Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-05371/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-05371-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHEVRON CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CRISTÓBAL BONIFAZ and THE LAW OFFICES

OF CRISTÓBAL BONIFAZ,

Defendants. /

No. 09-05371 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’

ANTI-SLAPP MOTION

TO STRIKE,

GRANTING IN PART

CHEVRON’S REQUEST

FOR A CONTINUANCE

AND GRANTING

CHEVRON’S MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO FILE

ADDITIONAL

BRIEFING

(Docket Nos. 25

and 44)

Plaintiff Chevron Corporation brings this action for malicious

prosecution against Defendants Cristóbal Bonifaz and The Law

Offices of Cristóbal Bonifaz. Defendants move to strike Chevron’s

complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,

commonly known as California’s anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against

Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute. Chevron asks the Court

to continue its decision on the motion and to allow discovery

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). In the

alternative, Chevron opposes Defendants’ Motion. Chevron also

filed an administrative motion for leave to file a response to

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Defendants’ evidentiary objections and a reply in support of its

request for a continuance of Defendants’ motion to strike. The

motions were taken under submission on the papers. Having

considered the papers submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS in

part Defendants’ anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike, GRANTS in part

Chevron’s request for a continuance to conduct discovery and GRANTS

Chevron’s motion for leave to file its additional brief. The Court

defers its decision on Defendants’ motion as it pertains to

striking Chevron’s action to the extent it is based on Defendants’

continued prosecution of claims by Luisa Maribel Jame Gonzales;

Chevron may conduct discovery on whether Defendants knew of Ms.

Jame’s admission that she did not have cancer.

BACKGROUND

Chevron is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of

business in San Ramon, California. Its malicious prosecution

action arises from Gonzales v. Texaco Inc., No. 06-02820 WHA (N.D.

Cal.). Defendants Bonifaz and his law firm (hereinafter

collectively, Bonifaz), citizens of Massachusetts, represented the

Gonzales plaintiffs.

Like several other actions filed in the United States and in

Ecuador, Gonzales involved claims arising from oil exploration and

production operations in the Oriente region of Ecuador. Litigation

against Chevron and/or its subsidiaries over these activities has

spanned several years. In addition to the Gonzales case, Bonifaz

was involved in another action against Chevron, filed in 2003 in

Lago Agrio, Ecuador by forty-eight Ecuadorians. He had been

discharged as counsel by the plaintiffs in that suit. 

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1 Chevron asks the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibits

A-C, K-L, P, R and V of the Declaration of Thomas Rector, all of

which contain court orders from the Gonzales action. A federal

court may take judicial notice of facts that are “capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

This includes taking “notice of proceedings in other courts, both

within and without the federal judicial system, if those

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United

States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court GRANTS Chevron’s

request and takes notice of the actions taken by the Gonzales

court. However, the Court does not take notice of the truth of the

findings of fact contained in these orders. United States v. Sine, 493 F.3d 1021, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “the introduction

of discrete judicial factfindings and analysis underlying the

judgment to prove the truth of those findings and that analysis

constitutes the use of hearsay”); see also Herrick v. Garvey, 298

F.3d 1184, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 29

F.3d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994); Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415, 417

(4th Cir. 1993).

3

In preparation for Gonzales, in January, 2006, Bonifaz engaged

Gerardo Peña Matheus, an Ecuadorian attorney, to identify potential

plaintiffs. Rector Decl., Ex. H.1 Bonifaz asked Mr. Peña to find

“[t]hree or four people who have resided close to the lakes of

petroleum left by Texaco and who have discovered in the last four

years that they have some form of cancer.” Rector Decl., Ex. H at

3. He also asked for a letter from a “Dr. Ribadeneira or from any

medic who has examined these persons that says that in his opinion

there is at least a 51% probability that the cancer was caused by

the fact that these people have been exposed to petroleum

contamination in the Amazon.” Rector Decl., Ex. H at 3. 

On April 25, 2006, Bonifaz and other attorneys initiated the

Gonzales action on behalf of nine Ecuadorians, bringing claims

against Chevron and two of its subsidiaries, Texaco and Texaco

Petroleum Company (TexPet). Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice

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2

 Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of fortytwo exhibits, which consist of documents filed in the Gonzales

action. Chevron objects to Defendants’ request for notice of

Exhibits 2-7, 9, 11, 12, 14-16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27-32, 35 and 41,

to the extent that they are offered for anything beyond the fact

that they were proffered in Gonzales. The Court GRANTS Defendants’

request for judicial notice. However, as with Chevron’s request,

the Court does not take notice of these documents for any hearsay

purpose.

