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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT E. BRUCE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

F l L E Df A~""ID Unill!d States Co~rt<? p,. ..... Tenth C1rcu1t 

SEP O 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 90-8095 

) (D.C. No. C88-276) 

EXETER DRILLING COMPANY, a Nevada, 

Corporation, 

) ( D. Wyo.) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, District Judge, 

District Court for the District of Colorado, 

designation. 

United States 

sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-8095 Document: 010110089455 Date Filed: 09/09/1991 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment entered by the 

district court on a jury verdict in this diversity action brought 

to recover damages for personal injuries he suffered in an 

accident on a drilling rig owned by defendant. Plaintiff's theory 

of liability was that defendant negligently equipped and 

maintained the rig by failing to provide it with an operable 

crown-a-matic, a safety device that allegedly would have prevented 

the accident that caused plaintiff's injuries. 

At the close of trial, the jury completed a special verdict 

form, indicating its separate conclusions that $150,000 "would 

fully and fairly compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he 

sustained as a result of the accident," but that defendant did not 

"breach its duty of reasonable care to plaintiff by not providing 

a crown-a-matic on [its rig]." R. Vol. I, Doc. 64. Thereupon the 

district court entered judgment "(t]hat the plaintiff take 

nothing, that the action be dismissed on the merits, that the 

defendant Exeter Drilling Company recover of plaintiff its costs 

of action." R. Vol. I, Doc. 68. Plaintiff raises three issues on 

appeal: 

(1) Did the Court err in allowing [defendant's] witness 

to testify that he attempted to meet (Wyoming] OSHA 

standards while forbidding (plaintiff's] witnesses from 

informing the jury that [defendant] failed to meet those 

standards or even informing the jury what those 

standards were? 

(2) Was the 

confusing? 

special verdict form ambiguous and 

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Appellate Case: 90-8095 Document: 010110089455 Date Filed: 09/09/1991 Page: 2 
(3) Did the judgment entered reflect 

verdict? 

the jury's 

Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting 

"that Plaintiff's expert and others not be allowed to testify with 

regard to the standard of care being based upon [Wyoming] OSHA's 

standards, and further that the jury not be instructed with regard 

to any such standards." R. Vol. I, Doc 57 at 2. Defendant argued 

that because it was not plaintiff's employer, and only an employer 

may be cited for violation of Wyoming OSHA regulations, the 

standards set out in the regulations were not applicable to 

defendant and, thus, should not be used to measure its liability 

to plaintiff. Id. at 1-2. 

Shortly before trial, the district court granted the motion 

without objection by plaintiff. This initial ruling is not 

challenged on appeal. However, plaintiff now contends that the 

district court erred in permitting defendant, over objection by 

plaintiff who had avoided any reference to OSHA standards in his 

case-in-chief at trial, effectively to withdraw the motion in 

limine and present testimony that defendant had considered OSHA 

regulations when equipping the rig, that defendant knew what the 

regulations required and tried to comply with them, and that 

Wyoming OSHA officials inspected the rig before and after the 

accident. 

The district court made it clear that its initial order 

excluding OSHA-related testimony would be nullified if defendant 

elected to open the door on the matter and, in that event, 

plaintiff "would be able to fully, on rebuttal, explore that issue 

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Appellate Case: 90-8095 Document: 010110089455 Date Filed: 09/09/1991 Page: 3 
and produce witnesses and evidence." R. Vol. IV at 26-28; see 

also R. Vol.Vat 15. This is, in fact, what transpired, though 

plaintiff chose not to dwell on the issue by conducting extensive 

cross-examination or by presenting any evidence in rebuttal. 

The decision to - admit or exclude evidence generally lies 

within the discretion of a district court, whose rulings in this 

regard will be upheld absent an abuse of that discretion. United 

States v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988). A 

district court also has discretion to control the mode and order 

of presenting evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). See also 

Rasmussen Drilling v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 

1149 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). 

When the district court ruled that the defense could pursue 

the OSHA issue, he (1) ruled that the defense would open the door 

for plaintiff to produce rebuttal OSHA evidence and (2) indicated 

he would allow a reasonable time "to get the witnesses necessary 

to rebut [defendant's OSHA testimony) if we have to," R. Vol.Vat 

25. Defendant did not object. Id. at 25-27. Plaintiff, however, 

declined, stating only that he did not want to delay the trial. 

Id. at 34; see also id. at 110. The district court did not abuse 

its discretion concerning the OSHA evidence or in its conduct of 

the trial. 

Plaintiff contends that the special verdict form used in this 

case was ambiguous and confusing for two reasons: first, it asked 

the jury to make a comparative negligence determination 

inappropriate to the circumstances of the case; and second, it 

required the jury to assess plaintiff's damages even if the jury 

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Appellate Case: 90-8095 Document: 010110089455 Date Filed: 09/09/1991 Page: 4 
found defendant had not breached its duty of care to plaintiff. 

We find no reversible error. Significantly, plaintiff admits that 

he "did not make a timely objection [to the verdict form] and so 

the appropriate standard of review is 'plain error,'" Brief of 

Appellant at 12. See Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co.-, . 898 F.2d 1452, 

1455-56 (10th Cir. 1990). Whatever the propriety of the 

comparative negligence question, its inclusion does not constitute 

plain error here, as the jury never even had to address it. See 

generally Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 796 F.2d 1307, 1312 n.4 

(10th Cir.)(party seeking to establish plain error has burden to 

show matter complained of "almost surely affected the outcome of 

the case"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986). Furthermore, 

asking the jury to determine damages where no liability is found 

is not legally inconsistent. To the contrary, such an approach 

serves the salutary purpose of obviating unnecessary retrial of 

the former issue should a new trial on liability thereafter be 

granted. The plain language in the special verdict form 

accomplished this legitimate objective. 

Finally, plaintiff argues that the judgment entered by the 

district court in favor of defendant is contrary to the jury's 

verdict, in light of the jury's determination that plaintiff 

suffered damages in the amount of $150,000. We disagree. 

The district court clearly reconciled the jury's 

determinations so as to render them complete and consistent. See 

generally Harvey ex rel. Harvey v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 

1343, 1347-48 (10th Cir. 1989); Furr v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 

824 F.2d 1537, 1545 (10th Cir. 1987). We will not disturb its 

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Appellate Case: 90-8095 Document: 010110089455 Date Filed: 09/09/1991 Page: 5 
reasonable construction of the verdict. Adoption of plaintiff's 

position would effectively nullify the jury's liability 

determination, while, consistent with what we have said above, the 

district court's construction gives due effect to the jury's 

determinations regarding both liability and damages. 

Our review of this issue is unaffected by a juror's affidavit 

submitted by plaintiff, as, under the circumstances here, the use 

of such evidence to impeach the jury's plain verdict on liability 

is prohibited by Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). See United States v. 

Black, 843 F.2d 1456, 1464 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(juror's affidavit 

is incompetent to impeach verdict for internal error); see also 

Howard D. Jury, Inc. v. R & G Sloane Mfg. Co., 666 F.2d 1348, 1352 

(10th Cir. 1981)(ordinarily, even direct testimony from jurors is 

incompetent to impeach matters inherent in a verdict). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Lewis T. Babcock, 

District Judge 

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