Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03014/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

F !LED 

U{lited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 4 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

BEATRICE HINDS CARLAND, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-3014 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 88-1713-K) 

Alvin Pasternak (William J. Toppeta, New York, New York, with him 

on the briefs), New York, New York, for the Defendant-Appellant. 

Andrew L. Oswald, Martindell, Swearer, Cabbage, Ricksecker & 

Hertach, Hutchinson, Kansas, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACBA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District 

Judge.* 

TACBA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-3014 Document: 01019297905 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 

appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee 

Beatrice Carland in an action for wrongful denial of insurance 

proceeds. On appeal, Metropolitan Life argues the district court 

erred by finding: (1) the determination of beneficiaries under a 

life insurance policy is subject to de novo review, (2) the 

divorce decree intended Beatrice Carland to be the irrevocable and 

sole primary beneficiary of the entire proceeds of the group 

policy, and (3) payment of life insurance benefits according to 

the company's beneficiary designation forms fails to satisfy the 

plan administrator's obligation under ERISA. Metropolitan Life 

also argues the district court improperly considered the affidavit 

of J. Richards Hunter, Beatrice Carland's divorce attorney, in 

determining the intent of the parties to the divorce decree. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and affirm. 

I. FACTS 

Ralph Carland, an employee of Metropolitan Life, was a holder 

of a group life insurance policy, Metropolitan Group Policy No. 50 

G.L., certificate number 134181. The group policy is part of an 

employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employment 

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA or Act), 29 u.s.c. §§ 1001 

et ~ During Ralph Carland's marriage to Beatrice Carland, he 

designated her the primary beneficiary of this policy's proceeds. 

On September 4, 1964, Ralph and Beatrice Carland were 

divorced. At that time, Beatrice Carland was a homemaker and 

Ralph Carland was employed by Metropolitan Life as district 

manager of the Hutchinson, Kansas district office. Following the 

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divorce, Ralph Carland was employed in a supervisory position at 

the New York City office of Metropolitan Life. Sometime after 

divorcing Beatrice Carland, Ralph Carland married Olive Kohlmeyer 

Carland. 

Ralph and Beatrice Carland negotiated a property settlement 

agreement that was incorporated into a divorce decree entered by 

the Reno County District Court in Kansas. The decree provides in 

pertinent part: 

The court further finds that the parties hereto 

have entered into an agreement which contains the mutual 

covenants of the parties hereto with regard to that for 

which they would jointly ask the Court to decree 

regarding child custody and visitation, child support, 

alimony, property division and expenses. An executed 

copy of said agreement is attached hereto and made a 

part hereof. 

[I]n accordance with said agreement Defendant is ordered 

to pay the premiums on, and to make irrevocable 

designation of Plaintiff as the sole primary beneficiary 

under and of, the policies of insurance on the life of 

Defendant listed in Schedule "A" appended to the 

Settlement Agreement to which reference has been made 

herein. 

Schedule A of the property settlement agreement lists specific 

life insurance policies that Ralph Carland agreed to designate 

Beatrice Carland the sole primary beneficiary of and the face 

value of those policies: 

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SCHEDULE "A" 

Policies of Insurance on Life of Ralph C. Carland 

Policy No. 

17 083 285A 

22 127 306A 

21 300 423 

21 372 985 

Ctf. 134181 

Company 

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 

New York Life Ins. Co. 

New York Life Ins. Co. 

Metropolitan Group Ins. 

Face Amount 

$ 5,000.00 

10,000.00 

5,000.00 

5,000.00 

Current value, 

less 1000.00 

On February 15, 1974, Ralph Carland sent a letter to 

Metropolitan Life. The letter states: 

Please note that the attached schedule is from my 

divorce decree of September 4, 1964, Case 13926. The 

decree provides that my Group Life Insurance is 

designated to go to my divorced wife -- Beatrice Hinds 

Carland -- in the amount of the current value, less 

$1,000.00 as of the date of the decree. 

Therefore, I direct the Company to make the following 

Beneficiary designations: 

Primary beneficiaries: 

BEATRICE HINDS CARLAND -- divorced wife, $13,000.00 

(Current value, less $1,000 as of date of divorce, 

September 4, 1964) 

OLIVE KOHLMEYER CARLAND present wife, Group 

Insurance over and above $13,000.00 

Secondary Beneficiaries: 

RALPH C. CARLAND, JR. and CHRISTOPHER BRIEN CARLAND 

(Share and share alike or all to survivor) 

I further request that the beneficiary designation be 

effective as of the date of this memo of record. 

