Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02042/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

NIKOLAY OTCHKOV, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ALAN EVERETT, in his official and 

individual capacities as Director of the 

Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses 

and Control; Former Director of the 

Arizona Department of Liquor and 

Licenses Control JERRY OLIVER Sr., 

in his official and individual capacities; 

OSCAR CORTEZ in his official and 

individual capacities as an officer in the 

Phoenix Police Department; CITY OF 

PHOENIX; Attorney JESS LORONA, 

and the law firm LORONA, DUCAR & 

STAINER LTD., 

Defendants. 

No. 12-CV-02042-PHX-JAT 

ORDER

 Pending before the Court are Defendant Oscar Cortez’s and the City of Phoenix’s 

(collectively “the City Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12), pro se Plaintiff Nikolay 

Otchkov’s Motion to Strike the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 18), and Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Strike the City Defendants’ reply to Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 27). The Court 

grants the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denies Plaintiff’s motions for the 

following reasons. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In 2000, Plaintiff opened and began operating a restaurant and sports bar called 

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“Famous Sam’s.” (Doc. 1 at 3). On June 14, 2007, City of Phoenix officials, including 

Defendant Cortez of the Phoenix Police Department, conducted an inspection of Famous 

Sam’s. (Id. at 4). As a result of the inspection, Defendant Cortez issued Plaintiff an 

“Arizona Traffic Ticket and Complaint” for no game center license, operating games of 

chance, and operating untagged coin operated games. (Id.). Plaintiff was allegedly not 

handcuffed or detained but was read his Miranda rights. (Id.). Plaintiff was ordered to 

appear in the City of Phoenix Municipal Court on June 28, 2007. (Id.). Plaintiff appeared 

in Court but was allegedly told by the court clerk that no complaint had been filed against 

him and none existed against him in the court file. (Id.). 

 In 2007, Plaintiff changed the name of the restaurant to “Big Nixx.” (Id. at 3). 

In January 2008, the Arizona State Liquor Board (the “Board”) audited Big Nixx and 

found multiple violations of Arizona law. (Id.). Plaintiff was required to surrender his 

current liquor license and acquire a series 6 liquor license. (Id.). In front of Phoenix City 

Hall, on January 24, 2008, Defendant Cortez allegedly told Plaintiff something like, “You 

Bulgarians never gonna learn to obey laws and that is why you never gonna get a license 

in this City.” (Id.). 

 To acquire a series 6 license Plaintiff had to enter the Arizona Liquor License 

Lottery. (Id.). On May 4, 2008, Plaintiff was randomly selected in the lottery, which 

allowed Plaintiff to apply for a series 6 license with the Department of Liquor Licenses 

and Control (“DLLC”). (Id.). To obtain a series 6 license, Plaintiff was required to apply 

with the DLLC and pay a “nonrefundable fifty percent (50%) deposit of the Fair Market 

Value” of his series 6 license which was “$55,834.00.” (Id.). Plaintiff paid the 

$55,834.00 “nonrefundable deposit” to the DLLC. (Id.). Plaintiff claims he was never 

warned that DLLC would keep his “nonrefundable deposit” in the case his application was 

disqualified by the Board. (Id.). Plaintiff also filed the application with the DLLC. (Id. at 

4). 

 In the application, one question asks “Have you ever been detained, cited, arrested, 

indicted or summoned into court for violation of any law or ordinance?” (Doc. 1-1 at 13). 

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Plaintiff answered the question by saying he was warned in June 2007 for possible game 

violations. (Id.). Another question asks “Have you or an entity in which you have held 

ownership, been an officer, member, director or manager, ever had a business, 

professional or liquor application or license rejected, denied, revoked, suspended or fined 

in this or any other state?” (Id.). In answering the question, Plaintiff failed to disclose 

some violations and the fine he was assessed for violations. (Id.). 

 In July 2008, the Phoenix City Council recommended disapproval of Plaintiff’s 

application for a series 6 license based on information provided by Defendant Cortez and 

the Phoenix Police Department regarding Plaintiff’s past violations. (Doc. 1 at 4). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cortez falsely accused Plaintiff of falsifying his series 6 

license application. (Id.). 

 In order to resolve the issues presented by the Phoenix City Council’s 

recommendation, the Board set a hearing. (Id.). Plaintiff retained assistance of attorney 

Jerry Lewkowitz for the hearing. (Id.). The hearing was held on December 8, 2008. (Id.). 

