Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05171/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05171-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 11, 1995 Decided August 15, 1995

No. 94-5171

BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.,

APPELLANT

v.

MERRELL WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(94ms0171)

Kenneth W. Starr argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were William C. Hendricks,

III, and Kerrie C. Dent. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., entered an appearance.

Barbara K. Bracher, Principal Assistant General Counsel and Solicitor, Office of the General

Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellees.

Before: SILBERMAN, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Brown & Williamson appeals an order of the district court

quashing subpoenas duces tecum issued to two Members of the House of Representatives. We

affirm.

I.

This case grows out of another lawsuit brought in Kentucky state court in September 1993

by the Louisville law firm Wyatt, Tarrant & Coombs (Wyatt, Tarrant) against a former paralegal at

the firm, Merrell Williams. Williams had worked on confidential litigation-related document

production for Wyatt, Tarrant in connection with the firm's representation of Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp. (B&W) in products liability lawsuits. About a year after leaving the firm, Williams

told Wyatt, Tarrant that he had made copies of various B&Wdocumentsto which he had had access;

he delivered to the firm a box claimed to contain the copies in his possession. At the same time, he

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threatened to seek damages for injuries allegedly caused by smoking and by his exposure during the

course of his employment to information that had induced psychological suffering.

Wyatt, Tarrant responded by suing Williams for breach of contract and various torts based

on his filching of B&W documents, which the firm sought to have returned. The court ordered

Williamsto surrender anymaterialstill in his possession and issued a temporary injunction restraining

him from disclosing or using any information acquired during his employment. B&W filed a motion

to intervene, which was granted several days after suit was brought. Williams filed his promised

counter-suit against B&W six months later, in March 1994.

Sometime earlier, in July 1993, the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Health and

the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce began hearings on the effects of

tobacco products. Appellee Waxman was the chairman of that committee, and appellee Wyden

apparently played a prominent role. By March 1994, the Subcommittee had turned its attention to

the question of manipulation of nicotine levels by tobacco manufacturers, and on April 14, 1994,

heard testimony on this subject from the CEOs of the nation's seven largest tobacco companies,

including B&W. Following this hearing, on March 5, 1994, Chairman Waxman wrote B&W stating

that the Subcommittee had "recently learned" that in the 1960sthe company had conducted research

into the pharmacological effects of nicotine and desired copies of any resulting studies and reports.

Two dayslater, on March 7, 1994, the first ofseveral newsstories concerning internalB&W

documents appeared in the national media. And the following day, Representative Waxman stated

in a radio interview that his subcommittee had recently received "documents that were evidently

stolen from some law firm office that represented [B&W]." B&W then obtained an order from the

Kentucky court directing Williams to appear for a deposition concerning the apparent receipt of its

documents byCongress and various newsreporters. The judge also issued an Order and Commission

for the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum to Representatives Waxman and Wyden for "the

production and inspection" of all B&W documents in the witnesses' possession as well as requiring

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1The subpoenas stated that leave was given B&W "to take a deposition" of each congressman

"for the sole and exclusive purpose of the inspection and copying of:"

(a) all alleged Brown & Williamson and affiliated companies' documents, and

copies of such documents, which are in the possession, custody, or control of the

said witness, or any subordinate or agent or representative of him and which were

referred to in:

1. The New York Times article of May 7, 1994 relating to such

documents;

2. The National Public Radio interview on May 8, 1994 in which said

witness discussed such documents;

3. The National Public Radio broadcast on Morning Edition on May 13,

1994 relating to such documents;

4. The Washington Post Article of May 14, 1994 relating to such

documents; and

(b) all other Brown & Williamson and affiliated companies' documents, and copies

of such documents, in the possession, custody, or control of such witness. 

2

In doing so, it declined to follow district court precedent holding that the passive receipt of

documents provided by outside parties is not a legislative act entitled to protection under the

Speech or Debate Clause. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 527 F. Supp. 676 (D.D.C.1981). 

the Congressmen to attend a deposition byB&W.1 On appeal, however, the appellant assures us that

it does not wish to depose the Congressmen. Similar Orders and Commissions authorized subpoenas

to various reporters and news organizations as well.

The Kentucky court's orders were presented to the Superior Court for the District of

Columbia, which issued the subpoenas on May 18, 1994. The following day, Representatives

Waxman and Wyden filed a petition for removal with the United States District Court, along with a

motion to quash the subpoenas on the ground that the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. Const., art. I,

§ 6, cl. 1, excused them from compliance. The court determined that it enjoyed removal jurisdiction

over the subpoena proceedings and, on June 6, 1994, granted the motion to quash. Maddox v.

Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 411-13 (D.D.C. 1994). The court agreed with the congressmen that the

Speech or Debate Clause barred enforcement of the subpoenas.2 B&W sought, and was denied,

reconsideration, and appealed.

II.

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3The courts of the District of Columbia are treated as "state" courts for removal purposes. 

Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 395 n.5 (1973). 

