Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01816/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01816-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ANTHONY LANE,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 05CV1816 IEG (BLM)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION; (2)

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2254; AND (3)

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)

 (Doc. No. 1)

vs.

M.A. MUNTZ, Warden,

Respondent.

On September 19, 2005, Michael Anthony Lane (“petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his July

17, 2003 conviction for possession for sale of cocaine base in San Diego Superior Court Case No.

SCD 171751. On May 31, 2006 Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major filed a Report and

Recommendation, recommending that the Court deny the petition on its merits. On June 15, 2006,

and August 15, 2006, Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation.

Following de novo review of Petitioner’s claims, including review of the original briefing

submitted by the parties and the underlying record and transcripts, for the reasons explained

below, Petitioner’s objections to the Report and Recommendation are rejected. The Court adopts

in full Magistrate Judge Major’s Report and Recommendation, and DENIES the petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. 

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1

 On August 15, 2006, petitioner filed a supplemental addendum “based on the magistrate

judge not considering the colorable claim [“the prosecutor did not justify that the San Diego police

followed a standardized governing policy or practice when opening the closed container found within

petitioner’s vehicle during inventory (Traverse Ground B)] raised in his habeas petition and traverse.”

(Supplemental Briefing at 1.) However, for the reasons stated below, petitioner’s Fourth Amendment

claim is without merit and is summarily addressed by the Magistrate Judge’s finding that petitioner’s

Fourth Amendment claims fail as a matter of law. 

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DISCUSSION

The Court incorporates by reference Magistrate Judge Major’s fair and accurate recitation

of the factual background and procedural background regarding Petitioner’s claims. (Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”), at. 2-5.) Magistrate Judge Major also correctly set forth the standard

of review for Petitioner’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). (R&R at 5-7.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1), the Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which petitioner objects. 

Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004).

1. The Fourth Amendment Claims

Petitioner argues he was deprived of an opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment

claims because the trial court did not compel the testimony of witnesses favorable to the defense.

Specifically, petitioner contends that had the trial court allowed Officer Lara or Detective Sargent

Nemec to testify, he would have proved that the contraband he was convicted of possessing was

not in plain view and therefore subject to suppression as the fruit of an illegal search. Petitioner

also argues that had he been permitted to call the witnesses, Officer Cesena’s testimony regarding

the circumstances of the arrest, would have been impeached. Petitioner objects that the R&R

improperly concluded “even if petitioner wasn’t arrested for the drugs or the domestic violence

warrant that never existed, Officer Cesena had probable cause to arrest petitioner for the traffic

violation or driving with (sic) suspended license.”1 (Obj. at 5.)

The R&R properly set forth the standard to be applied to petitioner’s claim. Under clearly

established federal law, “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of

a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” 

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). A petitioner is afforded a full and fair opportunity to

litigate his claims when, for example, he is granted an evidentiary hearing and allowed to present

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2

 Moreover, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, in large part, because it found

petitioner to be an unreliable witness. (Lodgement # 6, People v. Lane, D042554 (Cal. Ct. App. June

2, 2004) (“In this matter, the court did not find [petitioner] to be a credible witness ... first of all, he

was feeling the effects of cocaine base: he had only used it within 10-15 minutes prior to the stop ...

he claims he did not have a lapse of memory ... he claims it did not affect his ability to relate, recall

and recollect ... those are his claims ... but there is a reason why people do take controlled

substances.”) 

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evidence and witnesses. Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The R&R also properly applied the legal standards regarding whether petitioner received

an opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. As noted in the R&R, under California

law, a defendant may move to suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

See Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5 (Deering 2006). Because California law provides a defendant with

an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the evidence to be used against him, Fourth

Amendment violations are not cause for habeas corpus relief. Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613

(9th Cir. 1990) (“Whether [petitioner] ... did in fact litigate this fourth amendment claim in state

court, he did have the opportunity ... given that [petitioner] had an opportunity in state court for

‘full and fair litigation’ of his fourth amendment claim, the Constitution does not require ... habeas

corpus relief”). 

