Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07212/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07212-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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1The complaint sought damages from PIBC for breach of employment contract, refusal to pay

wages and negligent termination of employment contract; from the sovereign defendants (the

Central Bank, its Governor and Deputy Governor) and PIBC for malicious prosecution and false

arrest; from the sovereign defendants for false imprisonment; and from all defendants for libel

and intentional infliction of emotional and physical distress. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 14, 1995 Decided February 6, 1996

No. 94-7212

HASSAN EL-FADL,

APPELLANT

v.

CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv01895)

Sam W. Burgan argued the cause for appellant, with whom Frederick R. McDermott was on the

briefs.

Christopher M. Curran argued the cause for appellees Central Bank of Jordan, et al., with whom

George L. Paul was on the brief.

John R. Fornaciari argued the cause for appellee Petra International Banking Corporation, with

whom John J. Vecchione was on the brief.

Before: GINSBURG, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Hassan El-Fadl filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of

Columbia seeking to recover damages against Petra InternationalBanking Corporation ("PIBC") for

wrongful termination of employment as well as for various tort claims against several Jordanian

institutions and officials: the Central Bank of Jordan, its Governor and Deputy Governor, and Petra

Bank (together, the "Jordanian defendants").1 The Central Bank of Jordan removed the case to

federal district court pursuant to the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §

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1441(d) (1994). Following the removal, the Jordanian defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and

PIBC also filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court

dismissed the complaint as to all defendants. First, the court ruled that the Central Bank, Governor

Mohammed Saeed El-Nabulsi, and Deputy Governor Michel Marto (together, the "sovereign

defendants") were immune fromsuit under the FSIA. Second, the court granted Petra Bank's motion

to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under the District of Columbia "doing business" and

long-arm statutes found in D.C. Code §§ 13-334, 13-422, and 13-423. Third, the court granted

PIBC's motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, although the court had personal

jurisdiction, because El-Fadl had an available forum in the Jordanian courts. The court denied ElFadl's motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, El-Fadl contends principally that the district court erred in finding that he had an

adequate alternative forum available to sue PIBC in Jordan and that the court erred in dismissing,

prior to discovery, his claims against Petra Bank for lack of personal jurisdiction in the District of

Columbia. He also contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims against Deputy

Governor Marto. Although we find no merit to El-Fadl's claim that the court has jurisdiction over

DeputyGovernor Marto, we reverse the pre-discoverydismissal asto PetraBank for lack of personal

jurisdiction and remand to allow El-Fadl to have discovery of jurisdictional facts. We also reverse

and remand the forum non conveniens dismissal of the claims against Petra Bank and PIBC because

the defendants failed to show that El-Fadl's claims can be filed in the Jordanian courts.

I.

El-Fadl is a Lebanese nationalwho haslived in Jordan since 1982. In his complaint, he alleges

that he was employed by PIBC, a subsidiary in the District of Columbia of Petra Bank, a privately

owned bank in Jordan. From 1982 to 1989 he was employed by PIBC in Jordan as manager of a

regional office for Middle Eastern clients. He had signed a contract under which he "would be

permanently employed for life as a senior manager of Petra InternationalBanking Corporation." The

defendants maintain that El-Fadl was employed by Petra Bank (not PIBC) as a senior manager with

responsibility for currency and precious metals trading.

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In August 1989, the Central Bank of Jordan announced that it had uncovered widespread

financial improprieties at Petra Bank and placed Petra Bank in receivership. Since then, Petra Bank

has been run by a Liquidation Committee appointed by the Jordanian government. The Deputy

Governor of the Central Bank, Michel Marto, was appointed to administer the liquidation of PIBC,

and Marto came to the District of Columbia for that purpose. On September 14, 1989, Marto sent

El-Fadl a letter in which PIBC terminated El-Fadl's employment assenior manager ofthe PIBC office

in Amman. As part of the Jordanian authorities' investigation of the Petra Bank scandal, El-Fadl was

arrested on October 29, 1989. El-Fadl alleges that the military police detained him for five days and

tortured him, until he was released on bail. El-Fadl was prosecuted first in the Military Courts under

MartialLaw and then in the State SecurityCourt, where he was "declared innocent" on April 9, 1992,

which finding was affirmed by the Prime Minister on August 2, 1992. While the charges were

pending, El-Fadl alleges that he was forbidden to leave Jordan. On July 30, 1993, El-Fadl filed suit

in the District of Columbia.

II.

