Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00569/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00569-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

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1

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT ALVARADO in his

capacity as Trustee of the

CARPENTERS HEALTH AND

WELFARE TRUST FUND FOR

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

MARGARET ELLEN ALVAREZ, 

Individually; MARGARET ELLEN

ALVAREZ, Individually and dba

R.J. HATLER CONSTRUCTION,

INC.; R.J. HATLER

CONSTRUCTION, INC., a

California Corporation 

 Defendants.

_____________________________/

No. C-05-00569 PJH (WDB)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs are a voluntary unincorporated association to which various local

carpenter unions belong ("the Union"), various fringe benefit trust funds

established for the benefit of Union members, and the board of trustees of those

fringe benefit trust funds. See, Petition To Confirm Arbitration Award and

Complaint For Breach of Contract on Promissory Note, Breach of Contract, Actual

Damages, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Audit, filed February 8, 2005,

("Petition"), at 2. Defendant, R.J. Hatler Construction, Inc., is bound by a

collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") and various trust agreements to make

Case 4:05-cv-00569-PJH Document 32 Filed 09/16/05 Page 1 of 15
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1The Decision and Award lists the amounts due for unpaid fringe benefit contributions

and liquidated damages as $347,614.91 and for the cost of the Board of Adjustment proceedings

as $300.00. Petition at Ex. D.

2

timely contributions to plaintiff trust funds for work performed by R.J. Hatler

Construction employees. Declaration of Richard Alcantar in Support of Motion

for Default Judgment, filed May 16, 2005, (“Alcantar Decl.”), at ¶¶3, 4 and 5;

Errata to Declaration of Richard Alcantar in Support of Motion for Default

Judgment, at Ex. B (“Errata”); and Second Errata to Declaration of Richard

Alcantar in Support of Motion for Default Judgment, at Ex. A (“Second Errata”);

see also, Petition at 3. Defendant, Margaret Ellen Alvarez (“Alvarez”) signed a

Promissory Note on November 10, 2003, in which she acknowledges “doing

business as R.J. Hatler Construction” and being “individually liable, bound, and

subject to [the CBA and various trust agreements].” See, Petition at 3 and Ex. C.

At some point, a dispute arose between the parties over the unpaid

promissory note and unpaid benefit contributions. Pursuant to the terms of the

CBA, plaintiffs initiated a grievance procedure, ultimately submitting the

grievance to a Board of Adjustment. Petition at 5. 

The Board of Adjustment conducted a hearing on the grievance on March 9,

2004. See, Petition at Ex. D (Decision and Award of the Board of Adjustment). 

Ms. Alvarez appeared, pro se, before the Board of Adjustment on her own behalf

and in her representative capacity for R.J. Hatler. Id. On March 10, 2004, the

Board of Adjustment issued a Decision and Award ("Award") in favor of

plaintiffs, in the amount $347,914.91.1

On February 8, 2005, plaintiffs filed this action alleging that defendants

have refused to comply with the Board of Adjustment's Award, failed to meet their

obligations under the Promissory Note, and failed to allow plaintiffs to conduct an

audit as required by the various Trust Agreements and the Award. Petition at 5, 6

and 8. 

Case 4:05-cv-00569-PJH Document 32 Filed 09/16/05 Page 2 of 15
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2Plaintiffs’ Motion seeks, inter alia, confirmation of the Award for "$347,914.91 in

unpaid fringe benefits, liquidated damages, interest, amounts due and owing on the Promissory

Note; and costs of arbitration proceedings for the period of May 2003 through January 2004.”

Motion at 3. Plaintiffs’ Motion indicates that the Board's Award includes the amount owed on

the promissory note. Although the Board’s Award appears to include the amount owed under

3

Plaintiffs served defendants with a copy of the Petition and related

documents. See, Summons and Proofs of Service, filed April 5, 2005, and

Supplemental Declaration of Concepción E. Lozano-Batista in Support of

Response to Order for Supplemental Briefing, filed July 26, 2005, ("Supp. Lozano 

Decl.") at Ex. A. Defendants have not responded to plaintiffs' Petition. In

response to plaintiffs' application for entry of default, the Clerk of the Court

entered default as to defendants on April 22, 2005.

