Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_11-cv-02829/USCOURTS-alnd-4_11-cv-02829-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

KEVIN BOX, ET AL.,

PLAINTIFFS,

v.

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 

COMPANY, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS.

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CASE NO.: 4:11-CV-02829-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an ERISA action. Plaintiff Kevin Box, individually and as the 

representative for the Estate of Kenneth Box, and plaintiff Katrina Evatt seek 

pension benefits under defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company’s 1950 

Pension Plan. Plaintiffs are the children of Kenneth Box. Mr. Box was an 

employee of Goodyear from September 5, 1975 until August 5, 2003, and he 

participated in the company’s pension plan. On August 5, 2003, Mr. Box was shot 

and killed by his wife, Barbara A. Box. 

At the time of his death, Mr. Box was an active Goodyear employee and was 

not receiving benefits under the pension plan. The Goodyear pension plan is a 

defined benefit plan. The plan provides a qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity 

FILED

 2014 Sep-25 PM 03:46

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 1 of 20
2

(“QPSA”) benefit for the surviving spouse of a vested plan participant who dies 

before he is eligible to receive his pension benefit. 

Plaintiffs argue that the pre-retirement spousal benefit should be paid either 

to the estate of Kenneth Box or to Mr. Box’s heirs because Mrs. Box is not eligible 

for the benefit. Goodyear agrees that Mrs. Box is not eligible for the benefit but 

argues that because the plan provides no contingent beneficiary for the QPSA, the 

pre-retirement spousal benefit is not payable to any person, not even Mr. Box’s 

estate or his heirs. This Court must determine whether Goodyear must pay the preretirement spousal benefit under the terms of the plan.

I. ERISA STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Eleventh Circuit has formulated a multi-step framework for courts 

reviewing an ERISA plan administrator’s benefits decisions:

(1) Apply the de novo standard to determine whether the claim 

administrator’s benefits-denial decision is “wrong” (i.e., the court 

disagrees with the administrator's decision); if it is not, then end the 

inquiry and affirm the decision.

(2) If the administrator’s decision in fact is “de novo wrong,” then 

determine whether he was vested with discretion in reviewing claims; 

if not, end judicial inquiry and reverse the decision.

(3) If the administrator’s decision is “de novo wrong” and he was 

vested with discretion in reviewing claims, then determine whether 

“reasonable” grounds supported it (hence, review his decision under 

the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard).

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 2 of 20
3

(4) If no reasonable grounds exist, then end the inquiry and reverse 

the administrator’s decision; if reasonable grounds do exist, then 

determine if he operated under a conflict of interest.

(5) If there is no conflict, then end the inquiry and affirm the 

decision.

(6) If there is a conflict, the conflict should merely be a factor for 

the court to take into account when determining whether an 

administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Blankenship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2011). All 

steps of the analysis are “potentially at issue” when a plan vests discretion in the 

plan administrator to make benefits determinations. Id. at 1356, n. 7. The 

plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to ERISA benefits under 

the plan. Horton v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1038, 1040 (11th Cir. 

1998).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A. The Plan

Goodyear’s plan is a “pension plan” as that term is defined in ERISA, 29 

U.S.C. §1002(2)(A). (Doc. 14-1, p. 8). The plan designates a “Pension Board” to 

administer the plan. (Doc. 14-9, p. 4). The plan vests the Pension Board with 

discretionary power over every facet of plan administration. (Id.). 

 1 The parties filed a Stipulation of Facts in which the parties stipulated that Goodyear’s Initial 

Disclosures and the documents produced by Goodyear with those disclosures are authentic and 

relevant. (Doc. 13). 

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Before a claim reaches the Pension Board in the administrative review 

process, a plan administrator determines whether to accept or deny a claim for 

benefits under the pension plan. (Doc. 14-4, pp. 48–49). If a plan administrator 

denies a claim for pension benefits, then the claimant may appeal using the plan’s 

administrative review process. (Id. at 47–48). The plan’s administrative review

process consists of two levels. The “Benefits Review Committee” conducts the 

first level of review, and the Pension Board, which is also referred to as the 

“ERISA Appeals Committee,” conducts the second and final level of review. (Id. 

at 3–4).

