Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-00164/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-00164-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUE MARCELLA HAMBY,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-97-0164 LKK CHS P

vs.

TINA FARMON, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Sue Hamby is a state prisoner proceeding with counsel on a

second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Hamby attacks her March 16, 1994 conviction in the Solano County Superior Court,

case number C35712, for conspiracy to commit first degree murder.

II. ISSUES

Petitioner’s May 20, 2009, second amended petition raises three issues as

follow, verbatim:

A. Petitioner was denied her rights to Due Process and to jury trial by

the court’s failure to instruct the jury on conspiracy to commit a

lesser offense; 

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 1 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1 This statement of facts is taken from the July 1, 1996 opinion by the California

Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), lodged with

respondent’s answer as Exhibit L, Part 1. The murder of Hop Summar resulted in the

prosecution of multiple defendants, in separate trials, some of which involved multiple

juries. Hamby was tried along with Cherri Frazier and Robert Fenenbock in front of a

single jury. This statement of facts from the California Court of Appeal is drawn from

only the facts presented at Hamby’s trial and presented to the jury that determined

Hamby’s guilt, unlike the statement of facts from the California Court of Appeal opinion

concerning Bond and MacCarlie, where that court consolidated the appeals of Bond,

MacCarlie, Adcock and Lockley, resulting in a single statement of facts that not only

referenced the testimony heard by the Bond jury and the MacCarlie/Dodds jury, but also

the testimony heard by the Adcock/Lockley jury. That is why the California Court of

Appeal statement of facts may be relied upon here, but not in the Bond (99-cv-2150)

and MacCarlie (00-cv-1830) Findings and Recommendations. These facts have not

been rebutted with clear and convincing evidence and therefore are presumed correct. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).

2

B. Petitioner was deprived of rights guaranteed by the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments by the court’s refusal to instruct on

accessory after the fact, which decision was made after argument

was completed; and

C. The accumulation of error rendered her conviction fundamentally

unfair and a violation of her rights to Due Process under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend that this petition for habeas corpus relief be denied.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Facts1

The events occurred in Hawkins Bar, a small hamlet located

on Highway 299 in Trinity County. Hawkins Bar consists of a

general store, a set of BP gasoline pumps adjoining the

store, and a bar (Simon Legree's) located across the

highway from the store. Next to the store was a trailer park. 

It was here that Barbara Adcock lived with Bernard “Bird”

MacCarlie and her three children from a prior marriage.

Below the highway, along the river, was a United States

Forest Service campground accessible by a service road. In

September and October 1991 a group of people were

camped in the campground. They were described by local

residents as drunk and violent, especially wild and out of

control. Some of the campers had been there several

weeks; some were drifters. One couple had come to get

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 2 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

married at the Harvest Moon Festival on October 5. 

Defendant Cherri Frazier was there to attend the wedding. 

Some of the local residents-including Adcock, MacCarlie and

defendants Fenenbock and Hamby-spent time at the

campground.

The Prosecution's Case

It was the prosecution’s theory that Hop Summar was killed

by a mob from Hawkins Bar seeking to avenge an alleged

act of child molestation upon Barbara Adcock’s daughter.

The Victim

Hop Summar was a pathetic figure. Crippled from numerous

childhood orthopedic surgeries, he walked with a limp (hence

the nickname, “Hop”). Though he was in his 30’s, he was

physically frail, wore a colostomy bag, and had a rather

meek disposition. He lived on SSI (Supplemental Security

Income) and drank to excess nearly every day. He seldom

bathed and was distinctive for his offensive body odor. 

Hop had known Bird MacCarlie for several years, and he

often lived with Bird in the trailer Bird shared with Barbara

Adcock and her children. Sometimes Hop looked after

Adcock’s children while Adcock was partying at the

campground.

The Molestation Accusations

On September 30, 1991, Barbara Adcock reported to the

Trinity County Sheriff’s Department that Hop Summar had

molested her five-year-old daughter Rachelle H. (Ultimately

neither the sheriff nor the county’s Child Protective Services

found any evidence that Rachelle had been molested.) 

Adcock and Bird MacCarlie then proceeded to spread the

accusations among the denizens of Hawkins Bar.

Solicitation of Mike Sutton

Defendant Cherri Frazier arrived at the Hawkins Bar

campground on September 30. She was there to attend the

wedding of Leafe and Michelle Dodds. Frazier had camped

at Hawkins Bar earlier that summer.

Almost immediately upon her arrival, Frazier encountered

Barbara Adcock, who told her of the molestation of Rachelle. 

That same day, or the following day, Frazier gave a ride to

Mike Sutton, a drifter also camping at Hawkins Bar. During

the ride Sutton noticed a blue-handled knife on the

dashboard. Frazier said, “I’m going to go and cut off Hop’s

balls.” Frazier asked Sutton to come with her, but he

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 3 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

refused. She then told him to “stay out of it.”

In that same ride, Frazier told Bert Jones (another transient

camped at Hawkins Bar) that she needed to do something

about Hop’s molestation of Barbara Adcock’s daughter; that

she would drag Hop into the woods herself and kill him if she

had to.

On the evening of October l, Mike Sutton was in the

campground and heard Bird MacCarlie, Barbara Adcock and

“Redbeard” Bob Bond discussing how to kill Hop. Barbara

Adcock was sitting at a picnic table with defendants Cherri

Frazier and Sue Hamby. Barbara and Cherri asked Sutton if

he wanted to be in on it, as they weren’t getting any help

from the others. He declined. As he walked away from the

group of women, Sutton heard the women discussing that

defendant Sue Hamby was to keep Hop at her house so that

Barbara Adcock could find him once she rounded up help to

hurt him. Later that night, Sue Hamby apologized to Mike

Sutton for being so forward in the conversation.

The Assaults Upon Hop

On October 1, Hop went into Arcata and withdrew $600 in

cash from his bank account. About 5:30 in the evening, he

returned to Hawkins Bar, having hitched a ride. The driver

dropped him at the BP pumps. As Hop tried to enter the

trailer where he resided with MacCarlie and Adcock, a group

approached him and began to call him a rapist and a child

molester. Included in the group were MacCarlie, Adcock,

defendant Fenenbock, defendant Frazier and others. As the

crowd egged her on, a woman named April May Gault

chased Hop, caught up with him when he stumbled, and

beat him.

The attendant at the BP pumps did not see the beating, but

he saw Hop just afterward. His face was cut and bleeding. 

Hop told him April May had hit him with a beer can.

Sometime later, Hop was assaulted again. About 6:00 he

went into Simon Legree’s, the town bar. The bartender and

patrons observed that Hop’s face was cut and bleeding. 