Sovereign immunity. The district court dismissed the claims against the Central Bank,

Governor Nabulsi and Deputy Governor Marto under the FSIA. The court found that the Central

Bank was a "foreign state" under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), and had not waived its sovereign

immunity. The court ruled that Nabulsi and Marto were also immune because they were being sued

in their official capacities as agents of the Central Bank. The court rejected El-Fadl's arguments that

his claims fell under the "non-commercial tort" exception or the "commercial activity" exception to

the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(2), (5).

On appeal, El-Fadl has abandoned his claims against the Central Bank and Nabulsi but seeks

to maintain his claims against Marto on the ground that Marto was acting not in his official capacity

but in an individual capacity as Chairman and General Manager of PIBC. Because El-Fadl failed to

present any evidence that Marto was acting outside his official capacity, the district court found that

Marto had no "personal interests at stake in connection with Petra [Bank] or PIBC." We affirm.

An individual can qualify as an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. §

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2

28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) provides:

An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity

(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and

(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a

majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign

state or political subdivision thereof, and

(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in

section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third

country. 

3

In light of our disposition, we do not reach the district court's alternative holding that it

lacked personal jurisdiction over Deputy Governor Marto. 

1603(b) (1994);2see Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990).

Although El-Fadl claims to be suing Marto in an individual capacity, the only evidence in the record

shows that Marto's activities in managing PIBC were neither personal nor private, but were

undertaken only on behalf of the CentralBank. Thus, Marto's affidavit states that in connection with

the liquidation of PIBC, after being elected Chairman of PIBC and serving as its General Manager,

he continued to be employed only at the Central Bank and that his "responsibilities with respect to

PIBC were only a veryminor part of[his] responsibilities as a DeputyGovernor oftheCentralBank."

El-Fadl pointsto nothing more than the fact that Marto was Chairman and GeneralManager of PIBC

and sent the letter of termination while he was in the District of Columbia. We therefore affirm the

dismissal of the claims against Marto on grounds of sovereign immunity.3 El-Fadl is not entitled to

discovery against Marto because, in light of the evidence that Marto proffered to the district court

and the absence of any showing by El-Fadl that Marto was not acting in his official capacity,

discovery would " "frustrate the significance and benefit of entitlement to immunity from suit.' "

Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting

Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1988)).

III.

Personal jurisdiction. The district court granted Petra Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction under D.C. Code §§ 13-422, 13-334 or 13-423(a). First, the district court

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4The district court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction over PIBC under § 13-422 of the D.C.

Code. 

5D.C. Code § 13-334(a) (1995) (Service on foreign corporations) provides:

In an action against a foreign corporation doing business in the District, process

may be served on the agent of the corporation or person conducting its business,

or, when he is absent and can not be found, by leaving a copy at the principal place

of business in the District, or, where there is no such place of business, by leaving a

copy at the place of business or residence of the agent in the District, and that

service is effectual to bring the corporation before the court. 

agreed that it lacked general jurisdiction over Petra Bank under D.C. Code § 13-422 because Petra

Bank was not a "person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal

place of business in, the District of Columbia."4 D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-422 (1995). Second, the

court agreed with Petra Bank that it was not subject to general jurisdiction for "doing business" in

the District of Columbia under D.C. Code § 13-334.5 Neither Petra Bank's maintenance of

correspondent banking relationships nor its ownership of more than 70% of the shares in PIBC

sufficed for "doing business." Third, the court agreed that it lacked specific jurisdiction over Petra

Bank under the District of Columbia long-arm statute because none of El-Fadl's claims "arose from"

Petra Bank's alleged contacts with the District. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a) (1995). Although ElFadl had moved to stay dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction until he had conducted discovery

of jurisdictional facts, the district court denied his motion as moot.

A.

Raising Issue on Appeal. In his brief on appeal, El-Fadl contends that the district court had

personal jurisdiction over Petra Bank. He alleges, citing the long-arm statute, that various general

business contacts of Petra Bank with the District of Columbia constitute "transacting any business

in the District of Columbia." D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(1). In addition, he alleges that, by

entering into collateral loan agreements in the District, Petra Bank is "contracting to supply services

in the District of Columbia." Id. § 13-423(a)(2). El-Fadl also alleges that Petra Bank caused him

tortious injury in the District of Columbia because he was employed in the District when Petra Bank

allegedly tortiously interfered with his employment contract and defamed him. Id. § 14-423(a)(3),

(4).

