Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00926/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00926-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BLACKWATER LODGE AND

TRAINING CENTER, INC., a Delaware

corporation dba BLACKWATER

WORLDWIDE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08-CV-0926 H (WMC)

ORDER GRANTING

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

vs.

KELLY BROUGHTON, in his capacity

as Director of the Development Services

Department of the City of San Diego;

THE DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF SAN

DIEGO, an agency of the City of San

Diego; AFSANEH AHMADI, in her

capacity as the Chief Building Official for

the City of San Diego; THE CITY OF

SAN DIEGO, a municipal entity; and

DOES 1-20, inclusive,

Defendants.

On May 23, 2008, plaintiff Blackwater Lodge and Training Center (“Plaintiff”) filed

a complaint against the City of San Diego (“City”), the Development Services Department of

the City of San Diego and Kelly Broughton, that agency’s director, and the City’s Chief

Building Official (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1.) On May 27, 2008, Plaintiff filed

an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and an order to show cause

regarding a preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 4.) On June 4, 2008, the Court granted

Case 3:08-cv-00926-H-WMC Document 32 Filed 06/17/08 Page 1 of 17
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28 1 Plaintiff states that subsequently, in “late spring 2008,” Plaintiff and Southwest could

not reach mutually agreeable terms and parted company. (Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 14.) 

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Plaintiff’s application for a TRO and ordered Defendants to show cause why a preliminary

injunction should not issue. (Doc. Nos. 16, 17.)

On June 9, 2008, Defendants filed a response in opposition to the issuance of a

preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 21.) Defendants also filed a request for judicial notice.

(Doc. No. 21-2.) The Court grants that request with respect to decisions by California courts

and provisions of the San Diego Municipal Code. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. Plaintiff filed a

reply on June 12, 2008. (Doc. Nos. 24, 26, 27.) Plaintiff also filed objections to evidence

submitted by Defendants in support of Defendants’ response in opposition. (Doc. No. 28.) 

 On June 17, 2008, the Court held a hearing on its order to show cause regarding a

preliminary injunction. Michael I. Neil, John Nadolenco and Jeffrey Chine appeared for

Plaintiff. Defendants were represented by Michael J. Aguirre, Carmen A. Brock, George F.

Schaefer, Robert J. Walters and Maria Severson. For the reasons discussed below, the Court

grants a preliminary injunction. 

Background

Plaintiff has a contract to provide training to members of the United States Navy. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16-20; Decl. of Brian Bonfiglio ISO Plf’s. Ex Parte App. for TRO

(“Bonfiglio Decl.”) ¶ 7.) Plaintiff intends to conduct indoor training at a warehouse at

7685 Siempre Viva Road, in the Otay Mesa area of San Diego (“the Otay Mesa facility”). 

(Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 8.) The Otay Mesa neighborhood where Plaintiff’s facility is located

consists of large industrial buildings and lacks residential properties. (Id. ¶ 8, Exs. A, X.) 

Several vocational facilities, including a certified police academy, are housed near

Plaintiff’s facility. (Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 9.)

The City Grants a Series of Ministerial Permit Applications 

In developing the Otay Mesa facility, Plaintiff entered into a joint venture with

Southwest Law Enforcement Training Enterprises (“Southwest”).1

 (Id. ¶ 10.) On

September 5, 2007, Noble Construction Consultants, a contractor for Plaintiff, filed a

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general application with the City’s Development Services Department for a building permit

to construct 44 feet of new partitions at the Otay Mesa facility. (See Audit Report at 6;

Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 10; Decl. of Afsaneh Ahmadi ISO Defs.’ Oppo. to Plf’s. Ex Parte

Request For TRO (“Ahmadi Decl.”), Ex. A.) The application, which identified Southwest

as the “lessee or tenant” of the property, stated that the existing use was “w[are]house with

offices,” and that the proposed use was “same (no change).” (Ahmadi Decl., Ex. A.) The

City’s documents indicate that the project type was “ministerial.” (Id.) The City granted

that permit application. (Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 10.) 

On October 1, 2007, Plaintiff’s contractor Noble Construction Consultants filed

another building permit application. (Audit Report at 6.) This application identified the

project description as “install air conditioning and exhaust,” and the proposed use for the

facility as “training.” (Audit Report at 6.) 

