Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_11-cv-02559/USCOURTS-alnd-5_11-cv-02559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JAMES DAVID COX,

Plaintiff,

v.

TENNESSEE VALLEY

AUTHORITY; DENNIS BOTTORFF,

in his official capacity as Chairman of

the TVA Board of Directors;

MARILYN A. BROWN, MIKE

DUNCAN, TOM GILLILAND,

WILLIAM GRAVES, BARBARA S.

HASKEW, RICHARD HOWORTH,

NEIL MCBRIDE, and WILLIAM B.

SANSOM in their official capacities as

members of the TVA Board of

Directors; and DAY &

ZIMMERMANN NPS, Inc.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO. 5:11-cv-02559-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is currently before the court on defendant Tennessee Valley Authority’s

(“TVA”) Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 13). On July 13, 2011, plaintiff filed a one-count 1

complaint, (doc. 1), against TVA and Day and Zimmermann NPS, Inc. (“DZNPS”),

requesting relief pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat.

602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”). TVA argues that dismissal is

 Reference to a document number, (“Doc. ___”), refers to the number assigned to 1

each document as it is filed in the court’s record.

FILED

 2012 Mar-30 PM 01:15

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 1 of 20
appropriate because TVA is an improper defendant to this action, and plaintiff has not

exhausted his federal-sector administrative remedies. Upon consideration of the record, the

submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the

opinion that TVA’s Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 13), is due to be granted. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

First, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a party may move the court to dismiss a case

based on a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When deciding a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “must accept the allegations set forth in the

complaint as true.” Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d 1418, 1419 (11th Cir. 1993); see also

Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008).

The allegations in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiffs. [Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey, 312 F.3d 1222,

1225 (11th Cir. 2002).] However, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929

(2007); see also Watts v. Florida Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir.

2007). “The Supreme Court’s most recent formulation of the pleading

specificity standard is that ‘stating such a claim requires a complaint with

enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required element.” Watts,

495 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). This rule does not

“impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct.

at 1965. Instead, the standard “simply calls for enough fact to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the required

element. Id. “It is sufficient if the complaint succeeds in ‘identifying facts

that are suggestive enough to render [the element] plausible.’” Watts, 495 F.3d

at 1296 (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965).

Rivell, 520 F.3d at 1309-10.

“[T]he threshold that a complaint must meet to survive a motion to dismiss is

2

Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 2 of 20
‘exceedingly low.’” Holley v. City of Roanoke, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (M.D. Ala. 2001)

(quoting Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

However, taking the facts as true, a court may grant a motion to dismiss when, “on the basis

of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause

of action.” Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174

(11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). A court need not accept legal conclusions as true, but

onlywell-pleaded factual allegations are entitled to an assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) (citation omitted). Accordingly, for the purposes of TVA’s

Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (i.e. TVA is an improper party defendant), the

court accepts the allegations set forth in the complaint as true.

Second, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a party may move the court to dismiss a case

if the court lacks jurisdiction over its subject matter. TVA construes its contention that

plaintiff failed to exhaust his federal-sector administrative remedies as an attack on the

court’s subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 13 at 1.) However, “th[e] failure to exhaust

administrative remedies by federal employees does not require dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction but is, instead, grounds for dismissal based on failure to state a claim.”

Jackson v. Barnhart, No. 1:05-CV-2979-WSD, 2006 WL 2466810, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 24,

2006) (citing Bryant v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 967 F.2d 501, 504 (11th Cir. 1992)). It is “a

requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable

tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Moreover, and

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 3 of 20
explained infra, federal-sector ADEA claimants are not required to exhaust their

administrative remedies before instituting a civil action, provided that they give the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) a “notice of intent to file such action”

within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act and wait 30 days before filing suit. 29

U.S.C. § 633a(d). “It is [also] well established . . . that the notice of intent to sue requirement

is not an absolute jurisdictional requirement, but is subject to modification or excuse for

equitable reasons.” Ray v. Nimmo, 704 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). 

Therefore, the court considers the Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 13), and applies a Rule 12(b)(6)

standard of review in deciding whether plaintiff complied with the applicable statutory

prerequisites.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 2

PlaintiffJames David Cox (“plaintiff”), a 63-year-old male, began working for TVA

in late 1969 or early 1970 as a laborer at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (“Browns Ferry”

or “the plant”). (Doc. 23 ¶ 10.) Plaintiff retired in December 2004 but continued to work

periodically at Browns Ferry under various TVA subcontractors following his retirement.

