Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00962/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00962-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ACADEMY OF OUR LADY OF

PEACE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv962-WQH-AJB

ORDER

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO; CITY COUNCIL

OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO; and

DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction. (Doc. # 17, 25).

I. Background

On May 5, 2009, Plaintiff Academy of Our Lady of Peace (“OLP”) initiated this action

by filing a Complaint in this Court against Defendant City Council of the City of San Diego

(“City Council”) and Defendant City of San Diego (collectively, “City”). (Doc. # 1). OLP is

a nonprofit corporation which operates a Catholic, liberal arts, college-preparatory high school

for young women. (Id. ¶ 3). The Complaint alleges that OLP’s “existing campus facilities are

woefully outdated and inadequate to meet OLP’s mission” to educate and “inspire its students

to grow as committed Christians.” (Id. ¶¶ 12-13). OLP proposed a “Modernization Plan ...

that would add two new facilities to the 84-year old campus: an approximately 20,545 square

foot, two-story classroom building on the west side of the campus, and a two-level, 104-space

parking structure on the east side of campus.” (Id. ¶ 15). OLP’s “Modernization Plan would

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also require the demolition or removal of three single-family residences that OLP owns.” (Id.)

In 2007, OLP applied to the City for an amendment to its existing “Conditional Use Permit”

(“CUP”) and other use permits in order to implement OLP’s Modernization Plan. (Id. ¶ 16).

On March 3, 2009, the City Council denied the use permits necessary to implement OLP’s

Modernization Plan. (Id. ¶ 27). The Complaint alleges that “[t]he City’s action[s] in ...

rejecting the Modernization Plan have effectively precluded OLP from meeting its classroom

space and program needs at its current campus.... The City’s decision has imposed a

substantial burden on OLP’s religious mission because it cannot provide the Catholic education

it exists to provide.” (Id. ¶ 28).

The Complaint alleges thirteen causes of action related to the City’s March 3, 2009

decision to deny the Use Permits. The first cause of action alleges a violation of the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §2000cc, et seq.

(Id. at 9). The next ten causes of action allege violations of OLP’s right to free exercise of

religion, freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal protection and due process, as

secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article

1, Sections 2-7 of the California Constitution. (Id. at 10-13). The first eleven causes of action

seek compensatory damages, attorney fees and “an order declaring void the City’s decision to

reject the Modernization Plan, and instead directing that [the] City issue Use Permits allowing

the Modernization Plan.” (Id. at 16). The twelfth cause of action is a petition for writ of

mandate pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, seeking an order directing

the City to invalidate the March 3, 2009 City Council decision and issue the Use Permits

necessary to implement the Modernization Plan. (Id. at 13-14). The thirteenth and final cause

of action relates to the September 18, 2007 decision by an Administrative Law Judge

employed by the City finding OLP in violation of the then-current CUP and ordering OLP to

pay fines. (Id. at 14-16).

On May 26, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the thirteenth cause of action

of the Complaint. (Doc. # 6). On July 28, 2009, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss and

dismissed the thirteenth cause of action. (Doc. # 13).

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On November 23, 2009, the Magistrate Judge conducted an Early Neutral Evaluation

Conference. After the Conference, the Magistrate Judge issued an order which stated: 

There are central legal issues which can be addressed early on by way of a

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff will be filing a motion for summary

judgment on or before January 15, 2010. Defendant will be opposing and the

Court sets a telephonic Case Management Conference for April 12, 2010 at 9:30

a.m. to set further dates and deadlines as appropriate.... The record relative to

the underlying dispute is complete and there is no need for disclosures under

Rule 26 or formal discovery at this time. Should the Court find triable issues of

fact do exist, any needed discovery can be dealt with after the dispositive

motion.

(Doc. # 15 at 1).

On January 15, 2010, OLP filed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the

Motion for Permanent Injunction. (Doc. # 17, 25). OLP contends that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law as to the Complaint’s first cause of action that “the City violated

... RLUIPA ... when it rejected OLP’s application for its ‘Modernization Plan’ ... in that the

rejection imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by OLP and its students and

faculty.” (Doc. # 17 at 1-2). According to OLP, “[i]f the Court grants summary judgment as

requested, the [proposed permanent] injunction would command the City ... to approve the

Modernization Plan in the form approved by the City’s Planning Commission.” (Id. at 2; see

also Doc. # 25 at 1-2). OLP submitted numerous affidavits and exhibits in support of its

motions. (Doc. # 17-26).

