Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00789/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00789-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LEAH ZAMORA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SACRAMENTO RENDERING COMPANY; 

LOTHAR LEHMANN; MICHAEL PATRICK 

KOEWLER, 

Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-05-00789 DFL KJM 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiff Leah Zamora brings this action against her former 

employer, Sacramento Rendering Company (“SRC”), her former 

supervisor, Lothar Lehmann, and SRC’s CEO, Michael Patrick 

Koewler. She alleges sexual harassment, assault, battery, 

wrongful discharge, and various other mostly duplicative claims. 

Defendants seek summary judgment. The motion will be GRANTED in 

part and DENIED in part. 

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I. Facts

 SRC is a rendering company that processes animal carcasses 

into meal for products such as dog food and livestock feed. The 

company uses large volumes of water and, therefore, is required 

to have an on-site treatment facility. 

 Zamora started work as an assistant plant manager and 

safety director at SRC on September 11, 2003. During the period 

of time covered by the complaint, Lehmann was the plant manager 

and Zamora’s supervisor. Zamora alleges that during the first 

few months of her employment, Lehmann began staring at her 

breasts, standing too close, and brushing up against her, all of 

which made her uncomfortable. Over time, she alleges, Lehmann 

started touching her in even more inappropriate ways, including 

at least once stroking her face, touching her body through a 

slit in her overalls, and grinding against her crotch. She 

alleges that on one occasion Lehmann tried to kiss her while the 

two were alone in a trailer, then put his arm across the doorway 

as if to block her exit. She also alleges that Lehman made 

inappropriate sexual comments, including asking how much it 

would cost for a kiss or “something more,” stating that he could 

impregnate her despite his being sixty-eight years old, and 

asking to see her breast. Zamora claims that she asked Lehmann 

to stop harassing her, but that she did not report him for some 

time because she feared losing her job. 

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 Meanwhile, Zamora alleges, SRC was underreporting its 

wastewater flow to the California Regional Water Quality Control 

Board (“Water Board”). She claims that when she became aware of 

these alleged violations she expressed her concerns to Lehmann, 

who told her that “this is why we have insurance.” 

 On about June 28, 2004, Zamora told Amalia Ramirez, an SRC 

employee with human resources responsibilities, about Lehmann’s 

alleged harassment. Ramirez informed Richard Wilbur, SRC’s 

Controller. Wilbur spoke with Zamora, asked her to put her 

complaints in writing, and told her that he would seek advice 

from SRC’s counsel. Wilbur also informed SRC’s CEO, Patrick 

Koewler, of Zamora’s complaints. 

 Zamora alleges that instead of launching an immediate 

investigation, Koewler went on vacation for the first few weeks 

of July 2004. However, she does not dispute Koewler’s claim 

that he interviewed Lehmann on July 1, showed him Zamora’s 

complaint (the contents of which Lehmann denied), and told him 

not to take any retaliatory action against Zamora. Koewler also 

moved Zamora’s workspace out of the office she had shared with 

Lehmann, although Lehmann continued to supervise her work. 

 On September 27, 2004, Koewler informed Zamora that Lehmann 

denied her allegations and that the investigation had not 

revealed any witnesses who corroborated her charges. SRC’s 

attorney then asked Zamora to sign a statement that she was 

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satisfied with SRC’s response to her complaints. Zamora signed 

it, she claims, because she feared she would be fired if she did 

not. 

 Koewler then informed Zamora that she would no longer 

receive overtime hours because the plant’s expansion project had 

been completed. According to Zamora she protested against this 

change, asserting that ample overtime had been part of her 

initial employment agreement. She asserts that this action was 

retaliatory because much of the overtime she had worked until 

that point in time had not involved the expansion project. 

Koewler also told her that he was instituting a schedule 

under which Lehmann and Zamora would meet each day at 7:00 a.m. 

and 2:00 p.m. Zamora claims she expressed her unhappiness with 

this arrangement, but that Koewler ignored her concerns. 

Over the next several days, Zamora claims, Lehmann 

continued to stare at her breasts and make her feel 

uncomfortable. As a result, she demanded that Koewler transfer 

Lehmann out of her presence. Zamora claims that SRC management 

refused her request and began treating her with hostility. 

On November 4th, after allegedly hearing Lehmann make an 

off-color comment, Zamora went to speak with Koewler in his 

office. But instead of addressing her complaints, Zamora 

alleges, Koewler began angrily interrogating her about reports 

she had made to the Water Board concerning SRC’s wastewater 

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output.1 Zamora claims Koewler rose to his feet, slammed a file 

down onto his desk, and stepped towards her aggressively while 

pointing his finger at her. At the time, Zamora was three to 

four feet away from Koewler, and a desk stood between them. 

