Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00207/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CELSO GUERRERO, )

)

)

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-207 REC

(No. CR-F-96-5339 MDC) 

ORDER DEEMING MOTION FOR

RESENTENCING TO BE MOTION

FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 2255, DISMISSING

DEEMED § 2255 MOTION AND

DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

FOR RESPONDENT 

On February 22, 2006, petitioner Celso Guerrero filed a

"Motion for Resentencing To Time Served Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201

(Creation of a Remedy) and Fed.R.Cv.P. 60(b)(6)". By this

motion, petitioner request that his conviction be vacated or that

he be resentenced to time served.

Petitioner was convicted by jury trial of conspiracy to

manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, manufacture of methamphetamine, and possession

of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Petitioner was

Case 1:06-cv-00207-REC Document 2 Filed 03/13/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Section 2201(a) provides in pertinent part: 1

In a case of actual controversy within its

jurisdiction ..., any court of the United

States, upon the filing of an appropriate

pleading, may declare the rights and other

legal relations of any interested party

seeking such declaration, whether or not

further relief is or could be sought. Any

such declaration shall have the full force and

effect of a final judgment or decree and shall

be reviewable as such.

2

sentenced on March 16, 1998 to 306 months incarceration and 60

months of supervised release. Petitioner appealed to the Ninth

Circuit, which affirmed his conviction and sentence on February

3, 2000. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for

relief pursuant to Section 2255 based on Apprendi v. New Jersey. 

Petitioner’s motion was denied by Order filed on October 15,

2001. By Order filed on February 4, 2002, a Certificate of

Appealability was issued with regard to petitioner’s claim that

Apprendi v. New Jersey should be applied retroactively on

collateral review. On May 8, 2003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed

the denial of the Section 2255 motion.

In the instant motion, petitioner asserts that the motion is

brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Petitioner asserts that 1

he is entitled to relief pursuant to Section 2201 “because of the

adverse effects on his Liberty Interests caused by the violation

of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights which resulted in the 360

month sentence that was based on the PSR instead of an indictment

and the jury’s verdict.” Petitioner further contends that he has

“been injured by the deprivation of his liberty without due

Case 1:06-cv-00207-REC Document 2 Filed 03/13/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

process of law, and this was the result of ineffective trial and

appellate counsel.” Petitioner further contends that he is

entitled to relief because witness Cazares testified at trial to

the hearsay statement of John Simpson in violation of the

Confrontation Clause as recognized by the Supreme Court in

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which has been made

retroactive by the Ninth Circuit in Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d

1010, amended on denial of rehearing, 408 F.3d 1127 (9 Cir. th

2005), petition for cert. filed. 

In general, Section 2255 provides the exclusive procedural

mechanism by which a federal prisoner may test the legality of

his detention. Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9 Cir. th

2000). An exception to this rule exists where a petitioner

demonstrates that Section 2255 relief is unavailable or

ineffective. However, this exception is construed very narrowly. 

Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 th

U.S. 1178 (2000). Section 2255's remedy is not unavailable or

inadequate merely because Section 2255's gatekeeping provisions

prevent the petitioner from filing a second or successive Section

2255 motion. Lorentsen v. Hood, id. A federal prisoner cannot

circumvent the procedural requirements of Section 2255 by looking

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or the All Writs Act. See United States v.

Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 (9 Cir. 2001). In Ivy v. th

Pontesso, 325 F.3d 1037 (9 Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held th

that a petitioner raising a claim of “actual innocence” who is

otherwise procedurally barred from raising that claim under

Case 1:06-cv-00207-REC Document 2 Filed 03/13/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Section 2255 may seek relief pursuant to Section 2241 

when the petitioner claims to be: (1) legally

innocent of the crime for which he has been

convicted; and (2) has never had an

‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting

this claim. ... In other words, it is not

enough that the petitioner is presently

barred from raising his claim of innocence my

motion under § 2255. He must never have had

the opportunity to raise it by motion.

