Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00113/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00113-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONNIE WILLIAMS,

CDCR #T-54378,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO; R. OLSON;

E. MARRERO; M. ASHLEY; 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE; E. MARQUEZ; CALIFORNIA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT HIGHLAND,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:12-cv-00113-BTM-RBB

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM, 

AS FRIVOLOUS 

[ECF No. 126]

I. Procedural History1

Lonnie Williams (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the California State 

Prison - Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”) located in Represa, California, is proceeding in pro se 

 

1

 This matter has a very lengthy procedural history. The Court will only address the procedural history 

relevant to the current procedural posture of the case.

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and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”). (ECF No. 126.) 

On November 27, 2017, the Court GRANTED Defendants’ Motion for Judgment 

on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 121.) In this Order, the Court DISMISSED Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and conspiracy claims with leave to amend. 

(Id. at 15.) In addition, the Court DISMISSED Plaintiff’s state law libel and slander 

claims without leave to amend. (Id.) While Plaintiff was given leave to amend certain 

claims, she was specifically admonished by this Court that she may not “add any 

additional Defendants nor may she allege facts or claims that she has already presented in 

the twenty two (22) civil rights actions that she has filed since April of 2012.” (Id. at 5-

6.) However, Plaintiff has disregarded the Court’s admonition by adding additional 

claims and Defendants in her FAC. In Plaintiff’s FAC, she has added M. Ashley, 

California Department of Justice, E. Marquez and the California Police Department, 

Highland as named Defendants. (See FAC at 1-3.) 

II. Factual Background

On December 1, 2011, Plaintiff was housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”) and appeared before an institutional classification committee (“ICC”). 

(See FAC at 4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants Olson, Ashley, Marrero, and Paramo 

“conspired with each other” to remove the “R” suffix “from the Plaintiff’s central files.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that these Defendants found that the “placement of the ‘R’ suffix 

was unlawful and not in compliance with CDCR policies and procedural rules.” (Id.) 

However, two weeks later on December 14, 2011, Plaintiff alleges Defendants 

Olson and Ashley told the ICC that Plaintiff had been arrested for “assault to commit 

rape” and convicted of “sexual battery.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff claims Defendants 

Olson, Marrero, and Paramo “conspired with each other” and the “R” suffix was 

“reapplied” to Plaintiff’s file at the ICC hearing. (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleges that the 

Defendants “know that Plaintiff was never convicted of rape or sexual battery as a 

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juvenile” or as an adult. (Id.) 

Plaintiff attempted to file a grievance regarding the application of the “R” suffix to 

her file but was allegedly “hindered by the RJDCF- Sacramento Appeals Coordinators.” 

(Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also filed a “complaint” with the “California Department of Justice 

(DOJ)” in which she “refut[ed] the unlawful, incorrect conviction(s).” (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims the “DOJ” told her in “2009 (while Plaintiff was housed at North 

Kern State Prison) and 2010 in CSP-Sacramento” that they “could not correct the 

incorrect convictions unless the Court order[ed] the (DOJ) to correct the Plaintiff’s 

incorrect criminal history record’s and CLETS.” (Id.) 

On October 21, 2011 and October 24, 2011, Plaintiff claims she submitted 

grievances for “emergency medical treatment due to the Plaintiff being poisoned daily, 

while in Administrative Segregation at RJDCF, through her foods.” (Id.) On November 

15, 2011, Plaintiff filed a grievance against various correctional officers at RJD. (See id.) 

Plaintiff does not set forth the basis for this grievance, however, she claims Defendants 

Marrero and Paramo repeatedly denied her appeals on December 12, 2011, December 14, 

2011, and January 23 - 25, 2012. (See id. at 6.) Plaintiff also claims that they never 

returned her grievances to her “making the appeals system unavailable to the Plaintiff.” 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff claims Defendants Paramo, Marrero, Olson and Marquez “telephoned the 

CSP-Sacramento officials in 2012” after Plaintiff was transferred to CSP-Sacramento to 

“discuss the ‘R’ suffix and the poisoning of the Plaintiff’s food.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

she was poisoned daily with “nitrite poisoning,” “rat poisons, insecticides, fertilizers 

containing arsenic,” “nitrous acid,” and “pesticides” from 2010 to 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges that this poisoning has caused her to “suffer heart attacks, abnormal EKGs,” and 

“damage to Plaintiff’s heart.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Paramo, Marrero, and Olson relied on documentation 

provided by the Defendant “California Police Department, Highland, Sheriff’s 

Department, Records Division, CSP-Sacramento, Debbie Fontaine (WHD-Desk)” when 

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they determined that Plaintiff should have an “R” suffix on her classification. (Id. at 6-7.) 

Plaintiff alleges she has “never pleaded guilty to any sexual crimes” and she has “never 

been convicted of any sexual battery or rape” against anyone “living or dead.” (Id. at 7.)

