Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00993/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00993-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TUANJA EDWARD ANDERSON, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

A. HERNANDEZ, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 15cv993-BEN (BLM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE COMPLAINT 

[ECF No. 23], 

AND 

(2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 

FAILURE TO EXHAUST 

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 

[ECF No. 24] 

AND 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO BE TRANSFERRED TO 

ANOTHER INSTITUTION 

[ECF No. 34]

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Roger T. 

Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United 

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States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the following reasons, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be DENIED. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On May 1, 2015, Plaintiff Tuanja Edward Anderson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against 

Defendants Associate Warden Hernandez, Captain Stout, Correctional Officers (“C/O”) Davis, 

Bustos, Heddy, and Miller, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”). ECF No. 1 (“Comp.”). Plaintiff alleges claims under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (“ADA”) and the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 4-6. 

 On November 9, 2015, Defendants filed a “Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.” ECF No. 23-

1 (“MTD”). On November 10, 2015, the Court set a briefing schedule ordering Plaintiff to file 

his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss on or before December 16, 2015, and 

Defendants to file their reply on or before January 4, 2016. ECF No. 26. In accordance with 

the Court’s briefing schedule, Plaintiff timely filed his opposition [ECF No. 28 (“MTD Oppo.”)], 

and Defendants timely replied [ECF No. 30 (“MTD Reply”)]. 

On November 9, 2015, Defendants also filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment Re: 

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.” ECF No. 24-2 (“MSJ”). On November 10, 2015, the 

Court issued an “Order Providing Plaintiff Notice of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

Re Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies” in which the Court advised Plaintiff of the 

requirements for opposing Defendants’ summary judgment motion. ECF No. 25. The Court 

ordered Plaintiff to file his opposition to Defendants’ motion on or before December 16, 2015, 

and Defendants to file their reply to the opposition on or before January 4, 2016. Id. at 3. The 

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parties timely filed their respective opposition [ECF No. 29 (“MSJ Oppo.”)] and reply [ECF No. 35 

(“MSJ Reply”)]. Additionally, on November 24, 2015, Plaintiff signed a sworn declaration, which 

the Court accepted on discrepancy on December 9, 2015. ECF Nos. 31 & 32. The contents of 

the declaration suggest that Plaintiff filed the document in support of his opposition to 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 32 (“Plaintiff’s Decl.”). 

II. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he requested that his “cell be cleaned by staff” at 

the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) because he was legally blind and could not 

clean the cell himself. Comp. at 4. Plaintiff claims that on August 27, 2013, Defendant Stout 

reviewed Plaintiff’s request, and stated that he “was not running a maid service” and that he 

would find a cellmate for Plaintiff who “would help keep the cell cleaned.” Id. Plaintiff asserts 

that on August 28, 2013, Defendant Stout advised him that he would move “an ADA worker” 

into Plaintiff’s cell. Id. The same day, inmate Lee moved into Plaintiff’s cell, offered Plaintiff 

poisoned coffee, which made Plaintiff “drowsy and weak,” and threatened to “rape” Plaintiff that 

night. Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims that Lee was a member of the “blood” street gang and that Lee 

knew that Plaintiff was imprisoned for murdering a “blood.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendant Heddy that he was suicidal, and that Heddy 

responded “Fuck you, go to bed” and walked away. Id. Plaintiff claims that he then grabbed a 

razor but Lee told him to “wait because [Plaintiff] was going to slash [his] own throat,” and that 

Lee and other inmates started yelling “man down.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Bustos 

and Davis came to his cell door but refused to remove him from the cell, and that Lee sexually 

assaulted him that night. Id. Plaintiff maintains that he told the correctional officers that he 

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was suicidal because he hoped to be “moved so [that he] could make [his] complaint in private,” 

that the “bloods put a hit on [him] in 2004,” and that “there are letters in [his] C-file.”1 Id. 

 Plaintiff also claims that from September 21, 2013 until January 15, 2014, Defendants 

Heddy, Davis, Bustos, and Miller denied his requests for dental supplies, and that, as a result, 

he lost four teeth and the enamel on another tooth. Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends that Defendants 

retaliated against him after he reported the sexual assault and claimed that Defendants Davis, 

Heddy, and Bustos could have prevented the assault by removing him from the cell. Id. Plaintiff 

seeks $15,000,000 in damages, $850,000 in punitive damages, to be transferred to “Missouri 

D.O.C.,” and to have his damaged teeth “repair[ed] and/or replace[d].” Id. at 8. 

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff raises the following claims in his Complaint: “Reasonable Accommodation Under 

the ADA,” “Cruel and Unusual Punishment,” and “Access to [D]ental Supplies.” ECF No. 1 at 4-

6. Defendants move to dismiss all three claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

(“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. MTD at 1, 3-9. 

Defendants also move to dismiss all claims against Defendant Hernandez because Plaintiff fails 

to allege the personal involvement of Defendant Hernadez. Id. 7-9. Plaintiff disputes these 

arguments in his opposition. See MTD Oppo. 

/// 

/// 

                                                      

1 “A C-file is the central or main file for an inmate serving time in a state prison. Staff 

and inmates with special work clearance have access to the C-files.” Dunaway v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corr. & Rehab., 2015 WL 3992554, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2015). 

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A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to FRCP 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading 

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more 

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but 

whether he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). If the facts alleged in 

the complaint are “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability, the plaintiff has not satisfied 

the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, 

“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

 When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the pleadings 

liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). This rule of liberal 

construction is “particularly important” in civil rights cases. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d 

1058, 1063 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)); 

see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that because “Iqbal

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incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter the courts’ treatment 

of pro se filings; accordingly we continue to construe pro se filings liberally . . . .” This is 

particularly important where the petitioner is a pro se prisoner litigant in a civil rights matter). 

When giving liberal construction to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court is not 

permitted to “supply essential elements of the claim[] that were not initially pled.” Easter v. 

CDC, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. 

(quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268). 

 The court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint, “unless the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 

F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, 

“before dismissing a pro se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of 

the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to 

amend effectively.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that (1) a 

person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct 

deprived the plaintiff of some “rights, privileges, or immunities” protected by the Constitution of 

the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and 

show an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant.” Harris v. 

Schriro, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2009) (citation omitted). A particular defendant 

is liable under § 1983 only when the plaintiff proves he participated in the alleged violation. Id. 

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B. Discussion 

1. Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendants argue that Plaintiff offers “new 

allegations and exhibits” in his opposition to their motion to dismiss and ask the Court to 

disregard “these new allegations” in deciding the instant motion. MTD Reply at 2. “In 

determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the 

complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s 

motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(emphasis in original); see also Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th 

Cir. 1997). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider, 151 

F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a 

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell 

v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993)); Beattie v. Armenta, 2015 WL 10319088, at 

*3 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2015) (same). However, courts may consider new allegations in plaintiff’s 

opposition to determine whether to grant leave to amend. See Janoe v. Raske, 2009 WL 

1615991, at *4 n.3 (S.D. Cal. June 8, 2009) (citing Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 

Co., 268 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001)). Further, “[w]hen a plaintiff has attached various 

exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether dismissal 

[i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(citation omitted). The Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ objection. Accordingly, to the extent 

Plaintiff raises new allegations in his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court will 

not consider the new allegations and evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint but 

will consider them in determining whether to grant leave to amend. See Beattie, 2015 WL 

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10319088, at *6 (confining its analysis to the allegations in the complaint where plaintiff’s 

opposition purported to raise new allegations). 

