Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01205/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01205-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL TRAP,

Petitioner,

Case Nos. 12cv1205 BEN 

 10cr912 BEN

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO AMEND AND

DENYING § 2255 MOTION

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner Michael Trap’s motion to accept his amended § 2255 motion is

granted. Now before the Court is Trap’s amended motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Trap seeks relief on

several grounds, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the

reasons given below, Trap’s motion to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence

is denied.

BACKGROUND

Trap and his co-conspirators operated a fraudulent home loan modification

operation. He was charged by Information and thereafter entered into a plea

agreement and pled guilty to charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to

commit wire fraud and money laundering) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1957 (money

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laundering and aiding and abetting). The signed plea agreement contains Trap’s

express waiver of his right to collaterally attack his guilty plea, conviction, or

sentence. During the Rule 11 plea colloquy with the Magistrate Judge, Trap once

again waived his right to collaterally attack his plea, conviction, or sentence (so long

as he was sentenced within the Sentencing Guidelines range recommended by the

Government). Later, he was sentenced to a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines

range recommended by the Government – and well below the sentence

recommended by the Probation Officer.

The District Court accepted the guilty plea. At sentencing, the Probation

Officer calculated a Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months, and recommended a 57-

month sentence. The Government, on the other hand, calculated a Guidelines range

of 30 to 37 months, and recommended a sentence of 30 months. The Court imposed

a sentence of 30 months imprisonment and restitution in the amount of $460,249

jointly and severally with Trap’s co-defendants.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, after sentence was imposed, Trap,

for the third time, waived his right to collateral attack. The Court asked Trap: “Do

you acknowledge, sir, that you have, in fact, waived your right to appeal and

collateral attack?” Trap responded: “Yes.”

 Now, in spite of his waivers, Trap seeks to collaterally attack his conviction

and sentence on a number of grounds generally grouped as: (1) prosecutorial

misconduct claims; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (3) plain error

claims; and (4) evidence obtained by unconstitutional search and seizure claims.

DISCUSSION

I. Waiver

Courts enforce plea agreements containing knowing and voluntary waivers of

statutory rights of appeal or collateral attack because such “waivers usefully

preserve the finality of judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to valid plea

agreements.” United States v. Anglin, 215 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000); United

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States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.

Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1998)) (courts enforce a waiver of

appeal, as long as the waiver is “knowingly and voluntarily made” and

“encompasses the defendant’s right to appeal on the grounds claimed on appeal”). 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that strong public policy considerations justify the

enforcement of a defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal or to collaterally attack a

judgment. United States v. Novarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Waivers play an important role in the plea bargaining process and help ensure

finality. Id. at 322. The finality of judgments benefits both the government and the

courts. United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1997). In exchange

for the defendant’s guilty plea and waiver of rights to appeal and collaterally attack,

the government and the courts need not spend resources on litigation after the

sentencing. The defendant gets a lower sentencing recommendation and the court is

more willing to agree to a lower sentence than would be the case absent the waivers. 

A “defendant may waive the statutory right to file a § 2255 petition

challenging the length of his sentence” where the defendant: (1) expressly waives

the right of collateral attack; and (2) does so knowingly and voluntarily. United

States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 672 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Pruitt, 32

F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th

Cir. 1993).

Trap’s plea agreement provides that he expressly “waives, to the full extent of

the law, any right to appeal or collaterally attack the conviction and sentence,

including any restitution order, unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence greater

than the high end of the guideline range . . . recommended by the Government

pursuant to this plea agreement at the time of sentencing.” During a thorough Rule

11 colloquy with Trap prior to accepting his guilty plea, the Magistrate Judge

discussed this waiver provision and received confirmation from both Trap and his

counsel that Trap understood. The present claims collaterally attacking his guilty

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plea, conviction, and sentence in his § 2255 motion thus fall within the scope of the

express language of the waiver provision. Accordingly, by his plea agreement and

his representations in open court, Trap waived his right to collaterally attack his

guilty plea, conviction, and sentence. Trap’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his

right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence requires denial of his § 2255

motion. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 322 (finding a defendant could not ignore his

part of the bargain in a plea agreement after obtaining concessions from the

government).

