Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01053/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01053-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

1

The Honorable Gerald W. Heaney assumed retirement status August 31, 2006.

This opinion is being filed by the remaining judges of the panel pursuant to 8th Cir.

R. 47E.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1053

___________

Tomas Tostado, * 

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Ken Carlson, Interim Deputy Field * 

Office Director; Bureau of Immigration *

and Customs Enforcement, Department *

of Homeland Security, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2007 

 Filed: April 2, 2007

___________

Before SMITH, HEANEY,1

 and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Tomas Tostado appeals the district court's denial of his habeas petition. Tostado

argues that his state-law convictions for the unlawful possession of cocaine and

unlawful possession of cannabis are not aggravated felonies for purposes of the

Appellate Case: 05-1053 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/02/2007 Entry ID: 3294484
-2-

Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"). Based on the Supreme Court's recent

decision of Lopez v. Gonzales, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006), we reverse. 

I. Background

Petitioner Tomas Tostado is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the

United States on November 29, 1984, as a lawful permanent resident. Tostado has

never become a naturalized citizen. On May 2, 2001, Tostado was convicted in Illinois

state court for the unlawful possession of cocaine, a class 1 felony, and the unlawful

possession of cannabis, a class 4 felony. 

Because of Tostado's convictions, Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS) special agents in St. Louis, Missouri, arrested him. The INS served Tostado a

notice to appear—a charging document for removal proceedings filed with the

appropriate United States immigration court. The INS filed the charging document

with the immigration court in Chicago for a hearing in St. Louis, which was initially

set for October 23, 2001. The immigration court reset Tostado's hearing on his

application for relief from deportation until October 8, 2002.

Before Tostado's hearing, the INS filed an additional removal charge against

Tostado, charging him as removable for having committed an aggravated felony based

upon Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002). In that case, the Bureau of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed its prior holding that a first-time state felony

drug conviction was not a "drug trafficking crime" within the federal law. Under

Yanez, a state felony drug conviction is properly classified as an aggravated felony

under § 101(a)(43)(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). An alien who is

removable from the United States for committing an aggravated felony may not seek

the relief of cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). 

Appellate Case: 05-1053 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/02/2007 Entry ID: 3294484
2

We initially affirmed. Tostado v. Carlson, 437 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2006),

vacated and remanded, Tostado v. Carlson, 127 S. Ct. 936 (2007).

-3-

At Tostado's hearing, the immigration judge denied his relief application and

ordered him deported to Mexico. The BIA denied Tostado's appeal. The day before

Tostado's removal, he filed the instant habeas petition. The district court denied his

petition, finding that under Eighth Circuit law and the BIA's decision in Yanez,

Tostado's offense was an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of § 1101(a)(43).2

Tostado appeals, arguing that simple possession of cocaine is not a "drug trafficking

crime," and thus not an "aggravated felony," and that the BIA's application of Yanez

to him was an impermissible retroactive application of a new rule, which violates

precepts of substantive and procedural due process. 

II. Analysis 

A. Jurisdiction

We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the district court in habeas corpus

proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. In addition, the REAL ID Act of 2005,

Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, amends portions of § 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §

1252, and clarifies the scope of judicial review of removal orders. Pursuant to § 106

of the REAL ID Act, a petition for review to the courts of appeal is the exclusive

means of review of an administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion. 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Under § 106(c) of the REAL ID Act, district courts no longer

have habeas jurisdiction to review final orders of review; instead, any habeas corpus

petition pending in the district court in which an alien challenges a final administrative

order of removal, deportation, or exclusion must be transferred by the district court

to the appropriate court of appeals. "Furthermore, the amendment was intended to be

retroactive, applying to direct review of orders issued before, on or after the date of

the enactment." Lopez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL

ID Act § 106(b)). 

Appellate Case: 05-1053 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/02/2007 Entry ID: 3294484
-4-

The REAL ID Act has also added "an additional jurisdictional provision to §

242. The new provision, INA § 242(a)(2)(D), codifies our jurisdiction to review

constitutional claims or questions of law raised in petitions for review of decisions

made by the Attorney General under INA § 240A and other sections." Id. In this case,

Tostado raises a question of law regarding whether his conviction in Illinois meets the

INA definition of an "aggravated felony." Accordingly, we will treat Tostado's appeal

as a petition for review to determine if the BIA's decision and the district court's order

were correct. 

"We review the BIA's legal determination de novo, according substantial

deference to the BIA's interpretation of the statutes and regulations it administers."

Lopez, 417 F.3d at 936. (internal quotations and citations omitted). This court reviews

the "BIA's interpretation of federal criminal statutes de novo without according any

deference." Id. 

B. Aggravated Felony

Tostado argues that his Illinois conviction for the unlawful possession of

cocaine and unlawful possession of cannabis was not an aggravated felony for the

purposes of the INA because, while it was a felony under Illinois law, it would not be

considered a felony under federal law.

Under the INA, the term "aggravated felony" includes a "drug trafficking

crime." Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. at 627–28. In turn, the term "drug trafficking

crime" includes "'any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act . . . .'"

Id. at 628. "Under the immigration statutes . . . the Attorney General's discretion to

cancel the removal of a person otherwise deportable does not reach a convict of an

aggravated felony." Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(a)(3)). 

In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that "conduct made a felony under state law

but a misdemeanor under the Controlled Substances Act is [not] a 'felony punishable

Appellate Case: 05-1053 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/02/2007 Entry ID: 3294484
-5-

under the Controlled Substances Act.'" Id. at 627 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)). The

Court explained that "[m]ere possession is not . . . a felony under the federal CSA

. . . although possessing more than what one person would have for himself will

support conviction for the federal felony of possession with intent to distribute . . . ."

Id. at 629. 

Here, neither party disputes that Tostado's state law convictions for unlawful

possession of cocaine and unlawful possession of cannabis would constitute

misdemeanors if prosecuted under the CSA. Therefore, we hold, in accordance with

Lopez, that Tostado's crimes do not constitute "drug trafficking crimes," as they are

not punishable as felonies under the CSA. Thus, Tostado has not been convicted of

an "aggravated felony" and is eligible for cancellation of removal. 

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the BIA's order denying Tostado's

application for cancellation of removal and the district court's denial of his habeas

petition, and we remand to the BIA for consideration of Tostado's application for

cancellation of removal.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-1053 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/02/2007 Entry ID: 3294484