Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01737/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01737-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGELA MARIE SANDOVAL CRUZ, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

1:08cv01737 DLB

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Angela Marie Sandoval Cruz (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability

insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) pursuant to Titles II and

XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs,

which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Dennis L. Beck, United States

Magistrate Judge.1

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. On November 26, 2008,

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the matter was reassigned to the Honorable Dennis L. Beck for all purposes.

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on October 27, 2005, alleging

disability since December 31, 2002, due to her left side back, hand and knee injury. AR 101-104, 3

105-107, 128, 136. After being denied initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 65-68, 72-76, 78. On March 4, 2008,

ALJ Michael J. Haubner held a hearing. AR 22-47. ALJ Haubner denied benefits on May 23,

2008. AR 10-21. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on August 26, 2008.

AR 4-6.

Hearing Testimony

ALJ Haubner held a hearing on March 4, 2008, in Fresno, California. Plaintiff appeared

with her attorney, Melissa Proudian. AR 24. Vocational expert (“VE”) Cheryl Chandler also

appeared and testified. AR 24, 37-44.

Plaintiff was born in September 1971. She completed the twelfth grade and one Spanish

course in college. AR 27-28. In 2002, she did home health care of one person. AR 28.

Plaintiff lives with her husband and four children. Her youngest child is 7 months old.

Her oldest child is 15 years old. The other two are 8 and 2 years old. Two children are at home

during the day and two are in school. AR 29.

Plaintiff has a driver’s license. AR 29. Her husband works full-time outside the home. 

AR 29-30. She has no restriction on her driver’s license. She drives an automatic pick-up truck.

She lives in a house. There are three steps to get up inside her house, but no stairs to a second

floor or a basement. AR 30. She is able to care for her own personal needs. She brushes her

own teeth, puts on her own clothes, showers and bathes herself, and picks up her own utensils and

feeds herself. AR 30-31. She has to dress and feed her baby. She has to help the two-year-old

child dress and bathe. AR 31.

References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page 2

number.

On her SSI application, Plaintiff alleged an onset date of December 1, 2004. AR 101. On her DIB 3

application, Plaintiff alleged an onset date of December 31, 2002. AR 105.

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Plaintiff testified that she cooks or prepares meals twice a day. AR 31. She does dishes

every three days. AR 31-32. She goes grocery shopping twice a month. She goes shopping for

non-grocery items once every two months. She goes to church once a week. She does not go

out to eat. She visits with family or friends once a month. She talks on the phone every day for

about twenty minutes. She does not have a cell phone. She does not do any yard work. She

does not make her bed and does not change the sheets. Her oldest does the laundry, but Plaintiff

does it once a month. Plaintiff sweeps once every two weeks and vacuums once a week. AR 33.

She does not mop. AR 33-34. She does not dust the furniture or take out the trash. AR 34.

Plaintiff testified that she helps her children with their homework. Her children get

homework everyday. She spends about thirty minutes helping her children. She went to her

children’s school functions once in the year of the hearing. AR 34.

Plaintiff testified that her conditions are knee problems, low back problems and a history

of contusions with her hands. AR 34. She can lift and carry 15 pounds. She can sit for an hour

and a half before she has to get up and move around. She can stand for 45 minutes before she has

to sit down. She can walk half a block at one time. She has difficulty gripping or grasping things

with either hand. She can hold a coffee cup or a pencil for 15 minutes before she has to put it

down. She would have to rest for 20 minutes before she could hold something for another 15

minutes. AR 35.

Plaintiff testified that she has to lie down during the day because of pain, fatigue or

another reason. AR 35-36. She has to elevate her feet or lie down four hours out of an eighthour day. She has difficulty concentrating or paying attention to things. The longest she can

focus on something is an hour. AR 36.

Plaintiff testified that she does not have any criminal convictions. She is fully compliant

with all her treatment and medications. AR 36.

VE Cheryl Chandler also testified. She had an opportunity to review the work history

exhibits and was present during the course of the hearing. The VE questioned which of the jobs

was SGA. AR 37-38. The ALJ clarified that they were only looking at the 2002 job. The VE

asked whether Plaintiff was dispensing medication and doing light nursing care in that job. AR

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38. Plaintiff testified that when she was doing in-home health care services she gave medications

and helped with personal needs. AR 38.

