Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00678/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00678-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Elaina Kay Moza, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV 10-0678-TUC-BPV

ORDER 

Plaintiff, Elaina Kay Moza, suffers from the impairments of bipolar disorder, 

borderline personality disorder, history of alcohol dependence (in remission), bulimia, 

and degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine. Plaintiff applied for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on April 25, 2007, 

alleging disability since May 15, 2006 due to a mental condition and arthritis in her neck. 

Administrative Transcript (Tr.) 95-111, 114-124. The application was denied initially, 

(Tr. 55-56, 59-62), on reconsideration (Tr. 57-58, 65-71), and after an administrative 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held on January 8, 2009 (Tr. 15-25). 

This decision became the final decision for purposes of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) when the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1-4. 

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Plaintiff now brings this action for review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner for Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The United States 

Magistrate Judge has received the written consent of both parties, and, accordingly, 

presides over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. 

After considering the record before the Court and the parties’ briefing of the 

issues, the Court will reverse Defendant’s decision and remand for an immediate award 

of benefits. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, 

a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

court will set aside a denial of benefits only if the Commissioner's findings are based on 

legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) (“findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if 

supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”); Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 

1497 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir.1982), 

Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir, 1982)); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “‘Substantial evidence’ 

means ‘more than a scintilla,’ but ‘less than a preponderance.’” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279 

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(quoting Perales, 402 U.S. at 401 and Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 

(9th Cir. 1975)) (internal citations omitted); see also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009);Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). 

II. DISCUSSION

Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. 

To establish disability, the claimant must show (1) she has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, (2) she has a severe impairment, and (3) her impairment meets or 

equals a listed impairment or (4) her residual functional capacity (RFC) precludes her 

from performing her past work. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the 

claimant is able to perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

In her decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity from May 15, 2006, the alleged onset date. Tr. 17. At step two, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff had bipolar disorder; borderline personality disorder; bulimia; history of alcohol 

dependence, in remission; and degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, 

impairments that were “severe” pursuant to the regulations. Tr. 17. At step three, the ALJ 

found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 

medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. Tr. 

17-18. 

 The ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform work as 

follows: 

to occasionally lift and/or carry 50 pounds and frequently 25 pounds; stand 

and/or walk 2 hours at a time, for 6 hours total per day; sit 2 hours at a time, 

for a total of 6 hours a day; with postural limitations of no climbing ladders, 

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ropes or scaffolds and occasionally climbing ramps or stairs. The claimant 

also has mental limitations with the ability to understand and remember 

simple instructions with ability to remember detailed instructions and work 

at a consistent pace, particularly if it involved simple repetitive tasks. 

Tr. 18-23. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past 

relevant work as a certified nurse’s assistant. Tr. 23. At step five, relying on vocational 

expert testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform other work existing in significant 

numbers in the national economy. Tr. 24. Therefore, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not 

disabled at any time from May 15, 2006 through the date of her decision. Tr. 24-25. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred 1) by purporting to rely on the assessment of an 

examining psychologist, Carl Mansfield, Ph.D., when in fact the vocational expert 

testified that the limitations assessed by Dr. Mansfield would preclude sustained work 

activity; 2) by purporting to rely on the opinion of a state agency psychologist who 

completed assessment forms at the initial determination level but did not examine 

Plaintiff; and 3) by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony in the absence of clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. Plaintiff contends that the Court should exercise its 

discretion to remand for a determination of disability benefits. 

The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ committed reversible error in her 

evaluation of Dr. Mansfield’s opinion. Regarding the ALJ’s credibility determination the 

Commissioner contends that “clear and convincing” is not the appropriate standard of 

review. The Commissioner did not address Plaintiff’s second point of error, namely, that 

the opinion of a non-examining reviewer, standing alone, cannot serve as substantial 

evidence to support a decision to deny benefits. Finally, as to all claims of error, the 

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Commissioner contends that the Court should not “credit-as-true” any evidence, and that 

the proper disposition of this case is to remand for further proceedings. 

A. Dr. Mansfield’s Opinion 

Dr. Mansfield reviewed Plaintiff’s psychiatric progress notes from Value Options 

and performed a consultative psychological examination on behalf of the agency. Tr. 

209-11. Dr. Mansfield diagnosed depressive disorder, moderate, and kleptomania. Tr. 

