Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01155/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01155-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARCELINO CALDERON-SILVA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

M.S. EVANS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:11-cv-1155-EFB P 

ORDER1

 AND 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on an Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Deleon 

for his alleged use of excessive force, and on First Amendment claims against defendants 

Guzman and Carillo for their alleged retaliation for plaintiff’s filing of administrative appeals. 

See ECF No. 13 at 4 (Screening Order). Defendants move for summary judgment. ECF No. 39. 

For the reasons stated below, their motion must be denied. 

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 Defendants did not respond to the court’s order directing them to complete and return the 

form indicating either their consent to jurisdiction of the magistrate judge or request for 

reassignment to a district judge. Accordingly, the clerk will be directed to randomly assign this 

case to a district judge. 

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I. The Complaint 

 Plaintiff’s first amended and verified complaint (ECF No. 11) alleges the following: 

 On October 21, 2009, defendant Deleon, a correctional officer, approached plaintiff’s cell 

and told plaintiff that a sergeant wanted to talk to him. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff was handcuffed behind 

his back and taken out from his assigned cell. Id. ¶ 14. Deleon walked plaintiff down a hallway 

toward an office. Id. Plaintiff could see that Investigative Services Unit officers were waiting to 

interview plaintiff in the office. Id. Plaintiff stopped walking and told Deleon that he did not 

want to talk to anybody. Id. Deleon then became “very aggressive,” and “tightened” plaintiff’s 

left arm with both hands, causing plaintiff to “writhe” in pain. Id. Deleon then forced plaintiff 

into the office, lifting plaintiff from his left arm and “tossing” plaintiff toward the office. Id. ¶ 15. 

When a nearby correctional officer opened her office door to see what was happening in the 

hallway, Deleon stopped his use of force. Id. Plaintiff claims that Deleon’s conduct caused his 

left shoulder to become dislocated. Id. ¶ 37. He also claims to experience “chronic and 

degenerative pain from the top of his shoulder to his wrist.” Id. ¶ 37. 

 On October 30, 2009, plaintiff submitted a prison grievance complaining of Deleon’s 

excessive use of force. Id. ¶ 16. On November 17, 2009, defendant correctional officer Guzman 

was interviewed about the grievance. Id. According to plaintiff, on December 8, 2009, “as a 

retaliatory measure,” defendant correctional officers Guzman and Carrillo searched plaintiff’s 

cell. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. Plaintiff believes that they falsely claimed to have found a hypodermic 

syringe in his cell, and falsely claimed that plaintiff’s coffee was suspected heroin. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 

Plaintiff was subsequently issued a rules violation report for possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. 

¶ 17. Plaintiff claims that Guzman issued the “false charges” as retaliation. Id. ¶ 19. 

 On December 22, 2009, plaintiff filed a grievance against Guzman. Id. ¶ 18. 

Approximately one month later, defendants Guzman and Carillo served plaintiff with a gang 

validation package, and plaintiff was later validated as prison gang associate. Id. Plaintiff claims 

that his filing of administrative appeals was “the only motivating factor” behind Guzman and 

Carillo’s “retaliatory conduct to validate the plaintiff as a prison gang associate.” Id. ¶ 42. 

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II. Summary Judgment Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary 

judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases in which the parties do not dispute the facts relevant 

to the determination of the issues in the case, or in which there is insufficient evidence for a jury 

to determine those facts in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 

(1998); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). At bottom, a summary judgment 

motion asks whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury.

The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims 

or defenses. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, the rule functions to 

“‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Procedurally, 

under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting 

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if 

any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving 

party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A clear focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the factual issue in question is crucial 

to summary judgment procedures. Depending on which party bears that burden, the party seeking 

summary judgment does not necessarily need to submit any evidence of its own. When the 

opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving party 

need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v. National 

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Rather, the moving party need only point to matters 

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which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-

24 (“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a 

summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment must be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

To defeat summary judgment the opposing party must establish a genuine dispute as to a 

material issue of fact. This entails two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s) that 

is material, i.e., one that makes a difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). Whether a factual dispute is material is 

determined by the substantive law applicable for the claim in question. Id. If the opposing party 

is unable to produce evidence sufficient to establish a required element of its claim that party fails 

in opposing summary judgment. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 322. 