2. Claims Against Associate Warden Hernandez 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite personal involvement of 

Defendant Hernandez. MTD at 7-9; MTD Reply at 3. In support, Defendants state that Plaintiff 

has not included Defendant Hernandez in the body of his Complaint, and that Plaintiff’s 

“generalized and conclusory” allegations against Hernandez in the “Defendants” section of the 

Complaint are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. MTD at 8; MTD Reply at 4. Plaintiff 

responds that Defendant Hernandez “authorized Mr. Stout’s action2 so there would be no ‘maid 

service,’” and that Hernandez is thus not immune from suit in this case. MTD Oppo. at 4. 

To state a claim for a constitutional violation under Section 1983, a plaintiff “must plead 

facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 

Miss., 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 544; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 

at 662). Government officials are not liable under § 1983 for their subordinates’ unconstitutional 

conduct based on respondeat superior or another theory of vicarious liability, and plaintiff is 

required to plead that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (finding no vicarious liability for a “municipal person” under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983)). 

                                                      

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant Stout “was the official who denied 

[Plaintiff’s] ADA Reasonable Accommodation Request (First Level Reviewer) resulting in 

[Plaintiff’s] sexual assault.” Comp. at 2. 

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 A supervisor may be individually liable under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her 

personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

To be held liable, a supervisor need not be physically present when the alleged constitutional 

injury occurs nor be “directly and personally involved in the same way as are the individual 

officers who are on the scene inflicting constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205 (citation 

omitted). Rather, the requisite causal connection is established when a supervisor “set[s] in 

motion a series of acts by others,” or “knowingly refus[es] to terminate a series of acts by others, 

which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a 

constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207-08 (citation omitted). A supervisor may also be held liable 

for his “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates,” “acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation,” or “conduct that showed a 

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1208 (citation omitted). 

Additionally, a supervisor may be held liable if he implements a “policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional 

violation.” Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint names Associate Warden Hernandez in his individual 

and official capacities, and alleges that Hernandez “authorized the denial of [Plaintiff’s] ADA 

reasonable accommodation request, resulting in [Plaintiff’s] sexual assault.” Comp. at 2. As 

such, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Hernandez is liable because he “acquiesce[d] in 

the constitutional deprivation.” See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208. Such liability may be established 

where the supervisor reviewed plaintiff’s applicable inmate appeal and failed to take corrective 

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action, thereby allowing the violation to continue. See Poulson v. Kirkegard, 2015 WL 5943207, 

at *5 (D. Mont. Mar. 16, 2015). “If a constitutional violation is complete, however, and a 

supervisory grievance reviewer is simply making a determination on whether the prison should 

provide a remedy for a past violation, the supervisory grievance reviewer has no part in causing 

the constitutional violation.” Id. 

In Porter v. Cash, 2012 WL 5308369, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012), the court found 

that plaintiff adequately alleged supervisory liability of former warden Cash based on her 

acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct of her subordinates. In Cash, plaintiff’s complaint 

attached a Second Level Appeal Response signed by Cash addressing “Plaintiff’s request that 

the ICC [Institutional Classification Committee] rescind its request for an indeterminate SHU 

[Security Housing Unit] term and consider Plaintiff for PHU [Protective Housing Unit] placement.” 

Id.; see also id. at *1, 8 (explaining the abbreviations). The court concluded that the plaintiff 

adequately “alleged Cash’s knowledge of the ICC’s decision, coupled with her inaction or failure 

to terminate the ICC’s decision.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Hernandez are conclusory and insufficient. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies Defendant Hernandez in the caption and list of defendants but 

only generally alleges that Hernandez “authorized the denial of [Plaintiff’s] ADA reasonable 

accommodation request.” Comp. at 1-2. Plaintiff does not mention Defendant Hernandez in 

the body of his Complaint, and it is thus unclear whether Plaintiff is alleging claims against 

Hernandez for the ADA violation, the Eighth Amendment violation, or both. Moreover, the 

Complaint does not clearly and specifically describe what actions Defendant Hernandez took or 

failed to take that caused the alleged violation, especially since, as discussed in Section III.B.3, 

the ADA accommodation request was granted. As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege 

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sufficient personal involvement of Defendant Hernandez or a connection between Defendant 

Hernandez’s actions and Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation, and does not state a claim 

against Defendant Hernandez. See Henry v. Sanchez, 923 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (C.D. Cal. 1996) 

(“A supervisory official, such as a warden, may be liable under Section 1983 only if he was 

personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”). Plaintiff also does 

not allege any facts indicating that the alleged constitutional violation was not complete before 

Defendant Hernandez acted or failed to act. See Poulson, 2015 WL 5943207, at *5. 

If Plaintiff wants to re-allege constitutional violations against Defendant Hernandez, 

Plaintiff should bear in mind that defendants can only be liable for their own misconduct, and 

that therefore he must plead facts alleging that Defendant Hernandez violated the Constitution 

through his own individual actions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Further, Plaintiff must clearly 

state the facts, not merely conclusions, supporting his allegations. Id. at 678 (while detailed 

factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Finally, Plaintiff must clearly state 

which claim or claims he is asserting against Defendant Hernandez. The Court therefore 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

as to Defendant Hernandez. 

3. ADA Claim 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails for several reasons. See MTD at 3-4. 

First, Defendants argue that the ADA does not permit recovery against individuals. Id. at 3. 

Second, Defendants claim that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief because he fails 

to show that he was denied the benefits of the CDCR’s services or discriminated against while 

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housed at RJD, and that any exclusion or denial of benefits Plaintiff allegedly suffered was 

because of his disability. Id. at 3-4. Finally, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff may not recover 

punitive damages in connection with his ADA claim because the ADA does not permit the award 

of punitive damages in a private suit against a government or government agency. Id. at 4. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff claims that his “ADA claims are meritorious” because Medical 

Technical Assistant Martinez gave him the incorrect address for the CDCR, and that on 

September 10, 2015, the U.S. Marshals Service mailed the summons and Complaint to the 

address. MTD Oppo. at 1-2. Plaintiff attaches exhibits to support his allegations. Id. at 5-6. 

Defendants reply by objecting to Plaintiff’s offer of “new allegations and exhibits” and further 

argue that even if Plaintiff properly served the CDCR, the Complaint would still fail to state a 

claim. MTD Reply at 2. 

Plaintiff alleges in Count 1 of his Complaint that he was denied reasonable 

accommodation under the ADA. Comp. at 4. Plaintiff does not clearly identify which 

Defendant(s) he is alleging violated his ADA rights but his factual allegation names only 

Defendant Stout. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that on August 27, 2013, he had a CDCR 1824 

review, during which he informed Defendant Stout that he could not clean his cell because he 

was legally blind. Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Stout responded that he “was not running 

a maid service” and that he would find a cellmate who would keep Plaintiff’s cell clean. Id. 

a. Individual Capacity Claim Under the ADA 

“[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in [his 

or] her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA . . . .” Vinson v. 

Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Gary v. Hawthron, 2007 WL 2781098, 

at *2, *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2007) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)); 

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Cleveland v. T. Dennison, 2008 WL 4531971, at *1-3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2008) (finding that 

plaintiff was not entitled to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant in his 

individual capacity to vindicate rights created under Title II of the ADA); Nort v. Brown, 2015 

WL 5155195, at *1, 6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s individual 

capacity claims under the ADA). 

The proper defendant in a Title II claim is the public entity allegedly responsible for the 

discrimination. The term “public entity” includes state prisons. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 

524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (holding state prisons are public entities under Title II). A state official 

acting in his official capacity may be a proper defendant pursuant to an ADA Title II claim. 

Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In the “Parties” section of his Complaint, Plaintiff states that he is suing Defendant Stout 

only in his individual capacity. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff captioned the Complaint as arising under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserts this federal question as the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. Id. 

at 1. As such, even if Plaintiff can state a claim for an ADA violation, Plaintiff is barred from 

pursuing such claim against either Defendant Stout or Defendant Hernandez in their individual 

capacities. See Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1156 (holding that the ADA does not provide for § 1983 

actions against state officials in their individual capacities). The Court therefore RECOMMENDS

that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendants Stout and Hernandez 

in their individual capacities be GRANTED. Further, because Plaintiff cannot amend his 

Complaint to correct this defect, the Court RECOMMENDS that such dismissal be WITH 

PREJUDICE. See Nort, 2015 WL 5155195, at *1 (dismissing with prejudice individual capacity 

claims based on the alleged violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act). 

