Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01142/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeffrey Dennis Quiggle,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-14-1142-PHX-SRB (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on May 28, 2014 (Doc. 1). On July 1, 2014, Respondents filed their Limited 

Answer (Doc. 8), asserting defenses of the statute of limitations and procedural default. 

Petitioner filed a Reply on July 29, 2014 (Doc. 9).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On April 16, 2010, Petitioner was charged in a Direct Complaint with one count 

of sexual conduct with a minor, and two counts of molestation of a child. (Exhibit G.) 

(Exhibits to the Limited Answer, Doc. 8 are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

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Petitioner eventually entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit A), wherein 

he agreed to plead no contest to three counts of attempted molestation of a 6 year old 

child, with a stipulated sentence of 10 years on the first count, and lifetime probation on 

the other two counts. Petitioner was represented by counsel. (Id.) Petitioner entered his 

plea pursuant to the plea agreement, and the plea was accepted. (Exhibit B, M.E. 

1/27/11.) On March 4, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced to ten years on the first count, and 

consecutive terms of lifetime probation on the other two counts. (Exhibit C, Sentence.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.) 

Moreover, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. 

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 

614, 616 (1995).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding - On December 1, 2011, almost nine months after his 

sentence, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit D), asserting a 

claim of actual innocence. On December 12, 2011, the PCR court summarily dismissed 

the notice, noting that Petitioner had proffered nothing to support his allegations of 

actual innocence, citing to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5, and concluding that Petitioner “fails to 

state a claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” 

(Exhibit E, M.E. 12/12/11 at 2.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) 

Second PCR Proceeding – Almost five months later, n May 1, 2012, Petitioner 

filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, asserting a significant change of the law 

under Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1339 (March 21, 2012) (ineffective assistance in 

failing to communicate plea offer) and Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (March 21, 

2012) (ineffective assistance leading to rejection of favorable plea offer). (Petition, Doc. 

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1, Exhibits, at physical page 12). The PCR court observed that neither Frye nor Lafler

applied because Petitioner was provided the plea offer, and took it. Consequently, the 

PCR court concluded that the claim was not founded upon an applicable change in the 

law, and thus the notice was untimely and precluded as successive. (Exhibit F, M.E. 

5/7/12.) 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was summarily denied for 

failure to attach a mailing certificate. (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibits at physical page 19.) 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review. (Id. at physical page 31, “Appellant’s 

Opening Brief.”) That petition was summarily denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals 

on August 8, 2013. (Id. at physical page 23, Order 8/8/13.) Petitioner moved to extend 

the time to seek reconsideration, which was denied. (Id. at physical page 24, Order 

8/27/13.) Petitioner was, however, granted an extension of time to file a petition for 

review. (Id. at physical page 25, Order 9/10/13.) 

Ultimately, Petitioner filed a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

(Id. at physical page 27, “Motion for Review” 10/18/13.) That petition was summarily 

denied on March 27, 2014. (Id. at physical page 26, Order 3/27/14.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition – Two months later, Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 28, 2014 (Doc. 

1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following two grounds for relief:

1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel arising out of advice regarding the potential 

for using interviews of the victim in lieu of testimony. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.)

2. Denial of due process as a result of the trial judge’s active participation in plea 

negotiations. (Id. at 7.) 

Petitioner argues that any untimeliness should be excused because his first PCR 

petition was filed upon discovering that his attorney rendered bad advice on the 6th

Amendment, and his second PCR was founded upon a change in the law.

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Response - On July 1, 2014, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 8). Respondents argue that the Petition is barred by the habeas statute of 

limitations, and Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his available state remedies.

Reply - On July 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 9). Petitioner concedes 

that his first PCR petition was untimely, and that such untimeliness resulted from his 

lack of knowledge of applicable rules. (Id. at 2.) He argues that his second PCR petition 

was properly founded upon changes in the law. (Id. at 2-3.) With regard to the 

procedural default defense, Petitioner argues that his claims were presented in his 

petitions for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals and to the Arizona Supreme Court.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Conviction Final - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions 

generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).1 

 

1

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

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For an Arizona noncapital pleading defendant, the conviction becomes “final” at 

the conclusion of the first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32. 

“Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a pleaconvicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of 

conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for 

Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Here, Petitioner’s did not file an “of-right proceeding,” and his time to do so 

expired on Thursday, June 2, 2011, 90 days after his sentence of March 4, 2011. (His 

first PCR notice was not filed until December 1, 2011, almost six months after the 

expiration of this deadline.) 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction was final, and his habeas statute of 

limitations ordinarily would have begun running, on June 3, 2011.

