Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06837/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06837-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY GRAVES,

Plaintiff,

v.

C/O KELLY, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 6837 AWI SMS P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.) 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND FORMS

Johnny Graves (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 15, 2003, alleging a violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights for excessive force and deliberate indifference. Plaintiff names Correctional

Officer Kelly, Appeals Officer Dunlap, Does 1 through 10 and the Deputy Warden as defendants. 

A. SCREENING 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges that Correctional Officer Kelly pushed him and caused him to fall to the

ground causing damage to his right knee. “Upon investigation and discovery of causation of

injury and deliberate indifferent acts by C/O Kelly, appeal coordinator Mary L. Dunlap “conceal

the medical report injury and the force use of crutches from having been force to the ground by

the force push by C/O Kelly.” (Complaint at 3.) 

C. ANALYSIS 

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

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in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

In this case, plaintiff names the Deputy Warden and Does 1 through 10 as defendants but

he does not link any named individual to an act or omission giving rise to a constitutional

violation. As such, there is no claim for relief stated with respect to these individuals. 

2. Excessive Force

When a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the

cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, the question turns on whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). 

In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it is proper to

consider factors such as the need for application of force, the relationship between the need and

the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any

efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The extent

of a prisoner’s injury is also a factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly

have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Id. Although the absence of serious injury

is relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, it is not determinative. Id. That is, use of

excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even

though the prisoner does not suffer serious injury. Id. at 9. 

In addition, an inmate need not have suffered serious injury to bring an excessive force

claim against a prison official, “[not] every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a

federal cause of action. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later

seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”

Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.)(cert. denied sub nom. Johnson, 414

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U.S. 1033 (1973)). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimus uses of physical force. Id. at 9-

10.

Here, plaintiff’s allegation is simply that C/O Kelly pushed him and he fell down and hurt

his knee. Plaintiff provides no other facts surrounding these circumstances. Thus, the

information provided is insufficient to allow the Court to determine whether plaintiff’s

allegations state a claim for relief under Section 1983 against defendant Kelly.

c. Deliberate Indifference

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison

officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations are unclear in that he provides no specific information

as to who why defendant Kelly was deliberately indifferent and how. Plaintiff merely includes

the term “deliberately indifferent” without any further explanation. Thus, the complaint is

unclear and the Court cannot make a determination whether it states a cognizable claim for relief

against defendant Kelly. 

d. Defendant Dunlap

Plaintiff names Ms. Dunlap as a defendant in the case but it is entirely unclear of the facts

or what constitutional violation defendant Dunlap is accused of. Plaintiff indicates that she

concealed a report but provides no further information regarding the report or defendant

Dunlap’s actions and how they resulted in a constitutional violation. As a result, the Court can

make no determination regarding the acts or omissions of defendant Dunlap rose to the level of a

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constitutional violation 

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the defendants. The Court will provide plaintiff with

time to file a first Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he wish to

do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Amended Complaint how the conditions complained of

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 

1980). The Amended Complaint must specifically state how each defendant is involved. 

Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423,

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference the

appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

D. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within THIRTY

(30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

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in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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