Whether an exception exists – for a federal prisoner’s collateral attack based

upon an assertion that the plea bargain and its waiver was the product of ineffective

assistance of counsel – has not been decided by either the United States Supreme

Court or the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Washington v. Lampert,

422 F.3d 864, 869-73 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a state plea agreement that

waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is

unenforceable with respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that

challenges the voluntariness of the waiver, but noting that the court has not decided

the issue with respect to a federal defendant’s waiver of a § 2255 collateral attack);

see also Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (“We doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim

of ineffective assistance . . . . However, we need not face the issue here . . .”);

Abarca, 985 F.3d at 1014 (“While we do not hold that Abarca’s waiver categorically

forecloses him from bringing any section 2255 proceeding, such as a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel or involuntariness of waiver...”); United States v.

De Jesus Gutierrez, 434 Fed. App’x. 606, 606 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because that

issue is not presented here, we need not decide ‘whether even an express waiver of

all § 2255 rights could be enforced to preclude an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim implicating the voluntariness of the waiver itself.’” (quoting United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156 n.4)). 

In Trap’s case, the evidence demonstrates that he knowingly and voluntarily

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waived his right to collaterally attack at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. 

By the time of this third waiver, Trap had been made aware of the charges, described

for the Magistrate Judge the factual basis for his guilty plea, heard the sentence

actually imposed, had the opportunity to allocute, and had received assistance from

his retained counsel throughout – assistance about which he had never complained to

the Court and assistance from an attorney whom he had the right to replace at any

time. Trap waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence in this

motion brought under § 2255.

II. Legal Standard for a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Conviction 

and Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

Even if the Ninth Circuit decides that an exception to a valid collateral attack

waiver exists for certain ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the remaining

claims of prosecutorial misconduct, plain error, and unconstitutional search and

seizure would still be waived. At the same time, the § 2255 claim that it was the

ineffective assistance of his counsel that led to his plea agreement would still fail. 

Trap brings the present motion to collaterally attack his conviction and

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 provides that a federal prisoner

seeking relief from a custodial sentence “may move the court which imposed the

sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” on “the ground that the sentence

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the

court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in

excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack

. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To warrant relief under § 2255, a prisoner must allege a

constitutional, jurisdictional, or otherwise “fundamental defect which inherently

results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the

rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780,

783-84 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In contrast, “errors of law which might require reversal of

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a conviction or sentence on appeal do not necessarily provide a basis for relief under

§ 2255.” United States v. Wilcox, 640 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1981).

 When a motion “presents no more than conclusory allegations, unsupported

by facts and refuted by the record, an evidentiary hearing is not required.” United

States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Leonti,

326 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (evidentiary hearing unnecessary if allegations

when viewed against the record are palpably incredible or patently frivolous).

A defendant’s past representations in open court “constitute a formidable

barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations made in open

court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of

conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as

are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); see also Womack v. McDaniel, 497 F.3d 998,

1004 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim that plea was not knowingly, voluntarily or

intelligently entered where belied by his statements in open court and the contents of

his signed plea agreement).

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A § 2255 movant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show that:

(1) “counsel’s performance was deficient;” and (2) the “deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 55 (1985) (applying Strickland test to ineffective assistance

claims arising out of the plea process). In the context of a guilty plea, the

ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether the alleged ineffective assistance undercut 

the defendant’s ability to enter an intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty. 

To succeed, the defendant must prove both prongs of the Strickland test: that

counsel’s assistance was not within the range of competence demanded of counsel in

criminal cases and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result. Lambert

v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2004). To prove the prejudice prong, the

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defendant must show, “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 

Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential

[because it] is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance

after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining

counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act

or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Id. For this reason, there is a “strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. . . .” Id. Finally, “there is no reason for a court deciding an

ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of the inquiry if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

In his amended § 2255 motion, Trap describes 23 instances of alleged

ineffective assistance in paragraphs “a” through “x.” Only instances of ineffective

assistance going to the voluntariness or intelligence of the plea agreement and its

waiver of the collateral attack right are possibly outside the scope of the waiver. 

Therefore, of the 23 alleged instances of ineffective assistance found in paragraphs

“a” through “x” only those claims going to the voluntariness or intelligence of the

plea agreement and its waiver of the collateral attack right are given further

consideration here. Even where consideration is given, the allegations are not

credible in light of the record. 

