Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01936/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01936-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SEMCON TECH, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1936

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:12-cv-00532-RGA, Judge 

Richard G. Andrews.

______________________ 

Decided: August 19, 2016

______________________ 

MARC AARON FENSTER, Russ August & Kabat, Los 

Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by JEFFREY ZHI YANG LIAO, ADAM S. HOFFMAN,

PAUL ANTHONY KROEGER. 

JARED BOBROW, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Redwood Shores, CA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by AARON Y. HUANG. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-1936 Document: 55-2 Page: 1 Filed: 08/19/2016
2 SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, BRYSON and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Semcon Tech, LLC, (“Semcon”) appeals from 

a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Micron Technology, Inc., (“Micron”) by the United States 

District Court for the District of Delaware. The district 

court held that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 

7,156,717 (“the ’717 patent”) are invalid as anticipated by 

U.S. Patent No. 6,010,538 (“Sun”). Because we disagree 

with the analysis that led the district court to conclude 

that there is no genuine issue of material fact on the issue 

of anticipation, we vacate the district court’s summary 

judgment order and remand for further proceedings.

I 

The ’717 patent is directed to methods for finishing

semiconductor wafers during manufacture. The methods 

of the four asserted claims entail carefully reducing the 

thickness of the wafers by a computer-controlled polishing 

process that uses pressure and a chemical slurry. The 

finishing process employs sensors to monitor and adjust 

the reduction of the thickness of the wafers. When the 

process reaches a predefined endpoint it stops. 

It is undisputed that Sun is a close prior art reference. 

Like the ’717 patent, the Sun patent describes controlling 

the finishing of a semiconductor wafer using calculations 

derived from sensor data. The anticipation dispute focuses on only one limitation of the ’717 patent: “changing a 

plurality of control parameters in response to an evaluation of both the in situ process information . . . and the 

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SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 3

tracked information . . . during at least a portion of the 

finishing cycle time.”1 

The narrow issue on appeal is whether the district 

court erred in concluding, on summary judgment, that 

Sun discloses this limitation of changing the control 

parameters for the finishing process by using calculations 

that are based on both “tracked information” and “in situ 

process information,” and that no reasonable finder of fact 

could conclude otherwise. The district court construed 

tracked information to mean “pre-polishing information 

about the wafer being polished that is associated with the 

wafer,” and found that the initial thickness of the wafer

was an example of tracked information. The court construed in situ process information to mean “information 

that is sensed from the wafer currently undergoing CMP 

[chemical-mechanical polishing].” Those constructions 

are not disputed.

The district court found that Sun disclosed this limitation and based its analysis on statements by Micron’s 

expert, Dr. David Dornfeld. In particular, the court 

quoted the statement by Dr. Dornfeld in his principal 

declaration that “Sun discloses that the polishing process 

can be controlled in real time in response to pre-polish 

thickness information and information that is sensed from 

the wafers by sensors before reaching its endpoint.” The 

court also relied on Dr. Dornfeld’s statement in Micron’s 

claim chart that “Sun discloses a controller and processor 

algorithm which, in response to rate information calculated from the initial thickness of the wafer being polished 

and information detected from sensors, can control the 

 

1 Although minor variations of this limitation are 

found among the four asserted claims, Micron acknowledges that claim 1 is representative, and the parties have 

not argued that the analysis of the anticipation issue 

differs for any of the asserted claims.

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4 SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

CMP process.” Based on that evidence, the court concluded that Sun disclosed the use of tracked information, i.e., 

the initial thickness of the wafer, in connection with in 

situ process information obtained from the sensors, to 

calculate rate of removal information that is used to 

change the control parameters during the finishing process. The court thus adopted Dr. Dornfeld’s conclusion 

that Sun uses the initial thickness of the wafer to calculate the amount of material removed from the wafer 

during polishing and thus to calculate the rate of removal 

of the material from the wafer. The rate of removal, Dr. 

