Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01264/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01264-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL OSTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SOLANO; SOLANO 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 

and DOES 1 through 50, 

Inclusive,

Defendant.

No. 2:12-cv-1264 JAM-KJN 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of 

Solano and Solano County Sheriff’s Department’s (collectively, 

“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6). Plaintiff Michael 

Oster opposes the motion (Doc. #7).

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his complaint (Doc. #2) with this Court on 

May 10, 2012. Plaintiff alleges two causes of action, the first

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the second for retaliation for 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for September 5, 2012.

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exercising his First Amendment rights.

Plaintiff was employed as Deputy Sheriff for the County of 

Solano from October 28, 2001 until July 10, 2010 when he 

resigned. Plaintiff allegedly resigned in 2010 after years of 

harassment, retaliatory and invasive investigations, 

surveillance, and unwarranted intrusions into his and his 

family’s lives. Plaintiff believes that this occurred following 

his writing to local elected officials, the California Workers’

Compensation Board, and the California Department of Insurance 

to complain about corruption in the department and about how he 

was treated in spite of his qualifications.

Plaintiff was allegedly first assigned to Court Security at 

the Solano County Superior Court in Fairfield. In May 2002, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Solano County Sheriff’s 

Department (“SCSD”) assigned him to SCSD’s Canine Unit. The 

head of SCSD’s chapter of the Deputy Sheriff’s Association then 

allegedly threatened “to drag (Plaintiff) through the mud” 

unless Plaintiff resigned the Canine Unit Handler’s position, 

but Plaintiff did not resign. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Later in 2002, 

the Canine Unit manager allegedly threatened Plaintiff with 

termination after reading private emails between Plaintiff and 

the SCSD Captain that questioned the manager’s competence. 

Plaintiff was allegedly forced to resign from the Canine Unit in 

late 2002 or face possible termination. 

In or about 2003, Plaintiff allegedly took time off to 

recuperate from an injured knee. In early 2004, once Plaintiff 

had returned to a light duty assignment, the SCSD Captain 

allegedly threatened Plaintiff with termination because a 

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workers’ compensation supervisor allegedly lied to the Captain 

about details of Plaintiff’s injury. 

Plaintiff alleges that once he returned to active duty he 

was subject to undeserved employment actions by his superiors, 

including an involuntary transfer, having his workers’ 

compensation benefit payments delayed after a 2006 on-duty 

injury, having his request to wear a knee brace denied, 

undergoing a “bogus” investigation, and having his workers’ 

compensation benefits and medical treatment delayed after a 2007 

on-duty injury. 

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to 

dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint 

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Assertions that 

are mere “legal conclusions,” however, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to 

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Dismissal is 

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appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim 

supportable by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could 

not be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

B. Discussion

1. Monell Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 

claims for failure to allege constitutional violations under 

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 

(1978), and for failure to allege violations within the statute 

of limitations period.

a. Monell Standard

Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not allege a 

constitutional violation by Defendants and that Plaintiff cannot 

proceed on a “class of one” equal protection claim. Plaintiff 

responds that he is not making a “class of one” equal protection 

claim but instead, argues that Defendants treat a distinct group 

of officers who complain about official misconduct differently.

In the reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim cannot be 

brought as an equal protection claim because it is based on 

First Amendment activity.

Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Defendants is brought 

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under § 1983. Respondeat superior liability does not apply to 

actions against local government entities under § 1983. See

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Therefore, to prevail in a civil 

action against a local governmental entity, a plaintiff must 

establish “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which 

he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) 

that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the 

plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the 

‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt By 

& Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). 

A pre-Iqbal Ninth Circuit decision held that “a claim of 

municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on 

nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual 

officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or 

practice.” Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir.

2007). However, “[i]n light of Iqbal, it would seem that the 

prior Ninth Circuit pleading standard for Monell claims (i.e. 

‘bare allegations’) is no longer viable.” Young v. City of 

Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Thus, a 

Monell claim against Defendant requires more than labels and 

conclusions.

First, the conduct complained of must have deprived 

Plaintiff of some constitutional right because § 1983 is not a 

source of substantive rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 

934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff alleges that he was 

discriminated, harassed, and retaliated against because of his 

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protected categories and his repeated complaints to the Workers’

Compensation Board, the California Department of Insurance, and 

Plaintiff’s elected officials. Plaintiff, however, fails to 

allege that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was 

deprived. The only possible deprived right, as Defendants 

contend, is an equal protection claim but it is not adequately 

pleaded in the complaint. In his opposition, Plaintiff

acknowledges that his First Cause of Action is a Monell claim 

but he does not sufficiently describe the underlying right upon 

which he bases his claim. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to 

allege a violation of a specific constitutional right.

Even if Plaintiff’s allegations were interpreted by this 

Court as an equal protection claim, Defendants argue that he 

cannot proceed on a “class of one” equal protection claim 

because those claims are not permitted in the employment 

context. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 604-05 

(2008). Plaintiff argues that he is not making a “class of one”

claim, but making a claim that Defendants treat a distinct group 

of individuals differently because they complain about official 

misconduct. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 605 (noting that equal 

protection claims are allowed in the employment context when the 

government treats distinct groups of individuals categorically 

differently). Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. As 

Defendants correctly point out, this claim would be more 

properly brought under the First Amendment and not under the 

Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Webber v. First Student, 

Inc., No. 11-3032, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88238 (D. Or. July 12, 

2011), at *8-10; Mazzeo v. Gibbons, No. 08-01387, 2010 U.S. 

