Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00761/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00761-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDY L. WILLIAMS, )

)

)

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

WARDEN MENDOZA-POWERS, )

)

)

Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-761 REC/LJO HC

ORDER VACATING

RECOMMENDATION AND REMANDING

TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner asserts as his ground

for relief: "Inaccurate Prison Records. Prison officials have

failed to audit Petitioner's central filed and update leading to

restrictive custody. Liberty interest violation." In support of

this ground for relief, petitioner alleges:

Petitioner was assessed an ‘R’ suffix and

“sex” determinant to alert staff he has a

crime, sexual in nature, pursuant to Cal.Code

of Regulations. Petitioner has no history of

sex offenses other than the charges acquitted

of on Case No. RIF091448 ....

Case 1:05-cv-00761-NEW Document 6 Filed 09/14/05 Page 1 of 6
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On August 22, 2005, the United States Magistrate Judge

recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

dismissed because the petition does not allege a ground that

would entitle petitioner to habeas relief, finding in pertinent

part:

Petitioner is challenging the conditions of

his confinement, not the fact or duration of

his confinement. Therefore, his claim should

be raised in a civil rights action. To the

extent that Petitioner’s challenge seeks to

implicate a liberty interest protected by due

process, his challenge fails. In a habeas

proceeding, a prisoner is only entitled to

due process protection for State action that

would ‘inevitably affect the duration of his

sentence.’ Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

487 ... (1995). In this case, Petitioner’s

classification has no bearing on the duration

of his sentence. Thus, Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief, and this petition

must be dismissed. Should Petitioner wish to

pursue his claims, Petitioner must do so by

way of a civil rights complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

Petitioner timely filed objections to the recommendation. 

In his objections, petitioner contends that the allegedly

erroneous classification “will keep Petitioner in a more

restrictive custody level and will bar him from Level I camp

placement where he will receive two days credit for every one day

spent in custody.”

 In Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9 Cir. 1989), th

the Ninth Circuit held that “[h]abeas corpus jurisdiction ...

exists when a petitioner seeks expungement of a disciplinary

finding from his record if expungement is likely to accelerate

the prisoner’s eligibility for parole.” “Bostic thus holds that

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However, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1242 1

(2005), the Supreme Court held that prisoners can challenge the

constitutionality of state parole procedures in an action under

Section 1983 seeking declaratory and equitable relief and are not

required to seek relief exclusively under the federal habeas corpus

statutes.

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the likelihood of the effect on the overall length of the

prisoner’s sentence ... determines the availability of habeas

corpus.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9 Cir. 2003), th

cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004). In Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d

1024, 1028-1029 (9 Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit explained that th

Bostic

defined a class of suits outside the ‘core’

habeas cases identified [by the Supreme Court

in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475

(1973)]. Success on the merits in such cases

would not ‘necessarily’ implicate the fact or

duration of confinement. Instead such claims

have, at best, only a possible relationship

to the duration of a prisoner’s confinement,

as eligibility for parole is distinct from

entitlement to parole.

The Ninth Circuit held in Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023,

1024 (9 Cir. 1997) that challenges to the procedures used in th

denying parole are only cognizable via habeas. However, in Neal 1

v. Shinoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9 Cir. 1997), two prisoners th

challenged their administrative placement in Hawaii’s “Sex

Offender Treatment Program” (SOTP), a placement that made them

ineligible for parole. The prisoners brought their claims under

Section 1983. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the propriety of

Section 1983 as an avenue for relief:

If Neal and Martinez are successful in their

challenged of the SOTP and their labeling as

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sex offenders, that decision will not

undermine the validity of their convictions

or continuing confinement at all. The only

benefit that a victory in this case would

provide Neal and Martinez, besides the

possibility of monetary damages, is a ticket

to get in the door of the parole board, thus

only making them eligible for parole

consideration according to the terms of their

sentences. If Neal and Martinez win, it will

in no way guarantee parole or necessarily

shorten their prison sentences by a single

day. The parole board will still have the

authority to deny the inmates’ requests for

parole on the basis of any of the grounds

presently available to it in evaluating such

a request. A victory in this case will not

alter the calculus for the review of parole

requests in any way. Because the inmates’

challenges in this case do not necessarily

imply the invalidity of their convictions or

continuing confinement, it is properly

brought under § 1983.

393 F.3d at 824. In Docken v. Chase, id., the Ninth Circuit

addressed a prisoner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

challenging a parole board’s refusal to provide him with annual

review of his suitability for parole. After reviewing the cases,

the Ninth Circuit reconciled Neal as holding only that Section

1983 was an appropriate remedy in that case, without reaching the

issue of whether it was the exclusive remedy. 393 F.3d at 1030. 

The Ninth Circuit then addressed Docken’s claim:

In light of Bostic ... [i]t is certainly at

least possible that Docken’s suit would

impact the duration of his confinement if the

Board’s actions in changing the frequency of

his parole review violated the Ex Post Facto

Clause.

Of course, it is not certain that annual

review would affect the duration of Docken’s

confinement, especially given Docken’s

designation as a ‘dangerous offender.’ We

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are ill-suited, however, to substitute our

substantive analysis of the likely outcome of

Docken’s parole hearings for that of the

Board. And, in any event, we find nothing in

Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent

foreclosing habeas relief in such a case.

Instead, we understand Bostic’s use of the

term ‘likely’ to identify claims with a

sufficient nexus to the length of

imprisonment so as to implicate, but not fall

squarely within, the ‘core’ challenges

identified by the Preiser Court. Such a

reading follows from Bostic itself, which

spoke of claims that are ‘likely to

accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for

parole,’ ... rather than those likely to

accelerate the prisoner’s release. Docken’s

central contention - that he is entitled to

annual review - is even more related to the

duration of his confinement that eligibility

for parole in the abstract, and therefore

appears at least as viable as the subject of

a habeas petition as that which was before

the court in Bostic and Butterfield.

Ultimately, though Docken’s claim may not be

the kind of ‘core’ challenge the Preiser

Court had in mind, the potential relationship

between his claim and the duration of his

confinement is undeniable. In such a case,

we are reluctant to unnecessarily constrain

our jurisdiction to entertain habeas

petitions absent a clear indicia of

congressional intent to do so. ....

We therefore hold that when prison inmates

seek only equitable relief in challenging

aspects of their parole review that, so long

as they prevail, could potentially affect the

duration of their confinement, such relief in

available under the federal habeas statute.

....

393 F.3d at 1031.

Here, petitioner’s contention that the allegedly erroneous

classification bars him from eligibility for Level I camp

placement and it’s accelerated credit for time served could

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potentially affect the duration of his sentence. Consequently,

the court concludes that petitioner is entitled to proceed with

his claim in this action pursuant to habeas corpus under Section

2254.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. The recommendation filed on August 22, 2005 is vacated.

2. This action is remanded to the United States Magistrate

Judge for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00761-NEW Document 6 Filed 09/14/05 Page 6 of 6