Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02218/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02218-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED'-

united States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM SMITH, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

MAR 071995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

" . ) No. 93-2218 

) 

SECRETARY OF NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT ) 

OF CORRECTIONS; DERALD KERBY, ) 

Warden, Central New Mexico Correc- ) 

tional Facility, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CV 88-241) 

Stephen 

Mexico, 

P. McCue, Federal Public 

for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Margaret McLean (Tom Udall, Attorney General, with her on the 

brief), Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Before BRORBY, LOGAN and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Petitioner-appellant William J. Smith appeals the district 

court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Smith's primary basis for requesting 

relief from his two 1978 first degree murder con"ictions in New 

Mexico state court, and his corresponding consecuti"e life 

sentences, is the prosecution improperly withheld material 

exculpatory e"idence in "iolation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 u.s. 

Appellate Case: 93-2218 Document: 01019282412 Date Filed: 03/07/1995 Page: 1 
83 (1963), and its progeny. Our jurisdictionl arises under 28 

u.s. c. § 12 91. 

I . BACKGROUND 

A. Preliminary Facts2 

During the afternoon of Friday, August 12, 1977, rancher 

Wayne Wallace found the bodies of two young women in one of his 

corrals in rural Torrance County, New Mexico, near the small town 

1 Although the district court's order denying Mr. Smith's 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a "final judgment" for 

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the district court denied his 

request for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2253. As we discuss below, the requirement that a habeas 

petitioner obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal is a 

prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction; thus, the district court's 

refusal to grant a certificate of probable cause to appeal would 

limit our jurisdiction. Nonetheless, for reasons discussed in the 

body of this op1n1on, we conclude Mr. Smith has shown probable 

cause to appeal such that we will grant his request for a 

certificate of probable cause. See id. Accordingly, we have 

jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 

2 As is often the situation in many habeas corpus appeals, the 

sheer volume of the record, coupled with the factual complexity of 

the case and its age, makes our efforts to reconstruct what took 

place many years ago all the more difficult. The subsequent 

recitation of the background of this case should thus be 

understood in this light. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas courts must 

afford a presumption of correctness to a state court's findings of 

"basic, primary, or historical facts and the inferences that can 

properly be drawn regarding them." Case v. Mondragon, 887 F. 2d 

1388, 1393 (lOth Cir. 1989) (citing, inter alia, Marshall v. 

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431-32 (1983)), cert. denied. 494 u.s. 

1035 (1990); see also Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1348 n.l 

(lOth Cir. 1994). "Thus, [factual findings] must be determined, 

in the first instance, by state courts and deferred to, in the 

absence of 'convincing evidence' to the contrary, by the federal 

courts." Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (per curiam). 

As long as there is at least "fair support" in the record, a state 

court's findings of fact may not be disturbed by federal courts on 

habeas review. See Marshall, 459 U.S. at 432; see also Sumner v. 

Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598 (1982) (presumption of correctness 

requires a "high measure of deference" by federal habeas courts) . 

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of Mountainair. One of the bodies, later identified as that of 

Leslie McDonnell, was clothed in a yellow Budweiser T-shirt, jeans 

and no shoes. The other body, later identified as Cari Talton, 

a.k.a. Cari Newell,3 was found naked. A pair of jeans, a green Tshirt with the word "Okies" on it, and a pair of tan boots and 

socks were found next to Ms. Talton's body; however, no underwear 

could be located. 

Autopsies were performed the next day by Dr. J. Gauthier of 

the State Medical Examiner's Office. His examination of the 

partially decomposed bodies revealed Ms. McDonnell had been shot 

in the head by what could have been a shotgun, and Ms. Talton had 

been shot in the head and in the right side of her pelvis.4 Based 

on his finding of shotgun pellets and wadding in the vicinity of 

both of Ms. Talton's wounds, Dr. Gauthier concluded she had been 

shot with a shotgun, although he could not determine whether the 

same shotgun inflicted both of her wounds. Nelson Welch, an 

expert for the prosecution, testified5 although Ms. Talton had in 

3 Cari Talton often used the last name of her boyfriend or common 

law husband "Randy" Newell. Quotation marks are placed around the 

name "Randy" because, as we discuss later, "Randy" Newell was 

actually Samuel Newell. In fact, there was a real Randy Newell, 

who was Samuel's brother. Samuel Newell allegedly used his 

brother's name because he wanted to conceal his true identity. 

This issue is discussed in greater detail in the body of this 

opinion. 

4 With respect to the pelvic gunshot wound on Ms. Talton's body, 

Dr. Gauthier characterized it as a contact shotgun wound near the 

groin area. He further observed that the wound was inflicted 

directly over a professional tattoo. He also indicated his belief 

that because of the unusual location of the wound, whoever 

inflicted it did so intentionally. 

5 All references to the "testimony" of individuals are to their 

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fact been shot by a 12-gauge shotgun, he could not determine 

whether State's Exhibit 44, a 12-gauge shotgun belonging to Mr. 

Smith, was the gun actually used to shoot her. David Ramirez, a 

criminalistics expert, testified there were no workable prints on 

Exhibit 44, nor was there any indication the weapon had recently 

been cleaned. Dr. Gauthier was unable to determine the precise 

time of death due to the decomposition of the bodies. He did 

indicate, however, that the degree of decomposition of the bodies 

was consistent with the women having been dead for two to three 

days.6 

Because the women's bodies were found within the geographical 

limits of Torrance County, the initial investigation was 

undertaken by the Torrance County Sheriff's Department and the New 

Mexico State Police. When it was subsequently learned the women 

were from Albuquerque, in Bernalillo County, the Albuquerque 

Police Department also became involved. Prior to the time when 

the decision was made to prosecute these cases in Bernalillo 

County, the cross-jurisdictional nature of these cases resulted in 

two different investigative tracks. The Bernalillo County 

investigation focused on Mr. Smith and some of his friends, while 

the Torrance County investigation targeted 11Randy 11 Newell. 

testimony 

indicated. 

at the second trial in this case unless otherwise 

Mr. Smith's first trial ended in a mistrial. 

6 Entomologist Clifford Crawford testified that a maggot 

collected from Ms. McDonnell's body was at a stage of development 

consistent with having hatched approximately two and a half or 

three to eight days earlier. 

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B. The Results of the Bernalillo County Investigation 

Robert Hume had been living with Ms. McDonnell for about a 

year and a half at the time of her disappearance. He told 

authorities he first met Ms. Talton on Monday, August 8, ~977, 

when she and Ms. McDonnell arrived at the home of Mr. Hume and Ms. 

McDonnell. Mr. Hume indicated the two women stayed for an hour or 

so before they left to go out drinking and looking for drugs. The 

women went to a party that night at the home of one of Mr. Smith's 

friends, Rick Emmons. Ms. Talton, who was living with her common 

law husband 11Randy 11 Newell, met Mr. Smith at the party and they 

had sexual intercourse numerous times that evening. At the same 

party, Ms. McDonnell met Billy Grubbs, Mr. Smith's roommate, and 

she ended up spending the night with him at Messrs. Smith and 

Grubbs' house. The next time Mr. Hume saw Ms. McDonnell was at 

5:30 a.m. on Tuesday morning, when she returned home. Mr. Hume 

stated when Ms. McDonnell came home, she was crying and she asked 

him to hold her because she had used too much cannabinol, the 

active ingredient in marijuana, that night. 

When Mr. Smith awoke on Tuesday morning, August 9, he 

discovered a gram of cannabinol, which was worth about $~00, was 

missing from his stash of drugs. He testified he assumed Ms. 

Talton had taken it. At around ~0:00a.m., he drove his van to 

the residence of two of his friends, Harvey Bylsma and Ginger 

Donham. Mr. Smith wanted Mr. Bylsma's help in retrieving his 

pickup, which had been impounded. Mr. Smith also realized Mr. 

Bylsma's neighbor had a phone, and Mr. Smith had Mr. Bylsma call 

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Mr. Smith's boss to let him know he would not be coming into work 

that day. Approximately half an hour later, Mr. Smith, along with 

Mr. Bylsma, Ms. Donham and her daughter April, left Ms. Donham's 

house and went to Ms. McDonnell and Mr. Hume's house to inquire 

about the missing cannabinol. Mr. Smith wanted Ms. McDonnell's 

assistance in finding out where Ms. Talton lived. 

Both Mr. Hume and Mr. Smith testified Mr. Smith arrived at 

Mr. Hume's house around 10:30 a.m., accompanied by three other 

people. At that time, Mr. Smith told Ms. McDonnell either she or 

her girlfriend (i.e., Ms. Talton) "ripped off" his drugs the night 

before. He stated he wanted Ms. McDonnell to take him over to Ms. 

Talton's house so he could talk to her because he did not think 

she, Ms. McDonnell, had taken the drugs. Ms. McDonnell agreed and 

voluntarily left her house with Mr. Smith and his companions. 

When they arrived at Ms. Talton's house, she was on the 

couch, and she told them to come inside. Mr. Smith went in and 

spoke with Ms. Talton for a few minutes about the missing 

cannabinol while the others waited outside. Ms. Talton told Mr. 

Smith he had probably lost or misplaced the cannabinol at his 

house, and she suggested they go back to his house to look for it. 

Mr. Smith agreed, and they all went back to his house to look for 

the drugs. Ms. Donham's testimony confirmed this sequence of 

events. 

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While Mr. Smith was looking in his kitchen for the missing 

drugs, Ms. Talton came in with a bag containing about half a gram 

of cannabinol, proclaiming to have found the missing drugs. Mr. 

Smith, however, did not believe her and he accused her of having 

had the drugs all along. When he asked her where the other half a 

gram was, Ms. McDonnell stepped in and agreed to reimburse Mr. 

Smith for the missing half gram of cannabinol, which was worth 

approximately $50. Mr. Smith then took the remaining half gram 

and put it with the rest of his stash.? 

Ms. Donham testified they all got back in Mr. Smith's van at 

around 11:30 that morning, which was the last time she saw Ms. 

Talton and Ms. McDonnell with Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith then dropped 

Ms. Donham off at her home.8 Half an hour later, Messrs. Smith 

and Bylsma showed up at Ms. Donham's house for lunch, where they· 

stayed until around 2:00 in the afternoon, at which time Mr. 

Smith, Ms. Donham, Mr. Bylsma, and April went to Kenneth LaDue's 

house. Mr. LaDue had sold Mr. Smith a 1950 purple Ford pickup 

7 Mr. Hume made a statement to the police that 11 he heard the girl 

or girls advise that they would pay back Bylsma, Grubbs, and Smith 

'by Friday' (12 August) 11 for the missing half gram of cannabinol. 

Although Mr. Hume did not testify to this fact at trial, this 

statement was admitted during Mr. Smith's post-trial evidentiary 

hearing. 

8 Mr. Smith's v~n, which the prosecution alleges was used by him 

in the commiss1on of the crimes for which he was later charged, 

was searched by a Detective Lewis. Detective Lewis testified he 

found no blood, mud, dirt, or other evidence tending to show the 

van was somehow linked to these crimes, nor was there any evidence 

that the van had recently been cleaned. He did, however, find a 

cigarette case that Mr. Newell testified belonged to Cari Talton. 

The· cigarette case, however, proves only that Ms. Talton was in 

the van, a fact not disputed by the defense. 

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truck, which had been impounded; however, the paperwork had never 

been transfered properly to Mr. Smith's name. Thus, before he 

could get his truck from Broadway Towing, where it was impounded, 

he needed to see Mr. LaDue. 

Ms. Donham testified she spent the rest of Tuesday with Mr. 

Smith. Several other witnesses provided a detailed account of Mr. 

Smith's whereabouts on Tuesday, the day the prosecution claimed 

the murders were committed. From 2:30 until around 5:00p.m., 

these witnesses stated Mr. Smith was either with Mr. LaDue or he 

was at Broadway Towing, trying to get his truck out of the 

impoundment lot. Finally, Ms. Donham testified Mr. Smith stayed 

at her house9 for the remainder of the work week. She testified 

in some detail about what occurred on those days, and she 

indicated she never heard Mr. Smith leave the house during the 

night as she was a light sleeper and would have heard him moving 

around. Mr. Smith's employer Bill Gourly also provided Mr. Smith 

an alibi for the rest of the week as he testified Mr. Smith was at 

work during those days. 

Randy Appert and his roommate Ralph Strom testified that 

around this time, Mr. Smith had come to consider their apartment 

as his own and he had his own key. Mr. Appert testified Mr. Smith 

came by the house on Saturday, August 13, and asked him if he 

9 The fact that Mr. Smith was staying somewhere other 

own home was not that unusual. Due to problems 

landlord, Messrs. Smith and Grubbs had been planning to 

of their house anyway. 

-8-

than his 

with their 

move out 

Appellate Case: 93-2218 Document: 01019282412 Date Filed: 03/07/1995 Page: 8 
could leave his gun at their house. Mr. Appert told him he did 

not know. Apparently, Mr. Smith left the gun there anyway because 

Mr. Appert testified the next time he saw the gun was when the 

police removed it from a closet in their house pursuant to a 

search warrant. Mr. Strom testified he did not know Mr. Smith had 

left the gun at their apartment either. 

Nikki Thompson testified she was at the home of Messrs. Strom 

and Appert that Saturday morning when Mr. Smith showed up with a 

gun, similar in size to Exhibit 44, Mr. Smith's shotgun, in his 

hands in plain view. She further testified on direct examination 

she overheard a conversation between Messrs. Strom and Smith. She 

testified she heard Mr. Smith say something like "he had been 

burned and the people had been punished," although she denied ever 

hearing Mr. Smith say he had recently used the gun. During an 

evidentiary hearing several years later, however, Ms. Thompson, 

then using her marital surname of Peters, admitted she had 

perjured herself. While she had heard Mr. Smith tell Mr. Strom he 

had been "burned," she admitted she never heard Mr. Smith say 

anything about having to punish, or having actually punished, 

anyone. She said she lied because she had been coerced to do so 

by Dana Smith, a good friend of Ms. McDonnell. Ms. Smith 

testified at trial that Ms. Thompson told her Mr. Smith said he 

had to punish two girls. 

Mr. Strom testified that later on that Saturday, he went with 

Mr. Smith to buy some parts for Mr. Smith's truck, but they ran 

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out of gas. The two men decided to go to a bar, at which time Mr. 

