Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01513/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01513-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ALLIANCE 

OF PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT 

WORKS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-01513-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case was closed on May 15, 2015, after the Court determined that the action

was moot. ECF No. 51. On June 4, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration 

based on newly discovered evidence. ECF No. 53. The Court granted that Motion for 

the limited purpose of obtaining further briefing as to an argument Plaintiffs had raised 

for the first time in their Reply brief to that Motion. ECF No. 61. For the following 

reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is now DENIED.

///

///

///

///

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BACKGROUND

The Southern California Alliance of Publically Owned Treatment Works (“SCAP”) 

and the Central Valley Clean Water Association (“CVCWA”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are 

organizations whose members treat and recycle wastewater. Pursuant to the Clean 

Water Act, Plaintiffs’ members must obtain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 

System (“NPDES”) permits in order to release treated water into the environment. 

These permits are issued by the California Regional Water Quality Control Boards, the 

State Water Resources Control Board (“State Water Board”), and sometimes the United 

States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). However, it is the EPA that 

promulgates formal test methods for determining whether discharged water is deemed 

“toxic.” The permits contain monitoring requirements that “must be conducted according 

to test procedures approved under 40 CFR part 136.” 40 CFR 122.41(j)(4). The 

formally approved test procedures include the whole effluent toxicity (“WET”) test 

methods, which measure the biological effects (survival, growth and/or reproduction) on 

aquatic organisms exposed to environmental samples. 

In 2002, the EPA ratified a number of biological WET test methods to be 

applicable for use in the NPDES program.1 67 Fed. Reg. 69,952, Nov. 19, 2002. As 

part of this modification, EPA added a section to each method’s test review manual that 

included recommended statistical methodologies for analyzing WET test biological data. 

The WET test manuals recommend, but do not require, select statistical analyses to be 

applied to WET test results.

2 AR002357.3

In 2010, EPA published a guidance document (“2010 Guidance”) regarding a new 

 1 “Beyond assessing WET data for the NPDES Program, WET tests are used to assess toxicity of 

receiving water . . . and stormwater samples.” AR001841.

2 Plaintiffs dispute this fact and argue that only “formally promulgated statistical method[s]” can be 

used. Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 57, at 4:6 (citing to the four specified statistical methods for hypothesis testing 

identified in the 2002 rule). 

3 All citations to the Administrative Record in this Memorandum and Order will be denoted in this 

format and refer to the record filed with the Court on October 15, 2014. See ECF No. 22. 

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method of analyzing WET test data for the NPDES program—the Test of Significant 

Toxicity (“TST”). Pursuant to 40 CFR 136, all WET test methods must be conducted 

using five concentrations and a control.4 However, it is possible to conduct the TST 

statistical approach using only two concentrations: the effluent at the critical 

concentration and a control. If the effluent and the control differ by an unacceptable 

amount (the amount that would have a measured detrimental effect on the ability of 

aquatic organisms to thrive and survive), then the effluent sample is declared toxic. 

In May 2013, the Deputy Regional Administrator of EPA’s Region 9 sent a 

memorandum to EPA headquarters asking for clarification of the minimum number of 

test concentrations required to appropriately utilize the TST approach. AR000030-32. 

In response, a headquarters representative stated that the two-concentration design was 

not acceptable as the promulgated WET methods require “a control plus five effluent 

concentrations under the methods’ test acceptability criteria.” AR000028.5 The 

response went on to state, however, that use of the two-concentration TST approach

could be accomplished by use of the Alternate Test Procedure (“ATP“) process laid out 

in 40 CFR parts 136.4 and 136.5. AR000028-29. 

An ATP request can either be nationwide (40 CFR 136.4) or for limited use 

(40 CFR 136.5). While nationwide requests must be approved by the National 

Coordinator, a limited use request can be approved by the EPA’s Regional ATP

Coordinator, who has the discretion to restrict the use of the ATP to a specific facility or 

“to all discharger[s] or facilities (and their associated laboratories) specified in the 

approval for the Region.” 40 CFR 136.5.

On February 12, 2014, the State Water Board asked the Regional ATP

Coordinator to approve the two-concentration TST as an ATP for all of California. In 

 4 Part 136.7 requires that “a permittee/laboratory shall use suitable [quality assurance and quality 

control] procedures when conducting compliance analyses . . . .” The promulgated 2002 Methods state 

that toxicity tests generally have “a minimum of five effluent concentrations.” AR002679, Section 2.2.2.

5 The Court notes that this exchange mimicked an informal email chain between Region 9 and 

EPA headquarters that took place in 2012. See AR000040-43.