Zamora left Koewler’s office in tears. She now alleges that she 

was afraid for her physical safety. 

Zamora then informed SRC that although she would not 

resign, she could not return to work unless SRC made 

arrangements to keep both Koewler and Lehmann away from her. 

SRC proposed moving Zamora to a different work shift, allowing 

her to report to Ramirez, and ensuring that she would never 

again be alone with Lehmann. Zamora claims that she refused 

this proposed shift change because it would have conflicted with 

her childcare responsibilities, entailed a reduction in 

responsibility, and would have failed adequately to protect her 

from further harassment. She never returned to work at SRC. 

Zamora filed this action on April 21, 2005. Defendants 

filed this motion for summary judgment on August 9, 2006. 

 

1 The validity of Zamora’s charge to the Water Board is not 

at issue in this litigation. Zamora does not contend that there 

was actually a violation, only that she reasonably believed that 

there was and acted appropriately in making a report to the 

Water Board. SRC denies ever having made false wastewater 

reports. According to SRC, Zamora misinterpreted adjustments 

made to correct for the effects of rainwater. SRC states that 

the district attorney’s office has cleared it of any wrongdoing. 

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II. Claims 1 & 2: Hostile Work Environment 

Zamora brings claims for hostile work environment due to 

sexual harassment under both Title VII and FEHA. Both statutes 

prohibit an employer from creating or permitting a work 

environment in which the conditions are such as to discriminate 

against employees on the basis of their gender.2 

To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under 

either Title VII or FEHA, an employee must prove “(1) that [she] 

was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing 

nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the 

conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive 

working environment.” Pavon v. Swift Trans. Co., Inc., 192 F.3d 

902, 908 (9th Cir. 1999); Meritor Sav. Bank FSB, 477 U.S. at 67; 

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 

(1998); see also Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 38 Cal. 

4th 264 (2006)(noting that standards for hostile work 

environment sexual harassment claims under FEHA are identical to 

 

2

 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it 

unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual 

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e2(a)(1)). Similarly, under FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer 

“because of the . . . sex . . . of any person, . . . to 

discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment . . . or harass an 

employee.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a), (j)(1).

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those under Title VII). The “sexually objectionable environment 

must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a 

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that 

the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Faragher v. City of 

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (citation omitted). 

“[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents 

(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory 

changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” Id. at 

788 (internal citation omitted). 

Defendants argue that Lehmann’s alleged harassing acts were 

“vague, sporadic, isolated and trivial,” and therefore 

insufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work 

environment. They cite a number of cases in which federal and 

California courts have found workplace conduct to be 

insufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work 

environment. None of these cases, however, involved conduct as 

severe and pervasive as that which Zamora alleges here. For 

instance, in Kortan v. Calif. Youth Auth., the Ninth Circuit 

held that a supervisor’s largely isolated flurry of misogynistic 

comments was insufficient to create an objectively hostile work 

environment. 217 F.3d 1104, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 2000). In so 

holding, the court emphasized that the defendant’s comments were 

made mainly on a single day and were not directed at the 

plaintiff. Id. at 1110. In contrast, Zamora alleges that 

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Lehmann consistently engaged in sexual misconduct aimed directly 

at her for nearly two years. Moreover, Lehmann’s alleged 

misconduct includes highly inappropriate physical touching, 

something which was not alleged in Kortan. 

Defendants also cite Manatt v. Bank of America, where the 

Ninth Circuit held that a few racially insensitive “offhand 

comments” and incidents of “simple teasing” spread over two-anda-half years did not alter the conditions of plaintiff’s 

employment. 339 F.3d 792, 799 (2003). But as with Kortan, 

Manatt does not help SRC because Zamora alleges much more severe 

and frequent incidents of harassment. 

Lehmann’s alleged misconduct was repeated,3 unwelcome,4

spanned a significant period of time, and indicated a sexual 

 

 

3 Defendants contend that in her deposition Zamora 

identified “only” six incidents in which Lehmann touched her 

inappropriately, and that only in her subsequent declaration did 

she claim that Lehmann touched her inappropriately at least once 

a week from November 2003 through March or April 2004. Citing 

Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999), 

defendants argue that Zamora cannot create an issue of material 

fact by submitting a declaration that contradicts her deposition 

testimony. But defendants have not pointed to anything in 

Zamora’s deposition indicating that there were no more than six 

touching incidents. That she may have identified six incidents 

is not necessarily an admission that there were not more. More 

important, even if there were “only” six incidents of touching, 

a reasonable jury could find that Lehman’s alleged conduct 

created a hostile work environment. 

