Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00328/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00328-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gary Wayne Hicks, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-09-328-PHX-JWS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (docket # 1) Respondents have filed an Answer, docket # 13, to which Petitioner has

replied, docket # 16. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing

In November of 2003, Petitioner’s adult daughter, Mandy Mullins, brought a

notebook containing pornographic photographs of children to the Phoenix Police

Department, stating that she had found the notebook in Petitioner’s bedroom closet. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 2-3) After the matter was referred to the City of Glendale Police

Department, Detective Phillis Lawson obtained a search warrant for Petitioner’s home. The

Officers who conducted the search found numerous pornographic photographs of children,

including the six photographs which formed the basis of the charges against Petitioner. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A) Based on the photographs, on April 1, 2004, the State of Arizona

charged Petitioner with six counts of sexual exploitation of a minor by knowingly

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 The Honorable Jeffery A. Hotham presided.

- 2 -

possessing a visual depiction in which a minor under 15 was engaged in exploitive

exhibition or other sexual conduct in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3553. (Respondents’ Exhs. A,

Exh. F, item 1) 

Petitioner’s case proceeded to trial.1

 (Respondents’ Exh. A) The State offered

evidence that Petitioner’s fingerprints were on two of the photographs. (Respondents’ Exh.

A at 3) The State also presented the testimony of Dr. Lisa Kirsch, a pediatrician specializing

in child abuse cases. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 3) Dr. Kirsch testified that, except for the

person depicted in the photograph related to Count 4, the children in the other five

photographs appeared to be under fifteen years old. (Id.) Petitioner’s theory of defense was

that his daughter, Mandy Mullins, planted the photographs in his closet. In support of this

theory, Petitioner relied on the testimony of Detective Lawson that she found Petitioner’s

daughter, Mullins, not to be credible. (Respondents’ Exh. A) Defendant also presented

evidence that his daughter had a motive for inculpating him. Mullins was trying to transfer

her welfare benefits from California to Arizona and needed to prove residency in Arizona. 

Mullins asked Petitioner to sign a lease agreement and charge her rent. Petitioner refused. 

Petitioner also presented witnesses who testified that Mullins, who was homeless and

unemployed, wanted Petitioner’s house and assets. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 4-5) Petitioner

also presented testimony of family friends stating that they had never seen child

pornography in Petitioner’s house. (Respondents’ Exh. A) 

On Petitioner’s motion, the State struck the “under-fifteen” allegation on Count

Four. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 5) A jury acquitted Petitioner of Count Four, but found him

guilty of the remaining counts. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 5; Exh. F at 3) The court sentenced

Petitioner to consecutive, mitigated 10-year prison terms on four counts of conviction, and

to lifetime probation on the fifth count of conviction. (Respondents’ Exh. A; Exh. F at 3)

B. Direct Appeal

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Petitioner timely filed a direct appeal arguing that the trial court erred in

conditionally ruling that the State would be permitted to introduce other-act or impeachment

evidence against Petitioner if he testified. (Respondents’ Exhs. A, B) On December 20,

2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims and affirmed his convictions

and sentences. (Respondents’ Exh. A) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme

Court which was denied on July 20, 2006. (Respondents’ Exh. D)

C. Post-Conviction Proceeding

On August 29, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. E) Petitioner, through counsel, subsequently filed a

petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions because, although the jury had found that the children depicted in the

photographs were actual (rather than computer-generated) persons, the State had not

introduced evidence affirmatively disproving that the photographs had been computergenerated or otherwise altered or manipulated. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 7-12; Exh. G) 

Petitioner further argued that the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to

affirmatively prove that Petitioner knew the photographs depicted “actual minor children.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. F at 8, 15) In addition, Petitioner asserted that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, and that appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct

appeal. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 12-13) Petitioner also argued that counsel was ineffective

for failing to ensure that the jury was properly instructed that the State must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner “knew the material was produced with the use of a minor,

that minor being an actual child.” (Respondents’ Exh. F at 15-16) Petitioner further

claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this jury instruction issue

on appeal. (Id.)

The trial court found Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

procedurally defaulted. (Respondents’ Exh. H); See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (stating that

“[a] defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any ground .. . [t]hat

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 In his Reply, Petitioner raises new claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to ensure that the jury was adequately instructed on all elements of the offense, and that

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the jury instructions on appeal.