 On December 8, 2008, Defendant Cortez also allegedly entered Big Nixx and 

ordered the customers to leave and the bartender to close the restaurant. (Id.). 

 On December 19, 2008, the Board denied Plaintiff’s application for a series 6 

liquor license, allegedly solely on the basis of the information provided by Defendant 

Cortez—that Plaintiff had been arrested and falsified his application. (Id. at 5). As a 

result of his application denial, Plaintiff forfeited the $55,834.00 “nonrefundable deposit.” 

(Id.). Plaintiff did not appeal the Board’s decision because Lewkowitz advised Plaintiff 

that an appeal would be futile because the City of Phoenix based its recommendation on 

Defendant Cortez’s information. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff contacted Defendant Oliver, the former director of the Arizona DLLC, 

and apparently asked for his nonrefundable deposit back. Oliver refused to return the 

deposit and advised Plaintiff to seek legal counsel in order to dispute the issue in court. 

(Id.). In March 2010, Plaintiff hired Defendant Lorona to pursue a claim in an attempt to 

get the deposit back. (Id.). 

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 On June 28, 2010, the DLLC sent a letter to Plaintiff signed by Defendant Alan 

Everett, the Director of the DLLC, re-asserting that the DLLC would not refund the 

deposit that Plaintiff paid in May 2008 because the deposit was nonrefundable. (Doc. 1-1 

at 25). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lorona expressed to Plaintiff that this letter was an 

acknowledgment by the DLLC of wrongful acts and that the letter would be useful 

inculpatory evidence against the DLLC in a forth coming section 1983 claim. (Doc. 1 at 

5). 

 In September 2010, Defendant Lorona advised Plaintiff that there may be some 

issues preventing him from being successful on a claim under section 1983. (Id. at 6). In 

December 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint with another judge in this Court under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Arizona, the DLLC, City of Phoenix, and the Police 

Department. (Doc. 1-1 at 29-39). The complaint was eventually dismissed for failure to 

serve the defendants. In January 2011, Defendant Lorona and his law firm informed 

Plaintiff that the firm would no longer represent Plaintiff because Lorona had determined 

that Plaintiff had no legal claim. (Id.). 

 Plaintiff alleges he was deceived and betrayed by Lewkowitz and Defendant 

Lorona because they allegedly acted in favor of the DLLC and the City of Phoenix. (Id.). 

On June 16, 2011, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Everett which was referred to the 

Arizona Department of Administration Risk Management Division. (Doc. 1-1 at 41). The 

Department sent a letter back to Plaintiff on September 27, 2011, denying the claims 

Plaintiff presented and explaining that an investigation into Plaintiff’s application denial 

had revealed that Plaintiff’s application was handled and processed in accordance with 

established procedures and Arizona law. (Id.). 

 On September 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) in this Court 

alleging five counts against Alan Everett, Director of the Arizona DLLC, Jerry Oliver Sr., 

former Director of the Arizona DLLC, Oscar Cortez of the Phoenix Police Department, 

the City of Phoenix, and Attorney Jess Lorona, and the law firm Lorona, Ducar & Stainer 

Ltd. (Doc. 1). On November 21, 2012, the City Defendants filed the pending Motion to 

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Dismiss (Doc. 12). Plaintiff then made a single filing consisting of a Response to the 

Motion to Dismiss and the pending Motion to Strike the Motion to Dismiss (“First Motion 

to Strike”) on December 10, 2012 (Doc. 18). 

 The City Defendants then filed a Response to Plaintiff’s First Motion to Strike 

(Doc. 20) and Plaintiff filed a Reply to the City Defendants’ Response to the First Motion 

to Strike (Doc. 23). 

 The City Defendants also filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to 

Dismiss (“City Defendants’ Reply”) (Doc. 25). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the pending 

Motion to Strike the City Defendants’ Reply (“Second Motion to Strike”) (Doc. 27). The 

City Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Strike (Doc. 28) and 

Plaintiff filed a Reply to the City Defendants’ Response to the Second Motion to Strike 

(Doc. 30). 

II. PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AND SECOND MOTIONS TO STRIKE 

 As an initial matter, the Court will address and deny Plaintiff’s motions to strike. 

