Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02818/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02818-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL LEWIS, LAUREN TAYLOR, 

C.L., a minor, and B.L., a minor, by and 

through their guardian ad litem, 

Plaintiffs,

v. 

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY 

AGENT IAN BAXTER, COUNTY 

AGENT N. QUINTEROS, COUNTY 

AGENT SUPERVISOR BENITA 

JEMISON, COUNTY AGENT ABIGAIL 

JOSEPH, COUNTY AGENT 

SUPERVISOR ANTONIA TORRES, 

COUNTY AGENT SUPERVISOR 

ALFREDO GUARDADO, COUNTY 

AGENT BROOKE GUILD, and DOES 1-

50, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:13-cv-02818-H-JMA 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART, 

DENYING IN PART, DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[Doc. No. 109] 

 

On August 7, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a suit in California Superior Court against the 

County of San Diego (“County”) and individual social workers (collectively 

“Defendants”), claiming Defendants violated their constitutional rights, as well as various 

state laws. (See Doc. No. 1.) On November 27, 2013, this action was removed to 

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Federal Court. (Id.) On January 27, 2017, Defendants filed a motion for summary 

judgment. (Doc. No. 109.) Defendants Joseph, Guild, Torres, and Guardado move for 

summary judgment as to all claims against them on the grounds they are entitled to 

immunity for their actions in this case. (Id. at 2.) Defendant County of San Diego moves 

for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim the County’s policies and practices violated 

their constitutional rights. (Id.) Finally, all Defendants move for summary judgment as 

to Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claims, which Plaintiffs do not oppose. (Id.) Plaintiffs opposed 

the motion on February 15, 2017. (Doc. No. 136.) Defendants replied on February 22, 

2017. (Doc. No. 147.) On March 1, 2017, the Court heard arguments on the matter. 

(Doc. No. 153.) Plaintiffs Lauren Taylor, C.L., and B.L. were represented by Attorneys 

Robert Powell and Sarah Marinho. Plaintiff Michael Lewis was represented by Attorney 

Stephen Allen King. (Id.) Defendants were represented by Attorneys David Brodie and 

Erica Rocio Cortez. (Id.) 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from the warrantless removal of minor Plaintiffs C.L., age four, 

and B.L., age two, by the County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency 

(“HHSA”). C.L. and B.L., along with their parents Michael Lewis and Lauren Taylor 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”), sued Defendants alleging the removal and subsequent familial 

separation violated their constitutional rights, as well as various state laws. (Doc. No. 1.) 

The present motion does not focus on the circumstances of the warrantless removal, as 

the parties have agreed that questions of fact remain and the matter is proceeding to trial. 

Rather, the focus of the arguments concern Defendants’ conduct following the Juvenile 

Court order detaining C.L. and B.L., the Monell claim against the County of San Diego, 

and the state law Bane Act claims. 

By way of background, on August 8, 2011, Defendants Baxter and Quinteros, 

social workers with HHSA, visited Plaintiffs’ home on referral from the Coronado Police 

Department, who had previously visited the home and observed marijuana and marijuana 

paraphernalia. (Doc. No. 138-1 at 4.) During their visit, Defendants Baxter and 

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Quinteros also encountered marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia. In his petition to the 

Juvenile Court, Defendant Baxter wrote: 

Upon entering the home, there was a strong smell or marijuana. In the 

kitchen, on the counter, there were materials used to manufacture marijuana 

hash. There was a CO2 tank, a scale, and an extraction tank. In the freezer 

there was a large ice cream tub containing marijuana buds and in the door of 

the freezer there were chemicals and other grocery bags containing 

marijuana leaves. In the master bathroom there were marijuana buds, an 

aerosol can of butane fuel, a glass pipe, and a butane torch. In the 

roommate’s room, in the closet, there were eight marijuana plants, 

approximately two feet tall, growing under a lighting system. All of the 

drugs and paraphernalia are easily accessible to the minors. 

(Doc. No. 138-1 at 4.) 

