Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00610/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00610-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

HENNIS WASHINGTON, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 1:13-cv-610-WEF

) (WO – Do Not Publish)

UTILITY TRAILER )

MANUFACTURING COMPANY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Utility Trailer Manufacturing Company’s (“UTM”)

Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. #18). This case is brought by twelve

plaintiff-employees of UTM who allege that they were and still are subjected to racial

harassment by co-workers and supervisors. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on

August 27, 2013, and UTM moved to dismiss the complaint, or, alternatively, for a more

definite statement. (Docs. ##1, 12.) Since the Court agreed that the original complaint was

poorly pled, the Court granted UTM’s motion for a more definite statement without ordering

briefing on the motion to dismiss. (Doc. #14.) On October 18, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a First

Amended Complaint, and UTM again moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docs. ##16, 18.) The Court held oral argument on

UTM’s motion to dismiss on April 29, 2014. After considering the pleadings, the parties

briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court finds that UTM’s Motion to Dismiss

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the First Amended Complaint (Doc. #18) is due to be DENIED.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1343(a)(4), and 1367. Additionally, Defendants have not argued that the Court does

not have personal jurisdiction over them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is appropriate

in this district.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff’s

allegations as true and reads them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Duke v.

Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Further, a district court must

favor the plaintiff with “all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint.” 

Stephens v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint states

a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id. A complaint does not state a facially plausible claim for relief if it shows only “a sheer

possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. While a complaint need not contain

detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[a] pleading that offers labels

and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

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Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). Absent the necessary factual allegations,

“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Id. 

Courts are also not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Since this case is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts the

following allegations in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint as true:

The plaintiffs in this case are the following twelve employees of UTM: Hennis

Washington (“Washington”), Frederick Green (“Green”), Todd Hooks (“Hooks”), Keleen

Farrier (“Farrier”), Lawrence Silar (“Silar”), Daryl Lindsey (“Lindsey”), Robert Edwards

(“Edwards”), Johnny Baldwin (“Baldwin”), Bobby Terry (“Terry”), Timothy Caldwell

(“Caldwell”), Nick Whitfield (“Whitfield”), and Jimmy Curry (“Curry”). Each plaintiff

alleges facts to support his claim that he experienced a racially hostile work environment

while on the job for UTM. 

Unlike the original complaint, which alleged identical facts for the twelve plaintiffs

collectively, the First Amended Complaint alleges facts for each plaintiff individually. 

However, the individual allegations are, for the most part, identical for each plaintiff and are

simply copied and pasted twelve times. Each plaintiff individually alleges the position he

occupies at UTM and when he began working there. (Doc. #16, ¶¶ 19, 35, 51, 67, 83, 99,

115, 131, 147, 163, 179, 195.) Although most Plaintiffs allege they have been employees

at UTM since approximately 2010, Terry has worked for UTM since 1989 and Baldwin has

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worked there since 1993. (Doc. #16, ¶¶ 147, 131.) Each plaintiff also alleges a litany of

racial statements that were “made by white supervisors and co-workers” and that each

plaintiff “witnessed and/or is aware [of].” (Doc. #16, at ¶¶ 22, 38, 54, 70, 86, 102, 118, 134,

150, 166, 182, 198.) These paragraphs contain a list of racial epithets, more or less the same

for each plaintiff, but do not state: (1) who made the statements; (2) whether the statements

were made by co-workers or supervisors; (3) whether the statements were directed at

Plaintiffs or were made in Plaintiffs’ presence; (4) which statements were witnessed by

which Plaintiffs and which statements were statements Plaintiffs were aware of but did not

witness; (5) approximately when the statements were made; or (6) the approximate frequency

with which such statements were made.1

In addition to claiming to have experienced or been aware of racial epithets, Plaintiffs

each allege that they witnessed or were aware of racially offensive graffiti in the restrooms,

including “the Brotherhood has struck the first blow, now it’s time for the whites to stick

together,” “KKK,” “nigger,” and “we hate niggers.” (Doc. #16, ¶¶ 26, 42, 58, 74, 90, 106,

122, 138, 154, 170, 186, 202.) Plaintiffs name five to ten co-workers and supervisors who

“subjected [them] to harassment” and told racially offensive jokes and stories in Plaintiffs’

presence and in the presence of other black employees. (Doc. #16, ¶¶ 24–25, 40–41, 56–57,

1

 With respect to the frequency of the epithets, the Court is aware that Plaintiffs further

allege, regardless of when each employee began working at UTM, that the harassing conduct “has

been continuing in nature . . . and is still continuing today.” (Doc. #16, at ¶¶ 31, 47, 63, 79, 95, 111,

127, 143, 159, 175, 191, 207.) As with so many allegations in the First Amended Complaint, this

allegation is vague and imputed generically to all twelve plaintiffs, even though their dates of

employment range from beginning in 1989 to beginning in 2012. 

