Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01325/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01325-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAULA ANDERSON, CASE NO. CV F 05-1325 LJO GSA

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE

vs. ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

FRESNO COUNTY HUMAN

SERVICES SYSTEM,

Defendant.

 /

By notice filed on September 28, 2007, defendant Fresno County Human Services System moved

for summary judgment or in the alternative, partial summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 56.

Plaintiff Paula Anderson filed an opposition on November 6, 2007. Defendants filed a reply on

November 20, 2007. Pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h), this matter is submitted on the pleadings without

oral argument. Therefore, the hearing was vacated. Having considered the moving, opposition, and

reply papers, as well as the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order.

FACTUAL AN PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a former employee of the County, filed the instant lawsuit against the County in the

Federal District Court of California for the Central District on November 10, 2004. (Joint Scheduling

Report at 2:6-7.) The case was transferred to this Court on October 21, 2005. Plaintiff alleges that the

County violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, during her employment by

subjecting her “to different terms, conditions and privileges of employment than similarly situated

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employees outside of her protected group” and by treating her “less favorably than nonAfrican-American employees in the terms, conditions and privileges of employment.” (See generally

Complaint; Joint Scheduling Report at 2:8-11 and 6:3-4.) The complaint does not clearly identify the

claims. Rather, plaintiff alleges a series of events taking place during her employment from

approximately January 2002 until June 2004, and suggests – without so alleging – that each occurred

because of her race.

Plaintiff was employed with the COUNTY from approximately March 6, 2000 until she was

terminated for allegedly being absent without leave on January 6, 2005. On January 7, 2002, Plaintiff

was promoted to the position of Health Education Specialist (“HES”) with a probationary period of one

year. While on probation, on January 6, 2003, Plaintiff was rejected for a permanent position based on

poor work performance as outlined and detailed in several written evaluations of Plaintiff and in a

Performance Improvement Plan. She was returned to her former permanent position as Health

Education Assistant (“HEA”). On June 16, 2003, Plaintiff filed her charge of discrimination with the

DFEH and EEOC. Plaintiff went out on medical leave in June 2004. Plaintiff was on an approved

medical leave of absence until November 29, 2004, and defendant contends plaintiff was to return to

work on November 30, 2004. On January 6, 2005, an Order for Disciplinary Action was issued and

served on Plaintiff informing her that her employment with the County had been terminated effective

January 4, 2005 for job abandonment. Thereafter, plaintiff was terminated. On December 5, 2005,

Plaintiff filed a second charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In her opposition, plaintiff states her claims for relief are for race discrimination (Doc. 61,

Opposition p. 15), for racial harassment (Doc. 61, Opposition p.18), and for retaliation (Doc. 61,

Opposition, p.19.) 

A. Summary Judgment Standard

On summary judgment, a court must decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material

fact.” F.R.Civ.P. 56( c);see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Poller v. Columbia

Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 (9 Cir. 1985); th

Loeh v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9 Cir. 1984). The criteria of th

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“genuineness” and “materiality” are distinct requirements. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). The requirement that an issue be “genuine” relates to the quantum of evidence the

plaintiff must produce to defeat the defendant’s summary judgment motion. There must be sufficient

evidence “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. 

“As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial,” and in such circumstances, summary judgment

should be granted “so long as whatever is before the . . . court demonstrates that the standard for entry

of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56( c), is satisfied.” Celotex Corp. v. Catarett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). “If the party moving for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying for the

court those portions of the material on file that it believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine

issues of material fact,” the burden of production shifts and the nonmoving party must set forth “specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9 Cir. 1987)(quoting F.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). th

To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material

issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to

require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First National Bank

of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968) T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. The opposing

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.

. . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted). The

opposing party’s evidence is to be believed and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255;

Matasushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

“If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (“Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of

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summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a partywho fails to make

the showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”) “But if the nonmoving party produces enough

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Nissan

Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The amount of evidence

necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.’” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (quoting

First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592 (1968)). “The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Arguments Attacking the Form or Timing of the Administrative Charges

Defendant makes three arguments that seek to restrict the wrongful conduct plaintiff may pursue

at trial: (1) only conduct described in the administrative complaint is actionable, (2) plaintiff failed to

exhaust administrative remedies, and (3) the claims are administratively time-barred.

1. Conduct Not Described in the Administrative Charge is Not Actionable

Defendant argues that plaintiff is precluded from pursuing claims that are not described in the

DFEH and the EEOC administrative charges.