The VE classified Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a home attendant job, which is an SVP

3 and medium. It is consistent with the DOT and is the lowest level of semiskilled. In her past

relevant work, Plaintiff would have to do some cooking, basic math, record keeping, and very

basic nursing care, like bathing, washing. There was no transferability of skills. AR 39.

For the hypothetical questions, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person of the same age,

education, language and experience of Plaintiff. AR 39. For the first hypothetical, the ALJ also

asked the VE to assume a person who was unable to do work that requires frequent bending and

heavy lifting, but could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, could stand

and walk six hours out of eight with normal breaks, could sit without restriction, could kneel,

squat, and stair climb occasionally. AR 19. The VE testified that this person could not do

Plaintiff’s past relevant work. AR 40. This person could do other general work consistent with

unskilled, light work and sedentary. AR 40. The VE indicated that the grids apply for the

exertional levels of unskilled sedentary and light. AR 40.

For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person who could lift and

carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, could stand and walk about six hours out of

eight, and could sit about six hours out of eight. This person had an unlimited ability to push and

pull. The person could frequently climb, including ladders, ropes and scaffolds, could frequently

balance, crawl, and hover, and could occasionally stoop, kneel and crouch. AR 40. The VE

testified that there was no past relevant work because of a restriction to light work. AR 41. The

VE testified that the worlds of unskilled light and sedentary would be available to this person. AR

41.

For the third hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person with a disability

between precluding heavy work and substantial work. This person had lost 67 and a half percent

of their pre-injury capacity for activities such as bending, stooping, lifting, pushing, pulling or

other activities involving comparable physical effort, including prolonged sitting and standing.

The VE testified that there was no past relevant work because of the standing and sitting

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limitations. AR 41. There was other work with a sit/stand option. The VE testified that with

75% erosion, there are 28,725 cashier jobs in California at light, unskilled with a sit/stand option.

AR 42. At approximately 50% of the numbers, the VE also estimated that there are 5,000 ticket

taker jobs and 10,000 clerical, general office worker jobs, remaining in unskilled, light. AR 43.

Those numbers multiplied by 10 would give approximate U.S. availability. AR 43.

For the fourth hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person who could lift and

carry 15 pounds, could sit an hour and a half at a time, could stand 45 minutes at a time, could

walk half a block at a time, could grip or grasp something 15 minutes at a time and then rest

his/her hands 20 minutes. This person would need to lie down 4 hours of 8 and could concentrate

in one hour increments. AR 43. The VE testified that this person could not perform Plaintiff’s

past relevant work and could not perform any other generally appearing work. AR 43-44.

Plaintiff further testified that she uses a cane. AR 44. It was prescribed right after her

knee surgery, but Plaintiff could not remember the year or the name of the doctor. AR 44. 4

Plaintiff testified that after the surgery, he told her to get crutches or a walker. She was still

having problems, so he suggested a four-pronged cane. After she got better, Plaintiff found that

she could just use a stick cane. Plaintiff last saw the doctor in 2000 or 2001. AR 45. Plaintiff

now sees Dr. Gonzales, a family doctor, for regular medical treatment once every three months.

Dr. Gonzales knows that Plaintiff is using a case and says to use it when necessary. She uses it

twice a week. AR 46.

Medical Record

On June 30, 1998, Plaintiff received treatment from G. A. Fujihara, M.D., MPH, at

Concentra Medical Centers. Plaintiff reported that she tripped and fell, landing on both knees,

jamming her thumb and spraining her left wrist. Dr. Fujihara assessed Plaintiff with left and right

knee contusions with strain and left hand contusion with sprain especially of the thumb. She was

prescribed Anaprox DS and Darvocet. Dr. Fujihara placed her on light duty status of no kneeling

or squatting and using her left hand sparingly. Dr. Fujihara did not anticipate any permanent

According to counsel, Plaintiff’s surgery was on June 27, 2000, with “Dr. Gazall.” Plaintiff confirmed

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the doctor. AR 45.

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disability and anticipated complete recovery without any residual problems. AR 199-200. X-rays

of both knees and Plaintiff’s left hand were negative. AR 201.

On July 1, 1998, Plaintiff saw Dr. Fujihara for her hand and knee. Following examination,

Dr. Fujihara recommended that Plaintiff remain off work for one more week. AR 197. X-rays of

Plaintiff’s pelvis and left hip were negative. AR 201.

