Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00504/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00504-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DENNIS MAINS, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

JOE A. LIZARRAGA, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 14-cv-0504-JAM-EFB-P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a judgment of conviction entered 

against him in 2011 in the Sacramento Superior Court on charges of first degree murder with use 

of a gun. He also challenges his sentence of fifty years-to-life in state prison. Petitioner seeks 

federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) the trial court violated his federal 

constitutional rights in excluding evidence at his trial (2) his sentence is unlawful; and (3) this 

court should maintain copies of filed documents and send documents to him. Upon careful 

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s 

application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

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I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

A jury found defendant Dennis Robert Mains guilty of first degree 

murder, during which he personally used a gun. It then found he 

was sane at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to 

state prison for the prescribed term. 

Indisputably guilty of the act of homicide, defendant attempts to 

find reversible error in connection with his proffered defenses of 

provocation from the victim and his purportedly psychotic state of 

mind. To this end, he challenges the trial court's refusal to instruct 

on mistake of fact stemming from medicinally induced 

hallucinations; its failure to instruct on the elements of second 

degree murder; its failure to allow consideration of voluntary 

intoxication in connection with the subjective mental states 

involved in the elements of provocation or imperfect self-defense; 

and its refusal to admit evidence bolstering his testimony that he 

thought the victim was poisoning him and had behaved violently 

toward him. He also contends the trial court erred when it failed to 

grant a continuance after the prosecution provided a large amount 

of discovery on the eve of trial. We shall affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Defendant and the victim met in 1995. They were married three 

months later. It was a tempestuous relationship. The victim left 

defendant four times between 1998 and 2006, but each time they 

reunited. 

Defendant testified that the victim had tried to stab him three times 

over the years (reporting one of these incidents to his daughter). He 

also asserted that the victim had tried to kill her previous husband 

with a gun. On the other hand, a friend had observed the victim 

with physical injuries on three occasions, which the victim 

attributed to defendant (a claim defendant denied at trial). The 

victim's brother had also noticed bruising on the victim, and warned 

defendant against doing anything like that to her again. 

Both defendant and the victim obtained restraining orders against 

the other at different times. During one of their separations, 

defendant reported a violation of the restraining order against the 

victim to the police; he repeatedly said to the officer that he was 

afraid of the victim because she had previously threatened to kill 

him and could obtain a gun,1

 and he had learned someone was 

trying to locate him (even though he had not seen the victim in 

 1

 The victim's brother had helped her move during one of the periodic separations. He 

saw a gun among her possessions, which another sibling unloaded. 

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several months, who was in Arizona). Although unable to contact 

the victim, the responding officer filed a report pursuant to a city 

protocol with respect to restraining orders. 

Defendant testified that the victim was verbally abusive, and he 

shared with his daughter his belief in the victim's ongoing 

infidelity. He also testified that between 2005 and 2008, he had 

awakened four times to find the victim was spraying him with an 

arachnicide, and he once caught her pouring something from a 

small bottle into his milk container. He had told “seventeen 

different people” about the poisonings, including his daughter. 

Defendant sought hospitalization a dozen or so times for various 

physical and mental problems in the years preceding the murder. In 

his view, these were a result of the dosings with the arachnicide. 

His ailments included a “nervous breakdown,” paranoia, 

hallucinations, panic, nausea, vomiting, headaches, and profuse 

sweating. However, he never told anyone at a hospital about the 

poisonings because he would be rendered homeless if the victim 

were arrested. He also testified that he had tried several times to 

kill himself. At trial, he said his present medications mostly abated 

the hallucinations, but it was hard for him to focus. 

A doctor testified that she had treated defendant during a hospital 

stay for sedative withdrawal in April 2007, when he appeared 

confused, agitated, anxious, and short-breathed, and reported chest 

pains and hallucinations. His stay was a week long. She prescribed 

an antipsychotic, though strictly as an additional sedative – she did 

not believe defendant's claims of hallucinations. 

An emergency room (ER) doctor testified that he had twice treated 

defendant, in April and December of 2007. Defendant reported his 

belief in the first ER visit that a catheter had not been removed from 

his arm after a previous hospital visit, and asserted that he was 

having hallucinations. Defendant also claimed to have a history of 

schizophrenia. On the second occasion, defendant reported having 

chest pains (along with other physical ailments). The ER doctor did 

not find any foreign body present during the first visit, and all 

cardiac tests appeared normal on the second. At the time, defendant 

had prescriptions for a sedative and a high blood pressure 

medication. A sedative overdose could lead to lethargy and 

confusion, but the doctor had not seen any signs of this. Sedative 

withdrawal could have led to the symptoms defendant reported on 

the second occasion. 

