Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00991/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALEXANDER LEROY, #266237, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

) CASE NO. 1:11-CV-991-TMH

) [WO]

)

J. C. GILES, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Alexander Leroy [“Leroy”], a state inmate, on November 13, 2011. In this

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petition, Leroy challenges a conviction for trafficking in marijuana imposed upon him by

the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama on May 13, 2009. The trial courtsentenced

Leroy on June 16, 2009 to twenty years imprisonment. This conviction and sentence

became final by operation of law in February of 2010.

Pursuant to the orders of this court, the respondents filed answers in which they

The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to 1

prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173

F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11 Cir. 1993). Although the th th

court received the instant habeas petition on November 21, 2011, a review of the petition indicates that Leroy

submitted it to prison officials for mailing November 13, 2011. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief -

Doc. No. 1 at 15. In light of the foregoing, the court considers November 13, 2011 as the date of filing. 

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argue that this federal habeas petition is barred by the one-year period of limitation

applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The respondents

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contend that because Leroy’s controlled substance conviction became final in 2010 -- after

the effective date of the statute of limitations -- Leroy must have filed his § 2254 petition

within a year of his conviction becoming final, exclusive of the time that any properly filed

state post-conviction action related to the conviction remained pending in the state courts.

The respondents acknowledge that Leroy filed a state post-conviction petition under Rule

32, Ala.R.Cr.P., with the Circuit Court of Houston County on March 3, 2011. However,

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the respondents maintain that this Rule 32 petition failed to toll the federal period of

limitation because the petition was not filed within the one-year period of limitation

required by state law, see Respondents’ Exhibit E (Trial Court Order Denying Rule 32

Petition) - Doc. No. 10-5, and, therefore, the state petition was not “properly filed” as

required by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for purposes of statutory tolling.

Subsection (d) was added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the

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“AEDPA”). This Act became effective on April 24, 1996.

The Rule 32 petition establishes that Leroy executed the petition on March 3, 2011. Thus, this date

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is the earliest date on which Leroy could have submitted the petition to prison officials for mailing. 

Respondents’ Exhibit D - Doc. No. 10-4 at 7. As previously noted, a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed

in federal cases the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271-272.

“Alabama courts have [adopted the mailbox rule and] held that a pro se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is

considered to have ‘filed’ a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari when

those documents are given to prison officials for mailing.” Ex parte Allen, 825 So.2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002);

Holland v. State, 621 So.2d 373, 375 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (“[A] pro se incarcerated petitioner ‘files’ a Rule

32 petition when he hands the petition over to prison authorities for mailing.”). Consequently, the prison

mailbox rule applies to pro se Rule 32 petitions filed in the state courts of Alabama and March 3, 2011 is

therefore the appropriate date of filing for Leroy’s Rule 32 petition. 

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Respondents’ Answer - Doc. No. 10 at 5; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125

S.Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005) (“For purposes of determining what are ‘filing’ conditions, there

is an obvious distinction between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition

and a court’s ability to consider that petition, and the type of ‘rule of decision’ procedural

bars at issue in Artuz [v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000)],

which go to the ability to obtain relief.... [I]t must be the case that a petition that cannot

even be initiated or considered due to the failure to include a timely claim is not ‘properly

filed.’... For these reasons, we hold that time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’

conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner’s [state post-conviction] petition as

untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and [the petitioner] is not entitled to statutory tolling

[of the limitation period] under § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 128 S.Ct. 7,

4 (2007) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of

the matter’ for purposes of[statutory tolling of the limitation period under] § 2244(d)(2).”);

Sweet v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1317 (11 Cir. 2006) (An

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untimely collateral motion “was not ‘properly filed’ under § 2244(d), and it could not toll

the federal one-year period of limitation.”).

