Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03678/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03678-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:7604 Clear Air Act (Emission Standards)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER

ENVIRONMENT, et al.

Plaintiffs,

 v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, et al.

Defendants. /

No. C 07-03678 JSW

ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs

Communities for a Better Environment, Rocky Mountain Clean Air Action, Coalition for a Safe

Environment, and Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los Angeles (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

and the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by defendant United States Environmental

Protection Agency and Stephen L. Johnson, as Administrator of the United States

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers, the

relevant legal authority, and having good cause, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment and denies the EPA’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs have brought this action under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act,

42 U.S.C. § 4701, et seq., to compel the EPA to review, and if appropriate, revise the existing

air quality criteria and national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”) for carbon monoxide

(“CO”). The Clean Air Act directs the EPA to review these published criteria and standards 

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every five years. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1). It is undisputed that the EPA has missed this

deadline. The EPA last reviewed the NAAQS for CO in 1994. (Declaration of Stephen D. Page

(“Page Decl.”) at ¶¶ 39, 40.) The parties only dispute what the type of remedy the Court may

provide.

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary to its analysis in the remainder of

this Order.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment.

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1997).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. An issue of fact is “genuine” only if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the

outcome of the case. Id. at 248. If the party moving for summary judgment does not have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, that party must produce evidence that negates an essential

element of the non-moving party’s claims, or that party must show that the non-moving party

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion

at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Once the moving party meets his or her initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond

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the pleadings and, by its own evidence, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

In order to make this showing, the non-moving party must “identify with reasonable

particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

1279 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the party seeking to establish a genuine issue of material fact

must be sure to point a court to the evidence precluding summary judgment because a court is

“‘not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary

judgment.’” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.

2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th

Cir. 1988)). If the non-moving party fails to point to evidence precluding summary judgment,

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

B. The Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.

The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to conduct formal reviews of NAAQS to ensure

that the EPA standards reflect the latest scientific knowledge and fully protect the public. 42

U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409; see also American Lung Ass’n v. Browner, 884 F. Supp. 345, 346 (D.

Ariz. 1994). The EPA is required to conduct these reviews of and revise, if appropriate, the

NAAQS for certain air pollutants, such as CO, every five years. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d). The

EPA’s duty to do so is a non-discretionary, statutory duty. Id.; see also American Lung Ass’n,

884 F. Supp. at 346. Despite this mandatory deadline, the last time EPA reviewed the NAAQS

for CO was in 1994. (Page Decl., ¶¶ 39, 40.) 

The EPA concedes that it is in violation of its statutory duty to review, and if

appropriate, revise, the NAAQS for CO. The parties simply disagree as to how much time the

EPA should be provided to comply with this statutory obligation. Summary judgment is

appropriate where, as here, the only issue for the Court to address is to fashion an equitable

remedy. See American Lung Ass’n, 884 F. Supp. at 346.

The EPA bears a “heavy burden of proving impossibility as a defense to non-compliance

with” the statutory deadline. See Maine Ass’n of Handicapped Persons of Portland, Maine v.

Dole, 623 F. Supp. 920, 926 (D. Me 1985); see also Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785,

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 The Court need not resolve whether the five-year period is set from 1980 and

reoccurs every five years or whether the five-year period is set from the last time the EPA

conducted the required review of the NAAQS.

