Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04297/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04297-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 Plaintiff was granted leave to file his SAC after Cingular’s Motion had been fully

briefed. The parties’ briefing indicates, however, that the arguments set forth in such

briefing apply to the SAC as well. (See, e.g., Mot. at 11 n.2 (stating Cingular “is entitled to

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN D. WINIG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CINGULAR WIRELESS, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C-06-4297 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

CINGULAR’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF

DEFENDANTS AT&T MOBILITY, LLC

AND AT&T MOBILITY CORPORATION

Before the Court is defendant Cingular Wireless LLC’s (“Cingular”) Motion for

Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion”), filed June

20, 2008. Plaintiff has filed opposition, to which Cingular has filed a reply, and to which

reply plaintiff was permitted, by order issued concurrently herewith, to file a sur-reply. 

Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court

finds the matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), and

rules as follows. 

1. Cingular has presented undisputed evidence that, contrary to the allegations in

plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”),1

 (see, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 1, 5), Cingular, in July

Case 3:06-cv-04297-MMC Document 146 Filed 08/21/08 Page 1 of 5
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judgment on [p]laintiff’s claims, regardless of the outcome of the motion to amend”); Opp’n

at 11:5-7 (identifying plaintiff’s “core premise” in the action by citation to portions of SAC).) 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s Administrative Motion, filed July 22, 2008, in which plaintiff

suggests the Motion is “moot as a matter of law,” (see Pl.’s Admin. Mot. at 1:13), and

requests, inter alia, an order directing the parties to confer regarding a briefing schedule for

a future motion for summary judgment, (see id. at 3:4-9), is hereby DENIED.

2

 The parties agree that mobile-to-mobile minutes are not subject to charges under

the terms of the contract at issue.

3

 The complete provision, which is set off by a bullet point, reads: 

“Airtime minutes apply when . . . 

Call 411 (up to $1.50 charge per call). 

Calling toll-free numbers (800, 866, etc.). Incoming calls, 

outgoing calls, long distance calls and voicemail.” 

(See Arnese Decl. Ex. A at 5.) Although the punctuation and grammar are less than

optimal, the meaning is clear.

2

2005, did not effect a “change in policy” by which Cingular began charging customers for

voicemail retrieval. (See Decl. of Jacqueline Jackson (Cingular’s Product Manager for

Voicemail) ¶¶ 2, 5 (attesting that Cingular “did not change any of its policies related to

billing customers for voicemail retrieval calls or customers’ calls to their own Cingular

mobile numbers . . . in or around July 2005”).) Accordingly, Cingular is entitled to summary

judgment to the extent plaintiff’s claims are based on an asserted change in policy.

2. To the extent plaintiff now augments his breach of contract claim by the assertion

that Cingular breached the terms of the parties’ contract even in the absence of a policy

change, the claim likewise fails. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument that the contract “requires

that voicemail retrievals should be treated as free mobile-to-mobile minutes and not as

standard airtime minutes,” (see Opp’n at 11:5-7) (emphasis in original),2

 the contract makes

clear that calls to retrieve voicemail qualify as “airtime” and are subject to charges. In

particular, under the heading “CHARGES AND DISPUTES,” the contract expressly

provides: “Charges include, without limitation, airtime.” (See Decl. of Beth O’Neal Arnese

(“Arnese Decl.”) Ex. A at 24.) Under the heading “OTHER IMPORTANT INFO,” the

contract further provides: “Airtime minutes apply when . . . Calling . . . voicemail.”3 (See id.

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4

 The former provision appears in a document titled “Wireless Service Agreement”

and the latter provision appears in a document titled “Welcome Kit.” The parties do not

dispute each of said documents constitutes part of the parties’ contract.

5

 Contrary to Cingular’s argument, plaintiff’s reference to language in the Rate Plan

Brochure does not raise a new claim. The Rate Plan Brochure is expressly incorporated by

reference in the “Wireless Service Agreement” plaintiff alleges Cingular to have breached. 

(See Arnese Decl. Ex. A at 23 (providing Agreement “includes and incorporates additional

provisions contained in a separate rate plan or other brochure(s) describing the services to

which [plaintiff] subscribed (‘Rate Plan Brochure’)”)). 

