Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00945/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00945-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON LEE NORRIS, Civil No. 07cv0945-J (POR)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS BE DENIED WITH

PREJUDICED

[Doc. No. 1]

v.

DEBRA DEXTER, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 23, 2007, Petitioner Brandon Lee Norris (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner alleges the following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (2) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel; (3) trial court errors; (4) prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) insufficiency

of evidence. (Petition at 6-10.)

After a thorough review of the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all

supporting documents, this Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED with prejudice

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego, Petitioner was

tried and convicted by a jury of first degree murder, based on the January 10, 2002, killing of

Petitioner’s wife, Lori Norris, pursuant to California Penal Code §§ 187(a) and 189. The jury

further determined that Petitioner personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon during the

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commission of the murder in violation of California Penal Code § 12022(b)(1). (Lodgment 1, vol. 2

at 218, 289.) The superior court sentenced Petitioner to serve an indeterminate term of 26 years to

life in state prison. (Id. at 289, 332.)

Petitioner appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal. He argued the trial court

erroneously admitted evidence of hearsay statements made by the victim, and that this error violated

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to confrontation. (Lodgment 3.) In a reasoned opinion

filed September 1, 2004, the California Court of Appeal found that Petitioner failed to preserve the

issue for review by failing to make a timely and specific objection to the hearsay evidence in the

trial court, and denied Petitioner any relief. (Lodgment 6.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, in which he raised the

same issue presented to the court of appeal. (Lodgment 7.) The California Supreme Court denied

his petition on November 17, 2004. (Lodgment 8.)

On December 2, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Superior Court. (Lodgment 9.) In a written order filed January 20, 2006, the superior court rejected

Petitioner’s claims. (Lodgment 10.)

On March 10, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 11.) On May 17, 2006, in a written order, the court of appeal denied

the petition. (Lodgment 12.)

On September 11, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment 13.) On April 11, 2007, the California Supreme Court summarily

denied the petition. (Lodgment 14.)

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion in People v.

Norris, No. SCD 164985, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 1, 2004). (Lodgment 6.) The Court presumes

these factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

A. Prosecution Evidence

Norris and his wife Lori were both in the Navy. They had a son, Dante, who was born in

1999. From March 2001 to October 2001, Lori was stationed in Maine and Norris was

stationed in San Diego. During this time period, Lori began an extra-marital affair with

another Navy sailor named Jeffrey Ocampo. In the spring of 2001, Norris had a six-week

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affair with a woman named Kay Smith. From July 2001 to October 2001, Norris also had a

friendship with another woman named Alexis Marosi. Marosi slept with Norris in his bed

many times, and they kissed and “cuddle[d]” together, but never had sex.

In September 2001, while Lori was on leave in San Diego, she and Norris mutually agreed to

separate. The next month, however, Norris and Dante traveled to Galveston, Texas, where

Lori's ship was being commissioned. After this visit, Lori broke off her relationship with

Ocampo and Norris stopped seeing Marosi.

Lori's ship returned to San Diego in November 2001. Shortly afterward, Lori resumed her

affair with Ocampo. After Thanksgiving, Norris began having an affair with a coworker

named Brandi Kauffman. Norris told Kauffman that he and Lori were living together because

of their son, but that they led separate lives, and Lori was seeing somebody else. Two days

after Thanksgiving, Kauffman called Lori and confirmed that she was seeing somebody else.

According to Kauffman, her relationship with Norris continued until Lori's death. Kauffman

spent nights at Norris's apartment when Lori was gone. During this time period, Lori and

Norris decided to get a divorce.

On New Year's Eve, Lori told Norris that Ocampo was her boyfriend. Norris became upset.

On January 2, 2002, Norris came to Lori's ship while she was working. They argued and Lori

began crying. Norris left the ship.

On the evening of January 9, 2002, Lori went to a movie with Ocampo. Afterward, she

decided to spend the night at Ocampo's apartment. Sometime after midnight, Lori called

Norris to tell him that she would not be coming home that night, and that she would be home

in the morning to pick up her work uniform. The next morning, Lori asked Ocampo if she

could borrow some of his work clothing so that she would not have to return home. Ocampo

agreed. Lori left Ocampo's apartment around 6:15 a.m. Ocampo did not walk her out of the

apartment.

According to his cellular telephone records for the morning of January 10, 2002, Norris made

numerous attempts to reach Lori on her cellular telephone from 4:32 a.m. until 6:14 a.m. At

6:13 a.m., Norris called his employer and left a message saying that he had a flat tire and

would be late to work. Around 6:25 or 6:30 a.m., a witness observed Norris's car parked

behind Lori's car in a parking lot near Ocampo's apartment. Norris's car backed up, turned

into a parking stall, and then drove away. Lori's car remained parked in the same spot.

