Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-07-02539/USCOURTS-ca3-07-02539-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 07-2539

 

 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION;

ANDROGYNY BOOKS, INC.,

d/b/a A DIFFERENT LIGHT BOOKSTORES;

AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS FOUNDATION

FOR FREE EXPRESSION;

ADDAZI, INC.,

d/b/a CONDOMANIA;

ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION;

ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER;

FREE SPEECH MEDIA;

PHILADELPHIA GAY NEWS;

POWELL'S BOOKSTORES;

SALON MEDIA GROUP, INC.;

PLANETOUT, INC.;

HEATHER CORINNA REARICK;

NERVE.COM, INC.;

AARON PECKHAM, d/b/a URBAN DICTIONARY;

PUBLIC COMMUNICATORS, INC.;

DAN SAVAGE; SEXUAL HEALTH NETWORK

v.

*MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,

in his official capacity

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2

as Attorney General of

the United States

Michael B. Mukasey,

Appellant

*(Substituted as per FRAP 43(b))

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 98-cv-05591)

Honorable Lowell A. Reed, District Judge

 

Argued June 10, 2008

BEFORE: AMBRO, CHAGARES, 

and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 22, 2008)

 

Catherine N. Crump

Aden J. Fine

Christopher A. Hansen (argued)

Benjamin E. Wizner

American Civil Liberties Union

18th Floor

125 Broad Street

New York, NY 10004-0000

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3

Christopher R. Harris

Jeroen van Kwawegen

Katherine E. Marshall

Latham & Watkins

885 Third Avenue

Suite 1000

New York, NY 10022-4802

 Attorneys for Appellees

Jeffrey S. Bucholtz

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Patrick L. Meehan

United States Attorney

Scott R. McIntosh

United States Department of Justice

Civil Division

Room 7259

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530-0000

Charles W. Scarborough (argued)

United States Department of Justice

Appellate Section

Room 7244

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530-0000

 Attorneys for Appellant

David P. Affinito

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Dell’Italia, Affinito, & Santola

18 Tony Galento Plaza

Orange, NJ 07050-0000

 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Morality in Media, Inc.

Steven W. Fitschen

The National Legal Foundation 

2224 Virginia Beach Boulevard 

Suite 204

Virginia Beach, VA 23454-0000

 Attorney for Amicus Curiae National Legal Foundation

Robert Corn-Revere

Davis, Wright & Tremine

1919 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Suite 200

Washington, D.C. 20005-0000

 Attorneys for Amici Curiae Article 19, Reporters 

 Without Borders, and World Press Freedom

John B. Morris, Jr.

Center for Democracy & Technology

1634 I Street, N.W.

Suite 1100

Washington, D.C. 20006-0000

 Attorneys for certain amici curiae

 

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OPINION OF THE COURT

 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from

an order of the District Court entered March 22, 2007, finding

that the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”), 47 U.S.C. §

231, facially violates the First and Fifth Amendments of the

Constitution and permanently enjoining the Attorney General

from enforcing COPA. The Government challenges the District

Court’s conclusions that: (1) COPA is not narrowly tailored to

advance the Government’s compelling interest in protecting

children from harmful material on the World Wide Web

(“Web”); (2) there are less restrictive, equally effective

alternatives to COPA; and (3) COPA is impermissibly

overbroad and vague. We will affirm.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

It is useful at the outset to set forth a short history of the

background of COPA and an explanation of the relationship

between the Web and the Internet. Congress enacted COPA to

protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit material on the

Web. The Web is just one portion of the Internet, which “is an

interactive medium based on a decentralized network of

computers.” American Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478

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F. Supp. 2d 775, 781 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Gonzales”). “The

Internet may also be used to engage in other activities such as

sending and receiving emails, trading files, exchanging instant

messages, chatting online, streaming audio and video, and

making voice calls.” Id. The District Court described how the

Web functions:

On the Web, a client program called a Web

browser retrieves information from the Internet,

such as Web pages and other computer files using

their network addresses and displays them,

typically on a computer monitor . . . . Web pages,

which can contain, inter alia, text, still and

moving picture files, sound files, and computer

scripts, are often arranged in collections of related

material called Web sites, which consist of one or

more Web pages. . . . It is estimated that there

are between 25 and 64 billion Web pages on the

surface portion of the Web (‘Surface Web’) – that

is, the portion of the Web that is capable of being

indexed by search engines. These Web pages

may be displayed on a monitor screen and, thus,

the content may be seen by anyone operating a

computer or other Internet capable device which

is properly connected to the Internet.

Id. at 781-82 (citations omitted). The District Court indicated

that “[a] little more than 1 percent of all Web pages on the

Surface Web (amounting to approximately 275 million to 700

million Web pages) are sexually explicit.” Id. at 788.

COPA provides for civil and criminal penalties –

including up to six months imprisonment – for anyone who

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knowingly posts “material that is harmful to minors” on the Web

“for commercial purposes.” 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1).

“Intentional” violations result in heavier fines. Id. at §

231(a)(2). “[M]aterial that is harmful to minors” includes any

communication that is obscene or that:

(A) the average person, applying contemporary

community standards, would find, taking the

material as a whole and with respect to minors, is

designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to,

the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes, or

represents, in a manner patently offensive with

respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual

act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated

normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd

exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent

female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, lacks

serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific

value for minors.

Id. at § 231(e)(6). “The term ‘minor’ means any person under

17 years of age.” Id. at § 231(e)(7). A person makes a

communication “for commercial purposes” only if the person

when making the communication “is engaged in the business of

making such communications.” Id. at § 231(e)(2)(A). A person

is “engaged in the business” when the person:

devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities,

as a regular course of such person’s trade or

business, with the objective of earning a profit as

a result of such activities . . . . [and] only if the

person knowingly causes [or solicits] the material

that is harmful to minors to be posted on the

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World Wide Web . . . .

Id. at § 231(e)(2)(B). A Web publisher can assert an affirmative

defense to prosecution under COPA if he or she:

has restricted access by minors to material that is

harmful to minors – (A) by requiring use of a

credit card, debit account, adult access code, or

adult personal identification number; (B) by

accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or

(C) by any other reasonable measures that are

feasible under available technology.

Id. at § 231(c)(1).

Congress enacted COPA after the Supreme Court

declared Congress’s first attempt to protect minors from

exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Web to be

unconstitutional. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,

521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997) (holding that the

Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment).

The day after COPA became law on October 21, 1998,

plaintiffs, consisting of speakers, content providers, and users of

the Web, filed this action in the District Court seeking an

injunction barring COPA’s enforcement. On February 1, 1999,

the District Court preliminarily enjoined the Government from

enforcing COPA pending a trial on the merits. American Civil

Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).

In its opinion the court pointed out, among many other things,

that the plaintiffs suggested that filtering and blocking

technology was an “example of a more efficacious and less

restrictive means to shield minors from harmful materials” than

COPA but that the final determination of whether this was so

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“must await trial on the merits.” Id. at 497. 

The Government appealed but we affirmed the District

Court’s order after concluding that the “community standards”

language in section 231(e)(6)(A) by itself rendered COPA

unconstitutionally overbroad. American Civil Liberties Union

v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000) (“ACLU I”). The

Government then sought and obtained certiorari and the

Supreme Court vacated our decision and remanded the case to

us for further proceedings because the Court concluded that the

“community standards” language did not, standing alone, make

the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. Ashcroft v. American

Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 585, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1713

(2002).

On the remand we ruled that, for a variety of reasons,

COPA was not narrowly tailored to serve the Government’s

compelling interest in preventing minors from being exposed to

harmful material on the Web, was not the least restrictive means

available to effect that interest, and was substantially overbroad.

American Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251-

71 (3d Cir. 2003) (“ACLU II”). Consequently, we again

affirmed the District Court’s order granting the preliminary

injunction. Id. at 271. The Government again sought and

obtained certiorari but this time the Supreme Court affirmed our

decision though it remanded the case to the District Court for a

trial on the merits. The Court contemplated that the record

would be updated on the remand to reflect the then current

technological developments and to account for any changes in

the legal landscape. The Court further directed that the District

Court determine whether Internet content filters are more

effective than enforcement of the COPA restrictions or whether

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other possible alternatives are less restrictive and more effective

than COPA to effectuate Congress’s intention. Ashcroft v.