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error, the request referred to 40 CFR 136.4, despite the fact that the request did not ask 

for the approval of a nationwide ATP. On March 17, 2014, the EPA approved the twoconcentration TST test design as a limited use ATP for NPDES permits issued in 

California, finding that the two-concentration TST approach was an acceptable 

equivalent to the five-concentration test evaluated using NOEC-LOEC6 hypothesis 

testing. 

On June 25, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this action alleging that Defendants EPA and 

Jared Blumenfeld, as the Regional Administrator of EPA Region 9, (collectively 

“Defendants”) violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, and 

regulations implementing the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376.7 Specifically, 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants illegally and improperly approved the State Water 

Board’s request to use a newly formulated methodology as an ATP. Plaintiffs filed this 

action in order to overturn the ATP approval and to obtain a permanent injunction 

preventing the EPA from “mandating the use of the two-concentration TST or use of 

analytical results obtained using this non-promulgated method for NPDES compliance 

determination or other Clean Water Act purposes.” First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF 

No. 15, Prayer for Relief ¶ E. Concurrent with the filing of their original complaint,

Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order from the Court, which was later denied 

due to delay. Because there was no restraining order in place, NPDES permits 

containing the two-concentration TST test were issued while the parties litigated this 

case. 

On February 11, 2015—just before Defendants’ Reply to its Cross-Motion for 

Summary Judgment was due—the EPA withdrew its ATP approval of the two-

///

 6 Traditionally, when hypothesis tests are used to analyze toxicity test data, the results of the test 

are given in two endpoints, the No-Observed-Effect-Concentration (NOEC) and the Lowest-ObservedEffect-Concentration (LOEC). AR002356. 

7 Alexis Strauss has since been substituted in for Mr. Blumenfeld as the Acting Regional 

Administrator. ECF No. 91. 

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concentration TST testing method “effective immediately.”

8 McNaughton Decl., Ex. A, 

ECF No. 40-1, at 4. Defendants acknowledged that the withdrawal “arose because of 

this litigation.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 40, at 9:7. Because of this withdrawal, the Court 

determined the case to be moot on May 15, 2015. 

The Court found that it was “highly unlikely that this exact situation will occur 

again in the future.” The Court also reasoned that any future case about the issuance of 

an ATP to approve the two-concentration TST approach would be based on a new 

record. ECF No. 51 at 4. Additionally, the Court stated the allegedly wrongful behavior 

could not reasonably be expected to reoccur because “[t]he EPA can/not initiate the ATP 

process . . . . [a]nd there is no indication that the State Water Board will submit another 

ATP request to the EPA to use the two-concentration TST test method for all of 

California.” Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Court determined that 

“[e]ven if the State Water Board were to submit a new ATP request for this exact testing 

procedure, any decision on that request would be the result of a new proceeding on a 

new record.” Id. at 5. Finally, with respect to the permits containing the twoconcentration TST approach that had been issued while the litigation was pending, the 

Court held that state court was the “appropriate venue to challenge the contents of an 

individual NPDES permit.” Id. at 7. 

On June 4, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration based on newly 

discovered evidence in the form of a State Water Board internal memorandum (“the 

Memo”) discussing the effect of the EPA’s withdrawal of the State Water Board’s ATP 

request on future NPDES permitting. ECF No. 53-2, Ex. A. The Memo states that “[t]he 

three reasons for withdrawal, as described in the rejection letter, are clearly identified as 

procedural errors” and that the withdrawal was not based on “the substantive TST 

statistical analysis or the scientific validity of a two-concentration test design.” Id. The 

Memo goes on to state that once the EPA makes changes to the ATP regulations 

 8 Due to the timing of EPA’s withdrawal, the Court allowed additional briefing on the issue of 

mootness. See ECF No. 44. 

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through a proposed rulemaking, the State Water Board “will resubmit the ATP request in 

the proper format.” Id. The Memo provides a table showing that the five-concentration 

test design must be used for effluent testing but that the two-concentration method can 

be used for storm water and receiving water as those water sources are not subject to 

the same five-concentration test requirements found in 40 CFR 136.3.9 The Memo 

concludes by stating:

With the withdrawal of the two-concentration test design 

approval, an NPDES permit can still require the TST for 

statistical analyses, but only the biological responses from 

the permitted Instream Waste Concentration (IWC) and the 

control (effluent concentration of zero) are utilized.

Id.

In between the filing of this Motion and the filing of the Reply, Plaintiffs acquired 

more documentation from a previous Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request.10 

Pls.’ RJN, ECF No 58. Plaintiffs argued that these documents showed that the “EPA has 

demonstrated a clear pattern and practice of utilizing, and encouraging the State to 

utilize, the 2010 guidance documents to set chronic toxicity permit limits and monitoring 

requirements.” Pls.’ Reply at 3. Accordingly, Plaintiffs urged the Court to retain 

jurisdiction over this case, and to determine whether the EPA can do so without formally 

promulgating the TST approach as a recommended WET test statistical analysis 

approach, like those listed in the 2002 rule. The TST approach had only been discussed 

in the 2010 Guidance, and while the EPA was in the process of updating 40 C.F.R. 136, 

the proposed rule did not contain a reference to the TST approach. See Clean Water 

Act Methods Update Rule for the Analysis of Effluent; Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 

 9 This is because the methods manuals for receiving water and storm water recommended a twoconcentration experimental design. 

