Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02180/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lyle David Stotz, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. CV-14-02180-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Lyle David Stotz seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied 

him disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under sections 216(i), 

223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based 

on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff, a 54-year-old male, has a General Equivalency Degree and previously 

worked as a mechanic and a correctional officer. In September 2011, Plaintiff applied for 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, alleging disability 

beginning August 23, 2011. On April 24, 2013, he appeared with his attorney and 

testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. On May 21, 

2013, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the 

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Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process. 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

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be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final 

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since August 23, 2011. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the 

following severe impairments: bilateral knee osteoarthritis, right upper extremity 

tendonitis, chondromalacia patella,1

 and major depressive disorder. At step three, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 

Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to 

perform: 

light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the 

claimant can frequently perform operation of bilateral foot controls. The 

claimant should never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and occasionally 

climb stairs, crouch, kneel, and crawl; the claimant can frequently balance 

and stoop. The claimant can reach overhead with right upper extremity 

frequently. The claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to nonweather related extreme temperatures of hot and cold; concentrated 

exposure to pulmonary irritants, such as fumes, odors, dusts, gases; 

concentrated exposure to poorly ventilated areas. The claimant should 

avoid concentrated exposure to dangerous machinery with moving 

mechanical part[s], except motor vehicles and should avoid concentrated 

exposure to unprotected heights. The claimant is limited to work that is 

simple, routine, and repetitive. 

 

1

 Chondromalacia patella is a “general term indicating damage to the cartilage under [the] kneecap.” It is also known as patellofemoral pain syndrome. Chondromalacia patella, Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases- conditions/chondromalacia-patella/basics/definition/con-20025960 (last visited April 7, 2015). 

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A.R. 33. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of his past 

relevant work. A.R. 43. At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Plaintiff’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. A.R. 44. 

IV. Analysis. 

 Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision is defective for two reasons: (1) the ALJ 

improperly rejected the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, and (2) the ALJ 

incorrectly found Plaintiff can perform light work. 

A. Weighing Medical Source Evidence. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions of the 

following medical sources: Dr. Robert Kasa, Dr. Scott Kindler, and Dr. David Downs. 

The Court will address the ALJ’s treatment of each opinion below. 

 1. Legal Standard. 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when 

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, 

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective 

evidence). If it is not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating 

or examining physician can be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 

81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A 

contradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician “can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). 

 An ALJ can meet the “specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a 

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detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th 

Cir. 1986). “The ALJ must do more than offer [her] conclusions. [She] must set forth 

[her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” 

Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. The Commissioner is responsible for determining whether a 

claimant meets the statutory definition of disability and does not give significance to a 

statement by a medical source that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.927(d). 

 2. Robert Kasa, M.D. 

 On September 8, 2011, Dr. Robert Kasa, one of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, saw 

Plaintiff for knee pain. A.R. 315-17. The physical examination revealed Plaintiff had 

normal gait, no swelling of either knee, tenderness along the patellofemoral joint, full 

extension and flexion of both knees, and pain when squatting. A.R. 315. X-rays revealed 

“good joint spaces” with “early spurring” on the right knee. Id. Dr. Kasa diagnosed 

Plaintiff with bilateral knee pain and chondromalacia patella, and the radiology report 

noted Plaintiff had mild osteoarthritis of the right knee. A.R. 316-17. He recommended 

Plaintiff do strengthening exercises and stay home from work “until further notice.” A.R. 

317-18. The ALJ afforded the opinion little weight because Dr. Kasa only examined 

Plaintiff once, the clinical findings were inconsistent with a finding that Plaintiff could 

not work, and the opinion was conclusory. A.R. 41-42. She noted that Dr. Kasa’s 

finding of “no work until further notice” may have been in reference to Plaintiff’s work 

as a correctional officer, not all types of employment. In addition, the ALJ noted that the 

ultimate determination of whether a claimant can work is relegated to the Commissioner, 

not a medical source opinion. A.R. 42. 

 Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Kasa’s opinion should have been considered a treating 

source opinion by the ALJ. The length of the treatment relationship is relevant, and the 

regulations provide that the more times a claimant has been treated by the same source 

the more weight will be afforded to the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i). Plaintiff 

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submitted evidence establishing that Dr. Kasa only examined him once, and thus Plaintiff 

did not establish a treating relationship sufficient to demonstrate a “longitudinal picture 

of [his] impairment[.]” Id.

 Plaintiff also asserts that Dr. Kasa found that Plaintiff “does not have the knee 

capacity” to work. Dr. Kasa’s clinical findings, however, differed greatly from his 

ultimate opinion. He found that Plaintiff can fully extend and flex both knees and had 

mild pain in the right knee and none on the left, but nonetheless concluded that Plaintiff 

cannot work. Dr. Kasa’s opinion did not make clear whether Plaintiff was unable to 

perform his job at the time or work at all. The ALJ’s interpretation is rational given the 

fact that Plaintiff was working as a correctional officer when he was examined, a job that 

required much standing and walking. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (“[W]e must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation.”) (internal quotations omitted). In addition, Dr. 

Kasa opined that Plaintiff was “unable to work,” a finding that is not entitled to any 

significance under the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). The ALJ therefore 

discounted Dr. Kasa’s opinion with specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

 3. Scott Kindler, D.O. 

 Dr. Scott Kindler examined Plaintiff twice. On July 25, 2011, Plaintiff was seen 

for abdominal pain. A.R. 308. On September 1, 2011, Plaintiff was seen for bilateral 

knee pain. A.R. 305. The September treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff had 

tenderness on both knees but maintained good range of motion, had unremarkable gait, 

and had no significant crepitus. Id. Dr. Kindler diagnosed bilateral knee pain, referred 

Plaintiff to an orthopedist, and prescribed neoprene knee sleeves. Id. In February 2012, 

Dr. Kindler submitted a four-sentence statement that Plaintiff “suffers from significant 

knee pain” and “should be excused from work as he undergoes evaluation and treatment 

for this condition.” A.R. 354. The ALJ gave little weight to this opinion because it was 

inconsistent with the findings in the treatment notes, not supported by any objective 

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medical evidence, and conclusory. A.R. 42. 

 In her decision, the ALJ set out a detailed summary and analysis of the record 

evidence (A.R. 33-43) which indicated that Dr. Kindler’s opinion was contradicted by the 

opinions of Dr. Matthew Khumalo (A.R. 342-47), Dr. Thomas Disney (A.R. 89-99), and 

Dr. Nadine Keer (A.R. 103-115). Whereas Dr. Kindler opined Plaintiff was unable to 

work, all three sources found Plaintiff capable of at least medium work. Dr. Khumalo 

examined Plaintiff on January 18, 2012, and found Plaintiff could stand/walk 6-8 hours in 

an 8 hour day, climb stairs frequently, and kneel and stoop occasionally. A.R. 345-46. 

He noted Plaintiff had full range of motion in his right knee and partially-restricted range 

of motion in his left knee. A.R. 344. Dr. Disney conducted a records review and opined 

Plaintiff could stand/walk 6-8 hours in an 8 hour day. A.R. 97. He noted spurring in 

Plaintiff’s right knee, but also found that Plaintiff could return to work as a correctional 

officer. A.R. 99. Dr. Keer also found Plaintiff capable of medium work. A.R. 112-15. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should not have afforded any weight to the opinion of 

Dr. Keer because she did not review some of Plaintiff’s treatment records. These records 

were not generated until after Dr. Keer’s review, and the ALJ reasonably relied on Dr. 

Keer’s findings in light of the evidence available at the time. Plaintiff fails to explain 

how the later records would have affected Dr. Keer’s findings. In addition, Dr. Keer’s 

findings were consistent with those of Dr. Khumalo and Dr. Disney, as well as Dr. 

Kindler’s own clinical findings. 

