Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00024/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00024-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHOTOMEDEX, INC.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 04-CV-24 JLS (CAB)

CASE NO. 06-CV-1479 JLS (CAB)

ORDER: DENYING

PHOTOMEDEX INC.’S MOTIONS

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(04-CV-24 Doc. No. 182)

(06-CV-1479 Doc. No. 66)

vs.

DEAN STEWART IRWIN; RA MEDICAL

SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants.

RA MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PHOTOMEDEX INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court are PhotoMedex, Inc.’s motion for reconsideration in PhotoMedex

Inc. v. Dean Stewart Irwin (PhotoMedex I), 04-CV-24 JLS (CAB), (Doc. No. 182) and PhotoMedex

Inc.’s motion for reconsideration in RA Medical Systems, Inc. v. Photomedex, Inc. (RA Med. I), 06-

CV-1479 JLS (CAB), (Doc. No. 66.). Also before the Court are opposition briefs from RA Medical

Systems, Inc. and Dean Stewart Irwin and reply briefs from PhotoMedex. The motion, opposition,

and reply brief are identical in both cases and therefore treated in aggregate here. After full

Case 3:04-cv-00024-JLS-CAB Document 188 Filed 09/27/10 Page 1 of 8
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1

 PhotoMedex has also filed objections to various evidence in support of RA’s opposition to

the motions for reconsideration. The Court only relies on admissible evidence in conjunction with

these motions.

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consideration of this matter, the Court DENIES PhotoMedex’s motions.1

BACKGROUND

The parties in this case are well aware of the background of this matter. Moreover, this Court

and the Ninth Circuit have both provided a full description of the underlying facts. (See PhotoMedex

I, Doc. No. 145 (PhotoMedex I MSJ Order) at 1–2; RA Med. I, Doc. No. 31 (RA Med. I MTD Order)

at 1–2; PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin (PhotoMedex II), 601 F.3d 919, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2010); see also

RA Med. Sys., Inc. v. PhotoMedex, Inc. (RA Med. II), 2010 WL 1417890 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).)

Those factual summaries are incorporated by reference here.

However, this Order will quote the 9th Circuit’s description of the relevant facts from

PhotoMedex II.

PhotoMedex directly competes with Ra Medical in the production and sale of

lasers for use in dermatological treatments. These dermatological lasers are regulated

by the FDA and must pass what is known as the “510(k)” clearance process . . . before

being placed on the market. PhotoMedex’s product is the “XTRAC Excimer Laser

System” (XTRAC), the first excimer laser the FDA cleared for the treatment of the

skin disorders psoriasis and vitiligo.

Irwin served on the development team for the XTRAC system during his

employment with PhotoMedex from February 1998 to July 2002. Following his

departure from PhotoMedex, Irwin co-founded Ra Medical in September 2002.

Ra Medical entered into a licensing agreement for a competing laser product

with SurgiLight, Inc. on March 13, 2003. SurgiLight had received FDA 510(k)

clearance in March 2002 for its “EX-308” excimer laser for the treatment of psoriasis

and vitiligo, though at the time of the agreement it had not actually manufactured or

marketed the cleared laser. In exchange for royalties, SurgiLight gave Ra Medical the

“exclusive manufacturing rights and exclusive marketing rights for [the FDA-cleared

EX-308 device], including any derivative devices, substantially conforming to the

specifications[,] as well as the exclusive right to use its mark EX-308 on devices [Ra

Medical] intends to manufacture and market.”

After securing the license from SurgiLight, Irwin appeared on Ra Medical’s

behalf at a trade show held by the American Academy of Dermatology in March 2003.

At the show, Defendants distributed a brochure which proclaimed that Ra Medical’s

“Pharos EX-308 Excimer Laser” (Pharos) was “FDA Approved for Psoriasis &

Vitiligo.” This brochure also described Irwin as “inventor of the first FDA approved

excimer laser for phototherapy,” i.e., PhotoMedex’s XTRAC laser. Defendants’

subsequent marketing materials made similar promotional claims.

