Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00363/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00363-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 Petitioner Kenneth Clyde Grindley, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Florence, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The Honorable Michelle H. Burns, United States Magistrate 

Judge, issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 20), recommending that the 

petition be denied, and Petitioner objected to the R&R (Doc. 23). For the following 

reasons, the Court accepts and adopts the R&R, and denies the petition. 

I. Background 

In 1994, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. 

CR 94-09172, of two counts of aggravated assault of peace officers, both dangerous 

offenses. (Doc. 16-1, Exh. A.)1

 Petitioner was convicted by a jury, but that conviction 

was subsequently reversed on appeal. (Doc. 16-1, Exhs. D, M.) Petitioner was tried again 

and convicted of one count of aggravated assault on October 16, 1997. He was sentenced 

 1

 The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with underlying facts of conviction 

which, for the reasons below, need not be reached on habeas review. 

Kenneth Clyde Grindley, 

 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-14-00363-PHX-SPL

ORDER 

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to an aggravated 28-year term of imprisonment on November 17, 1997. (Doc. 16-1, Exhs. 

Q-T.)2

 On February 24, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in federal court, raising two claims for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed an 

Answer (Doc. 16) in which they argue that the petition should be dismissed as untimely, 

and alternatively, that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from 

federal habeas corpus review. 

II. Standard of Review

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court 

must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific 

objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a petitioner is not entitled as of right to de 

novo review of evidence and arguments raised for the first time in an objection to the 

R&R, and whether the Court considers the new facts and arguments presented is 

discretionary. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-622 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Discussion 

 Having reviewed the objected to recommendations de novo, the Court finds that 

the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner’s claims are time-barred. 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such petitions are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).3

 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

 2

 The trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve the 28-year term consecutive to any sentence currently being served (Doc. 16-1, Doc. T), which included a sentence of 10.5 

year term of imprisonment received following an unrelated conviction in 1996 in 

Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CR 95-00235. (Doc. 16-1, Exhs. I, J.) 

Petitioner does not challenge that conviction here. 

3

 The AEDPA applies to federal habeas petitions filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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The AEDPA imposes a 1-year statute of limitations in which “a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” can file a federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

A. Commencement of Limitations Period 

 Following a timely direct appeal, on January 29, 1999, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals issued a mandate affirming Petitioner’s 1997 conviction and sentence. (Doc. 16-

1, Exh. Y.) Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was 

summarily denied on September 3, 1999. (Doc. 16-1, Exh. X.) Therefore, Petitioner’s 

judgment became final on December 2, 1999, when the time for filing a petition for writ 

of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 958-959 (9th Cir. 2010) (“When, on direct appeal, review is sought in the state’s 

highest court but no petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is filed, 

direct review is considered to be final when the certiorari petition would have been due, 

which is 90 days after the decision of the state’s highest court.”). Therefore, absent any 

tolling, the one-year limitations period would have commenced the following day. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (the 1-year limitations period runs from the date on which 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review). 

B. Statutory Tolling of Limitations Period 

 Petitioner properly filed a notice of post-conviction relief on September 24, 1999, 

which statutorily tolled the limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). (Doc. 

16-1, Exh. Z, AA, EE.) Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings remained pending 

until July 17, 2001, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the trial court’s 

dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition. (Doc. 16-1, Exhs. BB, CC and II.). 

Petitioner did not seek review of that ruling, and the limitations period therefore began to 

run the following day, expiring one year later on July 18, 2002. Approximately ten years 

later, Petitioner filed subsequent notices for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 16-1, Exhs. DDGG.) Because those proceedings were commenced well after the limitations period had 

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expired, they did not revive and toll the limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently 

filed petition for post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute of limitations); Ferguson 

v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (state petition filed after the expiration of 

AEDPA’s one-year period does not revive a limitations period that ended before state 

petition was filed). 

C. Equitable Tolling of Limitations Period 

 The Magistrate Judge correctly found that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable 

tolling of the limitations period. Petitioner generally objects to the reasonableness of his 

sentence, but does not show that circumstances existed which prevented him from timely 

filing a federal habeas petition. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (“a 

petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 

prevented timely filing” his federal habeas petition) (internal quotations omitted). 

Therefore, because the instant habeas petition was not filed until 2014, more than a 

decade after the limitations period expired, and is not entitled to equitable tolling, 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. 

 D. Exception to the Limitations Period

 Lastly, Petitioner does not demonstrate that the “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice exception” is applicable and compels review of his time-barred claims. “[A]n 

actual-innocence gateway claim” may serve as an exception to AEDPA’s limitations 

period. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (adopting 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), holding actual innocence is an exception to 

procedurally defaulted claims). This “fundamental miscarriage of justice exception” is 

applied in rare instances, and a “tenable actual-innocence gateway” claim will not be 

found unless the petitioner “persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, 

no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). “To be credible, 

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such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new 

reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011); McQuiggin, 133 S. 

Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an “[u]nexplained delay in presenting new 

evidence”). 

 Petitioner objects to the R&R on the basis that the fundamental miscarriage of 

justice exception entitles him to have the merits of his petition considered. He argues that 

when the trial court sentenced him to a consecutive, rather than concurrent, term of 

imprisonment, the terms of his 1996 plea agreement were breached, constituting plain 

error and justifying relief. While Petitioner’s arguments may challenge the inherent 

fairness of his sentence and the constitutional adequacy of the procedures that led to it, he 

does not argue or point to evidence of actual, factual innocence. Therefore, Petitioner has 

not shown that there is evidence of actual innocence such that the fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exception entitles him to review of his time-barred claims. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Having reviewed the record as a whole, and finding Petitioner’s objections are 

without merit, the R&R will be adopted in full. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That Magistrate Judge Burn’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 20) is 

accepted and adopted by the Court; 

2. That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Doc. 1) is denied and dismissed with prejudice; 

3. That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

on appeal are denied because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain 

procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable; and

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4. That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action. 

Dated this 30th day of October, 2015. 

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

 

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