Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00069/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00069-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMIE DALE OTTO,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0069 MCE DAD P

vs.

DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL

HEALTH,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a former state prisoner who has been subsequently confined under a

civil commitment. He is proceeding through counsel with an application for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges both a March 11, 1999 finding by the

Solano County Superior Court that he was a sexually violent predator pursuant to § 6600 of the

California Welfare and Institutions Code and his resultant two year commitment to Atascadero

State Hospital (Atascadero). He seeks relief on the grounds that he was deprived of due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment by the trial court’s admission of multiple-level hearsay

evidence to establish that he had been twice convicted of “sexually violent offenses,” an element

required for a civil commitment. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable

law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner be denied habeas corpus relief.

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1

 A sexually violent predator is defined in California law as “a person who has been

convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed

mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is

likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 6600(a)(1).

2

 Pursuant to California law, a probable cause hearing is held after a petition for

commitment is filed to determine “whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual

named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his

or her release.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6602(a).

3

 This court has independently verified that petitioner currently remains a patient at

Atascadero. The basis for petitioner’s continuing commitment is not known to the court but

appears irrelevant to the disposition of the pending petition.

2

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 11, 1999, petitioner was found by the Solano County Superior Court to

be a sexually violent predator (hereinafter SVP) pursuant to § 6600 of the California Welfare and

Institutions Code (hereinafter SVPA).1 Petitioner was civilly committed to Atascadero State

Hospital for two years commencing March 5, 1999, and ending on March 5, 2001. (Resp’t’s

March 21, 2002 Mot. to Dismiss (MTD), Ex. 1.) On February 1, 2001, while petitioner was still

confined pursuant to the March 5, 1999 commitment and while his appeal from that commitment

was still pending in the state courts, the Solano County District Attorney filed a petition for

recommittment. (Id., Exs. 3 & 4.) On February 22, 2001, petitioner, represented by counsel,

appeared in court and waived his right to a probable cause hearing, waived time for trial on the

recommittment petition and agreed to remain at Atascadero State Hospital pending the outcome

of his appeal. (Id., Ex. 5.)2 At subsequent hearings conducted on September 6, 2001, October

10, 2001 and January 23, 2002, petitioner again waived time and requested that the probable

cause hearing and trial be continued until after his recovery from a scheduled surgery. (Id., Exs.

6, 7 & 8.) As of March 21, 2002, when respondent filed a motion to dismiss this action, trial on

the recommittment petition was set for July 24, 2002. (Id., Ex. 8.)3

In his March 21, 2002 motion to dismiss, respondent argued that petitioner was no

longer in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a) when he filed the

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4

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) limits jurisdiction to persons who are “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)

limits federal jurisdiction to “an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

5

 The following summary is drawn from People v. Otto, 26 Cal. 4th 200, 203-04 (2001),

in which the California Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s arguments on appeal from his

commitment to Atascadero State Hospital and held that the use of presentence and probation

reports to prove the details of the predicate offenses in a sexually violent predator civil

commitment hearing does not violate a defendant’s due process rights.

6

 At the People’s request, the trial court admitted the abstract of judgment and

presentence report from Otto’s felony convictions for molesting K.W., M.S., A.S., and D.S., a

1991 evaluation by Dr. Steen that accompanied the presentence report, the written psychological 

3

instant petition on January 10, 2002.4 The motion to dismiss was denied by order dated January

27, 2003. This court found that petitioner was in custody by virtue of his involuntary

confinement in Atascadero State Hospital when he filed his federal habeas corpus petition and

that the expiration of the challenged civil commitment did not defeat federal jurisdiction over

this action.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND5

On October 9, 1991, Jimmie Dale Otto pled no contest to four

felony counts of lewd and lascivious conduct on a child less than

14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The factual basis for

the plea was “contained in the police report.” The four counts

involved four different victims – K.W., M.S., A.S., and D.S. Dr.

