Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04541/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04541-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTO ABORDO, et al,

Plaintiffs,

v

JOHN E POTTER, United States

Postmaster General,

Defendant. /

No C 04-4541 VRW

ORDER

This case involves claims of employment discrimination

and retaliation brought by twenty-eight former “special delivery”

mail carriers in the San Francisco branch of the United States

Postal Service (USPS). Seven plaintiffs made specific claims of

disability discrimination and retaliation. Doc #14 at 16-17. 

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their single remaining

claim for retaliation (Doc #62); defendant John Potter (the

“Postmaster”) cross-moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’

claims for disability discrimination and retaliation. Doc #66. 

For reasons stated herein, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment

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is DENIED and the Postmaster’s cross-motion is GRANTED. The

Postmaster’s motion to strike the declarations of plaintiffs’

expert witnesses (Doc #79) is, moreover, DENIED. This order,

together with the court’s previous order (Doc #78), disposes of

plaintiffs’ case in its entirety.

 

I

The factual narrative regarding the USPS’s elimination of

special delivery mail (SDM) service and the procedural history of

plaintiffs’ claims is set forth at pages two through eight of the

court’s order dated August 21, 2006 granting the Postmaster’s

motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for age

discrimination and retaliation. Doc #78. Of the twenty-eight

plaintiffs in this case, seven also claim disability discrimination 

and retaliation based on their disabilities. Doc #14 at 16-18. 

These seven plaintiffs are Jessie Byrd, Alfred Chircop, Richard

Foley, Irving Hacker (deceased), Joseph Smith, Yvonne Smith, and

David Spector. Id at 17. 

Jessie Byrd was employed with the USPS as a SDM messenger

from 1973 until July 1997. Doc #41, Ex 10 at 48-49. Byrd suffered

extensive spinal damage in a job-related accident in December 1998

and was placed on limited duty upon his return to work. Id at 48;

Doc #14 at 4. He also had a knee replaced in 1995. Id. Byrd has

a ten-pound lifting limitation, works no more than four hours per

day and is unable to climb or descend more than a few steps at a

time without pain. Doc #41, Ex 10 at 48. Upon termination of the

SDM unit Byrd was not assigned to the San Francisco processing and

distribution center (“P&DC”) with the rest of the SDM messengers

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because he was unable to perform the work required at the P&DC. 

Doc #66 at 12. Byrd was allowed to remain at the 180 Napoleon

facility and assigned to answer telephones. Id; Doc #63, Ex 7 at

663. 

Alfred Chircop was employed by the USPS for around

twenty-eight years and was a SDM messenger from 1978 until July

1997. Doc #14 at 5; Doc #63, Ex 5 at 160. Chircop has a fifteenpound lifting limitation and suffers from a host of ailments,

including a ruptured Achilles tendon, tendinitis in his elbow,

asthma, rotator cuff problems and lupus. Doc #41, Ex 10 at 51. 

Upon termination of the SDM unit Chircop was reassigned to the

P&DC, where he presented his supervisor with a doctor’s certificate

indicating that he could not perform the work there. Doc #66 at

13. Chircop was intermittently placed at the P&DC and the

Embarcadero Postal Center while his supervisor attempted to find a

position that would accommodate his disability. Doc #63, Ex 5 at

163-69. On July 25, 1997, Chircop’s supervisor verbally informed

him that he could find no work for Chircop. Id at 168. Chircop

then filed a written request for an accommodation with the

postmaster of San Francisco, which was followed by a written

response from Chircop’s supervisor stating that there were no

assignments available and that Chircop could use any sort of leave

he had accrued over the years to cover his hours until a position

became available or until his medical condition changed. Id at

169. A suitable position never materialized. Doc #66 at 14. 

Richard Foley has been an employee of the USPS for over

thirty years and was a SDM messenger for ten years. Doc #41, Ex 10 

at 53. As a result of an on-the-job accident in 1979, Foley

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fractured two vertebrae and was diagnosed with spondyliothesis. Id

at 53-54. The injury prohibited Foley from walking more than a few

minutes without experiencing leg pain. Id. Upon termination of

the SDM unit, Foley was reassigned to a mail-sorting position at

the P&DC, where he was allowed to use a flat rest bar instead of an

elevated rest bar to accommodate his back injury and was excused

from doing the “round-up,” a work function which required walking

that exacerbated his leg pain. Doc #19, Ex E at 7. In July of

1999 Foley became a window clerk at Pine Street station. Doc #63,

Ex 5 at 267. 

