Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01259/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01259-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD L. WILKERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-1259 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REMAND

IN PART; DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOTION; AND

GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IN PART

Plaintiff Edward L. Wilkerson has filed a motion for summary

judgment or remand. Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart, in her capacity

as Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(Commissioner), opposes this motion and cross-moves for summary

judgment. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to remand to accept,

or give proper reasons for rejecting, Plaintiff’s subjective pain

testimony and to pose a proper hypothetical to the vocational

expert.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Edward L. Wilkerson first filed for Social Security

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security

Act on August 17, 2001, alleging disabling back pain that began

after a workplace accident on September 20, 2000. On November 21,

2001, this claim was denied and Plaintiff did not file an appeal. 

On May 1, 2003, Plaintiff filed a second application for disability

benefits under Title II alleging disabling back pain due to the

same injury. Plaintiff's second claim was denied initially and

again upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing before

an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which took place on March 22,

2005. On April 14, 2005, the ALJ issued his decision finding that

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act and was able to perform jobs existing in significant

numbers in the national economy. On June 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed

a timely request with the Appeals Council for review of the ALJ's

decision. On January 20, 2006, the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff's request and the ALJ's decision became the final

decision of the Commissioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Plaintiff's Education and Work Experience

Plaintiff was born on August 3, 1959. Transcript (Tr.) at

197. He has an eleventh grade education. Tr. at 133. Plaintiff

has been engaged in carpentry-type work since he was eighteen. Tr.

at 172. He was employed as a carpenter by Exxon Refinery/GSI for

five years, with Gillis Construction Company for two years, and

then with Creative Kitchens and Remodeling from 1999 until his

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injury on September 20, 2000, at which time he ceased all work

activity. Id. At Creative Kitchens and Remodeling, Plaintiff

performed general carpentry duties involving operating a back hoe,

frequent bending, lifting, and working with various hand tools. 

Tr. at 172, 228. “Twenty years ago,” Plaintiff suffered a workrelated injury in which a nail entered his right eye, which various

doctors have described as leaving him “blind,” with “vision loss,”

or with “residual blurred vision” in the right eye. Tr. at 171,

224, 230, 241, 330. 

II. Plaintiff's Medical History

On September 20, 2000, Plaintiff fell eleven to twelve feet

when a board he was leaning on gave way. Tr. at 228, 351. He

struck his head and landed on his back. Id. Initial radiologic

tests indicated mild degenerative changes to the cervical, lumbar,

and thoracic spines. Tr. at 179-182. Plaintiff was diagnosed with

chronic cervical, thoracic, and lumbar sprains and was treated

conservatively with physical therapy, pain medication, and

chiropractic manipulation. Tr. at 175, 177, 184-185, 201. 

Plaintiff also received a series of cervical and lumbar epidural

injections to treat his post-traumatic headaches. Tr. at 212-213,

284. From February, 2001 through November, 2004, Plaintiff was

treated by chiropractors Paul Anderson, D.C., and Eric Anderson,

D.C., who completed a number of workers’ compensation disability

forms for Plaintiff indicating that he was temporarily totally

disabled and precluded from his prior work as a carpenter. Tr. at

258-280, 302-304.

On September 6, 2001, Plaintiff consulted with orthopedic

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surgeon Kenneth Light, M.D., who diagnosed him with degenerative

changes of the lumbar spine and possible injury to the cervical

spine. Tr. at 256-257. On July 11, 2002, Dr. Light recommended

that Plaintiff have surgery to fuse his spine from L4 to S1. Tr.

at 255. On August 19, 2002, Plaintiff underwent the two-stage,

anterior and posterior fusion surgery. Tr. at 228, 249, 329. 

Plaintiff reported complete pain reduction after the surgery, but

experienced a recurrence of his low back pain eight months later. 

Tr. at 223-224, 329. 

On September 4, 2003, neurologist Frederic Newton, M.D.,

examined Plaintiff as an agreed medical examiner for workers’

compensation purposes. Tr. at 227. In his report dated October 1,

2003, Dr. Newton diagnosed Plaintiff with degenerative disk disease

of the cervical spine with cervical strain, degenerative disk

disease of the lumbar spine with lumbar strain, status post-fusion

at L4 to S1, with chronic myofacial pain, mild bilateral carpal

tunnel syndrome and post-traumatic headaches. Tr. at 235. Dr.

