Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00760/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00760-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER ANDREWS and

GREGORY ANDREWS,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 14-cv-760-CAB (JMA)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 17]

vs.

SALLIE MAE, INC. and DOES 1-100,

Defendant.

This matter comes before the court on defendant’s motion for partial summary

judgment. [Doc. No. 17.] Plaintiffs responded in opposition, defendant replied, and the

parties filed a joint statement of undisputed facts. [Doc. Nos. 22, 26, 25.] On

November 19, 2014, the court heard oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the

court grants defendant’s motion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs Jennifer Andrews and Gregory Andrews sue Sallie Mae, Inc.

(“defendant”) for violation of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

violation of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. §

227, and common-law intrusion. [Doc. No. 1.] 

Only plaintiffs’ TCPA claim is at issue here. Among other restrictions, the

TCPA prohibits a person from “mak[ing] any call (other than a call made for emergency

purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any

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automatic telephonic dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” to another’s

cell phone. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

In support of their TCPA claim, plaintiffs allege that, during the year prior to

their filing of the complaint, defendant used an automated dialing service to call their

cell phones more than 3,000 times, without their consent. [Id. ¶ 13.] Plaintiffs further

allege that, to the extent defendant thought plaintiffs had once consented to the calls,

plaintiffs repeatedly informed defendant that it did not have their permission to make

the calls. [Id. ¶¶ 15–18.] As a remedy for the alleged TCPA violations, plaintiffs

demand $1,500 in statutory damages for each phone call, plus costs and attorney’s fees. 

[Id. at 9.] 

On September 12, 2014, defendant filed its pending motion for partial summary

judgment. [Doc. No. 17.] Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiffs’ TCPA claim, to the

extent it arises out of phone calls placed prior to September 17, 2012, on grounds that

any such claim is barred by the settlement in a prior TCPA class action, Arthur v. Sallie

Mae, Inc., Case. No. 10-cv-198-JLR (W.D. Wash.) (“Arthur”). [Doc. No. 17 at 2.] 

Defendant also seeks a ruling from this court that, as a result of the Arthur settlement,

plaintiffs “are deemed to have provided prior express consent as of September 17, 2012

to receive calls through the use of an automated dialing system and/or an artificial or

prerecorded voice.” [Id.]

STATEMENT OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS

Most of the undisputed facts relevant to defendant’s motion relate to the

Arthur class-action settlement. On February 2, 2010, Mark Arthur filed a putative class

action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington against

SLM Corporation, d/b/a Sallie Mae, for violations of the TCPA. The named parties in

Arthur signed an Amended Settlement Agreement in October 2011. [Doc. No. 17-2 at

8.] The Agreement states that “[a]ny Settlement Class Member who has not submitted

or does not submit a valid and timely Revocation Request will be deemed to have

provided prior express consent to the making of Calls by Sallie Mae or any other

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affiliate or subsidiary of SLM Corporation to any phone numbers reflected in such

entities’ records.” [Doc. No. 17-5 at 11.] On April 3, 2012, the Arthur court issued an

order preliminarily approving the class settlement and directing notice to absent class

members. [Doc. No. 17-6 at 1.] 

Plaintiffs are members of the Arthur settlement class. [Doc. No. 25 ¶¶ 1, 2.] On

May 2, 2012, the settlement administrator mailed Jennifer Andrews a notice of the class

settlement. [Doc. No. 17-2 ¶ 5 and at p. 6.] The settlement administrator also caused

notice of the settlement to be published in “two separate national editions of USA

Today, dated April 18, 2012 and April 25, 2012, and one national edition of the U.S.

Wall Street Journal, dated April 18, 2012.” [Doc. No. 17-2 ¶ 5.] Plaintiffs did not opt

out of the class settlement or submit a Revocation Request. [Doc. No. 25 ¶¶ 7, 11.]

On September 17, 2012, the Arthur court entered its order and final judgment

approving the settlement. [Doc. No. 17-7.] This order incorporated the provisions of

the parties’ Amended Settlement Agreement and defined the Settlement Class as:

All persons to whom, on or after October 27, 2005 and through September 14, 2010, Sallie Mae, Inc. or any other affiliate or subsidiary of SLM Corporation placed a non-emergency telephone Call to a cellular telephone

through the use of an automated dialing system and/or an artificial or

prerecorded voice. Excluded from the Amended Settlement Class are . .

. all persons who validly request exclusion from the Settlement Class.

[Id. ¶ 6.]

The final approval order further stated that “each Settlement Class Member . . .

will be deemed to have fully released and forever discharged Sallie Mae . . . as of the

date of the Final Approval Order . . .” for claims that arise out of the Telephone

Consumer Protection Act. [Id. ¶ 9.]

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if, under governing substantive

law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

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242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “Where the

moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re

Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477

U.S. at 324). Inferences drawn from the underlying facts are viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

B. Analysis

Defendant asks for two types of relief in its motion for partial summary

judgment. First, defendant seeks partial summary judgment on plaintiffs’ TCPA claim

to the extent the claim arises from calls placed prior to September 17, 2012. Second,

to the extent that plaintiffs’ TCPA claim arises out of calls placed after September 17,

2012, defendant asks the court to find as a matter of law that plaintiffs gave their prior

express consent for defendant’s automated calls to their cell phones as of September 17,

2012. 

