Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00917/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00917-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOHN EDWARD WHITE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:13cv917-WHA

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 13, 2013, petitioner John Edward White (“White”) filed a pro se

motion construed by this court as a motion to vacate,set aside, or correctsentence under

28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. No. 1. White challenges his conviction and 235-month

1

sentence imposed by the district court in January 2007 following his guilty plea to

White titled his original pleading as a “Motion to Vacate” and maintained he was seeking relief 1

from his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. No. 1 at 1. This court informed him that the claims

in his motion were properly presented in a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. Nos. 2 & 4. Additionally, in compliance with Castro v. United States, 540 U.S.

375 (2003), the court notified him of its intention to treat his filing as a § 2255 motion and directed

him to advise the court whether he wished to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the claims in his

original pleading, amend his motion to assert additional claims under 28 U.S. § 2255, or withdraw

his motion. Id. In light of White’s response that he wished to continue seeking a reduction in his

sentence (see Doc. Nos. 3 & 5), this case is proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the claims in

White’s original pleading. 

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 1 of 10
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He

argues that the district court violated the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466 (2000), by applyingtheArmedCareer CriminalAct(“ACCA”), 18U.S.C. § 924(e),2

at his sentencing when his prior ACCA-qualifying convictions were not charged as

offense elementsin hisfederal indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Doc.

No. 1 at 1-3. White also seems to argue that his conviction is infirm because the

predicate prior felony conviction for second-degree theft of property alleged in his

federal indictment did not constitute a felony since he spent only one day of the 10-year

sentence imposed in that case in actual confinement. Id. at 1-4.

Thegovernment answersthatWhite’s§ 2255motion istime-barred because itwas

filed well after expiration of the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Doc.

No. 8 at 9-13. The government also argues that White’s § 2255 motion should be

dismissed based on his waiver, in the plea agreement, of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Id. at 7-9. Because the first rationale is dispositive of White’s § 2255

motion, and because White’s claims plainly lack merit, the court pretermits discussion

 The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years if a defendant convicted

2

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) has “three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug

offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another....” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The

district court considered White’s prior Alabama convictions for first-degree robbery, second-degree

robbery, and first-degree escape as qualifying violent felonies under the ACCA. 

2

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 2 of 10
of the effect of the waiver provision in the plea agreement.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Alleging ACCA-qualifying Convictions in Indictment

White contends the enhancement of his sentence under the ACCA violated the

holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because his prior ACCA3

qualifying convictionswerenot chargedas offense elementsinhisfederalindictment and

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Doc. No. 1 at 1-3. However,

Under binding precedent, a prior conviction need not be alleged in an

indictment to support the application of a sentencing enhancement. Under

binding precedent, a prior conviction need not be alleged in an indictment

to support the application of a sentencing enhancement.

Almendarez-Torres v.United States, 523U.S.224,243-44, 118S.Ct. 1219,

1230-31, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267,

1273 (11 Cir. 2006) (explaining that we are bound by Almendarez-Torres

th

unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court).

United States v. Davies, 391 Fed.Appx. 822, 825 (11 Cir. 2010). Consequently, this

th

claim in White’s § 2255 motion lacks merit.

B. Predicate Prior Felony Charged in Indictment

White suggests his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is infirm because, he

Under Apprendi, “ [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 3

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).

3

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 3 of 10
says, the predicate prior felony conviction for second-degree theft alleged in the

indictment did not constitute a felony. Doc. No. 1 at 1-4. In this regard, White says he

spent only one day in incarceration on the 10-year sentence imposed in June 2004 by the

MontgomeryCounty, Alabama,Circuit Courtfor the theft conviction. Id. Hemaintains

that because he was actually incarcerated for less than one year and a day on the theft

conviction, the conviction could not be used as a predicate felony for purposes of the

felon-in-possession statute. Id.

Second-degree theft of property under Alabama law is a Class C felony with a

sentencing range of “not more than 10 years or less than 1 year and 1 day.” Ala. Code

1975 §§ 13A-8-4(b), 13A-5-6(a)(3). White wassentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for

4

that offense. See Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) at p. 9, ¶ 37. The trial court

then imposed a “reverse split” sentence, with seven years suspended to be followed by

three years of incarceration and three years on probation. Id. Whether White (as he

claims) actually served only one day of incarceration on his felony conviction for

second-degree theft of property makes no difference. “The only limitation on predicate

convictions contained in § 922(g)(1) itself is that they must be ‘punishable by

 Under Alabama law, a felony is “[a]n offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment 4

in excess of one year is authorized.” Ala. Code. 1975 § 13A-1-2(8).

4

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 4 of 10
imprisonmentfor a termexceeding one year.’”United States v.Nix, 438 F.3d 1284, 1285

(11 Cir. 2006). See, also e.g., Latson v. O’Brien, 2013WL4400110, at *6 (N.D.W.Va.

th

Aug. 15, 2013) (stating that the Supreme Court’s holding in Carachuri–Rosendo v.

