Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03592/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03592-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD L. BAKER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M. CATE, N. GRANNIS, J. HUTCHINS,

R.A. HOREL, M.D. YAX, and C.E.

DUCART,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-03592 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

DUCART’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Reginald L. Baker, a state prisoner, brought this

case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials at Pelican Bay State

Prison (PBSP), where he is currently incarcerated, alleging that

Defendants unlawfully deprived him of property and violated his

First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In an order dated July

7, 2009, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's deprivation of property

claim, and dismissed the claims against all Defendants except

Defendant C.E. Ducart. The Court found cognizable Plaintiff’s

First Amendment claim against Defendant Ducart and ordered service

upon him.

On December 7, 2009, Defendant Ducart filed a motion for

summary judgment on the grounds that no triable issue of material

fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

(docket no. 13). Although given an opportunity to do so, Plaintiff

did not file an opposition.

For the reasons discussed below, Ducart's motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED.

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28 1 The following facts are undisputed.

BACKGROUND1

During 2007, Defendant Ducart was the warden’s designee who

made decisions regarding whether an inmate could possess

publications that contained sexually explicit material, in

accordance with California Code of Regulations, title 15,

§ 3006(c). Resp.’s Mot. Sum. Judg., Decl. of Ducart at ¶ 4. PBSP

permits inmates to possess images of breasts and genitalia which

are purchased by the inmate if the images are shown in educational,

artistic, or historical publications and are approved by the

institution. Id. at ¶ 5, citing § 3006(c)(17)(A), (B)(2). PBSP

also allows inmates to possess sexually explicit materials acquired

by the department which are educational, medical/scientific, or

artistic materials and inmates are permitted to possess sexually

explicit letters and articles and sexually suggestive pictures of

clothed people and similar images. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. 

On or before September 9, 2007, Plaintiff ordered two art

books entitled, “www.hrgiger.com” and “Saverio Tenuta Elegia.” 

Complaint at 3-3a. On September 9, 2007, Ducart reviewed these

books and found that they “contained images of female breasts, male

and female genitalia, vaginal or anal penetration, and sexual

positions with animal-like or mythical creatures.” Ducart Decl. at

¶ 9. As a result, Ducart determined that the books were contraband

under § 3006(c) and would have a tendency to create a hostile work

environment. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11, Ex. 4. Plaintiff received a “Notice

of Disapproval,” CDC Form 1819, which stated that the two books

were prohibited by Ducart because they contained “sexually explicit

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material showing frontal nudity and various sexual situations not

covered by [CCR] Section 3006(c)(17)(B)(1)(2).” Complaint at 3a;

Ducart Decl. at ¶ 9, Ex. 3. 

On September 11, 2007, Plaintiff requested an interview with

Receiving and Release at PBSP, indicating that he believed that the

books were exempted under Section 3006(17)(B)(2). Alternatively,

Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation by way of redacting

the offensive materials. Id. The Receiving and Release Department

rejected Plaintiff’s request, noting that books could not be

altered so Plaintiff would either have to mail them to another

destination, donate them, or allow them to be destroyed. Id.

On September 16, 2007, Plaintiff filed a CDC 602 inmate appeal

requesting the same exemption and reasonable accommodations. Id.

at 3a-3b. On September 26, 2007, the appeal was denied, concluding

that the books were not covered by any exemption and in fact were

excluded under Section 3006(c)(17)(B). Id. at 3b; Ducart Decl.,

Ex. 6. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second level of appeal and a

director’s level appeal, both of which were denied. Complaint at

3b-3c.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

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The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). A verified complaint may be used as an

opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is based on

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th

Cir. 1995).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991). A complete failure of proof concerning an

essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that Ducart’s refusal to allow him access to

his art books violated his First Amendment right to freedom of

speech. Complaint at 3. Plaintiff asserts that his books were an

exception to the prison regulation because they are “art,” and

alternatively that the Department’s policy results in a total ban

on sexual expression, does not work to deter sexual harassment, and

is an “exaggerated response” to the Department’s concerns. Id. at

3c-3d. In addition, Plaintiff argues that there were reasonable

alternatives to destruction or total banning of his books. Id. at

3d-3e.

