Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00921/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00921-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES ANTHONY PRICE, # 188095, )

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:13cv921-WHA

 ) (WO)

CHERYL PRICE, et al., )

 )

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Alabama inmate James Anthony Price (“Price”). Doc. No. 1.

1

I. BACKGROUND

On April 1, 2009, a Houston County jury found Price guilty of two counts of robbery

in the first degree, in violation of § 13A-8-41, Ala. Code 1975. On that same date, the trial

court sentenced Price as an habitual offender to life in prison without parole. 2

Price appealed, claiming that (1) the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding

his statement to police about his prior robbery conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying

Document numbers(“Doc. No.”) are those assigned by the Clerk of Court in this action.

1

Page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF.

In sentencing Price under Alabama’s Habitual Felony Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala.

2

Code 1975, the trial court relied on Price’s prior Georgia conviction for cocaine possession, for

which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison; his prior Florida conviction for strong-arm

robbery, for which he was sentenced to 3 1⁄2 years in prison; and his prior Alabama conviction

for first-degree robbery, for which he was sentenced to life in prison. See, e.g., Resp’ts Ex. 1

(vo1. 1, pt. 1) at 45.

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the defense’s requests for a continuance; (3) the State failed to present sufficient evidence

to sustain his convictions; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to give several of his requested

jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause on a prospective

juror; and (6) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the photographic lineup. 

Resp’ts Ex. 2 at 11. On March 12, 2010, by unpublished memorandum opinion, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Price’s convictions and sentence. Resp’ts Ex. 3. Price

applied for rehearing, which was overruled on April 2, 2010. Resp’ts Exs. 5 & 6. On April

21, 2010, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered a certificate of judgment. Resp’ts

Ex. 7.

On March 29, 2011, Price, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief

under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he asserted the

following claims:

1. His trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by– 

(a) withdrawing a request for a preliminary hearing

without consulting him;

(b) failing to properly investigate the out-of-state

convictions used to enhance his sentence under

Alabama’s Habitual Felony Offender Act

(“HFOA”);

(c) failing to object to the trial court’s denial of a

sentencing hearing;

(d) failing to object to use of his Georgia conviction

for cocaine possession to enhance his sentence

under Alabama’s HFOA when the conduct

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underlying the Georgia conviction would not

constitute a felony under Alabama law; and

(e) failing to object to the admission of evidence of

his prior bad acts, in violation of Ala.R.Evid.

404(b). 

2. His appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by– 

(a) violating Rule 28(a)(10) of the Alabama Rules of

Appellate Procedure in his appellate brief; and

(b) failing to challenge the out-of-state convictions

used to enhance his sentence under Alabama’s

HFOA.

Resp’ts Ex. 8 (pt.1) at 11-37. 

After receiving a response from the State, the court held an evidentiary hearing at

which Price was represented by appointed counsel. Resp’ts Ex. 8 (pt. 2) at 51-72. On

October 22, 2012, the court entered an order denying Price’s Rule 32 petition. Id. at 36-37.

Price appealed, reasserting the claims in his Rule 32 petition, except for his claim that

his appellate counsel wasineffective for failing to challenge the out-of-state convictions used

to enhance his sentence. Resp’ts Ex. 9. Following briefing by the parties, the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to make specific findings of fact

regarding Price’s claims. Resp’ts Ex. 11. The court then issued a supplemental record

containing an order with specific findings. Resp’ts Ex. 12 at 6-8. On July 3, 2013, on return

to remand, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued an unpublished memorandum

opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment denying Price’s Rule 32 petition. Resp’ts Ex.

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13. Holding that Price had failed to satisfy the two-prong test for claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel established bythe Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466U.S.

668 (1984), the state appellate court found:

Here, it was Price’s burden to prove his claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041, 1059 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005),

quoting Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 n.15 (11 Cir. 2000). th

Price failed, though, to offer any evidence in the circuit court to support his

claims. During Price’s evidentiary hearing, he did not offer a single witness

or any exhibits to prove his claims. Instead, he attempted to rely on his petition

and the arguments of counsel. However, allegations raised in petitions are not

evidence, nor are arguments of counsel. See Burgess v. State, 962 So.2d 272,

295 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (“Burgess made detailed allegations in his petition

concerning this issue; however, he failed to present any evidence in support of

this claim at the evidentiary hearing.”); Ex parte Coleman, 861 So.2d 1080,

1084 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Fountain Finance, Inc. v. Hines, 788 So. 2d 155,

159 (Ala. 2000)). The dearth of evidence was noted by the circuit court in its

findings of fact. (C. on Remand 6-7.) Because Price failed to meet his burden

of proof on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the circuit court did

not err in denying relief on those claims. Burgess, 962 So. 2d at 295.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Resp’ts Ex 13 at 3-4.

Price applied for rehearing, which was overruled on September 6, 2013. Resp’ts Exs.

14 & 15. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court,

which that court denied on November 15, 2013. Resp’ts Exs. 16 & 17. A certificate of

judgment was entered that same date. Resp’ts Ex. 17.