Hop told the bartender that Harry Darr had struck him in the

face with a pistol because he had refused to get into Darr’s

truck.

Indeed, just beforehand, Harry Darr had come into Maeolla

Berry’s trailer in the trailer park. When he left, he jumped

into his truck and rode across the highway. Maeolla Berry

could see a gun in the truck. Hop Summar was standing

across the street. Maeolla Berry did not see Darr get out of

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 4 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

his truck, but she heard Hop yelling for help, and she saw

Darr drive off as patrons of the bar came out to help.

Defendant Hamby’s Role

Defendant Sue Hamby lived in a trailer east of Hawkins Bar. 

Her friend, Michael “Scarecrow” Roanhouse, lived in a

second trailer on Hamby’s property. She gave him food in

exchange for repairwork on the property. Hamby was

engaged to marry Tex Lockley.

On the morning of October 1, Barbara Adcock and her

children appeared at Hamby’s trailer. Adcock told Hamby

her accusations against Hop Summar. After Adcock left,

Hamby told Scarecrow Roanhouse, but Scarecrow said he

didn’t believe Adcock’s story.

That afternoon, Hamby went to Maeolla Berry’s trailer and

asked for her advice. Hamby told Maeolla Berry that she was

supposed to keep Hop in her trailer and let Barbara Adcock

know so that Adcock could call the police. Berry advised

Hamby to call the police herself.

After their conversation, Berry drove Hamby to the

campground so Hamby could retrieve her truck. On the way

Hamby telephoned Hop to tell him to stay where he was, at

Simon Legree’s, and she would pick him up. Later that

evening, Hamby and Scarecrow Roanhouse came into

Simon Legree’s. Hop was dozing on his bar stool, with his

purple backpack at his side. When he awoke, Hamby got

him into her truck and drove him to her trailer. He slept on

her couch. The next morning, Hamby left her trailer and

went to the campground. According to her testimony,

Hamby told Scarecrow to keep an eye on Hop in case the

police arrived.

The Confrontation with Hop

Hop did not stay in Hamby’s trailer. About 6:15 or 6:30 p.m.

Tex Lockley and Scarecrow Roanhouse were driving in

Lockley’s red flatbed truck from the general store down to

the campground when they saw Hop on the access road. 

They stopped and gave him a ride in the back. Hop was

carrying his purple backpack.FN

FN. Tex Lockley’s truckbed was bloodied from

the carcass of a wounded pit bull dog.

As the truck approached the campground, however, a group

angrily came toward the truck, shouting, “Get him out of

here.” Barbara Adcock shook a baseball bat, yelling, “Get

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 5 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

the fuck on out of here.” Tex Lockley shifted quickly into

reverse and backed the truck up the hill to the highway.

Scarecrow Roanhouse testified that as the truck reached the

top of the hill and the passengers got out, defendant

Fenenbock and Redbeard Bob Bond walked toward the

truck. The two men walked up to Hop and struck him in the

face. Redbeard Bob hit him in the mouth; defendant

Fenenbock hit Hop in the eye. They accused Hop of being a

child molester, and Hop replied, “Not guilty. Not guilty.”

At this point Steven Thayer was walking up the access road

and passed the red truck. As he did so, he saw Bird

MacCarlie and Leafe Dodds drive up in Barbara Adcock’s

white Ranchero.FN2 They, too, talked to Hop, and Hop

replied that he hadn’t done anything. Hop asked, “What are

you going to do? Kill me here? Throw me in the bushes or

something?” Bird MacCarlie replied, “Yeah, something like

that.” Steven Thayer testified that when last he saw Hop,

Hop was seated inside the Ranchero between Redbeard

Bob Bond and Bird MacCarlie. The Ranchero pulled out

onto the highway and headed east. The red truck followed.

FN. Meanwhile, Mike Sutton was in the

campground and saw Bird MacCarlie leave in

the white Ranchero with Randy H. part way

under some blankets in the back. Defendant

Fenenbock was not in the campground. He

showed up later that evening, along with Bird

MacCarlie, Redbeard Bob Bond, and Tex

Lockley.

The Murder

Barbara Adcock’s son, Randy H., Jr., then age 9, was

sleeping on a mattress in the back of the white Ranchero. 

He testified that after stopping at the top of the hill the

Ranchero drove to a place where the men started stabbing

Hop. The men included Bird MacCarlie, defendant

Fenenbock, Redbeard Bob Bond and Leafe Dodds. 

Afterwards the men dragged Hop to another spot.

Four days later, on October 6, Hop Summar’s body was

discovered at a logging site. The body was covered with

branches and dirt. A piece of rope was found nearby and

there were ligature marks on Hop’s arms, suggesting he had

been tied and dragged. Two logs found nearby were

bloodied with Hop’s blood. A bloody knife was found 50 to

75 feet away. The blood was Hop Summar’s. The knife was

the same one used by Bird MacCarlie earlier on October

2 to stab Bert Jones. Faint tire marks consistent with Tex

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 6 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

Lockley’s red truck (but not the Ranchero) were found in the

roadway at the end of the drag marks.

Hop Summar died of multiple stab wounds and bludgeoning. 

His genitals showed signs of severe trauma from a blunt

instrument. Numerous bones in his face were fractured. His

left ear had been cut off while he was still alive. He had

been stabbed 18 times in the skull, 13 times in the chest. 

His left eye had been cut out. His arm and leg had been

stabbed, bringing the total stab wounds to over 70.

The Stabbing of Bert Jones

Earlier on the day of the murder, on October 2, Bert Jones, a

drifter staying in the campground, got into an altercation with

Michelle Dodds. Defendant Cherri Frazier intervened by

pushing Jones and demanding that he leave. Barbara

Adcock came at Jones with a baseball bat. Jones retreated

to his camp about a quarter of a mile from the main

campground to pack up and leave.

That evening, Bird MacCarlie and Tattoo Ernie Knapp having

heard about Jones's run-in with Michelle Dodds, drove in the

Ranchero to Jones’s campsite. Bird MacCarlie jumped out

of the car and immediately began stabbing Jones. Bird

MacCarlie forced Jones and his camp-mate, Steven Thayer,

into the Ranchero, and they drove back to the main

campground. When Jones got out of the car, Bird MacCarlie

put a knife to his ear and threatened to cut it off. Harry Darr

eventually intervened and told Jones to leave. Throughout

the assault upon Jones, Barbara Adcock castigated Jones

for defending Hop.FN

FN. A couple of days earlier, when accusations

were circulating about Hop’s molestation, Bert

Jones had expressed his view to the group at

the campground that he didn’t believe Hop was

guilty. After that, Bert Jones felt unwelcome at

the campground, shunned by the others.

