Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00573/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00573-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTIAN A. RODRIGUEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

COUNTY OF KINGS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1: 05-CV-00573-OWW-SMS

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO AMEND COMPLAINT (DOC. 6)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE

THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT NO

LATER THAN TEN DAYS AFTER THE

DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

ACTION FOR DEFECT IN REMOVAL

PROCEDURE (DOC. 6)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DECLINE TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL

JURISDICTION AND TO REMAND ACTION

TO STATE COURT 

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302(c)(1) and 72-303.

I. Background

On April 27, 2005, Defendants filed in this Court a notice

of removal of the instant action from the Kings County Superior

Court. The notice of removal and attached document reveal that

the action had been commenced on or about January 24, 2005, and

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Defendants had been served with notice of the action on April 4,

2005. The basis of removal was that this Court had original

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the action

contained claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Notice at 2.)

The Defendants include the County of Kings, the Kings County

Probation Department, and the Kings County Sheriff’s Department,

as well as named individuals who are employed by and have

positions of authority within the Kings County Sheriff’s and

Probation departments. The complaint reflects that Plaintiff

seeks compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries

sustained when Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Kings County

Juvenile Boot Camp. Most of the claims are based on state tort

law: some allege negligent conduct (on various theories,

including California statutory law) (claims one through three);

another asserts intentional infliction of emotional distress

(claim seven). There are three claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, including intentional or deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff’s medical needs and failure to protect Plaintiff from

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm (claims four

through six).

The case has not been scheduled. No answer has been filed.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, motion for more definite statement, and motion to strike

on May 4, 2005; opposing papers were filed by Plaintiff on May

27, 2005; and a reply was filed on June 3,2005. By minute order

dated June 7, 2005, the hearing on the motion to dismiss was

continued from June 13, 2005, to August 1, 2005.

The Plaintiff’s motions to remand and amend the complaint

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

were filed on May 26, 2005, including the motion itself, a

supporting memorandum, a declaration of Tracy E. Sagle, and a

proposed order. A responsive memorandum and declaration with

exhibits were filed on June 16, 2005. A reply and declaration of

Sagle were filed on June 24, 2005.

By separate order, the hearing set on the motions was

vacated, and the motions to amend and to remand were deemed

submitted for decision and findings and recommendations,

respectively. 

II. Motion to Remand Action

A. Magistrate Judge’s Jurisdiction to Determine the

 Motion

Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) provides in pertinent part:

(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary--

(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear

and determine any pretrial matter pending before

the court, except a motion for injunctive relief,

for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment,

to dismiss or quash an indictment or information

made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a

criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance

of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, and to 

involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the 

court may reconsider any pretrial matter under

this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that

the magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.

(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to

conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings,

and to submit to a judge of the court proposed

findings of fact and recommendations for the 

disposition, by a judge of the court, of any

motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications

for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted

of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions

challenging conditions of confinement.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Nondispositive Matters. A magistrate judge to whom

a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or defense

of a party is referred to hear and determine shall 

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

promptly conduct such proceedings as are required and

when appropriate enter into the record a written

order setting forth the disposition of the matter. 

Within 10 days after being served with a copy of 

the magistrate judge’s order, a party may serve and 

file objections to the order; a party may not 

thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate

judge’s order to which objection was not timely made.

The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall

consider such objections and shall modify or set aside

any portion of the magistrate judge’s order found to 

be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

(b) Dispositive Motions and Prisoner Petitions. A

magistrate judge assigned without consent of the

parties to hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a

claim or defense of a party or a prisoner petition

challenging the conditions of confinement shall 

promptly conduct such proceedings as are required.

A record shall be made of all evidentiary proceedings

before the magistrate judge, and a record may be made

of such other proceedings as the magistrate judge

deems necessary. The magistrate judge shall enter 

into the record a recommendation for disposition

of the matter, including proposed findings of fact

when appropriate. The clerk shall forthwith mail

copies to all parties.

The question presented is whether a motion to remand a

proceeding to state court is a nondispositive motion that a

magistrate judge can determine, or a dispositive motion that a

district judge must determine so that a magistrate judge may only

issue findings and recommendations. Some of the circuit courts of

appeals have held that motions to remand are dispositive, and

thus a magistrate judge does not have jurisdiction to determine

such a motion. The reasoning is that although such motions are

not enumerated in § 636(b)(1)(A), they nevertheless are

functionally the equivalent of a motion for involuntary dismissal

because they determine that there will not be a federal forum

available to entertain a particular dispute. Vogel v. U.S. Office

Products Co., 258 F.3d 509, 514-17 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting a lack

of decisions from other circuits); First Union Mortgage Corp. v.

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 994-97 (10th Cir. 2000); In re U.S.

Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1998). The Ninth

Circuit has not taken a position on whether or not a Magistrate

Judge can rule on a motion to remand an action to state court.

Some district courts have taken the position that a motion to

remand is not dispositive and thus may be determined by a

magistrate judge. See Bearden v. PNS Stores, Inc., 894 F. Supp.

1418, 1419 n. 1 (D. Nev. 1995). The present motion, if granted,

will terminate the availability of a federal forum. In an

abundance of caution, the Magistrate Judge will thus proceed by

way of findings and recommendations.

B. The Motion

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) mandates that a “defendant or

defendants” desiring to remove any civil action from a state

court to file in the district court a notice of removal and

copies of the papers filed upon “such defendant or defendants in

such action.”

It is established that all defendants must join in the

removal of an action, or the removal is procedurally defective.

Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1986).

This has been interpreted to mean that there be "some timely

filed written indication from each served defendant, or from some

person or entity purporting to formally act on its behalf in this

respect and to have the authority to do so, that it has actually

consented to such action." Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 759

(5th Cir. 2002); Foley v. Allied Interstate, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d

1279, 1283 (C.D.Cal. 2004) (citing Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of

North America, 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1988), and

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

holding that consent by a corporate party’s general counsel held

sufficient even where the party had retained separate counsel);

Simpson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 282 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1153-54

(N.D.Cal. 2003) (holding that a signed letter from co-defendant’s

counsel was sufficient where the letter was ultimately filed with

the Court).

Here, the Defendants’ notice of removal was filed by counsel

who described themselves as “Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF

KINGS, et al.” (Notice of Removal at 1.) The notice states,

“Defendants, COUNTY OF KINGS, et al, hereby give notice of the

removal....” (Id.) It refers to the notice of removal having been

filed by “the defendants” (id. at 2); and it refers to the

“Defendants” as having been served with notice of the action when

the “public entity defendants were served with a copy of the

complaint,” (id.). The notice was signed by James D. Weakley of

Weakley, Ratliff, Arendt & McGuire, LLP, as “James D. Weakley,

Attorneys for Defendants.” (Id.) The declaration of attorney

Leslie M. Dillahunty, submitted in opposition to the motion to

amend and remand, notes that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss

the complaint was electronically filed with this Court and that

notice thereof was received from the Court with an indication

that the motions had been filed on behalf of all defendants named

in the complaint.

The Court concludes that there is no ambiguity in the notice

of remand, and there is no basis for an inference that

Defendants’ counsel does not constitute the authorized

representative of the Defendants in this action. The Court

concludes that all defendants joined in the removal of the case.

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Accordingly, it will be recommended that Plaintiff’s motion

to remand the action based on the failure of all defendants to

join in the removal be denied.

III. Motion to Amend the Complaint

Plaintiff moves to amend the complaint in the following

respects: 1) remove the fourth through sixth claims for civil

rights violations; 2) combine the first and third claims for

negligence as one common law negligence claim; 3) renumber the

second claim as the seventh claim; 4) state three claims (first,

third, and fifth) for common law negligence against the

individual defendants; 5) state three claims for negligence in

the course of employment against entities and individuals

pursuant to Cal. Govt. Code §§ 820 and 815.2; 6) rename the

seventh claim as the thirtieth claim; and 7) state numerous

claims (eight through twenty-nine) based on alleged violations of

the California statutes and the Cal. Code of Regs. governing

juvenile facilities and their employees. Review of the proposed

amended complaint reveals that the claims based on violations of

California regulatory law concern alleged violations of duties

arising from state-created regulations regarding staffing,

training, supervision, creation of manuals, performance of safety

checks, suicide prevention, treatment assessments, counseling

services, health services, medical treatment decisions, health

care standards, health care monitoring, first aid, emergency

services, intake screening, health and medical appraisals, mental

health treatment, crisis intervention, suicide hazard avoidance,

and juvenile facility design relating to persons in custody, and

specifically, minors in custody (claims eight through twentyCase 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

nine).

Plaintiff’s counsel declares that pursuant to requests to

Defendants pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Cal.

Govt. Code § 6250 et seq.), further state and local regulations

and laws may be identified that will require further amendments.

Plaintiff’s counsel declares that she has recently learned of the

implication of California and local regulations and standards and

their application to juvenile facilities; no discovery has been

conducted. All relevant witnesses and parties reside in proximity

to the Kings County Superior Court; thus, no inconvenience to the

parties or witnesses would result from remanding the matter. 

Defendants do not oppose the amendment of the complaint.

Defendants do request that the Court retain supplemental

jurisdiction over the state claims in this matter. In

Dillahunty’s declaration, it is noted that in her opposition to

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that

the Kings County Clerk’s Office informed Plaintiff’s counsel that

all judges of the Kings County Superior Court have recused

themselves from this matter, and that all hearings and trial

would be heard before the Honorable Franklin Jones at the

Superior Court for the State of California, County of Fresno.