A few hours later, another witness noticed someone inside Lori's car. The witness called the

police. When the police arrived, they discovered Lori's dead body in the back seat of her car.

She was hanging from a cord that was wrapped twice around her neck and tied to the clothes

hook above the window. The cord had been ripped from a mesh storage pouch inside the

vehicle. Lori also had 230 puncture wounds to her head, neck, chest, and left hand and arm.

Some of the injuries were defensive wounds. The cause of death was multiple stab wounds

and hanging. Lori was still alive when she was hanged, but there was no sign that she

resisted the hanging.

Norris dropped Dante off at his daycare center between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m. that morning. He

usually dropped Dante off between 6:00 and 6:30 a.m. In the sign-in book, Norris wrote that

he had dropped Dante off at 6:30 a.m. Norris arrived at work between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m.

That night, Norris called his friend, Erica McGrath, and asked her to go to his apartment and

get rid of something in the dishwasher. She refused. The next day, the police recovered an

awl from Norris's dishwasher. The awl was part of a tool set, the rest of which was

discovered in the front passenger area of Norris's vehicle. The stab wounds could have been

inflicted by the awl.

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Ocampo had been in Lori's car two days before she was killed. He had not seen an awl in the

car. Lori had never talked to him about etching the dashboard of her car.

B. Defense Evidence

Norris testified in his own defense. He admitted that he had killed Lori by stabbing her with

the awl and strangling her with a cord.

According to Norris, he and Lori had agreed to separate in November 2001. They continued

living together and completed some paperwork for a divorce. However, Norris was “furious”

when Lori told him on New Year's Eve that the other person she had slept with was Ocampo.

Norris had met Ocampo in Texas and bought him a beer. He felt “disrespected” by Ocampo.

On January 4, 2001, after Dante told Norris that he had seen Lori and Ocampo kissing,

Norris confronted Lori at work on the ship. That night, Norris packed up all of Lori's

belongings in boxes. When she returned in the morning, he gave her some money and told

her to move out of the apartment. However, Lori convinced Norris to let her stay. They

decided to make one more attempt to reconcile, and they agreed to break off their other

relationships. According to Norris, he told Brandi Kauffman that he could not see her

anymore.

On January 9, 2002, Lori told Norris that she was going to the movies with Ocampo. Norris

was angry and suspicious, but Lori assured him that he had nothing to worry about because

they were going out only as friends. She said she would be home that night. Sometime after

midnight, however, Lori called Norris and said she would not be coming home.

Early the next morning, Norris repeatedly attempted to call Lori. He finally drove to

Ocampo's house, because he wanted to talk to Lori about their relationship. Dante was asleep

in Norris's car. On the way to Ocampo's house, Norris called work and left a message saying

that he had a flat tire and would be late.

As Norris approached Lori's parked car, he saw two people hug and kiss. When the woman

walked away and got into her car, Norris realized it was Lori. She started to drive away.

Norris pulled up behind Lori and flashed his headlights at her. She pulled over into the

parking lot and Norris got into her car. Lori asked him what he was doing there. He said he

just wanted to talk.

Norris and Lori started arguing and shouting. After they had finished arguing, they sat in the

car in silence. Norris reached over to hold Lori's hand. She pulled her hand back and slapped

him. Norris punched her, and Lori fought back.

Norris grabbed the awl from the cup holder of Lori's car near the gearshift. He had given the

awl to Lori about a week or a week and a half earlier, because she wanted to use it to etch her

name in her dashboard. Norris admitted stabbing Lori repeatedly with the awl, but he did not

realize he was doing it at the time. Lori fought back. At some point, they fell into the back

seat. Norris continued stabbing her. He remembered grabbing the rope in the back seat, but

could not recall wrapping it around Lori's neck or hanging her. Later that day, he realized

what he had done with the rope. When Norris left, Lori was in the back seat of the car,

bleeding and motionless. Norris ran to his car and drove away.

In closing argument, defense counsel argued that the killing was not premeditated, and that

Norris was guilty of either voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder, but not first

degree murder.

///

///

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As amended, the AEDPA now reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). 

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The threshold question is whether the rule of law

was clearly established at the time petitioner’s state court conviction became final. Williams v.

Taylor, 520 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 71 (2003). However, Ninth Circuit case law may be “persuasive authority for purposes of

determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme

Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established.’” Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000). Only after the clearly established federal law is

identified can the court determine whether the state court’s application of that law “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” that clearly established

federal law. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. 

