Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00973/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00973-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Brandon Meeks,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. Nunez; T. Scott,

Defendant.

Case No.: 13cv973-GPC-BGS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING

1. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

TERMINATING SANCTIONS; AND

2. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS HIS DEPOSITION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brandon Meeks (“Meeks”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional

violations for an incident occurring on April 25, 2011. (Doc. No. 74.) The alleged

incident took place during Meeks’s incarceration at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (“RJDCF”) in San Diego, California. (Id. at 3.) On October 8, 2015, the Court 

issued a Scheduling Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pre-Trial Proceedings 

establishing pretrial deadlines for the parties, including a deadline of February 8, 2016, 

for completion of discovery. (See ECF No. 109.)

Before the Court are two motions: Defendants’ Motion for Terminating Sanctions 

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and Plaintiff’s Motion to Suppress his Deposition. (ECF Nos. 158-1 and 195, 

respectively) The Court will address each motion separately. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS DEPOSITION

On September 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Suppress Deposition. (ECF No. 

195.) In this motion, Plaintiff “formally objects to how the officer transcribed the 

testimony or prepared, signed, certified, sealed, endorsed, sent or otherwise dealt with the 

deposition.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff explains that the deposition transcript contains numerous 

“errors and irregularities . . . to the point that it is misleading and does not accurately 

transcribe the actual and specific testimony of Brandon Meeks.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also 

states that he moved to terminate his deposition to obtain an order from the Court 

regarding his objections. (Id. at 3.)

Defendants attach an edited version of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony to their 

reply brief. (ECF No. 201-2.) To the extent the deposition was inaccurately transcribed, 

Plaintiff has had the opportunity to correct these errors, and has done so. (Id.) Moreover, 

the Court also finds that Plaintiff’s objection that his deposition was being conducted for 

purposes of harassment is without merit. Indeed, the deposition was being conducted 

pursuant to numerous court orders.1 As a result, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Suppress Deposition. 

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS

On June 20, 2016, Defendants filed the instant motion for terminating sanctions 

against Plaintiff for violating a court order by his refusal to participate in his deposition. 

(ECF No. 158-1.) 

 

1 The Court acknowledges that a Court order compelling the deposition does not insulate a deposition

from being used for the purposes of harassment. However, the Court determines that this deposition was 

not being used for the purposes of harassment, and there is no evidence to support such a showing. A

review of the deposition transcript indicates that the only question posed by Defense counsel was: “Are 

you taking any medications currently?” This question is a standard question during a deposition, and 

does not constitute harassment. As a result, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s objection of harassment as to

the taking of his deposition in general. The Court finds this objection improper, given that this Court 

compelled the deposition.

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A. Relevant Background

1. First Deposition Attempt in January 2016

On January 19, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s deposition. 

(ECF No. 124.) In that motion, Defendants explained that they had attempted to take 

Plaintiff’s deposition on January 14, 2016, and Plaintiff had refused. (Id.) On January 

20, 2016, nunc pro tunc January 15, 2016, the Court received an objection by Plaintiff to 

his deposition. (ECF No. 126.) Plaintiff objected on the basis that Defendants had not 

responded to his discovery requests and because he had not been provided access to the 

law library. (Id. at 2.) The Court issued an order granting Defendants’ Motion to 

Compel on February 29, 2016. (ECF No. 132.) In this order, the Court noted that 

Defendants had not sought leave from the Court to depose Plaintiff. (Id. at 4-5.) 

Although Plaintiff had not objected on that basis, the Court acknowledged that he would 

have been within his right to do so. (Id. at 4.) Notwithstanding, the Court determined

that its order would satisfy the requirement for leave of court to take Plaintiff’s 

deposition, and compelled Plaintiff’s participation. (Id. at 5.) 

2. Second Deposition Attempt in April 2016

Defendants attempted to take Plaintiff’s deposition on April 19, 2016, and Plaintiff 

again refused to attend. (Pattison Decl. ¶ 5.) As a result, Defendants filed a motion for 

terminating sanctions on April 25, 2016. (ECF No. 142.) On April 20, 2016, Plaintiff 

filed an objection to this Court’s February 29, 2016 Order granting Defendants’ motion to 

compel his deposition. (ECF No. 141.) In that objection, Plaintiff argued that 

Defendants did not have leave of Court to take his deposition. (Id. at 3-4.) He further 

stated that he “is not required to attend the the (sic) deposition on Jan. 14, 2016 or any 

other time because he ‘filed a timely objection.’ (ECF No. 129 at 2.)” (ECF No. 141 at 

3.)