American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 670-73, 124

S.Ct. 2783, 2794-95 (2004).

After a bench trial, the District Court on March 22, 2007,

issued extensive findings of fact, determined that plaintiffs have

standing to maintain this action, and concluded that:

COPA facially violates the First and Fifth

Amendment rights of the plaintiffs because: (1)

COPA is not narrowly tailored to the compelling

interest of Congress; (2) defendant has failed to

meet his burden of showing that COPA is the

least restrictive and most effective alternative in

achieving the compelling interest; and (3) COPA

is impermissibly vague and overbroad.

Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 821. The District Court

permanently enjoined the Attorney General and his officers,

agents, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active

concert or participation with him who received actual notice of

its order, from enforcing or prosecuting matters premised upon

COPA at any time for any conduct. Id.

The Government then filed a timely appeal to this Court.

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1331 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review the constitutionality of a federal statute and related

questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Abdul-Akbar v.

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McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2001). Although we

generally review a district court’s factual findings for clear

error, “[i]n the First Amendment context, reviewing courts have

a duty to engage in a searching, independent factual review of

the full record.” United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 91 (3d

Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “an

appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an independent

examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the

judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field

of free expression.’” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958 (1984)

(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,

284-86, 84 S.Ct. 710, 728-29 (1964)).

IV. DISCUSSION

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall

make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I. COPA criminalizes a

category of speech – “harmful to minors” material – that is

constitutionally protected for adults. Because COPA is a

content-based restriction on protected speech, it is

presumptively invalid and the Government bears the burden of

showing its constitutionality. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660, 124

S.Ct. at 2788.

The Government challenges the District Court’s decision

that COPA facially violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights

because it was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling

government interest, i.e., was not the least restrictive alternative

to advance that interest, the prevention of minors from being

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 1

The Government, however, does not challenge the District

Court’s determination that plaintiffs have standing to bring this

action.

12

exposed to harmful material on the Web, and was impermissibly

vague and overbroad.1

A. Law-of-the-Case Doctrine

Before we reach the merits of the case, we must address

the effect of our prior decision in ACLU II on this appeal, as the

presence of that decision may make the law-of-the-case doctrine

relevant here. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “when a

court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue

to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same

case.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S.

800, 816, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2177 (1988) (quoting Arizona v.

California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391 (1983)).

“This rule of practice promotes the finality and efficiency of the

judicial process by protecting against the agitation of settled

issues.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

We recently addressed the binding effect that our prior

decisions on legal issues at the preliminary injunction stage on

an earlier appeal in the same case have on later decisions. See

Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2004).

Clearly the nature of the showing that an applicant for a

preliminary injunction must make to obtain relief can present

special difficulties in applying the law-of-the-case doctrine in

later stages of the litigation. In Pitt News we noted that “three

separate rules are relevant” when considering the effect of a

preliminary injunction later in ongoing litigation:

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First, it is our Court’s tradition that a panel may

not overrule ‘a holding’ of a prior panel. Second,

it is well established that neither this tradition nor

the law-of-the-case doctrine requires a panel

hearing an appeal from the entry of a final

judgment to follow the legal analysis contained in

a prior panel decision addressing the question

whether a party that moved for preliminary

injunctive relief showed a likelihood of success

on the merits. Third, although a panel

entertaining a preliminary injunction appeal

generally decides only whether the district court

abused its discretion in ruling on the request for

relief and generally does not go into the merits

any farther than is necessary to determine whether

the moving party established a likelihood of

success, a panel is not always required to take this

narrow approach. If a preliminary injunction

appeal presents a question of law and the facts are

established or of no controlling relevance, the

panel may decide the merits of the claim.

Id. at 104-05 (citations and most internal quotation marks

omitted). We explained:

In the typical situation – where the prior panel

stopped at the question of likelihood of success –

the prior panel’s legal analysis must be carefully

considered, but it is not binding on the later panel.

Indeed, particularly where important First

Amendment issues are raised, the later panel has

a duty, in the end, to exercise its own best

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judgment. On the other hand, if the first panel

does not stop at the question of likelihood of

success and instead addresses the merits, the later

panel, in accordance with our Court’s traditional

practice, should regard itself as bound by the prior

panel opinion.

Id. at 105.

But even if we subsequently conclude that in a particular

case our prior determination ordinarily would bind us, we may

reconsider issues that we previously resolved if any of the

following “extraordinary circumstances” are present: “(1) there

has been an intervening change in the law; (2) new evidence has

become available; or (3) reconsideration is necessary to prevent

clear error or a manifest injustice.” Council of Alternative

Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing

In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir.

1998)).

In ACLU II we concluded that plaintiffs were likely to

succeed on the merits and thus concluded that the District Court

could grant them a preliminary injunction. Nevertheless we did

not stop our analysis after coming to that conclusion. Instead,

we opined at length on the constitutionality of COPA and

construed a number of terms of the statute. Consequently, the

procedural posture of this case and the scope of our prior

decision has set a foundation for the possible applicability of the

law-of-the-case doctrine here.

Though we will explain in more detail the basis for our

conclusions in ACLU II, for purposes of determining the

binding effect of that decision on this appeal it is enough to note

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now that we expressly held the following: (1) COPA’s

definitions of “material that is harmful to minors,” and

“commercial purposes” and COPA’s affirmative defenses are

not narrowly tailored to achieve the Government’s compelling

interest in protecting minors from harmful material on the Web,

322 F.3d at 251; (2) filtering software is a less restrictive

alternative than the COPA restrictions to advance the

Government’s compelling interest in preventing minors from

being exposed to harmful material on the Web, id. at 265; (3)

COPA is “substantially overbroad” because of its use of the

terms “material harmful to minors,” “minor,” “commercial

purposes,” and “community standards”; (4) COPA’s affirmative

defenses do not save the statute from sweeping too broadly; and

(5) a narrowing construction of COPA is not available to permit

it to be upheld, id. at 266-71.

In its decision affirming ACLU II, the Supreme Court

expressly declined to consider many of the issues that we had

determined. Specifically, the Court stated:

[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals that the

District Court did not abuse its discretion in

entering the preliminary injunction. Our

reasoning in support of this conclusion, however,

is based on narrower, more specific grounds than

the rationale the Court of Appeals adopted. The

Court of Appeals, in its opinion affirming the

decision of the District Court, construed a number

of terms in the statute, and held that COPA, so

construed, was unconstitutional. None of those

constructions of statutory terminology, however,

were relied on by or necessary to the conclusions

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of the District Court. Instead, the District Court

concluded only that the statute was likely to

burden some speech that is protected for adults,

which [the Government] does not dispute. As to

the definitional disputes, the District Court

concluded only that [the plaintiffs’] interpretation

was ‘not unreasonable,’ and relied on their

interpretation only to conclude that [the plaintiffs]

had standing to challenge the statute, which,

again, [the Government] does not dispute.

Because we affirm the District Court’s decision to

grant the preliminary injunction for the reasons

relied on by the District Court, we decline to

consider the correctness of the other arguments

relied on by the Court of Appeals.

Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 665, 124 S.Ct. at 2791 (citations omitted).

The Court then addressed the issue of whether there are less

restrictive alternatives to the COPA restrictions to further the

Government’s compelling interest in COPA’s objective and

stated that “[f]ilters are less restrictive than COPA.” Id. at 667,

124 S.Ct. at 2792. The Court recognized, however, that “there

are substantial factual disputes remaining in the case. . . .

[T]here is a serious gap in the evidence as to the effectiveness of

filtering software. For us to assume, without proof, that filters

are less effective than COPA would usurp the District Court’s

factfinding role.” Id. at 671, 124 S.Ct. at 2794 (citation

omitted). Thus, the Court recognized that restrictiveness and

effectiveness are separate matters. The Court also noted that:

[T]he factual record does not reflect current

technological reality – a serious flaw in any case

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 2

The Government wrote this letter in response to our request

that the parties file supplemental letter briefs on the law-of-thecase issue.

