Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01384/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01384-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN s. PLEASANT, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

vs. 

LARRY LOVELL, LARRY HYATT, 

VERNON PIXLEY, KENNETH BATSON 

and TIM FORTUNE, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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FILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 1 61989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1384 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 83-F-2251) 

William A. Cohan (Carl E. Stahl, with him on the brief), Cohan & 

Stahl, P.C., Denver, Colorado (Johns. Pleasant, Pro Se, with him 

on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Elaine F. Ferris, Attorney, Tax Division, Department of Justice, 

Washington D.C. (Roger M. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General, 

Michael L. Paup, and Jonathan S. Cohen, Attorneys, Tax Division, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with her on the brief and 

Robert N. Miller, United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, Of 

Counsel), for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, McWILLIAMS and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 1 
I • 

Plaintiffs-appellants, 145 members of an organization known 

as the National Commodity and Barter Association (NCBA), sought in 

this case to recover damages from defendants-appellees, five 

agents of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal 

Revenue Service (IRS), for alleged infringement of the members' 

constitutional rights. The NCBA is an organization advocating 

organized opposition to the federal income tax laws. 

Defendants-appellees held various positions in the Criminal 

Investigation Division of the IRS: Lovell, Batson and Fortune 

were special agents, Pixley was a group manager, and Hyatt was the 

chief of the Denver division. 

This case arose from a criminal tax investigation of various 

members of the NCBA during the latter half of 1979. A federal 

grand jury investigation followed in 1980 in Denver. During the 

summer of 1979, the IRS was concentrating its investigation on the 

NCBA and its founder, John Grandbouche. The IRS maintains that it 

was concerned with the promotion of tax evasion by the NCBA and 

its members, harassment of IRS agents working on tax collection 

matters, and a possible link between the NCBA and other tax 

protester organizations. 

The cornerstone of NCBA doctrine is the belief that the 

federal income tax is unconstitutional. Other goals of the NCBA 

philosophy include abolition of the Federal Reserve System and a 

return to the gold standard. NCBA members are urged to 

participate in seminars which discuss ways in which taxpayers may 

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make largely meritless challenges to the authority and procedures 

of the IRS. NCBA members provide assistance, if it can be called 

that, to persons involved in tax disputes with the IRS. They 

encourage self-representation and are willing to provide legal 

training. 

Some record evidence suggests that NCBA members may have 

advocated or participated in various schemes designed to evade 

federal income tax. These included engaging in a barter system 

for the purpose of not recognizing taxable income, submitting 

incorrect employee withholding forms (Form W-4) claiming exemption 

from federal tax withholding, and transacting business through a 

warehouse bank, such as the National Commodity Exchange (NCE), so 

as to avoid IRS scrutiny concerning cash deposits and payments, 

see Heinhold Hog Market, Inc. v. McCoy, 700 F.2d 611, 616 (10th 

Cir. 1983). While the political speech of NCBA members is 

protected by the first amendment, the same is not true of speech 

encouraging or facilitating illegal activity. 

Thus, the NCBA and some of its members engaged in a variety 

of activities of interest to the IRS. This interest soon resulted 

in an investigation by the defendants. The investigation was 

advanced by inside information when, in September 1979, one 

Pauline Adams called the Criminal Investigation Division of the 

IRS and spoke to defendant Lovell. She indicated that she had 

information relevant to the investigation. With defendant 

Pixley's approval, defendant Lovell later met with Adams. 

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Previously, Adams had met John Pleasant, plaintiff-appellant 

and NCBA member, when she was employed by a bankruptcy trustee in 

Denver. She assisted Pleasant with some pleadings before the 

district court. During the course of this assistance, Pleasant 

discussed the NCBA and its objectives with Adams. Adams expressed 

interest in the organization and later met Grandbouche. 

Thereafter, Adams agreed to come to Grandbouche's home and assist 

the NCBA in the preparation of subsequent pleadings. According to 

Adams, while she was assisting, she overheard discussions 

concerning NCBA activities and intimidation of IRS personnel. For 

reasons not entirely clear from the record, she then phoned the 

IRS and offered to disclose what she had overheard. 

Subsequently, Adams maintained her association with the NCBA 

and provided information to defendant Lovell. Adams requested 

that her identity remain confidential; defendant Lovell, with the 

approval of defendants Pixley and Hyatt, prepared a request that 

she be classified as a restricted source confidential informant. 

With this classification, knowledge of Adams' identity would be 

limited within the IRS. The classification was approved by the 

district director of the IRS in mid-October 1979. A few weeks 

later, the IRS learned that Adams had a state court felony 

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and that she was on 

probation. The IRS also learned from the Colorado Bureau of 

Investigation that Adams was hard to control as an informant, 

always wanting greater involvement. Rec. vol. VI, ex. 18 at 38-39 

(Hovde depo. Mar. 6, 1984). That assessment would prove accurate. 

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After losing her job with the bankruptcy trustee, Adams 

further ingratiated herself with NCBA members and was offered a 

clerical position with the organization. She approached defendant 

Lovell about this prospect of full-time employment with the NCBA. 

Defendant Lovell told Adams that, if she obtained such a position, 

she could provide the IRS with valuable information about the tax 

protest movement. He also told her that any decision to work for 

the NCBA would be her independent decision, and that she should 

give due regard to her personal safety and financial condition. 

He also stressed that if she accepted employment with the NBCA and 

continued to provide information to the IRS, she should be 

cautious not to entrap the NCBA members or commit unlawful acts. 

Adams went to work for the NCBA and began providing 

information and NCBA documents to the IRS. On October 23, 1979, 

she met with defendants Lovell, Hyatt and Pixley. Two things 

happened of note. First, defendants photocopied and then returned 

NCBA documents that were provided by Adams. These documents 

included NCBA instructional materials and the correspondence of 

Mr. Grandbouche. Second, Adams reported that she had heard a 

discussion at the NCBA office threatening harm to a federal judge 

and IRS personnel. This was consistent with more general 

information heard by another IRS special agent a few days earlier 

at a seminar where NCBA founder Grandbouche and NCBA member Jerry 

Manka discussed their views on federal tax avoidance. 

Defendants Hyatt and Lovell then obtained authorization from 

the National Office of the IRS and the Department of Justice to 

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electronically monitor the conversations of Grandbouche, Manka and 

other NBCA members. Adams had agreed to carry a concealed 

microphone and transmitter into the NCBA office and did so for 

three days in October 1979. A recording unit was also placed in 

her car for one day. Defendant Fortune assisted with the 

technical aspects of the consensual monitoring and recording 

activities. Defendant Pixley coordinated the endeavor, and 

defendant Lovell assisted. The electronic surveillance was 

discontinued at the end of October for lack of evidence. 

In early November 1979, Adams told defendant Lovell that she 

had been instructed to take the NCBA's trash home and burn it. 

She offered to let defendants Lovell and Pixley search the trash 

before she destroyed it. The agents accepted her offer. 

Adams had agreed to stay in daily contact with the agents. 

Rec. vol. v., pl. ex. 1-AA (Lovell file memo. 10/31/79). Over a 

seven-week period, defendants Lovell and Pixley, alone or in 

combination, met with Adams ten times. Rec. vol. r, doc. 3, ex. 

A, I 62 at 19-23 (Lovell affidavit); ex. B, I 26 at 10-15 (Pixley 

affidavit). At these meetings, Adams provided a narrative of what 

the trash contained and responded to questions. Over a nine-week 

period, defendant Lovell had some nineteen telephone conversations 

with Adams concerning the activities of Grandbouche and the NCBA. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 3, ex. A, I 64 at 23-24 (Lovell affidavit). 