211. Dr. Mansfield concluded that medical records indicated a history of bipolar disorder, 

and that Plaintiff indicated that Value Options had declared her seriously mentally ill 

(SMI). Tr. 211. Dr. Mansfield further concluded that Plaintiff’s emotional state and mild 

memory impairment would likely impact her ability to understand and carry out job 

instructions and respond appropriately to supervision and pressures in a work setting. Tr. 

211. 

Dr. Mansfield completed a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work 

Related Activities (Mental),” and noted that Plaintiff had mild limitations1

 in the ability 

to remember locations and work-like procedures; understand, remember and carry out 

very short and simple instructions; perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular 

attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; sustain an ordinary routine 

without special supervision; work in coordination with or proximity to others without 

being distracted by them; and make simple work related decisions. Tr. 204-07. Dr. 

 

1

 In each of these categories, the checkmark was placed on the line signifying “Not significantly limited (good/mild limitations)” but Dr. Mansfield had also underlined the 

word mild. In one category, the ability to ask simple questions or request assistance, Dr. Mansfield simply placed a checkmark on the line signifying “Not significantly limited (good/mild limitations),” without underlining either word. Tr. 204-07 

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Mansfield indicated that Plaintiff suffered moderate limitations (either fair or limited, but 

nor precluded) in the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions; carry out 

detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; complete 

a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based 

symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and 

length of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general public; accept instructions 

and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; get along with coworkers or 

peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavior extremes; maintain socially 

appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness2

; 

respond appropriately to changes in the work setting; and set realistic goals or make plans 

independently of others. Tr. 204-07. 

At the hearing, the vocational expert (VE) responded to a hypothetical question 

based on Dr. Mansfield’s assessment, assuming an individual with all of the moderate 

limitations as described above. Tr. 51-52. The term “moderate limitation” in the 

hypothetical was defined the same as it had been defined in the Medical Source 

Statement completed by Dr. Mansfield as “fairly limited, but not precluded.” Tr. 51. The 

VE responded “I believe that combination of impairments would preclude past work or 

any work.” Tr. 52. 

The ALJ reviewed the record of mental impairments and accepted the conclusions 

of Dr. Mansfield, summarizing both the mild and moderate limitations that Dr. Mansfield 

 

2

 In this category, Dr. Mansfield had underlined the words “standards of neatness.” 

Tr. 207. 

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noted in the Medical Source Statement. Tr. 20. After listing all the limitations, however, 

the ALJ stated: “With that, it was concluded the claimant could perform the mental 

demands of simple repetitive work tasks, a conclusion which is consistent with the above 

reported findings as well as the reported daily functioning.” Tr. 20. This statement did not 

encompass the entirety of the assessment and limitations reported by Dr. Mansfield. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s implicit rejection of Dr. Mansfield’s uncontradicted 

opinion was in error. The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. 

Mansfield’s opinion was “flawed,” that a review of Dr. Mansfield’s opinion and 

accompanying report reveals no such conclusion as stated by the ALJ. Nonetheless, the 

Commissioner argues that the record contains evidence supporting the ALJ’s 

determination that Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive work. The Commissioner 

further argues that the use of “moderate” limitations, i.e. a general “summary conclusion” 

category, is not appropriate for inclusion in the residual functional capacity, or, any 

underlying hypothetical question proffered to the vocational expert. 

 The Commissioner argues, in reliance on the authority of its Program Operations 

Manual System (POMS), that “general terms or severity ratings (like moderate) should 

not be used because they ‘do not describe function and do not usefully convey the extent 

of capacity limitations.’” (Doc. 27, at 9)(citing POMS DI 24510.065.B.1, 2001 WL 

1933372).3

 As noted by Plaintiff, however, the term “moderate” was defined, both in the 

 

3

 The Commissioner argues that “Dr. Barrons was the only mental health professional who translated the more general severity ratings into specific mental functional abilities, and her conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity was consistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could perform simple, 

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“Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work Related Activities (Mental),”4 (Tr. 

204-07) and in the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE, as fairly limited, but not precluded Tr. 

