Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01487/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01487-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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JKM

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Enrique Rodriguez-Macias, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-1487-PHX-DGC (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Enrique Rodriguez-Macias has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant

to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971), and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The Court will grant leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

When he filed this action, Plaintiff was confined in a Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) detention facility awaiting the conclusion of civil immigration proceedings,

but he was subsequently released and he now resides in Tucson. Plaintiff is therefore not

subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) fee payment requirements that apply

only to “prisoners.” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the filing fee

requirements of the PLRA do not apply to an alien detainee proceeding in forma pauperis”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis will be granted.

II. Statutory Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by indigent litigants. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)

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“applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners”). The Court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally

frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require detailed

factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951. But as the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue

to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A

“complaint [filed by a pro se inmate] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam)).

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127-29. Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without

leave to amend because its defects cannot be corrected by the allegation of other facts.

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III. Complaint

A. Background

Plaintiff is a native of Mexico, who was admitted to the United States as a lawful

permanent resident in 1980. In November of 1997, Plaintiff was convicted of indecent

exposure in violation of California Penal Code (CPC) § 314(1). On May 3, 2004, Plaintiff

was convicted of child annoyance in violation of CPC § 647.6(a). Based on those

convictions, immigration authorities issued a Notice to Appear charging that Plaintiff was

removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) as an alien convicted of two crimes involving

moral turpitude, and under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as an alien convicted of a child abuse

offense. An immigration judge subsequently issued an order for Plaintiff’s removal from the

United States and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On July 22, 2008, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s petition for review

and remanded to the BIA. Rodriguez-Macias v. Mukasey, No. 06-72061, 2008 WL 2812534

(9th Cir. Jul. 22, 2008) (unpublished memorandum). The Ninth Circuit held that Plaintiff

was not removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because his CPC § 647(a) child annoyance

conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Ninth Circuit also held that the BIA

erred in failing to address Plaintiff’s claim that his CPC § 647.6(a) conviction did not

constitute a crime of child abuse for purposes of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Id. at *1. 

On remand, the BIA held that Plaintiff’s CPC § 647.6(a) offense qualified as child

abuse and again issued an order for his removal from the United States. On May 21, 2010,

the Ninth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s second petition for review, holding that Plaintiff was not

removable based on his California child annoyance conviction. Rodriguez-Macias v. Holder,

No. 09-71054, 2010 WL 2034697 (9th Cir. May 21, 2010) (unpublished memorandum). 

B. Claims

In his four-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Attorney

General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, and Director

of Immigration and Customs Enforcement John Morton. In Count I, Plaintiff claims

Defendants Holder and Napolitano violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by

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charging him with removability for having been convicted of a child abuse conviction based

on his CPC § 647.6(a) child annoyance conviction. In Count II, Plaintiff claims that by

charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) “defendant(s) have

excessively prolonged [his] detention causing him much pain, grief and sorrow based on an

erroneous believe [sic] that [he] was removable from the U.S.A.” in violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Doc. 1 at 4. In Count III, Plaintiff claims that “defendant(s)”

improperly deprived him of his liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment by falsely

charging that his child annoyance conviction constituted a child abuse offense, which

“interfered with [his] early release and/or termination of proceedings.” Doc. 1 at 5. In Count

IV, Plaintiff claims that “defendant(s)” violated his First Amendment rights by preventing

him from being as religiously active as he would have been if he had not been detained.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages “whether there is a constitutional violation or not because

[he] need[s] money . . . and because [he] was not in this critical condition before this matter

got started.” Doc. 1 at 7. Plaintiff also seeks an order releasing him from detention.

IV. Discussion

A. Claim for Release

In addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling his immediate release from

detention. Such relief may only be obtained in a habeas corpus case, not a civil rights action.

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that habeas corpus is the exclusive

remedy for a prisoner who seeks immediate or speedier release from confinement). But the

Court will not treat this action as a habeas corpus petition because Plaintiff’s post-filing

release from detention moots his claim for release. See Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d 1061, 1064

(9th Cir. 2007) (a habeas corpus “petitioner’s release from detention under an order of

supervision ‘moots his challenge to the legality of his extended detention’”) (quoting Riley

v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2002)).

B. Failure to State a Claim Against the Named Defendants

Plaintiff also seeks damages against the Defendants for improperly charging him with

removability and subjecting him to detention based on his CPC § 647.6(a) child annoyance

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conviction. But because Plaintiff has failed to allege any personal involvement by any of the

named Defendants, his Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1948 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens . . . suits, a plaintiff

must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Although this pleading deficiency could be cured

by alleging additional facts in an amended complaint, the Court finds that amendment would

be futile because the Complaint suffers from a more fundamental defect.

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The REAL ID Act of 2005 divested the district courts of jurisdiction over many

immigration matters. As amended by the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) now provides:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of

law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other

habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court

shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien

arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien

under this chapter.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This provision has been applied to strip the district courts of jurisdiction

over Bivens actions seeking damages for a claim of wrongful commencement of removal

proceedings. Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Because Plaintiff is admittedly not a citizen or national of the United States, he is an

“alien” for purposes of § 1252(g). Therefore, the question of whether the Court has

jurisdiction turns on whether Plaintiff’s claims arise out of a decision to “commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders” against him. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

They do.

Plaintiff’s four claims for relief depend upon the proposition that the Defendants

improperly brought removal proceedings against him based on his CPC § 647.6(a) child

annoyance conviction. Count I expressly challenges the Defendants’ decision to commence

removal proceedings: “The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security treated me with

indifference by charging me in violation of INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) or 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for having a conviction under Calif. Penal Code § 647.6(a).” Doc. 1 at 3.

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Plaintiff claims in Count II that Defendants unlawfully prolonged his detention “based on an

erroneous believe [sic] that [he] was removable from the U.S.A. and/or a danger to society.”

Id. at 4. Count III mirrors Count II: “The defendant(s) have restrained me of my legal

enjoyment of life, pursuit of happiness and economical progress for over 6 years by their

erroneous or false believe [sic] that I was removable from the U.S.A.” Id. at 5. In Count IV,

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to freely practice his

religion, but he claims that they did so only by detaining him on a charge that he was

removable. Each of his claims therefore arise from Defendants’ decision to commence

removal proceedings against him.

That conclusion is bolstered by Plaintiff’s explanation of his attempts to exhaust his

administrative remedies. At the conclusion of each of his claims, Plaintiff asserts that “[o]n

May 21, 2010 [he] discovered [that his] assertions were correct upon receiv[ing the] 9th

Circuit Memorandum,” which held that his convictions were not removable offenses. Id. at

3-6. Because each of Plaintiff’s claims “arise from the decision or action by the Attorney

General to commence [removal] proceedings,” this Court lacks jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(g); see also Sissoko, 509 F.3d at 951.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 3) is granted.

(2) The Complaint (Doc. 1) and this action are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

(3) Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment (Doc. 5) is denied as moot.

DATED this 4th day of April, 2011.

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