Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03220/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03220-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PETER HOLLAND, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE RELATED COMPANIES, INC., et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 15-cv-03220-JSW 

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND 

DEFERRING IN PART MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND ORDERING SUPPLEMENTAL 

BRIEFING 

Re: Dkt. No. 98 

Now before the Court for consideration is the motion for partial summary judgment filed 

by Defendants, Related Management Company L.P. (“RMC”) and Third and Mission Associates 

LLC (“TMA”) (collectively “Defendants”) on Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief and on the issue of 

punitive damages.1 The Court has considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the 

record in this case, and it finds the motion suitable for disposition without oral argument.2

 See

N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The Court VACATES the hearing schedule for July 22, 2016, and it 

HEREBY GRANTS, IN PART, Defendants’ motion. The Court DEFERS ruling on the issue of 

whether Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages. 

 

1

 Defendant The Related Companies, Inc. (“TRCI”) also moved for summary judgment on 

each of Plaintiffs’ claims. In their opposition, Plaintiffs concede that TCRI should not be a 

defendant and state that they will dismiss the claims against TRCI with prejudice. To date, 

Plaintiffs have not filed a dismissal. Plaintiffs shall file a dismissal of TRCI by July 22, 2016, or 

the Court shall enter an order granting the motion for summary judgment as unopposed and shall 

enter judgment in favor TRCI. 

2

 Plaintiffs’ opposition brief contains footnotes that do not comply with Northern District 

Civil Local Rule 3-4(c)(2). The Court HEREBY ADVISES all parties that failure to comply with 

that rule in the future shall result in the Court striking offending pleadings and briefs from the 

record without further notice. 

 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 1 of 9
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

BACKGROUND 

The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. In November 2008, Plaintiffs, 

Peter Holland (“Mr. Holland”) and Kristin Holland (“Mrs. Holland”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 

leased unit 7C in The Paramount apartment complex (“The Paramount”). In December 2014, 

Plaintiffs renewed their lease for a period of one year. (See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), 

¶¶ 6, 9-10, 12; RMC Amended Answer to FAC (“RMC Answer”) ¶¶ 1, 6, 9-10, 12; TMA 

Amended Answer to FAC (“TMA Answer”) ¶¶ 1, 6, 9-10, 12; Declaration of Deborah Lunn in 

Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Lunn Decl.”) ¶ 3.) The Paramount is a 

residential apartment complex that is owned by TMA and is operated by RMC. (FAC ¶¶ 6-7; 

RMC Answer ¶¶ 6-7; TMA Answer ¶¶ 6-7; Declaration of Warren Loy in Support of Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 2; Lunn Decl., ¶ 2.) 

In January 2015, Defendants sent a notice to The Paramount’s residents that the building’s 

amenities space, which was located on the floor below Plaintiffs’ apartment, would be renovated. 

That project commenced in March 2015. (RMC Answer ¶¶ 13, 15; TMA Answer ¶¶ 13, 15; 

Declaration of Connie Cortese in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

(“Cortese Decl.”), ¶ 2; Lunn Decl., ¶ 5.) Mr. Holland suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 

(“PTSD”). After the renovation began, Mr. Holland raised complaints to Ms. Cortese, Jessie 

Liete, and Tanya Noeggerath Brown about noise from the construction. He also advised them that 

the noise was impacting his PTSD. (See Lunn Decl., ¶¶ 6, 8 Exs. A-B; Declaration of Joanne 

Childress in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 1-2, Exs. A-B; Cortese 

Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A; Declaration of Celia McGuinness in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Ex. A (Deposition of Tanya Brown at 84:2-14; McGuinness Decl., Exs. 5-

6).) Plaintiffs asked for an accommodation because of the construction noise. The parties 

engaged in discussions regarding Plaintiffs’ request but were unable to reach an agreement. 

On July 10, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their complaint and alleged that Defendants’ actions 

violated: (1) the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. sections 3601, et seq. (the 

“FHAA Claim”); (2) California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code sections 

12926, et seq. (the “FEHA Claim”); (3) California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code sections 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 2 of 9
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

51, et seq. (the “Unruh Act Claim”); and (4) California’s Disabled Persons Act, Civil Code 

sections 54, et seq. (the “CDPA Claim”). 

Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction with their complaint. (Docket 

No. 4.) On July 23, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and it 

ordered Defendants to “make a reasonable accommodation to Plaintiffs by moving them to an 

upper apartment in their building, free of construction noise, for the duration of their lease at their 

current rental rate,” and it ordered Defendants to pay “the reasonable costs of such relocation.”3 

(Docket No. 31, Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5:25-6:2.) Defendants 

moved Plaintiffs in compliance with the Court’s Order, and Plaintiffs moved out of The 

Paramount in December 2015. (Lunn Decl., ¶ 3.) 

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the analysis. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment. 

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of 

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary 

judgment, or partial summary judgment, is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the 

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of fact is 

“genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” 

if it may affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. If the party moving for summary judgment 

 

3

 The Court only addressed Plaintiffs’ claim for violations of the FHAA. 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 3 of 9
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, that party must produce evidence which 

either negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s claims or that party must show that 

the non-moving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate 

burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must “identify with 

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. 56(e). In addition, the party seeking to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact must take care adequately to point a court to the evidence 

precluding summary judgment. A court is “‘not required to comb the record to find some reason 

to deny a motion for summary judgment.’” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 

F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 840 

F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988)). If the non-moving party fails to point to evidence precluding 

summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 323. 

B. The Court Defers Ruling on the Issue of Punitive Damages.4

Plaintiffs ask that, if the Court does not deny the motion on the issue of punitive damages, 

that it defer ruling on the issue on the ground that there are outstanding discovery requests that are 

pertinent to resolution of the motion. On June 27, 2016, Magistrate Judge Laporte issued an order 

in which she directed the parties to meet and confer to narrow two of Plaintiffs’ interrogatories and 

rejected Defendants’ arguments that the interrogatories were not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims or 

defenses. Judge Laporte specifically addressed the potential relevance of the information to 

punitive damages. (Docket No. 107, Order re Joint Discovery Letters at 4:12-23.) According to 

Plaintiffs, the parties have not yet met and conferred on those issues and, thus, they have not 

received responses to those interrogatories. 

 

4

 Plaintiffs also concede that they are not seeking punitive damages on the Unruh Act and 

CDPA Claims. Rather, Plaintiffs are seeking treble damages under these statutes. Because the 

Court grants Defendants’ motion on the Unruh Act Claim, Plaintiffs’ request for damages on that 

claim, whether punitive or treble, is now moot. 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 4 of 9
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Plaintiffs also purport to recount deposition testimony from Warren Loy to support their 

argument that Defendants’ motion should be denied. (Declaration of Steven L. Derby, ¶¶ 13(e)-

(f).) Defendants object to these paragraphs on the basis that they constitute double hearsay and are 

contradicted by Mr. Loy’s deposition testimony. (Docket No. 120, Defendants’ Objections to 

Derby Declaration.) Although Defendants have submitted portions of Mr. Loy’s deposition in 

support of their reply brief, it is not clear whether they have submitted the portions they contend 

contradict Mr. Derby’s declaration.

The Court finds good cause to defer ruling on the issue of punitive damages, and it will 

permit the parties the opportunity to submit supplemental briefing, evidence, and any objections to 

the evidence, on this issue once Defendants have responded to the outstanding discovery requests. 

It also will permit Plaintiffs to submit the portions of Mr. Loy’s deposition that they purport to 

recount in Paragraphs 13(e) and 13(f) of the Derby Declaration. 

Because the Defendants are the moving party, they shall submit their supplemental brief by 

no later than August 5, 2016. Plaintiffs shall respond by August 19, 2016. Defendants shall reply 

by August 26, 2016. If the Court determines that a hearing is required, the Court shall permit oral 

argument at the pretrial conference scheduled for September 26, 2016. Otherwise, the Court will 

resolve the motion on the papers.5 

C. Defendants Are Entitled to Partial Summary Judgment on the Unruh Act Claim. 

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment, because the Unruh Act does not 

apply to requests for reasonable accommodation in residential apartment complexes.6

 The Unruh 

Act provides, in part, that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and 

no matter what their ... disability ... are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, 

facilities, privilege, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 51(b). The Unruh Act also provides that a “violation of the right of any individual under 

 

5

 The Court admonishes the parties to review the Court’s Guidelines for Trial and 

Final Pretrial Conferences in Civil Jury Cases, and it draws their attention to paragraph 2(i) 

in particular. 

