Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00367/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00367-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL L. JIMENA, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

UBS AG BANK, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-367 OWW/SKO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO SERVE SUMMONS AND

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT TO

CLIVE STANDISH'S ATTORNEY

WITHOUT PREJUDICE (Doc. 157) 

Plaintiff Carl L. Jimena, proceeding in pro per, has filed a

motion to serve a summons and the Third Amended Complaint on

Suhana S. Han, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York City, who Plaintiff

asserts “represents Clive Standish in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York, Civil Case No. 07 CV

11225 (RHS) ECF case together with the other defendants UBS AG,

Peter S. Wuffli, David S. Martin.”

After the motion was filed and noticed for hearing,

Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Letter Received from Clive Standish

Attorney.” (Doc. 177). In this letter dated November 2, 2009,

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Suhana S. Han states:

I am in receipt of your letters dated October

13 and October 19, 2009. Even if these

letters and their enclosed documents were

sufficient to effect proper service on Mr.

Clive Standish in the above-captioned action,

I neither represent Mr. Standish nor am

authorized to accept service on his behalf in

that action. In light of this, please

withdraw your ‘Motion to Serve Summons and

3 Amended Complaint to Clive Standish’s rd

Attorney.’

Along with this letter, I am returning your

letters and the enclosed documents.

UBS AG opposes this motion. Submitted with its opposition

is the Declaration of Suhana S. Han:

1. I am an attorney and a member of Sullivan

& Cromwell LLP. and am admitted to practice

in Massachusetts, New York, the United States

District Courts for the Southern and Eastern

Districts of New York, the United States

Courts of Appeal for the Second and Eleventh

Circuits, and the United States Supreme

Court. I have personal knowledge of the

matters set forth herein, and if called,

could and would competently testify thereto,

under oath. This declaration is submitted in

support of UBS AG’s Response to Plaintiff’s

‘Motion to Serve Summons and Complaint [sic]

to Clive Standish [sic] Attorney.’

2. I received by priority U.S. mail the

following documents from Carl L. Jimena dated

October 5, 2009: (i) a ‘Notice of Motion,

Motion to Serve Summons and 3 Amended rd

Complaint to Clive Standish’s Attorney’; and

(ii) a ‘Motion to Serve Summons and 3rd

Amended Complaint to Clive Standish’s

Attorney’; and (iii) ‘Memorandum of Law on

Motion to Serve Summons and 3 Amended rd

Complaint to Clive Standish Attorney.’

3. I also received by priority U.S. mail a

document from Mr. Jimena dated October 16,

2009 and entitled ‘Notice of Errata,’ which

included as an exhibit a notice of appearance

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that I filed for Mr. Standish in In re UBS

Securities Litigation, No. 07 CV 11225

(RJS)(S.D.N.Y.). Neither set of documents

that I received from Mr. Jimena contained a

complaint.

4. I, along with other lawyers at Sullivan &

Cromwell LLP, represent UBS AG in In re UBS

Securities Litigation, a putative securities

fraud class action concerning UBS’s portfolio

of mortgage-backed and auction rate

securities and its U.S. cross-border

business. In connection with that case, I

have filed notices of appearance on behalf of

numerous current and former UBS AG directors

and officers who were named as individual

defendants, including Mr. Standish.

5. Thus, while I do represent Mr. Standish

in a case pending in the Southern District of

New York, neither I nor any lawyer from

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP representing UBS AG

in In re UBS Securities Litigation represents

or is authorized to accept service on behalf

of Mr. Standish in the Jimena litigation. 

Indeed, I have never communicated with Mr.

Standish about this lawsuit or any other

matter.

In opposing this motion, UBS AG acknowledges that its counsel

does not represent Clive Standish in this litigation, but

“provides this response to Plaintiff’s motion because of UBS AG’s

interest in the speedy resolution of this frivolous case, which

has already dragged on for nearly three years and has

unnecessarily consumed both UBS AG’s and the Court’s resources.”

Plaintiff objects to UBS AG’s opposition to this motion,

contending that it does not have standing, making UBS AG’s

response “a mere scrap of paper that cannot be recognized and is

a scandalous matter that should be stricken under Rule 12(f)

FRCP.” 

