Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08117/USCOURTS-ca10-93-08117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

POWDER RIVER BASIN RESOURCE COUNCIL, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the United 

States Department of the Interior; 

ROBERT URAM, Director of the Office 

of Surface Mining, United States 

Department of the Interior; DENNIS 

HEMMER, Director Wyoming Department of 

Environmental Quality, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

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FILED ·~ United States Court ~r Appc:t~ Tenth Circuat 

APR 1 8 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-8117 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-1021-B) 

Mark S. Squillace, Laramie, Wyoming, (Jon B. Huss, Casper, 

Wyoming, with him on the briefs) for Appellant. 

Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Attorney General (Joseph B. Meyer, 

Attorney General, with her on the briefs), Office of the Attorney 

General, State of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellee Dennis 

Hemmer. 

Jeffrey P. Kehne, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources 

Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Lois J. 

Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Brian L. Ferrell, 

Attorney, and Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney, Environment & Natural 

Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 

and Richard McNeer, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of 

the Interior, Washington, D.C., with him on the briefs) for 

Appellee Bruce Babbitt. 

Appellate Case: 93-8117 Document: 01019283036 Date Filed: 04/18/1995 Page: 1 
Before TACHA and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and HANSEN,* District 

Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Powder River Basin Resource Council (PRBRC) filed 

suit under the citizen suit provision of the Surface Mining 

Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2), the 

federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the act 

allowing citizens to compel federal governmental performance, 28 

U.S.C. § 1361. Plaintiff alleged that the attorney's fees 

provision of Wyoming's surface mining regulatory scheme violated 

established federal regulations and requested declaratory and 

injunctive relief. The district court granted defendant's request 

for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff's action against the 

state was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that its case 

against the federal government was unripe. The court also denied 

plaintiff's request for attorney's fees in the case at bar. We 

exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. 

Before turning to plaintiff's allegations, we must first 

establish the regulatory framework as it existed when this 

litigation began. SMCRA permits a state to "assume exclusive 

jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining and 

* The Honorable C. LeRoy Hansen, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

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reclamation operations." 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a). Procedurally, any 

state wishing to control its surface coal mining operations was 

required to submit its plan for state control to the Secretary of 

the Interior (the Secretary) during an eighteen-month period 

beginning on August 3, 1977. Id. To gain exclusive control, 

however, the state has to demonstrate that it can carry out a 

number of tasks, including promulgating "rules and regulations 

consistent with regulations issued by the Secretary." Id. § 

1253 (a) (7) . 

According to federal regulations enacted under SMCRA, the 

Secretary can conditionally approve a program when the 

deficiencies were minor. 30 C.F.R. § 732.13(j). To obtain 

conditional approval, "[t]he State [must] agree[] in writing to 

correct such deficiencies within a time established by the 

Secretary and stated in the conditional approval." Id. § 

732.13(j) (3). If the state does not take corrective action within 

the prescribed time period, the regulations direct the following: 

[T]he Director [of the Office of Surface Mining] shall notify 

the Secretary that the deficiencies have not been corrected 

and shall within 30 days --

(i) Withdraw approval of the State program in whole or 

in part, and specify the extent to which approval of the 

State program is being withdrawn; 

(ii) Substitute direct Federal enforcement of those 

portions of the permanent regulatory program that the State 

has failed to implement; 

(iii) Initiate procedures ... to withdraw State 

program approval and implement a Federal program for the 

State, including specifying necessary remedial actions to 

correct continued deficiencies; or 

(iv) Take any combination of actions under paragraphs 

(j) (4) and (i) through (iii) of this section. 

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30 C.F.R. § 732.13(j) (4). 

SMCRA allows a court, whenever it deems proper, to order one 

party to reimburse another party for its costs and expenses 

(including attorney's fees) incurred in pursuing a SMCRA claim. 

30 U.S.C. § 1275(e). In accordance with this provision, the 

Secretary issued regulations specifying who may receive an award 

for costs and expenses. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1294. 

On August 15, 1979, Wyoming submitted its proposed regulatory 

plan under SMCRA. In 1980, the Secretary determined that the 

state's regulatory scheme was deficient in certain areas. See 

Conditional Approval of the Permanent Program Submission from the 

State of Wyoming Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 

Act of 1977, 45 Fed. Reg. 78,637 (1980). One such deficiency was 

the absence of a state provision for attorney's fees. Id. at 

78,674. The absence of an attorney's fee provision in Wyoming's 

plan conflicted with attorney's fees regulations previously 

enacted by the Secretary. Id. The state gained conditional 

approval, however, by agreeing to correct all of its plan's 

deficiencies by March 26, 1981. Id. at 78,683. 

