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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 1, 2004 Decided December 3, 2004

No. 02-7126

REBA ALEGRIA, AS NEXT FRIEND OF THE MINOR CHILD,

ALFONSO ALEGRIA ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02582)

Marc B. Tucker argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were Thomas V.M. Linguanti, Carl W. Hampe,

Marc B. Tucker, Robert I. Berlow, Myrna L. Fawcett and

Arthur H. Fawcett.

Donna M. Murasky, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-7126 Document #863284 Filed: 12/03/2004 Page 1 of 12
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cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Robert J.

Spagnoletti, Attorney General, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General.

Alice K. Nelson, Ankur Goel, and Francine A. Hochberg

were on the brief for amicus curiae Coalition of Parent and

Attorney Advocates, et al.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (‘‘IDEA’’), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2000),

provides for an award of attorneys’ fees to a ‘‘prevailing

party,’’ id. § 1415(i)(3)(B), a term the Supreme Court has

construed in the context of other fee-shifting statutes to

require judicial imprimatur on an enforceable judgment or

consent order. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v.

W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604–05

(2000). The district court denied appellants’ requests for

awards of attorneys’ fees for private settlements reached

prior to administrative hearings on special education placements. Appellants contend this was error because the purpose and substantive rights created by the IDEA inform the

meaning of ‘‘prevailing party,’’ and the statutory text, which

carves out a specific exception to the grant of attorneys’ fees

after a settlement offer, indicates Congress intended to allow

the recovery of attorneys’ fees for private settlements as an

incentive for the prompt resolution of disputes. We agree

that appellants’ interpretation of the IDEA’s fee-shifting provisions is plausible and supported by text in the IDEA.

However, appellants concede that the restrictions on attorneys’ fees also can be plausibly interpreted as curtailing

excessive fees, and as such does not expand the definition of

‘‘prevailing party’’ beyond that adopted in Buckhannon. In

the absence of clear evidence that Congress intended the

IDEA’s fee eligibility to be treated differently than other feeshifting statutes, and specifically, to allow awards of attorneys’ fees for private settlements, we hold that appellants fail

to overcome the presumption that Buckhannon applies. Accordingly, we affirm.

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I.

Congress enacted the IDEA in 1975 to ensure that children

with disabilities have available to them a ‘‘free appropriate

public education.’’ 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To enable

parents to obtain special education services for their children

with disabilities, the IDEA requires states and the District of

Columbia to provide various ‘‘procedural safeguards.’’ Id.

§ 1415(a). These safeguards include an opportunity for mediation, id. § 1415(b)(5); a complaint process, id. § 1415(b)(6),

with the right to an ‘‘impartial due process hearing’’ before

the state or local education agency regarding such complaints,

id. § 1415(f)(1); and a right of review by the state agency of

a local agency’s determination, id. § 1415(g). During the

course of ‘‘any administrative proceeding,’’ parents have ‘‘the

right to be accompanied and advised by counsel.’’ Id.

§ 1415(h)(1). ‘‘Any party aggrieved’’ by the final outcome of

the administrative process may seek judicial review in state

or federal district court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). ‘‘[T]he court, in

its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of

the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the

prevailing party.’’ Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

Underlying appellants’ requests for an award of attorneys’

fees are proceedings involving minor children who are students in the District of Columbia Public Schools eligible for

special education under the IDEA. They or their parents,

guardians, or court-appointed advocates sought provision by

the District of Columbia Public Schools of special education

placements. Their claims were resolved through a series of

administrative hearings and settlement agreements. They

then sued in court for an award of attorneys’ fees at the

prevailing rate in the community, experts’ costs, and interest.

The district court denied their motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims resolved through preadministrative hearing settlement agreements (‘‘private settlements’’), ruling that the parties to such claims were not

prevailing parties under Buckhannon and therefore were

ineligible for an award of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA.

An appeal was noted from the district court’s conditional

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order of September 9, 2002; it is procedurally proper because

that order became final on November 8, 2002. See Sacks v.

