Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00226/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00226-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

C.S. by and through his Conservator,

MARY STRUBLE, on behalf of himself

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 08-CV-0226 W (AJB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

APPLICATION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

vs. ORDER (Doc. No. 4) 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, et. al.,

Defendants.

On February 5, 2008 Plaintiffs C.S., et. al. (“Plaintiffs”) commenced this class

action against Defendant California Department of Education (“Defendant” or “CDE”)

alleging IDEA Act, Supremacy Clause, and Equal Protection violations and seeking

injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 19, 2008 Plaintiffs moved for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) to restrain Defendant CDE from contracting with the Office

of Administrative Hearings. (Doc. No. 4.) Several briefing schedules and extensions

followed. (Doc. Nos. 7, 12, 18.)

On April 8, 2008 the Court granted Defendant Ron Diedrich’s, in his official

capacity as director of chief administrative law judge of the state of California Office of

Administrative Hearings (“Defendant” or “OAH”), motion to intervene as a Defendant

in this action. (Doc. No. 35.) The Court now takes the application for temporary

restraining order under submission without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

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1

The Court finds it important to note that Plaintiff C.S. is currently appealing the result of his administrative due process hearing before Judge Larry Alan Burns in the Southern District of California. See Struble v. Fallbrook Union High School District, No. 07cv2328

LAB (CAB) (S.D.Cal. filed Dec. 13, 2007). As of the date of this order, discovery is ongoing and Judge Burns has not rendered a final decision.

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7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ application for a

temporary restraining order. (Doc. No. 4.)

I. BACKGROUND

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and implementing

regulations provide procedural and substantive standards for educating students with

disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1400. As a condition of receiving federal funds, states must

establish procedures to ensure that special education students are receiving a free

appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). The parents of special

education students may challenge the educational placement of their child by requesting

an administrative “due process hearing” before an independent and impartial hearing

officer. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).

Plaintiff C.S. is an eighteen year-old, conserved student who qualifies for special

education under the Autism eligibility category. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that he

participated as a party in an administrative due process hearing, which was conducted

in such a way as to deny him certain federal and constitutional rights. (Id. ¶ 10.)1

Plaintiff C.S. brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.

Defendant California Department of Education (“CDE”) is a California agency

tasked to administer the California education system. (Id. ¶ 25.) By receiving federal

funds, IDEA mandates that CDE provide disabled students’ parents with impartial

administrative due process hearings. (Id.) Defendant CDE contracts with Defendant

Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) to conduct these hearings. (Id. ¶ 26.)

Under the contract, or interagency agreement, OAH must provide Administrative Law

Judges (“ALJs”) with certain knowledge and training in special education law. (Id. ¶

10.) The contract also requires that CDE oversee the ALJ training and implementation

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of special education law. (Id.)

On February 5, 2008 Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant CDE, alleging that

CDE failed to adequately supervise OAH’s administrative hearing process. (Doc. No.

1.) The gist of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that CDE’s contractual relationship with OAH

is unlawful because the ALJs are neither appropriately trained nor following or

implementing relevant federal law. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs allege that C.S., and all others

similarly situated, have been denied due process as a result of poor ALJ performance.

(Id. ¶ 17.)

On February 19, 2008 Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, arguing

that CDE should be enjoined from renewing the current interagency contract with

OAH that expires on July 1, 2008. (Doc. No. 4.) On March 7, 2008 Ron Diedrich, in

his official capacity as Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge of the State of

California Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), moved for an order permitting

OAH to intervene as a defendant in this action. (Doc. No. 14.) Per OAH’s request,

the Court established a briefing schedule with the goal of granting or denying the

intervenor motion before CDE’s TRO opposition was due. (Doc. No. 18.) Among

other things, the Court ordered that Plaintiffs oppose OAH’s motion by March 24,

2008, an amount of time consistent with the time allotted to oppose a noticed motion

under the Local Rules. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(e)(1), (2).

On March 24, 2008 Plaintiffs opposed OAH’s motion to intervene. (Doc. No.

21.) The same day, Plaintiff moved ex parte for an Order to Show Cause why Defendant

CDE should not be ordered to file an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Doc. No. 24.)

The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion as moot when CDE filed an answer the next day,

on March 25, 2008. (Doc. No. 26.) On April 8, 2008 the Court granted OAH’s motion

to intervene as a Defendant, and OAH was added to the case. (Doc. No. 35.)

