Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01269/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01269-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Contract Default

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY GRAY and DINA GRAY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EXTENDED STAY AMERICA, INC.; 

ESA MANAGEMENT, LLC; LAURA 

BURKE; and DOES 1 to 25, 

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01269-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On April 4, 2019, Plaintiffs Timothy Gray and Dina Gray (“Mr. Gray,” “Mrs. Gray,” 

or “Plaintiffs”) filed the present action in state court as a result of personal injuries they 

claim to have sustained while staying at an Extended Stay Hotel located in 

West Sacramento, California. Once service was accepted on behalf of Defendant 

Extended Stay America Management, LLC (“ESA” or “Defendant”) on or about June 11, 

2019, ESA removed the action to this Court on July 9, 2019, citing diversity of citizenship 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Although additional defendants were named by 

Plaintiffs, including an individually-named California resident, ESA asserts that because 

it was the only properly joined and served defendant, complete diversity was 

nonetheless present.

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Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand the case back to the 

Superior Court of California for the County of Yolo where it was originally filed. Pls.’ Mot. 

to Remand (“Pls.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 5. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is 

DENIED.1

BACKGROUND2

On or about September 14, 2017, Plaintiffs stayed at the Extended Stay America 

Hotel located at 795 Stillwater Road, West Sacramento, California. When Mr. Gray got 

up in the middle of the night to use the restroom, he slipped and fell due to water leaking 

from the ceiling and hit his head on the bathtub, thereby sustaining an injury. Pls.’ 

Compl., pp. 4-5. Plaintiffs subsequently filed the present lawsuit, asserting causes of 

action for premises liability and negligence against ESA, Extended Stay America, Inc.,

and Laura Burke. As a result of her husband’s injuries, Mrs. Gray also claims loss of 

consortium damages. Id. at 6.

On May 10, 2019, counsel for ESA communicated to Plaintiffs’ counsel that they 

would be representing ESA in this matter. Pls.’ Mot. at 2:27-28. On May 22, 2019, 

Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Defendant’s counsel if they would accept service of process on 

ESA’s behalf. Id. at 3:1-2. Plaintiffs’ counsel followed up by emailing copies of the 

documents filed in state court along with a Notice and Acknowledgment that same day. 

Id. at 3:2-3. On June 11, 2019, ESA effectuated service of process by signing and 

returning the Notice and Acknowledgment. Def.’s Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, ¶ 3. 

ESA then filed and served its Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint on July 9, 2019. Id. ¶ 4.

On July 9, 2019, less than 30 days following its execution of the Notice and 

Acknowledgment, ESA removed the matter to this Court. Although Extended Stay 

1 Having concluded that oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court submitted 

this matter on the briefs in accordance with Local Rule 230(g).

2 The following recitation of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Def.’s 

Notice of Removal, Ex. A., ECF No. 1) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 5). 

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America, Inc. and an individual named Laura Burke were also named as Defendants,

ESA pointed out that under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, as “the only Defendant properly joined 

and served to this action,” it was entitled to independently effectuate removal on the 

basis of diversity of citizenship since “the existence of improperly joined and unserved 

Defendants will not deprive this court of jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 9.

Defendant asserts that Mr. and Mrs. Gray are, or were at the inception of this 

case, citizens and residents of California. Def.’s Notice of Removal, ¶ 6. ESA states 

that complete diversity is present because it is incorporated outside California with a 

principal place of business outside the state. According to Defendant, Burke is an 

improperly joined and unserved Defendant who does not deprive this Court of 

jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 9. As for the Doe Defendants, ESA states that they also do not deprive 

the Court of jurisdiction because they and their citizenship are fictitious and unknown.

3

Id. ¶ 10.

Plaintiffs disagree with Defendant’s analysis and move to remand the case 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 on grounds that Defendant has not demonstrated, as it 

must, that complete diversity of citizenship is present under § 1441(b). Plaintiffs further 

claim that Defendant failed to timely remove the action within 30 days following its 

receipt through service or otherwise of Plaintiffs’ complaint, as required by § 1446(b). 

