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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 24, 2014 Decided December 23, 2014

No. 13-5228

TRUMPETER SWAN SOCIETY, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00929)

William J. Snape, III argued the cause for appellants. 

With him on the briefs was Adam F. Keats.

Jennifer S. Neumann, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief 

were Robert G. Dreher, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

and J. David Gunter II and Justin D. Heminger, Attorneys. 

Christopher L. Bell argued the cause for intervenorappellees. With him on the brief were Christopher A. Conte, 

Robert N. Steinwurtzel, Michael Steven Snarr, Thomas 

Edward Hogan, and Anna M. Seidman. Roger R. Martella Jr. 

entered an appearance.

USCA Case #13-5228 Document #1528839 Filed: 12/23/2014 Page 1 of 12
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Before: TATEL, MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this case, 101 environmental 

groups, invoking section 21 of the Toxic Substances Control 

Act (TSCA), which allows “any person” to petition the 

Environmental Protection Agency for a rulemaking 

proceeding to regulate “chemical substances” that “present an 

unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,” 

filed a petition with EPA asking it to regulate spent lead 

bullets and shot. EPA rejected the petition as “not . . . 

cognizable” under section 21 on the grounds that it largely 

duplicated an earlier petition that two of the 101 groups had 

filed. EPA went on to explain that, even were it to consider 

the petition, it would deny it on the merits because another 

provision of TSCA, section 3(2)(B)(v), exempts cartridges 

and shells from the definition of “chemical substance.” The 

district court held that EPA had authority to classify the 

petition as non-cognizable under TSCA and dismissed the 

complaint. Although we disagree with the district court—

nothing in section 21 allowed EPA to dismiss this petition as 

non-cognizable—we nonetheless affirm because the 

environmental groups have suggested no way in which EPA

could regulate spent lead bullets and shot without also 

regulating cartridges and shells—precisely what section 

3(2)(B)(v) prohibits.

I.

Concerned that “human beings and the environment are 

being exposed each year to a large number of chemical 

substances and mixtures,” 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1), Congress 

enacted TSCA, which authorizes EPA to regulate “chemical 

substance[s]” that it has a “reasonable basis to 

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conclude . . . present[] or will present an unreasonable risk of 

injury to health or the environment,” id. § 2605(a). TSCA 

includes unusually powerful procedures for citizens to force 

EPA’s hand. Section 21 provides that “[a]ny person” may

petition the agency to initiate a rulemaking proceeding, id.

§ 2620(a), and requires that “[s]uch petition shall be filed in 

the principal office of the Administrator and shall set forth the 

facts which it is claimed establish that it is necessary to 

issue . . . a rule,” id. § 2620(b)(1). The statute requires EPA to 

grant or deny such a petition within 90 days, and if it denies 

the petition “the Administrator shall publish in the Federal 

Register the Administrator’s reasons for such denial.” Id.

§ 2620(b)(3). In such a case, or if EPA fails to act within 90 

days, the petitioner may, within 60 days, “commence a civil 

action in a district court of the United States to compel the 

Administrator to initiate a rulemaking proceeding as 

requested in the petition.” Id. § 2620(b)(4)(A). “The 

petitioner,” moreover, is “provided an opportunity to have 

such petition considered by the court in a de novo 

proceeding.” Id. § 2620(b)(4)(B). If the petitioner 

demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that “there 

is a reasonable basis to conclude that the issuance of such a 

rule or order is necessary to protect health or the environment 

against an unreasonable risk of injury,” the court “shall order 

the Administrator to initiate the action requested by the 

petitioner.” Id. § 2620(b)(4)(B)(ii).

In 2010, prior to the filing of the petition at issue in this 

case, five environmental groups petitioned EPA pursuant to 

TSCA section 21 for a rulemaking to prohibit, among other 

things, the “manufacture, processing and distribution in 

commerce of lead shot [and] bullets.” Petition to the 

Environmental Protection Agency to Ban Lead Shot, Bullets, 

and Fishing Sinkers Under the Toxic Substances Control Act

2 (August 3, 2010) (“2010 Petition”). According to those

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environmental groups, “spent lead ammunition,” id., poses an 

“ongoing threat of lead poisoning,” id. at 7. EPA denied that 

portion of the petition on the ground that “TSCA does not 

provide the Agency with authority to address lead shot and 

bullets as requested . . . due to the exclusion found in TSCA 

§ 3(2)(B)(v).” Letter from Stephen A. Owens, Assistant 

Administrator, U.S. EPA, to Michael Fry, Director of 

Conservation Advocacy, American Bird Conservancy 

(August 27, 2010) (“2010 EPA Letter”). That section exempts 

from the definition of “chemical substance,” and therefore

from TSCA’s scope, “any article the sale of which is subject 

to the tax imposed by section 4181 of the Internal Revenue 

Code,” 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B)(v), which in turn taxes 

“[s]hells and cartridges,” 26 U.S.C. § 4181. As required by 

section 21, EPA published this ruling in the Federal Register. 