On May 16, 2005, plaintiffs filed and served their Motion for Default

Judgment By Court ("Motion"). On June 22, 2005, Judge Hamilton referred this

matter to a Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. On July 13, 2005,

the Court ordered plaintiffs to submit supplemental briefing, fixed a deadline for

defendants to respond, and scheduled a hearing. The Court also ordered plaintiffs

to serve a copy of that order on defendants immediately. Plaintiffs’ counsel

represented that defendants were served with that order. See, Transcript of August

10, 2005, hearing. Plaintiffs filed supplemental materials on July 26, 2005. 

Defendants have not responded. On August 10, 2005, the Court conducted a

hearing in connection with plaintiffs’ Motion. No appearance was made on behalf

of defendants.

Following the hearing, the Court’s staff contacted plaintiffs’ counsel to

notify plaintiffs that, in the Court’s view, defendants had not been properly served

with the Petition. See, discussion section I, infra. On August 30, 2005, plaintiffs

filed a letter asking the Court to reconsider that conclusion.

In their motion for default judgment, plaintiffs seek the following relief: (1)

confirmation of the March 10, 2004, Board of Adjustment Award2; (2) an order

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the promissory note, it does not explicitly mention the promissory note. Plaintiffs represent that

the promissory note was included as part of plaintiffs’ Exhibit A to the Board and, therefore, was

before the Board. See, Response to Order for Supplemental Briefing re Motion for Default

Judgment, filed July 26, 2005, (“Supplemental Response”) at 5.

3Plaintiffs’ Motion also seeks “an accounting between Plaintiffs and Defendant.” Motion

at 3. Plaintiffs later clarify that their request for an audit and an accounting is “one and the

same.” Supplemental Response, at 11.

4

directing defendants to submit to an audit as required by the CBA and trust

agreements; (3) an order requiring defendants to pay all sums revealed by the

anticipated audit as due and owing; (4) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs related

to this lawsuit; and (5) an injunction permanently enjoining defendants to timely

submit all required monthly contribution reports and to timely pay all

contributions owing.3

The Court RECOMMENDS as follows.

I. Confirmation of the March 10, 2004, Board of Adjustment Award

A. Applicable Law

Plaintiffs seek confirmation of the March 10, 2004, Board of Adjustment

Decision and Award pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act. See, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition to

Confirm Arbitration Award, filed February 8, 2005, and Response to Order for

Supplemental Briefing re Motion for Default Judgment, filed July 26, 2005,

(“Supplemental Response”) at 3-4.

This Court believes, but is not certain, that the Federal Arbitration Act

applies to collective bargaining agreements such as the one in this case. See,

Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the only contracts

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4

See also, Smart v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 315 F.3d 721, 724

(7th Cir. 2003) (citing Circuit City for the proposition that the FAA covers collective bargaining

agreements). 

5

exempted from the FAA's coverage are contracts of "employment of transportation

workers").4

This Court is aware of authority in the Ninth Circuit that appears to suggest

that, in this circuit, the FAA does not cover CBAs. See, PowerAgent, Inc. v. Elec.

Data Sys. Corp., 358 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir., 2004). However, at this juncture,

the Ninth Circuit has not squarely decided whether the Supreme Court 's decision

in Circuit City overrules the Circuit’s earlier view that the FAA does not apply in

these kinds of situations. See, PowerAgent Inc., 358 F.3d at 1193 n.1. Given the

breadth of Circuit City's language, this Court is compelled to conclude that CBAs

are not exempt from the FAA. 

Under the pertinent provision of the Federal Arbitration Act,

(i) If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the

court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the

arbitration, and shall specify the court, then (ii) at any time within one

year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to

the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and

thereupon the court must grant such an order (iii) unless the

award is vacated, modified, or corrected, as prescribed in sections 10

and 11 of [the FAA] . . .(iv) Notice of the application shall be served

upon the adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have

jurisdiction of such party as though he had appeared generally in the

proceeding. If the adverse party is a resident of the district within

which the award was made, such service shall be made upon the

adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice

of motion in an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be

a nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be served by the

marshal of any district within which the adverse party may be found

in like manner as other process of the court. 

9 U.S.C. §9 (emphasis and roman numerals added).

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5At the August 10, 2005, hearing the Court erroneously indicated that it appeared that

plaintiffs would satisfy all requirements set forth in section nine of the FAA. Following the

hearing, while drafting this Report and Recommendation, the Court observed that plaintiffs had

not, in fact, satisfied the service requirement. 

6Plaintiffs satisfy all other requirements imposed by section nine of the FAA for

confirmation of the March 10, 2004, Board of Adjustment Decision and Award. 