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Plaintiff initially filed this as on August 18, 2009, as an

“Ex Parte Motion to Serve Summons and 3 Amended Complaint to rd

Clive Standish’s Attorney.” (Doc. 152). By Order filed on

September 30, 2009, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a notice

of motion, setting the motion on the Court’s civil law and motion

calendar. While UBS AG technically may not have standing to

oppose this motion, there is no prejudice to Plaintiff in

considering UBS AG’s contentions, especially since Plaintiff

responds to them in his reply brief. 

Clive Standish is named as a defendant in this action. In

the Memorandum Decision and Order filed on June 8, 2007 (Doc.

18), the Court noted at footnote 7:

The third defendant in this lawsuit,

individual defendant Clive Standish, a United

Kingdom citizen and Swiss resident, has not

been served and no attorney has made an

appearance for him. Plaintiff appears to

contend that he served Mr. Standish by

sending an email to the Yahoo email address

used by the impersonators who defrauded

plaintiff by pretending to be Mr. Standish. 

California does not provide for service by

email, and even if it did, such service could

not have been effective as to the real Mr.

Standish, a stranger to the Yahoo email

address used by Plaintiff.

On June 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion to order Yahoo,

Inc. “to make a disclosure on the two email accounts you contend

belong to an imposter of Clive Standish.” (Doc. 29). In this

motion, Plaintiff contended that he was dealing with the real

Clive Standish and that the two email addresses,

clive_standish@yahoo.com is Mr. Standish’s personal email address

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and customerservices@privateclientssubs.cjb.net is Mr. Standish’s

office email. Plaintiff asserted that he is in possession of an

email from Clive Standish wherein Mr. Standish admits that these

two email addresses are his and asserted that a disclosure by

Yahoo, Inc. will confirm his position. It appears from the

docket that this motion was denied by Magistrate Judge Goldner by

minute order filed on July 24, 2007. (Doc. 41). 

In his instant motion, Plaintiff asserts:

2. On March 9, 2007 before Plaintiff had any

knowledge of the notice of removal which was

received on March 12, 2007, plaintiff served

defendant Clive Standish three times in

succession with the summons and amended

complaint by email on his two email address

[sic], namely: ‘clive_standish@yahoo.com’ his

personal email address and

‘customerservices@privateclientssubs.cjb.net’

his office email address. This is shown by

the proof of service signed by a notary

public, Salman Ejaz, attached as Annex 7 to

Exhibit C of plaintiff’s motion to declare

notice of removal void or for remand, (Doc.

8).

3. The Superior Court of California

recognized the above service as valid service

under California’s Code of Civil Procedure,

rule 410.10 ... as shown by the Register of

Actions of the Superior Court of California

copy attached as Exhibit G to Doc. 8, motion

to declare notice of removal void. In view

of the difficulty of [sic] finding Clive

Standish, plaintiff is not waiving the

validity of the first service on March 9,

2007.

4. Plaintiff (without waiving the validity of

the first service on March 9, 2007 by email

as stated in paragraph two above) be

authorized to serve Clive Standish’s attorney

... by certified priority airmail with return

receipt requested, the same manner UBS AG and

UBS FS were served before.

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Plaintiff’s attempt to serve Clive Standish by email on March 9,

2007 occurred after the action was removed to this Court on March

6, 2007. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s contention that the Kern County

Superior Court recognized the email service of summons and

complaint on March 9, 2007 to the two email addresses listed by

Plaintiff, Exhibit G to Doc. 8 does not substantiate Plaintiff’s

contention. Exhibit G to Doc. 8 is a copy of a document

captioned “Civil Case Information - Register of Actions/Case

Docket” generated by the Kern County Superior Court in this

action prior its removal to this Court. For the date March 14,

2007, the docket entry states:

