Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_18-cv-01499/USCOURTS-alnd-4_18-cv-01499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

APRIL MAYBEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 4:18-cv-01499-LSC

)

ANDREW SAUL, )

Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, April Mayben, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for

a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Mayben timely 

pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the 

Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

Mayben was forty years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s 

(“ALJ’s”) decision, and she has a high school education. (Tr. at 55-56.) Her past 

work experience includes employment as a secretary. (Tr. at 65-66.) Mayben claims

she became disabled on August 21, 2015, as a result of a 2008 lower back 

laminectomy; a 2009 spinal fusion; a 2009 neck surgery; a 2009 hysterectomy; a 

FILED

 2020 Feb-04 PM 01:52

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:18-cv-01499-LSC Document 19 Filed 02/04/20 Page 1 of 15
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2009 Lapband placement and 2013 Lapband removal; pain in both knees, back, 

neck, bottom, legs, and feet; diabetes; high blood pressure; and depression and 

anxiety. (Tr. at 213.)

The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential 

evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus 

eligible for DIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. 

Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in 

order until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made, 

the analysis will proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 

416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff 

is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 

416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to 

the next step.

The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of 

the plaintiff’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. Id. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of 

impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational 

requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding 

of not disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence contained in the 

record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that 

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“substantial medical evidence in the record” adequately supported the finding that 

plaintiff was not disabled).

Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the 

plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal to 

the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed 

impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 

416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. Id.

If the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or 

medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff’s 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See id. 

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine 

whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant 

work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff’s impairment 

or combination of impairments does not prevent him from performing his past 

relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.

The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff’s RFC, 

age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the plaintiff can 

make an adjustment to other work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If 

the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled. Id.; 

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see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff cannot perform other 

work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Mayben meets 

the non-disability requirements for a period of disability and DIB and was insured 

through the date of her decision. (Tr. at 38.) She further determined that Mayben has

“not engaged in SGA since August 21, 2015, the alleged onset date” of her disability.

(Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s “right knee degenerative joint disease, 

fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, major depressive disorder, post-traumatic 

stress disorder, and panic disorder with agoraphobia” are considered “severe” based 

on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, the ALJ found that 

these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) She did not find Mayben’s

allegations to be totally credible, and the ALJ determined that Mayben has the 

following RFC: 

to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) except the claimant

can frequently climb ramps and stairs but never ladders, ropes or scaffolds. 

The claimant can frequently balance, stoop, and kneel and occasionally 

crouch or crawl. The claimant can never work around unprotected heights or 

with hazardous machinery. The claimant can understand, remember, and carry 

out simple instructions. The claimant can have occasional contact with 

coworkers and the general public. The claimant can handle infrequent and 

gradual changes in the work environment. 

(Tr. at 40.)

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According to the ALJ, Mayben “is unable to perform any of her past relevant 

work.” (Tr. at 43.) The ALJ also determined that Mayben is a “younger individual,

age 18-49,” and she has a “high school education,” as those terms are defined by the 

regulations. (Tr. at 43.) The ALJ determined that “the transferability of job skills is 

not material to the determination of disability.” (Id.) Because Plaintiff cannot 

perform the full range of light work, the ALJ enlisted a vocational expert (“VE”) and 

used Medical-Vocation Rules as a guideline. (Tr. at 43-44.) The VE found that there 

are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Mayben is capable of 

performing, such as garment sorter, housekeeper, or small parts assembler. (Tr. at 

64-68.) The ALJ concluded her findings by stating that Plaintiff “was not under a 

‘disability,’ as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 21, 2015, through the 

date of this decision.” (Tr. at 44.)

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act 

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there 

is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the 

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives 

deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are 

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supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. 

See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).

Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 

(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 

2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers 

to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent 

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding 

from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 

1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. 

Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 

894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard [for 

review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its entirety 

to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 

F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th 

Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for 

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reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Wiggins 

v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1989)).

III. Discussion

Mayben claims that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ 

improperly applied the pain standard by failing to explicitly cite objective medical 

evidence in the record that discredits her subjective pain testimony. 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints alone are insufficient to establish a disability. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.926(a); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 

(11th Cir. 1991). Subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms may establish 

the presence of a disabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. See 

Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit applies 

a two-part pain standard when Plaintiff claims disability due to pain or other 

subjective symptoms. The plaintiff must show evidence of an underlying medical 

condition and either (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the 

alleged symptoms arising from the condition, or (2) that the objectively determined 

medical condition is of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise 

to the alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (b), 416.929(a), (b); Social 

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029; Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 

1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). 

