Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01717/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01717-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZ MORALES,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JEFFREY A. BEARD, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:14-cv-1717-LJO-SAB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. 42) RE 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

(Docs. 26, 32)

I. INTRODUCTION

Coccidioidomycosis, commonly known as “Valley Fever,” is an infection caused by inhaling the 

spores of the fungus Coccidioides, which is endemic to the soil throughout the southwestern United 

States, and is particularly prevalent in California’s San Joaquin Valley.1 Valley Fever infections 

generally cause mild flu-like symptoms (or no symptoms at all), but the “disseminated” form of the 

disease, which occurs when the infection disseminates beyond the lungs and into other parts of the body, 

can cause serious, life-long health complications, and even death. Some groups of individuals, including 

certain ethnic groups, individuals over the age of 55, and individuals with compromised immune 

systems, are particularly susceptible of developing disseminated Valley Fever.

This is one of many civil rights cases currently pending in this district brought by current and 

former inmates who contracted Valley Fever while incarcerated at prisons located in the San Joaquin 

Valley, where cocci naturally exist. Plaintiff Miguel Angel Sanchez Morales (“Plaintiff”), a former state 

prisoner who contracted Valley Fever while incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), which 

is located in Delano in Kern County, California, where cocci naturally exist, brings this suit against 

 

1 Valley Fever and the spores that cause it often are referred to interchangeably as “cocci.”

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Defendants,

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various individuals associated with KVSP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) and 28 

U.S.C. § 1350, commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute (“the ATS”). Doc. 25, First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”), at 1. Plaintiff’s claims are premised on his assertion that Defendants’ intentional 

actions and inaction exposed him to an unreasonable risk of contracting Valley Fever and ultimately 

caused him to contract the disease, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the ATS.

Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss3the entire FAC. Doc. 26. 

The Magistrate Judge issued Findings and Recommendations (“F&Rs”), Doc. 42, to which Plaintiff filed 

objections. Doc. 46. Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff’s objections or file objections of their own. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court (1) dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim 

because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim; (2) dismiss Plaintiff’s ATS claims 

for failure to state a claim; (3) dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief because Defendants are 

entitled to immunity from that form of relief under the Eleventh Amendment; and (4) deny Plaintiff’s 

request to amend the FAC because any amendment would be futile. F&Rs at 15, 18, 19, 23, 26.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court has conducted a de novo review of the F&Rs 

and the relevant record. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(3). For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims without leave to amend.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff, a citizen of Mexico, was committed to KVSP around March 2008. FAC at ¶¶ 22-23. 

 

2 Named Defendants are former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, current Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Jeffrey A. 

Beard, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Matthew L. Cate, former 

Secretary of the CDCR, Martin D. Biter, Warden of KVSP, and Anthony L. Hedgpeth, former Warden of KVSP. Plaintiff 

voluntarily dismissed Defendant Brown. Doc. 36.

3 Only Defendants Beard, Cate, and Biter move to dismiss; Defendant Schwarzenegger and Hedgpeth have not been served 

with the FAC. Doc. 26-1 at 7 n.1. Accordingly, the Court’s reference to “Defendants” is to Defendants Beard, Cate, and Biter 

only. 

4 The Court incorporates by reference the Magistrate Judge’s thorough outline of the FAC’s allegations, F&Rs at 3-7, and 

provides only a summary of the FAC’s pertinent allegations. The Court has considered the entire record, but will address 

only the arguments necessary to resolve Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

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Plaintiff was hospitalized for two weeks in October 2010, and he was diagnosed with Valley Fever in 

November 2010. Id. By August 2011, the disease had progressed to “cocci meningitis, the most lethal 

form of Valley Fever, indicating that the infection . . . had reached the membranes enveloping 

[Plaintiff’s] brain and spinal cord.” Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff was then hospitalized for almost six months 

before being transferred back to KVSP. Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff continued to suffer from the infection and 

required frequent hospitalizations until he was granted humanitarian parole on March 6, 2014. Id.

Approximately one year later, Plaintiff was deported to Mexico, where he currently resides. Id. at ¶ 28. 

Plaintiff continues to suffer from cocci meningitis and requires significant medical attention. Id.

Plaintiff asserts Defendants are liable for his exposure to and contraction of Valley Fever while 

incarcerated in KVSP and brings this case for monetary damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief.

