Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00520/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00520-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA J. FOX, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

COUNTY OF TULARE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

1:11-CV-00520 AWI SMS

ORDER FOR

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

Currently pending before this Court is Defendants Leticia Castaneda, Erica Soto, and Ron

Castaneda’s motion to dismiss. On September 6, 2011, the Court held a hearing with respect to

this motion. The Court concludes that supplemental briefing is necessary relating to the

following issues.

1. State Created Danger Claim

In the fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs bring a state created danger claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Defendants contend that they are not liable because Defendants did not create any new

danger to C.M.R. Reply at 2:21. Defendants state that Plaintiffs’ Complaint suggests that

Defendant Rogers had at least partial custody of C.M.R. prior to Rogers being awarded primary

physical custody on May 12, 2009. Id. at 2:22-24; Complaint at ¶¶ 18, 38, 41, 42, 99, 117. 

Therefore, Defendants argue that any alleged actions or inactions by the Defendants did not

expose C.M.R. to any danger to which she was not already exposed. See Deshaney v.

Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (concluding that there was no state

created danger when the state temporarily removed minor child from father and then returned

Case 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS Document 34 Filed 09/09/11 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

child to father because the state placed the child in no worse position than had the state not acted

at all).

At the hearing, Defendants cited again to paragraph 18 of the Complaint, which suggests

that Defendant Rogers had at least partial custody of C.M.R. as of July 2008. In response,

Plaintiffs represented to the Court that Plaintiff Fox and Defendant Rogers had shared custody of

C.M.R. prior to May 12, 2009, but were unable to point to a specific allegation in the Complaint

where this is alleged. 

Plaintiffs are ordered to address whether the custody situation of C.M.R. prior to May 12,

2009 is clearly articulated in the Complaint. In addition, Plaintiffs are ordered to address

whether their state created danger claim is barred under Deshaney if Rogers already had shared

custody of C.M.R. when Rogers was granted primary physical custody on May 12, 2009?

2. Compliance with the Government Claims Act

Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ state law claims for failure to comply with

the Government Claims Act (“GCA”). 

Before suing a public entity or its employees, a plaintiff must present a timely written

claim for damages to the public entity under the GCA. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. Such a

claim must be presented to the governmental entity no later than six months after the cause of

action accrues. Id. Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are

conditions precedent to suit, and thus is an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. State v.

Superior Court of Kings County, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245 (2004); K.J. v. Arcadia Unified Sch.

Dist., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1238 (2009). 

The public entity must approve or reject a timely claim within 45 days and provide

written notice to the claimant. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 912.4, 912.6, 913. If a timely claim is

rejected in whole or in part, the claimant may file suit within six months after the date notice is

personally delivered or deposited in the mail. Id. at §§ 945.4, 945.6(a)(1). If the rejection is not

properly noticed in accordance with section 913 however, the action may be filed in court within

2

Case 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS Document 34 Filed 09/09/11 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

two years from the accrual of the cause of action. Id. at §§ 945.6(a)(2). 

If the entity determines that the claim was filed late, it must return the claim within 45

days from the date it was filed, along with a notice that the claimant may apply for leave to

present a late claim. Id. at §§ 911.3 and 911.4. In responding to an application for leave to

present a late claim, the entity must grant or deny leave within 45 days and provide notice. Id. at

§§ 911.6, 911.8. If an application for leave to file a late claim is rejected by the public entity, the

claimant must first obtain a court order for relief from the requirements of the claims act before

filing a suit. Id. at § 946.6. A petition for such an order must be filed with the court within six

months after the application is denied or deemed denied. Id. at §§ 946.6(b), 911.6. 

Where compliance with the GCA is required, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and

proving compliance. Mangold v. California Pub. Utils Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.

1995). In this case, Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that they have “complied with the

Government Tort Claims statutes of California, having had the most recent claim denied on

October 27, 2010.” Complaint at ¶ 3. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot proceed with their

state law claims because Plaintiffs never petitioned for relief to file a late claim under the GCA. 

Reply at 6:8-11. 

On September 17, 2010, Plaintiffs submitted a tort claim to the Clerk of the Board of

Supervisors of Tulare County. On September 21, 2010, the claim was returned as untimely

because the claim was not presented within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. 

Plaintiffs submitted another tort claim on October 14, 2010, which was substantially the same as

the September 17, 2010 tort claim. The second tort claim was returned as untimely on October

27, 2010. Both the September 21 and October 24, 2010 notices expressly stated that no action

was taken with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims and explained that Plaintiffs only recourse was to

apply for leave to present a late claim. Instead of filing a petition for leave to present a late

claim, Plaintiffs commenced the present action on March 24, 2011. 