Over the next three years, Wyoming attempted to correct the 

deficiencies in its program. See 30 C.F.R. § 950.15. When 

necessary, the Secretary extended Wyoming's deadlines for 

compliance. On September 27, 1982, the Secretary again ruled that 

Wyoming's program did not conform to the requirements of 43 C.F.R. 

§ 4.1294 and extended Wy~ming's deadline for compliance to May 20, 

1983. See Removal of Condition of Approval of the Wyoming 

Permanent Regulatory Program and Extension of the Deadline for 

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Wyoming to Satisfy a Condition of Approval, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,351 

(1982). Wyoming took no further action regarding its provision 

for attorney's fees, however, until after plaintiff filed its 

notice of suit in the case at bar. 

B. 

In 1991 plaintiff participated in an administrative 

proceeding concerning the renewal and revision of the Black 

Thunder Mine's Campbell County coal permit. The parties to that 

proceeding settled. Plaintiff then petitioned the Wyoming 

Department of Environmental Quality (the DEQ) for costs and 

expenses, including attorney's fees. DEQ director Dennis Hemmer 

denied plaintiff's petition, citing the version of Wyoming's costs 

statute then in force, Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-437 (f) (1988). 

At this point the litigation split into two parts. Plaintiff 

appealed Hemmer's decision in Wyoming state court. It also 

notified defendants on March 31, 1992, of its intent to sue them 

in federal court. Following the sixty day notice period required 

by statute, see 3 0 U.S. C. § 1270 (b) ( 1) (A) , plaintiff filed the 

case at bar in federal district court. 

Believe it or not, here's where the case gets complicated. 

In the sixty days between the notice of suit and the filing of 

suit in federal court, Hemmer proposed changes to Wyoming's 

attorney's fees provision. On May 16, 1992, the state published 

notice of its intent to engage in rulemaking, and on November 25, 

1992, the state filed the revised rules.1 

1 Plaintiff asked the district court for leave to amend its 

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Each party filed for summary judgment in federal district 

court. On September 29, 1993, the district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of both the state and federal defendants. It 

held that the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff's case against 

the state because plaintiff asked for retroactive relief. The 

court also ruled that the case against the federal defendants was 

unripe in light of Wyoming's ongoing attempt to comply with 

federal directives. Finally, the court denied plaintiff's request 

for attorney's fees in the current federal action, stating that 

plaintiff should have refrained from filing suit after the state 

defendant's institution of rulemaking procedures. Plaintiff 

appealed. 

As the parties were preparing their appeals to this court, 

two things happened. First, on January 24, 1994, the Secretary 

partially approved Wyoming's revised program, requiring a number 

of changes for full approval. 30 C.F.R. § 950.11. The Secretary 

ruled that Wyoming had to complete the revisions by June 1, 1994. 

Id. Second, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided plaintiff's appeal 

in its state court action. See Powder River Basin Resource 

Council v. Wyoming Envtl. Quality Council, 869 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 

1994). The court determined that plaintiff was eligible for 

attorney's fees for its work in the Black Thunder Mine permit 

proceeding. Id. at 439. It remanded the case for a determination 

complaint to include charges that Wyoming's revised guidelines 

were inadequate. The district court denied plaintiff's request. 

Plaintiff has not appealed that ruling. We therefore will not 

consider any contentions that Wyoming's revised statute does not 

conform to the federal mandate. 

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of whether the PRBRC was also entitled to attorney's fees for its 

state appeal. Id. 

On April 13, 1994, Wyoming submitted the current version of 

section 35-11-437 to the Secretary for approval. Approval of 

Amendments and Removal of Condition of Program Approval, 59 Fed. 

Reg. 53,094-95 (1994) (to be codified at 30 C.P.R. §§ 950.11, 

950.15). On October 21, 1994 -- approximately one month before 

oral argument in this case the Secretary approved Wyoming's 

amendment. Id. at 53,097. The Secretary therefore lifted the 

condition relating to attorney's fees from SMCRA approval. 

In their briefs, the parties raise issues concerning 

ripeness, mootness, standing, and the Eleventh Amendment. We must 

also address plaintiff's argument that it is entitled to 

attorney's fees in the case at bar. We first address these issues 

as they apply to the state and then turn to plaintiff's case 

against the federal government. 