1. Plaintiffs’ TCPA Claim Arising From Pre-September 17, 2012 Calls

As to defendant’s first requested relief—preclusion of plaintiffs’ TCPA claim to

the extent it arises out of pre-September 17, 2012 calls—the court first notes that this

request appears unnecessary, as plaintiffs only complain of calls that defendant made

beginning a year prior to the filing of their complaint. [Doc. No. 1 ¶ 13.] Plaintiffs

filed their complaint on April 2, 2014, so they complain of conduct beginning April 2,

2013. Thus, whether the Arthur class settlement would preclude plaintiffs from

pursuing a TCPA claim based on pre-September 17, 2012 calls is irrelevant, because

plaintiffs do not complain of conduct occurring prior to September 17, 2012. 

Nonetheless, the court agrees that the Arthur Final Judgment precludes plaintiffs

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from asserting a TCPA claim based on calls made prior to September 17, 2012. Under

the Arthur Final Judgment, all Arthur class members are “deemed to have fully released

and forever discharged Sallie Mae [and its affiliates] . . . from any and all . . . claims .

. . as of the date of the Final Approval Order: (a) that arise out of or are related in any

way to the use of an ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ or an ‘artificial or

prerecorded voice’ to contact a cellular telephone . . . including . . . claims under or for

violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act . . . .” [Doc. No. 17-7 ¶ 9.] Thus,

if plaintiffs intend to complain of calls made prior to September 17, 2012, the

Arthur Final Judgment precludes any such claim.

In their opposition, plaintiffs first argue that there is a dispute of fact as to

whether Jennifer Andrews is a member of the Arthur class. Yet in the joint statement

of undisputed facts, filed after plaintiffs’ opposition, plaintiffs acknowledge that they

are both members of the Arthur settlement class. [Doc. No. 25 ¶¶ 1, 2.] In addition,

Carl Cannon, whom defendant employs as a Customer Advocate, confirms in his

Declaration that defendant placed non-emergency phone calls to Jennifer Andrews’s

cell phone during the class period. [Doc. No. 26-1 ¶ 5.]

Plaintiffs also appear to argue that the Arthur Final Judgment cannot preclude

their TCPA claim, to the extent it arises out of pre-September 17, 2012 conduct,

because they “never received any notice of the class action known as Arthur v. Sallie

Mae.” [Doc. No. 22-2 at 2 ¶ 2, at 4 ¶ 2.] Jennifer Andrews states that she did not

receive the notice that was mailed to her on May 2, 2012, and Gregory Andrews

declares he did not read the notices published in USA Today on April 18, 2012 and

April 25, 2012, or in The Wall Street Journal on April 18, 2012. [Id. and Doc. No. 17-2

¶ 5.] 

But Due Process does not require that a class member receive actual notice of the

class settlement before being bound by it. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th

Cir. 1994). Instead, class notice satisfies Due Process when it is the “best notice

practicable.” Id. The Arthur court approved the program of class notice as “the best

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practicable notice under the circumstances,” [Doc. No. 17-7 ¶ 12], and plaintiffs here

do not argue that it was deficient (or explain why it was deficient). 

Plaintiffs also contend that the Arthur class settlement does not preclude claims

for violations of the TCPA that occurred after September 14, 2010, because the Arthur

class applied only to persons who received automated calls between October 27, 2005

and September 14, 2010. Yet while the Arthur class period ended September 14, 2010,

the Final Judgment in Arthur states that all class members release all TCPA claims

against Sallie Mae arising as of the date of the Final Judgment, September 17, 2012. 

[Id. ¶ 9.]

2. Plaintiffs’ TCPA Claim Arising From Post-September 17, 2012 Calls

Next, plaintiffs argue that any ruling that they are deemed to have given prior

express consent to defendant’s calls as of September 17, 2012 would conflict with the

Federal Communications Commission’s Declaratory Ruling, In the Matter of Rules &

Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 559,

564 (2008). By failing to opt out of the Arthur class settlement or to submit a

Revocation Request, however, plaintiffs accepted the terms of the Arthur settlement. 

If plaintiffs had objections to any terms of the Arthur settlement, they could have done

what the settlement notice instructed them to do: opt out or raise objections. As the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held in addressing a

similar argument from another Arthur class member:

Whether the Arthur court had the authority to approve the revocation request procedure is not properly brought before this Court. That issue could have been addressed upon an appeal from the Arthur Settlement

Order and Final Judgment. In the absence of a reversal of this Order and

Judgment on appeal, it remains binding upon Plaintiff and is determinative of the motion before this Court.

Fostano v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., No. 13-80511-CIV, 2014 WL 657680, at *4

(S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2014).

 Finally, plaintiffs contend that, even if they are deemed to have given their prior

express consent to defendant’s automated calls to their cell phone as of September 17,

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2012, they subsequently revoked their consent. Plaintiffs supports this argument with

their declarations that they have “repeatedly revoked any consent [defendant] had over

and over again. [They] orally revoked consent many times prior to 9/10/201 [sic], in

between 9/10/2010 and 9/17/2012 and after 9/17/2012.” [Doc. No. 22-2 at 2, ¶ 5 and

at 4, ¶ 5] (emphasis added). 

Defendant responds that the issue of whether plaintiffs revoked their consent after

September 17, 2012 is not before the court. Rather, defendant only seeks partial

summary judgment that plaintiffs are deemed to have given their prior express consent

as of September 17, 2012. Thus, defendant acknowledges that, with respect to

plaintiffs’ TCPA claim, a factual issue remains as to whether plaintiffs revoked their

prior express consent subsequent to September 17, 2012.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment

[Doc. No. 17] is GRANTED. To the extent plaintiffs assert a TCPA claim arising out

of defendant’s automated calls to their cell phone made prior to September 17, 2012,

the claim is precluded by the Arthur judgment. In addition, plaintiffs are deemed to

have given their prior express consent to defendant’s automated calls as of September

17, 2012. A genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether plaintiffs revoked

their consent subsequent to September 17, 2012.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 20, 2014

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States District Judge

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