Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35928/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35928-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT 

ASSOCIATION; COOK INLET 

FISHERMEN’S FUND,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES 

SERVICE; PENNY PRITZKER, in 

her official capacity as Acting 

United States Secretary of 

Commerce; KATHRYN 

SULLIVAN, Acting Under 

Secretary of Commerce and 

Administrator for the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration; JAMES W.

BALSIGER, in his official 

capacity as NMFS Alaska 

Region Administrator,

Defendants-Appellees,

STATE OF ALASKA,

Intervenor-DefendantAppellee.

No. 14-35928

D.C. No.

3:13-cv-00104-TMB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Timothy M. Burgess, Chief Judge, Presiding

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2 UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS

Argued and Submitted August 2, 2016

Anchorage, Alaska

Filed September 21, 2016

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard A. Paez,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz

SUMMARY*

Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 

Management Act

The panel reversed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the government in an action under the 

Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 

Act brought by two groups of commercial fishermen urging 

the rejection of Amendment 12, which removed the historic 

net-fishing area of Cook Inlet from the Salmon Fishery 

Management Plan (“FMP”); and remanded with instructions 

that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs.

The panel held that the National Marine Fisheries 

Service cannot exempt a fishery under its authority that 

required conservation and management from an FMP 

because the agency is content with State management. The 

panel held that the Magnuson-Stevens Act unambiguously 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS 3

requires a Regional Fishery Management Council to create 

an FMP for each fishery under its authority that requires 

conservation and management. The panel further held that 

the Magnuson-Stevens Act allowed delegation to a state 

under the FMP, but did not excuse the obligation to adopt an 

FMP when a Regional Fishery Management Council opted 

for state management. The panel concluded that 

Amendment 12 was therefore contrary to law to the extent 

that it removed Cook Inlet from the FMP.

COUNSEL

Jason T. Morgan (argued) and Beth S. Ginsberg, Stoel Rives 

LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Ellen J. Durkee (argued) and Coby Howell, Attorneys, 

Appellate Section; John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney 

General; Environment and Natural Resources Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; 

Caroline Park, NOAA Office of the General Counsel, Silver 

Spring, Maryland; Lauren Smoker, NOAA Office of the 

General Counsel, Department of Commerce, Juneau, 

Alaska; for Defendants-Appellees.

Seth M. Beausang (argued), Assistant Attorney General, 

Anchorage, Alaska, for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.

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4 UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 

Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–91 (“MagnusonStevens Act,” or “the Act”), creates a “national program for 

the conservation and management of the fishery resources of 

the United States.” Id. § 1801(a)(6). The Act establishes 

eight Regional Fishery Management Councils, each of 

which “shall” prepare a fishery management plan (“FMP”) 

“for each fishery under its authority that requires 

conservation and management.” Id. § 1852(a), (h)(1). The 

Secretary of Commerce, acting through the National Marine 

Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), then reviews each FMP or 

amendment of a plan “to determine whether it is consistent 

with the [Act’s] national standards, the other provisions of 

this chapter, and any other applicable law,” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1854(a)(1). See Or. Trollers Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 452 F.3d 

1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006).

The issue for decision is whether NMFS can exempt a 

fishery under its authority that requires conservation and 

management from an FMP because the agency is content 

with State management. The district court held that it could. 

We disagree, and reverse.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual and Legislative Background

Cook Inlet is one of the nation’s most productive salmon 

fisheries. Its salmon are anadromous, beginning their lives 

in Alaskan freshwater, migrating to the ocean, and returning 

to freshwater to spawn.

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UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS 5

In 1953, the United States entered into the International 

Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific 

Ocean. In response, Congress enacted the North Pacific 

Fisheries Act of 1954 (the “1954 Act”), authorizing the 

Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations governing 

fisheries contiguous to Alaskan waters. See Pub. L. No. 83-

579, §§ 10 & 12, 68 Stat. 698, 699–700 (previously codified 

at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1021–35). The Secretary then issued a 

regulation prohibiting salmon net fishing in the western 

waters of Alaska, but excepting Cook Inlet and two other 

areas where net fishing had historically been permitted under 

Alaska law; in those areas, federal regulation was to mirror 

existing Alaskan regulation. 50 C.F.R. § 210.10 (repealed).