A state court decision is “contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases” or “if the state court

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confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. “A

state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the

facts of the particular state prisoner’s case” or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal

principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to

extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at 407. Under Williams, an

application of federal law is unreasonable only if it is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). A

state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary

to” clearly established federal law. If a state court fails to provide a reasoning for its decision,

habeas review is not de novo, but requires an independent review of the record to assess whether the

state court erred in its application of controlling federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982

(9th Cir. 2000).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. Legal Standard

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective assistance of

counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Baylor v. Estelle, 94

F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that Strickland “has long been clearly established federal

law determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013

(9th Cir. 1997). A habeas petitioner must satisfy two requirements to demonstrate his assistance of

counsel was so defective that habeas relief is warranted. First, the petitioner must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “This requires showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

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defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, the petitioner must show counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. Id.

Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at

694; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Further, Strickland requires that

“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance ... be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Id. at 686-687. The Court need not address both the deficiency prong and

the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either one. Id. at 697.

2. Ground 1 - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, arguing that

counsel raised none of the issues Petitioner instructed him to raise. (Petition at 6; Traverse at 5.) 

Petitioner also claims that appellate counsel failed to raise any arguable issues. (Id.)

The standard for assessing the performance of trial and appellate counsel is the same. 

Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 920 (1993); Miller v.

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1989). With respect to claims of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, this means that a petitioner must demonstrate that he would have prevailed on

appeal absent counsel’s errors. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527, 535-36 (1986)).

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to Strickland’s

two-pronged test. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle,

792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 353-54, 102

L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988) (holding that where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the

assistance of appellate counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is

presumed; the implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is present but ineffective).

To prevail, a petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that appellate

counsel’s deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

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professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, a petitioner must establish that he

suffered prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 694. 

The presumption of reasonableness is even stronger for appellate counsel because he has

wider discretion than trial counsel in weeding out weaker issues; doing so is widely recognized as

one of the hallmarks of effective appellate assistance. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th

Cir. 1989). Appealing every arguable issue would do disservice to a petitioner because it would

draw an appellate judge’s attention away from stronger issues and reduce appellate counsel’s

credibility before the appellate court. Id. Appellate counsel has no constitutional duty to raise every

nonfrivolous issue requested by a petitioner. Id. at 1434 n.10 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,

751-54, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983)).

Here, Petitioner lists several issues he believes appellate counsel should have raised: (1) trial

court’s errors of practice and procedures; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3)

insufficiency of evidence. (Petition at 6.) However, Petitioner fails to demonstrate how appellate

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by not raising these issues

on appeal. Appellate counsel did not have a constitutional duty to raise these issues, in addition to

issues she did raise related to the admission of Ms. Norris’ hearsay statements. See Miller, 882 F.2d

at 1434. Appellate counsel would have done a disservice to Petitioner by raising every arguable

issue. See Id. Further, Petitioner fails to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

failure to raise these issues, he would have prevailed on appeal. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED based on this ground for relief

since Petitioner has not met his burden under Strickland.

3. Ground 2 - Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner argues his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated

when his trial counsel: (1) failed to object to hearsay testimony, (2) failed to ensure presentation of

probative evidence and expert testimony necessary to the defense, (3) failed to object to the

readback of hearsay testimony during jury deliberations, (4) failed to object to trial court’s denial of

the jury’s request to review evidence, and (5) failed to object to the instruction that the jury need not

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reach a unanimous verdict for guilt. (Petition at 7.) 

a. Hearsay Testimony

Petitioner claims that, during the in-limine hearing, hearsay testimony of Jeff Ocampo was

ruled inadmissable and hearsay testimony of Irish Kelly was ruled admissible only if accompanied

by a cautionary limiting instruction. (Traverse at 7.) Petitioner further claims that said testimonies

were then presented at trial with no accompanying cautionary instruction. (Id.)

Petitioner misrepresents the trial proceedings. During the in-limine hearing, the trial court

did rule inadmissable Ocampo’s testimony that Petitioner brought his brother to Galveston, Texas,

and that his brother had a gun. (Lodgment 2 at 47-48.) The trial court also ruled that Kelly’s

testimony that the victim had told her about controlling aspects of Petitioner’s behavior must be

accompanied by a cautionary limiting instruction, if presented at trial. (Lodgment 2 at 51, 54-55.) 

However, after a thorough review of the trial transcript, this Court finds that neither witness gave the

questioned testimony at trial. (Lodgment 2.) 

b. Not Presenting Expert Testimony

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to present an expert

witness to testify at trial. (Petition at 7.) Petitioner argues he needed an expert to support his

position that his “‘reason’ was obscured by passion, sending [him] into a ‘violent rage,’ upon the

instant provocatory [sic] act of being slapped in the face.” (Traverse at 19.) 