17

involving the Internet. The technology of the

Internet evolves at a rapid pace. Yet the

factfindings of the District Court were entered in

February 1999, over five years ago . . . . It is

reasonable to assume that other technological

developments important to the First Amendment

analysis have also occurred during that time.

More and better filtering alternatives may exist

than when the District Court entered its findings.

Id. Accordingly, the Court decided to remand the case to the

District Court for a full trial on the merits to “update and

supplement the factual record to reflect current technological

realities” and “to take account of a changed legal landscape” to

determine if other methods were less restrictive alternatives to

COPA to further the Government’s compelling interest in its

objective. Id. at 672, 124 S.Ct. at 2795.

The Government contends that the portion of our opinion

in ACLU II that goes beyond the Supreme Court’s holding “is

not binding because the Supreme Court’s decision remanding

for further consideration of the question whether filtering is a

less restrictive alternative than COPA contemplates a fresh

examination of all the issues in this case, including the scope of

COPA’s coverage and its efficacy and restrictiveness compared

to filtering.” Appellant’s Letter at 1 (May 30, 2008).2

 We

conclude, however, that the Government is incorrect on this

point. The Supreme Court’s decision explicitly left untouched

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our conclusions in ACLU II other than our decision that filters

are a less restrictive alternative than COPA for advancing the

Government’s compelling interest at stake in this litigation.

Moreover, our other determinations – including our

interpretation of the provisions of COPA and whether they are

narrowly construed or impermissibly overbroad – did not

depend on the factual record and thus would not be implicated

by the evidence developed in the subsequent trial on the merits

in the District Court. Accordingly, those conclusions remain

binding on us now.

The Government also contends that we should reconsider

the issues addressed in ACLU II on the basis of an intervening

change in the law since we decided that case. In this regard it

points to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States

v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830 (2008), where the Court found that

the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the

Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. §

2252A(a)(3)(B), is not overbroad under the First Amendment.

But the Court in Williams merely restated and applied the wellestablished legal doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness and did

not change the law applicable to this case. Accordingly, we

conclude that there are not “extraordinary circumstances”

justifying us in departing from our holdings in ACLU II other

than that with respect to filtering.

Now that we have delineated the contours of ACLU II’s

effect on this appeal, we will address the issues the Government

raises. As we consider these issues, we will determine whether,

and if so the extent, that our conclusions in ACLU II are the

law-of-the-case here.

B. Strict Scrutiny

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First, the Government challenges the District Court’s

decision that COPA is unconstitutional because it does not

survive strict scrutiny, the standard that we apply in this case

inasmuch as COPA is a content-based restriction on speech. See

Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512

U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994). To survive strict

scrutiny analysis, a statute must: (1) serve a compelling

governmental interest; (2) be narrowly tailored to achieve that

interest; and (3) be the least restrictive means of advancing that

interest. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns

Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989).

1. Compelling Interest

As we noted above, Congress enacted COPA to protect

minors from exposure to sexually explicit material on the Web.

The Supreme Court has held that “there is a compelling interest

in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of

minors,” Sable, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836, and the

parties agree that the Government has a compelling interest to

protect minors from exposure to harmful material on the Web.

Inasmuch as we agree with them on that point, we turn to the

question of whether COPA is narrowly tailored to effectuate its

purpose.

2. Narrowly Tailored

As we stated above, to survive a strict scrutiny analysis

COPA must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling

government interest. In ACLU II, we addressed this issue and

held that the following provisions of COPA are not narrowly

tailored:

(a) the definition of ‘material that is harmful to

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minors,’ which includes the concept of taking ‘as

a whole’ material designed to appeal to the

‘prurient interest’ of minors; and material which

(when judged as a whole) lacks ‘serious literary’

or other ‘value’ for minors; (b) the definition of

‘commercial purposes,’ which limits the reach of

the statute to persons ‘engaged in the business’

(broadly defined) of making communications of

material that is harmful to minors; and (c) the

‘affirmative defenses’ available to publishers,

which require the technological screening of users

for the purpose of age verification.

ACLU II, 322 F.3d at 251.

First, we addressed why we found that the “taking the

material as a whole” language in COPA’s definition of “material

that is harmful to minors,” was not narrowly tailored. COPA

defines such material to include any matter that is obscene or

that: 

(A) the average person, applying contemporary community

standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with

respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to

pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes, or

represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to

minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an

actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd

exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and

(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or

scientific value for minors.

47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (emphasis added). We concluded that the

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21

taken “as a whole” language, when read in context with other

language in the statute, mandates evaluation of an exhibit on the

Internet in isolation, rather than in context. ACLU II, 322 F.3d

at 253. We explained that:

Because we view such a statute, construed as its

own text unquestionably requires, as pertaining

only to single individual exhibits, COPA

endangers a wide range of communications,

exhibits, and speakers whose messages do not

comport with the type of harmful materials

legitimately targeted under COPA, i.e., material

that is obscene as to minors. Accordingly, while

COPA penalizes publishers for making available

improper material for minors, at the same time it

impermissibly burdens a wide range of speech

and exhibits otherwise protected for adults. Thus,

in our opinion, the Act, which proscribes

publication of material harmful to minors, is not

narrowly tailored to serve the Government’s

stated purpose in protecting minors from such

material.

Id. (citation omitted).

We also explained why we found that “COPA’s

definition of the term ‘minor,’ viewed in conjunction with the

‘material harmful to minors’ test, is not tailored narrowly

enough to satisfy the First Amendment’s requirements.” Id. at

255. COPA defines “minor” as “any person under 17 years of

age.” 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7). We stated that the term “thus

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22

applies in a literal sense to an infant, a five-year old, or a person

just shy of age seventeen.” ACLU II, 322 F.3d at 254. We

reasoned that “Web publishers would face great uncertainty in

deciding what minor could be exposed to its publication, so that

a publisher could predict, and guard against, potential liability.”

Id. at 255. We explicitly rejected the Government’s argument

that the term “should be read to apply only to normal, older

adolescents,” id. at 254, and stated that under either our

definition or the Government’s proffered definition, “the term

‘minor,’ viewed in conjunction with the ‘material harmful to

minors’ test, is not tailored narrowly enough to satisfy the First

Amendment’s requirements,” id. at 255.

We then proceeded to explain why we found that

“COPA’s purported limitation of liability to persons making

communications ‘for commercial purposes’ does not narrow the

reach of COPA sufficiently.” Id. at 256. COPA states that “[a]

person shall be considered to make a communication for

commercial purposes only if such person is engaged in the

business of making such communications,” and that

[t]he term ‘engaged in the business’ means that

the person who makes a communication . . . that

includes any material that is harmful to minors,

devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities,

as a regular course of such person’s trade or

business, with the objective of earning a profit . .

. . A person may be considered to be engaged in

the business . . . only if the person knowingly

causes [or solicits] the material that is harmful to

minors to be posted on the World Wide Web . . .

.

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23

47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2). We stated that:

we read COPA to apply to Web publishers who

have posted any material that is ‘harmful to

minors’ on their Web sites, even if they do not

make a profit from such material itself or do not

post such material as the principal part of their

business. Under the plain language of COPA, a

Web publisher will be subjected to liability if

even a small part of his or her Web site displays

material ‘harmful to minors.’

ACLU II, 322 F.3d at 256. We stated that this group included

“those persons who sell advertising space on their otherwise

noncommercial Web sites . . . [, including] the Web publisher

who provides free content on his or her Web site and seeks

advertising revenue, perhaps only to defray the cost of

maintaining the Web site.” Id. We also rejected the

Government’s argument that “COPA’s definition of ‘engaged in

the business’ limits liability to those persons who publish

material that is harmful to minors ‘as a regular course of such

person’s business or trade’”:

COPA’s use of the phrase ‘regular course’ does

not narrow the scope of speech covered because

it does not place any limitations on the amount, or

the proportion, of a Web publisher’s posted

content that constitutes such material. Thus, even

if posted material that is harmful to minors

constitutes only a very small, or even

infinitesimal, part of a publisher’s entire Web site,

the publisher may still be subject to liability.

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24

Id. at 257.

