Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02439/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02439-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 00:0000 Cause Code Unknown

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1 The United States of America is the sole remaining

defendant; the other named defendant in the complaint, Child

Development Center Number Three was dismissed pursuant to the

court's order of January 7, 2005 (granting the government's

unopposed motion to dismiss said defendant and certain causes of

action against the government)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

NICHOLAS SIUDA, by and through

his Guardian Ad Litem, TERESA

SIUDA, DOMINICK TRANFAGLIA, by

and through his Guardian Ad

Litem, CHRISTINA TRANFAGLIA,

NO. CIV. S-03-2439 FCD/KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant United States

of America’s (“defendant”)1 motion for summary judgment, or in

the alternative, partial summary judgment in this Federal Tort

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2 Plaintiff brings the instant suit against the

government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2671-2680, which is the source of the court’s jurisdiction

over the matter.

3 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to a

“Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

Claims Act2 case involving allegations of child abuse at a United

States Air Force preschool. Plaintiffs Nicholas Siuda

(“Nicholas”) and Dominick Tranfaglia (“Dominick”) (collectively,

“plaintiffs”), by and through their mothers as guardians ad

litem, oppose the motion.

The court heard oral argument on December 16, 2005. At the

hearing, the court granted plaintiffs leave to file a motion to

re-open discovery, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b),3

to depose a former employee of the preschool; plaintiffs filed

said motion on December 21, 2005; defendant filed its opposition

on December 23, 2005. 

By this order, the court now renders its decision on both

motions. Because the court denies plaintiffs’ motion to re-open

discovery, it reaches the merits of defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court

DENIES defendant’s motion.

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4 The following factual background includes facts

objected to by defendant on the basis of “inadmissible hearsay.” 

As set forth below, the court overrules defendant’s global

objection to all of plaintiffs’ evidence, except plaintiffs’

deposition testimony. Accordingly, the facts as described herein

relate both to the facts as developed at the time of the alleged

incidents of abuse and as subsequently testified to by plaintiffs

in their depositions in this case. Unless otherwise noted, the

facts recited herein are undisputed. (See Def.’s Mem. of P. &

A., Stmt. of Undisputed Facts [“SUF”], filed Sept. 27, 2005, at

2-11; Pls’ Opp’n, filed Nov. 21, 2005, at 7-11.) Where the facts

are in dispute, the court recounts plaintiffs’ version of the

facts.

5 Ms. Costa recalls that Mr. Suida came up to her on the

playground and told her about the conversation between Rocky and

Nicholas. (SUF at ¶ 2.) 

3

BACKGROUND4

According to Nicholas' mother, Teresa Siuda (“Mrs. Suida”),

on September 15, 2000 when she picked Nicholas, age four, up from

the Child Development Center Number Three at Travis Air Force

Base (“CDC3"), Nicholas told her he had a new friend named Rocky

(also age four). (Ex. D [Mrs. Suida’s Depo.] to Def.’s Appendix

of Evid. [“DAE”], filed Sept. 27, 2005, at 62:6-63:5.) Nicholas

told Mrs. Suida that he was mad at Rocky because Rocky asked him

to play a game called "pee pee in the butt" while they were in

the playground train. Nicholas said he told Rocky he did not

want to play; Rocky said that if Nicholas did not play he was

going to punch Nicholas in the face; Nicholas said if you punch

me, I'm going to punch you right back. Nicholas told his mother

that nothing else happened. (Id. at 32:17-21; 64:13-65:6.)

On September 18, 2000 (the next business day), Nicholas'

parents told the Director of CDC3, Teresa Costa (“Ms. Costa”),

about the conversation between Rocky and Nicholas.5 According to

Mrs. Suida, Ms. Costa promised that Rocky would not be near

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4

Nicholas anymore. (Id. at 78:23-80:10.) Mrs. Suida has no

information that Nicholas and Rocky were ever together after that

date. (Id. at 85:22-86:10.)

After her conversation with the Suidas, Ms. Costa confirmed

that Rocky and Nicholas were assigned to separate classrooms. 

While the classrooms were completely self-contained, they did, at

times, share the playground. Ms. Costa notified the teachers

about the incident, and that Nicholas’ parents were concerned

about Nicholas being with Rocky. However, she did not do a

formal incident report as she believed, at the time, the

circumstances did not indicate abuse. She tried to contact

Rocky’s parents but was not able to do so. (SUF ¶ 2.) Ms. Costa

later testified that Rocky’s conversation with Nicholas was a

“red flag” for possible sexual abuse. (Ex. 2 [Costa Depo.] to

Pls.’ Appendix of Evid. [“PAE”], filed Nov. 21, 2005, at 110:25-

111:19.)

Thereafter, on September 20, 2000, according to Dominick's

mother, Christina Tranfaglia (“Mrs. Tranfaglia”), a teacher at

CDC3 (Sandrea O’Conner, known as “Ms. Sam”) told her about an

incident between Rocky and Dominick (also age four). (Ex. E

[“Mrs. Tranfaglia’s Depo.”] to DAE at 43:22-44:8.) Ms. Sam told

Mrs. Tranfaglia that she found Rocky and Dominick under the loft

at the school (which is located inside the classroom) with their

pants down; Dominick was on his hands and knees with his buttocks

facing Rocky who was on his knees with his pants pulled down. 