 Before bringing a civil action under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a timely administrative charge

with the EEOC and receive a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). The civil action is limited

to acts of discrimination reasonably related to the allegations in the administrative charge or new acts

occurring during the pendency of the charge before the administrative body. Oubichon v. North

American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9 Cir. 1973); Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations th

Co., 36 Cal.App 4 1607, 1617 (1995). th

Plaintiff filed two separate charges of alleged discrimination. On June 16, 2003, plaintiff filed

a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“First EEOC/DFEH

Charge”). (Doc. 50, Littlewood Decl, Exh. “N.”) The DFEH complaint states, in relevant part, that

plaintiff was denied permanent status/promotion: “I believe that I was denied permanent status as a

Health Education Specialist because of my race (African-American).” Id. Plaintiff then filed the second

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charge of discrimination with the EEOC/DFEH on December 5, 2005 (“Second EEOC/DFEH Charge”).

(Doc. 50, Littlewood Decl, Exh. “P.”) This Second EEOC/DFEH Charge alleged that plaintiff was

discharged on January 6, 2005, for which plaintiff “believe[d] [she] had been discriminated against

because of [her] race (Black), in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended,

and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.” Id. Thus, each of the two charges filed with the

administrative agencies charged specific conduct.

In her opposition, plaintiff challenges purported discrimination in various terms and conditions

of her employment. Plaintiff appears to challenge each and every employment decision made during her

employment as discriminatory - employment reviews (see Amended Anderson Decl. ¶¶22, 31), lack of

training (Id. at ¶¶27, 39), reprimands (Id. at ¶21), timing of performance evaluations (Id. at ¶33), sending

emails (Id. at ¶40), misspellings (Id. at ¶43). Indeed, plaintiff categorizes her evidence as “different

terms and conditions” related to “Training,” “Performance Evaluations,” and “Reprimands, Probation

(delay in Salary Increase) Salary Reduction and Demotion.” (Doc. 61, Opposition p.1-14.) Plaintiff’s

argument and evidence challenge a broad spectrum of terms and conditions of her employment as

discriminatory.

None of these terms and conditions of employment wase raised in either administrative charge.

The civil action is limited to acts of discrimination reasonably related to the allegations of the

administrative charge or new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge before the administrative

body. Ouibchon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9 Cir. 1973). When an th

employee brings suit for incidents not listed in his prior EEOC charge, a federal court may hear the new

. . . claims if they are ‘like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge.’” Stache v.

International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, AFL-CIO, 852 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9 Cir. 1988) th

(quoting Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. App. & Train, Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9 Cir. 1984), cert. th

denied, 469 U.S. 1108, 105 S.Ct. 784 (1985)). “But if the two claims are not so closely related that a

second administrative investigation would be redundant, the EEOC must be allowed to investigate the

dispute before the employee may bring a . . . suit.” Stache, 852 F.2d at 1234. The crucial element is the

factual statement contained on the administrative charge, rather than the type of discrimination alleged

by the check-the-box selection, which constitutes a mere technical defect. Id. (adopting a like or

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Issues may be summarily adjudicated within a claim. Upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of 1

material fact as to particular claims(s) or defenses(s), the court may grant summary judgment in the party’s favor “upon all

or any part thereof.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 591, 594 (D.C.Ga. 1982)

(Plaintiff asserted that the defendants violated three sections of a statute; the court treated each alleged violation as a separate

claim.) “In cases that involve . . . multiple causes of action, summary judgment may be proper as to some causes of action

but not as to others, or as to some issues but not as to others, or as to some parties, but not as to others.” Barker v. Norman,

651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5 Cir. 1981); see also Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9 Cir. 1990) (same). Thus, the th th

Court views each act of discrimination as a separate claim.

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reasonably related" standard of whether the 'scope' of the DFEH investigation which can reasonably be

expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital and Medical Center,

642 F.2d 268, 271 (9 Cir. 1981) (Shah filed an EEOC complaint alleging sex and national origin th

discrimination. At trial Shah attempted to expand his Title VII action to include race, color and religious

discrimination. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these additional claims because

Shah failed to raise them before the EEOC. )

Plaintiff does not argue how any of these routine employment actions are reasonably related to

the acts of discriminatory probation/demotion and termination charged in her two EEOC/DFEH

administrative charges. The purpose of the administrative charge alleging discrimination is to trigger

administrative investigatory and conciliatory procedures. Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,

26 Cal.App.4th 846, 858, 31 Cal.Rptr. 2d 617 (1994). The limited scope of the two EEOC/DFEH

administrative charges do not remotely encompass the broad spectrum of alleged discriminatory conduct

now raised by plaintiff as to her terms and conditions of employment. Thus, the discriminatory conduct

in plaintiff’s terms and conditions of employment was not exhausted at the administrative level.1

2. Failure to Exhaust on Claims of Racial Harassment

Neither EEOC/DFEH Charge alleged racial harassment. As shown above, the First EEOC/DFEH

Charge filed by plaintiff alleged only discrimination in promotion/demotion: “I believe that I was denied

permanent status as a Health Education Specialist because of my race (African-American).” (Doc. 50,

Littlewood Decl, Exh. “N.”) The First EEOC/DFEH Charge did not allege racial harassment.

