Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05463/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 17, 1999 Decided January 11, 2000

No. 98-5463

American Immigration Lawyers Association, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Janet Reno, Attorney General

of the United States, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with

Nos. 98-5464 & 98-5466

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(97cv00597)

(97cv01229)

(97cv01237)

---------

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J.J. Gass argued the cause for appellants. With him on the

briefs were Judy Rabinovitz, Roderic V.O. Boggs, Robert

Rubin, Robert E. Juceam, David I. Gelfand, and Karen T.

Grisez. Adelia S. Borrasca and Jerome G. Snider entered

appearances.

Nancy L. Perkins was on the brief for amicus curiae The

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

Michele E. Beasley was on the brief for amicus curiae

Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children.

Linda S. Wendtland, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the briefs were

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Donald

E. Keener, David J. Kline, Ellen Sue Shapiro, and Teresa A.

Wallbaum, Attorneys.

Before: Ginsburg, Henderson, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: The Illegal Immigration Reform

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub.

L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, established a system for

expediting the removal of aliens who arrive at the border but

are not eligible for admission. Congress permitted judicial

review of the new system, but set a deadline: all actions had

to be "filed no later than 60 days after the date the challenged section, regulation, directive, guidance, or procedure

... is first implemented."1 8 U.S.C. s 1252(e)(3)(A)-(B).

Ten organizations and twenty aliens, some added after the

deadline expired, brought constitutional, statutory, and international law challenges after the Attorney General issued

__________

1 8 U.S.C. s 1252 provides the exclusive jurisdictional basis for

challenging the removal procedures: "Except as provided in this

section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court

shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of

any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney

General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute

removal orders against any alien under this Act." 8 U.S.C.

s 1252(g).

regulations under the new law. The district court disposed of

the cases mainly on jurisdictional grounds, although it did

reject the claims of two of the alien plaintiffs on the merits.

See American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18

F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 1998). We hold that the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing to litigate the rights of aliens not

parties to the lawsuits and that the judgment of the district

court should be affirmed in all other respects.

I

A

Every person who arrives at a United States port of entry

undergoes primary inspection during which immigration offiUSCA Case #98-5463 Document #489360 Filed: 01/11/2000 Page 2 of 20
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cers review the individual's documents. In fiscal year 1996,

the Immigration and Naturalization Service conducted 475

million primary inspections. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,318

(1997). Returning citizens produce their passports; aliens

must show a valid visa or other entry document. If the

immigration officer is unable to verify an alien's admissibility,

the alien is referred to secondary inspection for a more

thorough examination of eligibility to enter.

Before IIRIRA, if immigration officials could not verify an

alien's admissibility at secondary inspection, the alien was

entitled to defend his eligibility at an exclusion hearing before

an immigration judge. See 8 U.S.C. ss 1225(b), 1226(a)

(1994). The alien had the right to counsel at the hearing, id.

s 1362(a), could examine witnesses, id., and was provided

with a list of persons providing free representation, 8 C.F.R.

s 236.2(a) (1994). If the ruling were adverse, the alien could

appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and, ultimately,

federal court. See 8 U.S.C. ss 1105a(b), 1226(b) (1994).

IIRIRA reformed the secondary inspection process in order to "expedite the removal from the United States of aliens

who indisputably have no authorization to be admitted...."

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 209 (1996). To that end, the

statute provides that "if an immigration officer determines

that an alien ... is inadmissible" because the alien possesses

fraudulent documentation, see 8 U.S.C. s 1182(a)(6)(C), or has

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no valid documentation, see id. s 1182(a)(7), "the officer shall

order the alien removed from the United States without

further hearing or review...." Id. s 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). An

alien removed for these reasons is barred from reentry for a

period of five years. Id. s 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).

The statute exempts from immediate removal aliens who

"indicate[ ] either an intention to apply for asylum ... or a

fear of persecution." Id. IIRIRA directs immigration officers to refer such aliens to an interview with an asylum

officer. See id. s 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the asylum officer

"determines that an alien does not have a credible fear of

persecution, the officer shall order the alien removed from

the United States...." Id. s 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).2 Upon the

alien's request, an immigration judge will review the removal

decision. See id. s 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). The alien is given

an opportunity to be heard and questioned in an expedited

proceeding: "the review shall be concluded ... to the maximum extent practicable within 24 hours, but in no case later

than 7 days after the [asylum officer's] determination...."

