Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-07023/USCOURTS-caDC-01-07023-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 7, 2001 Decided December 11, 2001

No. 01-7023

Valerie Thomas,

Appellee

v.

National Football League Players Association,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cv03332)

Joseph A. Yablonski argued the cause the for appellant.

David L. Rose argued the cause for the appellee. Joshua

N. Rose was on brief for the appellee.

Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 1 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: The National

Football League Players Association (NFLPA) appeals an

award of attorney's fees to Valerie Thomas, a successful

plaintiff in a discrimination action against the NFLPA, and

the denial of costs against Rita Raymond and Julie TaylorBland,1 unsuccessful plaintiffs in the same action. For the

reasons set out below, we affirm the fee award to Thomas and

remand for entry of an award of costs to the NFLPA against

Raymond and Taylor-Bland.

I.

At a March 1988 board meeting, the NFLPA's Board of

Directors decided to lay off eleven per cent of its workforce.

After the meeting a number of employees, including Thomas

and Taylor-Bland, met with the new Board president, George

Martin. Thomas, who had previously filed a charge of race

and gender discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, complained of the lack of promotional

opportunities for blacks and women at the NFLPA. At a

second staff meeting the following month, Thomas again

raised these concerns. Subsequently, Martin and NFLPA

Board vice president Mike Davis conducted private interviews

with employees, including Thomas, Taylor-Bland and Raymond.

On March 18, 1988 Gene Upshaw, NFLPA Executive Director, after conferring with Martin and Davis, laid off Thomas, Raymond and four other employees. On April 12, 1988

Upshaw terminated all but one of the six laid-off employees

"for cause," namely that they "made libelous and slanderous

statements concerning NFLPA's executive personnel, violated the confidentiality and trust required [of them], were

disloyal to NFLPA, and engaged in other acts which were

intended to undermine NFLPA's effectiveness in serving the

interests of its members." Joint Appendix (JA) 154. According to Upshaw's trial testimony, he fired Thomas and Raymond because of statements they had made to Martin and

Davis and because he believed they were responsible for

__________

1 Julie Taylor-Bland was formerly Julie Bland.

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 2 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

circulating a pamphlet critical of the NFLPA's treatment of

employees. A short time later Taylor-Bland, who had been

Upshaw's secretary, was reassigned to what she considered

an inferior position. She resigned on June 13, 1988. Thomas

and Raymond pursued union grievances over their termination resulting in an arbitrator's award ordering them reinstated. The NFLPA, however, did not reinstate them.

Thomas, Raymond and Taylor-Bland filed this suit in December 1991 pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C.A. ss 2000e et seq. Their Fourth Amended

Complaint alleged the NFLPA (1) failed to promote all three

plaintiffs as a part of a pattern of racial and gender discrimination in promotions; (2) laid off Thomas and Raymond and

transferred Taylor-Bland on account of their race and gender

and in retaliation for Thomas's filing a discrimination charge,

Raymond's filing a grievance2 and the three employees' vocal

opposition to discriminatory practices; (3) discharged Thomas

and Raymond and constructively discharged Taylor-Bland on

account of their race and gender and in retaliation for their

opposition to discriminatory practices; (4) failed to reinstate

Thomas and Raymond pursuant to the arbitrator's award on

account of their race and gender and in retaliation for their

protected activities; and (5) failed to pay Thomas a salary

equal to those of male employees doing substantially the same

work.

During a bench trial in December 1995, the district court

dismissed the arbitration claim and granted judgment as a

matter of law in the NFLPA's favor on the pattern of

discrimination claim.3 After trial the district court issued a

memorandum opinion and order on July 24, 1996 granting

judgment in favor of Thomas on her retaliation claims and

awarded her back pay and benefits of $70,840 (plus prejudgment interest) for the period from her March 1988 lay-off to

December 1989, by which time, the court concluded, Thomas

__________

2 In 1987 Raymond had complained to her local of race and

gender discrimination after being denied a promotion for which she

applied.

