Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01182/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01182-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHUOC LUU,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 13-CV-1182-MMA

(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO.

11]

vs.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary,

Respondent.

Petitioner Phuoc Luu, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Petition was originally submitted to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

California on May 13, 2013, and transferred to this Court on May

17, 2013 [ECF No. 3]. The Court dismissed the Petition without

prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee or request to proceed

in forma pauperis. (Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, ECF

No. 6.) Luu moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No.

7], but the Court denied the Motion, noting that Petitioner

appeared to have funds to pay the $5 fee associated with filing

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the case. (Order Denying In Forma Pauperis Application &

Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, ECF No. 8.) Luu eventually

paid the filing fee [ECF No. 9], and the Court ordered briefing

from the Respondent. (Order Reopening Case & Setting Briefing

Schedule, ECF No. 10.) 

In this action, Luu does not challenge his state court

conviction or sentence. Instead, Petitioner claims that he was

denied due process during a prison investigation into his alleged

involvement in a conspiracy to murder a prison staff member, and

he seeks to expunge all references to this allegation from his

central file. (Pet. 1-3, 9, 11, 15, ECF No. 1.)1 On September

20, 2013, Respondent Beard filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support Thereof, and a Notice of Lodgment [ECF

No. 11]. Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition as untimely

under the statute of limitations as set forth by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act, and also on the ground that Luu’s

Petition is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review because

it does not challenge the legality or duration of his confinement. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-9, ECF No. 11.) 

Luu’s opposition to the Respondent’s motion was due by October 28,

2013. (Order Reopening Case 2, ECF No. 10.) To date, the Court

has not received any opposition from the Petitioner. Luu also

failed to file any requests for enlargement of time. 

1

 Because Luu’s Petition is not consecutively paginated, the Court

will refer to it using the page numbers designated by the Court’s

ECF system. Similarly, Lodgment Nos. 2 and 4 are not

consecutively paginated, so the Court has paginated the documents

and will cite to each using the assigned page numbers. 

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The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss, the memorandum in support of the motion, and the

lodgments. For the reasons expressed below, Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss should be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 3, 2010, while Luu was housed at the California

Medical Facility (“CMF”), he was placed in an Administrative

Segregation Unit (“ASU”) pending an investigation into

Petitioner’s alleged involvement in a conspiracy to murder a staff

member. (Pet. 12, ECF No. 1.) The investigation was completed by

June 25, 2010. (Id.) Luu alleges that although he was not

convicted of any charge, he nonetheless remained in ASU until his

transfer to Centinela State Prison. (Id.)

On August 12, 2010, Luu filed an administrative appeal

complaining about being in ASU for over two months and being

scheduled for transfer despite the lack of evidence against him. 

(See Lodgment No. 2, Luu v. Dickinson, Case No. FCR290989 (Cal.

Super. Ct. filed Feb. 22, 2012) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus attachment A, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form at 14).) Luu

requested that his transfer be halted until the investigation

being conducted by the “outside agency” was completed and that he

be allowed to stay at CMF. (Id.) Petitioner also demanded

information about the allegations or evidence tying him to the

conspiracy: “How can an investigation be so secret that in two

months I still don’t know who the conspiracy was against, how my

name was injected into this so-called conspiracy, or what outside

agency is looking into the issue?” (Id. at 15.) Finally, Luu

contended that the language in the CDC Form 114D, ASU Placement

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Notice, contains “latent ambiguities” that would allow the parole

board to deny him parole consideration. (Id.) 

On August 20, 2010, Petitioner’s appeal was granted in part

and denied in part. (See Lodgment No. 2, Luu v. Dickinson, Case

No. FCR290989 (petition for writ of habeas corpus attachment A,

memorandum at 16-17 (dated Aug. 20, 2010).) Luu received a copy

of two confidential information disclosure forms CDC 1030

generated by Lieutenant T. Lee, who prepared a confidential report

regarding Luu’s transfer. (Id. at 16.) The CDC denied Luu’s

request to stop the transfer, to reveal the name of the

investigating agent, or to remove the language in CDC114D from his

central file. (Id. at 17.) 