Defendants Lovell and Pixley have submitted affidavits to the 

effect that Adams operated independently and was instructed 

repeatedly not to take any items other than trash discarded by 

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Grandbouche. Certain file memoranda drafted by defendant Lovell 

support that contention. Rec. vol. v, pl. exs. 1-AA, 1-BB, 1-GG, 

1-HH, 1-LL. Adams has testified on deposition that she considered 

herself a "nonpaid informant" and that she removed only trash. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 3, ex. J at 47-49 (Adams deposition Aug. ·20, 

1981). However, the record reveals that on three occasions, Adams 

supplied the special agents with items from the NCBA office which 

were not trash. These items included: 1) a copy of a handwritten 

mailing list of NCBA members or supporters (over 100 pages) 

containing over 700 names, given to Adams for the typing of 

individual names onto cards, 2) a duplicate of a cassette tape 

letter mailed by Grandbouche to another party, and 3) 183 original 

affidavits subscribed by supporters of an NCBA spinoff 

organization known as the Committee of 200,000 to Save the State 

of Colorado. This organization is affiliated with the tax protest 

movement. Defendants Lovell and Pixley copied the affidavits and 

returned the originals to Adams. According to defendants Lovell 

and Pixley, the above items were stored and not used by them for 

any investigatory purpose. Even had these items been 

disseminated, the defendants contend that only 30 of the 

plaintiffs in this action could have been identified. Appellees' 

Brief at 17. 

Intitially, defendant Lovell dictated file memoranda of the 

meetings with Adams, but later tape recorded those meetings 

because Adams had "a gift for gab." Rec. vol. VI, pl. ex. 15 at 

110-11 (Lovell depo. 1/9/86). Some of the meetings between Adams 

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and defendants Lovell and Pixley were taped by the defendants. 

The tapes, and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom, are 

central to the plaintiffs' claim that Adams was acting at the 

direction of the government and violating the first and fourth 

amendment rights of plaintiffs by "creating trash'' at the NCBA 

offices and delivering it to the government, all without the 

formality of a warrant and a showing that the government had a 

compelling interest in this material. While the parties do not 

dispute the majority of transcribed statements, they do not agree 

on the proper characterization of those statements. We set out 

and discuss those statements in the context of whether qualified 

immunity for the defendants in this case is appropriate. 

The trash as collected and interpreted by Adams contained 

information concerning financial transactions of the NCBA and 

others. The IRS learned the identity of certain banks utilized by 

the NCBA and Grandbouche. This information was provided to a 

grand jury investigating certain tax protesters. Defendants 

Lovell and Batson assisted with the grand jury investigation and 

served grand jury subpoenas upon the summoned parties, including 

financial institutions and members of the NCBA. In July 1980, a 

grand jury subpoenaed financial records related to the NCBA and 

Grandbouche at the First National Bank of Englewood. Defendant 

Batson served the subpoenas on the bank and, when asked, told the 

bank that it was not necessary to notify the customers involved of 

the subpoenas. Batson indicated that he was without authority to 

prevent the bank from notifying its customers, but that the grand 

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Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 8 
jury's investigation would be easier if the customers were not 

notified. The bank complied with the subpoena without giving 

notice to its customers. 

Adams left the employ of the NCBA at the end of December 

1979. She notified defendant Lovell and then disclosed her status 

as an IRS informant, telling various elected federal officials and 

the news media. She claimed that she had provided information 

concerning dangerous tax protester activities, yet the IRS refused 

to provide her adequate protection. Based on this turn of events, 

the IRS Criminal Investigation Division decided to terminate its 

relationship with Adams. Still, the IRS sought to have Adams 

confirm her version of her undercover work for the agency. In 

early January 1980, defendants Lovell and Pixley met with Adams so 

that she might respond to a series of questions summarizing her 

activities. The grand jury proceedings related to this 

investigation terminated during the summer of 1982. None of the 

plaintiffs were indicted, nor was NCBA founder Grandbouche or NCBA 

member Manka. 

II. 

In November 1983, plaintiffs filed this action, claiming that 

the activities of the defendants violated their constitutional 

rights. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the investigatory 

activities of defendants violated the first and fourth amendment 

rights of the NCBA members. Plaintiffs allege that Adams was 

acting as an agent of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division and 

thus that her actions should be imputed to the federal defendants. 

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Plaintiffs maintain that Adams' inspection of financial 

information, correspondence and other documents was an illegal 

search, contrary to the fourth amendment. Further, they maintain 

that Adams' search and seizure of the NCBA membership list and the 

affidavits of Committee of 200,000 violated not only the fourth 

amendment, but also the first amendment. They also complain that 

the surveillance conducted by the defendants violated first 

amendment rights of NCBA members, even if the surveillance 

complied with the fourth amendment. According to plaintiffs, the 

purpose and affect of the defendants' activities was to harass 

NCBA members, causing some to abandon the organization and other 

potential members not to join. 

Plaintiffs also rely on the first and fourth amendments in 

challenging defendants' actions which led to the empaneling of a 

federal grand jury. They object to the grand jury subpoenas 

issued to the First National Bank of Englewood because the bank 

was requested not to provide notice. Overall, plaintiffs complain 

of a conspiracy among the defendants to chill the exercise of 

speech and associational freedoms and deny them protection against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. I & IV. 

Defendants maintain that all of their activities were 

shielded by either absolute or qualified immunity. They contend 

that Adams was not a government agent; rather, she operated 

privately and gratuitously. As for the items Adams took from the 

trash, defendants maintain that the plaintiffs had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in those items. As for the other items 

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taken, defendants maintain that Adams' access to those items 

belies any reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, 

defendants contend that a grand jury may subpoena bank records 

without liability attaching to those assisting the grand jury. 

Finally, defendants contend that plaintiffs have not been harmed 

because the information and documents provided by Adams were not 

used for any improper purpose; most of the information simply was 

stored away. 

The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary 

judgment, finding that Adams was not an agent of the government. 

In the alternative, the district court determined that the 

defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt were entitled to qualified 

immunity because no clearly established law provided that trash, 

even if it was to be withheld from the public and burned, could 

support a reasonable expectation of privacy. The district court 

also determined that defendant Batson properly could inform the 

bank that it need not alert its customers to a grand jury subpoena 

and that defendant Fortune's technical assistance with consensual 

monitoring was not actionable. 

On appeal and at oral argument, plaintiffs contend that the 

district court should have granted summary judgment in their favor 

on the issue.of defendants' liability. They argue that the trial 

court should have determined that 1) Adams was an agent of the 

government defendants, 2) that defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt 

were not entitled to qualified immunity, and 3) that defendants 

Fortune and Batson were liable for their grand jury activities 

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including the service of subpoenas. Though we have jurisdiction 

to review a denial of qualified immunity in the absence of a final 

judgment, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985), in this 

case our jurisdiction arises from the district court's final 

judgment granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. See 28 

u.s.c. § 1291. 

We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment with 

respect to defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt because there is a 

genuine issue of material fact concerning the lawfulness of some 

of their activities and qualified immunity for all claims of the 

plaintiffs is not warranted. On the other hand, we affirm the 

grant of summary judgment on behalf of defendants Batson and 

Fortune on immunity grounds, because plaintiffs have failed to 

come forward with sufficient evidence suggesting clearly 

established unconstitutional conduct. The district court's 

decisions on qualified immunity and summary judgment present 

questions of law which we review de novo. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 

U.S. at 528 n.9; Todd v. United States, 849 F.2d 365, 368 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

III. 

A suit for damages against a federal agent in his official 

capacity would be barred by sovereign immunity, unless the 

government has waived sovereign immunity. Atkinson v. O'Neill, 

867 F.2d 589, 590 (10th Cir. 1989) (sovereign immunity bars suit 

against IRS agents sued in their official capacities). But, a 

suit for damages against a federal agent in his individual 

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capacity acting under color of federal authority would not be 

barred by sovereign immunity, insofar as certain constitutional 

claims are alleged. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245-248 

(l979)~- Bivens v. Six.Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 

(1971). In Bivens, the Court held that liability may attach when 

a federal official acting under color of authority engages in 

unconstitutional conduct and is then held to account for that 

conduct in his individual capacity. Id. at 389; see also 

Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2466-68 (1988) (evolution 

of Bivens remedy discussed). However, "government officials 

performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.'' Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In evaluating this defense 

of qualified immunity, we must compare the "objective 

reasonableness" of the conduct complained of with the state of the 

law at the time of the alleged violation. Id. For a plaintiff to 

prevail, the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 

3039 (1987). Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified 

immunity, the plaintiff must "come forward with facts or 

allegations to show both that the defendant's alleged conduct 

violated the law and that law was clearly established when the 

alleged violation occurred." Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs. v. 