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6We also affirm the district court's holding that it lacked jurisdiction under § 13-422 because

the record shows that Petra Bank is organized under the laws of Jordan and maintains its principal

place of business there. 

El-Fadl's brief does not distinguish between "transacting business" under the long-armstatute

and "doing business" for purposes of general jurisdiction. See Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 763

(D.C. Cir. 1987). His reliance on the long-arm statute is misplaced because he has failed to show any

connection between the alleged jurisdictional acts and the District of Columbia. Because El-Fadl's

claims are not related to any of Petra Bank's general business contacts with the District of Columbia,

they cannot confer specific jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (Helicol). As to El-Fadl's claims of tortious

injury under subsections (a)(3) and (4), it appears unlikely that one living and working in Jordan

would be injured in the District ofColumbia merely because his employer's principalplace of business

was located here. In any event, El-Fadl has made no showing that such conduct by Petra Bank was

"purposefully directed" at the District of Columbia. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 476 (1985). Thus, we affirm the district court's holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction under

§ 13-423(a).6

On the other hand, El-Fadl's brief repeats the language of what the courts have construed to

be the District of Columbia's general jurisdiction statute, D.C. Code § 13-334(a), in arguing, as he

did in the district court, that "Petra Bank has been doing business in the District of Columbia."

Appellant's Brief at 17-20. In support of his contention, he recites a long list of general contacts

betweenPetraBank and the District ofColumbia,see infra Part III(B), and maintainsthat Petra Bank

"had systematically been involved in commercial banking activities in the District of Columbia,"

"continuously and systematically conducted business in the District of Columbia," and had a

"continuous presence and continuing involvement in business activities in the District of Columbia."

Id. at 18-20. This is the language of general jurisdiction, directly responsive to Petra Bank's motion

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under § 13-334. The district court's opinion makes clear that it so

understood El-Fadl's arguments, explaining:

Doing business has been interpreted by the District of Columbia Court of

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7The district court cited AMAF Int'l Corp. v. Ralston Purina Co., 428 A.2d 849, 851 (D.C.

1981) (per curiam), and Guevara v. Reed, 598 A.2d 1157, 1159 (D.C. 1991). In those cases, the

D.C. Court of Appeals rejected the argument that § 13-334(a) "is merely a service of process act,

superseded when the long-arm statute was enacted," and construed the statute to "confer[ ]

jurisdiction upon trial courts here over foreign corporations doing substantial business in the

District of Columbia, even though the claim arose from a transaction which occurred elsewhere,

and hence, outside the scope of the long-arm statute." Guevara, 598 A.2d at 1159 (citing AMAF

Int'l Corp., 428 A.2d 849). AMAF relied on this court's opinion in Goldberg v. Southern

Builders, Inc., 184 F.2d 345, 346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 428 A.2d at 850. 

Appeals as requiring a "continuing corporate presence", and conducting "substantial

business" in the District. The defendants argue that [El-Fadl's] conclusory statements

alleging that the defendants are doing business in the District within the meaning of

§ 13-334 are not sufficient to constitute the prima facie showing necessary to carry

the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. The Court is inclined to agree. [ElFadl] has failed to present any evidence to support his position that the court could

exercise jurisdiction over the Jordanian defendant pursuant to D.C. Code § 13-334.

To the contrary, the defendantsseem to establish that their presence in the District of

Columbia is very limited, and, in the case of Petra Bank, the presence of PIBC in the

District is insufficient to create personal jurisdiction over Petra Bank. (emphasis

added) [7]

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(6) requires the appellant's brief to include an

argument, which "must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, and the

reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." In

explaining the application of Rule 28(a)(6), this court has stated:

The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as

self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal

questions presented and argued by the parties before them.... Failure to enforce [Rule

28(a)(6)] willultimatelydeprive usin substantialmeasure ofthat assistance of counsel

which the system assumesa deficiency that we can perhaps supply by other means,

but not without altering the character of our institution. Of course not all legal

arguments bearing upon the issue in question will always be identified by counsel, and

we are not precluded fromsupplementing the contentions of counselthrough our own

deliberation and research. But where counsel has made no attempt to address the

issue, we will not remedy the defect ....

Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.). Thus, when an appellant

"contented itself with conclusory assertions," the "[a]ppellees did not addressthe merits of the claim

at all," and "the issue was not passed upon below," this court "normallywill not address claimsraised

in such a cursory fashion." Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 697-98

(D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ) Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 652 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

1991). Nor will the court address issues that are not at all mentioned in the appellant's brief, by

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8Not all the contacts recited by El-Fadl can logically be tied into his assertion of specific

jurisdiction. Although El-Fadl concludes that his claims "arise from Petra's role in taking over and

managing PIBC," he makes numerous other allegations of continuous contacts by Petra Bank that

are unrelated to its takeover of PIBC (e.g., "Petra Bank by its own and separate conduct made

commercial loans...."). His claims obviously do not "aris[e] from" these unrelated contacts. 

Thus, many of El-Fadl's allegations would relate only to a claim for general jurisdiction under §

13-334(a). 

contrast with "a situation in which an appellant incorporates by reference or otherwise "implicitly'

raises a generic legal claim." McBride v. Merrell Dow&Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1211

(D.C. Cir. 1986).

By contrast with the barren claims in Texas Rural Legal Aid, El-Fadl presented in his brief

detailed factual assertionsin opposition to Petra Bank's assertions, adopted by the district court, that

it was not "doing business" in the District of Columbia within the meaning of § 13-334. The

Jordanian defendantsrecognized that El-Fadl was again contesting their claim of lack of jurisdiction

under § 13-334 and have devoted nine pages of the eleven page-section in their brief on personal

jurisdiction to a comprehensive analysis of § 13-334. Jordanian Appellees' Brief at 25-33. As noted,

the district court expressly ruled on the § 13-334 arguments by the parties. Nothing in our local

version of Rule 28 would require more. D.C. CIR. R. 28(a).

Consequently, neither the opposing party, the district court, nor this court has been misled

by the fact that El-Fadl did not expressly cite D.C. Code § 13-334(a) itself in his brief. The "doing

business" argumentsin El-Fadl's brief, in response to the district court's agreement with Petra Bank's

§ 13-334(a) arguments, are presented in the language of general jurisdiction, notwithstanding the

misguided attempts by El-Fadl's counsel to link these contacts to the long-arm statute.8 El-Fadl did

not distinguish between specific and general jurisdiction in opposing Petra Bank's motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction in the district court, and by making the same arguments in his brief

on appeal, it is clear that he has not waived his § 13-334(a) arguments. Moreover, his failure to cite

§ 13-334(a) in haec verba becomes more understandable in light of "the confusion that sometimes

attends the analysis of personal jurisdiction issues," Crane, 814 F.2d at 763, and the misleading

organization ofthe District ofColumbia Code. Chapter 4 of title 13 of the District of Columbia Code

addresses jurisdiction while chapter 3 of title 13 addresses service of process. Yet, as the district

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court here recognized, the District of Columbia courts have construed § 13-334(a) to be a

jurisdictional statute. See supra note 7. Indeed, other district courts in this circuit have

acknowledged that § 13-334(a) on its face appears to apply only to service of process. See Ross v.

Product Dev. Corp., 736 F. Supp. 285, 289 n.7 (D.D.C. 1989); Bayles v. K-Mart Corp., 636 F.

Supp. 852, 855 (D.D.C. 1986).

The court, in any event, has unquestioned authority to reach the issue of general jurisdiction,

even if El-Fadl had waived any reliance on § 13-334(a). "When an issue or claim is properly before

the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather

retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law."

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). The Supreme Court has upheld a

decision by this court to reach "an issue "antecedent to ... and ultimately dispositive of ' the dispute

before it, even an issue the partiesfail to identify and brief." United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent

Ins. Agents, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2178 (1993) (quoting Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77

(1990)) (ellipsis in U.S. Nat'l Bank). In the instant case, resolution of the § 13-334(a) basis for

personal jurisdiction is potentially dispositive of Petra Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction. Moreover, prudential concerns should not lead us to construe El-Fadl's brief as waiving

reliance on § 13-334(a). Recognizing that "the hard analysis comes in determining when an issue or

claim is properly before the court," Independent Ins. Agents v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir.

1992)(Silberman,J., dissenting),rev'd sub nom. United StatesNat'l Bank v. IndependentIns. Agents,

113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993), we find that El-Fadl's brief presents both possible bases, general and specific,

for personaljurisdiction over PetraBank. Indeed, El-Fadl asserts, in hisstatement ofissues presented,

that "[t]he District Court erred ... in dismissing claims against a foreign defendant for lack of personal

jurisdiction, prior to discovery or a hearing."

