Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00092/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00092-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

JAMES KYLE TYNDOL, III, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CASE NO.: 2:13-CV-92-WKW 

 ) (WO) 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF 

REVENUE, et al., 

)

) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPNION AND ORDER

 Before the court is the motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. # 67) filed on behalf 

of Defendants Jackie Graham and Julie Magee in their individual capacities. 

Defendants seek an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Rule 

11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the court construes the motion 

for attorney’s fees as containing a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure and a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1988. Also pending is Defendants’ supplemental motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. # 

85). Upon consideration of the motions, the court concludes that they are due to be 

denied. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 On February 13, 2013, Plaintiff James Kyle Tindol filed a complaint against 

Defendants Alabama Department of Revenue, Alabama Personnel Department, 

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2 

Jackie Graham, and Julie Magee. Plaintiff sued Graham and Magee in their 

individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants denied him due 

process by denying him a promotion in Defendant Department of Revenue’s IT 

department on the basis of the Department of Revenue’s nepotism policy.1

 Plaintiff 

asserted the following claims in his complaint: 

- Count I: pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the equal protection 

guarantee of the 14th Amendment; 

- Count II: pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the procedural due 

process guarantee of the 14th Amendment; 

- Count III: pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of the substantive due 

process guarantee of the 14th Amendment; 

- Count IV: state law claim for negligence; and 

- Count V: state law claim for breach of employment contract. 

 On July 1, 2014, Plaintiff voluntarily moved to dismiss Count III, his 

substantive due process claim. (Doc. # 26.) On July 3, 2014, the court granted the 

motion and dismissed Count III. (Doc. # 27.) 

 On July 18, 2014, Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims (Docs. # 30, 32, 34), and Plaintiff filed a motion (Doc. 

# 35) for partial summary judgment. On January 23, 2015, the court granted 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s mother, Holley F. Tindol, was also employed by the Department of Revenue. 

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summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Docs. # 65, 66.) 

 On February 6, 2015, Defendants Jackie Graham and Julie Magee filed a 

motion for attorney’s fees for the defense of the claims asserted against them in their 

individual capacities. (Doc. # 67.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Attorney’s Fees as a Sanction Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure

 Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorney’s fees as a sanction under 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 provides for imposition of 

sanctions on a party’s motion under the following conditions: 

A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion 

and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 

11(b). The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed 

or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, 

contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 

days after service or within another time the court sets. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). 

 Defendants did not file their Rule 11 motion “separately from any other 

motion.” Id. Defendants also did not serve the motion at least 21 days prior to filing 

it, despite the plain language of the Rule. Defendants argue that sending a letter to 

Plaintiff’s attorney on May 29, 2014, asking him to “consider the Rule 11 basis” of 

the two state law claims satisfied the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 11’s safe harbor 

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provision. To justify their argument, and apparently without any sense of irony,2

Defendants cite three cases from other circuits without disclosing that those cases 

have consistently been rejected by other courts; that the majority of circuits do not 

allow use of informal letters to trigger the Rule 11 safe harbor provision; and that, 

with respect to whether an informal letter triggers the safe harbor provision, two of 

the three cited cases are no longer good law in their respective jurisdictions. See 

Wright & Miller, 5A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1337.2 (3d ed.) (collecting cases to 

support statements that “the safe harbor period begins to run only upon service of 

the proposed Rule 11 motion” and that “several courts have held that informal notice 

of a potential violation is insufficient to trigger the beginning of the twenty-one day 

safe harbor period”). 

 First, Defendants cite Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804 (7th 

Cir. 2003), in which the court held that sending an informal demand letter without a 

motion “substantially complied with” the requirements of Rule 11. As other courts 

have noted, Nisenbaum is conclusory and unpersuasive.3

 See, e.g., In re Pratt, 524 

F.3d 580, 587–88 (5th Cir. 2008) (“In [Nisenbaum], the Seventh Circuit did not 

address the language of Rule 11, the Advisory Committee Notes to the Rule, or any 

 

2

 “[T]he filing of a motion for sanctions is itself subject to the requirements of the rule and 

can lead to sanctions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendments. 