Before turning to the Speech or Debate Clause we must satisfy ourselves as to our

jurisdiction. In the district court, and again here, B&W has questioned whether Representatives

Waxman and Wyden, having merely been served with the subpoenas, were authorized to remove the

proceedingsto federal court. According to appellant, the relevant federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a) (1988), allowsfederal officersto transfer proceedingsto a federal district court only when

they are themselves defendantsin the state court action. Under such circumstances the federal forum

becomes necessary, we are told, because it is then that real concerns arise about the forum of

adjudication. The congressmen are not defendants here but only subjects ofsubpoenas ducestecum.

And while their refusal to comply may rest on assertions of federal privilege, that by itself is not

enough to satisfy the statute's conditions for removal.

It is certainly true that the language of the removal statute ostensibly supports B&W's

argument. The statute provides, in relevant part:

A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against

any of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of

the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it

is pending:

(1) Any officer of the United States ... for any act under color of such office

...

* * * *

(4) Any officer of either House of Congress, for any act in the discharge of his

official duty under an order of such House.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (emphases added). By its terms, then, the statute confers removal jurisdiction

over either a state court "civil action" or "criminal prosecution" brought "against" a federal

officialas long as the "action" for which he is being questioned was undertaken "under color" of

the federal office.3 This last condition has long been interpreted to require "that federal officer

removalmust be predicated on the allegation of a colorable federaldefense." Mesa v. California, 489

U.S. 121, 129 (1989). That such a defense has been raised is not contested. B&W disputes

appellees' contention that the Speech or Debate Clause immunizes appellees from compliance with

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4Congress first established removal jurisdiction in 1815 as a temporary measure for federal

customs officers. See Act of Feb. 4, 1815, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198. Later enactments broadened the

scope of officers entitled to seek removal and made the provision a permanent feature of the

judicial code. For a brief history of the evolution of these statutes, see Willingham, 395 U.S. at

405-06. See also P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE

FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1057-60 (3d ed. 1988). 

the superior court's subpoena, but it does not deny that the immunity asserted is an at least

"colorable" federal defense. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969).4

Appellant does, however, question whether it is possible to remove in the absence of some

sort of proceeding against an official. The statute, it is argued, contemplates some state inquiry into

an official's commission of an "act" under claim of federal office. And the superior court's subpoena

order constitutes neither a "criminal prosecution" nor a "civil action." The latter, under the Federal

Rules, is only created by the filing of a complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. In response, the congressmen

point to what they claim is the purpose of the removal statute, as described in the case law, rather

than the actual language. They assert that § 1442(a) was designed to carry out a congressional intent

"that federal officers, and indeed the Federal Government itself, [have] the protection of a federal

forum," and that therefore "[t]his policy should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging

interpretation." Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407. The statute serves to "ensure a federal forum in any

case where a federal official is entitled to raise a defense arising out of his official duties," Arizona

v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 241 (1981), and "to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United

States by safeguarding officers and others acting under federal authority against peril of punishment

for violation ofstate law." Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 517 (1932) (citing Tennessee v. Davis,

100 U.S. 257 (1880); Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926)). In light of these broad

pronouncements (among others), § 1442(a) should, according to appellees, be interpreted to allow

a federal officer to remove to federal court whenever he seeks to rely upon federal grounds in

proceedings before a state court. The statute is not, in other words, limited to the situation where

the federal officer asserts a federal excuse in defense of actions that are the focus of the state

proceeding. It is also available when a federal privilegehere, the Speech or Debate Clauseis

claimed to defeat an assertion of state court authority, such as the subpoenas at issue in this

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proceeding.

None of these Supreme Court cases, on which appellee relies, are directly on point.

Willingham, for example, decided simply that the "color of office" test was satisfied by an officer's

assertion of a colorable federal defensea matter not disputed here. As the case fell squarely within

the "civil action" category, see 395 U.S. at 409, it does not really bear on the issue before us. The

same istrue for Manypenny and Symes, which are essentially technical opinions. The former decided

that states could appeal adverse judgments in removed criminal proceedings, Manypenny, 451 U.S.

at 240-50, and the latter held that in "so exceptional a procedure" asremoval of a state criminal case,

an officer's removal petition could not rely upon conclusory statements, Symes, 286 U.S. at 519-20

(quoting Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. at 33).

The circuitsthat have considered whether proceedings not generally thought paradigm "civil

actions" or "criminal prosecutions" can be removed under § 1442(a) have not been uniform in their

approach. Garnishment proceedings, for example, have been held removable by the Ninth Circuit,

see Nationwide Investors v. Miller, 793 F.2d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 1986), but the Fifth Circuit came

to the opposite conclusion, see Hexamer v. Foreness, 981 F.2d 821, 823 (5th Cir. 1993). Those

circuitsto have confronted the questionwhether a contempt proceeding isremovable have, however,

answered affirmatively. See Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 1992); Florida v.

Cohen, 887 F.2d 1451, 1453 (11thCir. 1989); Wisconsin v. Schaffer, 565 F.2d 961, 963-64 (7thCir.

