Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00981/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00981-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO PEDRO TORRES,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00981-LJO-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 5.) His complaint is 

before the Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

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thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is incarcerated at California Institution for Men, but complains of acts that 

occurred at Wasco State Prison and the California Substance Abuse Treatment Center.

He names the following Defendants: (1) Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., (2) Warden 

P.L. Vasquez (Corcoran), (3) Associate Warden Y. Samara, and (4) Accounting Office 

Supervisor A. Hacobian. It is unclear whether Samara and Hacobian are employed at 

Wasco or CSATF. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

Plaintiff is illiterate, a monolingual Spanish speaker, and developmentally 

disabled. He has difficulty understanding oral communication. He attended only six 

months of formal schooling during his childhood in El Salvador.

While at Wasco State Prison, Plaintiff had $900 in his prison trust account. The 

funds were provided by his family to assist him during his long prison stay. He used them

periodically at the prison canteen. At some point, Plaintiff showed his canteen receipt to 

a friend, who asked why he had sent $500 out of the prison from his trust account. 

Plaintiff responded that he did not send any funds out of the prison. Plaintiff learned that 

$500 had been removed from his account on March 2, 2011 and sent to an individual in 

Barstow, California. Plaintiff states that he did not authorize the transaction, does not 

know the recipient, and has no family in the United States.

Plaintiff believes the fraudulent transfer was initiated by his cell mate, Daniel 

Mendez. Mendez is the only person who knew that Plaintiff had money and also had 

access to Plaintiff’s I.D. card. 

Plaintiff appealed the removal of funds from his account. His appeal was denied 

at the first and second levels of review on the grounds that Trust Accounting Staff 

followed procedures, the withdrawal form did not appear to be fraudulent, and staff was 

unable to verify that fraud had occurred. His appeal was cancelled at the third level of 

review due to untimeliness. 

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On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff initiated a civil suit in Kern County Superior Court 

against Defendants Vasquez, Samara, and Hacoban, and Does 1 and 2. The action 

apparently was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff claims that unspecified 

Defendants failed to assist Plaintiff with prosecuting his case.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable 

if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 

(9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has not alleged how each defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. The Court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his 

complaint. If he chooses to do so, he must link the named defendants to his claims.

B. Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from the deprivation of property 

without due process of law. An inmate has a protected property interest in his prison 

trust account funds. Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985). While an 

authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process 

Clause, neither negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a state 

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employee “constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the 

loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 & n.13 (1984) (citation 

omitted). Authorized, intentional deprivations of property violate the Due Process Clause 

when they occur “without underlying statutory authority and competent procedural 

protections,” Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Here, it appears funds were deducted from Plaintiff’s trust account pursuant to 

established prison procedures, rather than through a random unauthorized act by an 

individual prison official. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) 

(characterizing an authorized deprivation as one carried out pursuant to established 

state procedures, regulations, or statutes). Accordingly, Plaintiff had a right to 

competent procedural protections in relation to the withdrawal. The amount of process 

due in this context is a question of law. Quick, 754 F.2d at 1523. Generally, the process 

due inmates for removal of funds from inmate accounts in minimal. See Gardner v. 

Wilson, 959 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that due process requires no 

more than notice and a post-deprivation grievance process); Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 

F.3d 91, 95–96 (5th Cir. 1996) (notice and adequate post-deprivation remedy); Scott v. 

Angelone, 771 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (D. Nev. 1991) (no due process violation where 

money for medical charges deducted from inmate’s account).

Here, funds are alleged to have been removed from Plaintiff’s trust account 

pursuant to a withdrawal slip containing Plaintiff’s identification number and what 

purported to be his signature. Plaintiff had the opportunity to file, and did file, a 

grievance regarding the withdrawal. The grievance was responded to by prison officials. 

