Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-05194/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-05194-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PRINCESS POPE,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-05194-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Re: ECF 33]

This is a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) case that arises out of a slip-and-fall at a 

federal cemetery. Plaintiff, who was attending a family member’s funeral at San Joaquin Valley 

National Cemetery (“SJVNC”), alleges that she fell on wet concrete that was not properly marked, 

sustaining injuries. She brings a claim for general negligence based on premises liability, and 

seeks compensatory and punitive damages. See Compl., ECF 1 at 10-12. Defendant moves for 

summary judgment based on the failure of Plaintiff to respond to requests for admission, resulting 

in the requests being deemed admitted. Defendant argues that the admissions entitle it to summary 

judgment. For the reasons offered below, the Court agrees, and GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Some context is necessary to understand the procedural posture of this case. Plaintiff filed 

suit in Monterey County Superior Court on November 7, 2013. At the time she filed her

Complaint, Plaintiff was proceeding pro se. Defendant removed the action to this district and 

answered. See ECF 1, 3. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for 

summary judgment, but withdrew the motion following a case management conference before 

Judge Lucy Koh, to whom this case was originally assigned. 

Case 5:13-cv-05194-BLF Document 46 Filed 04/16/15 Page 1 of 7
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This case was reassigned to the undersigned on April 17, 2014. Defendant then renewed its 

motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. At a July 31, 2014 case 

management conference between the parties, Plaintiff requested the Court grant her an extension 

of time in which to obtain counsel. The Court granted her a brief extension of ten days, and 

Defendant elected to withdraw its motion for summary judgment. See Hearing Transcript, ECF 32 

at 17:13-24 (Defense Counsel: “[W]e’ll withdraw the motion and re-file it after August 27th.” The 

Court: “Then we will terminate the motion right now.”). Because Plaintiff had not yet responded 

to Defendant’s written discovery, the Court ordered Defendant to send new copies of its written 

discovery to Plaintiff and notice her deposition,

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and informed Plaintiff of the possible adverse 

consequences if she once again failed to respond: 

And let me tell you something that’s very important. Mr. Scharf sent 

you requests for admissions. If you do not answer them on time, 

they will be deemed true. So the first one is admit that the defendant 

has no liability. If you don’t answer that [] this case will be over 

because he will have a one-page motion for summary judgment 

based on your failure to respond.

. . . 

But it is very important that you respond truthfully and under oath to 

the discovery and at your deposition. . . . Because if you don’t 

respond to the written discovery, you will lose your case; okay?

Hearing Transcript at 11:25-12:6; 20:6-11. 

On July 31, 2014, the same date as the case management conference, defense counsel sent 

Plaintiff written discovery, see Scharf Decl., ECF 33-1 Exh. C, which included seven requests for 

admission. See id. Exh. A at 2. Plaintiff did not respond, and defense counsel sent Plaintiff an 

email on September 26, 2014, advising Plaintiff that if she did not respond to the discovery 

requests by October 10, 2014, Defendant would file a motion for summary judgment based on her 

failure to respond. See id. Exh. D. Plaintiff did not respond, and this motion followed on October 

24, 2014. 

 

1

The deposition was noticed for August 27, 2014. Plaintiff confirmed at the July 31 hearing that 

she was available to be deposed that date. See Hearing Transcript at 15:17-24 (Plaintiff: “Okay. 

August 27th is good.”). 

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Plaintiff did not timely oppose the motion, and on November 12, 2014, Defendant filed its 

reply. That same day, after the reply was filed, Plaintiff filed a document called “Judicial Notice in 

Opposition to Defendant’s Untimely Cancellation of Plaintiff’s Court Ordered Deposition 

Scheduled for November 17, 2014.” See ECF 35. Plaintiff argued that the summary judgment 

motion was a “bogus legal maneuver” and improper. Id. at 2. She further stated that she was 

“unable to meet the November 10th date to provide documents to the defense due to medical and 

health problems that were caused by the genuine accident at the fault of the defendant.” Id. at 3.

