Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02057/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appa:iln Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 2 2 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEBBIE A. COX, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

SANDIA CORPORATION, doing ) 

business as Sandia National ) 

Laboratories, a Delaware ) 

Corporation; R.G. BACA; and ) 

and R.L. WILDE, individually ) 

and in their official ) 

capacities, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 91-2057 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-367-M) 

Rudy Martin, Rudy Martin & Associates, P.A., Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, on the brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Robert M. St. John and Theresa w. Parrish, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, 

Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the brief for the 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-2057 Document: 01019726856 Date Filed: 08/22/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Debbie Cox appeals the district court's 

dismissal of her employment discrimination claim. Cox contends 

the district court abused its discretion by failing to find "good 

cause" or "excusable neglect" for her failure to timely serve 

process. We affirm. 1 

On April 17, 1990, Cox filed an employment discrimination 

claim in the district court. The deadline for service of process 

was August 18, 1990. Around the first of July of that year, Cox's 

counsel forwarded copies of the documents to be served to an 

individual who had previously served process for this counsel. 

Sometime in early September, the server informed counsel that due 

to an injury sustained in the first week in August, he had not 

been able to serve the documents and had sent them to the 

appropriate sheriff's departments for service. Because the 

documents were sent to the sheriff rather than Cox's counsel, Cox 

alleges she had no opportunity to timely request an extension of 

the filing deadline. The district court dismissed Cox's claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j). Cox filed a 

motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l) citing excusable 

neglect. The district court denied this motion. 

We review the district court's dismissal for untimely service 

for abuse of discretion. Putnam Y..!.. Morris, 833 F.2d 903, 904 

(10th Cir. 1987). The standard of review for a Rule 60 motion is 

the same. Greenwood Explorations, Ltd. Y...!.. Merit Oil~ Gas Corp., 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-2057 Document: 01019726856 Date Filed: 08/22/1991 Page: 2 
837 F.2d 423, 426 (10th Cir. 1988). A court abuses its discretion 

if its decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical." Pelican 

Prod. Corp. Y...!.. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j) requires the district 

court to dismiss a case in which process is not served within 120 

days of filing the complaint unless the plaintiff can show good 

cause for failure to serve within that period. The Rule does not 

define "good cause." The legislative history of the Rule cites a 

defendant's evasion of service as the sole example of "good 

cause." Wei Y...!.. Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 

1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4434, 4446 n.25). Although the 

standards for showing "good cause" under Rule 4 and "excusable 

neglect" under Rule 60 may not be identical, we do not find the 

outcome in this case affected by any distinction between these 

standards. 2 Cf. Putnam, 833 F.2d at 905; Winters Y...!.. Teledyne 

Movible Offshore, Inc., 776 F.2d 1304, 1306 (5th Cir. 1985). 

The courts that have considered this issue have regarded as 

insufficient excuses such as inadvertence and reliance on a 

process server who fails to perform. For example, in Wei, counsel 

inadvertently failed to calendar the service deadline and failed 

to timely effect service in an employment discrimination case. 

2 In their brief, appellees assert Cox cannot argue the 

excusable neglect standard because the district court had not 

ruled on Cox's Rule 60 motion before Cox appealed. The district 

court denied this motion July 12, 1991. We may assume 

jurisdiction over a prematurely filed appeal in which a final 

judgment has ultimately been rendered. See Lewis Y...!.. B.F. Goodrich 

Co., 850 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1988) (en bane). Cox's appeal was 

timely filed; only inclusion of the Rule 60 issue was premature. 

We consider the excusable neglect issue ripe for review but 

insignificant. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-2057 Document: 01019726856 Date Filed: 08/22/1991 Page: 3 
763 F.2d 370. The court held that to characterize inadvertence as 

good cause would allow an exception to swallow the rule. Id. at 

372. In Putnam, a hired process server unsuccessfully tried to 

serve a defendant at home every day. 833 F.2d at 905. However, 

the server did not leave a message at the defendant's home or try 

to contact the defendant by phone. Only after 123 days did he 

serve the defendant at the defendant's office. We upheld the 

district court's dismissal under Rule 4(j) because "it is trial 

counsel's responsibility to monitor the activity of the process 

server and to take reasonable steps to assure that a defendant is 

timely served." Id. In Braxton Y..!.. United States, 817 F.2d 238 

(3d Cir. 1987), counsel promptly secured a process server to 

effect process. Id. at 239. One-and-a-half months before the 

service deadline, counsel contacted the server to learn whether 

process had been served. The server informed counsel that process 

had not been served but it would be timely served. This assurance 

proved false, id., although no reason was given for the server's 

failure, id. at 242. The court held counsel's reliance on the 

server once counsel learned of the server's dilatory predilection 

was not good cause to excuse Rule 4's filing deadline. Id. 

As in Wei, Cox's counsel offers no valid excuse for allowing 

a significant portion of the time for service to run. As in 

Putnam and Braxton, Cox's counsel must assume responsibility for 

the failure of a hired process server to timely effect service. 

Although we note the distinctions in the instant case from Braxton 

in that Cox's counsel had no notice of the server's unreliability 

and here the server offered some excuse for his failure, we do not 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-2057 Document: 01019726856 Date Filed: 08/22/1991 Page: 4 
find the district court abused its discretion. We place no weight 

on these distinctions. The record does not show Cox's counsel to 

be any less dilatory than the server in Braxton. Had Cox's 

counsel promptly sent process to the server, he might well have 

avoided the instant problem. Rule 4 provides ample time to effect 

service. The district court refused to reward counsel with an 

excuse from the Rule's deadline for apparently wasting a majority 

of this period and then attempting to blame untimely service on an 

injured server. Although an injured foot suffered two weeks 

before the service deadline may make service more difficult, the 

district court's decision that this should not excuse service in 

the 120-day period is not "arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical." 

Cox's citation to Sanchez Y...!.. Board of Regents, 625 F.2d 521 

(5th Cir. 1980), to support her counsel's reliance on the server's 

past performance as being reasonable does not dissuade us from 

this conclusion. Sanchez dealt with the timeliness of filing a 

notice of appeal for a pro se prisoner. See Thompson Y...!.. 

Montgomery, 853 F.2d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing 

abrogation of Sanchez by Houston Y...!.. Lack, 108 s. Ct. 2379 (1988)). 

In Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit stated that although a notice of 

appeal is not filed when deposited in the mail, reliance on the 

normal delivery times of the postal service may be a basis for a 

court to find excusable neglect. Id. at 522 (citing Fallen Y...!.. 

United States, 378 U.S. 179 (1964) (prose prisoner case)); cf. 

Floyd Y.!.. United States, 900 F.2d 1045, 1047 (7th Cir. 1990) 

(attorney neglect coupled with substantial extenuating 

circumstances may support district court's finding of excusable 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-2057 Document: 01019726856 Date Filed: 08/22/1991 Page: 5 
neglect). The Sanchez decision does not refute the countervailing 

precedent upholding a district court's refusal to find attorney 

inadvertence and reliance on an unmonitored server constituted 

good cause or excusable neglect. 

As one commentator has observed: "The lesson to the federal 

plaintiff's lawyer is not to take any chances. Treat the 120 days 

with the respect reserved for a time bomb." Siegal, Practice 

Commentary Qil. Amendment of Federal Rule! (Eff. Feb. ~ 19B3) 

with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. BB, 109 

(19B3). It was not an abuse of discretion here to invoke this 

lesson. AFFIRMED. 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-2057 Document: 01019726856 Date Filed: 08/22/1991 Page: 6