Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05178/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05178-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 31, 1996 Decided August 20, 1996

No. 94-5178

FLORIDA AUDUBON SOCIETY, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

LLOYD M. BENTSEN,

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,

AND

MARGARET RICHARDSON, COMMISSIONER OF THE

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cv01195)

David F. Williams argued the cause for appellants, with whom James W. Moorman and Jonathan

R. Stone were on the briefs.

DavidC. Shilton, Attorney, United States Department ofJustice, argued the cause for appellees, with

whom Lois J. Schiffer and Loretta C. Argrett, Assistant Attorneys General, and Albert M. Ferlo, Jr.,

Gary R. Allen, and Teresa E. McLaughlin, Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD, SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, GINSBURG,

SENTELLE, HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, ROGERS, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed byCircuit Judge SENTELLE, with whom SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS,

GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges, join.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS, with whom EDWARDS, Chief Judge,

WALD, and TATEL, Circuit Judges, join.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary to

actual cases or controversies between proper litigants. See Liverpool, New York, & Philadelphia

Steam-Ship Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885). In order to qualify as a

proper litigant, the party bringing the action must, in the least, demonstrate that it has constitutional

standing to invoke the authority of an Article III court. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-

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100 (1968). To have constitutional standing, a party must establish that it has "personally ... suffered

some actual or threatened injury," which may be "fairly ... traced to the challenged action" and is

"likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" of the court. Valley Forge Christian College v.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). A party that fails to demonstrate any of these prerequisites cannot

seek relief from the federal judiciary.

The fundamental importance of standing has prompted our review in banc of the district

court's judgment that Diane Jensen, the Florida Audubon Society, the Florida Wildlife Federation,

and the Friends of the Earth ("appellants") cannot sue the Secretary of the Treasury and the

Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("Secretary") for authorizing a tax credit for the use

of a particular alternative fuel additive known as ethyl tertiary butyl ether ("ETBE") without

preparing an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"). Because the district court properly

determined that appellants had demonstrated neither a personal injury nor an injury fairly traceable

to the challenged acts of the Secretary, we affirm its decision that appellants lacked standing.

BACKGROUND

The NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct ("NEPA") generallyrequires "agencies ofthe Federal

Government" to "include in every ... report on ... major Federal actions significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment" an EIS detailing that effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

Regulations implementing this provision allow agencies to categorically exclude a class of actions

from the EIS requirement if that class of actions does not "have a significant effect on the human

environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. In Treasury Directive ("TD") 75-02, the Secretary of the

Treasury concluded that clarifications of tax rules qualify for such a categorical exclusion. See Final

Procedures for Implementation of the NEPA Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 1828, 1830 (Jan. 8, 1980).

In March 1990, after urging from various members of Congress and comment from other

interested parties, the Secretary of the Treasury, through a clarification of an existing rule, expanded

a tax credit for the use of certain gasoline-ethanol blends to the use of blends of gasoline and ETBE,

which is a fuel additive derived from, but not containing, ethanol. See Alcohol Fuels Credit;

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Definition of Mixture, 55 Fed. Reg. 8946 (1990) (codified at 26 C.F.R. Part 1). Believing that the

ETBE credit fell within the categorical exclusion of TD 75-02, the Secretary did not prepare an EIS

before approving the final rule. See Alcohol Fuels Credit, 58 Fed. Reg. at 8947. In the three years

after the rule was promulgated, no ETBE production occurred in the United States. 1994, however,

finally witnessed the start-up of three plants which, together, may produce up to 3,980 barrels of

ETBE per day, or lessthan one-twentieth of the 102,904 barrels of ethanol that existing facilities can

produce daily.

Appellants did not take as long to respond to the new tax credit. In proceedings begun two

months after the new regulation was finalized, they sued to permanently enjoin enforcement of the

rule and to require the Secretary to prepare an EIS. Upon reviewing cross-motions for summary

judgment, the district court concluded that appellants lacked standing.

