Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00042/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0101 Copyright Infringement (definitions)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

JOHN DOE, subscriber assigned IP 

address 98.176.143.26,

 Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-00042-CAB-JLB

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR 

LEAVE TO SERVE A THIRD 

PARTY SUBPOENA PRIOR TO A 

RULE 26(F) CONFERENCE

[ECF No. 4]

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for Leave to Serve a 

Third Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference. (ECF No. 4.) No opposition was 

filed as no defendant has been named or served in this case. For the reasons set forth below, 

Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This is one of numerous cases filed by Plaintiff alleging copyright infringement by

a John Doe defendant through the use of the BitTorrent file-sharing system.

1

 Plaintiff 

alleges that it is the copyright owner of motion pictures distributed through adult content 

 

1

See, e.g., 17-cv-2302-MMA-JLB; 17-cv-2312-MMA-NLS; 17-cv-2313-AJB-JMA; 17-cv-2315-MMAAGS; 17-cv-2316-GPC-KSC; 17-cv-2317-JAH-BLM; 17-cv-2318-DMS-BLM; and 17-cv-2319-JAHBGS. 

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websites Blacked, Tushy, and Vixen. (ECF No. 4-1 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges that between 

June 22, 2017 and November 15, 2017, the person or entity assigned Internet Protocol 

(“IP”) address 98.176.143.26 illegally copied, downloaded, and/or distributed thirty-seven

of Plaintiff’s motion pictures through his, her, or its use of the online BitTorrent file 

distribution network. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 23–30; ECF No. 1-2 at 1–3.) On January 5, 2018, 

Plaintiff commenced the instant action by filing a Complaint against Defendant “John Doe, 

subscriber assigned IP address 98.176.143.26.” (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint alleges a 

single claim of copyright infringement. (Id. at ¶¶ 34–39.) 

Because Defendant used the Internet to commit the alleged infringement, Plaintiff 

knows Defendant only by his, her, or its IP address, which Plaintiff believes was assigned 

to Defendant by the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) Cox Communications. (ECF No. 4

at 17.) In the present Motion, Plaintiff asserts that Cox Communications “is the only party 

with the information necessary to identify Defendant by correlating the IP address with 

John Doe’s identity.” (Id. at 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks leave to serve a Rule 45 

subpoena on Cox Communications to obtain the name and address associated with IP 

address 98.176.143.26. (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Discovery is not permitted before the parties have conferred pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 26(f) unless authorized by court order. Fed R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). 

“[H]owever, in rare cases, courts have made exceptions, permitting limited discovery to 

ensue after filing of the complaint to permit the plaintiff to learn the identifying facts

necessary to permit service on the defendant.” Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 

F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Requests to conduct discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) 

conference are granted upon a showing of good cause by the moving party, which may be 

found “where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of 

justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron 

Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 275–76 (N.D. Cal. 2002). “A district court’s decision to grant 

discovery to determine jurisdictional facts is a matter of discretion.” Columbia Ins. Co., 

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185 F.R.D. at 578 (citing Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 

430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977)).

District courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a three-factor test for determining whether 

good cause exists to allow for expedited discovery to identify Doe defendants. See

Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578–80. “First, the plaintiff should identify the missing 

party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real 

person or entity who could be sued in federal court.” Id. at 578. Second, the plaintiff 

“should identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant” to ensure that the 

plaintiff has made a good faith effort to identify and serve process on the defendant. Id. at 

579. Third, the plaintiff “should establish to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit 

against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 

642). Further, the plaintiff “should file a request for discovery with the Court, along with 

a statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery requested as well as identification 

of a limited number of persons or entities on whom discovery process might be served and 

for which there is a reasonable likelihood that the discovery process will lead to identifying 

information about defendant that would make service of process possible.” Id. at 580 

(citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks an order allowing it to serve a Rule 45 subpoena on Cox 

Communications before the parties have conducted a Rule 26(f) Conference so that 

Plaintiff may obtain the true name and address of Defendant. (ECF No. 4 at 7.) For the 

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED. 

A. Identification of Missing Party with Sufficient Specificity

For the Court to grant Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff must first identify Defendant with 

enough specificity to enable the Court to determine Defendant is a real person or entity 

who would be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 

at 578. This Court has previously determined that “a plaintiff identifies Doe defendants 

with sufficient specificity by providing the unique IP addresses assigned to an individual 

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defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing conduct, and by using ‘geolocation 

technology’ to trace the IP addresses to a physical point of origin.” 808 Holdings, LLC v. 

Collective of December 29, 2011 Sharing Hash, No. 12-cv-00186 MMA (RBB), 2012 WL 

12884688, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) (citing Openmind Solutions, Inc. v. Does 1–39, 

No. C-11-3311 MEJ, 2011 WL 4715200, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); Pink Lotus 

Entm’t, LLC v. Does 1–46, No. C-11-02263 HRL, 2011 WL 2470986, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. 

June 21, 2011)). 

