Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01833/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01833-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL CARTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-1833-JAH-AGS

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING IN PART AND 

DECLINING TO ADOPT IN PART 

THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE; 

(2) SUSTAINING IN PART AND 

OVERRULING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS;

(3) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT;

(4) SCHEDULING EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF 

EXHAUSTION

INTRODUCTION

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Pending before the Court is C. Hernandez, T. Johnson, G. Galvan, G. Hernandez, C. 

Davis, D. Paramo, and E. Baynard’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary 

Judgment. [Doc. No. 3]. The Honorable Clinton E. Averitte, United States Magistrate 

Judge, issued a report and recommendation (“Report”) recommending the Court deny

Defendants’ motion and order the parties to supplemental the record through an Albino

hearing. See Doc. No. 10. After careful consideration of the pleadings, and for the reasons 

set forth below, this Court ADOPTS in part and DECLINES TO ADOPT in part the 

Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge; SUSTAINS in part and 

OVERRULES in part Defendants’ objections; GRANTS in part and DENIES in part

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 3]; and schedules an evidentiary 

hearing to resolve factual questions pertaining to exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

BACKGROUND

Michael Carter (“Plaintiff”) an inmate at Donovan Correctional Facility, alleges that 

he has been a confidential informant for the prison’s Investigative Services Unit. See Doc. 

No. 1–14. Plaintiff states that his informant status was discovered by Baldwin, a fellow 

inmate, who threatened to blackmail and physically assault him. Id. Plaintiff further alleges 

that he discussed his safety concerns with Defendants who did nothing in response, and on 

July 4, 2014, Plaintiff was physically attacked by Baldwin and hospitalized with a head 

injury. Id. On August 9, 2014 Plaintiff submitted an initial appeal to Donovan’s inmate 

appeals office regarding the July 4th assault and requested the prison conduct an 

investigation. See Doc. No. 8, pg. 34, ¶ 7. On August 15, 2014, the appeals office canceled, 

or “screened out,” Plaintiff’s appeal because it was not submitted within thirty days of the 

alleged incident. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he appealed the cancellation of his initial appeal. 

Three months later the appeals department notified him that the initial appeal was never 

received by its office. Id. at ¶ 10. On November 7, 2014, Plaintiff filed a second appeal, 

which was deemed to be untimely and cancelled on November 24, 2014. See Doc. No. 8, 

pg. 46. Finally, Plaintiff appealed the November 24, 2014 cancellation but it was rejected 

for failing to attach all necessary documentation. Id. at pg. 49.

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On August 5, 2015, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an action in the Superior Court 

of California, County of San Diego alleging Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under 

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See Doc. No. 1–

14. On September 8, 2017 the matter was removed to this Court. See Doc. No. 1. On 

September 18, 2017, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an 

opposition, and Defendants filed a reply. See Doc Nos. 3, 8, 9. The magistrate judge issued 

a Report recommending this Court deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

finding that a “factual dispute exists as to the severity and impact of plaintiff’s head injury 

and whether it affected his mental faculties to the degree his tardy grievance should be 

forgiven.” Doc. No. 10. Defendants timely filed objections to the magistrate judge’s

Report. See Doc. No. 11. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The district court’s role in reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the court “shall 

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which an objection is 

made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” Id. The party objecting to the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation bears the responsibility of specifically 

setting forth which of the magistrate judge’s findings the party contests. See Fed.R.Civ. P. 

72(b). It is well-settled, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that a 

district court may adopt those parts of a magistrate judge’s report to which no specific 

objection is made, provided they are not clearly erroneous. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 

140, 153-55 (1985).

DISCUSSION

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Doc. No. 3–1. 

Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust all three levels of appeals

despite the opportunity to do so and, regardless, Plaintiff’s initial appeal was untimely. Id.

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Additionally, Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate as to the Defendants 

who were not named in either of the appeals filed by Plaintiff. Id. These arguments will be 

addressed in turn below.

i. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

The Report comprehensively analyzes whether the timeliness of Plaintiff’s initial 

grievance should be excused due to the traumatic head injury he claimed to have suffered. 

