Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00357/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00357-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COLIN RAKER DICKEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Acting Warden )

of San Quentin State Prison, )

)

Respondent. )

)

Case No. CIV. F-06-357-AWI-P

DEATH PENALTY CASE

Order Granting in Part Petitioner’s

Motion for Equitable Tolling and

Vacating Hearing Date

On November 1, 2006, Petitioner Colin Raker Dickey (“Dickey”), filed a

motion for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, requesting tolling of 235

days to October 14, 2007. Dickey filed a declaration of his federal counsel under

seal in support of the motion. Respondent Robert L. Ayers, Jr. (“the State”) filed

an opposition to the motion November 15, 2006. The motion is currently set for

hearing on December 4, 2006.

Dickey submits three reasons call for equitable tolling. First, he seeks

tolling for the amount of time that he was without federal counsel, from the United

States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on his direct appeal (Feb. 21, 2006),

through the date of his first federal filing (Mar. 30, 2006) until federal counsel was

appointed (Aug. 15, 2006). Second, he seeks tolling for the time from the

appointment of counsel until the Phase I budget was approved on Oct.16, 2006. 

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Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), 1

overruled on another issue by Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530,

540 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), Kelly overruled by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202

(2003).

OEquitableTollingDky 2

Third, he asserts, as additional justification for the entire time of requested tolling,

that insufficient investigation was done by state counsel and the federal petition

cannot be adequately prepared for filing until October 14, 2007.

In support of the last reason for tolling, the sealed declaration of counsel

gives specifics about what tasks state counsel did and which tasks remain to be

completed before an adequate habeas petition can be filed. Counsel estimates the

required investigation will take until May or June of 2007 to complete, and the

investigation is needed by anticipated experts in order to formulate their opinions. 

Counsel estimates the anticipated expert services will require another four months,

and allowing one month to incorporate the experts’ opinions into the petition puts

the earliest filing date in October.

The State’s first objection to Dickey’s motion asserts that requesting tolling

before the petition is filed is premature and seeks an advisory opinion, since the

statute of limitations is still running. The State contends Dickey must file his

petition as soon as possible, and then, if it is filed late, request relief – essentially

that Dickey must take his chances as to whether or not equitable tolling will be

available. The State asserts Beeler is not controlling on this issue, even though 1

the Ninth Circuit concluded that “extraordinary circumstances” existed which

justified equitable tolling, because no authority was given to support a decision in

advance of the statute expiring.

Equitable tolling has been granted in many California capital cases prior to

the filing of a federal petition. The State’s jurisdictional argument has little

support in the capital context. Beeler addressed the pre-petition posture of the

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OEquitableTollingDky 3

case, although admittedly without analysis. In Footnote 3, the Court discussed at

length the fact that no petition had been filed. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1287 n.3. 

Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction to

grant pre-petition equitable tolling. Further, anticipatory equitable tolling is

appropriate under McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 857-58 (1994), which held

that a district court had jurisdiction to appoint counsel and issue a stay of

execution before the filing of a petition. Similar interests are implicated by a

request for stay and a request for equitable tolling. Forcing Dickey’s counsel to

file a petition without a reasonable opportunity to fully research and present the

claims would severely limit Dickey’s right to counsel.

Second, the State argues that Dickey has no constitutional right to counsel

on habeas, so equitable tolling would not preserve any consititional due process

right. The State construes Beeler to be limited to its facts: where federal counsel

diligently pursued the preparation of Beeler’s petition, but when he withdrew after

accepting employment in another state, much of the work product he left behind

was not usable by replacement counsel, an event over which Beeler had no

control. The State argues that since there is no right to counsel in these

proceedings, Dickey was obligated to protect his own rights and prepare his

petition. The State contends the implication that Dickey sat on his rights should

not be considered an equitable basis on which to toll the statute.

This argument ignores the fact that in capital cases a right to counsel is

granted by statute, and that the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the

importance of counsel to prepare a capital habeas petition. See McFarland v.

Scott, 512 U.S. at 854-55. “An attorney's assistance prior to the filing of a capital

defendant's habeas corpus petition is crucial, because ‘[t]he complexity of our

jurisprudence in this area . . . makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able

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OEquitableTollingDky 4

to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the assistance of persons

learned in the law.’ ” Id. at 855-56 (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14

(1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). There is

no precedent in this district, or circuit, to expect a capital prisoner to prepare his

own federal habeas petition.

Third, the State asserts that neither the 37-day period before Dickey’s first

federal filing, nor the 60 days federal counsel spent “awaiting files and funding

approval for the case” are based on extraordinary circumstances beyond Dickey’s

control and so do not justify tolling. The State observes two counsel were

appointed to represent Dickey, which certainly places him in a much better

position to meet the AEDPA’s limitation period.

This argument is more persuasive. Most of the published orders granting

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations have done so only in limited

situations (i.e., lack of counsel or incompetence), and usually have not included

the time before a petitioner’s first filing in federal court. As to the time until the

budget was approved, Dickey cites to a case where tolling was granted for that

reason, but there the judge had instructed second counsel not to do any substantive

work until the budget was approved. See Holloway v. Wong, CIV. S-05-2089-

FCD-CMK (E.D. Cal., June 12, 2006). That situation did not occur here.

Lastly, the State disagrees with Dickey’s assertion that granting tolling

would not cause prejudice, stating the assertion is pure speculation and that the

continued passage of time runs the risk of memories fading or losing potential

witnesses or evidence. The State observes that 14 years have already passed since

Dickey was convicted, and unnecessary tolling would hinder the ability of the

victim’s survivors to obtain timely closure and jeopardize society’s interest in

swift punishment. This argument is not persuasive. Even if tolling is granted, it

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OEquitableTollingDky 5

would be for a limited period of time, which in light of the 14 years that the state

court took to review the case, is not significant.

There is sufficient justification and precedent to support granting equitable

tolling for the 138 days from Dickey’s first federal filing until counsel was

appointed. This would extend the statute of limitations to July 10, 2007. 

Dickey has made a persuasive showing that additional time beyond July 10

may be required to adequately prepare the petition due to the lack of investigation

by state habeas counsel, and has cited to some cases where equitable tolling was

granted because additional time was required to prepare the petition. Dickey’s

estimates of the time which will be required to complete the investigation and

expert opinions are, at this point, subjective and based on little specific time

requirements. 

Dickey’s motion for equitable tolling is granted for 138 days, extending the

statute of limitations to July 10, 2007. The denial of the remaining time is without

prejudice to raising the request again when the estimates of the time required to

complete the petition would be less speculative and based on more specific facts. 

The hearing set for December 4, 2006, is vacated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

c508d4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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