Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-01823/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-01823-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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1 In his motion for summary judgement, Descheny requested oral

argument on this matter. Descheny Motion (doc. 45). Finding oral

argument unnecessary, the Court shall deny this request.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Elena White, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 03-1823 PCT RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

United States of America and )

Reeverson Descheny, )

)

Defendants. ) )

On April 30, 2004, Plaintiff Elena White ("White"), acting

individually and as the parent and next friend of Sherianna White

("Sherianna"), filed an Amended Complaint in this matter. (doc.

22). Thereafter, on April 14, 2005, both Defendants Reeverson

Descheny ("Descheny") and the United States of America ("the

Government") moved for summary judgment.1

 Descheny Motion (doc.

45); USA Motion (doc. 48). These motions were fully briefed on

July 29, 2005. USA Reply (doc. 65). In addition, the Government

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moved to strike the Affidavit of Ronald Garrison and portions of

White's Statement of Facts. Mot. to Strike (doc. 67). This motion

was fully briefed on October 11, 2005. Reply (doc. 88). Having

carefully reviewed the arguments submitted by the parties, the

Court now rules.

I. Background Facts

This case arises out of an automobile accident occurring on

October 18, 2002, at the Rock Point Community School ("the

school"), which is located on the Navajo Indian Reservation. On

such date, Sherianna was injured when she fell from the top of the

cab of a pick-up truck that was being used in the homecoming parade

at the school. The parade was held on school property, and both

the roads and the parking areas used during the parade were within

the school's grounds. 

On the day of the accident, Descheny was home from an out-ofstate school and attended the parade with his parents. Upon

arriving at the school, Descheny visited with his brothers and

assisted them in preparing their float for the parade. At some

point before the parade began, Descheny met his cousin, Roderick

Descheny ("Roderick"). Descheny was advised that Roderick was

planning to drive the Junior Class float in the parade but that a

school employee would not allow him to do so. Roderick asked

Descheny if he would drive the parade route in his place, and

Descheny agreed to drive the float.

The vehicle Descheny was to drive in the parade belonged to

Roderick's parents, who had given Roderick permission to drive the

truck to the school grounds and to use it in the parade. Descheny

got behind the wheel of the vehicle and Roderick sat in the

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2

 This cause of action against the United States arises under the

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et

seq. Although the Rock Point Community School is not an operation of

the United States government, the Government has agreed to accept

tort liability for independent schools who are contractors of the

United States under the Indian Self-Determination and Educational

Assistance Act, Public Law 93-638 (25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq.). The Rock

Point Community School is such a school.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Government adopts state

law for determining tort liability. It is liable whenever and to the

same extent that a private person would be liable under the laws of

the state where the incident occurs. Thus, Arizona tort law applies

in this matter.

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passenger seat. Descheny then drove the parade route, traveling at

a slow speed the entire way.

After completing the parade route, he returned the truck to

the school parking lot where he originally found it, and parked the

vehicle. Descheny then turned off the engine, left the keys in the

ignition and exited the vehicle. Sometime soon after Descheny left

the vehicle, Roderick got in the driver's seat, turned on the

vehicle and started to drive. At that time, Sherianna was still in

or on the vehicle and fell off when Roderick pulled away.

Sherianna was injured in the fall from the top of the cab of

the truck. From her fall, Sherianna landed on her head and

allegedly sustained a traumatic brain injury, among other injuries,

such as a fractured wrist. White sued Descheny and the Government2

in this case. It is White's position that the Rock Point School was

mostly at fault for Sherianna's injuries, however she believes

there was comparative fault on the part of Descheny. Specifically,

"[i]t is Plaintiff's position that the Rock Point School was

negligent, that the parade was mismanaged, that the school created

a dangerous condition, that the school failed to prepare adequately

for the safety of participants, and that there was negligent

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supervision of the students from the junior class, who were allowed

to ride on a float without a class sponsor, whose presence was

required by school rules to be with the students at all times and

to maintain their safety." Resp. to USA Motion (doc. 57) at 1-2. 