New Rule – The habeas limitations statue provides a later commencement date 

of “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the 

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 

Petitioner argues that his Petition is based on new rules adopted by the U.S. Supreme 

Court in Frye and Lafler, decided March 21, 2012. “[N] neither Frye nor Lafler can 

form the basis for an application for a second or successive motion because neither case 

decided a new rule of constitutional law.” Buenrostro v. U.S., 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9

th

Cir. 2012). See also In re Liddell, 722 F.3d 737, 738 (6th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (citing 

cases); and Pagan-San Miguel v. U.S., 736 F.3d 44, 45 (1

st Cir. 2013).

Moreover, even assuming Frye and Lafler established a new constitutional right, 

§ 2244(d)(1)(C) requires that such a new right be made “retroactively applicable to cases 

on collateral review.” Petitioner points to no decision by the Supreme Court making 

Frye or Lafler retroactively applicable. The undersigned has found none. 

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Thus, Petitioner’s claim in his Petition is not founded on a constitutional right 

within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), and the finality of his conviction 

remains the proper commencement date for his habeas limitations period.

Newly Discovered Factual Predicate – In addition, section 2244(d)(1)(D) does 

provide an alternative commencement on “the date on which the factual predicate of the 

claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.” Thus, where despite the exercise of due diligence a petitioner was unable to 

discover the factual predicate of his claim, the statute does not commence running on 

that claim until the earlier of such discovery or the elimination of the disability which 

prevented discovery. 

Here, Petitioner argues that his PCR petition was delayed because he was 

unaware of his claim in Ground One, asserting ineffective assistance on the issue of his 

6

th Amendment right to confront the victim. However, Petitioner proffers nothing to 

establish that he was unable to discover the factual predicate of his claim on a timely 

basis. Rather, he argues that he filed his first PCR petition “after I found out that what 

my attorney had said and done was in violation of the Sixth Amendment.” (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 11.) He acknowledges that trial counsel “informed him that the family of his 

alleged victim was not going to let her testify, that the state was going to be able to use 

the tapes from the interview instead,” but asserts that “[w]hat petitioner’s trial counsel 

failed to tell him was that by the state doing this was/is in direct violation of the 

confrontational clause of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. constitution.” (Reply, Doc. 9 

at 3-4.) 

Thus, it appears that Petitioner was been aware of the facts underlying his claim 

in Ground One since before sentencing, and it was only the legal significance of those 

facts which was unknown. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not extend to a lack of 

knowledge of the law, unless it constitutes a decision in Petitioner’s own case. Shannon 

v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, although Petitioner may not 

have discovered until filing his first PCR that he may have had a constitutional right to 

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demand that the victim testify, that fact does not extend the commencement of the 

habeas limitations period. 

Moreover, the commencement is not delayed until actual discovery, but only until 

the date on which it “could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that he exercised due 

diligence in discovering his claim, and that he could not have discovered it until his first 

PCR petition was filed.

Finally, even if it is assumed that § 2244(d)(1)(D) applied, Petitioner was fully 

aware of his claim as of his December 1, 2011 first PCR petition. Thus, at best, his 

habeas statute of limitations would have begun running thereafter, and would have 

expired on December 1, 2012, long before the instant habeas petition was filed.

Conclusion re Commencement - Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running 

on June 3, 2011 (after the expiration of his time to commence an of-right PCR 

proceeding), and without any tolling expired on Monday, June 4, 2012,

2 making his May 

28, 2014 Petition almost two years delinquent.3

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

First PCR Proceeding - Petitioner’s limitations period commenced running on 

June 3, 2011. Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was commenced when he filed his PCR 

Notice on December 1, 2011, before his limitations period expired. Because it does not 

 

2 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), because the one year expired on Saturday, June 2, 

2012, Petitioner had through the next business day, Monday, June 4, 2012.

3

Petitioner’s habeas Petition is dated May 22, 2014. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) 

Even if this Court were to find that the Petition should be deemed filed as of that date 

rather than May 28, 2014, the 6 days difference would not be sufficient to make 

Petitioner’s Petition timely.

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alter the outcome, the undersigned treats the commencement date of this proceeding as 

the date of the signature of the notice, November 28, 2011. (Exhibit D, PCR Not. at 3.) 

That proceeding remained pending through December 12, 2011. (See Exhibit E, M.E. 

12/12/11.) 

Ordinarily, therefore, Petitioner’s limitations period would be deemed statutorily 

tolled for no more than 14 days, from November 28, 2011 through December 12, 20114.

However, Respondents point out that statutory tolling of the habeas limitations 

period only results from state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely 

application is never “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s first PCR 

petition was found to be untimely, and therefore was not properly filed and resulted in no 

statutory tolling. 

Indeed, the PCR court concluded that Petitioner’s PCR notice was untimely, 

despite Petitioner’s reliance on the time limit exception in Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.1(h) for claims of actual innocence. 

