Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00846/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00846-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 07cv846-J(NLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES HARRY FRANCK,

Petitioner,

v.

SUZAN L. HUBBARD, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No.07cv846-J (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

STAY PETITION & RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. Nos. 4 & 8]

On May 9, 2007, Petitioner James Franck (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). Presently before the Court are Petitioner’s Motion to stay the

petition [Doc. No. 4] and Respondent Suzan L. Hubbard’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 8]. Petitioner

concedes that one of his four federal claims is unexhausted, and requests that these proceedings be

stayed so that he can exhaust the claim in state court. Respondent seeks dismissal of the petition in its

entirety, arguing that none of Petitioner’s claims have been exhausted properly. For the reasons outlined

below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion to stay the petition be DENIED and

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate court opinion denying Petitioner’s

direct appeal. This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539,

545-47 (1981) (stating that deference is owed to factual findings of both state trial and appellate courts).

/ / / 

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“At about 3:30 p.m. on June 3, 2004, Franck broke into Todd Bradley’s apartment

when Bradley was not at home and stole a VCR, DVD player, and VHS cassettes. 

Bradley’s neighbor, Alicia Ramos, heard breaking glass and saw Franck leave the

apartment with two plastic trash bags. Ramos summoned the police. Before the police

arrived, Franck obtained ice cream from an ice cream vendor on the street, and then went

to an alley and showed the stolen items in the bags to a man in a truck. When the police

arrived, Franck left the items on the tailgate of the man’s vehicle and started walking

slowly away. The police called out to him to stop and return for questioning. At first

Franck ignored their commands, but eventually he turned and walked back to the police. 

Franck was detained and then arrested. 

Franck had broken through a sliding glass door to gain entry into Bradley’s

apartment. A brick from Bradley’s yard was found on the floor in the apartment. Holes

in the sliding screen and glass doors suggested that Franck threw the brick through the

screen and the glass door, and then reached his hand in and unlocked the glass door. At

the time of this arrest, Franck had no blood, cuts, or scratches on his arms.

Blood tests showed that Franck tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine

use. 

( . . . )

Rejecting Franck’s voluntary intoxication defense, the jury found him guilty of

residential burglary.” 

(Lodgment No. 3, People v. Franck, No. D045831, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal.Ct.App. October 14, 2005.).) 

On September 17, 2004, Petitioner was convicted of residential burglary (Cal.Penal Code § 459,

460), being under the influence of cocaine (Cal.Health and Safety Code § 11550(a)), and resisting an

officer (Cal.Penal Code § 148 (a)(1)). (See Lodgm’t. 1 at 61-63.) During a sentencing hearing on

January 13, 2005, the trial judge in the San Diego Superior Court struck one of Petitioner’s prison priors

and sentenced him to a thirteen year term of incarceration. (See Lodgm’t. 1 at 109.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One. (See Lodgm’t. 2). Petitioner alleged that (1) the trial court should have struck his prior

strike conviction given the nature of the offense and his condition at the time it was committed, and (2)

there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the necessary intent to commit residential burglary due

to intoxication. (See id. at 8,12.) On October 14, 2005, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions. (See Lodgm’t. 3 at 1.) Petitioner did not petition for direct review by the California

Supreme Court. 

On March 15, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego

Superior Court. (See Lodgm’t. 4.) Petitioner alleged four claims for relief: (1) his trial counsel was

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1

 Petitioner was presented with the standard options given pursuant to Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 520-21

(1982): (1) demonstrate exhaustion; (2) voluntarily dismiss the petition; (3) formally abandon his unexhausted claim; or (4)

file a motion to stay the federal proceedings while he exhausts his claims in state court. (See Order filed May 17, 2007, at 2-

4.) 

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ineffective for failing to use a psychiatric defense; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him

not to testify in light if his numerous prior convictions; (3) because he was not taking his psychiatric

medication, he was cognitively impaired at the time of the offense; and (4) the trial court was prejudiced

against Petitioner because of his prior convictions. (See Lodgm’t. 4, “Grounds for Relief.”) On May 4,

2006, the Superior Court denied the Petition. (See Lodgm’t. 5.) 