1977) (citing North Carolina v. Carr, 386 F.2d 129, 131 (4thCir. 1967)); Boron Oil Co. v. Downie,

873 F.2d 67, 68 (4th Cir. 1989). To our knowledge, no court has held otherwise.

Indeed, appellant concedes that removal would be available in this case if the congressmen

refused to comply with the subpoena and faced a civil contempt proceeding. That concessiona

necessary one, we thinkundermines part of their linguistic argument. An ancillary civil contempt

proceeding is no more a "civil action" within the meaning of the federal rules than is a subpoena

enforcement proceeding. If the former qualifies as a "civil action" under the removal statute there

is no reason to conclude that the latter does not. There are still the questions, however, whether a

subpoena enforcement proceeding should be thought a civil action "against" the congressmen as

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would be a civil contempt proceeding, and whether the congressmen can be thought to have "acted"

within the meaning of the statute.

The only circuit case to have decided whether removal is available to assert a federal privilege

against a subpoena is Louisiana v. Sparks. In Sparks, however, a "peculiarity of Louisiana law"

collapsed the very issue in dispute betweenB&Wand the congressmen. Id. at 232. The court upheld

removal prior to the initiation of contempt proceedings, but rested its decision on the Louisiana

courts' capacity to impose "direct" contempt sanctionswithout opportunity for removal. Id. The

court expressly reserved the question whether removalfor purposes of resisting the subpoena would

have been appropriate had there been an opportunity for removal at a later juncture, before the

imposition of sanctions. Id. n.10.

Admittedly, a civil contempt proceeding is closer in nature to a civil action than is a subpoena

enforcement proceeding. And at the point of contempt, as appellant argues, a federal official's action

is called into questionwhich is not really true at the earlier stage. Still in a subpoena enforcement

proceeding the power of the state court is certainly directed "against" the target official. Although

the federal officer might be thought to have not yet been called to account for his "action"refusing

to comply with the subpoenaprior to a contempt proceeding, that interpretation seems quite

artificial. Once the subpoena is issued, a clash between state power and the federal official appears

to be naturally inevitable. Certainly in any case in which the officer (typically represented by the

federal government or Congress) seeks removal, we can assume the officer would be prepared to

force the matter to a contempt proceedingat which point removal is clearly available. Appellant

has not suggested any reason why Congress would have wished that confrontation to be actually

ignited before removal. We think, therefore, that the officer's "act," declining to comply with the

subpoena, can be presumed to occur simultaneously with the removal petition. We do not believe

Congress used the terms "civil action," "against," or "act" in the limited fashion that appellant urges,

but rather meant to refer to any proceeding in which state judicial civil power was invoked against

a federal official. Jurisdiction lies under § 1442(a).

III.

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5Nevertheless, the Clause restricts the manner in which such a prosecution can be conducted. 

Even when properly subject to suit, members of Congress are privileged against the evidentiary

use against them of any legislative act, even if the act is not claimed to be itself illegal, but is

offered only to show motive, such as behavior in furtherance of a bribe. See United States v.

Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1979); Brewster, 408 U.S. at 527; Johnson, 383 U.S. at 169. 

The Speech or Debate Clause is deceptively simple: "for any Speech or Debate in either

House, [Members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6,

cl. 1. From this terse prohibition has emerged a somewhat complicated privilege, with several

strands. Chief among these is the immunization from lawsuits, both civil and criminal. The Clause

confers onMembers ofCongressimmunityfor all actions "within the "legislative sphere,' even though

their conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or

otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes." Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973)

(internal citations omitted). The purpose of the protection "is to insure that the legislative function

the Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently," without regard to the

distractions of private civil litigation or the perils of criminal prosecution. Eastland v. United States

Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975).

The Clause is not, to be sure, a blanket prohibition on suits against congressmen. It protects

onlythose congressionalacts properlythought to fallwithin the legislative functionthose "generally

done in a session of the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it." Kilbourn

v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881). The Clause does not, for example, prevent the criminal

prosecution of Members of Congress for misconduct, even if somehow connected with their

performance of official responsibilities. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) (citing

United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)). Malfeasance by a Member does not fall within the

legislative sphere simply because it is associated with congressional duties. As the Supreme Court

explained in allowing a bribery prosecution to go forward in Brewster, the constitutional protection

for acts within the legislative sphere does not extend to "all conduct relating to the legislative

process," 408 U.S. at 515, but only to those activities that are "clearly a part of the legislative

processthe due functioning of the process," id. at 516.5 This formulation, of course, implies that

the judiciary cannot avoid determining what are the outer limits of legitimate legislative process.

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Accordingly, congressional complicity in a scheme to seize property illegally will undo any claim of

immunity raised in a prosecution or civil action. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85

(1967); McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. granted,

434 U.S. 888 (1977), cert. dismissed sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U.S. 189 (1978).

The Speech or Debate Clause appliesin civil cases as well as criminal prosecutions. See, e.g.,

Eastland, 421 U.S. at 502-03; Dombrowski, 387 U.S. at 84-85; McMillan, 412 U.S. at 312-13.

Although the Clause "was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits," it was designed "to

prevent intimidation by the executive and accountabilitybefore a possiblyhostile judiciary," Johnson,

383 U.S. at 180-81. The Clause states, after all, that Members shall not be called to account "in any

other Place"not just a criminal court. The prohibition of civil actions is consistent, moreover, with

the objective of preserving legislative independence:

[A] private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a distraction

and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative

tasks to defend the litigation. Private civil actions also may be used to delay and

disrupt the legislative function. Moreover, whether a criminal action is instituted by

the Executive Branch, or a civil action is brought by private parties, judicial power is

still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative independence is

imperiled.

Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503. As with criminal prosecutions, however, the privilege only bars civil suits

when the action complained of falls within the legislative sphere. For example, although a

congressman cannot be sued for defamatory statements made on the House floor, he has no claim to

immunity for a libel action based on his subsequent republication of those statements outside

Congress; those later expressions are no part of the "legislative process." See Hutchinson v.

Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1979); see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 622-27

(1972); cf. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 314-16 & nn.8, 10 (1973); McSurely, 553 F.2d at 1285-86.

The privilege also permitsCongressto conduct investigations and obtain informationwithout

interference from the courts, at least when these activities are performed in a procedurally regular

fashion. In Eastland, the Supreme Court refused to authorize injunctions against congressional

subpoenas that sought access to the financial records of a group opposed to the Vietnam War.

Although the subpoenas arguably infringed upon the association rights of the group's contributing

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6Uses that fall outside the confines of "legislative action," howeversuch as the dissemination

of investigatory information outside Congressare not protected. McSurely, 553 F.2d at 1285-

86. 

7Except that appellant contends that civil actions are less of a constitutional concern than are

criminal proceedings. 

members, see National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449

(1958), they were nevertheless deemed closed to judicial inspection. The Court held that Congress

was authorized to investigate any subject "on which legislation could be had," Eastland, 421 U.S. at

504 n.15, and that therefore its issuance of subpoenas necessarily fell within the legislative sphere.

That Americans might suffer injustices(perhaps even unconstitutional ones) did not permit courtsto

scrutinize the purposes and methods of congressional inquiry. Rather, the legislative privilege is

"absolute" where it applies at all. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509. Those distressed by the investigation

had no judicial remedy so long as Congress acted in a procedurally regular manner. "[R]isk of such

abuse," the Court stated, "was "the conscious choice of the Framers.' " Id. at 510.

Closely relatedindeed a corollaryto this right to pursue investigations is Congress'

privilege to use materialsin its possession without judicial interference. McSurely, 553 F.2d at 1295-

96; Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821, 823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dicta), aff'd in part, rev'd in

part, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); see also Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1936). In this

context, the privilege operates to insulate materials held by Congress from claims based on actions

or occurrences other than Congress' present use. In McSurely, we held en banc that the questionable

provenance of documents or other materials was irrelevant to Congress' capacity to retain or make

use of them. "The law is clear that even though material comes to a legislative committee by means

that are unlawful or otherwise subject to judicial inquiry the subsequent use of the documents by the

committee staff in the course of official businessis privileged legislative activity." 553 F.2d at 1296-

97. Although Members and (more likely) their agents can be held accountable for illegal seizures,

see Dombrowski, 387 U.S. at 84-85; McSurely, 553 F.2d at 1294-96, that does not affect Congress'

privilege to use illegally seized materials, so long as that use is consistent with legislative purposes.6

These background legal principles essentially are common ground between the parties.7

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Appellant claims, however, that the core purpose of the Clause is to protect congressmen from suit.

Although the Clause has been extended to apply to efforts to compel congressmen to testify

concerning legislative acts relevant in lawsuits brought against third parties, such an extension

beyond the Clause's core purpose, appellant argues, must be carefully justified and weighed against

countervailing interests. And the justification for this extension should be limited to those

circumstances where a testimonial privilege is necessary to protect a congressman against a hostile

confrontation which seeks to impugn his or her reputation, not just a situation where a congressman

is inconvenienced by a court's request for the production of documents that had been given to the

congressman or Congress by a third party. In this case neither Congressman Waxman's nor

Congressman Wyden's behavior is challenged, only the actions of Williams who took the documents

from the law firm. Moreover, that the documents are both stolen and privileged (attorney-client and

work product) gives added force to appellant's claim that the privilege was over extended by the

district court.

The congressmen respond that the testimonial privilege is as extensive and as absolute as the

privilege against suit. "In the absence of an independent unconstitutional act by the Subcommittee

itself, the privilege accorded toCongressforitssubcommittee'sinvestigatorydocumentsis preserved,

regardless of B&W's separate claims against Williams." Appellees assert, somewhat half-heartedly,

that B&W's claimsthat the documents are both stolen and privileged is "unproven," but, in any event,

according to the Congressmen, that is irrelevant. Once the documents were received by Congress

for legislative useat least so long as congressmen were not involved in the alleged theftan

absolute constitutional bar of privilege drops like a steel curtain to prevent B&W from seeking

discovery. As an added point, appellees assert that in this case Congressman Wyden promised the

supplier of the document confidentiality, and therefore to permit B&W's discovery would

"jeopardize" that promise. Such a decision would, according to the congressmen, necessarily "chill"

Congress' ability to attract future confidential disclosures necessary for legislative purposes.

We think it is fair to assume on the record before us that the documents in question were in

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8

If this issue were seriously in disputeand materialit surely follows that it would be

inappropriate to affirm the district court, which did not make any finding as to whether the

documents were stolen. We therefore do not understand why appellees even question B&W's

assertion. 