Finally, we explained why we found that COPA’s

affirmative defenses were not narrowly tailored. As we already

have noted above, a Web publisher can assert an affirmative

defense if it:

has restricted access by minors to material that is

harmful to minors – (A) by requiring use of a

credit card, debit account, adult access code, or

adult personal identification number; (B) by

accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or

(C) by any other reasonable measures that are

feasible under available technology.

47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1). We first stated that implementation of

the affirmative defenses in COPA “will likely deter many adults

from accessing restricted content, because many Web users are

simply unwilling to provide identification information in order

to gain access to content, especially where the information they

wish to access is sensitive or controversial.” ACLU II, 322 F.3d

at 259 (footnote omitted). For this particular conclusion we

relied on factual findings the District Court made in granting the

preliminary injunction, so to this extent it does not bind us on

this appeal. 

Though we are not bound by previous conclusions with

respect to deterrence of adults seeking restricted content, in

ACLU II we reached other conclusions about COPA’s

affirmative defenses that do not depend on the facts as

developed in the District Court, and those conclusions are

binding on us on this appeal. For instance, in ACLU II we

stated that “the affirmative defenses do not provide Web

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25

publishers with assurances of freedom from prosecution”

because “‘[a]n affirmative defense applies only after prosecution

has begun, and the speaker must himself prove . . . that his

conduct falls within the affirmative defense.’” Id. at 260

(second alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech

Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 1404 (2002)). We

also considered the Government’s argument that other cases

dealing with display restrictions have upheld the use of blinder

racks to shield minors from viewing harmful material. We

distinguished those cases because:

[t]he use of ‘blinder racks’ . . . does not create the

same deterrent effect on adults as would COPA’s

credit card or adult verification screens. Blinder

racks do not require adults to compromise their

anonymity in their viewing of material harmful to

minors, nor do they create any financial burden on

the user. Moreover, they do not burden the

speech contained in the targeted publications any

more than is absolutely necessary to shield minors

from its content.

Id. We concluded that “[t]he effect of the affirmative defenses,

as they burden ‘material harmful to minors’ which is

constitutionally protected for adults, is to drive this protected

speech from the marketplace of ideas on the Internet. This type

of regulation is prohibited under the First Amendment.” Id.

In its decision made after the trial on the merits now on

appeal before us, the District Court concluded that COPA is not

narrowly tailored because it is both overinclusive and

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26

underinclusive. First, the court determined that COPA is

impermissibly overinclusive because it “prohibits much more

speech than is necessary to further Congress’ compelling

interest. For example, . . . the definitions of ‘commercial

purposes’ and ‘engaged in the business’ apply to an inordinate

amount of Internet speech and certainly cover more than just

commercial pornographers . . . .” Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at

810 (citations omitted). The court also concluded that COPA is

overinclusive because it “applies to speech that is obscene as to

all minors from newborns to age sixteen, and not just to speech

that is obscene as to older minors . . . .” Id.

The Government contends that COPA is narrowly

tailored because it applies only to commercial pornographers

and only to material that is harmful to “older” minors. But we

addressed and rejected the Government’s arguments in ACLU

II, when we found there is nothing in the text of COPA to limit

its application solely to “commercial pornographers” or to limit

the phrase “material that is harmful to minors” to include

material that only is harmful to “older” minors. See 322 F.3d at

253-57. Our prior decision is binding on these issues on this

appeal.

The District Court also found that COPA is not narrowly

tailored because it is underinclusive. In ACLU II we did not

address whether COPA is impermissibly underinclusive and so

we are free to review this finding on the merits. In its Findings

of Fact, the District Court stated that “a substantial number

(approximately 50 percent) of sexually explicit websites are

foreign in origin.” Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 789. The court

then reasoned:

[T]here is a significant amount of sexually

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27

explicit material on the Internet which originates

from outside of the United States. . . . [U]nlike

Internet content filters which are able to block

from view unsuitable material regardless of its

origin, COPA has no extra-territorial application.

As a result, . . . COPA is not applicable to a large

amount of material that is unsuitable for children

which originates overseas but is nevertheless

available to children in the United States . . . .

COPA’s lack of extraterritorial application

renders it underinclusive.

Id. at 810-11 (citations omitted). The Government contends that

the District Court erred by construing COPA not to apply to

foreign Web sites, and thus the Government argues that COPA

is not underinclusive.

The problem with the Government’s argument in this

respect is that, as we explain below, the Supreme Court already

has determined that COPA does not apply to foreign Web sites.

But notwithstanding this significant limitation on COPA’s

scope, if we had to pass on the issue we might conclude that

COPA is not unconstitutionally underinclusive. The Supreme

Court has explained the circumstances in which a court may find

that a regulation of speech is impermissibly underinclusive:

[A]n exemption from an otherwise permissible

regulation of speech may represent a

governmental ‘attempt to give one side of a

debatable public question an advantage in

expressing its views to the people.’ First Nat’l

Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86,

98 S.Ct. 1407, 1420-21, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978).

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28

Alternatively, through the combined operation of

a general speech restriction and its exemptions,

the government might seek to select the

‘permissible subjects for public debate’ and

thereby to ‘control . . . the search for political

truth.’ Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public

Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 538, 100

S.Ct. 2326, 2333, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).

City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 2043

(1994) (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted). These

quite narrow circumstances are hardly applicable to COPA.

Even though, as the District Court recognized, COPA does not

apply to foreign Web sites, we cannot understand how that

limitation on its scope would “represent a governmental attempt

to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in

expressing its views to the people . . . [or] to select the

permissible subjects for public debate.” Id. (citations and

quotation marks omitted). There is no evidence in the record of

which we are aware that Congress sought to favor foreign Web

site publishers over domestic Web site publishers when

regulating sexually explicit material on the Web, nor is there any

suggestion in the record that the Government is selecting the

permissible subject for public debate by excluding foreign Web

sites from COPA’s coverage. 

In fact, we think that it is likely that Congress would have

desired to place COPA’s restrictions on foreign Web sites

available for access in this country but chose not to do so

because, as the District Court recognized:

[e]nforcement of COPA against overseas Web site

owners would . . . be burdensome and impractical

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29

due to the knotty questions of jurisdiction which

arise in the Internet context. Furthermore, even if

a specific foreign Web site had sufficient contacts

with the forum to allow personal jurisdiction, it

could be quite difficult or impossible to ensure

that the offender would obey or could be forced to

obey the judgment of the U.S. court.

Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 811. In these circumstances, even

though COPA’s omission of foreign Web sites from its

regulations certainly is relevant in an inquiry into whether it is

the most effective means of advancing the Government’s

compelling interest in COPA’s object, the omission might not

lead us to a conclusion that the statute is impermissibly

underinclusive. After all, as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit recently noted, “a limitation on speech that is not allencompassing may still be narrowly tailored where the

underinclusivity does not favor a particular viewpoint or

undermine the rationale given for the regulation.” Bowman v.

White, 444 F.3d 967, 983 (8th Cir. 2006). 

On the other hand, we might conclude that because

COPA fails to apply to 50% of its purported commercial

pornography targets, we lack the evidence necessary to satisfy

us that Congress had in mind its stated goal of protecting minors

from harmful material on the Web when it passed COPA. It is

not as though Congress is unable to protect minors from harmful

material on foreign Web sites; for instance, Congress could

promote the use of Internet content filters, which do not

discriminate on the basis of geography. COPA’s failure to

protect minors from harmful material on foreign Web sites

might raise the inference that Congress had some ulterior,

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30

impermissible motive for passing COPA.

We note, however, that our possible disagreement with

the District Court on this one point would not change our

ultimate decision to affirm its order granting a permanent

injunction, as there are numerous other grounds that require us

to find that COPA is not narrowly tailored and is

unconstitutional. Accordingly, we will refrain from deciding the

matter. 

The District Court also found that COPA’s affirmative

defenses “do not aid in narrowly tailoring COPA to Congress’

compelling interest.” Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 813.

Specifically, the court found that:

there is no evidence of age verification services or

products available on the market to owners of

Web sites that actually reliably establish or verify

the age of Internet users. Nor is there evidence of

such services or products that can effectively

prevent access to Web pages by a minor.

