Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01735/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01735-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

Hereinafter referred to as “FAC.”

2

Hereinafter referred to as “MTD.”

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE L. MCKENNEY, JR., Civil No. 07cv1735-L (POR)

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AS TO DEFENDANT

HERNANDEZ BE GRANTED IN PART

AND DENIED IN PART

[Document No. 19]

v.

R. HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 26, 2008, Plaintiff Joe L. McKenney, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a First Amended Civil Rights Complaint1

 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five employees

of Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility: Robert J. Hernandez, Warden; M.F. Stout, Visiting

Lieutenant; L.V. Tillman, Visiting Sergeant; G.S. Gasgonia, Visiting Correctional Officer; and

Richard G. Ramirez, Visiting Correctional Officer (“Defendants”). (FAC at 1). On October 9,

2008, Defendants Hernandez, Ramirez, Stout, and Tillman filed a Motion to Dismiss2

 Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint as to Defendant Hernandez. (Doc. 19). After thorough review of the

parties’ motions and all supporting documents, this Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as to Defendant Hernandez be GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on August 28, 2005 he was visiting

with his wife when Defendant Ramirez handcuffed him and informed him that he “could not sit

towards/straddle [his] wife.” (FAC at 3.) Plaintiff claims he asked to speak with Defendant Stout,

and Defendant Ramirez left to make a phone call. (Id.) When Defendant Ramirez returned,

Defendant Gasgonia “attacked [Plaintiff] from behind” then “grabbed [Plaintiff’s] left leg and lifted

it upwards, throwing [him] forward” and causing him to “land hard on [his] face.” (Id.) Plaintiff

further alleges both Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia assaulted him with their “hands, feet and

batons in front of [his] wife, other visitors and inmates.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims Defendants Ramirez

and Gasgonia dragged him away into the rear search area and put leg irons on his legs. (Id.) 

Plaintiff further claims Defendants Stout and Tillman allegedly arrived on the scene and

witnessed Defendant Ramirez and Officer Gasgonia assault Plaintiff, but failed to try and stop the

assault. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Officer Gasgonia and Defendant Ramirez then placed Plaintiff into a

van and allegedly continued to assault him for approximately thirty minutes. (Id.) At the infirmary,

Plaintiff asserts Defendant Ramirez instructed the Medical Technical Assistant to document that

Plaintiff only had “minor or little injuries.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s wife left the prison in “hysteria” and complained of the incident to Defendant

Hernandez. (FAC at 4). Plaintiff also complained of the incident to Defendant Hernandez in person

at his “I.C.C. review” three days later on August 31, 2005. Plaintiff claims this shows Defendant

Hernandez was “completely aware of this injustice, did nothing to prevent it, and did nothing to

correct it.” (Id.) 

2. Denial of Outdoor Recreation

Plaintiff also claims he was denied outdoor recreation while in administrative segregation

from August 28, 2005 to February 24, 2006. (FAC at 5). Plaintiff claims Defendant Hernandez was

aware of this alleged denial because he was present at Plaintiff’s I.C.C. review on August 31, 2005. 

(Id. citing Ex. 19). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hernandez “was aware that [Plaintiff] was not

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receiving any recreation, and that the only reason [Plaintiff] was allowed to leave the cell the entire

six months [he] was in [administrative segregation] was for occasional showers and to be present at

I.C.C. reviews.” (Id.)

3. Denial of Access to Courts

Plaintiff claims he was denied access to court while in administrative segregation. (FAC at

6). Starting on December 27, 2005, Plaintiff claims he repeatedly requested law library access, but

these requests were denied. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant Hernandez “was aware of by being

present at [Plaintiff’s] I.C.C. which [Hernandez] oversees.” (Id. citing Ex. 19). 

B. Procedural Background

On August 31, 2007, Plaintiff Joe L. McKenney, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed

a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 21, 2007, the Honorable M.

James Lorenz found the Complaint survives sua sponte screening and directed the U.S. Marshall to

effect service. (Doc. 3). On December 18, 2007, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint. (Doc. 11,12). 

On July 10, 2008, the Court filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending the District

Court 1) grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official

capacities without leave to amend; 2) deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims against Defendant Ramirez; 3) grant Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Hernandez, Stout,

and Tillman with leave to amend; 4) grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim based on denial of yard recreation with leave to amend; 5) grant Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of double-cell occupancy

without leave to amend; 6) grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s access to courts claim

with leave to amend; 7) grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim without

leave to amend; and 8) deny Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief. 

(Doc. 14). On August 12, 2008, Plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 16). 