Before 1976, the United States asserted authority only 

over waters up to twelve nautical miles from the coastline, 

and there was substantial concern that foreign fishers were 

depleting American fisheries. See Mark H. Zilberberg, A 

Legislative History of the Fishery Conservation 

& Management Act of 1976 (“Legislative History”) 237–41, 

352, 448–49, 455–56, 472–73, 476–81, 519 (1976). In 1976, 

Congress enacted the Fishery Conservation and 

Management Act (the “1976 Act”), Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 

Stat 331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891), 

later renamed the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The 1976 Act 

extended federal jurisdiction to 200 miles from the coastline, 

id. § 101 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1811), and 

regulated foreign fishing in that area, id. §§ 201, 204 

(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1824). States 

retained jurisdiction over the first three miles from the coast, 

id. § 306(a) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1856), and 

the federal government had jurisdiction over the next 197 

miles, originally called the fishery conservation zone 

(“FCZ”) and later named the exclusive economic zone 

(“EEZ”), id. § 101 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 

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6 UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS

§ 1811). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1); Exclusive 

Economic Zone of the United States of America, 48 Fed. 

Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983).

The federal government manages its waters through 

eight regional Councils. 16 U.S.C. § 1852. During the 

debate on the 1976 Act, Senator Gravel of Alaska criticized 

the concept of federal management on one side of the threemile line and state management on the other, because fish 

freely travel across the three-mile boundary. Legislative 

History 412–13, 460–67. Senator Gravel suggested that a 

state should manage its federal waters under a plan approved 

by the federal government. Id. at 467, 471. Senator Stevens 

of Alaska, one of the bill’s managers, offered an even 

broader proposal, which provided for exclusive state 

management of “[t]hose fisheries capable of being managed 

as a unit, which reside principally within the waters of a 

single State.” Id. at 422. But, Congress instead approved a 

more modest substitute offered by the bill’s other manager, 

Senator Magnuson, directing Councils, if possible, to 

incorporate state management measures in FMPs. Id.; 1976 

Act § 305(c) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1855).

In 1979, NMFS promulgated an FMP for salmon 

fisheries near Alaska. See Fishery Management Plan for the 

High Seas Salmon, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,250 (June 8, 1979) (the 

“Salmon FMP”). The Salmon FMP divided Alaskan federal 

waters into East and West Areas; Cook Inlet is in the West 

Area. Id. at 33,267. With respect to the West Area, the FMP 

tracked the regulations promulgated under the 1954 Act 

prohibiting commercial salmon fishing except in the three 

historic net-fishing areas, including Cook Inlet, which the 

State would continue to manage. Id. (“These fisheries are 

technically in the FCZ, but are conducted and managed by 

the State of Alaska as inside fisheries.”). The decision to 

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UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS 7

leave these fisheries in the hands of the State was not based 

on a finding that they were in good health; to the contrary, 

the Salmon FMP found that “[a]ll salmon species are at 

historic low levels in the Cook Inlet management area, with 

chinook stocks seriously depleted.” Id. at 33,309.

In 1983, Congress amended the Act to specify that a 

Council need only prepare an FMP with respect to a fishery 

“that requires conservation and management.” Pub. L. No. 

97-453, § 5(4), 96 Stat. 2481, 2486 (codified as amended at 

16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1)). The conference report explained 

this amendment was intended “to clarify that the function of 

the Councils is not to prepare a fishery management plan 

(FMP) for each and every fishery within their geographical 

areas of authority. Rather, such plans are to be developed 

for those fisheries which require conservation and 

management.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-982, 97th Cong., 2d 

Sess., at *18.

Alaska had proposed to amend the Act “to direct the 

Secretary of Commerce to delegate authority of a domestic 

fishery in the FCZ to the adjacent state . . . if . . . 1) the 

fishery does not cross interstate boundaries; and 2) the State 

is capable and willing to provide conservation and 

management consistent with the National Standards.” 