Id. at 800. The court found that “[t]he rules of payment card

associations in this country prohibit Web sites from claiming

that use of a payment card is an effective method of verifying

age, and prohibit Web site owners from using credit or debit

cards to verify age,” and that “a significant number of minors

have access to [payment cards].” Id. at 801. The court also

reviewed data verification services, which are “non-payment

card-based services that attempt to verify the age or identity of

an individual Internet user,” and found that they are unreliable

because they “cannot determine whether the person entering

information into the Web site is the person to whom the

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31

information pertains.” Id. at 802. The court further found that

the minimum information required by a data verification

services company “can easily be circumvented by children who

generally know the first and last name, street address and zip

codes of their parents or another adult.” Id.

The court later explained, “[t]he affirmative defenses

cannot cure COPA’s failure to be narrowly tailored because they

are effectively unavailable. Credit cards, debit accounts, adult

access codes, and adult personal identification numbers do not

in fact verify age. As a result, their use does not, in good faith,

‘restrict [] access’ by minors.” Id. at 811 (second alteration in

original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A)).

The court also concluded that COPA’s affirmative

defenses “raise unique First Amendment issues” that make the

statute unconstitutional. Id. at 813. The court found that due to

the fees associated with the use of the procedures enumerated in

all of the affirmative defenses and verification services, “Web

sites . . . which desire to provide free distribution of their

information, will be prevented from doing so.” Id. at 804. The

court also found that:

[f]or a plethora of reasons including privacy and

financial concerns . . . and the fact that so much

Web content is available for free, many Web

users already refuse to register, provide credit

card information, or provide real personal

information to Web sites if they have any

alternative. Because requiring age verification

would lead to a significant loss of users, content

providers would have to either self-censor, risk

prosecution, or shoulder the large financial burden

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32

of age verification.

Id. at 805. Moreover, the court found that “many users who are

not willing to access information non-anonymously will be

deterred from accessing the desired information. Web site

owners . . . will be deprived of the ability to provide this

information to those users.” Id. at 806. The court also indicated

that:

[r]equiring Internet users to provide payment card

information or other personally identifiable

information to access a Web site would

significantly deter many users from entering the

site, because Internet users are concerned about

security on the Internet and because Internet users

are afraid of fraud and identity theft on the

Internet.

Id. Based on these findings, the court concluded that:

[t]he affirmative defenses also raise their own

First Amendment concerns. For example, the

utilization of those devices to trigger COPA’s

affirmative defenses will deter listeners, many of

whom will be unwilling to reveal personal and

financial information in order to access content

and, thus, will chill speech. Similarly, the

affirmative defenses also impermissibly burden

Web site operators with demonstrating that their

speech is lawful. Under the COPA regime, Web

site operators are unable to defend themselves

until after they are prosecuted. Moreover, the

affirmative defenses place substantial economic

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33

burdens on the exercise of protected speech

because all of them involve significant cost and

the loss of Web site visitors, especially to those

plaintiffs who provide their content for free.

Id. at 812-13 (citations and quotations omitted).

The Government argues that the District Court erred in

rejecting the limiting effect of COPA’s affirmative defenses. It

contends that “[t]he possibility that some minors may have

access to credit cards merely demonstrates that no system of age

verification is foolproof. It does not call into question the

availability of credit card screening as an affirmative defense

that tailors COPA more narrowly.” Appellant’s Br. at 37. The

Government also argues that “the court ignored testimony that

minors do not have access to traditional payment cards under

their own control but simply have access to cards supervised by

adults.” Id.

But the District Court found that even if there is parental

supervision of payment card use, the supervision does not

prevent access to harmful material by minors because parents

“may not be able to identify transactions on sexually explicit

Web sites because the adult nature of such transactions is often

not readily identifiable . . . .” Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 802.

In any event, we conclude that the District Court correctly found

that the affirmative defenses are “effectively unavailable”

because they do not actually verify age.

The Government also argues that the District Court

incorrectly determined that the affirmative defenses present their

own First Amendment concerns by imposing undue burdens on

Web publishers due to the high costs of implementing age

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34

verification technologies and the loss of traffic that would result

from the use of these technologies. The Government contends

that the:

court’s evaluation of the burdens imposed by

COPA was flawed because the court focused

largely, if not exclusively, on Web publishers who

provide their content for free. Whatever limited

application COPA might have beyond its core

regulation of commercial pornography, the court

erred in evaluating the burdens the statute

imposes based entirely on these marginal cases

and ignoring the heartland of the statute’s

proscriptions, where the burdens are far less

onerous.

Appellant’s Br. at 38-39 (citations and quotations omitted). We

reject this argument. The fact that COPA places burdens on

Web publishers whom the Government does not consider to be

within the “heartland” of the statute does not make those

burdens any less onerous or offensive to the principles of the

First Amendment. 

Moreover, there is good reason to believe that COPA

unduly would burden even those Web publishers whom the

Government considers to fall within the “heartland” of the

statute, because the District Court found that those publishers

also will face significant costs to implement the affirmative

defenses and will suffer the loss of legitimate visitors once they

do so. And, contrary to the Government’s suggestion at oral

argument, users would have alternatives to obtain pornography

even if COPA was in effect because, as we already have

indicated and discuss below, COPA does not apply to foreign

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35

Web sites. The loss of traffic that would result clearly is an

undue burden on even those Web sites that the Government

contends are in the “heartland” of COPA.

We conclude that the District Court correctly found that

implementation of COPA’s affirmative defenses by a Web

publisher so as to avoid prosecution would involve high costs

and also would deter users from visiting implicated Web sites.

It is clear that these burdens would chill protected speech and

thus that the affirmative defenses fail a strict scrutiny analysis.

The Government contends that nevertheless these

burdens “are no different in kind or degree from the burdens

imposed by state laws regulating the sale and commercial

display of ‘harmful to minors’ materials. . . . [T]he effect of the

statute is simply to requir[e] the commercial pornographer to put

sexually explicit images behind the counter.” Appellant’s Br. at

43 (citations and certain internal quotation marks omitted)

(second alteration in original).

We rejected this argument in ACLU II. See 322 F.3d at

260 (“Blinder racks do not require adults to compromise their

anonymity in their viewing of material harmful to minors, nor

do they create any financial burden on the user. Moreover, they

do not burden the speech contained in the targeted publications

any more than is absolutely necessary to shield minors from its

content.”). Blinder racks do not require adults to pay for speech

that otherwise would be accessible for free, they do not require

adults to relinquish their anonymity to access protected speech,

and they do not create a potentially permanent electronic record.

Blinder racks simply do not involve the privacy and security

concerns that COPA’s affirmative defenses raise, and so the

Government’s attempted analogy is ill-fitting.

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36

In sum, after considering our previous conclusions in

ACLU II and our analyses of the issues ACLU II has not

resolved, we are quite certain that notwithstanding Congress’s

laudable purpose in enacting COPA, the Government has not

met its burden of showing that it is narrowly tailored so as to

survive a strict scrutiny analysis and thereby permit us to hold

it to be constitutional.

3. Least Restrictive Alternative

In addition to failing the strict scrutiny test because it is

not narrowly tailored, COPA does not employ the least

restrictive alternative to advance the Government’s compelling

interest in its purpose, the third prong of the three-prong strict

scrutiny test. “A statute that ‘effectively suppresses a large

amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to

receive and to address to one another . . . is unacceptable if less

restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving

the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.’”

Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 665, 124 S.Ct. at 2791 (alteration in

original) (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 117 S.Ct. at 2346).

“[T]he burden is on the Government to prove that the proposed

alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.”

Id. (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 117 S.Ct. at 2346). The

Government’s burden is “not merely to show that a proposed

less restrictive alternative has some flaws; its burden is to show

that it is less effective.” Id. at 669, 124 S.Ct. at 2793 (citing

Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 117 S.Ct. at 2346).

Based on the preliminary injunction record in this case,

the Supreme Court held that “[b]locking and filtering software

is an alternative that is less restrictive than COPA, and, in

addition, likely more effective as a means of restricting

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 3

Our opinion in ACLU II is not entirely clear on this point.

