Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01025/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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F I ~L .t~ D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Stat0~ C<mrt of Ap:pcab 

Te~.t:1 C\•·cu1': 

MAYO 61992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

RONALD V. YONTZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ' 

v. 

AMF SCIENTIFIC DRILLING 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Clerk . 

No. 91-1025 

(D.C. No. 86-B-1159) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and OWEN,** District 

Judge. 

Plaintiff Ronald Yontz brought suit against his former 

employer, defendant AMF Scientific Drilling International, Inc. 

(AMF), alleging that his termination violated both an implied 

contract not to discharge him except by procedures set forth in an 

employee manual and an express oral contract to promote him. The 

jury returned a general verdict for Yontz. The district court 

subsequently denied AMF's motion for judgment not withstanding the 

verdict and, alternatively, for a new trial. 

AMF appeals those denials, arguing there was insufficient 

evidence to support a jury verdict for Yontz on either contract 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel . 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3 . 

** Honorable Richard Owen, United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-1025 Document: 010110247633 Date Filed: 05/06/1992 Page: 1
claim and Yontz cross-appeals the denial of his post-trial motion 

to alter or amend the judgment to allow prejudgment interest. 

We find that there was insufficient evidence to support a 

verdict of breach of an implied contract not to discharge Yontz 

except in accordance with the employee manual procedures. Although 

we also find there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of 

breach of an oral contract to promote, where, as here, the jury 

returned a general verdict which may have favored either of the 

two claims, we are compelled to reverse and remand for a new 

trial. Because of our disposition on this issue, we need not 

address the issue of prejudgment interest. 

I. 

Yontz began working for AMF's predecessor in 1976 and was 

eventually promoted to Division Manager for the Rocky Mountain 

Division based in Denver, Colorado. In 1983, Yontz's salary and 

position were reduced. He alleges that at or about that time his 

supervisor, Bill Minnett, told him that the general manager of 

AMF, Gene Durocher, promised that Yontz would get the next 

available sales manager position and a return to his prior salary 

level. Ultimately, another person was placed in the next 

available sales manager position, and in 1986 Yontz was laid off 

when AMF closed its Denver Sales Office. 

Yontz sued AMF, alleging that AMF's failure to promote him to 

the next available sales manager position was a breach of an 

express oral contract and that his termination by AMF was a breach 

of contract as established by AMF's "reduction of work-force 

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policy" in its employee manual. Yontz also alleged that he was 

discriminated against by reason of race, in violation of Title 

VII. 

The breach of contract claims were tried to a jury which 

returned a general verd1ct in favor of Yontz. The Title VII claim 

was tried to the court, which found in favor of AMF. The district 

court denied AMF's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

on the contract issues or, alternatively, a new trial. 1 

Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1332. 

II . 

Although the underlying cause of action is governed by the 

substantive law of Colorado in this diversity action, the required 

strength of the evidence to warrant a judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict is governed by federal law. Hurd v. American Hoist & 

Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cir. 1984). On appeal, we 

employ the same standard of review as the trial court. Joyce v. 

Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1981). The 

standard for determining whether to grant a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict is whether there is evidence upon 

which the jury could properly find a verdict for the party 

opposing the motion. The court must view the evidence most 

favorably to the party against whom the motion is made and give 

that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence. Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 F.2d 609, 612-13 (10th 

Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). The trial court's denial is 

1 The Title VII judgment was not appealed. 

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error only where "there is no evidence or dispute or the evidence, 

although in conflict, is of such a conclusive nature that if a 

verdict were reached in favor of the party, judicial discretion 

would require that it be set aside." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 

Milburn, 615 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Continental 

Oil co. v. Natrona Ser., Inc., 588 F.2d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 

1978)). 

A motion for a new trial is committed to the informed 

discretion of the district court. In reviewing the denial by the 

district court of a motion for a new trial, we do not make a de 

nova determination of the sufficiency or weight of the evidence . 