Rothberg, 845 F.2d 1098, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Our review

of the district court’s denial of summary judgment is de novo.

Cicippio–Puleo v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1031

(D.C. Cir. 2004).

II.

To demonstrate that they are eligible for awards of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA, appellants must provide ‘‘some

good reason’’ not to apply Buckhannon’s analysis of feeshifting statutes. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union

v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see

also Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 25–26 (1st Cir.

2004); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 475

(7th Cir. 2003). As the decisions of five other circuit courts of

appeals demonstrate, this burden is not easily met.1

In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court spoke broadly with

regard to fee-shifting statutes. While the fee requests before

the Court arose under provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees to a ‘‘prevailing

party,’’ 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(c)(2), 12205 (2000), the Court observed that ‘‘[n]umerous federal statutes’’ similarly authorized

fee awards and that it has ‘‘interpreted these fee-shifting

provisions consistently.’’ Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600, 603

n.4 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983)).

Viewing the term ‘‘prevailing party’’ to be ‘‘a legal term of

art,’’ id. at 603, the Court held it did not ‘‘include[ ] a party

that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court1 See Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d

857 (9th Cir. 2004); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.

2004); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469 (7th Cir.

2003); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545 (3d

Cir. 2003); J.C. v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2002);

cf. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2002). Contra

Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002).

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ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the

desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary

change in the defendant’s conduct,’’ id. at 600. The Court

observed that it had never approved an award of attorneys’

fees without formal judicial action. Id. at 606. ‘‘Private

settlements,’’ the Court noted, ‘‘do not entail the judicial

approval and oversight involved in consent decrees,’’ and

‘‘federal jurisdiction to enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the agreement

are incorporated into the order of dismissal.’’ Id. at 604 n.7.

Stating that its precedent ‘‘counsel[s] against holding that the

term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees

without a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of

the parties,’’ id. at 605, the Court gave short shrift to

ambiguous legislative history and to policy arguments unsupported by empirical evidence, ‘‘given the clear meaning of

‘prevailing party,’ ’’ id. at 607–08, 610.

This court thus has applied Buckhannon broadly. In Oil,

Chemical & Atomic Workers, the court treated the phrase

‘‘substantially prevailed’’ in the Freedom of Information Act

(‘‘FOIA’’), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (2000), as ‘‘synonymous’’

with ‘‘prevailing party,’’ in denying an award of attorneys’

fees for a settlement agreement. 288 F.3d at 455. The court

held that the settlement, in the form of a stipulation and

order of dismissal signed by a judge, ‘‘did not meaningfully

alter the legal relationship of the parties’’ because ‘‘[i]ts only

effect was to dismiss the union’s lawsuit with a court order

when no court order was needed.’’ Id. at 458. Therefore, the

requestor of fees had not ‘‘ ‘been awarded some relief by [a]

court,’ either in a judgment on the merits or in a courtordered consent decree,’’ and was ineligible for fees. Id. at

457 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603); see also Thomas

v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 330 F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

While acknowledging that ‘‘some good reason’’ could rebut

the presumption that Buckhannon controlled, the court saw

nothing in the statutory text or legislative history to suggest

Congress intended FOIA fee awards to be treated differently

than those interpreted in Buckhannon. Oil, Chem. & Atomic

Workers, 288 F.3d at 455–56. To date, this court has declined

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to follow Buckhannon only where controlling Supreme Court

precedent, which Buckhannon did not explicitly overrule,

interpreted a fee-shifting provision allowing an award of

attorneys’ fees ‘‘whenever [the court] determines that such

award is appropriate,’’ 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2000), to mean, in

light of a clear statement in the legislative history, that

Congress intended to authorize attorneys’ fees for ‘‘legitimate’’ lawsuits that ‘‘forced defendants to abandon illegal

conduct, although without a formal court order.’’ Sierra Club

v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 n.8 (1983)).

Nevertheless, appellants contend they meet their burden.

