Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01743/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01743-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO RAMIREZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

ROBERT HERNANDEZ, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:08-CV-01743 JMD HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGEMENT

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Alejandro Ramirez (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation pursuant to a jury verdict in January 2005, finding Petitioner guilty of voluntary

manslaughter (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)). (Answer at 1). The jury further found that Petitioner had

committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)) and

was an active participant in a criminal street gang(Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(a)). (Answer at 1; Pet.

at 2). Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of sixteen years and eight months. 

(Answer at 1). 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. 

(See Lod. Doc. 1). The appellate court issued a reasoned opinion on November 13, 2006, affirming

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

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Petitioner’s conviction and enhancements. (See Lod. Doc. 3). 

Petitioner then filed a petition for review to the California Supreme Court, which the court

denied. (See Lod. Docs. 4, 5). Petitioner also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the

California Supreme Court. (See Lod. Doc. 6). The California Supreme Court summarily denied the

petition. 

On October 31, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Southern District of California. The case was transferred to this district on November 14, 2008. 

(Court Doc. 3). 

On March 18, 2009, Respondent filed a response to the petition. 

 Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction

On March 9, 2009, Petitioner consented, pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. section 636(c)(1), to

have a magistrate judge conduct all further proceedings, including the entry of final judgment. 

(Court Doc. 18). Respondent had previously consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge on

February 23, 2009. (Court Doc. 14). On March 11, 2010, the case was reassigned to the

undersigned for all further proceedings. (Court Doc. 28).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A single bullet from a hail of gang gunfire behind a family meat market in

Orosi struck one person, the proprietor's 20-year-old son, Jorge López, who bled to

death. A jury found Alejandro “Spider” Ramírez, a member of the Original Gangster

Sureños (OGS) criminal street gang, guilty of voluntary manslaughter for the benefit

of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang and guilty of active

participation in a criminal street gang...

Like Spider, Pascual “Shadow” Rúa, José “Silent” Gonzáles, and Jesús

“Snoopy” Urtíz were OGS members. Though not a member himself, Orlando “Little

One” Rúa hung with OGS members. A few hours before the homicide, Silent showed

Little One and Shadow a loaded revolver in his pants pocket around the time when,

These facts are derived from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion issued on November 13, 2006. (See Lod.

1

Doc. 4). Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a determination of fact by the state court

is presumed to be correct unless Petitioner rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); see Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 948

(9th Cir. 2004). Here, Petitioner has not presented evidence that would permit the Court to set aside the presumption of

correctness that has attached to the State court’s factual findings.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 2

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elsewhere, Snoopy loaded a gun with flat-nose bullets.2

Not long afterward, Shadow, Silent, Snoopy, and fellow OGS member Erick

Barriga went to Spider's home for a backyard barbecue. Little One drove Shadow and

Silent to the barbecue in Shadow's Lincoln and saw Silent and Spider there with a

gun. Among the OGS members at Spider's barbecue were Miguel Angel “Marro”

Huerta, Samuel “Tumbado” Vásquez, Héctor “Troll” Camarena, Andrés “Flaco”

García, Juan “Yogi” Hernández, and Little One's and Shadow's brother Rolando

“Smiley” Rúa.

While OGS members congregated at Spider's barbecue, Jorge cooked meat for

family and friends at a barbecue behind Carnicería López, his father's meat market.

Even though he was not a gang member himself, Jorge hung at school with members

of Brown Pride Catella (BPC), a Norteño criminal street gang, but outside school he

was too busy to do that because he worked all the time for his father at the Carnicería.

As Jorge and his friend Jesús “Chui” Lozano waited for the coals to cool, blue-shirted

Smiley approached and dogged them. Just looking at someone who is dogging can be

dangerous, so Chui and Jorge turned away.