Bert Jones and Steven Thayer separately walked up the

access road to Hawkins Bar. (It was on this walk that

Thayer observed the confrontation between the men in the

white Ranchero and Hop Summar.) At the general store

Jones showed his stab wound to some people, and one man

drove them to the nearest hospital in Willow Creek. There

Jones called 911.

Jones told the responding sheriff’s deputy that a man named

“Hopalong” was going to be killed or injured. As a result of

Jones’s report, sheriff’s deputies descended upon the

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 7 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

campground to investigate. They did not find Hop’s body. (It

was not discovered until October 6, by a local resident

searching for wood.) But they did uncover some

incriminating pieces of evidence.

The Investigation

When various officers (from Humboldt and Trinity County

Sheriff's Departments, the California Highway Patrol, the

Department of Forestry) arrived in Hawkins Bar, the white

Ranchero was parked at the top of the access road with Bird

MacCarlie in the front seat. 

Sergeant Kartchner, the investigating officer, first checked

several places he thought he might find Hop-Sue Hamby’s

trailer, Bird MacCarlie’s trailer, and adjoining trailers. In the

trailer occupied by Ron Ammon and Ila Olson he found

Redbeard Bob Bond and defendant Fenenbock, both drunk

and disheveled. Neither had seen Hop, they said.

Sergeant Kartchner headed for the campground. On the

way, he passed the white Ranchero with Bird MacCarlie at

the wheel. Sergeant Kartchner stopped to talk to MacCarlie,

and within a few minutes Randy H. popped up from beneath

some blankets in the back of the truck; he then sank back

down again.

A trail of blood drops led from underneath the Ranchero to a

larger area of blood near some beads and scalp hair. The

officers asked MacCarlie to move the Ranchero so they

could get a better look, but MacCarlie told them the truck

was inoperable. The officers pushed the vehicle forward.

Bird MacCarlie had a fresh cut on his index finger. He wore

a knife sheath, but the sheath was empty. He was barefoot

and wearing a clean Hard Rock Cafe T-shirt. MacCarlie was

eventually placed under arrest that night.

Down in the campground, Sergeant Kartchner interviewed

several people. Tex Lockley had a bloody knife and was

arrested. Deputy Rist was assigned to stand by defendant

Sue Hamby while she was waiting to be questioned. The

deputy observed and seized a large buck knife in her back

pocket. Human blood was later detected on the knife.

Mike Sutton told Sergeant Kartchner that night that he knew

nothing. Later, however, he provided much of the

incriminating evidence against defendants.

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 8 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

The Aftermath

Mike Sutton testified that on the night of October 2, Tex

Lockley returned to the campsite and said to Barbara

Adcock, “It’s done.” Defendant Cherri Frazier replied,

“Good.” Barbara Adcock told them both to “shut up.”

Defendant Fenenbock lived in a trailer on the property of Sid

Smith. Redbeard Bob Bond and defendant Fenenbock were

dropped off at the Smith residence about 8 p.m. that night by

Bird MacCarlie driving the white Ranchero.FN Fenenbock

told Patsy Brown, Sid Smith’s wife, “You don’t have to worry

about that child molester anymore. We took care of him.” 

Patsy Brown later told Sergeant Kartchner that two women

were in the back seat of the Ranchero, and she heard Cherri

Frazier’s voice.

FN. This evidence-from Patsy Brown and from

a neighbor of Sid Smith’s-corroborates the

testimony of Randy H., who said that after the

killing Bird drove to Sid Smith’s and dropped off

Redbeard Bob and defendant Fenenbock.

The next day, October 3, defendant Fenenbock, Redbeard

Bob Bond, and Barbara Adcock arrived at the home of Sue

Mendes in Willow Creek. Fenenbock gloated that the “cops

didn’t even check [his] hands for blood.” When Sue Mendes

commented that she hoped Hop’s body was not in locations

where she hunted for mushrooms with her children, both

Fenenbock and Redbeard Bob told her not to worry about it.

The Back Pack

On the morning of October 3, Mike Sutton saw defendant

Sue Hamby rummaging through the back of Tex Lockley’s

red truck. She pulled out a backpack, which she said was

Hop’s.

Scarecrow Roanhouse also saw Hamby with the backpack. 

He saw her open it, search through it, then wipe the outside

with a wet cloth. She asked Scarecrow to burn it, but he

refused. According to Scarecrow, Mike Sutton suggested

cutting it into pieces.

That afternoon, Hamby approached Deputy Litts in the

campground and told him she wanted to turn over Hop’s

backpack. He picked it up from her house that evening. 

Hamby told him Hop had given it to her the day before. The

backpack was stained with Hop’s blood.

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 9 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

The Physical Evidence

Although the white Ranchero was observed near a pool of

blood on the night of October 2, Sergeant Kartchner did not

notice anything of evidentiary value, and the car was not

seized until late October. By then there were no traces of

blood.

Tex Lockley’s red truck, however, was seized after a sheriff’s

deputy noticed blood on it. Blood splatters were found inside

the truck, as if numerous blows had been struck there. And

blood stains were found several places on the exterior of the

truck. There was also blood on the driver’s seat, smeared

as if someone sat in it. And there were blood stains on the

seat of Tex Lockley’s pants. Rope was also found in the

back of the truck.

A shovel found in the red truck had a mixture of blood

matching Hop’s blood and Bird MacCarlie’s blood. Bird

MacCarlie had a fresh cut on his finger when he was

arrested on October 2. The prosecutor theorized that Bird

cut himself burying Hop.

Defendant Fenenbock was arrested the following day, on

October 3, on an outstanding warrant. He had a bloody

knife which was seized by police. The blood could not be

proven to be human.

A $20 bill and a $100 bill in the police inventory were found

to be stained with Hop’s blood. Bird MacCarlie had $525.59

when he was arrested. Defendant Fenenbock had $32.96. 

(The booking procedures used by the Trinity County Sheriff’s

Department do not isolate particular bills taken from

prisoners.)

Fenenbock’s Defense

Defendant Fenenbock testified that he first heard of the

molestation allegations on the morning of October 2. He

heard Barbara Adcock tell the group about the molestation,

and when someone asked, “What are you going to do about

Hop?” Barbara Adcock said the police were looking for him

and if anything happened to him, she and Bird would be the

first ones the police would come to.