Dornfeld explained, was used to affect the control parameters for the polishing process.

Semcon contends that the district court erred in its 

finding as to what Sun discloses. According to Semcon,

Sun calculates the rate of material removal from the 

wafer without reference to tracked information (e.g., the

wafer’s initial thickness). Instead, Semcon asserts, Sun 

calculates the rate of removal based exclusively on sensor 

readings gathered during the polishing process and 

timing information. As evidence for its interpretation of 

Sun, Semcon cites portions of the Sun patent and Dr. 

Dornfeld’s deposition testimony, which purportedly contradicts his declaration. Reviewing that evidence, the 

district court concluded that Semcon “offers no contrary 

expert testimony, but instead provides snippets of deposition examination. The snippets do not create a disputed 

material fact.” 

In this appeal we examine whether there is a genuine 

question that Sun discloses the use of the initial thickness 

of the wafer in calculating the rate of removal of material 

from the wafer. 

II

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

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SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 5

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute of 

material fact “if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable 

factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A 

The district court relied heavily on Dr. Dornfeld’s declaration and his attached claim chart. In particular, the 

court noted that Dr. Dornfeld referred to column 8, lines 

41-67, and Figure 13 from Sun as the basis for his conclusion that Sun discloses using the initial thickness of the 

wafer in calculating the rate of removal of material from 

the wafer during the polishing process. In fact, however, 

the cited portions of Sun do not appear to support Dr. 

Dornfeld’s characterization.

Earlier portions of column 8 of Sun describe how the 

initial thickness of the wafer can be used to determine the

endpoint of the polishing process based on the wafer’s 

current thickness. Sun first explains that “[a]t some point 

TE, the thickness of the layer has been reduced by a 

desired amount; that is, an endpoint to the CMP process. 

This is often all the information that is necessary to 

control the process and determine its endpoint.”2 Sun, 

col. 8, ll. 13-20. Sun then adds that “[b]y also knowing the 

starting thickness of the transparent layer, the measured 

thickness removed is subtracted to determine the remaining thickness of the layer. It is often desired to determine, as an endpoint of the process, when the layer has 

been reduced to a certain thickness. The CMP process is 

then stopped.” Id., col. 8, ll. 20-25.

 

2 The Sun specification describes how the amount of 

material that has been removed during the process is

determined from electromagnetic sensor readings without 

reliance on initial thickness. Sun, col. 7, line 43, through 

col. 8, line 16; col. 9, line 1, through col. 12, line 64.

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6 SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

Those portions of column 8 of Sun disclose using the 

wafer’s initial thickness to determine the endpoint of the 

CMP process based on a target remaining thickness, but 

they do not address the question whether the wafer’s 

initial thickness is used to calculate the rate of removal 

that is in turn used to control the process before the 

endpoint is reached.

To the contrary, the Sun specification at lines 41 

through 67 of column 8 states that the rate of removal of 

material from the wafer is determined from “the amount 

of material measured to have been removed during a 

certain time interval,” Sun, col. 8, ll. 48-49, which in turn 

is based on sensor information, in particular the interference measurements depicted in Figure 8A of the patent. 

Sun explains that “[n]o matter what specific condition is 

designated as the endpoint of the process of removing 

material from a transparent layer, that process may be 

controlled in real time, before reaching its endpoint, from 

the information being received in the form of Fig. 8A.” 

Id., col. 8, ll. 41-45. The rate of material removal is then 

calculated by measuring the amount of material removed 

during a certain time interval and dividing that amount 

by the time elapsed in that interval. Id., col. 8, ll. 45-50. 

“In response to such rate information, the CMP process 

may be adjusted until a desired removal rate is obtained 

and maintained.” Id., col. 8, ll. 50-52.

That portion of Sun, which was relied upon by Dr. 

Dornfeld, does not suggest that the rate of removal is 

determined by calculating the difference between the 

current thickness of the wafer and its initial thickness 

over time. Instead, it suggests that the rate of removal is 

calculated using only sensor information as to the amount 

of material removed, together with timing information.