On February 7, 2008, another general application was filed with the City’s

Development Services Department for a building permit to conduct electrical work at the

Otay Mesa facility. (Ahmadi Decl., Ex. B.) The application identified Safchild

Investments LLC as the owner of the property and referred to the project title as “South

West Police.” (Id.) The application sought a permit for work including the installation of

two new air conditioning units and six exhaust fans. (Id.) Similar to the previous

application for the Otay Mesa facility, the City classified the project type as “ministerial.” 

(Id.) The permit was granted. (See Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 11.)

On February 8, 2008, another general application for a building permit was filed,

this time by Raven Development Group, an entity that the application identified as a lessee

or tenant of the Otay Mesa facility. (Ahmadi Decl., Ex. C; see Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 11.) 

Raven Development Group is a corporate affiliate of Plaintiff and specializes in the

development of training facilities. (Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 11.) This application stated the

project description as: “Add indoor firing range.” (Ahmadi Decl., Ex. C.) It listed the

existing use of the property as “warehouse,” and the proposed use as “training facility.” 

(Id.) The City’s documents, which again listed the project type as “ministerial,” stated the

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project’s scope as “[b]uilding permit to add modular training unit inside of ex[isting]

warehouse for ex[isting] Southwest Law Enforcement facility.” (Id.) The City granted the

permit. (Id., see Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 11.) Once the permit was granted, Plaintiff states that it,

assisted by Raven Development Group, began installing the additional air conditioning

units and exhaust fans and constructing the firing range. (Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 11.) 

 On March 21, 2008, the City’s electrical inspector approved the Otay Mesa

facility’s electrical infrastructure. (Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 12.) On March 25, 2008, a City fire

inspector approved the fire and safety permits. (Id.) Mr. Bonfiglio, who is Plaintiff’s Vice

President, states that on each occasion he met with the inspector, identified himself as

working for Plaintiff, and provided his Blackwater business card. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

On April 29, 2008, the City’s Chief Building Official (defendant Ahmadi) reviewed

Plaintiff’s plans for the Otay Mesa facility and found no unresolved issues. (Bonfiglio

Decl. ¶¶ 17, 18.) On April 30, 2008, the City’s structural engineer conducted a final

inspection of the Otay Mesa facility. (Id. ¶ 19.) The structural engineer signed Plaintiff’s

permits and plans, and the evidence shows that the City on April 30, 2008 approved the

certificate of occupancy, since the “certificate of occupancy” line on the City’s inspection

record bears a signature from that date by “Aguirre.” (See Bonfiglio Decl., Ex. U.) At the

conclusion of the April 30, 2008 final inspection, the City’s structural engineer informed

Plaintiff that the City’s Development Services Department would mail the paper certificate

of occupancy within the next few weeks. (Id. ¶ 19, Ex. U.) 

The City Reverses Course and Refuses to Issue a Certificate of Occupancy

On May 19, 2008, the Director of the City’s Development Services Department

informed Plaintiff that the City would not issue a certificate of occupancy to Plaintiff for

the Otay Mesa facility. (Id. ¶ 51.) The letter stated that Plaintiff may continue to use the

facility as a warehouse, but not as a shooting range or vocational/trade school until a

certificate of occupancy has been issued. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) Plaintiff sought a TRO enjoining

Defendants from refusing to issue a certificate of occupancy for the Otay Mesa facility

consistent with the permits the City already had granted. At the May 30, 2008 hearing

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regarding Plaintiff’s application for a TRO, Defendants contended that new and/or

additional “discretionary” review was proper because throughout the permit process

Plaintiff had concealed its identity from the City, as well as misrepresented the true nature

of the intended use of the Otay Mesa facility. (Tr. (Doc. No. 15) at 26:4-28:2.) 

The Court Grants Plaintiff’s Application For a TRO

On June 4, 2008, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application for a TRO. (Doc. Nos. 16,

17.) The TRO enjoined Defendants from refusing to perform the ministerial task of issuing

a certificate of occupancy for the Otay Mesa property and/or refusing to allow Plaintiff to

occupy and use immediately that property consistent with the permits that the City already

has granted. (Id.) Additionally, the Court ordered Defendants to promptly and properly

process any currently pending ministerial permits for the Otay Mesa property. (Id.) On

June 6, 2008, Defendants submitted notice of compliance with the TRO. (Doc. No. 20.) 

According to the Deputy Director of the City’s Building Construction and Safety Division

of the Development Services Department and the City’s Chief Building Official, the City

on June 5, 2008 issued (1) a certificate of occupancy for the firing range consistent with

City Building Permit/Approval No. 529104 and (2) a certificate of occupancy for use of

other portions of the building consistent with City Building Permit/Approval No. 483606. 

