Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01092/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, 

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11 CV 1092 MMA (RBB)

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

[Doc. No. 3]

vs.

BRENDAN MCNAMARA; MERRILL

LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH

INCORPORATED,

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on May 25, 2011 for hearing on Plaintiff Fidelity

Brokerage Services LLC’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order and order to show

cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. [Doc. No. 3.] Attorneys James Turken and

Stacey Schmidt appeared on behalf of Fidelity, and attorneys John Vaughn and Timothy Pestotnik

appeared on behalf of Defendants Brendan McNamara and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,

Inc. After the May 25 hearing, the Court issued an order permitting the parties to submit certain

additional information to the Court. Upon consideration of the arguments made by counsel at the

hearing, as well as the written submissions of the parties, the Court concludes Fidelity has

demonstrated injunctive relief is appropriate.

BACKGROUND

Fidelity recently filed a civil complaint and statement of claim with the Financial Industry

Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) against its former Account Executive Brendan McNamara, and

Case 3:11-cv-01092-MMA-RBB Document 30 Filed 05/27/11 Page 1 of 13
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McNamara’s current employer Merrill Lynch, for among other things, misappropriation of trade

secrets and unfair competition. [Doc. No. 1.] Fidelity asserts that during McNamara’s tenure at

Fidelity he twice signed employment agreements containing confidentiality and non-solicitation

clauses. [Doc. No. 1, Exhs. B, C.] The Agreements indicate, generally, that McNamara would

have access to Fidelity’s confidential and trade secret information during his employment, and that

he agreed not to improperly use, copy, retain or disclose any such information upon termination of

his employment with Fidelity. The Agreements further state McNamara shall not solicit any of

Fidelity’s customers for a one year period after his employment with Fidelity terminated. 

During McNamara’s employment with Fidelity, he allegedly “had access to and acquired

contact and confidential financial information for close to one thousand (1,000) Fidelity accounts,

representing more than $238 million in assets under Fidelity management.” [Doc. No. 1, ¶35.] 

Fidelity alleges that in or around December 2010 McNamara began using his “Fidelity computer

to access, or ‘look up,’ confidential and trade secret information for a number of Fidelity

customers in very short, sporadic time periods.” [Id. at ¶40.] Fidelity asserts McNamara’s look up

activity was suspicious and continued until McNamara resigned on March 3, 2011 to take a job

with competitor Merrill Lynch. [Id. at ¶¶40-45.]

According to Fidelity, within days of McNamara’s resignation, he, in concert with Merrill

Lynch, “began sending letters to Fidelity’s customers regarding his new employment.” [Id. at

¶47.] Fidelity acknowledges McNamara may legally notify his clients that he moved to Merrill

Lynch, but argues McNamara wrongfully “called numerous Fidelity customers, soliciting their

Fidelity accounts for Merrill Lynch.” [Id. at ¶¶47-48.] McNamara admits he created a customer

list from memory after leaving Fidelity by using publically available sources to obtain contact

information for the names he recalled. [See id. at ¶56.] Fidelity asserts McNamara used this

information to do more than merely announce his new employment to his former clients, as

Fidelity received reports from several clients that McNamara had contacted them and discussed

moving their assets to Merrill Lynch on multiple occasions. [Id. at ¶48.] In one case, McNamara

allegedly continued to solicit a Fidelity client after she unequivocally indicated she had no desire

to move her accounts. [Id. at ¶¶52-54.]

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Fidelity estimates approximately $5 million of client assets previously managed by Fidelity

have been moved to Merrill Lynch since McNamara left three months ago. [Id. at ¶61.] From

March 2011 through early May 2011, Fidelity engaged in discussions with counsel for Merrill

Lynch regarding McNamara’s alleged activities in an attempt to reach an amicable solution to

Fidelity’s concerns. [Id. at ¶51.] When it became clear to Fidelity that an amicable resolution was

not possible, Fidelity filed the present action and motion for a temporary restraining order on May

18, 2011. Fidelity argues McNamara should be ordered to “return” the list of trade secret client

names he recreated from memory after moving to Merrill Lynch, and that Defendants should be

enjoined from soliciting Fidelity’s customers pending resolution of its claims before FINRA. 

LEGAL STANDARD

To prevail on a motion for temporary restraining order or to receive preliminary injunctive

relief, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating “(1) that it is likely to succeed on the

merits, (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that

the balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.” Earth

Island Institute v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “A preliminary

injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates that serious questions going to the merits

were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor.” Alliance for Wild

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal marks and citation omitted). 