3

 When a party cites a case from another circuit as persuasive authority, the party should, 

in full candor, indicate whether that case has been rejected by other courts and whether the circuits 

are split on the relevant issue. Defendants did not do so. 

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other Rule 11 jurisprudence. . . . Because the Seventh Circuit provided little analysis 

and cited no authority for its holding, the propriety of its holding has been called into 

doubt on more than one occasion.”); Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., 773 

F.3d 764, 768 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[Nisenbaum] declines to address any of the textual 

or policy concerns outlined [in Penn], and other circuits roundly criticize the 

decision’s cursory reasoning.”); Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2006) 

(“We find [Nisenbaum] unpersuasive . . . because it contains no analysis of the 

language of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or the Advisory Committee Notes, cites to no authority 

for its holding, and indeed is the only published circuit decision reaching such a 

conclusion.”). 

 Second, Defendants cite Barker v. Bank One Lexington, N.A., 156 F.3d 1228, 

1998 WL 466437 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished panel order), in which the Sixth 

Circuit held that a movant substantially complied with Rule 11 by sending warning 

letters. Defendants cite Barker without disclosing that the case is an unpublished 

panel order that was expressly rejected as nonbinding and unpersuasive by a 

subsequent published panel decision of the Sixth Circuit. See Penn, 773 F.3d at 768 

(noting that, as an unpublished decision, Barker “neither bind[s] us nor persuade[s] 

us to forsake the benefit to bench and bar afforded by requiring strict compliance 

with Rule 11’s clear text”); see also Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 

2011) (“Unpublished decisions in the Sixth Circuit are, of course, not binding 

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precedent on subsequent panels.”). 

 Third, Defendants cite Jeffreys v. Rossi, 275 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), 

holding that a defendant complied with Rule 11 by sending “a detailed letter to 

plaintiff’s counsel outlining defendants’ anticipated Rule 11 motion and requesting 

that [the plaintiff] withdraw his motion to amend the [c]omplaint and discontinue 

the action entirely.” Id. at 473, 480 n.27. However, Defendants fail to disclose that 

other judges in the Southern District of New York have declined to follow Jeffreys.

4

 

Defendants also fail to mention that, in Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing 

Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit 

Court of Appeals expressly held that, although Rule 11 does not require advance 

service of exhibits or a supporting legal memorandum, “[t]he safe-harbor provision 

is a strict procedural requirement,” and “[a]n informal warning in the form of a letter 

without service of a separate Rule 11 motion is not sufficient to trigger the 21–day 

safe harbor period.” 

 

4 See, e.g., Holmes v. Allstate Corp., No. 11 CIV. 1543 LTS DF, 2012 WL 627238, at *18 

& n.20 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11 CIV. 1543 LTS 

DCF, 2012 WL 626262 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2012) (collecting cases from the Southern District of 

New York and noting that “this [c]ourt has repeatedly refused to impose sanctions based on mere 

warning letters, even where the challenged conduct was sanctionable”); Diamonds.net LLC v. Idex 

Online, Ltd., 254 F.R.D. 475, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The Court . . . sees no reason not to apply 

Rule 11 as it is written.”); Gal v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 

(“Unfortunately for Defendants . . . the plain language of the rule states explicitly that service of 

the motion itself is required to begin the safe harbor clock – the rule says nothing about the use of 

letters.”). 

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 Defendants’ cited cases do not persuade this court to disregard the language 

of Rule 11. As numerous other courts have explained, the spirit, purpose, and plain 

language of Rule 11’s safe harbor provision cannot be satisfied with an informal 

warning letter. See, e.g., Roth, 466 F.3d at 1191–93. In any event, however, the 

cases Defendants selectively cite do not apply to the facts of this case. In Nisenbaum, 

the Seventh Circuit did not describe the contents of the demand letter in question, 

except to indicate that the letter “alerted [the offending party] to the problem and 

gave him more than 21 days to desist.” Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808. In Barker, the 

informal letter warned the plaintiff “in no uncertain terms that [the defendants] 

would be seeking sanctions due to the obvious frivolity of this case.” 1998 WL 

466437 at *2. Further, in Barker, after sending the informal letter, the defendants 

“also served [the plaintiff] with their motion for sanctions 21 days before filing it 

with the court.” Id. In Jeffreys, the movants prefaced the motion with “a detailed 

letter” that “outlin[ed] their anticipated motion and attach[ed] evidentiary support” 

and that expressly informed the plaintiff of the intent to file a motion for sanctions 

if the alleged Rule 11 violation was not withdrawn within 21 days. 