Fenenbock admitted confronting Hop that afternoon with

Redbeard Bob Bond at the top of the access road. He

claimed that he tried to calm Redbeard Bob down and

restrained him from hitting Hop. Fenenbock admitted

punching Hop once, but only after Hop swung his backpack

at him.

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 10 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

Fenenbock saw the white Ranchero drive up with Bird

MacCarlie driving and Leafe Dodds and Harry Darr in the

back seat. There was also a yellow Toyota truck with

someone in the driver’s seat.FN Fenenbock, however, left the

scene and went back down to the campground. Redbeard

Bob Bond and Harry Darr came with him. Later, Bird

MacCarlie returned to the campground and gave defendant

Fenenbock and Redbeard Bob Bond a ride back to

Fenenbock’s trailer on Sid Smith’s property.

FN. Tattoo Ernie Knapp had a yellow pickup

truck.

Trena Knapp, wife of Tattoo Ernie Knapp, testified that after

the confrontation with Bert Jones she saw Bird MacCarlie

drive the white Ranchero out of the campground with

Redbeard Bob Bond and Leafe Dodds, but it returned five

minutes later. After dinner, about 8:30, Bird MacCarlie,

Redbeard Bob Bond, and defendant Fenenbock left in the

Ranchero with Randy H. asleep in the back.

Frazier’s Defense

Defendant Frazier testified that she gave a ride to Mike

Sutton on September 30, but she did not discuss the

molestation accusations with Sutton or threaten Hop. In fact,

she did not know about the molestation at that time. She

gave Mike Sutton and Bert Jones a ride again on October 1,

but there was no conversation about Hop.

Frazier was at the picnic table when Barbara Adcock

complained that the authorities weren’t going to do anything. 

But Frazier denied discussing how to kill Hop or asking Mike

Sutton or Bert Jones if they wanted to be involved.

When Hop came into the campground in Tex Lockley’s truck,

Frazier took Rachelle H. and the two boys into the bathroom

at Barbara Adcock’s request. She heard Redbeard Bob

Bond yell that Hop was at the top of the hill. And she saw

Bird MacCarlie, Redbeard Bob Bond, Leafe Dodds and

Randy H. leave the campground in the Ranchero.

Frazier and Michelle Dodds then drove into Willow Creek to

buy some tequila. They passed Bert Jones and Steven

Thayer hitchhiking on the highway. Frazier testified that she

drank too much tequila and passed out for about three

hours. When she awoke, she saw Bird MacCarlie,

Redbeard Bob Bond, defendant Fenenbock and others in

the campground. Bird MacCarlie was wearing no shirt and

his hair was wet. He said he had stabbed Hop.

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 11 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

The next day Frazier asked Barbara Adcock what happened

to Hop, and Barbara Adcock traced her finger across her

throat. Frazier also heard Barbara Adcock and Sue Hamby

discussing where the body was located, whether the police

would ever find the body.

A few days later, Frazier was riding in the Ranchero with

Barbara Adcock when Adcock asked Frazier to look around

and see if there was any blood on the door or dashboard.

Frazier didn’t see any.

Hamby’s Defense

Defendant Sue Hamby testified that she and Hop were

friends. He showed up at her house on September 29 and

joined her and Scarecrow Roanhouse for a barbecue. Hop

spent the night on her couch. The next day she dropped him

off near the trailer park.

On October l, Barbara Adcock arrived at Hamby’s trailer and

told Hamby that Hop had molested Rachelle. Barbara

Adcock said she had told the police Hop was staying at

Hamby’s house and the police were on their way. Hamby

replied that Adcock was misinformed; that she (Hamby) did

not know where Hop was. Adcock asked Hamby not to tell

Hop that the police were coming for him.

That night Hamby went into Simon Legree’s bar to use the

phone. Hop was there, passed out at the bar. Hop’s face

had been beaten. Hop told Hamby he had been called a

rapist, and he asked Hamby if he could stay at her house for

the night. Hop got into the back of her truck, and she drove

him to her house. He slept on her couch. When Hamby left

the next morning, Hop was still asleep on her couch. She

never saw him again.

Hamby went to the campground to see why Hop had been

beaten. When she got there, Barbara Adcock complained

that the police weren’t going to do anything about the

molestation of her daughter.

Hamby disputed the testimony of Mike Sutton. Hamby

denied asking Barbara Adcock or others whether she should

keep Hop at her place. When Barbara Adcock asked

Hamby where Hop was, Hamby lied and said she did not

know. Later, Michelle Dodds asked Hamby if she was going

to keep Hop at her place until Hop could be dealt with. 

Hamby replied that she was not keeping Hop at her house;

that she did not know where Hop was. Hamby denied

apologizing to Mike Sutton for soliciting his help.

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 12 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

Hamby left the campground, and when she returned the

confrontation with Bert Jones had just concluded. Barbara

Adcock was yelling and screaming, and she yelled at Hamby

that she was “going to kick [her] ass.” Hamby did not see

Hop come down into the campground. She was in the

bathroom, but she heard Barbara Adcock shout “Get him out

of here.” When Hamby emerged from the bathroom, Cherri

Frazier was entering with the [] children.

Hamby heard but did not see the Ranchero leave the

campground. Hamby herself left the campground with

Scarecrow and Trena Knapp to get a grill for the barbecue.

On October 3, the day after Hop disappeared, Hamby was in

the campground talking with Barbara Adcock, and Hamby

told Adcock, “They are not going to find anybody ... with a

helicopter.” What she meant was that a helicopter would be

useless for finding Hop in the forest.

Hamby denied taking Hop’s backpack from Tex Lockley’s

truck. She denied wiping blood or fingerprints off Hop’s

backpack. What Scarecrow Roanhouse saw her cleaning

was dirt (Scarecrow’s footprints) from her own purse. 

Hamby did turn in Hop’s backpack to Deputy Litts-the

backpack Hop had left in her trailer.

Opinion at 2-14.

B. State Court Proceedings

Nine persons, Robert Bond, Bernard MacCarlie, Leafe Dodds, Robert

Fenenbock, Ernest Knapp, Anthony Lockley, Barbara Adcock, Cherri Frazier, and Sue

Hamby were charged in December of 1991 and October of 1992 with various crimes

relating primarily to the death of Gary Hop Summar. There were extensive and

voluminous pretrial proceedings. Ultimately all charges as to Ernest Knapp were

dismissed. The remaining eight persons were tried in three separate cases in two

different counties. With the exception of Dodds, all were convicted of various offenses,

and the post-trial proceedings were eventually concluded.