Article V of the plan provides for a QPSA, called the “Special 50% Joint and

Survivor Pre-Retirement Option.” (Doc. 16-1, p. 13). Article V(1) states that if an 

employee dies before receiving his plan benefit payment, his surviving spouse is 

entitled to receive monthly benefit payments for the spouse’s lifetime. (Id.). For a 

surviving spouse to qualify for the monthly benefit, the spouse and the employee 

must have been married for a one-year period ending on the date of the employee’s 

death, and the employee must not have elected to waive the pre-retirement spousal 

benefit. (Id. at 13–14). 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 4 of 20
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The plan does not address eligibility and payment options for the preretirement spousal benefit under the plan should the surviving spouse murder the 

plan participant, violate state or federal law in a manner that would preclude the 

surviving spouse’s right to such benefit, or otherwise become ineligible for the 

benefit. (Doc. 16-1; Doc. 16-3, p. 1; Doc. 16-4, p. 1). The plan provides no option

for an employee to elect or designate a contingent or secondary beneficiary of the 

QPSA benefit. (Doc. 16-1; Doc. 16-3, p. 1). Article V(1) provides that only a 

surviving spouse is eligible for the payment of the pre-retirement spousal benefit, 

and the plan does not authorize payment of such benefit to another beneficiary. 

(Doc. 14-4, pp. 26–28). Article V(1) states:

The surviving spouse of a married Employee or former Employee 

who has at least one hour of service or is on paid leave after August 

22, 1984, who is entitled to a pension under the provisions of Article 

III as in effect on the date of his death, and who dies prior to the 

commencement of retirement benefits under the Plan will be covered 

by the Pre-Retirement Benefit described in this Paragraph 1 in lieu of 

any pension otherwise payable under the Plan; provided that the 

deceased Employee or former Employee has been married to the 

surviving spouse throughout the one-year period ending on the date of 

his death; and provided, further, that during the applicable election 

period the Employee or former Employee did not elect, with spousal 

consent, to waive the Pre-Retirement Benefit provided hereunder. . . .

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 5 of 20
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Upon the death after August 22, 1984, and prior to retirement 

eligibility of any married Employee or former Employee who has not 

effectively waived the Pre-Retirement Benefit provided hereunder or 

who has revoked a prior effective waiver of the Pre-Retirement 

Benefit provided hereunder, monthly payments will be made to the 

surviving spouse of the Employee. . . .

(Id.). 

B. The Benefit Claim Dispute

On August 5, 2003, Barbara Box shot and killed her husband, Kenneth Box.

(Doc. 1, ¶ 11; Doc. 9, ¶ 11; Doc. 16-5). Mrs. Box was convicted of murder in the 

Circuit Court of Etowah County in March 2006 and currently is in jail. (Doc. 1, ¶

11; Doc. 9, ¶ 11; Doc. 16-5). Mr. and Mrs. Box were married for the 12 months 

immediately preceding Mr. Box’s death, and he did not waive the pre-retirement 

spousal benefit. (Doc. 14-4, p. 38). Mr. Box was an active employee when he 

died, meaning that he was not retired and was not receiving a benefit under the 

plan. (Id.). Kevin Box and Katrina Evatt are the surviving heirs of Kenneth Box. 

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1, 2).

In 2007, an attorney representing Mr. Box’s estate requested information 

from Goodyear regarding Mr. Box’s pension benefits so that the benefits could be 

included in the valuation and settlement of his estate. (Doc. 14-4, p. 49). In a 

letter dated July 12, 2007, the administrator of Goodyear’s plan denied this request. 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 6 of 20
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(Id.). The letter stated that pension benefits were not payable to the estate or to 

anyone other than the spouse, Barbara Box. (Id.). 

In 2010, the plaintiffs’ attorney asked Goodyear for copies of various plan 

documents and Mr. Box’s complete pension claim file. (Doc. 14-5 pp. 49–50). 

