Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01888/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01888-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The purported proof of service filed by Plaintiff shows that

she attempted to serve Superior Court Defendants by registered

mail. Registered mail is not a proper form of service. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(e), (j); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30. However,

Superior Court Defendants do not move to dismiss on those grounds. 

Nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff has served

Defendants Laurence Kay, Timothy Reardon, Patricia Sepulveda, Maria

Rivera, Ronald George or the State of California, and none of these

Defendants has made an appearance. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WANXIA LIAO,

Plaintiff,

v.

RONALD QUIDACHAY; PAUL ALVARADO;

MAURA RAMIREZ; LAURENCE KAY; TIMOTHY

REARDON; PATRICIA SEPULVEDA; MARIA

RIVERA; RONALD GEORGE; SAN FRANCISCO

SUPERIOR COURT; and STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-1888 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTIONS FOR STAY,

REMOVAL OF

COUNSEL, REQUEST

FOR TELEPHONIC

APPEARANCE AND TO

SHORTEN TIME

Defendants Superior Court of California for the County of San

Francisco (the Superior Court), Judge Ronald Evans Quidachay, Judge

Paul H. Alvarado and Maura Ramirez (collectively, Superior Court

Defendants) move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Wanxia Liao's complaint

against them.1

 Plaintiff opposes the motion, and also moves for a

stay of this action, for removal of Kay Yu, counsel for Superior

Case 4:05-cv-01888-CW Document 27 Filed 10/12/05 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Court Defendants, for approval of a telephonic appearance and to

shorten time on these motions. The matters were submitted on the

papers. Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties,

the Court GRANTS Superior Court Defendants' motion to dismiss

(Docket No. 15). The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motions for a stay,

for removal of counsel, for telephonic appearance and to shorten

time (Docket No. 22). 

BACKGROUND

The following facts are all taken from Plaintiff's First

Amended Complaint (FAC). Plaintiff, a Canadian citizen, brought a

civil rights lawsuit against James Cahill, a former professor at

the University of California, that was heard by the Superior Court. 

Plaintiff alleges generally that Superior Court Defendants engaged

in a cover-up for Mr. Cahill and intentionally sabotaged her case

against him. She also alleges that Defendant Ramirez, a court

clerk, cooperated with Judge Quidachay and Judge Alvarado and

forged court documents for the purpose of having Plaintiff declared

a vexatious litigant. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief and monetary damages on her claims for violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Plaintiff filed her complaint against Mr. Cahill and the

Regents of the University of California in the Superior Court on

May 9, 2002. On May 19, 2003, Judge Quidachay issued an order

sustaining the defendants' demurrer, with leave to amend the claims

against Mr. Cahill to plead that his absence from California tolled

the applicable statute of limitations. On May 29, 2003, Plaintiff

"served a Notice of Abandonment of the Whole Action on the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants counsel" stating that she believed Judge Quidachay was

biased against her because his order did not "provid[e] any reason

and only allowed [Plaintiff] the specific leave to amend in that

the permitted amendment was in fact untenable." FAC ¶ 20. In this

notice, Plaintiff also stated her intention to refile the action in

an alternative forum. Apparently, this notice was filed on June 2,

2003.

On June 19, 2003, Mr. Cahill moved to dismiss Plaintiff's

State court action on the grounds that she had failed to amend her

complaint as ordered. On June 20, 2003, Judge Alvarado dismissed

Plaintiff's entire action with prejudice. Plaintiff claims that

because she had filed her "Notice of Abandonment of the Whole

Action," Judge Alvarado, in dismissing her case, "acted in complete

absence of jurisdiction." FAC ¶ 26. Plaintiff appealed to the

California Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal as untimely. 

Plaintiff also filed a civil rights case against Mr. Cahill in

federal district court. That case was dismissed on grounds of res

judicata. 

On February 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior

Court against both the Superior Court and Mr. Laurenson, counsel

for Mr. Cahill, seeking revocation of Judge Quidachay and Judge

Alvarado's orders. Judge Quidachay sustained a demurrer in that

case without leave to amend, and later denied Plaintiff's

subsequent application for revocation of the order. 

