Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01379/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01379-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROLE TREW, on behalf of

herself and all others

similarly situated, and on

behalf of the general public as

a private attorney general;

JUDITH MARX, MATTHEW MARX, and

LOREN FUNK, on behalf of

themselves and all others

similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA,

LLC, and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-05-1379 DFL PAN

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Defendant Volvo Cars of North America, LLC (“Volvo”) moves

to strike plaintiffs’ claims for equitable monetary relief and

damages under California’s Business & Professions Code §§ 17200,

et seq. (the “UCL”). In a separate motion, Volvo moves to

dismiss plaintiff Trew (“Trew”) from the first amended complaint

(“FAC”). 

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiffs also allege that in Volvo vehicles with turbo 1

engines, another part, the PCV-intake-nipple, also required

cleaning. (FAC ¶ 13.)

 The court notes that plaintiffs use the term “cleaning” 2

whereas Volvo generally describes the procedure as “repairing”

the ETM. For consistency, the court will use “cleaning” on the

assumption that “cleaning” and “repairing” are the same in this

context.

2

I.

Plaintiffs currently own or lease vehicles manufactured by

Volvo. (FAC ¶ 7.) Beginning in 1999, Volvo manufactured

vehicles with an electronic throttle module (“ETM”). (Id. ¶ 8.) 

Plaintiffs allege that Volvo installed defective ETMs in their

vehicles, and that a malfunctioning ETM can cause a vehicle to

shake, surge, or lose power. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.) According to

plaintiffs, when customers complained, Volvo denied that the ETMs

were defective. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs allege that Volvo

continues to conceal the problem with its ETMs. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.)

In July 2001, Volvo issued a service bulletin to dealers

describing the problems with the ETM and providing that dealers

could submit claims for cleaning ETMs under warranty if a

customer were to complain. (Id. ¶ 30-31.) Before issuing the 1

service bulletin, Volvo allegedly considered that it was the

customer’s responsibility to clean the ETM, and typically did not

pay for ETM cleanings under a new car warranty. (Id. ¶ 35.) 2

Plaintiffs allege that by cleaning, instead of replacing, the

ETM, Volvo ensured that the defective ETMs would fail outside of

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiffs also allege that to pacify vocal customers 3

Volvo will sometimes provide free ETM cleanings after a

customer’s warranty expires. (Id. ¶ 39.) 

 However, plaintiffs allege Volvo also offered free ETM 4

replacements to customers who complained “loudly enough.” (Id. ¶

37.) 

3

the warranty period saving Volvo the cost of replacement. (Id. 3

¶¶ 15, 17.) Because only Volvo dealers could replace ETMs,

plaintiffs claim that Volvo profited from the sale of replacement

ETMs. (Id. ¶ 23.) 4

On May 12, 2004, Trew brought this class action against

Volvo in Sacramento County Superior Court. (Compl. ¶ 1.) On

June 21, 2005, plaintiffs filed the FAC. The FAC included two

additional named plaintiffs, Funk and Marx. Unlike Trew, both

Funk and Marx paid to clean and replace their ETMs. (FAC ¶ 2-3.) 

On July 8, 2005, Volvo filed a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441.

Plaintiffs allege that Volvo violated the California Secret

Warranty Law (“Secret Warranty Law”), California Civil Code

section 1795.90 et seq., by: (1) failing to notify all affected

vehicle owners that they could have their ETMs cleaned or

replaced for no charge (FAC ¶ 41); (2) failing to reimburse

vehicle owners who paid to have their ETMs cleaned (Id. ¶ 66);

(3) replacing faulty ETMs for some customers with expired

warranties but failing to notify all other customers of that

benefit (Id. ¶ 37); (4) failing to provide free cleaning or

replacement of faulty ETMs for customers who requested those

services (Id. ¶ 44); (5) cleaning ETMs for customers with expired

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

warranties (Id. ¶ 39); (6) failing to comply with the dealer

notification provisions (Id. ¶ 42); and (7) failing to comply

with the New Motor Vehicle Board notification procedures (Id. ¶

43). 

