Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01058/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN THOMPSON, an individual, on behalf

of himself, and on behalf of all persons

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv1058 IEG (WMc)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS COUNTS TWO AND

THREE OF THE COMPLAINT

[Doc. Nos. 6, 7, 8.]

vs.

HOME DEPOT, INC. a Delaware

Corporation, and DOES 1-100, inclusive 

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss the second and third causes of

action in plaintiff’s complaint. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

John Thompson (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on March 30, 2007, Home Depot Inc.

(“Defendant”) “requested and required [that he] fill out a Home Depot, Inc. preprinted form and

provide personal identification as a condition to performing a credit card transaction at Home

Depot, Inc.’s retail store.” (Pl. Compl. (06/08/2007) at ¶ 4.) The form in question is labeled

“REFUND” and contains a space for the cardholder’s name, telephone number, and signature. 

(Id., Exh. 2.) 

B. Procedural Background

On April 24, 2007, Plaintiff filed his complaint in San Diego Superior Court, alleging, on

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Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that the complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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behalf of himself and others similarly situated in California, that Defendant had committed

violations of (1) the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1747.08; (2) California’s

Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; and (3) the Consumers

Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. (Id. at ¶ 23-36.) Plaintiff seeks

statutory penalties, an injunction prohibiting Defendant from using a credit card form with a

preprinted space for the cardholder’s telephone number, an order declaring that practice to be an

unlawful business practice and ordering Defendant to restore personal information back to the

Plaintiff and other class members, and costs of suit. (Id. at 9.)

On June 6, 2007, Defendant removed the case to this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Subsequently,

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the second and third causes of action in Plaintiff’s complaint,

namely the actions based on alleged violations of the UCL and the CLRA respectively. (Doc. No.

6.) Plaintiff filed an opposition (Doc. No. 7) and Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. No. 8.) The

matter is now fully briefed, and the Court finds it appropriate for disposition without oral argument

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the

claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731

(9th Cir. 2001). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint generally must satisfy only the

minimal notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2).1

 Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483,

494 (9th Cir. 2003). A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (citing

Conley); see also Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners, 777 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir.1985) (a

court should not dismiss a complaint if it states a claim under any legal theory, even if plaintiff

erroneously relies on a different theory). In other words, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only

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Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a reasonable

inference from facts properly alleged. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10

L.Ed.2d 605 (1963) (inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

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where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1988).

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court's review is limited to

the contents of the complaint. Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996);

Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). The

court must accept all factual allegations pled in the complaint as true, and must construe them and

draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party.2 Cahill v. Liberty

Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.1996); Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th

Cir.1995) (citing Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987). In spite of the

deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, it is not proper for the court to

assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Furthermore, a court is not required to credit conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of

factual allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643

F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981).

A court may dismiss a complaint without granting leave to amend only if it appears with

certainty that the plaintiff cannot state a claim and any amendment would be futile. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a) (leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”); DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Systems, Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.1992); Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th

Cir. 1988); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)

(“leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts

consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency”).

//

//

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While Plaintiff’s complaint fails to explicitly label the UCL claim as the second cause of

action, the complaint discusses this claim after what it labels as the first cause of action (a violation

of the Song Beverly Credit Card Act) and before what it labels as the third cause of action (violations

of the CLRA).

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B. Analysis

1. Plaintiff’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) Claim

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges Defendant is civilly liable under the UCL.3

According to Plaintiff, Defendant “unfairly competes by engaging in [the illegal acquisition and

collection of consumer information] and thereby received an unfair competitive advantage over

competitors . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 30.) 

Under the UCL, the only persons authorized to bring claims are those who have “suffered

injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of [] unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 17204 (emphasis added); Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of

America, 150 Cal.App.4th 953, 802 (2007). Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted under the UCL because he has not alleged that filling out the

refund form caused him any damage. (Def. Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss

(“Memo. ISO Motion”) at 1.) Plaintiff disagrees, arguing it is sufficient for the complaint to allege

he was an actual victim of the Defendant’s business practice and noting that the California Court

of Appeals in Florez v. Linens ‘N Things, 108 Cal.App.4th 447 (2003), has expressly approved the

legally sufficiency of a UCL claim under similar circumstances. (Pl. Opp. at 1.) 

The Court agrees with Defendant—Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the UCL. While

Plaintiff’s alleges he was required to fill out a form which prompted him to provide personal

identification, he does not allege filling out the form caused him to lose any money or

property—as required to make out a claim under the UCL. Similarly, while Plaintiff’s complaint

alleges Defendant uses the personal information acquired on these forms for marketing purposes

(Compl. ¶ 13), he does not allege that he actually received any marketing solicitations as a result

of completing the form nor does he allege such solicitations would or could cause him monetary

injury. The complaint merely makes the conclusory claim that “Home Depot’s conduct caused

and continues to cause substantial injury” (Compl. ¶ 30), but does not specify the form or quality

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of the injury. The Court is not required to credit the Plaintiff’s conclusory legal allegations. See

Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A court does] not

... necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of

factual allegations.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s related

argument—which he urges without citation to supporting authority—that his personal information

constitutes property under the UCL, is similarly unpersuasive and also rejected. Cf. In re Jetblue

Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation, 379 F.Supp. 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“There is . . . no

support for the proposition that an individual passenger's personal information has or had any

compensable value in the economy at large.”); Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351,

1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (sale of cardholder names to various merchants did not state a claim for

tortious appropriation because cardholder’s name has little or no intrinsic value apart from its

inclusion on a categorized list). 

Finally, Plaintiff’s reliance on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Florez is misplaced. In

Florez, the Court of Appeal concluded that a store’s practice of prompting a customer for her

telephone number during a purchase violated the Song Beverly Credit Card Act, which in turn

supported a viable claim under the UCL. Florez, 108 Cal.App.4th at 454. But as Defendant points

out, Florez was decided more than a year before amendments to the UCL added a requirement that

a plaintiff personally suffer an injury in order to plead a cause of action under the UCL. See

Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC, 39 Cal.App.4th 223, 227 (2006) (explaining

that while California’s UCL previously authorized any person acting for the general public to sue

for relief, the current law—as amended on November 2, 2004 by proposition 64—gives a private

person standing to sue only if he or she has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property

as a result of the violation). This key development makes Florez distinguishable from the current

case and inapposite to the argument raised by Plaintiff.

2. Plaintiff’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) Claim

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that Defendant violated the CLRA. According to

Plaintiff, Defendant’s conduct is proscribed by § 1770(14) of the CLRA, which prohibits

“[r]epresenting that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does

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not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(14). Specifically,

Plaintiff contends Defendant’s “acts and practices constitute representations that the credit card

transactions in question confer rights, remedies, or obligations which they do not have, or which

are prohibited by law.” (Compl. ¶ 34.) 

The CLRA permits consumers “who suffer[] any damage as a result of the use or

employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by [the CLRA]”

to bring an action against that person and obtain actual damages or an order enjoining the methods,

acts, or practices. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a). As with the UCL claim, Defendant argues

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon under the CLRA because he has not alleged that filling out

the refund form caused him any damage as required by the statutory language. The Court agrees. 

Again, as with the UCL claim, Plaintiff’s opposition fails to direct the Court to a single portion of

the complaint which explains what specific injury occurred due to the alleged violation of the

CLRA. The Court’s own review of the complaint reveals only a bare allegation that Plaintiff and

class members “have been irreparably harmed.” (Compl. ¶ 36) As discussed above, this bare legal

conclusion is insufficient. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the second and third causes of action in

Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiff may

file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies set forth above, no later than 14 days from

the date this order is filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 18, 2007

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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