Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01935/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01935-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEYMON LEWIS, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

FELICIA PONCE, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 2:15-cv-1935 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a federal prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Both parties consented to 

proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Petitioner filed a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that he is actually 

innocent of the traffic citation charge of “unlawful turn . . . within 100 feet.” (ECF No. 1 at 1.) 

Respondent moves to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner fails to show that he is actually 

innocent. Petitioner filed an opposition; respondent did not file a reply. As set forth below, the 

court grants the motion to dismiss.

II. Background

On November 7, 2008, Oregon police officer Laws observed a light blue Ford Taurus fail 

to properly signal while executing an abrupt right turn into a parking lot, and initiated a traffic 

stop by following petitioner into a parking lot. (ECF No. 11-1 at 3.) Officer Laws believed 

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petitioner violated Oregon Revised Statute section 811.335 (failure to signal continuously during 

not less than the last 100 feet traveled before turning). (ECF No. 11-1 at 4.) During the traffic 

stop, petitioner admitted that he did not have a driver’s license. (ECF No. 11-1 at 4-5.) Oregon 

Police Officer Berne confirmed by record check that petitioner’s driver’s license was suspended 

as of June 12, 2004. (ECF No. 11-1 at 5.) 

Because petitioner’s license was suspended, Officer Laws ordered a vehicle tow and 

inventory search of petitioner’s car prior to its impoundment. (ECF No. 11-1 at 5.) During the 

inventory search, he discovered six individually-wrapped bindles of cocaine base. (ECF No. 11-1 

at 6.) Officer Berne searched petitioner’s wallet and found $452.00 in cash. (ECF No. 11-1 at 4.) 

Officers cited petitioner for driving after suspension and the turn-signal violation by citation no. 

z1759905. (ECF No. 1 at 18.) This citation was later dismissed when one of the police officers 

was unable to appear at a state court hearing. (ECF No. 11-1 at 20.) 

On December 10, 2008, petitioner was indicted by a federal grand jury on the sole charge 

of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, with a forfeiture allegation. United 

States v. Lewis, No. 3:08-cr-00539-MO (Dist. Ore.) (ECF No. 1 at 15-16). 

In September of 2009, petitioner filed a motion to suppress, contending that there was no 

probable cause for the traffic stop. (ECF No. 11-1 at 32.) Petitioner argued that it was impossible 

for him to comply with the turn signal law; because he traveled less than 100 feet on the road 

leading to the parking lot, there was no way for him to signal for 100 feet prior to the turn. (ECF 

No. 11-1 at 35-37.) On October 6, 2009, the trial court held a suppression hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 

20.) The trial court noted that there is a “difference between probable cause to believe the offense 

was committed and the existence of a defense to that crime.” (ECF No. 11-1 at 27.) The court 

explained:

Whether you had a defense to that doesn’t mean one way or the 

other that the officers did or didn’t have probable cause to believe 

that the offense, the infraction occurred. And so that’s my holding 

here, that the officers had probable cause to believe that the traffic 

infraction happened, and I base that not only on the officers’ 

testimony that they saw what they said they saw, but the 

[petitioner’s] own testimony, who candidly admits that he did not 

signal for a hundred feet prior to turning because he couldn’t have. . 

. . (¶) In any event, they had probable cause to believe the 

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infraction had occurred. That gave them the right to make the 

traffic stop and request ID. 

(ECF No. 11-1 at 28.) On October 14, 2009, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment, 

continuing to charge petitioner with a single count of possession with intent to distribute a 

controlled substance, with a forfeiture allegation. (ECF No. 11-1 at 43-44.) Petitioner proceeded 

to trial, and, on November 18, 2009, the second day of jury trial, petitioner pled guilty to the 

superseding indictment pursuant to a plea agreement. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Petitioner waived his 

right of appeal and to file any collateral attack, including a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

“challenging any aspect of the conviction or sentence on any grounds,” with a few exceptions not 

relevant here. (ECF No. 11-1 at 48.) 

On January 7, 2013, petitioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss the Civil Judgment Z1759905” 

in the underlying federal criminal action, Case No. CR-08-539-01-MO. (ECF No. 11-1 at 61.) 

Petitioner again argued claims concerning the November 7, 2008 traffic stop. (ECF No. 11-1 at 

61-71.) On April 9, 2013, the district court denied the motion by text order. Case No. CR-08-

539-01-MO (ECF No. 88). On April 25, 2013, petitioner sought clarification. Id. (ECF No. 90).