3

 The parties use different spellings and conventions with

regard to the Gonzales plaintiffs’ names. For the purposes of

clarity and consistency, the Court adopts the spelling provided in

the Second Amended Complaint filed in Gonzales, Defs.’ RJN, Ex. 9

¶¶ 8-16, and the conventions used by Defendants in this action. 

4

(RJN),2 Ex. 1. Luisa Maribel Jame Gonzales, Vilma Jacqueline

Moreno Chuquiom, Luz Maria Armas Cadenas and Maria Ignacia Cano

Zambrano3 averred that they had cancer caused by pollution from

Texaco and TexPet’s activities in the region. Their spouses, Nixon

Rodriguez, Tobias Alberto Canache, Jose Bonilla and Arturo Alava,

each brought claims based on their alleged fear of cancer and

emotional injury caused by their respective wives’ cancer. Gloria

Carmina Vera Chamba asserted claims based on her son’s alleged

leukemia. In the operative complaint, the plaintiffs sought

recovery for negligence, intentional or reckless infliction of

emotional distress and battery. Defs.’ RJN, Ex. 9 ¶¶ 81-100. 

The Gonzales plaintiffs did not prevail. The court either

dismissed with prejudice, by motion or pursuant to stipulation, or

granted summary judgment for the oil companies on the claims

brought by each of the plaintiffs. On January 31, 2007, the court

dismissed Ms. Moreno’s and Mr. Canache’s claims with prejudice

because they failed to cooperate during discovery. Defs.’ RJN, Ex.

13, at 2. On August 3, 2007, the court dismissed the claims of Ms.

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Vera, Ms. Jame and Mr. Rodriguez with prejudice, concluding that

terminating sanctions were appropriate because they had engaged in

deliberately deceptive practices. Rector Decl., Ex. B. In

addition, the court held that summary judgment was proper because

there was no triable issue of fact as to these plaintiffs’ claims. 

Id. In connection with this dismissal, the court, on its own

motion, imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Bonifaz and his co-counsel. 

Rector Decl., Ex. A. On August 27, 2007, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41(a), the parties jointly stipulated to the

dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Bonilla’s and Mr. Alava’s claims. 

Defs.’ RJN, Exs. 25-26. Finally, on November 15, 2007, the court

entered summary judgment against Ms. Armas and Ms. Cano, holding

that the relevant statute of limitations had run on their claims. 

Rector Decl., Ex. V; Defs.’ RJN, Ex. 36.

In the current complaint, Chevron alleges that Gonzales was

part of an extortion scheme by Bonifaz and others. It pleads that,

after the plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio litigation discharged him as

their lawyer, Bonifaz initiated the Gonzales suit “as a threat to

the money and political power” that those plaintiffs would gain

from that litigation. Compl. ¶ 43. 

Chevron brings its action for malicious prosecution, pleading

that it prevailed on the merits in Gonzales, that Bonifaz did not

have probable cause to bring or to continue to prosecute the action

and that he harbored malice against Chevron. It seeks various

types of relief, including special damages in the amount of $4

million. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides,

A cause of action against a person arising from any act

of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of

petition or free speech under the United States

Constitution or the California Constitution in connection

with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion

to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff

has established that there is a probability that the

plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). California anti-SLAPP motions

to strike are available to litigants proceeding in federal court. 

Thomas v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1206, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Courts analyze these motions in two steps. “First, the court

decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the

challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.” 

Equilon Enter. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 67 (2002). 

Second, the court “determines whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Id. 

“At [the] second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, the required

probability that [a party] will prevail need not be high.” Hilton

v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2010). The “statute

does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out

of the defendant’s free speech or petitioning; it subjects to

potential dismissal only those actions in which the plaintiff

cannot state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.” Id. at

908 (quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 93 (2002))

(quotation marks omitted). An anti-SLAPP motion to strike premised

on legal arguments is similar to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6),

whereas one based on a lack of evidence is similar to a summary

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judgment motion. Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, 57 F. Supp. 2d

973, 981 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 

A federal court may not apply provisions of the anti-SLAPP

statute if doing “so would result in a ‘direct collision’ with a

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.” Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v.

Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). For instance,

subsections (f) and (g) of section 425.16 do not operate in federal

court. Id. at 846. These subsections “‘create a default rule that

allows the defendant served with a complaint to immediately put the

plaintiff to his or her proof before the plaintiff can conduct

discovery.’” Id. (quoting Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 980). This

rule directly collides with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f),

which requires “discovery ‘where the nonmoving party has not had

the opportunity to discover information that is essential to its

opposition.’” Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 846 (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). Accordingly, on an

anti-SLAPP motion to strike, federal courts must apply Rule 56(f)

to determine whether a party is entitled to conduct discovery. 

DISCUSSION

Because it arises from a defendant’s constitutional right to

petition, “every claim of malicious prosecution is a cause of

action arising from protected activity because every such claim

necessarily depends upon written and oral statements in a prior

judicial proceeding.” Daniels v. Robbins, 182 Cal. App. 4th 204,

215 (2010) (citing Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal. 4th

728, 734-35 (2003)). Chevron does not dispute that its suit arises

from protected activity. Accordingly, Bonifaz satisfies the first

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step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry and shifts the burden to Chevron to

demonstrate that it can “state and substantiate” its malicious

prosecution action. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 908. 

I. Probability of Success on the Merits

A claim for malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to

prove that a defendant’s earlier litigation: 

(1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant

and was pursued to a legal termination in [the

plaintiff’s] favor; (2) was brought without probable

cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.

Estate of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515

F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.

4th 958, 965 (2004)) (emphasis in original). A defendant can also

be liable for “continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack

probable cause.” Zamos, 32 Cal. 4th at 973. 

Malicious prosecution actions are disfavored because of their

“potential to impose an undue ‘chilling effect’ on the ordinary

citizen’s willingness to . . . bring a civil dispute to court.” 

Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 872 (1989). 

To deter excessive and frivolous lawsuits, the “preferable approach

is ‘the adoption of measures facilitating the speedy resolution of

the initial lawsuit and authorizing the imposition of sanctions for

frivolous or delaying conduct within that first action itself.’” 

Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 817 (2002)

(quoting Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 872). 

A. Termination of Gonzales Claims in Favor of Chevron

A “favorable termination does not occur merely because a party

complained against has prevailed in an underlying action.” Casa

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Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal. 4th 336, 342 (2004) (quoting

Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 751 (1979)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). To be considered favorable for the purposes of a

malicious prosecution suit, “the termination must reflect the

merits of the action and the plaintiff’s innocence of the

misconduct alleged in the lawsuit.” Casa Herrera, 32 Cal. 4th at

342 (quoting Pender v. Radin, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1807, 1814 (1994))

(internal quotation marks omitted). For example, a court’s

decision to grant “summary judgment because there was insufficient

evidence to establish a triable issue of fact” constitutes a

favorable termination. Casa Herrera, 32 Cal. 4th at 342 (citing

Sierra Club Found. v. Graham, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1149-50

(1999)). However, a “technical or procedural termination,” such as

a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, “is not favorable

for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim.” Casa Herrera, 32

Cal. 4th at 342 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

As noted above, the Gonzales court dismissed the claims by Ms.

Vera, Ms. Jame and Mr. Rodriguez with prejudice, concluding that

terminating sanctions and the entry of summary judgment against

these plaintiffs were appropriate. Rector Decl., Ex. B at 5. 

Chevron asserts, and Bonifaz does not dispute, that this satisfies

the favorable decision requirement. 

The parties contest, however, the relevance and impact of the

dismissal of the other plaintiffs’ claims. As explained below, the

dismissal of these claims does not satisfy the favorable

termination requirement and, accordingly, the Court strikes

Chevron’s malicious prosecution action to the extent that it relies

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on these claims. 

1. Dismissal of Claims by Arturo Alava

Chevron asserts that the dismissal of Mr. Alava’s claims,

which occurred pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation,

constitutes a favorable termination on the merits. 

