Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01950/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01950-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

RUBEN SUMERA,

Plaintiff,

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, Attorney General of the 

United States, in her official capacity;

Defendant.

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No. 4:13-cv-01950-KAW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an employment discrimination case against Defendant Loretta E. Lynch, in her official 

capacity as the United States Attorney General. Plaintiff brings claims for discrimination, hostile work 

environment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Defendant filed 

her motion for summary judgment on November 19, 2015. (ECF 69.) Plaintiff’s opposition was due on 

December 11, 2015. Instead of filing a memorandum in opposition to the summary judgment motion, 

Plaintiff rested solely on objections to the evidence Defendant submitted in support of the motion. (ECF 

77.) Defendant filed a reply memorandum, responding to the evidentiary objections on December 31, 

2015. (ECF 78.) 

The Court deems the matter suitable for disposition without hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

7-1(b) and VACATES the hearing currently set for February 4, 2016. Having reviewed the papers filed 

by the parties and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS the motion for 

the reasons set forth below.

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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff was employed as an auditor with the San Francisco Regional Audit Office of the 

Inspector General (“OIG”) in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) from April 1998 until his resignation in 

March 2010. (Sumera Dep. at 16:21-18:10.)1 The OIG conducts internal audits of DOJ divisions and 

components as well as external audits of grants that DOJ awards to outside organizations. (Id. at 33:20-

35:11.) The expected timeline for completion of an internal audit is nine months, whereas the expected 

timeline for completion of an external audit related to a grant is five months. (Id. at 35:12-36:10.) 

Laura Nicolosi, who was one of two Assistant Regional Audit Managers, began supervising 

Plaintiff in 2008. (Sumera Dep. at 31:8-15.) When Nicolosi left OIG around October 30, 2009, David 

Gaschke, the Regional Audit Manager, became Plaintiff’s first-level supervisor. (Sumera Dep. at 23:14-

24:13.)

A. The County of Asotin Audit

In December 2007, Plaintiff was assigned to audit a grant awarded to Asotin County. (Sumera 

Dep. at 51-52.) The audit initially began as a limited scope Internal Control Survey audit and had an 

expected time frame for completion of 45 to 90 days from the entrance conference on January 15, 2008. 

(Sumera Dep. at 52.) On April 2, 2008, Nicolosi asked Plaintiff to close out the Internal Control Survey 

steps and prepare for a full scope grant audit. (Sumera Dep. at 54-55.) Under Audit Division 

guidelines, external audits are expected to be completed within five months of the entrance conference. 

(Sumera Dep. at 35-36; Gaschke Dep. at 60.)

Nicolosi and Plaintiff discussed the schedule for issuing a draft report to Asotin County and the 

grant agency and set July 29, 2008, as the deadline, approximately six and a half months after the 

entrance conference. (Sumera Dep. at 55-57.) The draft report was not issued until February 1, 2009, 

more than twelve months after the entrance conference. (Sumera Dep. at 66, 82-83.)

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The transcripts of the depositions of Plaintiff Ruben Sumera, (former) Assistant Regional Audit 

Manager Laura Nicolosi, Regional Audit Manager David Gaschke, and Program Analyst Karl Hense are 

attached to the Declaration of Wendy M. Garbers, as Exhibits A, B, C, and D, respectively. (ECF 70-

72.)

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B. The Sunnyside Audit and Issuance of the Performance Improvement Plan

In February 2009, Plaintiff was assigned to audit two grants received by the City of Sunnyside in 

Washington state. (Sumera Dep. at 119.) The Sunnyside grants were approximately $150,000 each. 

(Sumera Dep. at 418.) Despite being given an unusually long period of time to prepare for the entrance 

conference on May 5, 2009, Plaintiff exhibited errors at the outset of his work on the Sunnyside audit 

that should not have been made by an experienced GS-13 auditor. (Sumera Dep. at 119-120 & Ex. 13.)

Plaintiff was given a Notification of Unacceptable Performance and placed on a Performance 

Improvement Plan on July 31, 2009. (Sumera Dep., Ex. 3; Gaschke Dep. at 71-72.) Mr. Sumera 

provided a written response to the PIP. (Sumera Dep., Ex. 7.)