PROOF OF SERVICE-SUMMONS/COMPLAINT

WHAT SERVED: SUMMONS; AMENDED COMPLAINT

WHO SERVED: CLIVE STANDISH

HOW SERVED: CERTIFIED 

DATE SERVED: 3/9/07

Although Plaintiff argued to the Kern County Superior Court that

service of the summons and complaint on Clive Standish by email

was allowed under the law and facts, no such order from the Kern

County Superior Court is submitted by Plaintiff. A docket entry

by an unknown individual, which docket entry does not refer to

email service of summons and complaint, instead stating

“certified,” is not supportive of Plaintiff’s position. Attached

to Plaintiff’s reply brief as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the Kern

County Superior Court docket. The entry for February 5, 2007 in

connection with an order to show cause, which states in pertinent

part:

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COURT DECLINES TO GRANT EX-PARTE APPLICATION

TO CLERK RE: REQUEST FOR SERVICE IN

SWITZERLAND, WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

The entry for February 22, 2007 states:

RULING ON: DECLARATION OF COMPLIANCE FILED

2/8/07

PARAGRAPH 5: THIS COURT CAN NOT WAIVE ANY

REQUIREMENTS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION. FINAL

‘IN VIEW ...’ PARAGRAPH: THE COURT DOES NOT

WAIVE OBJECTIONS TO ANY SERVICE MADE IN

COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW.

Plaintiff cites Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International

Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9 Cir.2002), in support of his th

contention that service of the summons and Third Amended

Complaint on Ms. Han as counsel for Clive Standish in another

civil action is appropriate. 

In Rio Properties, Inc., Las Vegas hotel and casino operator

Rio Properties, Inc. (RIO) sued Rio International Interlink

(RII), a foreign internet business entity, asserting various

statutory and common law trademark infringement claims. The

District Court entered default judgment against RII for failing

to comply with discovery orders. RII appealed the sufficiency of

service of process, effected via email and regular mail pursuant

to Rule 4(f)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

To initiate suit, RIO attempted to locate RII in the United

States. RIO discovered that RII claimed an address in Miami,

Florida when it registered the allegedly infringing domain names. 

However, that address housed only RII’s international courier,

IEC, which was not authorized to accept service on RII’s behalf. 

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IEC agreed, however, to forward the summons and complaint to

RII’s Costa Rican courier. After sending a copy of the summons

and complaint through IEC, RIO received a telephone call from Los

Angeles attorney John Carpenter, inquiring about the lawsuit. 

Apparently, RII received the summons and complaint from IEC and

subsequently consulted Carpenter about how to respond. Carpenter

indicated that RII provided him with a partially legible copy of

the complaint and asked RIO to send him a complete copy. RIO

agreed to resend the complaint and, in addition, asked Carpenter

to accept service for RII; Carpenter declined. Carpenter did

request that RIO notify him upon successful completion of service

of process on RII. Id. at 1013.

RIO then investigated the possibility of serving RII in

Costa Rica. RIO searched international directory databases

looking for RII’s address in Costa Rica. The investigator

learned that RII preferred communications through its email

address, and received “snail mail,” including payment for

services, at the IEC address in Florida. Id.

Unable to serve RII by conventional means, RIO filed an

emergency motion for alternate service of process. RII opted not

to respond to RIO’s motion. The District Court granted RIO’s

motion, and pursuant to Rule 4(h)(2) and 4(f)(3), ordered service

of process on RII through the mail on Carpenter and IEC and via

RII’s email address. Id.

Rule 4(f) provides:

Unless federal law provides otherwise, an

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individual ... may be served at a place not

within any judicial district of the United

States:

(1) by any internationally agreed means of

service that is reasonably calculated to give

notice, such as those authorized by the Hague

Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial

and Extrajudicial Documents;

(2) if there is no internationally agreed

means, or if an international agreement

allows but does not specify other means, by a

method that is reasonably calculated to give

notice:

(A) as prescribed by the 

foreign country’s law for service in that

country in an action in its courts of general

jurisdiction;

(B) as the foreign authority 

directs in response to a letter rogatory or

letter of request; or

(C) unless prohibited by the

foreign country’s law, by:

(i) delivering a 

copy of the summons and of the complaint to

the individual personally; or

(ii) using any form 

of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to

the individual and that requires a signed

receipt; or

(3) by other means not prohibited by

international agreement, as the court orders. 