10 The documents include: recently issued permits that contain the TST statistical analysis 

(Exhibits A and C); a letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the FOIA request (Exhibit B); an email chain 

between EPA Region 9 staff members about the withdrawal of the ATP approval (Exhibit D); three orders 

requiring use of the TST (Exhibits E, I and J); two email chains regarding how the TST approach should be 

utilized in NPDES permits (Exhibits F and G); a PowerPoint presentation about the TST approach (Exhibit 

H); and a permit quality review from the State of Hawaii (Exhibit K); and a permit fact sheet for the Guam 

Waterworks Authority (Exhibit L). 

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8956 (Feb. 19, 2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-02-

19/pdf/2015-02841.pdf). 

Based on this newly raised argument, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Reconsideration for the limited purpose of permitting simultaneous further briefing on the 

impact of the evidence Plaintiff had identified on the issues raised in this case. In that 

Order, however, the Court made clear that because the case “centered entirely around 

the ATP request and its approval. . . that issue was now moot” given the EPA’s 

withdrawal of the approval.11 ECF No. 61 at 10. It nonetheless went on to conclude that 

Plaintiff’s new argument, “that the TST is not an approved Part 136 method that can be 

utilized in NPDES permits, and cannot be lawfully approved as an ATP,” was not fully 

briefed and it permitted the parties the opportunity to do so. Id. 

The Court has since received those simultaneous briefs, additional further briefing 

and an amicus brief. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, Plaintiffs’ Motion is now 

DENIED on the merits. 

STANDARD

A motion for reconsideration is properly brought pursuant to either Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59(e) or Rule 60(b).12 Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 

1989). Under Rule 59(e), three grounds may justify reconsideration: (1) an intervening 

change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct 

clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma 

GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In addition, Rule 60(b) provides:

///

 11 The Court’s initial decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is incorporated in its entirety 

here. ECF No. 61. 

12 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

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On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its 

legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 

discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could 

not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 

under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called 

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an 

opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 

been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an 

earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or 

applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any 

other reason that justifies relief.

Further, Local Rule 230(j) requires that a motion for reconsideration state “what 

new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were 

not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion,” and “why 

the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” E.D. Cal., 

Local Rule 230(j)(3)-(4).

It is a well-established maxim that a court should not revisit its own decisions 

unless extraordinary circumstances show that its prior decision was wrong. 

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988). Mere 

dissatisfaction with the court’s order, or belief that the court is wrong in its decision, is not 

grounds for relief. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 

(9th Cir. 1981); see Sheets v. Terhune, No. 1:08-cv-1056-SRB, 2010 WL 1287078, at *1 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2010) (holding that “[s]uch motions should not be used for the 

purpose of asking a court ‘to rethink what the court had already thought through—rightly 

or wrongly’”). Motions for reconsideration are therefore not intended to “give an unhappy 

litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.” Kilgore v. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-1792-

CKD, 2013 WL 5425313, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting Frito-Lay of P.R., Inc. 

v. Canas, 92 F.R.D. 384, 390 (D.P.R. 1981)). A motion for reconsideration should not be 

used to raise arguments or present evidence that could have reasonably been raised or 

presented earlier. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880 (citing Kona Enters., Inc. v. 

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). In order to succeed, a party 

making a motion for reconsideration must “set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing 

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nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” Pritchen v. McEwen, 

No. 1:10-cv-02008-JLT HC, 2011 WL 2115647, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (citing 

Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Cal. 1986) aff’d in 

part, rev’d in part, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs bring this Motion for Reconsideration on the basis of the discovery of 

new evidence. Relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence is warranted 

when (1) the moving party provides “newly discovered evidence”; (2) the moving party 

demonstrates that prior due diligence could not have discovered this evidence; and 

(3) this new evidence likely would have changed the disposition of the case. Feature 

Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). This Court has 

already determined that Plaintiffs met the first two prongs. ECF No. 61. As such, the 

focus of this Order is whether Plaintiffs’ new evidence would “have been likely to change 

the disposition of the case.” Feature Realty, 331 F.3d at 1093. It would not. 

