Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01706/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01706-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brian Halstead, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV12-1706 PHX DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Brian Halstead applied for disability and supplemental security income 

benefits pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act on November 1, 2000.1

 

Tr. 79-81, 274-276, 238-245. His claims were denied initially on June 18, 2002 (Tr. 277-

82), and upon reconsideration on September 12, 2002 (Tr. 283-87). Plaintiff was granted 

a hearing in which he appeared before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on 

December 11, 2003. Tr. 60, 17. In an opinion dated March 9, 2004, the ALJ determined 

that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 14-23. 

The ALJ’s March 9, 2004, decision became the Defendant’s final decision when the 

Appeals Council denied review on October 26, 2004. Tr. 7-9. Plaintiff sought judicial 

review of Defendant’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and on August 4, 2005, 

 1

 Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of November 1, 2000, but because there is 

no evidence of any medically determinable impairment prior to March 5, 2002, Plaintiff’s appeal is limited to the portion of the decision finding him not disabled as of March 5, 

2002. Doc. 18 at 7 n.1. 

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the district court granted the parties’ stipulation for remand. Halstead v. Barnhart, No. 

2:04-cv-02608-NVW (Aug. 4, 2005). On remand, Plaintiff was granted a hearing in 

which he appeared before an ALJ on September 12, 2006. Tr. 1416. The ALJ issued an 

unfavorable decision on February 7, 2007. Tr. 1233-1250. In response to Plaintiff’s 

request for review (Tr. 1251-1264), the Appeals Council remanded the matter for further 

proceedings on February 10, 2009 (Tr. 1268-1272). Plaintiff was granted a hearing and 

appeared before an ALJ on June 8, 2010. Tr. 1458. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act in a decision dated 

October 25, 2010. Tr. 310-322. The ALJ’s decision became Defendant’s final decision 

when the Appeals Council denied review on July 12, 2012. Tr. 288-291. Plaintiff then 

commenced this action for judicial review. Doc. 1. For reasons that follow, the Court 

will reverse Defendant’s decision and remand for an award of benefits.2

I. Standard of Review.

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court cannot affirm the 

decision “simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Day v. 

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); see Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. 

 2

 Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied. The parties’ briefing and other submissions have amply addressed the issues raised by the motions, and the Court finds that oral argument will not aid its decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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II. Analysis. 

 For purposes of Social Security benefits determinations, a disability is “the 

inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a five-step 

evaluation. The claimant bears the burden in steps one through four of showing that 

(1) he is not engaged in a substantial gainful activity, (2) he has a severe medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment, and (3) the impairment meets or equals a 

listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precludes him from 

performing his past work.3

 If at any step the Commissioner determines that a claimant is 

or is not disabled, the analysis ends; otherwise it proceeds to step five. The 

Commissioner bears the burden at step five of showing that the claimant has the RFC to 

perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) & 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

 The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since his alleged onset date. Tr. 313. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

suffered from the following severe impairments: depressive disorder not otherwise 

stated, personality disorder not otherwise stated, and a history of amphetamine abuse. Id. 

The ALJ determined at step three that none of these impairments or their combination 

met or equaled a listed impairment. Tr. 313-315. The ALJ then considered the entire 

record and determined that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels with the following non-exertional limitations: mild to moderate 

limitations in terms of cognitive functioning and social interaction; and those “set forth in 

Exhibits 5F and 6F.” Tr. 315. At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not 

 3

 RFC is the most a claimant can do in light of the limitations caused by her impairments. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989); 

20 C.F.R. § 416.945 (a); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). 

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disabled because he was capable of performing his past relevant work. Tr. 322. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to identify and resolve discrepancies 

in the RFC analysis (Doc. 18 at 1-2), improperly weighing medical opinions (id. at 14), 

by failing properly to evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility (id. at 23), and by improperly 

rejecting third party witness testimony (id. at 28). 

