Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01249/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01249-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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1 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendant Edwin P.

Horan, III on December 22, 2004. The other named defendants,

Crest Energy, Inc., Crest Oil Natural Gas Management Corp., and

NQ TX Quibono, are also represented by Crest’s counsel bringing

the instant motion but are not named as movants on the motion. 

In its motion, Crest describes that it is the successor in

interest to defendant Crest Energy, Inc.

1

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DONALD E. BENSON, MARYLAN

J. BENSON, and DONALD BENSON 

FAMILY LLC

NO. CIV. S-04-1249 FCD EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CREST ENERGY, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Crest Oil & Gas

Management Corp.’s (“Crest”)1 motion for summary judgment, or

alternatively, partial summary judgment, with respect to

plaintiffs Marylan J. Benson and the Donald Benson Family LLC’s

///

///

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2 Plaintiff Donald Benson, who died subsequent to the

filing of this action, was dismissed as a plaintiff pursuant to

the court’s order of January 5, 2006. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25

(permitting dismissal of a deceased party if a substitution of

parties is not filed within 90 days of the filing of a notice of

suggestion of death). 

3 Also pending before the court is plaintiffs’

application for appointment of a receiver, filed August 1, 2006

(Docket #58). (Minute Order, filed Aug. 2, 2006 [declining to

hear plaintiff’s motion ex parte, as plaintiffs requested, and

deferring motion so as to hear it in conjunction with Crest’s

pending motion for summary judgment].) However, because the

court finds herein in favor of Crest on its motion, plaintiffs’

motion is moot. Plaintiffs’ action against Crest is hereby

dismissed in its entirety, and thus, plaintiffs have no grounds

to seek appointment of a receiver. Additionally, to the extent

plaintiffs seek to strike Crest’s answer and/or its counterclaim

against them via their application for appointment of a receiver,

the motion is likewise denied. Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is

not only procedurally improper but it fails to provide any

factual or legal basis or even argument as to why such relief is

warranted.

4 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

(“plaintiffs”)2

 second amended complaint (“SAC”).3 By the

motion, Crest seeks adjudication in its favor as to plaintiffs’

claims for (1) breach of contract; (2) intentional

misrepresentation; (3) negligent misrepresentation; 

(4) accounting; and (5) unfair business practices (Cal. Bus. &

Prof. § 17200 et seq.).

Plaintiffs oppose the motion, primarily arguing they need

additional time for discovery to adequately oppose the motion. 

Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that as to each of their causes

of action, they raise triable issues of fact sufficient to

warrant denial of Crest’s motion.4 

As to plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery, this is

plaintiffs’ second such request under Federal Rule of Civil

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5 Plaintiffs were permitted to depose Horan, and Crest

was permitted to complete the deposition of plaintiff Marylan

Benson and to conduct the deposition of Laura Quinn, the

designated, person most knowledgeable regarding the Donald Benson

Family LLC.

6 Other than asserting the need for different discovery,

plaintiffs brief and supporting papers are nearly verbatim of

their original opposition.

3

Procedure 56(f) (“Rule 56(f)”) in response to the instant motion. 

Crest originally filed its motion on July 18, 2006, setting the

matter for hearing on August 18, 2006. (Pursuant to the Court’s

Pre-Trial Scheduling Order of July 22, 2005, the last day to hear

dispositive motions was August 24, 2006.) Plaintiffs responded,

moving for a continuance of the motion and time for additional

discovery under Rule 56(f). Specifically, plaintiffs sought to

depose Crest’s president, Edwin P. Horan, III (“Horan”). The

court granted plaintiffs’ request for a continuance of the motion

under Rule 56(f). (Minute Order, filed Aug. 22, 2006.) However,

as to the requested discovery, Crest opposed the deposition, and

the matter was heard by the magistrate judge, who ultimately

granted both parties additional depositions. (Order, filed Sept.

