Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01990/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01990-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TONY JOSEPH BOUSTANY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-01990 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, United ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

States Attorney General, )

PHILIP CRAWFORD, THOMAS A. )

LONG, ) 

 ) 

Respondents. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Mr. Tony Boustany, (“Petitioner”), who is detained at

the Eloy Detention Center, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 17, 2006.

Pursuant to the Court’s order of September 1, 2006, Respondents

filed a Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Docket No. 8) on September 29, 2006. Petitioner filed

a reply to the government’s response on October 12, 2006. See

Docket No. 9.

I. Procedural History

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Lebanon, admitted

to the United States as a conditional resident on June 17, 2002,

by application of his wife, a United States citizen. See

Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Response”),

Case 2:06-cv-01990-JAT Document 10 Filed 10/18/06 Page 1 of 8
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Exh. 1. Petitioner’s conditional status was contingent on the

filing of a “I-751" joint petition to remove the conditions of

his residency. Id., Exhs. 1 & 2. Respondents terminated

Petitioner’s conditional residency status on September 8, 2004.

See id., Exh. 4. On October 26, 2004, Petitioner was convicted

by the State of California of grand theft and sentenced to a

term of 16 months imprisonment. Id., Exh. 5.

 On January 9, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security

issued a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner with being

removable from the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act), as an alien who had committed a crime of moral

turpitude committed within five years of admission for which a

sentence of a year or more could be imposed. See id., Exh. 2.

Petitioner was taken into ICE custody at that time. Id., Exh.

2. 

On January 19, 2006, a hearing was conducted before an

Immigration Judge. See id., Exh. 3 & Exh. 6. Petitioner

admitted the factual allegations regarding his admission to the

United States as a conditional resident, and admitted his

default of that residency status, and admitted that he had been

convicted as stated supra. Id., Exh. 6. Petitioner expressed

no fear of persecution if removed to Lebanon. Id., Exh. 6.

After reviewing written arguments and evidence submitted by the

parties, the (“IJ”) concluded Petitioner had been convicted of

the charges specified in the Notices to Appear and found that

Petitioner was removable pursuant to the sections of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) cited by Respondents.

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1 Attached to the petition for habeas relief is a letter from

Respondent Crawford indicating ICE had determined Petitioner is a flight

risk. Petition, Attach. The letter, dated April 25, 2006, also states

that, if Petitioner was not removed prior to July 19, 2006, decisions

regarding his detention would be assumed by Headquarters Post Order Unit of

ICE. See id., Attach.

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See id., Exh. 6. Petitioner did not apply for relief from the

IJ’s decision in the form of applying for withholding of removal

or an application for asylum. Both Petitioner and Respondents

waived appeal of the IJ’s decision.

Respondents proceeded to effectuate Petitioner’s

removal. See id., Exhs. 7-11. On July 13, 2006, the Lebanese

consulate informed Respondents a travel document would be issued

to Petitioner after the Department of Homeland Security supplied

a travel itinerary, fingerprints, a money order for the travel

document, information regarding any accompanying Department of

Homeland Security agent, and a self-addressed stamp-envelope.

Id. Exh. 12. 

Petitioner asserts his continued detention, although he

“has served his sentence or is entitled to mandatory release”

violates his constitutional rights. Petition at 5. Petitioner

asserts he has been detained since January 10, 2006. Id.

Petitioner also contends he has fully cooperated with

Respondents in effectuating his removal. Id. Petitioner

asserts the situation in Lebanon regarding the conflict between

Israel and Hezbollah makes his removal in the foreseeable future

unlikely. Id., Attach. Although Petitioner asserts he is now

afraid of returning to Lebanon, the only relief sought in the

petition is Petitioner’s release from detention. Id.1

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Respondents aver that Petitioner’s removal has not been

effectuated because flights to Lebanon have been restricted.

Id. at 3. Respondents aver that “Petitioner will be on a flight

returning him to Lebanon within the first few weeks of October.”

Id. at 3, Exh. 13.

Petitioner asserts that, although he had no fear of

being removed to Lebanon in January of 2006, “the current

situation in his country and the unstable nature of relations

between [Israel] and Hezbollah have raised new concerns

regarding Petitioner’s safety upon his return.” Docket No. 9.