Figure 13 of Sun and the accompanying portion of the 

Sun specification also do not clearly support Dr. DornCase: 15-1936 Document: 55-2 Page: 6 Filed: 08/19/2016
SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 7

feld’s characterization of the Sun reference. The pertinent portion of Figure 13 is set forth below:

According to Dr. Dornfeld, Figure 13 shows that the 

initial thickness of the wafer is used in calculating the 

amount of material removed from the wafer, and in turn 

the rate of removal of material. Dr. Dornfeld asserted

that along with “in situ process information” from the 

sensors, the rate information is used to change the control 

parameters in the CMP process.

Dr. Dornfeld’s theory, however, appears to be at odds 

with the description of the claimed methods in the portion 

of the specification that addresses Figure 13.

The specification states that Figure 13 illustrates a 

processing algorithm that is used to determine “when a 

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8 SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

process of reducing the thickness of the transparent layer 

48 . . . has reached an endpoint TE.” Id., col. 13, line 66, 

through col. 14, line 3. One item that can be input in the 

first step of the algorithm, identified as step 116, is “the 

initial thickness of the film 48, which can be determined 

by measurement or ascertained from the parameters of 

the process used to form the layer.3 As the specification 

explains, “[i]f the initial film thickness was inputted by 

the operator in the step 116, the step 128 also calculates 

and outputs the remaining thickness of the film at the 

location of each of the sensor units.” Id., col. 14, ll. 50-55. 

Thus, Sun discloses that initial thickness information can 

be used to determine when the process endpoint has been 

reached, but it does not clearly disclose that initial thickness information is used to calculate the rate at which 

material is removed from the wafers, which in turn results in changing the control parameters in the polishing 

process.

Instead, the calculation of the removal rate at step 

126, according to the Sun specification, is performed by 

using data from the sensing units together with timing 

information. That data can be used to calculate the 

amount of material that has been removed from the wafer

and thus the rate of removal of material. Sun, col. 14, ll. 

12-45. The specification explains that in step 128 of 

Figure 13, “the thickness of material that has been removed from the layer 48 is determined by multiplying the 

removal rate determined in the step 126 by the amount of 

time that has elapsed during the process.” Id., col. 14, ll. 

46-49.

Thus, contrary to Dr. Dornfeld’s assertion that “rate 

information [is] calculated from the initial thickness of 

 

3 Sun makes clear that the film is the top layer of 

the wafer that is planarized during the CMP process. 

Sun, col. 7, ll. 41-52.

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SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 9

the wafer being polished,” that portion of the Sun specification does not state that the initial thickness of the film 

is used in calculating the removal rate of material from 

the film, but rather that the removal rate is determined

based on data from the sensing units. 

Semcon also contends that Dr. Dornfeld’s deposition 

contradicts the portions of his declaration on which the 

district court relied. In his deposition, Dr. Dornfeld 

agreed that determining the rate of removal of material 

referred to in Sun “does not require a comparison to the 

initial thickness” of the wafer, and that the rate of removal “is calculated without reference to the initial thickness.” Those statements are, at minimum, in tension 

with Dr. Dornfeld’s assertion that Sun discloses that rate 

information is “calculated from the initial thickness of the 

wafer being polished.” While it may be possible to reconcile Dr. Dornfeld’s deposition testimony with his declaration, the district court did not offer an explanation for the 

apparent inconsistency, and we conclude that the inconsistency between the two is a relevant factor bearing on 

whether it was appropriate for the district court to grant 

summary judgment based on Dr. Dornfeld’s declaration.4

 

4 Micron submitted a reply declaration by Dr. Dornfeld following his deposition, in which he sought to reconcile his deposition testimony with his characterizations of 

the Sun reference. While Dr. Dornfeld’s reply declaration 

reasserts that the removal rate in Sun is calculated based 

in part on the initial thickness of the wafer, a reasonable 

finder of fact could conclude that Dr. Dornfeld’s reply 

declaration failed to rebut Semcon’s characterization of 

column 8 of Sun, and could instead credit Dr. Dornfeld’s 

admissions during his deposition that “the rate of material removal does not require a comparison to the initial 

thickness” and that “rate is calculated without reference 

to the initial thickness.” 

