Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00525/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00525-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SADIQ GAMER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06CV0525 JM (POR)

ORDER DISMISSING 

PETITION FOR LACK 

OF JURISDICTION

vs.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, et al.,

Respondents.

Sadiq Gamer (“Petitioner”) petitions the court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents oppose the petition. After considering the parties’ papers, the

court hereby DISMISSES the petition for lack of jurisdiction for the reasons stated below.

Background

Petitioner, born in the Sudan and lawfully admitted to the United States, has been

ordered removed by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) as a result of his state

criminal conviction. On August 12, 2004, upon completion of his state sentence, Petitioner

entered DHS custody for removal proceedings and has remained in custody ever since. DHS

has authority to detain Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231. 

On March 10, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Respondents’ return, filed July 3, 2006, stated that the petition was now moot because

Petitioner would “soon be released” to a facility where his medical concerns could be

addressed. The facility turned out to be located in North Carolina, and Petitioner was

Case 3:06-cv-00525-JM-POR Document 24 Filed 10/19/06 Page 1 of 6
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transferred there on or around July 20, 2006. The traverse, filed July 24, 2006, contended that

the petition was not moot because it was unclear whether, despite transfer to the North

Carolina facility, Petitioner remained in Respondents’ custody. 

Upon learning of the transfer, the court expressed concern as to whether it still had

jurisdiction over the petition. Specifically, it was unclear to the court at that point whether

Petitioner remained in government custody; little was known about the nature of the medical

facility in North Carolina. Therefore, on August 14, 2006, the court ordered further briefing

on the circumstances of the transfer, why Petitioner was transferred to North Carolina, whether

Petitioner remained in government custody, and whether this court still had jurisdiction. 

Thereafter the parties submitted additional briefs, which revealed that Petitioner was

notified in writing on around July 14, 2006 that he was to be released from DHS custody with

conditions of supervision. One condition was that Petitioner reside at the New Salem

Missionary Baptist Church (“New Salem”) at Fayetteville, North Carolina for up to one year.

New Salem is a residential treatment and care facility for individuals in need of social and

medical services. North Carolina was selected was because the New Salem placement was

available.

With this background in mind, the court now turns to the question of whether it has

jurisdiction over the instant petition. 

Statutory Habeas Jurisdiction

In order for this court to exercise its habeas jurisdiction under § 2241, Petitioner must

be in government custody. Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001). “In

custody” for purposes of habeas corpus includes not only physical custody, but also conditions

of release that significantly restrict an individual’s liberty. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.

236, 243 (1963).

The court finds that requiring Petitioner to reside at a residential treatment facility for

up to one year is a significant restraint on Petitioner’s liberty. He is not free to choose where

to live and is under New Salem’s constant supervision. See Petitioner’s Further Briefing, Ex.

A at 8, filed under seal. Presumably if Petitioner were to violate his terms of release by, for

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However, it is unclear whether the court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s immediate

custodian, who is probably in North Carolina. But since the parties have not raised this issue, the

court need not address it.

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example, fleeing New Salem, the government could initiate procedures to revoke Petitioner’s

supervised release and take him back into DHS physical custody. Thus, the government

continues to exert significant control over Petitioner’s liberty. 

Respondents argue that requiring Petitioner to reside at New Salem is merely a valid

condition of release and not “custody” under the habeas statute. Updated Return at 4. The

court is unpersuaded by this argument. An individual sentenced to attend an alcohol

rehabilitation program for fourteen hours has been deemed “in custody” for purposes of habeas

corpus jurisdiction. Dow v. Circuit Court of First Circuit Through Huddy, 995 F.2d 922, 923

(9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1110 (1994). The restrictions here are

substantially greater than the restrictions imposed in Dow. Therefore, Petitioner is “in

custody” and the court has statutory habeas jurisdiction over the petition.

Even if the court were to agree with Respondents that Petitioner is no longer “in

custody”, the court would still have jurisdiction over the petition.1

 The petition was filed on

March 10, 2006, at which time Petitioner was clearly in Respondents’ custody. Petitioner was

then transferred to New Salem in July 2006. If a petitioner is in custody when his petition is

filed, his subsequent release from custody does not deprive the court of its habeas jurisdiction.

Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.

234, 238 (1968)).

However, this does not yet end the jurisdictional matter. The parties also dispute

whether transfer to New Salem moots the petition in light of the relief requested, thereby

denying this court its jurisdiction under Article III of the United States Constitution.

Article III Jurisdiction

Federal courts are empowered only to hear cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III,

§ 2; DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974). An action becomes moot, and therefore

 no case or controversy is presented, if after initiation of the action the aggrieved party receives

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the relief sought in the complaint. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 317.

Petitioner requested the following relief: “[T]hat this Court order the respondents to

release him from custody under the conditions of supervision set forth in 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(3).” Petition at 8. Section 1231(a)(3) provides:

If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the

alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations

prescribed by the Attorney General. The regulations shall include provisions

requiring the alien– 

(A) to appear before an immigration officer periodically for

identification;

(B) to submit, if necessary, to a medical and psychiatric examination at

the expense of the United States Government;

(C) to give information under oath about the alien’s nationality,

circumstances, habits, associations, and activities, and other

information the Attorney General considers appropriate; and 

(D) to obey reasonable written restrictions on the alien’s conduct or

activities that the Attorney General prescribes for the alien.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).

Respondents have released Petitioner from DHS physical custody under conditions of

supervision pursuant to its authority under § 1231(a)(3)(D) (reasonable written restrictions).

Petitioner concedes that an appropriate condition of release includes a period of residential

treatment. Petitioner’s Further Briefing at 6. Petitioner also concedes that New Salem is an

appropriate placement. Id. Thus, Respondents seem to have given Petitioner what he wants:

release with conditions of supervision, including residential treatment. 

Petitioner argues that a live controversy nevertheless exists because the court must,

under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001), determine whether the condition of

residential treatment at New Salem is appropriate under the circumstances. The court

disagrees. As already mentioned, Petitioner concedes that New Salem is an appropriate

placement. Although Petitioner makes his concession “pending the obtaining of additional

professional advice on the matter” and subject to the court’s approval, Petitioner’s Further

Briefing at 6, 8, this condition does not revive an otherwise dead controversy. Petitioner is

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correct that Zadvydas counsels habeas courts to fashion appropriate conditions before releasing

criminal aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, the provision under which Petitioner is being

detained. However, Zadvydas does not give the court authority to decide the appropriateness

of a particular condition when that appropriateness is not in dispute. In sum, because

Petitioner has already received the relief requested and the scope of that relief is not in dispute,

the court lacks Article III jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition. 

Two final matters must be addressed. First, the court had ordered Petitioner’s counsel

to produce competent evidence that Petitioner will not sign a medical release, not merely

counsel’s conclusory statement that being in custody has made Petitioner too paranoid to sign.

This order was made in response to Petitioner counsel’s request that the court enforce its

subpoena duces tecum on CCA for Petitioner’s medical records. Counsel seeks these records

in order to determine the medical care Petitioner should receive and thus whether New Salem

is an appropriate placement. Counsel now offers as competent evidence his declaration

outlining the basis for his belief that Petitioner will not sign the release. However, the need

for the medical records is now moot in light of the court’s dismissal and there is no reason for

the court to consider counsel’s declaration. 

Second, Petitioner’s counsel expresses concern that none of the New Salem documents

show an end date for Petitioner’s residential treatment, nor do they provide a procedure for

obtaining early discharge. Petitioner asks the court to fill in these gaps with an order.

However, the government’s “Alternatives to Detention Release Plan” already limits

Petitioner’s time at New Salem to up to one year. Traverse, Ex. C. The “up to one year”

provision necessarily includes the possibility of discharge before one year, and the court finds

it unnecessary to order New Salem to make available to Petitioner the procedures for early

discharge. The “up to one year” provision should also allay Petitioner’s fear of indefinite

detention by proxy–that is, the possibility that the government will require Petitioner to reside

at New Salem indefinitely–since Petitioner’s required residence at New Salem has a reasonable

and discernable end point. Therefore, Petitioner’s request is denied.

/ / / 

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court DISMISSES the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 19, 2006

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

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