Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-02120/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-02120-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DORROH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DEERBROOK INSURANCE COMPANY, a

wholly-owned subsidiary of Allstate

Insurance Company,

Defendant.

_____________________________________ 

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1:11-cv-2120 AWI GSA 

ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY

DISPUTES

(Docs. 64, 66, 67, and 75)

INTRODUCTION

This case involves claims of bad faith brought by Plaintiffs, Robert Dorroh and Barbara

Dorroh (“Plaintiffs”) against Defendant, Deerbrook Insurance Company (“Deerbrook” or

“Defendant”). The parties in this case have a contentious history. On May 4, 2102, this Court

conducted an informal telephonic conference call regarding a Motion for Protective Order filed

by Defendant. (Doc. 59). The Court helped the parties resolve this dispute, however, the

conflicts have continued as evidenced by the number of discovery motions pending before this

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Court. On July 17, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel. (Doc. 64). On July 19, 2012, 1

Defendant filed a Motion to Compel. (Doc. 66). Subsequently, on July 20, 2012, Plaintiffs filed 2

a Motion for Protective Order to limit the testimony of Mr. Stucky, Esq. during his deposition.3

The parties filed a Joint Statement Regarding Discovery Disputes (“Joint Statement”) on August

27, 2012. (Doc. 75). Both parties have requested monetary sanctions. A hearing regarding all of

the above motions was set for September 7, 2012. (Doc. 68). After reviewing the Joint

Statement, this Court vacated the hearing date and took the matter under submission for written

findings. (Doc. 80). The Court issues the following order as set forth below.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges that on March 13, 2000, Cedar Warren was driving to work when

he became distracted. To avoid a collision, Mr. Warren swerved into oncoming traffic, and

struck the vehicle driven by Mr. Dorroh. As a result of the accident, Mr. Dorroh was gravely

injured and rendered a paraplegic. At the time of the accident, Cedar Warren was insured under

an insurance policy issued by Deerbrook.4

Because he was on his way to work at the time of the accident, Mr. Dorroh filed a claim

against his employer’s workers compensation insurance carrier, Superior National Insurance

Company (“Superior”). Mr. Dorroh also made a claim against Deerbrook for $15,000.00 which

Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion to Compel seeks to compel the following: 1) responses to Special

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Interrogatories Nos. 3-10; 2) an order deeming Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions Nos. 1 and 3 admitted; 3) an order

requiring a designee on behalf of Defendant for a further deposition on items 1 through 16 and 25 through 37 of

Plaintiffs’ First Entity Deposition Notice to Deerbrook; and 4) sanctions for reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.

The Joint Statement only references some of Plaintiffs’ requests outlined above. The Court presumes that the other

items not contained in the Joint Statement were resolved by the parties prior to filing the pleading. As such, the

Court will only rule on those disputes specifically addressed in the Joint Statement.

 Deerbrook’s Motion to Compel seeks an order: 1) to compel the testimony of Joseph Carcione Jr. to

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provide further responses to questions that were asked at his June 28, 2012 deposition; 2) to compel a second session

of Mr. Carcione’s deposition; 3) to appoint a discovery referee to preside over the deposition; and 4) to sanction Mr.

Carcione and Plaintiffs’ counsel for reasonable costs and attorney’s fees for bringing the motion.

In addition to the above motions, a Motion to be Substituted as a Party was filed by Cedar Sol Warren on

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July 30, 2012 which will be addressed in a separate order. (Doc. 69).

Cedar Warren was an insured under his father, James Warren’s policy.

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was the policy limit in exchange for a release of all claims against Mr. Warren. At the time of

the demand, Deerbrook was aware that Mr. Warren was 100% at fault for the accident, and that

Mr. Dorroh had suffered in excess of $300,000.00 in medical bills. (Doc. 75, at Ex. 4 and 5).

During settlement negotiations between the Dorrohs and Deerbrook, the parties agreed to

a settlement of the $15,000.00 policy limit. However, before the settlement had been finalized,

Deerbrook received a “notice of lien” from Superior, advising Deerbrook of an unknown lien

amount. (Doc. 75, Ex. A). Based on the notice of lien, Deerbrook advised Mr. Carcione, Mr.