Newton opined that Plaintiff’s condition was permanent and

stationary and that he could perform a range of work at the light

exertional level with a preclusion from repetitive forceful

gripping. Tr. at 235, 322. On September 18, 2003, Dr. Light

examined Plaintiff and found normal sensory, motor, and deep tendon

reflexes, but couldn’t conclude whether Plaintiff’s spine was

completely healed from the fusion surgery. Tr. at 250. 

On September 27, 2003, orthopedist Robert Wechsler, M.D.,

examined Plaintiff at the request of the Social Security

Administration. Tr. at 223. Dr. Wechsler reviewed Dr. Light’s

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1

 Residual Functional Capacity, discussed below.

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post-surgical evaluations of Plaintiff. Id. Dr. Wechsler reported

normal sensory, motor and deep tendon reflexes. Tr. at 225. He

opined that Plaintiff could perform a range of work at the light

exertional level, including standing, sitting, and walking for up

to six hours in an eight-hour work day, and lifting and carrying

twenty pounds occasionally, and ten pounds frequently, with

postural limitations in the ability to bend, stoop, and crouch. 

Tr. at 226. On October 21, 2003, Disability Determination Services

(DDS) medical advisor Patrick Bianchi, M.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s

medical records and concluded that a “[l]ight RFC1 appears

reasonable.” Tr. at 244.

On November 13, 2003, Dr. Light questioned whether Plaintiff’s

spine was solidly healed and opined that "according to the Spine

and Torso Guidelines at this point [Plaintiff] would be 100%

disabled" because Plaintiff’s “pain is such that he is not able to

sit for more than 20 minutes at a time, stand, bend, or lift.” Tr.

at 249. On January 8, 2004, Dr. Light opined that Plaintiff’s

spine appeared to be healing in the correct anatomical position. 

On February 18, 2004, Dr. Bianchi reviewed Plaintiff’s medical

records again and concluded that Plaintiff was capable of light

work. Tr. at 297. On May 27, 2004, Dr. Light reported a normal

neurological examination of Plaintiff and found that Plaintiff’s

spinal fusion was solid and in anatomic position with no evidence

of nerve root impingement. Tr. at 306. At this time, Plaintiff

reported to Dr. Light that despite his ongoing back pain, he was

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2

 Although Dr. Newton’s October 18, 2004, opinion actually states

that “[t]here are preclusions from Light Work and Repetitive Forceful

Gripping,” it seems clear from the tenor of the document that this

phrasing is an error and that Dr. Newton is merely repeating his

conclusions from his report dated October 1, 2003, in which he opined

that “[t]here is an overall level of permanent partial spinal

disability that limits [Plaintiff] to Light Work” and “it would be

reasonable to preclude repetitive forceful gripping bilaterally.” Tr.

at 235, 339.

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“off all pain medication.” Id. Dr. Light recommended that

Plaintiff be treated with “medication and exercise,” and prescribed

him two pain relievers. Id. On July 8, 2004, Dr. Light reexamined Plaintiff and reported that Plaintiff had a greater range

of neck movement and opined that Plaintiff had been permanent and

stationary since November 13, 2003. Tr. at 325. 

On September 30, 2004, Dr. Light suggested that Plaintiff’s

condition might be improved by the removal of the pedicle screws

and rods installed in Plaintiff’s previous surgery. Tr. at 324. 

On October 6, 2004, Plaintiff was examined for workers’

compensation purposes by pain specialist Dr. Leslie Schofferman,

who opined that he was temporarily totally disabled, until the

outcome of the recommended hardware removal. Tr. at 329. On

October 18, 2004, Dr. Newton was asked to re-evaluate Plaintiff’s

condition for workers’ compensation purposes in light of diagnostic

tests performed on May 26, 2004. Tr. at 338-339. Dr. Newton

reiterated his opinion that Plaintiff’s condition remained

unchanged since September 4, 2003, and that Plaintiff had constant

slight pain in the spine and was capable of light work with a

preclusion from repetitive forceful gripping.2 Tr. at 339. On

December 23, 2004, Plaintiff requested that Dr. Light remove the

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hardware because of his continued back pain related to changes in

the weather. Tr. at 345. On January 4, 2005, Dr. Light performed

the elective surgery, removing the rods and screws from Plaintiff’s

spine. Tr. at 344, 346. There were no complications. Tr. at 344. 

III. Plaintiff's Testimony

On March 22, 2005, Plaintiff testified at his hearing before

the ALJ that he had not worked since September 20, 2000, and

suffered from headaches, and low back and neck pain. Tr. at 351,

354-356. He reported that for eight months after his fusion

surgery his back pain improved until he was walking one day and

experienced a sharp pain in his lower back. Tr. at 353. Otherwise

Plaintiff reported consistent headaches, low back and neck pain,

and occasional leg pain, from the time of his accident to the

present. Tr. at 353-357. He testified that his prior eye injury

caused a vision problem, but that it had not limited him in any

way. Tr. at 360. 