Word spread that the Pharos would be available for purchase within a few

months. The record includes evidence that a person attending the trade show heard

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that the Pharos was scheduled for sale in August 2003. SurgiLight issued a press

release, also in March 2003, announcing that “Ra Medical anticipates the introduction

of its PHAROS EX-308, Excimer laser system for treatment by dermatologists of

psoriasis and vitiligo (pigmentation loss) this summer.” Defendants did not actually

ship the first Pharos laser until September 2004, more than a year after the projected

introduction date. The Pharos laser differed in some respects from SurgiLight’s

already-cleared EX-308 laser.

PhotoMedex filed the present action against Defendants, asserting violations

of the Lanham Act and California laws prohibiting untrue and misleading advertising

and unfair competition. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendants on each of these claims. The court held PhotoMedex lacked standing to

challenge whether Defendants improperly promoted their laser as “FDA approved”

because the FDA retains exclusive jurisdiction over FDCA enforcement. The court

determined Defendants’ predicted release date for its laser was a non-actionable

forward-looking statement. Defendants’ assertion that Irwin invented PhotoMedex’s

laser was held to be a matter of opinion and not misleading. PhotoMedex timely

appealed.

PhotoMedex II, 601 F.3d at 922–23.

The Ninth Circuit held that this Court erred in granting summary judgment in PhotoMedex I

on the issues of (1) Defendants’ representations regarding the release date of the Pharos laser and (2)

Defendants’ representations regarding Defendant Irwin’s status as the “inventor” of the XTRAC. Id.

at 931–33. However, it affirmed this Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants based on

the statements that the Pharos had FDA clearance. Id. at 924–31. 

Similarly, the Circuit found that this Court properly dismissed PhotoMedex’s cross-claims

based on allegations regarding FDA clearance. RA Med. II, 2010 WL 1417890, at *1. However, it

also held that the Court should not have dismissed any of the other claims. Id. at *1–*2.

LEGAL STANDARD

PhotoMedex brings the instant request for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b). (Memo. ISO Motion at 6.) That rule provides, in relevant part, “any order or other

decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of

fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised

at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and

liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

Generally, a court will reconsider a decision if a party can show (1) new facts, (2) new law,

or (3) clear error in the court’s prior decision. See, e.g., School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v.

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 958,

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968 (S.D. Cal. 2003). However, reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present

evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”

Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 389 Orange St.

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis in original); cf. Brambles USA, Inc.

v. Blocker, 735 F. Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Del. 1990) (Reconsideration should not be used “to argue

new facts or issues that inexcusably were not presented to the court in the matter previously

decided.”). Ultimately, the decision on a motion for reconsideration lies in the Court’s sound

discretion. Navajo Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Kona Enters., 229

F.3d at 883).

ANALYSIS

Having reviewed the instant motions, the Court finds them deficient. As an initial matter, the

Court questions whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is the proper vehicle for PhotoMedex’s

motions. However, even if the motions are procedurally proper, they lacks any evidentiary basis.

Therefore, PhotoMedex’s motions are DENIED. 

I. The Motions for Reconsideration are Procedurally Improper

At the outset, the Court questions whether a request for reconsideration is procedurally

appropriate here. As noted above, this Court ruled that PhotoMedex’s FDA claims could not proceed,

and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that holding. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) does not vest this

Court with the authority to revisit and contradict the Circuit’s holding.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states that an order “may be revised at any time before

the entry of a judgment adjudicating all of the claims and all of the parties’ rights and liabilities.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). Once such a judgment is entered, a party may move for relief

under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) or may appeal to the relevant Court of Appeal. There is no indication,

in Rule 54(b) or elsewhere, that a party may bring a Rule 54(b) motion after appeal with respect to an

issue decided and affirmed on appeal. Rather, it appears to be specifically precluded by the

requirement that such a motion must be brought “before the entry of judgment.” This is, of course,

sensible, since any issue on which the district court errs will presumably be identified and reversed

by the Court of Appeal. 

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2

 The Court also finds PhotoMedex’s argument regarding the “law of the case” doctrine

inapposite. “As most commonly defined, the [law of the case] doctrine posits that when a court

decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent

stages in the same case.” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983); see also United States v.

Bad Marriage, 439 F.3d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a court is

ordinarily precluded from reexamining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher

court, in the same case.” (quoting Minidoka Irrigation Dist. v. Dep’t of Interior, 406 F.3d 567, 573

(9th Cir. 2005))).

In this case, the decision at issue is not one of law, it is a combined decision of law and fact.