(Decl. of Afsaneh Ahmadi ISO Cert. of Compliance ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff states that since that

time it has welcomed its first class of United States Navy sailors to the facility. (Plf’s.

Reply at 3.)

The City Auditor’s Report

On May 5, 2008, prior to the time that the City declared its refusal to issue a

certificate of occupancy for the Otay Mesa facility, the Mayor of the City of San Diego

ordered an investigation of Plaintiff’s permit applications and desire to use the Otay Mesa

facility for Navy training. (See Supp. Decl. of Brian Bonfiglio ISO Prelim. Inj. (“Supp.

Bonfiglio Decl.”) ¶ 3.) As part of this investigation, Plaintiff agreed to provide access to

the Otay Mesa facility to the City Auditor and his staff, as well as to answer all questions

and provide all documents requested by the City Auditor. (Id.) On June 5, 2008, the day

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after the Court granted Plaintiff’s application for a TRO, the City Auditor issued a

document entitled “Audit of Permits Issued for the Blackwater Facility” (hereinafter “the

Audit Report”). (Supp. Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) 

The stated objectives of the audit “were to answer the following questions:

• Did Blackwater misrepresent its identity or intended use of the facility

located at 7685 Siempre Viva Road, Otay Mesa Development District?

• Did Development Services’ staff properly issue permits in compliance with

codes and regulations for the Blackwater facility?

• Is the designation of Vocational/Trade School appropriate for the Otay Mesa

site?”

(Supp. Bonfiglio Decl., Ex. 1 at 7.)

After reviewing “the building permit and business tax certificate applications that

were filed for the Blackwater facility,” the City Auditor “determined that Blackwater did

not misrepresent [its] identity.” (Audit Report at 5.) “In the City of San Diego, building

permit applications do not require the name of the business owner.” (Id.) “The Municipal

Code Section 112.0102 permits either an owner, an agent of the owner, or a party with a

legal interest to be named on the permit application.” (Id.) In accordance with these

provisions of the SDMC, “Blackwater did not complete, sign, or file any of the building

permit applications, nor w[as it] required to do so.” (Id.) The City Audit noted that two of

the permit applications for the Otay Mesa facility indicated that the proposed use was for

“Training.” (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff’s business tax certificate application, dated

February 6, 2008, “indicated its primary business activity at the facility would be security

training for the U.S. Navy.” (Id. at 5-6.) The Audit report concluded that this constituted

“direct evidence that Blackwater represented to the City [its] intent to operate a training

facility at the address.” (Id. at 6.) Accordingly, the audit concluded that Plaintiff did not

misrepresent its identity or the intended use of the Otay Mesa facility.

Next, the audit addressed whether DSD staff properly issued permits for the Otay

Mesa facility. (Audit Report at 8.) After reviewing “the Municipal Code, the City

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Attorney’s opinion, and interview[ing] DSD staff, as well as Blackwater officials,” the

City’s Audit Report “determined that DSD staff had the authority under Municipal Code

Section 111.0205 to classify Blackwater’s use of the building as a vocational/trade school.” 

(Id.) First, SDMC section “111.0205 states that the City, without a public hearing, is

authorized to make a determination of the proper usage.” (Id.) Further, SDMC “section

131.0620(e) states that for any use that cannot be readily classified, the City Manager shall

determine the appropriate use category and use subcategory upon request of the applicant

or property owner.” (Id.(emphasis in original).) Based on these provisions of the

municipal code, the Audit Report reached two conclusions: (1) “DSD has the authority to

classify the use of the facility as a vocational/trade school,” and (2) “[v]ocational/trade

school, a permitted use, may be approved or denied by staff in accordance with a process

one [ministerial] review.” (Id.) The Audit Report noted that, consistent with these

provisions, DSD had “classified the American Shooting Center, another shooting range

located in the City, as a vocational/trade school.” (Id.) 

The SDMC provides that instruction at the vocational/trade schools must be “related

to a use permitted in the Otay Mesa Development District.” SDMC §§ 129.0102,

129.0107. Although “the Municipal Code does not state if the subject taught should be

directly or indirectly related to a permitted use,” Plaintiff’s project at issue here “proposes

security, law enforcement and/or military training.” (Audit Report at 9.) According to

DSD, security guard use would be classified as a “business support use,” which is expressly

permitted in the Otay Mesa Development District pursuant to SDMC 1517.0301(a)(7). 