Omnibus Authorization Bill for the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 

on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., Serial No. 97-118, 97 Cong. 

310 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Ronald O. 

Skoog, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Fish and 

Game). But, this proposal was not enacted. See Pub. L. No. 

97-453, § 5(4), 96 Stat. 2481, 2486 (1982).

The Salmon FMP was revised in 1990. The revised FMP 

stated that, under the regulation implementing the 1954 Act, 

50 C.F.R. § 210, salmon net fishing in the West Area was 

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8 UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS

prohibited, with the exception of the three historic netfishing areas, which “technically extend into the EEZ, but 

. . . are conducted and managed by the State of Alaska as 

nearshore fisheries.”

In 1992, a new international convention prohibited all 

fishing for anadromous fish beyond the EEZ. Convention 

for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North 

Pacific Ocean, art. I, III. Congress promptly implemented 

that convention and repealed the 1954 Act. North Pacific 

Anadromous Stocks Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-567, 

§§ 801–14, 106 Stat. 4309 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 5001–

5012). The Secretary of Commerce then concluded that 

regulations promulgated under the 1954 Act, including 

50 C.F.R. § 210, no longer had statutory support, and 

repealed them. Removal of Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 

39,271, 39,272 (Aug. 2, 1995). But, the Salmon FMP was 

not revised, and Alaska continued to manage the three 

historic net fisheries.

In 1995, a fishing vessel, “Mister Big,” engaged in a 

massive unregulated harvest of scallops in the federal waters 

of Prince William Sound. See Trawler Diane Marie, Inc. v. 

Brown, 918 F. Supp. 921 (E.D.N.C. 1995). That scallop 

fishery was not covered by an FMP, but the MagnusonStevens Act provided that a State could regulate fishing 

vessels in federal waters that were registered in that state. Id.

at 924, 926; see Pub. L. No. 98-623, § 404(4), 98 Stat. 3394, 

3408 (1984) (“[A] State may not directly or indirectly 

regulate any fishing vessel outside its boundaries, unless the 

vessel is registered under the law of that State.”). The Mister 

Big set sail from Seattle, renounced its Alaska registration, 

and began fishing for scallops in the Sound. Trawler Diane 

Marie, 918 F. Supp. at 924. By January 26, 1995, the quota 

that Alaska set for the area, 50,000 pounds of scallops, had 

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UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS 9

been harvested, so Alaska closed the scallop season and 

Alaska-registered boats returned home. Id. But, the Mister 

Big continued to dredge, eventually harvesting 52,000 

pounds of scallops before the Secretary of Commerce 

approved an emergency closure of the fishery. Id. at 925, 

927. The North Pacific Council had drafted an FMP which 

addressed the possibility that an unregulated vessel might 

fish for scallops in the federal waters off Alaska, but had not 

adopted it “because of the belief that all vessels fishing in the 

EEZ would be registered in Alaska and thus bound by the 

state’s regulations.” Id. at 926.

The following year, Congress revised the provision 

regarding state authority to regulate fishing vessels in federal 

waters. See Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 

§ 112, 110 Stat. 3559, 3595–97 (1996). After that 

amendment, the Magnuson-Stevens Act now provides, in 

relevant part:

A State may regulate a fishing vessel outside 

the boundaries of the State in the following 

circumstances:

(A) The fishing vessel is registered under the 

law of that State, and (i) there is no fishery 

management plan or other applicable Federal 

fishing regulations for the fishery in which 

the vessel is operating; or (ii) the State’s laws 

and regulations are consistent with the 

fishery management plan and applicable 

Federal fishing regulations for the fishery in 

which the vessel is operating.

(B) The fishery management plan for the 

fishery in which the fishing vessel is 

operating delegates management of the 

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10 UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS

fishery to a State and the State’s laws and 

regulations are consistent with such fishery 

management plan.