Although nothing in the plain text of the IDEA expressly

indicates that Congress intended a ‘‘prevailing party’’ to

include those parties who enter private settlements, appellants maintain that as a matter of statutory construction

there is ‘‘some good reason,’’ Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers,

288 F.3d at 455, to conclude that eligibility for fees under the

IDEA differs from the fee-shifting statutes in Buckhannon.

Appellants’ purposive interpretation of the IDEA has been

rejected by other circuits. E.g., Doe, 358 F.3d at 29; T.D.,

349 F.3d at 477. Here, appellants rely in part on the IDEA’s

purpose to ensure a ‘‘free appropriate public education,’’ 20

U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Because parents can vindicate their

substantive rights and those of their children through settlement, appellants contend that the IDEA cannot be read to

exclude attorneys’ fees when settlement occurs. However,

although the ‘‘IDEA guarantees the right to a free education,

[ ] ‘it does not explicitly guarantee the right to attorney’s fees

incurred in pursuit of that education.’ ’’ Doe, 358 F.3d at 29

(quoting T.D., 349 F.3d at 477). Therefore, relying on this

purpose is insufficient to overcome the presumption that

Buckhannon applies.

Appellants also rely on the IDEA’s second stated purpose

‘‘to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and

parents of such children are protected.’’ Id. § 1400(d)(1)(B).

To this end, Congress included various procedural safeguards

in the IDEA, including notice of the right to attorneys’ fees,

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id. § 1415(d)(2)(M), to enable ‘‘full participation of the parents

and proper resolution of substantive disagreements.’’ See

Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368

(1985). Allowing for the award of attorneys’ fees for private

settlements could protect children by facilitating efforts to

obtain early legal representation and prompt placements, as

appellants suggest. However, appellants cannot show that

the right to attorneys’ fees must apply to private settlements

in order for the IDEA’s purpose to be fulfilled. To the extent

that the absence of such awards may discourage representation or settlement, such effects are insufficient to overcome

the presumption established by Buckhannon as Congress

may have fulfilled the IDEA’s purpose by creating the administrative scheme itself and allowing the award of attorneys’

fees at the administrative hearing and judicial stages.

Appellants’ other statutory argument is based on

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i),2

 which denies awards of attorneys’ fees to

those who reject a written settlement offer and obtain no

greater relief from a hearing officer or judge, and

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii)3

, which limits fees for individualized edu2 Section 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) provides:

Attorneys’ fees may not be awarded and related costs may not

be reimbursed in any action or proceeding under this section

for services performed subsequent to the time of a written

offer of settlement to a parent if—

(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an

administrative proceeding, at any time more than 10 days

before the proceeding begins;

(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and

(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that

the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement.

3 Section 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) provides:

Attorneys’ fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting of

the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of

an administrative proceeding or judicial action, or, at the

discretion of the State, for a mediation described in subsection

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cation programs (‘‘IEP’’) meetings. Other circuits have dismissed reliance on these provisions, observing that they ‘‘do

not inform anything about the meaning of the term ‘prevailing party’ in the IDEA because they are relevant only after a

plaintiff has been deemed a ‘prevailing party.’ ’’ T.D., 349

F.3d at 476; accord Doe, 358 F.3d at 26–27. To the extent

that appellants rely on the canon of statutory construction,

expresio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., when Congress

enacts specific limitations in a general statute it is presumed

to allow other circumstances not included in those limitations,

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Labor (‘‘NAM’’), 962 F. Supp.

191, 196 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d, 159 F.3d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we

agree with our sister circuits.