Ducart responds that the books did not fall under any

exception to the prison’s ban on frontal nudity. Ducart Decl. at

¶ 10. Ducart refutes Plaintiff’s suggestion that the policy

completely bans sexual expression as the Department does allow

other sexually explicit images. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10. Further, Ducart

rejects Plaintiff’s suggested alternatives because they present

cost, logistical, and safety issues. Id. at ¶¶ 19-23. 

Alternatively, Ducart asserts that he is entitled to qualified

immunity.

A. Facial Challenge to Section 3006(c)(17)

"Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates

from the protections of the Constitution." Turner v. Safley, 482

U.S. 78, 84 (1987). Where prison rules or regulations impede the

exercise of a prisoner's constitutional rights, federal courts must

discharge their duty to protect those rights. See id. However,

courts must be aware that they are "ill equipped to deal with the

increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform." 

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Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the

regulations of a state prison are involved, "federal courts have

. . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate

prison authorities." Id. at 85 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

A prison regulation that limits a prisoner's exercise of his

or her constitutional rights will thus be upheld where it

"reasonably relate[s] to a legitimate penological interest." Id.

at 89-90. This determination entails consideration of four

factors: (1) whether there is a rational relationship between the

regulation and the proffered legitimate government interest;

(2) whether inmates have alternative means of exercising their

asserted rights; (3) how accommodation of the claimed

constitutional right will affect guards, a prisoner's fellow

inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether

the policy is an "exaggerated response" to the prison's concerns. 

Id.; see Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1999)

(en banc).

1. Rational relationship

 As noted, section 3006(c)(17) bans “[s]exually explicit images

that depict frontal nudity in the form of personal photographs,

drawings, magazines or other pictorial format.” Cal. Code Regs.,

tit. 15, § 3006(c)(17). The regulation defines sexually explicit

material as “material that shows the frontal nudity of either

gender, including the exposed female breast(s) and/or the genitalia

of either gender.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006(c)(17)(A). 

The regulation also provides, however, that inmates shall be

allowed access to the following sexually explicit material: 

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Educational, medical/scientific, or artistic

materials, including, but not limited to,

anatomy medical reference books, general

practitioner reference books and/or guides,

National Geographic, or artistic reference

material depicting historical, modern, and/or

post modern era art, purchased or possessed by

inmates and approved by the institution head or

their designee on a case-by-case basis.

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006(c)(17)(B)(2).

In considering, under the first prong of the Turner test,

whether there is a rational connection between a challenged policy

and a legitimate governmental interest, a court must determine

“whether the governmental objective underlying the policy is

(1) legitimate, (2) neutral, and (3) whether the policy is

rationally related to that objective.” Mauro, 88 F.3d at 1059

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff concedes that there is indeed a rational

connection between the policy and a legitimate governmental

interest. Complaint at 3c. The governmental objectives underlying

section 3006(c)(17), specifically, maintaining the safety and

security of the prisons, rehabilitating inmates, reducing sexual

harassment of correctional officers and preventing a hostile work

environment, are legitimate. Ducart Decl. at Ex. 2 (Initial

Statement of Reasons). See Self v. Horel, 2008 WL 5048392, at *5

(N.D. Cal.); Nelson v. Woodford, 2006 WL 571359, at *3 (N.D. Cal.);

see also Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1059 (finding objectives of maintaining

jail security, rehabilitating inmates and reducing sexual

harassment of female detention officers to be legitimate). 

The policy is neutral. A regulation restricting access to

certain types of publications is neutral if it furthers an

important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the

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2 Although Plaintiff asserts that the policy is ineffective

in actually preventing sexual harassment, that argument is

irrelevant to the determination of whether the policy is rationally

related to the governmental objectives. See Mauro, 188 F.3d at

1060 (“it does not matter whether we agree with the defendants or

whether the policy in fact advances the jail’s legitimate interests

. . . The only question that we must answer is whether the

defendants’ judgment was rational, that is, whether the defendants

might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its

interests.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

suppression of expression. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,

415-16 (1989). Section 3006(c)(17) draws distinctions between

materials solely on the basis of the materials’ potential effect on

the prison’s legitimate objectives, specifically, prison security,

rehabilitation of inmates, and preventing the harassment of female

correctional officers. See Self, 2008 WL 5048392, at *5; Nelson,

2006 WL 571359, at * 4; accord Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1060 (holding

that “the relationship between the possession of sexually explicit

materials and the problems sought to be addressed by [such a]

policy -- sexual harassment of female officers, jail security and

rehabilitation of inmates -- is clear.”). 

