Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00903/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00903-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOHN D. PARKER II and REGINA

PARKER, husband and wife; JERALD C.

THOMPSON and LESLIE C.

THOMPSON, husband and wife;

WITASICK, PARKER & THOMPSON, a

purported defunct partnership, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

KEVIN JOHN WITASICK and

WHITNEY WITASICK, husband and

wife, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-903-PHX-GMS

ORDER

On August 17 2009, the Court held the scheduled Final Pretrial Conference in this

matter. A representative and counsel for Plaintiffs was present. Although no counsel for

Defendants either participated in the preparation of a proposed final pretrial order, responded

to the pending motions in limine, or appeared to participate at the final pretrial conference,

Robert O. Dyer, who had withdrawn as counsel for Defendants last February, was present

and indicated that he had been specially re-retained by Defendants for the unique purpose of

appearing and asking the Court to postpone trial until sometime after a related criminal trial

now scheduled in the District of Virginia for November. The Court denied that request.

The Court further indicated that it would, on its own motion, strike the Answer and

Counterclaims of the Defendants and enter default. Plaintiffs agreed to provide research on

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the issue of whether Defendants were entitled to a jury trial on the remaining question of

damages, and Mr. Dyer indicated he would check with Defendants to see if they would be

participating in the damages phase of any resulting hearing or jury trial. A hearing was set

to consider the question the next day at 2:30 in the afternoon. 

Immediately prior to that August 18 hearing, the Court received from the Defendants

their Brief on the Issues Raised by the Court on August 17, 2009. (Dkt. #99). The Motion

made arguments against the entry of default and further requested an extension of time to

brief the threatened default and have a hearing on the issue. The Court allowed Defendants

additional time to brief the issue, and the parties received a hearing on it on August 25, 2009.

Thus, pending before the Court are the two motions in limine submitted by the Plaintiffs

(Dkt. # #. 93, 94), the Witasick’s Motion to Extend (Dkt. # 99), and the Witasick’s Motion

to Set Aside Default (Dkt. #104). 

Background. 

Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants were removed to this Court in March of 2006.

Early in this litigation, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims which was

denied. Thereafter, Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaims and the Court set a

scheduling order that provided for a discovery cut-off of February 5, 2008 and a dispositive

motion deadline of March 6, 2008. No dispositive motions were ever filed after the

Plaintiffs’ initial motion to dismiss was denied. The discovery and dispositive motion

deadlines were never extended. The court docket reflects no discovery ever occurring in this

matter other than, perhaps, the exchange of initial disclosure statements. 

After the Court initially set a final pretrial conference and a trial date, the parties

stipulated to postpone the civil trial pending a related and contemporaneously-scheduled

criminal trial occurring in the Eastern District of New Jersey. The Court twice continued

trial pending the criminal trial on the stipulation of the parties. 

During the course of this litigation, three separate counsel have withdrawn as counsel

for Defendants. In early February of 2009, Defendants third retained counsel, Robert O.

Dyer and Cynthia R. Estrella from the firm of Polsinelli Shugart P.C., filed a motion to

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withdraw as attorney of record for Defendants Witasick (Dkt. # 83). In that motion

Defendants’ counsel stated: 

Defendants Witasick’s address last provided to Polsinelli

Shughart is 114 Steeplebush Run, Swedesboro, NJ 08085.

Upon information and belief, Defendants Witasick’s current

address may be 215 Coyote Run, Mullica Hill, NJ 09052-1954

(provided by U.S. Postal Service with returned mail as

“forwarding time expired, return to sender”).

The Court granted Polsinelli’s motion to withdraw as counsel on February 5, 2009. But in

doing so it ordered “all future pleadings, . . . are to be mailed directly to Defendants Kevin

John Witasick and Whitney S. Witasick at the following last known addresses: 114

Steeplebrush Run, Swedesboro NJ o8l85 and 215 Coyote Run, Mullica Hill, NJ 09052-

1954.” (Dkt. # 85). No counsel were substituted to represent Defendants. Nevertheless, Mr.

Witasick is legally trained and was formerly authorized to practice law in this state. 

Shortly after the withdrawal of Polsinelli Shugart from representing Defendants,

Plaintiffs moved again to postpone the third trial setting. In doing so, Plaintiffs represented

to this Court that Mr. Witasick had been convicted on some of the counts related to tax

evasion in the criminal trial for which the initial postponements had been granted. Plaintiffs

further indicated, however, that the criminal charges had been severed for trial purposes and

the charges related to insurance fraud were scheduled for several months later. They

requested a third postponement until August of 2009 in light of this second impending

criminal trial. Plaintiffs indicated that they had attempted to communicate with the Witasicks

to obtain their stipulation to the postponement, but that the Witasicks did not respond in any

way to Plaintiffs’ attempts to contact them and had not responded to him. Plaintiffs further

indicated that “Plaintiffs are unable to fully comply with the requirement for a joint proposed

pretrial memorandum without the input of Defendants.” 

