Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04136/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04136-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZANE HUBBARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHNSON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-04136-JST 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), filed this pro se civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a 

separate order. His complaint (ECF No. 1) is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or an employee of a governmental 

entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b) (1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 

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necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

B. Complaint

The complaint names the following defendants: SVSP Correctional Counselor II (“CCII”) 

Johnson, SVSP Dr. Elsaid, SVSP Warden Muniz, and Sacramento County Superior Court Judges 

Lucas, McCormick, and Sumner (collectively, the “judge-defendants”). ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 

1-3.

The complaint makes the following allegations. Plaintiff is unlawfully in the custody of 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). On August 2018 and 

March 2019, the judge-defendants discriminated against Plaintiff based on his race when they 

found him incompetent to stand trial, sentenced him to the Department of State, and ordered him 

medicated and hospitalized if he refused to abandon his defense. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff filed five 

grievances alleging that the orders issued by defendants Judge McCormick and Judge Sumner 

were racially discriminatory. Id. Upon arriving at SVSP hospital in March 2019, Plaintiff filed 

two grievances alleging that the hospital was a threat to his health and safety. Id. 

On July 1, 2019, Plaintiff met with his Intra-Departmental Treatment Team (“IDTT”) 

Committee. Defendants CCII Johnson and SVSP Dr. Elsaid are both on his IDTT. Compl. at 5. 

At the meeting, Plaintiff was in mechanical arm restraints and calmly seated. Id. Upon meeting 

Plaintiff, defendant CCII Johnson said with aggression, “You are Black!” Id. Plaintiff responded, 

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“Fuck you, stupid ass nigger bitch, don’t call me that shit. I’m Maya.” Id. Defendant CCII 

Johnson responded, “What I said is not a reason to get mad, my file said you are Black!” Id. 

Plaintiff told Johnson that Black was not his heritage. Id. Plaintiff became defensive because 

defendant CCII Johnson knew from Plaintiff’s file that “state government[s] are racially 

discriminatory against him.” Id. Plaintiff was then escorted back to his cell without incident. Id. 

On July 3, 2019, SVSP Medical Tech Assistant Strimikis offered Plaintiff psychotropic 

medication. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff refused the medication because he had been housed at SVSP 

for over four months without needing psychotropic medication. Compl. at 6. MTA Strimikis 

informed Plaintiff that he had been placed on an involuntary medication order and that if Plaintiff 

refused the medication, it would be administered intravenously. Id. Plaintiff stated that he was 

unaware of any involuntary medication order. Id. Dr. Elsaid gave Plaintiff a court order dated 

June 4, 2019 and signed by Judge Lureas that ordered that Plaintiff be involuntarily medicated. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that the June 4, 2019 order and the attempt to medicate him against his will are

illegal, retaliatory and discriminatory because Dr. Elsaid ordered the medication after CCII 

Johnson insulted Plaintiff’s heritage, Plaintiff is in mechanical restraints so does not pose an 

immediate, unnecessary danger; and Plaintiff did not threaten CCII Johnson. Compl. at 7. 

Plaintiff further alleges that the attempt to medicate him against his will is an excessive use of 

force. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions violate numerous state regulations, such as 

sections 3000, 3004, 3270, 3271, 3272, 3278, 3285, 3291, 3303(b)(1), 3380, 3391, 3413(a)(2), 

3413(a)(6), and 3415 of the California Code of Regulations, title 15. Compl. at 7-8. 

Petitioner requests the following relief: (1) a preliminary restraining order against CDCR 

directors, secretaries and undersecretaries enjoining them from racial discrimination pursuant to 

Article 19c, Section 4 of the California Constitution, and Section 3418(c) of the California Code 

of Regulations, title 15; (2) “a jury public trial for racial discrimination,” and (3) that CDCR 

Director Timothy M. Lockwood be required to pay the full filing fee for violating CDCR policy 

and “assaulting [Plaintiff] with chemical agents for discrimination.” Compl. at 9. 

C. Legal Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated the Eighth Amendment of the Federal 

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constitution; Article I, Section 19 of the California Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985; 18 

U.S.C. § 241, and various sections of the California Code of Regulations, title 15. Liberally 

construed, Plaintiff appears to allege that (1) the judge-defendants discriminated against him on 

the basis of race and acted in retaliation for his later-filed grievances when they issued orders 

authorizing his involuntary medication and hospitalization; (2) Dr. Elsaid and CCII Johnson tried 

to administer medication to him against his will because of his race, in retaliation his 

defensiveness regarding CCII Johnson’s statement that Plaintiff is Black, and in violation of the 

prohibition on excessive force in both the California and Federal constitution; (3) Warden Davis 

failed to protect him from harassment by prison staff in violation of state regulations; and 

(4) Defendants violated various state regulations; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985; and 18 U.S.C. § 241.

The complaint will be dismissed with prejudice for the following reasons. 