Plaintiffs Michael Lewis and Lauren Taylor told Defendants Baxter and Quinteros 

they never used marijuana around their children and the children did not have access to 

the room where the marijuana was growing. (Id. at 5.) The children, however, said 

otherwise. C.L. told Defendant Baxter that: 

[H]e had seen mom and dad smoke inside and that it looks like a “bomb, but 

it’s not.” He said that he went into Nick’s room yesterday and climbed on 

the bed. He said that he and Dominic had been on Nick’s bed and his dad 

was poking them with keys. [C.L.] stated he and his mom eat broccoli and 

that his dad eats “stinky broccoli” and it “makes his breath smell bad.” 

(Id.) Dominic, another child not involved in this case, told Defendant Baxter he had seen 

Plaintiff Lewis smoke marijuana, had played in the room where the marijuana was 

growing, and was able to reach the freezer where the marijuana was stored by standing on 

his toes. (Id.) In fact, Dominic said he often accessed the freezer to get ice cream. (Id. at 

8-9.) Based on their observations at the home, Defendants Baxter and Quinteros decided 

to remove the children. 

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On August 11, 2011, the Juvenile Court held a detention hearing. (Doc. No. 138-

4.) At the hearing, Defendant Baxter filed a Detention Report setting forth his 

observations from the home and recommending that C.L. and B.L. should remain 

detained in a licensed foster home with HHSA having the discretion to place the children 

with an appropriate relative. (Doc. No. 138-1 at 2.) Furthermore, Defendant Baxter 

recommended the parents be allowed supervised visits and the parents be referred to drug 

treatment assessment. (Id.) The parents, as well as the minors, also appeared at the 

Detention Hearing and were represented by their own counsel. (Doc. No. 138-4 at 2.) 

Counsel for Plaintiff Taylor presented photographic evidence showing the parents had 

cleaned their home since the children were removed and argued the children should be 

returned. (Id.) Counsel for C.L. and B.L., acting in the best interest of the minor 

children, advocated the children be removed from their parents. (Doc. No. 120-3 at 13-

14.) 

After hearing the evidence, the Juvenile Court found that “[c]ontinued care in the 

home of the parent(s)/guardian(s) is contrary to the child[ren’s] welfare.” (Doc. No. 138-

4 at 2.) The Court also found that: 

[D]etention of the minor is necessary because of a substantial danger to the 

physical health of the minor and there is no reasonable means to protect the 

minor’s physical or emotional health without removing the minor from the 

parent’s physical custody at this time. 

(Id.) Finally, the Court found that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent removal 

of the children but there were no additional services available that would prevent the need 

for further detention. (Id.) Based on the findings, the Court ordered the children detained 

with supervised visitation rights. (Id. at 3.) The Court also referred Plaintiff Michael 

Lewis for substance abuse assessment. (Id.) 

After the Court issued the August 11, 2011 detention order, Defendants Joseph and 

Guild were the HHSA social workers managing C.L. and B.L.’s care. (Doc. No. 109-3 

¶¶ 3-5.) Defendants Guardado and Torres supervised Defendants Joseph and Guild. (Id. 

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¶ 6.) Defendant Joseph filed various documents with the Juvenile Court, updating the 

Court as to C.L. and B.L.’s condition, as well as making recommendations as to their 

care.1

 (E.g., Doc. No. 138-6.) Throughout the time Defendants Joseph, Guild, Torres, 

and Guardado managed C.L. and B.L.’s case, they were acting pursuant to the Juvenile 

Court’s order detaining the children. During this time, Plaintiffs were represented by 

counsel and actively involved in proceedings before the Juvenile Court. Plaintiffs Lewis 

and Taylor continued to oppose the children’s detention but C.L. and B.L.’s counsel, 

acting in the best interest of the minors, repeatedly joined the HHSA’s position in 

advocating in favor of detention. (E.g., Doc. No. 120-3 at 13-14; Doc. No. 154.) 

Plaintiff Lewis appealed the Juvenile Court’s decision to detain C.L. and B.L. In 

re Cameron L., D061636 (Cal. App. 4th August 2, 2012). On appeal, C.L. and B.L.’s 

counsel joined the County’s brief in favor of upholding the Juvenile Court’s order. (Doc. 

