Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01399/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01399-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TONY MARTINEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

G. MARONI CO., dba CHURCH’S 

CHICKEN #948, and MARONI-LUTFI 

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LP, 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-06-1399 DFL GGH 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiff Tony Martinez moves for attorneys’ fees in the 

amount of $6,958.25 following his pre-trial settlement with 

defendants G. Maroni Co., doing business as Church’s Chicken, 

and Maroni-Lutfi Property Management. Defendants challenge the 

requested fee award. For the following reasons, the court 

awards $1804.08 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 

I. 

On June 22, 2006, Martinez filed this action against 

defendants, alleging forty-one violations of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA) and related state statutes. Defendants 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 1 of 11
2 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

made a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment to 

plaintiff on August 16 and filed a motion to dismiss on August 

17. On August 23, plaintiff accepted defendants’ Rule 68 offer. 

On September 6, judgment entered based upon the agreement. The 

parties left the issue of attorneys' fees for this motion. 

The forty-one barriers alleged by plaintiff do not directly 

correspond to the modifications specified in the settlement 

agreement. Under the settlement agreement, defendants paid 

plaintiff $4,001 and agreed to: (1) add tow away parking signs; 

(2) add a van-accessible parking place with signage; (3) remove 

outdoor seating; (4) add the proper ISA sticker at the entrance 

closest to the van-accessible parking; (5) remove a partition in 

the women’s restroom; (6) lower the toilet paper dispensers in 

both the men’s and women’s restrooms; and (7) check and maintain 

the sinks in the men’s and women’s restrooms for proper knee 

clearance and insulation. 

Under a prior settlement agreement with a different 

plaintiff in a separate ADA action, defendants agreed to remedy 

“the lack of a van-accessible parking space” at the restaurant. 

When plaintiff filed this action, the specified time in which to 

remedy barriers under the prior agreement had not expired. 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 2 of 11
3 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. 

The ADA and Unruh Civil Rights Act provide that a 

prevailing party should recover reasonable attorney’s fees. See 

Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., No. Civ-S-03-1843, 2005 WL 

3287233, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005). Calculating an 

appropriate fee award involves a two-step process. Fisher v. 

SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). “First, the 

court must calculate the ‘lodestar figure’ by taking the number 

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation and multiplying 

it by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. “Second, a court may 

adjust the lodestar upward or downward using a ‘multiplier’ 

based on factors not subsumed in the initial calculation.” Van 

Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

Plaintiff seeks $5,950 for 30.9 attorney hours, $491.25 for 

6.55 paralegal hours, and $517 for costs and expenses, for a 

total requested award of $6,958.25. Defendants argue that 

plaintiff’s fee should be reduced in the following manner: (1) 

the attorneys’ hourly rates should be lowered; (2) all paralegal 

time should be disallowed; (3) all billings after the August 16, 

2006 Rule 68 offer should be disallowed; (4) all attorney travel 

time should be disallowed; (5) an appropriate reduction should 

be made for alleged barriers that defendants had previously 

agreed to remove; (6) an appropriate reduction should be made 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 3 of 11
4 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for plaintiff’s rate of success; and (7) all alleged costs and 

expenses should be disallowed.1 Defendants’ suggested reductions 

are discussed individually below. 

A. Attorney Rates

Plaintiff seeks compensation for Lynn Hubbard at $300 per 

hour and Mark Emmett, Hubbard’s associate, at $200 per hour. 

Defendants challenge these rates, arguing that $250 per hour for 

Hubbard and $150 per hour for Emmett are more appropriate rates. 

The court finds defendants’ suggested rates to be consistent 

with prior fee awards in the district for litigation of this 

subject matter and complexity. See Martinez, 2005 WL 3287233, 

at *4. Here, as in Martinez, plaintiff provides “no other 

evidence other than [the attorney’s] declaration to justify a 

rate.” Id. at 4. Because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 

why Hubbard and Emmett should be compensated at above-market 

rates, the court will calculate their hourly fees using the $250 

and $150 per hour rates, respectively. 