Between July 6, 1998 and September 27, 1999, Plaintiff saw Anthony Montana, M.D., at

Concentra Medical Centers, for her left knee strain and left hand contusion. AR 179-196. On

July 6, 1998, Dr. Montana recommended that Plaintiff remain on temporary disability, but placed

her on modified duty from August 10 to August 12, 1998. AR 195, 189. On August 10, 1998,

Plaintiff reported that she worked a full shift. AR 188. On August 17, 1998, Dr. Montana noted

that Plaintiff had “not had anymore physical therapy due to extended work hours.” AR 187. In

July 1999, Dr. Montana reported that Plaintiff had been laid off. AR 180. In August 1999,

Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Ghazal for orthopedic consultation. AR 179. On September 27,

1999, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Montana that Dr. Ghazal recommended bilateral knee arthroscopy

and lateral release. She was to remain on regular work status and be transferred to Dr. Ghazal.

AR 178.

On September 26, 2000, Plaintiff underwent an orthopaedic consultation by Craig R.

MacClean, M.D. Plaintiff complained of right and left knee pain with any squatting, kneeling or

stair climbing, pain behind the left thigh and radiating into the left hip on walking, low back pain

with any prolonged standing for more than 10-15 minutes, any walking for more than five minutes

and any lifting more than 30 pounds. She also complained of pain in the palm of her left hand and

base of thumb brought on with any pushing or pulling activities. AR 206. Dr. MacClean

diagnosed her with bilateral hand contusion with persistent left thumb pain, chondromalacia

patellae, both knees, status post arthroscopic debridement, left knee, with chondroplasty of medial

femoral condyle and patella, lateral retinacular release, and low back strain with underlying L5-S1

degenerative disk disease, rule out associated disk protrusion. AR 210.

Between February 26, 2001, and February 10, 2004, Plaintiff received treatment from

Berj. T. Kalamkarian, M.D., for lumbrosacral radiculopathy, degenerative disease of the lumbar

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spine and chronic low back pain. AR 231-277. 233, On March 9, March 28 and May 23, 2001,

Plaintiff underwent a lumbar epidurogram and L3-4 epidural steroid injection. AR 260, 263, 265.

On August 15, 2001, Plaintiff underwent an L3-4, L4-5 and L5-S1 facet block on the left. AR

256-57. On September 15, 2003, Plaintiff received a bilateral L3-4 and L4-5 radio frequency

facet rhizotomy. AR 241. On March 8, 2004, Plaintiff received a lumbar epidurogram and L5-S1

epidural steroid injection. AR 239. On February 10, 2005, Dr. Kalamkarian discontinued

Plaintiff’s medications due to pregnancy. AR 231.

On January 14, 2002, Charles J. Heller, M.D., completed an Agreed Medical Examination.

Plaintiff complained of constant pain in the thenar eminence of her left hand, in her low back and

in her left knee. AR 223. On examination, Plaintiff ambulated slowly and deliberately, using a

cane in the right hand. She was able to heel and toe walk. AR 223. Her left hand had tenderness

of the thenar musculature, but no swelling, no crepitus, and no temperature differentiation

between the two hands. There was normal sensation and circulation in the left hand and distal

pulses were present and equal. AR 223. Plaintiff did not put forth full effort on the Jamar

Dynamometer. AR 224. Dr. Heller opined that if Plaintiff had put forth full effort there would be

an estimated 15% grip loss. AR 224.

Examination of Plaintiff’s back revealed no tenderness over the left sacroiliac joint and left

hip joint. There was no evidence of scoliosis. Lateral rotation and lateral bending were

diminished 25%. Straight leg raising test was positive on the left at 40 degrees with hamstring

tightness. The Gaenslen’s and Patrick’s signs were negative. The deep tendon reflexes in the

lower extremities were present and equal. There was normal sensation and motor power to the

lower extremities, and the distal pulses were present and equal. AR 224.

Examination of Plaintiff’s left knee revealed three well-healed arthroscopy scars. There

was moderate effusion present within the left knee joint. AR 224. Her knee strength for

extension and flexion was normal. AR 225.

Following the examination, Dr. Heller opined that Plaintiff was not capable of returning to

her usual and customary occupation of production activities for Vendo. AR 227. At Vendo,

Plaintiff was required to work with pneumatic tools and to push cabinets onto the line. In her

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“essential job duties,” she was required to lift from 5-50 pounds. AR 221. She was a Medically

Qualified Injured Worker. AR 227.