(docket # 16 at 11) Petitioner cannot properly assert additional claims for relief in his Reply.

See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.1994) (district court need not

consider habeas claim raised for the first time in traverse), Thus, the Court declines to address

new arguments raised by Petitioner in his Reply. 

- 4 -

has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.”) The court

further found that Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel

lacked merit. (Respondents’ Exh. H) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals which was denied on May 14, 2008. (Respondents’ Exh. I) 

D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On February 17, 2009, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus raising the following claims:

Ground One: The State failed to prove that the individuals depicted in the

images where actual children. The images maintain first Amendment 

protection unless the individuals were actual children.

Ground Two: The State failed to produce any evidence that Petitioner knew

the material was produced with the use of minor children.

Ground Three: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “demand proof

beyond a reasonable doubt” that the photographs depicted real children, as

opposed to computer-generated or manipulated images.

Ground Four: Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.2

(docket # 1 at 6-9)

 Respondents concede that the Petition is timely filed within the one-year

limitation period imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (docket # 13 at 5)

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state

prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must have exhausted, in state

court, every claim raised in his petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

To properly exhaust state remedies, the prisoner must have afforded the state courts the

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

opportunity to rule upon the merits of his federal constitutional claims by “fairly presenting”

them to the state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.

346, 349 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the

State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ her claim in each

appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”).

It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were

before the state court or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Reese, 541

U.S. at 28 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the

court to federal nature of the claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to

the specific constitutional guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. 

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,

are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v.

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th

Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner

to have made “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked reference to

“due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). Similarly, a mere reference to

the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim

would be decided “on the same considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner

must make the federal nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the

decision of the federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly

present a claim to the state court if the court must read beyond the petition or brief filed in

that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

Where a prisoner fails to “fairly present” a claim to the State courts in a

procedurally appropriate manner, state court remedies may, nonetheless, be “exhausted.” 

This type of exhaustion is often referred to as “procedural default” or “procedural bar.” Ylst

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. There are two

categories of procedural default.

First, a state court may have applied a procedural bar when the prisoner

attempted to raise the claim in state court. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05. If the state

court also addressed the merits of the underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does

not vitiate the independent state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10

(1989); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found

ineffective assistance of counsel claims “barred under state law,” but also discussed and

rejected the claims on the merits, en banc court held that the “on-the-merits” discussion was

an “alternative ruling” and the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal

review). A higher court’s subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court’s

application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

Second, the state prisoner may not have presented the claim to the state courts,

but pursuant to the state courts’ procedural rules, a return to state court would be “futile.” 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). Generally, any claim not previously

presented to the Arizona courts is procedurally barred from federal review because any

attempt to return to state court to properly exhaust a current habeas claim would be “futile.”

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002);

State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.1(a)(3) (relief is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal

of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule

32.2(a)). 

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To

establish cause, a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded her efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective

factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual

or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id. To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate that the

alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

170 (1982). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice

prong. To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B).

A. Application of Law to Petitioner’s Claims

Respondents assert that Petitioner did not properly exhaust Grounds One and

Two, and that those claims are technically exhausted and procedurally barred from federal

habeas corpus review. (docket # 13 at 6) 

In Grounds One and Two, Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. 

(docket # 1 at 6-7; docket # 16 at 9-10) Petitioner attempted to raise these same claims on

post-conviction review. The State court found Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence precluded. (Respondents’ Exh. H) Petitioner appealed and the appellate court

summarily affirmed the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. 

(Respondents’ Exh. I) The appellate court’s summary denial affirms the trial court’s

application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

By virtue of the state court’s application of a procedural bar to Petitioner’s

claims raised in Grounds One and Two, those claims are technically exhausted and

procedurally barred. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404,

1417-18 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that petitioner’s federal claim is procedurally barred under

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

the independent and adequate state-ground doctrine, which forecloses federal habeas review

when a state court has found a prisoner’s federal claim precluded because the prisoner failed

to meet a state procedural requirement.). Thus, Grounds One and Two are not subject to

federal habeas corpus review unless Petitioner establishes cause and prejudice or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

B. “Cause and Prejudice” or “Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice”

1. Cause and Prejudice

Proof of cause “ordinarily turn[s] on whether the prisoner can show that some

objective factor external to the defense impeded” his compliance with the state rule. Dretke,

541 U.S. at 393-94. In this case, Petitioner does not assert any basis sufficient to overcome

the procedural bar. Petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of the law do not satisfy the

cause standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986);

Kibler v. Walters, 220 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000). 