Finally, there is a rational relationship between the ban on

materials depicting frontal nudity, as set forth in section

3006(c)(17), and the legitimate governmental objectives put forth

to justify it.2 See Self, 2008 WL 5048392, at *5; Nelson, 2006 WL

57139, at *4; see also Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1060 (holding

relationship between policy banning materials showing frontal

nudity and jail’s objectives rational even if “fit” not “exact,”

because “[t]he relationship between the jail’s policy of

prohibiting the possession of sexually explicit materials and the

goals of preventing sexual harassment of the female officers,

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inmate rehabilitation and maintenance of jail security is not so

remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational”). 

2. Alternative Means

The second factor to be considered under Turner is whether

there exist alternative means of exercising the challenged right

that remain open to prisoners. Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1061. “Where

‘other avenues’ remain available for the exercise of the asserted

right, courts should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of

judicial deference owed to correctional officials . . . in gauging

the validity of the regulation.’” Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at

90.)

Plaintiff asserts that section 3006(c)(17) is a complete ban

on sexual expression. Complaint at 3c. Ducart argues that

Plaintiff has a myriad of alternative means of receiving sexually

explicit publications. For example, the policy at issue does not

ban images of breasts and genitalia that are shown in medical

books, National Geographic, or artistic reference material and the

like. Ducart Decl. at ¶ 5. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §

3006(c)(17)(A), (B)(2). Further, inmates can possess such images

that are purchased or acquired by the Department for inclusion in

its libraries or educational areas. Ducart Decl. at ¶ 6. See Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006(c)(17)(B)(1). In addition, sexually

explicit letters and articles, photographs of clothed people, and

lingerie and swimsuit catalogs are not prohibited by this policy. 

Ducart Decl. at ¶ 7. 

Prison officials are not required to adopt the least

restrictive means of achieving their legitimate objectives. See

Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1060. The regulation at issue here, which

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expressly allows inmates to possess certain sexually explicit

educational, medical/scientific, and artistic materials, see Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006(c)(17)(B), provides ample alternative

means for inmates to express their First Amendment right to access

sexually explicit materials that do not pose a threat to the

Department’s legitimate governmental interests. See Nelson, 2006

WL 571359, at *4 (finding § 3006(c)(17) satisfies second prong of

Turner test because, as with the policy at issue in Mauro, the ban

“does not include sexually explicit letters, articles or

photographs of clothed person(s),” and allows certain sexually

explicit materials under § 3006(c)(17)(B)); see also Mauro, 188

F.3d at 1061 (affirming the district court’s determination that the

allowance of sexually explicit letters and articles or suggestive

photographs of clothed women provided ample alternative means to

justify the policy banning all sexually explicit depictions of

frontal nudity).

3. Impact of Accommodation

The third Turner factor is a determination of the impact the

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have on

prison personnel, other inmates, and the allocation of prison

resources. Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1061. As relevant to the instant

challenge, the Court must assess the impact of allowing inmates

unrestricted access to sexually explicit materials. Id. 

Ducart argues that allowing inmates unrestricted access to

sexually explicit materials could jeopardize the safety of prison

personnel by provoking harassment of female guards and violence

among inmates stemming from the possession or use of such

materials. 

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As found by the district court in both Self and Nelson,

allowing inmates unrestricted access to sexually explicit materials

has a significant negative impact on female correctional officers

because of harassment, and on inmates and correctional officers

because of the potential for violence. See Self, 2008 WL 5048392,

at *6; Nelson, 2006 WL 571359, at *4; see also Mauro, 188 F.3d at

1061 (finding significant negative impact if inmates afforded

unrestricted access to sexually explicit materials, because such

access “could lead to the bartering of sexually explicit materials

and anatomical comparisons which could in turn lead to fights

between inmates”). The unrestricted possession of sexually

explicit materials would have a significant negative impact on PBSP

personnel, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources.

4. Exaggerated Response

The fourth and final Turner factor to be considered is whether

the policy is, in effect, an “exaggerated response” to the prison’s

concerns. See Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1062. In that regard, the burden

is on the prisoner challenging the regulation, not on prison

officials, to show there are obvious, easy alternatives to the

regulation. Id.