6

 Defendants do not dispute that the Unruh Act applies generally to “the business of renting 

housing accommodations.” Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal.3d 721, 731 (1982). 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 5 of 9
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

the federal Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]... shall also constitute a violation of this 

section.” Id. § 51(f). The addition of Section 51(f) to the Unruh Act was to “‘adopt[] the full 

expanse’” of the ADA. Lentini v. California Center for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Presta v. Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 

1135 (N.D. Cal. 1998)). In Presta, the court also stated that the addition of Section 51(f) was 

intended to make the Unruh Act “co-extensive” with the ADA. Id. at 1135 (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). 

The ADA, in turn, provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis 

of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privilege, advantage 

or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by an person who owns, leases (or 

leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The ADA 

defines discrimination to include “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, 

or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford ... accommodations to individuals 

with disabilities[.]” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). However, courts have held that the ADA’s 

reasonable accommodation provisions do not apply to residential apartment complexes, because 

they do not fall within the ADA’s definition of public accommodation. See, e.g., Arceneaux v. 

Marin Housing Authority, No. 15-cv-00088-MEJ, 2015 WL 3396673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 

2015) (citing cases); Independent Housing Services v. Fillmore Center, 840 F. Supp. 1238, 1344 

n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(a). 

Defendants rely on Coronado v. Cobblestone Village Community Rentals, 163 Cal. App. 

4th 831 (2008), overruled on other grounds, Munson v. DelTaco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 678 

(2009).7

 In Coronado, the plaintiff, a quadriplegic, was required to use a wheelchair and the 

sidewalk at his apartment complex ended in a raised curb and did not have a wheel-chair access 

ramp. The plaintiff argued that this constituted a barrier to access and sued under the Unruh Act, 

based on an alleged violation of the ADA’s access requirement. 163 Cal. App. 4th at 836, 840. 

 

7

 In Munson, the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking damages pursuant to 

the Unruh Act based on alleged violation of the ADA does not have to prove intentional 

discrimination. 46 Cal. 45th at 678. 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 6 of 9
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

The trial court granted judgment in the defendant’s favor, because it concluded that the residential 

portion of the apartment complex was not covered by the Unruh Act. The court of appeals 

affirmed. It acknowledged that the “‘business of renting housing accommodations fell within” the 

scope of the Unruh Act. Id. at 840 (quoting Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 731 

(1982)). The court reasoned, however, that the residential portions of the apartment complex did 

not fall within the ADA’s definition of a “public accommodation,” and, therefore, those portions 

of the complex “are not subject to compliance with the ADA or federal regulations implementing 

the ADA.” Id. at 850; Cf. Carolyn v. Orange Park Community Ass’n, 177 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 

1098 (2009) (“purely residential areas of a common interest development are not public 

accommodations” for purposes of Unruh Act claim). 

“[W]here there is a multi-use facility in which there is a commercial office open to the 

general public but also residential and common areas that are not open to the general public, it is 

appropriate to consider the particular area in question when attempting to determine the 

applicability of the ADA structural access standards or other ADA requirements.” Coronado, 163 

Cal. App. 4th at 851 (emphasis added). Because the portion of the property at issue was a part of 

the residential apartment complex, the Coronado court held that the defendant was not required to 

install a curb ramp at that location. Id. at 850. In sum, because the defendant’s conduct did not 

violate the ADA, there could be no claim under Section 51(f) of the Unruh Act. 

The Court has not found any California Supreme Court decision that is directly on point. 

In Munson, the court overruled Coronado to the extent that case held that a plaintiff is not required 

to allege intentional discrimination to establish an Unruh Act violation based on a violation of the 

ADA. Munson, 46 Cal. 4th at 678. However, the court left intact the Coronado court’s ruling that 

residential portions of an apartment complex do not fall within the ADA’s definition of a public 

accommodation and, thus, would not support an Unruh Act claim. 

Plaintiffs rely on Flowers v. Prasad to argue that the court should construe the Unruh Act 

broadly, such that it would encompass a reasonable accommodation claim on the facts of this case. 

