Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02311/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02311-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BERNARDO MURILLO ARENAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-02311 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

CHARLES L. RYAN and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On or about December 18, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 10) on May 8, 2009.

Respondents contend the petition must be dismissed because it

was not filed within the statute of limitations specified by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Petitioner filed

a reply (“Reply”) in response to the answer to his petition on

May 22, 2009. See Docket No. 11.

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment issued June 30,

1999, charged Petitioner with seven felony counts of sexual

conduct with a minor, attempted sexual conduct with a minor, and

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sexual abuse. See Answer, Exh. A & Exh. D at 1. The charges

involved incidents, including anal sex, taking place over

several months in 1997 and involved Petitioner’s biological

daughter, who was approximately eleven years old in 1997. Id.,

Exh. A; Reply, Exh. 4.

On October 8, 1999, Petitioner entered into a written

plea agreement with the state regarding the disposition of these

charges. Answer, Exhs. B & Exh. C; Reply, Exh. 3. A plea

hearing was conducted on October 8, 1999, at which hearing a

translator was present. Answer, Exh. B & Exh. C; Reply, Exh. 3.

The trial court informed Petitioner, through the interpreter, of

his right to a jury trial on the charges against him and his

right to an appeal, and also explained Petitioner was waiving

these rights by pleading guilty. Answer, Exh. C & Reply, Exh.

3. 

Through the translator, Petitioner agreed to plead

guilty to three of the seven counts of the indictment, i.e.,

one count of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 15 and

two counts attempted sexual conduct with a minor under the age

of 15. Answer, Exh. B at 1; Exh. C at 2. In return for

Petitioner’s guilty plea to these charges the state agreed to

drop the remaining four charges of the indictment. Id., Exh. B

at 1; Exh. C at 3. With regard to sentencing, the written plea

agreement provided Petitioner would be sentenced to no less than

the 20-year presumptive term of imprisonment on the conviction

for sexual conduct with a minor. Id., Exh. B at 1. The plea

agreement also provided Petitioner would be sentenced to

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lifetime supervised probation pursuant to both of the other two

convictions. See id., Exh. B at 1.

A presentence report was prepared. Reply, Exh. 4. A

sentencing hearing was conducted on December 3, 1999, with the

assistance of a translator. After noting both the aggravating

circumstance of repeated offenses and the harm to the victim and

the mitigating factor that Petitioner had no previous criminal

record, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to the 20-year

presumptive term pursuant to his conviction for sexual conduct

with a minor and to terms of lifetime-probation on the other two

counts of conviction. Answer, Exh. E at 13–14; Exh. F at 3–4.

At that time, the trial court also notified Petitioner of his

right to seek post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Reply, Exh. 5 at 15.

Because Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal

of his convictions and sentences in his plea agreement, a state

action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, was Petitioner’s first available

action “as of right” to challenge his convictions and sentences.

Petitioner did not timely file a state action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. 

On October 30, 2007, approximately eight years after

his convictions and sentences were final, Petitioner filed an

action in the Maricopa County Superior Court seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32. Answer, Exh. G & Exh. L

at 1; Reply, Exh. 7. Petitioner acknowledged this action was

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untimely, but asserted one of the exceptions to the timeliness

rule applied to his case, i.e., that there was newly discovered

evidence. Answer, Exh. G. Petitioner also alleged that the

failure to timely file the post-conviction action was not his

fault and that there had been a significant change in the law,

citing Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. G at 3. Petitioner

further asserted that his plea was not voluntary or

intelligently made because the proceeding occurred in English.

Additionally, Petitioner maintained he was not informed of his

right to a jury determination of the factors used to aggravate

his sentence and that he was in fact denied this right.

Petitioner also alleged in his Rule 32 action that he was denied

his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id., Exh. G.

The state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32

action on December 6, 2007. See Petition, Exh. D. The state

trial court found the petition was not timely and that

Petitioner had not stated a valid exception to the timeliness

rule. Id., Exh. D. The state court also noted that

Petitioner’s claim pursuant to Blakely did not render the

petition timely because Blakely was not to be applied

retroactively. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner sought review of this

decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, asserting in his

appellate brief that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment

right to a jury trial. Answer, Exh. H. The Arizona Court of

Appeals summarily denied review in Petitioner’s state Rule 32

action on October 28, 2008. Petition, Exh. E.

