Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01799/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01799-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CYTOSPORT, INC., 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

NATURE’S BEST, INC.,and DOES 1 

through 10, inclusive, 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-06-cv-1799 DFL EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

This case involves disputes between two competing producers 

of high protein health drinks, Cytosport, Inc. and Nature’s 

Best, Inc.. Plaintiff Cytosport alleges that Nature’s Best is 

violating its trademark. Defendant and counter-claimant 

Nature’s Best contends that Cytosport has misrepresented the 

qualities and characteristics of its product, “Muscle Milk,” in 

violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1125(a)(1)(B). Cytosport now moves to dismiss Nature’s Best’s 

counterclaims. For the reasons below, the court DENIES 

Cytosport’s motion. 

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I. 

On August 11, 2006, Cytosport filed a trademark 

infringement suit against Nature’s Best, alleging that Nature’s 

Best trade name “Micellar Milk” infringes on Cytosport’s trade 

name “Muscle Milk.” On September 12, 2006, Nature’s Best filed 

an answer in which it makes counterclaims against Cytosport, 

alleging that Cytosport has misrepresented Muscle Milk in 

violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Nature’s Best contends 

that Cytosport’s advertising and labeling of Muscle Milk is 

false and misleading because: (1) the label states “Burn Fat 

Don’t Store It” when Muscle Milk does not burn fat; (2) the 

label states “Carb Conscious” when Muscle Milk contains 15 grams 

of carbohydrate; and (3) the label does not list Muscle Milk’s 

trans fat content, which suggests that Muscle Milk has no trans 

fat. On January 5, 2007, Cytosport moved to dismiss Nature’s 

Best’s counterclaims. In its opposition, Nature’s Best offered 

to strike its third counterclaim. Therefore, only the first and 

second counterclaims are addressed below. 

II. 

“Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), 

prohibits the use of false designations of origin, false 

descriptions, and false representations in the advertising and 

sale of goods and services.” Jack Russell Terrier Network of 

Northern Cal. v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1036 

(9th Cir. 2005). “In order to constitute a violation of § 43(a) 

of the Lanham Act, the contested statement or representation 

must be either false on its face or, although literally true, 

likely to mislead and to confuse consumers given the 

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merchandising context.” Mylan Labs. Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.2d 

1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1993). 

Cytosport first argues that “Burn Fat Don’t Store It” is 

not misleading under the Lanham Act. According to Cytosport, 

“80% of the saturated fat in [Muscle Milk] are [sic] in the form 

of medium chain triglycerides (MCTs)” and that “MCTs are 

typically burned as energy and show little or no propensity for 

storage as body fat.” Therefore, Cytosport intends to convey to 

consumers only that they would burn, and not store, the fat in 

Muscle Milk. 

This argument lacks merit. What Cytosport intends the 

statement to mean is irrelevant. Cytosport has violated the 

Lanham Act if the statement “Burn Fat Don’t Store It” is false 

and misleading, even if Cytosport did not mean it to be so. 

Moreover, at this stage of the litigation, Nature’s Best need 

only plead that the statement is false or that consumers find it 

misleading. It has done so here. Nature’s Best alleges that 

consumers may find the statement misleading because it implies 

that Muscle Milk helps them burn existing fat. Furthermore, 

Nature’s Best contends that the statement is literally false 

because consumers drinking Muscle Milk store 1.4 grams of 

saturated fat and 10.4 grams of total fat. 

Cytosport next argues that the Federal Drug, and Cosmetic 

Act (“FDCA”) bars Nature’s Best’s Lanham Act claim regarding the 

statement “Carb Conscious” on the Muscle Milk label. Because 

the FDA presently is considering formulating a regulation 

regarding use of the phrase “Carb Conscious,” Cytosport asserts 

that a judgment for Nature’s Best would preempt the FDA’s 

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discretion and interfere with a potential future regulation. 

This argument also is unpersuasive. 

“[F]alse statements are actionable under the Lanham Act, 

even if their truth may be generally within the purview of the 

FDA.” Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments, Co., 

933 F.Supp. 918, 933 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Summit Tech. II”); see

also Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (4th 

Cir. 1993); Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc., 191 F.3d 

1248, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs, however, may not 

sue under the Lanham Act to enforce the FDCA. Sandoz 

Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 

228-29 (3d Cir. 1990). “[W]hat the [FDCA] . . . do[es] not 

create directly, the Lanham Act does not create indirectly.” 

Id. Therefore, courts have dismissed Lanham Act claims that 

necessarily require interpreting and applying the FDCA or FDA 

regulations. But courts have refused to dismiss Lanham Act 

claims when plaintiffs can establish that the statements at 

issue are false or misleading without relying on the FDCA or FDA 

regulations. 

