Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02902/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02902-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2902

___________

Thomas Moran, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Anne-Marie Clarke; Robert Haar; *

Wayman F. Smith, III; Jeffery Jamison; * Appeal from the United States

Clarence Harmon, comprising the * District Court for the Eastern

Board of Police Commissioners * District of Missouri.

for the City of St. Louis; Ronald *

Henderson; Paul M. Nocchiero; *

Gregory Hawkins; Al Klein; Willie *

Thirdkill, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: October 11, 2005

Filed: April 11, 2006

___________

Before ARNOLD, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Moran, a St. Louis city police officer, sued various police department

officials in their individual and official capacities alleging they violated his federal

substantive due process rights and maliciously prosecuted him under state law. After

a storied, lengthy, and racially-charged history, this case ended with the jury finding

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1

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa, sitting by designation. See Moran v. Clarke, 309 F.3d 516, 518 (8th

Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that a district judge outside of the Eastern District of

Missouri would preside over this case and appointing Judge Pratt by random

drawing). 

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in favor of the defendants. Moran appeals, arguing the district court1

 erred in denying

his motion for a new trial because of error during voir dire. Specifically, Moran

contends that his challenges for cause and peremptory challenges against all of the

black members of the venire should have been granted. We disagree and affirm the

district court's denial of Moran's motion for a new trial. 

I. Background

This case arises from the aftermath of the notorious 1997 beating of Gregory

Bell, a mentally-impaired black teenager, by St. Louis police officers. The incident

catalyzed racial tensions in the community. Moran's lawsuit alleged that city officials,

several of whom are black, made him a scapegoat for Bell's beating because he is

white. Moran contended no evidence linked him to the beating. The factual and

procedural history of this case is well-documented. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638

(8th Cir. 2002); Moran v. Clarke, 309 F.3d 516 (8th Cir. 2002); Moran v. Clarke, 213

F. Supp. 2d 1067 (2002), Moran v. Clarke, 359 F.3d 1058 (2004); Moran v. Clarke,

323 F. Supp. 2d 974 (2004). 

In the most recent district court proceeding, the matter went to trial. During voir

dire, Moran moved to strike for cause two of the four black members of the venire,

Juror Norman-Cook and Juror Greene. In response to questioning, both jurors

expressed strong feelings about the Bell incident. However, both Norman-Cook and

Greene also indicated that they could be fair and impartial, despite the fact that doing

so would be difficult. The district court denied the challenges for cause.

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At the end of voir dire, and on his own initiative, Tate expressed his belief that

the attorneys had not been clear about what the case was about. Moran claims that this

statement was hostile and that Tate was also slightly antagonistic during voir dire.

Defendants dispute both claims.

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Moran then attempted to strike all four black members of the venire with

peremptory challenges. In response, the defendants challenged the proposed strikes

under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Moran's counsel proffered race-neutral

explanations for the proposed strikes. First, Moran stated that Norman-Cook, an

intensive care unit (ICU) nurse, said that images of Bell's beating gave her flashbacks

to other seriously injured persons she has treated over the years as an ICU nurse.

Moran noted that Norman-Cook had a mentally-challenged nephew. Norman-Cook

stated several times that she had very strong feelings about the case, but she also

stated that she could base her judgment of the case on the facts presented in court

despite those feelings. Moran's peremptory challenge was granted with respect to

Norman-Cook.

Second, Moran's race-neutral reasons for excluding Juror Greene were Greene's

recollection of emotion and anger surrounding the Bell incident and belief that he

would have trouble being impartial. Third, Moran noted Juror Tate's unemployment

and that he appeared hostile and antagonistic2

 as race-neutral reasons for using a

peremptory challenge. Fourth, Moran provided two race-neutral reasons for the

peremptory challenge to Juror Jones: (1) Jones testified during voir dire that he had

served on a federal jury recently but could not remember the judge's name or the case

outcome, and (2) Jones indicated in his voir dire questionnaire that he watched TV but

testified that he did not remember hearing about the widely televised Bell incident.

Notwithstanding the foregoing proffered race-neutral reasons for striking Jurors

Greene, Tate, and Jones, the district court concluded that the reasons proffered were

pretext. The district court rejected Moran's race-neutral reasons without requiring

defendants to state why the reasons proffered were pretext. 