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b. Remaining Claims Under the ADA 

The ADA claim set forth in Count 1 of the Complaint identifies only Defendant Stout and, 

as discussed above, does not state a claim against Defendant Stout. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff should not be allowed to amend his ADA claim because he cannot state a claim against 

any Defendant, including the CDCR. MTD at 4; MTD Reply at 2. Defendants admit that Plaintiff 

has a qualifying disability but argue that Plaintiff cannot allege that he was denied benefits or 

discriminated against due to his disability. MTD at 4. Defendants explain that while Defendants 

denied Plaintiff’s request to have Defendants clean his cell, Defendants agreed to (and did) 

assign Plaintiff a cellmate who would clean the cell so Plaintiff was not denied any benefits due 

to his disability. Id. While his argument is unclear, Plaintiff appears to argue that he should be 

allowed to amend his ADA claim to add the CDCR as a defendant. MTD Oppo. at 1-2. 

Title II of the ADA “prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability.” Lovell v. 

Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. §12132). In order to establish 

a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) 

he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, 

programs, or activities; (3) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the 

benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise 

discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 

discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 

(9th Cir. 2002). Title II of the ADA applies to state prisoners. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 524 U.S. at 

208. 

Punitive damages are not available in private suits brought under the ADA. Barnes v. 

Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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“To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA . . . , a plaintiff must prove intentional 

discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard for intentional discrimination 

is deliberate indifference. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 

2001). Deliberate indifference under the ADA requires (1) knowledge that a harm to a federally 

protected right is substantially likely; and (2) a failure to act upon that likelihood. Id. at 

1139. The first prong requires a plaintiff to “identify ‘specific reasonable’ and 

‘necessary’ accommodations that the state failed to provide.” Id. at 1140 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). The second prong requires a showing that the entity deliberately 

failed to fulfill its duty to act in response to a request for accommodation. Id. The entity’s duty 

is to undertake a fact-specific investigation to gather from the disabled individual and qualified 

experts sufficient information to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. Id. 

The second prong is not satisfied if the failure to fulfill this duty to accommodate results from 

mere negligence. Id. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he is a vision-impaired inmate and that he was housed at RJD at the 

time of the alleged ADA violation. Comp. at 4. As such, Plaintiff is an individual with a disability 

who is “otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of [the CDCR’s] services, 

programs, or activities,” and thus satisfies the first two elements required to establish a violation 

of Title II of the ADA. See Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895. However, the facts alleged in the 

Complaint do not establish discrimination against Plaintiff because of his disability. Rather, the 

alleged facts indicate that Defendant Stout reviewed Plaintiff’s request to have RJD staff clean 

Plaintiff’s cell and advised Plaintiff that he would find a cellmate “who would keep the cell 

cleaned,” and the very next day a new cellmate, whom Plaintiff describes as an “ADA worker,” 

was moved into Plaintiff’s cell. See ECF No. 1 at 4. Although Plaintiff’s specific accommodation 

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request (that staff clean his cell) was denied [see id.], Plaintiff was provided with other 

accommodations to ensure that his cell was cleaned. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged that he was “either excluded from participation in or 

denied the benefits of the [CDCR’s] services, programs or activities, and otherwise discriminated 

against,” and that such alleged exclusion, denial or discrimination occurred because of his 

disability, and thus Plaintiff has not established the third and fourth elements of the ADA 

violation. See Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895; Rideau v. Ochoa, 2010 WL 3733758, at *6 (S.D. 

Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA claims pursuant to 

FRCP 12(b)(6) where the plaintiff did not allege facts to support the claim that he was denied a 

single cell or medical treatment because of his physical disability). The Court therefore 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim be GRANTED. See 

Fleming v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 3069349, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (finding that 

“[p]laintiff’s housing needs have been met” and dismissing plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief 

where the plaintiff, who suffered from paralysis and was wheelchair-bound, was transferred to 

a cell that complied with the ADA and was assigned ADA workers to assist him); see also Allen 

v. Carrington, 2009 WL 2877557, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2009) (finding that the prison provided 

plaintiff with reasonable accommodations to participate in the day-to-day operations of the 

prison, where the prison assigned another inmate to assist the plaintiff with getting to and from 

the cafeteria and carrying his tray, and with “whatever other needs [the plaintiff] may have as 

a result of his eyesight.”); Williams v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 1999 WL 1068669, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 

Nov. 17, 1999) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment and requiring Illinois 

Department of Corrections to “[p]rovide [plaintiff] with navigational assistance when he is 

moving around the prison,” and noting that such “assistance may include the use of other 

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prisoners to assist [plaintiff]”); see also Curry v. Tilton, 2012 WL 967062, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 21, 2012) (noting that prison had an Inmate Assistance Program, which “allowed physicallylimited inmates who had difficulty participating in everyday activities to receive aid from 

designated inmate workers,” including “assistance in preparation of laundry bags, maintenance 

of cell cleanliness, scribing assistance, escort to and from the dining room with assistance to 

carry meal trays, and escort to educational and work programs.”) (emphasis added). Because 

it is not clear that Plaintiff cannot allege facts that will state a claim against the CDCR3 for an 

ADA violation, the Court RECOMMENDS that the claim be dismissed WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND. 

4. Eighth Amendment Claims 

Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim 

under the Eighth Amendment. MTD at 4-7. Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to 

allege facts establishing a deliberate indifference to either his safety or his medical care. Id. 

a. Deliberate Indifference to Safety 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Heddy, Davis and Bustos were deliberately indifferent to 

Plaintiff’s safety when they failed to remove Plaintiff from his cell after he stated that he was 

suicidal, resulting in Plaintiff being raped by his cellmate. See Comp. at 5. Defendants argue 

that Plaintiff has not “plead facts to establish that [he] complained about the actions of his 

cellmate to any of the Defendants or that any of the Defendants had knowledge that his cellmate 

                                                      

3Plaintiff has not served the summons and Complaint on Defendant CDCR. ECF No. 15. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff states that a prison employee at the Salinas Valley Psychiatric Program 

provided him with an incorrect address for Defendant CDCR. MTD Oppo. at 1-2. If Plaintiff files 

a First Amendment Complaint naming Defendant CDCR, Plaintiff must obtain the correct address 

and serve Defendant CDCR within ninety days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

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was a danger to him.” MTD at 6; MTD Reply at 3. Defendants also claim that Plaintiff’s allegation 

that he told them that he was suicidal, without more, is insufficient to establish deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s safety. See id. Plaintiff responds that Defendants are obligated to 

address any suicidal threats by prisoners. MTD Oppo. at 2. 

A prisoner may state a section 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison 

officials where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm or 

injury by another prisoner. Leach v. Drew, 385 F. App’x 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Berg v. 

Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1986); Robins v. Prunty, 249 F.3d 862, 866 (9th 

Cir. 2001). To assert an Eighth Amendment claim based on failure to prevent harm, a prisoner 

must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the objective requirement, the inmate must show that he was 

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. Under the subjective 

requirement, the prisoner must allege facts which demonstrate that “the official knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and 

he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove knowledge of the risk, the prisoner may 

rely on circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to 

establish knowledge. Id. at 842. 