Between his first surgery in 2002 and his second surgery in

2005, Plaintiff reported that he would walk the length of his

driveway, which is seventy-five yards long, up to six times a day

before the post-surgery pain recurred, and twice a day after that. 

Tr. at 357-358. He also reported that during this period he could

not bend over at all, could not sit in a “dinner table” type of

chair for more than thirty minutes, could not lift more than ten

pounds, but could stand for an hour and a half at a fishing

tournament. Tr. at 357, 358, 360, 367. Plaintiff stated that

since his hardware removal surgery in 2005, his condition is the

“basically the same” as it has been since 2003, when his pain

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recurred after his first surgery. Tr. at 363. 

Plaintiff testified that he can walk until his “body tells him

to stop,” go to the grocery store to do light shopping, drive up to

an hour at a time without pain, wash a handful of laundry, and

squat to pick up a twelve pack of soda or a gallon of milk. Tr. at

358, 359, 363-364. He reported that he fishes a little and went

out on his boat recently. Tr. at 368. He cannot launch the boat

by himself and cannot go out when the water is choppy because it

aggravates his back. Tr. at 368-369. Plaintiff mostly spends his

days watching television and walking. Tr. at 365. He lives with

his mother who, together with his fiancé, does most of the

housework and cooking. Tr. 365. Plaintiff reported that,

currently, he has a debilitating migraine headache approximately

twice a week, for which he takes medication. Tr. at 355-356. He

does not believe that there has been a time since his accident that

he could return to work, and does not think that there is any type

of work he could do in the future. Tr. at 366. 

IV. The ALJ's Findings

In his decision dated April 14, 2005, the ALJ found no good

cause for reopening Plaintiff’s August 17, 2001, application for a

period of disability. Tr. at 20. With respect to Plaintiff’s

present application, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not performed

any work since September 20, 2000, the date of his accident. Tr.

at 22. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of

degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine with lumbar strain,

and status post-fusion of L4-S1, with chronic low back and neck

pain. Id. The ALJ found insufficient medical evidence to support

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any other severe impairments. Id. He found that Plaintiff's

medically determined impairments did not meet or equal any listed

impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Social Security

Regulation No. 4. Id. As a result, the ALJ proceeded to determine

Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform past

relevant work or, considering his vocational profile, consisting of

his age, education, and past work experience, and his RFC, whether

Plaintiff could perform other work that exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. Id.

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had an RFC for a range of

work at the light exertional level with the ability to sit for up

to twenty minutes without a change of position, the ability to

occasionally rotate the neck, and a preclusion from forceful

gripping and lifting objects from floor level. Id. In formulating

this RFC, the ALJ gave the most weight to Dr. Wechsler's September,

2003 opinion, which he found consistent with Dr. Newton's October,

2003 opinion and the October, 2003 and February, 2004 opinions of

DDS medical advisor Dr Bianchi. Tr. at 22-23. The ALJ gave little

weight to Dr. Light's November, 2003 opinion that Plaintiff was

"100% disabled" because it was inconsistent with the other medical

evidence, including Dr. Light's own July, 2004 opinion that

Plaintiff was permanent and stationary since November 13, 2003, and

because Dr. Light was offering a vocational opinion outside his

area of expertise. Tr. at 23. The ALJ also gave little weight to

the opinions of chiropractors Paul Anderson and Eric Anderson

because they offered vocational opinions and because chiropractors

are not acceptable medical sources under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513. Id.

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The ALJ found Plaintiff's testimony regarding his inability to work

due to low back and neck pain not fully credible due to its

inconsistency with the medical evidence and Plaintiff's own

testimony regarding his daily activities. Id. The ALJ found

Plaintiff's testimony as to his daily activities indicative of a

capacity to work at the RFC he had determined. Id.

The vocational expert (VE) testified that Plaintiff's past

relevant work as a general carpenter was skilled and performed at

the medium, and occasionally heavy, exertional level. Tr. at 23,

372. The VE testified that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff's

vocational profile and RFC could not perform Plaintiff's past

relevant work. Tr. at 24. However, the VE testified that such a

person could perform the unskilled jobs of Bench Assembler (light)

and Final Assembler (optical). Id. The ALJ credited the VE's

testimony and concluded that jobs that Plaintiff could perform

exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act based upon Plaintiff's

application filed on May 1, 2003. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Overturning a Denial of Benefits 

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ's

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Martinez v.

Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

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adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir.

1995). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 

Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not just

the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that supports the

ALJ's conclusions and that which does not. Martinez, 807 F.2d at

772. 

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be upheld even

when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v. Secretary, 602

F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979), or when the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If supported by

substantial evidence, the findings of the ALJ as to any fact will

be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710,

712 (9th Cir. 1981). 

II. Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act 

Under the Social Security Act, "disability" is defined as the 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

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expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

months. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The impairment must be so

severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous

work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the

impairment must result "from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(3). 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Regulations set out

a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b)-(f);

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991); Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). The burden of proof is

on the claimant in steps one through four. Sanchez v. Secretary of

Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). In

step one, the claimant must show that she or he is not currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

In step two, the claimant must show that he or she has a "medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments" that significantly

limits his or her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); Bowen

v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If the claimant does not, he or she is

not disabled. Otherwise, the process continues to step three for a

determination of whether the impairment meets or equals a "listed"

impairment which the regulations acknowledge to be so severe as to

preclude substantial gainful activity. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141;

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20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If

this requirement is met, the claimant is conclusively presumed

disabled; if not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. At step

four, it must be determined whether the claimant can still perform

"past relevant work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(e). If the claimant can perform such work, he or she is

not disabled. If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an

inability to perform prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner for step five. At step five, the Commissioner must

show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work

that exists in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20

C.F.R. § 1520(f).

DISCUSSION

I. Closed Period of Disability

In his motion, Plaintiff does not argue that he disabled past

the date of his second surgery on January 4, 2005, but only that

the ALJ erred by not granting him a closed period of disability

from September 20, 2000, until either September 4, 2003, or January

4, 2005. A “closed period of disability” can be granted to an

applicant whose disability has ended, if it persisted for a

continuous twelve month period. Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d

1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1972) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(D)) (“The

Act itself does not provide for a closed period of benefits. 

However, we think it clear that such a closed period of benefits

may be awarded”); see Moore v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,

278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Myers). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored evidence showing that

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Plaintiff was disabled starting from his accident on September 20,

2000, and continuing until September 4, 2003, the first date

Plaintiff was declared permanent and stationary, or, based on the

opinions of Dr. Light and Dr. Schofferman, until his second surgery

on January 4, 2005. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ gave undue

weight to examining physician Dr. Wechsler's 2003 assessment in

making his decision to deny Plaintiff a closed period of disability

because Dr. Wechsler's report is "questionable" and does not

consider Plaintiff's condition prior to 2003. In response,

Defendant argues that the ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence

presented and that the Commissioner's previous November 21, 2001

opinion that Plaintiff was not disabled has a res judicata effect

on any claim that he was disabled from September 20, 2000, through

November 21, 2001, and requires a continuing presumption of nondisability from that point on. 

The Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claim during three separate

periods: (1) from his accident on September 20, 2000, until the

time his first claim was denied on November 21, 2001; (2) from the

November, 2001 denial until his first surgery on August 19, 2002;

and (3) from the first surgery until his second surgery to have the

hardware removed on January 4, 2005.

A. First Period: Res Judicata Effect of the November, 2001

Denial

"[T]he principle of res judicata should not be rigidly applied

in administrative proceedings," but "[t]he Commissioner may 

. . . apply res judicata to bar reconsideration of a period with

respect to which she has already made a determination, by declining

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to reopen the prior application." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

827 (9th Cir. 1995). "[R]es judicata applies to findings and

decisions on the merits which become final as a result of a

claimant's failure to seek administrative review after notice of an

adverse decision." Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir.

1985). "Further, [the Ninth Circuit] has held that res judicata

may apply even where the claimant never had a hearing, if the

claimant has failed to pursue an appeal and has presented no new

facts in a subsequent application to demonstrate that there may

have been inadequate grounds to support a determination of

non-disability on the previous application." Id. 

"As a general matter, the Commissioner's refusal to reopen her

decision as to an earlier period is not subject to judicial

review." Lester, 81 F.3d at 827. 

Once a decision becomes administratively final, the

Secretary's decision to reopen a claim is purely

discretionary. Discretionary decisions are not “final

decisions” within the meaning of section 450(g). 

Therefore, a refusal by the Secretary to reopen a previous

decision is not a “final” decision subject to judicial

review.

 Taylor, 765 F.2d at 877 (internal citations omitted).