Second, the dispute must be genuine. In determining whether a factual dispute is genuine 

the court must again focus on which party bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in 

question. Where the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial on 

the factual issue in dispute, that party must produce evidence sufficient to support its factual 

claim. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion. 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, the opposing party must, by affidavit 

or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue 

for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to 

demonstrate a genuine factual dispute the evidence relied on by the opposing party must be such 

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that a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248, 252. Absent any such evidence there simply is no reason for trial. 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s 

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See id. at 249, 255; 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the 

proponent must adduce evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American 

Int’l Group, Inc. v. American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., 

dissenting) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at 

issue, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th 

Cir. 1995). On the other hand, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier 

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 

U.S. at 587 (citation omitted); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (if the evidence presented and any 

reasonable inferences that might be drawn from it could not support a judgment in favor of the 

opposing party, there is no genuine issue). Thus, Rule 56 serves to screen cases lacking any 

genuine dispute over an issue that is determinative of the outcome of the case. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment included a notice to plaintiff informing him of 

the requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 

957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 

F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 

III. Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections 

Defendants have filed objections to nearly everything plaintiff has filed in opposition to 

their motion for summary judgment. Defendants filed a document entitled “Evidentiary 

Objections and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Declaration,” ECF No. 57, another entitled 

“Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts,” ECF No. 58, and yet 

another entitled “Defendants Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Separate Statement of Undisputed 

Facts . . . and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Objections,” ECF No. 59. In their reply brief, 

defendants also object to plaintiff’s opposition for its failure to comply with Local Ruled 260(b). 

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ECF No. 56. All of defendants’ objections are overruled.2

 Local Rule 260(b) states that any party opposing a motion for summary judgment “shall 

reproduce the itemized facts in the Statement of Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that are 

undisputed and deny those that are disputed, including with each denial a citation to the particular 

portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or other 

document relied upon in support of that denial.” E.D. Cal. L. R. 260(b). In his opposition, 

plaintiff repeats many of the allegations in his complaint and maintains his own account of the 

facts in this case. ECF No. 51. He includes numerous citations to the record, which he contends 

support his version of the facts. Id. Plaintiff’s brief satisfies the core purpose for requiring an 

annotated statement of facts, in that it sufficiently identifies the facts that plaintiff disputes and, 

importantly, cites to the material in the record that plaintiff relies upon for the factual assertion. 

The argument that this should all be moved to a separate sheet of paper(s) simply exalts form over 

substance. 

 Moreover, the practice of filing objections to every stitch of paper that the opposing party 

submits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment simply burdens the process and does not 

assist the court in considering the issues that are a proper focus for summary judgment. While the 

practice appears to have grown increasingly popular among some litigators it has drawn criticism 

from the courts. Indeed, as a judge of this district has explained, the practice is ultimately selfdefeating. 

 As a practical matter, the court finds this entire exercise of considering 

evidentiary objections on a motion for summary judgment to be futile and counterproductive. If a court must hear up to hundreds of objections during one civil 

calendar in addition to the motion itself, then this procedure begins to defeat the 

objectives of modern summary judgment practice-namely, promoting judicial 

efficiency and avoiding costly litigation. See Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 

531 (8th Cir.1979). “More importantly, even seemingly appropriate objections 

based on hearsay and failures to authenticate/lay a foundation are difficult to 

address away from the dynamics of a trial. During trial, when a party raises valid 

evidentiary objections, the opposing party will have an opportunity to present the 

evidence in an alternative and admissible form. At trial, a question can always be 

 2

 Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file a response to defendants’ objections is 

denied as moot. 

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rephrased if an objection to it is sustained. Not so in the context of summary 

judgment practice. 

 As a further example, if one witness attempts unsuccessfully to testify 

about matters regarding which that witness lacks personal knowledge, another 

witness may later be able to testify to the same evidence based upon her firsthand 

knowledge. In the context of a motion for summary judgment, however, the court 

must often delay a hearing on the merits for several weeks to offer parties a chance 

to cure the defects raised by the objections. The alternative is to throw litigants 

out of court on what may be deemed a curable technicality without a meaningful 

opportunity to respond-an approach that the court highly doubts the Ninth Circuit 

would condone. Again, this practice runs counter to summary judgment's assumed 

time-saving properties. 