In 2006, the victim and defendant had moved into a studio behind a 

house that the victim's daughter was renting. In March 2008, the 

victim filed for divorce, and intended to move elsewhere with her 

daughter. The daughter testified defendant refused to execute the 

dissolution agreement unless he was paid $5,000; the daughter paid 

him $3,000 and he signed the documents. However, he did not 

move out as he had promised to do. Defendant explained at trial 

that he had signed the documents only under threat of being put out 

on the street, ill and without any assets. Defendant then bought a 

gun with some of the money he had received. He testified that he 

needed it because he was in fear of the victim's family, who had 

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been threatening him. (In his interview with the police, however, 

he had claimed he bought it for purposes of suicide.) 

In April 2008, after inpatient treatment for mental health issues 

(apparently after a suicide attempt), defendant was referred to a 

halfway house clinic called T–Corps to help him transition to 

outpatient treatment for his depression. A physician's assistant 

(PA) specializing in psychiatry who worked there testified that only 

a person with a severe mental health problem would be referred to 

T–Corps. The PA met with defendant on April 22. The PA 

diagnosed defendant as having severe recurrent depression with 

psychotic features, and generalized anxiety disorder. The PA based 

this on defendant's report of episodes of depression and anxiety 

over the years, arising out of his difficulty with relationships 

(having been married six times) and his vague claims of auditory 

hallucinations over the past 18 months (which is actually a 

symptom more characteristic of schizophrenics who experience an 

onset of their disorder as young adults). Defendant appeared 

properly oriented to reality during the evaluation. Defendant also 

told the PA that he was afraid of the victim's family, who were 

dangerous people who might hurt him. Defendant again did not say 

anything at T–Corps about the victim poisoning him. Defendant 

seemed overwhelmed with grief over the loss of his marriage and 

his home. The PA changed the type of sedative prescribed for 

defendant, because defendant did not feel it was working and 

patients develop a tolerance for sedatives. Side effects of the new 

sedative could include a lowering of inhibitions, a paradoxical 

increase in anxiety, and drowsiness. However, hallucinations or 

psychosis are not listed among the typical adverse reactions from 

use of the drug (as opposed to an abrupt withdrawal from its use). 

The prescription limited defendant to two milligrams once per day 

for the first three days, then twice a day thereafter. Defendant 

mentioned having a history of abusing sedatives over the previous 

15 years. 

Defendant began taking the new sedative the next day. He took 

twice as much as prescribed. At trial, he asserted that the 

medication made it hard to control his emotions and made him feel 

aggressive. He also began to experience hallucinations. 

Defendant visited a longtime friend on April 24. The friend 

testified defendant was distraught about the divorce; he complained 

about the victim being physically and verbally abusive, and may 

have mentioned his belief that she had been poisoning him. He also 

shared his fears about her family menacing him. Defendant said he 

was upset that the victim would be living in a nice house while he 

would be near homeless. Defendant made vague allusions to 

having hallucinations. 

A T–Corps mental health worker assisting in defendant's case 

management met with him later that day to discuss housing. The 

T–Corps worker had done intake work with defendant in early 

April, and had been present during the PA's evaluation of him two 

days earlier. Defendant's mood seemed to have improved, and 

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defendant told him that the new medication made him feel better 

without upsetting his stomach. 

At trial, defendant said he had taken two more of the sedatives on 

April 24 and had been feeling okay during the day when visiting 

with his friend (and presumably during his meeting with the T–

Corps worker), but his hallucinations got worse that evening. He 

thought the victim looked like a black blob, and then a frog, sitting 

on the bed. 

The following morning, the hallucinations were worse and 

defendant felt shaky. Objects appeared to be melting and flying 

through the air; the floor rose, and a tuba appeared (playing visible 

musical notes). Defendant heard a deep voice saying, “break the 

curse.” He had been hearing this phrase for a couple of months, 

and believed it was referring to the need for him to die.2

 He 

nonetheless took another sedative. 

Defendant and the victim began to argue. She had learned 

defendant was responsible for reporting her out-of-town son to a 

local police department as a danger to himself or others, which 

resulted in the revocation of her son's parole and his return to prison 

for another 12 years. The victim was furious, and said she and her 

family would kill both defendant and his daughter. 

Defendant left for the store to allow the victim to cool off, but 

returned because he had forgotten his wallet. The argument 

resumed, and he took another sedative at some point. The victim 

went into another room and came back with a knife, charging at 

him. Defendant fled for the store. 