First, the CBA specifies that a party may obtain a judgment from this Court confirming

an award by the Board.

A decision of the Board of Adjustment by majority vote, or the decision of a

permanent Arbitrator shall be enforceable by a petition to confirm an arbitration

award filed in . . . the United States District Court for the Northern District of

California.

Errata, at Ex. A (Carpenters Master Agreement) at §51, ¶13 and Supplemental Declaration of

Richard Alcantar in Support of Response to Order for Supplemental Briefing, filed July 26,

2005, (“Supp. Alcantar Decl.”) at ¶2.

Second, plaintiffs' request is timely. The Board issued its Award on March 10, 2004.

Plaintiffs applied for an order confirming the Award less than one year later on February 8,

2005.

Third, nothing in the record suggests that the Board of Adjustment Award has been

vacated, modified, or corrected pursuant to sections 10 or 11 of the FAA. We therefore

RECOMMEND that the District Court FIND that the Award has not been so vacated, modified,

or corrected.

6

As alluded to above, the Court’s staff notified plaintiffs’ counsel that,

because defendants are nonresidents of this district and because this Court

concludes that the FAA applies to plaintiffs’ Petition, plaintiffs were required to

serve defendants via the marshal.5 Plaintiffs have not.

6

 

Plaintiffs’ August 30th letter asks the Court to reconsider its conclusion that

the FAA applies to arbitration agreements contained in collective bargaining

agreements. According to plaintiffs, section 301 of the LMRA governs their effort

to confirm the arbitration Award, and plaintiffs contend that they have satisfied the

service requirements applicable to that statute.

We grant plaintiffs’ request that we reconsider our ruling with respect to the

applicability of the FAA. As indicated, we continue to conclude that Circuit City

compels us to rule that the FAA applies to arbitration agreements contained in

collective bargaining agreements. However, we also conclude that the

applicability of the FAA does not preclude confirmation of an arbitration award

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7

under the alternate avenue of the LMRA. Therefore, until the Ninth Circuit tells

us otherwise, we RECOMMEND that the District Court find that where plaintiffs

seek to confirm an award made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement

plaintiffs may seek confirmation of that award if they satisfy the standards for

doing so under either the LMRA or the FAA.

In so recommending, we acknowledge Textile Workers Union of America v.

Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957) and its companion case GoodallSanford v. United Textile Workers of America, 353 U.S. 550 (1957), as well as the

Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Smart v. International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers, 315 F.3d 721 (2003). Lincoln Mills, in which a union sought to compel

arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and which was decided

after enactment of the FAA, established the LMRA as the basis for courts to create

a federal common law with respect to enforcement of collective bargaining

agreements. 353 U.S. at 456-7. At that same time, in Goodall-Sanford, the Court

was asked whether an order compelling arbitration in the labor context is

appealable. Answering, the Court stated directly, “[t]he right enforced here is one

arising under s301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.” These cases

post-date the FAA and seem to reflect the view that the LMRA is a primary

vehicle for enforcing arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements.

Referring to Lincoln Mills, the Seventh Circuit ruled that if there were a

conflict between the FAA and LMRA that circuit

would resolve it in favor of section 301. . . . Where there is no

conflict, however, and the FAA provides a procedure or remedy not

found in section 301 but does not step on section 301's toes, then, . . . 

We apply the [FAA].

Smart , 315 F.3d at6 724-5.

Furthermore, permitting confirmation of an arbitration award under an

alternate statutory scheme is consistent with and serves the pro-arbitration policy

underlying the FAA. We note that federal courts will permit enforcement of state

statutes that affect arbitration clauses as long as the statutes are “generally

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7We note that, in this case, the distinctions between the service requirements of the FAA

and those of the LMRA are of little practical import. The most important thing in cases such as

this is that the person who could be adversely affected actually knows about the proceedings

before the court and about her opportunity to appear. In this case, its very clear that Ms.

Alvarez, an individually named defendant and the representative for the company, was actually

notified of these proceedings through personal service. See, Summons and Proofs of Service,

filed April 5, 2005.

8

applicable” rather than specifically hostile to arbitration. Bradley v. Harris

Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001); see also, Circuit City, 532 U.S. at

112 and 122 (“the Act was . . . pre-emptive of state laws hostile to arbitration” and

“Congress intended the FAA to . . . pre-empt state antiarbitration laws to the

contrary”) (emphasis added). It would make little sense to permit use of generally

applicable state laws that do not directly undermine the FAA’s goals and policies

but not to permit use of a comprehensive federal statutory scheme that is not

hostile to the goals or policies of the FAA.