Petitioner fails to establish that trial counsel’s decision not to have an expert witness testify

rendered his performance deficient. Trial counsel’s representation of Petitioner appears reasonable

even without the use of an expert witness. Although trial counsel did not call an expert witness to

testify, he utilized the testimonies of Petitioner and Detective Ott to support Petitioner’s defense that

his actions were not premeditated and there was sufficient provocation to mitigate the murder charge

to either second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 4 at 688-715.) In

support of this defense, trial counsel primarily focused on Petitioner’s testimony. Petitioner testified

that (1) he drove to Ocampo’s apartment with his son, (2) at the time he decided to drive to

Ocampo’s apartment he intended to talk to his wife, (3) the thought of going to Ocampo’s apartment

to kill his wife did not enter his mind, and (4) he did not have the intent to harm his wife when he

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1

 A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.

Cal. Evidence Code s. 720(a). 

2

 CALJIC 17.48 states, in pertinent part, “you may write the court requesting that the reporter

readback [] relevant proceedings.” (Lodgment 1, Vol. 1 at134, 205.) 

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arrived at Ocampo’s apartment. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 4 at 602-3, 668-9.) 

In his closing argument, trial counsel emphasized Petitioner’s testimony and the fact that he

drove to Ocampo’s apartment with his son to illustrate his actions were not premeditated. 

(Lodgment 2, Vol. 4 at 688-715.) Additionally, trial counsel reminded the jury of Detective Ott’s

testimony regarding the letter “B” etched on the dashboard of Ms. Norris’ car, arguing that this

supported Petitioner’s testimony that the awl was already in his wife’s car and that he did not bring

it with him. (Id. at 506-10.)

Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Petitioner required an expert

witness. Petitioner does not contend he was entitled to an expert because trial counsel should have

asserted a defense of diminished capacity or insanity. Plaintiff does not argue, and there is no

evidence in the record, that he suffered from diminished capacity, insanity, or any other mental

illness such that an expert witness was necessary to Petitioner’s defense. There is no indication from

the record that the trier of fact required the testimony of a person with special knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education.1

 Based on trial counsel’s defense strategy, it does not appear that

an expert witness was necessary in this case. 

c. Readback of Testimony to Jury

Petitioner argues trial counsel failed to object when the trial court permitted a “customized”

readback of testimony during jury deliberations. (Petition at 7.) 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate trial counsel’s failure to object constituted deficient

performance since there is no indication in the record that the trial court “customized” the readback

of testimonies. In fact, the trial court took extra steps to explain CALJIC 17.482

 and noting it was

not going to “customize” readbacks of testimonies by explaining:

 “On a note on any requests that might come out of the jury for readbacks,

occasionally jurors will say ‘Well, I’d like to hear all the testimony – or we’d like

to hear all testimony that relates to this subject from one or two or three

witnesses.’ And we cannot do that for you because it would mean counsel and I

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are picking and choosing everything that may or may not apply to that issue, and

it’s just too dangerous. We might leave out something that’s crucial or include

things that shouldn’t have been included. And so we don’t want to stress anything

or leave anything out. 

We generally will reply to you, if you are requesting a readback, we will

offer the entire witness’s testimony as a readback rather than portions that might

be picked out. And then once the readback starts, it goes from the beginning of

that witness all the way to the end unless all 12 jurors are satisfied that they heard

enough. And the reporter can then stop reading in the middle.” 

(Lodgment 2, vol. 4 at 755-56.)

The record shows the jury requested readbacks of the testimonies of Irish Kelly and

Petitioner. (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 234, 240.) The trial court did not select portions of either

testimonies, but rather provided the jury with their entire testimonies and reiterated that the readback

may only be terminated upon the agreement of all twelve jurors. (Id. at 235, 345.) 

It appears that Petitioner is arguing his trial counsel failed to object to a situation that did not

arise. Based thereon, Petitioner cannot show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that

he was prejudiced. 

d. Denial of Evidence for Jury Review

Petitioner does not specifically state what evidence the jury requested to examine during

deliberations. However, it appears from the Court’s thorough review of the record there was one

instance when the trial court denied the jury’s request to “see the car (red saturn)” where Ms. Norris

was killed. (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 234-35.) The trial court explained its denial by stating “[t]he car

itself was not entered into evidence.” (Id.) 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate how trial counsel’s performance was deficient by not

objecting to the trial court’s denial of the jury’s request to view an item not entered into evidence. 

Additionally, Petitioner does not show how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object. Thus,

Petitioner fails to meet his burden under Strickland.

e. Unanimous Verdict Jury Instruction

Petitioner claims trial counsel should have objected when the jury was instructed it need not

reach a unanimous verdict to find guilt. (Petition at 7.) However, both the written jury instructions

and the trial court’s verbal jury instructions provided that a unanimous jury vote was necessary to

find Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder. (Lodgment 2 at 735; Lodgment 1 at 121.) 

