Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04214/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04214-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN LIEBB,

Petitioner,

v.

JILL BROWN, Warden,

Respondent. ___________________________________

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No. C 04-4214 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AS

UNTIMELY

(Docket no. 16)

Petitioner Stephen Liebb, a state prisoner incarcerated at San

Quentin State Prison (SQSP), filed the present pro se petition for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking to

have expunged from his prison records his 1989 Rules Violation

Report (RVR) for fighting with an inmate (Fighting RVR), for which

he was found guilty. Petitioner claims that the expungement of

this document "will remove a purported 'reason' to find him

unsuitable for parole or rescind a finding of parole when it is

subjected to [the] governor's review." (Am. Pet. at 2.)

Before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss the present

petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) -- the statute of

limitations set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner opposes the motion, and Respondent

filed a reply. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the

Court GRANTS Respondent's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR) issued the Fighting RVR after prison officials identified

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Petitioner as the aggressor in a fight with inmate Lopez on March

26, 1989. (Pet'r Ex. A, RVR 81677 dated Mar. 26, 1989.) 

Petitioner was found guilty at his disciplinary hearing on March

31, 1989 and assessed a ninety-day credit loss. (Id.)

One hour after the incident involving Petitioner and inmate

Lopez, inmate Leabow was fatally assaulted. (Pet'r Ex. D.) Prison

officials suspected that Petitioner conspired with other inmates to

have inmate Leabow killed. (Pet'r Ex. B.) On May 12, 1989, the

CDCR forwarded the matter to the district attorney's office. (Id.) 

Petitioner was placed in administrative segregation pending an

investigation by the district attorney. (Id.) 

On April 12, 1990, the CDCR issued another RVR officially

charging Petitioner with conspiracy to kill inmate Leabow

(Conspiracy RVR). (Resp't Ex. 4(G), RVR 92314 dated Apr. 12,

1990.) On May 3, 1990, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition

with the Solano County Superior Court. (Pet'r Ex. E.) On May 9,

1990, the superior court issued a temporary restraining order

prohibiting the CDCR from conducting administrative hearings

relating to the Conspiracy RVR. (Opp'n Attach. 1.) On September

17, 1990, the superior court issued an order prohibiting such

hearings while Petitioner remained a suspect in the district

attorney's ongoing investigation. (Pet'r Ex. E at 2-3.) On

September 12, 1991, the CDCR dismissed the Conspiracy RVR after

finding Petitioner not guilty of the charges. (Resp't Ex. 4(G),

RVR 92314 dated April 12, 1990.) 

After the Conspiracy RVR was dismissed, Petitioner claims that

SQSP Correctional Counselor II Vaught told him that the Fighting

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RVR would be removed from his file. (Opp'n at 2.) Petitioner

alleges that in 1990 and 1991, he "file[d] appeals on the retention

of the Rules Violation Report Log # 81677 [Fighting RVR] in his

Central File. . . ." (Id. (brackets added).) He claims that he

"received no response to these appeals." (Id.) 

In June, 1998, Petitioner wrote a letter to the warden

requesting that the Fighting RVR and the documents relating to the

Conspiracy RVR be expunged from his central file. (Pet'r Ex. G,

Letter to SQSP Associate Warden.) On June 29, 1998, the warden

directed Petitioner to submit his claim through the administrative

appeals process. (Pet'r Ex. G, Response from Associate Warden A.P.

Kane dated June 29, 1998.) 

On June 26, 1998, while waiting for the warden's response,

Petitioner filed a 602 inmate appeal seeking the expungement of his

Fighting RVR (Pet'r Ex. G, 602 appeal dated June 26, 1998.) On

July 2, 1998, his appeal was screened out as untimely pursuant to

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(c), which

states: "An inmate . . . must submit the appeal within 15 working

days of the event or decision being appealed, or receiving an

unacceptable lower level appeal decision." (Pet'r Ex. G, Permanent

Appeal Attachment dated July 2, 1998.) Petitioner did not pursue

this appeal to the next level in the administrative appeals

process.

On December 27, 2002, Petitioner was granted an Olsen review

in order to prepare for his July 17, 2003 parole suitability

hearing. (Resp't Ex. 6, Memorandum for Second Level Appeal log no.

03-3277 dated Dec. 8, 2003 at 4.) An Olsen review is an

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administrative procedure which allows an inmate to review his

central file. Petitioner had been granted previous Olsen reviews

on December 2, 1991, May 8, 1996 and March 1, 1989. (Resp't Ex. 6,

Memorandum for Second Level Appeal log no. 03-3277 dated December

8, 2003 at 4.) 

