Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00686/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00686-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gregory Kosies, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV 10-686-TUC-CRP

ORDER 

 This action commenced when Plaintiff Gregory Kosies sought judicial review of 

Defendant’s decision denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs on the issue, this 

Court entered an Order reversing the decision and remanding the matter for further 

proceedings. (Doc. 22). Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of 

$4,141.28 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d) (Docs. 

24, 26). Although Defendant does not contest the amount of fees requested, Defendant 

argues that fees are not warranted because the government’s action in this case was 

substantially justified (Doc. 25). For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s 

request for attorneys’ fees. 

DISCUSSION

 The EAJA “authorizes federal courts to award attorneys’ fees, court costs, and 

other expenses when a party prevails against the United States, although fee-shifting is 

not mandatory.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff is a 

prevailing party because the decision denying his benefits has been remanded for further 

proceedings. See Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2002); Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Under the EAJA reasonable attorneys’ fees shall be awarded unless Defendant 

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shows her position in this case was “substantially justified or that special circumstances 

make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. 

“Substantially justified” means “‘justified in substance or in the main’—that is, justified 

to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 

565, (1988); see also Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “Put 

differently, the government’s position must have a ‘reasonable basis both in law and 

fact.’” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 

565). Further, the EAJA’s reference to the government’s position encompasses “both the 

government's litigation position and the underlying agency action giving rise to the civil 

action.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870 (citations omitted). The government bears the burden of 

showing that its position was substantially justified. Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition, 

408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Defendant argues that an award of attorney’s fees should be denied because her 

position was substantially justified. (Response (Doc. 25)). In the context of a Social 

Security disability determination, “district courts should focus on whether the 

government’s position on the particular issue on which the claimant earned remand was 

substantially justified, not on whether the government’s ultimate disability determination 

was substantially justified.” Hardisty, 592 F.3d at 1078 (citing Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 

562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995)). A position can be substantially justified pursuant to the EAJA 

even when the position is ultimately incorrect. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2. The test for 

determining whether a position was substantially justified, therefore, focuses on whether 

“a reasonable person could think it correct[.]” Id. If “there is a genuine dispute” between 

reasonable minds then the position is “substantially justified” pursuant to the EAJA. Id. at 

565. However, the government’s defense of “basic and fundamental errors” cannot be 

considered as substantially justified. Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 

2008) (holding that it was legal error to discredit claimant’s testimony without giving 

clear and convincing reasons, and that the Commissioner was not substantially justified 

in defending it). 

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 In this case, the Court found that Defendant’s final decision merited remand 

because: (1) examining Doctor Rothbaum’s opinion was in conflict with other significant 

evidence in the record and, thus, the Appeal Council’s finding that Dr. Rothbaum’s 

opinion was entitled to “great weight” because it was “consistent with the totality of the 

evidence” was erroneous (Order (Doc. 22), pp. 2-5); (2) the ALJ failed to meet his burden 

by providing specific and legitimate reasons for discounting treating Dr. Levi’s opinion 

(id. at pp. 6-7); (3) the ALJ failed to meet his burden by stating germane reasons to 

discount Nurse Practitioner Amanti’s opinion and, instead, improperly arbitrarily 

substituted his own medical assessment to support his rejection of same (id. at pp. 8-9); 

and (4) the ALJ was incorrect on all three points on which he based his decision to 

discount Plaintiff’s credibility (id. at pp. 9-11). The government contends that the 

underlying administrative decision and the decision to oppose Plaintiff’s request for 

judicial review “had a reasonable basis in the facts.” (Doc. 25, pp. 5-12). 

 While the Court acknowledged in its remand decision that the record contained 

conflicting evidence related to Plaintiff’s impairments and pain (Doc. 22, pp. 4-5, 7, 11), 

the law is clear that the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical 

testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities, see Andrews v. Shalala, 53 

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995), and the record was equally clear that the ALJ completely 

failed to fulfill this responsibility given his “fail[ure] to resolve any of the many conflicts 

in the medical evidence.” (Doc. 22, p. 7; see also id. at pp. 4-5, 7, 11). Moreover, the 

ALJ’s burden to state legally sufficient reasons to reject or discount testimony is also 

clear under the law. See e.g. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (setting out 

ALJ’s burden to reject physician testimony); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 311 (the ALJ 

must provide germane reasons for discounting a nurse practitioner’s opinion); Robbins v. 

