Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16864/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16864-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS P. LEITE; MARY ANN K.

LEITE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CRANE COMPANY, a Delaware

corporation; AURORA PUMP

COMPANY, a foreign corporation;

BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC.,

successor-in-interest to RhonePoulenc AG Company, a foreign

company, AKA Amchem Products,

Inc., AKA Benjamin Foster Products

Company; UNION CARBIDE

CORPORATION, a New York

corporation; AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS

CORPORATION, successor-by-merger

to Buffalo Pumps, Inc., a New York

corporation; CERTAINTEED

CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation; CLEAVER-BROOKS,

INC., a Delaware corporation;

GOULDS PUMPS, INC., a Delaware

corporation; IMO INDUSTRIES, INC.,

individually and as successor-ininterest to Delaval Turbine, Inc., a

Delaware corporation, FKA Delaval

Steam Turbine Company, FKA IMO

No. 12-16864

D.C. No.

1:11-cv-00636-

JMS-RLP

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2 LEITE V. CRANE CO.

Delaval, Inc., FKA Transamerica

Delaval, Inc.; INGERSOLL RAND

COMPANY, a New Jersey

corporation; JOHN CRANE, INC., a

Delaware corporation; THE LYNCH

COMPANY, INC., a Hawaii

corporation; METROPOLITAN LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York

corporation; WARREN PUMPS, LLC,

a Delaware corporation; THE

WILLIAM POWELL COMPANY, an

Ohio corporation; VELAN VALVE

CORPORATION, a New York

corporation; COPES-VULCAN, a

subsidiary of SPX Corporation, a

Delaware corporation; ATWOOD &

MORRILL, a subsidiary of Weir

Valves & Controls USA, Inc., a

Massachusetts Corporation; DOES 1

TO 25,

Defendants-Appellees.

DAVID THOMPSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CRANE COMPANY, Delaware

corporation; AURORA PUMP

COMPANY, a foreign corporation;

BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC.,

successor-in-interest to RhoneNo. 12-16982

D.C. No.

1:11-cv-00638-

LEK-RLP

OPINION

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LEITE V. CRANE CO. 3

Poulenc AG Company, a foreign

company, AKA Amchem Products,

Inc., AKA Benjamin Foster Products

Company; UNION CARBIDE

CORPORATION, a New York

corporation; AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS

CORPORATION, successor-by-merger

to Buffalo Pumps, Inc., a New York

corporation; CERTAINTEED

CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation; CLEAVER-BROOKS,

INC., a Delaware corporation;

GOULDS PUMPS, INC., a Delaware

corporation; IMO INDUSTRIES, INC.,

individually and as successor-ininterest to Delaval Turbine, Inc., a

Delaware corporation, FKA Delaval

Steam Turbine Company, FKA IMO

Delaval, Inc., FKA Transamerica

Delaval, Inc.; INGERSOLL RAND

COMPANY, a New Jersey

corporation; JOHN CRANE, INC., a

Delaware corporation; THE LYNCH

COMPANY, INC., a Hawaii

corporation; METROPOLITAN LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York

corporation; WARREN PUMPS, LLC,

a Delaware corporation; THE

WILLIAM POWELL COMPANY, an

Ohio corporation; VELAN VALVE

CORPORATION, a New York

corporation; COPES-VULCAN, a

subsidiary of SPX Corporation, a

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4 LEITE V. CRANE CO.

Delaware Corporation; ATWOOD &

MORRILL, a subsidiary of Weir

Valves & Controls USA, Inc., a

Massachusetts Corporation; DOES 1

TO 25,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 8, 2013—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed April 25, 2014

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, and Raymond C.

Fisher and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Watford

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LEITE V. CRANE CO. 5

SUMMARY*

Removal Jurisdiction

The panel affirmed the district court’s orders denying

motions to remand to state court actions that were removed to

federal court under the federal officer removal statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1442.

Plaintiffs worked as machinists at the Pearl Harbor Naval

Shipyard, and they alleged that Crane Co. failed to warn them

of the hazards posed by asbestos used in and around

equipment that Crane Co. sold to the United States Navy.

The panel held that a plaintiff’s motion to remand may

raise either a facial attack or a factual attack on the

defendant’s jurisdictional allegations. The panel held that

plaintiffs raised a factual attack by contesting the truth of

Crane’s allegations regarding the existence of a colorable

federal defense and requisite causal nexus. The panel noted

that Crane bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence that the colorable federal defense and causal

nexus requirements for removal jurisdiction were met. Crane

asserted a government contractor defense, and the panel held

that Crane’s affidavits established that it had a colorable

federal defense. Finally, the panel held that Crane proved by

a preponderance of the evidence that a causal nexus existed

between plaintiffs’ claims and actions Crane took at the

direction of a federal officer.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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6 LEITE V. CRANE CO.

