Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03007/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03007-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:227 Telephone Consumer Protection Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

E-Filed 1/22/16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN BRINKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

NORMANDIN'S, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03007-EJD (HRL)

ORDER ON DISCOVERY DISPUTE 

JOINT REPORT 1

Re: Dkt. No. 60

Alan Brinker (“Brinker”) sues Normandin’s d/b/a Normandin Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram 

(“Normandin”) and OneCommand, Inc. in this class-action for alleged violations of the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act, 47 USC § 227 et seq (“TCPA”). Normandin provided Brinker a 

privilege log which identified certain documents Normandin did not intend to produce. Brinker 

disputed whether some of those documents could properly be withheld. Brinker and Normandin 

attempted to resolve the dispute but they were unable to do so. The parties therefore filed 

discovery dispute joint report (“DDJR”) 1.

Brinker claims three different types of documents have been improperly withheld: (1) 

documents withheld for “Privacy” and “Trade Secret” reasons; (2) documents withheld on the 

basis of attorney-client privilege but that are not communications between attorneys and clients; 

and (3) documents withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege but that were also sent to nonclients. Brinker also argues Normandin has invoked the work-product doctrine for every 

document purportedly protected by attorney-client privilege without making any showing that the 

work-product doctrine applies to any of them. Normandin responds: (1) documents which contain 

client email addresses, usernames, and passwords should not be produced because those are 

protected trade secrets; (2) Normandin did not previously explain why the work-product doctrine 

applies because “plaintiff did not appear to desire an explanation”; (3) Joshua Jouvenat

Case 5:14-cv-03007-EJD Document 72 Filed 01/22/16 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(“Jouvenat”), an employee for a third-party vendor, also worked as an ESI consultant to create 

some of the withheld documents “in anticipation of litigation and as a direct result of ongoing 

litigation to prepare defenses for Normandin”; (4) attorney-client privilege attaches to 

communications involving Jouvenat because “[h]is use as a consultant on matters requested by 

counsel also includes communications with Normandin employees”; (5) attorney-client privilege 

attaches to internal discussions between Normandin employees about privileged communications; 

and (6) “Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden[.]”

Discussion

As an initial matter, the court rejects nearly all of Normandin’s work-product designations

for a lack of supporting facts. Normandin has the burden to prove each “work product” document 

was generated “in anticipation of litigation or for trial[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A); e.g., 

Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). Every single document designated 

as privileged was also labeled as work product, seemingly as a matter of course. Normandin

recites legal standards, Dkt. No. 60 at 8, but makes no factual argument to support most of these 

work-product designations. The privilege log is too vague to make up for the deficiency in 

Normandin’s portion of the DDJR. For instance, Mark Normandin sent Paul Normandin an email 

about “Gonzales” on February 4, 2015—Normandin asks the court to conclude from solely those 

facts that the email is protected work product prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. The 

court is not persuaded by the low degree of detail Normandin provides for most of its workproduct designations.

Normandin brings only one colorable factual argument to support a subset of the workproduct designations: Jouvenat “generated” work-product emails in his capacity as an ESI 

consultant. Dkt. No. 60 at 8. Brinker responds that Normandin initially identified Jouvenat only 

as an employee for a third-party company and that Normandin did not claim Jouvenat as a 

consultant when the parties attempted to resolve these discovery disputes. Id. at 3, 6. Normandin 

admits it did not identify Jouvenat as a consultant when the parties discussed these disputes, but 

Normandin argues that should not matter because “plaintiff did not appear to desire an 

explanation.” Id. at 7. That claim seems disingenuous. The court requires parties to meet and 

Case 5:14-cv-03007-EJD Document 72 Filed 01/22/16 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

confer when they have discovery disputes so that they may explain their positions to each other 

and then seek common ground. The court is skeptical of the key factual claim—Jouvenat is a 

consultant for counsel who generated work-product emails—because Normandin conveniently 

raises that claim for the first time with the court instead of during the party-to-party discussions

that were supposed to either resolve or else narrow the scope of these discovery disputes. 

Normandin’s opportunistic claim fails to persuade the court that Jouvenat was actually retained as 

a consultant and tasked with the creation of work product. Normandin has not carried its burden 

of proof for any work-product designation and the court therefore rejects all of them.

Normandin provides no legal authority to support its decision to withhold “Privacy; Trade 

Secret” documents. In fact, Normandin does not discuss privacy at all in its portion of DDJR 1. 

Normandin instead argues only, with respect to these documents, that the disclosure of the 

usernames and passwords for proprietary software “would . . . violate trade secret information of a 

third party vendor” and that “there is no reason for plaintiff” to see those login credentials. Dkt. 