Declining to reach the issue of general jurisdiction would not further the prudential concerns

underlying Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 as articulated in Carducci v. Regan. This court

has the benefit of briefing by both parties as well as the ruling of the district court. Cf. United States

v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("A skeletal "argument', really nothing more than an

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assertion, does not preserve a claim."). The jurisdictional issue is fully presented to us, with the

assistance that counsel can provide. Efficiency in appellate adjudication is not served by letting stand

a potentially erroneous decision because counsel for the appellant has failed to cite the title and

section number of a statute that both parties address and the district court discussed in its decision

on personal jurisdiction. Cf. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 n.2 (4th Cir. 1993). The

lack of any prejudice to the appellee or to the institutionalstructure of the court from this apparently

inadvertent omission strengthens the general proposition that the court should "liberally construe

briefsin determining issues presented for review." SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1096 (5thCir. 1993)

(per curiam); accord Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Haralson, 813 F.2d 370, 373 n.3 (11th Cir.

1987). Any other result would be unduly harsh because the issue involves jurisdiction, thereby

jeopardizing a party's right to have the merits of his claims heard before any discovery has taken

place. Cf. Sikora v. Brenner, 379 F.2d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rohler v. TRW, Inc., 576 F.2d

1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1978).

B.

Discovery of factsfor general jurisdiction. As part of his contention that the district court

had generaljurisdiction over PetraBank, El-Fadlrequests discoveryfromPetraBank ofjurisdictional

facts. In opposing the Jordanian defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, ElFadl requested the district court to stay ruling on the motion until he had conducted "limited

discovery" on "[t]he extent of Petra Bank's business activities in the District of Columbia." In his

brief on appeal, El-Fadl maintains that "[q]uestions put to Petra Bank on discovery regarding its

business activities in the District of Columbia went unanswered.... At the very least, El-Fadl is

entitled to discovery on this matter before it is decided. Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir.

1987)."

On the present record, El-Fadl has not made a prima facie case that Petra Bank was "doing

business" in the District of Columbia. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-334(a); Edmond v. United States

Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991). For general jurisdiction, the Due

Process Clause requires that the defendant have "continuous and systematic general business

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9

In an unrelated case, the court did not reach the issue of whether PIBC was the "alter ego" of

Petra Bank. A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int'l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1457 (D.C. Cir.

1995). 

contacts" with the forum. Helicol, 466 U.S. at 416; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining

Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952). El-Fadl asserts the following facts about Petra Bank's contacts with

the District of Columbia: (1) Petra Bank issued a commercial loan of over $500,000 in 1989; (2)

in litigation concerning that loan in the D.C. Superior Court, Petra Bank filed a counter-claim; (3)

Petra Bank has entered into several "collateral agreements covering loans in the District of

Columbia," using a form contract that selects as the governing law the laws of the District of

Columbia; (4) Petra Bank owns 70% of PIBC, its District of Columbia subsidiary, with which Petra

Bank maintains bank accountsin the District ofColumbia; (5) El-Fadl sent millions of dollars by wire

transfers through Petra Bank from PIBC offices in Jordan to PIBC's main office in the District of

Columbia; and (6) in a deposition for another case, PIBC's general manager, Randolph Old, stated

that Petra Bank had "joint loans" with PIBC and that PIBC acted as Petra Bank's "collection agent"

in the District of Columbia. The allegations concerning the loan, the consequent litigation, and the

collateral agreements are mere isolated and sporadic contacts unrelated to the claims in the instant

case. By contrast, § 13-334(a) requires a "continuing corporate presence in the forum ... directed at

advancing the corporation's objectives." AMAF Int'l Corp., 428 A.2d at 851; see also Helicol, 466

U.S. at 416-17. El-Fadl's allegations concerning the relationship between PIBC and Petra Bank

attempt to attribute the subsidiary's contacts with the District ofColumbia to the parent corporation.9

Although a parent-subsidiary relationship alone is insufficient, Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing

Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1925), if parent and subsidiary "are not really separate entities," I.A.M.

Nat'l Pension Fund v. Wakefield Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 1254, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1983), or one acts as

an agent of the other, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 419 (9th Cir.

1977), the local subsidiary's contacts can be imputed to the foreign parent. Yet El-Fadl has shown

only that Petra Bank ownsthe majority ofsharesin PIBC and that the two corporations have worked

together on certain transactions. See Ramamurti v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407, 413 (D.D.C.

1978), aff'd mem., 612 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

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Even though El-Fadl's present jurisdictional allegations are insufficient, he has sufficiently

demonstrated that it is possible that he could supplement them through discovery. In Crane, 814

F.2d at 760, this court reversed when a plaintiff's case was dismissed "with no opportunity for

discovery on the issue of jurisdiction." Because no discovery at all had been allowed, Crane differs

from Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210

(1984), in which the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying further

jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff had already had " "ample opportunity' to take discovery."

