Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00489/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00489-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

Unless indicated otherwise, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to

Respondents’ Answer to Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 17).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Billy Gene Cummings, 

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondent. ______________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 09-489 TUC-RCC (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Billy Gene Cummings’ Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred

to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss

the Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 2004, Petitioner was indicted on charges to sexual assault and kidnaping, both

class two felonies. Exh. B., p. 1.1

 Petitioner was convicted on both charges and was

sentenced as a repetitive offender to presumptive, concurrent prison terms of 9.25 years and

10.5 years. Exh. A, pp. 1-2. 

Petitioner appealed his convictions, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for a mistrial based on the violation of his rights to confrontation. Exh. B.

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Specifically, Petitioner claimed his rights were violated because the trial court prevented him

from using his own transcript of the victim’s interview, rather than that the less complete

transcript prepared by the government, during cross examination of the victim. Exh. B, pp.

2-5. In a memorandum decision filed on February 23, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals

found the claim meritless and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Exh. A, pp.

5-6. Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Exh. C.

On May 1, 2007, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”)

in the trial court. Exh. D. Petitioner filed the PCR petition on November 30, 2007, and

raised three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) under Strickland v.

Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984). Exh. E. Petitioner claimed that his counsel:

should have had the Petitioner testify or, at a minimum, prepared

him to testify and discussed the merits of his testimony with

him. He should have used the ATM receipt showing the

Petitioner withdrew money from the ATM shortly before the

alleged offense. Finally, his cross examination of the victim

should have been much better [and], had he prepared for the

cross examination, it would have been.

Exh. E, p. 7. The trial court, after extensive analysis under Strickland, found the three claims

without merit. Exh. F.

Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

In his Petition for Review, Petitioner reurged only one claim: that his counsel had been

ineffective in his handling of Petitioner’s decision not to testify. Exh. G. In a Memorandum

Decision filed on November 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief,

stating that “the trial court clearly and correctly addressed the merits of [Petitioner’s]

ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . . .” Exh. H. 

On February 25, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. Exh. I. Petitioner noted that there were “[a]dditional instances of ineffective

assistance of counsel” that were not decided by the court of appeals. Exh. I, p. 2. Although

he does not cite United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), in his petition, Petitioner

clearly relies on Cronic’s holding when he argues that:

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Defense counsel who entirely fail[s] to subject [the] state’s case

to meaningful adversarial testing denied the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment rights, making the adversary process presumptively

unreliable. In such a case no showing of prejudice is required.

Exh. I, p. 2. The petition for review was denied by the Arizona Supreme Court and the Court

of Appeals issued the mandate on June 5, 2009. Exh. J.

In his pending habeas petition, which was timely filed on August 28, 2009, Petitioner

identified Ground One (his only claim for relief) as “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:

Failure to Establish Defense,” and explains that:

Petitioner’s counsel so utterly failed to defend against the

charges that the trial was the functional equivalent of a guilty

plea, rendering counsel’s representation presumptively

inadequate, violating his rights under the 6th and 14th

Amendments. Specifically, trial counsel failed to establish

Petitioner’s defense that the sexual contact with his accuser was

a consensual sexual encounter with a prostitute. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648

(1984).

Petition (Doc. 1), Attachment “A,” p. 1. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies for the

claim made pursuant to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) in the petition. A state

prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal court may consider the

merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion occurs either when a claim has been fairly

presented to the highest state court, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by

establishing that a claim has been procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain

available, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his claims to the

state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these claims. See

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been “fairly presented” if the

petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories on which the claim is based.

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.

1995). The operative facts must be presented in the appropriate context to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation requirement is not satisfied, for example,

when a claim is presented in state court in a procedural context in which its merits will not

be considered in the absence of special circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. An exact

correlation of the claims in both state and federal court is not required. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403.

The substance of the federal claim, however, must have been fairly presented to the state

courts. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court found his

claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims in any forum, that

no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.

1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 9th

Cir. 1999).

1. Petitioner’s Cronic claim

a. Failure to exhaust in state court 

A review of the record supports Respondents’ contention that Petitioner did not

exhaust his Cronic claim in state court. In fact, Petitioner never cites Cronic in his state court

filings and it is only when he reached the Arizona Supreme Court that he raised a claim

founded on the legal principles outlined in the Cronic decision. In Cronic, the Supreme

Court indicated that, unlike an IAC claim under Strickland, prejudice is presumed when

“there [is] a breakdown in the adversarial process,” such that “counsel entirely fails to subject

the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 662. In

his petition to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner took from Cronic almost verbatim when

he argued that his counsel had not subjected the state’s case to “meaningful adversarial

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

testing,” and noted that in such cases “no showing of prejudice is required.” Exh. I, p. 2.

This is the only time this claim appears in Petitioner’s state court proceedings.