On September 7, 2010, Petitioner submitted his second level

appeal. (Lodgment No. 2, Luu v. Dickinson, Case No. FCR290989

(petition for writ of habeas corpus at 11.) The appeal was denied

on September 29, 2010. (Id.) On July 14, 2011, Luu’s final level

administrative appeal was denied. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s first state habeas corpus petition was filed on

February 22, 2012, but placed in the mail for service on February

17, 2012. (Id. at 1, 34.) The petition was denied on April 18,

2012. (Lodgment No. 3, In re Luu, Case No. FCR290989, order at 1

(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 19. 2012.) On July 5, 2012, Luu

constructively filed his habeas petition with the California Court

of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 4, Luu v. Dickinson, Case No. [A1355931]

(Cal. Ct. App. filed July 5, 2012) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus at 39).) According to Luu, this petition was denied on

July 27, 2012. (Pet. 3, ECF No. 1.) He then filed a petition for

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a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court that was

summarily denied on November 28, 2012. (Id. at 52.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Luu’s federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was dated

May 9, 2013, and filed on May 13, 2013. (Pet. 1, 6, ECF No. 1.) 

Under the mailbox rule, a petition is filed on the date Petitioner

hands it to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487

U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir.

2010); see also Rule 3(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28

U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (West 2006). Under the mailbox rule, the

Court considers the Petition filed on May 9, 2013, the date Luu

signed it. Because Luu filed his Petition after April 24, 1996,

it is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) of 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006). AEDPA sets

forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.

Id. § 2254(a); see also Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the

law of habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th

Cir. 1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

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determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” See id. § 2254(a). Petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. See Reed

v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719;

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of

state law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation).

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to

adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question that

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matters under § 2254(d)(1) — whether a state court decision is

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other

words, a federal court is not required to review the state court

decision de novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed

directly to the reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

“explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court decision may

not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for example, because of

a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. 

“[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,’ an

authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” Id.; see also

Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996); Childress

v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella,

101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

[A] state court decision is “contrary to [the Supreme

Court’s] clearly established precedent if the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from . . .

precedent.”

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000)). A state court unreasonably applies federal law if

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its application is “objectively unreasonable,” which is “more than

[being] incorrect or erroneous.” Id. at 75.

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that Luu’s Petition is untimely under the

applicable statute of limitations and otherwise fails to state a

claim for federal habeas corpus relief. (Resp’t’s Notice Mot. &

Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 11.) The Court first addresses whether

Luu’s claims are appropriate for review under the federal habeas

statute. 

A. Luu’s Entitlement to Federal Habeas Relief

Respondent contends that Luu’s Petition should be dismissed

because the claims Petitioner asserts do not entitle him to

federal habeas relief. (Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 8, ECF No. 11.) Specifically, Beard argues that the

inconclusive prison investigation and Luu’s subsequent transfer

cannot be addressed on habeas corpus because they do not adversely

impact the fact or duration of his confinement. (Id.)

Generally, prisoner petitions fall into two distinct

categories: “(1) those challenging the fact or duration of

confinement itself; and (2) those challenging the conditions of

confinement.” McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 140 (1991).

“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on

complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under

the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the validity

of any confinement or to particulars affecting its

duration are the province of habeas corpus. An inmate’s

challenge to the circumstances of his confinement,

however, may be brought under § 1983.” 

Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (quoting Muhammad v.

Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam)); see also Badea v.

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Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing the scope of

habeas proceedings and civil rights actions). A writ of habeas

corpus is the “sole” federal remedy when “a state prisoner is

challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he

is entitled to an immediate or speedier release from that

imprisonment . . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500

(1973). The Supreme Court explained that the specific provisions

in the federal habeas statute foreclose the more general remedy

under § 1983. Id. at 490. “Congress has determined that habeas

corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the

validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that

specific determination must override the general terms of § 1983.” 

Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has permitted resort to habeas corpus

petitions to assert claims that are “likely to accelerate”

eligibility for parole, even though success in those cases would

not necessarily implicate the fact or duration of confinement. 

Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1989); Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003)). In Docken, the

prisoner challenged the state parole board’s refusal to review his

suitability for parole on an annual basis. The Ninth Circuit

concluded that a “sufficient nexus to the length of imprisonment”

exists, and therefore habeas corpus relief is available where a

prison inmate “seek[s] only equitable relief in challenging

aspects of [his] parole review that . . . could potentially affect

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the duration of [his] confinement . . . .” Docken, 393 F.3d at

1031. 

Success on the merits in such cases [those outside the

“core” habeas claims identified in Preiser] would not

‘necessarily’ implicate the fact or duration of

confinement. Instead, such claims have, at best, only a

possible relationship to the duration of a prisoner’s

confinement, as eligibility for parole is distinct from

entitlement to parole.

Id. at 1028–29. The court held that the district court’s

dismissal of Docken’s habeas petition was error and reversed. Id.

at 1032.

“Habeas corpus jurisdiction also exists when a [prisoner]

seeks expungement of a disciplinary finding from his record if

expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for

parole.” Bostic, 884 F.2d at 1269 (citing McCollum v. Miller, 695

F.2d 1044, 1047 (7th Cir. 1982)). “‘[T]he likelihood of the

effect on the overall length of the prisoner’s sentence . . .

determines the availability of habeas corpus.’” Docken, 393 F.3d

at 1028 (quoting Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 858). “[C]hallenges to the

procedures used in denying parole are only cognizable via habeas.” 

Docken, 393 F.3d at 1029 (citing Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d

1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997)). On the other hand, “habeas

jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, where a

successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily

shorten the prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859. 

Respondent argues that Luu’s Petition fails to plead a

federal habeas claim because Petitioner challenges the scope of a

prison investigation that did not lead to any disciplinary charges

against him. (Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8,

ECF No. 11.) Beard concedes that Luu “does make a general,

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unsubstantiated allegation that the inconclusive investigation

somehow adversely affects his chances of parole, but he fails to

explain, let alone demonstrate, how or why this is true,

especially considering that no disciplinary action was ever taken

against him.” (Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted) (internal citation

omitted).) 

In his Petition, Luu states that he “challenge[s] the adverse

documentation currently contained within his central file. Such

documentation, as written, only serves as a means by which to

vilify Petitioner, and which continues to lead to a miscarriage of

justice, adversely [a]ffecting Petitioner’s chances for parole.” 

(Pet. 11, ECF No. 1.) Luu refers to the language in the CDC Form

114D, ASU Placement Notice, which lists reasons for placement: 

“[Petitioner] presents an immediate threat to the safety of self

or others,” and “endangers institution security.” (Id. at 34.) 

The CDC Form 114D also states:

On July 21, 2010, you are currently housed in ASU. 

Initially, on June 3, 2010 you were removed from the

General Population and placed in Administrative

Segregation Unit (ASU) pending an investigation in to

[sic] your role in a conspiracy to commit murder on a

California Medical Facility (CMF) Staff Member. As of

June 25, 2010, the investigation has been completed and

your role in this conspiracy could not be determined. 

However, the facts revealed in the investigation, could

not exonerate you as a suspect in the investigation. 

Based on the particular elements of the investigation

that is deemed as “Highly Sensitive” your presence in

CMF General Population is deemed a threat to the safety

and the security of the Institution, its staff and

inmates. You will remain in ASU and be seen by the

Institution Classification Committee to establish your

current and future housing and program needs. 

(Id. at 34.) Petitioner claims that these remarks in the

Placement Notice would allow the parole board to deny him parole. 

