Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02885/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02885-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act (Definitions)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE VILLARRUEL et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-CV-2885-CAB-BGS

ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 15]

On February 13, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint against the United 

States of America and two border patrol agents, Scott Garrett and D. Gamboa, and Does 

1-25. [Doc. No. 13.] On February 27, 2017, The United States, Garrett and Gamboa 

(hereinafter “Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

and failure to state a claim. [Doc. No. 15.] On March 19, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a response. 

[Doc. No. 16.] On March 24, 2017, Defendants filed a reply. [Doc. No. 17.] For the 

reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

ALLEGATIONS OF AMENDED COMPLAINT

The following are allegations as stated in the Amended Complaint:

On September 2, 2015, at about 3:00 p.m., the United States Border

Patrol Agency [BPA], operating the Highway 86 checkpoint north of 

Westmorland, California, inspected a white Nissan pickup truck driven by 

Jose Villarruel with wife, Maria Villarruel, as passenger. Although the right 

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to be and remain in the United States had been established, the BPA 

exceeded the permissible administrative purpose of inquiring into the 

immigration status of persons crossing the checkpoint and were engaged in 

general criminal investigation without reasonable suspicion or probable

cause. [Amended Complaint for Damages, Doc. No. 13, ¶11.]

Border Patrol Agent Gamboa was present at said checkpoint for the

express purpose of investigating general criminal activity, including 

unlawful controlled substance smuggling, thereby knowingly exceeding the 

permissible limited administrative purpose of checking the immigration 

status of persons stopped and detained. Id. at ¶12.

Agent Gamboa was responsible for training and handling of his 

canine. The canine was improperly trained; Agent Gamboa improperly 

handled and/or was improperly trained in the handling of said canine, 

resulting in false alerts for lawful substances, namely sugar and candy, being 

identified as unlawful controlled substances. Agent Gamboa knew, or should 

have known, that he could not rely on alerts from said canine to form a 

reasonable basis for detention, or probable cause for a search and seizure of 

Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, Agent Gamboa wrongfully proceeded to stop, 

detain, and search these motorists, namely said Plaintiffs, for the 

impermissible purpose of conducting general criminal investigation without 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and wrongfully used the false alert 

allegedly given by his canine to justify continued unlawful detention, search 

and seizure of Plaintiffs and their property, all in violation of clearly 

established law. As a result of these unlawful acts, Plaintiffs Jose and Maria 

Villarruel were taken to "secondary" inspection where their vehicle was

searched, their lawful candy product was seized, along with Plaintiffs' 

vehicle and personal belongings, and said Plaintiffs were arrested, taken into 

custody and criminal charges filed against them. Id. at ¶12.

During the search of Plaintiffs’ vehicle, BPA agents1found boxes

containing packages which were clearly labeled and indicated a tamarind 

flavored candy brand "Jhonny dulces de tamarindo". "Jhonny dulces de 

tamarindo" is a brand owned, and sold by Jose Villarruel, Maria Villarruel, 

and Arturo Villarruel, and was at that time a successful business enterprise 

both in the United States and in Mexico. Id. at ¶13.

 

1 The complaint’s general reference to unidentified “BPA agents” is interpreted to refer to the actions of 

all or some of the Doe defendants 1-25. Actions attributed to “BPA agents” are not understood to allege 

actions specific to the named agents Gamboa or Garrett.

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BPA agents allegedly performed a field test on said candy which they

alleged resulted in a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. The 

combined weight was allegedly 930.1 pounds, or 421.9 kilograms. Id. at 

¶14.

At the time of performing the field test, BPA agents were aware that 

test results were inherently unreliable and must be confirmed by laboratory 

testing as the field test frequently provides false positive results on 

substances which are neither methamphetamine or illegal. Further, on 

information and belief, BPA agents failed to take into consideration the 

color of dye in candy could cause them to misread a negative as a false 

positive with the field test. Id. at ¶15.

Jose Villarruel and Maria Villarruel were arrested and taken into

custody by the BPA. The candy products and vehicle were seized. Id. at ¶16.

