Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00750/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00750-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Noel Alcarez-Guerrero, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV10-00750-TUC-JGZ(JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Noel Alcarez-Guerrero’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Following a jury trial, Alcarez-Guerrero was convicted of first-degree murder, 

a class one felony; kidnapping, a class two felony; aggravated assault resulting in a 

bone fracture, a class four felony; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or 

dangerous instrument, a class three felony; and aggravated assault while the victim 

was restrained, a class six felony. Answer, Ex. R, pp. 1-2. The trial court sentenced 

Alcarez-Guerrero to natural life for the murder conviction, to be served concurrently 

with a six-year term for aggravated assault resulting in a fracture and a 7.5 year 

sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The court also imposed 

sentences of five years for kidnapping and one year for aggravated assault while the 

victim was restrained, which were to be served concurrently but consecutive to the 

other sentences. Id., p. 2. 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows: 

In February 2005, the body of Sammy J. was found in a self-storage 

facility. Video surveillance footage provided Sierra Vista police with 

information that led them to Alcarez-Guerrero and others involved in 

the murder. 

 When Tucson police officers attempted to arrest AlcarezGuerrero at the request of the Sierra Vista police department, he fled in 

a vehicle. Tucson police followed Alcarez-Guerrero through 

residential neighborhoods, city streets, and undeveloped desert areas 

until a police helicopter was able to track him from the air. Once the 

helicopter established visual contact with Alcarez-Guerrero’s truck, the 

ground pursuit dropped back. The chase ended when Alcarez-Guerrero 

ran a red light and struck a vehicle and then a wall. He fled on foot into 

a residential yard and was arrested at that location. 

 After his arrest, Alcarez-Guerrero admitted to police detectives 

his brother had warned him he was wanted for Sammy’s murder. 

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Alcarez-Guerrero also told them he was angry with Sammy, had taken 

Sammy to the residence where the other defendants were, and had 

slapped Sammy repeatedly but denied killing him. During the 

interview Alcarez-Guerrero spontaneously denied choking or kicking 

Sammy, before the manner of his death had been made public. 

Alcarez-Guerrero also told officers the events surrounding Sammy’s 

death had been “already planned” when he took Sammy to the 

residence. 

Answer, Ex. R, pp. 2-3. 

 Alcarez-Guerrero appealed his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred 

by admitting evidence about his flight from police in an attempt to avoid arrest, by 

denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on Rule 20, Ariz.R.Crim.P., by 

giving a jury instruction on felony murder, by sentencing him to natural life for the 

murder without a jury finding. He also claimed that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction for felony murder. Id., Ex. R., p. 2. On August 16, 2007, the 

Court of Appeals affirmed Alcarez-Guerrero’s conviction in an unpublished 

memorandum decision. Id., Ex. R. Alcarez-Guerrero then petitioned the Arizona 

Supreme Court for review. Id., Ex. S. The Supreme Court denied the petition on 

March 18, 2008. Id., Ex. T. 

 On June 2, 2008, Alcarez-Guerrero filed a motion for post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”) with the Cochise County Superior Court pursuant to Rule 32.9, 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. Id., Ex. U. He argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to move for a change of venue for the trial, by failing to object 

to the traffic chase evidence, and by failing to present mitigation evidence at 

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sentencing. Id., Ex. U, pp. 12-24. By decision filed October 30, 2008, the trial court 

denied each of Alcarez-Guerrero’s claims on the merits. Id., Ex. X. 

 On January 20, 2009, Alcarez-Guerrero filed a petition for review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) 

that his counsel was for not moving for a change of venue; and (2) that his counsel 

was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence at sentencing. Id., Ex. Y. 

In a Memorandum Decision filed on June 15, 2009, the Court of Appeals granted 

review but denied relief. Id., Ex. AA. Alcarez-Guerrero then petitioned the Supreme 

Court for review. Id., Ex. BB. By letter dated December 15, 2009, review was 

denied. Id., Ex. CC. 