See id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges that California officials have known about the prevalence of cocci 

throughout the San Joaquin Valley, including Kern County, for decades. Id. at ¶¶ 54-57. Various federal 

and state health officials, physicians, medical researchers, and media have conducted a number of 

studies on Valley Fever concerning its cause, diagnosis, symptoms, and treatment. See id. at ¶¶ 54-70, 

81. These studies established that individuals of certain ethnic groups, including Hispanics, such as 

Plaintiff, are “at extremely high risk of developing the deadliest form of Valley Fever.” Id. at ¶¶ 66, 77-

78. These studies further established that a number of preventative and remedial measures can mitigate 

the prevalence of cocci effectively, thereby reducing the risk of contracting Valley Fever. See id. at ¶¶ 

86-88.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants were aware of the risk posed by cocci at KVSP and were aware 

that Plaintiff, as a Hispanic, was more susceptible to the disease. Id. at ¶ 91. Plaintiff alleges that, despite 

these known risks, Defendants continued to house Hispanics, including Plaintiff, at KVSP, even though 

it was known to be located in a region where cocci are “hyper-endemic.” Id. at ¶ 90. Plaintiff further 

alleges that Defendants knew there were numerous measures they could take to reduce Plaintiff’s 

exposure to Valley Fever, yet they intentionally refuse to implement those measures, despite knowing 

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that doing so would significantly increase the risk of contracting Valley Fever. Id. at ¶¶ 90-93. In 

addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to disclose and inform Plaintiff of the risk factors and 

symptoms of Valley Fever. Id. at ¶¶ 94-95. Thus, the crux of Plaintiff’s allegations is that Defendants 

knew of the risks cocci at KVSP would pose to Plaintiff, yet housed him there without informing him of 

the risks or taking appropriate remedial and preventative measures to protect him from those risks in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment and the ATS, despite their ability to exclude inmates from KVSP 

and to provide adequate protection from cocci. See id. at ¶¶ 3-7.

Specifically, Plaintiff’s first cause of action asserts Defendants’ conduct violated the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 31-32. Plaintiff argues that 

Defendants “knowingly and unreasonably disregarded the objectively intolerable risk of harm to 

Plaintiff by failing to take reasonable and recommended measures to abate the risk of contracting Valley 

Fever” with deliberate indifference. Id. at ¶ 149. Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action, brought 

under the ATS, involve largely the same allegations. Plaintiff seeks various forms of relief, including 

injunctive relief in the form of a “court-supervised medical monitoring and treatment program” and 

order from this Court “allowing Plaintiff to return to the United States.” Id. at 45.

Defendants move to dismiss all claims against all Defendants, including those yet to be served. 

Doc. 26-1 at 7-8. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ATS claims fail because the ATS “does not support 

actions against domestic defendants,” and, even if it did, the claims are duplicative of Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claim and do not state a claim under the ATS. Id. With regard to Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment cause of action, Defendants assert Plaintiff fails to state a claim and, even if he did, 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from any Eighth Amendment claim premised on 

Plaintiff’s exposure to and contraction of Valley Fever while incarcerated. Id. Finally, Defendants move 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), contending that the 

Eleventh Amendment bars any such relief. Id. at 8, 20-21. 

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III. STANDARDS OF DECISION

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of an action for “lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.” Faced with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving the 

existence of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 

1996). A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary 

affirmatively appears. Gen. Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968, 968-69 (9th Cir. 1981).

A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 

(9th Cir. 2000). As explained in Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2004):

In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are 

insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the 

challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke 

federal jurisdiction.

The present motion is a facial attack, because Couch “contends that the allegations of jurisdiction 

contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction.” 

Beco Dairy Automation, Inc. v. Global Tech Sys., Inc., __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2015 WL 2185121, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. May 8, 2015) (internal citation and quotation omitted). In a facial attack, “the plaintiff is 

entitled to safeguards similar to those applicable when a 12(b)(6) motion is made.” Id. “The factual 

allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true, and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails 

to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.; see also Cassirer v. Kingdom of 

Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1052 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(en banc) (applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), standard to a facial motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n 

reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, we take the allegations in the 

plaintiff’s complaint as true.”). 

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B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

allegations set forth in the complaint. A 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a 

cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the complaint, construes 

the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all doubts in the 

pleader’s favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs must allege “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557). 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 

allegations, a Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing 

more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ . . . are not entitled to be assumed true.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 681. In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting 

all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 562. To the extent that the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the 

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Plaintiffs should be afforded leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. 

Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Uncontested Aspects of the F&Rs.

Plaintiff explicitly states that he “does not object to the [F&Rs] concerning the [ATS] claims 

asserted in [his] operative complaint.” Doc. 46 at 6 n.1. Similarly, Plaintiff does not object to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court dismiss his request for injunctive relief because the 

Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff from seeking that form of relief from Defendants. In fact, he does 

not mention the Eleventh Amendment in his objections. See id. at 1-21. Accordingly, the Court 

ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s ATS claims and requests for 

injunctive relief against Defendants. Those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Plaintiff also does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court deny his 

request to amend the FAC to add another defendant. The Court ADOPTS IN FULL the F&Rs 

concerning that request. Plaintiff’s request to amend the FAC is DENIED.

B. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim.

