Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03352/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03352-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWNCEY BLAKE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANTA CLARA DEPT OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03352-HSG 

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO 

STATE COURT; DENYING PENDING 

MOTIONS AS MOOT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 4, 13

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, initiated this action by filing a pro se

complaint in Santa Clara County Superior Court against the Santa Clara Department of 

Corrections (“Santa Clara DOC”) and Santa Clara Valley Medical – Adult Custody Health 

Services (collectively, “Defendants). Pending before the Court are Plaintiff‟s motions to remand 

the case (Docket No. 4) and to consolidate cases (Docket No. 13). For the reasons set forth below, 

the Court GRANTS Plaintiff‟s motion to remand and remands this case back to the Santa Clara 

Superior Court; and DENIES AS MOOT the motion to consolidate cases filed in this action.

BACKGROUND

On December 16, 2014, Plaintiff initiated this case by filing a complaint in Santa Clara 

County Superior Court against Defendants.1 See Docket No. 6-6 (hereinafter “Complaint”). The 

Complaint lists a single cause of action for general negligence, which Plaintiff also refers to as 

 

1

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Complaint initiated this action. However, Plaintiff attaches a 

different complaint to his notice of removal. See Docket No. 4 at 6–9 (hereinafter Removal 

Complaint). Since the Complaint bears the Santa Clara County Superior Court‟s file-stamp and 

the Removal Complaint does not, the Court treats the Complaint as the operative complaint in this 

action. 

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medical negligence. See id. at 3–4. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to 

“treat and protect [him] from further injury [to his lower back].” See id. at 3. He alleges that after 

he injured his back loading blankets in January 2014, he requested an immediate medical 

appointment but was not seen by a doctor for eighty days. See id. He attaches two Santa Clara 

County DOC inmate grievance forms to the Complaint. In the first grievance form, he complains 

about the Santa Clara County Jail‟s failure to staff the jail with the necessary number of medical 

professionals and complains about the denial of soap to inmates. See id. at 5. The second 

grievance form is illegible but appears to grieve the above-mentioned delayed medical 

appointment. See id. at 6. Plaintiff does not reference federal laws in the Complaint.

On June 23, 2015, Plaintiff served Defendants with the documents attached to the Notice 

of Removal. 2 See Docket No. 1-1 and 1-2. Defendants received these documents on June 30, 

2015. See Docket No. 5 at 3. Some of these documents reference the Eighth Amendment and the 

 

2

The documents consisted of the following: 

(1) Santa Clara Superior Court Civil Lawsuit Notice and Alternative Dispute 

Resolution Information Sheet, see Docket No. 1-1 at 1–2; 

(2) California Form CM-010 Civil Case Cover Sheet file-stamped December 16, 2014 

by the Santa Clara Superior Court and executed by Plaintiff on December 5, 2014, see Docket No. 

1-1 at 3; 

(3) California Complaint Form PLD-PI-001 – Personal Injury, Property Damage, 

Wrongful Death file-stamped December 16, 2014 by the Santa Clara Superior Court and executed 

by Plaintiff on December 5, 2014, see Docket No. 1-1 at 4–6; 

(4) California Form SUM-100 Judicial Summons, see Docket No. 1-1 at 7;

(5) California Form POS-010 Proof of Service of Summons, see Docket No. 1-1 at 8;

(6) California Form POS-015 Notice and Acknowledgement of Receipt – Civil, 

executed by Plaintiff on June 23, 2014 see Docket No. 1-1 at 9; 

(7) letter dated June 12, 2015 from the Santa Clara County Sheriff‟s Office to Plaintiff 

responding to Plaintiff‟s appeal of Grievance #101031, see Docket No. 1-1 at 10;

(8) Plaintiff‟s Inmate Grievance #101031, see Docket No. 1-1 at 11;

(9) letter dated June 10, 2015 from Plaintiff to Division Commander appealing the 

denial of his Grievance #101031, see Docket No. 1-1 at 12; 

(10) letter dated July 3, 2014 from Santa Clara County‟s Employee Services Agency 

Liability/Property Claims Department to Plaintiff rejecting Plaintiff‟s Claim #HL-035328, see

Docket No. 1-1 at 13–16 (two copies); 

(11) 5-page document titled “Plaintiff Summary Brief” and dated June 15, 2015, see

Docket No. 1-2 at 1–5; and

(12) California Form POS-040 Proof of Service – Civil, dated June 23, 2015 see Docket 

No. 1-2 at 7–8.

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First Amendment. See, e.g., Docket No. 1-2 at 1–5.

On July 21, 2015, Defendants removed this case from Santa Clara Superior Court and paid 

the $400 filing fee. See Docket No. 1. On August 7, 2015, Plaintiff timely filed a motion to 

remand the case. See Docket No. 4. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard Governing Removal

Section 1441(a) of Title 28 provides that a defendant may remove from state court any 

action “of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” The vast 

majority of lawsuits “arise under the law that creates the cause of action.” American Well Works 

Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 

478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). Federal courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

However, “a case may [also] arise under federal law „where the vindication of a right under state 

law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law,‟” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808 

(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. V. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 

463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)), but “only [if] . . . the plaintiff‟s right to relief necessarily depends on 

resolution of a substantial question of federal law,” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 28 (emphasis 

added).

For removal to be proper, it must be clear from the face of the complaint that federal 

subject matter jurisdiction exists. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n. v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840–41 

(1989). The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded 

complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff‟s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 

482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 

582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). This rule makes the plaintiff the master 

of his claim in that the plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law. 

Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392.

The removal statute is strictly construed against removal and the defendant bears the 

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burden of establishing grounds for removal. Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 

28, 32 (2002) (citations omitted); Nevada v. Bank of America Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citation omitted). Courts must consider whether federal jurisdiction exists, Rains v. 

Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted), and 

must reject federal jurisdiction if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance, 

Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted); 

Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendants removed this action pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 

1443, contending the complaint alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of 

the Eighth and First Amendments, and that this Court therefore has original jurisdiction over this 

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Docket No. 1 at 1–2. Plaintiff seeks remand to state court, 

arguing that the instant action solely alleges the state-law claim of medical negligence.

Because the presence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded 

complaint rule, the Court examines whether a federal question is presented on the face of 

Plaintiff‟s properly pleaded complaint. See Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. Defendants 

correctly note that three versions of the complaint exist in the record. However, the only 

complaint that is relevant for the purposes of determining whether removal is appropriate is the 

complaint filed with the Santa Clara County Superior Court on December 16, 2014, which 

initiated this action, i.e. the Complaint. As discussed supra, the Complaint only brings a general 

negligence claim against Defendants, which Plaintiff also refers to as medical negligence. See

Complaint at 3–4. The Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to “treat and protect [him] from 

further injury [to his lower back],” by assigning him to work in the laundry room, by failing to 

promptly provide him with medical attention after he reinjured his back in January 2014 and by 

failing to properly staff the jail with medical professionals. See id. at 3 and 5. 

Contrary to Defendants‟ arguments, Plaintiff‟s state-law negligence claim does not turn on 

whether his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. A state-law claim of negligence requires a 

showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, 

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and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. United 

States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger–Hayes, Inc., 463 P.2d 770, 774 (1970); see also 6 Witkin, 

Summary of California Law § 835, p. 52 (10th ed. 2010 and Supp. 2015). In contrast, an Eighth 

Amendment violation requires deliberate indifference to a plaintiff‟s serious medical needs. See 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A prison official is deliberately indifferent to a 

prisoner‟s serious medical needs only if he knew that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of 

serious harm and if that prison official disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to 

abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A showing that a prison official has been 

negligent or medically negligent is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the 

Eighth Amendment. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Mere medical 

malpractice does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”) (citation omitted); see also Wood 

v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that even gross negligence is 

insufficient to establish a constitutional violation); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 

1998) (finding no merit in claims stemming from alleged delays in administering pain medication, 

treating broken nose and providing replacement crutch, because claims did not amount to more 

than negligence); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (mere 

negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a 

prisoner‟s 8th Amendment rights); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(repeatedly failing to satisfy requests for aspirins and antacids to alleviate headaches, nausea and 

pains is not constitutional violation; isolated occurrences of neglect may constitute grounds for 

medical malpractice but do not rise to level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); Anthony 

v. Dowdle, 853 F.2d 741, 743 (9th Cir. 1988) (no more than negligence stated where prison 

warden and work supervisor failed to provide prompt and sufficient medical care). The converse 

is also true. If a certain set of facts are insufficient to show that prison officials have been 

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner‟s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, these same set of facts may be sufficient to make a showing of negligence. See, e.g., 

O’Loughlin, 920 F.2d at 617 (although prisoner‟s allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth 

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Amendment violation, “they may constitute grounds for a medical malpractice claim”).

Defendants‟ other attempts to “federalize” Plaintiff‟s negligence claim are also 

unpersuasive. 

Defendants argue, in essence, that the facts alleged in the Complaint could only support a 

federal constitutional claim because (1) the facts alleged in the Complaint do not support a statelaw claim of negligence,3

and because (2) in a federal action previously filed by Plaintiff, Blake v. 

Santa Clara Dep’t. of Corr., et al., No. C 14-2568 JSW (PR) (“Blake I”), these same facts were 

interpreted as seeking remedy for a Eighth Amendment violation. Defendants are incorrect. Any 

failure by Plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to support his state-law claim does not transform his 

claim into a violation of federal law. Similarly, a federal court finding that the facts alleged in the 

Complaint could state a cause of action for an Eighth Amendment violation does not preclude the 

same facts supporting a separate cause of action for negligence. In addition, Defendants misstate 

the basis for dismissal of Blake I. In Blake I, the federal court did not interpret the facts as seeking 

remedy for an Eighth Amendment violation. Rather, the federal court did not reach that issue and 

Blake I was dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege any policy, pattern or general practice by 

Santa Clara County that caused him to receive inadequate care, which is necessary to impose 

liability for a civil rights violation under Section 1983 on municipal entities such as Defendants, 

and because Plaintiff failed to make any factual allegations regarding Correctional Officer 

Nguyen. See Order of Dismissal, Blake I (October 7, 2014). 

Finally, Defendants‟ speculation that Plaintiff will amend the Complaint to add a federal 

claim is irrelevant to the Court‟s analysis. In determining whether removal is proper, the Court 

only examines the properly-pleaded complaint. See Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392; see, e.g., 

Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) (post-removal 

amendments to pleadings cannot affect whether a case is removable; propriety of removal 

determined solely on the basis of the pleadings filed in state court).

 

3 Defendants incorrectly argue that Plaintiff is alleging a medical malpractice claim. See Docket 

No. 5 at 6. The Complaint utilizes the California Judicial Form for a general negligence cause of 

action, see Complaint at 3; and Plaintiff describes his cause of action as negligence and medical 

negligence, see id. at 4. Medical malpractice is not mentioned in the Complaint.

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Plaintiff is the master of his complaint. In the instant action, he has chosen to avoid federal 

jurisdiction by exclusively relying on state law. Nor is federal law a necessary element of his state 

law claim. Accordingly, remand is appropriate. See, e.g., Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 

114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff‟s motion to remand (Docket No. 

4) and orders that this case be remanded back to Santa Clara County Superior Court. Any pending 

motions in this case are DENIED AS MOOT, including the motion to consolidate cases filed in 

this action (Docket No. 13).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

12/8/2015

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