Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00803/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00803-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 130
Nature of Suit: Miller Act
Cause of Action: 40:3131 Bonds of contractors of public buildings

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for the 

use and benefit of:

McCULLOUGH PLUMBING, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HALBERT CONSTRUCTION 

COMPANY, INC. et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-803-CAB-WVG

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

[Doc. Nos. 188]

AND RELATED CROSS-CLAIMS AND 

COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD 

PARTY COMPLAINT

On September 27, 2019, the Court entered an order denying a motion by 

McCullough Plumbing, Inc. and the Guarantee Company of North America for attorneys’

fees, nontaxable costs, and prejudgment interest. McCullough now moves for 

reconsideration of that order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) on the grounds that, according to 

McCullough, it was manifestly unjust not to award McCullough and Guarantee their fees 

and prejudgment interest. The motion for reconsideration is denied.

In the motion for reconsideration, McCullough and Guarantee simply restate the 

arguments they made in their original motion. The Court, however, considered the entirety 

of the original motion (including the “success rates” claimed by McCullough and re-argued 

here) before concluding that McCullough was not the prevailing party and is therefore not 

entitled to its attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs pursuant to the Subcontract, and that

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Guarantee is not entitled to its fees for successfully defending Halbert’s claim under the 

Performance Bond. Unsurprisingly, McCullough and Guarantee are unhappy with the 

Court’s ruling, but their inability to convince the Court the first time around does not entitle 

them to a second bite at the apple under Rule 60(b)(6). By merely rearguing their positions 

that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees, nontaxable costs, and prejudgment interest, neither 

McCullough nor Guarantee have offered any grounds for reconsidering the Court’s order 

on the motion to dismiss. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Const. Corp., 248 

F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Because North American and Federal simply reargued their 

case . . . the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.”).

Ultimately, the Court echoes the following sentiment expressed by another district 

judge that motions for reconsideration should not be used merely as an intermediate 

“appeal” before taking a disputed ruling to the Ninth Circuit:

The Court cannot emphasize strongly enough that the Rules allowing for 

motions for reconsideration are not intended to provide litigants with a second 

bite at the apple. Rather, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be 

used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 

resources.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th 

Cir. 2000). In an adversarial system such as ours, more often than not one 

party will win and one will lose. Generally, it follows that the losing party 

will be unhappy with the Court’s decision. Rarely does the losing party 

believe that its position lacked merit, or that the Court was correct in ruling 

against it. Rather than either accept the Court’s ruling or appeal it, it seems 

to have instead become de rigueur to file a motion for reconsideration. The 

vast majority of these motions represent a simple rehash of the arguments 

already made, although now rewritten as though the Court was the opposing 

party and its Order the brief to be opposed. It is easy for each litigant to 

consider only his or her own motion, and the seemingly manifest injustice that 

has been done to them. But the cumulative effect is one of abuse of the system 

and a drain on judicial resources that could be better used to address matters 

that have not yet been before the Court once, let alone twice.

This is not to say that a motion for reconsideration is never well-taken. A 

litigant should not shy from bringing to the Court’s attention changes in facts 

and circumstances that render a ruling no longer logical, an intervening 

change in controlling authority, or other critical matters that the Rules provide 

should be brought to the Court’s attention in this way. On this basis, motions 

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for reconsideration should be few, far between, and narrowly focused. When 

this is the case, the Rules work as they were intended, and the Court can focus 

on the business of justice.

Strobel v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, No. 04CV1069 BEN(BLM), 2007 WL 1053454, 

at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2007). 

The instant motion does not meet the description in the second paragraph of the 

above block quote. To the contrary, the motion is a prime example of the circumstance 

identified in the first paragraph, with McCullough and Guarantee expressly characterizing 

the Court’s opinion as “argument” and treating the Court as the opposing party. See Doc 

No. 188-1 at 7 (“This Court argued that McCullough Plumbing was not entitled to fees and 

costs . . . .”), 12 (“This Court argues that because Halbert sought to enforce the bond rather 

than the subcontract . . . .) (emphasis added). The Court’s opinion is not argument; it is an 

explanation of the Court’s reasoning in resolving a dispute between the parties. In reaching 

its conclusions here, the Court considered all of the arguments McCullough and Guarantee 

made in their original motion, along with the arguments made by Halbert Construction 

Company in opposition and all of the facts of this case, including the jury verdict, and 

found that McCullough was not a prevailing party entitled to its fees, and that Guarantee 

was not entitled to its fees either. Likewise, the Court considered all relevant facts and 

arguments in finding that McCullough is not entitled to prejudgment interest. That 

McCullough and Guarantee think the Court’s conclusions are incorrect is not a grounds for 

reconsideration. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2019

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