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10 SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

B 

The law requires that in a summary judgment motion 

all justifiable inferences be drawn in the nonmovant’s 

favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Based on the portions

of the Sun specification cited above, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Sun does not disclose using both 

the initial thickness of the wafer and sensor information 

to calculate rate information. For that reason, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Sun does not disclose

the ’717 patent’s limitation of controlling the process “in 

response to an evaluation of both [sensor information] and 

the tracked information.” 

The fact that Semcon offered no contrary expert testimony directed to the issue of anticipation does not

justify the issuance of summary judgment. Through its 

textual arguments regarding the Sun reference and its 

reliance on the apparent inconsistencies between Dr. 

Dornfeld’s deposition testimony and his declaration, 

Semcon showed why a reasonable finder of fact might 

disagree with Dr. Dornfeld’s anticipation analysis.

That is all that is required on the part of the nonmoving party in opposing a summary judgment motion on an 

issue as to which the moving party has the burden of 

proof, as Micron does here. See Exigent Tech., Inc. v. 

Atrana Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 

2006); Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. United States, 434 F.3d 

1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting James Wm. Moore et 

al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13[1] (3d ed. 2005)) (“[I]f 

the motion is brought by a party with the ultimate burden 

of proof, the movant must still satisfy its burden by showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law even 

in the absence of an adequate response by the nonmovant.”); Lencco Racing Co. v. Joliffe, 215 F.3d 1341, 

1999 WL 506857, at *4 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When the movant bears the burden of proof . . . summary judgment 

cannot be granted unless the movant makes a showing on 

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SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 11

each required element and the nonmovant’s response fails 

to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any element.”). 

This court’s law on that issue is consistent with the 

law in other courts. See, e.g., Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Where, as 

here, the moving party [will bear] the burden of proof at 

trial, it must come forward with evidence [on summary 

judgment] which would entitle it to a directed verdict if 

the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. . . . In this 

situation, only after the moving party meets this burden 

must the non-moving party produce its ‘significant, probative evidence.’”) (quoting Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, 

Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991), and Chanel, 

Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 

(11th Cir. 1991)); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gill, 960 F.2d 

336, 340 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[W]here the movant bears the 

burden of proof at trial and the motion does not establish 

the absence of a genuine factual issue, the district court 

should deny summary judgment even if no opposing 

evidentiary matter is presented.”); Houghton v. South, 

965 F.2d 1532, 1536-37 (9th Cir. 1992). 

C 

Micron argues that the district court’s summary 

judgment order can be sustained on several alternative 

grounds. The alternative grounds, however, depend on a 

reference not relied upon by the district court and on a 

claim construction issue not addressed by the district 

court. They are therefore not ripe as grounds for this 

court to sustain the district court’s summary judgment 

order.

Micron’s first proposed alternative ground for affirmance is that U.S. Patent No. 5,499,733 (“Litvak”), which 

was incorporated by reference in the Sun patent, anticipates the asserted claims of the ’717 patent. The district 

court, however, did not rely on, or even discuss, Litvak in 

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12 SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

the portion of its summary judgment order addressing the 

relevant limitations.5 Because the district court did not 

rely on Litvak, we decline to reach the question whether 

Litvak could serve as an alternative ground for upholding 

the district court’s order.

Micron also argues that the district court’s anticipation judgment can be upheld on the theory that “tracked 

information” includes not only the initial thickness of the 

wafer, but also the target amount of film to be removed. 

The target amount of film to be removed, according to 

Micron, is used in the Sun process to control the CMP 

process, thus establishing that Sun anticipates the asserted claims of the ’717 patent.