On April 30, 2013, the district court denied the motion for clarification by text order. Id. (ECF 

No. 93). Petitioner filed an appeal. On June 6, 2013, the district court issued the following text 

order:

Defendant Seymon Lewis, Jr., filed a Motion to Vacate or Correct 

Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on 11/15/2012. The Court denied 

that motion on 12/17/2012. Then, on 1/7/2013, defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss [78] the final criminal judgment against him 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). I denied [88] 

that motion because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) does not 

apply to criminal proceedings, and it does not provide defendant 

with a viable avenue of relief from his final judgment. 

Case No. CR-08-539-01-MO (ECF No. 96). Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. Id. (ECF No. 

99).

III. Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 

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entitled to relief in the district court. . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases.1The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in 

violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state 

remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural 

grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default). 

IV. Application of the Savings Clause

Generally, a federal prisoner who seeks to challenge the legality of confinement must rely 

on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006), 

cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1313 (2007). Thus, jurisdiction does not lie under § 2241 unless petitioner 

qualifies for the sole exception to the rule that § 2241 does not permit challenges to a criminal 

judgment. A federal prisoner may contest the legality of his conviction or sentence in a § 2241 

petition only where his remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of 

his detention.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000); Stephens, 464 F.3d at 

897. This exception is known as the § 2255 “escape hatch.” Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 

953 (9th Cir. 2000). It is a narrow exception. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1051 (2003).

Section 2255’s remedy is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because of that statute’s 

gatekeeping provisions. Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1059. A § 2241 petition is available pursuant to the 

“escape hatch” only where a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had 

an “unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting that claim. Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (citing Ivy, 

328 F.3d at 1060). Both requirements must be satisfied.

V. Discussion

Petitioner’s attempt to seek redress by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 

§ 2241 is fatally flawed based on his failure to show that he is actually innocent of the crime of

 

1

 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases may be applied to other petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus at the Court’s discretion. See, id., Rule 1; Fed. R. Civ. P 81(a)(4).

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conviction, and did not have an unobstructed procedural opportunity to present his claim of 

innocence.

“‘Actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not merely legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. 

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-624, 118 S. Ct. 1604 (1998). To meet this test, the petitioner 

must show that in light of new and reliable evidence not present at trial, “it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup 

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-39 (2006) 

(prisoner must demonstrate that more likely than not, any reasonable juror would have reasonable 

doubt). 

Here, petitioner only challenges the facts underlying the traffic citation. Petitioner 

appears to contend that because his car traveled only 65 feet, 5 inches, rather than 100 feet, he is 

actually innocent of the traffic offense of failing to use his turn signal for 100 feet prior to turning. 

However, as argued by respondent, petitioner was not convicted for this traffic offense, and 

therefore his claim of actual innocence is unavailing. Here, petitioner is confined based on his 

guilty plea to possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. In order to avail himself of a 

claim of actual innocence, he must allege facts showing he is factually innocent of the drug 

possession charge. Petitioner has not done so. 

Moreover, petitioner fails to demonstrate that he did not have an “unobstructed procedural 

shot” at presenting the instant claim. The two factors to consider when assessing whether 

petitioner had an unobstructed procedural opportunity to present his claim of innocence are: (1) 

whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until the conclusion of his direct appeal 

and first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the applicable law changed in any relevant 

way after the conclusion of the petitioner’s first § 2255 motion. Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 

952, 960 (9th Cir. 2008).

As his motion to suppress demonstrates, petitioner was aware of the instant claims prior to 

his underlying criminal trial. Petitioner does not show that a relevant change in the law occurred 

after December 17, 2012, when his § 2255 motion was denied, or that the legal basis for 

petitioner’s instant actual innocence claim arose after his direct appeal and § 2255 were decided. 

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Thus, because petitioner does not qualify for the escape hatch, this court lacks jurisdiction 

under § 2241 to entertain the petition, and this action must be dismissed. See Stephens, 464 F.3d 

at 899 (affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where § 2241 petition challenged legality of 

conviction and sentence, and “escape hatch” exception to § 2255 did not apply).2 

VI. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) is granted; and

2. This action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Dated: March 30, 2016

/lewi1935.mtd.2241

 

2

 A certificate of appealability is not required for an appeal from the denial of a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Harrison, 519 

F.3d at 952.

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