Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55041/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55041-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEITH ANDREW MITCHELL,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ELVIN VALENZUELA, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 12-55041

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00562-

RGK-FFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 8, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed July 1, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

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2 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

Vacating the district court’s judgment dismissing a habeas

corpus petition and remanding, the panel held that a motion

to stay and abey a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition to permit

exhaustion of some of the petitioner’s claims in state court is

generally (but not always) dispositive as to the unexhausted

claims, and that a magistrate judge therefore generally cannot

hear and determine such a motion, but rather must submit a

report and recommendation to the district court.

The panel held that the magistrate judge’s order in this

case was effectively dispositive of the unexhausted claims

and, therefore, beyond his authority.

COUNSEL

Sean Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Michael David

Weinstein (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender, and

Mark Raymond Drozdowski, Deputy Federal Public

Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles,

California for Petitioner-Appellant.

Kamala Harris, Attorney General, Dane Gillette, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Lance Winters, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Michael Johnsen, Supervising Deputy

Attorney General, Kim Aarons (argued) and Ana Duarte,

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 3

Deputy Attorneys General, Office of the California Attorney

General, Los Angeles, California for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

A magistrate judge denied petitioner Keith Andrew

Mitchell’s motion to stay and abey his 28 U.S.C. § 2254

habeas corpus petition while he exhausted some of his claims

in state court. We hold that, in the context of a section 2254

habeas petition, this type of motion is generally (but not

always) dispositive as to the unexhausted claims. When it is

dispositive, a magistrate judge is without authority to “hear

and determine” such a motion, but rather must submit a report

and recommendation to the district court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A)–(B).

I.

Keith Andrew Mitchell was convicted of first degree

murder at a jury trial in California state court. He was

sentenced to fifty years to life in prison. On direct appeal,

Mitchell, represented by counsel, raised several claims

challenging the trial court’s jury instructions. The California

Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court denied relief.

Proceeding pro se, Mitchell then filed his first federal

habeas petition. The state moved to dismiss the petition for

failure to exhaust some of the claims, and Mitchell

voluntarily dismissed the petition without prejudice so he

could exhaust his state remedies.

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4 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

Still within the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1), and proceeding pro se, Mitchell then filed a

second federal habeas petition, at issue in this case, asserting

five due process claims. Three of the claims corresponded to

the arguments he had presented to the California courts on

direct appeal. The other two claims, both relating to a gang

sentencing enhancement, had been asserted in the first federal

petition. The new petition was referred to a magistrate judge,

authorized by the district court “to consider preliminary

matters and conduct all further hearings as may be

appropriate or necessary,” and thereafter to issue a report and

recommendation to the judge.

The state once again moved to dismiss the petition,

arguing that the two gang claims were not exhausted. As a

result, the state argued, the petition was “mixed,” and the

only proper resolutions were either to strike the unexhausted

claims or to dismiss the entire petition.

Mitchell responded by filing a motion to stay the case to

allow him to exhaust the two claims, citing Rhines v. Weber,

544 U.S. 269 (2005). He represented that he had already filed

state habeas petitions regarding the two claims, and that he

had reasonably relied on his appointed attorney in the state

proceedings to raise all of his potential claims on direct

appeal. The state opposed the motion, arguing that there was

no evidence Mitchell actually had filed any state habeas

petition.

The magistrate judge issued an order addressing both the

motion to dismiss and the motion to stay. Although Mitchell

had not filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, the

magistrate judge concluded that Mitchell’s motion to stay

“impliedly concede[d] that at least one of his claims is

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 5

unexhausted.” The magistrate judge also reviewed the record

and concluded that the two gang claims had not been raised

in the state direct appeals and that Mitchell had offered no

proof that the alleged state habeas petitions had been filed. 

As a result, the magistrate judge concluded, the motion to

dismiss was “well taken.”

As for the motion to stay, the magistrate judge noted that

Rhines requires a showing of good cause for the failure to

exhaust claims in state court. He found that a stay would be

“inappropriate” in this case, as Mitchell had dismissed his

prior petition “specifically to exhaust his state remedies with

respect to the two unexhausted claims” also asserted in the

current petition, yet “took no action to exhaust those claims.”

