Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00674/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00674-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST L. BONNER, JR., M.D.,

Plaintiff,

v.

RITE AID CORPORATION, and DOES 

1 through 50,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-00674-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through the present action, Plaintiff Ernest L. Bonner, Jr., M.D. (“Plaintiff”) alleges 

seven causes of action (“COA”) against Defendant Rite Aid Corporation (“Defendant”) 

arising from Defendant’s refusal to fill prescriptions written by Plaintiff and from alleged 

defamatory comments made by Defendant’s employees to Plaintiff’s patients. Presently 

before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”). ECF No. 11. Specifically, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, 

and seventh claims for relief for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 Additionally, pursuant to both 

Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f), Defendant moves to strike the portion of Plaintiff’s prayer for 

relief seeking restitution and punitive damages. ECF Nos. 11, 12. For the reasons set 

 

1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

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forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Defendant’s Motion to 

Strike is DENIED as moot.2

BACKGROUND3

Beginning in March 2018, Plaintiff began hearing from his patients that 

Defendant’s employees were making odd and defamatory comments when they tried to 

fill their prescriptions at Defendant’s pharmacies and that the pharmacists were refusing 

to fill their prescriptions. For example, one patient said a pharmacist told him that 

Defendant would no longer fill Plaintiff’s prescriptions and that Plaintiff is being 

investigated for writing too many prescriptions. About two months later, another patient 

told Plaintiff that one of Defendant’s employees said Defendant would not fill 

prescriptions written by Plaintiff because Plaintiff “doesn’t know how to write 

prescriptions” and that “he should not be practicing medicine.”

In March 2019, one of Defendant’s pharmacists refused to fill the prescription of 

one of Plaintiff’s patients. Plaintiff spoke to the pharmacist and patient on a three-way 

call, and Plaintiff was informed that Defendant would not fill the patient’s prescription 

because Plaintiff decreased patient’s opiate medication. When the patient tried to fill his 

prescription at another pharmacy operated by Defendant, the pharmacist there refused 

to fill the same prescription. 

On April 1, 2019, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff stating that Plaintiff wrote too 

many pain prescriptions and that some of his patients were “redflags” because they were 

self-paying. Due to these concerns and dangers of drug abuse, Defendant would no 

///

///

 

2 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

3 The following recitation of facts is taken from Plaintiff’s FAC. ECF No. 9.

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longer fill pain prescriptions written by Plaintiff as of April 15, 2019.4In addition to no 

longer filling prescriptions, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant began a “smear campaign” 

against him.

On April 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed his original complaint. ECF No. 1. On June 20, 

2019, Plaintiff filed his FAC, alleging seven causes of action against Defendant: 

(1) Unfair Competition (“UCL”); (2) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic 

Advantage; (3) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; 

(4) Defamation; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”); (6) violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”); and (7) violation of Title VII.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

 

4 Defendant states that the letter stressed Defendant’s concern about controlled substance 

prescription abuse and that Defendant and its pharmacists “have a responsibility to take appropriate steps 

to reduce the potential that drugs they dispense are not diverted or abused.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF 

No. 11, at 4.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the 

pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a 

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)).

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & 

Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their 

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” 

Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge 

that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and 

unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

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1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)).

ANALYSIS

Defendant moves to dismiss the following claims from the FAC: (1) Fifth, Sixth, 

and Seventh COAs; (2) claims for restitution as alleged in the First COA; and (3) claims 

for punitive damages as alleged in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth COAs.5

A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth COA for IIED is 

Granted With Leave to Amend

To prevail on a claim for IIED, Plaintiff must show: (1) extreme and outrageous 

conduct by the Defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) resulting severe or extreme emotional 

distress by the Plaintiff; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress 

by the Defendant’s outrageous conduct. Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 494 

(1998). “The alleged outrageous conduct ‘must be so extreme as to exceed all 

bounds . . . usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” Id. In addition, the requisite 

severe emotional distress must be such that “no reasonable [person] in civilized society 

should be expected to endure it.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 

1004 (1993). Plaintiff fails to allege any emotional distress or intentional conduct 

causing that distress. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Fifth COA is DISMISSED with leave to 

amend.

///

 

5 Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for restitution and punitive damages under 

Rule 12(f). Mot. Strike, ECF No. 12. Rule 12(f), however, is the improper vehicle by which to attack 

damages allegations. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010). Such 

attacks should instead be made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), especially when, as here, the sufficiency of the 

pleading is at issue. Id. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 12, is DENIED as moot and 

the Court will analyze Defendant’s motion to dismiss portions of Plaintiff’s prayer for relief under 

Rule 12(b)(6).

