Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01087/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01087-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL PUNI ULUGALU,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY BERRYHILL, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01087-GPC-JLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES 

[DKT. NO. 21.]

Before the Court is Michael Puni Ulugalu’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorney’s 

Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

(Dkt. No. 21.) No opposition was filed in response to Plaintiff’s motion. For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees. 

I. Background

The underlying action involved Plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of disability and 

Supplemental Social Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. On May 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed 

a complaint against Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner” of “Defendant”). (Dkt. No. 1.) On October 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed a 

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 14.) On November 20, 2017, instead of filing 

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a response, Defendant filed a Stipulation for Remand and Entry of Judgment in favor of 

Plaintiff pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Order”). (Dkt. No. 16.) On 

November 28, 2017, the Court granted the Order. (Dkt. No. 17.) A Clerk’s Judgment 

was entered on December 5, 2017. (Dkt. No. 18.) 

On February 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed an application for attorney’s fees under the 

EAJA seeking $6,383.96 in attorney’s fees and cost. (Dkt. No. 21.) In his motion, 

Plaintiff attached his attorney’s affirmation in support of fees. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff’s 

counsel, Stuart T. Barasch, requests an hourly rate of $196.79 for 25.3 hours of work 

performed, totaling $4.978.79. (Id. at 5.) Counsel further requests $125.00 per hour for 

9.9 hours of paralegal work, totaling $1,237.50. (Id.) Counsel also requests

reimbursement costs for the certified mailing of the summons and complaint to the 

Defendant in the amount of $17.67 and for the filing fee to initiate this action in the 

amount of $150.00. (Id.) No opposition was filed in response to Plaintiff’s motion. 

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard 

The EAJA provides, in pertinent part,

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a 

prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in 

addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that 

party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including 

proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the 

United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court 

finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 

special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The prevailing party must file an application within thirty 

days of final judgment in the action and submit an itemized statement stating the actual 

time spent and the rate that the fees and expenses were computed. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) 

(1)(B). “Fees and other expenses” include reasonable attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 

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2412(d)(2)(A). The court, however, may not award attorney's fees in excess of $125 per 

hour unless a special factor justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). 

1. Timeliness 

According to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), an application for fees must be filed 

“within thirty days of final judgment.” Id. Section 2412(d)(2)(G) provides that “‘final 

judgment’ means a judgment that is final and not appealable . . . . ” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the EAJA’s 30 day filing period does not begin to 

run until after the 60-day appeal period in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)1 has 

passed. Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 612 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, Plaintiff filed an attorney’s fee motion on February 10, 2018, 67 days after 

final judgment was filed. The motion was filed seven days after the 60 day period 

expired and falls within the 30 day filing period. Accordingly, the motion for attorney’s 

fee is timely. 

2. Prevailing Party 

A plaintiff is a prevailing party if she has “succeeded on any significant issue in 

litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit.” Shalala v. 

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (quoting Texas State Teachers Assoc v. Garland 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791–92 (1989)). Under the EAJA, attorneys’ fees are to 

be awarded to a party winning a sentence-four remand unless the Commissioner shows 

that his position with respect to the issue on which the district court based its remand was 

“substantially justified.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 568–69 (9th Cir. 1995)). Here, because the Court granted 

the Commissioner’s proposed order for remand and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff 

pursuant to sentence-four, Plaintiff is a prevailing party. (Dkt. No. 17.) 

 

1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a “notice of appeal may be filed by any party 

within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” if one of the parties is the United 

States or a United States officer sued in an official capacity. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). 

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3. Substantial Justification 

Under the EAJA, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees “unless the court 

finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The government 

bears the burden of proving that its position, both in the underlying administrative 

proceedings and in the subsequent litigation, was substantially justified. Meier v. Colvin, 

727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). The government must establish that it “had a 

reasonable basis both in law and fact” for its conduct. Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 

921 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Commissioner’s stipulation provided that, 

On remand, the Commissioner will conduct any necessary further 

proceedings to determine if Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act. If this matter is referred by the Appeals Council to an 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the ALJ shall make a new determination 

as to whether Plaintiff met Listing 1.04, Disorders of the Spine, under 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, Appx. 1, hold a new hearing (if so requested) and 

a issue a new decision. The parties further request that the Clerk of the Court 

be directed to enter a final judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and against 

Defendant, reversing the final decision of the Commissioner.

