Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00529/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00529-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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- 1 - 06cv0529

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS CLYDE OLIVER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06-CV-0529-H (WMc)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 2254

vs.

ROBERT J HERNANDEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

On March 13, 2006, Petitioner Curtis Clyde Oliver submitted a pro se petition

for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his California conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) The government submitted its answer on May 8, 2006, and

Petitioner filed a traverse on May 26, 2006. (Doc. Nos. 4-5, 7-8.) On December 11,

2006, Magistrate Judge McCurine signed a Report and Recommendation that the

petition be denied. (Doc. No. 9.) Petitioner filed objections on December 28, 2006.

(Doc. No. 10.) 

For reasons discussed below, the Court ADOPTS the report and

recommendation, DENIES petitioner’s objections, and DENIES the petition for a writ

of habeas corpus.

Background

On January 21, 2004, Petitioner was convicted at trial for possession of cocaine

base for sale, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11351.5, and child endangerment, Cal. Penal

Case 3:06-cv-00529-H-WMC Document 11 Filed 09/19/07 Page 1 of 6
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Material omitted from the following two excerpts relates primarily to the reversed child

endangerment conviction that is not at issue here.

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Code § 273a(a). (Lodgment No. 1 at 151, 153.) On appeal, Petitioner raised three

challenges: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to offer a requested jury instruction on

the possession charge, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the possession

charge, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the child endangerment

charge. (See Lodgments 3, 5.) On October 19, 2005, the California Court of Appeal

reversed the child endangerment conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence, but

rejected the other arguments and affirmed the conviction for possession. (See

Lodgment No. 6.) On January 4, 2006, the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s subsequent petition for review. (See Lodgments 7-8.)

The California Court of Appeals summarized the facts offered by the prosecution

against Petitioner (then appellant) as follows:1

On July 21, 2003, Deanna Horton, appellant's co-defendant, was seen by San Diego Police narcotics officers getting into appellant's car in an area where drug dealing frequently occurred. The car was stopped for a series of traffic violations. Horton was on probation for sale of cocaine base and

subject to search. Appellant was found in possession of $142 in cash in

small bills. Horton's wallet contained marijuana and approximately .20 grams of rock cocaine base worth about $40. Horton appeared under the influence of a stimulant. Horton admitted as much, and a urine test

confirmed she was under the influence of cocaine.

The apartment appellant shared with Horton and her 13-year-old child was searched. In a stereo speaker, apparently used as a table in Horton and appellant's bedroom, officers found 15 individually packaged rocks of

cocaine weighing approximately 4.00 grams. . . .

On top of the speaker containing the drugs was a letter addressed to

appellant at the apartment's address and a utility bill for the apartment in appellant's name. Next to the speaker was a stick of men's deodorant. On

the other side of the room was a rental agreement for the apartment in Horton's name. In the closet was a satchel containing two means of

identification belonging to appellant.

Appellant was placed under arrest and was transported to a hospital. At the hospital appellant spontaneously stated to an officer he was getting

tired of being locked up. The officer stated to appellant he did not want

to talk to him. Appellant asked if the officer knew why he was under arrest. The officer read appellant a synopsis from a jail document indicating the basis for his arrest. Appellant then stated: “This is all bogus. It's not what it seems. I have a problem with drugs and all, but I don't think this is going anywhere when it gets to the judge.” The officer

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told appellant he could understand that if the money was good it would be hard to stop. Appellant said: “The money isn't even that good. What I was selling wasn't even that big of a deal.”

People v. Oliver, No. D045114, 2005 WL 2660294, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The

court then summarized further facts offered by the defense:

Horton's 13-year-old son D. lived at the apartment where the drugs were found. He did not think appellant was living there. . . .

Deanna Horton testified that in May 2003 appellant moved into her apartment. While appellant helped Horton pay the bills, she did not know where he got his money. She stated appellant was unaware of the drugs in the house. Horton stated she purchased $100 worth of cocaine base three

days before her arrest. She rationed it into 20 or 25 separate bindles and placed them in plastic bags. She kept the drugs for her personal use.

Id. at *2. The court then held there was sufficient evidence to support the possession

charge against Petitioner and made the following findings:

There was strong evidence appellant not only lived at the apartment where the drugs were found but paid some of the expenses of the residence.

Documents bearing appellant's name were found on the top of the speaker

containing the cocaine. After his arrest appellant admitted to an officer he had a problem with drugs. When the officer stated he could understand

that if the money was good it would be hard to stop, appellant replied the money was not that good and what he was selling was not “that big of a deal.” This evidence taken together was sufficient to support appellant's

conviction for possession of cocaine base for sale.