 

4 Defendants contend that Zamora welcomed Lehmann’s alleged 

harassment because she admits sharing personal information with 

Lehmann, loaning him a copy of “American Pie,” sending an e-mail 

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interest in Zamora. As such, a reasonable jury could find that 

Lehman’s conduct created a hostile work environment. 

In the alternative, SRC claims a complete defense to a 

sexual harassment claim under Farragher v. City of Boca Raton. 

In Farragher the Court held that as long as no “tangible 

employment action” has been taken against the plaintiff, an 

employer has an affirmative defense where (a) it “exercised 

reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 

harassing behavior, and (b) . . . the plaintiff employee 

unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 

corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 

harm otherwise.” 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998). This defense is 

available under both Title VII and FEHA. Kohler v. Inter-Tel 

Tech., 244 F3d 1167, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Defendants assert that Zamora suffered no “tangible 

employment action,” which the Supreme Court has defined as “a 

significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 

failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 

responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in 

 

to his wife mentioning “saggy boobs,” using swear words, 

laughing with Lehmann about a picture depicting a nudist colony, 

accepting a $600 loan from Lehmann, once hugging Lehmann, and 

failing to complain promptly about Lehmann’s alleged 

inappropriate conduct. But while these facts may be sufficient 

for the jury to conclude that Lehmann’s conduct was welcome, 

they do not make the contrary conclusion unreasonable.

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benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 

761 (1998). Defendants further assert that they acted with 

reasonable care and that Zamora was unreasonable in refusing 

their corrective plan. 

In response, Zamora contends that she suffered two tangible 

adverse employment actions: (1) reduction of overtime and (2) a 

proposed package of unfavorable job changes if she continued to 

insist on separation from Lehman. As to the overtime, on 

September 27, 2004, Koewler told Zamora that her overtime hours 

would be cut because the expansion project was finished. He 

also told her that the decision to cut her hours had been 

Lehmann’s. Zamora avers that most of her overtime hours before 

September 27 had been spent in connection with tasks unrelated 

to the expansion project. She contends that the decision to cut 

her overtime was retaliatory. As to the package of unfavorable 

job changes, Zamora contends that SRC’s proposed “solution” to 

Lehman’s improper conduct was to offer her a demotion and a less 

desirable shift. 

Zamora has presented sufficient evidence to permit 

reasonable jurors to conclude that Koewler’s decision to take 

away Zamora’s overtime was retaliatory. If it was, it qualifies 

as a tangible employment action under Ellerth, and SRC’s 

Farragher defense would fail. As to the changed work schedule 

offered to keep Zamora and Lehman apart, plaintiff 

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presents sufficient evidence from which a jury could find either 

an adverse employment action or that Zamora acted reasonably in 

rejecting the corrective proposal. 

Finally, Zamora contends that after she complained, SRC 

forced her to continue spending time with her alleged harasser 

every day, sometimes alone. A reasonable jury might find SRC’s 

corrective response inadequate. 

For these reasons, SRC cannot establish a Farragher defense 

on summary judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment for 

defendants on claims one and two is DENIED. 

III. Claim No. 3: Failure to Prevent under FEHA

Zamora claims that SRC and Koewler violated FEHA by failing 

“to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent 

discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal. Gov. Code § 

12940(k). Although SRC did have a formal anti-sexual harassment 

policy in place, Zamora contends that SRC and Koewler did not 

take adequate steps to prevent further harassment once she 

complained. She says that she signed the statement absolving 

SRC only because she felt compelled to do so and not because she 

agreed with the contents. For the reasons discussed in the 

preceding section, there are sufficient facts alleged calling 

into question whether SRC adequately prevented further 

harassment after Zamora’s first complaint. Accordingly, summary 

judgment for SRC on the third claim is DENIED. 

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However, defendants correctly assert that a supervisory 

employee is not liable under FEHA for failing to prevent 

harassment by a subordinate employee. Fiol v. Doellstedt, 50 

Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1326 (1996). Therefore, summary judgment is 

GRANTED to Koewler on Zamora’s third claim for relief. 