27, 2006.)5 

As a result of that order, this court further continued the

hearing on Crest’s motion for summary judgment and permitted the

parties to file supplemental memoranda of points and authorities

to address the additional discovery. (Minute Order, filed Sept.

27, 2006.) However, in their supplemental opposition, plaintiffs

once again request time for further discovery.6 Now, plaintiffs

assert that Crest’s president, Horan, did not produce at his

deposition all records relevant to the subject wells’ production;

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4

however, Horan testified he did not have any other records. 

Nonetheless, plaintiffs maintain they need additional time to

obtain from “governmental agencies” the relevant documents,

although plaintiffs fail to describe the precise documents sought

or why such documents could not have been obtained during the

normal course of discovery.

Plaintiffs’ request for a further continuance and additional

discovery is wholly without merit; the court has given plaintiffs

ample time to conduct discovery in this matter. Indeed,

discovery closed in this nearly three-year old case on June 30,

2006. Plaintiffs did not move to re-open discovery but instead

waited until their opposition to Crest’s motion for summary

judgment, filed on the eve of the dispositive motion cut-off, to

request additional discovery under Rule 56(f). Despite the

arguably untimely request, the court granted plaintiffs their

requested relief, continuing the hearing on the motion for

summary judgment and modifying the pretrial scheduling order to

allow the magistrate judge to hear plaintiffs’ motion to compel. 

(Minute Order, filed Aug. 22, 2006.) That motion was granted and

plaintiffs were permitted to conduct further discovery. Now

plaintiffs want more but without offering any justification. 

Their request is denied, and the court, therefore, resolves

Crest’s motion on the merits. 

For the reasons set forth below, Crest’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs offer little, if any, evidence

///

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7 Indeed, nowhere in plaintiffs’ papers do they cite to

the relevant evidence; instead, they simply make conclusory

arguments in their opposition and cite only generally to certain

declarations in response to Crest’s statement of undisputed

facts. (See e.g., Pls.’ Opposing Stmt., filed Aug. 18, 2006,

stating “DENY – SEE DECLARATION OF LAURA QUINN.”) On this basis

alone, the court could grant Crest’s motion as plaintiffs have

failed to comply with both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and this court’s local rules for summary judgment motions. 

Nevertheless, the court has reviewed all of plaintiffs’

submissions and renders its decision herein on the merits of the

evidence presented.

8 Plaintiffs originally filed this action in February

2004 in the Superior Court of California, County of Glenn. 

Defendants removed the action to this court on the basis of

diversity jurisdiction.

5

in response to the motion,7

 and the little evidence proffered

fails to raise a triable issue of fact. 

BACKGROUND

Edwin P. Horan, III, President of Crest, met Donald and

Marylan Benson at the “Money Show,” an annual investment

conference in Orlando, Florida in February 1999. At the

conference, Crest was one of approximately 50 start-up companies,

including approximately 11 oil and gas companies, who presented

information regarding their respective companies. (Horan Decl.,

filed July 18, 2006, ¶ 4.)

As alleged in the SAC,8 plaintiff Marylan Benson (“Mrs.

Benson”) and plaintiff Donald Benson Family LLC (the “Family

LLC”) entered into the following written agreements with Crest:

(1) A February 5, 1999 agreement with the Family LLC for one

unit, totaling $58,482.00 for three wells (Logan Creek #5,

Willows WWH #2, Ramona “Black” #18); (2) A February 5, 1999

agreement with Mrs. Benson for one unit, totaling $58,482.00 for

three wells (Logan Creek #5, Willows WWH #2, Ramona “Black” #18);

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9 Two other agreements were alleged to have been entered

by Donald Benson with Crest; however, as Donald Benson has been

dismissed as a plaintiff in this action, those agreements are no

longer at issue in this action.