The Witasicks did not respond to the Third Request for Postponement. 

The Court granted the third request for postponement but, rather than merely setting

a new trial date, the Court set a scheduling conference with the parties for March 20, 2009.

This order setting the scheduling conference was mailed by the Court to the Witasicks.

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Shortly prior to the scheduling conference the Court received inquiries from the Witasick’s

east coast counsel – a Mr. Falciani -- on how to arrange for local counsel to appear at the

scheduling conference or the necessary procedures for Mr. Falciani to appear pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs’ counsel similarly represented at the scheduling conference that they had been

contacted by out-of-state counsel who was trying to arrange for representation of the

Witasicks at the scheduling conference. Nevertheless, neither the Witasicks themselves, Mr.

Falciani, nor any other counsel appeared on their behalf at the scheduling conference. 

The Court indicated to Plaintiffs’ counsel that it would grant their requested trial

postponement until sometime in early August, but this would be the final postponement in

light of the protracted nature of the case in Arizona. It set a trial date for August 24, 2009,

set a Final Pretrial Conference for August 17, and further ordered that a joint proposed final

pretrial order be filed on August 3. The Court further advised Plaintiffs that if it received no

cooperation or response from the Witasicks in the preparation of the joint proposed pretrial

statement, counsel could file the proposed order on his own. The Plaintiffs further moved

at the hearing for the entry of default against the Witasicks for their failure to appear,

telephonically or otherwise, at the scheduling conference. The Court directed Defendants

to file the motion in writing. A copy of the minute entry describing the proceedings of the

conference, including Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions and entry of default against

Defendants, was mailed to Defendants by the Court on March 20. 

In its Order Setting Final Pretrial Conference and Trial Date filed March 23, 2009

(Dkt. # 90), the Court ordered the parties to file a joint proposed pretrial order that would

include specified information including “any exhibit, witness, or other evidence” that the

parties intended to introduce at the trial of this matter. The order specifically and explicitly

noted that “the Court will not allow the parties to offer any exhibit, witness, or other evidence

that was not disclosed in accordance with the provisions of this Order and the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure and listed in the Proposed Final Pretrial Order except to prevent manifest

injustice.” (Dkt. # 90). The parties were ordered to exchange drafts of the proposed final

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pretrial order prior to filing with the Court. A copy of this scheduling order was mailed to

Defendants by the Court. 

Plaintiffs, on June 11, subsequently filed a motion for sanctions for Defendants’

failure to appear at the scheduling conference. Plaintiffs requested that Defendants’

pleadings be stricken and default entered against them. The motion itself indicates that it was

“electronically filed this 11th day of June and mailed to” the Swedesboro and Mullica Hill

addresses to which the Court had ordered mailings be sent. Defendants did not respond to

the motion. On July 13, the Court entered its order granting sanctions against Defendants

for their failure to appear at the scheduling conference. But, the Court did not strike the

Defendants’ pleadings or enter default. The Court mailed a copy of its order to Defendants

on July 13. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel avows to the Court that he called Defendants at least twice in the

month prior to the due date of the most recent draft proposed final pretrial order and three

times for the previously scheduled draft pretrial order and left messages on Defendants’

answering machine requesting their participation in preparing a proposed final pretrial order.

Plaintiffs’ counsel avows that he received no response from Defendants. He thus mailed

Defendants a copy of Plaintiffs proposed final pretrial order, filed with the Court on August

3 together with his motions in limine. Defendants did not respond to telephone messages left

on their answering machine by Plaintiffs’ counsel to coordinate their participation in the draft

of the Joint Proposed Final Pretrial Order. Defendants did not respond and still have not

responded with their own proposed pretrial order, or a response to the motions in limine.

Defendants did, however, send Mr. Dyer to the scheduled Final Pretrial Conference, not to

participate in the conference in any way, but to ask that the trial be postponed. 

Defendants did not participate in the preparation of the Proposed Final Pretrial Order,

and as a result have not requested to present any witnesses or evidence at the upcoming trial,

nor have they objected to any of Plaintiff’s proposed testimony or evidence. Defendants did

not offer any jury instructions or forms of verdict. When Defendants’ motion to postpone

was denied and the Court indicated it would enter default against the Defendants, Defendants

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filed a fairly extensive pleading with the Court within a day. The pleading presented

arguments against the entry of default and requested additional time for briefing. That

opportunity was provided to Defendants. 

