Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00221/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE SHARON L. GLEASON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

 Petitioner Michael Eugene Vickrey, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex – Eyman, Meadows Unit, in Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). For the reasons that 

follow, the Court recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed. 

BACKGROUND 

 On March 13, 2008, Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Pinal County 

Superior Court (“Superior Court”), Case No. CR 2008-00470, charging him with one 

count (Count I) of molestation of a child, and one count (Count II) of sexual conduct with 

a minor, both dangerous crimes against children. (Doc. 11-1, Exh. A.)1

 The underlying 

 1

 See also Arizona Judicial Branch Public Access Case Information for Case No. 

CR 2008-00470, found at http://apps.supremecourt.az.gov/publicaccess/caselookup.aspx (last visited May 9, 2014), which has been attached to this Report and Recommendation (“Attach. 1”) See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1114 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 2003) (public records may be judicially noticed to show that a judicial proceeding occurred or that a 

Michael Eugene Vickrey, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-13-00221-PHX-SLG (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 2:13-cv-00221-SLG Document 19 Filed 05/12/14 Page 1 of 18
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facts of the charges were summarized as follows: 

In 2007, Vickrey, who was then twenty-seven years old, began a relationship with M.H., a fourteen-year-old girl who lived two houses away. In the winter of 2007, M.H. visited 

Vickrey in his room several times. On one occasion, he 

placed his hands under M.H’s clothes and touched her 

genitals, while she simultaneously touched his genitals. 

(Doc. 11-1, Exh. A.)2

 On June 9, 2009, trial commenced, and a jury returned guilty 

verdicts on both counts on June 12, 2009. (Doc. 11-1, Exh. A; Doc. 11-1 at 16, Exh. B; 

Attach 1.) On September 25, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to an 11-year term of 

imprisonment for the first count, and a consecutive 20-year term of imprisonment for the 

second count. (Doc. 11-1, Exh. A; Attach 1.) 

 On October 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. 11-1 at 23, Exh. B.) 

On appeal, Petitioner presented three issues: 

I. Whether Appellant’s Conviction is Invalid Because the 

State Failed to Establish Jurisdiction at Any Point in the Trial 

II. Whether the Court Improperly Denied Appellant’s Motion to Preclude Wendy Dutton as a Purported Expert Witness 

III. Whether Appellant Was Entitled to a Mitigated Sentence on Count Two 

(Doc. 11-1 at 23, Exh. B.) In a memorandum decision filed on June 11, 2010, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Doc. 11-1, Exh. A); State v. Vickrey, 

No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0328, 2010 WL 2348663, (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). Petitioner did not 

seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 11-2, Exh. E.) 

 On August 24, 2010, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Superior Court (Doc. 11-2, Exh. F) and counsel was appointed to represent him. Upon 

review of the record, counsel filed a notice to the Superior Court that she found no issues 

 document was filed in another court case). 

2

 The Court presumes the state court’s factual recitation is correct because Petitioner 

has not contested or “rebut[ed] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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upon which to base a claim for relief, and requested an extension of time for Petitioner to 

file a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 11-2, Exh. G.) On July 7, 2011, 

Petitioner filed a Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, raising three issues: (1) the 

state court(s) failure to provide him with a complete copy of the “clerk’s file”; (2) his 

consecutive terms were improper because he had committed one act and that he should 

have been convicted only of child molestation because “the molestation charge (count 1) 

in this case makes the sexual conduct charge a lesser included offense to molestation, the 

sexual conduct conviction must be vacated as it activates the double jeopardy clause”; 

and (3) his consecutive terms were improper based on A.R.S. § 13–705(M), because the 

acts involved one victim. (Doc. 11-3, Exh. H.)3

 In an order dated September 14, 2011, the 

Superior Court dismissed Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition. (Doc. 11-4, Exh. K.) 

The Superior Court found both claims regarding sentencing precluded under state law 

because they could have been raised on direct appeal and alternatively, they were without 

merit. (Id.) The Superior Court’s decision was silent as to Petitioner’s claim concerning 

his criminal records. 