We started our discussion of the least restrictive alternative

question by indicating that “[w]e are also satisfied that COPA

does not employ the ‘least restrictive means’ to effect the

Government’s compelling interest in protecting minors.” ACLU

II, 322 F.3d at 261. Then in considering that question in more

detail we discussed filters at length. At one point in the opinion

we stated that “filtering software is a less restrictive alternative

that can allow parents some measure of control over their

children’s access to speech that parents consider inappropriate.”

Id. at 263. At several other points, we also stated that COPA is

not the least restrictive alternative. See id. at 261 (“We are . . .

satisfied that COPA does not employ the ‘least restrictive

means’ to effect the Government’s compelling interest in

protecting minors.”); id. at 265-66 (“The existence of less

restrictive alternatives renders COPA unconstitutional under

strict scrutiny. . . . COPA also fails strict scrutiny because it

does not use the least restrictive means to achieve its ends. . . .

Congress could have, but failed to employ the least restrictive

means to accomplish its legitimate goal . . . .”). Nevertheless we

stated that “[w]e agree with the District Court that the various

blocking and filtering techniques which that Court discussed

may be substantially less restrictive than COPA in achieving

COPA’s objective of preventing a minor’s access to harmful

material.” Id. at 265 (emphasis added). Because of this

statement, we cannot state with certainty that ACLU II squarely

holds that filters are less restrictive than COPA, though it

37

children’s access to materials harmful to them.” Id. at 666-67,

124 S.Ct. at 2792. We reached a similar conclusion in ACLU

II. See 322 F.3d at 265.3 After the trial on the merits, the

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probably does. Thus, for law-of-the-case purposes, we might

not consider ourselves bound on this appeal by that

determination. Of course, this discussion of whether we

determined that filters are less restrictive than COPA or that

filters only may be less restrictive than COPA is somewhat

academic, for on the appeal of ACLU II the Supreme Court

explicitly addressed this issue and, though remanding the case,

flatly indicated that filters are “less restrictive” than COPA,

Ashcroft, 342 U.S. at 667, 124 S.Ct. at 2792, and that Court’s

conclusions supersede our decision in ACLU II on this point.

38

District Court concluded that the Government did not meet its

burden of showing that COPA is the least restrictive effective

alternative for advancing Congress’s compelling interest

because filter software and the Government’s promotion and

support of filter software is a less restrictive effective alternative

to COPA.

The District Court discussed Internet content filters at

length in its Findings of Fact. We will review these findings in

detail, as the need to determine whether filters are more

effective than COPA to effectuate Congress’s purpose in

enacting that statute was the primary reason the Supreme Court

remanded the case. According to the District Court:

Internet content filters (‘filters’) are computer

applications which, inter alia, attempt to block

certain categories of material from view that a

Web browser or other Internet application is

capable of displaying or downloading, including

sexually explicit material. Filters categorize and

block Web sites or pages based on their content.

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39

By classifying a site or page, and refusing to

display it on the user’s computer screen, filters

can be used to prevent children from seeing

material that might be considered unsuitable.

Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 789. The court explained:

Filters can be programmed or configured in a

variety of different ways according to, inter alia,

the values of the parents using them and the age

and maturity of their children. . . . [F]ilters can be

set up to restrict materials available on Web pages

and other Internet applications based on numerous

factors including the type of content they contain,

the presence of particular words, the address of

the Web site, the Internet protocol used, or

computer application used. Some filters can also

restrict Internet access based on time of day, day

of week, how long the computer has been

connected to the Internet, or which user is logged

onto a computer.

Id. at 790. The court then described in detail how filters

operate:

Filters use different mechanisms to attempt to

block access to material on the Internet including:

black lists, white lists, and dynamic filtering.

Black lists are lists of URLs or Internet Protocol

(‘IP’) addresses that a filtering company has

determined lead to content that contains the type

of materials its filter is designed to block. White

lists are lists of URLs or IP addresses that a

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40

filtering company has determined do not lead to

any content its filter is designed to block, and,

thus, should never be blocked. . . . In addition to

its own black and white lists, filters often give

parents or administrators the option of creating

customized black or white lists. Dynamic

filtering products use artificial intelligence to

analyze Web site content in real-time as it is being

requested and determine whether it should be

blocked by evaluating a number of different parts

of the content, both what the user can actually see

on the Web page, and the various hidden pieces of

information contained with the content that are

part of its software code or script, known as the

‘metadata.’ Among other things, dynamic filters

analyze the words on the page, the metadata, the

file names for images, the URLs, the links on a

page, the size of images, the formatting of the

page, and other statistical pattern recognition

features, such as the spatial patterns between

certain words and images, which can often help

filters categorize content even if the actual words

are not recognized. In addition to analyzing the

content of Web pages, dynamic filters also take

the context of the page into consideration, to

ensure that the determinations are as accurate as

possible. For example, many companies will

develop templates that provide additional context

to teach the software how to recognize certain

contexts-for example, to block the word ‘breast’

when used in combination with the word ‘sexy,’

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41

but not when used in combination with the words

‘chicken’ or ‘cancer.’ The software analyzes

context, in part, by utilizing statistical pattern

recognition techniques to identify common

features of acceptable and unacceptable Web

pages, depending on the context in which the

content appears.

Id. at 790-91 (citations omitted). The court found that:

[f]ilters can be used by parents to block material

that is distributed on the Web and on the other

widely used parts of the Internet through

protocols other than HTTP and through other

Internet applications. For example, filters can be

used to block any Internet application, including

email, chat, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file

sharing, newsgroups, streaming video and audio,

Internet television and voice over Internet

protocol (‘VoIP’), and other Internet protocols

such as FTP. In addition to blocking access to

these Internet applications completely, some

products provide parents with the option of

providing limited access to these applications.

For example, instant messaging and email may be

permitted, but some of the filtering products will

only permit the sending and receiving of

messages from certain authorized individuals, and

will block e-mails or instant messages containing

inappropriate words or any images. Filtering

programs can also completely prevent children

from entering or using chat rooms, or some can

Case: 07-2539 Document: 00311978680 Page: 41 Date Filed: 07/22/2008
42

merely filter out any inappropriate words that

come up during a chat session.

Id. at 791 (citations omitted). The court then described the

flexible nature of filters:

Some filtering programs offer only a small

number of settings, while others are highly

customizable, allowing a parent to make detailed

decisions about what to allow and what to block.

Filtering products do this by, among other things,

enabling parents to choose which categories of

speech they want to be blocked (such as sexually

explicit material, illicit drug information,

information on violence and weapons, and hate

speech) and which age setting they want the

product to apply. . . . Filtering products can be

used by parents even if they have more than one

child. For example, if a family has four children,

many filtering products will enable the parent to

set up different accounts for each child, to ensure

that each child is able to access only the content

that the parents want that particular child to

access.

Id. (citations omitted). The court found that: 

[f]iltering products block both Web pages

originating from within the United States and

Web pages originating from outside the United

States. The geographic origin of a Web page is

not a factor in how a filter works because the

filter analyzes the content of the Web page, not

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43

the location from which it came.

Id. at 791-92. The court found that “[f]iltering products block

both non-commercial and commercial Web pages.” Id. at 792.

The court also found that:

[i]n addition to their content filtering features,

filtering products have a number of additional

tools to help parents control their children’s

Internet activities. Other tools available to

parents include monitoring and reporting features

that allow supervising adults to know which sites

a minor has visited and what other types of

activities a minor has engaged in online.

Id. 

The District Court found that “[f]ilters are widely

available and easy to obtain,” and that “[f]iltering programs are

fairly easy to install, configure, and use and require only

minimal effort by the end user to configure and update.” Id. at

793. The court found that “[i]nstalling and setting up a filter

will usually take a typical computer user no more than ten or

fifteen minutes. The installation and set-up process is not

technically complex and does not require any special training or

knowledge.” Id. at 794. The court then considered the evidence

regarding the effectiveness of filters. It found that:

[f]iltering products have improved over time and

are now more effective than ever before. This is

because, as with all software, the filtering

companies have addressed problems with the

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44

earlier versions of the products in an attempt to

make their products better. Another reason the

effectiveness of filtering products has improved is

that many products now provide multiple layers

of filtering. Whereas many filters once only

relied on black lists or white lists, many of

today’s products utilize black lists, white lists, and

real-time, dynamic filtering to catch any

inappropriate sites that have not previously been

classified by the product. There is a high level of

competition in the field of Internet content

filtering. That factor, along with the development

of new technologies, has also caused the products

to improve over time.