After Smiley left, red-shirted Arnulfo “Junior” Ildefonso dropped by. After

seeing his brothers Luis Miguel “Mike” Ildefonso and Norberto “Beto” Ildefonso with

César Yáñez at the K & K Market, Junior headed there with Jorge and his friends, but

everyone ended up talking in the alley between the two markets. As Jorge and his

friends were about to walk back to the Carnicería, Smiley dogged them again and

threw gang signs. Jorge put his hands up and yelled, “What's his problem?” or

“What's your problem?” Smiley called him a “buster,” short for “sod buster,” a

derogatory Sureño term that characterizes Norteños as uneducated Central Valley

farmers. Jorge voiced a derogatory and profane retort.

Although Smiley was alone, Chui feared gang members could “come out of

nowhere” and jump them, so he told Jorge, “Let's go.” Jorge and his friends walked

back to the Carnicería to hang there with him. As if preparing to fight, Jorge took off

his chains and his watch and put down his cell phone.

Meanwhile, the talk at Spider's barbecue was about “busters tripping in the

alley” behind K & K Market. In gang slang, “tripping” is challenging someone. Spider

said they were “gonna go fight.” Everybody got “excited.” Snoopy and Spider both

said, “Let's go.” After Erick put a gun into his pocket, Flaco drove him, Marro,

Snoopy, and others in his van. Yogi took others in his Taurus. Shadow took yet others

in his Lincoln.

On the way to the Carnicería, Shadow parked his Lincoln by the K & K

Market and stepped outside briefly with Marro and others. Flaco and Yogi arrived at

the Carnicería together and drove around as the passengers in both vehicles were

“staring, staring, staring” at Jorge and his friends. Once Shadow arrived in his

Lincoln, all three vehicles drove around together.

After the van parked in the alley, Chui said to Jorge, “Let's go .” Spider,

Tumbado, and others jumped out of the van. Tumbado threw gang signs and yelled

“buster” and “chapetes.” “Chapete” is gang slang for a country bumpkin who “doesn't

Initial references are by first and last names and, if applicable, by nicknames. Subsequent references in the factual

2

history are to nicknames, if applicable, or to first names, if not. Subsequent references elsewhere in the opinion are to last

names only.

U.S. District Court

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really get it.” Spider yelled “chapetes,” “leves,” “south side,” and “sur trece.” “Leve”

is gang slang for low life, rat, or worthless human. “Sur” and “trece” are Spanish for

“south” and “13.” Chui saw something that looked like a gun handle in Snoopy's

waistband.

Jorge yelled to Chui, “[B]ack me up.” Beto, César, and Mike picked up partly

burnt branches that were about a foot-and-one-half long and three to four inches in

diameter. Jorge looked at Spider and said, “One on one. One on one.” OGS members

differed with Jorge's father and friends as to whether Jorge had a knife in his hand.

Moments after Snoopy briefly pointed a gun at Jorge, Marro and a dozen or so

other young males ran through the alley to the market yelling and throwing beer

bottles. As Jorge and his friends dodged the beer bottles, gunfire from two, three, or

four guns rang out. Witnesses saw Marro pointing a gun at Jorge and saw Tumbado

firing a gun at Jorge.

The cause of Jorge's death was exsanguination from a single gunshot wound to

the chest. The blunt bullet the pathologist recovered from his chest was designed not

to pass through the body, but to stay inside the body, to release as much kinetic energy

as possible inside the body and to cause as much damage as possible to the body.

(Lod. Doc. 3, Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, at 1-4). 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may petition a district court for

relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner is currently incarcerated in Sierra Conservation Center and 3

Petitioner’s custody arose from a conviction in the Tulare County Superior Court. (Pet. at 2). As

both Tulare and Tuolumne County falls within this judicial district, 28 U.S.C. § 84(b), the Court has

jurisdiction over Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (vesting

concurrent jurisdiction over application for writ of habeas corpus to the district court where the

petitioner is currently in custody or the district court in which a State court convicted and sentenced

Petitioner if the State “contains two or more Federal judicial districts”).

