Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00520/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00520-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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1 Bill Bateman is no longer the Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center

and Robert Gaines is no longer the acting warden of that facility. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule

25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the new warden of the Perry County

Correctional Center, David O. Streiff, is substituted for Bateman and Gaines as a proper

respondent in this case.

2 While petitioner is no longer in the actual and present physical custody of David

O. Streiff, Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center in Uniontown, Alabama, see

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2724, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004)

(“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the

United States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MOHAMED TOURE, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CA 06-0520-WS-C

ALBERTO GONZALES, etc., :

et al.,1

:

Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Mohamed Toure, a native and citizen of Gambia ordered removed from

the United States, and presently being detained by the United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arm of the Department of

Homeland Security, has petitioned this Court for habeas relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241.2

 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for entry of

Case 2:06-cv-00520-WS-C Document 17 Filed 04/03/07 Page 1 of 18
confinement.”), he was confined in the Perry County Correctional Center when he filed the

instant action and, therefore, this Court retains jurisdiction to decide this matter, see Patel v.

United States Attorney General, 334 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Habeas jurisdiction

requires that the petitioner be in ‘custody.’ ‘Custody’ is determined as of the time of the filing of

the petition.”).

2

a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local

Rule 72.1(c). It is recommended that the instant petition be GRANTED, on

the basis that the removal of petitioner from the United States is not reasonably

foreseeable, and that petitioner be granted his immediate supervised release

from ICE under conditions to be enumerated by ICE.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Toure is a native and citizen of Gambia who entered the United

States on or about August 17, 1989 as a non-immigrant visitor. (Doc. 10,

Exhibit C, at 2)

2. On July 28, 1997, Toure was arrested in Atlanta, Georgia for

trafficking in cocaine and marijuana and possessing a knife during a crime; he

was eventually convicted of at least one of the charges and sentenced to two

(2) years probation. (See id.) On March 3, 1999, petitioner was convicted in

a Georgia state court of violating that state’s controlled substance act; he

received a five-year split sentence which required him to spend two years in

prison and serve the remaining three years on probation. (See id.) Based upon

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these convictions, removal proceedings were initiated against petitioner; a final

administrative order of removal was entered on October 19, 2000. (See id.) On

April 18, 2001, petitioner was removed from the United States to Gambia. (Id.)

3. Toure reentered the United States in May of 2002 (Doc. 10,

Exhibit B) and, on July 15, 2005, was arrested in Fulton County, Georgia on

a first-degree forgery charge (Doc. 10, Exhibit C, at 2). One week after this

arrest, on July 22, 2005, Toure entered ICE custody “and was ordered removed

by an authorized [i]mmigration officer by reinstating the prior removal order.”

(Id.)

4. The Post Order Custody Review Worksheet supplied to this

Court by the federal respondents (Doc. 10, Exhibit C) lists the following

attempts by ICE to obtain a travel document and status:

7/21/2005-TD request sent to the Embassy of Gambia

8/26/2005-TD inquiry to embassy via fax

9/26/2005-contacted Mr. Mendy at the embassy and stated a

request was sent to the Government for authorization.

10/17/2005-TD inquiry to embassy via fax

10/28/2005-TD request sent to HQ/ICE/TDU for assistance with

acquiring a TD with subject’s embassy. TD inquiry to embassy

via fax.

11/01/2005-message left at the embassy inquiring about TD

status.

(Id. at 4)

5. On November 7, 2005, a decision was made by ICE to continue

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Toure’s detention. (Doc. 10, Exhibit B)

This letter is to inform you that your custody status has been

reviewed and it has been determined that you will not be

released from the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) at this time. This decision has been made

based on a review of your file and/or your personal interview

and consideration of any information you submitted to ICE’s

reviewing officials. 

You are a citizen and national of Gambia who was removed

from the United States on 04/21/2001, due to your aggravated

felony convictions. Your (sic) reentered the U.S. sometime in

May of 2002, and have since been arrested for Reproduction of

Recorded Material, and Forgery 1st Degree. You have several

arrests and convictions to include: Control (sic) Substance Act,

Trafficking in Cocaine/Marijuana/Illegal Drugs and Possession

of [a] Knife during a crime, and Failure to Appear. Based on

your previous actions, criminal activity and willful disregard of

the immigration laws and regulations of the United States, you

are considered to be a threat to the community and a flight risk.

