Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00749/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00749-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 10cv0749

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERRY JOHNS,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 10cv0749-MMA (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: GRANTING MOTION

TO DISMISS

[ECF No. 13]

vs.

LARRY SMALL, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Petitioner Gerry Johns (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a California prisoner proceeding pro

se with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.)

Petitioner claims that his federal constitutional rights were violated in connection to a prison

disciplinary hearing because he was not allowed to call witnesses and did not have a fair and

impartial hearing officer. (Id. at 6-10.) 

Respondent Warden Larry Small (hereinafter “Respondent”) has filed a Motion to

Dismiss the Petition with an incorporated Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support

thereof, and has lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF No. 13.) Respondent argues that

this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims because there is no federallyprotected liberty interest implicated by the disciplinary proceedings, and, alternately, that

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief because the disciplinary proceedings did not

affect the fact or duration of his confinement. (Id. at 3-5.) 

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Petitioner has filed an Opposition to Respondent’s Motion along with a Notice of

Lodgment of Exhibits. (ECF Nos. 8, 15.) Petitioner argues that his claims are cognizable, and

that habeas relief is available, because the denial of his claims by the state court was contrary

to, and/or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (ECF No.

15 at 1-6.)

The Court finds, for the following reasons, that Petitioner has not identified a federallyprotected liberty interest implicated in or arising from the disciplinary proceedings, and has

therefore not alleged a violation of federal due process. Because Petitioner has not alleged that

he is in custody in violation of the federal laws, treaties, or Constitution, he has failed to invoke

this Court’s habeas jurisdiction. Alternately, assuming a federally-protected liberty interest is

implicated, Petitioner’s failure to identify a federal due process violation arising from the

deprivation of such interest requires dismissal of this action. The Court therefore recommends

GRANTING the Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSING the Petition.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted of murder on July 10, 1981, in the San Bernardino County

Superior Court, and was sentenced to 16 years-to-life in state prison, which included an

enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon. (Lodgment No. 1, Abstract of Judgment at 1-2.)

On June 30, 2008, while incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison in Imperial, California, Petitioner

was involved in an altercation with an inmate named Blair. (Lodgment No. 2, Rules Violation

Report at 1.) Correctional Officer Lopez reported that he observed Petitioner and inmate Blair

“striking each other with clenched fists in the upper torso area . . . I ordered both inmates to get

down with negative results.” (Id.) Officer Lopez reported that he sprayed Petitioner in the face

with pepper spray, after which Petitioner complied with his order and assumed the prone

position. (Id.) 

On July 30, 2008, Petitioner was interviewed by Correctional Officer Uribe, the

Investigative Employee assigned to investigate the Rules Violation Report that charged

Petitioner with mutual combat. (Id. at 3.) Officer Uribe informed Petitioner that his function

was to collect information, which included interviewing Petitioner, the reporting officer, and any

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other witnesses or persons having information about the incident. (Id.) Petitioner provided

Officer Uribe with the following statement:

I was unexpectedly punched in the facial area by Inmate Blair as confirmed via

the medical Report of injury and as I stumbled backwards, the only moves I made

were to ensure that I wouldn’t be subjected to further attack. There is nothing

within the Medical reports which support the officers [sic] report that I and Inmate

Blair were striking each other with clenched fists in the upper torso area. . . . The

body of the officers [sic] report does not comply with CCR 3286 which among

other things states the employee who renders the report should, if possible state

who was the aggressor, such viable factor [sic] of information would sustain my

disposition that I was not the aggressor nor was the incident a Mutual Combat.

(Id.) 

Petitioner identified four witnesses he wished to call at his disciplinary hearing, and

submitted four written questions for each of those witnesses. (Id. at 3-5.) The witnesses were

Inmates Blair and Galbreath, and Correctional Officers White and Gill. (Id.) Petitioner’s

request to have them present at the hearing was denied as unnecessary based on their written

answers to his questions. (Id. at 6-7.) The questions provided by Petitioner were: 

1. On the date of June 30, 2008 did you observe an incident involving myself

(Inmate Johns) and Inmate Blair?

