Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01299/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01299-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Petitioner has apparently since been released on parole, having been incarcerated

for 25 years. (See Notice of Change of Address, 8/31/10, Doc. 71.)

2

 Docs. 60 and 63 are duplicates of Docs. 59 and 61, respectively.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Larry Joe Prince,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents

CV-08-1299-PHX-SRB (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, incarcerated at the time as a prisoner of the Arizona Department of

Corrections in the Guadalupe County Correctional Facility in Santa Rosa, New Mexico,1

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 14, 2008

(Doc. 1). Petitioner raises claims of failure to disclose evidence, juror misconduct and

ineffective assistance of counsel. On October 27, 2008, Respondents filed their Answer

(Doc. 16). Pursuant to Court Order, Respondents filed a Supplemental Answer (Doc. 27)

on February 13, 2009. Petitioner filed a Reply on March 2, 2010 (Doc. 55). 

Pursuant to Court Order, Respondents supplemented the record on May 13, 2010

(Doc. 57), and on June 10, 2010 (Doc. 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66).2

 Petitioner

supplemented the record on August 9, 2010 with his Reply to Objections (Doc. 70). 

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

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3

 Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 16, and Supplements (Doc. 57, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65 and

66 , are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.” Exhibits to the Petition, Doc. 1, are referenced

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U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s Petition for Review from the denial of his first postconviction relief petition, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:

The trial evidence showed that, on October 12, 1984, petitioner

and Kevin Cobey went to a friend's apartment. Petitioner brought along

his gun, a KG-99. Petitioner telephoned Richards and made plans to

meet him outside the apartment. According to Cobey, after telephoning

Richards, petitioner said "he was pissed off,” that "Rob didn’t have his

stuff or something,” and that "he was going to shoot him."

Richards was with James Tabola at the time of the telephone

conversation. After the conversation, Richards asked Tabola for a

baggy and flour. Richards said he was going to sell the flour as cocaine

in order to recover $1,100 owed him by the person he had just spoken

to. He said the person he was going to meet had recently been released

from jail on an assault charge. Petitioner had been released on an

assault charge the previous day.

After his telephone conversation, petitioner left the apartment

carrying the KG-99 wrapped in a towel. Cobey testified that he heard

a car pull up in front of the apartments and then heard a shot. He then

saw Richards’ car pull away from the parking lot. Shortly afterward,

petitioner telephoned Cobey. At petitioner’s request, Cobey and a

companion picked him up at a nearby fast food restaurant. Petitioner

was shirtless and did not have his gun. However, he was carrying some

of Richards' jewelry.

Later, petitioner and Cobey used Richards' keys to enter

Richards' apartment. They searched for cocaine, money and jewelry,

but found only jewelry, which they took. Cobey and petitioner returned

to the apartment that they shared. There, petitioner admitted the murder

to Cobey, "describing how he had shot Richards in the face, rolled him

over to the passenger side of the car, and driven away."

Cobey subsequently told Ken Hatch about the murder. Hatch

confronted petitioner. Petitioner initially denied any involvement, but

later admitted the murder to Hatch. Petitioner "eventually told Hatch

details involved in the murder, including shooting Richards in the

mouth, removing Richards from the driver's seat, and then driving to

the location where the body was found and walking away." Richards'

body was found by a witness who, on the night of the murder, saw an

unidentified white male get out of the car and walk away. Petitioner is

a white male.

(Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 3/5/96 at 2-3.)3

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herein as “Pet. Exhibit ___.” Exhibits to the Reply, Doc. 55, are referenced herein as “Reply

Exhibit ___.”

4

 Because this Court must ultimately evaluate the effect of various Brady material,

and the validity of Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence, the undersigned summarizes the

testimony at trial and, hereinafter, the testimony at the various state court evidentiary

hearings.

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B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL AND ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner was charged with first degree murder, proceeded to trial in March and April,

1986. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 3/5/96 at 2.) At trial, the following testimony was presented:4

James Tabola - James Tabola testified (Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 98-125.) that

he was an entertainment business associate of the victim, and he allowed the victim to use

a closet in his home to store and process cocaine, in exchange for some of the cocaine.

Tabola last saw the victim on Friday, October 12th (the weekend of the murder) at about 7:30

p.m. at Tabola’s residence. He was wearing a gold necklace, watch, bracelet, and perhaps

ring, and silver eyeglasses. He did not have a gun, and Tabola did not consider him a rough

and tumble guy, but instead thought he was gay. 

The victim was at Tabola’s residence for about a half hour. While there, the victim

appeared to receive a phone call, and then asked to borrow some flour and a baggie, so he

could get back $1,100 that the guy on the phone owed him, by selling him the flour as

cocaine. The victim described the person on the phone as having recently gotten out of jail

for assault, and having no money. Tabola did not know Petitioner. 

The following Sunday, Tabola saw the victim’s body on TV, wearing the same clothes

he had worn on that Friday. A week later, police interviewed Tabola and he related the same

story. 

Subsequently, Tabola had a felony conviction for possession of a narcotic for sale.

Neither the victim nor Petitioner were involved in that case.

Officer Martinez - Louis Martinez testified (Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 126-134)

that he had been a police officer with the City of Phoenix since December 1974, and was on

patrol on Sunday, October 14, 1984, when he receive a call at 9:13 am to go to the area of

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22nd and Danbury in Northwest Phoenix. He found a Honda car parked, with the windows

rolled up and the drivers side door unlocked. There was a man in the front seat, his feet

sticking up on the passenger side and his head almost under the dash. He opened the car,

smelled the faint odor of gun powder, and then determined the man was dead. No one was

around the car. He then secured the area by blocking off the entire street. 

After other officers arrived, he and Deceive Jennings went to the victim’s residence

and entered the apartment with a passkey obtained from the manager. The apartment was

neat and furnished. They searched the home for people, but not for contraband. No one was

home. He noted an answering machine with lights on, a bird in a cage, and keys scattered

on the kitchen counter. He left the apartment after about five minutes, leaving Detective

Jennings behind.

Detective Jennings - Harry Jennings testified (Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 134-

153) that he was a retired detective with the Phoenix Police Department, and responded to

the location where the victim’s body was found. He obtained ID from a wallet laying next

to the body, and directed photographers to take some pictures. There was no money,

weapons or jewelry in the vehicle. He spoke to the witness who lived in the area and

reported the car. He determined the death was a homicide based upon the position of the

body and absence of weapons in the vehicle. He did not move the body and did not determine

a cause of death other than noting the large amount of blood. 

He then went to the victim’s apartment and looked through the apartment for signs of

the homicide having been committed there, but found the only thing unusual to be loose keys

on the counter, one of which was to the front door of the apartment. He had the keys and

apartment photographed and dusted for fingerprints. He removed two cassette tapes from

the phone answering machine, and delivered them to Detective Butler. 

He spoke to members of the victim’s family to try to determine the last time the victim

had been seen or spoken to. He had no involvement with the case after that first day. 

Tammy Shaw - Tammy Shaw testified (Exhibit III, R.T. 3/20/86 at 18-91; Exhibit

JJJ, R.T. 3/20/86 at 1-12) that in 1984 she and her roommate Julie Swan met Petitioner and

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Kevin Cobey. She became Petitioner’s girlfriend and Julie Swan became Kevin Cobey’s

girlfriend. Petitioner moved into her apartment in September, 1984, and continued to live

there at least three weeks after a search warrant was served on November 6, 1984. Petitioner

possessed a KG-99 gun with a long handle and a clip of bullets which he kept in a brief case,

but she did not see it after the end of September, when Swan had asked him to get rid of it.

He also had .380 Colt. 

Petitioner was dealing cocaine until sometime in October. Rob Richards was at her

apartment the weekend before the murder and met with Petitioner in the bedroom. Richards

was Petitioner’s supplier of cocaine. 

She knows nothing of Richards’ death. When interviewed by police she denied

knowing Petitioner. 

Petitioner had been arrested on October 8th and she and Julie Swan picked him up

from jail on October 11th, and returned to their apartment. Ron Rango, Kevin Cobey, and

Cheryl and Julie Swan were in the apartment at various times that day. At 2:00 in the

morning on October 12th, Petitioner, Cobey and Rango left the apartment. An hour later,

Cobey and Rango returned. She believed Petitioner had gone to this ex-girlfriend’s house.

After an hour, Petitioner called and asked Cobey to pick him up. Neither Petitioner nor

Cobey had a car. Cobey borrowed Swan’s car. Cobey left and returned with Petitioner an

hour later. There was no partying going on that evening.

The next evening, on October 12th, 1984, when Shaw returned home from work,

Petitioner and Cobey were there and just getting up and showering. A number of people

came to the home, and spent the evening partying, drinking and doing cocaine. People there

included Petitioner, Cobey, Swan, David (Swan’s brother), Beth LeBrun, Tom Ellinghausen,

Rango, Petitioner’s brother James, Martin Salazar, two girl cousins of Salazar, and a guy

named Steve. Rango, Ellinghausen, and Cobey left at about 8:00pm and returned about

11:00pm. Petitioner left the residence only once, at about 7:00pm for 10 to 15 minutes, and

she was told it was to talk to the victim.

Despite her testimony, she did tell Detective Butler that the partying had occurred on

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Thursday October 11, 1984, and that on Friday, October 12th, she was home alone with

Petitioner, and Swan. She told him that on that Friday night the victim came to the

apartment, and Shaw was able to describe his dress, which she described as things he always

wore, even though she had only seen him once. 

Shaw obtained immunity for her testimony, with regard to her possession of marijuana

and cocaine. The immunity was conditioned upon her truthful testimony.

Petitioner had a wad of money the weekend of the murder. 

Ronald Rango - Ronald Rango testified (Exhibit JJJ, R.T. 3/20/86 at 13-29) that he

was in the apartment of Petitioner and Kevin Cobey on Thursday, October 11, 1984, which

was the day Petitioner got out of jail. People were drinking, but he did not 

The following night was his wife’s birthday, and they went out to dinner, where they

met Cobey and Swan at about 11:30 in the evening. They returned home for the night, and

had a party attended by Swan and Cobey and others. 

He had seen Petitioner with his gun, which may have been a KG-99, on several

occasions. Early Sunday morning the weekend of the murder, Kevin Cobey told him that the

victim had been shot. 

Randee Rector - Randee Rector testified (Exhibit JJJ, R.T. 3/20/86 at 29-48; Exhibit

UUU, R.T. 4/2/86 at 26-45) that she had been Petitioner’s girlfriend for about two years, but

is not currently. Petitioner lived with her for about two weeks in the beginning of September,

1984. At that time he had a KG-99 which she saw a few times. A bullet from the gun was

left in her apartment, which she eventually gave to Detective Butler. 

Petitioner was dealing cocaine in the summer of 1984, and he was supplied by the

victim, Rob Richards, who she had met a few times. The last time she saw him was in

September shortly before he was killed. Around the end of September, the victim came to

her house with Petitioner, and while they sat there Petitioner took the victim’s key chain, and

was playing with it, taking the two halves apart. Rector denied telling Detective Butler that

Petitioner was not there when the victim was. 

Petitioner moved out of Rector’s house and moved in with Tammy Shaw around the

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5

 The defense made an offer of proof in response to a successful hearsay objection

that Rector would testify that Hatch told her that he had asked Petitioner about the

allegations, and that Petitioner had denied being involved. (Exhibit UUU, R.T. 4/2/86 at 25.)

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middle of September, 1984.

At about 1:00 in the morning, early Friday, October 12, 1984, she called Petitioner

and he came to her home and spent several hours. Petitioner apparently called Kevin Cobey

to pick Petitioner up. Cobey showed up at her door and said he was there to pick up

Petitioner. Petitioner left. 

Rector denied telling Detective Butler that Petitioner was violent and had beaten her

a number of times in the past. But, they did argue that night that he came over, he pushed

her on his way out, and punched a hole through her door when she wouldn’t let him back in.

Rector’s stepmother was present during that interview with Detective Butler. Butler

said he was going to get Petitioner if it was the last thing he did. 

She was dating Kenny Hatch sometime in the summer of 1985. While she was dating

Hatch, just before Petitioner was arrested, she was talking with Petitioner about reconciling

with him. Hatch did not want her around Petitioner, and offered to get a peace bond to keep

Petitioner away. One time while she was at Kenny Hatch’s residence, Petitioner called,

Kenny answered, and handed her the phone. 

A couple of month’s before Petitioner’s arrest, she spoke with Kenny Hatch at his

residence about Petitioner’s involvement with the victim’s death, including a conversation

between Petitioner and Kenny about the death.5

 She had a second conversation with Hatch

at a bar about Petitioner’s involvement. She tried to discuss the matter with Petitioner. She

does not believe Hatch to be honest. 

She visited Petitioner in jail on a number of occasions.

Heinz Karnitschnig - Heinz Karnitschnig testified (Exhibit JJJ, R.T. 3/20/86 at 49-

78) that he was the Maricopa County Chief Medical Examiner, and autopsied the victim, Rob

Richards. The victim had a close range gunshot wound to the left side of his face, where the

lips meet. The bullet was lodged on right side of the back of the victim’s neck. There were

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linear scars over the back of his left index finger. The victim died from the gunshot wound.

The bullet was recovered and given to a police officer.

The body was beginning to decompose, and the condition was consistent with being

shot and then left in a vehicle, and not discovered for as much as 36-37 hours, or as little as

24 hours. The blood in the vehicle was consistent with the victim being shot in the vehicle.

The powder tattooing was consistent with a shot from several inches to about a foot away.

A toxicology report reflected alcohol and cocaine in the victim. The lividity, the fixed, purple

coloring of the skin, was consistent with the victim being placed, within four hours of his

death, in the position in which he was found. 

Thomas Ellinghausen - Thomas Ellinghausen testified (Exhibit KKK, R.T. 3/21/86

at 2-63; Exhibit LLL, R.T. 3/21/86 at 3-36) that he is a fifth grade school teacher, and in

October 1984 lived at the same apartment complex as Kevin Cobey. Cobey lived with him

for several weeks. He met Petitioner through Cobey. On Thursday, October 11, 1984, he

went to the apartment of Cobey and Petitioners’ girlfriends. Petitioner had just gotten out

of jail, and they were celebrating. Tammy Shaw and Julie Swan were there. Julie left to visit

a friend in the hospital. Ron Rango and his girlfriend were also there. Ellinghausen was there

for one-half to three hours, had a few beers and left by himself. 

He had seen Petitioner in possession of a KG-99 firearm, both earlier that summer and

on October 11, 1984. The weapon was sitting in his briefcase, which was open. 

He did not go to Shaw and Swan’s apartment on Friday, October 12, 1984, but was

at home. At about 7:30pm, Petitioner and Kevin Cobey came to his home. Because of

Cobey’s cocaine possession and Petitioner’s gun, he had asked Cobey to move out about a

month before. Cobey still had some things in his home. 

After some time watching a game together, Petitioner went to use the phone, and then

left the apartment. Ellinghausen used the restroom and shaved in preparation for a date, and

when he finished, Cobey told him that Petitioner had called and they needed to go pick him

up. They drove to a Jack in the Box, and picked up Petitioner, who was sweating, not

wearing a shirt, not carrying anything, and was unusually quiet. They returned to his

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apartment, and Petitioner and Cobey left in Tammy Shaw’s car. Ellinghausen then went on

his date. He thought it was strange that they had asked him to pick up Petitioner even though

they had a vehicle. 

He had met the victim, Rob Richards on two occasions. The victim was Petitioner’s

cocaine supplier. He learned of the victim’s death and the search of Shaw’s apartment from

Cobey. Cobey was uncertain whether Petitioner had killed the victim, but was concerned that

he would himself be implicated. 

Kevin Cobey - Kevin Cobey testified (Exhibit LLL, R.T. 3/21/86 at 37-96;

Exhibit MMM, R.T. 3/24/86 at 2-73; Exhibit NNN, R.T. 3/24/86 at 4-14) that he had been

a co-defendant with Petitioner, charged with murder. He pled guilty to burglary in exchange

for no jail time, which he insisted on because of fear for his life in prison. Subsequent to his

plea, he was arrested for cocaine possession, and in exchange for an agreement not to

prosecute those charges, his plea agreement was modified to permit jail time, but no prison

time.

He had known Petitioner since the summer of 1982 or 1983. He lived in the same

apartment complex as Tom Ellinghausen, and lived in his apartment for about a month,

before moving in with Julie Swan and Tammy Shaw. In October, 1984, he still had some of

his things in Ellinghausen’s apartment. 

In October, 1984, Petitioner carried a KG-99 firearm which he often kept in a brief

case with cocaine. Swan and Shaw objected to the gun being in their apartment. Petitioner

was using and selling cocaine. He sold mostly to their group of friends in small quantities.

Cobey got cocaine from Petitioner, and Petitioner did not charge him for it. Cobey helped

petitioner cut, weigh and deliver the cocaine and picked up money for him. They had cut

cocaine at Ellinghausen’s apartment.

Cobey met Rob Richards through Petitioner, and knew Richards to be selling cocaine

to Petitioner. 

Approximately several weeks to a month prior to the shooting, Cobey, Kenny Hatch,

Petitioner’s brother, and Jimmy Pechac went to Smitty’s and bought ammunition for

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Petitioner’s gun. Petitioner was not with them. Kenny Hatch may have been the one that

bought the ammunition. 

On October 11, 1984, Petitioner was released from jail, and they had a party at

Tammy and Julie’s apartment, which was attended by Petitioner, Cobey, Swan, Shaw, Martin

Salazar, Petitioner’s brother, Rango and his girlfriend Cheryl, Ellinghausen, and another

small group of people. Various ones were drinking and/or using cocaine. He did not leave

the apartment with Petitioner.

On Friday, October 12, 1984, Cobey and Petitioner hung around the apartment. Ron

Rango and Cheryl came to their apartment, but Ellinghausen did not. He denied leaving the

apartment with Rango and Ellinghausen. He did eventually leave with Petitioner at about

6:30 p.m. to go to Ellinghausen’s apartment to get some clothes. They went in Shaw’s car,

because Cobey’s El Camino was broken down. The KG-99 was with them. 

Petitioner told Cobey he was upset with the victim because of a cocaine deal, and that

the victim owed him about two or three thousand dollars. While at Ellinghausen’s apartment,

Petitioner made a phone call which Cobey believed was to the victim. The victim then called

back and said he was coming over. Petitioner was upset and said he was going to shoot the

victim. Petitioner had made similar comments in the past. 

Ellinghausen went into the bathroom. Petitioner picked up his gun, put a towel over

it and went outside. Then a few minutes later Cobey heard the victim’s car pull up, and then

Cobey heard a shot. When he pulled back the curtain, the car was pulling away. He initially

told Detective Butler that he heard two shots. Ellinghausen was in the bathroom at the time

of the shot. When he came out, Cobey asked him if he had heard something. 

About twenty minutes after Petitioner had walked out of the apartment, the phone

rang, and it was Petitioner calling to be picked up at the Jack-in-the-Box. They left to pick

up Petitioner in Ellinghausen’s car because Cobey did not drive Swann’s car. 

When they picked up Petitioner, he got in the backseat. He was not wearing a shirt,

was not carrying his gun, and had some jewelry in his pocket. He was pale, shakey, and

breathing quickly. They returned to the apartment, Cobey got some shirts, they drank a beer,

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and then Cobey and Petitioner left in Swann’s car and went to the victim’s apartment to look

for money and cocaine. 

Petitioner had a key and they went in the apartment. Petitioner searched the

apartment, found a gold nugget bracelet which he took, and they left and went to Swan and

Shaw’s apartment. 

Only Swan and Shaw were at the apartment. Cobey asked Petitioner what they were

going to do, and Petitioner said not to worry that he would take care of it. Petitioner

described to him how he shot the victim in the face, rolled him into the passenger seat and

drove away. Petitioner said he had taken care of the bullet cartridge. 

Sometime later, other people began to arrive, including Petitioner’s brother James,

Martin Salazar and a couple of girls. It got noisy, so Swan got angry and left. 

The next night, Saturday, Cobey and Julie Swan went to Gatsby’s with Ron Rango

and Cheryl, and eventually went to Ron and Cheryl’s home. 

A week later, Cobey told Ellinghausen that Petitioner had shot the victim, but didn’t

tell him how it happened. He also told Petitioner’s friend Ken Hatch that Petitioner had shot

his coke dealer, that they had gone to the victim’s apartment to find his stash and found

nothing. 

Several weeks later, the police served a search warrant on Cobey at Swan’s apartment.

Cobey denied knowing anything about the murder.

Cobey denied having testified at Petitioner’s drug trial that he had never been

involved with Petitioner in cutting or dealing cocaine. 

Cobey did not see Petitioner’s KG-99 after the night of the murder. Petitioner may

have told him that he melted it down. 

Julie Swan - Julie Swan testified (Exhibit NNN, R.T. 3/2/86 at 14-64) that in October,

1984 she was renting an apartment with Tammy Shaw. Petitioner and Kevin Cobey were

staying in the apartment. Petitioner was Shaw’s boyfriend and Cobey was her boyfriend.

She had met Petitioner and Cobey that August or September, along with Ron Rango and

“Tom” at Graham Central Station. Petitioner had cocaine, scales, sifters and snorting tubes

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in the apartment. Petitioner used that equipment to weigh out and package cocaine.

Petitioner was dealing cocaine, and Cobey worked with him. 

She would get cocaine from Petitioner, but Petitioner would not charge her for it.

Cobey, Rango and Ellinghausen also got cocaine from Petitioner without paying for it. 

Petitioner would drive Shaw’s cars: a Camaro and a Torino.

Petitioner possessed a KG-99 firearm in September and October. The gun was usually

wrapped in a towel or in Petitioner’s brief case. She had complained to Shaw and Petitioner

about the gun, but Petitioner continued to have guns in the house. She did not see the KG-99

again after October 12th, but Petitioner had a new gun a week or two later.

She met Rob Richards, the victim, in October, about a week before his death, at her

apartment. He met with Petitioner in Tammy Shaw’s bedroom. 

Her friend’s fiancee was in an accident on October 10, and in the hospital. Petitioner

got out of jail on Thursday, the 11th. She and Shaw gave him a ride home from jail. Then

she went to the hospital. When she got home, there was a party going on. The people there

included Tammy Shaw, Petitioner, Cobey, Ron Rango and Cheryl, and Tom Ellinghausen.

They were drinking and using cocaine. She drank and used cocaine. Petitioner, Cobey and

Ron Rango left at some point, leaving just the girls there. Petitioner and Cobey returned.

She is not certain whether Rango returned.

She overslept the next morning, Friday October 12th, went to work at noon, worked

until 1:30 or 2:00 and then went to the hospital and stayed until about 9:00. At about 6:00

she called Shaw and asked her not to have a party. When she got home, Tammy was the only

one there, and she repeated not wanting anyone in the apartment because her friend’s fiancee

had died. Around 11:00 there was a commotion from a party going on. Petitioner and Cobey

were there, along with a number of other people. She left the apartment and went driving for

an hour and a half or two. When she returned, the party was still going on. She stayed out

by the pool until 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning. 

The next day, Saturday, she and Cobey went out with Ron and Cheryl. 

When she learned of the murder she spoke with Petitioner who denied knowing

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anything about it, suggested it was over a dope deal, and told her where he was and who he

was with when it happened. 

She and Cobey had been engaged, eventually moved in together in a different

apartment, but no longer see each other, and she asked the prosecutor to keep her from

having to see him at trial. 

Ken Hatch - Ken Hatch testified (Exhibit NNN, R.T. 3/24/86 at 64-106; Exhibit

OOO, R.T. 3/25/86 at 13-75) that he had known Petitioner for 15 or 16 years, and Kevin

Cobey for two years. He had only seen Cobey a few times as of October, 1984. Hatch and

Petitioner saw each other at least every month or so. Petitioner would provide him with

cocaine that they would do together. Petitioner would not charge him. Petitioner took over

Hatch’s apartment. Hatch never met the victim.

 About two weeks after Sunday, October 14, 1984, he talked with Cobey about the

victim’s death. At that time Hatch had not seen Petitioner for a month or so. Cobey said that

Petitioner had shot his dealer a couple of weeks prior. Cobey claimed he had seen Petitioner

shoot the victim, and was standing just a couple of feet away. Cobey said the Petitioner’s

gun was melted down. 

Later that night, Hatch spoke with Petitioner who at first denied involvement but then

Petitioner told him that Petitioner had shot his dealer once in the mouth while the victim was

sitting in his car, pushed him over and drove away. Petitioner claimed the victim was coming

to shoot him. Petitioner said the dealer had a .357 weapon in the car, which Petitioner later

put in his pants. He said he shot the victim with his KG-99, and that it happened in the

parking lot of the apartment complex. Petitioner said he picked up the shell and put it in his

pocket, drove the car six or seven blocks away, parked it and walked away. 

A couple of months later, he again spoke with Petitioner about the shooting.

Petitioner said he and his brother had been arrested and Petitioner had a gun on him. He said

the murder weapon was melted down.

Either Petitioner or Cobey told him that after the shooting Cobey had taken the gun,

and gone to the victim’s apartment after the shooting, where there were a couple of guns and

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some jewelry taken, but no cocaine found. 

Hatch had seen Petitioner in possession of a KG-99 in August. He kept it in his

briefcase with his cocaine, which he described as his life. Petitioner said he needed the gun

to protect himself. Hatch did not see the gun after the murder. Petitioner told him that it had

been melted down.

About a month before the murder, Hatch had taken Cobey to Smitty’s to buy 9mm

ammunition. Petitioner’s brother went with them.

About a month before Petitioner was arrested, Hatch was living with Petitioner’s exgirlfriend Randee Rector, and Petitioner called and threatened Hatch because of the

relationship. Petitioner told Hatch he was going to blow Hatch’s head off, and told Rector

he would cut Hatch’s throat. So Hatch contacted Roskey, whose brother was an undercover

narcotics officer to tell him about the murder. He also talked with “Tom” about it, but denied

talking with Tom Ellinghausen about the victim’s death. 

Rector eventually returned to dating Petitioner. Hatch told Rector what he knew about

the murder. Hatch told his work partner, Kenny Goodman, and his brother-in-law, Larry

Roskey, about what Petitioner told him. 

Hatch was told by Jimmie Pacheco where the melted gun was put.

Douglas Haese - Douglas Haese testified (Exhibit OOO, R.T. 3/25/86 at 76-81) that

he was a Phoenix Police officer, and on October 8, 1984 he stopped a vehicle driven by

Petitioner, who he arrested on a misdemeanor assault warrant. 

Elaine Richards - Elaine Richards testified (Exhibit OOO, R.T. 3/25/86 at 81-97) that

she was the mother of the victim, who was very fastidious about his clothes, laundry, and

vehicles. He carried two sets of keys, with the car keys on a separate ring to avoid scratching

the steering column. He had a pager and an answering machine. He also would on occasion

carry large sums of money. He had worked for the family engraving business, and left for

a time to work for a different company. She had no knowledge of his involvement with

cocaine. 

Pamela Richards - Pamela Richards testified (Exhibit OOO, R.T. 3/25/86 at 97-118;

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Exhibit SSS, R.T. 3/31/86 at 2-5) that she was the victim’s sister, that he was extremely

conscientious about cleaning his vehicles and his clothing, had much of his clothing

laundered, and it would be surprising for him to have someone help him with his laundry.

He was possessive about his vehicles and did not let his siblings drive his car. He had two

key rings connected by a silver connector. He had a phone answering system that he could

access messages away from his home. He was conscientious about checking his messages.

He would regularly carry several hundred dollar bills. She was not aware her brother was

involved in cocaine dealing. He was in a bowling league that bowled 7:00 to 11:00 on

Tuesdays or Thursdays. He regularly wore a nugget on a gold chain, a ring, a gold bracelet

and a watch. 

She saw television coverage on the murder on Sunday, October 13th. They looked for

coverage on Monday evening, on the different stations so they could videotape it. They saw

no coverage on that day.

Sammie Yates was the victim’s best friend, and the person he was buying his cocaine

from.

Steven Richards - Steven Richards testified (Exhibit OOO, R.T. 3/25/86 at 119-168)

that he was the victim’s brother. He lived with the victim for several months after they

moved out of their parents’ home. The victim kept his car very clean. He only allowed

Steven to borrow his car once, and Petitioner’s claims of having borrowed the car or parking

for the victim at their bowling league were not characteristic. He had two key rings, one with

car keys and the other with house keys, joined by a connector. He put plastic colored tags

on the keys. He was meticulous about his apartment and his clothes, having them dry

cleaned or washing them himself. He was in a bowling league with the victim that bowled

every Tuesday or Thursday night. The victim routinely carried cash. He had an answering

machine with a device so he could retrieve messages remotely. He usually wore a necklace,

watch, and a thick bracelet, all gold. He wore prescription glasses. He had purchased some

chains. When they went to clean out his apartment after his death, all the jewelry was gone,

but the cases were left. He had suspicions that his brother was involved in cocaine

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transactions. He had two briefcases, one for cassette tapes, kept a calendar and telephone

numbers. The victim told him he had a handgun that he kept in his apartment. The victim

worked for the family business, and then another firm, and wanted to get into the restaurant

business. He did not know Petitioner and had never heard him discussed. 

