Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01377/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01377-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Insurance Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before the Court is the stipulation of counsel to amend the scheduling order. (Doc. 42) In the 

stipulation, the parties indicate they have pursued discovering this case diligently but provide no factual 

basis to support this conclusion. Because the stipulation fails to demonstrate good cause for the 

amendment, the stipulation is DENIED.

I. Background

Nearly a year ago, on May 29, 2015, the Court issued the case scheduling order. (Doc. 19) At 

the request of counsel, on November 20, 2015, the Court amended the case schedule. (Doc. 34) At that 

time, counsel reported that they “will not be ready to make initial expert witness disclosures by the 

current deadline.” Id. at 2.

On January 11, 2016, after the case was reassigned to a different District Judge, the Court 

amended the case schedule once again. (Doc. 37) At that time, the Court extended the expert discovery 

deadline to May 20, 2016. Id. at 3. Less than a month later, counsel filed a stipulation requesting the 

HAROLD BENNETT, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01377 DAD JLT

ORDER DENYING STIPULATION TO AMEND 

THE SCHEDULING ORDER

(Doc. 42)

 

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Court amend the case schedule further. (Doc. 38) Using nearly the exact same language as the 

previous stipulation, counsel again reported they had acted diligently but that “it will be difficult to 

engage in expert disclosures by the current deadline . . .” Id. at 2. Counsel did not describe the nature 

of the “difficulty.” However, counsel assured the Court, “The parties do not anticipate any issues 

meeting [the case schedule] deadlines under the new dates for expert disclosures and deadline for all 

discovery.” Id. The Court granted the request and extended the discovery deadline to July 19, 2016, 

along with extending the dates related to expert disclosures. (Doc. 39 at 4)

Now, once again, counsel seek to amend the case schedule.1 Using the exact same language as 

they have used twice before in the previous stipulations, they claim they have worked diligently to 

complete discovery. (Doc. 42 at 2) They report also that they plan to engage in settlement efforts and 

would like to defer further discovery efforts until that process is completed. Id.

II. Analysis

Districts courts must enter scheduling orders in actions to “limit the time to join other parties, 

amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). In addition, 

scheduling orders may “modify the timing of disclosures” and “modify the extent of discovery.” Id. 

Once entered by a court, a scheduling order “controls the course of the action unless the court modifies 

it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(d). Scheduling orders are intended to alleviate case management problems. 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). As such, a scheduling 

order is “the heart of case management.” Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3rd Cir. 1986). 

Scheduling orders are “not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly 

disregarded by counsel without peril.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610 (quoting Gestetner Corp. v. Case 

Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Maine 1985)). Good cause must be shown for modification of the 

scheduling order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Ninth Circuit explained:

Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers the diligence of the party 

seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule if it 

cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension. 

Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no 

reason for a grant of relief. Although the existence of a degree of prejudice to the 

party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, 

 

1 On February 29, 2016, the matter was, once again, reassigned to a different District Judge. (Doc. 41) As a result, the 

Court re-set the pretrial and trial dates. Id. However, these changes are irrelevant to the current request.

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the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for modification. If that 

party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, parties must 

“diligently attempt to adhere to the schedule throughout the course of the litigation.” Jackson v. 

Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 

As noted above, counsel have made no showing to support their conclusion they have acted 

diligently. To show diligence, in the Court’s view—especially given the number of extension provided 

by the Court already—counsel were obligated to detail the discovery each side has completed and the 

discovery yet to complete. They should have explained why they did not complete the needed 

discovery earlier and why they could not have done so. Finally, they should have explained why they 

cannot complete the discovery within the deadlines2set by the Court. Thus, they have failed to make a 

sufficient showing to justify amendment of the case schedule. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

On the other hand, they report they have selected a mediator and will participate in mediation in 

June 2016. Though the Court applauds these efforts, counsel fail to provide any explanation why—

given they feel discovery while settlement efforts proceed is unwieldy—they did not attempt settlement 

earlier or schedule the mediation sooner. Likewise, the stipulation does not contend that the deadlines 

set forth in the case schedule have become unworkable due to “the development of matters which could 

not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling 

conference”(Jackson, at 608). To the contrary, settlement is a circumstance that they should have 

anticipated from the onset of the case. Thus, counsel have failed to demonstrate good cause to amend

the case schedule. Thus, the stipulation to amend the case schedule is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

2 These deadlines, notably, were proposed by counsel. Thus, the Court is unclear why counsel suggested dates that 

were unworkable for them.

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