The magistrate judge then returned to the motion to

dismiss, noting that, as a mixed petition not eligible for a stay

under Rhines, the petition was “subject to dismissal.” The

magistrate judge granted Mitchell leave to amend his petition

to remove the unexhausted claims and indicated that, if

Mitchell declined to do so, the magistrate judge would “issue

a recommendation that the Petition be dismissed without

prejudice for failure to exhaust.”

Mitchell did move to remove “all unexhausted claims”

from his petition. The magistrate judge granted Mitchell’s

motion and denied the motion to dismiss as moot.

Subsequently, the magistrate judge issued a report and

recommendation to the district judge regarding the pareddown petition. In discussing the case’s procedural history,

the magistrate judge noted that he had previously denied

Mitchell’s stay motion for lack of good cause, had granted

Mitchell’s motion to dismiss his unexhausted claims, and had

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6 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

denied the state’s motion to dismiss as moot. On the merits

of the remaining three claims, the magistrate judge

recommended that the court deny relief. Mitchell objected,

also on the merits of the three exhausted claims.

After de novo review, the district court adopted the report

and recommendation and dismissed the petition with

prejudice. The district court did not address the denial of the

stay motion at all. Mitchell timely appealed.

We granted a certificate of appealability, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c), as to “whether the magistrate judge exceeded his

authority by issuing, without the parties’ consent, orders

denying appellant’s motion for a stay and abeyance,

dismissing two of appellant’s claims, and denying as moot

appellee’s motion to dismiss.”

II.

The authority of magistrate judges “is a question of law

subject to de novo review.” United States v. Carr, 18 F.3d

738, 740 (9th Cir. 1994).

“The power of federal magistrate judges is limited by

28 U.S.C. § 636.” Estate of Conners by Meredith v.

O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Reynaga

v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also

Flam v. Flam, — F.3d ––, No. 12-17285, 2015 WL 3540771

at *2 (9th Cir. June 8, 2015). Pursuant to section 636,

magistrate judges may hear and determine nondispositive

matters, but not dispositive matters, in § 2254 proceedings. 

Hunt v. Pliler, 384 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Dispositive matters are those listed in section 636(b)(1)(A),

as well as “analogous” matters. See Flam, 2015 WL 3540771

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 7

at *2; United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d 1064, 1067

(9th Cir. 2004); accord PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597

F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2010); Vogel v. U.S. Office Prods. Co.,

258 F.3d 509, 515 (6th Cir. 2001).1“To determine whether

a motion is dispositive, we have adopted a functional

approach that looks to the effect of the motion, in order to

determine whether it is properly characterized as dispositive

or non-dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.” Flam,

2015 WL 3540771 at *2 (internal quotation marks and

alteration omitted). As to any dispositive matter, the

 

1

 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary–

(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear

and determine any pretrial matter pending before the

court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for

judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to

dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by

the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case,

to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.

A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter

under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown

that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.

(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate judge to

conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and

to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of

fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a

judge of the court, of any motion excepted in

subparagraph (A), of applications for posttrial relief

made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and

of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of

confinement.

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8 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

magistrate judge is authorized, absent consent, only to issue

a report and recommendation to the district judge, who in turn

must undertake de novo review.2

Mitchell argues that the magistrate judge overstepped his

authority by denying the motion to stay and abey his petition

pending exhaustion.3

 We agree.

2 The terms “dispositive” and “nondispositive” do not appear in section

636. They do appear in Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, which implements section 636. 

The notes to Rule 72 provide that at least subsection (b) of the Rule does

not apply to habeas cases, and one case of this court has so held. See

Cavanaugh v. Kincheloe, 877 F.2d 1443, 1449 (9th Cir. 1989). Another

Ninth Circuit opinion relies on Rule 72 in a habeas case. See Hunt,

384 F.3d at 1123–25.

For present purposes, it does not matter whether Rule 72 directly

applies. The habeas rules provide for broad application of section 636. 

See Rule 10, Federal Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (2015). The

“dispositive”/“nondispositive” terminology in Rule 72 reflects the

statutory distinction drawn in section 636 between the two principal roles

of magistrate judges. See Flam, 2015 WL 3540771 at *2 (noting that

“[t]he textual basis for the distinction between dispositive and

non-dispositive motions is found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)”). Before the

current Rule 72 was promulgated, the Supreme Court, citing the legislative

history of the Federal Magistrates Act, used the term “dispositive” in

describing those motions a magistrate judge is precluded fromhearing and

determining under section 636. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.