C. Notice of Proposed Removal

The PIP specifically required Plaintiff to complete the Sunnyside audit by October 30, 2009, 

which gave Plaintiff nearly six months (more than the usual five months) from the entrance conference 

to submit his draft audit report. (Sumera Dep. at 141-45.) Plaintiff never completed the Sunnyside 

audit. (Sumera Dep. 224-225.) Gaschke issued Plaintiff a Notice of Proposed Removal on February 25, 

2010. (Sumera Dep. at 214 & Ex. 13.)

Plaintiff attributed his inability to complete the Sunnyside audit to the reports and meetings that 

Nicolosi required of him during the period of the PIP, which he claimed were attempts by Nicolosi to 

“waste” his time. (Sumera Dep. at 134-36.) Nicolosi left OIG in October 2009, at which time Plaintiff 

no longer had to meet with her or submit daily reports. (Sumera Dep. 365.) By the time Plaintiff 

resigned in March 2010, nearly five months later, Plaintiff still had not completed the Sunnyside audit. 

(Sumera Dep. at 224-225.) At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he needed more time beyond March 

2010 to complete the Sunnyside audit. (Sumera Dep. at 226.) He could not, however, provide an 

estimate of how much more time he needed. (Sumera Dep. at 226-227.) During his third deposition 

session, Plaintiff testified, for the first time, that one of the reasons he didn’t finish the Sunnyside audit 

was because Gaschke “denied” his “request” to return to Sunnyside for a follow-up site visit. However, 

Plaintiff acknowledged that he never actually made this request to Gaschke directly, who was then his 

first-line supervisor. (Sumera Dep. at 403-05.)

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D. Plaintiff Elects to Resign Before Any Decision Is Made on the Proposed Removal

On March 24, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation to Gaschke. (Sumera Dep., Ex. 

14.) In it, Plaintiff stated that he had elected to take early retirement to “take advantage of the FERS 

Deferred Retirement Program” and had made this decision “with much thought and deliberation.” (See 

id.) Plaintiff did not wait for the DOJ to make a determination on the proposed removal and instead 

decided to resign because, as he explained, “I didn’t finish the Sunnyside audit and I don’t want removal 

on my personnel record.” (Sumera Dep. at 244-246.) Plaintiff’s last day was March 26, 2010. (Sumera 

Dep. at 224.) 

E. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff commenced this action on April 29, 2013. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) In the operative 

complaint, Plaintiff, who describes himself as a Filipino male over the age of 40, alleges that his 

supervisors engaged in a series of discriminatory and harassing actions against him because of his race, 

national origin, age, and participation in protected activity. (2d Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 4, 7.) 

Plaintiff asserts that he was and is qualified for his position and that he began experiencing 

problems only after Gaschke and Nicolosi joined the San Francisco Division. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 16.) 

According to Plaintiff, before these individuals became his supervisors, he was “ably performing his 

job” and “[b]ut for the harassment and actions of the two individuals . . . [he] would have been able to 

meet standards for successful performance; any perceived performance deficiency was the result of the 

harassment and adverse employment actions by his employer.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was singled-out for a PIP after he was late on one audit assignment. (Id. 

¶ 17.) He asserts that only a single auditor timely completed assignments during the previous year. (Id.) 

According to Plaintiff “[o]ther late auditors did not undergo a PIP, were not over 40, and were not 

members of a protected class.” (Id. ¶¶ 17, 40.)

Plaintiff also alleges that he was assigned to clean the kitchen during his audit, and that during

the week he spent on “the humiliating task,” he was unable to work on his audit, resulting in another 

citation for tardiness. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff further alleges that these “discriminatory work assignments”

materially affected the terms and conditions of his employment, depriving him of “the opportunity to do 

his job on equal footing with similarly situated employees.” (Id. ¶ 18.) He claims that auditors who 

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were not members of a protected class received preferential treatment. (Id. ¶ 19.) According to 

Plaintiff, his supervisors had developed a pattern of singling-out minorities and people over the age of 

40 for separation beginning in October 29, 2009. (Id. ¶ 22.)

