Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01683/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01683-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RACHEE A. WILLIS

Plaintiff,

v.

MCEWEN, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 11cv01683 LAB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS [ECF NO. 15]

Plaintiff Rachee Willis, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on July 25, 2011 [ECF Nos.

1, 3], and a First Amended Complaint nunc pro tunc to November 23,

2011 [ECF No. 5], pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Willis claims that

the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment while he was incarcerated at

Calipatria State Prison ("Calipatria"). (First Am. Compl. 1, 3-4,

10-11, ECF No. 5.) 

On May 21, 2012, Defendants Cerros, Navarro, Landeros, and the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR")

filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint,

along with a memorandum of points and authorities [ECF No. 15]. 

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The Defendant CDCR argues that it should be dismissed because it is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 15.) Individual Defendants Cerros,

Navarro, and Landeros argue that Willis fails to allege facts

sufficient to state a claim that they were deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff's safety. (Id. at 6-8.) 

Plaintiff filed an untimely "Motion to Deny Defendants' Motion

to Dismiss First Amended Complaint" on June 26, 2012, which the

Court construes as an Opposition [ECF No. 17].1 Willis contends

that Defendant CDCR cannot avail itself of Eleventh Amendment

immunity because its conduct falls into an exception; as to the

remaining Defendants, Plaintiff insists that he has alleged they

were deliberately indifferent because they acted recklessly. 

(Opp'n 2-4, ECF No. 17.)2 No reply was filed by Defendants.

The Court has reviewed the First Amended Complaint and

attachments, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and attachment, and

Plaintiff's Opposition. The Motion to Dismiss is suitable for

resolution on the papers. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For

the reasons stated below, the Defendants' Motion should be GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Willis pleads that on October 19, 2010, officials initiated an

"emergency recall" from the recreation yard due to poor visibility

1 Because the First Amended Complaint and the Opposition are

not consecutively paginated, the Court will cite to these filings

using the page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing

system ("ECF").

2

 The Court permitted Plaintiff to file an amended opposition

because it appeared that some of the pages in the original brief

were omitted [ECF No. 19]. Willis did not file another brief.

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caused by rain. (First Am. Compl. 8, ECF No. 5.) Two officers who

are not Defendants were patting down inmates outside of building A1, and Defendants Landeros and Cerros were conducting boot checks

at the "podium." (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that while waiting for

his boot check, a prisoner in "upper C-section" called his name. 

(Id.) When he looked to see who it was, he noticed only Black

inmates were being placed back in their cells – except the building

porter – whereas Hispanic inmates were allowed to stand in front of

their cells, unsecured. (Id.) According to Willis, this was

"extremely unusual" because the "normal procedure" is for officers

to cell inmates one building section at a time, as opposed to one

race at a time. (Id.) "[I]n my 5 years at this prison I've never

seen [this] before and because it is common knowledge that such

circumstances are ideal for riots where in a single race of inmates

have the tactical advantage of numbers over another or the unified

co-oporation [sic] to commit to mass disturbances against

correctional staff." (Id.) Defendant Navarro was purportedly in

the "A-1 control tower," and he decided to cell only Black inmates. 

(Id. at 2.) 

Willis urges that as soon as he stepped in front of the "staff

office door," Defendants Cerros and Landeros ran out of the

building to assist with a riot in the recreation yard; a large

group of prisoners ran out with the Defendants to attempt to

participate in the riot. (Id. at 8-9.) Defendant Navarro closed

the building door after realizing that inmates were running out to

join in the riot. (Id.) One of the Hispanic inmates had yelled

something in Spanish, and a large group ran toward the metal

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detector where two Black inmates were putting on their boots. (See

id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that when he realized the Hispanic inmates

were attacking the Black prisoners, three Hispanic inmates ran

toward him and "everything went black for a moment." (Id. at 9.) 

Willis was purportedly attacked by approximately forty Hispanic

prisoners with weapons for ten minutes; he was hit with the "base

of a large telephone" and a "large stick." (See id.) At some

point during the riot, Plaintiff lost consciousness and was found

lying in a pool of his blood while medical personnel assisted him. 

(See id.) He told the medical staff that his head, face, and left

lung hurt. (Id.) Willis was taken to a medical facility and given

a tetanus shot and antibiotics; he was also informed that the

puncture wound to his face "would probably need stitches." (Id.)