Strom recalled Mr. Smith mentioning someone, without using names, 

had "ripped off" some of his cannabinol. 

"Randy" Newell was called as a witness for the prosecution. 

He testified he had been living with Ms. Talton as common law 

husband and wife at the time of her disappearance, and the last 

time he saw her was late in the afternoon on Monday, August 8. 

Although she was not home when he left for work the next morning, 

he could tell she had been home at some point that morning because 

when he came home for lunch, he noticed the clothes she had been 

wearing the night before were either on the floor or the bed. 

Mr. Newell testified 

relationship with Ms. Talton. 

on direct examination about his 

He initially stated they got along 

"pretty good"; on cross-examination, however, he admitted she had 

not come home at night on at least two occasions, including 

Monday, August 8, and that this bothered him and made him unhappy. 

He also conceded they used to have "little arguments," and that 

one such argument resulted in Ms. Talton stabbing him with a 

knife. Mr. Newell also admitted both he and Ms. Talton were 

recovering heroin addicts and they would get up in the morning ·and 

go to a drug addiction program where they would receive oral 

methadone doses. Dr. Castillo, the clinical director of the 

program, testified Ms. Talton received her last dose of methadone 

sometime between 6:00 and 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, August 9, 1977. 

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Determining the day and time of death was an important issue 

that received a significant amount of attention at trial. "Randy" 

Newell's testimony was central to the prosecution's case because 

he supported their theory that Mr. Smith killed the women on 

Tuesday.10 The prosecution attempted to bolster the inference it 

wanted the jury to draw from Mr. Newell's testimony that the 

women were killed on Tuesday -- through the testimony of several 

other witnesses, including the aforementioned Clifford Crawford 

and Dr. Gauthier. Lois Chapman, Ms. McDonnell's grandmother, 

testified she and Ms. McDonnell's mother, Lois Strader, planned to 

meet Ms. McDonnell for lunch on Tuesday, August 9. Ms. Chapman 

further testified she spoke with Ms. McDonnell on Monday to 

finalize the arrangements, but she never showed up on Tuesday. 

When Ms. Chapman called her granddaughter at work, she was told 

she was not there. Ms. Chapman never heard from her granddaughter 

again. She claimed she and Ms. Strader looked for Ms. McDonnell 

for the rest of the week, but they, nor anyone else, had seen her. 

The defense introduced its own evidence on the question as to 

the time of death in an attempt to discredit the prosecution's 

theory that the women were killed on Tuesday. Wayne Wallace, the 

rancher who found the bodies in his corral on Friday, August 12, 

testified he used to go to his corrals every other day. He stated 

10 As the discussion above indicates, the testimony of Mr. 

Gourly, who was Mr. Smith's employer, and Ms. Donham, provided Mr. 

Smith with a relatively strong alibi for the remainder of the 

week. Thus, proof that the women were killed on Tuesday, 

presumably in the afternoon, was important because it was arguably 

the only day when Mr. Smith had the opportunity to kill the women. 

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when he had been out to this corral on Wednesday, August 10, he 

did not notice anything unusual. In addition, when he described 

how he found the women's bodies on Friday, he stated one of the 

bodies was clothed in a yellow T-shirt which stuck out "like a 

neon light." From this, Mr. Wallace deduced the bodies were not 

there on Wednesday because if they had been, he would have seen 

them. 

Ruth Shockey testified she rented Ms. Talton and Mr. Newell a 

duplex apartment located in the back of her yard in July of 1977. 

Ms. Shockey's house had a window in the bedroom enabling her to 

see into the yard. After she was unsuccessful in several attempts 

to collect the rent from Ms. Talton and Mr. Newell, she initiated 

legal proceedings to have them evicted. The eviction papers were 

posted on the door to the apartment on Monday, August 8. Ms. 

Shockey testified that between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. the next day, 

she saw Ms. Talton and another blonde woman,11 through her bedroom 

window, going into the apartment while they were crouched down. 

Ms. Shockey thought they were crouching down to hide from her. 

She then testified she never saw Ms. Talton again after that day. 

Moreover, although Mr. Newell testified he spoke to Ms. Shockey on 

Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday of that week to ask her 

if she had seen Ms. Talton, Ms. Shockey denied ever speaking to 

Mr. Newell until Friday, when Mr. Newell told her he had not seen 

Ms. Talton in four days and that he did not really care. 

11 It is undisputed Ms. McDonnell had blonde hair. 

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The defense also introduced the testimony of Walter Spruill, 

a retired member of the Navy .. Spruill testified that sometime in 

early August of 1977, he and his mother were driving to the nearby 

town of Moriarty when they saw a young, blonde-haired woman 

walking on the side of the highway. His mother, a retired 

teacher, thought the woman may have been one of her former 

students. Mr. Spruill turned the car around and picked the woman 

up. He described her as blonde and rather thin. She rode in the 

car for twenty or so minutes until they dropped her off. Mr. 

Spruill then testified he saw this same woman on a Wednesday, 

about four to six days later, at the "Travelburger" drive-in. He 

specifically recognized her as the woman to whom he had given a 

ride a few days earlier. In court, he identified this woman as 

Ms. Talton from her picture. He also remembered the woman at the 

restaurant was wearing a bluish colored T-shirt with the word 

"Okies" on it and that she was with a heavier woman in a Budweiser 

T-shirt. 

and he 

He testified he saw the women for five to eight minutes, 

recalled giving them three cents when they were short of 

money for their food. He also testified he gave the thinner woman 

a book of matches after she had asked him for a match, and that he 

saw the women get into a grey two-door Pontiac automobile. 

Finally, the defense called Alton Green, the owner of the 

"Travelburger 11 restaurant. His testimony essentially corroborated 

Mr. Spruill's testimony of what had transpired at the restaurant 

that Wednesday, which was August 10. He specifically remembered 

the two women because they, along with Mr. Spruill, were the only 

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customers in the restaurant at that time. He also recalled both 

women were wearing T-shirts and Levi jeans. 

C. The Results of the Torrance County Investigation 

While the aforementioned evidence and testimony constituted 

the essence of the prosecution's case against Mr. Smith, he was 

not, at least at the outset, the only suspect being investigated 

in regard to these murders. Torrance County's law enforcement 

officials who were investigating this case had reason to, and did 

in fact, suspect "Randy" Newell may have been the perpetrator of 

these killings.12 

On August 18, 1977, at around 2:35p.m., "Randy" Newell was 

driving his automobile near the scene where the bodies had been 

found when he collided with a semi tractor trailer. New Mexico 

Police Officer Donald Morrison was dispatched to the scene of the 

accident. Officer Morrison memorialized the following sequence of 

events in his report of August 19. Officer Morrison first asked 

Mr. Newell if he was injured, and Mr. Newell responded he was not. 

Officer Morrison then arrested Mr. Newell for driving while 

intoxicated, careless driving, and driving without a license. 

When Officer Morrison told Mr. Newell he was going to perform "a 

standard routine inventory" search of his car, however, Mr. Newell 

complained of various injuries and asked to be taken to a 

12 The federal mag·istrate judge who issued a report and 

recommendation in May of 1993 on Mr. Smith's federal petition 

stated he had reviewed all the state court evidence in this case; 

in his own words, "Randy" Newell was not just a suspect, he "was 

the focus of the Torrence [sic] County investigation." 

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hospital. Officer Morrison further stated Mr. Newell asked either 

to be allowed to drive his car to the hospital or to have his car 

towed to the hospital. The first request was denied because the 

vehicle was not drivable due to extensive damage from the 

accident. His car remained at the scene so Officer Morrison could 

inventory its contents. Mr. Newell was then taken by ambulance to 

a hospital in Albuquerque. 

During the inventory search of Mr. Newell's automobile, 

Officer Morrison found a white plastic bag on the rear passenger's 

side floorboard. His report stated: "[u]pon opening the white 

plastic bag, I found women's clothes that were damp and which 

smelled of mildew and had, what appeared to me, to have blood and 

hair on them. They were women's pants, blouses and panties." 

Officer Morrison found another plastic bag containing men's 

clothes with stains he characterized as "possibly blood." His 

report also disclosed Mr. Newell had been stopped in this same 

area four days earlier, on Sunday, August 14, for reasons not 

disclosed in the record. At that time, the vehicle was searched 

by Officer Mark Kennedy pursuant to Newell's written consent. 

When Officer Kennedy requested permission to search the trunk, Mr. 

Newell informed him he did not have a key to the trunk. 

Officer Morrison immediately advised Captain Frank Lucero, 

Sergeant Robert Gonzales, and Officer Mark Kennedy, members of the 

New Mexico State Police, of the existence of the clothes. Captain 

Lucero then told Officer Morrison to "relay these [items] to the 

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Crime Laboratory next date, 08-19-77, to be compared with the 

evidence found at the scene of the homicide." Officer Morrison's 

report further indicated assistant district attorney Neil Mertz, 

the Albuquerque prosecutor assigned to handle the grand jury phase 

of the Talton-McDonnell homicides: 

was notified of the[se] findings and stated Mr. Newell 

had been a suspect due to him being involved in a fight 

with his wife, victim Carrie Newell, on a previous 

occasion .... Further, because Mr. Newell was found 

within the general vicinity where the two homicide 

victims, McDonnell and Newell, were found, he was 

considered a suspect. 

Officer Morrison's report thus clearly stated "Randy" Newell was 

in fact a suspect in the Talton-McDonnell double homicide.13 The 

report also contained a motive for "Randy" Newell to have murdered 

Ms. Talton,14 namely, jealousy. 

Later that same day, Officer Morrison prepared an affidavit 

in support of a search warrant for Mr. Newell's car. In the 

affidavit, he describes what he found during his inventory search 

of the car. He further stated he learned, from other officers, 

that Mr. Newell had previously been stabbed by Ms. Talton, a fact 

that "suppl[ied] [Newell] with a ... motive for killing Carrie 

Newell." He further stated his belief that having found the 

13 Under the section in the police report describing the nature 

of the incident, Officer Morrison wrote: "TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WITH 

POSSIBLE HOMICIDE EVIDENCE FOUND TO CASE #77-1408, VICTIMS CARRIE 

NEWELL AND LESLIE MC DONNELL." In another section entitled 

"VEHICLE STATUS," he noted: "POSSIBLE SUSPECT." 

14 The record does not disclose whether Mr. Newell had a specific 

motive for killing Ms. McDonnell. But this absence of a motive is 

equally applicable with respect to the prosecution's case against 

Mr. Smith since no motive for him to have killed Ms. McDonnell was 

ever advanced. 

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clothes with possible traces of blood "makes it likely that these 

items are connected with the homicides and that other similar 

items· and weapons may be found elsewhere in ... the car Newell was 

driving." The subsequent search of the vehicle revealed no 

further evidence. 

In accordance with Captain Lucero's directive, Officer 

Morrison then took the clothes recovered from Newell's car to 

Wayne Ferguson of the New Mexico State Police Crime Laboratory on 

August 19, 1977, for testing. Although Officer Ferguson tested a 

number of items recovered from the vehicle, he did not, for some 

unknown reason, test the women's clothing found in the white 

plastic bag. The men's clothing was tested, and it tested 

negative for blood; however, Ferguson admitted these tests might 

be inaccurate because the clothing had been stored in moist 

conditions contributing to the growth of mildew. 

On October 3, 1977, Officer Ferguson turned over the untested 

items, including the women's clothing, to Officer Larry 

Michaelscheck of the Albuquerque Police Department, who in turn 

gave the items to Detective Laycock of the Albuquerque Police 

Department Criminalistics Laboratory. Detective Laycock, however, 

did not perform any tests on the women's clothes because he was 

instructed not to by a supervisor, Lieutenant Hubeny, for reasons 

again not apparent from the record. By the time of the 

evidentiary hearing in this case in 1983, this evidence had been 

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destroyed, and thus, it was never tested to determine if it could 

somehow be linked to the Talton-McDonnell homicides. 

At around the same time Officer Morrison arrested "Randy" 

Newell and found the clothing in his car, Sergeant Gonzales of the 

New Mexico State Police prepared a "Supplemental Report" regarding 

his investigation into the Talton-McDonnell homicides. His 

report, dated August 16, 1977, indicated he had contacted someone 

in the Albuquerque Police Department who told him "a Mrs. 

Pitchford had contacted him with some information regarding Kari 

Newell." Sergeant Gonzales' report indicates he then contacted 

Mrs. Pitchford himself and she told him, inter alia, that "Randall 

Newell was also known as Samuel J. Newell." 

D. The Indictment 

Although there was arguably some evidence tending to show 

"Randy" Newell may have been involved in the Talton-McDonnell 

homicides, there was also evidence tending to show Mr. Smith may 

have been involved. The prosecution exercised its prosecutorial 

discretion and elected to seek an indictment from the grand jury 

in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, against Mr. Smith. 

On August 19, 1977, the grand jury returned an eight-count 

indictment charging William J. Smith with two counts of kidnapping 

and two counts of first degree murder for the deaths of Cari 

Talton and Leslie McDonnell. The remaining counts of the 

indictment charged Mr. Grubbs with two counts of being an 

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accessory to kidnapping and two counts of being an accessory to 

first degree murder. Mr. Bylsma and Ms. Donham were also indicted 

for the murder of Ms. Talton and Ms. McDonnell. Prior to trial, 

the prosecution entered a nolle prosequi with respect to the 

charges against Mr . Grubbs due to insufficient evidence. 

. Thereafter, the charges against Ms. Donham were also dismissed, 

although it is unclear whether the prosecution entered a nolle 

prosequi as to her or whether the court dismissed the indictment 

against her. In any event, she was not required to stand trial, 

and the case proceeded against only Mr. Smith and Mr. Bylsma. 

E. Trial Proceedings 

After assistant district attorney Mertz handled the grand 

jury phase of the case, it was assigned to Peter McDevitt for 

·purposes of trial. Mr. McDevitt later recused himself because he 

knew some of the parties involved in the case, and it was 

reassigned to assistant district attorney Roy Anuskewicz, Jr., who 

was assisted by Virginia Ferrara. 