The plan administrator denied the request for plan documents in a letter dated May 

7, 2010. (Id. at 37). The letter states: “Legally, we are required to pay pension 

benefits to the spouse without having written consent to pay otherwise.” (Id.). The 

administrator also notified plaintiffs’ counsel that the plaintiffs had a right to 

appeal to the Benefits Review Committee and to submit evidence in support of an

appeal. (Id. at 37–38). On June 1, 2010, the plaintiffs responded to Goodyear’s 

denial of the request for plan documents. (Id. at 35–36). Plaintiffs cited federal 

case law that discusses the doctrine of “killers don’t take” and asked the plan to 

pay the pension benefit to Kenneth Box’s estate. (Id.).

On July 6, 2010, plaintiffs appealed the matter to the 

Benefits Review Committee. (Id. at 34). The Benefits Review Committee met in 

September 2010 to consider plaintiffs’ claim and reviewed all available 

information, including the plan and the information that plaintiffs submitted in 

support of their claim. (Id. at 23–24). In a letter dated October 4, 2010, the 

committee denied plaintiffs’ appeal. (Id.). The letter states that because federal 

common law and Alabama’s “slayer statute” prohibit payment of benefits to a 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 7 of 20
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surviving spouse convicted of murdering the plan participant, the plan determined 

that no payment should be made to Mrs. Box. (Id.). According to the letter, no 

benefits were payable to any other person because, absent spousal waiver, the preretirement spousal benefit is available only to an employee’s surviving spouse

under the terms of the plan. (Id.). 

In an October 13, 2010 letter, the plaintiffs requested a copy of all 

documents, records, and other information that the Benefits Review Committee 

relied upon in arriving at its decision. (Doc. 14-5, pp. 21–22). On November 22, 

2010, Goodyear shared with the plaintiffs “all of the information that was provided 

to Goodyear’s Benefits Review Committee for them to make a decision in the 

claim review process of Kenneth Box.” (Id. at 19).

On December 2, 2010, in accordance with the pension plan’s administrative 

procedures, the plaintiffs appealed to Goodyear’s ERISA Appeals Committee. 

(Doc. 14-4, pp. 39–42). Plaintiffs argued that federal common law, the Alabama 

slayer statute, and Alabama state law all supported payment of the pension benefit 

to the estate or heirs of the murdered plan participant in lieu of the slaying spouse.

(Id.). Plaintiffs again asked Goodyear to make pension payments either to the 

estate of Kenneth Box or to Kevin Box and Katrina Evatt directly. (Id.). A

timeline of events and an appendix of materials, including all correspondence 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 8 of 20
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between plaintiffs and the plan as well as federal and state case law, accompanied 

the letter. (Id. at 36).

On March 16, 2011, Goodyear’s ERISA Appeals Committee held an appeal 

hearing on the plaintiffs’ claim. (Doc. 16-11). During the appeal hearing and 

immediately following the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel presented legal authority to 

the Goodyear ERISA Appeals Committee to support the plaintiffs’ request for 

benefits. (Id.).

On March 25, 2011, Goodyear sent a letter to the plaintiffs denying their 

second appeal for pension benefits. (Doc. 14-4, p. 17–18). Goodyear explained 

that it had reviewed all of the information contained in Mr. Box’s claim file and all 

of the information that the plaintiffs submitted, including the information presented 

at the March 16, 2011 appeal hearing. (Id.). Goodyear stated that according to the 

plan, only a surviving spouse is entitled to annuity payments when a married plan 

participant dies before starting to receive a monthly pension payment. (Id.). 

Goodyear wrote that, “[t]his is a result of the Plan design . . .” (Id.). Goodyear 

noted that the factual circumstances of the plaintiffs’ claim presented a matter of 

“first impression” for the Pension Board. (Id.). Goodyear considered federal 

common law and Alabama’s “slayer statute” and ultimately determined that federal 

common law controlled plan administration. (Id.). Goodyear found that under the 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 9 of 20
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federal common law “slayer rule,” Mr. Box’s surviving spouse was barred from 

receiving the Pre-Retirement Spousal Benefit. (Id.). 

The plaintiffs exhausted all administrative remedies available under the plan.

(Doc. 16-4, p. 2). On August 16, 2011, based on the Pension Board’s final denial 

of their claim for pension benefits, the plaintiffs filed suit under ERISA in this 

Court. (Doc. 1).