3

at 5.)4

 

Additionally, in specifying how the length of a call is calculated, the contract provides

that “Chargeable Time begins for outgoing calls when you press SEND” and “ends after

you press END,” cautions that such chargeable time also “may include time for [Cingular] to

recognize that only one party has disconnected from the call, time to clear the channels in

use, and ring time,” (see id. at 24), and, immediately thereafter, reminds the subscriber that

“Chargeable Time may also occur from other uses of [Cingular] facilities, including by way

of example, voicemail deposits and retrievals, and call transfers,” (see id. (emphasis

added)).

The Court finds unpersuasive plaintiff’s argument that the terms of the Rate Plan

Brochure5

 provide an exception for voicemail retrieval where the subscriber dials his own

mobile telephone number. In support of such argument, plaintiff relies on the following

statement in the Rate Plan Brochure: “Mobile to Mobile Minutes may be used when directly

dialing or receiving calls from any other Cingular phone number from within your calling

area.” (See Decl. of Justin P. Karczag Ex. D.) Although plaintiff has presented evidence

that, when a customer accesses voicemail by dialing their own Cingular phone number, the

phone call is routed through a “pilot number,” i.e., an “other Cingular phone number,” (see,

e.g., Decl. of Nathan Lowery Ex. M at 21:24-22:25; 30:5-15), plaintiff has failed to show

that, by dialing his own Cingular phone number, he “directly dialed” the pilot number. 

Further, in a glossary of terms, under “UNLIMITED MOBILE TO MOBILE MINUTES,” the

contract explains that mobile-to-mobile minutes are “[c]alls to and from other local Cingular

customers in your mobile to mobile calling area.” (See Arnese Decl. Ex. A at 6 (emphasis

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6

 Plaintiff’s reliance on oral representations attributed to Cingular employees is

unavailing. Such evidence is inadmissible where, as here, the contract at issue is

integrated, (see Arnese Decl. Ex. A at 26 (providing Wireless Service Agreement and

specified other written documents “make up the complete agreement between [plaintiff] and

Cingular, and supersede any and all prior agreements and understandings relating to the

subject matter of this Agreement”)), and the oral representations are offered to support an

interpretation to which the contract terms are not reasonably susceptible, see Casa

Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal.4th 336, 343 (2004) (holding oral or written extrinsic

evidence may not be introduced “to vary, alter or add to the terms of an integrated written

instrument,” but only “to explain the meaning of a written contract ... [if] the meaning urged

is one to which the written contract terms are reasonably susceptible”) (internal quotations

and citations omitted); Estate of Gaines, 15 Cal.2d 255, 264 (1940) (holding California’s

parole evidence rule constitutes substantive, not procedural, law).

4

added).) Plaintiff does not suggest, nor could he, that dialing his own mobile telephone

number is calling an “other Cingular customer.”6

Accordingly, Cingular is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for breach

of contract, as well as plaintiff’s claims for unjust enrichment and breach of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing derivative therefrom.

3. In light of the Court’s finding herein that the contract unambiguously permits

Cingular’s categorization of minutes used to access voicemail as “Chargeable Minutes” or

“Airtime Minutes” rather than “Mobile to Mobile Minutes,” plaintiff’s remaining claims for

unfair competition, violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and violation of the

Federal Communications Act, each of which is premised on a misrepresentation or

omission with respect to such categorization, fail for want of an underlying wrongful act. 

4. The Court’s reasoning herein applies equally to defendants AT&T Mobility, LLC,

and AT&T Mobility Corporation, each of whom was named in the SAC but has not yet

appeared, and, accordingly, the Court likewise will grant summary judgment in favor of said

defendants. See Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 803

(9th Cir. 1995)) (affirming summary judgment in favor of nonappearing defendant, where

plaintiff, in response to motion filed by defendant who had appeared, had “full and fair

opportunity to brief and present evidence” on dispositive issue that controlled determination

with respect to nonappearing defendant).

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5

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, 

1. Cingular’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED; and

2. Summary judgment in favor of AT&T Mobility, LLC, and AT&T Mobility

Corporation is hereby GRANTED.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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