The BPA then proceeded, without performing any confirmatory 

testing, to disseminate information to the public including news media 

alleging a large scale seizure of methamphetamine, disseminating the names 

of Jose and Maria Villarruel, and the name of the said candy brand as being 

methamphetamine disguised as candy. Id. at ¶17.

On September 3, 2015, a criminal complaint, also available to the 

public was filed against Jose Villarruel Zendejas (this said Jose Villarruel) 

and Maria Villarruel charging each with violating Title 21, United States 

Code Section 841(a)(1), possession of a controlled substance with intent to 

distribute. The "Statement of Facts" attached to the complaint identified the 

substance that allegedly tested positive for methamphetamine as “Jhonny 

Dulces Mexican Candy”, the product owned and sold by Jose Villarruel, 

Maria Villarruel, and Arturo Villarruel. Id. at ¶18.

News media both in the United States and in Mexico published the

information provided by Defendants to both the public and media in both the 

United States and Mexico, naming Plaintiffs Jose Villarruel and Maria 

Villarruel and stating that “Jhonny Dulces Mexican Candy” was 

methamphetamine-laced candy. Defendant Scott Garrett was also quoted 

when referring to said Plaintiffs: “Criminals continue to come up with 

creative ways to smuggle their narcotics and agents continue to do whatever 

it takes to stay one step ahead of them.” Id. at ¶19.

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Subsequent laboratory testing was performed which confirmed that in

truth and fact there was no methamphetamine or other unlawful substance 

present in Plaintiffs’ vehicle or said candy, resulting in the criminal charges 

against Jose Villarruel, and Maria Villarruel being dismissed on September 

4, 2015. Nevertheless, Defendants, and each of them failed and refused to 

retract their previously disseminated information and said false allegations 

continue to be randomly re-published. Id. at ¶20.

As a proximate result of the foregoing Plaintiffs Jose Villarruel and

Maria Villarruel were deprived of their right to be free from unreasonable 

stop, detention, search and seizure, and were in fact detained and falsely 

imprisoned, their property was wrongfully seized and right of possession 

substantially interfered with. Id. at ¶21-26.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring four claims under Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (“Bivens”), 203 U.S. 388 (1971) for: (1) violation of 

the Fourth Amendment (for the unreasonable search and seizure of both Jose and Maria 

Villarruel and excessive force in the seizure of Jose Villarruel); (2) violation of the Fifth 

Amendment (for the deprivation of Jose, Maria and Arturo Villaruel’s liberty and 

property without due process) ; (3) failure to properly train; and (4) failure to properly 

supervise and discipline. Plaintiffs also bring four claims under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §2671, against Defendant United States of America for: (5) 

intentional tort – violation of rights secured by the federal and state constitution; (6) 

intentional tort – false imprisonment; (7) invasion of privacy; and (8) negligence.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard.

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the standard to be applied varies 

according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge. A motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of jurisdiction contained in 

the complaint as insufficient on their face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction 

(“facial attack”), or may be made as a “speaking motion” attacking the existence of 

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subject matter jurisdiction in fact (“factual attack”). Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General 

Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & 

Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d. Cir.1977). If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the 

court must consider the factual allegations of the complaint to be true. Williamson v. 

Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.1981); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. If the motion 

constitutes a factual attack, however, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's 

allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court 

from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 

(quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 889).

In an action where the United States is named as a defendant, a court will have no 

subject matter jurisdiction unless a specific statute can be relied upon which waives the 

Government's sovereign immunity. United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, 61 S.Ct. 

1011, 85 L.Ed. 1327 (1941); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 77 S.Ct. 269, 1 

L.Ed.2d 306 (1957). “Limitations and conditions upon which the government consents to 

be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions are not to be implied.” Soriano, 352 

U.S. at 276, 77 S.Ct. at 273. See also United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 

1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”—

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand . . . more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially 

plausible when the collective facts pled “allow . . . the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be 

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Court need not accept as true “legal 

conclusions” contained in the complaint, id., or other “allegations that are merely 

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” Daniels-Hall v. 

Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a), when there is no “[u]ndue delay, bad faith[,] 

dilatory motive on the part of the movant,... undue prejudice to the opposing party by 

virtue of ... the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment,” leave to amend a complaint 

is to be “freely given.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 

(1962). Generally, leave to amend is denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies of the 

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 

(9th Cir.1980).

B. Analysis.

1. Failure to state a claim.

Defendants argue that the first through fourth causes of action, brought pursuant to 

Bivens, fail to state a cause of action.

A Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695 (2006). The basis of 

a Bivens action is some illegal or inappropriate conduct on the part of a federal official or 

agent that violates a clearly established constitutional right. Baiser v. Department of 

Justice, Office of U.S. Trustee, 327 F.3d 903, (9th Cir. 2003). “To state a claim for relief 

under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege that a federal officer deprived him of his 

constitutional rights.” Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing see 

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Schearz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 432 (9th Cir. 2000)). A Bivens claim is only 

available against officers in their individual capacities. Morgan v. U.S., 323 F.3d 776, 

780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003); Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1996). “A plaintiff 

must plead more than a merely negligent act by a federal official in order to state a 

colorable claim under Bivens.” O'Neal v. Eu, 866 F.2d 314, 314 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff 

must allege facts linking each named defendant to the violation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); 

Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 

F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The factual allegations must be sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief, and the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

To state a claim against Defendants, Plaintiff must allege facts linking each named 

defendant to the violation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Simmons v. Navajo 

County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 

F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

a. First Cause of Action.

1. Unreasonable search and seizure.

It is well-established that victims of Fourth Amendment violations caused “by 

federal officers may bring suit for money damages against the officers in federal court.” 

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–67 (2001) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 

396). The Fourth Amendment protects persons against “unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment also protects individual 

privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 

347, 350, 88 S. Ct. 507, 510, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967). 

Here, Plaintiffs allege that defendants Gamboa, Garrett and Does 1-25 operated the 

Highway 86 Border Checkpoint “for the unconstitutional purpose of stopping vehicles 

without reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a primary purpose of general criminal 

investigation, including detection of contraband, including illegal drugs, thereby greatly 

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exceeding the permissible administrative purpose of investigating the immigration status 

of persons.” [Doc. No. 13, ¶30.] Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim 

because it is well-settled that immigration checkpoints are constitutional, and Plaintiffs’

allegations are too conclusory to state a claim. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 4-5.]

In United States v. Soto–Camacho, 58 F.3d 408 (9th Cir.1995), the Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Border Patrol 

checkpoint located near Jacumba, California. The Court of Appeals explained, “its 

primary purpose is to check for aliens, all vehicles are stopped, the checkpoint is well 

identified, Border Patrol agents exercise no discretion over the checkpoint's operation, 

and the stop itself involves a minimal intrusion.” Id. at 411. The Court of Appeals 

concluded, “We ... hold that the Jacumba checkpoint stop itself was not infected . . . by 

the fact that the Border Patrol bases the timing of its decision to set up the checkpoint in 

part on drug intelligence.” Id. at 412.

At least one district court has upheld the constitutionality of the Highway 86 

Border Patrol checkpoint. U.S. v. Summers, 153 F.Supp.3d 1261, 1266-67 (S.D. Cal. 

2015). However, that was in the context of a motion to suppress in a criminal case where 

evidence was presented regarding how many apprehensions in the prior three-year period 

were immigration-related versus drug-related. Based upon the record in that case, the 

district court found that the primary purpose of the checkpoint is to check for aliens, and 

that there was no evidence the checkpoint was operated for any purpose other than 

immigration enforcement. Id. at 1267.

Finally, in United States v. Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 1002 (9th Cir. 2016), the 

Ninth Circuit held that a district court abused its discretion by denying a drug defendant’s 

pretrial motion for discovery regarding the number and type of arrests and vehicle 

searches at a border patrol immigration checkpoint, to support his motion challenging the 

constitutionality of the checkpoint based on the argument that the government was using 

the checkpoint as a pretext to search for controlled substances, not to control 

immigration. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that discovery could have revealed an 

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unconstitutional seizure and led to the suppression of evidence that illicit drugs were 

found in the defendant’s car. Id.