In “a” Trap claims that on the day he signed the cooperation agreement his

attorney was not present, spoke only over the phone, and did not discuss the

document. The cooperation agreement was signed in October 2009. The plea

agreement, on the other hand, was signed March 19, 2010. This claim proves

neither ineffective assistance nor prejudice from the entry of the plea agreement.

In “b” Trap says that the plea agreement contained factual statements that

were not true but that his attorney told him it did not matter. The one example he

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offers is not persuasive. He asserts that “one statement identified me as an organizer

of the scheme,” but that was not true. At the same time he concedes that he was a

founder and key figure of the company. Considering that the company had one

product (loan modifications) and that Trap ran the day-to-day operations, it is hard

to see how the statement was untrue. Added to that is the fact that the plea

agreement contains a strike-out of a different factual statement, initialed by Trap in

the margin. This suggests Trap read the plea agreement closely and did not disagree

with the other statements. By this claim, Trap does not prove ineffective assistance

or that Trap would have otherwise insisted on going to trial. 

In “c” Trap claims his attorney failed to educate him about the crimes to

which he was pleading guilty. Trap then asserts that had he been educated, he would

not have pled guilty. Yet, he says “[o]f course, I would have pled to ‘a felony,’ as

agreed.” Continuing with conflicting assertions, Trap says “[a]lthough I believed I

was innocent . . . it made sense to limit my exposure to one charge.” In contrast to

some of his other claims, Trap’s assertions here are weighty. His evidence,

however, is not. The singular support for this claim is his own after-the-fact

asservations. 

Contrary evidence is contained in the record. The plea agreement he signed

says that he had, “fully discussed the facts of this case with defense counsel.” It also

says, “Defendant has committed each of the elements of the crime, and admits there

is a factual basis for this guilty plea.” See Plea Agreement at 2. Elsewhere in the

same plea agreement it says that Trap had a full opportunity to discuss the case with

his attorney “and has a clear understanding of the charges.” It also says that he is

pleading guilty “because in truth and in fact Defendant is guilty and for no other

reason.” See Plea Agreement at 7. Once again, at the end of the plea agreement,

Trap certifies that he read the agreement and that he had discussed the terms with his

attorney and fully understood its meaning and effect. See Plea Agreement at 12. 

The final sentence of the agreement states that Trap both consulted with his attorney

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and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s work. Id.

Before entering his guilty plea, the Magistrate Judge explained the elements of

the three charges, to which Trap said he understood. His counsel told the Magistrate

Judge that he had gone over the factual basis for the plea “in great detail.” Trap then

told the Magistrate Judge that he felt he understood the factual basis, he had no

questions about the factual basis, he fully adopted the factual basis in the plea

agreement, and that the facts were true. His counsel then told the court that he had

been working on the factual basis “for the better part of a month,” adding, “so, he’s

completely informed.” The truth of these statements is bolstered by the fact that

strike-outs and interlineations had been made to the factual basis in the plea

agreement and initialed by Trap. Trap then told the Magistrate Judge that he was

pleading guilty because he was guilty, not because he was threatened or promised

anything else and that he was satisfied with the legal services provided by his

attorney. 

These were solemn, serious statements made by Trap in open court. They

were made directly to a judge. They were made specifically about his own case. 

They were made and recorded at a time before Trap was sentenced and before he

moved to vacate his sentence. They are at odds with the assertions he makes now. 

The Magistrate Judge determined that the plea was knowing and voluntary and

recommended that the district court accept the plea. Trap did not object to that

recommendation or move to withdraw the plea. The district court accepted the plea. 

At the later sentencing hearing, when Trap spoke in court he made no mention of

actual innocence, or that his attorney failed to discuss with him the content or effect

of the plea agreement. Once again, the record of the sentencing hearing was made

and recorded at a time before Trap moved to vacate his sentence. 

Trap offers no other evidence in support of his current protestations. No

declarations from his counsel. No declarations from other counsel who reviewed his

attorney’s performance. No file notes or correspondence from his counsel that

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suggest Trap was misled or deceived by his counsel. No notes from Trap to his

counsel about his actual innocence or declarations from anyone who worked at his

loan modification operation. No deposition testimony of his attorney’s staff or

others familiar with his representation. The only evidence in support of his § 2255

claim is his own, new, self-serving statement to this Court. And in considering the

weight to be given to this new statement, one must consider that Trap has previously

been convicted in this Court for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1623, for lying to a federal

grand jury. What had he lied to the grand jury about? About a different fraudulent

business he was involved in. 