Plaintiff claims that section 3006(c)(17) is an exaggerated

response to prison concerns. Complaint at 3d. Specifically,

Plaintiff argues, there is no reason that inmates like himself, who

have not been accused of any sexual misconduct, should be denied

such materials. Id. Plaintiff suggests that the Department should

instead rely on disciplinary actions and legal recourse to deter

sexual misconduct and violence. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff

offers the alternative of allowing inmates in possession of

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prohibited materials to remove the offending pages rather than

destroying an entire magazine or publication. Id. at 3d-3e. In

response, Ducart argues that Plaintiff’s suggested alternatives

cannot be accommodated without significant costs to valid

penological interests. 

Regarding Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Department

discipline or prosecute prisoners who sexually harass staff or

expose the sexually explicit depictions in a harassing manner, the

Ninth Circuit has already decided that such an alternative could

not be obtained at a de minimis cost. See Frost v. Symington, 197

F.3d 348, 358 (9th Cir. 1999) (“forcing prison officials to wait

until after violations have occurred before restricting inmates’

access to these materials would unduly tie the hands of prison

officials who see the need for preventive measures”). Moreover,

allowing inmates who have no record of sexual misconduct to possess

sexually explicit materials that are currently prohibited may still

create a hostile work environment for female officers because such

materials could be bartered to obtain goods or services from other

inmates. See Self, 2008 WL 5048392, at *7, (citing Mauro, 188 F.3d

at 1061). 

Alternatively, Plaintiff’s proposal that the Department merely

remove specific offending pages from publications and other

materials rather than destroying or removing the entire publication

also does not come at a de minimis cost. PBSP receives

approximately 70,000 pieces of incoming mail per month and has six

to nine mailroom employees to process and scan each piece for

contraband. Ducart Decl. at ¶ 19. To require prison staff to

review each publication for purposes of finding and removing

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prohibited pages could cause significant delay in the delivery of

mail as well as slow down the mail room operations. Id. at ¶ 20. 

In addition, inmates are prohibited from possessing property that

has been altered because “altered property makes it easier for

inmates to conceal contraband in it, which jeopardizes prison

security.” Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. 

As noted, prison officials are not required to adopt the least

restrictive means of achieving their legitimate objectives. See

Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1063. The ban on frontal nudity set forth in

section 3306(c)(17) is not an exaggerated response to prison

officials’ legitimate penological concerns, in that the regulation

bans those materials deemed most likely to impact prison personnel

and other inmates negatively, but does allow inmates to have access

to certain sexually explicit materials, such as sexually explicit

letters, articles or photographs of clothed persons, and

educational and artistic materials. See Self, 2008 WL 5048392, at

*7; Nelson, 2006 WL 571359, at *4 (holding section 3006(c)(17) not

subject to challenge under fourth Turner factor; noting regulation

contains ample alternatives for prisoners to acquire sexually

explicit materials). 

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to provide a ready alternative to

section 3006(c)(17) that would accommodate the prison’s legitimate

penological objectives. Consequently, Plaintiff has not carried

his burden as to the fourth Turner factor. 

In sum, for the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that

section 3006(c)(17) is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests, see Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413, and, accordingly, the

regulation does not violate the First Amendment. See Self, 2008 WL

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5048392, at *8; Nelson, 2006 WL 571359, at *5; see also Mauro, 188

F.3d at 1063.

B. As-applied Challenge to Section 3006(c)(17)

Having found section 3006(c)(17) is not unconstitutional on

its face, the Court next considers whether Ducart, in denying

Plaintiff access to “www.hrgiger.com” and “Saverio Tenuta Elegia”

applied the regulation in an unconstitutional manner.

As noted, section 3006(c)(17) prohibits inmates from

possessing sexually explicit images that depict frontal nudity,

including male and female genitalia. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,

§ 3006(c)(17)(A). Plaintiff was denied a copy of “www.hrgiger.com”

and “Saverio Tenuta Elegia” because at least eight pages of the

books depicted frontal nudity. Complaint at 3a. There is no

factual dispute as to the nudity depicted in the book. Rather,

Plaintiff argues, Ducart wrongly determined that “www.hrgiger.com”

and “Saverio Tenuta Elegia” were not exempted materials under

section 3006(c)(17)(B)(2). 