More precisely, the district court dismissed as "speculative" appellants' argument that the tax

credit, by increasing the market for ETBE, would stimulate production of the corn, sugar cane and

sugar beets necessary to make the ethanol from which ETBE is derived, and that this increased crop

production would, in turn, necessarily result in more agricultural cultivation, with its accompanying

environmental dangers, in regions that border wildlife areas appellants (or their members) use and

enjoy. The court declared that, even if it presumed that the tax credit would increase corn and sugar

production, appellants had advanced no credible evidence that the increased production would

necessarily harm or even occur near the wildlife areas in Michigan, Minnesota, and Florida that

appellants visit. Because appellants had not established a geographic nexus between the harm they

asserted that the tax credit will likely cause and lands that appellantsor their membersuse, the

court ruled that appellants had not suffered the particularized injurynecessaryforstanding. The court

also found that appellantslacked standing because they had not demonstrated that the tax credit was

substantially likely to cause any harm to wildlife areas. The district court thus granted the Secretary's

motion for summary judgment.

On the initial appeal, a divided panel reversed. The majority held Jensen's claims that

increased corn production might affect specific wildlife areas in Minnesota sufficient to satisfy the

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geographic nexus requirement. See Florida Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 54 F.3d 873, 880-83 (D.C.

Cir. 1995). It also concluded that appellants demonstrated all the causation necessary for standing

because an EIS might prompt the Secretary to "rescind or otherwise modify the ETBE tax credit."

Id. at 882. We subsequently agreed to review the issue of standing in banc. Florida Audubon Soc.

v. Bentsen, 64 F.3d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION

Because Article III limitsthe constitutionalrole ofthe federal judiciary to resolving cases and

controversies,see, e.g., Chicago &Grand Trunk RailwayCo. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892),

a showing of standing "is an essential and unchanging" predicate to any exercise of our jurisdiction.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). In order to satisfy the "irreducible

constitutional minimum ofstanding," a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a "concrete and

particularized" injury that is: 1) "actual or imminent," id.; 2) caused by, or fairly traceable to, an act

that the litigant challenges in the instant litigation, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984);

and 3) redressable by the court. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38

(1976). This set of criteria implements Article III by limiting judicial intervention to only those

disputes between adverse partiesthat are " "in a form ... capable ofjudicialresolution.' " Schlesinger

v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.

83, 101 (1968)).

The two essential components of the injury element ofstanding roughly illustrate the aims of

the entire standing inquiry. A prospective plaintiff must show that it has suffered a concrete and

particularized injury in order to convince the court that it is sufficiently involved in the current legal

dispute to have a defined and personal stake in the outcome of the litigationin other words, that

it is a "proper" plaintiff. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring). A

plaintiff must also show that the particularized injury is at least imminent in order to reduce the

possibility that a court might unconstitutionally render an advisory opinion by "deciding a case in

which no injury would have occurred at all," Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (citing

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156-60 (1990); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-06

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1 Because a review of standing does not review the merits of a claim, but the parties and forum

involved, see Flast, 392 U.S. at 101, our assumption during the standing inquiry that the plaintiff

will eventually win the relief he seeks, see, e.g., In Re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d 1503, 1511 (D.C.

Cir. 1989), does not, on its own, assure that the litigant has satisfied any element of standing. 

Any assumption as to the outcome of the litigation simply does not resolve the issues critical to a

standing inquiry. 

(1983))in other words, to help confirm that the judiciary is the proper branch of government to

hear the dispute. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (quoting Ex Parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633,

634 (1937)).

Causation and redressability,see, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19; Von Aulock v. Smith, 720

F.2d 176, 180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1983), similarly assure that proper parties have brought their dispute to

the proper branch of the federal government. Causation, or "traceability," see Haitian Refugee

Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Opinion of Bork, J.), examines whether it is

substantiallyprobablesee, e.g., Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988)that the challenged acts

of the defendant, not of some absent third party, will cause the particularized injury of the plaintiff.

See Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19; California Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 778

F.2d 823, 825 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Redressability examines whether the relief sought, assuming that

the court choosesto grant it,

1 will likely alleviate the particularized injury alleged by the plaintiff. See

Simon, 426 U.S. 38-39; In Re Thornburgh, 869 F.2d at 1511. Causation may thus be said to focus

on whether a particular party is appropriate; redressability, on whether the forum is.

I. How is standing analyzed in procedural-rights cases?

Although the particular nature of a case does notand cannoteliminate any of the

"irreducible" elements ofstanding, the assertion of a procedural requirement may compel a court to

pay particular attention to those components ofstanding that ensure the proper parties are before the

court. The Supreme Court has recently noted that, in cases in which a party "has been accorded a

proceduralright to protect his concrete interests," the primary focus of the standing inquiry is not the

imminence or redressability of the injury to the plaintiff, but whether a plaintiff who has suffered

personal and particularized injury has sued a defendant who has caused that injury. Defenders of

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Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.

According to Defenders of Wildlife, a plaintiff may have standing to challenge the failure of

an agency to abide by a procedural requirement only if that requirement was "designed to protect

some threatened concrete interest" of the plaintiff. Id. at 573 n.8. In this type of case, which includes

suits demanding preparation of an EIS, see, e.g., Public Citizen v. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256, 270 n.2

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (Silberman, J., dissenting) (noting that NEPA "confers a procedural right")

(emphasis added), in order to show that the interest asserted is more than a mere "general interest [in

the alleged procedural violation] common to all members of the public," Ex Parte Lévitt, 302 U.S.

at 634, the plaintiff must show that the government act performed without the procedure in question

will cause a distinct risk to a particularized interest ofthe plaintiff. The mere violation of a procedural

requirement thus does not permit any and all persons to sue to enforce the requirement. See

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572-73; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 223; Capital Legal Foundation

v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258-60 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (allegation of improper process

by an agency does not grant standing absent assertion of some personal injury).

Nor does an alleged procedural violation by the government assure that the government is a

proper defendant in a procedural-rights case. Although the Supreme Court has expressly declined

to examine whether proper execution of the omitted procedure will likely prompt a modification of

the government's action, see Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7, the Court has never freed

a plaintiff alleging a procedural violation from showing a causal connection between the government

action that supposedly required the disregarded procedure and some reasonably increased risk of

injury to its particularized interest. See infra section II.B. In fact, as Defenders of Wildlife

repeatedly identified the "particularized injury" resulting from the construction of a dam that was

licensed without an EIS as part ofthe injury necessary for EIS standing, see 504 U.S. at 572 n.7, that

decision confirms that a prospective plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant caused the

particularized injury, and not just the alleged procedural violation. See Douglas County v. Babbitt,

48 F.3d 1495, 1501 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995) (observing that Defenders of Wildlife implied some causal

link between the government action implicating the omitted procedure and the injury to the plaintiff's

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2

Judge D.H. Ginsburg found that certain parties had standing and wrote the opinion of the

court on the merits of the claim, but disagreed with the majority on whether one particular

plaintiff had standing. See City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 482-85. 

particularized interest), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996). To demonstrate standing, then, a

procedural-rights plaintiff must show not only that the defendant's acts omitted some procedural

requirement, but also that it is substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the

essential injury to the plaintiff's own interest.

II. Do these appellants demonstrate standing?

Turning to the case at bar, we note, as a preliminary matter, that, because NEPA does not

offer a private right of action for individual plaintiffs seeking to enforce the EIS procedural

requirement, a private individual must found his right to sue on some other basis. See, e.g.,

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 571-72 (finding a procedural right in the citizen-suit provision of

the Endangered Species Act); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990)

(noting that the APA may provide a right to sue for final agency actions that omit some procedural

requirement). In this case, appellants have sought to enforce the NEPA procedural requirement

through § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). See 5 U.S.C. § 702. In order to

invoke judicial review of an alleged NEPA violation under the APA, a private individual must be

"adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning" of NEPA by some final agency action.