Trap’s earlier representations on paper, in court, and his earlier silence refutes

his present allegations. See Watts v. United States, 841 F.2d 275, 278 (9th Cir.

1988) (per curiam). Accordingly, when viewed against this record, Trap’s

allegations here are so palpably incredible that his claims are subject to dismissal. 

See Leonti, 326 F.3d at 1116; Womack, 497 F.3d at 1004. The claim is denied. 

In “d” Trap asserts his attorney coerced him to plead guilty. For the same

reasons described for “c,” this claim is denied.

In “e” Trap obliquely complains that he did not receive a sentence of home

confinement as predicted by his counsel. Since this claim relates only to counsel’s

alleged mishandling of the sentencing proceedings, and not the decision to accept

the plea bargain, the claim is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433. As a side note, at

sentencing, Trap was actually offered a sentence of home confinement. Trap will

need in depth medical care during his sentence. Consequently, the Court explored

the possibility of allowing the Defendant to continue his medical care through a

sentence of home confinement, conditioned upon his maintenance of private health

insurance which would facilitate that care. Trap told the Court he was not sure he

could commit to do that for a 57-month sentence. 

In “f” Trap claims that his attorney told him that this Judge “owed him one.” 

This claim for relief is meritless. Moreover, since this claim relates only to

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counsel’s alleged mishandling of the sentencing proceedings, and not the decision to

accept the plea bargain, the claim is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.

In “g” Trap claims that the plea deal was “a lie” because the prosecutor was

opposing home confinement and “I just did not know how to go to the court and say

I think my attorney has done nothing but lie to me the entire time.” For the same

reasons described for “c,” this claim is denied. Moreover, since this claim relates

only to counsel’s alleged mishandling of the sentencing proceedings, and not the

decision to accept the plea bargain, the claim is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.

In “h” Trap claims that his attorney lied to him about the sentence he would

receive. He claims his attorney told him he was looking at 18 to 30 months home

confinement and restitution would be waived. As before, Trap offers no

independent evidence to support his claims. The record evidence tells a different

story. The plea agreement makes clear that sentencing is within the sole discretion

of the judge. It states, “Defendant understands that the sentencing judge may

impose the maximum sentence provided by statute, and is also aware that any

estimate of the probable sentence by defense counsel is a prediction, not a promise,

and is not binding on the Court.” See Plea Agreement at 8 (emphasis in original). 

During the plea colloquy, the Magistrate Judge reminded Trap, “[t]hose Guidelines

will not bind the judge who sentences you. They’re only advisory. The judge may

impose the maximum penalties that have been described by counsel this morning. If

the judge imposes a penalty greater than what you expected, you will still be bound

by your guilty plea.” The record is clear that Trap knew his attorney could not

guarantee any sentence he might have predicted. Even so, Trap chose to plead guilty

and waive his collateral attack rights. For the same reasons described for “c,” this

claim is denied. Moreover, since this claim relates only to counsel’s alleged

mishandling of the sentencing proceedings, and not the decision to accept the plea

bargain, the claim is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.

In “i” Trap claims his attorney lied to him about how the law applied to his

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situation. For the same reasons described for “c,” this claim is denied.

In “j” Trap complains that his attorney did not attend meetings with the

prosecutor prior to signing the plea agreement, and did not attend the interview with

the Probation Officer after he signed the plea agreement. The first claim, even if

true, does not undermine the validity of the plea agreement. The second claim, even

if true, is clearly waived.

In “k” Trap returns to the subject of the cooperation agreement which

preceded his plea agreement. As in “a,” in “k” Trap claims that on the day he signed

the cooperation agreement his attorney was not present, spoke only over the phone,

and did not discuss the document. This claim proves neither ineffective assistance

nor prejudice from the entry of the plea agreement.

In “l” Trap again returns to the subject of the cooperation agreement which

preceded his plea agreement. Trap suggests here that the government failed to keep

its obligations under the cooperation agreement by continuing to charge him with

more than one felony. Even if true, Trap could have gone to trial rather than later

entering into the plea agreement. His counsel could have correctly concluded that

entering the plea agreement was still the best course of action. This claim proves

neither ineffective assistance nor prejudice.