No. 154.) On August 2, 2012, the California Court of Appeal reversed the Juvenile 

Court, ordering the children placed back in their parents’ care. In re Cameron L., 

D061636 (Cal. App. 4th August 2, 2012); (Doc. No. 136-3). Despite reversing the 

Juvenile Court, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that marijuana was present in 

Plaintiffs’ home and was accessible to the children at the time of removal. (Id. at 12) 

(“we cannot fault the Agency for acting in an abundance of caution by removing the 

children from the home based on the existence of marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia 

within reach of the children”). The Court of Appeal also noted Plaintiff Lewis’s 

threatening behavior and the fact he did not contest that “he suffered from PTSD or . . . 

that a restraining order had been issued against him for the protection of a social worker.” 

(Id. at 9.) Reviewing the entire record, the Court of Appeal determined detention was 

unnecessary because “there were less drastic measures available to protect the children” 

                                                                

1

 Defendant Guild was brought onto the case much later and never actually filed any reports with the 

Court. (Doc. No. 109-6 ¶ 4.) 

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and the evidence did not support a finding that the alleged drug use or mental illness 

negatively impacted the children. (Id. at 15.) 

ANALYSIS 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is limited to certain claims and bases 

for liability. (Doc. No. 109 at 2.) Defendant County of San Diego moves to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. Defendants also seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state-law claims 

under the California Bane Act. Finally, Defendants Joseph, Guild, Torres, and Guardado 

move for summary judgment as to all Plaintiffs’ claims because they were not involved in 

the warrantless removal and argue they are entitled to immunity for their actions in this 

matter. The Court addresses each issue in turn. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is proper when a moving party shows there is no genuine 

dispute of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). There is no genuine dispute if 

“the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

587 (1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of producing evidence showing they are 

entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 330. If the moving party 

satisfies their initial burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to introduce 

evidence showing there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 331. To satisfy its 

burden, the non-moving party “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his 

pleadings.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Rather, the 

nonmoving party “must present affirmative evidence . . . from which a jury might return a 

verdict in his favor.” Id. Facts and inferences are to be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 

/// 

/// 

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II. MONELL CLAIM AGAINST COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 

Local governmental entities such as the County can be sued under § 1983 when 

their policies or practices caused a person’s rights to be violated. Monell v. New York 

City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Defendants moved for summary 

judgment on Plaintiffs’ Monell claim, arguing it is not the County’s policy or practice to 

remove children from the home absent exigent circumstances. (Doc. No. 109-1 at 7-8.) 

Defendants have met their initial burden under Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 330, through 

declarations of County employees stating the County’s policy was only to remove 

children if they “had a court order, consent, or exigency.” (Doc. No. 109-8 ¶ 11) (see 

also Doc. Nos. 109-9, 109-10). Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to bring forth 

evidence sufficient to raise a material question of fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 330. 

Plaintiffs have done so. 

Plaintiffs produced a written County of San Diego policy entitled “Drug 

Endangered Children (DEC) Protocol” (“DEC Protocol”) that they claim instructs County 

employees to unconstitutionally remove children from their homes. (Doc. No. 136-23.) 

In the first paragraph, the DEC Protocol notes that: 

When raised in homes where parents are using drugs, the children, especially 

those under the age of seven, may be chronically exposed to 

methamphetamine and other narcotics. Additionally, these children are 

socialized among criminal elements that surround the drug lifestyle, and as a 

result of their immersion in that environment they suffer long-term physical, 

social, and psychological detriment. 

(Id. at 1.) Because of this danger to children, the DEC Protocol attempts to outline how 

County employees should address situations involving drugs and children. The DEC 

Protocol states that “[i]f a child is in a home where drugs and/or paraphernalia have been 

found, and they were accessible to the child/ren . . .they should be brought into custody.” 

(Id. at 6.) Similarly, the DEC Protocol defines all children found in settings involving the 

use of drugs as DEC Level II and provides that these children should “[c]omplete a urine 

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toxicology screen . . . after their recovery from the scene.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs argue that 

the DEC Protocol could be interpreted as requiring that all DEC Level II children be 

taken into County custody. In addition to the protocol, Plaintiffs have offered evidence 

that HHSA social workers were trained to follow the DEC Protocol and regularly 

consulted it when making decisions. (Doc. No. 136-17 at 4-9.) 

