Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_22-cv-00123/USCOURTS-azd-4_22-cv-00123-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Cezan C. Armenta, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

David Shinn, et al., 

 Respondents. 

CV 22-00123-TUC-RCC (LCK) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Petitioner, Cezan Armenta, incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison in 

Buckeye, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Before this Court are the Amended Petition (Doc. 10), 

Respondents' Answer (Docs. 22, 23), and Petitioner's Reply (Doc. 27). Pursuant to 

the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge 

Kimmins for Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends the 

District Court, after its independent review of the record, deny the Petition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted in the Pima County Superior 

Court on six counts of sale of a dangerous drug. (Doc. 22, Ex. S.) Subsequently, 

Petitioner pled guilty to possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor 

(a count that had been severed for trial). (Id., Exs. AA, BB.) On August 6, 2018, 

the court sentenced him to 15.75 years on each sale count, and 3.5 years on the 

prohibited possessor count, with all sentences to run concurrently. (Id., Ex. CC.) 

Petitioner appealed, but appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. (Id., Exs. 

DD, EE.) Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental opening brief. (Id., Ex. GG.) The 

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Arizona Court of Appeals directed counsel to file a supplemental opening brief 

addressing whether Petitioner's right to testify was violated. (Id., Exs. HH, II.) The 

appellate court summarized the facts in support of Petitioner's convictions for sale 

of a dangerous drug: "Armenta sold methamphetamine to an undercover police 

officer on six separate occasions in August and September 2015 in amounts 

ranging from one-eighth ounce to one-half pound, and admitted to the undercover 

officer that he sold, rather than used, drugs." (Id. at 2.) The court of appeals 

affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences (id., Ex. MM) and denied his pro 

se motion for reconsideration (id., Exs. NN, OO). Petitioner did not seek review in 

the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id., Ex. PP.) 

Petitioner filed a Notice for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR). (Doc. 22, Exs. 

QQ, RR.) Appointed counsel filed a PCR Petition. (Id., Ex. WW.) The PCR court 

found no basis for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the Petition on the merits. 

(Id., Ex. ZZ.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, which granted review but denied relief. (Id., Exs. BBB, CCC.) 

Petitioner's Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court was denied. (Id., 

Exs. DDD, EEE.) 

Petitioner initiated this federal habeas action on March 15, 2022. (Doc. 1.) 

The operative pleading is the Amended Petition filed on June 9, 2022. (Doc. 10.) 

Respondents concede that the Petition was timely filed. (Doc. 23 at 9-11.) 

DISCUSSION 

 The Amended Petition includes four multi-part claims. Claim 1 alleges 

Petitioner was denied his right to counsel when the trial court rejected his motions 

for substitute counsel. Claim 2 alleges the trial court denied Petitioner the right to 

present a complete defense by (a) denying his request to call the confidential 

informant as a witness, (b) denying his right to testify, and (c) denying a jury 

instruction on entrapment. Claim 3 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) 

during plea negotiations. Claim 4 alleges counsel was ineffective (a) at trial for 

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(1) failing to call the confidential informant as a witness, and (2) failing to present 

an entrapment defense; and (b) on appeal for (1) failing to challenge preclusion of 

the confidential informant as a witness, and (2) failing to appeal the trial court 

rulings on an entrapment defense. Respondents contend that Claims 2(a) and (c) 

are state law claims not eligible for relief before this Court; Claims 1 and 4 are 

procedurally defaulted without excuse; and Claims 2(b) and 3 fail on the merits. 

The Court first reviews the claims for cognizability, and exhaustion and 

procedural default, and then evaluates the remaining claims on the merits. 

EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 

Standard 

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a 

petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); 

see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To properly exhaust, a 

petitioner must "fairly present" the operative facts and the federal legal theory of 

his claims to the state's highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. 

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 

4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971). 

 In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for 

petitioners to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR 

proceedings. A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review 

in two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was 

raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural 

grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally 

defaulted if the petitioner failed to present it in state court and "the court to which 

the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 

735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that 

the district court must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any 

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presently available state remedy), overruled on other grounds by Apelt v. Ryan, 

878 F.3d 800, 827 (9th Cir. 2017). If no remedies are currently available pursuant 

to Rule 32, the claim is "technically" exhausted but procedurally defaulted. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 

161-62 (1996). 

 Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not 

review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner 

demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state 

court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation or shows that a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on the 

merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Claim 1 

Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to counsel when the trial court 

rejected his motions for substitute counsel. This issue was raised in Petitioner's 

pro se supplemental brief (Doc. 22, Ex. GG at 6-9), and by appellate counsel in 

his supplemental brief (id., Ex. JJ at 26-37). The Arizona Court of Appeals held 

that, based on his pretrial actions, Petitioner had waived all but a claim of 

fundamental error on appeal; and that his failure to argue fundamental error on 

appeal had waived the claim in entirety. (Id., Ex. MM at 8-9.) Because the state 

court imposed a procedural bar based on Arizona law as to Claim 1, it is 

procedurally defaulted in this Court. 

The court of appeals also denied the claim on the merits. (Id. at 9.) 