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If the first part of the pain standard is satisfied, the ALJ then evaluates the 

intensity and persistence of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and their effect on her 

ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225-

26. In evaluating the extent to which the plaintiff’s symptoms, such as pain, affect 

her capacity to perform basic work activities, the ALJ will consider (1) objective 

medical evidence, (2) the nature of a Plaintiff’s symptoms, (3) the Plaintiff’s daily 

activities, (4) precipitating and aggravating factors, (5) the effectiveness of 

medication, (6) treatment sought for relief of symptoms, (7) any measures the 

Plaintiff takes to relieve symptoms, and (8) any conflicts between a Plaintiff’s 

statements and the rest of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), (4), 416. 

929(c)(3), (4); SSR 16-3p. In order to discredit Plaintiff’s statements, the ALJ must 

clearly “articulate explicit and adequate reasons.” See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210.

A credibility determination is a question of fact subject only to limited review 

in the courts to ensure the finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Hand v. 

Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated for rehearing en banc, 

774 F.2d 428 (11th Cir. 1985), reinstated sub nom., Hand v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 275 

(11th Cir. 1986). Courts in the Eleventh Circuit will not disturb a clearly articulated 

finding supported by substantial evidence. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 

771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). However, a reversal is warranted if the decision 

contains no indication of the proper application of the pain standard. See Ortega v. 

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Chater, 933 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (S.D.F.L. 1996) (holding that the ALJ’s failure to 

articulate adequate reasons for only partially crediting the Plaintiff’s complaints of 

pain resulted in reversal). “The question is not . . . whether [the] ALJ could have 

reasonably credited [Plaintiff’s] testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong 

to discredit it.” Werner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 

2011). 

Mayben stated that she had to lie in bed all day, usually four to five days a 

week, because of her pain, anxiety, lack of ability to concentrate, flashbacks, and 

panic attacks. (Tr. 57-62.) The ALJ noted that the impairments causing Mayben’s 

underlying medical condition could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged 

symptoms, satisfying part of the pain standard. (Tr. at 41.) However, the ALJ found 

that Mayben’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects 

of these alleged symptoms were not entirely credible by pointing to explicit evidence 

that is inconsistent with her subjective complaints. (Id.) The ALJ covers a variety of 

evidence to support her conclusion, including objective medical evidence, treatment 

history, and daily activities. (Tr. at 41-43.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

conclusion in this case. 

The ALJ began by noting that the objective medical evidence does not support 

completely disabling allegations of pain and other symptoms. (Tr. at 41-43.) In 

November 2007, Mayben had a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) done that 

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displayed minimal to mild degenerative changes in her neck. (Tr. at 292.) On 

December 7, 2007, Mayben underwent a laminectomy. (Tr. at 303-07.) Then, on 

December 3, 2009, Mayben underwent a lumbar fusion, but she continued to 

experience pain. (Tr. at 407-11, 435-44.) Mayben then had another MRI of her 

cervical spine in July 2016, where Dr. John Rinker, M.D., concluded that Mayben 

had multilevel degenerative changes namely at C2-3. (Tr. at 539.) 

In November 2015, shortly after her alleged onset date for her disability claim, 

Dr. Sathyan Iyer, M.D., examined Mayben. (Tr. at 516-19.) Dr. Iyer, a consultative 

physician, determined that Mayben had a decreased range of motion in her lumbar 

spine, but she had full range of motion in her neck as well as full lateral flexion and 

rotational motion in her spine. (Tr. at 517-18.) Moreover, even though Mayben 

testified that she had frequent back pain, Dr. Iyer found that Plaintiff’s physical 

examination was generally normal. (Tr. at 516-21.) Mayben had full range of motion 

of her shoulders, normal gait, normal muscle power, and full range of motion of her 

hips, knees, and ankles; her grip strength was normal; and she had generally normal 

musculoskeletal functioning. (Tr. at 517-18.) Ultimately, Dr. Iyer determined that 

Mayben would have some limitations with bending, lifting, overhead activities, 

pushing, and pulling, which was consistent with the ALJ’s RFC findings. (Tr. at 40-

43, 519.) Mayben’s reports of disabling musculoskeletal symptoms are not 

supported by Dr. Iyer’s evaluation. (Tr. 515-21.) 

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As for her right knee degenerative joint disease, Mayben underwent a right 

knee arthroscopy in April 2013. (Tr. at 455-61.) During her follow-up visit after her 

knee surgery with Dr. Stephen Blackstock, M.D., Mayben’s treating physician, he 

noted that Mayben was doing well without complaints. (Tr. at 463.) Moreover, 

Mayben returned to work for two years after her knee surgery. (Tr. at 188, 202.) In 

November 2015, Dr. Iyer found on consultative examination that Mayben had full 

range of motion in her knees. (Tr. at 518.) Recent treatment records do not point to 

any complaints of knee pain by Mayben to her primary care physician. (Tr. at 633-

43.) 

Mayben continued to express pain at virtually every visit before and after her

surgeries. (Tr. at 285, 287, 293, 297, 308, 311, 318-19, 321, 324-26, 328, 338-41, 

343-45, 350, 355, 371, 376, 393, 397, 403, 418-19, 438-51, 454, 465, 469, 470, 516, 

519, 568, 600, 607.) Mayben testified that she still experiences pain on a daily basis. 