Again, the district court did not rely on that theory as 

a basis for its anticipation analysis and did not find in its 

summary judgment order that the term tracked information included the target amount of film to be removed.6 

In the absence of analysis of the “target amount” theory 

by the district court, we do not address whether that 

theory could support a summary judgment of anticipation. 

As in the case of the Litvak reference, the district court 

may consider on remand whether that theory provides a 

basis for anticipation.

 

5 The court addressed Litvak only in the portion of 

its summary judgment opinion discussing the uniform 

region limitations found in claims 37 and 56.

6 The district court’s only reference to the amount 

of film to be removed is in the court’s statement that 

Figure 13A “begins with ‘Input Initial Film Thickness & 

Target Amount of Film to be Removed.’” This direct 

quotation of the contents of the first box of Figure 13A 

was not presented as a construction of the term “tracked 

information.” Instead, when referring to tracked information, the court consistently referred to the initial 

thickness of the film.

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SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 13

III

After entering summary judgment of anticipation in 

favor of Micron, the court denied Semcon’s motion for 

summary judgment of no anticipation as moot. Semcon 

now argues that, in addition to reversing the summary 

judgment in favor of Micron, this court should reverse the 

district court’s denial of Semcon’s motion for summary 

judgment of no anticipation and direct the district court to 

enter summary judgment on that issue in Semcon’s favor. 

We decline to do so. 

The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a 

“final decision” of a district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1),

and therefore is not ordinarily appealable. Plantronics, 

Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 

M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., 439 

F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Lermer Germany GmbH 

v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). As 

the Supreme Court has explained, appellate courts lack 

jurisdiction over the denial of a motion for summary 

judgment based on disputed issues of fact because such a 

denial “does not settle or even tentatively decide anything 

about the merits of the claim.” Switz. Cheese Ass’n, Inc. v. 

E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966); see also

Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., 641 F.3d 

1368, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

Nor does the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction 

apply here. That doctrine is reserved for “only the most 

extraordinary circumstances,” Falana v. Kent State Univ., 

669 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012), such as where the 

pendent issue is “inextricably intertwined” with the 

principal issue before the court such that it is necessary to 

review both to ensure meaningful review. See Swint v. 

Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51 (1995); Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 490 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). The issue we have decided—that a reasonable 

finder of fact could find against Micron on the issue of 

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14 SEMCON TECH, LLC v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

anticipation—is separate from the question Semcon 

wishes us to decide—whether a reasonable finder of fact 

could only decide in favor of Semcon on the issue of anticipation.

This court has declined to exercise pendent appellate 

jurisdiction in cases indistinguishable from this one, 

where the court has reversed the grant of summary 

judgment for the appellee, but has declined to address a 

request that the court reverse the denial of the appellant’s 

motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Advanced Fiber 

Techs. Trust v. J&L Fiber Servs., Inc., 674 F.3d 1365, 

1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

Although it is within our authority under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2106 to direct the entry of summary judgment in Semcon’s favor on remand, we decline to do so. See Conoco 

Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 99 F.3d 387, 394-95 (Fed. Cir. 

1996). The district court did not rule on the merits of 

Semcon’s motion, but merely dismissed it as moot in light 

of the court’s ruling on Micron’s motion. Under these

circumstances, it would be inappropriate for this court to 

go beyond the scope of the final order of invalidity entered 

by the district court and adjudicate issues not squarely 

decided by that court in an appealable final judgment. 

See id. at 395 (“[D]irecting summary judgment for the 

appellant is appropriate only if appellate court is ‘quite 

certain that no further exploration of the facts is in order.’”) (quoting 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 

Practice ¶56.13, at 56-179 (1996 ed.)).

IV 

We vacate the summary judgment of invalidity and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We decline Semcon’s request that we direct the 

district court to enter summary judgment of invalidity in 

Semcon’s favor. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

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