Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01596/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01596-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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1

 Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion periodically refers to the original

complaint. E.g., (Doc. 21 at 8) (quoting from the Original Complaint). To the extent that

Plaintiff’s response refers to information that is contained in the Original Complaint, but not

in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court will ignore those portions because an amended

complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)

(“The amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as nonexistent.”) (citations omitted). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DeAnn J. Drottz, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Park Electrochemical Corporation; Park

Advanced Product Development

Corporation, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-1596-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants Park Electrochemical Corporation and Park

Advanced Product Development Corporation’s (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 20).

The Court now rules on the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) contains the following factual

allegations, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.1

 Plaintiff started working for Defendant Park Advanced Product Development

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Corporation (“PAPDC”) on September 24, 2007. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 7). Defendant Park

Electrochemical Corporation (“PEC”) is the parent company of PAPDC, and the Complaint

alleges that nearly all of Plaintiff’s supervisors and managers were employees of PEC. (Id.).

Plaintiff is a well-qualified employee and received high ratings from her former supervisor,

Doug Leys. (Id. at ¶ 8). 

Early in 2010, Ke Wang become Plaintiff’s new supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 9). Under

Wang’s supervision, Plaintiff alleges various incidents in which Wang acted inappropriately,

including that Wang: (1) “belittled and insulted” her in front of others; (2) criticized and

yelled at her unnecessarily; (3) blamed her for problems beyond her control; and (4) on one

occasion physically forced himself into Plaintiff’s office by “put[ing] his foot onto the middle

of the door, forcing his way in, [and] pushing [Plaintiff’s] hand off the door.” (Id. at ¶¶

9–26). Plaintiff also alleges that manager Greg Westphal repeatedly ignored her attempts to

report Wang’s behavior, and instead blamed Plaintiff as the source of the problems. (Id. at

¶ 16). 

Plaintiff reported Westphal and Wang’s behavior to Westphal’s boss, Sue Macaluso.

(Id. at ¶¶ 16, 20). Macaluso stated that she would discuss the situation with Westphal and

“handle the situation” with Wang. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 26). After the incident in which Wang

forced himself into Plaintiff’s office, Plaintiff alleges she was “afraid that Wang would

become physically violent with her.” (Id. at ¶ 26). Consequently, Plaintiff spoke with

Human Resources Coordinator Joan Couet and filed a written complaint. (Id.). Couet

forwarded Plaintiff’s written complaint to Macaluso and Westphal, who subsequently met

with Plaintiff to hand her a “disciplinary warning.” (Id. at ¶ 27). The warning Plaintiff

received included several allegations of poor work performance and violations of company

policy, all of which Plaintiff denies. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that no action was taken against

Wang, and Plaintiff was terminated on February 28, 2011. (Id. at ¶¶ 29–30). Plaintiff then

filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received

a right-to-sue notice on May 19, 2011. (Doc. 20-1 at 5). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges seven counts: (1) race and sex discrimination; (2) hostile

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work environment; (3) retaliation; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5)

negligent infliction of emotional distress; (6) race discrimination and retaliation under 42

U.S.C. § 1981; and (7) wrongful discharge in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-

1501(3)(C)(ii). (Id. at ¶¶ 37–67). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the

defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 47 (1957)). 

Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires “more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The factual allegations

of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Id.

Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.

Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could

satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also

‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citation omitted).

Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible

on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility

requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a

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2

 Defendants’ motion refers to Plaintiff’s second cause of action as Plaintiff’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (Doc. 20 at 5). But, that claim is actually

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action. (Doc. 12 at 24). 

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complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short

of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the facts

alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and the

Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States,

234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss contains four arguments: (1) PEC should be dismissed

because it never employed Plaintiff, and Plaintiff failed to name PEC in Plaintiff’s EEOC

complaint; (2) Plaintiff’s fourth,2

 fifth, and seventh causes of action should be dismissed for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); (3) Plaintiff’s entire

Complaint should be dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 12(b)(7)

and (19); and (4) the Complaint should be stricken under Rule 8(a) and 12(f). The Court will

consider each argument in turn.

