Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01879/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01879-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J.C., by and through his 

Guardian ad Litem Nandi Storm 

Cain and M.G., by and through 

her Guardian ad Litem Wendy 

Whittaker,

Plaintiffs,

v.

City of Vallejo, a municipal 

corporation; and DOES 1-50, 

inclusive, individually and 

in their official capacity as 

police officers for the 

Vallejo Police Department,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01879-JAM-AC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

INTRODUCTION OF CASE / PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from an interaction between Plaintiffs J.C. 

and M.G. (“Plaintiffs”) and City of Vallejo (“Defendant”) police 

officers following a motor vehicle stop. Plaintiffs bring this 

case by and through their guardians ad litem, N.C. and W.D. 

respectively. Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, California Civil Code § 52.1, and various tort law 

theories. Currently pending before this Court is Defendant’s 

Case 2:24-cv-01879-JAM-AC Document 29 Filed 12/17/24 Page 1 of 16
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Motion to Dismiss. See Mot., ECF No. 17. Plaintiffs submitted 

an opposition, Opp’n, ECF No. 23, and Defendant replied, Reply, 

ECF No. 26. For the reasons provided herein, the Court GRANTS in 

part Defendant’s motion to dismiss.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following facts alleged by Plaintiffs are accepted as

true for purposes of Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

On July 2, 2023, Plaintiffs M.G. and J.C. were passengers in

a vehicle driven by a friend of Plaintiff M.G.’s mother. See

Compl. ¶ 15. City of Vallejo Police subsequently pulled the 

vehicle over and an officer ordered the driver out of the car. 

The driver exited the vehicle and was placed in handcuffs. Id. 

At the same time, Plaintiff M.G. had originally been seated 

behind the driver’s seat and moved to sit in the driver’s seat. 

See Compl. ¶ 17. Once in the driver’s seat, Plaintiff M.G. began 

protesting and questioning the officers’ level of force. Id. 

Then, officers yelled instructions at Plaintiff M.G. and one 

officer grabbed Plaintiff M.G. and violently pulled her out of 

the car through a crack in the car window. Id. Plaintiff M.G. 

then landed on the concrete floor with her face and chest first. 

Plaintiff J.C. witnessed these actions and was also needlessly 

detained. Id.; Compl. ¶ 1. 

As a result of the incident, Plaintiff M.G. sought medical 

attention at Sutter Antioch where she received the diagnosis of 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for October 22, 2024. The Parties are advised that 

once the scheduling order is issued, the fictitiously-named 

defendants will be dismissed. 

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bruising. See Compl. ¶ 18. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A complaint must make a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 

(2007). 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the plausibility 

pleading standard set forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007), a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss by alleging 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” The complaint must contain sufficient “factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This “plausibility 

standard,” however, “asks for more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009), and “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 

relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court must accept all 

nonconclusory factual allegations of the complaint as true and 

construe those facts and the reasonable inferences that follow 

in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Id.; see also

Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). However, 

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legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual 

allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678-79 (2009). In the event dismissal is warranted, it is 

generally without prejudice, unless it is clear the complaint 

cannot be saved by any amendment. See Sparling v. Daou, 411 

F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. Judicial Notice

Along with their motion to dismiss, Defendant has requested 

that the Court take judicial notice of four exhibits that 

contain law enforcement records pertaining to Plaintiffs’ July 

2, 2023 incident. See ECF No. 17-1. The records at issue

consist of one Vallejo Police Department crime report (“Exhibit 

A”) and three MP4 audio/video recordings of body worn camera 

footage (“Exhibits B, C, and D”). Plaintiffs object to this 

request. See Opp’n, ECF No. 23-1. 

Defendant heavily relies on Exhibits A, B, C, and D in its

motion to dismiss and argues that the Court may take judicial 

notice of these records under Fed. R. of Evid. Rule 201(b), 

which provides courts discretion to take judicial notice of 

facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” and which are “capable 

of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b). Defendant cites Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of 

Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2006), 

asserting that the exhibits it has provided in this case are 

public government records which can be properly considered. 

The Court disagrees with Defendant’s theory and 

justification for judicial notice. As discussed above, Fed. R. 

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Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Ninth Circuit precedent are clear that when 

the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations are 

challenged by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “[r]eview is limited 

to the complaint.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 

1274 (9th Cir. 1993). All factual allegations set forth in the 

complaint “are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to [p]laintiffs.” Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 

83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). As Plaintiffs correctly 

argue, the Court may not generally consider materials outside 

the pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage. See Objection at 

2, ECF No. 17-1; Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & 

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997). 

