Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05039/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05039-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OF HAWLEY AND DAL CERRO

(JFLC2)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

EVAGELIA LISA VORGIAS,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, ROBERT

HAWLEY, LAWRENCE J. DAL CERRO, and

SEIU LOCAL 535,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 05-5039 JF (PVT) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1

DISMISS OF HAWLEY AND DAL

CERRO WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND

[re doc. no. 26]

Defendants Robert Hawley (“Hawley”) and Lawrence Dal Cerro (“Dal Cerro”) move to

dismiss the first amended complaint of Plaintiff Evagelia Lisa Vorgias (“Vorgias”). The Court

has considered the briefing submitted by the parties as well as the oral arguments presented at the

hearing on November 17, 2006. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted

without leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the dismissal of Plaintiff Evagelia Lisa Vorgias (“Vorgias”) from

her position of prosecutor in the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the California State Bar

Case 5:05-cv-05039-JF Document 41 Filed 01/30/07 Page 1 of 6
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28 A Skelly hearing is a pretermination opportunity for the employee to respond to the 2

charges against him or her. See Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal.3d 194, 215 (1975).

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OF HAWLEY AND DAL CERRO

(JFLC2)

(“State Bar”). Vorgias alleges that she worked as a State Bar prosecutor from November 1987

until she was placed on investigatory suspension for alleged misconduct in May 2003. Among

other things, Vorgias was alleged to have been incompetent, negligent, dishonest and absent

without leave. The State Bar conducted an investigation and scheduled a Skelly hearing for 2

August 2003. Vorgias alleges that she was not provided with relevant documents necessary to

prepare for the hearing. She also alleges that her supervisors, Hawley (State Bar Deputy

Director) and Dal Cerro (State Bar Assistant Chief Trial Counsel), destroyed a security camera

videotape that was relevant to the charges against her, improperly used her work access card

records to determine whether she was present in the building at particular times, and improperly

relied upon contents of her computer files. The State Bar terminated Vorgias’ employment in

October 2003.

Shortly after her termination, Vorgias filed a grievance through her union, SEIU Local

535. Vorgias alleges that SEIU Local 535 delayed progress on her grievance, failed to

communicate with her, failed to pursue settlement options with the State Bar, failed to seek

witnesses and other exculpatory evidence, and otherwise failed in its duty of representation. She

also alleges that Hawley and Dal Cerro falsely represented to SEIU Local 535 that Vorgias had

been provided with all investigative reports to which she was entitled. She alleges that Hawley

suggested that he would be more sympathetic to Vorgias’ case if she would answer questions

without reviewing the investigative reports. She further alleges that Hawley and Dal Cerro

threatened her with attorney discipline while extending an offer to settle her grievance. In June

2004, Vorgias wrote to Hawley, objecting to the appointment of the particular investigator who

had been assigned to her case and requesting that she be allowed to present additional witnesses

and evidence. Hawley and Dal Cerro refused those requests. Vorgias’ subsequent requests to

permit additional evidence likewise were denied. In March 2005, SEIU Local 535 notified

Vorgias that it would not pursue arbitration in her case. In June 2005 Vorgias was notified that

the union would uphold the decision of Local 535.

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OF HAWLEY AND DAL CERRO

(JFLC2)

Vorgias filed the instant action on December 6, 2005 and, following dismissal with leave

to amend, filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on August 31, 2006. The FAC

alleges (1) a claim that Hawley and Dal Cerro violated her due process rights and (2) a claim that

SEIU Local 535 violated its duty of fair representation. The Court dismissed Vorgias’ claim

against SEIU Local 535 without leave to amend on November 2, 2006. As a result the only

claim remaining in the case is the civil rights claim against Hawley and Dal Cerro. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, and the

Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the

complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections,

66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). When amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be

ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 

III. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who deprives another of a federally

protected right while acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To make out a claim

under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and

(2) deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. 

Ortez v. Washington County, 88 F.3d 804, 810 (1996). Vorgias alleges that Hawley and Dal

Cerro, acting under color of state law as officials of the State Bar, terminated her employment

without affording her due process.

