Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01351/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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 Neither party requested a hearing on the motion to dismiss and the

Court concludes that oral argument would not aid the decisional process.

 WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Randall R. Ratachie,

 Plaintiff,

vs.

AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.,

 Defendant.

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No. CV-11-1351-PCT-PGR

 

 ORDER

 

Pending before the Court is defendant AmeriCredit Financial Services,

Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). Having considered

the parties’ memoranda, the Court finds that the motion should be granted

without prejudice to plaintiff Randall Ratachie being granted leave to file a second

amended complaint.1

Background

According to the allegations in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), the

plaintiff was hired by the defendant as a collector and customer service

representative on September 11, 2006. Beginning in September 2008, the

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2

 Paragraph 11 of the FAC, the main paragraph setting forth the factual

background for the plaintiff’s claims of age discrimination, states in its entirety:

11. The 12 points of age discrimination included allegations that

employees of Defendant were routinely making insulting comments

about older male employees to Plaintiff; Plaintiff was prohibited from

accessing certain websites younger employees were allowed to

access during break periods; Plaintiff was put on a strict overtime

regimen when other employees were not; Plaintiff was written up for

performance deficiencies when others who had committed the same

deficiencies were not; and Plaintiff was required to report to a Team

Leader while other younger employees were not.

3

 Paragraph 13 of the FAC alleges these additional acts by stating in

relevant part: “Those incidents included rude and offensive comments being

directed at Plaintiff relating to his age, unequal enforcement of company policies,

and Plaintiff was prohibited from attending a social even[t] with his fellow

teammates.”

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plaintiff began documenting various incidents that were occurring at his

workplace related to his age and work activities. On December 12, 2008, the

plaintiff reported his concerns to the defendant’s human resource department

(“HRD”), providing it with 12 different points of age discrimination.2

 During a

subsequent meeting with HRD, the plaintiff was assured that his job was safe and

that his supervisor could not fire him without a HRD representative being present. 

The plaintiff thereafter documented additional acts that he felt were indicative of

age discrimination.3

 In December 2009, the plaintiff went on a three-week preapproved vacation and returned to work on December 28, 2009. He was

terminated from his employment that same day without explanation. 

On January 4, 2010, the plaintiff filed an administrative Civil Rights

Complaint with the Arizona Attorney General’s Civil Rights Division (“ACRD”)

through an online intake form. He alleged in that form that the defendant had

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subjected him to age discrimination and retaliation. On June 23, 2010, the

plaintiff filed an administrative Charge of Discrimination with the ACRD wherein

he alleged that “I believe and therefore allege that but for my race, Caucasian,

and my Age 64; [sic] I would not have been subjected to a hostile work

environment and terminated from my employment.” The charge did not mention

retaliation. As a result of the work-sharing agreement between the ACRD and

the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the

plaintiff’s ACRD charge was also considered filed with the EEOC. The ACRD

mailed a Notice of Right to Sue to the plaintiff on March 18, 2011. 

The plaintiff commenced this action in the Maricopa County Superior Court

on June 15, 2011, and it was removed by the defendant on the basis of federal

question jurisdiction on July 7, 2011. The plaintiff’s FAC, filed on July 28, 2011,

raises six claims for relief: intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count I);

negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count II); age discrimination under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Count

III), age discrimination under the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), A.R.S. § 41-

1461 et seq. (Count IV); retaliation under the ADEA (Count V); and retaliation

under the ACRA (Count VI).

Discussion

The defendant has moved to dismiss every claim in the FAC pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), basically on the ground that the FAC fails to allege

sufficient facts to support any cognizable claim raised by the plaintiff.

I. Age Discrimination

The defendant contends that the FAC fails for several reasons to state a

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4

 Since neither party has distinguished between the federal and state 

discrimination and retaliation claims for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the

Court’s resolution of the motion also does not differentiate between them. See

O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 764 n.7 (9th Cir.1996)

(Court noted that a plaintiff’s remedies under the ACRA are limited to the same

extent that they are under the ADEA); Sees v. KTUC, Inc., 714 P.2d 859, 861

(Ariz.App.1985) (Court noted that federal case law is persuasive in interpreting

ACRA).

