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).

 The Court does not make credibility determinations with respect to evidence offered, and is

required to draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See T.W. Elec.,

809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 ). Summary judgment is therefore not

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appropriate “where contradictory inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidentiary

facts . . ..” Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1980). 

ANALYSIS

In their Motion, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of

Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants assert that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, did not use

excessive force, and that, as a matter of law, they are not liable for deliberate indifference because

Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants knew that Plaintiff needed medical attention such that

they could be found to have consciously disregarded that need. Defendants further argue that are

entitled to qualified immunity. 

I. False Arrest

The Fourth Amendment proscribes “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. (citing U.S.

CONST. amend. IV.) Here, Plaintiff contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when

he was arrested. Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they

reasonably believed there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. The Court agrees with Defendants.

Qualified immunity applies to claims of unconstitutional arrest if the arresting officers had

arguable probable cause to arrest. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Actual probable

cause is not necessary. Id. “Probable cause exists when, at the time of arrest, the agents know

reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the

accused had committed or was committing an offense.” Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 237

(9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). An arresting police officer will only be denied qualified immunity

where probable cause is so lacking as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable. Malley

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1986).

Here, Defendants contend, and the Court agrees, that they had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff. The evidence before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff obstructed traffic by crossing

against a red light in the Defendants’ presence. It is undisputed that Plaintiff blocked a taxi cab from

proceeding for some period of time. Thus, Defendants arguably had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff on suspicion of obstructing a public street, a misdemeanor under Cal. Penal Code § 647c. 

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Similarly, Plaintiff’s state law claim for false arrest fails. The “immunity” standard under

California law is similar to the federal standard. California Penal Code § 847 states that “no cause of

action shall arise against any peace officer . . . for false arrest . . .[when] the peace officer at the time

of the arrest has reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.” As stated, a reasonable officer could

have believed that probable cause to arrest Plaintiff existed.

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At oral argument, Defendants’ stated they were not seeking summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim as it relates to the tackling of Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the excessive force claim as it relates to the tackling of Plaintiff is DENIED. 

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This violation would have permitted a custodial arrest under the Fourth Amendment.3 See Atwater

v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an

individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without

violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”). Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal and state causes of action for false arrest.

II. Plaintiffs’ Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action alleges that Defendants are liable, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, for the use of excessive force against Plaintiff. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ excessive

force claim against the officers should be summarily adjudicated because the evidence shows that

excessive force was not used.4 

A claim that police officers used excessive force during an arrest is analyzed under the

framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-

95 (1989). The test is the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard – whether the

officers’ actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances confronting them “judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Id. at 396-97. “That analysis requires balancing the ‘nature and quality of the intrusion’

on a person’s liberty with the ‘countervailing governmental interests at stake’ to determine whether

the use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Drummond v. City of

Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). “Because the test of reasonableness under the

Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application . . . its proper

application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

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safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The United States Supreme Court noted in Graham

that:

‘Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the

peace of a judge’s chambers,’ violates the Fourth Amendment. The

calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -- in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving -- about the

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. 

Id. (citation omitted).

 The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that whether excessive force was used by police

officers in a given situation is a question of fact for the jury. Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1056 (stating

that assessing whether police officers’ use of force was reasonable “nearly always requires a jury to

sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many

occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be

granted sparingly”). To defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff need only show that a reasonable jury

could find that the officers’ use of force was excessive. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410,

416 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants over-tightened his handcuffs and refused to loosen them.

Courts have recognized that excessively tight handcuffing can constitute a Fourth Amendment

violation. See, e.g., Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004); LaLonde v.

County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2000). However, in those cases, the plaintiffs

either suffered damage to their wrists as a consequence of the handcuffs or the plaintiffs complained

to the officers about the handcuffs being too tight. See Wall, 364 F.3d at 1109-1110, 1112;

LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 952, 960. Here, there is no evidence of a physical manifestation of injury to

Plaintiff from the handcuffs. Further, Plaintiff testified that he thought he complained to the police

officers about the handcuffs being too tight. However, such speculation is insufficient to raise a

genuine issue of material fact. It is also not clear whether Plaintiff complained to Defendants about

the handcuffs, or rather complained to other police officers at the scene. 

Regarding the two-piece physical restraint used on Plaintiff, it is undisputed that Plaintiff

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was not injured by the use of a nylon cord to tie his ankles or a nylon mesh blanket wrapped around

his legs. Plaintiff does not allege that the manner in which the restraints were applied were painful. 

Furthermore, the restraints were promptly removed when Plaintiff arrived at the county jail. And, in

any event, Plaintiff testified that he did not know what police officers placed him in the restraint. 

Thus, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, does not support a reasonable

inference that Defendants used excessive force when placing Plaintiff is the physical restraint.

 In sum, Defendants’ motion of summary judgment on the excessive force claim as it relates

to the handcuffing and physical restraint of Plaintiff is GRANTED. 

III. Denial of Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges state and federal claims based on deliberate indifference to medical needs. 

These claims are without merit. To survive summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a triable fact regarding: (1) the seriousness of the detainee’s

need; and (2) whether the officers knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the detainee’s health

and safety. Palacios v. City of Oakland, 970 F. Supp. 732, 741 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Plaintiff admitted

that he never requested any medical care and his medical examination two days after the incident

revealed only superficial injuries. Therefore, Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether Defendants knew of and disregarding an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and

safety. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims is

GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

the excessive force claim as it relates to the tackling of Plaintiff. The Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest claims, deliberate indifference claim, and

excessive force claims as it relates to the handcuffing and physical restraint of Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May __27__, 2005 __/s/___________________________ MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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