Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01058/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01058-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FOOTBALANCE SYSTEM INC. and 

FOOTBALANCE SYSTEM OY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ZERO GRAVITY INSIDE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-CV-1058 JLS (DHB)

ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE

(ECF No. 59)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendants’ Affirmative 

Defenses. (“MTS,” ECF No. 59.) Also before the Court are Defendants’ Response in 

Opposition to Plaintiffs’ MTS, (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 65), and Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of 

their MTS, (“Reply,” ECF No. 66). The Court vacated the hearing on the matter and took 

the motion under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

(ECF No. 67.) After considering the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court rules as 

follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(f) provides that the court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense 

or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 

“The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that 

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must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” 

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi–Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, 

Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 

(1994)). Accordingly, “[a] defense may be struck if it fails to provide ‘fair notice’ of the 

basis of the defense.” Qarbon.com Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 (N.D. 

Cal. 2004); see also Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979).

“Motions to strike are ‘generally disfavored because they are often used as delaying 

tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice.’” Cortina v. 

Goya Foods, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Rosales v. Citibank, 

133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). “[M]otions to strike should not be granted 

unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject 

matter of the litigation.” Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 

(N.D. Cal. 1991). “When ruling on a motion to strike, this Court ‘must view the pleading 

under attack in the light most favorable to the pleader.’” Id. (citing RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox 

Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).

Finally, this Court recently held that the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard 

applies to affirmative defenses. Rahman v. San Diego Account Service, No. 16CV2061-

JLS (KSC), 2017 WL 1387206 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2017). While the Court acknowledged 

that district courts are split on the issue, it ultimately determined that Wyshak’s “fair notice” 

standard, which relied on the sole case of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), had 

necessarily been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 

*2. “Accordingly, ‘fair notice’ necessarily now encompasses the ‘plausibility’ standard;

whatever standard ‘fair notice’ previously encompassed no longer exists.” Id. Thus, the 

Court here reviews Defendants’ affirmative defenses for plausibility.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks to strike Defendants’ Second Affirmative Defense of Invalidity, 

Fourth Affirmative Defense of Equitable Doctrines, Seventh Affirmative Defense of 

Inadequate Pre-Suit Investigation, Eighth Affirmative Defense of Inequitable Conduct, and 

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Ninth Affirmative Defense of Fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office

(“USPTO”). (See generally MTS.) The Court considers each in turn.

I. Second Affirmative Defense of Invalidity

Defendants’ second affirmative defense of invalidity alleges: “One or more claims 

of the ’433 patent and ’589 patent are invalid for the failure to satisfy the preconditions of 

patentability set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112, and/or 116.” (MTS 7–8

1

(citing 

Def. Zero Gravity Inside, Inc.’s (“ZGI”) Ans. 9, ECF No. 54).) Plaintiffs argue that this 

assertion fails to place Plaintiffs on notice of the particular factual or legal basis for this 

alleged defense. (Id. at 8.)

The Court agrees. As discussed above, in the absence of binding authority to the 

contrary, the Court applies the Twombly/Iqbal standard to Defendants’ pleading of their 

affirmative defenses. The Court previously explained that

[s]ince Twombly and Iqbal, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have come to 

differing conclusions regarding whether those cases necessitate a different 

interpretation of Wyshak’s “fair notice” standard. See, e.g., J & J Sports 

Prods., Inc. v. Scace, No. 10CV2496-WQH-CAB, 2011 WL 2132723, at *1 

(S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (discussing split). Ultimately, this Court agrees with 

the numerous district courts that have concluded the Twombly and Iqbal

“plausibility” standard applies with equal force to the pleading of affirmative 

defenses. Although there is a valid question as to whether the logic of 

Twombly and Iqbal—rendered in the context of Rule 8(a)—applies with equal 

force to Rule 8(c) governing affirmative defenses, this Court concludes that 

Wyshak compels application of the plausibility standard to pleading 

affirmative defenses. Specifically, the only case Wyshak cited to support its 

“fair notice” standard is Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957), 

Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827, and Conley has since been abrogated insofar as it 

permitted pleading at a standard lower than Twombly's plausibility standard, 

see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 560–61 (citing Conley for “fair notice” rule 

statement immediately prior to articulating “plausibility” standard and 

expressly abrogating Conley's “no set of facts” language). Accordingly, “fair 

notice” necessarily now encompasses the “plausibility” standard; whatever 

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

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standard “fair notice” previously encompassed no longer exists. E.g., Madison 

v. Goldsmith & Hull, No. 5:13-CV-01655 EJD, 2013 WL 5769979, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013); Gonzalez v. Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC, No. 2:12-

CV-01816-ODW, 2012 WL 3263749, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012); Perez 

v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C., No. 11-CV-03323-LHK, 2012 WL 

1029425, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).