C. Federal Court Proceedings

Hamby’s federal habeas corpus proceeding has been pending for a

decade, consumed by the vast state record, the five related federal cases pending in

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 13 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

this Court, and overwhelming procedural issues. On September 9, 2005, Magistrate

Judge Dale A. Drozd held a hearing, resulting in a lengthy report and recommendation

resolving complex procedural matters, particularly the respondent’s motion to dismiss,

involving circuitous issues concerning the timeliness of multiple claims. Judge Drozd’s

comprehensive report of September 11, 2006, was adopted by Senior United States

District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on July 6, 2007. 

On March 16, 2009, the Court having resolved the labyrinthine procedural

questions, Hamby was given time to file a second amended petition raising the three

claims remaining in the case. Respondent’s answer was filed on July 13, 2009. Hamby

has not filed a traverse and this matter is now ready for resolution.

///// 

IV. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the

merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Although “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any

one methodology,” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S 63, 71 (2003), there are certain

principles which guide its application. 

/////

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 14 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

First, the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the

“contrary to” clause if the state court applies a rule different

from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides

a case differently than we have done on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. The court may grant relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. 

The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court’s

application of clearly established federal law is objectively

unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show the

state court’s decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal

law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002). It is appropriate to

look to lower court decisions to determine what law has been "clearly established" by

the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular application of that law. See

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Second, the court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the

basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

So long as the state court adjudicated petitioner’s claims on the merits, its decision is

entitled to deference, no matter how brief. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76; Downs v. Hoyt, 232

F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2000).

Third, in determining whether a state court decision is entitled to

deference, it is not necessary for the state court to cite or even be aware of the

controlling federal authorities “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). 

Moreover, a state court opinion need not contain “a formulary statement” of federal law,

so long as the fair import of its conclusion is consonant with federal law. Id.

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 15 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

V. DISCUSSION OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

A. Lesser Offense Jury Instruction

1) Description of Claim

Hamby argues that the trial court refused her request to instruct the jury

on the elements of a lesser degree of homicide than premeditated first degree murder,

which was the alleged target of the conspiracy. Second Amended Petition at 12. 

Hamby argues that an instruction other than first degree murder was supported by

substantial evidence presented during the trial and that the failure to instruct prevented

the jury from determining her level of culpability. Id. at 13. 

While Hamby argues that her counsel requested this instruction,

respondent argues that no defendant requested instructions on lesser included target

offenses. Review of the record appears to support respondent’s argument. Reporter’s

Transcripts (“RT”) at 2731, 4508-10, 4683, 4686, 4714. 

2) State Court Opinion

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim, stating: 

We agree with the Attorney General that the record does not

indicate that instructions on lesser target offenses were

requested below. However, the Attorney General

acknowledges that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation

to instruct on lesser included target offenses if there is

evidence from which the jury could find a conspiracy to

commit a lesser offense. Under Penal Code section 182, the

jury must determine which felony the defendants conspired

to commit. The jury cannot perform that task unless it is

instructed on the elements of the offense the defendants are

charged with conspiring to commit and any lesser offenses

which the jury could reasonably find to be the true objects of

the conspiracy. (People v. Alexander (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d

647, 664-665, disapproved on another point in People v.

Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593; see People v. Horn (1974) 12

Cal.3d 290, 297, and fn. 4.) 

Defendant Hamby argues in her brief that instructions should

have been given on conspiracy to commit second degree

murder. She reasons as follows: The jury could have found

that the conspiracy into which she entered was a conspiracy

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 16 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

to hurt Hop Summar-to punish him, yes, but not to kill him. 

Because coconspirators are liable for the reasonably

foreseeable consequences of the planned offense and

because death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence

of the plan to inflict physical harm, the jury could have found

a conspiracy to commit second degree murder.

Hamby’s reasoning is faulty. The principle that conspirators

are liable for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of

the planned offense would render Hamby liable for the

substantive offense of second degree murder, not for

conspiracy to commit second degree murder. (E.g., People

v. Superior Court (Quinteros) (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 12, 21;

People v. Luparello (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 410, 435-445.) 

The offense of conspiracy requires not only the intent to

conspire, but also the specific intent to commit the planned

offense. (People v. Horn, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 296.) Under

Hamby’s theory, the conspirators had no specific intent to

kill; thus, they could not be convicted of conspiracy to

murder. (People v. Swain, supra, 12 Cal.4th 593.)

The more logical argument underlying Hamby’s theory is that

the jury should have been instructed on conspiracy to

commit offenses other than murder, e.g., assault, battery, or

mayhem. We requested supplemental briefing on whether

assault, battery, and mayhem qualify as offenses necessarily

included within the charged target offense of murder. We

conclude they do not.FN

FN. Because no instructions were requested,

we do not decide here whether the offenses of

assault, battery, or mayhem would qualify as

lesser related target offenses to justify

instructions upon request. (People v. Geiger

(1984) 35 Cal.3d 510.)

An offense is necessarily included in the charged offense if

(1) under the statutory definition of the charged offense the

charged offense cannot be committed without committing the

lesser offense, or (2) the charging allegations of the

accusatory pleading include language describing the offense

in such a way that if the charged offense was committed as

specified, the lesser offense was necessarily committed. 

(People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 636; People v.

Geiger, supra, 35 Cal.3d 510, 517, fn. 4.)

Here, the parties concede that neither assault, nor battery,

nor mayhem qualify as offenses included within the statutory

definition of murder. (See People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d

966, 972 [battery is not within the statutory definition of

attempted murder].) However, defendants Hamby and

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 17 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

Frazier argue in their supplemental briefs that the offenses

qualify as lesser included target offenses by virtue of

language in the information describing the overt acts.FN We

are not persuaded.

FN. Specifically, the third amended information

charged that defendants “did conspire together

to murder Gary L. ‘Hop’ Summar and thereafter

in furtherance of said conspiracy ... did commit

the following overt acts: ... [¶] [A] number of

conspirators talked in the Hawkins Bar

Campground of what was to be done to

suspected child molester Gary L. ‘Hop’

Summar.... [¶] [Bird] MacCarlie went around to

different individuals asking if they were ‘in on it

or not.’ ... [¶] [Redbeard Bob] Bond called Gary

L. ‘Hop’ Summar a child molester and hit

him.... [¶] [Defendant] Fenenbock called Gary

L. ‘Hop’ Summar a child molester and hit

him.... [¶] [A] conspirator bound Gary L. ‘Hop’

Summar's arms.... [¶] [A] conspirator cut off

one of Gary L. ‘Hop’ Summar's ears.... [¶] [A]

conspirator gouged out one of Gary L. ‘Hop’

Summar's eyes.... [¶] [A] conspirator broke

bones in Gary L. ‘Hop’ Summar's face.... [¶] [A]

conspirator broke one of Gary L. ‘Hop’

Summar's ribs.... [¶] [A] conspirator hit Gary L.