On April 14, 2008 both CDE and OAH opposed Plaintiffs’ application for TRO.

(Doc. Nos. 36, 37.) On April 22, 2008 Plaintiffs filed their Reply. (Doc. No. 41.)

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline the procedures a federal court must

follow when deciding whether to grant a temporary restraining order. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65. The standard for granting a temporary restraining order is the same as the

standard for entering a preliminary injunction. Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Franklin v. Scribner, Civil No. 07-

0438 BTM (LSP), 2007 WL 1491100, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 21, 2007). The Ninth

Circuit has prescribed the following equitable criteria for determining whether to grant

injunctive relief:

(1) the likelihood of the moving party’s success on the merits; (2) the

possibility of irreparable injury to the moving party if relief is not granted;

(3) the extent to which the balance of hardships favors the respective

parties; and (4) in certain cases, whether the public interest will be

advanced by granting the preliminary relief. The moving party must show

either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the

possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) the existence of serious questions

going to the merits, the balance of hardships tipping sharply in its favor,

and at least a fair chance of success on the merits... [T]he required degree

of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases. 

Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Swift Transp. Co., 367 F.3d 1108, 1111

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Miller ex. rel. N.L.R.B. v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456

(9th Cir. 1994)). The temporary restraining order “should be restricted to serving [its]

underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so

long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd.

of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974); accord

L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.

1980); Del Toro-Chacon v. Chertoff, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139-40 (W.D. Wash.

2006). 

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). Additionally, where the moving

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2

Plaintiffs, in their Reply, argue that “SEHO is irrelevant to his action, only OAH’s performance is relevant.” (Pls.’ Reply 5–6.) The Court wonders, then, how this argument squares with the analysis and allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, where an entire section is devoted to a “Comparison of Due Process Hearing Data Under OAH and Under its Predecessor, Special Education Hearing Office ‘SEHO.’” (Compl. ¶¶ 45–53.) Even in their motion for TRO, Plaintiffs argue that they are being irreparably harmed because they are only prevailing 10% of the time in due process hearings, implying that Plaintiffs enjoyed greater

rights when SEHO administered due process hearings and students allegedly succeeded 50% of the time. (Pls.’ TRO 9–10; Compl. ¶ 46.)

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party seeks to enjoin governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a

statutory or regulatory scheme, the moving party must meet a heightened standard

establishing both irreparable injury and a probability of success on the merits. Pinnacle

Armor, Inc. v. United States, No. CV F 07-1655 LJO DLB, 2008 WL 108969, at *5

(E.D.Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (citing NAACP, Inc. v. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 223

(2d Cir. 1995)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown a Likelihood of Success On The Merits

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are violating the IDEA and the Supremacy and

Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution. (Pls.’ TRO. 13–15.)

Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ inability and unwillingness to properly

train ALJs violates the standards set forth in IDEA, a federal law the preempts any state

regulation. (Id. 13–14.) Additionally, Plaintiffs argue an equal protection violation

because OAH and CDE interpret IDEA as to favor school districts and not students.

(Id. 14–15.) 

CDE, on the other hand, argues that the ALJs are qualified and that their

qualifications meet relevant federal standards. (CDE Opp’n 6–8.) Additionally, CDE

contends that there is no equal protection violation because under the current

interagency agreement, students and school districts are “winning” and “losing” at about

the same rate as when due process hearings were conducted by the Special Education

Hearing Office (“SEHO”).2

 (Id. 6.) 

OAH argues that Defendants have met all of IDEA’s safeguards, and have even

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3

Elsewhere, Plaintiffs mention 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) and (c), which requires ALJs to prepare and mail a written decision within forty-five days of a due process hearing. Also,

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have failed to provide parents a list of free or reduced costrepresentation in violation of California Education Code § 56502(h). Regardless of whether Plaintiffs could even get the relief they request—enjoining a new CDE-OAH contract—to

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exceeded them when it comes to hiring and training ALJs. (OAH’s Opp’n 12.)

Moreover, OAH argues that because laws involving disabled students do not trigger

“strict scrutiny” analysis, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that Defendants

have acted irrationally in implementing relevant laws. (Id. 13–14.)