(Audit Report at 9.) “There are many examples of security guards at other properties in

Otay Mesa that have the same zoning designation.” (Id.) Additionally, “[l]aw enforcement

and military uses are classified within the government office use category,” which uses “are

permitted in the OMDD by SDMC 1517.0301(a)(1).” (Id.) The Audit Report noted the

City Attorney’s stated belief that a shooting range or law enforcement/security training

operation did not “clearly” fall within any of the permitted uses of the IH-2-1 zone in which

Plaintiff’s Otay Mesa facility is located. (Audit Report at 10.) The Audit Report

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concluded that “[t]he complexity and lack of clarity for certain sections of the Municipal

Code contribute to these differing interpretations.” (Id.) With respect to use of the Otay

Mesa facility as a shooting range, the audit concluded that shooting galleries or target

ranges are regulated by the San Diego Police Department and do not fall within the

Development Services Department’s authority over zoning use and building regulations. 

(Id. at 11.) The San Diego Police Department “confirmed that a police permit was not

required for Blackwater to operate as a firing range.” (Id.) 

Discussion

Plaintiff argues that it has complied with all relevant requirements for several

permits related to the Otay Mesa facility, that City officials approved Plaintiff’s

applications, and therefore that Defendants have a non-discretionary duty to issue

certificates of occupancy in accordance with those successful permit applications. The

City’s Audit Report supports Plaintiff’s arguments. (See Audit Report at 5, 8.) Although

other City officials, including the Mayor, appear to agree, the City Attorney contends that

the City may subject Plaintiff’s project “to further land use discretionary review.” The

Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits

of its claims. The Court also concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated the appropriate

grounds for preliminary injunctive relief.

A. Preliminary Injunction – Legal Standard

A plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff demonstrates a

strong likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not

granted, that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs whatever damage the proposed

injunction might cause to the opposing party, and that the issuance of the injunction will

not be adverse to the public interest. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. ABC, Inc., 747 F.2d

511, 515 (9th Cir. 1984). Alternatively, a plaintiff may be entitled to a preliminary

injunction by establishing “the existence of serious questions going to the merits and that

the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.” Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402

(9th Cir. 1998); see Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839-

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41 (9th Cir. 2001). These alternative formulations “represent two points on a sliding scale

in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success

decreases.” Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d at 1402; see Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of

Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, if “the balance of harm tips

decidedly toward the plaintiff, then the plaintiff need not show as robust a likelihood of

success on the merits.” State of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village

of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988).

B. Plaintiff Has Met Its Burden for Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction 

After considering the submissions of the parties, the Court concludes that Plaintiff

has met its burden to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable

harm if injunctive relief is not granted, that the threatened injury to Plaintiff outweighs

whatever damage a preliminary injunction might cause to Defendants, and that the issuance

of the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.

ABC, Inc., 747 F.2d at 515.

1. Likelihood of Success On the Merits

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief centers on Plaintiff’s claim that, after

following all applicable rules for the issuance of its permits and passing all required

inspections, the City has a duty to issue the certificate(s) of occupancy consistent with

those permits and its own municipal code. See SDMC § 129.0114. Over the past several

weeks, Defendants have put forth numerous, often changing, purported justifications for the

decision to refuse to issue a certificate of occupancy for the Otay Mesa facility. Defendants

decried the fact that Plaintiff’s affiliates and contractors had applied for the permits at

issue. (Defs.’ Oppo. to Plf’s. Ex Parte Request for TRO at 5; see Tr. (Doc. No. 15) at

26:15-18.) The City’s own audit later concluded that Plaintiff and its contractors complied

with the municipal code and that Plaintiff did not misrepresent its identity or the intended

use of the Otay Mesa facility. (Audit Report at 7.) Alternatively, Defendants argued,

Plaintiff’s permits were improper because vocational facilities with target ranges were not

allowed without discretionary review by the City Council and CEQA review. (See Supp.

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Bonfiglio Decl., Ex. 1 at 27.) Once again, the City’s own audit contradicts that assertion,

which is not supported by the SDMC. Although SDMC § 53.10 provides, “It is the

purpose and intent of the Council of the City of San Diego that firing of firearms . . . within

the city limits be strictly regulated,” SDMC § 53.10(d) specifically provides exceptions for

shooting galleries or target ranges. (See Audit Report at 10-11.) Defendant’s argument

regarding the presence of a firing range is also undermined by the City’s past practice with

respect to other firing ranges in the City, since Defendant cannot cite a single example of a

firing range being subjected to discretionary review. (See Tr. (Doc. No. 15) at 30:2-16.) 