 A. The RFC Assessment.

 The ALJ determined that “the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following nonexertional 

limitations: the claimant has mild to moderate limitations in terms of cognitive 

functioning and social interaction. In addition, the specific non-exertional functional 

limitations set forth in Exhibits 5F and 6F are incorporated herein and made a part of the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity assessment.” Tr. 321. Exhibit 5F (Tr. 264-273) 

contains notes from the January 15, 2004, consultative mental evaluation conducted by 

clinical psychologist Dr. David Young. Dr. Young opined that Plaintiff has no 

limitations in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out short, simple instructions 

(Tr. 272), and that his functional limitations are slight with respect to his abilities to 

understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, make judgments on simple 

work-related decisions, interact appropriately with the public, with supervisor(s), and 

with co-workers, respond appropriately to work pressures in a usual work setting, and 

respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting (Tr. 272-273). Exhibit 6F 

(Tr. 1338-1350) contains the June 16, 2009, consultative mental evaluation conducted by 

licensed psychologist Dr. Elliot Salk. Dr. Salk opined that Plaintiff has moderate 

limitations in his ability to understand and remember complex instructions (Tr. 1348), no 

limitation in his ability to carry out simple instructions (id.), and that his functional 

limitations are mild with respect to his abilities to understand and remember simple 

instructions, make judgments on simple work-related decisions, carry out complex 

instructions, make judgments on complex work-related decisions, interact appropriately 

with the public, supervisor(s), and co-workers, respond appropriately to usual work 

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situations and to changes in a routine work setting (Tr. 1348-1349). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment constitutes legal error because the 

ALJ did not identify the limitations in Exhibits 5F and 6F, and failed to resolve 

discrepancies in their limitations. Doc. 18 at 2. For the first argument, Plaintiff cites 

Reddick, 157 F.3d 715, for the proposition that “[a] Court should not have to sift through 

the evidence to ascertain the ALJ’s RFC assessment” (Doc. 18 at 2), but Plaintiff does 

not provide a page cite for this holding and, in any event, the Court does not agree that 

reversible error is a consequence of the fact that the Court must sift through evidence. As 

to the second argument, the Court agrees that there are discrepancies in the limitations set 

forth in the evaluations of Drs. Young and Salk. For instance, Dr. Young opined that 

Plaintiff has no limitation in his ability to understand and remember short, simple 

instructions (Tr. 272), while Dr. Salk concluded that Plaintiff has mild restrictions 

(Tr. 1348). Additionally, while Dr. Young found that Plaintiff has slight limitations in 

his ability to understand and remember detailed instructions (Tr. 272), Dr. Salk found that 

Plaintiff has moderate limitations in his ability to understand and remember complex 

instructions (Tr. 1348). Although there do appear to be conflicts in the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment, the Court concludes that any error is harmless because the ALJ imposed 

more limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC than the evaluations of Drs. Young and Salk required, 

and these additional limitations benefit Plaintiff. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for harmless error, 

which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to 

the ultimate nondisability determination.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). As 

Plaintiff submits (Doc. 18 at 2), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s RFC contained 

greater cognitive functioning and social interaction limitations than set forth in the 

evaluations of Drs. Young and Salk. 

B. Medical Opinion Evidence. 

 “The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 

1041; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996). 

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Regarding the weight that an ALJ should give to a particular medical opinion, the Ninth 

Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, examining physicians, 

and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if 

that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ may reject the opinion 

of a treating or examining physician by making “findings setting forth specific legitimate 

reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.” Id. “The ALJ 

can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. 

 Opinions of examining or consulting physicians alone may constitute substantial 

evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision when they are consistent with other evidence in 

the record. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he reports 

of consultative physicians . . . may serve as substantial evidence.”); Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Opinions of a nonexamining, 

testifying medical advisor may serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by 

other evidence in the record and are consistent with it.”); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (“The 

opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may . . . serve as substantial 

evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other 

evidence in the record.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f) (stating that the opinions of 

non-examining physicians constitute medical evidence). 

 Therapists, like physician’s assistants, are considered “other source” opinions, and 

although not acceptable medical sources, an ALJ must take into account “other source” 

opinion evidence unless he or she expressly determines to disregard it and provides 

germane reasons for doing so. Cole v. Astrue, 395 Fed. Appx. 387, 389 (9th Cir. 2010); 

see also; Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 1. Dr. Kiti Ton, M.D.

 Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Kiti Ton, completed a mental impairment 

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report on June 11, 2002. Tr. 137-140. The report indicated that Plaintiff suffered from 

depression and had a history of anger, fighting, and substance abuse. Tr. 137. Dr. Ton 

opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in his ability to do many work-related 

mental activities. Tr. 137-140. Dr. Ton noted some limitations, such as in his “ability to 

carry out detailed instructions,” and opined that Plaintiff is limited because he needs help 

filling out complicated forms. Tr. 139. As to “ability to maintain attention and 

concentration for extended periods,” Dr. Ton was unsure of Plaintiff’s limitations 

because he “has had trouble holding jobs.” Id. As to his “ability to perform activities 

within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary 

tolerances,” Dr. Ton opined that Plaintiff was limited with respect to transportation 

because his driver’s license is suspended. Id. As to his “ability to complete a normal 

work-day and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and 

to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest 

periods,” Dr. Ton opined that Plaintiff is delusional at times because “he reported men in 

black suits showing up at potential employers,” and that his sleep is poor based on selfreporting. Id. The ALJ accorded significant weight to Dr. Ton’s assessment. Tr. 321. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ overlooked the portion of Dr. Ton’s assessment 

opining that Plaintiff has a limited ability to complete a normal workday and sustain a 

work-pace without interruption from psychologically based symptoms. Doc. 18 at 15. 

According to Plaintiff, had the ALJ accorded this portion of Dr. Ton’s assessment any 

weight, then the ALJ would have been required to find Plaintiff disabled based on the 

vocational expert’s testimony. Id. at 15-16 (citing Tr. 1454). Defendant argues that this 

does not constitute error because although the ALJ did not explicitly discount these 

portions of Dr. Ton’s assessment, Dr. Ton’s report noted that Plaintiff had substance 

abuse problems and, “elsewhere in the decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff denied using 

illicit substances in medical reports subsequent to Dr. Ton’s opinion.” Doc. 19 at 18. 

 The Court reviews “the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings 

offered by the ALJ – not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the 

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adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 

1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); Snell 

v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999)). The rationale provided by Defendant is 

therefore not relevant. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that an ALJ’s 

rejection of testimony is erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence where the 

ALJ has “selectively focused on aspects of [a medical report] which tend to suggest nondisability[.]” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 

Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ did not explain 

why he rejected Dr. Ton’s opinion that Plaintiff has limitations in his ability to complete 

a normal workday, performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and 

length of rest periods. This constitutes legal error. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. 

 2. Dr. Francisco Neufeld, M.D.

 In 2004, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist Dr. Francisco Neufeld completed a 

medical assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related mental activities, which 

indicated that Plaintiff’s degree of functional limitation ranged from mild to severe. 

Tr. 432-433. Dr. Neufeld completed a second assessment on June 24, 2009, which 

indicated that Plaintiff’s degree of functional limitation ranged from mild to severe, with 

no degree of deterioration in personal habits or restriction of daily activities. Tr. 1412-

1413. Dr. Neufeld completed a third assessment on May 26, 2010, which indicated that 

Plaintiff’s degree of functional limitation ranged from mild to severe, with no degree of 

deterioration in personal habits. Tr. 1224-1225. The ALJ rejected these assessments 

because Dr. Neufeld’s progress notes “consistently establish that the claimant’s 

symptoms, overall, were ‘mild’ and his condition ‘clinically stable’ with medication.” 

Tr. 321. Plaintiff argues that this constitutes error because “the record as a whole shows 

symptoms to be much greater than ‘mild.’” Doc. 18 at 18. The Court disagrees. 

 Dr. Neufeld treated Plaintiff from September 21, 2004, through June 10, 2009. 