On February 17, 2010, the City filed an opposition to OLP’s motions. (Doc. # 29). The

City stated that “[d]ue to the limited nature of discovery and scope of this motion, Defendants

rely exclusively on declarations and supporting documents submitted by Plaintiff.” (Id. at 1).

On February 25, 2010, OLP filed a reply in support of its motions. (Doc. # 30).

On March 22, 2010, the Court conducted oral argument on OLP’s pending motions.

(Doc. # 31).

II. Facts

A. OLP and Religion

OLP is a Catholic high school for girls, the only single gender high school for girls in

San Diego County. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 3, 2:23-24). OLP was founded in 1882 by the Sisters

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of St. Joseph of Carondelet, an order of nuns dating back to France in 1650. (Anchondo Dec.,

¶ 2, 2:3-8). OLP purchased its present location, in the North Park area of San Diego, in 1925

and moved its campus there in 1926. (Anchondo Dec., ¶ 2, 2:13-14, Ex. A:9-20). OLP’s

facilities have been consecrated and have long been used, and continue to be used, for religious

services and activities. (Anchondo Dec., ¶ 2, 2:9–3:1, ¶ 4, 3:21-27). OLP’s official Mission

is “twofold: to assist and enable parents to fulfill their role as the primary educators, and to

inspire its students to grow as committed Christians who are building Christ’s kingdom of

justice, love and peace” through a college-preparatory program. (Anchondo Dec., ¶ 3, 3:4-10).

Crucifixes are present in every classroom. (Anchondo Dec., ¶ 5, 4:6). OLP requires students

to pass a religious studies class each year to graduate. (Anchondo Dec., ¶ 4, 3:12-14). Each

day begins with a prayer broadcast over the school’s public address system, with additional

prayers offered throughout the day. (Anchondo Dec., ¶ 5, 4:4-10). OLP’s individual

departments and classes are required to reflect OLP’s religious purposes. (Anchondo Dec., ¶¶

5-6). The City Council has repeatedly recognized OLP’s religious nature and praised its value.

(Mahadevan Dec., Ex. E:35–G:49).

B. OLP’s Facilities

OLP’s Principal stated in a declaration: 

OLP’s facilities are inadequate, both in themselves and in comparison to

standards, to be able to provide this Catholic education. Meeting these standards

and having facilities comparable to other schools are important because about

98% of our graduates enroll in college.... I do not believe that OLP ... would be

able to survive at all if we could not offer a competitive college-preparatory

curriculum, for which we need the facilities in the Modernization Plan.

(Anchondo Dec., ¶ 7, 5:2-5; Ex. E:42). 

OLP’s Chief Financial Officer submitted a declaration outlining the following “specific

problems” with OLP’s current facilities: 

(a) Religion teachers must float between classrooms, rather than having a

dedicated religion classroom. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9a, 5:3-6). 

(b) There are fewer science labs than needed for OLP’s students. (Mahadevan

Dec., ¶ 9b, 5:7-18). 

(c) The existing computer room is inadequately small and contains

view-blocking pillars. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9c, 5:19-23, Ex. D:32). 

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(d) OLP’s arts studios are too small and subject to physical constraints such as

structural pillars in the way. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9d, 5:24–6:11, Ex. D:30,

D:33). 

 (e) OLP’s administrative offices are small and scattered from each other and

the activities being supervised. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9e, 6:12-17, Ex. D:31). 

(f) OLP’s library is smaller than OLP’s students need. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9f,

6:18-22).

OLP’s Chief Financial Officer stated that the Modernization Plan would have solved these

specific problems, and “would have provided an integral campus with all parking, classroom

and administrative space within a securable perimeter while preserving the historical areas of

the campus and meeting our religious and operational needs for the foreseeable future.”

(Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9, 4:27–5:2). 