In Rio Properties, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that

“service under Rule 4(f)(3) must be (1) directed by the court;

and (2) not prohibited by international agreement.” 284 F.3d at

1014. “[S]o long as court-directed and not prohibited by an

international agreement, service of process ordered under rule

4(f)(3) may be accomplished in contravention of the laws of the

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foreign country.” Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected RII’s

argument that Rule 4(f) creates a hierarchy of preferred methods

of service of process:

RII’s interpretation would require that a

party attempt service of process by those

methods enumerated in rule 4(f)(2), including

by diplomatic channels and letters rogatory,

before petitioning the court for alternative

relief under Rule 4(f)(3). We find no

support for RII’s position. No such

requirement is found in the Rule’s text,

implied by its structure, or even hinted at

in the advisory committee notes.

Id. at 1014-1015. The Ninth Circuit ruled:

Contrary to RII’s assertions, RIO need not

have attempted every permissible means of

service of process before petitioning the

court for alternative relief. Instead, RIO

needed only to demonstrate that the facts and

circumstances of the present case

necessitated the district court’s

intervention. Thus, when RIO presented the

district court with its inability to serve an

elusive international defendant, striving to

evade service of process, the district court

properly exercised its discretionary powers

to craft alternate means of service. We

expressly agree with the district court’s

handling of this case and its use of Rule

4(f)(3) to ensure the smooth functioning of

our courts of law. 

Id. at 1016. The Ninth Circuit then addressed whether the method

of service of process ordered by the District Court comported

with constitutional notions of due process. To meet this

requirement, the method of service crafted by the district court

must be “‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to

apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and

afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Id. 

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The Ninth Circuit ruled that the alternate service ordered by the

District Court was constitutionally acceptable. After discussing

service by mail on IEC, the Ninth Circuit addressed service on

the attorney, Carpenter, and on RII by email:

Service upon Carpenter was also appropriate

because he had been specifically consulted by

RII regarding this lawsuit. He knew of RII’s

legal positions, and it seems clear that he

was in contact with RII in Costa Rica. 

Accordingly, service to Carpenter was

reasonably calculated in these circumstances

to apprise RII of the pendency of the present

action.

Finally, we turn to the district court’s

order authorizing service of process on RII

by email at email@betrio.com. We acknowledge

that we tread upon untrodden ground. The

parties cite no authority condoning service

of process over the Internet or via email,

and our own investigation has unearthed no

decisions by the United States Courts of

Appeals dealing with service of process by

email and only one case anywhere in the

federal courts. Despite this dearth of

authority, however, we do not labor long in

reaching our decision. Considering the facts

presented by this case, we conclude not only

that service of process by email was proper -

this is, reasonably calculated to apprise RII

of the pendency of the action and afford it

an opportunity to respond - but in this case,

it was the method of service most likely to

reach RII. 

...

Although communication via email and over the

Internet is comparatively new, such

communication has been zealously embraced

within the business community. RII

particularly has embraced the modern ebusiness model and profited immensely from

it. In fact, RII structured its business

such that it could be contacted only via its

email address. RII listed no easily

discoverable street address in the United

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States or in Costa Rica. Rather, on its

website and print media, RII designated its

email address as its preferred contact

information.

Unlike the Iranian officials in New England

Merchants, RII had neither an office nor a

door; it had only a computer terminal. If

any method of communication is reasonably

calculated to provide RII with notice, surely

it is email - the method of communication

which RII utilizes and prefers. In addition,

email was the only court-ordered method of

service aimed directly and instantly at RII,

as opposed to methods of service effected

through intermediaries like IEC and

Carpenter. Indeed, when faced with an

international e-business scofflaw, playing

hide-and-seek with the federal court, email

may be the only means of effecting service of

process. Certainly in this case, it was a

means reasonably calculated to apprise RII of

the pendency of the lawsuit, and the

Constitution requires nothing more.