In order to explain this conclusion, the Court endeavors to make sense of the multiple 

filings Plaintiff has given the Court. Plaintiff and the City Defendants have made nine 

separate filings concerning the Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 12, 18, 20, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, & 

31). Three of these filings are the pending motions: the Motion to Dismiss, the First 

Motion to Strike, and the Second Motion to Strike (Docs. 12, 18, & 27). The merits 

concerning the Motion to Dismiss are only addressed in the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12), 

Plaintiff’s reply to the response to Plaintiff’s First Motion to Strike (Doc. 23), and the City 

Defendants’ reply to Plaintiff’s response to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25). 

 In Plaintiff’s reply to the City Defendants’ response to the Second Motion to 

Strike (Doc. 30 at 1), Plaintiff argues that he “addressed in part the ‘substance’ of [City 

Defendants’] arguments in his Reply (Doc.#22) enough to withstand their motion to 

dismiss.” However, this “Reply (Doc.#22)” is Plaintiff’s response to Defendant Alan 

Everett’s Motion to Set Aside default (Doc. 19). While Everett is a Defendant in this 

case, his arguments in the Motion to Set Aside default (Doc. 19) are entirely separate and 

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unrelated to the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12). 

 Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and the Court 

will construe Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, up to a point. Plaintiff has raised no valid 

reason to strike the City Defendants’ filings. In an attempt to address the merits of 

Plaintiff’s claims and the City Defendants’ arguments against them, the Court will deny 

Plaintiff’s repeated motions to strike and consider all arguments made for and against the 

City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

III. THE CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 12) 

 In the Motions to Dismiss, the City Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). (Doc. 12 at 1). “A motion under 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim can be granted only if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her 

claim.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court 

must construe the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter 

of the complaint and the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See 

Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, courts do not 

have to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. 

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 

 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges five claims against defendants. (Doc. 1). 

Plaintiff makes one state law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in 

Count Five (id. at 9-10) and appears to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the general basis for 

Counts One through Four (id. at 6-9). Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights 

on its own. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394 (1989). Section 1983 “merely 

provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Id. at 394 

(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). “To make out a cause of 

action under section 1983, plaintiffs must plead that (1) the defendants acting under color 

of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal 

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statutes.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Smith v. 

Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962)). 

 The City Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state claims upon 

which relief can be granted because the claims are 1) barred by the statute of limitations, 

2) barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 3) barred because Plaintiff has not stated a 

valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 4) barred because Plaintiff has not complied with 

state law. (Doc. 12). As the Court finds resolution of the statute of limitations issue to be 

dispositive in this case, the Court will not address the other issues raised by the City 

Defendants. 

A. Statute of Limitations 

 The City Defendants argue that the limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims expired 

on December 19, 2010, and Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on September 26, 2012. 

“Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 

12(b)(6) ‘only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would 

not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.’” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 

F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 

1991)); see also Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682 (“When a motion to dismiss is based on the 

running of the statute of limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the 

complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the 

statute was tolled.” (citing Leone v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 599 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 

1979)). 

 “State law governs the statute of limitations period for § 1983 suits.” Douglas v. 

Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th 

Cir. 1999)). “For actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Federal courts apply the 

statute of limitations for personal injury actions of the state in which the claim arises.” 

Myers v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. (AHCCS), 984 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (D. 

Ariz. 1996) aff’d sub nom. Myers v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 131 F.3d 

147 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Krug v. Imbordino, 896 F.2d 395, 396–97 (9th Cir.1990)). For 

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personal injury actions “[i]n Arizona, the applicable statute provides for a limitations 

period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues.” Id. (citing A.R.S. § 12–

542). 

 “To determine the timeliness of a claim, a court must establish whether a plaintiff 

has alleged ‘discrete acts’ that would be unconstitutional occurring within the limitations 

period.” Normandeau v. City of Phx., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1065 (D. Ariz. 2005) (citing 

RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002)). “But in 

borrowing a state statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, ‘we borrow no more 

than necessary.’” TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991 (quoting West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39–

40 (1987)). “Consistent with this maxim, federal, not state, law determines when a civil 

rights claim accrues. Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has 

reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 In this case, the City Defendants argue that on the face of the Complaint the last 

discrete act alleged to have been taken by either the City of Phoenix or Cortez was on 