On April 14, 2006, Petitioner filed a similar habeas petition in the California Supreme Court,

alleging: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use a psychiatric defense; (2) a violation of

his First Amendment rights based on his trial counsel’s refusal to let him testify at the close of trial in

his own defense; (3) diminished capacity because he was not taking his psychiatric medication at the

time of the offense; and (4) a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment

based on the sentence enhancement he received due to his prior convictions. (See Lodgm’t. 6, “Grounds

for Relief.”) On December 20, 2006, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition without

comment. (See Lodgm’t. 7.) 

On May 9, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition alleging four grounds for relief: (1)

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice based on the denial of the trial court of

his motion requesting a Marsden hearing; (2) a violation of his First Amendment rights based on his trial

counsel’s refusal to let him testify at the close of trial in his own defense; (3) a violation of his due

process rights based on prosecutorial vindictiveness; and (4) the trial court sentenced him in violation of

Cunningham v. California, U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). (See Lodgm’t. 8 at 6-9.) Petitioner

filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis concurrently with his federal petition. The Court granted

the motion, but stated that Petitioner failed to allege exhaustion for his Cunningham claim. (See Order

filed May 17, 2007, Doc. No. 3, 2-4.) The Court instructed Petitioner regarding his options to proceed,

given his failure to exhaust, and set a July 5, 2007, deadline for Petitioner to chose an option and file an

appropriate pleading.1

 (See id.) 

On July 5, 2007, Petitioner filed a “Petition to Motion to Procede [sic] in Forma Pauperis to

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Staying in Federal District and Getting a Favorable Decision in Supreme or Exhausting Remaining

Claims Simultaneously” [Doc. No. 4], as well as a Notice of Lodgment in Support [Doc. No. 7]. The

Court construed the motion as a request by Petitioner to stay and abey his petition in order to return to

state court and exhaust his unexhausted Cunningham claim, and ordered Respondent to file a response

to the motion [Doc. No. 5]. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 8], arguing that none of

Petitioner’s claims are exhausted, and therefore the petition should be dismissed in its entirety. 

(Respondent’s Motion, 1.) Petitioner did not file a response to Respondent’s Motion. 

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine which of Petitioner’s four federal claims have

been properly exhausted. The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s

consideration of claims presented in a habeas corpus proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by presenting the

state court with both the controlling legal principles and the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. 

See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). Exhaustion is accomplished if the state’s highest court

had an opportunity to rule on the merits of the claim. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66

(1995); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987).

Respondent asserts that Petitioner failed to exhaust all of his claims. (Respondent’s Motion, 1.) 

Petitioner admits in his federal Petition that he did not exhaust his Cunningham claim in state court;

also, by filing a motion for stay and abeyance, Petitioner concedes that the petition contains at least one

unexhausted claim. (Petition, 9.) However, Petitioner asserts that he exhausted his additional three

claims. (Id. at 6-8.) 

Petitioner’s first claim is that his Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel under U.S. v.

Gonzalez-Lopez, U.S. , 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006), was violated. (Petition, 6.) While at first glace it

appears that Petitioner did not raise this issue at all in state court, the facts that Petitioner alleges in

support of this claim are nearly identical to those Petitioner alleged in support of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in his petition to the California Supreme Court. However, in order to

satisfy the exhaustion requirement, when presenting claims in state court, the petitioner must be explicit

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2

 In Baldwin, the petitioner raised the issue of whether a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel could be

considered fairly presented in state court when the state analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel was identical to the

federal analysis. The United States Supreme Court, however, found the issue waived because the petitioner did not raise it

with the Ninth Circuit, and thus did not address the merits of the petitioner’s argument. 

5 07cv846-J(NLS)

that his claims are based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(holding that reference to “due process” was insufficient to present a federal claim). Thus, the

“petitioner must have either referenced specific provisions of the federal constitution or statutes or cited

to federal case law.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2000) as amended upon denial of

hearing en banc, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit later extended this principle and held

that “citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as a citation

to a federal case analyzing such an issue.” Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, Petitioner’s state petition as presented to the California Supreme Court states that his first

ground for relief is “ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Miller refused to use the appropriate defense

of temporary insanity.” (See Lodgm’t. 6 at 3.) Nowhere in the petition does Petitioner make any

explicit reference to the U.S. constitution, a federal case, or a state case citing federal law; his claim is

purely factually based. (Id. at 3, 7.) While the language of “ineffective assistance of counsel” seems to

imply a federal claim, it is not sufficient that the federal basis of Petitioner’s claim appears to be self

evident. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 34 (2004) (holding that habeas petition did not “fairly

present” a federal ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

668 (9th Cir. 2000). Without specifically referencing a federal statute, case, or the federal constitution,

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that his claim referred to a federal ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

instead of a state claim. See Baldwin v. Reese, 514 U.S. at 332

. As a result, Petitioner’s federal claim

alleging violation of his Sixth Amendment rights based on ineffective assistance of counsel has not been

fairly presented to the state’s highest court, and therefore is technically unexhausted. 