White sued both Descheny and the Government under theories of

negligence. Amended Complaint (doc. 22).

II. Motions to Strike

On July 29, 2005, the Government moved to strike portions of

White's Statement of Facts, dated June 20, 2005 ("Statement of

Facts"), arguing that such portions are "unduly argumentative, draw

questionable inference from the evidence, fail to specifically

reference the record and also contain plaintiff's characterization

of this case which is improper." Mot. to Strike (doc. 67) at 1. 

Additionally, the Government moved to strike the Affidavit of

Ronald Garrison, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(f), 26(e)(1), and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Id.

A. Portions of White's Statement of Facts

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) and Local

Rule 56, the Government requests that certain portions of White's

Statement of Facts be stricken from the record. Mot. to Strike

(doc. 67) at 1. Specifically, the Government moves to strike

paragraphs 77, 78, 83, 86, 87, 88, 92, 99, 100, 101, and 102,

asserting that such sections of the statement of facts contain

argument, factually unsupported allegations, conclusory statements,

and questionable inferences from the evidence of record. Id. at 2-

4. The Government, however, does not identify any authority that

directly supports the relief it requests.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that,

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...[a]ny party filing a motion for summary

judgment shall set forth separately from the

memorandum of law, and in full, the specific facts

on which that party relies in support of the

motion. The specific facts shall be set forth in

serial fashion and not in narrative form. As to

each fact, the statement shall refer to a specific

portion of the record where the fact may be found

(i.e., affidavit, deposition, etc.). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.1. In regard to a party opposing a motion for

summary judgment, the rule states that such party "must comply

with the foregoing in setting forth the specific facts, which the

opposing party asserts[.]" Id. In the instant case, the

Government has not shown that the Statement of Facts violates this

rule. 

In its motion to strike, the Government questions the bases

of many of White's factual statements and asserts that they are

argumentative. Such concerns reflect on the weight the Government

believes the Court should consider giving the contested "facts."

The Court alone shall determine the necessary and deserved weight

of each fact alleged by each of the parties in this matter. 

Therefore, the Court shall deny the Government's motion to strike

portions of the Statement of Facts.

B. Affidavit of Ronald Garrison

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f), 26(e)(1),

and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Government requests that the

Affidavit of Ronald Garrison be stricken from the record. Mot. to

Strike (doc. 67) at 1. In general, the Government argues that

Garrison's statements about the school's conduct and the postparade situation in the parking lot, where the accident occurred,

lack a factual basis in the record and equate to impermissible

speculation. Id. at 11. In turn, the Government argues that such

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3 Garrison's curriculum vitae, which is attached to his

affidavit, indicates that he has sixteen years of experience as a

consultant and trainer in safety and security. Garrison Vitae (doc.

58) at 1. He has evaluated over 2,500 schools and other facilities

for safety, security, planning and operations, disaster management

procedures, and critical incident and risk management procedures.

Id. His background includes fifteen years as a high school teacher,

one year as a college instructor, and six years as a school district

administrator. Id. He holds a Master of Arts degree, as well as a

Master of Science degree. Id. Garrison is also a member of the

American College of Forensic Examiners International. Id. at 3.

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speculation is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. In

contrast, White asserts that Garrison's personal experience,

education, and training qualifies him as an expert.3 Resp. to Mot.

to Strike (doc. 85) at 3. 

Expert testimony is admissible only in accordance with Fed.

R. Civ. P. 702: 

If scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue, a witness qualified as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education, may testify thereto in the form of an

opinion or otherwise.