Dorroh’s attorney, that it was required under California law to list Superior as a co-payee on any

settlement payment made to the Dorrohs. (Doc. 75, at Ex. 7 and 24). In fact, Deerbrook

explained that it had concerns that if they ignored the lien notice, it could expose Mr. Warren to

personal liability from the lienholder and possibly subject Deerbrook to tort liability for

interfering with the lien.

Mr. Carcione refused to accept a joint payee settlement check and demanded that

Deerbrook make the check payable to the Dorrohs only. Attorney Carcione contended that

Deerbrook could ignore the lien notice because the workers’ compensation carrier had denied the

claim and no monies were paid. (Doc. 75, at Ex. 8 and 9). Deerbrook asked for written proof

that the claim was denied, but Mr. Carcione did not timely provide a denial letter. Mr. Carcione 5

however, did offer to indemnify Warren and hold him harmless “from third parties who may

claim against [Warren] for additional monies over and above the $15,000.00.” (Doc. 75 at Ex. 9,

pg. 1). 

 After it was clear the parties were at an impasse, the Dorrohs filed suit against Cedar

Warren in Tuolumne Superior Court. In August 2006, prior to starting a bench trial, the Dorrohs’

counsel proposed that Warren assign his claim to the Dorrohs, and that Warren and Deerbrook

 In fact, Mr. Dorroh’s workers’ compensation claim had been denied, however, he had also filed an appeal

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with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“WCAB”). On July 14, 2001, the WCAB ruled that Mr. Dorroh

was injured in the course of his employment. (Doc. at 75, at Exhibit 3). Mr. Dorroh subsequently collected several

hundred thousand dollars in workers’ compensation benefits. The Dorrohs eventually presented the denial letter to

Deerbrook, but this allegedly did not occur until several years after the WCAB had ruled. (Doc. 75 at Ex. 22).

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stipulate to a judgment against Warren. The Dorrohs proposed they would agree not to execute

the judgment against Warren, and instead would file a bad faith case only against Deerbrook,

thus avoiding the need for a trial between the Dorrohs and Warren, and limiting Warren’s

liability. (Doc. 75 at Ex. 10). However, Deerbrook, rejected this offer. Mr. Warren then filed

for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Oregon, prior to the entering of

the verdict. The case went to trial, and on April 1, 2008, a $16 million judgment was entered

against Warren. (Doc. 75, at Ex. 1, 14 and 15). Warren and Deerbrook appealed the state court

judgment which was ultimately upheld on appeal and is now final. (Doc. 75, Ex. 15).

Meanwhile, Warren scheduled a “bad faith claim” against Deerbrook for its failure to

issue a settlement check without listing Superior as a co-payee as an asset of his bankruptcy

estate. In May 2009, subject to bankruptcy court approval, the Bankruptcy Trustee reached an

agreement with Deerbrook for the settlement of the bad faith claim in the amount of

$125,000.00. (Doc. 75, at Ex. 17, pg. 4). The Dorrohs objected to this agreement. The

Bankruptcy Court held a bench trial. (Doc. 75, at Ex 17, pg. 8). After the two parties submitted

bids, the Bankruptcy Court issued a decision and held inter alia, that Deerbrook’s final bid was

superior to the Dorrohs final bid and that the bad faith claim had little or no merit. The Dorrohs

timely appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.

On March 15, 2011, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) held that the

Bankruptcy Court had abused its discretion when it approved the settlement with Deerbrook. 

Specifically, the BAP held that the court had erred in accepting Deerbrook’s setttlement because

inter alia, there was no finding that the bad faith case was frivolous, the court had failed to

determine which of the two bids submitted were of greater value to the estate, and the proposed

distribution to creditors violated certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. (Doc. 75, Ex 17 at

pgs. 16-17). The case was remanded for further proceedings to remedy these deficiencies. (Doc.

75, Ex 17 at pg. 19-20).

Subsequently, on April 19, 2011, David F. Wurst, Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of

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Cedar Sol Warren, filed a complaint for bad faith in the Eugene Division of the United States

District Court, District of Oregon, naming Deerbrook as the sole defendant. (Doc. 1). On

September 7, 2011, a Notice and Request for Approval of Substitution of Party was filed with the

Oregon court. Thereafter, the Dorrohs were substituted in as Plaintiffs for Trustee Wurst (Doc.

26). The matter was then transferred to this Court, following a motion by the Dorrohs (Docs. 27-

29). (Doc. 36.)