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Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir. 1988). The defendant 

prevails unless such a showing is made; however, even if the 

plaintiff makes such a showing, the defendant still may prevail if 

he can establish "extraQrdinary circumstances and can prove that 

he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal 

standard." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 819. 

The qualified immunity standard serves to minimize 

interference with government officials performing discretionary 

government functions and "provides ample protection to all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." 

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Because the grant of 

qualified immunity may be dispositive, it should be considered 

first. The appellate issue here is straightforward: Do the facts 

alleged by the plaintiffs support a violation of clearly 

established law of which a reasonable person would have known? 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 528 n.9; Davis v. Scherer, 468 

U.S. 183, 191 (1984). It is ''an objective inquiry, albeit a 

fact-specific one." Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am, Inc. 

v. Chasin, 845 F.2d 113, 117 (6th Cir. 1988). 

In this case, extensive discovery has occurred. The summary 

judgment evidence submitted by the parties creates an issue of 

material fact concerning the events in which Adams and defendants 

Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt were involved. See Anderson v. 

Creighton, 107 S. Ct. at 3042 n.6. The constitutional 

implications of the facts differ, depending upon which version is 

correct. On the other hand, the summary judgment evidence 

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establishes that defendants Batson and Fortune are entitled to 

qualified immunity given a dearth of evidence concerning conduct 

which might be inconsistent with constitutional guarantees. 

IV. 

As noted, plaintiffs contend that the conduct of the 

defendants violated their first and fourth amendment rights. The 

two constitutional theories in this case are related. Searches 

and seizures of items presumptively protected by the first 

amendment must strictly comply with the fourth amendment. 

Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1984); Stanford v. Texas, 

379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). And when first amendment freedoms are 

involved, the first amendment may justify greater protection than 

mere compliance with the fourth amendment. Gibson v. Florida 

Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963). 

There is evidence in the record that the first amendment 

would protect some of the activities of the NCBA and its members, 

particularly advocacy concerning the lawful modification or 

elimination of the federal tax system. There are a number of ways 

in which government action may infringe upon a group member's 

right to associate with others to promote an unpopular viewpoint. 

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-23 (1984). 

These include imposing penalties or withholding benefits because 

of group membership, requiring disclosure of group membership when 

anonymity is desired, or interfering with the internal workings of 

the group. Id. Indeed, regarding the Qrand jury subpoena which 

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was issued here and ultimately challenged, we directed that first 

amendment associational freedoms of the NCBA and its members be 

respected when the government investigates allegations of unlawful 

tax-avoidance and seeks -bank. records which would identify an 

organization's membership. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 701 

F.2d 115, 117-18 (10th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. 

Citizens State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (8th Cir. 1980) (first 

amendment associational freedoms apply to organization challenging 

tax laws). And in Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 405 (10th 

Cir. 1985), we required that NCBA items seized pursuant to 

overbroad search warrants be returned, noting not only that the 

warrants at issue lacked sufficient particularity to satisfy the 

fourth amendment, but also that they were particularly infirm 

given that speech and associational rights of NCBA members were 

necessarily implicated. Id. at 405; see also United States v. 

Stelten, 867 F.2d 446, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., 

dissenting). Finally, in Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 

1465-66 (10th Cir. 1987), we held that the trial court must 

consider a claim of first amendment privilege concerning discovery 

requests for documents identifying the NCBA membership. 

In considering the plaintiffs' first amendment claim for 

freedom of expressive association, we are mindful of the multiple 

purposes of this organization. The NCBA and its members engaged 

not only in political advocacy concerning the tax system, but also 

in various business transactions including receiving funds from 

members. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit, however, that the 

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presence of some commercial activity does not change the standard 

of first amendment review, although commercial activity might make 

the challenged state action less disruptive of the political 

message. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842 F-2d 1229, 1235 (11th 

Cir. 1988). 

State compelled disclosure of the identity of group members 

has importaint first amendment implications. The reason for this 

is that the first amendment protects 

the rights of the people to associate together to 

advocate and promote legitimate, albeit controversial, 

political, social or economic action; that when the 

objective of the group or the group itself is unpopular 

at a given time or place, revelation of the identities 

of those who have joined themselves together or have 

affiliated with the group may provoke reprisals from 

those opposed to the group or its objectives; and that 

the occurrence or apprehension of such reprisals tends 

to discourage the exercise of the rights which the 

Constitution protects. 

Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 256 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd mem., 

393 U.S. 14 (1968). In these circumstances, compelled disclosure 

of the identities of group members requires the state to show a 

substantial relationship between the information sought and a 

legitimate state interest. Id. at 256-57. It was clearly 

established law in 1979 that an "overriding and compelling'' state 

interest must be demonstrated before disclosure would be 

justified. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546; .see also NAACP v. City of 

Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 

449, 466 (1958). 

It was also clearly established law in 1979 that the fourth 

amendment proscribed unreasonable searches and seizures by 

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government agents. Subject to a few carefully defined exceptions 

not applicable in this case, searches and seizures without a valid 

warrant are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment. See 

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Constitution 

requires that a valid search warrant be approved by a neutral 

magistrate in advance to guard against the abuse of government 

power. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). 

v. 

The first qualified immunity issue in this case is whether 

defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt could, as a matter of law, 

reasonably have believed that their interaction and receipt of 

information from Adams was lawful given the relationship between 

the government and Adams. 1 Adams inspected and removed documents 

and other items from the NCBA office without a warrant and without 

regard to whether any of the material was protected by the first 

amendment. "In order to impose personal liability, the 

[plaintiffs] must show that the seizure of specific items was 

illegal and that it was so illegal that it violated clearly 

established law." Williams v. Kunze, 806 F.2d 594, 600 (5th Cir. 

1986). Should it have been apparent to the defendants that Adams 

1 By its terms, the first amendment serves to limit state 

action, not action which is private in character. Lloyd Corp. v. 

Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). "[W]hile statutory or common 

law may in some situations extend protection or provide redress 

against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the 

free expression of others, no such protection is provided by the 

Constitution itself." Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). 

Likewise, the fourth amendment serves to limit state power, not 

action which is private in character. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 

U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 

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would be perceived as an agent or instrument of the government, 

and thus subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment? 2 

See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 487. 

The Supreme Court has held consistently that the protections 

of the fourth amendment only apply to governmental action; an 

unreasonable search or seizure by a private person not acting as a 

government agent or with the participation or knowledge of the 

government is beyond the scope of the fourth amendment. United 

States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell, 

256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); see also United States v. Smith, 810 

F.2d 996, 997 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 218 

(1988); United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 813-814 (10th Cir. 

1986). But if the government coerces, dominates or directs the 

actions of a private person, a resultant search and seizure may 

implicate the guarantees of the fourth amendment. Coolidge v. New 

Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 489. Whether the fourth amendment applies 

to a search involving a private person is determined after 

considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. 

2 While we recognize that compliance with the fourth amendment 

sometimes may be insufficient to protect first amendment 

interests, in this case we analyze the question of the agency 

relationship between Adams and defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt 

under the fourth amendment. After applying clearly established 

fourth amendment principles, we reject the contention that these 

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Based on the 

summary judgment evidence relied upon by the plaintiffs, a 

reasonable special agent could not believe that all of the 

activity of Adams was private in character. Having rejected the 

qualified immunity defense on this issue on fourth amendment 

grounds, we do not proceed to analyze it under potentially more 

rigorous first amendment standards. 

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At the time of the events complained of, this circuit 

recognized that a search or seizure conducted by a private person 

was beyond the scope of the fourth amendment, unless the search or 

seizure was a ''joint venture~ or a product of collusion between 

the private person and the federal agents. United States v. Ford, 

525 F.2d 1308, 1312 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Harding, 

475 F.2d 480, 483 (10th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 

964 (1973). We subsequently have defined a private act as "a 

unilateral act by an individual with no encouragement or 

acquiescence by the officers.'' United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 

474, 476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986). In 1976, 

the Ninth Circuit observed that there was a "gray area'' between 

the complete absence of governmental involvement in a search and 

the situation "where governmental involvement is so pervasive that 

it is no longer even nominally private." United States v. 

Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 6 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976). 

Several cases in which the actions of a private person have 

been attributed to the government have involved government conduct 

more directly intrusive than what plaintiffs have shown here. In 

Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966), an airline 

employee "participated in the search solely to serve the purposes 

of the government." Id. at 5. Likewise, in United States v. 

Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975), a Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) agent told an airline employee that he (the 

DEA agent) was without authority to search luggage, so the airline 

employee conducted the search in the presence of DEA agents; this 

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"joint participation" between the government and private airline 

employees was considered a government search. Id. at 1153-54. In 

United States v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1970), a 

vacationing police officer summoned a park ranger_ .. and accompanied 

him to a campsite. The off-duty police officer questioned the 

defendant, searched the defendant's vehicle and found contraband, 

and then participated in arresting the defendant. Id. at 170-71. 

This search could only be construed as governmental in nature 

given "the observation, guidance, direction and consent'' of the 

federal park ranger. Id. at 170. 

A case with facts similar to this is United States v. 

Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981). In Walther, an airline 

employee opened an overnight case placed in a container for prompt 

delivery (a Speed-Pak), discovered contraband, and reported it to 

the DEA. The employee was a confidential informant of the DEA and 

had been rewarded for providing drug-related information. The 

court of appeals upheld the district court's determination that a 

governmental search and seizure occurred because: 1) the DEA knew 

or should have known that the employee was searching Speed Paks 

for illegal drugs because of its extensive contact with the 

employee, and 2) the employee's motivation probably was for 

financial reward. Id. at 792-93. The court emphasized the 

narrowness of its holding: "We merely hold that the government 

cannot knowingly acquiesce in and encourage directly or indirectly 

a private citizen to engage in activity which it is prohibited 

from pursuing where that citizen has no motivation other than the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 21 
expectation of reward for his or her efforts." Id. at 793. If 

Walther is distinguishable at all it is only because there is 

little evidence to suggest that the confidential informant in this 

case (Adams) was motivated by the prospect of a monetary reward. 

In deciding whether a private person has become an instrument 

or agent of the government, two important inquiries are: "l) 

whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive 

conduct, and 2) whether the party performing the search intended 

to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends." 

United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982}} 

Walther, 652 F.2d at 792; accord United States v. Snowadski, 723 

F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984} 

(cited with approval in United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d at 476 

(10th Cir.)). Several cases have held that there is no conduct 

foreclosed by the fourth amendment when a private person 

voluntarily turns over property belonging to another and the 

government's direct or indirect participation is nonexistent or 

minor. See,~, United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1339 

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); United States v. 

Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 

U.S. 946 (1982); United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794, 800 

(9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 (1979). 

In this case, defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt knew of and 

acquiesced in the conduct of Adams. She informed them 

periodically of her activities and made numerous deliveries of 

items from the NCBA offices. The summary judgment evidence does 

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not allow us to conclude that reasonable special agents could have 

believed that their receipt of documents from Adams was lawful 

because she was a private actor. The involvement of Adams was 

continuous over a three-month period, _and it was not confined to a 

discrete suspected crime. The variety of the information obtained 

on this fishing expedition, the degree of supervision by the 

defendants, and the sheer number of contacts between Adams and 

defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt belie the notion that Adams 

merely was acting as a responsible citizen and merely delivering 

trash to government agents. Moreover, plaintiffs rely on an 

excerpt of a taped conversation between Adams and defendants 

Lovell and Pixley which strongly supports the contention that the 

defendants actually knew that Adams was acting as a government 

agent. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., 

concurring) (government official who actually knows that he is 

violating the law is not entitled to qualified immunity even if 

actions objectively reasonable). The excerpt is as follows: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

You know right now you could get an agent in 

there[.] 

In where? 

In there, in their meeting. 

Why, you? 

When they gonna have another. What meeting? 

(pause) What's the next one? 

Like going down to the one in Colorado 

[S]prings ..• 

Why do you say that: [sic] 

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ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

PIXLEY: 

••• that three days (pause) because, ahh, I 

told them that, ahh, I broke off with my 

boyfriend (pause) and I could get in there 

that way, if no one would recognize 

anbody [sic] 

Yea [sic], but didn't you tell that John was 

suspicious[?] 

Yeah, a little bit. 

Of plants? 

Of plants? 

Uh-huh. 

We don't need an agent in there as long as we 

got you. 

(Laughter) 

We got the best thing going, right, Vern? 

Ain't no joke. A new desk, typewriter, couch. 

Rec. vol. III, doc. 6 (Pixley Supp. Affidavit at 4-5). Of course, 

the defendants have offered explanations to refute the apparent 

meaning of the above. That task, however, is best left to the 

trier of fact. There is ample evidence in this record to indicate 

that Adams behaved as a government agent with the encouragement 

and acquiescence of defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt. 

To be sure, there is contrary evidence. Adams approached the 

IRS and volunteered information. She later decided to accept an 

offer of employment with the NCBA and continued to provide the IRS 

with information. Adams initiated her trash delivery system after 

her responsibilities at the NCBA office expanded. And to a 

limited extent, Adams decided what documents or items to provide 

to the government, and when. On one occasion, she provided a tape 

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recording even though the agents had declined her offer to obtain 

it. Rec. vol. II, doc. 5, pl. ex.3 (file memo of 11/14/79). But 

because the documentary and testimonial evidence and the 

inferences therefrom sharply conflict on whether Adams was acting 

as an instrument or agent of the government, summary judgment in 

favor of the defendants based on the lack of an agency 

relationship was inappropriate. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (summary judgment not appropriate 

when credibility must be assessed and evidence weighed to resolve 

a material factual dispute); Roth v. V.A., 856 F.2d 1401, 1408-09 

(9th Cir. 1988) (disputed factual issues concerning underlying 

events may preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity 

grounds). 

In the dissenting portion of his separate opinion, Judge 

McKay suggests that the agency issue ought to be decided as a 

matter of law. The dissent makes two arguments: 1) that an agency 

determination should not be a jury matter, and 2) that even if it 

was a proper jury matter, it should not be in this case because a 

directed verdict should be granted, holding that Adams functioned 

as a government agent. We cannot agree with either contention. 

Although the entire panel is in agreement that the defendants are 

not entitled to qualified immunity on this issue, the panel 

majority believes that the ultimate resolution of the agency 

question in this case should be left to the trier of fact. 

In the§ 1983 context, the dissent observes that district 

courts sometimes decide agency issues in civil rights cases and 

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always do in criminal cases, insofar as suppression hearings are 

concerned. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at 1-2. From this 

the dissent reasons that an agency determination in a civil rights 

case should be decided by.the court, _not the jury. Id. Not so. 

A private person may act under color of state law if she is a 

willful participant in a joint activity with the state or its 

agents. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). 

However, the question of whether a private person acts under color 

of state law is one of fact and normally a jury matter, unless it 

may be decided as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

(e.g., plaintiff has failed to allege facts which would show that 

private person was acting in concert with state official; 

dismissal for failure to state a claim appropriate) or under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 50 or 56 (e.g., facts and their inferences admit of but 

one conclusion concerning whether private person was acting under 

color of state law; summary judgment or directed verdict or 

j.n.o.v. appropriate). Two of the cases relied upon in the 

dissent, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at 1, n.2, merely 

involve situations where courts were able to resolve the issue as 

a matter of law. This does not mean, however, that where the 

facts are disputed, the color of state law inquiry would be 

resolved by the court rather than by the jury. See 3 E. Devitt, 

C. Blackmar & M. Wolff, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions 

§ 103.05 (4th ed. 1987) (jury instruction concerning agency 

between government official and private actor). 

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Turning to the cases relied upon in the dissent, Creamer v. 