Larry Roskey - Larry Roskey testified (Exhibit OOO, R.T. 3/25/86 at 168-189) that

he is the brother-in-law of Ken Hatch, who in December of 1984 told him that Petitioner

admitted killing Rob Richards. Roskey knew Petitioner through Hatch, and they had

socialized together. Hatch did not want to go to the police and didn’t want Roskey to tell

anyone. Roskey’s brother Richard is a detective for the Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Department. Roskey did not tell his brother about Petitioner, until the summer of 1985, when

Hatch asked him to. He did not know the victim and does not know anything about his

death. He never saw Petitioner with cocaine or weapons. Hatch had several pistols,

including at least one 9mm pistol. He believed Hatch to be truthful on things of importance.

Richard Roskey - Richard Roskey testified (Exhibit PPP, R.T. 3/26/86 at 4-14) that

he was a detective with the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. Ken Hatch was the brotherin-law of Richard’s brother Larry Rosky. On August 4, 1985, his brother contacted him

saying Hatch had information about a homicide. Hatch came to Richard Roskey’s home and

told him that Petitioner had killed someone, and that Detective Butler was handling the case.

He and Hatch then met with Detective Butler. In the narcotics world, the term “burn” refers

to someone who arranges to buy drugs, gets them without paying for them, sells them, and

then doesn’t pay his seller for them. 

Charlene Chigges - Charlene Chigges testified (Exhibit PPP, R.T. 3/2/86 at 14-29)

that she was a cocktail waitress at Bobby McGee’s, where she met the victim. They went

out on one date on Wednesday, October 10, 1984. The victim was to call her on Friday so

they could go out on Saturday, but he did not call. The victim was a neat dresser. When they

went on their date, they took the victim’s car, which was immaculate. They stopped for gas,

the victim spilled gas on the car and complained that he had just washed the car. The car’s

windshield was spotless. The victim had given her roses at her home, and gave her a gold

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bracelet after dinner. After the victim’s death, she returned the bracelet to the family because

it was a family tradition.

Billy Butler - Billy Butler testified (Exhibit PPP, R.T. 3/26/86 at 29-165; Exhibit

QQQ, R.T. 3/27/86 at 3-157; Exhibit VVV, R.T. 4/3/86 at 167-193; ) that he was a detective

with the Phoenix Police Department. On October 14, 1984, at 11:00 a.m. he responded to

the scene of a homicide, which had been secured by another officer. Another officer was

taking photographs and two print identification technicians were examining the vehicle and

surrounding areas for prints. The car’s upholstery and floor were very clean. There was

blood on the drivers side door, but none where the door and sill overlapped. There were

blood splatters on the passenger door and around the glove box. There were windshield

wiper marks on the windshield. The key was still in the ignition on a bent and paritally open

key ring. They could not remove the key from the ignition. The victim’s face was caked

with mud. There was coagulated blood and dried blood on the passenger floor of the car, and

blood on the victim’s shirt. The only money in the car was some change on the seat. There

was no money in the wallet found in the car. There was no weapon in the car. The victim’s

shirt pocket was ripped, and his pants zipper was half way down. The only jewelry he had

on was a watch and a ring. No jewelry was found in the vehicle. The car was impounded

and was later processed by DPS with a laser for latent prints. He could not see the entrance

wound for the blood, and did not see an exit wound. He observed the autopsy, including the

removal of a bullet and bullet fragments from the mouth and back of the head. The bullet

was impounded. 

He obtained a 9mm shell casing and bullet from Randee Rector. She told him that

Petitioner was a very violent person and had beat her up quite a few times in the past. 

He interviewed Tammy Shaw at her work, in a normal tone of voice. She at first

repeatedly denied knowing anyone named Larry. 

He also interviewed Julie Swan in a normal tone of voice. She reported that she first

learned of the victim’s death while seeing it on TV with Petitioner, and Petitioner said he

probably was killed because he owed somebody money for dope. When he interviewed her

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a second time, she said she learned of the death when Petitioner telephoned her.

On November 6, 1984 he executed a search warrant at Shaw and Swan’s residence

and at Petitioner’s grandfather’s residence. 

He interviewed Tom Ellinghausen after Petitioner and Cobey were arrested. He

interviewed him in a normal tone, and then put pressure on him by raising his voice and

accusing him of lying by raising known facts. Ellinghausen was nervous during the

interview.

He interviewed Cobey at the time he was arrested, and used a pressure technique, and

got him crying. 

His first interview with Petitioner was on November 1, 1984, and Butler had him

fingerprinted and photographed five days later. During the interview, Petitioner admitted

having been released from jail on October 11, 1984. He admitted knowing the victim, and

being with him at about 6:30 p.m. on October 12, 1984. He described the victim as his

cocaine dealer, and said that on that night he gave the victim $1,250 that he owed him plus

$2,500 from another person to buy cocaine. Petitioner admitted he was buying cocaine,

cutting it and selling it. Petitioner said he met the victim in the parking lot on 7th Avenue ,

the victim was in his car, and Petitioner gave him the money. He said the victim was wearing

parachute pants and white boots. Petitioner said that when he handed the victim the money

as the victim sat in his car, Petitioner may have touched the roof by the driver’s side. He did

not say he touched the windshield wipers. He claimed he had driven the vehicle once, a long

time ago to park it when they were bowling, and volunteered that he had touched the door

handle, steering wheel, and cassette. Petitioner appeared very nervous.

On November 6 or 8, 1984, Petitioner was stopped on a court order, and finger

printed. He had .380 Colt in the car when he was stopped. Butler interviewed him at the

police station. Petitioner told him that after he was released from jail, he was picked up by

Shaw and Swan, went to their apartment, had a party and got drunk. He said the people at the

part were Swan, Shaw, Cobey, Rango and Cheryl. Petitioner said he had known the victim

for one and one-half months. He met him at the Service Station Bar, which is directly south

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from where the body was found. Petitioner said that he had been at the victim’s apartment

two weeks prior to his death and did the victim’s laundry, and then they went bowling.

Petitioner denied ever being upset with the victim. Petitioner said on October 12, 1984 he

was wearing parachute pants, tennis shoes and a black shirt. Petitioner said the victim carried

two sets of keys joined by a connector. He said he had driven the victim’s car once, and that

was on Monday, October 8, 1984 to a Circle K to get something. 

Petitioner said he had just purchased a .380 Colt gun, but denied owning any other

gun. He denied ever having seen or owned a KG-99 gun, but volunteered that his brother

had a 9 millimeter Luger. Butler had not mentioned that a KG-99 is a 9 millimeter gun. The

search at Petitioner’s grandfather’s home had produced the box of a KG-99 in Petitioner’s

brother’s bedroom. Petitioner admitted having seen the box two nights before. Petitioner

was nervous. 

He interviewed Petitioner a third time on August 23, 1985. 

Petitioner told him that he had been arrested on a traffic citation on the day he had

driven the victim’s car. However, he had been arrested driving a brown Ford, not a red

Honda as owned by the victim. 

The police received two calls about the murder from an anonymous male caller, who

provided Petitioner’s phone number. 

When Butler interviewed Steve Richards on October 14, 1984, they discussed the

victim’s involvement with cocaine and Richards provided the name Steve Compton as one

of the victim’s buyers. 

He did not have the splatters in the victim’s car tested to confirm they were blood, nor

did he have splatter analysis done, nor have the car vacuumed. He did not have the gun

residue from the tattooing analyzed, although it could be used to identify the manufacturer

of the bullet. 

The body was reported by Doug [Daniel] McClung. 

He had the fingerprints checked against Petitioner, Petitioner’s brother, Kevin Cobey,

and Ken Hatch. He did not have them checked against Larry Roskey or Tom Ellinghausen.

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On November 21, 1984, he interviewed Jeff Pappe. Pappe told him that James Prince

demanded money back on the KG-99, and that he didn’t argue with him because he was a

a bad dude. He said he had fired the KG-99 on the Indian reservation, but was quite drunk

at the time, and couldn’t identify the location. He described it as being between 99th and

150th and that an Indian on horseback rode up and told them there was cattle in the area and

they could not be shooting there. 

In August of 1985, Tom Ellinghausen told him that Petitioner and Cobey had been at

his house after sundown, but could not remember a more specific time. 

The investigation was stalled from December, 1984 until Ken Hatch came forward in

August of 1985. He interviewed Swan and Shaw because an anonymous caller had given

him the phone number at their apartment and had referenced a “Larry” who had just gotten

out of jail. 

There was rain in Phoenix at Sky Harbor Airport on October 11th and 12th, 1984.

When the prosecutor interviewed Martin Salazar just before trial, Butler was present.

Salazar said the only occupants of his van were himself, Art, Petitioner and Ken Hatch. He

said he could not hear anything of the conversation between Hatch and Petitioner. 

When the prosecutor interviewed Randee Rector just before trial, Butler was present.

She said there was only one conversation between she and Hatch about Petitioner’s

discussion with Hatch. That discussion took place at Chapter Eleven, and Rector’s friend

Chris Patella was present. She did not say there was a second conversation between just her

and Hatch. 

Contrary to Petitioner’s claims, Petitioner never proposed being put in a lineup. 

Raymond Gieszl - Raymond Gieszl testified (Exhibit QQQ, R.T. 3/27/86 at 157-174;

Exhibit RRR, R.T. 3/28/86 at 3-89) that he was a criminalist for the City of Phoenix, trained

in examining firearms. He examined and dismantled the bullet from Randee Rector and he

examined the bullet from the victim.

The bullet from the victim was a .38 or 9 millimeter caliber. A KG-99 uses a nine

millimeter Luger cartridge. The bullet appeared to have been manufactured by Remington

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Peters, was a hollow point Luger bullet, from an early 1970's jacket design, indicating it was

a 115 grain bullet, The cartridge from Randee Rector was also a 9 millimeter cartridge with

a 115 grain jacketed hollow point bullet. It appeared to be the same design, caliber and

dimension as the bullet from the victim. It was of the type that would be fired by a KG-99.

A KG-99's rifling is six lands and grooves, a right-hand twist and the land and groove

widths were approximately equal. That was the same rifling as found on the bullet from the

victim. At least six other firearms have a similar caliber and rifling characteristics. 

A KG-99 is a semi-automatic hand gun with a high-capacity magazine, and is

uncommon in the west.

The powder tattooing on the victim indicated the shot was fired from two to six inches

away.

Mitchell Rae - Mitchell Rae testified (Exhibit SSS, R.T. 3/31/86 at 7-37; Exhibit

VVV, R.T. 4/3/86 at 138-148) that he was a police officer for the City of Phoenix in the

homicide detail, with experience in narcotics. He searched Shaw and Swann’s apartment and

Petitioner’s grandfather’s house on November 6, 1984. 

He served an order for fingerprints on Petitioner on that day. Petitioner had been

stopped by other officers. Rae arrived ten to fifteen minutes later. A Colt 380 semiautomatic

pistol had been found wedged between the center console and the front passenger seat. A

clip for the gun was also seized. A box of PMC 9 millimeter Lugar cartridges was in the

glove box. 

Another clip for the Colt gun was subsequently found between the mattress and box

springs of the bed in Tammy Shaw’s room. Shaw said it belonged to Petitioner, and that

Petitioner had just recently acquired the gun, and had had it for several weeks. Shaw said that

Petitioner had been keeping a KG-99 in the apartment, but she didn’t know who it belonged

to. She had last seen it a week and a half to two weeks before the search. The conversation

with Shaw about the Colt and the KG-99 were separated by different conversation about

some papers, a blue bag, etc.

In Shaw’s room, they also found drug paraphernalia, including a grinder used for

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cutting cocaine, sifters, a razor blade, snort tubes, scales and vial of inositol, used for cutting

cocaine by increasing the quantity. That type of paraphernalia is not normally possessed by

someone who is merely a user, but by a seller wanting to increase his profit. 

At Petitioner’s grandfather’s house they found a box for a KG-99. It was in plain

sight in a bedroom. Petitioner’s brother, James Prince, told him he bought the gun for $150

from a guy in a bar, and that he sold it to a guy at the Statler Lounge. 

He and Detective Butler went to a rifle range to search for bullets in connection with

the case. The did so based on information that an owner of the KG-99 had done target

practice at that range. He dug the bullets out of the earth backstop for a whole day.

Detective Butler went out again on a different day. 

In his experience, narcotics dealers keep records of people who owe them money. The

exhibits of the victim’s black book and papers appeared to be such records. The entries

recorded under the initials “LY” were consistent with a running balance totaling $1250. The

circling on the last page is indicative of a past due debt. 

Kevin Cobey told him that he had overheard a conversation by Petitioner in which he

stated he was expecting to receive some cocaine Friday night, October 12, 1984. Cobey told

Rae that Petitioner said the victim owed him $3,000, and he had been trying to locate the

victim all weekend. Cobey said he thought he had been at a big party at Shaw and Swann’s

apartment on Thursday, October 11, 1984, and at Gatsby’s with Swan, Ron, and Cheryl on

that Friday. Cobey said he was drunk most of the time and did not really remember. 

He took a photograph of Petitioner and six other people to the Service Station Bar, but

none identified Petitioner. 

He called Interdynamics and learned that the KG-99 purchased by James Prince had

six lines and six grooves and a right hand twist, but not all KG-99s did. 

Steven Anderson - Steven Anderson testified (Exhibit SSS, R.T. 3/31/86 at 37-74)

that he was a latent print examiner with the Arizona Department of Public Safety. He

examined the inside of the victim’s vehicle for latent prints, using black powder, super glue,

and lasers. No prints were obtained with the laser. He obtained prints from Petitioner.

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A latent print taken from the windshield wiper control of the victim’s car matched

Petitioner’s right ring finger. No prints were obtainable from the gearshift or steering wheel,

or light switch. 

Daniel McClung - Daniel McClung testified (Exhibit SSS, R.T. 3/31/86 at 76-104)

that, while at his home, he noticed the headlights and then the brake lights of a car parking

in front of a neighboring house that was vacant. It was unusual for a car to park in that area.

He went to look out the window, but was not wearing his glasses for his

nearsightedness. He had to bend down and look up to see past his orange tree. The driver

walked away from the car at a fast pace, without first locking the drivers door. The driver

was a white male, guessed to be in his twenties, from five and a half to six and a half feet

tall, with light colored or not black hair which was longer than conservative, a long, bony

face, medium weight, and possibly with or without a mustache, facial hair or sideburns. His

clothes were not white, and he believed them to possibly be either brown or tan and solid

colors, although it could have been checked or red and white stripped. He thought the car

might have been stolen, or that the driver was going to a party.

On Sunday morning, he looked at the vehicle again, a red Honda Accord. He wrote

down the license plate and looked inside and saw a body. He ran home and called the police.

He later spoke to two different detectives. Although he was uncertain of the time, he

originally told one of them that the car was parked there on Thursday night, between 9:45

and 10:00 p.m.. But it may have been Friday night and as late as 1:00 a.m. Saturday

morning, but likely not much before 10:00 p.m.

Michael Dywan - Michael Dywan testified (Exhibit SSS, R.T. 3/31/86 at 105-109)

that he employed the victim intermittently for several months as a commissioned outside

sales representative for his sign contracting, name plates, plaques and awards business. The

victim never brought any significant amount of business in, and didn’t make any money.

They discussed becoming partners, either in Dywan’s business, the victim’s parents’

business, or both. No agreement was ever reached. The victim purportedly had a business

partner who would provide the finances. 

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Elizabeth LeBrun - Elizabeth (Beth) LeBrun testified (Exhibit SSS, R.T. 3/31/86 at

109-198; Exhibit TTT, R.T. 4/1/86 at 2-31) that she met Petitioner in about June of 1984

through Tammy Shaw. She dates Shaw’s brother, and is Shaw’s friend. Petitioner lived with

Shaw from the summer of 1984. Petitioner was arrested in October, 1984. She did not seem

him on the day he was released, a Thursday, but saw him the next day, Friday, at about 6:00

p.m. Her boyfriend (Tammy Shaw’s brother, David) would get off work at 5:00pm, shower,

and then they would go to Tammy’s apartment. Petitioner, Tammy Shaw, and possibly Julie

Swan were there when she and David Shaw arrived. They drank and had a party, and a lot

of people showed up around 8:00 to 8:30 or later, including Kevin Cobey, Tom, and Ron.

Later, Marty came with Petitioner’s brother Jim Prince, Marty’s cousin, and two girls.

Kevin and Tom left shortly after they got there. The later group left for a short time

to take the two girls home, but came back quickly. Petitioner left for about 10 minutes. She

heard he went to the parking lot. She saw him leave and come back. She is certain he was

not gone for several hours. At about 11:30 or 12:00 she and Tammy Shaw left to go to the

liquor store. They were gone no longer than 20 minutes. She left at about 4:00 a.m. They

were supposed to take David Shaw’s mom to work at 4:30. 

At some point in the evening, Julie Swan came out and yelled at Tammy Shaw

because she didn’t want anyone at the apartment because her friend was in the hospital.

Swan dressed and left the apartment for several hours. LeBrun had about a half of a glass

of Seagram’s and 7Up to drink. Everybody was using drugs, and she used a little bit. She

had done it once before and was afraid of it.

The next night, she and David Shaw got to the apartment at about 7:30 or 8:00, and

stayed until about 2:00 a.m. Petitioner and Tammy were there. Jim and Marty showed up

later at about 10:00, after the races ended. 

She had seen Petitioner with a KG-99 on two occasions, once in June or July, and

again in September. Petitioner also had a Colt gun, like a Colt 380, during the same period

of time. She did not know why Petitioner would tell the police he acquired the Colt in

November, 1984. 

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She originally had told the prosecutor in a recorded interview that these events

occurred the weekend of October 21st, based upon her recollection tying it to her sister’s or

father’s birthday. But, her sister’s birthday was in November. She recalled being told the

victim was killed on Saturday night. She told the prosecutor that the party at Tammy’s when

they were there until 4:00 a.m. was on Saturday, and that the next night, Sunday, she stayed

home. She told the prosecutor that they were at Tammy Shaw’s apartment on the prior

Friday night until 2:00 a.m., but were not there the prior Thursday night. She told him that

Tom, and Tom’s friend Ron, Ron’s girlfriend Cheryl, Martin, Martin’s cousin and another

guy and two girls were there on Saturday night, but not on Friday night. She told him that

if the victim were killed on Friday, October 12th, that she would not have an alibi for

Petitioner, because she did not know where she was that night. 

On that Friday night, Julie Swan had left to go out with Ron and Cheryl. She told the

prosecutor that she, David Shaw, Tammy Shaw and Petitioner lived together in a house

beginning in December, 1984. Prior to that time, the four of them partied together about

every other weekend.

She told the prosecutor that Kevin Cobey told her that Petitioner killed the victim, that

she had talked with Petitioner about it and told him she didn’t think he had done it.

Jeff Pappe - Jeff Pappe testified (Exhibit TTT, R.T. 4/1/86 at 31-38) that he had

known Petitioner for six or seven years, and that shortly before June of 1984 Pappe bought

a 9 millimeter KG-99. In June of 1984, he sold the gun to Petitioner’s brother Jim Prince for

$400. When Prince complained the gun was worth only $300 he refunded $150 to him. He

disputed telling the detective that he couldn’t find the location where he had fired the gun

because he and his friend were four wheeling and drunk at the time.

David Shaw - David Shaw testified (Exhibit TTT, R.T. 4/1/86 at 38-67) that he had

met the Petitioner in the summer of 1984 and his sister, Tammy Shaw, was Petitioner’s

girlfriend. He recalled Julie Swan, his sister’s roommate, having a friend die from a car

crash. He was with Petitioner on Friday and Saturday on that weekend. On that Friday, he

was with his girlfriend Beth LeBrun, and they went to Tammy’s apartment at about 6:30 p.m.

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Tammy, Petitioner, Julie, and Kevin were there. Between 10:30 and 11:00, Martin, Jim

Prince and a couple of girls arrived, having come from the races. At about 8:30 or 9:00, Julie

left because she was upset they were there partying. David Shaw left at about 4:30 a.m. to

go move LeBrun’s car so his mom could go to work. Petitioner was there the entire time

David Shaw was there, but could have gone outside without him knowing it, but not for more

than 5 or 10 minutes. About 8:30 or 9:00, he Petitioner and Beth went out to the swimming

pool because Julie was upset that they were in the house. Sometime between 10:00 and

11:00 Beth and Tammy left together for about 15 minutes to go the store. They were all

using Larry’s cocaine, including David Shaw. 

He and Beth went to Tammy’s apartment on Saturday, at around sunset and left

between 11 and 12. Tammy and Petitioner were there. Julie and Kevin arrived later that

evening. Petitioner was there the entire time David Shaw was. 

David Shaw was not at the apartment the previous Thursday. 

In the summer of 1984, Petitioner had a KG-99. David only saw it the one time.

In an interview he told the prosecutor that he didn’t know what the dates were, but

was relying on his sister Tammy to tell him the dates. He and his sister had discussed the

events to refresh his recollection.

James Prince - James Prince testified (Exhibit TTT, R.T. 4/1/96 at 68-105) that he

is the Petitioner’s brother, he had known Kenny Hatch since the first grade, and had known

Kevin Cobey and Tom Ellinghausen since the summer of 1984. He met the victim one time

when he came with Petitioner to their grandfather’s house on October 8, 1984, the day

Petitioner had been arrested. 

In July of 1984 he purchased a KG-99 from Jeff Pappe for $400, but got $150 back

from him when he found out they could be purchased for $189, but Pappe had paid $250 for

it. In early August, 1984, he gave the gun to his brother, Petitioner, to hold because his

grandfather and girlfriend were giving him a hard time about having the gun. 

In the middle of September, Petitioner gave the gun back to him because Petitioner

had moved in with a girl who was giving him a hard time about having the gun. A week to

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a week and a half later he sold the gun to someone at the Statler Bar. He didn’t know the

buyer’s name. His girlfriend, Kimberly Meldanado, was with him when he sold the gun. 

His brother had a girlfriend, Randee Rector, who Petitioner would get in fights with.

Rector would spit in Petitioner’s face and had hit him two or three times. Petitioner had

pushed her away from him, but he had never seen Petitioner hit her.

He was with Petitioner in November, 1984 when Petitioner was stopped to be

fingerprinted. There was a .380 gun in the car that belonged to Petitioner. There were also

some 9 millimeter bullets in the glove box that belonged to his girlfriend. He had purchased

a P38 9 millimeter gun for her on October 17, 1984. 

On the Friday after petitioner’s release from jail on October 11th, Petitioner invited

him to come by Tammy Shaw’s apartment. James Prince was at the car races at the time, but

stopped by after the races, arriving at 10:00 to 10:30, having left the races early. He was

with Marty Salazar, and three other people: Rick Kinney, Tanya Burrows, and a girl named

Lisa. When they arrived, Petitioner, Tammy Shaw, Beth Lebrun and David Shaw were there.

Julie Swan was in the bedroom. Kevin Cobey was not there until 11:30. Cobey went to the

bedroom and he and Julie Swan argued, and Swan left. At about 12:30 to 12:45 he left with

his brother for 10 to 15 minutes to go to a nearby Circle K. Otherwise, Petitioner did not

leave the apartment. James Prince finally left the apartment at about 6:30 in the morning.

Beth Lebrun and David Shaw left several hours before he did. 

He was also with Petitioner the next night, arriving at around 10:00 to 10:30, after

leaving the races. Only Martin was with him on that night. Only Petitioner, Tammy Shaw,

Beth LeBrun and David Shaw were there. They stayed until about 6:00 or 7:00 the next

morning. Petitioner did not leave while James Prince was there. 

In 1984 or 1985 he went with Marty Salazar, in Salazar’s van, to a party thrown by

Michael Curry. Petitioner, Art and Kenny Hatch went with them. They stopped to pick up

beer. Marty and Art were in the front, James Prince and Kenny Hatch were on the back seat,

and Petitioner was on the floor. He could hear the conversation between Petitioner and

Kenny Hatch, but did not remember hearing anything about the shooting of the victim. 

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He denied buying a box of Remington 9 millimeter shells at Smitty’s on September

15, 1984. 

Kimberly Meldonado - Kimberly Meldonado testified (Exhibit TTT, R.T. 4/1/86 at

105-121) that she was previously James Princes’ girlfriend. She recognized the box and KG99 gun. She first saw the gun at Petitioner’s apartment on his birthday in August, 1984. At

some time, James Prince told her he had given the gun to Petitioner to hold. She saw the gun

for the last time in September, 1984 in her car when she and James Prince went to the Statler

Bar. Prince talked to a man, went outside with him, and then came back in and told her that

he had sold the gun, and showed her the money. They had had problems because she did not

like having the gun around. 

After he sold the KG-99, in October, 1984, James Prince used the money to purchase

her a 9 millimeter gun, a case, and some bullets to keep in the apartment because he was

going to move in. She was with him when he purchased it at a gun shop in Glendale. The

gun cost about $200. She kept it in her bedroom closet, and never carried it in her purse, but

did carry it to Michael Curry’s party. She sold the gun when she moved to California. She

had met Kevin Cobey several times. 

In late October or November, 1984, she went with Tammy Shaw to a party thrown by

Michael Curry. Kenny Hatch was at the party and was extremely intoxicated and out of

control toward the middle or end of the party. 

Martin Salazar - Martin Salazar testified (Exhibit TTT, R.T. 4/1/86 at 121-153) that

he has known Petitioner, James Prince and Kenny Hatch since he was about six years old.

He had done work on Kevin Cobey’s cars. In October, 1984, he went to a party at

Petitioner’s apartment on a Friday after the races. He was with James Prince. They arrived

around 10:30 or close to 11:00, and stayed until Saturday morning between 6:00 and 6;30.

He had to be at work around 7:00 or 7:30 that morning. Petitioner was there the whole time.

James Prince was there the whole time and left with him in the morning. Tammy Shaw was

there, but may have left to go to the store. 

The next night, a Saturday, he and James Prince went back to the apartment after the

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races, arriving about the same time and leaving around sunrise on Sunday morning.

Petitioner was at the apartment the entire time. 

Around the same date, he went to Michael Curry’s party. Petitioner, James Prince,

Kenny Hatch, and Salazar’s cousin Art rode in his van to the party with him. Kenny had a

gun with him. They stopped to pick up a keg on the way. Petitioner, Kenny and James were

sitting in the back of the van. He could not hear their conversation, but they did not seem to

be having a serious conversation. When they picked up Kenny, Petitioner and James, Kenny

was hyper. After they opened the keg, Kenny started acting out of control and knocked down

a fence. Kenny did not ride home with them after the party. They did not leave the party

together to go get beer.

Geno MiComi - Geno MiComi testified (Exhibit UUU, R.T. 4/2/86 at 22-26) that the

victim had dated his daughter Tami MiComi, and that he had discussions with Rob Richards

about opening a restaurant together, with Rob providing the money. They met the Friday

before the victim’s death, and set an appointment to meet again the following morning,

Saturday, at 12:00, at his restaurant, Angelo’s. When the victim did not show, his daughter

attempted to call him and left a message. 

Lucien Haag - Lucien Haag testified (Exhibit UUU, R.T. 4/2/86 at 46-174) that he

was a self-employed criminalist, who previously worked for the City of Phoenix Police

Department. He spoke with an employee at Intratech, manufacturer of the TEC-9, which he

described as the successor to the KG-99 manufactured by Inter Dynamics. Based on the

information from that employee, he concluded that there were no operations differences or

rifling characteristic differences between the two weapons. The distance a cartridge would

be ejected could be no more than to fall at a shooters feet or some distance dependent upon

the power of the cartridge and the tension in the bolt spring. He would expect the cartridge

to go at most three feet forward and eight feet out to the right. The presence of a towel

around the gun would affect where the cartridge went after being ejected. He tested firing a

TEC-9 through a car window to see if the cartridge would land inside or outside the vehicle.

They landed outside the vehicle. 

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Haag agreed with Gieszl’s identification of the make, type and caliber of the bullet

taken from the victim, and of the potential firearms which could have been used to fire the

bullet, including the KG-99. He disagreed that the land to groove ratio would change as a

gun was fired. Haag agreed with Gieszl’s estimation that the shot was fired from two to six

inches from the victim. Microscopic examination of the type of powder from the tattooing

on the victim, as well as the chemical composition of the bullet and the jacket could be used

to compare or contrast different bullets. 

The blood droplets on the windshield and glove box indicated that they were

deposited straight on, and not at an angle. The droplets on the side window showed they

were deposited at an angle, and those on the door seal indicated they were straight down.

