Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08071/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RAYMOND H. BERGER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 89-8071 

v. 

PAGE ENGINEERING CO., 

a Delaware corporation, 

(D.C. Civil No. C88-0176-J) 

(D. Wyo.) 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, SETH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in 

favor of appellee Page Engineering in a diversity negligence 

action brought by appellant Raymond Berger for injuries he 

sustained when a component of a dragline bucket manufactured by 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-8071 Document: 010110080469 Date Filed: 01/28/1991 Page: 1 
appellee crushed his right hand. Appellant asserts that the 

district court committed error in granting summary judgment. We 

affirm. 

The facts leading up to this appeal are as follows. Bridger 

Coal Company, appellant's employer, was interested in purchasing a 

dragline bucket. On March 24, 1986, appellee Page Engineering 

sent Bridger Coal a price quote for the dragline bucket and 

indicated that it would provide a serviceman for assembly of the 

large bucket. Representatives from both companies met. The price 

was agreed upon; however, whether the terms under the purchase 

order or sales order applied would become the subject of dispute. 

Page Engineering sent its employee, John Yard, to Bridger 

Coal to troubleshoot a problem in a 757 dragline. To the 

knowledge of Yard, Bridger Coal had not requested assistance in 

assembling the bucket, and it was a mere coincidence that Bridger 

Coal was erecting the dragline bucket the day that he arrived on 

another matter. Craig Paisley, field maintenance superintendent 

for Bridger Coal, testified that he could not recall why Yard was 

on the premises that day; but if Yard was needed for the erection 

of the bucket, he, Paisley, would have made the request. No 

documentation was produced to show whether Bridger Coal requested 

help in assembling the bucket. 

Sometime after Yard arrived, he noticed that two welders, 

Lane Laker and appellant Berger, had started assembling the 

bucket. Yard was told that the bucket was to be assembled with 

Esco teeth, and he stated that he had no knowledge or past 

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Appellate Case: 89-8071 Document: 010110080469 Date Filed: 01/28/1991 Page: 2 
experience in dealing with Esco teeth. On his way to the meeting 

concerning the problem on the 757 dragline, one of the welders 

asked Yard to tell Paisley that they needed an outside crane. 

Yard delivered the message to Paisley. After the 757 meeting 

ended Yard was heading out to the 757 dragline when he noticed 

that the welders had used the shop crane to teeter and crib the 

lip assembly for the bucket. The welders had not asked Yard if it 

was all right to do it that way. Yard testified that it really 

didn't look the best, but as long as the crane remained attached, 

he did not see how anything could happen. The welders said that 

they might need the crane to move the adapters and Yard suggested 

that they use a fork lift. 

After returning from their lunch break, the welders 

disconnected the crane to move the adapters and teeth closer to 

the assembly. Neither welder remembered to reconnect the crane. 

Appellant put his hand underneath the adapter and Laker jostled 

the adapter. As a result, the lip assembly came off the cribbing 

and crushed appellant's hand. 

Appellant commenced this action alleging negligence on the 

part of Joseph Walker, his immediate supervisor at Bridger Coal, 

and negligence on the part of the bucket manufacturer, appellee. 

Walker was later dismissed from the suit. After a series of 

motions the district court granted summary judgment for appellee 

Page Engineering. 

Appellant contends that he was prejudiced by the district 

court's order granting summary judgment because he did not receive 

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notice that the court was going to rule on the issue of appellee's 

negligence. Thus, he was not given the opportunity to be heard, 

and was not given the opportunity to supplement the record with 

depositions and exhibits. 

According to appellant, the two motions for summary judgment 

then before the district court did not encompass a motion for 

summary judgment as to appellee's negligence. Appellee, on the 

other hand, contends that the motion did include a request for 

summary judgment as to its negligence, and that the motion was 

discussed and argued before the court on two separate occasions; 

therefore, appellant was not prejudiced. The record shows no 

objection by appellant to these asserted procedural errors before 

the district court. 

It is fundamental that a party seeking review preserve the 

record for appeal by asserting timely objections. Neu v. Grant, 

548 F.2d 281 (10th Cir.). Generally, where counsel fails to 

object at the district court level, the court of appeals will not 

review the issue. The Post Office v. Portee, Inc., 913 F.2d 802, 

806 (10th Cir.). Despite this general rule, we have held that 

this court has the authority to consider an issue for the first 

time on appeal where failure to do so would result in manifest 

error, Gundy v. United States, 728 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir.), or 

under extraordinary circumstances. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co. 

v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 820 F.2d 338, 344, n.5 (10th Cir.) 

(citing Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 433 F.2d 708, 711 (10th 

Cir.)). We do not find such extraordinary circumstances here nor 

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Appellate Case: 89-8071 Document: 010110080469 Date Filed: 01/28/1991 Page: 4 
the possibility of "manifest error." Appellee's motion 

specifically requested summary judgment on the issue of its 

negligence. Both parties argued the issue before the district 

court, and it took the motion under advisement. At that time, 

appellant did not object to arguing the issue of negligence nor 

did he move for extra time to supplement the record with 

additional documents. After the court issued its ruling, 

appellant again did not object to any procedural errors. 

Appellant had ample opportunity to object or call his position to 

the attention of the district court and failed to do so. 

Appellant also asserts that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment in favor of appellee because factual 

disputes existed which precluded summary judgment. Specifically, 

he urges that pursuant to the purchase order, Yard was responsible 

for taking all safety precautions with respect to Bridger Coal 

employees; Yard had the authority to stop any unsafe procedure; 

and Yard's failure to stop the assembling of the dragline bucket 

when the crane was detached resulted in appellant's injuries. 