3 The equal pay claim had been dismissed by stipulated order on

October 13, 1995.

would have been re-employed had she diligently sought new

employment. At the same time the court granted judgment

in favor of the NFLPA on all of Raymond's and TaylorBland's claims. JA 167.

On August 1, 1996 the NFLPA filed a bill of costs, asserting it was the prevailing party and therefore entitled to

recover costs against Raymond and Taylor-Bland "totally and

completely" and "on eight of the ten race, sex, and retaliation

claims asserted by Thomas." JA 168. The district court

denied the NFLPA its costs in an order filed October 15, 1996

and in a memorandum filed November 26, 1996.

The NFLPA appealed the judgment in favor of Thomas.

This court affirmed the judgment but remanded for the

district court to reconsider the amount of prejudgment interUSCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 3 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

est. Thomas v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 131

F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (as vacated in part on rehearing

Feb. 25, 1998).4

After remand the district court issued a memorandum

order and an amended judgment on March 25, 1999 awarding

Thomas $73,390.60 in back pay, fringe benefits and prejudgment interest, plus post-judgment interest from October

21, 1996. JA 213-15. On May 28, 1999 Thomas filed a

motion for costs, including attorney's fees pursuant to 42

U.S.C. s 2000e-5(k),5 of $563,637, JA 216, which she corrected to $505,138.23 on June 30, 1999, JA 406. In a memorandum opinion and order filed March 29, 2000 the district court

denied the motion but granted leave to file a new motion

conforming to guidelines set out in the opinion. JA 457.

__________

4 The NFLPA also appealed the denial of its costs but the court

did not reach the issue.

5 This section provides:

In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in

its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the

Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee

(including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission

and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a

private person.

Thomas filed a new motion on August 29, 2000 seeking total

costs of $394,950, including attorney's fees of $355,193. JA

466. In a memorandum order filed December 15, 2000 the

district court reduced the fee award to approximately

$338,000.6 JA 501-10.

The NFLPA appealed both the amount of the attorney's

fees awarded and the denial of its costs. We address the

challenges separately.

II.

On appeal we may overturn the district court's award of

attorney's fees " 'only if it represents an abuse of discretion.' "

Williams v. First Government Mortgage and Investors Corp.,

225 F.3d 738, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Copeland v.

Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)).

Further, the district court's underlying findings of fact will be

sustained unless clearly erroneous. See City of Riverside v.

Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 572 (1986). Applying these standards

we uphold the district court's attorney's fee award.

The NFLPA contends the amount of the attorney's fee

award is excessive for three reasons. First, it challenges the

fee award on the ground it is excessive in relation to the

limited success achieved, given that only one of three plaintiffs prevailed on only two of her claims. In Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the United States Supreme

Court laid out the standards for awarding fees to a plaintiff

who, like Thomas, achieves only limited success:

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 4 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is

distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the

hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded

in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a

lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won

substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee re-

__________

6 The court provided only an estimate of the new figure in

recognition that "the several deductions required by the rulings set

forth in [its] memorandum w[ould] have to be calculated by plaintiff's counsel (and a new form submitted)." JA 507.

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 5 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

duced simply because the district court did not adopt

each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved

only limited success, the district court should award only

that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the

results obtained.

461 U.S. at 440. We conclude the district court reasonably

applied the Hensley factors in calculating Thomas's fee

award.

"Evaluation of the interrelatedness of several claims within

a single lawsuit, and of the legal work done on those claims, is

most appropriately a task for the district court that heard and

decided the case...." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 453 (Brennan, J.,

concurring). The district court adequately performed the task

here. In the March 29, 2000 decision denying Thomas's

initial fee petition the district court acknowledged the limited

nature of her success and properly segregated Thomas's

successful claims from the unsuccessful ones. The court

expressly found that "her unsuccessful claims of discriminatory layoff and discharge were related to her successful claim of

discrimination" but that her "pattern and practice claim of

discriminatory failure to promote was 'distinctly different'

from her other claims" and that her counsel therefore "may

recover no fees for their work on that claim." JA 462. The

court also concluded, appropriately, that Thomas should not

recover fees "for segregable time devoted to the failed individual claims of Ms. Raymond and Ms. Taylor-Bland." JA