The IDEA is Spending Clause legislation, and courts should be wary of reading

unwritten substantive standards into the Act. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,

190, 190 n.11 (1982) (“We would be less than faithful... if in this case we were to

disregard the statutory language and legislative history... by concluding that Congress

had imposed upon the States a burden of unspecified proportions and weight, to be

revealed only through case-by-case adjudication in the courts.”). If Congress intends

to impose a condition on the grant of federal monies, it must do so unambiguously.

Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002). 

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that the relevant section under IDEA is 20

U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A), which states:

(3) Limitations on hearing.

 (A) Person conducting hearing. A hearing officer conducting a hearing

pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) shall, at a minimum--

 (i) not be--

 (I) an employee of the State educational agency or the local educational agency

involved in the education or care of the child; or

 (II) a person having a personal or professional interest that conflicts with the 

person's objectivity in the hearing;

 (ii) possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand, the provisions of this title

[20 USCS §§ 1400 et seq.], Federal and State regulations pertaining to this title

[20 USCS §§ 1400 et seq.], and legal interpretations of this title [20 USCS §§

1400 et seq.] by Federal and State courts;

 (iii) possess the knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with 

appropriate, standard legal practice; and

 (iv) possess the knowledge and ability to render and write decisions in accordance

with appropriate, standard legal practice.3

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remedy these allegations of relatively minor procedural violations, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence to support a likelihood of success on the merits or to show irreparable injury or to suggest that the harm from these minor violations outweighs the harm from enjoining a new CDE-OAH contract.

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The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that all

persons similarly situated should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216

(1982). Absent any classification of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, then legislation is

presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is

rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473

U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Thus, a state law challenged on Equal Protection grounds must

be upheld if it has any plausible relationship to a legitimate government purpose.

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992). 

Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of this case.

Although Plaintiffs allege, over many pages, various transgressions committed by CDE,

OAH, and the ALJs, they have not tied any of these alleged improprieties to the

violation of any specific federal law. The IDEA generally requires that the hearing

officer not be an employee of a state or local educational agency, not have a conflict of

interest, possess sufficient knowledge of special education law, and possess written skills

sufficient to render decisions in due process hearings. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A).

Simply, Plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence suggesting that ALJs are employed

by state or local educational agencies, are conflicted, do not possess knowledge of special

education law, and do not possess the written skills sufficient to render decisions in due

process hearings. To the extent Plaintiffs allege that ALJs are performing their jobs

unsatisfactorily, Plaintiffs’ opinions and anecdotal observations are not indicative of a

violation of general Spending Clause legislation sufficient to support an extraordinary

TRO remedy.

Plaintiffs’ specific focus, instead, is on the particulars of the CDE-OAH contract,

which, inter alia, requires that ALJs receive certain training and establishes procedures

for enacting new rules. (Pls.’ TRO 3–7.) For example, Plaintiffs argue that OAH has

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4

For instance, Plaintiffs’ motion frets about old due process hearings, (Pls.’ TRO 4,); correspondence between Plaintiffs’ counsel and the United States Department of Education (Id. 5,); discussions between Plaintiffs’ counsel and CDE (Id. 5–7,); funding requests regarding OAH (Id.,); the meaning of “status quo,” (Pls.’ Reply 2–3,); OAH’s performance in mediation, (Id. 6,); and Plaintiffs’ Reply apparently requests that the United States Department of Education intervene in this action. (Id. 7–8.) None of these diversions are relevant to what

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not given ALJs eighty hours of proper special education training; Defendants respond

with declarations stating that, indeed, the ALJs have received such training. (Compare

Pls.’ TRO 3–5 with OAH Opp’n 12.) Regardless of whether the training occurred, the

eighty-hour requirement is not federal law—it is an obligation between two contracting

parties. Nowhere have Plaintiffs argued that they have standing to challenge the

fulfillment or continuance of these contractual obligations. See Fowler v. United States,

258 F. Supp. 638, 644 (C.D. Cal. 1966) (stating that a TRO will not ordinarily be

granted if any debate or doubts are created by the record as to the merits of the claimed

relief or power of the court to act). 

Nor have Plaintiffs articulated a cognizable theory showing that Defendants likely

violated the Equal Protection clause. To the extent Plaintiffs intend to show that

Defendants implement IDEA in a way that classifies or distinguishes special education

students, Plaintiffs have not shown that these classifications are irrational.