10 Plaintiffs’ response statement is Docket #75; the

court, however, does not cite herein to said statement as

plaintiffs failed to repeat the entirety of Crest’s statement,

including the citations to Crest’s evidence, and did not in

response provide any citation to their evidence. Nevertheless,

as set forth below, in all material respects, the court finds the

facts as described in this “background” to be undisputed. While

plaintiffs purport to dispute various facts stated herein, their

sole “evidence” is the declarations of Larry Rothman, their

attorney, and Laura Quinn, Donald and Marylan Benson’s daughter,

a Michigan attorney who has served as the Manager of the Family

LLC since November 2004. Neither of these declarations, however,

provides admissible evidence relevant to the motion.

On that ground, Crest objects to the declarations

(Docket #s 82, 83) and its objections are sustained for the

following reasons: Mr. Rothman’s declaration provides no

evidence related to the facts of this case; instead, his

declaration and supporting exhibits detail the parties’ various

discovery disputes which are not relevant to the instant motion;

therefore, his declaration is properly excluded. Ms. Quinn’s

declaration must also be wholly excluded as it is inadmissible

for lack of personal knowledge and/or is inadmissible hearsay

evidence. Ms. Quinn was not a party to the various agreements at

issue nor was she manager of the Family LLC at the time of the

6

and (3) A January 1, 2000 agreement with the Family LLC for an

assignment of a 6.8% working interest in the Northwest Grimes

(“NWG”) Well #2 for $50,000.00. (SAC, filed Oct. 27, 2004, 3:1-

15.)9 Plaintiffs allege that by these agreements, they purchased

interests in three oil and gas wells being developed by Crest,

Logan Creek #5, Willows WWH #2, and Ramona “Black” #18, as well

as an assignment of an interest in NWG Well #2. (Id. at 3:16-

18.)

In accepting participants who invest in an oil and natural

gas well project, Crest provides certain information regarding

the project. (Crest’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts [“UF”], filed

July 18, 2006, ¶ 7.)10 The terms of the well projects in which

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subject events, and thus, she has no personal knowledge of the

events in question. (Ex. M to Brod Decl., filed Nov. 9, 2006 at

54:16-22 [Ms. Quinn concedes she does not “have personal

knowledge” of the events in question as she was “not involved in

the investments back at the time”].) Additionally, her various

statements about what her parents were told by Crest or did in

relation to the drilling agreements is inadmissible hearsay

evidence.

7

plaintiffs sought to participate were enumerated in a Private

Placement Memorandum (“PPM”), entitled “1999 California Oil and

Natural Gas Drilling Program.” (Horan Decl., Ex. E.) The PPM

provides that any agreement between Crest and a participant is

not a partnership or joint venture. (UF ¶ 6.) All proposed

participants are required to return a signed “Working Interest

Participating and Turnkey Drilling Agreement” (“Drilling

Agreement”), which must be accepted by Crest, along with the

participant’s “Advanced Sums,” due pursuant to the PPM and

Drilling Agreement. (UF ¶ 22.) This must occur prior to the

commencement of drilling operations and payment must accompany

the executed agreements. (UF ¶ 25.)

Crest provided plaintiffs with all information required by

the PPM and Drilling Agreement. (UF ¶s 5, 7.) Plaintiffs had

the opportunity to review the information and ask questions prior

to making a decision to participate but chose not to do so. (UF

¶s 7, 9.) Plaintiffs were not induced to invest by anyone at

Crest. (UF ¶ 33.) Moreover, no one at Crest told plaintiffs

their investments would result in economic gain or that they

should expect any specific return on their investments, nor did

Crest’s written documents make such representations. (UF ¶s 32,

34.) Plaintiffs do not believe that anything in Crest’s

literature was misleading. (UF ¶ 35.) 