Citing WAWA, Inc. v. Christensen, ... 1999 WL

557936, at *1 ... (E.D.Pa, July 29, 1999)

..., RII contends that email is never an

approved method of service under Rule 4. We

disagree. In WAWA, the plaintiff attempted

to serve the defendant via email absent a

court order. Although RII is correct that a

plaintiff may not generally resort to email

service on his own initiative, in this case,

as in International Telemedia Associates,

email service was properly ordered by the

district court using its discretion under

Rule 4(f)(3).

Despite our endorsement of service of process

by email in this case, we are cognizant of

its limitations. In most instances, there is

no way to confirm receipt of an email

message. Limited use of electronic

signatures could present problems in

complying with the verification requirements

of Rule 4(a) and Rule 11, and system

capability problems may lead to controversies

over whether an exhibit or attachment was

actually received. Imprecise imaging

technology may even make appending exhibits

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and attachments impossible. We note,

however, that, except for the provisions

recently introduced into Rule 5(b), email

service is not available absent a Rule

4(f)(3) court decree. Accordingly, we leave

it to the discretion of the district court to

balance the limitations of email service

against its benefits in any particular case

... 

Id. at 1017-1018.

Plaintiff’s request that he be allowed to serve the summons

and Third Amended Complaint on Clive Standish by serving his

attorney in another civil action in another district is

problematic. 

First, service of process on an attorney is ineffective

unless the attorney has specific authority to accept service in

the action. See Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 827

F.2d 1246, 1248-1249 (9 Cir.1987). However, in Forum Financial th

Group v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 199 F.R.D. 22

(D.Me.,2001), the plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants,

including Jonathan Hay, an American residing in Russia, involving

Hay’s business dealings in Russia. The plaintiffs moved for a

court-directed service of process by certified mail to Spiegal,

an attorney who had recently accepted service of process on Hay’s

behalf in another federal case that also involved Hay’s business

dealings in Russia. The District Court addressed Spiegal’s

contention that service on a party through an attorney who is not

authorized to accept such service is generally inappropriate

because it risks adversely affecting the attorney-client

relationship. Id. at 24. Acknowledging the general rule that

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service of process on an attorney is not effective unless the

attorney is authorized to accept service, the District Court

ruled:

Those cases are distinguishable, however,

because they do not involve court-directed

service as is requested here, but only the

parties’ own attempts at service without

prior court authorization ... Where, as here,

a party moves for court-directed service

under Rule 4(f)(3), the court’s decision to

grant or deny the motion after careful

consideration of the particular facts of the

case can safeguard the attorney-client

relationship against any unwarranted

intrusion ... In this case, based upon the

representations made at this point in the

proceedings, I conclude that service of 5

process via Spiegal is appropriate given

Hay’s efforts to evade service in Russia and

Speigal’s recent acceptance of service on

Hay’s behalf in a case also involving Hay’s

business dealings in Russia ... Such service

via Attorney Spiegal is likely to fulfill the

due process requirement of being reasonably

calculated to give Hay notice of the case and

an opportunity to be heard ... Notably,

Attorney Spiegal does not argue that sending

service to him would fail to give Hay fair

notice, nor does he assert that he is not in

contact with Hay.

Employing local counsel in Russia, the 5

plaintiffs have attempted to serve Hay by

certified mail and by hand, at both his home

and business addresses. Chizhikova Decl. ¶

7. The plaintiffs’ legal counsel asserts

that Hay has actively evaded her efforts to

serve him, id., that he is now living under

an assumed name, and that she cannot find

him. Supplemental Chizhikova Decl. ¶ 4. The

plaintiffs also assert that they would be

prejudiced if forced to attempt to serve Hay

by letter rogatory because the attempt would

not be successful but would take between six

months and one year to complete. Pls. Reply

to Opp’n to Mot. for Court-Directed Service

at 5. 

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199 F.R.D. at 24-25 & n.5. 

However, the record in this action does not mirror the

circumstances in Forum Financial Group. Ms. Han and the law firm

Sullivan and Cromwell are not authorized to accept service of

process on behalf of Clive Standish in this action. The action

against Clive Standish and others in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York is a class action

alleging securities fraud by plaintiffs who purchased or acquired

securities issued by UBS AG on worldwide stock exchanges from

August 13, 2003 to February 23, 2009. Although both actions

involve allegations of fraud, there the similarities cease. 