Porter, 754 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985), does not involve a question 

of whether a private person was acting as a government agent. It 

also is .different procedurally than this case. In a bench trial, 

the district court dismissed two defendant sheriff's deputies from 

a civil rights action, characterizing them as "bystanders" while 

an unreasonable search and seizure occurred. The court of appeals 

reviewed the district court's findings on this issue and reversed 

in part under the clearly erroneous standard, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

52(a), holding that only one of the deputies was entitled to be 

dismissed after considering evidence of knowledge and 

participation. Id. at 1316-17. Because Creamer involved a bench 

trial, it is difficult to say with confidence that the issue of 

the deputies' participation was one of law. The appellate court's 

reliance on the clearly erroneous standard suggests that this 

factual issue was decided by the court because the court was the 

trier of fact. 

Wagner v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Auth., 772 F.2d 227, 

229 (6th Cir. 1985), involves a grant of summary judgment in which 

the court reviewed the legal relationship between an airport 

authority, Delta Airlines, which leased space from the airport 

authority, and a security contractor hired by Delta Airlines. 

Plaintiffs contended that a security contractor hired by Delta 

Airlines had performed an unreasonable search of their baggage. 

The grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants was 

affirmed after the court reviewed the applicable federal 

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regulations and the operating arrangement among the entities. Id. 

at 229-30. The requisite state action required for a§ 1983 suit 

was missing. Wagner seems particularly suited for summary 

judgment because, unlike the-present case, it did not involve 

conflicting accounts of the relationship between the government 

entity and the private actors. 

Finally, in King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1986), 

plaintiffs sued a landlord, various police officers, and the 

municipality based on an incident which began when the landlord 

sought to have various plaintiffs removed as trespassers. The 

court considered whether the landlord's actions were sufficiently 

connected with the state action involved. The court of appeals 

affirmed the dismissal of the landlord (apparently on summary 

judgment) because the landlord merely called the police and there 

was no indication that the landlord "asserted any control" 

concerning the officers' conduct which was challenged as 

unconstitutional. Id. at 829. In the case before the court, the 

agency inquiry is not nearly as straightforward because of the 

presence of conflicting accounts of what happened. It is partly 

because the "defendants may put a different gloss on the 

testimony," Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at 2, particularly 

concerning intent, that we do not resolve this issue as a matter 

of law. 

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VI. 

A. 

The defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified 

immunity even if Adams was found to be a government agent by a 

jury. The district court agreed and granted qualified immunity to 

defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt on grounds which we must 

reject. The district court concluded that if Adams was a 

government agent, there was no clear law "that a person who 

specifically instructs another person to take trash home and burn 

it retains an expectation of privacy in that trash." Rec. vol. 

III, doc. 11 at 25. In Calfornia v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 

(1988), the Court held that the fourth amendment does not 

proscribe searches and seizures of trash placed in an area 

accessible to the public for collection. Id. at 1628. The Court 

reasoned that placing garbage on or near a public street for 

collection is inconsistent with an objectively reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the garbage. Id. at 1628-29. 

In this case, it is apparent that the federal defendants 

viewed any trash removed from the NCBA offices as beyond the 

protection of the fourth amendment, without consideration of the 

mean~ of disposal. Though we agree with the conclusion that the 

NCBA members did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the actual trash, we do so for different reasons than the district 

court. Moreover, because not every item taken by Adams was trash, 

the effect of this conclusion cannot be a grant of qualified 

immunity to the defendants for all of their actions. 

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In 1979, those federal appellate courts which had decided the 

issue uniformly held that trash placed for collection in a 

location accessible to the public was without fourth amendment 

protection. United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (4th 

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979); United States v. 

Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973-974 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 

841 (1978); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir. 1976); 

United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972-73 (1st Cir. 1972); 

United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 

632, 634-35 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963). As 

explained by the Fourth Circuit: 

[A]bsent proof that a person has made some special 

arrangement for the disposition of his garbage 

inviolate, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy 

with respect to it once he has placed it for collection. 

The act of placing it for collection is an act of 

abandonment and what happens to it thereafter is not 

within the protection of the fourth amendment. 

Crowell, 586 F.2d at 1025. But given the facts of this case, this 

rule does not completely shelter the removal of NCBA materials by 

Adams. 

First, Adams did not remove only trash from the NCBA offices; 

she also removed a large mailing list, a cassette tape, and 

several affidavits which plainly were not trash. Second, it is 

unclear how much of the "trash" that was removed was in fact bona 

fide trash. Adams' comments seem to indicate that, at times, she 

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was creating trash. 3 And certain comments by defendants Lovell 

and Pixley support the inference that they condoned, 4 and even 

encouraged, 5 Adams to create trash so that it could then be shared 

3 Adams provided documents pertaining to the activities of one 

Don Turner. The following exchange between Adams and defendants 

Lovell and Pixley took place: 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

What have you got back there now, TURNERS'? 

See this little old thing here? 

Yeah. 

That's TURNER's operation. 

In a nutshell, huh? Is that prospectus? 

Pardon? 

The American Law Association presents for 

additional discussion and analysis the 

Workshop Principles. 

Now those are out of order, deliberately. 

Punched on the wrong side, deliberately. 

Thrown in the trash. 

Sun [sic]-of-a-gun. Tell you, you can't 

hardly get good secretarial help any more. 

Laughter. 

How about that. 

Trash, trash, dog gone, just creating trash. 

You just don't give that out to anybody. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 3, ex. A, attachment A, tape 1 tr. at 14-15. 

4 Adams supplied several documents from the NCBA office, 

apparently not in the correct order. Defendants Lovell and Pixley 

questioned Adams about the documents: 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

Who wrote up there [sic] secret tax return? 

That's, ah, DON's handwriting. But see, those 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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with the government. Third, the trash involved here was not set 

out in a public place for collection. Adams' NCBA supervisor, 

John Grandbouche, was reluctant to let others into the office and 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

aren't in order. 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

A limited power of attorney. 

But there in, I mean, you know, I, I had to do 

that in such a way so I could get it thrown in 

the trash. 

Good thinking. 

I'm sorry about that. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 3, ex. A, attachment A, tape 1 tr. at 18. This 

was not the only time that Adams delivered mixed up documents in 

her haste to get the documents out of the NCBA office and into the 

hands of the agents. See rec. vol. V, pl. ex. 2-C at 8. 

5 Defendant Lovell questioned Adams about the existence of 

files in the NCBA office concerning the Commodity Barter 

Association, Committee of 200,000, and a person named Applegar. 

Adams responded that she would have to look in the blue book 

maintained by Grandbouche. Lovell asked her again: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

I've heard the name from other sources, that, 

you know, from reading in the paper but uh, 

I've heard, well in that blue book there's uh, 

which I haven't been able to get out, cause it 

can't go in the trash, that has maybe three 

hundred names in it or better. 

Blue book? 

What's that suppose [sic] to be? 

That part of the, its a barter and, and, uh, 

uh, people that he's actually dealing with. 

Now that, I've looked in it and HUDSON'S name 

is, I mean uh, HOLMAN's is not in that. But 

it's all these other people that he has coming 

to his house. 

What do [you] mean he has additional name, 

names in addition to the what the ones we 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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gave Adams the specific duty of burning the trash, probably to 

avoid what occurred here. See rec. vol. I, doc. 3, ex. A (Adams 

depo. 10/27/83). Thus, assuming arguendo that Adams was a 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

already now [sic] about? 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

Yes. It's a book. 

Where does he keep the blue book? 

It's a ledger, it's in the, its [sic] in the 

file drawer. And pulls that out every once in 

a while, but it's a book just about like so 

and its uh bout [sic] 4 by 5 cards you know 4 

by 5 cards, ledger cards. 

What happens? 

He leaves it there when he's out of town? 

Yes. 

When DON's out of town? 

Um-huh. 

Now it's probable [sic] going to end up in the 

trash, isn't it? 

Okay. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 3, ex. B, attachment A, tape 2 tr. at 5-6. In 

another exchange, defendant Pixley asked whether he should tear 

pages out of some document brought by Adams. 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

You want me to tear those pages out of there? 

Pardon? 

Tear those pages out of there. 

Can I duplicate'em? 

Yeah, okay. 

