Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02296/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02296-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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- 1 - 05CV2296-WQH (JMA)

 

 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA HUNGATE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05CV2296-WQH (JMA)

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS, AND IN

THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

DONALD WINTER, Secretary, United

States Department of the Navy,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

Pending before the Court is Defendant Donald Winter’s motion to dismiss, and in the

alternative, motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 18-1). The Court finds this matter suitable for

submission on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2006, Plaintiff Maria Alicia Hungate (Plaintiff) filed a First Amended

Complaint against Defendant Donald Winter (Defendant) in his capacity as head of the

Department of the Navy. First Amended Complaint (FAC), ¶ 4. The First Amended Complaint

asserts claims for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and violation of the

Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973. FAC, ¶¶ 8-14, 15-22. On October 30, 2006, Defendant

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moved to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and in the alternative, moved

for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. (Doc. # 18-1).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a woman of Mexican American race, national origin and ancestry who worked

for the Navy for 17 years. FAC, ¶ 5. In her last position, Plaintiff served as a Navy Budget

Analyst for NAVAIR, North Island. FAC, ¶ 5. During Plaintiff’s employment with the Navy,

Plaintiff suffered from ankle, wrist, hand, and spinal disc ailments. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 3. 

Subsequent to her injuries, the First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant harassed and

discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of Plaintiff’s disabilities in violation of the Vocational

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. FAC, ¶ 19. The First Amended Complaint alleges Defendant also

harassed and discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of Plaintiff’s race, national origin, and/or

ancestry in violation of Title VII. FAC, ¶ 3. Common to both claims, Plaintiff asserts that she was

discriminated against and otherwise adversely treated by Defendant for several years in regards to

promotional opportunities, training opportunities, work load, and other terms and conditions of her

employment. FAC, ¶ 6.

Although unaware that she needed to contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO)

Counselor within 45 days of any unlawful discriminatory and/or harassing behavior, Plaintiff

contacted the NAVY’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office in December, 2001. 

Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 4. At that time, Plaintiff spoke with Dick Donaldson, a Naval Aviation Depot,

North Island (NADEP) EEO Intake Counselor. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 4. Plaintiff complained to

Donaldson about her supervisor Michelle Norris’ discriminatory actions, and Donaldson assured

Plaintiff that Plaintiff’s complaints would be investigated. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. 

In August 2004, the Navy terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 2. On

August 16, 2004, and believing her termination was the result of unlawful discrimination, Plaintiff

contacted NADEP’s Human Resources department. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 6. Plaintiff spoke with Cil

Pleman at Human Resources, and Pleman advised Plaintiff that she had until September 27, 2004,

to file an EEO complaint. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 6. Pleman sent Plaintiff a letter via certified mail

documenting the August 16, 2004 discussion, and clarified that Plaintiff had 45 days from

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1

 Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, on the grounds that the

exhibits lack foundation and contain hearsay. After considering the objections, the Court concludes

that the record adequately demonstrates that the evidence contained in Defendant’s exhibits would be

admissible at trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).

- 3 - 05CV2296-WQH (JMA)

incidents of harassment or discrimination in which to seek counseling. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 7;

Defendant’s Exhibit E-23.1

 Dated August 19, 2004, Pleman’s letter was not received by Plaintiff

until approximately October, 2004. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 7. 

Pursuant to her conversation with Cil Pleman, Plaintiff filed a written complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) office in Washington D.C. on September

27, 2004. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 8; Def’s Exhibit H. Plaintiff forwarded a copy of the EEOC

complaint to Cil Pleman on October 26, 2004. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 9. In the complaint, Plaintiff

checked a box indicating that she wished to allege disability discrimination. Plaintiff did not

check boxes indicating discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin, though such

boxes were available on the form. Def.’s Exhibit H-1.