 Dr. Kindler’s opinion that Plaintiff could not work was conclusory and not based 

on the evidence in the record. The statement was submitted almost six months after Dr. 

Kindler last treated Plaintiff where he found minimal limitations. Dr. Kindler’s own 

clinical findings are consistent with those of three other doctors, all of whom found 

Plaintiff capable of at least medium work. Consequently, the ALJ discounted Dr. 

Kindler’s opinion with specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

/ / / 

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 4. David Downs, M.D. 

 On February 11, 2013, Dr. David Downs completed a mental residual functional 

capacity assessment of Plaintiff. A.R. 560-62. Dr. Downs opined Plaintiff had marked to 

extreme limitations in a majority of the functional categories, such as responding 

appropriately to changes in the workplace, understanding and remembering detailed 

instructions, ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, interacting 

appropriately with the public, and responding appropriately to work pressures. A.R. 560. 

He also found that Plaintiff would be off-task 30% of the 8 hour workday, miss 5 days or 

more of work per month, and would be less than 50% efficient during the workday. A.R. 

561. In the “comments/clinical findings” section, Dr. Downs stated “depressed mood, 

poor energy, amotivation, disorganized flow of thought.” Id. The ALJ gave this opinion 

little weight because Dr. Downs only saw Plaintiff one time prior to the assessment, the 

assessment was completed shortly after Plaintiff was released from the hospital for a 

suicide attempt, and the opinion was inconsistent with the medical evidence in the record 

since Plaintiff improved with treatment. A.R. 42. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ gave more weight to the opinions of the state agency 

reviewing and consulting psychologists/psychiatrists and mental consultative examiner. 

But the ALJ explicitly afforded minimal weight to all the opinions because they were not 

privy to additional medical evidence. A.R. 41. Plaintiff offers no evidence that these 

decisions were given greater weight than Dr. Downs’ opinion. In fact the ALJ notes that 

“[g]reater weight is afforded to the treating mental health records,” which include the 

treatment notes from the Phoenix VA Health System where Plaintiff received treatment 

before and after the suicide attempt. 

 Plaintiff also asserts the ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff’s condition was 

improving with treatment. But Dr. Downs’ treatment notes dated February 4, 2013, 

indicate that Plaintiff “feels much better than he did and now he denies any suicidal 

thoughts telling me he is ashamed he ever ‘did that.’” A.R. 635. A couple weeks later, 

Dr. Downs noted that Plaintiff’s “mood is better, minimal depression/more stable than it 

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had been and believes the Perphenazine has been helpful improving his concentration and 

flow of thought.” A.R. 619. On April 2, 2013, Plaintiff stated that he was doing “pretty 

good” and engaging in equine therapy for an hour every day. A.R. 815. He reported a 

euthymic mood and denied thoughts of suicide. Id. In light of this evidence, the ALJ did 

not err in concluding that Dr. Downs’ opinion was inconsistent with the medical evidence 

in the record. The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence. See Rolston v. Astrue, 298 F. App’x 661, 662 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding ALJ’s 

decision to discount treating source opinion because the claimant’s condition improved 

after the opinion was provided and therefore “undermined” the assessment). 

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Plaintiff Could Perform Light Work. 

 Plaintiff contends the ALJ committed legal error by finding Plaintiff could 

perform light work instead of sedentary work. He states Dr. Kasa’s opinion supports a 

finding that Plaintiff cannot stand long enough to perform light work. This argument is 

unpersuasive. The ALJ gave Dr. Kasa’s opinion little weight for several reasons, one of 

which is that it appeared to reference Plaintiff’s job at the time as a correctional officer. 

As stated above, the ALJ provided other specific legitimate reasons for rejecting the 

opinion. The medical evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can 

perform light work, which is more conservative than the opinions of Drs. Khumalo, 

Disney, and Neer, all of whom believed Plaintiff could perform at least medium work. 

Plaintiff does not challenge any of the aforementioned source opinions. Consequently, 

the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 17th day of April, 2015. 

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