COUNSEL

L. Richard DeRobertis (argued), Gary O. Galiher, and Todd

W. Eddins, Galhier DeRobertis Ono, Honolulu, Hawaii, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Michael J. Ross (argued), Nicholas P. Vari, and Michael J.

Zukowski, K&L Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;

Edward P. Sangster, K&L Gates LLP, San Francisco,

California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals, Douglas

Leite and David Thompson, worked as machinists at the Pearl

Harbor Naval Shipyard in Hawaii, where they were allegedly

injured by exposure to asbestos. They sued defendants under

state tort law on the theory that defendants failed to warn

them of the hazards posed by asbestos used in and around

equipment that defendants sold to the United States Navy. 

(We focus here on only one of the defendants, Crane Co.,

because it alone filed a brief on appeal.)

Plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits against Crane in state

court, but Crane removed the actions to federal court under

the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. 

Plaintiffs asked the district courts to remand the actions to

state court on the ground that Crane had not provided

sufficient evidence of the factual requirements for removal

jurisdiction. In both cases, the district courts denied

plaintiffs’ motions. Acknowledging that other district courts

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LEITE V. CRANE CO. 7

confronted with similar facts have reached the opposite

conclusion,1the courts certified their orders for interlocutory

appeal. We agreed to hear these appeals under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b).

As relevant here, the federal officer removal statute

authorizes removal of a civil action brought against any

person “acting under” an officer of the United States “for or

relating to any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1).

2 To invoke the statute, Crane must show that

(1) it is a “person” within the meaning of the statute, (2) a

causal nexus exists between plaintiffs’ claims and the actions

Crane took pursuant to a federal officer’s direction, and (3) it

has a “colorable” federal defense to plaintiffs’ claims. See

1

See, e.g., Holdren v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.

Mass. 2009); Westmiller v. IMO Indus., Inc., 2005 WL 2850334 (W.D.

Wash. Oct. 20, 2005); Nguyen v. Allied Signal, Inc., 1998 WL 690854

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998).

 

2

 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) currently provides:

(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is

commenced in a State court and that is against or

directed to any of the following may be removed by

them to the district court of the United States for the

district and division embracing the place wherein it is

pending:

(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any

officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the

United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or

individual capacity, for or relating to any act under

color of such office or on account of any right, title or

authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the

apprehension or punishment of criminals or the

collection of the revenue.

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8 LEITE V. CRANE CO.

Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th

Cir. 2006).

In its removal notices, Crane alleged facts satisfying each

of these requirements. Crane alleged that it is a “person” for

purposes of § 1442(a)(1); that it omitted any warning of

asbestos hazards pursuant to the direction of Navy officers;

and that it has a colorable federal defense to plaintiffs’

claims—the government contractor defense. Crane

substantiated these allegations by attaching extensive

testimonial and documentary evidence, including affidavits

from four individuals: retired Rear Admiral David Sargent,

Jr.; retired Rear Admiral Roger Horne, Jr.; Dr. Samuel

Forman, a medical doctor who conducted extensive research

on the extent of the Navy’s knowledge of asbestos hazards;

and Anthony Pantaleoni, Crane’s Vice-President of

Environment, Health, and Safety. The Sargent and Horne

affidavits describe the Navy’s procurement policies, and in

particular the Navy’s detailed specifications regulating the

warnings that equipment manufacturers were required to

provide. Dr. Forman’s affidavit describes the Navy’s

evolving awareness of asbestos risks, and opines that the

Navy always knew at least as much about asbestos hazards as

equipment manufacturers like Crane.

Plaintiffs contest Crane’s jurisdictional allegations and

raise evidentiary objections to portions of Crane’s affidavits,

mainly on the ground that the affidavits contain speculative

expert opinion testimony that must be excluded under Federal

Rule of Evidence 702. Plaintiffs argue that, without these

improper opinions, Crane hasn’t satisfied each of the

requirements for removal jurisdiction.

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LEITE V. CRANE CO. 9

Plaintiffs’ arguments raise several novel procedural

questions we have not yet squarely addressed: May a

defendant establish removal jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1)

by adequately alleging the necessary facts, or must the

defendant prove those facts before the case may proceed in

federal court? If actual proof is required, must the district

court resolve evidentiary challenges to the defendant’s

evidence before decidingwhetherremoval jurisdiction exists?

And if the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual

issues, should the district court resolve those issues itself or

instead leave them to be resolved by the trier of fact?

Fortunately, all of these questions have been answered in

a procedurally analogous context—cases in which the

plaintiff files suit in federal court and the defendant moves to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). We’ll start by sketching

out the rules that govern in that context, for we conclude

those same rules should apply here.