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8

Once accepted as a participant, under the terms of the

Drilling Agreement, a participant has full and complete access to

the drill site, logs and other information gained by the drilling

of the well. (Horan Decl., ¶s 8-9.) As “Operator,” under the

Agreement, Crest provides notifications of participants’

elections, summaries of operations and drilling, and other

relevant tasks concerning the well on a periodic basis as

warranted by the ongoing situation. During 1999 and 2000, Crest

provided such reports by group e-mails and on occasion in 1999

only, the reports were also available through a voice-recorded

report, activated by a code which was provided to all

participants, including plaintiffs. (UF ¶ 5.) In addition,

under the Drilling Agreement, a participant had the right to

audit Crest’s records at its office, “insofar as such records

directly related to the activities conducted under this

Agreement.” However, at no time, did plaintiffs request any such

audit. (UF ¶ 8.)

As to the actual drilling, the PPM and Drilling Agreement

allow Crest to determine the “final site and manner of drilling”

and to substitute wells if Crest deems it necessary to do so. 

Additionally, Crest is entitled to terminate the drilling of any

well, and any return of the participant’s “completion funds” is

made only at the participant’s election. (UF ¶ 10.) During 1999

and 2000, Horan was responsible for making these determinations

on behalf of Crest. (Horan Decl., ¶ 14.)

In this case, the drilling of the Logan Creek #5 Well was

delayed by the flooding of the drill site for rice cultivation. 

During this time, a similar well tested uneconomic, which

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9

adversely impacted the expectations for the Logan Creek #5 Well. 

As a result, Horan made the decision to substitute the Logan

Creek #5 Well for the Weldgen-Eddins (“WE”) #2 Well and notified

plaintiffs of the substitution. Plaintiffs did not object nor

did they ask for the return of any funds. (UF ¶ 11.) The WE #2

Well was drilled and completed in March 2001 but never produced

in commercial quantities. The well was subsequently plugged and

abandoned according to applicable regulations. (UF ¶ 19.) 

The Willows WWH #2 Well was drilled and completed in January

2000, and it also never produced in commercial quantities. The

well was subsequently plugged and abandoned according to

applicable regulations. (UF ¶ 20.)

As to the Ramona Black #18 Well, Crest determined that

pursuing the drilling would be unwise due to the poor performance

of an earlier drilled well, the Black 17 Well. Crest decided to

substitute the Kroutch Well for the Ramona Black #18 Well. Horan

personally notified plaintiffs of the substitution and provided

plaintiffs with a revised PPM, detailing the Kroutch Well. 

Plaintiffs did not object to the substitution or ask for the

return of any funds. (UF ¶ 17.) The Kroutch Well was drilled

and completed in November 1999 but also did not produce in

commercial quantities. The well was subsequently plugged and

abandoned according to applicable regulations. (UF ¶ 19.) 

Finally, Crest commenced drilling of the NWG #2 Well in

December 1999. (UF ¶ 27.) In August 2000, the well began

production into a sales pipeline. Payment for the production was

sent in October 2000. Subsequently, Crest inadvertently issued

checks, made payable to Donald Benson on October 31, 2000,

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11 For the reasons described below, the facts regarding

the NWG #2 well are not at issue on this motion, and thus, the

court makes no findings herein regarding the parties’ dealings

concerning this well. These facts are described only to provide

a complete understanding of plaintiffs’ claims and Crest’s

arguments.

10

January 4, 2001, January 31, 2001, February 28, 2001, and March

31, 2001 in the total amount of $301,258.74 for the production

relating to this well. (UF ¶ 30.) However, plaintiffs’ Drilling

Agreement for this well was dated January 1, 2000 and was not

received by Crest until May 2001. (UF ¶ 28.) As the drilling of

the NWG #2 Well had begun prior to receipt and acceptance of

plaintiffs’ agreement for the well, plaintiffs were not entitled

to any proceeds from this well. (UF ¶s 27, 28, 29.) Crest never

accepted plaintiffs’ agreement. Upon receipt of the agreement in

May 2001, Crest realized its mistake in sending the participation

amounts to Donald Benson, and Horan contacted Donald Benson via

telephone, explaining the error and requesting Mr. Benson return

the proceeds. Mr. Benson refused to do so. (UF ¶ 30.)11

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see California v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