Petitioner alleges he has been cooperative in facilitating his

removal, asserting he had his brother bring his passport from

Lebanon to the United States. Id. Petitioner states he has

“been detained now for nearly 9 months, well beyond a

‘reasonable’ period” and asks the Court to “order his release in

the even that ICE cannot procure his removal by their projected

deadline of October.” Id.

II. Analysis

This Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to an

alien detainee who is “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. 2006).

Section 241 of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231,

applies to the detention of aliens who are being held pursuant

to an administratively final order of removal. This section

states: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an

alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the

alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this

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section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(A) (2005 & Supp. 2006). 

The immigration statutes also provide that

 [a]n alien ordered removed who is

inadmissible under section 1182 of this

title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C),

1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or

who has been determined by the Attorney

General to be a risk to the community or

unlikely to comply with the order of removal,

may be detained beyond the removal period ...

Id. at § 1231(a)(6) (emphasis added).

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001), the

Supreme Court examined section 1231 to determine whether aliens

may be detained indefinitely beyond the removal period, pending

their deportation. The Supreme Court concluded that “[a]

statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise

a serious constitutional problem.” Id. at 2498. To avoid the

constitutional difficulty, the Court decided to read an implicit

time limitation into section 1231(a)(6), and determined that the

statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a

period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal

from the United States.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded that,

if removal of an alien is not “reasonably foreseeable,” a court

should hold that his continued detention is unreasonable and

order his release. Id. at 2504. The Court determined that six

months was the presumptive limit on the “reasonably necessary”

period of time to detain an alien beyond the removal period.

See id. at 2505. 

In Zadvydas, the [United States Supreme]

Court ... held that following issuance of a

final order of removal there is a

“presumptively reasonable” period of six

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months during which the INS may continue to

detain an alien it is seeking to remove.

Thereafter detention is lawful only if there

is a “significant likelihood of removal in

the reasonably foreseeable future.”...

After [the expiration of the presumptively

reasonable 6-month, post-removal] period,

once the alien provides good reason to

believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must

respond with evidence sufficient to rebut

that showing. And for detention to remain

reasonable, as the period of prior

post-removal confinement grows, what counts

as the reasonably foreseeable future

conversely would have to shrink. This

6-month presumption, of course, does not mean

that every alien not removed must be released

after six months. To the contrary, an alien

may be held in confinement until it has been

determined that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the “reasonably

foreseeable future.”

Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2001),

modifying and reinstating Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 215 (2000)

(emphasis added and internal citations omitted). See also Clark

v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386, 125 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2005);

Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 413 F. 3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005).

Respondents contend Petitioner’s continued detention

pending removal is legitimate because Petitioner will be removed

to Lebanon in the reasonably foreseeable future. The burden of

showing that there is no significant likelihood that a habeas

petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future

rests with the petitioner seeking habeas relief. See Khan v.

Fasano, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2001). A

petitioner may make such a showing by establishing that there is

an “institutional barrier” to his repatriation, i.e., that the

country of removal does not have an agreement with the United

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States to accept repatriation of its nationals. See Kim Ho Ma

v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding

that because the United States had no functioning repatriation

agreement with Cambodia, the designated country of removal, and

because that the Cambodian government did not accept the return

of its nationals from the United States, there was no reasonable

likelihood that the INS would be able to accomplish the

petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future);

Fahim v. Ashcroft, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

Petitioner has not produced evidence of an “institutional

barrier” prohibiting his return to Lebanon.

Additionally, it appears Petitioner’s habeas petition

is premature. Petitioner was ordered removed from the United

States on January 19, 2006, a decision he did not appeal. The

ninety-day “removal period” concluded on or about April 18,

2006. The six-month post-removal period of presumptively

allowable detention expires with regard to Petitioner on or

about October 18, 2006. Petitioner has not been detained beyond

the presumptively reasonable period that Respondents may detain

Petitioner pending his removal.

III. Conclusion

The Court concludes that, because Petitioner has not

been detained beyond the period presumptively allowed to

effectuate his removal, Petitioner’s detention does not, at this

point in time, violate his constitutional rights or federal

immigration statutes.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Boustany’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed

without prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 17th day of October, 2006.

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