However, the Report fails to analyze whether Plaintiff sufficiently exhausted all available 

remedies regardless of whether his initial untimely grievance was excusable. The 

magistrate judge determined such an analysis would be superfluous in that “disputed facts 

about the appeal [at] step one [] render summary judgment inappropriate.” Doc. No. 10, 

pg. 5. Defendants object to such a finding, arguing that no evidence has been presented 

indicating that Plaintiff was prevented from pursuing administrative remedies through the 

third level of appeal. See Doc. No. 11, pg. 7. Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED. The 

Court disagrees with the Report that factual disputes pertaining to the initial grievance 

terminate Plaintiff’s obligation to extinguish all administrative remedies. The Court will 

conduct such an analysis in this order. 

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought 

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a 

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The failure to exhaust is an affirmative 

defense, and the defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of 

exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Defendants must first prove that there 

was an available administrative remedy and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available 

remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Albino v. Baca, 

747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted)). The burden then shifts to 

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Plaintiff to show that something in his particular case made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. Williams, 775 F.3d at 

1191 (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted)). The ultimate burden of 

proof on the issue of exhaustion remains with Defendants. Id. (quotation marks omitted).

California state prison inmates are required to complete three levels of appeals to 

exhaust all available administrative remedies: the first level of review by an appeals officer; 

the second level of review by the institution head or designee; and the third level of review 

by the Chief of Appeals for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”). Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Inmates must submit their initial appeal 

within 30 calendar days of “[t]he occurrence of the event or decision being appealed, or ... 

first having knowledge of the action or decision being appealed.” Id. at § 3084.8(b). 

Inmates must also submit their appeals to higher levels of review within 30 calendar days 

of receiving the first or second-level appeal decision. See id. Only a third-level decision 

exhausts all available administrative remedies, while a cancellation or rejection of the thirdlevel appeal is not exhaustive. Id.

As discussed above, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment based 

on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Doc. No. 3 – 1, pg. 13. In 

support of their argument, Defendants submit a declaration from B. Self (“Self”), the 

Appeals Coordinator at Donovan whose office receives all first and second level inmate 

appeals. See Doc. No. 3–2. ¶ 1. Self explains that all appeals received by the appeals office 

are assigned a log number for tracking purposes, even if they are later rejected or cancelled. 

After being assigned a log number, the appeal is entered into the prison’s computer system.

Id., ¶ 3. If an inmate appeal does not comply with appeals regulations, the appeals 

coordinator either rejects or cancels the appeal pursuant to Cal. Code Regs. 21 tit. 15, § 

3084.6. Id., ¶ 4. If an inmate appeal is rejected, the appeal is returned to the inmate with a 

letter explaining the deficiency in the appeal and giving the inmate an opportunity to 

correct the deficiency if possible. Id. A cancelled appeal, by contrast, informs the inmate 

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that his appeal has been cancelled and may not be resubmitted; a separate appeal, however, 

can be filed on the cancellation decision. Id.

Self conducted a thorough search of the appeals office records and determined 

Plaintiff filed the following appeals with his office. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff filed his initial 

grievance on August 12, 2014 and it was assigned Appeal Log No. RJD-B-14-02885 

(“2885 Appeal”). Id., ¶ 8a. On August 15, 2014 the Appeals office cancelled the 2885 

Appeal due to its untimeliness pursuant to California Code of Regulations title 15, § 

3084.6(c)(4).1Id. The next appeal the appeals office received from Plaintiff was on 

November 17, 2014, assigned Appeal Log No. RJD-B-14-04141 (“4141 Appeal”), which

alleged the same conduct as the 2885 Appeal. Id., Ex. 2. On December 15, 2014, the 

appeals office cancelled this appeal finding it untimely on similar grounds. Id., ¶ 8b. On 

December 26, 2014, the Appeals office received an appeal from Plaintiff appealing the 

cancellation of the 4141 Appeal. Id., ¶ 8c. This appeal was assigned Appeal Log No. RJDB-15-00131 (“131 Appeal”). Id. On January 14, 2015 the 131 Appeal was rejected and 

returned to Plaintiff because it was missing supporting documents that were required. Id.