 In the petition now before the Court, Alcarez-Guerrero raises five claims. In 

Claim 1, he alleges that the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of natural life 

violated his rights to due process. In Claim 2, he asserts that his due process rights 

were violated because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. In 

his last claim, Alcarez-Guerrero alleges several instances of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, including counsel’s failure to seek a change of venue (Claim 3), counsel’s 

failure to object to testimony regarding the high-speed chase preceding his arrest 

(Claim 4), and counselor’s failure to present mitigation evidence at sentencing 

(Claim 5). Petition, pp. 16-52. 

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II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. Timeliness 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Under these standards, Alcarez-Guerrero had one year from December 15, 

2009, which was the date on which the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of his 

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PCR petition, to file the instant petition. As Respondents recognize, the petition was 

timely filed on December 14, 2010. 

 B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 Respondents contend that two of Alcarez-Guerrero’s claims, Claim 2 and 

Claim 4, were not properly exhausted and are barred from habeas review. A state 

prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal court may 

consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); 

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully 

presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion 

requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper 

vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

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petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

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state court review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Arizona courts have been consistent 

in the application of the state’s procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Cirm.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent 

procedural bar). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on 

either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because any attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the 

claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice, or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

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petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

or reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

rules or lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

 1. Analysis of Claims

 a. Claim 2 

According to Alcarez-Guerrero, he was deprived of his due process rights 

because the State’s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first 

degree murder. Petition, p. 22. Respondents assert that the claim was not raised as a 

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federal claim. Alcarez-Guerrero contends that this claim was appropriately raised in 

his direct appeal brief, but that the Court of Appeals ignored the issue. 

 In his Opening Brief on direct appeal, Alcarez-Guerrero made no reference or 

mention to any federal authority in support of his insufficiency argument. Answer, 

Ex. O, pp. 24-25. The only law he cited was three Arizona state cases related to the 

standard of proof and standard of review. Id. However, citation to a state case can in 

some cases constitute fair presentment if the case explicitly analyzes the same federal 

constitutional claim raised by the petitioner. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); cf. Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th

Cir. 2005) (mere citation to a state case that conducts analysis under state and federal 

law does not necessarily satisfy exhaustion requirements). 

 As Respondents contend, two of the three Arizona cases do not even arguably 

touch upon the sufficiency of the evidence claim that Alcarez-Guerrero raises here. 

See State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314 (1987); State v. Whalen, 192 Ariz. 103 (App. 

1997). However, the third, State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576 (1992), does raise a 

sufficiency of the evidence claim and the decision discusses both the state a federal 

standards for such a claim. The federal case cited in Atwood is Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307 (1979), which in turn identifies the standard for evaluating a sufficiency 

claim as whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. This standard is the same as that 

applied under Arizona authority. See, e.g., State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432 

(1984) (citing Jackson for standard for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence 

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claims). Given that the Alcarez-Guerrero cited an Arizona case that analyzed an 

identical claim, he sufficiently exhausted this claim and it will be addressed on the 

merits.

 b. Claim 4 

 Here, Alcarez-Guerrero contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object or seeking to limit irrelevant and inflammatory testimony related to the highspeed chase that occurred prior to Alcarez-Guerrero being placed in custody by the 

Tucson police. Petition, pp. 39-42. As Alcarez-Guerrero contends, this claim was 

raised before the trial court in his PCR petition. Answer, Ex. U, pp. 17-19. However, 

as Respondents note, the claim was not raised in Alcarez-Guerrero’s petition for 

review of the trial court’s denial of his PCR petition. Id., Ex. O. In fact, AlcarezGuerrero expressly noted in the petition for review that he had raised the claim before 

the trial court, but was not pursuing it before the Court of Appeals. Id., Ex. Y, p. 12 

n. 18 (“The Defendant does not ask this Court to review the trial court’s 

determinations regarding the chase evidence.”). Because the claim was not presented 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals, it was not exhausted. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 29 (2004) (claim must be presented in each appropriate state court). 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 Respondents contend and Alcarez-Guerrero does not contradict, that AlcarezGuerrero is procedurally barred from now raising Claim 4 in State court. See 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under [Rule 

32] based upon any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any 

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previous collateral proceeding.”) Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). 