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11

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, "the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show "that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party

"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

ANALYSIS

1. Donald Benson Family LLC

Crest moves to dismiss all claims asserted against it by the

Family LLC on the ground that as a foreign (Michigan) corporation

who is not qualified to do business in California, it cannot

maintain the instant action. California Corporations Code § 2203

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12 As Mrs. Benson is the only remaining plaintiff with

viable claims, the only agreement at issue is her agreement with

Crest, described above, involving the Logan Creek #5, Willows WWH

#2, and Ramona “Black” #18 wells.

12

requires any foreign corporation transacting business in the

State to hold a valid certificate from the Secretary of State. 

Absent such a certificate, said corporation may not maintain an

action in this state. Cal. Corp. Code § 2105. Here, Laura

Quinn, manager of the Family LLC, testified that she did not

believe the Family LLC was qualified to do business in California

or that any attempts to qualify were made by the company. (Ex. M

to Brod Decl., filed Nov. 9, 2006, at 55:11-24.) Additionally,

Crest’s attorneys searched the California Secretary of State’s

website and did not find a certificate of qualification on file

for the Family LLC. (Brod Decl., filed July 18, 2006, ¶ 8.) 

Therefore, as there is no evidence the Family LLC is

authorized to transact business within California, its claims

against Crest must be dismissed. Summary judgment in Crest’s

favor is accordingly granted with respect to all claims as

asserted by the Family LLC. As such, the court’s discussion

below of the substantive claims pertains to plaintiff Marylan

Benson only.

2. Breach of Contract

As alleged in the SAC, Mrs. Benson asserts Crest breached

the PPM and Drilling Agreements12 by (1) “failing and refusing to

provide [her] with the agreed upon financial information and

reports concerning the wells and any production of the wells;”

(2) “by substituting other wells for those set forth in the terms

of the Agreements;” and (3) by failing to pay all sums due and

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13

owing from the wells’ production. (SAC at ¶ 11.)

As to the first alleged breach, Crest proffers evidence that

it complied with all requirements of the PPM and the Drilling

Agreements, providing plaintiffs with the information required by

the agreements’ terms. (UF ¶s 4-9.) Mrs. Benson, on the other

hand, provides no evidence in rebuttal. She does not provide a

declaration in response to the motion, and she testified at

deposition that she could not articulate what was sought in this

lawsuit or why the lawsuit was filed in the first instance. (Ex.

L to Brod Decl., filed Nov. 9, 2006, at 14:11-23, 24:6-14; 28:1-

15.) Because Mrs. Benson has no evidence in support of her

allegations, summary judgment in favor of Crest must be granted

as to this basis for her breach of contract claim.

As to Mrs. Benson’s claim that Crest breached their

agreement in substituting wells, again Crest proffers evidence

that it complied with the agreement’s terms. After determining,

in its discretion, that well substitutions were necessary under

the particular circumstances, it informed Mrs. Benson of the

substitutions, and she did not object or ask for a return of her

investment. (UF ¶s 10-14.) Like above, Mrs. Benson fails to

proffer any evidence in rebuttal. As such, Crest is entitled to

summary judgment as to this issue as well.

Finally, as to Mrs. Benson’s third basis for this cause of

action, she alleges in the SAC that she has “learned through

other sources that at least three and possibly all of [the] wells

are still active and producing but [she has not] received

[f]urther monies on account of such production.” (SAC at 4:5-

10.) Crest submits evidence describing how each of the subject

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13 The elements of a claim for intentional

misrepresentation are a misrepresentation, made with knowledge of

its falsity and with an intent to defraud or induce reliance,

justifiable reliance, and resulting damage. A claim for

negligent misrepresentation requires proof of each of the

foregoing elements except for knowledge of the falsity of the

representation; honest belief in the truth of the statement,

without a reasonable ground for that belief, is sufficient. Id.