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Given that Petitioner fails to even demonstrate that these issues were present at trial, he falls

short of his burden to show how trial counsel’s performance was deficient with regard to these

issues or how his defense was prejudiced. 

f. Conclusion

Based on the fact Petitioner fails to demonstrate trial counsel was ineffective as to each of his

claims in ground 2, this Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED based on this ground for

relief.

B. Procedural Default

Respondents argue grounds 3, 4, and 5 of the Petition are procedurally defaulted because

Petitioner failed to properly present those claims to the state courts. (Answer at 11-16.) 

A state procedural default arises from the “adequate and independent state law doctrine,”

which provides that the United States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review a judgment of a

state court which “rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). On direct

review of a state court judgment, the resolution of a federal claim would not affect a judgment which

rests on a state ground independent of the federal claim. Id. The Supreme Court would, in effect, be

issuing an advisory opinion on the federal claim, something the Court lacks jurisdiction to do. Id.

The adequate and independent doctrine has been extended to federal habeas actions. 

Although a federal habeas court does not review a judgment of a state court, it decides whether a

state prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. at 729-

30. When the “adequate and independent ground” for a state court’s rejection of a federal claim

involves a violation of state procedural requirements, a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted

his claim, and this Court cannot reach the merits of the federal claim. Id. To do so would allow a

habeas petitioner to avoid the limitation on direct review by the Supreme Court, avoid the habeas

exhaustion requirement, and undercut “the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes.” Id. at

730-32.

However, “a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct

or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case “‘clearly and

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3

 Petitioner fails to clearly state what testimony he is alleging constitutes hearsay statements of

the victim. In reading the Petition, there is no clear indication whose testimony contained hearsay

statements. Petitioner simply makes a broad statement that “hearsay testimony” was improperly ruled

admissible. (Petition at 8.) However, the Court’s reading of the Petition together with the Traverse

seems to indicate that Petitioner is alleging that the testimonies of Ocampo and Kelly contained

inadmissible hearsay statements. (Petition at 8; Traverse at 11.) 

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expressly’” states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

263 (1989) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985), quoting Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).). 

Because procedural default is an affirmative defense, the state must initially plead procedural

default. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). Once the state has asserted the

existence of an adequate and independent state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the

burden shifts to the petitioner who must place this defense at issue by “asserting specific factual

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority

demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule.” Id. at 586. If the petitioner meets his burden to

place the defense at issue, the ultimate burden to demonstrate the adequacy of a state procedural bar

is on the State. Id.

Finally, the Court may still reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner

can demonstrate (1) cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the claimed violation,

or (2) that the failure to review the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

1. Hearsay Testimony (Ground 3) and Prosecutorial Misconduct (Ground 4)

a. Procedural Default

Respondents assert that Petitioner failed to raise the following claims at trial, and is therefore

procedurally defaulted: (1) his claim in ground 3, that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay

testimony,3

 and (2) his claim in ground 4, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by offering into

evidence the hearsay testimony. (Answer at 11-14.) 

Here, the last reasoned state court decision on this issue clearly and expressly stated that

denial of the claim rested on a state procedural bar. (Lodgment 6 at 12.) The Ninth Circuit has

recognized and applied California’s contemporaneous objection rule, under which a defendant must

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make an objection at trial in order to preserve a claim on appeal, as grounds for denying a federal

habeas claim under the doctrine of procedural default. See Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953,

957-58 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Respondent has asserted that the state appellate court’s finding of waiver constitutes an

adequate and independent state bar, precluding federal habeas review. (Answer at 13.) Therefore,

the burden shifts to Petitioner to place this affirmative defense at issue. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586.

Petitioner, however, has not argued that the state procedural bar is inadequate or that it is

inconsistently applied. Instead Petitioner states “[a]s shown by lodgment no. 6 (Court of Appeal

Opinion) and no. 10 (Superior Court order denying petition) the petitions [sic] claims in grounds

three, four, and five, are “procedurally barred” from review.” (Traverse at 9.) Petitioner has cited

no authority and no factual allegations to rebut Respondent’s procedural default defense. Therefore,

Petitioner has not met his burden under Bennett. As a result, his claims in grounds 3 and 4 regarding

inadmissble hearsay statements and prosecutorial misconduct, respectively, are procedurally

defaulted. 

 Even though his claims are procedurally defaulted, Petitioner fails to demonstrate (1) cause

for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the claimed violation, or (2) that the failure to

review the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at

750. 

He asserts the ineffective assistance of trial counsel is the cause for the procedural default. 