A. Plaintiff’s employer and her failure to name PEC in the EEOC complaint

At the outset of their motion, Defendants first argue that PEC should be dismissed

because PEC never employed Plaintiff. (Doc. 20 at 3–4). Further, Defendants argue that

even if PEC did employ Plaintiff, Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies

against PEC because she failed to name PEC as her employer in her formal EEOC complaint.

(Id. at 4–5). 

Defendants’ administrative remedies argument lacks merit. Courts must construe

EEOC complaints liberally. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1990) (“‘EEOC

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3

 Defendants’ briefs refer to the “single employer” test, but the Ninth Circuit uses the

term “integrated enterprise” to refer to the same test. E.g., Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296

F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This circuit applies a four-part test to determine whether two

entities are an integrated enterprise for the purposes of Title VII coverage.”) (citation

omitted). 

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charges must be construed with the utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled

in the technicalities of formal pleading.’”) (quoting Kaplan v. Int’l Alliance of Theatrical and

Stage Emps. and Motion Picture Machine Operators, 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975));

see also Serpe v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 718 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1983) (relying on liberal

interpretation principles in holding that, even though the EEOC complaint did not allege that

the plaintiff was refused a promotion because she is a woman, the complaint was enough to

confer subject matter jurisdiction over that claim because an EEOC investigation would have

revealed her claims). Even failure to name a defendant in the EEOC complaint is not fatal

so long as the unnamed defendant was “‘involved in the acts giving rise to the [EEOC]

claims.’” Sosa, 920 F.2d at 1459 (quoting Wrighten v. Metro. Hosp., 726 F.2d 1346, 1352

(9th Cir. 1984)). Here, Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, alleges that all of her

supervisors and managers are employees of PEC. Assuming that Plaintiff is correct, PEC,

through its employees, was involved in the acts underlying Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. Thus,

PEC cannot be dismissed solely because it was not named in the EEOC complaint. 

Defendants also argue that PEC should be dismissed because PEC was never

Plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff argues that, under the economic realities test, PEC is a joint

employer with PAPDC. Plaintiff further argues that, even if PEC is not a joint employer, it

is liable as an indirect employer. Defendants respond that the economic realities test only

applies when determining joint employer status under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and that

the integrated enterprise test applies in the Title VII context.3

Both Defendants and Plaintiff are correct to some degree. The Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals has held that when courts determine whether an entity has enough employees to

count as an employer for the purposes of Title VII coverage, the appropriate test is the

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4

 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss states that “PAPDC is a Delaware corporation in

good standing and is active with nine employees.” (Doc. 20 at 4). Defendants cite an exhibit

attached to their motion to support this assertion, but the exhibit nowhere mentions the

number of people that PEC or PAPDC currently employs. (Doc. 20-1 at 7–8). Moreover,

“as a general rule, a district court may not consider materials beyond the pleadings in ruling

on a 12(b)(6) motion.” Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.9 (9th

Cir. 2012). There are exceptions to this general rule, but Defendants have not provided the

Court with which exception, if any, applies to the exhibit attached to their motion. 

5

 It should be noted that whether a plaintiff is jointly employed is typically a factual

issue addressed after the plaintiff has had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Boire v.

Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (“[W]hether [an entity] possessed sufficient

indicia of control to be an ‘employer’ is essentially a factual issue.”); see also Robinson v.

Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 338 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he issue of a joint employer relationship

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integrated enterprise test. Anderson v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 336 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“The [integrated enterprise] test does not determine joint liability . . ., but instead determines

whether a defendant can meet the statutory criteria of an ‘employer’ for Title VII

applicability.”) (emphasis in original). But, when there is no dispute that at least one

defendant qualifies as an employer under Title VII, the integrated enterprise test is wholly

inapplicable. Id. at 929 (“[The defendant] does not dispute that it employs at least 15

employees. Because this places [the defendant] within Title VII’s statutory coverage as an

‘employer,’ the integrated enterprise test is inapplicable.”) (internal footnote omitted). Here,

Defendants argue that the integrated enterprise test is appropriate to determine whether PEC

is an employer for liability purposes, not coverage under Title VII in the first place. (Doc.

22 at 5). Plaintiff has alleged that both PEC and PAPDC employ over fifteen people, and

Defendants have not yet disputed that claim or presented evidence to the contrary.4

 Thus,

Defendants are incorrect that the integrated enterprise test applies in this case. 

