Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-12115/USCOURTS-ca11-14-12115-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 

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[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-12115

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-22439-MGC

MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

BILLY CYPRESS, 

DEXTER WAYNE LEHTINEN, 

Esquire, et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(December 22, 2015)

Before HULL, BLACK and MELLOY,* Circuit Judges.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge:

*Honorable Michael J. Melloy, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

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Plaintiff Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida (the “Tribe”) appeals from 

two orders and a final judgment in a fraud-and-embezzlement-related RICO suit 

against former tribal officials, several attorneys, a law firm, and investment firm 

Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC (“Morgan Stanley”). In a first order, the 

district court granted Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed 

Morgan Stanley from this suit. In a second order, the district court dismissed two 

federal RICO claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding the claims 

presented a non-justiciable intra-tribal conflict. In the alternative, the district court 

held the complaint failed to state a federal claim. Diversity is lacking, and the 

district court elected to enter final judgment rather than retain supplemental 

jurisdiction over several state-law claims.

Here, the undisputed current leaders of the Tribe seek entry into federal 

court asserting federal question jurisdiction based on federal statutory claims 

against Tribal and non-Tribal members alike. On the pleadings as presented at this 

stage of the proceedings, general justiciability concerns regarding intra-Tribal 

conflicts do not defeat jurisdiction. We affirm dismissal of the suit for failure to 

state a claim, however, because the Tribe did not challenge the dismissal on these 

grounds in its opening brief and because the complaint lacks the requisite 

specificity and fails to state a plausible claim. 

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I. The Parties

The Plaintiff, the Miccosukee Tribe, is a federally registered tribe in 

Southern Florida. The defendants include: (1) Billy Cypress, the Tribe's former 

Chairman; (2) Julio Martinez, the Tribe's former CFO; (3) Miguel Hernandez, the 

Tribe's former Director of the Department of Finance; (4) Guy Lewis, a nonTribal-member attorney in Miami; (5) Michael Tein, a non-Tribal-member

attorney in Miami; (6) Lewis Tein, P.L., their firm; (7) Dexter Wayne Lehtinen, a

non-Tribal-member attorney for the Tribe; and (8) Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, 

LLC. Counsel for the defendant attorneys and counsel for Morgan Stanley have 

entered appearances in our court, filed briefs, and participated in this appeal. 

Counsel for the former-Tribal-leader defendants have neither entered appearances 

in our court nor filed briefs.

Cypress was the elected Chairman of the Tribe for a period of twenty-two 

years, including the years 2005 to 2010 during which time he is alleged to have 

orchestrated the looting of over $26 million from the Tribe. The Tribe alleges 

specifically that he: (1) took over $11.5 million largely in a series of $5,000 or 

$10,000 withdrawals from ATMs while visiting various casinos around the United 

States; (2) used Tribal credit cards to make more than $3 million in unauthorized 

purchases; (3) orchestrated a scheme to provide private legal services to himself 

and other Tribal members at Tribal expense at the same time the attorneys in 

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question were representing the Tribe; (4) orchestrated a scheme to pay inflated 

rates for unnecessary legal work in exchange for kickbacks from attorneys (the 

combined legal-work related schemes allegedly resulted in a loss of approximately

$11 million); and (5) allowed Martinez and Hernandez to make excessive and 

unauthorized purchases with Tribal credit cards totaling approximately $1 million. 

Notwithstanding these general allegations which clearly and implicitly presume the 

existence of Tribal-law-based limitations on Cypress’s use of funds and use of 

counsel, and notwithstanding the Tribe’s repeated characterization of Cypress’s 

actions as “unauthorized,” the Tribe alleges that, as Chairman, Cypress “oversaw, 

controlled, supervised and had unrestricted access and control over all the 

financial funds and records of the [Tribe] which are the subject of this lawsuit.”

(Emphasis added). 

The Tribe alleges generally that the Lewis Tein defendants were the 

attorneys involved in the scheme. The Tribe also alleges that Martinez and 

Hernandez had access to the Tribe’s financial records during Cypress’s tenure

(including monthly statements from Morgan Stanley), knew of Cypress’s

malfeasance, and concealed Cypress’s actions and spending from the Tribe. The 

Tribe further alleges Morgan Stanley participated in these frauds against the Tribe. 