B. Paralegal Fees

Plaintiff seeks compensation for paralegal work at $75 per 

hour. Defendants argue that paralegal fees should not be 

 

1

 Defendants also argue that the court has discretion to deny all 

fees because plaintiff sued without providing pre-filing notice 

to defendants. The court, however, has previously held that 

“the ADA does not require plaintiffs to engage in such prelitigation efforts.” Martinez, 2005 WL 3287233, at *2. 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 4 of 11
5 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reimbursed because plaintiff’s paralegal declarations do not 

state the required qualifications under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§ 6450 and the requested fees relate to mostly secretarial or 

administrative tasks. The court grants paralegal fees but 

reduces them based upon the substance of work performed. The 

court previously found paralegal Bonnie Vonderhaar qualified 

under § 6450. Sanford, 2005 WL 4782697, at *4. Although it 

previously found Crista Duncan unqualified, id., she since has 

satisfied § 6450 through completion of the U.C. Davis paralegal 

program. As for the substance of the work billed, plaintiff 

seeks fees at the paralegal rate for copying, faxing, and 

mailing documents. “[F]iling and serving documents are 

secretarial tasks that cannot be billed at a paralegal rate, 

regardless of who performs them.” Martinez, 2005 WL 3287233, at 

*7. The court reduces plaintiff’s paralegal fees by 2.2 hours 

for tasks more appropriately handled by a secretary than a 

paralegal.2

C. Rule 68 Reduction

Defendants argue that plaintiff should not recover fees for 

activity following defendant’s Rule 68 offer on August 16, 2006. 

 

2

 The court denies paralegal fees for the following work: Crista 

Duncan, 7/03/06 (both entries); Crista Duncan, 7/14/06; Bonnie 

Vonderhaar, 7/27/06 (both entries, with the exception of 0.2 

hours allowed for meeting with calendar clerk); Crista Duncan, 

8/03/06.

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 5 of 11
6 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The argument lacks merit. Defendants’ Rule 68 offer of judgment 

stated that it “exclud[ed] costs and attorney fees now accrued.” 

It was silent as to whether its award of $4,001 included any 

costs or fees accrued after the offer’s acceptance. Such 

ambiguity is construed against the offeror. See Nusom v. Cohm 

Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1997). The 

court, however, need not interpret the offer’s silence. “[A] 

Rule 68 offer for judgment in a specific sum together with 

costs, which is silent as to attorney fees, does not preclude 

the plaintiff from seeking fees when the underlying statute does 

not make attorney fees a part of costs.” Id. at 835. Since 

neither the ADA nor applicable California law defines costs to 

include attorney’s fees, Martinez, 2005 WL 3287233, at *4, the 

accepted Rule 68 offer does not bar plaintiff from seeking postacceptance fees. 

D. Travel Time

Plaintiff seeks compensation at a reduced rate for attorney 

time spent traveling to and from the barrier site. Defendants 

argue that plaintiff’s claim for attorney travel time should be 

disallowed as unreasonable. The court previously has rejected 

compensation for Hubbard’s travel time from his office in Chico 

to Sacramento barrier sites. Although such time normally might 

be billed to a paying client, such a client would have had the 

opportunity to choose whether to accept such charges or find an 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 6 of 11
7 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

attorney closer to the property at issue. See Martinez, 2005 WL 

3287233, at *5. Defendants, however, do not have the benefit of 

such a choice. Moreover, the court finds that it would be 

unreasonable to compensate Hubbard and his associate for travel 

time from Chico to Sacramento when the attorneys generate a 

large volume of work in Sacramento and request compensation at 

Sacramento rates. Id. By continuing to base their offices in 

Chico, while focusing much of their practice on Sacramento, the 

attorneys accept the predictable time and expense involved with 

litigating in a community other than their own. The court 

reduces each attorney’s fees by 4 hours for travel time. 

E. Barriers Addressed in Prior Settlement 

Plaintiff claims that he prevailed on his claim regarding 

barriers in the site’s parking lot. Defendants argue that 

plaintiff should not receive fees for the van-accessible parking 

claim due to a prior settlement agreement requiring the addition 

of such a parking space. A plaintiff prevails on a claim when 

the claim materially alters a legal relationship to the 

plaintiff’s advantage. See Barrios v. California 

Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002). A 

legal relationship is altered when “the plaintiff can force the 

defendant to do something he otherwise would not have to do.” 

Id. Here, although defendants agreed to provide plaintiff with 

the requested parking relief, a prior binding settlement 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 7 of 11
8 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

agreement already required them to remedy the alleged barrier. 

