Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05152/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 17, 2004 Decided March 9, 2004

No. 03-5152

LAKES PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD AND

THOMAS J. RIDGE, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv01721)

Michael Roberts and Lawrence C. Friedman were on the

briefs of appellant.

Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence

and Sherrie Evans Harris, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on

the brief of appellees.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Lakes Pilots Association,

Inc. sued in district court claiming that the Coast Guard

misapplied the relevant formula in setting rate ceilings for

pilotage services. The district court granted in part and

denied in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. While accepting various Coast Guard positions, it

ruled for the pilots on three merits issues and remanded for

further proceedings consistent with its order. The pilots

appeal those aspects of the district court’s opinion that were

unfavorable to them (ripeness as to one issue, one substantive

merits decision, and a claim based on certain non-record

documents). Finding that we do not have jurisdiction to hear

this appeal, we dismiss.

* * *

The courts of appeals have jurisdiction to hear ‘‘appeals

from all final decisions of the district courts.’’ 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. ‘‘A remand order usually is not a final decision.’’

NAACP v. United States Sugar Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1436

(D.C. Cir. 1996). But the pilots invoke the collateral order

exception created by Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949). To qualify under that

doctrine the order being appealed must: ‘‘(i) conclusively

determine the disputed question; (ii) resolve an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and

(iii) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’’ Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480

U.S. 370, 375 (1987) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Under limited circumstances a remand order will qualify.

The third requirement—that the decision not be susceptible

of appeal from a final judgment—is met when ‘‘the agency to

which the case is remanded seeks to appeal and it would have

no opportunity to appeal after the proceedings on remand.’’

Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 330 (D.C.

USCA Case #03-5152 Document #808237 Filed: 03/09/2004 Page 2 of 3
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Cir. 1989); see also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. BellSouth Telecommunications Inc., 298 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th

Cir. 2002) (same). The principle is not normally available to

the agency’s adversary. This asymmetry may seem strange,

but it flows from an evenhanded application of the requirement that the error asserted not be remediable on appeal

from a final judgment. Here, for example, the pilots will still

be aggrieved by the outcome (assuming that the Coast Guard

doesn’t spontaneously change its position on the issues where

the district court rejected its claims) and thus will be able

again to seek judicial review, including review in the court of

appeals, raising not only new issues but all those on which it

got no satisfaction in its original challenge. Mall Properties,

Inc. v. Marsh, 841 F.2d 440, 443 (1st Cir. 1988). The Coast

Guard, by contrast, will have to follow on remand the standard declared by the district court, and will be able to get

appellate review only if another party seeks appellate relief,

Occidental Petroleum, 873 F.2d at 330, and then only under

some circumstances. See Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry,

27 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (describing use of pendant

appellate jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order that is

not yet subject to appeal but is ‘‘closely related’’ to an

appealable order); Freeman v. B & B Assocs., 790 F.2d 145,

151 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (appellate court will consider any argument by an appellee that supports the judgment of the

district court). The pilots mistakenly rely on Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1990), which is

simply a straightforward application of these concepts, allowing an agency to appeal from a district court remand order.

* * *

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

So ordered.

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