On September 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed an informal EEO complaint alleging discrimination based 

on race, national origin, and age. (Id. ¶ 14.) Thereafter, on December 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed his 

formal EEO complaint. (SAC ¶ 15.) According to Plaintiff, that Nicolosi and Gaschke retaliated 

against him for making these complaints by putting him on a PIP and issuing the Notice of Proposed 

Removal. (Sumera Dep. at 212-13.) But, Plaintiff concedes that he was put on the PIP before he made 

a formal EEO complaint. (Sumera Dep. at 212:20 – 213:5.) Furthermore, in the weekly meetings that 

Plaintiff, Gaschke, and Nicolosi had to discuss Plaintiff’s performance, the managers informed Plaintiff 

that he was failing the PIP. (Sumera Dep. at 216:8-18.) In fact, Gaschke testified that he first became 

aware of Plaintiff’s EEO complaint in October 2009. (Gaschke Dep. at 80.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after adequate discovery, there is no genuine issue as to 

material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a 

material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis 

for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where the 

moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable 

trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. S. Cal. Gas. Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 

885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003). 

On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party 

may discharge its burden of production by either (1) “produc[ing] evidence negating an essential

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element of the nonmoving party’s case” or (2) after suitable discovery “show[ing] that the nonmoving 

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to discharge its 

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 

1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. 324-25.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific 

facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “A party opposing summary judgment may not simply question the 

credibility of the movant to foreclose summary judgment.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 

997 (9th Cir. 2001). “Instead, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own

evidence set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The non-moving 

party must produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that 

the dispute exists.” Bhan v. NMS Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). Conclusory or 

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material 

fact to defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 

738 (9th Cir. 1979).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011).

B. Legal Standard for Claims Under Title VII

Claims of discrimination under Title VII are analyzed using a burden-shifting framework.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of 

disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, 

(2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (4) he was 

treated differently than similarly situated persons outside his protected class. Peterson v. HewlettPackard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 

U.S. at 802-04; Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). “The defendant 

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[has] the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case—i.e., the burden of producing 

evidence that the adverse employment actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. St. 

Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993). After defendant provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions, any presumption of discrimination “simply drops out 

of the picture.” Id. at 511. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to raise a genuine factual issue as 

to whether the employer’s stated reason was a “pretext” or cover-up for unlawful discrimination. See

Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1432 (9th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff can prove pretext either “(1) 

indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence because it is 

internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful 

discrimination more likely motivated the employer.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2000). “[A] reason cannot be proved to be a ‘pretext for discrimination’ unless it is 

shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination is the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 

509 U.S. at 515 (emphasis in original).

C. Legal Standard for Claims Under the ADEA 

The ADEA protects federal employees over the age of 40 by making it unlawful for government 

employers to discriminate “because of [an] individual’s age.” Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 606-07 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)). Like Title VII claims, ADEA claims are governed on 

summary judgment by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting evidentiary framework. Id. at 608. 

Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to “establish a prima facie case of age 

discrimination.” Id. at 608 (citing Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 

2000)). A prima facie showing requires the plaintiff to establish (1) that he is at least forty years old, (2) 

that he was performing his job satisfactorily, (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) 

that a substantially younger employee was treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding 

the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. See id.; Whitman v. Mineta, 

541 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2008). “To prevail on a claim for age discrimination under the ADEA, a 

plaintiff must prove at trial that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.” Shelley v. 

Geren, 666 F.3d at 607 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)). “Unlike Title 

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VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age 

was simply a motivating factor.” Gross, 557 U.S. at 174. 

If, and only if, a prima facie showing is made, “the burden of production shifts to the [employer] 

to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.” Rahlf v. MoTech Corp, Inc., 642 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2011). Once the employer articulates a legitimate reason 

for its conduct, it is the plaintiff’s ultimate burden “to demonstrate that there is a material genuine issue 

of fact as to whether the employer’s purported reason is pretext for age discrimination.” Shelley, 666 

F.3d at 608; Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff “must do more 

than establish a prima facie case and then deny the credibility of the [defendant’s] witnesses.” Schuler

v. Chronicle Broad. Co., 793 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, the plaintiff must furnish 

“specific and significantly probative evidence” that the employer’s proffered justifications were 

pretextual.” Id. 

D. Legal Standard for Retaliation Claims Under Title VII and the ADEA

Both Title VII and the ADEA prohibit federal employers from retaliating against employees who 

oppose unlawful discrimination. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 477 (2008); White v. Gen. Servs. 