9Compare Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Gravel, 408 U.S. at 631-32; id. at 662-64

(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also McSurely, 553 F.2d at 1286-94; id. at 1303 (Wilkey, J.,

dissenting) (agreeing as to principle, but disagreeing as to its application). 

fact stolen (and that they were privileged).8 Representative Waxman said as much during a radio

interview. Under those circumstances, it seems more than a little strange for the district court and

appellees to assert an interest in preventing a judicial ruling that would have a "chilling" affect. It

cannot be seriously argued that we should wish to encourage Americans to steal other Americans'

documents, or any other items, to be passed on to Congress.9

Putting the character of the documents to one side, however, we examine B&W's basic

doctrinal argumentthat the testimonial privilege is weaker than congressional immunity from suit.

Looking only to the text of the Constitution, we would be inclined to conclude that, if anything,

appellant has it backwards. The Clause says nothing specifically about lawsuits; what it does say is

that members ofCongress "shall not be questioned in any other place" about legislative actions. U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Based on the text of the Constitution, it would seem that

the immunity from suit derives from the testimonial privilege, not the other way around.

In any event, the Supreme Court recognized the testimonial privilege in Gravel v. United

States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), and we relied upon and elaborated its scope extensively in Minpeco,

S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 844 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In the latter case, defendants

in a civil action subpoenaed information and documents from a congressional subcommittee on the

grounds that testimony contained in a subcommittee report (which they expected to be used against

them at trial) did not accurately reflect the testimony actually given. They sought proof, in other

words, that the subcommittee staff had falsified the report. Affirming the district court's decision to

quash the subpoenas, we rejected the argument that the privilege "is available only if Congress can

demonstrate that it faces the burden of defending a lawsuit that threatens an impermissible

interference in congressional business by the judiciary." Id. at 859. The Speech or Debate Clause,

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we said, "cannot be limited by so artificial a line.... A litigant does not have to name members or their

staffs as parties to a suit in order to distract them from their legislative work. Discovery procedures

can prove just as intrusive." Id. (emphasis added).

In so holding, we adopted reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit in a similar case, Miller v.

Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983). In Miller, a plaintiff in an action against

a third party sought to compel testimony from a former congressman about the circumstances of his

placing materials in the Congressional Record some years earlier. (The statute of limitations barred

any action against the congressman himself.) The Ninth Circuit thought that even though the

subpoena would not interfere with current congressional activities, its enforcement would result in

questioning asto a legislative act and would therefore be inconsistent with the Clause's concern with

protecting congressional integrity. Id. at 528. That the Clause was being asserted in a purely

testimonial context in no way limited its applicability. "Once the legislative-act test is met," the court

held, "the privilege is absolute." Id. at 529 (citing Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503). We embraced the

same principle in Minpeco, where we declared thatsince the subcommittee'sinclusion ofthe allegedly

altered testimony in a congressionalreport "was part of the legislative process," that was "the end of

the matter"the courts could not compel testimony over the assertion of the privilege. 844 F.2d at

861.

B&W claims that Minpeco and Miller do not control; the subpoenas at issue here are

different fromthe discoveryeffortsin those earlier cases, because there the information sought would

have impugned congressional "integrity" by showing that testimony had been altered before being

published as reports, see Minpeco, 844 F.2d at 857-58, or that materials had been inserted into the

Congressional Record for improper purposes, see Miller, 709 F.2d at 528. Here, by contrast, the

subpoenas are said to be entirely neutral as to congressional conduct; all that is sought is access to

appellant's own documents. It is a clever effort to escape the damaging precedent by focusing on one

meaning of the word "integrity," but it does not work. When the Supreme Court earlier stated that

the purpose of the Clause is to protect the "integrity of the legislative process," Brewster, 408 U.S.

at 507, 517, the word "integrity" was being used by the Supreme Court as it was by us in Minpeco,

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not in the sense of "reputation for rectitude" but rather in the sense of "a state of being unimpaired."

The privilege is not designed to protect the reputations of congressmen but rather the functioning of

Congress. In Minpeco we were not concerned with Congress' image, but only with its capacity to

function effectively if beset by third-party discovery requests. See 844 F.2d at 859-61. The same is

true for Miller. See 709 F.2d at 529. In both cases the only question was whether the subpoenas

inquired into legislative conduct. See Minpeco, 844 F.2d at 862 (quoting Miller, 709 F.2d at 529);

see also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503 ("[O]nce it is determined that Members are acting within the

"legitimate legislative sphere' the Speech or DebateClause is an absolute bar to interference.") (citing

McMillan, 412 U.S. at 314). Contrary to appellant's reading, the purposes behind the subpoenasor

their potential for embarrassment, if enforcedwere irrelevant to the holding in either case.

B&W does concede that a "second purpose" of the Clause is "to prevent intrusions into the

legislative process," but assures us that its request to inspect and copy its documents is "the least

intrusive means" of obtaining the information that it seeks. That appellant has devised the "least

intrusive means" does not, of course, establish its right to make the request in the first place; nor

doesit render the request unobtrusive. Appellant's subpoena might well be less onerous than the one

rejected in Minpeco (where all internal documents, correspondence, and communicationsrelating to

the disputed testimony were sought), but that is of no particular significance. The degree of

disruption is immaterial. In Minpeco too it was claimed that any distraction would be slight, but we

held that an approach to the Clause that would require "an initial judicial inquiry ... to calibrate the

degree to which [a subpoena's] enforcement would burden the committee's work" would be "absurd."

