Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04070/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE OROZCO DIAZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ANTHONY KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-4070 WHA (PR) 

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The

court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent has

filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and has lodged

exhibits with the court. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

STATEMENT

A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. See Cal. Penal

Code § 187 (a). It also found true allegations that defendant discharged a firearm causing death

and used a firearm during each murder, see id. at §§ 12022.53(d), 12022.5(a), and a special

circumstance allegation based upon multiple murders, see id. at § 190.2 (a)(3). With regard to

each murder conviction, defendant was sentenced to state prison for life without the possibility

of parole plus a twenty-five years to life enhancement (Ex. 9 (opinion of court of appeal) at 1-

2). The facts relevant to each claim will be set out as needed in the discussion below.

///

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United States District Court

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DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of

law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong

applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies

the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support

granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state

trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

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1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and

convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory

assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres

v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

Petitioner asserts that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate

petitioner’s cultural background and introduce evidence of it, and in failing to inform the jury

that charges were not filed as a result of the “1995 incident;” and (2) his appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to file a timely petition for review with the California Supreme Court.

1. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective counsel claim, petitioner must

show: first, that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms, Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984), and second, that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 693–94. A reasonable

probability is defined as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Ibid. 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Id. at 689. A difference of opinion as to trial tactics does not constitute

denial of effective assistance, United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981), and

tactical decisions are not ineffective assistance simply because in retrospect better tactics are

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known to have been available, Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984).

Petitioner murdered his wife and her lover when he found them in bed together (Ex. 9

(opinion of Court of Appeal) at 1). Petitioner and his wife were getting a divorce; petitioner’s

wife had packed her belongings to leave the family apartment, but apparently had not done so at

the time of her murder (Id. at 3). 

Petitioner’s defense was that the killings were voluntary manslaughter rather than firstdegree murder. Here he contends that his culture, that of rural Mexico, is one of “machismo” in

which honor requires that a deceived husband kill an unfaithful wife and her lover, and that

counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate this cultural background and introduce evidence

of it. 

The California Court of Appeal described the events on the night of the murders this

way:

On May 28, Carmen [a friend of Jennifer, petitioner’s wife and victim]

spoke with defendant by telephone. He wanted to go out but had no money, so

she offered to lend him $10. When Carmen and her cousin Paulina dropped off

the money that evening, Carmen told Jennifer they were going to a club in

Monterey. Jennifer, who was with her friend Alma from work, said defendant

also was going out. Carmen, but not Jennifer, was aware defendant was going to

the same club because he had asked about her destination. . . .

When Carmen and Paulina arrived at the club at 9:00 p.m., they met

Carmen's cousins Tony and Janet. Defendant arrived later, and he and Tony

played pool. Eventually, all five walked to the parking lot where Paulina

discussed her divorce with defendant, and he discussed his “situation” with

Jennifer, noting that it was “hard for him” to get a divorce. Defendant drove off

alone and Paulina began to take Carmen home, but Carmen decided to ask

defendant for a ride to save Paulina from going out of her way.

Paulina caught defendant's attention, both cars pulled over, and defendant

agreed to drive Carmen home. . . . During the drive to Carmen's home on Alamo

Way, defendant asked whether Jennifer was with someone else. When Carmen

did not respond, defendant suggested that in a few years she would “end up

telling him and laugh about it.” Outside Carmen's house, defendant continued to

ask about the men Jennifer had slept with “in her life,” but Carmen said nothing.

Defendant then named several men Jennifer had been with before they married

and said he knew Jennifer was with someone. Carmen said she did not know.

Carmen did not go inside her house, and defendant eventually drove her

towards Cross Street, where both Jose and defendant's mother lived. He said he

saw the car of Jennifer's co-worker Alma and angrily asked if Carmen knew who

Jennifer was with and whether he lived on Cross. Carmen started crying. She

did not know where Jennifer was but did know Jennifer was seeing Jose. As

defendant then drove from Cross back to Carmen's home, he looked “normal,”

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and Carmen reminded him that he was to give her a ride to work the next

morning.

While at Carmen's home, defendant said he wanted to check whether

Jennifer was home so he could confront her. He therefore drove Carmen to C

Street. When they arrived at defendant's house, Carmen said she wanted to go

home. Defendant handed her his car keys, but she could not drive his car

because it had a stick shift.

Defendant walked inside, looking for Jennifer, while Carmen stood at the

door and said, “she's not here.” Defendant said nothing. He angrily pulled the

telephone off the wall. He grabbed Carmen's arms, shook her, and yelled, “You

know where she's at. She's over there with him, right?” Carmen replied that she

did not know. Defendant then walked to a cupboard and removed something

from a file box that was wrapped in a towel. He then went into the bedroom

with a black clip in his hand. When Carmen saw bullets and a .40 caliber gun in

defendant's hand, she knocked on the door of defendant's brother Albert and

yelled for him. Albert then spoke with defendant, telling him to “be a man and

use your fist.” Defendant said something in reply and left the house.

Carmen followed defendant to his car to get her purse. When defendant

told Carmen to get in the car, she complied. She patted his pants in an

unsuccessful attempt to find his gun. Defendant swore at Carmen, telling her to

leave him alone, that he did not want to hurt her, and that if he was pulled over

he would have to shoot the police. He was very angry as he drove to Jose's

house on Cross.

Defendant left the car and told Carmen to wait for him. Instead, she

followed him to Jose's studio. When defendant said he was going to ask “him” a

question, Carmen said he could ask tomorrow. Defendant replied, “No, I'll do it

right now.” A woman's voice could be heard from inside. Defendant forced

open the door. When the light went on, Carmen could see that defendant was

holding a gun and that Jennifer and Jose were in bed together.