III. ANALYSIS

The parties have raised several issues. The Court considers those issues in 

the following order: (1) whether the plaintiffs have standing; (2) whether 

Goodyear’s denial of ERISA benefits was proper under the applicable standard of 

review; and (3) whether the plaintiffs can assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim 

against Goodyear.

A. Mr. Box has derivative standing to bring suit under ERISA as the

personal representative of a former plan participant’s estate.

To pursue an ERISA claim, a plaintiff must have standing. Courts recognize 

two types of standing under § 1132(a): independent standing and derivative 

standing. See Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1514–15 (11th Cir. 1997), reh’g en 

banc denied, 124 F.3d 223 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Estate of Prince v. Aetna Life 

Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4327049, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2008). Participants and 

beneficiaries have independent standing under § 1132(a). 29 U.S.C. § 

1132(a)(1)(B). “[S]uccessors in interest to participants or beneficiaries may []

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 10 of 20
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sustain an action under § 1132(a)(1)(B), via derivative standing.” Estate of Prince, 

2008 WL 4327049, at *3; see also Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1515 (holding that a party 

may obtain “derivative standing based upon an assignment of rights from an entity 

listed in” § 1132(a)).

In his capacity as the representative for the estate of Kenneth Box, Kevin 

Box has derivative standing. “[A] deceased-participant’s estate qualifies for 

derivative standing” because the estate “‘seeks only to enforce the beneficiary’s 

rights to pre-death accrued’” benefits. Estate of Prince, 2008 WL 4327049, at *3 

(quoting Cottle v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 1993 WL 8201, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 

1993); see also James v. La. Laborers Health and Welfare Fund, 766 F. Supp 530, 

533 (E.D. La. 1991). This is true even when the deceased would not have been 

entitled any benefit. See In re Estate of Burkland, 2012 WL 13550 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 

3, 2012). In Estate of Burkland, the estate of a deceased plan participant, whose 

wife allegedly killed him, challenged the distribution of life insurance proceeds 

under the deceased’s plan. 2012 WL 13550, at *1. The deceased’s wife was 

named as the primary beneficiary on the insurance policy, and the deceased’s son 

was the contingent beneficiary. Id. The deceased’s wife allegedly disclaimed her 

rights to the policy pursuant to an agreement with her son, the contingent 

beneficiary, so that her son would give her a portion of the proceeds to retain an 

attorney for her homicide defense. Id. The court held that the estate had standing 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 11 of 20
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to challenge the distribution as a representative of a former plan participant. Id. at 

*4. 

Consistent with this persuasive authority, Kevin Box, acting as personal 

representative for the estate of a former plan participant, has derivative standing to 

pursue plan benefits in this action.

2

 Therefore, the Court reaches the merits of the 

estate’s challenge to Goodyear’s refusal to pay the QPSA benefit. 

B. Goodyear Properly Denied the ERISA Benefits.

The Court begins its analysis by determining de novo whether the claim 

administrator’s denial of benefits was wrong. In reaching his decision, the claims 

administrator had to examine the extent to which Mr. Box’s murder by his wife, 

Mrs. Box, impacted the QPSA benefit. The analysis turned on the administrator’s 

interpretation of the terms of the plan and his selection and application of the 

appropriate “slayer rule,” a rule concerning the eligibility of a beneficiary who 

murders an insured. The administrator considered both Alabama law and federal 

law and decided to apply the federal common law slayer rule. (Doc. 14-4, pp. 17–

18). The estate of Kenneth Box asserts that the administrator erred because the

administrator should have used Alabama’s slayer rule to evaluate the plaintiffs’ 

 2 Kevin Box and Katrina Evatt do not have standing in their individual capacities because they 

are neither plan participants nor beneficiaries. They are not plan participants because they are 

not Goodyear employees. Box and Evatt are not beneficiaries because neither is “a person 

designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become 

entitled to a benefit thereunder.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8). The estate of Kenneth Box also is not a 

beneficiary. Mr. Box did not designate his estate as a QPSA beneficiary, and the plan does not 

designate the estate as such. Therefore, the estate does not have independent standing. 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 12 of 20
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request for benefits. (Doc. 16, p. 11; Doc. 19, p. 3). The Court does not have to 

choose because federal common law and Alabama’s slayer statute dictate the same 

result in this action.