The prosecution's theory was Mr. Smith killed Ms. Talton and 

Ms. McDonnell on Tuesday, August 9, out of revenge for Ms. Talton 

having stolen some of Mr. Smith's cannabinol.15 The motive for 

Ms. McDonnell's killing is more troubling, especially in light of 

the Mr. Smith's own testimony that he did not believe she had 

15 Although it was never firmly established that Ms. Talton had 

in fact stolen Mr. Smith's cannabinol, the record is clear Mr. 

Smith thought Ms. Talton had stolen it, thereby supplying him with 

a motive for the killing. 

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taken the drugs. This statement, coupled with Ms. McDonnell's 

agreement to reimburse Mr. Smith for the missing half gram, raises 

a question over the motive for Ms. McDonnell's killing. The 

prosecution's theory may simply have been that Ms. McDonnell was 

in the van with Mr. Smith and Ms. Talton when Mr. Smith killed Ms. 

Talton, and that Mr. Smith had to kill Ms. McDonnell because she 

witnessed Ms. Talton's killing and she could have identified Mr. 

Smith as the perpetrator. 

Timing was central to the prosecution's case. As previously 

indicated, it was essential for the prosecution to establish the 

women were killed on Tuesday, August 9, an important fact that did 

not escape the attention of the prosecution. In her opening 

statement, Ms. Ferrara asked the jury "to pay special attention" 

to the evidence regarding the day and time of death, evidence she 

called "very important." As a practical matter, the prosecution 

had to establish Tuesday as the day the women were killed in order 

to convict Mr. Smith because the testimony of Ms. Donham, coupled 

with the testimony of Mr. Smith's employer Bill Gourly, gave Mr. 

Smith a relatively strong alibi defense by accounting for Mr. 

Smith's whereabouts for the rest of the second week of August 

1977. Thus, the prosecution had to prove the women were killed on 

Tuesday in order to show Mr. Smith had the opportunity to commit 

these crimes. 

Mr. Smith was initially represented by Anth~ny Lucero Jr., 

and one week prior to trial, the court ordered Mr. Lucero to 

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obtain additional counsel to assist him at trial because he had 

been indicted in federal court. Mr. Lucero retained the services 

of Warren Harris. On August 22, 1977, prior to the trial in this 

case, Mr. Lucero filed a motion for discovery pursuant to the New 

Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure. The motion sought, inter 

alia, "[p]olice reports of whatever kind of nature, whether 

initial or supplemental, relating to investigation or inquiring 

into circumstances surrounding these criminal complaints." Eight 

days later, the trial court signed an order,stating: 

That the Defendant, WILLIAM SMITH, should be, [and 

is] hereby ordered to be given Discovery, pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, by the 

District Attorney's office, for the Second Judicial 

District, [who] shall disclose all police reports, 

records, papers, documents, photographs, or other 

tangible objects or copies thereof, including scientific 

experiments made in connection with this case, 

immediately, and shall continue to provide the copies to 

the defense counsel during the pendency of this action. 

Notwithstanding this order to disclose, the prosecution never 

divulged the police reports prepared by Officer Morrison and 

Sergeant Gonzales, both of which contained relevant information 

relating to "Randy" Newell's possible involvement in this case. 

The trial commenced on October 11, 1977. Mr. Smith's defense 

at trial was alibi and insufficient proof to implicate him in 

these crimes. On October 17, 1977, the trial court declared a 

mistrial due to the jurors' inability to reach a unanimous 

verdict. 

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In November 1977, prior to Mr. Smith's January 30, 1978 

retrial,16 Mr. Lucero withdrew from the case because of a dispute 

as to his use of the retained funds in preparing Mr. Smith's 

defense. As a result, Mr. Harris represented Mr. Smith by himself 

during the retrial. Prior to the start of the retrial, Harris, 

who had prepared a written motion seeking disclosure of the arrest 

and conviction records of three witnesses for the prosecution, Mr. 

Hume, Ms. Thompson, and "Randy" Newell, filed that motion in open 

court.17 The court made a handwritten ruling on the motion, which 

stated: "Filed in open court on 1/31/78 .... Denied as to arrests 

-- previously defendant previous told by D.A. no convictions as to 

any of these [signed] Cole D.J." The court's order, which is 

somewhat illegible,18 was made in reliance on a representation to 

the court made by Mr. Anuskewicz that "Randy" Newell had no prior 

convictions. Mr. Anuskewicz later testified he based this 

representation on the absence of a rap sheet on Newell in the file 

and Ms. Ferrara's failure to tell him anything about Mr. Newell 

having a record. 

16 The prosecution opted only to retry Mr. Smith and did not 

retry Mr. Bylsma. The reasons for this decision are not clear 

from the record. 

17 Mr. Lucero's motion for the police reports, which was filed 

prior to the commencement of the first trial, also requested 

records of prior convictions of any individual to be called as a 

witness for the prosecution. 

18 Although the judge's handwritten notation is somewhat 

illegible, our understanding of the court's ruling appears to be 

accurate in all material respects. Moreover, the State's 

acquiescence in this understanding of the court's ruling 

demonstrates its good faith willingness to acknowledge that this 

is a fair statement of the court's ruling. 

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During his retrial, Mr. Smith maintained the same defenses he 

asserted at his first trial. By this time, the prosecution was on 

notice of the essence of Mr. Smith's defenses, which were alibi 

coupled with what was characterized in his opening statement as 

proof that the prosecution's evidence strongly suggested 11 Someone 

else 11 had as much of a reason, if not more of a reason, to have 

committed these crimes. Mr. Harris did not refer to this other 

person by name, but it was obvious he was insinuating it was 

11 Randy 11 Newell. 

On February 4, 1978, the jury returned a verdict acquitting 

Mr. Smith on the kidnapping counts but convicting him on both 

counts of first degree murder. At around this time, 11 Randy 11 

Newell had moved into a house with Celia Payne and Mark Hopkins. 

On March 5, 1978, four days before Mr. Smith was to be sentenced, 

Newell was found lying on the floor of their house, with needle 

marks in his arms. The medical examiner's office later determined 

Newell had died from a drug overdose.19 

On March 9, 1978, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Smith to two 

consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Mr. Smith, with Mr. 

19 Ms. Payne and Mr. Hopkins both testified at the evidentiary 

hearing in 1983 that 11 Randy 11 Newell had made statements to them 

while he was living with them admitting to his involvement in the 

Talton-McDonnell homicides. Ms. Payne testified at the 

evidentiary hearing that Mr. Newell had told her he killed Ms. 

Talton out of jealousy; both Ms. Payne and Mr. Hopkins testified 

Mr. Newell once threatened to kill Ms. Payne as he had "the other 

two girls." In addition, Donna Nargelovic, one of Mr. Newell's 

coworkers, testified Mr. Newell had made a statement to her that 

Mr. Talton was killed because of jealousy. 

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Harris' assistance, filed a notice of appeal in the state supreme 

court20 on March 20, 1978, asserting fourteen claims of error. On 

February 27, 1979, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed Mr. 

Smith's convictions. See Smith v. State, 591 P.2d 664 (N.M. 

1979). The mandate was issued on March 16, 1979. 

F. State Court Evidentiary Hearing 

On September 27, 1982, Mr. Smith, through new counsel Alice 

Hector, filed a motion in the New Mexico Supreme Court seeking a 

recall of the mandate, a withdrawal of the opinion and 

reconsideration on the merits. This request was prompted by the 

Supreme Court's refusal to address two of Mr. Smith's claims of 

error in his direct appeal because Harris, his counsel, failed to 

provide the appellate court with the necessary transcripts, 

thereby resulting in a waiver of those issues.21 See Smith, 591 

P.2d at 667-68. The Supreme Court denied the motion on October 8, 

1982. 

20 New Mexico has a two-tiered appellate court-system, and in the 

ordinary case, a direct appeal would lie to the state court of 

appeals with the power of discretionary review resting with the 

state supreme court. The New Mexico Constitution, however, 

mandates that an appeal from a judgment in a criminal case 

imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment 11 Shall be taken 

directly to the supreme court. 11 N.M. Canst. art. VI, § 2. Thus, 

the notice of appeal was properly filed in the state supreme 

court. 

21 Warren Harris' misconduct in handling Mr. Smith's trial and 

appeal resulted in disciplinary proceedings, and ultimately the 

imposition of sanctions, against him. Moreover, he was later 

subjected to a public censure for his failure to respond to 

repeated inquiries from the Disciplinary Board relating to the 

investigation into his handling of this case. See Matter of 

Harris, 680 P.2d 602, 602 (N.M. 1984). He was temporarily 

suspended from the practice of law. 

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Mr. Smith's counsel continued to investigate this case, 

presumably in anticipation of filing a motion for post-conviction 

relief. In the latter part of 1982 and into early 1983, Mr. 

Smith's counsel's investigation revealed the prosecution may have 

failed to disclose several pieces of evidence, all of which 

related to Mr. Smith's defense that someone else -- 11 Randy 11 Newell 

-- committed these crimes. The specific evidence in question was 

the clothing taken from 11Randy 11 Newell's car, the police reports 

indicating Mr. Newell's status as a suspect in the Torrance County 

investigation, Mr. Newell's presence on two separate occasions 

near the location where the bodies were found, and Mr. Newell's 

use of 11 Randy 11 Newell as an alias for his true name, Samuel J. 

Newell; the prior conviction record of Samuel J. Newell and his 

status as a fugitive with an outstanding arrest warrant from the 

State of Kansas; several statements Mr. Newell made to law 

enforcement personnel; Mr. Newell's ownership of a shotgun; and 

allegedly exculpatory statements by an individual named Linda 

11 Crickett 11 Nelson.22 

22 While we address each of these arguments separately, we note 

the State argued, and Mr. Smith's counsel candidly acknowledged, 

that the last two pieces of evidence -- Mr. Newell's ownership of 

a gun similar to the one allegedly used to commit these crimes and 

the statements of Ms. Nelson -- were not raised in the briefs 

before the district court and therefore should not be considered 

on appeal. We agree these issues were not presented to the 

district court in the first instance, and that in the absence of 

extraordinary circumstances to the contrary, we will not consider 

such issues for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Singleton v. 

Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) ( 11 [i]t is the general rule, of 

course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue 

not passed upon below. 11 ); Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 

F.2d 716, 720-22 (lOth Cir. 1993) (discussing the policies behind 

this rule) . In this case, because we believe consideration of 

these two issues would not alter or affect our conclusion, we 

adhere to the general rule and do not consider these claims for 

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There were apparently only two specific discovery requests 

made by Mr. Smith's trial counsel, both of which were granted by 

the trial court: one for the police reports, and one for prior 

arrests and convictions of the prosecution's witnesses, including 

"Randy" Newell.23 Although there are conflicting statements in 

.the various pleadings in this case, it does not appear defense 

counsel ever made a catchall motion with a general request for the 

production of "any exculpatory material." Regardless of whether 

such a motion was made, there was never a court order to that 

effect. While the significance of failing to make such a request 

is discussed below, it is apparent that had the prosecution 

responded to the specific requests which were made, namely, the 

police reports, the contents of those reports would certainly have 

alerted defense counsel to the existence of the potentially 

exculpatory information regarding "Randy" Newell. 

On April 4, 1983, Ms. Hector, relying on the information she 

learned, filed a motion for post-conviction relief, also referred 

to as a Rule 57 motion,24 raising Brady claims based on the 

the first time on appeal. 

23 In fact, there were two specific requests for conv.iction 

records of State's witnesses. Mr. Lucero filed one such motion 

prior to the first trial and Mr. Harris filed one prior to the 

second trial. 

24 Throughout the pleadings, this motion is referred to by 

several names, the most frequent of which is the "Rule 57" motion. 

Although the State of New Mexico has long since amended its rules 

of procedure and the names accorded to particular post-trial 

motions, it appears that a Rule 57 motion was similar to either a 

motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence or a motion for 

a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See State v. 

Peppers, 796 P.2d 614, 617 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the 

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prosecution's alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, 

along with claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 

counsel relating to Mr. Harris' handling of the trial and direct 

appeal. She attached an affidavit to the motion attesting to her 

investigative efforts and proffering a summary of the evidence she 

intended to prove in support of these claims. The same judge who 

presided over Mr. Smith's trial granted Mr. Smith's request for an 

evidentiary hearing on these issues. A comprehensive, but 

fragmented, evidentiary hearing was subsequently held whereby Mr. 

Smith presented his evidence during five days in July, August and 

September of 1983, and the State presented its case during two 

days in December of 1983. There was a significant amount of 

testimony adduced at this hearing. Mr. Smith called numerous 

witnesses, including the two prosecutors who handled his trial and 

many of the law enforcement personnel involved in the 

investigation of the Talton-McDonnell homicides. 

Mr. Smith's first witness was lead prosecutor Roy Anuskewicz. 

When asked about Officer Morrison's report detailing several 

pieces of information regarding "Randy" Newell, including his 

status as a suspect, that he was seen in the area where the bodies 

were found on two occasions, and that the clothes were taken from 

precursor and successor rules to Rule 57) . In addition to Rule 57 

motions, a criminal defendant could also seek recourse by filing a 

state petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 616-18. 

This motion was in essence a petition in state court seeking 

relief from a conviction due to constitutional error. 

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his car, Mr. Anuskewicz stated he could not recall if the report 

had been disclosed or if it was in fact in Mr. Smith's file at 

that time. He further stated the Bernalillo County district 

attorney's office had in place an "open file" policy, whereby 

defense counsel could review a prosecutor's entire file upon 

request. Mr. Anuskewicz testified: 

I didn't go through [the file], mull through it, and say 

"Oh, this is exculpatory, this isn't." You know, if we 

have a police report in the file, we have a search 

warrant, we -- whatever it may be, you know, its an open 

file. They can come in and see it; you know, it solves 

some of the -- so you -- you know, I, I was I hate 

making those decisions, you know, its a difficult 

question. 

Ms. Ferrara acknowledged Officer Morrison's report and 

Sergeant Gonzales' report, regarding "Randy" Newell being known as 

Samuel J. Newell, were never disclosed to Mr. Smith's counsel. 

Doug Henson, counsel for the State during this hearing, stipulated 

Officer Morrison's report was not in the Smith file while he was 

preparing for this hearing, although he did not comment on whether 

it was in the file at the time of trial several years earlier. 