On May 4, 2016, the Honorable Judge Curiel issued an order overruling Plaintiff’s 

objections and denying Defendants’ motion for terminating sanctions. (ECF No. 145.) 

The Court ordered Plaintiff to appear for his deposition, stating:

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Plaintiff shall comply with the deposition notice and if there are objections, 

he shall state the objections on the record. If Plaintiff fails to comply,

Defendants may refile a motion for an order imposing termination sanctions 

and Plaintiff’s first amended complaint may be subject to dismissal.

(ECF No. 145, 7:2-5, emphasis in original.)

3. Third Deposition Attempt on May 9, 2016

On May 9, 2016, Defendants attempted to take the deposition of Plaintiff, but 

Plaintiff refused to attend. (Pattison Decl. ¶ 8.) On May 16, 2016, Defendants filed a 

motion with the Court seeking terminating sanctions and dismissal of the action due to 

Plaintiff’s refusal to attend his deposition. (ECF No. 149.) On May 19, 2016, the 

Honorable Judge Curiel issued an order denying the motion for terminating sanctions,

noting that Defendants had provided Plaintiff with only two days’ notice of the 

deposition. (ECF No. 151 at 3.) The Court directed Defendants to wait until sufficient 

time passed to allow Plaintiff to receive the Court’s order prior to noticing another 

deposition. (Id. at 4.) The Court added: “Once reasonable notice of his deposition is 

provided to Plaintiff and he fails to comply, Defendants may refile a motion for order 

imposing termination sanctions and Plaintiff’s first amended complaint may be subject to 

dismissal.” (Id.)

4. Fourth Deposition Attempt on May 27, 2016

On May 27, 2016, Defendants served Plaintiff with a notice of deposition setting

his deposition for June 13, 2016. (Decl. of Michelle Soto Vancil, ¶¶ 5, 6, Ex. A.) On 

June 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed an objection to the Court’s May 19, 2016, order in which he 

stated that he would not attend any deposition because he considered the order unlawful 

and he was under no obligation to comply with it. (ECF No.155.) In this objection, 

Plaintiff relied primarily on his claim that Defendants had not received leave of court 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2). The Honorable Judge Curiel issued 

an order overruling Plaintiff’s objections on June 15, 2016. (ECF No. 156.)

///

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5. Fifth Deposition Attempt on June 13, 2016

On June 13, 2016, Defendants attempted to take the deposition of Plaintiff. The 

deposition was recorded and transcribed by Thomas Lange, CSR# 4689. Plaintiff 

testified as follows:2

Q: Thank you. Are you taking any medications currently?

A: I object to the question, and I object to the deposition in its 

entirety. I, plaintiff Brandon Meeks, hereby move to terminate this 

deposition on the grounds that it’s been – it is being conducted in bad faith 

for purposes to harass. The noticed deposition by Richard Pattison under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30 is procedurally defective as defendants 

did not obtain leave of court as required to conduct plaintiff’s deposition, as 

he’s currently incarcerated at the California Men’s Colony. The order by the 

Magistrate Judge, Bernard G. Skomal, and the district judge, Gonzalo P. 

Curiel was not entered in compliance with rules, and any subsequent notice, 

including this notice dated May 27, 2016 by Richard Pattison, defendants’ 

attorney, is procedurally defective as noticed under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 30 because the rule in question was not followed by the 

defendants. The Plaintiff hereby moves to terminate this deposition on 

grounds that it’s being conducted in bad faith and for purposes to harass the 

plaintiff. 

Q: So you’re refusing to participate?

A: Well, I’m moving to terminate this deposition. I have already filed 

objections with the court, and a motion to terminate will be filed regarding 

this proceedings. I’m here for the purpose of – for the sake of legal 

argument only. 

