Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02038/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02038-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:160(1) National Labor Relations Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The court has attempted to “avoid commingling findings of fact with conclusions of

law.” Lieber v. Macy’s West, Inc., 80 F.Supp.2d 1065,1066 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1999). To the extent

this effort fails, “any conclusions that are inadvertently labeled as findings (or vice versa) shall be

considered ‘in [their] true light, regardless of the label that the . . . court may have placed on

[them].’” Id., quoting Tri-Tron International v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1975).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN B. REICHARD,

Petitioner, No. C 05-2038 PJH

v. ORDER RE FINDINGS OF FACT 

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

AUTOMOTIVE MACHINISTS LODGE

NO. 1173,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

At the May 25, 2005 hearing on petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, the

court invited petitioner to submit supplemental briefing on the need for findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Petitioner has submitted briefing suggesting that findings of fact and

conclusions of law are required to the extent that findings of fact and conclusions of law are

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and 65(d) for all preliminary injunctive relief. 

The court believes that the proposed order submitted by petitioner and entered on May

25, 2005, in conjunction with the court’s statements at the hearing, are sufficient for the

purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and 65(d). However, for purposes of any appeal or in the

event a contempt hearing becomes necessary, the court enters the following findings of fact

and conclusions of law.1

FINDINGS OF FACT

Petitioner, the regional director of the Thirty-Second Region of the National Labor

Relations Board (“NLRB”) has moved for a temporary restraining order concerning a labor

Case 4:05-cv-02038-PJH Document 16 Filed 06/06/05 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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dispute between employer Future Ford of Concord, a car dealership, and the Automotive

Machinists Lodge (“the union”). Future Ford has derived gross revenues in excess of

$500,000 and purchased and received goods valued in excess of $5000. 

Future Ford purchased Lithia Ford in Concord, California on or around October 22,

2004. Lithia had a collective bargaining agreement place with the union, but Future Ford

believed it was not required to recognize or bargain with the union when it purchased Lithia

Ford. On October 28, 2004, Future Ford owner Henry Hansel received a phone call from

Mark Hollibush, area director of the union, asking if Future Ford would be willing to negotiate a

contract for its employees. When Future Ford declined, Hollibush said he would go to “war”

with Future Ford. 

On October 28, the union called for a strike and picketing against Future Ford. The

picketing continued every day until December 1, and continued on weekends and

Wednesdays (Future Ford’s busiest days) until Feb. 6, 2005. 

On February 10, the NLRB filed a complaint against the union, claiming that it had

violated section 8(b)(7)(C) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) by picketing for union

recognition for more than 30 days without having filed a valid petition with the NLRB. After the

filing of the complaint, the union informed the NLRB that it would not picket for recognition until

after the dispute was resolved. 

On February 17, the union began picketing Future Ford again, claiming that they were

not picketing for union recognition, but rather, were picketing because Future Ford did not pay

area standard wages. The union began distributing flyers during their protests that on one

side detailed the area standards issues, but on the other, continued to protest the lack of union

recognition. The union denied that it was seeking recognition in correspondence with the

NLRB, but continued to protest. On March 21, the union sent a memo to its membership

detailing the need for recognition at Future Ford and urging the membership to participate in

further protests.

On April 13, Hollibush told a Future Ford employee that the protests would continue

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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until Future Ford either recognized the union or went out of business. 

On May 2, the NLRB informed the union that if the case did not settle by May 6, it would

move for injunctive relief. On May 6, the union informed the NLRB that it would not picket for “a

reasonable period” of time for any purpose, but reserved the right to resume picketing on the

area standards issue “at some future date.” The NLRB notes that the union admits that it will

be picketing again, and that the union does not state when picketing will recommence. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The NLRB asserts that the union has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of

section 8(b)(7) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7). Under section 10(l) of the NLRA the

NLRB may seek injunctive relief in district court if it has “reasonable cause” to believe that

recognitional picketing is taking place. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l). 

In reviewing the NLRB’s request, “the district court must determine whether there is

reasonable cause to believe that the violation charged has been committed, and whether the

issuance of an injunction is just and proper.” Nelson v. International Brotherhood of Elec.

Workers, Local Union No. 46, AFL-CIO, 899 F.2d 1557, 1560 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation

omitted). Reasonable cause is found when “the factual allegations and propositions of law

underlying the Regional Director’s petition are not insubstantial and frivolous.” Id. (citations

omitted). The NLRB need not establish a violation of the NLRA; rather, injunctive relief is

proper “if there be any evidence which together with all the reasonable inferences that might

be drawn therefrom supports a conclusion that there is reasonable cause to believe that a

violation has occurred.” Id. (citation omitted).

The court finds that the NLRB has established that it has reasonable cause to believe

that the union was engaging in prohibited recognitional picketing. See Hansel Affidavit Exh. 1

(statements made by Hollibush about union planning recognitional picketing in October 2004);

12/2/04 Hill Affidavit (public statements made by union representative on October 30, 2004

demanding recognition); 12/2/04 Hill Decl. Exh. 1 (union flyer from October 2004 demanding

recognition); 2/23/05 Hill Decl. Exh. 2 (leaflet implying that employer would not recognize

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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union); 5/4/05 Bohannon Decl. Exh. 1 (notes from conversation with union representative

where representative stated that union’s goal was to gain recognition). Furthermore, because

the union could begin picketing again at any time and has in the past stopped and resumed

picketing, the court finds that the request for injunctive relief is not moot. 

Having found that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charged violation has

been committed, and that it may be committed again, the court further finds that the issuance

of an injunction is just and proper. Nelson, 899 F.2d at 1560 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The temporary restraining order entered on May 25, 2005, sets forth the extent of the restraint

on respondent’s conduct that was approved at the hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2005

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-02038-PJH Document 16 Filed 06/06/05 Page 4 of 4