(Id. at 24.) 

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Respondent argues that the federal courts lack habeas

jurisdiction over claims that do not “necessarily spell speedier

release.” (Resp’t Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF No.

11.) He cites Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1289,

1298-99 n.13 (2011), and Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82

(2005), as support for his argument that Petitioner’s claim does

not lie in habeas and may be brought, if at all, under § 1983. 

(Id.) 

The plaintiff in Skinner was a state prisoner who had

requested and been denied testing under a Texas statute that

permitted prisoners to obtain postconviction DNA testing. 

Skinner, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1296. He subsequently

brought suit under § 1983, alleging that the statutory scheme

denied him procedural due process. The district court dismissed

the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that

postconviction requests for DNA evidence are cognizable only in

habeas corpus, not under § 1983, and the appellate court affirmed. 

Id. at 1295-96. The Supreme Court granted review to decide

whether “a convicted state prisoner seeking DNA testing of

crime-scene evidence [may] assert that claim in a civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or is such a claim cognizable in

federal court only when asserted in a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254?” Id. at 1293. Reversing

the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Skinner's claim

could be brought under § 1983 because “[s]uccess in his suit for

DNA testing would not ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of his

conviction. While test results might prove exculpatory, that

outcome is hardly inevitable; [the] results might prove

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inconclusive or they might further incriminate Skinner.” Id. at

1298. 

The Court in Skinner discussed the limits of § 1983

jurisdiction, beginning with the rule established by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), that a state prisoner may not

maintain a § 1983 claim for damages if a judgment in his favor

“‘would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence’”. Skinner, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1298 (quoting

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). The decision pointed out the significance

of the term “necessarily” as used in Heck. Id. (quoting Nelson v.

Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)). 

In Nelson, an earlier case, the Court explained:

Although damages are not an available habeas remedy, we

have previously concluded that a § 1983 suit for damages

that would “necessarily imply” the invalidity of the

fact of an inmate's conviction, or “necessarily imply”

the invalidity of the length of an inmate's sentence, is

not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the inmate

obtains favorable termination of a state, or federal

habeas, challenge to his conviction or sentence. This

“favorable termination” requirement is necessary to

prevent inmates from doing indirectly through damages

actions what they could not do directly by seeking

injunctive relief —- challenge the fact or duration of

their confinement without complying with the procedural

limitations of the federal habeas statute. Even so, we

were careful in Heck to stress the importance of the

term “necessarily.” For instance, we acknowledged that

an inmate could bring a challenge to the lawfulness of a

search pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance, even if

the search revealed evidence used to convict the inmate

at trial, because success on the merits would not

“necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was

unlawful.” To hold otherwise would have cut off

potentially valid damages actions as to which a

plaintiff might never obtain favorable termination —-

suits that could otherwise have gone forward had the

plaintiff not been convicted.

Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646-47 (citations omitted). 

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Respondent’s reliance on Skinner is misplaced. Skinner arose

in a § 1983 context, and a careful reading of the opinion makes it

clear that the limiting language refers to claims under § 1983,

and not habeas jurisdiction. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long

held that an action under § 1983 is not available “when a state

prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he

is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that

imprisonment . . . .” Preiser, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

Respondent’s citation to Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, is

likewise unavailing. Wilkinson explained that, beginning with

Preiser, the Supreme Court has held that a § 1983 claim is not

available if that claim will either result in an “immediate or

speedier release” from custody or “a judicial determination that

necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Id.

at 81. 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d at 853, another case cited by the

Respondent, arose in the context of a § 1983 challenge to the

procedures used in the prisoner’s disciplinary hearing and the

resulting sentence. There, the Ninth Circuit held that a

plaintiff may bring a § 1983 case to challenge the disciplinary

conviction. Id. at 859. “As Ramirez's suit does not threaten to

advance his parole date, his challenge to his disciplinary hearing

is properly brought under § 1983.” Id. The court explained that

“if Ramirez is successful in attacking the disciplinary hearing

and expunging his sentence, ‘[t]he parole board will still have

the authority to deny [his] request[ ] for parole on the basis of

any of the grounds presently available to it in evaluating such a

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request.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Neal v. Shimoda,

131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Finally, to the extent Respondent relies on Blair v. Martel,

645 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2001), the facts of that case are

distinguishable. In Blair, the petitioner challenged “the

California Supreme Court’s delay in processing his direct appeal.” 