 Based on the alleged violations of the Secret Warranty Law,

plaintiffs bring: (1) a claim under the UCL; and (2) an unjust

enrichment claim to recover “secret” profits obtained by Volvo. 

(Id. ¶¶ 65, 72.) In addition, plaintiffs raise the following

claims for Volvo’s alleged concealment of the ETM defects: (1)

violation of the UCL; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) fraudulent

concealment; and (4) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act

(“CLRA”), California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. (FAC ¶¶ 71, 79,

92-94.)

II.

A. Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), “the court may

order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Also,

“[a] motion to strike may be used to strike any part of the

prayer for relief when the damages sought are not recoverable as

a matter of law.” Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1479

(C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Tapley v. Lockwood Green Eng’rs, Inc.,

502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1974)). Rule 12(f) aims to prevent

“the expenditure of time and money that must arise from

litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior

to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

(9th Cir. 1983). However, courts generally disfavor motions to

strike because litigants often use them to delay proceedings and

because pleadings have limited importance in federal practice. 

Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D.

Cal. 1991). 

Volvo moves to strike plaintiffs’ claims for: (1)

disgorgement of profits; and (2) the cost of cleaning or

replacing the ETMs. (Mot. to Strike at 2, 5.)

1. Disgorgement of Profits

Volvo argues that plaintiffs’ claim for disgorgement of

profits under the UCL should be stricken because plaintiffs’

costs of cleaning and replacement cannot be traced to funds

acquired by Volvo. (Id. at 2-4.)

Under the UCL, plaintiffs are limited to injunctive relief

and restitution. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29

Cal.4th 1134, 1144 (2003). “An order for restitution is one

compelling a UCL defendant to return money obtained through an

unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom

the property was taken, that is, to persons who had an ownership

interest in the property or those claiming through that person.” 

Id. at 1149 (internal quotations omitted). A plaintiff may not

recover non-restitutionary disgorgement of profits under the UCL. 

Id. at 1152; Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC, 134

Cal.App.4th 997, 1015-1020 (2005) (holding that rule applies to

class action plaintiffs); Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp., 130

Cal.App.4th 440, 460 (2005) (same).

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In Corbett, the court did not address whether the 5

plaintiffs could recover under a theory of restitutionary

disgorgement. However, in Madrid, the court cited Corbett as an

example of restitutionary disgorgement. 130 Cal.App.4th at 461-

62.

6

Plaintiffs in this case seek disgorgement of the profits

Volvo earned from alleged violations of the Secret Warranty Law. 

(FAC ¶ 69.) Volvo argues that plaintiffs fail to allege that any

member of the class has paid money to Volvo to clean or replace

an ETM. (Mot. to Strike at 3.) Volvo claims that plaintiffs 

paid dealerships or independent mechanics to service their ETMs

and that these monies did not go to Volvo. (Id.) Because

plaintiffs have not paid Volvo directly, Volvo argues that it has

not retained any property in which plaintiffs have an interest. 

(Id.) Therefore, Volvo concludes that plaintiffs seek

non-restitutionary disgorgement. (Id.)

Plaintiffs respond that their claim is for restitution

because Volvo profited from those plaintiffs who cleaned or

replaced their ETMs because Volvo was the maker of the ETM and,

therefore, profited from their sale. (Opp’n to Mot. to Strike at

15-22.) Plaintiffs argue that their situation is analogous to

the plaintiffs in Corbett v Superior Court, 101 Cal.App.4th 649

(2002). (Id. at 21.) 5

In Corbett, the plaintiffs alleged that Bank of America and

Hayward Dodge violated the UCL by fraudulently increasing the

interest rate on car loans. 101 Cal.App.4th at 656. The

plaintiffs claimed that Bank of America approved car loans for

the plaintiffs at 12.50% interest, but Hayward Dodge prepared the

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

loan documents with a 17.50% interest rate. Id. Although the

plaintiffs paid Bank of America directly for the loan, the

defendants split the money from the elevated interest rate. Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that, similar to the plaintiffs in Corbett who

recovered from Hayward Dodge, Volvo has received profits from

class members who had their ETMs cleaned or replaced at Volvo

dealerships. (Opp’n to Mot. to Strike at 22.) 