On December 4, 2013 (Doc. No. 1), Price initiated this habeas action by filing a

§ 2254 petition asserting the following claims:

1. He did not abandon any claims on appeal from the trial court’s

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denial of his Rule 32 petition, and all of his claims are properly

before this court, because his counsel at the evidentiary hearing

on his Rule 32 petition stated that he “would stand on his

argument and exhibits in the Rule 32 petition”; further, the trial

court failed to make specific findings of fact regarding his Rule

32 claims. Doc. No. 1-1 at 2, 8-9, 42-46.

2. His trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by– 

(a) withdrawing a request for a preliminary hearing

(Doc. No. 1-1 at 7, 10-12, 27-29);

(b) failing to investigate, object to, or argue against

use of his out-of-state convictions to enhance his

sentence under Alabama’s HFOA (Doc. No. 1-1

at 4-5, 13-15, 17-19, 30-31, 34-35);

(c) failing to preserve for appellate review a

challenge to the lack of a sentencing hearing

(Doc. No. 1-1 at 15-17 & 32-33); and

(d) failing to object to the trial court’s admission of

his prior robbery conviction in evidence at trial

(Doc. No. 1-1 at 6, 20-23, 36-38).

3. His appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by– 

(a) violating Ala.R.App.P. 28(a)(10) in his appellate

brief (Doc. No. 1-1 at 24-26 & 39-41);

(b) failing to challenge use of his Georgia conviction

for cocaine possession to enhance his sentence

under Alabama’s HFOA (Doc. No. 1-1 at 4-5);

and 

(c) “failing to sufficiently argue regarding jury

instructions” and the motion to suppress the

photographic lineup (Doc. No. 1-1 at 7).

The respondents contend that all of Price’s claims are procedurally defaulted because

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he failed to present them fairly through one complete round of state court appellate review. 

Doc. No. 12 at 5-13. After consideration of the parties’ submissions, the record, and the

pertinent law, the undersigned finds that Price is not entitled to habeas relief because his

claims are procedurally barred from federal review; therefore, his § 2254 petition should be

denied without an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

in United States District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

Procedural Default

The respondents contend that Price procedurally defaulted his claims by failing to

present them through one complete round of state court appellate review. Doc. No. 12 at 5-

13.

The procedural default doctrine ensures that “state courts have had the first

opportunity to hear the claimsought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding.” Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). “[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State’s established appellate review process,” including review by the state’s court of last

resort, even if review in that court is discretionary. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

845 (1999). This exhaustion requirement applies to state post-conviction proceedings as well

as to direct appeals. See Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11 Cir. 2003). th

In Alabama, a complete round of the established appellate review process includes an

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appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, an application for rehearing to that court,

and a petition for discretionary review – a petition for a writ of certiorari – filed in the

Alabama Supreme Court. See Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (11 Cir. 2001); 3 th

Ala.R.App.P. 39 & 40. The exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas petitioner to do more than

refer vaguely to possible claims; “[t]he ground relied upon must be presented face-up and

squarely; the federal question must be plainly defined.” Kelley v. Sec., Dept. of Corr, 377

F.3d 1317, 1325 (11 Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Hunt v. Comm., Ala. Dept. of Corr., 666 th

F. 3d 708, 730-31 (11 Cir. 2012). It is not sufficient that all the facts to support the federal th

claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made; to

exhaust a claim sufficiently, “petitioners [must] present their claims to the state courts such

that the reasonable reader would understand each claim’s particular legal basis and specific

factual foundation.” Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1344-45, citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 277.

Here, a review of the record confirms the respondents’ contention that none of the

claims in Price’s § 2254 petition were fairly presented through one complete round of state

court appellate review. As the respondents note (Doc. No. 12 at 5 & 8-9), Price did not

present his initial claim – i.e., his claim that he did not abandon any claims on appeal from

the denial of his Rule 32 petition and that the trial court failed to make specific findings of

fact regarding his Rule 32 claims (see Doc. No. 1-1 at 2, 8-9, 42-46) – in his petition for writ

The filing of an application of rehearing is a prerequisite for certiorari review by the

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Alabama Supreme Court. Ala. R.App. P. 40(d)(1) (“In all criminal cases except pretrial appeals

by the state, the filing of an application for rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

is a prerequisite for certiorari review by the Alabama Supreme Court.”).

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of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court in his state post-conviction (Rule 32 related)

proceedings. See Resp’ts Ex. 16. The respondents also correctly observe (Doc. No. 12 at 5

& 10-12) that Price did not specifically assert any of his claims of ineffective assistance of

trial and appellate counsel (see Doc. No. 1-1 at 4-41) in the application for rehearing he filed

in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals after that court issued its memorandum opinion

affirming the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition. See Resp’ts Ex. 14. Because 4

federal courts “have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts[,]” Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-76, Price’s failure to allege and

pursue each of his claims specifically through each level of the state appellate process

renders them unexhausted.

Habeas claims not properly exhausted in the state courts are procedurally defaulted

if presentation of the claims in state court would be barred by state procedural rules. Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1

As the respondents note, in his application for rehearing Price only questioned the

4

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ interpretation of two Alabama state court cases – Burgess

v. State, 962 So.2d 272 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), and Ex parte Coleman, 861 So.2d 1080 (Ala.