On his return, defendant first looked in through the window to 

determine if the victim was near the door with a knife. As a part of 

his hallucination, the surroundings suddenly went dark. He heard 

the victim shouting that she was going to kill him. She was lying 

awake in the bed. Defendant went into the bathroom, which 

suddenly lightened. He grabbed his gun and went back into the 

other room, which was still pitch dark in his hallucination. The 

voice resumed its chant of “break the curse,” though these 

references to his need to die did not make sense to him. He saw 

trees on fire “on the left-hand side.” The victim was now asleep. 

Her face began to glow in the darkness. Defendant turned around 

to put the gun back in the bathroom. He heard a growl. When he 

turned back, there was a black wolf bleeding from its mouth in the 

bed. As this was an embodiment of evil, he was going to shoot it. 

However, he paused when it turned into a lamb. The vision toggled 

again between wolf and lamb. When it turned back into the wolf 

for the third time, defendant fired the gun twice at it because “the 

evil of the wolf was going to kill [him],” which was the evil in his 

wife that had behaved badly toward him and desired his death for 

 2

 In his police interview, defendant had said he interpreted the phrase as referring to the 

victim. At trial, he explained this was one of the lies he told in order to “[get] a needle in [his] 

arm and . . . put [him] to sleep” because he wanted to die. 

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what he had done to her son and for other reasons. He was aware 

that he was shooting at his wife and not a wolf. At that point, he 

grasped that he was in the midst of a hallucination and “woke up 

staring at the wall”; when he saw his wife, he became conscious of 

what he had done and “went into hysterics.” 

Defendant testified that he took 170 of his blood pressure pills and 

22 of his sedatives to kill himself. He left a suicide note for his 

daughter in which he expressed his anger about being left on the 

street, sick and alone. He called his friend to tell him what he had 

done, and warned the friend not to call the police or he would shoot 

himself. After defendant hung up, the friend nonetheless called the 

police. In the meantime, defendant called 911 to report that he was 

committing suicide after having shot his wife. He mentioned he 

and his wife had been in an argument, which had been building 

over the last week about her divorcing him and forcing him onto the 

streets, and he was frustrated. 

The victim was shot twice in the head. Although she still showed 

signs of life when police arrived, she died during the administration 

of first aid. 

An officer sat with defendant at the hospital. Defendant did not 

complain of any auditory or visual hallucinations, or state that he 

was suffering the effects of poisoning. He did not appear 

unresponsive to his surroundings. 

The ER doctor who evaluated defendant for a medical clearance 

before release into police custody did not find any signs of a drug 

overdose. Defendant's vital signs, including his blood pressure, 

were normal. As a precaution, the doctor ordered charcoal therapy 

(which defendant refused to swallow voluntarily). The doctor had 

treated defendant twice before in 2007 for claims of chest pain, 

which the doctor thought might be attributable to sedative 

withdrawal. Defendant did not on either occasion complain of 

hallucinations. While the doctor believed that an overdose of the 

sedative could cause some people to hallucinate, he did not observe 

defendant manifest any signs of psychosis during the latter's six 

hours at the hospital. Defendant also did not say anything about 

being poisoned. 

After his release from the hospital that afternoon, defendant agreed 

to a police interview after an explanation of his rights. Defendant 

appeared to be coherent, and acknowledged at trial that he was 

lucid during the interview. He again did not mention anything 

about being poisoned, or the assault with the knife before the 

murder, or the wolf/lamb hallucinations about which he testified at 

trial.3

 He did talk generally about having an 18–month history of 

auditory hallucinations (hearing radio stations and the curse-ending 

 3

 At trial, defendant explained he omitted the former details because he felt suicidal and 

indifferent to the outcome of the investigation, declaring that he did not want to drag his wife 

“through the mud” as a result. As for the latter, he did not think the interviewer would believe 

him. 

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voice, which he told the police had also been urging him “to do it”), 

visual hallucinations (moving objects, colors) and his nervous 

breakdown. He explained to the police that he had not told anyone 

else about the voices because he did not want to be committed. In 

response to defendant's claim of being psychotic, the police 

interviewer told defendant he did not behave like the psychotic 

people the interviewer had questioned over the years. 