Charlene Steen, appointed to examine Otto, stated in her report,

which was attached to the presentence report, that Otto admitted he

touched K.W. under her pants on one occasion, tickling her

buttocks and “private areas” without any sexual intent. Otto also

told the probation officer he tickled K.W. on her bottom under her

panties. He denied having molested any of the S. children, and

stated he had pled no contest because his attorney told him this was

the best possible deal. On December 13, 1991, Otto was sentenced

to 12 years in state prison. On February 27, 1998, the People filed

a petition seeking Otto’s commitment as an SVP. Otto moved in

limine to exclude “police or other hearsay reports” and prevent

psychological evaluators from relying on them. The trial court

denied the motion. Otto waived his right to a jury trial. Both the

People and Otto presented experts who reviewed and relied on the

presentence report and other documents. As relevant here, the

People’s three experts6 concluded two of Otto’s prior offenses

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evaluations of Dr. Zinik, Dr. Jackson, and Dr. Sreenivasan, and the notification of evaluation as

an SVP.

7

 In addition to this conclusion which is at issue here, the People’s experts relied on

additional factors, such as Otto’s admission he had molested his minor stepchildren (not the same

victims as those in the predicate offenses) and his substance abuse problem, in opining Otto

satisfied the criteria for the Sexually Violant Predators Act (SVPA), section 6600 et seq.

8

 At Otto’s request, the trial court admitted the written psychological evaluations of Dr.

Halon and Dr. Owen.

4

involved substantial sexual conduct.7 Indeed, although one defense

expert, who did not testify, opined in his written report Otto was

not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior as a

result of his diagnosed mental disorder, he also concluded Otto had

been convicted of sexually violent predatory offenses against two

or more victims. The other defense expert declined to offer an

opinion regarding this latter issue, although he noted in his written

report “the descriptions of the crimes strongly suggest that they

included ‘sexual violence.”8 The trial court found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Otto was an SVP within the meaning of

section 6600, and ordered him committed to Atascadero State

Hospital or other secure facility for two years.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, and denied Otto’s subsequent

petition for rehearing. We granted Otto’s petition for review, and

limited the issues to whether section 6600(a)(3) allows the

admission of multiple hearsay that does not fall within any

exception to the hearsay rule, and if so, whether reliance on this

evidence violates a defendant’s right to due process.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

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infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas corpus

petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). See also Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Crisafi v. Oliver,

396 F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are applicable. See Lindh v.

 Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 2254(d) as amended by the AEDPA, sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Jurisdiction

As explained above, this court has previously determined, in connection with

respondent’s motion to dismiss, that petitioner was “in custody” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a) when he filed the instant petition on January 10, 2002. More recently, 

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6

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has had the opportunity to address the question of under what

circumstances the claims of petitioner’s challenging civil commitments such as that at issue here

are rendered moot by the expiration of the term of commitment. In addition, the Ninth Circuit

has addressed whether a petitioner who does not file a federal habeas petition until after a term of

civil commitment has expired has standing to collaterally attack that underlying civil

commitment. Below the undersigned will briefly address these issues in the context of the

pending petition, concluding that petitioner has standing to bring his claims and that they have

not been rendered moot. 

In Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2004), the government argued that

the case was moot because the original term of commitment under the SVPA which was being

challenged by petitioner had expired and he was confined pursuant to a new two year term. (Id.

at 777.) The court rejected the argument holding that the petitioner’s challenge was not moot

because his claims were “capable of repetition yet evading review.” (Id.) In this regard, the

court found that the “capable of repetition” component of the analysis was satisfied because the

petitioner had already been confined pursuant to a second commitment proceeding and a third

petition to commit him was pending. (Id. at 777-78 & n.1.) The court also concluded that the

claimed harm evaded review because petitioner’s two-year term was too short to be fully litigated 

through the federal appellate process before the term expired. (Id. at 778.) 

The same is true in this case. At the time petitioner filed the instant petition, the

state had filed a second SVPA commitment proceeding against him. This court has verified that

petitioner remains a patient at Atascadero. Therefore, there is a reasonable expectation that

petitioner will be subject to continued commitment in the future. Further, petitioner could not

pursue his claims through the federal appellate process before his two-year term expired. Thus,

like the situation presented to the court in Hubbard, petitioner’s claims are capable of repetition

yet evading review. Therefore, this action has not been rendered moot.

/////

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9

 In order to have standing to bring a claim, a litigant must have suffered “(1) an ‘injury

in fact’ that is (2) ‘fairly traceable’ to the state court’s commitment order that he challenges, and

(3) that is ‘likely [to be] redressed by a favorable decision.” Jackson, 399 F.3d at 1071 (quoting

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).