“‘In most cases, a voluntary unilateral dismissal is

considered a termination in favor of the defendant in the

underlying action; the same is true of a dismissal for failure to

prosecute.’” Fuentes v. Berry, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1800, 1808 (1995)

(quoting Villa v. Cole, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1327, 1335 (1992)); see

also Sycamore Ridge Apartments, LLC v. Naumann, 157 Cal. App. 4th

1385, 1400 (2007) (citing Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d

166, 185 (1979)). This rule “‘arises from the natural assumption

that one does not simply abandon a meritorious action once

instituted.’” Sycamore Ridge, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 1400 (quoting

Lackner, 25 Cal. 3d at 750-51). 

However, resolution of claims that “leaves some doubt as to

the defendant’s innocence or liability is not a favorable

termination . . . .” Villa v. Cole, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1327, 1335

(1992). For this reason, a “dismissal resulting from negotiation,

settlement, or consent is generally not deemed a favorable

termination of the proceedings.” Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App.

3d 823, 827 n.4 (1978) (citing Webb v. Youmans, 248 Cal. App. 2d

851, 853 (1967)). “In such a case the dismissal reflects

ambiguously on the merits of the action as it results from the

joint action of the parties, thus leaving open the question of

defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Minasian, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 827

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4 Notably, Chevron does not assert that the dismissal of Mr.

Bonilla’s claims, which also occurred pursuant to joint

stipulation, constituted a favorable termination. 

11

n.4 (citation omitted). 

Although voluntary, the dismissal of Mr. Alava’s claims was

not a unilateral act. Chevron and Mr. Alava jointly stipulated to

dismiss his claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a). Chevron provides no authority to support its position that

a dismissal pursuant to a joint stipulation constitutes a favorable

termination on the merits.4

 Chevron could have declined to

stipulate and required Mr. Alava to seek a court order to dismiss

his claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Because Chevron’s

participation clouds the issue of its innocence, the dismissal of

Mr. Alava’s claims does not constitute a favorable termination on

the merits. 

Accordingly, the Court strikes Chevron’s malicious prosecution

action to the extent that it rests on Mr. Alava’s claims.

2. Dismissal of Claims by the Remaining Gonzales

Plaintiffs

Chevron does not assert that the dismissal of the claims by

Ms. Moreno, Mr. Canache, Ms. Armas, Mr. Bonilla and Ms. Cano

satisfies the favorable termination requirement. Therefore,

Chevron cannot maintain its malicious prosecution action based on

these plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, the Court strikes Chevron’s

action to the extent that it rests on these claims. 

B. Probable Cause

“The probable cause inquiry is objective, asking whether a

reasonable person would have thought that the claim was legally

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tenable ‘without regard to her mental state.’” Estate of Tucker,

515 F.3d at 1031 (editing marks omitted). This is a lenient

standard; only “those actions that any reasonable attorney would

agree are totally and completely without merit may form the basis

for a malicious prosecution suit.” Wilson, 28 Cal. 4th at 817

(citation and internal quotation and editing marks omitted). 

The “existence or nonexistence of probable cause is a legal

question to be resolved by the court in the malicious prosecution

case; litigants are thus protected against the danger that a lay

jury would mistake a merely unsuccessful claim for a legally

untenable one.” Id. (citing Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 874-77). 

1. Sanctions Order in Gonzales

Chevron contends that the order sanctioning Bonifaz and his

associates for the handling of the claims by Ms. Vera, Ms. Jame and

Mr. Rodriguez constitutes prima facie evidence of the lack of

probable cause. 

Citing Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward Hamilton & Scripps, 99

Cal. App. 4th 1179 (2002), Chevron argues that the findings of the

court in the Gonzales case in support of its sanctions order are

competent evidence that Bonifaz lacked probable cause to bring

suit. In Mattel, the state court provided, “The findings made in

connection with the rule 11 sanctions, the appropriate subject of

judicial notice requested of the trial court, are evidence that the

underlying action was filed without probable cause.” Id. at 1191

(citing Cal. Evid. Code § 451(a)). Other state courts, however,

have reached contrary conclusions, holding that such findings are

not admissible. See, e.g., Fowler v. Howell, 42 Cal. App. 4th

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1746, 1749 (1996) (stating “a court may not take judicial notice of

the truth of a factual finding made in another action”) (emphasis

in original); Sosinsky v. Grant, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1548, 1563 (1992)

(holding “judicial notice could not properly be taken of the truth

of the factual findings of the trial judge” in a prior case). 