Tr. 1048, 1351-1352. Dr. Neufeld’s notes from this period consistently indicate that 

Plaintiff’s symptoms ranged from mild to moderate, that he was minimally or much 

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improved, and that his GAF score ranged from 50 to 60. Tr. 1399-1400, 1396-1397, 

1394-1395, 1392-1393, 1390-1391, 1388-1389, 1386-1387, 1384-1385, 1382-1383, 

1378-1379, 1376-1377, 1374-1375, 1048-1049, 1043-1044, 1023-1024, 1015-1016, 

1008-1009, 1005-1006, 993-994, 943-944, 902-903, 898-899, 628-629. Plaintiff argues 

that his 50 to 55 GAF score range is “indicative of moderate to serious symptoms” 

(Doc. 18 at 19), but those scores are indicative of moderate symptoms only.4

 Plaintiff has 

not pointed to anything in Dr. Neufeld’s medical notes that supports his moderately 

severe to severe assessment. The ALJ identified a clear contradiction in Dr. Neufeld’s 

opinion – his medical notes do not support the assessment – and this constitutes a specific 

and legitimate reason to reject Dr. Neufeld’s opinion. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that a contradiction in a treating 

psychologist’s opinion constitutes a specific and legitimate reason to reject the opinion); 

see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. 

 3. Russell Beazer, Treating Therapist. 

Plaintiff’s treating therapist, Russell Beazer, assessed Plaintiff on March 5, 2002, 

and based on this assessment, Mr. Beazer reported that Plaintiff scored 25 out of 30 on a 

mini mental state exam (Tr. 178) and opined that Plaintiff’s global assessment of 

functioning was 40 (Tr. 180). Mr. Beazer diagnosed Plaintiff with psychotic disorder not 

otherwise stated, a mood disorder not otherwise stated, and amphetamine abuse. Tr. 180. 

As to Beazer’s opinion that Plaintiff’s GAF score was 40, the ALJ found that “[c]learly, 

the therapist was relying on the claimant’s allegations in forming this opinion as it is 

inconsistent with the evaluation.” Tr. 316. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s rejection of Mr. Beazer’s opinion constitutes legal 

 

4 The GAF scale ranges from 1 to 100 and reflects a person=s overall 

psychological, social, and occupational functioning. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 598 n.1;

Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). A GAF score of 41 to 50 

indicates severe symptoms or severe difficulty in functioning, while a GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in functioning. See id.

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error. Doc. 18 at 19-20. The Court disagrees. The ALJ offered a specific reason – that 

the opinion placed undue weight on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints – to discount Mr. 

Beazer’s opinion. Tr. 316. Because the Court finds below that the ALJ properly 

discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s rejection of Mr. Beazer’s opinion 

does not constitute legal error. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2001) (“Because the present record supports the ALJ in discounting [the claimant’s] 

credibility, as discussed above, [the ALJ] was free to disregard [an examining 

physician’s] opinion, which was premised on [claimant’s] subjective complaints.”). 

 4. Drs. David Young, Ed.D., and Elliot Salk, Ph.D. 

 The Court summarized the opinions of Drs. Young and Salk above. As to both, 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision to give the opinions substantial weight constitutes 

legal error. Doc. 18 at 20-21. The Court disagrees. 

 The ALJ’s decision to give substantial weight to the opinion of Drs. Young and 

Salk constitutes legal error only if the opinions are not consistent with independent 

clinical findings or other evidence in the record. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. 

Dr. Young’s opinion is consistent with his own independent clinical findings (Tr. 265-

269) and largely confirmed by Dr. Salk (Tr. 1348). Additionally, Dr. Young noted the 

medical records he relied upon in rendering his evaluation (Tr. 264). Dr. Salk’s opinion 

is consistent with his own clinical findings (Tr. 1342-1346) and is largely confirmed by 

Dr. Young’s opinion (Tr. 272-273). The ALJ’s decision to rely on the opinions of 

Drs. Young and Salk does not constitute legal error. 

 5. Dr. Paul Tangeman, Ph.D. 

Dr. Paul Tangeman completed a mental health assessment on June 17, 2002. 