December 19, 2008. (Doc. 12 at 3-4). On December 8, 2008, according to the Complaint, 

Cortez closed Big Nixx and ordered customers to leave because he was closing the 

restaurant. (Doc. 1 at 4). Also on December 8th, the Arizona State Liquor Board held a 

hearing to determine whether or not to grant Plaintiff a series 6 license because the 

Phoenix City Council had recommended disapproval of Plaintiff’s liquor license 

application. (Id.). Following the hearing, on December 19th the Board concluded that 

Plaintiff did not qualify for a series 6 liquor license. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges Cortez’s 

fabrications of criminal charges supported by other lies were the sole basis for the Board’s 

conclusion. (Id. at 4). As a result of the Board’s denial, Plaintiff forfeited the $55,834 

admittedly “nonrefundable” deposit that Plaintiff paid toward being given his series 6 

liquor license. (Id. at 3, 5). 

 On the basis of these facts, Plaintiff goes on to allege: that Cortez is liable in 

Count One for “conspiracy” with other defendants to deprive Plaintiff of “property and 

privilege” without “due process of law” in violation of the “Fourteenth Amendment to the 

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Constitution” (id. at 6-7); that City Defendants are both liable in Count Two for causing 

Plaintiff’s “loss of property, loss of privilege, loss of business and income and very 

serious health issues in violation of [the] First Amendment” (id. at 7-8); that Cortez is 

liable again in Count Three for “conspiracy” with other defendants to deprive Plaintiff “of 

property and privileges through deception and fraud . . . in violation of [the] First, Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at 8); that City Defendants are both liable in Count 

Four for “ethnic profiling” and depriving Plaintiff of “his rights to equal protection of all 

the laws” and depriving Plaintiff of “his right to his property” and “due process of law” 

“in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at 8-9); and that Cortez is 

liable in Count Five for “intentionally and willfully inflict[ing] emotional distress on 

Plaintiff” (id. at 9-10). 

 The City Defendants contend that these claims are barred by the two year statute 

of limitations because the last discrete acts that enabled Plaintiff to know or gave him 

reason to know of any injury caused by the City Defendants occurred on December 19, 

2008—when the Board denied Plaintiff’s liquor license. (Doc. 12 at 2-4). 

 1. Continuing Violation Theory 

 Plaintiff contends that the “continuing wrong doctrine” tolls the two year statute of 

limitations on all of his claims. (Doc. 23 at 3-4). “In actions like this one, where the 

federal courts borrow the state statute of limitations, we also borrow the forum state’s 

tolling rules.” TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 992 (citing Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 

(1989)). Plaintiff explains that his right to sue did not accrue until September 27, 2011, 

when the Arizona Department of Administration Risk Management Division informed 

Plaintiff that his “application for a liquor license was handled and processed in accordance 

with established procedures and the Arizona Revised Statutes.” (Doc. 1-1 at 41). 

 The continuing violation theory, which applies to section 1983 claims, allows a 

plaintiff to seek relief for events outside the limitations period. Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 

1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court addressed the continuing violations 

doctrine in the context of Title VII violations in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 

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Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Reviewing a Ninth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court 

noted that the Ninth Circuit recognized two ways to demonstrate a continuing violation 

under the doctrine “allowing courts to consider conduct that would ordinarily be time 

barred ‘as long as the untimely incidents represent an ongoing unlawful employment 

practice.’” Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 107 (quoting Morgan v. National 

R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court 

observed that Ninth Circuit jurisprudence permitted a plaintiff to establish a continuing 

violation either by showing: (1) a “serial violation,” where the alleged acts of 

discrimination outside the limitations period are demonstrated to be sufficiently related to 

similar acts within the limitations period; or (2) a “systemic violation” resulting from a 

“systemic policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in part, within the limitations 

period . . . .” Id. (quoting 232 F.3d at 1015-16). The Supreme Court rejected the “serial 

violation” basis for a continuing violation claim, holding that “discrete discriminatory acts 

are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed 

charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging 

that act.” Id. at 113. A “mere continuing impact from past violations is not actionable.” 

Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013 (quoting and citing numerous authorities). The Ninth Circuit in 

RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) applied Morgan to a 

section 1983 claim based on discrete time-barred acts. 