Mr. Harris testified he never received Officer Morrison's report 

and he was unaware of the contents of the report relating to 

"Randy" Newell's true identity. Mr. Harris' testimony is 

reinforced by the conspicuous absence of any cross-examination of 

Mr. Newell at trial about the material contained in Officer 

Morrison's report. 

With respect to the clothes seized from Mr. Newell's car, Ms. 

Ferrara, a relatively inexperienced felony trial prosecutor at the 

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time of Mr. Smith's trial in 1978, testified she recalled 

examining the bag of women's clothing taken from Mr. Newell's car 

in the evidence room at the Albuquerque Police Department with Mr. 

Anuskewicz prior to the first trial. She stated she did not 

believe she ever discussed the existence of these clothes with 

defense counsel, although she did indicate all the evidence from 

Newell's car was in the evidence room and it was marked with a tag 

stating "Articles from vehicle accident," albeit with no mention 

of, or connection to, "Randy" Newell. 

She remembered a pair of women's underwear was seized from 

Mr. Newell's car. She recalled it being stained on the right 

front side with several spots she thought were blood. Prior to 

trial, she spoke with Newell about the blood stains, and he told 

her the stains were menstrual blood as Ms. Talton had been 

menstruating at that time. Ms. Ferrara testified she did not 

believe the stains were menstrual blood, primarily because they 

were situated on the right front portion of the underwear, rather 

than in the area where menstrual blood would ordinarily be found . 

. Furthermore, the gunshot wound to Ms. Talton's pelvis was on her 

right side, the same side as the stains found on the underwear. 

In addition, Celia Payne, the woman with whom "Randy" Newell was 

living at the time he died, later testified Mr. Newell had bragged 

to her that the police stupidly believed his explanation that the 

stains were menstrual blood. 

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Ms. Ferrara next testified she thought it might be "helpful" 

to have the underwear examined in case it was introduced at trial 

in order to have a medical evaluation of whether the stains were 

in fact blood, and if so, whose blood it was. She recalled being 

"curious" about the stains, and she asked someone whether tests of 

the underwear were necessary. She said she was told not to worry 

about having the underwear tested since it was probably the same 

substance on the man's clothing which had been tested and which 

was found not to be blood. She acknowledged no tests were ever 

done on the underwear and that it, along with the rest of the 

clothes, was destroyed before any further testing could be 

performed. 

Ms. Ferrara admitted she did not realize at the time of trial 

that she had authority to order the police department to test the 

clothing. In hindsight, however, she acknowledged she did in fact 

possess such authority, although she still did not think "that was 

her role in this whole case, to have that done." There was 

additional testimony that at the time of trial, scientific testing 

was available to differentiate between menstrual and nonmenstrual 

blood. 

Mr. Harris testified he was never informed of the existence 

of these clothes, and if he had been so advised, he would 

certainly have investigated this issue in more detail by 

interviewing Officer Ferguson and others who had seen the clothes 

as well as contacting an independent expert if necessary. He 

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testified this information would have made a "tremendous" 

difference in his trial preparation strategy. 

Another critical issue at the evidentiary hearing surrounded 

the true identity of "Randy" Newell and whether and when the 

prosecution knew about his true identity. In fact, "Randy" 

Newell's real name was Samuel J. Newell. While he was living in 

New Mexico, he used the name "Randy," his brother's name, in an 

effort to conceal his real identity. Samuel J. Newell used the 

name "Randy" as an alias because he was a fugitive for whom an 

arrest warrant had been issued on August 14, 1974, by the 

authorities in Sedgwick County, Kansas. The warrant was based on 

Samuel J. Newell's failure to complete a drug addiction program 

and for his unauthorized leave from the treatment facility. In 

addition to being a fugitive, it was subsequently learned Samuel 

J. Newell was a twice-convicted felon, having pled guilty to two 

separate counts of burglary in Kansas in December of 1972 and 

March of 1973. 

Whether the prosecution knew "Randy" Newell was actually 

Samuel J. Newell, and if so, when they obtained this knowledge, 

were hotly contested issues during this evidentiary hearing. In 

an effort to show the prosecution knew prior to the end of the 

retrial, Mr. Smith relied on Sergeant Gonzales' police report, 

dated August 16, 1977, in which he stated a Mrs. Pitchford 

indicated that "Randall Newell was also known as Samuel J. 

Newell." Mr. Smith also introduced the testimony of Detective 

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Archie Borunda of the Albuquerque Police Department who stated he 

told the prosecution that "Randy" Newell was actually Samuel J. 

Newell. Detective Borunda testified once he learned this 

information, he obtained a rap sheet on Samuel J. Newell. The rap 

sheet indicated the prior convictions discussed above, and 

Detective Borunda stated he gave a copy of that rap sheet to the 

prosecution. As for the timing of when this information was 

allegedly conveyed to the prosecution, Detective Borunda stated, 

"I don't know how early in the investigation it became known 

that Randy Newell was actually Samuel Newell, but it was during 

one of the trials that it was known. In fact, it was in the 

reports that that was his real name.n25 Detective Borunda later 

reiterated he could not remember precisely when this information 

was given to the prosecution; however, he was certain it was 

during one of Mr. Smith's trials and before the end of the 

retrial. 

In addition to the two prior convictions for burglary as 

Samuel J. Newell, Ms. Ferrara's trial preparation notes reflect 

"Randy" Newell stated he had "completed 2 yrs + 2 yrs probation" 

for "Poss/Sales of MDA (Wichita)" in 1972. Preceding this 

information, Ms. Ferrara had written the word "Felonies." When 

she was asked about this notation at the evidentiary hearing, Ms. 

Ferrara admitted this information had not been disclosed to the 

defense but stated the reason for not disclosing it was because it 

25 The "reports" Detective Borunda was referring to was 

Sergeant Gonzales' report containing the statement 

Pitchford. 

-32-

actually 

of Ms. 

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could not be verified. She was, in other words, unable to 

determine if "Randy" Newell had actually been convicted of such a 

crime. Ms. Ferrara stated that based on this lack of 

verification, she assumed it was merely an arrest and not a 

conviction, although she recognized it was a bit unusual for 

.someone not to know if they had been convicted of a crime in the 

past. Without ever following up on this issue, Mr. Anuskewicz 

represented to the trial court that "Randy" Newell had no prior 

convictions with respect to the defense's motion for disclosure of 

conviction records. 

Mr. Anuskewicz testified he did not know "Randy" Newell's 

true name was Samuel J. Newell; however, he also said he was 

familiar with the entire file in this case, which presumably would 

have included Sergeant Gonzales' report regarding Ms. Pitchford's 

statement, which he was "sure" he had read in preparation for 

trial. 

Mr. Harris testified he was never informed "Randy" Newell was 

actually Samuel J. Newell, even though the court had ordered the 

prosecution to disclose, inter alia, police reports in this case. 

Moreover, because Harris never learned of Newell's true identity, 

he stated he did not know about his fugitive status or his prior 

convictions either. 

Yet another important issue at 

statements "Randy" Newell made 

-33-

this hearing involved four 

to Sheriff Chavez, Sergeant 

Appellate Case: 93-2218 Document: 01019282412 Date Filed: 03/07/1995 Page: 33 
Gonzales, Detective Borunda and an 

Examiner's Office. The prosecution 

statements, as Ms. Ferrara's pretrial 

employee of the Medical 

had knowledge of these 

notes regarding "Randy" 

Newell specifically noted he had given a tape recorded statement 

to Sheriff Chavez, as well as statements to Detective Borunda, and 

to someone in the Medical Examiner's Office. Mr. Newell's 

statement to Sergeant Gonzales was referenced in a supplemental 

report prepared by Sergeant Gonzales on September 15, 1977. While 

the precise contents of each of these statements has never been 

specifically identified, several excerpts from them were known, 

including "Randy" Newell's statement to Sergeant Gonzales that the 

blood on the women's underwear was menstrual blood. 

Mr. Anuskewicz testified he did not recall ever turning over 

a copy of any of these statements to defense counsel. He also did 

not recall ever seeing a transcription of the tape recorded 

statement given to Sheriff Chavez. Mr. Anuskewicz referred to a 

letter sent by Mr. McDevitt to Mr. Lucero, dated October 3, 1977, 

which advised Mr. Lucero of the district attorney's open file 

policy. The letter further indicated Sheriff Chavez had taken a 

tape recorded statement from "Randy" Newell. It indicated that 

the statement had not been provided to the prosecution and if the 

defense wanted the statement, it should obtain it by subpoena. 

Mr. Harris testified he was never advised of the existence of 

these statements, which he indicated would have been useful for 

both investigative and impeachment purposes. As to the former, if 

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Harris had been apprised of the existence of these statements, 

specifically the statement by Mr. Newell to Sergeant Gonzales as 

to the blood on the clothing being menstrual blood, this would 

have raised a red flag in his mind and alerted him to the 

existence of the clothes taken from Mr. Newell's car. As to the 

latter, attorney Ray Twohig testified as to the importance to 

attorneys of having witness statements prior to trial because of 

the value such statements serve in attempting to impeach a witness 

by highlighting the discrepancies among the statements. 

On February 24, 1984, after all the evidence had been 

received, the state trial court issued its thirteen-page opinion 

detailing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.26 The 

court considered Mr. Smith's evidence but concluded he had not 

shown any improper conduct by the prosecution nor had he 

demonstrated any entitlement to relief. The gravamen of the state 

court's findings was Mr. Smith or his attorneys had actual 

knowledge of some of this information and it was therefore not 

withheld; that all of the alleged Brady evidence was made available to defense counsel by way of the prosecution's "open file" 

policy, but that in any event, the evidence was not exculpatory; 

and that Harris provided Mr. Smith with competent representation. 

26 While the statutory presumption of correctness requires us to 

defer to the state court's underlying findings of fact, Mr. 

Smith's Brady claims and his ineffective assistance claims both 

involve mixed questions of law and fact subject to de novo review. 

See Strickland v. .washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) 

(ineffective assistance claims); Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 

610 (lOth Cir.) (Brady claims), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). 

Therefore, the state trial court's ultimate conclusions of law are 

not binding on us. 

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G. Subsequent State Court Proceedings 

Undeterred, Ms. Hector then sought a state petition for a 

writ ·of habeas corpus by filing a civil action on May 29, 1984, 

against the warden, the person with 11 custody 11 over Mr. Smith. In 

his petition, Mr. Smith claimed he 11was denied a fair trial and 

[he was] being illegally detained in violation of his 

constitutional right to a fair trial and due process of law. 11 He 

also requested another evidentiary hearing. 

The State responded to the court's order to show cause by 

filing a motion to preclude an evidentiary hearing and to dismiss 

the petition. The basis for the former motion, as set forth in 

the State's brief in support thereof, was Mr. Smith had already 

received a full and fair hearing on the identical issues at his 

Rule 57 hearing. The State conceded this was an issue of first 

impression in New Mexico but argued the court nonetheless should 

deny what was in essence a duplicative hearing on the same claims. 

On February 5, 1985, a different state trial judge denied the 

State's motion and was fully prepared to proceed with the hearing. 

That same day, however, the State sought to challenge this 

ruling by filing an original proceeding in the New Mexico Supreme 

Court seeking a writ of prohibition. The New Mexico Supreme Court 

temporarily enjoined the state trial court from proceeding with 

this hearing in order to allow briefing and argument. On October 

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28, 1985, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the State's 

position and held the state trial court was "without jurisdiction 

to grant an evidentiary hearing in the instant case." State ex 

rel. Sullivan v. Kaufman, 708 P.2d 322, 325 (N.M. 1985). 

Accordingly, it granted a permanent writ of prohibition against 

the state trial judge preventing him from holding another 

evidentiary hearing as to the claims for which the Rule 57 hearing 

was held. Id. The mandate was issued on November 12, 1985. 

While this order resolved the question of Mr. Smith's right 

to a hearing, it did not deal with the merits. It was not until 

April 10, 1987, that yet another state trial judge summarily 

dismissed Mr. Smith's state petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

on the merits. Discretionary review of the ruling on the merits 

was sought in the New Mexico Supreme Court on May 11, 1987, but 

the court denied review nine days later. 

H. Federal Habeas Corpus Review by the District Court 

On March 3, 1988, attorneys Alice Hector and Lewis Fleishman 

filed a petition on behalf of Mr. Smith in federal district court 

in New Mexico seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, Mr. Smith reasserted his Brady 

claim and his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. He 

also filed a motion requesting an evidentiary hearing on his 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, contending the 

record was inadequately developed to permit meaningful review of 

this claim. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge who 

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determined the claims in Mr. Smith's petition were in fact 

exhausted and were not amenable to summary disposition. The court 

then established a briefing schedule for the merits of the claims 

raised in the petition. 

On May 24, 1993, the magistrate judge issued a thirteen-page 

report and recommendation, making findings similar to those made 

by the state trial court after its Rule 57 post-conviction 

hearing. Specifically, the magistrate judge found, with respect 

to the Brady claims, although there may have been evidence that 

law enforcement knew "Randy" Newell was actually Samuel Newell, 

"[t]here is no indication that the prosecutors were aware of 

Newell's true identity." (Emphasis added.) The court then found 

"there is no indication the State knowingly failed to disclose 

information" (emphasis added), or that the prosecution "intentionally kept [evidence] from him" (emphasis added) . The court 

also stated" [s]imply because one county's investigation disclosed 

certain information, it does [not]27 follow that this information 

can be imputed to a different county's investigation since both 

counties are under the umbrella of the State of New Mexico." 

Stated alternatively, the magistrate judge concluded the 

"Bernalillo County investigation superseded the preliminary one of 

Torrence [sic] County." In addition, to the extent any of the 

evidence regarding "Randy" Newell being Samuel Newell was 

exculpatory, the court concluded it would only have been probative 

27 It is clear from the context of the magistrate judgeis report 

and recommendation that the word 11 not 11 was inadvertently omitted. 

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for impeachment purposes and it would have merely been cumulative. 

As for the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the 

court concluded Mr. Harris' representation at trial was not 

ineffective because it was the product of thorough investigation, 

it involved effective examination of witnesses and legitimate 

tactical decisions. Finally, the court summarily denied Mr. 

Smith's request for an 

assistance of appellate 

evidentiary hearing on the ineffective 

counsel claim, concluding Mr. Smith 

failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a hearing was 

warranted. 

