Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02774/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02774-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAREN DUELL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv2774-WQH-BGS

ORDER

v.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF

OMAHA; THE DUNNING LAW

FIRM,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 50) filed by Plaintiff Karen Duell.

I. Background

On November 20, 2014, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint,

alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.

(“FDCPA”), the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code

§§ 1788-1788.32 (“Rosenthal Act”), and the California Consumer Credit Reporting

Agencies Act § 1785 et seq (“CCCRAA”). (ECF No. 1).

On January 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint alleging the same

causes of action. (ECF No. 9). On February 5, 2015, Defendant The Dunning Law

Firm (“Defendant Dunning”) filed a motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the First

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 11). On February 6, 2015, Defendant First National

Bank of Omaha (“Defendant FNBO”) filed a motion to dismiss Count III of the First

- 1 - 14cv2774-WQH-BGS

Case 3:14-cv-02774-WQH-BGS Document 53 Filed 05/27/16 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 12). 

On July 29, 2015, the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part

Defendant Dunning’s motion to dismiss and concluding that Plaintiff has alleged

sufficient facts to state a claim pursuant to the FDCPA § 1692e(9) (10) and the

Rosenthal Act § 1788.17 and denying Defendant FNBO’s motion to dismiss on the

grounds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim pursuant to the

CCCRAA. (ECF No. 25). 

On November 20, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued the Scheduling Order

Regulating Discovery and Other Pre-Trial Proceedings. (ECF No. 45). The Magistrate

Judge ordered, “Any motion to join other parties, to amend the pleadings, or to file

additional pleadings shall be filed by December 18, 2015.” Id. at 1. The Magistrate

Judge ordered, “All fact discovery shall be completed by all parties by March 18,

2016.” Id. The Order states, “the dates and times set forth herein will not be modified

except for good cause shown.” Id. at 5.

On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff requests leave of the Court to file a Second

Amended Complaint to include a cause of action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq (“FCRA”) because during discovery Defendant FNBO

produced a document that establishes for the first time a violation of the FCRA by

FNBO. (ECF No. 50-1 at 2). Plaintiff states, 

At this stage of the litigation and due to the nature of the requested

amendment, FNBO’s strategy in defending this matter will be minimally affected since Plaintiff’s previous allegation brought pursuant to the

CCCRAA is based on similar claims and/or defenses. Additionally, the Parties have discussed the proposed amendment in detail . . . thus,

Defendant should not be unduly surprised. Finally, Plaintiff does not anticipate additional discovery in relation to the amendment since the

amended Complaint would not materially change any position FNBO has taken.

Id. at 4.

On April 25, 2016, Defendant FNBO filed an opposition to the motion for leave

to file a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 51). Defendant FNBO contends that

- 2 - 14cv2774-WQH-BGS

Case 3:14-cv-02774-WQH-BGS Document 53 Filed 05/27/16 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff has not established good cause to amend the scheduling order, and therefore

the liberal amendment standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 should not

apply. Id. at 3. On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 52).

II. Discussion

“Once the district court has filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 16 which established a timetable for amending pleadings that

rule’s standards control.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-

608 (9th Cir. 1992). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides that a district court

(b) . . . shall . . . enter a scheduling order that limits the time (1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings;

(2) to file and hear motions; and

(3) to complete discovery.

. . . A schedule shall not be modified except by leave of . . . [the district court]

upon a showing of good cause.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Because a scheduling order was entered in this case on

November 20, 2015, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is governed by Rule 16(b). 

See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608 (citing Forstmann v. Culp, 114 F.R.D. 83, 85 (M.D.N.C.

1987) (“party seeking to amend pleading after date specified in scheduling order must

first show ‘good cause’ for amendment under Rule 16(b), then, if ‘good cause’ be

shown, the party must demonstrate that amendment was proper under Rule 15.”)).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant FNBO recently produced documents which verify

that Defendant FNBO inaccurately reported information to credit bureaus regarding

Plaintiff’s payment history in violation of the FCRA. Plaintiff asserts that prior to

receiving these documents, Plaintiff did not have sufficient grounds to establish an

FCRA claim. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause to amend

the First Amended Complaint.

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown good cause, the Court must

consider whether leave to amend is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 

See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 mandates that leave

to amend “be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “This

- 3 - 14cv2774-WQH-BGS

Case 3:14-cv-02774-WQH-BGS Document 53 Filed 05/27/16 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,

316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178 (1962), the Supreme Court offered several factors for district courts to consider in

deciding whether to grant a motion to amend under Rule 15(a):

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason–such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to

the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of

amendment, etc.–the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’

Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see also Smith v. Pac. Prop. Dev. Co., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Forman factors).

“Not all of the [Foman] factors merit equal weight. As this circuit and others

have held, it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the

greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (citations omitted). “The party

opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v.

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing

of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in

favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

Defendant FNBO asserts that the facts of the case have been known to Plaintiff

since prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint, therefore Plaintiff has unduly

delayed in requesting leave to amend. Defendant asserts that there is no newly

discovered evidence that would have prevented Plaintiff from bringing the new alleged

claim two years and Defendant contends that it will be prejudiced by having to defend

a new cause of action.

After consideration of the submissions of the parties, the Court concludes that

Defendants have not made a sufficiently strong showing of the Foman factors to

overcome the presumption of Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend. See

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. 

///

///

- 4 - 14cv2774-WQH-BGS

Case 3:14-cv-02774-WQH-BGS Document 53 Filed 05/27/16 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 50) is granted. No later than fourteen (14) days from the date this

Order is filed, Plaintiff may file the proposed Second Amended Complaint which is

attached to the motion.

DATED: May 27, 2016

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

- 5 - 14cv2774-WQH-BGS

Case 3:14-cv-02774-WQH-BGS Document 53 Filed 05/27/16 Page 5 of 5