Dominick was crying and pulling away from Rocky saying "no, no,

no." Rocky was sent home. (Id.) The next morning, Dominick’s

parents, reported the incident to Ms. Costa, who asked Ms. Sam to

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5

write a written report. (SUF ¶ 3.) Ms. Sam did so. (Id.)

Mrs. Tranfaglia testified that Dominick told her Rocky had

asked Dominick to pull down his pants and that Rocky had asked

him to "kiss his (Rocky’s) pee pee;" Dominick admitted he

complied with Rocky's request and kissed Rocky's “pee pee” and

Rocky kissed Dominick's “pee pee.” (Ex. 6 [Mrs. Tranfaglia’s

Depo.] to PAE at 52:2-3, 56:3-8, 59:13-15.) Dominick also told

Mrs. Tranfaglia that Rocky wanted to play a game called “kiss

butts.” (Id. at 44:12-16.) 

After the incident involving Rocky and Dominick, Ms. Costa

reported the incident as well as the incident involving Nicholas

and Rocky to the Flight Chief and Family Advocacy Services (SUF ¶

3); due to those reports and to the complaints and concerns of

plaintiffs’ parents, the Commander at Travis Air Force Base

called for a Command Directed Investigation ("CDI") of the

management of CDC3. (Ex. F to DAE.) An investigator was

appointed to inquire into the handling and reporting of child

abuse cases and the training qualification procedures for child

care providers at the CDCs on base. Neither plaintiffs nor Rocky

were interviewed as part of this investigation because the

substantiation or non-substantiation of their allegations were

not part of the investigation. (Id.)

Ultimately, the CDI concluded that all of the teachers at

CDC3 were properly trained and that the incidents were properly

reported. (Id.) While the report also concluded that the

students were properly supervised, it determined that the loft

inside the school and the train structure on the playground gave

the children a place to hide and prevented adult supervision. 

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6 Plaintiffs did not specifically object to this

description of the purposes and nature of the OSI investigation. 

However, neither side offered into evidence any documentation of

the investigation, other than the videotapes of plaintiffs’ and

Rocky’s interviews. The court has nonetheless provided these

facts for background.

6

The report recommended the train play-structure be removed and

that the loft be removed or re-configured. (Ex. 11 to PAE.)

Additionally, upon being notified by the Family Advocacy

Office about a possible case of child abuse, the Air Force Office

of Special Investigations ("OSI") conducted an investigation; as

part of the investigation, various children were interviewed,

including plaintiffs and Rocky, and their interviews were

videotaped. The interviews were conducted by Jim Mowry, a

twelve-year OSI investigator who had received special training in

the forensic interviewing of children. According to defendant,

the purpose of the investigation was not to determine precisely

what occurred at the daycare, but rather to obtain leads to help

determine if any children were being sexually abused by an adult,

specifically an Air Force member. The investigation concluded

that Rocky learned the sexual behavior he was exhibiting from

someone (a ten year old) who had no affiliation with the Air

Force; the matter was referred to the Sacramento County Child

Protective Services. (Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 5:3-14.)6

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7 The court has reviewed the videotaped interviews of

Dominick, Nicholas, and Rocky (a transcript of the tapes was not

provided to the court by the parties). In the papers, both

parties describe the children’s testimony but in doing so they 

characterize the testimony in an effort to support their opposing

positions. The videotapes, however, speak for themselves. 

(Lodged Videotapes, filed Nov. 21, 2005 [Docket #35].) 

Nonetheless, for purposes of this order, the following summary of

the interviews is provided, based on the court’s review of the

videotapes; although, it is not intended to be a verbatim

transcript but rather an un-characterized description of the key

facts.

7

During Dominick’s videotaped interview,7 on September 26,

2000, Dominick first denies he knows Rocky, then later says he

does, that he plays with him, and that Rocky is one years old. 

Dominick describes that Rocky showed Dominick Rocky's privates

and Dominick "just walked away." Dominick says on one occasion

in the loft, Rocky touched Dominick's penis by reaching into

Dominick's clothes; Dominick did not touch Rocky's penis.

During Nicholas' videotaped interview, on October 10, 2000, 

Nicholas described an incident where he did not want to go in the

playground train with Rocky because something bad would happen;

he "didn't want to do it again." He described “it” as a game of

"butts and pee pees;" and that he had played it with Rocky before

("we had did it at school"). With the use of drawings of bodies,

Nicholas described how the game was played where Rocky put his

penis in Nicholas' butt and mouth and Nicholas did the same to

Rocky. He described that he played the game "5 or 6 or 4 times."