On January 2, 2003, Petitioner filed a 602 inmate appeal

alleging that during his December 27, 2002 Olsen review he

discovered his Fighting RVR and documents related to his Conspiracy

RVR in his central file, which "impact [his] protected liberty

interest in parole" and requested that they be removed. (Resp't

Ex. 6, 602 appeal dated Jan. 2, 2003.) This appeal was barred as

untimely on January 6, 2003. (Id., Permanent Appeal Attachment

dated Jan. 6, 2003.) 

 On June 10, 2003, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in

the Marin County Superior Court. (Resp't Ex. 4, State Habeas

Petition dated June 10, 2003.) On September 2, 2003, his petition

was denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Resp't

Ex. 6, Marin County Superior Court decision dated Sept. 2, 2003.)

On September 18, 2003, the California Court of Appeal denied

Petitioner's state habeas petition stating, "The petition and

documents appended thereto fail to demonstrate petitioner's

exhaustion of the inmate appeal process." (Resp't Ex. 6, Court of

Appeal decision dated Sept. 18, 2003 (citation omitted).)

On October 22, 2003, Petitioner filed another 602 appeal

requesting that the Fighting RVR and any documents relating to the

Conspiracy RVR be removed from his central file. (Resp't Ex. 2,

602 appeal log no. 03-3277 dated Oct. 22, 2003.) On the same date,

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his appeal was denied as untimely at the informal level. (Id.) On

October 26, 2003, Petitioner filed a formal level appeal, which was

denied as untimely on November 25, 2003. (Id.) On November 11,

2003, Petitioner filed a second level appeal, which was denied on

December 8, 2003. (Resp't Ex. 2, Second Level Appeal Response log

no. 03-3277 dated Dec. 8, 2003.) According to the Second Level

Appeal Response, the Fighting RVR and the documents relating to the

Conspiracy RVR were appropriate for retention. (Id. at 4.) 

Petitioner filed an appeal to the Director's level on December 18,

2003. (Resp't Ex. 2, 602 appeal log no. 03-3277 dated Dec. 18,

2003.) On May 4, 2004, his appeal was denied at the Director's

level. (Resp't Ex. 2, Director's Level Appeal Decision dated May

4, 2004.) While no relief was afforded to Petitioner at that time,

the Chief Inmate Appeals Officer noted that the "confidential

section of [Petitioner's] central file will be scheduled for an

audit . . . ." (Id. at 2.) On May 17, 2004, the Chief Inmate

Appeals Officer filed an addendum to the Director's Level Appeal

Decision deeming Petitioner's appeal to be granted as to the

documents relating to the Conspiracy RVR:

On May 10, 2004, the confidential section of the

appellant's central file was audited. Documentation

was indeed discovered that related to an April 12, 1990

Rules Violation Report (RVR) for Conspiracy to fatally

assault Another Inmate. As the RVR was dismissed, it

was determined that the associated documentation should

be expunged from the appellant's central file. 

Classification & Parole Representative (C&PR) C.

Belshaw concurred with the examiner's finding and

removed the documents from the appellant's file.

(Resp't Ex. 2, Addendum to Director's Level Appeal Decision dated

May 17, 2004.) The addendum did not address the Fighting RVR,

which was retained in his central file. (Id.)

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On June 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in

the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on June 10, 2004.

(Resp't Ex. 6, 7.) On June 18, 2004, Petitioner filed a state

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied

on September 1, 2004. (Resp't Ex. 8, 9.)

On October 5, 2004, Petitioner filed the present petition. He

filed an amended petition on June 27, 2005. In his petition, he

contends that the Fighting RVR is "inextricably linked" to the

Conspiracy RVR. (Pet. at 5.) Petitioner states that he refused to

waive his Miranda rights during his disciplinary hearing for the

Fighting RVR. (Id. at 7.) Therefore, he "entered no plea and made

no statement." (Id. at 5.) As a result, Petitioner submits that

the Fighting RVR should be expunged from his central file because: 

(1) it impacts his liberty interests in parole and (2) it shares a

common nucleus of operative facts with the dismissed Conspiracy

RVR. (Id. at 7.) 

The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition

should not be granted.

On August 14, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on

the ground that Petitioner had not exhausted his state court

remedies because the case numbers of the state habeas petitions

Petitioner provided did not address the claim in the present

petition. Petitioner conceded that he had provided incorrect case

numbers, and he identified the relevant state habeas petitions and

administrative appeals. In an Order dated March 14, 2007, the

Court denied Respondent's motion to dismiss and ordered Respondent

to file an answer. However, in lieu of filing an answer,

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 The Court finds unavailing Petitioner's argument that

Respondent waived the right to file the present motion because the

timeliness issue was not raised with the initial motion to dismiss

the petition as unexhausted. Rule 5(b) of the Rules Governing

Habeas Cases mandates that an answer to a federal habeas petition

"state whether any claim in the petition is barred by . . . a

procedural bar . . . or a statute of limitations." No answer has

been filed in this action; therefore, Respondent has not waived the

right to file the instant motion to dismiss.