In their opposition, Plaintiffs contend that they filed a timely claim. Opposition at 34:19. 

3

Case 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS Document 34 Filed 09/09/11 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A claimant who disputes the determination of untimeliness must raise that issue by filing suit

rather than filing an application for leave to present a late claim. Toscano v. Cnty. of Los

Angeles, 92 Cal. App. 3d 775, 782-83 (1979). Where a public entity erroneously returns a timely

claim as untimely, the entity’s action will be construed as a rejection of the claim. Rason v.

Santa Barbara Housing Auth., 201 Cal. App. 3d 817, 830 (1988). Thus, if the trial court finds

that the tort claim shows facts on its face which, if true, would make the claim timely, the entity’s

determination that the claim was untimely is construed as an outright rejection. Scott v. Cnty. of

Los Angeles, 73 Cal. App. 3d 476, 482 (1977).

As a preliminary matter, Defendants contended at the hearing that this Court is without

jurisdiction unless Plaintiffs filed both a Complaint and an application for leave to file a late

claim as required by the Rason case. In Rason, the California Court of Appeal stated that “the

cautious claimant who wishes to preserve both issues of timeliness and of excusable lateness

must file a complaint in court and a section 911.4 application with the public entity.” Rason, 201

Cal. App. 3d at 828. “The claimant is therefore not forced to make the agonizing choice between

two exclusive remedies.” Id. 

In this case, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court, but did not file an application for

leave to file a late claim with the County of Tulare. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion at the

hearing, Rason does not appear to conclude that a Plaintiff must file a section 911.4 application

for leave to file a late claim in order for the Court to have jurisdiction. The Rason case merely

suggests that a “cautious claimant” must file both a Complaint and a section 911.4 application in

the event a court concludes that a plaintiff’s tort claims were untimely. Therefore, Defendants

are ordered to address whether there is other case authority that concludes that a court is without

jurisdiction to adjudicate a plaintiff’s challenge to a public entity’s determination of untimeliness

if a plaintiff does not also file a section 911.4 application. 

With respect to whether Plaintiffs’ tort claims were timely on their face, Plaintiffs

analogize their case to the Scott case cited to above. Opposition at 36:2. In Scott, plaintiff’s

4

Case 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS Document 34 Filed 09/09/11 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

original tort claim was denied by operation of law, but the notice from the county stated that the

claim was untimely. Scott, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 479. Plaintiff filed a second tort claim, which the

county treated as an application to file a late claim under California Government Code § 911.4. 

Id. This claim was rejected. Id. Plaintiff then filed a petition to file a late claim in the superior

court pursuant to California Government Code § 946.6, which was denied. Id. at 480. 

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages. Id. The California Court of Appeal held

that plaintiff’s original tort claim on its face alleged facts that made the claim timely and thus the

county’s rejection of that claim was an outright rejection. Id. at 484. The county’s failure to give

proper notice of that rejection extended the statute of limitations for filing a complaint to two

years because the rejection was not properly noticed pursuant to California Government Code §

913. Id. 

The date of accrual of a cause of action marks the starting point for calculating the claims

presentation period. Cal. Gov’t Code § 901; K.J., 172 Cal. App. 4th at 1239. “The general rule

for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time ‘when, under the substantive

law, the wrongful act is done,’ or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability

arises[.]’” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 397 (1999) (citation omitted). In other

words, a cause of action accrues when it is “complete with all of its elements.” Id. An exception

to the general rule is the discovery rule, which “postpones accrual of a cause of action until the

plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” Id. A plaintiff “has reason to

discover the cause of action when he has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its

elements.” Id. at 398 (citation omitted).

In their opposition and at the hearing, Plaintiffs have only discussed the accrual of their

conspiracy claim. However, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs filed state law claims for (1) negligent

retention and supervision against the County, Leticia Castaneda and John Rozum; (2) intentional

infliction of emotional distress against the County, Leticia Castaneda, Erica Soto, Ron Castaneda

and John Rozum; (3) negligence against the County, Leticia Castaneda, Erica Soto, Ron

5

Case 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS Document 34 Filed 09/09/11 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Castaneda and John Rozum; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress against the County,

Leticia Castaneda, Erica Soto, Ron Castaneda and John Rozum; and (5) conspiracy against the

County, Leticia Castaneda, Erica Soto and Ron Castaneda. 