Plaintiffs argue that this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to them, 

could allow a reasonable jury to find the County’s policy caused social workers to 

remove children per se when marijuana was present in the home. Plaintiffs argue that 

such a per se rule would be improper under the Ninth Circuit precedent in Wallis v. 

Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000), because the analysis requires additional 

considerations. Id. at 1138 (warrantless removal only proper if there is “reasonable cause 

to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope 

of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury”); see also In re 

Alexis E., 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 452 (2009) (“it is true that the mere use of marijuana by 

a parent will not support a finding of risk to minors”); accord In re Destiny S., 210 

Cal.App.4th 999, 1003 (2012). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have taken portions of 

the DEC Protocol out of context and that social workers must still conduct a full 

investigation to determine whether removal is necessary and appropriate. (Doc. No. 147 

at 11.) In support of their position, Defendants have offered declarations from HHSA 

employees stating that, at the time of C.L. and B.L.’s removal, the County’s policies did 

not instruct social workers to remove children from the care of their parents solely due to 

the presence of marijuana in the home and the presence of drugs was only one factor in 

the social workers’ decision. (Doc. Nos. 109-9 ¶ 3, 109-8 ¶ 9.) Given the conflicting 

positions of the parties and the factual disputes about the County’s policies and practices 

on removing children when drugs are present, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on the Monell claim. 

/// 

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III. BANE ACT CLAIMS 

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims 

under the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 et seq., because Plaintiffs failed to timely 

present a written claim for damages. (Doc. No. 109-1 at 6.) Plaintiffs have not opposed 

this portion of Defendants’ motion and do not intend to pursue any Bane Act claims at 

trial. (Doc. No. 136 at 5.) Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants summary judgment 

as to Plaintiffs’ claims under the Bane Act. 

IV. QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 

Defendants Joseph, Torres, Guild, and Guardado (the “Dependency Social 

Workers”) were not involved in the August 8, 2011 warrantless removal of C.L. and B.L. 

(Doc. No. 109-3 ¶ 3; Doc. No. 109-4 ¶ 3; Doc. No. 109-5 ¶ 3; Doc. No. 109-6 ¶ 3.) The 

Dependency Social Workers only became involved with the case after the Juvenile Court 

issued its Detention Hearing order, removing B.L. and C.L. from their parents’ care and 

placing them under the protection of the state. (Id.) Defendants Joseph and Guild were 

the social workers assigned to manage the children’s case. (Doc. No. 109-3 ¶¶ 3-5.) 

Defendants Guardado and Torres supervised Defendants Joseph and Guild. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Defendants argue their actions are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because they were 

acting pursuant to a court order and in the role of an advocate of the state. (Doc. No. 109 

at 4-6.) Plaintiffs respond that the Dependency Social Workers are not entitled to 

absolute immunity. 

Social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in a quasijudicial or quasi-prosecutorial role. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898-99 (9th Cir. 

2003) (en banc). Such actions include initiating dependency proceedings, acting pursuant 

to a court order, and acting as a generic advocate of the state. Beltran v. Santa Clara 

Cnty., 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008); Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1115; Mabe v. San 

Bernardino Cnty., Dept. of Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001); Meyers v. 

Contra Costa Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987). In these 

situations, there are sufficient “safeguards built into the judicial process that tend to 

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reduce the need for private damage actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional 

conduct.” Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157. Only when social workers act outside of their 

quasi-judicial or quasi-prosecutorial role can they be held liable. E.g., Beltran, 514 F.3d 

at 908 (no immunity for fabricating evidence or making false statements in an affidavit); 

Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1109 (same); Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1115 (no immunity for “egregious 

acts of misconduct”). 

Once assigned to C.L. and B.L.’s case, the Dependency Social Workers duties 

included effectuating the Juvenile Court’s orders. (E.g., Doc. No. 109-3 at 2.) At the 

August 11, 2011 Detention Hearing, the Juvenile Court ordered C.L. and B.L. to be 

detained at the Polinsky Child Center and the parents be allowed supervised visitations. 