National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 882-83, 883 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 and noting that 5

U.S.C. § 704 deniesjudicialreview under the APA unlessthe agency action isfinal). To be adversely

affected within NEPA, appellants must at least demonstrate that they can satisfy all constitutional

standing requirements and that their particularized injury is to interests of the sort protected by

NEPA. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1991); City of Los

Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Opinion of D.H. Ginsburg, J.).2 Because

there is no dispute that the agency action involved in this case is final, and that the injury alleged by

appellants is of the sort that NEPA was "specifically designed" to protect, see National Wildlife

Federation, 497 U.S. at 886, we are left to review only whether appellants have sufficiently

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3 We, of course, do not concedeor even need to addressthe dissent's repeated suggestion

that our analysis somehow violates "Congress's determination" to provide a private cause of

action to individuals alleging some procedural lapse under 42 U.S.C. § 4332, see Dissent at 24-

25, as Congress did not expressly create this right in NEPA. See infra note 5. As standing limits

congressional authority to order judicial review as well as the courts' ability to conduct such

review, denial of standing cannot be thought to obstruct proper statutory commands. 

demonstrated all of the traditional components of standing.3

Although, as noted, we assume for purposes of standing that an appellant will ultimately

receive the relief sought, this assumption is not dispositive of our standing inquiry. See supra note

1. Standing does not examine whether the challenged tax credit will "significantly affect" the

environment in general, which is a key issue on the merits of EIS litigation; see 42 U.S.C. §

4332(2)(C); rather, standing in an EIS matter focuses on whether appellants have shown a

particularized environmental interest of theirs that will suffer demonstrably increased risk, and

whether the tax credit promulgated by the defendant issubstantially likely to cause that demonstrable

increase in risk to their particularized interest. See City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 483-84 (opinion

of D.H. Ginsburg, J.) (observing that a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the

challenged change in federalregulationand the incremental environmental effect the newregulation

would allegedly causeand the alleged injury to the particularized interests of the plaintiff).

The dissent objects that this standard will make it "virtually impossible" to bring this type of

EIS suit,see Dissent at 6, but an inescapable result of any standing doctrine application isthat at least

some disputes will not receive judicial review. That analysis of a party's standing should sometimes

dictate this result is not a reason to reject either the result or the analysis. See, e.g., Schlesinger, 418

U.S. at 226-27, 228; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974). Though we will

not attempt to describe the various hypotheticals in which a party may still demand an EIS, we have

no doubt that this standard will not uniformly preclude EIS suits. For instance, the example

suggested by the Supreme Court in Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7an EIS suit by a

party whose home lies directly upstream of a proposed dam that was approved without an

EISwould still easily clear the standard articulated here. On the other hand, a plaintiff seeking to

challenge a governmental action with alleged diverse environmentalimpactsmayhave some difficulty

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meeting this standard, but that difficulty stems from the nature of the plaintiff's claim, which is

premised on an alleged injury that is itself difficult to locate, not some flaw in the standard.

For, contrary to the dissent's assertions, see Dissent at 6, the proof required by the standard

is grounded firmly in the law. The standard established by this decision requires the bare minimum

necessary to assure that a court hear only EIS disputes over which it may constitutionally maintain

jurisdiction. The standard requires a particularized injuryan increased risk to a personal interest

of a plaintiffas demanded by a long line of standing precedent. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 560-63; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). It also requires this injury

to be demonstrable, a prerequisite necessitated by the well-established rule that a plaintiff must

demonstrate standing. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561; Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S.

