Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03841/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03841-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 ___________

 No. 03-3841

 ___________

Charles Jess Palmer, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Harold W. Clarke, Director, *

State of Nebraska Department of *

Correctional Services, * Appeals from the United States

* District Court for the

Appellee. * District of Nebraska.

*

____________________ *

*

National Association of Criminal *

Defense Lawyers, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of *

Appellant. *

 ___________

 No. 03-3842

 ___________

Charles Jess Palmer, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Harold W. Clarke, Director, *

State of Nebraska Department of *

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Correctional Services, *

*

Appellant. *

*

____________________ *

*

National Association of Criminal *

Defense Lawyers, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of *

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: May 13, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Charles Jess Palmer and the State of Nebraska each appeal from the district

court’s partial grant of Palmer’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm in part

and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Palmer has been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death three times for the

1979 felony murder of Eugene Zimmerman in Grand Island, Nebraska. The Nebraska

Supreme Court reversed Palmer’s first conviction and death sentence because the

state trial court erroneously admitted hypnotically induced testimony. State v.

Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Neb. 1981) (Palmer I). That court subsequently

reversed Palmer’s second conviction and death sentence because the trial court

allowed Palmer’s estranged wife (Cherie Palmer) to testify at trial in violation of

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Prior to the amendment, the privilege had been inapplicable only in cases

where the crime charged was rape, adultery, bigamy, incest, child abandonment, or

a crime committed against one spouse by the other or against a child of either. Palmer

III, 399 N.W.2d at 714-15; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505(a)(3)(a). The amendment

replaced rape and adultery with the more general “crime of violence” category.

Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 717.

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Nebraska’s marital privilege. State v. Palmer, 338 N.W.2d 281, 284 (Neb. 1983)

(Palmer II). The marital privilege, as it then existed, provided that: “During the

existence of the marriage, a husband and wife can in no criminal case be a witness

against the other. This privilege may be waived only with the consent of both

spouses.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505(a)(2) (Reissue 1995). Because of Palmer’s

appeal of a divorce decree in Texas, the couple’s marriage had not yet terminated, and

thus Cherie Palmer remained incapable of testifying against Palmer during the

pendency of the second trial.

After Palmer’s second conviction was reversed, but before his third trial, the

Nebraska Legislature amended the marital privilege statute by rendering the privilege

inapplicable in cases involving crimes of violence.1

 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505(a)(3)(a)

(Reissue 1995). As a result, Cherie Palmer was permitted to testify against Palmer

in his third trial. Palmer was again convicted and again sentenced to death. On

appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Palmer’s conviction and sentence.

State v. Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706 (Neb. 1986) (Palmer III).

Before the start of his third trial, Palmer filed a federal habeas corpus petition,

contending that his second trial violated his right against double jeopardy and that his

impending third trial would also constitute a double-jeopardy violation because the

properly admitted evidence in both his first and second trials was legally insufficient

to convict him. After four hearings before the district court, four appeals to our court,

and multiple remands, we dismissed Palmer’s petition. See Palmer v. Drum, No. 84-

8041 (8th Cir. May 10, 1984) (reversing dismissal of petition as premature); Palmer

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v. Grammer, 863 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1988) (Palmer (Fed.) I) (dismissing Palmer’s

original petition but remanding the case to allow Palmer to amend); Palmer v. Clarke,

961 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1992) (Palmer (Fed.) II) (remanding amended petition to

district court with instructions to consider prosecutorial misconduct argument);

Palmer v. Clarke, 12 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (Palmer (Fed.) III)

(dismissing Palmer’s amended petition).

Palmer subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Nebraska state

court. The state district court denied Palmer’s petition in its entirety, and the

Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Palmer, 600 N.W.2d 756 (Neb. 1999)

(Palmer IV). Palmer next filed a twenty-two-claim federal habeas corpus petition

challenging his third conviction and sentence. The district court denied the writ as

to Palmer’s third conviction, but granted the writ as to Palmer’s resulting death

sentence. The district court held that, because of errors committed during the

sentencing phases of all three of Palmer’s trials, the death penalty could not

constitutionally be imposed upon Palmer. The district court granted a certificate of

appealability as to the claims on which it denied relief, and the State appealed those

claims on which the district court granted relief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In habeas corpus cases, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear

error and its legal conclusions de novo. Reagan v. Norris, 365 F.3d 616, 621 (8th Cir.

2004).

A. Substantive Review of State Court Decisions

Our power to review underlying state court decisions in habeas corpus cases

is restricted to the “limited and deferential review” mandated by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790

(8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 125 S. Ct. 670 (2004)). Under AEDPA, we may grant a writ of habeas corpus

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only if the relevant state court decision was either (1) “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or (2) “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See also Ryan, 387 F.3d at 790.

The phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States” “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the

Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A decision is contrary to clearly established

Supreme Court precedent if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the] Court on a question of law or...decides a case differently than [the]

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-13. A decision

constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

precedent “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the]

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 413. An incorrect decision is not necessarily unreasonable, and we may

not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court decision is both wrong and

unreasonable. Colvin v. Taylor, 324 F.3d 583, 587 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

851 (2003). A state court’s determination of the facts is unreasonable “only if it is

shown that the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy

support in the record.” Jones, 359 F.3d at 1011.

AEDPA applies, however, only to habeas petitions filed after its effective

date—April 24, 1996. Ryan, 387 F.3d at 789. The applicability of AEDPA thus

centers on what was before a federal court on that date. Woodford v. Garceau, 538

U.S. 202, 207 (2003). Accordingly:

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If, on that date, the state prisoner had before a federal court an

application for habeas relief seeking an adjudication on the merits of the

petitioner’s claims, then amended § 2254(d) does not apply. Otherwise,

an application filed after AEDPA’s effective date should be reviewed

under AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant...were

presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA’s effective date.

Id. (emphasis in original).

The district court held that Palmer’s present habeas petition related back to his

prior federal petition, and that AEDPA standards therefore did not apply, because we

had “reserved judgment on the posttrial component” of Palmer’s original habeas

petition. We disagree for two reasons. First, Palmer’s original petition in federal

court contained no posttrial component. We noted in Palmer (Fed.) II that Palmer

specifically stated that he was “not alleging and [was] expressly reserving any

arguments [that] he [might] have arising out of his third trial” and that Palmer’s

original petition explicitly did not challenge his third judgment of conviction and

sentence. 961 F.2d at 775 (modification in original). We also stated that a later

petition attacking Palmer’s third conviction would not qualify as a second or

successive petition. Id. Accordingly, when Palmer’s entire pretrial petition was

denied in Palmer (Fed.) III, 12 F.3d at 783, there were no posttrial claims remaining

on which to reserve judgment. 