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Following trial on the merits, the jury found in favor of the defendants. Moran

then moved for a new trial, alleging error in the denial of his for-cause challenges and

peremptory challenges. In its published order denying the motion, the district court

reaffirmed its disbelief that the reasons for the peremptory challenges were race

neutral. The court noted that "Mr. Greene was hardly the only member of the venire

panel who recalled the Bell incident, yet he was the only venire person [Moran] chose

to strike because of his memory." 323 F. Supp. 2d at 981. The court further observed

that striking Greene because of his memory was difficult to reconcile with the attempt

to strike Jones due to his lack of memory of the Bell incident. The court also stated

that there was no support for Moran's contention that Tate should be struck because

of hostility or unemployment. Moran now appeals. We affirm.

II. Discussion

A. Challenges for Cause

Moran appeals the district court's denial of his challenges for cause against

Jurors Norman-Cook and Greene. We review denial of strikes for cause under an

abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Amerson, 938 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir.

1991). Appellants must clear a high hurdle to obtain reversal of a district court's

decision regarding the dismissal of a juror for cause. The courts presume that a

prospective juror is impartial, and a party seeking to strike a venire member for cause

must show that the prospective juror is unable to lay aside his or her impressions or

opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. United States

v. Wright, 340 F.3d 724, 733 (8th Cir. 2003). Essentially, to fail this standard, a juror

must profess his inability to be impartial and resist any attempt to rehabilitate his

position. See id.

Both Norman-Cook and Greene expressed that their recollection of the Bell

beating affected them emotionally. Both acknowledged difficulty being impartial,

given their strong emotions. Nonetheless, both consistently stated that they could be

impartial. The district court accepted the genuineness of the jurors assurances and

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As a related matter, the district court's failure to strike Norman-Cook for cause

is moot. Norman-Cook was subsequently dismissed by the court after Moran's

successful peremptory challenge. Therefore, the denial of the motion to strike her for

cause is moot, especially since Moran had unused peremptory challenges remaining

at the end of voir dire, i.e., it could not be said that he suffered any prejudice by

having to use a peremptory challenge to strike Norman-Cook. See United States v.

Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 892 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding there was no abuse of discretion by

district court's refusal to strike a juror for cause because the juror ultimately did not

serve on the jury and "the necessity of using a peremptory challenge does not establish

actual prejudice"); cf. Fetterly v. Paskett, 163 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1998)

(holding that defendant did not suffer actual prejudice due to pretrial publicity in part

because defendant did not use all of his peremptory challenges). 

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denied Moran's motion to strike these two jurors for cause. Given the district court's

superior position to gauge the jurors' credibility, we cannot say that the district court

abused its discretion.3

B. Peremptory Challenges

Moran also appeals the district court's denial of his attempted peremptory

challenges to all four black members of the venire. Specifically, the district court

allowed one black juror, Norman-Cook, to be stricken by peremptory challenge but

denied the dismissal of the other three, concluding the race-neutral reasons advanced

by Moran to be pretextual and therefore prohibited by Batson, 476 U.S. 79, and its

progeny. 

In Batson, the Supreme Court set forth a three-step analysis for peremptory

challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "First,

the opponent of the peremptory challenge must establish a prima facie showing that

the challenge is discriminatory." United States v. Wolk, 337 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir.

2003). Second, "[t]he proponent of the peremptory challenge must then articulate a

race-neutral explanation for the challenge." Id. Third, "[i]f a race-neutral explanation

is offered, the challenger must show that the explanation is a pretext for

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discrimination." Id. We review the denial of a peremptory challenge pursuant to

Batson for clear error. United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1365 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Moran directed all of his challenges—both for cause and peremptory—at the

four black members of the venire. Thus, the defendants established a prima facie case

under Batson, as the attempt to strike all black members of the venire and no one else

raises an inference of a discriminatory purpose. Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 299

(2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the prosecution's attempt to use all of its for-cause and

peremptory challenges to strike black and Hispanic jurors established a prima facie

case of discrimination under Batson); Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 346–47 (2d

Cir. 2003) (holding that it was "objectively unreasonable" for the state appellate court

to hold that petitioner failed to make a prima facie case under Batson where all five

prospective black jurors were eliminated by peremptory challenge). In Batson, the

Supreme Court stated that "a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the

particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S.

at 97. This case involves a pattern of using challenges to strike all prospective black

jurors from the venire. By finding that this pattern established a prima facie case, we

do not suggest that numbers alone create or negate a prima facie case under Batson.

See Luckett v. Kemma, 203 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Although the number

of African-Americans struck is relevant to determining whether a defendant has made

a prima facie case, that evidence alone is insufficient to negate or create such a case.").