16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(3). The version of the bill reported out 

of the House Committee on Resources would have 

authorized Alaska to enforce its regulations in federal waters 

even absent an FMP. H.R. Rep. No. 104-171, at *11–12 

(1995). But, that version was not enacted. Pub. L. No. 104-

297, § 112.

II. Amendment 12

The North Pacific Council has jurisdiction over the 

federal waters of Cook Inlet. Six of its 11 voting members 

are from Alaska and the remainder are from Washington and 

Oregon. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G), (b)(1), (b)(2)(C).

In 2010, the North Pacific Council began a 

comprehensive review of the Salmon FMP. As a result, 

NMFS “realized” that Cook Inlet was “not exempt from the 

FMP as previously assumed.” Council staff prepared a 

discussion paper, which summarized the situation as 

follows:

The FMP is vague on the function of the FMP 

in these areas. Though the FMP broadly 

includes these three areas and the salmon and 

fisheries that occur there within the fishery 

management unit and states that management 

of these areas is left to the State under other 

Federal law, the FMP does not explicitly 

defer management of these salmon fisheries 

to the State. The FMP does not contain any 

management goals or objectives for these 

three areas or any provisions with which to 

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manage salmon fishing. The FMP only 

refrains from extending the general fishing 

prohibition to those areas, where, as the FMP 

notes, fishing was authorized by other 

Federal law, [which has since been repealed]. 

Therefore, the FMP’s reference to “other 

Federal laws” may no longer be fully 

effective.

The North Pacific Council circulated a draft 

Environmental Assessment, held five public meetings, and 

took testimony. In 2011, the North Pacific Council 

unanimously voted to remove the three historic net fishing 

areas from the Salmon FMP. In April 2012, NMFS solicited 

comments on this change, “Amendment 12,” and proposed 

implementing regulations. 77 Fed. Reg. 19,605 (Apr. 2, 

2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 21,716 (Apr. 11, 2012).

Two groups of commercial fishermen, the United Cook 

Inlet Drift Association and the Cook Inlet Fishermen’s Fund 

(collectively, “United Cook”), submitted comments urging 

the rejection of Amendment 12. The comments cited a 51% 

decline since 1981 in the commercial catch of sockeye 

salmon. United Cook attributed this decline to two 

management failures by Alaska. First, United Cook argued 

that the State had failed to address the introduction of 

carnivorous northern pike into nearby lakes and streams. 

Second, United Cook argued that Alaska was not properly 

managing the escapement of salmon in Cook Inlet. The 

Magnuson-Stevens Act requires limits on the number of fish 

caught. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15). In contrast, Alaska 

manages commercial salmon fishing through escapement 

goals, i.e., the number of salmon allowed to “escape” past a 

fishery to spawn. According to United Cook, “the State 

misses the high end of its escapement goal targets as much 

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12 UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS

as 35% of the time,” leading to a massive unharvested supply 

of fish, and “has no escapement goals at all for many runs in 

Cook Inlet.”

In June 2012, NMFS issued a final Environmental 

Assessment, finding that “the State is the appropriate 

authority for managing Alaska salmon fisheries given the 

State’s existing infrastructure and expertise,” and that “the 

State’s escapement based management system is a more 

effective management system for preventing overfishing 

than a system [like the federal one] that places rigid numeric 

limits on the number of fish that may be caught.” NMFS 

also issued a finding that Amendment 12 would have no 

significant impact on the environment because it would not 

change the management of the fisheries. NMFS approved 

Amendment 12, and, in December 2012, promulgated 

implementing regulations. See Fisheries of the Exclusive 

Economic Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Salmon, 77 Fed. Reg. 

75,570 (Dec. 21, 2012); 50 C.F.R. § 679.2 (definition of 

West Area).