The Court concludes that none of Defendants’ arguments change the facts that form

the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint and request for injunctive relief: Plaintiff properly filed

several permit applications, which the City granted after conducting all required inspections

under the ministerial process provided by the City’s own laws. (See Bonfiglio Decl. ¶¶ 12,

18-19; Ahmadi Decl., Exs. A, C.) A City structural engineer conducted a final inspection

of Plaintiff’s facility, signed Plaintiff’s permits and plans, and informed Plaintiff that

Development Services Department would mail to Plaintiff the certificate of occupancy

within a short period of time. (Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. U.) That same day, April 30,

2008, a city official signed the “certificate of occupancy” portion of the inspection record. 

(Id. (signature of “Aguirre”).) Despite the SDMC’s clear provision stating that if all

requirements are met the City “shall issue a certificate of occupancy,” see SDMC 

§ 129.0114, the City subsequently refused to actually send Plaintiff the certificate. Plaintiff

contends that Defendants have a ministerial duty under the law to issue the certificate, and

the Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the

merits of that claim.

First, Plaintiff appears likely to succeed on its argument that no conditional use

permit is needed to operate a vocational/trade school within the Otay Mesa development,

since such uses are permitted as a matter of right. The SDMC authorizes “[a]ll uses

permitted in the IH-2-1 zone.” See SDMC § 1517.0301(a)(1). Vocational schools are

permitted in the IH-2-1 zone and, therefore, in the Otay Mesa development, which consists

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of industrial buildings and lacks residential properties. SDMC § 131.0622, Table 131-06B;

see Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 8, Exs. A, X. The SDMC exempts facilities permitted in the IH-2-1

zone from obtaining special permits, and provides that permits for such facilities are subject

to ministerial review, not the discretionary review process that requires an applicant to seek

approval by the City Council. See SDMC § 53.10(d). The fact that the vocational school

involves a firing range does not change that conclusion, since the SDMC expressly exempts

target ranges from discretionary Council approval, see Audit Report at 10-11, and assigns

to the San Diego Police Department the authority to require permits for a firing range

(which the SDPD has stated are not necessary for Plaintiff’s facility). (See Audit Report at

11.) 

Consistent with these provisions of the SDMC regarding vocational schools and/or

firing ranges, all required permits and approvals for Plaintiff’s property were considered by

the City to be ministerial. As such, they were granted without any indication that the

project required (or that the City had any authority to impose) discretionary review. See

SDMC § 1517.0301. Prior to the May 30, 2008 hearing regarding a TRO, Jerry Sanders,

Mayor of the City of San Diego, stated publicly that “the original decision was ministerial”

and that the Mayor believed that Plaintiff’s project “was properly permitted.” (Doc. No.

13; see Tr. (Doc. No. 15) at 4:9-10, 5:1-2.) Defendants’ complaints that Plaintiff’s

intended use does not qualify as a “vocational” school also ring hollow, in light of the

evidence indicating that Development Services staff (not Plaintiff) classified the building as

a vocational facility. (See Audit Report at 8.) Moreover, the evidence indicates that there

are other vocational facilities in the Otay Mesa area, as well as other firing ranges within

the City, none of which have ever been subjected to “discretionary” review by Defendants. 

(See Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 30; Audit Report at 8.)

Second, even if a permit was required for a change of use to a vocational/trade

school, the evidence indicates that multiple such permits were filed and granted. The

general application filed February 8, 2008, states the existing use as “warehouse” and the

proposed use as “training facility.” (Ahmadi Decl., Ex. C.) That application also listed the

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project description as “[a]dd indoor firing range,” and the attached hazardous material

questionnaire identified the “business activities” of the facility as “Training Facility for

Law Enforcement.” (Id.) The City granted that application. (Id.; Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 11.) 

Moreover, the application filed several months earlier, in September of 2007, which the

City also granted, had indicated that the partition revision was related to the “storage of

ammo.” (Ahmadi Decl., Ex. A.) One of the applications filed in February of 2008 stated

the project’s scope as “[b]uilding permit to add modular training unit inside of ex[isting]

warehouse for ex[isting] Southwest Law Enforcement facility.” (Ahmadi Decl., Ex. C.) 