Well [sic] that be alright? 

(footnote continued on next page). 

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government agent, qualified immunity for all the activities in 

question would be inappropriate. 

Fourth amendment protection of office papers and other items 

was clearly established in 1979. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United 

States, 429 U.S. 338, 352-53 (1977); See v. City of Seattle, 387 

U.S. 541, 546 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 

u.s. 344, 356-58 (1931). Whether discarded documents were 

entitled to fourth amendment protection turned on whether the 

method of discarding could support a reasonable expectation of 

privacy. Here, defendant Lovell has acknowledged that the method 

of discarding the trash in this case was purposely adopted for 

privacy. 

On November 1, 1979, Pauline Adams phoned me and 

explained that John Grandbouche had assigned her the 

responsibility of taking home and destroying his office 

trash. She said that Grandbouche did not want his 

office trash dumped into the building dumpster because 

it could result in some one [sic] person finding out 

about his activities. She said that Grandbouche had 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

PIXLEY: Yeah. 

LOVELL: 

ADAMS: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

LOVELL: 

PIXLEY: 

ADAMS: 

Id. at 17-18. 

Aaaaa. 

If not I can tear 'em out. 

Na, that's alright, go ahead wait to fill your 

book up, and throw it away. 

And then throw it away. 

Moan. 

But you can go ahead and duplicate the paper. 

Oh, okay. 

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asked her to take the office trash to her home and burn 

it in her fireplace since he did not have a fireplace in 

his home. 

Rec. vol. r, doc. 3, ex A, fl 60 at 18 (Lovell affidavit). Thus~ 

Adams informed the government of the steps taken by Grandbouche to 

secure the NCBA trash. We think it was clear that one who takes 

steps for the secure disposition of trash by a method reasonably 

calculated to avoid snooping can have a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the trash. This case does not involve trash placed at 

curbside for collection. Accordingly, we reject the district 

court's rationale for granting qualified immunity and conclude 

that should the trier of fact determine that Adams was a 

government agent, qualified immunity would be appropriate only 

with respect to the search and seizure of items which were bona 

fide trash for reasons we discuss below. 

B. 

If Adams was a government agent operating undercover, her 

review and removal of NCBA documents and other items would not 

constitute a search or seizure subject to the fourth amendment if 

she was given complete access to and control of these items by the 

NCBA, as her employer. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. at 468-70 

(undercover law enforcement officer may purchase allegedly obscene 

materials from adult bookstore without implicating the fourth 

amendment; officer merely doing what public at large may do). 

Thus, if her employer entrusted her with the removal and 

destruction of trash, the fourth amendment would not be a bar to 

her sharing that trash with other government agents. 

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The government may resort to artifice and strategem to 

disclose violations of the law. Sorrells v. United States, 287 

U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932). It has long been recognized that the 

government is "entitled to use decoys and conceal the identity of 

its agents." Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 209 (1966). 

Thus, an undercover agent may gain entry to a person's home by 

deception and purchase narcotics with no violation of the fourth 

amendment. Id. at 210. When the undercover agent behaves in an 

objectively reasonable fashion given the scope of the invitation, 

no reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed. Merely 

because a person unwisely reposes trust in what later turns out to 

be a government agent does not mean that the agent's covert 

conduct is actionable under the fourth amendment. Alderman v. 

United States, 394 o.s. 165, 179 n.11 (1969); Hoffa v. United 

States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966). For the teaching of a verse 

is also true in the law: "Do no secret thing before a stranger; 

for thou knowest not what he will bring forth." Ecclesiasticus 

8:18 (Apocrypha). But an undercover agent who gains entry for an 

isolated purpose may not make a secret warrantless inspection and 

remove every document and item to be found. Gouled v. United 

States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921). 

It is uncontroverted that Adams befriended various NCBA 

members and was taken into their confidence. Grandbouche employed 

her, and she was granted access to some NCBA materials. Most of 

the documents were turned over to Adams voluntarily by her NCBA 

employers with instructions that she take them home and destroy 

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them. Thus, to the extent that they participated with or 

encouraged Adams as their agent, the defendants would be entitled 

to qualified immunity regarding the consequences of: 1) her review 

of documents and-tapes to which she was allowed access by the 

NCBA, and 2) her review and removal of bona fide trash from the 

NCBA offices. Stated another way, no clearly established law 

would preclude the defendants from participating with or 

encouraging Adams to provide the government with her observations 

and physical evidence, provided she stayed within the scope of her 

inherent authority at the NCBA. 

c. 

If a jury determines that Adams was a government agent, the 

constitutional problem in this case occurred when Adams strayed 

beyond the scope of her appointed tasks at the NCBA and began 

inspecting and removing documents and other items which she lacked 

the inherent authority to inspect and remove. The plaintiffs have 

met their burden in identifying evidence which tends to prove that 

Adams went beyond her role as an undercover secretary and that she 

was assisted by defendants Lovell and Pixley in so doing. See 

n.3-5, supra. As noted, the defendants received a large mailing 

list, a cassette tape, and several affidavits which plainly were 

' 

not trash. Indeed, defendant Lovell testified on deposition that 

he knew that several items delivered by Adams, including the 

affidavits were not trash. Rec. vol. VI, pl. ex. 15 at 83, 85 

(Lovell depo. 1/9/86). Plaintiffs have come forward with 

competent evidence which suggests that defendants Lovell and 

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Pixley encouraged Adams to stray beyond her apparent duties at the 

NCBA and create trash. Id. 

The first amendment does not protect against investigation of 

suspected criminal activity, but as a safeguard, the requirements 

of the fourth amendment must be applied with "'scrupulous 

exactitude.'" Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) 

(quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965)). If Adams 

was operating at the control and direction of the government, the 

requirement of strict compliance with the fourth amendment (i.e. 

obtaining a warrant) should have been apparent to reasonable 

special agents in 1979. While Adams could search those items to 

which she reasonably had access, a reasonable special agent should 

have been aware of the warrant requirement of the fourth'amendment 

ins9far as it regards Adams' seizure of property, much of it 

protected by the first amendment. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 

U.S. 547; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476; Marcus v. Search 

Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729, 731 (1961); see Leclair v. Hart, 800 

F.2d 692, 694-96 (7th Cir. 1986) (law was clearly established that 

special agents of the IRS could not go beyond terms of search 

warrant and copy all financial records when warrant was far 

narrower). Contrary to the government's position, it would make 

little difference that the items which Adams provided were not 

used if those items were obtained in violation of the fourth 

amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 356-57. The 

evidence that plaintiffs have produced strongly supports the 

inference that circumvention of the warrant requirement of the 

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fourth amendment was contemplated, and on these facts it should 

have been apparent to a reasonable special agent. Thus, we cannot 

agree with the district court that blanket qualified immunity for 

defendants Lovell, Pixley and. Hyatt would be appropriate if Adams 

was deemed to be an instrument or agent of the government. 

Instead, we hold that these defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity regarding the activities of Adams only insofar as her 

activities were within the inherent scope of her clerical duties 

at the NCBA. 

VII. 

Plaintiffs also contend that the defendants conspired to 

deprive the plaintiffs of their first amendment speech and 

associational rights. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 

144, 152 (1970). We have recognized that these types of claims 

are more difficult to resolve under the Harlow standard because 

they involve a subjective element, namely the motivation of 

governmental defendants. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. 

Losavio, 847 F.2d at 647-48. We have determined that defendants 

Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt are entitled to qualified immunity 

regarding those actions of Adams which ostensibly were within the 

scope of her authority at the NCBA, such as removal of bona fide 

trash. Qualified immunity does not extend to liability for the 

activities of Adams which were plainly beyond her authority. In 

view of this conclusion and for reasons we discuss below, summary 

judgment on the conspiracy claim against these defendants was not 

appropriate. 

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The plaintiffs have met their burden of identifying specific 

evidence which could show that the actions of these defendants 

were improperly motivated. See id. In a conversation monitored 

and recorded by the defendants in October 1979, NCBA founder 

Grandbouche had a discussion with Adams concerning the affidavits 

completed by supporters of the Committee of 200,000 to Save the 

State of Colorado: 

GRANDBOUCHE: 

ADAMS: 

Now this one here is a fellow by the name 

of Bascom. Now the way these affidavits 

work, they mail 'em to us--and I'm not 

gonna take this with me--I don't want 

these ever to leave this office. 