For the above reasons, we RECOMMEND that the District Court hold that

confirmation of the arbitration Award may be sought under either the FAA or the

LMRA.

B. Satisfaction of Standard under LMRA

Service of an action based on the LMRA is made pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4. Rule 4 permits personal service by an eligible process server

within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. F.R.C.P. 4(c), (e), (h) and (m). 

Plaintiffs caused defendants to be personally served by a valid process server

within 120 days of filing the Petition.7 See, Summons and Proofs of Service, filed

April 5, 2005. Accordingly, we turn to the substance of plaintiffs’ request.

The Ninth Circuit has articulated the standard for review under the LMRA

as follows:

Judicial review of an arbitrator's decision in a labor dispute is

extremely limited. . . .As long as the arbitrator is even arguably

construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of this

authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does

not suffice to overturn his decision. . . . [A]mbiguity in an opinion

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28 8Although we list here only the most significant aspects of the March 10, 2004, Board of

Adjustment award, we RECOMMEND that the Award be confirmed in its entirety.

9

that accompanies an award, or a lack of any real opinion at all, is not

sufficient to permit an inference that the arbitrator exceeded his

authority. 

Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). 

The Court must uphold the arbitrator's award unless “(1) [it is clear from the

arbitral opinion that] the award does not draw its essence from the [CBA] and the

arbitrator is dispensing his own brand of industrial justice; (2) . . . the arbitrator

exceeds the boundaries of the issues submitted to him; (3) . . . the award is

contrary to public policy; or (4) . . . the award is procured by fraud." Southern

California Gas Co., v. Utility Workers Union of America, 265 F.3d 787 (9th Cir.

2001); Garvey, 203 F.3d 580, 585-89.

We have carefully reviewed the March 10, 2004, Board of Adjustment

Award. As the Award construes the effective Carpenters Master Agreement (See,

Errata, at Ex. B. and Supplemental Response at 12), and appears to be within the

Board's authority in all other respects, we FIND that the Award would

appropriately be confirmed under the LMRA. See, Transcript of August 10, 2005,

hearing.

We therefore RECOMMEND that the District Judge confirm the Board of

Adjustment’s Award under the standards of review established by the LMRA.

Under the Board of Adjustment’s Award, plaintiffs are entitled to the

following relief8:

1. A court order directing defendants to immediately cease and desist

further violations of the current Carpenters Master Agreement for the

remainder of its term, and directing defendants to comply with the

agreement for the remainder of its term.

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10

2. A court order directing defendants to pay a sum total of $347,614.91

which encompasses: (1) the Promissory Note for $120,672.06,

representing delinquent contributions for the period May 2003

through August 2003, as well as for liquidated damages ($13,378.02)

and accrued interest at the rate of 6% ($3,958.70) on the delinquent

contributions for that period; and (2) $190,551.94, representing

delinquent contributions for the period September 2003 through

January 2004, and liquidated damages ($19,055.19) on the delinquent

contributions for that period.

3. A court order directing defendants to immediately cease and desist

from improperly reporting and untimely paying Trust Fund

contributions that are required to be paid to the various Trust Funds

referred to in the Carpenters Master Agreement.

4. A court order directing defendants to correctly report and timely pay

all required contributions to each and all of the various Trust Funds

referred to in the Carpenters Master Agreement. Timely payment

means that all payments must be paid “on or before the 15th and no

later than the 25th of each month following the work month for which

each such report is made.”

5. A court order directing defendants to pay $300.00 representing

defendants’ share of the cost of the arbitration proceedings.

See, Petition at Ex. D (Award).

II. Order Requiring Defendants to Submit to Audit and Pay All Sums

Revealed By Audit as Due and Owing

The governing CBA requires,

[e]ach individual employer upon request of the Union, the Employer,

or any Trust Fund specified in this Agreement, shall permit the Trust

Fund Auditors to review any and all records relevant to the

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11

enforcement of the provisions of this Agreement and to enter upon

the premises of such individual employer during business hours at

reasonable time or times to examine and copy such books, records,

papers or reports . . . as may be necessary to determine whether or not

the individual employer is making full payment of all sums required

by this Agreement.