Id. at 794-95 (citations omitted). 

The District Court then found that: 

[o]ne of the features of filtering programs that

adds to their effectiveness is that they have

built-in mechanisms to prevent children from

bypassing or circumventing the filters, including

password protection and other devices to prevent

children from uninstalling the product or

changing the settings. Some products even have

a tamper detection feature, by which they can

detect when someone is trying to uninstall or

disable the product, and then cut off Internet

access altogether until it has been properly

reconfigured. Filtering companies actively take

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45

steps to make sure that children are not able to

come up with ways to circumvent their filters.

Filtering companies monitor the Web to identify

any methods for circumventing filters, and when

such methods are found, the filtering companies

respond by putting in extra protections in an

attempt to make sure that those methods do not

succeed with their products.

Id. at 795 (citations omitted). The court also found that “[i]t is

difficult for children to circumvent filters because of the

technical ability and expertise necessary to do so . . . .” Id.

Finally, the court found that “filters generally block about 95%

of sexually explicit material.” Id.

After describing filtering technology, the District Court

concluded that the Government “failed to successfully defend

against the plaintiffs’ assertion that filter software and the

Government’s promotion and support thereof is a less restrictive

alternative to COPA.” Id. at 813. The court reasoned that

“unlike COPA there are no fines or prison sentences associated

with filters which would chill speech. Also unlike COPA, . . .

filters are fully customizable and may be set for different ages

and for different categories of speech or may be disabled

altogether for adult use. As a result, filters are less restrictive

than COPA.” Id. (citations omitted).

The District Court also concluded that the Government

“failed to show that filters are not at least as effective as COPA

at protecting minors from harmful material on the Web.” Id. at

814. The court determined that COPA will not reach sexually

explicit materials on the Web that originate from foreign

sources, its affirmative defenses are not effective, and it is

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46

unlikely that COPA will be enforced widely. The court found

that:

filters block sexually explicit foreign material on

the Web, parents can customize filter settings

depending on the ages of their children and what

type of content they find objectionable, and filters

are fairly easy to install and use. . . . [F]ilters are

very effective at blocking potentially harmful

sexually explicit materials.

Id. at 815 (citations omitted). The court concluded that “[e]ven

defendant’s own study shows that all but the worst performing

filters are far more effective than COPA would be at protecting

children from sexually explicit material on the Web . . . .” Id.

The Government does not challenge the District Court’s

factual findings and therefore we need not set forth the evidence

on which the court based its findings. The Government does

contend, however, that the District Court erred in concluding

that filters are a less restrictive alternative because the court

applied a “flawed analytical framework” and that filters cannot

be considered a less restrictive alternative because they are part

of the “status quo.” Appellant’s Br. at 43-44.

But the Supreme Court’s statement on this issue

contravenes the Government’s argument:

In considering this question, a court assumes that

certain protected speech may be regulated, and

then asks what is the least restrictive alternative

that can be used to achieve that goal . . . . The

purpose of the test is to ensure that the speech is

restricted no further than necessary to achieve the

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47

goal, for it is important to assure that legitimate

speech is not chilled or punished. For that reason,

the test does not begin with the status quo of

existing regulations, then ask whether the

challenged restriction has some additional ability

to achieve Congress’ legitimate interest. Any

restriction on speech could be justified under that

analysis. Instead, the court should ask whether

the challenged regulation is the least restrictive

means among available, effective alternatives.

Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. at 2791. This reasoning

explains why the Court then instructed the parties to update the

factual record regarding “the effectiveness of filtering software”

so that the District Court could determine whether “filters are

less effective than COPA.” Id. at 671, 124 S.Ct. at 2794.

Accordingly, the Government is incorrect in its assertion that the

District Court applied an erroneous analytical framework.

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that filters

and the Government’s promotion of filters are more effective

than COPA. The Supreme Court already has written how the

Government could act to promote and support the use of filters:

Congress undoubtedly may act to encourage the

use of filters. We have held that Congress can

give strong incentives to schools and libraries to

use them. It could also take steps to promote their

development by industry, and their use by parents.

It is incorrect, for that reason, to say that filters

are part of the current regulatory status quo. The

need for parental cooperation does not

automatically disqualify a proposed less

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48

restrictive alternative. In enacting COPA,

Congress said its goal was to prevent the

‘widespread availability of the Internet’ from

providing ‘opportunities for minors to access

materials through the World Wide Web in a

manner that can frustrate parental supervision or

control.’ COPA presumes that parents lack the

ability, not the will, to monitor what their children

see. By enacting programs to promote use of

filtering software, Congress could give parents

that ability without subjecting protected speech to

severe penalties.

Id. at 669-70, 124 S.Ct. at 2793 (citations omitted).

As the District Court pointed out, filters can be used to

block foreign Web sites, which COPA does not regulate.

Though the Government contends that COPA applies to foreign

Web sites, the Supreme Court already has rejected the

Government’s construction of the statute. In Ashcroft the Court

stated that:

a filter can prevent minors from seeing all

pornography, not just pornography posted to the

Web from America. . . . COPA does not prevent

minors from having access to those foreign

harmful materials. . . . [I]f COPA is upheld, . . .

providers of the materials that would be covered

by the statute simply can move their operations

overseas.

Id. at 667, 124 S.Ct. at 2792. In light of the Supreme Court’s

express conclusion that COPA does not apply to foreign Web

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49

sites – a determination that does not depend upon the facts

developed at the later trial in the District Court – we cannot

construe COPA to apply to foreign Web sites. 

Given the vast quantity of speech that COPA does not

cover but that filters do cover, it is apparent that filters are more

effective in advancing Congress’s interest, as it made plain it is

in COPA. Moreover, filters are more flexible than COPA

because parents can tailor them to their own values and needs

and to the age and maturity of their children and thus use an

appropriate flexible approach differing from COPA’s “one size

fits all” approach. Finally, the evidence makes clear that,

although not flawless, with proper use filters are highly effective

in preventing minors from accessing sexually explicit material

on the Web.

At oral argument, the Government made much of a study

that found that only 54 percent of parents use filters. But the

Government has neglected the fact that this figure represents a

65 percent increase from a prior study done four years earlier,

which indicates that significantly more families are using filters.

App. at 159-60. Furthermore, the circumstance that some

parents choose not to use filters does not mean that filters are

not an effective alternative to COPA. Though we recognize that

some of those parents may be indifferent to what their children

see, others may have decided to use other methods to protect

their children – such as by placing the family computer in the

living room, instead of their children’s bedroom – or trust that

their children will voluntarily avoid harmful material on the

Internet. Studies have shown that the primary reason that

parents do not use filters is that they think they are unnecessary

because they trust their children and do not see a need to block

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50

content. Id. at 160, 164, 278, 1567. The Government simply

has not carried its burden of showing that COPA is a more

effective method than filters in advancing the Government’s

compelling interest as evidenced in COPA.

In addition to being more effective, it is clear that filters

are less restrictive than COPA. As the Supreme Court has

stated: 

[f]ilters are less restrictive than COPA. They

impose selective restrictions on speech at the

receiving end, not universal restrictions at the

source. Under a filtering regime, adults without

children may gain access to speech they have a

right to see without having to identify themselves

or provide their credit card information. Even

adults with children may obtain access to the

same speech on the same terms simply by turning

off the filter on their home computers. Above all,

promoting the use of filters does not condemn as

criminal any category of speech, and so the

potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least

much diminished. All of these things are true,

moreover, regardless of how broadly or narrowly

the definitions in COPA are construed.

Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667, 124 S.Ct. at 2792. Although the

Supreme Court made this statement after reviewing the record

from the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the evidence

produced at the trial on the merits confirms the Court’s initial

impression. Unlike COPA, filters permit adults to determine if

and when they want to use them and do not subject speakers to

criminal or civil penalties.