(Id. ¶ 11.) In early June 2010, TVA’s Projects and Modifications Manager offered plaintiff

The facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint, (doc. 23). While the 2

Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 13), addresses the allegations contained in the original

complaint, (doc. 1), the court granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint on November

9, 2011, (doc. 22). Because there are no facts in the First Amended Complaint which

change the court’s analysis, the court will consider the Motion to Dismiss as addressing

the allegations in the First Amended Complaint. 

4

Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 4 of 20
the opportunity to return to work as a supervisor over roofing contractors at Browns Ferry. 

(Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff accepted the offer and received a telephone call from DZNPS’s Vice

President of Staffing and Recruiting asking him to report on June 11, 2010. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that because “TVA controlled the personnel decisions of [DZNPS] from what was

an essentiallycentralized personnel function,” TVA and DZNPS “constitute joint employers

for [the] purposes of this action.” (Id. ¶ 14.) 3

Plaintiff supervised roofing contractors for approximately six weeks before his

reassignment to the plant’s 95-02 Fire Protection Project. (Id. ¶ 15.) About this time, in July

2010, plaintiff had a conversation with DZNPS Site Manager John Melvin (“Melvin”),

wherein plaintiff told Melvin that he retired from TVA in 2004 and had performed

contracting work at the plant ever since. (Id. ¶ 16.) Melvin replied that “the old station

personnel” were “the problem people” for DZNPS and himself. (Id.) To plaintiff’s

knowledge, Melvin was approximately 38 years old at the time of this conversation. (Id.) 

On or about September 24, 2010, Melvin terminated plaintiff and “replaced himwith

younger, less qualified employees, including Josh Normand, who, upon information and

belief, was only in his 40s, and Jason Hovater, who, upon information and belief, was only

in his 30s.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on or about

February 18, 2011, charging TVA and DZNPS with age discrimination. (Id. ¶ 9(a); see doc.

TVA does not contest its status as a “joint employer” for the purposes of this 3

motion.

5

Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 5 of 20
23-1.) On June 21, 2011, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter,

apprising plaintiff of his right to pursue his claim in district court. (Doc. 23 ¶ 9(b); see doc.

23-2.) On July 13, 2011, plaintiff filed a one-count complaint against TVA and DZNPS

requesting relief pursuant to the ADEA. (See doc. 1.) This motion to dismiss followed.

(Doc. 13.)

III. DISCUSSION

TVA moves for dismissal of this action on the grounds that: (1) “the nine-member

Board of Directors of TVA, in their official capacity as the head of the agency, are the only

proper defendants to this action . . . ,” and (2) plaintiff failed to exhaust his federal-sector

administrative remedies. (Doc. 13 at 1.)

Plaintifffiled an opposed motion for leave to amend his original complaint, (doc. 18),

following TVA’s Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 13), in order to add TVA’s nine-member Board

of Directors (“Board of Directors”) as defendants. The proposed amended complaint also

sought to add a more detailed narrative of facts. (See doc. 18-1.) TVA opposed the motion

on the ground that the addition of the Board of Directors as defendants was futile because

the proposed amended complaint could not overcome the obstacle that plaintiff failed to

exhaust his federal-sector administrative remedies. (See doc. 20.) The court nonetheless

granted plaintiff’s motion for leave without considering TVA’s opposition due to the

proposed amended complaint’s additional factual allegations and plaintiff’s impending

deadline for serving the Board of Directors. (See doc. 22.) Thus, even assuming that TVA

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 6 of 20
is an improper party, plaintiff may still maintain suit against the Board of Directors in their

official capacities assuming they are the proper defendants to this action. However,

assuming that the Board of Directors are proper defendants to this action, TVA’s contention

that plaintiff failed to comply with the applicable statutory prerequisites to suit serves as a

viable ground for dismissing both TVA and its Board of Directors from this action. 

1. Proper Defendants 

Section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16, is “the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal

employment.” Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). Title VII provides that in an action

against a federal agency, “the head of the . . . agency . . . shall be the defendant.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(c) (emphasis added). 29 U.S.C. § 633a, the statute governing federal workplace

age discrimination, does not provide similar instructions as to who constitutes the

appropriate defendant(s) in age discrimination cases against federal employers. However,

the procedural provisions of section 633a were patterned “directly after,” and are to be

construed in accordance with, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, the amendments to Title VII extending

that statute’s protection to federal employees. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S.

