Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00416/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00416-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY DEWAYNE LEE TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SACRAMENTO CITY FIRE DEPT., et 

al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-0416 DB P

ORDER AND

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s three prior pleadings were screened and found to be devoid of a 

cognizable claim. Plaintiff was granted one final opportunity to state a claim. The Court is now in 

receipt of plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint. 

I. Screening Requirements

“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or 

appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or 

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). This provision applies to all actions filed in forma pauperis, whether or not 

the plaintiff is incarcerated. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

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II. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial 

plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, 

while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff brings this action against Sacramento City Police Officer Guibord, Officer White 

Bear, Officer Waggoner, and T. Hopkins, a paramedic. Plaintiff seeks damages.

Plaintiff’s allegations may be fairly summarized as follows:

On August 14, 20161, plaintiff entered the Arco AM/PM market in Sacramento, 

California, whereupon he handed the store clerk, Steve Wiggins, a $100 bill. Wiggins, in turn,

contacted the police, complaining that plaintiff was unintelligible and waving his arms above his 

head. 

1 Attachments to the pleading suggest that this incident occurred in 2017, not 2016. (See ECF No. 

22 at 11.)

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In response to Wiggins’s call, Officers Guibord and White bear arrived at the market. 

Officer Guibord directed plaintiff to go outside of the store, where Officer White Bear detained 

him without explanation. Officer Guibord came out a few minutes later, learned that plaintiff had 

car keys on him for a vehicle parked in front of the market, and then placed plaintiff in handcuffs. 

The officers took plaintiff’s keys and searched plaintiff’s car without plaintiff’s consent. 

Officer Waggoner arrived on the scene by this point and took plaintiff’s blood pressure 

without plaintiff’s consent. Plaintiff was in fact refusing any medical treatment and blood draws, 

including to Hopkins, the paramedic, who also arrived on the scene.

The defendants ignored plaintiff’s vocal refusal to give consent for the blood draw, calling 

him a drug addict and telling him that his opinion does not count. Officer Waggoner grabbed 

plaintiff’s left wrist and threw his arm around plaintiff’s neck while Officer White Bear grabbed 

plaintiff’s right wrist. Officer Guibord grabbed plaintiff’s right shoulder and slammed him down 

to the ground where plaintiff was rendered unconscious. 

When plaintiff awoke, he was on a stretcher being taken towards the ambulance. Plaintiff 

attempted to get off the stretcher, but the three officers physically restrained him while trying to 

strap him to the gurney. It is then that paramedic Hopkins drew plaintiff’s blood over his 

objections. One vial of blood was eventually taken, which the defendant officers took to the 

“Highway Patrol Office of the Sacramento Police City Dept.” for testing. 

After his blood was taken, plaintiff was “kidnapped and forcefully taken” to the Mercy 

San Juan Hospital, where he was not given a blood test or offered a urine analysis test or a field 

sobriety test. He was also not informed that he violated any laws or given a citation to appear in 

court. 

Three months later, plaintiff appeared in court on other charges and first learned that he 

had been charged with Driving Under the Influence following the August 14, 2016, incident. On 

that charge, he was sentenced to 240 days with a three-year probation, which ran concurrent with 

plaintiff’s other case.

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IV. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. 

amend. IV. Blood tests “plainly constitute searches of ‘persons,’ and depend antecedently upon 

seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of that Amendment.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 

757, 767 (1966). “[W]arrantless compulsory blood tests are unreasonable unless supported by 

both probable cause and exigent circumstances.” Ellis v. City of San Diego, Cal., 176 F.3d 1183, 

1191-92 (1999); see also Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (“Such an invasion of 

bodily integrity implicates an individual’s most personal and deep-rooted expectations of 

privacy.”).

Plaintiff accuses the defendants of violating his Fourth Amendment rights when they held 

him down and drew his blood over his vociferous objections. Plaintiff also submits that he was 

charged with Driving Under the Influence for the August 14, 2016, events and sentenced thereon. 

Under the favorable termination rule laid out in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 

(1994), to recover damages in a § 1983 action for an alleged constitutional violation that would 

necessarily imply that a criminal conviction or sentence is invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. If the criminal 

conviction or sentence has not been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, claims that 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction or sentence must be brought in a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than through a § 1983 case. See id; Muhammad v. Close, 

540 U.S. 749, 750-751 (2004).

Here, the court finds that success on plaintiff’s claim of a Fourth Amendment violation 

stemming from the blood draw would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for 

Driving Under the Influence. Because plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction or sentence on 

that charge has been reversed or expunged, the court is forced to conclude that plaintiff is barred 

under Heck from seeking damages on his claim based on the unauthorized blood draw.

Plaintiff also appears to bring a claim for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 

stemming from the force used against him prior to the blood draw. As alleged, Officer Waggoner 

grabbed plaintiff’s left wrist and threw his arm around plaintiff’s neck, Officer White Bear 

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grabbed plaintiff’s right wrist, and Officer Guibord grabbed plaintiff’s right shoulder and 

slammed plaintiff face down on the ground hard enough to render him unconscious. Of these 

three defendants, only Officer Guibord’s actions can reasonably be construed as excessive force.

Police officers violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights when they use excessive 

force during an arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Such claims are 

assessed using an “objective reasonableness standard.” Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 

1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2005). “[R]easonableness is generally assessed by carefully weighing the 

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the 

importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” County of Los Angeles 

v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (internal quotation omitted). The government interest in 

use-of-force cases is evaluated from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Here, the court “must consider the risk of bodily harm that [Officer 

Guiford’s] actions posed to [plaintiff] in light of the threat to the public that [Officer Guiford] was 

trying to eliminate.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007).

Liberally construing the complaint, the risk of harm created by Officer Guibord’s force 

was high, as demonstrated by the fact that plaintiff was thrown to the ground so hard that he was 

rendered unconscious long enough to be transferred onto a gurney and taken towards an 

ambulance. On the other side of the scale, the asserted governmental interest was to prevent the 

crime that Officer Guibord believed plaintiff was committing. As to that, however, plaintiff was 

charged with Driving Under the Influence for having had driven his car to the market—that is, 

there was no pending crime taking place. Alternatively, Officer Guibord was attempting to 

prevent plaintiff from evading a blood draw. Under either scenario, the need for force appears 

inconsistent then with the amount of force used by this defendant. Since an excessive force claim 

would not necessarily be barred by Heck, Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 2008), 

the court finds that plaintiff has stated a cognizable Fourth Amendment excessive force claim 

against this defendant.

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V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a district judge be assigned to this 

case; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action proceed only on a Fourth Amendment 

excessive force claim against Officer Guiford and that all other claims and defendants be dismissed. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: March 15, 2021

/DLB7;

DB/Inbox/Substantive/turn0416.scrn 4AC

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