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Respondent filed the present motion to dismiss the petition as

untimely.1

 

 DISCUSSION

The AEDPA, which became law on April 24, 1996, imposes a

statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus

filed by state prisoners. Prisoners challenging non-capital state

convictions or sentences must file a petition within one year of

the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final

after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for

seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application

created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such

action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional

right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right

was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the

claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The AEDPA limitation period also applies when a prisoner is

challenging an administrative decision such as the revocation of

good time credit or denial of parole. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063

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(9th Cir. 2004). However, administrative decisions are not

governed by section 2244(d)(1)(A) because the word "judgment" in

that section refers to a judgment of conviction and sentence, and

the phrase "direct review" refers to the direct appellate review of

that judgment. Id. at 1081. Instead, administrative decisions are

governed by section 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Section 2244(d)(1)(D) states that the limitations period to

file a federal habeas petition will begin to run on "the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim . . . presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." For

administrative appeals, the "factual predicate," which causes the

limitations period to run, is the denial of a prisoner's

administrative appeal; it is not the denial of the state habeas

petition. See Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066.

Here, Petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of his

administrative disciplinary hearing relating to his Fighting RVR on

March 31, 1989. This date is arguably the date on which the

factual predicate of his claim was discovered under

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). However, under Shelby, the limitations period

begins to run the day after the prisoner receives timely notice of

the denial of his administrative appeal challenging the

disciplinary decision. Id. In the present case, Petitioner claims

that he filed 602 appeals relating to the Fighting RVR in 1990 and

1991; however, there is nothing in the record that shows that any

602 appeals were submitted to prison officials during that time. 

The record shows that Petitioner filed a 602 appeal on January 26,

1998, approximately nine years after he was found guilty of the

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Fighting RVR. After that 602 appeal was screened out as untimely

on July 2, 1998, Petitioner did not pursue his appeal to higher

levels. He filed another 602 appeal five years later, on October

22, 2003. He received the denial at the Director's level on

December 18, 2003 -- a total of fifteen years after he was found

guilty on his Fighting RVR. The Shelby court stated that allowing

a person an unlimited time to challenge an administrative decision

would contravene the finality principle on which the AEDPA is

based. Id. at 1065. Accordingly, Shelby supports a finding that

the limitations period began to run when Petitioner's time to file

his administrative appeal expired. Pursuant to Title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations, section 3084.6(c), Petitioner had

until April 21, 1989 -- fifteen business days after he was found

guilty -- to challenge his Fighting RVR. Because Petitioner did

not file a 602 appeal before his fifteen-day time period expired,

the limitations period began to run on April 22, 1989. Therefore,

he had until April 22, 1990 to file his federal habeas petition. 

Petitioner did not file the present petition until October 5, 2004

-- fourteen years after the limitations period expired. 

Accordingly, the petition is untimely absent tolling.

I. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled under

§ 2244(d)(2) for the "'time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

[with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim] is pending.'" 

Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28

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 In California, the supreme court, intermediate courts of

appeal, and superior courts all have original habeas corpus

jurisdiction. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006 n.2. Although a superior

court order denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state

prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the California

Court of Appeal. Id. If the appellate court denies relief, the

petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way

of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas

petition. Id. at 1006 n.3.

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U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)). Tolling applies to one full round of

collateral review. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). 

In Carey, the Supreme Court held that the limitations period is

tolled during the time between a lower state court's decision and

the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. Id. In

California, where prisoners generally use the State's "'original

writ' system," this means that the limitations period remains

tolled during the intervals between a state court's disposition of

an original state habeas petition and the filing of a further

original state habeas petition in a higher court, provided the

prisoner did not delay unreasonably in seeking review in the higher

court. See id. at 220-25; accord Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003,

1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (an application for collateral review is

"pending" in state court for "all of the time during which a state

prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a

particular post-conviction application") (citation omitted), cert.

denied, 529 U.S. 1104 (2000).2 If there is an unreasonable delay

between the different levels of collateral review, a petition will

be viewed as untimely. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 197

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(2006). Otherwise, a petitioner "would have an unlimited [amount

of] time in which to file [a] habeas petition, thus hindering the

finality principle." Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1062 (brackets in

original). 

Here, the record shows that Petitioner completed one full

round of state collateral review when he filed state habeas

petitions in the California Court of Appeal and the California

Supreme Court in 2004 -- fifteen years after he was found guilty of

the Fighting RVR. The appellate court denied his petition on June

10, 2004, and the California Supreme Court did the same on

September 1, 2004. 