That is, the Ninth Circuit decided (1) when, as a matter of law, a plaintiff could bring a claim under

the Lanham Act based on violations of the FDCA and (2) this case was one where such a claim would

be improper. PhotoMedex II, 601 F.3d at 924–31. PhotoMedex does not ask this Court to reject the

Ninth Circuit’s rule of law, but rather its determination that the evidence did not meet the legal

standard for bringing such a Lanham Act claim. (See, e.g., Memo. ISO Motion at 7 (“The Court

should exercise its discretion to revisit its grant of partial summary judgment, as ‘the evidence on

remand’ is ‘substantially different.’”).) As such, the law of the case doctrine is not relevant to the

question of whether reconsideration is proper. 

3

 As discussed infra, the Court finds that the evidence presented by PhotoMedex is not

actually “new” but could and should have been presented at the time of summary judgment.

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The Court sees the instant motions as analogous to a motion for reconsideration of a judgment

fully affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. In that case, a motion for reconsideration would obviously be

inappropriate. Although only part of the Orders here were affirmed, reconsideration of that affirmed

portion of the Orders is equally improper. It would permit the losing party on appeal another bite at

the apple and place the district court in a position to second guess the holding of a higher authority.2

Instead, the proper way to bring these motions before the Court would have been to request

reconsideration when PhotoMedex first received the “new” evidence and before the Ninth Circuit

issued its opinion.3 “[A] district court may entertain and decide a Rule 60(b) motion after notice of

appeal is filed if the movant follows a certain procedure, which is to ‘ask the district court whether

it wishes to entertain the motion, or to grant it, and then move this court, if appropriate, for remand

of the case.’” Davis v. Yageo Corp., 481 F.3d 661, 685 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gould v. Mut. Life

Ins. Co. of N.Y., 790 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

According to PhotoMedex, it received a copy of the letter from Mr. Thomas C. Knott to Dr.

Francis C. Lee on March 11, 2009 (Lee Letter). (Doc. No. 182-3 (Terman Decl.) ¶ 5.) Although this

case was on appeal at that time, it had yet to be fully briefed and would not be heard for oral argument

for another three months. If, as PhotoMedex clearly believes, the letter to Dr. Lee would have

compelled this Court to come to a different conclusion on summary judgment, PhotoMedex should

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4

 The Court does not consider the date PhotoMedex received the letter from Mr. Spears

because it was first in possession of its allegedly new evidence when it received the letter regarding

Dr. Lee’s inquiry.

5

 The Court uses the date of the later-issued decision of the Ninth Circuit because the

untimeliness of these motions is apparent whichever date is used.

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have brought it to the attention of this Court at that time. Having failed to do so, it is simply too late

to move for reconsideration now.

Moreover, PhotoMedex failed to meet the reconsideration deadlines imposed by Local Rule

7.1(i)(2). As noted above, that provision requires that “any motion or application for reconsideration

must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the ruling, order or judgment sought to

be reconsidered.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(i)(2). 

These motions fall plainly beyond of that deadline, regardless of the date from which the Court

counts. If the Court were to consider the relevant Order to be the one issued on October 29, 2007, the

motions would have been due on November 26, 2007. However, if the relevant date were the day

PhotoMedex discovered the Lee Letter, March 11, 2009, it would have had to bring the motions by

April 8, 2009.4

 Finally, if the date at issue were the date on which the Circuit issued its opinion

affirming in part and vacating in part this Court’s Order granting summary judgment, April 14, 2010,5

the due date was May 12, 2010.

The Court is unpersuaded by PhotoMedex’s counter-arguments. First, contrary to the assertion

in the reply brief, these motions are asking for reconsideration of this Court’s Orders granting

summary judgment and the motion to dismiss. (See Memo. ISO Motion at 7 (“The Court should

exercise its discretion to revisit its grant of partial summary judgment.”).) Thus, Rule 7.1(i)(2) clearly

applies. 

Second, the 28 day limit is not inappropriate. There is no statutory or decisional authority

which requires consideration of new evidence regardless of when it is brought to the court’s attention.

As such, the local rule is permissible limitation on parties’ abilities to move for reconsideration.

