Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01568/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01568-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH M. MARSH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05CV1568 WQH (NLS)

ORDER RE: PRECLUSIVE EFFECT

OF PLAINTIFF’S CALIFORNIA

VICTIM’S COMPENSATION AND

GOVERNMENT CLAIMS BOARD

PROCEEDINGS

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, M.L.

MURPHY, M.D., DAVID L. CHADWICK,

M.D., ROGER WILLIAMS, M.D.,

CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL MEDICAL

CENTER and DOES 1 to 100, Inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Kenneth M. Marsh’s motion for summary judgment, or

in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication. (Doc. # 58). The Court heard oral argument

regarding the motion on Monday, November 13, 2006.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 9, 2005, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the present case, alleging a conspiracy to

deprive him of his civil rights. (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff asserted seven causes of action, including federal

civil rights, malicious prosecution, and Monell claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as California

state law claims for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, statutory civil

rights violations, and malicious prosecution against Defendants County of San Diego, Children’s

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Hospital Medical Center, Dr. M.L. Murphy, Dr. David Chadwick, and Dr. Roger Williams

(collectively, Defendants). On November 16, 2005, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint.

(Doc. # 5). On May 5, 2006, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, and denied the

motion in part. (Doc. # 45). The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim

and his state claims for false imprisonment and statutory civil rights violations. (Doc. # 45). The

Court did not dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment, malicious prosecution, and Monell

claims, and further did not dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, malicious prosecution, and claims under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 43 and 45. (Doc. # 45).

Defendants answered the Complaint in May, 2006. (Docs. # 47, 49). Each Defendant asserted

various affirmative defenses, including that Plaintiff was responsible for the damages he suffered

because Plaintiff caused the death of Phillip Buell. On September 26, 2006, Plaintiff moved for

summary judgment. (Doc. # 58).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 27, 1983, two-year old Phillip Buell died after sustaining injuries while in the care

of Plaintiff Kenneth M. Marsh (Plaintiff). Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 4 at 23. The

State of California charged Plaintiff with second-degree murder, and the case went to trial. 

Children’s Hospital and Dr. Chadwick’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex.

1 at 8. At the trial, Dr. Chadwick and other physicians testified that Phillip Buell died as a result of

non-accidental injury, and on November 28, 1983, a unanimous jury convicted Plaintiff of seconddegree murder for Phillip Buell’s death. Declaration of Dr. David Chadwick, ¶ 2; Children’s Hospital

and Dr. Chadwick’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 1 at 8. 

Plaintiff appealed his conviction, but did not prevail. Plaintiff’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 3. On

appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that Plaintiff’s conviction was “overwhelmingly

supported” by the evidence, and noted that “medical experts unanimously ruled out accidental death.”

Plaintiff petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, but the petition was denied.

Plaintiff petitioned for writ of habeas corpus a second time in 2003. After the filing of the

second Petition, the San Diego District Attorney sought the expert opinion of Dr. Samuel P. Guilino

regarding the cause of Phillip Buell’s death. Though Dr. Guilino was “concerned that the head injury

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which caused the death of Phillip Buell may have been the result of inflicted trauma,” he was

ultimately “unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt or to a reasonable degree of medical

certainty, that [Buell] was a victim of child abuse.” Marsh’s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 20 at

14. In light of that opinion and the entirety of the record, the San Diego District Attorney asked the

San Diego Superior Court to grant Plaintiff’s writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex.

21. On August 10, 2004, the San Diego Superior Court granted Plaintiff’s writ of habeas corpus and

set aside Plaintiff’s conviction. Children’s Hospital’s Opp’n, Ex. 3. On September 3, 2004, the

District Attorney moved to dismiss the case against Plaintiff on the grounds that reasonable doubt

existed, even though the State denied that Plaintiff was “factually innocent.” Children’s Hospital’s

Opp’n, Ex. 2. Children’s Hospital’s Opp’n, Ex. 2. The San Diego Superior Court granted the motion

to dismiss. Prior to his release, Plaintiff had been incarcerated for close to twenty-one years.