Defendant discussed the abusive behavior of his wife and her 

family toward him, including his coerced agreement to a divorce 

under the duress of his straitened financial circumstances and 

illness, and her unfaithfulness. His police account did not include 

the antecedent argument about the victim's son or mention the 

victim's knife-brandishing. Defendant simply asserted that he had 

heard the voices that morning, and shot her while she slept because 

he could not fight them off any longer. When asked why he would 

say hateful things about the victim in the suicide note, defendant 

said she did not care if he was left on the street after the divorce 

(where he knew he would die), and acknowledged being angry at 

her for not returning his affections and forcing him to move into a 

boarding house. He said that he had not told the T–Corps worker 

on the previous day about voices wanting him to kill his wife 

because he did not want to be “taken in” and thought he could 

handle his condition on his own. Although the record is unclear on 

this precise point, an officer testified that defendant had some sort 

of seizure that required medical attention after the conclusion of the 

interview. 

Another longtime friend (who is a criminal defense attorney) went 

to the jail to visit defendant about a week after his arrest (at which 

point defendant was apparently in the psychiatric unit). The friend 

testified defendant seemed depressed and ill at ease at his presence. 

He recalled that defendant had mentioned something about seeing a 

wolf face on the victim.4

 Defendant could not remember at trial 

what they had talked about. Indeed, he asserted that he had not told 

anybody about seeing the wolf because it was not “necessary.” 

Defendant's daughter testified that defendant, who had been in the 

jewelry business, told her he had inhaled a great deal of jewelry 

cleaner, which caused him “to think funny things.” She recalled 

him telling her about the victim's trying to stab him, and 

complaining about the victim's infidelities. She thought he was a 

teller of absurd tales to which she generally paid little attention, 

such as his belief in time travel. He had lived with her for a period 

of time before she moved; she told him he could not come with her, 

at which point he returned to live with the victim. She described 

him as someone who preferred living with someone else to take 

care of him rather than get a job. 

 4

 Contrary to the account of this testimony in defendant's briefing on appeal, the attorney 

did not testify that defendant told him “he had only fired his gun because he . . . saw a wolf.” The 

exact snippets of testimony are “He did say something about, um, seeing a face, a wolf face or 

something like that” and “he was talking about seeing a wolf face on her,” without any reference 

to this being the cause of the shooting. 

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A forensic psychologist conducted an evaluation of defendant in 

February 2009. He found defendant's account of the shooting to be 

“fantastic,” because it was not consistent with the manner in which 

a person genuinely in the throes of psychosis or hallucinations 

would describe them. In the first place, visual hallucinations are 

“quite rare.” What defendant described was more in line with the 

“vivid” and “movie-like” visions that psychedelic drugs induce. 

His description of auditory hallucinations was also unlike the way 

true psychotics experience them, because they hear familiar voices 

that are an indistinguishable part of their reality. The witness did 

not believe defendant had a mental disorder; instead, that he 

suffered from three types of personality disorders: histrionic 

(displaying theatrically dramatic emotions), narcissistic, and 

borderline (i.e., unstable, impulsive, prone to making decisions on 

the basis of emotion rather than reason, and given to emotional 

extremes that include episodes of depression). These personality 

disorders might cause defendant to misperceive reality in ways to 

gratify his own needs or feed his self-esteem, but they do not give 

rise to hallucinations. Defendant's present account of the shooting 

was simply a “dramatic and theatrical expression of emotion” as an 

exercise in self-justification for acting on an impulse out of anger 

and resentment in response to the deprivations that the victim was 

exacting from him. It did not matter that defendant had a history of 

reporting hallucinations, because none of them were genuine; they 

were a function of his histrionic character. Although admitting he 

was not an expert, the forensic psychologist was familiar with the 

effects of psychotropic medications and did not think defendant's 

sedative could result in hallucinations. 

People v. Mains, No. C067590, 2013 WL 836708 at **1-5 (3d Dist. Cal. Mar. 7, 2013). 

 After the California Court of Appeal affirmed his judgment of conviction, petitioner filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. entitled “Petition for 

Review, California Supreme Court, April 11, 2013.” That petition was summarily denied. 

Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. entitled “Order Denying Petition for Review, California Supreme Court, 

June 12, 2013.” 

 Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in this court on February 18, 2014. ECF No. 1. 

Respondent filed an answer on June 27, 2014, and petitioner filed a traverse on June 30, 2014 and 

July 9, 2014. ECF Nos. 28-30. 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

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application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1,5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

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precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 5 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). 

Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but does not 

expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that 

the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 

S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... could 

have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

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jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to demonstrate 

that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 

925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Exclusion of Evidence

 1. Petitioner’s Arguments

 In his first ground for relief, petitioner claims that “they conspired to unconstitutionally 

deny a poison witness testimonie [sic] about arsenic.” ECF No. 1 at 4.6 Petitioner explains: 

Also the last PD told me Id have to do any more filings on my own. 