Id. at 1157. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it lacked habeas

jurisdiction over the case because the request for an expedited

appeal did not “necessarily spell speedier release.” Id. “[A]

request for an order directing a state court to hasten its

consideration of an appeal belongs in a § 1983 complaint, not a

habeas petition.” Id. at 1157-58 (footnote omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “the

demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas petitions

is not always clear[,]” and in some instances, “the same

constitutional rights might be redressed under either form of

relief.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (citations

omitted). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged “that § 1983 and

habeas are not always mutually exclusive.” Osborne v. District

Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1055

(9th Cir. 2005) (citing Docken, 393 F.3d at 1030-31 & n.6). The

distinction between the two remedies is especially challenging in

parole-related cases. Docken, 393 F.3d at 1030 n.6. The overlap

between remedies, however, does not deprive federal courts of

habeas jurisdiction. 

Many decisions in this circuit have found habeas jurisdiction

available for suits that do not fit squarely within the core of

habeas corpus proceedings. See Bostic, 884 F.2d at 1269 (noting

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that habeas jurisdiction exists to expunge a disciplinary finding

likely to accelerate eligibility for parole); Gray v. Beard, No.

12–CV–1911–H (RBB), 2013 WL 4782821, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 6,

2013) (concluding that petitioner's claim to expunge his gang

member designation is cognizable on habeas corpus); Walker v.

Hill, No. 2:12–cv–1601 GEB JFM P, 2012 WL 5042514, at *1-2 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (finding that petitioner serving an

indeterminate life sentence with the possibility of parole stated

a federal habeas claim in seeking expungement of a disciplinary

violation); Flores v. Lewis, No. C 10–2773 RMW (PR), 2011 WL

2531240, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2011) (concluding that

seeking expungement of inmate’s revalidation as an active gang

member stated a habeas corpus claim); Larriva v. Watson, No.

1:06–cv–01453 OWW WMW, 2008 WL 398847, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12,

2008) (stating that a claim challenging gang validation and SHU

placement may be asserted in a habeas petition). 

In this case, Luu has alleged that the adverse documentation

in his central file affects his chances for parole. (Pet. 11, ECF

No. 1.) Petitioner’s file includes the CDC Form 114D, ASU

Placement Notice, which indicates that Petitioner “presents an

immediate threat to the safety of self or others,” and “endangers

institution security.” (Id. at 34.) Expungement of these

findings, if appropriate, could affect the duration of Luu’s

confinement by making it more likely that he would be granted

parole. See, e.g., Martin v. Tilton, No. 08–55392, 2011 WL

1624989, at *1 (9th Cir. April 29, 2011) (unpublished

//

//

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memorandum disposition)2 (“Even though Martin did not forfeit any

work-time credits as a result of the disciplinary finding, we have

[habeas corpus] jurisdiction because the Board of Parole will

consider the charge when it evaluates Martin’s eligibility for

parole.”). Similarly, Petitioner’s claim to expunge the adverse

documentation is cognizable on habeas corpus. See Larriva v.

Watson, 2008 WL 398847, at *3. Therefore, Luu states a federal

habeas claim, and the Court recommends denying the Motion to

Dismiss on this ground. 

B. AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent Beard also moves to dismiss Luu’s Petition as

untimely. (Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-7, ECF

No. 11.) The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus

petitions is set forth in § 2244(d), which provides in relevant

part:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

2 Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Local Rule 36–3, unpublished

dispositions issued on or after January 1, 2007, may be cited to

the courts of the Ninth Circuit in accordance with Fed. R. App. P.

32.1 but are not precedent.

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1).

A federal petition for writ of habeas corpus may be dismissed

with prejudice when it was not filed within AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 483 (9th

Cir. 2001). The statute of limitations is a threshold issue that

must be resolved before the merits of individual claims. White v.

Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002).

In most cases challenging a conviction or sentence, the

limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s

direct review became final. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Where,

however, “a habeas petitioner challenges an administrative

decision affecting the ‘fact or duration of his confinement,’

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations runs from when the

‘factual predicate’ of the habeas claims ‘could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.’” Mardesich v.

Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D)). Typically, the factual predicate is the denial

of an administrative appeal. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d

1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the statute of

limitations begins to run when the petitioner’s administrative

appeal was denied); Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir.

2003) (holding that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of an

inmate’s administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the

inmate’s claim that triggered the commencement of the limitations

period).

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Respondent argues that the factual predicate for Luu’s

federal claim arose on July 14, 2011, when the final

administrative appeal challenging the investigation was concluded. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 11.) 

Respondent claims that the AEDPA limitations period began to run

the next day, July 15, 2011. See Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066. Under

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), Luu had one year from that date, or until

July 16, 2012, to file his federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C) (“[I]n computing any time

period specified . . .in any statute . . . include the last day of

the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day

that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.”); see Patterson

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the

statute of limitations shall be calculated according to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a)). Petitioner filed this action on May 9, 2013,

approximately ten months after the limitations period had expired. 

Absent any applicable tolling, the Petition is untimely. 

1. Statutory tolling

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is tolled during

periods in which a “properly filed” habeas corpus petition is

“pending” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2). The

statute specifically provides, “The time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” Id.; see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410

(2005). “[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery

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and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and

rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)

(explaining that typical filing requirements include all relevant

time limits). 

The interval between the disposition of one state petition

and the filing of another may be tolled under “interval tolling.” 

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). “[T]he AEDPA statute

of limitations is tolled for ‘all of the time during which a state

prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a

particular post-conviction application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lamaster, 167

F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at

219-22. The statute of limitations is tolled from the time a

petitioner’s first state habeas petition is filed until state

collateral review is concluded, but it is not tolled before the

first state collateral challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479

F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006). 

“The period that an application for post-conviction review is

pending is not affected or ‘untolled’ merely because a petitioner

files additional or overlapping petitions before it is complete.” 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2003). 

As stated above, the limitations period began to run on July

15, 2011. Luu’s state court petition for a writ of habeas corpus

was constructively filed in Solano County Superior Court on

February 17, 2012. (Lodgment No. 2, Luu v. Dickinson, Case No.

Case No. FCR290989 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 6-7).) 

This 217-day span is not statutorily tolled and counts toward the

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one-year limitations period. See Thorson, 479 F.3d at 646. Luu’s

superior court petition was denied on April 19, 2012. (Lodgment

No. 3, In re Luu, Case No. FCR290989, order at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct.

Apr. 19, 2012).) He then waited seventy-seven days, until July 5,

2012, before constructively filing his appellate habeas petition

with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 4, Luu v.

Dickinson, Case No. [A135931] (petition for writ of habeas corpus

at 8-9).) Respondent argues that Petitioner’s unexplained delay

in bringing his appellate petition is unreasonable, and he should

not be entitled to gap tolling for this period of time. (Resp’t’s

Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 11.) 

Statutory tolling applies to “intervals between a lower court

decision and a filing of a new petition in a higher court . . . .” 

Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. A petitioner is thus entitled to

statutory tolling, “not only for the time that his petitions were

actually under consideration, but also for the intervals between

filings, while he worked his way up the ladder[,]” Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey, 536

U.S. at 223), so long as those filings are timely, Carey, 536 U.S.

at 225-26. 