Further, the holding in Mattel does not comport with the Federal

Rules of Evidence. In federal court, findings of fact by another

tribunal constitute hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter

asserted. Sine, 493 F.3d at 1036. Chevron offers no hearsay

exception or controlling authority to establish that these findings

are admissible for their truth. The sanctions order constitutes

competent evidence that Bonifaz was sanctioned, but the underlying

findings made in support thereof are hearsay and not admissible for

their truth.

This leaves the question of whether Rule 11 sanctions, on

their own, suffice as evidence that Bonifaz lacked probable cause

at the time he brought Gonzales. They do not. The imposition of

sanctions demonstrates that Bonifaz and his colleagues made

improper representations to the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)-

(c). However, the sanctions do not speak to his knowledge when he

initiated Gonzales. Nor do they show that, based on this

knowledge, the plaintiffs’ claims were legally untenable. 

Certainly, the levy of sanctions suggests deficient conduct by

Bonifaz. However, Chevron stretches the meaning of the sanctions

too far. It does not necessarily follow that Bonifaz lacked

probable cause to initiate the suit. See Chromatic Comm’n Enters.,

Inc. v. Business Guides, Inc., 1993 WL 311503, at *7 (N.D. Cal.)

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(concluding that defendants in malicious prosecution action had

probable cause, despite the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in the

underlying suit). 

Accordingly, the sanctions order does not suffice as prima

facie evidence that Bonifaz lacked probable cause when he brought

suit. 

2. Failure To Obtain Consent To File Suit

To show Bonifaz lacked probable cause, Chevron cites findings

made by the Gonzales court that Bonifaz failed to obtain proper

consent from Ms. Jame, Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Vera to bring a

lawsuit in the United States on their behalf. As noted above, the

Gonzales court’s findings are inadmissible hearsay in this action. 

Chevron offers no other evidence or authority to show that these

plaintiffs did not give consent or that, based on the forms

submitted, any reasonable attorney would have concluded that

bringing suit would be legally untenable. 

3. Claims by Luisa Maribel Jame Gonzales

Chevron asserts that Bonifaz lacked probable cause to initiate

and to continue to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Jame. It

argues that Ms. Jame’s intake form contained limited information

and did not provide Bonifaz with probable cause to bring suit. On

the form, Ms. Jame indicated that she had breast cancer and that

she believed it was the result of contamination caused by Texaco “1

year ago.” Rector Decl., Ex. I at 1. Concerning how she knew that

she had cancer caused by contamination, Ms. Jame stated, “Because

everybody said that [the] result of the contamination is going to

kill us, we live because we work.” Rector Decl., Ex. I at 1. She

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also acknowledged that there was publicity about cancer being

caused by petroleum contamination. Rector Decl., Ex. I at 1. 

Chevron points out that Ms. Jame did not refer to any doctor’s

evaluation or medical record to support her claim that she had

cancer. Thus, Chevron asserts, the form did not give Bonifaz

probable cause to bring suit on her behalf. 

California courts have stated that, “when evaluating a

client’s case and making an initial assessment of tenability, the

attorney is entitled to rely on information provided by the

client.” Morrison v. Rudolph, 103 Cal. App. 4th 506, 512-13

(2002), disapproved of on other grounds by Zamos, 32 Cal. 4th at

973; accord Estate of Tucker, 515 F.3d at 1036. It is reasonable

for an attorney to rely upon this information, “‘unless the

client’s representations are known to be false.’” Morrison, 103

Cal. App. 4th at 513 (quoting Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice

§ 6.19 (5th ed. 2000)). 

The statements on Ms. Jame’s intake form do not show

affirmatively that Bonifaz knew her claims were false. It was

reasonable for Bonifaz to rely on Ms. Jame’s representation that

she had cancer. Also, Ms. Jame lived in an area, contaminated by

petroleum pollution, where Texaco and TexPet undertook oil

exploration and production activities; thus, it was not

unreasonable for Bonifaz to assume a connection between the

companies’ actions and Ms. Jame’s reported cancer. Although it

appears that Bonifaz had a minimal basis for probable cause,

Chevron has not made a prima facie showing that Ms. Jame’s claims

were totally and wholly without merit. In suggesting that the

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information was sparse and that Ms. Jame may have been improperly

motivated by publicity, Chevron implicitly argues that Bonifaz

lacked probable cause because he should have known that her claims

may have been false. However, such an argument espouses a

negligence standard for malicious prosecution, which the California

Supreme Court has rejected. Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 883. 