More importantly, Palmer’s petition was not pending in federal court on April

24, 1996. In Palmer (Fed.) III, we clearly and categorically denied the habeas petition

then pending before us. Id. The district court’s conclusion that we held the petition

“in abeyance” pending the conclusion of Palmer’s third trial simply has no basis in

the record. Our mandate issued, was received by the District of Nebraska, and was

fully in force after the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Palmer v. Clarke, 512

U.S. 1213 (1994). Furthermore, the district court’s observations about the disposition

of the case file and records following Palmer (Fed.) III cannot render nugatory our

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The district court based its holding in part on the fact that the district court’s

file pertaining to Palmer’s first habeas corpus petition was never officially closed.

Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1022 (D. Neb. 2003).

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clear language in that case.2

 Accordingly, Palmer’s present petition does not relate

back to his prior petition, and AEDPA standards apply to all of Palmer’s claims.

B. Fair Presentment

Before seeking federal habeas corpus relief, a petitioner must first fairly present

the substance of each claim to the appropriate state court, thereby alerting the state

court to the federal nature of each claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004);

Wemark v. Iowa, 322 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 870

(2003). A petitioner has fairly presented a claim when he has “properly raised the

same factual grounds and legal theories in the state courts which he is attempting to

raise in his federal habeas petition.” Wemark, 322 F.3d at 1021 (internal citations

and quotations omitted). 

III. CLAIMS ON WHICH THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED RELIEF

A. Claim I: Ex Post Facto Violation

Palmer first asserts that the application of the Nebraska Legislature’s marital

privilege amendment to his third trial constituted an ex post facto application of the

amended statute. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Nebraska Supreme Court,

relying on Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S.

380 (1898), held that the marital privilege amendment (L.B. 696) simply modified a

rule of evidence, and thus its application in Palmer’s case did not violate the ex post

facto prohibition. Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 714-18.

In his seriatim opinion in Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase enumerated four

categories of laws that he considered violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 3 U.S.

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386, 390 (1798). The fourth of those categories consisted of “[e]very law that alters

the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law

required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the

offender.” Id. (opinion of Chase, J.). In Hopt, decided almost ninety years later, the

Court examined a pre-trial, post-offense statutory modification that permitted

felons—who had theretofore been barred from being a witness in any case—to testify

in both civil and criminal cases. 110 U.S. at 587-88. The Court upheld the

modification against an ex post facto challenge and held that statutes which “simply

enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases” do not

offend the ex post facto prohibition because they do not make any act criminal which

was not criminal at the time of its commission, aggravate or increase the punishment

for any crime over that prescribed when the crime was committed, or alter the degree

or lessen the amount or measure of proof necessary to convict the defendant. Id. at

589. The Court later addressed a similar ex post facto challenge to a pre-trial, postoffense evidentiary change that permitted the previously barred introduction of other

writings in order to prove the authenticity of disputed writings, and concluded that

a state does not violate the ex post facto prohibition when it enacts a statute making

competent to testify a class of persons who were excluded from doing so on public

policy grounds at the time the offense was committed. Thompson, 171 U.S. at 381,

386-87. 

The Nebraska Supreme Court held that L.B. 696 was indistinguishable from

the statutes considered in Hopt and Thompson and that it thus did not run afoul of ex

post facto constraints. Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 716-17. Based on those cases,

which were controlling at the time that Palmer III was decided, we do not believe that

the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. L.B. 696 merely rendered a class of

persons previously barred from acting as witnesses in criminal cases fully competent

to testify from that point forward. Furthermore, the fact that L.B. 696 rendered

current spouses competent to testify in criminal cases did not make any acts criminal

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An old rule is a rule announced in a Supreme Court case that was decided after

a habeas corpus petitioner’s judgment of conviction and sentence, but that was

dictated by precedent existing before that judgment became final. Stringer v. Black,

503 U.S. 222, 227 (1992). 

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that were not criminal when committed, increase the punishment for any crime over

that applicable when the crime was committed, or alter the degree or amount of proof

required to convict any defendant. 

Palmer contends, however, that the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions in

Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000), and Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607

(2003), render the Nebraska Supreme Court’s disposition of his ex post facto claim

contrary to clearly established federal law or an unreasonable application thereof. We

find his arguments unavailing. Even assuming, arguendo, that Carmell and

Stogner—which were decided well after the Nebraska Supreme Court’s 1986

decision in Palmer III—qualify as “old rules” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

(1989),3

 and thus must be taken into account in our consideration of clearly

established federal law, see Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412, they do not affect our conclusion

that Hopt and Thompson dispose of Palmer’s claim.

 

In Carmell, a defendant challenged a modification to Texas’s “corroboration

or outcry” rule. 529 U.S. at 516. Prior to 1993, the rule stated that the testimony of

certain minor victims of sexual assault could not support a conviction unless it was

corroborated or unless the victim had informed another person within six months of

the offense (“outcry”). Id. at 517-18. Texas then amended the statute to eliminate the

corroboration or outcry requirement for all minor victims. Id. at 518. In holding that

the statute could not be applied to crimes committed prior to its enactment, the Court

specifically addressed Justice Chase’s fourth category and held that it was directed

at sufficiency of the evidence rules, which “mean that evidence is insufficient to

convict by the force of [those laws] alone,” as opposed to witness competency rules,

which produce that result only in combination with the normally operative sufficiency

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Palmer also asserts that, even if L.B. 696 is merely an evidentiary rule, its

attainder characteristic distinguishes it from other such rules. Whatever this may

mean for Palmer’s bill of attainder claim, see infra, it is irrelevant to our ex post facto

analysis.