Tr. 184. The assessment indicated that Plaintiff was diagnosed with depression not 

otherwise stated and amphetamine dependence (Tr. 184, 187, 192), that his impairments 

from these disorders were severe but not expected to last 12 months (Tr. 184), and that 

there was insufficient evidence for the period of November 2000 through March 2002 

(id.). Dr. Tangeman’s functional limitation assessment predicted that by March 2003, 

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Plaintiff would have no episodes of decompensation of extended duration, and that he 

would have mild limitations with regard to restriction of activities of daily living, 

difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace. Tr. 194. Dr. Tangeman’s findings were confirmed 

by Dr. Hubert Estes, M.D. Tr. 196. In concluding his step four determination, the ALJ 

noted that the “conclusion is fully supported by the assessments of the state Agency 

medical consultants who conducted a detailed review of the claimant’s medical file and 

concluded that claimant’s impairments would not preclude basic work activity 

(Exhibit 3F).” Tr. 321. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Tangeman’s opinion significant 

weight is legal error because the opinion is speculative and “contrary to the conclusion of 

the ALJ finding that the impairments lasted greater than 12 months.” Doc. 18 at 22. The 

Court does not agree. The ALJ’s citation to Dr. Tangeman’s opinion is ambiguous as to 

what weight, if any, the ALJ afforded the opinion. The Court cannot find that this 

citation, after reaching a definitive determination at step four, constitutes legal error. 

Additionally, because the ALJ imposed more limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC than required 

by Dr. Tangeman’s opinion, any error in the weight given to Dr. Tangeman’s opinion 

constitutes harmless error. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (“the court will not reverse 

an ALJ’s decision for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that 

the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” 

(quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

 6. Dr. Edward Jasinski, Ph.D. 

Dr. Edward Jasinski testified at the June 2010 and December 2006 hearing as an 

impartial psychological expert. Tr. 1420, 1465. Dr. Jasinski testified that Plaintiff did 

not have a disorder or a combination of disorders that meet or equal a listing. Tr. 1466. 

In making his determination at step three, the ALJ accepted and adopted Dr. Jasinski’s 

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opinion.5 Tr. 314. Plaintiff argues that this was error because Dr. Jasinski incorrectly 

discounted Plaintiff’s symptoms because of alleged substance abuse and the ALJ failed to 

address this deficiency in Dr. Jasinski’s opinion. Doc. 18 at 23. The Court does not 

agree. The ALJ adopted Dr. Jasinski’s opinion with respect to step three and not step 

four. As the ALJ noted, to find to the contrary at step three, “the mental impairments 

must result in at least two of the following: marked restriction of activities of daily 

living; marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, 

each of extended duration.” Tr. 313-314. With respect to the ALJ’s decision at step 

three, under which the ALJ adopted Dr. Jasinski’s opinion, Plaintiff has not pointed to 

legal error. The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision at step three is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

 C. Plaintiff’s Testimony. 

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, 

and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the extent they are inconsistent 

with the RFC assessment. Tr. 320. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ evaluated 

Plaintiff’s testimony using the two-step analysis established by the Ninth Circuit. See 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Applying the test of Cotton v. 

Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff’s 

impairments could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. Tr. 320. Given this 

conclusion, and because there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to 

present “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff not entirely credible. 

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 The ALJ appears to have referred to Dr. Jasinski initially as “Dr. David Jarmon, Ph.D.” Tr. 313. The ALJ describes “Dr. Jarmon’s” testimony, and then states that “[i]n making this finding, the [sic] Dr. Jasinski also considered whether the ‘paragraph B’ criteria are satisfied.” Id. There is no other reference to “Dr. Jarmon” in the ALJ’s 

opinion. Defendant argues that reference to Dr. Jarmon is a typographical error that does 

not significantly detract from the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 19 at 19 n.4. Plaintiff submits in 

his reply brief that “it is unknown if this was a typographical error, given the all other [sic] errors in the record.” Doc. 23 at 10. The Court agrees with Defendant. 

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Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. This clear and convincing standard “is the most demanding 

required in Social Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 

924 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ found “claimant credible to the extent he alleges some impairment in 

terms of cognition and social interaction,” and reduced his RFC “to recognize and 

accommodate these limitations.” Tr. 321. The ALJ was unable, however, “to find 

credible evidence of disabling symptoms of such frequency, duration, or intensity as to 

prevent claimant from sustaining basic work activity consistent with the residual 

functional capacity established in this case.” Tr. 321. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected his subjective complaints. 

