Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01772/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01772-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD C. DIAZ,

CDCR #AD2009

Plaintiff,

v.

N. McGEE; S. RUTHLEDGE; D. 

HOLBROOK; J. WILBORN; CALVERT; 

RICHARD J. DONOVAN 

CORRECTIONAL FACILTY ,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-1772-LAB-BLM

ORDER:

(1) VACATING JUDGMENT 

PURSUANT TO FRCP 60(a); and 

(2) DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A

I. Procedural History

On August 31, 2017, Ronald C. Diaz (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently 

incarcerated at California State Prison - Los Angeles County located in Lancaster, 

California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) He alleged violation of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights when he was previously housed at the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (Compl. at 1.) In addition, 

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Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) 

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and simultaneously dismissed 

his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an 

amended pleading in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s 

Order. (Id.) On October 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

(ECF No. 4.) However, once again, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. 

(ECF No. 5.) 

Plaintiff was again given leave to file an amended pleading. (Id.) However, the 

time passed and Plaintiff had not complied with the Court’s Order. On January 12, 2018, 

the Court dismissed the entire action for the reasons set forth in the Court’s November 

13, 2017 Order and for failing to comply with a Court Order. (ECF No. 7.) In the 

meantime, the Court received and filed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). 

(ECF No. 6.) Because it does appear that Plaintiff signed his SAC on December 28, 

2017, the Court finds this pleading to be timely. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 

(1988) (deeming notice of appeal to be “filed” when prisoner delivers it to prison 

authorities for forwarding to the district court); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 

(9th Cir. 2009) (“Houston mailbox rule applies to § 1983 suits filed by pro se 

prisoners.”). Therefore, the Court VACATES the judgment entered on January 17, 2018 

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) and will conduct the sua sponte screening of Plaintiff’s 

SAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A.

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, “[t]he Court shall review, before 

docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing,” complaints 

filed by all persons proceeding IFP, and by those who are “incarcerated or detained in 

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any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 

diversionary program.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court must sua 

sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to 

state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 

679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting the Iqbal plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U. S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“Under § 1983, when determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must 

accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 

1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while the court has an “obligation . . . where the 

petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally 

and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010), citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en 

banc), it may not, in so doing, “supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

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initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 

(9th Cir. 1982).

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both 

(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 

(2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao 

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

On August 28, 2015, Plaintiff went to “medical for ‘chest pains’” and while he was 

there he “became suicidal.” (SAC at 4.) Plaintiff was sent to a “crisis bed.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that officers failed to pack up the personal belongings in his cell and as a 

result, other inmates “stole all of Plaintiff’s property.” (Id.) When Plaintiff returned, he 

filed a grievance with Correctional Officer Rodgers1 who told Plaintiff that “he was 

willing” to get Plaintiff “reimbursed for all his lost property.” (Id. at 3.) Rodgers told 

Plaintiff that he had to follow up by filing another grievance with Rodgers’s supervisor, 

Defendant McGee. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims McGee “lied” and told Plaintiff he “never received” Plaintiff’s 

grievance. (Id.) He further told Plaintiff that he had to start the grievance process “all 

over again.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges it “became clear” that McGee was retaliating against 

him because McGee “hates all prisoners” and is part of a “wanna be gang” known as the 

“Green Slobbs.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims he has a “history for speaking up” and has 

“filed numerous staff misconduct complaints” against McGee. (Id.) 

 

1

 Rodgers is not a named Defendant.

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C. Retaliation

Throughout Plaintiff’s SAC, he claims that Defendants are retaliating against him 

by refusing to reimburse him for the loss of his property. Specifically, Plaintiff claims 

that he has a “history for speaking up” and filing “numerous staff misconduct complaints 

on Sgt. McGee, Sgt. Ruthledge and [their] partners for committing crimes on Donovan 

prisoners, etc.” (SAC at 3.) 

Retaliation against a prisoner for exercising his rights to speech or to petition the 

government may violate the First Amendment. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable 

claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a 

state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege facts to support his claim that he was 

engaging in “protected conduct.” (Id.) Rather, Plaintiff only generally states that he has 

a history of filing complaints but he does not provide further detail as to the nature of the 

grievances and whether the Defendants named in this litigation were directly aware of the 

grievances filed by Plaintiff. There is no causal connection sufficiently alleged between 

the purported “protected conduct” and the actions allegedly taken on the part of any of 

the named Defendants. 

As set forth above, the “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting Iqbal’s plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation are dismissed 

for failing to state a claim.

/ / /

/ / /

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D. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims

Plaintiff also alleges that his right to equal protection under the law was violated 

by Defendants. (See SAC at 5.) Under the Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiff must allege 

facts showing or intimating he was discriminated against because of his race, religion, or 

national origin. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 681. Allegations of discrimination need be 

“plausible,” not merely “conceivable.” Id. “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions 

or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”” Id. at 678 

(internal citation and punctuation omitted).

“To state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment plaintiff must show that the defendant[] acted with an intent or 

purpose to discriminate against [him] based on membership in a protected class.” Furnace 

v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

To support such a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly show discriminatory 

intent. Id.; see also Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); FDIC v. 

Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) (essential element of an equal protection 

claim is to allege that officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner, and with a 

discriminatory purpose). 

Here, Plaintiff’s SAC is devoid of any allegations that there was some intentional 

action taken to discriminate against Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff must allege that 

Defendants took some course of action against him “because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’ 

[the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group,” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.

“[P]urposeful discrimination requires more than ‘intent as volition or intent as 

awareness of consequences.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (quoting Personnel Administrator of 

Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). To state an equal protection claim, 

Plaintiff’s SAC must contain sufficient “factual content” to plausibly show his treatment 

was “invidiously dissimilar to that received by other inmates.” Seals v. Russell, No. C 04-

1569 SBA, 2007 WL 1697319 *7 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2007). The discriminatory act must 

be purposeful. Id. Plaintiff’s SAC contains no such claims.

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Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 

allegations fail to state a claim upon which § 1983 can be granted.

E. Conspiracy claims

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants “participated in a conspiracy” to deny 

Plaintiff “of his reimbursement of all his lost property.” (SAC at 6.) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 

proscribes conspiracies to interfere with certain civil rights. Karim-Panahi v. Los 

Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). In order to state a claim 

for conspiracy to deny his right to equal protection, Plaintiff must allege that two or more 

Defendants conspired “for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, 

in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny 

[him] the equal protection of the law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The absence of a § 1983 

deprivation of rights precludes a § 1985 conspiracy claim based on the same allegations. 

Cassettari v. Nevada County, Cal., 824 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Mahaney 

v. Warren County, 206 F.3d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that “bare” allegations are 

insufficient to support a claim under § 1985 for civil conspiracy). Accordingly, for the 

same reasons set forth above regarding why Plaintiff has failed to state § 1983 claim, he 

has also failed to state a conspiracy claim.

III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. VACATES the Clerk’s Judgment entered on January 17, 2018 pursuant to 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a); 

2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint in its entirety for 

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Because the Court finds further amendment futile, leave 

to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 

1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment 

would be futile). 

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3. The Court further CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order of 

dismissal would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26, 2018

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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