Rahman, 2017 WL 1387206, at *2; see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Peterson, No. 16-CV786 JLS (NLS), 2017 WL 1550091, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2017) (applying the 

Twombly/Iqbal standard to pleading affirmative defenses). Although Defendants urge the 

Court to reverse course, (Opp’n 10–11), the Court will not do so based simply on nonbinding caselaw that predates this Court’s Rahman decision. (See id. (citing Kohler v. 

Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 464, 468 (S.D. Cal. 2013).)

To be sure, Defendants attempt to distinguish Rahman in their efforts to avoid 

applicability of the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards to their affirmative defenses. They 

first argue that “the clear distinguishing point” is that Rahman did not involve patent 

infringement claims. (Opp’n 11.) But there is nothing inherently clear about that. Nor do 

Defendants explain why that difference matters, much less why it clearly matters. To the 

contrary, this Court—and others—have recently held that Twombly/Iqbal applies, for 

example, to complaints for patent infringement. See, e.g., Scripps Research Inst. v. 

Illumina, Inc., No. 16-CV-661 JLS (BGS), 2016 WL 6834024, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 

2016) (explaining that Twombly/Iqbal apply to pleading patent infringement claims); 

Footbalance Sys. Inc. v. Zero Gravity Inside, Inc., No. 15-CV-1058 JLS (DHB), 2016 WL 

5786936, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016) (same and further noting that the Court “is not 

convinced that holding [plaintiff’s] complaint for patent infringement to the same standard

as nearly every other civil action filed in federal court would be unjust or impracticable”).

Defendants’ argument that the Patent Local Rules obviate the need for plausible 

pleadings is a bit stronger, but still fails to carry the day. Specifically, Defendants argue 

that Patent Local Rule 3.3 addresses the timing for the disclosure of factual support for an 

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affirmative defense. (Opp’n 11–12.) That is partially true, but Defendants’ characterization 

is misleading. Specifically, Defendants are right that Patent Local Rule 3.3, titled 

“Invalidity Contentions,” requires each party opposing a claim of patent infringement to 

serve its invalidity contentions, which, among other things, contain the party’s factual 

support and legal arguments that a patent is invalid. 

But Defendants are wrong that Patent Local Rule 3.3 “addresse[s] the timing for the 

disclosure of factual support for an affirmative defense.” (Opp’n 11–12 (emphasis added); 

see also id. at 12 n.2 (“This Court’s Local Patent Rule 3.3 sets forth the time in which 

Defendants must detail facts to support an affirmative defense. Through the motion to 

strike, Plaintiffs attempt to impose a different schedule on Defendants to set forth their 

invalidity theories, which is plainly inconsistent with this Court’s Rules.”).) As an initial 

matter, Patent Local Rule 3.3 does not reference a party’s pleading obligations, much less 

specifically address the time to disclose factual support for the same. So Defendants’ 

argument is wrong on its face.

Furthermore, even if it did, these Patent Local Rules cannot supplant the Supreme 

Court’s directives in Twombly/Iqbal, which clarified the pleading standards under the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1) (noting that a local rule 

must be consistent with federal statutes and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 

2075). In other words, Defendants are bound by the pleading standards announced in 

Twombly and Iqbal, regardless of what a local rule says.

Finally, the requirements of pleading under Twombly and Iqbal and the information 

contained in invalidity contentions under Patent Local Rule 3.3 are separate and not 

inconsistent. The Court does not here suggest that Defendants’ affirmative defenses must 

contain the same depth of analysis and factual support required by this District’s local rules. 

All that Twombly and Iqbal require is plausibility. As the Court previously explained when 

discussing a similar argument made as to the Patent Local Rules governing infringement 

contentions:

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[T]he Court’s holding does not require a patentee to plead with the specificity 

required in its infringement contentions, which Plaintiff seems to suggest. 