(Dkt. No. 17 at 2.) Because the Commissioner filed a voluntary stipulation for remand 

and the matter was referred to an Administrative Law Judge to make a new determination 

as to Plaintiff’s disability, the Court is persuaded the Commissioner did not have 

substantial justification for denying Plaintiff disability rights. Thus, because there is no 

substantial justification, Plaintiff is entitled to receive attorney’s fee under the EAJA, 

provided that they are reasonable. 

4. Special Circumstances 

The government bears the burden of demonstrating that no special circumstances 

exist that make the award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Jawad v. Barnhart, 370 F.

Supp. 2d 1077, 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir.

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1994)). The special circumstance exception applies when the case involves a novel but 

credible interpretation of the law, an issue on which reasonable minds could differ, or an 

important and doubtful question. Grayson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th 

Cir. 1991). Since no opposition was filed by the Commissioner, the Court finds that there 

are no special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust. 

5. Reasonable Attorney’s Fees

The amount of fees awarded shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the 

kind and quality of the services provided. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Such fees, 

however, shall not exceed $125 per hour “unless the court determines that an increase in 

the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys 

for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).

i. Reasonableness of Hours 

The party seeking an award of fees has the burden of demonstrating that the 

requested hours are appropriate and reasonable. Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 

(1983). “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a 

fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on 

the litigation. . . .” Id. at 435. Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary should be excluded. Id. at 434. Plaintiff’s counsel provides that he 

expended a total of 35.2 hours on the instant case.2In light of the amount of time that 

social security cases generally take, the claimed hours here are reasonable. See Costa v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting “[m]any 

district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often requested and 

granted in social security cases”); see also Thompson v. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-01850-AC, 

2015 WL 1767733, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (finding 63.4 hours to be reasonable); 

 

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25.3 of the hours performed are for attorney time and 9.9 hours are for paralegal time. (See Dkt. No. 21 

at 5.)

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Boulanger v. Astrue, No. 2:07-cv-0849-DAD, 2011 WL 4971890, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct.

19, 2011) (finding 58 hours to be a reasonable amount of time); Valleyjo v. Astrue, No. 

2:09-cv-03088-KJN, 2011 WL 4383636, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (finding 62.1 

hours to be reasonable).

ii. Cost of Living Adjustment 

In calculating the cost-of-living increase, the Court must multiply the $125–per–

hour cap by the annual average consumer price index for all urban consumers for the 

years in which the attorney performed work in the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2); see

Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has

also established adjusted maximum rates for work performed in 2017, the years for which 

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks recovery. According to the Ninth Circuit, the maximum hourly 

rate for work performed in 2017 is $196.79.

3 Given that Plaintiff’s counsel’s request is 

the correct rate under the guidelines, (see Dkt. No. 21 at 5), the Court will apply the 

adjustment and award fees for the 25.3 hours of attorney time at the rate of $196.79, 

totaling $4,978.79.

iii. Paralegal Fees 

Plaintiff also seeks paralegal fees at a rate of $125 per hour. (Id.) The EAJA 

permits compensation for paralegals that are in line with rates “in the community for 

similar services by paralegals of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” 

Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 918 (9th Cir. 2009); Richlin Sec. Serv. v. Chertoff, 

553 U.S. 571, 578, 588-89 (2008) (paralegal fees may be awarded at prevailing market 

rates under the EAJA). 

Although there is no objection to the requested paralegal rate, the Court still must 

determine whether it is reasonable for purposes of the EAJA. See Hampton v. Colvin, 

No. 13-cv-04624-MEJ, 2015 WL 1884313, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2015) (assessing 

 

3 See https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last visited April 24, 2018).

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reasonableness of plaintiff's requested paralegal rates despite lack of objection from the 

Commissioner). While Plaintiff has provided no evidence to support the reasonableness 

of the requested paralegal rate, despite it being his burden to do so, the Court looks to the 

United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report (“Report”) to determine the 

market rate for paralegals. See Uhl v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-01303-SMS, 2016 WL 

3361800 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2016) (finding an award reasonable based on figures 

provided in United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report); Schneider v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., No. 2:12-cv-01375-JAD-GFW, 2014 WL 4251590, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 

2014) (same). The Report provides that the median hourly rate for all paralegals in San 

Diego, California is $100.00.