III. Procedural Background

United Cook filed this action in 2013, challenging 

Amendment 12 and its implementing regulations as contrary 

to the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s requirement that a Council 

prepare an FMP “for each fishery under its authority that 

requires conservation and management,” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1852(h)(1). United Cook also alleged that Amendment 12 

was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the National 

Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The 

district court granted Alaska’s motion to intervene as a 

defendant, and entered summary judgment for the 

government. United Cook timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that “[e]ach 

Council shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 

chapter—(1) for each fishery under its authority that requires 

conservation and management, prepare and submit to the 

Secretary (A) a fishery management plan . . . .” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1852(h)(1). Thus, the usual initial question is whether the 

fishery at issue even needs conservation and management. 

See Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 139 F. Supp. 

3d 102, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2015). We review that 

administrative decision under the traditional arbitrary and 

capricious standard. Id. But we need not tarry over that 

issue here; the government concedes that the Cook Inlet 

fishery requires conservation and management.

But, the government argues that the Act only requires an 

FMP for fisheries that need federal conservation and 

management, and that Cook Inlet is in good hands with 

Alaska. The district court found the Act ambiguous, gave 

Chevron deference to the government’s interpretation, and 

found not arbitrary and capricious the agency’s decision that 

federal involvement was not necessary.

We determine whether to afford Chevron deference to an 

agency interpretation of a statute under a two-step analysis. 

First, we consider “whether Congress has directly spoken to 

the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). “If the 

intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.” Id. 

Only “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 

specific issue,” do we go to step two, which considers 

“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 

construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.

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14 UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS

“We start, as always, with the language of the statute.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000). Section 

1852(h)(1) of the Act provides that a Council “shall” prepare 

an FMP for a fishery (1) “under its authority” that 

(2) requires “conservation and management.” The 

government concedes that Cook Inlet is a fishery under its 

authority that requires conservation and management. But it 

argues that an FMP is only mandated by the Act when 

“federal” conservation and management is required. Thus, 

the government asks us to insert the word “federal” into 

§ 1852(h)(1) before the phrase “conservation and 

management.”

“[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a 

statute that do not appear on its face,” Bates v. United States, 

522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997), and the government never 

persuasively explains why we should deviate from that rule 

here. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank, 

693 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a reading of 

the Magnuson-Stevens Act which “requires inserting the 

word ‘only’ or ‘solely’ into subsection [1853a](c)(5)”); see 

also Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 

1020 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts “lack . . . power” to 

“read into the statute words not explicitly inserted by 

Congress”). In arguing that we should insert the word 

“federal” into § 1852(h)(1), the government relies heavily on 

what it calls the “deferral” provision of the Act, 

§ 1856(a)(3)(A)(i), which allows a state to regulate statelicensed vessels in federal waters when no FMP exists. The 

government argues that this provision assumes that NMFS 

can cede regulatory authority to a state over federal waters 

that require conservation and management simply by 

declining to issue an FMP. But, § 1856(a)(3)(A)(i) does not 

create an exception to the general obligation to issue an FMP 

when a fishery requires conservation and management; 

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UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS 15

rather, the provision only restates the longstanding principle 

that a State can regulate vessels registered under its laws in 

federal waters absent federal law to the contrary. This 

principle dates at least to 1976. See 1976 Act § 306(a) (“No 

State may directly or indirectly regulate any fishing which is 

engaged in by any fishing vessel outside its boundaries, 

unless such vessel is registered under the laws of such 

State.”).

The 1996 amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Act did 

not expand that traditional state authority, but rather limited

state jurisdiction over state-registered vessels to when (i) 

there is no FMP, or (ii) state law is consistent with the FMP. 

See Sustainable Fisheries Act, § 112 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1856(a)(3)(A)). This “deferral provision” would be a 

strange form of delegation of federal regulatory authority, as 

it does not allow states to regulate vessels registered in other 

states. In contrast, the next paragraph of the 1996 

amendments, the so-called “delegation” provision, expressly 

authorizes NMFS to “delegate[ ] management of the fishery 

to a State” through an FMP, at which point the state can 

regulate any fishing vessel in the federal waters at issue, 

regardless of registration. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1856(a)(3)(B)).

The Act is clear: to delegate authority over a federal 

fishery to a state, NMFS must do so expressly in an FMP. 

