Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05756/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05756-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEE EDWARD HUGHES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

JAMES A. YATES, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:04-cv-05756-AWI-DLB-HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 22)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO

ENTER JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On December 13, 2005, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and

Recommendations that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DENIED and the Clerk of Court enter judgment for Respondent. These

Findings and Recommendations were served on all parties and

contained notice that any objections were to be filed within thirty

(30) days from the date of service of that order. On January 3,

2006, plaintiff filed objections to the Findings and

Recommendations. On January 11, 2006, Respondent filed a reply to

Petitioner's objections. 

//

Case 1:04-cv-05756-AWI-DLB Document 25 Filed 07/31/06 Page 1 of 6
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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de novo review of the case. 

Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court concludes that

the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations are supported

by the record and proper analysis.

In the objections, Petitioner disputes the Magistrate Judge's

use of the harmless error analysis to resolve many of Petitioner's

claims. Unlike other forms of review, habeas review generally

calls for examining the trial record as a whole for signs of the

requisite prejudice or error before reversing a conviction. See

e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (violation of

Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination and Sixth

Amendment right to confront witnesses subject to harmless error

analysis); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (elements of

prosecutorial misconduct claim include showing of prejudice);

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (ineffective

assistance of counsel claims requires prejudice); Evanchyk v.

Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2003) (jury instruction error

subject to harmless error analysis). 

Under the harmless error analysis, a habeas petitioner is only

entitled to relief if a trial error “had substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). Further, the court may

not grant a habeas petition if the state court erred in concluding

that any errors were harmless; rather, habeas relief is appropriate

only is the state court harmless error analysis was done in an

“objectively unreasonable” manner. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S.

12, 17-18 (2003). Here, several witnesses identified Petitioner

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as the robber for both the March 12, 1994 and March 13, 1994

robberies. For the reasons discussed in more detail by the

Magistrate Judge, this court agrees that any errors were harmless

and did not result in prejudice to Petitioner. 

One issue deserves further discussion. Petitioner alleges

that the prosecutor allowed the use of false testimony. Detective

Prudhomme testified that he received a radio broadcast regarding a

vehicle that had fled the scene of the March 13, 1994 robbery, and

the vehicle Petitioner was driving matched that description. No

evidence in the record corroborates the fact that the radio

broadcast included a description of the vehicle leaving the March

13, 1994 robbery. In fact, the prosecutor's statements at the

pretrial hearing, the police reports, and the witnesses' testimony

imply that none of the witnesses to the March 13, 1994 robbery gave

a vehicle description. (The witnesses to the March 12, 1994

robbery had given a vehicle description.) Despite this absence of

corroborating evidence, the record is less than clear on whether

Detective Prudhomme in fact testified falsely and whether the

prosecutor knew the testimony was false. As admitted by

Respondent, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to resolve

whether the testimony was false and whether the prosecutor knew it

was false. However, even assuming the testimony was false and the

prosecutor knew it was false, habeas corpus relief is still not

available.

Courts have long recognized the special role played by the

American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials. 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). The prosecuting

attorney's interest in a particular case is not necessarily to win

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the case, but to do justice, and a prosecutor has a duty to assure

that the defendant has a fair and impartial trial. Hayes v. Brown,

399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005); Commonwealth of The Northern

Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir.1992)

(citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by George v.

Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). The government

may not use false evidence to obtain a criminal conviction. Napue

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Hayes, 399 F.3d at 978. In

addition, the government may not allow false evidence to go

uncorrected even though the government did not specifically solicit

the false evidence. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 978. "[I]f it is

established that the government knowingly permitted the

introduction of false testimony reversal is virtually automatic." 

Hayes, 399 F.3d at 978 (citations omitted).

In this habeas petition, Petitioner argues that because the

prosecutor allowed Detective Prudhomme to testify falsely, the

court must automatically reverse Petitioner's conviction. At a

minimum, Petitioner contends in the objections that an evidentiary

hearing is warranted. Contrary to Petitioner's assumption,

reversal based on a prosecutor's knowledge of false testimony is

not automatic. Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 745 (9th Cir. 2006). 

A conviction will be reversed on habeas corpus review if "two

conditions are met: First, the prosecution knowingly presented

false evidence or testimony at trial; and, second, it was material,

that is, there is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence

or testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." 

Morris, 447 F.3d at 743. While Petitioner is technically correct

that there is no harmless error analysis when a prosecutor allows

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the admission of false testimony, the court must still find the

error was material. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984. Unlike the harmless

error analysis, the test for materiality is whether, despite the

false evidence, the Petitioner received a fair trial, which means a

trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Morris, 447

F.3d at 745; Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984. 

In this case, even if the jury had been informed that

Detective Prudhomme's testimony regarding receiving a radio

broadcast describing the vehicle that fled robbery was false and it

should be disregarded, or even if there had been a new trial at

which Detective Prudhomme was not allowed to testify about such a

broadcast, the court finds that the outcome of the trial would have

been the same. The jury convicted Petitioner because they believed

the witnesses when they testified Petitioner was the robber. 

Petitioner's conviction did not hinge on Petitioner's car matching

the description of the car the fled the March 13, 1994 robbery. 

In fact, why Detective Prudhomme pulled over Petitioner's car had

little to no baring on whether Petitioner committed the robberies. 

Thus, assuming for the purposes of this habeas corpus petition that

Detective Prudhomme did testify falsely and the prosecutor knew of

his error, the court cannot find the false testimony was material. 

The court finds Petitioner received a fair trial and the verdict is

worthy of confidence. 

With this additional analysis concerning the alleged false

testimony, the court adopts the Findings and Recommendations. The

objections present no basis to not adopt the Findings and

Recommendations.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations, filed December 13,

2005, are ADOPTED IN FULL;

2. The insufficiency of the evidence claim is DISMISSED from

this action for failure to exhaust;

3. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED; and,

4. The Clerk of Court enter judgment for Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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