Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04042/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04042-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

*E-FILED 7/12/07*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

VALERA W. LYLES, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF MONTEREY, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. C 05-04042 JW (RS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO COMPEL AND DENYING

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs move to compel the deposition of, and production of documents by, defendant

Michael Rhoades and for sanctions. Based on the parties’ briefing, the arguments of counsel, and

the record herein, the motion to compel will be granted and the motion for sanctions will be denied.

 II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this action are Valera W. Lyles and William Lyles (collectively, “the Lyles”),

each of whom have an interest in the residential property located at 158A Spindrift Road in Carmel

Highlands, California. Defendants are the County of Monterey and individual employees from its

Planning, Building and Inspection Department (collectively, “the County”). The Lyles bring this

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. The Lyles aver that for three and a half years, the County denied Valera Lyles an

emergency permit and other permits necessary for construction of a retaining wall to prevent the

continued accelerated erosion and sloughing of her coastal property. 

The County’s original denial of the Lyles’ emergency permit request was transmitted in a

Case 5:05-cv-04042-JW Document 163 Filed 07/12/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

July 25, 2003 letter signed by defendant Rhoades. Rhoades also sent an internal email on August

15, 2003 wherein he explained certain issues surrounding the Lyles permit, and expressed his desire

to act as the chief contact for the Lyles case. The Lyles contend that Rhoades is a “key defendant”

in this action, and have undertaken steps to depose him. The Lyles allege that on April 21, 2006,

and again on April 28, 2006, their counsel wrote to defendants’ counsel in a meet and confer effort

and to select mutually convenient dates for the scheduling of depositions. The Lyles further allege

that no response to those letters was ever received. As a result, the Lyles served the County with

notice of Rhoades’ deposition and a request for production of documents, setting the deposition for

July 6, 2006 at 1:00 p.m. 

When that day arrived, defendants notified plaintiffs that Rhoades was not available and

could not be deposed at 1:00 p.m., as scheduled, and instead requested the deposition be rescheduled

for another date. Defendants’ counsel also requested that plaintiffs provide alternative dates for

Rhoades’ deposition, which he volunteered to communicate to Rhoades. On July 21, 2006

plaintiffs’ counsel sent an email to defendants’ counsel requesting that the Rhoades deposition be

rescheduled to take place prior to an Early Neutral Evaluation session that was scheduled for August

11, 2006, and before the discovery cutoff date of August 18, 2006. The Lyles allege that they

received an email from defense counsel on July 31, 2006 wherein defendants took responsibility for

the “Rhoades deposition scheduling glitch” and further indicated that Rhoades’ employment

situation would limit his availability to be deposed to Fridays, within the San Jose area. Plaintiffs

responded by stating that they would be willing to accommodate Rhoades’ limited availability, but

that counsel’s own schedule prevented him from deposing Rhoades on a date prior to the discovery

cutoff deadline. Accordingly, plaintiffs indicated that defendants would need to waive the discovery

cutoff deadline to allow for the deposition of Rhoades. The County agreed to waive the deadline.

Thereafter, the parties continued to correspond in an attempt to select a mutually convenient

date and time for the deposition of Rhoades. The Lyles contend they served an amended notice

scheduling Rhoades’ deposition for Friday, October 27, 2006, but that the deposition was ultimately

cancelled on October 25, 2006 (the record is not entirely clear why the deposition was cancelled, as

the County contends that Rhoades was in fact available the morning of the 27th, but the Lyles claim

Case 5:05-cv-04042-JW Document 163 Filed 07/12/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

that Rhoades found the date and location to be inconvenient).

On February 9, 2007 the Lyles served an amended notice scheduling Rhoades’ deposition for

Friday, March 9, 2007 in San Jose, and requesting the production of certain documents, including

those referred to as “the documents in the 11 banker boxes.” The documents contained in those

boxes had already been produced by the County for inspection on August 9, 2006 and October 13,

2006, in response to plaintiffs’ Demand for Production. Nevertheless, in emails dated October 25,

2006, the parties agreed that the documents in question would be produced at Rhoades’ deposition. 

On March 8, 2007, with Rhoades’ deposition scheduled for the following day, the County

informed the Lyles that “because of the nature of Mr. Rhoades’ rights as a governmental employee,

he will not be made available to be deposed until such time, if any, as the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals rules that he is not entitled to immunity.” Rhoades’ deposition did not take place.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Compel 

The Lyles request that this Court order defendant Rhoades to appear at his deposition, and to

produce certain documents, by setting a date and time that allows sufficient time for a transcript to

be made available before trial, which is presently scheduled for August 7, 2007. 

FRCP 37(d) provides that if a party fails “to appear before the officer who is to take the

deposition, after being served with a proper notice . . . the court in which the action is pending on

motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d).

1. Deposition of Rhoades

a. Jurisdiction

The County argues that the motion to compel must be denied because this Court no longer

has jurisdiction over the individual defendants, in light of their appeal of the Court’s order denying

summary adjudication based on their claim of qualified immunity. Defendants’ motion, however,

only sought qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ first and third claims for relief, asserting violations of

Case 5:05-cv-04042-JW Document 163 Filed 07/12/07 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Order entered on January 10, 2007 [Docket No 110 at pg. 7, n.3] (“Defendants have not

moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Second Count”).

