Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05809/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05809-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN BRIGGS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-05809-EMC 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Docket Nos. 1, 2, 6, 8, 9

I. INTRODUCTION

Kevin Briggs, formerly an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed 

this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His petition for 

writ of habeas corpus is now before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2243 and Rule 4 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. His request for 

appointment of counsel, motion for a stay, and application to proceed in forma pauperis are also 

before the court for review. 

II. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Briggs alleges in his petition that he pled nolo contendere and was convicted in Santa 

Clara County Superior Court of making a criminal threat, see Cal. Penal Code § 422. He further 

alleges that he was sentenced in September 2013 to four years in prison. Mr. Briggs states that he 

appealed; his conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal in 2014 and his petition 

for review was denied by the California Supreme Court in 2015. He also filed unsuccessful state 

habeas actions. He then filed this action.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Review of Petition

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A 

district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall “award the writ or issue 

an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it 

appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2243. 

The petition for writ of habeas corpus alleges the following claims: 

(1) Mr. Briggs received ineffective assistance of counsel because 

counsel failed to investigate, which deprived Mr. Briggs of a “fair 

trial.” Docket No. 8 at 5, 6. 

(2) Mr. Briggs‟ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated when the prosecutor “introduced trial testimony which was 

known to be or should have been recognized as perjury.” Id.at 5. 

(3) Mr. Briggs‟ First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights and 

rights under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street 

Act were violated by an unauthorized interspousal wiretap 

recording. Docket No. 8 at 5. His allegations suggest that the 

factual basis is that his wife or ex-wife recorded and altered a 

recording she made of a conversation with him. See id.at 8. 

(4) Mr. Briggs‟ Fifth Amendment right was violated when someone 

committed perjury, apparently based on the facts that his wife 

“changed statement to the operator [on a 911 call] to get a 

conviction,” and the prosecutor did not correct it. Id.at 9. 

(5) Mr. Briggs‟ right to due process was violated because the 

prosecutor did not prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(6) Mr. Briggs‟ Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the 

disclosure of an electronic communication.

(7) There is no Claim 7 in the petition. Claim 8 is the next claim 

listed after Claim 6 in the petition. See Docket No. 8 at 11-12.

(8) Mr. Briggs‟ Fourth Amendment rights and rights under 18 

U.S.C. § 2518(8) and 2253(2) were violated because the “prosecutor 

failed to establish the date of conversation” and other details about 

phone records. Docket No. 8 at 12.

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(9) Mr. Briggs‟ First, Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights were 

violated by an “illegal search of conversation.” Docket No. 8 at 13. 

(10) Mr. Briggs‟ Sixth Amendment rights were violated by a breach 

of the plea agreement when the prosecutor mistakenly recommended 

a sentence at the top of the guidelines range instead of 

recommending a low-end guideline sentence. Docket No. 8 at 14. 

(11) Mr. Briggs‟ rights against self-incrimination and double 

jeopardy were violated, but the facts alleged do not make sense. 

Docket No. 8 at 15. 

(12) Mr. Briggs did not have the right “mental state of mind” 

because he was “drunk and don‟t remember conversation.” Id.at 16. 

(13) “[F]ederal violation of states claim - imposing on increased 

sentence.” Id.at 17 (errors in source). In the place where he was 

directed to provide factual support for his claim, Mr. Briggs wrote 

that imposing an increased sentence under ACCA violates due 

process. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)).

The petition has numerous problems. First and foremost, most of Mr. Briggs‟ claims are 

barred because he was convicted upon a plea of nolo contendere, which has essentially the same 

effect as a guilty plea.1 Pre-plea constitutional violations cannot be considered in a federal habeas 

action brought by a petitioner who pled guilty. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 

(1973); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (guilty plea forecloses consideration of 

pre-plea constitutional deprivations); see, e.g., United States v. Friedlander, 217 F. App‟x 664 

(9th Cir. 2007) (in § 2255 proceedings, “[petitioner] contends that trial counsel was ineffective in 

her preparation and submission of two suppression motions submitted to the district court, which 

were denied. Because [petitioner] pled guilty, his allegations of pre-plea constitutional defects are 

waived.”); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to consider contention 

that petitioner‟s attorneys were ineffective because they failed to attempt to prevent the use of his 

confession as pre-plea constitutional violation). The only challenges left open in federal habeas 

corpus after a guilty plea are the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea and the nature of 

the advice of counsel to plead. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985). Pre-plea events 

 

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“[A] plea of nolo contendere shall be considered the same as a plea of guilty and [] upon a plea 

of nolo contendere, the court shall find the defendant guilty. The legal effect of such a plea, to a 

crime punishable as a felony, shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty for all purposes.” Cal. 

Penal Code § 1016 (2003). Under California law, a “plea of nolo contendere „is the functional 

equivalent of a guilty plea.‟” United States v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 1219, 1220 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting People v. Whitfield, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).