Plaintiff argues that the economic realities test applies when determining whether two

employers jointly employ one employee. Title VII includes a short definition of “employee”;

the statute says that “[t]he term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an employer.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006). Defendants do not dispute that PAPDC is Plaintiff’s employer.

The issue is whether PEC is a joint employer with PAPDC.5

 

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[is] a question of fact, which preclude[s] summary judgment.”). The fact that it is not clear

on the face of the Complaint whether PEC jointly employs Plaintiff weighs in favor of

denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and allowing discovery. Cf. Von Saher v. Norton

Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a

complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds

unless it is clear on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot possibly establish

timeliness). 

6

 Defendants argue that the economic realities test only applies when “determining

joint employer status under the Fair Labor Standards Act.” Doc. 22 at 2. Plaintiff cites a

published Ninth Circuit opinion that applies the economic realities test in the Title VII

context. See EEOC v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 351 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 2003) reh’g granted, 367

F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2004). As the court in Brown pointed out, however, that opinion was

“withdrawn ahead of a rehearing en banc.” Brown v. Arizona, No. CV-09-2272, 2011 WL

2911054, at *3 n.2 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2011). The parties in Pacific Maritime stipulated to a

dismissal before the rehearing took place, and the “Ninth Circuit never vacated its prior order

or reinstated the opinion of the three-judge panel.” Id. Thus, the Brown court did not treat

Pacific Maritime as binding, but did find it persuasive. Id. Many courts in this circuit have

approvingly cited Pacific Maritime for the proposition that the economic realities test applies

in the Title VII context. E.g., EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., Cv. No. 11-00257 DAE-RLP,

2012 WL 928160, at *7 (D. Haw. Mar. 16, 2012); King, 2011 WL 2295035, at *2; Miljkovic

v. Univ. of Haw., President’s Office, Civ. No. 09-00064 ACK-KSC, 2011 WL 237028, at *6

(D. Haw. Jan. 21, 2011); Rubino v. ACME Bldg. Maint., No. C08-00696, 2008 WL 5245219,

at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008); Garcia v. Courtesy Ford, Inc., No. C06-855RSL, 2007 WL

1192681, at *5–6 (W.D. Wash. April 20, 2007). Further, the Ninth Circuit has consolidated

the various tests, including the economic realities test, into a single test and has found that

test applicable in the Title VII context. Murray v. Principal Financial Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d

943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, the economic realities test, as

incorporated under Murray, is applicable in the Title VII contest. 

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Plaintiff is correct that the Ninth Circuit has used the economic realities test to

determine whether a plaintiff is a direct employee under Title VII. King v. Corcoran State

Prison, No. 1:10-cv-00878-LJO-SKO, 2011 WL 2295035, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2011)

(citing EEOC v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 351 F.3d 1270, 1275–77 (9th Cir. 2003)).6

 Plaintiff is also

correct that the Ninth Circuit has used a different test in order to find an employer liable even

if it does not directly employ the plaintiff. Baker v. McNeil Island Corr. Ctr., 859 F.2d 124,

127–28 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th

Cir. 1980)). The test Plaintiff refers to is known as the “common law hybrid test.” Murray

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7

 While true that Darden arose in the ERISA context, ERISA’s definition of

“employee” is verbatim the same as Title VII. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), with 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(f). Thus, “[t]here is no reason why the Darden test would be inappropriate in the

Title VII context.” Murray, 613 F.3d at 945. 

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v. Principal Financial Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has recently clarified and consolidated the various tests that have

been used to determine employment status in Title VII cases. Id. The Murray court found

three formulations of the test for employment status in the Ninth Circuit: “a ‘common law

agency’ test, an ‘economic realities’ test, and a ‘common law hybrid’ test.” Id. Although

the three tests have slight differences, the Murray court held that “there is no functional

difference between the three formulations.” Id. (citation omitted). The common law agency

test was announced by the Supreme Court in Darden. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,

503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). Thus, to the extent that there are any differences between the

three tests, the Darden analysis controls.7

 Murray, 613 F.3d at 945. 

The inquiry under Darden for whether a plaintiff is an employee is “the [defendant’s]

right to control the manner and means by which the [plaintiff’s work] is accomplished.”