2003) – in finding that Price did not present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing on his Rule

32 petition, but instead only “attempted to rely on his petition and the arguments of counsel,” and

thusfailed to meet his burden of proof to obtain post-conviction relief. See Resp’ts Ex. 13 at 3-4.

Price did not specifically reassert his various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his

application for rehearing, but only questioned the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision

on the ground that he had attached exhibits to his Rule 32 petition. See Resp’ts Ex. 14 at 1-4

(application for rehearing); id. at 10-16 (brief in support of application for rehearing). While

arguing against the appellate court’s alleged misinterpretation of Burgess and Coleman, Price

questioned the court’s application of Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.3, which setsforth the parties’ respective

burdens of proof in Rule 32 proceedings.

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(1991). Here, no state remedy remains for Price to return to state court to present his

unexhausted claims; any attempt now to present his claims in state court would be barred

under state procedural rules. An attempt by Price to raise his claims in another Rule 32

petition would be successive and untimely. See Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b), (d), 32.2(c). 

Consequently, all claims in his § 2254 petition are procedurally defaulted.

Exceptions for Procedurally Defaulted Claims

This court may reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim only in two narrow

circumstances:

First, a petitioner may obtain federal review of a procedurally defaulted claim

if he can show both “cause” for the default and actual “prejudice” resulting

from the default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986);

[Wainwright v.] Sykes, 433 U.S. [72,] 87 [(1977) ].... Second, a federal court

may also grant a habeas petition on a procedurally defaulted claim, without a

showing of cause or prejudice, to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs

in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the

conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Id.

Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11 Cir. 2003). th

Cause and Prejudice

Cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the petitioner can show

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules or that the procedural default resulted fromineffective assistance of counsel. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170

(1982). In this context, to establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors at trial

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worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, “infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170; see Murray, 477 U.S. at 494. Price,

however, asserts no grounds as cause for the procedural default of his claims.5

Actual Innocence

Demonstrated actual innocence may trump a procedural bar in a habeas proceeding

to provide a gateway to federal review of an otherwise defaulted § 2254 claim. See Murray,

477 U.S. at 495-96; Rozzelle v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 672 F.3d 1000, 1011

(11 Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11 Cir. 2001). th th

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held that

prisoners asserting actual innocence as a gateway to review of defaulted claims must

establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 513 U.S. at 327. 

“[T]he Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case.” 

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). A petitioner must show “factual innocence, not

mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998).

As the Supreme Court in Schlup observed:

The holding in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), does not apply

5

to Price’s procedurally defaulted claims, because his defaults occurred either when he failed to

present claims properly in the application for rehearing he filed in the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals after that court issued its memorandum opinion affirming the trial court’s

denial of his Rule 32 petition, or in the petition for writ of certiorari he filed in the Alabama

Supreme Court in the appellate proceedings on his Rule 32 petition. Martinez is limited to

defaults of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that occur at the Rule 32 court level.

See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319-20.

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[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an

innocent person is extremely rare... . To be credible, such a claim requires

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable

evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at

trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of

cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.

513 U.S. at 324.

Here, Price points to no new reliable evidence, as required by Schlup, to support his

claim that he is actually innocent of the offense of which he was convicted. Consequently,

the actual innocence exception provides no gateway for review of his procedurally defaulted

claims, and his claims are foreclosed from federal habeas review.6

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION ofthe Magistrate Judge that the petition

for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED and this case be DISMISSED

with prejudice.

Price appears to argue that this court must excuse his procedural default to prevent a

6

miscarriage of justice because he is actually innocent of the enhanced sentence he received under

Alabama’s HFOA. Doc. No. 19 at 1-2. He predicatesthis argument on his assertion that his prior

out-of-state convictions were improperly used to enhance his sentence under the HFOA. He

contends, therefore, that he received an illegal sentence and that his petition sets forth a

“jurisdictional claim” that overcomes application of the procedural default bar.Id. Price presents

no new evidence that satisfies Schlup’s standard. Rather, he makes a purely legal – and

conclusory – argument that focuses on the State’ssupposed procedural failings under Alabama’s

HFOA. He does not contend that he did not actually commit the prior felony offenses. “In other

words, he makes no claim of factual innocence of the predicate offense[s].” McKay v. United

States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1199 (11 Cir. 2011). The court also notes that Price wholly fails to set

th

forth facts establishing that his Georgia conviction for cocaine possession was based on conduct

that would not constitute a felony under Alabama law. On this record, the actual innocence

exception does not save any of Price’s claims from the procedural default bar.

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The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file the Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge and to serve a copy on the petitioner. The petitioner is DIRECTED to file any

objections to this Recommendation on or before March 1, 2016. Any objections filed must

specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation to which the petitioner objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections

will not be considered by the District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party froma de novo determination by the District Court

of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th

Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th

Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11 Cir. 1989). th

Done, this 16 day of February, 2016. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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