Appellants contend that ‘‘[b]y carving out a specific exception to the grant of attorneys’ fees after a settlement offer,

[Congress used] TTT language, [that] as a matter of statutory

construction, allows for fees to be awarded to parents who

succeed in settlement in the first place.’’ Appellants’ Br. at

30. Unless fees are allowed for private settlements, appellants maintain, the restrictions on fee awards in

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i), (ii) would be superfluous. But, applied

here, expresio unius does not demand the interpretation

appellants advance. Expresio unius shows only that the

IDEA allows fee awards to those who ultimately prevail at an

administrative hearing or in a court proceeding and who have

not rejected better settlement offers, a showing that belies

appellants’ superfluity contention. As the District of Columbia points out, nothing in NAM, 159 F.3d at 597, would

‘‘justify interpreting [§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)], applicable only to

parents who secure a favorable decision on the merits, as

textual evidence that ‘prevailing party’ includes parents who

settle their claims.’’ Appellee’s Br. at 21. In NAM, the court

merely construed the definition of ‘‘association’’ according to

its terms and declined to narrow the scope of that general

provision by reference to a partial exemption from it. 159

F.3d at 600.

(e) of this section that is conducted prior to the filing of a

complaint under subsection (b)(6) or (k) of this section.

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Neither is appellant’s reading of § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) demanded. As the Seventh Circuit observed: ‘‘if a party pursues an

unsuccessful mediation and eventually obtains a victory with

judicial imprimatur, then he may recover attorney’s fees for

the unsuccessful mediation if it occurred [before] the filing of

a complaint.’’ T.D., 349 F.3d at 476. This, too, indicates that

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) is not rendered superfluous if those who

enter into private settlements are ineligible for awards of

attorneys’ fees.

However, appellants’ reliance on § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) also

turns on the implication of viewing it as a means by which

Congress intended to provide an incentive for settlements.

As appellants explained during oral argument,

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) was Congress’s means of encouraging settlements in order to carry out the IDEA’s purpose to enable

children with disabilities to receive an appropriate education

promptly, so as to ‘‘prepare them for employment and independent living.’’ Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A). If fees for private

settlements are permitted, § 1415(3)(D)(i) would encourage

parents to accept good settlement offers from school districts

to avoid the risk of facing additional attorneys’ costs after an

administrative or court hearing; it also would encourage the

District of Columbia to make good settlement offers, and

thereby avoid having to pay larger awards of attorneys’ fees

after hearings. By contrast, appellants explained, applying

Buckhannon to the IDEA would undermine

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)’s role in encouraging settlements: A parent

who refuses a written offer to settle a complaint, and later

prevails at an administrative hearing or in court but obtains a

result that is not more favorable than the written settlement

offer, would still be eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees for

work performed prior to the settlement offer, whereas those

parents who accept settlement offers would be ineligible for

any award of attorneys’ fees. But even if application of

Buckhannon will reduce the incentive to settle, that is insufficient to overcome Buckhannon’s powerful presumption about

what ‘‘prevailing party’’ means.

Appellants’ interpretation of § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) is hardly unreasonable. In Spiegler v. District of Columbia, 866 F.2d

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461, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1989), (citing 121 Cong. Rec. 37,416 (1975)

(statement of Sen. Williams)), the court acknowledged that

Congress ‘‘intended to ensure prompt resolution of disputes

regarding appropriate education for handicapped children.’’

The IDEA’s text offers some support for the focus on the

incentive role that Congress intended for § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).

Section 1415(i)(3)(D)’s provisions underscore the desirability

of prompt placements by prohibiting awards of attorneys’ fees

for prehearing IEP meetings unless such meetings are conducted prior to the filing of a complaint, or where a settlement offer is made early, the parents fail to accept it within

ten days, and the relief in the offer is more favorable than

that later obtained. The only exception is where a parent

who is a ‘‘prevailing party’’ was ‘‘substantially justified in

rejecting the settlement offer.’’ Id. § 1415(i)(3)(E). In addition, § 1415(i)(3)(F), (G) reduces awards of attorneys’ fees if a

parent unreasonably protracts final resolution of the disputed

claim for placement but eliminates such reductions if the

school district unreasonably protracts final resolution. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 68,4

 on which § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) was patterned,

‘‘express[es] a clear policy of favoring settlement of all lawsuits.’’ Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985).

The problem with appellants’ interpretation of

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) is not a matter of its plausibility, however.