\\\

Sierra Conservation Center is located in Jamestown, California. Jamestown falls within the territorial boundaries

3

of Tuolomne County.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 4

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II. ADEPA Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed after the statute’s

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499

(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97

F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by

Lindh, 521 U.S. 320 (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s enactment)). The

instant petition was filed in 2008 and is consequently governed by the provisions of the AEDPA,

which became effective April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Thus, the

petition “may be granted only if [Petitioner] demonstrates that the state court decision denying relief

was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71.

As Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for Petitioner’s

habeas petition. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004) in holding that, “[s]ection

2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state

court judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction’”). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes ‘clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is “clearly established Federal law,” this

Court must look to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of

the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. (quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412). “In other

words, ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id. 

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72, (quoting 28

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U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. “Under the

‘unreasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “[A] federal court may

not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable

application” inquiry should ask whether the State court's application of clearly established federal

law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the state court’s decision is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth

Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision

is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003); Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, AEDPA requires that we give

considerable deference to state court decisions. The state court's factual findings are presumed

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's interpretation of its own laws. Souch v.

Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2002).

The initial step in applying AEDPA’s standards requires a federal habeas court to “identify

the state court decision that is appropriate for our review.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091

(9th Cir. 2005). Where more than one State court has adjudicated Petitioner’s claims, the Court

analyzes the last reasoned decision. Id. (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) for the

presumption that later unexplained orders, upholding a judgment or rejecting the same claim, rests

upon the same ground as the prior order). Thus, a federal habeas court looks through ambiguous or

unexplained state court decisions to the last reasoned decision in order to determine whether that

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decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Bailey v.

Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112-1113 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the California Court of Appeal and the

California Supreme Court were the only courts to have adjudicated Petitioner’s claims. (See Lod.

Docs. 3, 5, 7). As the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s claims that were

raised in his petition for writ of habeas corpus and petition for review, the Court looks through those

decisions to the last reasoned decision; namely, that of the California Court of Appeal. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 804. 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner presents four claims for relief in his petition for writ of habeas corpus: (1) the

admission of hearsay statements was a violation of his Confrontation Clause rights; (2) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel;(3) the jury was incorrectly instructed when the trial court issued

California Jury Instructions Criminal (“CALJIC”) No. 3.02; and (4) the trial court violated his

constitutional right to due process of the law by issuing CALJIC No. 3.02. (Pet. at 6-9).

A. Ground One: Confrontation Clause and Equal Protection

Petitioner contends that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the trial court’s

admission of hearsay testimony by the gang expert and by the admission of certified copies of other

gang member’s convictions. (Pet. Mem. P. & A. at 5-9). In a subpart to this ground for relief,

Petitioner also contends that his equal protection rights were violated. (Id. at 9-11). 

1. Confrontation Clause

The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant from unreliable hearsay evidence being

presented against him during trial. See U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI. The Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment specifically provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Id. The Sixth

Amendment's Confrontation Clause was made applicable to the states through the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965). In Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation

Clause bars the state from introducing out-of-court statements which are testimonial in nature, unless

“the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to

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cross-examine.” The Crawford court categorically rejected statements, which were otherwise

deemed to be reliable, as exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, reasoning that “dispensing with

confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with a jury because a

defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment proscribes.” Id. at 62. 

Here, the Court finds that the State court’s denial of Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim

was not unreasonable as clearly established federal law does not lead to the conclusion that

Petitioner’s rights were violated. As noted by the State court, the statements by Detective Aguilar

were admitted for the purpose of explaining the basis of his expert opinion that OGS was a criminal

street gang. (Lod. Doc. 3 at 6-7; RT at 2173-2183). As a basis for this opinion, Detective Aguilar

explained that members of OGS participated in a pattern of criminal gang activity, information that

was obtained from hearsay sources. (Id. at 2176-2183). As noted by Petitioner himself, the

information attested to by Detective Aguilar pertained to his expert opinion and the basis for that

opinion, as Petitioner readily admits that his objection was to “the introduction of ‘testimonial’

hearsay as a basis for a opinion of the prosecution’s gang expert regarding the predicate offense

element.” (Pet. at 3) (emphasis added). 

The Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other

than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9 (citing Tennessee v.

Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)); see Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 2009). In Moses,

the Ninth Circuit found that the admission of the out of court statement made by Petitioner’s son to a

social worker did not violate the Confrontation Clause as the statement was admitted to explain why

the social worker called Child Protective Services. Additionally, the Federal Rules of Evidence

permit testimony by an expert even where the expert’s opinion is based on inadmissible hearsay

evidence as long as the evidence is of a kind exerts in the field regularly consult. Fed.R.Evid. 703;

see United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that police officer

possessing years of experience and special knowledge of gangs may qualify as expert witnesses); see

also United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 976 n. 13 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that there exists no

Supreme Court precedent pertaining to an expert witness’ reliance on otherwise inadmissible

sources); but cf. United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2nd Cir. 2008) (noting that a police

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expert’s testimony explaining the inadmissible evidence he relied upon in reaching his conclusion

may implicate the Confrontation Clause where the expert “simply transmit[s] that hearsay to the

jury”). 

Petitioner additionally argues that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the

admission of certified records of the prior convictions pertaining to the predicate offenses Detective

Aguilar relied upon in forming his expert opinion. As noted previously, the Supreme Court in 4

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, found that the admission of testimonial evidence violates a defendant’s

Confrontation Clause rights where the witness is unavailable and was not previously subject to cross

examination by the defendant. The Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821

(2006) further clarified that “[i]t is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from

other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the

Confrontation Clause.” The Davis court defined the contours of what constitutes testimonial

statements, finding that a statement is testimonial “when the circumstances objectively indicate that

... the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to

later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 822. The Davis court found statements made by a woman to a 911

operator reporting she had been assaulted was non-testimonial as the objective circumstances

indicated “that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an

ongoing emergency” and was thus not subject to the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 822. The Supreme

Court further defined the contours of what constitutes testimonial evidence in Melendez-Diaz v.

Massachusetts,129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009). The Melendez-Diaz court found that a certificate of analysis

testing a substance for cocaine constituted testimonial evidence as the certificates were “quite plainly

affidavits...functionally identical to live, in court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on

Petitioner also seems to posits that the admission of evidence pertaining to the predicate offenses constituted

4

improper character evidence. (Pet. Mem. P. & A. at 8-9). The Court finds such an argument misguided as the predicate

offenses were not committed by Petitioner and thus would not be evidence of Petitioner’s character. Even if the evidence

could be considered evidence of Petitioner’s character, this claim could not provide a basis for habeas corpus relief as the

Supreme Court has reserved the question of whether a trial court's admission of propensity evidence violates the Due Process

Clause. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 863-867 (9th Cir. 2006)(citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n. 5

(1991)). Thus, a determination by he California Court of Appeal that the admission of character evidence to show propensity

did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process could not be contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1946 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Petitioner would not be entitled to relief

under section 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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direct examination.’” Id. at 2532 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830). The Court noted that the

affidavits’s testimonial nature were due to the primary purpose of the statements, which were“‘made

under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statements

would be available for use at a later trial.’” Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). Here, the Court

finds that the certified judgement of convictions pertaining to the predicate offenses were not

testimonial pursuant to the tests laid out in Crawford and its progeny. It would be abundantly clear

to any objective witness that the judgements in question were not prepared for use at a later trial. See

Vega v. Clark, 2010 WL 1024589 * 21 n. 7 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that “[t]he admission of the

certified judgment of conviction was also not violative of Crawford” as the certified abstract of

judgments were clearly not prepared for use at Petitioner's trial). Thus, the judgements were not

comparable to the certificate of analysis found to be testimonial in Melendez-Diaz. 

