Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00577/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00577-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD HART,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CSP-SOLANO, et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. CIV S-02-0577 JKS-P

O R D E R

This is a § 1983 action brought by prisoner Plaintiff Richard Hart challenging grooming

regulations that require him to cut his hair. Hart alleges that the regulations infringe on an oath he

made to God as part of his Nazarite Christian faith not to cut his hair and thus violate his First

Amendment right of freedom of religion and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Currently before the Court is a motion for

summary judgment by Defendants, alleging that the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”)

grooming regulations do not violate RLUIPA. See Docket Nos. 45 (Mot.); 52 (Opp’n). This Court

has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Hart is incarcerated in California State Prison–Solano. CDC grooming standards require

male inmates’ hair to be no “longer than three inches” and to “not extend over the eyebrows or

below the top of the shirt collar while standing upright.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3062(e). In

addition, “[h]air shall be cut around the ears, and sideburns shall be neatly trimmed, and shall not

extend below the mid-point of the ear.” Id. 

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 Placement on “C-Status” prevents inmates from earning good-time credits, among other

things. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3062(m) & 3315(f). Typically, violation of the grooming

standards is an administrative violation. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3314(a)(3)(L). However,

repeated administrative violations can result in what is classified as a “serious violation,” see Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3315(a)(3)(M), which can then result in a C-Status classification.

ORDER 

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Hart has been a member of the Nazarite faith since 1993. Docket No. 52 at 3. He claims

that he took an oath to not cut his hair when he separated from his family “to make amends for the

sins of his past.” Id. He cites to the Christian Bible to support his oath. Id. at 6. He alleges that the

CDC policy has substantially burdened the practice of his religion. Specifically, Hart points to his

receipt of at least nine disciplinary reports, his loss of prison employment, his exclusion from

“programming (C-Status),”1 and the loss of other privileges, including commissary, telephone, and

packages. Id. at 6. He asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the grooming policy and

for damages against specific individuals. It is these claims for which Defendants have moved for

summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. Standards for summary judgment

The standards for summary judgment are well settled. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

dictates that “[a] party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a

declaratory judgment may . . . move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(b) (providing the same standard for parties defending a claim). Summary judgment is

appropriate if the Court finds that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). The Court will construe all evidence and draw all evidentiary inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2727, at 459 &

n.5 (3d ed. 1998) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)).

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ORDER 

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A dispute over a “genuine” material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable

fact-finder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there

be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247–48. The nonmoving party may defeat the summary

judgment motion by producing sufficient specific facts to establish that there is a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). However, mere

allegations of factual dispute, without more, will not defeat an otherwise proper motion. Angel v.

Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 653 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A motion for summary judgment

cannot be defeated by mere conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.”).

II. RLUIPA Standards

Prior to the enactment of RLUIPA, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

of 1993 (“RFRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, et seq. RFRA allowed government to “substantially

burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the

person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive

means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2). 

However, lacking a substantive grounding in the Commerce Clause to the United States

Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held that RFRA exceeded the bounds of Congress’s

remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36

(1997). Congress responded to the invalidation of RFRA with RLUIPA, which is less expansive

than its predecessor. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2118 (2005). Specifically applicable

to this case, § 3 of RLUIPA applies to the exercise of religion by institutionalized persons. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The Supreme Court has recently held that RLUIPA does not violate the

Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 2117.

RLUIPA provides that the Government cannot impose a substantial burden on an

institutionalized person’s exercise of his religion unless the Government (1) has a compelling

interest and (2) uses the least restrictive means. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2). RLUIPA requires

plaintiffs to produce “prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free

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 The State makes the additional assertion that the grooming standards promote personal

hygiene. However, the remainder of the State’s arguments do not point to why this is the case. The

arguments instead focus on the safety issues discussed above.

ORDER 

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Exercise Clause .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). However, to rebut such evidence the government

“shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that plaintiff shall bear the

burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice that is

challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.” Id. RLUIPA

further makes it clear that Courts shall construe its terms “in favor of a broad protection of religious

exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).

III. Compelling Interest/Least Restrictive Means Test

Initially, the State makes three arguments to justify the grooming regulations. First, they

argue that they have not substantially burdened the exercise of Hart’s religion. Docket No. 45 at 7. 

This argument is predicated on the State’s assertion that Hart’s religion does not require him to

leave his hair uncut and that even if it did, Hart has not shown that the religion would not take his

status as a prisoner into account to essentially excuse his compliance with the grooming regulations. 

Second, the State contends that the CDC has a compelling interest—the safety of the public and

prison employees—in maintaining the grooming standards.2 Id. at 8–9. Long hair allows prisoners

to conceal weapons and quickly alter their appearance to aid in escape. Additionally, the State

argues that guards familiarize themselves with prisoners’ appearances, that guards must be able to

quickly and repeatedly identify prisoners, and that a prisoner’s ability to quickly alter his appearance

puts the safety of guards in jeopardy, as well as that of other prisoners. 