During Rocky's videotaped interviews on September 22 and

October 27, 2000, Rocky described that Dominick touched Rocky's

butt and “pee pee” (penis). Rocky described that Dominick put

his “pee pee” in Rocky's butt and that Rocky put his “pee pee” in

Dominick's butt; he said this took place at his house. Rocky

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8

also describes that Dominick sucked Rocky's “pee pee” at his

house and that Rocky sucked Dominick's “pee pee.” Rocky further

describes playing "kiss butts" and "pee pee in the butts" in the

loft at school with Dominick and Nicholas. Rocky learned the

"kiss butts" game from Chas, an older boy he knew and who he

played the game with; he also played "pee pee in the butt" with

Chas at Chas' house; he played "pee pee in the butt" with Chas by

sucking Chas' penis and then Chas' sucking Rocky's penis.

Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on November 24, 2003. 

In the course of discovery, plaintiffs depositions were taken. 

On April 28, 2005, Dominick, then 9, testified to the following: 

He remembers going to daycare at CDC3; he does not remember the

names of any children, except Rocky. (SUF at ¶ 27.) An incident

happened in the playground train structure with Rocky; Rocky

showed his penis to Dominick and Dominick then showed his penis

to Rocky. (Id. at ¶s 31, 33.) Dominick did so because Rocky

told him to do it. Dominick grabbed the waistband of his shorts,

quickly showed his penis and then pulled his shorts back up. 

(Id. at ¶ 33.) Rocky blocked Dominick's way out of the train

until Dominick showed Rocky his penis; then Rocky let Dominick

out. (Id.) Rocky did not touch or kiss Dominick's penis or

buttocks and Dominick did not touch or kiss Rocky's penis or

buttocks. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Dominick does not remember if a

teacher caught him and Rocky during the incident. (Id. at ¶ 36.) 

Dominick does not remember anything ever happening with Rocky in

the loft inside the school. (Id.) Dominick stated there were

never any other incidents with Rocky. (Id. at ¶ 38.)

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28 8 Ms. Sam currently resides in Terra Haute, Indiana.

9

On April 29, 2005, Nicholas, then 9, testified to the following: 

He does not remember going to daycare at CDC3. (Id. at ¶ 8.) He

does not remember anything bad happening to him there. (Id. at ¶

9.) Nicholas stated he has never heard of a game called "kiss

butts" or "pee pee in the butts" and has never played it with

anyone. (Id. at ¶ 15.) No one has ever pulled his pants down

and showed Nicholas his penis; Nicholas has never lowered his

pants and shown anyone his penis. (Id. at ¶s 16-17.)

No one, other than his mother, father, or a doctor has ever

touched Nicholas' penis or buttocks; Nicholas has never touched

any other child's penis or buttocks. (Id. at ¶s 18-21.)

Finally, plaintiffs proffer evidence that over the years

since the abuse, they have made statements regarding the abuse by

Rocky to physicians and/or therapists. (Exs. 4, 7, 9 to PAE.)

ANALYSIS

I.

Motion to Re-Open Discovery

Plaintiffs move to re-open discovery to take the deposition

of Ms. Sam,8 the teacher at CDC3 who found Rocky and Dominick

under the loft with their pants down, on the grounds that: (1)

the original discovery deadline was only extended by the court at

plaintiffs' request some 75 days; (2) as became apparent at the

summary judgment hearing, Ms. Sam's testimony is critical to the

liability issues in this case, namely whether the staff at CDC3

adequately supervised the children and whether the play

structures at the facility prevented them from doing so; and

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9 Counsel’s schedule included a two-week trial in another

case; responses to four summary judgment motions; preparation for

a major medical malpractice trial which was continued at the last

minute in late October; and significant other discovery in this

case.

10

(3) "extenuating circumstances" provide "equitable grounds" for

granting plaintiffs’ motion in that plaintiffs' counsel is a sole

practitioner who has had an extremely impacted schedule over the

last six months.9

Pursuant to Rule 16, a pretrial scheduling order "shall not

be modified except upon a showing of good cause." Fed. R. Civ.

P. 16(b). That "good cause" standard primarily focuses upon the

diligence of the party requesting the amendment. The district

court may modify the pretrial schedule "if it cannot reasonably

be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.

1992). "Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the

party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons

to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving

party's reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not

diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. at 610.

Plaintiffs’ showing is insufficient to demonstrate good

cause to re-open discovery for several reasons. First,

plaintiffs have had ample time to complete discovery in this

case. The case was filed November 23, 2003 and the pretrial

scheduling order issued May 5, 2004; that order set the close of

discovery for July 12, 2005. However, at plaintiffs' request,

defendant stipulated, and the court ordered, the continuation of

the discovery cut-off twice, ultimately extending the date to

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11

September 26, 2005. Second, plaintiffs ignore the fact that

during the course of discovery in this case (which they maintain

was "substantial"), their counsel took only one deposition, and

during the extension of discovery for some eleven weeks,

plaintiffs did not take any depositions. Third, plaintiffs’

counsel was specifically informed by defendant of Ms. Sam's

whereabouts on May 9, 2005 and had adequate time to take her

deposition before the original discovery cut-off on July 12 and

certainly before the extended cut-off on September 26. Fourth,

plaintiffs have known of the need to depose Ms. Sam since the

inception of this case; her written statement was part of the CDI

investigation which plaintiffs have had since the beginning of

this case. Finally, in opposing defendant's motion for summary

judgment, plaintiffs did not request to re-open discovery or make

a motion under Rule 56(f); rather, they requested leave to file

the instant motion only after the court's comments at oral

argument emphasizing the relevance of Ms. Sam’s testimony. 