The Dorrohs are now pursuing the bad faith claim against Deerbrook as Warren's

assignee. For the purposes of the discovery issues, the Dorrohs contend that Deerbrook acted in

bad faith by: (1) refusing to ignore the workers’ compensation lien; (2) failing to issue a

settlement draft in Dorrohs name only; and (3) by not accepting Dorrohs proposed judgment

prior to the entry of judgment during the state court proceeding. The Dorrohs also allege that

Deerbrook inappropriately advised Mr. Warren to file for bankruptcy and offered to pay his

bankruptcy fees, and improperly manipulated the Bankruptcy Trustee by convincing him to sell

the estate’s bad faith claim to Deerbrook for $125,000.00. In contrast, Deerbrook contends that

the Dorrohs’ bad faith claim is meritless as evidenced by California law and the Bankruptcy

Court’s finding that the case lacked merit. Moreover, Deerbrook argues that the discovery

should be limited to the events related to the notice of lien only, and the Dorroh’s discovery

requests are too broad as the issues in the bankruptcy and subsequent settlement negotiations are

not relevant. 

DISCUSSION 

 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that much of the parties’ positions related to the

discovery disputes in this matter have been premised on arguments about whether Deerbrook

acted in bad faith when it refused to issue the $15,000.00 settlement check to the Dorrohs

without listing Superior as a co-payee. The parties have each argued their respective

interpretations of California statutes and case law on this issue including citing inter alia, Coe v.

State Farm, 66 Cal. App. 3d 981, 994 (1977), Mercado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 F. 3d 824 (9

th

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Cir. 2003) and California Labor Code section 3859. However, while this legal discussion is

informative for purposes of establishing a context of the issues, it has done little to aid the Court

in resolving the discovery disputes presented; the Court would be constrained to limit the

discovery of either side absent a ruling from the district court judge on this issue. Moreover, it is

apparent that much of this dispute is the result of the attorneys’ inability to effectively meet and

confer which is a requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. This is evidenced by the fact that the first

twenty pages of the parties’ fifty page joint statement consist largely of engaging in

unprofessional bantering amongst themselves. The parties are reminded that discovery is broad

in scope and is defined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) which in pertinent part states as follows:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant

to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature,

custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things

and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable

matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to

the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be

admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence.

Given the broad scope of discovery, the Court will address each of the issues raised in the

Joint Statement.

Post-February 2001 Discovery

The Dorrohs have argued that they are entitled to discovery for events that occurred postFebruary 2001 (after the initial settlement discussions between the Dorrohs and Deerbrook)

because Deerbrook’s subsequent actions are further evidence of its bad faith. These actions

include its refusal to stipulate to the Dorrohs’ settlement offer at trial, its alleged influence over

Mr. Warren to file bankruptcy, and its alleged inappropriate contact with the Bankruptcy Trustee

during the bankruptcy proceedings. The Dorrohs also argue that Deerbrook’s motion for

summary judgment raises several defenses based on the bankruptcy proceedings which makes

those proceedings relevant. Finally, this information is relevant to the economic, emotional, and

punitive damages that both Mr. Warren and the Dorrohs are entitled to.

In opposition, Deerbrook argues that post-February 2001 events are only relevant to the

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emotional and punitive damages of the bad faith claim and that as an assignee, the Dorrohs are

not entitled to that relief. Furthermore, only Warren can raise claims related to the bankruptcy

proceeding. With regard to the rejection of the settlement agreement, Deerbrook contends that as

a matter of law it was within its rights to reject the settlement offered by the Dorrohs during the

state trial. Finally, it notes that there is no motion for summary judgment pending and that any

reference to the bankruptcy proceedings in the motion for summary judgment was done for

context purposes only.

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Preliminarily, in a separate order this Court has determined that Mr. Warren cannot be

substituted in as a party and he will not be able to pursue additional claims in this lawsuit. 

Notwithstanding this finding, at this juncture of the proceedings, this Court is unable to make

dispositive determinations regarding which aspects of the bankruptcy proceeding claims (i.e.

economic or otherwise) belong to the Dorrohs versus Mr. Warren. Those dispositive issues need

to be resolved by the District Court Judge. Moreover, no dispositive ruling has been made

regarding whether Deerbrook had a right to reject the settlement offer during the state court

proceedings. Therefore, post-February 2001 events remain relevant for discovery purposes. 