In Luckett, the defendant's Batson challenged rested primarily on the fact that "the

prosecutor had used most of his peremptory challenges against potential AfricanAmerican jurors." Id. We held that numbers alone could not establish a prima facie

case. Here, by contrast, Moran's attempt to strike all of the black members of the

venire and no one else constituted a pattern of using challenges that gave rise to an

inference of discrimination.

Moran proffered race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges under the

second step of Batson. The standard that a party defending a Batson challenge must

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meet is extremely low. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (stating that the

second step of Batson "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even

plausible"). Moran's stated concerns about Juror Norman-Cook's vivid recollections

of Bell's injuries and the flashbacks to her own experiences as an ICU nurse, as well

as the fact that she had a mentally challenged nephew, were race neutral. By citing

concerns over Juror Greene's repeated expressions of emotion and anger over the Bell

incident, Moran also provided a facially race-neutral reason for the exclusion of

Greene. Also, Moran provided facially race-neutral reasons for striking Juror Tate by

expressing concern over Tate's unemployment and his allegedly antagonistic behavior

during voir dire. Finally, Moran provided race-neutral reasons for striking Juror Jones

by expressing concern over Jones's inability to remember key facts about his recent

jury service, as well as his lack of recollection of the widely publicized Bell incident

despite claiming that watching television was a primary hobby. 

This case turns on part three of the Batson analysis and presents this court with

a difficult issue. In a typical case, once the party making the peremptory challenge

states a race-neutral justification under the second part of Batson, the opposing party

"may then attempt to prove the facially valid reason is mere pretext and that the real

reason for the strike was discrimination." United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1365

(8th Cir. 1996) (citing Elem, 514 U.S. at 767); accora d United States v. Jones, 245

F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261 (8th Cir.

1996)).This procedure is consistent with the key principle that "the ultimate burden

of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the

opponent of the strike." Elem, 514 U.S. at 768. 

Yet, in an exceptional case, as here, this principle comes into tension with a

more fundamental judicial principle: determinations of credibility, including those

surrounding voir dire, are peculiarly within the province of the district court. See

Elliott, 89 F.3d at 1365 ("On appeal, we are mindful of the fact that evaluation of the

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4

Indeed, the district court began its discussion by acknowledging that race

"played an enormous role in this case." Moran, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 980. The court then

quoted Judge Shaw's statement that "[t]his case starts with race, becomes embroiled

with race and climaxes with race." Id. (quoting Moran v. Clarke, 213 F. Supp. 2d

1067, 1074–76 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (Judge Shaw's opinion of voluntary recusal)). 

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prosecutor's state of mind based upon demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within

a trial judge's province." (citations and quotations omitted)). 

The district court departed from the script of the typical Batson play. The court

did not turn to the challenger of the peremptory challenge to put forth evidence

probative of pretext. The district court found the justifications to be pretext with

respect to Jurors Greene, Tate, and Jones without hearing argument from the

defendants regarding why Moran's race-neutral justifications were pretext. The

question we face is whether this judicial determination of pretext in a Batson

challenge without first demanding proof of pretext from the proponent of the

challenge greater than that implicit in the evidence of the prima facie case requires

reversal. 

Given the extraordinary nature of this case, we cannot say that the district

court's findings were clearly erroneous. Race became a factor in this case at its very

inception. The plaintiff's due process claim itself arises from his belief that race

influenced the city's decision-making process in the aftermath of a police incident

affecting a racial minority. The racial undertones and tensions permeating this case

would not have escaped the notice of the district court.4

 The preferred procedure for

the district court would have been to take the third Batson step and provide the

defendants the opportunity to show pretext. But in this exceptional case, we cannot

say that a new trial is warranted, where the district court decided the Batson query

based upon its credibility assessment of the proffered reasons, and, where no argument

is made that the subsequent trial lacked fairness because of juror bias. We give the

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same deference to the district court's decision whether it is to reject or approve a

Batson challenge.

We emphasize the rare nature of this case and the importance of making

detailed findings on the record in support of a ruling on a peremptory challenge under

Batson. U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc., v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320 F.3d 809, 814

(8th Cir. 2003) ("We strongly urge, however, as we have in the past, that trial judges

make on-the-record rulings articulating the reasoning underlying a determination on

a Batson objection."). The First Circuit has articulated the importance of the general

procedure as follows: 

Indicating these findings on the record has several salutary effects. First,

it fosters confidence in the administration of justice without racial

animus. Second, it eases appellate review of a trial court's Batson ruling.

Most importantly, it ensures that the trial court has indeed made the

crucial credibility determination that is afforded such great respect on

appeal. 