There were no splatters on the white seat cover on the passenger seat. The splatter evidence

was more consistent with the victim being shot while in the passenger seat than while in the

drivers seat. But, he could not testify that the victim was not in the drivers seat when he was

shot, and then falling over onto the passenger side. The blood on the victim indicated he

continued to bleed for some time before ending up in the position his body was found in.

Larry Prince - Petitioner testified (Exhibit VVV, R.T. 4/3/86 at 3-137) that he was

born in 1963, and in 1984 worked in his grandfather’s business delivering ice. He worked

fifteen to sixteen hours a day. In August, 1984, he started taking some time off, and was

introduced to the victim as a cocaine dealer by someone he knew from the Service Station

Bar. 

He met Tammy Shaw and Julie Swan the middle of August, 1984. At the end of

August, he moved out of his apartment after a month and a half of renting, and moved into

Tom Ellinghausen’s apartment in the same complex. Kevin Cobey was also living there. He

had just met Ellinghausen and Cobey after moving into the apartment complex. He met Ron

Rango two weeks later. He moved into Shaw’s apartment between the 10th and 15th of

September, 1984, and Cobey was staying there but had not moved in by the middle of

October.

The victim would bring cocaine by and they would either use it or sell it. Petitioner

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was not selling to make money off of it. He was buying about a half an ounce per week for

$1250. Cobey’s co-workers and Ellinghausen’s friends were buying. 

On a Thursday or Friday, two or three weeks before the last time he saw the victim,

Petitioner was at the victim’s apartment and was helping him fold his laundry. On that

occasion, the victim changed his clothes several times before they left to go bowling. They

went bowling so the victim could practice for a bowling league he had joined. Because they

had been drinking beer, the victim was wobbly so Petitioner offered to drive them back to

Shaw’s apartment. The victim agreed and Petitioner drove them to the apartment. Shaw and

Swan were not yet home from work, and no one else was there. The victim stayed a few

minutes then left. 

On the Monday a week before Petitioner was arrested on October 8, 2004, the victim

stopped by the apartment, and invited Petitioner to go for a ride. Petitioner went with him,

and the victim stopped to meet some guys in a parking lot behind Lunt Avenue Marble Club.

They ate at McDonalds then went back to Shaw’s apartment. The victim left.

Some time after noon on Monday, October 8, 2004, the victim came to the apartment

and picked up Petitioner. They drove to his grandparents house, he introduced the victim to

his grandmother, and they waited 15 or 20 minutes for his brother Jimmy to return.

Meanwhile, the victim used the telephone. They all agreed to meet at the Pony Express that

evening. They left, stopped at a Circle K at about 3:30 or 4:00 to buy beer, and then went

back to Shaw’s apartment. The victim stayed for a few minutes and then left him cocaine

that Petitioner sold that evening for $1250 to Ken and Dave. Petitioner did not tell Detective

Butler about going with the victim to his grandparents. 

He did not drive the victim’s car that day. He had been in the car two other times.

And he had driven it only once and that was on the day he was at the victim’s apartment

helping with laundry and they went bowling. He was not in the victim’s car after Monday,

October 8, 1984.

At about 7:30 or 8:00 on October 8th, he left the apartment, and was pulled over in a

traffic stop. He was driving without a license, and was arrested on a warrant for assault from

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early in 1984. 

He was released the following Thursday between 6:30 and 8:30 in the evening. Swan

and Shaw picked him up in Swan’s car. Swan dropped them off at their apartment and went

to the hospital. Cobey was there, and at about 9:30 or 10:00 Ron Rango, Cheryl and Tom

Ellinghausen arrived and they had a party. Swan returned home about the same time. Rango

left at about 1:00 a.m. Cheryl was drunk so stayed longer, and left between 2:30 and 3:00.

At about 1:00, Randee Rector called and asked him to come over. Ellinghausen and

Petitioner left at about 1:30. Petitioner stayed at Rector’s for about an hour and a half or two

hours, got into an argument with Rector and she hit him in the mouth and took his money out

of his pockets, about $200. When he discovered the money missing, he started knocking on

the door asking her to open the door, and threatening to call the police if she did not return

the money. She refused so he ultimately punched a hole in the door. He walked to a nearby

store and called Cobey for a ride. Cobey missed him the first time and Petitioner called the

apartment again to tell Swan where to send Cobey back to get him. Cobey picked him up at

about 3:30 or 4:00, Friday morning.

He had not seen the victim at all on the Thursday.

That Friday, Petitioner slept until noon when Shaw came home for lunch. About 1:00

or 1:30 a friend called asking for cocaine and they arranged it for that afternoon. About

3:00 or 4:00 p.m., shortly before Shaw returned from work, the buyers, two Mexican males,

Phil and Sam, dropped off $2500 to purchase an ounce of cocaine. He expected to be able

to buy an ounce and a quarter for $2500 and sell the other quarter ounce for $500. He met

Phil and Sam at Grand Central Station through some acquaintances Tim and Dave. He had

sold cocaine to them twice before. He eventually paid the $2500 back to Sam.

Cobey was at the apartment all afternoon. About 5:15, Shaw came home from work

without Swan. Between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., the victim called and Petitioner asked when he

was going to pickup his money from the cocaine he received the prior Monday. At about

6:30 or 6:45, David Shaw and Beth LeBrun arrived, putting Petitioner, Tammy Shaw, Kevin

Cobey, David Shaw and Beth LeBrun at the house. Then, the victim called back and said he

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would be right over. Petitioner went out by the jacuzzi, and at about 6:30 or 7:00 saw or

heard the victim drive past in the parking lot, so he began walking to the parking lot. The

victim had turned around and pulled up and Petitioner walked around to the drivers side. He

met the victim in the apartment parking lot, walked around the car and gave him the $1250

from the cocaine he got on Monday, and $2500 for the cocaine his friend had asked him to

buy. The victim was alone, and was driving. The victim rolled down the window, and

turned the dome light on. The money was all in cash. The victim did not count it, but put

it in a notebook. Petitioner did not expect to get that cocaine for a day or two. When asked

about timing, the victim said he would call Petitioner. The victim said he was headed up

north. That was the last time Petitioner heard from the victim. He wasn’t concerned about

being observed by the police because the victim always listened to the police surveillance

teams on the radio scanner. 

As he returned to the apartment, Cobey asked what was up and Petitioner told him that

he had given the victim the money and what he was expecting. Other than Petitioner and the

victim, Cobey was the only other person who knew how much money Petitioner gave the

victim. Petitioner did not give the anonymous tip to the police that he had given the victim

$1250 plus $2500. 

At about 7:30 or 8:00, Tom Ellinghausen arrived. About ten minutes later, Ron Rango

stopped by for about ten minutes. The group drank and did cocaine. After about 20 to 25

minutes Ellinghausen and Cobey left. About ten minutes later, Julie Swan came home, and

went straight to her room. Swan was mistaken when she testified that Shaw was the only one

home.

At about 10:30 or 11:00 Petitioner’s brother, Jim Prince, Martin Salazar, Lisa, two

other girls and a guy came over. Kevin Cobey and Tom Ellinghausen returned at 11:30 or

12:00. Everyone else was still there. Cobey went into Swan’s room and then Swan came

storming out with her purse and went out the front door. Cobey followed her and Tammy

Shaw followed them both outside. Eventually Cobey and Shaw returned. Ellinghausen left

again about ten minutes after he arrived.

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Later, Shaw and LeBrun went to the liquor store to get Seagrams Seven, and then later

Petitioner and his brother went to Circle K to buy beer. 

Martin Salazar’s friends left at about 12:30 or 12:45. Everyone else stayed most of

the night. At about 1:00 or 2:00 a.m., the apartment complex guard came because of the loud

music. As Petitioner went to open the door, Swan brushed past and went back to her room.

At about 4:30 a.m. Tammy and David Shaw’s mother called looking for David and LeBrun.

Tammy Shaw told them they had already left, but later called back and said they were on

their way home. Jim Prince, Martin Salazar and Jamie left at about 5:30.

Petitioner attempted to call the victim late that night or 1:00 Saturday morning, and

left a message saying “Rob, call me” that he believes to be on the seized answering machine

tapes. 

He was never at Tom Ellinghausen’s apartment on October 12, 1984. He did not

shoot the victim.

At the end of August, 1984 he got a KG-99 gun that his brother asked him to hold on

to because his grandparents didn’t want it in their house. About a week later, he and Cobey

took the gun to a water hole and fired a couple rounds. As Cobey fired the gun, the

cartridges flew back about five or six feet to the right, comparable to Haag’s testimony of the

expected ejection pattern. It was the only time he fired the gun. In the middle of September,

he told his brother that Swan and Shaw didn’t want the gun in their apartment, so he returned

it to his brother and did not see the gun again. 

He lied to the police about having the gun because he did not know if it was legal to

have or if it had been stolen. The only other gun he had in the summer and fall of 1984 was

a Colt 380 he bought from a black guy in South Phoenix that he met through some friends.

That is the weapon he had in the vehicle when he was stopped on November 6, 1984. He had

gotten the gun the week prior to when he was fingerprinted. He refused to tell the police

where he got the gun.

From August 12th to the middle of October, he was supplying cocaine to Kevin Cobey.

He was not supplying Kenny Hatch, but was supplying cocaine to Tom Ellinghausen and

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periodically to Ron Rango. They were cutting it and selling it to their friends. In January,

1986, he was convicted of possessing cocaine that was found during the search of the

apartment on November 6, 1984. 

He saw Kenny Hatch a few times in 1984, and took Hatch’s apartment in the complex

where Cobey and Ellinghausen lived. He didn’t see Hatch for a while after that, and didn’t

know where he moved to. 

He saw Hatch at the Deer Head bar. Hatch looked at Randee Rector, grabbed her by

the neck and pushed her up on the wall. Petitioner told Hatch to let her go. Hatch didn’t so

Petitioner hit him in the head, knocking him under a pool table. 

Petitioner and Kevin Cobey were together most of the time in 1984. Ellinghausen was

around most of the time until he started teaching again in September. They saw Ron Rango

almost every evening or night. Ellinghausen eventually moved in with his girlfriend

somewhere he didn’t know, and Cobey and Swan moved to an apartment that they had rented

somewhere he didn’t know. He only talked to Cobey once on the phone after Cobey moved

out of Shaw’s apartment, until he and Julie broke up. Cobey called him once to ask if he

wanted to try some cocaine, and he saw him three times: once at Chapter 11, but they did not

speak, once at Tammy’s apartment where he was helping wash a car, and at Petitioner’s

birthday party on August 4, 1985, which was thrown by Marty Salazar. 

He stopped seeing Tammy Shaw on an everyday basis after the November 6, 1984

search, but would still see her every couple of weeks. Of the cocaine paraphernalia found

in the house, only the sifter and the inositol belonged to Petitioner. Shaw and Swan put the

stuff in the blue bag. 

He learned before the summer of 1985 that Kenny Hatch was seeing Randee Rector.

A few days after his birthday on August 4, 1985, he called Kenny and spoke with Kenny and

Randee. Randee was coming by in the middle of the night to see Petitioner at his

grandfather’s house, and he wanted to know what was going on. 

He wanted to find out who killed the victim. The victim’s death caused him problems

because the people who had given him the $2500 he gave the victim, wanted their money

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by appointment. (See Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 (voluntariness hearing) at 20.) 

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back. He told Swan and Shaw that he was concerned that the killer might come after him. 

He told Detective Butler about driving the victim’s car at the bowling alley, touching

the car, and that he thought the victim might have been killed because the victim had said he

owed $10,000 in gambling debts. He told the detective that he had seen 50 pair of pants in

the victim’s closet. He told the detective who he thought the victim’s supplier was. When

Petitioner and the victim got to Shaw’s apartment from the bowling alley, Petitioner parked

the car, removed the keys and they got out of the car. He had no problem getting the keys

out of the car. They were on a twist-type key ring. The detective asked him about the

victim’s sexual orientation, and he responded he was uncertain. It was not raining while he

drove the car, but when making a sharp turn he knocked the windshield wipers on and had

to turn them off.

He was nervous when talking to the detective because of the murder investigation and

because the people wanting their $2500 were inside the house.6

 

He first learned of the victim’s death when Cobey called him on that Sunday and told

him what channel to watch. He saw them pulling the victim’s body out of the car. He was

alone. Later that afternoon he told Swan and Shaw when they came home. He was mistaken

when he told Detective Butler that he saw it on TV on Monday. 

On November 6, 1984, he was pulled over by a policewoman. Other police cars

arrived, and Detective Rea asked if he was Larry Prince, and put handcuffs on him and told

him there was a court order for his fingerprints. They asked his brother for permission to

search the car, and he gave it. Petitioner told the officers that the Colt was in car. There was

a clip in the gun, but the clip was empty and there were no bullets in the gun. The clip found

in the apartment also had no bullets. He was transported to DPS where he was fingerprinted.

His appearance has changed. His hair is shorter and he is 15 pounds lighter. His color

has remained the same, and he has always been clean shaven. 

He misunderstood when he was supposed to get his fingerprints done. He did not tell

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Detective Butler that he had parked the victim’s car, but that he had driven from the bowling

alley to Shaw’s home. 

At the beginning or middle of September, he gave the victim directions to Randee

Rector’s house. The victim came to drop off some cocaine. While the victim was there, he

and Petitioner had played with the victim’s key ring. The victim was offering to sell

Petitioner his motorcycle and was showing him the key. Petitioner playingly took the keys,

took it apart, and removed the key.

He never fought with or argued with the victim. Petitioner had never cheated him, and

they had a good relationship.

He talked with Detective Butler about seeing the KG-99 box in his brother’s room at

his grandparents house. He told him his brother had a 9 millimeter Lugar type of weapon.

He spoke to Hatch one time about the victim’s death. Hatch had stopped by

Petitioner’s grandparents, and they told him they were going to Michael Curry’s party.

Hatch showered, and Marty Salazar picked them up in his van. Petitioner, Marty Salazar,

Art, Jim Prince and Kenny Hatch were in the van. They stopped for a keg of beer and went

to the party. They did not talk about the victim’s death during the van ride. Hatch had a .44

Magnum with him in the van. After about two hours at the party, Hatch was pretty drunk and

they had to stop him from tearing down a fence in the back yard. At the end of the party

when everyone was pretty drunk. Hatch called him over to the van, where he was sitting

with his gun in his lap. Hatch claimed he knew that Petitioner killed the victim, but wouldn’t

tell who had told him that. He did not tell Hatch that he had killed the victim. 

Edward Gould - Edward Gould testified (Exhibit VVV, R.T. 4/3/86 at 148-167) that

he was employed as an investigator for the public defender’s office. On September 30, 1985

he interviewed Jim Prince about his KG-99 gun. Jim Prince told him that he purchased the

gun from Jeff Pappe, had it for three or four months, and then sold it to some cowboy at the

Statler Bar. He sold it about two months before the murder. He said he let his brother use

it for a couple of weeks, three or four months before the shooting. 

He interviewed Martin Salazar on October 8, 1985. Salazar told him that on October

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7

 Other claims presented included: (1) the death sentence was disproportional; (2)

the trial court improperly found aggravating circumstances; (3) the judge had not been

selected by merit selection; (4) prejudicial hearsay had been improperly admitted; (6)

petitioner was not allowed to impeach prosecution witnesses and prosecution witnesses

vouched for each other; (7) the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; (8)

violation of Miranda by admission of un-counseled statements by Petitioner; (9) various trial

errors; (10) failure to properly balance mitigating and aggravating circumstances; (11) the

death sentencing procedures violated the federal right to a jury trial; (12) the death sentencing

procedures violated the state right to a jury trial; (13) the death sentencing procedures

violated the federal right to jury participation; (14) the death sentencing procedures violated

the federal right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt; (15) the death sentencing procedures

improperly placed the burden of proof on mitigating factors on the defendant; (16) the death

sentencing procedures failed to provide adequate standards for weighing aggravating and

mitigating circumstances; (17) the death sentencing procedures violated due process because

of the lack of opportunity to voir dire the judge; and (18) the fruits of the search warrants

should have been suppressed. (Exhibit MM, Opening Brief.)

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12, 1984 he was at the races until 10:30 or 11:00, and left in his van with Jim Prince, and

Salazar’s cousin, Art Basuto. They were being followed by Rick, Kenny, Tanya Burrows

and another girl. It took twenty to twenty-five minutes to get to the apartment, and they

arrived at about 11:30 p.m.. He described being in his van after the party in January on the

south side of Phoenix with Petitioner, Ken Hatch, and Art, but did not mention anyone else

being in the van. In a later phone interview Salazar described the seating as Art driving,

Salazar in the passenger seat, Hatch and Petitioner in the back on the bed or sitting on the

floor. 

Conclusion of Trial and Appeal - Petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to death.

(Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 3/5/96 at 2.)

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, arguing, inter alia: the jury was “polluted” through

various juror misconduct, including perjury on voir dire, coercion of a juror, prejudice by a

juror, exclusion of a juror for deliberations, and deliberation by an unauthorized alternate.7

(Exhibit M, Opening Brief.) In a 1989 opinion, his conviction was affirmed, but his

sentence was reduced to life imprisonment on the basis that the state failed to prove the sole

aggravating circumstance, pecuniary gain, beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Prince,

160 Ariz. 268, 772 P.2d 1121 (1989). Moreover, the court remanded for a determination

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whether the life sentence for murder should be consecutive or concurrent with the sentence

on the drug charge. 

On August 22, 1989, Petitioner was resentenced to “life imprisonment without

possibility of parole for 25 calendar years,” to be concurrent with his other conviction. (Pet.

Exhibit 1, Sentence 8/22/89.) 

Some 13 years later, on October 17, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Recall the

Mandate (Reply Exhibit 1), arguing that his challenge to participation by juror Milam had

been wrongly denied based on an illegally altered trial transcript. That motion was

summarily denied on December 23, 2002. (Pet.Exhibit 8, Order 12/23/02.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST AND SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Petition - Petitioner initiated his first post-conviction relief (PCR)

proceeding by filing his PCR Notice on March 22, 1994 (Exhibit A). Petition filed a PCR

Petition (Exhibit B), arguing claims for:

(1) violation of due process as a result of perjured testimony by Cobey and Hatch

(id. at 7); 

(2) denial of due process as a result of failure to apply a change in the law on

instructions on lesser included offenses (id. at 27);

(3) due process right to new trial based on newly discovered evidence (id. at 45);

(4) violation of due process as a result of the prosecutor’s use of perjured

testimony (id. at 50); and

(5) ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of failure to adequately crossexamine witnesses and introduce favorable evidence (id. at 54).

As his newly discovered evidence in Ground 3, Petitioner presented affidavits of Jimmy

Pechac and his wife, Debbie Pechac. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the

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8

 The Pechac affidavits have apparently not been provided to this Court. Petitioner

does not suggest that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ summary of the affidavits is incorrect

or incomplete. Moreover, James Pechac testified in the evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s

third PCR petition, and that testimony reflects the same story related by the Arizona Court

of Appeals. (See Exhibit EEEE, R.T. 5/21/02 at 71-81.) 

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affidavits as follows:8

In the trial court, petitioner offered an affidavit from James Pechac

stating that, two or three weeks before Halloween of 1984, he

purchased “gold nugget” bracelets from Cobey. Petitioner also offered

an affidavit from Debbie Pechac, James Pechac’s wife, stating that, in

late 1985, Cobey telephoned her about the bracelets and stated “that

gold could send us away forever” if it was recovered by the police.

(Exhibit F. Mem. Dec. 3/5/96 at 10-11.) 

The trial count found claims 1 and 4 were waived by failure to raise them on direct

appeal, claim 2 was without merit because the change in law did not apply to Petitioner’s

case, claim 3 was without merit because the new evidence likely would not have changed the

outcome, and the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was without merit. (Exhibit C, M.E.

2/27/95.) 

First Petition for Review - Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit E),

arguing that the trial court had improperly found Claims 1 and 2 waived, and improperly

rejected the remainder of his claims. On March 5, 1996, the Arizona Court of Appeals found

the claims related to impeachment of Cobey and Hatch waived at trial, but remanded for a

decision on the related ineffective assistance claim as to perjury by Cobey. The claims of

prosecutorial misconduct were deemed waived at trial, and the related claims of ineffective

assistance were without merit. The newly discovered evidence claim was rejected on the

basis that it likely would not have changed the outcome. The decision on the change in the

law/lesser included offense was upheld. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 3/5/96.)

Second PCR Petition - Petitioner initiated his second PCR proceeding by filing his

PCR Notice on September 29, 1995 (Exhibit G), and filing his PCR Petition (Exhibit H) on

January 13, 1997. Petitioner asserted claims that:

(1) newly discovered evidence showed juror misconduct in the form of perjury

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9

 The only portions of this testimony relevant to the Petition are the defense’s lack

of knowledge of the undisclosed information, which is undisputed. Defense counsel’s

opinions about the likely affect of the undisclosed information is not factual in nature, but

opinions on matters which this Court must independently resolve. Consequently, the

undesigned does not summarize that testimony.

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during voir dire by a juror concerning a relationship with witness Hatch (id. at

3);

(2) newly discovered evidence showed a conspiracy to murder the victim and

Petitioner (id. at 6); and

(3) counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate to discover this newly

discovered evidence (id. at 16).

The trial court rejected Claim 1 on the basis that it had been presented on direct

appeal, and was known to Petitioner at the time of his first PCR, and thus was precluded, and

on the basis that the claim was without merit. Because the claim was without merit, the court

rejected the related ineffectiveness claim in Claim 3. (Exhibit I, M.E. 3/14/97.) 

Decision on Remaining Claims - . An evidentiary hearing was set on Claim 2, and

on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim remanded in the first PCR proceeding. (Exhibit

I, M.E. 3/14/97; Exhibit J, M.E. 11/3/97; Exhibit K, M.E. 11/4/97.) Testimony ws presented

from the original prosecutor, Greg Thurston(Exhibit AAAA, R.T. 11/3/97 at 3-117), defense

counsel Henry Florence (id. at 117-127), defense counsel Joel Thompson (id. at 127-158),

and defense counsel Sherry Bell (Exhibit BBBB, R.T. 11/4/97 at 4-25), and defense

investigator David Brewer (id. at 26-36) testified about the investigation and course of the

trial in this case and Petitioner’s drug case.9

 In addition, Petitioner presented testimony of

Rocky Wheeler, and James Pechac. The prosecution presented testimony by Larry Roskey.

Rocky Wheeler - Rocky Wheeler testified (Exhibit BBBB, R.T. 11/4/97 at 39-73) that

in 1984 he worked with Larry Roskey and Kenny Hatch on a jobsite at the Elm Street

Apartments. On October 12, 1984, in the afternoon or evening, he went to a Circk K with

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10 The “Quail Tree Apartments” is where Petitioner and Cobey lived with Shaw and

Swan. (See Exhibit LLL, R.T. 3/21/86 at 41 (Cobey trial testimony).) 

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Hatch to get some beer. As they passed the Quail Tree Apartments10, Hatch said he had been

told that a guy from South Phoenix lived in the apartment who was dealing a lot of cocaine

and it “would be an easy score.” After purchasing the beer, they returned to their vehicle and

Hatch pulled from under the seat a white towel wrapped around Hatch’s Browning nine

millimeter pistol. They pulled into the Quail Tree Apartments, Hatch asked Wheeler to look

for a brown Ford Torino (a description of Shaw’s vehicle) and a red Honda with tinted

windows (a description of the victim’s vehicle). The found the brown Torino, but not the red

Honda, and Hatch was insistent on finding it. Hatch subsequently pressured Wheeler to help

him rob the drug dealers. Later, Hatch and Roskey had a conversation at the job site in

which the name Cobey was mentioned. Wheeler went home around 6:30 or 7:00. 

The next morning, he saw Hatch and Roskey at the job site, having an animated

conversation. Roskey told Hatch that “he really fucked up and that he was nuts.” Hatch had

what appeared to be clothes and something wrapped up in a towel. Later that morning, Hatch

offered to sell Wheeler two pistols, a Browning 9 millimeter and a Colt .357, but insisted on

a quick sale because the guns “were hot as hell.” Hatch had previously expressed a desire

to buy a .357 magnum. Wheeler later spoke with Roskey who complained that Hatch had

messed up and expected Roskey to clean it up. Roskey warned him not to buy the guns from

Hatch. Roskey said Hatch had gotten a bunch of cocaine the night before. In his last

conversation with Wheeler, three or four days later, Hatch warned him not to talk about their

going to the Quail Tree Apartments. 

Wheeler recalled the events as being on October 12th by timing them to a payday,

although they were paid weekly. Wheeler admitted to being in prison since 1988 for

trafficking in stolen property. While in prison, he was charged with aggravated assault.

He never knew the victim or of his murder, and did not connect the events until

discussing them with Petitioner in prison in 1994. 

Petitioner unsuccessfully proffered IRS and employment records of Wheeler to

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11 The Hatch affidavit has apparently not been provided to this Court. It would be

relevant to these proceedings only in so far as it would buttress Petitioner’s claim of actual

innocence. Given it’s introduction by the prosecution and opposition by Petitioner (see e.g.

Reply, Doc. 55 at 13-14), the undersigned concludes that it would not be favorable to

Petitioner’s claims beyond the corroboration discussed herein, and the impeachment of

Hatch. (See Exhibit O, PFR at 22 (summarizing testimony from affidavit).) As it thus would

not alter the outcome, its production has not been ordered.

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establish his employment in 1984.

Jimmy Pechac - Pechac testified (id. at 73-79) that he knew Cobey, Ellinghausen,

Dave Brown, and Jim Prince. Petitioner proffered testimony by Pechac that Cobey sold him

jewelry, but the court ruled that line of questioning irrelevant. 

Larry Roskey - Larry Roskey testified (Exhibit CCCC, R.T. 11/12/97 at 3-20) that in

1984 he worked with Rocky Wheeler and Ken Hatch at the Elm Street Apartments. Hatch

was his brother-in-law through marriage. He denied recalling anything of the events testified

to by Wheeler. He initially denied recalling seeing Hatch pull a gun on someone, but

recanted when presented with a police report of an incident between Hatch and Hatch’s wife.

Hatch had a volatile temper in the fall of 1984. Hatch and Roskey were police informants

for U.S. Customs in drug cases and got paid. Roskey was paid thousands of dollars as an

informant. 

Hatch Affidavit - In addition, the prosecution admitted into evidence an affidavit of

Kenny Hatch, who was living in Judsonia, Arkansas at the time. (Exhibit BBBB, R.T.

11/12/97 at 70-73.)11 According to Petitioner, the Hatch affidavit corroborated Wheeler’s

story of Hatch offering to sell him a .357 magnum pistol. (Reply, Doc. 55 at 13.) 

On March 31, 1998, the court issued its decision on both claims. As to the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim remanded by the Court of Appeals in Petitioner’s first PCR

proceeding, the court found defective performance in counsel’s failure to obtain transcripts

of Cobey’s drug trial testimony, but found a lack of prejudice because the omitted evidence

would not have changed the result. (Exhibit M, M.E. 3/31/98 at 1-4.)

As to the newly discovered evidence claim from his second PCR proceeding, the court

found that the newly discovered evidence was of such limited credibility that it would not

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have changed the outcome of the trial. (Id. at 4-6.) 

Second Petition for Review - On December 29, 2000, Petitioner filed his second

Petition for Review (Exhibit O), arguing that the PCR court had improperly resolved his

newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance claims, and that the PCR court had

wrongly precluded him from presenting evidence to support his claims. Petitioner further

argued that he could not have raised his juror misconduct claim until he had the supporting

affidavit. The Petition was summarily denied. (Exhibit P, Order 7/24/03.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON THIRD POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

During the pendency of his first and second PCR proceedings, Petitioner filed his third

PCR Notice (Exhibit Q). On February 7, 2001, he filed his third PCR Petition (Exhibit R),

arguing that:

(1) an alternate and impaneled juror had switched during deliberations, without

authorization from the court;

(2) counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue this juror switch issue, 

(3) newly discovered evidence reflected that Cobey had been involved in a drug

robbery at the location where the victim’s body was found, and showed

Petitioner’s actual innocence;

(4) newly discovered evidence showed that the prosecution had failed to disclose

impeachment evidence on the witness Tabola in violation of Brady; and

(5) counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the information on Cobey and

Tabola.

In 1987, the state had submitted an amended transcript to reflect that the alternate had not

participated in deliberations. (Exhibit S.) 

On July 10, 2001, the PCR court issued a minute entry rejecting most of the petition,

finding that the first claim was waived and without merit, the fourth claim was without merit

because the impeachment of Tabola likely would not have changed the outcome. The court

set a hearing on the Cobey issue, and did not discuss the ineffective assistance claims.

