Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02150/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02150-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

C.M. HARRISON, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 05CV2150 J (CAB)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE BENCIVENGO’S REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION; AND

(2) DENYING PETITIONER’S

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS [DOC. NO. 1].

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo’s Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court deny Petitioner Keith Williams’

(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, challenges his San Diego Superior Court

conviction, Case No. 148887, for first degree murder with special circumstances. Respondent

filed his Answer and Petitioner filed a Traverse. Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights

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were violated when 1) the trial court failed to provide written instructions on duress and 2) when

the prosecution dismissed prospective jurors based on race and gender. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 4, 6;

Petition at 1, 5.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the

Petition in its entirety.

Background

On October 7, 2002, Petitioner was charged with: 1) one count of murder, a violation of

California Penal Code § 187; 2) one count of carjacking, a violation of California Penal Code §

215(a); and 3) one count of robbery, a violation of California Penal Code § 211. (Clerk’s Trans.

at 212-13.) Special circumstances under California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17) were also alleged

as follows: 1) the murder was committed during the attempt and commission of a robbery in

violation of California Penal Code §§ 211 or 212.5; 2) the murder was committed during the

attempt and commission of a kidnapping in violation of California Penal Code §§ 207 or 209;

and 3) the murder was committed during the attempt and commission of a carjacking in violation

of California Penal Code § 215. (Clerk’s Trans. at 213.) The complaint further alleged

Petitioner personally used a firearm during the attempt to commit robbery and murder in

violation of California Penal Code § 12022.5(a)(1). (Clerk’s Trans. at 212-13.) Petitioner

pleaded not guilty to all allegations. (Clerk’s Trans. at 179.)

On October 23, 2002, the jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder, kidnapping,

robbery, and carjacking. (Clerk’s Trans. at 150-55.) Furthermore, the jury found the murder

was committed during the attempt and commission of a kidnapping, robbery, and carjacking. Id.

The jury did not decide on the firearm charge, which was later dismissed. Id. On December 12,

2002, Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for his

conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances. (Clerk’s Trans. at 166.) The court

stayed the sentences for robbery and carjacking (Clerk’s Trans. at 166-67; 217), but Petitioner

was ordered to pay a restitutionary fine. (Clerk’s Trans. at 167).

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division

One. Petitioner claimed: 1) the trial court’s failure to provide the jury with written instructions

on duress after giving an oral instruction on duress violated his due process rights; 2) the

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prosecution impermissibly excluded prospective jurors based on race; and 3) the restitutionary

fine should be stricken. (Lodgment Nos. 3, 4.) On July 14, 2004, the Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment, but struck the restitutionary fine. (Lodgment No. 7.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court claiming that his due

process rights were violated. On September 22, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied the

petition for review. (Lodgment No. 9.)

On November 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No.

1.] On March 11, 2006, Respondent filed an Answer. [Doc. No. 12.] On May 10, 2007,

Petitioner filed his Traverse. [Doc. No. 56.]

Legal Standard

I. State Prisoner Habeas Corpus Standard

A federal court may grant a habeas petition if it shows the applicant is in custody “in

violation of the Constitution or other laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

State interpretation of state laws and rules cannot serve as the basis for a federal habeas petition,

as no federal or constitutional question would be implicated. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

68 (1991). Habeas petitions are governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).

Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief from a state court

judgment only if the adjudication was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002).

 A state court decision is “contrary to clearly established federal law” if it (1) applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless

arrives at the opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court

decision is an unreasonable application of the facts “if the state court identifies the correct

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governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413.

According to 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1), a federal district court should presume the finding of

a state court to be correct unless the petitioner can rebut the presumption with clear and

convincing evidence. 

II. Reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth

in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report...to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, modify, in whole or in part, the finding or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676

(1980). “When no objections are filed, the district court may assume the correctness of the

magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law.” Johnson v.

Nelson, 142 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). “Under such circumstances, the Ninth

Circuit has held that ‘a failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give

de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.’” Id.

(quoting Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989)). In this case, Petitioner filed

objections to the R&R. [Doc. No. 61.] Accordingly, the Court will make de novo determinations

of factual findings as to those portions of the R&R to which objections have been made.

Discussion

Petitioner objects to the R&R on the grounds that: 1) his due process rights were violated

when the state court omitted from the jury the written instruction on duress after having given

oral instructions; 2) his right to equal protection was violated when the prosecution

impermissibly used peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors based on race and

gender; and 3) the R&R did not address whether the prosecution exhibited gender discrimination

during voir dire. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 3, 6).