 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on October 

17, 2011. (Doc. 1 at 34-51.)4

 In a memorandum decision filed on December 28, 2011, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief, reasoning: 

¶ 3 Rule 32.2(a)(3) provides in relevant part that “[a] defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based 

upon any ground ... waived ... on appeal.” The trial court correctly found precluded the sentencing claims Vickery raised because they could have been raised on appeal. Indeed, Vickrey challenged the sentence on count two on appeal, 

arguing the trial court should have sentenced him to a 

mitigated prison term rather than the presumptive, twentyyear term. Vickrey, No. 2 CA–CR 2009–0328, ¶ 12. Thus, although he could have challenged the propriety of the 

 3

 Petitioner emphasized that he was “not challenging[] either finding of guilt, but [was] challenging the fact[] that the sentencing court” improperly sentenced him. (Doc. 

11-3 at 8, Exh. H.) 

4

 See also Arizona Court of Appeals Division Two Case Information for Case No. 2 

CA-CR 2011-0318-PR, found at: http://www.apltwo.ct.state.az.us/ODSPlus/caseInfolast. 

cfm?caseID=122649 (last visited May 9, 2014), which has been attached to this Report and Recommendation (“Attach. 2”) 

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consecutive terms as well, he failed to do so. On review 

Vickrey has not argued, much less persuaded us, that the court erred in finding the claims raised in the pro se petition precluded. 

¶ 4 Although the trial court was not required to address the merits of Vickrey’s petition, it did so in any event. The court 

found Vickrey had committed more than one act, 

distinguishing State v. Ortega, 220 Ariz. 320, 206 P.3d 769 

(App. 2008), which Vickrey had relied on in his petition. The court also rejected Vickrey’s argument that consecutive terms were improper based on § 13–705(M). The court was correct. 

The two charges alleged in the indictment, child molestation 

and sexual conduct with a minor, were based on two entirely 

independent, separate acts, albeit acts committed on one 

occasion in December 2007. Even assuming the two acts 

occurred simultaneously, count one was based on Vickrey 

having had the victim fondle his penis and count two was 

based on his having digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina. Although § 13–705(M) allows concurrent sentences for child 

molestation or sexual abuse under certain circumstances, this 

provision requires the imposition of consecutive prison terms when the defendant has committed child molestation or 

sexual abuse together with “any other dangerous crime 

against children,” which is what occurred here. See State v. 

Tsinnijinnie, 206 Ariz. 477, ¶¶ 11, 13, 80 P.3d 284, 286 

(App.2 003) (analyzing materially identical language of former A.R.S. § 13–604.01(K)). 

¶ 5 In Ortega, the defendant had penetrated the victim’s vulva 

with his penis and that act served as the basis for a charge of sexual conduct with a minor. 220 Ariz. 320, ¶¶ 3, 5, 27, 206 P.3d at 771, 772, 778. But the penetration itself, rather than a separate touching, was also the basis for a molestation charge. 

Id. Thus, the court concluded the defendant could not receive 

two convictions based on the same act because it would result 

in his conviction for both the greater and lesser offense. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Here, however, as we previously stated, Vickrey committed two separate acts. The trial court did not err when 

it initially imposed the sentence nor has Vickrey established the court misinterpreted or misapplied the law, thereby 

abusing its discretion, when it denied his petition for post- conviction relief. See State v. Burgett, 226 Ariz. 85, ¶ 1, 244 P.3d 89, 90 (App. 2010) (noting “abuse of discretion includes an error of law”). We, therefore, grant the petition for review but deny relief. 

(Doc. 11-4, Exh. M); State v. Vickrey, No. 2 CA-CR 2011-0318-PR, 2011 WL 6916544 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). In March 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, which the 

Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied on August 2, 2012. (Doc. 1 at 18-32; Attach. 

2.) 

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 On August 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(Doc. 11-5, Exh. O) and a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Doc. 11-4, Exh. P). 