1) Objective Prong

Plaintiff alleges that on August 28, 2013, inmate Lee was transferred to Plaintiff’s cell and 

told Plaintiff that he would rape Plaintiff that night. Comp. at 5. Plaintiff claims that Lee was a 

member of the “blood” gang and that Lee knew that Plaintiff was imprisoned for murdering a 

“blood.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Lee drugged and raped him in his cell. Id. at 5. These 

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facts satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim as they allege that Plaintiff was 

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. See Becker v. Cowan, 

2008 WL 802933, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008) (“[a] substantial risk of being physically 

attacked, beaten, or raped is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective element of an Eighth 

Amendment claim”) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832)); Wright v. Grannis, 2010 WL 6086269, 

at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2010) (finding that plaintiff has pled facts to satisfy the objective prong 

of an Eighth Amendment claim where the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he was drugged and 

raped in his cell by his cellmate), adopted, 2011 WL 890817 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011). 

2) Subjective Prong 

Plaintiff states that after Lee threatened to rape him, he informed Defendant Heddy that 

he was suicidal, and that Heddy responded “Fuck you, go to bed” and walked away. Comp. at 

5. Plaintiff alleges that he then grabbed a razor from his locker. Id. Plaintiff does not allege 

that he intended to harm himself or others but rather, Plaintiff merely claims that Lee told him 

to “wait because [Plaintiff] was going to slash [his] own throat.” Id. Plaintiff states that Lee 

and other inmates started yelling “man down.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Bustos and 

Davis came to the door of his cell but refused to remove him. Id. Plaintiff does not state what, 

if anything, he told Defendants Bustos and Davis about his mental state, nor does Plaintiff 

describe how he was behaving or what Lee and the other inmates told Defendants Bustos and 

Davis about the situation. Id. While Plaintiff states that he told Defendants that he was suicidal 

because he hoped to be “moved so [that he] could make [his] complaint in private,” Plaintiff 

does not indicate what, if anything, Plaintiff did to convey that hope or his fear of harm to the 

named Defendants. Id. Finally, Plaintiff states that the “bloods put a hit on [him] in 2004. 

There are letters in my C-file.” Id. Plaintiff does not provide any details regarding the alleged 

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hit, nor does he describe what information is contained in the letters or how that information 

impacted the alleged risk of harm facing Plaintiff. See Comp. Plaintiff also does not allege that 

any of the Defendants had access to his C-file or that they knew about the 2004 hit and/or the 

contents of the letters. See id. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts establishing the subjective prong of his Eighth 

Amendment claim. Plaintiff does not allege that he told Defendants that his new cellmate posed 

a significant danger to him. Plaintiff also does not allege any facts indicating that Defendants 

knew or inferred that Plaintiff’s new cellmate created a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. While 

Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant Heddy that he was suicidal, Plaintiff does not state what 

if anything he told Defendants Bustos and Davis when they responded to the yells of “man 

down.” Plaintiff also does not describe either interaction or otherwise allege facts indicating that 

Plaintiff was suicidal and that Defendants should have known or inferred that he presented an 

excessive risk to his own safety. In fact, Plaintiff only alleges that he said he was suicidal and 

grabbed a razor in hopes that Defendants would remove him from his cell. These allegations 

are insufficient to state a claim that Defendants knew of or disregarded an excessive risk to 

Plaintiff’s safety. In his opposition and in his prison grievances, Plaintiff set forth additional 

facts, which cannot be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the Complaint but do indicate 

that the dismissal should be with leave to amend. See Sosa Decl., Exh. B at 19; see also id., 

Exh. A at 9; MSJ Oppo. at 6. Similarly, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains vague 

conclusory statements which could be used to state a claim if additional facts are provided. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for 

deliberate indifference to his safety against Defendants Heddy, Davis and Bustos be GRANTED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

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b. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Medical Needs

Defendants maintain in their motion to dismiss that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient 

to establish the existence of a serious medical need and the subjective culpability on the part of 

each Defendant. MTD at 6-7; MTD Reply at 3. Plaintiff responds that he is allowed one 

toothpowder and one toothbrush per week, and that Defendants Heddy, Davis, Bustos, and 

Miller did not distribute those items to him, stating that he “[was] not on the list,” and that 

despite his assertion that he “need[ed] . . . dental supplies,” Defendants repeatedly refused to 

provide the requested supplies. MTD Oppo. at 2. Plaintiff states that he did not have any 

available funds to purchase the requested dental supplies and asserts that Defendants acted in 

retaliation after he reported his sexual assault to Lieutenant Rink. Id. 

As noted above, courts generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings when 

resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1; 

Jacobellis, 120 F.3d at 172. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff asserts new facts in his 

opposition, the Court will not consider those facts and will limit its analysis to the allegations in 

the Complaint. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that from September 21, 2013 until January 15, 

2014, Defendants Heddy, Bustos, Davis, and Miller denied his requests for “dental supplies,” 

and that, as a result, he lost four teeth and enamel on another tooth. Comp. at 6. Plaintiff also 

claims that Defendants acted in retaliation after he complained that Defendants Heddy, Bustos, 

and Davis “could have prevented the assault by taking [him] out of the cell when [he] said that 

[he]was suicidal.” Id. 

A prison official’s “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” violates 

the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Clement v. 

Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). A prisoner must satisfy an objective and a subjective 

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requirement to assert an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. The objective requirement is satisfied 

so long as the prisoner alleges facts to show that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such 

that the “failure to treat [the] condition could result in further significant injury or the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The subjective component 

requires the prisoner to allege facts showing a culpable mental state, specifically, “deliberate 

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. The indifference 

must be substantial, and inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, 

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976). Indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere 

with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide 

medical care.” Tracey v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff, 2008 WL 154607, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 

2008) (quoting Hutchinson v. U.S., 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

1) Objective Prong 

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Nawabi v. Wyatt, 

2009 WL 3514849, *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 at 104). In 

considering the seriousness of an alleged medical need, courts should consider whether (1) a 

reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment or treatment; (2) the 

condition significantly affects the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) the condition is chronic and 

accompanied by substantial pain. Id. (citing Doty v. Cnty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540. 546 n.3) (9th 

Cir. 1994)). 

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“Dental care is one of the most important medical needs of inmates.” Hunt v. Dental 

Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The Eighth Amendment requires 

that prisoners be provided with a system of ready access to adequate dental care. Id. The 

Seventh Circuit has stated the following: 

a number of other courts have also held that dental pain accompanied by various 

degrees of attenuated medical harm may constitute an objectively serious medical 

need. See Fields v. Gander, 734 F.2d 1313, 1314–15 (8th Cir. 1984); see also 

Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir. 1996) (recession or bleeding of 

the gums); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1995) (deterioration of teeth 

due to lack of treatment); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(an interference with the ability to eat). For example, in Penrod v. Zavaras, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, for summary 

judgment purposes, the deprivation of toothpaste resulting in bleeding gums and 

tooth decay which had to be attended to by a dentist could constitute serious harm 

under the Eighth Amendment. Penrod, 94 F.3d at 1406. 

Bd. v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2005) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that for almost four months starting on September 21, 2013, 

Defendants Heddy, Bustos, Davis, and Miller denied Plaintiff “dental supplies,” and that he lost 

four teeth and enamel on another tooth. Comp. at 6. Reading Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally and 

in favor of Plaintiff [see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895], Plaintiff satisfies 

the objective prong because the facts set forth a plausible allegation of serious harm or injury. 

2) Subjective Prong 

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the subjective portion of the deliberate 

indifference test as he has not alleged that Defendants Heddy, Davis, Bustos, and Miller were 

aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Initially, Plaintiff fails define the phrase “dental supplies.” The Complaint asserts that Defendants 

refused to provide Plaintiff with dental supplies but Plaintiff does not describe the specific items 

that were not provided. Dental supplies is a broad term which could encompass many products 

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from a toothpick to toothpaste and toothbrush to floss to an electronic Waterpik or other items. 