On or about November 19, 2004, Plaintiff received a telephone call from EEOC

Administrative Law Judge Odem in Washington D.C., and he informed Plaintiff that her complaint

was being handled by the San Diego EEO office. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 10. On November 19, 2004,

EEO counselor Gloria Ketchum interviewed Plaintiff in response to Plaintiff’s discrimination

complaint. Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 11. In her EEO Counselor’s Report, Ketchum indicated that the

basis of Plaintiff’s complaint was harassment due to physical disability. Def.’s Exhibit B-2. 

During the interview with Ketchum, Plaintiff alleged several incidents of disability discrimination

which occurred between July of 2001 and May of 2004. Def.’s Exhibit B-2. One of the incidents

which Plaintiff alleged was an incident where her supervisor, Gloria Case, asked Plaintiff to speak

English after hearing Plaintiff speaking Spanish at work. Def.’s Exhibit B-2, B-7. Ketchum’s

EEO counselor’s report indicates that Plaintiff did not contest her termination. Def.’s Exhibit B-4;

Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 14.

On December 30, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Formal Complaint of Discrimination with the

EEOC. Def.’s Exhibit C. On the complaint form, Plaintiff checked a box indicating that she

believed she was discriminated against on the basis of her physical disabilities. Plaintiff did not

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check boxes indicating that she was discriminated against on the basis of race, national origin or

ancestry, though such boxes were provided. Def.’s Exhibit C-2. Plaintiff answered a question on

the complaint form indicating that she believed she had been discriminated against because of her

physical disabilities, but Plaintiff did not mention discrimination on the basis of race, color or

national origin. Def.’s Exhibit C-4. The Formal Complaint of Discrimination indicates that

Plaintiff believed the last discriminatory action taken against her occurred in May, 2004. Def.’s

Exhibit C. Plaintiff did not list her termination as a discriminatory action taken against her. Def.’s

Exhibit C.

On February 1, 2005, the EEOC dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint because she failed to

initiate contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days of any alleged discriminatory act taken

against her as required by 29 C.F.R § 1614.105(a)(1). Def.’s Exhibit D-2. The agency’s dismissal

stated that the events forming the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint occurred between July 2001 and

May 2004, and that Plaintiff did not initiate the EEO process until October 26, 2004. Def.’s

Exhibit D-2. The agency considered Plaintiff’s forwarding of a copy of the EEOC complaint to

Cil Pleman of the Navy’s EEOC office as the initiation of the EEO process, which was more than

five months after the last discriminatory action Plaintiff alleged in her complaint to the agency. 

Def.’s Exhibit D-2.

On March 16, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the EEOC seeking review of

the agency’s dismissal of her complaint. Def.’s Exhibit E. In her appeal, Plaintiff did not

challenge the framing of the complaint and did not challenge her termination. Def.’s Exhibit F-2. 

Instead, Plaintiff argued that she initiated the EEO process by filing a complaint with the EEOC on

September 27, 2004, rather than on October 26, 2004, which was the date she forwarded the EEO

complaint to the EEOC. Def.’s Exhibit F-2. The EEOC affirmed the agency’s dismissal of

Plaintiff’s complaint reasoning that, even if Plaintiff had initiated the EEO process on September

27, 2004, she would still not have initiated the EEO process within the 45-day limitation period. 

Def.’s Exhibit F-2. The EEOC denied Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration. Def.’s Exhibit G.

/

/

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STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Federal judicial power extends only to cases and controversies over which a court has

subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); Barker-Hatch v. Viejas Group Baron Long

Capitan Grande Band of Diqueno Mission Indians of Viejas Group Reservation, 83 F. Supp. 2d

1155, 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2000). Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil

actions and the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting

jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(1) allows for dismissal where there is a “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter”

of the suit. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). A federal court should consider its own subject matter

jurisdiction prior to ruling on any other motion. See U.S. v. Ceja–Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th

Cir. 2003).

A motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) “may either attack the allegations of the

complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Pub. Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979). If a defendant brings a “speaking motion” attacking the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction in fact, the court need not presume the allegations of the complaint to be true and can

determine the facts for itself. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

2004). In determining whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, the court may look beyond the

allegations of the complaint and consider extrinsic evidence. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d

1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). A court need not “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely

because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643

F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

Summary judgment is appropriate under FED. R. CIV. P. 56 where the moving party

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a

matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);

Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2003). A fact is material when, under the

governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such

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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he district court may limit its review to

the documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those parts of the record

specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1030 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Credibility determinations [and] the weighing of evidence . . .

are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

DISCUSSION

I. CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE, NATIONAL ORIGIN AND/OR ANCESTRY

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination on the basis of race,

national origin and/or ancestry pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) on the grounds that the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to allege

discrimination on the basis of race, national origin and/or ancestry at any stage of the

administrative process, including during her EEO counseling session and in the complaints she

filed with the EEOC and NADEP’s EEO counseling department. Defendant further contends that

Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and/or ancestry is not like

or reasonably related to Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination on the basis of physical disability. 

Plaintiff contends that she effectively raised the issue of discrimination on the basis of race,

national origin and/or ancestry when she told EEO Counselor Gloria Ketchum that a supervisor

reprimanded Plaintiff for speaking Spanish to another employee and ordered Plaintiff to speak

only English at work. Plaintiff further contends that her claim of discrimination on the basis of

race, national origin and/or ancestry is “like or reasonably related” to her claim for disability

discrimination.

A federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a Title VII claim unless the

plaintiff has first exhausted his or her administrative remedies. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092,

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1103 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (failure to

exhaust becomes a jurisdictional issue if the Plaintiff does not substantially comply with

administrative presentment requirements). In order to exhaust administrative remedies under Title

VII, the complainant must “file a timely charge with the EEOC, thereby allowing the agency time

to investigate the charge.” Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d at 1104; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The

administrative requirement gives the charged party notice of the claim and “narrow[s] the issues

for prompt adjudication and decision.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t., 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

The specific claims made in the district court must be presented to the EEOC, Albano v.

Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d 384, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), and the district court has jurisdiction

over any claims of discrimination that are “like or reasonably related to” the claims filed with the

EEOC. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990). Where plaintiffs have alleged one

form of discrimination at the administrative level and then attempted to assert a different form of

discrimination in federal court, their claims have been dismissed for failure to exhaust. See Lowe

v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1004 (9th Cir.), amended by, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986)

(plaintiff who alleged only race discrimination in administrative complaint could not include other

claims in federal court action); see also Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 117, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2003)

(plaintiff who alleged race discrimination at the EEOC stage could not later allege disability

discrimination in district court). A theory of discrimination cannot be alleged for the first time in

district court even when the theory arises out of the same conduct underlying a different charge of

discrimination filed with the EEOC. Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital & Med. Ctr., 642 F.2d 268, 271-72

(9th Cir. 1981).

Although Plaintiff took administrative action before filing her Complaint in district court,

the record indicates that Plaintiff based each administrative action on alleged disability

discrimination, and not on discrimination on the basis of race, color, and/or national origin. First,

in Plaintiff’s September 27, 2004 complaint filed with the EEOC in Washington, D.C., Plaintiff

checked a box indicating that she believed that Defendant had discriminated against her on the

basis of “handicap,” but she did not check available boxes related to discrimination on the basis of

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race, color, or national origin. Def.’s Exhibit H-1. Second, the EEO counselor’s report prepared

by Gloria Ketchum on December 14, 2004, indicates that the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint was

disability discrimination (wrist, ankle, back). Def.’s Exhibit B-2. Third, in Plaintiff’s December

30, 2004 complaint, Plaintiff again checked a box indicating that she believed that Defendant

discriminated against her on the basis of her physical disabilities, but Plaintiff did not check boxes

to indicate discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Plaintiff included a short

narrative on the complaint form which detailed the alleged disability discrimination, however, the

narrative did not mention any other theory of discrimination. Def.’s Exhibit C-4. Finally, in

Plaintiff’s EEOC appeal from the agency’s dismissal or her complaint, Plaintiff did not challenge

the framing of the complaint as a complaint for disability discrimination. Def.’s Exhibit F-2. 

