Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01514/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01514-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER T. HARRELL, No. CIV S-07-1514-MCE-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY 

PATROL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending

before the court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint (Doc. 6), filed on December 7, 2007.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court is also required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Because plaintiff, who

is not a prisoner, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court will screen the

complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). 

/ / /

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26 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1

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Under these screening provisions, the court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints

contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and

directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the

plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129

(9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts

by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy

this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by

law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and three of its officers

have violated his First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The basis for his claims

arises from a traffic stop initiated by Officer Shouse on September 2, 2006, while plaintiff was

proceeding southbound on Interstate 5 in Siskiyou County, California. Plaintiff alleges Officer

Shouse did not have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to initiate the traffic stop, a

violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that

Officer Shouse violated of his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to advise plaintiff of his

Miranda rights. In addition, plaintiff alleges the CHP, Officer Roberts, Captain Lopey, and 1

Officer Shouse violated his right to privacy by maintaining a list of vehicles frequently operated

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Plaintiff also alleges several state law claims, which this court need not address at 2

this time.

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in northern California which are licensed in Oregon, and retaliated against plaintiff for obtaining

a dismissal of a prior citation for violation of the California Vehicle Code.

2

Plaintiff’s original complaint, which named the same defendants and raised the

same claims as this amended complaint, was dismissed at screening for failing to state a claim. 

The undersigned found that plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Miranda claim, Fourth Amendment

invasion of privacy claim, and First Amendment retaliation claims were not cognizable. 

However, plaintiff was allowed an opportunity to cure his Fourth Amendment search and seizure

claims, which was also deficient. In an apparent attempt to cure the defects in his original

complaint, plaintiff filed this first amended complaint and restated all of his claims. Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims and First Amendment retaliation claims are

addressed in a separate order. The remaining claims are addressed below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Miranda Warning 

The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” This right against self-incrimination was

addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),

when it held:

the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or

inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By

custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 

As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully

effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their

right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise

it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning,

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the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that

any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,

and that he has a right to the presence of any attorney, either

retained or appointed.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

Since Miranda, this principle has been frequently reaffirmed. The Supreme Court

itself stated:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure

that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into

confessing, to relieve the ‘inherently compelling pressures’

generated by the custodial setting itself, ‘which work to undermine

the individual’s will to resist,’ and as much as possible, to free

courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to

determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were

voluntary.

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1964) (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,

430 (1984), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58, 467 (1966)). 

The issue in this case is whether questioning during a traffic stop is considered

custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue as well. While finding that

a traffic stop significantly curtails the freedom of action of the driver when a vehicle is detained,

“the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less ‘police dominated’ than

that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself and in the subsequent cases

in which we have applied Miranda.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436-39. In fact, the Court found

“the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop,’ than to a formal arrest.” Id.

at 439 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Under a Terry stop, an officer “may ask the

detainee a moderate number of questions . . . [b]ut the detainee is not obligated to respond.” Id. 

Because the detentions in a Terry stop are comparatively nonthreatening, detainees are not

subject to the required Miranda warning. Id. at 440. “The similarly noncoercive aspect of

ordinary traffic stops” lead the Court to “hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such

stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.” Id. 

/ / /

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This is not to say that a traffic stop could never require Miranda warnings. Once a

motorist is formally arrested or is “subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for

practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.”

Id. (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.

492, 495 (1977)). 

In this case, plaintiff was subject to an ordinary traffic stop in which the officer

conducted a brief questioning of plaintiff. Plaintiff indicates that he was detained for “an

unreasonable amount of time,” but states that he was in fact detained for only about 15 minutes. 

During that 15 minute stop, defendant Shouse reviewed plaintiff’s driver’s license, registration

and insurance. He also purportedly spoke on the telephone to defendant Roberts several times.

Finally, he also asked plaintiff questions regarding his registration and issued plaintiff a citation. 