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787 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (finding agency’s burden in demonstrating impossibility was “especially

heavy”). The EPA disagrees that it is required to demonstrate that completing the NAAQS

review process in less time than it proposes would be an impossibility and, thus, does not even

argue that it meets this standard. (EPA Mot. at 11.) According to the EPA as long as it

completes the NAAQS process within five years of when citizens file a lawsuit contesting its

failure to comply with its non-discretionary statutory duty, it need only establish a “reasonable”

schedule. (Id.) However, the statutory time-frame does not begin when a lawsuit is filed, but

began in 1980 and reoccurs every five years thereafter.1

 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1); see also

American Lung Ass’n, 884 F. Supp. at 347-48 (rejecting EPA’s proposed four-year, three-month

review schedule where EPA last conducted a review of the NAAQS for particulate matter seven

years prior). The EPA’s reliance on Idaho Sportsmen’s Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962

(W.D. Wash. 1996), for the proposition that it is only obligated to demonstrate a reasonable

schedule, is misplaced. Unlike the mandatory duty at issue here, the duty at issue in Idaho

Sportsmen’s Coalition was discretionary. Id. at 968. Moreover, the Court does not construe

Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal. 1982) or Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F.

Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1987) to support the EPA’s proposition either. In both Gorsuch and

Thomas, the statutory deadlines at issue were relatively short (six months and two years,

respectively), the plaintiffs merely sought an order requiring compliance within the statutory

period, and the EPA sought to extend its time to comply by more than double the statutory

period. Gorsuch, 551 F.Supp. at 786-87; Thomas, 658 F. Supp. at 170. Accordingly, the Court

finds that the EPA bears the heavy burden of proving impossibility. 

The Court must carefully scrutinize an agency’s claims of impossibility or infeasibility. 

See Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. at 787 (citing National Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510

F.2d 692, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). “Excuses for delay must go beyond the general proposition

that further study and analysis of materials will make final agency action better, ... because

further study will always make everything better, and it is always easier to do something with

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 The EPA questions the validity of Train because it predates the Supreme Court’s

opinions in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) and Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55

(2004). However, the holdings of Vermont Yankee and Norton are inapplicable and thus do

not undermine the authority of Train. In Vermont Yankee, despite the fact that the agency

employed all of the procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the

court of appeal found the proceedings were inadequate and overturned the rule adopted by

the agency. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 535. The Supreme Court criticized the lower court

for devising procedures for the agency to follow rather than inquiring into the validity of the

agency’s exercise of its rulemaking authority. Id. at 544. In Norton, the plaintiff brought a

claim under Section 706(1) of the APA, which is limited to an agency’s failure to take

discrete action that it is required to take. Norton, 542 U.S. at 64-65. In explaining the

limitation of “required” action, the Court explained that “when an agency is compelled by

law to act within a certain time period, but the manner of its action is left to the agency’s

discretion, a court can compel the agency to act, but has no power to specify what the action

must be.” Id at 65. The Court then provided the following an example of what it meant: A

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more rather than less time.” American Lung Ass’n, 884 F. Supp. at 346 (citing Train, 510 F.2d

at 713). The EPA’s burden “is especially heavy where, as here, [the EPA] has failed to

demonstrate any diligence whatsoever in discharging its statutory duty ... and has in fact

ignored that duty for several years.” Thomas, 658 F. Supp. at 172. Notably, one of Congress’s

express purposes in enacting the Clean Air Act was to “accelerate a national research and

development program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution.” 42 U.S.C. §

7401(b)(2); see also Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. at 787. On the other hand, the public interest would

not be served by unworkable NAAQS which would not survive judicial review. Thomas, 658

F. Supp. at 172. Therefore, courts should not impose an infeasible schedule upon an agency in

order to punish the agency for its delinquency. Id.

“District courts have ‘broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary to

remedy an established wrong.’” Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc.,

236 F.3d 985, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Southwest Marine”) (quoting Alaska Cntr. for

Environment v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, courts have even

broader and more flexible equitable powers where the public interest is involved, as opposed to

when only a private controversy is at stake. Northwest Envir. Defense Cntr v. Bonneville Power

Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 680 (9th Cir. 2007). When, as here, an agency fails to meet a statutory

deadline for a nondiscretionary duty, the court may exercise its equitable authority “to set

enforceable deadlines both of an ultimate and an intermediate nature.” Train, 510 F.2d at 705;2

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supported a judicial decree under the APA requiring prompt issuance of regulations, but not

a judicial decree setting forth the content of those regulations.” Id.