Mr. Smith then filed timely objections to the magistrate 

judge's report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b) (1), taking issue primarily with the magistrate judge's 

disposition of the Brady claims. The district court explicitly 

stated it conducted a de novo review of those portions of the 

record to which an objection was raised, a statement we accept at 

face value. See Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1171 (lOth Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1213 (1992). The district court, 

however, overruled Mr. Smith's objections, adopted the magistrate 

judge's recommendation, and dismissed the petition with prejudice. 

Because Mr. Smith objected to the report and recommendation, he 

preserved his right to renew his objections on appeal. See Moore 

v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

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I. Procedural Issues on Appeal 

Mr. Smith, once again represented by new counsel, assistant 

federal public defender Stephen P. McCue, filed a timely notice of 

appeal challenging the district court's adverse ruling denying his 

petition for relief. Before turning to the merits of Mr. Smith's 

.claims, however, we must address two threshold procedural issues. 

The first involves a jurisdictional matter regarding the 

availability of a certificate of probable cause to appeal, and the 

second relates to the procedural prerequisites for federal habeas 

corpus review. 

1. Certificate of Probable Cause 

28 U.S.C. § 2253 provides, in relevant part, "[a]n appeal [of 

an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus] may not 

be taken to the court of appeals ... unless the judge who 

rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of probable cause." The district court declined to 

issue a certificate of probable cause to appeal, finding "no 

substantial issue of law for review." Because "[t]he statutory 

certificate of probable cause is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 

appeals from final orders in habeas corpus proceedings," Ramsey v. 

Hand, 309 F.2d 947, 948 (lOth Cir. 1962) (per curiam),28 cert. 

28 See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b) ("In a habeas corpus proceeding in 

which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by 

a state court [i.e., pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254], an appeal by 

the applicant for the writ may not proceed unless a district or a 

circuit judge issues a certificate of probable cause.... If the 

district judge has denied the certificate, the applicant for the 

writ may then request issuance of the certificate by a circuit 

judge.") (emphasis added). 

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denied, 373 U.S. 940 (1963), we must determine whether Mr. Smith 

has in fact made the requisite showing of an entitlement to a 

certificate of probable cause to appeal. If he has, then we are 

authorized under § 2253 to issue a certificate of probable cause 

to appeal, and upon its issuance, petitioner "must then be 

afforded an opportunity to address the underlying merits." 

Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per curiam); see 

also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983). If, however, 

there has not been a sufficient showing of an entitlement to a 

certificate of probable cause to appeal, then we are without 

jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Ramsey, 309 F.2d at 

948. 

There is no automatic right to appeal a district court's 

order denying federal habeas corpus relief. By enacting § 2253, 

Congress authorized a conditional right to appeal, conditioned on 

the habeas petitioner first obtaining a certificate of probable 

cause. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. This requirement furthers the 

salutary purpose of weeding out frivolous appeals, see Barefoot, 

463 U.S. at 892-93 (the "primary means of separating meritorious 

from frivolous [habeas corpus] appeals should be the decision to 

grant or withhold a certificate of probable cause"), by placing 

the burden on the habeas petitioner to make a threshold showing 

that the issues sought to be raised on appeal are at least 

arguably meritorious. See id. 

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In Gallagher v. Hannigan, 24 F.3d 68 (lOth Cir. 1994), we 

discussed the criteria courts should look to in evaluating whether 

a certificate of probable cause is warranted. In general, a~ habeas petitioner who fails to obtain relief in the district court 

should be permitted to appeal that disposition only upon a 

"substantial showing of the denial of an important federal right 

by demonstrating that the issues raised are debatable among 

jurists, that a court could resolve the issues differently, or 

that the questions deserve further proceedings." Id. at 68 

(citing Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 & n.4). 

In the present case, we believe the briefs demonstrate Mr. 

Smith has carried this threshold burden by making a satisfactory 

showing that the issues he seeks to raise are arguably 

meritorious and that they warrant further proceedings. Moreover, 

given the purpose of the requirement that a petitioner obtain a 

certificate of probable cause to appeal, we do not find that the 

claims are frivolous such that Mr. Smith should be denied 

appellate review of the district court's order denying his 

petition. Therefore, we grant his request for a certificate of 

probable cause to appeal. 

2. Exhaustion 

Having thus concluded we have jurisdiction over Mr. Smith's 

appeal, we next address whether his petition has satisfied the 

nonjurisdictional, but nonetheless important, procedural prerequisites to federal habeas corpus review. 

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At the time of his direct appeal, the three claims Mr. Smith 

now raises in federal court Brady violations, ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, and ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel29 -- were unavailable to him. In his state 

petition for post-conviction relief, however, he was permitted to, 

and did in fact, litigate these three claims on the merits. Thus, 

he has undoubtedly exhausted these claims by fairly presenting 

them to the state courts, see, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 

29 Mr. Smith's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel relates to Mr. Harris' representation in Mr. Smith's 

direct appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court after his 

conviction. As noted above, the New Mexico Constitution mandates 

that an appeal from a judgment imposing a sentence of death or 

life imprisonment "shall be taken directly to the supreme court." 

N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2. This appeal was therefore a direct 

appeal as of right, and not a ruling after a grant of 

discretionary review, even though the appeal was to the state 

supreme court and not the state intermediate court of appeals. 

Accordingly, it is clear Mr. Smith did in fact have a 

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel on 

appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (noting the 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a criminal defendant's 

first appeal as of right recognized in Douglas v. California, 372 

U.S. 353 (1963) encompasses the right to effective assistance of 

counsel during that appeal) . 

Mr. Smith is not challenging his representation during any of 

his collateral proceedings, either state or federal, presumably in 

recognition of the fact that he has no Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel during such proceedings. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 u.s. 551, 

555-56 (1987) (because precedent holds a criminal defendant has no 

constitutional right to counsel beyond the first appeal of right, 

there is no right to counsel, and thus, no right to effective 

assistance of counsel, during proceedings collaterally attacking 

the validity of a conviction) . This is true because the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel applies only to criminal proceedings, 

see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985), and habeas corpus 

proceedings are civil in nature, see Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 

u.s. 770, 776 (1987), as our sister circuits have properly 

recognized. See, e.g., Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th 

Cir. 1994); Barkauskas v. Lane, 946 F.2d 1292, 1294 (7th Cir. 

1991) . 

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518-20 (1982), and they are therefore ripe for federal habeas 

corpus review.30 

30 One final comment regarding the procedural stature of this 

case is in order before turning to a discussion of the merits. 

Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing§ 2254 Proceedings "provides the 

state with an equitable defense to unjustifiably delayed 

petitions." Hannon v. Maschner, 845 F.2d 1553, 1555 (lOth Cir. 

1988) (emphasis added). The State of New Mexico, however, has 

never, either in its brief or at oral argument, asserted prejudice 

in its ability to respond to Mr. Smith's claims due to the fact 

that this case is over seventeen years old. 

This defense of prejudice in the ability to respond is 

equitable in nature, akin to laches. See, e.g., Walters v. Scott, 

21 F. 3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Rule 9 (a) codifies the 

equitable doctrine of laches as applied to habeas corpus 

petitions.") (footnote omitted); Smith v. Duckworth, 910 F.2d 

1492, 1494 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing cases). But cf. Heflin v. 

United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959) (stating that under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255, "there is no statute of limitations, no res 

judicata, and the doctrine of laches is inapplicable.") 

(Stewart, J., concurring). Therefore, we view this defense of 

prejudice in the ability to respond as an affirmative defense 

which, if not pled, as in the case at bar, is waived. See Bragan 

v. Morgan, 791 F. Supp. 704, 717 n.14 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), cited in 

8C Moore's Federal Practice§ 14.09[2] n.S; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(c) (laches is an affirmative defense). In addition, the fact 

that the State may be prejudiced if it is required to retry Mr. 

Smith is irrelevant to a Rule 9(a) defense. Hannon, 845 F.2d at 

1556) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)). The 

prejudice inquiry under Rule 9(a) is limited to prejudice in the 

State's ability to respond to the allegations in the petition 

because of petitioner's delay in filing it, and not prejudice to 

the State's ability to retry the petitioner. See Hannon, 845 F.2d 

at 1555-56 (discussing Vasquez, 474 u.s. at 265); cf. United 

States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 327-28 (3d Cir. 1994) (prejudice 

to the government's ability to retry the defendant "is not a 

consideration when ruling upon a§ 2255 motion."). 

Although prejudice is not an issue in this case, we feel 

compelled to point out we would likely reject such a claim because 

we do not believe the lapse of time in bringing the federal 

petition in this case was either inexcusable or inordinate. In 

fact, although Mr. Smith has been litigating his appeals for over 

seventeen years, almost one third of that time has been spent 

waiting for a disposition by the two federal magistrate judges who 

handled this case. In addition, post-conviction proceedings in 

New Mexico state court took three years to complete, although half 

the delay there is attributable primarily to collateral procedural 

litigation before the New Mexico Supreme Court regarding the writ 

of prohibition; the other half of that three-year delay is, 

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II. DISCUSSION 

We now turn to the merits of Mr. Smith's arguments on appeal, 

beginning with his claim that the prosecution failed to disclose 

various pieces of material exculpatory evidence. We start with an 

overview of the Brady doctrine. 

however, unexplained. In federal court, the federal magistrate 

judges took in excess of five years and two months to issue a 

report and recommendation on Mr. Smith's federal petition. 

We recognize this case, like many habeas corpus cases, has a 

voluminous record requiring a great deal of time and attention. 

Some of the delay before the federal district court was 

attributable to the numerous extensions of time requested by both 

sides; however, some of the delay, including a lapse of over two 

and a half years from August 1990 to May 1993, is unexplained. We 

reaffirm our disapproval of such inordinate and unreasonable 

delays in the absence of some reasonable explanation why it was 

necessitated. "Plainly, 'the writ of habeas corpus, challenging 

detention, is reduced to a sham if the trial courts do not act 

within a reasonable time.'" Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 

1284 (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 

(8th Cir. 1978)). While the record does not indicate all the 

reasons for the delays, we reiterate our prior rejection of a 

defense based on docket congestion. See Johnson, 917 F.2d at 

1284-85 (granting a writ of mandamus based on fourteen-month 

delay); id. at 1284 (the writ of habeas corpus is "intended to 

afford a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal 

restraint or confinement." (Citations omitted)). 

Furthermore, Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings 

provides a petition for habeas corpus relief "shall be presented 

promptly to a judge of the district court" and that the petition 

"shall be examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned." 

While we are all too familiar with the overwhelming number of 

prisoner law suits and the burden they place on the district 

courts and their dockets, the fact remains these suits, which 

involve an individual's liberty, must receive an appropriate 

degree of attention. We are confident, however, that this case is 

an aberration and that the circumstances presented here are 

unlikely to recur in the future. 

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A. The Brady Doctrine 

"[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 

87; accord United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 1440 (lOth 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088 (1990). "This oft-quoted 

language established the prosecutor's broad duty to disclose 

exculpatory material to the defense." Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1440. 

The disclosure principles of Brady are not rooted in the 

discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); United States v. 

Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1459 (lOth Cir. 1989) ("Brady is not a 

discovery rule, but a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial 

obligation" (citations omitted)). Rather, they are grounded in 

the constitutional guarantee of due process of law contained in 

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.31 See 

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107; Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. The essence of the 

Brady rule is the proposition that nondisclosure of material 

exculpatory evidence violates a defendant's due process right to a 

fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 

(1985) ("The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due 

process.") (opinion of Blackmun, J.); United States v. Robinson, 

31 Because a Brady claim is in fact a due process claim, it is 

clear that we are empowered, under the appropriate circumstances, 

to grant federal habeas corpus relief "on the ground that [the 

petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution ... of 

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). 

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39 F.3d 1115, 1118 (lOth Cir. 1994) ("Due process mandates 

disclosure"); United States v. Fleming, 19 F.3d 1325, 1330 (lOth 

Cir.) · (same),32 cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 93 (1994). 

We must be cognizant of the fact that "[i]f the suppression 

of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the 

character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor." 

Agurs, 427 u.s. at 110; see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 

219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases 

[alleging a Brady violation] is the fairness of the trial, not the 

culpability of the prosecutor."). As a result, it is irrelevant 

for Brady purposes "'whether the nondisclosure was a result of 

negligence or design.'" Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (quoting 

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)); see also 

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (noting that suppression of material 

exculpatory evidence violates due process "irrespective of the 

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); United States v. 

Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1527 (lOth Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied, 

115 S. Ct. 347 (1994); United States v Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340, 

1345-46 (lOth Cir. 1983). 

32 Brady relied on earlier Supreme Court cases holding 

"rudimentary demands of justice" were offended by the 

prosecution's failure to disclose evidence showing that a 

conviction was obtained through the knowing use of perjured 

testimony. See, e.g., Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) 

(citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). In Napue v. 

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Supreme Court extended Mooney 

and held "[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not 

soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 

appears." Id. at 269. Thus, the grounding of Brady in the 

requirements of due process was merely an extension of prior case 

law. See generally Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n.8 (discussing the 

case law upon which Brady rested) . 

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The purpose of Brady "is not to displace the adversary system 

as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure 

that· a miscarriage of justice does not occur." Bagley, 473 U.S. 

at 675. Brady and its progeny are thus grounded in notions of 

fundamental fairness and they embody a practical recognition of 

the imbalances inherent in our adversarial system of criminal 

justice. See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 692-95 (Marshall, J., 

dissenting). To compensate for these imbalances, Brady represents 

a "limited departure from a pure adversary model" in the interest 

of promoting and enhancing the search for truth. Bagley, 473 U.S. 

at 675 n.6; see also United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 

1180 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("The government's hand is stacked with 

cards the defense lacks."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 107 (1992). 

Equally important, Brady acknowledges "that the prosecutor's role 

transcends that of an adversary" because the prosecutor, acting as 

the representative of the sovereign, has an obligation to ensure 

"'not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.'" 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.6 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 

u.s. 78, 88 (1935)); see also Brady, 373 u.s. at 87-88. 

Of course, the Brady principle has limitations. The 

Constitution, as interpreted in Brady, does not require the 

prosecution to divulge every possible shred of evidence that could 

conceivably benefit the defendant. 