In his reply, Petitioner argues that by raising an IAC claim in state court, he preserved

his claim under Cronic. Petitioner argues that, “[a]lthough it is not clear why, the State

suggests that Cronic is a separate species of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that must

be explicitly cited to preserve the issue for review.” Reply, p. 3. However, Petitioner’s

argument is not correct. In Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002), the United States Supreme

Court noted that the difference between a Strickland claim and a Cronic claim is a matter

“not of degree but of kind.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 697. The state courts in the instant case had

no reason, at least prior to Petitioner’s submission of his petition of his brief to the Arizona

Supreme Court in his PCR proceedings, to analyze his claims under the presumed prejudice

standards of Cronic. Understandably, the state court decisions evaluated Petitioner’s IAC

claims under Strickland. Therefore, Petitioner has not exhausted his Cronic claim. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

b. The claim is procedurally barred.

Under Arizona law, pursuant to Rule 32.2, Ariz.R.Crim.P., a petitioner may not be

granted state court relief on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32

petition for post-conviction relief. Only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (outlined

in sub-sections (d) through (g) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was

omitted from a prior petition will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2 be avoided. Here,

Petitioner presents no argument addressing the applicability of any exception provided in

Rule 32. Thus, Petitioner is procedurally barred from now raising his Cronic claim in state

court and is thus procedurally defaulted in federal court. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263

(1989) (citations omitted). 

Because the claim is procedurally defaulted, it can be addressed on the merits only if

Petitioner can demonstrate “cause” for the default and “actual prejudice” as a result of the

alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrates the failure to consider the claim will result

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991);

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the default

and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To show cause, a petitioner must ordinarily

demonstrate that “some factor external to the defense” impeded efforts to raise the claim in

state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). The fundamental miscarriage of

justice exception is only available “where the petitioner supplements his constitutional claim

with a colorable showing of factual innocence.” Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)). As Petitioner has not

argued factual innocence and has not shown that cause and prejudice are present, there is no

basis for review of this claim. 

2. Petitioner did exhaust one Strickland claim.

Although Petitioner did not exhaust his Cronic component of Ground I, he also

included authority and argument in his habeas petition that establishes that he is also

claiming IAC under the Strickland standards. Although there are several components to his

Strickland argument there is only one component that was sufficiently raised in the state

courts, the claim that his counsel was ineffective in his handling of Petitioner’s decision not

to testify. State courts are said to have been given a sufficient opportunity to hear an issue

when a petitioner has presented the state court with the claim’s factual and legal basis.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404,

1411-12 (9th Cri. 1997) (factual basis). Here, Petitioner raised this component of his IAC

claim in his PCR petitions in both the trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals. See

Exhs. E & G. The trial court recognized that Petitioner was arguing that his counsel was

ineffective “for failing to advise, encourage, or prepare him to testify.” Exh. F, p. 2. The

trial court then analyzed and rejected the claim. Id., pp. 2-3. Then the Court of Appeals, in

a Memorandum Decision filed on November 25, 2008, first recognized the claim as counsel’s

“failing to discuss the ‘pros and cons’ of whether to testify, in failing to prepare him in the

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

event that he did decide to testify, and in advising him not to testify.” Exh. H, p. 2 (footnote

omitted). The appeals court then adopted the trial court’s reasoning wholesale, stating that

“the trial court clearly and correctly addressed the merits of [Petitioner’s] ineffective

assistance of counsel claim . . . .” Exh. H. Thus, this portion of Petitioner’s Strickland claim

was exhausted and can be addressed on the merits. 

B. Merits

Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state decision

was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision

can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority,

or (2) if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts "materially

indistinguishable" from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result.

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state

court decision is contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision

of a state court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092,

1101 (9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a new set

of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails to extend a

clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).

1. Strickland standards for ineffective assistance of counsel

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly assess

and inform Petitioner of the need for Petitioner to testify. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment

of the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right to “effective assistance of

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to determine if

Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel, the court must determine “whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the

trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. The Strickland standard for

ineffective assistance of counsel has two components. A defendant must first demonstrate

that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 466

U.S. at 687. It requires the defendant to show that counsel's conduct “fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687-688. Second, a defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense, i.e., that counsel’s errors were so serious as

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 466 U.S. at 687. In other words, “but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at

694. 

In reviewing counsel's performance, the court must be highly deferential to counsel's

behavior. “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 466 U.S. at 689. A reviewing court

may first consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and if it finds that the alleged

unprofessional conduct would not have changed the result of the proceeding, it need not

consider the performance prong. Id.

1. The trial court’s decision was reasonable

As a threshold matter, the trial court applied the correct controlling authority. The

court cited Strickland along with relevant Arizona authority and described the two elements

to be applied. Then, addressing the IAC claim at hand, the trial court (which issued the last

reasoned decision) concluded as follows:

First, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The

defendant, alone, has the right to decide whether or not to

testify. Petitioner does not claim to have been ignorant of this

fact. The court actually advised Petitioner of his right to testify,

and explained that he could change his mind at any time.