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Dist. LEXIS 115044, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010); Occhionero v. 

City of Fresno, No. 05-1184, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51184, at *8 

(E.D. Cal July 3, 2008).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient 

facts to satisfy the first requirement of a Monell claim and 

therefore his First Cause of Action must be dismissed. The 

Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend because Plaintiff may be 

able to clarify in an Amended Complaint which constitutional 

right was deprived.

2

2. Statute of Limitations

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff only alleges discrete 

isolated acts that occurred in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007, which 

do not fall within the two-year statute of limitations. In 

Plaintiff’s opposition, he points out that he alleged that he 

resigned within the limitations period in July 2010. 

In § 1983 claims, federal courts borrow state statutes of 

limitations for personal injury actions. Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.S. 384 (2007); Lukovsky v. City of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 

1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). In California, there is a two-year 

statute of limitations. Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 

1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007). Federal law determines when a 

cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations 

begins to run for a § 1983 claim. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate 

Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

2 Plaintiff must also allege facts to satisfy the other three 

requirements of a Monell claim—that the municipality had a 

policy, that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference, and 

that the policy is the moving force behind his constitutional 

violation.

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In constructive discharge cases, the statute of limitations 

begins to run on the date of resignation because a constructive 

discharge is a discriminatory act. Draper v. Coeur Rochester, 

Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1998). However, 

“discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, 

even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed 

charges.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 

113(2002); Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa

Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 828-29 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, the complaint was filed on May 10, 2012; therefore, 

anything before May 10, 2010, falls outside of the statute of 

limitations. Plaintiff resigned in July 2010, which is within 

the limitations period. Plaintiff does not deny that the acts 

in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007 are discrete discriminatory acts. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleging constructive 

discharge based on constitutional violations is within the 

statute of limitations, but the discrete acts that occurred 

between 2002 and 2007 are not actionable even if related to 

Plaintiff’s resignation. Consequently, his claim is limited to 

his resignation and any acts within the statute of limitations.

3. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Cause of 

Action—a First Amendment retaliation claim—for failure to allege 

any violation within the statute of limitations period and for 

failure to allege that Plaintiff engaged in constitutionally 

protected speech. Plaintiff makes the same arguments as above 

for the statute of limitations; therefore, similarly, the claim 

is limited to his resignation and acts within the statute of 

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limitations. Plaintiff further argues that his speech is 

protected speech because it is related to discrimination in the 

workplace. 

To state a claim against a government employer for 

violating the First Amendment, an employee must show (1) that he 

engaged in protected speech; (2) that the employer took an 

“adverse employment action” and (3) that his speech was a 

“substantial or motivating” factor for the adverse employment 

action. Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citations omitted). 

a. Protected Speech

For the first element, Plaintiff must allege that he 

engaged in protected speech. Id. A public employee’s speech is 

constitutionally protected if it addresses a matter of 

legitimate public concern. Id. Speech regarding individual 

personnel disputes and grievances is not of public concern. Id.

Contrastingly, speech regarding corruption in government can be

protected speech depending on the statements. Desrochers v. 

City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 723 (9th Cir. 2009)

(collecting cases). 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he wrote to elected 

officials among others about the corruption in the department 

and about the way he was treated despite his qualifications and 

that as a result, he suffered harassment, retaliation, highly 

invasive investigations, surveillance, and intrusions into his 

life. Any speech related to how he was treated and his 

relationship with coworkers is a personal grievance and is not 

protected speech. Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 

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1148 (9th Cir. 2010). Although Plaintiff alleges that his 

speech also related to corruption in the department, Plaintiff 

provides no factual allegations of when he wrote the letters or

what the statements were that would allow the Court to determine 

whether the speech is protected. Plaintiff argues in his 

opposition that speech related to discrimination is of public 

concern, but he does not allege in the complaint that his 

letters related to workplace discrimination. 

b. Adverse Employment Action

An adverse employment action is an action “reasonably 

likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” 

Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 976 (citation omitted). An adverse 

employment action need not be severe and it need not be of a 

certain kind. Id. at 975. Under this standard, unwarranted 

investigations, harassment, and reprimands could be adverse 

employment actions. See Id. at 976. Plaintiff has alleged that 

he underwent this type of treatment, but he has not alleged any 

details of the adverse actions. He has only provided details of 

discrete acts that occurred outside of the statute of 

limitations. As a result, Plaintiff has not alleged an adverse 

employment action. 

c. Substantial or Motivating Factor

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts connecting his speech 

with an adverse action, such as proximity in time, that the 

employer opposed his speech, or that the employer’s explanations 

for an adverse employment action were false and pre-textual. 

See Id. at 977. Plaintiff has failed to allege the third element 

of a retaliation claim. 

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Therefore, Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action claim is 

dismissed with leave to amend. The Court grants Plaintiff leave 

to amend because Plaintiff’s speech related to corruption might

support a First Amendment retaliation claim if properly pleaded

and within the statute of limitations.

4. Civil Rights Claims Based on Federally Protected 

Leave or Workers’ Compensation Benefits

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain civil 

rights claims on the basis of taking a federally protected leave 

or on the basis of receiving workers’ compensation benefits. 

The Court need not address these arguments at this time. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff must file his 

Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days from the date of this 

Order. If Plaintiff elects not to file an Amended Complaint, he 

should file a notice of dismissal within the next twenty (20) 

days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 10, 2012

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