Chevron also appears to suggest that Bonifaz was remiss in not

fully investigating Ms. Jame’s claims. This argument is unavailing

because, as Chevron acknowledges, “the reasonableness of his

investigation, or lack thereof, is not relevant to the objective

determination of probable cause . . . .” Opp’n at 24; see also

Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 883. Chevron provides no argument or

authority to show that any reasonable attorney would have

concluded, at the onset, that Ms. Jame’s claims were legally

untenable. 

Even if Bonifaz had probable cause when he filed the lawsuit,

Chevron asserts, he lacked probable cause to continue prosecuting

Ms. Jame’s claims after she admitted to Othni Lathram and Dennis

Patanzis, who were other attorneys for the plaintiffs, that she did

not have breast cancer. Even though Ms. Jame had never

communicated this directly to Bonifaz, Chevron argues that a jury

could infer that he knew this information because his co-counsel

had been told. Bonifaz acknowledges that Ms. Jame admitted to

these attorneys that she did not have cancer, but nevertheless

asserts that this is immaterial as to his knowledge and the

existence of probable cause. 

This admission by Ms. Jame to the other attorneys demonstrates

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that Chevron’s action could have some merit. If Bonifaz knew that

Ms. Jame did not actually have cancer, he would have lacked

probable cause to continue Ms. Jame’s suit. Bonifaz states that he

never met or spoke with any of the Gonzales plaintiffs. Bonifaz

Decl., ¶ 6. Instead, it appears that he delegated investigatory

duties to other attorneys. Bonifaz does not deny that he was told

of Ms. Jame’s revelation. Nor does he provide evidence that his

associates withheld such information from him. His substantial

role in the litigation and the significance of Ms. Jame’s admission

warrant affording Chevron the opportunity to conduct discovery on

whether Bonifaz knew of Ms. Jame’s statement to Lathram and

Patanzis. Because such discovery is necessary for Chevron to mount

its opposition, the Court defers its ruling on Bonifaz’s motion to

the extent that it seeks to strike Chevron’s claim that his

continued prosecution of Ms. Jame’s claims was malicious. 

Bonifaz cites Estate of Tucker, which provides that “a party’s

malfeasance in initiating a lawsuit is not imputable to counsel. 

Nor are claims related to continuing such a lawsuit interchangeable

for parties and attorneys.” 515 F.3d at 1032 (citation omitted). 

This case is inapposite. Wrongdoing by Ms. Jame or co-counsel will

not be imputed to Bonifaz. 

Chevron does not make out a prima facie case that Bonifaz

lacked probable cause to bring suit on behalf of Ms. Jame. The

Court therefore strikes Chevron’s action to the extent that it

rests on Bonifaz filing Ms. Jame’s claims. However, discovery is

required as to whether Bonifaz lacked probable cause to continue

prosecuting her claims. The Court accordingly defers deciding

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whether to strike Chevron’s action insofar as it rests on this

issue. 

4. Claims by Nixon Rodriguez

Chevron contends that Bonifaz lacked probable cause to bring

suit on behalf of Mr. Rodriguez, Ms. Jame’s spouse. It asserts

that Mr. Rodriguez did not submit an intake form indicating that he

suffered from any physical or emotional harm. Chevron also

maintains, without proffering evidence, that he did not tell

Bonifaz, Mr. Peña or any of Mr. Peña’s assistants that he had

suffered such harm. 

As noted above, Chevron has not established a prima facie case

that Bonifaz lacked probable cause to bring the claims by Ms. Jame. 

With regard to Mr. Rodriguez, Chevron likewise fails to proffer

evidence to demonstrate that his claims were wholly without merit. 

Because it does not satisfy its burden, the Court strikes Chevron’s

malicious prosecution claim to the extent that it rests on Mr.

Rodriguez’s claims. 

5. Claims by Gloria Carmina Vera Chamba

Chevron also maintains that Bonifaz lacked probable cause to

bring and to continue to prosecute Ms. Vera’s claims. As noted

above, Ms. Vera asserted claims on behalf of her son. The Second

Amended Complaint alleged, “In October 2002, Jane Gloria Chamba’s

son, who was seven years old, was diagnosed with leukemia.” Defs.’

RJN, Ex. 9 ¶ 12. 