Finally, the Tribe alleges several related state-law claims against various

combinations of defendants as well as an unrelated state-law claim against attorney 

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Lehtinen.1 In alleging RICO claims, the Tribe identifies as predicate RICO 

offenses the federal offenses of: mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; laundering of 

monetary instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956; and engaging in monetary transactions in 

property derived from unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1957.

The issues on appeal are limited. First, we address the initial order granting 

Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissing Morgan Stanley 

from this suit. Second, we address whether federal subject matter jurisdiction is 

barred by an intra-tribal dispute over which the sovereign Tribe rather than the 

federal courts must preside. And third, because we conclude subject matter 

jurisdiction is not barred, we address whether the complaint articulates a federal 

claim.

II. Order Compelling Arbitration and Dismissing Morgan Stanley

The Tribe alleges Morgan Stanley and former Tribal Chairman Billy 

Cypress colluded in violation of RICO to steal funds from the Tribe. The Tribe 

appears to allege specifically that (1) initially, a Morgan Stanley representative in 

Florida actively colluded with Cypress in a manner detrimental to the Tribe, and 

 1 The appeal against Lehtinen is moot because the Tribe did not appeal the dismissal of its statelaw claims and there are no federal RICO allegations against Lehtinen.

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(2) subsequently, Morgan Stanley failed to execute account controls and 

protections to recognize and act upon a long series of suspicious cash withdrawals. 

Shortly after the Tribe filed the present suit, Morgan Stanley moved to compel 

arbitration. The district court granted the motion.

In granting the motion, the district court relied on an arbitration provision in 

a 2008 account agreement Cypress entered into with Morgan Stanley on behalf of 

the Tribe.2

 The relevant language stated:

6. Arbitration

This agreement contains a pre-dispute arbitration clause. By signing 

an arbitration agreement the parties agree as follows:

All parties to this agreement are giving up the right to sue each other 

in court, including the right to a trial by jury, except as provided by 

the rules of the arbitration forum in which a claim is filed.

. . .

I agree that all claims or controversies, whether such claims or 

controversies arose prior, on or subsequent to the date hereof, between 

me and [Smith Barney] and/or any of its present or former officers, 

directors, or employees concerning or arising from (i) any account 

maintained by me with [Smith Barney] individually or jointly with 

others in any capacity; (ii) any transaction involving [Morgan Stanley] 

or any predecessor firms by merger, acquisition or other business 

 2 Cypress actually entered into several account agreements on behalf of the Tribe with Smith 

Barney and other predecessors to Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC. Although the Tribe 

disputes the validity of all the agreements, the Tribe acknowledges that, to the extent they may 

be valid, Morgan Stanley is now a party to the agreements and is the proper defendant. The 

parties focus their attention on the 2008 agreement signed by Cypress, and the Tribe does not 

allege the other agreements contain materially different arbitration language or require separate 

examination or analysis.

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combination and me, whether or not such transaction occurred in such 

account or accounts; or (iii) the construction, performance or breach 

of this or any other agreement between us, any duty arising from the 

business of [Smith Barney] or otherwise, shall be determined by 

arbitration before, and only before, any self-regulatory organization or 

exchange of which [Smith Barney] is a member . . . .

The district court noted that the Tribe did not attack the validity of the 

arbitration provision in particular nor did the Tribe argue that the RICO claims at 

issue were of a type falling outside the scope of the arbitration provision. Rather, 

the Tribe challenged only Cypress’s authority to contractually bind the Tribe. The 

district court enforced the arbitration provision, holding Cypress possessed actual 

and apparent authority to contractually bind the Tribe.

We review de novo the district court’s order granting the motion to compel 

arbitration. See Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1213 (11th Cir. 

2011). Arbitration is a matter of consent, and a party’s agent may bind the party to 

arbitration. See Bd. of Trs. of City of Delray Beach Police and Firefighters Ret. 

