Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01277/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE EVAN MORRIS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-1277 GEB DAD P

vs.

WARDEN EVANS, et al., ORDER AND

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus, together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis.

Examination of petitioner’s in forma pauperis application reveals that petitioner is

unable to afford the costs of suit. Accordingly, the application to proceed in forma pauperis will

be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Under the rules that govern habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in

federal court, the court is required to examine a habeas corpus petition before requiring a

response to it. See Rules 3(b) and 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. “If it plainly appears from

the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in

the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal . . . .” Rule 4, Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases.

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Petitioner is challenging the sentence imposed by the Sacramento County Superior

Court on August 5, 1998, following his conviction on July 8, 1998. Petitioner alleges that he was

sentenced to an aggregate term of 81 years to life in state prison, plus an additional 22 years and

4 months consecutive as a sentencing enhancement based upon his eight prior felony convictions. 

It is difficult to discern whether petitioner is alleging one claim or six and whether his sentencing

claims are exhausted. Petitioner makes the following assertions: the trial court erroneously and

arbitrarily abused its discretion in imposing sentence; petitioner was entitled to a remand for resentencing on appeal under state law; a challenge to the use of priors is not frivolous; there are

pre-emptive norms of law from which a state may not derogate; the Double Jeopardy Clause is a

“pre-emptory norm of law which prohibits multiple punishment”; the California scheme of using

priors for enhancement punishments is unconstitutional. 

The court’s own records reveal that petitioner previously filed a federal habeas

petition challenging his 1998 conviction. (See Wayne Morris v. R.A. Castro, et al., case No. CIV

S-01-1567 DAD P, filed August 13, 2001.) Petitioner’s previously filed action was stayed on

August 7, 2002, to permit petitioner to exhaust additional claims. On August 18, 2003, the stay

was lifted, and on September 8, 2003, the court directed respondents to respond to the third

amended petition filed by petitioner on September 4, 2003. Respondents filed their answer on

January 8, 2004, and petitioner filed his traverse on May 3, 2004. The petition in case No. CIV

S-01-1567 has been fully briefed and stands submitted for decision.

The third amended petition in case No. CIV S-01-1567 presents the following

claims: (1) trial court error in allowing the prosecution to call Deputy Anderson as a rebuttal

witness; (2) denial of effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to interview

Deputy Anderson before trial; (3) the state coerced petitioner into abandoning his right of selfrepresentation by providing him with inadequate legal materials; (4) prosecutorial misconduct for

failing to timely disclose court ordered discovery; (5) prosecutorial misconduct in using unfair

surprise by calling Deputy Anderson as a rebuttal witness and using false testimony to secure a

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conviction; (6) trial court denial of an opportunity to offer testimony favorable to petitioner’s

defense; (7) prosecutorial misconduct in informing a witness of petitioner’s criminal history and

aiding in the changing of other witnesses’ testimony; (8) trial court error in not allowing

questions regarding “masked suspects” during trial, in violation of petitioner’s rights to confront

and cross-examine witnesses; (9) prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor and police

suppressed exculpatory evidence regarding a 911 tape and police dispatch communications; (10)

denial of effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to investigate and use experts;

(11) trial court error in not suppressing petitioner’s in-court identification by witnesses, which

was suggestive and tainted.

The undersigned has considered whether petitioner should be permitted to file a

fourth amended petition in case No. CIV S-01-1567 to add the sentencing claims alleged in this

new action. An application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be amended or supplemented as

provided in the rules of civil procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242. See also

Rule 11, Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

may be applied in habeas corpus proceedings to the extent that the rules of civil procedure are not

inconsistent with any statutory provision or with the rules governing habeas cases); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 81(a)(2) (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to proceedings for

habeas corpus “to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the

United States, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the Rules Governing Section 2255

Proceedings”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a habeas petitioner may seek leave

of court to amend his pleading at any time during the proceeding. Mayle v. Felix, U.S. ,

125 S. Ct. 2562, 2569 (2005).

Under Rule 15(c), a petitioner’s amendments made after the statute of limitations

has expired will relate back to the date of his original pleading if the new claims arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. 

Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)). “The ‘original pleading’ to which Rule 15 refers is the

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complaint in an ordinary civil case, and the petition in a habeas proceeding.” Id. at 2569-70. The

complaint in an ordinary civil case need only provide fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the

grounds on which his claim rests, while a habeas petition is required to specify all grounds for

relief available to the petitioner and state the facts supporting each ground. Id. at 2570. Because

of this difference between civil complaints and habeas petitions, the relation back of new habeas

claims “depends on the existence of a common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and

newly asserted claims.” Id. at 2572. The common core of operative facts must not be viewed at

too high a level of generality, and an “occurrence” will consist of each separate set of facts that

supports a ground for relief. Id. at 2573. Applying these principles in Mayle, the Supreme Court

ruled that the petitioner’s new claim did not relate back to his original claim because the new

claim arose from the petitioner’s own pretrial interrogation and was different in time and place

from his original claim, which arose from the pretrial police interrogation of a witness. Id. at

2572-73.

The undersigned has compared the sentencing claims raised in this action with

those alleged in petitioner’s third amended petition in case No. CIV S-01-1567 DAD. The

sentencing claims differ in time and place from all of the previously alleged claims. Petitioner’s

sentencing claims do not share a common core of operative facts with any of the claims raised in

case No. CIV S-01-1567 DAD and therefore do not relate back to the third amended petition in

that case. Permitting petitioner to file a fourth amended petition in his first federal habeas case

for the purpose of adding claims that are plainly barred by the statute of limitations would be

futile and would serve only to delay the resolution of petitioner’s eleven submitted claims. This

duplicative action raising time-barred claims should be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 4.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s June 12, 2006 application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted;

2. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this order and findings and

recommendations, together with a copy of the habeas petition filed in this case on June 12, 2006,

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upon Angelo S. Edralin, Jr., the Deputy Attorney General who is attorney of record for

respondents in case No. CIV S-01-1567 DAD P; and

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be summarily dismissed.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

fifteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file

written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Petitioner is advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 21, 2006.

DAD:13

morr1277.156

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