Id. If the immigration judge overturns the asylum officer's

finding, the alien is given a hearing under 8 U.S.C. s 1229a.

If the immigration judge affirms the asylum officer's finding,

the alien is subject to summary removal.3

B

The Attorney General issued Interim Regulations, effective

April 1, 1997, setting forth procedures implementing the

summary removal system. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. ss 208.30, 235.

This started the statutory time limit for judicial review running. Any action challenging the statute or the Interim

Regulations had to be filed no later than sixty days after

April 1. See 8 U.S.C. s 1252(e)(3)(B). Organizations who

represent and assist aliens seeking to enter the United States

filed two complaints challenging IIRIRA and the Interim

__________

2 If the asylum officer finds that there is a credible fear of

persecution, the alien is given a full hearing under 8 U.S.C. s 1229a.

3 At this juncture, habeas corpus review on a limited number of

issues is available. See id. s 1252(e)(2).

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Regulations as they apply to asylum-seeking aliens.4 The

cases--American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n (AILA) and

Liberians United for Peace and Democracy (LUPD)--were

consolidated. A few of the same organizations joined with

the Dominican American National Foundation (Miami area)

and aliens to assert claims against the summary removal

system as it applied to non-asylum seekers. This third

case--Wood--focused on determinations, at the secondary

inspection stage, that aliens lacked proper documentation.

The AILA and LUPD complaints challenged the same stage

of summary removal, but also focused on the "fear of persecution" determination and the procedures available to asylum

seekers. In the Wood case, an amended complaint filed on

August 28 added individual plaintiffs who were removed after

the sixty-day deadline. The district court consolidated the

Wood and AILA/LUPD cases.

The complaints raised a host of contentions. Some plaintiffs claimed that IIRIRA violated the due process and equal

protection rights of aliens seeking to enter the United States,

that the Attorney General's regulations were not consistent

with IIRIRA, and that summary removal violated international treaties protecting children and refugees. Plaintiffs rested

their due process and statutory claims on the following allegations: the summary removal procedures banned communication with family, friends, or attorneys; failed to notify aliens

of the reasons for removal and the procedures available for

challenging removal; failed to provide adequate language

interpretation; and limited review of removal decisions.

__________

4 The organizations, each of which is an appellant, are the American Immigration Lawyers Association, a 4500 member association

of immigration lawyers, and the following groups which assist either

particular nationalities of aliens or aliens arriving in a particular

area of the United States: Florida Immigration Advocacy Center;

Human Rights Project (Los Angeles area); Liberians United for

Peace and Democracy; National Coalition for Haitian Rights; New

York Immigration Coalition; Northern California Coalition for Immigration Rights; World Tamil Coordinating Committee; and

Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs.

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Plaintiffs also challenged the procedures as applied to specific

individual plaintiffs, claiming that immigration officials were

not following IIRIRA or the Interim Regulations. The only

claim asserted on behalf of the organizations in their own

right was that the First Amendment entitled their members

to have access to persons subject to summary removal procedures.

The district court dismissed each of the complaints. With

respect to individuals who missed the statutory deadline, the

court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Two remaining individual

plaintiffs--Perlina Perez and Flor Aquino de Pacheco, both

non-asylum seekers--filed within the sixty-day window, but

the court dismissed their claims for failure to state a cause of

action, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).5 See

18 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47, 52-60. The court found that the

Attorney General's regulations actually provided more procedural safeguards than the statute required, id. at 52-57, that

the individuals did not have sufficient contacts with the

United States to invoke due process rights, id. at 58-60, and

that they failed to make the prima facie case of discrimination necessary for their equal protection challenge, id. at 60.6

With respect to the validity of the regulations "as applied" to

these plaintiffs, the court held that IIRIRA provided review

only for written procedures and thus there was no jurisdiction

to challenge the particular practices of immigration officials.7

__________

5 Plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of the sixty-day

limit, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 47 n.8, perhaps in recognition of the

longstanding principle that determining the conditions governing

the admission of aliens is "so exclusively entrusted to the political

branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial

inquiry or interference." Bruno v. Albright, 1999 WL 1082957, at

*5 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 3, 1999) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342

U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)).