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323. Some factors relevant to this inquiry are:

[1] the skill required; [2] the source of the instrumentalities and tools; [3] the

location of the work; [4] the duration of the relationship between the parties;

[5] whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the

hired party; [6] the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how

long to work; [7] the method of payment;[8] the hired party’s role in hiring and

paying assistants; [9] whether the work is part of the regular business of the

hiring party; [10] whether the hiring party is in business; [11] the provision of

employee benefits; and [12] the tax treatment of the hired party.

Id. Plaintiff alleges that all of her supervisors and managers were employees of PEC.

Defendant has not disputed that claim. Without the aid of discovery and assuming Plaintiff’s

allegations are true, PEC had complete control over the manner and means of Plaintiff’s

work. Indeed, according to the Complaint, it was PEC who hired Plaintiff, assigned Plaintiff

her work projects, provided Plaintiff feedback regarding her work, dictated when and where

Plaintiff would work, disciplined Plaintiff when necessary, committed the acts the Complaint

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alleges, and ultimately fired Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint properly alleges that PEC

is her employer for Title VII purposes. 

B. The sufficiency of Plaintiff’s fourth, fifth, and seventh causes of action

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded her fourth, fifth, and

seventh causes of action. (Doc. 20 at 5–12). Plaintiff concedes that her fifth cause of

action—negligent infliction of emotional distress—is barred by Arizona’s Worker’s

Compensation Statute. (Doc. 21 at 5). Thus, the Court need only determine the sufficiency

of Plaintiff’s fourth and seventh causes of action. 

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”). In order to state a claim for IIED, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege: (1) “conduct

by the defendant [that is] ‘extreme’ and ‘outrageous’”; (2) that “the defendant . . . intend[ed]

to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard[ed] the near certainty that such distress

[would] result from his conduct”; and (3) that “severe emotional distress . . . occur[red] as

a result of defendant’s conduct.” Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987).

Defendants argue that the conduct Plaintiff alleges, even if true, is not sufficiently extreme

or outrageous enough to satisfy the first element of an IIED claim. (Doc. 20 at 5–7).

In order to satisfy the extreme and outrageous prong, Plaintiff must allege conduct that

is “so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Mintz

v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 563 (Ariz. 1995) (citations omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). It is “extremely rare to find conduct in the employment

context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery

for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In Bell Atlantic, the plaintiff, Mintz, alleged that she was

repeatedly passed over for promotions based on her sex. Id. at 561. As a result of the

discrimination, Mintz was hospitalized for “severe emotional and psychological problems.”

Id. Initially, Mintz’s employer paid her short term disability benefits. Id. Despite knowing

that Mintz’s doctor had recommended she not return to work until October 1, Mintz’s

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employer stopped paying her short term disability and ordered her to work on September 11.

Id. Mintz returned to work as ordered, and was back in the hospital the next day as a result

of the stress. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court found that Mintz had failed to sufficiently

plead outrageous and extreme conduct to state an IIED claim. Id. at 564 (“Although we can

certainly see the apparent callousness and insensitivity of delivering a job-reassignment letter

to an employee in Mintz’s condition, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that

the facts alleged by Mintz were not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to state a claim

against her employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). 

Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss defends her IIED claim in only

one sentence. (Doc. 21 at 5) (citing Ford, 734 P.2d at 585). Plaintiff’s reliance on Ford is

misplaced. In Ford, Letta Ford’s supervisor, Braun, engaged in a campaign of sexual

harassment that included numerous explicit, expletive-filled demands for sexual contact.

Ford, 734 P.2d at 581–83. After Ford spurned his repeated advances, Braun on one occasion

grabbed her in a choke hold with one hand and sexually assaulted Ford with his other hand.

Id. at 582. Ford complained of this conduct to more than eight different people within her

employer’s (Revlon) organization, none of whom took any action for over a year, even after

determining that Ford was telling the truth. Id. at 582–83. Ford ended up attempting suicide

as a result of the onslaught of harassment, and she eventually sued her employer for IIED.

Id. at 583. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the jury’s verdict finding Revlon liable for

IIED, stating that it was outrageous for Revlon to ignore Braun’s extreme and outrageous

conduct. Id. at 585–86. 