United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 1994). 

In conclusion, we affirm the district court's denial of Moran's motion for a new

trial. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moran's challenges for

cause, and it did not commit clear error by denying three of Moran's peremptory

challenges given the peculiar racial backdrop of this case.

BEAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

While this case has gone on far too long without a resolution, the matter

nonetheless required the selection of a jury that was fair to all parties, not just the

defendants. Since that did not occur, I respectfully dissent.

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One such participant stated, "only Jesus can count [how many times I hit

Bell]." Trial Tr., Vol. III at 147.

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I am in disagreement with the court on only two issues, one of which requires

reversal. I will discuss the issues in order of their importance to equitable jury

selection, as I see it.

While I believe both juror number 21, Ms. Norman-Cook, and juror number 4,

Mr. Greene, should have been stricken for cause, the district court more clearly

committed reversible error in refusing to grant Moran's peremptory challenge of

Greene. Explanation of this conclusion requires the elucidation of a few important

facts and the repetition of some of the court's own observations.

Plaintiff/Appellant Moran, a Caucasian police sergeant, alleges that

defendants/appellees, St. Louis City officials, the majority of whom are AfricanAmerican, made him a scapegoat in their effort to diffuse the public indignation,

especially within the African-American community, resulting from Mr. Bell's beating.

Ante at 2.

Although, as noted in my opinion in Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 645 (8th

Cir. 2002), the record does not clearly set forth the race of the various police officers

who preceded Moran to the scene of the beating and who by their own admission

struck and brutalized Bell,5

 the evidence suggests that at least some, if not all, of these

early arriving officers were African-American. It is clear that the police chief who led

the investigation of the incident and referred Moran for criminal prosecution was

African-American. It is also clear that Moran was the only St. Louis police officer of

any race recommended for criminal prosecution, a prosecution that failed. 

The court correctly notes that "[t]he racial undertones and tensions permeating

this case," ante at 8, were enormous. In this regard, the court quotes the first assigned

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trial judge from his opinion of recusal who said, "[t]his case starts with race, becomes

embroiled with race and climaxes with race." Ante at n.4. Unfortunately, this may

have been an understatement.

Thus, it was within this framework that the voir dire, jury selection and trial was

to be undertaken. For clarity, I set forth, in part, the record of what was said by and

about juror Greene and several of the other venirepersons of both races during voir

dire:

Mr. Goldstein [plaintiff's attorney]:

Juror No. 4, Mr. Greene, do you remember the incident that I started to ask

about?

Juror No. 4: Very vaguely.

Mr. Goldstein: Do you remember that–an occasion, two officers answered

the burglar alarm and that what had happened was that a

melee ensued and that a young man was injured? Do you

remember anything further about that case?

Juror No. 4: Do you want me to recall what I remember?

Mr. Goldstein: Sure, absolutely.

Juror No. 4: I remember officers responded to a burglary in progress,

and apparently there was a – from my recollection again –

there was a mentally-challenged man on the roof, and

apparently he lived there and the officers didn't know that,

but since he was mentally impaired, he was unable to

explain the situation to the officers. That's all I remember.

Mr. Goldstein: Do you remember that Tom Moran, the Plaintiff in this

matter, was indicted for criminal offenses on account of

that incident?

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Juror No. 4: No, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Goldstein: And you are aware that that event had media coverage?

Juror No. 4: Yes. That's how I heard of it.

Mr. Goldstein: Both the written press and television coverage?

Juror No. 4: Yes.

Mr. Goldstein: Do you remember any of the press coverage?

Juror No. 4: No.

Mr. Goldstein: Is there anything about what you remember that would

keep you from giving a fair trial to Tom Moran and the

claims that you've already been told that he has made

concerning malicious prosecution and abuse of process?

Juror No. 4: Absolutely not.

Mr. Goldstein: Thank you.

Voir Dire Tr., Vol. I at 72-74.

Mr. Dunne [Defendants' Attorney]:

Anybody else? Could you raise your hands again, those of you who recall the

incident?

Would anybody answer that question differently than Miss Lynch answered it?

In other words, is there anything about what you recall about the incident that

I've just described that coming into court his morning, you don't believe it's

possible for you to listen to the evidence that you're going to hear in this case

and base a verdict on the claims being brought by Mr. Moran against the

Defendants in this case on the evidence that you hear here and give each side

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to this case a fair and impartial trial which is what your obligation as jurors is

and what we're entitled to receive from you, frankly? Is there anybody who

would have a hard time doing that, questions whether they can do that, or are

simply prepared to tell me that you can't do that?