On October 11, 2004, Dr. Heller completed an Agreed Medical Examination re-evaluation

of Plaintiff. He spent 45 minutes with her. AR 212. Dr. Heller diagnosed degenerative disk

disease, L4-5, L5-S1, aggravated by the injury of June 30, 1998. AR 215. Dr. Heller opined that

Plaintiff’s condition had reached maximal medical improvement and was permanent and stationary

with regard to the low back. AR 216. Dr. Heller further opined that Plaintiff’s work restrictions

were a “disability between precluding heavy work and a disability precluding substantial work.” 

AR 216. This opinion contemplated that Plaintiff had lost “approximately 62 1⁄2% of her preinjury capacity for such activities as bending, stooping, lifting, pushing, pulling, climbing and other

activities involving comparable physical effort, including prolonged sitting or standing.” AR 216.

On March 6, 2006, Benjamin Chang, M.D., completed a consultative orthopedic

evaluation. Plaintiff complained of chronic low back pain and left knee pain. AR 274. On

examination, Plaintiff had a mildly antalgic gait and was able to walk on her toes and heels. Her

cervical spine range of motion was within normal limits. She had mild tenderness to percussion in

the lumbar area of her spine, but no sciatic notch tenderness. Her straight leg raising was to 80

degrees bilaterally without pain. AR 275. She had mild tenderness over the medial and lateral

aspect of the left knee with mildly positive McMurray’s test. Her pulses were normal. Her hand

grip strength was 5/5 bilaterally. She had normal muscle bulk and tone with no evidence of

muscle atrophy. Her reflexes and sensation were normal. AR 277.

Dr. Chang diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic mechanical low back pain, chronic left knee

pain, rule out meniscus tear status post arthroscopic surgery. AR 277. Dr. Chang opined that

Plaintiff was unable to do work that requires frequent bending and heavy lifting. She could lift

and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, could stand and walk six hours out of

an eight hour day with normal breaks, could sit without restriction and occasionally could kneel,

squat and climb stairs. AR 278.

On April 5, 2006, D. D. Sharbaugh, the state agency medical consultant, completed a

Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. AR 279-86. Dr. Sharbaugh opined that

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Plaintiff could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, could stand and/or

walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, could sit about six hours in an 8-hour workday, and

could push and/or pull without limitation. AR 280. She frequently could climb, balance, stoop

and crawl. She occasionally could stoop, kneel and crouch. AR 281. She had no manipulative,

visual, communicative or environmental limitations. AR 282-83.

ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of status post left knee

arthroscopy, history of bilateral patella chondromalacia, degenerative disc disease lumbar spine

and history of lumbar radiculopathy. AR 15. Despite these impairments, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally

and 10 pounds frequently, stand and walk for six hours out of an 8-hour day, and occasionally

kneel, squat and climb stairs. AR 17. Although Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant

work, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national

economy that she could perform. AR 19-20.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence. 42 U.S.C. 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at

401. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995

(9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the

proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This

Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are

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supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d

509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that she is unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42

U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that she has a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that she is not only unable to do her previous work, but cannot, considering her age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists

in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The

burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir.

1990).

In an effort to achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner has promulgated

regulations which contain, inter alia, a five-step sequential disability evaluation process. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(g), 416.920 (a)-(g). Applying this process in this case, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff: (1) has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 31, 2002; (2) has

an impairment or a combination of impairments that is considered “severe” (status post left knee

arthroscopy, history of bilateral patella chondromalacia, degenerative disc disease lumbar spine

and history of lumbar radiculopathy) based on the requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR §§

404.1520, 416.920(b)); (3) does not have an impairment or combination of impairments which

meets or equals one of the impairments set forth in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4; (4)

cannot perform her past relevant work; but (5) there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in

the national economy that she can perform. AR 15-20.

DISCUSSION

In this case, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Dr. Heller’s

opinion, which was rendered in the context of a worker’s compensation claim. Specifically,

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ had an unfettered obligation to translate the worker’s compensation

terms of art in Dr. Heller’s agreed medical evaluation to language useful in the Social Security

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context. Opening Brief, p. 6. To support this assertion, Plaintiff relies on Desrosiers v. Secretary

of Health & Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Desrosiers does not require an

ALJ to “translate” worker’s compensation terminology. In Desrosiers, the court found error

where an ALJ failed to recognize that the categories of work under the Social Security scheme

are “measured quite differently” from the worker’s compensation scheme. Id. at 576. While

Social Security categories “are differentiated primarily by step increases in lifting capacities,”

worker’s compensation categories are not based on strength, but on whether a person sits, stands

or walks for most of the day. Id. The ALJ in Desrosiers improperly equated the worker’s

compensation preclusion from heavy work with a preclusion from heavy lifting. Id.