ICE is working toward obtaining a travel document with which

to effect your removal, which is likely to occur in the reasonably

foreseeable future.

Based on the above, you are to remain in ICE custody pending

your removal from the United States. You are advised that you

must demonstrate that you are making reasonable efforts to

comply with the order of removal, and that you are cooperating

with ICE’s efforts to remove you by taking whatever actions

ICE requests to effect your removal. You are also advised that

any willful failure or refusal on your part to make timely

application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary

for your departure, or any conspiracy or actions to prevent your

removal or obstruct the issuance of a travel document, may

subject you to criminal prosecution under 8 USC Section

1253(a).

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If you have not been released or removed from the United States

by 11/27/2005, jurisdiction of the custody decision in your case

will be transferred to the Headquarters Post Order Unit

(HQPDU), 801 I St. NW, Washington, DC 20536. HQPDU will

make a final determination regarding your custody.

(Id.)

6. On February 2, 2006, Toure filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the United States District Court for

the Western District of Louisiana, Monroe Division. (Doc. 10, Exhibit A,

Report and Recommendation, at 1) The Report and Recommendation entered

in that case on May 8, 2006 reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Despite several attempts, ICE has been unsuccessful in securing

Toure’s travel documents; however, most recently, on April 20,

2006, ICE learned that the Gambian Embassy was still

attempting to verify Toure’s identity and that an update would

be available after May 1, 2006.

...

In this case, while the presumptively reasonable sixmonth period has indeed expired, Toure has failed to

demonstrate that there is no significant likelihood of his

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The lapse of the

presumptive detention period, by itself, does not mandate

release, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701, and the petitioner must

still give good reason to believe that his removal is unlikely in

the foreseeable future. Here, the Government has demonstrated

that it is engaged in ongoing efforts to obtain Toure’s travel

documents from the Gambian government, and has provided

credible evidence to support its belief that travel documents will

be issued in the reasonably foreseeable future. While ICE’s

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previously unsuccessful attempts to obtain travel documents

would normally militate toward release, Toure’s wilful

disregard for the law makes these unsuccessful attempts and

the delays they cause tolerable, especially in light of ICE’s

most recent contact with the Gambian government.

(Id. at 1-2 & 3 (emphasis supplied)) The District Court entered judgment on

June 15, 2006 dismissing Toure’s § 2241 petition without prejudice. (Doc. 10,

Exhibit A)

7. On June 5, 2006, Toure penned a letter to the Gambian Embassy

to inquire about the status of a travel document request made on his behalf by

ICE. (Doc. 11, June 19, 2006 Attachment Entitled Travel Document)

Please be informed that all necessary documents pertaining to

your case had (sic) been submitted to the competent authorities

in The Gambia for onward studies. Since the submission of your

document[s] and that of other inmates awaiting removal, I have

not received any instruction on your case. For that matter, I

cannot issue you any travel document without a lawful

authorization.

(Id.) This letter of June 19, 2006 from the Gambian Embassy in Washington,

D.C. was signed by Njagga Mendy. (Id.)

8. Toure filed his petition seeking habeas corpus relief, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241, in this Court on September 1, 2006. (Doc. 1)

9. On November 13, 2006, John Seright, a Deportation Officer with

the Detention and Removal Operations Division of ICE, executed a declaration

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which was filed by the federal respondents in support of their response to

Toure’s habeas corpus petition. (Doc. 10, Exhibit D)

2. I have been in contact with the Embassy of

Gambia in regard to the removal of Mohamed Toure. In July,

2006 my former contact, First Secretary for Consular Affairs

Mr. Mendy, vacated his post.

3. Subsequently, I have been in contact with the new

First Secretary for Consular Affairs, Mr. Taal. I have spoken to

him in regard to Mohamed Toure on several occasions. Mr. Taal

informed me that there was a delay with Mr. Toure’s case due

to recent changes of personnel in the consular section of the

Gambian Embassy.