Additionally, a business tax application, filed on February 6, 2008 (more than two

months before the City raised concerns about Plaintiff’s use of the Otay Mesa facility) was

filed by “Blackwater Lodge & Training Center, Inc.” (Audit Report at 7.) The application

listed Blackwater’s business address as 7685 Siempre Viva (the location of the facility at

issue here) and stated: “Blackwater will conduct security training for the United States

Navy.” (Id.) Additionally, the application stated, “Blackwater has contracted with the

United States Navy to conduct a course called ‘Ship Reactionary Force Basic.’” (Id.) In

light of these applications, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ arguments that

Plaintiff’s identity and/or the nature of Plaintiff’s project only recently became known. 

(See Audit Report at 6-7.) 

On April 30, 2008, a City structural engineer inspected the facility, signed Plaintiff’s

permits and plans, and informed Plaintiff that the City’s Development Services Department

would mail to Plaintiff the certificate of occupancy within a short period of time. 

(See Bonfiglio Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. U.) Also on April 30, 2008, a city official signed the

“certificate of occupancy” portion of the inspection record. (Id.) Nothing remains but for

Defendants to issue the certificate of occupancy, and the SDMC provides no discretion for

Defendants to refuse to do so: “The Building Official shall inspect the structure and if the

Building Official finds no violations of the Land Development Code or other regulations

that are enforced by the City’s designated Code Enforcement Official, the Building Official

shall issue a certificate of occupancy.” SDMC § 129.0114.

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Defendants repeatedly stress that “[t]he issuance of building permits . . . is a

discretionary function,” see Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore, 18 Cal. App. 4th 49, 57

(1993), but the present case does not involve a municipality’s discretionary decision to

grant or deny a permit application. A building official is authorized to determine “whether

or not a particular project satisfies all the conditions of its building permit, as well as

applicable code and other requirements, before issuing the certificate of occupancy.” 

Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 57. “[T]he building official must

be allowed great latitude (i.e., discretion) in making this determination.” Id. However, the

difference in this case is that the evidence shows City officials have already made that

determination, have granted the permits at issue and, after conducting the final inspection,

have approved the issuance of certificates of occupancy consistent with those permits. (See

Bonfiglio Decl., Ex. U.) Once that occurs, pursuant to the City’s own municipal code there

is little to no discretion regarding whether to issue the certificates. SDMC § 129.0114. 

California law supports the conclusion that under these circumstances issuing the

certificate of occupancy is a non-discretionary duty that Defendants must perform. “[T]he

discretion to issue a building permit at all is much broader than the discretion which must

be exercised in determining whether to issue a certificate of occupancy. Once the building

permit has been issued, it cannot be de facto revoked by the simple expedient of never

issuing the certificate of occupancy.” Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore, 18 Cal. App. 4th

at 57-58; see also Inland Empire Health Plan v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 4th 588, 593

(2003) (“a city has a mandatory duty to issue a certificate of occupancy once it has found

that a construction project has complied with all requirements”). “The critical point . . .

which defendants have failed to grasp, is that . . . the building official had already exercised

its discretion; even if the building official is immune for its discretionary act in determining

whether or not the certificate should be issued (i.e., that the building complies with the

relevant requirements), the building official had in fact – by its ‘Final Inspection Okay’ –

already actually approved [the] owner’s building.” Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore, 18

Cal. App. 4th at 58. “Accordingly, the building official retained no further discretion to

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withhold the certificate of occupancy.” Id. 

Here, the Mayor, the San Diego Building Official, the City’s own inspectors, and the

San Diego Municipal Auditor have all stated that Plaintiff met every requirement for

immediate use and occupancy of the Otay Mesa facility. (See Tr. (Doc. No. 15) at 5:1-2;

Bonfiglio Decl. ¶¶ 12, 18-19, Ex. U; see also Audit Report.) Defendants cannot point to

any provision of the Municipal Code that allows the City to conduct all required

inspections and approve all permits and occupancy, only to later decide not to issue the

formal certificate of occupancy. Based on the SDMC as well as state law, the Court

concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on its claim that

Defendants must issue the certificate(s). 