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would be relevant only as they affected counsel‟s advice to a petitioner to plead guilty or nolo 

contendere. Claims 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and the self-incrimination portion of Claim 11 are dismissed 

because they are for pre-plea constitutional violations.2

Claim 1, for ineffective assistance of counsel, alleges that counsel‟s ineffectiveness 

deprived Mr. Briggs of a fair trial, but the alleged impact on the course of trial is factually 

meritless because there was no trial. Claim 1 is dismissed with leave to amend so that Mr. Briggs 

may allege an ineffective assistance of counsel claim (if one exists) with regard to the advice to 

enter a plea of nolo contendere. In his amended petition, Mr. Briggs must allege facts supporting 

his claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance in connection with the plea proceedings, and 

must allege how he was prejudiced by any allegedly deficient performance of counsel.

Claims 5 and 12 challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Claim 5 alleges that the 

prosecutor failed to prove that he committed the crime, and Claim 12 alleges that Mr. Briggs did 

not have the requisite mental state for the crime. These claims are dismissed because the 

prosecutor is not required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when the defendant enters a 

plea of guilty or nolo contendere. “Put simply, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require an on-the-record development of 

the factual basis supporting a guilty plea before entry of the plea, and the failure of a state court to 

elicit a factual basis before accepting a guilty plea does not in itself provide a ground for habeas 

corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1151 (3d Cir. 1995). 

“[T]he state court‟s failure to find the factual basis for [a defendant‟s] no contest plea--

unaccompanied by protestations of innocence--does not present a constitutional issue cognizable 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Loftis v. Almager, 704 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 2012).

Claim 10 appears to be cognizable in a federal habeas action and should be alleged again in 

 

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There is an additional bar to the Fourth Amendment portions of Claims 3, 6, 8, and 9. The case 

of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) bars federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment 

claims unless the state did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of those claims. 

California state procedures provide an opportunity for full litigation of any Fourth Amendment 

claim. See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (whether or not defendant 

litigated Fourth Amendment claim in state court is irrelevant if he had opportunity to do so under 

California law). 

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the amended petition.

The petition has insufficient information about Claim 11 for the Court to determine 

whether it may proceed. Mr. Briggs alleges that there was a double jeopardy violation, but fails to 

allege any facts showing that he was twice put in jeopardy for the same crime. In his amended 

petition, he needs to explain how his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated, e.g., 

describe the case in which he earlier was tried for, convicted, or acquitted of the same offense.

Claim 13 alleges that “imposing an increased sentence under ACCA residual clause 

violates the due process of law.” Docket No. 8 at 17. This claim is meritless because the Armed 

Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is a federal sentencing provision and Mr. Briggs was not 

sentenced under it. Mr. Briggs was sentenced in state court and under state law. Claim 13 is 

dismissed. 

B. Miscellaneous Motions

Mr. Briggs commenced this action by filing a “motion for stay and abeyance pending 

exhaustion of claim in state court.” Docket No. 1 at 1. A stay and abeyance “is only appropriate 

when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his 

claims first in state court,” the claims are not meritless, and there are no intentionally dilatory 

litigation tactics by the petitioner. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). Mr. Briggs 

failed to show he meets any of the criteria for a Rhines stay. The motion he filed was a form 

motion, and provided no information about Mr. Briggs‟ case. At the time he filed the motion, he 

did not submit a habeas petition, did not identify any unexhausted claims or explain why he had 

not exhausted his state court remedies before filing his federal petition. Mr. Briggs may not even 

need a stay and abeyance to exhaust state court remedies and may have completed his state court 

efforts: the California Supreme Court had denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus less than a 

week before he sent his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus to this court. See Docket No. 1 

at 2. For these reasons, the motion for stay and abeyance is DENIED without prejudice. Docket 

No. 1.

Mr. Briggs has requested appointment of counsel to represent him in this action. A district 

court may appoint counsel to represent a habeas petitioner whenever “the court determines that the 

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interests of justice so require” and such person is financially unable to obtain representation. 18 

U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). The decision to appoint counsel is within the discretion of the district 

court. See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). Appointment is mandatory only 

when the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent 

due process violations. See id. The interests of justice do not require appointment of counsel in 

this action. The request for appointment of counsel is DENIED. Docket No. 2 and 9.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed with leave to amend. Mr. Briggs must 

file an amended petition curing the deficiencies identified in this order no later than May 27, 2016. 

Failure to file the amended petition by the deadline will result in the dismissal of all claims except 

Claim 10, as that is the only claim the Court has found cognizable.

Mr. Briggs‟ motion for stay and abeyance and request for appointment of counsel are 

DENIED. Docket Nos. 1, 2, and 9. Mr. Briggs‟ in forma pauperis application is GRANTED. 

Docket No. 6.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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