2. At any time during the incident did you see me striking Inmate Blair

with clenched fists in the upper torso area?

3. Upon your observations of the incident, was it possible to determine who was

the aggressor?

4. Who would you say was the aggressor during the incident?

 

(Id. at 3-4.) 

The Senior Hearing Officer deemed questions three and four “not relevant,” and the

witnesses were not allowed to answer them. (Id. at 4.) Inmate Blair refused to answer any

questions, and Correctional Officer Gill answered each question by stating that he was on

vacation that day. (Id. at 4-5.) Correctional Officer White answered yes to the first question and

no to the second question. (Id. at 3.) Inmate Galbreath answered yes to the first question and

“No, it was more of a dance” to the second question. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner had no additional

questions for these witnesses and did not request any additional witnesses. (Lodgment No. 3,

Director’s Level Appeal Decision at 1.) The Senior Hearing Officer took into account the

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written report by Officer Lopez, as well as a statement by Correctional Officer Aguirre who

stated: “I observed [Petitioner and inmate Blair] take a fighting stance and begin strike [sic] one

another in the head with fists.” (Lodgment No. 2, Rules Violation Report at 7.)

Petitioner was found guilty “based on the preponderance of evidence submitted at the

hearing,” and was assessed 90 days forfeiture of custody credits, 30 days loss of telephone

privileges, and 10 days loss of yard privileges. (Id.) Petitioner has submitted a declaration from

Inmate Blair, dated the day after the disciplinary hearing, wherein Inmate Blair states that he was

not interviewed by Officer Uribe, did not refuse to answer questions, and that if he had been

interviewed he would have stated: “I punched [Petitioner] and stayed out of his reach preventing

any type of mutual combat.” (ECF No. 8 at 30.) Petitioner’s appeal through the prison

administrative appeals system, which included Inmate Blair’s declaration, was denied at every

level. (Lodgment No. 3.) 

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the superior court on January 23, 2009, presenting the

same claims he presents in his federal habeas petition here, namely, that his constitutional rights

were violated because: (1) it was not established that Inmate Blair and Correctional Officer Gill,

who did not provide answers to Petitioner’s written questions, would have refused to answer the

questions had they been called to testify at the hearing; and (2) Petitioner was not provided with

an impartial hearing officer as the hearing officer arbitrarily ruled that Petitioner’s questions

about who was the aggressor were not relevant. (Lodgment No. 4.) That petition was denied

in an order filed on April 14, 2009, on the basis that he did not utilize the mandatory petition

form. (Lodgment No. 5.) Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the appellate court on May 26,

2009, presenting the same claims, with the additional allegation that it was error to base the

finding of guilt solely on the reporting officer’s version of the facts. (Lodgment No. 6.) That

petition was denied on the merits in an order filed on August 21, 2009. (Lodgment No. 7.) The

appellate court found that: (1) Petitioner’s request to have the witnesses present was properly

denied because the applicable rules provided that witnesses need not be present if they have no

relevant or additional testimony; (2) the questions about who was the aggressor were properly

deemed irrelevant because such a finding is not mandatory and would in any case not negate the

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finding of mutual combat; (3) the hearing officer did not base the finding of guilt solely on the

reporting officer’s statement, but also took into account Officer Aguirre’s statement; and

(4) relief was not available in any case because there was “some evidence” within the meaning

of Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) in the record to support the conclusion

reached by the disciplinary board. (Lodgment No. 7, In re Johns, No. D055173, Order at 2 (Cal.

App. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009).) Petitioner presented the same claims to the state supreme court in a

habeas petition filed on September 22, 2009, which was summarily denied on March 18, 2010,

without a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment Nos. 8-9.)

II. Discussion

Respondent contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims because

he “has no federally-protected liberty interest to invoke review of the disciplinary violation.”

