Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-02246/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-02246-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CARLA PINHEIRO, individually and on behalf

of all similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ACXIOM INFORMATION SECURITY

SERVICES, INC.; AEROTEK, INC.; QUEST

DIAGNOSTICS CLINICAL LABORATORIES,

INC; DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C10-02246 HRL

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

AEROTEK, INC.’S MOTION TO

DISMISS SEVENTH AND EIGHTH

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND

[Re: Docket No. 11]

BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, filed on behalf of a putative class, plaintiff Carla Pinheiro

was an employee of defendant Aerotek, Inc. (Aerotek), an employment agency. She further

alleges that she was assigned to work as a temporary customer service representative for

defendant Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. (Quest). The gravamen of Pinheiro’s

complaint as to Aerotek is that Aerotek wrongfully terminated her employment (Sixth Claim for

Relief) and failed to timely pay her final wages in violation of California Labor Code sections

201-203 (Seventh Claim for Relief). Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Aerotek under

California Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200 (Eighth Claim for Relief) based upon the alleged

failure to timely pay her final wages.

*E-FILED 08-03-2010*

Case 5:10-cv-02246-HRL Document 47 Filed 08/03/10 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Aerotek does not challenge the wrongful termination claim here. However, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), it moves to dismiss Pinheiro’s seventh and eighth claims for relief

concerning the alleged failure to timely pay her final wages. Pinheiro opposes the motion. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have expressly consented that

all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated by the undersigned. The

court finds the matter appropriate for determination without oral argument. See CIV. L.R. 7-

1(b). Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers this court grants the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In ruling on

such a motion, a court generally does not consider any matters outside the complaint. However,

documents which properly are the subject of judicial notice may be considered along with the

complaint when deciding a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim for relief. 

See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

In such a motion, all material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. See Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699. However,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Morever, “the

court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This means that the “[f]actual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted); see

also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief

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survives a motion to dismiss.”). However, a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations and “heightened fact pleading of specifics” is

not required to survive a motion to dismiss. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. Rather, the

complaint need only give “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id.

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, plaintiff advises that the issues presented by the instant motion currently

are pending before the California Supreme Court. See Pineda v. Bank of America, 207 P.3d 1

(2009). Nevertheless, for the reasons stated below, this court finds that, based upon the law as

it currently stands, plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims for relief as to Aerotek should be

dismissed.

A. Seventh Claim for Relief (Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203)

Pinheiro alleges that Aerotek terminated her employment on April 11, 2008. 

(Complaint ¶ 25). Although Aerotek disputes the date of plaintiff’s termination, everyone

agrees that plaintiff received her final paycheck from Aerotek one week later on April 18, 2008. 

(Id. ¶ 98). Pinheiro does not sue for underlying wages because all of her wages admittedly have

been paid. Instead, she seeks only waiting time penalties under Cal. Labor Code § 203 for the

failure to timely pay her final wages upon the termination of her employment in violation of

Cal. Labor Code § 201. Even assuming that the payment of plaintiff’s final wages was

untimely, Aerotek argues that Pinheiro’s claim is time-barred because the instant lawsuit was

not filed until April 7, 2010, about one year too late.

At issue here is whether Pinheiro’s claim for waiting time penalties is subject to a oneyear statute of limitations (Aerotek’s view) or to a three-year limitations period (Pinheiro’s

position). This court agrees that the one-year statute of limitations under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

340(a) applies, and plaintiff’s seventh claim for relief therefore is time-barred. See McCoy v.

Super. Ct., 157 Cal. App.4th 225, 68 Cal. Rptr.3d 483 (2008) (holding that in action seeking

only waiting time penalties, and not wages, the one-year statute of limitations under Cal. Code

Civ. Proc. § 340(a) applies). Cf. Ross v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, Case No. C07-02951SI, 2008

Case 5:10-cv-02246-HRL Document 47 Filed 08/03/10 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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WL 4447713 *4 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 30, 2008) (concluding that the three-year statute of

limitations period under Cal. Labor Code § 203 applied where plaintiff sought unpaid wages, as

well as waiting time penalties). Plaintiff’s cited authority, Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration

Products Co., 23 Cal.4th 163, 999 P.2d 706, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 518 (2000), in which the plaintiff

sought both unpaid wages and waiting time penalties, does not compel a contrary conclusion.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is granted without leave to

amend.

B. Eighth Claim for Relief (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200)

With respect to Aerotek, Pinheiro’s claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law

(UCL) is premised entirely upon the alleged failure to timely pay her final wages. (Complaint,

¶¶ 107, 109). Accordingly, her claim for waiting time penalties and her UCL claim stand, and

in this case fall, together. See Landayan v. Washington Mutual Bank, Case No. C09-

00916RMW, 2009 WL 3047238 *3 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 18, 2009). In any event, remedies under

California Labor Code § 203 are penalties, and not restitution, and therefore cannot be

recovered under the UCL. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp.2d

609, 619 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Tomlinson v. Indymac Bank, F.S.B., 359 F. Supp.2d 891, 895 (C.D.

Cal. 2005).

This claim will also be dismissed as to Aerotek without leave to amend. See HodgersDurgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Unless the named plaintiffs are

themselves entitled to seek injunctive relief, they may not represent a class seeking that

relief.”).

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Aerotek’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the

seventh and eighth claims for relief is granted without leave to amend.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

August 3, 2010

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For the Northern District of California

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5:10-cv-02246-HRL Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Alison Marie Miceli amiceli@gracehollis.com

Alison P. Danaceau adanaceau@carltonfields.com, cwiltey@carltonfields.com,

lmitchell@carltonfields.com

Brooke Lewis blewis@carltonfields.com

Caroline McIntyre cmcintyre@be-law.com, sbrill@be-law.com

Daniel J. Bergeson dbergeson@be-law.com, swalker@be-law.com

Jonathan Morris Brenner jbrenner@sidley.com

Michael James Grace mgrace@gracehollis.com, tkim@gracehollis.com

Shweta Gera sgera@morganlewis.com, gjohnson@morganlewis.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

Case 5:10-cv-02246-HRL Document 47 Filed 08/03/10 Page 5 of 5