16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(3)(B). If NMFS concludes that state 

regulations embody sound principles of conservation and 

management and are consistent with federal law, it can 

incorporate them into the FMP. Id. § 1853(b)(5). Indeed, 

Amendment 12 expressly delegates management of the East 

Area – certain federal waters off Alaska not including Cook 

Inlet – to Alaska. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone 

Off Alaska; Pacific Salmon, 77 Fed. Reg. at 75,570–71; 

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50 C.F.R. §§ 679.1(i)(2) (“State of Alaska laws and 

regulations that are consistent with the Salmon FMP and 

with the regulations in this part apply to vessels of the United 

States that are commercial and sport fishing for salmon in 

the East Area of the Salmon Management Area.”), 679.3(f). 

Amendment 12 could have expressly delegated management 

of Cook Inlet to Alaska as well, but it did not. The 

government argues removing Cook Inlet from the FMP 

amounts to delegation. But, the federal government cannot 

delegate management of the fishery to a State without a plan, 

because a Council is required to develop FMPs for fisheries 

within its jurisdiction requiring management and then to 

manage those fisheries “through” those plans. 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1801(b)(4)–(5), 1852(h)(1). The “deferral” provision 

covers those waters where for some reason a plan is not in 

effect; it is not an invitation to a Council to shirk the statutory 

command that it “shall” issue an FMP for each fishery within 

its jurisdiction requiring conservation and management.

Although we find the statutory language clear, we also 

note that the legislative history of the Act belies the 

government’s argument.1 The Act makes plain that federal 

fisheries are to be governed by federal rules in the national 

interest, not managed by a state based on parochial concerns. 

Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a)(6) (“A national program for 

the conservation and management of the fishery resources of 

the United States is necessary to prevent overfishing . . . and 

to realize the full potential of the Nation’s fishery 

 1 “[W]e ‘cautiously adhere’ to the practice of consulting legislative 

history” at step one of a Chevron analysis, Irvine Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 

275 F.3d 823, 829 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Am. Rivers v. Fed. Energy 

Reg. Comm’n, 201 F.3d 1186, 1196 n.16 (9th Cir. 2000)), recognizing 

that “courts have no authority to enforce a principle gleaned solely from 

legislative history that has no statutory reference point,” Shannon v. 

United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584 (1994) (alterations omitted).

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resources.”) and 1802(33)(A) (“The term ‘optimum’, with 

respect to the yield from a fishery, means the amount of fish 

which—(A) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the 

Nation.”) and 1811(a) (“[T]he United States claims, and will 

exercise in the manner provided for in this chapter, sovereign 

rights and exclusive fishery management authority over all 

fish, and all Continental Shelf fishery resources, within the 

exclusive economic zone.”) with Alaska Br. 13 (“The Alaska 

Constitution requires the State to manage natural resources 

for the maximum benefit and use for all Alaskans.” (citing 

Alaska Const. art. VIII, §§ 1–2)). Congress therefore 

repeatedly rejected proposals to provide for state 

management of federal fisheries without an FMP. Compare 

Legislative History 422, 467, 471, with 1976 Act § 305(c); 

compare Hearings, supra, at 310, with Pub. L. No. 97-453, 

§ 5(4) (1982); compare H. Rep. No. 104-171 at *11–12, with 

Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 112 (1996). We decline the 

government’s invitation to vest in Alaska the very authority 

that Congress abjured.

Alaska argues that NMFS has discretion not to adopt an 

FMP for federal waters requiring management and 

conservation, because “shall” sometimes means “may.” See

Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2001). 

But, that is not the general rule; we recognized in Sierra Club 

that “‘shall’ in a statute generally denotes a mandatory duty.” 