Id. at 788 (quoting Zarilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see Edmond, 953 F.2d at

1401 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). The Crane court held that the

plaintiff was "entitled to a fair opportunity to inquire into [the defendant]'s affiliations with the

District." 814 F.2d at 764. Similarly, in Edmond, this court held that the district court abused its

discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff had alleged the existence of a

conspiracy that would allow the court to attribute the local conspirator's contacts with the District

of Columbia to the co-conspirators. 949 F.2d at 425. The Edmond court distinguished Naartex as

a case "where the allegations of conspiracy were conclusory." Id.; see also Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686

F.2d 276, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1982).

El-Fadl's request is for initial discovery, limited to jurisdictional facts. His allegations,

although they fallshort of a prima facie case that Petra Bank was "doing business" in the District of

Columbia, are not "conclusory" to the extent that El-Fadlhas alleged specific transactions. His theory

that Petra Bank may have had further, as yet unknown, connectionsto the District is not implausible.

Petra Bank initially denied having any contacts with the District of Columbia other than as a

correspondent bank. If litigation had not fortuitously ensued over Petra Bank's $500,000 commercial

loan, El-Fadlwould not have been able to challenge the statements by Petra Bank's affiantsthat it had

not extended such loans. A plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

is entitled to reasonable discovery, lest the defendant defeat the jurisdiction of a federal court by

withholding information on its contacts with the forum.

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of El-Fadl's claims against Petra Bank for lack of

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personaljurisdiction and remand those claimsto the district court in order to allow El-Fadlto conduct

reasonable discovery on personal jurisdiction.

IV.

Forum non conveniens. The district court dismissed El-Fadl's claims against all defendants

on the ground of forum non conveniens. In light of the affirmance of the dismissal of the claims

against the sovereign defendants on other grounds, El-Fadl's objectionsto the dismissal on forum non

conveniens relate to the remaining defendants, Petra Bank and PIBC.

In deciding a forum non conveniens motion, the district court must first establish that there

is an adequate alternative forum:

At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine

whether there exists analternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied

when the defendant is "amenable to process" in the other jurisdiction. In rare

circumstances, however, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly

unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the initial

requirement may not be satisfied. Thus, for example, dismissal would not be

appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject

matter of the dispute.

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) (citation omitted). Only if there is an

adequate alternative forummust the court then weigh the relative conveniencesto the parties against

the presumption ofthe plaintiff'sforum selection. Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775,

784 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). "Availability of adequate alternative fora

is a threshold test ... in the sense that a forum non conveniens motion cannot be granted unless the

test is fulfilled." Friendsfor All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 717 F.2d 602, 607 (D.C.

Cir. 1983). The defendant bears the burden of proving that there is an adequate alternative forum.

See, e.g., Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 935 F.2d 419, 423, 425 (1st Cir. 1991); In re Air Crash

Disaster Near NewOrleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1164 (5thCir. 1987) (en banc), vacated in part on other

grounds, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989); Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

464 U.S. 1017 (1983); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1160 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Watson

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 769 F.2d 354, 357 (6th Cir. 1985).

Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is for abuse of

discretion. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257; Pain, 637 F.2d at 781. Although this is a deferential

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standard of review, the district court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider a material factor

or clearly errs in evaluating the factors before it, Mercier, 935 F.2d at 423, or "does not hold the

defendantsto their burden of persuasion on all elements ofthe forumnon conveniens analysis." ReidWhalen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862

F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988).

To show the existence of an adequate alternative forum, the defendant "must provide enough

information to enable the District Court" to evaluate the alternative forum. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S.

at 258. Because the defendant has the burden of establishing that an adequate alternative forum

exists, this court will reverse when "the affidavit through which [the defendant] attempted to meet

its burden containssubstantial gaps." Mercier, 935 F.2d at 425. The amount of information that the

defendant must provide, in supporting affidavits or other evidence, depends on the facts of the

individual case. Lacey, 862 F.2d at 44. Accordingly, the defendant must provide more detailed

information if the plaintiff provides evidence that controverts the defendant's evidence. See Camejo

v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration, 838 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1988). If the record

before the court isso "fragmentary" that "it isimpossible to make a sound determination" of whether

an adequate alternative forum exists, the court will remand for further development of the facts. See

C.A. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 1983).