For example, in Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, plaintiff claimed 

that defendant violated the Lanham Act solely because its labels 

were literally false. Id. at 230. Plaintiff chose not to argue 

that they were misleading to the public. Id. According to 

plaintiff, defendant listed an ingredient as “inactive” when it 

was “active” under a FDA regulation. Id. To determine whether 

this characterization was literally false, the court would have 

had to interpret the regulation. See id. Accordingly, the 

court dismissed plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 231. 

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Similarly, in Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. 

Instruments Co., the court dismissed one of plaintiff’s Lanham 

Act claims because it required interpreting FDA regulations. 

922 F.Supp. 299, 306 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Summit Tech. I.”). 

Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the Lanham Act by 

putting their products on the market without disclosing that 

they did not have FDA approval. Id. at 305. The omission 

purportedly misled consumers to believe that the FDA had 

approved defendants’ products. See id. at 305-06. The court 

observed, however, that the FDA already had approved other 

versions of the same products, and the FDA had not decided 

whether FDA regulations require granting defendants’ products a 

separate approval. Id. at 306. Because defendants’ omission 

would be misleading only if the regulations required separate 

approval, the court found that plaintiff’s claim required 

interpretation of FDA regulations and, therefore, dismissed it. 

Id. 

In contrast, in Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Flavor Fresh 

Foods, Inc., the court found that plaintiff could sue defendants 

under the Lanham Act even though defendants’ alleged 

misrepresentation might implicate an FDA regulation. 720 

F.Supp. 714, 716 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Plaintiff alleged that 

defendants misrepresented their orange juice as “100% [pure] 

orange juice from concentrate.” Id. at 715. While an FDA 

regulation defines “orange juice from concentrate,” the court 

found that plaintiff could establish a Lanham Act violation 

without resorting to the regulation. Id. at 716 (“Grove Fresh 

would simply need to provide other evidence establishing the 

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proper market definition of ‘orange juice from concentrate.’”) 

Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff had stated a valid 

cause of action. 

In Summit Tech. II., the court reached a similar result. 

In that case, plaintiff contended that one defendant 

misrepresented products it imported as “identical” to 

domestically manufactured products that the FDA had approved. 

Summit Tech. II, 933 F.Supp. at 934. Although plaintiff could 

rely on FDA regulations to establish its claim, the court 

refused to dismiss the Lanham Act claim. Id. at 935. According 

to the court, “the question of whether the domestic and 

international [products] are ‘identical’ is a factual one that 

can be resolved without the interpretation or application of FDA 

regulations.” Id.

Here, contrary to Cytosport’s assertions, Nature’s Best’s 

Lanham Act claims do not require the court to interpret FDA 

regulations or the FDCA. Cytosport is correct that the FDCA 

allows the FDA to regulate “nutrient content claims,” which are 

claims made by manufacturers regarding the level of nutrients in 

a particular product. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(A) (2007). And 

Nature’s Best contends that the statement “Carb Conscious” 

describes the level of carbohydrates in Muscle Milk, making it a 

nutrient content claim. Cytosport, however, does not allege 

that the statement “Carb Conscious” is valid under the FDCA or 

any FDA regulations.1 Instead, Cytosport argues that the FDCA 

allows the FDA to promulgate regulations regarding nutrient 

 

1 Because Cytosport does not make this claim, the court expresses 

no opinion on whether plaintiffs can pursue a Lanham Act claim 

based on conduct that FDA regulations or the FDCA clearly allow. 

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content claims, and that, while the FDA has not yet promulgated 

a regulation regarding the statement “Carb Conscious,” it is 

considering doing so. In short, the nub of Cytosport’s argument 

is that Nature’s Best’s claim restricts the discretion of the 

FDA to formulate a future regulation. 

This argument lacks merit. Cytosport fails to cite any 

case in which a court dismissed a Lanham Act claim because it 

might implicate a future regulation. As discussed above, courts 

have dismissed only Lanham Act claims that require interpreting 

FDA regulations or the FDCA. In its papers and at oral 

argument, Cytosport asserts that this is necessary here. But 

Cytosports concedes that there currently is no applicable 

regulation. Moreover, Nature’s Best does not need to rely on 

the FDCA or any FDA regulation to show that the statement “Carb 

Conscious” is misleading. To make its case, Nature’s Best can 

present evidence, such as consumer surveys, that indicate 

consumers would consider such statement misleading when Muscle 

Milk contains 15 grams of carbohydrate. 

III. 

For the reasons above, the court DENIES Cytosport’s motion 

to dismiss. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 8, 2007 

 /s/ David F. Levi___________

 DAVID F. LEVI 

 United States District Judge

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