Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00445/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00445-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES BOONE,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVE DAVEY,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00445 AWI MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION ON

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 9]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 Respondent is represented in this action by 

Rebecca Whitfield, of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of California.

I. Background

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, upon being 

convicted by a jury on March 15, 2011 of unlawful sexual intercourse by force, unlawful 

oral copulation by force, and various sentencing enhancements. (See Lodged Doc. 1.) 

 

1 Respondent notes that the Warden’s last name was incorrectly spelled by Petitioner. The Court 

hereby corrects and substitutes the properly spelled name of Respondent. 

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On April 13, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of 

twenty-five (25) years to life. (Id.) 

On January 16, 2013, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 

affirmed the judgment. (Lodged Doc. 2.) Review was denied by the California Supreme 

Court on March 27, 2013. (Lodged Docs. 3-4.)

Petitioner proceeded to file seven petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California state courts as follows:

1. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: June 19, 20132; 

Denied: July 10, 2013;

2. Fresno County Superior Court

Filed: July 15, 20133;

Denied: August 23, 2013;

3. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: September 18, 20134; 

Denied: November 14, 2013;

4. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: December 30, 20135; 

Denied: October 1, 2014;

5. Fresno County Superior Court

Filed: April 13, 20156;

Denied: May 15, 2015;

6. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

 

2 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition 

to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 

1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Although the petition 

was filed on June 25, 2013, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the petition filed on June 19, 

2013, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

3

Although the petition was filed on July 18, 2013, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers 

the petition filed on July 15, 2013, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

4

Although the petition was filed on September 23, 2014, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on September 18, 2014, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

5

Although the petition was filed on January 13, 2014, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on December 30, 2013, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

6

Petitioner failed to date the petition. As the Court is unable to determine the date the petition was 

mailed, Petitioner is not entitled to an earlier filing date.

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Filed: April 13, 20157; 

Denied: May 21, 2015;

7. California Supreme Court

Filed: August 31, 20158; 

Denied: January 13, 2016.

(Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. 5-18.)

On March 28, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in this Court.9 On May 31, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the 

petition as being filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d), and for failure to exhaust state remedies. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.) 

Petitioner filed an opposition on June 17, 2016, Respondent filed a reply on June 24, 

2016, and Petitioner filed a sur-reply on July 22, 2016. (ECF Nos. 11-12, 17.) The matter 

stands ready for adjudication.

II. Discussion

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

 

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Although the petition was filed on April 20, 2015, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on April 13, 2015, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

8

Although the petition was filed on September 11, 2015, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on August 31, 2015, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

9

Although the petition was filed on March 31, 2016, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on March 28, 2016, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

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Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of the oneyear limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Respondent's motion to dismiss 

is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state 

remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal 

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4.

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on March 28, 2016 and is subject to the 

provisions of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As 

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the 

petitioner’s direct review became final or the date of the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on March 27, 

2013. The state appeal process became final ninety days later, on June 25, 2013, when 

the time for seeking certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. U.S. 

Supreme Court rule 13; Bowen v. Rowe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). The AEDPA 

statute of limitations began to run the following day, on June 26, 2013. Patterson v. 

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner had one year from June 26, 2013, absent applicable tolling, in which to 

file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed in filing the 

instant petition until March 28, 2016, over a year and a half after the statute of limitations 

period expired. Absent the later commencement of the statute of limitations or any 

applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year 

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

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a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner is entitled to tolling during the 

pendency of Petitioner’s first state court petition. Petitioner’s first petition was filed on 

June 19, 2013 – a week prior to the commencement of the limitations period. While 

Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the week prior to the limitations period, he is entitled 

to tolling from the commencement of the limitations period on June 26, 2013, until the 

denial of the petition on July 10, 2013. 

Petitioner had the entire year limitations period remaining as of July 10, 2013. 

Petitioner filed his second state petition with the Fresno County Superior Court on July 

15, 2013. While Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner is entitled to tolling during the 

pendency of Petitioner’s second through fourth state court petitions, he asserts that 

Petitioner is not entitled to tolling during the interval period between filing the first and 

second petitions. Respondent argues that Petitioner was not pursuing his application up 

the ladder of the state court system. Review is "pending" within the meaning of § 

2244(d)(2) only where a prisoner is pursuing a single, full round of habeas relief in state 

court; thus, no review is "pending" where a prisoner files a second petition in a court 

which raises new claims and does not constitute merely an elaboration of the facts 

relating to the claims in a prior petition or an attempt to correct the prior petition's 

deficiencies. Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 951, 954-56 (9th Cir. 2012); Banjo v. Ayers, 

614 F.3d 964, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2010). After seeking review from the California Court of 

Appeal in his first petition, Petitioner filed his second action in the Fresno County 

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Superior Court. Accordingly, Petitioner was not ascending up the state court hierarchy. 

Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner is not entitled to the 

benefit of tolling for the interval period. Therefore four days of the limitation period 

expired prior to the filing of the second petition. As Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the 

pendency of the second through fourth state petitions, 361 days of the limitation period 

remained on October 1, 2014, the date the fourth petition was denied by the Fifth District 

Court of Appeal. 

Respondent again acknowledges that Petitioner is entitled to tolling during the 

pendency of his fifth through sixth state petitions, but argues that he is not entitled to 

tolling for the interval between the fourth and fifth petitions as Petitioner was not 

ascending up the state hierarchy at that time. Respondent is correct. Petitioner 

proceeded after the denial of his fourth state petition with the Fifth District Court of 

Appeal to appeal to file his fifth petition with the Fresno County Superior Court. 

Accordingly, Petitioner was not ascending up the state court hierarchy, and therefore not 

entitled to tolling for the interval between petitions. Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; Stancle, 692 

F.3d at 951, 954-56; Banjo, 614 F.3d at 964, 968-69. 194 days of the limitation period 

expired between the denial of the fourth petition on October 1, 2014 and the filing of the 

fifth petition on April 13, 2015. As Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the pendency of the 

fifth through sixth state petitions, 167 days of the limitation period remained on May 21, 

2015, the date the sixth petition was denied by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. 

Petitioner did not file his seventh state habeas petition in the California Supreme 

Court until August 31, 2015, which is 101 days after the California Court of Appeal 

denied habeas relief to his sixth petition. Given that a habeas petition that is untimely 

under state law is not "properly filed," Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005), 

"none of the time before or during the state court's consideration of an untimely petition 

is tolled for purposes of AEDPA's limitations period," Curiel v. Miller, 2016 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 13487, 2016 WL 394172, at *3 (9th Cir. July 25, 2016) (en banc) (citing Campbell 

v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010)). "[I]f a California court dismisses a 

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habeas petition without comment . . . a federal court 'must itself examine the delay in 

each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to 

timeliness.'" Robinson v. Lewis, 795 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Chavis, 546 

U.S. at 197-98). In the instant case, the California Supreme Court summarily denied 

Petitioner's state habeas petition without comment. Thus, the Court must examine the 

delay and determine whether the petition was timely under state law.

California courts apply a general "reasonableness" standard to determine whether 

a state habeas petition is timely. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222 (2002). Because 

"California courts had not provided authoritative guidance on this issue," the Supreme 

Court in Chavis "made its own conjecture . . . 'that California's "reasonable time" 

standard would not lead to filing delays substantially longer than' between 30 and 60 

days." Robinson, 795 F.3d at 929 (quoting Chavis, 546 U.S. at 199). However, if a

petitioner demonstrates good cause, California courts allow a longer delay. Robinson, 

795 F.3d at 929 (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 959 

P.2d 311 (1998)). The Ninth Circuit has also previously held that unexplained delays of 

such duration are unreasonable, and not entitled to statutory tolling. See Velasquez v. 

Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (unexplained eighty and ninety-one day delays in 

filing are unreasonable under California law and prevent tolling of AEDPA's one year 

statute of limitations.). Petitioner delayed 102 days from the denial of his sixth petition to 

the filing of his seventh habeas petition. Such an unexplained delay is unreasonable, 

and Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the period between the filing of the sixth and 

seventh petitions or during the pendency of the seventh petition.

On May 21, 2015, the date the sixth petition was denied by the Fifth District Court 

of Appeal, 167 days of the limitation period remained. The limitations period therefore 

expired 167 days later on November 4, 2015, and the present petition was not filed until 

March 28, 2016, over four months later. Accordingly, the petition is untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

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“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir. 1993). In his opposition, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to tolling based on his 

ignorance in the law. 

Petitioner claims he should be entitled to equitable tolling because he is 

uneducated and does not have knowledge of the law. This claim for equitable tolling 

must fail. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (lack of legal 

sophistication is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling); Turner 

v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999) (inmate's lack of legal training, a poor 

education, or illiteracy does not give a court reason to toll the limitations period); 

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 

1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Petitioner's circumstances and lack of knowledge of the law are 

no different than the majority of incarcerated prisoners attempting to file petitions for writ 

of habeas corpus. Accordingly, his ignorance of the law is not an extraordinary 

circumstance entitling Petitioner to equitable tolling.

E. Exhaustion

Respondent, in his motion to dismiss, asserts an alternative ground for dismissal 

based on failure to exhaust state remedies. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 9-11.) As the petition 

is untimely and subject to dismissal, in an exercise of judicial efficiency, the Court will not 

address Respondent's claims regarding failure to exhaust judicial remedies.

III. Conclusion

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for habeas corpus 

within the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner is not 

entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling, but not equitable tolling. Regardless, the 

petition remains untimely even with the benefit of statutory tolling. Based on the 

foregoing, this Court recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

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IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for 

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period be 

GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States 

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and 

Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and 

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and 

Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). Petitioner is advised that failure to 

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's 

order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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