Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08251/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08251-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shane A. LaCount, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Yavapai County, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-8251-PCT-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiff’s motion to remand and request for award of

attorney’s fees (doc. 4), defendants’ response (doc. 7), and plaintiff’s reply (doc. 9). We also

have defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. 5), plaintiff’s response (doc. 6), and defendants’

reply (doc. 8). 

Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Superior Court of Arizona in Yavapai

County. Plaintiff is a former employee of defendant Yavapai County, and alleges he was

terminated after notifying defendant of his disability. Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1)

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) violation of due process under the Arizona

Constitution; (5) intentional interference with contractual relations; (6) intentional infliction

of emotional distress; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Notice of Removal,

ex. A, Complaint (doc. 1). Defendants removed on the basis of federal question subject

matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1441. They relied on plaintiff’s allegations of

violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq. and

Case 3:10-cv-08251-FJM Document 10 Filed 02/02/11 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Defendants agree with plaintiff that he has not plead a cause of action under the

FMLA. See Response at 4 n.1 (doc. 7).

- 2 -

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq. Notice of

Removal, ¶ 7. Plaintiff moves to remand because none of his causes of action arises under

federal law.

We have jurisdiction where “a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal

law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on

resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v.

Construction Laborers Vacations Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2856 (1983).

Jurisdiction exists only where a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s

properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425,

2429 (1987). The removal statute is strictly construed, and defendants bear the burden of

establishing that removal is proper. Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc.,

582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S.

28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002)).

In their opposition to plaintiff’s motion to remand, defendants argue only that plaintiff

states a cause of action under the ADA.1

 Plaintiff does not include a cause of action under

the ADA as one of his seven claims. Nevertheless, defendants argue that “the ‘well-pled’

allegations of the Complaint specifically raise factual allegations supporting an ADA-based

cause of action” for discrimination and/or retaliation. Response at 5.

Plaintiff explains that he has not asserted a cause of action under the ADA, as such

a claim would fail because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has

not completed its investigation of plaintiff’s charge of discrimination, and so plaintiff does

not have a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)–(f). Defendants counter that the

ADA’s requirement that plaintiff obtain a right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional, and

therefore, plaintiff’s failure to allege administrative exhaustion does not preclude jurisdiction.

See Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006) (“An individual plaintiff

Case 3:10-cv-08251-FJM Document 10 Filed 02/02/11 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

must first file a timely EEOC complaint against the allegedly discriminatory party before

bringing an ADA suit in federal court. . . . The filing of a timely charge of discrimination

with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit, but is a requirement subject

to equitable doctrines such as waiver and tolling.”). 

Defendants’ argument is beside the point. Plaintiff does not contend that an ADA

claim would necessarily be barred on jurisdictional grounds, but rather explains that he chose

not to bring the ADA claim because it would be premature and likely dismissed for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. Further, given that plaintiff filed a complaint before the

EEOC, it is not surprising that his complaint contains factual allegations that could support

a cause of action under the ADA. But it does not necessarily follow that he has prematurely

brought such a claim. Plaintiff recognizes that only his state law claims are ripe at present.

Accordingly, he brought those claims in state court, rather than wait for the conclusion of the

EEOC investigation, out of concern that the statutes of limitations for the state claims might

run before the EEOC made its final determinations. 

Defendants attempt to base our jurisdiction on an implicit federal claim, which both

parties recognize would not yet be ready for our review. We will not infer a claim that

plaintiff sensibly did not assert. Plaintiff does not state a cause of action under the ADA, and

therefore defendants have not met their burden to establish that removal was proper. 

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiff’s motion to remand (doc. 4).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED REMANDING LaCount v. County of Yavapai, et al., CV

10-8251-PCT-FJM to the Superior Court of Arizona in Yavapai County. IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED DENYING defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. 5) as moot. Plaintiff’s request

for fees shall be resolved in accordance with LRCiv 54.1. 

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2011.

Case 3:10-cv-08251-FJM Document 10 Filed 02/02/11 Page 3 of 3