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72–73, 88–89, 104–05, 120–21, 136–37, 152–53, 168–69, 184–85, 200–01.) The list of coworkers and supervisors alleged to have said these things is largely overlapping for each

plaintiff, but Plaintiffs make allegations particular co-workers and supervisors on an

individual basis. Each plaintiff further alleges that white employees wore T-shirts with rebel

flags on them, that a rebel flag was draped on the door to the restroom, and, without further

elaboration, that “there have been references to the KKK and KKK symbols.” (Doc. #16,

¶¶ 27, 43, 59, 75, 91, 107, 123, 139, 155, 171, 187, 203.) Finally, each plaintiff alleges he

“repeatedly complained” about the alleged racial harassment to several named members of

management and Human Resources, as well as to two third-party representatives of the

company.2

 (Doc. #16, ¶¶ 28, 44, 60, 76, 92, 108, 140, 156, 172, 188, 204.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs bring a claim for racial harassment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count 1)

as well as state law claims for outrage (Count 2) and negligent/wanton

supervision/training/retention (Counts 3–5). Defendants move to dismiss all counts. 

Defendants argue first that the racial harassment claim in Count 1 is not pled with the

specificity required by Twombly and Iqbal and as required in the Court’s first order granting

Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’

claims for outrage on the grounds that the allegations do not rise to the level of extreme and

2

 This allegation is repeated verbatim for each plaintiff except Edwards. The First Amended

Complaint alleges in his case only that “Edwards is aware of other African-Americans who have

repeatedly complained” about the hostile work environment. (Doc. #16, at ¶ 124.) 

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outrageous conduct under Alabama law. Finally, Defendants move to dismiss the negligent

supervision/training/retention claims because they are dependent on the existence of the

underlying state law tort of outrage, which, they argue, is due to be dismissed.

A. Section 1981 Racial Harassment

In its order granting UTM’s motion for a more definite statement, the Court noted that

Plaintiffs’ original complaint made allegations as to all Plaintiffs in an undifferentiated

manner, failed to specify who made which statements to which Plaintiffs, and generally

failed to allege claims in such a way as to allow UTM to know how to answer the allegations. 

(Doc. #14.) Rather than wasting the parties’ and the Court’s time with briefing UTM’s

motion to dismiss and issuing a Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court granted UTM’s

alternative motion for a more definite statement and allowed Plaintiffs to file an amended

complaint. The point of the Court’s order was to put Plaintiffs on notice that each plaintiff

must allege sufficient facts to plausibly state a claim for that particular plaintiff on an

individual basis.

Unfortunately, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint that is only a marginal

improvement at best. Count One now includes separate headings for each plaintiff, but the

allegations for each plaintiff are simply repeated, copy-and-paste style, twelve times. As a

result, Plaintiffs’ complaint has expanded from twelve pages to thirty-eight but adds very

little new information or substance. The new information that is provided, such as the dates

on which each employee began working for UTM and the supervisors to whom Plaintiffs

reported the alleged harassment, is helpful. However, the First Amended Complaint still

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suffers from the same lack of specificity as the original complaint and continues to treat all

twelve plaintiffs identically.

The Court cannot help but notice the similarities between the complaint in this case

and that in Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 2008). 

In that case, Judge Tjoflat noted the confusion, unnecessary delay, and error the plaintiffs’

shotgun pleading caused, beginning with the district court and continuing throughout the

appeal. 516 F.3d at 979–84. In fact, the law firm Judge Tjoflat reprimands in the Davis case,

see id. at 979–80 n. 55, is the same firm representing Plaintiffs in this case. The complaint

in Davis was brought by nine current and former employees of Coca-Cola Bottling Co.