Further, in Forum Financial Group and Rio Properties, the

opinions noted the extent to which evasion of service occurred

and, in Rio Properties, the Ninth Circuit expressly noted that no

international treaty service requirements were involved. Here,

Plaintiff makes no showing that he is not bound by the

requirements of the Hague Convention.

In addition, there is a real issue in this action whether

the Clive Standish emailed by Plaintiff is the Clive Standish,

formerly Chief Financial Officer for UBS AG. As noted, Standish

is represented to be a citizen of Great Britain and a resident of

Switzerland. Plaintiff makes no showing in his motion of any

efforts other than the March 9, 2007 emails, to accomplish

service of process on Clive Standish. Annex 1 to Exhibit C to

Doc. 8, is a copy of “Plaintiff’s Explanation on Order to Show

Cause on March 22, 2007" filed in the Kern County Superior Court

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on March 14, 2007, wherein Plaintiff asserts:

5. The only defendant not served is

defendant Clive Standish who can only be

served in accordance with the 1964 Hague

Convention on service of Judicial and

Extrajudicial Documents abroad. (Kott v.

Superior Court, 45 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1135-

1136) and this Court declined service of the

papers to him. 

Plaintiff gives no explanation for the Kern County Superior

Court’s ruling, if such in fact was the ruling, and what is meant

by “this Court declined service of the papers to him.” 

Plaintiff asserts in his reply brief:

Clive Standish presumably resides in

Switzerland. Plaintiff while this case was

in the Superior Court of California prepared

all the papers for service thru proper

channels in Switzerland. Plaintiff requested

the California Superior Court for permission

to serve the papers thru international

channels but it was rejected by the

California ... With no alternative left,

plaintiff resorted to California’s Long Arm

Statute, Sec. 410.10, California Code of

Civil Procedure and served Clive Standish by

email which was accepted by the California

Superior Court. Then this case was removed

to this District Court. Plaintiff continued

to search the internet bi-weekly or monthly

for any clue as to the whereabouts of Clive

Standish but to no avail until plaintiff came

across a news [sic] in the internet that a

William Wesner filed suit against Clive

Standish. Plaintiff searched the court files

of the Southern District of New York and

found Atty. Suhana Han. Plaintiff is on $600

monthly social security income and cannot

afford to hire an investigator in Switzerland

to find Clive Standish. The only tool

available to plaintiff to make a search in

[sic] the internet.

As noted, the record does not establish that the Kern County

Superior Court accepted or approved of the emailed service of

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process. Attached to Plaintiff’s reply brief as Exhibit 1 is a

copy of the Kern County Superior Court docket. The entry for 

February 5, 2007 in connection with an order to show cause, which

states in pertinent part:

COURT DECLINES TO GRANT EX-PARTE APPLICATION

TO CLERK RE: REQUEST FOR SERVICE IN

SWITZERLAND, WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

The entry for February 22, 2007 states:

RULING ON: DECLARATION OF COMPLIANCE FILED

2/8/07

PARAGRAPH 5: THIS COURT CAN NOT WAIVE ANY

REQUIREMENTS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION. FINAL

‘IN VIEW ...’ PARAGRAPH: THE COURT DOES NOT

WAIVE OBJECTIONS TO ANY SERVICE MADE IN

COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW.

Plaintiff’s briefs in support of this motion provide no

explanation of the Superior Court’s February 5, 2007 ruling and

why he could not then proceed to serve Standish in his country of

residence, because the denial was without prejudice. Plaintiff

does not submit copies of his pleadings filed in the Superior

Court regarding service of process on Clive Standish. At the

hearing, Plaintiff stated that the Superior Court provided no

explanation for its ruling and that he did not again attempt

service of process on Clive Standish pursuant to the Hague

Convention because he expected the Superior Court to make the

same ruling. 

Rio Properties notes:

A federal court would be prohibited from

issuing a Rule 4(f)(3) order in contravention

of an international agreement, including the

Hague Convention referenced in Rule 4(f)(1). 