(ECF No. 13 at 3.) Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s temporary loss of

telephone and yard privileges did not give rise to a liberty interest because they did not impose

an atypical and significant hardship on Petitioner in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life, and that the loss of custody credits did not impact the duration of his incarceration because

it could not extend his maximum term, which is life, could not affect his minimum term, which

passed long ago, and its effect on any parole decision is too attenuated to implicate a liberty

interest. (Id. at 4-5.) In a related argument, Respondent contends that because there has been

no impact on the length of Petitioner’s term of incarceration, his claims are not cognizable on

federal habeas review, but must be brought in a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (Id. at 3.)

A. Jurisdiction

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). See also Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir.

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1991) (“We have pointed out that the Great Writ is available only where the Constitution or

other federal law specifically protects against the alleged unfairness or guarantees the procedural

right in state courts.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, to present a

cognizable federal habeas corpus claim under § 2254, a state prisoner must allege both that he

is in custody pursuant to a “judgment of a State court,” and that he is in custody in “violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

It is undisputed that Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, so

Respondent’s jurisdictional argument turns on whether Petitioner has identified a violation of

the federal Constitution, laws, or treaties. Petitioner claims that he is in custody in violation of

the federal Constitution based on allegations that he was deprived of federal due process in

connection to the disciplinary proceedings in that he did not have an impartial decision maker

and was denied the right to call witnesses at his hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 6-10.) He also has

alleged that he appeared for a parole consideration hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings

on October 7, 2009, and, based in part on the disciplinary infraction, was denied parole and had

his next parole consideration hearing set for ten years out. (Id. at 7.)

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant

prisoners liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke due process protection. Meachum v.

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)

(noting that “[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary

action of government, . . . and the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate

for the circumstances must be observed.”)). In Wolff, for example, the Supreme Court held that

the liberty interest arising from prison regulations regarding disciplinary hearings entitle the

prisoner to: (1) written notice of the charges at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing; (2) a

written statement indicating upon what evidence the fact finders relied and the reasons for the

disciplinary action; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when

doing so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (4) an

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impartial fact finder. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. 

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), however, the Supreme Court “refocused the

test for determining the existence of a liberty interest away from the wording of prison

regulations and toward an examination of the hardship caused by the prison’s challenged action

relative to the ‘basic conditions’ of life as a prisoner.” Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th

Cir. 1996) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). Thus, after Sandin, a state-created liberty interest

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment arises from conditions of

confinement only if the prisoner alleges facts which show a change in his confinement that

imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life,” or “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484-

87; Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (“After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone

of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding

restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those

conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Petitioner could establish a liberty interest under Sandin if “the State’s action will

inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. Petitioner was assessed

a loss of 90 days custody credits. However, Petitioner has already served close to 30 years on

a 16 years-to-life sentence, and it does not appear that the loss of custody credits could have any

direct impact on the length of his incarceration. As Respondent points out, the credits cannot

extend his maximum term of life, and could not affect his minimum term which expired long

ago. Although Petitioner contends the disciplinary conviction extended his incarceration

because it had an adverse affect on his parole eligibility, Sandin specifically rejected such a

consideration as “too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause.”

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 (noting that “[t]he decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of

considerations. And, the prisoner is afforded procedural protection at his parole hearing in order

to explain the circumstances behind his misconduct record.”); see also Gilman v.

Schwarzenegger, — F.3d —, 2010 WL 4925439 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2010) (holding that a

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1

 The Court has discretion to construe Petitioner’s claim as one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and therefore retain jurisdiction over this action. See Willwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249,

251 (1971) (holding that district courts have discretion to construe a habeas petition attacking conditions

of confinement as a complaint under section 1983 despite deliberate choice by petitioner to proceed on

habeas), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84

(2006). For the reasons discussed below, however, the interests of justice do not support the exercise

of such discretion because Petitioner has not stated a claim for a violation of federal due process under

either § 2254 or § 1983. 