Uh-huh. 

Rec. vol. v, pl. ex. 2-A. In November 1979, Adams delivered the 

original affidavits, including the one by Mr. Bascom. Id., pl. 

ex. 5. Defendants Lovell and Pixley then proceeded to copy the 

original affidavits, store the copies and make no further use of 

them. Rec. vol. I, doc. 3 ex. A, fl 62(f) at 22 (Lovell 

affidavit); id. ex. B, fl 26(f) at 13. The government agents were 

informed through consensual monitoring that the affidavits were 

confidential and, as noted, defendant Lovell indicated that he 

knew they were not trash. Yet the agents proceeded to copy these 

affidavits which are plainly political speech. 

The record is replete with evidence which would support the 

plaintiffs' claim that defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt were 

seeking to gather as much information on the NCBA as possible, 

including the identities and activities of its members. 

Defendants, through Adams, gathered letters, correspondence, 

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Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 40 
textbooks and instructional materials. Rec. vol. v, pl. ex. 1-L. 

There is evidence which suggests, despite the claims of these 

defendants to the contrary, that Adams was instructed to remove 

this information by creating trash. Much of the information 

gathered has no demonstrated law enforcement value, but 

regardless, this type of activity may constitute governmental 

interference with the freedom to associate and the privacy in 

one's associations. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative 

Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. at 544. Indeed, the plaintiffs 

have submitted evidence indicating that various NCBA members are 

now reluctant to associate with the group. At the same time, we 

recognize that some interference may be permissible when the 

government can demonstrate a compelling interest, such as 

good-faith criminal investigation that is narrowly tailored to 

detect information concerning tax evasion. In re Grand Jury 

Proceeding, 842 F.2d at 1236. 

We also acknowledge that certain NCBA members were aware that 

IRS agents were registering and attending NCBA seminars on the tax 

system. Rec. vol. I, doc. 3, ex. F (Thompson affidavit). The 

agents were familiar with the positions advocated by the NCBA 

speakers insofar as they urged willful noncompliance with the tax 

laws. The special agents also were aware of various unlawful 

schemes designed to avoid tax promoted by the NCBA. These 

factors, however, would not excuse compliance with clearly 

established first and fourth amendment law. The value of the 

warrant requirement of the fourth amendment is apparent in this 

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case. 

VIII. 

Having decided that the claims against defendants Lovell, 

Pixley and Hyatt cannot-be resolved fully on qualified immunity or 

other grounds, we turn to plaintiffs' remaining contentions. 

Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in holding that 

defendant Batson's technical assistance during the consensual 

monitoring of various NCBA members was not actionable. Regarding 

defendants Batson and Fortune, plaintiffs also contend that the 

district court erred in holding that their conduct on behalf of 

the grand jury likewise was not actionable. 

A. 

Defendant Fortune provided technical assistance for the 

consensual electronic monitoring of the NCBA offices in October 

1979. The consent of Adams was obtained, and the defendants 

received Department of Justice and IRS approval prior to 

initiating the electronic surveillance, although the failure to do 

so would not implicate the fourth amendment. United States v. 

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751-52 (1979). It is plain that this 

activity did not violate the fourth amendment rights of NCBA 

members. There is statutory authority6 for consensual monitoring, 

6 18 u.s.c § 2511 provides in pertinent part: 

(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a 

person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, 

oral or electronic communication, where such person is a 

party to the communication or where one of the parties 

to the communication has given prior consent to such 

interception. 

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and the Court repeatedly has held that it does not violate fourth 

amendment interests. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 

750-51; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971). 

Plaintiffs contend that the lawfulness of the consensual 

monitoring activities under the fourth amendment is immaterial for 

purposes of their first amendment claim. We cannot agree; but in 

any event, the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. 

When the electronic surveillance occurred, the defendants were 

investigating a threat against a federal judge about to preside in 

a criminal tax trial. No fourth amendment interest was 

compromised and the government had a compelling interest in 

investigating the matter and taking appropriate action. 

B. 

To the extent that defendants Batson and Fortune assisted the 

federal prosecutors by serving grand jury subpoenas, their actions 

are absolutely immune as "associated with the judicial phase of 

the criminal process." See Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 

(1976) (prosecutors initiating a prosecution and presenting the 

government's case are entitled to absolute immunity); Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (disclosure of grand jury matters may be 

made to government personnel assisting government attorney). 

Absolute immunity, however, would not extend to investigative and 

administrative activities of the agents, even if they were 

assisting the federal prosecutors. See Imbler v. Patchman, 424 

U.S. at 430-31; Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 

1983). Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs are arguing that the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 43 
investigative activities of defendants Fortune and Batson are 

implicated, the qualified immunity standard would be appropriate. 

Liffiton v. Keuker, 850 F.2d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1988). 

Applying this standard, --we hold that defendants Batson and 

Fortune would be entitled to qualified immunity while assisting 

the government prosecutors with a grand jury investigation. It 

must be remembered that the investigative activities of defendants 

Batson and Fortune on behalf of the grand jury were aimed at 

disclosing violations of the federal tax code such as the failure 

to report income. The plaintiffs simply have not produced 

evidence which indicates that either defendant violated clearly 

established law while assisting the grand jury and investigating 

various NCBA members. See In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842 F.2d 

at 1236. 

c. 

The final issue we discuss concerns plaintiffs' claim that 

defendant Batson should be held liable because he served a grand 

jury subpoena on a bank with NCBA records and advised the bank 

that it need not notify its customer of the subpoena. The Right 

to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422, places strict 

limitations on a grand jury's use and retention of bank customer 

financial records, 12 u.s.c. § 3420, and also requires that a copy 

of a judicial subpoena be served upon the customer or mailed to 

his last known address, 12 u.s.c. § 3407. But, the Act does not 

apply "to any subpena or court order issued in connection with 

proceedings before a grand jury." 12 u.s.c. § 3413(i). Thus, a 

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bank is not required to notify its customer of a grand jury 

subpoena. Indeed, as amended in 1986, § 3413(i) now provides that 

under certain conditions a court may order a bank not to disclose 

to the customer the existence of the grand jury subpoena or the 

information that the bank provided. See 12 u.s.c. § 3409. 

The Act was passed in response to United States v. Miller, 

425 U.S. 435 (1976), in which the Court decided that under the 

fourth amendment, a bank customer does not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in bank records concerning his account; 

accordingly, a subpoena to a third-party bank will not implicate 

the fourth amendment. Id. at 442-445; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 95th 

Cong. 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 

9273, 9306. It is clear from the House Report that Congress 

sought to provide a statutory right to privacy in bank records of 

certain persons and entities. H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 34, reprinted 

in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 9306. 

A bank may comply with a grand jury subpoena for a customer's 

bank records by turning over those records to an agent of the 

grand jury. United States v. A Residence Located at 218 Third 

St., 805 F.2d 256, 260-61 (7th Cir. 1986), United States v. 

Kingston, 801 F.2d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 

U.S. 1014 (1987). Under the Act, there is no requirement that a 

bank notify its customer of a grand jury subpoena. Given this 

fact, plaintiffs cannot contend that defendant Batson's advice to 

the bank violated any clearly established right. 

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Instead, the plaintiffs rely on the first amendment and our 

decision concerning this same subpoena in which we held that the 

district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether enforcement of the subpoena-would chill associational 

rights. In re First Nat'l Bank, 701 F.2d at 118-19. If so, the 

district court would be required to balance the first amendment 

interests of the NCBA members against the grand jury's need for 

the information, and consider narrowing the subpoena. Id. at 119. 

We are informed by the government that this balancing did not 

occur, presumably because the government did not pursue 

enforcement of the subpoena. Appellee's Brief at 41-42. On the 

other hand, plaintiffs contend that because of defendant Batson's 

actions, "the defendants, and other IRS special agents assigned to 

assist the grand jury, were able to identify between 100 and 200 

NCBA members, supporters and associates, who were then contacted 

and interrogated concerning their membership in and knowledge and/ 

or support of the NCBA, its members and their philosophy." 