II. THE CASE AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS 

Plaintiffs asked for declaratory and injunctive relief and 

for reimbursement of their costs incurred in litigating the case 

at bar. Although we find that the district court had jurisdiction 

over the case when it was filed, we conclude that the district 

court lost its power to hear the case when plaintiff's injury was 

eradicated. Because jurisdiction was present at the beginning of 

the suit, however, we nonetheless address plaintiff's request for 

attorney's fees. Cf. Clark v. Busey, 959 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 

1992) ("Subject matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of the 

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Appellate Case: 93-8117 Document: 01019283036 Date Filed: 04/18/1995 Page: 7 
underlying action is a 'condition precedent' to an award of fees 

or costs under the EAJA."); People Organized for Welfare & 

Employment Rights v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1984) 

(holding that plaintiffs could not obtain attorney's fees unless 

they "had standing to bring [the] lawsuit in the first place") .2 

A. 

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from 

entertaining suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the 

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 

Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Canst. amend. XI. Federal 

courts will therefore hear suits initiated against a state only 

when that state has consented to suit in federal court or Congress 

has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the state's 

immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 

99 (1984) .3 This prohibition applies to suits brought by a 

state's own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. See 

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1890). 

2 The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, 

explicitly includes a requirement that the court have jurisdiction 

to hear a case before issuing a cost award. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d) (1) (A). Courts have applied this same prerequisite in 

cases without the EAJA's language. See Thompson, 727 F.2d at 169 

(jurisdiction is necessary for award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 

This requirement would logically also apply to the SMCRA statute, 

which allows an award of costs in an "action brought pursuant to 

subsection (a)." 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d). If plaintiff files suit 

but jurisdiction never attaches, plaintiff effectively has not 

brought suit in accordance with SMCRA's provisions. 

3 SMCRA does not abrogate states' sovereign immunity. It 

explicitly allows suit only "to the extent permitted by the 

eleventh amendment." 30 U.S.C. § 1270 {a) (1). 

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Citizens may, however, challenge a state official's action in 

enforcing state law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). 

But when a suit names a state official as the defendant, the 

Eleventh Amendment still bars the action if "the state is the 

real, substantial party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. 

Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Whether the 

state is the real party in interest turns on the relief sought by 

the plaintiffs. Suits that seek prospective relief are deemed to 

be suits against the official, while suits that seek retroactive 

relief are deemed to be suits against the state. Edelman v. 

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-66 (1974). We review de novo a state's 

claim that a suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Ponca 

Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1427 (lOth Cir. 1994), petition 

for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-

1029) . 

Plaintiff here asked for two forms of relief. It requested a 

judgment stating that Wyoming's state attorney's fees program is 

invalid because the state failed to satisfy the terms of the 1983 

conditional approval. In the alternative, plaintiff asked the 

court to construe Wyoming's provisions as consistent with 43 

C.F.R. § 4.1294(b), (c), and (d), and apply such provisions 

retroactively to May 20, 1983. The district court held that the 

Eleventh Amendment barred suit because plaintiff asked for relief 

"retroactive" to 1983. 

Assuming arauendo that plaintiff's second request included an 

aspect of retroactive relief under Edelman, all forms of relief 

were not barred in this case. Plaintiff asked for declaratory 

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relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Declaratory judgments are 

construed as retroactive relief only when "[t]here is no claimed 

continuing violation of federal law, and therefore no occasion to 

issue an injunction." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985). 

Declaratory relief is prospective when sought to prevent a state's 

current violation of the law. And the Eleventh Amendment clearly 

permits relief against state officials "to prevent a continuing 

violation of federal law." Id. at 68. 

Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that Wyoming's attorney's 

fees provision violated federal SMCRA law. At the time plaintiff 

brought suit, the allegedly deficient attorney's fees statute was 

still in effect. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-437(f) (1988). Thus, 

plaintiff alleged a continuing violation of SMCRA. Because 

plaintiff's request sought prospective, as opposed to retroactive, 

relief, the claim was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and 

the district court wrongly granted summary judgment to the state 

on that ground. 

B. 

We next face the issue of whether the action was ripe when 

originally filed. Because ripeness is a jurisdictional issue, our 

standard of review is de novo. Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 

1412, 1415 (11th Cir. 1994). To ensure that a case is ripe, a 

court should "evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial 

decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court 

consideration." Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); 

see also Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1415 (lOth Cir. 

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1990). In applying this test, we must "caution against a rigid or 

mechanical application of a flexible and often context-specific 

doctrine." Id. at 1417. 

We first turn to the "fitness for judicial resolution" prong. 