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In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts his

First Amendment right to the “redress of grievances and access

to the courts” has been violated. Petitioner also asserts he is

entitled to relief because his right to due process of law and

his right to equal protection of the laws were violated.

Petitioner further contends his sentences violate his right to

be free of double jeopardy. Additionally, Petitioner maintains

he was denied his right to a jury trial and his right to

confront the witnesses against him. Petitioner further contends

he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

The undersigned notes Petitioner does not clearly challenge his

convictions, but instead argues his sentences are invalid.

II Analysis

The petition is barred by the statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th

Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2008). See also

Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000);

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

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129 S. Ct. 397 (2008). 

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final when the time expired for filing his first action

for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in Arizona, the statute

of limitations began to run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32

of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”).

Petitioner was sentenced on December 3, 1999, and he had until

March 2, 2000, to file a state Rule 32 action. See Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.4 (2000). Accordingly, Petitioner had one year from

that date, i.e., until March 2, 2001, to file his section 2254

petition seeking federal habeas relief. See Bunney v. Mitchell,

262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner did not file a federal habeas petition on or

before March 2, 2001. Additionally, Petitioner’s action seeking

state post-conviction relief, filed in October of 2007, more

than six years after the statute of limitations expired, could

not and did not restart the already-expired statute of

limitations for filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing

Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston

v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). A state-court

petition that is filed after the expiration of the statute of

limitations under the AEDPA does not revive the running of the

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limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th

Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.

2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001).

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely habeas action. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v.

Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy

is “typically applied sparingly”). The petitioner must

establish a causal connection between the alleged roadblock to

their timely filing of their federal habeas petition and the

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actual failure to file the petition on time. See Gaston, 417

F.3d at 1034; Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th

Cir. 2005). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that

equitable tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at

1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.”

See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969

(9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.

1999). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has “rejected a per

se rule that a petitioner’s language limitations can justify

equitable tolling, but [has] recognized that equitable tolling

may be justified if language barriers actually prevent timely

filing.” Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069–70 (9th Cir.

2006). However, “a non-English-speaking petitioner seeking

equitable tolling must, at a minimum, demonstrate that during

the running of the AEDPA time limitation, he was unable, despite

diligent efforts, to procure either legal materials in his own

language or translation assistance from an inmate, library

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personnel, or other source.” Id. at 1070. 

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing,

pursuant to the standard stated in Mendoza, that he was unable

to procure assistance in his own language or that this was the

reason for his failure to file a habeas petition within the

statute of limitations. 

In his reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

contends he did not have notice of the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations and argues that, accordingly, to assert the statute

of limitations denies him of due process of law. See Reply.

Additionally, Petitioner alleges tht he received a document

regarding his right to file a Rule 32 action, but that his

attorney did not “alert” him to the importance of filing such an

action. Id. at 4. Petitioner alleges the plea agreement was

not voluntary because he was threatened with a sentence of life

imprisonment by his attorney if he did not sign the plea

agreement. Petitioner also argues that Arizona’s rules

regarding actions for post-conviction relief violate the

Supremacy Clause and that the state’s denial of post-conviction

relief denied him his right to access the courts. Id. at 2-4.

With regard to the timeliness of his habeas petition,

Petitioner briefly alleges he did not know his constitutional

rights were violated until 2007. Petitioner further asserts he

did not waive his right to file a federal habeas petition

because he did not have notice of the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations. Id. at 6. Petitioner also alleges he was

prejudiced by the inability to acquire legal materials in the

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Spanish language so that he could “better understand” his

rights. Id. at 7. Petitioner argues that, because his right to

file a habeas petition is a fundamental right, unless he waived

this right he must be allowed a hearing on the merits of a

petition.

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Brown

v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding the

petitioner has a strong burden to plead specific facts

supporting their claim of extraordinary circumstances). See

also Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19, 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding

that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling

because he was not misled or confused about the exhaustion of

his state remedies and filing his federal habeas petition).

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that there

were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made

it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition.

Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir.

2005). Additionally, Petitioner did not act with reasonable

diligence throughout the time period he seeks to toll. See

Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a

claim to equitable tolling where the petitioner “provided no

specificity regarding the alleged lack of access and the steps

he took to diligently pursue his federal claims”). Compare Roy,

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465 F.3d at 969-72.

III Conclusion

Petitioner failed to file his federal habeas action

within the time specified by the AEDPA. Petitioner has not

established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Arenas’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

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a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 28th day of May, 2009.

 

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