4

In light of Plaintiff’s lack of evidence as to the skill, experience and reputation of 

the paralegals, the Court finds the hourly rate of $100 as an appropriate amount for the 

expended paralegal time in this case. See Martinez v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-3043-BTMWVG, 2017 WL 766665, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2017) (sua sponte reducing paralegal 

rate where Plaintiff failed to support requested rate because he “provided no information 

regarding the experience, skills, or reputations of the paralegals who worked on this 

matter”); Denepita v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-00846-JLT, 2014 WL 5242496, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. Oct. 14, 2014) (same). Based on the foregoing, the Court awards Plaintiff the 

requested 9.9 hours of paralegal time at the hourly rate of $100.00 for a total of $990.00.

6. Costs 

A prevailing party may also recover expenses necessary for the preparation of the 

case. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Plaintiff requests reimbursement in the amount of

$17.67 for the certified mailing of the summons and complaint to the Defendant. (Dkt. 

No. 21 at 5.) Plaintiff further requests reimbursement in the amount of $150.00 for the 

filing fee to initiate this action. (Id.) In his motion, Plaintiff attached records from 

 

4 United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report 2015-2016, pp. 187 (R.L. Burdge 2018). 

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Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm database. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 9-18.) The database records 

include entries for the filing fee and for the certified mailing of the summons and 

complaint. (See id.) Thus, because Plaintiff has provided adequate documentation for 

such expenses, the Court grants reimbursement costs in the amount of $167.67.

7. Assignment of Rights to Counsel

Finally, Plaintiff requests that payment of the EAJA award be made directly to 

Plaintiff’s counsel based on a Waiver of Direct Payment of EAJA fees signed by 

Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 20.) According to the EAJA, fees and other expenses shall 

be assigned to the prevailing party. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The U.S. Supreme Court 

has considered whether this provision of the EAJA makes a fee payable to the prevailing 

party or the attorney. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 588-89 (2010). In Ratliff, the

Court highlighted the absence of language in EAJA explicitly directing fees to attorneys 

and, comparing the EAJA with a provision in the Social Security Act (“SSA”) making 

fee awards payable “to such attorney,” the Court concluded that “given the stark contrast 

between the SSA's express authorization of direct payments to attorneys” and the absence 

of such language in the EAJA, it would not interpret the EAJA to “contain a direct fee 

requirement absent clear textual evidence supporting such an interpretation.” Id. at 593–

98 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A)). Nonetheless, district courts have recognized that 

Ratliff does not prevent payment of a fee award directly to the attorney where there has 

been a valid assignment and the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government. See Bell 

v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-00809-MMC, 2018 WL 452110, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018); 

Hernandez v. Berryhill, No. 2:15-cv-1322-DB, 2017 WL 2930802, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 

10, 2017).

Attached to Plaintiff’s motion is an Affidavit and Waiver of Direct Payment 

executed by Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 20.) Plaintiff’s counsel provides that, 

With this Waiver, if Plaintiff owes any debts that qualifies under the 

Treasury Offset Program (31 USCS § 3716), any payment shall be made 

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payable to the Plaintiff and delivered to Plaintiff’s attorney. If the United 

States Department of Treasury determines that Plaintiff owes no debt subject 

to offset, the government will accept the assignment of EAJA fees and pay 

such fees directly to Plaintiff’s attorney. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (U.S. 

2010).

(Dkt. No. 21 at 6.) Since no evidence has been provided as to whether Plaintiff owes a 

debt subject to offset, the Court orders the EAJA fees to be paid directly to Plaintiff's 

Counsel, Mr. Barasch, subject to any administrative offset due to Plaintiff's outstanding 

federal debt, if any exists.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion seeking 

attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,136.46, provided Plaintiff has no outstanding federal 

debt.5 The hearing date set for May 4, 2018 shall be vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2018

 

5 Counsel Time: 25.3 (hours) x 196.79 (hourly rate) = $4978.79; Paralegal Time: 9.9 (hours) x 100 

(market rate) = $990.00; Costs: 17.67 (mailing costs) + $150 (filing fee) = $167.67; Total = $6,136.46.

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