Whether the Dorrohs have cognizable claims, and whether any of this related evidence will be

admissible at trial are determinations to be made by Judge Ishii once the dispositive motions have

been filed and ruled upon. As such, the Court will permit discovery on post-February 2001

issues at this point in the proceedings. 

Ms. Harcharik’s Deposition

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s designee, Ms. Harcharik, was insufficiently prepared for

the deposition as they clearly wanted to ask questions about Deerbrook’s claims manual. In

 The Court acknowledges that Deerbrook has withdrawn its motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs’

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relevancy argument on that basis is without merit. There is nothing in the record as it currently exists to indicate that

Deerbrook intends to make this argument in the future. However, Deerbrook is cautioned the Court has reviewed the

motion and notes that it is unpersuaded by Deerbrook’s representations that references to the bankruptcy proceedings

were used only for purposes of context. Deerbrook relies on the findings of the Bankruptcy Court in the motion for

summary judgment as a defense and in support of its motion which would make the bankruptcy proceedings relevant

under Rule 26. Compare Doc. 75 at pg. 23 and Doc. 54-1 pg. 25.

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particular, the witness did not have information related to how and why some of the policies end

up in the manual, how the manual is assembled, and how and when revisions are made. 

Deerbrook contends that Ms. Harcharik was adequately prepared given the vague and

over broad description contained on the examination notice. Defendants argue that since they

complied with the deposition notice, Plaintiffs should request the remaining information in a

written interrogatory.

In response, Plaintiffs’ counsel has indicated that he does not believe an interrogatory

would be an effective way to obtain the information. He would be willing to provide a more

detailed deposition notice clearly identifying what information about the claim manual he is

seeking

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) provides that notice of a subpoena directed to an

organization must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(b)(6). A review of the notice reveals it could have been more specific. On the other

hand, Ms. Harcharik’s deposition testimony reveals that she possessed limited information to

answer questions regarding the claims manual. In fact, she had not referred to the manual in

several years. As such, the Court will permit further deposition of another designee on the

condition that Plaintiffs’ deposition notice clearly identifies the information sought. The Court

will not dictate to Plaintiffs’ counsel which discovery devices are most appropriate. Counsel are

cautioned that they shall work together to ensure the requested information is exchanged. Both

sides need to be realistic about which discovery devices are the best methods for obtaining this

information. This issue clearly could have been resolved through a meaningful meet and confer. 

Written Responses to Plaintiffs’ Written Discovery

Plaintiffs contend that Deerbrook failed to answer Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories Nos.

3 and 4 that relate to information concerning whether Defendant offered to pay Mr. Warren’s

bankruptcy fees. (Doc. 75, Ex. 21). Although there were several objections raised in the initial

response to the interrogatories, the only basis for the objection in the Joint Statement relates to

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the time limitation and the fact that the Dorrohs cannot recover emotional distress damages.7

These issues have already been addressed previously in this order. As such, Defendant must

answer these interrogatories.

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant failed to adequately answer Special Interrogatories

Nos. 8-9 which relate to the steps that Deerbrook took to verify the lien that Superior National

had against Robert Dorroh as of February 21, 2001. (Doc. 75, Ex 21). Plaintiffs argue that

Deerbrook did not answer the questions and only gave information related to what attempts it

made to obtain a “denial letter,” which was not the question posed. In response, Deerbrook

argues that based on California law, it was required to honor the lien whether or not Superior

National paid any money to the Dorrohs and that it fully answered the question. 

Functions of interrogatories include obtaining evidence, information which may lead to

evidence and admissions, and to narrow issues to be tried. United States v. West Virginia Pulp

and Paper Co., 36 F.R.D. 250, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (citing United States v. Watchmakers of

Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 2 F.R.Serv.2d 33.353, Case 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)). The party

answering interrogatories must furnish “the information available to the party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

33(b)(1)(B). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3) requires that each interrogatory, unless objected to, must be

answered separately and fully in writing, under oath. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). An “evasive or

incomplete . . . answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to . . . answer, or respond.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). 

“Parties must provide true, explicit, responsive, complete, and candid answers to

interrogatories.” Hansel v. Shell Oil Corp., 169 F.R.D. 303, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1996). If a

responding party is unable to supply requested information, “the party may not simply refuse to

answer, but must state under oath that he is unable to provide the information and ‘set forth the

efforts he used to obtain the information.’” Hansel, 169 F.R.D. at 305 (quoting Milner v.