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claim for age discrimination under either the ADEA or the ACRA.4

 

A. Failure to State an Age-Based Hostile Work Environment Claim

While there is no dispute that the plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination

alleged that he had been subject to a hostile work environment, the defendant

argues at some length that to the extent the FAC attempts to raise an age-based

hostile work environment claim that claim must be dismissed because the pretermination allegations in the FAC, even if accepted as true, do not rise to the

level of severity and pervasiveness required by law. In his cursory response to

this argument, wherein the plaintiff summarizes the FAC as alleging “that Plaintiff

was terminated because of his age in violation of the ADEA, suffered retaliation

for reporting his concerns, and suffered emotional distress[,]” the plaintiff asserts

that the defendant’s motion “presupposes that Plaintiff is going to make certain

arguments without any evidence supporting its motion[;]” nowhere in his response

does the plaintiff specifically refer to the existence of a hostile work environment

claim in the FAC, nor does he make any effort to show that the well-pleaded facts

in the FAC are sufficient to allege such a claim. For those reasons, the Court

concludes that the FAC does not raise a separate age-based hostile work

environment claim under either the ADEA or ACRA and therefore the Court does

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5

 Because the Court construes the FAC as not raising a hostile work

environment claim, the Court concludes that it need not resolve at this time the

parties’ timeliness-related arguments regarding the applicability of the continuing

violations theory to pre-termination allegations of age discrimination.

6

 In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the

ADEA, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he (1) was at least 40 years old,

(2) was performing his job satisfactorily, (3) was discharged, and (4) was either

replaced by a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications

or was discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of

age discrimination. Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. Partnership, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207

(9th Cir.2008). The Supreme Court has now made clear that a plaintiff bringing an

ADEA claim must establish that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s

adverse action. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).

 With regard to the ADEA/ACRA age discrimination claims, the plaintiff

alleges in relevant part in the FAC that “Plaintiff is over the age of 40 and was

well qualified and capable of performing his job duties with the Defendant and

Defendant either replaced him with a younger employee or did not fill his

position.” (FAC paragraphs 32 and 39).

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not reach the merits of this portion of the motion of dismiss.5

B. Failure to State an Age-Based Termination Claim

The defendant also argues that the ADEA/ACRA claims, Counts III and IV

of the FAC, which allege that the plaintiff was terminated due to his age, must be

dismissed because the FAC fails to state a prima facie case of age discrimination

in that there is no allegation that the plaintiff was either replaced by a

substantially younger employee or that his position was terminated as a result of

a general reduction in force.6

 

The issue here is not whether the FAC alleges a prima facie age

discrimination case because an ADEA plaintiff is not required to plead specific

facts that establish all of the elements of a prima facie case in order to survive a

motion to dismiss. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002)

(Court held that “a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit [need] not

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contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).”) 

However, while the FAC need not state detailed factual allegations in order to

defeat the motion to dismiss, it must do more than offer “labels and conclusions”

or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, it must contain “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (some internal quotation marks

omitted), and facial plausibility is present when the plaintiff pleads factual content,

as opposed to legal conclusions, that allows a court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. Dismissal is

appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if the pleaded facts are merely consistent with

the defendant’s liability because such allegations do not suffice “to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at

1949-50 (“But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not

shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”) (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted).

The Court concludes that the age discrimination claims are subject to

dismissal because the FAC’s factual allegations do not raise a plausible inference

that the plaintiff’s employment was terminated due to his age; at best, the factual

allegations, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, merely suggest the possibility that the

termination was age-related and that is insufficient under Twombly and Iqbal. 

While the plaintiff asserts that the examples of discriminatory conduct alleged in

the FAC, such as those referred to in his “12 points of discrimination,” provide

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7

 For purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss, the Court assumes that

all of these allegations are properly considered in determining whether the FAC

states ADEA and ACRA age discrimination claims.

8

 The other incidents mentioned in the FAC regarding the plaintiff’s

employment-related treatment prior to his discharge are devoid of any factual

enhancement showing that they were even age-related. These incidents are that

“Plaintiff was put on a strict overtime regimen when other employees were not;

Plaintiff was written up for performance deficiencies when others who had

committed the same deficiencies were not” (FAC paragraph 11), that there were

incidents involving “unequal enforcement of company policies, and Plaintiff was

prohibited from attending a social even[t] with his fellow teammates” (FAC

paragraph 13), and that “[f]requently, Plaintiff was spoken to negatively in front of

other employees[.]” (FAC paragraph 14).

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context and evidence supporting his age discrimination, the Court cannot agree. 

The FAC sets forth very few facts specifically linked to age-related incidents

occurring prior to the plaintiff’s discharge and all of those are unenhanced in

terms of such important details as what the alleged misconduct was, who was

responsible for the alleged misconduct, whether those persons had supervisory

authority over the plaintiff, when the alleged misconduct occurred and its

frequency, etc.7

 These allegations, which are that “employees of Defendant were

routinely making insulting comments about older male employees to Plaintiff;

Plaintiff was prohibited from accessing certain websites younger employees were

allowed to access during break periods,” (FAC paragraph 11), “Plaintiff was

required to report to a Team Leader while other younger employees were not”

(FAC paragraph 11), and “incidents includ[ing] rude and offensive comments

[were] directed at Plaintiff relating to his age” (FAC paragraph 13), are insufficient

to plausibly suggest that the plaintiff’s termination, which the FAC states was

“without explanation,” was actually due to the plaintiff’s age.8

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II. Retaliation

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The defendant argues in part that the plaintiff’s ADEA/ACRA retaliation

claims, Counts V and VI of the FAC, are barred due to his failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. The defendant’s contention is based on the undisputed

fact that the plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination, which he filed with the ACRD on

June 23, 2010, did not allege any claim of retaliation; the plaintiff only alleged in

that administrative charge that he was subjected to a hostile work environment

and was terminated due to his race and age. 