Burch v. Regents of University of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Judge 

Shubb further explained that: 

 Under such circumstances it is tempting to throw up one’s hands and 

simply say, as one court already has, that 

The device of summary judgment was conceived as a method of 

saving the time of the Court and litigants where the case is 

demonstrably spurious. Where, as here, the time and effort required 

for a satisfactory definitive resolution of the issues on the basis of 

the paper record presented on this motion might well exceed that 

required at a full-dress trial, the Court will not utilize the summary 

judgment procedure. 

Id. (quoting Koleinimport ‘Rotterdam’ N.V. v. Foreston Coal Export Corp., 283 F. Supp. 184, 

188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). Here, defendants’ parade of objections seems to suggest that the court 

should simply accept all of defendants’ evidence and ignore the evidence that plaintiff attempts to 

present to satisfy his burden of showing that there are triable issues of fact. 

Further, defendants fundamentally misunderstand the summary judgment standards as 

they apply to the admissibility of evidence relied on by the party opposing summary judgment. 

Plaintiff’s evidence and defendants’ objections cannot be divorced from the nature of this 

proceeding, i.e., summary judgment, in which defendants are the moving parties. See Burch, 433 

F. Supp. 2d at 1118–24. 

 The portion of Rule 56 pertaining to supporting affidavits and records provides that “[a] 

party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form 

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that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). However, on summary 

judgment, the non-moving party’s evidence need not be in a form that is admissible at trial. See 

Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). 

Instead, a court is concerned with the admissibility of the contents of the evidence. Id.; see also, 

Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court 

properly considered a diary which defendants moved to strike as inadmissible hearsay because, 

“[a]t the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form. 

We focus instead on the admissibility of its contents.”). As long as the information contained 

within what is otherwise a hearsay document could be presented in an admissible form at trial, it 

is properly considered on Rule 56 motion in determining whether triable issues of fact preclude 

summary judgment. Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1037. 

 Having overruled defendants’ voluminous objections to nearly every item of paper 

plaintiff has filed in opposition to the summary judgment motion, the court turns to the merits of 

the motion. 

IV. Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion 

 As set forth above, this action proceeds on plaintiff’s claims that Deleon used excessive 

force on October 21, 2009, and that defendants Guzman and Carillo retaliated against plaintiff by 

falsely claiming to have found drug paraphernalia in plaintiff’s cell and by validating plaintiff as a 

prison gang associate. 

A. Excessive Force Claim 

 “When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they violate the inmates’ 

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 

F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to establish a claim for the use of excessive force in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that prison officials applied force 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). In making this determination, the court 

may evaluate (1) the need for application of force, (2) the relationship between that need and the 

amount of force used, (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and (4) any 

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efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. at 7; see also id. at 9-10 (“The 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from 

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not 

of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted)). 

 Defendants Carrillo and Guzman each submit declarations stating that they observed 

Officer Deleon as he escorted plaintiff and that no force was used. ECF No. 39-3, Carillo Decl. 

¶¶ 10-11; ECF No. 39-5, Guzman Decl. ¶¶ 10-11. Defendant Deleon also submits a declaration 

averring that he used no force against plaintiff. ECF No. 39-4, Deleon Decl. ¶ 13. Defendants, 

quoting from Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), argue that “[w]hen opposing parties tell two 

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury 

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version for purposes of ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment.” ECF No. 39-1 at 8. Defendants then point out that “three different officers, 

all with several years of experience attest that no force was used on [plaintiff] and that [plaintiff] 

was allowed to leave the office and return to his housing unit without incident.” Id. And, as 

noted previously, plaintiff’s verified complaint tells a very different story. 

 Defendants appear to be suggesting that the court must resolve credibility in the context of 

this motion and credit the testimony of the three “experienced” officers over the testimony of the 

inmate plaintiff. This is not a proper basis for summary judgment. It is well established that 

credibility of witnesses over material factual disputes cannot be resolved on paper. Rather, when 

there are genuine disputes over material issues of fact, the credibility issues must be resolved by 

the fact finder at trial. Although defendants have presented evidence upon which a fact finder 

could reasonably resolve the issue in their favor, plaintiff is a percipient witness to the events in 

question, and he maintains that Deleon used excessive force. See ECF No. 51 at 11 (“After 

plaintiff stopped walking, c/o Deleon unsuccessfully pulled plaintiff [from] his arm, he tightened 

both his hands around plaintiff’s upper area of his left arm, [and] tried to lift him and toss him 

towards the office” causing plaintiff to “writhe in pain” and his left shoulder to “pop” out). If 

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plaintiff so testifies at trial,3 and his version is believed with respect to his claim that Deleon’s 

needlessly tightened grip and tossing motion caused plaintiff to writhe in pain and his shoulder to 

dislocate, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that force applied was excessive. Whether 

plaintiff’s version is worthy of credence cannot be determined on this motion. As a percipient 

witness, his credibility and that of the other witnesses who contradict him cannot be weighed on 

paper. For these reasons, defendants’ motion must be denied as to this claim. 

