Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00907/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00907-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUPITA CRUZ TORRES,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 18-cv-0907 DMS (BLM)

ORDER REMANDING CASE

v.

KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., 

and DOES 1 to 10,

Defendants.

On May 23, 2018, the Court held a telephonic conference with the parties. 

After consulting with counsel, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental 

briefing discussing whether subject matter jurisdiction existed over the present 

action. Having considered the parties’ briefs, the relevant legal authority, and the 

record, the Court remands the action.

This action arises from Plaintiff Lupita Torres’s purchase/lease of an allegedly 

defective 2016 Kia Optima. On April 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against 

Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. in the Superior Court of California, County of 

San Diego, alleging claims for violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty 

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq., breach of express warranty under Cal. Civ. Code 

§§ 1791.2(a) & 1794, breach of implied warranty of merchantability under Cal. Civ. 

Code §§ 1791.1 & 1794, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. 

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Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. On May 10, 2018, Defendant removed the action to 

this Court based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

Defendant premises subject matter jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s reference to a federal 

law in her prayer for relief, which requests, in part, “costs of the suit and Plaintiff’s 

reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) 

and/or the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

2310(d)(2)[.]” (Compl. at 8.)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter 

jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant 

may remove a civil action from state court to federal court only if the district court 

could have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A removed 

action must be remanded to state court if the federal court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter 

jurisdiction may not be waived, and, ... the district court must remand if it lacks 

jurisdiction.”). “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party 

seeking removal[.]” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th 

Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit has directed courts to “strictly construe the removal 

statute against removal jurisdiction[,]” so that “any doubt as to the right of removal”

is resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil 

actions “arising under” federal law. “A case ‘arises under’ federal law either where 

federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the vindication of a right under state 

law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.’” Republican Party of 

Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Franchise Tax 

Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). “The presence or 

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absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 

rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. 

v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Here, Plaintiff’s claims do not “arise under” federal law. The Complaint 

alleges causes of action under California law. The allegations neither cite to nor 

depend on any federal law. Moreover, the causes of action do not require resolution 

of a substantial issue of federal law. Although Plaintiff’s prayer for relief includes 

a reference to federal law, it is not sufficient on its own to create federal question 

jurisdiction. “‘The valid exercise of federal question jurisdiction ... depend[s] upon 

the substantive claims raised[,]’ not on any remedy requested.” Palantir Techs. Inc. 

v. Abramowitz, No. 16-CV-5857-PJH, 2017 WL 926467, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 

2017) (quoting Carter v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(“[t]he valid exercise of federal question jurisdiction ... depend[s] upon the 

substantive claims raised[,]” not on any remedy requested)); see Rains v. Criterion 

Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 343 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In its prayer for relief, the complaint 

seeks attorneys’ fees and pre-judgment interest under both federal and state law.... 

However, we do not find the attorneys’ fee and pre-judgment interest requests 

determinative. It is the nature of the cause of action that is controlling.”). Because 

subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 is lacking, removal was improper. 

Accordingly, the Court remands this action to the Superior Court of California, 

County of San Diego.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 2, 2018

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