Likewise, the Second EEOC/DFEH Charge did not allege racial harassment. The Second

EEOC/DFEH Charge alleged that plaintiff was discharged on January 6, 2005, for which plaintiff

“believe[d] [she] had been discriminated against because of [her] race (Black), in violation of the

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 Plaintiff does not mention or argue in her opposition that she is claiming disability discrimination in this action.

2

Therefore, the Court finds that disability discrimination, while alleged in the Second EEOC/DFEH Charge, is not before this

Court.

 Plaintiff identified in verified written discovery responses the following three protected activities in support of her

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“retaliation” claim: (1) the filing of a discrimination claim with the DFEH in June 2003; (2) the filing of a worker’s

compensation appeal on July 7, 2003; and (3) her receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the DFEH on May 25, 2004. (Doc. 50,

Littlewood Decl. Exh. L, p.21.) 

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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, and in retaliation for engaging in protected

activity.” 

Accordingly, claims for racial harassment were not administratively exhausted in the First

EEOC/DFEH Charge and in the Second EEOC/DFEH charge. Accordingly, summary adjudication will

be granted for claims of racial harassment.

3. Alleged Retaliation Claim in the Second DFEH/EEOC Charge is Time-barred

Plaintiff’s Second EEOC/DFEH Charge on December 5, 2005 included additional claims for (1)

retaliation for filing the First EEOC/DFEH Charge, and (2) disability discrimination. (Doc. 50, Decl. 2

Littlewood Exh. P.) Defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint and supplemental discovery responses

do not identify any unlawful conduct taking place within the 300 days before December 5, 2005.3

Title VII bars a plaintiff's discrimination claim unless the plaintiff files a charge of discrimination

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurs, or with a state agency having authority to seek relief from unlawful

employment practices within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(e)(1). Title VII establishes two potential time limitations periods within which a plaintiff

must file an administrative charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); MacDonald v. Grace

Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081-1082 (9 Cir. 2006). Generally, a Title VII plaintiff must file an th

administrative charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the last act of discrimination. Id. However,

the limitations period is extended to 300 days if the plaintiff first institutes proceedings with a “State or

local agencywith authority to grant or seek relief from such practice.” Id. Under Title VII, state agencies

are authorized to investigate and enforce Title VII claims pursuant to “work sharing agreements” with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(b); 29 C.F.R.

§1626.10( c). Charges filed with either the EEOC or the DFEH are deemed “constructively filed” with

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the other. 29 CFR §1626.10( c); Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (9 Cir. th

1999).

(a) The 300 Day Limitations Period is Applicable

The Court finds that the applicable limitations period is 300 days of the last act of discrimination,

not 180 days as argued by defendant. The DFEH and the EEOC have a work share agreement. See

E.E.O.C. v. Dinuba Medical Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 585 (9 Cir. 2000) (Constructive filing is made th

possible by “worksharing agreements,” which designate the EEOC and the state agency each other's

agents for the purpose ofreceiving charges). The Second Charge was filed with both the DFEH and with

the EEOC. (Doc. 50, Littlewood Decl. Exh. P (“I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the

State or local Agency, if any.”)) Accordingly, the longer limitations time of 300 days applies to this

case.

Title VII precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside

the statutory time period. “A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ on the day that it

‘happened.’” Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (2002)

(addressing claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,

et seq.). In Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, the United States Supreme Court further

explained:

“First, discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are

related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a

new clock for filing charges alleging that act. . . . The existence of past acts and the

employee’s prior knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from

filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently

discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed.”

According to the Supreme Court, easily identifiable discrete acts include “termination, failure to

promote, denial of transfer or refusal to hire.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061. “Each incident

of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable

‘unlawful employment practice.’” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see infra, footnote 1.

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(b) Acts occurring more than 300 Days before the filing of the Pre-complaint

Questionnaire are time-barred

Plaintiff submits evidence that she completed an EEOC questionnaire and had it time-stamped

on October 31, 2005. (Anderson Decl. ¶¶83-84.) Although not stated by plaintiff, the Court assumes

plaintiff is arguing that the date of the Second EEOC/DFEH Charge, December 5, 2005, should relate

back to the pre-complaint questionnaire date of October 31, 2005. Plaintiff did not cite any authority

that the formal charge may relate back to the pre-complaint questionnaire. 