Irving Hacker, who is now deceased, worked for the USPS

from 1970 and was an SDM messenger from 1984 until July 1997. Doc

#41, Ex 10 at 56. Hacker suffered from kidney failure, diabetes

and medical problems stemming from those ailments. Id at 56-57. 

Hacker was granted time off to go to dialysis, was accommodated in

his requests either to stand or sit and was given light-duty

assignments. Doc #67, Ex A at 484, 487, 505. The USPS granted

every accommodation that Hacker requested. Id at 489. 

Joseph Smith was employed by the USPS for thirty-one

years and was a SDM messenger for fourteen years. Doc #41, Ex 10

at 58. Joseph Smith suffers from tendinitis in his hand and

chronic back pain. Id at 59. Joseph Smith was restricted from

lifting more than twenty-five pounds, remaining seated or standing

for long periods of time, performing repetitive motions with his

right hand or working for more than one and one-half hours per day. 

Doc #66 at 12-13. Upon termination of the SDM unit, Joseph Smith

was given a job sorting the mail at the P&DC and was not required

to work longer than one and one-half hours per day. Doc #63, Ex 5

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at 197, 199-200. 

Yvonne Smith has worked for the USPS for over thirtythree years and was a SDM messenger from 1984 until July 1997. Doc

#41, Ex 10 at 62. Yvonne Smith had a back injury, tendinitis in

her knees and, prior to 1997, a twenty-pound lifting limitation. 

Id. Upon termination of the SDM unit, Yvonne Smith was sent to the

P&DC where, for three months with full pay, she waited for the USPS

to find her work that accommodated her disability. Doc #63, Ex 6

at 441-42. After three months Yvonne Smith was placed in a

position answering complaints and helping with express mail; she

was permitted to use an orthopedic chair prescribed by her doctor

in her work area. Id at 441, 444. 

David Spector has worked for the USPS since 1973 and as a

SDM messenger from 1987 to 1991 and from 1995 until July 1997. Doc

#41, Ex 10 at 64. Spector has a lifting limitation of thirty-five

to forty-five pounds, a herniated disk in his lower back and

tendinitis in his right shoulder. Id at 64-65. Upon termination

of the SDM unit, Spector was assigned to casing mail at the P&DC,

but he began to experience problems casing the mail because of his

injuries. Doc #67, Ex B at 1024. Spector was subsequently

transferred to the loading docks where he directs mail coming into

the facility. Id, Ex C at 14. 

II

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court

must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist,

resolving any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. 

“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

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under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Anderson v Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). 

Further, the dispute over a material fact must be “genuine,” that

is, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. And the burden of

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies

with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23

(1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings, 

but must produce significant probative evidence, by affidavit or as

otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting its claim that a genuine

issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v Pacific Elec

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). The evidence

presented by the nonmoving party “is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson,

477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id at 249.

The evidence presented by both parties must be

admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing

Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979). Hearsay

statements in affidavits are inadmissible. Japan Telecom, Inc v

Japan Telecom America Inc, 287 F3d 866, 875 n 1 (9th Cir 2004).

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III

The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the standard used

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC §§ 12101-

12213, to determine whether an act of discrimination violates the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC § 791(g); 29 CFR § 1614.203(b); Coons v

Dept of the Treasury, 383 F3d 879, 884 (9th Cir 2004); McLean v

Runyon, 222 F3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir 2000). To state a prima facie

disability discrimination claim under § 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act, plaintiffs must show that they: (1) were otherwise qualified

disabled individuals for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act and (2)

suffered an adverse employment action because of their

disabilities. Lucero v Hart, 915 F2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir 1990). 

If plaintiffs are able to make out a prima facie case of disability

discrimination, then the burden shifts to the defendant who must

demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action. Id. If the defendant does so, then the burden

shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered

reason is a pretext. See Smith v Barton, 914 F2d 1330, 1340 (9th

Cir 1990). The ultimate burden lies with the plaintiff. Id. 