‘Hop’ Summar in the testicles.... [¶]

[C]onspirators repeatedly stabbed Gary L.

‘Hop’ Summar with knives.”

In People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 405, the

Supreme Court first authorized using the language of the

accusatory pleading as a yardstick for measuring what

offenses qualify as “necessarily included” offenses for

purposes of deciding whether the defendant could properly

be convicted of a lesser offense. The Supreme Court

reasoned that when the charging allegations reveal all the

elements of a lesser offense, the defendant is fairly put on

notice that he should be prepared to defend against a

showing that he committed the lesser offense. (Id. at pp.

399, 405 [defendant charged with robbery of an automobile

could be convicted of lesser offense of auto theft].)

Here, in the context of deciding whether the trial court was

obligated to instruct sua sponte on lesser included offenses,

we conclude that allegations of overt acts committed in

furtherance of the alleged conspiracy do not provide notice

of lesser included target offenses.

For the crime of conspiracy, the criminal act is the

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 18 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

agreement. The agreement is not punishable unless some

overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

(Pen.Code, §§ 182, subd. (b), 184.) FN But the overt act

itself need not be committed by the defendant, and it need

not be a criminal offense. (People v. Robinson (1954) 43

Cal.2d 132, 139-140.) “To render him guilty it is not

necessary that a conspirator perform some act which is in

itself unlawful in carrying out the criminal conspiracy. If there

is a conspiracy to commit murder by means of poison sent

through the mail, a conspirator may not escape responsibility

because he only agreed to and did purchase the postage

stamps with which the poison is sent to the victim, an act

entirely lawful in itself, but punishable if done under an

agreement among the conspirators and in carrying out the

unlawful purpose of the conspiracy.” (People v. Corica

(1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 130, 134.) It is the agreement, not the

overt act in furtherance of the agreement, which constitutes

the offense.

FN. The prosecution must plead and prove, in

addition to a criminal agreement, an overt act

(Pen.Code, §§ l 82, subd. (b), 184), and due

process principles require that overt acts be

pleaded with particularity to give the defendant

notice of the prosecution's theory. (Feagles v.

Superior Court (l970) 11 Cal.App.3d 735, 739-

740.) We need not reach the question whether

the overt act is an actual element of the

conspiracy. The Attorney General relies upon

cases holding that the jury need not

unanimously agree upon the same overt acts. 

(E.g., People v. Von Villas (1992) 11

Cal.App.4th 175, 234-235; People v. Jones

(1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 509, 516-517.) Yet, the

case law is in conflict on this point. Other

cases have held that the overt act is an

element of the crime of conspiracy and jury

unanimity is required. (See generally, 1 Witkin

& Epstein, op. cit., supra, § 178, pp. 198-199.)

Because overt acts need not be criminal offenses or even

acts committed by the defendant, the description of the overt

acts in the accusatory pleading does not provide notice of

lesser offenses necessarily committed by the defendant.FN

Moreover, inasmuch as overt acts may be lawful acts, the

overt acts do not necessarily reveal the criminal objective of

the conspiracy. For example, in the hypothetical posed by

the Corica court, an alleged overt act of purchasing postage

stamps provides no notice of even the charged target

offense of murder, much less of a necessarily included target

offense.FN

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 19 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

FN. Indeed, in the present case some of the

alleged overt acts were allegedly committed by

Bird McCarlie or persons other than

defendants Hamby or Frazier, and some acts

were themselves lawful, e.g., talking about

what was to be done with Hop, calling Hop a

child molester.

FN. We reject the Attorney General’s argument

that allegations of overt acts are analogous to

enhancement allegations, which the Supreme

Court has held are not part of the accusatory

pleading for the purpose of defining lesser

included offenses. (People v. Wolcott (1983)

34 Cal.3d 92, 100-101 [assault with deadly

weapon held not a lesser included offense

under a charge of robbery with enhancement

for use of a firearm].) In Wolcott, the Supreme

Court reasoned that (1) because an

enhancement allegation becomes relevant only

if the defendant is convicted of the substantive

crime, a defendant may not be adequately

notified, to satisfy principles of due process,

that he must controvert the enhancement

allegation to protect against a conviction for a

lesser offense; and (2) because the jury

determines the truth of an enhancement

allegation only after it determines guilt on the

charged or a lesser offense, this procedure

would become muddled if evidence of the

enhancement must be considered in

determining guilt of a lesser offense. Neither of

these considerations applies to overt acts of a

conspiracy.

In our view, it is the description of the agreement within the

accusatory pleading, not the description of the overt acts,

which must be examined to determine whether a lesser

offense was necessarily the target of the conspiracy. Here,

the information alleged only that defendants conspired to

murder Hop Summar. There is nothing in this terse

description of the agreement to indicate an agreement with a

lesser objective. We therefore we (sic) hold that the trial

court was not required to instruct the jury sua sponte on

conspiracy to commit assault, battery, or mayhem as lesser

offenses included within the charged offense of conspiracy

to commit murder.FN

FN. The argument of Hamby and Frazier that

the agreement was not, as alleged, to murder,

but merely to assault, batter, or maim, is in

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 20 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

essence an argument that there was more than

one conspiracy: a conspiracy to assault, batter,

or maim (of which Hamby and Frazier were a

part) and a separate conspiracy to murder (of

which Fenenbock and the other killers were a

part). (See, e.g., People v. Skelton (1980) 109

Cal.App.3d 691, 717-719.) However plausible

this argument might have been at trial, it was

not made. No instructions were requested,

and the trial court had no sua sponte duty to

instruct upon this theory.

Opinion at 19-23.

3) Applicable Law And Discussion

“Normally jury instructions in State trials are matters of State law.” 

Hallowell v. Keve, 555 F.2d 103, 106 (3rd Cir. 1977) (citation omitted); see also Williams

v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996). 

An instructional error “does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas

proceeding.” Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted);

see also Van Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986) (claims that merely

challenge correctness of jury instructions under state law cannot reasonably be

construed to allege a deprivation of federal rights) (citation omitted). A claim that a state

court violated a federal habeas petitioner’s due process rights by omitting a jury

instruction requires a showing that the error so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violated due process. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977);

Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Estelle, 502 U.S. at

72 (discussing due process standard). In cases in which a petitioner alleges that the

failure to give an instruction violated due process, her burden is “especially heavy,”

because “[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a

misstatement of the law.” Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155. Here, Hamby fails to meet this

heavy burden.