Here, Ducart determined that “www.hrgiger.com” and “Saverio

Tenuta Elegia” did not come within the exception under section

3006(c)(17)(B)(2) because they were not akin to “materials like

Michelangelo’s David and those typically seen in National

Geographic, medical-reference books, education materials, and

traditional art books that are carried by public schools.” Ducart

Decl. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff argues Ducart should have allowed him to

possess the books because they were “art” and the challenged images

were fictional characters rather than real people. Complaint at

3a, Ex. B.

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Prison officials are to be provided broad discretion to

determine what publications may enter a prison. See Thornburgh,

490 U.S. at 416. Regulations that provide for individualized

determinations as opposed to predetermined categorical exclusions

strike an acceptable balance between the prison’s legitimate

governmental objectives and prisoners’ First Amendment rights. See

id. at 416-17 & n.15. Here, section 3006(c)(17)(B) provides for

individualized determinations as to what sexually explicit

materials inmates may possess. Even if, as Plaintiff argues, 

“www.hrgiger.com” and “Saverio Tenuta Elegia” have some artistic

value, it was neither arbitrary nor irrational for Ducart to deny

Plaintiff access to the publications. See Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1060. 

While section 3006(c)(17)(B)(2) allows inmates to possess some

sexually explicit materials, it does not require that inmates be

allowed to possess sexually explicit material solely because it is

deemed to have educational or artistic value. Further, Ducart’s

decision did not deprive Plaintiff of the right to possess either

educational art materials that do not contain frontal nudity, or

that otherwise meet the requirements of section 3006(c)(17)(B)(2). 

In sum, Ducart’s individualized determination to ban

“www.hrgiger.com” and “Saverio Tenuta Elegia” was a constitutional

application of section 3006(c)(17). See Self, 2008 WL 504392, at

*7-8 (finding prison officials’ individualized determination to

preclude prisoner from receiving “The Practical Guide to Drawing”

which depicted at least seven pages of images of frontal nudity was

constitutional application of § 3006(c)(17)); Nelson, 2006 WL

571359, at *5 (finding constitutional application of § 3006(c)(17)

with respect to prison officials’ individualized determination to

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preclude prisoner’s receipt of Esquire magazine). Because there is

no triable issue with respect to whether Plaintiff was properly

denied access to “www.hrgiger.com” and “Saverio Tenuta Elegia,”

summary judgment will be granted in favor of Ducart.

C. Qualified Immunity

Ducart claims, in the alternative, that even if Plaintiff's

allegations revealed a constitutional violation, qualified immunity

would protect him from liability for Plaintiff's First Amendment

claim.

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

of qualified immunity provides ample protection to “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law;”

defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the

facts or about what the law requires in any given situation.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). The threshold question in qualified

immunity analysis is: “Taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's

conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. A court

considering a claim of qualified immunity must determine whether

the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual

constitutional right and whether such right was “clearly

established.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009).

Where there is no clearly established law that certain conduct

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constitutes a constitutional violation, a defendant cannot be on

notice that such conduct is unlawful. Rodis v. City and County of

S.F., 558 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). The relevant, dispositive

inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable defendant that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier, 533

U.S. at 202.

On these facts, viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, Ducart prevails as a matter of law on his qualified

immunity defense because the record establishes no constitutional

violation. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. However, even assuming a

constitutional violation had occurred with respect to Plaintiff's

First Amendment claim, Ducart could reasonably have believed his

conduct was lawful. California Code of Regulations title 15,

section 3006(c)(17) includes frontal nudity of either gender,

including exposed breasts and genitalia, in its definition of

prohibited “sexually explicit material.” It would not have been

clear to a reasonable official that denying Plaintiff the

publications containing the images at issue here would have been

unlawful. Ducart is entitled to qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ducart’s motion for summary

judgment (docket no. 13) is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in

favor of Defendants. All parties shall bear their own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 8/2/2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD L. BAKER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M. CATE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-03592 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on August 2, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Reginald L. Baker F-24891

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95532

Dated: August 2, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:08-cv-03592-CW Document 16 Filed 08/02/10 Page 18 of 18