Consolidated (“CCBCC”) who alleged CCBCC engaged in a pattern and practice of

discriminating against black employees with respect to hiring, promotion, pay, a racially

hostile work environment, and light work assignments. Id. at 961. Like the complaint in this

case, the complaint in Davis involved multiple plaintiffs and was not brought as a class

action. Also like the original complaint in this case, the complaint in Davis made collective,

undifferentiated allegations for the plaintiffs as a whole. Id. at 963–64. For instance, the

complaint in Davis alleged that the plaintiffs suffered race discrimination in “pay, raises,

benefits, ability to advance, and right to be free of racial discrimination, harassment and

intimidation, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Id. at 980. Concerning this

allegation, Judge Tjoflat said:

This all-encompassing discrimination gave the eight named

plaintiffs (and the unnamed members of their class) untold

causes of action, all bunched together in one count contrary to

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the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 10(b). 

With one exception–the “ability to advance,” which became the

foundation for plaintiffs’ “promotion” claims–Count I failed

explicitly to link a particular plaintiff to a particular cause of

action . . . No competent lawyer–whether skilled in Title VII

litigation or not–could compose an answer to these sweeping

and multifaceted acts of discrimination that would be in keeping

with what the framers of the Rules envisioned in fashioning

Rule 8(b).

Id. 

The reason the Court held a hearing in this case is because the Court could not tell

from reading the First Amended Complaint which of the “untold causes of action” Plaintiffs

intended to assert. The complaint and First Amended Complaint contain a similar allegation

as the complaint in Davis, although in the case of the First Amended Complaint the causes

of action are linked to each plaintiff. Count I is styled a claim for “race discrimination” and

“racial harassment.” Although racial harassment is a form of race discrimination and the

allegations are clearly intended to support a claim for racial harassment, each Plaintiff is also

alleged to have been subject to “discrimination and harassment” that included “racial slurs

. . . discipline, assignments, intimidation, disparate treatment, as well as other terms and

conditions of employment.” (See, e.g., Doc. #16, ¶ 21.) Each and every plaintiff asserts that

“the harassment has included discipline, intimidation, heightened scrutiny, harder and dirty

job assignments and disparate application of work rules and policies.” (See, e.g., Doc. #16,

¶ 30.) Like the complaint in Davis, “[t]his all-encompassing discrimination [gives] the

[twelve] named plaintiffs untold causes of action.” Id. The fact that the Court had to guess

which causes of action Plaintiffs were bringing is reason enough to find that Count I fails to

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meet the pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal.

3

At the hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs clarified for the Court that Count I asserts only

a claim for racial harassment under § 1981. The Court’s concern about “untold causes of

action” lurking in Count I’s copy-and-paste allegations is not mere nitpicking. In the Davis

case, the plaintiffs conducted discovery on claims that were not included in the complaint and

attempted to create claims through arguments in their brief on appeal based on confusion as

to which plaintiff was asserting which claim. 516 F.3d at 973–75, 977. The Davis court

noted that it took “several rounds of pleadings . . . for the court even to begin the process of

narrowing the issues” and that, as a result of the shotgun pleadings, “the [district] court

missed some claims altogether” in its summary judgment analysis. Id. at 981. The potential

exists for the same problems to occur in this case because the First Amended Complaint

combines vague allegations of fact with sweeping statements of “all-encompassing

discrimination” attributed to twelve plaintiffs without any differentiation. The Court would

prefer to narrow the issues now before allowing the case to proceed to discovery. As Judge

Tjoflat states in his latest remarks on the problems with shotgun pleadings, “[w]hy should

parties wait until discovery to identify, with precision, the subject of the litigation? That is

exactly backward. Civil pleadings are supposed to mark the boundaries of discovery;

discovery is not supposed to substitute for definite pleading.” Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins.

3

 The use of the words “disparate treatment” and “disparate application of work rules,” as

well as facts relevant to separate causes of action, such as retaliation and discriminatory denial of

overtime, indicate to the Court that Plaintiffs’ claims were not limited to only racial harassment. 

(See, e.g., Doc. #16, ¶¶ 30, 46, 78.) 

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Co., No. 13-12696, 2014 WL 1363544, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2014). 