844 F.2d at 860. In short, any probing of legislative acts is sufficient to trigger the immunity.

To be sure, as appellant emphasizes, Gravel, although recognizing the testimonial privilege,

held that a Senator's aide (or the Senator) could be questioned before a grand jury regarding the

provenance of classified Defense Department documentsthe Pentagon Papersthat had come into

Senator Gravel's possession (and which he had entered into the record during a midnight meeting of

the Buildings and Grounds Subcommittee ofthe Senate Public Works Committee). 408 U.S. at 609.

The Speech or Debate Clause, the Court determined, privileged the Senator (and his aides) against

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testifying as to legislative acts, even with respect to potential wrongdoing by third parties. See id.

at 616-22. But the Court did not "perceive any constitutional or other privilege" standing in the way

of "grand jury questions relevant to tracing the source of obviously highly classified documents that

came into the Senator's possession and are the basic subject matter of the inquiry." Id. at 628. From

this case appellant argues that, at least, the testimonial privilege does not categorically bar efforts to

discover the source of documents that Congress has obtained.

We think that is a vast overreading of Gravel; if that were so, any person facing the prospect

oftestimony before Congress could initiate discovery proceedingsto reach documentsthat Congress

had not prepared itself. That certainly would "chill" any congressional inquiry; indeed, it would

cripple it. It should first be noted that in parsing Gravel the questioning allowed by the Supreme

Court was part of a grand jury investigationa factor the Court repeatedly emphasized. See id. It

does not necessarily follow from Gravel that the same rule would apply to similar efforts stemming

from a civil action brought by a third party. Although a distinction between civil and criminal does

not really square with the Court's statements in Eastland that the Clause's prohibition, when

applicable, is "absolute," Eastland was decided after Gravel, and certainlytook into account the prior

opinion'sregard for the significance of "trials or grand juryproceedingsinvolving third-party crimes,"

Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622; see also id. at 628. Gravel's sensitivities to the existence of criminal

proceedings against persons other than Members of Congress at least suggest that the testimonial

privilege might be less stringently applied when inconsistent with a sovereign interest, but is

"absolute" in all other contexts.

Still, the Third Circuit has also read Gravel and the Clause in a fashion that, at least in part,

supports appellant. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978). There the court

decided that when the Clause is invoked as a bar to discovery of documentary materials the

availability of the privilege depends on the purposes for which the information is sought. See id. at

595. The "documents" at the center of that case were telephone toll records which had been

subpoenaed fromthe Clerk ofthe House in the course of a grand jury investigation into illegal actions

on the part of a congressman. The court believed that

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to the extent that the Speech or Debate Clause creates a testimonial privilege as well

as a use immunity, it does so only for the purpose of protecting the legislator ... from

the harassment of hostile questioning. It is not designed to encourage confidences by

maintaining secrecy, for the legislative process in a democracy has only a limited

toleration for secrecy. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.

Id. at 597.

From this understanding, the Third Circuit reasoned that the Speech or Debate Clause

privilege "when applied to records or third-party testimony is one of nonevidentiary use, not of

nondisclosure." Id. (citing United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 523 (3d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 442

U.S. 477 (1979)); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings(Cianfrani), 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).

Accordingly, it held that although toll records of telephone calls relevant to "legislative acts" could

not be used as evidence before the grand jury, the privilege did not bar the U.S. Attorney from taking

part in proceedingsin camera to determine which telephone calls corresponded to "legislative acts."

B&Wurges usto join the Third Circuit in holding that even though the Speech or Debate Clause bars

the use of documents as evidence against Members, it does not privilege them against

"discovery"and thus does not justify congressional refusals to disclose.

We do not accept the proposition that the testimonial immunity of the Speech or Debate

Clause only applies when Members or their aides are personally questioned. Documentary evidence

can certainly be as revealing as oral communicationseven if only indirectly when, as here, the

documentsin question (unlike those in Grand Jury Investigation) do not detailspecific congressional

actions. But indications as to what Congress is looking at provide clues as to what Congress is doing,

or might be about to doand this is true whether or not the documents are sought for the purpose

of inquiring into (or frustrating) legislative conduct or to advance some other goals, such as those

claimed by B&W here. We do not share the Third Circuit's conviction that democracy's "limited

toleration for secrecy" is inconsistent with an interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause that

would permit Congress to insist on the confidentiality of investigative files. To the extent that the

Third Circuit has adopted a special rule for the testimonial use of documents, we therefore disagree.

None of the Supreme Court's opinions acknowledges such a distinction. Indeed, the only authority

upon which the Third Circuit relied in adopting its approach isthe Constitution's (somewhat distant)

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10We are not convinced that the Third Circuit would enforce the subpoenas at issue here. 