National School of Health Tech., 73 F.R.D. 628, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1977)). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 “is to

Since the other objections were not raised in the Joint Statement, they have been waived.

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be given a broad and liberal interpretation in the interest of according to the parties the fullest

knowledge of the facts and of clarifying and narrowing the issues.” West Virginia Pulp, 36

F.R.D. at 252. 

The Court has reviewed Deerbrook’s response to Interrogatories 8 and 9 and disagrees

with Defendant that it answered the questions. Although it is Deerbrook’s position that the

question is not relevant based on California law, Judge Ishii has not made that determination. 

Therefore, the questions posed by Plaintiffs are relevant and Deerbook must provide answers. As

noted by Plaintiffs, if Deerbrook did nothing other than request a copy of the denial letter then it

should state so.

Attorneys’ Depositions

The remaining disputes involve the extent of questions of two attorneys: 1) Mr. Roger

Stucky, a partner at Carcione, Cattermole, Dolinski, et al., (“the Carcione law firm”) the

attorneys of record for Plaintiffs Robert and Barbara Dorroh and 2) Mr. Carcione, Esq., who 8

handled the initial settlement negotiations between the Dorrohs and Deerbrook. Plaintiff is

seeking to limit the questions that Mr. Stucky can be asked in an anticipated deposition. 

Deerbrook has filed a motion to compel additional testimony from Mr. Carcione in a second

deposition. 

Mr. Stucky

Plaintiffs have agreed that Mr. Stucky may be deposed but argue the questions should be

limited to those matters where he is a factual witness only, including his conversations with

Deerbrook’s claim adjuster, Jason Kenady, and possibly to non-privileged matters that occurred

during Mr. Dorroh’s workers’ compensation case. 

Defendant agrees that it should be permitted to question Mr. Stucky on the issues outlined

above, but that it should also be permitted to obtain information about why Mr. Stucky promised

to provide Deerbrook the denial letter, but failed to do so until September 2009. Additionally,

Mr. Stucky is still handling Mr. Dorroh’s ongoing worker’s compensation matter. 

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Deerbrook argues it is entitled to ask questions about why the Dorrohs contend the compensation

claim was denied when Mr. Dorroh received $485,000.00 in workers’ compensation benefits. In

support of its position, Deerbrook argues that the advice of several legal treatises indicate that

members of the Carcione law firm should not be representing the Dorrohs in this bad faith action

given that it represented the Dorrohs during the underlying settlement negotiations. It also cites

Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Superior Court (Hicks), 72 Cal. App. 3d 786 (1977) for

the proposition that when an attorney is the sole negotiator in a bad faith action alleging punitive

damages, then the attorney can be deposed and facts fall outside of the attorney-client privilege,

and outside of the work product rule.

Plaintiffs respond that the attorneys at the firm understand the implications and

limitations of their legal representation and will hire additional attorneys to try the case if

necessary. Moreover, the Dorrohs argue that the reason Mr. Stucky did not provide the denial

letter is irrelevant as this would not have changed the outcome of this case. Finally, the answers

to Deerbrook’s questions involving Mr. Stucky’s legal contentions can be obtained via

contention interrogatory rather than deposition. 

As a preliminary matter, absent a motion to disqualify counsel, this Court will not offer

an opinion about whether the Carcione law firm should be representing the Dorrohs in this

matter. It is not the role of this Court to advise attorneys whether or not to take advice offered in

any legal treatises. As such, Defendant’s argument in this regard is unpersuasive.9

Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a) provides that depositions may be taken of “any person.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Therefore, there is no express prohibition against the taking of attorney

depositions. However, courts have long recognized the burdens imposed on the adversary

process when lawyers themselves are the subject of discovery requests and have resisted the

notion that lawyers should be routinely subjected to broad discovery. Shelton v. American

Defendant itself acknowledges that it is the Dorrohs’ attorneys prerogative to ignore this advice. (Doc. 75

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at pg. 38).

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Motors Corp., 805 F. 2d 1323, 1327 (8 Cir. 1986). The Eighth Circuit has held that opposing th

counsel should only be deposed after a showing that: (1) no other means exist to obtain the

information sought; 2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and 3) the

information is crucial to the preparation of this case. Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.

2d at 1328. The Sixth Circuit has adopted the Shelton rule and the Dorrohs have argued that

Shelton is the leading case in this area. See, Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.