Frustration notwithstanding, the Court will allow Plaintiffs a final opportunity to replead Count I. Plaintiffs’ argument at the hearing that claims for racial harassment are not

discrete acts and, therefore, cannot be plead with the same specificity as a discriminatory

termination claim is well-taken. However, this does not excuse Plaintiffs from pleading

specific facts that correspond to what each specific plaintiff experienced to give rise to a

plausible claim for racial harassment with respect to that particular plaintiff. Plaintiffs need

to provide examples of the context in which the racial epithets were used that would

plausibly allege a claim for racial harassment. See McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370,

1378–79 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding no hostile work environment where racial epithets were

uttered sporadically, no racial epithets were directed at the plaintiff, and other racial epithets

were not spoken in the plaintiff’s presence); Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d

1269, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that “Title VII is only implicated in the case of a

workplace that is ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult,’ not where

there is the ‘mere utterance of an . . . epithet’”) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 21)); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that “the

mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an

employee does not affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to a sufficiently

significant degree to violate Title VII”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The Court cannot evaluate the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ racial harassment claim based

on the standards expressed in the cases cited above until, as requested by this Court

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repeatedly now, Plaintiffs give examples of “when the statements are alleged to have been

made, or by whom, or to whom, or where” and approximately how frequently and over what

time period. (Doc. #14, at 2) (quoting UTM’s brief).4

 Of course, Plaintiffs are not expected

to recount every discrete act of harassment they experienced. Further, if Plaintiffs were

similarly situated and collectively experienced the same harassment, then the complaint need

not repeat the allegation verbatim for each plaintiff but must state facts clarifying which

racial epithets Plaintiffs experienced in common. For example, if all twelve plaintiffs used

the restroom with racially offensive graffiti, then the complaint may simply say so. But

Plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts to create a plausible claim that they were subjected to

racial harassment on an individual basis and may not lump general allegations together in an

undifferentiated manner.

Since the Court is permitting Plaintiffs a final chance to re-plead their § 1981 racial

harassment claim, UTM’s motion to dismiss Count I is DENIED with leave to refile.5

 The

Court warns Plaintiffs that if the Second Amended Complaint is not pled in accordance with

the principles outlined in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court may dismiss this

count with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to follow

a court order. See Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556

4

 Plaintiffs’ generic allegations that the harassing conduct “has been continuing in nature .

. . and is still continuing today” are insufficient to allege plausibly that the harassment was

pervasive. (Doc. #16, at ¶¶ 31, 47, 63, 79, 95, 111, 127, 143, 159, 175, 191, 207.)

5

 Plaintiffs represented to the Court at the hearing that their § 1981 claim in Count I was

limited to a racial harassment claim. Plaintiffs may not use this order to re-plead Count I as an

opportunity to add new claims. 

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F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding dismissal of complaint with prejudice pursuant to

41(b) after plaintiff failed to re-plead claims in accordance with district court’s instructions). 

Independently of this, UTM may file another Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if warranted,

which the Court will rule on accordingly. 

B. State Law Claims

UTM moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ outrage claim on the grounds that the conduct

alleged in the First Amended Complaint is not sufficiently severe to satisfy Alabama law, and

moves to dismiss the claims for negligent/wanton supervision/training/retention on the

grounds that they are dependent on the underlying state law tort for outrage, which,

Defendants argue, fails as a matter of law. (Doc. #18.) In light of the fact that the Court will

allow Plaintiffs to re-plead their § 1981 racial harassment claim, it would be premature to

rule on whether they state a claim for outrage since the racial harassment provides the factual

basis for this claim. However, the Court can speak to certain disputes that were discussed

in the briefs and at oral argument for clarification.

Under Alabama law, “one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or

recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such

emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from the distress.” Am. Rd. Serv. Co. v.

Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980). “The emotional distress thereunder must be so

severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Id. The Alabama Supreme

Court “has consistently held that the tort of outrage is a very limited cause of action that is

available only in the most egregious circumstances.” Thomas v. BSE Indus. Contractors,

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Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Ala. 1993). The Thomas court surveyed the twelve years of

cases following Inmon, in which the Alabama Supreme Court first recognized the tort of

outrage, and found that the tort of outrage had been recognized as a viable claim in only three

circumstances: (1) cases having to do with wrongful conduct in the context of family burials;

(2) cases where insurance companies used barbaric means in attempting to coerce insurance

settlements; and (3) cases involving egregious sexual harassment. Id. The court in Potts v.

Hayes reaffirmed the limitations of outrage as a cause of action under Alabama law, and

repeated Thomas’s observation that outrage has been recognized only in regard to the three

kinds of conduct previously enumerated. 