14

wells, Logan Creek #5, Willows WWH #2 and Ramona “Black” #18, was

either drilled or substituted for another well which was drilled,

how each well performed (none ultimately produced in commercial

quantities), and how each well was plugged and abandoned

according to applicable regulations. (UF ¶s 15-30.) Again, Mrs.

Benson offers no evidence to support her allegation that any

monies were due, let alone, still owing from these wells.

Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Crest is granted as to

this basis for her breach of contract claim as well.

3. Intentional and Negligent Misrepresentation

Defendants move for summary judgment as to Mrs. Benson’s

claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation on the

ground that she has no evidence Crest made any false

representations to plaintiffs regarding their investments. To

establish a claim for either intentional or negligent

misrepresentation, plaintiff must establish, among other things,

that Crest made a misrepresentation of fact. R & B Auto Center,

Inc. v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 140 Cal. App. 4th 327, 377 (2006).13 

In the SAC, Mrs. Benson alleges Horan represented that

plaintiffs could expect to be paid royalties from the wells, and

that the projects were a “good sound investment.” (SAC ¶ 17.) 

However, in her deposition, Mrs. Benson testified: 

///

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15

(1) she did not know of any statements made by Crest,

written or oral, that turned out to be false (UF ¶ 35;

Ex. L to Brod Decl., filed Nov. 9, 2006, 13:17-14:10);

(2) No one at Crest made any promises to her, personally,

and she had no knowledge of any promises made to anyone

else, that the investments would result in economic

gain (UF ¶ 34; Ex. L to Brod Decl. at 27:12-20); 

(3) she could not state that any documents provided by

Crest were misleading or unclear (UF ¶ 35; Ex. L to

Brod Decl. at 10:9-11:22); and

(4) she was not induced by anyone at Crest to invest (UF ¶

33).

On the basis of this testimony, Mrs. Benson cannot

establish, as a matter of law, a prima facie case for intentional

and/or negligent misrepresentation as she has no evidence of a

misrepresentation of fact by Crest. Therefore, her claims are

dismissed. 

4. Accounting

By this cause of action, Mrs. Benson seeks an accounting

based on the rights and obligations as provided for in the PPM

and Drilling Agreements. Specifically, Mrs. Benson complains

that Crest “never accounted for the principal of the Plaintiffs

or provided the Plaintiffs with tax information K 1 or 1099.” 

(Opp’n, filed Aug. 18, 2006, at 16:25-26.) However, other than

this blanket statement in her opposition, Mrs. Benson provides no

evidence to support her entitlement to such an accounting or

information as described in the relevant agreements with Crest,

nor does she provide any evidence that said information was not,

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in fact, provided by Crest. As stated above, Mrs. Benson does

not submit a declaration in opposition to the motion, and there

are no documents submitted by her counsel in support of this

claim. Likewise, she provided no relevant testimony at her

deposition. 

Contrary to Mrs. Benson, Crest has provided undisputed

evidence that it complied with all terms of the agreements

regarding disclosures and reports to plaintiffs, and that

plaintiffs failed to invoke their rights under the agreements to

audit Crest’s records should they have desired to do so. (UF ¶s

5, 7, 8.) 

Therefore, based on the undisputed facts and lack of any

evidentiary showing by Mrs. Benson in support of her allegations,

the court grants summary judgment in favor of Crest on this

claim.

5. Unfair Business Practices

California Business and Profession Code § 17200 et seq.

prohibits unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices, as

well as unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising. 

Here, Mrs. Benson’s claim is based on the same allegations as her

claims for breach of contract, misrepresentation and accounting. 

As those claims are dismissed, her unfair business practices

claim, based on those claims, also cannot succeed. She has

proffered no evidence in support of this claim, and therefore,

Crest is entitled to summary judgment.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Crest’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in its entirety. Plaintiffs’ related motion 

for appointment of a receiver is denied as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: December 1, 2006

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