As such, the merits of the claims need not be addressed unless Alcarez-Guerrero 

establishes cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has 

occurred. Alcarez-Guerrero does not argue that cause and prejudice exist in this case 

and, therefore, Claim 4 is not subject to review. 

C. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

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to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. The AEDPA is not unconstitutional. 

As a prelude to his numbered claims, Alcarez-Guerrero asserts that the 

AEDPA is unconstitutional because it suspends the writ of habeas corpus and 

violates the separation of powers doctrine. However, in Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 

F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit found that the AEDPA amendments to 28 

U.S.C. 2254 did not violate the Constitution. Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 579. 

Additionally, in Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1124-30 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth 

Circuit found that the operative provisions of the AEDPA do not violate the 

Suspension Clause. Therefore, Alcarez-Guerrero’s claim that the AEDPA is 

unconstitutional is unavailing. 

 2. Claim 1 

In Claim 1, Alcarez-Guerrero argues that the natural life sentenced imposed 

by the trial court was inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in 

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), and violated his due process rights. 

Petition, pp. 16-18. In its Memorandum Decision denying this claim on direct 

appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained the claim and its reasoning in support 

of its denial: 

 Alcarez-Guerrero asks us to vacate his murder sentence because 

a judge rather than a jury sentenced him to natural life without parole 

(natural life) instead of life with the possibility of parole after twentyfive years (life). Because the United States Supreme Court has held that 

an aggravating factor that would subject a defendant to a sentence in 

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excess of the statutory maximum must be established by a jury beyond 

a reasonable doubt, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 

S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000), Alcarez-Guerrero contends his sentence is 

unconstitutional. Were natural life an aggravated sentence, he might 

have a colorable Apprendi claim. However, the Arizona Supreme Court 

has explicitly rejected such a characterization of Arizona's sentencing 

scheme in State v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 554, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 594, 600 (2005). 

 Alcarez-Guerrero argues that Fell is contrary to the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to jury trial and procedural standard of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as recently interpreted by the United 

States Supreme Court in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 

S.Ct. 856 (2007). But we have no authority to overrule our state 

supreme court, and it is that court to which Alcarez-Guerrero should 

address his arguments. See State v. Long, 207 Ariz. 140, ¶ 23, 83 P.3d 

618, 623 (App.2004). Moreover, Cunningham does not explicitly or 

implicitly overturn the decision in Fell. The crux of Fell was that a 

sentence of either life or natural life is warranted by a jury finding of 

guilt in a first-degree murder trial and natural life is not an aggravated 

sentence warranting jury findings under the Sixth Amendment. See 

Fell, 210 Ariz. 554, ¶¶ 14, 19, 115 P.3d at 598-560. Unlike the 

California sentencing scheme in Cunningham, Arizona's first-degree 

murder statutes do not create tiers of punishment, but “provide[ ] the 

superior court with the discretion to sentence an offender within a 

range-from life to natural life-for non-capital first degree murder.” Fell, 

210 Ariz. 554, ¶ 15, 115 P.3d at 598. 

 Here, based on the jury's verdict, the trial court had the 

discretion to sentence Alcarez-Guerrero to either life or natural life, see 

Id. ¶ 17, without performing any additional fact-finding, see Id. ¶¶ 13-

15. We fail to see the conflict between Cunningham and Fell that 

Alcarez-Guerrero alleges. As the state points out in its brief, “ 

Cunningham confirms that Fell is correctly decided because it reaffirms 

that the Sixth Amendment is not [violated] if ‘the jury's verdict alone’ 

authorizes the sentence.” Cunningham, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. at 869. 

Here, it was solely the jury's guilty verdict that put Alcarez-Guerrero at 

risk of life or natural life and when the trial court sentenced him, it did 

not violate the Sixth Amendment. 

 Alcarez-Guerrero makes a number of additional arguments 

premised on the assumption rejected in Fell that natural life is an 

aggravated sentence under Arizona's statutory scheme. Because we 

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reject Alcarez-Guerrero's contention that Fell has been superceded [sic] 

by Cunningham, we necessarily reject those arguments as well. 

Answer, Ex. R, pp. 9-11. 