2. Equal Protection

Petitioner contends that the State violated his right to equal protection of the laws by

permitting the use of the terms “Nortenos” “Surenos” and “Mexican Mafia,” which injected racial

prejudice into the trial. (Pet. Mem. P. & A. at 9-10). As noted by the Respondent, the California

Supreme Court issued the only decision addressing Petitioner’s claim as it was only raised before the

California Supreme Court. (Answer at 18). As the California Supreme Court summarily denied the

claim, there does not exist a reasoned decision issued by the State courts on this claim. Thus, the

Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the State court’s

summary denial was objectively unreasonable. See Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 835 (9th

Cir. 2009); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

“The equal protection clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated

alike.’” Mayner v. Callahan, 873 F.2d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.

Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Petitioner is correct that “[s]everal circuits have recognized

that a defendant’s constitutional rights may be violated by a trial infected with racial prejudice.” 

United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing cases). Clearly established 

federal law prohibits a prosecutor from presenting racially based prosecutorial arguments as such

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arguments may violate a defendant’s rights to equal protection and due process of the law. 

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n. 30 (1987); see Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 974 (9th

Cir. 2000) (finding constitutional violation where prosecutorial arguments “went beyond merely

providing evidence of motive and intent...and that invited the jury to give in to their prejudices and to

buy into the various stereotypes that the prosecutor was promoting”); see also United States v.

Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating, “[a]ppeals to racial, ethnic, or religious

prejudice during the course of a trial violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial”). In

Cabrera, the Ninth Circuit found that improper testimony by a witness appealing to racial, ethnic, or

religious prejudice also violates a defendant’s constitutional rights. See Cabrera, 222 F.3d at 596

(finding police officer’s testimony, that repeatedly referenced defendants’ Cuban origin and in which

officer made generalizations about Cubans’ drug activities, impermissibly prejudiced defendants). 

As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Santiago,“the core concern is whether ‘the argument shifts its

emphasis from evidence to emotion’” in determining whether the trial has been impermissibly

infected with racial prejudice. Santiago, 46 F.3d at 891 (quoting United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16,

25 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Where the testimony “overall, was a ‘dispassionate and intelligent presentation

of the evidence,’ the relevant use of a racial term is less likely to prejudice the outcome.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1989)). 

Here, none of the references to the terms Nortenos, Surenos, and Mexican Mafia that

Petitioner points to were appeals by the prosecutor or by the gang expert to racial, ethnic, or religious

prejudice. Rather, the Court finds that the references were “for ambiguous reasons amidst an overall

dispassionate and intelligent presentation” and is thus not “sufficiently prejudicial so as to constitute

an equal protection violation.” Bains, 204 F.3d at 975. 

B. Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by trial counsel’s

failure to request and secure a limiting instruction regarding the admission of gang evidence. (Pet.

Mem. P. & A. at 13-18).

\\\

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An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that a petitioner establish two

elements–(1) counsel’ s performance was deficient and (2) petitioner was prejudiced by the

deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346

(9th Cir. 1994). Under the first element, the petitioner must establish that counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, specifically identifying alleged acts or omissions

which did not fall within reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and there exists a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687; Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s errors were so egregious that the petitioner

was deprived of the right to a fair trial, namely a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. To prevail on the second element, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that there

exists “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694). A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697. Since prejudice is a prerequisite to a successful claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, any deficiency that was not sufficiently prejudicial to the petitioner’s case is fatal to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.

Petitioner contends that counsel’s “failure to request proper limitations limiting [sic]

instructions allowed the jury to consider several significant pieces of evidence for an improper

purpose,” constitutes prejudice as those pieces of evidence–namely the expert testimony of Detective

Aguilar and the admission of the judgements pertaining to the predicate crimes–“gave the

appearance that Petitioner was implicated in the commission of those crimes.” (Pet. Mem. P. & A. at

16-17). The Court notes that Petitioner fails to assert with any specificity the content of the limiting

instruction Petitioner faults counsel for not requesting. Regardless, Petitioner’s contention is

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unavailing. The California Court of Appeal found that the testimony of the gang expert regarding

the five predicate crimes by member of the Sureno criminal street gang “did not implicate

[Petitioner] in the commission of any of those crimes.” (Lod. Doc. 3 at 8). Likewise, the Court’s

review of the record reveals that neither Detective Aguilar’s testimony nor the judgements pertaining

to the predicate offenses implicated Petitioner in those crimes. (RT at 2177-2183). Consequently,

there is not a reasonable probability that counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction prejudiced

the verdict against Petitioner.

