Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02130/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02130-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gary Thomas Kelley, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Laura Escapule, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02130-PHX-SPL (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Gary Thomas Kelley has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 16.) Petitioner has filed a 

reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 22.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends 

that the Petition be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On May 13, 2010, Petitioner was indicted on one count of second-degree murder 

and one count of aggravated assault in the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 16, 

Ex. B.) Petitioner’s first jury trial resulted in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a 

unanimous verdict. (Doc. 16, Ex. C.) After a second jury trial, Petitioner was convicted 

of both charges. (Doc. 16, Ex. D.) On July 5, 2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 

an aggravated term of twenty-years’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder 

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conviction, and a consecutive term of seven-and-one-half years’ imprisonment for the 

aggravated assault conviction. (Doc. 16, Ex. E.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. On February 8, 2012, 

appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that she had searched the record and was unable to find any issue to raise on 

appeal. (Doc. 16, Ex. F.) Petitioner then filed a supplemental brief. (Doc. 16, Ex. G.) 

On October 18, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. (Doc. 16, Ex. A.) Petitioner filed a petition for review, which the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied on March 27, 2013. (Doc. 16, Exs. H, I.) 

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On November 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the 

trial court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. (Doc. 16, Ex. J.) Postconviction counsel filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on appeal that the trial court erred by denying 

Petitioner’s request for a crime prevention jury instruction. (Doc. 16, Ex. K.) On March 

7, 2014, the trial court denied post-conviction relief, stating that Petitioner raised the 

underlying issue on direct appeal and therefore review of that issue was precluded. 

(Doc. 16, Ex. M.) The court further stated that even though Petitioner himself had raised 

the underlying issue on direct appeal, and not his appellate counsel, “there [could] be no 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel” because the issue was brought before the 

court. (Id.) Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. 

D. State Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On May 12, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 16, Ex. N.) The Arizona Supreme Court found that 

Petitioner’s claims should have been raised in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32, and dismissed the petition on September 2, 2014. (Doc. 16, Ex. O.) 

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E. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Answer

 On September 24, 2014, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in this Court. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises the following claims: (1) the Arizona 

Supreme Court violated Petitioner’s due process rights by failing to consider the claims 

raised in his state petition for writ of habeas corpus (Ground One); (2) the trial court 

interfered with Petitioner’s ability to obtain transcript excerpts and the state appellate 

court denied him counsel, both in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights (Ground Two); (3) the trial court in Petitioner’s first trial denied him 

due process by constructively amending the indicted charge by giving a “defective jury 

instruction on the charge of second-degree murder excising its two clauses for the 

consideration of self-defense, which confounded the jurors and caused their inability to 

reach a verdict” (Ground Three); and (4) the trial court in his first trial improperly 

declared a mistrial in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights (Ground Four).1

 (Doc. 1 

at 6-9.) 

 On October 30, 2014, the Court ordered Respondents to file an answer to the 

Petition. (Doc. 4 at 2.) The Court specified that Respondents must not file a dispositive 

motion, but they could file an “answer limited to relevant affirmative defenses, including 

but not limited to, statute of limitations, procedural bar, or non-retroactivity.” (Doc. 4 at 

3.) The Court further stated that if Respondents’ answer was “not limited to affirmative 

defenses, the answer must fully comply with all the requirements of Rule 5 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases.” (Id.) On January 23, 2015, Respondents filed a limited 

answer asserting that federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally 

barred. (Doc. 16.) Respondents filed several exhibits to support their answer. (Doc. 16, 

Exs. A-O.) 

 

1

 In Ground Four, Petitioner’s re-alleges his claim, asserted in Ground Two, that 

the trial court denied him access to transcripts during his post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 1 at 9.) The Court will only consider this claim in its discussion of Ground Two. 

See Section III.B. 

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 In his reply, Petitioner moves to strike Respondents’ limited answer as nonresponsive to a rule or order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)(2), for failure to 

comply with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, and because it is a 

“thinly veiled” motion to dismiss in violation of the Court’s October 30, 2014 Order. 

(Doc. 22 at 1.) The Court rejects these arguments for the following reasons. First, the 

Court’s October 30, 2014 Order specifically permitted Respondents to file an answer 

limited to affirmative defenses, including procedural bar. (Doc. 4 at 3.) As allowed by 

the Court’s order, Respondents filed a limited answer arguing that federal habeas corpus 

review of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. (Doc. 16.) Therefore, this limited 

answer does not violate the Court’s prohibition on filing a dispositive motion. 