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Evidentiary hearings were held on May 21, 2002 (Exhibit U, M.E.; Exhibit EEEE,

R.T. 5/21/02) and May 22, 2002 (Exhibit V, M.E.; Exhibit FFFF, R.T. 5/21/02) 

Brown’s Testimony - At the hearing on Petitioner’s third PCR petition, David Brown

testified (Exhibit EEEE, R.T. 5/21/02 at 4-71) that he had known Petitioner for 19 or 20

years, and purchased drugs from Petitioner in 1983, 1984, and 1985. He knew Kenny Hatch,

Randee Rector, Jim Prince, and Tammy Shaw. He made one transaction in 1984 for $1200.

He attempted to make a second deal but Petitioner was in jail. Subsequently, he arranged a

second purchase from Petitioner and paid him $2500, but never received the drugs. Brown

testified that he has a brother named Kenny Brown, and that he it was he and his brother, and

a guy named Jerry Whitley that had given money to Petitioner in 1984. 

A few days later Brown ran into Petitioner in a bar, but Petitioner said he did not have

the money. He then lost track of Petitioner. He attempted to find Petitioner through a mutual

friend, Jimmy Pechac, but Pechac did not know where Petitioner was, but told Brown where

Cobey was and that Cobey had tried to sell him some gold jewelry. Brown eventually

encountered Cobey at a bar, took him to a parking lot, put a gun to his head and demanded

his money. He did not ask Cobey where Petitioner was.

Cobey began paying him back for the purchase price, and to pay off the balance he

invited Brown to rob the drug dealer Howk near Cobey’s house. Cobey told him to show his

gun but not shoot Howk because he didn’t “want to go through that again after what Kenny

did to Rob.” (Id. at 17.) Brown and an accomplice, Steve Schmitt, attempted to rob Howk,

took money and drugs from him, but a fight ensued. Howk escaped, rammed Brown’s

vehicle disabling it, so Brown and his accomplice took off on foot. Brown left his wallet and

fingerprints in the car. The police contacted the owner of the car, Brown’s girlfriend, told her

the victims had identified Brown, but they were not going to pursue the matter because they

considered it a drug deal gone bad. The robbery occurred near where the victim’s body was

found.

Pechac Testimony - Petitioner also called as a witness James Pechac who testified

(Exhibit EEEE, R.T. 5/21/02 at 71-81) that he knew Petitioner, James Prince, Kevin Cobey,

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David Brown, Kenny Hatch, and Tom Ellinghausen. He has known Dave Brown and

Petitioner since he was 10 or 12 years old. In 1983 and 1984, Cobey worked at Graham’s

with Pechac’s brother, Mark Pechac. Pechac worked for Petitioner’s grandfather, and traded

in cocaine and jewelry. In 1984, a couple of weeks before Halloween, he purchased three

gold nugget bracelets and a gold chain from Cobey for about $500. Ellinghausen may have

been with Cobey at the time. A month or two later he told Dave Brown about the jewelry

from Cobey, and he told Petitioner’s brother James about it after Petitioner’s trial. He did not

tell anyone about this information because he did not know it was relevant. 

Randee (Rector) Ely Testimony - Randee (Rector) Ely testified (Exhibit EEEE, R.T.

6/10/10 at 103-113) that she had known Petitioner since she was 14, and knew Sherryl

Pierzchalski, Ron Rango, Larry Roskey, and Kenny Hatch. Sheryl’s birthday was October

12th, 13th or 14th. The week of her birthday in 1984, Sheryl stayed a couple of nights at

Randee’s house. Randee called Sheryl on her birthday, but she was not at home. Kenny

Hatch worked at Chapter 11, the bar, and used cocaine that he confiscated from patrons at

Chapter 11. Randee used cocaine with Hatch at his house. 

Detective Applegate - Detective Applegate testified (Exhibit FFFF, R.T. 5/22/02 at

30-47) that he was formerly a police detective involved in the investigation of the robbery

of John Howk. He was investigating it as possession of narcotic drugs for sale, and arrested

Howk on January 11, 1986. He was not contacted on the case after the arrest. He does not

know what fingerprints were found on the drugs confiscated. He was not contacted when

Kevin Cobey was arrested in connection with the murder of the victim. He believed Howk

to be a drug dealer, but he did not recall doing any followup investigations on Howk’s

suppliers or customers.

Ronald Clements Testimony - Ronald Clements testified (Exhibit FFFF, R.T.

5/22/02 at 48-67) that in August, 1985, he worked with Kevin Cobey. While Cobey was in

jail after being arrested for murder, he called Clements and mentioned that Petitioner had also

been arrested and that the police were looking for Kenny Hatch. After Cobey was released

in September, he lived with Clements for three weeks to a month. Clements was dealing

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12 The Robinson Affidavit has apparently not been produced in this case. Petitioner’s

summary of the affidavit in his Petition of Review to the Arizona Supreme Court is

comparable to the state’s summary in the PCR court. (See Exhibit CC, PFR at 16-17.) It

would only be relevant to this case to the extent that it would bolster Petitioner’s claim of

actual innocence. Because it does not alter the outcome, the undersigned presumes that this

description is accurate, complete and would reflect Robinson’s testimony if compelled to

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cocaine at the time, and Cobey used cocaine at Clements’ house. Kenny Hatch visited in

Clements’ home with Kevin Cobey, did cocaine together, reviewed the police reports and

talked about the murder. Kevin Cobey and Kenny Hatch admitted their involvement in the

murder. At first Cobey said Petitioner was not involved, then on another occasion said he

was, and then when Clements asked him directly about Petitioner’s involvement, Cobey said

it didn’t matter and he would say whatever he needed to save himself. Based on their

comments, Clements believed Petitioner was innocent, but did not report that to anyone. If

called to testify in 1985, he may have exercised his Fifth Amendment rights. Clements was

at the time of his testimony imprisoned at the Central Detention Unit of the Arizona

Department of Corrections.

Other Evidence - In addition, Petitioner called Amy Robinson aka Aimee Jamison,

who refused to testify due to threats to her family if she testified in Petitioner’s behalf and

was excused (Exhibit EEEE, R.T. 5/21/02 at 94-97). In its written closing arguments, the

state summarized the affidavit of Robinson as follows:

This affidavit said, in summary, that at the time of the murder she knew

the victim Rob Richards, Cheryl Pierzchalski, Ron Rango, Cobey, and

Prince. The affidavit states that Rango and the others knew that they

couldn’t make any money without Prince’s help. Further, her affidavit

says, Rango told Cobey to “scuff up” Richards and Cobey told Rango

that he would have someone else take care of it.

The affidavit says that on the night of the murder Ms. Jamison

went to Cheryl Pierzchalski’s apartment. Pierzchalski and Richards

were there with a lot of cash and cocaine. Cobey called on the phone

for Richards and arranged a meeting with him, and Richards left. An

hour later Rango came to the apartment and told Robinson and

Pierzchalski to get in his car. As he drove away, Rango told the women

that “Rob’s dead and Larry’s gonna find out why,” and Pierzchalski

said Larry would be “pissed” and started crying. The affidavit also says

that Robinson discovered that Yates and Pierzchalski had planned to

throw suspicion on Prince to keep the cops away from them.

(Exhibit X, Resp. Clos. Arg. at 3-4.)12

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testify. 

13 The other claims included: (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the

transcript change (Exhibit Z at 14); (4) counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the

cumulative effect issue (id. at 18); (5) the PCR court erred by failing to appoint counsel (id.

at 19); (6) the PCR court erred by failing to appoint an investigator (id. at 21); (7) the state

had improperly destroyed the evidentiary exhibits from the trial (id. at 22); (8) the state had

held improper ex parte communications with the PCR court (id. at 26); (9) the PCR court had

wrongly excluded testimony by trial counsel as to the effect of undisclosed evidence (id. at

27); (10) the PCR court erred in refusing to liberally construe Petitioner's questions at trial

to avoid self-incrimination issues for the witnesses (id. at 29); (11) the PCR court erred in

excluding certain hearsay testimony (id. at 30); (12) the PCR court abused its discretion in

adopting the State's statement of the facts (id. at 30); (13) the PCR court's reliance on the

State's statement of facts exacerbated its failure to make a cumulative effect determination

on undisclosed evidence (id. at 34); (14) the PCR court abused its discretion in finding that

Petitioner was not diligent in pursuing newly discovered evidence (id. at 34); and (15) the

PCR court improperly refused to grant sanctions against the State for failure to provide notice

of or information on witness interviews (id. at 36).

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Petitioner also presented testimony of trial counsel Henry Florence (id. at 114-121)

who offered little testimony because of objections on relevance. In addition, Detective Butler

testified (Exhibit FFFF, R.T. 5/22/20 at 15-29) that he retired in 1992, had no notes, and due

to a medical condition affecting his memory had no independent recollection of the case. 

Results of Hearing - On July 15, 2002, the court issued its ruling, finding that either

the evidence could have been discovered earlier, or that it likely would not have changed the

outcome at trial. The Petition was denied. (Exhibit W, M.E. 7/15/02.) Petitioner filed a

motion for rehearing which was summarily denied. (Exhibit Y, M.E. 5/15/03.) 

Petitioner filed his third Petition for Review (Exhibit Z), arguing, inter alia: (1) the

transcript had been illegally changed (id. at 10); and (3) the trial court failed to consider the

cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidence (id. at 15).13 The Arizona Court of Appeals

summarily denied review. (Exhibit AA, Order 1/14/04.)

Petitioner then filed a consolidated Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court

(Exhibit CC), raising claims that:

(1) the transcript concerning the alternate juror was illegally altered (id. at 10);

(2) the PCR court failed to make a cumulative effect analysis on the undisclosed

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evidence (id. at 11); and

(3) the newly discovered evidence entitled Petitioner to a new trial (id. at 15).

The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. (Exhibit DD, order 2/14/05.)

E. PROCEEDINGS ON FOURTH POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On February 23, 2004, during the pendency of his petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court, Petitioner instituted his fourth PCR proceeding by filing his PCR Notice

(Exhibit EE). On December 1, 2004, he filed his fourth PCR petition (Exhibit FF), asserting:

(1) failure to disclose interviews with Ronald Flood showing cocaine dealings

among Cobey, Hatch, and the victim (id. at 5);

(2) newly discovered evidence in the form of Cobey’s presentence report and a

written declaration by Cobey referenced in it had not been disclosed by the

State (id. at 16); and

(3) newly discovered evidence in the form of evidence of witness Rosky’s cocaine

use and Roskey and Hatch’s concealment of Hatch’s cocaine thefts had not

been disclosed by the State (id. at 20); and

(4) Petitioner right to pro se representation was denied as a result of shackling of

Petitioner at his prior PCR hearing (id. at 26).

A hearing was held on the Petition on November 22, 2005. (Reply re Exhibits, Doc.

70, R.T. 11/22/05.) 

On January 12, 2006, the PCR court denied Petitioner’s petition, finding that the

claims were waived and thus precluded, and that: (1) Cobey did not provide the only

evidence of premeditation; (2) the Flood testimony was not credible and likely would have

not made a difference at trial; and (3) the Cobey presentence report did not exist at the time

of trial or sentencing, was at most impeaching evidence, was not relevant to Cobey’s case,

there was no reasonable likelihood that it would have changed the outcome, and was not

Brady material because it was immaterial and was not in the State’s possession.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit HH), arguing that:

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(1) the PCR court improperly concluded his claims were waived (id. at 7);

(2) the PCR court erred in denying his failure to disclose claims without

conducting the proper analysis and having an evidentiary hearing, and on the

basis that there was other evidence of premeditation (id. at 9);

(3) the PCR court’s conclusion that the Flood testimony would not have altered

the outcome was an abuse of discretion (id. at 13);

(4) Cobey’s presentence report was newly discovered evidence of recantation, was

entitled to consideration, and was in the state’s possession at the tme of trial

(id. at 18);

(5) the PCR Court failed to rule on the Roskey and Hatch cocaine use and theft

issues (id. at 19).

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review (Exhibit II, Order 8/23/07).

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit JJ),

which was summarily denied. (Exhibit KK, Order 1/3/08.) 

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 14, 2008 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition

asserts the following three grounds for relief:

(1) violation of due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) as a

result of the prosecution’s failure to disclose: (a) the August 19, 1985 Phoenix

Police report identifying the witness Dave Brown and connecting Cobey with

a “drug rip-off”; (b) 1985 Phoenix Police reports on witness Tabola; (c)

interviews of exculpatory witness Flood; (d) Cobey’s May, 1986 presentence

report; and (e) a written declaration by Cobey referenced in the presentence

report; and as a result of the PCR court’s consideration of the evidence on an

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14 Petitioner also complains in the 10 pages of his Ground One of a variety of

purported improprieties by the prosecution and the PCR courts, i.e. presenting false

testimony, denying Petitioner a hearing, etc. The undersigned construes these allegations to

be part of the res gestae. The only items of evidence alleged by Petitioner to have been

existent and not disclosed are those identified herein.

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item by item basis14

(2) violation of his right to due process as a result of: (a) juror Pigg’s false denial

of a relationship to witness Hatch; (b) excused juror Milam’s participation in

jury deliberations, and the alteration of trial transcripts to hide the matter;

(3) violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial

counsel’s failure to adequately challenge inconsistent testimony by Cobey.

Response - On October 27, 2008, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) (Doc.

16). Respondents concede that Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies on Grounds I

(Brady), but contend that his state remedies on the remainder of his claims were not properly

exhausted, and are now procedurally defaulted. Respondents argue that all of the claims are

either entirely without merit, or the state courts’ decisions were not sufficiently erroneous to

merit relief under the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On January 28, 2009, the Court ordered Respondents to supplement their response to

address whether presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court was required because of

Petitioner’s life sentence, in light of the 1989 amendments to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.21,

which granted the Arizona Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals from life sentences.

The purpose of the supplement was to assist the Court in determining whether, under

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), presentation of claims to the Arizona

Supreme Court was necessary for Petitioner to have exhaust his state remedies.

On February 13, 2009, Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer (Doc. 27)

reiterating the legislative history, and conceding the applicability of the 1989 amendments

to Petitioner’s PCR proceedings. 

Reply - On March 2, 2010, after protracted extensions as a result of Petitioner’s

efforts to secure a typewriter to assist in preparation of his reply, Petitioner filed a

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handwritten Reply (Doc. 55). Petitioner argues that his claims were properly exhausted and

are meritorious. 

Supplements to Record - On May 13, 2010, the undersigned noted that Exhibit FF

was incomplete, and directed (Doc. 56) provision of the balance. On the same date,

Respondents provided a complete copy of their Exhibit FF (Doc. 57).

On May 21, 2010, the undersigned noted the potential need to review various records

in connection with Petitioner’s claims of actual innocence, suppressed evidence, and his

ineffective assistance claims. Respondents were directed (Doc. 58) to supplement the record

to include various transcripts and documents. On June 10, 2010, Respondents filed their

response with various exhibits. (Docs. 59, 60, 61, 62, 53, 64, 65, and 66.) Upon review, it

appears that duplicates of the exhibits have been filed at Docs. 59 and 60, and at 61 and 63.

Because these latter supplemental exhibits were filed in no certain order, with several

exhibits spread across multiple docket entries, the undersigned includes herein an index of

the exhibits and their location in the docket, including docket page numbers:

Exh Description Docket Page

QQ Phoenix PD interview of Kevin Cobey, 8/23/85 64-4 1

RR Kevin Cobey presentence report, 5/27/86 64-4 20

SS Phoenix PD interview of James Tabola, 11/07/84 64-4 28

TT Phoenix PD report of Det. Williams, re: Tabola, 3/19/85 64-4 30

UU Phoenix PD report of Det. Taugner, re: Tabola, 3/19/85 64-4 38

VV Phoenix PD report of Det. Maxwell, re: Tabola, 3/19/85 64-4 43

WW Mesa PD report of Ofc. Otañez, re: Tabola, 5/14/85 64-4 46

XX Mesa PD report of Det. Sowards, re: Tabola, 5/14/85 66-1 1

YY Mesa PD report of Det. Byers, re: Tabola, 5/14/85 66-1 7

ZZ Phoenix PD report of Ofc. Driscoll, re: Howk, 8/19/85 66-1 23

AAA Phx. PD report of Ofc. Antonini, re: Howk, Brown, 8/19/85 66-1 27

BBB Phoenix PD report of Det. Applegate, re: Howk, 8/20/85 66-1 31

CCC Phoenix PD report of DPS Sgt. Capp, re: Howk, 8/22/85. 66-1 33

DDD Phoenix PD lab report of Criminalist Leister, re: Howk 59-6 1

EEE AZDOC information for inmate Ronald T. Flood 59-6 3

FFF Transcript, separate drug trial, 1/07/86

Part 1 59-8 1

Part 2 59-7 1

GGG Transcript, murder trial (jury selection), 3/17/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-79) 61-2 1

Part 2 (pages 80-134) 61-1 1

HHH Transcript, murder trial (voluntariness hearing), 3/19/86

Part 1 (pages 1-79) 61-4 1

Part 2 (pages 80-155) 61-3 1

III Transcript, murder trial, 3/20/86 morning session

Part 1 (Pages 1-50) 61-6 1

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JJJ Transcript, murder trial, 3/20/86 afternoon session 61-7 1

KKK Transcript, murder trial, 3/21/86 morning session 61-8 1

LLL Transcript, murder trial, 3/21/86 afternoon session

Part 1 (Pages 1-69) 61-9 1

Part 2 (Pages 70-97) 61-10 1

MMM Transcript, murder trial, 3/24/86 morning session 62-1 1

NNN Transcript, murder trial, 3/24/86 afternoon session

Part 1 (Pages 1-50) 62-3 1

Part 2 (Pages 51-106) 62-2 1

OOO Transcript, murder trial, 3/25/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-80) 62-4 1

Part 2 (Pages 81-140) 62-5 1

Part 3 (Pages 141-189) 62-6 1

PPP Transcript, murder trial, 3/26/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-80) 62-7 1

Part 2 (Pages 81-140) 62-8 1

Part 3 (Pages 141-165) 62-9 1

QQQ Transcript, murder trial, 3/27/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-80) 64-1 1

Part 2 (Pages 81-140) 64-2 1

Part 3 (Pages 141-175) 64-3 1

RRR Transcript, murder trial, 3/28/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-50) 64-5 1

Part 2 (Pages 51-90) 64-6 1

SSS Transcript, murder trial, 3/31/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-95) 64-9 1

Part 2 (Pages 96-194) 64-7 1

Part 3 (Pages 195-198) 64-8 1

TTT Transcript, murder trial, 4/01/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-80) 65-2 1

Part 2 (Pages 81-153) 65-1 1

UUU Transcript, murder trial, 4/02/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-70) 65-5 1

Part 2 (Pages 71-140) 65-3 1

Part 3 (Pages 141-175) 65-4 1

VVV Transcript, murder trial, 4/03/86.

Part 1 (Pages 1-89) 65-8 1

Part 2 (Pages 90-180) 65-6 1

Part 3 (Pages 181-194) 65-7 1

WWW Transcript, murder trial, 4/04/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-70) 65-10 1

Part 2 (Pages 71-131) 65-9 1

XXX Transcript, motion for new trial, 5/02/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-70) 66-3 1

Part 2 (Pages 71-126) 66-2 1

YYY Transcript, motion for new trial, 5/07/86

Part 1 (Pages 1-60) 66-5 1

Part 2 (Pages 61-75) 66-4 1

ZZZ Transcript, sentencing, 5/15/86 66-6 1

AAAA Transcript, Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, 11/03/97

Part 1 59-2 1

Part 2 59-1 1

BBBB Transcript, Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, 11/04/97 59-3 1

CCCC Transcript, Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, 11/12/97 59-4 1

DDDD Transcript, Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, 5/20/02 59-5 1

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EEEE Transcript, Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, 5/21/02

Part 1 59-11 1

Part 2 59-10 1

FFFF Transcript, Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, 5/22/02 59-9 1

Petitioner asserted various objections (Doc. 67) to these supplements, where were denied.

(See Order 9/15/10, Doc. 72.) Petitioner then submitted copies of several transcripts from

his 2005 PCR hearings (Doc. 70). The Court accepted those as a part of the record. (See

Order 9/15/10, Doc. 72). 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL BAR & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s state remedies on the claims in Ground II (Juror

Misconduct) as to Juror Pigg’s relationship to witness Hatch, and Ground III (Ineffective

Assistance) were not properly exhausted because Petitioner failed to raise them to the

Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state

remedies as to his claims in Ground II (Juror Misconduct) as to Juror Milam’s participation

in the state proceedings, because the matter was never raised as a federal claim. Respondents

argue that the claims with unexhausted state remedies are now procedurally defaulted.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

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conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). 

b. Proper Forum

 Ordinarily, a petitioner has not satisfied the exhaustion requirement unless he has

fairly presented his claim to the highest state court. Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38

(9th Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) the Supreme

Court recognized that it is only "available" remedies that must be exhausted, and that

requiring prisoners to pursue discretionary review by state courts may result in an unwelcome

increase in filings with state courts. 526 U.S. at 847. Thus, the Court instructed that habeas

courts are not to ignore state rules or law making a given procedure "unavailable." Id. In his

concurrence in O'Sullivan, Justice Souter noted: "I understand that we leave open the

possibility that a state prisoner is likewise free to skip a procedure even when a state court

has occasionally employed it to provide relief, so long as the State has identified the

procedure as outside the standard review process and has plainly said that it need not be

sought for the purpose of exhaustion." Id. at 1735 (Souter, J. concurring). 

In O'Sullivan, the Supreme Court specifically cited State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157,

777 P.2d 220 (1989). In Sandon, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that there was no right

to appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court except in cases where the death sentence or life

imprisonment was imposed, citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.21(A)(1). Sandon, 161 Ariz. at

158, 777 P.2d at 221. Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a petition for review to the

Arizona Supreme Court was not required to exhaust state remedies for federal habeas

purposes.

In Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit relied

on O'Sullivan and Sandon to conclude that absent a death penalty or life sentence, Arizona

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state prisoners have exhausted claims presented in habeas petitions if they have been ruled

upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. In so doing, the Swoopes court cited Justice Souter's

concurrence. Id. at 1009-10.

Respondents argue (Answer, Doc. 16 at 11) that, notwithstanding Swoopes,

presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court (not just the Arizona Court of Appeals) is

required for exhaustion, citing Baldwin v. v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 30–33 (1999). The Ninth

Circuit’s subsequent reliance on Swoopes in Castillo v. McFadden, 370 F.3d 882, 887 n. 3

(9th Cir. 2004), notwithstanding Baldwin, dispels this argument. Moreover, nothing in

Baldwin precludes the reasoning in Swoopes. 

However, this case is not squarely under the language of Swoopes, because Petitioner's

direct appeal and resentencing straddled the April, 1989 amendments to Ariz. Rev. Stat. §

120.21 which granted the Arizona Court of Appeals jurisdiction over cases with life

sentences. See Arizona Session Laws 1989, Ch. 58, § 1 (amending Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-

120.21 giving jurisdiction of life sentence appeals to Arizona Court of Appeals) (effective

April 19, 1989). Respondents concede that these amendments were applicable to all of

Petitioner’s PCR proceedings. (Supp. Answer, Doc. 27 at 2-3.) Thus, review by the

Arizona Supreme Court of those PCR proceedings was discretionary.

The Swoopes decision refers to there being no right of appeal to the Arizona Supreme

Court "except in capital cases or when a life sentence is imposed." Swoopes, 196 F.3d at

1009. Indeed, the decision concludes that "except in habeas petitions in life-sentence or

capital cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas

once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.” Id. at 1010. However, in reaching

its decision, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a habeas petitioner whose appeal to the Arizona

Court of Appeals was denied in 1988, prior to the 1989 amendments eliminating

life-sentences from the exceptions to Arizona Court of Appeals jurisdiction. See State v.

Swoopes, 155 Ariz. 432, 747 P.2d 593 (App. 1988). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit was

required to draw on decisions applying the pre-1989 amendments law. In State v. Sandon,

161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), the Arizona Supreme Court considered the review rights

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of a defendant whose appeal was denied in 1986. Sandon, 161 Ariz. at 157, 777 P.2d at 220.

Although the Sandon court noted the adoption of the 1989 amendments in a footnote, they

were not applying that law. Id. at 158 n. 1, 777 P.2d at 221 n.1. 

Similarly, the decision in State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 684 P.2d 154 (1984), also

relied on in Swoopes, predated the 1989 amendments. Indeed, the only Arizona decision

relied upon in Swoopes and made after the 1989 amendments was Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192

Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Moreno did not, however rely upon Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§

12-120.21 or 13-4031, or specifically discuss the death/life sentence limitation. Rather,

Moreno focused on the "nature and scope of discretionary review by petition for review,"

Moreno, 192 Ariz. at 134, 962 P.2d at 133, and was concerned with whether such

discretionary review was an "appeal" within the meaning of the exceptions to Arizona's

timeliness bar for claims not presented on "appeal" for good cause. 

Moreover, the import of Sandon was the Arizona Supreme Court's apparent desire to

stop the flood of "large numbers of prisoner petitions seeking to exhaust state remedies."

Sandon, 161 Ariz. at 157, 777 P.2d at 220. The Sandon court concluded that "'[o]nce the

defendant has been given the appeal to which he has a right, state remedies have been

exhausted." Id. at 158, 777 P.2d at 221, quoting Shattuck, 140 Ariz. at 585, 684 P.2d at 157.

Thus, their recitation of the death/life sentence limitation is not properly read as the limit of

their holding, but as a reiteration of the pre-1989 holding of Shattuck. Thus Sandon may

only be reasonably read as an attempt by the Arizona Supreme Court to remove their

discretionary review from the cycle of review required for exhaustion of Arizona’s state

remedies. While a given respondent may desire to require its Arizona prisoner to file a

petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, it is not the respondents’' desire,

however, but that of the Arizona court that is controlling. 

Finally, Swoopes itself did not hinge on any reading of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-120.21

or 13-4031 themselves, but upon the question "whether Arizona has identified discretionary

Supreme Court review 'as outside the standard review process and has plainly said that it

need not be sought for the purpose of exhaustion.' " Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010, quoting

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O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. 838, 850 (1999). The only basis for identifying that discretionary

review as being tied to death/life sentences was the language of Shattuck and Sandon, and

their reliance upon the then applicable pre-1989 versions of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § § 12-120.21

and 13-4031. 

Thus, until this issue is resolved by the Ninth Circuit, the Arizona District Courts are

faced with either applying the exact language of Swoopes, or applying the principle of

Swoopes to the facts as they exist in this case. The latter holds truer to the function of a trial

court in attempting to apply appellate court precedent. 

Using the techniques developed at common law, a court confronted

with apparently controlling authority must parse the precedent in light

of the facts presented and the rule announced. Insofar as there may be

factual differences between the current case and the earlier one, the

court must determine whether those differences are material to the

application of the rule or allow the precedent to be distinguished on a

principled basis. 

Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Applying the rule of Swoopes, the undersigned concludes that in light of the 1989

amendments, claims fairly presented by Petitioner to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his

PCR proceedings are exhausted notwithstanding any failure to fairly present them to the

Arizona Supreme Court.

Effect of Skipping Intermediate Courts - While presentation to the Arizona Supreme

Court was not necessary in Petitioner’s PCR proceedings, neither was it sufficient absent

presentation to the trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

In Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated that to properly

exhaust a claim, "a petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct review." 

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas

corpus states, "Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion

requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire

direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire

judicial postconviction process available in the state." 

Casey, 386 F.3d at 916 (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and

Procedure, § 23.3b (4th ed. 1998).

In Arizona, review of a petition for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court of

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15 Nonetheless, the failure to present to the trial court might prevent habeas review

if it results in the appellate court applying a procedural bar which qualifies as an

"independent and adequate state ground".

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Appeals is governed by Rule 32.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which clarifies that

review is available for "issues which were decided by the trial court." Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.9(c)(1)(ii). See also State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (Ariz.App.,

1980) (issues first presented in petition for review and not presented to trial court not subject

to review). Accordingly, PCR claims presented for the first time to the Arizona Court of

Appeals are not fairly presented. 

Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court does not grant review of claims not raised

below, absent special considerations. See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 565, 20 P.3d 631,

632, n.2 (2001). Presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court for the first time is not sufficient

to exhaust an Arizona state prisoner's remedies. "Submitting a new claim to the state's

highest court in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special

circumstances does not constitute fair presentation." Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). 

On the other hand, in a direct appeal, failure to present to the trial court does not

necessarily prevent exhaustion; all that is required is presentation "at all appellate stages."

Casey, 386 F.3d at 916 (emphasis added). "If the petitioner fails to raise a federal claim at

trial (or if the claim was not cognizable at all or did not arise until after trial), the petitioner

satisfies the exhaustion requirement by raising the claim on appeal, on a motion for rehearing

of the appeal, or even in a delayed appeal." Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus

Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (5th ed. 2001).15 However, failure to present a claim to the

trial court in a PCR proceeding may result in a finding that the claim has not been fairly

presented, id. at n. 26, i.e. if the failure to present to the trial court results in the appellate

court applying a procedural bar which qualifies as an "independent and adequate state

ground.” See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989).