In this case, because the state law under which petitioner was convicted provided petitioner

an opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims, petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims

are not grounds for federal habeas relief. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494. Furthermore, petitioner

exercised his right to challenge the search and seizure in his case at a suppression hearing and

again on appeal. (See Lodgement #2, Transcript of 1538 Motion Hearing; Lodgment # 6 People

v. Lane, D042554 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2004.)) That petitioner’s claims were denied in the state

court, and again on appeal, are also not sufficient grounds for habeas corpus relief, regardless of

whether petitioner was permitted to present every witness he wanted to present.2

 See Gordon, 895

F.2d at 613.

2. The Fifth Amendment Claims

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it failed to advise petitioner of his Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent. Petitioner objects that the R&R misinterpreted his argument to

be that the court had a “duty” to advise him of his Fifth Amendment right. But, as he argued in

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3

 Because the California Supreme court did not articulate a reason for denying petitioner’s

confrontation clause claim, as to the missing witnesses, the Court reviews the merits of petitioner’s

claims. 

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his traverse, petitioner again argues that the trial court has a “duty to make sure that a witness who

might incriminate him or herself is protected by their fifth amendment right.” (Obj. at 6; Traverse

at 10 (“The court has a ‘duty’ to ensure that the witness is fully advised of his/her Fifth

Amendment rights.”)) 

The R&R properly noted that there is no Supreme Court case law in support of petitioner’s

argument. The cases cited by petitioner in a supplemental brief filed on January 20, 2006, solely

address the rights of a witness testifying at a trial. E.g., Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 36

(1917). Likewise, the California state court decisions cited by petitioner in his traverse are silent

as to whether there is a duty to warn a defendant, represented by counsel, of his Fifth Amendment

right to remain silent. E.g., People v. Warren, 161 Cal.App. 3d 961 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). The

state court’s failure to warn petitioner of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was,

therefore, neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

3. The Sixth Amendment Claims

A. Right to Compulsory Process

Petitioner claims he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process because

counsel failed to interview, investigate, and subpoena witnesses. (Obj. at 9.) Petitioner objects that

Magistrate Judge Major improperly concluded that the testimony of the missing witnesses would

not have effected the outcome of the suppression hearing. 

The R&R set forth the proper legal standard to be applied to Petitioner’s confrontation

clause claim.3

 The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant with the right “to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; Williams v. Stewart, 441

F.3d 1030, 1055 (9th 2006) (“The Compulsory Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the

right to present relevant and material witnesses in his defense”) (internal citations omitted). 

“Violations of the right to compulsory process are subject to harmless error review.” Stewart, 441

F.3d at 1055. 

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4

 Officer Lara did not testify at the suppression hearing because he was not under subpoena

and the court declined to delay the case. (Lodgement #2, Transcript of 1538; Motion Hearing at 25-

26.)

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Here, the trial court’s decision to preclude Officer Lara from testifying is harmless error.4

Petitioner claims that Officer Lara’s testimony could have impeached Officer Cesena’s testimony

and bolstered petitioner’s own version of the facts. However, as noted in the R&R, defense

counsel achieved both of those objectives during her cross examination of Officer Cesena. 

(Lodgement #2, Transcript of 1538 Motion Hearing at 24.) Furthermore, despite petitioner’s

claims to the contrary, Officer Lara could not have testified as to why Officer Cesena first stopped

petitioner’s vehicle; the reason Officer Cesena arrested petitioner; the timing of petitioner’s arrest;

or offered any other evidence about what occurred before Officer Lara arrived on scene.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision to continue the suppression hearing without allowing

petitioner to subpoena the missing officers was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (2000).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner also argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel. In support of his argument, petitioner claims counsel failed to “file a motion challenging

[petitioner’s] alleged serious felony prior conviction, to review [petitioner’s] rap sheet, [and]

investigate [petitioner’s] criminal history.” (Obj. at 12.) Petitioner also claims that counsel’s

performance was deficient because she did not “ask petitioner specific questions concerning

[petitioner’s] prior battery conviction” and failed to “obtain information from the prosecutor who

has the burden of proof to present evidence that petitioner’s prior conviction is a serious felony.” 