IV. Claim No. 4: Wrongful Discharge (Harassment) 

Zamora claims that she was constructively discharged in 

violation of the public policy that favors reporting sexual 

harassment. To prevail, she must prove that she was 

constructively discharged in violation of a public policy that 

is (1) fundamental, (2) beneficial for the public, and (3) 

embodied in a statute or constitutional provision. Turner v. 

Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal 4th 1238, 1256 (1994) (citations 

omitted). 

“Constructive discharge occurs when the employer’s conduct 

effectively forces an employee to resign.” Id. at 1244. The 

plaintiff must prove that “under all the circumstances, the 

working conditions are so unusually adverse that a reasonable 

employee in plaintiff’s position would have felt compelled to 

resign.” Id. at 1247. Zamora alleges that SRC constructively 

discharged her by taking inadequate steps to prevent Lehmann 

from continuing to harass her. Moreover, Zamora contends that 

SRC’s offer to have her report to Ramirez would have required 

her to work a less desirable shift and accept a position with 

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less responsibility. She also claims that SRC’s proposal would 

not have protected her adequately from further encounters with 

Lehmann. There is an adequate factual basis for Zamora’s 

contention that she was constructively discharged such that this 

issue cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 

Zamora also must prove that she was discharged in violation 

of a “firmly established, fundamental, and substantial” public 

policy. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 254 Cal. 3d 654, 671 

n.11 (1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Antidiscrimination laws such as FEHA unquestionably satisfy this 

requirement. See Cal. Gov. Code § 12920 (“It is hereby declared 

as the public policy of this state that it is necessary to 

protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons 

to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination on 

account of . . . sex.”). Discharging an employee in retaliation 

for reporting sexual harassment violates California public 

policy. Barton v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc., 43 Cal. App. 4th 

1200, 1208-09 (1996). 

 Finally, defendants contend that Zamora has failed to show 

that she left her job as a result of the alleged harassment. 

Rather, they assert, she left because SRC refused her lawyer’s 

demand for $175,000. This is a jury question. 

For these reasons, summary judgment for defendants on the 

fourth claim is DENIED. 

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V. Claim Nos. 5 & 6: Negligent Supervision and Management

Zamora brings claims against SRC and Koewler for negligent 

hiring, supervision, training, and retention of Lehmann, and for 

breaching its duty “to manage its facilities in a lawful manner 

and to refrain [sic] its employees and supervisors from 

committing . . . sexual harassment.” 

Workers’ compensation law bars negligence claims by 

employees against their employers. See Coit Drapery Cleaners, 

Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1595, 1605-06 (1993). 

Zamora asserts that her claims are not barred by workers’ 

compensation exclusivity because defendants’ misconduct was 

intentional and against public policy. There is indeed an 

exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity for intentional 

employer misconduct. See Vuillemainroy v. American Rock & 

Asphalt, Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 1284 (1999). But Zamora’s 

claims are for negligence, which, by definition, is not 

intentional. Thus, these claims do not fall within the 

exception. See Coit Drapery, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1606 (stating 

that workers’ compensation laws would bar negligent supervision 

claim by harassed employee). Accordingly, summary judgment for 

defendants on Zamora’s fifth and sixth claims is GRANTED. 

VI. Claims 7 & 8: Assault and Battery

Zamora claims that Lehmann and Koewler assaulted and 

battered her. “In order to state a cause of action for assault a 

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plaintiff must establish (1) that defendant intended to cause 

harmful or offensive contact, or the imminent apprehension of 

such contact, and (2) that plaintiff was put in imminent 

apprehension of such contact. Brooks v. United States, 29 

F.Supp.2d 613, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Restatement (Second) 

of Torts § 21). “An actor is subject to liability to another 

for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or 

offensive contact with the person of the other or a third 

person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a 

harmful contact with the person of the other directly or 

indirectly results.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13. 

 As to Koewler, Zamora alleges that he put her in 

apprehension of harmful or offensive contact during their 

November 4, 2004 meeting. However, the alleged facts are not a 

sufficient basis from which a reasonable jury could find Koewler 

liable for assault. Getting angry and yelling at an employee 

may be rude and upsetting, but it is not assault. “Words do not 

make the actor liable for assault unless together with other 

acts or circumstances they put the other in reasonable 

apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact with 

his person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 31; see Brooks v. 

United States, 29 F.Supp.2d 613, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“Assault 

is a tort of specific intent; a plaintiff must prove that 

defendant intended to place plaintiff in a reasonable 

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apprehension of harmful or offensive contact.”). There is no 

showing here that Koewler placed Zamora in reasonable 

apprehension of “imminent” physical contact, or that he intended 

to do so. Although he allegedly got angry, raised his voice, 

dropped a file on his desk and pointed his finger, he never 

raised a hand as if to strike nor did he use threatening 

language. If the alleged facts here amount to assault, then any 

angry confrontation between two people becomes an assault. This 

is not the law. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 31. 