On January 5, 2012, Plaintiff alleges she “personally informed” Defendants 

Paramo, Marrero, Olson, and the ICC that Defendant Marquez “told several inmates (in 

my presence) that this Plaintiff was/am [an] alleged convicted sex-offender.” (Id.) As a 

result, Plaintiff claims that she is “in imminent danger and receiving threats of harm from 

“two-five gang members with taunts, harassments, and imminent safety concerns.” (Id.

at 7-8.) Plaintiff claims the “two-five gang members have directly threatened ‘to get the 

plaintiff’ for allegedly being a sex-offender based on what [Defendant Marquez] stated to 

them about Plaintiff.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Paramo told Plaintiff in 

response to these concerns, “So what! That is not my problem! That is your problem!” 

(Id.) On that same day, January 5, 2012, Plaintiff “attempted to file a grievance as to all 

the allegations raised in this civil action” but correctional counselors at both RJD and 

CSP-Sacramento “refused to file or make the appeals system available to the Plaintiff.” 

(Id.) 

III. Sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) & § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, her FAC requires a screening 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must 

sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, 

malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See

Williams v. King, __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 5180205, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

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Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it 

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

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that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Marquez “told several inmates (in my presence) 

that this Plaintiff was/am [an] alleged convicted sex offender.” (FAC at 7.) Plaintiff 

claims that these alleged statements by Marquez caused her to receive “threats of harm 

from ‘two-five’ gang members.” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that “two-five” gang 

members have “threatened to ‘get the plaintiff’ for allegedly being a sex-offender” based 

on the alleged statements by Marquez. (Id. at 8.)

These allegations are virtually identical to the allegations in Plaintiff’s original 

Complaint. While Plaintiff does not provide a timeline as to when these actions occurred 

in her FAC, she did allege that she told Defendants Paramo, Olson and Marrero on 

January 5, 2012 that Marquez had made these statements. (See orig. Compl., ECF No. 1, 

at 4.) On April 11, 2012, Plaintiff notified the Court in a separate matter that she had 

been transferred back to CSP.2

While these are serious claims, the Court found in the November 27, 2017 Order 

that Plaintiff’s original Complaint was devoid of any allegations that she had suffered a 

physical injury while housed at RJD from the fall of 2011 to April 11, 2012. (See Nov. 

27, 2012 Order, ECF No. 121, at 5.)

Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to avoid excessive risks

to inmate safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To state a claim 

under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege Defendants were “deliberate[ly] 

indifferen[t]” to “conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. Deliberate 

indifference is more than mere negligence, but less than purpose or knowledge. See id. at 

836. A necessary element to find “deliberate indifference” is a showing of actual harm. 

 

2

 See Williams v. Paramo, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:12-cv-00025-AJB-WMc, ECF No. 8, 

Notice of Change of Address.

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Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).)

While Plaintiff alleged facts in pleadings outside of her original Complaint, she 

offered no factual allegations that any physical harm came to her while housed at RJD or 

that she was physically harmed at CSP because of the actions allegedly taken by the RJD 

Defendants in her original Complaint. The Court instructed Plaintiff that if she were to 

amend her pleading, “she must provide plausible factual allegations that demonstrate a 

direct causal connection between the RJD Defendants and the physical harm she alleges 

that she has suffered” while housed at CSP. (Nov. 27, 2017 Order, ECF No. 121, at 5.)

In her FAC, Plaintiff now alleges that she was “poisoned daily” while at RJD 

through “her foods.” (FAC at 5.) As the Court found in the previous Order, Plaintiff has 

made claims that she is being poisoned by prison officials at CSP in at least eleven 

actions filed in the Eastern District between 2012 and 2017. 3 In one of these matters, the 

Ninth Circuit found, in reviewing an appeal filed by Plaintiff who is subject to a prefiling review order, that the appeal Plaintiff filed in Williams v. Roberts, et al., E.D. Cal. 

Civil Case No. 2:14-cv-00728-KJM-DAD, which contained claims of poisoning, was “so 

insubstantial as to not warrant further review.”4

In fact, Plaintiff has filed these identical claims in this Court as well. In Williams 

v. Ramos, et al. S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:11-cv-02348-JLS-PCL, Plaintiff alleged RJD 

officials, including Defendant Marquez, were placing “biological agents, bacteria, toxins 

and poisons into my food.” (Id., FAC, ECF No. 21, at 5.) Plaintiff’s IFP status was 

 

3

 See Williams v. Wedell, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-01438-GEB-GGH; Williams v. 

Nappi, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-01604-GEB-CMK; Williams v. CDCR, et al., E.D. Cal. 

Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-01616-JAM-EFB; Williams v. Brennan, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv02155-KJM-AC; Williams v. D. Bauer, et al. E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-02158-MCE-EFB; 

Williams v. Norton, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-02889-CKD, Williams v. Murillo, et al., 

E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:12-cv-03066-MCS-KJN; Williams v. Roberts, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

2:14-cv-00728-KJM-DAD; Williams v. Harris, E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:14-cv-01191-WBS-AC; 

Williams v. Lopez, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 2:16-cv-00131-KJM-KJN; Williams v. Moghaddam, 

et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case no. 2:17-cv-01481-JAM-EFB. 

4

 See In re: Lonnie Clark Williams, Jr., No. 14-80007 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2015)

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revoked in this matter and Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. (Id., ECF No. 

33.) The Ninth Circuit found that Plaintiff had at least three or more actions dismissed as 

frivolous or for failing to state a claim. (Id., ECF No. 40.) Plaintiff was directed to pay 

the filing fee on appeal or show cause why her IFP status should not be revoked on 

appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff did not do either and the appeal was dismissed. (Id., ECF No. 41.) 

Plaintiff then filed a second action in this Court alleging Defendant Marquez was 

poisoning her food, as well as “inject[ing]” Plaintiff with “air and poisons.” See Williams 

v. Paramo, et al., S.D.Cal. Civil Case No. 3:12-cv-00025-AJB-WMc, ECF No. 1, at 6. In 

this matter, Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP was denied as barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) and the case was closed. (Id., ECF Nos. 6, 7.) Plaintiff did not appeal this 

decision.

After the matter currently before this Court was filed, Plaintiff filed Williams v. 

Russell, et al., S.D.Cal Civil Case No. 3:12-cv-00218-JAH-MDD (“Russell I”). In this 

matter, Plaintiff alleged Defendant Marquez was “constantly spitting into my foods and 

placing a poison (which contains arsenic) into my foods.” (Id., ECF No. 1, at 7.) 

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this action. (Id., ECF No. 3.) However, Plaintiff later 

filed the identical action in Williams v. Russell, et al., S.D.Cal. Civil Case No. 3:12-cv00390-CAB-PCL (“Russell II”) and this action contains the identical factual allegations 

against Defendant Marquez as the previous matter that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed in 

Russell I. In Russell II, Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP was denied as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g) and the case was dismissed. (Id., ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff did not appeal 

this decision.

In Williams v. Sedighi, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:12-cv-00573-LAB-BGS, 

Plaintiff sought to hold RJD medical officials liable for failing to treat her based on the 

allegations of the poisoning placed in her food. (Id., ECF No. 1, at 5.) While Defendant 

Marquez was not a named Defendant in this action, Plaintiff did allege Marquez 

“subjected” her to “deliberate, intentional poisonings (through my foods).” (Id.) 

An IFP complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

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[formerly § 1915(d)] if it “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Id.

(construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see

also Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n 

assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first, [the court] examine[s] 

whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the 

action, are the same.”), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 

904 (2008). Here, it is clear that Plaintiff has attempted, on many occasions six years 

ago, to claim that she was poisoned on a daily basis by Defendant Marquez, while housed 

at RJD in 2011 and 2012. These claims are duplicative and therefore, the Court finds 

they must be dismissed as frivolous.

In addition, as outlined by the Court, Plaintiff has filed these exact claims 

regarding the poisoning of her food by prison officials in at least fifteen separate civil 

rights actions involving multiple prisons and defendants over a period of at least eight (8) 

years. The Court finds these claims are patently frivolous. A pleading is “factual[ly] 

frivolous[]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, 

whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton 

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1992). 

“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal 

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. . . . 

[The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable 

legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 

319, 325 (1989). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, the court need not 

accept the allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual 

allegations,” Id. at 327, to determine whether they are “‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ [or] 

‘delusional,’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims regarding food poisoning to “rise to the level 

of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33, and as such, these 

claims requires dismissal as frivolous.

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Plaintiff also attempts to allege that she has suffered harm based on the comments 

by Defendant Marquez because “two-five” gang members have “directly threatened ‘to 

get the Plaintiff’ for allegedly being a sex-offender based on what (c/o) I. Marquez stated 

to them about the Plaintiff” in early 2012. (FAC at 8.) However, three years prior to this 

action being filed, Plaintiff filed Williams v. Rodriguez, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

1:09-cv-01882-LJO-GSA. In this matter, Plaintiff claimed that she was “attacked by 

three (3) inmates who identify themselves as being members of disruptive groups ‘twofives’ and ‘Independent Rida’s’” because she “is a transsexual and would not participate 

in the sexual advances of inmates.” (Id., ECF No. 5, at 14.) These allegations of 

harassment by the “two-five” gang members began at a different prison and nearly three 

(3) years before Plaintiff filed the action before this Court. This would directly contradict 

the allegation in this action that the purported harassment by “two-five” gang members 

began when Marquez allegedly called Plaintiff a sex offender in front of other inmates at 

RJD in 2012. 