There is an exception to the general rule that courts may

not review the Commissioner's decision not to reopen,

where the Commissioner considers “on the merits” the issue

of the claimant's disability during the

already-adjudicated period. Where such a de facto

reopening occurs, the Commissioner's decision as to the

prior period is subject to judicial review.

Lester, 81 F.3d at 827, fn. 3 (internal citations omitted). 

The authority cited above supports Defendant's contention that

the initial denial of Plaintiff's claim, left unappealed, operates

as a final judgment and creates a res judicata effect on any

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disability claims for the period that was denied. Because

Plaintiff did not appeal the November, 2001 denial, it became a

final decision of the Commissioner, with a preclusive effect on any

disability claim brought for that period. Because Plaintiff's 2003

application presented no new facts pertaining to the September,

2000 through November, 2001 period, and neither the Commissioner

nor the ALJ reopened the 2001 denial by reconsidering any of the

merits of that decision, the denial of disability from September,

2000 through November, 2001 is unreviewable by this Court. 

Therefore, Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ should have

reconsidered Plaintiff's disability from September, 2000 through

November, 2001 is without merit.

B. Second Period: Effect of the November, 2001 Denial on

Plaintiff’s claim until August 19, 2002.

Defendant asserts that the Commissioner’s prior decision that

Plaintiff was not disabled from September, 2000 through November,

2001, which is now final, creates a rebuttable presumption that

Plaintiff is not disabled until Plaintiff proves his condition has

changed. Although the prior decision does create a rebuttable

presumption that Plaintiff is capable of work, “[t]he

Commissioner's authority to apply res judicata to the period

subsequent to a prior determination is much more limited.” Lester,

81 F.3d at 827. In Lester, the Ninth Circuit stated: 

[A]n ALJ's finding that a claimant is not disabled

“create[s] a presumption that [the claimant] continued to

be able to work after that date.” The presumption does

not apply, however, if there are “changed circumstances.” 

An increase in the severity of the claimant's impairment

would preclude the application of res judicata . . . In

addition, the Commissioner may not apply res judicata

where the claimant raises a new issue, such as the

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existence of an impairment not considered in the previous

application.

Id. at 827-828 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the 2001

findings of non-disability create a presumption of continuing

non-disability unless Plaintiff proves changed circumstances. 

According to the medical records submitted by Plaintiff, his

condition did not appreciably change from the time of his accident

in September, 2000 until his spinal fusion surgery on August 19,

2002. Plaintiff’s recitation of the facts of his case states that

he only saw two doctors, Jack Miller, M.D., and Michael Tran, M.D.,

during this period. Id. at 12:4-12:17. These records indicate

Plaintiff’s condition was stable, and in fact, Dr. Tran noted on

December 19, 2002, that Plaintiff had no new complaints, and Dr.

Miller expressly stated in his report of his July 18, 2002,

examination of Plaintiff that his “impressions of [Plaintiff]

remain unchanged.” Tr. at 202, 212. Neither doctor indicated that

Plaintiff was incapable of work. Therefore, Plaintiff has not

overcome the presumption that he was not disabled during the period

beginning after the denial of his first claim in November, 2001,

and ending before his first changed circumstance, his fusion

surgery on August 19, 2002. 

C. Third Period: The ALJ Properly Weighed the Medical

Evidence Presented

The third period was from Plaintiff’s first surgery on August

19, 2002, until his second surgery on January 4, 2005. Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ’s decision denying benefits for this period was

not based on substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

should have found him totally temporarily disabled at least from

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3

 Plaintiff actually argues that his disability began on

September 20, 2000, but as discussed above, the earliest possible date

to consider Plaintiff disabled is August 19, 2002.

18

August 19, 20023, through September 4, 2003, because Plaintiff’s

disability can be “logically inferred” in the absence of reports

saying that he could work prior to Dr. Newton’s opinion, on

September 4, 2003, that he could. 

This argument is not well-taken. It is Plaintiff's burden to

prove he was unable to work for a twelve month period due to a

"disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act." 

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1452; 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). None of the

records pertaining to Plaintiff’s immediate post-surgery condition

indicates he was unable to work and, in fact, all the doctors and

Plaintiff himself agree that for eight months after the surgery he

felt remarkably better. Plaintiff’s argument is belied by the fact

that he reported substantial, near total, relief from pain for most

of the period he now argues the ALJ should have found him disabled. 

Thus, the ALJ did not err by relying on medical records from the

period immediately after Plaintiff’s pain recurred.

In determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ found Dr. Wechsler's

September, 2003 opinion that Plaintiff had an RFC "for a range of

work at the light exertional level with the ability to sit up to 20

minutes without change of position, the ability to occasionally

rotate the neck and preclusion from forceful gripping and lifting

objects from the floor level" consistent with the September, 2003

opinion of examining physician Dr. Newton, and the October, 2003

opinion of consulting DDS medical advisor Dr. Bianchi. Tr. at 22-

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23. The ALJ gave little weight to the November, 2003 opinion of

treating physician Dr. Light that Plaintiff was "100% disabled." 

Id. The ALJ based this finding on the fact that Dr. Light’s

opinion was inconsistent with the other medical evidence, including

Dr. Light's later opinion in July, 2004. He also found that Dr.

Light was offering a vocational opinion outside his expertise,

acting more as an advocate than a treating physician when he made

that statement. Id. (citing Mattney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016,

1020 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

As a general rule, the opinion of a treating doctor should be

given more weight than the opinion of examining or consulting

doctors. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Where a treating physician's opinion is contradicted by another

doctor, the Commissioner may reject the treating physician's

opinion, but must provide "specific, legitimate reasons" supported

by substantial evidence in the record for doing so. Rodriguez v.

Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989); Murray v. Heckler, 722

F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). Where the opinion of a non-treating

source is based on independent clinical findings that differ from

those of the treating physician, the opinion of the non-treating

source may itself be substantial evidence; it is then solely the

province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict. Magallanes, 881 F.2d

at 751.

The ALJ was incorrect in finding that Dr. Light’s opinion was

internally inconsistent. Dr. Light’s opinion on July 8, 2004, that

Plaintiff had been “permanent and stationary” since November 13,

2003, is not inconsistent with his opinion that Plaintiff was “100%

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disabled” on November 13, 2003. However, the ALJ did not err in

rejecting Dr. Light’s conclusion that Plaintiff was “100%

disabled.” Dr. Light’s disability opinion was based on his finding

during the November 13, 2003 exam that Plaintiff “is not able to

sit for more than 20 minutes at a time, stand, bend or lift.” Tr.

at 249. Dr. Light’s opinion that Plaintiff could not stand at all

is directly contradicted by the rest of the medical evidence, and

Plaintiff himself testified that during this period he could lift

as much as ten pounds without a problem. Tr. at 367. In contrast,

two weeks earlier, on September 27, 2003, Dr. Wechsler opined that

Plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk for up to six hours in an

eight hour period, and lift up to twenty pounds occasionally. Tr.

at 226. 

Nonetheless, even if the opinions of Dr. Light and Dr.

Wechsler were equally supported by substantial evidence, it is

“solely the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict.” 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The ALJ rejected Dr. Light’s

disability conclusion, as well as that of examining physician Dr.

Schofferman, in favor of the opinions of Dr. Wechsler, examining

physician Dr. Newton, and consulting DDS medical advisor Dr.

Bianchi. Both Dr. Wechsler and Dr. Newton thought Plaintiff was

capable of certain light work, and Dr. Bianchi reviewed these

opinions and found them “reasonable.” Tr. at 226, 235, 244. These

opinions constitute substantial evidence. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d

at 751. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision was not legal error.

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II. The ALJ Properly Concluded That Plaintiff Could Perform Work 

Requiring Light Repetitive Gripping

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by

eliciting and then ignoring the VE's testimony that the jobs

recommended for him required repetitive gripping. According to

Plaintiff, Dr. Newton stated that Plaintiff was precluded from

"repetitive gripping." Defendant argues that Dr. Newton's opinion

was in fact that Plaintiff could perform gripping activities so

long as they were not "forceful," and that the VE testified that

the occupations of “bench assembler, 706684022” and “assembler of

optical goods, 713687018” required only light gripping.

Plaintiff omits the word "forceful" from his description of

Dr. Newton's medical opinion. Dr. Newton opined that "it would be

reasonable to preclude repetitive forceful gripping bilaterally." 

Tr. at 235. The testimony of the VE as to the type of gripping

involved in the jobs he recommended for Plaintiff was as follows: 

ALJ: Would this gripping be, you said it would be

repetitive, but would it require a forceful gripping?

VE: No. We're talking about small objects. That's why

they're at the light and sedentary level.

ALJ: Okay.

VE: The most forceful would be probably using a

screwdriver and exerting less than five pounds of forceful

effort. 

Tr. at 378. Although stating he sometimes had problems with his

grip and the use of his hands due to carpal tunnel syndrome,

Plaintiff never testified to any problems with light repetitive

gripping and he points to no medical evidence contradicting the

VE's opinion that he could perform a job with light repetitive

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gripping. Therefore, it was not legal error for the ALJ to

conclude that Plaintiff could perform the occupations of bench

assembler and assembler of optical goods on the grounds that they

require light repetitive gripping. 