To invoke a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, a

plaintiff needs to provide only “a short and plain statement of

the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(1). The plaintiff must allege facts, not mere legal

conclusions, in compliance with the pleading standards

established by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See

Harris v. Rand, 682 F.3d 846, 850–51 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Assuming compliance with those standards, the plaintiff’s

factual allegations will ordinarily be accepted as true unless

challenged by the defendant. See 5C Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1363, at

107 (3d ed. 2004).

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10 LEITE V. CRANE CO.

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may challenge the

plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations in one of two ways. A

“facial” attack accepts the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations

but asserts that they “are insufficient on their face to invoke

federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer,

373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court

resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true

and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,

the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as

a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Pride v.

Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013).

A “factual” attack, by contrast, contests the truth of the

plaintiff’sfactual allegations, usuallybyintroducing evidence

outside the pleadings. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at

1039; Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp.,

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). When the defendant raises

a factual attack, the plaintiff must support her jurisdictional

allegations with “competent proof,” Hertz Corp. v. Friend,

559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010), under the same evidentiary

standard that governs in the summary judgment context. See

Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir.

2010) (en banc); Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus.,

Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1559 (9th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that each of the requirements

for subject-matter jurisdiction has been met. Harris, 682 F.3d

at 851. With one caveat, if the existence of jurisdiction turns

on disputed factual issues, the district court may resolve those

factual disputes itself. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at

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LEITE V. CRANE CO. 11

1039–40; Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077

(9th Cir. 1983); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733.3

Challenges to the existence of removal jurisdiction should

be resolved within this same framework, given the parallel

nature of the inquiry. The statute governing removal of civil

actions tracks the language of Rule 8(a)(1), requiring the

defendant to provide “a short and plain statement of the

grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Like plaintiffs

pleading subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 8(a)(1), a

defendant seeking to remove an action may not offer mere

legal conclusions; it must allege the underlying facts

supporting each of the requirements for removal jurisdiction. 

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992) (per

curiam). A plaintiff who contests the existence of removal

jurisdiction may file a motion to remand, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c), the functional equivalent of a defendant’s motion

to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule

12(b)(1). As under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff’s motion to

remand may raise either a facial attack or a factual attack on

the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations, triggering

application of the rules discussed above for resolving such

challenges.

We recognize that defendants enjoy much broader

removal rights under the federal officer removal statute than

they do under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 

See Durham, 445 F.3d at 1253 (cataloging the differences). 

3 The caveat is that a court must leave the resolution of material factual

disputes to the trier of fact when the issue ofsubject-matter jurisdiction is

intertwined with an element of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. See,

e.g., Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039–40; Augustine, 704 F.2d at

1077.

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12 LEITE V. CRANE CO.

We nonetheless conclude that applying the Rule 12(b)(1)

framework to resolve jurisdictional challenges in this context

will not unduly burden the unique rights § 1442 affords

removing defendants. In most cases, defendants will already

be in possession of competent proof supporting what they are

required to show: personhood, a causal nexus, and a colorable

federal defense. Requiring defendants to produce such proof

when their § 1442 jurisdictional allegations are challenged

will not frustrate the statutory policy of facilitating access to

a federal forum.

In this case, plaintiffs do not raise a facial attack on

Crane’s jurisdictional allegations, as the allegations are

sufficient on their face to support removal jurisdiction under

§ 1442(a)(1). But plaintiffs have raised a factual attack by

contesting the truth of Crane’s allegations regarding the

existence of a colorable federal defense and the requisite

causal nexus. See Durham, 445 F.3d at 1251. In support of

their factual attack, plaintiffs have submitted extensive

evidence outside the pleadings, including military

specifications, technical manuals, warning label guides, and

deposition excerpts.

Because plaintiffs have raised a factual attack on Crane’s

jurisdictional allegations, Crane must support its allegations

with competent proof. See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d

at 1039. And Crane bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the colorable federal

defense and causal nexus requirements for removal

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LEITE V. CRANE CO. 13

jurisdiction have been met. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004).4

The only federal defense Crane asserts is the government

contractor defense recognized in Boyle v. United

Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). To establish that

defense in the context of plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims,

Crane will ultimately have to prove that (1) the Navy

exercised its discretion and approved certain warnings for

Crane’s products, (2) Crane provided the warnings required

by the Navy, and (3) Crane warned the Navy about any

asbestos hazards that were known to Crane but not to the

Navy. See Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 866 (9th Cir.