Doc. 18 at 24-28. The Court disagrees. In discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, 

the ALJ made the following findings: 

the claimant is limited in his ability to engage in some work-related activity 

due to mental impairment, but not to the extent alleged. The record also 

supports that the claimant’s symptoms and limitations have fluctuated from 

mild to moderate, but were never severe or marked. Further, the record 

establishes that claimant’s mental impairments are manageable with 

medication and continued treatment. Specifically, the record supports that 

when the claimant is medication compliant, his mental condition is 

generally stable. 

Tr. 320. 

 The ALJ provided a lengthy evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical records. Tr. 316-

320. That evaluation clearly supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s symptoms are not 

severe or marked, particularly when he is medication compliant. To the extent Plaintiff 

alleges otherwise, the objective medical evidence does not comport with those 

complaints. The ALJ’s extensive review and recitation of Plaintiff’s medical history, 

which demonstrated nothing more than mild to moderate impairments that were largely 

manageable through medication, provided clear and convincing reasons – supported by 

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substantial evidence – for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaint testimony. This 

does not constitute legal error. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 

1155, 1161 (9th Cir.2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis 

for rejecting the claimant's subjective testimony.”) (citation omitted); Batson v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir.2004) (lack of objective medical 

evidence supporting claimant's allegations supported ALJ’s finding that claimant was not 

credible). 

D. Third Party Witness Testimony.

 Plaintiff’s mother provided testimony indicating that Plaintiff has social 

functioning difficulties and difficulties with his memory, concentration, and task 

completion. Tr. 364-372. The ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s mother’s “report[ing] that the 

claimant prepared meals and worked on his car.” Tr. 314. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s 

failure to mention his mother’s testimony and failure to give germane reasons for 

rejecting the testimony constitutes legal error. Doc. 18 at 29. Defendant argues that any 

error in this respect is harmless because Plaintiff’s mother’s testimony mirrored 

Plaintiff’s own testimony and the ALJ found that Plaintiff lacked credibility. Doc. 19 at 

15. The Court agrees. Having found that the ALJ did not err in discrediting Plaintiff’s 

testimony, the Court finds that the ALJ’s failure to give a specific reason for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s mother’s testimony, which mirrored Plaintiff’s own testimony, is harmless. 

See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1117-22 (9th Cir. 2012). 

IV. Remedy. 

 The Court has the discretion to remand the case for further development of the 

record or for an award benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 

1173-74 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff asks the Court to consider granting him disability 

status based on his “subjective complaint testimony and treating medical source 

opinion[.]” Doc. 18 at 29. As explained above, however, the ALJ did not err in rejecting 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The only error was that with respect to Dr. Ton’s 

opinion. 

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 The Ninth Circuit has held that evidence should be credited as true, and an action 

remanded for an award of benefits, where three conditions are met: the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, no outstanding issue remains 

that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and it is clear 

from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were the 

rejected evidence credited as true. See, e.g., Varney v. Sec’y of Health and Human 

Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 As to Dr. Ton’s opinion that Plaintiff is limited in his “ability to complete a 

normal work-day and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based 

symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and 

length of rest periods” (Tr. 139), the Court concludes that it need not be credited as true 

on remand. The credit-as-true rule applied in Varney and its progeny is “specifically 

limited to cases ‘where there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

proper disability determination can be made[.]’” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593 

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Varney, 859 F.2d at 1401). Dr. Ton’s opinion about Plaintiff’s 

ability to complete a normal workday at a consistent pace is cryptic, based on information 

more than a decade old, and somewhat ambiguous. Tr. 139. The opinion does not 

specify the degree of limitation, and instead states only that Plaintiff is limited to the 

extent that he is “delusional at times” and that his “sleep is poor.” Id. Although the 

vocational expert testified that an individual “unable to complete a normal workday and 

workweek without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms, and to perform at 

a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods” would not 

be able to perform Plaintiff’s past work (Tr. 1454), Dr. Ton did not opine that Plaintiff is 

“unable” to complete a normal workday at a consistent pace. Accordingly, it is not clear 

from the record that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled if the rejected 

portion of Dr. Ton’s opinion were credited as true. For this reason, the Court will remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

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IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendant=s decision denying benefits is reversed. 

 2. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in this matter. 

 Dated this 11th day of July, 2013. 

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