 Second, Respondents’ answer complies with Rule 5(a), which provides that an 

answer is not required unless a “judge so orders.” Here, the Court ordered Respondents 

to file an answer and specifically permitted them to file an answer limited to affirmative 

defenses. Thus, the Court’s order modified Rule 5(b)’s requirement that an “answer must 

address the allegations in the petition.” The answer also complies with Rule 5(b) because 

Respondents identified the available transcripts and submitted the portions of the record 

that are relevant to their answer. (Doc. 16 at 2-3, Exs. A-O.) 

 Finally, under Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to habeas corpus proceedings. However, there 

is no basis to strike Respondents’ answer under Rule 12(f)(1) because the answer does 

not contain “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1). Accordingly, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s request to strike Respondents’ answer should be denied (Doc. 22 at 1-2) and, 

therefore, considers the briefing on the Petition. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

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upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.2

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

 

2

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

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“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims 

 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from federal 

habeas corpus review. Petitioner disputes this assertion. As set forth below, the Court 

finds that Ground One is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review and, 

alternatively, lacks merit. The Court also finds that Grounds Two, Three, and Four were 

not properly exhausted in state court and Petitioner has not established a basis to 

overcome the procedural bar. 

A. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that he was denied due process when the 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review of his state petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(Doc. 1 at 6.) He asserts that the Arizona Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to 

consider his claims. (Id.) Respondents argue that federal habeas corpus review of 

Ground One is procedurally barred because Petitioner did not present this claim to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. The record reflects that Petitioner did not present this claim to 

the state courts. However, the parties have not addressed what, if any, state remedies 

would be available for Petitioner to challenge the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of a 

state petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court does not need to resolve this issue 

because the Court can deny “an application for writ of habeas corpus on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

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of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). As discussed below, Ground One is not 

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review and, alternatively, lacks merit. 

 1. Ground One is not Cognizable on § 2254 Review 

 To be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner must establish that 

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state law. 

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). It is not the policy of the federal courts to reexamine state court determinations of state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 

62, 67-68 (1991). On habeas corpus review, federal courts lack jurisdiction to review 

state court applications of state procedural rules. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 

(9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, a petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a 

federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 

1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 As previously stated, in Ground One, Petitioner argues that his due process rights 

were violated when the Arizona Supreme Court dismissed his state petition for writ of 

habeas corpus without considering the merits of his claims. (Doc. 1 at 6.) The Arizona 

Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s state petition for writ of habeas corpus because it 

asserted claims that should have been presented in a petition for post-conviction relief 

under Rule 32. (Doc. 16, Ex. O.) The court’s determination was based on its 

interpretation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4233, Rule 32.3, and several other Arizona 

procedural rules.3

 (Id. (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) and (g); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19, 

 3

 Arizona Revised Statute 13-4233 provide that: 

A proceeding pursuant to this article is a part of the original criminal action and not a separate action. It displaces and incorporates all trial court post- trial remedies except post-trial motions and habeas corpus. If a defendant applies for a writ of habeas corpus in a court having jurisdiction of his person attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence, that court 

pursuant to this article shall transfer the cause to the court where the 

defendant was convicted or sentenced and that court shall treat it as a 

petition for relief under this article and the procedures of this article apply. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4233. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3 is substantially the 

same. 

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and Ariz. Sup. Ct. Rule 1).) Thus, Ground One challenges the Arizona Supreme Court’s 

application of Arizona law to dismiss his state petition for writ of habeas corpus. This 

claim turns on the interpretation and application of state law and therefore is not 

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. Petitioner’s characterization of Ground One 

as a violation of due process does not transform it into a federal claim. Accordingly, 

federal habeas corpus review is unavailable for Ground One. 

 2. Petitioner has not Established a Due Process Violation 

 However, assuming that Petitioner’s citation to the Due Process Clause was 

sufficient to transform his state law claim asserted in Ground One into a federal claim, 

that claim lacks merit. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 

persons against deprivations of life, liberty or property. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 

209, 221 (2005). To invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, a 

petitioner must establish that one of these interests is at stake. Id. However, the federal 

courts are not arbiters of state law. See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948) (“We 

cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due process; 

otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come here as a 

federal constitutional question.”). 