Petitioner argues it was not a true alternative ruling because the default and merits 

ruling was intermingled and, therefore, the procedural ruling does not stand as an 

independent state law basis to dismiss the claim. When a state court decision 

"rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and 

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adequate to support the judgment," federal courts will not review the state court's 

resolution of a federal question. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. However, when "a 

state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be 

interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any 

possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept 

as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it 

did because it believed that federal law required it to do so." Michigan v. Long, 

463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983); see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 733. Here, the Court 

need not resort to the presumption from Long because the appellate court's 

decision does not appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with 

it. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 737 (finding that when "it does not fairly appear that the 

state court rested its decision primarily on federal grounds, it is simply not true 

that the 'most reasonable explanation' is that the state judgment rested on federal 

grounds."). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals' decision on Arizona grounds was 

independent and adequate. The court set forth Petitioner's claim, articulated the 

applicable law and facts, and then issued a ruling. (Id. at 6-9.) In an initial 

paragraph it found a default based on state law, and then in a separate paragraph 

rejected the claim on the merits. (Id. at 9.) When a state court issues an alternative 

holding on the merits of a federal claim, a habeas court still must honor a state 

procedural bar if it was explicitly invoked as a separate basis for the state court's 

decision. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989). In other words, "[a] state 

court's application of a procedural rule is not undermined where, as here, the state 

court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim." Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 

573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10; Carriger v. Lewis, 

971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 1991)). As long as the state court's application of the state procedural ground 

provides "an adequate and independent state law basis" for the denial of relief, the 

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claim is defaulted. Id. (quoting Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 

2000)). In Petitioner's case, in a separate paragraph addressing only a state 

procedural ground, the Arizona Court of Appeals found the claim waived. This 

was an independent and adequate state law basis to deny the claim. Therefore, 

Claim 1 is defaulted. 

Claim 2(a) 

Petitioner alleges he was denied the right to present a complete defense 

when the trial court precluded the confidential informant as a witness. 

Respondents argue that the trial court precluded the witness based on state 

evidentiary rules; therefore, it is not a federal claim reviewable in this Court. On 

appeal (Doc. 22, Ex. GG at 10-16) and before this Court (Doc. 10 at 14-15, 18-

24), Petitioner argued this claim as a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to present a complete defense. That is a constitutional claim 

cognizable before this Court. Because the claim was fairly presented to the state 

appellate court it was properly exhausted, and the Court will address it on the 

merits. 

Claim 2(c) 

Petitioner alleges he was denied a jury instruction on entrapment. 

Respondents argue that this is an issue solely of state law that is not cognizable in 

a habeas proceeding. More specifically, Respondents contend that, because 

entrapment is a state defense to a state crime, the state court's denial of the defense 

in Petitioner's case is an unreviewable state court decision. Although this Court is 

prohibited from reviewing state court rulings based solely on state law, the claim 

raised by Petitioner in this Court is based on his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights to present a complete defense. (Doc. 10 at 7.) That claim is cognizable in 

this Court. Therefore, the Court reviews it for exhaustion. 

On direct appeal, Petitioner alleged that the denial of a jury instruction on 

entrapment denied his right to present a complete defense. Although Petitioner 

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touched on a constitutional concept, it is not clear he fairly presented Claim 2(c) 

as a federal claim in his pro se appellate brief. However, appointed counsel also 

raised this claim in his supplemental appellate brief. (Doc. 22, Ex. JJJ at 37-42.) In 

concluding his argument on the claim, counsel argued that the denial of a jury 

instruction on entrapment violated Petitioner's right to due process. He cited the 

case of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), which is based on a 

defendant's due process right to defend himself as required for a fair trial. Based 

on this supplemental brief, the Court finds that Claim 2(c) was fairly presented to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, and it will address the claim on the merits. 

Claim 4 

 Petitioner alleges counsel was ineffective (a) at trial for (1) failing to call 

the confidential informant as a witness, and (2) failing to present an entrapment 

defense; and (b) on appeal for (1) failing to challenge preclusion of the 

confidential informant as a witness, and (2) failing to appeal the trial court rulings 

on an entrapment defense. In the Amended Petition, Petitioner acknowledges that 

he did not raise Claim 4 to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 10 at 9.) This 

concession is confirmed by a review of the state court filings. The PCR Petition 

alleged only one claim, that trial counsel was ineffective during plea proceedings 

(as raised in Claim 3 of the Amended Petition before this Court). (Doc. 22, Ex. 

WW.) In turn, that singular claim was the only one raised in the petition for 

review to the court of appeals from the denial of the PCR Petition. (Id., Ex. BBB.) 

Because Petitioner did not fairly present the allegations raised in Claim 4 to the 

state courts, he did not properly exhaust the claim. If Petitioner were to return to 

state court now to litigate this claim it would be found waived and untimely under 

Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(b)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b); 32.1(b)-(h). See State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67, 213 Ariz. 562, 566 

(2006) ("As a general rule, when 'ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 

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raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, 

subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and 

precluded.'") (quoting State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 526, 202 Ariz. 1, 2 (2002)). 

Therefore, Claim 4 is technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Gray, 

518 U.S. at 161-62; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. 

Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice and Cause and Prejudice 

 The Court found Claims 1 and 4 procedurally defaulted. The Court now 

examines Petitioner's arguments that the Court should overlook the defaults. 

Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Petitioner did not argue that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would 

result if Claims 1 or 4 were not addressed on the merits. However, he suggests he 

would have been found not guilty if the jury was allowed to consider entrapment. 