Sys. v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 622 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2010). “The 

determination whether a signatory . . . had the authority to bind a non-signatory . . .

to arbitrate ‘turns on the specific facts of each case,’” and generally is an issue for 

the court to decide “unless the parties have clearly delegated to the arbitrator 

responsibility for this determination.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, the Tribe 

argues two questions surround the agreement to arbitrate: first, whether Cypress 

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had either actual or apparent authority to bind the Tribe; and second, whether the 

alleged acts of fraud eliminated such authority. In addressing these questions, we 

note that the arbitration provision at issue in this case expressly and clearly 

indicates that disputes as to the “the construction, performance or breach of this . . . 

agreement” are subject to arbitration.

The district court concluded that the Tribe’s own pleadings, as set forth in 

their Second Amended Complaint, established that Cypress possessed actual and 

apparent authority to enter into the account agreements on behalf of the Tribe. We 

agree with the district court that Cypress possessed at least apparent authority to 

bind the Tribe and find arguments to the contrary to be frivolous and unworthy of 

discussion. 

Whether alleged acts of fraud and collusion between Cypress and the 

Morgan Stanley representative effectively eliminated such authority raises a 

separate issue. The Supreme Court has addressed the precise issue of how 

allegations of fraud affect the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. See

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). In Prima Paint, 

the Court held that, where an agreement containing an arbitration provision exists, 

allegations that the entire agreement was the product of fraud must be presented to 

the arbitrator for resolution. Id. at 403–04. The Court drew a distinction, however, 

holding that if a party opposing arbitration alleges specifically that the arbitration 

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provision itself, as contrasted with the entire agreement, was the product of fraud, 

then the court is to address the allegation of fraud before ordering arbitration. Id.; 

see also Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71 (2010) (“[W]here 

the alleged fraud that induced the whole contract equally induced the agreement to 

arbitrate which was part of that contract . . . we nonetheless require the basis of 

challenge to be directed specifically to the agreement to arbitrate before the court 

will intervene.”)

Here, the Tribe articulates no arguments that differentiate between alleged 

fraud in the formation of the contract and fraud specifically in the inclusion of an 

arbitration provision. As such, pursuant to Prima Paint and Rent-A-Center, West, 

the effect of any alleged fraud upon Cypress’s authority is an issue to be raised in 

arbitration rather than an issue for the court to address in assessing whether to 

order arbitration. We affirm the district court’s judgment in granting Morgan 

Stanley’s motion to compel arbitration.

III. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction: Intra-Tribal Dispute

“Indian tribes are distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 

original natural rights in matters of local self-government. Although no longer 

possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, they remain a separate people, with 

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the power of regulating their internal and social relations.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. 

Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Due to this unique status, the federal courts recognize two analytically distinct but 

related bases that may defeat jurisdiction in cases involving tribes. First, tribes 

enjoy an affirmative defense of sovereign immunity as to many civil actions, 

subject to the limitation that Congress maintains plenary authority to restrict tribes’ 

sovereign immunity. See id. at 58; Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of 

Indians of Fla., 177 F.3d 1212, 1224 (11th Cir. 1999). And tribes, of course, may 

waive this immunity. Tamiami Partners, 177 F. 3d at 1224. 

Second, certain issues are, by their very nature, inherently reserved for 

resolution through purely tribal mechanisms due to the privilege and responsibility 

of sovereigns to regulate their own, purely internal affairs (and due to the 

concomitant impropriety of the federal courts dictating answers to such questions). 

Examples of such issues include membership determinations, inheritance rules, 

domestic relations, and the resolution of competing claims to tribal leadership. 

See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (describing retained 

inherent tribal authority over “the powers of self-government” as involving “only 

the relations among members of a tribe” and listing examples of such powers); In 

re Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litig., 340 F.3d 749, 767 

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(8th Cir. 2003) (finding a lack of jurisdiction to resolve an internal tribal leadership 

dispute between competing factions).

Here, the Tribe asserts no claims of sovereign immunity; the Tribe seeks 

entry into federal court to press its RICO claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) 

and (d). In the absence of a wholly non-justiciable issue, federal question 

jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1362, and the Tribe has met its 

burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Tetco Metal Products, Inc. v. Langham, 

387 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1968) (“The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of 

a court has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.”).