This prong requires us to consider "both the legal nature of the 

question presented and the finality of the administrative action." 

Id. In this case, both factors confirm that plaintiff's action 

was ripe when originally filed. "Where disputed facts exist and 

the issue is not purely legal, greater caution is required prior 

to concluding that an issue is ripe for review." Id. But the 

question here was purely legal: Plaintiff asked the court to 

focus its inquiry on whether Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-437(f) violated 

federal law and whether Wyoming had further violated federal law 

by refusing to satisfy the requirements of its conditional 

approval. This judgment would be based almost exclusively on 

Wyoming's legal duties under federal law. 

Defendant contends that the issue was not final because the 

state had initiated proceedings to change section 35-11-437(f). 

We disagree. In most cases involving ssues of ripeness, the 

administrative rule is not final, see Sierra Club, 911 F.2d at 

1418, or the agency retains discretion over whether to enforce the 

rule, see Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163 (1967). 

By contrast, section 35-11-437(f) was a Wyoming statute. It had 

the force of law and had been applied to plaintiff in this case. 

Even though defendant began proceedings to change the statue, 

those proceedings did not lessen the force of the statute, and 

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there was no guarantee that defendant would actually alter the 

provision. 

Moving to the second prong of Abbott Laboratories, it is 

clear that plaintiff would suffer hardship. In evaluating 

potential hardship to the parties, a court should consider (1) 

whether the challenged rule has had a direct impact on the party 

challenging the rule, and (2) the possible harm to the parties of 

delaying judicial consideration. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1415. 

Because the state denied attorney's fees to plaintiff, its failure 

to correct its allegedly deficient provision had a direct impact 

on plaintiff's activities. Delaying judicial consideration would 

further harm plaintiff. We therefore hold that the case was ripe 

when filed. 

c. 

Although we have determined that plaintiff's suit against the 

state was ripe when filed and was not barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment, we must now address whether plaintiff lost standing 

because of the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in 1994. See 

Powder River Basin, 869 P.2d at 435. Although the parties did not 

raise this issue in district court, "[s]tanding may be raised at 

any time in the judicial process." Board of County Comm'rs v. 

W.H.I .. Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1063 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

We first examine whether a party can lose standing in the 

middle of a lawsuit. Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff had 

standing when it filed suit. Thus, although" [s]tanding 

represents a jurisdictional requ~rement which remains open to 

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review at all stages of the litigation," National Org. for Women, 

Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802 (1994), we must still 

answer the question of whether standing is measured only when a 

suit is filed or throughout the litigation. 

In diversity jurisdiction cases, the Supreme Court has stated 

that, as a general matter, "jurisdiction is tested by the facts as 

they existed when the action is brought." Smith v. Sperling, 354 

U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957). Thus, "the jurisdiction of the Court 

depends upon the state of things at the time of the action 

brought, and . after vesting, it cannot be ousted by 

subsequent events." Mullen v. Torrance, 22 U.S. ( 9 Wheat.) 53 7, 

539 (1824); see also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake 

BayFound., Inc., 484U.S. 49,69 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 

The Fifth Circuit recently followed this language in a federal 

question case, holding that "with all questions of subject matter 

jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the 

date of the filing of the complaint, and subsequent events do not 

deprive the court of jurisdiction." Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., 

Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Senter v. 

General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 520 (6th Cir.) ("Standing is 

determined as of the date the suit is filed."), cert. denied, 429 

u.s. 870 (1976). 

More recently, however, in a case grounded in federal 

question jurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated that "the 

plaintiff must maintain a 'personal stake' in the outcome of the 

litigation throughout its course." Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 

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115, 126 (1991) (emphasis added) .4 We believe this view better 

represents the principles underlying standing. Accord City 

Communications. Inc. v. City of Detroit, 888 F.2d 1081, 1086 (6th 

Cir. 1989) ("A plaintiff must maintain standing throughout all 

stages of his litigation."). Standing is a limitation on a 

court's jurisdiction. See American Postal Workers Union v. United 

States, 861 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1988). When a plaintiff no 

longer has an injury, the Article III requirements of a case or 

controversy are no longer met. In diversity cases, like Smith and 

Mullen, courts look to prevent defendants from conspiring to 

deprive the court of jurisdiction by moving into the state 

following the filing of suit. In contrast, if a plaintiff is no 

longer injured, courts lack a true "case or controversy" upon 

which to render a decision. We therefore hold that a plaintiff 

must maintain standing at all times throughout the litigation for 

a court to retain jurisdiction. 

