Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04154/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04154-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID MCDONALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

WEST CONTRA COSTA NARCOTICS 

ENFORCEMENT TEAM, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-04154-VC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 51, 53, 56, 61, 62

The Arrest and Investigation

1. Westnet's motion to dismiss on the ground that it can't be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

is granted. To the extent Westnet is a separate legal entity, it is a state entity that would not be 

deemed a "person" within the meaning of Section 1983, because it is comprised of both state and 

local law enforcement officers and is supervised by the California Department of Justice. 

McDonald has not cited a case, nor is the Court aware of one, in which a comparable task force 

could be sued under Section 1983. Dismissal is with prejudice.

2. Barr and Souza's motion to dismiss the first cause of action as to them is granted. 

McDonald's conviction under California Health and Safety Code § 11382 was based on evidence 

that he represented to the undercover agents that the powders he was selling them were ephedrine 

and methamphetamine. Any plausible argument that the agents lacked probable cause to arrest 

him for selling ephedrine and methamphetamine would undermine the conviction, so any claim 

based on a lack of probable cause is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

McDonald's request for leave to file an amended complaint to assert a claim for malicious 

prosecution is granted.

3. Barr and Souza's motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The allegation 

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United States District Court

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that the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by stealing money from McDonald's store

while they were executing the warrant implicates the Fourth Amendment, as does the allegation 

that the officers intentionally left the door open for people to ransack the store. The argument that 

such conduct does not implicate the Fourth Amendment is difficult to square with the language of 

that amendment, which protects people from "unreasonable" searches so that they may be "secure 

in their persons, houses, papers and effects . . . ." The argument is also difficult to square with the 

established rule that "[a]n officer's conduct in executing a search is subject to the Fourth 

Amendment's mandate of reasonableness from the moment of the officer's entry until the moment 

of departure." San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 

962, 971 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Collins v. Guerin, 2014 WL 7205669 at *6 & n.2 (S.D. Cal.). 

It's obviously "unreasonable" to steal someone's money while executing a search warrant. 

Slider v. City of Oakland, 2010 WL 2867807 at *4 (N.D. Cal.) is arguably to the contrary. 

But the decision in Slider appeared to rely solely on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), which discussed whether the Fourth Amendment is 

implicated when someone is in prison, his property is in inventory, and something happens to the 

property. Id. at 537-540. Justice O'Connor's opinion does not stand for the proposition that when 

an officer is executing a warrant to search someone's home or business, some types of 

unreasonable conduct by the officer, such as stealing or destroying property, escape the Fourth 

Amendment's reach.

The Pretrial Detention

1. The motion to dismiss the third and fourth causes of action on statute of limitations 

grounds is denied as to Marin County and Augustus. Before this case was removed, the Marin 

County Superior Court ruled that the limitations period was tolled by California Government Code 

§ 945.3. Although the Superior Court's interpretation of Section 945.3 may well be wrong, see 

Lincoln v. County of San Bernadino, No. E046069, 2010 WL 619747 (Cal. App. 2/23/10), it is not 

so obviously wrong as to warrant reconsideration by this Court. See Preaseau v. Prudential Ins. 

Co. of America, 591 F.2d 74, 79 (holding that a federal court "treats everything that occurred in 

the state court as if it had taken place in federal court" and that the federal judge should overturn 

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the state judge if "he is firmly convinced that an error of law has been committed") (emphasis 

added). It is at least plausible that the statutory phrase "conduct of the peace officer relating to the 

offense for which the accused is charged" includes conduct by a jailer towards someone who is in 

jail awaiting trial, because pretrial confinement for an offense is at least arguably "related to" that 

offense. Cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992) (discussing the 

expansive reach of the words "relate to").

Augustus argues that even if tolling applies, the third and fourth causes of action are not 

timely as to him because McDonald did not name him as a defendant in the original complaint, 

and because the subsequent version of the complaint that named Augustus should not relate back 

to the original complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) applies in this situation. See 

Butler v. National Community Renaissance of California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 

2014). And the amended complaint relates back to the original complaint because McDonald's 

original decision to name only Marin County, and not its individual employees, constitutes a 

"mistake concerning the proper party's identity" within the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). See 

Soto v. Brooklyn Correctional Facility, 80 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1996).

2. But Section 945.3 only tolls claims against peace officers. Wyatt-Lucha and Osaki are 

clearly not peace officers, so the motion for summary judgment on the ground that the complaint 

is not timely as to them is granted.

3. Marin County and Augustus also move to dismiss the third and fourth causes of action

(for violation of the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA) on the merits. This motion is denied. 

McDonald alleges he needed vegetarian meals at the jail because of his long-held adherence to 

"Evenism," which is a "religious and spiritual worldview" that "eating the flesh of land-based 

animals is no different than eating human flesh." TAC ¶ 52. Nobody appears to dispute that this 

allegation, in isolation, could survive a motion to dismiss, but the defendants argue that McDonald 

contradicted this allegation when he filed a grievance in jail. On the grievance form, which is 

quoted in the complaint, McDonald complained about the rule that an inmate must be religious to 

get a vegetarian diet and stated: "my belief in not hurting animals is just as important as any 

religious belief." TAC ¶ 54. The defendants argue that this constitutes an admission by 

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McDonald that his need for a vegetarian diet was not based on religion. But it's plausible that 

McDonald was simply disavowing "religion" in the layperson's sense of the word while

articulating to his jailers a belief system that is "religious" within the meaning of the First 

Amendment and RLUIPA. See, e.g., Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2005) 

("The problem here was that the prison officials did not treat atheism as a 'religion,' perhaps in 

keeping with Kaufman's own insistence that it is the antithesis of religion. But whether atheism is 

a 'religion' for First Amendment purposes is a somewhat different question than whether its 

adherents believe in a supreme being, or attend regular devotional services, or have a sacred 

Scripture."). McDonald is entitled to discovery to pursue this plausible theory. 

5. Augustus argues that the fourth cause of action should nonetheless be dismissed as to 

him. He contends that individuals cannot be held liable under RLUIPA because Congress enacted 

this statute pursuant to its spending power. McDonald responds that RLUIPA was also an 

exercise of the commerce power, and argues that a claim against Augustus is therefore proper. 

Because the Court has not received thorough briefing on this question, and because the RLUIPA 

claim against Augustus will not alter the scope of discovery since the Free Exercise claim is going 

forward in any event, this motion is denied without prejudice to raising the argument again at the 

summary judgment stage. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2015

______________________________________

 VINCE CHHABRIA

 United States District Judge

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