Finally, Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant’s removal was procedurally defective 

because it failed to attach, in accordance with § 1446(a), copies of all process, pleadings 

and orders served upon Defendant in state court prior to removal. 

STANDARD

When a case “of which the district courts of the United States have original

jurisdiction” is initially brought in state court, the defendant may remove it to federal court 

3 Plaintiffs do not contest Defendant’s statement regarding the Doe Defendants and their effect on 

diversity jurisdiction. It is well-established that “the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names 

shall be disregarded” for purposes of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

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“embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There are 

two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A district court 

has federal question jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, 

or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 1331. A district court has diversity jurisdiction 

“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is 

between citizens of different states, or citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a 

foreign state. . .” Id. § 1332(a)(1)-(2).

A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to federal district court if 

the district court has original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The 

party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” 

Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Williams v. 

Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 940 (9th Cir. 1986)). Courts “strictly construe the 

removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 

(9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). “[I]f there is any doubt as to the right of 

removal in the first instance,” the motion for remand must be granted. Id. Therefore, “[i]f 

at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded” to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

ANALYSIS

A. Diversity of Citizenship

According to Defendant’s Notice of Removal, Plaintiffs are citizens and residents 

of the State of California. Def.’s Notice of Removal, ¶ 6. Plaintiffs do not dispute that 

they are California citizens. In addition, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the amount in 

controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(a) has been 

satisfied. Plaintiffs do claim, however, that ESA has not demonstrated complete 

diversity because Defendant Burke is a California citizen, and Defendant did not

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sufficiently allege ESA’s citizenship. Pls.’ Mot. 1:24-28. Plaintiffs also allege, as 

indicated above, that Defendant’s removal was untimely and procedurally defective since 

required state court pleadings were not attached to the petition for removal. Because 

Defendant, as the removing party, bears the burden of establishing their jurisdictional 

prerequisites, each of Plaintiffs’ claims must now be addressed. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 

980 F.2d. 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that the defendant has the burden of 

establishing that removal was proper due to of the strong presumption against removal 

jurisdiction); see also Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 

941, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (the party requesting removal has the burden of establishing 

federal subject matter jurisdiction). 

1. ESA’s Citizenship

Plaintiffs first argue that while ESA’s removal petition states unequivocally that it 

is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of North Carolina with its principal 

place of business located in North Carolina,4 Defendants’ allegations in that regard are 

nonetheless insufficient to establish diversity because “merely stating a business entity is 

in a certain state regardless of its form does not sufficiently allege citizenship of that 

state.” Pls.’ Mot., 5:24-25. According to Plaintiffs, to the extent that ESA is a limited 

liability corporation (“LLC”), its citizenship is that of each of its owners. See Johnson v. 

Columbia Props. Anchorage LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (joining other circuits 

in holding that an LLC is treated as a partnership for diversity purposes in that it is a 

citizen of all the states of its members); see also Handelsman v. Bedford Village 

Assocs., Ltd. Partnership, 213 F.3d 48, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2000) (for purposes of diversity 

jurisdiction, an LLC is a citizen of its members’ states) (citing Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 

150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998)).

4

In opposition to this Motion, Defendant submitted the Declaration of Annette Rose (ECF No. 7-2)

which indicates, inter alia, that the removal petition inadvertently described both the state of incorporation 

and the principal place of business as being in North Carolina despite the fact that Defendant is in fact 

incorporated in Delaware. The Rose Declaration corrects that scrivener’s error, which does not change 

the diversity analysis as to ESA in any event since its citizenship is diverse under either scenario to 

Plaintiffs’.

