Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01106/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e-2ra Job Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEREMIAH W. BALIK,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16cv1106-WQH-BGS

ORDER

v.

SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT

CO.; TIME WARNER CABLE, INC.;

TELEPHONE AND DATA

SYSTEMS, INC.; PATRICK M.

GAVIN, VP of Counsel; SPRINT,

INC.,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the “Motion – Additional Details Per Fed R C

24(a)(3)” (ECF No. 8) filed by Plaintiff Jeremiah W. Balik.

On May 9, 2016, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a

Complaint. (ECF No. 1). On May 9, 2016, Plaintiff also filed the motion to proceed

in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2).

On May 25, 2016, the Court issued an Order denying the motion to proceed in

forma pauperis without prejudice on the grounds that Plaintiff did not provide the Court

with sufficient information. (ECF No. 3). The Order stated, “Plaintiff shall ... either

(1) pay the requisite $400 filing fee, or (2) submit a more detailed motion to proceed

in forma pauperis.” Id. at 3.

On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed the “Motion – Additional Details Per Fed R C

12(a)(3).” The motion provides the Court with additional information regarding

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Plaintiff’s bank account balances and monthly spending. The Court construes the

motion as a motion to proceed in IFP, and considers the information in both motions to

proceed IFP in deciding whether to grant Plaintiff IFP.

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 4.5. An action may proceed

despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177

(9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right.” Smart v.

Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965).

In Plaintiff’s affidavit accompanying the original motion to proceed in forma

pauperis, Plaintiff states that he is not currently employed. Plaintiff states that he

receives $2,900 per month in VA benefits. Plaintiff states that he has a 2011 Toyota

Prius that he is still making payments on. Among other expenses, Plaintiff states that

his average monthly rent is $2,015 and his monthly utilities cost $350. Plaintiff states

that he spends at least $800 on food, $150 on clothing, $35 on laundry and dry cleaning,

and approximately $623 on transportation each month. In his most recent motion,

Plaintiff provided bank account records which indicate that as of June 7, 2016, Plaintiff

had $1,217.28 in his Wells Fargo checking account, $437.01 in his Wells Fargo savings

account, and $163.52 in his Navy Federal Credit Union accounts.

The Court has reviewed the motions and accompanying documents and finds that

they are sufficient to show that Plaintiff is unable to pay the fees or post securities

required to maintain this action. The Court grants the motion to proceed IFP pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. Initial Screening of Complaint

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) is also subject to mandatory review and sua sponte dismissal to the

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extent it “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). The standard used to evaluate whether a complaint states a claim is a liberal one,

particularly when the action has been filed pro se. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

97 (1976). However, even a “liberal interpretation . . . may not supply elements of the

claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” 

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quotation omitted).

Plaintiff named Sprint/United Management Co., Time Warner Cable, Inc., and

Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. as Defendants. Plaintiff alleges claims against

Defendants for racial discrimination pursuant to § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). (ECF No. 1 at 3). The Complaint

alleges the following facts with regard to Plaintiff’s application for employment with

Defendants and Defendants’ actions in not hiring Plaintiff: “Plaintiff applied for

numerous jobs with Defendants, in numerous states [E.g., California, Illinois and

Wisconsin]. Plaintiff was denied employment in every situation due to the first cause

of action; discrimination [with pretext] . . . .” Id. The Complaint alleges that after

Plaintiff accepted an offer from Defendant [Sprint], “Plaintiff’s Sprint offer was

rescinded for no valid reason.” Id. at 5. The Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff applied

for positions Plaintiff was more than qualified for with Defendant in San Diego and Los

Angeles. Plaintiff received email replies that Defendant would not be moving on with

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Plaintiff.” Id. at 8. The Complaint alleges that 

Plaintiff interviewed and accepted an offer with TDS Telecom/Defendant

at or around March 21, 2012 . . . Plaintiff received call from TDS . . . HR

Specialist Nicole Jooranstand after signing offer letter and getting training start date that they needed to do additional background checking – call Plaintiff’s references. Nicole Joraanstad lied; she never called any of Plaintiff’s job references, one of which is US Senator Charles Grassley. Plaintiff called US Senator Grassley staffer . . . he confirmed he never

received a call from Nicole Jooranstad.

Id. at 9. The Complaint alleges that 

Plaintiff applied for/took assessments for numerous jobs with Time

Warner Cable/Defendant, Inc. in the Los Angeles CSMA and San Diego CSMA on or about from October 2014 – May 2015 . . . . Plaintiff was

never called for interview[s] and would only receive emails from Time

Warner, Inc. stating that they are pursuing other candidates.

Id. at 17. The Complaint alleges that “either Congressman Fred Upton . . . or Mayor

Rahm Emanuel or BOTH abused their authority and called in a favor to Time Warner,

Sprint et al to block and prevent Plaintiff from getting interviewed and hired at

telecommunications companies.” Id. at 19.

The Court concludes that the allegations in the Complaint are vague, conclusory,

or both. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n. 3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a ‘showing,’

rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation

in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of

providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim

rests.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any facts to support an inference that

Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff based on his race by declining to employ

him. Many of the factual allegations in the Complaint are not related to Plaintiff’s

claim for employment discrimination or alleged wrongdoing by the named Defendants. 

The Court concludes that the Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to

state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Complaint is dismissed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I).

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III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF

No. 8) is granted. The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed without prejudice.

DATED: August 2, 2016

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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