First and foremost, the documents uncovered post-judgment would have had no 

impact on Plaintiffs’ challenge to the ATP approval. While Plaintiffs complain that there 

is still a live controversy because permits are still being issued containing the twoconcentration TST approach, the Court already considered and rejected this argument 

when it ruled on the parties’ original motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 51 at 6; 

see also ECF No. 61 at 9-10 (reiterating that the TST approach, sometimes with a twoconcentration method, had been used in the past and would still possibly be used going 

forward even absent the ATP). The fact remains that permits are not being issued 

pursuant to the challenged ATP and that controversy is dead. 

In the face of that conclusion, Plaintiffs have now dramatically switched tactics

and argue that their case is not moot because “[a]t its core, Plaintiffs . . . fundamentally 

challenge the ability of the EPA to utilize guidance documents in the same way as a 

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promulgated rule . . . to regulate Plaintiffs’ members’ activities.” Pls.’ Further Brief, ECF 

No. 67, at 7. More specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the 2010 TST guidance 

documents are now being impermissibly used as a regulation. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiffs thus

seek “a judicial determination . . . stating that the 2010 TST guidance documents cannot 

be used as a rule unless and until subjected to notice and comment rulemaking 

procedures provided by the APA.” Id. at 9. The problem with this argument is that 

Plaintiffs did not plead such a claim in their First Amended Complaint.13 

Plaintiffs of course attempt to argue to the contrary, reasoning that “[b]ecause of a 

grave concern that [permits might still issue even if the ATP approval was withdrawn], 

Plaintiffs raised in their Complaint the issue of the 2010 TST guidance documents being 

used as a regulation before being properly incorporated into the applicable regulations.” 

Id. (citing FAC, ¶¶ 3, 22, 30, 31, 32 and 34). Plaintiffs would thus have the Court

conclude that “even outside of the issue of the approval of the ATP, Plaintiffs adequately 

pled the issue of the use of the TST guidance to set effluent limitations and monitoring 

requirements in . . . NPDES . . . permits.” Id. Not so. 

Throughout this entire case, through both complaints, through briefing on 

Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief, through briefing on the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment, and even most of the way through the original briefing 

on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, the only issue Plaintiffs raised was the EPA’s 

approval of the ATP. It was not until Plaintiff’s filed their Reply to their Motion for 

Reconsideration that they switched gears. Before then, Plaintiffs never argued that 

Defendants were impermissibly relying on guidance documents to justify decisions. 

Indeed, Plaintiffs gave the 2010 TST guidance documents barely a mention in the 

FAC. For example, while Plaintiffs do cite the documents in the “Legal Background” 

 13 “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the 

requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the 

claim rests.” Id. A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to 

plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. 

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section of their pleading, it is clearly by way of background only, to show that because 

Defendants could not rely on the guidance as a regulation, they concocted the 

challenged ATP strategy instead. Moreover, the guidance documents were not 

referenced at all in the “Factual Background” pertaining to the instant action, and all of 

the claims for relief focused only on ATP approval. There is simply no plausible reading 

of the FAC that supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs were challenging anything other 

than the EPA’s actions in approving the ATP. 

The parties’ course of conduct also makes clear that neither side believed 

Plaintiffs were challenging Defendants’ reliance on guidance documents as opposed to 

the ATP approval. Throughout extensive briefing on multiple issues, the guidance 

documents were never raised as a basis for Plaintiffs’ requested relief. Nor did Plaintiffs 

include any claim based on the guidance documents in the parties’ joint status report. 

See ECF No. 18. 

This makes sense because throughout this case, the permits were being issued 

pursuant to the ATP. There was no reason to challenge the EPA’s reliance on the 

guidance documents because those documents were not being used to justify issuing 

permits. Indeed, even if Plaintiffs had wanted to raise such a challenge in their FAC, any 

such claim would have been speculative and unripe at the time. 

Because Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a claim challenging Defendants’ 

reliance on the 2010 TST guidance documents, they cannot pursue that claim now. It 

was simply too late to pursue a new claim once summary judgment had been granted 

and the parties had reached the tail end of briefing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Reconsideration. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1080

(9th Cir 2008) (“[O[ur precedents make clear that where, as here, the complaint does not 

include the necessary factual allegations to state a claim, raising such claim in a 

summary judgment motion is insufficient to present the claim to the district court.”).

14 

 14 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs never properly moved for leave to amend the FAC to add a 

proper claim and mentioned only in various footnotes that, if the Court found its pleading lacking, leave to 

amend should be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). 

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The Court’s order granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was thus proper 

and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.15 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (ECF 

No. 53) and Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 75) are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 22, 2016

 

15 Defendants’ related Motion to Strike (ECF No. 75) is DENIED as moot. Plaintiffs’ requests for 

judicial notice, on the other hand, are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court considered that 

evidence that went to support Plaintiffs’ argument that its ATP approval challenge was not moot. The 

Court did not consider evidence offered in support of Plaintiffs’ unpleaded guidance document claim. 

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