7

With respect to standing, in Jackson v. Cal. Dept. of Mental Health, 399 F.3d

1069 (9th Cir. 2005), the court recently held that a petitioner lack standing to challenge an

expired SVPA confinement term where he had voluntarily recommitted himself.9 The court

concluded that the decision in Hubbard did not compel a different result because Jackson’s term

had expired before he filed his habeas petition. (Id. at 1072.) Most importantly, the court found

that because no further recommittment petition had been filed by the state and the petitioner was

in custody only because he had voluntarily recommitted himself, his confinement was not fairly

traceable to any action by the state. (Id. at 1074-75.) Because the petitioner had failed to

demonstrate that he was suffering harm associated with the SVPA confinement order, he was

found to lack standing to challenge the state court’s jurisdiction. 

However, petitioner’s case is factually distinguishable from that presented in

Jackson. Here, the state filed a second recommittment proceeding prior to the expiration of

petitioner’s first term of commitment. Although petitioner voluntarily waived time for trial in

that matter, he did not voluntarily recommit himself and there is no indication in the record that

petitioner would have remained at Atascadero State Hospital if the state had not filed a second

petition for recommittment. Further, petitioner was required under California law to remain in

custody under the initial commitment order until the recommittment petition was tried. See Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604 (a “person shall not be kept in actual custody longer than two years

unless a subsequent extended commitment is obtained from the court incident to the filing of a

petition for extended commitment”) and § 6601.5 (if the judge determines that a petition for

commitment supports a finding of probable cause, “the judge shall order that the person be

detained in a secure facility until a hearing can be completed”). For these reasons, in this case

petitioner’s continued confinement was “directly traceable” to the state’s second commitment

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10 At the time of petitioner’s commitment, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a) (3)

provided:

Conviction of one or more of the crimes enumerated in this section

shall constitute evidence that may support a court or jury

determination that a person is a sexually violent predator, but shall

not be the sole basis for the determination. The existence of any

prior convictions may be shown with documentary evidence. The

details underlying the commission of an offense that led to a prior

conviction, including a predatory relationship with the victim, may

be shown by documentary evidence, including, but not limited to,

preliminary hearing transcripts, trial transcripts, probation and

sentencing reports, and evaluations by the State Department of

Mental Health. Jurors shall be admonished that they may not find

a person a sexually violent predator based on prior offenses absent

relevant evidence of a currently diagnosed mental disorder that

makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that

it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal

behavior.

(italics added). The italicized portion of this code section is placed at issue by the habeas 

petition pending before the court.

8

petition. Petitioner has also suffered an “injury in fact” (continued commitment) which would be

addressed by a favorable decision on his claims. Thus, petitioner has satisfied all of the

requirements to confer on him standing to present his claims to this court. Jackson, 399 F.3d at

1071-75. Accordingly, below the court will address petitioner’s claims on the merits.

III. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner alleges that he was deprived of due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment by the trial court’s admission of multiple-level hearsay evidence (the probation

report reflecting the victims’ descriptions of the offenses) to prove that he had been twice

convicted for “sexually violent offenses,” which is an element required for a civil commitment.10

Petitioner claims that admission of this evidence violated his right to due process in that (1) he

was deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him as guaranteed

by Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1967); (2) the evidence admitted over his

objection was of a type that could not be admitted in a criminal trial as explained by the Supreme

Court in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); and (3) the result was to relieve the state of its

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9

burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, or at least by clear and convincing evidence, all of

the facts necessary to justify his confinement, contrary to the holdings in Addington v. Texas,

441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) and Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). (Pet. at 3-4.) 

The California Supreme Court thoroughly considered and addressed petitioner’s

argument that the admission of hearsay statements in an SVP proceeding violated his due process

right to confrontation and the concomitant right to be convicted only upon reliable evidence. See

People v. Otto, 26 Cal. 4th 200, 209-215 (2001). At the outset the California Supreme Court

acknowledged that a defendant in an SVP proceeding is entitled to due process protections. Otto,

26 Cal. 4th at 209 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). Applying the relevant

factors to determine what process is due in this context, the court held petitioner’s right to due

process had not been violated by the admission of hearsay at his civil commitment proceeding. 

(Id. at 210-15.) In this regard, the court first noted that the private interests affected by the

official action are the significant limitations on the defendant's liberty, the stigma of being

classified as an SVP, and subjection to unwanted treatment. Id. at 210 . Next, the court

considered the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures used. Id.