The Court directs Plaintiffs to address how each state law claim against each Defendant

was timely on its face. Plaintiffs must point to their tort claim forms and indicate when each

state law claim accrued against each Defendant and explain why they are timely. 

3. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

Defendants Leticia Castaneda and Erica Soto move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first, third and

fourth causes of action, which are brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claims are based on Defendants’ conduct in the Family

Law Court, which involved conduct that was the basis for the removal of C.M.R. from Fox. 

Opposition at 3:24-26. Defendants argue that these actions were “quasi-prosecutorial” and

therefore they are absolutely immune from liability with respect to these claims. Id. at 3:26. 

A prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from liability for damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 “when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher,

522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). A prosecutor’s activity involves an advocacy function and is

protected by absolute immunity only when that activity is “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 

Prosecutorial immunity depends on “the nature of the function performed and not the

identity of the actor who performed it.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127. Thus, absolute prosecutorial

immunity has been extended to non-prosecutors. In Meyers v. Contra Costa County Department

of Social Services, 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987), the

Ninth Circuit extended absolute prosecutorial immunity to social service caseworkers in

initiating and pursuing child dependency proceedings. The Ninth Circuit reasoned:

Although child services workers do not initiate criminal proceedings, their responsibility

to exercise independent judgment in determining when to bring such proceedings, is not

very different from the responsibility of a criminal prosecutor. The social worker must

make a quick decision based perhaps on incomplete information as to whether to

6

Case 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS Document 34 Filed 09/09/11 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

commence investigations and initiate proceedings against parents who may have abused

their children. The social worker’s independence, like that of a prosecutor, would be

compromised were the social worker constantly in fear that a mistake could result in a

time-consuming and financially devastating civil suit. We therefore hold that social

workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial functions

connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings.

Id. 

In their opposition and at the hearing, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants’ conduct is not

quasi-prosecutorial. Opposition at 18-19. Citing to Beltran v. Santa Clara, 514 F.3d 906 

(9th Cir. 2008), Plaintiffs contend that Defendants conduct was investigative and not quasiprosecutorial. Opposition at 19. 

Therefore, Defendants are directed to clarify why the allegations against them were quasiprosecutorial and indicate whether there are any cases that have analogized child dependency

proceedings to custody disputes in Family Court.

4. Claims against Ron Castaneda under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985

Plaintiffs bring direct constitutional violation claims against Ron Castaneda in the first

and third claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and then bring a conspiracy claim against Ron

Castaneda under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Defendants argue that there are insufficient allegations to

show a constitutional violation or that he participated in a conspiracy. 

Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing that the only allegations against Ron Castaneda

occurred in 2007. See Complaint at ¶¶ 36-40. Plaintiffs are directed to explain how these

allegations are sufficient to show that Ron Castaneda’s conduct violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights. If Plaintiffs are only seeking claims against Ron Castaneda based on conspiracy, then

Plaintiffs must clarify this in their supplemental brief. In addition, Plaintiffs appeared to indicate

at the hearing that the only allegation that Ron Castaneda participated in a conspiracy was the

fact that he was the brother-in-law of Defendant Leticia Castaneda. Plaintiffs are directed to

clarify their conspiracy theory with respect to Ron Castaneda and explain if there are any other

allegations in the Complaint relating to Ron Castaneda’s participation in the conspiracy.

5. Conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

7

Case 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS Document 34 Filed 09/09/11 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the third claim for relief, Plaintiffs bring a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

A claim brought for violation of section 1985(3) requires four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for

the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in

furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or

deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,

978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). A racial, or perhaps otherwise

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus is an indispensable element of a section 1985(3)

claim. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2001). 

For the first time in the opposition, Plaintiffs state that their conspiracy claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim is based on gender discrimination against Plaintiff Fox. Opposition at

24-32. At the hearing, Plaintiffs requested that they be granted leave to amend this claim. 

Plaintiffs are directed to explain whether there are any allegations in the Complaint that suggest

any gender discrimination or whether they are formally requesting leave to amend. 

6. Other legal issues

Plaintiffs and Defendants may brief any other issue they deem relevant and want to bring

to the Court’s attention.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. On or before September 23, 2011, the parties shall file supplemental briefing

consistent with this order; and 

2. On or before September 30, 2011, the parties may file a reply brief to the

opposing parties’ supplemental brief. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 9, 2011 

0m8i78 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

8

Case 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS Document 34 Filed 09/09/11 Page 8 of 8