Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_14-cv-00754/USCOURTS-alnd-4_14-cv-00754-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

LARRY EMBRY, }

}

Plaintiff, }

}

v. } Civil Action No.: CV-14-RDP-0754-M

}

CAROLYN W. WILSON, }

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, }

}

Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Plaintiff Larry Embry (“Plaintiff”) brings this action, pursuant to Sections 205(g) and 

1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his claims for a period of disability, 

disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). See also 42 

U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs submitted 

by the parties, the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is due to be affirmed.

I. Proceedings Below

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on October 26, 2010.

(Tr. 10, 22). The Social Security Administration initially denied Plaintiff’s applications on 

February 3, 2011. (Tr. 10, 35). Plaintiff subsequently requested and received a hearing before 

Administrative Law Judge Michael Hazel (“ALJ”) on August 22, 2012. (Tr. 24-31). However, 

Plaintiff did not attend the hearing. (Tr. 10, 24), and Plaintiff failed to show good cause for his 

failure to appear. (Tr. 17, 101). In his decision, dated September 24, 2012, the ALJ determined 

that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 10-11). Plaintiff sought review 

FILED

 2015 Aug-04 AM 09:37

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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of the ALJ’s decision, but the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request. (Tr. 1). Accordingly, 

the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner; and therefore is a proper 

subject of this court’s appellate review.

II. Facts

Plaintiff alleges disability due to mental impairment beginning on January 1, 2007. (Tr.

12, 109, 131). Plaintiff was born on May 12, 1980; thus, he was 26 years old on the alleged onset 

date. (Tr. 18). He has a 10th grade education. (Tr. 132). Plaintiff alleges he is unable to work 

because of the following: he stays in his room most of the day and does not go outside often; he 

avoids seeing people and tends to isolate himself in the house; he does not sleep well and has 

nightmares; he has no hobbies and rarely watches television; he often stares at the ceiling; and 

cannot concentrate or pay attention very long. (Tr. 145-152). The following paragraphs provide a 

chronological summary of Plaintiff’s case.

On October 12, 2010, almost four years after his alleged onset date of disability, Plaintiff 

sought treatment at Gateway Family Counseling for symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 

(“PTSD”) and depression. (Tr. 197). At Gateway, Plaintiff recited events from his life that likely 

caused his PTSD and depression. For instance, Plaintiff claimed that his parents neglected him 

when he was a child because his father was a deaf mute and his mother was deaf. (Tr. 193).

Plaintiff additionally stated that his mother committed suicide by lighting herself on fire when he 

was 15 years old. (Tr. 193). Plaintiff further claimed that he was present when the doctor took his 

mother off of life support and that a few of his mother’s fingers broke off in his hand as she died.

(Tr. 193). Plaintiff then stated that, as a result, he had suffered from PTSD symptoms since high

school and that the symptoms had grown worse during the previous five years. (Tr. 193). At 

Gateway, Daniel Marullo, Ph.D. diagnosed Plaintiff with PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder.

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(Tr. 198). Soon after his visit to Gateway, on October 26, 2010, Plaintiff applied for a period of 

disability, DIB, and SSI. (Tr. 10, 22). 

On November 8, 2010, Plaintiff sought treatment at the UAB Hospital Emergency 

Department for insomnia and right hip pain. (Tr. 199). On December 22, 2010, Plaintiff visited 

Greg J. Sullivan, M.D., (Tr. 228, 246), who prescribed Plaintiff an assortment of drugs for 

anxiety, depression, and pain. (Tr. 227). On January 19, 2011, State agency consultative 

examiner, Catherine Prince, Ph.D., examined Plaintiff and concluded the following: “[Plaintiff] 

would likely have difficulty carrying out and remembering instruction in a work setting. He 

would likely have difficulty dealing with work pressures, and responding appropriately to 

supervision and co-workers. [Plaintiff] would likely have difficulty living independently.” (Tr. 

205).

On January 24, 2011, State agency psychological consultant, Gloria Roque, Ph.D., 

examined Plaintiff’s medical records and opined that Plaintiff has no more than moderate 

limitations of his activities of daily living, social functioning, and ability to maintain 

concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 220). Dr. Roque ultimately concluded that Plaintiff can 

carry out very short and simple instructions, sustain an ordinary routine without special 

supervision, and make simple work-related decisions. (Tr. 220).