Admin., 652 F. 2d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 1981). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff 

must establish that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, 

and (3) “there was a causal link between the [two.]” Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1179-80 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002)); Jordan v. 

Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987). In 

the retaliation context, an “adverse employment action” is conduct that is “reasonably likely to deter the 

charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.” Poland, 494 F.3d at 1180; Ray v. 

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “only non-trivial employment actions 

that would deter reasonable employees from complaining about [discrimination] will constitute 

actionable retaliation.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Crady

v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (adverse employment action 

requires more than “mere inconvenience or alteration of job responsibilities”). Once a plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case, the employer bears the burden of articulating a legitimate, nonCase 4:13-cv-01950-KAW Document 80 Filed 02/01/16 Page 8 of 16
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discriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for its actions, and if it does so, the employee must then come 

forward with competent evidence that the employer’s reason is a mere pretext for unlawful retaliation. 

Manatt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a series of discriminatory actions because of his race, 

national origin, and age, and further retaliated against after he filed an EEO complaint. Specifically, 

Plaintiff, who describes himself as a Filipino male over the age of 40, alleges that the DOJ discriminated 

against him when (1) Nicolosi placed him on a PIP on July 31, 2009 for being late on one audit 

assignment but did not place any other auditors who were late on a PIP, (2) in August 2009, Nicolosi 

required him to submit daily reports instead of weekly reports, a task that no other auditor was required 

to perform, and (3) Nicolosi humiliated Plaintiff by forcing him to clean the office kitchen, which 

prevented him from working on his audit and timely completing it. (SAC ¶¶ 7, 17, 31.) Several of the 

challenged actions were not adverse employment actions. In any event, the record shows that the DOJ 

had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged actions. Plaintiff has offered nothing to 

suggest that any of these reasons were pretextual. 

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case based on the PIP, the requirement of daily reports, or 

the kitchen cleaning assignment2because they did not materially affect the terms and conditions of 

employment and therefore are not adverse employment actions. See Cozzi v. Cty. of Marin, 787 F. 

Supp. 2d 1047, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Written warnings and performance improvement plans are not 

adverse actions where they do not materially affect the terms and conditions of employment.”); Cole v. 

Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he performance improvement plan was not a materially 

adverse action because Cole suffered no reduction in responsibility, pay, hours, or any other benefit, and 

it did not impose a material change in her employment duties.”); Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 

27, 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[A] minor disruption in the tasks [an employee] preferred to perform cannot, as 

 

2 With respect to the kitchen cleaning assignment, Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing 

that it was discriminatory. The record reflects that many employees, including Regional Audit Manager 

Gaschke were given collateral duties. (Gaschke Dep. at 62 (Gaschke was on the “roster” for “cleaning 

out the refrigerator.”); Hense Dep. at 97-98 (testifying that employees had “duties to clean out the 

refrigerator” and “go clean up the kitchen”); Sumera Dep. at 103 (“David Gaschke had a piece of paper 

with a schedule requiring auditors to clean the refrigerator.”).)

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a matter of law, sustain [a] claim for damages under Title VII's antidiscrimination provision.”).

Even if these challenged actions are deemed adverse, OIG has demonstrated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for them. As set forth above, there were, unfortunately, multiple problems with 

Plaintiff’s performance. They include:

 Being significantly late in completing audit work. Plaintiff was supposed to issue his 

draft report on the Asotin audit on July 29, 2008. (Sumera Dep. 55-57.) The draft report 

was not issued until February 1, 2009.3 (Sumera Dep. 66-, 82-83.) Plaintiff does not 

dispute that the audit was late. (Sumera Dep. 82, 83.) 

 Plaintiff never completed the Sunnyside grant audits. Plaintiff does not dispute that the 

work was never completed. (Sumera Dep. at 224-225.)

Defendant has produced substantial evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff was terminated for 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence demonstrating that 

the performance-related issues Defendant has identified were pretextual or that other similarly-situated 

auditors outside his protected class were not subject to the same treatment. As such, Defendant is 

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims under Title VII and the ADEA. 