408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) ("We 

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know of no constitutional 

Appellate Case: 93-2218 Document: 01019282412 Date Filed: 03/07/1995 Page: 48 
requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed 

accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a 

case."); United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (lOth Cir. 

1988) ("The Government has no obligation to disclose possible 

theories of the defense to a defendant."). Due process only 

requires the disclosure of material exculpatory evidence which, 

"if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial." 

Bagley, 473 u.s. at 675. Therefore, in order to establish a Brady 

violation, the defendant bears the burden33 of establishing: "1) 

that the prosecution suppressed evidence; 2) that the evidence was 

favorable to the accused; and 3) that the evidence was material." 

United States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (lOth Cir. 1994) 

(citing United States v. DeLuna, 10 F.3d 1529, 1534 (lOth Cir. 

1993)); accord Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1472 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

We address the guiding legal principles governing each of these 

requirements in turn. 

1. Suppression of Evidence 

The first element requires proof that the "prosecution" 

suppressed or withheld the evidence in question. Several issues 

are particularly relevant to the determination in the case at bar 

of whether specific evidence was suppressed or withheld. First, 

as indicated above, the term "suppression," in the Brady context, 

does not require a finding of bad faith or any other culpable 

33 It is clear the defendant bears the burden of establishing a 

Brady violation. See, e.g., Bonnett, 877 F.2d at 1459; United 

States v. George, 778 F.2d 556, 561 (lOth Cir. 1985) ("the burden 

is on the defendant to establish the failure to disclose was 

violative of his due process rights."). 

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state of mind on the part of the prosecutor.34 See Brady, 373 

U.S. at 87. Second, the prosecutor is the party who is ultimately 

accountable for the nondisclosure of evidence. See Giglio, 405 

U.S. at 154. Third, the "prosecution" for Brady purposes 

encompasses not only the individual prosecutor handling the case, 

but also extends to the prosecutor's entire office, see id., as 

well as law enforcement personnel and other arms of the state35 

34 As we noted in Fero: 

"The Supreme Court's jurisprudence divides cases 

involving nondisclosure of evidence into two distinct 

universes. Brady and its progeny address exculpatory 

evidence still in the government's possession. [Arizona 

v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)] and [California v. 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984)] govern cases in which 

the government no longer possesses the disputed 

evidence." 

Fero, 39 F.3d at 1472 (quoting United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990, 

993 (1stCir. 1993)). 

Thus, while the state of mind of the prosecutor is irrelevant 

to the question under Brady of whether the prosecution failed to 

disclose material exculpatory evidence, "the Due Process Clause 

requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the 

State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be 

said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results 

of which might have exonerated the defendant." Arizona v. 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988) (emphasis added). In order to 

prevail on a claim that the prosecution "destroy[ed] or otherwise 

fail[ed] to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, the 

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the government 

acted in bad faith in doing so." Pedraza, 27 F.3d at 1527 (citing 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58); accord Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1331. 

Because Mr. Smith has not raised a Youngblood claim, but only 

Brady claims, we need not concern ourselves with the prosecutor's 

state of mind. 

35 "The duty to produce requested evidence falls on the state; 

there is no suggestion in Brady that different 'arms' of the 

government are severable entities .... 'The duty to disclose is 

that of the state, which ordinarily acts through the prosecuting 

attorney.'" Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184, 186-87 (5th 

Cir. 1980) (quoting Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 

F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964)). 

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involved in investigative aspects of a particular criminal 

venture. Logically, then, it follows that because 

11 ' 11 investigative officers are part of the prosecution, the taint 

on the trial is no less if they, rather than the prosecutors, were 

guilty of nondisclosure.'" 11 Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (quoting 

United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452,· 455 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(quoting United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 

1978))). 

Thus, while proof the prosecutor had actual knowledge of the 

existence of the evidence at issue would be sufficient to 

establish the suppression element of a Brady claim, such proof is 

by no means necessary. For purposes of Brady, 11 [k]nowledge by 

police or investigators is imputed to the prosecution. 11 

Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1442 (citations omitted). Our recent 

decision in Fero, which reaffirmed the continuing vitality of this 

constructive knowledge doctrine in the Brady context, stated 

11 [b]ecause the police are considered agents of the prosecution for 

Brady purposes, the fact that it was the police and not the 

prosecutor who misplaced the [evidence], is irrelevant. 11 Fero, 39 

F.3d at 1472 n.12 (emphasis added) (citing Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 

1442); see also Ballinger v. Kerby, 3 F.3d 1371, 1377 (lOth Cir. 

1993) (Kelly, J., dissenting) ( 11 Even imputing the nondisclosure of 

this [evidence] to the prosecutor 11 ) .36 

36 The question of how much of the knowledge possessed by various 

arms of the State should be imputed to the prosecution is an issue 

of first impression in this circuit. Clearly, if the prosecution 

had actual knowledge that several arms of the State were involved 

in the investigation of a particular case, then the knowledge of 

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2. Exculpatory Nature of the Evidence 

The second element of a Brady claim requires proof the 

evidence in question was exculpatory, or favorable, to the 

defendant. In this regard, it is worth noting that "'because 

impeachment is integral to a defendant's constitutional right to 

cross-examination, there exists no pat distinction between 

those arms is imputed to the prosecution. In the absence of 

actual knowledge, however, the circuits are somewhat split as to 

the precise contours of when knowledge by an arm of the State will 

be imputed to the prosecution. For example, the First and Third 

Circuits have taken an expansive view and have imputed a broad 

range of knowledge to the prosecution. See United States v. 

Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir.) (citing United States v. 

Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S. 

Ct. 483 (1993), for the proposition that "[t]he prosecutors have 

an obligation to make a thorough inquiry of all enforcement 

agencies that had a potential connection with the witnesses."), 

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 483 (1993)); United States v. Osorio, 929 

F.2d 753, 760-62 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing a prosecutor's duty 

to "demand compliance with disclosure responsibilities by all 

relevant dimensions of government."). The Fifth Circuit has taken 

a more moderate approach. See Williams v. Whitley, 940 F.2d 132, 

133 (5th Cir. 1991) ("the prosecution is deemed to have knowledge 

of information readily available to it"). The District of 

Columbia and the Ninth Circuits have not clearly defined the 

extent of the obligation. See United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 

1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (prosecutor's duty to disclose extends 

to material maintained by branches of government "closely aligned 

with the prosecution."); United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 

1490 (9th Cir. 1992) (obligation on prosecution under Brady 

extends to production of "any favorable evidence in the personnel 

records" and citing cases that the prosecution must produce 

materials even if they are in the possession of another agency) . 

In this case, it is undisputed that the Bernalillo Co~nty 

district attorney's office had actual knowledge that there were 

two separate investigations into these homicides by the 

authorities in Bernalillo County and by the authorities in 

Torrance County. Because the prosecution had actual knowledge of 

the fact that these two arms of the State were investigating this 

case, it is reasonable to impute the knowledge possessed by each 

entity to the prosecution under Brady. Furthermore, this fact 

relieves us from having to determine the full extent of when 

knowledge possessed by an arm of the State will be imputed to the 

prosecution. 

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impeachment and exculpatory evidence under Brady.'" Ballinger, 3 

F.3d at 1376 (quoting Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1443); accord Hughes, 

33 F.3d at 1252. This is especially true "[w]here a witness' 

credibility is material to the question of guilt." Fleming, 19 

F.3d at 1330; see also Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55. As Justice 

Blackmun stated in Bagley: 

Impeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory 

evidence, falls within the Brady rule. See Giglio v. 

United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Such evidence 

is "evidence favorable to an accused," Brady, 373 U.S. 

at 87, so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it 

may make the difference between conviction and 

acquittal. Cf. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 

(1959) ("The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and 

reliability of a given witness may well be determinative 

of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle 

factors as the possible interest of the witness in 

testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty 

may depend"). 

473 U.S. at 676-77.37 In sum, then, the fact that a particular 

piece of evidence is probative only for purposes of impeachment is 

not a defense to a Brady claim because "' [i]mpeachment evidence 

merits the same constitutional treatment as exculpatory 

evidence.'" Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1179 (citation omitted). 

3. The Materiality of the Evidence 

The third and final element of a Brady claim requires proof 

that the evidence was "material either to guilt or to punishment." 

37 The case law uses the terms "favorable" and "exculpatory" 

interchangeably. This distinction may be traceable to an 

ambiguity after the Brady decision on the issue of whether 

impeachment evidence, which is arguably "favorable" but not 

"exculpatory" per se, was subject to Brady disclosure. Because 

the Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative in 

Giglio, holding impeachment evidence is subject to Brady 

disclosure, we see no significant difference between the two 

terms. 

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Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376. "A 

fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in 

the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed 

evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." Agurs, 

427 U.S. at 104; Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1441. 

"The proper standard of materiality must reflect our 

overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt." 

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court 

first addressed the materiality question in Agurs, enunciating 

three different standards38 of materiality dependent upon "the 

specificity of the defendant's request and the conduct of the 

prosecutor." Buchanan, 891 F. 2d at 1441. 

If the defendant made a specific request for disclosure of an 

identifiable piece of evidence, then the prosecution was on 

specific notice of what was sought. Thus, the standard of 

materiality should be, and was, more lenient than if the defendant 

made either a general request for "all Brady evidence" or no 

request at all, both of which fail to provide any descriptive 

38 The Supreme Court enunciated a fourth standard of materiality 

for the exceptional case where the undisclosed evidence would 

demonstrate "the prosecutor's knowing failure to disclose that 

testimony used to convict the defendant was false." Bagley, 473 

U.S. at 678. In those rare situations, the evidence is 

presumptively material "unless failure to disclose it would be 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 680. The 

justification for this presumption of materiality is that by 

affirmatively using perjured testimony, or by passively failing to 

correct what is known to be perjured testimony under Napue, the 

prosecution is participating in a "corruption of the truth-seeking 

function of the trial process." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. 

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notice of what is being sought. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-83 

(discussing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-12). 

Agurs specifically considered the obligation of the 

prosecution in cases where no request was made. Recognizing that 

disclosure obligations are tied to the level of notice afforded to 

the prosecution, the Court held: 

If there is a duty to respond to a general request ... it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character 

of certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. But 

if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of 

innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty 

to produce, that duty should equally arise even if no 

request is made.... [W]e conclude that there is no 

significant difference between cases in which there has 

been merely a general request for exculpatory matter and 

cases ... in which there has been no request at all. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added). Therefore, while it is 

certainly more prudent for defense counsel to at least make a 

"general request" for Brady material rather than no request at 

all, the failure to make any request does not relieve the 

prosecution of its obligation to disclose evidence with an 

"obviously exculpatory character." 

As a practical matter, this must be true, at least in 

situations where defense counsel simply has no way of knowing the 

prosecution possesses certain exculpatory evidence. See Agurs, 

427 U.S. at 106 ("In many cases, however, exculpatory information 

in the possession of the prosecutor may be unknown to defense 

counsel."). Any other rule would penalize criminal defendants for 

their counsel's failure to be prescient. Moreover, if defense 

counsel knew the prosecution possessed particular exculpatory 

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evidence, counsel could vitiate this entire problem by making a 

specific request for that evidence. It is precisely because 

defense counsel does not, and cannot, know what potentially 

exculpatory evidence the prosecution possesses that there cannot 

realistically be any meaningful distinction between the 

prosecution's obligation under Brady in a "general request" case 

and its obligation in a "no request" case. If the prosecution 

possesses evidence that, in the context of a particular case is 

obviously exculpatory, then it has an obligation to disclose it to 

defense counsel whether a general request is made or whether no 

request is made. This represents a paradigmatic example of the 

imbalances inherent in the criminal justice process, and it serves 

to illustrate the purpose behind the Brady doctrine. 

The Agurs framework, however, was unnecessarily rigid and the 

semantic distinctions between the different standards of 

materiality were often difficult to apply in practice. In Bagley, 

five members of the Court, through two separate opinions, adopted 

a single standard of materiality "sufficiently flexible to cover 

the 'no request,' 'general request,' and 'specific request' 

cases." Bagley, 473 u.s. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 

685 (opinion of White, J.);39 see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 

39 Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Justice O'Connor, and 

Justice White's concurrence, which specifically agreed with this 

definition of materiality, was joined by Chief Justice Burger and 

then-Justice Rehnquist. See Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252 n.3 (quoting 

Ballinger, 3 F.3d at ·1376 n.4); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 

480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (noting that a majority of the justices of 

the Supreme Court have adopted the definition of materiality 

enunciated in Bagley). "Accordingly, the plurality opinion [of 

Justice Blackmun] may be taken to state the holding of the Court." 

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593, 603 (lOth Cir.) (discussing the three standards of 

materiality under Agurs and noting that after Bagley, courts are 

to apply "a single test ... to all instances of nondisclosure, 

including specific request, general request and no request 

cases"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). Under this standard, 

"[t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; accord Fero, 

39 F.3d at 1472; Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376. 

Under this more flexible, sliding scale approach to assessing 

the materiality vel non of the evidence in question, the 

specificity of the request is inversely related to the 

prosecution's disclosure obligation. As the specificity of the 

defendant's request increases, a lesser showing of materiality 

will suffice to establish a violation. Conversely, as the 

defendant's request becomes more general or even nonexistent, a 

greater showing of materiality is required to establish a Brady 

violation. 

In making the materiality determination, "we view the 

suppressed evidence's significance in relation to the record as a 

whole," Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252 (citing United States v. Wolf, 839 

Waters v. Churchill, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1893 (1994) 

(Souter, J., concurring)~itations omitted)). 

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F.2d 1387, 1391 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988)), 

keeping in mind that "[w]hat might be considered insignificant 

evidence in a strong case might suffice to disturb an already 

questionable verdict." Robinson, 39 F.3d at 1119 (citing Agurs, 

427 U.S. at 113). We are also to consider "any adverse effect 

that the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the 

preparation or presentation of the defendant's case in light 

of the totality of the circumstances." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683. 

