Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00252/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00252-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Court substitutes James A. Yates, warden of PVSP, where

Diaz is currently imprisoned. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN GUILLERMO DIAZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden, 

 Respondent.

 /

No. C 05-0252 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Juan Diaz, an inmate incarcerated at Pleasant

Valley State Prison (PVSP) in Coalinga, California, petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent James A.

Yates, warden of PVSP, opposes the petition.1 The Court DENIES

Diaz's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

Unless indicated otherwise, the following facts are taken from

the State appellate court's unpublished opinion ruling on Diaz's

direct appeal. Respondent's Exhibit F. 

On September 24, 2002, Santa Clara County police officers

executed a search warrant for Robert Griffin's home. The officers

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discovered methamphetamine and evidence of the intent to sell

narcotics. Griffin agreed to cooperate with the officers and

called his supplier "Franco" to arrange a purchase. Griffin stated

that Franco was the supplier's street name and that he did not know

his true name. One of the officers testified that Griffin

described Franco as "a Hispanic male in his late 20's, possibly

early 30's, about three or four inches shorter than myself . . .

kind of muscular or husky in stature." Reporter's Transcript

(R.T.) at 63. The probation report indicates that Griffin said

that Franco would be driving a green Ford Thunderbird.

Officers conducting surveillance outside of Griffin's house

saw a green Ford Thunderbird driven by Diaz, who fit Griffin's

description of his supplier. An officer testified at trial that

the car "slowed in front of the residence and the driver of the

vehicle appeared to be looking at the front door area, the window

area of the residence." R.T. at 64. According to the officer, the

car continued down the street and made a u-turn at the corner. Id.

The officer testified that as the car passed one of the

surveillance vehicles, the driver slowed down and looked at the

officer in the car. Id. at 65. The car again slowed down as it

passed Griffin's house and then stopped at a red light at the

corner. 

The officers decided to stop Diaz for a traffic violation 

because the car had paper dealer plates and no registration

sticker, a violation of the California Vehicle Code. Neither the

California Court of Appeal's decision nor the record offer many

details about the stop and subsequent search of the car. 

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However, over the course of the search, the officers

discovered over half a pound of methamphetamine between the metal

panel of the car and the cloth liner of the trunk. R.T. 68. It is

not clear whether Diaz gave the officers permission to search the

trunk or unlocked the trunk for them because the officer who

testified at trial did not arrive on the scene until after the

trunk was already opened. Id. A cell phone with the number that

Griffin called to arrange the sale was discovered on Diaz's person.

R.T. 71. Again, there are few details about the actual search of

Diaz's person to locate the telephone and whether it was found

before the methamphetamine was discovered or before Diaz was

arrested. The officers also discovered work orders and a money

order in the car that were made out to Carlos Sanchez and Francisco

Diaz. The officers later discovered that these were aliases that

Diaz had used. 

At the time of the search, Diaz claimed to be a Mexican

citizen without identification. The testifying officer remembers

Diaz giving a false name; however, the officer could not remember

the name Diaz gave. After Diaz was arrested and booked, the

officers used his fingerprints to determine his identity. At

trial, Griffin identified Diaz as his supplier, "Franco."

Diaz was charged with transportation, sale or distribution of

a controlled substance in violation of California Health & Safety

Code § 11379, subd. (1), possession for sale of a controlled

substance in violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11378,

and giving a false name to a peace officer in violation of

California Penal Code § 148.9. The information also alleged that

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2 Both prongs of § 2254(d)(1) apply to questions of law and

mixed questions of law and fact. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d

1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-74 (2003).

4

Petitioner had a prior conviction for sale of a controlled

substance, that he had served two prior prison terms, and that he

had a prior strike conviction. A jury found Diaz guilty on all

counts. 

Diaz filed a timely direct appeal challenging his conviction

based on the sufficiency of the evidence. The California Court of

Appeal denied that claim in an unpublished written opinion, and the

California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review

on July 21, 2004. Diaz then filed a State petition for a writ of

habeas corpus on the same grounds as this petition, ineffective

assistance of counsel for failing fully to investigate possible

defenses and for not filing a motion to suppress, which the

California Supreme Court summarily denied. On January 18, 2005,

Diaz filed his petition in this Court. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), a district court may grant a petition challenging a State

conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on

the merits in State court only if the State court's adjudication of

the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;2

 or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

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presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

"Clearly established federal law" refers to "the holdings, as

opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the

time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams (Terry) v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-04, 412 (2000). A State court decision

may not be overturned on habeas review simply because of a conflict

with circuit-based law. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000). However, circuit court decisions may be

persuasive authority to determine whether a particular State court

holding is an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent

or to assess what law is "clearly established." Id.; see also

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

124 S. Ct 446 (2003); Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th

Cir. 1997).

A State court's decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court law if

the State court "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached

by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law," or reaches a

different conclusion based on facts indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A State court's

decision constitutes an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court

precedent if the State court "either (1) correctly identifies the

governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way

that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend

a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way

that is objectively unreasonable." Id. at 407. An “unreasonable

application” of federal law is different from an incorrect or

erroneous application of federal law. Id. at 412. Accordingly, 

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3The Court also notes that Diaz alleges that he wanted to

testify on his own behalf and never knowingly or intelligently

waived that right. Petition at 3. Diaz asserts that he told his

attorney that he wanted to testify, but that counsel stated "that

won't be necessary." Id. Although the ultimate decision whether

to testify rests with the defendant, he is presumed to assent to

his attorney's tactical decision not to call him to testify. 