The Court’s research discloses that the date of filing the administrative complaint may relate back

to the date of the pre-complaint questionnaire. In Casavantes v. California State University,

Sacramento, 732 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir.1984), the Court held that the filing of an intake questionnaire was

sufficient to serve as the filing of a charge when it gives the EEOC sufficient information to identify the

parties and to describe the practices challenged. Compare Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890,

894 (9 Cir. 2001) (plaintiff left blank all questions pertaining to the discrimination he allegedly th

suffered.)

In plaintiff’s case, the questionnaire sets out sufficient information to satisfy Casavantes v.

California State University, Sacramento. It sets out the parties, plaintiff and the County, and the alleged

discriminatory practices of termination for racial discrimination, disability discrimination and retaliation.

Accordingly, the Court deems the Second EEOC/DFEH Charge filed on October 31, 2005.

Thus, any claim of retaliation that occurred prior to the date which marks 300 days before the

Second EEOC/DFEH Charge was deemed filed is time-barred. The Court grantssummary judgment in

favor of the defendant on all claims that arose before 300 days before the Second EEOC/DFEH Charge

was deemed filed. 

4

4. Acts Occurring More than 300 Days before the First EEOC/DFEH Charge are Also

Time-barred

Here, plaintiff filed her First EEOC/DFEH Charge on June 16, 2003. For the same reasons

discussed, infra, events more than 300 days before June 16, 2003 are not timely. No act occurring before

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August 21, 2002 can constituted retaliation or discrimination. Plaintiff failed to exhaust her

administrative remedy as to such acts. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendant

on all claims that arose before 300 days before the First EEOC/DFEH Charge was filed.

C. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not Include A Claim for Discriminatory Termination 

Plaintiff filed her complaint on November 10, 2004 in the Central District of California. The

action was transferred to this Court on October 21, 2005. Since the initial filing of the Complaint, the

Complaint has not been amended.

Defendant argues that the allegations of the complaint before this Court do not include a claim

for racial discrimination in plaintiff’s termination. Defendant states that plaintiff alos has failed to

include in her discovery responses any claim for race discrimination in her termination.

The Ninth Circuit has upheld refusal to permit unpled issues to proceed to trial. In Coleman v.

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1291 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Gentile v. Quaker Oats Co., 533

U.S. 950 (2001), the plaintiff could not avoid summary judgment by asserting a theory not plead or made

known to defendant during discovery because permitting unpled theory 'would prejudice the defendant'.

In Coleman, the district court was not required to allow the employees to proceed on disparate impact

claims at summary judgment stage where they had stated disparate treatment claims in their complaints

but had failed to plead disparate impact claims or to make known during discovery their intention to

proceed on disparate impact theory at summary judgment stage. A complaint guides the parties'

discovery, putting the defendant on notice of the evidence it needs to adduce in order to defend against

the plaintiff's allegations. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d at 1292.

The complaint in this case does not include any claim for discriminatory termination. From the

Court’s review of plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff does not allege any wrongful conduct after August 11,

2004. The allegations of wrongful conduct stop with the last act of August 11, 2004. Plaintiff, however,

was terminated in January 2005. Her termination is not alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff never moved

to amend its complaint with a theory of liability for termination. Thus, the complaint does not allege

termination.

In addition, from the Court’s review of plaintiff’s written discovery responses submitted as

evidence by defendant, plaintiff did not state discriminatory termination was a basis of her claims. (Doc.

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50, Littlewood Decl, Exh. L.) In defendant’s propounded interrogatories, plaintiff was asked to state all

facts: “that defendant discriminated against you on the basis of your race,” “that defendant harassed you

during your employment,” “that defendant retaliated against you during your employment,” “that race

was a motivating factor” in the terms and conditions of her employment. (Doc. 50, Littlewood Decl,

Exh. L, Interrogatory 3, 5, 7, 9 .) None of her discovery responses indicates any wrongful conduct after

June 16, 2004. None of her discovery responses indicate that she claimed discriminatory termination.

Plaintiff’s discovery responses are a litany of events starting in 2001 and continuing to June 16, 2004.

The termination is not mentioned. Discovery ended months ago; the trial is only two months away.

Allowing new theories of liability at this late stage of litigation would prejudice defendants. 

Accordingly, as plaintiff’s January 2005 termination is not plead in the complaint and was not the

subject of discovery responses, it is not properly before this Court. Accordingly, summary adjudication

on plaintiff’s claim for termination/racial discrimination is granted.

D. Racial Discrimination in Promotion/Demotion

1. Burden of Proof on Prima Facie Case

Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire

or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual’s race . . .”