Plaintiff also brings a claim for hostile work environment. In order to demonstrate the prima 

facie elements of a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact as to 

whether (1) the plaintiff was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of protected characteristics; 

(2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Manatt, 339 F.3d 

at 798 (citing Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2002)). A plaintiff must show that 

the work environment was abusive from both a subjective and an objective point of view. Fuller v. City 

of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22

(1993)). “To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII, [the 

courts] look at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it 

 

3

Plaintiff was placed on a PIP in July 31, 2009. (Sumera Dep. 213.)

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unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 

F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). “[O]nly severe or pervasive misconduct can give rise to a hostile work 

environment.” Capristo v. Brennan, No. C-15-1071 EMC, 2015 WL 4396268, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 

2015). That “standard is not without some teeth.” Id. “The Supreme Court has made it clear that 

conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” George v. 

Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff has not put forward evidence of mistreatment that satisfies this standard. Significantly, 

Plaintiff does not claim that he was subjected to any physical or verbal abuse. He testified at his 

deposition that Nicolosi and Gaschke never yelled at him, called him names, or made any racial or agebased comments. (Sumera Dep. at 43, 383-87.) Plaintiff nevertheless claims that he was subject to a 

hostile work environment because Nicolosi “nitpicked” his work and called him frequently to check on 

the progress audits, as well as the fact that he was put on a PIP and tasked with cleaning the kitchen. 

(Sumera Dep. at 383-87.)

Criticisms of a subordinates work—like the “nitpicking,” monitoring and the PIP—do not give 

rise to a hostile work environment. “Criticisms of a subordinate’s work and expressions of disapproval 

(even loud expressions of disapproval) are the kinds of normal strains that can occur in any office setting

. . . . [T]hey do not demonstrate a work environment that was pervaded by discrimination.” Singh v. 

U.S. House of Representatives, 300 F. Supp. 2d 48, 56 (D.D.C. 2004). Neither do negative performance 

reviews. Hutchinson v. Holder, 815 F. Supp. 2d 303, 322 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[N]egative performance 

reviews—even if inaccurate, as Plaintiff claims—are not strong indicia of a hostile work environment.”). 

Nor can “close scrutiny of assignments by management be characterized as sufficiently intimidating or 

offensive in an ordinary workplace context.” Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 

2009).

The fact that Plaintiff was briefly given the collateral duty of kitchen organization does not give 

rise to a hostile work environment either. “[C]omplaints over undesirable job responsibilities and office 

arrangements do not support a hostile work environment cause of action.” Hussain v. Gutierrez, 593 F. 

Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that plaintiff’s allegations that “she was asked to do tasks below 

her job title, asked to sit in the reception area, and told how to organize her desk” did not give rise to a 

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hostile work environment); see also Brooks v. Grundmann, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2012) 

(“[A]ssignment to undesirable duties” does not give rise to a hostile work environment.). There is no 

evidence that plaintiff was given the kitchen duty because of his race, national origin or age. The 

evidence is to the contrary. It was typical for employees in San Francisco Regional Audit Office to be 

asked to perform collateral duties—even Regional Audit Manager Gaschke. (Gaschke Dep. at 62 

(Gaschke was on the “roster” for “cleaning out the refrigerator.”); Hense Dep. at 97-98 (testifying that 

employees had “duties to clean out the refrigerator” and “go clean up the kitchen”); Sumera Dep. at 103 

(“David Gaschke had a piece of paper with a schedule requiring auditors to clean the refrigerator.”).) 

Moreover, Nicolosi sent Plaintiff a note, thanking and commending him for his efforts in the kitchen 

(Sumera Dep. at 110-11), which is not consistent with an intention to “humiliate” Plaintiff. 

“A hostile-work-environment claim is simply not a cause of action for the ordinary tribulations 

of the workplace.” Hutchinson, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 323. While Plaintiff may have found his working 

environment distasteful, no reasonable jury could conclude that the issues about which he complains are 

sufficiently severe to have created a hostile work environment. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 643-44. 

Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim for retaliation. Plaintiff contends that Gaschke issued him a 

Notice of Proposed Removal on February 25, 2010, in retaliation for the informal EEO complaint that he 

filed on September 11, 2009, and the formal EEO complaint he filed on December 14, 2009. (SAC ¶¶ 

102-103; Sumera Dep. at 213:6-20.) Plaintiff further alleges that the EEO initially contacted his 

supervisors about his allegations on September 29, 2009. (SAC ¶ 93). 

But, Plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation fails because he cannot demonstrate a causal link 

between his protected activity and the Notice of Proposed Removal. Nicolosi communicated to Plaintiff 

that there were problems with his performance long before he contacted the EEO. Plaintiff was placed 

on a PIP in July 2009. (Sumera Dep. at 212-13.) In the meetings that Plaintiff had with Nicolosi and 

Gaschke during the period of the PIP, his supervisors communicated to Plaintiff that they did not believe 

he was performing well under the PIP. (Sumera Dep. at 216:8-18 (“Sometimes they would say that I’m 

failing the PIP.”). Thus, Plaintiff cannot raise an inference of causation because the DOJ’s actions after 

the protected activity continued on the same course they had been before the protected activity. See, 

e.g., Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 272 (fact of employer “proceeding along lines previously 

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contemplated . . . is no evidence whatever of causality”). “Since [the record] has established that h[is]

supervisors began the process of terminating h[is] employment before []he engaged in protected activity, 

[]he cannot rely on temporal proximity to satisfy the causal connection element of a prima facie case of 

Title VII retaliation.” Risco v. McHugh, 868 F. Supp. 2d 75, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 

The DOJ also had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the purportedly adverse employment 

actions Plaintiff complains of here. Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence showing that these 

explanations were a pretext. Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to raise a triable issue as to retaliation.

IV. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

Plaintiff objects to portions of the declaration of Wendy M. Garbers (“Garbers Declaration”), his 

deposition transcript and exhibits 3, 7, and 12-15 to that transcript, the transcripts for the depositions of 

Laura Nicolosi, David Gaschke, and Karl Hense, and the December 12, 2012 decision by Administrative 

Judge David T. Kelley. The Court addresses each piece of evidence in turn.

A. Garbers Declaration

Plaintiff objects to paragraphs 2-6 of the Garbers Declaration on the grounds that:

These averments lack foundation, fail to demonstrate factually any basis for personal 

knowledge possessed by Ms. Gerbers [sic] as to the authenticity of the attachments (she 

did not attend the depositions, for example, and do not demonstrate whether the 

documents ostensibly authenticated are in fact not hearsay or somehow subject to an 

exception to the hearsay exclusion. . . . Thus, because the paragraphs [2-6] are 

meaningless in this context, these paragraphs are not relevant FRE, Rules 401-403; 

“[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible.” FRE, Rule 402.

(Pl.’s Objections at 2.)

The challenged paragraphs to the Garbers Declaration are as follows:

2. The deposition of Plaintiff Ruben Sumera was taken on April 30, July 15, and 

September 15, 2015. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the 

transcript of Mr. Sumera’s deposition, as well as Exhibits 3, 7, 12, 13, 14, and 15 to Mr. 

Sumera’s deposition.

3. The deposition of (former) Assistant Regional Audit Manager Laura Nicolosi was 

taken on June 18, 2015. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the 

transcript of Ms. Nicolosi’s deposition.

4. The deposition of Regional Audit Manager David Gaschke was taken on June 4, 2015. 

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the transcript of Mr. Gaschke’s 

deposition.

5. The deposition of Program Analyst Karl Hense was taken on August 27, 2015. 

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the transcript of Mr. Hense’s 

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deposition.

6. On December 12, 2012, EEOC Administrative Judge David T. Kelley issued a 

Memorandum Opinion ruling in Defendant’s favor and finding that Plaintiff had not been 

discriminated against. A true and correct copy of the Memorandum Opinion is attached 

hereto as Exhibit E.

(Garbers Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.). 

Plaintiff’s objections to the Garbers Declaration are OVERRULED. Paragraph 1 to the Garbers 

Declaration reads: “I am an Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern District of California and 

counsel of record for Defendant Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney General, in the abovecaptioned action.” (Id. ¶ 1.) The exhibits to Garbers Declaration were, therefore, properly authenticated 

based on the personal knowledge Ms. Garbers obtained in her capacity as counsel of record for 

Defendant, irrespective of whether she personally attended the depositions.

B. Deposition transcripts

Plaintiff objects to his own deposition transcript and the transcripts of the depositions of 

Nicolosi, Gaschke, and Hense on the grounds that Defendant has relied on them “without establishing 

any foundation, personal knowledge, or authenticity.” (Pl.’s Objections at 2-3.) He argues that they are 

hearsay and should be excluded. (Id. at 2-3.) He also objects to exhibits 3, 7, and 12-15 to the 

Plaintiff’s deposition transcript on the grounds that they are not separately authenticated and are hearsay. 

(Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff’s objections to deposition transcripts are OVERRULED. “A deposition or an extract 

therefrom is authenticated in a motion for summary judgment when it identifies the names of the 

deponent and the action and includes the reporter’s certification that the deposition is a true record of the 

testimony of the deponent.” Orr v. Bank of America NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2002). The 

transcripts for Plaintiff’s deposition and the transcripts of the Gaschke and Hense depositions contain the 

required certification page and identify the name of the respective deponent. This is sufficient. The 

transcript of Nicolosi’s deposition, however, does not contain the required certification page, and for this

reason, the Court has not considered it in deciding the instant motion for summary judgment. The 

objection to the Nicolosi deposition transcript is, therefore, OVERRULED AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s 

objection that the deposition transcripts are hearsay are also OVERRULED, as Plaintiff has not 

identified the specific content that cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible at trial. See 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

Plaintiff’s objections to certain exhibits to the transcript of his own deposition also fail. He 

objects to exhibits 3, 7, and 12-15 on the grounds that they are not separately authenticated and are 

hearsay. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff, however, authenticated and laid the foundation for each exhibit during his 

deposition. Exhibit 3 is a “Notification of Unacceptable Performance and Performance Improvement 

Plan.” (Sumera Dep., Ex. 3.) At his deposition, when shown a copy of the marked exhibit, Plaintiff 

testified that he recognized the document and that it looked like a copy of the PIP he received on or 

about July 31, 2009. (Sumera Dep. at 50-51.) Exhibit 7 is a “Response to Performance Improvement 

Plan” dated August 5, 2009. (Sumera Dep., Ex. 7.) At his deposition, when shown a copy of the 

marked exhibit, Plaintiff stated that he recognized the document, wrote it, and signed it. (Sumera Dep. 

147-148.) Exhibit 12 is a letter from Ruben Sumera to Vontell D. Frost-Tucker. (Sumera Dep., Ex. 12.) 

Upon being shown a copy of the marked exhibit, Plaintiff testified that he recognized the document, that 

it was his writing, and that his signature appeared at the bottom of the document. (Sumera Dep. at 207-

208.) Exhibit 13 is an “Official Notice of Proposed Removal.” (Sumera Dep., Ex. 13.) Plaintiff was 

shown a copy of the marked exhibit, and he testified that it was a copy of the Notice of Proposed 

Removal he received on or about February 25, 2010. (Sumera Dep. 214.) Exhibit 14 is a copy of 

Plaintiff’s letter of resignation. (Sumera Dep., Ex. 14.) When shown a copy of the marked exhibit, 

Plaintiff testified that he recognized the document, which he wrote, and identified it as his letter of 

resignation. (Sumera Dep. 224.) Exhibit 15 is Plaintiff’s “Response to the Official Notice of Proposed 

Removal.” (Sumera Dep., Ex. 15.) Plaintiff was shown a copy of the marked exhibit at his deposition, 

he testified that he recognized the document, and he identified it as his response to the proposed 

removal. (Sumera Dep. 232.)

Plaintiff’s hearsay objection is also OVERRULED as to documents Plaintiff authored and 

signed, i.e., exhibits 7, 12, 14, and 15, which constitute statements of a party-opponent. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 801(d)(2). The Notification of Unacceptable Performance and Performance Improvement Plan 

(exhibit 3) and the Notice of Proposed Removal (exhibit 13) would be admissible business records. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Plaintiff’s hearsay objection to these documents, then, is also OVERRULED.

///

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C. EEOC decision

Plaintiff objects to the December 12, 2012 decision by Administrative Judge David T. Kelly on 

the grounds that it “is not relevant to these proceedings because it has no evidentiary value herein” and 

“Defendant has attached [it] . . . without establishing any foundation, personal knowledge, or 

authenticity.” (Pl.’s Objections at 3.) Plaintiff argues that the decision is hearsay and should be 

excluded. (Id.) Because the Court has not relied on the decision in deciding the instant motion, 

Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED AS MOOT.

V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 02/01/16

__________________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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