 The Court also concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated a strong likelihood of

success on its procedural due process claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A

property interest in a benefit protected by the due process clause results from a legitimate

claim of entitlement created and defined by an independent source, such as state or federal

law.” Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, Plaintiff argues that state

and local law providing that Defendants “shall” issue the certificate of occupancy creates a

protectable property interest, because when a governmental agency is given little to no

discretion regarding whether to grant a permit, the denial of that permit creates a

protectable right. See id. Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

right to procedural due process by depriving Plaintiff of that right without “notice and

opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” See Cleveland Bd. of Educ.

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). Based on the submissions of both sides and all

the evidence properly before the Court, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated

a strong likelihood of success on this claim. Plaintiff’s evidence shows that Plaintiff

obtained all necessary building permits and approvals for a certificate of occupancy, that on

April 30, 2008, the certificate of occupancy was approved (see Bonfiglio Decl., Ex. U), but

that Defendants without notice to Plaintiff have refused to actually issue the certificate of

occupancy. See Parks, 716 F.2d at 657 (“[o]nce the conditions are met the city lacks

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discretionary powers”). 

 In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated a strong likelihood of 

success on the merits of its claim that Defendants have a mandatory duty to issue the

certificate of occupancy.

2. Plaintiff Faces Irreparable Harm In the Absence of Injunctive Relief

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated that it faces a significant threat

of immediate and irreparable injury in the absence of interim injunctive relief. See Simula,

Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999). First, Plaintiff has demonstrated a

strong likelihood of success on its constitutional claims, see supra, a situation in which

most courts do not require a further showing of irreparable injury. See Elrod v. Burns, 427

U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Additionally, Plaintiff has demonstrated that it has an urgent need to

receive the certificate of occupancy and to continue occupying and utilizing the Otay Mesa

facility. In the absence of interim injunctive relief, Plaintiff faces the threat of being unable

to fulfill an important training contract with the United States Navy. (See Bonfiglio Decl. 

¶ 31.) Plaintiff’s obligations under that contract have already commenced, and the

evidence indicates that following the Court’s order issuing a TRO, Plaintiff welcomed its

first class of Navy sailors and began training pursuant to the contract. Without a

preliminary injunction, Plaintiff will be unable to continue that training. Moreover, the

Court concludes that in addition to the potential monetary harm and deprivation of its

constitutional rights Plaintiff faces a threat of significant harm to its reputation if it cannot

conduct the training according to its contract. See United Healthcare Ins. Co. v.

AdvancePCS, 316 F.3d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Loss of intangible assets such as

reputation and goodwill can constitute irreparable injury.”). Based on all the evidence

properly before the Court, the Court concludes that Plaintiff meets its burden under the law

to establish that, without injunctive relief, Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury.

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3. Balance of Hardships

Third, the Court concludes that the threatened injury to Plaintiff outweighs whatever

damage a preliminary injunction might cause to Defendants. See Regents of Univ. of Cal.

v. ABC, Inc., 747 F.2d at 515. The potential harm to Plaintiff if injunctive relief is denied

is significant, while granting a preliminary injunction will result in little to no damage or

hardship to Defendants. The Court concludes that the balance of hardships tips sharply in

Plaintiff’s favor, so that even if Plaintiff’s application demonstrated only “serious questions

going to the merits,” Plaintiff still would be entitled to a preliminary injunction under the

Ninth Circuit’s alternative standard for interim injunctive relief. Roe v. Anderson, 134

F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998); see Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240

F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2001). 

4. Consideration of the Public Interest

Finally, the Court concludes that granting a preliminary injunction will not adversely

affect the public interest. Id. To the contrary, given the nature of the intended use of the

Otay Mesa facility and Plaintiff’s training contract with the United States Navy, the Court

concludes that the public interest weighs in favor of granting injunctive relief. 

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Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court issues a preliminary injunction keeping

in place the terms of the TRO that the Court granted on June 4, 2008. On June 6, 2008,

Defendants provided notice that they complied with the TRO by sending to Plaintiff the

certificates of occupancy. (See Doc. No. 20.) Accordingly, Defendants are hereby

enjoined from refusing to allow Plaintiff to occupy and use immediately the property

located at 7685 Siempre Viva Road, Otay Mesa, consistent with the building permit

applications that the City already has granted. Defendants also are enjoined from revoking

Plaintiff’s certificate(s) of occupancy and/or subjecting Plaintiff’s ministerial permit

applications to additional “discretionary” review, absent further order of the Court. Finally,

the Court orders Defendants to promptly and properly process any currently pending

ministerial permits for the Otay Mesa property. 

Under the circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff must give

security in the amount of $10,000. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 17, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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