Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00104/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00104-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES EVERETT TAYLOR JONES,

Inmate Booking No. 1256782,

Civil No. 13cv0104 IEG (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b)

[ECF No. 9]

vs.

DON ALLIE, U.S. Marshal, et al.

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 8, 2013, James Everett Taylor Jones (“Plaintiff”), an inmate currently housed

at the George Bailey Detention Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se,

has submitted a civil action. In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). On February 6, 2013, this Court granted Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed IFP but sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A. (ECF No. 4.)

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Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. (Id. at 5-6.) On March 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed

his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 6.) The Court once again conducted the

required sua sponte screening and dismissed Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A. (ECF No. 8 at

7.) Plaintiff has now filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 9.)

II.

SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Orders, notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or

portion thereof, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires courts to review complaints

filed by prisoners against officers or employees of governmental entities and dismiss those or

any portion of those found frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Prior to the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only

frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing a prisoner’s suit make and rule

on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The district court should grant leave to

amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.

1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

/ / /

/ / /

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“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while liberal

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court may nevertheless not “supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). 

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to state

a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the

conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

Once again, Plaintiff attempts to allege a constitutional violation on behalf of another

individual. (ECF No. 9 at 6-7.) However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he has no

authority to represent the legal interest of any other party. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d

1103, 1105 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th

Cir. 1987); see also FED.R.CIV.P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall

be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s original name, or if the party is not

represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims brought

on behalf of “Carlie Casey” are dismissed.

In addition, the entirety of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint contain challenges to

either his pending criminal matter or his past criminal conviction. “In any § 1983 action, the first

question is whether § 1983 is the appropriate avenue to remedy the alleged wrong.” Haygood

v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). A prisoner in state custody simply

may not use a § 1983 civil rights action to challenge the “fact or duration of his confinement.”

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Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). The prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus

relief instead. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489). 

“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether

a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that

the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487

(1994). Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 action may be “barred (absent prior invalidation)–no matter the

relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of his suit (state conduct leading

to conviction or internal prison proceedings)–if success in that action would necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82. 

In this case, some of Plaintiff’s claims–particularly those alleging a “malicious”

prosecution and “criminal police misconduct,” may “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his

confinement or its duration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82. In creating a

favorable termination rule in Heck, the Supreme Court relied on “the hoary principle that civil

tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal

judgments.” Heck, 511 U.S. at 486. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the constitutional

validity of an outstanding conviction or sentence, to satisfy Heck’s “favorable termination” rule,

he must allege facts which show that the “malicious prosecution” which forms the basis of his

§ 1983 suit has already been: (1) reversed on direct appeal; (2) expunged by executive order;

(3) declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination; or (4) called into

question by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added); see

also Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997).

 Plaintiff has alleged no facts sufficient to satisfy Heck. Thus, any claims pertaining to

the legality of his arrest or the search may be barred by Heck. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Gates, 442

F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (Heck barred plaintiff’s civil rights claims alleging wrongful arrest,

malicious prosecution and conspiracy among police officers to bring false charges against him);

Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Heck barred

plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims until conviction was invalidated); Smithart v.

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Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (Heck barred plaintiff’s civil rights claims alleging that

defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought unfounded criminal charges against

him); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2000) (civil rights action seeking

damages for an allegedly illegal search and seizure upon which criminal charges are based is

barred by Heck until the charges are dismissed or the conviction overturned).

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants seized his property and failed to return it to

him. (ECF No. 9 at 7.) Where a Plaintiff alleges the deprivation of a liberty or property interest

caused by the unauthorized negligent or intentional action of an official, the Plaintiff cannot state

a constitutional claim where the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) provides an adequate post-deprivation state remedy

for the random and unauthorized taking of property. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17

(9th Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiff has an adequate state post-deprivation remedy and his claims

relating to the loss of his property are not cognizable in this § 1983 action, and must be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1).

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A. Moreover, because the Court finds amendment

of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile at this time, leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an

abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile)

The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

DATED: May 31, 2013 _______________________________________ HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ 

 United States District Judge

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