Holder, 560 U.S 563 (2010), “mandate[s] that prior state convictions must be classified

on the basis of the maximum sentence which the particular defendant in question could

have received under the applicable state sentencing scheme at the time of conviction,”

not on the basis of time actually spent incarcerated).

Because second-degree theft of property under Alabama law is a Class C felony

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, White’s conviction for that

offense could be used as the predicate prior felony for his § 922(g)(1) charge and

conviction.

C. Timeliness of § 2255 Motion

Because neither of the above-discussed substantive claims establishes White’s

actual innocence or successfully impugns the district court’s jurisdiction or the legality

of his sentence, White’s § 2255 motion is not immune from application of the time-bar

in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). That section states:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

5

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 5 of 10
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making amotion created by

governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by

such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by

the SupremeCourt, ifthatright has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

The record reflects that White’s guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a

convicted felonwas entered onOctober 23, 2006. On January18, 2007, the district court

sentenced White to 235 monthsin prison. The district court entered itsjudgment on that

same date. White took no direct appeal. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in

effect at the time of White’ssentencing allowed 10 daysfrom entry of judgment to seek

appellate review. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (2007). Therefore, for purposes of 5

filing a § 2255 motion, White’s judgment of conviction became final on January 29,

Effective December 1, 2009, Rule 4(b)(1) provides that a defendant’s notice of appeal must be 5

filed within 14 days after entry of the district court’s judgment. 

6

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 6 of 10
2007, the first business day after January 28, 2007, and the date on which his time to

appeal expired. See Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11 Cir. 2011). th

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), then, White had until January 29, 2008, to file a timely

§ 2255 motion in this court. However, he did not file his § 2255 motion until December

13, 2013.

White maintains his § 2255 motion is timely under § 2255(f)(3), because it was

6

filed within one year after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Alleyne, ___

U.S. ___ 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), which he maintains is retroactively applicable. Id. at

1-4. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that the enhancements described in 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) – brandishing or discharging a firearm – triggering higher

mandatory minimum sentences, must be treated as elements of separate, aggravated

offenses, to be alleged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Assuming White is arguing that Alleyne requiresthat his prior ACCA-qualifying

convictions were charged as offense elements in his federal indictment and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt, his argument isforeclosed by Almendarez–Torres v. United

Section 2255(f)(3) provides for the one-year limitation period to start the date on which the right 6

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(f)(3)

7

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 7 of 10
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). In Almendarez–Torres, the Supreme Court held that, for

sentencing enhancement purposes, a defendant’s prior conviction does not have to be

alleged in the indictment or submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 239-40. Notably, Alleyne did not overrule Almendarez–Torres.

SeeAlleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2160 n.1 (noting that “[i]nAlmendarez–Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), we recognized a narrow

exception to this general rule for the fact of a prior conviction. Because the parties do

not contest that decision’s vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision

today.”).

Assuming White is seeking to rely on Alleyne to support his claim regarding use

of his Alabama conviction for second-degree theft of property as the predicate prior

felony for his § 922(g)(1) charge and conviction, White’sreliance is misplaced. Alleyne

simply has nothing to do with whether the period of actual incarceration, versus the

punishable term of imprisonment provided by statute, controls when determining if a

predicate conviction constitutes a felony for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

What is more, Alleyne is also inapplicable to White’s case because it does not

apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Chester v. Warden, 552 F. App’x

8

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 8 of 10
887, 891 (11 Cir. 2014) ( “Alleyne’s rule does not apply retroactively on collateral

th

review.”); United States v. Harris, 741 F.3d 1245, 1250 n.3 (11 Cir. 2014) ( “Alleyne

th

was decided in the context of a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court itself has not

expressly declared Alleyne to be retroactive on collateral review ... [a]nd Alleyne has not

been made retroactive through any combination of cases that necessarily dictate

retroactivity.”); Barkley v. Hastings, 2014 WL 808079, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2014)

(“The decision in Alleyne, is ‘an extension’ of that in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).... Given thatApprendi is notretroactively

applicable on collateral review, it is unlikely the Supreme Court will give the ruling in

Alleyne retroactive effect.”). Alleyne does not apply to White; therefore, the limitation

period in § 2255(f)(3) does not apply to his motion.

BecauseWhite did notfile his § 2255motion untilDecember 13, 2013, hismotion

is time-barred under § 2255(f)(1).7

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it isthe RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion be denied as it was not filed within the controlling federal

 White presents no argument that the limitation period in his case is controlled by § 2255(f)(2) 7

or § 2255(f)(4), or that equitable tolling of the limitation period should be applied.

9

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 9 of 10
limitation period and that this case be dismissed with prejudice. It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on

or before November 18, 2014. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general

objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall

bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667

th

F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. th th

1981) (en banc).

Done this 4 day of November, 2014.

th

/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

Case 2:13-cv-00917-WHA-CSC Document 13 Filed 11/04/14 Page 10 of 10