The precise item that was denied may affect the validity of Plaintiff’s claim. See Pigues v. Solano 

Cnty. Jail, 2015 WL 2358647, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2015) (noting that “a denial of dental 

floss to pretrial detainees did not present a constitutional question”) (citing, inter alia, Green v. 

Denning, 465 Fed. Appx. 804, 807 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“a claim based on the denial of dental 

floss was one of the examples of frivolous prisoner suits cited in the legislative history of the 

Prisoner Litigation Reform Act.”); Mitchell v. Cate, 2015 WL 5255339, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 

2015) (noting that “[w]hile the Eighth Amendment guarantees sanitation . . . including personal 

hygiene supplies such as . . . toothpaste . . . , temporarily substandard conditions of confinement 

do not rise to the level of constitutional violations . . . .”) (citing Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 

F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996); Wright v. 

Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Lopez v. Cate, 2013 WL 239097, at 

*8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013) (finding that “the deprivation of . . . toothbrush, and toothpowder 

for approximately seven days does not rise to level of Eighth Amendment violation.”). 

Secondly, the Complaint merely states that the named defendants “continued to refuse 

[Plaintiff] dental supplies.” Comp. at 6. This statement is vague and conclusory and could mean 

that someone else originally denied the dental supplies or that someone else provided him with 

some dental supplies while the named Defendants refused to do so. Similarly, the Complaint 

states that Plaintiff was denied dental supplies from September 21, 2013 thourgh January 15, 

2014 but it does not provide any information regarding the time frame that each of these 

defendants allegedly caused the denial. The Complaint also does not assert that Plaintiff 

requested specific supplies and/or was entitled to the supplies nor does it allege that these 

Defendants knew that Plaintiff had requested and/or not received the dental supplies. Finally, 

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the Complaint does not provide any details regarding the specific actions that each defendant 

took which caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Smedley v. Reid, 2010 WL 391831, 

at *11 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2010) (“to survive Rule 12(b)(6) motion, complaint must directly 

connect defendants’ actions with alleged harm”) (citation omitted). As a result, Plaintiff’s 

allegations are too conclusory to state a constitutional claim for deliberate indifference to his 

medical needs against Defendants Heddy, Davis, Bustos, and Miller. See Easter, 694 F. Supp. 

2d at 1183 (“[v]ague and conclusory allegations” are not sufficient to withstand a motion to 

dismiss) (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268). However, Plaintiff’s opposition indicates that he may 

be able to allege additional facts. See MTD Oppo. at 3. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference 

to his medical needs against Defendants Heddy, Davis, Bustos, and Miller be GRANTED WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND.

IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

his administrative remedies as to all claims and all Defendants prior to filing the instant action. 

MSJ at 3-10. 

A. Exhaustion Under The Prison Litigation Reform Act 

Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995 provides: 

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of 

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted. 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve the 

quality of prisoner suits.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). The United States 

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Supreme Court has confirmed that exhaustion is a mandatory prerequisite to filing suit in federal 

court. Id. Failure to exhaust may not be waived. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) 

(“[e]xhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court”). The United States 

Supreme Court has stated that “[t]here is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the 

PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 

211 (2007). 

 To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff 

failed to properly exhaust available administrative remedies. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 

1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 216 (inmates are not required to specially 

plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his or her complaint because failure to exhaust is an 

affirmative defense under the PLRA). The defendant cannot demonstrate an absence of 

exhaustion unless some relief remains available. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Therefore, the defendant must produce evidence that the plaintiff did not properly 

exhaust a remedy that is available “as a practical matter” in that it must be “capable of use” or 

“at hand.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171. 

 Once the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must “come forward with evidence 

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. at 1172. The Ninth Circuit 

has consistently held that administrative remedies were unavailable where the inmate was 

thwarted by affirmative misconduct or obstruction by prison officials. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 

F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010) (screening out an inmate’s administrative grievance for improper 

reasons rendered administrative remedies unavailable); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 

1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (a prison warden’s mistake in misdirecting the inmate rendered 

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administrative remedies unavailable). However, an inmate who did not make any attempt to 

properly utilize the prison grievance system cannot sidestep the exhaustion requirement by 

arguing that it now would be futile to attempt to exhaust within the prison system. Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (“we stress the point . . . that we will not read futility or 

other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided 

otherwise.”); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 100 (“if the party never pursues all available 

avenues of administrative review, the person will never be able to sue in federal court.”). 

 The Supreme Court in Woodford held that an inmate cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion 

requirement by “filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance 

or appeal.” Id. at 83-84. “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must 

‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with applicable procedural rules,’” 

defined by the specific prison grievance process in question. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quoting 

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines 

and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively 

without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford, 548 U.S. 

at 90-91. This requirement serves PLRA’s purpose because it “gives prisoners an effective 

incentive to make full use of the prison grievance process and accordingly provides prisons with 

a fair opportunity to correct their own errors.” Id. at 94. Therefore, an inmate incarcerated in 

CDCR must comply with all the regulations and procedures of California’s prison administrative 

appeals system to properly exhaust his claim. See Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (“[t]he California prison system’s requirements ‘define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion’” for inmates bringing suit in California). 

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B. California Regulations 

 To properly exhaust available remedies for an administrative decision or perceived 

mistreatment in California, an inmate must proceed through three formal levels of review. See 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1–3084.9. The three levels include: “(1) a first level appeal, to 

be conducted by the division head or his or her designee”4; “(2) a second level appeal, to be 

conducted by the hiring authority or his or her designee; and (3) a third level appeal, to be 

conducted by the Office of Appeals in Sacramento, California (formerly the Inmate Appeals 

Branch).” Jones v. Paramo, 2013 WL 4517829, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013); Cal. Code Regs. 

tit. 15, §§ 3084.1, 3084.7. “The third level review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on an appeal” and “exhausts 

administrative remedies.” Id. § 3084.7(d)(3). 

 An inmate must submit his or her appeal “within 30 calendar days of: (1) The occurrence 

of the event or decision being appealed, or; (2) Upon first having knowledge of the action or 

decision being appealed, or; (3) Upon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response to an 

appeal filed.” Id. § 3084.8(b). An appeal may be cancelled if it is untimely. Id. § 3084.6(c)(4). 

Once cancelled, the appeal shall not be accepted unless a determination is made that the 

cancellation was made in error or new information is received making the appeal eligible for 

                                                      

4 “All appeals shall be initially submitted and screened at the first level unless the first 

level is exempted.” Id. § 3084.7(a). An appeals coordinator “may bypass the first level of 

appeal of: (1) A policy, procedure or regulation implemented by the department. (2) A policy or 

procedure implemented by the institution head. (3) An issue that cannot be resolved at the 

division head level such as Associate Warden, Associate Regional Parole Administrator, CALPIA 

manager or equivalent. (4) Serious disciplinary infractions.” Id. § 3084.7(a)(1-4). 

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further review. Id. §§ 3084.6(a)(3), 3084.6(e). A cancellation does not exhaust an appeal, 

though a cancellation at the Third Level may itself be appealed. Id. § 3084.6(e). 

The inmate may initiate litigation in federal court “only after the administrative process 

ends and leaves his grievances unredressed.” Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th 

Cir. 2006). “Administrative remedies shall not be considered exhausted relative to any new 

issue, information, or person later named by the appellant that was not included in the originally 

submitted CDCR Form 602 . . . , and addressed through all required levels of administrative 

review up to and including the third level.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). 

 C. Summary Judgment Standard

The proper vehicle for challenging a complaint based on failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies is a motion for summary judgment under FRCP 56. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168 

(overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) which held that the proper 

procedural device for defendants to raise an exhaustion defense was an unenumerated FRCP 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). “If under the Rule 56 summary judgment standard, the court 

concludes that plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is 

dismissal without prejudice.” Wells v. Kyte, 2014 WL 3058361, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) 

(citing Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120, overruled on other grounds by Albino, 747 F.3d 1162). 

