Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04056/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04056-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Linda S. McMahon became the Social Security Commissioner on January 20, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Linda S. McMahon has

been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

JESS A. MAY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-4056

LINDA S. MCMAHON, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff, Jess May, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

August 8, 2005, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 9). Plaintiff originally moved for an award of

$1582.00 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 11.3 attorney hours work before the court at

an hourly rate of $140.00 per hour. (Doc. # 11). The defendant filed a response objecting to

plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees on the ground that counsel requested compensation for 1.24

hours for the performance of tasks that could have been performed by his staff. (Doc. # 13).

Plaintiff’s counsel then filed an amended motion for attorney’s fees reducing his total hours to

9.9 and requesting compensation in the amount of $ 1386.00, as recommended by the defendant.

(Doc. # 14). The defendant has filed no response to plaintiff’s amended motion. 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the record, we find plaintiff is the

prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).

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In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.

1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the

absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th

Cir. 1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

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The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $140.00 an hour. Attorney's

fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour - the maximum statutory rate under §

2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor such

as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic and remains at the discretion of the

district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919

F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate may be increased when there is

"uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees

of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff’s counsel

did attach a summary of the Consumer Price Index or present evidence of an increase in the cost

of living. Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to an award of $140.00 per hour. 

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks reimbursement for a total of 2.90 hours of attorney work

performed between August 5, 2005, and August 8, 2005. The Complaint was not filed in this

court until August 8, 2005. (Doc. # 1). We note that time spent at the administrative level is not

compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984).

However, the time submitted on the above referenced dates was clearly in preparation for the

filing of the Complaint with this court. Therefore, we will allow 2.00 hours and deduct .90 hour

from counsel’s total number of compensable hours. 

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Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 1.80 hours for reviewing notices of electronic

filings(.20 x 6), reviewing file stamped copies of documents (.20), filing appeal brief (.20), and

transmitting a letter to his client (.20). We find this to be a tasks that could have been performed

by support staff. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987)

(work which could have been completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA).

Accordingly, counsel’s total award will be reduced by 1.80 hours. 

Counsel also requests a total of 1.8 hour of compensation for reviewing and executing

the notice of availability (.30), reviewing order of reference (.20), and reviewing the defendant’s

answer (.50), and reviewing the defendant’s appeal brief (.80). However, we find this time to

be excessive. Accordingly, we will deduct .85 hour of time from counsel’s hours.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 6.35

(9.9-3.55) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $140.00 per hour for a total attorney’s fee

award of $889.00. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due

benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of February 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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