Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00756/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00756-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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 WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

K.B., a minor (by the mother, 

Deborah Beymer), 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-0756-TUC-DTF

ORDER

Plaintiff’s mother brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial

review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). Plaintiff

filed an opening brief and Defendant responded. (Docs. 27, 32.) The parties consented to

exercise of jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Docs. 9,

15.) The Court finds this case should be remanded for further proceedings.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

Plaintiff’s mother filed an application on his behalf for Supplemental Security Income

(SSI) on May 6, 2008. (Administrative Record (AR) 77-80.) Plaintiff alleged disability from

April 8, 2008. (AR 77.) The application was denied upon initial review (AR 44, 46-48) and

on reconsideration (AR 45, 57-60). A hearing was held on January 22, 2010 (AR 34-43),

after which ALJ Larry E. Johnson found that Plaintiff was not disabled (AR 14-30). The

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1-3.)

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Plaintiff was born on February 21, 2003, making him a 5-year-old preschooler at the

alleged onset date of his disability. (AR 77.) Plaintiff’s mother testified that at home Plaintiff

has no control of his emotions and gets very angry but at school he does not get into

conflicts, he does not have friends, he has learning disabilities and insomnia, and he is a

compulsive perfectionist. (AR 37-42.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had three serious

impairments, learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and explosive

disorder. (AR 20.) He further concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met, equaled or functionally equaled one of the listed

impairments. (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff was markedly impaired in only one of the six

functional equivalence domains, acquiring and using information. (AR 24.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A person under the age of 18 will be considered disabled and eligible for

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) if he has a “medically determinable physical or mental

impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The Commissioner

employs a three-step sequential process to evaluate SSI claims for minors. First, if the

claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b).

Second, if the claimant does not have a medically determinable severe impairment(s), in that

the impairment does not cause more than minimal functional limitations, he is not disabled.

20 C.F.R. § 426.924(c). Third, if the claimant’s impairment does not meet, medically equal,

or functionally equal an impairment in the listings, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 924(d).

There are six areas the Commissioner assesses for functional equivalence: acquiring and

using information; attending and completing tasks; interacting and relating with others;

moving about and manipulating objects; caring for yourself; and health and physical wellbeing. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b).

The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive if supported by

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substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla

but less than a preponderance.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). The court may overturn

the decision to deny benefits only “when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are

not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257

F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001). This is so because the ALJ “and not the reviewing court

must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (quoting

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971)); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner’s decision, however, “cannot be

affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Sousa v. Callahan,

143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989)). Reviewing courts must consider the evidence that supports as well as detracts from

the Commissioner’s conclusion. Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give controlling weight to his treating

psychiatrist’s opinion. Plaintiff’s psychiatrist, Michael Mardis, conducted an initial

psychiatric evaluation in December 2007. (AR 187.) The administrative record contains

medical records from Dr. Mardis dated from the initial evaluation through October 2008.

(AR 194, 197, 199, 202, 204, 230, 231, 233, 236, 238.) Dr. Mardis diagnosed Plaintiff with

Intermittent Explosive Disorder, ADHD and Primary Insomnia. (AR 231.) During the course

of treatment, Dr. Mardis tried numerous drugs for Plaintiff’s various symptoms, finding a

combination that seemed to be working effectively in August 2008. (AR 194, 197, 199, 202,

204, 230, 231, 233, 236, 238.) In December 2009, Dr. Mardis opined that Plaintiff had

marked limitations in attending and completing tasks, and health and physical well-being;

and extreme limitations in interacting and relating with others. (AR 255-56.)

The ALJ acknowledged Dr. Mardis as Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist; however, in

reviewing the available medical records the ALJ summarized only Plaintiff’s first

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appointment with Dr. Mardis in December 2007. (AR 21.) The ALJ did not address Dr.

Mardis’s December 2009 opinion. Further, in assessing Plaintiff’s functional limitations, the

ALJ did not consider any information from Dr. Mardis and his records. (AR 23-29.)

Dr. Mardis’s opinion is contradicted by the opinion of examining psychologist

Francisco A. Sanchez, Ph.D. (AR 210-14), and two reviewing psychologists (AR 215-16,

249-50). In an August 2008 examination, Dr. Sanchez diagnosed Plaintiff with ADHD and

Hyperactive Sleep Disorder. (AR 213.) Dr. Sanchez opined that Plaintiff may have problems

acquiring and using information, would probably have mild to moderate problems regarding

completing tasks, and is expected to have some problems in interacting with others but was

able to relate to Dr. Sanchez and reported making a friend on his first day of kindergarten.

(AR 214.) Dr. Goldberg concluded Plaintiff had no marked limitations (AR 217-18), while

Dr. Foster-Valdez found that Plaintiff’s only marked limitation was in acquiring and using

information (AR 251-52).

When there is a conflict between the opinions of a treating physician and an

examining physician, “[i]f the ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating physician,

he or she must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are

based on substantial evidence in the record.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th

Cir. 1987). Here, the ALJ erred because he provided no reasons for rejecting Dr. Mardis’s

opinion, in fact, he wholly failed to address it. Defendant argues this error is harmless

because Dr. Mardis’s assessment is contradicted by the balance of the record including his

treatment notes. There is contradictory evidence in the record, including part of Dr.

Sanchez’s opinion, portions of Plaintiff’s teacher’s opinion, and the treatment records

suggesting medication had stabilized Plaintiff’s symptoms. However, Dr. Mardis’s opinion

was some of the strongest evidence supporting Plaintiff’s application. The Court does not

find the error harmless because the ALJ’s failure to consider Dr. Mardis’s opinion and

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 1 In suggesting the error is harmless, the Commissioner asks this Court to usurp the role

of the ALJ by conducting an independent assessment of the entirety of the record and step

three of the analysis. This is just what Defendant does in her brief, evaluating each of the six

functional domains based on the whole record – something the ALJ failed to do.

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treatment records was not irrelevant to his ultimate decision regarding disability.1 See Stout

v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (an error is harmless only

if a court can conclude with confidence that “no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the

testimony, could have reached a different disability determination.”). The ALJ’s implicit

rejection of Dr. Mardis’s opinion was reversible error because it not based on specific,

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff requests that the Court award benefits. Defendant requests that the Court

deny relief or, if the Court concludes there was reversible error, remand for further

proceedings. A federal court may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand a social security case.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When a court finds that an administrative decision is flawed, the remedy

should generally be remand for “additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Ventura,

537 U.S. 12, 16 (2006) (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744

(1985)); see also Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004). If there are no

outstanding issues because “the record has been developed fully and further administrative

proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the . . . court should remand for an immediate

award of benefits.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). However, if

further proceedings can remedy a defect and the Commissioner is in a better position to

evaluate the evidence than the court, remand is appropriate. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d

172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990).

The Court concludes that further administrative proceedings would be of benefit and

that the ALJ is better to suited to address the conflicting testimony in this case. The ALJ

failed to address in entirety Dr. Mardis’s opinion. Because there are differing opinions in this

case, including variances between Dr. Mardis’s records and his December 2009 opinion, the

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ALJ should re-evaluate the six functional domains considering all of the evidence. See

Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for reconsideration of a

credibility finding). Further, there are no medical records after October 2008. Plaintiff’s

mother indicated during the January 2010 hearing, that Plaintiff was still seeing a doctor.

(See AR 40, 42.) Therefore, the ALJ should obtain any outstanding medical records relevant

to the disability determination.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that this case is remanded to the ALJ for a new hearing and further

proceedings, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S. C. § 405(g). The Clerk of Court should

enter judgment and close this case.

DATED this 26th day of March, 2013.

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