Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05310/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-05310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1, 2005, and replaced with the

Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal Code § 5075(a).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE L. PAYNE,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES DAVIS, Chairperson Board of Parole

Hearings,

Respondent. __________________________________________

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No. C 06-5310 SBA (PR)

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AS

UNTIMELY AND SETTING

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

(Docket no. 5)

Petitioner George L. Payne, filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss the instant

petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) -- the statute of

limitations set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner

opposes the motion. Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES

Respondent's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

In 1987, a Los Angeles County jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder while

using a weapon. (Resp't Ex. 1.) On November 30, 1987, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to

sixteen years to life in state prison. (Id.) In 1988, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment of the trial court. (Pet. at 3.) In 1990, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's

petition for review. (Id.)

On April 7, 2004, the California Board of Parole Hearings1

 (Board) denied Petitioner parole

at his third parole suitability hearing. (Pet. at 6.) On July 6, 2004, the Board issued its final decision

denying parole for two years. (Resp't Ex. 2 at 64.) On September 13, 2004, Petitioner filed a state

habeas petition challenging the Board's decision in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Resp't

Ex. 3.) On November 2, 2004, the superior court denied the petition. (Id.) On January 4, 2005,

Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal. (Resp't Ex. 4.) On January

Case 4:06-cv-05310-SBA Document 9 Filed 03/31/08 Page 1 of 9
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 A federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on the date the prisoner submits it to

prison authorities for filing, rather than the date it is received by the courts. Saffold v. Newland, 250

F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 122 S.

Ct. 2134 (2002). This is known as "the mailbox rule." Id. The Court applies the "mailbox rule" to

deem the petition filed on August 16, 2006, the date it was signed. 

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14, 2005, the appellate court denied the petition. (Resp't Ex. 5.) On February 22, 2005, Petitioner

filed a state habeas in the California Supreme Court. (Resp't Ex. 6 at 1.) On January 4, 2006, the

supreme court denied the petition. (Resp't Ex. 7.) 

On August 16, 2006, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition with the Court challenging as a

violation of his constitutional rights the Board's denial of parole.2

 DISCUSSION

The AEDPA, which became law on April 24, 1996, imposed a statute of limitations on

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging

non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on

which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for

seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state

action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right

asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Section 2244's one-year limitations period applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons in

"custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court," even if the petition challenges a pertinent

administrative decision rather than a state court judgment. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1077,

1079 (9th Cir. 2003). For prisoners challenging the denial of parole, such as Petitioner, 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D) applies. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003). Pursuant to

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations begins to run when the factual predicate of the claim could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. In Redd, the Ninth Circuit held that the

factual predicate of a parole denial becomes discoverable when the decision becomes final. 343

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F.3d at 1079. In the instant case, the date Petitioner's parole denial became final was on July 6,

2004. As a result, the statute of limitations expired a year later, on July 6, 2005. See Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting "anniversary method;" absent any tolling,

the expiration date of the limitations period will be the same date as the triggering event, but in the

following year). Therefore, the instant federal habeas petition filed on August 16, 2006 -- almost

one year after the limitations period had expired -- is untimely absent tolling.

A petition may be timely if the limitations period was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for

a substantial period of time. The AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled under § 2244(d)(2)

for the "'time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review [with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim] is pending.'" Dictado v. Ducharme, 244

F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)). In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

223 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the limitations period is also tolled during the time between

a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. In

California, where prisoners generally use the State's "'original writ' system," this means that the

limitations period remains tolled during the intervals between a state court's disposition of an

original state habeas petition and the filing of a further original state habeas petition in a higher

court, provided the prisoner did not delay unreasonably in seeking review in the higher court. See

id. at 220-25.

In California, the supreme court, intermediate courts of appeal, and superior courts all have

original habeas corpus jurisdiction. Nino v. Galaza,183 F.3d 1003, 1006 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Although a superior court order denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may

file a new habeas corpus petition in the court of appeal. Id. Likewise, if the court of appeal denies

relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for

review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the supreme court. Id. at 1006 n.3. Despite

this unusual system, the time between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition in a

higher court is treated as "pending," so long as the petitioner did not "unreasonably delay" in seeking

review. Carey, 536 U.S. at 221-23; accord Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006 (an application for collateral

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 Nino concluded that the limitations period "remains tolled during the intervals between the

state court's disposition of a state habeas petition and the filing of a petition at the next state

appellate level." Nino, 183 F.3d at 1005. After Carey, this means that a state habeas petition is

pending "in the absence of undue delay," while a California petitioner "complete[s] a full round of

[state] collateral review" all the way to the California Supreme Court. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d

1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted). 