Although Petitioner did not assert this argument as a means to overcome default, 

the Court briefly evaluates it for that purpose. 

To demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse a procedural 

default, the petitioner must show that "a constitutional violation has probably 

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 327 (1995). To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must 

show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found 

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. The Supreme Court has 

characterized the exacting nature of an actual innocence claim as follows: 

[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the 

conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. . . . To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at trial. Because 

such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful. 

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Id. at 324; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). Petitioner did not 

identify any new reliable evidence to support such a claim.1

 Therefore, Petitioner 

cannot establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if Claims 1 or 4 

are not heard on the merits. 

Cause and Prejudice, Claim 1 

Petitioner argues the ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel is cause to 

overcome the default of Claim 1. Specifically, Petitioner contends appellate 

counsel should have argued that the denial of his motions for substitute counsel 

constituted fundamental error, which would have preserved his claim.2

 IAC may 

operate as cause to excuse a default. However, before ineffectiveness of appellate 

counsel may be used to establish cause for a procedural default, it must have been 

presented in state court as an independent claim. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 

489 (1986). Petitioner has not fairly presented in state court any claims of IAC on 

appeal. 

An ineffectiveness claim regarding appellate counsel is now foreclosed in 

state court by Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(b)(3) 

because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b); 32.1(b)-(h). See Bennett, 146 P.3d at 67, 213 Ariz. at 566 ("As a general 

________________________ 

1

 As discussed more fully below, with respect to Claim 2, Petitioner provided a proffer of evidence regarding entrapment in state court. These were facts to which he attested that he and the confidential information could have 

testified at trial, if allowed. This Court concluded that his evidence was not 

sufficient to establish innocence by way of an entrapment defense because he could not establish the third element of the defense. 

2

 Petitioner argued on appeal, in his pro se supplemental brief, that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motions to replace counsel (Claim 1). (Doc. 22, Ex. GG at 6-9.) To the extent Petitioner, himself, made the decision not to argue fundamental error on direct appeal, that cannot operate as cause because it is not attributable to something external to him. Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining cause as "any 'objective factor' that is 'external' to the petitioner and that 'cannot fairly be attributed to him'") (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753). 

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rule, when 'ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been 

raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective 

assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.'") (quoting Spreitz, 39 P.3d at 

526, 202 Ariz. at 2). Because Petitioner may not exhaust such a claim now, it is 

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62;

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. Thus, IAC on appeal cannot operate as cause unless 

Petitioner establishes cause and prejudice to excuse the default of the appellate 

IAC claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000) (ineffective 

counsel as cause can itself be procedurally defaulted). Petitioner briefly alleged 

before this Court, as part of Claim 4(b)(2), that appellate counsel was ineffective 

in how he raised the substance of Claim 1. (Doc. 10 at 32.) Recognizing that 

Claim 4 was procedurally defaulted, in entirety, Petitioner alleged that the cause 

for that default was ineffectiveness of PCR counsel. The Supreme Court holds that 

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel cannot serve as cause to excuse the default of a 

claim of IAC on appeal. See Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 529 (2017). Because 

Petitioner's assertion of cause based on appellate IAC is defaulted, he has failed to 

establish cause to excuse the default of Claim 1. 

Cause and Prejudice, Claim 4 

Petitioner argues as cause to overcome the default of Claim 4 that his PCR 

counsel was ineffective in failing to raise IAC at trial (Claim 4(a)) and on appeal 

(Claim 4(b)). There is no constitutional right to PCR counsel; thus, the Sixth 

Amendment is not implicated when counsel is ineffective in such a proceeding. 

However, if PCR counsel is ineffective pursuant to the standards of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in failing to raise a trial IAC claim, that may 

constitute cause to excuse a default of that claim. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 

(2012). The Supreme Court has limited IAC during PCR as cause solely to claims 

of trial IAC. Thus, ineffectiveness of PCR counsel may not operate as cause to 

excuse the default of a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. See Davila, 

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582 U.S. at 529. Therefore, it may not excuse the default of Claim 4(b). 

Respondent argued this law in the Answer, and Petitioner did not attempt to 

dispute it in his Reply. Because Petitioner has not presented cause to excuse the 

default of Claim 4(b), IAC on appeal, it remains defaulted. 

The Court examines whether PCR counsel's failure to raise a claim of IAC 

at trial may operate as cause to excuse the default of Claim 4(a). To establish 

"cause" to overcome procedural default under Martinez, a petitioner must show: 

(1) the underlying ineffective assistance of [ ] counsel claim is "substantial"; 

(2) the petitioner was not represented or had ineffective counsel during the PCR 

proceeding; (3) the state PCR proceeding was the initial review proceeding for the 

IAC claim; and (4) state law required the petitioner to bring that claim in the 

initial review collateral proceeding. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 423 (2013). 

There is no dispute as to elements 3 or 4 in this case. To demonstrate that an 

underlying IAC claim is "substantial" for element 1, Petitioner must show that it 

has some merit. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 15 (noting a claim is insubstantial if it has 

no merit, is "wholly without factual support," or counsel's performance was not 

below constitutional standards). A substantial claim is one as to which "reasonable 

jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further." Wiese v. Nooth, 761 F. App'x 758, 760 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)). 