42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. A plaintiff may show violation of Title VII by proving disparate treatment or

disparate impact, or by proving the existence of a hostile work environment. Sischo-Nownejah v.

Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9 Cir. 1991). th

A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by introducing evidence that

“give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981); Sischo-Nownejah, 934 F.2d at 1109. The evidence may

be either direct or circumstantial, and the amount that must be produced to create a prima facie case is

“very little.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093; Sischo-Nownejah, 934 F.2d at 1110-1111.

A plaintiff can make out a prima facie case for failure to promote under Title VII by showing:

1) she belongs to a protected minority; 2) she applied for and was qualified for the position that she was

denied; 3) she was rejected despite her qualifications; and 4) the employer filled the position with an

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employee not of plaintiff's class, or continued to consider other applicants whose qualifications were

comparable to plaintiff's after rejecting plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct.

at 1824 (to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff mustshow, inter alia, that he applied

and was qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill); Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437

(9 Cir. 1991) (that she belongs to a protected group, that she applied and was qualified for a job which th

was open for applications, that she was rejected, and that the position remained open after her rejection

and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the plaintiff's qualifications.)

2. Elements of the Prima Facie Case Which Are Not Met

County does not dispute that plaintiff meets the first and third elements of the prima facie case.

(Doc. 44, Moving papers p.17.) Defendant, however, argues that plaintiff cannot meet the second

element, that she was qualified for the HES position. Defendant also argues that plaintiff cannot meet

the fourth element, that the employer filled the position with an employee not of plaintiff's class, or

continued to consider other applicants.

The second element of the prima facie case requires plaintiff to show that she was qualified for

the position. Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Health Education Specialist (HES) in January

2002 and demoted in January 2003. (Doc. 62, Amended Anderson Decl. ¶ 12, 42.) 

Inexplicitly, plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence of her qualifications for the position.

Plaintiff’s discovery responses state she received “accolades” for some functions she coordinated in

2002. (Doc. 50, Littlewood Decl. Exh L, p.3.) Plaintiff’s other evidence explains how she was not

trained, did not have “templates”, was inexperienced, was reprimanded, etc. Nowhere in her declaration

or in her discovery responses does she explain her qualifications for the position and how she was

qualified to continue performing the HES position. Indeed, plaintiff does not dispute defendant’s

undisputed fact which states:

“Plaintiff can adduce no competent and objectively verifiable evidence

of her qualifications for the HES position.” (Doc. 71-1, Defendant’s

Compendium Stated of Undisputed Material Facts, Fact 31.)

Plaintiff did not dispute this fact. (See Doc. 64, Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts, Fact 31.)

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1992); accord Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9 Cir. 2001). th

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Plaintiff did not present any contrary evidence. Id. 5

In addition, plaintiff’s opposition fails to argue that plaintiff was qualified for the position. The

opposition merely concludes that, “she was qualified for the position.” (Doc. 61, Opposition p.15-16.)

She does not provide any factual support for the conclusion that she was qualified for the position. Thus,

there is no evidence before the Court that plaintiff was qualified to perform the HES position.

Likewise, plaintiff does not provide any evidence on the fourth element of the prima facie case.

The fourth element requires that plaintiff raise a triable issue of fact that other employees similarly

situated to her passed probation or that the HES position was held open while defendant continued to

seek applications.

There is simply no evidence before the Court as to what occurred after she was demoted from

the HES position. There is no evidence whether defendant filled the position with an employee not of

plaintiff's class. There is no evidence whether defendant continued to consider other applicants whose

qualifications were comparable to plaintiff's after rejecting plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiff did not submit any

evidence to support defendant’s undisputed fact that she has no evidence of who replaced her:

“Plaintiff has no evidence that other similarly situated employees of a

different race passed probation for the HES position. Because she does

not even know who made the decision to rejecting [sic] her on probation,

plaintiff has no evidence that race was a motivating factor in the decision

to reject her on probations for the HES position.” (Doc. 77-1,

Compendium of Statement of Undisputed Facts, Fact 30.)

Plaintiff did not submit any evidence that the County kept the HES position open:

“Plaintiff has no evidence that the COUNTY kept her HES position open

and sought applications from people with similar qualifications as her.”

(Doc. 77-1, Compendium of Statement of Undisputed Facts, Fact 32.)

Plaintiff did not submit any evidence that could remotely infer facts on the fourth element of the prima

facie case. As there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that plaintiff met her prima

facie burden, summary judgment on this claim is appropriate. The Court, therefore address the

remaining shifting burdens in the McDonnell Douglas test.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment. The Clerk

of the Court is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 29, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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