OLP submitted declarations indicating that OLP’s current campus is subject to unusual

site constraints, including steep slopes, restricted fire access, and historic, architecturallyvaluable buildings. (Lia Dec., ¶ 8, 6:9-22; Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 2, 2:9-11, 14-15; Marshall Dec.,

¶ 6, 4:6-10; McArdle Dec., ¶ 3a, 2:23-27; 3c–3f, 3:9–4:7). An architect submitted a

declaration indicating that “OLP asked [his firm] to evaluate the merits of potential adaptive

reuse of several existing buildings on campus, to convert current spaces into classroom and

support uses so as not to need something like the Modernization Plan.” (McArdle Dec., ¶ 4,

4:8-10). The architect stated that OLP’s existing buildings do not meet structural standards

for the proposed reuse, such as for height of classrooms, load bearing ability, ventilation, and

compliance with disabled access requirements, and upgrades would be extensive and

expensive. (McArdle Dec., ¶ 4a-4e, 4:21–6:12).

C. City Planning Commission Decision

OLP submitted its application for the Modernization Plan to the City in 2007. (Tunney

Dec., ¶ 2-3, 2:5-22, Exs. A:8–F:45). The project went through extensive City review lasting

over a year. (Tunney Dec., ¶ 4-6, 2:23–3:26, Exs. G:47–O:442). City staff determined that

the Modernization Plan needed four use permits: a planned development permit for height,

setback and use of tandem parking; a site development permit because part of the property

contained steep slopes; an amendment to OLP’s existing CUP to allow the school to have 750

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students; and a neighborhood development permit, also for tandem parking. (Tunney Dec., ¶

6, 3:14-23, Ex. N:206-207). OLP made frequent efforts to engage the community about the

Modernization Plan. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 6, 3:15-24). OLP’s architect stated that “OLP made

numerous changes to its [Modernization Plan] proposal to accommodate, as best we could,

neighbors’ and City staff’s concerns.” (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 8, 4:4-5). 

In a report dated September 12, 2008, City staff recommended approval of the

Modernization Plan. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9, 4:24-25; Tunney Dec., Ex. N:204). The City staff

report summarizes the Modernization Plan as follows:

The current campus facility includes eight structures and two surface parking

lots, in a primarily Mediterranean-style design. Three existing single-family

structures adjacent to the property have been purchased by AOLP over the years

and are proposed for demolition and incorporation into the modernized campus

with this permit.... The school has exceeded the allowed enrollment as specified

in [the CUP in effect at the time], which has resulted in the issuance of a Civil

Penalties Administrative Enforcement Order by the City.... In conjunction with

the terms of that order, the school is processing this permit request. The

proposed development is proposed to address the current and future operational

and academic needs of the school. ...

The proposed project is a request for a Planned Development Permit, Site

Development Permit, Conditional Use Permit and Neighborhood Development

Permit to allow: a maximum annual enrollment of 750 students; demolition of

three existing residential structures; construction of an approximately 21,059-

square-foot, two-story classroom building; and construction of a new, two-level

parking structure on the site. ...

The applicant has stated that their primary objective in proceeding with this

‘master plan’ project is to modernize the Academy of Our Lady of Peace school

and to allow the school to remain competitive in the current educational

environment in San Diego. Recently opened parochial high schools in the area

... offer state of the art facilities, and the ability to attract new students to AOLP

has become a challenge.... Currently, classrooms at the school are tucked into

nooks, attics, closets, etc., in structures that were originally residences. While

several classroom buildings were added over the years and the conversion of a

former dormitory was accomplished, many current spaces used for classrooms

are of inadequate size for normal education classroom functions.

(Tunney Dec., Ex. N:205-206). The staff report contains a statement from the Chair of the

Urban Design/Project Review Subcommittee of the North Park Planning Committee, which

states that the Subcommittee “voted to deny the project and the CUP amendment by a vote of

6-3-0.” (Tunney Dec., Ex. N:211). The staff report states that “[t]he project is the subject of

intense community interest.” (Id.) The community concerns identified in the report involved

parking issues and the proposal to “demolish three existing residential structures; two of which

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have been determined to be locally significant based on their architectural features. The

applicant has considered adaptive reuse of these structures, but based on classroom size

requirements and library facility requirements, has determined these are not viable options.