In “m” Trap argues that his attorney “never conducted any discovery,” but

that he did hire and charge him for the cost of an investigator. There is no evidence

Trap identifies that supports his claim. This claim proves neither ineffective

assistance nor prejudice. 

In “n” Trap repeats his assertion that his attorney did not investigate a

defense, i.e., he did not speak with the attorney that did work for the mortgage

modification company. As before, there is no evidence Trap identifies that supports

his claim. This claim proves neither ineffective assistance nor prejudice. 

In “o” Trap repeats the assertion that his attorney did not investigate a defense

and did not argue for a minor role reduction. As before, there is no evidence Trap

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identifies that supports his claim. This claim proves neither ineffective assistance

nor prejudice. 

In “p” Trap asserts that his attorney did nothing to disagree with the findings

in the pre-sentence report. Because this claim does not concern attorney

performance leading to the plea agreement and the collateral attack waiver, the claim

is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.

In “q” Trap asserts that his attorney did nothing to disagree with the amount

of restitution that the prosecution presented to the court. Because this claim does not

concern his attorney’s performance leading to the entry of the plea agreement and

the collateral attack waiver, the claim is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433; but cf.

United States v. Tsosie, 639 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] defendant cannot

waive his right to appeal a restitution order if, at the time he agrees to waive appeal,

he is not given a reasonably accurate estimate of the restitution order to which he is

exposed.”) (emphasis added).

In “r” Trap says that his attorney did not inform the Court about completing

his course work for a Master of Arts degree, which could have been favorably

considered during sentencing. (Actually, Trap mentioned this himself while reading

a letter to the Court at the sentencing hearing.) Because this claim does not concern

his attorney’s performance leading to the entry of the plea agreement and the

collateral attack waiver, the claim is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.

In “s” Trap contends that his attorney failed to inform the Probation Officer or

the court of the degree of his significant health complications occurring between the

time of his plea and his sentencing. This led to his incarceration, Trap says, at a

prison that is unable to care for his medical needs. Because this claim does not

concern his attorney’s performance leading to the entry of the plea agreement and

the collateral attack waiver, the claim is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433. 

In “t” Trap asserts that his attorney failed to object at sentencing when the

Court denied his request for home confinement. Because this claim does not

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concern his attorney’s performance leading to the entry of the plea agreement and

the collateral attack waiver, the claim is waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.

In “u” Trap notes that his attorney “allowed the judge” to order inappropriate

restitution. Because this claim does not concern his attorney’s performance leading

to the entry of the plea agreement and the collateral attack waiver, the claim is

waived. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.

Claim “v” is omitted in the amended motion.

In “w” Trap objects that his attorney “allowed the prosecution” to include a

waiver of appeal rights. He says he did not discuss it. He says there was no

concession or consideration given. Strictly construed, the appeal waiver is a

different matter not directly relevant to the collateral attack waiver. Even if one 

construes the claim liberally as a claim including the collateral attack waiver, Trap

offers no other evidence to support his present objection. The record evidence tells a

different story. For the same reasons described for “c,” this claim is denied.

Finally, in “x” Trap claims that his attorney did not challenge a search

warrant. The evidence uncovered was then “leveraged” by the government to obtain

his guilty plea. Here, Trap fails to demonstrate how effective assistance of counsel

would have achieved suppression of the evidence obtained from the search or how

the suppression of evidence would have led to Trap’s decision to go to trial, instead

of pleading guilty. This claim is without merit.

For the reasons given above, Trap’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

challenging the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea and waiver are

without merit. The Court concludes Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived

his statutory right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence.

IV. Remaining Claims

Petitioner’s remaining claims do not challenge the knowing and voluntary

nature of his guilty plea and waiver but rather attack his conviction and sentence on

other grounds. Because these claims are within the scope of Trap’s valid waivers,

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the Court will enforce the waivers barring these remaining claims.

V. Miscellaneous Motions

The other miscellaneous motions, including a motion for court-appointed

counsel, a motion for a subpoena for his former attorney’s email records, and courtprovided copies of various filings, is denied.

VI. Certificate of Appealability

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), there is no appeal from the

final order in a proceeding under § 2255 unless a “circuit justice or a circuit or

district judge issues a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).” A

“certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

To make the required showing, a “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner has failed to make

such a showing. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner a certificate of

appealability.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, the Court denies Petitioner’s amended motion to

vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. The Court also denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 3, 2013

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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