474, 487 (U.S. 2008) (citing Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 167 n.15 (1981),

superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105

Stat. 1071 (1991)); Edwards v. Shalala, 64 F.3d 601, 606 (11th Cir. 1995); Lavery v. Marsh,

918 F.2d 1022, 1025 (1st Cir. 1990); Honeycutt v. Long, 861 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (5th Cir.

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 7 of 20
1988). Thus, courts generally hold that “[t]he only proper defendant in a federal employee’s

ADEA action is the head of the federal agency that employed the plaintiff.” AGE

DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW §32I.D.2., at 740 (2003)(citing Quraishi v. Shalala,

962 F. Supp. 55, 58 (D. Md. 1997); Gregor v. Derwinski, 911 F. Supp. 643, 654 (W.D.N.Y.

1996); Meyer v. Runyon, 869 F. Supp. 70, 76 (D. Mass. 1994)); See also Honeycutt,

861 F.2d at 1348-49; Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

481 U.S. 1050 (1987); Ellis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 784 F.2d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It is

well-settled in this circuit that, in a Title VII action alleging discrimination in the Postal

Service, the only proper defendant is the head of the agency . . . . The only novel question

presented by this case, then, is whether the same rule should apply to actions under the

ADEA. We hold that it should.”).

Moreover, as explained infra, plaintiff argues, though in not certain terms, that his

ADEA complaint is properly before this court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d). Section

633a(d)’s accompanying EEOC regulation states, in pertinent part, that: “[a]s an alternative

to filing a complaint under this part, an aggrieved individual may file a civil action in a

United States district court under the ADEA against the head of an alleged discriminating

agency . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.201(a) (emphasis added). The nine-member Board of

Directors act as the “head” of TVA. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 831a(a), (g). Accordingly, the court

is of the opinion that the individual members of the Board of Directors in their official

capacities are the proper defendants in the case at bar and, therefore, TVA is due to be

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dismissed from this action.

2. Prerequisites to Suit

TVA also moves for dismissal of plaintiff’s ADEA complaint because: (1) he failed

“to exhaust his administrative remedies by timely contacting an Equal Opportunity (EO)

counselor and filing a formal administrative complaint,” or in the alternative, (2) he failed

to “fil[e] a notice of intent to file a civil action with the EEOC.” (Doc. 15 at 3.) 

TVA is an executive agency within the parameters of 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). As such, 

a TVA employee may impose ADEA liability only in accordance with section 633a. See 29

U.S.C. § 633a(f). 

The ADEA provides federal-sector employees with two alternative avenues of relief

for acts of age discrimination. On one hand, “[a]n individual may invoke the EEOC’s

administrative process and then file a civil action in federal district court if he is not satisfied

with his administrative remedies.” Stevens v. Dep’t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1991)

(citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 633a(b), (c)). Alternatively, a federal ADEA complainant may bypass

the administrative process altogether and present his complaint directly in federal court if

certain preconditions are satisfied. See id. at 6 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d)).

If a federal ADEA complainant chooses to invoke the EEOC’s administrative

remedial process (the first avenue), “[he] must [first] initiate contact with a Counselor within

45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel

action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). 

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 9 of 20
“Generally, when the claimant does not initiate contact within the 45-day charging period,

the claimis barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Varnado v. Mukasey, No.

08-61331-CIV, 2010 WL 2196263, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2010) (quoting Shiver v.

Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not alleged that he ever contacted an EO counselor regarding his allegedly

discriminatory termination. (See doc. 23 ¶¶ 9(a)-(c).) Thus, plaintiff’s complaint cannot

proceed in federal court against TVA or its Board of Directors absent his compliance with

the second avenue for pursuing ADEA relief, the “administrative bypass” option.

As the name suggests, the “administrative bypass” option permits federal

complainants seeking relief for age discrimination to proceed directly to federal court

without exhausting their administrative remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d). The ADEA

provides for the “administrative bypass” provision as follows: 

When the individual has not filed a complaint concerning age discrimination

with the Commission, no civil action may be commenced by any individual

under this section until the individual has given the Commission not less than

thirty days’ notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed

within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice

occurred. 