 Thus, in the cases cited by Defendants, the informal letters provided fair notice 

of (1) the movant’s intent to file a Rule 11 motion if the violation was not corrected; 

and (2) the substance of the arguments that would be raised in the forthcoming 

motion for sanctions. In this case, however, Defendants’ informal letter did not 

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fairly place Plaintiff on notice that a Rule 11 motion would be forthcoming if 

Plaintiff did not withdraw his claims within 21 days, and the letter did not fairly 

detail the full substance of the motion for sanctions as to all claims. 5 See Lancaster 

v. Zufle, 170 F.R.D. 7, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he plain language of the Rule 

expressly requires the serving of a formal motion, and with good reason, for by 

serving such a motion a movant itself certifies to its own compliance with Rule 11 

in bringing [the] motion and thus places its adversary on notice that the matter may 

not be viewed as simply part of the paper skirmishing among adversaries that too 

often characterizes litigation in this uncivil age.”). 

 Accordingly, the motion for sanctions is due to be denied for noncompliance 

with Rule 11. 

B. Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 

 1. Standard of Review

 A prevailing defendant in a civil rights case may be awarded attorney’s fees 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 only if “‘the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, 

unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad 

faith, or . . . the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’” Hughes v. 

 

5

 The motion for sanctions seeks relief “as to all of Plaintiff’s claims,” but the letter merely 

requested that Plaintiff “consider what Rule 11 basis [Plaintiff] had in fact and law for the breach 

of contract claims and the negligence claims.” (Doc. # 67-1.) The letter also requested that 

Plaintiff consider Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff had “no basis in law or fact” for certain 

other claims in the complaint, but did not implicate Rule 11 with respect to those other claims. 

The letter did not state that a Rule 11 motion would follow if Plaintiff failed to withdraw his claims. 

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Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 

U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). 

 “The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient 

justification for the assessment of fees” under § 1988. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14. To 

determine whether an action is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1988, the court focuses 

on “‘whether the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without 

foundation[,] rather than [on] whether the claim was ultimately successful.’” 

Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting 

Jones v. Tex. Tech Univ., 656 F.2d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981)). “Factors considered 

important in determining whether a claim is frivolous include: (1) whether the 

plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; 

and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown 

trial on the merits.” Id. These factors “are general guidelines only, not hard and fast 

rules. Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.” 

Id. 

 2. Discussion

 a. Fifth Amendment Claim

 Plaintiff included stray references to the Fifth Amendment in the jurisdictional 

statement of his complaint and in the demand for relief sought. Plaintiff did not 

reference the Fifth Amendment elsewhere in his complaint, nor did he state factual 

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allegations or claims for relief that could reasonably be construed as an assertion of 

a Fifth Amendment violation. As Defendants recognized in their summary judgment 

brief (Doc. # 39 at 30), Plaintiff’s stray references to the Fifth Amendment at the 

beginning and end of his complaint did not, without more, assert a claim for relief 

for a Fifth Amendment violation. (Doc. # 1.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“A pleading 

that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the 

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, 

which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.”). 

 Defendants devoted a one-sentence paragraph in their summary judgment 

brief to explaining that Plaintiff did not raise a Fifth Amendment claim, and a 

footnote in the brief to explaining that any Fifth Amendment claim would be subject 

to dismissal on grounds that no federal governmental entity is involved in the case. 

(Doc. # 39 at 30 & n. 21.) Plaintiff did not attempt to defend or contest Defendants’ 

arguments regarding the existence or viability of a Fifth Amendment claim. 