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B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth COA under § 1981 is 

Granted With Leave to Amend

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Sixth COA fails because Plaintiff is not an 

employee of Defendant and the FAC does not involve the making and enforcement of 

contracts. Section 1981 provides “a federal remedy against discrimination in private 

employment on the basis of race.” Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 412 U.S. 454, 

459-60 (1975). It further provides, in pertinent part, that all persons shall have the same 

right “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full 

and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as 

is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 is not, however, “a 

general proscription of racial discrimination . . . it expressly prohibits discrimination only 

in the making and enforcement of contracts.” Peterson v. State of Cal. Dep’t of Corr. 

and Rehab., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2006), quoting Patterson v. McLean 

Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct “denied employment opportunities 

providing substantial compensation and benefits” and “deprived [Plaintiff] an African 

American Doctor of the same rights as are enjoyed by white citizens to the creation, 

performance, enjoyment, and all benefits and privileges.” FAC, ECF No. 9, at 17-18. 

First, Plaintiff fails to allege any discriminatory conduct or intent. To support his claim 

Plaintiff merely states that because of his race, Defendant refused to fill prescriptions 

written by him. Such conclusory assertions are insufficient to show that Plaintiff’s race 

motivated Defendant’s decision, especially when it is undisputed that Defendant sent 

Plaintiff a letter stating concern for prescription drug abuse as the reason behind the 

refusal.

Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s conduct affects Plaintiff’s existing and 

future contractual relationships with patients. To establish a prima facie case of racial 

discrimination in non-employment contracts, a plaintiff must show: “(1) [he] is a member 

of a protected class, (2) [he] attempted to contract for certain services, and (3) [he] was 

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denied the right to contract for such services.” Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 

447 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff does not assert any contractual 

relationship between him and Defendant and instead alleges that Defendant’s conduct 

interfered with his contractual relationships with third parties. These contract arguments, 

however, were first addressed in Plaintiff’s Opposition and thus the Court cannot 

consider these arguments at this time.6 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Sixth COA is DISMISSED

with leave to amend.

C. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Seventh COA under Title VII 

is Granted Without Leave to Amend

Next, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim because Plaintiff is 

not an employee. The protections of Title VII apply only to employees. Murray v. 

Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff fails to address this 

contention in his Opposition. See ECF No. 18; Tatum v. Schwartz, No. Civ. S-06-01440 

DFL EFB, 2007 WL 419463, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007) (holding that the plaintiff 

“tacitly concede[d]” that her claim should be dismissed by failing to address defendants’ 

argument in her opposition, and granting defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to 

that claim). Plaintiff is an independent physician and has never worked for Defendant. 

See generally FAC, ECF No. 9. Because Plaintiff is not an employee and fails to 

address this in his Opposition, Plaintiff’s Seventh COA is DISMISSED without leave to 

amend.

D. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Request for Restitution 

under the First COA is Granted With Leave to Amend

Defendant also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s request for restitution under the First 

COA because Plaintiff failed to allege how Defendant was unjustly enriched at Plaintiff’s 

expense. “Restitution under the UCL is limited to restoration of any interest in money or 

property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair 

 

6 Plaintiff also alleges for the first time in his Opposition that his chronic pain patients sign a written 

contractual agreement if they are treated with opioid medication. Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 18, at 8.

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competition.” Stars & Bars, LLC v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., No. SACV-16-01397-

CJC(SSx), 2016 WL 9414093, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The FAC fails to allege facts indicating that any money was paid to Defendant that 

should be restored to Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for restitution under the First 

COA is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

E. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Request for Punitive 

Damages under the Sixth COA is Granted With Leave to Amend7

Punitive damages are available in an action brought under § 1981. See Johnson, 

421 U.S. at 460. Punitive damages are available “when the defendant’s conduct is 

shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous 

indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 

(1971) (applying to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim); see Woods v. Graphic Commc’ns., 925 

F.2d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Smith to punitive damages under § 1981). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to include any factual assertions supporting a conclusion that 

Defendant acted with evil motive. Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that Defendant “acted 

with malice or reckless indifference” is insufficient to justify an award of punitive 

damages. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages under the Sixth COA is 

DISMISSED with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth COA, 

Sixth COA, and requests for restitution and punitive damages, ECF No. 11, is 

GRANTED with leave to amend but GRANTED without leave to amend as to Plaintiff’s 

 

7 Plaintiff further requests punitive damages for his Fourth and Fifth COAs, both of which fall under 

state law. Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to comply with California Code of Civil Procedure 

§ 425.13, which states a plaintiff cannot seek punitive damages from a healthcare provider on a claim for 

professional negligence without leave of court. There is a great jurisdictional split on whether this statute 

applies in federal court, but both parties fail to address this issue. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege any 

malice, oppression, or fraud. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES this request with leave to amend, 

specifically to address the applicability of this statute in federal court.

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Seventh COA. Defendant’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 12, is also DENIED as moot. Not 

later than twenty (20) days following the date of this Memorandum and Order is 

electronically filed, Plaintiff may (but is not required to) file an amended complaint. If no 

amended complaint is filed within said twenty (20)-day period, without further notice to

the parties, the causes of action dismissed by virtue of this Memorandum and Order will 

be deemed dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2020

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