Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00066/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00066-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rev. Richard Arno Lee, deceased,

represented by Wanda Lee, wife and

Personal Representative, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-0066-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Two motions to dismiss are pending before the Court: one filed by the State of

Arizona (the “State” or “Arizona”) (Doc. 34) and one filed by Defendants Maricopa County

(the “County”), Detective Brian Mackiewicz, #1227 (“Det. Mackiewicz”), and Sheriff Joseph

Arpaio (“Sheriff Arpaio”) (collectively the “County Defendants”) (Doc. 25). The Court

grants the State’s motion and denies the County Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

The Amended Complaint alleges the following. On April 24, 2008, Plaintiff’s

decedent, Reverend Richard Arno Lee (“Lee”) was arrested for the murder of Douglas

Spencer. At the time of his arrest, Lee was seventy-four years old. He wore dentures and

suffered from a number of other health issues, including diabetes. Det. Mackiewicz, who

interviewed Lee for the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), received a kit

containing Lee’s medications and false teeth. While in custody with Det. Mackiewicz, Lee

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mentioned that he was in pain and requested his false teeth and an examination of his blood

sugar levels. After several more complaints, Det. Mackiewicz stated that he had the

medications and the dentures and promised to talk to the nurse about Lee’s condition. Lee,

however, never received his dentures or other requested medical care. Lee was processed

into the general population of the Maricopa County Towers Jail and shared a cell with two

other inmates. The next day, the State filed criminal charges against Lee. 

Several days later, Lee received a visit from Ms. Lee, the Plaintiff in this action. They

filled out the necessary forms to receive a breathing machine and heart pills. Lee never

received a breathing machine, heart pills, his false teeth, or a diabetes examination, even after

his family made subsequent inquiries about his healthcare. On August 16, 2008, Lee was

released from MCSO custody on bail. Lee died on June 21, 2009, without being prosecuted

for murder.

Plaintiff initiated the instant action. Many of Plaintiff’s nine counts are redundant,

but the Amended Complaint appears to allege two types of federal claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983: (1) violation of Lee’s federal constitutional protection against cruel and unusual

punishment based on Defendants’ failure to provide adequate medical care, (2) violation of

Lee’s federal constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments based

on the officers’ failure to provide Lee with Miranda warnings prior to his questioning and

the right provided to victims under the Arizona law permitting victims to address the Court

in proceedings related to Douglas Spencer’s death. In addition to the federal claims, the

Complaint raises state law claims based on wrongful death and the unconstitutionality of

Arizona’s victims’ rights laws. On July 1, 2010, Plaintiff provided documentary evidence

that she is the personal representative of the estate (Doc. 48). The Court now considers the

motions to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or

a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[;]” it must contain factual

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allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual

allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent

with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

When analyzing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court’s inquiry is generally

“limited to the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th

Cir. 2008). And because Plaintiffis proceeding pro se, theCourt must construe the complaint

liberally. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (“It is settled law that the allegations

of [a pro se plaintiff’s] complaint, however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent

standardsthan formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”) (internal quotations omitted). Legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations, however, are not given a presumption of

truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient

to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DISCUSSION

“To state claim for relief in an action brought under [section] 1983, [plaintiffs] must

[allege] that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source

of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

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conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). “It is well settled that section 1983 ‘imposes liability for

violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising

out of tort law.’” Johnson v. Barker, 799 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Baker,

443 U.S. at 146). 

I. The Eleventh Amendment Bars Claims Against the State.

“Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is immune from suit under state or federal

law by private parties in federal court absent a valid abrogation of that immunity or an

express waiver by the state.” In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2000)

(footnote omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528

U.S. 62 (2000). States retain their immunity against suits by private parties under the

Eleventh Amendment, “regardless of the relief sought.” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).

Plaintiff has brought three claims against the State pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that the State violated Lee’s civil rights protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by implementing the “Victims Bill of Rights” of the

Arizona Constitution. Plaintiff asks the Court to declare the “Victims Bill of Rights” invalid.

 Plaintiff concedes Arizona has not waived its right to immunity, but contends that section

1983 abrogates the State’s immunity to be sued. By its terms, section 1983 applies only to

a “person” acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Supreme

Court has held “that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are

‘persons’ under [section] 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Although, “[s]ection 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil

liberties, . . . it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a

State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. Id. at 66. Because the State is not a person

under section 1983, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to that provision must fail as a matter of law.