Petitioner raised one issue, “the deprival of the Petitioner’s right to a copy of the 

complete file.” (Doc. 11-4 at 7, Exh. P.) In an order filed on August 9, 2012, the Superior 

Court summarily dismissed the Notice and Petition, finding “Petitioner ha[d] filed a 

successive and untimely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and Petition for postConviction Relief which d[id] not comply with the requirements of Rule 32.2(2).” (Doc. 

11-4, Exh. Q.) On October 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review. (Doc. 11-4, 

Exh. R.) In a memorandum decision filed on December 13, 2012, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review, but denied relief, reasoning in relevant part: 

¶ 2 In the petition for post-conviction relief Vickrey filed in August 2012 simultaneously with his notice of postconviction relief, he asserted he had been “deprived of [his] right to a copy of the complete file,” referring to minute entry orders entered in July 2011 in the initial post-conviction proceeding. Vickrey’s counsel in that proceeding had filed a notice stating she had found no colorable claim to raise and 

had requested that Vickrey be permitted to file a pro se petition. Vickrey seems to be asserting in this proceeding that he never received a copy of his complete case file even though the trial court had ordered counsel to provide it to him, and that he had been required to file his pro se petition in the first proceeding before he ever was able to obtain that 

complete file. 

¶ 3 The trial court dismissed the notice and the petition in this proceeding, finding the successive notice was untimely and 

that the petition failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 32.2(b). In his petition for review, Vickrey reasserts the claim he raised in the petition, again contending he was not provided with a copy of his complete file and re-questing that he be permitted to file a “subsequent” petition for post- conviction relief once he has had an opportunity to review his 

complete file. Vickrey has not established the trial court 

abused its discretion by summarily dismissing the petition on the basis of preclusion pursuant to Rule 32.2. 

¶ 4 Although the trial court’s ruling is correct, we point out 

that the claim Vickery raised in this proceeding was not cognizable under Rule 32.1. In addition, his complaints were addressed in the first post-conviction proceeding by the court’s rulings related to Vickery’s requests for production of his file. Vickery presumably was referring to that proceeding 

when he complained in his successive petition for post- conviction relief he had been required to file his pro se 

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petition without access to a complete file. Any complaints about matters regarding the production of Vickery’s file that remained unresolved in the first proceeding could not be raised in a new post-conviction proceeding. Rather, such complaints had to be raised in the same proceeding about which he is complaining and either in the petition for review that followed the denial of postconviction relief - to challenge the orders denying Vickery’s requests for his file - or, perhaps, in a special action petition - to challenge the denial of Vickery’s motion for an order to show cause regarding contempt against trial counsel. See Elia v. Pifer, 194 Ariz. 74, 

¶ 30, 977 P.2d 796, 802 (App.1998) (acknowledging generally that “orders adjudicating whether a person should be held in contempt for refusing to obey a court order are ... reviewable in appropriate circumstances by special action”). 

(Doc. 1 at 14-17); State v. Vickrey, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0421-PR, 2012 WL 6218486 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

 On February 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). In his petition, Petitioner raises two grounds for 

relief: 

GROUND ONE: Did the State Courts correctly apply the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, be it federal or 

state . . . as well as various federal case laws... 

GROUND TWO: Was the Petitioner’s right to possess a copy of his complete file prior to filing an appeal violated? 

(Doc. 1 at 6-7.) Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 11), arguing that Petitioner 

failed to exhaust his claims in state court and they are procedurally barred from review. 

Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 17) maintaining the contrary. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Applicable Law 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).5

 28 U.S.C. § 

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 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date, 

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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2244. 

 A. Standard for Habeas Relief 

Under AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It follows that, “[b]y its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any 

claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 

2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011). 

“Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported 

or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether 

it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are 

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Harrington, 

131 S.Ct. at 786. 

 In applying this standard, the federal habeas court reviews “the last reasoned state 

court decision addressing the claim in question.” Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 

(9th Cir. 2013); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). A state court 

decision adjudicated a claim “on the merits” where it resolved the substance of the claim 

rather than relied on a procedural or other non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 

393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). But see Johnson v. Williams, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1096 (2013) (“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly 

addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was 

adjudicated on the merits—but that presumption can in some limited circumstances be 

rebutted.”). “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the 

habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for 

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the state court to deny relief” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. 