Also the court used apprx. 3 judges & 2 D.A.s & 2 P.D.s & 

conspiring to violate the court proceedures [sic] & also the 

defendant at that time was delusional & incorrjable [sic]. 

Id. In the traverse, petitioner states that his wife tried to poison him. He also states that when he 

shot his wife he was “delusional.” ECF No. 29 at 1. Petitioner explains that he still suffers from 

the effects of the poisoning. Id. He asks, “why didn’t the judge put the professional CSI poison 

investigator on the stand to tell the truth about how much poison was in me at the time shot [sic]? 

Why didn’t the judge let new evidence come in, in the middle of my trial?” Id. Petitioner has 

also filed numerous excerpts of the trial testimony in this matter and letters to the court explaining 

his mental state at the time of the shooting. See ECF Nos. 8, 12-15, 19-22. 

 On appeal, petitioner claimed that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right 

to a fair trial and his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense when it denied his request to 

introduce evidence to support his theory that he shot his wife in unreasonable self-defense 

 6

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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because he believed she was trying to poison him. Petitioner described the excluded evidence as 

follows: (1) evidence that “testing of Mr. Mains’s hair after arrest established that he had elevated 

amounts of antimony – a poison similar to arsenic but found in household cleaners, fire retardant, 

and metal;” (2) evidence that petitioner had told his daughter before the shooting that his wife 

was poisoning him; (3) evidence that petitioner told two of his friends that his wife had poisoned 

him in the past and was poisoning him still, and that he was afraid to eat the food she prepared for 

him; and (4) evidence that petitioner told the same two friends that he heard his wife was 

attempting to get a permit for a gun and that he and one of those friends “went to police to try and 

stop [her] from getting a gun.” Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. entitled “Appellant’s Opening Brief” 

(hereinafter AOB) at 55-57. In his arguments before this court, petitioner appears to be 

narrowing his claim to the absence of trial testimony by a “poison witness . . . about arsenic.” 

ECF No. 1 at 4. 

 2. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s claims regarding the trial court’s 

exclusion of evidence. The court reasoned as follows: 

Defendant identifies three areas that the trial court precluded him 

from pursuing. These include (1) an offer of proof that he had 

significantly elevated amounts of antimony in his hair at the time of 

his arrest (which abated thereafter), and that the symptoms he was 

reporting before the murder were consistent with antimony 

poisoning; (2) his daughter's testimony that before the murder he 

told her of his suspicions of being poisoned (to which she did not 

give credence); and (3) testimony from Arizona friends whom he 

told before the murder about his poisoning suspicions (to which 

they apparently did not give credence, either) and his fear of 

allowing the victim to obtain a gun. 

The court found the absence of any foundation connecting the 

presence of antimony in defendant's hair with an effect on his 

mental state, or with the claimed arachnicide sprayings (including 

the absence of any evidence of the active ingredients of the spray) 

as opposed to some other source for it,7

 and thus excluded the 

evidence. The court sustained an objection to the daughter's 

testimony about defendant's poisoning suspicions; and allowed 

defendant to call one or the other of his friends to testify about 

defendant telling them that the victim menaced him with a knife, 

 7

 Defense counsel had earlier asked defendant about antimony. Defendant testified he 

was not familiar with the element, and was not aware of ever ingesting or handling it. 

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but excluded the remainder of their testimony as irrelevant. 

(Defendant never called either of the friends as a witness.) 

Defendant argues it was prejudicially erroneous to exclude this 

evidence, because it corroborated his testimony that he had a 

genuine belief antedating the murder that the victim had been 

poisoning him, and was also in fear of her. He claims this was 

essential to his theory of unreasonable self-defense, and as a result 

the exclusion of the evidence was a violation of both state and 

federal law. 

As defendant failed to provide any connection between the presence 

of antimony in his hair and a mechanism by which the victim could 

have exposed him to it (as opposed to some source other than the 

victim) - most importantly, that it is even an ingredient in the spider 

spray - the evidence did not provide any rational basis for the jury 

to infer any corroboration of the poisoning claims of defendant, and 

thus the trial court properly excluded it on that basis. (California 

Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1, 

44–45; People v. Berti (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 872, 876.) The lack 

of any expert testimony about the effect of antimony on mental 

functioning also was a proper basis for excluding the hair evidence 

in connection with defendant's mental state at the time of the 

murder. 