 In this case, Plaintiff’s argument that the statute of limitations was tolled because 

of the continuing violation doctrine is without merit. In arguing that the City Defendants’ 

actions fall within the limitations period, Plaintiff does not allege that the City Defendants 

have committed discrete illegal actions after December 2008. Instead, the gravamen of 

Plaintiff’s claim is that the impacts on him from their actions, such as the Arizona 

Department of Administrations letter in September 2011, are themselves discrete illegal 

acts. As set forth above, discrete illegal acts do not escape the statute of limitations 

challenge simply because they are related to act allowed in timely filed charges. Nat’l. 

R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113. Moreover, the continuing impacts from past 

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violations of section 1983 are not actionable. Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013 (citing Abramson v. 

Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979)). See also Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 

1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[a] continuing violation is occasioned by unlawful acts, not 

by continual ill effects from an original violation. . . . Continuing non-employment 

resulting from an original action is not a continuing violation.”). 

 Regarding Plaintiff’s claims in Counts Two, Four, and Five, for fraudulent 

misrepresentation and ethnic profiling against the City Defendants and for the state law 

tort claim against Cortez, Plaintiff has not alleged that the City Defendants have done 

anything further to him since the Board denied his license application. Instead, it is clear 

from the Complaint that Plaintiff knew of his alleged injury no later than December 2008. 

In fact, Plaintiff filed a complaint with another judge in this Court on December 3, 2010 

(Doc. 1-1 at 29-39), that was dismissed for failure of service, alleging most of the claims 

asserted here against the City Defendants. Thus, the two-year statute of limitations period 

expired several years prior to the date Plaintiff filed this Complaint. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that each claim alleged in the Complaint against the City Defendants is timebarred. 

 2. Continuing Conspiracy Theory 

 With respect to Counts One and Three in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff appears 

to argue that Cortez and other defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of 

his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1 at 7-8). Even if Counts One and Three were not barred 

under the continuing violation theory, the Court would still dismiss these counts because 

this argument also has no merit. The Ninth Circuit has determined that the “last overt act” 

doctrine applies to the accrual of civil conspiracies for limitations purposes. Gibson v. 

United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[i]njury and damage in a civil 

conspiracy action flow from the overt acts, not from ‘the mere continuance of a 

conspiracy.’”) (citations omitted); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1984), 

abrogated on other grounds by Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 

U.S. 143 (1987). Under the last overt act doctrine, the injury and damage in a civil 

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conspiracy action flows from the overt acts, not from the mere continuance of a 

conspiracy, and the cause of action runs separately from each overt act that is alleged to 

cause damage to the plaintiff. Id. (holding that a plaintiff may recover only for the overt 

acts that specifically were alleged to have occurred within the limitations period). 

 In this case, the last overt acts that Plaintiff has alleged against the City 

Defendants occurred on December 19, 2008. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims of 

conspiracy against City Defendants that were filed on September 26, 2012 are far outside 

the expiration of the statute of limitations. All of the Plaintiff’s claims against the City 

Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court will grant the 

City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against 

the City Defendants upon which relief can be granted. 

B. Respondeat Superior Theory of Liability is not Valid in a Section 1983 

 Claim 

 Even if Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Phoenix were not barred by the 

statute of limitations, the Court would still be compelled to grant the City Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss the City of Phoenix. The only two claims against the City of Phoenix 

in the Complaint are Counts Two and Four—for violating section 1983 and respectively 

causing Plaintiff’s “loss of property, loss of privilege, loss of business and income and 

very serious health issues in violation of [the] First Amendment” (Doc. 1 at 7-8) and for 

“ethnic profiling” and depriving Plaintiff of “his rights to equal protection of all the laws” 

and depriving Plaintiff of “his right to his property” and “due process of law” “in violation 

of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at 8-9). Plaintiff alleges that the “City of 

Phoenix is liable for the actions of Defendant Detective Cortez under the doctrine of 

respondeat superior.” (Id. at 8). 

 The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held “a municipality cannot be 

held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory” “solely because [the 

municipality] employs a tortfeasor.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 

U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Therefore, simply because the City of Phoenix employs Officer 

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Cortez it cannot be held liable under respondeat superior. Municipalities, however, can 

be sued under section 1983 “for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to 

governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval 

through the body’s official decision making channels.” Id. at 690-691; see also Oviatt By 

& Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[O]nly deprivations 

visited pursuant to municipal ‘custom’ or ‘policy’ . . . lead to municipal liability.”) 