In that briefing, the Defendants argue that the Court should not enter default against

them because they made some efforts to arrange for legal representation to appear for them

at the March 20 scheduling conference, and they were ignorant of the Court’s proceedings

because Plaintiffs’ counsel was misleading them and was not timely providing them notice

of such proceedings. They further assert that Plaintiffs’ counsel was not complying with the

Court’s Orders. 

The Court rejects these arguments for the following reasons: Defendants cannot make

any credible argument that they were unaware of their obligation to appear at the March 20

scheduling conference or were unaware of the dates set by the Court for the preparation of

the joint proposed final pretrial order, the final pretrial conference or the trial itself. The

Court further rejects any implication that Defendants were unaware that Plaintiffs had moved

for the entry of default against them. Defendants make no argument that they did not receive

the Courts’ orders. At the time that Polsinelli Shugart withdrew in February, the Court

directed further mailings to be sent to both addresses provided by Mr. Dyer at the time of his

withdrawal. One of these addresses was the address at 215 Coyote Run in Mullica Hills,

New Jersey. No orders sent by the Court to Defendant at this address were returned as

undeliverable. As Defendants’ own exhibit demonstrates, mailings sent to the Plaintiffs at

215 Coyote Run in Mullica Hills were being forwarded as late as June 23, 2009, to the

Defendants’ present address. Those orders include the order setting the March 20, 2009

scheduling conference, the minute entry concerning the March 20, 2009 scheduling

conference that indicated that Plaintiffs had moved for sanctions, including the entry of

default against the Defendants for their failure to attend the scheduling conference, the

subsequent scheduling order dated March 23, and the Court’s entry of sanctions against

Defendants dated July 13, 2009. Plaintiffs demonstrably received these orders because, as

they acknowledge, their East Coast attorney, Mr. Falciani, made at least some attempt to

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arrange for representation of the Witasicks prior to the March 20 status conference. Further,

they knew when and where to have Mr. Dyer appear for his limited appearance at the time

the Final Pretrial Conference was scheduled. And, in their memorandum filed on August 18,

2009 they were familiar with the contents of the Court’s July 11, 2009 Order imposing

sanctions against them. 

To the extent that Defendants may have been experiencing some delay in receiving

notice of progress of this litigation because they had moved from the addresses given to the

Court by Mr. Dyer, it was the fault of no one but the Defendants. Pursuant to the local rules

of the Court it is the obligation of the parties to keep the court and the parties updated as to

their present current address. LRCiv. 83.3(d). (An . . . unrepresented party must file a notice

of a name or address change . . . The notice must be filed no later than 10 days before the

effective date of the change.”) This, the Defendants failed to do. Yet, although the Court’s

rules required the Defendants to update the Court and the parties on their current address, and

the post office reminded Defendants to inform those sending them mail of their new address,

Defendants failed to do so. Further, Defendants cannot hold others responsible for the fact

that they only pick up their mail weekly, or that, being aware of required action in this case,

they left for a two-week vacation without undertaking that action. 

Further, Defendants claim that Mr. Falciani indicated in conversations with Mr.

Jensen prior to Plaintiffs’ non-appearance at the March 20 scheduling conference that

Plaintiffs could contact him with any requests for Defendants. This alleged statement by Mr.

Falciani is denied by Mr. Jensen, but it is immaterial. Mr. Falciani never entered his

representation of Defendants in this matter. Plaintiffs, therefore, were under no obligation

to attempt to contact him.. 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) a Court may issue orders on its own motion if a party

or its attorney fails to appear at a scheduling or other pretrial conference, is substantially

unprepared to participate, or fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order of the court.

In this case Defendants are in repeated violation of this rule. One of the sanctions explicitly

authorized by the rules is “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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37(b)(2)(a)(iii). The Court initially, on its own motion, indicated it would strike Plaintiff’s

pleadings and order the entry of default.

 Generally, prior to granting a sanction that amounts to a dismissal, as is the case here

at least as it pertains to Defendants’ counterclaims, the Court should consider:

a five-part test to determine whether the dismissal sanction is

just: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk

of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the

availability of less drastic sanctions.

Valley Eng’rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal

quotations omitted). However, “[t]his ‘test’ is not mechanical. It provides the district court

with a way to think about what to do, not a set of conditions precedent for sanctions or a

script that the district court must follow[.]” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of

Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007). “[W]here a court order is violated,

factors 1 and 2 support sanctions and 4 cuts against case-dispositive sanctions, so 3 and 5 . . .

are decisive.” Valley Eng’rs, 158 F.3d at 1057. 