In California, a petition for collateral review is timely if

filed within a “reasonable” amount of time; this contrasts with

states that specify a time limit, usually thirty or forty-five

days. Carey, 536 U.S. at 222–23. Luu waited seventy-seven days

after his superior court habeas petition was denied to file a

petition with the appellate court. Because this gap is not

explained, interval tolling does not apply to the period between

the denial of Luu's superior court petition and his constructive

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filing of the next petition with the California Court of Appeal. 

The petition to the higher court was not filed within a

"reasonable time," presumptively thirty to sixty days. See Evans,

546 U.S. at 192-93. "[I]f the successive petition was not timely

filed, the period between petitions is not tolled." Banjo v.

Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, the period of

seventy-seven days is not statutorily tolled and must be counted

toward the limitations period. See Livermore v. Sandor,

487 F. App’x 342, 343-44 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that delay of

seventy-six days between state habeas petitions was unreasonable);

Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding

delays of eighty-one and ninety-one days were unreasonable). 

The California Court of Appeal denied Luu’s habeas petition

on July 27, 2012. (See Pet. 3; 50, ECF No. 1.) He filed a habeas

corpus petition with the California Supreme Court that was denied

on November 28, 2012. (Id. at 52.) “The statute of limitations

period is . . . not tolled after state post-conviction proceedings

are final and before federal habeas proceedings are initiated.” 

Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)); Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. A decision of the

California Supreme Court becomes final upon filing. Phelps v.

Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 724 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004); Burton v. Cate,

No. 10–1797–WQH(WVG), 2011 WL 4529664, at *4 n.3 (S.D. Cal. June

17, 2011); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.532(b)(2)(C). Thus, the

time period after the denial of Luu’s petition by the California

Supreme Court and before the filing of his federal habeas petition

is not statutorily tolled. Luu constructively filed his federal

habeas petition on May 9, 2013, or 162 days after the California

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Supreme Court denied his petition. This period must be counted

against the one-year limitation period.

The AEDPA statute of limitations period was running in this

case for 217 days before Luu filed his state habeas petition, 77

days between the state superior court’s denial of Luu's petition

and his filing of the next petition with the California Court of

Appeal, and 162 days between the date the California Supreme Court

denied his petition and Luu constructively filed his federal

habeas petition. The three periods when the limitations period

was not tolled total 456 days, which exceeds the AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly,

Luu is not entitled to statutory tolling.

2. Equitable tolling

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is

appropriate when the petitioner can show “‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way’ . . . .” Holland v. Florida, 560

U.S. 631, 632 (2010) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418); see also

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007) (same); Rouse v.

U.S. Dep’t of State, 548 F.3d 871, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). 

A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations where “‘extraordinary circumstances beyond

a prisoner’s control made it impossible’” to file a timely

petition. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)).

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)

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(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212

F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). The failure to file a timely

petition must be the result of external forces, not the result of

the petitioner’s lack of diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Determining whether equitable

tolling is warranted is a ‘fact-specific inquiry.’” Spitsyn, 345

F.3d at 799 (quoting Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th

Cir. 2001)).

Respondent argues that Luu is not entitled to equitable

tolling because Petitioner fails “to explain his unreasonable

delay in commencing his federal action, let alone establish that

extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing the Petition

in a timely manner, and that he has otherwise been diligent in

pursuing his federal habeas claims.” (Resp't's Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 11.) Luu has not opposed

Respondent’s Motion and has not alleged any facts in his Petition

that would explain his delay in bringing this Petition. 

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of establishing that

“extraordinary circumstances” were the proximate cause of his

untimeliness. See Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. Accordingly, the

Court concludes that Luu is not entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends granting

the Motion to Dismiss the Petition as untimely.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

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States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before May 23, 2014. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed on or before June 6, 2014. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157

(9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2014 __________________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge 

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