The court concluded that the victim hearsay statements must contain "special indicia of reliability

to satisfy due process" but also observed that under the circumstances generally present in an

SVP proceeding, this requirement would almost always be met. Id. According to the California

Supreme Court, the most critical factor demonstrating the reliability of the victim hearsay

statements is that the defendant was convicted of the crimes to which the statements relate. Id. at

211. Because the SVPA requires conviction of a sexually violent offense against two or more

victims, some portion, if not all, of the alleged conduct will have been already either admitted in

a plea or found true by a trier of fact after trial. Id. Additionally, the court noted that

consideration of hearsay statements contained in presentence reports is not unique to the SVPA.

Id. at 212-14. The reliability of such statements withstands scrutiny, the court suggested, because

by statute criminal defendants must be provided the opportunity to review and challenge

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10

inaccuracies contained in such reports. Id. at 212. For all these reasons, the California Supreme

Court concluded that there was no deprivation of the defendant’s rights as a result of the reliance

on the hearsay statements. Id. at 214. 

The California Supreme Court also found that reliance on victim hearsay

statements in a SVP proceeding does not deny the defendant any right of confrontation, noting

that there is no right to confrontation under the state and federal Confrontation Clause in civil

proceedings. Id. at 214. The court concluded that under the SVPA, a defendant’s due process

right to confront witnesses is preserved because the defendant has the right to cross-examine any

prosecution witness who testifies in connection with the underlying criminal charges. Id. Next,

the court found that the government's interest in protecting the public from those who are

dangerous and mentally ill could potentially be impeded by requiring live victim testimony,

noting that the SVP proceeding occurs at the end of the defendant's sentence, which may be years

after the events in question. Id. at 214. Finally, the California Supreme Court concluded that

reliance on hearsay evidence in SVP proceedings does not impede the defendant's interest in

being informed of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the commitment proceeding nor

prevents the defendant from presenting his side of the story before a responsible government

official. Id. at 215.

At the outset it must be noted that the United States Supreme Court has not

considered the question whether a defendant must be afforded the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses before he may be involuntarily committed pursuant to a state’s sexually

violent predator law. For this reason, it may not be said that the California Supreme Court’s

decision in Otto was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established federal

law. See Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004); Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d

952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, to the extent the United States Supreme Court has addresses

the issue is somewhat similar contexts the decision of the California Supreme Court is not an

objectively unreasonable application of federal law in this area. 

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11 In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the

Confrontation Clause bars the state from introducing into evidence in a criminal proceeding

out-of-court statements which are testimonial in nature unless the witness is unavailable and the

defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such

statements are deemed reliable. Id. at 68-69. As discussed above, in Otto the California

Supreme Court concluded that for use in an SVP proceeding the victim hearsay statements must

"contain special indicia of reliability to satisfy due process." 26 Cal. 4th at 210. Because

Crawford requires that there be a right to in-court confrontation as opposed to a judicial finding

11

The United States Supreme Court has held that involuntary commitment under a

sexually violent predator act is not a "criminal" proceeding, but is civil in nature. Kansas v.

Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). The Supreme Court has also held that civil commitments

involve a significant deprivation of liberty and therefore mandate due process protections. 

Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (involuntary commitment of insanity acquitee); Jackson v. Indiana, 406

U.S. 715, 738-39 (1972) (involuntary commitment of criminal defendant who was incompetent

to stand trial). The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is limited by its express terms to

criminal defendants. U.S. Const., Amend. VI. Therefore, as found by the California Supreme

Court, in civil proceedings the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is grounded in the

Due Process Clause and not in the Sixth Amendment. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,

608 n.4 (1993) (Confrontation Clause does not apply in civil cases). In analogous circumstances,

the United States Supreme Court has held that in parole revocation proceedings due process does

not requires confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses if the hearing officer finds

good cause for not allowing confrontation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489. Likewise, in

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Supreme Court held that one’s right to due process

was not violated by the use of documentary substitutes for live evidence at a probation revocation

hearing. Id. at 782 n.5 (“[W]e emphasize that we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use

where appropriate of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits,

depositions, and documentary evidence.”) The California Supreme Court’s detailed finding of

good cause for the use of documentary evidence in SVP civil commitment proceedings is a

reasonable application of these United States Supreme Court holdings.11

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of reliability, it might be argued that the use of presentence reports in SVP proceedings violates a

sex offender's right to confrontation. However, this court concludes that the holding in Crawford

does not apply in the context of the SVPA. Nothing in Crawford extended the Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause to civil litigants, including those named as defendants in SVP proceedings. 