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I. Lack of Written Jury Instruction

In claim one, Petitioner contends his right to due process was violated because a theory

vital to his defense was omitted when the trial court did not provide the jury with CALJIC No.

4.40, a written instruction on duress. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 3.) Petitioner claims that even if there

exists no constitutional right to written instructions, Petitioner’s due process rights were violated

when the court provided all specifically requested instructions except those vital to his defense. 

(Pet’r’s Obj. at 3-4; Traverse at 9.) Petitioner contends that omitting the instruction 1)

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto Petitioner and 2) the jury could have concluded

that the duress defense no longer applied to his case because only the defense’s requested written

instructions were excluded, whereas none of the prosecution’s requested written instructions

were omitted. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 3-4; Traverse at 9.) In his Answer, Respondent argues that

Petitioner has failed to state a federal question regarding claim one. [Doc. No. 12 at 11.] 

Respondent contends that even if Petitioner’s claim did present a federal question, the California

Court of Appeal reasonably rejected the claim and the decision therefore does not fall under §

2254(d). Id.

The defendant has a right to have the jury instructed to his theory of the case. United

States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984). “The right to have the jury

instructed as to the defendant's theory of the case is one of those rights ‘so basic to a fair trial’

that failure to instruct where there is evidence to support the instruction can never be considered

harmless error. Jurors are required to apply the law as it is explained to them in the instructions

they are given by the trial judge.” Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). 

The trial court is not required to give a specific instruction requested by the defense as long as

the court’s instructions adequately cover the defense’s theory of the case. United States v.

Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1993). If the court’s instructions, as a whole, cover the

defense’s theory, failure to use the defendant’s proposed instruction is not reversible error. 

United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990).

The trial court gave the jury an oral instruction on duress using language from CALJIC

No. 4.40. The oral instruction concerning duress was as follows:

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A person is not guilty of a crime other than murder . . . when he engages in

conduct which would otherwise be criminal when acting under threats and

menaces under the following circumstances; [¶] where the threats and menaces

are such that they would cause a reasonable person to fear that his life would

be in immediate danger if he did not engage in the conduct charged and; [¶] if

the person in fact then believed that his life was so endangered. This rule does

not apply to threats, menaces and fears of future danger to his life nor does it

apply to the crime of murder. At least certainly murder in the--what we've

referred to as the traditional definition of murder, the unlawful killing of one

human being with express malice aforethought, the intent to kill, with or

without premeditation or deliberation, which is the distinguishing factor

between the two degrees of murder. This rule does not apply to murder of that

traditional definition. [¶] Now, when we consider the alternate theory of

murder that we have here, the felony murder theory, the rule applies in this

sense; that the threats and menace described here may negate the underlying

felony if a person is not guilty of the underlying felony due to duress, he

cannot be guilty of a felony murder if he can't be first found guilty of the

underlying felony. He can't have killed in the preparation of the crime of

which he is not guilty. [¶] So this defense, if you will, of duress or threats and

menace does in effect apply to the felony murder theory if you find that there

is proof of the underlying felony. Again, threats and menaces must be such

that they would cause a reasonable person to fear that his this [sic] life would

be in immediate danger if he did not engage in the conduct charged, and the

person must have actually in fact believed that his life was so endangered. 

(Rep. Trans. at 535-36.)

There is no constitutional right to a written copy of jury instructions, so it is

unclear whether Petitioner has a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 based on a federal

question. However, assuming Petitioner does have a claim, he was not deprived of his

right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case. The oral instructions given to

the jury adequately covered the defense’s theory of the case. See Ragsdell v. S. Pac.

Transp. Co., 688 F.2d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982). Instructions, when viewed as a whole,

are adequate when they outline each element of the case so that the jury understands the

issues central to the trial without being misled. Id. In this case, the instruction on duress

clearly laid out the elements of duress and included language from CALJIC No. 4.40

stating, “threats and menaces must be such that they would cause a reasonable person to

fear that his life would be in immediate danger if he did not engage in the conduct

charged, and the person must have actually in fact believed that his life was so

endangered.” (Rep. Trans. at 535-36.) The instruction also explained to the jury how

duress is applicable to the underlying felonies in a felony murder case, and further stated

that if the defendant was not guilty of the underlying felonies by reason of duress, then

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the jury could not find the defendant guilty for felony murder. Id. The oral instruction

therefore adequately explained the elements and consequences of the duress defense.

