Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02250/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZACHERY DUFFY,

Plaintiff,

v

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT

et al,

Defendant.

 /

No C-02-2250 VRW

ORDER

After three years of delay, plaintiff attempted to serve

a summons and complaint on certain individual officers of the San

Francisco Police Department (SFPD) named as defendants in this

action. Those officers -- Michael Turkington, G Pak, Sergio Lopez,

Warren Lee, Latanya Briggs and Jose Guardado (collectively, the

“officers”) -- move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to FRCP

12(b)(5) for insufficiency of service of process. Doc #50. For

the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.

FRCP 4(e)(1) provides that “service upon an individual *

* * may be effected * * * pursuant to the law of the state in which

Case 3:02-cv-02250-VRW Document 60 Filed 04/29/05 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the district court is located.” California law (like federal law,

see FRCP 4(e)(2)) expresses a preference for personal service. But

plaintiff did not personally serve the officers; instead, he relied

on the provisions for substitute service found in Cal Code Civ Pro

§ 415.20(b) (erroneously cited as § 415.20(a) on the summonses):

If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot

with reasonable diligence be personally

delivered to the person to be served, as

specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or

416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a

copy of the summons and complaint at the

person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode,

usual place of business, or usual mailing

address other than a United States Postal

Service post office box, in the presence of a

competent member of the household or a person

apparently in charge of his or her office,

place of business, or usual mailing address

other than a United States Postal Service post

office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall

be informed of the contents thereof, and by

thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of

the complaint by first-class mail, postage

prepaid to the person to be served at the place

where a copy of the summons and complaint were

left. Service of a summons in this manner is

deemed complete on the 10th day after the

mailing.

There is no dispute that service was effected in the manner

described above, but the officers argue that plaintiff did not use

“reasonable diligence” in attempting to deliver the summons and

complaint personally to the officers. It is plaintiff’s burden to

demonstrate “reasonable diligence.” See Walker & Zanger (West

Coast) Ltd v Stone Design SA, 4 F Supp 2d 931, 934 (C D Cal 1997)

(citing Carimi v Royal Carribean Cruise Line, Inc, 959 F2d 1344,

1346 (5th Cir 1992)) (“Once the validity of service of process is

contested, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing its

validity.”).

How much diligence is “reasonable diligence”? California

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cases instruct that never once attempting personal service is not

reasonable diligence, see Burchett v City of Newport Beach, 33 Cal

App 4th 1472, 1477 (1995), while making three or four unsuccessful

attempts at personal service at a location where the defendant is

likely to be found does constitute reasonable diligence, see Bein v

Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc, 6 Cal App 4th, 1387, 1391-92 (1992);

Espindola v Nunez, 199 Cal App 3d 1389, 1392 (1988).

Despite this being the central issue presented by the

officers’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s declarations do not speak

with specificity to the efforts made at personal service. 

Plaintiff’s counsel, Stanley Hilton (“Hilton”), states that he was

told over the telephone that process servers generally are not

allowed to loiter at police stations waiting for officers. Hilton

Decl (Doc #54) ¶2. But this is merely research; it is not an

attempt at service. Next, Hilton states that “in February and

March 2005 I made efforts to serve the individual officers in this

case.” Id ¶3. But he does not state precisely when these attempts

were made, where he went, how many times he went and which of the

six officers he sought to serve. Finally, Hilton states that “in

March 2005 I also made other diligent efforts to try to personally

serve the individual police officers.” Id ¶4. This statement is

conclusory and discloses no facts about Hilton’s attempts at

service.

Moreover, Hilton’s claim of efforts at personal service

before mid-March is belied by the summons issuance history in this

case: It was not until March 14, 2005 -- four days before the

court-imposed service deadline -- that Hilton obtained summonses

issued by the clerk. Newdorf Decl (Doc #51) Ex B (summonses). The

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docket reflects that the March 14, 2005, summonses are the only

ones issued by this court. Thus Hilton he did not even possess a

summons to serve before March 14, 2005; he could not have made any

true attempt at personal service before March 14. (No summons was

issued originally in this case because it was removed from state

court.)

Plaintiff also offers the declaration of Hilton’s

paralegal, James Chaffee. Chaffee describes going to the SFPD’s

legal division, Chaffee Decl (Doc #56) ¶5, and then going to each

officer’s duty station to leave a copy of the summons and

complaint. While it appears that Chaffee effected proper

substitute service, it does not appear that he ever attempted

personal service.

In sum, the court finds no credible evidence that

plaintiff exercised any diligence (let alone reasonable diligence)

in attempting personal service before falling back on substitute

service. To the contrary, it appears that plaintiff gave up on

personal service rather easily. Locating and personally serving

police officers may be difficult, but this does not excuse

plaintiff from the diligence standard required by Cal Code Civ Pro

§ 415.20(b).

Plaintiff also argues that the officers should be

estopped from raising a defense of insufficiency of service because

the SFPD’s legal division told Hilton and Chaffee that substitute

service would be sufficient. Setting aside the foolhardiness of

relying on one’s adversary for legal advice, the estoppel argument

fails on the merits: The statements of one entity (the SFPD’s

legal division) cannot estop another (the officers, sued in their

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individual capacities), nor is it reasonable to rely on an

employer’s representation about what rights its employee will or

will not insist upon when sued in an individual capacity.

Moreover, plaintiff was on notice that substitute service

was contrary to standard SFPD procedure. In a June 22, 2004,

filing in connection with SFPD’s motion to dismiss, the officer in

charge of the SFPD legal division stated that “General Order 3.14

authorizes the Legal Division to accept service of summons and

complaint on behalf of [SFPD]. It does not authorize the Legal

Division to accept service on behalf of individual police officers. 

Under this order, individual officers ‘are entitled to be

personally served with a Summons and Complaint.’” Keohane Decl

(Doc #31) ¶¶3-4 (citation omitted). The pertinent regulation was

attached to the declaration. See id Ex A. Thus plaintiff was on

notice that, even for police officers, substitute service was

appropriate only after a reasonably diligent effort at personal

service was unsuccessful.

Finally, even if plaintiff had exercised the reasonable

diligence required by California law, the court would still dismiss

the case against the officers for a reason not even mentioned by

the parties: In its order of February 25, 2005, the court extended

the time for service under FRCP 4(m) through and including March

18, 2005. Doc #42. Summonses were left for the officers and

mailed to them on March 14, 2005, but Cal Code Civ Pro § 415.20(b)

provides that such substitute service “is deemed complete on the

10th day after the mailing” of the additional copy of the summons

and complaint. Consequently, service was not complete until after

March 18, 2004; even if service was sufficient under Rule 4(e), it

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was not timely under Rule 4(m). Rule 4(m) provides that in such a

situation, “the court, upon * * * its own initiative after notice

to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice.” 

Plaintiff was put on notice by the court’s February 25, 2005, order

of the service deadline and the consequences for not meeting it. 

Accordingly, a dismissal without prejudice is appropriate under

FRCP 4(m) as well as under FRCP 12(b)(5).

* * *

In sum, the officers’ motion to dismiss (Doc #50) is

GRANTED. The officers are DISMISSED without prejudice. The

hearing set for May 26, 2005, is VACATED. See Civ L R 7-1(b). The

parties shall appear for a case management conference on May 31,

2005, at 9:00 am to discuss a further discovery plan.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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