Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02289/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-02289-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMAREAK J. TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-02289-JD 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has filed an amended 

complaint.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

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cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 

omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” 

standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 

to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff states that he was denied family visiting privileges due to an improperly issued 

Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) and defendants retaliated against him. California inmates are 

generally classified for placement and custody designation, and reclassified, if needed, for 

administrative or disciplinary reasons. Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise 

from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 

U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an 

unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by 

state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations authorized by state law 

that are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount 

to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or 

regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e. give the 

inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. 

at 477-87. Generally, “real substance” will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes 

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,”

id. at 484, or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487. 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

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elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under 

§ 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional 

rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as 

preserving institutional order and discipline). The prisoner must show that the type of activity he 

was engaged in was constitutionally protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or 

motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no 

legitimate penological interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring 

retaliatory motive from circumstantial evidence).

Plaintiff argues that he was improperly found guilty at a RVR hearing resulting in the loss 

of family visiting privileges. Plaintiff describes no other aspects of the punishment. Plaintiff has 

failed to demonstrate that the loss of family visiting privileges was an atypical and significant 

hardship related to ordinary prison life to state a constitutional violation. The amended complaint 

is dismissed with leave to amend to address the legal standards set forth above. Plaintiff also 

states that the RVR finding was due to retaliation, but he provides no allegations in support nor 

does he identify how defendants were involved. Plaintiff should address these deficiencies in a 

second amended complaint. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants violated prison regulations and 

rules fail to state a constitutional violation and that claim is dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

1. The amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. The second 

amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed and 

must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 

the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik 

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the 

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original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the 

dismissal of this case.

2. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice 

of Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 

do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2018

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMAREAK J. TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-02289-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on November 19, 2018, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Demareak J. Turner ID: K53249

Salinas Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 1050

Soledad, CA 93960 

Dated: November 19, 2018

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

Case 3:18-cv-02289-JD Document 14 Filed 11/19/18 Page 5 of 5