On the whole, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a sincere desire to improve the lot of

California’s special education students. Unfortunately, although Plaintiffs may

personally feel that California is not doing enough to provide a FAPE to those with

exceptional needs, Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed in proving

that Defendants violated the Constitution or any of IDEA’s generalized provisions. See

Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (stating that if Congress intends to impose

a condition on the grant of federal monies, it must do so unambiguously). Without

some proof that Defendants actually violated a specific federal law, the Court is

powerless to act. Accordingly, because much of Plaintiffs’ argument contains complaints

unmoored from federal requirements, Plaintiffs have failed to make the clear

 showing necessary to justify the drastic remedy of a TRO.4

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28 Plaintiffs must show to invoke federal judicial relief: namely, that particular parties in the lawsuit violated some sort of federal or state law.

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B. Plaintiffs Have Not Shown the Possibility of Irreparable Injury

Plaintiffs argue that they have suffered irreparable harm because special education

students prevail only 10% of the time in due process hearings. (Pls.’ TRO 9–10.)

Additionally, Plaintiff C.S. argues that he has suffered irreparable harm because

Fallbrook Union High School never advised him or his parents that he may not get a

high school diploma. (Id.) Others similarly situated are allegedly at home suffering

“frustration, low self-esteem and school phobia.” (Id. 11.) Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that

parents no longer feel safe enforcing their children’s rights. (Id.)

Both CDE and OAH, in response, contend that Plaintiffs’ irreparable injury

allegations are unsupported by statistics or evidence. (CDE Opp’n 10–11.) Moreover,

Defendants argue, Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. (Id. 11.)

A preliminary injunction may only be granted when the moving party has

demonstrated a significant threat of irreparable injury, irrespective of the magnitude of

the injury. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition

to showing irreparable harm, a party must also show the absence of an adequate remedy

at law. O’Shea v. Littleton, 441 U.S. 488, 502 (1974). Under the IDEA, Parents

dissatisfied by an ALJ’s due process hearing decision may appeal the decision by filing

a civil action in federal or state court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). 

Though unclear, Plaintiffs appear to complain that if OAH and CDE are not

prevented from contracting, they will suffer several alleged irreparable harms: (1) low

success rates in due process hearings; (2) Fallbrook High School’s failure to provide

Plaintiff C.S. with a FAPE; (3) other school districts denying similarly situated Plaintiffs

a FAPE; (4) ongoing feelings of frustration and low self-esteem by all Plaintiffs; and (5)

injury to parents and students disenchanted by the process of pursuing due process

violations.

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5

The Court surmises that this is relevant to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to compare the 10% success rate to what is presumably (for them) the more palatable 50% success rate under SEHO.

6

Plaintiffs’ argument that “this District Court appeal will take months, if not a year, to resolve, and, then may be the subject of a 9th [sic] Circuit appeal...” is unpersuasive. The fact remains that Plaintiff C.S. enjoys a remedy at law for any injury that Defendants allegedly have inflicted upon him.

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Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, all of the harm they allege is either unsupported by

any significant evidence or may by remedied by law. First, Plaintiffs’ discontent over the

allegedly too-low student due process hearing success rate is strongly countered by

Defendants’ affidavits showing similar success rates under SEHO’s administration.5

Regardless, any “win-loss” statistics are not probative as to any irreparable

harm—whether a student prevails is weighed on a host of individual factors, and the

decision is appealable. 

More importantly, Plaintiff C.S. is already exercising his statutory right to appeal

his due process hearing decision before Judge Burns in this very District. See Struble v.

Fallbrook Union High School District, No. 07-cv-2328 LAB (CAB) (S.D.Cal. filed Dec.

13, 2007). Irreparable injury does not exist where Plaintiff C.S. has an adequate remedy

at law; indeed, determining whether the State of California, Defendants, or Fallbrook

High School irreparably harmed or will harm C.S. could conflict with Judge Burns’

ability to render a decision.6

 In other words, regardless of whether the CDE-OAH

contract is enjoined by this Court, Plaintiff C.S. may receive the relief he seeks.

Additionally, as OAH has already rendered Plaintiff C.S.’s due process decision, it is

unclear how enjoining any new CDE-OAH contract, to take effect in July 2008, would

remedy or prevent any alleged irreparable injury to him. Identical concerns apply to all

“similarly situated” Plaintiffs who already enjoy a right to appeal.