Appellate inquiry is limited to whether the district court's 

refusal to set aside the jury's verdict and order a new trial 

constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion. Paz v. Carman Indus., 

860 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1988). 

A. Contract Claim Based on The Employee Manual 

Under Colorado law, an employee who is hired for an 

indefinite period of ti.me is an "at will employee," whose 

employment may be terminated by either party without cause and 

without notice, and whose termination does not give rise to a 

cause of action. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 

708, 711 (Colo. 1987). However, an employee manual may alter atwill employment, and provisions of the manual may create an 

enforceable contract. Tuttle v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 797 P.2d 

825, 827 (Colo. App. 1990). Colorado adopts neither the rule that 

an employee manual automatically becomes part of the employment 

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contract, nor the rule that such manuals are no more than 

unilateral expressions of general company policies which have no 

bearing on the employee's contractual rights. Continental Air 

Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d at 711. In Colorado, provisions 

in an employee manual may become part of the employment contract 

under either of two theories. Id. 

The first is a theory of offer and acceptance, under which 

the employee must demonstrate that in promulgating the employee 

manual provisions, the employer was making an offer to the 

employee - that is, the employer manifested his willingness to 

enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the employee in 

understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the 

employer and that the employee's assent would conclude the 

bargain. The employee's initial or continued employment 

constitutes acceptance of and consideration for the observance of 

those provisions. Id. at 711-12 (citations omitted). 

The second theory under which an employee may enforce 

provisions set out in an employee manual is that of promissory 

estoppel. Under this theory, the employee must demonstrate that 

the employer should reasonably have expected the employee to 

consider the employee manual as a commitment from the employer to 

follow its provisions, that the employee reasonably relied on the 

provisions to his detriment, and that injustice can be avoided 

only by enforcement of the provisions. Id. at 712; see also 

Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1349 (Colo. 1988). 

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In this case, Yontz claims that AMF's employment manual 

became part of his employment contract under the offer and 

acceptance theory. The employment manual stated: 

In a permanent reduction in force, the company will 

consider length of service, job skills, classification 

and job performance. Employees who are permanently laid 

off may ask their supervisors to explain the procedure 

used to determine which employees were laid off. If the 

employees do not receive what they feel is a 

satisfactory explanation, they may then inquire at the 

human resources department. 

Appendix to Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at Tab 13. Yontz 

maintains that his acceptance of the reduction in work force 

policy was evidenced by his continuing employment with AMF. 

Further, Yontz claims that AMF breached its contract to consider 

the factors listed in the employee manual because "[w]ith the 

possible exception of job performance, there was no evidence that 

the managers who decided that Yontz would be laid off considered 

the promised factors at any point in making the decision." Reply 

and Answer Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 8 (footnote omitted.) 

AMF argues that the manual was not an offer to change Yontz's 

at will employment contract, but rather set forth only general 

guidelines that were too vague to form a contract. We agree. 

The Colorado Supreme Court has held that an "offer must not 

merely be complete in terms, but the terms must be sufficiently 

definite to enable the court to determine whether the contract has 

been performed or not." Stice v. Peterson, 144 Colo. 219, 223, 

355 P.2d 948, 952 (1960) (citing Newton Oil Co . v . Bockhold, 115 

Colo. 510, 518, 176 P.2d 904, 908 (1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 

784 (1947)). The alleged promise in the employment manual "to 

consider" certain factors in making termination decisions is too 

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indefinite to constitute an offer. Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary 483 defines "consider" in the following 

ways: "1: to reflect on, to think about with a degree of care or 

caution; 2: to think of, regard, or treat in an attentive, 

solicitous or kindly way." One may consider factors without any 

demonstrative or manifested behavior, making it impossible for the 

court to determine if AMF had "considered" as promised. The word 

"consider" is simply too vague and indefinite to convey anything 

meaningful and definite to either employer or employee. It is 

insufficient as a matter of law to create a contract concerning 

reduction in force procedures. Therefore, the employee manual did 

not constitute an offer and did not change the at will employment 

contract. 