However, “plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible.” Id. at 1131

(citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008)). Because injunctive relief prior to

trial is an extraordinary remedy, it is to be granted sparingly. Id. Moreover, on application for

injunctive relief the court need not decide disputed questions of fact. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v.

Edgewood Partners Ins. Ctr., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8924 *7-9 (N.D. Cal.) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief “to preserve the status quo pending a

final determination of the merits of this dispute” by FINRA. Merrill Lynch v. Chung, 2001 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 3248 *6 (C.D. Cal.) (italics in original); Toyo Tire Holdings of Americas Inc. v.

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 Defendants maintain, however, that McNamara did not misappropriate Fidelity’s trade secrets

as it is lawful for him to use the client names to announce his move to Merrill Lynch.

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Continental Tire North America, Inc., 609 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2010) (“district court has

authority to issue equitable relief in aid of arbitration”).

II. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

Under California law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) prohibits employees from

misappropriating their former employer’s trade secrets. Cal. Civ. Code. § 3426.1. “Actual or

threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.” Id. at § 3426.2. Thus, to succeed on the merits of

its claims, Fidelity must demonstrate the information McNamara possesses constitutes a trade

secret, and that McNamara has either misappropriated such information, or that McNamara’s

possession poses a threat of misappropriation. 

Customer lists may qualify as trade secret information subject to protection under UTSA. 

The Retirement Group v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1238 (2009). At the hearing,

Defendants appeared to concede the list of customer names McNamara recreated from memory

after he joined Merrill Lynch contains confidential trade secret information belonging to Fidelity.1

The parties primarily dispute whether McNamara’s alleged use of Fidelity’s client names is

protected. Thus, for purposes of this order the Court assumes Fidelity’s client names are protected

trade secret information.

After joining Merrill Lynch, McNamara admits he recalled the names of several clients he

serviced while at Fidelity, and then used publically available resources to obtain contact

information for these clients. [Doc. No. 15-1, ¶4.] McNamara asserts he used the information to

announce his “new business affiliation to as many of [his] Fidelity clients as [he] could (depending

on his ability to obtain sufficient contact information from those publically available resources . .

.).” [Id. at ¶14.] McNamara states he sent announcement cards to approximately 50 Fidelity

clients and called some clients to announce his move, but he denies asking any of the clients for

their business or otherwise soliciting them to move their accounts from Fidelity to Merrill Lynch. 

[Id. at ¶¶5, 13-14.] 

/ / /

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 Fidelity identifies the four customers by name but has redacted this information to preserve

its clients’ privacy. 

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The parties agree California law permits McNamara to notify Fidelity clients that he has

moved to Merrill Lynch. Aetna Bldg. Maint. Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 203-04 (1952). 

McNamara may also discuss business with the clients, if invited to do so. Id. at 204. But he may

not ask the clients for their business or otherwise solicit them to transfer their accounts from

Fidelity to Merrill Lynch. Id. at 203-204. Fidelity argues that after McNamara lawfully

announced his new employment to approximately 50 clients, he impermissibly continued to call

and solicit Fidelity clients. In support, Fidelity provides a declaration from William Gloyd,

Fidelity’s Vice President, Branch Office Manager for its Del Mar location, indicating he received

reports that “McNamara was calling Fidelity customers to discuss potentially doing business with

them at Merrill Lynch.” [Doc. No. 5, ¶16.] Specifically, four customers “reported that McNamara

had contacted them and discussed moving their assets to him at Merrill Lynch.” [Id.]2

 In addition,

Gloyd states he learned that McNamara contacted one particular customer in early May 2011 for a

third time after the customer indicated she had no interest in transferring her accounts from

Fidelity to Merrill Lynch. [Id. at ¶24.] Specifically, Gloyd declared:

On May 9, 2011, I learned that a Fidelity Account Executive, John

Metzger, had received a telephone call that same day from one of the

customers who had previously been assigned to McNamara and was

now assigned to him, [Ms. S.] Ms. S advised him that she had been

contacted and solicited by McNamara on several occasions, with the

most recent instance occurring just a few days earlier. I immediately

telephoned Ms. S to follow up with her about her report to Mr.

Metzger. During my conversation with her, I learned that McNamara

initially contacted her by mail and telephone in March 2011. At that

time, she advised McNamara that she was not interested in transferring

her account from Fidelity to Merrill Lynch. Nonetheless, Ms. S

reported that on or about May 6, 2011, she spoke with McNamara

again by telephone and he solicited her business. When McNamara

spoke to her, he appeared to be aware of her account type and

investment interests, spoke negatively (and comparatively) about

specific Fidelity products relating to her account, and requested a

meeting to discuss the potential transfer of her account to Merrill

Lynch. The customer was very concerned by what McNamara had told

her, and Mr. Metzger had to invest a substantial amount of time to

reassure her of Fidelity’s ability to manage her account. 

