Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01152/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Tort/Motor Vehicle (P.I.)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PATRICIA WALKER, individually;

PATRICIA WALKER, as Guardian

Ad Litem for LINDSAY WALKER

and ASHLEY WALKER minors; and

PATRICIA WALKER, as SuccessorIn-Interest to FREDERICK

WALKER II, JANELLE WALKER,

NO. CIV. S-03-1152 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FMC TECHNOLOGIES, FMC

FoodTech, FRIGOSCANDIA, and

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on motion by defendants, FMC

Technologies, Inc. (“FMC”), FMC Foodtech, and Frigoscandia

(sometimes collectively “defendants”), pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(c) and/or 56, seeking summary adjudication

of whether California’s or Wisconsin’s rules of decision for

measuring damages in wrongful death suits apply in this case. 

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

2

For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motion is DENIED.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, residents of California, brought this wrongful

death suit in the Superior Court of California for the County of

Sacramento; defendants subsequently removed the case to this

court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. (FMC’s

Mem. of P. & A., filed March 3, 2005, at 2.) Plaintiffs include

decedent’s widow, Patricia Walker, decedent’s two minor children,

and decedent’s adult child, Janelle Walker. (Pls.’ Opp’n, filed

March 29, 2005, at 2.) Defendant FMC is a Delaware corporation

with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs’ decedent, Frederick Walker, II, was employed by

KVP Plastics located in Rancho Cordova, CA. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 2-

3.) KVP Plastics manufactures conveyor belts for the foodprocessing industry. (Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts [“Pls.’ Resp.”], filed March 29, 2005, at 2.) 

Defendant FMC manufactures industrial freezers and other

equipment for the food-processing industry. (Pls.’ Resp. at 3.) 

FMC sold industrial freezers to Kraft Foods for use at Kraft’s

Tombstone Pizza Facility in Medford, Wisconsin. (Pls.’ Resp. at

3.) Kraft obtained the industrial freezer as a result of a

direct purchase pursuant to a “design build agreement” by which

Kraft contracted with FMC for a custom freezer to meet its

specific operating requirements. (FMC’S Reply, filed April 8,

2005, at 3.) KVP Plastics instructed plaintiff’s decedent and

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The court construes defendants’ motion as motion for

summary adjudication under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).

3

others to travel to Wisconsin to perform certain modifications to

the conveyor belts on the FMC industrial freezers located at

Kraft’s Tombstone Pizza Facility. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 4.) 

The incident which provides the basis of this suit occurred

on September 23, 2001 in the Kraft-Tombstone facility in Medford,

Wisconsin. (Pls.’ Resp. at 2.) Plaintiffs’ decedent was in the

course and scope of his employment when he was injured while

trying to reinstall a conveyor belt on an FMC freezor at the

facility. (Pls.’ Resp. at 2.) Ultimately, Mr. Walker was

crushed between one of the freezor’s rotating spokes and a fix

beam. (Pls.’ Add’l Disputed Facts, filed March 29, 2005, at 4.) 

He died four days later on September 27, 2001. (Id. at 5.) 

STANDARD2

Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication on part

of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim . . . may . . . move . . . for a

summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F.Supp. 374,

378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F.Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). Thus,

summary adjudication is appropriate when the moving party

demonstrates that there exists no genuine issue as to any

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

material fact, entitling it to a ruling in its favor as a matter

of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party “always bears the

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities

Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-289 (1968).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301,

1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence of the opposing party is

to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn

from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of

the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158-59). 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the choice of law

principles of the state in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor

Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). The parties agree that

the material facts regarding this motion are not in dispute. The

sole issue is a question of law as to what State’s measure of

damages law should be applied. Thus, this court looks to

California choice of law rules.

A. California Choice of Law Rules

Absent an enforceable choice of law provision, California

follows a “governmental interests” approach to resolve conflict

of law issues. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir.

1986); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 554 (1967). The

governmental interests analysis “embodies the presumption that

California law applies unless the proponent of foreign law can

show otherwise.” Marsh v. Burrell, 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1496 (N.D.

Cal. 1992). When a litigant invokes foreign law, he or she must

“demonstrate that the [foreign] rule of decision will further the

interest of the foreign state and therefore that it is an

appropriate one for the forum to apply . . ..” Hurtado v.

Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581 (1974). The burden of

proving that a foreign jurisdiction’s law applies is on the party

invoking the foreign rule of decision. McGhee v. Arabian

American Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1422 (9th Cir. 1989).

California’s governmental interests analysis follows a three-step

process. Liew v. Official Receiver and Liquidator, 685 F.2d

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1982). 

First, the court must determine whether the substantive laws

of California and the foreign jurisdiction differ on the issue

before it. Id. 

Second, if the court determines that a difference exists

between the two laws, then the court must determine what

interests the competing jurisdictions have in the application of

their respective laws. Id.; Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at 581. If only

one of the jurisdictions has an interest in having its law

applied, then there is a “false conflict” between the laws. 

Liew, 685 F.2d at 1196; Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at 580. “Only if

each of the states involved has a ‘legitimate but conflicting

interest in applying its own law’ will we be confronted with a

‘true’ conflicts case.” Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil

Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 163 (1978) (citations omitted). As the

forum, a California court will conclude that a conflict is

“false” and apply its own law unless the application of the

foreign law will “significantly advance the interests of the

foreign state.” Strassberg v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,

575 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). 