We reiterate the question of "[w]hether the government was 

required to disclose certain evidence under Brady is a mixed 

question of law and fact which we review de novo." Fleming, 19 

F.3d at 1330 (citing Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1440); Abello-Silva, 

948 F.2d at 1179. Therefore, "[t]he state court's ultimate 

conclusion under Brady ... is not entitled to a presumption of 

correctness under section 2254(d) and is open to review by federal 

courts." Bowen, 799 F.2d at 610 (citing Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 

1334, 1344-46 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090 

(1985)); see also Case, 887 F.2d at 1393 ("No presumption of 

correctness attaches to legal conclusions or determinations on 

mixed questions of law and fact. Those are reviewed de novo on 

federal habeas review.") .40 Findings of fact by the district 

40 In Wright v. West, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992), the 

Supreme Court reconsidered the appropriate level of deference to 

be accorded to state court findings on mixed questions; the Court, 

however, declined to resolve the issue. See id. at 2489-92; see 

also Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376 n.3. Therefore, we continue to 

adhere to precedent, which mandates de novo review of mixed 

questions. See, e.g., Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1330 (Brady claims are 

mixed questions reviewed de novo); Bowen, 799 F.2d at 610 (same). 

See generally Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-18 (1985) (mixed 

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court are reviewed for clear error. See Thomas v. Kerby, 1995 WL 

3405 *1 (lOth Cir. Jan. 4, 1995) (a district court's factual 

findings in a habeas corpus case are reviewed for clear error) 

(citing Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1991)). 

We must now apply these principles to the facts of the present 

case. 

B. Application to the Case at Bar 

A review of the record in this case reveals the prosecution 

did in fact fail to disclose most, if not all, the evidence at 

issue. The State's primary defenses to Mr. Smith's claims were 

that the evidence was made available pursuant to the district 

attorney's 11 open file 11 policy, that the evidence was not withheld 

intentionally, or that the prosecutors did not have knowledge the 

evidence existed. Because these issues are largely irrelevant to 

Brady analysis, it follows that the State has not offered a 

legitimate defense to Mr. Smith's claims. Further, our confidence 

in the outcome of the trial has been seriously undermined by the 

cumulative effect of several of these nondisclosures. We 

therefore find, for reasons set forth below, Mr. Smith is entitled 

to federal habeas relief. 

1. Police Reports 

It is undisputed Mr. Smith made a specific request for police 

reports 11 relating to investigation or inquiring into circumstances 

constitutional questions are 11 subject to plenary federal review11 

on habeas). 

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surrounding these criminal complaints," and that the trial court 

entered an order requiring disclosure of "all police reports 

made in connection with this case." In Agurs, the Supreme Court 

warned "[w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant 

request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, 

excusable." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106. The State argues it had an 

"open file" policy in place that discharged its obligation under 

Brady by making this material available to the defense. We 

disagree. 

An "open file" policy is neither mandated by the 

Constitution, see Moore, 408 U.S. at 795, nor is it ipso facto 

constitutionally sufficient. While an "open file" policy may 

suffice to discharge the prosecution's Brady obligations in a 

particular 

It is not 

case, it 

difficult 

often will not be dispositive of the issue. 

to envision circumstances where the 

prosecution possesses, either actually or constructively, Brady 

information that for some reason is not in the "file," such as 

material in a police officer's file (but not in the prosecutor's 

file) or material learned orally and not memorialized in writing. 

No one could reasonably argue that under those circumstances, 

assuming the evidence was exculpatory, the prosecution's Brady 

obligations would be satisfied by its "open file" policy. To 

adopt such a holding would permit the prosecution to discharge its 

obligations under Brady by talismanically invoking the words "open 

file policy," and thus circumvent the purpose behind Brady. We 

believe this reading of Brady is too formalistic and is flawed 

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because it fails to recognize that Brady material may be found in 

places other than a prosecutor's file. The prosecution's 

affirmative obligation under Brady may often go beyond divulging 

what is in "the file.n41 Thus, while a prosecution's "open file" 

policy is relevant and may be considered in determining whether a 

.Brady violation occurred, it cannot, standing alone, be given 

dispositive weight. 

a. Officer Morrison's Report 

In the present case, it is clear as a threshold matter that 

the report prepared by Officer Morrison of the New Mexico State 

Police, that contained information relating to "Randy" Newell's 

presence near the vicinity of the bodies on two separate 

occasions, to the clothes taken from his car and to his status as 

a suspect in this investigation, falls within the scope of the 

trial court's disclosure order. Although his report was initially 

necessitated by a traffic accident involving "Randy" Newell, both 

the contents of the report and the caption of the report indicate 

a relationship between the report and the Talton-McDonnell 

homicides. The report thus was relevant and within the umbrella 

of the defendant's request. The question then becomes whether it 

was disclosed. 

41 To the extent an "open file" policy would be probative of the 

question of whether the prosecution acted in good faith in 

attempting to discharge its Brady obligation, we reiterate the 

state of mind of the prosecutor is irrelevant to the Brady 

inquiry. 

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The magistrate judge made a conclusory finding found that 

"[p]etitioner has not shown that the State failed to comply with 

its Brady obligation to turn over [Officer Morrison's] report." 

Although this finding is reviewed only for clear error, and 

although we are required to afford appropriate deference to the 

trial courts on factual matters, we must still scrutinize factual 

findings to insure that there is a sufficient evidentiary basis 

for the finding. In this case, while we do not do so lightly, we 

are convinced, for reasons set forth below, that this finding is 

clearly erroneous. 

We are troubled by the fact that this "finding" of disclosure 

of Officer Morrison's report is unsupported by evidence in the 

record. In fact, the evidence in the record from the evidentiary 

hearing strongly suggests and supports a contrary finding, namely, 

that the report was not disclosed. For example, neither 

prosecutor had any recollection of specifically disclosing this 

report to Mr. Smith's counsel. Although no finding was made 

concerning whether this report was in the file in 1977, the State 

stipulated the report was not in the file in 1983. While far from 

conclusive, this fact tends to support a finding of nondisclosure, 

especially in light of the other evidence. 

Mr. Harris' testimony was also consistent with a finding of 

nondisclosure as he testified he never received a copy of that 

report. But perhaps the most highly probative evidence relating 

to the disclosure vel non of this report is the conspicuous 

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absence of any cross-examination of Mr. Newell on the matters 

contained in Officer Morrison's report, matters that were 

extremely relevant to Mr. Smith's defense.42 The sum total of 

this evidence, coupled with the sheer absence of any evidence 

supporting a finding of disclosure, compels us to conclude the 

magistrate judge's finding of disclosure of this report was 

clearly erroneous. 

Moreover, there can be no doubt the evidence contained 

therein was "favorable" to the defense. Officer Morrison's report 

would have provided important investigative leads and impeachment 

evidence to Mr. Smith and his attorney regarding "Randy" Newell. 

The evidence would have permitted more thorough impeachment of a 

critical state's witness and would have immeasurably strengthened 

Mr. Smith's defense that "Randy" Newell was the perpetrator and 

not Mr. Smith. 

To the extent the magistrate judge concluded this impeachment 

evidence would merely have been cumulative, the record provides no 

support for this finding and it is therefore clearly erroneous. 

See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). 

"Cumulative evidence" is defined as evidence "which goes to prove 

what has already been established by other evidence." Black's Law 

42 Even if Mr. Harris' testimony is self-serving, thereby 

weakening this aspect of Mr. Smith's Brady claim, testimony that 

Harris had the report but did not utilize it would be, at the very 

least, incredible, given his defense at trial, and at most, highly 

persuasive evidence bearing on Mr. Smith's ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel claim. 

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Dictionary 343 (5th ed. 1979). Officer Morrison's report might 

have been cumulative had the specific contents of it been 

disclosed to the defense at some other time. But, as the 

discussion below illustrates, the contents of the report were not 

disclosed nor was Mr. Newell ever impeached about any of the 

material contained in the report. 

Thus, the potential impeachment value of the report cannot be 

said to be cumulative of anything already established on crossexamination of Mr. Newell. To the contrary, disclosure of this 

report would have alerted counsel to the existence of the clothing 

and permitted defense counsel to examine the clothing found and to 

have it tested. Furthermore, this information, taken together 

with Mr. Newell's already existing motive of jealousy, which was 

established on cross-examination, would have undoubtedly inured to 

Mr. Smith's benefit. 

The nondisclosure of this report, and the contents thereof, 

dramatically altered and limited the effectiveness of Mr. Smith's 

defense at trial. Additionally, while the knowledge the police 

were investigating Mr. Newell would arguably carry significant 

weight with the jury in and of itself, that fact would also have 

been useful in 11 discredit[ing] the caliber of the investigation or 

the decision to charge the defendant, 11 factors we may consider is 

assessing whether a Brady violation occurred. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 

613. 

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Finally, we cannot agree with the state post-conviction court 

and the federal district court that, in the alternative, this 

evidence was not "material." We repeat that the failure to 

disclose this report, in light of a specific request for it, is 

"seldom, if ever, excusable." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106. We believe 

the nondisclosure of this report clearly impacted the defense's 

preparation and presentation of its case at trial. See Bagley, 

473 u.s. at 683. In addition, given Mr. Smith's defense at trial, 

the significance of "Randy" Newell's testimony, and the fact that 

the first trial resulted in a mistrial, we believe the disclosure 

of this evidence, considered in light of the entire record, can 

reasonably be said to have affected the outcome of the retrial so 

as to undermine our confidence in the verdict. 

b. Sergeant Gonzales' Report 

The same holds true for Sergeant Gonzales' report containing 

the critical information that Ms. Pitchford indicated "Randy" 

Newell was known as Samuel J. Newell. As we discuss below, there 

is evidence in the record that the prosecution learned this 

information from Detective Borunda. Detective Borunda stated he 

told the prosecutors sometime prior to the end of the retrial that 

he had learned "Randy" Newell was Samuel J. Newell. 

Limiting the present discussion to Sergeant Gonzales' report, 

we note the record does not indicate whether this report was ever 

in the file. Harris testified he was never advised as to "Randy" 

Newell's true identity. If this report was in the file and was 

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not disclosed, then a Brady violation occurred. But even if this 

report was not in the prosecutor's file, it is clear that for 

Brady purposes the knowledge of law enforcement personnel is 

imputed to the prosecutor, thereby constituting constructive 

knowledge of Newell's true identity. Accordingly, the State's 

argument, which was accepted by the magistrate judge, that Ms. 

Ferrara "did not actually know the true identity of Newell," is 

simply misplaced because actual knowledge is not necessary. 

Moreover, the State has not argued this information would not be 

evidence "favorable" to Mr. Smith, subject to Brady disclosure, 

thereby implicitly conceding that point, which is entirely proper 

in our view. Finally, we believe this evidence was "material" in 

that disclosure of "Randy" Newell's true identity, with the 

accompanying information regarding his prior convictions and 

fugitive status, can reasonably be said to have altered the 

verdict on this case. 

2. "Randy" Newell's True Identity 

The fact of "Randy" Newell's true identity, and the 

information as to his background, was not limited to Sergeant 

Gonzales' report. Detective Borunda testified he told one of the 

prosecutors some time before the end of the second trial that 

"Randy" Newell was Samuel J. Newell, and that he provided a rap 

sheet with Samuel J. Newell's record. 

Although Detective Borunda testified he informed the 

prosecutors of this information, they denied ever learning of this 

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fact or of ever obtaining a copy of a rap sheet for Samuel J. 

Newell, thereby creating a factual dispute in the record. If it 

was ·in fact true the prosecutors actually knew of Mr. Newell's 

real identity and nonetheless permitted him to testify under a 

false name, then this case would be governed by Napue, which held 

the prosecution may not knowingly fail to correct information it 

knows to be false. See Napue, 360 u.s. at 269. Under such 

circumstances, the nondisclosed evidence would be presumptively 

material unless the State demonstrates the nondisclosure was 

harmless error. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. 

In this case, the state post-conviction court and the 

magistrate judge implicitly found Detective Borunda's testimony 

not credible because both courts concluded there was no evidence 

the prosecution 

We cannot say this 

had actual knowledge of Newell's true identity. 

finding of the district court is clearly 

erroneous because the evidence is susceptible to two permissible 

interpretations depending on the weight given to the testimony of 

the respective witnesses. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74; see 

also Exxon Corp. v. Gann, 21 F.3d 1002, 1005 (lOth Cir. 1994) 

(appellate court must uphold district court's factual findings as 

long as they are 11 permissible 11 in light of the evidence in the 

record) . The only way these courts could have reached their 

conclusions would be to discredit Detective Borunda's testimony, 

and we do not second-guess such credibility determinations on 

appeal. See, e.g., Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1516 (lOth 

Cir. 1991) ( 11 we treat a state court finding regarding witness 

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Appellate Case: 93-2218 Document: 01019282412 Date Filed: 03/07/1995 Page: 67 
credibility as a finding of fact."); cf. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 

574-75 (emphasizing appellate courts owe heightened deference to 

trial court's credibility determinations under Rule 52(a)). 

But while the factual determination that Detective Borunda 

.did not convey this information to the prosecution avoids a Napue 

situation, it does not alter the fact that Detective Borunda, who 

himself was a member of the Albuquerque Police Department, knew of 

this false identity. Under prevailing principles governing Brady 

claims, this information, having been possessed by an 

investigative arm of the state that the prosecution knew was 

involved in investigating this case, is imputed to the prosecution 

under Brady. Accordingly, the prosecution is deemed to have known 

"Randy" Newell was actually Samuel J. Newell; whether they had 

actual knowledge of this fact is irrelevant.43 

In this respect, both the magistrate judge and the State 

manifested a misunderstanding of the applicable law. The 

magistrate judge repeatedly faulted Mr. Smith for failing to prove 

the prosecution's failure to disclose was done knowingly or 

intentionally. In so doing, however, we believe the magistrate 

judge placed an excessive burden on Mr. Smith because Buchanan and 

the discussion above hold exactly to the contrary, namely, that 

actual knowledge is not necessary to establish a Brady claim. The 

43 The finding that the prosecution did not have actual knowledge 

of Mr. Newell's true identity would demonstrate its failure to 

disclose was made in good faith. As we have repeatedly stated, 

however, state of mind is irrelevant under Brady. 

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State, moreover, argues "[c]ommon sense infers the prosecution's 

obligation to disclose information is limited to that information 

which is in the possession of the prosecution." The problem is 

the State interprets the italicized language too narrowly, 

contending "possession" means "actual possession" and that "the 

prosecution" is limited to the prosecuting attorneys and not law 

enforcement personnel. For reasons already expressed, both of 

these interpretations of law are inaccurate. 