[Id.]

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Defendants urge the Court to disregard the majority of Gloyd’s declaration because it is

largely hearsay in that it merely recounts his conversation with Ms. S. [Doc. No. 15, p.16-19.]

Fidelity has not submitted any client declarations indicating inappropriate contact from

McNamara. However, the Court declines to disregard Gloyd’s testimony entirely on the ground

that it does not comply with the formal requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As the

Supreme Court has explained: “the purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the

relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose,

and given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary

injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that

is less complete than in a trial on the merits. A party thus is not required to prove his case in full

at a preliminary-injunction hearing . . . .” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 

Here, Gloyd’s declaration describes a specific conversation he had with a particular client,

and he recounts the details of that conversation, including the concerns the client expressed to him. 

Although Gloyd’s declaration alone may not be sufficient to carry Fidelity’s burden during

arbitration, the Court finds the information persuasive in its limited consideration of Fidelity’s

request for immediate injunctive relief. See also, Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389,

1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction necessitates a prompt

determination and makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to

testify at trial. The trial court may give even inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so

serves the purpose of preventing irreparable harm before trial.”) (citations omitted).

During the hearing, defense counsel argued that courts have only applied these less

rigorous evidentiary standards when the circumstances and need for injunctive relief were more

exigent than they are here. The defense points out that McNamara left Fidelity more than three

months ago, giving Fidelity adequate time to develop competent admissible evidence. The Court

is mindful, however, that from the time of McNamara’s departure in March 2011, through early

May 2011, Fidelity was actively working with Merrill Lynch to informally resolve its concerns. 

Gloyd learned of McNamara’s alleged repeated solicitation to Ms. S on May 9, 2011, after

McNamara contacted her a third time on May 6. On May 11 Merrill Lynch unequivocally

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indicated it would not give Fidelity the client list McNamara recreated from memory, and Fidelity

filed its complaint and motion for injunctive relief one week later on May 18. Fidelity acted

diligently to protect its trade secret information and should not be faulted for attempting to reach

an amicable solution without involving the Court. Further, the Court disagrees that the threat that

McNamara might use Fidelity’s trade secret information, which he admittedly has in his

possession, does not present a situation as exigent as that in Camenisch, where a deaf student filed

suit to order a university to provide him with interpreter services. 

Fidelity further argues that even if the client reports are disregarded, it will still likely

prevail at arbitration because McNamara admits he has Fidelity’s protected client names in his

possession, he acknowledges he has already used the information for its only lawful purpose, and

yet McNamara refuses to return the information to Fidelity. Accordingly, McNamara’s conduct

alone presents a clear threat of misappropriation that warrants injunctive relief. The Court

concludes that when the record is considered as a whole, Fidelity has put forth sufficient

information to demonstrate it may reasonably succeed in the arbitration proceedings.

Aside from Gloyd’s statements regarding his conversation with Ms. S, Fidelity provides 

spreadsheets purportedly showing that during McNamara’s final months at Fidelity he frequently

looked up multiple client accounts in short spans of time. Fidelity contends this rapid look up of

client accounts is suspicious because account executives typically only retrieve one client’s

information at a time in relatively regular intervals throughout the day when working on the

individual accounts. Fidelity also originally argued that McNamara was looking up the accounts

during break times or after normal business hours. Although Fidelity has since conceded the time

of day may not be inherently suspicious, Gloyd maintains that the number and frequency of

McNamara’s account look ups is concerning. [Doc. No. 22-2.] McNamara flatly denies taking

any confidential information from Fidelity or soliciting any of Fidelity’s clients. [Doc. No. 15-1.] 

Nevertheless, while no single piece of evidence indicates Fidelity is likely to succeed on the merits

of its claims, when the record is considered in its entirety, the Court finds there is a reasonably

possibility that Fidelity will succeed at the FINRA arbitration. Accordingly, the first factor in the

Court’s analysis weighs in favor of granting injunctive relief. 

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III. IRREPARABLE INJURY

Defendants contend immediate relief is unwarranted because McNamara left Fidelity

nearly three months ago and Fidelity is just now seeking injunctive relief. As discussed above,

however, the record indicates Fidelity endeavored during that time to resolve its concerns

informally with Merrill Lynch, as it had done in the past. On May 11, 2011, Defendants

unequivocally refused to return the information sought by Fidelity. On May 18, Fidelity filed the

present complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order. Therefore, the purported delay is

not reason to deny Fidelity injunctive relief that is otherwise warranted. 