Finally, it argues that the grooming standards are the least restrictive means to meet the

safety goals. Id. at 9–10. In making this argument, the State points out that Congress intended

prison officials have substantial discretion in determining the best way to implement penological

policies. Consistent with this approach, CDC officials determined that the hair length restrictions

were necessary to facilitate the quick examination of prisoners, that no alternatives were less

burdensome, and that exceptions to the rule made enforcement difficult and engendered resentment

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 While Hart does not include what he calls the “unpublished order” with his motion, it

appears that Judge Karlton included the injunction in a published decision issued after Hart filed his

opposition. In Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2004), Judge Karlton

enjoined the CDC from enforcing grooming regulations that prevented Muslim inmates from having

half-inch beards, concluding that the prohibition violated the least restrictive means test of RLUIPA. 

Id. at 1095–96.

4

 Specifically, he points to Numbers 6:5. Docket No. 52 at 6.

ORDER 

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in other prisoners. In the alternative, the State argues that even if the policy violates RLUIPA,

liability for damages against the individual Defendants cannot lie because they are entitled to

qualified immunity. Id. at 10–11.

Hart responds by disputing the safety concerns raised by the State. He points out that taking

two pictures of an inmate—one with the inmate’s long hair down and one with it up—would solve

most of the problems to which the State points, such as the difficulty of detection when an inmate

escapes and alters his appearance by cutting his hair. Docket No. 52 at 3–6. He points out that his

religious beliefs are supported by his reading of the Christian Bible and that he has repeatedly been

the subject of disciplinary action as the result of following his beliefs. In response to the State’s

argument that the grooming restrictions are the least restrictive means of enforcing prison safety

issues, he additionally points out that prison officials already make an exception to the policy for

Muslim men. Id. at 7–8. He points to a preliminary injunction issued by Judge Karlton in the case

of “Mayweather v. Newland” that allowed Muslim men to maintain half-inch beards.3 Id. And

finally, he argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because he informed them

that they were violating the free exercise of his religion in violation of the Constitution. 

As a starting point, the Court declines to address the issue of whether Hart’s religion

proscribes the cutting of his hair. “Determining whether a belief or practice is religious rather than

secular is ‘a most delicate question.’” Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1974)). Hart provides evidence that his belief is grounded

in the Christian Bible.4 The State does not seriously dispute this assertion, other than to state in

conclusory fashion that the Nazarite faith does not proscribe hair cutting and that Hart has not

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 RLUIPA and the Supreme Court allow inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s belief,

which the Supreme Court finds to be a separate question from an impermissible inquiry into whether

the belief is “central” to a prisoner’s religion. Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124 n.13. In the current case the

Court has no reason to doubt the sincerity of Hart’s belief.

6

 Prior to the enactment of RFRA, a prison regulation that impinged on an inmate’s

constitutional rights was valid “if it [was] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

ORDER 

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shown that his faith would not except him from any requirements because of his incarceration.5

Suffice it to say that, as described in more detail below, enough courts have recognized Hart’s faith

and addressed the merits of similar grooming restriction challenges for the Court to conclude that

Hart has sufficiently raised a legitimate religious issue. Cf. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1552

(8th Cir. 1996) (assuming without evidence from prisoner that grooming regulations substantially

burdened plaintiff in RFRA challenge); Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 503 (11th Cir. 1996)

(same). Further, Hart’s history of punishment, which the State does not challenge, as well as the

relevant California regulations punishing repeated violations and prescribing progressive

punishment, provide sufficient evidence that the CDC policy substantially impairs Hart’s religious

beliefs. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3314(a)(3)(L) & 3315(a)(3)(M).

However, the Court recognizes the compelling interest that the CDC has in keeping the

public, as well as its employees and other inmates, safe. Stated simply, “prison security is a

compelling state interest.” Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124 n.13. Numerous courts that have addressed

grooming challenges brought by members of the Nazarite religion have recognized these safety

interests and rejected the suits. See, e.g., Campbell v. Purkett, 957 F.2d 535, 536–37 (8th Cir.

1992); Scott v. Miss. Dept. of Corr., 961 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Pollock v. Marshall,

845 F.2d 656, 658–59 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting hair grooming challenge raised by Lakota American

Indians for concerns including, among others, safety and identification). While these decisions were

decided under the more forgiving Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), standard,6 they are notable

for the notion that identification and the hiding of contraband, such as weapons or drugs, are

legitimate concerns. The Ninth Circuit does have one case concluding that grooming standards did

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 Examples of evidence that the State presents along with its motion include a declaration

from a prison administrator, the comments and history of the grooming policy, numerous photos of

inmates before and after having their hair cut, and the history of numerous escapees and how their

appearance aided their attempts. See Docket No. 46.

