Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01358/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01358-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KOUA VANG, 

Petitioner, 

v.

TOM. L. CAREY, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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1:05-cv-01358 LJO TAG HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AS UNTIMELY (Doc. 1);

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On October 27, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (Doc.

1). On April 9, 2007, after conducting a preliminary review of the petition, the Court issued an

Order to Show Cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). (Doc. 7). On May 11, 2007, Petitioner filed an Application for Relief to Show

Cause, contending that, as a layperson, he was unaware that any time limits existed regarding

these habeas proceedings. (Doc. 8, p. 1). Petitioner also contends that the recent United States

Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), was “not available to

the petitioner at the time of his own case pending [sic].” (Id.). 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a

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petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook,

260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001). The Ninth Circuit held that a district court may dismiss sua

sponte a habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the

petitioner adequate notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. Herbst, 260

F.3d at 1041-42 (indicating that once a petitioner is given adequate notice and opportunity to

respond to allegations that his petition is subject to dismissal pursuant to AEDPA's statute of

limitations, petitioner has the burden of providing an adequate response). 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499-5000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“justice and judicial

economy are better served by applying the Act to cases filed after the enactment date”), overruled

on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320. The instant petition was filed on October

27, 2005; thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

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(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Here, Petitioner asserts that he was convicted on July 11, 2000, and that he did not file a

direct appeal. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4). Petitioner’s conviction became final on the date when the time

for filing an appeal expired. Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575-77 (3d Cir. 1999); see

also, United States v. Wilson, 256 F.3d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 2001). In California, a conviction

becomes final sixty days after the superior court proceedings have concluded. Cal. Rules of

Court, rule 31(d); Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2001). In this case,

the sixty-day period expired, and Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 9, 2000, i.e.,

sixty days after his conviction. Thereafter, Petitioner would have one year, or until September 9,

2001, within which to file his federal petition. The instant petition was filed on October 27,

2005, or more than four years after the one-year AEDPA period had expired. Thus, unless

Petitioner has been “saved” by either statutory or equitable tolling under the AEDPA, his petition

is untimely and should be dismissed. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period.

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (the Court held that a

petitioner is normally entitled to one “full round” of collateral review in state court without

federal interference. While the “full round” is properly in progress, the AEDPA’s one-year

statute is tolled.). Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) cert. denied by Welch v.

Carey, 541 U.S. 1078 (2004). 

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition includes several attachments, which reflect that

Petitioner commenced a “round” of state habeas proceedings on April 27, 2005 in the

San Joaquin County Superior Court, and concluded when the California Supreme Court denied

his habeas petition on August 31, 2005. (Doc. 1, pp. 14, 20). Thus, he would be entitled to

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statutory tolling for a period of 126 days. However, that still leaves over three and one-half years

un-tolled. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling for that entire period of time, the

petition is untimely under the AEDPA.

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128

F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct.

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998); abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau,

538 U.S. 202, 205-06 (2003) (noting that “[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases,

as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s

control make it impossible to file a petition on time”). “[W]hen external forces, rather than a

petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). In order to win equitable

tolling, a prisoner must demonstrate that “extraordinary circumstances beyond [his] control”

made it “impossible to file a petition on time.” (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288. In Allen v. Lewis,

255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the petitioner “must show

that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the but-for and proximate cause of his untimeliness.” 

The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this rule in Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026

(9th Cir. 2005). In that case, the Court pointed out that the determination vis-a-vis equitable

tolling is “highly fact-dependent” and that the petitioner “bears the burden of showing that

equitable tolling is appropriate.” Id.

The instant petition claims that under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Blakely, Petitioner is entitled to request a modification of sentence to comply with the Supreme

Court’s opinion in that case. (Docs. 1, 2). In his response to the Order to Show Cause, Petitioner

suggests that because Blakely was decided after his own case became final, he is entitled to

equitable tolling. (Doc. 8). Applying this logic, it appears that Petitioner does not believe he

could have raised this claim prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely, and thus,

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implicitly, he believes he is entitled to equitable tolling up to the date of the Blakely decision that

would make his petition timely. Petitioner’s assumption is incorrect for several reasons. 

First, Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004, but Petitioner did not file the instant petition

until October 27, 2005, approximately sixteen months after Blakely. Thus, even were Petitioner

entitled to equitable tolling up to June 24, 2004, his petition would still be untimely. 

 Second, the underlying claim in Blakely, i.e., that the Sixth Amendment bars any

sentence exceeding the statutory maximum that is based upon facts not pleaded and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt and not submitted to a jury for its determination, was known and

understood well before Blakely was decided. In Blakely, the Supreme Court applied Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to invalidate a Washington state sentence that was more than

three years above the statutory maximum and was supported by facts determined by the trial

court and not a jury. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-06. Similarly, a year later, in United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) the Supreme Court once again reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi:

“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the

maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be

admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 125 S.Ct. at

756, citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488-90. 

Thus, although Petitioner implicitly suggests that his claim derives from a “new” basis for

relief established by Blakely, his challenge is in fact ultimately based on the earlier holding in

Apprendi, and Apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law. Apprendi was decided on June

26, 2000, prior to Petitioner’s conviction. In other words, Petitioner could have raised the

underlying constitutional claim set forth in Apprendi either in his direct appeal in state court or

on collateral review in state court, and such challenges would have been entitled to statutory

tolling under the AEDPA. Thereafter, Petitioner could have raised his claim in a timely federal

petition. That he did not do so until prompted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely, and

that he then waited an additional sixteen months to file his petition, does not excuse his

untimeliness nor does it demonstrate “but-for” causation for being untimely. 

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Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances beyond his

control prevented him from timely filing his federal petition. Moreover, even were the petition to

somehow be deemed timely under the AEDPA, Petitioner’s attempt to raise a Blakely issue in

these habeas proceedings would be unavailing because neither Apprendi, see, Harris v. United

States, 536 U.S. 545, 581 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“No Court of Appeals, let alone this

Court, has held that Apprendi has retroactive effect.”); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282

F.3d 664, 671 (9th Cir.2002) (Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on initial collateral

review), nor Booker, see, Carrington v. U.S., 470 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); nor Blakely, see, Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025,

1038 (9th Cir. 2005), have been given retroactive application to cases on collateral review, such

as the instant case. 

 RECOMMENDATIONS

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition (Doc. 1), be

DISMISSED for violating the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of

Practice for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Within thirty

(30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed

within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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