Lastly, if the court determines that both jurisdictions have

a policy interest in the application of their laws, then the

court proceeds to the third step known as the “comparative

impairment” test. Liew, 685 F.2d at 1196. During this step, the

court must determine which jurisdiction’s interests would be most

impaired if its policies were subordinated to those of the other

jurisdiction. Id.; Offshore Rental Co, 22 Cal. 3d at 161.

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

B. Application of California Choice of Law Rules 

The first step in California’s conflict of laws analysis is

to determine whether the substantive laws of the relevant

jurisdictions differ. Two states are implicated in this case:

(1) California - the place of plaintiffs’ domicile and residence,

the place of decedent’s employment, and the place of the forum;

and (2) Wisconsin - the place of the alleged wrongful death. As

discussed below, the rules of decision for measuring damages in

wrongful death actions in these two jurisdictions differ

markedly. 

Specifically, there are three material differences between

California’s and Wisconsin’s rules of decision for measuring

damages in wrongful death actions. First, California law allows

recovery without limitation for all damages proximately caused by

a tort. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333. Under the law of Wisconsin, a

plaintiff may recover no more than $350,000 in non-economic

damages. WIS. STATS. § 895.04(4). Consequently, a finding that

Wisconsin law applies would lead to a cap on the non-economic

damages that plaintiffs may seek against defendants. Second,

under California law “a plaintiff’s contributory negligence does

not bar his recovery but merely diminishes proportionately the

amount of damages he may recover against others who contributed

to his injury.” Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State of

California, 115 Cal. App. 3d 116, 119-120 (1981). In Wisconsin,

recovery for negligence is barred if the plaintiff’s negligence

is greater than that of the person against whom he seeks

recovery. WIS. STATS. § 895.045. Lastly, California law allows

“[a] cause of action for the death of a person caused by the

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 In their Reply, defendants offer nine specific reasons

to apply Wisconsin law including: 1) the accident occurred in

Wisconsin; 2) the contract for the industrial freezer arose in

Wisconsin; 3) Wisconsin was the location of the job site; 4) the

industrial freezer made the subject of this litigation is located

in Wisconsin; 5) the facility is under the control of Kraft in

Wisconsin; 6) Wisconsin OSHA regulates conduct in Wisconsin; 7)

plaintiffs’ cause of action for negligence is based upon the

alleged conduct by FMC in Wisconsin; 8) plaintiff seeks punitive

damages which are to deter conduct; and 9) Wisconsin has an

interest in deterring wrongful conduct that takes place within

its borders. (FMC’S Reply at 10:17-25.) The court will not

address each of these arguments individually as they all center

on deterring/regulating conduct. 

8

wrongful act or neglect of another [to] be asserted by” the

surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, or heir by

intestate succession. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 377.60. Wisconsin

law allows the personal representative of the deceased or the

person to whom the amount recovered belongs to bring an action

for wrongful death. WIS. STATS. § 895.04(1). Accordingly, a

finding that Wisconsin law applies in this case would demand that

plaintiffs Janelle Walker and decedent’s minor children be barred

from bringing this action. It is clear that California and

Wisconsin have markedly different laws with regards to wrongful

death suits. 

The second step under California’s choice of law analysis is

to determine whether Wisconsin has any policy interest that may

justify applying its damages law instead of California law in

this action. Defendants offer two main reasons to apply

Wisconsin law: 1) Wisconsin is the place of the alleged wrongful

death, and 2) Wisconsin has an interest in regulating and

deterring wrongful conduct within its borders.3 Defendants’

emphasis on Wisconsin’s interest in regulating and deterring

conduct is misplaced because “[l]imitations of damages for

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

wrongful death . . . have little or nothing to do with conduct. 

They are concerned not with how people should behave but with how

survivors should be compensated.” Reich, 67 Cal. 2d at 556. 

Unlike Wisconsin, California has a policy interest in determining

how plaintiffs should be compensated because plaintiffs are

residents of California. Moreover, “a jurisdiction’s only

interest in having its damages limitation rules applied is to

protect its resident defendants from excessive financial burdens

or from exaggerated claims.” Marsh, 805 F. Supp. at 1498

(citations omitted). In this case, none of the defendants are

residents of Wisconsin. Thus, Wisconsin does not have a policy

interest in the application of Wisconsin’s rules of decision

limiting damages in this wrongful death suit. 

As discussed earlier, a California court will apply its own

law unless the application of the foreign law will significantly

advance the interests of the foreign state. The court finds that

defendants have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that

application of Wisconsin law will further the interests of the

foreign state and, as such, the alleged conflict between

Wisconsin and California law is a “false” conflict. The court

therefore need not reach the third, “comparative impairment,”

step of California’s choice of law analysis because only

California has an interest in having its damages law applied in

this action. See Marsh, 805 F. Supp. at 1502 (stating when a

court finds a “false” conflict the “comparative impairment” step

is unnecessary); Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640,

644 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Schlumberger Logelco Inc. v. Morgan

Equipment Co., 1996 WL 251951 (N.D. Cal.) (same).

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

C. Impact of Application of California Law to This Case

The court finds that California law applies in this case

such that there will be no cap on non-economic damages as sought

by plaintiffs and decedent’s children may proceed as plaintiffs

in this wrongful death action.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

adjudication is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 18, 2005.

 /s/ Frank C. Damrell, Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-01152-FCD-DAD Document 46 Filed 04/19/05 Page 10 of 10