 

A

Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to support their

disability discrimination claims. In response to the Postmaster’s

cross-motion for summary judgment on their disability

discrimination claim (Doc # 66), plaintiffs respond by directing

the court to the EEOC Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) damage

decision for each of the plaintiffs issued in January of 2002. Doc

#71 at 12. Plaintiffs, however, fail to note that the EEOC Office

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of Federal Operation (OFO) reversed the administrative judge’s

decisions because her findings of disability discrimination were

not supported by substantial evidence. Doc #78 at 7. Plaintiffs

have not raised a genuine issue of material fact. For this reason,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ disability

discrimination claim is granted.

B

The Postmaster does not dispute the “disabled” status of

any of the seven plaintiffs under the Rehabilitation Act, but

contends that none of the plaintiffs alleging disability

discrimination can show that they were reassigned because of their

claimed disabilities. Doc #66 at 10. 

On July 16, 1997, the San Francisco SDM unit was

abolished and all SDM messengers, including plaintiffs, were

reassigned. Doc #78 at 6. Plaintiffs claiming disability

discrimination do not claim that they were treated any differently

from SDM messengers who were not disabled. There is an absence of

a genuine issue of material fact because there is no evidence that

plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment action because of their

disabilities. All SDM jobs were abolished, not just those held by

disabled persons. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to meet the

second prong essential to establishing a prima facie case for

disability discrimination. See Lucero, 915 F2d at 1372. 

C

Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs were capable of

establishing a prima facie case for their disability claim, the

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court finds that plaintiffs would nevertheless fail under the

burden shifting analysis outlined above. As set forth in the

court’s order of August 21, 2006, the Postmaster articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for reassigning plaintiffs in

1997. Doc #78 at 15-16. The Postmaster articulated three

interrelated, legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons: that SDM

service was abolished nationwide and there were, as a result, no

longer any SDM items to deliver; that the SDM unit was inefficient;

and that the nationwide postal rules discouraged SDM messengers

from delivering express mail. Id. Plaintiffs, in turn, have

failed to rebut the Postmaster’s articulated reasons by showing

that they are a mere pretext. See Id at 16-18. 

D 

Plaintiffs assert that the Postmaster denied them

reasonable accommodations “from July 15, 1997 until September

2000.” See Doc #14 at 18. Plaintiffs, however, have produced no

evidence to support their assertion. Again, plaintiffs direct the

court to the ALJ’s damage decisions that were later reversed by the

EEOC OFO for lack of substantial evidence. See Doc #71 at 14; Doc

#78 at 7. Such evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue

of material fact. 

Accordingly, the court grants the Postmaster’s crossmotion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ disability

discrimination claim. 

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IV

The Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC § 701, prohibits

retaliation in employment against disabled persons by the federal

government, including the USPS. 29 USC §§ 791, 794. In order to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the

Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs must adduce evidence tending to

establish the following elements: (1) they engaged in a protected

activity; (2) they were thereafter subjected to an adverse

employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action. Coons, 383

F3d at 887; Porter v California Dept of Corrections, 419 F3d 885,

894 (9th Cir 2005) (ADA context). “The plaintiff must present

‘evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment

decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion.’” 

Coons, 383 F3d at 887. In other words, plaintiffs must, in this

case, show a connection between their engagement in a protected

activity and the adverse employment action. If plaintiffs

establish a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts

to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason

for the challenged action. Id. If the employer meets this burden,

the plaintiff must show that the articulated reason is pretextual

in order to proceed beyond the summary judgment phase. Id.

A

The anti-retaliation provision of the Rehabilitation Act

provides that no person shall discriminate against an individual

because such individual has opposed any act or practice made

unlawful by the Rehabilitation Act. 29 USC § 794(a), (d); 42 USC §

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12203(a). Allegations of discrimination which are not included in

the plaintiffs’ administrative charge may not be considered by a

federal court unless the new claims are “like or reasonably related

to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.” BKB v Maui

Police Dept, 276 F3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir 2002). 

 Plaintiffs allege in their first amended complaint that

their reassignment was in retaliation for their participation in

the 1991 EEO actions and class arbitration concerning the

decentralization of the San Francisco SDM unit. See order dated

August 21, 2006 (Doc #78) at 8. As this court previously ruled in

its order dated August 21, 2006, indirect participation in the

class arbitration was not protected activity; only the filing of

the 1991 EEO complaints constitutes protected activity. Id at 11. 