Defendants Landeros and Cerros allegedly failed to secure the

building's equipment locker and center podium before the "first or

second voluntary inlines" from the recreation yard. (Id.) Prison

procedures require officers to secure these areas to prevent

inmates from using a "mop and broom sticks and shaving razor

blades" as weapons. (Id.) Willis further submits that after the

incident and while prisoners were being interviewed, Defendant

Landeros apologized to the Black inmates saying, "‘I'm so sorry, I

had no idea [the Hispanic prisoners] were going for you guys, we

thought they were going to fight each other.’" (Id.) According to

Plaintiff, this shows that Landeros and other officers knew that a

"mass altercation" was about to transpire. (Id.) Plaintiff

insists that it was later discovered "that the tower officer in

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building A-3" only let Black inmates into their cells but left

Hispanic prisoners unsecured in the building. (Id. at 10.) 

In count one, Willis argues that Defendants Landeros, Cerros,

and Navarro violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to

protect him. (Id.) These Defendants knowingly neglected to secure

the equipment locker and razor cabinet. (Id.) Also, they

intentionally permitted only Black prisoners to enter their cells,

contrary to prison procedures. (Id.) Willis maintains that

Defendants left him in a building with forty to fifty unrestrained

Hispanic prisoners outside of their cells, although the Defendants

anticipated a riot. (Id.) In count two, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant CDCR has authorized widespread practices that violate the

Eighth Amendment and caused Willis harm. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). "The old formula –-

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)]." Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain "enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

The court must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them,

and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188,

1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792

F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

"ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there

"is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must "examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff." Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994)) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

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the facts alleged[]"). "Nor is the court required to accept as

true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions

of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside

of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194,

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v.

Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). "The

focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint." 

Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes consideration of

"new" allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff's opposition to

a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing

Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993)).

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is "particularly important in civil rights

cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not "supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.; see

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also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). "The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claim." Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint "unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. United

States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a pro se

civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must provide the

plaintiff with a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. KarimPanahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where amendment of a pro se

litigant's complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is

appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.

2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting "under color of state law"

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986).

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III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Failure to Timely Oppose

The Court set the hearing for Defendants' Motion for June 25,

2012. Accordingly, any opposition was to be filed no later than

fourteen calendar days before the hearing, or by June 11, 2012. 

S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(e)(2). Willis did not file his Opposition to

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on June 26, 2012 [ECF No. 17]. The

relevant date in § 1983 cases is the date that a plaintiff delivers

the documents to prison authorities ("the prison mailbox rule"). 

See Cromp v. Conway, No. 1:10-cv-00802-LJO-BAM PC, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 84820, at *4 n.1 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2012) (citing Douglas v.

Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009)).

The proof of service attached to Willis's Opposition indicates

that he delivered his brief to prison authorities on June 21, 2012,

ten days after the June 11, 2012 deadline. (Opp'n 5, ECF No. 17.) 

Nevertheless, the Court will consider the Opposition as if it were

timely filed. See Link v. Duncan, No. C-12-0726 MMC, 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 57443, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2012) (considering

an opposition despite plaintiff's failure to file within the

required time frame).

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendant CDCR argues that it is protected by Eleventh

Amendment immunity because it is "an arm of the State of

California" and, thus, immune from any action in federal court. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 15.) CDCR alleges

that it should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id.) 

Willis counters that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect

the CDCR from his lawsuit because its conduct falls into the

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exception for acts that are official policy. (Opp'n 2, ECF No.

17.) He contends that the exception applies when the "execution of

a government policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury." (Id.)

Plaintiff urges that CDCR policy falls into this exception because

the correctional officers "followed Alarm Response Training

Procedures" that demonstrate "'that deliberate indifference is a

persistent and widespread practice or course of action that

charecteristically [sic] was repeated under like circumstances.'" 

(Id. (citation omitted).)

The Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private

civil suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Seven Up Pete Venture v.

Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2008); Henry v. Cnty. of

Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 137 F.3d

1372 (9th Cir. 1998). A state has immunity from "'suits brought in

federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of

another State.'" Pittman v. Oregon, 509 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974)). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to agencies and

departments of the state. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) ("In the absence of consent a

suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is

named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.");

Brown v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). 

This immunity applies to civil rights claims brought under § 1983;

thus, an inmate cannot recover damages from the state unless the

state waives its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th

Cir. 1994).

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"A municipality or other local government may be liable under

[§ 1983] if the governmental body itself 'subjects' a person to a

deprivation of rights or 'causes' a person 'to be subjected' to

such deprivation." Connick v. Thompson, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct.

1350, 1359 (2011). To impose liability, a plaintiff must show that

the action that caused injury was made pursuant to municipal

policy. (Id.) The Supreme Court, however, has held that § 1983's

term "person" includes municipalities, but not states. Will v.

Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 (1989). Thus,

"person" does not include arms of the state because Congress did

not intend to abrogate sovereign immunity under § 1983. Pittman,

509 F.3d at 1072-73 (citing Will, 436 U.S. at 66).

Here, Defendant CDCR is an arm of the state and not a "person"

under § 1983, so it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

Zacharie v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. CIV S-11-1466 EFB P,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 815, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (citing

Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1993)). As a

result, the official policy exception does not apply because the

exception is only applicable to municipalities and local

governments, not the state or arms of the state. See Pittman, 509

F.3d at 1072-73. Defendant CDCR is therefore immune from suit, and

its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim against it should be

GRANTED.

C. Eighth Amendment: Failure to Protect

Defendants Cerros, Navarro, and Landeros maintain that their

conduct amounted to nothing more than negligence, which falls short

of the required state of mind to satisfy deliberate indifference's

objective prong. (Id. at 6.) As to Navarro, Defendant argues that

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his actions could have prevented a larger riot on the prison yard. 

(Id.) Additionally, Defendants insist they were acting "quickly to

protect prison staff and inmates on the yard." (Id.) According to

Defendants, malice must be shown when prison officials respond to

prison riots. (Id. at 6-7.)

Defendants Cerros, Navarro, and Landeros also insist that

Willis only alleges legal conclusions because he does not provide

any facts to support his assertions. (Id. at 7.) They contend

that Plaintiff has not argued they were involved in allowing only

Black inmates into their cells because the tower officer, not the

officers searching inmates, allows inmates to return to their

cells; Cerros and Landeros were patting down inmates who entered

building A-1. (Id.) These three Defendants contend it is not

plausible to act as a tower officer and search inmates as they

enter the building. (Id.) 

Next, Cerros, Navarro, and Landeros submit that Plaintiff

fails to meet deliberate indifference's subjective prong because he

does not allege the Defendants knew of an excessive risk to

Willis's safety and deliberately failed to act. (Id. at 8 (citing

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).) In fact, they state

that Landeros's alleged apology contradicts any claim the

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's safety. 

(Id.) Therefore, according to Defendants, the First Amended

Complaint should be dismissed. (Id.)

In his Opposition, Willis contends that Defendants ran out of

the building, which allowed a racial riot to occur between AfricanAmerican and Hispanic prisoners, "knowing that there existed a

strong likelihood that all unrestrained Hispanics would attack

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Black inmates." (Opp'n 3, ECF No. 17.) Willis points out that he

alleged in his First Amended Complaint that Defendant Navarro was

the tower control officer in building A-1 who chose to cell only

Black prisoners first, leaving all Hispanic inmates unrestrained,

against procedure. (Id.) It was subsequently learned that the

tower control officer in building A-3 had done the same. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants expected the Hispanic inmates to

fight each other; instead, the Hispanic prisoners attacked the

"remaining Blacks." (Id.) Willis contends that Defendant

Landeros's apology "implied knowledge that an attack would occur." 

(Id.) "The fact that she was apologetic only makes evidence that

there was no direct intent against my safety, but does not change

the fact that she and [the other Defendants] knew a mass

altercation was to occur." (Id.)

"[T]he treatment a prisoner receives and the conditions under

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The

Eighth Amendment "requires that inmates be furnished with the basic

human needs, one of which is 'reasonable safety.'" Id. at 33

(quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489

U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). Therefore, a plaintiff has a right to be

protected from violence while in custody. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. at 833; Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000);

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). 

"Prison officials must take reasonable steps to protect inmates

from physical abuse." Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th

Cir. 1982). When the state takes a person into custody, the

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Constitution imposes a duty to assume some responsibility for his

safety and well-being. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200. 

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must

show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner's safety. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834; see Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th

Cir. 1995); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267-68 (N.D. Cal.

1995). The prison official is only liable when two requirements

are met; one is objective and the other is subjective. Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834; see Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir.

2009). First, the purported violation must be objectively,

"sufficiently serious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must subjectively "know of and disregard an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety." Id. at 837.

1. Objective requirement: sufficiently serious

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, the alleged

deprivation must be "objectively, 'sufficiently serious.'" Id., at

834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). In cases alleging prison

authorities' failed to prevent harm, the inmate may satisfy the

"sufficiently serious" requirement by showing that "he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm" to him. Id. Courts must consider the seriousness of the

potential harm and whether society deems the risk to be so grave

that it violates standards of decency. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36;

see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).