PIBC and Petra Bank could not prove on the present record that Jordan was an adequate

alternative forum. PIBC submitted an affidavit from a Jordanian attorney, Rami M. Al-Hadidi, who

states that "Jordanian courts are open to El-Fadl to adjudicate these claims against the defendants."

Al-Hadidi also explainsthat the JordanianCivilCode recognizes various causes of action that El-Fadl

has brought. Yet PIBC's expert fails to address various potentially dispositive provisions of Jordanian

law that El-Fadl brought to the district court's attention. Given the gap in PIBC's expert's affidavit

and the undeveloped state of the record on this issue, the district court erred in finding that PIBC or

Petra Bank met its burden ofshowing that Jordan is an adequate alternative forum. Cf. Mercier, 935

F.2d at 425; C.A. La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at 1308.

El-Fadl maintains that the Jordanian courts lack jurisdiction over claims based on actions

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10Resolution No. 4/90 of the Economic Security Committee, entitled Liquidation of Petra

Bank Public Shareholding Company Ltd., issued on July 15, 1990, decrees that:

Upon the request of the liquidator, the courts and the execution

departments shall stop the proceedings in any court action or act at present

undertaken by Petra Bank or against it. As from the date of the start of the

liquidation no court action or any new judicial proceedings may be heard against

Petra Bank or the liquidator.

In Resolution No. 230/90, entitled Suspension of Lawsuits and issued on September 8, 1990, the

Petra Bank Liquidation Committee announced that:

[T]he Liquidation Committee has resolved ... [to][r]equest the competent Courts

to suspend the progress in all the lawsuits in which the Petra Bank is a party

whether as a plaintiff or defendant before the Courts of Conciliation, First Instance

and Appeal as well as the Wages Authority Court of the Ministry of Labour and

[to] commission the Director General to communicate with the concerned

authorities for the implementation of this resolution.

El-Fadl has also produced letters from Bassam Atari, the deputy chairman of the Liquidation

Committee, to the President of the Amman Court of Appeals and to the President of the

Magistrate Court of Amman, in which Atari refers to the two resolutions quoted above and

requests the judges on both those courts to implement the resolutions and "suspend all the

lawsuits in which the Petra Bank is a party." 

taken in connection with the Petra Bank scandalincluding actions on which he bases his claims for

recovery. He called the district court's attention to a Jordanian statute, Law No. 2 for the year 1992,

the Law of Lifting of Responsibility as a Result of Cancellation of the Martial Law (issued Sep. 12,

1991) ("Law No. 2"). As part of the lifting of martial law, Law No. 2 referred "[a]ll lawsuits" then

in the military courts to the "competent Courts," except that "[n]otwithstanding the [general]

provisions ..., the lawsuits of Petra Bank Company which are currently at the Martial Courts under

investigations or trialshall be referred to the State SecurityCourt." Law No. 2 further declared that:

All civil and military employees as well as all the other persons who undertook

the implementation of the instructions of the Military Administration or had any

relation with the implementation thereof at any time during the time when the martial

law was in effect shall be discharged from any legal responsibility which resulted or

will result from their actions pursuant to the provisions.

In addition, El-Fadl cited two resolutions regarding Petra Bank.10 Based on the foregoing legal

authorities, El-Fadl's expert, a Jordanian attorney named Ibrahim J. Tukan, states in his affidavit that

"[t]he above listed laws, decrees, and statutes constitute an absolute prohibition to Mr. El-Fadl to

bring his causes of action in Jordan." PIBC's expert, Al-Hadidi, does not address any of these

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authorities in his affidavit.

Consequently, if El-Fadl's expert is correct in describing the legal situation in Jordan, the

Jordanian courts would appear to be closed to El-Fadl's claims against Petra Bank and perhaps even

to claims against PIBC. Then this court would be faced with the "rare circumstance[ ]" in which "the

alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute." Piper Aircraft, 454

U.S. at 254 n.22. A foreign forum is not inadequate merely because it has less favorable substantive

law, id. at 247-55, because it employs different adjudicative procedures, see, e.g., Lockman Found.

v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 768 (9thCir. 1991), or because of general allegations

of corruption in the judicial system. See, e.g., Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, 997 F.2d

974, 981-82 (2d Cir. 1993). El-Fadl's repeated reliance on a State Department report expressing

"concern about the impartiality" of the Jordanian court system, for example, is unavailing. But if the

foreign forum would deny him access to its judicial system on the claims in his complaint, dismissal

on forum non conveniens grounds is inappropriate. See Ceramic Corp. v. Inka Maritime Corp., 1

F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 1993).