These cases show that internal immigration checkpoint stops are permissible as 

warrantless searches as long as officials effecting the stops remain within the bounds of 

their narrowly circumscribed authority. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-567. 

Individuals may challenge the constitutionality of a checkpoint and obtain discovery as to 

whether it is operated in a constitutional manner. See Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d at 1002. 

Here, in the first cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that the Highway 86 Border 

Patrol Checkpoint was operated by Garrett and Gamboa “for the unconstitutional purpose 

of stopping vehicles without reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a primary 

purpose of general criminal investigation, including detection of contraband, including 

illegal drugs, thereby greatly exceeding the permissible administrative purpose of 

investigating the immigration status of persons.” [Doc. No. 13, ¶30.] Plaintiffs further 

allege that the “stop, detention, and search of Plaintiffs and their vehicle was without 

reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and was not in furtherance of a narrowly 

tailored permissible administrative purpose permitting the stop of vehicles without 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Id. at ¶31. 

Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Plaintiffs are not contesting the general 

constitutionality of the internal checkpoint. Rather, Plaintiffs are alleging that, in this 

instance, the stop, search, and detention were done intentionally for the primary purpose 

of general criminal investigation and, therefore, were unconstitutional. That is sufficient 

to state a Bivens claim for Fourth Amendment violation. See United States v. Soto–

Zuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits 

unreasonable searches and seizures”); Quilici v. California Highway Patrol (E.D. Cal., 

Jan. 24, 2017, No. 2-16-cv-1523 MCE AC (PS)), 2017 WL 345523, at *3. Therefore, the 

motion to dismiss the first cause of action as to unreasonable search and seizure is 

DENIED.

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2. Excessive force.

Also alleged in the first cause of action is an excessive force claim against Doe 1. 

Excessive force claims are also governed by the Fourth Amendment's “objective 

reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989). 

Plaintiff Jose Villareal alleges Doe 1 shoved him without cause, thereby using excessive 

force in his seizure of the Mr. Villareal. [Doc. No. 13, ¶¶22, 32.] However, Plaintiffs do 

not allege the use of excessive force by any other defendant. Therefore, the motion to 

dismiss the excessive force claim for failure to state a claim as to Defendants Garrett and 

Gamboa is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The motion is DENIED as 

to Doe 1 only.

b. Second cause of action.

For the second cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that the Border Patrol Agency2 

disseminated information to the public including news media alleging Jose and Maria 

Villarruel imported methamphetamine-laced candy. [Doc. No. 13, ¶¶17,19.] Plaintiffs 

allege this public statement was made based on inherently unreliable and false allegations

and deprived them and plaintiff Arturo Villarruel of their “liberty interest in their good 

name and their property interest in their business and candy brand.” [Doc. No. 13, ¶38.] 

Plaintiffs allege that by making the public statements the Border Patrol Agency failed to 

provide Plaintiffs “with the minimum requirements of due process of law prior to listing 

them in public publications as criminals who disguised large quantities of 

methamphetamine as candy.” Id. at ¶40.

In their original complaint, Plaintiffs sought to bring a claim under the FTCA 

based upon similar allegations. [Doc. No. 1 at 7.] However, as Defendants pointed out 

in a previous motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 9-1 at 6], the FTCA does not extend to the tort 

 

2 The Plaintiffs’ factual allegations only identify Defendant Scott Garrett individually as being part of 

this dissemination. The motion to dismiss this claim as to Defendant Gamboa therefore is GRANTED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND separately on the basis that the complaint fails to make any factual 

allegations that he disseminated any defamatory public statements. 

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causes of action of defamation, slander and libel. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2680(h). 

Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed that claim and have brought this claim as a purported 

Bivens claim for a Fifth Amendment violation. Defendants argue that these allegations 

are insufficient to state a Fifth Amendment claim. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids the federal government 

from depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 

Const. amend. V. Plaintiffs allege injury to their personal reputations and damage to the 

reputation of their business “Jhonny Dulces Mexican Candy,” that has had a negative 

impact on their business enterprise.