 As Respondents contend, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejection of this claim 

was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This is because, as the appeals court noted, unlike the 

California law at issue in Cunningham, Arizona’s laws authorize the sentencing court 

to impose a sentence of life or natural life and do not oblige the trial judge to 

sentence a defendant to the lesser term unless it first finds aggravating factors. See 

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. at 275 (describing California sentencing 

requirements). 

 Alcarez-Guerrero also cites Stokes v. Schriro, 465 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 2006), in 

support of his claim that the trial court violated Apprendi in imposing a sentence of 

natural life. However, there is no conflict between Stokes and Alcarez-Guerrero’s 

sentencing. The sentence imposed in Stokes exceeded the statutory maximum, 

whereas the Alcarez-Guerrero’s sentence did not. Because Alcarez-Guerrero’s 

sentence was authorized under the jury’s findings, no Apprendi violation occurred. 

 3. Claim 2 

 Alcarez-Guerrero’s Claim 2 is that he was deprived of his due process rights 

because the State’s evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. In addressing 

this argument on appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated: 

 Next, to the extent we understand his arguments, AlcarezGuerrero contends the trial court's explanation at sentencing of its 

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decision to impose consecutive sentences for his kidnapping and 

murder convictions somehow rendered erroneous the denial of his 

motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20 and its instruction 

to the jury on first-degree, felony murder. Alcarez-Guerrero similarly 

claims the trial court's “finding at sentencing vitiates any felony murder 

verdict,” maintaining without authority or explanation that the court's 

general statements somehow illustrate the insufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction. 

 First, Alcarez-Guerrero takes liberties with the record. The trial 

court made no finding or suggestion at sentencing that he had not 

committed first-degree murder based on felony murder, but explained 

its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences for particular offenses 

rather than concurrent ones. [FN2 Alcarez-Guerrero does not argue that 

the imposition of the consecutive sentences was error.] Second, both 

the denial of a Rule 20 motion and the giving of a particular jury 

instruction are decisions that we review in light of the evidence before 

the court at the time the decision was made. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 20(a); 

State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67, 796 P.2d 866, 869 (1990) (judgment 

of acquittal appropriate only when there is no substantial evidence that 

could support conviction); State v.. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 

P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984) (“If reasonable [persons] could differ as to 

whether the evidence establishes a fact in issue, that evidence is 

substantial.”); State v. Cruz, 189 Ariz. 29, 31, 938 P.2d 78, 80 

(App.1996) (trial court may properly give instruction on any theory 

reasonably supported by evidence). Alcarez-Guerrero does not explain 

how statements made by the trial court at sentencing, months after the 

verdict was returned, require the reversal of those decisions made 

during trial. Nor has he has cited any authority to support that 

argument, and we have found none. 

 Although Alcarez-Guerrero also contends insufficient evidence 

exists to support his felony murder conviction, he only challenges the 

lack of special interrogatories on the verdict form. Again without any 

supporting authority, he claims “special interrogatories about which 

theory of first degree murder [the jury] applied in reaching its verdict” 

are required but were not requested of the jury and thus, the felony 

murder verdict cannot stand. We disagree because, “in Arizona, firstdegree murder is only one crime whether it is premeditated murder or a 

felony murder.” State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 168-69, 654 P.2d 

800, 804-05 (1982). Although the defendant may demand a unanimous 

verdict on whether an offense has occurred, he or she is not entitled to a 

unanimous decision on exactly how that offense was committed. Id. 

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Therefore, interrogatories were not required and Alcarez-Guerrero has 

provided no reason to overturn the jury's decision. We also note that it 

is the jury's responsibility to determine whether a death occurred “in 

the course of and in furtherance of” a felony, not the trial court's, and it 

is therefore difficult to see how a trial court's statements at sentencing 

could be grounds for overturning the jury's verdict. A.R.S. § 13-

1105(A)(2). 

 Because Alcarez-Guerrero has cited no authority that supports 

his novel contentions, as required by Rule 31.13(c)(1)(vi), Ariz. 