Here, Congress is asserting the privilege as to matters that it holds confidentialthe content of its

fileswhereas in Grand Jury Investigation, the subpoenas sought the production of materials that

were also possessed by third parties. Cf. 587 F.2d at 595. Moreover, the court's disquiet over

congressional claims to secrecy was animated by the countermanding sovereign interest in

criminal law enforcement that was present in that case, as in Gravel. We doubt whether it would

take the same dim view of assertions of the privilege against private parties. 

11Appellant also argues that the privilege does not apply because it was waived by

Representative Waxman by virtue of his statements made during a radio broadcast interview. In

the interview he stated that the Subcommittee had received documents, apparently stolen, from a

law office that represented B&W. This statement is certainly not sufficient to support a finding of

any waiver of the Speech or Debate clause privilege. Cf. Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 490-91 (waiver

of immunity against prosecution, if possible, requires "explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the

protection"). 

direction that each House keep a "Journal of its Proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3, but we

do not read that provision as having any bearing on the applicability of the Speech or Debate Clause

privilege to documentary materials, cf. id. ("excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require

Secrecy").10

In any event, our own circuit precedent precludes our making this distinction between

documentary and oral testimony. It will be recalled that in Minpeco, documents had been sought for

solely testimonial purposes(i.e., not for use as evidence against Congress or any ofits Members), and

yet we held that the Speech or Debate Clause barred enforcement ofthe subpoenas ducestecum. See

844 F.2d at 859-60. That holding, it bears repeating, was premised on the notion that the Speech or

Debate Clause serves to insulate Members of Congress from distractions that "divert their time,

energy, and attention from their legislative tasks." Id. at 859 (quoting Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503).

Obviously, the nature of the use to which documents will be puttestimonial or evidentiaryis

immaterial if the touchstone isinterference with legislative activities. That is the rationale attributed

to the Clause in our most apposite precedents, and it necessarily governs our decision today.

To sum up, we do not agree with appellant's doctrinal approach to the Speech or Debate

Clause.11 A party is no more entitled to compel congressional testimonyor production of

documentsthan it is to sue congressmen. We do not perceive a difference in the vigor with which

the privilege protects against compelling a congressman's testimony as opposed to the protection it

provides againstsuit. Gravel permitted the tracing of allegedlyclassified documentsin the possession

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of the Senator and his aides because, as the Court said:

no prior case has held that Members of Congress would be immune if they executed

an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out an illegal arrest, or if, in order to

secure information for a hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the

privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides should be immune from liability or

questioning in such circumstances. Such acts are no more essential to legislating than

the conduct held unprotected in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).

Gravel, 408 U.S. at 621. Thus, documents or other material that comes into the hands of

congressmen may be reached either in a direct suit or a subpoena only if the circumstances by which

they come can be thought to fall outside "legislative acts" or the legitimate legislative sphere.

In this regard, we turn back to the character of the documents in question here. Appellant's

claim, as we understand it, isthat Congress' use of documents obtained through theft is no part of any

legitimate legislative activity. The point is a subtle one. Appellant does not accuse Congress of

complicity in any illegality. Rather, B&W assertsand the argument has some appealthat there

are procedures available to Congress through which it generally is presumed to operate. The

legislature has broad investigatory authority, including the subpoena power, and Congress certainly

could have sought the documents from B&W directly. But had it done so, the argument runs,

appellant would at least have had an opportunity to raise its privilege claim. Cf. United States v.

Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). Since there are mechanisms through which Congress could have

attempted to obtain these documents consistent with the rule of law, the means by which it operated

in this case cannot be thought "essential to legislating." Gravel, 408 U.S. at 621; cf. Brewster, 408

U.S. at 515-16 (privilege does not cover "all conductrelating to the legislative process" onlyactsthat

are part of "the due functioning of the process" (footnotes omitted)). As noted, the congressmen

respond to this argument with an argumentative stonewall. Unless the congressmen are responsible

for gaining the material through unconstitutional means an American who wishes access is just out

of luck. We are not prepared to accept that argumentthat once stolen and privileged property

passes into the legislative maw it can no longer be recovered. We very much doubt that Congress

can with impunity appropriate Americans' private property or maintain possession of any and all

privileged documents. (Suppose, for instance, the psychiatrist's records of an unpopular figure, facing

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12We can imagine some rather difficult hypotheticals involving tension between Congress' right

to "use" any such materials and a person's property right or the protection of doctor-patient

privileged material. Both interests might be accommodated under certain circumstances. For

instance, suppose a business' documents, of which it has no copies, are stolen and given to

Congress. If the business later needs the information that these documents contain it would have

a strong claim for obtaining copies of the documents but not necessarily the originals. The harm

that is caused by Congress retaining the stolen documents, the business' lack of the needed

information contained in the documents, can be remedied by simply allowing the business to

obtain copies. Congress could continue to keep the originals. Of course, one could construct

other scenarios where the harm caused by Congress retaining stolen documents might not be so

easily remedied. In any event, the remedy must be connected to the harm caused by Congress'

retention of stolen documents. It follows that the remedy does not necessarily have to take the

form of a return of the actual property. 

legislative inquiry, were stolen by a third party and passed on to a congressional committee.)12

Indeed, it may even be that congressmen could be prosecuted for knowing receipt of stolen

propertywhich after all is a crime in most jurisdictions. Still, it does not seem to us that the quality

of documents or material that Congressreceives hasthe same character regardless of who seekstheir

return (or discovery). Surely the American Tobacco Company, General Motors, or Common Cause

would not assert the privileged or stolen nature of the documents involved in this case as a basis for

subpoenaing them. That suggests that in asking whether the documents were obtained in a fashion

that should be thought to fall outside a legislative act we must bear in mind that the answer could be

different depending on who seeks the documents, and with what legal claim to entitlement.