 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 

moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party to 

provide admissible evidence beyond the pleadings to show that summary judgment is not 

appropriate. Id. at 322-24. The opposing party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials 

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of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (citation omitted). In cases 

where the defendant is moving for summary judgment for plaintiff’s failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

the defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available administrative 

remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy. See id. 

(“[T]he respondent . . . must show that domestic remedies exist that the claimant 

did not use.”). Once the defendant has carried that burden, the prisoner has the 

burden of production. That is, the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward 

with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the 

existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to 

him. See id. (“[T]he burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that the 

local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or 

obviously futile.”). However, as required by Jones, the ultimate burden of proof 

remains with the defendant. 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. 

 A court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on a motion for 

summary judgment; rather, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Furthermore, in order to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on 

conclusory allegations of fact. Berg, 794 F.2d at 459. Instead, the nonmovant must designate 

which specific facts show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

 D. Defendants’ Evidence 

Defendants submitted declarations from V. Sosa, the Appeals Coordinator at RJD, and 

M. Voong, the Chief of the Office of Appeals, to establish that Plaintiff had access to an 

administrative process and failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. See ECF No. 

24-3, Declaration of V. Sosa (“Sosa Decl.”); ECF No. 24-4, Declaration of M. Voong (“Voong 

Decl.”). V. Sosa describes the administrative grievance process that was available to Plaintiff at 

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RJD, including that “[a]ll appeals received by the appeals office are assigned a log number for 

tracking purposes,” and entered into the computer system. Sosa Decl. at 1-3. V. Sosa states 

that he searched the office records pursuant to the request from the Office of the Attorney 

General and found the following four relevant grievances submitted by Petitioner during the 

designated time period5: 

(1) Appeal Log No. RJD-B-13-02337. On July 30, 2013, the appeals office received a 

Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request from Plaintiff dated July 27, 2013, stating 

that he is visually impaired and requesting a magnifing device and assistance in cleaning his cell. 

Sosa Decl. at 4, 34 (Exh. D). The request was partially granted at the first level of review in 

that Plaintiff was provided with a magnifiying device and prison staff was instructed to “expedite 

a bed move” to provide Plaintiff with an appropriate cellmate who could assist with cleaning. 

Id. at 4, 33. Plaintiff did not appeal this decision. Id. at 4; 

(2) Appeal Log No. RJD-X-13-02788. On August 15, 2013, the appeals office received a 

health care appeal from Plaintiff dated May 13, 2013 in which Plaintiff identified himself as legally 

blind and asked to have a specific inmate help Plaintiff with his reading and writing. Id. at 3, 

28-30 (Exh. C). On September 10, 2013, this request was cancelled as moot “due to [Plaintiff’s] 

transfer to SATF.” Id. at 4, 23; 

(3) Appeal Log No. RJD-C-14-02285. On June 14, 2014, the appeals office received a 

CDCR 602 grievance from Plaintiff dated June 9, 2014, alleging that Plaintiff was poisoned and 

sexually assaulted by his “ADA worker” cellmate Lee on August 28, 2013. Id. at 3, 7-9 (Exh. A). 

                                                      

5V. Sosa states that he searched the prison records for relevant grievances filed between 

August 1, 2013 and January 15, 2014, but three of the identified responsive grievances are 

outside that time frame. Sosa Decl. at 3-4, 6-35. 

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Plaintiff alleges that he tried to get help from C/Os Davis, Bustos, and Heddy but they went 

home without helping him. Plaintiff states that he told Lieutenant Rink about the attack on 

August 29, 2013, that Lt. Rink told C/O Davis, and that C/O Davis threatened to kill Plaintiff if 

anyone on his crew got in trouble. Id. at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that from September 21, 

2013 through January 15, 2014, his “attacker harassed, teased and threatened [him].” Id. 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that a large number of RJD staff, including Defendants Hernandez, 

Bustos, Davis, Heddy and Miller, “denied [Plaintiff] showers, meds, shaves, writing material, and 

state issued envelopes . . . and repeatedly threw away [his] blind canes and magnifiers” and 

stole his money and “gave him tiny portions of food.” Id. This grievance was cancelled because 

the “[t]he time limits for submitting the appeal are exceeded even though [Plaintiff] had the 

opportunity to submit within the prescribed time constraints.” Id. at 3, 6; and 

(4) Appeal Log No. RJD-X-14-03013. On August 19, 2014, the appeals office received a 

CDCR 602 grievance from Plaintiff dated August 2, 2014 re-alleging the details regarding his 

sexual assault on August 23, 2013, the claims that COs Bustos and Davis refused to help Plaintiff 

prior to the assault, and that all of the COs in “B6” retaliated against Plaintiff for telling Lt. Rink 

about the assault and officer misconduct. Id. at 17-19 (Exh. B). This grievance was cancelled 

as untimely and for duplicating Appeal No. RJD-C-14-02285. Id. at 3, 15-16. 

M. Voong states that the Office of Appeals “did not receive or accept any appeals from 

Plaintiff, between, August 1, 2013 and January 15, 2014” pertaining to the instant allegations. 

Voong Decl. at 4. M. Voong explains that the Office of Appeals accepted a grievance from 

Plaintiff on October 14, 2013 (RJD-13-02277), which was exhausted at the Third Level, involved 

a challenge to a Rules Violation Report, and was irrelevant to the instant claims. Id. Although 

no other appeals were submitted during the relevant time period, M. Voong identified one other 

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grievance (RJD-13-01868) which was received on June 17, 2013 and screened out on June 27, 

2013 “because the appeal had previously been cancelled.” Id. 

E. Plaintiff’s Evidence 

Plaintiff filed a verified complaint (ECF No. 1), an unverified opposition (MSJ Oppo.), 

exhibits (id. at 3-8), and a sworn declaration (Plaintiff Decl.) arguing that he exhausted his 

claims, that he submitted a timely grievance which was not processed, and/or that his mental 

health status and treatment prevented him from exhausting his claims. 

Plaintiff states in his sworn declaration that he was sexually assaulted by his cellmate Lee 

on August 28, 2013 and that he reported the assault to Lieutenant Rink and the CDCR 

Investigative Services Unit on August 29, 2013, claiming that Defendants Heddy, Davis and 

Bustos could have prevented the assault had they addressed his suicide threat. Plaintiff Decl. 

at 1. Plaintiff explains that he was sent to an outside hospital for a rape exam, that he was 

placed in a suicide cell upon his return, and that he was transferred to the “‘New Corcoran’ State 

prison for crisis bed housing” from September 1-20, 2013. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff states that he 

“was not allowed writing supplies” until September 24, 2013. Id. at 2. Plaintiff states that on 

September 24, 2013, after his return to RJD, he “wrote an appeal,” gave it to C/O Crawford “to 

turn in to the appeals box,” and that C/O Crawford walked away with the envelope. Id. In his 

verified complaint, Plaintiff states that “[o]n 9-24-13 I gave an inmate appeal to C/O K. Crawford 

and asked him to put it in the appeals box. I never heard anything again. On 6-9-14, I submitted 

another appeal, and I advised the appeals coordinator that I submitted a previous appeal in a 

timely manner[.]” Comp. at 7. 

Plaintiff states that beginning on September 28, 2013, he asked several prison officials, 

including Defendants Heddy, Bustos, Davis, Miller, and Hernandez, about his missing personal 

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property (vision impaired vest, blind cane, and glasses) and was told the property was lost. 

Plaintiff Decl. at 2. Plaintiff states that starting on September 20, 2013, he was denied “showers, 

yard, shaves, medication” and “toothpaste, toothbrushes, indigent envelopes, and pen fillers.” 