6 Perez and Aquino appeal only the dismissal of their statutory

claims. See Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14.

7 The district court did not reach the international law claim

because it found that neither the "organizational [n]or individual

Id. at 57-58 (citing 8 U.S.C. s 1252(e)(3)(A)).

As to the organizational plaintiffs, the district court recognized, and the government conceded, standing for their First

Amendment claim. See 18 F. Supp. 2d at 50. The court

rejected that claim on its merits. See id. at 60-62 (citing

Ukranian-American Bar Ass'n, v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374 (D.C.

Cir. 1990)). With regard to the other claims, the court found

that the organizations alleged "speculative" injuries and did

"not meet the causation and redressability requirements" of

Article III standing. See 18 F. Supp. 2d at 49-50.

II

A

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As the cases now stand, we have appeals by the individual

aliens who filed late and for that reason had their claims

dismissed, and by the two non-asylum seekers (Perez and

Aquino) who filed timely but lost for failure to state a cause of

action. We see no reason to disturb the district court's

analysis, and so we affirm the dismissal of these claims

substantially for the reasons stated in the court's thorough

opinion. See 18 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47, 52-60.

As to the organizational plaintiffs, they have not pressed

their First Amendment claim on appeal. This leaves only

their contentions that the new system violates, not their

rights or the rights of their members, but the constitutional

and statutory rights of unnamed aliens who were or might be

subject to the statute and regulations. In discussing why

they do not have prudential standing to litigate these claims,

we will not distinguish between the organizations and their

members. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver.

Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977). The district court

rightly observed that, with one exception, the organizations

and their members alleged identical injuries. The court

rejected as too speculative the one injury asserted for associational standing but not for organizational standing--the claim

that members of the associations might some day be subject

to summary removal. See 18 F. Supp. 2d at 51. We agree

__________

plaintiffs have standing to assert the International Law claim." 18

F. Supp. 2d at 52 n.14. The plaintiffs' brief does not discuss

standing under the treaties, so we do not consider this ruling.

with the court's conclusion and will say no more on that

subject.

B

Each of the organizational plaintiffs seeks to vindicate the

rights of unnamed third parties--namely, aliens who have

been or will be processed pursuant to the new law and

regulations.8 Yet one of the "judicially self-imposed limits on

the exercise of federal jurisdiction" is "the general prohibition

on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights." Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). The district court, though

holding that the individual plaintiffs could not assert the

rights of third parties, see 18 F. Supp. 2d at 47, did not

directly address third party standing with regard to the

organizational plaintiffs. Instead, the court discussed the

"zone of interests" test, an aspect of prudential standing

distinct from third party standing. See id. at 47-49. The

zone of interest test looks at the nature of the claims asserted; third party standing focuses on who is asserting the claim

and why the holder of the asserted right is not before the

court. Compare Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397-

400 (1998), with National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l

Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488-99 (1998). Satisfying

the "zone of interests" test is usually easy when the plaintiff

is able to establish third party standing: "if the litigant

asserts only the rights of third parties, then he may satisfy

the zone of interests requirement by reference to the third

parties' interest if the court determines both that the litigant

has third party standing and that the third parties' interests

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fall within the relevant zone of interests." Haitian Refugee

Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing

FAIC Secs., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 358 (D.C. Cir.

1985)).

The government's brief contained nothing on third-party

standing. Government counsel said at oral argument that

__________

8 Because the district court dismissed for lack of standing, there

has been no ruling on the merits of the AILA/LUPD challenges to

the provisions of IIRIRA dealing with aliens seeking asylum. With

respect to Wood, there remains a due process challenge on behalf of

non-asylum seekers having allegedly sufficient contacts with the

United States (for example, returning legal permanent residents).

there was no intention to waive an objection on this ground.

Normally the proper method of preserving an argument on

appeal is to make it. But in this circuit we treat prudential

standing as akin to jurisdiction, an issue we may raise on our

own, in part because the doctrine serves the "institutional

obligations of the federal courts." Animal Legal Defense

Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also

Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 697 & n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en

banc); cf. United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1351 (D.C.

Cir. 1991) (Randolph, J., concurring).