Chevron argues that the information Bonifaz had prior to

filing suit did not support probable cause. On her intake form,

Ms. Vera stated that she first suspected that her son had cancer on

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5 Unlike the forms of the other plaintiffs, that of Ms. Vera

did not have a field for the type of cancer alleged. 

6

 Chevron objects to Bonifaz’s declaration in its entirety,

asserting that it is inadmissible hearsay. The Court overrules

this objection because Bonifaz makes his statements in a sworn

declaration and, as a party, can be called to testify at trial. 

Thus, his statements in his declaration are not hearsay. Also, the

Court overrules Chevron’s hearsay objection to Bonifaz’s statement

that Mr. Peña and Mr. Gallo explained to him that Ms. Vera’s son

had leukemia. This is not received to prove that Ms. Vera’s son

had the disease, but instead to show Bonifaz’s knowledge, belief

and state of mind.

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October 23, 2002, Rector Decl., Ex. I at 7, but she did not list

the date when the cancer was diagnosed. Ms. Vera does not state

anywhere on the form that her son had leukemia.5 However, Bonifaz

states that, on March 10, 2006, one month before the lawsuit was

filed, he met with Mr. Peña and Eduardo Gallo, another Ecuadorian

attorney, who explained that Ms. Vera’s son had leukemia. Bonifaz

Decl. ¶ 9.6

 He asserts that Ms. Vera’s intake form and his prefiling conversation with Mr. Peña and Mr. Gallo provided probable

cause. 

The intake form contained limited information and Bonifaz

apparently relied on information from Mr. Peña and Mr. Gallo that

proved unsubstantiated. However, on this motion, Chevron bears the

burden to proffer evidence that, if credited, would demonstrate a

lack of probable cause. Nothing proffered by Chevron establishes a

prima facie showing that Bonifaz knew, at the time the lawsuit was

filed, that Ms. Vera’s claims were false. 

Chevron also asserts that Bonifaz lacked probable cause to

continue prosecuting Ms. Vera’s case after “obtaining conclusive

evidence that her claim was baseless.” Opp’n at 28. Chevron

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7 Chevron also cites statements made in the Gonzales court’s

sanctions order. As explained above, Chevron cannot rely on that

court’s findings and analysis for the truth of the matters

asserted.

20

refers to the medical records of Ms. Vera’s son, proffered in the

Gonzales case, which did not reflect a diagnosis of leukemia.7

Although these records are not before the Court, the lack of

information in the records would not suggest that Bonifaz knew that

Ms. Vera’s representations were false. There is no competent

evidence that to support a prima facie case that Bonifaz lacked

probable cause to continue prosecuting Ms. Vera’s claims. 

Accordingly, the Court strikes Chevron’s malicious prosecution

action to the extent that it rests on Ms. Vera’s claims. 

C. Malice

In a malicious prosecution action, malice refers to “‘the

subjective intent or purpose with which the defendant acted in

initiating the prior action.’” Estate of Tucker, 515 F.3d at 1030

(quoting Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 874). Malice “is not limited

to actual hostility or ill will toward the plaintiff.” Sierra Club

Found., 72 Cal. App. 4th at 1157. It is also “present when

proceedings are instituted primarily for an improper purpose.” Id.

Suits demonstrating an improper purpose include those in which: 

(1) the person initiating them does not believe that his

claim may be held valid; (2) the proceedings are begun

primarily because of hostility or ill will; (3) the

proceedings are initiated solely for the purpose of

depriving the person against whom they are initiated of a

beneficial use of his property; (4) the proceedings are

initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement which

has no relation to the merits of the claim.

Estate of Tucker, 515 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Sierra Club Found., 72

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Cal. App. 4th at 1157). If a “‘trial court determines that the

prior action was not objectively tenable, the extent of a defendant

attorney’s investigation and research may be relevant to the

further question of whether or not the attorney acted with

malice.’” Sycamore Ridge, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 1407 (quoting

Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 883). “Malice is usually a question

of fact for the jury to determine.” Estate of Tucker, 515 F.3d at

1030 (citation omitted). 

As noted above, Chevron may be able to show that Bonifaz

lacked probable cause to maintain Ms. Jame’s suit after she

admitted to his associates that she did not have breast cancer. 

After this admission, it would have been apparent that her claims

were not valid. If Bonifaz knew of her admission and did not

dismiss her claims, malice on his part could be inferred. Drummond

v. Desmarais, 176 Cal. App. 4th 439, 452 (2009) (“A lack of

probable cause will therefore support an inference of malice.”)