Defendant said nothing. He pulled a blanket off Jennifer and shot her in

the abdomen. Jose pushed Jennifer to the floor and stood on the bed. Carmen

pulled on defendant's shirt, but he pushed her away. Jose and defendant

struggled until defendant shot Jose, who fell. Defendant then shot Jose a second

time. In the meantime, Jennifer had made her way to the door. Defendant

extended his right hand and fired a shot at her from behind. She fell to the

ground. Next, defendant moved “very close” to Jose and shot him in the head. 

Defendant then walked to where Jennifer lay on the ground and kicked her in the

stomach. Carmen picked up the telephone and called 911 from the bathroom. 

As she called, she heard more gunshots.

(Ex. 9 at 3-6.)

The Court will assume for purposes of this decision that counsel’s failure to introduce

evidence of petitioner’s supposedly highly-traditional macho cultural background was deficient

performance. Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated, however,

because on these facts there was not a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

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U.S. at 693–94 (standard). 

Under California law, the “heat of passion” element of voluntary manslaughter has both

a subjective and an objective component. People v. Steele, 27 Cal. 4th 1230, 1252 (2002). The

defendant must show not only that he or she subjectively killed in the heat of passion, but must

also show that the heat of passion would have been “‘naturally aroused in the mind of an

ordinary reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances.’” Ibid. (quoting People v.

Logan, 175 Cal. 45, 49 (1917)). The “cultural background’ argument goes to the subjective

element, but would have no relevance to the objective element. 

First, although petitioner’s father was from central Mexico and very traditional,

petitioner was born in the United States, went to school here, married here, and worked here. 

These considerations would so weaken the prospective testimony regarding the macho Mexican

rural culture that there was not a reasonable probability that introduction of that evidence would

have affected the jury’s consideration of the subjective element. 

Secondly, under the facts as quoted above, it is clear that petitioner had considerable

time to think over what he wanted to do, and a number of opportunities of avoid trouble; this

was not a situation where petitioner accidently came upon the scene of his wife’s infidelity;

petitioner went looking for it. The jury thus would not have found that a reasonable person

under the given facts and circumstances would have acted from the heat of passion. That is, the

result on the objective prong of the “heat of passion” test, the one which is unaffected by failure

to introduce the cultural evidence, is such that it cannot be said that there is a “reasonable

probability” that the outcome would have been different had the cultural evidence been

introduced. 

For these reasons, the Court concludes that counsel was not ineffective in failing to

introduce evidence of the cultural norms of rural Mexico. 

Petitioner also contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to inform the jury that

charges were not filed as a result of the “1995 incident.” The California Court of Appeal

described that incident:

The prosecution sought to introduce evidence concerning the 1995

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domestic violence incident under sections 1109 and 1101, subdivision (b). It also

sought to introduce Jennifer's hearsay statements from that incident under

section 1370. In support of its request, the prosecution attached Salinas Police

Department report # 95-110306 to its brief and described the facts underlying the

prior domestic violence as follows: “On November 4, 1995, the defendant and

[Jennifer] were dating but living separately. The defendant climbed up a tree

outside [Jennifer's] apartment located on the second floor and saw what he

thought to be [Jennifer] and another man in the bedroom. The defendant went to

the apartment, shoved past [Jennifer's] roommate, Gail Hunt who answered the

door. [Jennifer] blocked his entrance into the bedroom. The defendant stated

that he saw [Jennifer] with another man and ‘was going to kill him.’ [Jennifer]

went to the kitchen to call 911 and the defendant followed. He picked up a steak

knife, walked back down the hallway, pushed [Jennifer] up against the wall and

stated he was going to kill the man and if he had to would kill [Jennifer] also.

[Gale] screamed at the defendant to leave. Upon leaving the apartment, the

defendant punched a hole in the wall. The Salinas Police Department were [sic]

called and subsequently interviewed the defendant five days later upon his arrest.

After waiving his Miranda rights, the defendant indicated that he was at the

apartment and saw a man in [Jennifer's] apartment, got jealous and argued with

[Jennifer]. He admitted to pushing [Jennifer] and punching the hole in the wall

but denied use of a knife or making any threats.” The prosecution added that,

when Gale was interviewed about the 1995 incident on January 25, 2000, she

stated that a “very drunk” male friend (Larry) was in their apartment trying to

rest, that the defendant had “pushed his way” past Gale, threatening to kill Larry,

Jennifer, and himself, and that the defendant had “brandished a knife at

[Jennifer] and threatened to stab her and punched a hole in the wall as well.”

(Ex. 9 at 15-16.)

That no charges were filed as a result of this incident was such a minor point that there

is no reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to introduce evidence that no charges

were filed the outcome would have been different. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were

not violated by counsel’s failure to introduce such evidence. 

Because counsel was not ineffective in either of the ways specified by petitioner, the

rejection of this claim by the state appellate courts was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly-established United States Supreme Court authority. 

2. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective in not file a timely petition

for review with the California Supreme Court. Counsel filed a petition six days late and asked

for relief from the default, which was denied.

Petitioner’s claim is without merit because there is no right to counsel when pursuing

state discretionary review, such as review in the California Supreme Court. See Wainwright v.

Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (no right to counsel when pursuing discretionary state

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appeal). Where no constitutional right to counsel exists, there can be no claim for ineffective

assistance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991); Torna, 455 U.S. at 587-88 (no

ineffective assistance of counsel claim for retained counsel's failure to file timely application for

discretionary state appeal when no right to counsel at such proceeding). 

Because petitioner had no right to effective assistance of counsel for filing his petition

for review, his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by counsel’s failure to file on time. 

The rejection of this claim by the state appellate courts therefore was not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 13 , 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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