In March 1974, Ralph Carland completed two change of 

beneficiary forms for the group policy. One names Beatrice 

Carland primary beneficiary for $13,000 and Olive Carland primary 

beneficiary for the amount in excess of $13,000. The other form 

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designates Olive Carland sole primary beneficiary for all proceeds 

of the group policy. It is unclear which form was completed last. 

Ralph Carland died on April 9, 1987. Within three days, the 

Tulsa, Oklahoma office of Metropolitan Life received a letter from 

Beatrice Carland notifying the company of her claim to the policy 

proceeds. The letter enclosed a copy of the relevant portions of 

the decree. The Tulsa office sent Beatrice Carland claim application forms and requested a death certificate for Ralph Carland. 

While waiting for the death certificate to arrive, Beatrice 

Carland spoke with a Metropolitan Life employee in the company's 

office in Wichita who assured her she was sole primary beneficiary 

of the group policy. However, Beatrice Carland was informed later 

that the company intended to pay the proceeds to another 

individual. Although Beatrice Carland supplied company officials 

with documentation supporting her claim, Metropolitan Life paid 

Olive Carland the entire proceeds of the group policy. 

Metropolitan Life later informed Olive Carland of Beatrice 

Carland's claims to the proceeds of the group policy. Olive 

Carland agreed to resolve the issue of the conflicting beneficiary 

designation forms by returning $13,000 of the proceeds. 

Metropolitan Life then paid Beatrice Carland this amount plus 

interest. 

Beatrice Carland filed suit against Metropolitan Life in Reno 

County District Court for wrongful denial of insurance proceeds. 

Metropolitan Life removed the action to federal district court 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1441. The insurance company filed a 

motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing any obligation 

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under ERISA had been satisfied by payment of the proceeds to the 

beneficiaries of record. Beatrice Carland responded she stated a 

claim under ERISA and moved for summary judgment. The district 

court granted Beatrice Carland's motion for summary judgment. 

Carland~ Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 727 F. Supp. 592 (D. Kan. 

1989). 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

We review a summary judgment under the same standard a 

district court applies pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Osgood~ State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 

F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988). In determining whether a genuine 

issue of material fact remains, we view all facts and inferences 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burnette ~ 

Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 (lOth Cir. 1988). Summary 

judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The substantive law 

regarding a claim identifies which facts are material in a motion 

for summary judgment. Anderson~ Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 u.s. 

242, 248 (1986). 

Metropolitan Life contends we only should review a 

beneficiary determination for an abuse of discretion by the plan 

administrator. In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. ~ Bruch, 489 

u.s. 101, 115 (1989), the Supreme Court held a denial of benefits 

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challenged under ERISA is reviewed under a de novo standard unless 

the benefit plan gives the administrator discretionary authority 

to construe the terms of the plan. Here, the group policy does 

not grant Metropolitan Life such discretion. Rather, the plan 

requires the company to pay proceeds to the beneficiary of record. 

We find no reason to apply an abuse of discretion standard in this 

action. 

B. ERISA 

1. Preemption in General 

Both parties agree this case is governed by ERISA. The ERISA 

preemption clause provides in pertinent part: "[T]he provisions 

of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall 

supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 

hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . " 29 u.s.c. 

§ 1144(a). This clause establishes a broad area of exclusively 

federal concern preempting state law claims that "relate to" an 

employee benefit plan. See FMC Corp. ~ Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 

407 (1990). The Supreme Court has stated the preemption clause is 

"deliberately expansive" and should be given its "broad commonsense meaning." Pilot Life Ins. Co. Y..!.. Dedeaux, 481 u.s. 41, 46-

47 (1987) (citing Shaw~ Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 

(1983)); see also Settles Y..!.. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 

508 (lOth Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court also has held state 

common law tort and contract claims for improper processing of 

benefits claims are preempted by ERISA. Metropolitan Life Ins. 

Co.~ Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co.~ 

Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 45, 57 (1987). We therefore must determine 

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Appellate Case: 90-3014 Document: 01019297905 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 7 
whether Beatrice Carland's state law claim for wrongful denial of 

insurance proceeds is preempted and converts to a removable 

federal ERISA claim over which we may exercise jurisdiction. 

2. Conversion of State Law Claims 

In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court explained the 

relation between ERISA preemption and removal jurisdiction. The 

Court pointed out that federal preemption is ordinarily a defense 

to state law claims. Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63. As a 

defense, preemption will not appear on the face of a well-pleaded 

complaint and therefore will not authorize removal to federal 

court. Id.; see Gully~ First National Bank, 299 u.s. 109 

(1936). The Court noted where Congress has completely preempted a 

particular area of the law, however, any civil complaint raising a 

claim in that area is necessarily federal in character. 