R.Crim. P., 17 A.R.S., we do not further address the issues he raises 

based on the trial court's statements at sentencing. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 

31.13(c)(1)(vi) (appellant's brief must include “an argument which 

shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 

presented, and ... with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of 

the record relied on”); State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175, 771 P.2d 

1382, 1390 (1989) (“In Arizona, opening briefs must present 

significant arguments, supported by authority, setting forth an 

appellant's position on the issues raised.”). 

Answer, Ex. R, pp. 7-9. 

 Alcarez-Guerrero contends that the Arizona Court of Appeals decision was 

contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307 (1979), because the trial court found that the kidnapping occurred 

separately from the murder, thereby nullifying the possibility of a felony murder 

conviction, and because the State did not present evidence that Alcarez-Guerrero 

either planned or was present during the murder. 

 This argument, however, is simply a reiteration of Alcarez-Guerrero’s 

argument before the Arizona Court of Appeals. As Respondents note, AlcarezGuerrero has not explained how the Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the 

United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the 

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facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). 

 Moreover, even if Alcarez-Guerrero could establish a legal basis for his claim, 

the facts of the case against him are damaging. In the Petition he lists a number of 

relatively minor evidentiary issues that he contends establish that no reasonable juror 

could have found him guilty. Petition, pp. 22-25. What he refused to recognize 

before the State court and continues to overlook is the ample evidence that led to his 

conviction and supports the Court of Appeals’ rejection of his insufficiency claim. 

This evidence supports his conviction under either a felony murder or accomplice 

theory of liability, and includes the following facts summarized by the Court of 

Appeals: 

Alcarez-Guerrero also told them he was angry with Sammy, had taken 

Sammy to the residence where the other defendants were, and had 

slapped Sammy repeatedly but denied killing him. During the 

interview Alcarez-Guerrero spontaneously denied choking or kicking 

Sammy, before the manner of his death had been made public. 

Alcarez-Guerrero also told officers the events surrounding Sammy’s 

death had been “already planned” when he took Sammy to the 

residence. 

Answer, Ex. R, p. 3. Because Alcarez-Guerrero has not explained how this evidence 

is insufficient to support the verdict against him, he is not entitled to relief on this 

claim. 

 4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Alcarez-Guerrero raises three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As 

discussed above, Claim 4, is unexhausted and not subject to habeas review. The 

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operative legal standard applicable to the two remaining claims is a familiar one, 

addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). The standards enunciated there by the Court are applied unless there is 

other Supreme Court precedent directly on point. See Wright v. Van Patten, 128 

S.Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Under Strickland, Alcarez-Guerrero must show both deficient 

performance and prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation was 

ineffective. 466 U.S. at 687. In the context of habeas claims evaluated under § 

2254(d)(1) standards, the question “is not whether a federal court believes the state 

court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was 

unreasonable– a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473 (2007). 

 a. Claim 3 

Alcarez-Guerrero alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a 

change of venue based on the publicity the murder received. To be successful on this 

claim, Alcarez-Guerrero must demonstrate that the venue motion would have, or 

should have, been granted. Tyers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Pretrial publicity requires a change of venue when “the community where the trial 

was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the 

crime” or “voir dire reveals that the jury pool harbors ‘actual partiality or hostility 

[against the defendant] that [cannot] be laid aside.” Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 

508 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1361-63 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 In denying this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained: 

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 As he did below, Alcarez-Guerrero contends his trial counsel 

performed ineffectively by failing to move to change the venue of his 

trial based on pretrial publicity the case had received. The same judge 

who had presided over the trial ruled on the petition for post-conviction 

relief. He determined that counsel's failure to file such a motion had 

neither constituted deficient performance nor prejudiced the defense, 

noting that he would have denied a motion to change venue had one 

been filed. 

 Failure to file what would have been a futile motion does not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Noleen, 142 

Ariz. 101, 106, 688 P.2d 993, 998 (1984) (failure to challenge 

voluntariness of defendant's statements not ineffective assistance 

because challenge “would have been futile”). Whether to grant or deny 

a motion for change of venue is within the discretion of the trial court. 

State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, ¶ 44, 84 P.3d 456, 470-71 (App.2004). 