Hawley and Dal Cerro argue that Vorgias’ due process claim is time-barred. The Court

agrees. A claim that employment was terminated without due process accrues when the plaintiff

is informed that the decision to terminate is final and that no more pre-termination process is

available. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259-61 (1980). It appears on the face

of the FAC that Plaintiff’s pre-termination process (the Skelly hearing) commenced in August

2003 and was concluded prior to her termination in October 2003. Vorgias did not file this

action until December 2005, after the applicable two-year limitations period had expired. 

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OF HAWLEY AND DAL CERRO

(JFLC2)

See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting applicability of two-year

statute of limitations to § 1983 claims). 

At the hearing, Vorgias asserted that she is entitled to equitable tolling. The basis for her

assertion is not entirely clear. To the extent that she asserts equitable tolling on the ground that

she was pursuing a post-termination grievance proceeding, the Supreme Court has held that “the

pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision,

does not toll the running of the limitations period.” Ricks, 449 U.S. at 261. “The grievance

procedure, by its nature, is a remedy for a prior decision, not an opportunity to influence that

decision before it is made.” Id. at 261.

To the extent that Vorgias asserts equitable tolling on the ground that she was pursuing an

EEOC proceeding, pursuit of such a proceeding is insufficient to toll a claim brought under §

1983. See London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) (statute of

limitations for § 1981 claim not tolled during pendency of EEOC proceeding); Reese v. City of

Emeryville Fire Dept., 746 F. Supp. 987, 988 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (extending London to § 1983

claims).

Vorgias alternatively argues that her claim against Hawley and Dal Cerro is not timebarred because Hawley and Dal Cerro engaged in a continuing violation of her civil rights after

the date of her termination. The continuing violation doctrine does not apply to termination of

employment or other discrete, actionable conduct. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).

The Court is troubled by Vorgias’ allegations that Hawley and Dal Cerro engaged in

affirmative misconduct during her post-termination grievance proceedings. At the hearing, the

Court questioned both sides closely as to what remedies, if any, might lie for such alleged

misconduct. Counsel for Defendants asserted that, whatever remedies might apply to such

misconduct in the abstract, the only claim Vorgias has alleged in this case is deprivation without

due process of her property interest in her employment, and that claim clearly is time-barred. 

Having conducted its own research into the issue, the Court must agree. “Process is not an end in

itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OF HAWLEY AND DAL CERRO

(JFLC2)

legitimate claim of entitlement.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). “The

categories of substance and procedure are distinct” and “‘[p]roperty’ cannot be defined by the

procedures provided for its deprivation.” Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

532, 541 (1985). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Vorgias may not maintain a due process

claim based solely upon Defendants’ alleged misconduct during the post-termination grievance

proceeding.

At the hearing, Vorgias asserted that Defendants’ conduct during the post-termination

grievance proceeding constituted “individual discriminatory acts.” Vorgias has not alleged a

claim of discrimination, nor has she suggested at any point since the inception of the instant case

that Defendants’ conduct was motivated by her gender, race or other impermissible criteria. The

only claim she has alleged against Hawley and Dal Cerro is for alleged violation of her right to

due process. For the reasons discussed above, that claim is time-barred. Accordingly, the Court

will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend.

IV. ORDER

The motion to dismiss of Hawley and Dal Cerro is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND.

Dated: 1/30/07

___________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Court

 

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OF HAWLEY AND DAL CERRO

(JFLC2)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Plaintiff pro se:

Evagelia Lisa Vorgias

3378 Cropley Avenue

San Jose, CA 95132

Counsel for State Defendants:

Michael John von Loewenfeldt

Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP

100 Spear Street, Suite 1800

San Francisco, CA 94105 

Lawrence C. Yee

Colin Wong

State Bar of California

Office of General Counsel

180 Howard Street

San Francisco, CA 94105-1639 

Counsel for SEIU:

Stewart Weinberg

Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld

A Professional Corporation

1001 Marina Village Parkway

Suite 200

Alameda, CA 94501-1091

Case 5:05-cv-05039-JF Document 41 Filed 01/30/07 Page 6 of 6