Accordingly, this situation has resulted in significant unmitigated impact. The decisionmaker

will be required to make a Statement of Overriding Considerations in order to grant this

request.” (Tunney Dec., Ex. N:211-212).

OLP submitted memoranda and exhibits to the City Planning Commission stating

OLP’s position that its current facilities were inadequate and that adaptive reuse of OLP’s

existing facilities would not suffice. (Tunney Dec., Exs. O:395-414; P:444-447, 459-463,

470-471, 483-485).

On October 9, 2008, the City’s Planning Commission voted 5-0 to approve the

Modernization Plan with conditions. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9, 4:24-25; Tunney Dec., ¶ 8, 4:6-7,

Ex. S:542-554). A local ad hoc group, called “Between the Heights,” and the North Park

Planning Committee, the City’s official community planning group for the area, appealed the

Planning Commission’s decision to the City Council. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 9, 4:25-26; Tunney

Dec., ¶ 8, 4:7-9).

The City Council continued its hearing once to get more information and allow OLP

and the project’s opponents to attend mediation. (Tunney Dec., Ex. R:535; Williamson Dec.,

Ex. A:8:13-16). The project’s opponents declined the mediation suggested by the

councilmember even though OLP had offered to pay for it. (Williamson Dec., Ex. A:10:9-10,

A:11:10-23, A26:5-10). The opponents’ representative explained that the community members

“feel like they’ve been going through mediation for three years, and they’ve given everything

they have to give. They’ve agreed to everything that [OLP] was requesting in terms of square

footage, in terms of facilities. The only request that they have is that [OLP] preserve[s] the

three homes....” (Williamson Dec., Ex. A:11:14-19).

D. City Council Decision

During a meeting on March 3, 2009, the City Council voted on the permits necessary

to implement OLP’s Modernization Plan. (Williamson Dec., Ex. A:41:8-12). During the

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meeting, the following findings were made by Councilmember Todd Gloria:

Although the proposed project would implement objectives in the Greater North

Park Community Plan for providing high-quality educational facilities and

preserving open space and hillsides, the proposed project would eliminate two

historic buildings located in the immediate neighborhood, located at 2544

Collier Avenue and 2765 Copley Avenue. According to the project’s

Environmental Impact Report, the proposal to remove the two architecturally

significant structures conflicts with the community plan’s objective in the urban

design element for preserving the architectural variety and residential character

of the Greater North Park community and preserving and restoring unique or

historic structures within the community. The two structures have been

characterized and associated with the Spanish eclectic architectural style, and

their loss, as proposed by the project, would result in significant and unmitigable

impact as stated in the [Environmental Impact Report]. Therefore, the project’s

proposal to remove the architecturally significant structures would adversely

impact the Greater North Park Community Plan’s objectives for preserving

architectural variety and historic structures within the community, and this

finding cannot be made.

(Williamson Dec., Ex. A:19:1-25, A:20:1-13). Councilmember Gloria stated:

Based upon these findings and on the findings of the information

contained in the staff report, I move that the Planned Development Permit

Number 450668 and Site Development Permit Number 450706 be denied, and

Conditional Use Permit Number 450705 and the Neighborhood Development

Permit Number 590185 be granted in the form, exhibits, terms and conditions

as set forth in Permit Number 450705. 

And based upon Staff’s comments today, my motion does not include

adoption of the statement of overriding considerations. Additionally, my motion

includes two permit conditions that I’d like to add: First, that ... amendment to

the CUP [and] NDP is required prior to the issuance of demolition or relocation

permits for any building more than 45 years old located within the project

boundaries; and Second, that within 60 days of the approval of the permit,

Exhibit A shall be revised to reflect the City Council’s actions including

identifying buildings which are to remain to the satisfaction of City Staff.

Even though it’s my intention that the Site Development Permit and the

Project Development Permit be denied, I want to be clear that I feel a project

here is warranted, and I’m hopeful that OLP will bring forward a project that

will enable it to meet the programmatic needs of its students while preserving

the character of the surrounding community.