C. Ground Three: Erroneous Jury Instruction

Petitioner contends that the “jury was incorrectly instructed...that Petitioner could be

convicted of voluntary manslaughter as the natural and probable consequence of aiding and abetting

a misdemeanor breach of the peace” and that this incorrect jury instruction violated his constitutional

right to due process of the law as the instruction “was highly confusing and misleading.” (Pet. at 7-

8). 

Generally, claims based on instructional error under state law are not cognizable on habeas

corpus review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991) (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459

U.S. 422, 438 n. 6 (1983)). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a

petitioner must show that the error so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; see Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (quoting

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973) in finding that a habeas court must not merely

consider whether an “instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned” but must

instead determine“‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process’”). An erroneous jury instruction “directed toward an element of the

offense may rise to the level of a constitutional defect.” Byrd, 566 F.3d at 862 (citing Neder v.

United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1999)). “Due process requires that jury instructions in criminal

trials give effect to the prosecutor’s burden of proving every element of the crime charged beyond a

reasonable doubt. [Citation] ‘Nonetheless, not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury

instruction rises to the level of a due process violation.’” Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1209

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curiam)). 

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Additionally, “[t]he jury instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered

in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the

Constitution.” Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437. 

 Petitioner is challenging the issuance of a modified version of CALCRIM No. 3.02, claiming

that the instruction permitted a jury to convict him of voluntary manslaughter based on a theory that

he aided and abetted a misdemeanor breach of peace. (Pet. Mem. P. & A. at 20). The modified

version of CALCRIM No. 3.02 states:

One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is not only

guilty of that crime, but is also guilty of any crime committed by a principal which is

a natural and probable consequence of the crime originally aided and abetted.

In order to find the defendant guilty of the crimes of murder, as charged in

Count 1, on the theory of aiding the abetting liability for the natural and probable

consequences, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. One of the crimes of 

a. Assault, Penal Code Section 240

b. Breach of Peace, Penal Code Section 415

c. Assault by Means Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury, Penal

Code Section 245(a)(1)

2. That the defendant aided and abetted that crime;

3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime of

a. Assault, Penal Code Section 240

b. Breach of Peace, Penal Code Section 415

c. Assault by Means Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury, Penal

Code Section 245(a)(1); 

4. The crime murder was a natural and probable consequence of the

commission of the commission of one of the crimes,

a. Assault, Penal Code Section 240

b. Breach of Peace, Penal Code Section 415

c. Assault by Means Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury, Penal

Code Section 245(a)(1);

In determining whether a consequence is “natural and probable,” you must

apply an objective test, based not on what the defendant actually intended, but on

what a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to

occur. The issue is to be decided in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the

incident. 

A “natural” consequence is one which is within the normal range of outcomes

that may be reasonably expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. 

“Probable” means likely to happen. You are not required to unanimously

agree as to which originally contemplated crime the defendants aided and abetted, so

long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agreed that the

defendants aided and abetted the commission and identified in the identifying target

crime, and that the crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence of the

commission of that target crime....

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(CT at 541-542; RT at 2686-2688). 

Petitioner appears to be arguing that the misdemeanor breach of peace could not support a

murder conviction under the natural and probable cause doctrine, because “killings which occur in

the commission of a misdemeanor breach of the peace are subject to the misdemeanor-manslaughter

rule.” (Pet. Mem. P. & A. at 23). Consequently, Petitioner contends that a misdemeanor breach of 5

peace would at most support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. (Id. at 24-27). 6

The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that :

The natural and probable consequences doctrine dooms Ramírez's argument.

