Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02130/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02130-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS WHITEHEAD, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFF’S

DEPT.; SHERIFF MICHAEL

HENNESSEY; SAN FRANCISCO

JAIL MEDICAL SERVICES; DR.

GOLDENSEN; JOHN TAYLOR, 

Defendants.

 

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No. C 06-2130 JSW (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Docket No. 2)

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the San Francisco Jail in San Bruno, California,

has filed this civil rights complaint regarding the conditions of his confinement in the

San Francisco Jail. Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (docket no.

2), which is now GRANTED in a separate order filed simultaneously. In this order the

Court reviews Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismisses the

complaint with leave to amend within thirty days. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has filed a complaint which fails to clearly identify the claims he wishes

to pursue. The complaint form identifies the five separate Defendants listed above, but

the body of the complaint also appears to assert claims involving different Defendants,

not named as Defendants in this suit. Moreover, the body of the complaint does not

identify conduct which provides a basis for liability against Defendants other than

Defendant Taylor. As such, Plaintiff must clearly identify the substance of his complaint

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and clearly inform the Court against which defendants he wishes to proceed. The Court

now dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to file an amended complaint within thirty

days of the date of this order. 

I Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be

liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

II Legal Claims

 The majority of Plaintiff’s complaint appears directed at the failure of jail officials

to provide him with necessary medical treatment for his “severe chronic sciatic nerve

pain, severe chronic arthritis pain, and degenerative joint disease.” Complaint at p. 4. 

Plaintiff asserts that he has been receiving vicodin as a pain management regimen for

over ten years and that Dr. Goldensen, the jail medical director, ordered him to see a

specialist at San Francisco General Hospital, who recommended that he continue that

regimen. He asserts that jail officials generally and Nurse Practitioner John Taylor

specifically have abruptly and unjustly refused to provide him the needed medication in

violation of his civil rights. 

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Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

banc); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). A determination of

"deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the

prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need. See

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. 

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id.

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of an injury that a reasonable

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence

of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a

"serious" need for medical treatment. See id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright,

900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)).

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable

steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for deliberate

indifference to be established, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the part

of the defendant and resulting harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v.

Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff’s

allegations against Nurse Practitioner John Taylor states a claim for deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. However, in his complaint, Plaintiff has failed to

state a claim against other individuals or municipal liability on the part of the County

Defendants.

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A complaint that fails to state the specific acts of the defendant which violated the

plaintiff's rights fails to meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982). 

District courts must afford pro se prisoner litigants an opportunity to amend to correct

any deficiency in their complaints. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc). In this case, Plaintiff has failed to state the specifics regarding the

mistreatment he suffered at the hands of any other defendants, how his constitutional

rights were violated, whether he suffered any injury as a result, and the conduct of each

defendant that he asserts is responsible for a constitutional violation. For example, with

regard to Dr. Goldensen, Plaintiff has not stated any specific allegations other than that

he referred him to a specialist for a consultation. This does not state a claim for a

constitutional violation. Plaintiff must specifically identify what each named Defendant

did or did not do in order to state a claim. As such, Plaintiff will be granted leave to

amend to allege specifics regarding any claims he has against each individually named

and municipal defendant.

 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff must establish legal liability of each person

for the claimed violation of his rights. Liability may be imposed on an individual

defendant under section 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately

caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628,

634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A

person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act

which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff

complains. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633; see, e.g., Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442

(9th Cir. 1995) (prison official's failure to intervene to prevent 8th Amendment violation

may be basis for liability). Sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice; the plaintiff

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must instead "set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant's" deprivation of

protected rights. Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. Plaintiff has failed to name or allege factual

allegations that state a claim against the following Defendants: San Francisco County

Jail, Sheriff Hennessey, Jail Medical Services and Dr. Goldensen.

With regard to the supervisory employees named, Plaintiff should be mindful that

a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only upon a showing of (1) personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). A supervisor

therefore generally “is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed

to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under no

circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under § 1983, that is, liability solely

because one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Id. Plaintiff has not

set forth a claim against these Defendants. 

With regard to the named municipal Defendants, Plaintiff has also failed to state a

claim. Local governments are "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep't of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, a city or county may not be held vicariously

liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat

superior, see Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436

U.S. at 691; Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995). To impose

municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must

show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate

indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving

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force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of

Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). In this case, Plaintiff has not properly

alleged liability on the part of the municipal Defendants.

In addition, while Plaintiff has not specifically named anyone as a defendant with

regard to the allegations, Plaintiff may also be attempting to state a claim of excessive

force. It is unclear from the complaint whether Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee or a

sentenced prisoner. The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the

Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). However, the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post-arraignment pretrial

detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. See Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39

(1979)); cf. Pierce v. Multnomah County, Oregon, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.

1996)(Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard applies to allegations of use of

excessive force against pre-arraignment detainee). If Plaintiff wishes to state a claim for

excessive force, he must identify as defendants those against whom he wishes to state a

claim and provide a clear and plain statement of the basis for their liability for the use of

excessive force, as set forth above. As such, Plaintiff will be provided with thirty days in

which to amend to correct the deficiencies in his complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown,

1. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, as indicated

above. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of this

order in which he asserts factual allegations against all Defendants named therein. The

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amendment must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the

words “COURT ORDERED AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. Failure to

amend within the designated time will result in the Court proceeding only on the claim

regarding deliberate indifference to medical needs against Defendant Taylor.

2. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. "[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint

which are not alleged in the amended complaint." London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644

F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981). Defendants not named in an amended complaint are no

longer defendants. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

506 U.S. 915 (1992). 

3. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 31, 2006

 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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