/ /

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16 Respondents also argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust his remedies on a claim of

a relationship between Juror Pigg and the victim. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 15-16.) The

undersigned does not understand Petitioner to assert such a relationship, and Petitioner

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c. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,”

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d

750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal

claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state law claim was made.”

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

On the other hand, both the federal and state courts are tasked with enforcement of the

federal constitution. See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus,

"a citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as

a citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue.” Id.

d. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

(1) Ground II (Juror Misconduct) - In his Ground II, Petitioner argues that his due

process rights were violated because: (a) juror Pigg falsely denied a relationship to witness

Hatch; and (b) excused juror Milam participated in jury deliberations, and the trial transcripts

were altered to hide the matter. 

Misconduct by Juror Pigg - Respondents argue that Petitioner’s state remedies on

the claims in Ground II (Juror Misconduct) as to Juror Pigg’s relationship to witness Hatch,16

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explicitly denies asserting such a claim. (Reply, Doc. 55 at 8.) The only reference to the

victim in Ground II is to explain that during voir dire the trial court referenced the names of

the victim and the witnesses. (See Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.)

17 The undersigned notes that Respondents do not assert that the rejection of this

claim on preclusion and waiver grounds amount to an independent and adequate state

grounds, barring habeas review of the merits. (See Answer, Doc. 16 at 15-16 (discussing

failure to exhaust Ground II).) Perhaps this is because Petitioner’s appellate brief plainly

limits its challenge to Juror Pigg on the basis of his general bias against drug usage, and does

not reference any issue concerning a relationship with a witness (see Exhibit MM, Open.

Brief at 5-8), and there is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner was aware of the

relationship between Pigg and Hatch prior to his receipt of the Brannen Affidavit (Exhibit

NN) in November, 1995. Petitioner explicitly contends that the trial court’s finding of

presentation on direct appeal (and thus preclusion of the claim) is false on this basis. (Reply,

Doc. 55 at 8-9.) That would further explain Petitioner’s failure to assert that the PCR Court’s

ruling established his exhaustion, and he instead points to his Petition for Review to establish

exhaustion. (Id. at 11.) 

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were not properly exhausted because Petitioner failed to raise them to the Arizona Supreme

Court. However, as discussed above, presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court was not

required to exhaust Petitioner’s state remedies on his PCR petitions. However, this claim

was not fairly presented to either the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme

Court.

 Presentation to PCR Court - Respondents point out that this matter was raised in

Petitioner’s second PCR petition. (Answer, Doc. 1 at 16 (citing Exhibit H, PCR Pet. at 3-5.)

Petitioner asserted that the misconduct by Pigg denied him his right to an impartial jury in

violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments. (Id. at 5.) However, the PCR court found that the

claim had been raised on direct appeal, and was thus precluded from further review. The

PCR Court also found that the matter was known by Petitioner at the time of his first PCR

petition and was waived by failure to present it in that proceeding.17 Finally, the trial court

rejected the claim on its merits, finding that Petitioner had failed to show prejudice because

disclosure of the information would not have necessarily resulted in Pigg being excused, and

there was no probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. (Exhibit

I, M.E. 3/14/97 at 1-2.) 

Presentation to Arizona Court of Appeals - Petitioner argued in his Petition for

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Review (Exhibit O) that this claim was improperly deemed waived because he had not raised

Juror Pigg’s misconduct on direct appeal, and did not have evidence of the misconduct until

November 22, 1995, after his first PCR petition had already been decided and was the subject

of a petition for review. (Exhibit O, PFR at 41-42.) Petitioner further argued that he had

made a colorable claim, citing State v. Stolze, 112 Ariz. 124, 126-127, 539 P2.d 881 (1975)

and State v. Robinson, 127 Ariz. 324, 620 P.2d 703 (1980). While the latter makes no

reference to federal law, the former cited United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.

1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1064 . However, that decision was not based upon any

particular federal guarantee, but simply referenced the jury being qualified as “fair and

impartial.” Crosson, 462 F.2d at 104. The citation to Crosson would not served to alert the

Arizona Court of Appeals that the claim being asserted was a federal one. Petitioner did not

reference any constitutional provision, nor cite any federal authorities in his Petition for

Review.

The Arizona Court of Appeals issued a summary denial of review. (Exhibit P, order

7/24/03.) 

It might be argued that the underlying presentation of the claim as a federal one to the

PCR court should have carried over to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Indeed, Petitioner

argues that he attached the prior PCR rulings to his petitions for review. (Reply Doc. 55 at

6-7.) However, "ordinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim to a state court if

that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does not alert

it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion

in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). The Arizona habeas

petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue before the Arizona Court of

Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." Castillo v. McFadden, 370 F.3d

882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner did not fairly present

his challenge to Juror Pigg’s misconduct to the Arizona Court of Appeals as a federal claim.

Presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court - Petitioner asserts in his Petition and

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18 Petitioner makes the novel argument that presentation to the Arizona Supreme

Court would have been futile because the Court of Appeals issued a summary denial and thus

there was no “ ‘decision’ the court can review.” (Reply, Doc. 55 at 7.) In support, Petitioner

cites State v. Aguilar, 170 Ariz. 292, 823 P.2d 1300 (App. 1991), in which the Arizona Court

of Appeals held that it had no jurisdiction to consider on a petition for review on a city court

decision or an appellate decision thereon by the superior court. In rejecting the attempt to

invoke by analogy the normal petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court from a

judgment originating in the superior court and reviewed in the court of appeals, the Aguilar

court noted that the Arizona Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19 was

limited to review of “a court of appeals decision.” 170 Ariz. at 294, 823 P.2d at 1302

(emphasis added). Because there had been no presentation to (and thus no decision by) the

Arizona Court of Appeals, no jurisdiction by the Arizona Supreme Court was possible, and

therefore the analogy failed. However, nothing in Aguilar suggests that a summary denial by

the Arizona Court of Appeals does not qualify as a “decision” within the meaning of Rule

31.19. Cf. Ariz. R. App. P. 28(a) (differentiating between “opinion”, “memorandum

decision,” and “order”). 

Regardless, it is irrelevant whether on this basis review by the Arizona Supreme Court

was available. The undersigned has concluded that presentation to that court was

unnecessary for exhaustion pursuant to Swoopes. Moreover, Petitioner failed to present his

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

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Reply that he sought review of his second PCR proceeding in the Arizona Court of Appeals

in his November, 2004 Petition for Review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3; Reply, Doc. 55 at 6.)

However, Petitioner’s November, 2004 Petition for Review did not include any reference to

misconduct by Juror Pigg. (See Exhibit CC, PFR.) Moreover, even if Petitioner had

presented this claim to the Arizona Supreme Court, it would not have been fairly presented

because Petitioner had failed to first present it to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Roettgen,

33 F.3d at 38.18

Motion to Recall Mandate - Petitioner asserts in his Petition that he exhausted his state

remedies by presenting his claims in Ground II in his Third PCR petition and the Motion to

Recall Mandate. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) However, the third PCR petition (Exhibit R at 4-8)

and the motion to recall the mandate (Reply Exhibit 1) were limited to arguing the

misconduct by excused Juror Milam and the related alteration of the trial transcript. 

Summary re Misconduct by Juror Pigg - Petitioner presented his federal claim on

misconduct by Juror Pigg to the PCR court, but failed to present it as a federal claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals or to present it at all to the Arizona Supreme Court. Accordingly,

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19 Because, at the time of his direct appeal Petitioner was subject to a death sentence,

presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court was necessary to exhaust his claims.

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this claim was not properly exhausted.

Misconduct by Juror Milam - Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to

exhaust his state remedies as to his claims in Ground II (Juror Misconduct) as to Juror

Milam’s participation in the state proceedings and the alteration of the transcript showing that

participation, because the matter was never raised as a federal claim. 

Presentation on Direct Appeal - Petitioner raised the facts of the participation by Juror

Milam on direct appeal. (Exhibit MM, Open. Brief at 7, 28.) However, Petitioner asserted

no federal claim in connection with this argument. Rather, he cited only Ariz. R. Crim. P.

24.1(c)(3) and 24(d), and State v. Garcia, 141 Ariz. 580, 688 P.2d 206 (App. 1984). The

latter case does cite Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (“due process does not

require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising

situation”). However, Garcia was cited by Petitioner solely for the proposition that the

“standard of review is whether or not the Court abused its discretion.” (Exhibit MM, Open.

Brief at 27.) That portion of the discussion in Garcia did not rely upon Smith, or any federal

law, but upon another state case. Thus, the mere citation to Garcia was not sufficient to alert

the Arizona Supreme Court19 to the federal nature of Petitioner’s claim.

Motion to Recall Mandate - As noted above, Petitioner asserts in his Petition that he

exhausted his state remedies by presenting his claims in Ground II in the Motion to Recall

Mandate. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) In the motion to recall the mandate, Petitioner argued that

he was entitled “to a jury trial by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”

(Reply Exhibit 1, at 10. See also id. at 6.) Arguably, he also asserted that the alteration to

the transcript was a “denial of due process of law . . . in violation of . . . the United States

Constitution.” (Id. at 13.) However, presentation of a claim for the first time in a motion to

recall a mandate is not fair presentation. "Submitting a new claim to the state's highest court

in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered absent special

circumstances does not constitute fair presentation." Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38. In Arizona,

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20 Petitioner also cited Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 120 S.Ct. 1479 (2000). (See

Exhibit Z, PFR at 13.) However, that case dealt with diligence in developing in the state

courts the the factual basis for federal claims. Petitioner cited it for the proposition that

diligence may be shown despite failure. 

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a motion to recall a mandate is only issued based upon a “balancing of competing interests

. . . the interests of justice. . . [and] the interest in bringing litigation to an end . . [or] where

there has been either fraud, imposition, or mistake of fact” Lindus v. Northern Insur. Co. Of

New York, 103 Ariz. 160, 162, 438 P.2d 311, 313 (1968). 

Accordingly, presentation in the Motion to Recall Mandate was not fair presentation

of any claims raised therein.

Presentation to PCR Court - Petitioner also raised the facts of this claim in his third

PCR Petition. (Exhibit R, 3rd PCR Pet. at 4-8.) However, he cited only state law in support

of his claim, including Ariz. Rev. Stat. Const. Article 2, §§ 23 and 24, Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-

221, and 21-102(A), Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.2 and 18.5(h), and 31.8(h). (Id. at 8-11.)

Presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals - Conversely, in his Petition for Review

to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner specifically asserted that he was denied his “right

to a fair trial in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution and Article 2, Section 4, 23 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution (which includes

a required unanimous 12 person verdict in a death penalty case and the right to appeal that

conviction.” (Exhibit Z, PFR at 11.) 20 However, this was buried in a section of his brief

discussing Petitioner’s claim that the transcript of the jury polling had been improperly

altered. 

Perhaps it would be tempting to suggest that this was nonetheless sufficient to assert

the federal claim of jury misconduct. However, the PCR court had already determined that

the facts of that claim had already been asserted to and rejected by the Arizona Supreme

Court on direct appeal. (Exhibit T, M.E. 7/10/01.) Thus, Petitioner’s Petition for Review

asserted only the claim “that the 1986 trial court reporter illegally altered a trial transcript of

the jury’s 1986 trial verdict.” (Exhibit Z, PFR at 3 (summary of issues presented for

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21 Because the claim had not been previously presented, this Court need not “look

through” the appeals court’s summary denial to the trial court decision, Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797 (1991), nor apply a presumption that the summary decision was on federal

grounds, Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). The issue is not how the claim was

disposed of, but rather whether it was fairly presented. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 918,

n. 23 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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review).) It is not surprising then, that the reference to the actual participation issue is

mentioned as an aside in the transcript argument.

Moreover, Petitioner did not assert that the transcript alteration was itself a federal

violation. Rather, Petitioner relied upon Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.8(c) and (h) and State v.

Chavarria, 569 P.2d 831 (Ariz. 1977) and State v. Bass, 12 P.3d 796 (Ariz. 2000). These

cases dealt with the standard of proof required to show a waiver to a jury trial, and were cited

by analogy to reference the courts’ presumption for relying upon transcripts. The opinion

in Chavarria did cite Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), for the proposition that the

“record must affirmatively show that the appellant waived his right to a jury trial.” 569 P.2d

at 832. But no discussion of a federal right to an unaltered transcript was considered. Bass

dealt directly with purported errors in the original transcript, but made no reference to any

related federal constitutional right. 12 P.3d at 801. Thus the citation of these cases did not

raise a federal claim based on the alteration.

Moreover, even if Petitioner did manage to adequately assert his federal claims to the

Arizona Court of Appeals, because Petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the PCR

court, his presentation of them to the Arizona Court of Appeals was not a fair presentation.21

Presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court - Finally, in his Petition for Review to the

Arizona Supreme Court in his 3rd PCR proceeding, Petitioner relied solely upon the alteration

to the transcript, and asserted no federal claims, referencing only “Arizona’s constitutional

framework” and his “constitutional right to a jury trial.”. (Exhibit CC, PFR at 10-11.) 

Summary re Misconduct by Juror Milam - Petitioner did not fairly present his federal

claims of jury misconduct concerning deliberation by Juror Milam and the related alteration

to the transcript to the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court.

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Accordingly, Petitioner’s state remedies on these claims were not properly exhausted.

(2) Ground III - Ineffective Assistance - In his Ground 3, Petitioner asserts that his

rights to effective assistance of counsel were violated when trial counsel failed to adequately

challenge inconsistent testimony by Cobey. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Petitioner asserts that he presented this claim in his first PCR proceeding.

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s state remedies on this claim were not properly exhausted

because the claim was not asserted to the Arizona Supreme Court. As discussed above,

however, presentation of Petitioner’s PCR claims to the Arizona Supreme Court were not

required to exhaust his remedies for federal habeas purposes.

Presentation to PCR Court - Petitioner argued to the PCR Court that he received

“ineffective assistance of counsel,” citing “U.S. Const. Amends., VI and XIV.” (Exhibit B,

PCR Pet. at 54.) He argued that trial counsel failed to adequately impeach Cobey. (Id. at

54-60.) 

Presentation to Arizona Court of Appeals - Petitioner again raised the facts of this

claim in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals on his first PCR petition.

(Exhibit E, PFR at 15-18.) There, Petitioner did not cite the federal constitution directly.

However, Petitioner did quote the portions of State v. Vickers, 180 Ariz. 521, 525, 885 P.2d

1086, 1090 (1994) which quoted Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) for the

standard for ineffective assistance claims. (Exhibit E, PFR at 17.) Moreover, Vickers was

explicitly based upon an assertion of a “right to effective assistance of counsel at trial. U.S.

Const. Amend VI.” 180 Ariz. at 525, 885 P.2d at 1090. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals remanded that issue to the trial court for an evidentiary

hearing. Following that hearing and the PCR court’s order, Petitioner raised the facts of this

claim in his consolidated, second Petition for Review filed December 29, 2000 (Exhibit O

at 32-33). Petitioner did not directly identify the legal basis for his claim. But he did cite the

instructions by the Arizona Court of Appeals upon remand of the first PCR petition, which

included citations to a variety of federal cases to establish the standard for an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. (I.d at 13-14.) That was sufficient to alert the Arizona Court

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of Appeals to the federal nature of his ineffectiveness claim.

Presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court - Although Petitioner contends in the

Petition that he submitted this claim to the Arizona Supreme Court in his first post-conviction

relief proceeding (Petition Doc. 1 at 7), which he in turn asserts was through his November,

1994 consolidated Petition for Review (id. at 2.) However, Petitioner’s November, 1994

Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court did not include a claim of ineffective

assistance based upon counsel’s failures with regard to Cobey. (See generally Exhibit CC.)

Nonetheless, as discussed above, Petitioner was not required to present his PCR

claims to the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust his state remedies for federal habeas

purposes. 

Summary re Exhaustion of Ineffective Assistance Claim - Petitioner fairly presented

his ineffective assistance claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. His failure to present them

to the Arizona Supreme Court was not required. Consequently, Petitioner’s state remedies

on his claims in Ground III were properly exhausted.

e. Summary re Exhaustion

Respondents concede that Plaintiff properly exhausted his claims in Ground I (Brady).

(Answer, Doc. 16 at 15.) The undersigned concludes that Petitioner has properly exhausted

his state remedies on his claims in Ground III (Ineffective Assistance), and that he did not

properly exhaust his state remedies on his claims in Ground II (Jury Misconduct). 

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis,

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

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(1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to

the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim.

Proc. 32.2(a), and its timeliness bar in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 14-15.)

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for review of

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a

subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a claim

may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post conviction relief that "has been waived

at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). 

Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply shows "that the

defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding."

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show

that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights

“that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399,

166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v.

Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver

of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the

Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at

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22 Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type

of waiver required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz.

at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission),

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived by

omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal sentence

(waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge conflict of

interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 2008).

23 In the unpublished decision in State v. Marietta, 2009 WL 1804167 (App. 2009),

the Arizona Court of Appeals found that such a claim of juror misconduct by false testimony

on voir dire was waivable under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 by failure to raise it. But see Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 31.24 (no precedential effect and citation of unpublished decisions). 

24 Petitioner presented the facts of his unexhausted claims to the state courts. To the

extent that he may have asserted the related federal claims on one of the levels (albeit

inadequately to result in exhaustion), it is possible that the claims would be deemed

precluded under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2) by prior presentation rather than waived.

Because the effect would be the same, and the undersigned finds the claims also time barred,

no attempt is made to discern whether these claims would be deemed precluded.

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450, 46 P.3d at 1071.22

Here, Petitioner’s unexhausted claim as to misconduct by Juror Pigg on voir dire does

not fit within the list of claims identified as requiring a personal waiver. Nor is it of the same

character.23 Therefore, it appears that this claim would be precluded by his failure to raise it

in an earlier proceeding.

On the other hand, the purported participation in deliberations by excused Juror Milam

and the related transcript alteration could be construed as affecting the right to a twelve

person jury, and thus requiring a knowing waiver. See e.g. State v. Prince, 142, Ariz. 256,

258, 689 P.2d 515, 517 (984) (knowing waiver of right to twelve member jury required).24

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions

for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order

and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128,

912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting that first petition

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of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That time has long

since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to timeliness

bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his claims. 

Nor, with one exception, does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines

the excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a claim

is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state

courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application.

Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his unexhausted claims. Paragraph

(f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. Paragraph (g) has

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no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in the law since his last PCR

proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no

application to Petitioner’s procedural claims. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404, 166

P.3d 945, 959 (App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where petitioner had “ not established that

trial error ...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”). 

Summary - Accordingly, the undersigned must conclude that review through

Arizona’s direct appeal and post-conviction relief process is no longer possible for

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Summary re Procedural Default - Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal claims in

Ground II (Juror Misconduct), and is now procedurally barred from doing so. Accordingly,

these unexhausted claims are procedurally defaulted, and absent a showing of cause and

prejudice or actual innocence, must be dismissed with prejudice. 

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Although both "cause" and "prejudice"

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, a court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43

(1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991).

 "Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123. "Because

of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court

'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274

(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The

Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily turn on some objective

factor external to petitioner, for instance:

 ... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

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reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by officials",

made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this

standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Here, Petitioner does not overtly assert any cause to excuse his failure to exhaust. 

Petitioner does argue that his efforts to pursue his claims as to the deliberation by

Juror Milam were stymied by alteration of the transcript and the failure of the prosecution

to serve copies of the amended transcript, so that the Arizona Supreme Court’s reliance upon

it in denying that claim was a surprise and was thus unopposed. (Reply, Doc. 55 at 16-17.)

Petitioner goes so far as to assert that the altered transcript “has never appeared in any record

in this case.” (Reply, Doc. 55 at 16.) However, Petitioner was able to quote the altered

transcript in his third PCR petition. (Exhibit R, PCR Pet. at 7.)

More importantly, Petitioner does not suggest how knowledge of the existence of the

amended transcript would have affected his failure to challenge on direct appeal Juror

Milam’s participation on federal grounds, rather than just on state grounds. Perhaps

Petitioner confuses the lack of success on this claim (as a result of his lack of opportunity to

rebut the alteration because he was unaware of it until after the Arizona Supreme Court

ruled), with the failure to assert the claims as a federal ones.

Nor does Petitioner suggest how the delay in obtaining the transcript prevented him

from challenging the alteration on federal grounds in his third PCR proceeding. By that time,

Petitioner was well aware of the alteration. Any lack of access to the actual transcript did not

preclude the assertion of his federal claim.

Thus, Petitioner has failed to show “cause” to excuse his failure to properly exhaust

his state remedies, and is not entitled to be relieved from his procedural defaults under the

“cause and prejudice” standard.

4. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800

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25 Petitioner also complains in the 10 pages of his Ground One of a variety of

purported improprieties by the prosecution and the PCR courts, i.e. presenting false

testimony, denying Petitioner a hearing, etc. The undersigned construes these allegations to

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F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in

an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis

added). 

Petitioner asserts he has garnered evidence of his “actual innocence.” 

The Supreme Court has instructed that “a federal court faced with allegations of actual

innocence whether of the sentence or of the crime charged, must first address all nondefaulted claims for comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural

default.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 394 (2004). Having already addressed the other

grounds to excuse the default, the claims of actual innocence will be addressed after the

merits of the non-defaulted claims are disposed of.

B. GROUND I - BRADY

In his Ground I, Petitioner asserts that his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963) were violated:

 (1) as a result of the prosecution’s failure to disclose: 

(a) the August 19, 1985 Phoenix Police report identifying the witness Dave

Brown and connecting Cobey with a “drug rip-off”;

(b) 1985 Phoenix Police reports on witness Tabola; 

(c) interviews of exculpatory witness Flood; 

(d) Cobey’s May, 1986 pre-sentence report; and 

(e) a written declaration by Cobey referenced in the pre-sentence report;

and 

(2) as a result of the PCR court’s consideration of the evidence on an item by item

basis25

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be part of the res gestae. The only items of evidence alleged by Petitioner to have been

existent and not disclosed are those identified herein.

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1. Duty of Disclosure Under Brady

 In Brady, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s due process rights are violated

when the state fails to disclose to the defendant “evidence favorable to an accused . . . where

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad

faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. A failure of the prosecutor to disclose evidence

to the defense is a due process violation, only if three conditions are met: “The evidence at

issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is

impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282

(1999). 

Favorable Evidence - Brady mandates the disclosure of “favorable” evidence. This

obligation extends to impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence, and

to evidence that was not requested by the defense. Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169, 1176

(9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

However, the favorability of evidence is determined by the evidence itself, not based

upon the potential use to which a defendant may have eventually put it, e.g. by discovering

additional evidence based on the undisclosed evidence, or by adjusting his trial strategy. See

U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976) (discussing absence of requirement of disclosure

of all information, albeit in the context of materiality). In Agurs, the Court discussed the

distinctions and correlations between the prosecutor’s before-the-fact determination of

favorability and the reviewing court’s afer-the-fact determination of materiality. Id. at 108.

To require disclosure of evidence that in hindsight was material (e.g. may have changed the

outcome), but which viewed prospectively was not favorable evidence would be to mandate

disclosure of the prosecution’s entire file. “If everything that might influence a jury must be

disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to

allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.” Id. at 109. Thus, in

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Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), the Court found no Brady violation despite the

prosecution’s failure to disclose the identity of a prosecution witness prior to trial, who was

an informant known to the defendant, despite allegations that the disclosure would have

permitted a fuller opportunity to prepare cross-examination of the witness.

That is not to imply that information available to the prosecution must itself be

admissible evidence. Although expressed in terms of materiality, the Ninth Circuit has

plainly held that information is subject to Brady even if not admissible, so long as it could

lead to admissible evidence. See Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1116-1117 (9th Cir.

1998), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998); U.S. v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d 1056, 1059

(9th Cir. 1989). But see Seder, A Search for the Truth or a Game of Strategy? The Circuit

Split over the Prosecution’s Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible Exculpatory Information,

51 Syracuse L. Rev. 139 (2001) (noting split among circuit on whether inadmissible evidence

is subject to disclosure).

Neither is it to suggest that favorability is determined based upon the subjective state

of mind of the prosecutor as to the nature of the information. It is the impact on the fairness

of the trial which is at issue, not the culpability of the prosecutor. U.S. v. Price, 566 F.3d

900, 907-908 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, for example, it is not necessary to show that prior to trial

the prosecutor knew the testimony at trial for which the evidence would be impeaching. In

Kyles, the Supreme Court rejected a proposal to change it’s materiality standard because

under it prosecutors were “forced to make judgment calls about what would count as

favorable evidence, owing to the very fact that the character of a piece of evidence as

favorable will often turn on the context of the existing or potential evidentiary record.” Kyles

v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995). 

Suppression - The prosecution’s duty to disclose favorable evidence is not dependent

upon a request from the accused, and even an inadvertent failure to disclose may constitute

a violation. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 110 (1976). “The term

‘suppression’ does not describe merely overt or purposeful acts on the part of the prosecutor;

sins of omission are equally within Brady's scope.” U.S. v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir.

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26 Petitioner goes to some lengths to show that the participants in this case

(investigating officers, prosecutors, judges, witness’ counsel, etc.) were intertwined with

Petitioner’s drug prosecution, the Howk/Brown/Cobey investigation, the prosecutions of

Tabola based upon the raid of his home and the undercover operation in which Tabola was

providing counter-surveillance, the prosecution of Cobey, the prosecution of Hatch, etc. The

undersigned is unaware of any assertion by Respondents that any of Petitioner’s Brady

materials were not within the control of the prosecution and thus properly deemed

“suppressed.” To the contrary, Respondents counter Petitioner’s Brady arguments based

solely on the failure of the other two components: favorability and materiality. Accordingly,

no effort is made to analyze Petitioner’s claims on the intertwining of the various

investigations and prosecutions.

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2009). The prosecution is responsible for disclosing not only what is in the prosecutor’s case

file, but any information known to the prosecutor or any investigating officers or members

of the prosecution team. “[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable

evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the

police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).26

However, “Brady and its progeny do not require the government to conduct an

investigation for the defense.” U.S. v. Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 1997). Nor is there

a Brady violation where the substance of the evidence is otherwise known to the defense.

“When, as here, a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the supposed

Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by the government.” U.S. v. Aichele, 941

F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991). See also U.S. v. Bond, 552 F.3d 1092, 1095-1097 (9th Cir.

2009). As Justice White said, “any allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment

of what the State knows at trial in comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.” Giles

v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (White, J., concurring).

Prejudice - “To determine whether prejudice exists, we look to the materiality of the

suppressed evidence.” Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008). Evidence is

deemed material for Brady purposes “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). A “reasonable probability,”

in turn, “is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “A

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‘reasonable probability’ does not require showing by a preponderance that the outcome

would have been different.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 479 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

banc). “The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received

a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,

understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.

419, 434 (1995). 

Once a reviewing Court has found a failure to disclose "material evidence," i.e.

evidence whose absence caused prejudice, no further harmless-error analysis is required. Id.

at 435.

The materiality of a particular item of suppressed evidence is not decided in isolation.

Rather, the Court must determine whether the suppressed evidence was material based on the

cumulative impact of all the evidence the government suppressed. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-38.

Moreover, in “determining whether the failure to disclose Brady material undermines our

confidence in the outcome of the trial,” the court must “weigh the withheld evidence ‘in the

context of the entire record.’ ” U.S. v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 913 (9th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless,

“[w]e evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item; there is no

other way. We evaluate its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality separately and at the

end of the discussion.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437, n. 10.

2. AEDPA Limitations on Relief

Legal Determinations - While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search

for violations of federal law, not every error justifies relief. "[A] federal habeas court may

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24-

25 (2002) (per curiam). Rather, to justify habeas relief, a state court's decision must be

"contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 

Factual Determinations - Federal courts are further authorized to grant habeas relief

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in cases where the state-court decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's

fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state

court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992,

999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Presumption of Correctness - Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to

retry his case in the federal courts by presenting new evidence. There is a well established

presumption of correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption has been

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual issue made

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 

3. Police Report re Brown

Petitioner asserts he was wrongly denied access to the August 19, 1985 Phoenix

Police report identifying the witness Dave Brown and connecting Cobey with a “drug ripoff.” Petitioner contends that Brown ultimately testified at the hearing in his third PCR

proceeding that he was the person who gave Petitioner $3700 the week the victim was

murdered, and that Cobey and Hatch were involved in the murder, rather than Petitioner, and

that Cobey had orchestrated a drug rip-off at the location where the victim was found.

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 5B.) 