That determination was based upon a determination that Petitioner had not 

provided the facts underlying his claim of actual innocence. The ordinary requirements 

for a PCR notice are simply that it “bear the caption of the original criminal action or 

actions to which it pertains.” And, although the Rule requires the court to “provide 

notice forms for commencement of all post-conviction relief proceedings,” the use of 

such forms does not appear mandatory, nor are there any requirements for any detailed 

pleading in the notice. 

Thus, to find the PCR notice inadequate, the PCR court asserted reliance on 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.5. However, Rule 32.5 establishes the criteria for 

a petition for post-conviction relief, and mandates that PCR petitions have detailed facts, 

etc.. Here, Petitioner was never permitted to file such a petition. Rather, as required by 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4, Petitioner first filed a “notice of post-conviction relief.” Indeed, 

 

4

Even with such tolling, Petitioner’s Petition would still be over six months delinquent.

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under Rule 32.4(c), because Petitioner was “proceeding without counsel” he had “sixty 

days to file a petition from the date the notice is filed or from the date the request for 

counsel is denied.” Thus, his PCR petition was not due to be filed until Monday, 

January 30, 2012, over a month and half after the PCR court had already dismissed the 

proceeding. 

Nonetheless, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4232 does mandate that when an untimely PCR 

notice asserts a claim of actual innocence under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4231(5), “the 

notice shall set forth the substance of the claim and the reasons for not raising the claim 

in the previous petition or in a timely manner. If the notice does not state meritorious 

reasons substantiating the claim and why the claim was not stated in the previous petition 

or in a timely manner, the proceeding shall be summarily dismissed.” Cf. State v. Pruett, 

185 Ariz. 128, 132, 912 P.2d 1357, 1361 and n. 5 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1995) (finding 

erroneous dismissal of PCR notice as untimely, before petition asserting delayed claims 

could be filed, but noting “recent statutory modifications” mandating “a petitioner 

attempting to raise such claims in a successive or untimely petition must set forth in the 

notice of post-conviction relief the substance of the claim and the reason for not raising it 

in the previous petition or in a timely manner”). 

Thus, the PCR court properly mandated that Petitioner lay out facts supporting his 

claim of actual innocence, albeit under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4232 rather than Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.5. And, here, Petitioner plainly failed to state any such facts, and instead 

simply asserted that he had been “trying since I was sentence to prison to get the 

evidence that I need to prove the facts.” (Exhibit D, PCR Notice at 3.)

Thus, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s first PCR petition was untimely, 

was therefore not “properly filed,” and as a result Petitioner is not entitled to any 

statutory tolling for its pendency.

Second PCR Proceeding – Petitioner also commenced his second PCR 

proceeding while his limitations period was running, by filing his second PCR notice on 

May 1, 2012. Because it does not alter the outcome, the undersigned treats the 

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commencement date of this proceeding as the date of the signature of the incorporated 

affidavit of indigency, April 24, 2012. (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibits at physical page 14.) 

However, Respondents contend this proceeding was also dismissed as untimely, thus 

precluding any tolling. 

Here, the PCR court noted that Petitioner relied upon the exception for a 

“significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant's case would 

probably overturn the defendant's conviction or sentence,” under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.1(g). That exception, however, does not require that a change in the law actually 

apply to the defendant’s case, for the exception to apply. Rather, the claim is considered 

timely as long as the law has changed, and that change (if determined to apply) would 

justify relief.

Here, the PCR court ultimately concluded that the changes asserted did not apply.

That did not, however, mean that the exception did not apply or that the proceeding was 

untimely. See Hess v. Ryan, 651 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1022-1025 (D. Arizona 2009) (citing 

State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 823 P.2d 41 (1991)). It simply meant that Petitioner 

was not entitled to relief. 

When a new principle of law is articulated, a defendant whose 

conviction has become final may seek relief under Rule 32. That 

defendant is insulated from the rules of finality and preclusion 

when, as the rule contemplates, there “has been a significant change 

in the law applied in the process which led” to conviction or 

sentence. Whether relief may be obtained under Rule 32 then 

depends on the question of retroactive application of the new 

principle of law. 

State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 184, 823 P.2d 41, 51 (1991) (en banc). 

Consequently, at least with respect to Petitioner’s claim of a change in the law, his 

second PCR proceeding was timely initiated, albeit ultimately unsuccessful. 

Therefore Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the pendency of this 

proceeding. 

At the time this proceeding was commenced on April 24, 2012, Petitioner had 

used 326 days of his one year, and had only 39 days remaining. The proceeding 

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remained pending through September 10, 2013, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

Petitioner’s petition for review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at Exhibit, at physical page 25.) 

Petitioner’s one year would have then begin running again on September 11, 2013, and 

expired 39 days later, on Monday, October 21, 2013. As a result, his May 28, 2014 

Petition was over seven months delinquent.

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner does not proffer any grounds for equitable tolling, and the undersigned 

finds none.