On August 27, 2004, Mr. Laurenson filed a motion to have

Plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant based on her attempts to

continue litigating the claim. On October 20, 2004, Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Quidachay granted the motion, and required Plaintiff to furnish

security in order to pursue her litigation against the Superior

Court and Mr. Laurenson. Plaintiff acknowledges that Judge

Quidachay "may have an excuse" for this ruling, based on "some

misunderstandings or confusions cause by the Summons on 1st

Amended." FAC ¶ 28. Plaintiff appears to allege that Ms. Ramirez

fraudulently issued a summons to Mr. Laurenson based on an amended

complaint, although he was no longer a proper party to the State

case. FAC ¶¶ 28-30, 34. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Ramirez issued

the summons to Mr. Laurenson to trap Plaintiff into being

prosecuted as a vexatious litigant. Plaintiff also objects to the

fact that Judge Quidachay, in finding her to be a vexatious

litigant, considered two actions filed in Canada, and concludes

therefore that his order was issued "in complete absence of the

most fundamental jurisdiction." FAC ¶ 31. 

On October 25, 2004, Plaintiff filed in Superior Court a

"Notice of Dismissal of Entire Action without Prejudice as against

Defendant San Francisco Superior Court only." FAC ¶ 22. She also

moved for reconsideration of Judge Quidachay's October 20, 2004

order, explaining that the confusion caused by the allegedly

improper Summons was "induced by Court Supervisor Ramirez's fraud." 

FAC ¶ 28. The motion for reconsideration was denied. On December

2, 2004, Judge Quidachay granted Mr. Laurenson's motion to dismiss

the case for failure to furnish the required security. 

Plaintiff states that, because she had no prior dealings with

Judge Alvarado and Judge Quidachay, racial discrimination is "the

only reason possible" for their acts. FAC ¶ 33. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff filed a timely appeal of Judge Quidachay's dismissal

with the California Court of Appeal. Defendants Reardon, Sepulveda

and Rivera, all judges on the Court of Appeal, denied the appeal in

an unpublished opinion. Plaintiff's petition for rehearing was

dismissed by Defendant Judge Kay. Plaintiff currently has an

unspecified "request" pending before Defendant Ronald George, Chief

Justice of the California Supreme Court. FAC ¶ 23. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be

denied unless it is “clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506

(2002)). 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Each averment of a pleading shall be simple,

concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are

required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). These rules “do not require a

claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his

claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair

notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds on which it

rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

The Court, however, "is not required to accept legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged."

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 

DISCUSSION

I. Immunities

A. Absolute Judicial Immunity

Superior Court Defendants argue that Judge Quidachay and Judge

Alvarado are entitled to absolute judicial immunity and therefore

the claims against them should be dismissed. Judges and those

performing judge-like functions are absolutely free from liability

for damages for acts performed in their official capacities. 

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 

Judicial immunity from claims for damages generally can be overcome

only in two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune

from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in

the judge's judicial capacity. See Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405,

413 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that judge may lose protection of

judicial immunity when performing administrative act). Second, a

judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken

in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 11 (1991). As long as the judge has jurisdiction to

perform the "general act" in question, he or she is immune however

erroneous the act may have been, however injurious the consequences

of the act may have been, and irrespective of the judge's claimed

motivation. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200). 

Plaintiff concedes that the alleged acts by Judge Quidachay

and Judge Alvarado were taken in their judicial capacity. However,

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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she argues that she has sufficiently plead that they lacked

jurisdiction to issue orders as they did. In doing so, Plaintiff

misconstrues this exception to judicial immunity. Even if Judge

Quidachay or Judge Alvarado erred in dismissing Plaintiff's

complaints or declaring her a vexatious litigant, e.g. by failing

to terminate the entire case without prejudice upon Plaintiff's

filing of a "Notice of Abandonment," such "general acts" are still

functions that they had jurisdiction to perform. See Harvey, 210

F.3d at 1212 (noting that the "'general act' which Judge Hernandez

was performing in this case--the issuance of an ex parte order to

destroy contraband at the request of the county--is a function that

Judge Hernandez has jurisdiction to perform'"). As the Supreme

Court has explained, 

A distinction must be here observed between excess of

jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over

the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction

over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped

authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the

want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is

permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter

is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he

holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall

be exercised are generally as much questions for his

determination as any other questions involved in the case,

although upon the correctness of his determination in these

particulars the validity of his judgments may depend.

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 n.6 (1978) (quoting Bradley v.

Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351-52 (1872)). The Court does not take as

true the FAC's legal conclusions regarding Judge Quidachay and

Judge Alvarado's alleged complete lack of jurisdiction to issue the

orders they did. In fact, because the Superior Court is a court of

general jurisdiction, the exception to judicial immunity based on a

complete lack of jurisdiction appears to be inapposite. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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For this reason, Plaintiff's claims against Judge Quidachay

and Judge Alvarado are dismissed. Plaintiff has already included

many details in her FAC, and it appears to the Court that any

amendment is unlikely to overcome absolute judicial immunity. 

However, the Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her

complaint to allege actions that these Defendants have taken that

are not protected by absolute judicial immunity.

B. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Superior Court Defendants argue that Ms. Ramirez, a court

clerk, is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity and

therefore the claims against her should be dismissed. 

"Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from

damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that

are an integral part of the judicial process." Mullis v. United

States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). This

absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to "court clerks and other

non-judicial officers for purely administrative acts--acts which

taken out of context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in

context are actually a part of the judicial function." In re

Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff

alleges that Ms. Ramirez fraudulently issued a summons to Mr.

Laurenson. The act of issuing a summons is part of the judicial

function, and thus Ms. Ramirez is entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity for it. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims

against Ms. Ramirez. Plaintiff has already included many details

in her FAC, and it appears to the Court that any amendment is

unlikely to overcome absolute quasi-judicial immunity. However,

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the Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her

complaint to allege actions that Ms. Ramirez has taken that are not

protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Superior Court Defendants move to dismiss the claims against

Defendant Superior Court on the basis that the Eleventh Amendment

to the United States Constitution, which bars the federal courts

from entertaining suits against a State by citizens of a foreign

State, deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Superior Court Defendants are correct. See Greater Los Angeles

Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.

1987) ("[A] suit against the Superior Court is a suit against the

State, barred by the eleventh amendment."). The statute cited by

Plaintiff, California Government Code § 815.2, concerns the

liability of State entities for injuries to their employees and is

not relevant to this case. Therefore, the Court dismisses

Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Superior Court of San

Francisco County without leave to amend, but without prejudice to

refiling in State court. 

II. Unserved Defendants

Because the deficiencies identified by the Court with respect

to Plaintiff's complaint apply equally to the unserved Defendants,

including the State of California and judges for the California

Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, the Court also dismisses the

claims against them. See Silverton v. Dep't of Treasury, 644 F.2d

1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (court may sua sponte dismiss action as

to defendants who have not moved to dismiss, where such defendants

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are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where

claims against such defendants are integrally related). 

The dismissal of claims against the State of California is

without leave to amend, but without prejudice to refiling in State

court. With respect to the unserved State judge Defendants, it

appears to the Court that any amendment is unlikely to overcome

absolute judicial immunity. However, the Court will allow

Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint to allege actions

that these Defendants have taken that are not protected by absolute

judicial immunity.

III. Plaintiff's Motions

Plaintiff states that on September 29, 2005, she initiated a

"criminal action against some of these Defendants and their counsel

Kay Yu to this action by sending a Complaint And Request for

Investigation to the Civil Rights Section of the Department of

Justice [DOJ] of the United States." Mem. P. & A. in Supp. of Mot.

at 1. She asks the Court to stay action in this case pending the

outcome of this complaint to the DOJ and to disqualify Ms. Yu from

representing Superior Court Defendants. Plaintiff also moves to

shorten time on these motions and to appear at the hearing by

telephone. 

Plaintiff's filing of a complaint with the DOJ does not

constitute a "criminal action." The authority upon which Plaintiff

relies for a stay, Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d

322, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1995), is therefore inapplicable. Plaintiff

has shown no grounds for either a stay or the disqualification of

Ms. Yu, and the Court accordingly denies those requests. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff's motions to shorten time and for a telephonic appearance

are denied as moot. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Superior Court Defendants' motion

to dismiss is GRANTED (Docket No. 15). Plaintiff's motions are

DENIED (Docket No. 22). 

Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint (SAC) if she is

able truthfully to amend her allegations to overcome the

deficiencies identified in this Order. Any SAC must be filed

within twenty days of the date of this Order. It may not include

any claims against Defendants Superior Court and State of

California.

If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must

properly serve the SAC and summons on Defendants or ask Defendants

to waive service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), (d). Registered mail is

not a proper method of service. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/12/05

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-01888-CW Document 27 Filed 10/12/05 Page 11 of 11