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51

During oral argument, the Government contended that

the First Amendment does not prohibit Congress from adopting

a “belt-and-suspenders” approach to addressing the compelling

government interest of protecting minors from accessing

harmful material on the Web, with filters acting as the “belt”

and COPA as the “suspenders.” But as counsel for plaintiffs

correctly pointed out, under the First Amendment, if the belt

works at least as effectively as the suspenders, then the

Government cannot prosecute people for not wearing

suspenders. Here, based on the prior litigation in the Supreme

Court and this Court in ACLU II and the District Court’s

findings on the remand, the Government has not shown that

COPA is a more effective and less restrictive alternative to the

use of filters and the Government’s promotion of them in

effectuating COPA’s purposes. Indeed, we would reach this

conclusion on the basis of either the prior litigation or the

District Court’s findings on the remand. Accordingly, COPA

fails the third prong of a strict scrutiny analysis and is

unconstitutional.

C. Vagueness and Overbreadth

The Government also challenges the District Court’s

decision that COPA facially violates the First and Fifth

Amendments because it is impermissibly vague and overbroad.

1. Vagueness

The Supreme Court recently described the vagueness

doctrine:

Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the

First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment. A conviction fails to

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52

comport with due process if the statute under

which it is obtained fails to provide a person of

ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is

prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes

or encourages seriously discriminatory

enforcement. Although ordinarily a plaintiff who

engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed

cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as

applied to the conduct of others, we have relaxed

that requirement in the First Amendment context,

permitting plaintiffs to argue that a statute is

overbroad because it is unclear whether it

regulates a substantial amount of protected

speech. But perfect clarity and precise guidance

have never been required even of regulations that

restrict expressive activity.

Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1845 (citations, quotation marks, and

brackets omitted). The Court further explained:

What renders a statute vague is not the possibility

that it will sometimes be difficult to determine

whether the incriminating fact it establishes has

been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of

precisely what that fact is. Thus, we have struck

down statutes that tied criminal culpability to

whether the defendant’s conduct was ‘annoying’

or ‘indecent’ – wholly subjective judgments

without statutory definitions, narrowing context,

or settled legal meanings.

Id. at 1846.

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53

Our discussion in ACLU II of the question of whether

COPA is impermissibly vague was quite limited but in a

footnote we stated that we considered COPA’s use of the term

“minor” as incorporated in COPA’s definition of “material that

is harmful to minors” to be impermissibly vague. We reached

this conclusion because we believed that “a Web publisher will

be forced to guess at the bottom end of the range of ages to

which the statute applies,” and thus will not have “fair notice of

what conduct would subject them to criminal sanctions under

COPA” and “will be deterred from engaging in a wide range of

constitutionally protected speech.” 322 F.3d at 268 n.37.

The District Court on the remand concluded that COPA

is vague for several reasons. First, the court pointed out that

COPA utilizes two different scienter requirements –

“knowingly” and “intentionally” – but does not define either

standard. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 816-17. Second, the

court determined that although Congress intended COPA to

apply solely to commercial pornographers, the phrase

“communication for commercial purposes” as modified by the

phrase “engaged in the business” does not limit COPA’s

application to commercial pornographers. Id. at 817. Thus,

Web publishers that are not commercial pornographers will be

uncertain as to whether they will face prosecution under the

statute, chilling their speech. Id. Third, the court found that the

definition of “minor” as any person under 17 years of age

creates vagueness in COPA because materials that could have

“serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” for a 16-

year-old would not necessarily have the same value for a threeyear-old. Id. Thus, Web publishers cannot tell which of these

minors should be considered in deciding the content of their

Web sites. Id. at 817-18. Fourth, the court stated that COPA’s

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54

use of the phrase “as a whole” is vague because it is unclear how

that phrase would apply to the Web. Id. at 818.

The Government contends that the District Court erred in

finding COPA impermissibly vague and argues that the statutory

provisions that the District Court concluded rendered the statute

vague instead served to limit the reach of the statute.

We are bound by our conclusion in ACLU II that

COPA’s definition of “minor” renders the statute vague.

Furthermore we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that

COPA’s use of the phrases and terms “communication for

commercial purposes,” “as a whole,” “intentional,” and

“knowing” renders it vague, for the reasons the District Court

stated in its opinion.

2. Overbreadth

The Supreme Court also addressed the First Amendment

overbreadth doctrine in Williams, stating that:

[A] statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a

substantial amount of protected speech. The

doctrine seeks to strike a balance between

competing social costs. On the one hand, the

threat of enforcement of an overbroad law deters

people from engaging in constitutionally

protected speech, inhibiting the free exchange of

ideas. On the other hand, invalidating a law that

in some of its applications is perfectly

constitutional – particularly a law directed at

conduct so antisocial that it has been made

criminal – has obvious harmful effects. In order

to maintain an appropriate balance, we have

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55

vigorously enforced the requirement that a

statute’s overbreadth be substantial, not only in an

absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s

plainly legitimate sweep. Invalidation for

overbreadth is strong medicine that is not to be

casually employed.

128 S.Ct. at 1838 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

In ACLU II we held that COPA is “substantially

overbroad” because:

it places significant burdens on Web publishers’

communication of speech that is constitutionally

protected as to adults and adults’ ability to access

such speech. In so doing, COPA encroaches upon

a significant amount of protected speech beyond

that which the Government may target

constitutionally in preventing children’s exposure

to material that is obscene for minors.

322 F.3d at 266-67. We found that COPA’s definition of

“material harmful to minors” “impermissibly places at risk a

wide spectrum of speech that is constitutionally protected”

because it “calls for evaluation of ‘any material’ on the Web in

isolation.” Id. at 267. Thus, we explained:

an isolated item located somewhere on a Web site

that meets the ‘harmful to minors’ definition can

subject the publisher of the site to liability under

COPA, even though the entire Web page (or Web

site) that provides the context for the item would

be constitutionally protected for adults (and

indeed, may be protected as to minors).

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56

Id. We also found that COPA’s definition of “minors” renders

the statute overinclusive because it “broadens the reach of

‘material that is harmful to minors’ under the statute to

encompass a vast array of speech that is clearly protected for

adults – and indeed, may not be obscene as to older minors . . .

. ” Id. at 268. We next found that COPA’s definition of

“commercial purposes” rendered the statute overbroad for the

same reasons that it failed strict scrutiny. Id. at 269.

We also found that “COPA’s application of ‘community

standards’ exacerbates these constitutional problems in that it

further widens the spectrum of protected speech that COPA

affects.” Id. at 270. We stated that “COPA essentially requires

that every Web publisher subject to the statute abide by the most

restrictive and conservative state’s community standards in

order to avoid criminal liability.” Id. (quoting ACLU I, 217

F.3d at 166). Finally, we found that there was no available

narrowing construction that would make COPA constitutional.

Id. at 270-71. These conclusions bind us here.

The District Court also found that COPA is overbroad for

several reasons. First, the court determined that the vagueness

of the phrases “communication for commercial purposes” and

“engaged in the business” means that COPA could apply to a

wide swath of the Web and thus COPA would prohibit and chill

a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech for

adults. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 819. Second, because the

definition of “minor” includes any person under 17, Web

publishers do not have fair notice regarding what they can place

on the Web that will not be considered harmful to any minor.

Id. Thus, the definition of “minor” renders COPA overinclusive

because it broadens the statute to encompass a large array of

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57

protected speech. Id. Finally, the court found that because the

statute does not reference commercial pornographers, it found

that it could not read such a limitation into the statute to save it

from being overbroad. Id. at 819-20.

The Government claims that COPA is not overbroad, but

it is clear that our prior decision in ACLU II binds us on this

issue. It is apparent that COPA, like the Communications

Decency Act before it, “effectively suppresses a large amount of

speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to

address to one another,” Reno, 521 U.S. at 874, 117 S.Ct. at

2346, and thus is overbroad. For this reason, COPA violates the

First Amendment.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, COPA cannot withstand a strict scrutiny,

vagueness, or overbreadth analysis and thus is unconstitutional.

We reach our result both through the application of the law-ofthe-case doctrine to our determination in ACLU II and on the

basis of our independent analysis of COPA and would reach the

same result on either basis standing alone. For the foregoing

reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s March 22, 2007

order.

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