Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01610/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01610-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tracy Eugene Kelley, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-1610-PHX-NVW (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Tracy Eugene Kelley filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 14, 2014, 

challenging his convictions, pursuant to a plea agreement, in Maricopa County Superior 

Court for two class 4 felonies. His habeas petition alleges that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Respondents contend that his petition is untimely. As explained 

below, the Court recommends that Kelley’s petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 In April 2009, Kelley was found guilty in Maricopa County Superior Court for 

armed robbery and unlawful use of means of transportation. (Doc. 10, Ex. H) While on 

probation for these two convictions, Kelley absconded. (Id.) He was later arrested for 

drug possession; during this arrest, he acknowledged having a handgun in his pocket. 

(Id.) On June 1, 2012, Kelley entered a plea of guilty in Maricopa County Superior Court 

to one count of possession or use of dangerous drugs and one count of misconduct 

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involving weapons with one prior felony conviction. (Doc. 10, Ex. E) The Court 

reviewed the plea agreement with Kelley and then advised him “of all pertinent 

constitutional rights and rights of review.” (Id.) 

 On August 3, 2012, the Court sentenced Kelley to concurrent terms of three years 

for the possession charge and five-and-one-half years for the weapons charge (“2012 

sentences”). (Doc. 10, Ex I) The Court also ordered Kelley confined for one-and-onehalf years for violating his probation in the unlawful use of means of transportation 

charge, and five years for violating his probation in the armed robbery charge. (Doc. 10, 

Exs. F, G) The Court ordered Kelley’s confinement in the probation violations to begin 

after his 2012 sentences and to run consecutively to each other. (Id.) At his sentencing, 

Kelley received a “Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure” which 

detailed his right to post-conviction relief, including the timeframe for initiating such 

relief. (Doc. 10, Ex. J) Kelley signed this Notice to acknowledge his receipt. (Id.) 

 On December 12, 2012, the Maricopa County Superior Court filed a document 

from Kelley titled “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief Counsel Request.” (Doc. 10, Ex. K) 

It is a one-page, entirely handwritten document that says “On this 3rd day of November 

2012 I file this notice and request counsel.” Kelley wrote “11/3/12” next to his signature 

and underneath he wrote “Mailed 11/5/12.” (Id.) 

 On January 22, 2013, the Superior Court dismissed his notice as untimely under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a), stating that Kelley’s “notice of postconviction relief was due not later than November 2, 2012,” he did not timely file his 

notice, and “no circumstance has been shown that might justify [Kelley’s] untimely 

filing.” (Doc. 10, Ex. L) On January 31, 2013, Kelley filed a “Request to Review” in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals arguing that prison officials had withheld Rule 32 forms from 

him and so he could not timely mail this Notice. (Doc. 10, Ex. M) On March 18, 2014, 

the Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief. (Doc. 10, Ex. N) The Court 

noted that “Kelley did not use a form for his notice of post-conviction relief. He filed a 

handwritten pleading, and he offers no explanation why this handwritten pleading could 

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not have been timely filed.” State v. Kelley, 2014 WL 1048370 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 

2014). (Doc. 10, Ex. N) The Court of Appeals concluded that the Superior Court did not 

abuse its discretion when it summarily dismissed Kelley’s notice. (Id.) 

 On July 14, 2014, Kelley filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. 

(Doc. 1) His Petition argues that (1) his counsel was ineffective because he did not 

receive concurrent sentences and (2) he tried to timely file his Rule 32 Notice. (Id. at 6-

8) He also states “I should not have been found guilty of the crimes as there is no factual 

and legal basis.” (Id. at 8) Respondents contend that his Petition is untimely and that he 

is not entitled to equitable tolling. The Court agrees and recommends that this Petition be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Kelley’s Petition is Untimely. 

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is 

required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during 

the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). If a defendant is convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, then 

the first post-conviction proceeding is considered a form of direct review and the 

conviction becomes “final” for purposes of Section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the Rule 32 ofright proceeding concludes. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a 

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for 

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”) (internal quotation omitted); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (conviction pursuant to plea agreement is final on expiration of 

the time for seeking Rule 32 relief). 

 Kelley was sentenced on August 3, 2012, and his post-conviction proceedings 

were final 90 days later, on November 2, 2012.1

 The Superior Court’s rejection of 

 

1

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Kelley’s notice means that it “must be treated as improperly filed, or as though it never 

existed,” such that “for purposes of section 2244(d), the pendency of that petition did not 

toll the limitations period.” Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Accordingly, Kelley’s one year limitations period began on November 3, 2012, and he 

was required to file his habeas petition in this court by November 3, 2013. Instead, he 

filed his habeas petition over eight months later, on July 14, 2014. Therefore, his petition 

is untimely. 

Kelley is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling. 

 Kelley’s Petition is untimely unless he can show that he is entitled to equitable 

tolling.2

 To make such a showing, Kelley must demonstrate both that he pursued his 

rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing his 

petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 

 Kelley repeatedly claims that his requests for a Rule 32 Notice form were denied. 

(Doc. 1; Doc. 10 at Ex. M) When he requested that the Court of Appeals review the 

dismissal of his Rule 32 Notice, he said that he had received the forms in November 

2012, immediately asked inmates to help, and then mailed the form. (Doc. 10, Ex. M) In 

his Petition, he states that he never received the form and so he “finally took a piece of 

paper and wrote the notice and timely gave it as legal mail.” (Doc. 1 at p. 7) These 

inconsistent explanations do not explain why his solution – a handwritten Notice – was 

not, and could not have been, timely filed. Because Kelley has not demonstrated that he 

pursued his rights diligently, he is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

 Kelley had until the following Monday, November 4, 2012, to timely file his Rule 32 

petition. (Doc. 10 at p. 8, n.3) However, the Court of Appeals found no error of law in 

the Superior Court’s conclusion that Kelley’s deadline was November 2, 2012, and this 

Court defers to that decision. See, e.g., Rawson v. Mauldin, 2009 WL 2761917, at *2 (D. 

Ariz. Aug. 28, 2009) (“The state court found that Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition . . . was untimely, and this Court must defer to that finding.”). 

2

 The Ninth Circuit has recognized an actual innocence exception to the limitations bar. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011). Kelley makes one statement in his Petition that alludes to an innocence claim but he does not provide any supporting arguments or information. (Doc. 1 at p. 8) Because his one assertion does not 

demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. at 937, this argument is unavailing. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Tracy Eugene Kelley’s Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 15th day of April, 2015. 

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