I’m confident that this can be done and that, when it is, I’m confident that

it will receive the support of the surrounding neighborhood and the Planning

Committee. I find -- I just think that’s entirely doable, but I don’t know that that

can be done today under these circumstances. With that, I restate my motion

that the Council modify the Planning Commission’s decision by denying the

PDP and SDP but approving the CUP and NDP. This motion includes certifying

the [Environmental Impact Report] and adopting the [Mitigation Monitoring and

Reporting Program] for the no project/no development alternative with a

modification for the parking described in that alternative as detailed in the

revised permit and the [Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program] and that

this motion is based on the findings already read into the record.

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(Williamson Dec., Ex. A:20:14-25, A:21:1-25, A:22:1-2). The reference to “a modification

for the parking” is further explained in the relevant Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting

Program report: “[T]he parking deficit of 47 spaces ... would be eliminated by provision of 104

parking spaces via a combination of restriping of the existing on-campus parking areas and

designated off-site parking areas ... within 60 days [from] the March 3, 2009 City Council

Hearing.” (Tunney Dec., Ex. T:580). The Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program

report contains additional provisions mitigating “impacts associated with Transportation and

Circulation.” (Tunney Dec., Ex. T:580; see also id. at T:600-602).

Councilmember Gloria’s motion was passed by the City Council by a vote of 5-3.

(Williamson Dec., Ex. A:41:8-12).

In its written resolution memorializing the City Council decision, the City Council

stated that “[t]he originally proposed project was a master plan to allow the school to address

its operational and academic needs as a college preparatory school”; “[a] primary goal of the

project is to ensure a safe, secure campus for the student population by providing additional

on-site parking”; and “[t]he original proposed development plan would have improved the

educational opportunities of residents attending the school and ensure the continuing viability

of AOLP and continue the school’s contributions to the community.” (Tunney Dec., Ex.

U:608-609, U:611). The City Council resolution also memorialized the findings made by

Councilmember Gloria at the March 3, 2009 City Council meeting, quoted above, concluding

that “the project’s proposal to remove the [two] architecturally significant structures would

adversely impact the Greater North Park Community Plan’s objectives for preserving

architectural variety and historic structures within the community....” (Tunney Dec., Ex.

U:608, U:612-613).

E. The Houses

OLP owns the three houses at issue. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 2, 2:15-17). The City agreed

that one of the three houses is not historically or architecturally significant. (Williamson Dec.,

Ex. A:19:8-12). The City viewed the two remaining houses as significant based upon their

architectural style. (Tunney Dec., Ex. Q:499, Ex. N:209). According to the City’s study, there

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1

 California Government Code § 37361 prohibits the involuntary historical designation

of a “noncommercial property owned by any association ... that is religiously affiliated,”

provided the association ... objects to the designation and “the association ... determines in a

public forum that it will suffer substantial hardship, which is likely to deprive the association

... of economic return on its property, the reasonable use of its property, or the appropriate use

of its property in the furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is approved.” Cal.

Gov. Code § 37361(c).

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are at least a dozen architecturally similar houses within a few blocks of the OLP-owned

houses at issue. (Lia Dec., ¶ 3, 3:8–4:6, Exs. E:180–F:196). The historic regulations of the

City, state and federal governments allow the removal (i.e., relocation) of architecturally

significant structures. (Lia Dec., ¶ 5, 4:14–5:7, Ex. H:211-212). The City has authorized the

relocation of at least nine historic structures since 1995, including two to sites out of the City.

(Lia Dec., ¶ 6, 5:8-23). The City has authorized the demolition of at least five historic

structures since 1995. (Lia Dec., ¶ 7, 5:24–6:8).

On September 6, 2007, OLP’s board of directors adopted a resolution pursuant to

California Government Code § 37361 barring the City from designating the three houses as

historic on the basis of OLP suffering a substantial hardship.1

 (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 13,

7:24–8:2, Ex. C:23-24; Lia Dec., ¶ 4, 4:7-13, Ex. G:198-199). The City has not questioned the

validity of this resolution. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 13, 8:2-3). The City staff report states: “The

Board of Directors of [OLP] adopted a [resolution] of financial hardship pertaining to a

religious exemption of [OLP] property from designation as a historical resource pursuant to

Government Section 37361. Therefore, 2544 Collier Avenue and 2746 Copley Avenue

properties are not, or would not be, listed in the City’s or other historical register; however,

disclosure of the impacts is required under [the California Environmental Quality Act

(“CEQA”)].” (Tunney Dec., Ex. N:209).