To evaluate substantiality, the Court necessarily considers the merits of 

Petitioner's IAC at trial claims. These claims are tied closely to his assertions of 

trial court error alleged in Claim 2. For that reason, the Court places the 

examination of the merits of Claims 4(a)(1) and (2) after the analysis of Claim 2. 

As explained below, the Court finds these claims are not substantial because 

counsel's conduct was not objectively unreasonable, and Petitioner was not 

prejudiced by his conduct. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 15. Therefore, PCR counsel 

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was not ineffective in failing to raise Claims 4(a)(1) and (2). Because 

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel cannot operate as cause, Claims 4(a)(1) and (2) 

remain defaulted. 

MERITS

The Court concluded that Claims 2 and 3, in entirety, were fairly presented 

and properly exhausted. Therefore, the Court addresses them on the merits. The 

Court also looks at the merits of Claims 4(a)(1) and (2) for purposes of evaluating 

whether PCR counsel's ineffectiveness may operate as cause to excuse the default 

of those claims. 

Legal Standards for Relief under the AEDPA 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 

created a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' . . . 

demand[ing] that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)). Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief on any claim "adjudicated on the merits" by the state court 

unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The last relevant state court decision is the last reasoned 

state decision regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 

2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 "The threshold test under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply 

a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction 

became final." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess 

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a claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the "clearly 

established Federal law," if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on 

habeas review. "Clearly established" federal law consists of the holdings of the 

Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's state court conviction became final. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006). 

Claim 2 

 Petitioner alleges he was denied the right to present a complete defense 

when the trial court (a) denied his request to call the confidential informant as a 

witness, (b) denied his right to testify, and (c) denied an entrapment jury 

instruction. Each of these claims relate to whether the trial court should have 

allowed Petitioner to present an entrapment defense. That defense is codified 

under Arizona law: 

A. It is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge that the person was entrapped. To claim entrapment, the person must admit by the person's testimony or other evidence the substantial elements of the 

offense charged. 

B. A person who asserts an entrapment defense has the burden of 

proving the following by clear and convincing evidence: 

1. The idea of committing the offense started with law enforcement 

officers or their agents rather than with the person. 

2. The law enforcement officers or their agents urged and induced the person to commit the offense. 

3. The person was not predisposed to commit the type of offense charged before the law enforcement officers or their agents urged and induced the person to commit the offense. 

C. A person does not establish entrapment if the person was 

predisposed to commit the offense and the law enforcement officers 

or their agents merely provided the person with an opportunity to 

commit the offense. It is not entrapment for law enforcement officers or their agents merely to use a ruse or to conceal their identity. The 

conduct of law enforcement officers and their agents may be considered in determining if a person has proven entrapment. 

A.R.S. § 13-206. 

The Court of Appeals made the following rulings relevant to Claim 2: 

¶4 At a November 2017 pretrial hearing on the state's motion in 

limine, the trial court ruled there would be no testimony about a "tip," 

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a "confidential informant," a "source," or "anything that in any way is a negative suggestion . . . Armenta was previously involved in other criminal activity." Noting that any information related to a "source" 

was not relevant to the charges, the court stated it would only permit testimony that the police "received some information and they acted on the information." At the same hearing, the court expressly directed Armenta to decide before trial if he intended to assert an entrapment defense, an instruction his attorney, Paul Gattone, acknowledged; Armenta raised no such defense before trial. 

¶5 At the conclusion of the second day of trial, after the state had rested . . . the court explained to Armenta: the state could ask about 

his prior convictions if he elected to testify; the decision whether to testify was up to him; and because the state had rested, he had to decide "now" if he would testify. Armenta responded, "All right. Then I'm just going to decide not to [testify]." He confirmed he had conferred with his attorney about his decision and Gattone similarly stated he had advised Armenta not to testify and explained that, because that decision involves a constitutional right, "telling a client 

not to testify isn't something that [he] take[s] lightly." The court 

again asked Armenta, "And in the end you've elected not to testify, correct? and he responded, "Yeah," and told the court, "Thank you." 

¶6 The following day Armenta asked the trial court if it was too 

late for him to testify and if the court would give a jury instruction on entrapment if he were to present "slight evidence" of the defense, which he then described to the court. The court stated it was going to treat the evidence Armenta proffered as an offer of proof: the undercover officer had called Armenta urging and inducing him to sell the officer drugs; those telephone calls "were never recorded but 

[were] on the phone records"; the investigation "started with a lady that was [Armenta's] friend who was also calling [Armenta] multiple times and asking [him] to sell narcotics . . . to the officer," who would help her financially. 

¶7 The trial court reminded Armenta that the state would object to such testimony as irrelevant, an objection the court would grant, and that the jury would then be permitted to learn about his prior 

convictions. Gattone likewise pointed out that if Armenta testified, he would "be opening himself up to all sorts of cross-examination as to 

[his] propensity towards" selling drugs. Gattone explained that because the court had previously entered a ruling prohibiting any testimony about a confidential informant, Armenta would not "have much he could say that could benefit his situation." The court told 

Armenta, "[T]he testimony you want to offer is not going to be allowed for a number of reasons. Part of it was litigated in the pretrial motions. Part of it is the current case law. Part of it is that entrapment was never disclosed." The court stated, "[Y]ou're not going to be allowed to present to this jury any testimony that you were entrapped, a little bit of it or a whole lot of it. . . . under the facts of this case." 