Therefore, as section 1983 does not abrogate the State’s immunity, the Court does not

address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against Arizona. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66 (“Congress,

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1

 To the extent Plaintiff raises a claim based on the Confrontation Clause, this claim

fails for the same reason, as Plaintiff was never prosecuted for Douglas Spencer’s murder.

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in passing [section] 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment

immunity.”); Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 1115–16 (barring actions against states absent a waiver

of sovereign immunity).

II. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Against Det. Mackiewicz Based Only on the

Deprivation of Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs.

An individual acting under color of state law is personally liable under section 1983

“only upon a showing of personal participation” in the deprivation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Det. Mackiewicz violated

Lee’s constitutional rights by forcing him to incriminate himself and by being deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs. Although Plaintiff does not state a claim based on

the alleged self-incrimination, Plaintiff adequately states a claim based on the deprivation of

Lee’s medical needs.

A. Self-Incrimination

Plaintiff alleges that Lee was compelled to be a witness against himself in violation

of the Fifth Amendment because Det. Mackiewicz failed to read Lee his Miranda rights prior

to questioning and because Lee was required to attend court hearings where Douglas

Spencer’s family was allowed to speak pursuant to the “Victim’s Bill of Rights” provided

under Arizona law. “Statements compelled by police interrogations of course may not be

used against a defendant at trial, . . . but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a

violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs[.]” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767

(2003). “[Plaintiff] was never made to be a ‘witness’ against himself in violation of the Fifth

Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements were never admitted as

testimony against him in a criminal case. Nor was he ever placed under oath and exposed

to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted).1

 To the contrary, the Amended Complaint alleges that Lee died before the

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government could complete its criminal prosecution. Likewise, even if the fact that Douglas

Spencer’s family spoke about the murder somehow would have violated Lee’s Fifth

Amendment rights under normal circumstances (and Plaintiff cites no authority to suggest

that it would have), no constitutional violation could have occurred here because the

allegedly self-incriminating circumstances were never used against Lee in a criminal case.

Cf. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Det. Mackiewicz

violated Lee’s Fifth Amendment rights.

B. Serious Medical Needs

The remainder of Plaintiff’s claimsfocus on the lack of medical care provided to Lee.

Although Plaintiff has brought a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection

against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process,

the Court construes the Amended Complaint as asserting a Fourteenth Amendment due

process claim. “Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d

1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). “Because pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment, however,

[courts] apply the same standards.” Id. 

A violation of the right to adequate medical care requires alleging “that the officials

acted with deliberate indifference in failing to respond to a serious medical need.” Id. at

1130. In other words, a plaintiff must show (1) a serious medical need and (2) that the

defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2006). This second prong is satisfied by showing a purposeful act or failure to respond

and harm caused by the indifference. Id. Deliberate indifference “may appear when prison

officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown

by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States,

838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 97, 104–05 (1976)).

The indifference to medical needs, however, “must be substantial; a constitutional violation

is not established by negligence or‘an inadvertentfailure to provide adequatemedical care.’”

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2

 It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to raise a claim based on non-medical

conditions of confinement, as the Amended Complaint pleads facts relating to the number

of people sharing Lee’s cell. Such an argument would fail, however. Confinement

conditions are unconstitutional only where there is an “objectively, sufficiently serious”

deprivation and the prison official acts with deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Lee apparently shared his cell with

two other individuals, and Plaintiff offers no legal or factual argument why this would

constitute an “objectively, sufficiently serious” condition.

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Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d at 1310, 1316 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06).

Defendants do not appear to dispute that the Amended Complaintsufficiently alleges

that Lee had a serious medical need for his medicine, breathing treatment, and dentures.

Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether Det. Mackiewicz acted with deliberate

indifference. The Amended Complaint alleges that Lee informed Det. Mackiewicz about the

kit containing his pills and dentures, that Lee needed and requested varioustypes of medical

care, that his family inquired about the medical care multiple times, and that he ultimately

did not receive the medical care he requested. Because the Court must construe the

Amended Complaint broadly, see Hughes, 449 U.S. at 9, a plausible inference is that Det.

