Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01254/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01254-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Ci!"ruir 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT AUG 2 9 1990 

MARY L. PANETTA~ ROBERT J. PANETTA, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

TUMBLING RIVER RANCH INC., a Colorado 

corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1254 

(D.C. No. 87-M-1787) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

A£ter examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs-appellants Mary and Robert Panetta appeal from an 

order of the district court grant ing summary judgment in favor of 

defendant-appellee Tumbling River Ranch Inc. (ranch). Plaintiffs 

brought suit alleging Mary Panetta was injured while a guest at 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the l aw of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. lOth Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1254 Document: 01019384667 Date Filed: 08/29/1990 Page: 1 
the ranch due to defendant's negligent failure to maintain the 

premises in a safe manner. Jurisdiction in the district court was 

premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Plaintiffs, Florida residents, were guests at the ranch in 

September, 1986. While there, Mary Panetta requested and received 

permission to use the laundry facilities. The washer and dryer 

were located on an upper level approximately four or five steps 

above the main floor. While using the dryer, ~ry Panetta 

allegedly fell backwards down the steps causing the injuries 

giving rise to this lawsuit. 

Resolution of plaintiffs' claims requires application of 

Colorado's premises liability law. At the time the motion for 

summary judgment in this case was decided, Colorado's premises 

liability statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-115 (1987), governed 

these claims. The district court's memorandum and order granting 

summary judgment was based solely on the interpretation and 

application of this statute. While this appeal was pending, 

however, the Colorado Supreme Court issued Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 

P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989). In that decision, the court found section 

13-21-115 unconstitutional in violation of both state and federal 

equal protection provisions. Id. at 863. The court ordered 

reinstatement of pre-statute premises liability law. Id. 

Prior to enactment of section 13-21-115 in 1986, premises 

liability law in Colorado was governed by the principles set forth 

in Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo . 1971). 

That case abolished common law classifications and imposed a 

liability scheme unaffected by the status of the injured party on 

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Appellate Case: 89-1254 Document: 01019384667 Date Filed: 08/29/1990 Page: 2 
the property. Id. at 311. Section 13-21-115, on the other hand, 

sought to eradicate this 11 reasonable person 11 standard and was 

passed in direct response to problems which arose from the Mile 

High decision. Gallegos, 779 P. 2d at 861. Therefore, the 

Gallegos mandate to return to pre-1986 law constitutes a very 

substantial change in the law governing this case. 

On appeal, plaintiffs assert the case must be remanded for 

reconsideration in light of the Gallegos decision. We agree. In 

a diversity case such as this, "'we are obligated to overturn a 

trial court decision if an intervening decision of the 

highest court of a state changes the applicable law.'" Riley v. 

Brown & Root, Inc., 896 F.2d 474, 478 (lOth Cir. 1990)(quoting 

Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1262 

(lOth Cir. 1984)). "Although the district court attempted to 

apply the controlling state law when it entered its judgment, that 

judgment must be reversed on appellate review if in the meantime 

the state courts have adopted a different rule of law." Riley, 

896 F.2d at 478; see also Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 u.s. 232, 236 

(1944)(duty rests with the federal court to apply controlling 

state law in effect at time of ruling)(citing Vandenbark v. OwensIllinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941)). 

Accordingly, we VACATE the order of the United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado and REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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Appellate Case: 89-1254 Document: 01019384667 Date Filed: 08/29/1990 Page: 3