On September 8, 2008, the Honorable M. James Lorenz adopted the Report and

Recommendation in full. (Doc. 17). On September 29, 2008, Plaintiff filed the First Amended

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Complaint alleging an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment against

Defendants Hernandez, Ramirez, Stout, Tillman, and unserved Defendant Gasgonia; an Eighth

Amendment claim for denial of outdoor recreation against Defendant Hernandez; and a First

Amendment claim for denial of access to courts against Defendant Hernandez. (Doc. 18). 

On October 9, 2008, Defendants Hernandez, Ramirez, Stout, and Tillman filed a Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as to Defendant Hernandez. (Doc. 19). Defendants

seek dismissal on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Hernandez for (1)

an eighth amendment violation, and (2) denial of access to the court. (MTD at 1). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. A claim can only be dismissed if it “appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1974). The court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable

inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of

Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[U]nder Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), [the Court must] accept[] all

facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff,”) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 The court looks not at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the claimant

is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

Dismissal is not warranted unless it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. 

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must construe the

pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly

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important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving

liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (conclusory

allegations unsupported by facts are insufficient to state a claim under section 1983). “The plaintiff

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint unless it is

“absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before a pro se civil rights complaint may be

dismissed, the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. 

Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24.

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff contends Defendants Hernandez, Stout, Tillman, Gasgonia, and Ramirez violated

his Eighth Amendment rights because they (1) violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment, and (2) denied him yard recreation. (FAC at 3-5). Defendants contend Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Hernandez should be dismissed for failure to state a

claim. (MTD at 11). 

1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

a. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Hernandez, Stout, Tillman, Gasgonia, and Ramirez violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force. (FAC at 3-4). Defendants contend Plaintiff has

not alleged sufficient facts to support an excessive force claim against Defendant Hernandez. (MTD

at 13). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is...whether force was applied in a good-faith

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effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Schwenk v. Anderson, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000);

Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts examine (1) the need for application

of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (3) the extent of injury

inflicted; (4) the extent of threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by

responsible officials on the basis of facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the

severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Supervisors can only be held liable for

excessive force of their subordinates if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege Defendant Hernandez participated in, directed, or knew of and

failed to prevent the use of excessive force against him on August 28, 2005. (FAC at 3-4). Plaintiff

merely states his wife complained to Defendant Hernandez of the alleged assault and Plaintiff

personally complained of the alleged assault to Defendant Hernandez three days after the incident on

August 31, 2005. Id. at 4. Although Plaintiff asserts Defendant Hernandez was “aware of this

injustice, did nothing to prevent it and did nothing to correct it,” Defendant Hernandez could not

have prevented an assault he become aware of three days after it occurred. Id. Plaintiff’s allegations

are therefore insufficient to establish an excessive force claim against Defendant Hernandez under

the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Hernandez be GRANTED without leave to

amend.

b. Deliberate Indifference to Safety

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman were deliberately indifferent to

his safety in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 

(FAC at 4). Defendants contend Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant Hernandez. (MTD at 13). 

“The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

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(1994)(internal quotation omitted); see also Morgan v. Morgansen, 465 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.

2006)(“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of

confinement.”). However, due to the “harsh and restrictive” nature of a prison setting, a prisoner’s

injury does not automatically constitute a constitutional violation. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045. 

A prisoner alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment must satisfy both an objective and a

subjective component. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the objective

requirement, an inmate must show “the deprivation he suffered was objectively, sufficiently

serious.” Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045. The deprivation must be such that the prisoner is denied “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation

omitted). As long as the institution provides inmates “with adequate food, clothing, shelter,

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety,” no Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. 

Hoptowitt v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982).

The subjective requirement, relating to the defendants’ state of mind, requires a prison

official to have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Allen v.

Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court must analyze each claimed violation in light

of these requirements, for Eighth Amendment violations may not be based on the “totality of

conditions” at a prison. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47.

“Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1250-51. To establish a violation of this duty, a prisoner must

establish prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference is present when a prison official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Here, Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to his safety satisfies the objective

requirement. The August 28,2005 assault alleged in the complaint is contrary to a prison’s duty to

provide prisoners with personal safety. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246. However, Plaintiff’s claim

against Defendant Hernandez fails to satisfy the subjective requirement. Plaintiff fails to plead

sufficient facts to show “deliberate indifference” to his safety on the part of Defendant Hernandez. 