See Notices: Environmental Protection Agency, Lead in 

Ammunition and Fishing Sinkers; Disposition of TSCA 

Section 21 Petition, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,377 (Sep. 24, 2010).

Three of the environmental groups, seeking de novo review, 

filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia but not until after 60 days had passed from 

publication in the Federal Register of EPA’s partial denial of 

their petition. The district court dismissed the complaint for 

lack of jurisdiction, Center for Biological Diversity v. 

Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2011), and the 

environmental groups never appealed.

Six months later, two of the environmental groups, now 

joined by 99 other organizations, submitted the instant

petition concerning “spent lead ammunition,” this time 

seeking “regulations that adequately protect wildlife, human 

health and the environment against the unreasonable risk of 

injury from bullets and shot containing lead used in hunting 

and shooting sports.” Petition to the Environmental Protection 

Agency to Regulate Lead Bullets and Shot under the Toxic 

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Substances Control Act (March 13, 2012) (“2012 Petition”) at 

2, 4 (emphasis added). In response, EPA ruled that because

two of the groups had been part of the earlier petition and the 

two petitions were largely redundant, the 2012 petition did not 

qualify as a “new petition cognizable under section 21.”

Letter from James J. Jones, Acting Assistant Administrator, 

U.S. EPA, to Jeff Miller, Center for Biological Diversity 1

(Apr. 9, 2012) (“2012 EPA Letter”). Moreover, EPA 

explained, “even if the 2012 submission were considered to 

be a new or different petition cognizable under section 21 of 

TSCA,” EPA “would deny it for the same reasons it denied 

the [earlier] petition.” Id. at 2. EPA did not publish this 

rejection in the Federal Register. See id.

Seeking de novo judicial review pursuant to section 21, 

seven of the 101 environmental groups, only one of which

had participated in the 2010 petition, filed suit, arguing that 

EPA lacked authority to classify their petition as “not . . . a 

new petition cognizable under section 21.” Amended 

Complaint 1–3. The district court agreed with EPA and

dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Motion to 

Dismiss Hearing Tr. 48 (May 23, 2013). According to the 

district court, the term “petition”—undefined in TSCA—is 

ambiguous and “EPA’s interpretation is persuasive.” Id. at 

63–66. Given this, the district court found it unnecessary to 

consider whether EPA has statutory authority to regulate

bullets and shot. Id. at 48.

The environmental groups now appeal, arguing (1) that 

EPA lacked authority to treat their petition as 

“not . . . cognizable under section 21” and (2) that TSCA

section 3(2)(B)(v) does not prohibit EPA from regulating 

spent lead bullets and shot. Addressing these issues in turn, 

“[w]e review de novo the District Court’s dismissal of claims 

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for want of subject matter jurisdiction . . . .” El Paso Natural 

Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

II.

As in so many of our cases, the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), guides our review of 

EPA’s interpretation of TSCA. “If this court ascertains that 

Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, 

then both the court and EPA ‘must give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” Chemical 

Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 984 (1988) 

(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43) (applying Chevron

framework to EPA’s interpretation of TSCA). Only if the 

statute is ambiguous do we defer to the agency’s reasonable 

construction. Id.

Here, unlike the district court, we see nothing ambiguous 

about TSCA section 21. That provision allows “[a]ny person”

to petition the agency for a rulemaking to regulate a toxic 

substance. 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a). Critically for our purposes, 

section 21 requires that a petition satisfy only two 

requirements: that it be filed in EPA’s principal office and

that it set forth facts establishing the need for the requested

rule. Id. § 2620(b)(1). Equally critically, section 21 gives EPA 

only three options: grant the petition, deny the petition, or 

take no action at all (which has the same effect as a denial).

Id. § 2620(b)(3)–(4). Nothing in section 21, however,

empowers EPA to declare that a petition, which satisfies the 

two statutory requirements—both of which EPA 

acknowledges were met here—is nonetheless “not 

cognizable.” Indeed, allowing EPA to do so would permit it to 

defeat TSCA’s unusually powerful citizen-petition 

procedures. Take this case, for example. Even though TSCA 

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section 21 gives “any person” the right to “petition” the 

agency to initiate a toxic-substance rulemaking, EPA has 

denied that right to the dozens of environmental organizations

that were not party to the earlier petition. To be sure, EPA 

went on to reiterate its 2010 ruling that it lacked statutory 

authority to regulate bullets and shot, but under its view, as 

well as that of the district court, the environmental groups 

would be denied the de novo judicial review guaranteed by

TSCA. In other words, according to EPA, its determination in 

this case that it lacks authority to regulate bullets and shot is 

immune from the de novo judicial review that TSCA 

guarantees. This is hardly what Congress intended.

