Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01176/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01176-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mehar Khurram Shahzad, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-01176 PHX DGC MEA

)

v. ) 

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

John Gurule, Field Office ) UPON REMAND

Director, Arizona, )

 ) 

Respondent. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

Procedural background

On June 11, 2013, Mr. Mehar Shahzad (“Petitioner”), who

is pro se in this matter, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging his continued detention

by Respondent without a bond hearing violated federal law and

his constitutional rights. Petitioner was a Lawful Permanent

Resident (“LPR”) of the United States, detained at the Pinal

County Jail, who is under a final order of removal to Pakistan;

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Pakistan. Petitioner was

ordered removed from the United States because he was found to

be an alien convicted in 2009 of an aggravated felony and a

crime of violence, and because he had been convicted of the

murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.

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Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to Petition

for Habeas Corpus (Doc. 11) on August 19, 2013. Petitioner

filed a reply (Doc. 12) to the response on September 12, 2013.

On September 24, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation recommending that the petition be denied because

Petitioner was not entitled to relief pursuant to section 2241.

Although Petitioner had, at that time, been detained for two

months beyond the presumptively reasonable post-removal period,

he had not established that his detention was potentially

indefinite such as to implicate his right to due process. See

Doc. 13.

Petitioner docketed objections to the Report and

Recommendation. See Doc. 15. On December 19, 2013, the Court

adopted the Report and Recommendation in full. See Doc. 21.

The Court further remanded the matter to the Magistrate Judge

for consideration of Petitioner’s assertion that he was entitled

to a hearing before an Immigration Judge regarding his

eligibility for release from detention on bond pending his

removal to Pakistan. See Doc. 21. On December 27, 2013, the

copy of the Court’s order at Doc. 21 which was mailed to

Petitioner was returned to the Court as undeliverable because

Petitioner had been released from detention. See Doc. 22.

Accordingly, on January 7, 2014, the Magistrate Judge gave

Respondent until January 24, 2014, to notify the Court as to

Petitioner’s custody status and place of custody, and to notify

the Court as to whether Respondent contends Petitioner is or is

not entitled to a custody hearing before an Immigration Judge or

whether this matter had been rendered moot. See Doc. 23. 

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Petitioner filed a document on January 10, 2013,

notifying the Clerk of the Court that Respondent had attempted

to remove him from the United States but that he had been

returned to custody in the Pinal County Jail, and asking the

Clerk to consider his document as a “motion for continuance.”

The pleading appears to ask the Magistrate Judge to, on remand,

“order a bond hearing”. Doc. 24. 

On January 24, 2014, in timely response to the Court’s

order at Doc. 23, Respondent filed a status report. See Doc.

26. Respondent avers that, on October 1, 2013, after the

Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendation but before

it was adopted by the Court, Petitioner requested a bond hearing

before the Immigration Court. Respondent further alleges:

On October 17, 2013, the Immigration Judge

conducted a bond hearing pursuant to

Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d

1127 (9th Cir. 2013), and ordered that

Petitioner be held at no bond, finding that

he poses a danger to the community and flight

risk. Immigration Judge’s Order, October 17,

2013, Exhibit 2; Memorandum Order, November

7, 2013, Exhibit 3. 

 On October 28, 2013, Petitioner filed a

Notice of Appeal with the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Board of

Immigration Appeals Inquiry System printout,

Exhibit 4. The BIA dismissed this appeal on

January 15, 2014. Decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals, January 15, 2014,

Exhibit 5. 

 On November 7, 2013, Pakistan issued a

travel document for Petitioner. The document

was valid from November 6, 2013 to January 5,

2014. Declaration from Deportation Officer,

K. Estepa (“Dec. of K. Estepa”), Exhibit 6,

¶ 6. The Department scheduled Petitioner’s

removal to Pakistan for December 17, 2013.

Dec. of K. Estepa, Exhibit 6, ¶ 5.

Doc. 26 at 2.

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Respondent further asserts:

On December 17, 2013, Petitioner exited the

United States in the custody of a removal

team from the Department of Homeland

Security. Dec. of K. Estepa, Exhibit 6, ¶ 7.

On December 18, 2103, Petitioner and the

removal team missed the connecting flight

from Istanbul, Turkey, to Islamabad,

Pakistan. The removal team and Petitioner did

not have authorization to lawfully remain in

Turkey long enough to board the next

available flight to Pakistan. The removal

team and Petitioner therefore returned to the

United States. Dec. of K. Estepa, Exhibit 6,

¶ 8. On December 20, 2013, Petitioner

returned to Pinal County Jail in Florence,

Arizona, where he remains in the custody of

the Department of Homeland Security.

Id. at 2.

Respondent also contends that: “On January 24, 2014,

the Department received a new Pakistani travel document for

Petitioner. The travel document is valid until April 20, 2014.”

Id. at 3.

 II Analysis

Petitioner seeks a bond hearing regarding his custody

pending execution of his final order of removal to Pakistan. 

Respondent contends:

Petitioner remains at the Pinal County Jail,

Florence, Arizona, in the custody of the

Department of Homeland Security, Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 

[] Is Petitioner Entitled to a Custody

Hearing Before an Immigration Judge?

Petitioner has had a bond hearing which was

held after the Report and Recommendation

(doc. 13, filed September 24, 2013) issued in

this matter, and after Petitioner’s objection

to the Report and Recommendation (doc. 15,

filed October 7, 2013). On October 1, 2013,

Petitioner requested a bond hearing before an

immigration judge, invoking Casas, Diouf, Singh and Rodriguez. Exhibit 1. A bond

hearing was held on October 17, 2013,

pursuant to Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez

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II), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), at which

the immigration judge ordered Petitioner be

held with no bond on the ground that the

government established by clear and

convincing evidence that Petitioner posed a

danger to the community and is a flight risk.