Since, as a matter of law, the employee manual did not alter 

Yontz's at will employment contract with AMF, there was 

insufficient evidence upon which a jury could properly find a 

verdict for Yontz based on breach of an implied contract. 

Therefore, we hold that the motion for judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict was improperly denied on the implied contract claim. 

B. Express Contract Claim 

AMF argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury 

to properly find that an express oral contract was formed, by 

which AMF agreed to promote Yontz to the next available sales 

manager position. Specifically, AMF objects to Yontz's testimony 

that his supervisor, Minnett, told him that general manager 

Durocher promised that Yontz would get the next available sales 

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manager position and a return to his prior salary level. AMF 

claims this was pure hearsay and therefore should not have been 

admitted to evidence. AMF claims that without this testimony, 

there is no basis for any alleged oral contract . The district 

court overruled AMF's objecti on on the ground of Fed. R. Evid . 

80l(d)(2) . 

The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound 

discretion of the district court, and on appeal, reviewable only 

for abuse of discretion . United States v . Rodriguez-Pando, 841 

F.2d 1014, 1018 (10th Cir. 1988). We hold that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion when it overruled AMF's objection to 

Yontz's testimony. 

Fed. R. Evid . 80l(d)(2) provides in pertinent part: 

[a] statement is not hearsay ... if the statement is 

offered against a party and is (A) the party' s own 

statement in either an individual or a representative 

capacity, or . . . (D) a statement by the party' s agent 

or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 

agency or employment, made during the existence of the 

relationship. 

Both parties concede that the statement allegedly made to 

Minnett by Durocher is a party admission under Fed. R. Evid. 

80l(d)(2)(A), and therefore is not hearsay. However, it is 

Minnett's statement to Yontz that AMF argues is hearsay, and 

should not have been admitted. Yontz claims that Minnett ' s 

statement is admissable under Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d)(2)(D). We 

agree. 

This court has outlined a three-part test in order for a 

statement to be admissable under 80l(d)(2(D): (1) the party must 

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establish the existence of the employment relationship independent 

of the declarant's statement offered as evidence; 2) the statement 

must be made during the existence of the declarant's agency or 

employment; and 3) the statement must concern a matter within the 

scope of declarant's employment. Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d at 1032 

(10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). 

It is undisputed that Minnett was Yontz's supervisor and that 

his alleged statement was made during the existence of Minnett's 

employment with AMF. AMF argues that Yontz failed to demonstrate 

that Minnett was acting within the scope of his employment when he 

allegedly made the statement to Yontz. However, under the third 

part of the Boren test, it was not necessary to show that Minnett 

was acting within the scope of his employment, but rather that his 

statement concerned a matter within the scope of his employment. 

A supervisor is generally expected to relay messages from the 

company or a general manager to an employee. Therefore, because 

Minnett was Yontz's supervisor, and because Minnett was allegedly 

relaying a message from Durocher regarding Yontz and Yontz ' 

employment, the statement concerned a matter within the scope of 

Minnett's employment and was not hearsay under 801(d)(2)(D). 

Since neither statement is hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2), the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting Yontz's testimony, and his testimony provided sufficient 

evidence to defeat a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict on the oral contract claim. 

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C. General Verdict Where There Are Multiple Theories of Recovery 

AMF argues that when a jury renders a general verdict based 

on multiple causes of action, the verdict cannot be sustained if 

one or more of the causes is not supported by the evidence . We 

agree. Where, as here, ' a general verdict may rest on more than 

one claim, it is not possible to determine which theory was the 

basis of the jury's verdict and the judgment must be reversed. 

See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co . , 

370 U.S. 19 , 29-30 (1962); United New York and New Jersey Sandy 

Hook Pilots Ass'n. v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 619 (1959 ) ; Farrell 

v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F . 2d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir. 1989); Collis 

v. Ashland Oil and Refining Co., 722 F.2d 625, 627 (10th Cir. 

1983). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for a new 

trial. Because of our disposition of this case, we elect not to 

reach the prejudgment interest issue. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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