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rule. Id. at 551-52 & n.35 (emphasis in original). Because a failure to supplement

victim testimony with corroboration or outcry made that testimony insufficient to

convict by the force of the pre-modification rule alone, the rule was a sufficiency of

the evidence rule, and thus its pre-trial, post-offense modification lessened the

amount of proof required to convict in violation of the ex post facto prohibition. Id.

at 530. Put another way, the modification made a state case based solely upon victim

testimony legally sufficient where, under the previous law, a case based solely upon

victim testimony (even if sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt) was legally

insufficient, and thus the application of the amended statute violated the Ex Post

Facto Clause. Id. at 530-31. 

In contrast, even accepting, arguendo, Palmer’s argument that Cherie Palmer’s

testimony was crucial to his conviction, the admission of that testimony pursuant to

L.B. 696 merely served to make the case factually sufficient to convict without

changing the legal sufficiency of the evidence standard. Nebraska’s prior marital

privilege did not render cases presented without spousal testimony insufficient;

rather, those cases were judged by whether they proved the defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. Similarly, the fact that spousal testimony became admissible by

virtue of L.B. 696’s enactment does not necessarily make a case sufficient where it

previously was insufficient. Both before and after L.B. 696, the sufficiency of a case

was judged by whether the factual evidence presented was sufficient to meet the legal

sufficiency of the evidence standard: guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.4

In Stogner, the Court considered a statute that allegedly violated Justice

Chase’s second category of ex post facto laws. 539 U.S. at 612-13. As support for

its decision that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to crimes committed prior

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to its enactment, the Court looked to the historical episodes cited by Justice Chase as

alternative descriptions of his four categories, in which he detailed the various bad

acts of Parliament that gave rise to our Constitution’s ex post facto prohibition. Id.

at 612-14. In his alternative description of the fourth category implicated here,

Justice Chase stated that Parliament occasionally “violated the rules of evidence...by

admitting...the oath of the wife against the husband.” Id. at 612; Calder, 3 U.S. at

389. Palmer claims that this passage, in addition to the Court’s citation in Stogner to

Justice Chase’s alternative descriptions, makes L.B. 696 an impermissible ex post

facto law. We disagree.

As an initial matter, it is instructive to note that Justice Chase’s opinion in

Calder was written in the period in which each Justice gave his opinion seriatim.

Thus, it is not a Supreme Court holding that would be included in the definition of

“clearly established Federal law.” Justice Chase’s opinion has historical significance

solely because his four categories have been viewed “as an authoritative gloss on the

Ex Post Facto Clause’s reach” by more recent Supreme Court decisions. See

Carmell, 529 U.S. at 567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even if Calder did have full

precedential force, however, the best argument that Palmer could make is that there

is a conflict between Calder’s alternative descriptions and the holdings in Hopt and

Thompson, and thus that the applicable federal law is not clearly established.

Furthermore, although the Court did rely upon Calder’s alternative descriptions in

striking down the statute at issue in Stogner, it neither implicitly nor explicitly held

that Calder’s alternative description of the fourth ex post facto category stands on

equal precedential footing with the more traditional definition. Quite the opposite,

the Court’s brief treatment of the fourth category cited Carmell’s analysis of that

category. 539 U.S. at 615.

Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court’s disposition of Palmer’s ex post

facto claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

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B. Claim II: Bill of Attainder 

Palmer next claims that L.B. 696 functioned as an unconstitutional bill of

attainder. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that

because L.B. 696 did not specify Palmer as its target, it did not constitute a bill of

attainder. Palmer IV, 600 N.W.2d at 769-70.

In order to be termed a bill of attainder, a law must: (1) specify the affected

persons; (2) impose punishment; and (3) lack a judicial trial. Selective Serv. Sys. v.

Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984). Historically, bills of

attainder identified by name the persons they intended to punish. Id. Even if an

individual is not identified by name, however, an enactment constitutes an attainder

if it describes the individual “in terms of conduct, which, because it is past conduct,

operates only as a designation of particular persons.” Communist Party v. Subversive

Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86 (1961). Thus, “when past activity serves as ‘a

point of reference for the ascertainment of particular persons ineluctably designated

by the legislature’ for punishment,” the enactment may be an attainder. Selective

Serv., 468 U.S. at 847 (quoting Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 87).

On its face, L.B. 696 makes no reference to Palmer and is generally applicable

to all cases in which a crime of violence is alleged. Rather than distinguishing

between persons charged with a crime, it appears to distinguish among criminal

prosecutions in which the marital privilege is applicable. Thus, there is no way to

determine which individuals were “ineluctably designated” by L.B. 696 for

punishment. Notwithstanding the frequent references to Palmer in L.B. 696’s

legislative history, we cannot say that this fact alone renders the state court decision

unreasonable.

Furthermore, even if the Nebraska Supreme Court’s conclusion that L.B. 696

did not specify Palmer were found to be so completely belied by the record as to fail

the unreasonableness standard of review, Palmer still would not be entitled to habeas

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relief on this claim. Whether a law imposes punishment upon a certain individual

requires three inquiries: “(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical

meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, viewed in terms of the

type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive

legislative purposes; and (3) whether the legislative record evinces a [legislative]

intent to punish.” Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 852 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). L.B. 696 meets none of these tests. First, the disability imposed upon

Palmer—the elimination of his ability to bar Cherie Palmer from testifying—does not

equate to those deprivations historically viewed as punishment, e.g., imprisonment,

banishment, confiscation of property, or deprivation of employment or participation

in a trade or trade union. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Svcs., 433 U.S. 425, 473-74

(1977). Second, “[l]egislation designed to guarantee the availability of evidence for

use at criminal trials,” such as L.B. 696, constitutes a valid nonpunitive exercise of

legislative power. Id. at 477. Finally, the legislative record in this case cannot fairly

be characterized as evincing an intent to punish. Although both the state senator from

the victim’s district and the prosecutor in Palmer’s case specifically cited the reversal

of Palmer’s second conviction as a justification for L.B. 696, their testimony took

place in a committee hearing, and both stated that they were testifying for themselves

alone. See Palmer App., vol. II, at 413-16 (testimony of Senator Peterson and Hall

County Attorney Steven Von Reisen). In addition, although Senator Peterson

reiterated his personal appeal on the floor of the Unicameral and distributed a news

release from the Hall County Board reflecting community sentiments towards Palmer,

see Palmer App., vol. II, at 430 (statement of Senator Peterson), this isolated

statement does not show that the Unicameral as a whole “was intent on encroaching

on the judicial function of punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses.”