Since we will consider third party standing sua sponte, a

preliminary question needs to be addressed. "Congress may

grant an express right of action to persons who would otherwise be barred by prudential standing rules." Warth v.

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); see also Havens Realty

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg.

Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Has it done so

here? We think not. Nothing in IIRIRA supports the idea

that Congress intended to allow litigants to assert the rights

of others, and there are indications that Congress meant to

preclude such suits.

The statute permits judicial review of the "implementation"

of 8 U.S.C. s 1225(b), the provision spelling out the procedures for inspecting applicants for admission to the United

States. 8 U.S.C. s 1252(e)(3)(A). The judicial review section

states that such lawsuits may be brought only in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia; that the

lawsuits are limited to determining whether the statute or

regulations are constitutional, and whether the regulations or

other guidelines are consistent with the statute or other law;

and that the lawsuits must be brought within the sixty-day

period we have described earlier. 8 U.S.C. ss 1252(e)(3)(A)

& 1252(g). We cannot see anything in these provisions

allowing litigants--whether individuals or organizations--to

raise claims on behalf of those not party to the lawsuit.

The district court, in ruling that Congress had relaxed the

zone of interest test, stressed the sixty-day time limit on

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judicial review: "such an action would probably not be

brought in time if Congress intended that only aliens subject

to summary removal orders be allowed to bring such an

action." 18 F. Supp. 2d at 49. This is a large stretch,

especially in light of the fact that some aliens did bring suit

within the period. A sixty-day limit is commonplace for

judicial review of agency action. The Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C.

s 2344, is a well-known example. No one has ever thought

that this time limit, in itself, amounted to a legislative repudiation of prudential standing. See, e.g., Reytblatt v. NRC, 105

F.3d 715, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Water Transport Ass'n v. ICC,

819 F.2d 1189, 1193 & n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National

Treasury Employees Union v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 743

F.2d 895, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. FMC, 655

F.2d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In each of the cases just cited

the sixty-day period for judicial review under the Hobbs Act

applied and yet we still required the petitioners to satisfy

prudential standing requirements.

We have also considered another argument, although it was

not mentioned in the district court's opinion. Washington,

D.C., one might suppose, is hardly a convenient forum for an

alien removed from, say, a port of entry in Hawaii or California or Florida. Yet--to continue the argument--Congress

restricted judicial review to actions brought in the federal

court in the District of Columbia, see 8 U.S.C. s 1252(e)(3)(A),

thereby signifying that organizations, rather than (or perhaps

in addition to) individual aliens, may bring suit. The argument is not very telling. For one thing, plaintiffs themselves

alleged that Washington is one of the "major locations for

summary removal cases." LUPD/AILA Amended Complaint

p 85. For another, aliens who have been summarily removed

might be from anywhere in the world, regardless of where

they attempt to enter the country. When they have been

returned to their native country, Washington, D.C. is not

necessarily less convenient than any other forum. And once

again, it has been common for Congress to designate the

District of Columbia as the exclusive venue for judicial review

of agency action. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. s 2278a-3b (Farm

Credit System Assistance Board); 30 U.S.C. s 1276(a)(1)

(Surface Mining Act nationwide rules); 42 U.S.C. s 7607(b)(1)

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(Clean Air Act regulations); 47 U.S.C. s 402(b) (FCC licensing decisions). The purpose is obvious and has nothing to do

with prudential standing. By confining judicial review to one

venue, Congress avoids conflicting decisions about the validity

of particular regulations or statutes.

When we examine other subsections of 8 U.S.C. s 1252(e)

dealing with judicial review, we find signs that Congress

meant to allow actions only by aliens who have been subjected

to the summary procedures contained in s 1225(b) and its

implementing regulations. Section 1252(e)(1)(B) provides:

"Without regard to the nature of the action or claim and

without regard to the identity of the party or parties bringing

the action, no court may ... certify a class under Rule 23 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in any action for which

judicial review is authorized under a subsequent paragraph of

this section." Contrast this prohibition on class actions with

the allegations of the organizational plaintiffs. The LUPD/

AILA amended complaint (pp 96, 99, 103) raises claims on

behalf of all "bona fide refugees" and "all aliens who may be

eligible" for asylum interviews. The Wood amended complaint (pp 1, 6, 79, 80, 85) raises claims on behalf of the alien

"clients" of the organizational plaintiffs and "those persons

similarly situated who have been and will be harmed by the

new expedited removal proceedings created by INA s 235

and governed by the Interim Rules and Defendants' other

implementing policies and procedures," a group that includes

"United States citizens, lawful permanent residents ('LPRs'),

and those other persons eligible for admission to the United

States, including non-immigrant visa holders with facially

valid visas, parolees, unaccompanied minors, refugees, asylees, those persons for whom documents are not required for

admission, and those potentially eligible for admission

through waivers, adjustment of status or other benefits under

the INA."