-8- 10cv0749

California law which significantly increased the duration between prisoners’ parole hearings did

not create a significant risk of prolonging prisoners’ incarceration because prisoners retained the

ability to apply for expedited hearings).

To the extent Petitioner relies on the 30 days loss of telephone privileges and 10 days loss

of yard privileges, he has not alleged a liberty interest under Sandin because those restrictions

are not “the type of atypical, significant deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty

interest.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. Sandin involved a prisoner serving a sentence of 30 years-tolife who was not permitted to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, and who was sentenced

to 30 days segregation where he had to remain alone in his cell with the exception of 50 minutes

per day for exercise and showers, during which he wore leg irons and waist chains. Id. at 475.

The short loss of telephone and yard privileges suffered by Petitioner here are not conditions so

significant as to create a liberty interest because Petitioner has not alleged that they amount to

a “major disruption in his environment” when compared to those shared by prisoners in the

general population. Id. at 486; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000)

(holding that a prisoner’s placement in the SHU—where recreational opportunities, access to

showers, and access to the library were limited—was “within the range of confinement to be

normally expected by prison inmates in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”)

(internal quotations marks and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not alleged facts demonstrating that he is in custody in

violation of the federal laws, treaties, or Constitution. As such, Petitioner has not invoked this

Court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the Court recommends GRANTING

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on this basis.1

///

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B. Failure to State a Due Process Claim

Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that a

federally-protected liberty interest did arise under Sandin, or that he could amend his Petition

to include such allegations, he has nevertheless failed to allege a violation of federal due process

in connection to the disciplinary hearing. There are two steps in analyzing a due process claim:

“the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which was been interfered with

by the State . . . the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation

were constitutionally sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460

(1989) (citations omitted). As set forth above, if a federally-protected liberty interest was

implicated here, the pre-deprivation process to which Petitioner is entitled includes written notice

of the charges, a written statement indicating upon what evidence the decision was based and

the reasons for the disciplinary action, the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary

evidence, and an impartial fact finder. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. Petitioner has alleged, both

here and in the state courts, that he was deprived of his right to call witnesses and to have a fair

and impartial decision maker. As the state appellate court correctly observed, however, the

Senior Hearing Officer comported with the disciplinary hearing rules, and courts will not disturb

prison disciplinary action where there is “some evidence” in the record supporting the

disciplinary conviction. (Lodgment No. 7, In re Johns, No. D055173, Order at 2, citing

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985).)

The Supreme Court in Hill held that “revocation of good time does not comport with the

minimum requirements of procedural due process[] unless the findings of the prison disciplinary

board are supported by some evidence in the record.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). No due process violation occurs if “there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56. The

“some evidence” standard assures that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings

of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Id. at 457. The standard

is “minimally stringent,” and “the court is not to make its own assessment of the credibility of

witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

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Hill, 472 U.S. at 455). 

In this case it is clear that the statements of Correctional Officers Lopez and Aguirre

provide the requisite “some evidence” supporting the finding of guilt on the charge of mutual

combat. Both witnesses stated that they saw Petitioner and Inmate Blair strike each other with

their fists. (Lodgment No. 2, Rules Violation Report at 7.) Although Petitioner contends that

the medical evidence does not support a finding that either he or Inmate Blair struck each other

in the torso, and that the witnesses he was not permitted to call might have provided evidence

to support his own version of the incident, the Court is not permitted to reweigh the evidence or

make its own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Cato, 824 F.3d at 705. Thus, even

assuming Petitioner could demonstrate that he was deprived of a federally-protected liberty

interest, he has not alleged that the deprivation involved a violation of federal due process, and

this action would be subject to dismissal whether it was brought as a habeas petition under

28 U.S.C. § 2254 or as a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because it is clear

that Petitioner cannot cure this defect with amendment, the Court recommends DISMISSAL

with prejudice.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) directing that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED; and (3) directing that judgment be entered

DISMISSING the Petition with prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 14, 2011 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

///

///

///

///

///

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than February 4, 2011. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991);

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 21, 2010

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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