Notwithstanding TSCA’s clarity, EPA insists that it must 

be able to declare certain petitions non-cognizable because 

any other reading of TSCA would “render the 60-day 

limitations period in Section 21 meaningless.” Appellees’ Br.

23. Specifically, EPA worries that a contrary reading “would 

particularly burden EPA and the courts because it would 

encourage petitioners—whether or not they had sought 

judicial review of an earlier petition—to file successive 

petitions in the hopes of obtaining favorable de novo review.” 

Id. Citing the principle that “[a] statute should be construed so 

that effect is given to all its provisions,” id. at 21 (quoting 

Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)), EPA argues that it 

must have authority to define “petition” as excluding 

repetitive petitions in order to give effect to the 60-day limit.

At oral argument, EPA counsel candidly acknowledged that 

this is the crux of the agency’s position in this case. 

We have two reactions to this argument. For one thing, it 

has no applicability to the 99 organizations that were not 

parties to the 2010 petition. No one can argue they are 

“successive petition[ers].” Appellees’ Br. 23. To be sure, as 

EPA counsel implied at oral argument, the two 2010 

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petitioners may well have recruited the 99 additional 

organizations to file a new petition. But TSCA gives “any 

person” the right to file a petition, and we see no statutory 

basis for allowing EPA to declare a petition “not cognizable” 

simply because the agency suspects it was filed at the 

suggestion of an earlier petitioner.

EPA, moreover, has all the authority it needs to protect 

its resources in the face of repeat petitioners. If a party files a 

second petition similar to an earlier one, EPA can summarily 

deny it, citing the reasons given in its response to the first

petition. Indeed, this approach would have consumed 

considerably fewer agency resources than the one it chose 

here: it took EPA two pages to explain its creative rejection of 

the 2012 petition, but only four sentences to deny the 2010 

petition on the merits. Nor, contrary to EPA’s argument,

would denying it the power to dismiss qualifying petitions as 

non-cognizable impose any unmanageable burden on the 

courts. If a court, acting pursuant to section 21’s de novo

judicial review provisions, affirms EPA’s denial of a petition 

on its merits, that decision would be res judicata in any case 

brought by the same petitioner raising the same issue. See

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“By 

‘preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have 

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,’ th[is] . . . doctrine[] 

protect[s] against ‘the expense and vexation attending 

multiple lawsuits, conserv[es] judicial resources, and foste[rs] 

reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of 

inconsistent decisions.’” (quoting Montana v. United States, 

440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979))). In other words, both EPA 

and the courts have ample authority to protect their resources

without undermining the force of TSCA’s citizen-petition 

provisions.

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III.

This, then, brings us to the merits. In the normal TSCA 

section 21 case, we would review the administrative record to 

determine whether the environmental groups had, as they 

claim, demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence 

that “there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the issuance 

of [the requested rule] is necessary to protect health or the 

environment against an unreasonable risk of injury . . . .” 15 

U.S.C. § 2620(b)(4)(B)(ii). Here, however, we face an 

antecedent issue. According to EPA, TSCA section 3(2)(B)(v) 

excludes bullets and shot from the definition of “chemical 

substance.” If this is correct, then we would have no reason to 

consider whether the environmental groups have satisfied 

section 21’s health or environment standard.

The environmental groups urge us not to resolve this 

antecedent issue, but rather to “remand[] back to the District 

Court with instructions to order the agency to comply with 

TSCA’s petition provisions and either grant or deny 

appellants’ petition.” Appellants’ Br. 26. But the question 

before us is a legal one, our review is de novo, and both the 

environmental groups and EPA made clear at oral argument 

that no additional facts are necessary to resolve the matter.

See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (“[D]ecisions on questions 

of law are reviewable de novo.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). For reasons of judicial efficiency, therefore, we 

shall proceed to the merits.