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see also Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d 46, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying Train to a

violation of a nondiscretionary duty under the Clean Air Act). To hold that courts could not

order interim deadlines “would invite lawlessness; an agency could escape its statutory duties

simply by procrastinating.” Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1494, 1497

(W.D. Wash. 1992). 

The EPA argues that the Court lacks authority to order completion of interim tasks that

are not statutorily required. According to the EPA, the only remedy the Court may issue is an

order requiring the agency to comply with the ultimate deadline to review and revise, if

necessary, the NAAQS for CO. (EPA Reply at 6.) However, the Court’s authority is not so

limited. See Southwest Marine, 236 F.3d at 1000. In Southwest Marine, the Ninth Circuit

rejected a similar argument made by a defendant. The court explained that the authority to

enforce a statutory requirement entails “more than the authority to declare that the requirement

exists and repeat that it must be followed. So long as the district court’s equitable measures are

reasonably calculated to ‘remedy the established wrong,’ they are not an abuse of discretion.”

Southwest Marine, 236 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Alaska Cntr. for Envir., 20 F.3d at 986).

Relatedly, the EPA argues that the government has not waived its sovereign immunity

with respect to anything more than an injunction requiring it to comply with the ultimate

deadline to review and revise, if necessary, the NAAQS for CO. However, the cases upon

which the EPA relies do not stand for the proposition that when a statute authorizes an

injunction against the government, the statute must specify the details of what such injunctions

may entail. In Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996), the Supreme Court merely held that a waiver

of sovereign immunity for suits for damages against the government could not be implied when

the statute did not expressly authorize damages against the government. Id. at 191-198. In

United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 628 (1992), the Supreme Court held that

the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act do not expressly

authorize punitive fines against the government and, thus, sovereign immunity has not been

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waived with respect to such fines. Significantly, subsequent to Ohio, courts, including the

Ninth Circuit, have imposed and affirmed broad injunctive relief under these environmental

statutes. See National Wildlife Fed. v. Nat’l. Marine Fisheries Serv., 481 F.3d 1224, 1241-43

(9th Cir. 2007) (upholding district court’s order requiring regular status reports, imposing a

deadline within which to conduct remand proceedings, and requiring a federal agency to

provide a failure report); see also Amer. Lung Ass’n, 884 F. Supp. at 348-49; Missouri Coal. for

the Envir. v. United States Envir. Prot. Agency, 2005 WL 223479, *2 n.5 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14,

2005) (finding that the court found had considerable discretion to fashion equitable remedies

and thus rejecting the EPA’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to order such interim

deadlines).

The EPA initiated the review process by issuing a call for information on September 13,

2007. See 72 Fed. Reg. 52,369. The EPA proposes the following schedule for the review

process: 

(1) prepare the draft integrated review plan, have a public comment period, and prepare the

final integrated review plan by April 2008; 

(2) start the integrated science assessment (“ISA”) in September 2007, prepare the first draft

of the ISA by June 2009, have a public comment period, prepare the second draft of the

ISA by January 2010, have a public comment period, and prepare the final ISA by May

2010; 

(3) start developing the scope and methods plan for the risk/exposure assessment (“RA”) in

October 2008, prepare the scope and methods plan by July 2009, have a public comment

period, prepare the first draft of the RA by January 2010, have a public comment period,

prepare the second draft of the RA by September 2010, have a public comment period,

and prepare the final RA by January 2011; and

(4) start developing the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (“ADPR”) in July 2010,

prepare the ADPR by February 2011, have a public comment period, publish the notice

of proposed rulemaking for decisions by October 2011, publish the notice announcing

and explaining the final decisions on the CO NAAQS by October 2012.

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(Page Decl. at ¶¶ 54-58 and Attachment B.)