Thus, Defendants argue that the economy of the parties and the

interests of justice weigh in favor of the action’s proceeding in

federal court.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides in pertinent part:

A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a

matter of course at any time before a responsive

pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which

no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has 

not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it

is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party’s

pleading only by leave of court or by written consent

of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given

when justice so requires. . . .

Although the rule is to be construed liberally, leave to amend is

not automatically granted. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d

1385, 1387 (9th Cir.1990). In determining whether the Court

should exercise its discretion to allow amendments, the following

factors should be considered: (1) whether the movant unduly

delayed seeking leave to amend, or acted in bad faith or with

dilatory motive; (2) whether the party opposing amendment would

be unduly prejudiced by the amendment; 3) whether there have been

repeated failures to cure, and (4) whether amendment would be

futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230

(1962).

Here, the action has just begun; there has been no discovery

or scheduling. There has been no undue delay. No bad faith or

dilatory motive appears.

Defendants do not oppose amendment. No prejudice has been

shown.

There is no indication that amendment would be futile.

Defendants do not raise any insufficiency of the proposed claims.

Further, it appears that the amendments concern state law claims. 

Therefore, it IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to amend

the complaint IS GRANTED. Plaintiff SHALL FILE the proposed

amended complaint as the first amended complaint no later than

ten days after the date of service of this order.

IV. Retention of Supplemental Jurisdiction

Defendants ask that this Court retain supplemental

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

jurisdiction over the action, which after the amendment will

contain only state law claims. Defendants argue that Plaintiff

has attempted to manipulate the choice of forum; further, because

the Kings County judges have recused themselves, it would be

incorrect to remand the matter to state court.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or

as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute,

in any civil action of which the district courts

have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall 

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 

claims that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under Article

III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental

jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the

joinder or intervention of additional parties.

. . . . 

(c) The district courts may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 

subsection (a) if--

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue

of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the

claim or claims over which the district court

has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are 

other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

In the present case, the § 1983 claims originally pled were

properly removed. Plaintiff has now been given leave to file an

amended complaint that deletes the federal claims. 

The remaining state law claims are so related to the previously

pled federal claims that they form part of the same case or

controversy over which the Court exercised removal jurisdiction

and thus appear to fall within § 1367(a). City of Chicago v.

International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 167 (1997).

When in a removed case all federal claims have been

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

dismissed but state law claims remain over which the court has

supplemental jurisdiction, the court has the discretion to remand

the state law claims to state court, instead of dismissing with

prejudice, upon a proper determination that retaining

jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate. CarnegieMellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 348-357 (1988)

(construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and § 1441(c) in light of

the court’s doctrine of pendent jurisdiction articulated in Mine

Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), which was later

substantially codified in amendments to § 1367); see Executive

Software v. United States Dist. Ct., 24 F.3d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir.

1994)); Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1993).

Exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of

the Court, United Mine Workers of America v.Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

726 (1966), and will be reviewed for clear error, Imagineering,

Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992).

Where the federal claims have been dismissed, the Court should

consider factors of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 976 F.2d at 1309; Lee

v. City of Beaumont, 12 F.3d at 937. In balancing the factors in

the usual case involving dismissal of all federal claims,

conservation of judicial resources is a weighty factor that will

often indicate that declining to exercise jurisdiction over state

law claims will be appropriate. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit

Pacific Co., 976 F.2d at 1309. The Court must state reasons for

declining to retain supplemental jurisdiction following dismissal

of claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Acri v. Varian

Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1992).

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Here, no resources of the Court have been expended other

than administrative energy in filing the various papers. The case

has been pending for only a short period of time, and discovery

has not even begun. Thus, economy would support the Court’s

declining to exercise jurisdiction. 

Comity favors declining jurisdiction because only state law

questions remain, and it is appropriate that a state court

determine and apply the many questions of state law that are

raised in the amended complaint. The fact that Plaintiff

originally filed federal claims does not necessarily mean that a

later but diligent choice of a state forum constitutes

manipulative conduct. See Baddie v.Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d

487 490-91 (9th Cir. 1995). The fact that some recusal of some

state court judges has occurred does not ipso facto render the

case appropriate for federal court. There is no showing that a

state forum is unavailable or inappropriate.

Thus, it will be recommended that the Court decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and that the action be

remanded to state court.

VI. Recommendations

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1. The Plaintiff’s motion to remand the action to state

court because of defective removal BE DENIED; and

2. The Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the action, which now contains only state law claims; and

3. The action BE REMANDED to the Superior Court of the

County of Kings.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00573-OWW -SMS Document 22 Filed 06/29/05 Page 13 of 13