Id. Plaintiff asserts that these denials “only happened when defendants Miller, Heddy, Davis, 

and Bustos were on duty.” Id. 

Plaintiff maintains that he “was so stressed out,” he “went back to crisis bed” in the 

California Healthcare Facility (“CHCF”) Stockton, on January 15, 2014.6 Id. On February 6, 

2014, Plaintiff was transferred to a Psychiatric Program at the Salinas Valley State Prison. Id. 

at 2-3. Plaintiff concludes that the cancellation of Appeal No. RJD-C-14-02285 was improper 

“because for 9 1⁄2 months, [he] was mentally incapable of filing the appeal. [He] was in the 

SVPP-DSH program receiving therapy and treatment for being sexually assaulted, teased, bullied 

and tortured.” Id. at 3. 

F. Analysis

An inmate must submit his grievance within thirty calendar days of the occurrence of the 

event being appealed. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b); see also Sosa Decl. at 2; Voong 

Decl. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that the ADA violation occurred on August 27, 2013 [see Comp. at 

4] and the relevant grievances were received by the prison on July 30, 2013 and August 15 

2013. Sosa Decl. at 4; Exhs. C & D. The July 30th grievance was granted in part and not 

                                                      

6 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s declaration appears to contain an error with respect to 

the year when Plaintiff “went back to crisis bed” in CHCF Stockton. See Plaintiff Decl. at 2. Even 

though the declaration references 2013, the context of the declaration, as well as Plaintiff’s 

Appeals Log Nos. RJD-C-14-02285 and RJD-X-14-03013, indicate that Plaintiff is referring to 

January 2014. See id.; see also Sosa Decl., Exh. A at 9; id., Exh. B at 17. The Court will correct 

the error and use the date of January 15, 2014. 

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appealed and the second grievance was cancelled as moot due to Plaintiff’s transfer to another 

prison. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the Eighth Amendment violation relating to his safety occurred 

on August 28, 2013 [Comp. at 5] and Defendant’s evidence establishes that the relevant appeal 

was received on June 14, 2014 and cancelled for being untimely. Sosa Decl. at 3; Exh. A. A 

second, almost identical appeal, was received on August 19, 2014 and screened out for being 

duplicative and untimely. Sosa Decl. at 3; Exh. B. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Eighth Amendment violation relating his dental needs occurred 

between September 21, 2013 and January 15, 2014. Comp. at 6. The only grievance addressing 

medical issues identified by either party is Appeal Log No. RJD-C-14-02285. Sosa Decl. at 3; 

Exh. A; MSJ Oppo. at 6. In relevant part, this appeal alleges that RJD staff, including Defendants 

Heddy, Davis, Bustos, and Miller, “[d]enied [Plaintiff] showers, meds, shaves, writing material, 

and state issued envelopes,” “threw away [his] blind canes and magnifiers,” took away his 

money, and “gave [him] tiny portions of food.” Sosa Decl., Exh. A; MSJ Oppo. at 6. The 

grievance does not allege a denial of dental supplies, and thus did not place prison officials on 

notice of Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. In addition, the appeal 

was cancelled because it was not timely as it was not received until June 14, 2014. Sosa Decl. 

at 3; Exh. A. 

The Court finds that the Defendants have satisfied their initial burden of establishing that 

Plaintiff did not submit timely grievances asserting any of the three claims at issue in this 

Complaint and did not exhaust the available administrative remedies. The burden of production 

therefore shifts to Plaintiff and he must must “come forward with evidence showing” either that 

he properly exhausted all available administrative remedies before filing suit, or that “there is 

something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

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remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 

2015) (quoting Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172); Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. Plaintiff presents two 

arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that he submitted a timely grievance on September 24, 2013. 

Second, Plaintiff asserts that his mental health status and treatment prevented him from filing 

timely grievances. 

Plaintiff avers in his declaration that he handwrote an appeal and gave it to C/O Crawford 

on September 24, 2013 to deposit in the appeals box and that C/O Crawford inspected the 

envelope, accepted the grievance, and walked away with it. Plaintiff Decl. at 2. In his June 14, 

2014 appeal, Plaintiff stated that the September 24, 2013 handwritten appeal was “similar” to 

the June 14, 2014 appeal, RJD-C-14-02285. Sosa Decl., Exh. A at 9. Plaintiff explains that he 

created a copy of the September 24, 2013 appeal but it was stolen from his personal belongings, 

along with his impaired vision vest, blind cand, and glasses. Plaintiff Decl. at 2-3. Plaintiff thus 

argues that he followed the prison’s grievance procedure by submitting a timely grievance and 

that prison officials prevented him from exhausting the claim. MSJ Oppo. at 1-2. Defendants 

acknowledge that misconduct by prison officials resulting in an appeal not being processed may 

render administrative remedies unavailable, but argue that such a finding is not appropriate in 

this case because there is no evidence that the appeal was actually submitted and Plaintiff made 

no effort to inquire as to the status of the submitted appeal. MSJ Reply at 2-3. 

In Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191-92, plaintiff stated in her verified complaint that she had 

informed a prison officer about the facts alleged in her complaint, that the officer did not help 

her, and that she subsequently attempted to file a grievance and an appeal with another prison 

officer, who rejected the grievance and refused to file the appeal. Id. at 1186, 1191-92. Plaintiff 

also alleged in her opposition that “prison officials would not file or allow [her] to file a 

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grievance,” cited the facts in her complaint, and claimed that she “‘attempted’ to exhaust her 

administrative remedies as to all the allegations alleged in the complaint and was hampered by 

prison officials.” Id. at 1187. The Ninth Circuit found that “[b]ecause there were genuine 

disputes of material fact and because Defendants did not carry their burden of demonstrating 

that [plaintiff] failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, summary judgment was 

inappropriate . . . .” Id. (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit “treat[ed] [plaintiff]’s complaint 

as an affidavit because it was made under penalty of perjury,” and found that the plaintiff’s 

sworn statements in her complaint were sufficient to meet her burden of production to establish 

that administrative remedies were unavailable. Id. at 1191-92; id. at 1192 n.11. 

The Court finds that in this case, Plaintiff’s sworn statements in his declaration and 

Complaint, accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are sufficient to 

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively 

unavailable to him with regard to the allegations set forth in Appeal Log No. RJD-C-14-02285. 

See id. at 1191-92; Bamdad v. Gavin, 2016 WL 1658657, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (finding 

that plaintiff’s sworn statement that he attempted to file grievances but was prevented from 

exhausting his administrative remedies was sufficient to defeat defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies); see also Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1177 (concluding that prison officials had not carried their burden of proving an available 

administrative remedy where grievance forms “had to be requested by an inmate and were 

never provided to [plaintiff], despite his repeated complaints”). 

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s declaration should be disregarded or not believed 

because he fails to provide a copy of the missing grievance and because he did not inquire about 

the status of the missing grievance does not eliminate the disputed issue. Rather, Defendants’ 

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argument highlights the dispute—Plaintiff’s declaration constitutes evidence that he filed a timely 

grievance and that prison officials made the administrative process unavailable to him for this 

grievance and Defendants’ declarations constitute evidence that he did not do so. This is clearly 

a disputed material fact and it is not the Court’s province on a motion for summary judgment to 

make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material 

fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

Defendants also imply that Plaintiff should not be believed because he was able to file 

other grievances and there is no reason to believe that prison officials would have prevented 

him from filing this particular grievance. MSJ Reply at 3 (“It simply doesn’t make sense that the 

prison would receive and process several other appeals during this time frame, but ignore one 

specific appeal.”). Plaintiff counters that Defendants retailiated against him for telling Lt. Rink 

about the assault and alleged officer misconduct and implies that the officers did not process 

the grievance regarding the assault to ensure that none of the involved officers would get in 

trouble. Plaintiff Decl. at 1-3. Because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether 

Plaintiff submitted a timely grievance raising the issues set forth in Appeal Log. No. RJD-C-14-

02285 and whether prison officials prevented the grievance from being processed, summary 

judgment is inappropriate. 