(Doc. No. 138-4 at 3.) In order to administer the Juvenile Court’s order, the Dependency 

Social Workers regularly communicated with C.L. and B.L.’s parents, coordinated 

services for the family, and followed up with those service providers. (Doc. No. 109-3 ¶ 

4; Doc. No. 109-6 ¶¶ 3-4.) This is protected because the social workers were effectuating 

the Court’s orders. Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1109 (social workers enjoy absolute immunity 

when “making post-adjudication decisions pursuant to a valid court order”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Beltran, 514 F.3d at 908 (immunity available for 

“functions that are critical to the judicial process itself”); but see Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 

1115 (abrogating immunity where there were “egregious acts of misconduct”). 

The Dependency Social Worker’s also submitted petitions with the Juvenile Court, 

informing the court as to developments in the case and making recommendations on 

behalf of the HHSA. (Doc. No. 109-3 ¶ 4; Doc. No. 109-6 ¶¶ 3-4.) For example, on 

February 6, 2012, Defendant Joseph filed an amended petition listing additional concerns 

regarding Plaintiff Lewis’s alleged PTSD and threatening behavior. (Doc. No. 138-6 at 

4.) Defendant Joseph informed the court that Plaintiff Lewis claimed to have “severe 

PTSD which has not been verified with medical documentation” and Plaintiff Lewis said 

the PTSD was preventing him from stopping his marijuana use, as well as causing him to 

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have “difficulty sleeping and controlling his thoughts.” (Id.) Plaintiff Lewis and his 

counsel acknowledged Lewis’s PTSD during the August 11, 2011 Detention Hearing: 

THE COURT: Mr. Cruz, what was the basis for the father’s medical 

marijuana? 

MR. CRUZ: PTSD as well as migraines. 

THE FATHER [LEWIS]: Extreme. 

(Doc. No. 156 at 8:18-21.). 

In addition to the PTSD, Defendant Joseph reported that Plaintiff Lewis “presented 

with threatening behavior including verbal threats towards [a social worker] . . . [and a] 

Retraining Order was ordered by the Court to address the concerns.” (Id.) Indeed, on 

August 23, 2011, the Superior Court issued a restraining order against Plaintiff Lewis 

because of his threats to Defendant Baxter. (Doc. No. 156 at 22.) Defendant Joseph also 

reported that C.L. and B.L.’s paternal grandmother and maternal aunt felt threatened by 

Plaintiff Lewis’s behavior. (Doc. No. 138-6 at 4.) For example, C.L. and B.L.’s paternal 

grandmother told Defendant Joseph she came to visit the children but had to leave 

“prematurely and abruptly after she confronted Mr. Lewis” about his drug use. (Id.) On 

account of these observations, Defendant Joseph maintained that C.L. and B.L. should be 

detained. (Id. 2, 4, 8-10.) This behavior qualifies as quasi-prosecutorial because it 

“contributes as an advocate to an informed judgment by an impartial decision maker. 

Caldwell v. LeFaver, 928 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991). Or put another way, it involves 

“presenting the state’s case as a generic advocate.2” Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1115; see 

                                                                

2

 Even though the Court concludes the social workers are entitled to immunity for their actions in this 

case, it rejects Defendants’ argument that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for all of their 

actions once dependency proceedings have commenced. (E.g., Doc. No. 147 at 6-7.) But this goes too 

far. The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have instructed courts to focus on the specific functions 

an official is undertaking to determine whether immunity applies. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 

(1997) (“in determining immunity, we examine the nature of the function performed”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); accord Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, if a social 

worker exceeds their quasi-judicial roles they are not entitled to immunity—regardless of the timing of 

their actions. See also Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1115 (denying immunity for malicious activities 

undertaken after dependency proceedings commenced). 

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also Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157 (categorizing actions that aid in the “preparation or 

presentation” of a case as quasi-judicial). And Defendant Joseph’s statements to the 

Court were accurate, as the Court of Appeal acknowledged “[Plaintiff Lewis] initially 

displayed rage toward the Agency and anger toward a family member.” (Doc. No. 136-3 

at 15.) 