(quoting City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985)). 

 In order for the City of Phoenix to be liable under section 1983 for its policies and 

customs, Plaintiff “must establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he 

was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to 

deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the 

‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1474 (quoting 

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). The Court finds Plaintiff’s 

allegations in Counts Two and Four are wholly inadequate to meet these requirements and 

therefore insufficient to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 

 Plaintiff has not alleged a single fact against the City of Phoenix. Plaintiff has 

merely made the conclusory statement that the City “is liable for the actions of Defendant 

Detective Cortez under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” (Doc. 1 at 8). Plaintiff has 

not alleged that the City of Phoenix had a policy, Plaintiff has not explained how such a 

policy amounts to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, nor has 

Plaintiff explained or alleged any facts to show how the policy was the moving force 

behind any constitutional violation. Consequently, Plaintiff’s allegations against the City 

of Phoenix do not meet federal pleading standards. 

 C. Count Five Against Defendant Cortez is also Barred by A.R.S. § 12- 

 821.01 

 Even if Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Cortez were not barred by the statute 

of limitations the Court would still be compelled to dismiss Defendant Cortez from Count 

Five. Plaintiff’s Complaint makes a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

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distress in Count Five against Cortez. Plaintiff claims Officer Cortez and the other 

individual defendants intentionally and willfully inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff 

by violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Doc. 1 at 9). This claim against Cortez, 

however, is barred by A.R.S. § 12-821.01, which requires a claimant to provide notice of 

claim to a public entity or public employee within one hundred eighty (180) days after the 

cause of action accrues.1

 Claims that do not comply with this statute are barred and no 

action may be maintained. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A); see also Crum v. Superior Court, 922 

P.3d 316, 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). As discussed above, see supra Section III.A, the 

Complaint alleges the action for Plaintiff’s claims against Cortez accrued on December 8, 

2008. Plaintiff did not file his Complaint until September 26, 2012. Even if the Court 

were to agree with Plaintiff’s argument that the action accrued on September 27, 2011 

(Doc. 23 at 3), Plaintiff still filed his Complaint a year later. Therefore, under either the 

Court’s date of accrual or Plaintiff’s, Count Five would still be barred by A.R.S. § 12-

821.01. 

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 

 The Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint with regard to the 

City Defendants. Plaintiff has not amended nor sought leave to amend his Complaint as a 

matter of right under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the 

twenty-one day time frame to file an amendment following a motion to dismiss has 

expired, Plaintiff has lost his right to amend the Complaint as a matter of course. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1). While previous precedent from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

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 A.R.S. § 12-821.01. 

 A. Persons who have claims against a public entity or a public employee shall file 

claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service for the public entity or 

public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil procedure within one hundred 

eighty days after the cause of action accrues. The claim shall contain facts sufficient to 

permit the public entity or public employee to understand the basis upon which liability is 

claimed. The claim shall also contain a specific amount for which the claim can be settled 

and the facts supporting that amount. Any claim which is not filed within one hundred 

eighty days after the cause of action accrues is barred and no action may be maintained 

thereon. 

 B. For purposes of this section, a cause of action accrues when the damaged party 

realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, 

source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage. 

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instructed that district courts should grant leave to amend sua sponte when granting a 

motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals has recently called that precedent into question in 

light of the recent revision of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. See Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 A district court’s denial of leave to amend is subject to an abuse of discretion 

standard of review. See Telesaursus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 

2010). The Court has “an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil 

rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of 

any doubt.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bretz v. 

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). “A district court should not 

dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Id. (quoting Schucker 

v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 

 In this case, Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Phoenix and Officer Cortez are 

barred because of the statute of limitations, the inherent nature of section 1983 claims, and 

Arizona state law. The Court finds that it is absolutely clear that these bars to Plaintiff’s 

claims cannot be cured by amendment. Any attempt to amend the Complaint would be 

futile. Accordingly, the Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to amend the claims against 

the City Defendants. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

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IT IS ORDERED Defendant Cortez’s and Defendant City of Phoenix’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 12) is granted. Defendant Cortez and Defendant City of Phoenix are 

dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 18) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ reply 

to Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 27) is denied. 

 Dated this 4th day of September, 2013. 

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