The court also pointed out that if Armenta had timely notified the 

state he intended to present an entrapment defense, it would have "completely . . . . changed how the State tried [its] case." Armenta 

then responded, "Okay. Those are the only questions I had." 

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¶8 We disagree with Armenta that he was denied the right to testify, and instead conclude he voluntarily made that decision. The record shows that he decided not to testify after the trial court explained that he would be prohibited from testifying about the confidential informant, testimony it previously had precluded, and that he had not presented evidence of entrapment. Nor does the 

record show Armenta demanded to testify against the advice of 

attorney. . . . To the contrary, Gattone clearly stated in Armenta's presence that the decision to testify was "totally in [his] control," although he advised against doing so, after which Armenta made his own decision. 

¶9 And we find no error in the trial court's application of the entrapment defense to the facts here, nor does Armenta meaningfully establish that any such error occurred. The facts Armenta presented in his offer of proof did not establish the requisite elements in the 

entrapment statute, A.R.S. § 13-206, nor did he try to tie the 

proffered evidence to those elements in a meaningful way. Rather, his statements constituted little more than an allegation that entrapment occurred because an undercover officer5

 contacted him 

and his friend asked him to sell narcotics to the officer. 

¶10 Nor did the trial court improperly apply Rule 15.2(b) and (d), which require the timely disclosure of an entrapment defense. As previously mentioned, the court had expressly prohibited any 

testimony about a confidential informant and had warned Armenta 

that he could not raise an entrapment defense on "the morning of trial," much less after the state rested, because belatedly introducing a new defense theory would have significantly changed the way the 

state tried its case. Although preclusion of evidence for lack of 

disclosure is a "sanction of last resort," . . . it is appropriate when the evidence introduces an "entirely new defense theory" and allowing that theory to be presented would "cause[] a significant disadvantage to the state . . .. In summary, we reject Armenta's assertion that he was denied the right to testify, but instead that he voluntarily decided 

not to testify, and thus conclude he is not entitled to relief on this 

claim. 

5

Notably, the undercover officer testified that Armenta had 

told him he sold rather than used drugs, and detailed Armenta's quick and repeated access to illegal drugs during the multiple sales of which he was convicted. This belies any suggestion that Armenta was not "predisposed to commit the type of offense charged" before 

law enforcement officers induced him to do so. See § 13-206(B)(3), (C). 

(Doc. 22, Ex. MM at 3-6.) The appellate court subsequently held, for the reasons 

discussed in paragraphs four to ten, that the trial court properly denied Petitioner's 

request to raise an entrapment defense and did not err in denying a related jury 

instruction. (Id. at 9 ¶ 19.) 

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Claim 2(a) 

Petitioner alleges he was denied the right to present a complete defense 

when the trial court precluded the confidential informant as a witness. Petitioner 

argues that he needed to show the informant was a police agent and she instigated 

the idea of the crime to support an entrapment defense. He also contends that the 

informant could have testified to the content of the phone calls she made to him 

and that she induced him to sell drugs to the undercover officer. When he was 

precluded from presenting her as a witness, he argues it ruined his defense. 

Although the Arizona Court of Appeals acknowledged that Petitioner raised Claim 

2(a) (Doc. 22, Ex. MM at 3), it did not rule on this portion of Claim 2. Because it 

is evident that the appellate court did not decide this issue, our review is de novo. 

See Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reynoso v. 

Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Factual Background 

In response to the State's motion in limine to preclude reference to the 

confidential informant, Petitioner's counsel argued that information about the 

confidential informant was relevant and crucial to Petitioner's defense. (Doc. 22, 

Ex. GGG at 5-6.) He asked to keep open the possibility of calling her as a witness, 

and he requested the ability to question the officer about his relationship with the 

informant and the circumstances of her cooperation. (Id. at 6-7.) Counsel argued 

that, not only did the informant provide Petitioner's phone number to the 

undercover officer, she also was contacting Petitioner directly. (Id. at 7.) 

The state argued, without dispute from Petitioner and his counsel, that the 

informant was not a witness to any of the criminal activity. (Id. at 6-7.) The trial 

court agreed with the State that the informant's identity was not relevant because 

the person was not a witness, and she did not need to be made available for an 

interview or as a witness. (Id. at 9-10.) Upon query from defense counsel, the 

court confirmed that the informant had not received any benefit for providing 

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Petitioner's phone number to the police. (Id. at 11-12.) The court expressed 

concern that Petitioner may be prejudiced by the jury learning that a confidential 

informant provided his phone number, because that could suggest his involvement 

with other criminal activity not before the jury. (Id. at 12-13.) The court ruled that 

the state should elicit from a law enforcement officer that he obtained information 

that a person at the specific phone number might be interested in a drug deal. (Id.

at 14-15.) The court found any further information about the informant was not 

relevant to the charges, and it was more prejudicial to the defendant than probative 

of the facts. (Id.) 