4. I spoke with Mr. Taal in regard to Mr. Toure on

October 17, 2006. Mr. Taal informed me that all required

documentation had been received by the Embassy of The

Gambia and forwarded to its capital, Banjul, for verification and

approval. Mr. Taal informed me that he would issue travel

documents as soon as he receives approval from Banjul and that

the United States should consider the request for travel

documents as “pending approval”.

(Id.)

10. The federal respondents have provided this Court with no further

information, since November 14, 2006, to indicate that travel documents have

been approved for Toure and/or that Toure has been repatriated to his native

Gambia. In other words, four and one-half additional months have elapsed

since the federal respondents answer that “the request for travel documents is

progressing toward approval[]” with no indication that such approval is likely

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to come in the reasonably foreseeable future. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2498,

150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), the Supreme Court determined that “§ 2241 habeas

corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional

challenges to post-removal-period detention.” 

2. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the post-removalperiod detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, “read in light of the Constitution’s

demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period

reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United

States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689, 121 S.Ct. at

2498. 

3. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 reads, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered

removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section, when

an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall

remove the alien from the United States within a period

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of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal

period”).

(B) Beginning of period

 The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal

becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the

removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final

order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an immigration process), the date

the alien is released from detention or

confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in detention

during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses

to make timely application in good faith for travel or

other documents necessary to the alien’s departure or

conspires or acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to

an order of removal.

(2) Detention

During the removal period, the Attorney General

shall detain the alien. Under no circumstances during the

removal period shall the Attorney General release an

alien who has been found inadmissible under section

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1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable

under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.

Id. (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court in Zadvydas concluded that six

months represents a presumptively reasonable period of time to detain a

removable alien awaiting deportation pursuant to the provisions of this statute.

533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. at 2505 (“While an argument can be made for

confining any presumption to 90 days, we doubt that when Congress shortened

the removal period to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all reasonably

foreseeable removals could be accomplished in that time. We do have reason

to believe, however, that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of

detention for more than six months. . . . Consequently, for the sake of uniform

administration in the federal courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-

month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the

Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And

for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval

confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’

conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of course, does

not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To

the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined

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that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.”); see Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the sixmonth period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90 days thereafter.”).

4. In this case, the federal respondents concede, as they must, that

the presumptively reasonable six-month detention period has long since

passed. (See Doc. 10, at 4 (“The Court of Appeals has held that Zadvydas does

not set out a per se rule that mandates an alien’s release after six months.”)) In

fact, as found by Magistrate Judge Karen L. Hayes in the Western District of

Louisiana, as of the date of the entry of the report and recommendation--May

8, 2006--Toure’s “presumptively reasonable six-month detention period ha[d]

[] expired[.]” (Doc. 10, Exhibit A, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, at

3) Ten months have elapsed since the entry of Judge Hayes’ report and

recommendation with no production of travel documents for Toure and a mere

November 13, 2006 representation from John Seright that “the United States

should consider the request for travel documents as ‘pending approval’.” (Doc.

10, Exhibit D, Seright declar., at ¶ 4) Accordingly, Toure has been detained by

ICE now for some twenty (20) months since being taken into custody on July

22, 2005 and ordered removed in accordance with the prior removal order.

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5. In Zadvydas, supra, the Supreme Court indicated that “[a]fter

this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there

is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the

Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And

for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval

confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’

conversely would have to shrink.” 533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. at 2505; see also

id. at 699-700, 121 S.Ct. at 2405 (“[T]he habeas court must ask whether the

detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal.

It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s basic

purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.

Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued

detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.”). 

6. The undersigned concludes that Toure has provided good reason

to believe that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner has now been detained by ICE

awaiting removal for over 20 months--well in excess of the six-month

presumptively reasonable period--with the only assurance he has received from

the Gambian Embassy in Washington, D.C. being that it cannot issue him any

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travel documents “without a lawful authorization.” See Seretse-Khama v.