Errata, at Ex. A (Carpenters Master Agreement) at §21 and (“Supp. Alcantar

Decl.”) at ¶2. Accordingly, we RECOMMEND that the District Court find that

plaintiffs are entitled to an audit of defendants' relevant records.

In addition, plaintiffs seek a court order requiring defendants to pay all sums

revealed as due and owing by the anticipated audit. 

Plaintiffs' counsel represented that the audit procedures followed by

plaintiffs include 

a formal audit request by the Trust Fund to defendants for an audit to

take place on the defendants’ premises at a reasonable time with

defendants paying the cost of the audit. If the audit reveals that

additional contribution amounts are due and owing to plaintiffs,

plaintiffs will request that the Court amend the Judgment to include

such amounts. If such request is necessary, plaintiffs will petition the

court in writing and will provide defendants with sufficient notice so

that they may appear if desired.

Supplemental Response at 7.

The Court FINDS that plaintiffs' stated practice provides defendants with a

sufficient opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the audit. Accordingly, we

RECOMMEND that the District Judge grant plaintiffs' request for an order

directing defendants to pay all sums revealed as due and owing by the audit on the

condition that defendants are given sufficient notice of the pendency of any court

proceedings and a fair opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the audit before

the District Judge. 

Plaintiffs also seek post-judgment interest on unpaid contributions which

are found as a result of the audit, if any. Response to Order for Supplemental

Briefing re Motion for Default Judgment, filed July 26, 2005, at 7:14-16. 

Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to post-judgment interest at a rate of 10%

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pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. §658.010. Id. At this juncture, no judgment has been

entered and no determination has been made that additional monies (principal) are

owing. Therefore, the Court makes no finding concerning whether interest on an

amount found at an audit, if any, is chargeable at all, the appropriate interest rate,

or whether post-judgment interest will run from the date of the original judgment

or from the date the judgement is amended. We RECOMMEND the District Judge

refrain from ruling on these matters until the issues become ripe.

III. Attorneys' Fees and Costs

Plaintiffs based their initial request for attorneys’ fees and costs on their

assertion that “defendant’s refusal to comply with the arbitration award is

unjustified and in bad faith.” See, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award at 4. Plaintiffs have also

indicated that their request for fees and costs may be based on the terms of the

CBA, the terms of the Promissory Note signed by Ms. Alvarez, and the March 10,

2004, Board of Adjustment’s Award. Supplemental Response at 7. Finally,

plaintiffs may also be entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under Section 1132(g)

of ERISA, which requires a court to award plaintiffs "reasonable attorney's fees

and costs of the action" when Trustees obtain a judgment in their favor recovering

delinquent contributions to fringe benefit trust funds. 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(2)(D);

Northwest Administrators Inc., v. Albertson's Inc., 104 F.3d 253, 258 (9th Cir.

1996). 

We found that the Board of Adjustment did not exceed its authority in

issuing the Award. See, section, I, supra. If the District Judge adopts our

recommendation to confirm the Board of Adjustment’s Award, the Award entitles

plaintiffs to reasonable fees and costs incurred to enforce the Award. 

Accordingly, we need not consider alternative bases for the fee award.

//

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13

A. Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of attorneys' fees in the amount $5,400.00. 

See, Supp. Lozano Decl. at ¶2; Declaration of Concepción E. Lozano-Batista in

Support of Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs, filed August 10, 2005, (“Fee

Decl.”) at ¶2. Plaintiffs incurred fees in connection with review of the file,

preparing documents (e.g., Petition), requesting default, and filing the motion for

default judgment and supporting documentation. Supp. Lozano Decl., at ¶2. 

Counsel expended twenty seven (27) hours in connection with this lawsuit. Based

on this Court's experience with similar cases and counsel’s billing entries, we

FIND that the number of hours expended by plaintiffs' counsel in connection with

the instant case is reasonable. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel billed at the rate of $200.00 per hour for work by Barry

Hinkle and Concepción E. Lozano-Batista. Declaration of Concepción E. LozanoBatista in Support of Motion for Default Judgment, filed May 16, 2005, (“Lozano

Decl.”) at ¶2. Mr. Hinkle is a managing shareholder at Weinberg, Roger &

Rosenfeld and was admitted to the California Bar in 1976. He has been with the

firm for 22 years. Ms. Lozano-Batista is an associate attorney at Weinberg, Roger,

& Rosenfeld and was admitted to the California Bar in 2003. She has been with

the firm for one year. Supp. Lozano Decl., at ¶3. At the hearing on plaintiffs’

