Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03033/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03033-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Collegeville/Imagineering Ent., et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-3033 PHX-DGC

ORDER

The parties disagree on whether Defendants may communicate with class members

regarding possible settlement of this suit, or whether such communications are barred by an

attorney-client relationship between the EEOC and the class members. Defendants seek an

opportunity to settle with the five class members separately because of the individualized

nature of their claims. Dkt. #82 at 1. The EEOC argues that it has established an attorneyclient relationship with the class members and that defense contact with them would violate

Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, which prohibits ex parte contact with represented

parties. Defendants argue that Rule 4.2 does not apply because the EEOC and the class

members have not established an attorney-client relationship. Dkt. #82 at 3.

Defendants assert that “[e]mployers routinely settle discrimination claims directly

with the individuals represented by the EEOC, without involving the EEOC in the settlement

process or obtaining approval from either the EEOC or the courts.” Dkt. #82 at 2.

Defendants cite cases in which parties who had previously filed a charge with the EEOC

either brought suit individually or settled with defendants. See, e.g., EEOC v. Harris

Case 2:05-cv-03033-DGC Document 106 Filed 01/17/07 Page 1 of 4
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Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. UPS, 860 F.2d 372, 373 (10th

Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1541-42 (9th Cir. 1987).

There is a difference, however, between a claimant voluntarily departing from an attorneyclient relationship to settle or file a new suit and a defendant initiating contact with a

claimant already in an attorney-client relationship. None of Defendant’s cases permit the

latter form of contact. 

The Court has reviewed the cases cited by both Plaintiffs and Defendants to discern

when an attorney-client relationship begins in a Title VII lawsuit brought by the EEOC. An

attorney-client relationship does not exist across an entire potential class merely when the

EEOC has filed a case and identified the class. See EEOC v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. CV-06-

1273, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72378, at *18 (D. Colo. October 4, 2006). Rather, an attorneyclient relationship commences when the aggrieved individuals take action to manifest their

intent to enter the relationship. Courts have found such a relationship to exist when an

individual contacted the EEOC through questionnaires and phone calls, EEOC v. Int’l Profit

Associates, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Ill. 2002), consulted the EEOC with an intent to seek

legal advice, EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., CV-93-5481, 1998 WL 778369, at *5-6

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1998), or signed an affidavit stating a belief that an attorney-client

relationship existed, EEOC v. Chemtech Int’l Corp., CV-94-2848, 1995 WL 608333, at *2

(S.D. Tex. May 17, 1995); EEOC v. HBE Corp., No. CV-93-722, 1994 WL 376273, at *2

(E.D. Mo. May 19, 1994).

The EEOC bears the burden of showing an attorney-client relationship with each class

member. See Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 1998 WL 778369, at *4. The only evidence the

EEOC identifies in support of its claim is that the five class members were disclosed as a

class, two of the class members are current employees of Defendants, and three of the class

members filed administrative charges of discrimination with the EEOC. Dkt. #83, n.1. The

EEOC states that it “is prepared to obtain affidavits from each of the five class members

expressing their consent to representation by the EEOC,” but it has not done so. Id. at 2. 

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The fact that the individuals were disclosed as a class does not show that an attorneyclient relationship exists. See Albertson’s, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72378 at *16; EEOC v.

Dana Corp., 292 F.Supp.2d 827, 839 (N.D. Ind. 2002). Nor is such a relationship established

by the fact that two of the class members work for Defendants. While the EEOC cites cases

explaining that communications between a defendant and its current employees could have

a coercive effect, the EEOC has shown nothing to indicate what sort of coercive effect such

communications might have in this case, and the Court is confident that its order can alleviate

such concerns. See, e.g., EEOC v. TIC, No. CV-01-1776, 2002 WL 31654977, at *6 (E.D.

La. Nov. 21, 2002) (discussing coercion concerns but allowing defendant to communicate

with class members who were current employees); Albertson’s, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

72378, at *23-24. 

The Court concludes that the filing of charges with the EEOC by three class members,

along with the EEOC’s subsequent filing of suit against Defendants, constitutes sufficient

evidence of an attorney-client relationship between the three charging parties and the EEOC.

See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 308 n. 9 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting)

(recognizing with approval that the EEOC believed attorney-client relationship existed

between charging parties and the Commission); EEOC v. TIC, 2002 WL 31654977, at *6;

EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 948 F.Supp. 54, 55 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (noting with

approval that defendant seeking to contact non-filing class members had agreed not to

contact class members who had filed charges with the EEOC). The Court therefore

concludes that Defendants should not initiate ex parte communications with Linda Honer,

Rosa Limon, and Linda Avalos. 

Because the EEOC has not carried its burden of showing an attorney-client

relationship with the other two class members, the Court will not hold that Defendants are

precluded from communicating with them. To the extent that the two purported class

members are still employed by Defendants, Defendants shall advise them that it is unlawful

for Defendants to retaliate against employees for consenting to representation by the EEOC

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and participating in the lawsuit. See TIC, 2002 WL 31654977, at *6.

The EEOC also argues that “[t]o the extent that Defendants seek to challenge the

EEOC’s ability to entertain only those settlement offers which afford complete relief for its

class members, this issue is not ripe[.]” Dkt. #83 at 1. The Court agrees, but does not view

Defendant’s brief as challenging the EEOC’s authority to control settlements with the class.

Defendants merely ask the Court to allow them to contact class members with independent

settlement offers.

IT IS ORDERED:

Defendants may communicate ex parte with class members other than Linda Honer,

Rosa Limon, and Linda Avalos. Before such communications commence, Defendants shall

inform the class members of the pending litigation by the EEOC, make them aware that they

are speaking to a representative of Defendants, and inform them that participation in the

EEOC lawsuit will not result in any retaliation by Defendants. If the class members express

a desire not to communicate with Defendants or otherwise indicate that they are represented

by the EEOC, Defendants shall terminate the ex parte communications.

DATED this 17th day of January, 2007.

 

 

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