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The records of the state courts demonstrate that the Rule 32 petition was deemed untimely as to all

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claims presented by Leroy with the exception of the claim that his sentence was not authorized by law, a

jurisdictional claim which is notsubject to the state period of limitation. See Rule 32.2(c), Ala.R.Cr.P. With

respect to this claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the claim lacked merit. 

Respondents’ Exhibit C -Doc. No. 10-3 at 3. 

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It is likewise clear that Leroy’s Rule 32 petition was filed after expiration of the

federal limitation period and, consequently, the petition did not serve to toll the one-year

period of limitation because the state petition was not “pending” as required by the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for purposes of tolling the time period. Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991, 121 S.Ct. 481,

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148 L.Ed.2d 454 (2000) (“[E]ven ‘properly filed’ state-court petitions must be ‘pending’

[during the one-year period of limitation] in order to toll the limitations period. A state

court petition ... that is filed following the expiration of the limitations period cannot toll

that period because there is no period remaining to be tolled.”); Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d

1377, 1381 (11 Cir. 2003) (“While a ‘properly filed’ application for post-conviction relief

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tolls the statute of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of limitations once the

limitations period has expired. In other words, the tolling provision does not operate to

revive the one-year limitations period if such period has expired.”); Tinker v. Moore, 255

F.3d 1331, 1335 n.4 (11 Cir. 2001) (“[A] properly filed petition in state court only tolls

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the time remaining within the federal limitation period.”).

Absent tolling or a delayed start date, the record establishes that Leroy filed his

federal habeas petition after expiration of § 2254’s one-year period of limitation. The court

therefore entered an order advising Leroy that he failed to file his federal habeas petition

within the one-year limitation period established by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). Order of

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January 5, 2012 - Doc. No. 11. This order also provided Leroy an opportunity to show

cause why his habeas petition should not be barred from review by this court as untimely

filed. In response to this order, Leroy asserts that: (i) He is entitled to equitable tolling of

the limitation period until receipt of documents from appellate counsel for use in his Rule

32 petition; (ii) Counsel’s delay in providing the documents to him “constitutes the type

of [state action] impediment warranting [invocation] of” the later triggering date set forth

in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1)(B), i.e., the limitation period should not begin to run until he

received documents relevant to his conviction from appellate counsel on February 27,

2011; and (iii) He did not understand the law regarding the documents necessary to filing

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a Rule 32 petition. Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 14 at 2-3.

Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties, the undisputed state court record

and applicable federal law, the court determines that no evidentiary hearing is required,

Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and

concludes that the present habeas petition is due to be denied as Leroy failed to file the

petition within the applicable one-year period of limitation.

II. DISCUSSION

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 became effective on

April 24, 1996 and amended the habeas corpus statute to include a one-year period of

Leroy advises that he retained counsel to represent him on direct appeal of his conviction. 5

Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 14 at 2.

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limitation on petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This limitation period is

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides that:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newlyrecognized bythe Supreme Court andmade retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

Leroy maintains that the action of appellate counsel in delaying provision of

documentsto himfor use in preparing/filing hisRule 32 petition establishes an impediment

created by State action violative of his constitutional rights which prevented him from

timely filing his federal habeas petition. Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 14 at 2. He

therefore argues that under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) the limitation period did not begin

to run until he received the documents on February 27, 2011. Id. at 2-3. This argument

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is without merit because the action of retained counsel about which Leroy complains does

not constitute state action. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (attorney who

represents defendant in criminal proceedings does not act under color of state law); Mills

v. Criminal District Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5 Cir. 1988) (“[P]rivate attorneys,

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even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors....”). Consequently, the start

date of the limitation period allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) for an “impediment

to filing an application [for writ of habeas corpus] created by State action” is not

warranted.

In light of the foregoing, the applicable provision of the statute directs that the

limitation period begins to run at the conclusion of direct review or upon expiration of the

time for seeking direct review, whichever is later. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Where a

petitioner preserves his right to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court, the statute of limitations is tolled during the ninety-day period in which

such action may be undertaken. Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000) (“A th

judgment does not become ‘final by the conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of

the time for seeking such review,’ see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court

has had an opportunity to review the case or the time for seeking review has expired.”).