Although Thomas and Potts appear to limit recovery for outrage to three specific

categories of conduct, the court in Little v. Robinson stated that it is not the case that “the tort

of outrage is viable in only the three circumstances noted in Potts.” 72 So. 3d 1168, 1172–73

(Ala. 2011). The Little court noted it had recently affirmed a judgment of an outrage claim

that did not involve any of the three circumstances listed in Thomas and Potts. Id. at 1173

(citing O’Rear v. B.H., 69 So. 3d 106 (Ala. 2011) (upholding outrage judgment against a

family physician that parents sent boy to for counseling but who exchanged addictive

prescription drugs with the boy in exchange for homosexual sex, resulting in the boy’s drug

addiction)). Little makes clear that outrage claims are not strictly limited to the three

categories noted in Thomas and Potts, but that the inquiry is rather on whether the conduct

is “so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds

of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” 72

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So. 3d at 1173 (quoting Horne v. TGM Assocs., L.P., 56 So. 3d 615, 631 (Ala. 2010)).

Turning to the employment context, it is clear that an employee may assert an outrage

claim against an employer based on sexual harassment even without consideration of Little

since egregious sexual harassment is one of the categories of outrage recognized in Thomas

and Potts. See Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1989) (per curiam)

(finding that plaintiff could base outrage claim on supervisor’s sexual harassment but that

supervisor’s conduct did not create liability for employer); see also Edwards v. Hyundai

Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1354–55 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (holding triable

issue on outrage based on sexual harassment and citing Busby); Scott v. Estes, 60 F. Supp.

2d 1260, 1275–76 (M.D. Ala.) (basing conclusion that plaintiff stated cause of action for

outrage only on allegations of sexual harassment even though plaintiff also sued for disability

discrimination); Quillen v. Am. Tobacco Co., 874 F. Supp. 1285, 1297–98 (M.D. Ala. 1995)

(finding triable issue on outrage based on sexual harassment). The more difficult cases arise

in employment contexts, such as this one, that involve allegations of other sorts of

harassment or discrimination. 

Courts in this district, including this Court, have generally dismissed outrage claims

in the employment context that fall outside the three categories listed in Thomas and Potts. 

However, the cases surveyed by the Court generally do not treat the failure of an outrage

claim to fall into a recognized category under Thomas and Pitts as an absolute bar, but do

consider this fact to weigh against a finding that the relevant conduct was extreme and

outrageous. See, e.g., Short v. Mando Am. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1276–77 (M.D. Ala.

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2011) (Fuller, J.) (finding that outrage claim based on race and national origin discrimination

does not fall into any Thomas category but also that relevant conduct was not extreme and

outrageous); Bahadirli v. Domino’s Pizza, 873 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (M.D. Ala. 1995)

(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over outrage claim based on national origin

discrimination on the grounds that it presented a novel and complex issue of state law since

it did not fall into recognized category of outrage claims); Walker v. City of Elba, 874 F.

Supp. 361, 364–65 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (stating that outrage claim based on racially

discriminatory termination “falls into neither of the categories enunciated by the Alabama

Supreme Court in Thomas” but going on to find there was no substantial evidence of

outrageous conduct); Bivins v. Jeffers Vet Supply, 873 F. Supp. 1500, 1509–10 (M.D. Ala.

1994) (noting outrage claim based on racial harassment did not fit into any Thomas category

but also finding facts not “so poignant as to rise to the level of outrage”). Thus, although the

Court has not uncovered an Alabama case that has recognized an outrage claim in the

employment context based on racial harassment, such a claim could exist if the relevant

conduct were sufficiently extreme and outrageous. However, even in the light of Little, the

Court would be willing to recognize a cause of action for outrage based on racial harassment

only in extreme circumstances absent precedent from an Alabama appellate court.

In conclusion, the Court cannot rule on UTM’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law

claims until Plaintiffs re-plead Count I. Since the Court still lacks such information as who

said which epithet, whether the epithets were directed at Plaintiffs, were said in the presence

of Plaintiffs, or were only comments Plaintiffs were aware of, the Court declines to rule on

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UTM’s motion do dismiss the state law claims in the First Amended Complaint. Therefore,

the Court DENIES UTM’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims with leave to refile.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED that UTM’s Motion to

Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. #18) is DENIED with leave to refile. It is

further ORDERED that Plaintiffs file a Second Amended Complaint addressing the

deficiencies noted in this Memorandum Opinion and Order within twenty-one days of the

entry of this order.

DONE this the 23rd day of June, 2014.

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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