Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00626/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00626-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER RAYGOSA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12cv0626-BAS (MDD) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

[ECF No. 10] 

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION, et al, 

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Cynthia A. Bashant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After

reviewing the First Amended Petition (ECF No. 10), Respondent’s Answer (ECF 

No. 48), Petitioner’s Traverse (ECF No. 50), and the supporting documents and

pertinent state court Lodgments, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be 

GRANTED for the reasons stated below.

II. FACTS

Javier Raygosa (“Petitioner”), is a California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) inmate serving an indeterminate sentence of seventeen

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years to life for second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. (ECF No. 48). 

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, challenges the CDCR’s April 1, 2010, final

determination that he violated California Code of Regulations (CCR), Title 15,

§ 3016(c). Section 3016(c) provides, “Inmates shall not distribute, as defined in

§ 3000, any controlled substance.” (ECF No. 10). Distribution means the sale or

unlawful dispersing, by an inmate or parolee, of any controlled substance; or the

solicitation of or conspiring with others in arranging for, the introduction of

controlled substances into any institution, camp, contract health facility, or

community correctional facility for the purpose of sales or distribution. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3000 (2014) (emphasis added).

According to the CDRC Rules Violation Report written by Officer E. Duarte,

on July 19, 2009, approved visitor Anabelina Bermudez-Carrillo (“Ms. Bermudez”)

visited Petitioner at Calipatria State Prison. (Lodg. 3 at 1). During the visit, Ms.

Bermudez kissed Petitioner on the mouth. (Id. at 4). Security & Investigations

Officers E. Duarte and E. Garcia observed the kiss take place from the visiting room

via surveillance camera, and it appeared to them that Ms. Bermudez had passed an

unknown object into Petitioner’s mouth during the kiss. (Id.). 

After consenting to a search, Ms. Bermudez admitted to having multiple

“bindles” of marijuana “secreted” in her vagina. (Id.). After an unclothed body

search was performed by female officers, Officer Duarte was advised that Ms.

Bermudez had relinquished one large bindle, which contained seven smaller bindles

of the suspected controlled substance inside a yellow baggie. (Id.). The bindles were

given to Officer Duarte, who determined the bindles had a total weight of 12 grams. 

(Id.). Officer Duarte also performed a Valley Toxicology Laboratories test on the

green, leafy substance in bindle #3, which tested presumptive positive for marijuana. 

(Id.). 

While Ms. Bermudez was being escorted to the Visiting Processing Center by

Office Duarte, Officer Garcia proceeded to the strip room where the visiting room

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staff were conducting a clothed body search on Petitioner for contraband. (Lodg. 4 at

16). Officer Garcia smelled pungent odor coming from Petitioner’s mouth. (Id.).

Garcia ordered Petitioner to open his mouth and stick out his tongue. (Id.). 

Petitioner complied, and Garcia claimed to observe pieces of a green, leafy substance

on Petitioner’s tongue. (Id.).

On April 1, 2010, the Senior Hearing Officer issued the final determination

finding Petitioner guilty of violating § 3016(c). The Senior Hearing Officer found

Petitioner guilty based on the following evidence: (1) The Reporting Employee’s

Report (CDC-115) authored by Officer Duarte (Lodg. 3 at 1); (2) Testimony

provided by Officer M. Mcnair at the time of hearing [that he observed green, leafy

partials on Petitioner’s tongue that appeared to be marijuana] (Id. at 3); and (3) The

incident report authored by Officer Garcia. (See Lodg. 4). Petitioner was assessed

the following penalties: 180 days forfeiture of good-time credit, 5 days loss of yard

privileges, 360 days loss of visits followed by 720 days loss of contact visits, and one

year mandatory controlled substance testing. (Lodg. 3 at 5).

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 11, 2009, Petitioner filed an inmate appeal over the rules

violation which was denied without comment. (ECF No. 10 at 35-37). On December

15, 2009, Petitioner’s second level appeal was denied based on a finding that

Petitioner provided no new or compelling evidence to the rules violation report. 

