Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01225/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01225-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Fresno Division

TOM STEVE CORIC, Civil

No.

1:08cv1225 JTM (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

[Doc. Nos. 25 and 26]

vs.

COUNTY OF FRESNO,

Defendant.

On September 24, 2009, Plaintiff, previously incarcerated at Fresno County Jail and proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed an amended civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

[Doc. No. 23.] Plaintiff alleges insufficient funding for jail personnel by the County led to a lack of

supervision resulting in two attacks on him byfellow detainees. Pending before the Court is Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6), filed on October 13, 2009. [Doc. Nos. 25 and 26.]

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition or a statement of no opposition within the allotted time

period. Thus, the Court considers this matter submitted on the papers 

without oral argument.

/ / /

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I. Standard of Review pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) “tests the legal sufficiency

of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on

the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive merits, “a court may [typically] look only

at the face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc.,

284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” [citation omitted]. A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570).

Dismissal also can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990). Allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The court

need not, however, accept as true allegations that are conclusory, legal conclusions, unwarranted

deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979,

988 (9th Cir. 2001); Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(on motion to dismiss court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.”). “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’

but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported byfactual allegations. When there arewell-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume

their veracity and then decide whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. 

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“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949. Where a complaint pleads facts that

are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when a plaintiff has not “nudged

[his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.”). 

II. Discussion

Plaintiff asserts he was severely beaten at Fresno County Jail by fellow detainees while there

were no members of staff present. [Doc. No. 23 at 3.] Plaintiff attributes the lack of on-duty detention

officers to an ongoing policy or custom of the County of Fresno to inadequately fund the jail. [Id.]

Plaintiff further states the County ignored warnings from Fresno County Sheriff Mims about over

crowding and under staffing. [Id. at 2.] He states the severity of his injuries is well documented in

official health records and internal Sheriff’s Department crime reports. [Id.]

Plaintiff asserts municipal liability under “Monell.” [Doc. No. at 3.] In Monell v. Dept. of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that a local governmental entity

may be sued under section 1983 if four conditions are alleged: (1) the plaintiff “possessed a

constitutional right of which he was deprived;” (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts

to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policywas the “moving force”

behind or cause of the constitutional violation. Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900

(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996)). Liability may

be based on a local government’s deliberate acts or omissions. Conn v. City of Reno, No. 07-15572,

2010 WL 48649, at *11, (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 2010). The liability of municipalities does not depend on the

liability of individual officers, “it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made

by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts

the injury, that the government as an entity is responsible under section 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 

(1) Constitutional Right

Although pretrial detainees, such as Plaintiff, are protected under the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts have borrowed Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to analyze the

extent of such protection. Conn, No. 07-15572, 2010 WL 48649, at *11. Underthe Eighth Amendment

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prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994), citing Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558

(CA1 1988). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was beaten at the hands of fellow detainees or

that Plaintiff had a constitutional right to be protected against the beating. [Doc. No. 26 at 6.] 

Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts under Monell that would connect the

beatings to a governmental policy of under funding resulting in a constitutional violation. [Id. at 7.] 

(2) Municipal Policy

“A policy can be one of action or inaction.” Long v. City of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178,

1185 (9th Cir. 2006). As long as a municipality makes a “conscious” choice to act or not act, it will be

subject to section 1983 liability. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). Plaintiff alleges

that despite Sheriff Mims’ “warning” to county officials of the over crowding and under staffing in the

jail, the County continued to inadequately fund the jail, even after Plaintiff was beaten in the absence

of sufficient supervision. [Doc. No. 23 at 2.] Construing this factual allegation as true and in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds it is possible to draw an inference that the County acted

consciously in its budget decisions regarding funding to the jail. 

(3) Deliberate Indifference

Deliberate indifference to a plaintiff’s constitutional right by a municipality may be

established where violation of federal rights was a highly predictable consequence of the alleged

omission of duty. Long, 442 F.3d at 1186. In Farmer, the Supreme Court specified that deliberate

indifference involved more than a mere awareness of facts from which an inference of the particular risk

may be drawn, officials must have actually drawn that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825 at 837. 

Plaintiff alleges, “the County of Fresno were [sic] well aware that they were under staffed[] for

the amount of inmates housed in Fresno County Jail” and “ignored the risk of injuries (in this case

serious) as a result of being under staff [sic].” [Doc. No. 23 at 1.] Plaintiff further states, among other

things, “the Sheriffs dept. had clearlyinformed the Countythat the over-crowding and under staffingwas

a real issue.” [Id. at 2.] 

Again, if the Court assumes the factual content of Plaintiff’s Complaint to be true, the

information about under staffing and over crowding that was given to County officials by Sheriff Mims,

and the attack on Plaintiff itself (documented in letters and medical reports), provide a plausible claim

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that both the Sheriff and County knew, or that it was obvious, that over crowding and under staffing

would eventually lead to a violation of detainees’ constitutional right to protection.

(4) Causation 

There must be “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. According to Plaintiff, had there been sufficient

numbers of officers on duty at the time he was attacked, the attacks would not have happened, nor would

the perpetrators have had the time and opportunity to drag him back to the scene for a second beating

when he attempted to leave for help. Plaintiff asserts “there wasn’t any staff watching out for inmates

safety during the time Plaintiff was [] beaten! Plaintiff wasn’t beaten once (1), but twice (2), Plaintiff

dragged back to a second beating for attempting to leave and find 

someone to Help him. A period of time passed for both attacks to happen.” [Doc. No. 23 at 3.] Taken

as true, and construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, these facts lead to a reasonable

inference that inadequate funding for sufficient staff presence led to the attack on Plaintiff. 

Having assessed the four conditions that need to be alleged under Monell, the Court finds

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, that allows the Court to draw

a reasonable inference of liability on the part of Defendant. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(2009).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [doc. nos. 25 & 26]. 

Defendant shall file an Answer within 14 days from the date this Order is stamped “Filed”

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(4)(A).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 25, 2010

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

 

cc: Honorable Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major

All parties and counsel of record

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