Metropolitan Life, 481 u.s. at 63; see also, ~' Avco Corp. ~ 

Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists ~Aerospace Workers, 

390 U.S. 557 (1968) (claims preempted by section 301 of the LMRA 

are removable federal claims). A state law claim will convert to 

a federal claim only if the claim is preempted by ERISA and within 

the scope of ERISA'S civil enforcement provisions. Metropolitan 

Life, 481 U.S. at 64. 

The civil enforcement provision of ERISA states: "A civil 

action may be brought . . . by a . beneficiary . . . to 

recover benefits due ... under the terms of [the] plan." 

29 u.s.c. § 1132(a). A "beneficiary" is defined as "a person 

designated by a participant . . . who is or may become entitled to 

a benefit" under the plan. Id. § 1002(2)(B)(8). Beatrice Carland 

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is a beneficiary within the statutory definition because Ralph 

Carland designated her the sole primary beneficiary for the group 

policy during their marriage. As a designated beneficiary, she 

may be entitled to benefits under that policy. Additionally, 

Beatrice Carland's claim for wrongful denial of insurance proceeds 

from an ERISA welfare benefit plan clearly is "related to" that 

plan and, therefore, is preempted. Because Beatrice Carland's 

state claim to recover benefits under the group policy falls 

within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision and is 

preempted by ERISA, the claim against Metropolitan Life is 

converted to an ERISA claim over which we have removal 

jurisdiction. 

3. A Statutory Exception for Preemption of Divorce Decrees 

Metropolitan Life argues ERISA's preemptive powers should 

nullify any effect the state divorce decree has on the company's 

obligation to pay the policy proceeds. In determining whether 

ERISA preempts the divorce decree, we look to congressional 

intent, "whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the 

statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and 

purpose." Jones Y..!.. Rath Packing Co., 430 u.s. 519, 525 (1977) 

(quoted in Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. at 95). We begin with the 

statutory language, assuming the ordinary meaning of that language 

expresses Congress's intent. See Holliday, 111 S. Ct. at 407 

(citing Park~~ Inc. ~Dollar Park~~ Inc., 469 u.s. 

189, 194 (1985)). 

The statute defines "State law" subject to preemption to 

include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State 

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Appellate Case: 90-3014 Document: 01019297905 Date Filed: 06/04/1991 Page: 9 
action having the effect of law, of any State." 29 u.s.c. 

§ 1144(a). Although this language apparently would include claims 

based on divorce decrees issued by state courts, subsection (b)(7) 

explains the preemption clause "shall not apply to qualified 

domestic relations orders [QDROs] (within the meaning of section 

1056(d)(3)(B)(i) of this title)." Id. § 1144(b)(7). 

According to section 1056(d), a court order relating to 

spousal property rights is a QDRO if it "creates or recognizes the 

existence of an alternate payee's right to ... receive all or a 

portion of the benefits payable" under a plan. 

Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I). To qualify under the statute, a court 

order must include: (1) the name of the participant and the name 

and mailing address of an alternate payee covered by the order, 

(2) the amount or percentage of benefits payable to an alternate 

payee or a manner of determining the amount or percentage, (3) the 

number of payments or period affected by the order, and (4) the 

plan to which the order applies. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(II), (C). 

The statute also includes three general prohibitions for a QDRO. 

The order may not require a plan to provide: (1) any type of 

benefit or option not provided under the plan, (2) increased 

benefits, or (3) payment of benefits to an alternate payee 

required to be paid to another alternate payee under a previous 

QDRO. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(II), (D). 

Section 1056(d)(3), which lists the requirements for a QDRO, 

exempts qualifying domestic relations orders from the general 

anti-alienation requirement in section 1056(d) applicable to 

pension benefit plans. 29 u.s.c. § 1056(d)(3). Because the 

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reference in the preemption clause to section 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) 

does not restrict application of the statutory preemption 

exception to pension benefit plans, however, we interpret the 

exception to apply to all qualifying domestic relation orders 

whether they involve a pension or welfare benefit plan. Taken 

together, sections 1144(b)(7) and 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) of the statute 

exempt divorce decrees meeting the statutory requirements from 

ERISA preemption. The general goals of ERISA are served by this 

interpretation of the preemption exception because a divorce 

decree meeting the requirements contained in section 1056(d) 

provides all the necessary information to determine the identity 

of a beneficiary without creating unreasonable administrative 

burdens for the plan administrator. 