Moreover, as the Court stated in the previous Order, Plaintiff still has not alleged 

that she suffered any physical harm while housed at RJD based on the statements 

attributed to Marquez despite the fact that she initially filed this action six (6) years ago. 

Nor has she alleged any facts to show that she has suffered harm at her current place of 

confinement due to the alleged actions of any of the named RJD Defendants. For all the 

above stated reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect 

claims must be DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

and as frivolous.

D. Fourteenth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that the “R” suffix placed on her classification was “unlawful and 

not in compliance with CDCR policies and procedural rules.” (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff 

alleges that juvenile court convictions which were the basis of the decision to apply the 

“R” suffix were “unlawful” and “incorrect.” (Id. at 5.)

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of 

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interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and 

property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison 

regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process 

protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme 

Court has significantly limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. 

Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty 

interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a 

change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 

131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The Sandin test requires a case-by-case examination of both the conditions of the 

prisoner’s confinement and the duration of the deprivation at issue. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 

486. In short, Plaintiff must allege facts to show “a dramatic departure from the basic 

conditions” of his confinement before he can state a procedural due process claim. Id. at 

485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 

F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to receive a particular security 

classification. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-50 (1983); Moody v. Daggett, 

429 U.S. 78, 87 n.9 (1976). However, the Ninth Circuit has applied Sandin’s procedural 

due process analysis to a claim similar to Plaintiff’s. In Neal, the Court considered a due 

process challenge to Hawai’i’s Sex Offender Treatment Program (“SOTP”), which 

labeled all persons in state custody convicted of specified sex crimes as “sex offenders” 

and compelled their participation in a psychoeducational treatment program as a prerequisite to parole eligibility. Neal, 131 F.3d at 821-22. Applying Sandin, the district 

court concluded that the “labeling of [Neal] as a sex offender and any resultant impact on 

[his] custody level or eligibility for parole . . . [did] not impose ‘atypical and significant’ 

hardship” upon him. Neal, 131 F.3d at 828. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, 

finding that the “stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label 

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coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program 

whose successful completion is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of 

deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections.” Id. at 830 (emphasis added). 

Here, while Plaintiff alleges that she has been given the “R” suffix, that 

classification alone does not “impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, Neal, 131 F.3d 

at 830, Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (A sex offender 

classification “must also be ‘coupled with’ some mandatory, coercive treatment which 

affects a liberty interest, such as a parole release in Neal, or a physical transfer to a 

mental hospital for involuntary confinement.”) (emphasis in original.) Plaintiff offers no 

factual allegations that the “R” suffix has impacted her conviction, parole date, or the 

duration of her sentence. In addition, she has not alleged that she was compelled to enroll 

in a mandatory treatment program. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process 

claims must be DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.

E. Conspiracy claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “conspired with each other” when they “reapplied the ‘R’ suffix” to Plaintiff’s classification. (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff does not indicate 

whether she is bringing a claim of conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985.

Under § 1985, a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights falls can fall under one of 

the following three possibilities: (1) preventing an officer from performing their duties; 

(2) obstructing justice by intimidating a party, witness, or juror; or (3) depriving persons 

of rights or privileges. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Here, Plaintiff’s claims would fall under 

§ 1985(3) and to properly state a claim pursuant to §1985(3) “a complaint must allege (1) 

a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a class of persons of the equal protection of the 

laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one of the 

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conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage 

or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Gillespie v. 

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980). “[T]he language requiring intent to deprive 

equal protection . . . means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin v. 

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 

1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no facts to plausibly suggest 

that she was given an “R suffix” based on any “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 

invidiously discriminatory animus.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 

1056 (9th Cir. 2002).

To state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff must allege specific 

facts showing two or more persons intended to accomplish an unlawful objective of 

causing him harm and took some concerted action in furtherance of that goal. Gilbrook 

v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856–57 (9th Cir. 1999). In other words, Plaintiff 

“must show ‘an agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights.’” 

Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 

441 (9th Cir. 2002)). Conclusory allegations of wide-spread conspiracy, however, are 

insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim. Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 

(9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)

“Conspiracy itself is not a constitutional tort under § 1983.” Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012). In order to bring a conspiracy claim, “there 

must always be an underlying constitutional violation.” (Id.) Plaintiff offers no specific 

factual allegations regarding this alleged conspiracy among the Defendants and rather 

simply sets forth conclusory statements. Moreover, the Court has found that Plaintiff has 

not alleged facts sufficient to state an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim and thus, 

Plaintiff cannot adequately state a conspiracy claim based on claims that her 

constitutional rights were violated.

/ / /

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IV. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in its entirety for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Because the Court finds further amendment futile, leave 

to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 

1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment 

would be futile). 

2. The Court further CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order of 

dismissal would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2018

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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