If “defendants are permitted to present their own version 

of the facts at the pleading stage — and district courts accept 

those facts as uncontroverted and true — it becomes near 

impossible for even the most aggrieved plaintiff to demonstrate 

a sufficiently ‘plausible’ claim for relief.” Khoja v. Orexigen 

Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Such undermining 

of the usual pleading burdens is not the purpose of judicial 

notice. Id. When “matters outside the pleading are presented 

to and not excluded by the court,” the 12(b)(6) motion converts 

into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Kohja, 

899 F.3d at 998. 

Additionally, unlike the ordinances which were publicly 

accessible via the internet in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, the 

Court does not find that a police report and body worn camera 

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footage are within the same category of readily available public 

government records discussed in that case. Instead, Defendant’s

records seek to contradict the allegations in Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint and cannot be considered for their substance at this

stage. While Defendant’s exhibits may be considered during 

later stages of litigation, the Court finds that judicial notice 

of Defendant’s exhibits is premature and declines to take 

judicial notice of the content of these exhibits for purposes of 

this motion. Thus, the Court determines that considering the 

police report and body worn camera footage is inappropriate at 

this stage. It follows that the Court has not relied on 

Defendant’s exhibits or the arguments pertaining to them in 

deciding this motion. 

C. Analysis

1. Fourth Amendment Seizure

Under Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997), police 

officers, as a matter of course, may order passengers of a 

lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. If officers possess a 

concern for their safety, they may also handcuff and move all 

occupants of the vehicle. See Rohde v. City of Roseburg, 137 

F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Allen v. City of Los 

Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendant also 

points out that officers may “despite the absence of probable 

cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, order all

occupants of the vehicle to step outside.” Ruvalcaba v. City of 

Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1995).

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs do not set forth any 

allegations regarding the original stop and detention of the 

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driver. See Compl. They do not plead that the driver was 

stopped and arrested unlawfully. Nor do they allege that they 

did not know why they were being stopped or whether they fully 

complied with officers’ instructions during the stop. Indeed, 

Plaintiffs provide mere conclusory statements that police 

officers seized passengers without probable cause and reasonable 

suspicion. See Compl. ¶ 30. 

Because the constitutionality of a passenger’s detention is 

predicated upon the initial stop of the driver, the Complaint 

has provided insufficient factual content to assert a viable 

Fourth Amendment unconstitutional seizure claim. With no 

information about the original circumstances surrounding the 

vehicle stop, there are not enough factual allegations in the 

Complaint to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. As such, the 

Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this claim with 

leave to amend. 

2. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force 

Plaintiff asserts an excessive force claim due to the 

manner she was extracted from the stopped vehicle. While 

Plaintiff does not identify the specific police officer who 

committed this action, it is plausible that at least one 

individual officer exercised unlawful force while effectuating 

Plaintiff M.G.’s arrest. 

Plaintiff M.G. alleges that after she moved from the “rear 

driver’s side” to the driver’s seat and protested officers’ 

actions, one officer grabbed Plaintiff M.G. and pulled her out 

of the car through a crack in the car window. See Compl. ¶ 17. 

This action caused Plaintiff M.G. to land on the floor and 

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receive bruising. Id. The Complaint also alleges that 

Plaintiff M.G. “posed no threat” to officers and that this use 

of force was unnecessary because she was “completely calm, 

cooperative, and unresisting during the incident.” See Compl. 

¶¶ 36-37. While Defendant disputes this depiction of the 

incident and argues that officers used reasonable force because 

M.G. was noncompliant, the Court cannot consider these arguments 

because they rely on exhibits outside of the Complaint. See

Mot. at 14. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, excessive force claims are 

assessed under a reasonableness test. See Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 388 (1989). The reasonableness inquiry is an 

objective inquiry that asks “whether the officers’ actions are 

‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 

motivation.” Graham, 460 U.S. at 397. Because the Court must 

take the Complaint at face value and construe the facts in the 

light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court determines 

that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that officers’ level of 

force was unreasonable since M.G. was fully compliant and posed 

no threat. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. 

3. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff M.G. alleges that officers used excessive force 

against Plaintiff in retaliation for protesting police action. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 43-46. However, Plaintiff M.G.’s allegations are 

insufficient to state a claim because according to the 

Complaint, she was not engaged in protected speech activity 

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prior to the police encounter. 

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff

must plausibly allege that she “(1) was engaged in a 

constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant's actions 

would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to 

engage in the protected activity and (3) the protected activity 

was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s 

conduct.” Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). As Defendant argues, Plaintiff M.G.’s

retaliation claim is conclusory and she does not plead all of 

the required elements. 