3d 621, 628 (6 Cir. 2002) (adopting Shelton). However, the Court notes that the Second Circuit th

has adopted less stringent criteria. In In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F. 3d 65,

72 (2d Cir. 2003), the court held that Rule 26 requires a flexible approach to attorney depositions

that takes into consideration all of the relevant facts and circumstances to determine whether the

proposed deposition would entail an inappropriate burden or hardship. Such considerations may

include the need depose the lawyer, the lawyer’s role in connection with the matter on which

discovery is sought in relation to the pending litigation, the risk of encountering privilege and

work product issues, and the extent of discovery already conducted. The Court noted that these

factors are appropriately considered in determining whether interrogatories should be used in lieu

of a deposition. Id. The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue.

This case presents an unusual circumstance because Mr. Stucky is not only a fact witness

in this case, but his actions were also implicated in the underlying settlement negotiations. 

Deerbrook cites Merritt v. Superior Court (Reserve Ins. Co.), 9 Cal. App. 3d 721 (1970) for the

proposition that in a third party bad faith case, an attorney may be deposed who represented the

insured in that action on relevant non-privileged matters such as settlement demands or offers

received, and non-privileged communications with the insurer’s claims representatives or

attorneys. The holding is not as broad as Deerbrook alleges however. In Merritt, the Court was

examining a specific interrogatory and held that when determining what discovery devices can be

used when getting information from an attorney, is important to examine the manner in which the

case is prosecuted. Merritt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d at 730. Specifically, in Merritt, the

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Court found that discovery of information held by plaintiff’s former counsel would be permitted

because the plaintiff was relying heavily on evidence that his prior attorney could only have

learned in the course of his employment. Id. In doing so, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had

initiated a lawsuit in which he placed the attorney’s decisions, conclusions, and mental state of at

issue. Id.

Here, the Dorrohs agree that Mr. Stucky can be deposed but seek to limit the questions to

those of a fact witness. However, Deerbrook is seeking information as to why Mr. Stucky did

not send the denial letter, as it will argue negligence by the Carcione law firm as a defense in this

action. As such, the Court will permit the deposition testimony of Mr. Stucky on that issue. The

Court also finds that Deerbrook may inquire into the reasons why Mr. Stucky continues to assert

the workers’ compensation claim was denied even though Mr. Dorroh received a monetary award

as this is relevant for discovery purposes. The Court will not make a broad ruling as to the 10

other issues that may arise in the course of the deposition. Privilege objections must be asserted

to particular questions and evaluated. Blanket privilege objections are not permitted. If counsel

believes that a question is improper, he should state a specific objection to the question and the

Court will rule on the issue at a later time if needed.

Mr. Carcione

Deerbrook has brought a motion to compel a second deposition of Mr. Carcione, a

percipient witness in this case. Deerbrook contends that during his deposition, Mr. Carcione

obstructed the questioning by providing non-responsive argumentative testimony, abused and

insulted opposing counsel, and pretended not to understand the questions presented. Deerbrook

requests that the Court order a second session of Carcione’s deposition, requiring that : 1) Mr.

Carcione provide straightforward, non-argumentative responses; 2) the Court order that a

discovery referee preside over the second session of Carcione’s deposition at Plaintiffs’ expense;

 The Court notes that Dorrohs’ counsel has already answered both of these questions in the Joint

10

Statement. (Doc. 75, at pg. 36, fn. 20).

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and 3) that the Court order monetary sanctions in the amount of $6,020.00 to compensate

Deerbrook for the cost and expense of bringing this motion. 

The Dorrohs contend that they allowed Mr. Carcione to be deposed as a fact witness in

this case. However, they argue that Deerbrook’s questions at the deposition were inappropriate

as they went beyond the scope of a fact witness and instead asked questions: 1) that required

legal analysis, 2) that related to the attorney client privilege and work product, and 3) that were

unrelated to this case. The Dorrohs contend that Mr. Carcione answered questions to the best of

his ability and that Deerbrook has not identified any proper questions under Shelton that went

unanswered.