Here, Defendants are correct that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead extreme and

outrageous conduct in order to establish an IIED claim. The conduct Plaintiff alleges is

nowhere near the conduct found outrageous and extreme in Ford. Moreover, the alleged

conduct does not even rise to the same level of outrageousness as the employer’s conduct in

Mintz. The most extreme conduct Plaintiff alleges is that Wang forced himself into her office

in order to hear her conversation with Macaluso, and then left once he realized she wanted

to speak in private. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 26). Plaintiff also alleges that Wang yelled at her and

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called her a liar on multiple occasions. While incredibly rude, this conduct is not so extreme

as to go beyond all bounds of decency. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state an IIED

claim. 

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is for wrongful discharge in violation of Arizona’s

Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”), which states that: 

3. An employee has a claim against an employer for termination of

employment only if one or more of the following circumstances have occurred:

. . . .

(c) The employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee

in retaliation for any of the following reasons:

. . . .

(ii) The disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that the employee

has information or a reasonable belief that the employer, or an employee of the

employer, has violated, is violating or will violate the Constitution of Arizona

or the statutes of this state to either the employer or a representative of the

employer who the employee reasonably believes is in a managerial or

supervisory position and has the authority to investigate the information

provided by the employee and to take action to prevent further violations of the

Constitution of Arizona or statutes of this state or an employee of a public

body or political subdivision of this state or any agency of a public body or

political subdivision.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1501(3)(C)(ii) (2012) (West). By the plain terms of the AEPA,

a plaintiff must point to a predicate Arizona constitutional provision or statute that the

employer “is violating or will violate.” Id. In order to fulfill that requirement, Plaintiff

alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for reporting conduct that constitutes criminal

assault under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1203 and harassment under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-2921. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 64). Defendants respond that the conduct alleged in the complaint

does not show a violation of either predicate statute Plaintiff cites. 

An actual violation of the predicate statute need not occur. Logan v. Forever Living

Prod. Int’l, Inc., 52 P.3d 760, 763 (Ariz. 2002) (citing Wagonseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l

Hosp. , 710 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Ariz. 1985)). Rather, the AEPA allows wrongful termination

claims when an employee has a reasonable belief that the employer “has violated, is

violating, or will violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state.” Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 23-1501. 

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 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim based on Arizona’s assault

statute, the Court need not reach the parties’ arguments regarding Arizona’s harassment

statute. 

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Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for reporting conduct that is

forbidden by Arizona’s criminal assault and harassment statutes. (Doc. 12 at ¶¶ 63–67).

Criminal assault in Arizona is defined as: (1) “[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly

causing any physical injury to another person;” (2) “[i]ntentionally placing another person

in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury;” or (3) “[k]nowingly touching

another person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke such person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-1203(A) (2012) (West). Plaintiff has alleged conduct that, if true, satisfies subsection

three. Plaintiff alleges that immediately following a heated discussion with Wang, Wang

forced his way into her office by “pushing [her] hand off the door.” (Doc. 12 at ¶ 26). Given

these facts, Plaintiff has alleged that Wang knowingly touched her with an intent to either

insult or provoke. See King v. Cross, No. 10-cv-879-DRH, 2011 WL 5877447, at *6 (S.D.

Ill. Nov. 23, 2011) (“Any degree of touching could violate Arizona[’s] simple assault statute

as it encompass[es] ‘knowingly touching another person with the intent to . . . insult or

provoke such person.’”) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1203(A)(3)). Defendants are

correct that Wang’s behavior may not rise to the level of intentionally causing injury or

placing Plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of imminent injury under subsections one and

two. However, it is reasonable to infer from the facts in Plaintiff’s Complaint that Wang

acted with an intent to provoke or insult. At this early stage, the Court cannot find that

Plaintiff has failed to state an AEPA claim under Rule 12(b)(6) standards.8

C. Plaintiff’s failure to join her spouse in the Complaint

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed because she did not

join an indispensable party—her spouse. Defendants rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

19 and argue that, should they prevail, they will not be accorded complete relief because

Plaintiff’s community property will be shielded from any recovery Defendants are awarded.