238 Cal. App. 4th 930 (2015). In that case, the plaintiff, who was required to use a service dog, 

alleged that the defendant violated Section 51(f) of the Unruh Act when she denied him service at 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 7 of 9
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

her restaurant. The Flowers case is distinguishable on its facts, because the establishment at issue 

was a restaurant. 238 Cal. App. 4th at 934. Thus, there was no dispute that it fell within the 

ADA’s definition of a place of public accommodation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(b). 

Plaintiffs also cite the Court to portions of the Unruh Act’s legislative history. For 

example, Plaintiffs note that the legislative history stated that the addition of Section 51(f) would 

“‘[m]ake a violation of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Act. Thereby providing persons injured 

by a violation of the ADA with the remedies provided by the Unruh Act (e.g., right of private 

action for damages).’” See Munson, 46 Cal. 4th at 672 (quoting Sen. Judiciary Rep. on Assem. 

Bill No. 1077, (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) at p. 5). This language appears to be a recognition that, in 

contrast to the Unruh Act, the ADA does not provide for damages. See, e.g, Wander v. Kaus, 304 

F.3d 856, 858 (9thc Cir. 2002); Munson, 46 Cal. 4thg 673 (noting that incorporation of ADA 

accessibility standards provides a “damages remedy for any violation of the ADA’s mandate of 

equal access to public accommodations”) (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). It 

is therefore consistent with the intent that the amendments to the Unruh Act were intended to 

“‘retain California law when it provides more protection for individuals with disabilities than the 

[ADA].’” Flowers, 238 Cal. App. 4th at 942 (quoting Stats.1992, ch. 913, § 1, p. 4282.) 

Absent clear guidance from the California Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit on this 

issue, the Court finds the reasoning in Coronado persuasive and shall follow it. Thus, because 

Plaintiffs sought a reasonable accommodation in connection with areas that are indisputably 

within the residential portions of The Paramount, they cannot show a violation the ADA and, thus, 

cannot premise their Unruh Act on that alleged violation. See Rodriguez v. Morgan, No. 09-cv8939-GW (CWx), 2009 WL 253867, at *1-*3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012) (granting summary 

judgment in plaintiff’s favor on FHAA, FEHA, and CDPA claims based on defendant’s failure to 

permit plaintiff to break lease to accommodate disabilities but granting summary judgment in 

favor of defendant on Unruh Act claim on same facts); Smith v. Powdrill, No. 12-cv-06388 DDP 

(RZx), 2013 WL 5786586, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013) (granting summary judgment for 

plaintiff on FHAA, FEHA and CDPA Claims based on defendant’s refusal to make exception to 

no-pets policy in residential lease for service animal but granting judgment in defendant’s favor on 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Un

jud

Da

 

8

 

Ho

acc

the

Ca

4th

Un

nruh Act clai

Accord

For the 

dgment on th

IT IS S

ated: July 11

 

The Co

omeowner’s A

commodatio

e court referr

lifornia Civi

h at 668 n.5 (

nruh Civil Ri

im on same f

dingly, Defen

foregoing re

he Unruh Ac

O ORDERE

1, 2016 

 

ourt in South

Ass’n reache

ns in a housi

red to the Un

il Code secti

(“Although t

ights Act, th

facts).8 

ndants are en

easons, the C

ct Claim, and

ED. 

 

ern Californ

ed a contrary

ing complex

nruh Act, the

ion 54.1(b), w

this court an

e statutory la

9

ntitled to jud

CONCLU

Court GRAN

d it DEFERS

___

JEF

Un

nia Housing 

y conclusion

x. 426 F. Su

e provision i

which falls w

nd others hav

abel applies 

dgment in the

USION 

NTS Defend

S ruling on th

__________

FFREY S. W

nited States D

Rights Cent

n regarding r

upp. 2d 1061

in cited in su

within the C

ve referred to

more precis

eir favor on 

dants’ motion

he issue of p

___________

WHITE 

District Judg

ter v. Los Fe

requests for r

, 1068 (C.D

upport of its 

CDPA. See, e

o both sectio

sely only to s

this claim. 

n for partial 

punitive dam

__________

ge 

eliz Towers 

reasonable 

. Cal. 2008)

conclusion w

e.g., Munson

on 51 and 52

section 51[.]

summary 

mages. 

________ 

. Although 

was 

n, 46 Cal. 

2 as the 

]”). 

Case 4:15-cv-03220-JSW Document 122 Filed 07/11/16 Page 9 of 9