In his second federal claim, Petitioner asserts that his First Amendment rights were violated

when he was not permitted to address the jury during closing arguments at his trial. Petitioner alleges

that his attorney, the judge, and the bailiff all restrained him to prevent him from speaking to the jury. 

(Petition, 7.) Petitioner asserted this claim in his state petition before the California Supreme Court. 

See Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a habeas petitioner has satisfied

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the exhaustion requirement if the federal claim was presented to the highest state court with jurisdiction

to consider it). Petitioner specifically plead his claim as a violation of the First Amendment, thus

Petitioner “fairly presented” the issue to the California Supreme Court and the claim has been properly

exhausted.

Petitioner’s third claim in his federal petition is that his conviction was a result of prosecutorial

vindictiveness based on the exercise of Petitioner’s legal rights, citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21

(1974), and United States v. Goodman, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). (Petition, 8.) However, Petitioner did not

assert this claim, or even a similar claim, in his petition to the California Supreme Court. (See

generally, Lodgm’t. 6 at 3, 7.) As such, this claim is clearly unexhausted.

Finally, Petitioner alleges in his federal petition a violation of Cunningham v. California, 

U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). It is difficult to discern precisely what Petitioner asserts, as his factual

basis in support of his claim consists of a broad generalization of the Cunningham holding and contains

little application of the holding to his own sentence. (Petition, 9.) Regardless, Petitioner himself admits

that he did not raise this claim, or a similar claim, in his petition to the California Supreme Court. As

such, this claim is also unexhausted, and Petitioner’s federal petition contains one exhausted claim and

three unexhausted claims, and therefore is considered a “mixed petition.” See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 522 (1982).

II. Stay and Abeyance

There are two approaches for analyzing a stay-and-abeyance motion, depending on whether the

petition is mixed or fully exhausted. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005). If the

petitioner seeks a stay-and-abeyance order as to a mixed petition containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, the request is analyzed under the standard announced by the Supreme Court in

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. If, however, the petition currently

on file is fully exhausted, and what petitioner seeks is a stay-and-abeyance order to exhaust claims not

raised in the current federal petition, the approach set out in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.

2003), applies. See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. Because the petition in this case is mixed, Rhines applies.

Under Rhines, as a threshold condition for this Court to exercise its discretion to issue a

stay-and-abeyance order, the Court must determine that there was good cause for failing to exhaust his

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claims before raising them in this case. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 277. If there is good cause for

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny the request for stay and abeyance

where there is no indication of intentional dilatory litigation tactics. See id. at 278. However a stay and

abeyance is not appropriate where the unexhausted claims are plainly meritless. See id. at 277.

The Supreme Court in Rhines did not define “good cause.” Id. at 276. The Ninth Circuit has

endorsed a lenient standard in Jackson v. Roe, holding the “good cause” standard to be less stringent

than the “extraordinary circumstances” standard applied to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 (2005). However, the Ninth Circuit has

not provided additional clarification as to the meaning of “good cause.” District courts have taken

varying approaches. One such district court concluded that the good cause standard for failure to

exhaust “should not be so strict a standard as to require a showing of some extreme and unusual event

beyond the control of the defendant.” Riner v. Crawford, 415 F. Supp.2d 1207, 1210 (D. Nev. 2006). 

The court held that the petitioner must show that he was “prevented from raising the claim, either by his

own ignorance or confusion about the law or the status of his case, or by circumstances over which he

had little or no control . . . ” Id. at 1211. Other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have analogized “good

cause” to the cause required to overcome a procedural bar. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 2006 WL 37037

(C.D. Cal. 2005). In this context, “cause” would mean some objective factor external to the petitioner

which gave rise to the default. See id. at 3. In sum, the “good cause” standards set forth in Rhines

requires, at the very least, a showing of diligence in exhausting claims in state court. 