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Specifically, Plaintiff fails to plead facts demonstrating Defendant Hernandez had actual knowledge

he faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable

steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hernandez was “completely aware of this

injustice, did nothing to prevent it and did nothing to correct it.” (FAC at 4). Plaintiff further

contends both he and his wife complained of the incident to Defendant Hernandez. (Id.) However,

Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as well as supporting documents indicate Defendant

Hernandez did not become aware of the alleged assault until August 31, 2005, three days after it

occurred. (FAC at 4, 31, 54). In Exhibit 10 of his complaint–a letter from Defendant Hernandez to

Plaintiff’s wife–it is apparent Plaintiff’s wife did not complain to Defendant Hernandez about the

alleged assault until August 31, 2005. (Exhibit 10, FAC at 31). Similarly, in his complaint and in

Exhibit 19– a document from Plaintiff’s August 31, 2005 I.C.C. review regarding the August 28,

2005 incident–Plaintiff indicates he did not complain to Defendant Hernandez about the alleged

assault until August 31, 2005, three days after it occurred. (FAC at 4, 54; Exhibit 19). 

In light of the representations Defendant Hernandez did not learn of the alleged assault until

three days after it occurred, Plaintiff cannot show Defendant Hernandez had actual knowledge of the

possibility Plaintiff was going to be assaulted, that he witnessed Plaintiff being assaulted, or that he

failed to stop Plaintiff from being assaulted. Plaintiff has failed to allege, with at least some degree

of particularity, overt acts demonstrating Defendant Hernandez knew Plaintiff faced a substantial

risk of serious harm or that Defendant Hernandez had the necessary information to enable him to

take reasonable steps to abate that risk. Based thereon, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to safety against

Defendant Hernandez be GRANTED without leave to amend.

2. Deprivation of Yard Recreation

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hernandez violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment when he denied him yard recreation for the six months he

was kept in administrative segregation. (FAC at 5). Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to state a

claim against Defendant Hernandez for denial of outdoor recreation because he does not allege any

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facts showing Defendant Hernandez subjectively knew Plaintiff was denied outdoor recreation while

he was in administrative segregation. (MTD at 11).

“Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates, ... the full protections of the eighth

amendment most certainly remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect persons

convicted of crimes.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). 

The Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires neither that

prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find desirable. Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” which

includes those sanctions that are “so totally without penological justification that it results in the

gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976); see also

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. This includes not only

physical torture, but any punishment incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that

mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

Outdoor exercise is considered “extremely important to the psychological and physical well

being of the inmates.” Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. If the deprivation of outdoor exercise is “long-term,”

then it amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation even if there were no adverse medical effects

resulting from the deprivation. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1133 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000). To assert

an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of confinement, a prisoner must

satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen v. Sakai,

48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).

“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an

inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. This objective component is

satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing,

shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246; Farmer, 511

U.S. at 833; Wright v. Rushen, 642 f.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981).

//

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The subjective requirement, relating to the defendants’ state of mind, requires “deliberate

indifference.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. “Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Finally, the Court must analyze

each claimed violation in light of these requirements, for Eighth Amendment violations may not be

based on the “totality of conditions” at a prison. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 246-47; Wright, 642 F.2d at

1132.

Plaintiff’s claim satisfies the objective requirement. The six months of deprivation alleged in

the complaint are more “long-term” than the six-and-one-half weeks of deprivation in Lopez, and,

therefore, the conditions alleged here objectively amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133 n.15.

Plaintiff’s claim also satisfies the subjective requirement. In his complaint, Plaintiff states

Defendant Hernandez “was aware that [he] was not receiving any recreation, and that the only

reason [he] was allowed to leave the cell the entire six months [he] was in ad-seg was for occasional

showers and to be present at [his] I.C.C. reviews.” (FAC at 5). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

Defendant Hernandez became aware he was being denied yard recreation at his August 31, 2005

I.C.C. review. (FAC at 5). Further, Plaintiff asserts he notified Defendant Hernandez he was being

denied outdoor recreation at his November 23, 2005 I.C.C. review, three months after Plaintiff

alleges his denial of outdoor recreation commenced. (FAC 12; Exhibit 1). Therefore, Plaintiff

adequately alleges Defendant Hernandez was aware of the substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health by

“set[ting] forth specific facts as to...[his] deliberate indifference.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628,

634 (9th Cir. 1988). Based thereon, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of denial of outdoor recreation against Defendant Hernandez be

DENIED. 

C. Access to Court Claim

Plaintiff contends he was denied access to the court while in administrative segregation for

six months. (FAC at 6). Defendants contend Plaintiff’s first amendment claim as to Defendant

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Hernandez fails to state a claim for denial of access to the court. (MTD at 15). 