Accordingly, a state court judgment of conviction becomes final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244

when the Supreme Court denies certiorari or the time to apply for certiorari expires. Id.

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On May 13, 2009, Leroy entered a guilty plea before the Circuit Court of Houston

County, Alabama to trafficking in marijuana. The trial court sentenced Leroy to twenty

years imprisonment on June 16, 2009. Leroy filed a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence. On January 22, 2010, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a

memorandum opinion affirming Leroy’s trafficking conviction. Respondents’ Exhibit A -

Doc. No. 10-1. Leroy did not seek further appellate review of his conviction. Hence, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued the certificate of judgment on February 10,

2010. Since Leroy failed to fully exhaust the direct appeal process, he could not petition

the United States Supreme Court for review of his conviction. By operation of law,

Leroy’s trafficking in marijuana conviction became final, at the latest, on February 10,

2010 -- upon issuance of the certificate of judgment -- and the one-year limitation period

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) began to run on February 11, 2010. In the absence

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of judicially prescribed equitable tolling or statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),

the limitation period expired on February 11, 2011.

1. Equitable Tolling. Case law directsthat the limitation period “may be equitably

tolled” on grounds apart from those specified in the habeas statute “when a movant

untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and

unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 Cir.

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In computing the federal period of limitation, “exclude the day of the event that triggers the 6

period[.]” Rule 6(a)(1)(A), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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1999); see also Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11 Cir. 2000); Knight v. Schofield,

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292 F.3d 709, 711 (11 Cir. 2002). “Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases,

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as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States

District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9 Cir.1997). Equitable tolling applies only in truly

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extraordinary circumstances. Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039-1040 (11 Cir.

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2002); Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11 Cir. 2002). “The

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burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the

petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286; see Helton v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections,

259 F.3d 1310, 1313-1314 (11 Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1965,

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152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002). The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed the

AEDPA’s one-year period of limitation “is subject to equitable tolling” but only when a

petitioner “shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (quoting Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)).

Leroy argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period until the

time he received copies of state court documents from appellate counsel. Petitioner’s

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Leroy identifies the documents at issue as the sentencing order, plea agreement, guilty plea

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transcript, indictment, suppression hearing transcript and briefs filed on direct appeal. Petitioner’s Response

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Response - Doc. No. 14 at 2. In support of this argument, Leroy maintains that counsel’s

delay in providing the requested documents deprived him of the ability to access the trial

court via the filing of a Rule 32 petition. However, well settled law establishes that the

challenged action of appellate counsel did not constitute an impairment to Leroy filing a

Rule 32 petition. Hansen v. United States, 956 F.2d 245, 248 (11 Cir. 1992) (A prisoner’s th

request for records associated with “his underlying conviction is premature [when made]

prior to the filing of a collateral attack on that conviction.”). Consequently, a prisoner is

not entitled to obtain records for the purpose of preparing a collateral attack on a criminal

conviction. Id.

In addition, case law directsthat the lack of records did not adversely affect Leroy’s

ability to file a federal habeas petition prior to expiration of the one-year period of

limitation. The pleadings and evidentiary materials filed by Leroy establish that he

participated in the guilty plea, suppression and sentencing proceedings from which his

habeas claims arise. Leroy therefore had either actual or constructive knowledge of the

factual basis for each of the claims presented to this court challenging the constitutionality

of his conviction and could have presented his claims to this court in a timely filed § 2254

petition without access to any other information or documents associated with his state

- Doc. No. 14 at 3. Leroy alleges that he needed these documents to file a Rule 32 petition “to raise the claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the guilty plea and the 20 year sentence received

therefrom.” Id. at 4. 

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court proceedings. Under these circumstances, Leroy needed nothing more “to proceed

with filing a habeas corpus petition.” Lloyd v. Van Natta, 296 F.3d 630, 633-634 (7 Cir.