(Doc. 20 at 12–13). Plaintiff responds by citing an Arizona case which states that a

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plaintiff’s spouse is a “proper, though not a necessary or indispensable, party.” (Doc. 21 at

7) (citing Dombey v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 708 P.2d 742, 747 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985),

vacated on other grounds, 724 P.2d 562 (Ariz. 1986)). 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that: “A person who is subject to service

of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must

be joined as a party if . . . in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief

among existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). The court in Weimer discussed whether a

plaintiff’s spouse is an indispensable party under Rule 19(a). Weimer v. Maricopa Cnty.

Cmty. Coll. Dist., 184 F.R.D. 309, 310 (D. Ariz. 1998). There, Ricky Weimer, an Arizona

resident, sued his employer for wrongful termination and violations of his constitutional

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 309. Weimer was married but did not initially join his

spouse as a plaintiff. Id. The court found Weimer’s spouse to be an indispensable party

under Rule 19(a) because state and federal law provided, in certain instances, that a

prevailing defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 310. The court reasoned

that “[f]or a party to hold the marital community accountable for any obligation, it must sue

both spouses jointly. In this case, Mrs. Weimer must be joined as a plaintiff for the marital

community to be bound under a [potential] judgment awarding attorneys’ fees to [the

defendant].” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

Here, as in the § 1983 action in Weimer, Defendants could potentially be awarded

costs and attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Thus, Plaintiff’s spouse is an

indispensable party and must be joined. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Dombey is misplaced. The court in Weimer considered Dombey

in reaching its decision and found Dombey to be inapplicable to whether a plaintiff’s spouse

is an indispensable party. As the Weimer court noted, the issue in Dombey was whether a

plaintiff’s spouse was a proper party, not an indispensable party. Weimer, 184 F.R.D. at 310

n.2. The Dombey court “gave no reasoning as to why it found the spouse not to be a

necessary party.” Id. Furthermore, the Weimer court distinguished Dombey on the grounds

that in Weimer, there was a “potential award of attorneys’ fees in [the defendant’s] favor.”

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Id. Here too, there is a potential award for attorneys’ fees is Defendants favor, and the Court

agrees with the Weimer court that this fact distinguishes the instant case from Dombey. 

Although the Court finds that Plaintiff’s spouse is an indispensable party, the Court

need not dismiss the case. As Defendants have requested in the alternative, the Court will

order Plaintiff to file a third amended complaint that joins Plaintiff’s spouse as a party and

is otherwise consistent with this Order. 

D. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Defendants’ final argument is that the Complaint should be stricken under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) because it does not comply with Rule 8(a). Defendants point

to several paragraphs in Plaintiff’s Complaint that span multiple pages. Plaintiff responds

that if she were ordered to “abbreviate the allegations, this court would most likely be faced

with another motion to dismiss based upon Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544

(2007).” (Doc. 21 at 8). 

Rule 8(a) requires that pleadings contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(f) allows

courts to “strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “‘The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the

expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing

with those issues prior to trial.’” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973

(9th Cir. 2010). A party moving to strike a pleading under Rule 12(f) must point to those

portions of the complaint that are either redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.

Id. at 973–74. 

Defendants rely on Hatch in arguing that the Complaint should be stricken. (Doc. 20

at 14) (citing Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985)). In Hatch, the

Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a complaint that exceeded 70 pages and

was “confusing and conclusory.” Hatch, 758 F.2d at 415. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint, while

not a model of conciseness, is less than half the length of the complaint stricken in Hatch.

Further, Plaintiff’s complaint is not confusing and is largely factual, not conclusory. The

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Complaint is sufficient to inform Defendants of the factual allegations underlying Plaintiff’s

claims, and informs Defendants of the specific legal claims levied against them. Defendants

have not demonstrated which portions of the Complaint must be stricken because they are

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. Thus, the Court will not strike the

complaint under Rule 12(f).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) is granted in part

and denied in part as contained herein. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of action are

dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion to

Strike (Doc. 20) is denied in all other respects. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that, within five days of this Order, Plaintiff shall file

an amended complaint consistent with this order and joining her spouse as a plaintiff. If

Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the allotted time, the Clerk shall dismiss

this case without further notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure

to obey a Court order. 

DATED this 18th day of April, 2012.

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