 As Defendants point out, the court granted summary judgment on the Fifth 

Amendment claim. (Doc. # 65 at 22.) However, to be entitled to attorney’s fees, a 

defendant must not only be the prevailing party, but the defendant must be the 

prevailing party on a frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless claim asserted by the 

plaintiff. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646 (2016) 

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(“When a defendant is the prevailing party on a civil rights claim[,] . . . district courts 

may award attorney’s fees if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or 

groundless.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the 

complaint inartfully included stray references to the Fifth Amendment, for purposes 

of deciding the motion for attorney’s fees, it cannot reasonably be said that Plaintiff 

asserted a Fifth Amendment claim at all, frivolously or otherwise. Therefore, 

Defendants are not entitled to attorney’s fees with respect to that claim. 

 b. Equal Protection Claims 

 Plaintiff was unable to submit evidence necessary to support an as-applied 

equal protection challenge to the Department of Revenue’s use of its nepotism policy 

to deny Plaintiff a promotion. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment on 

that claim. (Doc. # 65 at 29–32.) Plaintiff was also unable to sustain a facial equal 

protection attack on the Department of Revenue’s nepotism policy by articulating a 

colorable legal argument pertinent to the rational basis test. (Doc. # 65 at 34 (“Mr. 

Tindol’s argument [in support of his facial equal protection challenge] distracts from 

the necessary constitutional inquiry of a state regulation subject to a facial attack.”).) 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s equal protection claims were frivolous. See Christiansburg, 

434 U.S. at 421 (holding that a district court has discretion to award attorney’s fees 

in a Title VII case if an action was “without foundation”); Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189 

(noting that claims are frivolous when a plaintiff cannot introduce any evidence to 

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support the claims). 

 c. Procedural Due Process Claim 

 In determining whether a plaintiff’s claims are groundless or frivolous, the 

court usually considers various factors, including whether the claims survived 

summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, whether the plaintiff produced any 

evidence in support of the claim, whether the plaintiff failed to establish a prima 

facie case, whether the defendant offered to settle, and whether the case was 

dismissed prior to trial. Head, 62 F.3d at 355–56 (citing Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of 

Pinellas Cty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). These factors “are general 

guidelines only,” though, “not hard and fast rules. Determinations regarding 

frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189. 

 The merits of Plaintiff’s § 1983 procedural due process claim rested on 

whether he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his promotion.6

 

Factors relevant to determining whether the claim was frivolous—such as Plaintiff’s 

ability to survive summary judgment on his procedural due process claim, establish 

a prima facie case, provide evidence in support of the claim, and proceed to trial on 

the claim—depended entirely on the success of his novel argument that Alabama 

 

6

 “In this circuit, a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof 

of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) 

state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 

1232 (11th Cir. 2003). 

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statutes and regulations covering merit system employees created a protected 

property interest in the promotion. Therefore, in determining whether the procedural 

due process claim was frivolous, it would be patently unjust and illogical to weigh 

those factors against Plaintiff unless the novel property interest argument was itself 

so frivolous or groundless as to warrant the imposition of fees. 

 Similarly, unless Plaintiff’s novel argument for sustaining the due process 

claim was frivolous, there is little support for Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff 

unreasonably persisted in pursuing the claim by rejecting Defendants’ early 

settlement offer. Cf. Desisto Coll., Inc. v. Town of Howey-In-The-Hills, 718 F. Supp. 

906, 916 (M.D. Fla. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Desisto Coll., Inc. v. Line, 914 F.2d 267 

(11th Cir. 1990) (“The defendants’ offer of settlement appears to have been a 

generous one in light of the strength of the defendants’ legal position. The Court, 

therefore, finds that the plaintiffs’ refusal of the settlement offer further supports the 

unreasonableness of plaintiffs’ filing the case and continuing the litigation after the 

case was filed.”). Although Plaintiff’s novel argument ultimately proved to be the 

weaker position, Plaintiff’s reasonableness in evaluating the relative strengths of the 

case or in rejecting Defendants’ early settlement offer cannot be evaluated in 

hindsight. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421–22 (explaining that, in some 

circumstances, pursuit of a claim at the early stages of the case may be reasonable 

even when the law or the facts initially appear questionable or unfavorable). 

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Moreover, Defendants did offer to settle, which, under Sullivan, generally weighs in 

Plaintiff’s favor on the motion for attorney’s fees. 