Prisoner’s have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,

346 (1996). In Lewis, the United States Supreme Court limited the right of access to the courts to

non-frivolous direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus proceedings, and section 1983 actions. See id.

at 353 n.3, 354-355. However, the Ninth Circuit has held “the right of meaningful access to the

courts extends to established prison grievance procedures.” Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279

(9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit points out that in some cases, “a prisoner may be required to

exhaust the established prison grievance procedure before securing relief in federal court...In those

cases, a prisoner’s fundamental right of access to the courts hinges on his ability to access the prison

grievance system.” Id. 

A prisoner’s access-to-the-courts right is violated when he does not have access to an

adequate law library and when he can show he suffered an “actual injury” as a result, that his efforts

to pursue some claim were hindered. Id. at 351. A plaintiff must adequately describe the claim that

was hindered and allege facts that show it was actually hindered in some way. Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The analysis in Christopher describes two kinds of hindered

claims: “forward-looking” claims that are currently being impeded, and “backward-looking” claims

that are now impossible to file. Id. at 412-14.

In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Hernandez denied him access to a law library

while he was in administrative segregation from August 28, 2005 until February 24, 2006. (FAC at

6). Plaintiff contends Defendant Hernandez denied him law library access both at his August 31,

2005 I.C.C. review and at his November 23, 2005 I.C.C. review, thereby establishing a causal

connection between Defendant Hernandez’s alleged actions and Plaintiff’s denial of library access. 

(FAC at 6,12). 

However, Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish his efforts to pursue some claims were

hindered as a result of being denied library access. It is unclear from his first amended complaint

which claims Plaintiff alleges are being impeded. First, Plaintiff claims that as a result of the denial

of access to the law library, he was unable to “adequately prepare [his] defense in a timely manner.” 

(FAC at 6). One plausible interpretation is that he is referring to his direct criminal appeal. 

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Another plausible interpretation is that he is referring to his defense to the charge he committed

battery on two peace officers during the August 28, 2005 incident. Second, Plaintiff alleges he was

unable to “create and perfect [his] claims of assault and battery against Donovan Corrections staff”

and “litigate...issues involved in [his] criminal appeal.” (FAC at 58). Third, Plaintiff claims the

denial of access to the law library caused him to file a late tort claim with the Victim Compensation

and Government Claims Board (VCGCB), which was then denied. (FAC at 6, 64). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges no facts to show he has a “backward-looking” claim -- one that can no

longer be filed. Likewise, although Plaintiff attempts to allege “forward-looking” claims, Plaintiff

alleges no facts to show he has a claim that is currently being impeded. First, assuming the first

claim Plaintiff refers to is his direct criminal appeal, Plaintiff has not adequately described the claim

that was hindered and has not alleged facts that show it was actually hindered in some way. 

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating he missed court deadlines

relating to his criminal appeal or that the court dismissed legitimate claims as a result of his lack of

access to the prison law library. Even assuming the first claim he refers to is his defense to the

charge of battery against two peace officers, nothing in the complaint indicates it has been impeded. 

Second, with regard to the excessive force claim, Plaintiff has successfully filed the claim in

his complaint, and nothing indicates it has been impeded. (FAC at 3-4). Third, with regard to the

tort claim, Plaintiff waited nearly a year and a half after the alleged assault prior to filing his tort

claim with the California VCGCB. (FAC at 64). However, Plaintiff was released from

administrative segregation on February 24, 2006 and still had one month from that date to file his

California tort claim. Plaintiff does not allege he was prevented from filing his claim during this one

month time period, thereby indicating Plaintiff’s confinement in administrative segregation and

Defendant Hernandez’s alleged denial of access to the law library did not cause him to file a late tort

claim. More importantly, Plaintiff does not allege that his late tort claim before the California

VCGCB deprived him of the ability to file a claim with the Court. 

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to allege facts to support the existence of either a

“forward-looking” or a “backward-looking” claim, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s access-to-the-courts claim against Defendant Hernandez be

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GRANTED with leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this case and based on the foregoing, the Court

hereby RECOMMENDS:

1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against

Defendant Hernandez be GRANTED without leave to amend.

2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of

deliberate indifference to safety against Defendant Hernandez be GRANTED

without leave to amend.

3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of denial

of outdoor recreation against Defendant Hernandez be DENIED.

4) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s access-to-the-courts claim against

Defendant Hernandez be GRANTED with leave to amend.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted

to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1994).

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Court

judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before May

1, 2009. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

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Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before May 11, 2009. The

parties are advised that no extensions of time will be granted for purposes of filing

objections. The parties are further advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 1, 2009

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable M. James Lorenz

all parties

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