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Additionally, Petitioner has not established that failure to consider Grounds One

and Two will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. “[T]he miscarriage of justice

exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.” Calderon v.

Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 208, 324 (1995)). 

“‘To be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not

presented at trial.” Id. at 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). The Supreme Court

has explained that:

The meaning of actual innocence as formulated by Sawyer and Carrier

does not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt exists in light

of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found

the defendant guilty. It is not the district court’s independent judgment as

to whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard addresses; rather the

standard requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination 

about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do. Thus, a 

petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the

district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably,

would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added); see also Lorensten v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 954

(9th Cir. 2000) (“Petitioner bears the burden of proof on this issue by a preponderance of the

evidence, and he must show not just that the evidence against him was weak, but that it was

so weak that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.”). To establish a claim of actual

innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence presented in his habeas

petition.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998). The “actual innocence”

exception is narrow and “claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Schlup, 513

U.S. at 324. See also Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)(“The

Supreme Court has stressed the narrow scope of the actual innocence exception . . . .”) 

Petitioner does not establish that failure to consider Grounds One and Two will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner has not shown that, in view of new

evidence, it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Petitioner in

light of any new evidence. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 559. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to

establish that failure to consider his procedurally defaulted claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Because Petitioner has not established any basis to overcome the procedural bar

to his defaulted claims, the Court will not reach the merits of Grounds One and Two. The

Court will consider Petitioner’s remaining claims after discussing the standard of review. 

III. Standard of Review 

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner “whose claim was adjudicated on the merits

in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638 (2003). Thus, a state prisoner is not

entitled to relief unless he demonstrates that the state court’s adjudication of his claims

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2); Carey

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Mancebo

v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether a state court ruling was

“contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, courts must look

exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state

court’s decision. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-15 (2003); Yarborough v. Gentry,

540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). 

Thus, a federal court cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that

decision conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v.

Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.

2003). Even if the state court neither explained its ruling nor cites United States Supreme

Court authority, the reviewing federal court must examine Supreme Court precedent to

determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S.

3, 8 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that citation to federal law

is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not even require awareness

of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts them.” Id. 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law

“that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set

of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003)(citations omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application of” federal law if

the court identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a

particular case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An

incorrect application of state law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado,

541 U.S. 652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the

state court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”) “It is not enough that a federal habeas

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

court, in its independent review of the legal question,” is left with the “firm conviction” that

the state court ruling was “erroneous.” Id.; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, the petitioner

must establish that the state court decision is “objectively unreasonable.” Middleton v.

McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

Additionally, a state court’s factual determinations “shall be presumed to be

correct,” on federal habeas review, and Petitioner can overcome that presumption only by

“rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2000). The burden placed on

petitioner is considerable because “this standard means that the federal habeas court must

‘more than simply disagree’ with the state fact-finding.” Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d

45, 55 (2nd Cir. 2001) (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432 (1983)). 

Where a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine

whether it resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th

Cir. 2002). Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993).

IV. Analysis

The record reflects, and Respondents concede, that Petitioner properly exhausted

state remedies as to Grounds Three and Four by presenting those claims to the state courts in

a procedurally proper manner. (docket # 13 at 6) As discussed below, however, Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

A. Controlling Law

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When

reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely

limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial

strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691-92; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (stating that “a violation

of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the

defendant is prejudiced.”) To show prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). The court may proceed directly to the prejudice

prong. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697). The court, however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155.

B. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the images at issue depicted real children as

opposed to computer-generated images. (docket # 1 at 8) Respondents construe Petitioner’s

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

claim as challenging the State’s failure to provide expert testimony establishing that the

photographs depicted real children, rather than images that had been computer-generated or

otherwise altered or manipulated. (docket # 13) In his Reply, Petitioner states that he

“never stated that it was incumbent upon the State to provide expert testimony, only that

some evidence [must have been] introduced” to establish that the images depicted actual

minor children. (docket # 16 at 10) Petitioner raised this claim on post-conviction review

and the State court rejected it. (Respondents’ Exh. F, H, I) The State court applied the

correct legal standard, Strickland, to Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

and Petitioner has not established that its decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts, or was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus

relief on Ground Three.