462. While noting that Thomas's counsel had "already

backed out of the fee petition 'time and expenses unique to

the factual proof of the pattern of promotions claim and to the

individual claims of Raymond and Bland,' " JA 462-63,7 the

court emphasized that the resubmitted costs motion should be

limited to fees incurred "in connection with Ms. Thomas's

claim of retaliation and of discriminatory layoff and dis-

__________

7 According to Thomas's counsel's declaration, they had "excluded

approximately $42,000 of time and expenses from the amount

claimed ... based on lack of success on the Raymond and Bland

claims and on the statistical promotion case." JA 451.

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 6 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

charge." See JA 463. After Thomas resubmitted her motion,

the court noted that the new fee amount was "some 22

percent less than the amount previously requested," JA 501,

and found that counsel had "made a good-faith effort to 'back

out' time principally related to plaintiff's pattern and practice

claims and the failed individual claims of Ms. Raymond and

Ms. Taylor-Bland," JA 507. We cannot say this finding is

clearly erroneous. Nonetheless, the court further reduced

the time claimed by 23.75 hours based on the NFLPA's

specific objections, see JA 501-03, and found that the resulting award of approximately $338,000 was not "unreasonable

in relation to the overall result achieved" given the length of

the litigation and the "dilatory" defense waged, JA 508-09.8

This finding too must be sustained. That the fees awarded

are, as the district court acknowledged, "nearly five times the

amount of plaintiff's recovery," JA 507, does not make them

excessive. See City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 576 ("[R]easonable attorney's fees under s 1988 are not conditioned upon

and need not be proportionate to an award of money damages."); cf. Williams, 225 F.3d at 747 ("declin[ing] to read a

'rule of proportionality' into the [District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act]").

The NFLPA further challenges the fee award on the

ground Thomas did not offer adequate billing records to

substantiate the apportionment of time among the successful

and unsuccessful claims. We reject this contention as well.

The district court acknowledged that the records "were not in

the best of shape,"--and accordingly reduced the costs

awarded Thomas for time spent responding to the NFLPA's

interrogatories about the records. JA 502-03. Nevertheless,

the court found the records sufficient to support the fee

awarded and, reviewing the record, we cannot say its finding

was clearly erroneous.

__________

8 The court characterized the defense as " 'dilatory' in the classic

sense, ... not to state or imply that the defense was in any way

improper, or harassing, or oppressive" but "simply the unfortunate

stuff of modern, knock-down, drag-out litigation." JA 508.

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 7 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Finally, the NFLPA asserts that under Rule 68 Thomas is

ineligible for any costs, including attorney's fees, incurred

after August 14, 1995. Rule 68 provides in relevant part:

At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a

party defending against a claim may serve upon the

adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken

against the defending party for the money or property or

to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then

accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer

the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is

accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice

of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and

thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not

accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine

costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is

not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay

the costs incurred after the making of the offer.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. The NFLPA contends that its August 14,

1995 offer of $60,000 to the three plaintiffs shifted all postoffer costs, including attorney's fees, to Thomas because the

offer exceeded her final recovery which, if pre-judgment

interest were calculated at the 52-week Treasury-Bill rate as

of that date, was only $59,018.70, that is, below the $60,000

offer of judgment. We reject this argument for two reasons.

First, the district court in fact calculated pre-judgment

interest at the prime rate of interest rather than at the

Treasury-Bill rate. See JA 167. The NFLPA does not

dispute that with interest calculated at the higher prime rate

Thomas's final recovery exceeds the NFLPA's $60,000 offer

of judgment. Nor can the NFLPA effectively challenge the

propriety of using the prime rate. See Forman v. Korean

Air Lines Co., Ltd., 84 F.3d 446, 451 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 10 (1996) ("[W]e think the Seventh Circuit is correct--that the prime rate is not merely as appropriate as the

Treasury Bill rate, but more appropriate....") (emphasis

original; citing In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the

Coast of France, 954 F.2d 1279, 1332 (7th Cir.1992)).