Except to the extent they might rebut any claim of recent 

fabrication, defendant's hearsay statements to his daughter and 

friends regarding suspicions of poisoning were of minimal 

corroborative value at best, given that they did not accord his 

statements any credence. As for rebutting any inference of recent 

fabrication, their testimony in fact could equally give rise to the 

opposite inference, that defendant's testimony was simply part and 

parcel of a history of making unfounded accusations against the 

victim. That said, the testimony of his friend about their 

conversation on the day before the murder demonstrated to some 

extent that the purported poisonings were not merely a post hoc 

rationale. 

The proposed testimony about defendant's fear of the victim's 

obtaining a gun would have been cumulative of the brother's 

testimony that the victim was found in possession of a gun on a 

previous occasion, and of the officer's testimony that defendant 

seemed genuinely in fear of the victim coming after him with a gun 

when reporting a violation of the restraining order against her. In 

addition, his daughter did testify that he had told her of at least one 

incident in which the victim tried to stab him, which would 

corroborate his claimed fear as well (as would the testimony he 

chose not to adduce from one of the two Arizona friends). 

We thus conclude that none of this evidence was essential to the 

theory of the defense such that its erroneous exclusion must be 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 381, 427–428.) We also are of the opinion that it is not 

reasonably probable that admission of this evidence would have 

resulted in a more favorable outcome to defendant. As we have 

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found in his previous argument, the absence of any imminent peril 

or a reasonably contemporaneous provocation make any evidence 

of his subjective state of mind beside the point. As a result, we 

therefore do not need to decide the underlying question of whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. 

Mains, 2013 WL 836708, at *8-9. 

 In other portions of its opinion, the Court of Appeal made the following relevant 

observations: 

Reasonable provocation for heat of passion is entirely absent: Both 

the victim's death threats and her brandishing of the knife to which 

defendant attested occurred before he went off to the store and 

chose to return, which are circumstances inconsistent with 

maintaining a state of heat of passion. Defendant also did not testify 

that he was actually in any state of provocation when he entered the 

studio and found his wife lying in bed, or when he came out of the 

bathroom with the gun and watched her sleeping on the bed. As for 

his claim of acting unreasonably in self-defense, he did not identify 

any imminent peril to which he was responding at the time he shot 

the sleeping victim, only his fear and anger at her past evil conduct 

toward him generally and that morning. 

Id. *8 (emphasis in original). 

On appeal, defendant argues there was evidence from which a jury 

could have concluded that he suffered involuntary intoxication 

resulting in the wolf hallucination because there was a change to a 

new medication, the possible hallucinatory side effects of which he 

was not aware. Defendant claims he testified that “he mistakenly 

believed he was shooting a wolf because he was hallucinating” and 

thought it was attacking him. The record, however, is to the 

contrary. 

As we noted above, the PA testified that hallucinations are a 

potential result of withdrawal from the sedative, not from its use or 

abuse (as defendant incorrectly asserts repeatedly in his briefing). 

Although the ER doctor who evaluated defendant after the murder 

thought hallucinations were possible from an overdose, he did not 

observe defendant manifesting any signs that he was in fact 

hallucinating. This leaves only defendant's self-serving account of 

experiencing hallucinations, which the only psychiatric expert 

testifying at trial discredited as being inconsistent with authentic 

accounts of visual hallucinations. This is hardly substantial 

evidence of a hallucinated mistake of fact. 

* * * 

Moreover, defendant never testified that he feared an attack at the 

time of the murder from the wolf in the bed. Nor did he think he 

 

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was shooting only at a wolf; he testified his wife's evil behavior 

toward him was embodied as a wolf, but he was nonetheless aware 

that the wolf was still his wife. 

Id. at *6 (emphasis in original). 

 3. Applicable Law

 Criminal defendants have a constitutional right, implicit in the Sixth Amendment, to 

present a defense; this right is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v. 

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687, 690 (1986); 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972). 

Necessary to the realization of this right is the ability to present evidence, including the testimony 

of witnesses. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19. However, the constitutional right to present a defense 

is not absolute. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 877 (9th Cir. 2003). “Even relevant and 

reliable evidence can be excluded when the state interest is strong.” Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 

1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 State law rules excluding evidence from criminal trials do not abridge a criminal 

defendant’s right to present a defense unless they are “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the 

purposes they were designed to serve” and “infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused.” 

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). See also Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-91 

(discussion of the tension between the discretion of state courts to exclude evidence at trial and 

the federal constitutional right to “present a complete defense”); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 

1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, a criminal defendant “does not have an unfettered right to 

offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of 

evidence.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 

410 (1988)). In general, it has taken “unusually compelling circumstances ... to outweigh the 

strong state interest in administration of its trials.” Perry, 713 F.2d at 1452. “A habeas petitioner 

bears a heavy burden in showing a due process violation based on an evidentiary decision.” 

Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). 

///// 

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 4. Analysis

 The trial record reflects that the trial judge held a California Evidence Code § 402 hearing 

at which petitioner’s trial counsel examined a toxicologist regarding the level of antimony in 

petitioner’s hair.8 Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 1203-1220. The trial court declined to 

admit the proffered evidence at trial because petitioner had failed to establish a link between the 

antimony and petitioner’s mental state at the time of the killing. Id. at 1223-25. In relevant part, 

the trial judge described his reasoning as follows: 

THE COURT: Your record is preserved. Your record is made. 

You have made all of your arguments with regard to offers of proof. 

You have a 402 hearing in which your witnesses have testified. 

The other witnesses would simply provide chain of custody and 

actual analysis, but your record is there. 

The issue is basically one in which this Court is ruling on because 

the evidence you are offering for consideration by the jury is not 

relevant. What you are arguing is that it’s relevant solely as to your 

client’s state of mind based on speculation. I understand that. I’m 

not going to allow it.9

MS. SCHIAVO (petitioner’s trial counsel): It’s not just for that, 

your Honor, it goes to all of the mental defenses that negate first to 

second. 

 8

 California Evidence Code § 402 provides: 

(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its 

existence or nonexistence shall be determined as provided in this 

article. 

(b) The court may hear and determine the question of the 

admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury; 

but in a criminal action, the court shall hear and determine the 

question of the admissibility of a confession or admission of the 

defendant out of the presence and hearing of the jury if any party so 

requests. 

(c) A ruling on the admissibility of evidence implies whatever 

finding of fact is prerequisite thereto; a separate or formal finding is 

unnecessary unless required by statute 

9

 In one of the partial trial transcripts filed by petitioner, petitioner has inserted the 

following handwritten note at this point in the transcript: “this is where our professional witness is 

not allowed to testify.” ECF No. 15 at 8. It therefore appears that, in the instant petition, 

petitioner is challenging the trial court’s refusal to allow the testimony of the toxicologist 

regarding the level of antimony in petitioner’s hair. 

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THE COURT: Ms. Schiavo, if it goes to the mental states, then you 

must have at least some expert who is going to be able to come in 

here and testify that antimony levels can correlate to mental status 

in some fashion. I just asked your expert about that, and he 

indicated he was not aware of any studies that make such a 

correlation. If you have some other expert who can make that offer, 

I’m happy to reconsider the matter, but as I have heard you say on a 

number of occasions, you don’t have anybody who is going to say 

that. 

MS. SCHIAVO: I don’t see any case law or anything that says I 

have to have an expert come in to state that. And if there is one, I 

mean, I haven’t found that. 

THE COURT: All right. I understand the issue. The ruling stands. 

Id. at 1224-25. 

 As set forth above, the California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s decision to 

exclude all of the evidence described by petitioner in his claim on appeal. Mains, 2013 WL 

836708 at *9. With regard to the toxicologist, the court concluded, as the trial court had, that this 

evidence was irrelevant given the lack of evidence connecting the antimony in petitioner’s hair 

with any actions by petitioner’s wife, with spider spray, or with “mental functioning” in general. 

The appellate court also concluded that the proposed testimony from petitioner’s daughter and 

friends was of minimal relevance or was cumulative of other testimony introduced at petitioner’s 

trial. Finally, the Court of Appeal concluded that any error in admitting evidence of petitioner’s 

fear of his wife was harmless because petitioner failed to show “imminent peril” or “a reasonably 

contemporaneous provocation” at the time he shot his wife. Id. 

 After a review of the record in this case, this court concludes that the decision by the state 

court on petitioner’s claims of evidentiary error is not contrary to or an unreasonable application 

of the federal authorities cited above, nor is it based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. With regard to the claim petitioner appears to be raising in this court – regarding the 

exclusion of the toxicologist’s testimony – the conclusion of both the trial court and the state 

appellate court that this evidence was not relevant to petitioner’s state of mind at the time of the 

shooting is fully supported by the trial record. Petitioner was not able to establish that the 

antimony in his hair was caused by any actions of his wife, or that the antimony had any 

connection to issues regarding mental health. See, e.g., RT at 1219. Under these circumstances, 

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the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence did not violate petitioner’s right to a fair trial or to 

present a defense. 

 To the extent petitioner is also challenging the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony 

by petitioner’s daughter and friends, he has failed to establish entitlement to relief. The decision 

of the California Court of Appeal on these claims is not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of federal law or the facts of this case. Certainly, the decision of the California Court 

of Appeal on the claims raised by petitioner on direct appeal, including petitioner’s claim related 

to testimony about the level of antimony in his hair, is not “so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief on these claims. 