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review is "pending" in state court for "all of the time during which a state prisoner is attempting,

through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a

particular post-conviction application.") (citation omitted).3 Thus, a federal court must determine

"just when a [California] review application (i.e., a filing in a higher court) comes too late." Carey,

536 U.S. at 223. In other words, it must determine whether a petitioner "delayed 'unreasonably' in

seeking [higher state court] review." Id. at 225. If so, the application would no longer have been

"pending" during the period at issue. Id. If the state court does not clearly rule on a petitioner's

delay, as is the case here, the federal court must evaluate all "relevant circumstances" and

independently determine whether the delay was "unreasonable." Id. at 226.

In sum, the Supreme Court held in Carey that "(1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA's 1-year

limitations period for the time between the lower court's adverse decision and the filing of a notice

of appeal in the higher court; (2) in California, "unreasonable" delays are not timely; and (3) a

California Supreme Court order denying a petition "on the merits" does not automatically indicate

that the petition was timely filed." Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 197 (2006) (Ninth Circuit erred

by departing from Carey when it found timely a California prisoner's request for appellate review

made three years after the lower state court ruled against him). "In the absence of (1) clear direction

or explanation from the California Supreme Court about the meaning of the term 'reasonable time' in

the present context, or (2) clear indication that a particular request for appellate review was timely or

untimely, the [Court] must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts

would have held in respect to timeliness." Id. Therefore, "the federal court must decide whether the

filing of the request for state-court appellate review (in state collateral review proceedings) was

made within what California would consider a 'reasonable time.'" Id. 

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The Court notes that sixty-nine days passed between July 7, 2004, when the limitations

period began running, and September 13, 2004, when Petitioner filed his state habeas petition in

superior court. Pursuant to Carey, Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period

for the entire time he was pursuing state collateral relief. In sum, the statute resumed running on

January 4, 2006, the date the California Supreme Court's denial of Petitioner's state habeas petition

was final, and ran until August 16, 2006, the date his federal petition was deemed filed, which is 224

additional days. Therefore, a total of 293 days (69 days plus 224 days) had elapsed before Petitioner

filed his federal petition. Therefore, the Court finds that his federal petition is timely because it was

filed seventy-two days (365 days minus 293 days) before the 365-day limitations period expired. 

However, Respondent's position is that the sixty-three-day gap between the superior court's

ruling and Petitioner's filing a petition in the California Court of Appeal as well as the thirty nineday gap between the Court of Appeal's ruling and Petitioner's filing a petition in the California

Supreme Court were periods of "unreasonable delay" and thus that the limitations period was not

tolled for those periods. (Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4.) 

"In most States a statute sets out the number of days for filing a timely notice of appeal,

typically a matter of a few days. California, however, has a special system . . . . Under that

system . . . a notice of appeal is timely if filed within a 'reasonable time'." Evans, 546 U.S. at 192-93

(citing In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 828 n.7 (1993); Carey, 536 U.S. at 221). "The fact that

California's timeliness standard is general rather than precise may make it more difficult for . . .

courts to determine . . . when a review application . . . comes to late." Evans, 546 U.S. at 193

(quoting Carey, 536 U.S. at 223). "Nonetheless, the [Court] must undertake that task." Evans, 546

U.S. at 193. "California's system is sufficiently analogous to appellate systems in other States to

treat it similarly." Id. (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 222). "[I]n most states a prisoner who seeks review

of an adverse . . . decision must file a notice of appeal . . . and the timeliness . . . is measured in

terms of a determinate time period, such as 30 or 60 days." Evans, 546 U.S. at 192. In other words,

"California's 'reasonable time' standard [should] not lead to filing delays substantially longer than

those in States with determinate timeliness rules." Id. at 200 (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 222-23). It is

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 No California case has held that the Supreme Court was wrong.

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clear that six months is not reasonable, because in Evans the Supreme Court noted that six months is

far longer than the thirty to sixty days that most states provide for filing an appeal, and held that an

unjustified or unexplained six-month delay between post-conviction applications in California is not

"reasonable" and so does not fall within Carey's definition of the term "pending." Id.; see Gaston v.

Palmer, 447 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (after Evans, revising original opinion in 417 F.3d

1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005), and finding no "gap tolling" during delays of 10, 15 and 18 months

between California habeas petitions). It can also be fairly inferred from the Supreme Court's

reference to the usual thirty or sixty day periods provided by states with determinate deadlines that a

delay of sixty days would not be unreasonable. Thus the extremes of "reasonable time" have been

set fairly clearly -- sixty days and six months. 