Petitioner does complain that he was ignorant of the law, and overwhelmed by 

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“facing the rest of his life in prison.” (Reply, Doc. 9 at 5.) 

With regard to Petitioner’s lack of legal prowess, “[i]t is clear that pro se status, 

on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 

970 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner's “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ 

circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 

204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). And, ignorance of the law is not grounds for 

equitable tolling. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se

petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling”).

Nor would Petitioner’s purported mental state establish grounds for equitable 

tolling. "Where a habeas petitioner's mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to 

meet the AEDPA filing deadline, his delay was caused by an "extraordinary 

circumstance beyond [his] control," and the deadline should be equitably tolled." Laws 

v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). In Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th 

Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit articulated a two-part test to determine whether a mental 

impairment amounts to an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. 

The impairment must have (1) been “so severe that the petitioner was unable 

personally...to understand the need to timely file...a habeas petition,” and (2) “made it 

impossible under the totality of the circumstances to meet the filing deadline despite 

petitioner’s diligence.” Id. at 1093.

Petitioner proffers nothing beyond his broad assertion that he was overwhelmed 

by his circumstances such that he was at “a substantial disadvantage.” (Reply, Doc. 9 at 

5.) A mere disadvantage is not enough to justify equitable tolling; rather, Petitioner must 

show that a timely habeas filing was impossible, e.g. that he was unable to understand 

the need for a timely filing. His bare allegations of being disadvantaged by his 

circumstances fails to assert that level of disability.

Moreover, Petitioner managed to file multiple state petitions during the running of

his habeas limitations period. The ability to file petitions during the limitations period is 

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evidence that Petitioner’s mental illness did not prevent him from filing a habeas 

petition. See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010); Gaston v. Palmer, 

417 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because [petitioner] was capable of preparing and 

filing state court petitions [during the limitations period], it appears that he was capable 

of preparing and filing a [federal] petition during the time in between those dates.”), 

modified on other grounds, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Laws, 351 F.3d at 

923 (“Of course, a petitioner’s statement [of mental illness], even if sworn, need not 

convince a court that equitable tolling is justified should countervailing evidence be 

introduced.”). 

Finally, even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing for a 

time, equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue filing 

afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable 

diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of 

causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and 

the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde v. 

Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). But see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th 

Cir. 2002), McKeown, J. dissenting (arguing that equitable tolling should work a 

stoppage of the clock, with a resulting extension of the deadline). Ordinarily, thirty days 

after elimination of a roadblock should be sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 

1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he acted 

diligently in the face of his circumstances. Here, some seven months elapsed since the 

conclusion of Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding in which Petitioner demonstrated his 

capacity to pursue his claims. Petitioner makes no explanation for his failure to 

promptly file his federal petition after the conclusion of that proceeding.

On these circumstances, the undersigned finds no basis for equitable tolling of the 

habeas limitations period.

/ /

/ /

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5. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). The petitioner must make a showing of actual innocence on each charge from 

which he seeks relief. Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Moreover, "[i]n cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges in the 

course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing of actual innocence must also extend to 

those charges." Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998). In Griffin v. Johnson, 350 

F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held "that habeas petitioners may pass 

Schlup’s test by offering 'newly presented' evidence of actual innocence," and that the 

actual innocence determination is not limited to newly discovered evidence. 

However, Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding.

Petitioner did assert such a claim in his first PCR proceeding. However, as 

discussed hereinabove, Petitioner failed to proffer anything to the PCR court to support 

that claim. In his second PCR notice, Petitioner again argued his innocence, but did so 

only by asserting that his “wife is an alibi witness and will testify she was with me and 

not where the accuser said she was at the time of the alleged crime.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

Exhibits, at physical page 16, 2nd PCR Notice, Attachment A.)

However, Petitioner fails to present anything other than his conclusory allegations 

that his wife would provide an alibi. Schlup instructed that a claim of actual innocence 

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must be supported by “new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that 

was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Moreover, a petitioner may not 

simply allege that such evidence exists, but must present it to the habeas court, through 

affidavit of the witness, etc. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342, 1352-1353 (8th Cir. 

1997). Petitioner has not presented an affidavit from wife to support his allegation of an 

alibi. Nor does he proffer anything to suggest why such an affidavit should be deemed 

trustworthy. 

Accordingly, there is no basis for a finding of actual innocence.

6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period expired no later than October 21, 2013, making his May 28, 2014 

Petition over seven months delinquent. Petitioner has shown no basis for additional 

statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable tolling or actual innocence to avoid the 

effects of his delay. 

Consequently, the Petition must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents also argue that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his state 

remedies on his claims, barring habeas relief. Because the undersigned finds the petition 

plainly barred by the habeas statute of limitations, these other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

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cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

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of Habeas Corpus, filed May 28, 2014 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: September 19, 2014

14-1142r RR 14 09 12 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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