Significantly for the issue before us, the environmental 

groups seek regulation of spent bullets and shot. In their 

petition, they recount numerous harms resulting from the fact 

that “spent lead ammunition is uncontrolled and lead remains 

widely encountered and distributed in the environment from 

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hunting and sport shooting sources.” 2012 Petition at 2 

(emphasis added). They repeat this point throughout the 

petition. See, e.g., id. at 20 (“Spent lead shotgun pellets on the 

ground in fields where upland game birds are hunted are also 

ingested by birds as grit making herbivorous birds as well as 

carnivorous birds victims of lead poisoning.”) (emphasis 

added); id. at 50 (“The most serious exposure is from 

accidental ingestion of lead shot pellets or lead bullet 

fragments in [] meat.”). In conclusion, they claim to have “set 

forth the facts establishing the indisputable toxicity of spent

lead bullets and shotgun pellets,” id. at 68 (emphasis added),

and argue that these facts “support[] the conclusion that the 

risk is such that lead shot and bullets should be regulated 

under the Act,” id. at 69.

We agree with EPA that it lacks statutory authority to 

regulate the type of spent bullets and shot identified in the 

environmental groups’ petition. TSCA section 3(2)(B)(v) 

unambiguously exempts “article[s] the sale of which [are] 

subject to the tax imposed by section 4181 of the Internal 

Revenue Code” from the definition of “chemical substance.”

Section 4181 is equally unambiguous: it taxes “shells and 

cartridges.” TSCA section 3(2)(B)(v) thus exempts “shells

and cartridges” from the definition of “chemical substance.”

Given that bullets and shot can become “spent” only if they 

are first contained in a cartridge or shell and then fired from a 

weapon, petitioners have identified no way in which EPA

could regulate spent bullets and shot without also regulating 

cartridges and shells—precisely what section 3(2)(B)(v) 

prohibits. This understanding is reinforced by regulations 

issued pursuant to I.R.C. section 4181, which define “[s]hells 

and cartridges” as “[i]nclud[ing] any article consisting of a 

projectile, explosive, and container that is designed, 

assembled, and ready for use without further manufacture in 

firearms, pistols or revolvers.” 27 C.F.R. § 53.11. Because 

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bullets and shot are “projectiles,” and because spent bullets 

and shot must have been included in an “article”—along with 

an “explosive” and “container”—“designed, assembled, and 

ready for use without further manufacture,” this regulation 

makes clear that TSCA section 3(2)(B)(v) exempts spent

bullets and shot from the definition of “chemical substance.”

The environmental groups agree that were they seeking 

to regulate “shells and cartridges, EPA would be justified in 

claiming that it lacks the authority to regulate such products.” 

Appellants’ Br. 23. According to the environmental groups, 

however, they seek not regulation of shells and cartridges, but 

rather the “lead in bullets and shot.” Id. Insisting that “[t]his is 

not mere semantics to skirt the intention of the law,” id. at 24, 

they point to legislative history of TSCA stating that section 

3(2)(B)(v) “does not exclude from regulation under the bill 

chemical components of ammunition which could be 

hazardous because of their chemical properties,” id. (quoting

H.R. Rep. No 94–1341 at 10). But even if TSCA’s legislative 

history were relevant, this argument does not help the 

environmental groups. No matter how one characterizes their 

claim—whether as an effort to regulate cartridges and shells 

(EPA’s view) or as an attempt to regulate the lead in bullets 

and shot (the environmental groups’ view)—their petition 

seeks the regulation of spent lead yet suggests no way in 

which EPA could regulate spent lead without also regulating 

cartridges and shells.

Finally, the environmental groups point out that under the 

section 4181 regulations “[n]o tax is imposed by section 

4181 . . . on the sale of parts or accessories of . . . shells and 

cartridges when sold separately . . . .” 27 C.F.R. § 53.61(b)(1)

(emphasis added). But this would help the environmental 

groups only if their petition had asked EPA for a rulemaking 

concerning bullets and shot sold separately. True, at oral 

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argument, counsel for the environmental groups insisted that 

“[a]ll we’re trying to regulate are bullets sold separately, 

whether to a hunter or to a manufacturer of cartridges.” Oral 

Argument Rec. at 54:30–:36. But as explained above, see 

supra at pp. 9–10, in their petition the environmental groups

focused only on spent bullets and shot and, except for one 

stray and ambiguous reference (on page 54 of a 69-page

petition) to “[s]portsmen who reload rifle and pistol 

ammunition,” 2012 Petition at 54, made no reference at all to

bullets and shot sold separately. Nor did the environmental 

groups give any hint in the district court or in their briefs filed 

here that they were seeking the regulation of separately sold 

bullets and shot. The argument is thus triply forfeit. See 

Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1290 

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule, claims not presented to 

the agency may not be made for the first time to a reviewing 

court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Figueroa v. 

District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, 633 

F.3d 1129, 1133 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Ordinarily, we do not 

consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal . . . .”); 

Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 108 

n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (argument cannot be raised for the first 

time at oral argument).

IV.

We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 

complaint.

So ordered.

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