In cases where it is unclear whether the subject IP address is “dynamic” or “static,” 

such as here, it matters when Plaintiff’s geolocation efforts were performed.2In the context 

of dynamic IP addresses, “a person using [a particular IP] address one month may not have 

been the same person using it the next.” State v. Shields, No. CR06352303, 2007 WL 

1828875, at *6 (Conn. Sup. Ct. June 7, 2007). It is likely that the user of IP address 

98.176.143.26 is a residential user and that the IP address assigned by Cox 

Communications is dynamic.3 Thus, if Plaintiff’s geolocation efforts were performed close 

in time to the offending downloads, they may be probative of the physical location of the 

subject IP subscriber. If not, the geolocation of the subject IP address may be irrelevant. 

Here, the Court concludes that the instant Motion sufficiently demonstrates that 

Defendant is likely subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Plaintiff attaches to its Complaint a 

table reflecting that the user of IP address 98.176.143.26 engaged in allegedly infringing 

activity between June 22, 2017 and November 15, 2017. (ECF No. 1-2 at 1–3.) In addition,

Plaintiff attaches to its Motion the declaration of Tobias Fieser, an employee of IPP 

International UG (IPP), a forensic investigation services company. (ECF No. 4-2.) Fieser 

 

2

“Static IP addresses are addresses which remain set for a specific user. Dynamic IP addresses are 

randomly assigned to internet users and change frequently. Consequently, for dynamic IP addresses, a 

single IP address may be re-assigned to many different computers in a short period of time.” Call of the 

Wild Movie, LLC v. Does, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 356 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. 

Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 160 (D. Mass. 2008)). 

3

“Most consumer IP addresses are ‘dynamic’ as opposed to ‘static.’” Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. 

Supp. 2d at 356.

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declares that IPP connected to an electronic device using IP address 98.176.143.26, which 

was observed distributing multiple pieces of Strike 3 Holding’s motion pictures. (Id. at ¶ 

7.) Fieser also declares that, according to IPP’s ancillary surveillance program, IP address 

98.176.143.26 is associated with significant and long-term BitTorrent use. (Id. at ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff’s Motion asserts that the IP address 98.176.143.26 belongs to Cox 

Communications and that Plaintiff employed Maxmind’s geolocation technology to locate 

that IP address within the Southern District of California. (ECF No. 4 at 7, 13.) Plaintiff’s 

Motion argues that this Court has accepted Maxmind’s geolocation findingsfor the purpose 

of allowing expedited discovery and that federal law enforcement relies on Maxmind for 

its cyber investigations. (Id. at 13) (citing Criminal Prods., Inc. v. Doe-72.192.163.220, 

No. 16-CV-2589 WQH (JLB), 2016 WL 6822186, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016)). At 

the Court’s request, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Declaration of Emilie Kennedy, an 

employee of Plaintiff, addressing when the device associated with IP address

98.176.143.26 was tracked to this district. (ECF No. 6.) Kennedy declares that IP address 

98.176.143.26 was automatically inserted into Maxmind’s Geolocation Database on 

September 6, 2017, after Plaintiff first received infringement data from IPP,

4

and Maxmind 

traced the IP address location to Vista, CA. (ECF No. 6-1 at ¶ 4.) Kennedy also declares 

that as of February 2, 2018, Maxmind’s Geolocation Database continues to trace IP address 

98.176.143.26 to a location in this district. (Id. at ¶ 5.)5 

The Court concludes that based on the timing of the IP address tracing efforts

employed by Plaintiff, the documented success of the Maxmind geolocation service, and 

the continued tracing of the IP address to this district, Plaintiff has met its evidentiary

burden of showing that IP address 98.176.143.26 likely relatesto a physical address located 

 

4 The Court notes that the table attached to Plaintiff’s complaint references alleged infringement as early 

as June 22, 2017. (ECF No. 1-2 at 1–3.) 

5 On February 2, 2018, IP address 98.176.143.26 was identified as located in San Marcos, CA, which is 

approximately seven miles from its original location in Vista, CA. (Id.) Both locations are within this 

district.

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in this district. 

B. Previous Attempts to Locate Defendant

For the Court to grant Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff must next identify all of the steps 

it took to locate Defendant to ensure the Court it made a good faith effort to identify and 

serve process on Defendant. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579. The Court 

concludes that Plaintiff has met this burden. Plaintiff retained a forensic investigation 

services company, IPP, to monitor the BitTorrent file distribution network for the presence 

of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works and to identify the IP addresses of devices that are found 

distributing Plaintiff’s copyrighted works. (ECF No. 4-2 at ¶¶ 4–5.) Through IPP, Plaintiff 

has been able to identify much about the subscriber of IP address 98.176.143.26, such as 

his, her, or its ISP and the software used to commit the allegedly infringing acts. (Id. at ¶¶ 

7–10.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s ISP is the only entity that can correlate the IP 

address to its subscriber and identify Defendant as the person assigned the IP address 

98.176.143.26 during the time of the alleged infringement. (ECF No. 4 at 7.) Based on 

the above, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has made a good faith effort to locate 

Defendant and that Plaintiff cannot, on its own, locate Defendant with any greater 

specificity than it already has. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently 

satisfied the second prong of the “good cause” test. 