The difficulty with appellant's position is the lack of a connection between the alleged stolen

or privileged nature of the documents and the remedy it seeks. B&W has not shown how copying

the documents would advance either its property or privilege interest. Even if it had, B&W might

be obliged to pursue other remedies before seeking to interfere with Congress' use, but it is

unnecessary to decide that here.

B&W claims (in a footnote in its brief) that it wishes to copy the documents as an aid to its

lawsuit against Williams "to prove damages... to preserve its privilege claims and to ascertain exactly

which documents were stolen by Williams." We find B&W's proffer quite unpersuasive. B&W has

conceded that the identity of the intermediary who delivered the documents to Congressis no longer

at issue; a plaintiff's lawyer, Richard Scruggs, has come forward as the source. Moreover, the

documents were apparently supplied to various media and academic institutions so we cannot

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13Theoreticallybut we think only theoreticallythe amount of damages could depend on

exactly which of B&W's documents were turned over to Congress. Appellant would have had to

spell that out quite precisely, however, to oblige us to decide such a difficult constitutional issue. 

Moreover, B&W has given us no reason to believe that they could not obtain this information in

another way. 

14We also note that B&W has the benefit of subpoenas issued directly to various press agencies

themselves. The best way to "authenticate" the papers relied upon by the media is by examining

the versions in the media's possession. We offer no view, of course, as to B&W's rights to

enforce such subpoenas or the privileges, if any, that might be asserted in response. 

conceive of how copies of the exact documents supplied to Congress can possibly be relevant to

damages. If congressional legislative action were to be considered an element of damages (which we

very much doubt) surely it is enough to establish that Congress received some of the documents

which is not really in dispute.13

Nor has B&W explained how the opportunity to review the documents relates in any way to

appellant's desire to "preserve its privilege claims." We do not understand how its requestto be

allowed to copy the documentsbears on its capacity to assert whatever attorney-client or

work-product privilege may be inherent in those materials. If in some future litigation it becomes

important for B&W to demonstrate that it never waived its privilege, it would certainly suffice, as

regardsto the documentsinCongress' possession, that it took affirmative stepsto secure them. B&W

does not itself need to gain access to preserve its privilege. It must merely attempt to prevent others

from doing so. (Of course our decision today, which is limited to discussing Congress' Speech or

Debate Clause privilege, in no way reflects on B&W's own privileges with respect to any of its

documents, stolen or otherwise, in Congress' possession.)

B&W's final justification for its subpoenas is that they are necessary to "authenticate the

documents discussed in the media." Whatever this means (and we have no idea), we do not see how

it relates to examination of the documents in the possession of Congress. Appellant has never

maintained that it lacks the originals of the documents that Williams allegedly copied and

disseminated. Presumably, it could "authenticate" any of the statements contained in press reports

by investigating its own files.14

The stolen or privileged character of the documents is irrelevant to the constitutional issue

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15We reject the district court's alternative ground for its holdingthat the Supremacy Clause

itself bars the issuance of subpoenas to Members of Congress. Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp.

406, 413-15 (D.D.C. 1994). This claim apparently was not even raised by appellees, who here

cannot bring themselves to argue a point upon which they prevailed below. They concede that

"the Supremacy Clause is not an independent basis for asserting substantive constitutional rights." 

before us. If this were merely a straight discovery effortto reach documents in Congress'

possession for a private purposewe doubt whether appellant would even seriously argue that the

privilege would not attach. At oral argument, however, appellant urged that we not focus on

appellant's purpose in seeking discovery; if that was unclear in the record, the case should be

remanded to the district court. We think, however, we are entitled to examine appellant's proffer

because it bears so directly on the relevance of the character of the documents to appellant's claim.

And the proffer on its own terms simply does not establish that relevance. For that reason, B&W

must be regarded as no different than any other plaintiff in a third party lawsuit who sought to

discoverthe documents. We therefore believe it unnecessary to decide whether Congress may invoke

the Speech or Debate Clause to protect stolen property against a rightful owner or to "use" privileged

documents in the same manner as any other material that comes into its possession. B&W's claim at

bottom, is to a right to engage in a broad scale discovery of documents in a congressional file that

comes from third parties. The Speech or Debate Clause bars that claim.15

* * * *

Although we affirm the district court, fairness obliges us to disassociate ourselves from

comments the district judge made in his opinion concerning his views as to the likely content of the

documents in question (which neither he nor we have seen) and B&W's motivation in seeking the

subpoenas. The products of major American tobacco companiesindeed their very existenceis

at the heart of one of the more contentious political issues of our time. As federal judges we wish

to make clear that we are not taking sides on this political issue.

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