III. The ALJ’s Decision as to Plaintiff's Credibility is Not

Supported by Sufficient Evidence of Malingering.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not cite evidence or clear

and convincing reasons to support his disbelief of Plaintiff's

subjective complaints. Defendant argues that the ALJ's opinion as

to Plaintiff's credibility was properly supported by the record.

A. Legal Standard

As a threshold matter, for a claimant’s subjective symptom

testimony to be deemed credible, he or she "must produce objective

medical evidence of an underlying impairment 'which could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms

alleged.'" Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)

(en banc) (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The “Cotton test” does not require a claimant to produce objective

medical evidence of the pain itself, or its severity, but only

evidence from which the pain alleged can be reasonable inferred. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282.

Once a claimant meets his or her burden, "the Commissioner may

not discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms

merely because they are unsupportable by objective evidence. 

Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is

malingering, the Commissioner's reason for rejecting the claimant's

testimony must be 'clear and convincing.'" Lester, 81 F.3d at 834

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(quoting Swanson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989));

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. When judging the credibility of a

plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ must consider "all of the available

evidence" in analyzing the severity of the claimed pain. SSR 88-

13. Factors to be analyzed include: (1) the nature, location,

onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain;

(2) precipitating and aggravating factors; (3) type, dosage,

effectiveness and adverse side effects of any pain medications; (4)

treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain; (5)

functional restrictions; and (6) the plaintiff's daily activities. 

Id.; see Fair, 885 F.2d at 603; Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157,

1166 (9th Cir. 2001). Medical evidence is still relevant in

determining the severity of a plaintiff's alleged pain and its

disabling effects. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Rollins v.

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Analysis

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's "testimony [was] not fully

credible to the extent that his allegation of inability to work

because of low back pain and neck pain is inconsistent with the

medical evidence and opinion supporting [his] RFC." Tr. at 23. 

Plaintiff’s medical records demonstrate a sufficient evidentiary

basis from which Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain can be

reasonably inferred. Because Plaintiff meets his burden under the

Cotton test, it was the ALJ’s burden to cite to evidence of

malingering or to list “clear and convincing” reasons why

Plaintiff’s reasonable pain complaints should be ignored. 

The ALJ’s reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony was that

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it was “inconsistent with the medical evidence” upon which the ALJ

formulated Plaintiff’s RFC. Tr. at 23. Among these cited

inconsistencies was the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s statement

that Dr. Light told him he wasn’t “healed yet” was not credible

because Dr. Light opined on July 8, 2004, that Plaintiff had been

permanent and stationary since November 13, 2003. Tr. at 23. 

Here, the ALJ appears to have confused which surgery Plaintiff and

Dr. Light were referring to. Plaintiff testified as follows:

Attorney: You’re still, your surgery was in January of

this year. Have you been back to see Dr. Light?

Plaintiff: I seen him March 3rd.

Attorney: Okay. And what did he tell you on March 3rd?

Plaintiff: The reason why I’m experiencing what I’m

experiencing is because I’m not healed yet.

Tr. at 361. Plaintiff stated that Dr. Light told him that he was

not healed from his second surgery on January 5, 2005. Thus, Dr.

Light’s comment on July 8, 2004, that Plaintiff’s condition after

his first surgery had been permanent and stationary since November

13, 2003, is not inconsistent with this testimony.

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony that he could not bend

over due to pain between 2003 and 2004 inconsistent with

unspecified “medical evidence and opinions.” Tr. at 23; 360. The

Court finds no such inconsistent medical evidence. Instead, Dr.

Wechsler’s opinion suggested that Plaintiff was precluded from

“bending, stooping, and crouching.” Tr. at 226. Defendant argues

that Dr. Newton’s and Dr. Wechsler’s opinions show that Plaintiff

was capable of bending in late 2003. Although neither doctor found

Plaintiff’s spine completely unable to bend, both noted during

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their examinations that Plaintiff’s bending ability was restricted

by one-third. Tr. at 225, 230. The fact that the doctors did not

find Plaintiff totally immobile upon examination does not

contradict his testimony that bending on his own during this period

caused him debilitating pain. 

The ALJ also relied on the fact that Plaintiff was not on pain

medication at his May 27, 2004 examination with Dr. Light. 