Plaintiff alleges a sufficient risk of serious harm to

himself. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Willis argues that

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Defendants Landeros and Cerros created a risk of danger when they

failed to secure the podium and equipment locker containing

potential weapons, which were later used by Hispanic inmates to

injure Plaintiff during a racial riot. (See First Am. Compl. 9,

ECF No. 5.) Leaving weapons readily available to inmates as a race

riot erupts creates a serious risk of harm to inmates. See

Williams v. Sangha, No. 12cv1449 WQH (NLS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

105185, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2012) (finding that plaintiff

identified a serious risk when other inmates attacked him using a

metal baseball bat during a riot).

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Navarro created a risk of

serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Willis pleads that

Navarro was acting as the tower guard when the riot occurred, and

the Defendant was only celling Black inmates and leaving Hispanic

prisoners unsecured outside their cells. (See First Am. Compl. 2,

9, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Navarro

shut the door to the building, confining Willis to the building

with a large group of Hispanic inmates. (Id. at 9.) When

Defendant Navarro allowed only Black inmates into their cells,

contrary to normal practice, it increased the potential for a race

riot. See Sykes v. Ryan, No. CV 11-8156-PCT-RCB (MEA), 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 137951, at *4-5, 8-9 (D. Az. Nov. 30, 2011) (finding

that deliberate indifference was not alleged and not discussing

whether a serious risk of harm to Black inmate was alleged based on

the disproportionate number of white inmates on the yard); see also

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (stating that a prisoner may establish a

serious risk of harm by demonstrating he belongs to an identifiable

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group of inmates who is frequently singled out by other inmates for

attacks).

2. Subjective requirement: deliberate indifference

After an inmate has alleged that he suffered a deprivation

that was objectively, "sufficiently serious," he must also assert

that the risk to the inmate was sufficiently obvious that prison

officials must have been "aware of the severity of the

deprivation." See Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir.

2010). "[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere

negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or

omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge

that harm will result." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Liability

materializes if the defendant knew the inmate faced a risk of harm

and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

respond to it. Id. at 847.

The subjective component of deliberate indifference involves a

two-part inquiry: (1) whether the defendant was subjectively aware

of a risk of serious harm to the prisoner's safety and (2) whether

the official had a reasonable justification for the deprivation. 

Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51.

"First, the inmate must show that the prison officials were

aware of a 'substantial risk of serious harm' to an inmate's health

or safety." Id. at 1150 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (footnote

omitted). This may be satisfied if the prisoner establishes that

the risk posed by the violation was "obvious." Id. A plaintiff

need not show that an "individual prison official had specific

knowledge that harsh treatment of a particular inmate, in

particular circumstances, would have a certain outcome." Id. at

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1151. "Rather, [courts] measure what is 'obvious' in light of

reason and the basic general knowledge that a prison official may

be presumed to have obtained regarding the type of deprivation

involved." Id. at 1151 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). "Second,

the inmate must show that the prison officials had no 'reasonable'

justification for the deprivation, in spite of that risk." Thomas,

611 F.3d at 1150-51 (footnote omitted) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

844).

The Court will consider the subjective component of the Eighth

Amendment inquiry as it applies to each Defendant. See Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) ("The

prisoner must set forth specific facts as to each individual

defendant's deliberate indifference.").

a. Defendants Cerros and Landeros

Plaintiff pleads that these Defendants failed to secure the

equipment locker and a center podium before responding to the

alarm. (First Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 5.) Their actions, he claims,

created a serious risk of harm because the inmates had access to

items that were ultimately used as weapons. (Id.) As a result,

Willis was attacked by forty armed Hispanic prisoners for ten

minutes before guards reentered the building. (Id.) Sometime

after the riot, Plaintiff alleges that Landeros apologized to a

group of Black inmates and stated that "we" thought the Hispanic

inmates would fight among themselves, not attack Blacks. (Id.) 

Willis must allege that Defendants were aware of a

"substantial risk of serious harm" to his safety. Thomas, 611 F.3d

at 1150. Deliberate indifference requires an actual perception of

risk. Bonty v. Ramsey, No. C 10–5360 LHK (PR), 2011 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2011); see also Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 836 & n.4. 

The standard does not require that the guard or official

"'believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to

attack another at a given place at a time certain before

that officer is obligated to take steps to prevent such

an assault. But, on the other hand, he must have more

than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.'"

Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting State

Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir. 1983)). 

Advance notification is not a necessary element of an Eighth

Amendment failure-to-protect claim. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 849.

Defendants claim that Plaintiff must allege and prove malice

in the prison riot setting. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

6, ECF No. 15.) The Ninth Circuit, however, has concluded that

whether the defendant's conduct was "malicious" is the standard for

imposing liability where a prison guard's use of force to quell a

riot is at issue. Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,

1441-42 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

320-21 (1986)). Here, the conduct in question is the Defendants'

inaction, not their use of force, so the deliberate indifference

standard applies. Id.; see also Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d at 461

(explaining that deliberate indifference applies to the

"unprevented attack").