3

 The non-Tribalmember attorney defendants argue, however, that theories of fraud and 

embezzlement lie at the heart of the Tribe’s RICO claims. They also argue that no 

determination of embezzlement may be reached without exploring the limits of 

Cypress’s authority under Tribal law—if Tribal law permitted Cypress to take over 

$26 million in cash and services for himself and his close confidants while 

concealing his scheme from the Tribe, then any alleged conspiracy and self-dealing 

were not actually illegal (and the alleged secrecy may have been mere political 

image control rather than a conspiratorial attempt to conceal an illegality).

 3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), we adopted as 

binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.

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In accepting this argument, the district court correctly determined that it was 

necessary to examine the federal claims in the case to determine if “at their core” 

they presented important matters of internal Tribal governance bearing upon the 

Tribe’s status as a sovereign. We believe this case presents a close question in this 

regard. We disagree, however, with the conclusion that the current pleadings 

present a genuine question regarding the presence of a non-justiciable issue. We 

reach this conclusion for two reasons.

First, and most importantly, the mere suggestion of a dispute regarding tribal 

law is insufficient to trigger the intra-tribal dispute doctrine. Instead, to trigger the 

intra-tribal dispute doctrine, a case must present a genuine and non-frivolous 

question of tribal law. 

This case does not present such a question because the argument that 

Cypress’s actions were in accord with Tribal law is a speculative suggestion, at 

best. It is by no means clear that any actual dispute exists regarding the scope of 

Cypress’s authority to use funds or hire counsel. The defendant attorneys’ 

argument in this regard rests on speculation, one vague and ambiguous statement 

in the complaint, and an absence of any actual references to Tribal law. Cypress’s 

lack of authority to grossly enrich himself at Tribal expense is expressly stated or 

implicitly presumed throughout most paragraphs of the Tribe’s extensive 

complaint. The alleged secrecy of the schemes also is inconsistent with the 

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defendant attorneys’ suggestion that Cypress was acting in accord with his 

authority. One statement in the complaint, standing alone, suggests broad 

authority for Cypress—the statement that he “oversaw, controlled, supervised and 

had unrestricted access and control over all the financial funds and records of the 

[Tribe] which are the subject of this lawsuit.” This conclusory and isolated 

statement may indicate that Cypress truly possessed unfettered discretion to enrich 

himself; it may merely indicate, however, that he operated under thorough lack of 

oversight.

Our jurisdiction over an otherwise justiciable RICO claim does not fail 

merely due to the suggestion that an issue of tribal law may arise based on the 

presence of an errant, unclear, and potentially inconsistent statement in an 

extensive pleading. The facts of this case do not require us to decide whether the 

intra-tribal-dispute doctrine may ever find application in this or a similar case. We 

hold merely that more than the speculative assertion of undefined Tribal law and 

reference to a vague and seemingly errant statement in a pleading is required to 

introduce a genuine question of Tribal law into the case and convert the otherwise 

justiciable RICO claim into a non-justiciable matter of internal Tribal affairs.4

 4 Although we base our decision only on the pleadings, subsequent developments including an 

evidentiary hearing on a sanctions motions, state court rulings, and attorney representations at 

oral argument shed additional light on the theories and sources of Tribal law potentially at play 

in this matter. Such developments, however, are not part of the present record and play no part 

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Second, even if at some future point the court is presented with a seemingly 

genuine question of Tribal law regarding whether the alleged acts of embezzlement 

and self-dealing were within the scope of Cypress’s authority, it is not necessarily 

the type of question the court is categorically precluded from addressing. It does 

not touch upon the cited matters of membership disputes, active disputes between 

competing factions claiming current leadership power, domestic relations, or 

inheritance rules. Rather, it presents a potential scope-of-authority question we

previously have examined in the context of suits against Tribal officials. See

Tamiami Partners, 177 F. 3d at 1225 (“[W]e begin with the proposition that tribal 

officers are protected by tribal sovereign immunity when they act in their official 

capacity and within the scope of their authority; however, they are subject to suit 

under the doctrine of Ex parte Young when they act beyond their authority.”). 

While the cited case involved injunctive, Ex Parte Young actions against tribal 

officials (and necessarily involved questions regarding the constitutional scope of 

permissible authority for tribal leaders) it nevertheless required the courts to 

examine the scope of authority granted by a tribe to its officials. And although 

courts are not free to delve into the resolution of outstanding questions of Tribal 

law, courts are competent to examine a developed record to determine whether an 

actual dispute exists regarding the scope of tribal authority.