(Id.) Petitioner contends that had counsel performed effectively he would have “only been

exposed to a maximum 11 years with half time, ... not 16 years at 80%.” (Id. at 13.) Petitioner

objects that the R&R mistakenly concluded that his sentence would have been the same regardless

of counsel’s alleged failure to investigate petitioner’s criminal history.

The R&R set forth the proper legal standard to be applied to Petitioner’s claim of

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 Because petitioner failed to exhaust this claim for relief, the Court reviews the merits of his

claim.

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ineffective assistance of counsel.5 First, the petitioner must establish that his counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d

1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversed in part) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688

(1984)). Second, the petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient

performance. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In order to meet the first requirement, the

petitioner must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). This

requires the petitioner to identify specific material errors and omissions demonstrating that his

counsel’s performance was outside the range of reasonableness. United States v. Oplinger, 150

F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22 (2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Bald

assertions unsupported by facts of ineffective assistance of counsel do not entitle a petitioner to an

evidentiary hearing on his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205

(1995).

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, unsupported by the record, do not

warrant habeas relief. For example, petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to independently

investigate and review petitioner’s rapsheet. Petitioner claims that had counsel adequately

investigated his criminal history, his sentence would not have been enhanced for a past battery

because counsel would have discovered that his conviction was not for battery/great bodily injury

inflicted. In support of his argument petitioner contends that the California State Attorney General

and the California Court of Appeal both recognize that his past battery is not a felony strike

because there is no evidence that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Petitioner claims

that his battery/serious bodily injury conviction does not, per People v. Taylor, 118 Cal. App. 4th

11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), constitute a battery/great bodily injury conviction, thereby negating the

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6

 In Taylor the California Court of Appeal noted the “separate and distinct statutory

definitions” of “great bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” and explained that in certain

circumstances, the statutory differences effect whether a defendant’s sentence is enhanced. Taylor, 118 Cal. App. 4th at *24.

7

 Likewise, the California Attorney General interpreted petitioner’s previous battery

conviction as a non “strike” conviction only after the Court of Appeal’s decision in Taylor. (Lodgement #12, Petitioner’s Supplemental Briefing re Taylor.)

8

 On September 14, 2006, petitioner filed an “Addendum of Related Cases in Support of

Ground ‘5’ of Objections to Report and Recommendation.” (Doc. No. 24.) The Court reviewed

petitioner’s addendum and finds his argument, that “there was insufficient evidence to support that

petitioner’s prior battery conviction constituted ‘a serious’ felony pursuant to the three strikes law”

to be without merit. See Hester, 22 Cal. 4th at 295.

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sentence enhancement imposed in his case.6 

Petitioner’s claim fails because the California Court of Appeal decided Taylor after

petitioner was sentenced. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to guess and apply future decisions

of the California Court of Appeal which could have impacted her service to petitioner.7

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal did not hold, despite petitioner’s assertion to the contrary, that

his battery conviction was not one in which great bodily injury was inflicted. Rather, the Court of

Appeal held that petitioner’s case involves “the more typical situation where great bodily injury

and serious bodily injury have the same meaning.” (Lodgment # 13, D042554 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.

20, 2004.))

Finally, as noted by both the Court of Appeal and the R&R, pursuant to California law

petitioner is estopped from “complaining” about the sentence to which he agreed. People v.

Hester, 22 Cal. 4th 290, 295 (Cal. 2000).8 Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of possession for

sale of cocaine base, a prior conviction for the same offense, and the battery “strike” conviction in

exchange for the district attorney’s office dismissing the remaining charges and a mutually agreed

upon nine year sentence. (Lodgement # 2, Transcript of Allocution Hearing at 51.) The Court of

Appeal applied Hester to petitioner’s appeal and declined to disturb petitioner’s sentence. 

(Lodgment # 13, D042554 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2004.) This Court may not “reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions ... in conducting habeas review.” Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Therefore, petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is denied.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation and DENIES petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus with prejudice. 

 Furthermore, the Court DENIES petitioner a certificate of appealability, as petitioner has not

 made a substantial showing that he has been denied a constitutional right.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: September 26, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:05-cv-01816-IEG-BLM Document 25 Filed 09/26/06 Page 8 of 8