The Court notes that, upon examination of the review schedules for the other NAAQS

the EPA has conducted or is planning to conduct, there is flexibility in the amount of time for

each proposed phase of the review process as well as flexibility in when the different phases

begin. For example, the EPA intends to prepare the first draft of the ISA for the review of the

NAAQS for particulate matter within sixteen and a half months, whereas the EPA proposes a

twenty-three and a half month period to conduct the first draft of the ISA for the CO NAAQS. 

(Charts attached to Page Decl.) The EPA proposes that it no start to develop the scope and

methods plan for the RA until thirteen and a half months after the EPA begins preparing the

first draft of the ISA, but start the scope and methods plan for the RA for other NAAQS review

within five and a half months. (Id.) The EPA proposes to prepare the final RA eight months

after the final ISA, but has completed or proposes to prepare the final RA at the same time or

within four months of the final ISA for other NAAQS reviews. (Id.) The EPA proposes to

prepare the policy assessment (or the ANPR) and the proposed and final rulemaking within

twenty-seven months, but has completed or proposed to complete the same processes for other

NAAQS reviews within as little as twelve and a half months. (Id.)

The EPA proposes taking a period of five years and one month from the initial call for

information to complete the review process for CO NAAQS. The EPA argues that its proposed

schedule entails the minimum amount of time needed to accomplish each task in reviewing the

NAAQS and that imposing a shorter timetable would jeopardize the integrity of any proposed

NAAQS revisions. (EPA’s Mot. at 2-3 (citing Page Decl. at ¶¶ 49-65).) However, it does not

explain how the EPA has, or proposes to, complete the review process for other pollutants in

less time. The EPA also argues that the Court must consider that the EPA is engaged in

conducting other NAAQS reviews at the same time. However, this is what is contemplated and

required by the statute. Based upon a review of the evidence in the record, the Court concludes

that it would not be impossible for the EPA to complete the NAAQS review and revision

process for CO by May 13, 2011, which is forty-four months since EPA initiated the review

process by issuing a call for information. 

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Although the Court has the authority to do so, the Court is hesitant to set interim

deadlines at this time. In a letter dated January 22, 2008, the Clean Air Scientific Advisory

Committee (“CASAC”) harshly criticized the EPA’s new NAAQS review procedures. 

(Plaintiff’s Not. of Suppl. Auth. Ex. 1.) Although the EPA touts its recently revised NAAQS

review process as one that would streamline and strengthen the NAAQS review process (see

Page Decl., ¶¶ 21-25.3), the CASAC found the ANPR for lead NAAQS “to be entirely

unsuitable and inadequate for use in rulemaking. ...” both with respect to the timing of the

ANPR within the review cycle and respect to the lack of substantive information contained

within the ANPR. (Id., Ex. 1 at p.2 (emphasis in original).) Based on the structure and content

of the ANPR the EPA prepared, the CASAC found it to be a regulatory tool more appropriately

suited to the “beginning” of the process for reviewing a NAAQS. (Id. (emphasis in original).) 

“The Agency’s ANPR for the Lead NAAQS ... represented a remarkable weakening of the

scientific foundation of the NAAQS review process. Far from improving the efficiency of the

review, the ANPR essentially reversed the process.” (Id., Ex. 1 at p.3 (emphasis in original).) 

In light of the CASAC’s recent critique, the EPA may seek to alter its current procedures. 

However, given how many years have passed since the EPA’s mandatory deadline has expired,

the Court is wary of merely providing the EPA a long-term deadline without any oversight or

review. Therefore, the Court HEREBY DIRECTS the EPA to submit, by no later than July 7,

2008, a revised schedule with interim deadlines in accordance with this Order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

and DENIES the EPA’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The EPA shall have until May

13, 2011 to complete the NAAQS review and revision process for CO by May 13, 2011 as

required by 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1). The Court HEREBY DIRECTS the EPA to submit, by no

later than July 7, 2008, a revised schedule with interim deadlines in accordance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2008 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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