Under the ADEA, allegations of retaliation not included in the plaintiff’s

administrative charge may not be considered by this Court unless the new claims

are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the administrative

charge. Albano v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d 384, 386 (9th Cir.1990). A

retaliation claim that was within the scope of the administrative agency’s

investigation or which reasonably could have been expected to grow out of the

administrative charge is within the Court’s authority to resolve. 

The Court cannot conclude at this time that it lacks authority to adjudicate

the plaintiff’s retaliation claims because, based on the limited record currently

before it, those claims could reasonably be expected to have grown out of the

totality of the information presented to the ACRD by the plaintiff. This is so

because, as specifically alleged in the FAC, the plaintiff clearly included an

allegation of age-based retaliation in his Civil Rights Complaint that he filed online

with the ACRD on January 24, 2010. As the Supreme Court has recognized for

purposes of the administrative exhaustion requirements of the ADEA,

“[d]ocuments filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to the

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extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the

employee’s rights and statutory remedies.” Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki,

552 U.S. 389, 406 (2008). Notwithstanding that the defendant refers to the

plaintiff’s initial Civil Rights Complaint as an intake questionnaire, that document,

which the Court is required to construe with the utmost liberality, facially meets

the requirements for an administrative charge of discrimination in that it provides

the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s identifying information, it specifically states in

part that the plaintiff’s termination “was clearly an act of retaliation due to [the

plaintiff’s] ADEA complaint[,]” it states the plaintiff’s belief “that by filing this sole

complaint with your office, a dual complaint is automatically filed with the Federal

EEOC commission[,]” and it asks for the agency’s intervention to resolve the

plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination by the defendant. See id. at 405-06;

Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999) (Court

noted that it had previously held that a detailed, signed intake questionnaire may

serve as a charge of discrimination sufficient to initiate administrative

proceedings.) While further development of the record may result in a

determination that the retaliation claims were in fact unexhausted, the Court

cannot make that determination now since it does not know whether the plaintiff

intentionally did not include the retaliation claim in his June 2010 charge, whether

he then intended for the retaliation claim to be included but ACRD personnel

failed to include it, whether the ACRD’s investigation, if any, included a review of

the retaliation-related allegations, etc. 

B. Failure to State a Retaliation Claim

The defendant further argues that the retaliation claims must be dismissed

even if they are within this Court’s adjudicatory authority because the FAC fails to

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9

 In order to establish a claim of retaliation under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.

§ 623(d), a plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity,

(2) that he was discharged or suffered some other adverse employee decision,

and (3) that there is a casual connection between the two.

 The ADEA/ACRA retaliation claims in the FAC allege that “Plaintiff

participated in protected activity by reporting potential Age Discrimination to

Defendant,” that “Plaintiff suffered and adverse employment action as a result of

participating in protected activity,” and that “Plaintiff suffered damages as a result

of Defendant’s actions.” (FAC paragraphs 45-47 and 51-53).

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allege a prima facie retaliation claim inasmuch as it does not set forth a sufficient

causal connection between the plaintiff’s protected activity and his discharge from

employment.9

 The specific basis for the defendant’s argument is that while the

FAC alleges that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity by presenting the

defendant’s HRD with his “12 different points of age discrimination” on December

12, 2008, the FAC also alleges that the plaintiff was not terminated until

December 28, 2009, over a year later. The plaintiff argues that he has stated a

prima facie retaliation claim “by alleging that he participated in protected activity,

was later terminated, the cause of which he alleges was his participation in

protected activity” and that the length of time between the protected activity and

his termination is not a sufficient reason to dismiss the retaliation claim prior to

discovery.

The issue here is not whether the plaintiff has alleged a prima facie

retaliation claim but whether the factual allegations in the FAC, taken as true,

state a claim for retaliation that is facially plausible in terms of causality. The

Court concludes that the retaliation claims are subject to dismissal because the

well-pleaded factual allegations in the FAC related to whether the plaintiff’s

discharge was in retaliation for his protected activity are insufficient to raise the

issue of causation above the level of speculation. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50

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10

 Under Arizona law, a prima facie case of intentional infliction of

emotional distress requires a showing (1) that the defendant engaged in extreme

and outrageous conduct, i.e., conduct “so outrageous in character, and so

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be

regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” (2) that the

defendant intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the

near certainty that such distress would result from its conduct, and (3) that the

plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the defendant’s conduct.

Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir.2007).

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(Since the plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully,” well-pleaded facts that merely permit a court to

infer the possibility of misconduct are insufficient to show that the plaintiff is

entitled to relief.) In short, the plaintiff’s allegation that his termination was in

retaliation for his complaints to HRD 54 weeks earlier is simply a naked assertion

of causation devoid of sufficient factual enhancement. Id. at 1949.

III. Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims

The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress claim, Count I of the FAC, and his Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress claim, Count II of the FAC, must be dismissed because the factual

allegations in the FAC are insufficient as a matter of law to support either claim. 

The plaintiff cursorily contends that the FAC pleads enough of a factual basis for

both claims to move forward and that the defendant is improperly asking the

Court to use an evidentiary standard in resolving the motion to dismiss.

A. Intentional Infliction

As to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the defendant

contends that it fails because it does not properly allege the outrageous or

atrocious conduct necessary to state such a claim.10 The Court agrees with the

defendant that the background facts alleged in the FAC relevant to this claim fall

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11

 These allegations are those set forth in paragraphs 11 and 13 of the

FAC. See footnotes 2 and 3.

12

 The only allegations in the FAC relevant to the issue of “illness or

bodily harm” are the following:

14. Frequently, Plaintiff was spoken to negatively in front of other

employees resulting in his embarrassment, extreme discomfort, and high stress. 

During this period, Plaintiff’s doctor prescribed him stress relief and anxiety

medications and instructed him to remove stress from his life caused by his

working conditions.

* * *

22. Plaintiff suffered severe and debilitating emotional distress, humiliation,

and degradation as a result of the acts undertaken by the Defendant entitling him

to recover damages.

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far short of describing conduct on the defendant’s part that is plausibly so

extreme or outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.11 

This is particularly so when the alleged facts are reviewed with the understanding

that Arizona law recognizes that it is “extremely rare to find conduct in the

employment context that will rise to the level of outrageous necessary to provide

a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,” 

Mintz v. Bell Atlantic Systems Leasing Int’l, 905 P.2d 559, 564 (Ariz.App.1995),

and that such liability does not arise for conduct that amounts to “mere insults,

threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Craig, 496 F.3d at

1059 (citing restatement 2d of Torts, § 46, comment (d).) 

B. Negligent Infliction

As to the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, the defendant

argues that it fails because it does not adequately allege that the emotional

distress the plaintiff suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions resulted in

illness or bodily harm.12 The Court agrees with the defendant that factual

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* * *

26. Defendant’s negligence caused Plaintiff emotional distress,

humiliation, and degradation, and as a result of this emotional harm, Plaintiff

suffered physical injury or illness.

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allegations underlying this claim are also insufficient under the Twombly/Iqbal

standard.

Under Arizona law, “[i]n order for there to be recovery for the tort of

negligent infliction of emotional distress, the shock or mental anguish of the

plaintiff must be manifested as a physical injury. Damages for emotional

disturbance alone are too speculative.” Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 669-70

(Ariz.1979); Glau v. Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc., 901 P.2d 455, 457 (Ariz.App.1995)

(same); but see, Harris v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 978

(9th Cir.2011) (Court noted that while Arizona law requires that emotional distress

result in “illness or bodily harm” in order to recover for the tort of negligent

infliction of emotional distress, “bodily harm” includes “substantial, long-term

emotional disturbance unaccompanied by any physical injury.”) (some internal

quotation marks omitted).

The allegations in the FAC regarding the physical impact of the defendant’s

conduct on the plaintiff are too conclusory to withstand the motion to dismiss. 

They do not contain the factual enhancements necessary to nudge the plaintiff’s

claim that he suffered actionable emotional distress “across the line from

conceivable to plausible” as is required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also,

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”) Missing from

the FAC is sufficient factual matter plausibly showing that the defendant’s

conduct caused physical injury to the plaintiff that constituted something more

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than transitory physical phenomena, or that resulted in substantial, long-term

emotional disturbance.

IV. Second Amended Complaint

Although the plaintiff has not requested that he be permitted to file a

second amended complaint should the Court grant the motion to dismiss, the

Court will allow such an amendment because the Court cannot determine as a

matter of law based on the record before it that the plaintiff is incapable of

pleading facts sufficient to properly state any of the claims raised in the FAC. 

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended

Complaint (Doc. 10) is granted and that the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) is

dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall file a second amended

complaint no later than April 23, 2012. The plaintiff failure to timely amend his

complaint shall result in the dismissal of this action.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2012.

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