Petitioner also argues that the omission of his requested written instructions

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof by creating a mandatory presumption. (Pet’r’s

Obj. at 4.) “A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed

fact if the State proves certain predicate facts. A permissive inference suggests to the jury

a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require

the jury to draw that conclusion.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985). The

court’s oral instruction in this case did not require the jury to presume anything as true. 

The jurors still had the responsibility to determine whether or not duress applied to the

underlying felonies. 

Petitioner claims that jurors are guided by the written instructions given to them. 

(Pet’r’s Obj. at 2.) Petitioner relies on cases where the given oral instructions were

misstated or misread and later corrected with written instructions. People v. Osband, 13

Cal.4th 622, 687 (1996); People v. Crittenden, 9 Cal.4th 83, 138 (1994). But an omitted

instruction is not as likely to be prejudicial as an erroneous statement of the law. 

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). The court’s given oral instruction in this

case was not incorrect with respect to the legal application of duress. See United States v.

Morlan, 756 F.2d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985). Petitioner does not object to the content of

the oral instructions that were given, nor does he contend that the written copy of those

instructions provided by the clerk deviates from the court’s oral instructions. Petitioner’s

claims rests solely on an omitted instruction. Because the jury instructions adequately

covered the defense’s theory of the case, the state appellate court’s ruling on claim one

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s claim.

II. Prosecutorial Discrimination

In claim two, Petitioner contends, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986), that his right to equal protection was violated when the trial court erroneously

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allowed the prosecution to dismiss prospective jurors based on their race and gender. 

(Pet’r’s’ Obj. at 6-7.) Petitioner also claims the R&R did not address his objection to the

prosecution’s use of gender discrimination as a pretext for racial discrimination. (Pet’r’s

Obj. at 7; Traverse at 16-17.)

A. Batson Challenge

Batson protects a defendant’s equal protection rights by prohibiting parties from

purposefully excluding prospective members of the jury based on race. 476 U.S. at 86. 

However, the defendant does not have a right to have a jury composed, in whole or in

part, of people of his own race. Id. Thus, the court must determine whether the

prosecution harbors discriminatory intent in order for the petitioner to succeed on a

Batson challenge. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).

Batson outlines a three-step process to determine whether the prosecution made

peremptory challenges based on race. First, a defendant must make a prima facie case

that the prosecution made a peremptory challenge on the basis of race; second, the

prosecution must give a race-neutral justification for the strike; and third, the trial court

must decide whether the defendant has proven discriminatory intent based on the parties’

submissions. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1207-08 (2008). But if the

prosecution has offered a race-neutral explanation and the trial court has decided whether

intentional discrimination existed, then the defendant’s prima facie burden becomes moot. 

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. In this context, a neutral explanation is an explanation with

reasoning based on something other than race. Id. at 360. As long as the trial court

cannot discern any discriminatory intent from the prosecution’s explanation, the

reasoning will be considered race neutral. Id.

Federal review requires great deference to the state court’s factual findings. Id. at

366. In a habeas case, a petitioner must refute the presumption that the state court’s

conclusion is correct with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); MillerEl v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005). Factual findings made by the state court may be

set aside only if they are unsupported by the record. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769

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(1995). Thus, because a trial court’s ruling on discriminatory intent is a factual finding, it

is given deference unless it is clearly erroneous. Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1208; Anderson v.

City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 

Petitioner claims that the prosecution dismissed three African-American women

based on race. [Doc. No. 1 at 5.] In response to the Batson challenge, the prosecution

provided the following explanations for peremptorily challenging Jurors I, II, and III: 1)

Juror I served on a hung jury and had a brother and friend who had been arrested; 2) Juror

II expressed discontent with law enforcement; and 3) Juror III worked to provide services

to low income and disadvantaged families. (R&R at 9). After evaluating the prosecutor’s

reasons for dismissing each potential juror, the trial court held the prosecution’s

explanations to be race-neutral and denied the defense’s Batson claim. (Rep. Trans. at

475.) The California Court of Appeal reviewed the record and affirmed the trial court’s

decision, finding no evidence of discriminatory intent. (Lodgment No. 7 at 14.) 

Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidence of discriminatory intent to

refute the presumption that the trial court’s decision is correct. Because the trial court’s

decision is not clearly erroneous, this Court shall not overturn the state court’s ruling on

discriminatory intent. 