 

2 Plaintiff alleges that portions of the transcript do not reflect his testimony. In their reply brief, 

Defendants provide the Court with an edited version of Plaintiff’s transcript. The Court includes 

Plaintiff’s edits in this Order.

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Q: So you’re simply here to place your objection on the record and 

you’re refusing to continue?

A: On the grounds that objections have been filed with the court 

regarding the court’s previous order dated May 4 and May 19th by Gonzalo 

P. Curiel and on the amended scheduling order by the magistrate judge. 

Objections have been filed with the court regarding those orders, and a 

motion to terminate these proceedings is also underway. So that is my 

objection for the purpose of this procedurally defective noticed deposition. 

And I’m requesting a copy of this plaintiff’s objections on the record from 

the reporter. 

Mr. Pattison: Well, Mr. Meeks, since you’re refusing to continue, I 

guess we’re concluded. Thank you. 

On June 20, 2016, Defendants filed the instant motion for terminating sanctions 

against Plaintiff for violating a court order by his refusal to participate in the deposition. 

(ECF No. 158-1.)

B. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Terminating Sanctions

Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ Motion for Terminating Sanctions on 

October 5, 2016. (ECF No. 198.) In this brief, Plaintiff states that Defendants have 

failed to seek and obtain leave of Court to take his deposition, and therefore, the 

deposition was procedurally defective. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff explains that the Court 

previously issued an “erroneously misconstrued order to compel Plaintiff’s deposition on 

2/29/16 (Dkt. No. 132.).” (Id.)

C. Relevant Law

Rule 37(b)(2)(A) provides the Court with the power to issue such sanction orders 

as are “just” when a party has failed to comply with discovery orders. Such sanctions 

may include, an order that the subject matter of the discovery shall be taken to be 

established in accordance with the defendant’s defense, or that the plaintiff may not 

support or oppose designated claims or defenses or introduce designated matters into 

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evidence, or dismissing the action in whole or in part, or finding the plaintiff to be in

contempt of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii); see also Roadway Express v. 

Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2464, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980). The sanction to

be ordered is within the Court’s discretion, and if the sanction ordered is less than 

dismissal, the plaintiff’s noncompliance need not be proven to be wilful or in bad faith. 

See, e.g., Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 536 F.2d 838, 843–44 (9th Cir. 1976); see also 

Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 

357 U.S. 197, 208, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958) (for purposes of Rule 37(b)(2)

“a party ‘refuses to obey’ simply by failing to comply with an order”). 

If, however, the contemplated sanction is dismissal, dismissal is appropriate only if 

the plaintiff’s noncompliance is “‘due to willfulness, bad faith or fault.’” Henry v. Gill 

Industries, 983 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Conn. Gen. Life 

Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007). This 

requirement, however, does not require a finding of wrongful intent or any particular 

mental state. Rather, “[d]isobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the 

litigant is sufficient to demonstrate willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Jorgensen v. 

Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Henry, 983 F.2d 

at 948 (same).

Before case-dispositive sanctions may be ordered pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A), in 

addition to determining whether the requisite willfulness, bad faith, or fault exists, a court 

must consider and weigh the following five factors: (1) the public interest in expeditious 

resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of 

prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

cases on the merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. See, e.g., Conn.

Gen., 482 F.3d at 1096; Henry, 983 F.2d at 948. When the violation of a court order 

serves as the basis for a terminating sanction request, factors (1) and (2) support the 

imposition of such sanctions and factor (4) cuts against them, and thus, factors (3) and (5) 

are the critical factors to consider. Valley Eng’rs, Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 

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1057 (9th Cir. 1998); Henry, 983 F.2d at 948.

D. Plaintiff’s Status as a Pro Se Prisoner

Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding on a pro se basis in this case. While a party’s 

lack of counsel may be considered in evaluating the willfulness of discovery violations 

and the failure to obey court orders and in weighing the other factors regarding dismissal, 

pro se status does not excuse intentional noncompliance with discovery rules and court 

orders. See Lindstedt v. City of Granby, 238 F.3d 933, 937 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming the 

imposition of the sanction of dismissal and holding that “[a] pro se litigant is bound by 

the litigation rules as is a lawyer, particularly here with the fulfilling of simple 

requirements of discovery”); Gordon v. County of Alameda, 2007 WL 1750207, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. June 15, 2007) (“pro se plaintiffs must abide by the rules of discovery, and 

when they fail to do so in bad faith dismissal is warranted”); Handwerker v. AT & T 