Here, Plaintiffs are prejudiced by Defendants’ ongoing refusal to comply with the

Court’s orders. Prior to the Court’s determination to enter default, Defendants have not

responded to any of Plaintiffs’ inquiries since February. Thus, Plaintiffs have proceeded

with the court-ordered procedures to prepare this matter for trial without Defendants’ courtordered participation. Permitting Defendants’ constant “mulligans” only frustrates Plaintiffs’

ability to justly present their claims. Further when Defendants fail to designate any

witnesses, evidence, or jury instructions by which they propose to establish their

counterclaims by submitting a proposed pretrial statement, they lose to ability to establish

any claim on which they have the burden of proof. Thus, factor three favors dismissal of at

least the Defendants’ counterclaims. 

Factor 5 “involves consideration of three subparts: whether the court explicitly

discussed alternative sanctions, whether it tried them, and whether it warned the recalcitrant

party about the possibility of dismissal.” Valley Eng’rs, 158 F.3d at 1057. The Court has

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1

 In their Motion To Set Aside, Defendants suggest that the Court vacate its previous

entry of sanctions. Yet, even assuming that such a motion is timely, the Defendants offer no

justification sufficient to vacate its previous sanctions order. Defendants were aware of their

obligation to appear at the scheduling conference and did not do so. 

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already attempted the imposition of lesser sanctions on Defendants without effect.

Defendants were sanctioned for their failure to appear at an ordered scheduling conference.

The Court finds that Defendants were aware that they had been sanctioned, and yet

Defendants made no effort to move the Court for reconsideration of its entry of sanctions1

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nor did they comply with the Court’s Orders in the preparation of the Proposed Joint Pretrial

Order and participation in the Joint Pretrial Conference.

For the reasons stated above, dismissal of Defendants’ counterclaims is appropriate.

Upon reconsideration of its August 17 decision, however, the Court will not strike the

Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims or order the entry of default against Defendants

because there remains a lesser, but significant, sanction which is sufficient in this case to

fairly adjust the parties’ interests. Pursuant to the Court’s previous Orders that were

provided to Defendants, Defendants knew that by failing to participate in the process of

preparing the Proposed Joint Pretrial Order, failing to submit a Proposed Final Pretrial Order,

and failing to participate in the Final Pretrial Conference, especially in the face of existing

lesser sanctions for their previous non-compliance with Court Orders, Defendants would be

unable to present testimony or evidence in support of their claims and defenses. 

Therefore, the Court will enter a Final Pretrial Order that includes the substance of

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Final Pretrial Order, once Plaintiffs transmit an electronic version of

that proposed order to the Court. Because Defendants have failed to submit a Proposed

Final Pretrial Order, they will be precluded from presenting evidence or testimony in this

matter, except to prevent manifest injustice. 

CONCLUSION

Having granted the Defendants’ Motion to Extend (Dkt. #99) at least in part, 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDGRANTING IN PART the Witasicks’ Motion to Set

Aside Default (Dkt. # 104) in that, the Court will not enter an order requiring the clerk to

strike the Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaim and/or enter default against the Defendants.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING Defendants’ counterclaims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED RESETTING trial to September 1, 2 and 3 and

September 9, 10 and if needed September 11 to begin unless otherwise ordered at 9:00 A.M.

in this division. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot by this Order and the Final Pretrial

Order to be entered in this case, Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Re: to Exclude Evidence and

Witnesses not Disclosed by Defendants (Dkt. # 94), and Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Re: To

Exclude Testimony re: Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses (Dkt. # 93). 

The parties are informed that eight jurors will be selected with no alternates. The

Court will voir dire the entire panel. When the Court has completed the voir dire questioning

of the entire panel, the attorneys will be allowed a brief period for follow-up questions of

individual jurors. The attorneys will not use this time to engage in voir dire excesses such

as arguing their case, extracting promises or speculating on jury instructions. During their

follow-up questioning of individual jurors, the attorneys may not ask any question of the

entire jury panel unless the question is pre-approved by the Court. During a recess the

parties will exercise their challenges for cause. The peremptory challenges will be

simultaneous and secret. See LRCiv 47.1. 

Upon further examination of their Proposed Pretrial Order, the Plaintiffs, who

requested four trial days in which to present their testimony, are allowed a maximum of

eighteen hours to present their case including their opening argument, direct examination of

witnesses, any redirect of witnesses and closing argument. Defendants who requested one

and possibly two trial days in which to make argument and conduct cross-examination, are

allowed a maximum of nine hours to present their case including opening argument, their

cross-examination of witnesses, and their closing argument. The Court will keep the time.

The Court will give final instructions to the jury before closing argument. Jurors will not be

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allowed to ask questions during trial, but will be allowed to take notes. By August 27, 2009

Plaintiffs’ counsel will contact Kathleen Zoratti at (602) 322-7233 to coordinate the premarking of exhibits. The parties will also contact Brian Lalley at (602) 322-7131 prior to

August 27, 2009 to arrange a time prior to trial to learn how to use the Court’s electronic and

trial presentation equipment.

DATED this 26th day of August, 2009.

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