Petitioner was indicted on multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, each

a class 2 felony and dangerous crime against children, committed in November 2003. Each

count involved possession of visual depictions of a minor engaged in exploitive exhibition

or other sexual conduct, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3553. At the time of Petitioner’s

conviction, Arizona Revised Statute § 13-3553 provided, in pertinent part, that:

A. A person commits sexual exploitation of a minor by knowingly:

* * * 

2. Distributing, transporting, exhibiting, receiving, selling, purchasing,

electronically transmitting, possessing or exchanging any visual depiction

in which a minor is engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual 

conduct. 

* * * 

C. Sexual exploitation of a minor is a class 2 felony and if the minor is

 under fifteen years of age it is punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01.

A.R.S. § 13-3553 (West 2003). Also, at the time of Petitioner’s conviction, A.R.S. § 13-

105(26) defined “person” as a “human being.” A.R.S. § 13-3551(5) defined “minor” as “a

person or persons who were under eighteen years of age at the time a visual depiction was

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

created, adapted, or modified.” Id. (West 2003). The photographs upon which Petitioner’s

convictions were based were discovered in 2003, and therefore, were necessarily taken and

developed with the technology that existed before or during their discovery in 2003. 

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to demand that the State offer

evidence that the photographs depicted real children, as opposed to computer-generated

images. 

Petitioner’s argument stems from the possibility in this age of technology that,

rather than creating images of real children, pornographers can alter images or create

computer-generated images. Such images — as well as sexually explicit images of

individuals who appear to be minors but are not - are protected by the First Amendment. 

See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244-45 (2002) (stating that “[i]t is well

established that speech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects offending our

sensibilities.”). The United States Supreme Court has held that the federal statute which

included the possession of virtual child pornography within the scope of prohibited conduct

was unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment. 535 U.S. at 245-46 (invalidating

18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). The Court found that because the federal statute did not distinguish

between pornography depicting actual children from photographs of “virtual child

pornography,” it “prohibit[ed] speech that records no crime and creates no victim in its

production.” 535 U.S. at 250-51. 

Unlike the federal statute invalidated by the Supreme Court, the Arizona Statute

at issue requires that prohibited visual depictions show actual minor children. See, A.R.S. §

13-3553, §13-13-3551; State v. Hazlett, 205 Ariz. 523, 73 P.3d 1258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)

(explaining that A.R.S. § 13-3553 was limited to visual depictions of “actual minors”

actually engaged in real or simulated exploitive exhibition or sexual conduct.). Thus, the

First Amendment issue to which Petitioner alludes is not present in this case. 

Moreover, to satisfy its burden under A.R.S. § 13-3553, the State could rely on

the visual depictions themselves, without introducing additional evidence regarding those

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

images. Although Petitioner asserts that he never “stated that it was incumbent upon the

State to provide expert testimony,” docket # 16 at 10, he does not explain what type of

evidence the State should have introduced to establish that the visual depictions showed

actual children. Respondents correctly argue that the State was not required to produce

expert testimony that the visual depictions were pictures of actual children, rather than

virtual images. The Supreme Court has never imposed such an expert-witness requirement

in the case of photographic evidence. Additionally, the federal circuit courts that have

addressed the issue have found no such requirement. See United States v. RodriguezPacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that courts “universally accept the

proposition that juries are capable of distinguishing between real and virtual images, without

expert assistance”); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 121 (2nd Cir. 2006); United States

v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding no expert testimony required to prove

“real children” factor; trier of fact could examine evidence to determine if government

satisfied its burden); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding “jury’s conclusion that real

children were depicted even where the images themselves were the only evidence the

government presented on the subject.”). These courts reasoned that the jury that views the

photographs can “draw its own independent conclusion as to whether real children were

depicted.” U.S. v. Vig, 167 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 1999). Because the State was not

required to present expert testimony or other evidence to establish that the photographs were

not computer-generated or manipulated, counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge

the State’s failure to offer expert testimony or additional evidence on that issue.

Likewise, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to offer a defense expert’s

evaluation of the photographs. Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make reasonable decisions that make particular investigations

unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. “This includes a duty to investigate the

defendants’s ‘most important defense,’ . . . and a duty adequately to investigate and

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

introduce into evidence records that demonstrate factual innocence, or that raise sufficient

doubt on that question to undermine confidence on the verdict . . . .” Bragg v. Galaza, 242

F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Here, defense counsel made a strategic

decision not proffer a defense based on the intrinsic character and nature of the photographs.

Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s decision was deficient performance. See Harris

v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1368 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that petitioner, who had the

burden of proof, failed to “overcome the ‘strong presumption’ that [defense] counsel’s

failure to introduce the 1971 EEG results . . . fell within the ‘wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.’” And concluding that “[b]ecause it is possible that the failure to

introduce the abnormal EEG results was a difficult but thoughtful tactical decision, we must

presume that counsel’s conduct was within the range of competency.”). Rather than

challenging the character of the photographs, counsel presented a third-party culpability

defense that Petitioner’s daughter downloaded the photographs from the internet, and

planted them in Petitioner’s bedroom to inculpate him. Counsel presented evidence of the

daughter’s motive, including her desire to assume control of Petitioner’s home and

possessions, and her anger that Petitioner would not help her obtain welfare benefits. An

alternative focus on the photographs themselves, or Petitioner’s perceptions of them, would

have detracted from that defense. See Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1247 (10th Cir.

2008) (stating that for trial counsel to have “raised any type of mental disorder defense

would have been inconsistent with a defense of actual innocence and would have

considerably weakened both defenses. Counsel’s decision in this case was reasonable trial

strategy, which we will not second guess on appeal.”). 

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced as a result of his

defense attorney’s failure to demand evidence that the photographs depicted real children.

Petitioner has not made any showing that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Petitioner

has not provided evidence of any particular expert or other witness that would have testified

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

regarding the visual depictions, or the content of such testimony. “[C]omplaints of uncalled

witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus review because allegations of what the

witness would have testified are largely speculative . . . . In addition, for [petitioner] to

demonstrate the requisite Strickland prejudice, [he] must show not only that [the] testimony

would have been favorable, but also that the witness would have testified at trial.” Evans v.

Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also United States v.

Hardin, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance

based on counsels’ failure to call a witness who would have taken responsibility for a gun

found in defendant’s possession because, inter alia, “[t]here is no evidence in the record

which establishes that Washington would testify in [petitioner’s] trial.”).

Petitioner has not presented any evidence indicating that an expert or other

witness was available to testify at his trial regarding whether the images at issue depicted

real children as opposed to computer-generated images. Moreover, Petitioner has not

established any prejudice as a result of counsel’s failure to call an expert or other witness to

testify regarding the photographs, because he has not offered the substance of such

purported testimony. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel asserted in Ground Three does not warrant habeas corpus relief.

C. Ground Four

In Ground Four Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. Petitioner also

asserts that appellate counsel raised a single “weak issue” instead of raising the “stronger”

issues that were raised on post-conviction review. (docket # 1 at 9) 

In challenges to the effective assistance of appellate counsel, the same standards

apply as with the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.

259, 285 (2000); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). In Smith, the United States Supreme

Court indicated that an appellate attorney filing a merits brief need not and should not raise

every non-frivolous claim. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288. Rather, an attorney may select from

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal. Id. As a result, there

is no requirement that an appellate attorney raise issues that are clearly untenable. Gustave v.

United States, 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir.1980). As such, counsel may have to make

strategic choices regarding which claims to raise and which to ignore. 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is vague and

conclusory. Petitioner appears to challenge appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence concerning whether the photographs depicted real children.

As discussed previously in connection with Ground Three, this argument lacks

merit. The State was not required to offer expert or other evidence that the children in the

photographs were real. Rather, the jury was able to view the photographs and determine

whether they depicted real children, as opposed to computer-generated images. See United

States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding “jury’s conclusion that real

children were depicted even where the images themselves were the only evidence the

government presented on the subject.”). Additionally, the pediatrician called by the State

testified that, based on her training and experience and the bodily development and

characteristics she saw in all but one of the photographs, the children depicted therein were

less than 15 years of age. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 18; citing Tr. 9/15/04 at 81-93). The

jury viewed the pictures and considered the testimony, including that of the pediatrician. 

Petitioner has not shown that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that, but for appellate

counsel’s failure to raise that issue on appeal, the outcome of that proceeding would have

been different. Because Petitioner has failed to prove either prong of the Strickland test, his

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims fail.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Petition should be denied

because Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally defaulted or fail on the merits. 

Accordingly,

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (docket # 1) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 6th day of October, 2009.

Case 2:09-cv-00328-JWS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 19 of 19