Trial courts have a gatekeeping obligation to ensure that all

expert testimony is reliable and relevant. See Kumho Tire Co.,

Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 199 S. Ct. 1167, 1174

(1999). In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579

(1993), the Supreme Court set forth factors to analyze Rule 702

evidence: (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been

tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to

peer review, (3) whether the error rate is known and standards

exist controlling the operation of the technique, and (4) whether

the theory or technique has gained general acceptance. 509 U.S.

at 593-94. This list of factors, however is meant to be helpful,

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not definitive. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151. "The

determination as to the relevance and reliability of such evidence

is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Daubert,

509 U.S. at 591. 

The Court finds that the Government has failed to show that

Garrison's affidavit is unreliable and irrelevant. The parties do

not seem to dispute that Garrison has a significant educational

and experiential background in school safety and security. The

Government merely demonstrates that it disagrees with Garrison’s

conclusions and the bases for such conclusions. Such

disagreements could certainly be handled during cross-examination

of Garrison and the exploration of the opinions of a competing

expert utilized by the Government. Therefore, the Court shall

deny the Government's motion to strike the Affidavit of Ronald

Garrison.

III. Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Standard

To grant summary judgment, the Court must determine that the

record before it contains "no genuine issue as to any material

fact" and, thus, "that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether to

grant summary judgment, the Court will view the facts and

inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear

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the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986). "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine

issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323. In

such a case, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law. Id.

The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between

the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion

for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine

issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is any factual dispute

that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing

substantive law. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute

in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. 

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest

upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but

instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine

issue for trial. See id. at 250. Finally, if the nonmoving

party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly

probative, a court may grant summary judgment. See, e.g.,

California Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan

Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

B. Descheny's Motion for Summary Judgment

 White has sued Descheny in this case under a theory of

negligence. Amended Complaint (doc. 22) at 9-11. White alleges the

following claimed breaches of Descheny's duty of care:

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a. intentionally turning over control of the

vehicle to a minor who Mr. Descheny knew was not

allowed to drive the subject vehicle;

b. carelessly leaving the keys in the ignition of

the vehicle in the immediate proximity of a

relatively inexperienced minor, whom Mr. Descheny

knew was not permitted to drive the subject

vehicle;

c. leaving the vehicle while Sherianna White and

other [sic] were still in precarious positions on

the vehicle;

d. failing to assist Sherianna White in getting

down from the top of the cab of the pick-up truck.

Id. at ¶ 44. Descheny, in his motion for summary judgment,

challenges the viability of White's claim, arguing that, at the

time of the accident, he had no specific duty of care to

Sherianna, and, even if such a duty existed, he did not

proximately cause her injuries. Descheny Motion (doc. 45) at 4-9.

For these reasons, Descheny asserts that summary judgment should

be granted in his favor.

Negligence is the failure to act as a reasonable and prudent

person would act in like circumstances. Morris v. Ortiz, 437 P.2d

652, 654 (Ariz., 1968). The test of negligent conduct is what a

reasonable prudent person would or would not do under the

circumstances. Id. To put it another way, to constitute

actionable negligence the defendant must owe a duty to the

plaintiff, the breach of which results proximately in plaintiff's

injury. Id. Thus, initially the Court must determine what duty,

if any, did Descheny owe to Sherianna.

The issue of duty is generally decided by the trial court as

a matter of law. Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 898 P.2d

1000, 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). "A defendant who does not owe a

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4 "An actor who gratuitously undertakes to render services

agrees to exercise reasonable care in performing the undertaking."

Bishop v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 837 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1992). However, the scope and nature of the undertaking

determine the scope and nature of the duty gratuitously assumed. Id.

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duty to a plaintiff cannot be liable for the plaintiff's injury

even if the defendant acted negligently." Id. Determining the

existence of a duty involves the question of whether "the

relationship between the parties impose[s] on the defendant an

obligation to use some care to avoid injury to the plaintiff[.]" 

Id. "Courts take a broad view of the class of risks and the class

of victims that are foreseeable for the purpose of finding a

duty." Id. 