“Therefore, when the state court does not supply reasoning for its decision, we are 

instructed to engage in an independent review of the record and ascertain whether the 

state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Crucially, this is not a de novo

review of the constitutional question. Rather, even a strong case for relief does not mean 

the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 

939 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” refers to holdings 

of the Supreme Court in effect at the time the state court rendered its decision. Greene v. 

Fisher, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 

(2003); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010) (“A legal principle is ‘clearly 

established’ within the meaning of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding 

of this Court.”). “If Supreme Court cases give no clear answer to the question presented, 

it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law. 

In other words, it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for 

a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established 

by the Supreme Court.’” Hedlund v. Ryan, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 1622765, *3 (9th Cir. 

April 24, 2014) (internal citations, quotations and brackets omitted). A state court’s 

decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state court applies a rule 

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state 

court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 

Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). “For a ‘federal court to find a state 

court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent unreasonable, the state court’s decision 

must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.’” Hernandez v. Holland, __F.3d __, 

2014 WL 1622766, *5 (9th Cir. April 24, 2014) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 

520 (2003). Instead, the application must have been “‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. 

“AEDPA thus precludes a federal court from granting habeas relief if ‘fairminded jurists 

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could disagree’ whether the state court incorrectly applied federal Supreme Court 

precedent. Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court’s decision is based on unreasonable 

determination of the facts if its “findings are ‘unsupported by sufficient evidence,’ if the 

‘process employed by the state court is defective,’ or ‘if no finding was made by the state 

court at all.’ Hernandez, 2014 WL 1622766 at *9 (quoting Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004)). See also Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). See 

Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 500 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 

611 (2012); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). A federal court in a 

habeas corpus proceeding must accord a presumption of correctness to a state court’s 

factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, “where the state courts plainly 

misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension 

goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension 

can fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding 

unreasonable.” Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Taylor, 366 

F.3d at 1001). 

 With regard to either exception under § 2254(d), “it is only noncompliance with 

federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the 

federal courts. The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue 

a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. 

Corcoran, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (original emphasis) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a)). In other words, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state 

law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 

(1990). Federal courts accept a state court’s interpretation of state law “and alleged errors 

in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Langford v. 

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). A habeas petitioner also cannot “transform a 

state law issue into a federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland 

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v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389). 

“[T]he Supreme Court has long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure 

immunity from judicial error or uniformity of judicial decisions.” Little v. Crawford, 449 

F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 B. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

A federal court may not grant habeas relief under AEDPA if the petitioner has 

failed to exhaust his claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); see O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to 

the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the 

claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the 

proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 

(9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

 First, a petitioner must present his claims to the state’s highest court in a 

procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848. A petitioner “must give 

the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one 

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” Id. at 845. “[C]laims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them” either on direct appeal or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. 

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Second, if a petitioner fails to invoke the 

required procedure, exhaustion is not satisfied even if the petitioner raises the claim 

through an alternative procedure. See e.g., Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38 (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies when he presented claim in the state habeas petition 

instead of Arizona Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding).

In addition to presenting a claim in the proper forum and vehicle, to satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement, “a petitioner must ‘present the substance of his claim to the state 

courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts 

that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 1026, 1041 (9th Cir. 

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2013) (quoting Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582-83 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Bland v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other 

grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In presenting 

the factual basis of a claim, a petitioner need not present “every piece of evidence 

supporting his federal claims,” but must “provide the state court with the operative facts, 

that is, all of the facts necessary to give application to the constitutional principle upon 

which [the petitioner] relies.” Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 28 

(2004). In presenting the legal basis of a claim, a petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that he is asserting a federal claim and cite to the specific constitutional guarantee 

upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 

(9th Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Our rule is that a 

state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state 

court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal 

law”) amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” 

such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial” is 

insufficient); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (finding a mere reference 

to the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a federal claim). 