Although not taking pain medication can discredit a claimant’s pain

testimony, this appears to have been an isolated occasion. During

the same May 27, 2004 exam, Dr. Light prescribed two different pain

killers. Plaintiff reported being on pain medication at most other

examinations, and at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. Tr.

at 224, 249, 251, 330, 367, 370-371. Plaintiff also has a history

of pursuing various non-pharmaceutical treatments to relieve his

pain. 

Finally, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s daily activities were

indicative “of a greater capacity for work activity than

[Plaintiff] is willing to acknowledge,” citing Plaintiff’s walking,

driving, standing at a fishing tournament, and watching television

as inconsistent with the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s pain

testimony. Tr. at 23. Plaintiff testified that at the time of the

hearing, he walked up and down his driveway until his “body tells

[him] to not.” Tr. at 358. He also testified that he stood at a

fishing tournament for an hour and a half, over which time his pain

steadily increased to the point that he had to leave and go to bed. 

Tr. at 357. As for driving, Plaintiff testified he could drive for

a maximum of an hour, and for longer trips he must split the trip

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up into two days. Tr. at 363-364. Plaintiff testified to watching

television, but he never specified the manner in which he did it,

whether sitting, standing, reclining, or lying down. Tr. at 365. 

None of this is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s pain testimony, and

in fact, supports his subjective feeling that he is limited to all

but minimal life activities due to his pain. 

Thus, the ALJ does not cite clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Therefore, on remand the ALJ

shall reconsider Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony.

IV. The ALJ Erred by Not Including Plaintiff's Right-Eye

Limitations in the Hypothetical to the VE

Plaintiff argues for the first time in his reply that the ALJ

wrongly concluded that Plaintiff’s lack of visual acuity in his

right eye was unsupported by the record, and that the jobs

recommended by the VE require “frequent near acuity.” In her surreply, Defendant concedes that the ALJ was mistaken in finding no

medical support for Plaintiff’s right-eye limitation, but argues

nonetheless that Plaintiff has “no visual limitation.” 

"An ALJ must propound a hypothetical to a VE that is based on

medical assumptions supported by substantial evidence in the record

that reflects all the claimant's limitations." Osenbrock v. Apfel,

240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001); see Roberts v. Shalala, 66

F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995). "The hypothetical should be

'accurate, detailed, and supported by the medical record.'"

Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1165. "It is, however, proper for an ALJ to

limit a hypothetical to those impairments that are supported by

substantial evidence in the record." Id.; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at

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756-57.

Dr. Wechsler states that Plaintiff is “blind in the right

eye.” Tr. at 224. Dr. Newton reports that Plaintiff has “vision

loss” in his right eye due to an injury. Tr. at 230. DDS medical

advisor Dr. Bianchi states that Plaintiff is “[b]lind in right eye

due to previous injury.” Tr. at 241. Dr. Schofferman states that

Plaintiff has “some residual blurred vision.” Tr. at 330. The

only mention the ALJ makes of Plaintiff’s visual impairment is that

he finds Plaintiff’s RFC for light work consistent with the

“additional postural and visual limitations" noted by the DDS

medical advisor, but that he does not "find any medical support for

the additional visual limitations related to the right eye." Tr.

at 23. This statement is inconsistent with the medical evidence. 

Moreover, Defendant is incorrect when she argues that Dr. Wechsler,

who stated that Plaintiff was blind in his right eye, “assessed no

visual limitation.” 

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified that he was not

precluded from work due to his visual impairment. Tr. at 23. 

However, despite Plaintiff's feelings as to his capabilities, the

ALJ is required to pose a hypothetical to the VE which includes all

of Plaintiff's limitations supported by substantial evidence. The

blindness in Plaintiff’s right eye may not have affected his

previous work as a carpenter, but it may affect the VE’s

recommended jobs of “assembler of optical goods, 713687018,” which

according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) requires

"[a]ttach[ing] nose pads and temple pieces to optical frames, using

handtools: Position[ing] parts in fixture to align screw holes.

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4

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these jobs require “‘frequent’ near acuity,” and he cites the wrong

DOT numbers for “bench assembler” and “optical assembler.” See Pl.’s

Response to Def.’s Mot. 4:12-4:14.

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Insert[ing] and tighten[ing] screws, using screwdriver," and “bench

assembler, 706684022,” which requires "position[ing] parts in

specified relationship to each other, using hands, tweezers, or

tongs."4 Therefore, on remand the ALJ shall pose a hypothetical to

the VE incorporating all of Plaintiff’s impairments and limitations

that are supported by medical evidence in the record. 

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion

to remand (Docket No. 13).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/2/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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