Id. at *3.

Discussion

I. Standards of Review

The district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects

to any portion of the report, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id. Courts construe pro

se pleadings liberally. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 493 (1989). The Court

construes Petitioner’s objections as encompassing the Report and Recommendation in

its entirety and will review it de novo.

///

///

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2

Petitioner also argued that the statements he made while under arrest were inadmissible

character evidence under California law, but the Court declines to rule on that issue. (See Petition at

9 (citing the California Evidence Code and California case law as grounds for this objection.).) “A

federal court may not issue a writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465

U.S. 37, 41 (1984). Even if the Court were to construe this as some type of federal claim, it was not

raised before the California Court of Appeal and is therefore not reachable here. See Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (Federal court may not consider merits of a claim

unless petitioner “fairly presented this claim in the state courts.”).

3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) permits a conviction to be overturned only if based on "a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"or “an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Respondent’s statement of facts also

makes reference to 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1), which presumes the correctness of state court findings and

requires proof to the contrary by clear and convincing evidence, but this standard only applies where

petitioner offers new evidence in federal court. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir.

2004). Where Petitioner challenges the state court's findings based on the state record, the

"unreasonable determination" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) applies. See Id. at 999-1000.

4

Some California appellate courts have concluded that the intent element is met by possession

with intent that any person, not necessarily the defendant, will sell the controlled substance. See, e.g., People v. Parra, 70 Cal. App. 4th 222, 226 (1999). The Court concludes that the evidence is sufficient

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II. The Possession Conviction Was Supported by Sufficient Evidence

Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.2

(See Petition at 7-9.) Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief if, based upon the trial

record, “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The Ninth Circuit has noted

that it is an open question whether 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) or 2254(d)(2) require

deference in addition to the Jackson standard,3

 or whether it should be applied as

written. See Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005); Chein v. Shumsky,

373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Since the Court would reach the same

result with or without such additional deference, it is not necessary to resolve the

interaction of section 2254(d) and Jackson. The Court concludes that, under the

Jackson standard, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

The elements of possession for sale of cocaine are: (1) exercising control over the

cocaine, (2) knowledge of the cocaine’s presence and its nature as a controlled

substance, (3) an amount of cocaine sufficient to be used for sale, and (4) possession

with intent to sell.4

 In re Christopher B., 219 Cal. App. 3d 455, 466 (1990). “It is well

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not necessary to reach this issue.

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established that one may become criminally liable for possession for sale . . . of a

controlled substance, based upon either actual or constructive possession of the

substance.” People v. Morante, 20 Cal. 4th 403, 417 (1999). “Constructive possession

exists where a defendant maintains some control or right to control contraband that is

in the actual possession of another.” Id. This encompasses a “wide variety of conduct

in a wide variety of settings” in accordance with a policy of punishing those who

exercise “such a degree of intentional direction over contraband that [they] can be

justifiably and fairly punished in the same manner as if . . . in actual physical possession

. . . .” Armstrong v. Superior Court 217 Cal. App. 3d 535, 539 (1990).

The evidence introduced here is sufficient to support each of these elements. In

the apartment where the cocaine was found, officers also found a letter addressed to

Petitioner at that address, a utility bill for the apartment in Petitioner’s name, two forms

of identification belonging to Petitioner, and men’s deodorant. Oliver, No. D045114,

2005 WL 2660294, at *1. These all support an inference that Petitioner constructively

possessed the cocaine found there. Petitioner also admitted “a problem with drugs” and

stated that: “The money isn’t even that good. What I was selling wasn’t even that big

of a deal.” Id. A rational trier of fact could infer control, knowledge, and intent to sell

from theses statements. The approximately four grams of cocaine was divided into 15

packages, sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that it was sufficient in

amount and intended for sale. Id.

Petitioner argues that mere presence is insufficient to support this possession

charge, but the evidence here supports more than mere presence, particularly given

Petitioner’s statements. Petitioner further argues that the conviction was based on

“speculation passion and prejudice” merely because he was “[a] black male living in a

high crime area, who has a girlfriend who has an addiction . . . .” (Petition at 9.) The

facts discussed above, however, show that a rational trier of fact could convict without

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undue speculation or prejudice, and Petitioner points to no facts indicating that race or

other prejudicial factors were improperly considered.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court ADOPTS the report and

recommendation, DENIES petitioner’s objections, and DENIES the petition for a writ

of habeas corpus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 19, 2007

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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