Ashcroft, 215 F.Supp.2d 37, 48 (D. D.C. 2002) (“Based on this record of the

continued detention of petitioner awaiting removal for well over three years

(far in excess of the six-month presumptively reasonable period), with no

success by the INS (and arguably little effort) in obtaining travel documents,

the Court concludes that petitioner has met his burden of showing ‘good

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.’”)). For its part, ICE has not provided sufficient

evidence to rebut Toure’s showing. The November 13, 2006 declaration

statement from John Seright that, according to Mr. Taal, the Gambian First

Secretary for Consular Affairs, the United States’ travel document request on

petitioner was “‘pending approval[]’” does nothing but underscore petitioner’s

showing that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future particularly in light of the four and one-half months that

have elapsed since that date with no production of travel documents. See

Andreasyan v. Gonzales, 446 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2006)

(“Petitioner has now been detained for more than eight months since his order

of removal became final on November 17, 2005. Given the time that has

passed since the R & R without the production of travel documents, and given

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that six weeks have passed since Respondents’ last request for a ‘few more

weeks,’ this Court now finds that the Government has not responded with

enough evidence to rebut Petitioner’s claim that removal is not likely in the

reasonably foreseeable future.”).

7. It is clear to the undersigned not only that there is no significant

likelihood of Toure’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future but, as well,

that his continued detention does not meet the purposes of the statute. As

recognized in Zadvydas, supra, the purposes of the statute are ensuring the

alien’s presence at the moment of removal and preventing danger to the

community. See 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. at 2499 (citation omitted). The

respondents have parenthetically argued that “[p]etitioner’s conviction for drug

crimes and possession of a firearm or knife while committing those crimes,

and his more recent forgery arrest, as well as his illegal re-entry to the United

States after his prior removal, establish both a reason to doubt that he will

voluntarily present himself for removal and a reason to believe that he presents

a risk to the community of further criminal activity.” (Doc. 10, at 4 n.6) 

But by definition the first justification-preventing flight-is weak

or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility at best.

As this Court said in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct.

1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), where detention’s goal is no

longer practically attainable, detention no longer “bear[s] [a]

reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was]

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committed.” Id., at 738, 92 S.Ct., at 1845.

The second justification-protecting the community-does

not necessarily diminish in force over time. But we have upheld

preventive detention based on dangerousness only when limited

to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong

procedural protections. . . . In cases in which preventive

detention is of potentially indefinite duration, we have also

demanded that the dangerousness rationale be accompanied by

some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that

helps to create the danger.

533 U.S. at 690-691, 121 S.Ct. at 2499. 

8. Given the risk-of-flight analysis by the Supreme Court in

Zadvydas, the argument made by the federal respondents in this case is

adequately countered by the undersigned’s earlier determination that

petitioner’s removal from this country is not reasonably foreseeable. 

9. Relevant to the respondents’ argument that petitioner represents

a danger to the community, the Supreme Court indicated in Zadvydas that

“once the flight risk justification evaporates, the only special circumstance

present is the alien’s removable status itself, which bears no relation to a

detainee’s dangerousness.” 533 U.S. at 691-692, 121 S.Ct. at 2499 (citations

omitted). While petitioner’s convictions for trafficking in cocaine and

marijuana and possessing a knife during the commission of these offenses may

constitute a crime of violence, nothing in the record indicates that Toure’s

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mere possession of a knife while trafficking in cocaine and marijuana

establishes that he is a specially dangerous person nor is there any attendant

special circumstance, such as mental illness or a volitional impairment.

Accordingly, the respondents’ danger-to-the-community argument need be

rejected.

10. In light of the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this

Court release petitioner from custody, subject to reasonable conditions ICE

deems necessary to ensure Toure’s appearance and return--including those set

forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(a)--pending the issuance of travel documents by the

Gambian Embassy to effectuate his removal to his native country. See

Zadvydas, supra, 533 U.S. at 700, 121 S.Ct. at 2504 (“[T]he alien’s release

may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised

release that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt

be returned to custody upon a violation of those conditions.”).

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that this Court grant Mohamed

Toure’s habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and order

his immediate supervised release under conditions set forth by the ICE arm of

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the Department of Homeland Security.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 29th day of March, 2007.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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