 As Defendants point out, and as noted in the January 23, 2015 Memorandum 

Opinion and Order on the summary judgment motions (Doc. # 65 at 38), the 

Eleventh Circuit has held, as a general rule, that state employees do not have a statecreated property interest in a promotion. Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th 

Cir. 1988) (“[A] prospective promotion is not a property or liberty interest protected 

by the fourteenth amendment.”); Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 

1486 (11th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Swann v. S. Health Partners, 

Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 2004) (summarily citing Wu). However, those 

Eleventh Circuit cases were not the end of the court’s inquiry on summary judgment, 

nor should they have been. 

 “Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 

rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law – 

rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of 

entitlement to those benefits.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 

564, 577 (1972).7

 State rules and statutes can give rise to protected property interests 

 

7

 Neither Wu nor Olandeinde addressed a situation where, as here, the plaintiff argued that 

a particular state statute or rule created a protected property interest in a promotion. In support of 

the holding in Wu, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 641 (4th Cir. 

1979), which held that, “absent some statute, ordinance or institutional regulation,” a state 

university faculty professor lacked any constitutionally recognized property interest in a 

promotion. 

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in employment where none would otherwise exist. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 

341, 344 – 45 (1976), overruled in part on other grounds by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540 – 41 (1985) (“A property interest in employment 

can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract. . . . Whether such 

a guarantee has been given can be determined only by an examination of the 

particular statute or ordinance in question.”). 

 In ruling on the parties’ summary judgment motions, the court noted the 

general rule that, as a public employee, Plaintiff had no property interest in a 

promotion. The court also considered Plaintiff’s argument that certain Alabama 

statutes and rules created a protected property interest for state merit system 

employees in his situation. Because the argument was novel, it was per se

unsupported by existing law at the time the case was filed. Ultimately, Plaintiff lost 

the argument. However, in deciding whether § 1988 entitles a defendant to 

attorney’s fees, frivolity and lack of foundation are not determined through the lens 

of hindsight; otherwise, § 1988 would discourage “‘all but the most airtight claims.’” 

Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 355 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Christiansburg, 434 

U.S. at 421–22). “‘Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or 

unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for 

bringing suit.’” Id. (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421–22). “[S]ection 1983 

claims should not be considered groundless or without foundation for the purpose of 

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an award of fees in favor of the defendants when the claims are meritorious enough 

to receive careful attention and review.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 

787 (11th Cir. 1991). 

 The court’s comments at the October 21, 2014 pretrial conference adequately 

demonstrate that, without the benefit of hindsight, Plaintiff’s claims were 

sufficiently meritorious to deserve careful consideration. (Doc. # 69.) At the pretrial 

conference, the court commented on the arguments in the pending summary 

judgment briefs as follows: 

So this case appears to me to be — all cases are important, but this 

seems to be a pretty significant case, potentially. And so my first 

question is rhetorical. Do you really want a ruling on your [summary 

judgment] motions? And if you do, you’re going to get them; and 

there’s going to be some law set one way or the other. I’m not sure 

that’s what everybody wants. Maybe the plaintiffs are trying to make 

new law for the state merit system. Maybe the defendants want a 

definitive ruling on it. You’re going to get it. I’m right in the middle 

of it, and it’s a very interesting case. I’m not sure that there is a lot of 

law directly on point, particularly from the plaintiff’s perspective, but 

there is an argument there. So the first thing I’m going to bring up but 

the last thing we’ll discuss is whether y’all are able to have any chance 

of settling the case. 

Now, you’ve made your licks. You’ve made your points. It’s good 

briefing on both sides. I know the case has been somewhat contentious, 

but it’s because everybody is passionate about your positions. I just ask 

that you consider at this point is a — we’re on a sidetrack today. And 

is this the point where you-all want to make law, because that’s what’s 

going to happen. 

. . . . 

We have two motions — well, three motions on the defense side and 

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one motion on the plaintiff’s side. But the motion on the plaintiff’s side 

seems to hit the crux of the legal issue in the case. There’s a little bit 

more factual development in you-all’s three motions on the defense 

side, but it basically boils down to some of the same issues. I know that 

there are issues about who might be entitled to immunity and whether 

the agency itself should be a party, and those are the kind of things I’ll 

resolve. But the core issue is about this policy of the merit system and 

the process. . . . 

. . . . 