Here, the domestic relations order recognizes Beatrice 

Carland's right to receive policy benefits. The decree denotes 

the name of the participant, Ralph Carland, and the beneficiary, 

Beatrice Carland, and provides the names and address of her 

attorneys. Schedule A specifies that the decree affects the group 

policy, certificate number 134181. The schedule states Beatrice 

Carland should receive the "current value" of the policy, less one 

thousand dollars. Further references to Beatrice Carland as the 

"irrevocable" and "sole primary beneficiary" indicate her 

entitlement is based on the value of the group policy at the time 

of Ralph Carland's death. Because the divorce decree includes all 

the information required by the statute and does not involve any 

of the prohibitions, the divorce decree entitling Beatrice Carland 

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to the group policy proceeds, less one thousand dollars, is not 

preempted by ERISA. 

Metropolitan Life argues an issue of fact remains regarding 

the amount of benefits Beatrice Carland was intended to receive 

under the settlement agreement. Construction of the provisions of 

a settlement agreement, like any other question of contract 

construction, is a question of law. See Florom ~Elliott Mfg., 

867 F.2d 570, 575 (lOth Cir. 1989); Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. 

~Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., 519 F.2d 317, 320 (lOth Cir. 

1975). Only when ambiguity exists on the face of a contract is a 

question of fact presented. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. ~ 

Fernandez, 767 F.2d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1985). The presence of 

ambiguity in a contract term must be determined as a matter of 

law. Royal~ Inc.~ Jenkins Coffee Serv., Inc., 898 F.2d 

1514, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990); Fernandez, 767 F.2d at 1301. An 

ambiguous contract term is one "reasonably susceptible to more 

than one interpretation." Fabrica Italiana Lovorazione Materie 

Organiche, S.A.S. ~Kaiser Aluminum~ Chern. Corp., 684 F.2d 776, 

780 (11th Cir. 1982); ~Orkin Exterminating Co. ~FTC, 849 F.2d 

1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 u.s. 1041 (1989); 

see also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts §§ 3-14 (3d ed. 

1987) . 

Metropolitan Life concedes the company was under no 

obligation to pay the proceeds until Ralph Carland's death. 

Therefore, we reject as unreasonable the company's suggestion that 

Ralph Carland intended "current value" to signify some 

hypothetical value of the group policy at the time of divorce. 

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Likewise, we dismiss the possibility that Ralph Carland made an 

illusory promise by agreeing to designate Beatrice Carland the 

sole primary beneficiary of a policy he should have known, as an 

insurance man, had a zero value at the time of the divorce. In 

light of language describing Beatrice Carland as the "irrevocable" 

and "sole primary" beneficiary under the policies in Schedule A, 

the terms of the settlement agreement are not ambiguous. The term 

"current value" has only one meaning in this context -- the value 

of the policy at the time of Ralph Carland's death. Because our 

construction of "current value" is a legal determination not 

involving extrinsic evidence, the district court's consideration 

of the affidavit of Beatrice Carland's divorce attorney is 

immaterial. 

4. Metropolitan's Obligation Under ERISA and the Plan 

Metropolitan Life contends payment of life insurance benefits 

according to the company's beneficiary designation forms satisfies 

any affirmative duty imposed by ERISA or the plan. The fiduciary 

provision of ERISA provides: "[A] fiduciary shall discharge his 

duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the 

participants and beneficiaries and . • . in accordance with the 

documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such 

documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of 

[ERISA]." 29 u.s.c. § 1104. Section VII of the group policy 

states: "Upon receipt by the Insurance Company of satisfactory 

proof, in writing, that any Employee insured hereunder shall have 

died, the Insurance Company shall pay . . . to the Beneficiary of 

record of Employee, the amount of Life Insurance • • • in force 

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hereunder • . . " Further, section VI(D) of the policy requires 

the insured, Ralph Carland, and his employer, Metropolitan Life, 

to furnish "all information . which the [Metropolitan Life] 

Insurance Company may reasonably require . . . with regard to the 

happenings of any event . . . affecting or relating to the Life 

Insurance of any Employee." 

Ralph Carland apparently complied with his policy obligation 

by sending a copy of the divorce decree to Metropolitan Life when 

he attempted to change beneficiaries in March 1974. Metropolitan 

Life also received notice of Beatrice Carland's claim under the 

decree when she sent the letter in April 1987 to the Tulsa office 

and enclosed a copy of the relevant provisions and later sent the 

company a certified copy of the decree. Because Metropolitan Life 

received the divorce decree and was on notice, the company had a 

duty to consider that decree as part of "the record" in 

determining the beneficiary of record under this ERISA-governed 

plan. Metropolitan Life's duty to pay the appropriate 

beneficiary, taking into account the qualifying divorce decree, is 

part of the fiduciary responsibilities Congress referred to in 

section 1104 of the statute. See 29 u.s.c. § 1104. 