Such unbounded allegations sweep in nearly all aliens

anywhere in the world who have tried or will try to enter the

United States. The situation of any particular alien is of no

moment, and imposes no confining influence on the scope of

the lawsuit. What portions of the statute and regulations will

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be challenged, and on what grounds, are totally in the control

of the organizations and their lawyers. Should we suppose

that Congress, having barred class actions, intended to permit actions on behalf of a still wider group of aliens, actions in

which no class representative appears as a party and the

plaintiffs are unconstrained by the requirements of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23? From all we can gather, Congress must have contemplated that lawsuits challenging its

enactment would be brought, if at all, by individual aliens

who--during the sixty-day period--were aggrieved by the

statute's implementation. We come to this conclusion not

only in light of the statute's ban on class actions, but also

because Congress restricted injunctive relief in the following

terms: "no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have

jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of

[the expedited secondary inspection provisions] other than

with respect to the application of such provisions to an

individual alien against whom the proceedings under such

chapter have been initiated." 8 U.S.C. s 1252(f)(1). The

jurisdictional provision provides still further proof: "Except

as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other

provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any

cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the

decision or action by the Attorney General to commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders

against any alien under this Act." 8 U.S.C. s 1252(g). One

cannot come away from reading this section without having

the distinct impression that Congress meant to allow litigation challenging the new system by, and only by, aliens

against whom the new procedures had been applied.

What we have just written about congressional intent influences our analysis of the judicially-created third party standing doctrine as it applies to the cases before us. We will get

to this in a moment, but first we need to look at developments

in this circuit and in the Supreme Court. The place to begin

is Judge Bork's opinion in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey,

809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which describes a lawsuit quite

similar to the cases before us. There, organizations challenged a presidential proclamation ordering interdiction of

boats carrying undocumented aliens attempting to enter the

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United States. The organizations complained that the interdiction program violated the rights of the aliens under the

Refugee Act of 1980, the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment, and various treaties. See 809 F.2d at 797-98.

Because the litigants asserted the rights of third party aliens,

Judge Bork conducted a thorough examination of cases in

which the Supreme Court made exceptions to the traditional

prohibition against third party standing. See id. at 807-11.

The analysis led to the following conclusion: "If the government has directly interfered with the litigant's ability to

engage in conduct together with the third party, for example,

by putting the litigant under a legal disability with criminal

penalties, and if a statute or the Constitution grants the third

party a right to engage in that conduct with the litigant, the

litigant has standing to challenge the government's interference by invoking the third party's rights." Id. at 808. Most

of the cases allowing third party standing involved laws that

imposed legal sanctions on the litigant.9 Third party standing was allowed because "enforcement of the challenged

restriction against the litigant" resulted "in the violation of

the third parties' rights." Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at

510)). This circumstance eliminates one of the concerns

animating the third party prohibition: courts should not

decide disputes if third parties will be able to exercise their

rights regardless of the litigant's success. See Singleton v.

Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297

__________

9 As examples, see Secretary of State of Maryland v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955-59 (1984), in which a fundraiser had

standing to raise the First Amendment rights of donors because the

statute penalized fundraisers for receiving commissions; Craig v.

Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194-97 (1976), in which the Court recognized

standing for a beer vendor to assert the equal protection claims of

males who were not allowed to purchase beer until they turned 21,

although women could purchase beer upon turning 18; Doe v.

Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973), in which doctors were allowed

to assert the privacy interests of patients because the statute

imposed criminal penalties on doctors performing abortions; and

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972), in which vendors

of contraceptives had standing to assert purchasers' privacy interests because the statute criminalized selling contraceptives.