(Traverse at 10.) In order to show counsel’s ineffectiveness was the cause, he must show that

counsel’s performance was professionally unreasonable and a reasonable probability that the

outcome would be different if the claims in question had been brought. Williamson v. Jones, 936

F.2d 1000, 1006 (8th Cir. 1991). Petitioner neither shows how trial counsel’s performance was

professionally unreasonable nor a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different if his

claims in grounds 3 and 4 had been brought. 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result absent

review of the claim by this Court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748; Vansickel, 166 F.3d at 957-58. 

Therefore, the Court is precluded from considering the merits of this claim. However, even

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 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that:

[C]ourts are empowered to, and in some cases should, reach the merits of habeas

petitions if they are, on their face and without regard to any facts that could be developed

below, clearly not meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar. See Lambrix v.

Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 [] (1997) (“We do not mean to suggest that the

procedural-bar issue must invariably be resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be.

It is wasteful of both our resources and that of the litigants to remand to the district court

a case in which that court improperly found a procedural bar, if the ultimate dismissal

of the petition is a foregone conclusion.”). Procedural bar issues are not infrequently

more complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense

in some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the same.

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002).

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if these claims were not procedurally barred, they lack merit.4

b. Merits

 i. Claim that Trial Court and Prosecutor Violated Cal. Evidence Code

One of Petitioner’s claims in ground 3 is that the trial court violated California Evidence

Code section 1250 by ruling hearsay testimony admissible. (Petition at 8.) His sole contention in

ground 4 that the prosecutor violated California Evidence Code by presenting hearsay testimony. 

(Petition at 9.)

Only certain claims are cognizable on federal habeas review, specifically those which allege

a violation of the petitioner’s federal constitutional rights. Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a),

sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (LexisNexis 2007). 

Federal habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in the interpretation or application

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

Here, Petitioner cannot seek federal habeas relief on the basis that the California Evidence

Code was violated by the trial court ruling hearsay testimony admissible and the prosecutor’s

presentation of hearsay testimony since federal habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in

the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED on these grounds for relief

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since Petitioner is precluded from bringing these claims on federal habeas review.

ii. Hearsay Statements Not Testimonial

In ground 3, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated Petitioner’s rights under the

confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it admitted

hearsay statements of the victim, Lori Norris. ((Petition at 8; Traverse at 11.) 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." In Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004), the Supreme Court held that this provision bars

"admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [s]he was

unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." In

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), the Court noted with respect to the Crawford decision:

A critical portion of this holding . . . is the phrase 'testimonial

statements.' Only statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a 'witness'

within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause." [Citation omitted.] It is the

testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that,

while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to

the Confrontation Clause.

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.

In Crawford, the Court discussed what constitute "testimonial statements:"

Testimony . . . is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the

purpose of establishing or proving some fact. [Internal quotations and citation

omitted.] An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers

bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an

acquaintance does not.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. In Davis, the court added that one testifies out of court when he or she

acts like a witness. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. In other words, the determinative question to ask is

whether the out of court statement is “a weaker substitute for live testimony at trial.” [Internal

quotations omitted.] Id.

While the contours of what constitutes “testimonial statements” under Supreme Court

precedent at this point have not been precisely demarcated, the statements by Ms. Norris to Ocampo

and Kelly are not testimonial statements. Ms. Norris was not acting “like a witness” when she

discussed her relationship with Petitioner with them. She was not attempting to establish or prove

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some fact, but was simply conversing with Ocampo and Kelly when she made her statements. Cf.

United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1012, 126 S. Ct.

1487, 164 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2006)(out of court statements from one co-conspirator to another not

"testimonial"). In light of Crawford and Davis, the court must reject petitioner’s Confrontation

Clause claim.

iii. Confrontation Clause Permits Hearsay Statements 

Even if Ms. Norris’ statements are deemed “testimonial,” the confrontation clause permitted

the use of her out-of-court statements. The confrontation clause ensures the reliability of the

testimony presented against a criminal defendant. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). 

The right to confrontation may be satisfied absent a face to face confrontation at trial when denial of

such right is necessary to further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is

otherwise assured. Id. at 850. The clause permits, for example, the admission of certain hearsay

statements despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant. Id. at 847-48.

The hearsay rules and the confrontation clause are generally designed to protect similar

values, but this does not mean that the confrontation clause is no more than a codification of the

hearsay rules and their exceptions. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970)(plurality

opinion)(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,

63 (1980). 

The confrontation clause permits the use of out-of-court statements when 1) the declarant is

unavailable and 2) the statement bears indicia of reliability. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; United States v.