Is there anybody who feels that way? Mr. Greene?

Juror No. 4 [Mr. Greene]:

Just being honest. Now that we're talking about the case more, – 

Mr. Dunne: Right.

Juror No. 4: – I'm remembering the images that were shown on TV and

how badly this young man was beaten. And going on that

information and what I'm remembering, it would be hard

because those images stick with you.

Mr. Dunne: It was a vivid and painful incident at the time.

Juror No. 4: Exactly.

Mr. Dunne: Mr. Bell's an African-American person. Do you recall that?

Juror No. 4: Yes.

Mr. Dunne: All right. You know, you say, "I'm just being honest."

Well, to be perfectly frank with all of you, we're entitled to

that from everyone. Okay? It's like somebody saying,

"Well, I could be sort of fair." There's no such thing as

being sort of fair. We need jurors who can be fair, be

completely fair, fair to Mr. Moran. That's what he's entitled

to. Fair to the Defendants; that's what we're entitled to.

Is there anybody that feels the same way as Mr. Greene that

what they recall about the incident is painful for them and

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that regardless of what the evidence in this case were, they

couldn't give a fair and impartial trial to both sides?

The Court: Mr. Dunne, I think Miss Norman-Cook has her hand raised.

Id. at 93-94.

Mr. Dunne: We've heard from some of you who have told me that it

would be difficult for you to [be impartial], that this just

isn't the case for you, so to speak.

Is there anybody else who has not expressed those thoughts

who feels them?

(Silence)

Thank you.

Mr. Greene, I want to be very clear about something with

you, sir. I don't mean to pick on you by talking to you

again. Are you telling me that based on your recollection

of the case, that you could not set your feelings aside, your

memories aside, and listen to the evidence in this case and

return a verdict based on the evidence you hear?

Juror No. 4: I'm not saying it would be impossible. I'm just saying it

would be difficult because that did stir a lot of emotions in

me which I'm sure it did in a lot of people because, like I

say, you just can't erase that. And I'm sure that information

is going to be brought up, and it's going to rekindle some

memories. Like I said, it's not impossible but it would be

difficult.

Mr. Dunne: And I don't want to assume anything is true, but let's face it.

This was something that made you angry at the time it

happened. Am I right about that?

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Ms. Norman-Cook had testified that she remembered the Bell incident and that

it would be difficult to sit as a juror in the case. She also stated that she worked in an

intensive care unit and that she had a retarded nephew. Voir Dire Tr., Vol. 1 at 96-98.

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Juror No. 4: Oh, by all means.

Mr. Dunne: I mean it's possible to stir emotions of pleasure or

happiness, but that's not what we're talking about here.

This is something that made you angry.

Juror No. 4: Oh, definitely.

Mr. Dunne: And although you're saying it could be difficult, could you?

Juror No. 4: Yes.

Mr. Dunne: And, if chosen, would you?

Juror No. 4: Yes.

Id. at 99-100.

Mr. Dunne was, of course, one of the defendants' attorneys and his job was, in

part, to attempt to rehabilitate any venireperson his client might wish to have on the

jury. And, as I will later demonstrate, it is apparent that the defendants wanted Mr.

Greene and all other African-American venirepersons on the jury, while Moran, to the

contrary, wanted all Caucasian venirepersons as jurors, if possible.

At completion of voir dire, Mr. Karsh, one of Moran's lawyers, moved to strike

for cause several venirepersons, including Greene. Karsh explained specifically that

"Juror No. 4, Mr. Greene, and Juror No. 21, Miss Norman-Cook [also an AfricanAmerican venireperson]6

 both testified to their extreme difficulty in remaining fair

during this trial on the basis of the images they have of a beaten Gregory Bell. They

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During his response to the Batson objection, Karsh, for his nondiscriminatory

showing in support of the peremptory challenge, pointed out that Mr. Tate was

unemployed and had expressed some antagonism toward counsel for the parties which

was "somewhat offputting." Voir Dire Tr., Vol. I at 120-21.

8

The Clerk of Court presented venirepersons numbered one through forty to the

district judge for jury selection. All forty venire members were questioned at voir

dire. After challenges, both cause and peremptory, were sustained or overruled, the

lowest-numbered twelve venirepersons remaining were seated to hear the case. Jurors

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17 and 18 were selected.

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both indicated that they were angry, and setting aside their anger would clearly be an

enormous problem." Id. at 113. The motions to strike for cause were overruled.