 When the case is governed by the AEDPA, such as this one, the liberty interest 

must be one recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See Nunes v. RamirezPalmer, 485 F.3d 432, 443 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting petitioner’s liberty interest claim 

under § 2254(d)(1) because “the United States Supreme Court has never recognized 

California’s Sumstine doctrine as creating a liberty interest that is protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment.”). As discussed below, Petitioner’s due process claim lacks 

merit. 

 The record reflects that the Arizona Supreme Court acted according to Arizona 

statutes and rules when dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.3 and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4233. Additionally, contrary to Petitioner’s 

assertion that the Arizona Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to consider his claims, 

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review by the Arizona Supreme Court is discretionary, except in capital cases. See Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 12-120.21(A)(1) and § 13-4031 (providing that the “criminal actions 

involving crimes for which a sentence of death has actually been imposed may only be 

appealed to the supreme court.”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(f) (stating that “[i]f the 

Supreme Court grants review, its order shall specify the issue or issues to be reviewed.”);

see also Cofsky v. Schriro, 2009 WL 733869 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2009) (discussing review 

by the Arizona Supreme Court). Because Petitioner was not actually sentenced to death, 

he was not entitled to automatic review by the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-4031. 

 Petitioner has not cited any authority indicating that he had any liberty interest 

under Arizona law that entitles him to review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the Arizona Supreme Court violated the Due 

Process Clause by denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus without considering the 

merits of his claims. Accordingly, assuming Ground One asserts a claim cognizable on 

federal habeas corpus review, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground One because it 

lacks merit. 

B. Grounds Two, Three, and Four 

 1. Petitioner did not Properly Exhaust Grounds Two, Three and 

 Four 

 In Ground Two (a), Petitioner alleges that, on post-conviction review, the trial 

court violated his due process rights by denying him access to “select excerpts to 

transcripts to prepare a supplement to the Rule 32 proceeding.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) In Ground 

Two (b) Petitioner alleges that the Arizona Court of Appeals “acted to create a denial of 

counsel in the direct appeal,” in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment and 

the Due Process Clause. (Id.) Petitioner did not present Ground Two (b) to the trial court 

in his petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 16, Ex. K.) Additionally, Petitioner did 

not appeal the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and, therefore, 

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did not present Ground Two (a) or (b) to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly, 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust Grounds Two (a) and (b). 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that, in his first trial, the court denied him due 

process by constructively amending the indicted charge by giving a “defective jury 

instruction on the charge of second-degree murder excising its two clauses for the 

consideration of self-defense, which confounded the jurors and caused their inability to 

reach a verdict.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that the court in his 

first trial denied him due process by declaring a mistrial. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Petitioner did not 

present these claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct review. (Doc. 16, Exs. F, 

G.) Similarly, he did not present these claims to the trial court on post-conviction review. 

(Doc. 16, Ex. K.) Moreover, he did not present any claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals on post-conviction review. Accordingly, Petitioner did not properly exhaust 

Grounds Three and Four. 

 2. Petitioner did not Fairly Present Grounds Two, Three and Four 

 As Petitioner argues, he presented his claims asserted in Grounds Two (a) and (b), 

Ground Three, and Ground Four to the Arizona Supreme Court in a state petition for writ 

of habeas corpus.4

 (Doc. 16, Ex. N at 3.) The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed the 

petition because Petitioner’s claims should have been raised in a Rule 32 petition. 

(Doc. 16, Ex. O.) 

 In Arizona, a state petition for writ of habeas corpus is a limited remedy reserved 

for challenges to the court’s jurisdiction. See Griswold v. Gomes, 523 P.2d 490, 493 

(Ariz. 1974) (“The writ of habeas corpus is not intended to serve as a means for a 

defendant to obtain successive appeals, and all issues which were raised by a defendant 

on appeal or which might have been raised on appeal are precluded from attack in 

subsequent petitions for writ of habeas corpus”); State v. Montez, 432 P.2d 456, 459 

(Ariz. 1967) (in Arizona, habeas corpus petitions “may not be used to collaterally attack a 

 

4

 In that petition, Petitioner states that these claims were not presented in any appeal or post-conviction petition. (Doc. 16, Ex. N at 3.) 

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judgment of conviction where the claimed errors do not involve a loss of jurisdiction by a 

court . . . .”); Boies v. Dovico, 400 P.2d 109, 110 (Ariz. 1965) (the issuance of the writ of 

habeas corpus is discretionary with the court in which it is sought). 