A defendant is only entitled to a change of venue based on pretrial 

publicity if proceeding in the original venue would be “‘fundamentally 

unfair.’“ Id. ¶ 45, 84 P.3d 456, quoting State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 

630, 832 P.2d 593, 647 (1992). Prejudice from pretrial publicity may 

be actual or presumed, but prejudice will not be presumed absent a 

showing that the publicity was “so extensively pervasive and 

prejudicial” it created a “‘carnival-like atmosphere’“ in which the court 

could not “‘give credibility to the jurors' attestations, during voir dire, 

that they could decide [the case] fairly.’“ Id. ¶ 46, 832 P.2d 593, 

quoting Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 631, 832 P.2d at 648, and State v. 

Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 717, 727 (2001). To show 

actual prejudice, a defendant “must show that ‘the jurors have formed 

preconceived notions concerning the defendant's guilt and that they 

cannot leave those notions aside.’ “ Id. ¶ 49, 25 P.3d 717, quoting State 

v. Chaney, 141 Ariz. 295, 302, 686 P.2d 1265, 1272 (1984). 

 Alcarez-Guerrero cites nothing in the record suggesting the 

jurors who decided his case had been actually prejudiced by pretrial 

publicity. Rather, he contends that “[t]he trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to disregard the results of voir dire in its inquiry.” 

But the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding pretrial 

publicity in this case had not been presumptively prejudicial. The 

overwhelming majority of the news articles Alcarez-Guerrero cited as a 

basis for his claim were published months before his trial and contained 

primarily factual information about the crimes, arrests, and pretrial 

proceedings. See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, ¶ 46, 84 P.3d at 471 (“We have 

refused to presume prejudice when the publicity was ‘primarily factual 

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and non-inflammatory or if the publicity did not occur close in time to 

the trial.’”), quoting Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 429, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d at 727. 

Although newspaper and online coverage of the trial of one of AlcarezGuerrero's codefendants occurred close in time to Alcarez-Guerrero's 

trial and included reports that the codefendant had implicated AlcarezGuerrero in the murder, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining implicitly that these articles, and the pretrial publicity as a 

whole, had not satisfied the “high” and “rarely met” standard required 

for presumed prejudice. Id. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion 

by concluding that trial counsel had neither performed deficiently nor 

prejudiced the defendant by failing to move for a change of venue for 

the trial. 

Answer, Ex. AA, pp. 2-4. 

 Alcarez-Guerrero contends that the Court of Appeals’ denial of this claim was 

objectively unreasonable. He argues that Sierra Vista media coverage of the killing 

was “patent and pervasive” and that this caused the jury pool to be tainted and biased. 

Petition, pp. 36-36. However, as the Court of Appeals concluded, he has not offered 

evidence that presumed or actual prejudice resulted from the failure to seek a change 

of venue. Presumed prejudice exists only in cases where pretrial publicity is 

“extreme.” Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2915 (2010). Examples of 

these extreme cases include Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), where local 

television stations broadcasted the defendant’s filmed confession just prior to trial, 

and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 

(1966), where the courtrooms were literally overrun by the media. The Supreme 

Court characterized the convictions in these cases as “obtained in a trial atmosphere 

that [was] utterly corrupted by press coverage . . . .” Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2914 

(quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798-799 (1975). There is no evidence 

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that media coverage of Alcarez-Guerrero’s trial even approached the levels needed to 

support a presumption of prejudice. As the Court of Appeals reasonably concluded, 

the coverage cited by Alcarez-Guerrero was largely factual and did not contain a 

confession or other obviously prejudicial information that a potential juror could not 

be reasonably expected to set-aside during trial. 

 The Court of Appeals also reasonably concluded that no actual prejudice 

resulted from holding the trial in Sierra Vista. Relief would be warranted only 

where it is demonstrated that the jurors had “fixed opinions” which would prevent 

them from judging the case impartially. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984). 

The evaluation of the media’s impact on the jurors is “particularly within the 

province of the trial judge.” Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2817. Alcarez-Guerrero is unable 

to show that the trial judge failed to recognize that jurors had opinions about the case 

that rendered them impartial. He contends that because some jurors were exposed to 

pre-trial publicity shows he was prejudiced. However, impartiality does not require 

that jurors be completely unaware of the facts and issues involved in the case. 