2011); accord Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 140 F.3d 654,

658–60 (6th Cir. 1998); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp.,

96 F.3d 992, 1003–04 (7th Cir. 1996).

Crane’s affidavits establish that it has a colorable federal

defense. With respect to the first element, Rear Admirals

Horne and Sargent state that the Navy issued detailed

specifications governing the form and content of all warnings

that equipment manufacturers were required to provide, both

on the equipment itself and in accompanying technical

manuals. According to their affidavits, the Navy was directly

involved in preparing the manuals, which included safety

information about equipment operation only to the extent

directed by the Navy. Horne and Sargent further state that

equipment manufacturers could not include warnings beyond

those specifically required and approved by the Navy, and

4 Plaintiffs do not contest that Crane, a private contractor producing

equipment for the Navy, qualifies as a “person” under § 1442(a)(1). See

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 153–54 (2007); Isaacson v.

Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008).

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14 LEITE V. CRANE CO.

that the Navy’s specifications did not require equipment

manufacturers to include warnings about asbestos hazards. 

These statements, which are supported by an adequate

foundation based on the affiants’ knowledge of Navy

procurement policies, establish a colorable showing that the

Navy exercised its discretion and approved certain warnings

for Crane’s products. See Getz, 654 F.3d at 866–67.5

In their affidavits, Horne and Sargent go further and opine

that if Crane had asked the Navy to approve warnings about

asbestos hazards, the Navy would have rejected them. 

Plaintiffs argue at length that this counterfactual opinion

testimony is entirely speculative and unreliable and therefore

can never be established by admissible evidence under

Federal Rule of Evidence 702. We need not resolve

plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to this testimony because

Crane has made a colorable showing under Getz’s first

element without it, based on the portions of the Horne and

Sargent affidavits discussed above. It’s enough under Getz

that the Navy exercised its discretion by prescribing certain

warnings and prohibiting others without its express approval. 

Horne and Sargent are competent to testify to those facts;

5 We note that the government contractor defense will not lie if the

warnings approved by the military are completely unrelated to the

warnings prescribed by state law. Because the defense is intended to

protect the government’s discretion, there must be a conflict between the

military specifications and state-law requirements. See Boyle, 487 U.S.

at 507, 511–12. Only when the warnings required by state law fall within

the scope of the warnings approved by the federal government will the

government’s exercise of discretion necessarily conflict with the

contractor’s state-law duty to warn. See Getz, 654 F.3d at 866–67. For

the reasons explained above, Crane has made a colorable showing that

warnings about the risks of asbestos fell within the scope of the warnings

considered and adopted by the Navy.

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LEITE V. CRANE CO. 15

there’s nothing speculative about what, in their view, the

Navy’s procurement policies actually required. Contrary to

plaintiffs’ assumption, Crane need not prove that the Navy

would have forbidden it to issue asbestos warnings had Crane

requested the Navy’s approval. As we held in Getz, the

government contractor defense isn’t limited to “instances

where the government forbids additional warning or dictates

the precise contents of a warning.” 654 F.3d at 867; accord

Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176, 1185 n.2 (7th Cir.

2012).

Crane’s affidavits also establish a colorable showing with

respect to the second and third elements of the government

contractor defense. Pantaleoni, a Crane vice-president, states

that all of the equipment Crane sold to the Navy complied

with Navy specifications, which would include the

specifications regarding required warnings. Sargent confirms

that an outside vendor’s equipment could not have been

installed aboard Navy vessels unless it complied with all

applicable Navy specifications. Plaintiffs do not raise

evidentiary objections to these statements, which make a

colorable showing that Crane provided the warnings required

by the Navy. And Dr. Forman’s affidavit, supported by an

adequate foundation based on his years of historical research,

makes a colorable showing that the Navy at all times knew at

least as much about asbestos hazards as the equipment

manufacturers, leaving nothing for Crane to warn the Navy

about.

At this stage, Crane doesn’t have to prove that its

government contractor defense is in fact meritorious, and we

express no view on whether it is. As the Supreme Court has

held, a defendant invoking § 1442(a)(1) “need not win his

case before he can have it removed.” Willingham v. Morgan,

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16 LEITE V. CRANE CO.

395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). All that Crane must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence is that its government

contractor defense is “colorable.” Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker,

527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). The evidence Crane has submitted

satisfies its burden.

Based on the same evidence, Crane has also proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that a causal nexus exists

between plaintiffs’ claims and the actions Crane took at the

direction of a federal officer. In assessing whether a causal

nexus exists, we credit the defendant’s theory of the case. Id.

at 432; Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137. Such a nexus exists here

because the very act that forms the basis of plaintiffs’

claims—Crane’s failure to warn about asbestos hazards—is

an act that Crane contends it performed under the direction of

the Navy. Crane may not be right—indeed, it may be that the

Navy had nothing to do with Crane’s failure to warn. But the

question “whether the challenged act was outside the scope

of [Crane’s] official duties, or whether it was specifically

directed by the federal Government, is one for the

federal—not state—courts to answer.” Isaacson, 517 F.3d at

138; see also Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407.

AFFIRMED.

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