Id.; see also United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 

(1989) (stating that by using “shall,” “Congress could not 

have chosen stronger words to express its intent that 

forfeiture be mandatory”); Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 

1067 n.10 (9th Cir. 2001) (“‘Shall’ means shall.” (quoting 

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833, 837–

38 (9th Cir. 2001))). Our holding in Sierra Club that the 

Environmental Protection Agency did not have a mandatory 

duty to bring enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act 

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18 UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS

was driven by “the traditional presumption that an agency’s 

refusal to investigate or enforce is within the agency’s 

discretion,” and based on an “[a]nalysis of the structure and 

the legislative history of the Clean Water Act.” 268 F.3d at 

902, 904. No similar factors here support reading “shall” as 

“may.”2

The government argues that § 1852(h)(1) does not 

expressly require an FMP to cover an entire fishery, noting 

that “the provision says nothing about the geographic scope 

of plans at all.” But, the statute requires an FMP for a 

fishery, a defined term. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(13). No one 

disputes that the exempted area of Cook Inlet is a salmon 

fishery. But, under the government’s interpretation, it could 

fulfill its statutory obligation by issuing an FMP applying to 

only a single ounce of water in that fishery. We disagree. 

When Congress directed each Council to create an FMP “for 

each fishery under its authority that requires conservation 

and management,” id. § 1852(h)(1), it did not suggest that a 

Council could wriggle out of this requirement by creating 

 

 2 Alaska also argues that, if we fail to add the word “federal” before 

“conservation and management” in § 1852(h)(1), NMFS will be forced 

to issue an FMP for every fishery, because all fisheries require some 

conservation and management. However, the legislative history of the 

Act directly refutes this argument. A previous version of the statute 

required an FMP for every fishery under a Council’s authority. In 1983, 

Congress amended the statute to specify that an FMP is necessary only 

where a fishery “requires conservation and management.” Pub. L. No. 

97-453 § 5(4), 96 Stat. 2481, 2486 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1852(h)(1)). If every fishery required some type of conservation and 

management, this amendment would amount to a nullity. But, “[w]hen 

Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment 

to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397–

98 (1995)). The amendment thus indicates Congress understood that 

some fisheries might not require conservation or management.

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UNITED COOK INLET DRIFT ASS’N V. NMFS 19

FMPs only for selected parts of those fisheries, excluding 

other areas that required conservation and management. See 

id. § 1853(a) (setting out the required contents of FMPs).3

Finally, the government argues that its interpretation is 

supported by National Standards 3 and 7 in the MagnusonStevens Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3), (7), and the 

implementing guidelines for those standards, 50 C.F.R. 

§§ 600.305–355. But, the National Standards only govern 

the contents of an FMP, not the decision whether to issue 

one. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (requiring that FMPs “be 

consistent with the following national standards for fishery 

conservation and management”). The government’s 

advisory guidelines fare no better, as they do not have the 

force of law. Id. § 1851(b).

CONCLUSION

The Magnuson-Stevens Act unambiguously requires a 

Council to create an FMP for each fishery under its authority 

that requires conservation and management. The Act allows 

delegation to a state under an FMP, but does not excuse the 

 

 3 The government also appears to argue that it fully discharged its 

statutory obligation when the Salmon FMP was adopted in 1990, because 

the FMP included Cook Inlet (albeit by placing it under Alaska’s 

authority), and that it was thereafter free under the Act to remove any 

parts of the West Area from the FMP. But, removing a fishery from an 

FMP is no different than excluding that fishery from the start. An 

amendment to an FMP, like the FMP itself, must conform to the statutory 

scheme. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h)(1) (“Each Council shall . . . prepare 

and submit to the Secretary . . . (B) amendments to each such plan that 

are necessary.”); 1854(a)(1) (requiring the Secretary to review an FMP 

amendment “to determine whether it is consistent with the national 

standards, the other provisions of this chapter, and any other applicable 

law”).

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obligation to adopt an FMP when a Council opts for state 

management. Amendment 12 is therefore contrary to law to 

the extent it removes Cook Inlet from the FMP.4 We reverse 

the judgment of the district court and remand with 

instructions that judgment be entered in favor of United 

Cook.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

 

 4 Because Congress has spoken clearly, we need not reach Chevron

step two. And, because we conclude that Amendment 12 is contrary to 

law with respect to its removal of Cook Inlet from the FMP, we need not 

address United Cook’s other challenges to the Amendment.

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