Here, the parties do not dispute that Descheny was asked to

drive the subject truck along the parade route in order to allow

the junior class float to be displayed in the school's homecoming

parade. It is logical to conclude that contained within that

request was the responsibility to drive the subject truck from the

parking lot to the parade route and from the parade route to the

parking lot.

White argues that "implicit in the request that [Descheny]

drive the float was that he exercise reasonable care." Resp. to

Descheny MSJ (doc. 56) at 4. The Court agrees that Descheny owed

a duty of reasonable care to the passengers riding in the vehicle

to which he held the ultimate control.4 Having determined that

Descheny owed White a duty while he drove the float, the Court

must now consider whether he arguably breached the standard of

care applicable to that duty. 

The question of breach is ordinarily decided by the trier of

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fact, unless "there is no evidence of breach and, therefore, the

defendant was not negligent." Rudolph, 898 P.2d at 1004. Where

reasonable persons could not differ, the court properly takes the

issue from the jury. See Hill v. Safford Unified School District,

952 P.2d 754, 757 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Descheny completed

the requested task of driving the parade route without incident. 

In addition, the parties do not dispute that upon returning the

vehicle and its passengers to the school parking lot, Descheny

proceeded to bring the truck to a complete stop and turned off the

engine. At that point, Descheny completed the task of which he

had been asked to do, and, by bringing the car to a complete stop

and turning off the engine, Descheny exercised reasonable care.

From that point forward, Descheny no longer owed a duty of care to

the passengers on the float.

White argues that Descheny's act of leaving the keys in the

vehicle instead of turning them over to a school official or

Roderick's parents was a breach of his duty of reasonable care. 

Resp. to Descheny MSJ (doc. 56) at 5. Specifically, White

contends that by leaving them in the truck, Descheny, in effect,

gave them directly to Roderick. Id. at 7. In addition, White

asserts that Descheny breached his duty of care by failing to

ensure that Sherianna exited the vehicle safely. Id. at 4-6. The

Court disagrees. 

"The gratuitous actor does not assume an extended duty

independent of the undertaking itself." Bishop v. State, Dept. of

Corrections, 837 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). The scope

and nature of the undertaking determine the scope and nature of

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the duty gratuitously assumed. Id. In Bishop, a high school 

student was injured in an automobile accident that occurred while

she was returning home from a youth conference held in Flagstaff. 

Id. The student, Valery Bishop, brought a negligence action

against the organization that recruited her to attend the youth

conference, Cochise Community Counseling Services ("CCCS"),

claiming that it failed to exercise due care in coordinating and

supervising transportation for the students. Id. at 1209. The

trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CCCS on Bishop's

negligence claims, and Bishop appealed. Bishop, 837 P.2d at 1209. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,

concluding that Bishop had not sufficiently established that CCCS

undertook a duty to travel in a caravan with the students, which

was the basis of Bishop's claim. Id. at 1211. Discussing the

limitations of the duty imposed on a gratuitous actor, the court

noted that Bishop produced no evidence that indicated that CCCS

had agreed to assure student drivers were licensed drivers and to

check the drivers for fatigue. Id. at 1210-11. Consequently, the

court found that CCCS owed no duty to Bishop. Id. at 1211. 

Here, White has cited no authority that suggests that any

duty of care Descheny owed the passengers while the vehicle was in

motion during the parade continued after he returned the vehicle

to the parking lot, parked it, and turned off the engine. 

According to the evidence, Descheny was never asked, nor did he

offer, to assist the passengers in exiting the vehicle or remain

with the vehicle until all of the passengers exited. It is

undisputed that Descheny drove the subject truck to and from the

parking lot without incident, that he turned the vehicle's engine

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5

 White agrees that the Government is not liable for Roderick's

negligence. Resp. to USA MSJ (doc. 57) at 12.

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off, that the vehicle was not in motion when he left it, and that

it was parked in the parking lot. 

Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

The Court concludes that White cannot show that Descheny breached

his duty of reasonable care when he was in control of the subject

vehicle, nor that he owed a duty of care to Sherianna after he

completed driving the float in the parade and returned the truck

back to the original parking lot, parked the vehicle and turned

off the engine. Consequently, Descheny is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.

C. The Government's Motion for Summary Judgment

In its motion for summary judgment, the Government argues

that it cannot be held liable for Roderick's conduct because (1)

he was not an agent of the United States; (2) his acts were

impulsive and unanticipated; (3) his acts were not reasonably

foreseeable; and (4) the family purpose doctrine renders

Roderick's parents solely responsible for White's injuries. USA

Motion (doc. 48) at 4-15. White does not challenge the

Government's first and fourth arguments, but contests the

remaining two arguments. Resp. to USA MSJ (doc. 57).5

First, the Government asserts that Arizona law holds that "no

negligence, or inadequacy of supervision, can be postulated on a

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failure to guard against sudden, impulsive or unanticipated acts

of a student." USA Motion (doc. 48) at 4. The Government notes

that Roderick had been warned twice, earlier that same day, that

he was prohibited from driving a vehicle during the parade, and

that he had acknowledged that he understood the rules. Id. at 5.

Under the decision in Morris, the Government asserts that Arizona

law rejects the idea that a teacher must anticipate the myriad of

unexpected acts which occur daily in and about schools and school

premises. Id., citing 437 P.2d at 654. 

Second, the Government argues that Arizona has defined the

principles of "foreseeability," in the context of school district

liability, in Hill. "[U]nder Arizona law, a plaintiff must

establish that the school or facility had sufficient specific

knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury

in order to find that a school or facility breached its duty to

provide adequate supervision in the context of injuries caused by

the acts of fellow students." Id., citing Hill, 952 P.2d at 759-

60. The Government argues that, under the circumstances in this

case, the school provided adequate and reasonable supervision in

the post-parade parking lot where Sherianna was injured. USA

Motion (doc. 48) at 11-14.

In contrast, White asserts that summary judgment should be

denied because disputed issues of material fact still remain in

the case, and, as a matter of Arizona law, this case must proceed

for determination by the fact-finder. Resp. to USA MSJ (doc. 57)

at 1. Specifically, she contends that she has presented

sufficient evidence to establish that the Rock Point Community

School breached its duty of reasonable care to Sherianna. Id. at

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17. Thus, White argues that the matter should be given to the

finder of fact to decide.

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute that the

school held a duty of reasonable care to Sherianna. USA MSJ Reply

(doc. 65) at n. 9. 

[S]chool teachers and administrators have both a

statutory and common law duty not to subject

students within their charge to a foreseeable and

unreasonable risk of harm through acts, omissions,

or school policy.

Hill, 952 P.2d at 756. The relationship between the school and

Sherianna imposed an additional obligation on the school to take

reasonable precautions for her safety. See id. Thus, the

essential question is whether a reasonable person could conclude

that the school breached its duty to Sherianna and proximately

caused her injuries. See id. at 756-57.

Whereas the finding of a duty is a question of law for the

court, the question of breach is ordinarily decided by the trier

of fact, unless "there is no evidence of breach and, therefore,

the defendant was not negligent." Rudolph, 898 P.2d at 1004. 

Where reasonable persons could not differ, the court properly

takes the issue from the jury. Hill, 952 P.2d at 757. In addition,

the Rudolph court stated that the issue of causation is usually an

issue for a jury to decide and that the act or omission of the

defendant "need not be a 'large' or 'abundant' cause of the

injury; even if defendant's conduct contributes 'only a little' to

plaintiff's damages, liability exists if the damages would not

have occurred but for that conduct." 898 P.2d at 1004-05.