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 8 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Second, we agree with the Seventh Circuit's decision in

Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., 164 F.3d 1071, 1075 (7th Cir.

1999), that an unallocated offer of judgment to multiple

defendants is not effective under Rule 68. The Seventh

Circuit rested its decision on two grounds: (1) "A judgment

less favorable than the offer requires that a plaintiff pay the

defendant's usually substantial post-offer costs and [t]here

must therefore be a clear baseline from which plaintiffs may

evaluate the merits of their case relative to the value of the

offer" and (2) "courts also need easily comparable sums."

164 F.3d at 1076. Because the record does not reflect that

the individual plaintiffs knew the value to each of them of the

lump-sum offer, they "simply could not have evaluated the

individualized values of the offer" and "without two precise

figures to compare, the district court was in no position to

resolve the lack of precision." Id. Accordingly, we conclude

the joint offer of judgment did not trigger Rule 68's costshifting provision.

For these reasons we conclude the district court's award of

attorney's fees to Thomas should be affirmed.9

__________

9 The NFLPA also contends the district court was required to

consider as a factor in awarding fees that Thomas and her counsel

adopted "unreasonable settlement positions" during the litigation.

See Brief for Appellant at 38-40. The district court has discretion

to consider settlement negotiations in determining the reasonableness of fees but it is not required to do so. See Sands v. Runyon, 28

F.3d 1323, 1334 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Postal Service made an offer

of judgment in December 1992 that would have given plaintiff a

back pay award equal to the amount calculated by his own expert,

and paying his attorney one-half of her requested fees. The district

court remarked that this offer was strikingly similar to the court's

eventual judgment in 1993. This is a factor a court may use in

considering the attorney's fee award."); Vocca v. Playboy Hotel of

Chicago, Inc., 686 F.2d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Counsel's refusal

to settle the case earlier for an amount only slightly less than the

amount ultimately agreed upon, accompanied by his statement that

Playboy could afford to pay more, provide sufficient support for the

district court's conclusion that he had unreasonably prolonged the

litigation."). The court's decision not to do so below was not an

abuse of its discretion.

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 9 of 10
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

III.

Finally, the NFLPA contends the district court should have

awarded it costs insofar as it was the "prevailing party"

against Raymond and Taylor-Bland.10 As noted above, the

NFLPA filed a bill of costs on August 1, 1996, seeking

$11,112.35 for transcripts, copies of trial exhibits and copying

costs. JA 168. In a memorandum opinion dated November

26, 1996 the district court concluded the NFLPA was not

entitled to costs because "the court consider[ed] plaintiff

Thomas to be the prevailing party." JA 179. We agree with

the NFLPA that this ruling was an abuse of the district

court's discretion.

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides in relevant part: "Except when express provision

therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in

these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed

as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise

directs...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). While Thomas may

have been the sole prevailing party on her own claims against

the NFLPA, it is uncontestable that the NFLPA was the sole

prevailing party on the claims asserted by Raymond and

Taylor-Bland. Thus, under the plain language of Rule

54(d)(1) the NFLPA is entitled to recover costs against them

"as a matter of course." See Byers v. Dallas Morning News,

209 F.3d 419, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2000) (successful Title VII

employer is entitled to costs under express language of Rule

54)d)(1)).11

For the preceding reasons we affirm the award of attorney's fees to Thomas and remand to the district court to

award the NFLPA costs under Rule 54(d)(1) as the "prevailing party" against Raymond and Taylor-Bland.

So 

ordered.

__________

10 As noted above, the NFLPA's bill of costs below sought costs

against Thomas as well. On appeal the NFLPA appears not to do

so. See Brief for Appellant at 41-42.

11 Thomas's counsel contend that the bill of costs filed August 1,

1996 was "premature" because it was submitted before a judgment

was filed. We are aware of no support for this contention, either in

Rule 54 or case law, and, accordingly, reject it summarily.

USCA Case #01-7023 Document #644333 Filed: 12/11/2001 Page 10 of 10