3

Honeywell Savings & Ownership Plan v. Jicha, 2010 WL 276237 (D.N.J. 

Jan. 15, 2010), illustrates the point. In Honeywell, an ERISA plan participant was 

murdered. Id. The participant’s husband was convicted of hiring a hit man to kill

the participant. Id. At the time of her death, the decedent was enrolled in three 

employee benefit plans: a Savings and Ownership Plan (“SOP”), a Secured Benefit 

Plan (“SBP”), and a pension plan. Id. at *2. The decedent did not designate a

beneficiary under these plans. Id. The SOP and SBP both provided that if the 

participant failed to name a beneficiary, then at the participant’s death, the benefit 

would go to the participant’s spouse, or if there was no spouse, to the participant’s 

estate. Id. The QPSA stated that the surviving spouse was entitled to the benefit 

unless the participant elected not to provide QPSA coverage or the spouse had not 

 3 The federal rule applies in this case if ERISA preempts Alabama’s slayer rule. Neither the 

United States Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has determined whether 

ERISA preempts state slayer statutes. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152 

(2001) (declining to address whether ERISA preempts state slayer statutes); Kennedy v. Plan 

Admin’r for DuPont Sav. And Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009) (same). Several district courts 

have concluded that ERISA does not preempt state slayer statutes. Courts addressing the issue 

have looked to Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152 (2001). There, the United States Supreme Court 

refused to rule on whether ERISA preempts state slayer statutes, but the Court noted in dicta that 

“the principle underlying [slayer] statutes—which have been adopted by nearly every State—is 

well established in the law and has a long historical pedigree predating ERISA.” (Id.); see

Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 610, 614 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Admin. Comm. for 

the H.E.B. Inv. and Ret. Plan v. Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761 (E.D. Tex. 2002).

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 13 of 20
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been married to the participant for at least one year at the time of death. Id. The 

QPSA did not offer the option of naming a contingent beneficiary. Id. at *6. 

Pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, the Honeywell court had to determine 

whether, as a matter of law, the participant’s husband was eligible to receive 

benefits under the employee benefit plans. Id. at *1.

To decide the issue, the Honeywell court examined both the relevant state 

slayer statute and the federal common law rule. The court found that the principles 

governing the state slayer statute were consistent with the federal common law

standard so that the result was the same under either rule: the plan participant’s 

husband was “not eligible to receive any benefits because he may not profit from 

his wrongful act.” Id. at *6. Treating the husband as predeceasing his wife, the 

court looked to the terms of the plans to determine the proper beneficiaries. Id. 

The court declared that the estate was the proper beneficiary under the terms of the 

SOP and the SBP. The court also held that under the terms of the QPSA, only the 

surviving spouse could receive pension benefits; the plan did not provide for a 

contingent beneficiary. Id. Because the husband was ineligible for the QPSA 

benefit, the court concluded that “there is no beneficiary to whom the Pension Plan 

may be paid. The Pension Plan benefits will not be paid to any person.” Id. 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 14 of 20
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As in Honeywell, federal common law and the Alabama slayer statute are 

consistent and produce the same result in this case. The relevant portion of the 

Alabama slayer statute states:

(c) A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other 

contractual arrangement who feloniously and intentionally kills the 

principal obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is issued is 

not entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy or other contractual 

arrangement, and it becomes payable as though the killer had 

predeceased the decedent.

Ala. Code § 43-8-253(c). The Alabama slayer statute treats Mrs. Box as though 

she predeceased Mr. Box. Therefore, Mrs. Box is not entitled to the QPSA benefit

under Alabama law. 

The federal common law principle regarding slayers is that no person should 

profit from her own wrong. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 384 (2008)

(citing N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886)); see also 

Honeywell Savings & Ownership Plan v. Jicha, 2010 WL 276237, at *6. Thus, 

under either the Alabama slayer statute or federal common law, Mrs. Box is 

ineligible for the spousal benefit.