Appellants' Brief at 41. We have reviewed the exhibits referenced 

by plaintiffs which ostensibly support this claim; however, we 

cannot find the link between these particular bank records and the 

investigative activities on behalf of the grand jury conducted by 

defendants Fortune and Batson. In any event, defendant Batson has 

absolute immunity for the actual service of the grand jury 

subpoenas. It is uncontroverted that defendant Batson served the 

subpoena on the bank at the direction of the prosecutor who would 

be entitled to absolute immunity for such an action. See Valdez 

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Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 46 
v. City and County of Denver, F.2d , , No. 86-2719, 

86-2771 slip op. at 11-12 (10th Cir. ) (law enforcement 

officers acting at direction of judge entitled to absolute 

immunity); T & W Inv. Co., Inc. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 801, 802-03 

(10th Cir. 1978) (receiver acting at direction of judge entitled 

to absolute immunity). Defendant Batson would be entitled 

qualified immunity for advising the bank not to notify its 

customer of the subpoena. Essentially, plaintiffs are requesting 

that we find a clearly established right of customer notice when 

grand jury subpoenas are served on banks and first amendment 

concerns are implicated. This we cannot find. We note that 

without such a right plaintiffs were able to challenge the 

subpoena in another proceeding and to prevail. In re First Nat'l 

Bank, 701 F.2d 115. 

IX. 

We hold that defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt are not 

entitled to qualified immunity on the theory that the law was not 

clearly established in 1979 concerning whether informant Adams 

would be viewed as a government agent. Whether Adams acted as a 

government agent is a question of fact which must now be resolved 

by the trier of fact. We further hold that, should the trier of 

fact determine that Adams was a government agent, these defendants 

would be entitled to qualified immunity regarding information and 

documents relayed by Adams, if she obtained them within the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 47 
inherent scope and course of her secretarial duties for the NCBA. 

Again, the evidence is controverted on this point. 

Those special agents who served grand jury subpoenas are 

entitled_ to absolute-immunity for such service. -Defendant Fortune 

has qualified immunity for his technical consensual monitoring 

assistance; no clearly established first or fourth amendment right 

was violated. To the contrary, the activity is beyond the scope 

of the fourth amendment. Defendant Batson cannot be held liable 

for advising the bank not to notify the plaintiffs of a grand jury 

subpoena for bank records in response to the bank's inquiry. 

Defendant Batson is not liable for his comment on grounds of 

qualified immunity. We cannot say that a bank customer had a 

clearly established right to notification of such a grand jury 

subpoena even if first amendment concerns were implicated. 

Finally, defendants Batson and Fortune are entitled to qualified 

immunity based on their investigative activites on behalf of the 

grand jury. 

ARRIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 48 
No. 87-1384 - Pleasant et al. v. Lovell et al. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

I agree wholly with the majority opinion with one exception: 

whether Ms. Adams was acting as a government agent when she took 

documents from the plaintiffs and gave them to the government. I 

cannot agree that we must remand that determination to the trier 

of fact. I believe that the evidence fully supports a directed 

verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the issue of Ms. Adams' agency. 

All of the cases cited by the majority where an "agency" 

determination is made are criminal cases in which the court 

decides the issue on a motion to suppress. 1 In all of the section 

1983 cases I can find, the court has made the determination but 

has never discussed the allocation of function between judge and 

jury where credibility is at issue. 2 Here, the uncontested facts 

1 See United States v. Milly, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982); 

United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981); United 

States v. Snowadski, 723 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1984); United States 

v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Black, 

767 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 

1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gummerlock, 590 

F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1979). 

2 See Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985) (issue 

for the court whether officer was a mere "bystander" or participated in search); Wagner v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Auth., 

772 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1985) (issue for the court whether action 

taken by private individuals may be "under color of State law" 

when significant state involvement attaches to the action); King 

v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1986) (issue for the court 

whether landlord was a "joint actor" of the state when he called 

police in to search plaintiff's apartment). 

Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 49 
seem to me to establish as a matter of law that the relationship 

had passed well over the threshold required to make Ms. Adams a 

government agent for section 1983 purposes. In any event, if the 

court in a criminal suppression hearing can make the determination 

of agency for purposes of determining whether the evidence was 

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it would seem 

illogical to allocate that function to the j·ury in a section 1983 

civil case where the legality of the search is at issue. 

The majority states that "the defendants have offered explanations to refute the apparent meaning of [some of the testimony]." Maj. op. at 24. The defendants may put a different gloss 

on the testimony, but there are apparently no subsidiary or historical facts in dispute that would call for a jury determination. 

When the facts are not at issue--but merely whether these facts 

amount to the legal determination that one is an agent--such 

determination is properly made by the court. 

I would hold as a matter of law that Ms. Adams was an agent, 

for Fourth Amendment purposes, at the time she took the documents. 

Because in my view it is abundantly clear that Ms. Adams was acting as a government agent, the defendants are not entitled to 

qualified immunity on that issue. 

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

June 6, 1989 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 87-1384; Pleasant v. Lovell 

Attached are corrected pages 46 and 47 to the opinion 

authored by Judge Baldock filed on May 16, 1989. The correction 

deletes the citation to Valdez v. City and County of Denver, No. 

86-2719. 

PF: tas 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

by: 

J ' IC' 1[i ;_ L \ 

--~ 

I t (, '-· , I ' 

Patri-ck Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 87-1384 Document: 01019963559 Date Filed: 05/16/1989 Page: 51 
Instead, the plaintiffs rely on the first amendment and our 

decision concerning this same subpoena in which we held that the 

district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether enforcement of the subpoena would chill associational 

rights. In re First Nat'l Bank, 701 F.2d at 118-19. If so, the 

district court would be required to balance the first amendment 

interests of the NCBA members against the grand jury's need for 

.the information, and consider .narrowing the subpoena. Id. at 119. 

We are informed by the government that this balancing did not 

occur, presumably because the government did not pursue 

enforcement of the subpoena. Appellee's Brief at 41-42. On the 

other hand, plaintiffs contend that because of defendant Batson's 

actions, "the defendants, and other IRS special agents assigned to 

assist the grand jury, were able to identify between 100 and 200 

NCBA members, supporters and associates, who were then contacted 

and interrogated concerning their membership in and knowledge and/ 

or support of the NCBA, its members and their philosophy.'' 

Appellants' Brief at 41. We have reviewed the exhibits referenced 

by plaintiffs which ostensibly support this claim; however, we 

cannot find the link between these particular bank records and the 

investigative activities on behalf of the grand jury conducted by 

defendants Fortune and Batson. In any event, defendant Batson has 

absolute immunity for the actual service of the grand jury 

subpoenas. It is uncontroverted that defendant Batson served the 

subpoena on the bank at the direction of the prosecutor who would 

be entitled to absolute immunity for such an action. See 

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T & W Inv. Co., Inc. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 801, 802-03 (10th Cir. 

1978) (receiver acting at direction of judge entitled to absolute 

immunity). Defendant Batson would be entitled qualified immunity 

for advising the bank not to notify its customer of the subpoena. 

~--Essentially,~plaintiffs are requesting that we find a clearly 

&stablished right of customer notice when grand jury subpoenas are 

served on banks and first amendment concerns are implicated. This 

we cannot find. We-note that without such a right_ plaintiffs were 

able to challenge the subpoena in another proceeding and to 

prevail. In re First Nat'l Bank, 701 F.2d 115. 

IX. 

We hold that defendants Lovell, Pixley and Hyatt are not 

entitled to qualified immunity on the theory that the law was not 

clearly established in 1979 concerning whether informant Adams 

would be viewed as a government agent. Whether Adams acted as a 

government agent is a question of fact which must now be resolved 

by the trier of fact. We further hold that, should the trier of 

fact determine that Adams was a government agent, these defendants 

would be entitled to qualified immunity regarding information and 

documents relayed by Adams, if she obtained them within the 

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