We now turn to whether plaintiff lost its standing when it 

recovered attorney's fees in state court. The constitutional 

minimum of standing contains three elements. "First, the 

plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' -- an invasion of 

a legally-protected interest." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). The "injury in fact" must be both 

(1) concrete and particularized and (2) actual or imminent. Id. 

Second, the court must find a causal connection linking 

4 Similarly, the Supreme Court also recently concluded that a 

case was unripe because of events that occurred subsequent to the 

filing of suit. See Anderson v. Green, 115 S. Ct. 1059, 1060 

(1995) (per curiam). 

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defendant's action to the injury. Id. "Third, it must be 

'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will 

be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" Id. (quoting Simon v. 

Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976); see 

also Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1450 (lOth Cir. 

1994) (restating the three Lujan factors). The party asserting 

jurisdiction "bears the burden of establishing these elements." 

Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. 

Plaintiff no longer meets the first prong of the Lujan test. 

To establish an injury in fact, "the plaintiff must show 'a 

distinct and palpable injury to itself.'" Wyoming ex. rel. 

Sullivan v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 881 (lOth Cir. 1992) (quoting 

Glover River Org. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 675 F.2d 

251, 254 (lOth Cir. 1982)). When plaintiff filed suit, its injury 

was the state's refusal to reimburse plaintiff for its attorney's 

fees. The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision ordered defendant to 

pay those attorney's fees, forcing defendant to remedy plaintiff's 

continuing injury. Plaintiff at that point lost the injury on 

which its standing was originally based. 

Plaintiff's sole remaining injury is the generalized 

assertion that defendant was not in compliance with the federal 

mandate. That general complaint does not distinguish plaintiff 

from any other Wyoming citizen and is insufficient to grant 

standing. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 u.s. 95, 111 

( 19 83) ("Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be 

wronged in a similar way, [plaintiff] is no more entitled to an 

injunction that any other citizen of Los Angeles."); Sierra Club 

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v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (" [T]he party seeking review 

[must] be ... among the injured."). 

D. 

Having determined that plaintiff originally had standing but 

lost it after the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision deprived it of 

an injury in fact, we must still address whether plaintiff is 

entitled to attorney's fees incurred up to the time at which it 

lost standing.5 SMCRA allows a court to "award costs of 

litigation (including attorney and expert witness fees) to any 

party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 

30 U.S.C. § 1270(d). When examining claims under section 1270(d), 

we review the decision to determine "whether the district court 

applied improper legal standards or abused its discretion." Save 

Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43, 47 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 857 F.2d 1516 (1988) (en 

bane). 

Unless one of the statute's exceptions is met, no plaintiff 

may bring an action prior to sixty days after notice is provided 

to the appropriate agency. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(b). This notice 

period is mandatory and cannot be disregarded by a plaintiff. See 

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26 (1989). Here, as 

instructed by statute, plaintiff allowed the notice period to 

elapse before filing suit. 

5 Although we have determined that plaintiff lost standing, we 

note that "the expiration of the underlying cause of action does 

not moot a controversy over attorney's fees already incurred." 

Dahlem v. Board of Educ., 901 F.2d 1508, 1511 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

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The district court, however, ruled that plaintiff should 

never have brought suit because defendant started proceedings to 

correct the alleged deficiency. It therefore barred the recovery 

of attorney's fees. We believe this result misconstrues the 

effect of SMCRA's notice provision. 

Section 1270(b) is merely a procedural requirement. It 

affects the litigation only if plaintiff files prematurely, 

thereby forcing the court to dismiss the action. Notice serves 

two important and interrelated purposes. "First, notice allows 

Government agencies to take responsibility for enforcing 

environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for citizen 

suits." Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29. "Second, notice gives the 

alleged violator 'an opportunity to bring itself into complete 

compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a 

citizen suit.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 

at 60). These interests are protected not through the statute 

itself but through the Article III requirement of a case or 

controversy. When the violator brings itself into complete 

compliance during the sixty-day period, the plaintiff is not 

procedurally barred from bringing the suit. Rather, the district 

court will dismiss the citizen suit as moot. 

Here, Wyoming did not bring itself into complete compliance -

- or even partial compliance -- during the notice period. It 

merely began procedures which had the potential to result in a new 

attorney's fee rule. The allegedly deficient rule, however, was 

still in effect when plaintiff filed suit. The district court 

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therefore abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's attorney's 

fees against the state for its stated reasons. 