Defendants also assert Fidelity has not demonstrated the possibility of irreparable injury

because monetary damage does not constitute irreparable harm. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61,

90 (1974) (“temporary loss of income, ultimately to be recovered, does not usually constitute 

irreparable injury”). Although Defendants are correct monetary harm alone does not create a

likelihood of irreparable injury, Fidelity’s asserted risk of harm goes beyond tangible monetary

losses. Specifically, Fidelity asserts it will suffer loss of goodwill and damage to its reputation if

Defendants are not enjoined from soliciting Fidelity’s clients. Fidelity argues their relationship

with their clients is based on confidence and trust, and customers will lose trust in Fidelity if

McNamara continues to contact them and discuss the clients’ personal information that was

disclosed to Fidelity in confidence. 

Loss of goodwill is irreparable harm that warrants injunctive relief. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales

Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Evidence of threatened loss of

prospective customers or goodwill certainly supports a finding of the possibility of irreparable

harm.”); Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance, 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991)

(recognizing that intangible injuries, such as harm to reputation and goodwill, qualify as

irreparable harm). Irreparable harm may be found, where as here, Defendants’ alleged actions

may injure Fidelity’s reputation if Fidelity’s clients perceive a violation of their confidential

information. Bank of Am. v. Immel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65358 *7-8 (N.D. Cal.) (citations

omitted). Gloyd’s declaration, which states Fidelity already expended significant time to reassure

Ms. S that Fidelity is capable of maintaining her accounts, indicates Fidelity’s fears are not

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unfounded. [Doc. No. 5, ¶24.] Accordingly, the second factor weighs in favor of granting

Fidelity’s request for injunctive relief.

IV. BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS

Fidelity asserts the balance of hardships weighs in favor of granting its request for a

temporary restraining order because the requested relief is narrowly tailored to prevent McNamara

and Merrill Lynch from unlawfully using Fidelity’s trade secrets to solicit Fidelity clients; and

Fidelity’s desired relief will not prevent McNamara and Merrill Lynch from servicing or

marketing other clients. McNamara asserts his career will be crippled if he cannot communicate

with his clients. [Doc. No. 15, p.12.] The Court finds McNamara’s concern is exaggerated. First,

McNamara admits he has already announced his move to all the Fidelity clients he was able to

locate through publically available sources. Although the law permits McNamara to make

multiple announcements, his clients already have his new contact information and know where to

reach him if they desire to transfer their accounts to Merrill Lynch. Second, Fidelity has not

requested an injunction that will prevent McNamara from having any contact with his former

clients. Fidelity agrees McNamara may assist clients who have already reached out to him, or who

may reach out to him in the future. Fidelity also does not intend to interfere with McNamara’s

ability to service former Fidelity clients who have moved their accounts to Merrill Lynch, nor will

Fidelity impede any client’s efforts to transfer his or her account from Fidelity in the future. 

Fidelity merely desires to prevent McNamara and Merrill Lynch from using Fidelity’s trade secret

information to solicit clients McNamara knows to be valuable assets from his employment with

Fidelity. 

The relative harm McNamara may suffer if he cannot use Fidelity’s trade secret

information to make repeated announcements of his move to Merrill Lynch is slight when

compared to the intangible harm Fidelity may suffer in losing the faith and trust of its customers. 

Thus, the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of Fidelity and issuing a temporary

injunction.

/ / /

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V. PUBLIC INTEREST 

The public has an interest in fair competition, and therefore an interest in protecting

Fidelity’s trade secret information. Immel, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *8-9. The Court recognizes

the public also has an interest in allowing people the freedom to choose which financial advisor

they want to work with. See, e.g., Prudential Securities, Inc.. v. Plunkett, 8 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519

(E.D. Va. 1998). In this case, however, Fidelity has not impeded its clients’ efforts to transfer

their accounts to Merrill Lynch when requested. Nor does Fidelity desire to preclude McNamara

from responding to client inquiries or servicing clients who have transferred their accounts. 

Therefore, because Fidelity has shown there is a threat of misappropriation due to McNamara’s

continued possession of its trade secret client information, the public interest weighs in favor of

issuing a temporary restraining order. 

All four factors weigh in favor of issuing an order restraining certain limited conduct by

Defendants for a short time until the FINRA arbitration concludes. Fidelity has shown a

likelihood of success on the merits, that irreparable injury is likely if Defendants are not enjoined,

that the balance of hardships tips in Fidelity’s favor, and the public interest favors issuing

injunctive relief. What remains is whether Fidelity must post a bond under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(c), and what specific activity shall be enjoined. 

