Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07937/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07937-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CHARLES CHRISTOPHER REED,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNKNOWN,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-07937-VKD 

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

Pro se plaintiff Charles C. Reed, a state prisoner at the Salinas Valley State Prison 

(“SVSP”), filed this civil rights action for an injury that occurred at SVSP. Dkt. No. 1. Mr. Reed 

has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 2. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),

(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

Mr. Reed claims that on January 22, 2019, he was working in the central kitchen at SVSP 

as a “vegetable room worker.” Dkt. No. 3. He claims that he was given the use of a machine (a 

slicer) to cut cucumbers when he accidentally cut off the side of one of his fingers, resulting in 

severe injury. Id. He was later informed that he could no longer work in the kitchen, and that he 

should file a workman’s compensation claim. Id. Plaintiff filed a claim with the state but was 

informed that the “CDC” did not have insurance and that his “information may not be safe.” Id. 

He seeks damages for the deformity of his finger, the loss of work, and severance from work 

duties. Id.

The complaint is deficient because Mr. Reed fails to satisfy the two elements to establish a 

§ 1983 claim: (1) the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the violation was committed by a 

person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 at 468. There are no 

allegations with respect to the violation of a constitutional right, and Mr. Reed names no 

individual defendants who are liable for the injury he suffered. Dkt. No. 2. To the extent that Mr. 

Reed may be asserting that the requirements of his job led to the injury, the Eighth Amendment is 

implicated in prison work claims only if the prisoner has alleged that he was compelled to perform 

“‘physical labor which [was] beyond [his] strength, endanger[ed his life] or health, or cause[d] 

undue pain.’” Morgan v. Canady, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Berry v. Bunnel, 

39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). There are no allegations in this regard. 

Secondly, Mr. Reed names no individual defendants who are responsible for his injury. Mr. Reed 

shall be granted leave to file an amended complaint to correct these deficiencies. In preparing an 

amended complaint, he should keep the following principles in mind. 

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 

inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner 

receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the 

Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Amendment also 

imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life 

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such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 832. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the 

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official possesses 

a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 297, 298 (1991)). Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate 

indifference. See id. at 835–37 & n.4. A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth 

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the standard for 

criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety. See id. at 837.

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 

plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the 

deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 

1085 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A person deprives 

another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if he performs an affirmative act, 

participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in 

the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003–04 

(9th Cir. 2012). Even if a supervisory official is not directly involved in the allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct, “[a] supervisor can be liable in this individual capacity for his own 

culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 

indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). The claim that a supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional conditions and ‘culpable 

actions of his subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in the unconstitutional 

conduct of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability.’” Keates v. 

Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208) (finding that 

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conclusory allegations that supervisor promulgated unconstitutional policies and procedures which 

authorized unconstitutional conduct of subordinates do not suffice to state a claim of supervisory 

liability).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, after screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 

the Court finds that the complaint as pled fails to state a claim and fails to name any defendants. 

Mr. Reed may file an amended complaint to attempt to correct the deficiencies discussed above no 

later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date this order is filed. The amended complaint 

must include the caption and civil case number used in this order, No. C 19-cv-07937 VKD, and 

the words “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. If using the court form complaint, Mr. 

Reed must answer all the questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. 

Mr. Reed is advised that the amended complaint will supersede the original complaint, the 

latter being treated thereafter as non-existent. Ramirez v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 

1008 (9th Cir. 2015). Consequently, claims not included in an amended complaint are no longer 

claims, and defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See Ferdik 

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). 

If Mr. Reed fails to file an amended complaint in the time, or the amended complaint fails 

to cure all defects described above, the Court will issue an order reassigning the case to a district 

judge with a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed in part for the reasons described 

above.

The Clerk of the Court shall include two copies of the Court’s form complaint with a copy 

of this order to Mr. Reed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2020

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

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