Despite academic criticism, the natural and probable consequences doctrine remains

an “ ‘established rule’ “ of American jurisprudence holding aiders and abettors “

‘responsible for the criminal harms they have naturally, probably and foreseeably put

in motion.’ “ ([People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 (Cal. 1996)], quoting People

v. Luparello (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 410, 439.) An aider and abettor “ ‘is guilty not

only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of any reasonably

foreseeable offense committed by the person he aids and abets,’ “ so that one “

‘whose liability is predicated on his status as an aider and abettor need not have

intended to encourage or facilitate the particular offense ultimately committed by the

perpetrator.’ “ (Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 261, quoting People v. Croy (1985)

41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5, impliedly overruled on another ground by People v. Dyer

(1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 60-64, as stated by People v. Sarkis (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23,

26.)

The scope of the doctrine is not without limits, of course. There must be a

close connection between the target crime aided and abetted and the offense actually

committed for the doctrine to apply. (Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 269.) In

addition, an aider and abettor rarely, if ever, is liable for the commission of a very

serious crime that his or her confederate commits where the target offense he or she

contemplated by his or her aiding and abetting is trivial. ( Ibid.) In the context of a

bitter rivalry involving gang members willing to fight to the death over territory,

however, the target offense of breach of the peace for fighting in public is not the least

bit trivial. [People v. Montes, 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)]. We

reject Ramírez's argument.

(Lod. Doc. 3 at 15).

\\\

\\\

As noted by Respondent, Petitioner incorporates this section of his petition from the appellate brief of his co5

defendant Samuel Vasquez.

In response to this claim, Respondent misguidedly cites to section 3 of the California Court of Appeal’s decision,

6

which pertains to Petitioner’s argument that the jury instruction was erroneous as it permitted a manslaughter verdict based

on an infraction breach of peace charge as opposed to a misdemeanor breach of peace. (Answer at 25-29; Lod. Doc. 3 at -12).

This argument was not raised in the appeal. The pertinent section of the California Court of Appeal’s decision for the

purposes of this argument is actually section 5. (See Lod. Doc. 3 at 14-15).

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Petitioner’s argument is based on an interpretation of State law that was rejected by the

California Court of Appeal. As “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions,” this argument does not entitle Petitioner to habeas

corpus relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68; see also Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74,

76 (2005) (per curiam) (stating “a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced

on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus”). This is

especially true as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that California’s natural and probable

consequences doctrine does not violate due process. See Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 976-77 (9th

Cir. 1999) (finding that misdemeanor can support a “natural and probable consequences” aiding and

abetting murder conviction); see also San Nicolas v. Dexter, 2009 WL 1651621, * 21 (C.D. Cal.

2009). 

D. Ground Four: Erroneous Jury Instruction

In a related contention, Petitioner argues that the modified version of CALCRIM No. 3.02

was “highly confusing and misleading.” 

As the Court has previously noted, “not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a

jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation. The question is whether the ailing

instruction so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Middleton,

541 U.S. at 437. Petitioner contends that “[t]he jumbled version given here gave conflicting

indications as to whether the target crime needed to have been committed at all and by whom, and

did not require a finding that a co-principal had committed an offense other than the target crime.” 

(Pet. Mem. P. & A. at 42). 

The California Court of Appeal found only one cogent argument existed regarding

instructional error–namely, that the trial “court’s modification of the standard instruction allowed the

jury to find Ramírez guilty of murder only if the jury were to find that a co-principal committed one

of the target offenses.” (Lod. Doc. 3 at ). The Court finds the appellate court’s summary denial of

Petitioner’s argument, that the instruction did not mandate that a target crime needed to have been

committed, reasonable. The preface of CALCRIM No. 3.02 makes clear that a target crime was

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required to have been committed as “[o]ne who aids and abets another in the commission of crime

[sic] is not only guilty of that crime, but is also guilty of any crime committed by a principal which is

a natural ad probable consequence of the crime originally aided and abetted.” (RT at 2686; CT at

543) (emphasis added). Thus, the failure to explicitly require that the jury find that a target offense

had been committed later in the instruction did not so infect the trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process. 