Concerning parents’ and students’ feelings of low self-esteem, depression, and

mistrust of the administrative hearing process, Plaintiffs have only provided self-serving

declarations in their Reply to support these allegations. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not

shown that these alleged injuries are recognized as irreparable harm, or that enjoining

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7

The Court also assumes that a district court may remand cases to ALJs after a due process appeal, but Plaintiffs have not shown that the risk of injury by a new CDE-OAH contract on remand is anything more than speculative.

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any new OAH-CDE contract will do anything to rectify or prevent these injuries—if

anything, restraining a new contract will only help the speculative class of people yet to

challenge a FAPE in a due process hearing.7

Once again, Plaintiffs opine about how California allegedly mismanages its

administrative procedures and the parental and student impact thereon. Unfortunately,

that is not enough to demonstrate the possibility of irreparable injury. Because every

injury Plaintiffs complain of is unsupported by evidence or may be properly appealed by

statute, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing a possibility

of irreparable harm.

C. The Balance of Hardships Does Not Favor Either Party

Plaintiffs argue that, under the current structure, students and parents are

constantly harmed because they may be forced to press an annual due process claim and

subject themselves to the same inexperienced and undertrained ALJs. (Pls.’ TRO

12–13.) Plaintiffs then pose a serious of rhetorical questions apparently designed to

show that neither Defendant would be harmed by enjoining contract negotiations. (Id.)

CDE contends, in response, that not having a contract in place could jeopardize

the entire procedure for hosting due process hearings for hundreds of thousands of

California special education students. (CDE Opp’n 12.) CDE also alleges that because

no other agency exists to administer the due process system, California risks violating

a federal funding condition if the contract is not signed. (Id. 12–13.)

OAH argues that Plaintiff C.S., currently appealing his individual decision, is not

currently suffering hardship. (OAH Opp’n 16.) By contrast, OAH contends, enjoining

the CDE-OAH contract would leave California special education students without any

dispute resolution process. (Id. 16.) 

Plaintiffs’ hardship claims must be tempered with the fact that they are entitled

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to a statutory right of appeal before a tribunal unaffiliated with CDE or OAH; indeed,

Plaintiff C.S. is currently pursuing his appeal in this very District. Without any

injunction, it is entirely possible that Plaintiff C.S. will eventually obtain the relief he

seeks. Any argument that Plaintiffs might have to pursue a claim every year is entirely

speculative and unsupported by any evidence in the record. 

On the other hand, Defendants have posed credible arguments on behalf of all

special education students in California. For instance, Defendants argue that not

having an interagency agreement in place could leave every California special education

student without the opportunity to pursue a due process claim—including, presumably,

members of Plaintiffs’ class. Furthermore, Defendants present evidence that CDE risks

losing federal funding if no due process administration system is in place after June 30,

2008. (Bellotti Decl. Ex. A.) 

Given the above, the Court cannot say that the balance of hardships weighs in

Plaintiffs’ favor, especially when Plaintiff C.S. is in the midst of his own appeal and it is

unclear how enjoining any new contract will remedy any harm Plaintiffs have already

suffered. Conversely, all of California’s special education students may suffer, and CDE

could lose significant federal funding, if this Court enjoins the CDE-OAH contract.

Given the nature of this suit, any “public interest” analysis closely resembles the

balance of hardships analysis. Because Plaintiffs have not met their burden under the

first three prongs of the TRO test, the Court declines to make a preliminary decision

about where the public interest lies. At this point, it suffices to say that the public has

a strong interest in both providing qualified ALJs and ensuring that California’s special

education system remains a functioning whole. 

///

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs have not shown a probability of success on the merits and irreparable

injury needed for the issuance of a temporary or preliminary order restraining OAH and

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CDE from contracting with each other. The core of Plaintiffs’ problem is an inability

to show that Defendants’ conduct actually violated federal law and that Plaintiffs would

be irreparably harmed if the Court failed to enjoin any new contract. Combined with

serious questions over standing and the risk that CDE loses federal funding, the Court

finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that they are deserving of an order at this time

enjoining any contract or negotiations between OAH and CDE. Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. No. 4.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 30, 2008

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00226-W-AJB Document 47 Filed 04/30/08 Page 13 of 13