(citing Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260,

292 (2006)). 

II. Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(f)

Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that the court may deny or continue a motion for summary judgment

“[i]f a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for

specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its

opposition.” The requesting party must show (1) it has set forth

in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from

further discovery, (2) the facts sought exist and (3) the soughtafter facts are essential to oppose summary judgment. Family Home

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& Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 525 F.3d 822,

827 (9th Cir. 2008). Federal courts apply the Rule 56(f) analysis

when considering whether to grant additional discovery on an antiSLAPP motion to strike. Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 845-47. 

Chevron maintains that, because it requires discovery to mount

its opposition, the Court should defer its decision on this motion. 

This argument is only relevant as to discovery concerning probable

cause to bring or to continue the prosecution of the claims by Mr.

Rodriguez, Ms. Jame and Ms. Vera. As stated above, Chevron cannot

establish that the claims of the other Gonzales plaintiffs were

favorably terminated on the merits; no discovery on this issue

could change this determination. 

Concerning Mr. Rodriguez, Chevron does not identify any

specific facts that would buttress its argument that Bonifaz lacked

probable cause to bring his claims. Accordingly, Chevron has not

met its burden to show that discovery is necessary with respect to

Mr. Rodriguez.

Likewise, Chevron fails to identify specific facts it requires

to support its argument that Bonifaz lacked probable cause to bring

Ms. Jame’s claims. However, as explained above, discovery on the

discrete, narrow issue of what Bonifaz knew of Ms. Jame’s statement

to Lathram and Patanzis could provide support for Chevron’s claim

that he lacked probable cause to continue his prosecution of her

claims. Thus, under Rule 56(f), the Court affords Chevron the

opportunity to conduct discovery on this matter.

With regard to Ms. Vera, Chevron asserts that, for this

motion, Bonifaz asserts for the first time that Mr. Peña and Mr.

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Gallo communicated to him that Ms. Vera’s son had leukemia. As

stated above, Bonifaz cited this communication to assert that he

had probable cause to bring suit on behalf of Ms. Vera. Chevron,

however, does not cite evidence that contradicts Bonifaz’s

assertion. Nor does Chevron identify specific facts that it hopes

to uncover during discovery that would show that Bonifaz lacked

probable cause to bring Ms. Vera’s claims. Instead, Chevron

broadly asserts that there is a dispute as to material facts

concerning the discussions at the March 10, 2006 meeting, referring

to the date on which Bonifaz claims he learned about Ms. Vera and

her son. See Bonifaz Decl. ¶ 9. Stating that there is a dispute

of fact, however, is not equivalent to citing specific facts that

can be uncovered through discovery. Accordingly, Chevron does not

meet its burden to be allowed discovery concerning Ms. Vera. 

Chevron is entitled to pursue discovery as to whether Bonifaz

knew of Ms. Jame’s statement to his associates. Thus, the Court

defers its ruling on Bonifaz’s motion to the extent that it rests

on Chevron’s claim concerning the continued prosecution of Ms.

Jame’s claims. However, Chevron fails to identify specific facts

it requires to oppose Bonifaz’s motion as to Mr. Rodriguez and Ms.

Vera. Discovery concerning the claims of these Gonzales plaintiffs

is not necessary. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part

Defendants’ anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike (Docket No. 25), GRANTS in

part Chevron’s motion for a continuance and to conduct discovery

and GRANTS Chevron’s administrative motion for leave to file

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additional briefing (Docket No. 44). The Court defers ruling on

Defendants’ motion to the extent that it is directed at Chevron’s

malicious prosecution action based on Bonifaz’s continued

prosecution of claims by Ms. Jame after her admission that she did

not have breast cancer. In all other respects, the Court strikes

Chevron’s malicious prosecution action and denies Chevron’s request

to conduct to discovery.

The Court grants Chevron sixty days to conduct discovery on

whether Bonifaz knew that Ms. Jame admitted to his co-counsel that

she did not have cancer. Chevron may file a supplemental

opposition brief, addressing this limited issue, of no more than

ten pages in length, by July 15, 2010. Defendants’ supplemental

reply, of equal length, shall be due July 22, 2010. 

The case management conference scheduled for June 29, 2010 at

2:00 p.m. is continued to August 10, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 12, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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