(Opp’n 5, ECF No. 23.) As Plaintiff explains, its infringement contentions 

“will provide information concerning how each limitation of the asserted 

claims [is] met by the accused products.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Here, 

however, Plaintiff must simply provide sufficient factual allegations 

concerning how each limitation of the asserted claims is plausibly met by the 

accused products. See e.Digital, 2016 WL 4427209, at *4 (“To require a 

patentee to plausibly allege that the accused product practices each of the 

limitations in at least one asserted claim should not impose an undue burden 

on most plaintiffs, because a patentee is already required to perform an 

adequate pre-filing investigation before bringing suit.”) (citation omitted); see 

also TeleSign Corp. v. Twilio, Inc., No. CV 16-2106 PSG (SSX), 2016 WL 

4703873, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2016) (“[I]t is irrelevant at this stage 

whether Plaintiff’s allegations are accurate, as the Court accepts all of 

Plaintiff’s allegations as true . . . . The Court only requires that Plaintiff 

plausibly alleges that a product or products of Defendant infringes on at least 

one claim of the [asserted] patent.”).

Scripps, 2016 WL 6834024, at *6.

Finally, Defendants argue that “[a]lthough not required to do so, [they] have 

nonetheless addressed in their proposed amended answers Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding 

the invalidity defense” and have ostensibly provided more factual allegations that might 

nudge their affirmative defenses from conclusory to plausible. (Opp’n 14.) But the Court 

does not here assess the plausibility of Defendants’ proposed amended answers, which are 

not the target of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike. Defendants will, of course, have an 

opportunity to amend their answers to include whatever information they believe will 

support their affirmative defenses. And the Court may have occasion to assess their 

plausibility should Plaintiffs file another motion to strike. But that would be a question for 

another day. Today the Court simply concludes that Defendants’ affirmative defense of 

invalidity is conclusory and thus implausible. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this 

portion of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike.

/ / /

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II. Fourth Affirmative Defense of Equitable Doctrines

Defendants’ fourth affirmative defense of equitable doctrines alleges “Plaintiffs are 

barred from asserting the patents-in-suit against Zero Gravity, in whole or in part, by the 

equitable doctrines of laches, estoppel, unclean hands, and/or waiver.” (MTS 8 (citing Def. 

ZGI’s Ans. 9).) Plaintiffs argue the Court should strike this affirmative defense because it 

fails to plead any facts to support their alleged equitable defenses. (Id.) 

The Court agrees—without any factual allegations the Court is unable to determine 

whether these defenses are plausible. Defendants again argue that they are not subject to a 

heightened pleading standard, (Opp’n 14), which the Court again rejects for the reasons 

already stated. Defendants also appear to argue that their amended answers will provide 

the necessary factual allegations to support these defenses. (Id. at 15.) As discussed, the 

Court does not here assess the adequacy of Defendants’ proposed amended answers, 

focusing instead on what has been filed and what is before the Court. Defendants are now 

on notice that their defenses, including these, must include factual allegations sufficient to 

make them plausible. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this portion of Plaintiffs’ Motion 

to Strike.

III. Seventh Affirmative Defense of Inadequate Pre-Suit Investigation

Defendants’ seventh affirmative defense of inadequate pre-suit investigation alleges 

that “Plaintiffs failed to conduct a proper or adequate investigation prior to filing this suit, 

for had they done so, they would have recognized that the thermoplastic component of Zero 

Gravity’s product does not extend to the metatarsal phalangeal joint of the foot, which is a 

claimed element in all claims of Plaintiffs’ patents, as described in the specification of the 

asserted patents and as admitted by Plaintiffs before the PTAB.” (See, e.g., Def. ZGI Ans. 

10.) Plaintiffs argue the Court should strike Defendants’ defense of an inadequate pre-suit 

investigation because the defense “simply states a legal conclusion and fails to inform 

Plaintiffs as to the theory underpinning their alleged defense.” (MTS 9.) While Defendants 

do not agree with Plaintiffs’ argument, they note that they have removed this defense from 

their proposed amended answers, thus rendering moot this issue. (Opp’n 15–16.) Because 

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the Court will grant Defendants an opportunity to amend their answers, which will 

presumably exclude this affirmative defense, the Court DENIES AS MOOT this portion 

of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike.