Under Arizona law, the general test for whether a defendant's

conduct has breached the standard of care is whether a foreseeable

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risk of injury resulted from the defendant's conduct. Hill, 952

P.2d at 759. A public school district may be liable for a

student's injury if it fails "to act as a reasonable and prudent

person would act in like circumstances." Morris, 437 P.2d at 654.

A reasonably foreseeable event is one that might

"reasonably be expected to occur now and then, and

would be recognized as not highly unlikely if it

did suggest itself in the actor's mind."

Hill, 952 P.2d at 759. 

In Morris, a student jumped, suddenly and without warning,

onto a piece of metal, injuring another student. 437 P.2d at 653. 

A teacher was present at the time of the incident but was unable

to stop the student's act. Id. at 654. The plaintiffs in Morris

argued that the school breached its duty of reasonable care to the

injured student by not designating a group leader that would

supervise the group of students of which the injured student and

acting student were a part. Id. The court, unconvinced by this

argument, found that this omission did not reflect a violation of

the school's duty of reasonable care, nor did the appellant

establish that appointing a student as a group leader would have

prevented the incident. Id. The court determined that the

teacher could not reasonably be expected to anticipate acts by

students that occur on sudden impulse. Id.

In Hill, a student was fatally shot by a fellow student after

school hours and away from school premises. 952 P.2d at 755. 

After the shooting, a negligence action was brought against the

school district and a teacher at the school. Id. The Court of

Appeals held that, despite the fact that there had been arguments

between student gang members, the school district did not breach

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its duty to provide reasonable supervision to the students. Id.

at 761. Finding no evidence in the record that the teacher or any

school official was aware of students bringing weapons to school,

that "on going gang difficulty" occurred at the school, that the

after-school gathering had any gang relation, or that the shooter

"was known to have dangerous propensities and violent tendencies,"

the court found that the shooting was not foreseeable. Id. "[O]n

the record before us, this is that rare case where it can be said

'as a matter of law Defendant could not have taken reasonable

measures that probably would have prevented the attack.'" Id.,

citing Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Assoc.,

Inc., 941 P.2d 218, 224 (Ariz., 1997).

Here, the Government argues that the facts in the case at bar

are on par with those of Morris and Hill. USA Motion (doc. 48) at

5-7. Specifically, the Government asserts that Roderick's

behavior occurred on sudden impulse and was not foreseeable, thus

the school and the Government are not liable. In contrast, White

asserts that this case is distinguishable from Morris, because, in

Morris, the teacher was present at the immediate scene and was

supervising the students in his charge. "[I]n the instant case no

teacher or class sponsor was in or on the float supervising the

junior class...The critical distinction is that there was no

supervision of the junior class float, in direct violation of the

school's own guidelines." Resp. to USA MSJ (doc. 57) at 13. 

White asserts that a Minnesota case is more relevant in

determining how this matter should be resolved. Id. at 14, citing

Verhel v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 359 N.W.2d 579 (Minn.

1984). The Verhel case involved a van, carrying twelve high

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school cheerleaders, that was involved in a motor vehicle accident

during a school-sponsored event. 359 N.W.2d at 583. The driver

of the van was a seventeen year-old girl who had been driving for

thirteen months. Id. at 584. On appeal by the school district,

the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the school had a duty to

provide proper supervision of the cheerleaders' activity, and had

a duty to provide proper instruction to the sponsor it assigned to

the squad. Id. at 589. In addition, the court opined that the

driving behavior of the youthful driver was foreseeable, even

though it was sudden, because such behavior of unsupervised

students is to be expected. Id. at 590. Here, the Court finds

White's reliance on Verhel to be misplaced. 

Despite the fact that this Court is not required to follow

the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusions in Verhel, the analysis

required here does not significantly resemble that which occurred

in the Minnesota case. Specifically, the court in Verhel reviewed

the lower court's determination that the defendant school owed a

duty of care to the cheerleaders. Id. at 586. In the case at

bar, the existence of a duty owed by the school is not disputed. 