Therefore, for all of these reasons, the court DENIES

plaintiffs’ motion to re-open discovery. If plaintiffs are to

succeed in defeating defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

they must do so without the deposition testimony of Ms. Sam.

II.

Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Evidentiary Issues

Defendant moves for summary judgment arguing that plaintiffs

have no admissible evidence that they were sexually abused or

molested at CDC3; defendant argues that any statements plaintiffs

made regarding the alleged abuse by Rocky to their mothers, to

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12

the OCI investigator, and/or to physicians or therapists are

inadmissible hearsay. Defendant contends that the only

admissible evidence is plaintiffs' deposition testimony which

defendant argues demonstrates that “no actionable conduct

occurred;” rather, according to defendant, plaintiffs’ deposition

testimony reveals nothing “more than normal inquisitive sex play

between 4-year-olds.” (Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 2:6.) 

To the contrary, plaintiffs maintain that the "underlying"

evidence of abuse (i.e., plaintiffs' statements to their parents,

the investigator and/or doctors) are admissible under the

residual exception to the hearsay rule (Federal Rule of Evidence

[“FRE”] 807) and/or as recorded recollection (FRE 803(5)) and/or

as statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis (FRE

803(4)).

The court notes preliminarily that, at least with respect to

Dominick, reliance on evidence outside his deposition testimony

may not be necessary to defeat summary judgment. Unlike

Nicholas, who recalled nothing about the alleged abuse at his

deposition, Dominick describes at least one incident of alleged

abuse which a reasonable trier of fact could determine is

“actionable.” At a minimum, Dominick describes a situation were

he was forced by Rocky to show Rocky his penis in order to be let

out of the train play-structure. Contrary to defendant’s

characterization of the event, a reasonable trier of fact could

well find this incident more than mere “inquisitive sex-play” as

the conduct was coerced. 

Nevertheless, leaving this point aside, the court first

considers, generally, whether the videotaped interviews of

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10 While plaintiffs did not specifically request admission

of Rocky’s videotaped interviews, the court considers the issue

as Rocky’s interviews provide important corroboration of

plaintiffs’ statements.

13

Nicholas, Dominick and Rocky10 are admissible. Because the court

finds that the residual exception to the hearsay rule applies to

the videotapes, it does not consider the applicability of FRE

803(5) (recorded recollection).

FRE 807 provides: "A statement not specifically covered by

Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees

of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if:"

(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (2)

the statement is more probative on the point for which it is

offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure

through reasonable efforts; and (3) the general purposes of these

rules and the interests of justice will best be served by

admission of the statement into evidence. While courts have

restricted application of this rule to extraordinary

circumstances, courts have specifically employed the residual

exception in child abuse litigation to admit hearsay statements

of the victims. United States v. Harrison, 296 F.3d 994, 1004

(10th Cir. 2002) (finding the consistency of the child abuse

victim's prior statements to an FBI agent about the sexual abuse

by the defendant sufficient to establish their "trustworthiness,"

even though the victim subsequently recanted her statements); Doe

v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1079 (7th Cir. 1992)

(consistency and graphic descriptions by three year old child

abuse victim to her mother strongly suggest her statements were

trustworthy); United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 392 (4th

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11 Plaintiffs offer testimony from their expert, Dr.

Grogan, as to the reliability of the process used. (Exs. 3, 10 to

PAE.)

12 The court notes Dr. Grogan reviewed the tapes and

concluded that the statements of the children bore remarkable

similarities and were corroborative of each other (Ex. 10 to

PAE.)

14

Cir. 1998) (repetition and consistency of teenage abuse victims’

statements about their father to government officials render the

statements trustworthy).

Similarly here, sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness are

present in that: (1) the children were questioned by Jim Mowry, a

12 year veteran OSI investigator who had received special

training in forensic interviewing of child abuse victims; (2) the

interviews were conducted according to an organized template

which tested the children's ability to discern truth from lies;

their cognitive ability; their ability to understand and express

spatial relationships; and their recollection of their

interactions with each other at CDC3;11 (3) the statements were

taken close in time to the alleged incidents (within days, if not

at the longest, within approximately a month); (4) the children

corroborated, at least in part, one another's stories, including

descriptions of the same games, “kiss butts,” “kiss pee pees,”

and “pee pee in the butt,” coerced contact by Rocky, and

touchings in similar ways12; (5) importantly, plaintiffs’

statements were corroborated, at least in part, by the alleged

abuser, Rocky; and (6) plaintiffs repeated their statements, at

least in part, to parents and physicians/therapists.