Exhibits 2, 3 (pp. 7- 8). Petitioner appealed

the order to the BIA, which denied the

appeal. Exhibits 4, 5. 

 Petitioner has had the bond hearing that he

sought. In addition, Petitioner’s continued

detention does not violate Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001), in which the

Supreme Court held that “an alien may be held

in confinement until it has been determined

that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” An attempt at removal has already

been made which would have been completed but

for a missed connecting flight. A new removal

date has been established in the near future,

a new travel itinerary prepared, and a new

travel document received from the Pakistani

Consulate. In short, there is a significant

likelihood that removal will occur in the

reasonably foreseeable future.

Doc. 26 at 3-4.

Absent a finding that the petitioner’s federal

constitutional or substantive statutory rights have been

violated, the Court lacks habeas jurisdiction to review some of

the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions, including the

amount of bond, if any, set by an Immigration Judge. See

Prieto–Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“alien may appeal the IJ’s bond decision to the BIA, see 8

C.F.R. § 236.1(d), but discretionary decisions granting or

denying bond are not subject to judicial review, see §

1226(e).”).

After an alien is taken into immigration custody, the

local ICE office makes an initial custody determination,

including the setting of bond, if any. See 8 C.F.R. §

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236.1(c)(8), 236.1(d). After the initial custody determination,

the alien may request a bond redetermination by an Immigration

Judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d). The alien may appeal the

Immigration Judge’s bond determination to the Board of

Immigration Appeals. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3). After the

Immigration Judge has made an initial bond redetermination, an

alien’s request for a subsequent bond redetermination must be

made in writing and must show that the alien’s circumstances

have changed materially since the prior bond redetermination.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e).

When making a bond decision, “an Immigration Judge must

consider whether an alien who seeks a change in custody status

is a threat to national security, a danger to the community at

large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk.”

Matter of Guerra, 24 I & N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006), citing Matter

of Patel, 15 I & N Dec. 666 (BIA 1976). An Immigration Judge

may also consider any number of discretionary factors,

including:

(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in

the United States; (2) the alien’s length of

residence in the United States; (3) the

alien’s family ties in the United States, and

whether they may entitle the alien to reside

permanently in the United States in the

future; (4) the alien’s employment history;

(5) the alien’s record of appearance in

court; (6) the alien’s criminal record,

including the extensiveness of criminal

activity, the recency of such activity, and

the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the

alien’s history of immigration violations;

(8) any attempts by the alien to flee

persecution or otherwise escape authorities,

and (9) the aliens manner of entry to the

United States.

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Matter of Guerra, 24 I & N Dec. at 40.

In this case, the record shows that Petitioner was

afforded a bond redetermination hearing before an Immigration

Judge and was provided the opportunity to submit evidence in

support of his release. In determining whether Petitioner was

entitled to bond, the Immigration Judge properly considered the

factors set forth in Matter of Guerra. See Doc. 26, Exh. 3.

The Immigration Judge determined, citing Petitioner’s “extensive

and serious criminal history,” and Petitioner’s disrespect for

United States laws and the virtual impossibility of relief from

removal, id., Exh. 3 at 5 & 7, that Petitioner was a flight risk

and a potential danger to the community. Id., Exh. 2.

Additionally, Petitioner exercised his right to appeal the

Immigration Judge’s decision to the BIA. Id., Exh. 5.

Accordingly, there were no procedural deficiencies in the bond

proceedings.

Neither has Petitioner’s right to due process been

implicated by the length of his detention. Federal law

provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an

alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the

alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this

section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(A). In Zadvydas v. Davis, the United States Supreme

Court held section 1231 could not be read to authorize the

potentially indefinite detention of a removable alien. The

Supreme Court concluded due process concerns were implicated by

the detention of an alien, pending their removal from the United

States, for more than six months after the expiration of the

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removal period. See 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001).

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the United States Supreme Court

held that, absent special circumstances, resident aliens who

demonstrate that they are unlikely to be removed in the

reasonably foreseeable future, primarily because no country will

accept them, cannot be “indefinitely” detained pending their

removal. See 533 U.S. at 699-702, 121 S. Ct. at 2404-05. The

Court construed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), authorizing detention

beyond the ninety-day removal period, to limit such detention to

a period reasonably necessary to effect removal.

Petitioner’s order of removal became administratively

final on October 31, 2012. The 90-day removal period expired

January 28, 2013. The six-month presumptively reasonable postremoval period term of detention expired July 27, 2013. 

Accordingly, at this time Petitioner has been held for

a little over six months beyond the presumptively

constitutionally reasonable post-removal period. However,

Petitioner’s removal has been attempted once and appears to

again be imminent. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met his

burden of establishing there is “no significant likelihood of

removal in the foreseeable future,” and, accordingly, his

continued detention does not violate his constitutional rights.

The Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner’s

detention does not violate his federal constitutional rights nor

federal statutes. Petitioner has received an individualized

bond hearing, at which the Immigration Judge determined

Petitioner should not be released pending his removal to

Pakistan. Petitioner’s removal is not indefinite, as Pakistan

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has not refused his repatriation, nor at this time has his

detention by Respondent been sufficiently lengthy to implicate

his due process rights. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief pursuant to section 2241. 

III Conclusion

Although the Court retains jurisdiction to review

discretionary decisions when a petitioner’s detention violates

due process or exceeds statutory authority, see Gutierrez–Chavez

v. INS, 298 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2002), Petitioner fails to

articulate any constitutional or statutory claim to relief

pursuant to section 2241. As the Court can provide no other

relief, Petitioner’s section 2241 action should be dismissed. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Shazad’s request

for an individualized bond hearing be denied, and that this

matter be dismissed.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

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of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 4th day of February, 2014.

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