Holland, 880 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1989). The reliability is inferred when the evidence falls

within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987);

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

A hearsay exception is firmly rooted 'if, in light of 'longstanding judicial and legislative

experience,' [citation], it 'rest[s] [on] such [a] solid foundatio[n] that admission of virtually any

evidence within [it] comports with the "substance of the constitutional protection.'" Lilly v. Virginia,

527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999). This standard is designed to allow the introduction of statements falling

within a category of hearsay whose conditions have proven over time 'to remove all temptation to

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falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath' and

cross-examination at trial. [Citation.]" Id. at 126. "[W]hether the statements fall within a firmly

rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes is a question of federal law." Id. at 125 .

If, as in Lilly, the proferred statement is inherently unreliable and falls outside a firmly rooted

hearsay exception, the prosecution must satisfy the second prong of the Roberts test in order to

introduce the statements. Id. at 131, 134.

The California Evidence Code section 1250 state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule is

firmly rooted in California's decisional and statutory law. See Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., 29B

West's Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll § 1250, pp. 280-281; People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d

177, 148 P.2d 627; see also People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 552, 257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770

P.2d 244 (Morales).) Included within this hearsay exception are statements offered to show the

declarant's intent to do a future act, such as draw others into a plot to rob a restaurant or to commit

murder. People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 518, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751, 905 P.2d 420

(Sanders); Morales, supra, at p. 552.)

Here, the declarant, Ms. Norris, is unavailable since she is deceased. Her statements to

Ocampo and Kelly bear indicia of reliability since her statements constitute hearsay statements that

fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Based thereon, the hearsay statements did not violate

the confrontation clause. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in ground

3 regarding hearsay statements be DENIED on this ground for relief.

2. Due Process Claims in Grounds 3and 5

In ground 3, Petitioner asserts his due process rights were violated when the trial court

excluded evidence requested by the jury to examine during deliberations, instructed “the jury that a

unanimous verdict is not necessary for a factual finding of guilt for the allegation of murder,” and

allowed “a partial read-back of transcript testimony, contrary to instruction forbidding such.” 

(Petition at 8.) In ground 5, Petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence to establish guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. (Petition at 9.) 

a. Procedural Default

Respondent argues these claims are procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to raise

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them on direct appeal. (Answer at 14-16.) Specifically, Respondent contends that a “defendant who

could have raised a claim on direct appeal but did not will be barred, under the Dixon bar, from

raising that claim on habeas corpus.” (Id. at 14.) According to Respondent, Petitioner has raised his

due process claims in grounds 3 and 5 in state habeas petitions presented to the California Superior

Court and the California Supreme Court. (Id. at 15.) The California Superior Court invoked the

Dixon5 rule when it refused to address those claims because they “could have been, but were not,

raised on timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.” (Answer at 15; Lodgment 10 at 4.) 

Respondent contends denial of these claims by the California Superior Court and the California

Supreme Court constitutes an adequate and independent state bar. (Answer at 13.) Therefore, the

burden shifts to Petitioner to place this affirmative defense at issue. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586.

As previously discussed, Petitioner has not argued that the state procedural bar is inadequate

or that it is inconsistently applied. Instead Petitioner states “[a]s shown by lodgment no. 6 (Court of

Appeal Opinion) and no. 10 (Superior Court order denying petition) the petitions [sic] claims in

grounds three, four, and five, are “procedurally barred” from review.” (Traverse at 9.) Petitioner

has cited no authority and no factual allegations to rebut Respondent’s procedural default defense. 

Therefore, Petitioner has not met his burden under Bennett. As a result, his due process claims in

grounds 3 and 5 are procedurally defaulted. 

 Petitioner fails to demonstrate (1) cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from

the claimed violation, or (2) that the failure to review the claim would result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

He asserts the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the cause for the procedural

default. (Traverse at 10.) However, Petitioner neither shows how appellate counsel’s performance

was professionally unreasonable nor a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different if

his claims in grounds 3 and 5 had been brought. See Williamson, 936 F.2d at1006.

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result absent

review of these claims by this Court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748; Vansickel, 166 F.3d at 957-58. 

The Court is, therefore, precluded from considering the merits of this claim. Even if these claims

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were not procedurally barred, they lack merit.

b. Merits

i. Ground 3 - Due Process Claim

In ground 3, Petitioner asserts his due process rights were violated when the trial court

denied evidence requested by the jury to examine during deliberations, instructed “the jury that a

unanimous verdict is not necessary for a factual finding of guilt for the allegation of murder,” and

allowed a partial readback of Petitioner’s trial testimony. (Petition at 8, Traverse at 11.) 

“Trial error ‘occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury’ and is amenable to

harmless-error analysis because it ‘may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of other

evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it had on the trial].’” Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991)). 