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479. In fact, Senator Peterson’s brief reference to Palmer’s case

was the only reference made to Palmer in floor debates, and the prosecutor in

Palmer’s case explicitly testified that, even with the marital privilege amendment,

Palmer was entitled to a fair trial. See Palmer App., vol. II, at 416 (testimony of

Steven Von Reisen). Because L.B. 696 cannot be characterized as “punishment,”

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Palmer’s bill of attainder claim accordingly fails regardless of whether L.B. 696

specifies him.

C. Claim IX: Double Jeopardy

Palmer alleges that the prosecutor in his second trial and the judge that presided

over that trial committed misconduct by allowing Cherie Palmer to testify in violation

of Nebraska’s then-existing marital privilege, and that such misconduct should bar

his third trial on double jeopardy grounds. In Palmer (Fed.) III, however, we

specifically affirmed the district court’s conclusion that no prosecutorial or judicial

misconduct had occurred during Palmer’s second trial. 12 F.3d at 783. Furthermore,

although we stated in Palmer (Fed.) II that a later petition challenging Palmer’s third

conviction would not be second or successive, 961 F.2d at 774-75, this claim again

challenges Palmer’s third trial on grounds identical to those raised and addressed in

Palmer’s prior federal habeas petition, to wit, that because of prosecutorial and

judicial misconduct, Cherie Palmer’s testimony in the second trial should be excluded

when determining whether the evidence in the second trial was sufficient to convict

Palmer. See Palmer (Fed.) III, 12 F.3d at 782. The record also indicates that the

“goading to mistrial” argument presented by Palmer in this petition and the cases

cited in support thereof were specifically raised and rejected by the district court in

connection with the prior federal habeas petition. Thus, Palmer’s double jeopardy

claim qualifies as a second or successive claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) and

must be dismissed. See, e.g., Vancleave v. Norris, 150 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 1998).

D. Claim X: Speedy Trial

Palmer claims that the seventeen-week delay between the reversal of his second

conviction and the commencement of his third trial deprived him of his constitutional

right to a speedy trial. If the length of the delay cannot be said to be presumptively

prejudicial, however, there is no deprivation of the speedy trial right. Barker v.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

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The Nebraska Supreme Court, citing Barker, held that a seventeen-week delay

is not presumptively prejudicial. See Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 721-22. This

conclusion was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

E. Claims XI-XIII: Admission of Certain Evidence

Palmer asserts that certain evidence in his third trial was admitted in violation

of due process. In claim XI, he alleges that a pretrial photographic display shown to

the victim’s wife (Monica Zimmerman) was impermissibly suggestive because

Palmer was noticeably taller than all of the other individuals in the display, and,

accordingly, that Mrs. Zimmerman’s subsequent in-court identification of Palmer

should have been excluded. In claim XII, he argues that Mrs. Zimmerman’s

testimony in his second and third trials was impermissibly tainted by the hypnosis

session that led to the exclusion of her testimony in the first trial. In claim XIII, he

asserts that the combination of the photographic display and the hypnosis also

rendered the photographic display impermissibly suggestive. The Nebraska Supreme

Court held that the display was not impermissibly suggestive and that, even if it was,

the totality of the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Zimmerman’s review of the display

rendered the display not “unduly suggestive.” Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 720-21. In

addition, the court held that Nebraska evidentiary rules, as well as the court’s prior

precedent, did not bar the introduction of Mrs. Zimmerman’s testimony because the

testimony related to matters of which she had knowledge before the hypnosis session.

Id. at 719-20.

“[C]onvictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial

identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic

identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States,

390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). Even if a photographic identification procedure is

impermissibly suggestive, however, the “central question” regarding eyewitness

identification at trial is “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the

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identification was reliable despite any suggestive or inappropriate pre-trial

identification techniques.” Trevino v. Dahm, 2 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)). In determining whether the identification was

reliable, a court must consider: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal

at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the

witness’s prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by

the witness at the time of the photographic display; and (5) the length of time between

the crime and the photographic display. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. The existence of

each factor is a factual determination to be made by the state court, Sumner v. Mata,

455 U.S. 591, 597 n.10 (1982) (per curiam), and is entitled to the requisite

presumption of correctness.

Although the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the photographic display was

not suggestive because one could not determine the height of each subject (including

Palmer) by looking at the pictures, it also held that “the totality of the circumstances

ma[de] it abundantly clear that the photographic array was not unduly suggestive.”

Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 721. It thus appears that the court incorrectly introduced

the Biggers factors, which address the inherent reliability of the in-court

identification, into its suggestiveness analysis. 

Even if the court erred in its analysis, Palmer is not entitled to relief on this

ground unless his constitutional or statutory rights were violated. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). The Nebraska Supreme Court specifically found that it took Mrs.

Zimmerman “one to two” seconds to eliminate all other subjects but Palmer from the

photographic array. The district court additionally found that Mrs. Zimmerman had

observed Palmer in her home on several occasions, had described his approximate

age, height, and hair color one day after the murder, and was positive about the

identification made from the photographic array. There is ample support for these

findings in the record, and Palmer did not dispute them. Furthermore, the record

indicates that Mrs. Zimmerman last saw Palmer approximately three weeks before she

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5

Palmer framed his argument as whether the hypnosis session, in combination

with the photographic array, made the array unduly suggestive. We believe, however,

that the proper inquiry is whether the hypnosis session rendered Mrs. Zimmerman’s

in-court identification unreliable.

-17-

picked him out of the photographic array. Based on a totality of the circumstances,

we conclude that Mrs. Zimmerman’s in-court identification of Palmer was inherently

reliable, despite any potentially suggestive features of the photographic array, and

thus properly admissible at trial.

The fact that Mrs. Zimmerman’s hypnosis session took place before the

photographic array and the in-court identification of Palmer does not alter our

conclusion. The “suggestions” made to Mrs. Zimmerman in the hypnosis session

regarding the physical features of the person she suspected had murdered her husband

were vague and based upon facts that she had already disclosed to investigators.

Additionally, any suggestions could not have been made with Palmer in mind, as

Palmer’s identity and physical appearance were not known to police until the

photographic array took place almost two weeks later. Finally, and most importantly,

there is no evidence that the Austin, Texas, Police Department personnel who

conducted the photographic array knew of the hypnosis session or its results.