United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993). The

trial court has no duty to advise the defendant of his right to

testify, nor is the court required to ensure that an on-the-record

waiver has occurred. See United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 445,

446 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, waiver of the right may be inferred

6

"a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state

court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable." Id. at 411. The reasonableness inquiry under the

“unreasonable application” clause is objective. Id. at 409. 

Where, as here, the State court gives no reasoned explanation

of its decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no

reasoned lower court decision on the claim, a review of the record

is the only means of deciding whether the State court's decision

was objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848,

853 (9th Cir. 2003). When confronted with such a decision, a

federal court should conduct "an independent review of the record"

to determine whether the State court's decision was an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Id.

DISCUSSION

Diaz's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is based on a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's

failure (1) to conduct adequate investigation and (2) to move to

suppress evidence seized by the police.3 

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from the defendant's conduct and is presumed from the defendant's

failure to testify or notify the court of his desire to do so. See

Joelson, 7 F.3d at 177; Edwards, 897 F.2d at 446. A defendant who

wants to reject his attorney's advice and take the stand may do so

by insisting on testifying, speaking to the court or discharging

his lawyer. See Joelson, 7 F.3d at 177. A defendant waives the

right to testify if he remains silent in the face of his attorney's

decision not to call him as a witness. See Horton v. Mayle, 408

F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2005); Dows v. Woods, 211 F.3d 480, 487

(9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089,

1094-95 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court finds that this

allegation does not support Diaz's claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. 

7

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id.

 In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

counsel claim a petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that is,

that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance, that is, that "there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome. Id. However, "strategic choices made after thorough

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4

The Court has already dismissed Petitioner's claim attacking

the validity of the search itself as barred by Stone v. Powell, 428

U.S. 465 (1976). See Order to Show Cause at 2. Therefore, the

Court does not address those sections of the petition that appear

to challenge the search itself.

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investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable." Id. at 690. The Strickland framework

for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

considered to be "clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States" for the purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-08. 

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and act on possible defenses and for failing to file a motion

to suppress the evidence obtained when the officers searched his car.4

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that particular

investigations are unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691;

Turner, 158 F.3d at 456. Strickland directs that “‘a particular

decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure

of deference to counsel’s judgments.’” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d

825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 491). 

When the record shows that the lawyer was well-informed and the

petitioner fails to state what additional information would be

gained by the investigation he now claims was necessary, an

ineffective assistance claim fails. Id.

Further, when a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

due to a failure to make a motion to suppress, a showing of

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prejudice requires that the petitioner demonstrate that "had the

motion been filed, there was a reasonable probability that the

evidence would have been suppressed, and the outcome of the trial

would have been different." Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346-47

(9th Cir. 1994).

I. Failure to Investigate a Potential Defense Related to the

Amount of Money in Diaz's Possession at the Time of his Arrest

Diaz also alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate conflicting testimony about the amount of money he had

at the time of his arrest. Petition at 2-3. Diaz argues that "the

conflicting testimony or the lack thereof, is a point of

credibility of the officers and the evidence itself." Id.

However, trial counsel did note the discrepancies in his cross

examination of the investigating officer's testimony. See R.T. 95-

96. Further, Diaz does not indicate what counsel was supposed to

investigate, or what he might have discovered. This claim does not

provide grounds for granting the petition.

II. Motion to Suppress

As stated above, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based on counsel's failure to file a motion to

suppress, a petitioner must demonstrate that the motion to suppress

was meritorious. It is apparent that counsel considered the

legality of the search and then decided not to make a motion on

that basis. In his petition, Diaz notes that trial counsel

"mentioned that the search may have been illegal, but never

attacked this critical component with a motion to suppress." 

Petition at 3. This demonstrates that counsel did in fact consider

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5

None of the actual argument on the motions in limine is

included in the record. It appears from the record that they were

argued in the trial judge's chambers. See R.T. at 25. 

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the legality of the search. Further, the trial judge noted that,

when arguing the motions in limine,5 defense counsel 

explained at great lengths [his] thought processes and

thoroughly analyzed the illegal or legal stop issues and

he believed it did not warrant a motion. The defense

attorney went through a 15 step process to the

description to the court and opposing counsel of where

he would have argued that it was an illegal stop given

such factors, but that in totality he believed based

upon his experience and research and discussion with

other attorneys that he would not be successful in such

a motion. 

R.T. 24

Based on this record, the Court finds that trial counsel

considered the legality of the stop and search, conducted further

research and decided that such a motion likely would not be

successful. The police officers had probable cause to believe that

Diaz was violating the vehicle code because the car he was driving

did not have a registration sticker. The case law is clear that as

long as an officer has probable cause to stop a car for a vehicle

code violation, it does not matter whether the vehicle code

violation was a pretext. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

(1996). Further, it is well established that under the automobile

exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search a car

without a warrant if he or she has probable cause to believe that

the car contains contraband. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.

132 (1925). Here, there was ample evidence to establish probable

cause. Diaz drove by Griffin's house within an hour of Griffin

calling his supplier to set up a purchase of methamphetamine. Diaz

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fit Griffin's description of his supplier and drove a car that fit

the description Griffin gave to the police. Further, he acted

suspiciously when he realized he was being watched.

Once the officers had probable cause to believe that the car

contained contraband, they could search "every part of the vehicle

and its contents that [could] conceal" that contraband. United

States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). Therefore, it was

reasonable for the officers to search behind the paneling of the

trunk where they discovered the methamphetamine.

The Court finds that Diaz has not demonstrated a reasonable

probability that a motion to suppress would have been granted. 

Therefore, counsel's decision not to file the motion does not

constitute ineffective assistance. Diaz's petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is denied to the extent that it is based on this

claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Diaz's petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. Judgment shall enter accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/21/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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