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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3728

LONZO J. STANLEY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 15-cv-222-bbc — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED MAY 31, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 1, 2016 —

OPINION ISSUED JUNE 27, 2016*

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. More than a decade ago 

Lonzo Stanley was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment 

 

* This appeal initially was decided by a nonprecedential order. The 

court has revised the order and issued it as an opinion.

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after he pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine. His sentence depended in part on the district court’s conclusion that 

he is a career offender under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1, which calls for 

extra time in prison if the defendant has two or more prior 

convictions for serious drug crimes or violent felonies. The 

court counted three qualifying convictions: one for a controlled-substance offense, another for unlawfully possessing 

a firearm, and a third for aggravated battery. Stanley did not 

appeal from his sentence or file a collateral attack under 28 

U.S.C. §2255 within the year allowed by §2255(f).

After the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), Stanley took advantage of the opportunity created by §2255(f)(3), which allows a fresh year from 

“the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review”. We held in Price v. 

United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015), that the right newly identified in Johnson is retroactive, and in Welch v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), the Supreme Court agreed. But 

the district judge concluded that Johnson does not affect Stanley’s sentence and denied his petition for collateral review.

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72909 (W.D. Wis. June 5, 2015).

Johnson holds that part of 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is unconstitutional. Subsection 924(e), called the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, requires longer sentences for persons convicted of three or more violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 

The statute defines some of these categories and adds a kicker in clause (ii), which classifies as a violent felony any crime 

that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 

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No. 15-3728 3

potential risk of physical injury to another”. The part of 

clause (ii) that begins “or otherwise involves” is known as 

the residual clause. Johnson holds that the residual clause is 

unconstitutionally vague. Johnson does not otherwise affect 

the operation of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Nor does

Johnson discuss how, if at all, its holding affects the careeroffender guideline. For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that Johnson applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. Another panel has that question under advisement. We do not 

express any opinion on it.

A flurry of filings in the district courts after Price, which 

became a blizzard after Welch, depends on a belief that Johnson reopens all questions about the proper classification of 

prior convictions under the Guidelines and the Armed Career Criminal Act. But the sole holding of Johnson is that the 

residual clause is invalid. Johnson does not affect the first 

portion of clause (ii) (“burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] use 

of explosives”) and does not have anything to do with the 

proper classification of drug offenses or the operation of 

§924(e)(2)(B)(i), known as the elements clause, which classifies as a violent felony any crime punishable by a year or 

more in prison that “has as an element the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another”. The Guidelines contain the same language. 

U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(1).

Stanley is among the many petitioners who have misunderstood the effect of Johnson. We go through his prior felony convictions one at a time to show why.

His drug conviction counts under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(b), and 

it would have counted under §924(e)(2)(A) if this had been a 

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proceeding under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He does 

not argue otherwise.

Stanley’s conviction for illegal possession of a firearm, by 

contrast, does not count—not because of Johnson, but because it never qualified as a violent felony. The Sentencing 

Commission has concluded that a felon’s possession of a gun 

that could be possessed lawfully by a non-felon is not a 

crime of violence for the purpose of the career-offender 

guideline. See Amendment 433 (Nov. 1991), now reflected in 

§4B1.2 Application Note 1 ¶3. See also Stinson v. United 

States, 508 U.S. 36, 47 (1993). The district court should not 

have counted this conviction in 2004, when Stanley was sentenced. Because the classification of this conviction is unaffected by Johnson, §2255(f)(3) does not grant Stanley a fresh 

window to file a collateral attack. Indeed, because Stanley 

could have appealed his sentence based on the application 

note, he could not have filed a collateral attack even within 

the year originally allowed by §2255(f). The United States 

has waived its timeliness and forfeiture defenses in order to 

obtain a substantive decision on this appeal, however, so the 

validity of Stanley’s sentence depends on the treatment of 

his remaining prior conviction.

Stanley’s conviction for aggravated battery of a peace officer, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-3, 5/12-4(b)(6) (1997), also 

is outside the scope of Johnson. The district court counted 

this conviction under the elements clause, U.S.S.G. 

§4B1.2(a)(1), which is parallel to 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(i). 

Johnson does not have anything to do with the elements 

clause of either the Guidelines or the Armed Career Criminal 

Act, and §2255(f)(3) therefore does not afford prisoners a 

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No. 15-3728 5

new one-year period to seek collateral relief on a theory that 

the elements clause does not apply to a particular conviction.

Perhaps a prisoner could argue that he decided not to 

press an argument about the elements clause at sentencing, 

or on appeal, when the only consequence would have been 

to move a conviction from the elements clause to the residual clause. Then it would be possible to see some relation between Johnson and a contention that the conviction has been 

misclassified, for the line of argument could have been 

pointless before Johnson but dispositive afterward. But this is 

not the sort of argument that Stanley makes.

Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2012), concludes that the Illinois offense of aggravated battery of a 

peace officer is a violent felony because the use of force is an 

element of the offense. Johnson has nothing to say about that 

subject. What Stanley now contends is that he might have 

pleaded guilty to aggravated battery under a different part

of the battery statute that penalizes insulting conduct. That 

would not be a crime of violence under either the elements 

clause or the residual clause, so this possibility, too, is unaffected by Johnson.

What the Supreme Court curiously calls the “modified 

categorical” approach determines how to classify a prior 

conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act and similar provisions, including §4B1.2. Under this approach the 

Court asks whether the elements of the crime—rather than 

what the defendant did in fact—bring the conviction within 

the scope of the recidivist enhancement. Usually a statute 

will be wholly in or wholly out, but some statutes are divisible into discrete theories of criminal culpability. See 

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). When a 

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statute is divisible, a court may consider the charging papers 

and judicial findings, or concessions made at a plea colloquy, to determine whether the conviction qualifies. See, e.g., 

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). We held in United 

States v. Rodriguez-Gomez, 608 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2010), 

that aggravated battery in Illinois is a divisible statute. Stanley contends that he might have been convicted under a part 

of this statute that lacks an element based on the use of force. 

Yet this contention is unrelated to Johnson and so does not 

authorize a belated collateral attack.

Stanley’s argument fails on the merits in addition to being untimely. Illinois charged Stanley with a violent battery 

that satisfies the elements clause. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1). It 

is always possible that someone charged with a violent felony may plead guilty to a lesser offense, but a court does not 

assume this. It must be shown. As the proponent of collateral review, Stanley had to produce evidence demonstrating 

entitlement to relief. See Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 279 

(1945); Martin v. United States, 789 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 

2015). For Stanley that meant showing a difference between 

the charge and the conviction. A notation in the judgment of 

conviction might do this. Judicial findings, or stipulations 

during a plea colloquy, also might suffice. But Stanley did 

not produce any of this potentially relevant evidence. When 

a statute is divisible, “a silent record leaves up in the air 

whether an error has occurred, and the allocation to defendant of the burdens of production and persuasion makes a 

difference.” United States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 

(7th Cir. 2010). The absence of any evidence to undermine 

the indictment’s description of a violent felony means that 

Stanley would have lost, even had he raised this contention 

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on direct appeal or by a timely motion under §2255. His sentence is lawful.

AFFIRMED

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