After the Superior Court dismissed the charges against him, Plaintiff filed a claim for damages

with the California Victim’s Compensation and Government Claims Board (Claims Board) pursuant

to California Penal Code § 4900. Plaintiff’s Mot. Summ. J., Exs. 22-25. In December, 2005, the

Claims Board held a hearing to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to monetary compensation

for wrongful incarceration. Plaintiff’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 23. At the hearing, Deputy State Attorney

General James Dutton (Dutton) represented the interests of the State of California.

At the commencement of the Claims Board hearing, Dutton represented the State of

California’s role as follows:

MR. DUTTON: Jim Dutton, Your Honor, from the Attorney General’s Office in an

advisory capacity having to do with Penal Code Section 4900 et seq.

Children’s Hospital’s Opp’n, Ex. 4 at 21 (Emphasis added.). Plaintiff’s attorney Donnie Cox (Cox)

also noted that,

[B]oth [Hearing Officer Hedum] and Mr. Dutton indicated that [Hearing Officer

Hedum] considered this to be a fact finding procedure, more than an adversarial

procedure, and I think Mr. Dutton agreed with us on that.

Children’s Hospital’s Opp’n, Ex. 4 at 22. The State did not call witnesses during the Claims Board

hearing, and noted the point on the record–“As you are aware, we will not be calling any witnesses,

we’ll just be respondent and cross-examining when appropriate some of the witnesses for the

claimant.” Children’s Hospital’s Opp’n, Ex. 4 at 10, 23. The State also failed to object to

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questionable evidence introduced by Marsh, such as Plaintiff’s witness Ted Armijo testifying that he

believed Marsh’s version of the events. Finally, the State did not oppose Plaintiff’s version

concerning Phillip Buell’s cause of death, did not oppose Plaintiff’s proposed legal conclusions, and

ultimately admitted that Plaintiff established his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.

Declaration of Colin H. Murray, ¶¶ 13-16, Children’s Hospital’s Opp’n, Ex. 7 at 77. 

Defendants, with the possible exception of the County of San Diego, were not given notice of

Plaintiff’s Claims Board proceedings. McCarthy Decl., ¶ 7; Murray Decl., ¶¶ 3-5; Declaration of

David L. Chadwick, ¶¶ 5-6. Nor were Defendants in the present case actual parties in Plaintiff’s

Claims Board proceedings. Declaration of Deborah A. McCarthy, ¶ 6; Murray Decl., ¶¶ 3-4. In fact,

none of the Defendants in the present case was given the opportunity to appear or participate in

Plaintiff’s Claims Board proceedings. McCarthy Decl., ¶¶ 6, 8; Murray Decl., ¶¶ 3-7. 

On January 4, 2006, Claims Board Hearing Officer Kyle Hedum entered his preliminary

findings and ruling with respect to Plaintiff’s § 4900 claims in the form of a “Proposed Decision.”

Plaintiff’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 23. Therein, Hedum ruled that:

After careful evaluation of all of the evidence, and with the concurrence of the AG, it

is determined that Marsh has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he did

not violate California Penal Code section 187 and that he did not, either intentionally

or negligently, contribute to his arrest or conviction for that offense. In addition, it is

determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Marsh suffered pecuniary loss due

to his erroneous conviction and subsequent imprisonment.

Plaintiff’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 23 at 11. On January 19, 2006, the Claims Board adopted Hedum’s

proposed decision as its Decision. Plaintiff’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 24. On January 25, 2006, a bill was

introduced in the State Senate which appropriated $756,000 to the Claims Board for payment to

Plaintiff as compensation for his wrongful imprisonment. Plaintiff’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment and summary adjudication are appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Avalos v. Baca, No. CV 05-07602 DDP (SHx), 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 58342 (C.D. Cal. August 7, 2006). A fact is material when, under the governing

substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

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242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may meet this burden in

two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an

element essential to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at

322-23. If the moving party fails to discharge this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied

and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398

U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary

judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also Anderson,

477 U.S. at 252. Rather, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(e)) (internal quotations omitted).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he district court may limit its review to the

documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those parts of the record specifically

referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.