(Id. at 38-39). On April 1, 2010, Petitioner’s Director’s Level Appeal was denied

based on the Senior Hearing Officer’s determination that if the staff did not detect

Petitioner’s actions, Petitioner would have successfully distributed the controlled

substance in the facility. (See Lodg. 2). 

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in Imperial County Superior Court on July 14, 2010. (See

Lodg. 6). On August 19, 2010, the Petition was denied because the Superior Court

found Petitioner was afforded due process of law because the decision of the Senior

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Hearing Officer was supported by “some evidence” of the charge of distribution. 

(ECF No. 10 at 17). On October 1, 2010, Petitioner filed a new habeas Petition to the

California Court of Appeals. (Lodg. 8 at 4-12). The California Court of Appeals

denied the Petition on November 24, 2010, finding that there was some evidence that

Petitioner solicited or conspired for the introduction of a controlled substance into the

institution. (ECF No. 10 at 19). On February 17, 2011, Petitioner filed a habeas

Petition with the California Supreme Court, which was denied without comment on

August 10, 2011. (Id. at 20). 

On March 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). On March 15, 2012, the Court

dismissed the Petition without prejudice for failure to name a proper respondent. 

(ECF No. 2). On July 23, 2012, Petitioner filed the First Amended Petition (“FAP”). 

(ECF No. 10). In his FAP, Petitioner contends that his due process rights were

violated. He claims that the fact-finding process was flawed resulting in an arbitrary

and capricious decision and that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge

of conspiracy to distribute. Relatedly, Petitioner claims that the prison authorities

wrongly classified the offense as distribution as opposed to possession. (Id.). 

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254, subsection (a) provides the scope of review

for federal habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the grounds that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 

As discussed below, all claims presented here were adjudicated on the merits in state

court. In order to merit habeas relief, Petitioner must demonstrate that the state court

adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A state court’s decision may be

“contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state

court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of

[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s]

precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision

may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and

only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts

that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall,

__ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application

must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). 

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the

United States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In order

to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the factual

findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of his claims rests, assuming it

rests upon a determination of facts, are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Even if Petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d),

Petitioner must still demonstrate a federal constitution violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551

U.S. 112, 119-22 (2007); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc). 

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Petitioner presented each of the claims raised in his federal habeas Petition to

the state trial, appellate, and supreme court in sequential habeas petitions. (Lodg.

Nos. 7-10). The appellate court denied Petitioner’s claim on the merits and denied

findings that the decision was not supported by some evidence. The California state

supreme court summarily denied the petition without a statement of reasoning or

citation of authority. (Id. at 10). “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or

rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803-06 (1991). Here, neither the state trial or appellate courts directly

addressed Petitioner’s claim that he was denied procedural due process in connection

with the prison disciplinary proceedings. The silent denial by a state supreme court is

presumed to be a denial on the merits. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct.

770, 785 (2011) (“when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the

state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the

claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles

to the contrary.”)

V. DISCUSSION

In his FAP, Petitioner alleges he was denied his due process rights in connection

with his disciplinary hearing. First, Petitioner asserts he was deprived of his due

process rights because the fact-finding process was flawed resulting in an arbitrary and

capricious decision. (ECF No. 10 at 2). Specifically, Petitioner claims that the Senior

Hearing Officer produced testimony from Ms. Bermudez under duress, rendering his

disciplinary hearing flawed. (Id. at 8). Second, Petitioner claims that prison officials

failed to meet their burden to present “some evidence” of distribution at Petitioner’s

disciplinary hearing and, at best, he should have only been found guilty of the less

serious charge of possession. (Id. at 6-7).

In their Answer, Respondents deny that the disciplinary hearing was flawed. 

(ECF No. 48). Respondents contend that the Senior Hearing Officer’s findings were

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supported by “some evidence.” (Id.). Likewise, Respondents deny the claim that the

Senior Hearing Officer wrongly classified the rules violation. (Id.). 

A. There is no evidence that the statement of Ms. Bermudez used

against Petitioner was coerced.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, due process requires procedural

protections before a prison inmate can be deprived of a protected liberty interest in

good-time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). Prison

disciplinary proceedings command the least amount of due process along the

prosecution continuum. United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir.