Likewise, the appellate court found that the trial court committed error in not explicitly

instructing the jury that they were required to find that the co-principal committed murder or

manslaughter. However, the State court found this error was harmless as “[i]mplicit in the verdicts

finding Ramírez not guilty of murder but guilty of voluntary manslaughter is the jury’s understanding

that he could be criminally liable only for an offense that a co-principal committed and that was the

natural and probable consequence of a target offense Ramírez aided and abetted.” (Lod. Doc. 3 at

14). The Court finds the California Court of Appeal’s analysis to be objectively reasonable as the

jury’s finding that Petitioner was guilty of voluntary manslaughter reflects an understanding that

Petitioner could only be liable for the substantive offense committed by his co-principal. Thus,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground.

E. Ground Five: Trial Court’s Denial of Stay for Gang Enhancement or Crime

Lastly, Petitioner contends the trial court should have stayed either his sentence for

participating in a criminal street gang crime or the criminal street gang enhancement. Petitioner’s 7

argument is based on California Penal Code section 654(a), which states in relevant part that, “[a]n

act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished

under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall

the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” Thus, Petitioner argues that as the

substantive offense and the enhancement proscribe the same conduct, one of the sentences should

have been stayed pursuant to California Penal Code section 654(a).

This claim was not identified in the petition but was extensively addressed in the memorandum of points and

7

authorities attached to the petition. Thus, while Respondent does not address this argument, the Court finds it is still proper

for a merits adjudication.

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The Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. In order

to obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state

court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law” and that Petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Here, Petitioner fails to establish a violation of the Constitution or federal law as his

claim is based entirely on the interpretation and application of state law. As noted previously, issues

of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas as“‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

errors of state law.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990)). More importantly, federal courts defer to a state court’s interpretation of its sentencing

laws. Id. at 67-68; Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, absent a showing of

fundamental unfairness, the state court’s application of its own sentencing laws does not give rise to

federal habeas relief. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994).

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal found that it was proper under

state law to deny the stay, as:

“ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more

than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of

the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be

punished ... not for more than one [of the offenses].’ [Citation.]”( People v. Latimer

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208, quoting Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11,

19.) Whether the defendant had multiple criminal objectives is a question of fact for

the trial court that, if supported by substantial evidence, will be upheld on appeal. (

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730-731.)...

The statute authorizing the count 2 criminal street gang crime defines “a

substantive offense whose gravamen is the participation in the gang itself.” ( People v.

Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467, fn. omitted; italics in original.) “In

contrast,” the statute authorizing the count 1 criminal street gang enhancement

“creates additional punishment for anyone who commits a felony for the benefit of, at

the direction of, or in association with a street gang.” ( Id. at p. 1467, fn. 12; italics

added.) On a record of substantial evidence in support of the court's implicit finding

that Ramírez had multiple criminal objectives of participation in a gang and

commission of a violent felony, no section 654 stay is required. ( People v. Osband,

supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731; 186.22, subds. (a), (b).)

(Lod. Doc. 3 at 16-17). In light of the analysis undertaken by the appellate court, Petitioner has

failed to establish fundamental unfairness resulted from the sentencing court’s imposition of separate

terms for Petitioner’s convictions stemming from the voluntary manslaughter committed for benefit

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of a criminal street gang and for the active participation in a criminal street gang. Consequently,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

IV. Certificate of Appealability

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides that a circuit judge or judge may

issue a certificate of appealability where “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right.” Where the court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a

certificate of appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of

his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate

“something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.”

Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1040. In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not

find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable,

wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED with prejudice;

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment; and

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2010 /s/ John M. Dixon 

hlked6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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