Accordingly, the existence of the hypnosis session does not shift the totality of the

circumstances toward a finding that Mrs. Zimmerman’s in-court identification of

Palmer was unreliable.5

We also uphold as not contrary to clearly established federal law the Nebraska

Supreme Court’s determination that Mrs. Zimmerman’s testimony in the second and

third trials was admissible despite the hypnosis session. The admissibility of

evidence in a state trial is a matter of state law, and thus we will grant habeas relief

only if the state court’s evidentiary ruling “infringes upon a specific constitutional

protection or is so prejudicial that it amounts to a denial of due process.” Clark v.

Groose, 16 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). The Nebraska

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Supreme Court found that Mrs. Zimmerman’s testimony was properly limited to facts

that she knew and had disclosed to others prior to the hypnosis session, Palmer III,

399 N.W.2d at 719, and there is ample evidence in the record to support this finding.

Therefore, the admission of Mrs. Zimmerman’s testimony resulted in no violation of

due process or of any other constitutional protection.

F. Claim XIX: Warrantless Arrest and Seizure of Evidence

Palmer next argues that his arrest in Texas (prior to his first trial), and the

seizure of evidence from him at that time, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. A

Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review unless the state

fails to provide “an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the] claim.” Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Thus, we will review a Fourth Amendment claim

raised in a habeas petition only if either “the state provided no procedure by which

the prisoner could raise his Fourth Amendment claim, or the prisoner was foreclosed

from using that procedure because of an unconscionable breakdown in the system.”

Willett v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1265, 1273 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Palmer does not

dispute that his Fourth Amendment claim was reviewed and decided by the Nebraska

Supreme Court in Palmer I, 313 N.W.2d at 652, and thus we need not reexamine that

court’s decision.

G. Claim XVIII: Death by Electrocution

Palmer asserts that Nebraska’s current method of carrying out the death penalty

by electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. He concedes, however, that he did not challenge electrocution as a

method of execution in state court and thus procedurally defaulted the claim. We

nevertheless may review a procedurally defaulted claim, however, if a habeas

petitioner shows “cause for the default and prejudice from the alleged violation of his

rights.” Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 443 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.

Ct. 902 (2005). 

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Palmer argues that cause exists to excuse his procedural default because (1) the

dearth of executions in Nebraska between 1972, when the Supreme Court declared

the death penalty unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, and 1995,

when his post-conviction evidentiary hearing took place, rendered the factual basis

of his claim unavailable, and (2) legal and social trends rejecting electrocution as a

method of execution had not emerged prior to his evidentiary hearing. We disagree

that these allegations establish cause for Palmer’s procedural default. Although

Nebraska executed only one person between 1972 and 1995 (Harold Otey, executed

September 6, 1994), the record indicates that information about that execution,

including pictures thereof and the procedures used therein, were available at the time

of Palmer’s evidentiary hearing. Thus, the factual predicate for his Eighth

Amendment claim was available during the state post-conviction process. See also

Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333, 336-37 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that factual

predicate underlying challenge to Nebraska electrocution procedure was available,

at the very least, at the time of Otey’s execution). Furthermore, Palmer’s argument

that, since 1997, one state has abandoned electrocution as a method of execution and

three states have provided for lethal injection as an alternative to electrocution does

nothing to change our 1997 holding that “there is no argument even plausible that

there are differences in the level of ‘evolving decency’ among the different circuits

or states of the union, or over the last very few years,” that justifies a holding that the

practice of electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 337

(quoting In re Sapp, 118 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, Palmer cannot

show cause for his procedural default, and his Eighth Amendment claim is not

cognizable on federal habeas review.

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IV. CLAIMS ON WHICH THE DISTRICT COURT GRANTED RELIEF

A. Claims III, IV, and V: Proportionality Review

Palmer argues in claims III and IV that his Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth

Amendment, and procedural due process rights were violated by the Nebraska

Supreme Court’s improper interpretation and application of Nebraska’s statutorily

mandated proportionality review scheme. See Neb. Rev. Stat §§ 29-2521.02–29-

2521.03 (Reissue 1995). He asserts that, by abandoning its previous precedents and

construing the Nebraska requirement of comparison with “previous cases involving

the same or similar circumstances” to require comparison of his case only with cases

in which the death penalty was imposed, Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 736, the Nebraska

Supreme Court improperly refused to consider similar cases in which life

imprisonment was imposed. Both the Supreme Court and this court have held,

however, that the Constitution does not require a federal court to reexamine a state

court’s proportionality finding in order to adjudge “the manner in which the court

conducted its review or whether the court misinterpreted the [state proportionality]

statute.” Six v. Delo, 94 F.3d 469, 478 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Walton v. Arizona,

497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536

U.S. 584, 609 (2002).

To the extent that Palmer also claims that the Nebraska Supreme Court’s

decision to affirm his sentence based on its new interpretation of the proportionality

statute, rather than to remand the case to the trial court in accordance with Nebraska’s

two-tier proportionality review, violated his procedural due process rights and

amounted to an unconstitutional appellate resentencing (claim V), we hold that such

claims are procedurally defaulted. In his motion for rehearing in Palmer III, as well

as his pleadings in Palmer IV, Palmer argued only that the Palmer III court had

incorrectly conducted its proportionality review and that its new construction of the

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6

Although Palmer argues that the retroactive application of the “exceptional

depravity” aggravating circumstance to his case deprived him of fair notice in

violation of due process, see infra, he makes no such claim with regard to the Palmer

III court’s construction of the proportionality review process.

7

Palmer does, however, make such a claim respecting the Nebraska Supreme

Court’s reformulated “exceptional depravity” aggravator. See infra.

-21-

proportionality statute should not have been retroactively applied to his case.6

Neither those documents nor the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Palmer IV opinion make

any mention of a claim that Palmer was unconstitutionally deprived of the two-tier

process or that the court’s use of the new proportionality review standard constituted

an appellate resentencing.7

 Because Palmer presented neither the factual basis nor the

federal legal substance of these claims in state court, and because he has shown no

cause to excuse his procedural default, his claims are not cognizable on federal

habeas review. See Wemark, 322 F.3d at 1021. 