2001). The court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “Credibility determinations [and] the weighing

of evidence . . . are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that he proved his innocence in the death of Phillip Buell by a preponderance

of the evidence by prevailing under § 4900 in the Claims Board proceedings. As a result, Plaintiff

contends that he is entitled to summary adjudication on the issue of his innocence under the principles

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of collateral estoppel (a.k.a.–issue preclusion).

Defendants highlight the relevance and importance of the issue of Plaintiff’s culpability in the

death of Phillip Buell, and argue that one of their primary defenses against Plaintiff’s federal and state

claims is that Plaintiff is culpable for the death of Phillip Buell, and that therefore, Defendants cannot

be liable for malicious prosecution and or conspiracy to wrongfully convict Plaintiff. Defendants

contend that Plaintiff’s Claims Board decision should not have preclusive effect in this case because

(a) the issue in the § 4900 proceedings was not identical to the issue here, (b) the issue of Plaintiff’s

innocence was not “actually litigated” in the Claims Board proceedings, and (c) Defendants were not

parties and were not virtually represented in the Claims Board proceedings.

A. Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues of fact or law that were litigated in a prior

proceeding. Robi v. The Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988). “In both offensive and

defensive use situations the party against whom estoppel [issue preclusion] is asserted has litigated

and lost in an earlier action.” Id. “Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the

dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same

party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane

Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).

“Assuming a full and fair opportunity to litigate, . . . federal courts must accord preclusive

effect to state court judgments,” as well as to state administrative proceedings. Marquez v. Guttierez,

51 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1026 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738. State law governs the extent

and elements of collateral estoppel. Valley Wood Preserving, Inc. v. Paul, 785 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir.

1986). In order to apply collateral estoppel in California, 

(1) the issue must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue

must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue must have been

necessarily decided in the prior proceeding; (4) the decision must have been final and

on the merits; and (5) preclusion must be sought against a person who was a party or

in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.

Alvarez v. May Dep’t Stores, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1233 (2006).

“California gives preclusive effect to state administrative decisions pursuant to the guidance

of United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-422 [1966].” Marquez, 51

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F. Supp. 2d at 1026; see also People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 479 (1982). Accordingly, a California

state administrative proceeding can have preclusive effect if “(1) the administrative agency acted in

a judicial capacity; (2) the agency resolved disputed issues of fact properly before it; and (3) the

parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate.” Marquez, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1026-27; Sims, 32 Cal.

3d at 479.

1. The Claims Board Proceedings

The first issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the decision of the California Victim’s

Compensation and Government Claims Board can be given preclusive effect. In order to be given

preclusive effect, Plaintiff’s Claims Board proceedings must have been conducted in a judicial and

adversarial manner, the hearing officer must have resolved disputed issues of fact properly before him,

and the parties must have had an adequate opportunity to litigate. Marquez, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1026-

27; Imen v. Glassford, 201 Cal. App. 3d 898, 906-07 (1988). 

In Diola v. State Bd. of Control, 135 Cal. App. 3d 580, 586 (1982), the California Court of

Appeal noted that § 4900 Claims Board proceedings are quasi-adjudicative, allow for the presentation

of evidence and cross-examination, and are governed by rules. See also Cal. Penal Code §§ 4900 et

seq. After reviewing the statutes which govern Claims Board proceedings, the Court concludes that

a Claims Board proceeding is capable of functioning and operating in a judicial-like capacity. The

Court concludes, however, that a § 4900 Claims Board proceeding may in some instances operate in

a non-judicial capacity.