F. Heritage Plan

Some opponents of the Modernization Plan wanted OLP to hire David Marshall as an

architect to propose a plan that would not require demolishing the houses. (Mahadevan Dec.,

¶ 14, 8:4-6; Williamson Dec., Ex. A:30:19–31:12). During the pendency of this litigation,

OLP hired Marshall and his firm (“Heritage”) to perform that study. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14,

8:6-8; Marshall Dec., ¶ 5, 3:2-19). Heritage proposed a plan that did not require removal the

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 The City contends that it cannot respond to the facts related to the Heritage plan “until

formal discovery has been completed.” (Doc. 29-1 at 14-16).

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three houses. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14, 8:8-9; Marshall Dec., ¶ 6, 3:20-22, Ex. A).

OLP contends that the Heritage plan is infeasible for the following reasons:2

(a) The Heritage plan would require finding an alternative location, at great

expense, for about half of OLP’s classes for the year or two it would take to

construct. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14a, 8:11-20; Marshall Dec., ¶ 6a, 3:24–4:5).

(b) The Heritage plan increases the cost of the project by about eight million

dollars, which OLP cannot foresee raising. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14b, 8:21-22;

Leverton Dec., ¶ 2, 2:10-12; Marshall Dec. Ex. A:76, 101). However, the cost

of potential mitigation measures in the event the three houses are demolished has

not been determined. (Marshall Dec., ¶ 6c, 4:13-14).

(c) The Heritage plan would divide the school’s library into small spaces,

impairing instructional value and necessitating the hiring of supervisory staff.

(Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14c, 8:23-26; Marshall Dec., ¶ 6e, 4:18-21).

(d) The Heritage plan would provide fewer parking spaces than the City had

required. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14d, 8:27–9:2; Marshall Dec., ¶ 6f, 4:22-26, Ex.

A:58).

(e) The Heritage plan requires disruptive construction in the center of campus,

while the Modernization Plan’s construction was on the campus’s periphery.

(Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14e, 9:3-5).

(f) The Heritage plan would require additional effort to provide an integral (i.e.,

secure) campus. (Marshall Dec., ¶ 6d, 4:15-17).

(g) Pursuing approval of the Heritage plan would require additional time and

cost for City review and risk further litigation. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14f-h,

9:6-13; Marshall Dec., ¶ 6a, 4:3-5).

(h) The Heritage plan raises its own issues about affecting potentially historic

and architecturally valuable buildings. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 14i, 9:14-17;

McArdle Dec., ¶ 4e, 6:9-12; Marshall Dec., Ex. A:57).

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of fact is “genuine” only if there is sufficient

evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to find for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of

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the case. See id. at 248.

“When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial,

it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence

went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” Miller

v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). “Once the

moving party comes forward with sufficient evidence, the burden then moves to the opposing

party, who must present significant probative evidence tending to support its claim or defense.”

C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citation omitted).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “all justifiable inferences are to be drawn

in [the non-moving] party’s favor.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quotation

omitted). At the summary judgment stage, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those

of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

“Simply because the facts are undisputed does not make summary judgment

appropriate. Instead, where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn from the

undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper.” Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (citation omitted).

B. Contentions of the Parties

In the Motion for Summary Judgment, OLP contends that the City violated RLUIPA

by denying OLP’s application for the permits needed to implement the Modernization Plan.

OLP contends: “RLUIPA applies because the City’s actions affect commerce and because the

City’s actions implemented local land use rules”; “OLP is attempting to exercise its and its

students’ religious rights”; “the City imposed a substantial burden on these religious

activities”; and “the City did not tailor its actions to a compelling interest.” (Doc. # 17-1 at 6,

8, 12, 13). In the Motion for Permanent Injunction, OLP requests an injunction that “would

command the City, including its agents, employees and those acting on its behalf or in concert

with it, to approve without delay all discretionary permits necessary for OLP to proceed with

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OLP’s ‘Modernization Plan’ in the form approved by the City’s Planning Commission.” (Doc.