51. Moreover, the Medical Source Statement described several sub-categories within four 

broad functional areas: 1) understanding, carrying out, and remembering; 2) sustained 

concentration and persistence; 3) social interaction; 4) and adaptation. Tr. 204-07. These 

 repetitive work.” (Doc. 27, at 9) This argument is misleading at best. As Plaintiff notes, the POM directive, DI 24510.065 specifically applies to state agency reviewers, such as Heather Barrons, Psy. D., and provides instructions to such reviewers for writing the “formal narrative mental RFC assessment” for each of four subsections A through D: understanding and memory; sustained concentration and persistence; social interaction; 

and adaptation. (DI 24510.065) Specifically, the reviewer is instructed to discuss the 

functions that the individual has demonstrated that she “can do, as well as any limitations of those functions.” (Id.)(emphasis in original) Dr. Barrons identified several areas in which Moza was “not significantly limited” and five areas in which Moza was 

“moderately limited” under the summary conclusion portion of the form, nearly identical to Dr. Mansfield’s assessment. Tr. 217-18. In the narrative portion of the form, however, which the Commissioner now argues is the crucial portion of the form, translating the more general severity ratings into a specific mental RFC, Dr. Barrons curiously identifies no functional limitations whatsoever, completely disregarding the five areas in which she previously noted Moza was moderately limited. Dr. Barrons summarized what she 

referred to as the “data,” and simply restated, in narrative form, the areas in which Moza 

was “not significantly limited” (there was a separate box for “no evidence of limitation in this category”) as a “fair to good” “ability” to perform certain activities and simply failed 

to state any of Plaintiff’s limitations. For example, where Dr. Barrons checked the box 

indicating Moza was not significantly limited in her ability to remember locations and work-like procedures, the narrative describes this as: “Data suggests that the CLMT is able to remember basic workplace locations and procedures.” Where Dr. Barrons checked the box indicating Moza was “moderately limited in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods,” this moderate limitation was completely disregarded in the narrative portion of the form. Though a fine example of cherry-picking, a review of Dr. Barron’s RFC assessment suggests that it is not more useful or a “more specific” or a “more concrete” explanation of limitations than Dr. Mansfield’s Medical Source 

Statement. 

4

 The Court questions the implications of Commissioner’s actions, if as stated by Plaintiff, it provides this assessment form to its own examiner, only to argue in this appeal that the form should not be used to assess a claimant’s work capacities. The Court further questions whether the Commissioner regularly relies on a form it deems deficient to assess a claimant’s work capacities in its regular assessment of work capacity. 

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twenty different sub-categories within the broad functional areas combined with the 

definitions provided for each accurately described Plaintiff’s limitations.5

 

The Commissioner argues that this case is analogous to Stubbs-Danielson v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008). In Stubbs–Danielson, the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals held that “an ALJ's assessment of a claimant adequately captures 

restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment is 

consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony.” Id. at 1174. There, the 

record contained some evidence of the claimant's slow pace, but the only concrete 

functional limitation provided by the medical sources was that the claimant could 

perform “simple tasks.” Id. at 1173–74. As a result, the ALJ formulated a RFC that 

limited the claimant to “simple, routine, repetitive sedentary work.” Id. at 1173. The 

Court of Appeals concluded that the ALJ did not err in that formulation of the RFC and, 

as a result, did not err in formulating hypothetical questions to the vocational expert. 

This case is more analogous to Brink v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 

Fed.Appx. 211 (9th Cir. 2009), which distinguished Stubbs–Danielson. Although Brink is 

an unpublished decision and thus only of persuasive value, it is instructive in regards to 

5

 Furthermore, if the ALJ felt these records were inadequate or too ambiguous for the ALJ to employ in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, it was incumbent upon the ALJ's to 

develop the record further, even when Plaintiff is represented by counsel. Mayes v. 

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ has a duty to develop the record when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.). There is a heightened duty where the claimant is suffering from a mental condition because mental claimants may not be able to protect themselves from loss of benefits by producing evidence. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th

Cir. 1991). An ALJ's duty to develop the record is further triggered when there is ambiguous evidence or when "the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence." Mayes, 276 at 459-60; Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 

2001). This duty may require that the ALJ obtain additional information by, inter alia, contacting treating physicians, scheduling consultative examinations, or calling a medical expert. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912(e)-(f), 416.919a. 