IV. Eighth Affirmative Defense of Inequitable Conduct

Defendants’ eighth affirmative defense of inequitable conduct alleges that:

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any legal or equitable relief due to their

inequitable conduct before the United States Patent and Trademark Office

regarding the origin and development of Plaintiffs’ patents. The asserted 

patents, U.S. Patent No. 7,793,433 (“the ‘433 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 

8,171,589 (“the ‘589 patent”), are unenforceable due to the inequitable 

conduct of Erkki Hakkala, the sole named inventor of the asserted patents and 

the founder and CEO of Plaintiffs. Mr. Hakkala filed for exceedingly broad 

claims covering subject matter that was unquestionably found in prior art that 

Mr. Hakkala was aware of at the time the patent applications were filed. Mr. 

Hakkala deliberately withheld the existence of this prior art from the United 

States Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”) in order to obtain allowance of 

these broad and plainly invalid claims. Mr. Hakkala also violated his duty of 

candor by failing to disclose material information to the examiner through the 

Information Disclosure Statement.

(Def. ZGI Ans. 10.)

Plaintiffs argue that this affirmative defense fails to meet the heightened pleading 

standard required for pleading inequitable conduct. (MTS 4–7.)

“Inequitable conduct resides in failure to disclose material information, or 

submission of false material information, with an intent to deceive, and those two elements, 

materiality and intent, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Kingsdown Med. 

Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Intent and 

materiality are separate requirements. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 

649 F.3d 1276, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 2011). But-for materiality is required to establish 

inequitable conduct. Id. at 1291–92.

/ / /

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party 

must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” The Federal 

Circuit has held that inequitable conduct must be pled with specificity in accordance with 

Rule 9(b). See Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., 

LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[I]nequitable conduct, while a broader 

concept than fraud, must be pled with particularity.”).

2

“[T]o plead the circumstances of 

inequitable conduct with the requisite particularity under Rule 9(b), the pleading must 

identify the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation 

or omission committed before the PTO.” Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328. A pleading of 

inequitable conduct must include sufficient facts from which a court can “reasonably infer 

that a specific individual both knew of invalidating information that was withheld from the 

PTO and withheld that information with a specific intent to deceive the PTO.” Delano 

Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “A 

reasonable inference is one that is plausible and that flows logically from the facts alleged, 

including any objective indications of candor and good faith.” Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329

n.5.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants fail to plead with particularity the who, what, when, 

where, and how of the material misrepresentation committed before the USPTO. (MTS 5–

7.) Defendants do not argue that their affirmative defenses, as they currently stand, are 

sufficiently pled under this exacting pleading standard. (Opp’n 9.) Rather, Defendants 

argue that “as detailed [in their opposition brief], as well as in the proposed amended 

 

2 Although procedural matters such as motions to dismiss are typically governed by regional circuit law 

rather than Federal Circuit law, the Federal Circuit has expressly held that its law controls over the 

question of whether inequitable conduct has been pled with particularity under Rule 9(b). Central 

Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Adv. Cardiac Sols., P.C., 482 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

(“Whether inequitable conduct has been adequately pled is a procedural matter, but since it bears on an 

issue that pertains to or is unique to patent law, we will apply our own law to the question of whether the 

pleadings were adequate.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Exergen Corp. v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 

575 F.3d 1312, 1326–27 (Fed Cir. 2009) (“[W]e apply our own law, not the law of the regional circuit, to 

the question of whether inequitable conduct has been pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b).”).

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answers, the available information regarding . . . inequitable conduct and fraud on the 

USPTO is plentiful and more than enough to set forth the defenses.” (Id.) Of course, the 

Court cannot consider this information in assessing Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike 

Defendants’ filed Answers. But Defendants will have an opportunity to amend their 

answers to provide this—and other—detail they believe will support a plausible affirmative 

defense of inequitable conduct. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this portion of Plaintiffs’ 

Motion to Strike.3

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 59). However, the Court GRANTS Defendants 

LEAVE TO AMEND their answers to address the pleading deficiencies in their 

affirmative defenses. Accordingly, Defendants SHALL FILE their amended answers on 

or before fourteen days from the date on which this Order is electronically docketed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 5, 2017

 

3 The Court also GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendants’ ninth affirmative defense of fraud on

the USPTO. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ arguments against this affirmative defense mirror their arguments as 

to Defendants’ defense of inequitable conduct. (MTS 4–7.) And Defendants’ response in opposition does 

the same. (Opp’n 9–10.) As discussed, Defendants will have an opportunity to amend their answers to 

include more detail as to their affirmative defense of fraud on the USPTO.

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