B. Claims VI & VII: Vagueness of Exceptional Depravity Aggravating

Circumstance and Appellate Resentencing

Palmer claims that the “exceptional depravity” aggravating circumstance

applied to justify his third sentence, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2523(1)(d) (Reissue

1995), was unconstitutionally vague and that he was deprived of his due process right

to two-tiered sentencing review when the Nebraska Supreme Court “resentenced” him

under a reformulated version of the aggravator.

At Palmer’s third sentencing hearing, the sentencing panel specifically found

that two aggravating circumstances were present in Palmer’s case. First, the panel

found “that the murder was committed in an apparent effort to conceal defendant’s

identity as the perpetrator of the robbery.” Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 713. Second,

the panel found that Zimmerman’s murder “manifested exceptional depravity by

ordinary standards of morality and intelligence.” Id. Without in any way

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8

“(1) [T]he apparent relishing of the murder by the killer, (2) the infliction of

gratuitous violence on the victim, (3) the needless mutilation of the victim, (4) the

senselessness of the crime, and (5) the helplessness of the victim.” Palmer III, 399

N.W.2d at 731.

-22-

acknowledging that the definition of “exceptional depravity” applied at Palmer’s third

sentencing hearing was vague, the Nebraska Supreme Court reformulated the

aggravator to include a list of five factors8

 originally laid out by the Arizona Supreme

Court in State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1 (1983). Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 731-32. The

court then reweighed aggravating circumstances (including the reformulated

exceptional depravity aggravator) against mitigating circumstances in order to

determine whether Palmer’s death sentence was warranted. Id. at 732-33. 

We subsequently held in a separate case that the definition of exceptional

depravity applied at Palmer’s sentencing hearing was unconstitutionally vague. See

Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1990). We have recognized,

however, that the saving interpretation applied in Palmer III was “clearly

constitutional.” Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1244 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing

Walton, 497 U.S. at 654-55). Accordingly, Palmer’s vagueness claim fails.

 Palmer also is not entitled to relief on his due process/appellate resentencing

claim because state appellate courts in states that weigh aggravating circumstances

against mitigating circumstances (such as Nebraska) are permitted to cure the

constitutional deficiency that results from a trial court’s application of an

unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance either by reweighing the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances or by engaging in traditional harmless error

analysis. Id. at 1244 (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1990)).

Such courts are permitted to do so even when state law vests primary death penalty

sentencing authority in a lower body. Reeves v. Hopkins, 76 F.3d 1424, 1429 (8th

Cir. 1996), rev’d in part on other grounds, 524 U.S. 88 (1998). This procedure is

constitutionally available only if Nebraska state law, as interpreted by the Nebraska

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Supreme Court, authorizes it. See id. at 1428-29. If a state appellate court determines

that it is authorized to reweigh, it may do so by applying a corrected and

constitutional definition of the vague aggravator. Id. at 1428.

Prior to 2000, the Nebraska Supreme Court had determined that it possessed

the authority to reweigh. See Reeves v. Hopkins, 76 F.3d at 1430. The court in

Palmer III conducted an extensive analysis of both the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances allowable under Nebraska law, and determined that at least one

aggravating circumstance (the reformulated “exceptional depravity” aggravator) was

established beyond a reasonable doubt and that no mitigating circumstances were

established. 399 N.W.2d at 732-33. Assuming, arguendo, that this analysis

constituted a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in Palmer’s

case, the court’s findings, combined with the majority’s proportionality review, were

sufficient to justify the imposition of the death penalty under Nebraska law. See Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 29-2522 (Reissue 1995).

Finally, Palmer contends that State v. Reeves, 604 N.W.2d 151 (Neb. 2000),

establishes that the Nebraska Supreme Court no longer has the ability to reweigh

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Even if this is true, however, it does not

affect our analysis. A state court’s subsequent reconsideration of its ability to

reweigh is irrelevant to federal habeas review. Reeves v. Hopkins, 76 F.3d at 1429-

30. Once the state court has asserted authority to reweigh in the petitioner’s case, the

issue is removed from the federal arena. Id. at 1430.

C. Claim VIII: Lack of Notice of Reformulated Exceptional Depravity

Aggravating Circumstance

Palmer alleges that the Nebraska Supreme Court’s reformulation of the

“exceptional depravity” aggravator deprived him of notice that his conduct would

subject him to the death penalty, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In

Palmer IV, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that a person has sufficient notice of

the scope of an aggravating circumstance which may be applied at a sentencing

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9

It appears that the Nebraska Supreme Court misquoted its own governing

standard. Compare Palmer IV, 600 N.W.2d at 771 (citing State v. Moore, 553

N.W.2d 120 (Neb. 1996)) with State v. Moore, 553 N.W.2d at 134. Because notice

analysis focuses on the defendant’s knowledge at the time of the crime, the first prong

of the test applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Palmer IV misstates the

constitutional requirement. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354

(1964).

-24-

hearing where: “(1) the language of the statute and previous constructions of it in

existence at the time of the sentencing hearing” provide “reasonable notice to a

person of ordinary intelligence of the scope of criminal behavior reached by the

aggravating circumstance”; and “(2) any new construction of the aggravating

circumstance which occurs after the hearing does not increase the scope of the

behavior considered under that particular aggravating circumstance.” 600 N.W.2d

at 771. We have explicitly approved a similar construction of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s fair notice requirement as “clearly not an unreasonable application of

federal law as established by the Supreme Court.” Moore v. Kinney, 320 F.3d 767,

775-76 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The construction we approved, however, examined

the defendant’s knowledge at the time of the crime.

9

 See id. 

The Palmer IV court’s test, once the first prong is corrected to focus on the time

of the crime rather than the time of the sentencing hearing, “correctly identifie[s] the

Supreme Court’s rule regarding notice of a statute’s subsequent construction as it may

affect sentencing.” Kinney, 320 F.3d at 776. Accordingly, we utilize that test in

order to conduct our review. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that Palmer

inflicted gratuitous violence on a helpless victim, and thus that his crime “manifested

exceptional depravity.” Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 732. The court additionally found

that cases in which exceptional depravity was found and which predated Palmer’s

1979 acts also involved the infliction of gratuitous violence on helpless victims. Id.

See, e.g., State v. Holtan, 250 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Neb. 1977) (exceptional depravity

found where defendant “killed...unresisting victims”); State v. Peery, 261 N.W.2d 95,

105 (Neb. 1977) (exceptional depravity found where defendant repeatedly shot

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10The district court did not have the benefit of the Schriro decision at the time

of its opinion in this case.