The district court concluded "that the affidavit submitted by [El-Fadl's] Jordanian attorney

does not state unequivocally that [El-Fadl] is barred from bringing this suit in Jordan." Yet the

attorney (Tukan) makes precisely that claim in his affidavit, based on his interpretation of the

Jordanian statutes. PIBC and Petra Bank failed to respond with evidence that the Jordanian courts

are available to El-Fadl. Petra Bank, which argued only that Resolution No. 4/90 directed El-Fadl's

claims to insolvency proceedings, failed to address Law No. 2 altogether. PIBC's only evidence

showing that El-Fadl can sue PIBC in Jordan was the conclusory statement in Al-Hadidi's affidavit

that "Jordanian courts are open to El-Fadl to adjudicate these claims against the defendants." This

conclusory statementeven though not specifically contradicted in Tukan's affidavit asit pertainsto

PIBCfliesin the face of evidence that El-Fadlmay not be able to sue Petra Bank, and the statement

isinsufficient to show that he can sue PIBC in Jordan. This court will remand when the district court

fails to consider a material matter in dispute. See Mercier, 935 F.2d at 423. Moreover, the district

court appearsto have incorrectly placed the burden of proving the inadequacyofthe Jordanian courts

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upon El-Fadl in stating that: "[A]s the plaintiff [El-Fadl] has failed to demonstrate that this action

would be barred in its entirety in Jordan, the Court determines that an adequate alternative forum

exists." The district court was required to hold PIBC and Petra Bank to their burden of persuasion

on this issue. See Reid-Whalen, 933 F.2d at 1394.

For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing El-Fadl's claims against

Petra Bank and PIBC on forum non conveniens grounds. On remand, the district court should

determine the accuracy ofEl-Fadl's uncontroverted characterization of the legal effect of the decrees

asthey relate to claims against Petra Bank. In determining whether the Jordanian courts provide ElFadlwith an alternative forum, the district court should also determine whether the Jordanian decrees

would bar suit against PIBC. In addition, because El-Fadl's expert, Tukan, also concluded that ElFadl's intentional tort claims could not be brought in a civil lawsuit for recovery of damages, but

could only be brought in conjunction with a criminal complaint, the district court should determine

whether the Jordanian courts are inadequate for that reason. Although this procedural difference may

not render El-Fadl's remedy in Jordan inadequate, see Lockman Found., 930 F.2d at 768-69, the

district court should consider whether the situation would be different if El-Fadl shows that filing a

criminal complaint requires the cooperation of the Jordanian authorities, who worked with the

defendants in prosecuting El-Fadl in the military courts.

If the district court on remand findsthat PIBC and Petra Bank have met their burden to show

that Jordan is an adequate alternative forum, and the court again concludesthat the balance of private

and public interests weighs in favor of forum non conveniens dismissal, "the trial judge must finally

ensure that [El-Fadl] can reinstate [his] suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or

prejudice." Pain, 637 F.2d at 785. If doubts about the availability of an alternative forum remain due

to the difficulties in determining Jordanian law, the district court may dismiss for forum non

conveniens, but only if conditioned on the defendants' submitting to jurisdiction in Jordan and on the

Jordanian courts' acceptance of the case. See, e.g., Blanco, 997 F.2d at 984; Mercier, 935 F.2d at

426; Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1551-52 (5th Cir. 1991). Even if the district court

determinesthat there is an available forum, the court may condition a dismissal on PIBC's agreement

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11We do not decide PIBC's contention that El-Fadl's claims were barred by D.C. Code § 12-

301, because his causes of action accrued in September 1989 and he did not file suit until July

1993. El-Fadl responded that the running of the statute of limitations period was tolled by reason

of imprisonment or, alternatively, duress. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-302(a)(3). The district court did

not reach the merits of El-Fadl's arguments for tolling; inasmuch as the merits rest on findings of

fact that this court is ill equipped to make, nor do we. 

to be served in the District of Columbia for suit in Jordan.11

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the claims against Petra Bank for lack of personal

jurisdiction and remand to allow El-Fadl to conduct discovery of jurisdictionalfacts; we also reverse

the dismissal of the claims against Petra Bank and PIBC on grounds of forum non conveniens,

remanding for a finding whether Petra Bank and PIBC can show that Jordan is an adequate

alternative forum; otherwise, we affirm.

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