Analysis 

Petitioner contends the trial court's denial of the confidential informant as a 

witness violated his right to present a complete defense. Criminal defendants are 

constitutionally entitled to present a complete defense, and that right "is abridged 

by evidence rules that 'infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused' and are 

'arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.'" Holmes 

v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 

523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). However, trial judges are permitted by the 

Constitution to exclude evidence that is "repetitive," "marginally relevant[,] or 

poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues." Id. at 

326-27 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986) (affirming that 

Constitution accords States' power to exclude evidence through evidentiary rules 

designed for fairness and reliability)); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 

(1996) (finding state evidentiary rules authorizing the exclusion of evidence that is 

overly prejudicial or cumulative, or that will confuse the issues, mislead the jury, 

or waste time do not violate a defendant's due process rights) (citing Taylor v. 

Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991)). 

The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that it is reluctant to impose 

constitutional constraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial courts and 

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has acknowledged that they have "wide latitude" under the Constitution to exclude 

evidence of limited relevance or substantial prejudice. See Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-90. 

The trial court excluded evidence of the confidential informant on the basis 

that it was not relevant and prejudicial to Petitioner. Petitioner does not dispute 

that the informant was not a witness to any of the crimes. Thus, his case is 

distinguishable from the Roviaro case upon which he relies. In that case, the Court 

directed disclosure of the informant's identity because that person was the only 

witness to the criminal activity with which the defendant was charged. Roviaro v. 

United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64 (1957). Defendant did not need the confidential 

informant's testimony to rebut any elements of the crime. 

Petitioner argues that he needed evidence about, and from, the informant to 

demonstrate elements of entrapment. First, he wanted to rely on her testimony to 

demonstrate the first element, that the idea of the offense started with a 

government agent. This would have been repetitive because there is no question 

that an undercover officer approached Petitioner about a drug transaction. Thus, 

the jury was informed that a government agent initiated the contact, without 

testimony about the informant. 

Second, Petitioner argues that the informant could have testified about her 

phone calls to Petitioner and the fact that she urged/induced him to sell drugs to 

the officer, which would have corroborated his offer of proof at trial regarding the 

second element of entrapment. In his offer of proof, Petitioner stated that he 

would testify that the undercover officer and the informant urged him to sell drugs 

to the officer. (Doc. 10, Ex. 9 at 5.) Even if he could have used the informant's 

testimony to that effect, he did not offer evidence of all the elements of an 

entrapment defense. Specifically, Petitioner did not proffer testimony from 

himself or the informant (before or at trial, or before this Court) that would have 

satisfied the third element of an entrapment defense – that "[t]he person was not 

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predisposed to commit the type of offense charged before the law enforcement 

officers or their agents urged and induced the person to commit the offense." 

A.R.S. § 13-206(B)(3), (C). 

With regard to this third element, Petitioner argued that the state did not 

present evidence that he had been involved in the sale of drugs prior to the 

undercover officer contacting him, and that he had no priors for selling drugs. 

(Doc. 10 at 21.) The state has no obligation to rebut an entrapment defense in the 

absence of a defendant presenting evidence in support. The burden to prove 

entrapment is on a defendant. Petitioner did not offer evidence at trial, or here, of 

the third element. For that reason, Petitioner's reliance on the DiBlasio case is 

misplaced. In that case, the court directed that the informant be disclosed because 

the defendant presented sufficient evidence of entrapment to warrant a jury 

instruction on the defense. DiBlasio v. Keane, 932 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 

1991) (noting the defendant argued he did not have the requisite state of mind; 

therefore, informant testimony about interactions before and during the crimes 

was material). In contrast, here, Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence of 

such a defense. 

Because Petitioner has not substantiated his ability to establish all the 

elements of an entrapment defense, even with testimony from the confidential 

informant, the exclusion of the informant did not deny him a right to present a 

complete defense.3

 Instead, the trial court was within its wide discretion under the 

________________________ 

3

 Petitioner did not notice an entrapment defense prior to trial. Therefore, his right to present a complete defense was not violated by the denial of evidence upon which he did not notice an intent to rely. Petitioner contends the trial court did not have the right to deny an entrapment defense, based on a state court evidentiary rule requiring disclosure prior to trial, because that denial impeded his constitutional rights. Even if the state court rule was not a sufficient basis to deny the defense, the trial judge stated that she would not have allowed entrapment evidence regardless, because Petitioner was unable to present evidence necessary to establish all of the elements of that defense. 

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Constitution to exclude evidence of limited relevance without violating 

Petitioner's right to due process. Claim 2(a) is without merit. 

Claim 2(b) 

Petitioner alleges he was denied the right to present a complete defense 

when the trial court denied his right to testify. Petitioner had a constitutional right 

to testify on his own behalf. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987). However, 

the court of appeals made a factual finding that Petitioner ultimately decided not 

to testify, and this Court must presume that finding correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). To dispute that finding, Petitioner points solely to his query on the 

third day of trial asking the court whether it was too late to testify. But Petitioner 

did not request to testify once the court explained the restrictions applicable to his 

testimony. Therefore, Petitioner has not met the applicable burden of overcoming 

the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, id., and the factual finding is 

supported by the trial transcripts (Doc. 22, Ex. FFF at 156-59, Ex. HHH at 3-9). 

Factually, Petitioner has not established he was denied the right to testify. 

Petitioner argues that his decision whether to testify was constrained by the 

trial court's preclusion of testimony about entrapment. A defendant's right to 

testify may "bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial 

process," but such restrictions "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the 

purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a State must 

evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on 

the defendant's constitutional right to testify." Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56, 61. As 

discussed above, in Claim 2(a), the trial court's restriction on any witnesses, 

including Petitioner, testifying about a confidential informant was within 

constitutional bounds. 