Plaintiff only objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding and recommendation that his Eighth 

Amendment claim should be dismissed because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the 

claim. See Doc. 46 at 6. As the Magistrate Judge noted, this Court recently found that defendants 

involved with other San Joaquin Valley prisons where cocci are endemic were entitled to qualified 

immunity from inmates’ Eighth Amendment claims premised on their alleged unreasonable exposure to 

and contraction of Valley Fever.5Plaintiff acknowledges that this case is materially identical to those 

 

5

See Jackson v. Brown, No. 1:13-cv-1055-LJO-SAB, 2015 WL 5522088 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015), as amended, __ F. Supp. 

3d __, 2015 WL 5732826 (E.D. Cal. 2015 Sept. 28, 2015), appeal docketed No. 15-17076 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2015) ; Smith v. 

Schwarzenegger, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2015 WL 5915353 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal docketed No. 15-17155 (9th Cir. 

Oct. 28, 2015); Nawabi v. Cates, No. 1:13-cv-272-LJO-SAB, 2015 WL 591529 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2015); Gregge v. Kate, 

1:15-cv-176-LJO-SAB, Doc. 103 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2015), appeal docketed No. 15-17201 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2015).

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cases. As Plaintiff states in his objections to the F&Rs: 

Plaintiff understands that this Court has adopted the Magistrate’s Findings and 

Recommendations in related cases, Jackson v. Brown, . . . Smith v. Schwarzenegger, . . . and 

Nawabi v. Cate . . . finding in each case that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity

. . . . Defendants, in their motion to dismiss, have asserted the same arguments as to qualified 

immunity as have Defendants in the aforementioned cases and the Magistrate has relied upon the 

decisions in Jackson, Smith, and Nawabi. While Plaintiff is cognizant of the Court’s recent 

decisions, Plaintiff feels it is necessary to object to those same arguments herein, to ensure a 

clear record of litigation on qualified immunity in this case, while the issue remains unsettled by 

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Doc. 46 at 9 n.2.

Plaintiff, represented by the same counsel as are the plaintiffs in Jackson and Nawabi, lodges 

nearly identical objections to the F&Rs as did the plaintiff in Nawabi. The Court has done a line-by-line 

comparison of Plaintiff’s objections and the Nawabi plaintiff’s objections, and notes that almost all of 

the former are drawn verbatim from the latter.6Plaintiff has not provided any argument or authority in 

his objections that the Court did not consider when deciding Jackson, Smith, Nawabi, and Gregge. 

Briefly summarized, the plaintiffs in Jackson, Smith, Nawabi, and Gregge alleged that the 

defendants unconstitutionally exposed them to an excessive risk of harm posed by cocci at various San 

Joaquin Valley prisons, where cocci are endemic. Like Plaintiff here, the plaintiffs in those cases alleged 

that the defendants were fully aware of the risks posed by cocci at the prisons, yet they intentionally 

failed to take appropriate preventative and remedial measures to protect the plaintiffs from those risks. 

Further, like some, but not all of the plaintiffs in those cases, Plaintiff here alleges he is particularly 

susceptible to contracting Valley Fever and developing the disseminated form of the disease due to his 

ethnicity. 

The Court found that all of the defendants in Jackson, Smith, Nawabi, and Gregge were entitled 

to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims. The crux of that finding is that

 

6 This is not meant as a slight to Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court appreciates counsel’s candor and consistency, both of which 

demonstrate a respect for the Court’s and Defendants’ time and resources.

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there has been disagreement among judges about the circumstances that would support an inmate’s 

Eighth Amendment claim premised on exposure to and contraction of Valley Fever while incarcerated, 

and this unsettled state of the law entitled the defendants to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Smith, 2015 

WL 5915353, at *13; id. at 13 n.17. The Court does not intend to suggest that all Valley Fever cases 

have the same facts or the same dispositions for the same reasons. But Plaintiff has made no attempt to 

distinguish the Court’s recent Valley Fever cases from this one and has tacitly acknowledged that the 

Court’s qualified immunity analysis in those cases is directly applicable here. See Doc. 46 at 9 n.2.

For the reasons more thoroughly outlined in Jackson, Smith, Nawabi, and Gregge, the Court 

finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. The 

Court therefore ADOPTS the F&Rs concerning Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim and DISMISSES

the claim against Defendants WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1. GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 26);

2. DISMISSES Defendants Beard, Cate, and Biter from this case; and

3. DENIES Plaintiff’s request to amend the FAC.

The Clerk of Court is not directed to close this case. Defendants appear to suggest—but do not 

clearly argue—that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hedgpeth and Schwarzenegger should be 

dismissed despite their not being served by the time Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. See Doc. 

26-1 at 7, 7 n.1. The record indicates that those Defendants have now been served, see Docs. 44, 48, so 

the Court will consider responsive pleadings from those Defendants if and when they are brought.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 18, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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