Mackiewicz was aware of Lee’s serious medical need for pills, dentures, and other medical

care, but nonethelessrefused to take the actions needed to ensure that adequate medical care

was actually provided. Therefore, Plaintiff adequately alleges that Det. Mackiewicz

purposely failed to respond to Lee’s need for medical care, thus causing Lee further injury.2

C. Qualified Immunity

The Court further rejects Defendants’ assertion that qualified immunity warrants

dismissal of any claims against Det. Mackiewicz. Qualified immunity will shield a defendant

from liability if the plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of a constitutional violation

or if, notwithstanding a constitutional violation, the constitutional right was not clearly

established at the time of the violation. See Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir.

2001) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–05 (2001)). “If a public official could

reasonably have believed that his [or her] actions were legal in light of clearly established

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law and the information he [or she] possessed at the time, then his [or her] conduct falls

within the protective sanctuary of qualified immunity.” Orin, 272 F.3d at 1214. As Plaintiff

has adequately pled a constitutional violation, qualified immunity would apply only if the

constitutional right was not clearly established at the time. As described above, however, it

is settled law that public officials cannot be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious

medical needs by purposely denying treatment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97, 104–05, Jett, 439

F.3d at 1096, Hutchinson, 838 F.2d at 394. The Amended Complaint, read fairly to the pro

se Plaintiff, alleges that Det. Mackiewicz was aware of medical treatment that Lee required,

yet prevented him from receiving it. If true, these facts could constitute a denial of a clearlyestablished constitutional right. Although qualified immunity ultimately may bar claims

against Det. Mackiewicz depending on the facts available at the summary judgment stage,

the Amended Complaint has alleged facts sufficient to avoid dismissal.

III. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Against the County and Sheriff Arpaio.

“[A] municipality can be found liable under [section] 1983 only where the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat Superior or

vicarious liability will not attach under [section] 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95

(1978) (emphasis deleted)). Liability may attach against a municipality in two ways. First,

the municipality itself may violate an individual’s rights through a policy, ordinance,

regulation, or other formal decision. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th

Cir. 2002). Second, in certain circumstances, a municipality may be liable based on its

omissionsif its employee commits a constitutional violation, even if the municipality did not

formally direct the employee to do so. Id. at 1185. Meanwhile, “[a] supervisor is only liable

for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff alleges that the County and Sheriff Arpaio failed to train officers in

administering medical care, resulting in Det. Mackiewicz and other MCSO employees

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denying Lee certain medical care. “[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the

basis for [section] 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of

Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheriff Arpaio, acting as the

final decision maker for Maricopa County, had a policy and practice of failing to teach

officers to recognize when the sick and elderly required certain medical care and how to

administer it properly. As training regarding the health needs of prisoners is inherent in

creating a well-functioning correctional facility, the Amended Complaint fairly alleges that

Sheriff Arpaio and the County were deliberately indifferent to Lee’s medical needs. A

plausible inference further arises that some level of training beyond what was given was

required given Plaintiff’s allegations that repeated requests for medical care were followed

only by repeated failures to provide medical care. The policy of a lack of training may have

manifested itself in Det. Mackiewicz’s alleged failure to ensure that Lee received the medical

care he needed and in other MCSO employees ignoring repeated inquiries from the Lees

regarding medical care. The County Defendants repeatedly assert that Plaintiff must plead

more facts surrounding the training policy, but they do not suggest what additional level of

detail this pro se litigant must allege, at this early stage of litigation, to put the County

Defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them. Accordingly, the Court denies the

County Defendants’ motion regarding Sheriff Arpaio and the County.

IV. Plaintiff May Not Seek Pain and Suffering Damages

Although Section 1983 does not contain a survivorship provision, Section 1988 of the

Civil Rights Act provides that with regard to any matter on which the Act is silent, the

applicable law is the law of the state where the district court is located. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Arizona law disallows pain and suffering damages to survive the death of the person entitled

to those damages. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-3110. Therefore, with respect to Plaintiff’s

federal and state claims, Plaintiff has not pled a claim to receive pain and suffering damages,

but may seek all other damages allowed by law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Arizona (Doc.

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34) is GRANTED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the County

Defendants (Doc. 25) is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. The Motion is

granted only to the extent that (1) Plaintiff alleges a violation of Lee’s right against selfincrimination, and to the extent that (2) Plaintiff seeks damages based on Lee’s pain and

suffering. The Motion is denied in all other respects.

DATED this 6th day of October, 2010.

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