In this case, there is no indication that the ALJ failed to recognize that there is a

distinction between the worker’s compensation scheme and the Social Security scheme. Indeed,

the ALJ summarizes Dr. Heller’s opinion, noting that the limitations “are couched in Workers’

Compensation terms.” AR 19. The ALJ discounted Dr. Heller’s opinion because the limitations

were somewhat vague and seemed too restrictive in light of the minimal objective findings. AR

19. The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that

opinion is inadequately supported by clinical findings. See, e.g., Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). As cited by the ALJ, Dr. Heller’s clinical findings in 2002 revealed that

Plaintiff had tenderness of the thenar musculature of the left hand, but no swelling. The left hand

had normal sensation and circulation with equal distal pulses. She had no muscle atrophy and

Pahlen’s Finkelstein’s and Tinel’s signs were negative. AR 16, 223. Plaintiff also did not put

forth full effort on the Jamar Dynamometer. Plaintiff also had no tenderness over the left

sacroiliac join or left hip joint, the Gaenslen’s and Patrick’s signs were negative, deep tendon

reflexes in the lower extremities were equal with normal sensation and motor power. Her left

knee join had a moderate effusion, but was stable. AR 16, 224. In 2004, Dr. Heller opined that

Plaintiff should continue conservative treatment, but no surgical procedures or additional

injections were needed. AR 217.

Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ misunderstood the definition and terminology used

by Dr. Heller, pointing to the hypothetical presented to the VE utilizing Dr. Heller’s opinion. A

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review of the record reveals that the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person who “has a disability

between precluding heavy work and substantial work,” which “contemplates this person has lost

62 and a half percent of their pre-injury capacity for activities such as bending, stooping, lifting,

pushing, pulling, or other activities involving comparable physical effort including prolonged

sitting and standing.” AR 41. The ALJ’s description was taken directly from Dr. Heller’s opinion

regarding Plaintiff’s restrictions and is nearly verbatim. AR 216.

Although the ALJ questioned whether the VE could answer the hypothetical because he

was “not sure we knew what her pre-injury was to reduce it by 62 percent,” the VE thought she

could answer it. AR 41. Using Dr. Heller’s restrictions, the VE testified that there was no past

relevant work, but there were other light jobs. AR 41-42. In his decision, the ALJ noted that

even if he adopted Dr. Heller’s limitations, the VE had identified other light jobs. AR 19. An

ALJ may rely on a VE's testimony, including testimony regarding the number of relevant jobs in

the national economy. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s statement at the hearing that “[j]ust because she was doing

a medium job doesn’t mean that was her maximum capacity” demonstrates legal error because in

worker’s compensation terms “pre-injury capacity” is the maximum capacity set by the claimant’s

past work. AR 41; Opening Brief, p. 10. However, Plaintiff herself quantifies pre-injury capacity

as “simply that amount which [she] was required to perform in her past work activity,” not her

maximum capacity. Opening Brief, p. 9. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ was not

required to utilize Plaintiff’s proposed algebraic formula to determine Plaintiff’s remaining work

capacity based on the worker’s compensation evaluation identifying a 62 1⁄2% loss of pre-injury

capacity. This is particularly true where the ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. Chang, a

consultative examiner, who provided an opinion as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations based on

the Social Security scheme. AR 19, 278. A consultive examiner’s opinion constitutes substantial

evidence. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, opinions

concerning degrees of disability peculiar to worker’s compensation are not conclusive in a Social

Security case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 4040.1504, 416.904; Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir.

1996) (citing Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 576).

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Moreover, to the extent that Dr. Heller opined that Plaintiff could not return to her

previous work doing production activities, it was not an opinion that she was precluded altogether

from working. A physician evaluating a plaintiff in the context of a worker’s compensation case

is focused on deciding whether the plaintiff could return to her past job and not whether there was

other work she could perform. (See, e.g., Mattox v. Astrue, 2008 WL 761073, *9 (E.D.Cal. Mar.

17, 2008). Here, the work that the ALJ found that Plaintiff can do now is a different type of

work. AR 20.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security. The clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Michael

J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Angela Marie Sandoval Cruz.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 11, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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