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2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1121, 123 S.Ct. 856 (2003); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,

500 (1991) (where a petitioner has at least constructive knowledge of the factual basis for

his claims there is no impediment to the filing of a federal habeas petition); Donovan, 276

F.3d at 93 (petitioner who attended every evidentiary hearing did not need transcripts to

file habeas petition). Furthermore, “there is no requirement that a habeas petitioner

enumerate in his petition every fact which supports a ground for relief. Rather, Rule 2(c)

of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that a petitioner need only ‘set forth in

summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds’ specified in the petition. See

Donovan v. Maine, 276 F.3d 87, 93 (1 Cir. 2002) (habeas corpus petition need not be

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pleaded with particularity,so citation to transcript unnecessary); Ruark v. Gunter, 958 F.2d

318, 319 (10 Cir. 1992 (prisoner not entitled to transcript before filing § 2254 petition).”

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Lloyd v. Van Natta, 296 at 633; Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1203-1204 (7 Cir.

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1996) (Petitioner in attendance at state court proceedings “knew or should have known

what transpired. He was thus on notice that he should include [claims arising during such

proceedings] in [a properly filed habeas petition]”.).

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Even though Leroy was not in possession of various state court records for the

These same conclusions are equally applicable to Leroy’s ability to properly file a state post- 8

conviction petition challenging his conviction. 

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period of time he alleges, he has failed to set forth any “extraordinary circumstances”

which prevented the filing of a timely habeas petition. Drew, 297 F.3d at 1290; Lloyd, 296

F.3d at 634 (“equitable tolling does not excuse [a petitioner’s] late filing simply because

he was unable to obtain a complete trial transcript before he filed his § 2254 petition”),

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1121, 123 S.Ct. 856, 154 L.Ed.2d 802 (2003); Donovan, 276 F.3d

at 93 (delay in obtaining transcript not a basis for equitable tolling of one-year limitation

period); Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 806 (8 Cir.2001) (“[L]ack of access to a trial

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transcript does not preclude a petitioner fromcommencing post-conviction proceedings and

therefore does not warrant equitable tolling”); Gassler v. Bruton, 255 F.3d 492, 495 (8

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Cir. 2001)(delay in receipt of transcript does not warrant equitable tolling); Brown v. Cain,

112 F.Supp.2d 585, 587 (E.D.La. 2000) (transcript unnecessaryto prepare habeas petition);

Fadayiro v. United States, 30 F.Supp.2d 772, 779-780 (D.N.J. 1998) (delay in receiving

transcripts notsufficiently extraordinary to justify application of equitable tolling); United

States v. Van Poyck, 980 F.Supp. 1108, 1110-1111 (C.D.Cal. 1997) (delay in receipt of

transcript not an “extraordinary circumstance[ ]” sufficient to justify equitable tolling);see

also Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 142-143 (3 Cir. 2002) (petitioner’s claim of

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deprivation of legal materials did not warrant equitable tolling). In light of the foregoing,

the court concludes that Leroy’s lack of access to transcripts and other records relevant to

his conviction and sentence for trafficking in marijuana does not establish an extraordinary

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circumstance sufficient to justify equitable tolling.

Moreover, Leroy also fails to demonstrate that he exercised reasonable diligence in

pursuing his § 2254 petition prior to expiration of the limitation period as is “required for

equitable tolling purposes.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653, 130 S.Ct. at 2565. Despite the

challenged action of appellate counsel, it is clear that Leroy could have filed a federal

habeas action with this court prior to expiration of the one-year period of limitation.

Specifically, Leroy concedes knowledge of the limitation period well before its expiration

and the record demonstrates that he could have filed either a timely state post-conviction

tolling the federal limitation period or a federal habeas action prior to expiration of the

limitation period. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d at 143 (Court properly denied

equitable tolling to petitioner based on deprivation of legal materials where petitioner “did

not seek to file a timely petition and then clarify it once he had access to his materials.”).