On January 26, 2011, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Sullivan’s office for opiate dependency.

(Tr. 236). During this visit, Dr. Sullivan noted that Plaintiff continued to have hip pain but 

seemed to be doing well otherwise. (Tr. 236). Also, during the visit, Plaintiff stated that his 

prescription medications were helping his depression and stabilizing his moods. (Tr. 236). The 

record indicates that Plaintiff returned to Dr. Sullivan’s office for appointments in February, 

April, and July of 2011. (Tr. 246, 244, 242). Additionally, the prescription history found in the

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records indicate that Plaintiff regularly filled his prescriptions from January 2011 through April

2012. (Tr. 247-251).

On April 12, 2012, Plaintiff sought treatment at the Brookwood Medical Center and was 

admitted for mood disorder secondary to substance abuse, PTSD, opiate dependence, and alcohol 

abuse. (Tr. 252). At Brookwood, Jorge W. Castro, M.D., noted that Plaintiff was prescribed 

medications for PTSD and depression but Plaintiff has not been able to afford them. (Tr. 252). 

As a result, Plaintiff was given antidepressants, and his condition improved. (Tr. 252).

On August 22, 2012, the ALJ conducted a video hearing. (Tr. 10). However, Plaintiff 

failed to attend the hearing, and Plaintiff also failed to respond to a Notice to Show Good Cause 

for Failure to Appear. As a result, the ALJ found, pursuant to Hallex I-2-4-25D, that Plaintiff

constructively waived his right to appear for a hearing. Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

was not disabled.

III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step test. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, 

an ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial work activity” is work activity that involves doing 

significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a). “Gainful work activity” is 

work that is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b). If an ALJ finds that the claimant 

engages in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant cannot claim disability. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(b). Second, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable 

impairment or a combination of medical impairments that significantly limits the claimant’s

ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Absent such impairment, 

the claimant may not claim disability. Id. Third, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s 

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impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526. If such criteria 

are met, the claimant is declared disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

If the claimant does not fulfill the requirements necessary to be declared disabled under 

the third step, an ALJ may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. An ALJ 

must first determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which refers to the 

claimant’s ability to work despite his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). In the fourth step, 

an ALJ determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is determined to be capable of performing past relevant work, 

then the claimant is deemed not disabled. Id. If an ALJ finds the claimant unable to perform past 

relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(v). In the last part of the analysis, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant is 

able to perform any other work commensurate with his RFC, age, education, and work 

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). At this point, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant 

to the ALJ to prove the existence, in significant numbers, of jobs in the national economy that 

the claimant can do given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(g), 404.1560(c).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

In the instant case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity and has a combination of the severe impairments PTSD and Major Depressive 

Disorder, thus satisfying steps one and two of the analysis. (Tr. 12). The ALJ then found that 

Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 

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404, Subpart P, Appendix 1,” (Tr. 13), thus failing to satisfy step three of the analysis. Next, the 

ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC, specifically holding: 

[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations. [Plaintiff] is limited to 

simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; requires low stress jobs with only occasional 

decision making and occasional changes in the work settings; is limited to only 

occasional interaction with the public so long as the interaction is brief and superficial; is 

limited to occasional interaction with co-workers so long as no tandem tasks are assigned 

and the interaction is brief and superficial; and is limited to occasional interaction with 

supervisors. 

(Tr. 15). In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony about his 

symptoms and concluded: “[Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the 

[RFC] assessment.” (Tr. 15). The ALJ then articulated various reasons for finding that Plaintiff’s 

statements were not entirely credible, including the fact that Plaintiff’s symptoms substantially 

improve when he takes his medications and the fact that Plaintiff is capable of performing 

household chores. (Tr. 16). Additionally, the ALJ assigned substantial weight to the medical 

opinions of Dr. Roque and Dr. Sullivan, while only assigning some weight to the medical 

opinion of Dr. Prince. (Tr. 17).

The ALJ then moved to step four of the analysis and held that Plaintiff did not have any 

past relevant work, (Tr. 17), thus implicating step five of the analysis. At step five, the ALJ held 

that “[c]onsidering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and [RFC], there are jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.” (Tr. 18). 