B. Petitioner’s Sentence 

 Petitioner was sentenced in this case to 25 years-to-life on the murder charge and a 

consecutive sentence of 25 years-to-life for the gun use allegation, for a total sentence of 50 

years-to-life in state prison. Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 664; RT at 2248. Petitioner 

appears to be raising a challenge to that sentence in his second and third claims for relief. 

 Petitioner’s second ground for relief is stated, in full, as follows: 

Also w/ other case citations & in Victorville Superior a man named 

Frank Edward shot a man w/ a 357 in back seat of car & wanted to 

sell a shotgun for $40 & he stated he just shot him & wasn’t 

because he wanted the shot gun. Also if I can have a P.D. on this 

case & to sheapardize & cite other cases & plead 6 yrs. 

ECF No. 1 at 4. Petitioner’s third ground for relief is stated as follows: 

If the court can appoint counsel & can file some & cite some case 

laws. Also w/ the Board of Parole & can cite any of these cases 

w/life & possibility to parole & some cases were paroled & treating 

some one kind of equally & can have any relief & counsel to 

research other case & sent to court yearly. 

Id. at 5. 

 With these two claims, petitioner appears to be arguing that his sentence is unfair when 

compared to the sentences of other criminal defendants. Petitioner’s claims in this regard are 

unexhausted; however, the court recommends that they be denied on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the 

State”).10 

 Petitioner’s challenge to his sentence essentially involves an interpretation of state 

sentencing law. As explained above, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

state court determinations on state law questions.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, ___, 131 S. 

Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67). So long as a sentence imposed by a state 

court “is not based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and unusual, racially or 

ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for violation of state statutes are 

matters of state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976). Thus, 

“[a]bsent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own 

sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s imposition of a sentence of 

50-years-to-life for first degree murder with use of a firearm was fundamentally unfair. 

 Nor is petitioner entitled to relief on a claim that his sentence of fifty years-to-life for first 

degree murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

of the U.S. Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment 

includes a “narrow proportionality principle” that applies to terms of imprisonment. See 

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Taylor v. 

Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006). However, successful challenges in federal court to 

the proportionality of particular sentences are “exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 

289-90 (1983). See also Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004). “The Eighth 

 10 Respondent construes petitioner’s third claim for relief as a request for the 

appointment of counsel to represent him before the parole board. ECF No. 28 at 26. As noted by 

respondent, any such claim is premature because petitioner will not be eligible for parole until he 

has served fifty years in prison. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 

580-81 (1985) (a case that involves "contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or 

indeed may not occur at all@ is not ripe for decision). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner is 

requesting the appointment of counsel at a future parole consideration hearing, his request should 

be denied. 

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Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids 

only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 

1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303). In Lockyer v. Andrade, the 

United States Supreme Court held that it was not an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law for the California Court of Appeal to affirm a “Three Strikes” sentence of 

two consecutive 25 year-to-life imprisonment terms for a petty theft with a prior conviction 

involving theft of $150.00 worth of videotapes. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Similarly, the Supreme 

Court has held that a “Three Strikes” sentence of 25 years-to-life in prison imposed pursuant to a 

grand theft conviction involving the theft of three golf clubs from a pro shop was not grossly 

disproportionate and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 

29 (2003). 

 Petitioner has failed to show that his sentence falls within the type of “exceedingly rare” 

circumstance that would support a finding that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Petitioner’s sentence is certainly a significant penalty. However, petitioner was convicted of 

premeditated murder of his wife with use of a handgun. In Andrade, the United States Supreme 

Court upheld the same sentence for far less serious crimes than the crimes petitioner was 

convicted of. In Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of life without possibility of 

parole for possessing a large quantity of cocaine. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996. And in Rummel, 

the Supreme Court concluded that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for obtaining 

money by false pretenses did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 

282. In light of these decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the sentence 

imposed in petitioner’s case was grossly disproportionate. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled 

to federal habeas relief on his second and third claims. 

C. Copies

 In his final ground for relief, petitioner states: “If the U.S. court can make & keep filed 

copies & sent copies & papers to the inmate.” ECF No. 1 at 5. This statement does not state a 

federal question and should be denied. Petitioner is advised that all documents filed in this case 

will remain on the court docket and that he will be served with copies of filed documents. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: October 20, 2016. 

Case 2:14-cv-00504-JAM-EFB Document 32 Filed 10/20/16 Page 22 of 22