Plaintiff was sent a screening notice informing him that he needed to provide the original 

cancelled appeal and could resubmit the appeal within the time frames specified in CCR 

3084.6. Id., Ex. 3. The appeals office received nothing further from Plaintiff concerning 

the 131 Appeal.

Based on this presentation of evidence, Defendants have adequately shown that there 

were available administrative remedies that Plaintiff did not fully exhaust. Particularly

because the evidence shows that the appeals department informed Plaintiff of their decision 

to reject the 131 Appeal, and provided instructions on how to properly remedy the 

deficiencies. The obligation to exhaust “available” remedies persists as long as some 

 

1 An appeal that is rejected pursuant to subsection 3084.6(b) may later be accepted if the reason noted 

for the rejection is corrected and the appeal is returned by the inmate or parolee to the appeals 

coordinator within 30 calendar days of rejection. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6 (emphasis added).

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remedy remains “available.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005). As such, 

the burden shifts to Plaintiff “to come forward with evidence showing that there is 

something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166.

In opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence, via a sworn declaration, that he “appealed 

the cancellation of the [2885 Appeal] and attached the original,” but never heard from the 

appeals department for three months regarding that appeal. Doc. No. 8, ¶ 10. Plaintiff states 

he contacted the appeals coordinator who notified him that the appeals department never

received his appeal. Id. Plaintiff claims this appeal was lost in the “institutional mail” and 

it took him “almost a year to recover that lost appeal” from prison officials.2Id. Plaintiff 

acknowledges that the appeals office requested the “original appeal” after rejecting his 131 

Appeal, but Plaintiff claims that it had been “lost in the institutional mail,” and upon 

requesting a copy from the appeals department he did not receive it until almost a year 

later. Id. 

Plaintiff primarily relies upon Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 

2009) and Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 2010) to assert that an exception 

to the exhaustion requirement applies in this case. In Marella, the Ninth Circuit held that a 

prisoner was not required to “exhaust further levels of review once he [had] . . . been 

reliably informed by an administrator that no remedies are available.” Marella, 568 F.3d at 

1027. Plaintiff’s reliance on Marella is unavailing, because here, unlike in Marella, Plaintiff 

was informed that he could appeal the cancellation of his appeal, and that appeal was only 

rejected because he failed to provide all necessary documentation. Furthermore, the appeals 

department informed Plaintiff that he could refile his rejected appeal within thirty days so 

long as he attached the requested documents. It is clear that additional levels of review 

remained available to Plaintiff.

 

2 The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff did not submit this “lost appeal” to the Court. 

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What is unclear, however, based on the evidence presented to this Court in the 

papers, is whether Plaintiff took reasonable and appropriate steps in a good faith effort to 

exhaust his grievances, but was precluded from exhausting through no fault of his own. 

See Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff claims that he 

appealed the cancellation of the 2885 Appeal, wherein he attached the original copy of the 

2885 Appeal, but both documents were lost in institutional mail. Doc. No. 8, ¶ 10. Plaintiff 

contends that the appeals department then rejected his 131 Appeal because the original 

copy of his 2885 Appeal needed to be attached. Id. There is apparent confusion as to which 

“original appeal” the appeals department requested. Plaintiff seems to believe that the 

appeals department was requesting an original copy of the 2885 Appeal, while Defendants 

argue that the letter is requesting an original copy of the 4141 Appeal. Regardless, the letter 

states that Plaintiff could obtain “copy(ies) of requested documents by sending a request 

with a signed trust withdrawal form to your assigned counselor.” Doc. No. 8, pg. 49. 