Corp., 211 F.R.D. 203, 208–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“giving appropriate recognition as 

necessary to the difference of status, Rule 37 sanctions may be applied to pro se litigants 

no less than to those represented by counsel”); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 

(11th Cir. 1989) (opining that “[i]f a pro se litigant ignores a discovery order, he is and 

should be subject to sanctions like any other litigant,” and affirming the dismissal of a pro 

se prisoner’s complaint as a discovery sanction). 

“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other 

litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (overturned on other 

grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Ghazali v. 

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (failure of pro se litigant to follow 

procedural rules justified dismissal of civil rights action). “The severe sanction of 

dismissal with prejudice may be imposed even against a plaintiff who is proceeding pro 

se, so long as a warning has been given that noncompliance can result in dismissal,” 

because “all litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply with court orders.” 

Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming Rule 

37(b)(2) dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s case in view of his failure to appear for deposition 

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“in the face of repeated and explicit warnings from the court that the refusal to comply 

with court orders to appear for his deposition would result in the dismissal of his action”).

E. Plaintiff’s Failure to Participate in his Deposition was Willful

The record establishes that Defendants made five separate attempts to depose 

Plaintiff. On each occasion, Plaintiff either refused to attend or refused to participate. In 

its order addressing Defendants’ Motion to Compel, this Court explained to Plaintiff that, 

“[u]nder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff could not refuse to appear for his 

deposition based on his objections. Instead, Plaintiff was required to note his objections 

on the record, but proceed with the deposition.” (ECF No. 132 at 4 citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

30 (c)(2).) In this same order, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to compel, and 

noted that they need not seek a further court order for Plaintiff’s deposition, as the instant

order will satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule 30(a)(2). Plaintiff filed an objection 

with the District Judge (ECF No. 141). The Court overruled Plaintiff’s objections on 

May 4, 2016. (ECF No. 145.) In so doing, the Court stated that “Here, Plaintiff’s 

reasons for objecting to the notice of deposition were not valid bases to refuse to attend 

his deposition.” (Id. at 5.) The Court concluded that 

it was not contrary to law for the Magistrate Judge to construe the court’s 

order as granting Defendants’ leave of court to depose Plaintiff. Therefore, 

despite Defendants’ failure to obtain leave of Court, the Magistrate Judge 

did not err by granting Defendants’ motion to compel the deposition of 

Plaintiff. Thus, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections.

(Id.) Plaintiff also appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit (ECF No. 136), who 

determined that they lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. (ECF No. 153.)

Plaintiff filed yet another objection to the Court’s determination overruling his 

objections, which was again overruled by the District Judge on June 15, 2016. (ECF No. 

156.) A review of Plaintiff’s testimony during the deposition again reiterates his 

disagreement with the rulings of the Court and his refusal on that basis to participate in 

his deposition. (ECF No. 201-2.)

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The record makes clear that Plaintiff’s failure to participate in his deposition to the 

extent he plainly could do so—i.e., by answering questions in good faith—was not 

outside his control. Rather, it was a choice he made based on objections that had been 

overruled numerous times by this Court.

3 For these reasons and under the prevailing 

legal standards discussed earlier, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s failure to participate 

in his deposition, despite being ordered to do so, was wilful for purposes of Rule 

37(b)(2).

F. Analysis of Factors for Dismissal

1. Factors One and Two: The Public Interest in Expeditious Resolution 

of Litigation and The Court’s Need to Manage its Dockets

These factors support dismissing this case as a sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v). 

Plaintiff has flouted several of this Court’s Orders, which has caused this action to come 

to a stall and to consume an unwarranted and inordinate amount of this Court’s time and 

resources to deal with a problem arising solely from Plaintiff’s failure and refusal to meet 

his discovery obligations and to comply with court orders. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 

F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) based 

on the same five-factor test and finding the first and second factors “strongly 

support[ed]” dismissal when the pro se plaintiff’s “vexatious noncompliance” with the 

court’s orders caused the case to drag on and consume “large amounts of the court’s 

valuable time”).