325 F.3d at 1060. 

Here, to the extent that petitioner claims he is entitled to

relief pursuant to Section 2201 on the ground that the sentence

imposed was based on the Presentence Investigation Report rather

than the allegations of the Indictment and the jury’s verdict,

and that the failure to raise such claims was the result of

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, such

claims are cognizable under Section 2255 and do not constitute a

claim of “actual innocence”. Although petitioner cites In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) and Stirone v. United States, 361

U.S. 212 (1960), it is apparent that these claims are a

continuation of petitioner’s previously raised claim based on

Apprendi v. New Jersey. Petitioner contends that “Winship and

Stirone are a correct statement of the law at the time of

petitioner’s trial and present no issue of retroactivity.” As

noted, however, petitioner’s claim based on Apprendi was

dismissed, which dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on

the ground that Apprendi is not retroactively applicable to cases

on collateral review. Therefore, to the extent that petitioner’s

motion under Section 2201 seeks relief on these grounds, the

Case 1:06-cv-00207-REC Document 2 Filed 03/13/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 2

pertinent part that a court may relieve a party from a final

judgment or order because of:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered

evidence which by due diligence could not have

been discovered in time to move for a new

trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

heretofore denominated intrinsic or

5

court deems the motion to be one for relief under Section 2255. 

Because petitioner has previously filed a Section 2255 motion,

petitioner’s claims are raised in a second or successive Section

2255 motion governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Before petitioner may

proceed with these claims in this court, he must petition the

Ninth Circuit for authorization to raise them in a second or

successive motion. Absent such authorization from the Ninth

Circuit, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of

the claims. United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664 (9 Cir. th

1998).

Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to relief pursuant to

Section 2201 based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v.

Washington also seeks relief cognizable under Section 2255. 

Therefore, the court deems this claim for relief to be brought

pursuant to Section 2255. Because this is a second or successive

Section 2255 petition, petitioner must seek authorization from

the Ninth Circuit to proceed with this claim. See discussion

supra.

Petitioner’s motion also refers to Rule 60(b), Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, contending: 2

Case 1:06-cv-00207-REC Document 2 Filed 03/13/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been

satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior

judgment upon which it is based has been

reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no

longer equitable that the judgment should have

prospective application; or (6) any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of

the judgment. The motion shall be made within

a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2),

and (3) not more than one year after the

judgment [or] order ... was entered or taken.

6

Rule 60(b) has replaced the ancient ‘Writ of

Error’ and is a proper vehicle to address

defects in habeas proceedings. In this case,

petitioner is ACTUALLY INNOCENT of the

sentence he received because that sentence

was based on the PSR instead of the jury’s

verdict. In denying petitioner’s 2255

motion, the district court said: ‘In this

case, the indictment did not allege the

quantity of methamphetamine, nor was the jury

instructed to find the quantity and purity of

the controlled substance, and the sentence

exceeds the 20-year maximum set out in 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).’ On page 8 of that

order the government admits that it was error

to have failed to submit the questions of

drug type and quantity to the jury, but

contends that there was no prejudice. 

However, without a jury verdict on the

quantity the maximum sentence should have

been based on level 12 of § 2D1.1 of the

Guidelines, and even if the three counts were

stacked, petitioner has served that sentence.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)

from the prior Order denying his initial Section 2255 motion. As

noted above, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the initial

motion on the ground that Apprendi v. New Jersey is not

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. 

Case 1:06-cv-00207-REC Document 2 Filed 03/13/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

Therefore, petitioner’s arguments for relief pursuant to Rule

60(b) are foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the

Order denying petitioner’s initial Section 2255 motion. 

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Petitioner’s "Motion for Resentencing To Time Served

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Creation of a Remedy) and Fed.R.Cv.P.

60(b)(6)" is deemed to be a motion for relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255;

2. Petitioner’s deemed motion for relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 is denied;

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for

respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00207-REC Document 2 Filed 03/13/06 Page 7 of 7