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how it distinguished Stubbs–Danielson. In finding error and rejecting the Commissioner's 

argument premised on Stubbs–Danielson, the Court of Appeals reasoned: 

In Stubbs–Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008), we held that 

an “assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to 

concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with 

the restrictions identified in the medical testimony.” Id. at 1174. The 

medical testimony in Stubbs–Danielson, however, did not establish any 

limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. Here, in contrast, the 

medical evidence establishes, as the ALJ accepted, that Brink does have 

difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace. Stubbs–Danielson, 

therefore, is inapposite. 

Id. The undersigned finds that the reasoning of Brink is persuasive and supports a 

conclusion that Stubbs–Danielson does not control this case. See also Betancourt v. 

Astrue, 2010 WL 4916604, at *3–4 (C.D.Cal. Nov.27, 2010) (where the ALJ accepted 

medical evidence of plaintiff's limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence, or 

pace, a hypothetical question to the VE including plaintiff's restriction to “simple, 

repetitive work” but excluding plaintiff's difficulties with concentration, persistence, or 

pace resulted in a VE's conclusion that was “based on an incomplete hypothetical 

question and unsupported by substantial evidence.”); Melton v. Astrue, 2010 WL 

3853195, at *8 (D.Or. 2010), aff'd., 442 Fed.Appx. 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (ALJ erred in her 

assessment of plaintiff's RFC where the assessment included plaintiff's restriction to 

simple, repetitive tasks, but did not include plaintiff's mild-to-moderate limitations in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace). In this case, as in Brink, the ALJ 

accepted evidence of plaintiff's moderate limitations with sustained concentration and 

persistence, but the RFC only included a reference to “the ability to understand and 

remember simple instructions with ability to remember detailed instructions and work at 

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a consistent pace, particularly if it involved simple repetitive tasks.” That RFC is 

materially incomplete in light of the evidence in the record and the ALJ's own findings. 

Because the ALJ did not reject Dr. Mansfield’s opinion, it was error not to include 

these limitations in the residual functional capacity, as they do describe function and 

convey the extent of Plaintiff’s mental functional capacity. 

Next, the Commissioner argues that although the ALJ misstated Dr. Mansfield’s 

opinion, there is ample evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that 

Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive work. The Commissioner points to other 

medical evidence in the record, as well as Moza’s activities of daily living to support this 

argument. 

As Plaintiff correctly notes, however, “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician 

cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of 

either an examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 831 

(9th Cir. 1995); see also Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th

Cir. 2008). Thus, the Commissioner’s reliance on Dr. Barron’s opinion is misplaced. 

Thus, this issue boils down to application of the “credit-as-true” rule to the facts of 

this case. The Commissioner submits that Dr. Mansfield’s own opinion is not necessarily 

inconsistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive 

work. (Doc. 27, at 6) The Commissioner further argues that, because there is record 

evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion as to Plaintiff’s mental RFC, and further 

proceedings would allow the ALJ to pose only proper hypotheticals, remand for further 

proceedings, and not outright reversal, is the appropriate remedy. (Doc. 27, at 11) 

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Plaintiff submits that because Dr. Mansfield’s assessment was uncontradicted 

substantial evidence regarding Moza’s limitations, and because the vocational expert 

testified without contestation that those limitations precluded the ability to work, this 

matter should be remanded for determination of benefits based on evidence from the 

agency’s own examining psychologist and vocational expert. (Doc. 16, at 22) 

The decision to remand for further development of the record or for an award of 

benefits is within the discretion of the Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Harman v. Apfel, 

211 F.3d 1172, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2000). This Circuit has held that an action should be 

remanded for an award of benefits where the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient 

reasons for rejecting evidence, no outstanding issue remains that must be resolved before 

a determination of disability can be made, and it is clear from the record that the ALJ 

would be required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected evidence credited as 

true. See, e.g., Varney v. Sec’y of HHS, 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (Varney II). 

The Commissioner asserts that remand for further proceedings is appropriate, 

because it would allow the ALJ to properly address Dr. Mansfield’s opinion, obtain 

additional evidence concerning mental health listings, and more thoroughly address 

Plaintiff’s credibility, whereas Plaintiff’s argument would have the Court improperly 

serve as finder of fact. 