 Accordingly, the presentation of claims in a state petition for writ of habeas corpus 

does not constitute fair presentation for purposes of the exhaustion requirement. See 

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (raising a claim in a procedural context in 

which the merits would not be considered absent special and important reasons does not 

constitute fair presentation for purposes of exhaustion); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 

36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Submitting a new claim to the state’s highest court in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special circumstances 

does not constitute fair presentation.”). 

 As set forth above, Petitioner did not fairly present Grounds Two (a), Two (b), 

Three, and Four to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally proper manner. It 

would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state court to try to exhaust these claims 

because a successive petition for post-conviction relief would be untimely, and his claims 

would be precluded from Rule 32 review because they could have been raised in 

Petitioner’s prior post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 

32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a general rule, when 

[claims] are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, 

subsequent claims [] will be deemed waived and precluded.”) (internal quotation 

omitted). 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s claims do not implicate any of the other exceptions to 

the timeliness or preclusion rules referred to in Rule 32.4(a) and Rule 32.2(b), including 

being held in custody after the imposed sentence expired, the presentation of newly 

discovered material facts that probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, the 

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief or a notice of appeal that was not 

the defendant’s fault, a change in the law, or the petitioner’s actual innocence. See Rule 

32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). Accordingly, federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s 

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claims asserted in Grounds Two (a) and (b), Ground Three, and Ground Four is 

procedurally barred. See McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(finding claims procedurally defaulted because petitioner was barred from exhausting his 

claims in the first instance by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)); see also Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

at 848. 

 3. Petitioner has not Established a Basis to Overcome the 

 Procedural Bar 

 Because Petitioner’s claims in Grounds Two (a) and (b), Ground Three, and 

Ground Four are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas corpus review is unavailable 

unless Petitioner establishes “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” to overcome the procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. For the reasons 

below, the Court finds that Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome the 

procedural bar. 

 i. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, 

a petitioner must present “new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not 

presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

 The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than not that 

no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327. 

Petitioner has not presented new evidence and has not shown that failure to consider his 

procedurally defaulted claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

(Docs. 1, 22.) Thus, he has not met Schlup’s high standard and this exception does not 

excuse the procedural bar. 

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 ii. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Liberally construed, Petitioner’s reply asserts that the trial court’s denial of his 

request for transcripts constitutes cause for his procedural default. (Doc. 22 at 4.) 

Petitioner argues that during post-conviction proceedings the trial court denied him 

transcripts from his first trial that ended in a mistrial. The trial court denied Petitioner’s 

request for transcripts from his first trial because that trial had ended in a mistrial and was 

not appealable. (Doc. 1 at 37.) In his Petition, Petitioner states that he “eventually 

track[ed] down” the transcripts. (Doc. 1 at 7.) However, he does not specifically identify 

the transcripts that he was allegedly denied or state when he obtained the transcripts. See 

United States v. Lewis, 605 F.2d 379 (8th Cir.1979) (holding that prisoner does not have 

an absolute right to transcripts to collaterally attack his sentence). Significantly, 

Petitioner does explain why he needed the transcripts from his first trial that ended in a 

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mistrial to properly exhaust any of the federal claims asserted in his Petition. Petitioner’s 

general assertion that he was denied transcripts from his first trial that ended in a mistrial 

does not constitute cause for the procedural default of his claims. 

 Petitioner does not assert any other basis to establish cause for his procedural 

default of his claims. Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge and 

assistance, and limited legal resources do not establish cause to excuse the procedural bar 

to review of his claims. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause 

to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). Accordingly, 

Petitioner has not shown cause for his procedural default and the Court does not consider 

whether Petitioner has shown prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Therefore, federal habeas corpus review of these claims is barred. 

IV. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents did not violate any rule 

or order by filing an answer limited to the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust. 

Accordingly, the Court considered Respondents’ answer. As set forth above, Ground 

One is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review and, alternatively, lacks merit. 

Grounds Two (a) and (b), Ground Three, and Ground Four are procedurally barred and 

Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome that bar. Accordingly, the Court 

recommends that the Petition be denied.5

 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s request to strike Respondents’ Limited 

Answer (Doc. 22 at 1-2) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

 

5

 In his Reply, Petitioner argues that the matter should be stayed and asserts that Attorney General Mark Brnovich has a conflict of interest. (Doc. 22 at 7-8.) The Court 

previously addressed these issues and will not revisit them. (See Docs. 18, 19.) 

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 21st day of May, 2015. 

 

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