Further, the decision in Crawford did not expressly nor impliedly modify or overrule existing law

concerning a civil litigant's due process right to confront witnesses. Thus, the opinion of the

California Supreme Court that the use of hearsay evidence to prove that petitioner had been twice

convicted for “sexually violent offenses” is also not contrary to or an unreasonably application of

the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford. 

12 One court has observed that the decision in Specht “is a precursor of Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which hold that facts

increasing the statutory maximum punishment must be proved, to the jury's satisfaction, beyond a

reasonable doubt, using the procedures normally employed at a trial--which per Specht includes

the opportunity to confront and cross-examine one's accusers in the flesh.” Szabo v. Walls, 313

F.3d 392, 398-99 (7th Cir. 2002). 

12

The cases cited by petitioner do not dictate a contrary result. In Specht v.

Patterson, 386 U.S. 606 (1967), the defendant was convicted but not sentenced under one statute

and was thereafter sentenced under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act for an indeterminate term

without notice and a full hearing. The Colorado Sex Offenders Act did not make commission of

a specified crime the basis for sentencing, but made one conviction the basis for commencing

another proceeding to determine whether a person constituted a threat of bodily harm to the

public or was an habitual offender and mentally ill, which was a new finding of fact that was not

an ingredient of offense charged. Thus, Specht was subjected to a sentence of up to life

imprisonment after being convicted of an offense with a statutory maximum sentence of ten

years. Id. at 607. The Supreme Court indicated that, in view of the consequences, the sentencing

proceedings amounted to a new criminal charge against the defendant. Id. at 610. Accordingly,

the court held that a defendant in such a circumstance is entitled to a full panoply of due process

rights, including the right to confront witnesses, when a sentencing proceeding results in an

additional criminal conviction. 386 U.S. at 610.12

Here, on the contrary, petitioner was not subjected to increased criminal

punishment as a result of his commitment under the SVPA. As discussed above, petitioner’s

commitment to Atascadero State Hospital was pursuant to a civil commitment and was not a

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13 Likewise, petitioner’s argument that the hearsay evidence admitted to support his civil

commitment was “of a type that could not be admitted in a criminal trial,” in violation of Idaho v.

Wright (Pet. at 3-4) must also be rejected. In that case the Supreme Court held that the hearsay

statements of the child victim admitted against petitioner at his trial on criminal charges lacked

the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission under the Confrontation

Clause. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 & 827 (1990). Again, because petitioner’s civil

commitment proceeding was not a criminal prosecution the holding in Wright is not applicable. 

13

criminal punishment. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62 (holding that involuntary confinement

pursuant to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was not punitive, thus precluding a finding

of any double jeopardy or ex post facto violation). For these reasons, the decision of the

California Supreme Court rejecting petitioner’s claim in this regard is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Specht. 

13

Finally, petitioner claims that the use of hearsay evidence at his commitment

proceeding relieved the state of its burden to prove his SVP status “beyond a reasonable doubt, or

at least by clear and convincing evidence,” contrary to the holdings in Addington v. Texas and

Foucha v. Louisiana. (Pet. at 4.) In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) the Supreme Court

determined that to meet due process demands, the standard for use in commitment for mental

illness must be proof greater than the preponderance of evidence standard applicable to other

categories of civil cases and must be no less than clear and convincing evidence but that the

reasonable-doubt standard was not constitutionally required. 441 U.S. at 425. Similarly, in

Foucha, the Supreme Court held that "the State must establish insanity and dangerousness by

clear and convincing evidence in order to confine an insane convict beyond his criminal

sentence, when the basis for his original confinement no longer exists." 504 U.S. at 86. Having

determined that due process was not violated by the reliance on hearsay evidence at his civil

commitment hearing, petitioner’s argument in this regard must fail. There is no indication that

the documentary evidence with respect to his prior sexually violent predatory offenses admitted

at petitioner’s commitment proceeding did not rise to the appropriate level of proof required to

support a civil SVP commitment. 

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For all of the reasons explained above, this court concludes that the decision of

the California Supreme Court that the use of hearsay evidence at petitioner’s civil commitment 

hearing under the SVPA did not violate due process is neither contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 28, 2005.

DAD:8:otto69.hc

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