Plaintiff claims that he “requested a copy of the [original 2885 Appeal that the appeals 

office] had on file but didn’t receive it until almost a year later.” Id., pg. 35. The Court

concludes there is a factual dispute precluding summary judgment concerning whether 

Plaintiff took reasonable steps to exhaust, but was precluded from exhaustion due to lost 

mail and a failure of the appeals department to timely provide requested documents. 

ii. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Initial Grievance 

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies 

because his initial grievance was untimely. The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires 

“proper exhaustion” of available administrative remedies. Id. at 93. Proper exhaustion 

demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because 

no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure 

on the course of its proceedings. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s initial August 9, 2014 grievance was untimely 

because it was submitted to the appeals coordinator at Donovan more than thirty calendar 

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days after the asserted July 4, 2014 assault. See Doc. No. 3–1, pg. 17 (citing Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b). Plaintiff acknowledges that his initial appeal was untimely but 

argues that his injury qualifies as a “special circumstance” because his “severe skull 

fracture . . . impaired [his] cognitive thinking skills for numerous months.” Doc. No. 8, pg. 

11. In a sworn declaration filed in opposition of Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, Plaintiff stated that as of August 9, 2014 he was still “recovering from a serious 

cranium injury, which impaired [his] cognitive thinking skills” and was only able to submit 

the tardy grievance with the “assistance of [his] cellmate Erin Sutton.” Doc. No. 8, pg. 34–

35. 

In the Report, the magistrate judge acknowledged that certain circumstances, such 

as a serious head injury, may justify a tardy grievance. See Doc. No. 10. The magistrate 

judge noted that courts have previously found administrative remedies are unavailable 

when “(1) an inmate’s untimely filing of a grievance is because of a physical injury and (2) 

the grievance system rejects the inmate’s subsequent attempt to exhaust his remedies based 

on the untimely filing of the grievance.” Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 

2003) (also citing Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2004); Barretto v. Smith, 

No. CIV S–07–1544, 2009 WL 1271984, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009); Macahilas v. 

Taylor, No. CIV S-06-0502, 2008 WL 220364, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2008)). Ultimately, 

the magistrate judge found that a genuine factual dispute existed as to Plaintiff’s head 

injury and whether this injury prevented him from timely filing his grievance. See Doc. 

No. 10, pg. 4. The magistrate judge determined that if Plaintiff’s evidence of cognitive 

impairment was believed by a fact finder it would qualify as an injury which would provide 

for a tolling of the administrative requirements. Id. (citing Greenup v. Lee, No. CIV.A. 13-

0392, 2014 WL 471715, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2014)). As such, the magistrate judge 

recommended that this Court deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

Defendants filed an objection to this portion of the Report. Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s “self-serving” declaration is unable to create a triable issue of fact that his head 

injury prevented him from timely filing his grievance. See Doc. No. 11, pg. 2. Defendants 

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further argue that Plaintiff’s claims of cognitive impairment is “so blatantly contradicted 

by the record” such that no reasonable fact finder could possibly believe it. Id. at pg. 3 

(citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007). 

Defendants summarize the evidence in the record demonstrating Plaintiff’s medical 

condition following the July 4, 2014 assault. This evidence includes visits from a registered 

nurse on July 5, 2014 who found Plaintiff to be “alert and orientated,” and July 6, 2014

where Plaintiff was found to be alert, orientated, and ambulating. See Doc. No. 3–1, pgs. 

23, 27. On July 7, 2014 Plaintiff submitted a Healthcare Services Request Form requesting 

stronger medicine because “[t]he medication I’m on for pain is not working.” Id. at pg. 29. 

A registered nurse responded to this request and noted that Plaintiff was able to walk, ask 

questions, and understood information. Id. Plaintiff was visited by registered nurses on July 

8, 2014 and July 9, 2014 who noted, among other things, Plaintiff ambulated, asked 

questions, and summarized information. Id. at pgs. 31, 43. On July 24, 2014, Plaintiff 

appeared for a hearing regarding a rules violation for possession of morphine, which was 

found on his person after the July 4, 2014 assault. See Doc. No. 3–1, pgs. 46–53. The 

officer conducting the hearing recorded that Plaintiff “was able to articulate a clear 

understanding of the charges” and was able to “read the contents of the [rules violations 

report] and . . . verbally articulate his comprehension of the circumstances.” Id. Finally, 

Defendants presented evidence of a July 9, 2014 phone call between Plaintiff and Officer 