Plaintiffs analogy between this case and Corbett is

persuasive, at least on the facts as plaintiffs allege them. In

Corbett, the court allowed the plaintiffs to recover against

Hayward Dodge because it received some of the profits from the

allegedly fraudulent activity. Similarly, plaintiffs allege that

Volvo profited from its sale of replacement ETMs to the mechanics

and dealers that ultimately replaced parts for plaintiffs. (FAC

¶ 73.) Taking plaintiffs’ allegations as true, if Volvo profited

from class members who replace defective ETMs by purchasing new

ones, then plaintiffs could recover that money from Volvo under a

theory of restitution. Therefore, the court DENIES Volvo’s

motion to strike plaintiffs’ claim for disgorgement of profits

under the UCL.

2. Reimbursement for Cleaning or Replacement of ETMs

Volvo also moves to strike plaintiffs’ claim for

reimbursement of class members who paid for cleaning or

replacement of their ETMs. (Mot. to Strike at 5.) 

As stated above, under the UCL, plaintiffs are limited to

injunctive relief and restitution. Korea Supply, 29 Cal.4th at

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 The court notes that the cases use the term “vested 6

interest” whereas plaintiffs refer to an “ownership interest.” 

The court uses these terms interchangeably.

8

1144. Because plaintiffs never paid Volvo for cleaning or

replacement of their ETMs, Volvo argues that any “reimbursement”

that plaintiffs claim would be the same as a damage remedy which

is not provided under the UCL. (Mot. to Strike at 5.)

Plaintiffs respond that the class members who cleaned or

replaced their ETMs have an ownership interest in the money they

now seek by operation of the Secret Warranty Law. (Opp’n to 6

Motion to Strike at 11-12.) Sections 1795.92 (d) and (e) of the

Secret Warranty Law state: 

(d) A manufacturer who establishes an adjustment

program shall implement procedures to assure

reimbursement of each consumer eligible under an

adjustment program who incurs expenses for repair of a

condition subject to the program prior to acquiring

knowledge of the program . . . .

(e) Any consumer who, prior to acquiring knowledge of

an adjustment program, incurs expenses for repair of a

condition subject to the adjustment program may file a

claim for reimbursement under subdivision (d) . . . .

Plaintiffs argue that under those sections, a car

manufacturer who expands or extends a warranty must reimburse

consumers who incurred expenses in repairing a part covered by

the “secret warranty.” (Opp’n to Mot. to Strike at 12.) 

Therefore, plaintiffs argue, because Volvo expanded its warranty

to cover the cleaning of ETMs in certain cases, and did not

reimburse plaintiffs who paid to have their ETMs cleaned or

replaced without knowledge of the warranty, Volvo has possession

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

of money in which plaintiffs’ have an ownership interest. (Id.) 

According to plaintiffs, because they have such an interest, the

payment of these monies may be seen as restitutionary as opposed

to the typical damages remedy that is not available under the

UCL. (Id. at 11-12.) 

To support their argument, plaintiffs cite Rosales v.

Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 133 F.Supp.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 

In Rosales, the plaintiff brought a claim under the UCL and the

Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (“EFTA”), against

Citibank for failing to reimburse him for $2,149.23 in

unauthorized withdrawals from his bank account. 133 F.Supp.2d at

1179. Citibank moved to strike the plaintiff’s claim for

restitution of the money that was withdrawn from his account

without his authorization. Id. at 1180. Although Citibank never

received the funds taken from the plaintiff’s account, the court

ordered Citibank to restore the amount improperly withdrawn. Id.

at 1182. The court reasoned that if the EFTA required Citibank

to credit the plaintiff for the unauthorized withdrawals, and it

had not, then Citibank possessed money that belonged to the

plaintiff “in violation of the law . . . by means of ‘unfair

competition.’” Id. at 1181.

Plaintiffs argue that this case is analogous to Rosales. 

(Opp’n to Mot. to Strike at 12.) They claim that if Volvo has

expanded its warranty, § 1795.92 requires it to reimburse class

members who have already paid for cleaning or replacement of

their ETMs. (Id.) By failing to reimburse plaintiffs, Volvo,

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

like Citibank, possesses funds in which plaintiffs have an

interest. (Id.) Therefore, plaintiffs argue that their claim

for reimbursement is restitution.