No. 60 at 7. Normandin provides no further details and no legal explanation for how that vague 

factual claim might matter here. Brinker has expressed, however, that he would be satisfied by the 

production of the “Privacy; Trade Secret” documents with the passwords redacted, id. at 4, and

Normandin makes no argument for why the other information in those documents should be

withheld. Normandin shall produce the “Privacy; Trade Secret” documents with any login 

credentials redacted—this shall permit Normandin to withhold the information in those documents 

that Normandin has asked to withhold, and Brinker shall receive the subset of information that he 

actually seeks. Normandin shall also treat those documents, to the extent appropriate, as 

confidential documents subject to the terms of the protective order that governs this case.

The federal common law governs privilege claims in federal court when that claim does 

not relate to a “claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.” Fed. R. Evid. 

501. Federal law supplies the rule of decision in this case and the federal common law therefore 

governs Normandin’s attorney-client privilege claim. Normandin has the burden to prove

attorney-client privilege applies to withheld documents. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 

F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). Federal privilege claims should be narrowly construed to serve 

Case 5:14-cv-03007-EJD Document 72 Filed 01/22/16 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

their underlying purposes. In re Pacific Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Attorney-client privilege exists in order to encourage frank conversations between attorneys and 

clients. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Voluntary disclosure to a third party 

shows a client is comfortable discussing the disclosed information in situations less private than an 

attorney-client communication, and the privilege does not serve its underlying purpose when 

applied to information a client is already comfortable discussing in less private contexts. Pacific, 

679 F.3d at 1126-27. The voluntary disclosure of a privileged communication to a third party

“will [therefore] generally destroy” the attorney-client privilege for that communication. Id.

Normandin argues privilege applies to confidential attorney-client communications which 

are contained in emails between Normandin’s employees. Dkt. No. 60 at 8. The court agrees that 

attorney-client privilege is not waived as to a particular communication when Normandin 

employees share that communication with each other. Still, attorney-client privilege prevents the 

disclosure of particular “communications” sent between attorneys and clients as opposed to the 

“disclosure of . . . underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney[.]” Upjohn, 449 

U.S. at 395. The mere fact that a non-privileged email contains a copy of a privileged 

communication does not extend privileged status to other facts or statements that are also 

contained within the non-privileged email. Parties might otherwise frustrate the eventual 

discovery of a non-privileged internal email simply by attaching a copy of a privileged 

communication. Normandin has made no other argument to justify the retention of these internal

emails. Normandin shall therefore produce the purely internal emails it has withheld on attorneyclient privilege grounds, but Normandin may redact any privileged attorney-client 

communications contained within them.

Normandin also argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(A) attaches attorneyclient privilege to all emails sent to or written by a consultant hired by counsel. Dkt. No. 60 at 8.

True, attorney-client privilege may sometimes attach to communications if a consultant created 

them for the primary or predominant purpose of facilitating the provision of legal advice, North 

Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2003), but Normandin has 

argued only that Jouvenat was hired to provide technical assistance to counsel. Normandin also 

Case 5:14-cv-03007-EJD Document 72 Filed 01/22/16 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

misunderstands subsection (b)(3)(A)—it codifies the work-product doctrine, but it does not 

expand the distinct, common-law scope of attorney-client privilege. Normandin has therefore 

failed to show that attorney-client privilege attaches to any of the emails sent or received by

Jouvenat.

The court notes that the scope of discovery permitted under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26 changed while this DDJR was pending. Parties may now obtain discovery, in

general, on “any nonprivileged matter that is” both: (1) “relevant” to any claim or defense; and (2) 

“proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the 

action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ 

resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issue, and whether the burden or 

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This 

class action for statutory damages under the TCPA may eventually result in a substantial 

settlement or damages award. Brinker requests the production of certain documents that are likely 

to be relevant to liability; Normandin has not shown that it may rightly withhold those documents 

on any basis. Normandin considers the number of documents at issue in this DDJR to be “very 

small” in the context of this case. Dkt. No. 60 at 9. The court concludes that the materials 

requested by Brinker are relevant and that the burden of producing those materials would be 

proportional to the needs of this case.

Conclusion

By February 20, 2016, Normandin shall produce the documents requested by Brinker in 

DDJR 1. Brinker may redact the customer login credentials contained within the requested 

“Privacy; Trade Secret” documents. Brinker may also redact any privileged attorney-client 

communications that are copied within other produced documents. Brinker shall provide a 

supplemental privilege log to show any redactions are justified.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/22/16

________________________

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:14-cv-03007-EJD Document 72 Filed 01/22/16 Page 5 of 5