Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00022/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00022-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MENDEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

DERRAL ADAMS, Warden, California

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State

Prison,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-00022 WHA

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY ON CERTAIN

CLAIMS AND ORDER DENYING

CERTIFICATE ON OTHER

CLAIMS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Michael Mendez requests a certificate of appealability to challenge this

Court’s rejection of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner requests that nine claims

be certified for appeal. Four of the claims merit consideration by the Ninth Circuit. The other

five do not. The request for a certificate is therefore GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

STATEMENT

The Court denied petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus and entered judgment

against him and in favor of respondent Darrel Adams on December 16, 2005. On February 8,

this Court granted petitioner an extension of time to file his notice of appeal and accepted jos

previously filed but untimely notice. On February 13, he requested a certificate of

appealability. 

ANALYSIS

Case 3:03-cv-00022-WHA Document 66 Filed 02/21/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A person appealing a denial of habeas relief must first obtain a certificate of

appealability. The request initially passes to the district court judge who made the final order. 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 22(b)(1). That judge may grant the certificate “only

if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). The certificate may also be granted if the petitioner demonstrates “that the

issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [differently];

or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Any doubt is

resolved in the petitioner’s favor. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F. 3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted). 

At least one of these qualifications are met for each of the following claims. The first is

based on the Due Process Clause. The final three are founded on that clause and on the Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial: 

1. The state admitted evidence of prior convictions to show

petitioner’s propensity to commit the charged offenses;

2. The state gave jury instructions 2.50.01 and 2.50.1 from the

California Jury Instructions – Criminal (1998 version); 

3. The state did not submit to the jury the question of whether the

charged offenses did or did not occur on a single occasion; 

4. The state did not submit to the jury the question of whether

petitioner qualified for probation under California Penal Code

Section 1203.066(c). 

This order therefore constitutes a certificate of appealability as to these claims. 

The following claims, however, failed to present an arguably viable theory of a

constitutional violation. 

Petitioner claimed he was denied procedural due process because, he contends, there

was substantial evidence that raised an objective doubt as to his mental competency to stand

trial and yet the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue. The only

evidence suggesting that petitioner was mentally incompetent was a psychologist’s report that

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petitioner had low intelligence and a learning disability. Such problems are insignificant when

compared with the magnitude of those that disqualify a person from standing trial. See Pate v.

Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). No hearing therefore

was constitutionally mandated. 

Petitioner also asserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his 

lawyer did not negotiate a successful plea deal or persuade petitioner to accept the one offered. 

In fact, petitioner’s counsel negotiated a reasonable plea bargain and made extra efforts to

persuade petitioner that it was a good one. Counsel’s performance came nowhere near falling

“below an objective standard of reasonableness.” See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

686–89 (1984). 

Petitioner also claimed that his rights to due process and a jury trial were violated by the

court’s denial of his motions to represent himself. Petitioner, however, made those motions far

too late — after trial had begun — to come near the protections of Faretta v. California, 422

U.S. 806 (1975) and Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2005), the decisions that set

the constitutional standards on this issue. 

Petitioner also contended that his rights to due process and to confront witnesses against

him were violated when the court allegedly did not make a proper finding of reliability before

admitting into evidence videotaped interviews of his victims. There is not, however, any

applicable rule that would have required the judge to assess the reliability of non-scientific

evidence before it was admitted. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). That

task is assigned to counsel conducting cross-examination. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341,

347–48 (1981). Furthermore, the victims appearing in the videotapes testified at trial. There

could be no Confrontation Clause problem. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 &

n.9 (2004). 

Finally, petitioner charged that his rights to due process and a jury trial were violated

when the judge told jurors that they could find that petitioner used force, an element of one

count, if the act was against the will of the alleged victims and that there were differences in age

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and size between them and petitioner. In fact, this instruction was a verbatim recital of blackletter California law on this element. No constitutional issue was raised. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, THE CERTIFICATE ISSUES ON THE CLAIMS LISTED AS

NOS. ONE THROUGH FOUR, above. NO CERTIFICATE ISSUES FOR THE OTHER CLAIMS. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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