Well, it seems to me what [Plaintiff is] asking the Court to do . . . is 

potentially, one view of it, to turn the merit system on its head and to 

move the property interest two steps back or forward – I don’t know if 

you say it’s back or forward; I guess I’ll just say back – not to the 

probationary period, but to actually promotion, potential promotion. 

And there’s a logical problem if you’re saying, well, it’s not the 

probationary period. That would still apply. Yeah. Well, then so you 

have a hearing as to whether you get the position or not, but you don’t 

have a hearing as to whether you get fired after you — the day after you 

got the position. So it seems to me that it – the potentiality for turning 

the whole system on its head is here, and that’s why I think it’s 

significant that we slow down and take our time to resolve the thing, 

from my standpoint. Of course, it will wind up — on the legal issue, if 

y’all can’t settle it, it’s going to wind up in the Circuit before it’s over 

with. 

(Doc. # 69 at 3–4, 6–7, 12–13.) 

 It cannot be said that Plaintiff filed or continued to pursue the procedural due 

process claim knowing that he had no protected property interest. Cf. Head v. 

Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 356 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a due process claim was 

“legally groundless” where the plaintiff, an at-will employee, asserted a procedural 

due process claim “based knowingly on a nonexistent property interest”). Rather, 

as the court noted while the summary judgment motions were pending, Plaintiff’s 

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procedural due process claim was deserving of careful consideration. Therefore, the 

claim was not “groundless” or “without foundation” in the sense necessary to 

support an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 

15–16 (1980) (“Allegations that, upon careful examination, prove legally 

insufficient to require a trial are not, for that reason alone, ‘groundless’ or ‘without 

foundation’ as required” for awarding attorney’s fees to the defense under § 1988.). 

 d. State Law Claims

 Defendants recognize that § 1988 does not authorize an award of attorney’s 

fees solely for the defense of state law claims. Defendants argue that, under § 1988, 

they are entitled to attorney’s fees for defending Plaintiff’s state law claims merely 

because those claims are related to and arise out of the same set of facts as the 

frivolous federal claims.8

 (Doc. # 67 at 9–10, ¶ 23.) In support of this argument, 

Defendants cite National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 

646, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the 

District of Colombia Circuit, citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434–35 

(1983), noted that a plaintiff may be awarded attorney’s fees on “related pendent 

state law claims” if the plaintiff “also prevails on its federal civil rights claim.” 

 However, a defendant cannot establish entitlement to attorney’s fees on 

 

8

 Although Defendants argue that the state law claims are frivolous for purposes of Rule 

11 sanctions, Defendants do not contend that the alleged frivolousness of the state law claims 

entitles them to attorney’s fees under § 1988. 

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supplemental state law claims merely by showing that the state law claims are 

“interrelated with” the frivolous civil rights claims or that the state law claims “arose 

out of the same transaction” as the frivolous civil rights claims. Fox v. Vice, 563 

U.S. 839, 839–40 (2011). Rather, a defendant must prove that the fees sought 

“would not have accrued but for the frivolous claim.” Id. at 839. 

 Defendants make no effort to establish that they would not have incurred 

attorney’s fees on the state law claims but for the defense of the frivolous federal 

civil rights claims. Therefore, Defendants have not shown that an attorney’s fee 

award is appropriate under § 1988 with respect to the state law claims. 

C. Amount of Attorney’s Fees to Be Awarded 

 This case involves frivolous and nonfrivolous § 1988 claims. The motion for 

attorney’s fees does not indicate whether all of the requested attorney’s fees were 

expended solely because of the frivolous allegations. It is not possible to award fees 

on the basis of the motion because it is not possible to determine what amount, if 

any, should be awarded as an attorney’s fee. See Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 840–41 

(2011) (“In a suit of this kind, involving both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a 

defendant may recover the reasonable attorney’s fees he expended solely because of 

the frivolous allegations. And that is all.”). Therefore, the motion for attorney’s 

fees is due to be denied. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 

1. The motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure (Doc. # 67) is DENIED. 

2. The motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Doc. # 67) is 

DENIED. 

3. The supplemental motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. # 85) is DENIED. 

DONE this 29th day of September, 2016. 

 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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