Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05883/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05883-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: SOPHIA NG,

Debtor

__________________________________/

PATRICIA HEWLETT,

Appellant,

 v.

JANINA ELDER,

Appellee. /

No. C 07-05883 CRB

Bankruptcy No. 06-30904 TEC

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL AS

UNTIMELY

Appellant Patricia Hewlett appeals from the bankruptcy court’s order of turnover of

real property entered by the court on September 28, 2007 and amended on November 2,

2007. Now pending before the Court for decision is the motion of appellee Janina Elder, the

bankruptcy trustee, to dismiss the appeal as untimely. After carefully considering the papers

and oral argument of the parties, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 30, 2006, the debtor Sophia Ng filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy. At the

time the bankruptcy was filed Ng owned real property, including an apartment building

located at 1385 Clay Street. In January 2007, appellant Patricia Hewlett filed a proof of

claim in the Ng bankruptcy claiming various interests in 1385 Clay Street based on preCase 3:07-cv-05883-CRB Document 26 Filed 02/11/08 Page 1 of 5
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bankruptcy petition contracts. These interests included the right to occupy one of the units,

manage and operate the building, and purchase the building at a particular price. The Trustee

subsequently filed an adversary proceeding against Hewlett challenging her claimed interests

in 1385 Clay Street and objected to Hewlett’s proof of claim.

The Trustee moved to sell 1385 Clay free and clear of any liens and interests,

including Hewlett’s claimed interests so that the property could be sold. By Order filed

September 28, 2007, the bankruptcy court granted the motion and, among other things,

enjoined Hewlett from going onto any part of 1385 Clay Street. In particular, the bankruptcy

court ordered that as of noon on September 28, 2007, “all possessory, management,

ownership, and other interests of Patricia Hewlett in the Property are terminated.” 

Hewlett responded to this Order by filing a complaint with the San Francisco Rent

Control Board. The Trustee successfully moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that

it was filed in violation of the bankruptcy automatic stay and that the 1385 Clay is an asset of

the bankruptcy estate and therefore under the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.

On October 30, 2007, Hewlett filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court, case

number C 07-5532 CRB, seeking to vacate the bankruptcy court’s September 28, 2007

Order. This Court denied the petition by Order filed October 31, 2007.

By Order filed November 2, 2007, the bankruptcy court issued an order amending the

September 28, 2007 turnover order. The Order reads: 

In addition to the September 28, 2007 order relating to Patricia Hewlett, as of

November 2, 2007 at 5:00 p.m., Patricia Hewlett’s brother, Javier Rivera, shall

vacate [1385 Clay St.] and Mr. Rivera is hereby enjoined from going into any

part of the Property, except as expressly authorized by an order of this court or

upon written express consent of Trustee. Mr. Rivera is also ordered to deliver

to the office of the trustee’s counsel (Jeffrey Fillerup at 121 Spear St., Suite

200, San Francisco, California, 94105) any and all keys to any doors or locks at

[1385 Clay], including but not limited to keys to unit #3, the entrances to the

building, and any other unit in the building, by 5:00 p.m. on November 2,

2007.

No other relief is provided in the Order.

Hewlett filed this appeal on November 5, 2007. Her brother, Javier Rivera, also filed

an appeal the same day. He subsequently dismissed his appeal with prejudice. Appellee

moves to dismiss Hewlett’s appeal on the ground that it is untimely.

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DISCUSSION

A party must file a notice of appeal of a bankruptcy order, judgment or decree within

10 days of the filing of the challenged order. Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a). “The provisions of

Bankruptcy Rule 8002 are jurisdictional; the untimely filing of a notice of appeal deprives

the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s order.” In re Mouradick,

13 F.3d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1994). “Because of the jurisdictional implications, this court

[must] strictly construe[] the ten-day requirement.” In re Souza, 795 F.2d 855, 857 (9th Cir.

1986).

Appellee moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the bankruptcy court issued

its turnover order as to Hewlett on September 28, 2007--much more than 10 days before

Hewlett filed her Notice of Appeal. See Saunders v. Band Plus Mortgage Corp., 31 F.3d 767

(9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing as untimely appeal filed 12 days after entry of bankruptcy court

order appealed from).

Hewlett does not dispute that her appeal is untimely as to the September 28, 2007

Order; instead, she contends that her appeal is timely because the bankruptcy court amended

the September 28 Order on November 2, 2007--only three days before she filed her appeal. 

Hewlett first argues that because her brother appealed the November 2 Order, she had

ten days to file her Notice of Appeal. As support for her argument she cites Bankruptcy Rule

8002(a) which provides that “[i]f a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party

may file a notice of appeal within 10 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal was

filed.” Hewlett thus interprets this Rule as making an appeal from any order timely provided

it is filed within 10 days of another party’s appeal, even if the other party’s appeal is of a

different order.

Hewlett does not cite any case to support her expansive view of Rule 8002(a). This

omission is unsurprising given that such a Rule would make the 10-day appeal rule and the

strict construction of such rule meaningless. If Hewlett is correct she could appeal an order

issued two year’s earlier upon another party’s appeal of an order issued two year’s later, even

if the later order has nothing to do with Hewlett or the earlier order. When Rule 8002(a) is

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read in context and as a whole it is manifest that another party’s appeal of an order extends

the time for a different party filing an appeal of the same order. Rule 8002(a) thus does not

save Hewlett’s appeal.

Next, Hewlett argues that because the November 2, 2007 Order amended the

September 28 turnover order, the 10 days to appeal her eviction in the September 28 Order

ran anew from the issuance of the latter order. In FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator

Co., 344 U.S. 206 (1952), the Supreme Court held that while the period for review is not

tolled every time a judgment is revised “in an immaterial way,” that period is tolled “when

the lower court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity in a [prior]

judgment. The test is a practical one. The question is whether the lower court, in its second

order, has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had

been plainly and properly settled with finality.” FTC, 344 U.S. at 211-12.

The question here, then, is whether the bankruptcy court’s November 2, 2007 Order

“disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment [the Sep. 28

Order], had been plainly and properly settled with finality.” Id. The answer is no. The

September 28 Order settled the issue of Patricia Hewlett’s occupation of and any interest in

1385 Clay. The amended November 2 Order did not “disturb or revise[] legal rights and

obligations” settled by the September 28 Order; the November 2 Order merely addressed the

legal rights of a different person, Hewlett’s brother.

At oral argument Hewlett argued that she had subleased a unit to her brother and

therefore the November 2 Order affected her legal rights; namely, the right to collect rent

from her brother. This argument does not make sense. The September 28 Order terminated

every property interest Hewlett had in 1385 Clay, including the right, if she had one, to

sublease her unit. The November 2 Order did not disturb or revise Hewlett’s legal rights in

1385 Clay–it terminated Hewlett’s brother’s legal rights in the building, to the extent any had

existed.

//

//

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Moreover, Bankruptcy Rule 8001 expressly identifies when a later order will extend

the time to appeal an earlier-filed order. Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b). For example, if a party

makes a timely motion to make additional findings of fact under Rule 7052, the time for

appeal runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion to make additional findings. 

Id. 8002(b)(1). Appellee’s motion to amend the September 28 Order to exclude Hewlett’s

brother from the property does not fall within any of the identified motions. Id. 8002(b0(1)-

(4).

CONCLUSION

As Hewlett seeks to appeal the September 28 Order, and as the November 2 Order did

not “revise or disturb” legal rights or obligations addressed by the September 28 Order,

Hewlett’s appeal is untimely and is therefore DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: Feb. 11, 2008 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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