Plaintiffs argue the Dependency Social Workers are not entitled to absolute 

immunity because Defendants’ conduct was outside of the social workers’ legitimate role 

as a quasi-prosecutorial advocate presenting the state’s case. (Doc. No. 136 at 16.) 

Certainly “egregious acts of misconduct” can abrogate a social workers immunity. 

Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1114. In Hardwick, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s 

denial of absolute immunity to social workers because their conduct was “well outside of 

the social workers’ legitimate role as quasi-prosecutorial advocates.” 844 F.3d at 1116. 

In Hardwick, the social workers allegedly lied to the dependency court on multiple 

occasions and knowingly misrepresented specific conduct of the mother as to her 

children, causing the dependency court to conclude that the mother was “using” her 

children. Id. at 1115. Indeed, the California Court of Appeal had already reviewed the 

facts in Hardwick, and found there was sufficient evidence “to demonstrate the social 

workers committed egregious acts of misconduct” and the County of Orange had 

conceded its “social workers lied and fabricated evidence.” Fogarty-Hardwick v. Cnty. 

of Orange, 2010 WL 2354383 *10, n.4 (Cal. App. 4th June 14, 2010). That set of facts is 

very different from the present case. 

Here, the social workers have not conceded misconduct. (Doc. No. 147 at 10; see 

also Doc. No. 109-8 ¶ 6.) Furthermore, the California Court of Appeal made no mention 

of misconduct on the part of the social workers when it reversed the Juvenile Court’s 

jurisdictional decision. See In re Cameron L., D061636 (Cal. App. 4th August 2, 2012). 

Quite the opposite, the Court of Appeal noted that “we cannot fault the Agency for acting 

in an abundance of caution by removing the children from the home based on the 

existence of marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia within the reach of the children.” Id. 

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at 12. And even though the Court of Appeal ultimately reversed the Juvenile Court’s 

jurisdictional finding and returned C.L. and B.L. to the care of their parents, quasijudicial immunity is not diminished simply because the advocate supported an ultimately 

incorrect position. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976). 

The Juvenile Dependency proceedings include sufficient safeguards built into the 

judicial process to vindicate a party’s rights. Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157. At the outset of 

the dependency proceedings, each Plaintiff was provided with counsel. (Doc. No. 138-4 

at 2); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 316, 317. Through their counsel, the parents 

presented evidence at the Detention Hearing and vigorously argued that the children 

should be returned because of additional safeguards and a willingness to cooperate with 

the HHSA. (Doc. No. 138-4 at 2; Doc. No. 120-3 at 9-11.) Counsel for C.L. and B.L., 

acting in the best interest of the minor children, joined with the HHSA in asking the 

Juvenile Court to order out-of-home detention. (Doc. No. 120-3 at 9.) Throughout the 

process, Plaintiffs were entitled to initiate a modification hearing whenever there were 

changed circumstances or new evidence. Cal. R. 5.560(d). These procedural safeguards 

ensured that Plaintiffs had the opportunity to fully engage in the adversarial process and 

appraise the court of evidence to support their arguments. 

Turning to Plaintiffs’ theories against immunity, Defendants actions do not rise to 

the level of misconduct or other conduct sufficient to abrogate their immunity. For 

example, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Joseph improperly referenced Plaintiff Lewis’s 

PTSD. (E.g., Doc. No. 136 at 14-15.) But they have pointed to no evidence that 

contradicts Defendant Joseph’s representations to the Juvenile Court regarding the 

matter. Defendant Joseph’s petition to the Juvenile Court stated that “Mr. Lewis claims 

to have ‘severe PTSD’ which has not been verified with medical documentation.” (Doc. 

No. 138- 6 at 4.) Notably, Defendant Joseph did not diagnose Plaintiff Lewis with 

PTSD, but only reported that Plaintiff Lewis claimed to have PTSD. And this statement 

is accurate given that Plaintiff Lewis and his counsel admitted he had PTSD during the 

August 11, 2011 detention hearing. (Doc. No. 156 at 14.) Significantly, the Court of 

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Appeal noted that Plaintiff Lewis “[did] not challenge his statement that he suffered from 

PTSD,” (Doc. No. 136-3 at 11). Furthermore, because Defendant Joseph stated that the 

PTSD was unverified, the Dependency Social Workers did not misrepresent facts or 

withhold exculpatory information from the Juvenile Court concerning Plaintiff Lewis’s 

PTSD self-diagnosis. 