In Imen v. Glassford, the California Court of Appeal identified a number of factors which can

assist a district court in determining whether an administrative proceeding possesses the requisite

judicial character to be afforded preclusive effect. Glassford, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 907. Among other

things, the Glassford factors include whether the proceedings were adversarial, whether the

proceedings included an impartial hearing officer, whether the parties had a right to subpoena

witnesses, and whether a verbatim record of the proceedings was kept. Glassford, 201 Cal. App. 3d

at 907. After evaluating the Claims Board proceedings which took place in this case, the Court notes

that some of the Glassford factors support a finding that Plaintiff’s Claims Board proceedings were

of a judicial nature. However, it is evident to the Court that the first Glassford factor–whether the

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proceedings were adversarial–indicates a contrary and distinctly non-judicial character of the

proceedings.

On at least two occasions at the beginning of Plaintiff’s Claims Board proceedings, the parties

expressly represented on the record that they did not view the proceedings as adversarial. In stating

his appearance on the record, Deputy Attorney General Dutton stated that the State’s role in the

proceedings was not as Plaintiff’s adversary, but as an advisor to the hearing officer:

MR. DUTTON: Jim Dutton, Your Honor, from the Attorney General’s Office in an

advisory capacity having to do with Penal Code Section 4900 et seq.

Children’s Hospital’s Opp’n, Ex. 4 at 21 (Emphasis added.). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff’s attorney,

Donnie Cox, confirmed the State’s advisory role, and in fact represented that the entire proceeding

was non-adversarial, stating,

[B]oth [Hearing Officer Hedum] and Mr. Dutton indicated that [Hearing Officer

Hedum] considered this to be a fact finding procedure, more than an adversarial

procedure, and I think Mr. Dutton agreed with us on that.

Children’s Hospital’s Opp’n, Ex. 4 at 22. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Defendant (the

non-moving party), the above statements indicate that the Claims Board proceedings were not

adversarial. That the State never intended to and didn’t call witnesses, failed to object to evidence,

didn’t oppose Plaintiff’s version of Phillip Buell’s death, and ultimately told the Claims Board hearing

officer that Plaintiff had met his burden also supports that conclusion. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that, viewed in the light most favorable to Defendant, the Claims Board proceedings lacked

an adversarial nature.

Aside from the proceedings not being adversarial, Defendants contend that preclusion should

not apply because they did not have an opportunity to litigate in the Claims Board proceedings, let

alone an “adequate opportunity” as required by law. Marquez, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1026-27; Sims, 32

Cal. 3d at 479. Plaintiff contends that Defendants had an adequate opportunity to litigate because they

were virtually represented by the State during Plaintiff’s Claims Board hearings.

“A non-party can be bound by the litigation choices made by his virtual representative.” Irwin

v. Mascott, 370 F.3d 934, 929 (9th Cir. 2004); Alvarez, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1223. In determining

whether a party is the virtual representative of a party from a prior proceeding, courts note that, “close

relationship, substantial participation, and tactical maneuvering all support a finding of virtual

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1

 § 4904. Report of findings to legislature; recommendation; limitation on amount of

recovery

If the evidence shows that the crime with which the claimant was charged was either not committed

at all, or, if committed, was not committed by the claimant, and that the claimant did not, by any act

or omission either intentionally or negligently, contribute to the bringing about of his or her arrest or

conviction, and that the claimant has sustained pecuniary injury through his or her erroneous

conviction and imprisonment, the State Board of Control shall report the facts of the case and its

conclusions to the next Legislature of this state, with a recommendation that an appropriation be made

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representation,” while “identity of interests and adequate representation are necessary to such a

finding.” Id. at 930. In the State of California, “[t]he emphasis is not on a concept of identity of

parties, but on the practical situation. The question is whether the non-party is sufficiently close to

afford the application of the principle of preclusion.” Id. “[T]he determination of privity depends

upon the fairness of binding [the party] with the result obtained in earlier proceedings in which it did

not participate.” Citizens for Open Access et. Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Assn., 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1070-

71 (1998).

