Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00906/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00906-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN FRATUS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:12-cv-00906-LJO-SKO (PC)

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS, GRANTING IN 

PART AND DENYING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT, AND REFERRING MATTER 

BACK TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO 

ISSUE AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER

(Docs. 38 and 67)

I. Background

Plaintiff John Fratus, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 4, 2012. This action is proceeding on 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint against Defendants Callow and Beard for violation of 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. Defendant Callow, a 

correctional lieutenant, is sued in his individual capacity for damages; and Defendant Beard, 

Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), is sued in his 

official capacity for injunctive relief. Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 

November 14, 2014.

The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302, and on July 13, 2015, the Magistrate Judge filed a Findings and 

Recommendations recommending Plaintiff’s motion be granted in part and denied in part. 

Case 1:12-cv-00906-DAD-SKO Document 71 Filed 08/31/15 Page 1 of 5
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Plaintiff filed objections on July 28, 2015, Defendants filed objections and a response on August 

12, 2015, and Plaintiff filed a response on August 26, 2015. Local Rule 304(b), (d). 

II. Parties’ Objections

Plaintiff was found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing of battery on a peace officer, and

he was assessed an eighteen-month Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) term and a time-credit 

forfeiture. While serving his SHU term, Plaintiff received additional SHU term assessments, 

resulting in an almost twenty-year term. Plaintiff litigated the credit loss in state court, and the 

appellate court found his due process rights had been violated, granted his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, and ordered CDCR to either restore Plaintiff’s time credits or conduct a new

disciplinary hearing. In re Fratus, 204 Cal.App.4th 1339, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 660 (Cal.Ct.App. 

2012). In this section 1983 action, Plaintiff is pursuing a claim for denial of due process arising 

out of his SHU term. He seeks damages and the expungement of the disciplinary report and/or 

release from the SHU.

Relying on the doctrine of issue preclusion, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff was 

entitled to summary adjudication on the issues determined by the appellate court in In re Fratus

but he was not entitled to summary judgment on his due process claim against Defendant Callow, 

as such a finding would require Plaintiff to first prove that he was deprived of a protected liberty 

interest in avoiding SHU confinement. Plaintiff now objects to the finding that he is not entitled 

to summary judgment on the issue of Defendant Callow’s liability for violating his right to due 

process.

To prevail on his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate 

that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for him. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 

509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted); Southern California Gas Co. v. City 

of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003). To establish a violation of his right to due 

process under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he had a protected liberty interest 

at stake and (2) he was deprived of that protected interest without the procedures he was due under 

federal law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). Plaintiff must prevail 

on both elements for Defendant Callow to be held liable for a constitutional violation, and Plaintiff 

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offered no argument or evidence regarding the first element. Thus, a finding that Plaintiff is

entitled to summary judgment would require the Court to find that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff had 

a protected liberty interest in remaining free from an eighteen-month SHU term. See Brown v. 

Oregon Dept. of Corrs., 751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014). The Magistrate Judge did not err in 

declining to find for Plaintiff on that element as a matter of law, a finding which would have been 

sua sponte given Plaintiff’s failure to produce argument or evidence as to that element. Plaintiff’s 

argument that the appellate court ruled his due process rights were violated and he is therefore 

entitled to summary judgment in this action mischaracterizes the protected liberty interest that was 

litigated in state court. Plaintiff challenged the loss of his time credits in his habeas petition and 

he may not rely on a ruling related to his interest in his time credits to establish a protected interest

in remaining free from the SHU.

Next, Plaintiff’s objection relating to Defendants’ failure to comply with Local Rule 

260(b) lacks merit because their failure to comply with a procedural rule does not legally entitle 

him to prevail on the merits of his claim. Nor is Plaintiff’s characterization of his motion as 

unopposed correct. Defendants filed an opposition, although they failed to comply fully with 

Local Rule 260(b). However, “[d]istrict courts have broad discretion in interpreting and applying 

their local rules,” Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010), and the 

Magistrate Judge’s consideration of the Plaintiff’s motion on its merits despite Defendants’ 

procedural violation provides no basis for a valid objection. 

Finally, Defendants’ objections also lack merit. The Magistrate Judge did not find that the 

appellate court decided all the elements of a due process claim under section 1983. The 

Magistrate Judge confined her findings regarding issue preclusion to those issues specifically 

decided by the appellate court. The Magistrate Judge stated, “In finding that Plaintiff was not 

allowed to present his defense at his disciplinary hearing, and was thus denied a fair hearing, the 

state appellate court specifically determined that Defendant Callow’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to 

call inmate Johnson as a witness violated Plaintiff’s due process rights under Wolff and Hill, and it 

determined that SHO Callow refused to allow Plaintiff to ask more than one question of the 

adverse officer witnesses. In re Fratus, 204 Cal.App.4th at 1350-51. Defendant Callow is not 

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now permitted to relitigate these issues. . . .” (Doc. 67, F&R, 12:6-11.) That Defendants would 

argue this was error is perplexing given the appellate court’s decision, which unquestionably 

precludes Defendants from relitigating (1) Defendant Callow’s failure to call inmate Johnson as a 

witness, which the appellate court found violated one of procedural due process rights Plaintiff 

was due under federal law, and (2) Callow’s failure to allow Plaintiff to ask more than one 

question of the adverse officer witnesses, which the appellate court found was a violation of state 

prison regulations. In re Fratus, 204 Cal.App.4th at 1351-52. Both deprivations led the appellate 

court to conclude that Plaintiff was deprived of a fair hearing, the remedy for which was a credit 

restoration or a rehearing of the disciplinary violation. Id. Defendant Callow is not permitted to 

relitigate those issues in this case and the Magistrate Judge did not err in so finding.1 Gonzales v. 

California Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 739 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014). 

III. Conclusion and Order

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court has conducted a 

de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court finds the Findings 

and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis. Accordingly, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations, filed on July 13, 2015, is adopted in full; 

2. Issue preclusion is applied to (1) Defendant Callow’s failure to allow Plaintiff to 

call inmate Johnson to testify on his behalf, in violation of his procedural due 

process rights under federal law, and (2) his failure to allow Plaintiff to ask the 

adverse officer witnesses more than one question each, in violation of his 

procedural due process rights under state prison regulations; 

 

1 The Magistrate Judge made no findings regarding whether there was “some evidence” supporting the decision, and 

she made no broader findings regarding Plaintiff’s due process claim or Defendant Callow’s liability. To the extent 

Defendants raised an objection regarding the issue of “some evidence” because of the reference to the Hill case, the 

citation to the Hill case was made by the appellate court. Additionally, Plaintiff was the party moving for relief, and 

Defendants have not yet sought summary judgment. Neither the Magistrate Judge nor the undersigned is in a position 

to speculate regarding whether they will do so and if so, what arguments will be made. On that basis, the Magistrate 

Judge stated that she was not going to reach their argument regarding the existence of “some evidence,” an argument 

which was not responsive to any grounds for summary judgment raised by Plaintiff in his motion. 

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3. Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication on the issue of Defendant Callow’s 

liability for violating his federal right to due process is DENIED; and

4. This matter is referred back to the Magistrate Judge to issue the amended 

scheduling order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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