Leroy maintains that he believed “he could not file the [Rule 32] petition without

those legal documents” in counsel’s possession. Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 14 at 4.

To the extent Leroy argues that his misunderstanding of the law entitles him to equitable

tolling, this assertion is without merit. The law is well settled that an inmate’s lack of legal

knowledge, his failure to understand legal principles and/or the inability to recognize

potential claims for relief at an earlier juncture do not constitute extraordinary

circumstancessufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period. United States

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v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4 Cir. 2004) (pro se status and ignorance of the law do not

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justify equitable tolling); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8 Cir. 2000), cert.

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denied, 534 U.S. 863, 122 S.Ct. 145, 151 L.Ed.2d 97 (2001) (lack of legal knowledge or

legal resources, even in a case involving a pro se inmate, does not warrant equitable

tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

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1194, 121 S.Ct. 1195, 149 L.Ed.2d 110 (2001) (a petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance

of the law are insufficient to support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations); Felder

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 622,

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148 L.Ed.2d 532 (2000) (ignorance of the law and pro se status do not constitute “rare and

exceptional” circumstances justifying equitable tolling); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13,

17 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 63 (2000) (petitioner’s nd

pro se status throughout most of the period of limitation does not merit equitable tolling);

Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504,

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145 L.Ed.2d 389 (1999) (unfamiliarity with the legal process during the applicable filing

period did not merit equitable tolling); Wakefield v. Railroad Retirement Board, 131 F.3d

967, 969 (11 Cir. 1997) (ignorance of the law “is not a factor that can warrant equitable

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tolling.”).

The record is devoid of evidence that Leroy’s delay in filing the instant § 2254

petition resulted fromextraordinarycircumstances beyond his control and unavoidable with

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the exercise of reasonable diligence. Drew, 297 F.3d at 1290; Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d

153, 159 (3 Cir. 1999). This court simply “cannot say that [Leroy] has acted with the

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‘conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence’ necessary ‘to call into action the powers

of the court.’ This conclusion is based on the longstanding, firmly rooted principle that a

court cannot grant equitable tolling unless it is satisfied that the party seeking such relief

has acted with diligence.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1291 n.5. Thus, Leroy is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the limitation period. Bryant v. Arizona, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9 Cir.

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2007); Diaz v. Secretary for Dept. Of Corrections, 362 F.3d 698, 701 (11 Cir. 2004).

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Absent statutory tolling, the applicable one-year period of limitation began to run on

February 11, 2010 and expired on February 11, 2011.

2. Statutory Tolling of the Limitation Period. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

providesthat “[t]he time during which a properlyfiled application for State post-conviction

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section.” Although Leroy filed

a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama on March 3, 2011, this

state post-conviction petition did not warrant statutory tolling of the federal limitation

period as Leroy failed to file the petition prior to expiration of the federal period of

limitation. Webster, 199 F.3d at 1259 (“A state court petition ... that is filed following the

expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because there is no period

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remaining to be tolled.”). Thus, Leroy is not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitation

period.

3. Expiration of the Limitation Period. Under the circumstances of this case as

set forth herein, the one-year period of limitation calculated in accordance with the

directives of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) began to run February 11, 2010 and expired on

February 11, 2011. Leroy filed his petition for federal habeasrelief on November 13, 2011

and has failed to demonstrate that this petition should not be dismissed as untimely filed.

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that the instant petition for habeas corpus

relief is due to be denied as Leroy filed the petition after expiration of the applicable oneyear period of limitation.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Alexander Leroy be DENIED as it

was not filed within the one-year period of limitation mandated by the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before July 8, 2014 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

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Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

th

33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en

th th

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 23rd day of June, 2014.

/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17

Case 1:11-cv-00991-TMH-TFM Document 17 Filed 06/23/14 Page 17 of 17