Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-01126/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-01126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

GEORGE HOEY MORRIS, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:09cv1126-ID

) (WO) 

THOMAS CORAM, JR., )

 )

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983/Bivens

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action alleging that his constitutional rights were abridged in the course of his air-travel

transfer, on or around June 3, 2009, between correctional facilities in Atlanta, Georgia,

Grady County, Oklahoma, and Tuscon, Arizona. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff names as

defendants Thomas Coram, Jr. (a former investigator with Immigration Customs

Enforcement [“ICE”]), and an “unidentified conspirator” employed by the company

contracted by the United States Marshals Service to effectuate Plaintiff’s transfer. Plaintiff

The records of this court reflect that on October 6, 2006, Plaintiff was convicted of four counts 1

related to criminal sexual activity with a minor, immigration fraud, and firearm possession by a

convicted felon. See United States v. Morris, Criminal Case No. 2:05cr108-LSC (M.D. Ala.). The

court’s records further establish that on October 31, 2006, Plaintiff was convicted of making a false

statement in the application for or use of a passport. See United States v. Morris, Criminal Case No.

2:0cr218-MHT (M.D. Ala.). 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Federal courts have 2

analogized Bivens claims to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which require a showing that defendants

acted under color of state law to deprive a plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Butz v. Economou,

438 U.S. 478, 498-99 (1978).

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contends that the defendants conspired with one another in various ways and acted under

color of law to cause him “discomfort, apprehension and anguish”during his air transfer

between correctional facilities and “to intentionally inflict physical pain and suffering

(torture)” by causing a “security box” to be placed upon his hands while he was in transit. 

(Doc. No. 1 at pp. 2-3.) Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the amount of one million

dollars ($1,000,000) for pain, suffering, and mental anguish and requests that “unidentified

conspirator” be fired from his job and that Coram be prosecuted for his part in the incident. 

(Id. at p. 3.) 

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that the actions about which he complains are the result of a

conspiracy between the defendants. He asserts that Coram “used his influence” to cause his

mistreatment during his transfer between correctionalfacilities in June 2009 and in particular

to cause “unidentified conspirator” to install a painful “security box” on his hands during

his transfer “when it was not needed.” (Doc. No. 1 at p. 3.) It is unclear from Plaintiff’s 3

complaint if Coram was still employed with ICE when the actions about which Plaintiff

complains allegedly occurred. Equally unclear – and, in fact, missing entirely – from

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Other alleged instances of mistreatment cited by Plaintiff are his placement in a jail cell in Grady 3

County, Oklahoma – rather than a Federal Transport Center – while he was in transit, and his

transport from the Grady County jail to the airport “while dirty, unshaven, partially naked and in a

mental state of paranoia, fear, humiliation and distress.” (Doc. No. 1 at pp. 2-3.)

 The allegations and language in Plaintiff’s complaint and affidavit tend to suggest that Coram 4

was no longer employed by ICE when the events in question occurred.

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Plaintiff’s allegations is the manner by which Coram is purported to have “used his

influence” to bring about Plaintiff’s mistreatment during his June 2009 transfer between

correctional facilities.

A conspiracy claim justifiably may be dismissed because of the conclusory, vague,

and general nature of the allegations of a conspiracy. Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553,

556-57 (11 Cir. 1984); see also Amnesty International, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170 (11

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Cir.2009); Epps v. Watson, 492 F.3d 1240, 1243 (11 Cir. 2007); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325

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F.3d 1228, 1235 (11 Cir. 2003); Arnold v. Board of Education of Escambia County, th

Alabama, 880 F.2d 305, 309 n.2 (11 Cir. 1989). “It is not enough to aver in the complaint

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that such a conspiracy existed.” Fullman, 739 F.2d at 557. The complaint must demonstrate

that the conspiratorial acts intruded upon plaintiff's federal rights, and it must show that the

defendants reached an agreement or understanding to commit the acts. Hadley v. Gutierrez,

526 F.3d 1324 (11 Cir. 2008) (citing Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 469 (11 Cir. th th

1990); Addickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). Further, sufficient factual

information must be presented so that there is an adequate basis for believing that the

conspiracy existed. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11 Cir.1984). th

This court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint. At best, the assertions made

byPlaintiff are self-serving, purely conclusory allegations that fail to set forth those material

facts necessary to establish a conspiracy between the defendants. Strength v. Hubert, 854

F.2d 421, 425 (11 Cir. 1988) (to properly state a claim for relief based on a conspiracy th

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between private individuals and state actors, a plaintiff must plead that the offending parties

“reached an understanding” to denythe plaintiff his constitutional rights); Harvey v. Harvey,

949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11 Cir. 1992) (merely “stringing together” acts, without showing

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contacts between private persons and state actors which could prove that these parties

“reached an understanding” to violate plaintiff’s rights, is insufficient to demonstrate the

existence of a conspiracy). Other than his suppositious allegations, Plaintiff presents

nothing, nor can this court discern any evidence, to indicate that the defendants entered into

a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

In light of the foregoing, this court concludes that Plaintiff’s bare allegations of a

conspiracy are insufficient to support a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983/Bivens.

Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1133; Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-57. This claim is therefore due to be

summarily dismissed in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).5

This court notes that none of the acts of the “unidentified conspirator”asserted by

Plaintiff in his complaint are alleged to have occurred in this judicial district. To the extent

Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations stemming from the actions of this defendant or

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 804, 110 Stat. 1321, 5

and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this court is required to screen complaints filed by prisoners against a

governmental entity or officers or employees of governmental entities and to dismiss the complaint

or any portion of the complaint that it finds frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

In this case, Plaintiff paid the full civil filing fee of $350.00. Notwithstanding the full payment of

the filing fee, the screening procedures that have been established for prisoner civil actions by §

1915A apply whether the plaintiff has paid the entire filing fee or is proceeding in forma pauperis.

Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5 Cir. 1998). th

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seeks to allege constitutional violations by the United States Marshals Service, he should,

if he so chooses, initiate any civil action in the judicial district in which a substantial part of

the events giving rise to any claims occurred.

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case

be dismissed with prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to the directives of 28 §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before March 17, 2011. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party is

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District

Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court

and, therefore, it is not appealable. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings

and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party

from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District

Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677

F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). th th

See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as

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binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 4 day of March, 2011.

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/s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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