Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02133/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02133-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN VILLEGAS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 03 CV 2133

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE THIRD-PARTY

COMPLAINT

vs.

ERIC HACKETT, an individual, and CITY

OF CALEXICO,

Defendants.

In this non-prisoner § 1983 action, Plaintiff Juan Villegas alleges several state and federal civil

rights claims against Eric Hackett and the City of Calexico. Defendants now move under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 14(a) for leave to file a third-party complaint seeking indemnification

from the County of Imperial (“the County”). The proposed third-party complaint (“TPC”) is attached

as an exhibit to Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff filed a timely opposition to which Defendants replied.

For the reasons set forth below, the court hereby DENIES the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the arrest of Villegas at his home in Calexico on December 3,

2002. The court fully set forth the undisputed facts in its January 24, 2005 order granting partial

summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on two of his claims. (See Docket no. 44 at 2-3.) That

statement of facts is incorporated herein.

Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 29, 2003. Defendants answered on December 5, 2003.

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The FRCP were amended on December 1, 2007. The amendments to Rule 14 made no

substantive changes. The amended text of the rule provides, in pertinent part, “A defending party

may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable

to it for all or part of the claim against it.” FRCP Rule 14(a)(1).

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In its January 24, 2005 order, the court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff on his state law

claim for false arrest (claim no. 4) and his federal claim for unreasonable seizure (claim no. 7). The

court also found that defendant Hackett was not entitled to qualified immunity. 

Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, and this court stayed the action pending appeal on

April 5, 2005. (Docket no. 73.) In a memorandum decision filed March 19, 2007, the Ninth Circuit

affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim and the finding that Hackett was not

entitled to qualified immunity. (Docket no. 89, Exh. 1.) The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the appeal

as to the state-law claim and remanded the case back to the district court. The remaining claims now

include three § 1983 claims against Hackett alone, and three state-law claims against both Hackett and

Calexico. The case is set for trial on February 19, 2008.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants move under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 14(a). They argue

that the County should indemnify them for any liability. They claim that, when Hackett arrested

Plaintiff, Hackett relied on “stale” and “erroneous” information from the County which “did not

support probable cause.” (Memo. of P. & A. in Supp. of Motion (“Motion”) at 3.) Because Hackett

relied on this “negligently obtained, negligently maintained, mistaken and erroneous information,”

Defendants claim entitlement to indemnification from the County.

Plaintiff opposes the motion on a number of grounds. The main theme of his argument is that

Defendants waited far too long to bring this complaint.

A. Legal Standards

Under FRCP Rule 14(a), a defendant seeking to file a third-party complaint more than ten days

after serving the original answer must obtain the court’s permission.1

 The crucial characteristic of a

Rule 14(a) claim is that the original defendant seeks to transfer some or all of its potential liability to

a third party. United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.

denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984). Thus, a defendant can only implead a third party where the defendant

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asserts a claim “derivatively based on the original plaintiff’s claim.” One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708

F.2d at 452. 

The court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to allow a third-party claim under

Rule 14(a). Southwest Adm’rs., Inc. v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing,

inter alia, One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d at 452). In making this determination, the court must

balance the benefits afforded by liberal third-party practice, including “‘the desire to avoid circuity

of actions and to obtain consistent results[,] against any prejudice that the plaintiff might suffer from

complications of the case.’” Irwin v. Mascott, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting

Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,

405 U.S. 1017 (1972)). The court should consider the following factors: “(1) prejudice to the original

plaintiff; (2) complication of issues at trial; (3) likelihood of trial delay; and (4) timeliness of the

motion to implead.” Irwin, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1056; see also Southwest Adm’rs, 791 F.2d at 777

(affirming denial of impleader application where impleader would “disadvantage the existing action”

by complicating and lengthening trial). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the TPC would cause him a great deal of prejudice due to Defendants’

delay in requesting to file the TPC. (Oppo. at 3-4.) He claims he would suffer prejudice because the

County would inevitably request and rightfully receive a continuance of the trial date, which he has

awaited for four years. He also argues that Defendants failed to offer a valid excuse for pursuing the

TPC nearly four years after Plaintiff’s original complaint, especially since Defendants allegedly knew

about the County officer’s role in the incident from the start of the case. 

Defendants claim that the TPC would cause no prejudice to Plaintiff or the County. (Motion

at 305.) They state that including the County would neither delay the trial nor make it more

protracted. They claim that the case does not involve complex facts, the discovery already conducted

will be available to the County, and the trial will already necessarily involve the facts relevant to the

County’s liability. They also claim that the County would not suffer prejudice because it has had

notice of the potential case against it since the May 25, 2004 deposition of Officer Duran. 

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the applicable authorities, and the pertinent factors

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Defendants suggest that the court has the option to bifurcate the trial under FRCP Rule 42(b)

“should the County challenge the pleading or take any action which reasonably delays the trial of this

case and if prejudice be found.” (Reply at 2.) This argument concedes that, if included, the County

may well take action that complicates and delays the trial. Because adding the County and then

bifurcating does not promote efficiency in resolving this case, the court rejects Defendants’ argument.

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to be weighed, the court denies the motion for leave to file the TPC. See Irwin, 94 F. Supp. 2d at

1056. The first factor, that of prejudice to the original plaintiff, weighs heavily in Plaintiff’s favor.

More than four years have passed since the inception of the case. Plaintiff already has received

summary judgment on two of his claims, upheld by the Ninth Circuit. This matter is nearly ready for

trial. A continuance of the trial at this point would only extend what has become an inordinate

passage of time between the filing of this action and trial. This court sees no justification for

memories of witnesses to further fade and justice to be delayed. Turning to the second factor,

complication of issues at trial, there is no question that, although the underlying factual matrix of the

case is relatively straightforward, folding into the equation the potential liability of the County would

complicate the case. Substantial evidence relating to the County’s generation and maintenance of

criminal information would be adduced as well as how information regarding Plaintiff’s brother was

maintained and ultimately utilized in this case. It is conceivable experts could be called on the

reasonableness of these issues. Moreover, it is foreseeable various immunities of the California Tort

Claims Act (Cal. Gov. Code § 800, et seq.) would be advanced by the County. In sum, Defendants’

argument that the case would not be complicated by bringing in the County at this juncture is an

attempt to hide an elephant in a mousehole. The second factor also weighs heavily in favor of

Plaintiff. The third factor, continuance of trial, is a certainty if the TPC is filed and all issues are tried

at one time. This factor also weighs in favor of Plaintiff. Finally, as to timeliness of the instant

motion, there is little doubt Defendants could have filed many months earlier and, conceivably, shortly

after the March 2007 affirmance by the Ninth Circuit.

In sum, a consideration of all relevant factors strongly counsels against a grant of Defendants’

motion. The court therefore denies leave to file the TPC.2

In so holding, the court expresses no opinion about the merits of the proposed indemnification

claim. While the parties’ briefs touched on the issue of viability, that issue is not now before the court.

Accordingly, the court does not decide the extent to which the California Tort Claims Act and its

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claim-presentation requirement applies to the proposed claim for indemnification from the County.

Nor does the court rule on the applicability of the two-year statute of limitations established in

California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1. (See Oppo. at 4-5; Reply at 3-6.)

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion for leave to file a

third-party complaint, without prejudice to any future claim for indemnification properly raised in a

separate state or federal action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 5, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

CC: All parties

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