The Complaint alleges that after officers pulled the 

vehicle over and arrested the driver, M.G. protested the “level 

of force” used by officers. See Compl. ¶ 17. Thus, Plaintiff 

M.G.’s “protest” occurred in the context of an already 

effectuated vehicle seizure. Contrary to what Plaintiff 

alleges, resisting police actions during a lawful stop is not 

protest within the meaning protected by the First Amendment. 

Unlike the Plaintiff in Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372,

1378 (9th Cir. 1990), M.G. was not engaged in protected free 

speech activity prior to being detained – her resistance

occurred after the vehicle had already been stopped. Given that 

Plaintiff’s speech occurred during a police seizure, the Court 

does not find that she was engaged in protected activity and 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this claim.

4. Denial of Medical Care

Plaintiff M.G. also pleads a denial of medical care claim 

under the Fourth Amendment. See Compl. at 10. The Fourth 

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Amendment requires law enforcement officers to provide 

objectively reasonable post-arrest care. Mejia v. City of San 

Bernardino, 2012 WL 1079341, at *5 n. 12 (citing Tatum v. City & 

County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d at 1099). “This means that 

officers must ‘seek the necessary medical attention for a

detainee when he or she has been injured while being apprehended 

by either promptly summoning the necessary medical help or by 

taking the injured detainee to a hospital.’” Id. (quoting 

Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 

1986)). 

Under the facts alleged in the Complaint, this claim is

factually and legally deficient. Plaintiff does not allege that 

she requested medical care or that she suffered any injuries 

necessitating medical treatment. The Complaint provides merely 

that Plaintiff received a later diagnosis of “bruising.” Compl. 

¶ 18. Bruising is not the typical care that requires medical 

attention and it is objectively reasonable for officers to not 

have summoned medical help for a minor injury. Based on the 

allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs has not plausibly 

asserted a denial of medical care claim under the Fourth 

Amendment’s reasonableness standard and Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss this cause of action is GRANTED. 

5. Monell Liability

Plaintiffs also raise a Monell claim in their Complaint. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Monell claim fails because 

Plaintiffs do not allege with any particularity the specific 

City policies or practices claimed to support liability and 

instead takes a “kitchen-sink approach” that provides conclusory 

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restatements of the law. See MTD at 17. The Court agrees.

Defendant cites to AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012), which holds that the 

Starr standard requiring “sufficient allegations of underlying 

facts” applies to pleading policy or custom for claims against 

municipal entities. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th 

Cir. 2011). Under the Starr standard, allegations in a 

complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of 

a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of 

underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing 

party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual 

allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an 

entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the 

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and 

continued litigation. Id.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not meet the Starr standard 

because it consists of only vague and conclusory statements. 

See Compl. at ¶¶ 56-60. Although Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n 

information and belief, [officers] were not disciplined for 

their use of excessive force,” Plaintiffs do not allege that 

they ever filed complaints with the City of Vallejo’s Police 

Department or sought any other administrative remedies. 

Plaintiffs also allege, without any particularity, that the City 

“ha[s] and maintain[s] an unconstitutional policy, custom, and 

practice of arresting individuals without probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion, and using excessive force, which also is 

demonstrated by inadequate training.” Compl. at ¶ 56. It is 

not apparent from the Complaint what this specific policy is.

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Plaintiffs also provide only conclusory statements about 

the City’s liability, alleging that the City “inadequately 

supervis[es]” officers, maintains “grossly inadequate procedures 

for reporting, supervising, investigating, reviewing, 

disciplining, and controlling” officers, and “fail[s] to 

discipline” officers. Compl. at ¶ 56. These statements are 

insufficient to plausibly allege that Defendant has acted 

unlawfully and are simply bare restatements of the law.

After Iqbal, allegations of Monell liability are sufficient 

for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) only where they: (1) identify the 

challenged policy/custom; (2) explain how the policy/custom is 

deficient; (3) explain how the policy/custom caused the 

plaintiff harm; and (4) reflect how the policy/custom amounted 

to deliberate indifference, i.e., show how the deficiency 

involved was obvious and the constitutional injury was likely to 

occur. See Herd v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 311 F. Supp. 3d 

1157, 1166–67 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Young v. City of Visalia, 

687 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2009)); see also Harvey v. 

City of S. Lake Tahoe, No. CIV S-10-1653 KJM EFB PS, 2011 WL 

3501687, *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011). Plaintiffs’ Complaint 

does not fulfill any of these four metrics: the allegations do 

not specify what the City policy is, how the City policy is 

deficient, or how the training and hiring practices caused

Plaintiffs’ constitutional injury. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ 

opposition is devoid of factual reasoning because it merely 

lists other cases against the City of Vallejo that contain 

materially dissimilar facts and are not relevant to the incident 

at issue. See Opp’n at 6-13. 