667, 673–76 (1980); id. at 693 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, the

distinction derives from the statute and applies to habeas cases; Rule 72

simply implements the distinction for ordinary civil cases.

3 The state argued for the first time at oral argument that Mitchell

forfeited his right to appellate review of his contention that the magistrate

judge acted beyond his authority by failing to object to the denial of the

stay order before the district court. The state’s briefs do mention that

Mitchell did not appeal the denial of the stay to the district court, but only

to argue that section 636 was “complied with,” not to argue that the

question whether the statute was complied with was forfeited. The state’s

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 9

“[W]here the denial of a motion to stay is effectively a

denial of the ultimate relief sought, such a motion is

considered dispositive, and a magistrate judge lacks the

authority to ‘determine’ the matter.” S.E.C. v. CMKM

Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 1260 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing

Reynaga, 971 F.2d at 416–17). By contrast, a motion to stay

is nondispositive where it “[does] not dispose of any claims

or defenses and [does] not effectively deny . . . any ultimate

relief sought.” Id.

CMKM Diamonds fell into the latter, nondispositive

category. In that case, a Securities and Exchange

Commission civil enforcement action, one of the defendants

moved to stay the civil proceedings until a related criminal

case had concluded. Id. at 1251, 1254. A magistrate judge

denied the motion, and we held the magistrate judge within

his authority in doing so. Id. at 1260. The defendant had

“simply speculated that he might have stronger evidence to

support his position in the civil proceedings if he was able to

go through the criminal proceedings first.” Id. Such

speculation, we held, was insufficient to establish that the

denial of a stay would either “dispose of any claims or

defenses” or “effectively deny him any ultimate relief

sought.” Id. The magistrate judge was therefore empowered

to hear and determine the matter. Id.

forfeiture argument is therefore waived. See Gallardo v. United States,

755 F.3d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 2014); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1182

(9th Cir. 2009). In any event, as the issue is one purely of law, and

concerns the appropriate exercise of federal judicial authority, even if the

issue were forfeited, we would exercise our discretion to decide the scope

of the magistrate judge’s authority as to Rhines stays. See Nguyen v.

United States, 539 U.S. 69, 77–81 (2003); Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp.,

667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 2012).

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10 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

In so holding, CMKM Diamonds cited the rule established

by our prior decision in Reynaga. The prisoner plaintiff in

Reynaga filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that the judge, district attorneys, and public defender

involved in his state criminal case had denied him a fair trial. 

971 F.2d at 415. The case was referred to a magistrate judge,

who determined that the defendants were immune from

moneydamages and that the injunction sought—namelyearly

release from prison—could only be pursued through habeas

corpus. Id. The magistrate judge thus ordered the action

stayed until the plaintiff exhausted his state remedies and

directed the clerk of court to administratively close the file. 

Id.

We concluded on appeal that it was “clear” that, absent

consent, the magistrate judge’s stay order “was beyond his

authority.” Id. at 416. Among other things, we said in

support of our conclusion, “[t]he Magistrate’s imposition of

the stay effectively denied Reynaga’s request for an

injunction,” and “the Magistrate’s order was in essence an

involuntary dismissal of Reynaga’s action.” Id. at 416–17. 

Both a motion for injunctive relief and a motion for

involuntary dismissal are among the specifically enumerated

dispositive matters listed in section 636(b)(1)(A). Id.

Taking CMKM Diamonds and Reynaga together, the

dispositive question for us is whether the motion to stay and

abey at issue here was effectively dispositive of a claim or

defense or of the ultimate relief sought. See Flam, 2015 WL

3540771 at *2. As Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005),

makes clear, the answer is “yes.” Indeed, at oral argument

the state conceded that the stay denial in this case “was

tantamount to a dismissal” of the unexhausted claims, and

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 11

there was “no way” Mitchell would be able to return to

federal court to assert those claims later.

Under Rhines, a section 2254 habeas petitioner may seek

to stay and abey his petition while he exhausts his claims in

state court. This procedure addresses the difficulties posed by

the interaction of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), and the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA).