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15

The court acknowledges, as defendant strenuously points out, that

there are inconsistencies in the interviews (see Defs.’ Reply,

filed Dec. 5, 2005, at 6-9), however, the court must take into

account the age of the children at the time, (four years old),

and the gravity of the situation for these children. (See Ex. 10

[Dr. Grogan’s Report] to PAE [describing the impact of this type

of abuse on such young children]); United States v. Dorian, 803

F.2d 1439, 1444 (8th Cir. 1986) (inconsistency did not render a

five year old sexual abuse victim’s hearsay statements unreliable

since “it frequently takes a long time for children to share what

is really going on and they may then do so in stages, telling a

little more each time.”) As the court remarked at oral argument,

defendant’s view of these videotapes is too mechanical, offering

too little leeway for consideration of the children’s age and the

serious circumstances. See Doe, 976 F.2d at 1079 (“it is to

overall consistency that we look, not constancy with regard to

each and every detail”) (emphasis in original). 

Finally, the court does not consider persuasive defendant’s

reliance on Mr. Mowry’s interrogatory response that “based on the

age of the children, it would be very hard for me to say any of

the interviews were ‘trustworthy’ statements.” Defendant takes

this statement out of context. Mowry's response to

interrogatories, construed as a deposition on written questions,

was in reply to the question: "Please set forth each and every

step you took to obtain a trustworthy forensic statement from

[Nicholas and Dominick] when you interviewed him on videotape in

the course of the . . . [OSI investigation]." Mowry's complete

response was as follows: 

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[H]owever, there is an important aspect which I think 

needs clarification. The facts inserted in the Report 

of Investigation (ROI) were facts AS presented by the

witnesses and victims in this case. I cannot state 

that any of my actions made their forensic videotape

statements "trustworthy." I have opinions pertaining to

this case that were never contained in the ROI (we 

don't report opinions, just facts). I took all the steps 

I could with all the VERY young children in this case, 

but based on the age of the children, it would be very 

hard for me to say any of the interviews were "trustworthy"

statements.

(Ex. 12 to PAE.) Thus, Mowry’s response is not contrary to the

court’s findings. He simply states his opinion that based on the

children’s age it is not possible to say definitely that their

statements are trustworthy. Similarly the court does not find

that the videotaped interviews are per se trustworthy, rather

that, based on the totality of circumstances, addressed above,

“sufficient” guarantees of trustworthiness are present. Doe, 976

F.2d at 1080-81.

As to the remaining elements of FRE 807, they are easily met

(indeed, defendant did not argue said elements could not be met;

rather its argument focused only on the initial inquiry of

“trustworthiness”): The videotapes interviews address a material

fact–-the alleged abuse. The videotapes are arguably the most

probative evidence on the issue of abuse since the statements

were made close in time to the alleged events, rather than five

years later at the time of Nicholas' and Dominick's depositions.

Also, considering the children's age, only four years old, the

statements likely have more indicia of trustworthiness then than

they do now (5 years after the events). Likewise, the court

considers significant that plaintiffs did not simply repeat in

their depositions what their parents could have easily “coached”

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them to testify (see Doe, 976 F.2d at 1079 [“‘Consistency does

not always guarantee trustworthiness; it could be evidence that

the statements were rehearsed.’”]); in failing to recall the

abuse, the children arguably appear more credible. Lastly, the

interests of justice are served in introducing the evidence,

namely the protection of minors who suffered child abuse.

For largely the same reasons, Nicholas' and Dominick's

statements to their parents would also be admissible under FRE

807. Doe, 976 F.2d at 1080-81 (admitting three year old child's

statements to mother under FRE 807). Specifically as to the

trustworthiness of the statements, they were made on the alleged

day of the incidents, they were highly descriptive and detailed,

plaintiffs acknowledge their involvement and compliance with

Rocky’s demands, and the statements were unsolicited.

Finally, regarding plaintiffs’ (and their parents’)

statements to physicians and/or therapists, plaintiffs argue the

statements are admissible under FRE 803(4) which provides:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 

even though the declarant is available as a witness: 

. . . (4). . . Statements made for purposes of medical

diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, 

or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or 

the inception or general character of the cause or 

external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent 

to diagnosis or treatment.

Courts have consistently admitted under FRE 803(4) statements

made by child abuse victims and their parents to

physicans/therapists in the course of treatment of the child. 

See United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436-38 (8th Cir.

1985) (statements made by child abuse victim to her treating

physician identifying defendant as the abuser were admissible);

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Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948-49(4th Cir. 1988) (child

abuse victim's statements about the abuse to her physician should

have been admitted despite victim's competency to testify at

trial) ; United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172, 176-77 (8th Cir.

1989) (minor sexual assault victim’s statements to psychologists

and physicians regarding identity of assailant admissible under

FRE 803(4)). Plaintiffs proffer evidence that both Dominick and

Nicholas sought and received psychiatric treatment as a result of

the incidents. (Exs. 4, 7, 9 to PAE.) As part of that

treatment, plaintiffs and their parents made statements to

doctors and therapists about the abuse by Rocky. Said evidence

is admissible under the above cited authorities.

B. Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see California v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, "the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine

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13 Pending against defendant are the following claims as

set forth in plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, filed January

30, 2004: (1) First Cause of Action – Negligent Daycare Operation

(2) Second Cause of Action – Negligent Childcare; (3) Third Cause

of Action – Negligent Hiring; (4) Fourth Cause of Action –

Negligent Supervision; (5) Fifth Cause of Action – Abuse of a

Minor; (6) Sixth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress; (7) Eighth Cause of Action – Premises

Liability; and (8) Ninth Cause of Action – Breach of Fiduciary

Duty. Per the court’s order of January 7, 2005 (Docket #18),

plaintiffs’ claims against defendant for the following were

dismissed:(1) Seventh Cause of Action – Battery; (2) Tenth Cause

of Action – Intentional Misrepresentation; (3) Eleventh Cause of

Action – Negligent Misrepresentation; (4) Twelfth Cause of Action

– Breach of Contract; and (5) Thirteenth Cause of Action –

Negligence Per Se.

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Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show "that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party

"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

C. Claims for Relief13

It must be noted initially that defendant does not move for

summary judgment specifically as to each pending cause of action

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against it, described above (fn. 13); instead, defendant argues,

generally, in the motion that plaintiffs cannot sustain a

"negligence claim” against defendant because (1) “nothing

consequential happened at [the] daycare” by plaintiffs' own

admissions in their deposition testimony and (2) "even if

something [actionable] occurred at CDC3, there are no facts to

establish [negligence]." (Mem. of P. & A. at 14, 16.) Thus, for

purposes of resolving the motion only two inquires are relevant:

(1) whether a triable issue of fact exists as to instances of

"child abuse" and (2) if so, whether a triable issue of fact

exists as to defendant's "negligence."

Regarding the first inquiry, the court’s evidentiary rulings

above are dispositive of the issue. Considering plaintiffs’

statements to their parents, to the OCI investigator, and to

physicians/therapists, there is ample evidence to raise a triable

issue of fact that instances of child abuse occurred at CDC3. 

Specifically regarding Nicholas, while defendant is correct that

his deposition testimony does not provide a factual basis for his

claim, his prior statements to his parents, his videotaped

interview, and his statements to his physicians and therapists

supply evidence of the abuse. As to Dominick, his deposition

testimony alone raises a triable issue as to abuse; contrary to

defendant's characterization that the described incident was

simply “one brief incident [between] two 4-year-olds involving a

[game] of ‘you show me yours and I’ll show you mine,’” Dominick

is clear that his actions, in pulling down his pants to show

Rocky his penis, were not voluntary but coerced by Rocky who

would not let him leave the train play-structure without

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14 The government strongly objects, on the basis of

inadmissible hearsay, to any reliance on the written report of

“Ms. Sam.” Ms. Sam’s report, written at the direction of Ms.

Costa, was not provided to the court as evidence on the motion

for summary judgment. Instead, evidence of her observations came

in through the deposition testimony of Dominick’s mother and Ms.

Costa, who was also told of the incident between Dominick and

Rocky by Ms. Sam. In one sense, said evidence is not hearsay as

it is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted but

rather as evidence of “notice” and/or a lack of supervision of

the children by the CDC3; although, plaintiffs do also seek to

rely on Ms. Sam’s observations as evidence of the abuse itself. 

In that regard, the evidence is inadmissible hearsay. However,

admission of the evidence is not necessary for plaintiffs to

defeat summary judgment. Importantly, Dominick also told his

mother about the incident in the loft (which Ms. Sam apparently

observed at least in part). That evidence comes in, for the

reasons stated above, under FRE 807. 

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complying with Rocky’s demand. Additionally, considering the

other evidence which the court finds admissible, including

Dominick’s statements to his mother, the OCI investigator, and

his doctors and therapists further support a finding of a triable

issue of fact as to abuse.

As to the next inquiry, defendant argues that even

considering all the alleged evidence of abuse (including what it

deems the "inadmissible hearsay evidence"), plaintiffs have no

evidence of defendant's negligence. At most, defendant argues

the evidence establishes only two events of which the CDC3 was

aware: (1) the conversation between Rocky and Dominick wherein

Rocky asked Nicholas to play a game of “pee pee in the butt” and

if he did not play, Rocky would punch Nicholas in the face and

(2) the incident in the loft between Rocky and Dominick where

they were found by Ms. Sam with their pants down (Dominick 

described to his mother that Rocky had asked him in the loft to

pull down his pants and “kiss Rocky’s pee pee” which Dominick did

and Rocky kissed Dominick’s penis).14 As to both instances,

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defendant argues it acted appropriately in response to the

complaints.

Under the FTCA, liability is determined applying the

substantive tort law of the state where the incident occurred,

which in this case is California. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. 

California Civil Code § 1714(a) sets out a basic standard of

conduct: "Everyone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned

to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the

management of his property or person." For liability to exist,

there must be a legal duty owed which was breached. Nally v.