8

 The Court recognizes that the standard of discretion originally outlined by O’Lone has been

superceded by statute. However, Congress has consistently indicated, in passing both RFRA and

RLUIPA, that giving deference to the experience and expertise of prison officials is still appropriate. 

Within RLUIPA’s Congressional record, Congress specifically noted that it expected federal courts

to continue giving “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in

establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline,

consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2123 (quoting

Joint Statement 146 Cong. Rec. S7775 (quoting S.Rep. No. 103-111, p. 10 (1993), U.S. Code Cong.

& Admin. News 1993, pp. 1892, 1899, 1900))) & 2124 n.13. See also Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 1552–53

(outlining history of deferential discretion to prison officials under O’Lone and its continued

applicability under RFRA, as found in the Congressional record of the Act).

ORDER 

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not meet the lesser Turner standard. See Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 731–32 (9th Cir. 1990). 

However, the Ninth Circuit’s holding was based on the State’s failure to provide any evidence to

substantiate its arguments supporting the grooming regulation; a failure not present in the instant

case.7 

More recently, courts have upheld hair grooming restrictions under RFRA based on similar

safety concerns. See, e.g., Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 72–73 (5th Cir. 1997); Hamilton, 74 F.3d at

1554–55; Harris, 97 F.3d at 503–04. The Court cannot see why those concerns are any less valid

under RLUIPA than under the former standards, especially when the cases decided under RFRA

used the same compelling interest standard in reviewing inmate claims. The Court therefore finds

that the State has stated a valid compelling interest in promulgating the grooming restrictions.

Similarly, the Court is satisfied that the current policy is the least restrictive means to meet

safety concerns. The Court is required to give due deference to prison officials in designing

procedures to meet legitimate penological interests. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,

349 (1987).8 As the State points out, the CDC considered other options and found them insufficient. 

Like other courts that have addressed this issue, this Court is unable to think of other procedures

that would adequately meet the compelling interests identified above, nor has Hart suggested any. 

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 For example, dual pictures would provide limited help in helping guards locate an inmate

that wanted to quickly and momentarily alter his appearance in prison. The guards would be forced

to turn to photographic records of some sort rather than quickly relying on their own recognition of

an inmate’s appearance.

ORDER 

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See, e.g., Harris, 97 F.3d at 504 (finding in RFRA case that, like other courts to which it cited, the

court was unable “to suggest any lesser means than a hair length rule for satisfying” legitimate

safety interests). Even if Hart’s suggestion of double photos for identification completely satisfied

the State’s identification concern—a suggestion on which the Court harbors doubts9—it does

nothing to alleviate contraband safety concerns. And, unlike female inmates, who are allowed

longer hair and to whom Hart points in arguing that contraband is an overblown issue, the CDC

specifically considered the needs of female and male inmates. In justifying the different standards,

the CDC explained that male inmates had a greater history of escape and that female inmates had

“not been known to produce the weaponry or attack instruments that male inmates have.” Docket

No. 46, Ex. B (Int. stmt. of reasons).

The Court recognizes that Judge Karlton issued an injunction in the case of beards on male

Muslim inmates. But that injunction only allowed half-inch beards, specifically finding it plausible

that cutting longer beards or very long hair could aid an inmate to elude capture while half-inch

beards likely could not. Mayweathers, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1095; see also Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d

69, 74 (2d Cir. 1989) (“It is certainly not irrational to believe that a full beard, which may well

extend for significant lengths sideways from the cheeks as well as downwards from the chin, may

impede identification more than a one-inch beard.”). It seems reasonable as well to conclude that

contraband could more likely be hidden in longer beards; a task made much more difficult in the

case of half-inch beards. Consistent with Judge Karlton’s limited approach, the Court is satisfied

that the current regulation strikes an adequate balance. It does not require inmates to shave their

heads. It allows hair lengths up to three inches. Longer hair is a greater concern from the

standpoint of concealing weapons or contraband just as longer beards would be.

Like the Eighth Circuit in Scott, the Court appreciates the fact that requiring Hart to cut his

hair is more than a cosmetic punishment. 961 F.2d at 82. The Court assumes that Hart has made a

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ORDER 

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religious commitment in not cutting his hair that helps to alleviate his separation from his family

and to recognize past offenses. However, as the Scott court explained, “the cropping of that hair is a

temporal symbol of the crimes he has committed;” crimes that now necessitate his confinement in

prison. While inmates continue to retain constitutional rights when incarcerated, the free exercise of

those rights is necessarily more circumscribed than it would otherwise be were they not in prison.

In summary, the challenged regulation does not violate RLUIPA. The State has a

compelling interest in the regulation and the means used are the least restrictive. Accordingly, the

State’s motion for summary judgment will be granted. A separate judgment will issue dismissing

Hart’s claims with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

The motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 45 is GRANTED.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 8th day of July 2005.

/s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

United States District Judge 

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