The Plaintiffs have no federally protected right or legal guarantee of a good 

reputation. Reputation is neither a liberty nor property interest guaranteed against 

deprivation without due process. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 785, 708-712 (1976) (a 

defamatory publication, however seriously it may have harmed someone’s reputation, did 

not deprive him of any liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause). 

See also Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming that damage to 

reputation alone caused by police press release is not actionable as a §1983 claim for due 

process violation). 

The allegation that the defamatory remarks also affected the reputation of their 

business resulting in the loss of goodwill, sales and their business relationships does not 

make this a “stigma-plus” violation subject to a due process claim. Paul, 424 U.S. at 

712. Damage to business goodwill does not go beyond injury to business reputation. 

“Damage to the reputation of a business, without more, does not rise to the level of a 

constitutionally protected property interest.” WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 

367, 376 (9th Cir. 1999)(en banc). 

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Therefore, the motion to dismiss the second cause of action is GRANTED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

3

c. Third Cause of Action.

In the third cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Garrett, Gamboa and Does 10 

through 25 failed to adequately train their subordinates. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs 

have only alleged generalities and therefore have not stated a claim. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 7-

8.]

It is well-established that a governmental officer may be held liable for damages 

for constitutional wrongs engendered by his failure to adequately supervise or train his 

subordinates. Ting v. U.S., 927 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th Cir. 1991), citing Bergquist v. 

County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364, 1369–70 (9th Cir.1986). Similarly, a governmental 

entity may also be liable for due process violations which result from its failure to train 

its employees. Id. However, the inadequacy of police training may serve as a basis for 

liability under section 1983 or Bivens “only where the failure to train amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” 

Ting, 927 F. 2d at 1512, quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 

Mere negligence by the supervisor is insufficient. Ting, 927 F. 2d at 1512.

Here, as to the third cause action against defendant Garrett, Plaintiffs allege that 

Garrett “failed to maintain adequate and proper training necessary to educate BPA agents 

as [sic] the Constitutional rights of the public . . .”[Doc. No. 13, ¶45], “knew or should 

have known that agents were violating people’s constitutional rights by using internal 

checkpoints for a primary purpose of general criminal investigation without reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause . . . “[Id. at ¶47], and “failed to promulgate corrective 

policies and regulations in the face of repeated Constitutional violations”[Id. at ¶48]. 

 

3 This appears to be the only cause of action involving Plaintiff Arturo Villareal, although the Third, 

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eight causes of action purport to be on behalf of “all” Plaintiffs. To the 

extent leave to amend has been granted, should Plaintiffs file a Second Amended Complaint, they must 

include specific allegations showing how Arturo Villareal has standing to bring those claims. 

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However, Plaintiffs have not alleged how defendant Garrett knew or should have known 

that agents were violating people’s constitutional rights, and have failed to allege facts 

showing repeated Constitutional violations. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the third 

cause of action as to defendant Garrett is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

As to defendant Gamboa, Plaintiffs allege that he failed to properly train his canine 

in the detection of controlled substances and/or failed to obtain proper training in the 

handling of his canine because he relied on a false alert. [Doc. No. 13, ¶¶ 12, 46.] These 

are conclusory statements unsupported by any factual allegations. The Plaintiffs offer no 

factual support that Gamboa failed to properly train his canine, only that he wrongfully 

used a false alert allegedly given by the canine to justify Plaintiffs’ detention and search. 

The Plaintiffs only alleged a single negligent instance of relying on a false alert by the 

canine, rather than a failure to train evidencing deliberate indifference to the rights of 

others. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the third cause of action as to defendant 

Gamboa is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

d. Fourth Cause of Action.

In the fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that defendant Garrett and Does 10-

25 failed to provide adequate supervision and discipline. Again, Defendants argue the 

allegations are too vague to state a claim. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 7-8.]

As to the Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs allege that defendant Garrett “failed to 

provide adequate supervision to officers that hold the power, authority, insignia, and 

equipment entrusted to them, including D. Gamboa . . .” [Doc. No. 13, ¶51], “failed to 

promulgate and enforce adequate policies regarding misconduct . . . ” [Id. at ¶52], has a 

“widespread history of ratifying illegal searches and seizures . . . [Id. at ¶53], “knew or 

should have known that agents, including D. Gamboa . . . were violating people’s 

constitutional rights by use of internal checkpoints for general criminal investigation . . . 