B. Retaliation Claims 

 To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that the 

defendant took some “adverse action” against him because of his protected conduct, and that such 

action chilled the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). He must also show that the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. Id. 

 Defendants seek summary judgment on the ground that “Carillo and Guzman engaged in 

authorized conduct when they searched [plaintiff]’s property and cell on three occasions as part of 

their investigation [into plaintiff’s suspected gang-related activity].” ECF No. 39-1 at 9. Their 

motion makes no mention of plaintiff’s allegations that defendants falsely claimed to have found 

drug paraphernalia in his cell, and subsequently validated plaintiff as a prison gang associate 

because of his filing of administrative appeals. Thus, the motion presents nothing of substance as 

to the retaliation claims. Arguing generally that a cell search was authorized misses the point. It 

also misconstrues plaintiff’s retaliation claims. What is not addressed in defendants’ motion are 

plaintiff’s claims that defendants Carrillo and Guzman falsely claimed to have found drug 

paraphernalia in plaintiff’s cell and falsely validated him as a prison gang associate in retaliation 

for having filed administrative grievances. These claims do not turn on whether Carillo and 

Guzman “had a legitimate penalogical interest in conducting the searches.” See ECF No. 39-1 at 

11. Undoubtedly, they did. But that hardly addresses the basis for plaintiff’s claims of 

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 3 See Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1037, as to the form of evidence at this stage of the proceedings. 

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retaliation. For these reasons, defendants fail to meet their initial burden on summary judgment, 

and their motion must be denied as to the retaliation claims. 

C. Qualified Immunity 

 Defendants contend generally they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity 

protects government officials from liability for civil damages where a reasonable person would 

not have known their conduct violated a clearly established right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987). In determining whether the doctrine of qualified immunity provides a 

government officer protection, a court must make two inquiries: 1) do the facts alleged show that 

the officer violated a constitutional right; and 2) was the constitutional right well established. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts 

have discretion to decide which of the two Saucier prongs to address first). A plaintiff invokes a 

“clearly established” right when “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable 

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 

 Defendant Deleon’s qualified immunity argument rests on his version of the October 21, 

2009 encounter and his contention that there was no constitutional violation. See ECF No. 39-1 

at 10. As discussed above, the facts are in dispute as to whether there was a constitutional 

violation. If there was not, then of course there was no violation of a clearly established 

constitutional right. But the material factual disputes which preclude summary judgment on that 

question also preclude summary judgment on Deleon’s assertion of qualified immunity. See 

LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (“If . . . there is a material 

dispute as to the facts regarding what the officer or the plaintiff actually did, the case must 

proceed to trial”). 

 Defendant Carrillo and Guzman’s qualified immunity argument also rests on their belief 

that they did not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. But given their misunderstanding or 

misstatement of the retaliation claims asserted against them, they have not demonstrated the 

absence of a genuine dispute as to whether they took adverse action against plaintiff in response 

to his filing of administrative appeals. Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the undisputed facts do 

not establish that Carrillo and Guzman did not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights or that a 

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reasonable person in their positions could have believed their conduct was lawful. See ECF No. 

39-1 at 11. A reasonable officer would not have believed that it was lawful to falsely claim to 

have found drug paraphernalia in plaintiff’s cell and to falsely validate him as a prison gang 

associate in retaliation for having filed administrative grievances. While those allegations are 

surely disputed, as noted previously, Carrillo and Guzman’s motion ignores those allegations 

entirely. Accordingly, Carrillo and Guzman have not established that they are entitled to 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 

V. Order and Recommendation 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Defendants’ objections to plaintiff’s opposition papers are overruled and the motions 

to strike those papers (ECF Nos. 57, 58, 59) are denied. 

2. Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file a response to defendants’ objections 

(ECF No. 62) is denied as moot. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall randomly assign a United States District Judge to this 

action. 

 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment (ECF No. 39) be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 28, 2014. 

Case 2:11-cv-01155-GEB-EFB Document 64 Filed 02/28/14 Page 12 of 12