# 25 at 1-2). “OLP makes this motion [for permanent injunction] on the grounds that, upon

the Court’s grant of partial summary judgment that the City violated ... RLUIPA ... by

imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion when the City Council rejected

OLP’s application for its ‘Modernization Plan,’ issuance of the requested injunction is

necessary to ensure compliance with RLUIPA.” (Doc. # 25 at 2).

The City contends:

OLP’s motion must be denied because Plaintiff has not shown the City’s action,

which allows Plaintiff to retain its entire existing and projected student body

within the existing facilities successfully used to date by Plaintiff to

accommodate the same 750 students, constitutes a substantial burden on its

exercise of religion. This defect is further magnified by the fact that the City

neutrally applied historical preservation laws and because the parking

structure–covering two of the three controversial buildings–is not protected by

RLUIPA. Moreover, the City’s obligation to abide by state historic preservation

guidelines under CEQA constitutes a compelling interest, and the City’s

requirement that if feasible, Plaintiff allow the historic structures remain onsite,

constitutes the least restrictive alternative available to the City.

(Doc. # 29 at 3 (citations omitted)).

C. RLUIPA

RLUIPA establishes the following “general rule”:

No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that

imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a

religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that

imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution –

(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). This general rule “applies in any case in which”:

(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives

Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general

applicability;

(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would

affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian

tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; or

(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use

regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes,

or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the

government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the

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property involved.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2).

The plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on whether RLUIPA’s general rule applies,

and whether the land use regulation at issue imposes a “substantial burden” on plaintiff’s

“religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). If plaintiff successfully carries its burden, the

government bears the burden of persuasion on whether the imposition of the “substantial

burden” is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and is the least restrictive

means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc(a)(1).

1. Applicability of RLUIPA

OLP contends that RLUIPA applies because “the substantial burden affects ...

commerce with foreign nations, among the several States.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B). OLP

has submitted evidence that OLP draws students from Mexico each year and has alumnae

throughout the United States. (Mahadevan Dec., ¶ 3, 2:20-21, 2:24-28).

The City does not contest this evidence or OLP’s contention that RLUIPA applies

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that RLUIPA applies in this case.

2. Religious Exercise

RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). “The

use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be

considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the

property for that purpose.” 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-5(7)(B). 

OLP has submitted evidence indicating that OLP’s existing classrooms–and the

construction of new classrooms–fit within RLUIPA’s definition of “religious exercise.”

(Anchondo Dec., ¶¶ 3-6). The City does not contest that the Modernization Plan’s proposed

construction of a two-story classroom building fits within RLUIPA’s definition of “religious

exercise.” 

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The Court concludes that OLP has demonstrated, as a matter of law, that the proposed

construction of a classroom building fits within RLUIPA’s definition of “religious exercise.”

See San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“Inasmuch as [the plaintiff] intends to convert the [p]roperty from hospital use to a place for

religious education, it appears that a ‘religious exercise’ is involved in this case.”).

3. Substantial Burden

“[A] ‘substantial burden’ must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise.”

Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation

omitted). “For a land use regulation to impose a ‘substantial burden,’ it must be ‘oppressive’

to a ‘significantly great’ extent. That is, a ‘substantial burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must

impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.” Id. (quoting San Jose

Christian College, 360 F.3d at 1034). “[D]etermining whether a burden is substantial (and if

so whether it is nevertheless justifiable) is ordinarily an issue of fact ... and ... substantiality is

a relative term–whether a given burden is substantial depends on its magnitude in relation to

the needs and resources of the religious organization in question.” World Outreach

Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2009); cf. Shakur v. Schriro,

514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) (“On this record, where there is factual dispute as to the

extent of the burden on Shakur’s religious activities, the extent of the burden that would be

created by accommodating Shakur’s request, and the existence of less restrictive alternatives,

we cannot conclude that summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim was appropriate.”).