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U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The

direct impact of the law on the litigant also mitigates the

concern that third parties would be better proponents of their

own rights. See id. (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,

397 (1898)).

The Supreme Court has also recognized third party standing when a law, though not punishing the litigant, directly

interferes with a protected relationship between the litigant

and third party. Singleton v. Wulff, in which doctors challenged a law that prohibited Medicaid payments for abortions

that were not "medically indicated," is such a case. See 428

U.S. at 106. In a plurality opinion,10 Justice Blackmun found

that the law was "specifically intended to burden the third

party's relationship with their physicians." Haitian Refugee

Ctr., 809 F.2d at 810 (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 106).

Because the right being asserted--the third party patient's

Roe v. Wade right--was a right protecting the patient's

access to physicians, the Court recognized third party standing.

In contrast, the interdiction law at issue in Haitian Refugee

did not directly interfere with the relationship between Haitians and the litigants who were trying to help them. See id.

Impeding contact between the two groups was only an indirect effect of the interdiction program's aim of preventing the

entry of Haitians. See id. at 809-10. Yet "allowing standing

for unintended side effects of programs would involve the

court in the continual supervision of more governmental

activities than separation of powers concerns should permit."

Id. Moreover, the constitutional rights asserted--the Haitians' due process rights--did not protect a relationship between the litigants and the aliens. See id. at 809. The same

is true in our case. The organizations faced no legal sanction

from the statute or the regulations. The claimed violation of

aliens' rights--impeded access to attorneys--is but a side

effect of the expedited removal system.

In addition to the factual congruity between Haitian Refugee and this case, the rule of decision Judge Bork announced

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10 Justice Stevens, the fifth vote for standing, wrote separately on

the grounds that the doctors were asserting their own rights.

for the court11 would foreclose the organizational plaintiffs

from litigating the due process rights of unnamed aliens.

Haitian Refugee held: "A litigant therefore could never have

standing to challenge a statute solely on the ground that it

failed to provide due process to third parties not before the

court." Id.12

Nonetheless, plaintiffs argue that one of our recent decisions is squarely at odds with the rule of Haitian Refugee

just quoted. They have a point. A few months ago, this

court--without mentioning Haitian Refugee--allowed a litigant to assert the due process rights of third parties. See

Lepelletier v. FDIC, 164 F.3d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The

plaintiff in Lepelletier was a "money finder," a person who

receives income by locating the owners of unclaimed deposits

at failed banks. Lepelletier filed suit against the FDIC, the

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receiver of three failed banks, after the agency denied his

Freedom of Information Act requests for the names of the

owners of the unclaimed deposits. See id. at 40-41. The

complaint alleged that "under the due process clause of the

Fifth Amendment, the FDIC was required to publish the

names of all parties with unclaimed deposits before forfeiting

the funds...." Id. at 41. Because the unidentified depositors' property interest gave rise to the due process claim,

Lepelletier had to overcome third party standing doctrine.

See id. at 42.

The Lepelletier court invoked, without discussion, the

three-part test for third party standing the Supreme Court

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11 Judge Buckley joined this portion of Judge Bork's opinion, see

809 F.2d at 796 n.1, and it therefore represented the law of the

circuit.

12 At oral argument, plaintiffs cited National Cottonseed Products

Ass'n v. Brock, 825 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the one opinion of this

circuit to question Haitian Refugee. But the doubt expressed there

has no bearing on this case. It dealt with the portion of Judge

Bork's Haitian Refugee opinion dealing with whether third party

standing automatically attached to a vendor-vendee relationship.

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announced in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). See 164

F.3d at 43. Powers allowed a criminal defendant to assert a

claim of racial discrimination in jury selection because: 1) the

defendant suffered an injury in fact;13 2) he had a close

relationship to the excluded jurors; and 3) there was some

hindrance to the excluded jurors asserting their own rights.

499 U.S. at 411; see also Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392

(1998) (applying Powers in the grand jury context).

Did Powers supersede the Haitian Refugee rule? The

defendant in Powers certainly faced a legal penalty (imprisonment), but it is not clear that a juror's equal protection rights

"protect that party's relationship with the litigant." Haitian

Refugee, 809 F.2d at 809. The Powers Court referred to "the

relation between petitioner and excluded jurors," Powers, 499

U.S. at 413, but the jurors' equal protection rights were

treated principally as a protection of the integrity of the

judicial system, see id. at 412, 414. It could be that Haitian

Refugee and Powers now coexist and a party can establish

third party standing by meeting either standard. A postPowers decision of this court appears to take this approach.