Karsh then sought to peremptorily challenge jurors numbered 4 (Mr. Greene),

8, 17 (Mr. Tate)7

 and 21 (Ms. Norman-Cook), all of the African-American

venirepersons. At this point, Dunne interposed a Batson objection to the proposed

strikes on behalf of the defendants. Id. at 119. Karsh then advanced (as step two of

the Batson procedure requires) legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for seeking to

strike the potential jurors. He again specifically pointed out that "Mr. Greene testified

that his recollections on the Gregory Bell incident made him angry and he [Greene]

was very hesitant about being able to put aside his emotions and render a fair and

impartial verdict." Id. at 120. At the conclusion of this discussion, the court, without

requiring or permitting anything more from any party, granted the Norman-Cook

peremptory challenge and said, "[t]he other three are overruled. I think those are not

legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. They're staying." Id. at 121. When Karsh

attempted to "re-emphasize" Greene's anger, the court stopped him, stating, "I made

my ruling, counsel. You made your record." Id. Moran's lawyers attempted no

further strikes and the three challenged African-Americans remained in the venire to

be considered by assigned number when the jury was finally seated. Being a low

number, juror number 4, Mr. Greene, became a member of the jury after remaining

unchallenged by the defendants.8

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See ante at n.4.

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The defendants then peremptorily challenged jurors 10, 11, 14 and 16, all

Caucasian venirepersons, and all potential jurors with lower juror numbers than Mr.

Tate, juror number 17, one of the African-American venirepersons sought to be

challenged by Moran.9

 Thus, these peremptory challenges, when sustained by the

court, insured that Tate would be seated as a juror. When Karsh, in turn, objected that

the defendants' strikes were all Caucasians, and noted that nothing was developed at

voir dire to support the strikes, Dunne, on behalf of the defendants, stated "Your

Honor, it's in the nature of peremptory challenges that they may be offered for any or

no reason." Id. at 124. Adding, upon interjection by the court the notion of race, age

and gender discrimination, "[u]nless–I was about to add, your Honor, the proposed

venire person being challenged is a member of a protected class [apparently referring

only to the African-Americans] whose right to serve ought to be protected by the

Court." Id. When the court noted to Karsh that "all that's left [for the defendants] is

Caucasians," id. at 123, Karsh corrected the court by noting that jurors 4, 8 and 17, the

African-American venirepersons he had attempted to strike, remained available. 

Of course, when reminded by Karsh that Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,

500 U.S. 614 (1991), can be read to extend Batson-type protections to all races, at

least in criminal cases, the district court, while agreeing with Dunne that no

nondiscriminatory reasons were actually needed for his peremptory challenges of the

Caucasian venirepersons, id. at 124-25, required Dunne, apparently out of an

abundance of caution, to respond to Karsh's objections as to jurors 10, 11, 14 and 16.

See, e.g., United States v. Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[B]y

its terms Batson is not limited to members of racial minorities."); Gov't of Virgin Is.

v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[W]e will not read Batson to make a

distinction between white and black defendants.").

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According to the record, the reasons advanced by Dunne and the district court's

response to the showing were as follows:

Mr. Dunne: Your Honor, Juror No. 10 is employed as a professor. He

had 32 years as a teacher and principal in the secondary

Mehlville School District and then works as a college

professor now. He also teaches a class in Business Law.

It's my belief that such a person tends to have stronger

opinions which I prefer not among juries that I select in the

school teaching profession.

Juror No. 11 apparently frequents a tavern near the place

where I also live. He objected to karaoke, which I happen

to enjoy, and so I didn't like his points of view where those

matters were concerned. I also thought that Juror No. 11

had a somewhat, although refreshingly flippant but a

somewhat of a flippant sense of humor.

Juror No. 14, Miss Giessing, said that she tended to be or

was in the past politically active and also made a comment

and – something about what she considered to be trivial

lawsuits going to trial. I didn't like those comments. I

realized after voir dire concluded that I know Gail

Hadican's [juror number 16] husband. He's an attorney here

in town, and I didn't want to be in a position of having Mrs.

Hadican serve on a jury that I was trying a case in front of.

The Court: Okay. I think those are all legitimate nondiscriminatory

reasons.

Voir Dire Tr., Vol. I at 125-126.

The Caucasian venirepersons were summarily stricken without permitting

Karsh to attempt to make a showing of discriminatory animus on the part of Dunne

in his making of the challenges of the lower-numbered Caucasian venirepersons.