It follows that because the State is deemed to have had 

knowledge of "Randy" Newell's true identity, it is accountable for 

failing to disclose his prior record of convictions and his 

fugitive status, which were the subject of a specific Brady 

request by Mr. Smith's counsel and which the State properly 

concedes are subject to Brady disclosure. Once again, for the 

same reasons discussed earlier, we find this evidence to be 

"material" because its nondisclosure undermines our confidence in 

the verdict. The prior convictions serve as significant 

impeachment evidence of Mr. Newell,44 as does the fact he was 

44 At the time of Mr. Smith's trial, New Mexico's rules of 

evidence provided for impeachment by prior convictions by way of a 

statute modeled after Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 11-609(A) (1). It is clear impeachment of 

Mr. Newell with these prior convictions would be well within the 

scope of the rule, albeit subject to the district court's 

discretion to exclude this evidence. Id. While we cannot be 

absolutely certain of how the trial court would have exercised its 

discretion, we believe that in light of the importance of Newell's 

testimony and the defendant's desire to undermine his credibility 

as much as possible, see State v. Lucero, 648 P.2d 350, 352-53 

(N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (citing these factors as ones to be 

considered in determining whether to permit impeachment by prior 

conviction), it is probable these convictions would in fact have 

been admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching Newell. The 

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attempting to conceal his true identity. Furthermore, this 

evidence also supports Mr. Smith's defense that "someone else," 

someone with at least as strong of a motive as that attributed to 

Mr. Smith, may have committed these crimes. 

The record thus discloses a classic situation where the left 

hand did not know what the right hand was doing. It appears that 

the various investigative agencies involved in this case 

constructed a wall separating the Bernalillo County investigation 

of Mr. Smith from the Torrance County investigation of Mr. Newell. 

But this lack of communication and coordination among arms of the 

state cannot be, and is not, a defense to the prosecution's 

failure to disclose favorable, material information to the 

defendant when that failure to disclose amounts to denying a 

criminal defendant a fair trial. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108. 

3. The Clothing Seized From "Randy" Newell's Car 

We next address Mr. Smith's claim the prosecution failed to 

disclose the clothes seized from Mr. Newell's car. As indicated 

above, there is no distinction in the prosecutor's obligation to 

disclose Brady material when the defense makes a general request 

as compared to when the defense makes no request at all. If the 

evidence in question has an "obviously exculpatory character," 

then disclosure of that evidence is mandatory. See Agurs, 427 

u.s. at 107. 

failure to admit them for that purpose would arguably have been an 

abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this case. 

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In the present case, Mr. Smith argues the State was aware of 

the clothes prior to trial, that it suspected the substance on the 

women's underwear was blood but that it never tested the 

substance, and that it did not make the clothing available to the 

defense to allow it to test the substance. Thus, in the context 

of this case, given Newell's possible involvement in this case, 

Mr. Smith argues the prosecution violated Brady by failing to 

disclose the clothing. The State responds by arguing that any 

potential exculpatory value of the clothing is speculative since 

no testing was ever done, that the clothes were in the evidence 

room and were available upon request from Mr. Harris, and the 

magistrate judge found the clothing was not material.45 

As an initial matter, there can be no doubt if the 

prosecution had tested the clothing, the results of those tests 

would have to be disclosed pursuant to the court's discovery 

order. That order provided, in relevant part, that the district 

attorney's office shall disclose to the defense, inter alia, 

"scientific experiments made in connection with this case, 

immediately, and shall continue to provide the copies to the 

defense counsel during the pendency of this action." The clothes, 

however, were never tested and no scientific reports ever produced 

45 As noted below, the magistrate judge essentially adopted the 

state post-conviction court's determination on this issue. The 

magistrate judge, however, appears to have confused its obligation 

to give state court factual findings a presumption of correctness 

with its obligation to conduct a de novo review of the materiality 

of the evidence. 

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before the clothes were destroyed. It is also undisputed both Ms. 

Ferrara and Mr. Anuskewicz knew these clothes existed prior to the 

start of the first trial in this matter; they had examined them at 

the evidence room in the Albuquerque Police Department. 

The question thus becomes whether the prosecution had an 

obligation to disclose either the existence of these clothes, any 

testing of the clothes, or both,46 to the defense, knowing that: 

they were seized from the vehicle of another suspect; everyone who 

examined the underwear said the substance might have been blood; 

the substance on the underwear was on the same side as the gunshot 

wound to Talton's leg; and Mr. Newell, a self-interested witness 

who was a suspect in these same crimes and who had been stopped in 

the vicinity where the bodies were found, indicated the substance 

was menstrual blood even though the substance was not in an area 

where menstrual blood would ordinarily be found. Under the 

unusual circumstances of this case, we believe the prosecution 

failed to comply with the requirements of Brady by not disclosing 

these clothes to the defense. 

First, we once again reject the prosecution's reliance on its 

"open file" policy. The prosecution knew about the circumstances 

surrounding the seizure of these clothes, and Mr. Harris testified 

46 Mr. Smith contends he was entitled to cross-examine Mr. Newell 

about the clothes found in his car, even if they were not tested, 

as the mere fact that the clothes were in his car would have been 

a legitimate area of cross-examination. While Mr. Newell would 

have s·tated the clothes were laundry, Mr. Smith contends the jury 

should have been permitted to hear this line of cross-examination 

in assessing Mr. Newell's credibility. 

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he was never made aware of their existence. He had no reason to 

know he should have asked to see these clothes since he did not 

know they existed.47 While the clothes were marked in the 

evidence room with a tag, it stated "Articles from vehicle 

accident," and nothing more. Because Mr. Harris was never given 

the police reports indicating clothing had been seized from Mr. 

Newell's car and because he otherwise had no way of knowing he 

should be looking for these clothes, the prosecution's failure to 

advise him specifically of their existence was faulty. 

Second, we have no trouble concluding this evidence was 

"favorable" to Mr. Smith. Even without medical tests of the 

clothing to evaluate whether the substance was in fact blood, the 

mere fact that Mr. Newell had these clothes in his car would 

itself have been a subject for cross-examination. As for the lack 

of any testing, the State's argument that the potential 

exculpatory value of testing is speculative because none was ever 

done is not persuasive. The State possessed these clothes and at 

least Ms. Ferrara recognized the potential importance of the 

substance on the clothes, and she thus suggested tests be done. 

In spite of this initial decision, no tests were ever performed 

and the clothes were never made available to the defense to allow 

it to conduct independent tests. Under these circumstances, the 

47 To the extent Mr. Harris' testimony 

he was aware of these clothes, his 

trial would again bear heavily on 

assistance of counsel claim. 

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is again self-serving, and 

failure to utilize them at 

Mr. Smith's ineffective 

Appellate Case: 93-2218 Document: 01019282412 Date Filed: 03/07/1995 Page: 73 
State may not now claim that whatever exculpatory value the 

clothes possessed was speculative. 

Finally,· while the State asserts this evidence was not 

"material," in reliance on the magistrate judge's conclusion, we 

again respectfully disagree with that ruling. Our de novo review 

of the entire record in this case convinces us the result of the 

proceeding could reasonably have been different had the clothes 

taken from Mr. Newell's car been disclosed to the defense. This 

evidence was highly probative with respect to Mr. Smith's defense 

at trial and could very well have resulted in the first jury 

returning an acquittal. Under the circumstances of this case, our 

confidence in the outcome of the proceeding has been undermined. 

We cannot say that the result of the trial would have remained the 

same had this evidence been disclosed. Therefore, we find this 

evidence was "material" for Brady purposes. 

4. "Randy" Newell's Statements 

The last pieces of evidence at issue are Mr. Newell's 

statements to various law enforcement personnel. Although it does 

not appear a specific request for these statements was made, the 

State does not dispute its obligation to produce a witness' prior 

statements. The state post-conviction court found II [r]eports 

indicate statements were taken from Newell which statements were 

not in the files of the District Attorney, were not examined by 

the District Attorney, and which have never been located or 

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verified as existing or as to content." The magistrate judge did 

not expressly address the merits of this claim, stating only: 

Petitioner ... contends that much of the evidence 

marshalled by the Torrence [sic] County law enforcement, 

such as ... statements made by Newell, were material and 

exculpatory and should have been disclosed .... The 

Bernalillo County investigation superseded the 

preliminary one of Torrence [sic] County. The Torrence 

[sic] County tapes were not part of that investigation. 

Thus, the magistrate judge seemed to erect a wall between the two 

local investigations, notwithstanding the fact they were both 

state entities and that the prosecuting office was aware that both 

entities were involved in investigating this case. 

The State attempts to defend the nondisclosure of these 

statements by arguing its "open file" policy, and further, that 

"[t]he prosecution apparently did not have possession of or use 

the supposed statements during the trial or for purposes of 

investigation." We have previously noted why the State's reliance 

on the "open file" policy is misplaced. As an aside, the issue of 

Mr. Newell's statements presents a perfect example of the 

inadequacy of an "open file" policy with respect to the 

prosecution's obligations under Brady: the state postconviction 

court found that Mr. Newell's statements were not even in the 

file. 

Furthermore, even assuming the prosecution did not know about 

these statements,48 it is clear the various law enforcement 

48 Both Ms. Ferrara and Mr. Anuskewicz testified they knew Mr. 

Newell had given statements to certain individuals. Ms. Ferrara's 

knowledge is confirmed by her handwritten trial notes. 

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personnel did. Accordingly, their knowledge is again imputed to 

the prosecuting attorneys for Brady purposes. The prosecution's 

alleged nonuse or lack of possession of these statements is an 

attempt by the State to alter the relevant inquiry. It remains 

undisputed the law enforcement personnel possessed these 

statements, and this is what is important, not whether the 

prosecution did or did not use or possess the statements. 

Moreover, these statements are again evidence "favorable" to 

Mr. Smith as impeachment evidence relative to Mr. Newell's 

credibility. For the same reasons espoused above, we believe the 

failure to disclose these statements, when taken in conjunction 

with the other nondisclosures, undermines our confidence in the 

outcome of this case. 

In sum, we hold the cumulative49 effect of the prosecution's 

nondisclosures undermines our confidence in the outcome of the 

trial. We perceive the primary cause for these nondisclosures to 

be a lack of communication between various law enforcement 

agencies of the State of New Mexico, rather than a deliberate 

suppression of evidence. Nonetheless, the prejudice resulting 

Additionally, the state postconviction court's finding that the 

contents of these statements could never be verified is also 

questionable. Sergeant Gonzales indicated Mr. Newell told him the 

blood stains on the women's underwear found in his car were 

menstrual blood. 

49 Because there are multiple Brady violations involved in this 

case, we express no opinion on the question of whether any one of 

these violations, standing alone, would warrant relief. Moreover, 

because we conclude Mr. Smith is entitled to relief on his Brady 

claims, we express no opinion on his remaining arguments. 

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from the prosecution's failure to coordinate the various 

investigations in this case cannot be allocated to the defendant 

when his constitutional right to a fair trial lies in the balance. 

"[T]he existence of any small piece of evidence favorable to the 

defense may, in a particular case, create just the doubt that 

prevents the jury from returning a verdict of guilty." Bagley, 

473 U.S. at 693 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Robinson, 39 

F.3d at 1119. While some of this evidence, standing alone, may 

seem somewhat trivial, in the context of the entire record in this 

case, we believe the disclosure of all of this evidence might have 

led to a different result. In short, our confidence in the result 

of the retrial has been sufficiently undermined to warrant relief 

in this case. 

Almost all of the nondisclosed evidence was relevant to Mr. 

Smith's attempt to demonstrate why "Randy" Newell had as much 

reason to have committed these murders as did Mr. Smith. The 

nondisclosure of this evidence altered and affected Mr. Smith's 

preparation and presentation of his defense at trial. The fact 

that the prosecution's case was entirely circumstantial, coupled 

with the fact that the jury in Mr. Smith's first trial was unable 

to reach a unanimous decision, creates a reasonable probability 

the result of the proceeding would have been different had this 

evidence been disclosed to the jury. Prosecutor Virginia Ferrara 

even expressed her skepticism at whether a conviction would have 

been possible if this evidence had been disclosed. E.g., Bowen, 

799 F.2d at 610 (recognizing the relevance of the prosecutor's own 

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views as to the effect the evidence would have had on the ability 

to convict). Therefore, we find Mr. Smith has sustained his 

burden of establishing he was denied a fair trial under Brady.SO 

CONCLUSION 

The due process clause does not confer upon a criminal 

defendant a right to an error-free trial. See United States v. 

Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983). But it unquestionably 

guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental right to a fair 

trial. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953). 

For the reasons stated above, we are compelled to hold the 

prosecution's failure to disclose several pieces of relevant, 

material exculpatory evidence to Mr. Smith violated his 

constitutional due process right to a fair trial. In so doing, we 

merely applied settled principles of law to the facts of this 

case; we did not increase the prosecution's burden to disclose 

information nor did we increase the defendant's right to receive 

information. All we hold is that under the facts of this case, 

the prosecution did not fulfill its obligation to disclose to Mr. 

Smith material exculpatory evidence. It bears repeating that 

"[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a 

given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and 

it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the 

witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty 

may depend." Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. 

50 Because we conclude Mr. Smith is entitled to federal habeas 

corpus relief based on his Brady claims, we need not address his 

remaining claims in support of his petition for relief. 

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Our holding should not be interpreted as undermining the 

important interests of comity and federalism inherent in our dual 

sovereignty system of governance. These interests undoubtedly 

command hesitation before acting under these circumstances; yet, 

these interests do not exist in a vacuum. They must be understood 

in light of the countervailing obligation of the federal courts to 

insure that a criminal conviction is not obtained in violation of 

the Constitution. 

In sum, we GRANT Mr. Smith's request for a certificate of 

probable cause to appeal. Based on our conclusion his conviction 

is constitutionally infirm, we VACATE the conviction, and REMAND 

this case to the district court. In attempting to comply with our 

statutory mandate of disposing of habeas corpus proceedings "as 

law and justice require," 28 U.S.C. § 2243, see also Burton v. 

Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 693-94 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 

S. Ct. 1879 (1993), we instruct the district court on remand to 

enter an order directing the State of New Mexico, within ninety 

(90) days of the entry of that order, to either grant Mr. Smith a 

new trial or, in the alternative, to order his permanent release 

from custody. 

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