In his motion, Petitioner offers no explanation for his failure to exhaust three of his four federal

claims. Petitioner does not comment as to why he never sought relief on all his current claims by way of

state post-conviction proceedings. Instead, Petitioner simply re-alleges many of the facts that he raised

in all of his state and federal petitions, and nothing more. (See Petitioner’s Mot. at 7.) Petitioner does

not assert that his failure to exhaust was due to his own ignorance or confusion about the law, or

circumstances over which he had no control. Because Petitioner has not established good cause for

failure to present the unexhausted claims to the California Supreme Court before filing this habeas

action, Petitioner is not entitled to a stay-and-abeyance order. Respondent’s motion to dismiss should

be granted because the instant petition contains unexhausted claims. 

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 While November 23, 2005 was Thanksgiving day, the statute of limitations began to run, nonetheless. See

Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 12.

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Denial of a motion for stay and abeyance, in combination with granting a motion to dismiss the

petition, shall result in the dismissal of the entire petition. As such, Petitioner ordinarily should then be

given an opportunity to choose from one of two remaining options available under Rhines: (1) file an

amended petition which deletes the unexhausted claims and presents only his exhausted claim; or (2)

accept dismissal of the entire petition, including the exhausted claim, without prejudice to re-filing the

petition once all the claims have been exhausted in state court. However, as explained in further detail

below, the statute of limitations for Petitioner to file a federal petition has expired, rendering option two

impracticable. 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a petitioner has

one year to file his federal petition for habeas corpus from the date on which his judgment of conviction

became final by the conclusion of direct review, or the expiration of time seeking such review. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). On October 14, 2005, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District

affirmed the judgment against Petitioner. (See Lodgm’t 3 at 1.) Because Petitioner did not seek direct

review by the California Supreme Court, Petitioner’s conviction became final forty days after the Court

of Appeal issued its decision, on November 23, 2005. See Cal.Rules of Court 8.264(b); Cal.Rules of

Court 8.500(e); Smith v. Duncan 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations

period began running the following day, November 23, 2005.3

 The statute of limitations would

normally expire one year from that date, but because November 24th fell on the day after Thanksgiving,

a federal holiday that year, the last true day for Petitioner to file a federal habeas petition was on

November 27, 2006. Because Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was filed on May 9, 2007, nearly six

months past the statute of limitations expiration, Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is

untimely, and must be dismissed, unless he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. 

AEDPA provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not

be counted toward any period of limitation . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application is considered

“pending” until “the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction

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4

 This time would ordinarily be calculated from the date petitioner filed his petition with the California Supreme

Court. Petitioner, however, filed his petition in the California Supreme Court prior to obtaining a judgment on the petition

from the Superior Court. Accordingly, the tolling date for the petition in the California Supreme Court will be calculated from

the date the Superior Court issued its judgment, on May 4, 2006. 

9 07cv846-J(NLS)

procedures . . . ” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). However, the limitation period is not

tolled for the period between the petitioner’s final state court judgment and the filing of an application

for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court since no state court application is “pending.” 

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999). Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to

tolling for the time between when his state court conviction became final and the filing of his first state

habeas petition. Petitioner is, however, entitled to tolling for the time between when he filed his petition

in the state superior court and the superior court’s denial of his petition. Petitioner filed his petition on

March 15, 2006, and the Superior Court denied the petition on May 4, 2006, so Petitioner is entitled to

fifty days of tolling while this petition was pending. Petitioner is also entitled to tolling for the time his

petition was pending before the California Supreme Court, from May 4, 2006 to December 20, 2006;

two hundred thirty one days.4

 Added together, the time Petitioner is entitled for tolling totals two

hundred eighty-one days, or a little more than nine months. 

Accounting for the time the Petition was properly tolled, the limitations period expired on

September 4, 2007. Therefore, as stated above, Petitioner has no time remaining under the one-year

statute of limitations period imposed by section 2244(d) to exhaust his claims in state court and return to

re-file his exhausted claims in federal court. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner

be given an opportunity to file an amended petition which deletes the unexhausted claims and presents

only his exhausted claim. 

CONCLUSION

Because Petitioner is unable to demonstrate good cause for his failure to exhaust three of his four

federal claims, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay and Abeyance [Doc. No.

4] be DENIED and that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 8] be GRANTED. This Court

FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Petitioner be given an opportunity to file an amended petition which

deletes the unexhausted claims and presents only his exhausted claim. 

/ / /

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This Report and Recommendation is submitted by the undersigned Magistrate Judge to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of Title 28, United States

Code, section 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 3, 2007, any party to this action may file written

objection with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than December 14, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 5, 2007

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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