Davis, which was recorded and later transcribed. See Doc. No. 9, pgs. 14–23. Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff demonstrated his cognitive functioning by articulating what occurred 

on July 4, 2014, the injuries suffered, and potential penalties for being found in possession 

of morphine. See Doc. No. 11, pg. Defendants argue that this evidence so blatantly 

contradicts Plaintiff’s “conclusory, self-serving declaration” such that Plaintiff is unable to 

create a genuine issue of material fact.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 

if any. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 

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justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s self-serving affidavit is insufficient 

to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the severity of Plaintiff’s head injury. This 

Court disagrees. First, a plaintiff can defeat summary judgment by filing a declaration that 

contradicts the defendant’s contentions. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 

(9th Cir.1999). Second, declarations submitted by a party are often times self-serving, 

“[a]nd properly so, because otherwise there would be no point in [a party] submitting 

[them].” United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir.1999). Only in certain 

instances—such as when a declaration “state[s] only conclusions, and not ‘such facts as 

would be admissible in evidence,’”—can a court disregard a self-serving declaration for 

purposes of summary judgment. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

Plaintiff declares that he was struck numerous times in the head and face with a rock 

rendering him unconscious. Doc. No. 8, ¶¶ 2–3. Plaintiff alleges the following injuries 

resulting from the assault: fracture to the right orbital wall; fractures of the bilateral nasal 

bones; fracture of the anterior nasal septum with small associated hematoma; commotion 

retinae of the right eye due to blunt force trauma; lip laceration; cheekbone and eyebrow 

laceration; and a concussion. Id. at ¶ 4.3 Plaintiff asserts that he had to undergo 

reconstructive surgery as a result of these injuries, including nasal fracture repair surgery 

in January of 2015 and orbital wall repair surgery in March of 2015. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff 

further declares that he now suffers from permanent post-traumatic facial neuralgia and 

will be forced to take medication for the duration of his life. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff avers that 

he was only able to file his grievance on August 9, 2014 with the assistance of his cell 

 

3 Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of the facts in his declaration, including the severity of 

his injuries. See Doc. No. 8, pg. 7, fns. 1, 2. The Court DENIES this request in that the facts in his 

declaration are not generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court and cannot be accurately 

and readily determined by any source of record whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. Fed. R. 

Evid. 201.

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mate, Erin Sutton, because at the time he was still recovering from a serious cranium injury 

which impaired his cognitive thinking skills. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8. 

Third, Plaintiff’s opposition is not based upon his declaration alone. Plaintiff does 

state in the recorded telephone conversation with Officer Davis that he was scheduled for 

“reconstructive surgery on [his] nose and [his] cheek bone,” stiches were removed from 

his face on the day of the call, and he stated that he was “kind of forgetful . . . [about] stuff.” 

Doc. No. 9, pg. 17. In addition, Plaintiff submitted a partial declaration from inmate Erin 

Sutton,4supporting his declaration that he was unable to file a grievance on his own. Taking 

all of this evidence as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, Plaintiff’s 

declaration provides sufficient facts to support his conclusion that he suffered, and thus 

was still recovering from, a serious cranium injury. This Court agrees with the magistrate 

judge’s finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding exhaustion, rendering

summary judgment inappropriate at this time. Accordingly, Defendants’ objection is 

OVERRULED.

iii. Evidentiary Hearing

The issue of “[e]xhaustion should be decided, if feasible, before reaching the merits 

of a prisoner’s claim.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170. Therefore, as is the case here, when 

summary judgment is not appropriate as to the issue of exhaustion, the district judge should 

hold an evidentiary hearing to decide disputed questions of fact “in the same manner a 

judge rather than a jury decides disputed factual questions relevant to jurisdiction and 

venue.” Id. at pg. 1168. Defendants request the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing “on 

the papers.” See Doc No. 3. However, as the magistrate judge noted, Plaintiff’s credibility 

will be of significant importance to the Court and “[i]t is only in rare instances . . . that 

credibility may be determined without an evidentiary hearing.” Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 

1158, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2005). One of the primary purposes of an evidentiary hearing is 

 

4 Plaintiff submitted a signed declaration of Erin Sutton, however the Court notes that the second page of 

the declaration was either not submitted or otherwise missing. 