/////

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 21 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

22

First, there is no clearly established federal law that requires a state trial

court to give a lesser included offense instruction as would entitle Hamby to relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 & n. 7 (1980) (holding that

failure to instruct on lesser included offense in a capital case is constitutional error if

there was evidence to support the instruction but expressly reserving “whether the Due

Process Clause would require the giving of such instructions in a non-capital case”);

Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (in non-capital case,

failure of state court to instruct on lesser included offense does not alone present a

federal constitutional question cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 839; Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure

of state trial court to instruct on lesser included offenses in non-capital case does not

present federal constitutional question), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 950 (2004). Accordingly,

to the extent Hamby’s argument is solely predicated upon the trial court’s failure to give a

lesser included offense instruction, this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review

and should be denied on that basis. 

Second, although “the defendant’s right to adequate jury instructions on his

or her theory of the case might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the [foregoing]

general rule,” Solis, 219 F.3d at 929, Hamby’s was not such a case. See Clark v. Brown,

450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (state court’s jury instructions violate due process if

they deny the criminal defendant “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense”), cert. denied by, Ayers v. Clark, 549 U.S. 1027 (2006) (quoting California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). 

Hamby argues that “the prosecution noted that there might be evidence

supporting a different lesser offense as the object of the conspiracy,” that evidence

showed Hamby “may have been involved . . . in a plan to hold Hop at her house until the

police could arrest him,” that there “was evidence introduced to show some kind of

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 22 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

23

connection between petitioner and the others charged with conspiracy,” that “the

evidence raised a factual question” about intent and that the “prosecution’s own case”

described overt acts such as assault, battery and mayhem. Second Amended Petition at

13. 

What Hamby does not argue is that it was her theory of the case that she

was guilty of a lesser included target offense. As the trial judge expressly stated:

[I]t doesn’t seem that under any theory that’s been put

forward by either the prosecution or defense that there is any

possibility of any lesser homicide. 

RT at 4508. It does not appear that Hamby challenged the trial judge’s conclusion. 

Here, Hamby does not argue that a lesser included offense was her theory of the case

but merely that there was evidence to support such an instruction. The trial court’s ruling

therefore did not impact Hamby’s right to adequate jury instructions on her theory of the

case. 

 Finally, Hamby has not made any showing as to how the alleged failure to

instruct had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict, other than the

assertion that it prohibited the jury from determining “her level of culpability.” Second

Amended Petition at 13-14. It seems apparent from the verdict that the jury did

determine Hamby’s level of culpability, finding her guilty of conspiring to commit first

degree murder but not guilty of committing the actual murder. Hamby has not shown

how the trial court’s decision effected that verdict. Therefore, even assuming that Hamby

had established that the trial court constitutionally erred in failing to give the lesser

included offense instruction, and she did not, any such error was harmless. See Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637-38; see also Clark, 450 F.3d at 905 (habeas petitioner must show that

the alleged instructional error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining jury’s verdict). 

/////

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 23 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

24

The state court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established constitutional law and Hamby is not

entitled to relief on this claim. 

B. Accessory After The Fact Jury Instruction

1) Description of Claim

Hamby argues that after the trial court initially agreed to instruct the jury on

accessory after the fact as an alternative to conspiracy, and after closing arguments had

been delivered, the trial court decided not to issue the instruction. Second Amended

Petition at 14. Hamby argues that as a result she was not given an opportunity to argue

her case with full knowledge of the instructions that were going to be given thereby

impairing her defense. Id. at 14-15. 

2) State Court Opinion

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim stating: 

In People v. Geiger, supra, the Supreme Court held that in

appropriate circumstances a requested instruction on a lesser

related offense should be given. The court identified three

prerequisites to such an instruction: (1) there must exist some

basis other than an inexplainable rejection of prosecution

evidence, on which the jury could find the offense to be less

than that charged; (2) the offense must be one closely related

to that charged and shown by the evidence; and (3) the

theory of the defense must be consistent with a conviction for

the related offense.

* * * * *

With respect to defendant Hamby, the Attorney General

concedes that there is evidence to support a conviction as an

accessory. After the murder, Hamby removed Hop’s

backpack from Tex Lockley’s red truck and discussed with

Mike Sutton and Scarecrow Roanhouse ways to dispose of it. 

Although she eventually turned the backpack over to the

sheriff, she lied to him about how she had obtained it. And

she did not reveal to Sergeant Kartchner or the other

investigating officers all that she knew about the murder.

The Attorney General argues, however, that the third prong of

Geiger has not been met, as defendant Hamby did not rely

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 24 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

25

upon a theory that she was guilty at most of being an

accessory to the conspiracy.FN This point is valid. Under the

third prong of Geiger, “the instructions must be justified by the

defendant’s reliance on a theory of defense that would be

consistent with a conviction for the related offense. Thus, the

instruction need not be given if the defense theory and

evidence reflect a complete denial of culpability as when the

defense is alibi, or the only issue is identity, unless the

defendant argues that the evidence at most shows guilt only

of the related offense.” (People v. Geiger, supra, 35 Cal.3d at

pp. 531-532.)

FN. The Attorney General further argues that

the second prong of the Geiger test has not

been met, because the evidence of Hamby’s

conduct after the murder did not tend to prove

or disprove any element of conspiracy. The

Attorney General reasons that by the time

Hamby acted to conceal the killing the crime of

conspiracy had ended. The argument is not

convincing. Geiger requires only that the

evidence relied upon for the lesser related

offense also be “relevant to and admitted for the

purpose of establishing whether the defendant

is guilty of the charged offense.” (35 Cal.3d at

p.531.) The Attorney General has read too

restrictively the language in People v. Hill

(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 798, 806. In that case,

the court explained that evidence supporting a

lesser related offense must pertain to the

elements of the charged offense and not simply

the identity of the perpetrator, because when

there is a question about identity there is no

incentive to convict the defendant of some

crime.

In any event, even if the conspiracy had ended

once the killing occurred, the evidence of

Hamby’s post-killing conduct permitted the

inference that she had been part of the

conspiracy all along. Indeed, the prosecutor in

closing argument pointed to Hamby’s

falsehoods to the police as proof of Hamby’s

participation in the conspiracy. Thus, contrary

to the Attorney General’s assertion, the

evidence was relevant to an element of the

charge of conspiracy, the element of Hamby’s

membership in the conspiracy. And that same

evidence would support a conviction of

accessory after the fact.