Further without contact, there can be no battery. The court 

therefore GRANTS summary judgment for Koewler on the seventh and 

eighth claims. 

Zamora’s assault and battery claims against Lehmann are 

another matter. Zamora alleges that Lehmann repeatedly touched 

her in an offensive manner. Accepting these allegations as 

true, a reasonable jury could find that Lehmann assaulted and 

battered Zamora. Accordingly, summary judgment for Lehmann on 

claims seven and eight is DENIED. 

Finally, defendants provide no support for their assertion 

that SRC may not be held vicariously liable for Lehmann’s 

intentional torts. Thus, summary judgment for SRC on the 

seventh and eighth claims is DENIED. 

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VII. Claim 9: Ralph Act

Zamora claims that defendants violated the Ralph Act, which 

prohibits “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence . . . 

on account of . . . sex.” Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51.7, 51(b). 

It takes actual violence or the threat of violence to state 

a claim under the Ralph Act. Winarto v. Toshiba America Elec. 

Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 2001). Zamora 

alleges that Lehmann intimidated her by implicitly threatening 

violence when he allegedly attempted to kiss her and then to 

block her from exiting the room. She alleges that when he 

blocked her way, she was afraid Lehmann was going to hurt her 

physically. 

Under Winarto, the question is whether “a reasonable 

person, standing in the shoes of the plaintiff, [would] have 

been intimidated by the actions of the defendant and perceived a 

threat of violence.” Id. (citation omitted) More specifically, 

the question is whether a reasonable woman in Zamora’s position 

would have been intimidated and perceived a threat of violence. 

Id. (citation omitted). 

 Zamora’s allegations against Lehmann suffice to create a 

triable issue as to whether a reasonable woman in her position 

would have perceived a threat of violence when Lehmann allegedly 

barred the trailer door with his arm. In her deposition, Zamora 

states that she had no difficulty moving past Lehmann’s arm, 

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that he did not make any further attempt to detain her, that he 

did not touch her as she left, and that he did not follow or 

chase her. She also states that Lehmann never verbally 

threatened her. Nevertheless, the gesture of blocking someone’s 

exit might reasonably be perceived as a threat of violence. The 

court cannot conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable woman 

would not perceive a threat of violence in Lehmann’s alleged 

conduct. This is a question for the jury. Accordingly, summary 

judgment for Lehmann and SRC on the ninth claim is DENIED.5 

Zamora’s Ralph Act claim does not specifically mention 

Koewler or specify how his alleged conduct violated the Ralph 

Act. Nor does plaintiff’s opposition to the instant motion 

discuss a Ralph Act claim against Koewler. Nevertheless, the 

complaint states that the Ralph Act claim is brought against all 

defendants. 

The only allegations against Koewler that possibly could 

implicate the Ralph Act concern his alleged conduct at the 

November 4, 2004 meeting with Zamora. For the same reasons 

discussed above in the assault context, however, a reasonable 

woman in Zamora’s position would not have interpreted Koewler’s 

 

5 Because there is a triable issue as to whether Lehmann 

intimidated Zamora by threat of violence, the court does not 

consider whether any of Lehmann’s alleged unwelcome touchings 

constituted “violence” within the meaning of the Ralph Act.

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alleged conduct as threatening violence. Accordingly, summary 

judgment is GRANTED on Zamora’s Ralph Act claim against Koewler. 

VIII. Claim 10: Violation of the Bane Act

Zamora alleges that Koewler’s conduct at the November 4, 

2004 meeting violated the Bane Act, which creates a cause of 

action against anyone who “interferes by threats, intimidation, 

or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, 

or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or 

individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or 

laws of this state.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. Specifically, she 

alleges that “Koewler, by his intimidation of Plaintiff through 

the threat of physical violence, interfered or attempted to 

interfere with Plaintiff’s exercise or enjoyment of her right to 

be free from sexual harassment and retaliation.” 

Zamora has not presented evidence that Koewler threatened 

or coerced her. It is a somewhat closer question as to whether 

Koewler’s conduct could be deemed intimidation.6 But Zamora has 

not presented any evidence that Koewler’s intimidation, if any, 

deprived her or was intended to deprive her of any legal right. 

