Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01566/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01566-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILSON THOMAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

 )

NEIL H. ADLER, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:08-cv-01566-AWI-JMD-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Petitioner Wilson Thomas (“Petitioner”) is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted of various narcotics-related offenses in 1999. (Answer, Ex. 2). The

sentencing court imposed a sentence of one-hundred eighty months incarceration. (Id.). Petitioner

was received into the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) on April 13, 2001. (Answer,

Ex. 3).

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 20, 2008. (Doc. 1). 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on January 30, 2009. (Doc. 11). Petitioner filed a

traverse on February 20, 2009. (Doc. 12).

On March 2, 2010, the Court issued a Findings and Recommendation (“Recommendation”)

recommending that the petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc.

15). Petitioner filed objections to the Recommendation on March 9, 2010. (Doc. 16) Petitioner’s

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Residential re-entry centers (“RRC’s”), colloquially known as “half-way houses,” were formerly referred to as

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“CCC’s” under BOP regulations. See, e.g.,Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180, 1181 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner employs

the acronym CCC throughout the petition.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

objections reveal that, subsequent to Respondent’s answer and prior to the Court’s Recommendation,

Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies. (Id.).

Factual History

Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is executing Petitioner’s sentence in a

way that violates federal law because the BOP refuses to consider Petitioner for twelve-month

placement in a halfway house (“RRC”). Accordingly, the factual background relevant to

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Petitioner’s claim concerns the BOP’s response to Petitioner’s request for placement in an RRC.

Petitioner’s objections reveal that Petitioner initiated a request for administrative relief in

March 2009. (Objections at 6). In response to Petitioner’s request for consideration for placement in

an RRC, staff responded by stating “upon review it has been determined that your current

designation is appropriate.” (Id. at 7). 

The record also demonstrates that, subsequent to filing his petition, Petitioner likely

underwent a BOP Program Review. (Answer at 9-10, Exs. 4 and 5). Pursuant to BOP policy, a

prisoner’s request for transfer to an RRC’s is considered during his next scheduled Program Review. 

(Answer, Ex. 4). Thus, it appears that Petitioner has already received consideration for placement in

an RRC, notwithstanding the fact that he has not received the desired transfer. 

Discussion

I. Jurisdiction and Venue

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Section 2241 may be used to challenge the execution of a prisoner’s

sentence even where the prisoner does not seek release or to shorten the duration of his confinement. 

See Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180, 1182; Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir.

2000) (entertaining petitioner’s challenge to his transfer to a private prison as a challenge to the

execution of his sentence pursuant to section 2241); see also Montano-Figueroa, 162 F.3d at 549

(reaching the merits of petitioner’s section 2241 challenge to amount and timing of fine payments);

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U.S. District Court

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United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008) (entertaining section 2241 challenge

to restitution schedule). Federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the BOP’s refusal

to transfer a prisoner to an RRC facility pursuant to section 2241. See Rodriguez, 541 F.3d at 1189

(affirming district court’s grant of habeas relief under section 2241 to prisoner challenging BOP’s

refusal to consider prisoner for transfer to RRC facility). 

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Taft Correctional Institution, which is within the

territorial jurisdiction of the Eastern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 84. Accordingly, the Eastern

District is the appropriate venue for Petitioner’s action. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

II. Mootness

The Court must consider Article III jurisdiction sua sponte and dismiss if jurisdiction is

lacking. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir.

1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines

at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action”). Mootness is

jurisdictional. See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000). A

habeas petition is moot where a petitioner’s claim for relief cannot be redressed by a favorable

decision of the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus. Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 1000-01

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). Without a live “case or

controversy,” this Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. 

It appears Petitioner’s action is moot. The essence of Petitioner’s claim for relief is that BOP

policy conflicts with federal law in that a BOP policy promulgated in December 2002 prohibits a

prisoner’s transfer to an RRC unless the prisoner has served ninety percent of his sentence. (Pet. at

2-3). However, the BOP has eliminated the policy Petitioner complains of, and under current BOP

policy, an inmate may be considered for transfer to an RRC at any time. (Answer, Ex. 4).

Pursuant to federal law, federal prisoners undergo periodic “program reviews” at least once

every one-hundred-eighty calendar days. 28 C.F.R. § 524.11 (2010). Current BOP policy provides

that where an inmate requests consideration for transfer to an RRC, the BOP shall evaluate the

prisoner’s request during the next program review. (Answer, Ex. 4). Absent a showing to the

contrary, the Court must presume that the BOP complies with its own state policies and governing

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 In Garner, the Supreme Court applied this presumption to a state’s parole board, citing United States ex rel. 2

Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-268 (1954), an immigration case, as authority for the presumption. Accordingly,

the Court reads Garner as stating a general presumption that an agency is presumed to act consistent with its governing

regulations.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

statutes. See, e.g., Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256 (2000) (“Absent a demonstration to the

contrary, we presume the Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its

obligations”). Therefore, the Court presumes that the BOP has complied with the requirement of 2

affording Petitioner a program review, and that Petitioner’s request for transfer to an RRC was given

due consideration during the program review. (See Objections at 5) (stating that Petitioner had a

program review scheduled for May 2009); (Answer, Ex. 4) (stating BOP policy of giving

individualized consideration for RRC requests during prisoner’s next program review). Petitioner

presents no evidence to the contrary, and the allegations initially set forth in the petition are

irrelevant now due to the BOP’s policy change. The mere fact that the BOP found Petitioner

unsuitable for a transfer to an RRC does not provide a basis for habeas relief as long as the BOP

gave Petitioner’s request individualized consideration in compliance with its current policies. See,

e.g., Smith v. Sanders, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82265*19-20 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985) for the proposition that BOP’s exercise of discretion may not be

disturbed if “some evidence” supports decision); see also Rodriguez, 541 F.3d at 1189 (basis for

habeas grant was BOP’s failure to consider prisoner for transfer, not substantive decision to deny

RRC placement).

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DISMISSED and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent. This

Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

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ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2010 /s/ John M. Dixon 

hkh80h UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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