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Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing. ESA’s petition on its face indicates that ESA is 

a corporation organized under the laws of another state with its principal place of 

business also in another state, and a declaration appended to the petition attests to that 

fact. See Decl. of William Hashe, ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 2. ESA’s citizenship is therefore 

diverse from that of Plaintiffs. Regardless, the result would not change if the Court were 

to further examine ESA’s ownership as Plaintiffs would appear to advocate. A 

supplemental declaration from William Hashe submitted in conjunction with Defendant’s 

opposition indicates that ESA is wholly-owned by non-served Defendant Extended Stay 

America, Inc., and that both ESA and Extended Stay America, Inc. are Delaware 

corporations with principal places of business in North Carolina. See Hashe Decl., ECF 

No. 7-1, ¶ 4.5 Consequently, the diversity analysis is the same under either scenario, 

and this Court finds that ESA’s citizenship has been sufficiently established.

2. Timeliness of Removal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)

“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days 

after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, or a copy of the initial 

pleading setting forth the claim...” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). In the absence of actual service 

having been effectuated by Plaintiffs, Defendant maintains that this 30-day period did not

begin to accrue until it signed and returned the acknowledgment of receipt sent to 

Plaintiffs. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 7 at 4:20-24. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs contend that an 

email sent to Defendant on May 22, 2019, asking Defendant’s counsel if they would 

accept service on behalf of ESA, constitutes a “receipt by the defendant” for purposes of 

§ 1446(b). Pls.’ Mot. at 8:1-3. To support their argument, Plaintiffs cite to Fristoe v. 

Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980), but that case states only generally 

that the 30-day statutory “time limit is mandatory and a timely objection to a late petition 

will defeat removal . . . ” Id. at 1212 (citing American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 

341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 (1951)). Fristoe does not support Plaintiffs’ proposition that their

email itself constitutes “receipt by the defendant” and that the 30-day time limit should 

5 Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to the Hashe declaration are OVERRULED.

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start to accrue the day that email was sent at a time when neither actual service nor 

Defendant’s formal notice and acknowledgment of receipt had occurred.

When service of process becomes effective is governed by state law. City of 

Clarksdale v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 428 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2005); see also

Hardy v. Square D Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 676, 680 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (reasoning that 

when it comes to service by mail, state law determines when service becomes effective).

Defendant cites the California Code of Civil Procedure, which states unequivocally that 

service “is deemed complete on the date a written acknowledgment of receipt of 

summons is executed.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(c).

6 Accordingly, the dispositive 

date is the day upon which acknowledgment of receipt is executed and returned to the 

sender. Long v. McAffee, 2019 WL 6840388 at *4 (E.D. Cal. December 16, 2019).

Plaintiffs’ contention otherwise is utterly devoid of merit.

7

 Defendant’s

Acknowledgment of Receipt of the summons was executed on June 11, 2019, meaning 

that the July 9, 2019 Notice of Removal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of 

that date. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was 

timely.

3. Non-Diverse and Non-Served Defendant Laura Burke

Defendant asks the Court to disregard Burke’s citizenship for purposes of 

determining diversity, contending that Burke is an improperly joined defendant. Def.’s 

Opp’n at 3:3-4. Plaintiffs assert that Burke is a non-diverse defendant, making removal 

improper because courts have routinely considered the citizenship of non-served 

defendants. See Clarence E. Morris, Inc. v. Vitek, 412 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1969) 

(irrespective of service, “[a] nonresident defendant cannot remove a ‘non-separable’ 

6 Courts have construed Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 413.30 as authorizing service by email if it is 

reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served. Cisco Sys. v. Shaitor, 2018 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 106893 at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2018).

7 While Plaintiffs purport to cite § 1446, they fail to demonstrate what “receipt through service or 

otherwise” means, even though there is an abundance of case law discussing this issue. Instead of 

addressing the arguments made by Defendant, Plaintiffs merely copied and pasted their original argument 

into their Reply.