The question remains, however, whether plaintiff should 

nevertheless be denied attorney's fees on other grounds. When, as 

here, there has been no judicial determination on the merits, a 

plaintiff may prevail for attorney's fees purposes if she can show 

"(1) that [the] lawsuit is causally linked to securing the relief 

obtained and (2) that the defendant's conduct in response to the 

lawsuit was required by law." J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of 

Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1473 (lOth Cir. 1985) (citing Nadeau v. 

Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978)); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 

482 U.S. 755, 760-62 (1987) (when defendant's voluntary action 

produces some or all of the relief sought by plaintiff, plaintiff 

has prevailed); Collins v. Romer, 962 F.2d 1508, 1512 (lOth Cir. 

1992) (reiterating the applicability of the Nadeau test). 

In prior cases, this court has applied the two-part Nadeau 

test when the statute required the recipient of attorney's fees to 

"prevail." See, e.g., Collins, 962 F.2d at 1511 (using Nadeau 

test to examine an award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Foremaster v. 

City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (lOth Cir. 1989) (same), 

cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990). Even in statutes without a 

prevailing party requirement, however, the party requesting 

attorney's fees must achieve some success to be eligible for an 

attorney's fees award. See Ruckelhaus v. Sierra Club, 463 u.s. 

680, 688 (1983). Because under either type of statute the 

plaintiff must be successful -- and the Nadeau test is designed to 

ferret out any success by a plaintiff -- we hold that the same 

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catalyst test applies to attorney's fees requests under 30 U.S.C. 

§ 1270(d). 

Plaintiff claims that it was a "catalyst" for the change in 

Wyoming's attorney's fees provision. The first prong of the 

Nadeau test requires a factual determination made by the district 

court; the second prong poses a legal question. Collins, 962 F.2d 

at 1511. Because the district court never reached this question, 

we remand for a determination of whether plaintiff's action fits 

the legal definition of a "catalyst." If so, the district court 

may assess costs against the state in accordance with 30 U.S.C. § 

1270 (d) . 

III. THE CASE AGAINST THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS 

A. 

We next examine whether the case against the federal 

defendants is moot. The jurisdiction of federal courts extends 

only to actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 

2, cl.1; Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976). 

Federal courts therefore "avoid advisory opinions on abstract 

propositions of law." Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969). 

The federal defendants contend that this case no longer 

presents a live controversy, rendering plaintiff's claim moot.6 

"A claim is moot when no reasonable expectation exists that the 

alleged violation will recur and interim relief of events have 

6 The federal defendants also claim that (a) the case was 

unripe and (b) plaintiff lost its standing or the case was moot 

following the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision. Because we 

resolve plaintiff's claims against the federal defendants on other 

grounds, we need not address these issues. 

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eliminated the effects of the alleged violation." Committee for 

the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1524 {lOth Cir. 

1992). "[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of 

review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." Steffel 

v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.lO {1974). 

In this case, plaintiff asks the court to enforce the 

allegedly mandatory requirements of 30 C.F.R. § 732.13{j) (3). 

Even if the steps contemplated by section 732.13(j) (3) are 

required, however, they apply only when the Secretary has 

conditionally approved the state's program. Here, the Secretary 

has determined that the state has fully complied with SMCRA's 

requirements and therefore removed conditional approval. See 59 

Fed. Reg. 53,094. This court can offer no relief. The case is 

moot. 

B. 

Plaintiff also asks for attorney's fees against the federal 

government under 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d). Although we remand for a 

determination of whether attorney's fees may appropriately be 

assessed against the state, the same determination is not 

necessary against the United States. 

Section 1270(d) allows a court to assess costs against a 

party whenever it determines an award is appropriate. 

Nevertheless, a party must achieve at least some measure of 

success to warrant an attorney's fees award. See Ruckelshaus, 463 

U.S. at 688. Here, plaintiff did not extract any of the requested 

relief from the United States. Plaintiff asked the court to order 

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the fe,::ral defendants to take one of the allegedly mandatory 

requirements in 30 C. F. R. § 732.13 (j) (4) . The only action taken 

by the federal defendants, though, was approving Wyoming's revised 

attorney's fees plan. This action did not conform to any of the 

relief requested by plaintiff. Plaintiff did not prevail and 

therefore is not entitled to recover attorney's fees from the 

federal defendants. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We dismiss the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief 

against both the state and federal defendants. Plaintiff lacks 

standing to continue its suit against the state defendants, and 

the case against the federal defendants is moot. We REMAND the 

case to the district court, however, for a determination of 

whether plaintiff is entitled to recover costs from the state 

under 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d). 

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