Under the terms of the Goodyear plan, Mrs. Box is the only QPSA 

beneficiary. The plan does not identify a contingent beneficiary. Applying the 

legal fiction that Mrs. Box predeceased her husband, there is no surviving spouse

and thus no beneficiary to whom Goodyear must pay the spousal benefit. 

Therefore, as in Honeywell, the QPSA benefit should not be paid at all.

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 15 of 20
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The estate of Kenneth Box points to New Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. 

DeRocha, 779 F. Supp 845 (E.D. La. 1991), for the proposition that when a 

surviving spouse is disqualified under a QPSA, the benefit must be paid to the 

contingent beneficiary or the estate of the plan participant. (Doc. 16, p. 21–22). 

That decision is not persuasive in this case. Under the terms of the plan at issue in 

DeRocha, if a spouse was ineligible for the QPSA benefit, then the plan required 

payment to the designated beneficiary. DeRocha, 779 F. Supp. at 851. Moreover, 

Louisiana law provides that when a beneficiary becomes disqualified because the 

beneficiary is responsible for the death of the insured, the contingent beneficiary 

receives the proceeds. Id. Therefore, in DeRocha, both the plan and state law 

mandated payment of the QPSA proceeds to a contingent beneficiary named in the 

plan.

4

 In this case, neither the terms of the QPSA nor Alabama law requires 

payment of the QPSA to a contingent beneficiary.5

 

 4 The Louisiana Code states:

(1) No beneficiary, assignee, or other payee under any personal insurance contract shall 

receive from the insurer any benefits under the contract accruing upon the death, 

disablement, or injury of the individual insured when the beneficiary, assignee, or other 

payee is either:

(a) Held by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction to be criminally 

responsible for the death, disablement, or injury of the individual insured.

(b) Judicially determined to have participated in the intentional, unjustified killing of the 

individual insured.

(2) Where such a disqualification exists, the policy proceeds shall be payable to the 

secondary or contingent beneficiary, unless similarly disqualified, or, if no secondary or 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 16 of 20
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contingent beneficiary exists, to the estate of the insured. Nothing contained in this 

Section shall prohibit payment pursuant to an assignment of the policy proceeds where

such payment defrays the cost and expenses of the insured's funeral or expense incurred 

in connection with medical treatment of the insured. Nothing contained in this Section 

shall prohibit payment of insurance proceeds pursuant to a facility of payment clause, so 

long as such payment is not made to a beneficiary, assignee, or other payee disqualified 

by this Section.

LSA-R.S. 22:901(D). Alabama’s slayer statute does not contain a provision similar to LSA-R.S. 

22:901(D)(2) that requires payment of policy proceeds to the decedent’s estate if no secondary or 

contingent beneficiary exists.

5 The Box estate argues that under Alabama law, in a slayer situation, plan benefits pass to the 

decedent’s estate. (Doc. 16, p. 20). In support of this argument, the estate points to two 

Alabama Supreme Court opinions: Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Linson, 17 So. 2d 761 (1944), and 

Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 311 So. 2d 294 (1975). In Linson, the Alabama 

Supreme Court recited the “well-settled rule” that “‘a beneficiary in a life insurance policy who 

murders or feloniously causes the death of the insured forfeits all rights which he may have in or 

under the policy. This rule is based upon public policy and upon the principle that no one shall 

be allowed to benefit from his own wrong. * * *.’ 29 Am.Jur. § 1310.” Id. at 761. The 

beneficiary of the group life insurance policy at issue in Linson avoided application of the slayer 

rule in the trial court by relying on an incontestability clause in the policy. The Alabama 

Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision, holding that “[t]he basic reasons behind the 

denial of recovery in [a slayer] case are so compelling, we now declare the rule that no 

incontestability clause can invest the beneficiary who has feloniously slain the insured with the 

right to recover the death benefit, by stipulations closing the door to such defense or otherwise.” 