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action if the citizenship of any codefendant, joined by the plaintiff in good faith, destroys 

complete diversity...”). However, a “fraudulently joined defendant will not defeat removal 

on diversity grounds.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(reasoning that the defendant seeking removal is entitled to show that the plaintiff’s 

joinder of a defendant is fraudulent) (citing McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 

1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 

1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).

Plaintiffs aver that the voluntary/involuntary rule applies in this case to bar 

Defendant’s assertion of fraudulent joinder. Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 8 at 4:25-26. This rule 

dictates that if a resident defendant is dismissed from a case by a voluntary act by the 

plaintiff, then it is removable, but if the resident defendant is dismissed by the 

defendant’s or court’s action, then the case cannot be removed. Insinga v. LaBella,

845 F.2d 249, 252 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 

545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967)). In their Motion, Plaintiffs fail to note that an exception to the 

voluntary/involuntary rule exists where a non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently 

joined. Graybill-Bundgard v. Standard Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1120-21 (N.D. 

Cal. 2011) (citing Self v. Gen. Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 656 (9th Cir. 1978)). In order 

to find that a defendant was fraudulently joined, the determination that must be made is 

whether the plaintiff can establish liability against the defendant. Briano v. Conseco Life 

Ins. Co.,126 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1295 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime 

Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Circ. 1992).

When it comes to Plaintiffs’ claims against Burke, Defendant argues that there are 

no grounds in law or fact to impose liability on Burke for the alleged slip and fall at her 

place of work. Def.’s Opp’n at 3:12-13. The Court agrees. The Complaint has no 

substantive allegations against Burke. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not outline any conduct by 

Burke making her liable under the causes of action presented. For these reasons, the 

Court finds that Burke is an improperly joined defendant.

///

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4. All Process, Pleadings, and Orders

Section 1446(a) mandates that the Defendant’s Notice of Removal have “a short 

plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, 

pleadings, and orders serviced upon such defendant or defendants in such action.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Plaintiffs argue that Defendant failed to follow the procedures of 

§ 1446(a) because Defendant did not attach the Civil Case Cover Sheet, Case 

Management Statement, ADR Packet, Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt, and a

state court order from April 4, 2019. Pls.’ Mot. at 7:6-9. Instead, Defendant’s removal 

petition appended only the Summons and Complaint along with Defendant’s Answer 

filed in state court.

Even if Defendant did not include the above-enumerated documents in the Notice 

of Removal, for the most part they relate to the state court’s management of this matter 

which terminated once removal was effectuated, or to process made within the confines 

of the state court action. As such, Defendant argues that any procedural defect in that 

regard is both de minimis and curable. The Court agrees. See Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. 

Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with other circuits that, 

even after the statutory time limit has expired, de minimis procedural defects are 

curable) (citing Countryman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 639 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir.2011); 

Walton v. Bayer Corp., 643 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 2011)). “[T]he failure to include all 

state court pleadings and process with notice of removal is procedurally incorrect but is 

not a jurisdictional defect.” Cook v. Randolph County, Ga., 573 F.3d 1143, 1150 

(11th Cir. 2009). Courts have allowed defendants to amend removal petitions to correct 

procedural defects after the time period for removal has expired. Woodall v. Insurance 

Co. of North America, 582 F. Supp. 247, 248 (N.D. GA 1984). 

Although Defendant claims it provided this Court with all “material” documents 

that provide the basis for its removal (see Def.’s Opp’n at 5:5-7), Plaintiffs correctly point 

out that any such interpretation of §1446(a) is incorrect due to the fact that the statute 

explicitly requires that “all process, pleadings, and orders” be provided. Pls.’ Reply at 

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7:3-5. Nonetheless, while ESA was required to submit all documents served upon it with 

its Notice of Removal, ESA has now provided all documents in the state court case file. 

ECF No. 7-2, Ex. C. ESA has consequently cured any defect in its Notice of Removal 

and, as the case law cited above demonstrates, it is immaterial that the 30-day time limit 

has elapsed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (ECF No. 5) is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2020

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