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 25 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

26

Here, Hamby denied the conduct that would support a

conviction for accessory. She denied taking Hop’s backpack

from Tex Lockley’s truck; she claimed she found it in her

trailer. She denied discussing how to dispose of the

backpack. In closing argument, defense counsel did not

mention the offense of accessory.

Defendants Frazier and Hamby further argue that even if an

instruction on accessory was not required under Geiger, the

trial court erred in withdrawing the instruction after having

announced that it would be given. Defendants rely upon

People v. Sanchez (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7, in which

the court found prejudicial error in the trial court’s belated

decision to withdraw an instruction on a defense theory. We

reject the argument.

Penal Code section 1093.5 requires the trial court to decide

upon the instructions before the commencement of

argument.FN However, any error is harmless if there was no

hindrance to counsel’s ability to argue the case. (People v.

Orchard (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 568, 577.) The Sanchez case

is readily distinguishable. There, the trial court changed its

mind in the presence of the jury in the midst of defense

counsel’s closing argument, requiring counsel to make abrupt

changes in his argument and destroying defense counsel’s

credibility with the jury. Here, in contrast, the jury did not

know that the theory of accessory had been withdrawn. Nor

were defense counsel hindered in their ability to argue the

case.

FN. Penal Code section 1093.5 provides: “In

any criminal case which is being tried before the

court with a jury, all requests for instructions on

points of law must be made to the court and all

proposed instructions must be delivered to the

court before commencement of argument. 

Before the commencement of the argument, the

court, on request of counsel, must : (1) decide

whether to give, refuse, or modify the proposed

instructions; (2) decide which instructions shall

be given in addition to those proposed, if any;

and (3) advise counsel of all instructions to be

given. However, if, during the argument, issues

are raised which have not been covered by

instructions given or refused, the court may, on

request of counsel, give additional instructions

on the subject matter thereof.” 

Neither defendant relied upon the theory of being an

accessory in closing arguments. Counsel did not mention the

offense, nor did either counsel focus on the evidentiary basis

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 26 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

for the crime of being an accessory. We can see no

prejudice from the trial court’s belated decision to withdraw

the instruction.

Opinion at 24-27. 

3) Applicable Law And Discussion

To the extent that Hamby is arguing that the trial court violated her right to

an instruction on accessory after the fact, there is no constitutional right to an instruction

based on lesser related offenses that are not lesser included offenses under state law. 

Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1998) (“Almost all States ... provide instructions

only on those offenses that have been deemed to constitute lesser included offenses of

the charged crime. We have never suggested that the Constitution requires anything

more.”) (citations omitted). Hamby does not argue that being an accessory after the fact

to conspiracy is a lesser included offense of conspiracy and under California law being

an accessory after the fact to murder is not a lesser included offense of murder. People

v. Majors, 18 Cal.4th 385, 408 (1998); People v. Preston, 9 Cal.3d 308, 319-320 (1973).

To the extent Hamby is arguing that the trial court’s decision adversely

impacted her defense, the Supreme Court has held that a denial of an opportunity to

make a closing argument violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. Herring v.

New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (holding that statute authorizing trial judge in nonjury criminal case to refuse to hear defense closing argument violated the Sixth

Amendment); see also United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It can

hardly be doubted that a defendant has a right to a closing argument.”). Further, the

“[f]ailure to instruct on the defense theory of the case is reversible error if the theory is

legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable.” Beardslee v. Woodford,

358 F .3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended); see also Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d

1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he right to present a defense would be empty if it did not

entail the further right to an instruction that allowed the jury to consider the defense.”)

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 27 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 Hamby’s co-defendant, Frazier, also did not make an accessory argument

during her closing, which is what caused the trial judge to reconsider issuing the

instruction. RT at 4974.

28

(internal quotation marks omitted); Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000)

(as amended) (“It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to adequate

instructions on the defense theory of the case.”). A habeas petitioner must show

however that the alleged trial error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citation omitted); see also

Beardslee, 358 F.3d at 578.

Here Hamby argues that, by initially agreeing to issue the instruction, and

then reversing that decision after closing arguments had already been completed, the

trial court prevented Hamby’s counsel from “adequately representing” her. Hamby

argues that the decision was “fundamentally unfair,” and that it “improperly removed from

the jury’s consideration an issue presented by the evidence.” Second Amended Petition

at 15. However, as the trial court and the California Court of Appeal found, Hamby did

not rely on the theory of being an accessory in her closing arguments.2

 See RT at 4874-

4923. 

Hamby’s defense counsel did not mention the offense of accessory during

her closing argument. To the contrary, the complete thrust of her closing argument was

that Hamby was not involved in any of the crimes charged. Id. at 4922. That closing

argument was consistent with Hamby’s trial testimony in which she denied involvement

in the conspiracy and the murder. Id. at 4085-4392. Deciding not to issue the instruction

after Hamby failed to present an accessory argument in no way prevented Hamby from

presenting her defense theory. Further, not issuing the instruction did not negatively

impact the jury’s verdict, because the jury heard no argument on the matter and was

totally unaware of the issue. 

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 28 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 3

 There is no opinion by the state court as to this claim. 

29

Neither Hamby’s closing argument nor the jury’s verdict was impacted by

the trial court’s decision to not issue the instruction. Therefore, even if the trial court’s

decision was error, which it was not, Hamby’s claim would still fail because she cannot

show that the decision had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. 

 The state court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established constitutional law and Hamby is not

entitled to relief on this claim. 

C. Cumulative Error

1) Description of Claim

Hamby argues that the failure to give “any lesser included jury instructions

rendered her conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder fundamentally

unfair and a denial of federal due process.” Second Amended Petition at 17. 

2) Applicable Law And Discussion3

In cases where there are a number of trial errors, the court may look at “the

overall effect of all the errors in the context of the evidence introduced at trial against the

defendant.” United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)). “In other words, ‘errors

that might not be so prejudicial as to amount to a deprivation of due process when

considered alone, may cumulatively produce a trial setting that is fundamentally unfair.’ ” 

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 883 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Thomas v. Hubbard, 273

F.3d 1164, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001)).

However, “where there is no single constitutional error existing, nothing can

accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation.” Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704

(9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). 

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 29 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

30

Here, there was no single error committed and therefore there was no cumulative error. 

Hamby thus is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within twenty-one days after being served with these findings and recommendations,

any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such

a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within seven

days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In any objections he

elects to file petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in

the event he elects to file an appeal from the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate

of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant).

DATED: May 20, 2010

Case 2:97-cv-00164-LKK-CHS Document 155 Filed 05/21/10 Page 30 of 30