Id. at 763. The insurer argued that because the beneficiary of the policy murdered the insured, 

the policy should be treated “as if no beneficiary had been named, the cause of action being in 

the personal representative of the insured.” 17 So. 2d at 762. The Alabama Supreme Court did 

not answer the argument directly but noted that, “‘[t]he fact that [the] public policy prevents the 

payment of the insurance benefits to the murderer does not void the insurance policy; the liability 

of the insurer is just the same when death is the result of murder as when it is produced by any 

other cause, and if there is any person who has a right to the benefits of the policy, his rights will 

be enforced.’” Id. (quoting Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 1942)). 

In Hanna, the Alabama Supreme Court explained that, “[a]s decided in [Linson], where the 

primary beneficiary’s rights are forfeited, the insurance company remains liable for the proceeds 

of the policy, to the contingent beneficiary or the insured’s estate, as the case may be.” Hanna, 

311 So. 2d at 297. The policy at issue in Hanna expressly stated that, “‘[a]ny amount of 

insurance for which there is no beneficiary at the death of the Employee shall be payable to the 

estate of the Employee.’” Id. at 295 (quoting the policy at issue). Neither Linson nor Hanna

establishes a rule requiring an insurer to pay the estate in every slayer situation. Rather, the 

opinions stand for the proposition that in a slayer situation, the insurer is not relieved of its 

obligation to pay a person who has a contractual right to the benefits of the policy upon 

disqualification of the slayer. Here, Mrs. Box is the only person who may recover the QPSA 

Case 4:11-cv-02829-MHH Document 29 Filed 09/25/14 Page 17 of 20
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The Box estate also argues that state law must fill the “gap” created by the 

plan’s failure to provide for a contingent beneficiary. (Doc. 18, p. 14–15). Here, 

the plan expressly provides for an alternative beneficiary in other situations, such 

as the death benefit described in Article IV(8)(d). (Doc. 14-9, p. 9). Like the court 

in Honeywell, this Court views the absence of an express provision for a contingent 

beneficiary not as a gap in the plan, but as an expression of intent not to provide 

such a benefit. Alabama’s rules of contract interpretation support the Court’s 

analysis. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Kirkland, 69 So. 3d 98, 

101 (Ala. 2011) (“Insurance contracts, like other contracts, are construed so as to 

give effect to the intention of the parties, and, to determine this intent, a court must 

examine more than an isolated sentence or term; it must read each phrase in the 

context of all other provisions.”) (internal quotations omitted). Even if this Court 

were to regard the absence of a provision for a contingent beneficiary as a gap in 

the plan, Alabama law does not supply a means to fill the gap. See note 5, supra. 

Alabama’s slayer statute does not require Goodyear to make payments to the 

estate. The statute mandates that the policy “becomes payable as though the killer 

had predeceased the decedent.” Under the terms of the plan, if Mrs. Box 

predeceased Mr. Box, Goodyear would not have to pay the pre-retirement spousal 

 

benefit under the terms of the Goodyear plan. Because Mrs. Box is ineligible for the benefit as a 

matter of law, Goodyear does not have to pay the benefits. 

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benefit. Thus, even applying state law to fill the gap, Goodyear properly refused to 

pay benefits to the Box estate.

Thus, based on its de novo review of the record, the Court finds that the plan 

administrator’s decision to deny benefits was correct. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Fails as a Matter of 

Law.

As an alternative to the estate’s claim for plan benefits under § 1132(a)(1), 

the estate seeks equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3). 

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 35–41). Claims for equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3) are available 

only when a plaintiff has no other claim for relief under ERISA. See Varity Corp. 

v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996); Ogden v. Blue Bell Creameries U.S.A., Inc., 

348 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that the central focus is “whether Congress 

has provided an adequate remedy . . . elsewhere in the ERISA statutory 

framework”). The estate’s primary claim is for an award of plan benefits under § 

1132(a)(1), and the relief sought for breach of fiduciary duty is an award of those 

same benefits. (Doc. 1, pp. 10–11). Congress has provided an adequate remedy 

for plaintiffs’ claims under § 1132(a)(1). Therefore, the estate may not pursue 

equitable relief. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Goodyear’s motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. 14) and DENIES the estate of Kenneth Box’s motion for 

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summary judgment (Doc. 15). The Court will enter a final order consistent with 

this memorandum opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this September 25, 2014.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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