Specifically, during the hearing, the ALJ asked the Vocational Expert what type of jobs a person 

of Plaintiff’s age, education level, and RFC could perform. (Tr. 29). The Vocational Expert 

testified that Plaintiff could perform jobs such as kitchen helper, cleaner, and solderer. (Tr. 18, 

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29). As a result, the ALJ ultimately held: “[Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as defined 

in the [Act] from [the alleged onset date] to [the date of the ALJ’s decision].” (Tr. 19).

III. Plaintiff’s Argument for Reversal

In his appellate brief, Plaintiff divided his discussion into two specific arguments: (1)

“[t]he ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence of record from examining source, Dr. 

Prince.” (Pl.’s Br. at 7); and (2) “[t]he ALJ failed to properly consider Plaintiff’s pain pursuant to 

the Eleventh Circuit’s three part pain standard.” (Pl.’s Br. at 10). The court addresses each 

argument below.

IV. Standard of Review

The only issues before this court are whether the record reveals substantial evidence to 

sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 

(11th Cir. 1982), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Lamb v. Bowen, 847 

F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) mandates that the Commissioner’s findings are conclusive if supported by 

“substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The district 

court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of 

the Commissioner; instead, it must review the final decision as a whole and determine if the 

decision is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. See Id. (citing Bloodsworth v. 

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). 

Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance of 

evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other 

citations omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s factual findings 

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must be affirmed even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings. See

Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review of the ALJ’s 

findings is limited in scope, the court also notes that review “does not yield automatic 

affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.

V. Discussion

A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Evidence in Dr. Prince’s Report

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ applied an improper legal standard in evaluating Dr. Prince’s 

report. It is axiomatic that an ALJ has the responsibility of assessing a claimant’s RFC, and a 

claimant’s RFC is based on all relevant evidence in the case record, including medial opinions. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c), 416.945(a)(1). Here, pursuant to this responsibility, the ALJ 

considered all of the evidence in the record, including medical opinions, and determined 

Plaintiff’s RFC. Further, an ALJ can give less weight to a medical opinion that is less consistent 

with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). Here, the ALJ incorporated Dr. Prince’s 

opinions “to the extent they are consistent with the remainder of the medical evidence,” thus 

giving the report less weight where it is inconsistent with the record as a whole. Furthermore, the

law clearly states that medical opinions from one-time examiners, such as Dr. Prince, are not 

entitled to controlling weight. See Stone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F.App’x 839, 842 (11th Cir. 

2013) (“The ALJ does not have to defer to the opinion of a physician who conducted a single 

examination, and who was not a treating physician.”). See also Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004). In this case, Dr. Prince examined Plaintiff on one 

occasion; therefore, the ALJ did not err in not giving Dr. Prince’s opinion controlling weight.

Plaintiff also cites 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519p(b) and 416.919p(b) in support of a secondary

argument that this case should be remanded so the ALJ can fully consider Dr. Prince’s opinion 

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(Pl.’s Br. at 10). However, according to these regulations, the ALJ must only request a revised 

medical opinion if the original one is “inadequate or incomplete.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519p(b), 

416.919p(b). Here, Dr. Prince’s opinion is neither inadequate nor incomplete.

Although Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s decision to give less weight to Dr. Prince’s 

opinion, the ALJ was permitted to do so. The ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence and Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ committed a legal error. Therefore, this court 

affirms the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Prince’s opinion.

B. The ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Pain

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not correctly apply the Eleventh Circuit’s pain test. The 

court disagrees. In a disability case, a claimant’s subjective testimony about pain or other 

disabling symptoms is sufficient to establish disability if the testimony is supported by medical 

evidence that satisfies the pain test. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). The 

pain test can be divided into two parts: (1) a threshold inquiry and (2) a credibility determination. 

The threshold inquiry, sometimes called a two-part test, is the oft-quoted standard articulated in 

Holt and its progeny. To move past the threshold requirement, a claimant must present both (1) 

evidence of an underlying medical condition and (2) either objective medical evidence that 

confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition, or that the objectively 

determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to cause the 

alleged pain. Id.

Once a claimant has met the threshold inquiry, pursuant to the two-part test, the ALJ may 

conduct a credibility determination. In short, the ALJ may reject a claimant’s subjective 

testimony if it is not found to be credible. See, e.g., Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225-26

(11th Cir. 2002); Davis v. Astrue, 346 F.App’x 439, 440 (11th Cir. 2009). Specifically, according 

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to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1), after the claimant meets the threshold by establishing that he has 

“a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce ...

symptoms, such as pain,” the ALJ may decide not to credit the claimant’s subjective claims 

about pain or other symptoms based on a review of all available evidence. Id; see also Mack v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 420 F.App’x 881, 883 (11th Cir. 2011).