As the California Court of Appeal noted in Glassford, a defendant’s incentive to defend is an

important consideration in determining the propriety of giving preclusive effect to an administrative

decision. Glassford, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 906-07. “If a defendant in the first action is sued for small

or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are

not foreseeable.” Id., citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). In comparing

the Attorney General’s incentives to defend in the Claims Board proceeding to the Defendants

incentives to defend here, the differences are striking. After the favorable decision from the Claims

Board, Plaintiff received $756,000 in compensation from the State of California. Here, on the other

hand, Plaintiff seeks damages of approximately $50,000,000, including punitive damages. Another

difference between the Claims Board proceedings and this case is that it was the State who was liable

in the Claims Board proceedings, whereas Drs. Chadwick, Williams, and Murphy are exposed in their

individual capacities here. While the State certainly had some incentive to protect its financial coffers

in the Claims Board proceedings, that incentive dwarfs the incentive of the individual Defendants to

protect their own bank accounts from colossal sums in this case. Finally, the decision of the Claims

Board was, by statute, only a recommendation to the State Legislature that it should appropriate

money to Plaintiff. See Cal. Penal Code § 4904.1

 Accordingly, the State Legislature was not under

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by the Legislature for the purpose of indemnifying the claimant for the pecuniary injury; but the

amount of the appropriation recommended shall be a sum equivalent to one hundred dollars ($100)

per day of incarceration served subsequent to the claimant's conviction and that appropriation shall

not be treated as gross income to the recipient under the provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

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an absolute obligation to appropriate money after the Claims Board proceedings. Here, on the other

hand, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff would be a judicially enforceable requirement. With those

points in mind, the Court cannot conclude that the State’s incentive to defend vigorously in the Claims

Board proceeding is equivalent to Defendants incentive to defend here. The Court concludes that an

evaluation of the incentives to defend does not support giving preclusive effect to the decision of the

Claims Board.

It is undisputed that none of the Defendants participated in Plaintiff’s Claims Board

proceedings. It is also is evident that a majority, if not all, of the Defendants did not have notice that

the Claims Board proceedings were taking place. Finally, the record from the Claims Board

proceedings establishes that Defendants’ putative virtual representative at the Claims Board

proceedings, the State of California, viewed its role as an advisor, and not as Plaintiff’s adversary.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Defendants, the Court concludes that these facts

do not support a finding of virtual representation because Defendants are not “sufficiently close” to

the State of California to justify the “application of the principle of preclusion.” Irwin, 370 F.3d at

930.

The Court concludes that the Claims Board proceedings lacked a judicial-like adversarial tone,

and further, that Defendants did not have an adequate opportunity to litigate in those proceedings

because they neither knew about the proceedings nor were virtually represented by the State during

the proceedings. As a result of those conclusions, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s favorable

Claims Board decision should not be given preclusive effect. 

2. Collateral Estoppel Generally 

Though Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication could be denied on the above grounds

alone, the Court also notes that general principles of collateral estoppel also preclude the doctrine’s

application in this case. As noted earlier, in order to apply collateral estoppel in California, 

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(1) the issue must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue

must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue must have been

necessarily decided in the prior proceeding; (4) the decision must have been final and

on the merits; and (5) preclusion must be sought against a person who was a party or

in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.

Alvarez v. May Dep’t Stores, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 1233. The general elements of collateral estoppel,

like the elements for giving preclusive effect to administrative decisions, include the requirements that

issues be “actually litigated,” and that preclusion be sought against a person who was a party or in

privity with a party in the prior proceeding. As noted above, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Defendants, the non-adversarial nature of the Claims Board proceedings precludes the conclusion that

the issue of Plaintiff’s innocence was “actually litigated.” Id. Furthermore, viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to the Defendants, the Court concludes that there was neither privity nor virtual

representation between Defendants and the State during the Claims Board proceedings. For those

reasons, the Court concludes that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Defendants, the facts

do not support the application of collateral estoppel in this case. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication (Doc. #

58), is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 18, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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