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to “enable [] the finder of fact to see the witness’s physical reactions to questions, to assess 

the witness’s demeanor, and to hear the tone of the witness’s voice,” United States v. Mejia, 

69 F.3d 309, 315 (9th Cir. 1995), thereby assisting the finder of fact in evaluating witness 

credibility. Id. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing will be held before this Court to 

determine whether Plaintiff “fully” and “properly” exhausted all available administrative 

remedies or is excused for failing to do so. 

iv. Defendants not named in Plaintiff’s appeals

Defendants’ final argument concerns the Defendants who were not named in either 

grievance filed by Plaintiff, specifically D. Paramo, C. Hernandez, and T. Johnson. See

Doc. No. 3–1, pg. 17. Defendants contend that California inmate regulations require 

inmates to “list all staff member(s) involved and shall describe their involvement in the 

issue . . . [or] [i]f the inmate or parolee does not have the requested identifying information 

about the staff member(s), he or she shall provide any other available information that 

would assist the appeals coordinator in making a reasonable attempt to identify the staff 

member(s) in question.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). In the Report, the 

magistrate judge acknowledges that Plaintiff never explicitly states that he could not 

provide all necessary names due to his head injury but makes a reasonable inference that 

his injury prevented him from doing so. See Doc. No. 10, pg. 6. The magistrate further 

notes that the content of the lost appeal is unknown and it is possible other Defendants 

could be named in that appeal. Id.

Defendants object to this determination, and the Court SUSTAINS that objection.

The Court finds that Plaintiff provided no evidence that his failure to provide the names of 

all Defendants in his grievances was due to his alleged injury. Moreover, Plaintiff presented 

no evidence that additional Defendants were included in the lost appeal. Plaintiff was 

required to abide by Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3) in order to properly exhaust 

administrative remedies, his failure to do so bars federal review as to those Defendants not 

named. See Ngo, 548 U.S. at 90–91 (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an 

agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can 

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function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its 

proceedings.”); see, e.g., Martinez v. Swift, 2015 WL 1349525, *2 (N.D.Cal. 2015) 

(Seeborg, J.) (granting summary judgment for non-exhaustion because the grievance “does 

not mention [defendant], or describe with any specificity his actions or words” and 

therefore did not comply with § 3084.2(a)(3)); Panah v. State of Cal. Dep't of Corr. and 

Rehabilitation, 2015 WL 1263494, *9–*10 (N.D.Cal. 2015) (Freeman, J.) (even if 

plaintiff’s failure to pursue inmate appeal to highest level is excused, he failed to properly 

exhaust his claim against the warden because his inmate appeal did not name the warden 

or describe the basis for his liability); Gray v. Smith, 2015 WL 875482, *2–*3 (N.D.Cal. 

2015) (Alsup, J.) (granting summary judgment for non-exhaustion where inmate appeal 

described an incident at the prison but did not name the warden and did not describe a 

widespread practice or that the warden knew of the incident and failed to stop it).

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Defendants 

D. Paramo, C. Hernandez, and T. Johnson. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Court ADOPTS IN PART and DECLINES TO ADOPT

in Part the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge

[Doc. No. 10]; 

2. SUSTAINS in part and OVERRULES in part Defendants’ 

objections thereto, as set forth above;

3. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 3] is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; 

a. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is 

GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants 

Paramo, C. Hernandez, and Johnson;

b. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED

in all other respects;

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4. The Parties are ordered to appear for an evidentiary hearing on 

December 3, 2018, at 2:30 p.m., before this Court;5

5. It is further ORDERED that Pleasant Valley State Prison

officials shall transport Plaintiff to the court and provide 

security during the evidentiary hearing;

6. It is further ORDERED that the entirety of Plaintiff’s medical 

records shall be made available to the Court for its 

consideration during the hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 25, 2018 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

 

5 The Court will entertain live testimony from Plaintiff but not from any other inmate. Any other inmate 

evidence must be submitted by declaration. Should Plaintiff possess a complete copy of Erin Sutton’s 

declaration Plaintiff shall submit it to the Court prior to the evidentiary hearing.

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