Undisclosed Evidence - The referenced police reports have now been provided as

Exhibits VV, ZZ, AAA, BBB, and CCC. They reflect that on August 19, 1985, Officer

Driscoll was dispatched to investigate a possible fight or shots fired. While in route, he was

advised that an off-duty DPS officer was following possible suspects. Two witnesses had

observed the altercation, and reported it to the off duty DPS officer, who had pursued the

people leaving the scene. Ultimately, the suspects, John Howk and Kevin “Kobie” were

apprehended. Howk related that after leaving Cobey’s residence he had stopped to assist

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people with a vehicle pulled over at 2300 W. Hartford, and they robbed him at gun point of

$800. He returned and got Cobey and they began to search for the robbers. Ultimately,

Howk was found to be in possession of narcotic drugs, and admitted he was selling drugs.

Howk denied that the robbery was drug related. Detectives Applegate and Maxwell located

a vehicle at the scene with a firearm under the seat, and fingerprints of David Brown were

found on a beer can in the car, and his drivers license in a wallet. 

Additional Evidence - At the PCR hearing on this issue, Petitioner presented

testimony of Dave Brown that he and his brother Ken were the two that at the time of the

murder had given Petitioner $2500 to buy cocaine which was not delivered. Brown testified

that he subsequently was told where Cobey was and that Cobey was attempting to sell gold

jewelry, and that he attempted to collect the $2500 from Cobey. The robbery of John Howk

was instigated by Kevin Cobey as a means of paying off the debt. In the course of setting

up the robbery, Cobey cautioned Brown not to shoot anyone because he didn’t “want to go

through that again after what Kenny did to Rob.” (Exhibit EEEE, R.T. 5/21/02 at 17.) To

corroborate Brown’s testimony, Petitioner offered testimony of the mutual friend, Jimmy

Pechac, who Brown had gone to looking for Petitioner and who had told Brown about

Cobey’s attempts to sell him jewelry and how to contact Cobey. Petitioner also offered

testimony of an investigating officer, Officer Applegate, to show that Howk was a drug

dealer, and that the robbery of Howk occurred near where the victim’s murder occurred.

State Court’s Decision - The last reasoned decision on Petitioner’s claim concerning

the police reports on Brown was the trial court’s decision in his third PCR proceeding.

(Exhibit W, M.E. 7/15/02. See also Exhibit AA Order 1/14/04 (Ariz. Ct. App. summary

decision); Exhibit DD (Ariz. Sup. Ct. summary decision).) In its first order on that PCR

petition, the trial court noted that the claim was based upon “an exculpatory police report

involving Kevin Cobey and a 1985 drug transaction was withheld from him improperly.”

(Exhibit T, M.E. 7/10/01 at 2.) However, the trial court analyzed the claim only under the

state law “newly discovered evidence” standard, and set a hearing. (Id. at 3-4.) In its

ultimate decision, however, the trial court again did not address Petitioner’s clam as a Brady

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27 Perhaps the trial court was addressing the newly discovered evidence standard as

a precursor to addressing the merits under Arizona’s preclusion and timeliness bars. In doing

so, however, the Court addressed solely the hearing testimony of Brown, and did not address

the underlying police reports which were the materials subject to Brady. 

28 It was not that the Brady claim was not fairly presented. Indeed, in its written

closing argument in the third PCR proceeding, the State characterized Petitioner as asserting

claims of “newly discovery evidence and a Brady violation.” (Exhibit X, Responding

Closing Arguments at 2.) Nonetheless, the state argued solely the “newly discovered

evidence” standard under state law (id. at 21-31) and made only passing reference to Brady

(see e.g. id. at 42). (See also Exhibit Z, Pet. Rev. at 17-18 (arguing Brady claim to Ariz. Ct.

App.).) The trial court appears to have followed suit, and failed to address the Brady claim

at all.

29 While that case notes the “favorable evidence” component of the Brady standard,

it does not address whether conflicts with a defendant’s testimony necessarily renders

evidence unfavorable. 

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claim, but as the assertion of a state-law claim of newly discovery evidence, i.e. the

testimony of Brown.27 Accordingly, no state court has addressed the merits of this portion

of Petitioner’s Brady claim, and this Court is left to address the claim de novo.

28 “Because

the [state] courts did not reach the merits of [the defendant’s federal] claim, federal habeas

review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies under AEDPA to ‘any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.’” Cone v. Bell, 129 S.Ct. 1769,

1784 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

Respondents’ Arguments - Respondents contend that the evidence was not favorable

because Brown’s testimony contradicted Petitioner’s own testimony at trial, citing as

authority U.S. v. Luis-Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1983). (Answer, Doc. 16 at

25.)29 Respondents also contend that this Court should defer to the state court’s findings that

Brown’s testimony was not credible. (Answer, Doc. 16 at 25.) However, the testimony is

only relevant as potential fruit of the reports (and thus indicative of their materiality) only

after it is determined that the reports themselves were favorable and thus subject to

disclosure.

Evidence Not Favorable - Petitioner does not show that the police reports themselves

were favorable. They showed little more than that Cobey’s friend Howk had been the victim

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30 Moreover, this additional information was problematic for petitioner. Petitioner’s

testimony was that the lost drug money came from “Phil” and “Sam” that he met through a

“Dave” and “Tim”. (Exhibit VVV, R.T. 4/3/86 at 71-73.) In contrast, Brown testified that

the drug money came from him and his brother Kenny Brown (Exhibit EEEE, R.T. 5/21/02

at 29), and maybe “Jerry Whitley” (id. at 43). Petitioner claimed he was nervous because

the buyer’s who lost the $2,500, “a couple of Mexican males”, were in his apartment when

he was interviewed by Detective Butler. (Exhibit VVV, R.T. 4/3/86 at 39, 46.) In contrast,

Brown claimed his contacts with Petitioner after delivering the money were by phone

(Exhibit EEEE, R.T. 5/21/02 at 6-7) and in a bar (id. at 44-45).

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of a robbery in the area where the victim’s body was found and near where Cobey was living,

that it appeared to be a drug related robbery, and that a Dave Brown was involved in the

robbery. This evidence was not favorable, but neutral.

It is only the addition of the information provided by Brown’s testimony that would

makes the police reports favorable, i.e. that Brown was acting at the invitation or direction

of Cobey, that Cobey had made incriminating comments to Brown, and that this Dave Brown

was the Dave who had provided $2500 for cocaine to Petitioner.30 Petitioner does not

suggest that this additional information was known to the prosecution (or any member of the

prosecution team). 

Petitioner would have this Court extend the Brady disclosure duty beyond favorable

information, to include any information that might lead to favorable information. Petitioner

shows no authority for such a broad reading of the Brady duty. Rather, the disclosure duty

is limited to information which is itself either “exculpatory” or “impeaching.” Strickler, 527

U.S. at 281-282. 

Brady...established that the prosecution's suppression of “evidence

favorable to an accused upon [his] request violates due process where

the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.” Thus, the rule

applies only to impeachment and exculpatory evidence; neutral or

inculpatory evidence lies outside its coverage.

U.S. v. Nixon, 881 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1989). See also U.S. v. Grintjes, 237 F.3d 876,

880 (7th Cir. 2001) (inculpatory evidence not subject to Brady even if defendant could have

used it to conduct investigation leading to exculpatory evidence). “The most that can be said

of these materials is that they might have provided investigatory leads. Brady does not

require a prosecutor to turn over files reflecting leads and ongoing investigations where no

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exonerating or impeaching evidence has turned up.” Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1037

(9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that because the Brown police reports

themselves were not favorable evidence, no duty of disclosure applied. 

Reports Requested - The undersigned notes that the defense filed a motion

specifically requesting “Copies of all police reports, surveillance notes and field

interrogations regarding Robert Dana Richards, Kevin Cobey, Kenneth Hatch and Tom

Ellinghausen.” (Reply, Exhibits, Doc. 55-4, at physical p. 6. Thompson Affidavit at ¶ 4

(referencing Motion for Disclosure requesting).) The Howk/Brown/Cobey reports would

have fallen into this request. 

However, the requirement for disclosure does not depend upon the existence of a

specific request. It is true that in his dissent in U. S. v. Bagley, Justice Stevens would have

applied a less strict standard of materiality (not favorability),where requested material had

not been disclosed, i.e. the evidence “could have affected” the outcome. 473 U.S. 667, 710-

711 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, that formulation was rejected by the Court

which instead held it’s single standard for materiality “sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no

request,’ ‘general request,’ and ‘specific request’ cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose

evidence favorable to the accused.” 473 U.S. at 682. Nor does a request necessarily render

evidence favorable. 

In Bagley, the Court did note that although no request is required to impose an

obligation to disclose, the existence of a request may impact the evaluation of the effect of

a failure to disclose because of the negative implication that favorable evidence does not

exist. Id. at 682-683. Here, because the reports themselves were not related to any fact at

issue in the instant case, there was no negative implication to be made from their nondisclosure.

4. Police Reports re Tabola

Petitioner complains that he was not provided the 1985 Phoenix Police reports on

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31 The November 7, 1984 police report (Exhibit SS) reflected that Tabola told police

the victim had been at his home on October 12, 1984 at 7:45pm, and called someone who

owed him $1100, and that the victim intended to get his money back by selling the guy flour.

This report largely matched Tabola’s trial testimony.

32 Had the trial court simply employed the language of a “likelihood” of a different

outcome, the decision would have been contrary to Supreme Court law. See Kyles, 514 U.S.

at 434 (noting that a likelihood of a different result is not necessary, but rather a “reasonable

probability”, i.e. a sufficient probability that the verdict is not “worthy of confidence”).

Instead, the trial court’s use of the disjunctive (“no likelihood or reasonable probability”)

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witness Tabola. He argues that with this information, the defense could have impeached

Tabola by showing: (1) his perjury about his own drug dealing; and (2) he was afforded

favorable treatment for his testimony. He also argues that it denied the defense evidence of

“third party culpability” and other impeaching evidence, and that it would have shown that

the prosecution used Tabola to obtain the search warrant when they knew he was a cocaine

dealer and not telling everything he knew. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5D.) 

The police reports have been produced as Exhibits TT, UU, VV, WW, XX, andYY.31

Exhibits TT and UU reflect that based upon information from a confidential informant of

illegal drug possession and sales, Detectives Applegate and Maxwell, among others,

executed a search warrant at Tabola’s house on March 19, 1985. They discovered “large

quantities” of cocaine and marijuana, packaging materials, scales, grinders, cutting agents,

etc. and two handguns, one of which had been stolen. One handgun was a .25 caliber Raven

automatic and the other was a .38 caliber Colt Mark IV automatic. Tabola and Arthur Halley

were arrested at the scene on charges of possession of cocaine for sale.

Exhibits WW, XX, and YY relate that on May 13, 1985, Tabola was arrested in

connection with an undercover drug operation, on the basis of his serving as countersurveillance for the drug sellers. 

State Court Decision - Petitioner raised his Brady claim concerning the Tabola

reports in his third PCR Petition (Exhibit R at 23-27). The state court summarily denied the

claim, finding “no likelihood or reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed,

the result of the trial would have been different.” (Exhibit T, M.E. 7/10/01 at 4.)32 Thus the

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indicates a finding that not only was there no “likelihood” there also was not a “reasonable

probability.” 

33 It is true that the undersigned has concluded that the Brown/Howk/Cobey reports

were not, of themselves, favorable and thus not subject to disclosure. See infra at ___.

However, the state court did not reach that conclusion but instead ignored Petitioner’s Brady

claim and simply addressed the Brown testimony under a state law standard for newlydiscovered evidence. Id. As such, the state court had no basis to fail to consider the

materiality of the Tabola reports in conjunction with the Brown/Howk/Cobey reports. 

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trial court applied the standard applicable under Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).

However, as noted by Petitioner, the trial court considered the materiality of this

evidence individually, and not cumulatively with the other withheld information, i.e. the

Brown/Howk/Cobey Report. (See Petition, Doc. 1 at 5D; Exhibit T, M.E. 7/10/1.) Thus, the

state court’s decision was contrary to Supreme Court law mandating consideration of the

cumulative effect of all withheld evidence.33 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-38. However, the

undersigned has concluded that the Brown/Howk/Cobey reports were not, of themselves,

favorable information, and thus no disclosure was required. Consequently, the undersigned

cannot say that the decision to determine the materiality of the Tabola reports in isolation was

improper. 

That does not resolve, however, whether the Tabola reports were properly deemed

immaterial. 

Drug Dealing - Petitioner argues that these reports would have allowed the defense

to impeach Tabola based upon his drug dealing. Petitioner contends that on crossexamination Tabola denied dealing drugs. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5C.) The record reflects that

Tabola admitted his drug dealing conviction, but denied that he was involved with dealing

with the victim. On direct examination, Tabola plainly admitted his conviction of

possession for sale:

Q. [by Mr. Thurston, prosecutor] Now, before you came here

today, at some time in 1985 and, more particularly in July of 1985,

were you convicted and sentenced for the felony offense here in

Maricopa County of possession narcotic drug for sale?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Has that fact, that you got convicted of a felony, changed

your testimony in this case?

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34 Petitioner does argue that the debt was established by the victim’s ledger. At the

hearing on his fourth PCR proceeding, Petitioner’s counsel argued for such an inference: 

Now, the other thing that happened, and this speaks for itself in

terms of the effect on potential cross-examination, is that Tabola and

Halley not only had a lengthy criminal history but arrests and

subsequently it was learned Richards’ drug ledger reflected debts to

Richards by both Tabola and Halley.

Now the State correctly says, well, we don’t know that. We just

know that Rob Richards use initials L.Y. equals Larry prince, for

instance. But we do know that the Supreme Court in its case on Prince

established as law of the case the formula for interpreting Ron

Richards’ drug ledger. And if you follow that formula, indeed L.Y.

equals Prince and A.R.T. equals Art Halley and you go on from there.

That information wasn’t known and would have been dynamic

information to cross-examine these witnesses. 

(Doc. 70, Reply, Exhibit, R.T. 11/22/05 at 10-11.) Counsel for the state summarized the

evidence on the issue:

Ms. Gieszl [Petitioner’s PCR counse] said that the [Arizona]

Supreme Court or said that the drug ledger established that A.T. was

Arthur Halley; oh, come on. We don’t - - we simply don’t know.

We argued at trial that L.Y. might mean Larry and some of the

other things might mean other people. But we don’t know. And we

never will. The victim is not going to come back to life to tell us what

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A. No, sir.

(Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 112.) On cross-examination, Tabola testified:

Q. [by Mr. Thompson, defense counsel] Mr. Tabola, you were

convicted of possession of narcotic drug for sale. Where you involved

in any sales with Rob Richards?

A. No, sir.

Q. Were you involved in any transactions with him, other than

his gift to you of cocaine in return for the use of your apartment?

A. No, sir.

(Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 114.) Petitioner does not show any additional impeachment

regarding Tabola’s drug dealing which would have been suggested by these police reports.

To be sure, Petitioner argues that in the related prosecutions “it was discovered that

. . . (3) Tabola and Halley were dealing cocaine from that house and owed Rob [the victim]

$4095 when he was murdered.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5C; Reply, Doc. 55 at 26 ($4,095 and

$1,725.) However, Petitioner proffers nothing from the police reports to establish that that

debt.34

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he meant by his ledger.

The drug ledger does not show that Arthur Halley owed the

victim anything. It says in its entirety “A.T. 40.95". That’s all.

And to assume that A.T. means Arthur Halley and 40.95 means

that Arthur Halley owed the victim $4,095 is simply a - - it’s a fantasy.

It simply is not evidence enough. It’s not evidence.

(Id. at 25-26.) 

Certainly solid evidence that Tabola was engaged in selling drugs with/through/from

the victim would have been usable for impeachment and some indication that Tabola might

be the perpetrator. However, the evidence that Halley owed the victim money was at least

as questionable as the evidence that Petitioner’s debts were reflected in the drug debt log.

Moreover, the connection of that debt from Halley to Tabola was similarly thin, being little

more than their association as drug dealing/using roommates. Impeachment of Halley was

irrelevant as he was not a witness against Petitioner.

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Relationship with Victim - Petitioner argues that Tabola falsely claimed he was not

friends with the victim. Tabola testified:

Q. [By Mr. Thurston, prosecutor] In reference to the questions

the defense lawyer asked you about Finney Bones [a comedy club];

when Rob came over to your house was he ever trying to get you to go

to Finney Bones with him?

A. He was. Anybody that wanted to, yeah, he would have took

me if I wanted to go, sure.

Q. What was your problem that night?

A. Well, one thing, I was sick. And the other thing, I wouldn’t

have gone someplace with him.

Q. You and he didn’t hang around together?

A. No. We weren’t buddies, pals, or nothing.

(Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 124.) Nothing in the police reports counters that testimony.

Petitioner asserts that Tabola’s pre-sentence report indicated Tabola “‘shared the apartment

with Robert Richards who was a dealer of narcotics’ and that ‘he let Mr. Richards use the

premises in exchange for drugs.’” (Exhibit R. 3rd PCR Pet. at 24-25.) Perhaps Petitioner

extrapolates from the pre-sentence report writers statement that Tabola and the victim

“shared the apartment” that there was some relationship beyond landlord and tenant.

However, even that writer apparently clarified that the relationship was one of “use [of] the

premises in exchange for drugs.” (Exhibit R. 3rd PCR Pet. at 24-25.) However, Tabola

testified to essentially those same facts: 

Q. [By Mr. Thurston, prosecutor] Any [sic] in reference to your

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residence there, was Rob a roommate or a person staying there with

you?

A. He was neither.

Q. What was he, as far as your residence and you go?

A. He stopped by occasionally to - - to - - he - - I let him use

one of my closets to do some business in.

Q. Okay. In that regard, the business he was doing was storing

cocaine there?

A. Well, whatever he did, storing it, cutting it up, changing the

form of it, whatever. 

Q. And back at that period of time, in October of ‘84, did you

yourself use any cocaine?

A. Pardon me, sir?

Q. Did you yourself use any cocaine?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. As a matter of fact, would Rob Richards give you anything

in return for you letting him store whatever he wanted in a closet there?

A. Yes, sir. That was more or less the deal. He would give me

some for me allowing him to use my premises.

Q. He’d give you some cocaine?

A. Yes, sir.

(Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 100-101.) 

Favorable Treatment - Petitioner also argues that these reports would have permitted

impeachment based upon Tabola’s favorable treatment. Petitioner argues that Tabola never

spent a day in jail as a result of his multiple arrests. However, Petitioner fails to show how

the police reports establish that Tabola was given favorable treatment. 

At best, the reports reflect that Tabola was arrested based upon the March 19, 1985

search of his house, and again based upon the undercover drug operation on May 13, 1985.

The subsequent arrest indicates that Tabola was no longer detained as of May 13, 1985 on

the earlier arrest. That by itself, however, establishes no favorable treatment, inasmuch as

a defendant’s release may be ordered by the court despite an ongoing prosecution.

At the pretrial hearing concerning impeachment of Tabola with his drug dealing

conviction, the prosecutor related: “I think [Tabola] was out - - he was out on bond, or

something and then he was arrested on this case and we were continuing - - continuing the

sentencing until after this trial because the outcome might affect what his character is, as far

as that sentence.” (Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 9.) Moreover, the reports establish neither

an express or tacit agreement of favorable treatment in return for testimony. “Without an

agreement, no evidence was suppressed, and the state's conduct, not disclosing something

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it did not have, cannot be considered a Brady violation.” Todd v. Schomig, 283 F.3d 842, 849

(7th Cir.2002). Nor does Petitioner suggest that such an agreement existed, let alone that it

existed at the time of his trial. “The government is free to reward witnesses for their

cooperation with favorable treatment in pending criminal cases without disclosing to the

defendant its intention to do so, provided that it does not promise anything to the witnesses

prior to their testimony.” Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir.2003). The question

under consideration, however, is not whether there was an agreement required to be

disclosed, but an inference of an agreement and thus bias to be made from evidence that was

otherwise subject to disclosure.

Moreover, the defense was aware at the time of trial that Tabola had been prosecuted

for drug dealing, and had received a sentence of probation.

MR. THURSTON [prosecutor]: Your Honor, there is - - there is

probably only one issue that’s really in dispute here.

There is a conviction against witness James Tabola for

possession of narcotic drug for sale. It’s a 1985 conviction. He’s our

witness. And I think they can impeach him with that.

(Exhibit HHH, R.T. 3/19/86 at 3-4.) 

THE COURT: With respect to Mr. Tabola, the Court finds that

in regard to his 1985 conviction for possession of a narcotic drug that

the probative value of that prior felony conviction outweighs any

prejudice [sic] value it may have.

That was an Arizona conviction, counsel?

MR. THURSTON: Yes, Your Honor. Here in Maricopa County.

He’s presently on probation.

(Id. at 10.) 

Petitioner does not suggest what additional information on favorable treatment would

have been discovered had the Tabola reports been provided, nor does Petitioner even suggest

that such additional information exists. For example, Petitioner does not suggest that there

was an undisclosed plea agreement conditioned upon Tabola’s testimony in Petitioner’s case.

The defense was aware of the prosecutions, the release on bond, and the plea to probation.

Petitioner does not establish any additional information of favorable treatment which should

have been disclosed. 

In Schad v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit found no prejudicial effect from the prosecution’s

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failure to disclose letters written by the prosecution on a prosecution witness’s behalf in an

unrelated criminal proceeding, where the defense was aware of the prosecution’s promises

to assist the witness. 606 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2010). The court found that “the letters

provided no independent basis for impeaching’ the witness. Id. at 1036. The court noted

they had consistently been “ less likely to find the withholding of impeachment material

prejudicial in cases in which the undisclosed materials would not have provided the defense

with a new and different form of impeachment.” Id.

Further, Tabola’s testimony at trial was consistent with this statements to Detective

Butler in 1984. At that time, the searches of Tabola’s house had not been conducted, nor the

sting operation conducted. Accordingly, no favorable treatment on those later occurring

offenses could have prompted his initial statements to Butler. 

Search Warrant - Petitioner also argues that armed with this information he would

have fared better at suppressing the results of the search warrant obtained on the basis of

Tabola’s statements about his interaction with the victim on the night of his murder.

Petitioner contends that the warrant was based on “false statements attributed to ...James

Tabola.” However, Petitioner does not establish how any material statement by Tabola in

his interview with Detective Butler (on which the search warrant affidavit was based) was

shown by the Tabola police reports to be false. Moreover, the fact that an informing witness

may have lied does not render a search warrant invalid unless the attesting officer knew or

acted in reckless disregard, at the time the warrant was obtained, that the statements were

false. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). “The deliberate falsity or reckless

disregard whose impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant.” Id. Petitioner offers nothing to suggest that Detective Butler knew

any statement by Tabola on which he based the search warrant application was false.

5. Interviews of Flood

Petitioner contends his Brady rights were violated because the prosecution failed to

disclose interviews of exculpatory witness Ronald Flood. Petitioner presented an affidavit

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from Flood dated August 29, 2003 in his fourth PCR proceeding (Exhibit PP). In the

affidavit, Flood asserted that in September or October 1984 he was with the victim, who was

a friend, at a bar. The victim was approached by a “Kevin” and a “Ken” who discussed

purchasing cocaine from the victim. In the summer of 1985, Flood saw the two men at

another bar, Chapter 11, where “Ken” was working as a bouncer, and “Kevin” was a patron.

Flood shared his observations with some friends of the victim. Shortly afterward, he was

contacted by Detective Butler who showed him pictures which Flood identified as “Kevin”

and “Ken.” Butler told him it was a different “Kevin.” Flood was not contacted again.

Flood later identified the two men, Kevin Cobey and Ken Hatch, from photographs.

Respondents assert that this purported interview by Detective Butler was never made

a part of the record in the case, and his name does not appear until Petitioner’s Fourth PCR

Proceeding. (Respondents’ Submission, Doc. 59 at 1-2.) Accordingly, no documents other

than the Flood affidavit have been produced.

State Court Decision - The last reasoned decision on Petitioner’s claim concerning

the Flood interview was the trial court’s decision in Petitioner’s Fourth PCR proceeding.

(See Exhibit II, order 8/23/07 (Ct. of App. summary decision); and Exhibit KK, Order 1/3/08

(Az. Sup. Ct. summary decision).) There, the trial court found that “the affidavit’s story

makes no sense” and concluded “there is no reasonable likelihood Flood’s testimony would

have made a difference at trial.” (Exhibit GG, M.E. 1/12/6 at 3.) 

Failure to Determine Materiality Cumulatively - The court separately concluded that

the Cobey Pre-Sentence Report was “not Brady material because it is not material to

Defendant’s guilt or punishment.” (Id..) To the extent that the court failed to consider these

items cumulatively, it’s decision appears at first blush to be contrary to Supreme Court law.

See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-38. 

Respondents attempt to avoid that impropriety by arguing that the state court found

the Brady evidence was either not favorable, not suppressed, or separately not material, and

thus a cumulative analysis was not necessary. “In other words, zero multiplied by any

number yields zero.” (Answer, Doc. 16 a 26.) Respondents’ argument would be correct if

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35 The converse would not be true of the state court’s failure to consider the Flood

information when considering the materiality of the Cobey report.

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limited to findings of unfavorability or lack of suppression. Once a court proceeds to the

third criteria, materiality, Kyles mandates that it consider all favorable suppressed

information cumulatively. 

Nonetheless, the trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim on the Cobey Presentence

Report based upon a finding that “it was not in possession or control of the State or any of

its agents”, i.e. not suppressed. Although the undersigned concludes hereinafter that this

determination was wrong under Federal law applicable in the Ninth Circuit, the undersigned

also concludes that it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of established

Supreme Court law. As such, the state court’s failure to consider the Cobey report together

with the Flood report, was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

law.35

Credibility Determination - While it is tempting to treat the state court’s conclusion

that the story “makes no sense” as a credibility determination entitled to deference and a

presumption of correctness, the court did not find Flood incredible, just his story. There was

no evidentiary hearing at which the trial court was able to observe Flood and ascertain his

credibility. Thus this determination cannot be a credibility determination based on the state

court’s observations of the witness.

 The undersigned does not perceive the basis for the PCR court’s determination, and

that court offered no explanation. The most perplexing part of the Flood story is Detective

Butler’s failure to pursue the matter. But then, Butler may have simply concluded that Flood

had encountered a “different Kevin.” Or, he could have simply concluded that the

investigation was permeated with petty drug users and dealers who all moved in the same

social circle, and found nothing remarkable in the simple fact that Cobey and Hatch had

made a drug purchase from the victim.

Perhaps the state court referred not just to Flood’s story, but to Petitioner’s grander

theory that Flood’s story would show that Cobey and Hatch killed the victim to avoid paying

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their drug debts. While that theory has little support in either Flood’s story, or the balance

of the evidence from trial, it cannot be said that it causes Flood’s story itself to fail to make

sense. Moreover, support of Plaintiff’s blame shifting theory is only one use to which

Petitioner could put the Flood story, the others being his attacks upon the credibility of the

prosecution, and the impeachment of Cobey and Hatch.

Thus, the undersigned finds no support in the record for the state court’s determination

that the Flood story made no sense. Therefore, to the extent that the state court’s statement

that Flood’s story “makes no sense” amounts to a factual finding, the undersigned finds it to

be “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 473 (9th

Cir.1997) (“We must defer to the state court's credibility finding unless the finding is not

fairly supported by the record considered as a whole.”).

Suppression - Respondents do not assert that the Flood affidavit is untrue insofar as

it asserts the provision of information to Detective Butler. Detective Butler testified that he

had lost all memory of the investigation. No notes or records have been produced to refute

the assertions. 

The suppression prong of Brady may be met, however, even though a

“record is not conclusive as to whether the individual prosecutor [or

investigator] ... ever actually possessed” the Brady material. The

proponent of a Brady claim-i.e., the defendant-bears the initial burden

of producing some evidence to support an inference that the

government possessed or knew about material favorable to the defense

and failed to disclose it.

U.S. v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner has met that burden through the

unrebutted Flood affidavit. 

Thus, the undersigned finds that Flood did interview with Butler and provided him the

information about the purported drug dealings between Kevin Cobey, Ken Hatch, and the

victim. (That is not equivalent to a finding that Flood’s narrative to Butler was itself true.)

Accordingly, it must be assumed that the information was in fact provided to Butler, and thus

was in the constructive possession of the prosecution. 

With that presumption, the undersigned finds it irrelevant that no written record of the

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Flood/Butler interview has been located. See e.g. U.S. v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 381 (6th Cir.

1997) (finding Brady duty to disclose statements by witness to prosecutor, and remanding

for hearing on materiality). A perverse incentive would apply if the prosecution could avoid

disclosure of exculpatory information simply because the officers possessing it failed to

memorialize it in writing or otherwise. 

Favorability - Respondents do not dispute that the statements made by Flood to

Butler were favorable to Petitioner. If the Flood statements were known, and Flood called

to testify, they would have served to impeach the testimony of both Cobey and Hatch. 