Fair Employment Council continued to apply the Haitian

Refugee "relationship" standard, see Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Haitian Refugee, 809 F.2d at

809)), but applied that standard only after deciding that

plaintiffs could not meet the Powers "obstacle" test, see id.

The effect of subsequent case law on the Haitian Refugee

rule is not entirely clear. Nor is the general state of third

party standing law. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 454

n.1 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our law on [third-party

standing] is in need of what may charitably be called clarification.").14 Although we are unsure how to reconcile Haitian

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13 We cannot see what this factor adds. Prudential standing

aside, if the litigant has not suffered injury there is no constitutional

standing. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United

For Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).

14 A third party standing decision of the Supreme Court after

Haitian Refugee allowed an attorney to assert the due process

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Refugee with Powers and Lepelletier, we can decide this

appeal without making the attempt. Even under the Powers

formulation, the organizational plaintiffs cannot prevail. To

establish third party standing "there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own

interests."15 Powers, 499 U.S. at 411. Singleton v. Wulff,

428 U.S. at 116, sounded a similar note: "If there is some

genuine obstacle ... the third party's absence from court

loses its tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at

stake, or truly important to him, and the party who is in court

becomes by default the right's best available proponent." We

do not believe excluded aliens suffered from the type of

impediment, the "hindrance" or "obstacle," the Court had in

mind.

We accept plaintiffs' statement that "aliens removed directly from secondary inspection are detained and prohibited

from communicating with anyone throughout their stay in the

__________

claims of his client. See United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett,

494 U.S. 715 (1990). The law being challenged regulated the fees

an attorney could receive in black lung disease cases. Triplett thus

is another example of the well-established exception that a litigant

can assert third party claims when the challenged law imposes a

penalty on the litigant.

Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), also involved a legal

disability imposed on the litigant. The plaintiff had been denied

citizenship on the basis of a proof-of-paternity requirement for

illegitimate, foreign-born offspring of American fathers. The Court

allowed the plaintiff to raise her father's equal protection claim (a

test was not required for the illegitimate, foreign-born offspring of

American mothers). See id. at 424-27.

15 This language demonstrates that when the "Powers test" is

applied, all three requirements must be met. See also Powers, 499

U.S. at 411 ("We have recognized the right of litigants to bring

actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria

are satisfied...."). Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United

States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1988), which upheld third party

standing even though the hindrance requirement "counsel[ed]

against review," appears inconsistent with the Court's current

approach.

country." Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 46. But

the period of detention typically was quite short; that is the

point of summary removal. When an alien returned to his

native country, nothing prevented him from bringing suit

here. To this the organizational plaintiffs reply that "under

the construction of the 60-day limit adopted by the district

court, for those aliens arriving after June 1, 1997, there is no

possibility of bringing a challenge at all." Id. at 47. True

enough. But this is precisely what Congress intended.

None of the Supreme Court's decisions invoking the Powers formulation even comes close to suggesting what plaintiffs

propose. In Powers itself, the third party juror "possess[ed]

little incentive" to bring suit because "of the small financial

stake involved and the economic burdens of litigation." 499

U.S. at 415. It also would have been difficult for the excluded

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juror to recognize, and later prove, that his exclusion was the

result of systemic discrimination. See id. at 414-15; see also

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254, 257 (1953) (allowing

third party standing to vindicate the rights of "unidentified"

victims of racially restrictive covenant). This latter consideration--unawareness of the injury--is the type of obstacle

Lepelletier thought adequate to meet the Powers standard.

The third parties in Lepelletier were unidentified depositors

who did not know they were being deprived of property.

Excluded aliens faced no comparable impediment to suit.

They were quite aware of their summary removal. And they

had a strong incentive to challenge the exclusion procedures

in court.

Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, has said that

when a "hindrance signals that the rightholder did not simply

decline to bring the claim on his own behalf, but could not in

fact do so," third party standing may be permitted. Miller v.

Albright, 523 U.S. at 450 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Hodel v.

Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1987), involves the most obvious

application of this principle: the rightholders, the litigants'

parents, were deceased. Another case, Singleton, 428 U.S. at

117, held that the "imminent mootness" of any woman's

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tion of the right. And the Court permitted third party

standing when assertion of the right would essentially defeat

it. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,

459 (1958) (recognizing that if the organization were required

to assert its own privacy interests, the privacy it sought to

protect would be undermined).

We do not believe aliens excluded in the Spring of 1997,

when the statute was first implemented, were in a position

comparable to the missing individuals in the cases we have

just summarized. Congress passed IIRIRA in September

1996. The organizations appearing before us, whose purpose

it is to assist aliens arriving on our shores, thus knew well

ahead of time what was coming. On March 27, 1997, five

days before the implementing regulations went into effect,

the American Immigration Lawyers Association and three

other organizations filed suit. They eventually added, within

60 days of April 1, the two excluded aliens whose claims the

district court adjudicated on the merits. The organizations

do not allege that, despite their best efforts, they were unable

to identify and provide legal assistance to any other potential

plaintiffs--that is, aliens facing removal during the relevant

time frame. How large was the pool? The government

informed us after argument that in the 60 days beginning

April 1, 1997, immigration officials processed approximately

10,200 expedited removal cases at the country's 25 largest

ports of entry--or 1200 per week.

To the extent there were obstacles or hindrances to any of

these individuals joining in the cases, they are either imposed

by Congress or result from the normal burdens of litigation.

Those who are not financially well off face obvious obstacles

when they seek to bring a lawsuit. Some excluded aliens, but

hardly all,16 doubtless fell into that category. Those who are

__________

16 For instance, the excluded aliens added in the amended Wood

complaint included two British citizens who supplied items to U.S.

Air Force squadrons in England; a citizen of the Peoples Republic

of China who is the president of a real estate development company;

a businesswoman from Canada; and another Canadian citizen who

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uninformed about the workings of the courts, or of their legal

rights, or of the availability of counsel, also face obstacles.

Individuals who do not speak English or who reside far from

the courthouse are hindered when it comes to taking legal

action. Congress knew all this as well as we do, and as well

as the organizational plaintiffs do. Yet rather than alleviating

these burdens Congress placed strict limits on the time for

filing challenges to the summary removal system, and it

barred class actions. To allow third party standing in the

face of those provisions (which are not challenged) and the

jurisdictional provision mentioned earlier (p. 12, supra) would

be to contradict the principles on which the standing doctrine

rests--namely, "the proper--and properly limited--role of

the courts in a democratic society." Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. at 498; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 750-52. Congress

imposed the 60-day limit on actions in order to cabin judicial

review and to have the validity of the new law decided

promptly. It would be inconsistent with the "properly limited

role of the courts" for us to use this provision as the basis for

expanding jurisdiction through the back door of third party

standing. And in the face of a statute barring even class

actions that comply with the rules of procedure, it would be

inconsistent, indeed almost contradictory, if the device of

third party representation could be used to prosecute what

are essentially unbounded class lawsuits.

We mentioned earlier that Congress may relax the prudential standing rules the judiciary has created. See Warth v.

Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501; Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,

455 U.S. at 372; Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1278.

Congress may do so--and has sometimes done so--in the

exercise of its Article I power, so long as it keeps within the

limits of Article III of the Constitution. See Henry P.

Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 313

& n.195 (1984). If Congress can thus expand federal jurisdiction, Congress also has the power to contract federal jurisdiction. There is no reason why, for instance, a statute could

__________

held a degree in hotel/restaurant management from an American

university.

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not expressly state that, without exception, each party to a

lawsuit must raise only their rights and not the rights of

others. That would constitute a legislative direction to the

courts that the third party standing doctrine, in its strictest

form, must be applied. Congress may not have gone so far in

IIRIRA. But our analysis of the statute, and particularly the

bar on class actions, strengthens the judicial presumption

against suits seeking relief for a large and diffuse group of

individuals, none of whom are parties to the lawsuit--suits,

that is, such as the ones before us. For all of these reasons,

we hold that the plaintiff organizations do not have standing

to raise claims, whether statutory or constitutional, on behalf

of aliens subjected to IIRIRA's expedited removal system.

Affirmed.

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