OLP contends that “[r]ejecting the Modernization Plan substantially burdened the

exercise of religion.... The Modernization Plan would have solved OLP’s existing problems,

which include rooms that are cramped, undersized, and for some purposes simply absent;

spaces that contain pillars blocking students’ views; and ... the absence of a secure perimeter.”

(Doc. # 17-1 at 8-9). The City contends that “OLP’s motion must be denied because Plaintiff

has not shown the City’s action, which allows Plaintiff to retain its entire existing and

projected student body within the existing facilities successfully used to date by Plaintiff to

accommodate the same 750 students, constitutes a substantial burden on its exercise of

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religion.” (Doc. # 29 at 3 (citations omitted)).

Viewing all reasonable inferences in the City’s favor, the Court concludes that OLP has

failed to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to whether the City imposed

a substantial burden on OLP’s religious exercise. See Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (“Simply

because the facts are undisputed does not make summary judgment appropriate. Instead,

where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts,

summary judgment is improper.”) (citation omitted). OLP has submitted evidence from which

a reasonable jury could find that OLP’s facilities are “inadequate” (Doc. # 17-1 at 3) and

“cramped” (id. at 8). However, in light OLP’s successful operation of the school for many

years at or near its current and projected enrollment (Mahadevan Decl., Ex. F at 39, Doc. # 19),

a reasonable jury could find that the City’s actions did not “impose a significantly great

restriction or onus upon [OLP’s religious] exercise.” Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988; see

Hillcrest Christian Sch. v. City of Los Angeles, No. 05cv8788, 2007 WL 4662042, at *5-*6

(C.D. Cal., July 12, 2007) (“In Guru Nanak, the substantial burden stemmed in part from the

fact that, absent a CUP, the [plaintiff] lacked a temple in which to hold services. For the

[plaintiff in Guru Nanak], the ultimate denial of a CUP placed its very existence in question.

Hillcrest does not face the same dire burdens of uncertainty. Hillcrest already operates a

school through which, by its own accounts, it prodigiously exercises its religious beliefs.”)

(finding, after a bench trail, that despite the claimed “onus of Hillcrest continuing to operat[e]

within ... an inadequate and cramped facility,” the city’s denial of permits necessary to build

a new campus for a religious school did not amount to a substantial burden under RLUIPA);

see also Int’l Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 632 F. Supp. 2d 925, 941

(N.D. Cal. 2008) (granting the defendant city’s motion for summary judgment on a RLUIPA

claim despite the plaintiff’s argument that “the Church’s core functions are being inhibited by

the inadequate facility in which the City has forced it to remain”) (quotations omitted). 

OLP has not submitted evidence that the burden is sufficiently substantial that the Court

would conclude that OLP is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cf. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d

at 989 (affirming the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff, agreeing that the county

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imposed a substantial burden “based on two considerations: (1) that the County’s broad

reasons given for its tandem denials could easily apply to all future applications by Guru

Nanak; and (2) that Guru Nanak readily agreed to every mitigation measure suggested by the

Planning Division, but the County, without explanation, found such cooperation insufficient”);

Grace Church of North County v. City of San Diego, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1136 (S.D. Cal.

2008) (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on its RLUIPA substantial burden

claim, stating: “At various levels of Defendants’ mandatory CUP process, Grace Church

experienced outright hostility to its application, decision-making that is seemingly arbitrary

or pretextual, and ignorance regarding the requirements of controlling federal law regarding

the application of land use laws to religious institutions.”); Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of

Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (granting summary judgment in

favor of plaintiff on a RLUIPA claim because “[t]he burden on the Church’s use of land in this

case is not only substantial, but entire. By denying the conditional use permit, the City has

effectively barred any use by the Church of the real property in question.”).

The Court concludes that OLP has failed to “come forward with evidence which would

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial” as to the issue of

whether the City imposed a substantial burden on OLP’s religious exercise. Miller, 454 F.3d

at 987. Accordingly, OLP’s pending motions are denied.

IV. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is

DENIED (Doc. # 17), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction is DENIED (Doc. #

25).

DATED: April 1, 2010

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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