 

in this appeal. We address only the question of jurisdiction based upon the record as presented to 

the district court.

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Because we do not find the case as presented at this stage to involve a 

genuine dispute as to a non-justiciable intra-tribal issue, we hold that federal 

question jurisdiction exists, and we proceed to address the sufficiency of the 

pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6).

IV. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

In the district court the parties presented arguments regarding the sufficiency 

of the pleadings. The district court summarily concluded as an alternative basis for 

its dismissal of the suit that the Tribe failed to state a claim. In its opening brief on 

appeal, the Tribe does not address this issue. The attorney defendants urge this 

basis for affirmance in their appellees’ brief, and the Tribe presented argument on 

this issue in its reply brief.

“Our longstanding case law rule is that an appellant who does not raise an 

issue in his opening brief may not do so in his reply brief, in a supplemental brief, 

in a rehearing petition, or on a remand from the Supreme Court . . . .” United 

States v. Durham, 795 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). In Durham, the 

court softened this “longstanding . . . rule” but only to permit an appellant to raise 

an argument omitted from an opening brief when an intervening Supreme Court 

opinion overruled existing circuit law. Id. at 1331 (“We leave our circuit law 

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intact insofar . . . as any issue based on a Supreme Court decision that was issued 

soon enough, as a practical matter, for it to have been included in the opening brief 

is concerned.”). 

While it may seem harsh to enforce this rule against a party as to an issue the 

district court referenced only in summary fashion and as an alternative basis for its

judgment, the rule as described in Durham allows for no “summary-conclusion” or 

“alternative basis” exception. To the contrary, we have held that:

[t]o obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on 

multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that 

every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect. When 

an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds 

on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have 

abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the 

judgment is due to be affirmed.

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). Our 

court applies this waiver rule strictly, and we are not at liberty to recognize an 

exception for issues district judges rely upon in summary fashion or state as 

alternative explanations for their underlying judgments. See Hamilton v. 

Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that 

“[a] passing reference to an issue in a brief is not enough, and the failure to make 

arguments and cite authorities in support of an issue waives it.”); Irwin v. Hawk, 

40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir.1994) (applying this standard to a pro se brief). 

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Finally, we note that Durham clearly indicates that the court’s loosening of the rule 

was intended to be very narrow in scope and focused exclusively upon situations 

involving new Supreme Court authority that changes existing circuit precedent.5

 

The parties raised and briefed the Rule 12(b)(6) issue below, the district 

court clearly cited this issue as an alternative basis for its ruling, and the Tribe 

waived this issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief. We therefore affirm the 

judgment of the district court on this alternative basis.

We nevertheless write further to explain our agreement with the district 

court’s conclusion regarding the substance of this issue. In general, a plaintiff 

must allege sufficient facts to make a claim “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

 5 The court stressed the limited nature of its holding repeatedly, concluding:

The change in circuit law that our holding makes is enough to decide the question 

presented by the motion before us, and that is as far as our holding goes. We leave our 

circuit law intact insofar as cases that are no longer pending on direct appeal are 

concerned, insofar as any issue that was not previously foreclosed by binding precedent is 

concerned, and insofar as any issue based on a Supreme Court decision that was issued 

soon enough, as a practical matter, for it to have been included in the opening brief is 

concerned. And nothing in this decision loosens the strictures of the plain error rule, or 

affects the force of any appeal waiver agreed to in the district court. The only rule 

affected is the rule concerning the effect of a failure to raise a claim or theory in the 

opening brief that a party files where that claim or theory is based on an intervening 

Supreme Court decision.

Durham, 795 F.3d at 1331.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must accept as true the pleaded 

allegations of fact, but the court need not accept “legal conclusions.” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 570. And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

The standards of Twombly and Iqbal, however, are not the only measuring 

sticks for the present complaint. When a plaintiff asserts RICO and RICO 

conspiracy claims, the court must look at the underlying allegations of racketeering 

predicates to determine the nature of the alleged wrongdoing. When the 

underlying allegations assert claims that are akin to fraud, the heightened pleading 

standards of Rule 9(b) apply to the RICO claims. Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. 

Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2007). As such, the pleading 

requirements do not extend merely to plausibility, they demand plausibility based 

upon Rule 9(b)’s heightened degree of specificity. “To satisfy the Rule 9(b) 

standard, RICO complaints must allege: (1) the precise statements, documents, or 

misrepresentations made; (2) the time and place of and person responsible for the 

statement; (3) the content and manner in which the statements misled the Plaintiffs; 

and (4) what the Defendants gained by the alleged fraud.” Id.

Applying the Rule 9(b) standard to the present complaint, we note that the 

district court previously afforded the Tribe the opportunity to amend its complaint 

to add particularity. In doing so, the Tribe submitted a 314-page second amended 

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complaint which, at first blush, appears to contain particularity: it contains more 

than 208 pages of tables identifying: (1) ATM withdraws by amount, date, and 

city; (2) meeting dates for business council or general council meetings where 

select defendants “upon information and belief” were present and financial matters 

were discussed; and (3) invoice numbers and dates for bills from Lewis Tein to the 

Tribe as well as dates the Tribe paid those invoices. These 208 pages, however,

actually consist of a 34-page list of ATM transactions; 6 identical 17-page listings 

of the Lewis Tein invoices and dates; and 8 identical 9-page listings of the business 

council and general council meeting dates. Much of the remainder of the 

complaint is spent restating generalized allegations as state claims against various 

combinations of defendants. The complaint’s 314 pages, therefore, appear largely 

to be an attempt to create the impression of specificity through page-number 

“shock and awe.”

It is unnecessary in this case to focus specifically on the elements of the 

alleged predicate offenses for the RICO claims. The deficiency of the pleadings 

exists at a more fundamental level. Looking first at the allegations concerning the 

attorney defendants, the complaint suffers from a wholesale lack of detail to satisfy 

the plausibility standard of Iqbal and Twombly or the heightened requirements of 

Rule 9(b). The complaint alleges generally that the attorneys billed the firm for 

legitimate services to the Tribe as well as illegitimate or fictitious services. The 

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complaint also alleges generally that the attorneys received payment at inflated 

rates for their services and provided services to individual tribal members at Tribal 

expense under the auspices of fictitious loan arrangements. No attempt is made, 

however, to articulate what services were deemed legitimate and proper, what 

services comprised part of the alleged fraudulent scheme, and what rates were 

inflated.

6

 Further nothing is alleged to suggest the attorneys conspired, agreed or 

were otherwise aware their representation of the firm or of some of its members

was unauthorized. Regardless of the extent of Cypress’s authority, the complaint 

alleges he engaged the attorneys on behalf of the Tribe and on behalf of himself 

and other Tribal members as individuals. Further, the extensive tables listing 

attorney invoice numbers, invoice dates, and payment dates do not suggest what 

services, legal matters, attorneys, or dollar amounts were associated with which 

invoices. There is, therefore, insufficient specificity to distinguish between what

attorney matters the Tribe deems to have been legitimate and what the Tribe deems 

to have been illegitimate. Finally, the Tribe alleges a kickback scheme in which 

the attorneys received payment and refunded money to Cypress, but there are no 

factual references to support these allegations.

 6 The complaint does allege specific instances of personal representation of Cypress, namely, 

representation in a criminal matter and a civil matter concerning a car accident while Cypress 

was intoxicated. In addition, the complaint alleges representation of Cypress on an IRS matter. 

The complaint does not allege specific facts to illustrate attorney knowledge that such 

representation was somehow illicit or beyond Cypress’s authority.

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This leaves the allegations against Tribal members Martinez, Hernandez, 

and Cypress. Looking only at the allegations of fact surrounding Cypress, there 

likely exists sufficient detail to articulate plausible claims of embezzlement and 

theft. The allegations against Martinez and Hernandez as related to the RICO 

claims, however, fare no better than the claims against the attorneys. Any

sufficiency of detail regarding Cypress simply does not extend to the other

defendants to satisfy the pleading requirements for the Federal RICO or RICO 

conspiracy claims. And, one person’s nefarious acts do not define a RICO 

enterprise. Even if the Rule 12(b)(6) issue had not been waived, therefore, we 

would agree with the conclusion that the Tribe failed to meet the pleading 

standards.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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