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Iqbal has made clear that conclusory, “threadbare” 

allegations that merely recite the elements of a cause of action 

will not survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 

1949–50. Thus, without more, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim does not 

survive Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and must be dismissed. 

6. Bane Act California Civil Code Section 52.1

Plaintiffs assert a state cause of action under the Bane 

Act. “The Bane Act civilly protects individuals from conduct 

aimed at interfering with rights that are secured by federal or 

state law, where the interference is carried out by threats, 

intimidation or coercion.” Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 

F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the 

defendant, by improper means, “tried to or did prevent the 

plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do 

under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he 

or she was not required to do under the law.” Austin B. v. 

Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883, 57 

Cal.Rptr.3d 454 (2007). 

Defendant correctly contends that the Bane Act requires 

defendants act with “specific intent” to deprive plaintiffs of 

their constitutional rights and cite to Reese v. Cnty. of 

Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing 

Cornell v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal.App.5th 766 

(2017)). See Reply at 9. While the Ninth Circuit recognized in 

Reese that “the elements of the excessive force claim under 

§ 52.1 are the same as under § 1983,” [the Ninth Circuit] did

not read those cases as contradicting the intent requirement” 

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previously established by California state courts. 888 F.3d at 

1044 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While 

Plaintiff M.G. has sufficiently plead a Fourth Amendment 

excessive force violation, she has not sufficiently alleged that 

officers possessed specific intent to interfere with her rights

as required under the Bane Act. See Compl. ¶ 62.

Because the Ninth Circuit has instructed that jurors must 

find that the defendants “intended not only the force, but its 

unreasonableness, its character as ‘more than necessary under 

the circumstances’” to prevail on a Bane Act claim predicated on 

excessive force, Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 

1045 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court finds that allegations about 

underlying intent are necessary to properly assert a Bane Act 

cause of action. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to plead all 

elements of the Bane Act and Defendant’s motion to dismiss this 

claim is GRANTED. 

7. Tort Causes of Action 

Plaintiffs plead a series of tort allegations including 

assault/battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 

negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

Plaintiffs also allege a false arrest/false imprisonment claim. 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently 

plead these claims. See Mot. at 18-19. The Court finds that 

Plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead the elements for the 

alleged tort actions because the claims lack specificity as to 

who the tortfeasors are and what specific duties are owed. 

Presently, Plaintiffs group the fictitiously-named police 

officers and municipal entity together and then conclude that 

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tort liability exists. However, group pleading does not provide 

defendants fair notice of the claims against them under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8. See Gen–Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., Inc., 926 F.

Supp. 948, 960–62 (S.D. Cal. 1996); see also, Smith v. City of 

Marina, 709 F. Supp.3d 926, 937-38 9 (N.D. Cal. 2024)

(dismissing tort claims in a § 1983 action for lack of 

specificity and disaggregation). Accordingly, these tort claims

are dismissed and Defendant’s motion is GRANTED because

Plaintiffs fail to specify particular defendant officers or

identify the duties owed and breaching conduct for each 

individual defendant.

As for Plaintiffs’ false arrest/false imprisonment claim, 

this claim stands on the same footing as the federal Fourth 

Amendment seizure claim and Plaintiffs have failed to allege 

sufficient facts establishing an unreasonable arrest. Thus, 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED on this claim as well. 

8. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend. See Opp’n at 17. 

A court granting a motion to dismiss a claim must decide whether 

to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely 

given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the 

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] 

futility of [the] amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 

178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 

1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those 

to be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). 

Because Plaintiffs may cure the defects in their Complaint by 

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adding more specificity and identifying which officers were 

involved in the incident, the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to 

amend.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to the Fourth Amendment seizure 

claim (First Cause of Action), First Amendment retaliation claim 

(Third Cause of Action), Fourth Amendment denial of medical care

claim (Fourth Cause of Action), Monell liability claim (Fifth 

Cause of Action), Bane Act claim (Sixth Cause of Action), the 

tort liability claims (Seventh through Tenth Causes of Action), 

and the false imprisonment claim (Eleventh Cause of Action) with 

leave to amend. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to dismiss 

as to the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim (Second Cause of 

Action).

Plaintiffs shall file their Amended Complaint no later than 

twenty (20) days from the date of this Order. Defendant shall 

file its responsive pleading to the Amended Complaint no later 

than twenty (20) days thereafter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2024

Case 2:24-cv-01879-JAM-AC Document 29 Filed 12/17/24 Page 16 of 16