However, this case is distinguishable from Rosales for two

reasons. First, in Rosales, the bank returned money taken from

the plaintiff’s account. By contrast, here, no one took money

from plaintiffs. Instead, plaintiffs allege that they have been

injured because they had to pay to clean or replace the ETM in

their vehicle. Plaintiffs’ claim for reimbursement of the cost

of cleaning or replacing their defective ETMs is a classic claim

for damages, not restitution. See Pfingsten v. Westenhaver, 39

Cal.2d 12, 23 (1952) (discussing the reasonable cost of repairs

as a measure of damages). 

Second, the EFTA provides a definite remedy. Under the

EFTA, a financial institution must recredit a customer’s account

for acts defined as error by the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693f. 

If the financial institution fails to comply with the statutory

requirements for error resolution, then it is liable to the

consumer for damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693m. By contrast, the

Secret Warranty Law only states that consumers may file a claim

for reimbursement. The statute contains no provisions for civil

liability that allows a consumer to seek damages by way of a

lawsuit if the manufacturer fails to make the reimbursement. A

customer might be able to complain to a regulatory agency, but no

case has held that the customer has a private right of action to

recover the funds and plaintiffs do not make such a claim. 

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

Without a clear indication that the Secret Warranty Law requires

reimbursement, plaintiffs have not shown that they have a vested

interest in the cost of cleaning or replacing their ETM. 

Therefore, the court GRANTS Volvo’s motion to strike plaintiffs’

claim for reimbursement of class members who paid for cleaning or

replacement of their ETM. 

C. Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary

Judgment

1. Conversion to Summary Judgment

Volvo moves to dismiss Trew from the FAC, or, in the

alternative, for summary judgment on her claim. In support of

the motion for summary judgment, Volvo has attached a number of

declarations. Plaintiffs respond that the court should not

convert Volvo’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary

judgment because they have not had sufficient time for discovery. 

(Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 10.) Until the facts and claims in

this case are better developed, the court declines to rule on a

motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the court will not

consider the exhibits attached to the parties’ papers.

2. Motion to Dismiss

Volvo moves to dismiss Trew’s claims for: (1) violation of

the UCL; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) fraud; and (4) violation of

the CLRA. (Mot. to Dismiss at 6, 12-13.) Volvo argues that Trew

cannot bring these claims because she has not suffered an injury. 

(Id.) 

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

a. Standing

Volvo argues that Trew’s claim under the UCL should be

dismissed because recent amendments to that statute have changed

the requirements for standing. (Mot. to Dismiss at 5-12.) Trew

responds that she has standing, and, in the alternative, that the

amendment to the UCL does not apply retroactively. (Opp’n to

Mot. to Dismiss at 6-8.) However, because this case is in

federal court, Trew must meet the standing requirements of

Article III. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992). Article III standing is limited

to those plaintiffs who can allege an injury in fact that is: (1)

actual and imminent; and (2) concrete and particularized. Id. 

The court must consider whether Trew has standing for each

claim raised by her. Trew brings claims for Volvo’s alleged

concealment of the defect in the ETM under: (1) the UCL; (2) the

CLRA; (3) fraudulent concealment-nondisclosure; and (4) unjust

enrichment. She also brings a claim for violations of the Secret

Warranty Law under the UCL and unjust enrichment. 

i. UCL, Fraud, CLRA, and Unjust Enrichment Claims 

Volvo argues that Trew’s claims for concealing the defect in

the ETM under: (1) the UCL; (2) the CLRA; (3) fraudulent

concealment-nondisclosure; and (4) unjust enrichment should be

dismissed because she has not suffered an injury. (Mot. to

Dismiss at 12.) 