After applying the credit-as-true rule to improperly discredited evidence, however, 

no outstanding issue remains to be resolved before determining that Plaintiff is entitled to 

benefits. The impartial vocational expert testified that the mental limitations assessed by 

Dr. Mansfield, if adopted, would preclude past work or any work. Tr. 51-52. Because it is 

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clear that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled, see Benecke v. Barnhart, 

379 F.3d 587, 593-95 (9th Cir. 2004), the Court will remand the case for an award of 

benefits. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding for an award of 

benefits where it was “‘clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to determine 

the claimant disabled’”) (citation omitted). Given this ruling, the Court need not address 

Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her credibility and erred in 

adopting the assessment of the non-examining doctor. 

The Commissioner takes the position that the “credit-as-true” rule is inconsistent 

with the Social Security Act and with other Ninth Circuit actions, citing the dissent in 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2009)(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). Even Judge 

O’Scannlain in the dissenting opinion acknowledges, however, that the current state of 

the law which this Court is bound by is that: 

“[w]here the Commissioner fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting 

the opinion of a treating or examining physician, we credit that opinion ‘as 

a matter of law.’” [Lester, 81 F.3d] at 834; Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 

1172, 1178 (9th Cir.2000) (same); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587 (9th

Cir.2007) ( “Because the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting Benecke's testimony and her treating physicians' opinions, we 

credit the evidence as true.”). Lester, Harman, and Benecke courts did not 

require any other conditions to be fulfilled before the court credited 

testimony as true. Rather, the Harman and Benecke courts followed the 

bright-line rule first set forth in Lester: that testimony which was 

improperly rejected will be credited as true as a matter of law. 

Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 603-04 (dissent). This Circuit has clearly held that an action should 

be remanded for an award of benefits where, as here, the ALJ has failed to provide 

legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, no outstanding issue remains that must 

be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and it is clear from the 

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record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected 

evidence credited as true. See, e.g., Varney II, 859 F.2d at 1400; see also Benecke, 379 

F.3d at 593 (citing Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178). 

The parties concede that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

not considering and therefore by implication, improperly rejecting Dr. Mansfield’s 

opinion. No outstanding issue remains to be resolved before determining that Plaintiff is 

entitled to benefits. The impartial vocational expert testified that application of Dr. 

Mansfield’s opinion with regard to Plaintiff’s mental impairments would result in the 

conclusion that such a person would be unable to perform Plaintiff’s past work or any 

work. Tr. 51-52. The Commissioner did not object to this factual finding. Because it is 

clear that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled, the Court will remand the 

case for an award of benefits. See Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593-95 (remanding for an award 

of benefits where no outstanding issues remain and ALJ would be required to find 

claimant disabled if evidence is credited); Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc.Sec.Admin., 166 

F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)(where the court "conclude[s] that...a doctor's opinion 

should have been credited and, if credited, would have led to a finding of eligibility, we 

may order the payment of benefits."); Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (remanding for payment of 

benefits because, after crediting doctor’s opinion as true, inter alia, “the 

evidence...demonstrates that...” the plaintiff was disabled.); Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 

502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanding for payment of benefits where the Secretary did not 

provide adequate reasons for disregarding examining physician’s opinion); Winans v. 

Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)(same). 

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Plaintiff applied for disability benefits more than five years ago. She has been 

denied at the initial, reconsideration, hearing, and appellate levels of review. Plaintiff 

specifically raised these same issues of error regarding Plaintiff’s mental limitations as 

assessed by Dr. Mansfield and adopted by the ALJ in a memorandum to the Appeals 

Council (Tr. 185-88-53), at which stage the Appeals Council could have remanded for a 

further hearing so that the ALJ could take further evidence or remand for a further 

hearing, yet the Appeals Council declined that opportunity. All three factors that the 

Court must consider support Plaintiff's request to remand the matter for an award of 

benefits. Benecke, 379 F.3d at 595 (recognizing that "[r]emanding a disability claim for 

further proceedings can delay much needed income for claimants who are unable to work 

and are entitled to benefits, often subjecting them to 'tremendous financial difficulties 

while awaiting the outcome of their appeals and proceedings on remand.'" (quoting 

Varney II, 859 F.2d at 1398). A remand for further proceedings is not warranted. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s decision denying benefits is reversed. 

2. The case is remanded to Defendant for an award of benefits. 

3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 21st day of May, 2012. 

Case 4:10-cv-00678-BPV Document 34 Filed 05/22/12 Page 15 of 15