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The parties agree, however, that the Hague

Convention does not apply in this case

because Costa Rica is not a signatory. 

284 F.3d at 1015 n.4. Switzerland is a signatory with

declarations to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial

or Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Criminal Matters (the

“Hague Convention”). Article 10 of the Hague Convention states:

Provided the State of destination does not

object, the present Convention shall not

interfere with -

(a) the freedom to send judicial

documents, by postal channels,

directly to persons abroad,

(b) the freedom of judicial

officers, officials or other

competent persons of the State of

origin to effect service of

judicial documents directly through

the judicial officers, officials or

other competent persons of the

State of destination,

(c) the freedom of any person

interested in a judicial proceeding

to effect service of judicial

documents directly through the

judicial officers, officials or

other competent persons of the

State of destination. 

However, Switzerland declared its reservations that “In

accordance with Article 21, second paragraph (a), Switzerland

declares that it is opposed to the use in its territory of the

method[] of transmission provided for in Article[] ... 10.” 

Further, “[i]n accordance with Article 21, first paragraph (a),

Switzerland designates the cantonal authorities as Central

Authorities referred to in Articles 2 and 18 of the Convention. 

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Requests for service of documents may also be addressed to the

Federal Justice and Police Department in Bern, which will forward

them to the appropriate Central Authority.” See

www.hcch.net/index_en.php?actconventions.authorities&cid17.

Therefore, direct mail to a Swiss resident is not an

“internationally agreed means” permitted by Rule 4(f) and the

Hague Convention. However, there are indications in the record

that Plaintiff does not know the address of Clive Standish or

whether he is in fact a resident of Switzerland. Article I of

the Hague Convention provides that “[t]his Convention shall not

apply where the address of the person to be served is not known.” 

However, Plaintiff provides no information of his efforts to

ascertain Standish’s address in Switzerland, except to state that

he cannot afford to conduct an appropriate investigation.

Plaintiff makes no showing that Clive Standish is attempting

to evade service of process. The only attempted service by

Plaintiff was the email service in March 2007; Plaintiff provides

no evidence that he has otherwise attempted service of process

since that date through the Hague Convention. See U.S. Aviation

Underwriters, Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., 2007 WL 3012612 at *2

(W.D.Wash., Oct. 11, 2007), citing Rio Properties:

Based on this authority [Rio Properties],

plaintiff’s request to use Rule 4(f)(3)

simply because it ‘will be much faster, thus

moving this case forward in an expeditious

and cost-effective manner,’ ... by itself is

not sufficient justification for the Court to

authorize service by alternative method. 

Plaintiff cites no reason what the methods

specified by Fed.R.Civ.P 4(f)(1) and (2)

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would be ineffective, unlike Rio Properties

where the defendant was ‘elusive’ and

‘striving to evade service of process.’ Rio

Properties, 284 F.3d at 1016. Because the

requirements for due process and respect for

international law outweigh plaintiff’s desire

to proceed expeditiously, the Court finds

insufficient cause to authorize service by

alternative means.

Plaintiff’s real explanation for this motion is his contention

that he cannot afford to investigate the local address for Clive

Standish in order to serve him via the Hague Convention

procedures applicable to Switzerland. Plaintiff asserts that

evasion of service is not a prerequisite to court-directed

service of process on Standish’s attorney in another case, citing

Forum Financial Group, supra, 199 F.R.D. at 23-24:

Attorney Spiegal ... contends that courtdirected service under Rule 4(f)(3) is not

generally available unless attempts at

service by means authorized by any applicable

international agreement have proven

unsuccessful. He asserts that court-directed

service is ‘extraordinary relief’ that is

inappropriate in this case because the

plaintiffs have not attempted to serve Hay by

letter rogatory. He asserts that the latter

method is allowed under a 1985 agreement

between the United States and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics ... Contrary to

these assertions, nothing in Rule 4(f) or its

advisory committee notes indicates that

court-directed service under Rule 4(f)(3) is

‘extraordinary relief.’ By its plain

language and syntax, Rule 4(f)(3)’s plain

language unambiguously indicates that the

only limit it imposes on court-directed

service under Rule 4(f)(3) is that the means

must not be prohibited by international

agreement ... Moreover, the 1985 Agreement

between the United States and U.S.S.R. - if

it is even applicable - merely sets forth

procedures for executing letters rogatory; it

does not prohibit other means of service. 