The essence of Flood’s story is that he observed Cobey and Hatch arranging to

purchase cocaine from the victim. In contrast, Cobey testified that only Petitioner, not Cobey,

bought cocaine from the victim, and that all of the cocaine Cobey used he obtained from

Petitioner. (Exhibit MMM, R.T. 3/24/86 at 51-52.) Ken Hatch testified that he had only

seen Cobey a few times as of October, 1984, and didn’t know him real well, but well enough

to recognize him walking down the street. (Id. at 87.) Hatch testified that he had never met

the victim, and had never had any cocaine dealings or transactions with the victim. (Exhibit

OOO, R.T. 3/25/86 at 45.) 

Thus, the evidence would have been favorable.

Import of Testimony - Central to Petitioner’s defense was his assertion that

investigating officers had early become fixated upon Petitioner as the culprit, and proceeded

to ignore any evidence to the contrary. Certainly the failure to pursue Flood’s story would

have supported that theory.

The most significant use of the information would have simply been impeachment of

Cobey and Hatch, who provided the only direct evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, i.e. Cobey’s

direct testimony of the events of the night of the murder, and both witnesses’ claims of

Petitioner’s confession. A false denial of a relationship with the victim would be a

significant detraction to their credibility; somewhere between impeachment on their

testimony about the murder/confession and impeachment on a peripheral issue such as the

particular time of a marginal event. 

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No doubt, some portion of that detraction would have flowed from the suspicions

created by a false denial which had no apparent motivation. Cobey and Hatch were not

ingenuous citizens who might be expected to deny a relationship with a drug dealer to

preserve their reputations. Each admitted to drug usage, and Cobey to being involved in

dealing drugs. They all moved in a social circle permeated with cocaine users and dealers,

and in which the victim himself was a regular participant. The balance of their testimony

would have been no less believable, and their reputations no more sullied, if they had

testified that they regularly bought drugs from the victim.

Similarly, there is some implication from the Flood statements that the relationship

between Hatch and Cobey was greater than they admitted (e.g. just passing acquaintances) -

enough so that they were attempting a drug purchase together. Again, the lack of apparent

motive for denying their relationship would (if the implication were made) have cast a

shadow over their involvement and their motives in testifying.

Certainly there are plausible explanations which could explain away the discrepancies

between Flood’s story and Hatch and Cobey’s testimony: e.g. Hatch was actually the one

buying, not Cobey; and/or having never met the victim before or since, Hatch didn’t know

the person they had purchased from was the victim. However, there is no indication such

explanations were available.

Impeachment of Investigation - A major line of attack by the defense at trial was an

effort to show that the investigating officers had become fixated upon Petitioner and failed

to pursue other lines of inquiry. (See Exhibit WWW, R.T. 4/4/86 at 43, 52-54, 61 (defense’s

closing argument).) The Flood story would have bolstered that line of attack by showing that

the lead investigator failed to followup on evidence that showed that Petitioner was not the

only person living at the Swann/Shaw apartments who was involved in drug transactions with

the victim. See e.g. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 442, n.13 (1995) (finding prejudice

where prosecution failed to disclose “Brady evidence on which the defense could have

attacked the investigation as shoddy.” ); Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir.

1986) (“A common trial tactic of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the

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36 Petitioner adds an argument that this was particularly significant becaue he had

been denied an opportunity to present witness testimony that Cobey had acquired the victim’s

jewelry during the burglary.

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investigation or the decision to charge the defendant, and we may consider such use in

assessing a possible Brady violation”); and Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1042 (5th Cir.

1985) (Brady evidence “carried within it the potential ... for the ... discrediting ... of the

police methods employed in assembling the case”). However, apart from the fingerprint

ballistics testimony, this case was not dependent upon testimony by the investigating officers

about the results of their investigations, but rather upon the lay witnesses. Indeed, Detective

Butler conceded that the investigation had been stalled until Hatch revealed Petitioner’s

confession. (See Exhibit PPP, R.T. 3/26/86 at 158.) 

6. Cobey Pre-Sentence Report

Petitioner argues that the prosecution suppressed the Cobey Pre-Sentence Report,

which was favorable for its potential to impeach Cobey based upon his statements to the

report writer that he “remained outside” while Petitioner burgled the victim’s apartment, in

contrast to his trial testimony that Cobey went inside.36 From that discrepancy, Petitioner

argues a string of inferences, the most significant of which is that Cobey could not have

heard the incriminating statements purportedly made by Petitioner while in the apartment.

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 5F-5g.) 

Petitioner also argues that impeachment on the point would have suggested that

Cobey, not Petitioner possessed the victim’s key, and thus that Cobey was the murderer.

These inferences may have been argued by the defense had they been able to impeach

Cobey’s credibility generally. But nothing in the Presentence Report explicitly addresses

those matters.

At trial, Cobey testified that after the murder, he and Petitioner went to the victim’s

apartment to look for money or cocaine. Petitioner had the key and they both went inside.

Petitioner proceeded to search the apartment and found some jewelry. (Exhibit LLL, R.T.

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3/21/86 at 58.) On cross examination, Cobey clarified his movements:

Q When you got to the apartment, what happened?

A We went to his apartment.

Q Did both of you go inside?

A Yes.

Q What did you do inside Rob’s apartment?

A Stood there in the hallway.

Q Were the lights on?

A I can’t remember.

Q What do you recall happening while you were at the

apartment?

A Going through some stuff, looking for some coke or money.

Q Did you do that?

A Pardon?

Q Did you do that?

A No.

Q You didn’t go through any stuff?

A Standing there in the hallway.

Q You just stayed and waited?

A Yes.

Q Larry went in?

A I walked back in the bathroom. I walked right back out to the

hallway.

* * * 

Q When Larry was in the apartment could you hear him going

through drawers?

A Yes.

Q And through closets?

A I don’t remember going through the closets. Drawers.

Q Could you hear from where you were?

A You could see him from the hall. I was in the hallway. 

* * * 

Q During that time, except for the one point where you walked

in the bathroom and turned around and walked back out, you just stayed

in the hallway and waited?

A Yes.

(Exhibit MMM, R.T. 3/24/86 at 28-31.) 

In contrast, the Presentence Report references a written declaration by the defendant,

and summaries it as saying that after the murder “he and Mr. Prince went to the Richards

residence where he, the defendant, remained outside and Mr. Prince went inside.” (Exhibit

RR at 2.) The report writer summarized the offense as: “The accomplice [Petitioner] entered

the apartment and removed a variety of items while the defendant, Mr. Cobey, stood watch

outside.” (Id. at 1.) 

State Court Decision - The PCR court rejected Petitioner’s claim on this report on

the basis that: (1) it was “not material to Defendant’s guilt or punishment”; and (2) there was

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no disclosure obligation because the report was “not in possession or control of the State or

any of its agents.” (Exhibit GG, M.E. 1/12/06 at 3.) 

Materiality - In so far as the PCR court determined the materiality of this evidence in

isolation from the Flood evidence, the court’s decision was contrary to Supreme Court law.

See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (state court decision which

analyzed materiality of withheld evidence only separately, and did not proceed to the second

step of analyzing it cumulatively was “contrary to clearly established Federal law”).

Suppression - The PCR Court did not explain why it concluded that the report was not

in the prosecution’s control. The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for

dissemination of presentence reports to the parties prior to sentencing, and with some

limitations, to the public after sentencing. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.6(b) and (c). 

In applying the state newly discovered evidence standard, the PCR court noted that

the Presentence Report did not exist at the time of trial because it was not written until after

Defendant’s trial and original sentencing had been completed. (Exhibit GG, M.E. 1/12/06

at 3.) The Cobey Report is dated May 27, 1986. (Exhibit RR at 7.) Petitioner’s guilty

verdict was rendered on April 4, 1986. (Exhibit WWW, R.T. 4/4/86 at 128.) He was

initially sentenced on May 15, 1986. (Pet. Exhibit 1, Sentence 5/15/86.) He was resentenced on August 22, 1989. (Pet. Exhibit 1, Sentence 8/22/89.) 

To the extent that the PCR court determined that Brady did not apply because the

report was not prepared until after sentencing, the undersigned would conclude that the PCR

court’s decision would be in violation of federal law, based upon Tennison v. City and

County of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1094 (9th Cir. 2009) (decided June 23, 2009). See

also Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“Brady requires disclosure of

information that the prosecution acquires during the trial itself, or even afterward.”) But see

U.S. v. Jones, 399 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir. 2005) (“As such evidence did not exist at the time

of trial, it was not Brady material.”); U.S. v. Maldonado-Rivera, 489 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2007)

(evidence unknown to prosecution until after trial not Brady material); and 2 Fed. Prac. &

Proc. Crim. § 256 (4th ed.) (citing Jones); and Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 234 (6th Cir. 2008)

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37 It seems to the undesigned that there is a distinction to be made between seeking

evidence obtained by the prosecution post-conviction/sentencing which is known to be

favorable, and seeking post-conviction/sentencing access to pre-existing evidence for testing

which is hoped to have favorable results, such as that at issue in Osborne. The former affects

the fairness of the proceeding and the function of the prosecution, the latter only the

correctness of the trial’s result. As suggested by the Supreme Court’s continuing refusal to

decide whether actual innocence is a valid constitutional claim, wrong results are not

necessarily unfair results, and the Due Process Clause seems only to be concerned with unfair

results.

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(declining to extend Brady to “post-trial witness favorable treatment-something never

previously considered by any court to be within Brady's ambit” absent a formal or tacit pretrial agreement).

 However, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), habeas relief may not be granted unless a

state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined

by the Supreme Court.

On June 18, 2009, the Supreme Court held that Brady did not apply to a request for

DNA testing in a post-conviction proceeding, and instead general notions of due process

governed whether the state had properly denied the requested testing. In doing so, the Court

approvingly noted the Ninth Circuit’s acknowledgment that “nothing in [the Supreme

Court’s] precedents suggested that [the Brady] disclosure obligation continued after the

defendant was convicted and the case was closed.” District Attorney's Office for Third

Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2319 -2320 (2009).37 Thus, it must be concluded

that the Supreme Court has not yet determined that Brady applies to favorable evidence not

obtained by the prosecution until after “the case was closed.” 

What is unclear to the undersigned is whether by the phrase “closed,” the Court

referred to the verdicts, entry of a judgement of conviction, sentencing, or the conviction

becoming final by the conclusion of direct review. But see U.S. v. Santos, 2010 WL

2985913, 7 (E.D.N.Y.,2010) (citing Osborne, “As an initial matter, the prosecution's Brady

obligation to disclose evidence does not extend to information it discovered after

conviction.”) If the latter, then, Petitioner’s case was not “closed” until after expiration of

his time of direct appeal on the August 22, 1989 resentencing, and the material would be

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38 While it might be tempting to latch upon the Ninth Circuit’s use of the phrase “pretrial” to suggest that the obligation to disclose can no longer accrue upon commencement of

the trial, the Supreme Court has described the duty of disclosure as “ongoing; information

that may be deemed immaterial upon original examination may become important as the

proceedings progress, and the court would be obligated to release information material to the

fairness of the trial.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987). See also U. S. v.

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (“ in advance of trial, and perhaps during the course of a trial

as well, the prosecutor must decide what, if anything, he should voluntarily submit to defense

counsel”); and Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (applying Brady to penalty phase). 

39 If Petitioner asserted that the suppressed evidence were relevant to sentencing, as

opposed to conviction, then the vacating of the death sentence and resentencing in 1989

would be relevant. Here, Petitioner only asserts that the suppressed evidence is relevant to

his guilt, not to his current sentence. 

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subject to Brady. In addressing the duration of the inception of the Brady obligation, the

Ninth Circuit had simply noted that it was a “novel question...[whether Due Process] extends

the government’s duty to disclose ... to post-conviction proceedings,” although it summarized

“the Supreme Court’s cases involving Brady rights [as involving] only the right to pre-trial

disclosure.” Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist., 521 F.3d 1118,

1128 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).38 Nonetheless, the authorities uniformly describe

Brady as a right applicable to trial. See e.g. Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir.2006)

(“The animating purpose of Brady is to preserve the fairness of criminal trials.”). As

recognized in Osborne, “[a] criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have

the same liberty interests as a free man.” Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2320. “In the end, any

allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in

comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.” Giles v. State of Md., 386 U.S. 66, 96

(1967) (White, J., concurring, emphasis added.) 

The undersigned has found no Supreme Court authority extending Brady to

discoveries between entry of a judgment and finality on direct appeal, and nothing in the

language of the Supreme Court’s cases which would necessitate such an extension. Thus,

the undersigned must, at a minimum, conclude that the state court’s determination that Brady

did not extend to the report produced after entry of the judgment of conviction was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.39

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40 Even if the undersigned concluded that the pre-sentence report had been mad

known to the prosecution at such a time that failure to disclose it was “suppression” under

Brady, the outcome would be unchanged. The relevant information from the report was the

declaration, and the undesigned concludes hereinafter that the suppression of the declaration

itself does not justify relief.

41 In contrast, Petitioner explicitly asserted a claim based upon the state’s failure to

disclose “Cobey’s ‘written declaration’ (date unknown).” (Exhibit FF, PCR Pet. at 19.)

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Thus, this Court is faced with a state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s Brady claim on

one basis which was contrary to federal law (e.g. deciding materiality in isolation) , and on

a second basis (existence during trial) which was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of established Supreme Court law. Because the supportable basis (existence) was

not dependent upon an antecedent determination on the unsupportable basis (materiality ) ,

this Court must still grant deference to the supportable basis. Cf. Panetta v. Quarter man,

551 U.S. 930, 953-954 (2007) (antecedent, incorrect rejection on one prong of standard

impacted fact finding on other prong).

Consequently, this Court may not grant Petitioner relief on the basis of the

prosecution’s failure to disclose the Cobey presentence report.40

7. Cobey Declaration

Petitioner also argues that the prosecution wrongly failed to disclose the written

statement by Cobey upon which his presentence report was based. 

Here, the state court wholly failed to address Petitioner’s claim with regard to the

underlying statement by Cobey. To the contrary, it’s decision was explicitly limited to “the

Presentence Report.” 41 (Exhibit GG, M.E. 1/12/06 at 3.) The limited nature of the state

court’s determination is further indicated by the failure to analyze when the Cobey

declaration came into existence. Accordingly, there is no state court decision on this claim

to which this Court may grant deference. See Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1784. 

Suppression - Petitioner suggests that Cobey’s written declaration must have been

prepared at an earlier date than the Presentence Report, and perhaps before Petitioner’s

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conviction. However, Petitioner bears the initial burden of showing that the evidence was

in the prosecution’s possession. U.S. v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 910 (C.A.9 (Or.),2009) (“The

proponent of a Brady claim-i.e., the defendant-bears the initial burden of producing some

evidence to support an inference that the government possessed or knew about material

favorable to the defense and failed to disclose it.”) Petitioner’s bare speculation does not

meet that burden, and the twelve days differential between Petitioner’s sentencing and

preparation of the report permits no inference that the statement must have been prepared

before sentencing, such as might arise if the gap were only a day or two.

Moreover, Petitioner makes no suggestion that the presentence report writer would

have delivered Cobey’s underlying statement, or notice of it, to the prosecution before

delivering the presentence report. 

Nor does Petitioner suggest that the report writer is himself part of the prosecution

team, so as to place a burden of disclosure on the prosecutor. Arizona law directs that

presentence reports be prepared by adult probation officers. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-253(4).

 Indeed, the report was submitted by “Jack Mead, Deputy Adult Probation Officer.” (Exhibit

RR, at 7.) Adult probation officers are appointed either directly by or with the approval of

the presiding judge of the superior court. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-251(A). “As we have noted,

this is appropriate because [probation] officers are part of the judicial function.” Broomfield

v. Maricopa County, 112 Ariz. 565, 568, 544 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ariz. 1975). 

Brady v. Maryland involved evidence withheld by the prosecution.

Here appellant sought discovery of a presentence report prepared by the

probation officer for the court's use in sentencing a co-defendant and

witness for the Government. A probation officer is not subject to the

control of the prosecutor; nor are his reports to the court public records.

U.S. v. Walker, 491 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1974). See also U.S. v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844

F.2d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Presentence reports are prepared by probation officers for

the court's use in sentencing; they are not public documents subject to prosecutorial

control.”); U.S. v. Rivera Rodriguez, 617 F.3d 581, 595 (1st Cir. 2010) (no Brady violation

where no evidence prosecutor had received witness’ presentence report prior to or during

trial). Cf. U.S. v. Strifler, 851 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding Brady obligation on

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42 That is particularly true under the Arizona rules which, unlike the Federal Rules,

provide for disclosure of presentence reports to the prosecution and their being made public.

Compare Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.6(a) and (e) with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. 

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court to release witness’ probation file upon request). 

That is not to say that had the probation officer delivered the Cobey statement to the

prosecution it would not have been subject to Brady. In U.S. v. Trevino, the Fifth Circuit

declined to find a presentence report in another case of a prosecution witness to be in the

possession of the prosecution and thus subject to Brady. The court noted:

By the same token we do not attempt to contract Brady by insulating

such presentence reports entirely from discovery if the prosecution does

have in its possession (pursuant to [Federal Rules] providing for its

provision to the prosecution] and the sentencing court's discretion) a

witness' presentence report containing exculpatory material. In such

instances Brady might well compel disclosure of relevant portions of

the report. 

556 F.2d 1265, 1271 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977).42 Thus, once the Cobey presentence report was

delivered to the prosecution, the information about the Cobey statement was in the

prosecution’s possession, and subject to Brady. That would not have occurred, however,

until after Petitioner’s conviction. 

In disposing of Petitioner’s claim with regard to the Cobey presentence report, this

Court must give deference to the state court’s decision rejecting it, as discussed above.

However, that decision was explicitly limited to the presentence report, and did not explicitly

encompass the underlying witness statement. If the state court’s decision is read to

encompass the underlying statement, this Court might have to reject Petitioner’s claim on the

same basis that the claim with regard to the presentence report is rejected.

“Regardless of whether the state courts have purported to resolve a particular claim

on the merits, the federal courts are obliged to determine whether that claim in fact was

addressed by the state courts.” Brown v. Smith,551 F.3d 424, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). Given the

explicit language in the state court’s decision, the undersigned concludes that the Petitioner’s

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43 For the reasons discussed hereinafter in evaluating the import of the Cobey

Statement, had the state court considered the Cobey statement, its result would likely have

been the same as that for the Cobey presentence report, the one being a subset of the other.

Nonetheless, this Court does not speculate on what a state court might have done, but acts

on the basis of what it actually decided. See Franz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-739 (9th Cir.

2008) (discussing limitations on use of hypothetical bases for a state court’s decisions).

44 Although one might wonder whether the Tennison court considered Osborne,

decided just five days before, the decisions are not irreconcilable. Arguably, Osborne was

based not upon a claim of failure to disclose known favorable evidence, but upon failure to

permit discovery of potentially favorable evidence. The case law is replete with

determinations that Brady did not mandate discovery.

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claim concerning the Cobey Statement was not addressed.43 Thus there is no state court

decision addressing “on the merits” the claim based on the Cobey declaration. The deference

demanded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) only applies to claims that were “adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings.” Id. In the absence of such an adjudication, the federal habeas

court reviews a claim de novo. “For claims for which no adjudication on the merits in state

court was possible, however, AEDPA's standard of review does not apply.” Killian v. Poole,

282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002).

In that light, this Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tennison (decided

after Osborne), that favorable material is subject to Brady’s disclosure requirement even

though it did not come into the possession of the prosecutorial team prior to sentencing.44

Thus, without the deference demanded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Cobey Statement would

have been subject to disclosure under Brady, and this Court is obligated to resolve whether

failure to disclose the Cobey statement was favorable and whether it was prejudicial within

the meaning of Brady’s materiality standard.

Favorability - The Cobey statement was not clearly favorable to Petitioner. Petitioner

argues that it would have permitted impeachment of Cobey on his in-trial statements that he

went inside the victim’s apartment. Respondents make no argument to the contrary. 

However, the Presentence report does not clearly relate that the written statement

makes such claims. The Report states: 

The defendant, Kevin Cobey, in his written declaration states that he

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was a witness to the murder of Robert Richards by the accomplice,

Larry Prince. He states at the time he did not come forward because he

was in fear of his life. He then informed me that following that

incident, he and Mr. Prince went to the Richards residence where he,

the defendant remained outside and Mr. Prince went inside. The

defendant states he received no property as a result of the burglary.

The defendant further states he has been extremely cooperative with the

prosecution and has fulfilled all of his terms of the plea agreement to

this point.

(Exhibit RR, Cobey Presentence Report at 2 (emphasis added).) The inference is that the

information available in the written declaration was limited to the events of the murder, and

that the information concerning the robbery was provided by Cobey’s oral statements directly

to the probation officer. 

However, the statement has not been provided to this Court, was not part of the state

court record, and is now apparently lost. (Resp.’s Submission, Doc. 59 at 1-2.) Because

Respondents do not assert the statement was not favorable, the undersigned presumes for

purposes of this Report & Recommendation that the report included the revelation that Cobey

“remained outside.” 

Import - Even though “favorable,” the import of the Cobey statement is limited. The

language of the presentence report simply summarizes the statement as indicating Cobey

“remained outside.” In contrast, at trial, Cobey consistently testified that, although he

entered the apartment, he remained in the hallway most of the time, and only entered the

bathroom momentarily. (See infra at 96 (discussion on Cobey Presentence Report, quoting

testimony).) Clearly, Cobey’s trial testimony was intended to convey that he made only

limited entry into the apartment. Thus, by itself, a statement that Cobey remained outside

would not provide a significant departure from his trial testimony. 

Petitioner attempts to expand the import of the statement by asserting that it would

have impeached Cobey’s testimony that he heard Petitioner while he was in the apartment.

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 5G.) However, the statement did not suggest that Cobey would not have

been able to hear from outside. For example, Cobey did not indicate that the apartment door

was closed, or that he had not gone to the apartment at all.

Moreover, the real import of the related trial testimony was that Petitioner had burgled

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the victim’s apartment and had taken some jewelry in the process. Cobey’s testimony in that

regard was not dependent upon Cobey’s presence inside the apartment:

Q When you left the apartment was Larry carrying anything he

didn’t have when you came in?

A Yes.

Q What was that?

A Some jewelry.

Q Describe that jewelry.

A I think it was a bracelet, a gold bracelet or something.

Q Did you see it or did Larry just tell you about it?

A I saw it.

***

Q What did Larry do with the bracelet?

A Put it in his pocket.

Q You saw him do that?

A That’s where he pulled it out to show me.

(Exhibit MMM, R.T. 3/24/86 at 31-31.) 

On the other hand, impeachment of Cobey on the burglary would have had some

significance. There was little other direct evidence to connect Petitioner to the burglary.

Hatch testified that the burglary had been committed by Petitioner and Cobey, but that

testimony was based upon Cobey’s statements to Hatch. (Exhibit NNN, R.T. 3/24/86 at 97-

98.) On redirect, Hatch asserted he could not remember whether Petitioner or Cobey had

told him about the burglary. (Exhibit OOO, R.T. 3/25/86 at 58.) 

The indirect evidence centered on the victim’s keys and the remnant’s of his key ring,

found scattered on his kitchen counter, whilst the balance was in his car when his body was

found. Only if it were accepted that Petitioner was the murderer (or at least in the car with

the victim’s body), the inference made that he took the victim’s keys (as opposed to some

third party, such as a passerby), would there be any other evidence apart from Cobey of

Petitioner’s entry into the victim’s apartment. But that chain of inference pre-presumes the

key fact at issue: Petitioner’s guilt of the victim’s homicide. 

While the prosecution presumably pressed the issue of the uncharged burglary in part

to establish a motive for the murder, as noted by the Arizona Supreme Court, “the trial judge

rejected it” as an aggravating circumstance because he “did not find the existence of

pecuniary gain on the basis of jewelry or money.” State v. Prince, 160 Ariz. 268, 275, 772

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P.2d 1121, 1128 (Ariz.1989). Indeed, the evidence as whole suggests that the robbery was

more of a crime of opportunity created by the murder, than a motivation for it. 

On the other hand, the burglary served to tie Petitioner to the murder. At a minimum,

Petitioner’s presence at the crime scene was indicated by his possession of the victim’s key,

and brazen burglary of his apartment. 

In sum, the Cobey statement would have been useful almost exclusively to impeach

Cobey’s credibility.

Delayed Disclosure - This is not the classic case where the prosecution possessed

favorable information at trial, and suppressed it as trial proceeded to a verdict and judgment.

Rather, here the prosecution did not possess the information on the Cobey Statement until

receiving the Cobey Presentence Report, twelve days after sentencing. According to

Petitioner, that information was not “disclosed” until 2001 when it was inadvertently

unsealed and delivered to Petitioner by the clerk of the court. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5F.) 

In instances of delayed disclosure, prejudice is not evaluated by asking solely what

effect the information would have had on the verdict. Rather, the court must evaluate what

effect the delay in disclosure worked. See Tennison, 570 F.3d 1078, 1093 (evaluating

prejudice from post-verdict statement by examining effect on intervening motion for new

trial). But see Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 472 n. 21 (6th Cir. 2006) (the “better approach”

is to consider undisclosed and belatedly disclosed items together). 

 Here, the obligation to disclose the Cobey Statement did not accrue until after

sentencing, when the Cobey Presentence Report was delivered. Thus, the relevant delay was

from post-sentencing until Petitioner’s third PCR petition was pending. Thus, any prejudice

would have occurred only in the course of Petitioner’s direct appeal, first, and second, and

third PCR proceedings. In evaluating the effect in those proceedings, the undersigned

recognizes that Petitioner was ultimately able to bring his claim on the Cobey Statement, and

thus looks only to the impact that the inability to bring the Brady claim sooner had on the

results of those proceedings. See U.S. v. Schwartzbaum, 527 F.2d 249, 255-256 (2d Cir.

1975) (no prejudice to motion for new trial, because subsequent motion for new trial

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permitted).

Petitioner’s direct appeal focused on the alleged juror misconduct, the propriety of the

sentence, the judge’s qualifications, various evidentiary objections and trial errors. (Exhibit

MM Opening Brief.) The only relevant determinations in that proceeding were his claims

that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, see Prince,160 Ariz. at 274, 772 P.2d

at 1127, and that there was no evidence to support the pecuniary gain aggravating

circumstance, id. at 275-276, 772 P.2d at 1128-1129. The latter was not impacted inasmuch

as the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the burglary as a basis for

aggravation. Thus, the prejudice if any would have affected only the weight of the evidence

claim, and only to the extent that the Arizona Supreme Court may have considered the Cobey

Statement in making that determination.

Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding included potentially relevant claims of: (1)

prosecutorial misconduct through use of Cobey’s perjured testimony as to his drug dealing;

(2) newly discovered evidence in the form of Jimmy Pechac’s testimony about Cobey selling

him gold jewelry, and Debbie Pechac’s affidavit that Cobey phoned her and said “that gold

could send us away forever” if recovered by the police. The prosecutorial misconduct claim

was deemed waived by failure to raise it at trial. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 3/5/96 at 6.) Thus,

addition of the Cobey Statement claim would not have impacted that determination. 

In disposing of the Pechac claim, the PCR court assumed the Pechacs’ credibility, but

concluded that it “would likely have not altered the verdict at trial since it is not materially

inconsistent with the State’s evidence against Petitioner.” (Id. at 11.) The Arizona Court of

Appeals noted that “there was evidence at trial that both Petitioner and Cobey went to

Richards’ apartment after the murder, found jewelry and took it,” and Petitioner had not

“offered a persuasive explanation why, if the Pechac’ claims were believed by a jury, they

would have had a decisive effect on Cobey’s credibility and on the outcome of the trial.”

(Id.) The addition of the Cobey statement could have reduced Cobey’s credibility on his

claim that he had been part of a burglary by Petitioner, and if then coupled with the Pechac

story would have lent credence to the implication that it was Cobey alone who had burgled

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the victim’s apartment, and thus that it was Cobey who had killed the victim. Thus there may

have been impact on the resolution of the first PCR.

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding included: (1) Petitioner’s ineffective assistance

claim founded upon the failure to impeach Cobey with his drug trial testimony: and (2) a

claim of newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony by a Rocky Wheeler that on the

day of the murder Hatch had confided to him a plan to rob Petitioner and the victim, that they

“cased” the apartment complex, and the next day Hatch tried to sell him weapons matching

the murder weapon. 

As to the ineffective assistance claim, the PCR court rejected the claim on the basis

of a lack of prejudice, given that the variances in Cobey’s testimony were immaterial,

because in both trials he testified that he served as Petitioner’s assistant in selling drugs, and

the only variance was “whether he admitted to the label of ‘cocaine dealer.’” (Exhibit M,

M.E. 3/31/98 at 4.) The court did find a variance in Cobey’s testimony that at his drug trial

he had not denied cutting cocaine, when he had actually made the denial. However, in light

of his admission of drug dealing, the court found no reasonable likelihood of an affect on the

trial. Assuming the Court would have considered the Cobey statement as part of that

determination, there may have been an effect. 

Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding consisted of his: (1) Brady claim based on the

Brown/Howk/Cobey report; and (2) his newly discovered evidence claims based upon

statements by Aimee Robinson aka Amy Jamison that Cobey and Rango had conspired to

kill the victim, and others had conspired to blame it on Petitioner, and testimony of Ronald

Clements that he heard Cobey and Hatch confess to the murder. The trial court disposed of

the claims, finding (in part) that the “new” evidence would not likely have altered the

outcome of the trial. Assuming the Court would have considered the Cobey statement as part

of that determination, there may have been an effect. However, as to the

Brown/Howk/Cobey report, the state court rejected the claim also on the basis that it was not

“newly discovered evidence.” Conversely, the undersigned has concluded that it was not

Brady evidence. Consequently, the Brown/Howk/Cobey report need not be considered in

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determining the prejudice of the Cobey declaration.

In sum, the delay in disclosure of the Cobey Statement may have had in impact on the

various decisions in the intervening appeal and PCR proceedings, but only to the extent that

it would have altered the state courts’ findings of the likelihood of a different outcome at

trial. That determination is essentially the same as a normal Brady prejudice determination.

The distinction would be the need to consider the effect of the Cobey Statement not only with

respect to the evidence actually presented at trial, but also in connection with the new

evidence asserted in the subsequent proceedings, including: (1) the Jimmy Pechac testimony;

(2) the Cobey drug trial evidence; (3) the Rocky Wheeler testimony; (4) the Aimee Robinson

statement; and (5) the Ronald Clements testimony.

8. Materiality: Cumulative Effect

The undersigned has concluded that the following information was properly

determined to be either not favorable or not suppressed: (a) the Brown/Howk/Cobey reports;

and (b) the Cobey Presentence Report. The undersigned has concluded, at least for purposes

of this Report and Recommendation, that the prosecution suppressed the following favorable

information: (1) the Tabola police reports, (2) the Flood story, and (3) the Cobey statement.

The undersigned has evaluated the import of each of these items, and now must determine by

considering them cumulatively whether they were prejudicial, i.e. whether there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had this

evidence been before the jury. 

As an expedient, and because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned also

considers cumulatively the evidence asserted in Petitioner’s PCR proceedings potentially

impacted by the failure to disclose the Cobey Statement, i.e.: (1) the Jimmy Pechac testimony;

(2) the Cobey drug trial evidence; (3) the Rocky Wheeler testimony; (4) the Aimee Robinson

statement; and (5) the Ronald Clements testimony.

The application of section 2254's deferential review to the cumulative effect of the

undisclosed evidence is somewhat troublesome, given the progressive nature of Petitioner’s

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45 The state courts assumed the credibility of the Jimmy Pechac testimony. (See

Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 3/5/96 at 11.) 

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presentation of his Brady claims to the state courts. His claims concerning the Brown and

Tabola police reports were presented in his third PCR petition (Exhibit R). His claims

concerning the Flood story and the Cobey statement were presented in his fourth PCR

petition (Exhibit FF). It is further complicated by the fact that the state court did not even

reach the prejudice of the Cobey statement. 

 Where the habeas court faces a different set of facts than that considered by the state

courts, no deference can or need be applied. See Brown v. Smith, 551 F.2d 424, 428429 (6th

Cir. 2008). “In making this ‘materiality’ determination, the third step in any Brady analysis,

we are unable to accord AEDPA deference on an item-by-item basis to the four items of

exculpatory material considered in state court, because we are obliged to assess the materiality

of exculpatory evidence ‘collectively, not item by item.’” Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286,

298 -299 (4th Cir. 2003).

Nonetheless, the undersigned is bound by the credibility determinations of the state

courts, at least insofar as they have not been shown to be unreasonable. In particular, the PCR

court found that: (1) the Rocky Wheeler testimony was of limited credibility, being eroded

by the 11 year delay in testifying and intervening prison consultations with Petitioner (see

Exhibit M, M.E. 3/31/98 at 5-6); and (2) the Amy Robinson affidavit and Ronald Clements

testimony were not credible. (See Exhibit W, M.E. 7/15/02 at 2-3.)45 On the other hand, the

undersigned already has rejected as unreasonable the state court’s determination that the Flood

testimony “makes no sense.” 

With that background, the undersigned concludes that had the suppressed favorable

testimony been presented at trial, there is not a reasonable probability that the verdict would

have been different. 

The evidence at trial was, apart from Tabola, Cobey and Hatch’s testimony,

circumstantial. It largely consisted of a drug buyer/seller relationship between Petitioner and

the victim, evidence that Petitioner owed the victim money, that Petitioner was at

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Ellinghausen’s apartment in the area of the murder the night of the murder, left and was later

picked up by Ellinghausen, and that Petitioner had possessed a weapon which could have been

the murder weapon. The only tangible piece of evidence was a fingerprint of Petitioner on

the windshield wiper control of the victim’s car, which had either been put there during a

drive days before and somehow managed to escape destruction from the victim’s use and

fastidious car cleaning, or was placed there by Petitioner on the possibly rainy night of the

murder. 

Much testimony was introduced which tended to show Petitioner’s presence at the

Swann/Shaw apartment at the time of the murder, as opposed to Ellinghausen’s apartment and

the murder scene. However, the credibility of these witnesses was largely very low; they

reflected a bias in favor of Petitioner, a general lack of consistency internally and between the

witnesses as to the events over the days surrounding the murder, and almost uniformly

evidenced the witnesses’s own cocaine and alcohol abuse at the time. 

To that mix was added Tabola’s testimony which pointed to a meeting between the

victim and Petitioner the night of the murder, and an intent by the victim to rip off Petitioner.

Also added was Cobey’s eyewitness account of Petitioner conferring with the victim by

phone, going to meet him in the parking lot gun in hand, the sound of at least one gunshot, the

subsequent pickup of Petitioner, and their joint burglary of the victim’s apartment. Finally,

Cobey and Hatch both testified that Petitioner admitted the murder to them. 

Cobey’s credibility was heartily attacked by the defense based upon his inconsistent

statements. Hatch’s credibility was attacked on the basis of his tendency to lie, his bias

against Petitioner as a result of a feud over Randee Rector, and direct contradictions of his

account of Petitioner’s confession in the van on the way to a party. The prosecution’s

investigation was attacked based upon it’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation of the

scene, ballistics evidence, etc. The testimony on the gun was attacked based on competing

testimony that Petitioner had returned it to his brother and his brother had sold it prior to the

murder. 

To that mix, Petitioner now seeks to add the Tabola police reports, the Flood story, and

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the Cobey Statement. The Tabola police reports do little to rebut the prosecution’s story

directly. There is only a marginal inference that Tabola had motive to kill the victim, and a

even more marginal inference that he had not been aggressively prosecuted by law

enforcement and thus was biased toward the prosecution. The fact that Tabola’s story about

the victim’s plans to cheat Petitioner predated the events of the police reports would diffuse

the attacks on his credibility. Thus, there is no reason to believe this information would have

resulted in suppression of the search warrant. 

At best, the Flood story serves only to impeach Cobey and Hatch on the collateral

testimony that they didn’t purchase drugs from the victim, and if believed would suggest from

their attempts to hide that relationship that there was some guiltiness attached to that

relationship. While it would also serve to attack the credibility of the investigation, this was

not a case which turned upon the investigating officers’ testimony, but upon the statements

of the other witnesses, and the fingerprint evidence. 

The Cobey Statement affected an even more peripheral issue: Cobey’s presence in the

apartment during the burglary. The disparity between the statement and Cobey’s trial

testimony was hazy (outside vs. waiting in the hallway) and largely inconsequential to the

events of the burglary, let alone to the murder. The statement would have provided little

additional traction to efforts discredit Cobey.

If combining only the Tabola police reports, the Flood story and the Cobey Statement,

the undersigned finds no reasonable probability that the jury would have elected to reject the

testimony of Tabola, Cobey, or Hatch as to Petitioner’s involvement in the murder. The

testimony of Ellinghausen as to Petitioner’s conduct the night of the murder as well as the

fingerprint evidence and other circumstantial evidence still remain the vast weight of the

credible evidence. 

To evaluate the materiality of the belatedly disclosed Cobey Statement, the

undersigned also considers the cumulative impact of (1) the Jimmy and Debbie Pechac

testimony; (2) the Cobey drug trial evidence; and (3) the Rocky Wheeler testimony. The

Aimee Robinson statement; and the Ronald Clements testimony are not considered because

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this court is bound by the state courts’ determination that they were not credible. 

Jimmy Pechac testified that Cobey tried to sell him gold jewelry; his wife avowed that

Cobey told her the jewelry “could send us away forever.” The implication Petitioner seeks

is that Cobey had obtained the gold from the victim, and that Cobey had killed the victim and

was fearful of prosecution. However, even if credited, this testimony was consistent with the

prosecution’s story that Cobey had been at least marginally involved in the victim’s murder,

and actively involved in the burglary. Further, it was inconsistent with Petitioner’s attempts

to paint Tabola as the culprit.

The Cobey drug trial testimony was inconsequential. At best, it showed that at his

drug trial Cobey admitted to helping Petitioner in his drug dealing activities, but denied being

a “cocaine dealer” himself, and that he lied at Petitioner’s trial when he denied testifying he

was not a “cocaine dealer.” Given the obtuseness of admitting being an assistant to a drug

dealer in his cocaine dealings and to distributing drugs to ones friends but denying being a

“cocaine dealer,” it is little wonder that Cobey would take exception with his own statement.

It seems unlikely a jury would have been swayed by such impeachment. 

The Rocky Wheeler testimony is a direct attack on the prosecution’s story, inasmuch

as Wheeler claimed he was a confidant to Hatch’s plans to rob his drug dealer the day of the

murder, and his attempts to dispose of a weapon the day after. The absence of any

corroboration of this story in the rest of the evidence (apart from corroboration at the PCR

hearing that tended to show Wheeler knew Hatch in 1984, and that Hatch had indeed to tried

to sell him a pistol), and the limited credibility of this prison produced story, makes it highly

incredible. (See Exhibit M, M.E. 3/31/98 at 5-6.) Moreover, it also contradicted Petitioner’s

attempts to suggest Tabola as the culprit. 

In sum, the evidence (admitted and proffered) altogether showed what is often seen in

drug related cases: a series of witnesses with vast credibility problems, conflicting stories, and

many reasons to lie, including their own potential criminal exposure and the shifting loyalties

of people whose primary commitment is to keeping their own party going. 

Outstanding in that morass is: (1) the largely unassailed testimony of Ellinghausen,

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placing Petitioner at the scene described by Cobey and showing his otherwise unexplained

need to be picked up down the road from where the victim was found; and (2) Petitioner’s

fingerprint in the vehicle. None of the various stories and discrepancies presented by

Petitioner diminish the import or credibility of that evidence. Those elements of evidence,

in turn, bolster the credibility of the testimony from Cobey, Hatch and Tabola.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable

probability that had the suppressed information been timely disclosed, that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different.

Therefore, Petitioner’s Brady claims must be denied as without merit.

8. Summary re Brady Claims

Petitioner raised five separate Brady claims: (1) the Brown/Howk/Cobey reports; (2)

the Tabola police reports; (3) the Flood interview; (4) the Cobey Presentence Report; and (5)

the Cobey declaration. Petitioner has failed to show that (1) the Brown/Howk/Cobey reports

were, of themselves, favorable. Petitioner has failed to show that the state court’s decision

that the (4) Cobey Presentence Report was not suppressed was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court law. Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable probability 

that (2) the Tabola police reports, (3) the Flood interview, and (5) the Cobey declaration

would have altered the outcome of the proceeding, even when considered together with the

other new evidence impacted by the untimely disclosures. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground

I is without merit and should be denied. 

C. GROUND III - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

For his Ground III, Petitioner argues the violation of his right to effective assistance

of counsel as a result of trial counsel’s failure to adequately challenge inconsistent testimony

by Cobey by producing Cobey’s testimony from Petitioner’s drug trial. (Petition, Doc. 1 at

7, et seq.) The state court found deficient performance, but rejected this claim based upon

Petitioner’s failure to establish prejudice. Petitioner argues that determination was erroneous.

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Respondents argue that the state court’s determination must be sustained under the deferential

review of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims - Generally, claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In order to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance -

counsel's representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice

- there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was

reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

 The court hearing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must consider the totality

of the evidence with an eye toward the ultimate issue of whether counsel's conduct so

undermined the functioning of the adversarial process that the proceeding lacked fundamental

fairness. Id. at 686; Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1990)(observing that counsel

cannot be labeled ineffective for failing to raise issues which have no merit); Boag v. Raines,

769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (failing to raise meritless argument on appeal does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).

Defective Performance - The state court found that Petitioner had shown defective

performance. 

Based on his associate's recollection of Cobey's testimony, a reasonable

attorney would have ordered the transcript, or portions of it, to be

prepared. Cobey's credibility was an important factor in the murder trial

and if these transcripts offered the potential to impeach Cobey on the

nature of his relationship with defendant, a reasonable attorney would

have attempted to obtain them.

(Exhibit M, M.E. 3/31/98 at 4.) 

For the reasons expressed by the state court, the undersigned also finds deficient

performance. 

Prejudice - Petitioner asserts, in essence, that because the case hung so heavily upon

Cobey and his credibility, and the prosecution’s insistence that Petitioner was the lone drug

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dealer in the group, that prejudice must have flowed from counsel’s failure to utilize a

transcript of the drug trial to impeach Cobey.

The only issue that Petitioner points out that was impacted by the drug trial transcripts

was Cobey’s involvement in drug dealing. At trial, Cobey testified:

Q Did you ever help Larry in any way with any of his sales?

A Yes.

Q How did you do that?

A Weigh it up, help him cut it.

Q What were you cutting it with?

A I don’t remember. Could have been a few different things.

Q Did you ever deliver any cocaine for him to people?

A Yes.

Q Pick up money for it?

A Yes.

Q How many times would you estimate that you delivered

cocaine to someone for Larry?

A I don’t know.

Q You were interviewed in August 1985 by Detective Butler

and when you were talking about meeting Rob you said that you weren’t

sure the exact month you met him and that we just started dealing after

that.

Do you remember that?

A Vaguely.

Q Was that a true statement?

A That we just started dealing after that?

Q Yes.

A You might say yeah.

Q When you say we, you meant you and Larry?

A Uh-huh.

Q And you meant that you and Larry started dealing in cocaine

after you met Rob?

A We had dealt before that.

Exhibit MMM, R.T. 3/24/86 at 53-55.) 

Q Thank you. You said that you were involved with Larry in

some cocaine dealing.

A Correct.

Q Is that true? Did you ever help him cut cocaine?

A Yes.

Q Did you ever do that over at the Tom Ellinghausen

apartment?

A Yes. 

* * * 

Q You had said something about a first trial. You testified at a

drug trial with Larry Prince or where Larry Prince was the defendant

correct?

A Correct.

Q During that trial didn’t you testify that you were never

involved in dealing cocaine?

A I don’t recall saying that, no.

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Q Didn’t you also testify at that trial that you had never been

involved in cutting cocaine?

A I don’t think so.

(Exhibit NNN, R.T. 3/24/86 at 4-5.) 

At Petitioner’s drug trial, Cobey had attributed to Petitioner all of the contents of the

blue bag of drug using and dealing paraphernalia found at the Shaw/Swan apartment,

including the grinder, scales, weights, sifter, inositol, razor blade, straw, etc. (Exhibit FFF,

R.T. 1/7/86 at 103-108.) As to his own activities, he testified:

Q. Let me show you - - I believe that’s it.

Okay. Now as far as every one of these items I’ve shown

you, had you used any one of these items before?

A. Yeah, I am sure I have used this before.

Q. Okay. You are pointing to this grinder/sifter unit, Exhibit 1-

A?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And when would you have used that?

A. The nights of the parties at the house - - at the apartment.

Q. Okay. How many times would you say when you lived in

the apartment you would use it?

A. Maybe three, four - - three or four times.

Q. The entire time you lived there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you use any one of these other times?

A. I am sure I used the razor blade, you know, a few times.

Q. Okay. Any other items?

A. Nope - - no.

Q. Okay. You would never cut the cocaine with the Inositol or

weight it out on the scale?

A. No.

(Id. at 108- 109.)

Q. What about yourself, were you a coke dealer?

A. No.

Q. What about Larry Prince, was he a coke dealer?

A. Yes.

(Id. at 1112.) On cross examination, Cobey testified:

Q. So you used the sifter and the grinder?

A. I have used that right there.

Q. Which is a sifter and a grinder; right?

A. Okay.

Q. Now you testified that during the time you lived in this

apartment you were not selling drugs; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And yet you used that grinder? Therefore that grinder is not

used only for people that sell drugs; is that right?

A. Yes. 

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46 Petitioner complains that the state court had no basis for its conclusion that the drug

trial testimony showed Cobey “aided and abetted” the drug dealing. (Reply, Doc. 55 at 6.)

The fair gist of Cobey’s testimony showed his regular participation in distributing the drugs,

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(Id. at 122.) Cobey eventually admitted that he had said everyone used the grinder. (Id. at

124-126.) He also admitted to obtaining cocaine for his friends.

Q. During the time that you lived in that apartment, Kevin, you

sold or obtained coke for your friends; didn’t you?

A. I would get it for them.

* * * 

Q. So, do you remember on how many occasions you obtained

coke for your friends?

A. No.

Q. So it could have been like five times, 10 times?

A. Five.

Q. In the times that you obtained coke for your friends, you had

to purchase it or get it some way; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. When you purchased this coke for your friends, you

were concerned about whether you were getting the right amount:

weren’t you?

A. Pardon? Repeat the question.

Q. When you purchased coke, in other words you are giving

somebody money because you want a certain quantity of cocaine, right?

A. Uh-huh, right.

Q. You are concerned that you get the right quantity; aren’t you?

A. Yes.

Q. And in a situation like that you would be likely to weight it,

wouldn’t you?

A. No, I never touched that scale.

Q. Kevin, would you agree - - that on occasions, when

somebody does purchase cocaine, that it would be wise to weigh it to

make sure you got the right quantity?

A. Yes.

Q. Is cocaine expensive?

A. Yes.

(Id. at 127-128.) He admitted he may have touched the scales once or twice, and put them

away on a shelf. (Id. at 129-130.) On redirect, Cobey effectively admitted selling cocaine:

Q. Do you recall the defense lawyer asking you and you

indicating that you, when you provided somebody with cocaine,

wouldn’t weigh the cocaine that you sold?

A. No, I did not weigh it.

Q. And what’s the reason why you wouldn’t weigh it?

A. It was not my department.

Q. Whose department was that?

A. Larry’s.

(Id. at 138-139.)46 

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even to the point of distributing (if not selling) them to his friends.

47 Petitioner makes much ado about the prosecution’s insistence in the drug trial that

Cobey was not a dealer. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7A; Reply, Doc. 55 at 5.) That is irrelevant to

the effect to which counsel could have put the transcript of the drug trial in the instant trial.

Only Cobey’s actual testimony was usable to impeach Cobey.

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Thus, equipped with the transcript of the drug trial, counsel could have affirmatively

shown Cobey to have lied about denying being a cocaine dealer. Any impeachment beyond

that statement, however, would have been more problematic. The questioning at the drug trial

about specific activities, like weighing cutting and grinding cocaine, were all specifically

limited to activities while Cobey was living at the Swann/Shaw apartment. The purpose of

such limitation was obvious: the drug trial was based upon items found at the Swann/Shaw

apartment and attributed to Petitioner.47 

In contrast, the consistent testimony at the instant trial was that Cobey had been

involved in cocaine dealing before moving to the Swann/Shaw apartment, and in particular

was involved with Petitioner in dealing cocaine from Ellinghausen’s apartment. (See Exhibit

VVV, R.T. 4/3/86 at 9-10, 32-33.) 

Accordingly, as concluded by the PCR court, the only solid impeachment to be gained

by use of the transcript would have been on Cobey’s assertion that he had not denied being

a cocaine dealer. As noted above, it is not surprising that Cobey would distance himself from

that singular denial since it was largely inconsistent with the balance of his testimony at both

trials.

Moreover, it seems not illogical for a jury to have seen through Cobey’s niggling over

terminology. There is no indication that Cobey was actively involved in selling as a

profession, as opposed to a user who would let friends buy into his own purchases, or who

would help Petitioner in completing his sales. Doubtless many users in that situation would

not consider themselves a “dealer” despite their buying and selling, the same way that the

casual buyer and seller of used cars would not consider themselves a “car dealer.”

Under these circumstances, the undersigned cannot find a reasonable likelihood that

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the outcome of trial would have been different had trial counsel made use of the drug trial

transcript to impeach Cobey’s trial testimony. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s Ground III is without merit and must be denied.

D. ACTUAL INNOCENCE

The undersigned has concluded that Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal claims in

Ground II (Juror Misconduct), is now procedurally barred from doing so, and has failed to

show cause and prejudice to excuse his failure. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause for

the procedural default.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added).

Petitioner asserts he has established his actual innocence. (Reply, Doc. 55 at 32, et seq.)

The Supreme Court has instructed that a federal court faced with allegations of actual

innocence whether of the sentence or of the crime charged, must first address all nondefaulted claims for comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural

default.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 394 (2004). Because the undersigned concludes

herein above that there are no non-defaulted claims of merit, and has already addressed the

other grounds to excuse the default, the claims of actual innocence will be addressed in this

section.

Applicable Standard - “In Schlup [v. Delo], the Court . . .held that prisoners asserting

innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, ‘it

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ ” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-537 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S.

298, 327 (1995). 

New Reliable Evidence - An actual innocence claim does not permit the habeas court

to simply second guess what the jury has already decided. Rather, a claim of actual innocence

“requires ‘new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.’” Id. In

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evaluating that new evidence, the habeas court is to “consider how the timing of the

submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that

evidence.” Id. at 538 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 331-332). 

All the Evidence - However, the habeas court’s review is not limited to the new

evidence. Rather, “the habeas court must consider ‘all the evidence,’ old and new,

incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted

under ‘rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.’ ” Id. at 538 (quoting Schlup, at 327-

328). 

Nor is this Court limited to evidence actually or properly admitted at trial. 

Instead, the emphasis on “actual innocence” allows the reviewing

tribunal also to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that

was either excluded or unavailable at trial. Indeed, with respect to this

aspect of the [actual innocence] standard, we believe that Judge

Friendly's description of the inquiry is appropriate: The habeas court

must make its determination concerning the petitioner's innocence “in

light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally

admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence

tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become

available only after the trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-328 (quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on

Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)).

Deference - In evaluating the evidence, the habeas court is bound by the presumptions

of correctness normally accorded to review of state court factual findings mandated by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e), including credibility determinations. Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378-379

(4th Cir. 2010). But see House, 547 U.S. at 539 (discussing inapplicability of AEDPA’s

stricter standards for second or successive claims). However, those presumptions must be

applied in light of the issue at hand. “It does not matter to our [actual innocence] analysis

whether the witness is actually telling the truth-the purpose of a credibility determination-but

rather we care only whether all reasonable jurors would choose to believe the proffered

testimony.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1142, n. 11 (9th Cir. 2007).

Any Reasonable Juror’s Reasonable Doubt - “Based on this total record, the court must

make ‘a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would

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do.’ The court's function is not to make an independent factual determination about what

likely occurred, but rather to assess the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors.”

House, 547 U.S. at 538 (quoting Schlup, at 329.) “A petitioner's burden at the gateway stage

is to demonstrate that more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror

would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-or, to remove the double negative, that more

likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.” Id.

Evidence Considered - In evaluating Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence, this Court

must consider not only the evidence presented at trial, but any new evidence proffered by

Petitioner. Accordingly this Court must also consider the Brady evidence considered in

deciding Ground I, i.e.(1) the Tabola police reports, (2) the Flood story, and (3) the Cobey

statement. Moreover, although it was not deemed subject to Brady, this Court must consider

(a) the Brown/Howk/Cobey reports and the testimony of Dave Brown submitted as a result

of those reports; and (2) the Cobey Presentence Report. 

Further, this Court must consider the other “newly discovered evidence” raised by

Petitioner in his state proceedings which was impacted by the Cobey Statement, including

most significantly: (1) the Jimmy Pechac testimony; (2) the Cobey drug trial evidence; (3)

the Rocky Wheeler testimony; (4) the Amy Robinson affidavit; and (5) the Ronald Clements

testimony. Further, this Court must consider the other newly discovered evidence before the

state courts, even if not affected by the Cobey Statement, including, most significantly: (1)

the Larry Roskey testimony; and (2) the Hatch Affidavit.

Analysis of Reasonable Doubt - Certainly the evidence at trial was itself not

uncontroverted; a reasonable juror could have found a reasonable doubt of Petitioner’s guilt

simply by discounting the testimony of Cobey, Hatch and Ellinghausen, and finding the

fingerprint evidence explained away by Petitioner’s admitted presence in the car on an earlier

date.

The “new” evidence certainly increases the likelihood that a reasonable juror could

have found a reasonable doubt. Petitioner’s new evidence presents a plausible story that

Cobey and Hatch were themselves involved in drug dealings with the victim, conspired to rob

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48 Petitioner argued to the state courts that this Affidavit served to impeach Hatch

because of his claims of having never been to the “Quail Tree Apartments,” that Wheeler was

a prison buddy of Petitioner, and that Petitioner had threatened him. (See Exhibit O, PFR at

21-23. See Exhibit NNN, R.T. 3/24/86 at 66-67, 98 (discussion between hatch and Coobey

at apartments at “7th Avenue and Missouri”.) Even if this Court were to presume that the

Affidavit provided such impeachment, given the passage of time and the collateral nature of

the inconsistencies, the undersigned would not find the impeachment persuasive.

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him, did so, the victim was killed by Hatch in the process, and they eventually plotted to make

Petitioner their scapegoat. While comprised primarily of testimony tainted by it’s “discovery”

in prison many years after the events, the testimony (as opposed to those testifying) is not

patently incredible, and there is evidence untainted by a prison birth to at least partially

corroborate it, e.g. the Brown/Howk/Cobey reports, the Hatch affidavit (worked with Wheeler

and tried to sell him a gun)48, the Roskey testimony (worked with Hatch and Wheeler) and the

Pechac testimony and affidavits (Cobey sold him jewelry, it was incriminating, and Brown

was looking to collect and was sent to Cobey). Alternatively, the Tabola police reports and

related evidence suggest that Tabola and his roommate were in debt to the victim, stood to be

beneficiaries of his drug stash, and thus had at least some motive to kill the victim, with

Tabola then positioned to implicate Petitioner. All of this evidence, if believed by a jury,

could have created a reasonable doubt about Petitioner’s guilt.

But the standard for the actual innocence gateway is not satisfied by simply showing

a likelihood that a reasonable juror could have reasonable doubt, nor even a likelihood that

a reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt. Rather, Petitioner must show that a

likelihood that “any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.” House, 547 U.S. at 538.

Or, conversely, Petitioner must show a likelihood that “no reasonable juror would find him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

Here, the reasonable juror with all the evidence would still face a need to evaluate the

credibility of the witnesses in order to determine whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt

was shown. Here, a juror could, in the face of all Petitioner’s new evidence, still reasonably

choose to find the testimony of Tabola, Cobey, Hatch, and Ellinghausen sufficiently credible,

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49 There certainly was other evidence which was consistent with the prosecution’s

story, such as the weapons evidence, the drug debt log, etc.. However, that evidence was

circumstantial, and not particularly persuasive of itself. For example, many weapons could

have been the murder weapon and many key players had weapons, the prosecution ultimately

had to argue that interpreting the drug debt log was highly speculative, etc. 

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(especially when coupled with the fingerprint evidence),49 and Petitioner’s new evidence

sufficiently incredible, so as to be convinced of Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to show that this

is “an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. 

Therefore, Petitioner may not be relieved of his procedural default of his state remedies

on the claims in Ground I. 

D. SUMMARY RE CLAIMS

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his state remedies on the claims in Ground II (Juror

Misconduct), and has failed to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence to avoid the

effect of his default. Accordingly, that ground must be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner has failed to show a constitutional violation in his Brady claims in Ground

I, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Ground III. Accordingly , the balance

of Petitioner’s Petition must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

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Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds

without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the

prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part on

the merits. 

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the

reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on the merits, under the reasoning

set forth herein, the constitutional claims are plainly without merit. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to

the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ground II (Juror Misconduct) of the

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed July 14, 2008 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that remainder of the Petitioner's Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed July 14, 2008 (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file

a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or

recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: April 11, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\08-1299-001r RR 10 05 07 re HC Working.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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