VI. BOND

Under Rule 65(c), “[t]he court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary

restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to

pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or

restrained.” The Ninth Circuit has “recognized Rule 65(c) invests the district court ‘with

discretion as to the amount of security required, if any.’” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906,

919 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir.1999)). 

“The district court may [therefore] dispense with the filing of a bond when it concludes there is no

realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or her conduct.” Id. 

Here, Defendants request the Court enter a bond in the amount $20,000 to “protect them in

the event that any injunction is proven wrongful.” [Doc. No. 27, p.2.] Defendants assert $20,000

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is appropriate given the bond amounts other courts have required in “cases involving injunctions

against departing employees,” including cases in which Fidelity was required to post a bond. [Id.

at p.2-3.] But Defendants fail to make any connection between the potential harms in the cases

cited, and whether those harms could potentially occur here. Simply, Defendants do not identify

what harm they may suffer if a bond does not issue, nor show that “some harm is more likely

absent the posting of a security bond.” Jorgensen, 320 F.3d at 919. 

As set forth below, the Court’s order enjoins Defendants from engaging in very limited

conduct, for a relatively brief amount of time. In addition, Fidelity makes the salient point that the

injunction does not prohibit Defendants from engaging in lawful conduct to service their new and

existing clients. Rather, it narrowly restricts the unlawful solicitation of Fidelity’s clientele

through use of Fidelity’s trade secret information. 

Accordingly, absent an identifiable harm Defendants may suffer if the injunctive relief is

ultimately deemed unnecessary, the Court in its discretion finds no bond shall issue.

VII. CONDITIONS OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes a narrowly tailored order restraining

certain limited conduct by Defendants McNamara and Merrill Lynch until completion of the

expedited FINRA arbitration proceedings is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as

follows:

Defendants are hereby enjoined and restrained, pending the completion of an expedited

hearing on the merits of Fidelity’s claims before FINRA, as follows:

(1) Defendants, and all persons acting in concert with them, are not permitted to create,

recreate from memory, or possess any records or documents (whether in original, computerized,

electronic, hard copy, handwritten or memorialized in any other form) containing Fidelity’s

Confidential Information, as that term is defined in McNamara’s Fidelity Employee Agreement,

executed by McNamara on November 10, 2010, which expressly includes but is not limited to,

information pertaining to Fidelity’s customers that was obtained or derived from McNamara’s

employment with Fidelity (“Fidelity’s Confidential Information”);

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(2) Defendants, and all persons acting in concert with them, are not permitted to use,

disclose or transmit in any manner whatsoever, Fidelity’s Confidential Information; and

(3) Defendants, and all persons acting in concert with them, are not permitted to initiate

contact with any Fidelity customers whose identities are known to them as a result of McNamara’s

employment with Fidelity, for the purpose of encouraging, inviting, suggesting, or requesting the

transfer of any accounts or business or patronage from Fidelity. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if

Fidelity customers initiate contact with Defendants, or either of them, Defendants shall be

permitted to respond to and accept business from said customer(s). Defendants shall also be

permitted to continue servicing former Fidelity clients who have already moved their accounts to

Merrill Lynch.

(4) Within seven (7) days from the entry of this Order, Defendants, and all persons

acting in concert with them, shall relinquish custody and control of the aforementioned records

and documents, see para.1 supra, and confirm the permanent deletion of electronic records

containing Fidelity’s Confidential Information. The records and documents must be submitted

directly to the Chambers of the undersigned via courier no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 3, 2011.

The Court shall maintain possession of the records and documents for the duration of the

arbitration proceedings. Fidelity shall notify the Court of the arbitrators’ final decision within

three (3) days of its issuance. If the arbitration panel concludes Defendants are not entitled to

possess Fidelity’s Confidential Information, the Court shall destroy the records and documents

relinquished into its possession by Defendants. If the arbitrators conclude Defendants are entitled

to lawfully possess and use Fidelity’s Confidential Information, Defendants shall coordinate with

the Court for retrieval of the records and documents. 

(5) Pursuant to the requirements of sections 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9

U.S.C. §§ 3-4, the parties agree to proceed toward an expedited arbitration hearing on the merits

before a duly appointed panel of arbitrators pursuant to Rule 13804 of the FINRA Code of

Arbitration Procedure.

/ / /

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(6) The above terms and conditions shall remain in full force and effect during the

arbitration proceedings and shall automatically terminate without further order from the Court

upon conclusion of the arbitration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 27, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-01092-MMA-RBB Document 30 Filed 05/27/11 Page 13 of 13