In support of his second argument, Plaintiff states in his sworn declaration that “for 9 1/2 

months, [he] was mentally incapable of filing the appeal.” Plaintiff Decl. at 3. Plaintiff explains 

that after he was sexually assaulted on August 28, 2013, he was taken to a hospital for a rape 

exam and then placed in a “suicide cell” at RJD. Id. at 2. Plaintiff states that he was moved to 

New Corcoran State Prison “for crisis bed housing” from September 1, 2013 through September 

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20, 2013, and that upon his return to RJD, he was not allowed writing supplies until September 

24, 2013. Id. “From September 20, 2013,” Plaintiff asserts that numerous prison staff, including 

Defendants, harassed, threatened, and retaliated against him, including stealing his belongings, 

which stressed him out. Id. Plaintiff states that “[he] was so stressed out, [he] went back to 

crisis bed” on January 15, 2014 in CHCF Stockton, and that on February 6, 2014, he was 

transferred to the Salinas Valley State Prison’s Psychiatric Program. Id. at 2-3. Defendants did 

not submit evidence establishing that Plaintiff was mentally competent but merely argue that 

the fact that he filed other appeals during the relevant time frame negates his claim of mental 

incompetence. MSJ Reply at 3-4. Defendants also did not present any evidence establishing 

what, if any, administrative remedies and processes were available to Plaintiff at the various 

prisons and psychiatric facilities where he was housed, whether he was provided access to 

writing materials and the relevant prison forms at all times during his treatment at the various 

facilities, and/or the specific times he was housed in each of the facilities. See MSJ; MSJ Reply. 

In Millner v. Biter, 2016 WL 110425, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016), Plaintiff asserted in 

his verified declaration that he was unable to file a grievance due to his mental and physical 

condition and placement in a mental health crisis bed, suicide watch, and subsequent recovery, 

and argued that he was “not allowed any property, writing materials, or access to the CDCR 

grievance system.” The court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

the administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to plaintiff, reasoning as follows: 

Defendants submit evidence that the administrative grievance process was 

available in general, but do not address specifically the extent of the availability of 

the administrative process during placement in a mental health crisis bed, suicide 

watch, and Plaintiff’s subsequent recovery from such conditions . . . . The factual 

contentions raised by Plaintiff cannot be resolved by way of motion for summary 

judgment. The fact that Plaintiff may or may not have had the ability to previously 

file an inmate appeal . . . , when he was in a mental health crisis bed, is not 

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relevant nor dispositive of the issue of whether the circumstances at the relevant 

time in this case rendered the administrative remedy process unavailable. Thus, 

without examining all the facts and claims and weighing the evidence, the Court 

cannot resolve whether or not Plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to utilize the 

administrative remedies during the relevant time frame or whether the 

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. 

Id. (citing Marella v. Terhune,7 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding exhaustion issue 

to district court where record was unclear as to whether prisoner injured in a knife attack by 

another prisoner had access to the necessary grievance forms or the ability to timely file an 

appeal due to his stay in the hospital, prison infirmary, and subsequent administrative 

segregation); see also Urioste v. Burns, 2015 WL 3498528, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015) 

(finding that administrative remedies are effectively unavailable when the inmate does not have 

access to necessary grievance forms, such as when the inmate has been hospitalized). 

Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff’s sworn statements are sufficient to create a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether the administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to Plaintiff 

during the thirty days after his assault and the thirty days after the period of denial of dental 

supplies. See Plaintiff’s Decl. at 2-3; see also Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191-92. Although 

                                                      

7 The Ninth Circuit relied on the following regulations, which it concluded “explicitly create 

an exception to the timely filing requirement”: 

[T]he appeals coordinator is only permitted to reject an appeal if “[t]ime limits for 

submitting the appeal are exceeded and the appellant had the opportunity to file 

within the prescribed time constraints.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 §§ 3084.6(c) and 

3084.3(c)(6) (emphasis added). The California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation Operating Manual directs the appeals coordinator to “ensure that 

the inmate or parolee had, in fact, the opportunity to file in a timely manner.” 

Section 54100.8.1. 

Id. at 1027. 

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Defendants argue that other appeals filed by Plaintiff between September 24, 2013 and 

June 2014, suggest that Plaintiff was mentally and physically capable of filing an appeal, 

Defendants do not establish “the extent of the availability of the administrative process during 

[Plaintiff’s] placement in a mental health crisis bed, suicide watch, and Plaintiff’s subsequent 

recovery.” See Millner, 2016 WL 110425, at *6; Williams, 775 F.3d at 1192 (noting that 

defendants’ argument that remedies were available to plaintiff as evidenced her unrelated 

appeals was “a virtual non-sequitur because it d[id] nothing to rebut [plaintiff]’s evidence that 

administrative remedies were not available to her at the time she tried to file the relevant 

grievance and appeal in this case”) (emphasis added).

The Court finds that in light of the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s sworn declaration and 

verified Complaint, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff had 

meaningful access to the administrative remedy process during the relevant time periods at the 

relevant facilities. The Court concludes that Defendants’ evidence is insufficient to carry their 

“ultimate burden of proof” with respect to all of the claims asserted in the Complaint and 

therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies be DENIED as to all three claims. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) granting in 

part and denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint; and (3) denying 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than July 11, 2016. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court 

and served on all parties no later than August 1, 2016. The parties are advised that failure 

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

VI. MOTION TO BE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER INSTITUTION [ECF No. 34] 

On December 28, 2015, the Court accepted on discrepancy a document signed by Plaintiff 

on December 16, 2015, titled “Injunction,” in which Plaintiff asks the Court to move him to the 

California Medical Facility in Vacaville. ECF Nos. 33 & 34. In support, Plaintiff alleges that he is 

vision impaired and walks with a cane, and that his disability verification form CDCR 1845 

mandates that he should not be housed on a prison yard with obstacles that “severely hinder[] 

his program and/or movement.” ECF No. 34 at 1. Plaintiff further contends that the D-yard of 

the California State Prison, Los Angeles County, has steps, that on November 21, 2015, he 

tripped and fell over a step, and that the yard is difficult to navigate with a cane because it 

comprises of mostly dry mud. Id. Plaintiff also maintains that the facility to which he seeks to 

be transferred is designed for vision impaired inmates, and that his transfer will prevent future 

injuries. Id. In light of the relief requested by Plaintiff, the Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as 

a motion to be transferred to another institution. 

The Court does not have jurisdiction to order Plaintiff to be transferred to another 

institution. See Sharma v. Johnson, 2014 WL 2769139, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) 

(construing portion of petitioner’s civil rights complaint for a prison transfer as a habeas petition 

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brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and denying the request for transfer where the “court lack[ed] 

jurisdiction to order the petitioner’s transfer to another prison [because] Title 18 U.S.C § 3621(b) 

gives the BOP [Bureau of Prisons] authority to ‘designate the place of the prisoner’s 

imprisonment’ and the discretion to ‘direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal or 

correctional facility to another.’”). “Title 18 U.S.C. § 3625 prohibits judicial review of ‘any 

determination, decision, or order’ that the BOP makes under 18 U.S.C. § 3621.” Id.; 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3625; see also Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227-29 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Although judicial 

review remains available for allegations that BOP action is contrary to established federal law, 

violates the United States Constitution, or exceeds its statutory authority,” review of the BOP’s 

discretionary decisions regarding an individual inmate’s place of incarceration falls outside 

federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction). In addition, it appears that Plaintiff already has been 

moved to another facility. See ECF No. 36 (containing Plaintiff’s change of address notice). 

Accordingly Plaintiff’s motion for transfer to another institution is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 6/20/2016 

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