However, even if the Court were to not apply the rule from the date of the Order, but rather

the date of discovery of the evidence, it would still be untimely. PhotoMedex had Mr. Knott’s letter

in hand for well over a year before it brought these motions. The fact that a party has “newly

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discovered evidence” does not vitiate the need to promptly bring it before the Court. 

Finally, the Court finds PhotoMedex’s claims that it “did not sit on its hands” to be

disingenuous. (Reply at 6.) As just noted, it held the Lee Letter for well over a year before bringing

it to the attention of this Court. As to the June 4, 2010 letter from Mr. Spears (Spears Letter), and as

discussed infra, the Court finds that PhotoMedex failed to exercise due diligence and should have

obtained and presented this information in the summary judgment briefing. As such, it seems to the

Court that it is entirely appropriate to describe PhotoMedex as “sit[ting] on its hands.”

Thus, the Court finds that (1) a motion for reconsideration is procedurally inappropriate and

(2) even if such a motion were appropriate, PhotoMedex failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(i)(2)’s

timeliness requirements. The Court therefore DENIES the motions for reconsideration.

II. PhotoMedex Should Have Presented the “New” Facts on Summary Judgment

Even assuming, arguendo, that PhotoMedex’s motions were procedurally proper and timely,

they would still fail on their merits. As noted above, PhotoMedex’s entitlement to reconsideration

depends on its ability to show (1) new facts, (2) new law, or (3) clear error in the Court’s prior

decision. See ACandS, 5 F.3d at 1263. PhotoMedex relies only on a purported showing of new facts.

(See Memo. ISO Motion at 7 (“‘[T]he evidence on remand’ is ‘substantially different.’”).) However,

PhotoMedex’s facts are not new in the sense that they would allow it to obtain reconsideration.

A motion for reconsideration “may not be used to . . . present evidence for the first time when

[it] could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890 (citing

389 Orange St. Partners, 179 F.3d at 665) (emphasis in original). Although the letter to Dr. Lee

postdates this Court’s summary judgment Order, its substance could have—and should have—been

presented at that time. There is no indication that the contents of this letter represent a factual

development occurring after the Order issued, nor is there any reason to think that PhotoMedex, had

it bothered to ask the questions asked by Dr. Lee, would not have found the same answers. As such,

these allegedly “new” facts are not new at all and should have been presented back when summary

judgment was first at issue.

Further, the letter to Dr. Lee appears to be remarkably similar in substance to what was before

the Court at the time of summary judgment. It merely reiterates the contents of the previous

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communications between the FDA and RA Medical and adds no new information. (Compare Terman

Decl., Ex. B with Terman Decl., Ex. A, PhotoMedex I MSJ Order at 4–5, and PhotoMedex II, 601

F.3d at 922–23.)

As to the Spears Letter, the Court is of the same opinion as with the letter to Dr. Lee. This

letter was the “result[ of] a phone conversation” between Stephen Terman and Larry Spears which

occurred on June 3, 2010. (Terman Decl. ¶ 7.) Mr. Terman does not explain why this conversation

could not have occurred in 2007. Nor does he indicate why PhotoMedex did not previously seek out

Mr. Spears’s opinion. Thus, like the Lee Letter, PhotoMedex should have presented this information

on summary judgment and cannot now raise it as “new facts” to support reconsideration.

Given that the facts in both the Lee Letter and the Spears Letter were readily discoverable prior

to the motion for summary judgment, they offer no basis for granting reconsideration here. Failing

to obtain and present facts cannot be an adequate basis for reconsideration. Otherwise parties would

have the incentive to put some facts in their back pocket just in case they were to lose on the initial

summary judgment motion. Thus, this lack of new facts requires that PhotoMedex’s motions be

DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the instant motions for reconsideration are DENIED. To reiterate, the

presentation of this “new” evidence is simply an attempt by PhotoMedex to get a third bite at the

apple. There is no reason why PhotoMedex could not have presented the information contained in

the June 2010 Spears Letter at the time of summary judgment, other than a lack of diligence or an

attempt to put evidence in its back pocket as an insurance policy. Moreover, PhotoMedex sat on Mr.

Knott’s letter to Dr. Lee and now hopes that this Court will overlook the substantial delay in asking

for its consideration. Such abuses of the litigation process will not be entertained.

The clerk SHALL FILE this Order in both of the above-captioned cases.

DATED: September 27, 2010

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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