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Thus, it is clear from the record that both sides wanted to use peremptory

challenges to racially shape the jury. Only the defendants were allowed to

successfully do this in any discernible measure.

Although not material to my dissent, I digress to note that this may have been

one of those rare cases in which the intended remedial thrust of Batson does not fully

contemplate the deeper issues in a case so permeated with race. That being said,

perhaps both parties should have been permitted to use more liberalized bases for

"cause" challenges accompanied by the elimination of "peremptory" challenges

altogether. See Hon. Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v.

Kentucky: A Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. Rev. 361, 374 (1989-90); State v.

Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999) ("[I]n a prosecution 'in which race by

definition is a patent factor [, race] must be taken into account to assure a fair trial.'")

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Harris, 716 A.2d 458 (N.J. 1998) (Handler,

J., dissenting)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (permitting use of minority

racial preferences in law school selection process that rejected a white female

applicant whose purely academic qualifications exceeded those of a student who was

admitted based in part on diversity). 

Assuming, as I must, that Batson fits this case, I turn directly to the district

court's major error. Dunne was, of course, correct in stating that, absent race, age and

gender considerations, a peremptory challenge may be asserted "for any or no reason."

Voir Dire Tr., Vol. 1 at 124. He was also correct in lodging a Batson objection for his

clients when all African-Americans were challenged. The district court, however,

erred by not applying Batson even-handedly to both parties' peremptory challenges,

as precedent requires. And, contrary to the court's analysis, our review is not limited

to clear error. We must review not only the trial judge's conclusions about the reasons

given for the strikes, but we must first consider de novo whether the judge correctly

applied the law established by Batson and subsequent cases.

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I agree with the court that there is precedent for the proposition that the

challenging of all African-American venirepersons by a Caucasian plaintiff is

sufficient evidence of racial motivation to establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination. But, a prima facie case is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish

purposeful racial discrimination if nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reasons for the

challenges are advanced by the plaintiff. At the same time, the defendants' proposed

(and ultimately successful) challenges of the four lower-numbered Caucasian

venirepersons were also sufficient to establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination. This is so because it was obvious that the result intended was to

maximize the number of African-Americans seated on the jury. Thus, contrary to the

trial court's initial inclinations, the defendants likewise had a duty to advance

nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reasons for the proposed strikes. 

More importantly, however, after examination of Karsh's reasons for the

proposed peremptory strikes, the district court obviously recognized that the

articulation concerning Ms. Norman-Cook was sufficient. The Norman-Cook

showing was based upon her own testimony concerning the Bell incident. The

challenge was properly sustained. Mr. Greene presented almost exactly the same set

of circumstances except that he did not work at an ICU or have a relative with a

disability. There was absolutely nothing incredible about Karsh's recitation of

Greene's testimony. It was straight from the evidence before the court. The Karsh

presentation clearly answered, under step two of the Batson procedure, the defendants'

prima facie theory. Accordingly, any presumption of discrimination based upon a

prima facie showing totally disappeared from the case. While the substance of the

explanations advanced by Karsh was properly evaluated by the trial court for

discriminatory animus, even after the prima facie case was gone, no such animus

emerged from the reasons stated by Karsh. Under any reasonable credibility

evaluation, the justifications advanced by Karsh as to Mr. Greene were clearly

nonpretextual. For instance, no other unchallenged venirepersons of any race who

remembered the Bell incident expressed problems with giving Moran a fair trial.

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Indeed, the evidence tended to run in another direction, that is, toward a possibility

that Greene would have trouble giving Moran a fair trial. In fact, the recitation of

Greene's own testimony about his concerns over his ability to be fair to Moran

because of his anger over Bell's beating tended to negate, not establish, an invidious

racial reason for the Greene challenge. And, though the defendants were not required

to do so, they did not offer any information to the contrary. To be sure, Greene was

weakly rehabilitated by Dunne, the defendants' counsel but, to be fair, only barely so.

As the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, rehabilitation is only sparse evidence of ability

to fairly serve. "In determining whether a district court has abused its discretion in

refusing to remove a juror for actual bias, this court accords significant weight to a

juror's definitive statement that he can serve impartially. Nevertheless, 'the juror's

assurances that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the accused's rights.'"

United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Murphy

v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975)) (citation omitted). In the same vein, I disagree

when the court says that during voir dire "both [Norman-Cook and Greene]

consistently stated they could be impartial." Ante at 4. They were, at best, equivocal

on the issue. Neither do I agree that the Batson inquiry permits a trial judge's

credibility determinations to trump the due process dimensions inherent in seating a

fair jury. I could find no precedent supporting such a balancing act and, if it can

occur, constitutional rights must surely prevail.