 If a petitioner fails to fairly and fully present his federal claim in state court, and 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state courts’ procedural rules would 

bar consideration of the claim, the claim is procedurally defaulted and is barred from 

federal review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); 32.1(a)(3) (post-conviction review is precluded for claims 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); 32.9 (stating 

that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state 

post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. 

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Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, 

distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as 

“technical” exhaustion because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state 

court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 732 (1991). 

 A claim may also be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review if it 

was actually raised in state court, but found by that court to be defaulted on an adequate 

and independent state procedural ground, such as waiver or preclusion. Beard v. Kindler, 

558 U.S. 53 (2009); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991). Arizona courts 

have been consistent in their application of procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and 

independent procedural bar); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) is independent of federal law and has 

been regularly and consistently applied, so it is adequate to bar federal review of a 

claim.”); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review “if the 

petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546). See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as 

well as to those represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish 

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 488-89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional 

violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish 

prejudice, a petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

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substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or 

prejudice, the court need not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 

1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 fn. 13. 

 Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has 

‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” 

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by 

“persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be 

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error 

with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

II. Application 

 A. Ground One 

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his consecutive sentences violate double 

jeopardy principles because child molestation is a lesser-included offense of sexual 

conduct with a minor, citing to Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 

Petitioner’s claim in Ground One was presented in his first round of state post-conviction 

proceedings. His claim was raised before the Superior Court and presented on appeal to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 11-3 at 52, Exh. J; Doc. 1 at 37-39.) Although 

both courts found the claim was precluded, they both also considered its merits. (See

Doc. 11-4, Exhs. K and M.) Therefore, contrary Respondents’ assertion, Petitioner 

properly exhausted his claims in Ground One. See Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 331 

(9th Cir. 2011) (if the highest state court considers the merits of the claim, then 

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exhaustion is satisfied); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(holding that petitioner exhausted claim by presenting it in motion for reconsideration to 

Washington Supreme Court where court considered merits of claim). 

 In turning to the merits, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of 

this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of federal law, or that 

it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Double Jeopardy Clause 

protects criminal defendants from multiple convictions and punishments for the same 

offense. U.S. Const. amend. V. See also Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 

(1995) (the guarantee against double jeopardy protects against: (1) a second prosecution 

for the same offense after acquittal or conviction; and (2) multiple punishments for the 

same offense). “[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 

statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or 

only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” 

Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Thus a defendant may not be convicted for both an offense 

and its lesser included offense, because they are considered the “same offense” for double 

jeopardy purposes. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (concluding conviction for 

both greater and lesser included offense violates double jeopardy under Blockburger test). 

 In distinguishing Petitioner’s case from State v. Ortega, 206 P.3d 769 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 2008), the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the imposition of consecutive 

sentences did not violate double jeopardy principles. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

found that in Petitioner’s case, unlike in Ortega,

6

 “[t]he two charges alleged in the 

indictment, child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor, were based on two 

entirely independent, separate acts, albeit acts committed on one occasion in December 

2007.” (Doc. 11-4 at 20, Exh. M) (emphasis added). The charge of molestation of a child 

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 “In Ortega, the defendant had penetrated the victim’s vulva with his penis and that act served as the basis for a charge of sexual conduct with a minor. But the penetration itself, rather than a separate touching, was also the basis for a molestation charge. Thus, the court concluded the defendant could not receive two convictions based on the same 

act because it would result in his conviction for both the greater and lesser offense.” (Doc. 11-4 at 21, Exh. M (internal citation omitted).) 

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was “based on Vickrey having had the victim fondle his penis,” and the charge of sexual 

conduct with a minor “was based on his having digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina.” 

Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of relief based on these facts without further 

analysis of the statutory elements under Blockburger was not objectively unreasonable. 