B. Comparative Analysis

Petitioner claims that the prosecution’s explanations were merely a pretext for

discriminatory intent. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 6.) He claims that when non-black retained jurors

are compared with excluded African-American jurors, racial motivation is apparent. 

However, the California Court of Appeal stated that the prosecution’s explanations

concerning Jurors I, II, and III provided “no credible evidence the peremptory challenges

were exercised on impermissible racial grounds.” (Lodgment No. 7 at 11; Doc. No. 12 at

18.)

A comparative juror analysis is appropriate to evaluate whether or not a

prosecutor’s explanation for dismissing potential jurors is a pretext for discrimination. 

See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 343 (2003). However, a comparative analysis is

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helpful only if the compared jurors share similar attributes. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 128

S.Ct. 1203, 1211-12 (2008) (where the Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s

explanations were a pretext for racial discrimination through a comparative analysis of

jurors with same or similar concerns). 

Petitioner claims that the prosecution impermissibly excluded Juror I because she

shared similar experiences with non-black jurors who were retained. [Doc. No. 1 at 6.] 

Many jurors who were included had either served on a hung jury or had friends or family

who were arrested. Id. However, the prosecution challenged Juror I because she was the

only prospective juror who had served on both a hung jury and had family or friends

arrested. (Rep. Trans. at 474.) Unlike Juror I, none of the retained jurors possessed both

of these characteristics. Thus, a comparative analysis between Juror I and retained jurors

does not show the state court was clearly erroneous.

Petitioner contends that the prosecution’s explanation for excluding Juror II is

pretextual because she was dismissed due to her dissatisfaction with law enforcement

while retained jurors shared the same emotion. [Doc. No. 1 at 7.] Juror II said she felt

law enforcement treated her unfairly after calling police to report a domestic violence

incident. (Rep. Trans. at 428-30.) But a similarly situated retained juror, who was angry

with police for receiving a DUI, felt he got what he deserved. (Rep. Trans. at 32.) The

retained juror’s statements reflect a feeling of equal treatment while Juror II’s comments

reflect a deep dissatisfaction with law enforcement. Because Juror II and retained jurors

do not share a similar outlook toward law enforcement, a comparative analysis of Juror II

and included jurors does not provide clear and convincing evidence that refutes the

presumption the state court decision is correct.

Petitioner seeks to compare Juror III with retained jurors who he claims have

similar occupations. [Doc. No. 1 at 7.] The prosecutor stated he excluded Juror III from

the jury because she worked with pre-school children and their families at Neighborhood

House, an organization that works with low-income and disadvantaged families. (Rep.

Trans. at 159.) Juror III also had a brother who had been arrested. (Rep. Trans. at 124.) 

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One retained juror volunteered at a hospital doing pastoral work for eight hours a month,

as opposed to Juror III, who worked with disadvantaged families as part of her full-time

employment. (Rep. Trans. at 157.) Another juror worked with high school students and

was married to a Deputy City Attorney, whereas Juror III worked with younger children. 

(Rep. Trans. at 353.) Because Juror III and the retained jurors Petitioner offers in

comparison do not share similar qualities, a comparative analysis to determine possible

discriminatory intent is not helpful. 

Furthermore, the prosecution does not need to explain why Juror III’s occupation

is relevant to her ability to be impartial during the trial. The prosecution’s explanation

need not be “persuasive, or even plausible,” as long as no discriminatory intent is

apparent. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-69. In this case, the prosecution’s explanations are

race-neutral. (Rep. Trans. at 475.) 

A juror comparison between Juror III and particular retained jurors could be

meaningful because all express concern for children or the welfare of others. However,

the trial court’s decision to deny the Batson challenge should not be overturned. “Where

there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them

cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). 

Unless a trial court’s ruling on discriminatory intent is clearly erroneous, the decision

must be sustained. Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1207. Therefore, this Court will not overturn the

state court’s decision regarding Petitioner’s Batson claim.

Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidence that proves the

prosecution possessed discriminatory intent during voir dire. Thus, Petitioner presents no

evidence to show the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Petitioner’s petition with respect to claim two.

C. Gender Discrimination

Petitioner claims that the prosecution also discriminated against potential jurors

based on gender. (Pet’r’s Obj. at 6.) He asserts that the prosecution’s exclusion of

sixteen women shows discriminatory intent. Id. However, Petitioner did not bring the

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gender discrimination claim in his original Petition and therefore this Court need not rule

on the issue. [Doc. No. 1.]

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS Judge Bencivengo’s R&R and

DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 21, 2008

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: All Parties of Record

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