Murphy, 421 U.S. at 800. Without evidence of actual prejudice, the Court cannot 

find that the state courts’ denials of this claim were unreasonable. 

 b. Claim 5 

 Alcarez-Guerrero’s final argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective in 

not presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing. Initially, Respondents contend that 

this claim is barred under Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2006), and 

Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2005), which are the basis for the 

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Ninth Circuit’s holding that there is no clearly established precedent in the context of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in noncapital cases. Davis, 443 F.3d at 1158 (citing 

Cooper-Smith, 397 F.3d at 1244). However, in a recent decision, the Supreme Court 

held that Strickland prejudice can occur at sentencing. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 

S.Ct. 1376 (2012). Because Lafler was decided well after Alcarez-Guerrero was 

sentenced, there is a question about its applicability. 

 In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a new 

rule of constitutional law cannot be retroactively applied in the habeas context unless 

the new rule forbids criminal punishment of the conduct in question or if it is a 

“watershed” rule of criminal procedure. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-12. It is the latter 

of these two exceptions that potentially applies here. However, the Supreme Court 

has stated that “[a]lthough the precise contours of this exception may be difficult to 

discern, [the Court has] usually cited Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 

792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), holding that a defendant has the right to be represented 

by counsel in all criminal trial for serious offenses, to illustrate the type of rule 

coming within the exception.” Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990). As the rule 

here, unlike the rule announced in Gideon, is not within the “small core of rules 

requiring ‘observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of 

ordered liberty,” the exception is inapplicable. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 

478 (1993) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). 

 Even if Lafler was to apply, the Arizona Court of Appeals decision is 

nevertheless reasonable. Evaluating this claim, the court wrote: 

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 Next, Alcarez-Guerrero contends that counsel performed 

deficiently by “fail[ing] to present any mitigation evidence” at 

sentencing. Specifically, he contends counsel failed to properly 

investigate mitigating issues, failed to present for inclusion in the 

presentence report a letter that had been written by Alcarez-Guerrero's 

family and contained over one hundred “supporting” signatures, and 

failed to inform family members that the time for the sentencing 

hearing had been changed or otherwise facilitate their speaking at the 

sentencing hearing. He claims his family members' statements “could 

have humanized [him]” and provided the basis for a life sentence with 

the possibility of parole. 

 Initially, we note the trial judge stated at sentencing that he had 

considered Alcarez-Guerrero's expression of remorse and other 

mitigating factors that had been submitted. But, even assuming as true 

that counsel had neither investigated nor presented mitigating 

circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding no 

prejudice from counsel's inaction. As the court noted in its ruling, 

Alcarez-Guerrero did “not submit[ ] any indication of what mitigating 

evidence an investigator might have discovered” or what statements his 

family could have made that would have persuaded the court to impose 

a different sentence. The letter Alcarez-Guerrero attached to his 

petition did not contain any mitigating information but merely 

expressed disagreement with the verdict. And, to the extent AlcarezGuerrero contends his family could have told the court the effect 

methamphetamine use had had on him, the court had noted at 

sentencing that, although it had not 

hear[d] any evidence or really any argument that would 

explain how the use of methamphetamine in this murder, 

kidnaping and assault would explain or excuse to any 

extent the defendant's actions, ... even if [it] consider[ed] 

the use of methamphetamine as well as remorse as 

mitigating circumstances, [it did] not believe that they 

would be sufficient to outweigh the aggravating 

circumstances in this case. 

Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining 

Alcarez-Guerrero had failed to present a colorable claim on this issue 

as well. 

Answer, Ex. AA, pp. 5-6. 

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 Alcarez-Guerrero asserts that his counsel “gave-up” and “failed to present 

humanizing evidence.” Petition, p. 47. As specific examples, he again notes that his 

methamphetamine use should have been emphasized and the letter from his family 

presented to the court. These assertions were reasonably addressed by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals and Alcarez-Guerrero offers nothing that would undermine the 

validity of that determination. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Alcarez-Guerrero’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV10-00750-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 12th day of July, 2013. 

 

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