Grace Community Church, 47 Cal.3d 278, 292 (1988). Here, the

parties do not dispute that under California law, child

development centers are deemed as having a special relationship

with the children under their care, and that that special

relationship imposes a duty upon the adult care givers to protect

the children under their care from harm resulting from third

party misconduct that is reasonably foreseeable. See Gavin W. v.

YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles, 106 Cal. App. 4th 662, 665

(2003). Specifically, a daycare center can be liable if a

plaintiff establishes that the center’s employees negligently

failed in their duty to protect and safeguard the children while

they were under the center’s care and control. Doe v. United

States, 838 F.2d 220, 224 (7th Cir. 1988). As in Doe, central to

this case is whether CDC3 employees properly supervised the

children.

Defendant argues first that plaintiffs have no evidence CDC3

was aware of any problems with Rocky prior to being informed of

the above two incidents between plaintiffs and Rocky. Once

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15 Section 646 provides in full: “(a) As used in this

section, "defendant" includes any party against whom the res ipsa

loquitur presumption operates. (b) The judicial doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur is a presumption affecting the burden of producing

evidence. (c) If the evidence, or facts otherwise established,

would support a res ipsa loquitur presumption and the defendant

has introduced evidence which would support a finding that he was

not negligent or that any negligence on his part was not a

proximate cause of the occurrence, the court may, and upon

request shall, instruct the jury to the effect that: (1) If the

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informed of them, defendant contends CDC3 acted appropriately. 

As support, defendant points to the evidence that: After her

conversation with Nicholas’ parents, Ms. Costa confirmed that

Rocky and Nicholas were assigned to separate classrooms; she

talked with staff about the incident and notified them about

Nicholas' parents’ concern about Rocky and Nicholas being

together; and she attempted to contact Rocky's parents. After

the report regarding Dominick and Rocky, Ms. Costa asked Ms. Sam

to provide a written statement; she immediately contacted the

Flight Chief and Family Advocacy Services; she then spoke with

Rocky's mother and Rocky was not allowed to stay at daycare that

day. Defendant thereafter fully investigated the facility and

plaintiffs’ complaints through the CDI and OCI investigations. 

In further support of this fact, defendant offers the declaration

of its expert, Toni Koppen, the Chief of Family Member Programs

for the Air Force, who concluded that all Air Force policies and

procedures were followed in this case (Ex. G to DAE at 4-5.)

Plaintiffs argue, to the contrary, that by application of

the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter, defendant's negligence may be

presumed. In California, the doctrine is defined by statute as

“a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.” Cal.

Evid. Code § 646(b).15 The presumption arises when the evidence

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facts which would give rise to res ipsa loquitur presumption are

found or otherwise established, the jury may draw the inference

from such facts that a proximate cause of the occurrence was some

negligent conduct on the part of the defendant; and (2) The jury

shall not find that a proximate cause of the occurrence was some

negligent conduct on the part of the defendant unless the jury

believes, after weighing all the evidence in the case and drawing

such inferences therefrom as the jury believes are warranted,

that it is more probable than not that the occurrence was caused

by some negligent conduct on the part of the defendant.”

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establishes three conditions: (1) the accident must be of a kind

which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's

negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality

within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must

not have been due to the voluntary action or contribution on the

part of the plaintiff. See Brown v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 4

Cal. 4th 820, 825-26 (1993). A presumption affecting the burden

of proof requires the trier of fact to assume the existence of

the presumed fact unless the defendant produces evidence to the

contrary. Id. “If the defendant introduces ‘evidence which

would support a finding that he was not negligent or that any

negligence on his part was not a proximate cause of the

occurrence,’ the trier of fact determines whether defendant was

negligent without regard to the presumption, simply by weighing

the evidence.” Id. at 826. 

Here, absent applicability of this doctrine, plaintiffs

cannot withstand summary judgment, at least with regard to

Nicholas, as they have not proffered any evidence that CDC3 knew

of any wrongdoing by or problems with Rocky, prior to Nicholas’

parents’ complaint on September 18, 2000. Considering the

evidence, however, as revealed by Nicholas in his videotaped OCI

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interview, plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of fact

sufficient to find that plaintiffs may be entitled to the res

ipsa loquiter presumption. 

Neither party offers any controlling case law, nor is the

court aware of any, either invoking or disallowing the res ipsa

loquiter presumption in a case involving similar facts. From the

court’s research, the most analogous California cases arise in

the child dependency context, involving invocation of California

Welfare and Institutions Code § 355.1, which has been compared to

the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter. See In re E.H., 108 Cal. App.

4

th 659, 669-70 (2003). Section 355.1 also creates a presumption

affecting the burden of proof. It provides: 

(a) Where the court finds, based upon competent 

professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or

detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a 

nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except 

as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts 

or omissions of either parent, the guardian, or 

other person who has the care or custody of the minor, 

that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor 

is a person described by subdivision (a) [child at serious

risk of physical harm inflicted non-accidently], 

(b) [child at serious risk of physical harm for failure 

to supervise], or (d) [child at risk of sexual abuse] 

of Section 300 . . . 

(c) The presumption created by subdivision (a) 

constitutes a presumption affecting the burden of

producing evidence.

Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code § 355.1 (emphasis added). The court finds

that this statute, although not directly relevant here, is

particularly instructive on the issue of application of res ipsa

loquiter in this child abuse case. While the court is cognizant

to “avoid applying the res ipsa loquiter doctrine in a way that

undermines our system of tort liability based on fault,”

plaintiffs have done more here than simply “prove that [Nicholas]

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was injured by some unidentified person’s negligence.” Lamb v.

State of Tenn., 2002 Tenn. App. Lexis 738, *22-23 (Oct. 16,

2002). 

In Lamb, the plaintiff mother brought suit alleging her

mentally impaired daughter was sexually abused while in the

custody of the Alvin C. York Agricultural Institute. Plaintiff

attempted to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter to

establish the defendant’s negligence; however, the court found

her showing inadequate in that she failed to establish her

daughter was, in fact, injured while in the care of the defendant

and that her daughter’s injuries were “probably caused” by the

defendant’s negligence. Id. at *25. However, in so ruling, the

court discussed at length the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter, and

important to this case, the court did not find the doctrine

inapplicable, theoretically, to this type of case. Indeed, the

court found that the doctrine would be applicable where a

plaintiff brings “home [the negligence] to [the] defendant” and

shows “a rational basis for concluding that the negligent conduct

that caused the injury is probably attributable to the

defendant.” Id. at *22-23 (citing W. Page Keeton, Prosser and

Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39 at 248 (5th ed. 1984)). The court

finds that this is such a case.

Here, the nature of the incidents between Nicholas and

Rocky, involving repetitive and elaborate conduct over a short

period of time, are of the kind that do not occur in the absence

of a daycare provider’s failure to properly supervise the

children. The court emphasizes that if Nicholas’ statements in

the interview are believed, the serious conduct at issue occurred

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16 Neither party proffered evidence establishing the dates

when plaintiffs and Rocky attended CDC3. However, at oral

argument, plaintiffs’ counsel represented that Nicholas and Rocky

were together at the facility for approximately two months, and

Dominick and Rocky were together at the facility for

approximately one month. Defendant’s counsel did not object to

this representation to the court.

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some 4 to 6 six times over only an approximately two month

period;16 the conduct involved not mere touchings but rather

forced penetration by Rocky of his penis into Nicholas’ buttocks. 

It is undisputed that both Nicholas and Rocky were under the

exclusive care and custody of CDC3, and, again, if Nicholas is

believed, his participation in the conduct was not voluntary or

contributory (Nicholas described that he did not want to play

“butts and pee pees” again; that it was something “bad.”) On

these facts, as described by Nicholas close in time to the

events, plaintiffs may be entitled to application of the doctrine

and the presumption.

As to Dominick, it is not necessary to turn to the doctrine

of res ipsa loquiter because plaintiffs have proffered sufficient

evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that defendant acted

negligently in responding to Nicholas’ report and that negligence

caused the harm to Dominick days later. Specifically, plaintiffs

proffer evidence that: Ms. Costa did not make a formal complaint

as to the incident between Rocky and Nicholas because she did

not, at the time, consider it abuse; she did not ensure that

thereafter Rocky was more closely monitored; she did not talk

with Rocky's parents about the incident; yet, she later testified

at her deposition that the incident between Rocky and Nicholas

was a "red flag" for abuse. Just days after the incident between

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17 Plaintiffs additionally rely on the CDI report to argue

that defendant negligently maintained its facilities in that the

loft and train play-structure prevented the visual observation of

the children at all times. The court does not rely on said

report in ruling on the motion as neither plaintiffs nor

defendant (who cites the report as evidence of CDC3's proper

investigation of the incidents) established its admissibility. 

While the report may well qualify under the business records

exception to the hearsay rule and/or as an admission of a party

opponent that showing was not made by the parties on the motion. 

Nevertheless, the report is not necessary for plaintiffs to

withstand summary judgment.

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Nicholas and Rocky, a much more serious incident occurred between

Rocky and Dominick. Considering this evidence, a reasonable

trier of fact could find that proper supervision of Rocky could

have prevented the abuse of Dominick on September 20, 2000.17

Thus, the court cannot find with respect to Dominick that as

a matter of law defendant was not negligent. Rather, a

reasonable trier of fact, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs, could find that CDC3 should have done

much more after the report of the incident between Rocky and

Nicholas. Indeed, if plaintiffs’ evidence is believed, all that

was done was to ensure the two children were in separate

classrooms; they continued, however, to share time on the

playground. Arguably, additional monitoring of Rocky was

warranted in light of his violent threat to punch Nicholas if he

did not play a very descriptive "game" of "pee pee in the butt.” 

A conversation with Rocky's parents never took place, and just

days later, (as told by Dominick to his mother) Rocky forced

Dominick to kiss Rocky’s penis and Dominick kissed Rocky’s penis. 

With respect to Dominick’s claim, said evidence establishes a

triable issue of fact as to CDC3's negligence.

///

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion to re-open 

discovery is DENIED. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: February 10, 2006

 /s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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