The language in Evans referred to above -- that most states find thirty to sixty days to be

reasonable -- seems to imply that delays are reasonable only if they are of roughly that magnitude,

thirty to sixty days. More conclusive is the Supreme Court's statement that in determining whether a

delay is reasonable "the [Ninth] Circuit must keep in mind that, in Saffold, we held that timely

filings in California (as elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling provision on the assumption that

California law in this respect did not differ significantly from the laws of other states, i.e., that

California's 'reasonable time' standard would not lead to filing delays substantially longer than those

in States with determinate timeliness rules." Evans, 546 U.S. at 199-200 (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at

222-223). "California, of course, remains free to tell us if, in this respect, we were wrong." Evans,

546 U.S. at 200.4

In the instant case, the delays of sixty-three-days and thirty-nine-days to seek higher state

court review are well within the "reasonable" delay of thirty to sixty days in Evans. Applying

Evans, other California federal district courts, including this Court, have held that delays longer than

those in the instant case were unreasonable. See Culver v. Director of Corrections, 450 F. Supp. 2d

1135, 1140-41 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (97-day and 71-day delays "unreasonable"); Dorthick v. Hamlet,

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5

 Respondent argues that Court should add the two time frames and consider as unreasonable

"the 102-day [63 days plus 39 days] total delay between his state court petitions." (Reply at 1.) The

Court finds unavailing Respondent's argument to add the two time frames together in its statutory

tolling analysis. Even if the Court were to add the two time frames together and even assuming

arguendo the 102-day delay was unreasonable, it is important to note that Respondent is not

claiming that Petitioner was 102 days late in filing his federal habeas petition. Before Petitioner

filed his state habeas petition in superior court, sixty-nine days elapsed. After Petitioner pursued

state collateral relief, the limitations period would have then started to run again for 224 days from

January 4, 2006, the date of the state supreme court's denial, until August 16, 2006, the date he filed

his federal petition. According to Respondent's argument, a total of 395 days (69 days plus 102 days

plus 224 days) of the limitations period would have elapsed, and Petitioner's federal habeas petition

filed on August 16, 2006 would have been untimely by only thirty days. In any event, the Court has

already determined that Petitioner's delays, considered separately, were reasonable and that he is

entitled to tolling the entire time he was pursuing state collateral relief. Therefore, as mentioned

above, the Court has found that a total of 293 days (69 days plus 224 days) had elapsed before

Petitioner filed his federal petition. Accordingly, his federal petition is timely because it was filed

seventy-two days (365 days minus 293 days) before the limitations period expired. 

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2007 WL 1430041, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (97-day and 174-day delays were unreasonable). 

Therefore, the Court finds that the sixty-three day and thirty-nine day time frames that Petitioner

waited before seeking higher court review is tolled.5

Accordingly, Petitioner's federal habeas petition was filed within the one-year limitations

period because he is entitled to statutory tolling of the entire period that he was pursuing state

collateral relief. The statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) does not bar the instant

petition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (docket no. 5) is DENIED.

2. Respondent is directed to SHOW CAUSE why the petition should not be granted and

the parties shall abide by the scheduling order below: 

a. Respondent shall file with the Court and serve upon Petitioner, no later than

sixty (60) days of the date of this Order, an Answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. 

Respondent shall file with the Answer a copy of all portions of the relevant parole suitability hearing

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P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.06\Payne5310.denyMTD(sol).frm 8

records and any other state records that have been transcribed previously and that are relevant to a

determination of the issues presented by the petition. 

 b. If Petitioner wishes to respond to the Answer, he shall do so by filing a

Traverse with the Court and serving it on Respondent no later than forty-five (45) days of his

receipt of the Answer. Should Petitioner fail to do so, the petition will be deemed submitted and

ready for decision forty-five (45) days after the date Petitioner is served with Respondent's Answer. 

3. It is Petitioner's responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner must keep the court

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk of the Court headed

"NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS," and comply with any orders of the Court within the time

allowed or ask for an extension of that time. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Martinez v.

Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1997) (Rule 41(b) applicable in habeas cases). 

4. Petitioner is reminded that all communications with the Court, whether by way of

formal legal motions or informal letters, must be served on Respondent by mailing a true copy of the

document to Respondent's counsel. 

5. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

However, the party making a motion for an extension of time is not relieved from his or her duty to

comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having made a motion for an extension of

time. The party making the motion must still meet the deadlines set by the Court until an order

addressing the motion for an extension of time is issued. Any motion for an extension of time must

be filed no later than ten (10) days prior to the deadline sought to be extended.

 6. This Order terminates Docket no. 5.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 31, 2008 _______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY L. PAYNE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

B. CURRY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-05310 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on April 7, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Gregory L. Payne D72559

PO Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960

Dated: April 7, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-05310-SBA Document 9 Filed 03/31/08 Page 9 of 9