In this case, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective statements according to the proper 

legal standards. The ALJ enumerated and applied a two-part test that closely resembles the 

threshold inquiry and credibility determination steps explained above. First, pursuant to the 

threshold test, the ALJ evaluated whether there was “an underlying medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment(s)--i.e., an impairment(s) that can be shown by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques--that could reasonably be expected to 

produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms.” (Tr. 15). This inquiry closely (and sufficiently) 

resembles the Eleventh Circuit’s two-part test as communicated in Holt. Although the language

used by the ALJ does not exactly match the Eleventh Circuit standard, it similarly entails

determining whether there is an underlying impairment and then evaluating whether objective 

evidence confirms the symptom’s severity or that the impairment is of such severity that it can be 

reasonably expected to give rise to the claimed symptom. The Eleventh Circuit has noted that 

“the ALJ does not have to recite the pain standard word for word; rather, the ALJ must make 

findings that indicate that the standard was applied.” Cooper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 521 

F.App’x 803, 807 (11th Cir. 2013). Ultimately, the ALJ held that “[a]fter careful consideration 

of the evidence, ... [Plaintiff’s] severe impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some 

of the alleged symptoms.” (Tr. 15). Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met this initial threshold. 

This court cannot say that the ALJ committed a legal error in applying this test.

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Next, the ALJ correctly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility. In his opinion, the ALJ 

explained the credibility determination step by stating: “whenever statements about the intensity, 

persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by 

objective medical evidence, the [ALJ] must make a finding on the credibility of the statements 

based on a consideration of the entire case record.” (Tr. 15). Then, after evaluating all of the 

evidence, the ALJ held that Plaintiff’s statements “are not credible to the extent they are 

inconsistent with the [RFC].” (Tr. 15). A court must affirm an ALJ’s credibility determination if

(1) the ALJ articulated reasons for discrediting a claimant’s subjective statements, see Davis, 346 

F.App’x at 440 (citing Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225), and (2) the ALJ’s decision to do so is 

supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 441. Thus, this court must analyze two issues: whether

the ALJ articulated specific reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective statements and whether

the ALJ’s decision to not credit Plaintiff’s subjective statement is supported by substantial 

evidence.

As to the first issue, the ALJ did, in fact, articulate reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s 

subjective testimony. Specifically, the ALJ articulated that: (1) Plaintiff’s symptoms 

substantially improve when he is compliant with medication treatment; (2) Plaintiff is capable of

performing household chores, cooking, cleaning, taking out the trash, and going places outside 

the home; (3) Plaintiff occasionally engages in work activity; (4) Plaintiff’s symptoms improve 

with medication treatments; and (5) Plaintiff’s work activity was better before he sought mental 

treatment. (Tr. 17). Additionally, the ALJ also stated that Plaintiff’s decision to miss the hearing 

and subsequently fail to respond to the Notice to Show Good Cause for Failure to Appear “shows 

a disregard for the outcome of this case and suggests that he may not be as limited as initially 

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alleged.” (Tr. 17). Thus, the ALJ clearly articulated reasons for not crediting Plaintiff’s 

subjective statements.

As to the second issue, the ALJ’s decision not to credit Plaintiff’s subjective statements is 

supported by substantial evidence. To reiterate the standard described above, substantial 

evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted).

Further, this court may not “decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment 

for that of the [ALJ].” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips 

v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations omitted). The ALJ’s 

decision not to credit Plaintiff’s testimony was supported by the five reasons listed above. Those 

reasons are sufficient to meet the substantial evidence standard because a reasonable person

would accept them as adequate to support the conclusion that Plaintiff’s subjective statements 

are not credible to the extent they conflict with the medical evidence and the ALJ’s RFC

determination which was based upon the record evidence.

VI. Conclusion

The court concludes that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is 

supported by substantial evidence and the proper legal standards were applied in reaching this 

determination. The Commissioner’s final decision is therefore due to be affirmed. A separate 

order in accordance with this memorandum opinion will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this August 4, 2015.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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