Id. (emphasis added); See also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.201 (notice must be filed within 180 days

of alleged unlawful act and at least 30 days before suit is filed). Here, plaintiff filed one

document with the EEOC charging TVA with age discrimination. This document, attached

as Exhibit A to the First Amended Complaint, (doc. 23-1), is titled “Charge of

Discrimination,” and the First Amended Complaint labels this document as a “charge,” (doc.

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 10 of 20
23 ¶ 9(a)). Plaintiff has not alleged that he gave the EEOC a “notice of an intent to file

[suit]” (“notice of intent to sue”). Because an EEOC “charge” and a “notice of intent to sue”

are separate and distinct administrative devices, see infra, at 12-18, plaintiff has not

complied with the prerequisites of the “administrative bypass” option, and TVA and its

Board of Directors are due to be dismissed as party defendants to this action.

While the court is aware of the harsh results of this decision, plaintiff’s attempt to

circumvent section 633a(d)’s “notice of intent to sue” requirement cannot be upheld. To put

plaintiff’s argument into context, it is important to explain the ADEA administrative

remedial process applicable to employees of private entities (“private employees”).

29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) governs the administrative procedures applicable to private

employees seeking ADEA relief. Unlike federal employees, private employees must file “a

charge of unlawful discrimination with the EEOC before filing suit,” Leach v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 431 Fed. Appx. 771, 774-75 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Bost v. Fed.

Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)) (emphasis

added), “[and] [t]o be timely, the charge must be filed within 180 days after the date of the

allegedly unlawful act,” id. at 775 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(A)). “The employee must

then wait at least 60 days before filing a civil action.” Bost, 372 F.3d at 1238 (citing

Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1100 (11th Cir. 1996)); See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). 

If the EEOC dismisses the charge and issues a right-to-sue notification, 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)

requires private employees to file suit within 90 days of receiving such notification. 

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 11 of 20
Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to DZNPS, his private

“joint employer.” That is, he filed a charge of age discrimination against DZNPS with the

EEOC on February 18, 2011, only five months after his September 2010 termination, and

he filed suit within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter.

(Doc. 23 ¶¶ 9(a)-(c); see docs. 23-1, 23-2.) Plaintiff’s charge also named TVA as a

discriminating “joint employer.” (See doc. 23-1.) As noted, the ADEA provides federal

complainants with two alternative avenues for pursuing redress for age discrimination,

neither of which provides that a federal employee may commence civil litigation against a

federal employer after filing a timely EEOC charge. Plaintiff, however, contends that a

section 626(d) “charge” and a section 633a(d) “notice of intent to sue” are interchangeable

terms. (Doc. 16 at 17 n.7.) Thus, plaintiff implicitly argues that he satisfied the prerequisites

of the “administrative bypass” option because he filed a “charge,” an allegedly adequate

substitute for a “notice of intent to sue,” within 180 days of his termination, and he filed suit

more than 30 days after filing that “charge.” See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d).

The ADEA does not define the terms “charge” or “notice of intent to sue,” but 

EEOC regulations set forth the contents which should be included in an ADEA “charge.” 

The relevant regulations state, in pertinent part:

(a) In addition to the requirements of [29 C.F.R. § 1626.6], each charge 4

Section 1626.6 provides that “[a] charge shall be in writing and shall name the 4

prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s). Charges

received in person or by telephone shall be reduced to writing.” 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6.

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 12 of 20
should contain the following:

(1) The full name, address and telephone number of the person making

the charge; 

(2) The full name and address of the person against whom the charge

is made; 

(3) A clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent

dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices; 

(4) If known, the approximate number of employees of the prospective

defendant employer or members of the prospective defendant labor

organization. 

(5) A statement disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged

unlawful employment practice have been commenced before a State

agencycharged with the enforcement offair employment practice laws

and, if so, the date of such commencement and the name of the 

agency. 

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, a charge

is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the

charge either a written statement or information reduced to writing by the

Commission that conforms to the requirements of § 1626.6.

29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.8(a), (b) (emphasis added; footnote added). The Supreme Court has

defined a “charge” as a filing which “must be reasonably construed as a request for the

agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute

between the employer and the employee.” Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389,

402 (2008). 