Further, Petitioner has never suggested he had any evidence to offer, by his 

own testimony or otherwise, that would satisfy the third element of an entrapment 

defense. For that reason, denying his right to testify about entrapment did not deny 

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him a right to present a complete defense. The trial court did not preclude him 

from testifying in entirety and the restrictions the court imposed were not arbitrary 

or disproportionate to their intended purpose. Therefore, the appellate court's 

denial of this claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Supreme Court law. 

Claim 2(c) 

Petitioner alleges he was denied the right to present a complete defense 

when the trial court denied a jury instruction on entrapment. Instructional error 

rises to the level of a constitutional error only if it "so infected the entire trial that 

the resulting conviction violates due process." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 

154-55 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). When a 

habeas petitioner alleges the omission of an instruction, rather than an erroneous 

statement of the law, the burden to show a due process violation is particularly 

heavy. Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Henderson 431 U.S. at 155.) However, the failure to instruct the jury on a defense 

"for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his 

favor" may deprive a defendant of his due process right to present a complete 

defense. Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the 

absence of an entrapment instruction deprived defendant of due process) (quoting 

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); California v. Trombetta, 467 

U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). 

As addressed above in Claim 2(a), Petitioner did not offer evidence to the 

trial court, or here, sufficient for a jury to find entrapment. Specifically, Petitioner 

has pointed to no evidence that he was "not predisposed to commit the type of 

offense charged before the law enforcement officers or their agents urged and 

induced the person to commit the offense." A.R.S. § 13-206(B)(3), (C). When the 

trial court discussed with Petitioner the possibility of testifying, his counsel noted 

that he would open himself to cross-examination on propensity. (Doc. 22, Ex. 

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HHH at 8.) Additionally, the court of appeals pointed out that the undercover 

officer testified "that Armenta had told him he sold rather than used drugs, and 

detailed Armenta's quick and repeated access to illegal drugs during . . . multiple 

sales." (Id., Ex. MM at 6 n.5.) Because Petitioner did not have evidence to 

establish all the elements of entrapment, his case is distinguished from Bradley. In 

that case, the court found the defendant offered "ample evidence supporting the 

giving of the entrapment instruction." 315 F.3d at 1099. Petitioner has not 

established that the denial of an entrapment instruction so infected his trial with 

error as to deny him due process. At a minimum, the court of appeals's denial of 

this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. 

Merits of Claims 4(a)(1) and (2) for Cause Analysis 

Claims 4(a)(1) and (2) both allege IAC; therefore, the Court sets forth the 

standard for those claims below. Because the Court is evaluating the merits of 

these claims solely to determine substantiality for purposes of a cause analysis, 

and not as a basis for habeas relief, no AEDPA deference is applicable. 

Standard for IAC claims 

 To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel's 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the 

deficiency prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687-88. The inquiry under 

Strickland is highly deferential, and "every effort [must] be made to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 

time." Id. at 689. Thus, to satisfy Strickland's first prong, deficient performance, a 

defendant must overcome "the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id.

Because an IAC claim must satisfy both prongs of Strickland, the reviewing 

court "need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 

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deficiencies." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ("if it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we 

expect will often be so, that course should be followed"). A petitioner must 

affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693. To demonstrate prejudice, he "must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.

at 694. 

Claim 4(a)(1) 

Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the 

confidential informant as a witness. More specifically, that after the trial court 

precluded the confidential informant as a witness, counsel did not object to that 

decision as Petitioner requested. Petitioner has identified no new ground counsel 

could have presented to the trial court to obtain a different ruling. And nothing in 

the record indicates the judge would have changed her mind if counsel had urged 

the issue again before trial. In fact, after the state presented its case, the judge 

affirmed her decision precluding evidence about the confidential informant. The 

judge informed Petitioner that, if he were to testify, she would preclude testimony 

about the confidential informant (and entrapment generally), because it was not 

relevant. (Doc. 22, Ex. HHH at 5-6.) Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel's 

conduct, in not moving a second time to call the confidential informant as a 

witness, was objectively unreasonable. Further, Petitioner has not demonstrated a 

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if counsel had 

objected to the court's decision. 

Claim 4(a)(2)

Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an 

entrapment defense. As discussed extensively above in Claim 2, entrapment has 

three elements. The third element would have required Petitioner to establish that 

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he did not have a predisposition to sell drugs before an officer urged him to do so. 

A.R.S. § 13-206(B)(3), (C). Petitioner never suggested before the trial court or 

this Court that he had any evidence by which he could prove this element. There 

was testimony to the contrary, as discussed above, and Petitioner would have been 

subject to cross-examination on predisposition if he had testified as required for an 

entrapment defense. Because Petitioner has not alleged that he had sufficient 

evidence of an entrapment defense, counsel's failure to present such a defense was 

not objectively unreasonable. And because there was not a reasonable probability 

that such a defense would have been successful, Petitioner was not prejudiced. 

Claim 3 

Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him that, 

if he were sentenced after trial he would have to serve "flat-time," but if he 

accepted the plea he would have been eligible to serve only 85% of the sentence. 