Lundy held that district courts were required to dismiss

without prejudice “mixed” section 2254 habeas

petitions—that is, those including both exhausted and

unexhausted claims. 455 U.S. at 510. As Rhines explained,

Lundy held this “requirement of ‘total exhaustion’” before a

petition may proceed was required by “the interests of comity

and federalism.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273–74. Fourteen years

later, Congress enacted AEDPA, which imposed a one-year

statute of limitations for the filing of a federal habeas petition. 

While that limitations period is tolled “during the pendency

of a ‘properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review,’ [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(d)(2), the filing

of a petition for habeas corpus in federal court does not toll

the statute of limitations.” Id. at 274–75.

Considering the implications of the enactment of AEDPA

for the continued viability of the Lundy rule requiring

dismissal of all mixed petitions, Rhines began from the

recognition that “[i]f a petitioner files a timely but mixed

petition in federal district court, and the district court

dismisses it under Lundy after the limitations period has

expired, this will likely mean the termination of any federal

review.” Id. at 275. Rhines therefore authorized a

“‘stay-and-abeyance’ procedure,” under which the district

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12 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

court, “rather than dismiss the mixed petition,” may “stay the

petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner returns to

state court to exhaust his previously unexhausted claims.” Id. 

Concerned that “[s]tay and abeyance, if employed too

frequently, has the potential to undermine” AEDPA’s

purposes of reducing delay and requiring petitioners to

exhaust state remedies before coming to federal court, Rhines

instructed that “the district court should stay, rather than

dismiss, the mixed petition,” only “in limited circumstances,”

namely when three conditions are met: “[(1)] the petitioner

had good cause for his failure to exhaust, [(2)] his

unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and [(3)]

there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 277–78.4

4 Under this circuit’s caselaw, a petitioner who has not exhausted all his

potential federal habeas claims has another mechanism available to him

to avoid the difficulties posed by the interaction of AEDPA’s statute of

limitations and Lundy’s rule—the three-step procedure outlined in Kelly

v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007). The Kelly

procedure permits “(1) a petitioner to amend his petition to delete any

unexhausted claims; (2) the court in its discretion to stay and hold in

abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, providing the petitioner

the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims; and

(3) once the claims have been exhausted in state court, the petitioner to

return to federal court and amend[] his federal petition to include the

newly-exhausted claims.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.

2009). “[T]he Kelly procedure remains available after Rhines,” and,

unlike Rhines, “its availability is not premised upon a showing of good

cause.” Id. at 1140. As we explained in King, from the perspective of the

petitioner, the downside of the Kelly procedure is that there is no

assurance that the claims added to the petition after exhaustion will be

considered timely filed. Id. at 1140–41. Thus, compared to the Rhines

procedure, “Kelly is not only a more cumbersome procedure for

petitioners, but also a riskier one.” Id. at 1140.

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 13

In light of Rhines, we conclude that a motion to stay and

abey section 2254 proceedings is generally (but not always)

dispositive of the unexhausted claims. Rhines acknowledged

“the gravity of th[e] problem” of the interaction of Lundy’s

total exhaustion rule with AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitation, “and the difficulty it has posed for petitioners.” 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. “[P]etitioners who come to federal

court with ‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever losing

their opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted

claims,” id., because, absent a stay, they are presented with

two choices, each of which will ordinarily result in precluding

some or all of their claims: Either they may voluntary dismiss

unexhausted claims, proceeding on only the exhausted ones,

or theymay decline to do so, leading to dismissal of the entire

petition. Either kind of dismissal would be, in form, without

prejudice. But, because the one-year statute of limitations is

not tolled while the federal petition is pending, Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001), and because state

proceedings can be lengthy and unpredictable, in most cases

either option will mean that a petitioner will be barred from

federal review of some or all of his claims by the time he

exhausts them. If a petitioner voluntarily dismisses his

unexhausted claims, it is very likely that final state court

exhaustion of unexhausted claims will come too late to allow

the claims to be heard in federal court, whether because

(1) the statute of limitations period will have run on the

claims and they will not relate back to the filing of the

petition because they do not “arise[] from the same core of

operative facts as a claim contained in the original petition,”

Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks omitted); (2) the remaining federal

habeas petition will have been decided by the time the state

courts act on the new habeas claims, triggering the onerous

requirements for filing a second or successive habeas petition,

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14 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); or (3) both. Similarly, if a petitioner

chooses to accept dismissal of the entire petition under Lundy,

he will very likely be barred from reasserting any of his

claims in federal court by AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In

either event, the result is the same as to the unexhausted

claims: The petitioner will lose the opportunity ever to

present those claims to a federal habeas court.5 Thus, in this

case, like Reynaga and unlike CMKM Diamonds, the

magistrate judge’s order was effectively dispositive of the

unexhausted claims and, therefore, beyond his authority.

5

It is, of course, possible that in some cases a petitioner could

successfully return to federal court after he exhausts his claims, even

without a stay. For example, a petitioner whose petition is dismissed

under Lundy could have time remaining on the AEDPA statute of

limitations; that period is tolled during the pendency of “a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, he might exhaust his

remaining claims and file a second habeas petition, all within the statute

of limitations. But, because a petition may be deemed not “properly” filed

after years of litigation, see, e.g., Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 200

(2006), it is generally impossible for a petitioner to know in advance

whether he will be successful in bringing his dismissed claims back to

federal court. Exacerbating this uncertainty in the context of this case is

“California’s unusual system of independent collateral review” in which

“a prisoner seeks review of a lower court’s denial of relief by filing an

original petition for habeas corpus in the reviewing court,” rather than an

appeal, and a “petition is timely filed if it is filed within a ‘reasonable

time,’” rather than within a set period of time. Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d

964, 968 (9thCir. 2010). Because ofthis ex ante danger that the petitioner

will not be granted the benefit of statutory tolling for some unforeseen

reason, the denial of a motion to stay and abey a habeas petition should be

treated as presumptively dispositive of unexhausted claims.

We do not, however, foreclose the possibility that the state could

establish, in particular cases, that the denial of such a motion was not

dispositive under the circumstances. The state has not made nor attempted

any such showing here.

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 15

Indeed, we have previously recognized, in similar but not

identical circumstances, that the interaction of AEDPA’s

statute of limitations and Lundy’s total-exhaustion rule

constrains the authority of magistrate judges. Hunt v. Pliler

considered a magistrate judge’s order holding a habeas

petition mixed and warning that, unless the petitioner sought

leave to file an amended petition without the unexhausted

claims, the court would dismiss the petition in full under

Lundy. 384 F.3d at 1120. The petitioner refused to do so

and, after a “tortuous procedural hegira,” the district court

ultimately dismissed the petition with prejudice. Id. at

1120–23. We vacated the court’s judgment, citing, in part,

the court’s and the magistrate judge’s “fail[ure] to comply

with § 636 and Rule 72, depriving Hunt of the right to de

novo review by the district court of the magistrate judge’s

pivotal determination that the [petition] contained

unexhausted claims.” Id. at 1125. That determination was

pivotal, we explained, because it “required Hunt to forfeit the

claims [the magistrate judge] found unexhausted or face

dismissal of the entire petition, effectively with prejudice

because any newly filed petition would be barred by

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.” Id. at 1124 (citing

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)); see also id. (observing that the

magistrate judge’s order could “hardly be considered

equivalent to a dismissal with leave to amend because [it]

compelled Hunt to abandon claims he contended had been

exhausted or face dismissal of his entire petition with

prejudice”). We therefore held that the magistrate judge’s

determination, purportedly on his own authority, that the

petition was mixed “exceeded his statutory authority.” Id.

Hunt is different from this case in that the petitioner in

Hunt did not seek a stay pending exhaustion in state court, id.

at 1125, and Mitchell did not affirmatively contest that his

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16 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

petition was mixed. But Hunt held that the magistrate judge

could not hear and determine the question whether the

petition was mixed because the resolution of that issue would

have dispositive effect as to the unexhausted claims: If the

petition was mixed, Huntrecognized, the choices confronting

the petitioner would be to either “abandon” his purportedly

unexhausted claims or else face “dismissal of the entire

petition, effectively with prejudice,” because of AEDPA’s

statute of limitations. Id. at 1124. The stay-and-abeymotion

at issue here was, as explained above, dispositive for the same

reason. In the shadow of Lundy and AEDPA, the denial of a

Rhines stay, like a determination that the petition is mixed,

generally amounts to dismissal of the unexhausted claims

with prejudice.