First, the judge defendants are entitled to judicial immunity for the alleged actions and 

therefore DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be 

maintained against a government official in her individual capacity who, under color of law, 

deprives an individual of constitutional rights. However, certain categories of government 

officials are protected from such claims by absolute immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 

219, 225-226 (1988). A state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts 

performed in his or her judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) 

(applying judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Only actions taken “in clear 

absence of all jurisdiction” will not be protected by absolute immunity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 

U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from an ultimate 

assessment of damages. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). To determine whether 

absolute immunity applies, the inquiry focuses on the nature and function of the act, not the 

specific action taken. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Whether an act by a judge is a judicial one 

relates to (1) the nature and function of the act and not the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function 

normally performed by a judge, and to (2) the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt 

with the judge in his judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Other factors in determining 

whether a particular act is judicial include whether: (1) the events occurred in the judge’s 

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chambers, (2) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge, and (3) 

whether the events arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or 

her official capacity. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). If the act 

is judicial in nature, absolute immunity attaches even if the act is done maliciously or in bad faith,

involves grave procedural errors, or exceeds the judge’s jurisdiction. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 359. 

The issuance of court orders is a quintessential judicial function. Id. at 362 (finding that a judge’s 

issuance of an order was a judicial act and “the type of act normally performed only by judges”). 

Plaintiff is challenging the judge-defendants’ issuance of orders that authorized his forced 

medication and hospitalization, which are judicial actions. Accordingly, Defendants Judges 

Lueras, McCormick, and Sumner are absolutely immune from the claims in this action. These 

defendants are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. 

Second, Defendant Dr. Elsaid is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to his actions in 

administering medication to Plaintiff against his will because he was acting pursuant to facially 

valid court orders issued by the judge defendants.

Prison officials who simply enforce facially valid court orders “are 

performing functions necessary to the judicial process.” Miller, 335 

F.3d at 895-96. They must not be required to second-guess the 

courts if that process is to work fairly and efficiently. For this and 

the other reasons discussed above, we hold that prison officials, like 

the defendants in this case, who are charged with executing facially 

valid court orders enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for 

conduct prescribed by those orders.

Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that prison officials who 

placed inmate-plaintiff on probation pursuant to court order were entitled to absolute immunity 

even though the probation term was later determined to be illegal because there was no question 

that state court had authority to issue order, that defendant prison officials had authority to enforce 

order, or order was facially valid). 

Third, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim against 

defendant Dr. Elsaid. “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation 

entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the 

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inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote 

omitted). The prisoner must show that the type of activity he was engaged in was constitutionally 

protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged 

retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. 

Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring retaliatory motive from 

circumstantial evidence). Liberally construed, the complaint alleges that Dr. Elsaid sought to 

administer medication to Plaintiff against his will in retaliation for Plaintiff’s defensive reaction 

towards CCII Johnson insulting his heritage. Plaintiff’s defensive reaction to CCII Johnson is not 

protected conduct, and the administration of medication to Plaintiff pursuant to a court order 

advances the penological order of maintaining prison safety by complying with court orders. 

Fourth, the complaint’s allegation that CCII Johnson insulted Plaintiff’s ethnic heritage 

fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim. Allegations of verbal harassment and abuse fail to 

state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th 

Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 

2008). This is so even if the verbal harassment is racially motivated. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 

F.2d 1237, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal court cannot order guards to refrain from using racial 

slurs to harass prisoners).

Fifth, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants have violated state regulations or the 

California constitution fail to state cognizable § 1983 claims. As discussed supra, to state a claim 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of either federal law or of the United 

States Constitution. West, 487 U.S. at 48. Furthermore, the state regulations cited by Plaintiff 

have not created a private right of action. For example, Section 3000 sets forth general 

definitions, Section 3004 sets forth general guidelines encouraging inmates, parolees, and officials 

to treat each other with respect and dignity, Section 3270 sets forth the primary objectives of the 

CDCR; Section 3391 discusses employee conduct; Section 3413 lists activities considered to be 

“incompatible” for CDCR employees. “The existence of regulations governing the conduct of 

prison employees does not necessarily entitle Plaintiff to sue civilly to enforce the regulations or to 

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sue for damages based on the violation of the regulations.” Chappell v. Newbarth, No. 106CV01378OWW-WMWPC, 2009 WL 1211372, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2009). 

Sixth, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Warden Muniz. Plaintiff’s only 

allegation against Warden Muniz is that he failed to prevent Plaintiff from being harassed in 

violation of state regulations. There is no respondent superior liability under Section 1983, i.e. no 

liability under the theory that one is liable simply because he supervises a person who has violated 

a plaintiff’s rights. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, as 

discussed above, there is no private right of action for violation of Title 15 of the California Code 

of Regulations. 

Seventh, there is no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 241. Allen v. Gold Country 

Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the dismissal claims under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 241 because it is a criminal statute that does “not give rise to civil liability”). 

In sum, the majority of the conduct challenged by Plaintiff’s claims were the court orders 

ordering that Plaintiff be medicated against his will, and Defendants’ conduct pursuant to these 

court orders. Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity with respect to these claims. The 

allegations that CCII Johnson verbally harassed Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s ethnic heritage fails 

to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim. Finally, the state and federal regulations that Plaintiff 

claims were violated do not provide for a private right of action. Accordingly, this action is 

DISMISSED with prejudice. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 

(9th Cir. 2011) (district court may dismiss without leave to amend where amendment would be 

futile).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk shall 

enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2019

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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