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to show that Defendants

Cerros and Landeros were aware that leaving the podium and

equipment locker unsecured – full of potential weapons – would pose

a substantial risk of serious harm to Willis's safety. See Thomas,

611 F.3d at 1150-51. Failing to lock an area containing brooms,

mops, and razor blades in a prison when the inmates were being

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searched while entering the building from the exercise yard would

create an obvious risk that unrestrained or uncelled inmates could

use the items as weapons. See id. at 1151 (explaining that in

determining whether a risk to an inmate's health is obvious, a

prison official is deemed to have the general knowledge of an

individual performing the functions of that job). Willis further

alleges that the proper procedure was to secure the areas before

permitting inmate movement from the recreation yard. (See First.

Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 5.)

Landeros's alleged apology is some support for the claim that

she and Defendant Cerros were aware of a substantial risk of

serious harm. See Armstrong v. Smalls, No. 11-0401-WQH-WVG, 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133757, at *22-24 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011)

(finding plaintiff stated a claim when defendants knew of an

impending attack); see also Swan v. United States of America, 159

F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("[T]urning a blind eye to

the relevant surrounding facts will not shield a prison official

from liability."). 

Next, Plaintiff must show that Defendants Landeros and Cerros

had no "reasonable" justification for their actions. Thomas, 611

F.3d at 1150-51. The reasonableness of their conduct must be

considered in light of their alleged knowledge that leaving

unsecured items could result in an altercation. (See First Am.

Compl. 9, ECF 50.) Willis alleges that both Landeros and Cerros

were conducting a "boot check" next to the unsecured podium and

equipment locker, and that they rushed, without securing the podium

or equipment locker containing broom sticks, mops, and razor

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blades. (Id. at 8-9.) Indeed, Defendants' responses to the

developing riot on the yard may have been reasonable.

The facts in the First Amended Complaint sufficiently allege

that Defendants had no reasonable justification for their pre-riot

failures to secure potential weapons before conducting boot checks

of out-of-cell inmates. See Page v. Horel, No. C 09-289 MHP (pr),

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011)

(finding that deliberate indifference was alleged when defendant

allowed an active gang member to go through the security door and

run into the yard when prison procedure was to lock down gang

member inmates before opening security doors). Willis pleads facts

demonstrating that Defendants knew, prior to the riot on the yard,

that any racial imbalance as to celled prisoners could result in

physical altercations. (See First Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 5.) Also,

Defendants elected not to secure potential weapons that were later

used in an altercation. The Motion to Dismiss the failure-toprotect claims against Landeros and Cerros should be DENIED.

b. Defendant Navarro

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Navarro was acting as an "A-1

control tower" officer and celled only Blacks before celling the

Hispanics, contrary to normal procedure. (First Am. Compl. 2, 8,

ECF No. 5.) He urges that correctional officers lock up inmates by

section, not race, because locking up one race at a time creates

"ideal" riot conditions. (Id. at 8) Defendant Navarro also shut

the door to the building to prevent inmates from entering the yard

to join the riot. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff's claim is that Navarro

knew a large altercation was about to occur and was deliberately

indifferent to Willis's personal safety. (Id. at 10.) As alleged,

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the practices and procedures Plaintiff describes indicate that the

risk to inmates would be obvious when one racial group is placed in

their cells and another group is not celled. See Thomas, 611 F.3d

at 1151 (explaining that in determining whether a risk to an

inmate's health is obvious, a prison official is deemed to have the

general knowledge of an individual performing the functions of that

job). Willis's pleading suggests that Navarro would have known

that creating a racially imbalanced lockup would create an obvious

risk to Plaintiff, who was one of the few Black inmates who were

not celled and was attacked by forty Hispanics who were also not

celled. Navarro subsequently closed the building door, confining

Willis with the unrestrained, armed Hispanics. 

The Plaintiff has also alleged that Navarro did not have a

reasonable justification for celling the inmates by race. See

Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51 (footnote omitted). Defendant Navarro

does not provide any rationale for deviating from the normal

procedure and celling Black prisoners first, leaving all Hispanic

inmates unsecured. Defendant Navarro's Motion to Dismiss the

failure-to-protect cause of action against him should be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described, Defendant CDCR's Motion to Dismiss

on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds should be GRANTED. 

Defendants Cerros, Landeros, and Navarro's Motion to Dismiss the

Eighth Amendment claims against them should be DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

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before October 15, 2012. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before October 29, 2012. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: September 13, 2012 ____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

 United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Burns 

All Parties of Record

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