Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01068/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01068-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

POLLARD & WHEELER PROPERTIES, 

LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RONALD E. CEARLEY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-1068 TLN AC (PS) 

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 According to defendant’s Notice of Removal, plaintiff Pollard & Wheeler Properties, 

LLC, commenced an unlawful detainer action against defendant in the San Joaquin County 

Superior Court (Manteca), on April 20, 2015. ECF No. 1 at 7-12 (summons and complaint). 

Defendant Cearley removed the unlawful detainer action to this court on May 18, 2015. ECF 

No. 1. He also requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. 

Defendant has submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing that he is 

unable to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, defendant’s request to 

proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii), when a party seeks to proceed in forma 

pauperis, the court shall dismiss the case “at any time,” if the court determines that the action is 

frivolous, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. If the court lacks jurisdiction 

Case 2:15-cv-01068-TLN-AC Document 4 Filed 05/26/15 Page 1 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

over the subject matter of the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the action is properly 

dismissed under the in forma pauperis statute. See Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (“As Cato's complaint neither identifies any constitutional or statutory right that was 

violated, nor asserts any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction or waiver of sovereign 

immunity, it was properly dismissed” under the in forma pauperis statute); Henshall v. Central 

Parking, Inc., 2008 WL 152195 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (same); Pergamensch v. Novato Police 

Dept., 2007 WL 80727 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 

the court hereby DISMISSES plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 

because as such, it is frivolous”). 

 Even apart from the authority granted by the in forma pauperis statute, this court must 

remand the action once it becomes apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447 (“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded”); California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 

F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[i]f the district court at any time 

determines that it lacks jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the improvident 

grant of removal by remanding the action to state court”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 974 (2005). 

 Here, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action. This court has 

jurisdiction over an action removed from state court only if the action could have been brought in 

this court initially under its original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (permitting removal of 

actions “of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction”); Caterpillar, 

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“[r]emoval is proper only if the court could have 

exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been filed in federal court”); Hawaii ex rel. 

Louie v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[t]he general removal 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), grants district courts jurisdiction over state court actions that 

originally could have been brought in federal court”). 

 Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, “jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as 

Case 2:15-cv-01068-TLN-AC Document 4 Filed 05/26/15 Page 2 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. The “presence or absence of federal-question 

jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal 

jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly 

pleaded complaint.” Id. 

 Attached to the Notice of Removal is a copy of the complaint and exhibits filed by 

plaintiff in the San Joaquin County Superior Court. ECF No. 1 at 9-18. The complaint contains a 

single claim for unlawful detainer. Id. at 9-12. It contains no claim within the original 

jurisdiction of this court, and evidences no other basis for federal jurisdiction. Defendant, in his 

Notice of Removal, does not expressly assert that there is a basis for federal jurisdiction over the 

unlawful detainer action. However, he does assert that (1) the action involves the same property 

that is in dispute in Cearley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2:15-cv-0353 MCE EFB (E.D. Cal.),1

 and 

(2) the unlawful detainer action was filed in violation of California’s civil and criminal laws, and 

unspecified “Federal Laws.” ECF No. 1 at 2. None of these assertions warrant the exercise of 

removal jurisdiction in this case. 

 Removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim 

raising a federal question, whether filed in state or federal court. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 

556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (“[n]or can federal jurisdiction rest upon an actual or anticipated 

counterclaim”); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2009) (federal 

jurisdiction cannot rest upon a federal defense to the state action); accord, Metro Ford Truck 

Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 1998) (federal question raised in thirdparty claim does not provide removal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999). 

 Moreover, there is no legal basis for predicating removal jurisdiction on the grounds that 

the state lawsuit involves property that is involved in another federal lawsuit. See Energy 

Management Services, LLC v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.3d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 2014) (“‘[t]hat a 

related case was pending in federal court [i]s not in itself sufficient grounds for removal under 28 

U.S.C. § 1441’”) (quoting Fabricius v. Freeman, 466 F.2d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 1972)); FNMA v. 

 

1

 Defendant has filed a motion in Cearley to consolidate that case with this one. See ECF No. 3. 

Case 2:15-cv-01068-TLN-AC Document 4 Filed 05/26/15 Page 3 of 4
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

Bridgeman, 2010 WL 5330499 at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Several courts have correctly rejected the 

premise that a state law claim may be removed to federal court on the basis of a related case in 

federal court”) (collecting cases). 

 In summary, the state court complaint indicates that the only cause of action is one for 

unlawful detainer, which arises solely under state law and not under federal law. Thus, this action 

does not arise under federal law, and no other grounds for federal jurisdiction are apparent. 

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), is GRANTED; and 

 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be remanded to the San Joaquin 

County Superior Court. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all 

parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: May 22, 2015 

Case 2:15-cv-01068-TLN-AC Document 4 Filed 05/26/15 Page 4 of 4