-25-

“thoroughly” bound victim). We cannot say that this comparison to pre-existing

cases was unreasonable. See Colvin, 324 F.3d at 587 (state court decision must be

both wrong and unreasonable to warrant habeas relief).

In addition, because the Gretzler factors adopted in Palmer III constituted a

narrowing construction of the exceptional depravity prong, the Nebraska Supreme

Court did not “increase the scope of actionable behavior considered by the

sentencers.” Kinney, 320 F.3d at 777 (internal citations omitted). Thus, Palmer was

not deprived of fair notice of the narrowed aggravator.

D. Claim XXII: Jury Sentencing

Palmer’s claim that, under Ring v. Arizona, he was entitled to have the facts

at his sentencing hearing proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is foreclosed by

the Supreme Court’s holding in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004),

that Ring does not apply retroactively.10

E. Claim XIV: Felony Murder

Palmer claims that the death penalty cannot, consistent with the Eighth

Amendment, be imposed upon him for the crime of felony murder because no court

has found that he had an intent to kill Zimmerman. The Palmer IV court, citing State

v. Rust, 388 N.W.2d 483 (Neb. 1986), denied this claim on the ground (stated in

Rust) that the Supreme Court prohibited the imposition of the death penalty only

when a defendant does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take

place. Palmer IV, 600 N.W.2d at 769; Rust, 388 N.W.2d at 492-93. This is an

accurate statement of the Supreme Court’s test. In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782

(1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the

Eighth Amendment is satisfied by a showing that the defendant actually killed,

attempted to kill, or intended to kill the victim. Tison, 481 U.S. at 150. See also

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11In order to convict a defendant of felony murder in Nebraska, a jury must find

that the defendant actually killed the victim. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303(2)

(Reissue 1995).

12The district court granted habeas relief on Claims XX and XXI, but did not

discuss Claims XVI and XVII.

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Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986), abrogated on other grounds, Pope v.

Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 n.7 (1987); Murray v. Delo, 34 F.3d 1367, 1376 (8th Cir.

1994). Because the Nebraska Supreme Court, as well as the jury in Palmer’s third

trial,11 determined that the record in this case showed that Palmer alone killed

Zimmerman, Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at 733, the death penalty may constitutionally

be imposed upon Palmer. See Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386-88 (so long as any state court

makes the requisite finding, the Eighth Amendment is satisfied). Accordingly, the

Nebraska Supreme Court’s disposition of this claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

F. Claim XV: Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offenses

Palmer claims that he was deprived of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights because the trial court in his third trial failed to instruct the jury

on the lesser included offenses of manslaughter and second degree murder. The

United States Supreme Court has upheld the Nebraska Supreme Court’s

determination that, in Nebraska, felony murder has no lesser included offenses.

Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 96-100 (1998). See also Palmer III, 399 N.W.2d at

724. Accordingly, Palmer’s claim is without merit.

G. Claims XVI, XVII, XX, and XXI: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Palmer alleges that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at

various points in his trial process.12 We discuss each claim in turn.

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13Our review of the record indicates that Palmer’s counsel did, in fact, object

to the presentation of Cherie Palmer’s testimony at the first sentencing hearing. See

St. D. Ct. File, Ex. 105, vol. VIII, at 984-85. His counsel’s objection, however,

apparently concerned the Nebraska statute addressing the permissible content of

presentence investigations. See id.; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2261 (Reissue 1995).

Because Palmer’s present claim is that the introduction of Cherie Palmer’s testimony

violated the Nebraska marital privilege statute, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505, we must

continue with our analysis.

14The “clean slate” rule states that where a defendant succeeds in overturning

his conviction, there is no double jeopardy bar to retrial. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 441-

42. The clean slate rule is inapplicable, however, when the ground for the reversal

was that the evidence was insufficient to convict. Id. at 442. These concepts are

equally applicable to trials and sentencing hearings. Id. at 446; Palmer IV, 600

N.W.2d at 775 (explicitly holding that double jeopardy concerns apply in Nebraska

sentencing hearings). 

-27-

1. Claims XVI and XVII

Palmer claims that if his counsel had objected to Cherie Palmer’s testimony at

the time it was introduced at his first sentencing hearing or during the direct appeal

of his second conviction, the prosecution would not have been able to prove the

existence of aggravating circumstances and thus Palmer would have been “acquitted”

of the death penalty.13 As a result, the State would have been barred from seeking the

death penalty against him in both his second and third trials. The Nebraska Supreme

Court analogized these claims to a claim that the evidence presented at sentencing,

absent Cherie Palmer’s testimony, was insufficient to prove the existence of

aggravating circumstances. Palmer IV, 600 N.W.2d at 774-76. The court then stated

that, under Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988), both properly and improperly

presented evidence could be examined to determine whether the evidence presented

at Palmer’s first sentencing hearing was sufficient to prove the existence of

aggravating circumstances, and ultimately held that the totality of the evidence was

sufficient. Palmer IV, 600 N.W.2d at 776-79. See also Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40-42.

As a result, the court applied the “clean slate” rule and held that any errors pertaining

to the first sentencing were corrected by Palmer’s retrial.14 Palmer IV, 600 N.W.2d

at 778. See also Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442-43 (1981).

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To make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

show: (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient

performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). Although the Nebraska Supreme Court did not apply this test, which

certainly qualified as clearly established federal law when Palmer IV was decided, we

cannot say that the court’s ultimate disposition of these claims was either contrary to

Strickland or an unreasonable application of Lockhart. In Lockhart, the United States

Supreme Court addressed the claims of a habeas corpus petitioner who claimed (as

Palmer does) that his sentence enhancement was based on improperly admitted

evidence (a pardoned conviction). 488 U.S. at 34-36. The petitioner claimed that,

without the improperly admitted evidence at his first sentencing hearing, the evidence

presented in support of the enhancement was insufficient and thus double jeopardy

prevented the state from seeking the enhancement at any subsequent resentencing.

Id. at 37. The Court held that even though the evidence in support of the

enhancement in the petitioner’s case was clearly insufficient absent the pardoned

conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial

court—both correctly and incorrectly—in order to determine whether the evidence

at the disputed proceeding was sufficient to convict, and therefore whether double

jeopardy permits retrial. Id. at 40-41. The Court also held that the erroneous

admission of evidence at trial is a “trial error” that is fundamentally different from a

finding that the evidence was insufficient to convict. Id. at 40.