Furthermore, the court's statement that the unsupervised student's

behavior of failing to obey a stop sign "is to be expected and is

precisely the harm to be guarded against by the exercise of the

school district's supervision" is merely dicta. Id. at 590. 

Thus, the Court does not find Verhel to be instructive in regards

to the instant case.

In addition, White asserts that the school breached its duty

of reasonable care to Sherianna when a school employee directed

her to sit on the roof of the truck and allowed her to remain on

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6 White also cites the depositions of Melvin Arthur, Ernessa

Begay, Vanessa Begay and Violet Edgewater, however the sections she

cites from these depositions either do not directly support the claim

or were not provided to the Court. PSOF (doc. 58) at ¶ 72.

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top of the cab during the parade. The Court finds no evidence in

the record to corroborate the allegation that Sherianna was

directed by a school official to sit on the roof of the truck. At

a minimum, White fails to identify which school employee or

"persons in charge" instructed Sherianna to do such act. However,

the parties seem to dispute whether Sherianna rode on the roof of

the truck during the parade or only climbed on the roof of the

truck in the parking lot after the parade. 

The Government asserts that none of the fourteen school

employees that participated along the parade route, and that White

deposed, indicated that they saw Sherianna riding on the roof of

the truck during the parade. USA MSJ Reply (doc. 65) at 4. In

addition, the Government notes that Nashana Johnson testified that

it was her and Sherianna's joint decision to boost themselves onto

the roof as they approached the parking lot. Id. at 4, n.8, citing

USASOF (doc. 49) at ¶ 10, Nashana Johnson Depo. at 16-17. In

contrast, White cites the deposition testimony of Terry Descheny,

who indicates that he saw Sherianna riding on the roof of the

truck during the parade. PSOF (doc. 58) at ¶ 72.6 Moreover, White

submits to the Court a photograph of Sherianna seated on the roof

of the subject truck and a photograph of the school football

team's float, which had numerous students seated on the hood and

roof of a truck. Id. at ¶¶ 72, 78. 

It is undisputed that Roderick had a valid driver's license,

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parental permission to drive the subject truck, a "clean" driving

record and no "reputation" for vehicular misconduct. Moreover, it

is undisputed that the truck had been stopped and parked just

prior to the incident, and that there were no prior student

injuries before, during or after parades of similar school

sponsored events. However, the parties do dispute whether

Sherianna rode on the roof of the truck during the parade or

climbed onto the roof while in the parking lot. Regardless, under

either factual scenario, the Court believes that reasonable

persons could differ as to whether Sherianna's fall from the truck

was reasonably foreseeable. It is arguable that a fall from the

roof of a stopped truck is as plausible and as dangerous as a fall

from a truck that is in motion. Thus, a trier of fact may not

find Roderick's actions to be the source of the school's alleged

breach. Further, the Court believes that reasonable persons could

differ as to whether the school's omission of not requiring

Sherianna to get down off the roof or not providing enough

supervision to allow it to be aware that she was on the roof,

exposed Sherianna to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm,

resulting in a breach of its duty to her as a student. 

School teachers and administrators have both a statutory and

common law duty not to subject students within their charge to a

foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm through acts, omissions,

or school policy. Hill, 952 P.2d at 756. The question of breach

is ordinarily decided by the trier of fact, unless "there is no

evidence of breach and, therefore, the defendant was not

negligent." Rudolph, 898 P.2d at 1004. Where reasonable persons

could not differ, the court properly takes the issue from the

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jury. Hill, 952 P.2d at 757. In the instant case, a genuine

issue of material fact remains in dispute. Moreover, the Court

believes that reasonable persons could differ in their

determinations of whether the school breached its duty to

Sherianna. Consequently, the Court shall deny the Government's

motion for summary judgment.

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Government's Motion to Strike (doc.

67) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Descheny's Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. 45) is GRANTED.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Government's Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. 48) is DENIED. 

DATED this 21st day of March, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

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