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Petitioner made the decision not to testify, and he repeatedly

explains his reasons for making that decision in his Affidavit:

“At that time it was my preference to not testify if I did not have

to. I was afraid of my prior conviction coming up and that it

would hurt me more than help me. (. . . ) again, I told [my

lawyer] my preference not to testify because I was worried

about my prior conviction.” Affidavit of Petitioner, statements

2,3. According to evidence of the discussions between

Petitioner and counsel (including Petitioner’s own Affidavit),

counsel did not entirely neglect to speak with his client about

testifying, but rather, advised his client against it, and honored

his client’s preference not to. Defense counsel’s performance

does not amount to ineffective assistance, merely because he did

not encourage Petitioner to testify.

Petitioner was made aware by the court of his right to testify,

and he was encouraged to do so by defense counsel’s supervisor.

Nevertheless, Petitioner made the decision not to testify.

Petitioner argues that this decision was predicated on his

mistaken belief that his prior felony would be made known to

the jury if he took the stand. He claims that defense counsel was

ineffective in advising him not to testify, as well as failing to

explain to him exactly what would be disclosed to the jury, in

terms of his prior felony. There is limited evidence offered to

indicate exactly what was explained to Petitioner, by counsel, on

this subject. However, the record reveals that the court

explained its ruling on the admissibility of his prior conviction

in Petitioner’s presence. Additionally, the State verbalized, in

Petitioner’s presence, that only the date, time and number of the

prior conviction would be revealed to the jury if the defendant

testified. (RT 9/20/05, page 2, lines 15-20). Petitioner should

have been aware of the extent to which his prior conviction

would be revealed to the jury, had he paid attention during court

proceedings. Even if Petitioner could prove that counsel failed

to adequately explain to him the consequences of testifying, this

would not rise to the level of ineffective assistance.

Second, Petitioner had not shown that counsel’s performance

prejudiced him. Even if it were shown that further discussion

between Petitioner and his counsel would have persuaded him

to testify, Petitioner would still fail to satisfy the second prong

of Strickland. In order to “demonstrate substantial prejudice

resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel,” Petitioner must

show that the absence of his testimony amounted to substantial

prejudice, without which the outcome of the case would have

been different. State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 467, 616 P.2d

924, 927 (App. 1980). Petitioner argues that taking the stand

and explaining his version of events would have persuaded

jurors to acquit, especially in light of all the evidence. Petitioner

refers to evidence that he withdrew cash from an ATM as

particularly supportive of his story that he intended to pay the

victim for consensual sex.

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

However, it is unclear from Petitioner’s argument, how telling

his story to the jury would overshadow the overwhelming

evidence that contradicted it. Evidence such as the medical

report of marks to the victim’s neck and knees, as well as the

witness who called 911 after hearing the victim scream, is

inconsistent with Petitioner’s defense of consensual sex.

Petitioner has failed to point to any aspect of his hypothetical

testimony that would be so persuasive as to change the outcome

of the trial, especially considering that his version of events was

made known to the jury through documentation of statements he

made to police. Because Petitioner failed to satisfy both prongs

of the Strickland test, his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, for neglecting to advise, encourage or prepare him to

testify, does not entitle Petitioner to post-conviction relief.

Exh. F, pp. 2-3. 

On habeas review, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has presented no “clear and convincing” evidence that

contradicts the trial court’s determination that he was aware of his right to testify and the

extent to which information about his prior felony would be admitted. A defendant in a

criminal case nearly always must confront the “dilemma demanding a choice between

complete silence and presenting a defense . . . .” Williams v. Forida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 (1970).

His awareness of this dilemma and the implications is established through his admission that

he feared the impact of impeachment based on his prior conviction. As the trial court found,

Petitioner was concerned that his testimony would “hurt me more than help me.” Based on

these expressed concerns, it was reasonable for the trial court to reject Petitioner’s claim and

conclude that he had been advised of his right to testify and that his counsel “honored his

client’s preference not to.” 

Turning to Strickland’s prejudice prong, there is no basis for a finding that the trial

court was unreasonable in concluding that the alleged unprofessional conduct would not have

changed the result of the proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The appropriate inquiry

is whether the state court’s factual determinations on the issue were “objectively

unreasonable.” Miller-El v. Cockrell 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The trial court stated that

it was “unclear from Petitioner’s argument, how telling his story to the jury would

overshadow the overwhelming evidence that contradicted it.” The court then reviewed that

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

evidence, which included the medical report of marks to the victim’s neck and knees and the

witness testimony from the woman who called 911 after hearing the victim scream. Based

on this evidence, it was more than reasonable for the trial court to reject Petitioner’s

contention that his testimony would have bee so persuasive as to change the outcome of the

trial. Petitioner has not satisfied his burden with evidence that rebuts the trial court’s

findings. As such, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For all of the above reasons, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS that

the District Court, after its independent review, issue an Order dismissing Petitioner's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to

the objections. If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV

09-0489-TUC-RCC. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination

of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc).

DATED this 18th day of May, 2011.

Case 4:09-cv-00489-RCC Document 21 Filed 05/18/11 Page 11 of 11