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Because no international agreement prohibits

me from directing service on Hay via

certified mail to Spiegel, neither does Rule

4(f)(3). 

Plaintiff further asserts that, even if it is first necessary for

Plaintiff to establish that Clive Standish has evaded service of

process:

Plaintiff has no direct evidence that Clive

Standish is actually evading service because

he is presumably in Switzerland while

Plaintiff is in California. Plaintiff has no

eyes and ears in Switzerland. But the

circumstantial evidence that he is evading

service is when he was served by email at his

office address he did not answer. His office

email address 

customerservice@privateclientssubs.cjb.net is

a good email address because plaintiff say

that before in UBS AG’s website,

http://www.ubs.com/ Defendants now say that

email address is an imposter address - this

is sham and false. Plaintiff personally saw

that email address at www.ubs.com many times

before this case was filed. Another

circumstantial evidence of evading service is

that plaintiff could not find any clue in the

internet other than his case pending in

Southern [sic] District of New York. 

Apparently he has withdrawn himself from the

public scene in view of the fraud cases he

got involved. [sic] Defendants say plaintiff

‘has not made a good faith effort to serve

Mr. Standish through traditional means.’ ...

Plaintiff already explained this above that

he prepared all papers for service under

international law but the California Superior

Court rejected it.

Again, Plaintiff provides no explanation for the Superior

Court’s ruling and his contention that the email address for

Clive Standish is correct is unproven as yet. Further, the cases

emphasize evasion of service of process. Merely because Clive

Standish’s personal address is not available via the internet

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does not mean he evaded service of process. 

UBS AG cites Rio Properties, supra, 284 F.3d at 1016, that

“we hold that Rule 4(f)(3) is an equal means of effecting service

of process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and we

commit to the sound discretion of the district court the task of

determining when the particularities and necessities of a given

case require alternate service of process under Rule 4(f)(3).” 

UBS AG argues that the “particularities and necessities” of this

case weigh against granting Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff has

filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in which he asserts

that this action is ripe for summary adjudication and UBS AG has

filed a motion for summary judgment:

If, as UBS AG believes, its motion should

dispose of this case, this is particularly

inopportune time to bring in an additional

defendant, sued on the same frivolous legal

theory, who will need to expend time and

money to get up to speed on this years’ long

litigation. 

This action was commenced in the Kern County Superior Court

in February 2007 and removed to this Court on March 6, 2007. The

Memorandum Decision and Order denying Plaintiff’s motion to

remand was filed on June 8, 2007, in which the Court noted at

footnote 7:

The third defendant in this lawsuit,

individual defendant Clive Standish, a United

Kingdom citizen and Swiss resident, has not

been served and no attorney has made an

appearance for him. Plaintiff appears to

contend that he served Mr. Standish by

sending an email to the Yahoo email address

used by the impersonators who defrauded

plaintiff by pretending to be Mr. Standish. 

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California does not provide for service by

email, and even if it did, such service could

not have been effective as to the real Mr.

Standish, a stranger to the Yahoo email

address used by Plaintiff. 

Although Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default against

Clive Standish on June 15 and 20, 2007, (Docs. 20 & 22), the

request was denied by the Clerk on June 15 and 22, 2007 because

there is no valid proof of service on file with the Court. (Docs.

21 & 23). Plaintiff did not file the instant motion until

October 8, 2009. Although Rule 4(m), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedures’s 120 day limit on service of process does not apply

to service in a foreign country under Rule 4(f), Plaintiff

delayed for years, with no apparent effort at service after the

case was removed, before bringing this motion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s motion to serve a

summons and the Third Amended Complaint on Clive Standish’s

attorney is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. There is no showing why

Plaintiff has waited three years to effect service on Clive

Standish or that statutorily authorized means of service will not

be effective.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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