Finally, Flam recently held that a motion to remand a

removed case to state court is a dispositive matter under our

“functional approach.” Flam, 2015 WL 3540771 at *2–3. 

Flam agreed with several other circuits that “such a remand

order is ‘dispositive insofar as proceedings in the federal

court are concerned,’” because “such an order ‘preclusively

determines the important point that there will not be a federal

forum available to entertain a particular dispute.’” Id. at *3

(quoting In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir.

1998)). Because remand orders “put litigants out of federal

court,” Flam held, they are dispositive in the relevant sense. 

Id.

Much the same is true in this context. The denial of a

motion to stay and abey is “dispositive insofar as proceedings

in the federal court are concerned,” because “such an order

preclusivelydetermines the important point that there will not

be a federal forum available to entertain” the petitioner’s

unexhausted claims. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 17

In sum, the magistrate judge in this case had no authority

to hear and determine the motion to stay and abey habeas

proceedings to permit exhaustion of claims. He was, instead,

required to submit a report and recommendation to the district

court on that matter, for de novo review.

Because, “the procedure leading to [the] dismissal” of this

habeas petition “failed to complywith § 636,” Hunt, 384 F.3d

at 1125, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand

for further proceedings, guided by the principle that “we

cannot countenance a magistrate judge’s unauthorized”

orders, Allen v. Meyer, 755 F.3d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2014), nor

the results flowing from such orders, cf. Hunt, 384 F.3d at

1125.

The magistrate judge should have issued a report and

recommendation as to the motion to stay and abey. The

district court should therefore undertake, on remand, de novo

review as to whether such a stay was warranted at the time of

the magistrate judge’s order. The district court may consider

the magistrate judge’s order on the stay as a report and

recommendation, in which case the court should afford the

parties an opportunity to lodge objections. See

Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d at 1071 (remanding “for the

district court to apply de novo review . . . “treat[ing] the

magistrate judge’s ‘order’ as proposed findings and

recommendations”). If the district court concludes that no

stay was warranted, then the magistrate judge’s unauthorized

action was harmless, and the district court may reimpose its

previous order. See id.

If a stay was warranted, then the district court must

determine what prejudice the petitioner suffered as a result. 

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18 MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA

The pertinent question is: Would the case have progressed

differently had a stay been granted, and, if so, how?

The magistrate judge’s unauthorized denial of the motion

to stay and abey proceedings led directly to Mitchell’s

voluntary dismissal of two of his claims. The magistrate

judge expressly linked the two issues in his order, noting that,

because the petition was not eligible for a Rhines stay, unless

Mitchell voluntarily dismissed his unexhausted claims, the

magistrate judge would recommend that the state’s motion to

dismiss be granted. Mitchell did so shortly thereafter. But

for the magistrate judge’s unauthorized action, if a stay was

warranted, the case would have been stayed while Mitchell

sought to exhaust the two unexhausted claims. Thus, if a stay

should have been granted, the unauthorized stay denial

caused Mitchell to lose the opportunity for a merits review on

habeas of those two claims. Consequently, if the district

court determines that a stay was warranted at the time, it

should either stay the case under Rhines, if those claims

remain unexhausted, or, if now exhausted, proceed to

consider those claims as if they had never been dismissed.6

 

6 With the petition not stayed and the claims dismissed, Mitchell could

well have concluded that exhaustion would have been futile with regard

to the viability of those claims in federal court. Indeed, it is quite likely

that he recognized what the state conceded in oral argument: The denial

of the stay motion was “tantamount to a dismissal” of the unexhausted

claims with prejudice, as there was “no way” Mitchell would be able to

return to federal court to assert them.

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MITCHELL V. VALENZUELA 19

We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand

for proceedings consistent with this opinion.7

VACATED AND REMANDED.

7 Because we remand on this basis, we do not decide the other aspects

of the certified question. Nor do we reach Mitchell’s uncertified issues,

as they address the merits of the stay denial and of the three claims

addressed by the district court.

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