Of the seven named plaintiffs claiming disability discrimination

and retaliation based on disability, only Spector alleged

disability discrimination in his EEO complaint and only Hacker

alleged retaliation in his administrative charge. Doc #19, Ex A at

9. Byrd and Joseph Smith were not parties to the 1991 complaint. 

Doc #19, Ex E at 4. 

In the case arising from the decentralization issue

(Black v Henderson, C-99-4806 SBA), in which plaintiffs tried to

raise the same claims of discrimination, Judge Armstrong found that

plaintiffs who did not explicitly raise disability and retaliation

claims in their EEO complaints should not be permitted to proceed

on such claims in their federal action. Doc #19, Ex A at 9-11. 

Absent a mention of disability discrimination in the EEO complaint,

Judge Armstrong reasoned, the EEOC would not investigate the issues

and facts necessary to support whether the Postmaster’s actions

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constituted discrimination, so plaintiffs who had not claimed

discrimination in their 1991 complaint had failed to exhaust their

administrative remedies. Id at 10. The undersigned judge agrees

with Judge Armstrong’s disposition. 

For these reasons, the court finds that the retaliation

claims of Byrd and Joseph Smith cannot proceed because they did not

participate in any protected activity. Chircop, Foley, and Yvonne

Smith’s retaliation claims also cannot proceed because they did not

allege disability discrimination or retaliation in their 1991 EEO

complaints. Accordingly, only Hacker’s and Spector’s retaliation

claims are properly exhausted and ripe for judicial review.

B

The Postmaster does not dispute that plaintiffs’ filing

of the 1991 EEO complaints constituted protected activity or, for

purposes of this summary judgment motion, that an adverse action

was taken against plaintiffs. Instead, the Postmaster argues that

plaintiffs cannot establish the necessary causal link between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action. Doc #66 at

7-9. 

In order to establish causation, plaintiffs must show “by

a preponderance of the evidence that engaging in the protected

activity was one of the reasons for [the adverse employment action]

and that but for such activity” they would not have been subjected

to the adverse employment action. Villiarimo v Aloha Island Air,

Inc, 281 F3d 1054, 1064-65 (9th Cir 2002). Plaintiffs may submit

direct or circumstantial evidence of causation. See Manatt v Bank

of America, 339 F3d 792, 802 (9th Cir 2003). Causation may be

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inferred from timing alone “where an adverse employment action

follows on the heels of protected activity.” Villiarimo, 281 F3d

at 1065. But the adverse employment action “must have occurred

‘fairly soon after the employee’s protected expression.’” Id. For

example, in Villiarimo, an eighteen-month lapse between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action was too long

for a court to infer causation. Id. On the other hand, an

intervening period of two or three months can be short enough for a

court to infer causation. See Yartzoff v Thomas, 809 F2d 1371,

1376 (9th Cir 1987); Miller v Fairchild Industries, Inc, 797 F2d

727, 731-32 (9th Cir 1986).

In its August 21, 2006 order the court addressed

causation, the last element of a prima facie case of retaliation. 

Doc #78 at 12-15. The court found that too much time had elapsed

between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action

to infer causation. Id. Additionally, the court found that

plaintiffs’ letter to the USPS expressing their intention to

reinstate the EEO action, while almost certainly protected

activity, was executed after the Postmaster began the process of

eliminating the SDM and, therefore, was inapposite for purposes of

determining causation. Id at 14-15. Because the analysis for

retaliation under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act are the

same, the same reasoning applies here. There is no causal nexus

based on temporal proximity and accordingly, plaintiffs cannot

establish a prima facie case. 

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C

Even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs were able to

establish causation and make out a prima facie case, the Postmaster

has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 1997

reassignment, as noted above and in the court’s previous order. 

See Doc #78 at 15-16. Additionally, plaintiffs have failed to

offer evidence that would reasonably support the conclusion that

the Postmaster’s articulated reason was pretextual. See Id at 16-

18. 

V

After considering the declarations of plaintiffs’ experts

KD Hughes (Doc #74) and Eve Hill (Doc #75), the court finds that

neither declaration adds to the record any admissible evidence

creating a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the court

has not been swayed in its determination as to the final

disposition of the case. Granting the Postmaster’s motion to

strike is, therefore, unnecessary. 

VI

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED and the

Postmaster’s cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’

claims for disability discrimination and retaliation is hereby

GRANTED. The Postmaster’s motion to strike is DENIED.

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The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Postmaster

and shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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