1977). Federal procedural due process is satisfied in connection with a prison

disciplinary hearing, if the petitioner is provided written notice of charges no less

than twenty-four hours before his appearance, a written statement is authored by

the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary

action, and the petitioner is allowed to call witnesses and present documentary

evidence in his defense. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-566. 

Petitioner has not identified any procedural deficiencies. The lodgements

show Petitioner received all pertinent documents more than twenty-four hours prior

to the hearing; the preliminary report was served within fifteen days of discovery;

and the hearing was held within thirty days of service. (See Lodg. 6). Petitioner

requested that witnesses Officer Castro and Officer Ruelas testify. (Id. at 42). At the

time of the hearing Petitioner elected not to call them and instead requested that

Officer Mcnair testify. (Id.). The request was approved by the Senior Hearing

Officer. (Id.). 

In his FAP, Petitioner alleges that the introduction of Ms. Bermudez’s

statment that she passed him bindles of marijuana during a kiss was improper because

it was coerced and elicited under duress. (ECF No. 10 at 8). Use of coerced

statements may render proceedings fundamentally unfair. See William v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). The state court did not directly address

Petitioner’s claim that the statements obtained and used from Ms. Bermudez were

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coerced. (ECF No. 10 at 17). 

Petitioner has presented no evidence in support of his claim that the statements

obtained from Ms. Bermudez were coerced. Petitioner’s unsupported conclusory

allegation is insufficient to raise a genuine issue. Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477,

482 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s due process claim

challenging the use of statements made by Ms. Bermudez be DENIED. 

B. The evidence is insufficient to support the disciplinary committee’s decision that Petitioner is guilty of distribution. 

Petitioner alleges that there was insufficient evidence presented to constitute

“some evidence” of distribution. (See ECF No. 10). Petitioner alleges that the

disciplinary hearing committee wrongly found him guilty of distribution of a

controlled substance under CCR § 3016(c), as defined at § 3000, when the evidence

only supported, at best, a finding that he had possessed a controlled substance in

violation of § 3016(a). (Id.). Petitioner requests that the Court order Calipatria State

Prison to reduce the rules violation charge to possession which carries a lesser

punishment. (Id.). Specifically, Petitioner claims the Senior Hearing Officer

disregarded available testimony including Ms. Bermudez’s statements that Petitioner

did not want or ask her to bring any contraband into the prison, and that no list of

clients or money, no phone numbers, and no recorded conversations were

produced to support the charge of distribution. (Id.).

The rules violation report indicated that Ms. Bermudez used the restroom

located inside the foyer prior to entering the visiting room. (Lodg. 3 at 1). The

location of the restroom gave Ms. Bermudez privacy to retrieve the secreted

contraband. And, there was evidence that Ms. Bermudez passed some amount of

marijuana to Petitioner through a kiss. (Id. at 2-6). There is no evidence of the

amount of marijuana passed in the kiss. Later, Ms. Bermudez was found to have 7

bindles of marijuana contained within a plastic bag secreted in her vagina. (Id. at 2). 

In total, 12 grams of marijuana remained. (Id.). If packaged equally, each bindle

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contained approximately 1.5 grams of marijuana. (Id.). The additional marijuana

was not accessible to Petitioner during the visit. There was no evidence of any

partnership between Petitioner and Ms. Bermudez for further distribution within the

prison nor any evidence that Petitioner was going to further distribute the marijuana

he received. 

The state appellate court denied Petitioner’s claim stating that, “there is some

evidence to support the charge of distribution.” (ECF No. 10 at 17-18). The state

appellate court found that the rules violation report which indicated an officer saw

Ms. Bermudez kiss Petitioner, the fact that Ms. Bermudez had multiple bindles of

marijuana and had passed a bindle to Petitioner, and the green leafy substance

observed on Petitioner’s tongue, was sufficient evidence to support the charge of

distribution. (See Lodg. 3). Petitioner’s claims were denied by the state appellate

court on the basis that Petitioner had solicited or conspired with another in arranging

for the introduction of controlled substance into the institution. (ECF No. 10 at 19). 