[Id. at ¶54], and “failed to promulgate corrective policies and regulations in the face of 

repeated Constitutional violations”[Id. at ¶56]. Again, Plaintiffs fail to allege how

Garrett knew or should have known that agents were violating people’s constitutional 

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rights, and fail to allege facts showing a widespread history of ratifying illegal searches. 

Therefore, the motion to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action as to defendant Garrett is 

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

e. Sixth Cause of Action.

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is an FTCA claim for the intentional tort of false 

imprisonment. Defendants acknowledge that such a claim may be brought under the 

FTCA, but argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. [Doc. No. 

15-1 at 11.]

Under California law, the elements of false imprisonment are: (1) the 

nonconsensual, intentional confinement of person; (2) without lawful privilege; and (3) 

for an appreciable period of time. Tekle v. U.S., 511 F.3d 839, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citations omitted). A false arrest is one way of committing the tort of false 

imprisonment. Watts v. County of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001).

The FTCA specifically permits liability for false arrest when committed by federal 

law enforcement officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Under the FTCA, “[l]iability is 

determined by the tort law of the state where the claim arose.” Gasho v. United States, 39 

F.3d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1994). In general, the United States is liable “to the same extent 

as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. California law 

“protects a law enforcement officer from liability for false arrest...where the officer, 

acting within the scope of his or her authority, either (1) effects a lawful arrest or (2) has 

reasonable cause to believe the arrest is lawful.” Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 

1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003).

Defendants argue that the BPA arrested Plaintiffs after the dog alerted and the 

candy field-tested positive for drugs and, therefore, they had probable cause to arrest. 

[Doc. No. 15-1 at 11.] However, the sixth cause of action also alleges that the “continued 

detention after confirming Plaintiffs’ lawful right to be within the United States was 

without lawful right and the fruits of a policy that violates clearly established law limiting 

the administrative purpose of stopping motorists . . . “[Doc. No. 13, ¶67]. This unlawful 

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continued detention allegedly occurred before the dog alert and field test. [Id. at ¶69.] 

Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for false imprisonment. Therefore, the 

motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action is DENIED.

f. Eighth Cause of Action.

Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action is an FTCA claim for negligence. Again, 

Defendants acknowledge that such a claim may be brought under the FTCA, but argue 

that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 12.] 

To state a claim for negligence under California law, Plaintiff must show: (1) a 

legal duty to use due care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) the breach was the proximate or 

legal cause of the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the breach 

of the duty of care. Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 534 (2009). Defendants 

argue that no breach of duty is alleged because the agents had reasonable cause to arrest 

based on the dog alert and the positive field test. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 12.] However, as 

stated above, Plaintiffs also allege that the negligence occurred prior to the dog alert, 

when defendants allegedly detained them for the “improper purposes of general 

investigation.” [Doc. No. 13, ¶79.] Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for 

negligence. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the eighth cause of action is DENIED.

2. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

a. Fifth Cause of Action.

Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action is an FTCA claim made against the United States 

pursuant to California Civil Code § 52.1. Defendants argue that this claim must be 

dismissed as the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to 

Bivens claims. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ constitutional tort theories 

alleged under the United States Constitution are improper and that, in essence, Plaintiffs 

seek to bring Bivens type actions against the United States itself. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 8-10.] 

Plaintiffs argue that this cause of action is appropriate because it is based on violations of 

state law and State Constitution, as well as state law relating to the use of force, coercion, 

and intimidation in a violation of Fourth Amendment Rights. [Doc. No. 16 at 9.]

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Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its 

agencies from suit. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (internal citations 

omitted). The FTCA waives the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity for certain 

torts committed by federal employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346. However, constitutional tort 

claims are not cognizable under § 1346(b) and thus not actionable. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 

475. To be actionable under § 1346, a claim must allege, inter alia, that the United States 

“would be liable to the claimant” as “a private person” “in accordance with the law of the 

place where the act or omission occurred.” Id. (“The United States simply has not 

rendered itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.”).