Motion, plaintiffs’ counsel represented that Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld has

agreed to bill its union clients at the rate of $200.00 per hour for both attorneys

despite the fact that Mr. Hinkle is substantially more experienced and could seek a

higher rate. Ms. Lozano-Batista also confirmed that the firm’s union and trust

fund clients are actually billed at this rate and pay it. Having sat in this

jurisdiction for 21 years, and having learned a great deal over that period about

billing rates in this region for a wide range of legal work, the undersigned is wellpositioned to pass judgment on the reasonableness of the hourly rates for which

counsel seek compensation here. Accordingly, we FIND, and we RECOMMEND

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9Plaintiffs’ counsel stated, “our client will be billed for courier service for filing

Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and related papers.” Lozano Decl., at ¶11 and Supp.

Lozano Decl., at ¶11 (emphasis added). However, as far as we can tell, plaintiffs’ never

submitted evidence indicating the amount of that charge. Accordingly, no reimbursement for

this request is included.

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that the District Judge find, that counsel’s billing rate is commensurate with the

prevailing market rate in the Bay Area for lawyers of plaintiffs' counsels' skill and

experience doing the kind of work this matter involved.

Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement for fees incurred for work by their

counsel’s “paralegal department” which includes a “senior paralegal," a

“paralegal,” and a "Litigation Case Clerk." Supp. Lozano Decl., at ¶¶4-8. Courts

routinely reimburse litigants for work conducted by a paralegal. Based on the

Court's experience with similar cases and familiarity with billing rates in this

jurisdiction, we FIND both the amount of time spent by the paralegals as well as

their billing rates reasonable. However, plaintiffs have cited no legal authority for

their claim that they are entitled to reimbursement for work conducted by a

“litigation case clerk.” The cost of utilizing staff such as Ms. Natwick, the

"litigation case clerk," is in the nature of “overhead” and is typically subsumed

within the billing rates charged for the firm’s attorneys. Therefore, the Court

FINDS that plaintiffs have not proved that they are entitled to $131.25 charged for

Ms. Natwick’s time. Accordingly, we RECOMMEND that Judge Hamilton deny

plaintiffs’ request for reimbursement of ‘fees’ incurred for work conducted by the

“litigation case clerk.”

B. Costs

Plaintiffs request costs in the amount of $715.68. Supp. Lozano Decl., at

¶11. This request encompasses costs for the Court’s filing fee, courier and various

other service costs, and costs incurred conducting electronic research. Supp.

Lozano Decl., at ¶10.9 We are satisfied both that plaintiffs incurred all of the costs

listed above, and that the costs are reasonable.

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10Plaintiffs’ counsel’s final fee summation totaled $7,765.00. Fee Decl., at ¶5. According

to our math, however, the total is $6,065.00; this sum is based on $4,700.00 for attorneys’ fees

as evidenced in paragraph 2 of the Supplemental Lozano Declaration, $700.00 for attorneys’ fees

as evidenced in the “Fee Declaration” and $665.00 for paralegal fees as evidenced in paragraph

4 of the Supplemental Lozano Declaration.

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C. Total Fees and Costs

If the District Judge adopts this Court's recommendation to confirm the

Board of Adjustment Award, we RECOMMEND that the District Judge award

plaintiffs costs and fees in the amount of $6,780.68 ($5,400.00 for counsel’s fees,

$665.00 for their paralegals, and costs for $715.68).10

IV. Conclusion

We RECOMMEND that Judge Hamilton CONFIRM the March 10, 2004,

Board of Adjustment Award. 

We also RECOMMEND that Judge Hamilton GRANT plaintiffs' request for

default judgment for the following:

(1) an order directing defendants to submit to an audit,

(2) an order requiring defendants to pay all sums revealed as due and owing by

the contemplated audit on the condition that defendants are given actual

notice of the pendency of any further Court proceedings and an opportunity

to challenge the results of the audit, and 

(3) attorneys' fees and costs in the amount $6,780.68.

The Court ORDERS plaintiffs to serve a copy of this Report and

Recommendation on defendants immediately.

IT IS SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.

Dated: September 16, 2005

/s/ Wayne D. Brazil 

WAYNE D. BRAZIL

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to: 

Plaintiffs with direction to serve defendants, 

PJH, wdb, stats

Case 4:05-cv-00569-PJH Document 32 Filed 09/16/05 Page 15 of 15