In connection with disciplinary actions, a petitioner must demonstrate that the

decision reached was arbitrary and not supported by "some evidence” within the

record. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445

(1985). “The ‘some evidence’ standard is minimally stringent, such that a decision

will be upheld if there is ‘any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.’” Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th

Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (citing Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.

1987)). 

Here, the question is whether there is “some evidence” of distribution. As

defined by the State of California for these purposes, distribution means the sale or

unlawful dispersing, by an inmate or parolee, of any controlled substance; or the

solicitation of or conspiring with others in arranging for, the introduction of controlled

substances into any institution, camp, contract health facility, or community

correctional facility for the purpose of sales or distribution. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

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3000 (2014) (defining distribution for purposes of § 3016(c) - emphasis added). 

Conspiracy to distribute requires proof of “‘an agreement to commit a crime

other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.’ . . . Were the rule otherwise, every

narcotics sale would constitute a conspiracy.” United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814,

819 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, as in other circuits,

mere sales to other individuals do not establish a conspiracy to distribute or possess

with intent to distribute; rather “the government must show that the buyer and seller in

question had an agreement to further distribute the drug.” Id.

The decision of the state appellate court is based upon the facts that a

distribution occurred from Ms. Bermudez to Petitioner and that Ms. Bermudez had

additional bindles of marijuana in her possession. (ECF No. 10 at 19). The charge,

however, required some evidence that Petitioner agreed with Ms. Bermudez or others

to further distribute marijuana within the prison. Inasmuch as the additional

marijuana in Ms. Bermudez’s possession was inaccessible to Petitioner, the mere fact

that Ms. Bermudez had additional bindles provides no evidence of Petitioner’s intent

to distribute. And, there is no evidence that the bindles retained by Ms. Bermudez

were further segmented into smaller bindles indicative of distribution. If so, it would

be possible to infer that the marijuana passed to Petitioner was similarly segmented

providing some evidence of intent to further distribute. 

The only evidence, apart from the additional bindles retained by Ms. Bermudez,

pointing to further distribution is the statement of the investigating officer that Ms.

Bermudez told him that “during the kiss I past [sic] bindles over to him.” (Lodg. 3 at

2). There is no evidence, however, regarding the number of bindles or amount of

marijuana passed by the one kiss. The use of the plural “bindles” by the investigating

officer in reporting on the statements made by Ms. Bermudez is the only evidence in

the record supporting the notion that Petitioner may have received more than one

bindle. Inasmuch as the evidence is that each bindle contained approximately 1.5

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grams of the leafy marijuana, there appears to be some limit as to how much could be

passed in one kiss. There was no evidence of how much marijuana would

demonstrate an intent to further distribute. Also presented was evidence that a cell

phone retrieved from Ms. Bermudez reflected text messages from other inmates at

Calipatria. (ECF No. 10 at 73). There was no evidence, however, tying those contacts

to Petitioner. 

A review of cases in which petitioners challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting a charge of conspiracy to distribute suggests that some additional evidence

of intent to distribute is required. See, e.g., Barboza v. Hill, 2011 WL 6100274 *3

(E.D. Cal. December 7, 2011) (expert testimony presented at the disciplinary hearing

that the 2.77 grams of heroin found in petitioner’s possession indicates possession for

distribution); Banner v. Janda 2014 WL 1953349 *9 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2014) (eight

individually wrapped bindles of heroin, with a total weight of .2 grams, found in

petitioner’s mouth); and, Hunter v. Tilton, 2010 WL 2089377 *7 (E.D. Cal. May 21,

2010) (in addition to marijuana, a letter found in cell detailing a plan to set up a

distribution ring in the prison). 

The Court finds that the evidence relied upon by the disciplinary committee was

insufficient to support its decision that Petitioner conspired to introduce a controlled

substance into the facility for the purpose of sales or distribution. The evidence was

sufficient, however, to support a decision that Petitioner possessed a controlled

substance within the facility. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s due process claim

challenging the classification of the rules violation be GRANTED. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation; (2) Granting Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for a writ of

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habeas corpus; and, (3) ORDERING that Defendant take appropriate administrative

action consistent with this ruling. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than October 17, 2014. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any

reply to objections shall be served and filed by November 3, 2014. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 23, 2014

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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