Palmer’s claims are somewhat different. He claims that he is entitled to more

expansive double jeopardy protection because the failure to object to the trial court’s

erroneous admission of Cherie Palmer’s testimony at his first sentencing hearing and

the failure to argue the issue during his second direct appeal constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel. We see no reason, however, why Palmer should be able, via

an ineffective assistance claim, to obtain relief that he would not be entitled to via a

claim of trial error. It is plain, given Lockhart, that Nebraska would have been

permitted to seek the death penalty in the second and third sentencing proceedings if

Palmer’s sole claim had been the erroneous admission of Cherie Palmer’s testimony,

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15Although Palmer did not make such an argument in his habeas petition, the

district court granted habeas relief on the ground that Palmer’s counsel had failed to

conduct a proper investigation into statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors.

Because Palmer’s second and third sentencing hearings cured any possible prejudice

resulting from errors at his first sentencing hearing, however, he is not entitled to

relief on that ground. In addition, we agree with the Tenth Circuit’s view that a

district court may not “rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented.”

Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted).

-29-

because any finding that the introduction of such testimony warranted reversal would

be based on trial error rather than sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, any reviewing

court would be permitted to consider all of the evidence—including Cherie Palmer’s

testimony—in deciding whether the evidence at the first sentencing hearing was

sufficient to convict. 

That Palmer frames the issue as ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than

trial error, does not change the fact that Palmer still would have to prove prejudice to

his case even if we were to find that his counsel performed deficiently in failing to

object to Cherie Palmer’s sentencing testimony. He cannot do so. Any potential

prejudice to his case would have resulted from the erroneous admission of Cherie

Palmer’s testimony. As the Supreme Court has stated, however, such an error is a

trial error, rather than an issue of evidentiary sufficiency, and thus the clean slate rule

is fully applicable. Accordingly, any errors resulting from Palmer’s first sentencing

hearing were cured by his second and third sentencing hearings, and thus the clean

slate rule eliminated any possible danger of prejudice from the alleged deficient

performance.15

2. Claims XX and XXI

Palmer asserts that his counsel also was ineffective for conceding the existence

of Nebraska’s “killing to conceal one’s identity” aggravating circumstance, Neb Rev.

Stat. § 29-2523(1)(b), in his first sentencing hearing and for failing to conduct any

investigation into mitigating and aggravating circumstances, to direct his probation

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-30-

officer to investigate Palmer’s personal history, or to interview Cherie Palmer in

preparation for his third sentencing hearing.

The Palmer IV court reviewed these claims under its own test for ineffective

assistance of counsel:

“[T]o sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a violation

of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 11, of

the Nebraska Constitution, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s

performance was deficient and (2) such deficient performance

prejudiced the defendant, that is, demonstrate a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.”

600 N.W.2d at 771 (quoting State v. Hunt, 580 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Neb. 1998)). This

accurately states the United States Supreme Court’s test. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687, 694.

The Palmer IV court first determined that Palmer’s counsel’s decision to

concede the 1(b) aggravator did not constitute deficient performance, and,

accordingly, that the counsel’s assistance at the first sentencing hearing was not

ineffective. 600 N.W.2d at 771-72. This conclusion was not an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Although it is true, as the district court observed, that all

murders render the victim incapable of identifying the perpetrator, it does not follow

that all victims would be capable of identifying the perpetrator in the first instance.

There was specific evidence in this case that the victim knew Palmer and his wife by

name and had met Palmer and his wife on at least three separate occasions prior to the

murder. Given that Palmer apparently had no evidence to contradict these facts, he

cannot overcome the presumption that his counsel’s decision to concede the

aggravator’s existence was “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Similarly, Palmer’s complaints that his counsel should have conducted (or

instructed others to conduct) more thorough investigations prior to Palmer’s third

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sentencing hearing are without merit. The Nebraska Supreme Court denied these

claims on the basis that the decisions not to conduct further investigation into each

challenged aspect of Palmer’s case did not constitute deficient performance and,

furthermore, that Palmer could prove no prejudice to his case. We agree.

 To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Palmer must affirmatively prove

prejudice to his case, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, by “show[ing] that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel’s unprofessional errors,” the result

of his sentencing proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. He has not made

this showing with respect to any of his counsel’s alleged errors. First, although he

argues that his counsel should have interviewed Cherie Palmer prior to his third

sentencing hearing, he has not shown what, if any, additional information would have

been gleaned from such an interview, let alone how such information would have

affected the outcome of his trial. Throughout three trials and three sentencing

hearings, the content and character of Cherie Palmer’s testimony was undoubtedly

well known to both defendant and his counsel. In addition, Palmer has not alleged

what, if any, additional information about any aspect of his case would have been

gleaned from an expanded investigation by his probation officer. Such general

allegations do not satisfy the requirement that Palmer affirmatively prove prejudice.

Finally, with regard to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Palmer has

again failed to show what, if any, statutory or non-statutory mitigating factors would

have been uncovered through further investigation. Although the district court stated

that, through further investigation, Palmer’s counsel might have discovered

information about Palmer’s difficult childhood, such evidence was in fact presented

to the sentencing panel, and Palmer’s counsel made an extensive reference to

Palmer’s family history in his argument before the panel. See Palmer III Trial Tr.,

vol.V, at 912 (introduction of deposition of Palmer's sister), 917 (same), 934

(argument). The sentencing panel had an opportunity to review this information and

hear argument on it, and it obviously did not change their “appraisal of moral

culpability.” See St. D. Ct. File, Ex. 118, vol. IV, at 665-66 (order of sentence in

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16Palmer also argues that further investigation and research would have led his

counsel to argue that the “exceptional depravity” aggravator was unconstitutionally

vague. His counsel did make such an argument on appeal, however.

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third sentencing hearing, specific discussion and rejection of Palmer’s family history

as a mitigating circumstance).16

V. CONCLUSION

The district court’s partial denial of Palmer’s habeas corpus petition is

affirmed, its partial grant of the petition is reversed, and the case is remanded to the

district court with directions to dismiss the petition in its entirety. 

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