Metropolitan Life argues ERISA requires a plan administrator 

to look only at the plan documents to determine the beneficiary of 

a welfare benefit plan. In summarizing section 1104 as simply 

requiring fiduciaries to "discharge [their] duties with respect to 

a plan . • . in accordance with the documents and instruments 

governing the plan," Metropolitan Life fails to mention Congress 

included the phrase "insofar as the instruments are consistent 

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with the provisions of this subchapter or subchapter III of this 

chapter." See 29 u.s.c. § 1104(1)(0). Blindly paying the 

proceeds as specified in the insurance company's beneficiary 

designation forms would be inconsistent with the statutory 

preemption exception that recognizes the validity of domestic 

relations orders affecting beneficiary designations. See 29 

u.s.c. § 1056. Because a divorce decree satisfying the statutory 

requirements becomes part of the record when a plan receives 

notice, a plan administrator complying with ERISA must take that 

decree into account in making a beneficiary determination. 

Metropolitan Life cites a recent Sixth Circuit decision, 

McMillan~ Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990), as support 

for its decision to disregard the divorce decree in determining 

the beneficiary of record. Parrott involved the issue whether a 

broad waiver of "any and all claims" against the other spouse in a 

divorce decree nullifies an individual's pre-divorce designation 

of an ex-spouse as beneficiary. The court in Parrott held the 

designation of a beneficiary on file with the insurance company 

controls in determining what effect a divorce decree may have on a 

beneficiary designation. Id. at 312. 

Although the issues involved in the two cases differ, our 

holding resolves several concerns the Sixth Circuit raised in 

Parrott. One reason for the court's holding in Parrott was that 

the decree provided for a general waiver of claims and did not 

"specifically refer to the spouse's rights as beneficiary" in the 

ERISA plan. Id. ERISA requires specific information in a divorce 

decree for that decree to escape preemption and qualify as a 

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beneficiary designation for an ERISA-governed plan. Based on the 

statutory requirements in section 1056, a plan administrator can 

determine with certainty whether language in a divorce decree 

affects the payment of benefits. Similar to the Parrott decision, 

our holding allows plan administrators to rely on designations on 

file with the company. However, when a plan has notice of a 

divorce decree satisfying the requirements of section 

1056(d)(3)(B)(i), the administrator may not contravene Congress's 

intent by ignoring that decree in favor of other documents on 

file. We further agree with the Sixth Circuit that Congress 

intended ERISA plans to be "uniform in their interpretation and 

simple in their application" -- a goal that is well-served when 

all plan administrators honor divorce decrees meeting the 

statutory requirements. 

Metropolitan Life argues any duty beyond payment of proceeds 

to the individual listed on the most recent beneficiary 

designation forms imposes a burdensome obligation on plan 

administrators that conflicts with their fiduciary responsibility 

to preserve and protect the assets of the plan. However, ERISA 

already requires an administrator of a pension benefit plan to 

investigate the marital history of a participant and determine 

whether a domestic relations order exists that could affect the 

distribution of benefits. 29 u.s.c. § 1056; see Fox Valley, 897 

F.2d at 282. Our holding based on the statute and plan 

obligations only requires that administrators of welfare benefit 

plans also consider the marital history of a participant when 

paying benefits. Further, the statutory requirement a plan 

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administrator have notice of the beneficiary's name, address, and 

the amount or percentage of a particular benefit plan ensures the 

decree provides an administrator with information needed to 

process a claim efficiently so that assets are preserved and 

beneficiaries' interests are served. 

Metropolitan Life's conduct relating to Beatrice Carland 

disregarded the heart of the fiduciary provision requiring plan 

administrators to discharge their duties "solely in the interests 

of the participants and beneficiaries." Metropolitan Life 

effectively ignored the interests of a beneficiary by 

participating, knowingly or unknowingly, in Ralph Carland's 

attempt to avoid his legal obligation to Beatrice Carland under 

the divorce decree. Because Metropolitan Life has not shown any 

genuine dispute of material fact remains, we hold as a matter of 

law Beatrice Carland is entitled to the entire proceeds of the 

group policy, less one thousand dollars, as the divorce decree 

requires. We AFFIRM. 

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