Plaintiff alleges no deficiencies in the grievance process. Although the grievance 

perhaps was not investigated as thoroughly as Plaintiff would have liked, this in itself 

does not state a constitutional claim. See Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1985) (“[W]e can find no instance where the courts have recognized inadequate 

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investigation as sufficient to state a civil rights claim unless there was another 

recognized constitutional right involved.”). Based on the allegations presented, it 

appears Plaintiff was afforded all of the procedural protections he was due. Additionally, 

the Court notes that the officers responsible for the removal of Plaintiff’s trust funds 

likely are protected by qualified immunity because reasonable officials could have 

believed their conduct to be lawful based on the facially adequate trust withdrawal slip. 

See Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir.1996).

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a due process claim. 

He will be given leave to amend. If he chooses to amend, he must allege facts to show 

how named Defendants deprived him of adequate procedural protections in relation to

the withdrawal of funds from his prison trust account.

C. State Law Negligence

Plaintiff may intend to allege that Defendants were negligent in removing funds 

from his prison trust account. Negligence is a state law claim.

The elements of negligence under California law are: “(1) defendant’s obligation 

to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against 

unreasonable risks (duty); (2) failure to conform to that standard (breach of duty); (3) a 

reasonably close connection between the defendant’s conduct and resulting injuries 

(proximate cause); and (4) actual loss (damages).’” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 

572 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McGarry v. Sax, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519 (2008)).

Plaintiff has not alleged which Defendants had a duty to protect his prison trust 

funds but breached that duty. Even if he had, the Court will not exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over any state law claim absent a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 

2001); see also Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 

1994). “When . . . the court dismisses the federal claim leaving only state claims for 

resolution, the court should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them 

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without prejudice.” Les Shockley Racing v. National Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 

(9th Cir. 1989).

Because Plaintiff has not alleged any cognizable federal claims, the Court will not 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim. Plaintiff may amend this

claim, but if he fails to allege a viable federal claim in his amended complaint, the Court 

will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); 

Herman Family Revocable Trust, 254 F.3d at 805.

D. Access to Court

Inmates have a fundamental right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, 

and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise 

from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forwardlooking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried 

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). A 

plaintiff must show that he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out of court. Lewis, 

518 U.S. at 350-51. An “actual injury” is one that hinders the plaintiff’s ability to pursue a 

legal claim. Id. at 351.

Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to bring a state court suit in relation to the 

conduct alleged in this action. However, it is not apparent that the suit involved claims 

for violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. Accordingly, it is unclear whether the right of access 

to the courts applies. Even if such a right applies, Plaintiff has not explained how any of 

the named Defendants frustrated or hindered his opportunity to litigate his case. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that his action was dismissed for failure to prosecute is 

insufficient to show that Defendants are responsible for the dismissal.

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If he chooses to do so, he must explain the 

events leading up to the dismissal of his state court case and how that dismissal is tied 

to Defendants’ conduct.

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E. Exhaustion

Documents attached to Plaintiff’s complaint reflect that he may not have 

exhausted the prison’s administrative appeal process with regard to the $500 removal 

from his prison trust account. 

Plaintiff is advised that he is required to exhaust “such administrative remedies 

as are available” prior to bringing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of 

administrative remedies is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner. Booth 

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). To properly exhaust, “a prisoner must complete 

the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, 

including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Ngo v. Woodford, 

539 F.3d 1108, 1109 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)).

Exhaustion may be excused where administrative procedures were effectively 

unavailable, prison officials obstructed attempts to exhaust, or the plaintiff was 

prevented from exhausting because procedures for processing grievances were not 

followed. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-24 (9th Cir. 2010).

The defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of 

exhaustion. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Additionally, it is possible that Plaintiff is excused from 

the exhaustion requirement on one of the grounds stated above. Accordingly, the Court 

will not dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint at the pleading stage for failure to exhaust. Plaintiff 

nevertheless is advised that his claims ultimately may be subject to dismissal if he failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies and is not excused from the exhaustion 

requirement.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim. The Court will grant Plaintiff an 

opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts 

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resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate 

that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this screening order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form and a 

copy of his complaint, filed June 29, 2015;

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3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a 

first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal, 

this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a court 

order and failure to state a claim, and will be subject to the “three strikes” 

provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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