In any event, the trial judge overruled Karsh's strike of Greene not because the

defendants proved "purposeful racial discrimination" as the law requires, Purkett v.

Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) or because the defendants showed that Moran's

reasons were pretext for discrimination, United States v. Wolk, 337 F.3d 997, 1007

(8th Cir. 2003). Rather, the trial court improperly stopped at step two of the Batson

process (see ante at 7 concerning the three steps of the Batson analysis), collapsing

step three into step two, something the Supreme Court has said may not be done. In

Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 1994), this court said,

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 [W]here the prosecution strikes a prospective juror who is a member of

the defendant's racial group, solely on the basis of factors which are

facially irrelevant to the question of whether that person is qualified to

serve as a juror in the particular case, the prosecution must at least

articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for believing those factors

will somehow affect the person's ability to perform his or her duties as

a juror.

25 F.3d at 683. Not so, said the Supreme Court. "If a race-neutral explanation is

tendered [at step two], the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the

opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination." Purkett, 514 U.S.

at 767. The Court explained that at the second step, the reason given does not have

to be persuasive or even plausible. "'[T]he issue is the facial validity of the

prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the

prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'" Id. at 768

(emphasis added) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)).

In this case, the articulation by plaintiff's attorney was on its face race-neutral,

relevant, accurate and nonpretextual. The reasons given were certainly not inherently

discriminatory. Rather, the reasons abundantly established that Mr. Greene was a very

problematic juror, who would very possibly not be fair to Moran given Greene's

admitted state of mind over the Bell incident.

Karsh's peremptory challenge of Mr. Greene should have been sustained. It was

error not to do so.

Were I able to apply a "harmless" error review to the district court's error, I

would still be inclined to reverse because, as the court stated, "the racial undertones

and tensions permeating this case" were enormous. Ante at 8. On the other hand, I

likewise agree with the court that the "storied, lengthy" history of the case suggests

an ending of some kind would be in order. Ante at 1. But, courts consistently find

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that the existence of even one juror who should have been either seated or excluded

is a structural defect requiring automatic reversal. Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d

541, 547 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); Ford v.

Norris, 67 F.3d 162, 170 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that peremptory exclusion of

eligible juror violates Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) and is structural

defect); United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that

erroneous combination of second and third steps of Batson which resulted in denial

of valid peremptory challenge resulted in structural error and new trial); and United

States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1143 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("'The denial or

impairment of the right [of peremptory challenge] is reversible error without a

showing of prejudice.'" (alteration in original)) (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 218). The

Annigoni court stated:

every other circuit to address this issue agrees that the erroneous

deprivation of a [party's] right of peremptory challenge requires

automatic reversal. See United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 221

(5th Cir. 1993) ("The denial or impairment of the right to exercise

peremptory challenges is reversible error without a showing of

prejudice."), abrogated on other grounds by J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.

127 (1994); Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d

1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It is reversible error to deny a party to a

jury trial the peremptory challenges to which the rules of procedure

entitle him . . . ."); United States v. Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.

1989) (affirming the automatic reversal rule described in Swain, and

stating that Batson "does not call into question this aspect of Swain.");

United States v. Ricks, 802 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986) (same); Carr v. Watts, 597 F.2d 830, 832

(2d Cir. 1979) (impairment of right of peremptory challenge is

"reversible error without a showing of prejudice"). Other circuits have

recognized the automatic reversal rule in dicta. See United States v.

Cambara, 902 F.2d 144, 147 (1st Cir. 1990) ("restricting a defendant's

use of the lawful number of peremptory challenges is reversible error if

a challenge for cause is erroneously denied") [abrogated on other

grounds by United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000)];

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United States v. Mosely, 810 F.2d 93, 96 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484

U.S. 841 (1987) (same).

96 F.3d at 1141 (some citations omitted).

Here, we had a venireperson seated, Mr. Greene, who should have been

excluded. Precedent rightly demands that invidious racial reasons should never be

used to exclude an otherwise qualified juror. But, on the other hand, precedent does

not support the seating of a properly challenged juror simply because of his minority

racial status. Justice Thurgood Marshall in his eloquent Batson concurrence stated

"Our criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the

accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the

state the scales are to be evenly held.'" Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986)

(quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). The same principle holds true

in a civil case such as this.

In my view, the scales were not so evenly held in the jury selection in this case.

Accordingly, I dissent.

______________________________

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