EEOC regulations do not specify what information should be included in a “notice 

of intent to sue.” However, Chapter 4 of the EEOC Management Directive 110 (“MD13

Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 13 of 20
110”), effective as of November 9, 1999, provides that: 

b. The notice of intent to sue should be dated and must contain the following

information:

(1) statement of intent to file a civil action under section 15(d) of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended[,] [29

U.S.C. § 633a(d)];

(2) name, address, and telephone number ofthe employee or applicant;

(3) name, address, and telephone number of the complainant’s

designated representative, if any;

(4) name and location of the federal agency or installation where the

alleged discriminatory action occurred;

(5) date on which the alleged discriminatory action occurred;

(6) statement of the nature of the alleged discriminatory action(s); 

and

(7) signature of the complainant or the complainant’s representative.

MD-110, Chap. 4, § IV(D)(b) (Nov. 9, 1999), available at http:// www. eeoc. gov/ federal/

directives/ md110/ chapter4. html (emphasis added).

The court acknowledges that the underlying purposes of a “charge” and a “notice of

intent to sue” are nearly identical. Upon receiving a “charge,” the EEOC “shall promptly

notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall

promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of

conciliation, conference, and persuasion.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). Similarly, upon receiving

a “notice of intent to sue,” the EEOC “shall promptly notify all persons named therein as

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 14 of 20
prospective defendants in the action and take anyappropriate action to assure the elimination

of any unlawful practice.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d).

While “charges” and “notices of intent to sue” serve the same underlying purposes,

their dissimilarities demonstrate that they are separate and distinct administrative devices. 

Above all, a “charge” is a “request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the

employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee.”

Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added). A “notice of intent to sue,” however, does

not request the EEOC to take any remedial action whatsoever. Rather, a “notice of intent

to sue” alerts the EEOC that a federal complainant intends to bypass the administrative

process altogether and file an age discrimination complaint directly in federal court. See 29

U.S.C. § 633a(d); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.201(a); MD-110, Chap. 4, § IV(D)(b). The court also

finds relevant the fact that a “notice of intent to sue” must contain certain information,

whereas a “charge” need not contain any particular piece of information. See MD-110,

Chap. 4, § IV(D)(b); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.8(a), (b); Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402. Moreover,

the EEOC requires “charges” and “notices of intent to sue” be filed at different locations. 

A “notice of intent to sue” “must be filed in writing with [the] EEOC, at P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013, or by personal delivery or facsimile . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.201(a). 

A “charge” “may be submitted in person, by telephone, or by mail to any office of the

Commission or to any designated representative of the Commission.” 29 C.F.R. § 1626.5. 

Based on these differences, the court is of the opinion that a section 626(d) “charge” and a

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section 633a(d) “notice of intent to sue” are not interchangeable administrative devices. 

The court’s conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Congress has drawn a clear

distinction between the terms “charge” and “notice of intent to sue.” When the ADEA was

enacted in 1967, the former section 626(d) read: “No civil action may be commenced by any

individual under this section until the individual has given the Secretary [of Labor] not less

than sixty days’ notice of an intent to file such action.” ADEA, Pub. L. No. 90–202, 81 5

Stat. 602, 605 (1967) (emphasis added). On April 6, 1978, Congress amended section

626(d) to read as follows: “No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this

section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the

Secretary.” See ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978)

(emphasis added). As noted by the Middle District of North Carolina: 

Prior to the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, Pub. L. 95-256, section 626(d)

required a complainant to file a “notice of intent to sue” rather than a “charge”

of age discrimination. This change was meant to expand complainants’ rights

under the ADEA and make more flexible the notice requirement of section

626(d) so as to avoid having complainants’ efforts frustrated by failing to

identify or mention an “intent to sue.” Pirone v. Home Insurance Co., 507 F.

Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Scaramuzzo v. Glenmore Distilleries, Co., 501

F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 

Frasco v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 532 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (M.D.N.C. 1982). Congress

also amended section 633a in the 1978 amendments. However, Congress “retained [section

“Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, responsibility and authority for 5

enforcement of the [ADEA] was transferred from the Department of Labor to the

[EEOC]. The transfer became effective and the Commission assumed enforcement of the

Act on July 1, 1979.” 48 Fed. Reg. 26434, 26434 (June 7, 1983). 