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 provides in pertinent part:

At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party

defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an

offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party

for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer,

with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of

the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer

is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of

acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted

shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment

finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the

offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making

of the offer.

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Rather it is due to the fact that, as appellants concede, there

is another plausible interpretation of this provision that is

consistent with Buckhannon, namely that urged by the District of Columbia and adopted by other circuits. Under this

interpretation, § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i), and the other provisions limiting fees, ‘‘ ‘define situations in which attorney’s fees may be

prohibited or reduced’ even for ‘prevailing parties.’ ’’ T.D.,

349 F.3d at 476 (quoting John T., 318 F.3d at 557). In

enacting § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i), the District of Columbia contends,

Congress incorporated into the IDEA the provisions of Fed.

R. Civ. P. 68 simply to reduce the amount of fee awards in an

administrative hearing or court proceeding, if the relief obtained is not more favorable than a timely written offer of

settlement by the Public Schools. Therefore, following Buckhannon to preclude awards of attorneys’ fees for private

settlements would not undermine § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).

The District of Columbia’s interpretation is not barred by

the statutory text. Even assuming appellants’ incentive interpretation would be more likely to accomplish Congress’s

goal of ensuring prompt special education placements, the

District’s interpretation is a plausible view of Congress’s

intent. See T.D., 349 F.3d at 476; John T., 318 F.3d at 557.

Because there are two plausible statutory interpretations of

eligibility for awards of attorneys’ fees under the IDEA, one

of which is consistent with Buckhannon, we held that appellants’ textual arguments fail to provide ‘‘some good reason,’’

Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 455, not to follow

Buckhannon.

Appellants’ other contentions, even considered in conjunction with their statutory arguments, also fail to provide ‘‘some

good reason.’’ They maintain that by 1997, when Congress

reenacted the IDEA, the courts of appeals and district courts

had interpreted the IDEA to allow the award of attorneys’

fees for private settlements. Congress is ‘‘presumed to be

aware’’ of the circuit and district courts’ interpretation and to

have ‘‘adopt[ed] that interpretation’’ when it re-enacted the

IDEA ‘‘without change.’’ Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580

(1978). However, their re-enactment argument essentially revives the catalyst theory rejected in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at

605.

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Appellants’ reliance on the cap on awards of attorneys’ fees

under the IDEA in the Appropriations Acts for the District of

Columbia for fiscal years 1998–2004, e.g., Pub. L. No. 108–

199, 118 Stat. 141 (2004), is misplaced. The D.C. Appropriations Acts do not amend the IDEA and offer no insight into

congressional intent regarding fee awards for private settlements under the IDEA.

Amicus’ reasons for not following Buckhannon are no more

persuasive. First, Amicus points to anomalies that would

result if attorneys’ fees are unavailable under the IDEA for

private settlements. Assuming such policy arguments may

be considered, see Doe, 358 F.3d at 29 (citing Buckhannon,

532 U.S. at 610), the empirical evidence on which Amicus

relies is not part of the record on appeal. Amicus refers to a

Report by the District of Columbia Auditor that, Amicus

asserts, shows that the number of administrative hearings has

increased from 28% in 2001 to 59% in 2002, and that settlements have decreased by nearly 60%, and in which it is stated

that D.C. Public Schools ‘‘recognizes that if attorneys’ fees

are unavailable there is ‘a clear disincentive’ to alternative

dispute resolution.’’ Amicus Br. at 8 (quoting D.C. Auditor’s

Report at 44). Without examining the Auditor’s Report, the

court cannot evaluate the context of the Auditor’s conclusions.

Second, Amicus expresses concern about the obstacle to

judicial imprimatur for parents who enter private settlements

as part of the mandatory ‘‘administrative process,’’ for which,

Amicus contends, fees are expressly authorized. The District

of Columbia has eliminated the basis for Amicus’ concern by

treating parents who prevail at administrative hearings as

prevailing parties under § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i). Appellee’s Br. at

19.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment denying appellants’

requests for awards of attorneys’ fees for private settlements

under the IDEA.

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