All of this was conducted in a span of 15 minutes. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant spent

the entire 15 minutes questioning him. There is no indication that the amount of time plaintiff

was detained was extended or that plaintiff was subjected to anything other than a moderate

number of questions. Although plaintiff was issued a citation, he was not formally arrested and

was not subjected to the treatment which would have rendered him in custody for practical

purposes. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (discussing the length of detention

in turning a Terry stop into de facto arrest). Therefore, the officer initiating the traffic stop was

not required to advise plaintiff of his Miranda rights, and the failure of the officer to so advise

plaintiff was not a violation of plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights.

This claim should be dismissed because it does not appear that the deficiencies

can be cured through amendment. 

B. Invasion of Privacy 

The Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy protects individuals where there is a

justifiable, reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government

action. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983). 

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“One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because

its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s

residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little

capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public

thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain

view.” A person traveling in an automobile on public

thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his

movements from one place to another. When [a driver] travel[s]

over the public streets he voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who

want[s] to look the fact that he [is] traveling over particular roads

in a particular direction

including the stops he makes and his final destination. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82 (quoting

Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). 

Plaintiff alleges that his right to privacy, protected by the Fourth Amendment, was

violated by the officers maintaining a list of vehicles frequently seen in northern California

without California registration. However, plaintiff fails to show how maintaining a list of

vehicles operated on public highways within the state of California has violated his right to

privacy. The Supreme Court has stated there is no reasonable expectation of privacy while

traveling on public streets. California law requires vehicles based in California or primarily used

on California highways to be registered with the state of California. See Cal. Veh. Code

§4000.4. If law enforcement is not able to keep track of vehicles frequently seen in California,

using California highways, they would not be able to enforce that law. 

This claim should be dismissed because it does not appear that the deficiencies

can be cured through amendment. 

The only allegations relating to defendant Roberts are his actions in maintaining

the lists. Officer Roberts was not personally present during plaintiff’s traffic stop and was not

personally involved in any potential claim he might have for a violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, as addressed separately. 

Therefore, as plaintiff cannot state a claim for Officer Roberts actions in maintaining the list, and

no other claims have been made against Officer Roberts, Officer Roberts should be dismissed

from this action.

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C. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff attempts to state a Fourth Amendment violation claim against Captain

Lopey on the basis of his failure to properly train and supervise the officers under his direction.

Plaintiff does not allege any affirmative action on behalf of Captain Lopey, only vague and

conclusory allegations that Captain Lopey “assisted and conspired with [Officers Roberts and

Shouse] to obstruct justice, and to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.” 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or had actual

knowledge of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. See id. When a defendant holds a

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the

involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v.

Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Therefore, plaintiff has not stated a claim

against Captain Lopey, and Captain Lopey should be dismissed from this action.

D. Municipal Liability

Plaintiff also attempts to state a claim against the CHP for its policy, custom,

and/or common practice of maintaining a list of vehicles with Oregon plates.

Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to

whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 

Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id.

at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local

government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials

under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.

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397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not

of the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the

plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or

custom of the municipality. See id. A claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to

withstand dismissal even if it is based on nothing more than bare allegations that an individual

defendant’s conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice. See Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff’s claim against the CHP arises in the context of maintaining this list

which plaintiff claims his name or vehicle is listed. He claims that it is the CHP’s custom and

policy to maintain the list, which violates his constitutional rights. However, as discussed above,

no constitutional rights are violated by the CHP or its officers in maintaining a list of vehicles

known to the officers to be operated frequently in California with license plates and registration

documents from another state. As there is no violation, plaintiff is unable to state a claim against

the CHP, and the CHP should be dismissed from this action. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for violation of his

Fifth Amendment rights for failing to advise him of his Miranda rights, and violation of his

Fourth Amendment right to privacy. In addition, plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a

claim against defendants Roberts, Lopey, and the CHP. Because it does not appear possible that

the deficiencies identified herein can be cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled

to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment invasion of privacy claim and Fifth Amendment failure to advise claim should be

dismissed. In addition, the undersigned recommends that defendants Roberts, Lopey, and the

CHP should be dismissed. This case should proceed on plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation

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claim and Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim as against defendant Shouse only, as

addressed by separate order.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 26, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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