The remaining conduct of the Dependency Social Workers is similarly protected. 

Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157. Plaintiffs offer a letter from Ms. Grudzinski, a therapist 

working with Plaintiffs, concerning the therapy plan for Lewis and Taylor. (Doc. No. 

136 at 12-13.) On closer review, however, the issues raised by Ms. Grudzinski reflect a 

difference of opinion about treatment providers and the course of therapy for the parents. 

For example, Ms. Grudzinski claimed that Defendant Joseph discounted the value of the 

“culturally appropriate services” Ms. Grudzinski was offering and advocated for conjoint 

therapy rather than individual therapy, among other disputes. (Doc. No. 138-5 at 4-5.) 

Plaintiffs have also offered testimony from two foster care providers, Janel Dowlearn and 

Jennifer Anstead concerning positive interactions with the family. (Doc. Nos. 136-15, 

136-16.) 

Significantly, Plaintiffs’ therapists and foster parents were readily available to 

Plaintiffs and their counsel in the dependency proceedings. Moreover, as representatives 

of the state, the Dependency Social Workers were responsible for drawing their own 

conclusions regarding the best interest of the children and advocating those positions 

before the Juvenile Court. As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of 

material fact that impugns the intentions of the Dependency Social Workers or abrogates 

their immunity. Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1115 (immunity extends to social workers acting 

as advocates of the state but not for egregious misconduct). 

In sum, the Dependency Social Workers were acting in their roles as quasi-judicial 

officers and are entitled to immunity. Miller, 335 F.3d at 898-99 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 

banc) Reviewing the record as a whole, Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of 

material fact as to whether the social workers engaged in misconduct or other actions 

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sufficient to abrogate their immunity. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, the 

Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Dependency Social 

Workers. 

V. STATE-LAW IMMUNITIES 

In California, social workers are generally immune from state-law liability under 

California Government Code §§ 820.2 and 821.6, as well as California Civil Code § 47. 

(Doc. No. 109-1 at 6-7.) An exception to this general rule abrogates immunity for social 

workers when they maliciously engage in perjury, fabricate evidence, or fail to disclose 

known exculpatory evidence. Cal. Gov. Code § 820.21. For purposes of abrogating 

immunity, malice is defined as “conduct that is intended . . . to cause injury to the 

plaintiff or despicable conduct that is carried on . . . with a willful and conscious 

disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Gov. Code § 820.21(b). 

Reviewing the record as a whole, Plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue of 

material fact as to whether Defendants’ conduct triggers the exception to immunity in § 

820.21. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. Plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue of 

material fact as to whether the Dependency Social Workers engaged in perjury, 

fabrication of evidence, or knowing admissions of exculpatory evidence. The California 

Court of Appeal made no mention of misconduct and Plaintiffs have failed to provide 

sufficient evidence indicating otherwise. Additionally, Plaintiffs have raised no triable 

issue of material fact as to whether the Dependency Social Workers exhibited malice. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were motivated to keep Plaintiffs’ family separated in 

retaliation for Plaintiff Lewis’s threatened legal action. (E.g., Doc. No. 136 at 11-12.) 

But they have failed to provide sufficient evidence showing the Dependency Social 

Workers were influenced by Plaintiff Lewis’s threats or acted differently in retaliation for 

those threats. As such, the Court concludes Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are precluded 

under state-law immunity. 

/// 

/// 

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part, and denies in part, Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment. The Court denies without prejudice Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment regarding the Monell claim. The Court grants summary judgment 

for Defendants on the Bane Act claims. Finally, the Court grants summary judgment for 

Defendants Guardado, Guild, Joseph, and Torres, the Dependency Social Workers, as to 

all claims, including the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Fourth Amendment claim, the 

False Imprisonment claim, and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 3, 2017 

 Hon. Marilyn L. Huff 

 United States District Judge 

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