See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302 (stating that where there is a factual distinction between 

the transactions, the offenses are not continuous). Because Petitioner’s convictions each 

rested on specific and distinct conduct, Petitioner was not punished twice for the same 

offense under any statute. See United States v. Lynn, 636 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“the government must allege and prove distinct conduct underlying each charge, whether 

the conduct underlying each charge occurred on the same or different dates”). The Court 

therefore concludes that neither the Arizona Court of Appeals’ reasoning nor result was 

contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that 

Ground One be denied.7

 B. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that he was deprived of his right to a complete 

copy of his criminal records on appeal and/or in post-conviction relief proceedings. 

Petitioner presented this claim in his first post-conviction relief proceedings. Petitioner 

argued that he had “diligently attempted to secure a copy of the complete clerk’s file, all 

to no avail.” (Doc. 11-3 at, Exh. H.) While he was provided with certain items, “portions 

of the trial transcripts were removed, such as jury instructions, voir dire, opening and 

closing arguments, [etc.]... The defendant is at a severe disadvantage without these. Once 

 7

 Additionally, the imposition of consecutive sentences does not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause where the legislature has authorized such sentences. See Whalen v. 

United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980). To any extent that Petitioner may argue that his consecutive sentences were improper based on an application of A.R.S. § 13–705(M), such claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. A state-law sentencing claim is not subject to federal habeas corpus review. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 

F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that petitioner’s claim that the state court erred in 

imposing consecutive sentences was not cognizable in federal habeas); Hendricks v. 

Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “claim regarding merger of convictions for sentencing is exclusively concerned with state law and therefore not 

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.”); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 

1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to consider alleged errors in violation of state 

sentencing law). 

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secured, the defendant may opt to make an additional filing, once items are reviewed.” 

(Doc. 11-3 at, Exh. H.) 

 While Petitioner presented this claim to the Superior Court, he did not raise it 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals. Therefore, Petitioner did not give the state courts 

one complete round of review in his first post-conviction relief proceedings. See 

O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45. Petitioner also presented a similar claim in his second 

post-conviction relief proceedings. However, that claim was found to be untimely and 

precluded from review. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. See Jones, 

691 F.3d at 1101. 

 A return to state court to present Petitioner’s claims would be futile under 

Arizona’s procedural rules. The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state 

court under Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Petitioner has 

not shown that any of the exceptions under Rule 32.1 apply to him. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b). Petitioner does not offer any reason to excuse the default, nor does the record 

plainly suggest otherwise. Further, Petitioner has not presented new evidence that 

justifies review of his procedurally defaulted claim. He does not proffer any evidence or 

argument of actual innocence, but rather only challenges the constitutional fairness of the 

sentences he received. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred from federal 

habeas review. 

 Petitioner has also not shown there was no reasonable basis for the state court to 

deny relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Henry, 720 F.3d at 1084 (court may deny the a 

habeas claim on the merits, even if petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies); 

Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 777 fn. 10 (9th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Terhune, 309 

F.3d 614, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2002); Gatlin v. Maddling, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999). 

An indigent defendant has “a due process right to a record sufficient to allow him a fair 

and full appeal of his conviction.” Ayala v. Wong, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 707162, *10 (9th 

Cir. February 25, 2014) (emphasis added). Thus, a state court’s refusal to provide a copy 

of a record “in the face of a plausible [constitutional] claim,” may amount to an 

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unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Boyd v. 

Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006). However, an indigent defendant is not 

constitutionally entitled to a copy of his records as of right. Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1150. 

 Here, Petitioner complains that he was not provided with a complete copy of his 

state court records. He does not identify which remaining portions of the record he 

requires, nor does he offer why the records are or were necessary for any effective 

defense or appeal. See Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1151. Instead, Petitioner appears to generally 

challenge the state court’s failure to provide him with copies of all existing records in 

collateral proceedings. Without more, Petitioner has not shown that the denial of records 

amounted to a denial of due process. Therefore, it cannot be said that the state court was 

objectively unreasonable in denying relief. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that 

Ground Two be denied. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Based on the above analysis, the Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 12th day of May, 2014. 

 

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