(Tr. at 61.) This led Dr. James Robinson, M.D., another treating physician, to 

diagnose Mayben with fibromyalgia in 2010. (Tr. at 435-54.) In 2015, Dr. Iyer found 

her symptoms to be suggestive of fibromyalgia as well. (Tr. at 519.) But Mayben’s 

medical records, as of 2017, show that the medication for her fibromyalgia has 

stabilized her. (Tr. at 698, 705, 711.)

The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Iyer’s opinion, which is inconsistent with 

the severity of Mayben’s alleged symptoms. (Tr. at 41-43.) Despite some discomfort 

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in her back and suggestive fibromyalgia, Dr. Iyer found Mayben’s physical 

examination unremarkable. (Tr. at 516-21.) None of the few limitations cited by Dr. 

Iyer is completely disabling nor would affect Mayben’s capacity to work because 

these limitations were included in the RFC determined by the ALJ. (Tr. at 40, 519.) 

Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s credibility determination with 

regard to Mayben’s complaints of disabling mental disorders. Dr. June Nichols, a 

consultative clinical psychologist, diagnosed Mayben with PTSD, generalized 

anxiety disorder, panic disorder and major depressive disorder in November 2015. 

(Tr. at 514.) Based on her examination, she noted that Mayben had full orientation, 

adequate concentration and attention, grossly intact memory, adequate fund of 

information, normal abstraction, normal thought process, no auditory or visual 

hallucinations, good judgment and insight, and average range of intellectual ability. 

(Tr. at 513-14.) Dr. Nichols opined that while Mayben’s abilities might be 

compromised, she did not demonstrate deficits that would interfere with her ability 

to remember, understand, and carry out work related instructions. (Tr. at 514.) 

The ALJ gave Dr. Nichol’s opinion some weight because of her diagnosis of 

Mayben’s mental disorders. (Tr. at 42.) Nonetheless, the opinion is inconsistent with 

the severity of Mayben’s alleged symptoms. (Tr. at 42.) The assessment performed 

by Dr. Nichols mirrors the RFC results determined by the ALJ. (Tr. at 40, 512-14.) 

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In other words, she did not find limitations in Mayben’s ability to work greater than 

the limitations provided by the ALJ in the RFC. (Tr. at 40.) 

The ALJ also properly considered that the treatment to relieve Mayben’s 

alleged symptoms has been mild. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (ALJ may consider 

treatment history and medication in determining whether claimant’s alleged 

symptoms affect her capacity to work). Mayben testified that she takes pain 

medication, antidepressants, and medication for her diabetes and hypertension. (Tr. 

at 63.) Additionally, Mayben has been receiving treatment and therapy at the CED 

Mental Health Center since May 2016 for her mental impairments. (Tr. at 522-36.) 

Mayben reported that she is doing better with her depression and panic attacks in 

February 2017. (Tr. at 689.) While there have been some setbacks in Mayben’s

progress, the most recent treatment record from August 25, 2017, shows that she is 

“doing okay” and is able to get out more. (Tr. at 495, 644, 687, 764, 822.) 

Finally, the ALJ considered Mayben’s daily activities in analyzing her 

subjective pain complaints. (Tr. at 42.) The ALJ did not rely solely on Mayben’s 

daily activities in determining Mayben’s subjective pain complaints. See Macia v. 

Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that an ALJ may consider 

daily activities in assessing a Plaintiff’s credibility); see also 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(3) (specifically listing daily activities as a factor to consider in 

evaluating a claimant’s credibility). The ALJ analyzed Mayben’s activities as one 

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factor along with the objective medical evidence and her treatment to relieve her 

symptoms. (Tr. at 41-42.) The ALJ noted that Mayben is able to take a shower, go 

to the bathroom, grocery shop on a weekly basis, set medication reminders, make 

plans to take her medication, prepare her own meals, eat three meals a day, perform 

household chores, drive a car, manage money, and pay bills. (Tr. at 243-51, 514.) 

Mayben also used an exercise bike during the relevant period, which is suggestive 

of greater functioning than she alleged. (Tr. at 600-01.) 

In sum, despite Mayben’s subjective complaints of pain, the objective medical 

evidence shows that she did not have functional limitations greater than those in the 

RFC that would affect her capacity to work. She repeatedly exhibited normal gait, 

full muscle power, adequate concentration and attention, normal extremities, normal 

grip strength, and intact sensation. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1226 (determining that 

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discount the Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints). Although Mayben exhibited periodic physical tenderness

and mental impairments, the ALJ properly accounted for these minimal limitations 

caused by her pain by limiting her to light work with several additional restrictions

listed. (Tr. at 40.) 

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IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering Mayben’s 

argument, this Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED on February 4, 2020.

_____________________________

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

201416

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