C. Whether Plaintiff’s Suit Can Withstand a Motion to Dismiss

For the Court to grant Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff must next show that its suit against 

Defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579 

(citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). The Court finds Plaintiff has met this burden.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a single cause of action against Defendant: copyright

infringement. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 34–39.) To prove a claim of direct copyright infringement, 

a plaintiff “must show: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) that the defendant 

violated the copyright owner’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.” Ellison v. 

Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2003)). Here, 

Plaintiff purports to be the owner of the thirty-seven copyrighted works at issue, and asserts

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that every work has been registered with the United States Copyright Office or has a 

pending copyright registration application. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 31, 32; ECF No. 4 at 16

(citing Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010).) 

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant used the BitTorrent file network to illegally download and 

distribute Plaintiff’s copyrighted motion pictures.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 23.) IPP declares that 

it observed the device using IP address 98.176.143.26 distributing multiple pieces of Strike 

3 Holding’s motion pictures, and when assembled, the distributed pieces constitute a fully 

playable digital movie. (ECF No. 4-2 at ¶¶ 7–10.) Plaintiff has verified that each digital 

file is a copy of Strike 3’s motion pictures. (ECF No. 4-3 at ¶¶ 7–10.) IPP also declares

that this IP address is associated with significant and long-term BitTorrent use. (ECF No. 

4-2 at ¶ 12.) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged the prima facie elements of 

direct copyright infringement and its suit against Defendant would likely withstand a 

motion to dismiss. 

D. Specific Discovery Request

Finally, for the Court to grant Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff “should file a request for

discovery with the Court.” Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 580 (citing Gillespie, 629 

F.2d at 642). Although Plaintiff did not provide the Court with a proposed subpoena, 

Plaintiff has provided the Court with sufficient information regarding its requested 

discovery by stating in its Motion that it will seek from Cox Communications only the 

name and address of the subscriber of IP address 98.176.143.26. (ECF No. 4 at 18.) 

E. Additional Considerations

This Court shares the concern noted by other courts in this district of “‘unscrupulous 

tactics [being] used by certain plaintiffs, especially in the adult film industry, to shake down 

the owners of IP addresses’ to exact quick and quiet settlements from possibly innocent 

defendants who pay out only to avoid potential embarrassment.” Strike 3 Holdings, LLC 

v. John Doe, No. 17-cv-2312-MMA-NLS (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017) (citing Malibu Media, 

LLC v. Does 1-5, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77469, *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012)). 

Accordingly, the Court issues an order establishing procedural safeguards to protect the 

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privacy of Defendant. See e.g., Malibu Media v. Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 79595, *5 

(M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2014) (imposing conditions and citing cases that do the same); see also 

Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35534, *17 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds good cause to allow Plaintiff to serve 

a Rule 45 subpoena upon Cox Communications at this time. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

Motion is GRANTED as follows: 

1. Plaintiff may serve on Cox Communications a subpoena, pursuant to and 

compliant with the procedures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, seeking only the 

name and address of the subscriber assigned IP address 98.176.143.26 for the relevant 

time period of the alleged infringement. Plaintiff shall not seek from Cox Communications 

any other personally identifiable information about the subscriber; 

2. Plaintiff’s subpoena to Cox Communications must provide a minimum of 

forty-five (45) calendar days’ notice before any production responsive to the subpoena 

shall be made to Plaintiff;

3. At the time Plaintiff serves its subpoena on Cox Communications, Plaintiff 

shall also serve on Cox Communications a copy of this Order;

4. Within fourteen (14) calendar days after service of the subpoena, Cox 

Communications shall notify the subscriber assigned IP address 98.176.143.26 that his, 

her, or its identity has been subpoenaed by Plaintiff and shall provide the subscriber a copy 

of this Order with the required notice;

5. The subscriber whose identity has been subpoenaed shall have thirty (30)

calendar days from the date of such notice to challenge Cox Communications’ disclosure 

of his, her, or its name and address by filing an appropriate pleading with this Court 

contesting the subpoena;

6. If Cox Communications seeks to modify or quash the subpoena, it shall do so 

as provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3);

7. In the event a motion to quash, modify, or otherwise challenge the subpoena 

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is brought properly before the Court, Cox Communications shall preserve the information 

sought by the subpoena pending the resolution of any such motion; and

8. Plaintiff may only use the information disclosed in response to a Rule 45 

subpoena served on Cox Communications for the purpose of protecting and enforcing 

Plaintiff’s rights as set forth in its Complaint. If the Defendant wishes to proceed 

anonymously, Plaintiff may not release any identifying information without a court order 

allowing the release of the information.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 9, 2018

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