However, as mentioned above, the one-year limitations period

had expired on April 22, 1990. A state habeas petition filed after

the AEDPA's statute of limitations ended cannot toll the

limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823

(9th Cir. 2003) ("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed," even if the state petition was timely

filed). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot "revive" the limitations period

once it has run (i.e., restart the clock to zero); it can only

serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Once the

limitations period has expired, "collateral petitions can no longer

serve to avoid a statute of limitations." Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991

F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

Accordingly, Petitioner's state habeas petitions filed in 2004

do not revive the limitations period that has already run. 

While Petitioner did seek collateral review of his claim in

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state court by filing petitions in the state superior, appellate

and supreme courts from 1990 to 2004, the limitations period is not

tolled because Petitioner's filing delays between state court

petitions were unreasonable. See Evans, 546 U.S. at 197. 

Petitioner fails to assert facts establishing that the limitations

period should be tolled for approximately fourteen years. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not alleged any facts suggesting that

statutory tolling renders the petition timely. 

Because Petitioner did not meet the one-year requirement for

filing the instant federal habeas petition and he is not entitled

to statutory tolling, his petition is barred as untimely under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) unless he can show that he is entitled to a

delayed commencement of the limitations period or equitable

tolling.

II. Delayed Commencement of the Limitations Period

Petitioner argues for a delayed commencement of the

limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Petitioner alleges that he did not discover the factual predicate

of the present petition until his Olsen review on December 27,

2002. He claims that it was at that time that he discovered that

his Fighting RVR and documents related to his Conspiracy RVR were

still in his central file. (Resp't Ex. 6, 602 appeal dated Jan. 2,

2003.) As a result, Petitioner claims that the commencement of the

limitations period should be delayed until May 17, 2004 -- the date

he received the Addendum to the Director's level decision --

because that was when he exhausted his 602 appeal log number 03-

3277 relating to the expungement of his Fighting RVR and documents

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related to his Conspiracy RVR. 

However, the factual predicate of Petitioner's claim could

have been discovered "through the exercise of due diligence" prior

to December 27, 2002. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner

claims that as early as 1990 he began filing 602 appeals requesting

the expungement of his Fighting RVR, but that he received no

response. In addition, he knew of the factual predicate of his

claim in June, 1998 when he wrote a letter to the warden requesting

that the Fighting RVR and documents relating to the Conspiracy RVR

be expunged from his file. Moreover, he had the opportunity to

discover the factual predicate of his claim prior to the December

27, 2002 because he conducted Olsen reviews on March 1, 1989,

December 2, 1991, and May 8, 1996. 

Even if Petitioner was aware that the Fighting RVR and the

documents relating to the Conspiracy RVR were still in his central

file but failed to recognize the possible future implications of

those items, his federal habeas petition is untimely. Hasan v.

Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). A prisoner knows of

the factual predicate of a claim "when . . . he knows (or through

the diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the

prisoner recognizes their legal significance." Id. (citing Owens

v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000)). Therefore, Petitioner

is not entitled to a delayed commencement of the limitations

period. Accordingly, his federal habeas is untimely, unless

equitable tolling applies.

III. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled

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because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitation and not a

jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States District Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on

other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly),

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). "When external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling will not be available in

most cases because extensions of time should be granted only if

"extraordinary circumstances beyond [a] prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)(brackets in

original). The prisoner must show that "the 'extraordinary

circumstances' were the cause of his untimeliness." Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The

Ninth Circuit has said that the petitioner "bears the burden of

showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to him." 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether

equitable tolling is in order turns on an examination of detailed

facts. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Although Petitioner does not state expressly in his opposition

to the motion to dismiss that he is entitled to equitable tolling,

he does discuss the doctrine, indicating his awareness and

understanding of it. (Opp'n at 6.) The Court finds that it would

be futile to provide him leave to amend to allege equitable

tolling. All the relevant facts are presented in detail in the

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record. Based on a thorough review of those facts, the Court

concludes that nothing suggests the possibility of equitable

tolling. Petitioner alleges no facts from which the Court could

infer that his failure to raise his claims prior to the expiration

of the limitations period was because of circumstances which were

beyond his control and which made it impossible to file a timely

federal petition. It was Petitioner's delay in pursuing his state

court and administrative remedies, rather than extraordinary

circumstances, that led him to exceed the limitations period. See

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1065. The limitations period will not be

equitably tolled. 

Accordingly, the petition is dismissed because it was not

timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss the

petition as untimely (docket no. 16) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the

Court shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent, terminate all

pending motions, and close the file. 

This Order terminates Docket no. 16.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/17/08 _______________________________

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-04214-CW Document 19 Filed 03/17/08 Page 15 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.04\Liebb4214.grantMTD(sol).frm 16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIEBB,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BROWN et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV04-04214 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 17, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Denise Alayne Yates

Office of the Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Stephen Liebb C-60825

San Quentin State Prison

San Quentin, CA 94974

Dated: March 17, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:04-cv-04214-CW Document 19 Filed 03/17/08 Page 16 of 16