2

 In that event, however, a subpoena arguably might be necessary.

4

due process and equal protection, respectively.1

 Since plaintiffs’ second claim for relief regarding

violations of their First Amendment rights was not at issue in defendants’ motion for summary

adjudication, that matter was not appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and thus remains within the

jurisdiction of this Court.

Accordingly, in that the case remains ongoing at the district court level on that second claim

for relief, there is no obstacle to taking Rhoades’ deposition at this juncture. Moreover, because

plaintiffs’ second claim for relief arises from the same facts as the matters appealed to the Ninth

Circuit, it is neither necessary nor feasible to carve out subject matter limitations on the deposition. 

Allowing plaintiffs to proceed now would not create a situation where a second deposition of

Rhoades would inevitably need to follow in the event the appeal is resolved against Rhoades on the

immunity issue. Of course, even should he prevail on appeal, Rhoades is a witness with knowledge

relevant to claims remaining against the County. As a result, taking his deposition would still be

appropriate, notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal.2

b. Rule 29

The County alternatively argues that the motion to compel be denied on grounds that

plaintiffs’ improperly sought Rhoades’ deposition after the expiration of the court-imposed

discovery cutoff date, without obtaining approval from the court, in violation of FRCP 29. The

County’s characterization of Rule 29 as providing that “stipulations to extend the time for discovery

may only be made with the approval of the court,” however, is incorrect. In fact, Rule 29 expressly

states that “[u]nless otherwise directed by the court, the parties may by written stipulation provide

that depositions may be taken . . . at any time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 29. 

The record shows that the Lyles and the County filed their Joint Supplemental Case

Management and Preliminary Pretrial and Trial Setting Conference Statement and Proposed Order

(“Joint Statement”) on January 12, 2007, wherein the parties stipulated to four matters, including the

Case 5:05-cv-04042-JW Document 163 Filed 07/12/07 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Lyles’ ability to depose Rhoades up to 30 days before trial. On January 23, 2007, the Court issued

its Preliminary Pretrial Conference Scheduling Order, setting out the case schedule and other

guidelines to govern the case. The County suggests that the Court’s failure to address any of the

parties’ stipulations within that order constitutes a rejection of the written stipulation concerning

Rhoades’ deposition. 

In response, the Lyles assert that during the Preliminary Pretrial Conference the Court stated

that the parties’ proposals were acceptable and therefore the order issued by the Court does not

reflect a rejection of those stipulations. The Lyles’ position is confirmed by the County’s

subsequent conduct, in that it complied with each of the other three stipulations set out in the parties’

Joint Statement. The record reflects that the parties at all times treated the stipulations of the Joint

Statement as valid, and that it was always understood and agreed that the deposition of Rhoades

could and would go forward notwithstanding the discovery cutoff. The County’s attempt to invoke

Rule 29 as a bar to the deposition now is not viable. Accordingly, immediately upon receipt of this

order, the parties shall meet and confer to arrange for the deposition to be taken at the earliest

practicable opportunity. 

2. Production of “11 Banker Boxes”

In addition to the opportunity to depose defendant Rhoades, the Lyles seek the production of

the “11 banker boxes.” The County argues that the Lyles’ demand is unduly burdensome on

Rhoades, who is no longer an employee of the County, and therefore maintains no control over the

documents. The County further contends that it has already produced the documents for inspection

on two separate occasions, and that this demand would constitute the Lyles’ third opportunity to

review the documents. In response, the Lyles argue that even after the County produced the 11

banker boxes for the second time, the County nevertheless agreed to produce the same documents at

Rhoades’ deposition, and should therefore stand by its agreement. Additionally, the County failed to

object to the Lyles’ February 9, 2007 amended notice of Rhoades’ deposition, wherein the Lyles

expressly requested the 11 banker boxes be produced.

Agreements made between the parties in the spirit of cooperation are to be encouraged. As a

result, the parties’ October 25, 2006 emails memorializing their agreement to have the 11 banker

Case 5:05-cv-04042-JW Document 163 Filed 07/12/07 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

6

boxes produced at Rhoades’ deposition will be enforced, and the County shall produce the requested

documents at Rhoades’ scheduled deposition.

B. Motion for Sanctions

Although the Court has rejected defendants’ arguments, under all the circumstances, the

contention that Rhoades should not be subject to deposition at this time was not so unreasonable as

to warrant the imposition of sanctions. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to compel is granted and the motion for sanctions

is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2007 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:05-cv-04042-JW Document 163 Filed 07/12/07 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

7

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Gerald V Barron barron@barronbuck.com, buck@barronbuck.com, ehs@sbcglobal.net

Irven Grant granti@co.monterey.ca.us, mcfarlandc@co.monterey.ca.us

Patrick I. McGreal mcgrealp@co.monterey.ca.us, edwards-jamesg@co.monterey.ca.us

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court’s CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 7/12/07 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

Case 5:05-cv-04042-JW Document 163 Filed 07/12/07 Page 7 of 7