Defendant responded, stating that Plaintiff’s deposition was taken off-calendar because she 

had failed to respond to written discovery requests. ECF 36 at 2. Defense counsel further stated 

that Plaintiff had twice continued the deposition, first to September 29, 2014 and then again to 

November 17, 2014. See Scharf Decl., ECF 33-1 at ¶ 8. 

Defendant’s motion was calendared for March 26, 2015. On March 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed 

a proposed substitution of counsel and a set of verified answers to Defendant’s requests for 

admission, approximately seven months untimely. The Court approved the substitution of counsel.

See ECF 40. Then, on March 24, 2015, two days before the hearing on the motion was scheduled, 

Plaintiff’s counsel requested the hearing be continued because he was unavailable. Defendant 

objected. See ECF 42. Because Plaintiff did not immediately inform the Court of his unavailability

following his substitution as counsel, and because he provided no reason why he was unavailable 

except that he had a scheduling conflict and would be in southern California, the Court denied the 

request. See ECF 43. Plaintiff’s counsel did not appear in person for the hearing on the summary 

judgment motion, nor did he request permission to appear via telephone, though Plaintiff herself 

did appear. 

In the motion to continue, Plaintiff’s counsel intimated his belief that the summary 

judgment motion was mooted because he had filed belated verified answers to the requests for 

admission. The Court made clear in its March 25, 2015 Order that this was not correct under the 

Federal Rules: 

Plaintiff’s counsel further indicates that he believes the motion for 

summary judgment has been mooted due to his filing of verified 

responses to the Defendant’s requests for admission on March 13, 

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2015. See id. at ¶ 3. This is not accurate. Defendant has sought 

summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to timely respond to 

its requests for admission. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

36(a), a matter is deemed admitted unless a party “within 30 days 

after service of the request, . . . serves upon the party requesting the 

admission a written answer or objection.” Once admitted, the matter 

is “conclusively established unless the court on motion permits 

withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” Conlon v. United 

States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). Plaintiff 

has not sought leave of Court to withdraw or amend her prior

admissions pursuant to Rule 36(b). “A deemed admission can only 

be withdrawn or amended by motion in accordance with Rule 

36(b).” Id. Plaintiff’s late filing of verified responses thus does not 

render moot Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

ECF 43 at 2. 

Although the Court did not invite Plaintiff to file for relief under Rule 36(b), the Court 

delayed issuing this Order for three weeks to allow ample time for such a motion to be filed. As of 

April 16, 2015, Plaintiff’s counsel has not filed a Rule 36(b) motion. 

B. Rule 36(a) and the Undisputed Facts

Rule 36(a) states that a matter is deemed admitted unless:

[W]ithin 30 days after service of the request . . . the party to whom 

the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 

admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, 

signed by the party or by the party's attorney.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). 

Once a matter is admitted, it is “conclusively established unless the court on motion 

permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 

(9th Cir. 2007). Defendant sent Plaintiff its requests for admission on July 31, 2014. Plaintiff did 

not respond within thirty days, nor did she respond when Defendant provided her with a follow-up 

notice giving her until October 10, 2014 to respond. See Scharf Decl. Exh. D. The requests are 

therefore deemed admitted and conclusively established. See, e.g., Conlon at 621. Defendant thus 

submits these admissions as undisputed facts upon which the motion is brought: 

1. Admit that defendant is not liable for your alleged injuries.

2. Admit that you did not sustain any damages as a result of 

defendant’s conduct. 

3. Admit that you did not present an administrative tort claim 

with a sum certain to the cemetery before you filed this 

lawsuit. 

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4. Admit that it rained on the day of the subject accident, before 

the accident occurred. 

5. Admit that the cemetery had a scraper mat on the inside of 

the door and a mat on the outside of the door to absorb water 

when the subject accident occurred. 

6. Admit that the floor was in a reasonably safe condition when 

the subject accident occurred. 

7. Admit that you slipped because your shoes were wet. 

See Mot. at 4; see also Scharf Decl. Exh. A at 2.