The Court has reviewed the transcript and finds that a second deposition is warranted as

Mr. Carcione’s and Mr. Markowitz’s actions in the deposition were unresponsive and

uncooperative. Likewise, many of the questions posed by Mr. Klee, Deebrook’s attorney, were

not clearly worded, or would undoubtedly illicit a privilege or relevancy objection. In the second

deposition, Mr. Carcrione shall answer questions related to the factual matters of this case, i.e.,

the dates and times that certain events occurred, as well as his reasons for declining to accept

Deerbrook’s $15,000.00 settlement offer with Superior National listed as co-payee. Since the

Dorrohs are arguing bad faith based on Deerbrook’s rejection of the settlement offer at the

subsequent state proceedings, and Deerbrook’s alleged misconduct conduct at the bankruptcy

proceedings, Mr. Carcione shall also answer questions on those topics if he was involved in those

proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, the Court is not giving Deerbrook carte blanch to pose

any questions it wishes with regard to the issues listed above. Deerbrook shall not engage in a

fishing expedition. In fact, some information may indeed be protected by a privilege. However,

it is clear from the holdings in Merritt and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company that while

certain privileges are waived in third party actions alleging bad faith, it is important to examine

the information sought and the specific facts at issue when ruling on privileged matters. In this

circumstance, the Court will not adhere to the Shelton test but will adopt the more flexible

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approach outlined in In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman as this is more consistent with

the holdings in Merritt and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company. As such, the Court declines to

prospectively carve out the contours of the privilege in this case as it would be inappropriate to

do so. When and if the Court is called upon to resolve a specific privilege claim, it will do so.

During any of these depositions, the Court expects that counsel will conduct themselves

professionally. The Court directs the parties to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (c) which in relevant section

provides as follows :

(1) Examination and Cross-Examination. The examination and cross-examination of a

deponent proceed as they would at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence ...

(2) Objections. An objection at the time of the examination - whether to evidence, to a

party’s conduct, to the officer’s qualifications, to the manner of the taking the deposition,

or to any other aspect of the deposition - must be noted on the record, but the examination

still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to any objection. An objection must be

stated concisely in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner. A person may instruct

a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limited

ordered by the court, or to repsent a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(1) and (2). 

Any non-compliance with completing the discovery in the case pursuant to these

guidelines will be looked upon with great disfavor. Although the Court has given Deerbrook

permission to question the attorneys in this case, the Court expects that Deerbrook will be

thoughtful when formulating questions and only ask questions that are relevant and necessary.

Similarly, Plaintiffs’ counsel are forewarned that they shall make a good faith effort toward

answering questions and shall invoke privileges or other objections only when appropriate and in

a professional manner. The Court denies Deerbrook’s request for a referee at the second

deposition. However, counsel are advised that failure to follow these guidelines will result in the

probability of heavy sanctions against the offending attorney or party. 

Sanctions

Here, both parties are requesting monetary sanctions for bringing these motions. The

Dorrohs request $5,400.00 and Deerbrook requests $6,020.00. A party seeking discovery may

move for an order compelling an answer if a party fails to permit inspection as requested under

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Rule 34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). If the motion is granted, or if the discovery is provided

after the motion is filed, the court may require the party whose conduct necessitated the motion

to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney fees. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(5)(A). However, the court must not order payment if the movant filed the

motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without a court order, if the

opposing party’s non-disclosure, response or objection was substantially justified, or other

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(5)(A)(i-iii). 

Similarly, if the motion to compel is denied, the court may require that the movant pay

the opposing party its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion including attorney’s

fees. However, the court must not order payment if the movant filed the motion before

attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without a court order, if the opposing party’s

non-disclosure, response or objection was substantially justified, or if other circumstances make

an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(5)(B). If the motion is granted in part, and

denied in part, the court may apportion reasonable expenses for the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(5)(C). 

Here, the Court has granted both of the parties’ motions in part. However, the Court

denies both parties’ request for sanctions. In this case, neither party has clean hands as both

parties have engaged in dilatory tactics. As previously noted, many of these discovery disputes

could have been resolved by the parties if counsel had cooperated with each other. It is not this

Court’s practice to mediate the attorney’s personal vendettas. Counsel are cautioned that

gamesmanship and future motions to compel without meaningful meet and confer will result in

the imposition of sanctions. 

ORDER

Based on the above, Plaintiffs’ Motions to Compel and Defendant’s Motion to Compel

are GRANTED IN PART as outlined in this order. Both parties’ request for sanctions is

DENIED. All of the relevant discovery outlined in this order shall be completed by October 31,

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2012. All other deadlines in this case remain in effect as outlined in this Court’s scheduling

order issued on March 29, 2012. (Doc. 51).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 21, 2012 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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