 

6 “There is no definitive definition of the word 

‘intimidation’ in California law. In common parlance, 

‘intimidation’ means ‘to make timid or fearful.’” Harold E. 

Kahn & Robert D. Links, California Civil Practice Civil Rights 

Litigation § 3:19 (2006) (quoting Ex parte Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488, 

526 (1942)). 

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See Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 (1998) (stating 

that Bane Act violation requires “attempted or completed act of 

interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of 

coercion.”). Zamora does not allege that Koewler indimidated 

her into performing or not performing any particular action. 

Any intimidation Koewler’s anger might have caused could not 

have prevented Zamora from making a report of alleged wrongdoing 

she had already made. Nor is there evidence that Koewler’s 

anger had anything to do with Zamora’s sexual harassment 

allegations against Lehmann, or that it was intended to or did 

prevent future complaints. In short, Zamora has failed to 

present any evidence that Koewler’s alleged display of anger 

interfered with her legal rights. Accordingly, summary judgment 

for Koewler is GRANTED on the tenth claim. 

On the other hand, as already discussed, a triable issue 

exists as to whether Lehmann intimidated Zamora when he 

allegedly moved to block her exit. A jury might find that 

Lehmann intimidated Zamora in an effort to interfere with her 

right to work in an environment free of discrimination based on 

sex. Accordingly, summary judgment for Lehmann and SRC is 

DENIED as to the tenth claim. 

IX. Claim 11: Wrongful Discharge (Wastewater) 

Zamora claims that SRC wrongfully discharged her because 

she told the Water Board that SRC was not properly reporting its 

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wastewater flow numbers. Zamora alleges that she informed the 

authorities of her suspicions regarding SRC’s wastewater 

reporting on November 4, 2004 – the last day she worked at SRC – 

and that this was the reason Koewler became angry with her that 

day. As already discussed, Zamora has alleged facts from which 

a reasonable jury might find that she was constructively 

discharged. A reasonable jury also might find that SRC 

constructively discharged her in retaliation for taking her 

concerns to the authorities. Accordingly, summary judgment is 

DENIED on Zamora’s eleventh claim. 

X. Claim 12: Constructive Discharge 

Zamora brings a claim for constructive discharge. 

Constructive discharge is not itself a cause of action under 

California law. See Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at 1251 (“Even after 

establishing constructive discharge, an employee must 

independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection 

with employment termination in order to obtain damages for 

wrongful discharge.”) (emphasis original and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED to SRC on the twelfth 

claim. 

XI. Punitive Damages

Zamora seeks punitive damages against all defendants. To 

recover punitive damages, Zamora must establish oppression, 

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fraud or malice by clear and convincing evidence. See Cal. Civ. 

Code § 3294(a). 

Zamora persuasively argues that reasonable jurors could 

find by clear and convincing evidence that Lehmann’s alleged 

conduct was oppressive or malicious. Accordingly, summary 

judgment on punitive damages against Lehmann is DENIED. 

On the other hand, Zamora has failed to allege facts from 

which reasonable jurors could be clearly convinced that Koewler 

or SRC ratified Lehmann’s alleged sexual harassment. Punitive 

damages may be awarded against a corporate employer based on the 

conduct of an employee only if it had “advance knowledge of the 

unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a 

conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or 

authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct.” Cal. Civ. Code § 

3294; see also Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 4th 

704, 724 n.11 (1994) (“Punitive damages are not assessed against 

employers on a pure respondeat superior basis. Some evidence of 

fault by the employer itself is also required.”). Even if 

Koewler and SRC failed to respond adequately to Zamora’s 

allegations against Lehmann, Zamora’s allegations do not support 

the conclusion that Koewler or SRC “authorized” or “ratified” 

Lehmann’s alleged harassment. Accordingly, the court GRANTS the 

motion for summary judgment with respect to punitive damages 

against Koewler and SRC. 

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CONCLUSION 

As discussed above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

is DENIED on claims one and two; DENIED as to SRC and GRANTED as 

to Koewler on claim three; DENIED on claim four; GRANTED on 

claims five and six; GRANTED as to Koewler and DENIED as to 

Lehmann and SRC on claims seven and eight; GRANTED as to Koewler 

and DENIED as to Lehmann and SRC on claim nine; GRANTED as to 

Koewler and DENIED as to Lehmann and SRC on claim ten; DENIED as 

to claim eleven; GRANTED on claim twelve; DENIED as to punitive 

damages for Lehmann and GRANTED as to punitive damages for 

Koewler and SRC. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 1/16/2007 

______________________________ 

DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge 

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