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Case 5:11-cv-02559-SLB Document 32 Filed 03/30/12 Page 16 of 20
633a(d)’s] ‘notice of an intent to file’ language while [section] 626 was modified to require

the filing of a ‘charge.’” Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Sufficiency of Contents of

Notice to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Charging Violation of Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, 27 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 367 n.8 (2008); See ADEA

Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189. Clearly, Congress’s choice to

substitute the “notice of intent to sue” language with “charge” in the private-sector context,

yet retain the “notice ofintent to sue” requirement in the federal-sector context lends support

to the court’s conclusion that a “charge” and “notice of intent to sue” are not interchangeable

terms.6

Congress also added 29 U.S.C. § 633a(f) in the 1978 amendments to the ADEA

which, “literally read, mandates a complete divorce between the [private and federal

compliance] schemes.” Kennedy v. Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1982); See

At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel directed the court to the United States 6

Supreme Court decision of Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) in support of the

proposition that a “charge” and “notice of intent to sue” are interchangeable

administrative devices. The Lorillard decision, decided on February 22, 1978, examined

whether the ADEA provided private litigants with a right to a jury trial in actions seeking

recovery of lost wages. 434 U.S. at 576. In doing so, the court briefly noted that, at that

time, section 626(d) required private ADEA complainants to “give notice to the Secretary

of Labor of [their] intention to sue in order that the Secretary can attempt to eliminate the

alleged unlawful practice through informal methods.” Id. at 580. Nowhere in the opinion

does the Supreme Court mention the term “charge,” much less suggest that a “charge” is

an adequate substitute for a “notice of intent to sue.” The absence of the term “charge” is

not surprising considering that the Lorillard decision was issued before the April 6, 1978

amendments to the ADEA. Thus, the court finds that the Lorillard decision does not

support plaintiff’s position. 

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ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189. Section 633a(f) states that

any ADEA claim brought by a federal employee is neither affected by nor subject to “any

provision of [the ADEA], other than the provisions [relating to age discrimination in

compensation and age requirements] and the provisions of this section [633a].” 

Section 633a is a self-contained statute, and byenacting it, “Congress deliberatelyprescribed

a distinct statutory scheme applicable only to the federal sector . . . .” Lehman, 453 U.S.

at 166. However, construing “charges” and “notices of intent to sue” as interchangeable

administrative devices creates an inherent overlap between the “administrative bypass”

option of section 633a(d) and the private-sector remedial scheme of section 626(d), an

overlap which section 633a(f) plainly seeks to avoid. 

Finally, the fact that plaintiffsues a private corporation and a federal agency as “joint

employers” does not alter the outcome. (See doc. 23 ¶ 14.) The EEOC has issued guidelines

addressing the appropriate administrative procedure for when “a staffing firm sends its

employee on a job assignment with a federal agency and the individual is subjected to

discrimination while on the assignment . . . .” EEOC Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement

Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary

Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms (Dec. 3, 1997), available at http:// www.

eeoc. gov/ policy/ docs/ conting. html. “Staffing firms” are defined as “temporary

employment agencies, contract firms, and other firms that hire workers and place them in 

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job assignments with the firms’ clients.” Id. The EEOC Notice states:

If the staffing firm worker seeks to pursue a complaint against the federal

agency as his or her employer, (s)he should contact an [EO] Counselor at the 

federal agency within 45 days of the date of the alleged discrimination. If the 

individual also seeks to pursue a claim against the staffing firm, (s)he should

file a separate charge with an EEOC field office. 

Id. Thus, the EEOC contemplates a bifurcated administrative remedial process when a

complainant pursues relief against a private employer and a federal employer for the same

discriminatory act. That is, a complainant alleging discrimination should separately exhaust

his federal-sector and private-sector administrative remedies when suing a federal agency

and private entity as “joint employers.” Id.; See also Frank v. England, 313 F. Supp. 2d 532,

537 (D. Md. 2004) (“[T]he Court notes that it would be unreasonable to consider the Navy

a second employer under Title VII, but exempt Plaintiff from exhausting his administrative

remedies as to the Navy.”). While the EEOC Notice does not take into account the

“administrative bypass” option available to federal ADEA complainants, it is nonetheless

instructive insofar as it shows that suing a private entity and a federal agency as “joint

employers” does not exempt a complainant from complying with the express prerequisites

to suit applicable to federal employees.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, TVA’s Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 13), is due to be granted. 

As a result, TVA and the individual members of its Board of Directors are due to be

dismissed as partydefendants. An Order in accordance with this MemorandumOpinion will

be entered contemporaneously herewith. 

DONE this 30th day of March, 2012.

 

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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