Plaintiff received notice of the prior settlement agreement 

before entering into his agreement with defendants. Inclusion 

of van-accessible parking in this settlement did not impose new 

obligations upon defendants. To award fees for such activity 

would encourage unproductive and wasteful litigation. The court 

finds that plaintiff did not prevail for fee purposes on claims 

related to van-accessible parking due to the existence of a 

prior settlement agreement requiring such barriers to be 

remedied. 

F. Degree of Success

Plaintiff originally alleged forty-one violations of 

federal and state law. He argues that he succeeded in 100% of 

his claims because defendants have agreed to remedy ADA 

violations related to (1) tow away parking signs, (2) vanaccessible parking, (3) outdoor seating, (4) ISA stickers at the 

restaurant entrance, (5) the women’s restroom toilet partition, 

(6) the lowering of toilet paper dispensers, and (7) clearance 

and insulation under bathroom sinks. Defendants argue, based on 

the settlement agreement, that plaintiff succeeded on seven of 

forty-one claims and should have fees reduced accordingly.3

 

3 As discussed above, the court finds for fee purposes that 

plaintiff was not a prevailing party on the van-accessible 

parking claim. 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 8 of 11
9 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The parties’ methods for evaluating plaintiff’s degree of 

success are too simplistic. Neither party attempts to 

demonstrate specifically how the settlement terms correspond 

with the originally claimed barriers. The court, to the best of 

its ability given the limited development of the claims, finds 

that the settlement addressed eleven of the forty-one alleged 

violations noted in the Preliminary Site Accessibility Report, 

attached to the complaint.4 The court declines, however, to 

engage in a direct proportional reduction of the fees by the 

eleven out of forty-one success rate. Such precision is 

artificial, given the limited fee documentation provided by 

plaintiff. Plaintiff’s billing records are “not sufficiently 

detailed to enable the court to match each entry to the 

corresponding claims.” Martinez, 2005 WL 3287233, at *4. 

Therefore, although guided by the proportional reduction 

analysis, the court reduces plaintiff’s fees by two-thirds based 

 

4 The court finds that the settlement agreement did not address 

the following claims: Claims 2-11 (concerning parking lot 

features other than tow away parking signs); Claims 12-15 

(concerning exterior route of travel issues); Claims 18-19 

(concerning the counters in the restaurant); Claims 22-24 

(concerning the dining room seating); Claim 25 (concerning 

directional signage to the restroom); Claim 27 (concerning 

interior doors); Claims 30-32 (concerning water closet features 

or obstructions); Claims 33-36 (concerning toilet paper 

dispenser features unrelated to height); Claim 37 (concerning 

placement of the lavatory); and Claim 40 (concerning placement 

of the soap dispenser). The court finds that Claims 1, 16-17, 

20-21, 26, 28-29, 38-39, and 41 are addressed by the settlement 

agreement. 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 9 of 11
10 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

upon a general assessment of his success as well as the court’s 

estimate of the amount of time reasonably incurred to achieve 

that level of success. 

G. Costs and Expenses

Plaintiff seeks $517.00 in litigation costs for electronic 

research fees, a site report, postage, and telephone service. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff has already been compensated for 

these expenses in the bill of costs. Defendants also argue that 

the expenses are unsubstantiated. These arguments are 

unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s bill of costs sought compensation 

only for the filing fee and service. Here, plaintiff seeks 

compensation for different expenses. Although plaintiff does 

not provide extensive documentation supporting the expenses, the 

attorneys’ declarations provide sufficient support given the 

reasonableness of plaintiff’s requested amount. The court 

awards plaintiff $517.00 in costs and expenses. 

III. 

For the above reasons, the court awards the plaintiff 

$1287.08 in attorneys’ fees, calculated as follows: 

 Hours Rate Total 

Lynn 

Hubbard 1.00 $250 $250.00 

Mark 

Emmett 21.90 $150 $3285.00 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 10 of 11
11 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Paralegals 4.35 $75 $326.25 

Sub-total: $3861.25 

Negative 

Multiplier 

(2/3): $1287.08 

Additionally, the court awards plaintiff $517.00 in costs and 

expenses. In total, the court awards plaintiff $1804.08. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 1, 2007 

 /s/ David F. Levi___________

 DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge 

 

Case 2:06-cv-01399-DFL-GGH Document 24 Filed 05/02/07 Page 11 of 11