The written plea agreement offered to Petitioner stated, "[i]f sentenced to prison, 

the defendant must serve approximately 85 percent of the sentence imposed 

before (s)he is eligible for release on any basis." (Doc. 10, Ex. 3 at 2.) The 

sentencing statute for a person convicted of selling methamphetamine, however, 

provided that the person was "not eligible for suspension of sentence, probation, 

pardon or release from confinement on any basis until the person has served the 

sentence imposed by the court." A.R.S. § 13-3407. 

In addressing this claim, the PCR court set forth the following factual 

background: 

A plea agreement was extended to the Defendant in June of 

2017 while he was represented by his third attorney, Paul Gattone. At a hearing held in open court and on the record, the terms of the plea and the potential exposure at trial were discussed in detail. The 

Defendant acknowledged reviewing the plea and discussing the trial risks with his attorney but was reluctant to make a decision. He asked 

for, and was granted, an additional week to consider his choice. On 

October 16, 2017, a second hearing was held at which time Mr. Gattone avowed that he spent the weekend discussing the plea again with his client, but that the Defendant was rejecting the plea and taking his case to trial. The Defendant stated that was true on the 

record. 

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(Doc. 22, Ex. ZZ at 2.) The court also noted that Petitioner "was palpably and 

vocally distrustful of any advice he received while his case was pending and 

insisted that he wanted to take his case to trial and did not want an attorney who 

even discussed a non-trial resolution. He made it clear multiple times that he 

wanted to litigate his case." (Id. at 1.) 

The PCR court denied the claim based on the following analysis: 

At the hearings on the proffered plea, the risks of taking the case to trial and the benefits of the plea agreement over the possible prison 

exposure should the Defendant not prevail with a jury were explained by the court. And as for any prejudice, the sentence eventually imposed by the Court, 15.75 years in the Department of Corrections, was only 1.75 years more than the maximum possible sentence of 14 

years under the rejected plea. . . . 

 The Defendant also is asserting that he was never adequately advised that any sentence imposed after a jury conviction would be served as flat time. The rejected plea would also have resulted in a 

flat time sentence, therefore, the Defendant has failed to show that 

the outcome on that issue would have been any different even if the Court were persuaded that trial counsel was ineffective in explaining the plea. 

(Id. at 3.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals also denied relief on this claim, agreeing 

with the PCR court that Petitioner faced a flat-time sentence under the plea, just as 

he did after trial. (Id., Ex. CCC at 4.) It went on to explain: 

Moreover, trial counsel avowed he had explained to Armenta that "the plea and trial exposure would result in the same type of sentence" and that "the number of years would be higher at trial." Counsel also stated that Armenta's "reasons for rejecting the plea 

w[ere] the alleged legal deficiencies in the State's case and not 

whether the sentence was 85% or flat time." We therefore do not see 

how counsel "failed to give information necessary to allow [Armenta] to make an informed decision whether to accept the plea." 

(Id.) The court noted that, regardless of the language in the plea agreement, the 

trial court would not have had the authority to authorize release after Petitioner 

had served 85% of a sentence (if he had pled guilty) because that was not allowed 

under the governing statute. (Id. at 4 n.4.) 

In deciding whether to accept a plea offer, "defendants are 'entitled to the 

effective assistance of competent counsel.'" Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-

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63, 168 (2012) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)); see 

also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) (finding counsel's conduct 

deficient because she failed to communicate an offered plea to the defendant). If a 

defendant is denied effective assistance in evaluating an offered plea, "prejudice 

can be shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction 

on more serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence." Lafler, 566 

U.S. at 168. 

Petitioner represents that his understanding at the time he rejected the plea 

was that his sentence under the plea or after trial would be served at 85% of the 

sentenced time. In fact, the inverse was true. Under the law governing the 

sentences for Petitioner's drug sales convictions, Petitioner was subject to a flat 

time sentence whether he went to trial or accepted a plea, regardless of the 

language of the plea document. Counsel averred that he explained that the "type" 

of sentence would be the same, although he may not have used the term "flat 

time." (Doc. 22, Ex. XX, Ex. 3.) Because there was no differential between the 

percentage of the sentence Petitioner was obligated to serve under a plea 

agreement or a conviction after trial, Petitioner has not established that he 

received erroneous advice from counsel. Because counsel provided accurate 

information about the plea, his conduct was not objectively unreasonable. 

Further, to the extent counsel provided any inaccurate information, 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced. He alleges that he rejected 

the plea with the accurate understanding that he would face more time after trial 

(1.75 years more, at a minimum). He alleges that he inaccurately understood that 

either sentence would be served at 85%. But he has not averred that he would 

have accepted the plea, if he had understood that the law required that any 

sentence would have to be served in full. Thus, he has not established a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would have been different, because he would have 

taken the plea, if he understood the flat-time requirement. At a minimum, the 

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Arizona Court of Appeals' denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable.

See Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994-95 (2010) (noting that review of a 

decision under Strickland and the AEDPA is "doubly deferential" because courts 

must be highly deferential in evaluating counsel's performance). 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Claims 1 and 4 are procedurally defaulted and Petitioner has not established 

cause and prejudice to overcome the defaults or that a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice will occur if Claims 1 and 4 are not addressed on the merits. Claims 2 and 

3 are without merit. Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends 

that the District Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve 

and file written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the 

Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party's objections 

within fourteen days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is 

granted by the District Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be 

deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case 

number: CV-22-123-RCC. 

 Dated this 24th day of January, 2024. 

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