California Civil Code Section 52.1 provides that if a person interferes, or attempts 

to interfere, by threats, intimidation, or coercion with the exercise of enjoyment of the 

constitutional or statutory rights of any individual, the individual may sue for damages 

independently of any other action that is available. Cal. Civil Code §52.1(a). Here, 

Plaintiffs claim their rights were violated by unreasonable searches and seizures in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, 

Section 13 of the California Constitution. [Doc. No. 13, ¶59.]

To the extent the fifth cause of action is premised upon violations of the United 

States Constitution, it is improper. The FTCA only subjects the United States to liability 

of a “private person.” Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475. “A wrongful search or seizure by a private 

party does not violate the fourth amendment.” U.S. v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th 

Cir. 1981). “With a few exceptions, such as the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, 

constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do not apply to the 

actions of private entities.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 619, 

111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991). What Plaintiffs seek basically amounts to a claim based on federal 

constitutional violations that cannot be the basis of liability under the FTCA. See Delta 

Savings Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1026(9th Cir. 2001)(Plaintiff’s Section 

52.1 claims rejected as “an attempt to do an ‘end around’ the local law requirements of 

the FTCA”); Reynoso v. United States, No. 13-cv-718-AJB-RBB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

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157887, **9-11 (S.D. Cal. 2013)(dismissing Section 52.1 claims against the United 

States and holding: “While California Civil Code §52.1 allow for such claims as a matter 

of state law, this Federal District Court finds them improper as the Supreme Court has 

expressly denied the applicability of the FTCA to constitutional tort claims.”); Munyua v. 

United States, No.C-03-04538 EDL, 2005 WL 43960, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2005) 

(granting defendant United States’ summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims made under 

California Civil Code § 52.1 and stating “[t]he Court is also wary of allowing Plaintiff to 

make what amounts to a claim based on federal constitutional violations that cannot be a 

basis of liability under the FTCA.”). Therefore, to the extent the fifth cause of action is 

based upon violations of federal law, it is not allowed. Delta Savings Bank, 265 F.3d at 

1026.

To the extent the claim is based upon violations of state law and the State 

Constitution, it also may not proceed because Section 52.1 claims may not be brought 

against private actors. Jones v. Kmart, 17 Cal.4th 329, 335-36 (1998)( Section 52.1 does 

not apply to private actors’ putative violations of legal guarantees that only limit a state’s 

power). Thus, even for violations of state law and the State Constitution, Section 52.1 

cannot be the basis of an FTCA claim, which only subjects the United States to liability 

of a “private person.” Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the fifth 

cause of action is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

b. Seventh Cause of Action.

In the seventh cause of action, Plaintiffs allege an unlawful search that constitutes 

an invasion of privacy in violation of the California Constitution. [Doc. No. 13, ¶73.] 

Defendants argue that the United States is immune from suit for such an alleged 

constitutional tort. [Doc. No. 15-1 at 11-12.]

Unlike claims under California Civil Code Section 52.1, private individuals can be 

held liable for violating the California Constitution’s right to privacy. Hill v. National 

Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal.4th 1, 16 (1994); Jones, 17 Cal.4th at 338. Such alleged 

violations of the state constitution are treated as FTCA claims. See Papa v. United 

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States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1010 n. 20 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the motion to dismiss the 

seventh cause of action is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. DENIED as to the unreasonable search and seizure claim in the first cause of 

action, GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the excessive 

force claim in the first cause of action as to defendants Garrett and Gamboa (but 

DENIED as to Doe 1);

2. GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the second cause of 

action;

3. GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the third cause of action as to 

Defendants Garrett and Gamboa;

4. GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the fourth cause of action;

5. GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the fifth cause of action;

6. DENIED as to the sixth cause of action;

7. DENIED as to the seventh cause of action;

8. DENIED as to the eighth cause of action.

If Plaintiffs wish to file a Second Amended Complaint (SAC), they must do so by 

July 17, 2017. If Plaintiffs do not file an SAC by that date, then Defendants shall 

answer the Amended Complaint, as modified by this order, by July 31, 2017.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 26, 2017

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