Further, he asserts that the unusual sequence of attaching the 

adapters to the teeth before attaching the lip to the bowl halves 

compromised the safety of the welders. 

We review the district court's order granting summary 

judgment under a de novo standard of review. Anderson v. 

Department of Health & Human Services, 907 F.2d 936, 946 (10th 

Cir.). Summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and. 

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the moving party is 

Appellate Case: 89-8071 Document: 010110080469 Date Filed: 01/28/1991 Page: 5 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

We apply the accepted doctrines. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242; Manders v. Oklahoma ex rel Dept. of Mental Health, 

875 F.2d 263, 264 (10th Cir.). 

To defeat appellee's request for summary judgment, appellant 

was required to establish a prima facie case of negligence. 

Therefore, appellant had to show that (1) the contractual 

relationship between Bridger Coal and appellee gave rise to a duty 

of care, and that appellant qualified as a third-party beneficiary 

under that contract; (2) appellee failed to perform that duty; and 

(3) appellee's failure to perform proximately caused damages to 

appellant. Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 709-710 (Wyo.). We agree 

with the district court's finding that appellant failed to 

establish a prima facie case of negligence. 

In granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, based upon 

the language in the purchase order, the district court concluded 

that appellee had a contractual duty to "provide all necessary and 

sufficient safeguards and take all proper precautions against the 

occurrence of injury to any person" arising from the assembling of 

the dragline bucket. Further, the district court found that 

appellant qualified as a third-party beneficiary under the 

contract. 

The district court found that although the contract provided 

for a serviceman at no additional cost, there was no showing that 

Bridger Coal ever requested that a serviceman be sent. To Yard's 

knowledge, he was there to troubleshoot a problem with the 757 

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dragline. He had no knowledge or experience assembling Esco teeth 

and admitted that to Bridger Coal when he arrived. Even Paisley 

could not recall why Yard was there and indicated that if Bridger 

Coal needed a serviceman, he would have done the requesting. No 

written documentation was produced which indicated that Bridger 

Coal ever requested a serviceman. Lastly, if Yard was needed to 

supervise the assembling of the dragline bucket, Bridger Coal 

would not have scheduled a meeting concerning the 757 dragline 

during that time. 

The district court concluded that even if Yard was the 

serviceman contemplated by the contract, he fulfilled all of his 

duties. When Yard arrived, Bridger Coal had already started 

assembling the dragline bucket. Yard was never informed that he 

had control of the assembly. Neither party had contemplated 

needing the serviceman to instruct the crew about the selection 

and use of cranes. Bridger Coal had experience in assembling 

buckets and Yard was needed only for his technical advice. Yard 

provided some limited advice and the district court found that 

appellee did not breach its duty to appellant. 

Lastly, the district court found appellant's reliance on 

paragraph 17 of the purchase order unpersuasive. Paragraph 17 

provided that all products delivered and work performed must 

comply with federal, state or local law or regulation. The 

district court concluded that appellee did not assume a duty to 

ensure that Bridger Coal would use proper cranes in assembling the 

dragline bucket. Because neither Yard's performance as a 

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Appellate Case: 89-8071 Document: 010110080469 Date Filed: 01/28/1991 Page: 7 
serviceman nor the bucket supplied by appellee failed to comply 

with any duty of care, appellant failed to est ablish a prima facie 

case of negligence. 

After a careful review of the record, it must be concluded 

that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment. 

The facts construed in a light most favorable to appellant do not 

permit the finding that appellee was negligent. We must conclude 

that Yard was not the serviceman contemplated in connection with 

the contract for the same reasons stated by the district court. 

Furthermore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

appellant, we must conclude that even if Yard was the serviceman 

mentioned in the contract, the jury would have to find that he 

performed all of his obligations. 

Even assuming that the contract did require Yard to supervise 

the selection and use of cranes, a jury would have to find that he 

fulfilled this obligation as well. Although appellant contends 

that Yard had the authority to stop an unsafe practice and failed 

to do so, the evidence shows that the welders did not follow 

Yard's advice. The welders did not ask Yard whether it was all 

right to use the shop crane. When Yard saw the welders using the 

crane, he told them that the rigging was safe so long as the crane 

remained connected. When the welders said they might have to 

detach it to lift the adapters, Yard suggested that they use a 

forklift. The welders simply chose to ignore Yard's advice. 

Appellant also contends that Yard should have told the 

welders that the rigging was unsafe when the crane was detached. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8071 Document: 010110080469 Date Filed: 01/28/1991 Page: 8 
• 

Appellant fails to support this contention with any facts. There 

is no testimony in the record that Yard ever noticed that the 

welders had disconnected the crane. Yard was not present when the 

accident occurred because he was on his way to the 757 dragline. 

Finally, appellant's contention that the safety of the 

welders was compromised by the unusual sequence of assembling the 

dragline bucket is without merit. Appellant fails to show how a 

different method would have prevented the accident. His argument 

amounts to conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by the record. 

See McKibben v. Chubb, 840 F.2d 1525, 1528 (10th Cir.) (citing 

Mcvay v. Western Plains Corp., 823 F.2d 1395, 1398 (10th Cir.)). 

Appellant's "case" demonstrated that no genuine issues of 

material fact existed and no reasonable jury could have found in 

favor of appellant. Accordingly, the district court's order of 

summary judgment in appellee's favor is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-8071 Document: 010110080469 Date Filed: 01/28/1991 Page: 9