2. The Risk of Prejudice to The Party Seeking Sanctions

The third factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal in this case. “A defendant 

suffers prejudice if the plaintiff’s actions impair the defendant’s ability to go to trial or 

 

3 The Court reiterates this point for emphasis. Plaintiff made objections that the deposition was being 

conducted for purposes of harassment, and requested an order from the Court terminating the deposition. 

Although this is an otherwise valid basis to refuse to testify, this deposition had been ordered by the 

Court, and Plaintiff had been ordered multiple times to provide testimony. As a result, Plaintiff had no 

good faith basis to believe the deposition was being conducted for the purposes of harassment and, 

instead, simply sought to shirk his obligations to meaningfully participate in the discovery process. 

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threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Adriana Int’l Corp. v. 

Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990). The presumption of prejudice to

defendants caused by plaintiff’s wilful failure to participate in his deposition and to 

comply with this Court’s Orders is not rebutted. Because plaintiff is a pro se, 

incarcerated litigant, there has been no Rule 26(a) initial disclosure in this case. Thus, 

defendants have been forced to rely solely on discovery as a means of ascertaining the 

facts and evidence on which plaintiff bases his claims and intends to proceed at trial. 

Plaintiff, however, will not participate in the discovery process, despite this Court’s 

repeated Orders directing him to do so. Defendants cannot reasonably prepare for trial if 

plaintiff refuses to provide participate in the discovery process. Thus, defendants have 

been prejudiced in their ability to prepare for trial. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 

the third factor militates in favor of dismissal. See, e.g., Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 

1162, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding prejudice due to plaintiffs’ repeated failure to 

appear at scheduled depositions, which left defendants without crucial information and 

unable to construct their defense).

3. The Public Policy Favoring Disposition Of Cases On The Merits

While the fourth factor of the test generally tends to cut against dismissal as a 

sanction, the public policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits is not 

furthered by litigants who repeatedly ignore court orders and who refuse to provide the 

defense with critical discovery, thereby hindering the preparation of a defense on the 

merits. Plaintiff cannot legitimately expect this case to proceed to a merits disposition if 

he refuses to provide defendants with his testimony. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 

(PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (the fourth 

factor “‘lends little support’ to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward 

disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction”) (citation 

omitted).

4. Availability of Less Drastic Sanctions

The fifth factor is the only factor that this Court finds cuts against dismissal. For a 

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party’s failure to respond to discovery, Rule 37(d) authorizes the Court to take action 

including: (1) designate facts as established; (2) refuse to allow the disobedient party to 

support or oppose designated claims; (3) prohibit the disobedient party from introducing 

designated matters in evidence; (4) strike out pleadings or parts thereof; (5) stay further 

proceedings until an order is obeyed; (6) dismiss an action, proceeding or any part 

thereof; or (7) render judgment by default against the disobedient party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(d) (cross referencing sanctions identified in Rule 37(b)(2)(A) through (C). 

Because there are less drastic options available, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

Defendants’ Motion for Terminating Sanctions be DENIED. However, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that, as an alternative sanction, Plaintiff be prohibited from using his 

testimony as evidence to support his case. By precluding the taking of his deposition, 

Plaintiff has thwarted the purpose of the discovery process and prevented Defendants 

from learning key facts about Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff cannot shield his testimony 

from Defendants, only to capitalize on that unilateral knowledge at trial. Indeed, 

“[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to 

proper litigation. Thus the spirit of the rules is violated when advocates attempt to use 

discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the 

issues by . . . unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses.” (Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26 advisory notes (internal citations omitted).) The Court finds that precluding 

Plaintiff from using his testimony at trial prevents any prejudice to Defendants and 

allows this matter to proceed to resolution. 

IV. CONCLUSION

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted 

to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 

U.S.C. section 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Suppress his Deposition be DENIED. 

2. Defendants’ Motion for Terminating Sanctions be DENIED but that the Court 

issue an alternative sanction precluding Plaintiff from offering his testimony at 

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trial. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 23, 2016, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than December 7, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 9, 2016

Case 3:13-cv-00973-GPC-BGS Document 207 Filed 11/09/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

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