Plaintiff’s contends that she exhausted her administrative remedies as to her claim of

discrimination on the basis of race, national origin and/or ancestry discrimination by relating the

incident where she was told to speak English at work to EEO Counselor Ketchum. Plaintiff

contends that, as an unsophisticated party, she could not reasonably be expected to state all her

possible EEO claims in her Formal Complaint, and that the Navy’s EEO office had a duty to

“properly categorize” her complaint. Opposition at 7. However, while it is true that

administrative requirements are to be construed “with utmost liberality,” B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100,

a complainant must nevertheless reveal her intent and provide notice of her claims. Leong, 347

F.3d at 1122. 

In the present case, the record indicates that Plaintiff intended to bring a claim of disability

discrimination, and the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s mere mention of the incident where

Plaintiff’s supervisor told Plaintiff to speak English at work did not put the EEOC or Defendant on

notice of a claim for discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Plaintiff

repeatedly failed to check available boxes indicating a claim for discrimination on the basis of

race, color, or national origin, and did not mention the basis for liability in her narrative on the

complaint form. After reviewing the First Amended Complaint and the evidence submitted, the

Court concludes that Plaintiff did not seek EEO counseling or file an administrative complaint

with respect to her claim for race, color, or national origin discrimination.

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The court must still determine whether Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination on the basis of

race, color, national origin and/or ancestry is “like or reasonably related to” her claim for disability

discrimination. District courts have jurisdiction over Title VII claims that are “like or reasonably

related to” the charge filed with the EEOC. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff seeks to bring a suit on an entirely new

theory–discrimination on the basis of race, color, and/or national origin–which is not like or

related to disability discrimination. Where plaintiffs have alleged one form of discrimination at

the administrative level and attempted to assert a different form of discrimination in federal court,

their claims have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1004; Shah, 642 F.2d at 271-72; Leong, 347 F.3d at

1120-23. 

This case is analogous to Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). In Leong, the

plaintiff filed a claim with the EEOC alleging discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex,

national origin and/or age.” Id. at 1120. In a subsequently filed action in the district court, the

plaintiff alleged discrimination based on disability (mental illness). The district court dismissed

the plaintiff’s disability claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing the claim in the district court. On appeal, the

Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and rejected the contention that

plaintiff’s disability claim was “like or reasonably related to” his claim for race discrimination. 

Leong, 347 F.3d at 1122. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that,

Leong’s charges do not provide the Postal Service adequate notice of

his disability discrimination claim or that a voluntary settlement of

his claim might be possible through reasonable accommodation of

his mental illness. . . . A decision that an EEOC complaint with no

mention whatsoever of disability is “like or reasonably related to”

Leong’s disability claim would reduce the exhaustion requirement to

a formality.

Id.

The record indicates that Plaintiff’s administrative actions were based on Plaintiff’s

allegations of disability discrimination, and not on allegations of discrimination on the basis of

race, color, national origin and/or ancestry. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim of

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discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin and/or ancestry is not “like or reasonably

related to” her claim of disability discrimination. See Leong, 347 F.3d at 1122. Therefore, as in

Leong, Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination on the basis of race, color, and/or national origin is

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF PHYSICAL DISABILITY 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination should be dismissed

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff failed to seek EEO counseling within 45 days

of the last discriminatory action taken against her as is required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). In

the alternative, Defendant moves for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Plaintiff

contends that she did seek EEO counseling within 45 days of the last discriminatory action taken

against her, and argues that her claim should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust her

administrative remedies. Plaintiff further contends that her termination was only one of many acts

contributing to a hostile work environment and that Defendant’s earlier discriminatory acts

contributing to the hostile work environment should be considered for purposes of determining

Defendant’s liability.

The Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim for

disability discrimination because Plaintiff substantially complied with the statutory claim

presentment requirements; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a); and because “the

filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to

filing suit.” Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006); see Sommatino v. United

States, 255 F.3d 704, 707-10 (9th Cir. 2001) (though a timely filed EEOC complaint is not a

jurisdictional prerequisite, substantial compliance with the presentment of a discrimination

complaint is a jurisdictional prerequisite in the Ninth Circuit); see also Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, 455 U.S. 358, 392-93 (1982). Notwithstanding jurisdiction, a federal employee must

nevertheless seek counseling “within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory

or, in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1614.105(a)(1); Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2003). “Failure to

comply with [29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1)] is ‘fatal to a federal employee’s discrimination claims.’”

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Id., citing Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1105. 

In determining whether Plaintiff sought EEO counseling within 45 days of the last

discriminatory action taken against her, the court must determine the nature and date of the last

discriminatory action taken. Plaintiff contends that her August 8, 2004 termination was the last

discriminatory action taken against her and cites her conversation with Cil Pleman of the Navy’s

Human Resources department on August 16, 2004, and her subsequent filing of a complaint with

the EEOC as satisfaction of the 45 day counseling requirement. Plaintiff asserts that she

justifiably relied on the advice of Pleman in filing her claim with the EEOC and that this act

initiated the administrative process in lieu of speaking with an EEO counselor. Defendant

contends that Plaintiff never contested her termination at the administrative level, and cites to

Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint, the EEO counselor’s report, and Plaintiff’s complaint filed with the

Navy’s EEO agency in support. Def.’s Exhibit H, B, C.

Plaintiff’s contention that she timely contested her termination as the last act of

discrimination taken against her is not supported by the administrative record. First, in Plaintiff’s

complaint filed with the EEOC on September 27, 2004, Plaintiff did not allege that her termination

was an act of discrimination. See Def.’s Exhibit H-1-2. In fact, Plaintiff indicated that she was

last discriminated against in April of 2004, several months before her termination. Def.’s Exhibit

H-1. Second, when Plaintiff was interviewed on November 19, 2004, by EEO Counselor

Ketchum, Plaintiff indicated that she did not wish to contest her termination as an act of

discrimination. See Def.’s Exhibit B-4; Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 14. In her counseling report, Ketchum

noted that Plaintiff alleged that the discriminatory actions taken against her occurred between July

of 2001 and May of 2004. Def.’s Exhibit B-3. Finally, third, in Plaintiff’s complaint filed with the

Navy’s EEO agency on December 30, 2004, Plaintiff indicated that the most recent claim of

discrimination occurred in April of 2004, and Plaintiff did not allege her termination as an act of

discrimination. See Def’s Exhibit C. The evidence indicates that Plaintiff did not contest her

termination as a discriminatory act at the administrative level.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the 45 day window for

which Plaintiff could seek EEO counseling began to run no later than May 31, 2004, the date of

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the last discriminatory incident Plaintiff alleged at the administrative level. Accordingly, Plaintiff

had until July 15, 2004, to seek EEO counseling. Plaintiff, however, did not contact Cil Pleman

until August 16, 2004, did not file a complaint until September 27, 2004, and did not initiate EEO

contact until October 26, 2004. The record indicates that Plaintiff had ample opportunity to seek

counseling and file administrative complaints, yet failed to do so within the time allowed.

 The Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to seek EEO counseling within 45 days of the last

incident of discrimination, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination is “time

barred.” Cherosky, 330 F.3d at 1248.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s claim

for disability discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 18-1) Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination based

upon race, national origin, and/or ancestry is GRANTED pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 18-1) on Plaintiff’s claim for disability

discrimination is GRANTED because Plaintiff failed to seek EEO counseling within 45 days.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 3, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-02296-WQH-JMA Document 29 Filed 05/03/07 Page 12 of 12