Defendant included at the bottom of these requests the warning “Please note that your 

failure to respond to these requests for admissions in a timely manner will cause these facts to be 

deemed admitted.” See Scharf Decl. Exh. A at 2.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Summary 

judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (emphasis added). The Court draws all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In order to meet its burden, the moving party must “either produce evidence negating an 

essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or show that the nonmoving party does not have 

enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

“Unanswered requests for admissions may be relied on as the basis for granting summary 

judgment.” Conlon at 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing O’Campo v. Hardisty, 262 F.2d 621, 624 (9th 

Cir. 1958)); Asea, Inc. v. So. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1248 (“[A] request for admission, 

and thus an admission itself, is not improper merely because it relates to an ‘ultimate fact.’”). 

 III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s uncontroverted admissions are dispositive of her claim for 

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negligence because they negate essential elements of her claim. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), a claim brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act is to be 

governed by the law of the state where the tort allegedly occurred; as such, California law governs 

Plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Yanez v. United States, 63 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1995). Under California 

law, to prove a claim for negligence a Plaintiff must show that Defendant owed her a duty, 

breached that duty, and caused an injury which resulted in damages. See, e.g., Friedman v. Merck 

& Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 454, 463 (2003). In a case sounding in premises liability, as Plaintiff’s 

does here, the element of duty requires that a landowner “exercise reasonable care in keeping the 

premises reasonably safe.” See Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1205 (2001). An owner 

“exercises ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the portions of the premises open to 

customers, and the care required is commensurate with the risks involved.” Id. To show causation:

[Plaintiff] must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis 

for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of 

the defendant was cause in fact of the result. . . . [S]peculation and 

conjecture with respect to how long a dangerous condition has 

existed are insufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden.

Id. at 1205-06 (internal citations omitted). This means the Plaintiff must show that Defendant’s 

actions were a “substantial factor” in bringing about her injury. See Saelzler v. Adv. Grp. 400, 25 

Cal. 4th 763, 774 (2001). 

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s admissions render her unable to carry her burden of 

persuasion with regard to breach, causation, or damages, three of the four essential elements of a

negligence claim arising out of premises liability. 

First, she admits that the “floor was in a reasonably safe condition when the subject 

accident occurred.” Scharf Decl. Exh. A at 2 (Request for Admission No. 6). She further admits 

that Defendant took reasonable precautions to prevent individuals from falling on the day of the 

accident: it was raining, see id. (Request for Admission No. 4), but the cemetery “had a scraper 

mat on the inside of the door and a mat on the outside of the door to absorb water.” Id. (Request 

for Admission No. 5). These uncontroverted facts mean that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant 

breached its duty to exercise reasonable care because Plaintiff concretely admits that Defendant 

did exercise such care. 

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Second, Plaintiff cannot show causation or resulting damages, because she admits that she 

“did not sustain any damages as a result of defendant’s conduct.” Id. (Request for Admission No. 

2). She further admits that defendant is not liable for any of her alleged injuries. Id. (Request for 

Admission No. 1). 

Because Plaintiff’s uncontroverted admissions establish that Defendant did not breach a 

duty to her and did not cause her any injury that resulted in damages, Defendant is entitled to 

summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s premises liability negligence claim. 

IV. ORDER

Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to comply with her obligations in this matter, including her

multiple failures to respond to Defendant’s written discovery while she was proceeding in this 

action pro se. See Brown v. Rumsfeld, 211 F.R.D. 601, 605 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that pro se 

Plaintiffs “must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants”). Despite warnings 

by this Court, see Hearing Transcript at 11:25-12:6; 20:6-11, and written warnings provided by 

Defendant’s counsel, see Scharf Decl. at 2 (stating, immediately below the requests for admission, 

that “your failure to respond to these requests for admissions in a timely manner will cause these 

facts to be deemed admitted”), Plaintiff did not timely respond to Defendant’s brief discovery

requests. Though Plaintiff eventually obtained counsel, her counsel has failed to file any motion 

with the Court to withdraw or amend these admissions under Rule 36(b). 

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 16, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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