Social Sec. Admin, 466 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating test for discounting a 

claimant’s credibility). Yet, the ALJ failed to satisfy his burden. The Ninth Circuit has 

found that an ALJ’s “[f]ailure to make findings and weigh evidence...” constitute 

“serious” errors. Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1072 (quoting Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1053 

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(9th Cir. 1998)). 

 Here, the ALJ’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and based on 

legal error given his failure to state legally sufficient reasons to support the decision to 

deny benefits. Defense of such “basic and fundamental errors” lack substantial 

justification on this record. Id. When the government's underlying position is not 

substantially justified, the Court need not address whether the government's litigation 

position was justified. Meier, 727 F.3d at 872 (citing Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1071). 

Moreover, consideration of the government's position in this litigation, would inevitably 

result in the conclusion that the government’s defense of the ALJ’s errors is not 

substantially justified. See e.g., Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir.1996) 

(stating that “[i]t is difficult to imagine any circumstance in which the government's 

decision to defend its actions in court would be substantially justified, but the underlying 

administrative decision would not.”); Meier, 727 F.3d at 873 (same); Green v. Colvin,

2013 WL 1878924 at *2 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2013) (“While it may be possible that some 

decision will be unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error and yet still 

have a reasonable basis in law and fact, this is not that case.”). This is especially so given 

that Defendant’s attempt to establish substantial justification essentially restates her 

arguments that the Court previously rejected in its order remanding this matter for further 

proceedings. See Meier, 727 F.3d at 873 (rejecting government’s attempt to establish 

substantial justification for its position by relying on arguments raised on previous 

unsuccessful appeal); Shreve v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4010993 at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2013) 

(rejecting government’s reliance on arguments made in opposing judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s decision to show substantial justification for its position). In light of the 

errors in the ALJ’s analysis, the Court cannot conclude that the government was 

substantially justified in defending the administrative decision in this case. Consequently, 

the Court will award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees under the EAJA. 

 Defendant does not contest the amount of fees requested. However, Defendant 

points out that, although Plaintiff assigned his rights to such fees to his attorney, in light 

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of Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), EAJA fees awarded “belong to the Plaintiff and 

are subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program (31 U.S.C. ' 3716(c)(3)(B)).” 

(Doc. 25, p. 12). Defendant proposes, and Plaintiff has not objected to, Defendant 

making fees payable directly to Plaintiff’s counsel if Defendant determines that Plaintiff 

does not owe a debt that is subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program and agrees 

to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act. (Id. at pp. 12-13). However, if 

Plaintiff owes a debt under the Treasury Offset Program, then Defendant cannot agree to 

waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, and any remaining EAJA fees after 

offset will be paid by a check made payable to Plaintiff but delivered to Plaintiff’s 

attorney. (Id. at p. 13). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is to entitled attorneys’ fees in the uncontested 

amount of $4,141.28. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to 

the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. ' 2412(d)), in the amount of $4,141.28 is 

GRANTED. Payment will be delivered to Plaintiff’s attorney at his office: John A. 

Gravina, Esq., 3546 N Euclid Ave., Tucson, AZ 85719-1743. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, after receiving the Court’s EAJA fee order, 

the Commissioner: (1) determines upon effectuation of the Court’s EAJA fee order that 

Plaintiff does not owe a debt that is subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program, 

and (2) agrees to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act (31 U.S.C. § 

3727(b)), the fees will be made payable to Plaintiff’s attorney. However, if there is a debt 

owed under the Treasury Offset Program, the remaining EAJA fees after offset will be 

paid by check made out to Plaintiff but delivered to Plaintiff’s attorney. 

 Dated this 1st day of May, 2015. 

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