Trew argues that she has suffered an injury for two reasons:

(1) even though the ETM in her vehicle has not failed, it will;

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

and (2) she would have paid less for her vehicle if she had known

about the defective ETM. (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) 

To support her argument that she has suffered an injury

because her ETM will fail, Trew cites Chamberlan v. Ford Motor

Co., 369 F.Supp.2d 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2005). (Opp’n to Mot. to

Dismiss at 6.) In Chamberlan, the plaintiffs brought a class

action against Ford Motor Company alleging violations of the UCL

and CLRA. 369 F.Supp.2d at 1141. The plaintiffs claimed that

Ford failed to disclose problems with the intake manifolds on a

number of vehicles. Id. at 1142-43. Ford moved for summary

adjudication on the CLRA claims by those class members whose

manifolds had not failed. Id. at 1146. Ford argued that those

plaintiffs had not established any damages under the CLRA. Id. 

Based on testimony offered by the plaintiffs that all, or nearly

all, of the class members’ manifolds would fail, the court found

that the plaintiffs had raised sufficient evidence of an injury

to deny the motion. Id. at 1148. 

Similar to the plaintiffs in Chamberlan, Trew argues that

the defective part in her vehicle will almost certainly fail. 

(Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) Volvo responds that Trew’s

claim that the ETM in her vehicle will fail is speculative. 

(Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) However, to avoid

dismissal, Trew need only allege facts necessary to state a

cognizable claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Because plaintiffs

contend that every ETM is defective and will fail, Trew has met

this standard. (FAC ¶ 22.) 

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

Second, Trew argues that she would not have paid as much for

her vehicle if she had known of the ETM defect. (FAC ¶¶ 83,

98-99.) Volvo responds that, because Trew leased her vehicle,

she cannot claim a loss in value, but fails to address her

argument that she would not have paid as much initially. (Reply

in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 7.) Therefore, Trew has alleged

sufficient facts to establish a second injury. 

Because Trew has alleged two possible injuries, the court

DENIES Volvo’s motion to dismiss Trew’s claims for concealing the

defect in the ETM under: (1) the UCL; (2) the CLRA; (3)

fraudulent concealment-nondisclosure; and (4) unjust enrichment. 

ii. Secret Warranty Law

Volvo argues that Trew has not suffered an injury because

she has not lost money or property as a result of the alleged

violations of the Secret Warranty Law. (Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) 

Plaintiffs appear to claim that Volvo violated the secret

warranty law by: (1) failing to notify all affected vehicle

owners that they could have their ETMs cleaned for no charge (FAC

¶ 41); (2) failing to reimburse vehicle owners who paid to have

their ETMs cleaned (Id. ¶ 66); (3) replacing faulty ETMs for some

customers with expired warranties (Id. ¶ 37); (4) failing to

provide free cleaning or replacement of faulty ETMs for customers

who requested those services (Id. ¶ 44); (5) cleaning ETMs for

customers with expired warranties (Id. ¶ 39); (6) failing to

comply with the dealer notification provisions (Id. ¶ 42); and

(7) failing to comply with the New Motor Vehicle Board

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

notification procedures (Id. ¶ 43).

Neither party has addressed Trew’s standing to raise these

separate claims for violations of the Secret Warranty Law. 

Without such briefing, the court is not in a good position to

determine if Trew’s UCL and unjust enrichment causes of action

for violations of the Secret Warranty Law should be dismissed for

lack of standing. When the facts in this case are more

developed, and plaintiffs have refined the claims that Trew

raises, the defendant may renew a challenge to Trew’s Secret

Warranty claims on the basis of a lack of standing. Therefore,

the court DENIES Volvo’s motion to dismiss Trew’s UCL and unjust

enrichment causes of action for violations of the Secret Warranty

Law.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

III.

For the reasons stated above, the court: (1) DENIES Volvo’s

motion to strike plaintiffs’ claim for disgorgement of profits

under the UCL; (2) GRANTS Volvo’s motion to strike plaintiffs’

claim for reimbursement of class members who paid for cleaning or

replacement of their ETMs; (3) DENIES Volvo’s motion to dismiss

Trew’s claims under the UCL and CLRA, and for fraudulent

concealment-nondisclosure and unjust enrichment arising from

Volvo’s alleged concealment of the defective ETMs; and (4) DENIES

Volvo’s motion to dismiss Trew’s UCL and unjust enrichment causes

of action for violations of the Secret Warranty Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/7/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-01379-MCE -EFB Document 59 Filed 02/08/06 Page 16 of 16