As previously noted, Petitioner does not clearly state what evidence the jury requested to

examine during deliberations. However, it appears from the Court’s thorough review of the record

there was one instance when the trial court denied the jury’s request to “see the car (red saturn)”

where Ms. Norris was killed. (Lodgment 1, Vol. 2 at 234-35.) The trial court explained its denial

by stating “[t]he car itself was not entered into evidence.” (Id.) Although Petitioner frames his

argument as a federal due process claim, he is essentially challenging the trial court’s error in

applying California’s evidence code and federal habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in

the interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

As to Petitioner’s claim that the jury was instructed that they need not reach a unanimous

verdict to find guilt, the Court’s review of the record shows the trial court never provided such

instructions. On the contrary, both the written jury instructions and the transcript of the verbal jury

instructions state the jury must agree unanimously whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and

if the jury finds him guilty, the jury must agree unanimously whether he is guilty of murder of the

first degree or murder of the second degree or voluntary manslaughter. (Lodgment 2 at 735;

Lodgment 1 at 121.) As such, Petitioner fails to demonstrate a due process violation when the error

he alleges does not appear to have even taken place.

Finally, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by providing the jury with partial

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readbacks of testimony when it previously instructed that partial readbacks would not be permitted. 

However, the record indicates that there was no instruction forbidding the partial readback of

testimonies. The jury was given CALJIC 17.48 which stated, in pertinent part, “you may write the

court requesting that the reporter readback [] relevant proceedings.” (Lodgment 1, Vol. 1 at134,

205.) When the trial judge read these instructions to the jury, the trial judge further explained:

 “On a note on any requests that might come out of the jury for readbacks,

occasionally jurors will say ‘Well, I’d like to hear all the testimony – or we’d like

to hear all testimony that relates to this subject from one or two or three

witnesses.’ And we cannot do that for you because it would mean counsel and I

are picking and choosing everything that may or may not apply to that issue, and

it’s just too dangerous. We might leave out something that’s crucial or include

things that shouldn’t have been included. And so we don’t want to stress anything

or leave anything out. 

We generally will reply to you, if you are requesting a readback, we will

offer the entire witness’s testimony as a readback rather than portions that might

be picked out. And then once the readback starts, it goes from the beginning of

that witness all the way to the end unless all 12 jurors are satisfied that they heard

enough. And the reporter can then stop reading in the middle.” 

(Lodgment 2, Vol. 4 at 755-56.)

It appears Petitioner misunderstood the trial court’s instructions. Here, the jury requested a

readback of Petitioner’s entire cross-examination. (Lodgment 1, vol. 2 at 240, 244.) The trial judge

even requested clarification that the jury only wanted the cross-examination and further offered

Petitioner’s direct and re-direct examinations. (Id. at 241.) Based on the agreement of all twelve

jurors, the trial judge provided the jury with Petitioner’s entire cross-examination. (Id. at 245.) As

such, the trial court did not select portions of Petitioner’s testimony. Thus, it appears the trial court

did not err by allowing a readback of Petitioner’s cross-examination since its actions comport with

the its jury instructions as relates to CALJIC 17.48. 

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED based

on this ground for relief.

ii. Ground 5 - Due Process Claim

In ground 5, Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty

of first degree murder. (Petition at 9.) 

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond

a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re

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Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction

does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, but rather determines whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335,

338 (9th Cir. 1992). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt may the writ be granted. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. The

“prosecution need not affirmatively ‘rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt’,” and the

reviewing federal court “faced with a record of historical facts that support conflicting inferences

must presume--even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record--that the trier of fact resolved

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Wright v. West,

505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).

The Court finds that sufficient evidence supports Petitioner’s conviction. The evidence in

the case included the Petitioner’s own testimony that (1) he became jealous when Ms. Norris called

to say she would not be coming home from Ocampo’s, and that he drove to Ocampo’s the next

morning and killed her; (2) he stabbed her with an awl and that afterwards he grabbed some rope

and tied it around her neck and hung her; (3) that after stabbing and hanging her, he left his wife in

the car and did not call 911, the ambulance, or anyone for help; (Lodgment 2, vol. 3 at 602-06, 609-

10, 613-14.) The medical examiner also testified that he counted 230 stab/puncture wounds on Ms.

Norris to the head, neck, chest, and left hand and arm. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 1 at 148-49.) Taking the

evidence in the light most favorable to obtaining a conviction, the Court finds sufficient evidence

supports the jury verdict that Petitioner was guilty of first degree murder, using a deadly weapon. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED based on this ground for

relief.

VI. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, this

Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and this action be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for

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Disposition of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, the Honorable Napoleon A. Jones, Jr., pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) (2007) and Local Rule 72.1(d).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that September 19, 2008, any party may file and serve written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. Martinez v. Y1st, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 18, 2008

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Napoleon A. Jones, Jr.

all parties

Case 3:07-cv-00945-J-POR Document 27 Filed 08/18/08 Page 23 of 23