312, 316 (1991); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 & n.8 (1986). It

further requires the plaintiff to show that the demonstrated particularized injury is fairly traceable to

the agency act allegedly implicating the EIS. See supra at 7 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

at 572 n.7). And it requires, as well established in our precedent, that this challenged act is

substantially probable to cause the demonstrated particularized injury. See, e.g., Kurtz, 829 F.2d at

1143-44. These requirements, while sufficient to maintain the constitutional demand of standing, fall

far short of requiring an EIS plaintiff to "conduct the same environmental investigation that he seeks

in hissuit to compel the agency to undertake." Dissent at 5 (quoting City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671).

Appellantsin this case premise their claims of particularized injury and causation on a lengthy

chain of conjecture. In brief, appellants contend that the tax credit will cause more ETBE production,

which in turn will cause more ethanol production, which consequently will cause more production

ofthe corn and sugar necessary for ethanol, which will then cause more agricultural pollution, which,

as this pollution is likely to occur on farmland bordering wildlife areas appellants visit, is also likely

to harm the areas visited by appellants. As we are reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we

require specific facts, not "mere allegations," to substantiate each leap necessary for standing.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. Because appellants have not adequately demonstrated either

an injury to their particularized interest or that defendant's actions created a "substantial probability"

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of this injury, see, e.g., Kurtz, 829 F.2d at 1143-44, we conclude that they lack standing to sue for

preparation of an EIS.

A. Did appellants demonstrate injury?

To demonstrate injury sufficient for standing, appellants must show that the omission or

insufficiency of an EIS may cause the agency to overlook the creation of a demonstrable risk not

previously measurable (or the demonstrable increase of an existing risk) of serious environmental

impacts that imperil appellants' particularized interest. See City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 483-84

(opinion of D.H. Ginsburg, J.). Previous standards in this area articulated within this circuit have not

always clearly stated the need for an EIS plaintiff to show that the government action that implicated

the allegedly violated procedural requirement would subject a particularized interest of the plaintiff,

rather than the environment in general, to increased risk.

For example, the majority of the panel in City of Los Angeles indicated that, to demonstrate

injury sufficient for standing, an EIS plaintiff must show only that the omission of an EIS may cause

the agency to overlook a "reasonable risk [of] environmental harm [that] may occur," as long as that

plaintiff had "a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the challenged project that he may be

expected to suffer whatever environmental consequences the project may have." Id. at 492 (Wald,

C.J., for the court). Although this two-pronged expression of the injury threshold in NEPA cases

outlines important standing concerns, its structure added an unnecessarily broad inquirydid the

challenged action demonstrably increase the risk ofsome general environmental harm?to the more

narrow, and more pertinent, standing question of whether the underlying government act

demonstrably increased some specific risk of environmental harm to the interests of the plaintiff.

The presence of a particularized risk of injury to the plaintiff's interests requires even more

exacting scrutiny when the challenged government action is not one located at a particular "site," as

was the action in the case from which City of Los Angeles imported its standard, see City of Davis

v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9thCir. 1975), as cited in City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 482, 492,

but instead involves a broad rulemaking, as present in City of Los Angeles and this case. In the case

of broad rulemaking, a court may not assume that the areas used and enjoyed by a prospective

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4 Such analysis ignores that an injury-in-fact sufficient for constitutional standing must

demonstrate at least two fundamental characteristics. First, the injury must be demonstrated to be

to the particularized interests of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508

(1975). Second, the plaintiff must show that he is not simply injured as is everyone else, lest the

injury be too general for court action, and suited instead for political redress. See, e.g.,

Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176-80. Although the dissent's "more likely than the next plaintiff"

analysis may have some use in determining whether the injury asserted is too general for

standingand thus aid in determining whether a demonstrated injury satisfies the second

requirementit does not address the critical first criterion. As the "geographic nexus" test at

issue here was in fact intended to ensure that a plaintiff's injury met this first criterion of being

particularized and personal, an analysis of that test that does not actually require the plaintiff to

demonstrate that such particularity must be invalid. That the dissent thinks otherwise perhaps

also illustrates that it has not yet come to grips with the injury at issue in determining standing in

this type of suit. The injury is not merely the procedural violation, but the harm caused by the

underlying act. Part IIB infra. This underlying injury thus must also be particularized, not only to

guarantee that the grievance is not too general for constitutional standing, but that the plaintiff

truly has a personal stake in the matter. 

plaintiff will suffer all or any environmental consequences that the rule itself may cause. Nor is it

enough, as the dissent wrongly and repeatedly suggests, see Dissent at 14, 16, that a plaintiff show

that his particularized interest is merely more likely to sustain injury than some other person's

interest.4Instead, in reviewing an EIS claim, a court must examine whether the demonstrably

increased risk of serious environmental harm shown actually threatens the plaintiff's particular

interests before that plaintiff may have a particularized injury sufficient for standing.

Appellants thus have rightly sought to demonstrate that the ETBE tax credit poses a

demonstrably increased risk of injury to particular wildlife areasin Minnesota, Michigan, and Florida

that they, or their members, use and enjoy. Appellants, however, have not demonstrated that

individual corn or sugar farmers in these areas will affirmatively respond to the tax credit by

significantly increasing production. See, e.g., Florida Audubon Soc., 54 F.3d at 887 (Sentelle, J.,

dissenting). Instead, appellants, through expert testimony, contend that the tax credit will create a

generalrisk ofserious environmentalharmbyencouraging farmersthroughout the United States, and

thus, by implication, farmers near the wildlife areas appellants visit, to increase production in a

manner that will increase agricultural pollution that, in turn, will damage the wildlife areas.

We cannot treat such speculation assufficient for standing. See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 42-

46; United Transportation Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908, 911-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497

U.S. 1024 (1990) (rejecting allegations that cannot be described as true or false as too speculative

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for standing). Whatever the possible environmental impacts of the ETBE tax credit, appellants have

not provided competent evidence that corn farmers in particular areas of Minnesota or Michigan or

sugar producers in particular regions of Florida will grow their crops in such a fashion as to lead to

greater quantities of pesticide use and erosion than alreadyexistso asto pose a significantly increased

risk to the lands used by these appellants because of the presence of that credit. Even if the coming

years witness some increased cultivation of land in the United States, appellants have not

demonstrated that this increased cultivation would occur on land adjacent to the property in

Minnesota or elsewhere that any appellants visit. Because appellants have not demonstrated such a

geographic nexusto anyasserted environmentalinjury, we cannot hold that theyhave standing to sue.

B. Have appellants demonstrated causation?

As in all cases, standing in an EIS suit requires adequate proof of causation. The conceptual

difficulty with this requirement, in this type of case, is that an adequate causal chain must contain at

least two links: one connecting the omitted EIS to some substantive government decision that may

have been wrongly decided because of the lack of an EIS and one connecting that substantive

decision to the plaintiff's particularized injury. The first link in this causal chain foreshadows the issue

of redressability. See, e.g., Competitive Enterprise Inst. v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 113 (D.C. Cir.

1990); Mideast Systems and China Civil Const. Saipan Joint Venture, Inc. v. Hodel, 792 F.2d 1172,

1177 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The second link addresses what often proves the more critical causation

question in this type of case. During past consideration of NEPA standing by panels of this circuit,

however, our precedent has largely focused on only the first link of an EIS causal chain, or whether

the would-be plaintiff had demonstrated a "reasonable likelihood that if [a federal actor] performed

an EIS, it would arrive at a different conclusion about" undertaking the major action at issue. City

of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 497 (opinion of Wald, C.J., for the court); see also Florida Audubon

Soc., 54 F.3d at 882.

This abridged causation analysisisincomplete in that it viewsthe injury at issue in an EIS suit

to be, at bottom, only the procedural violation. The ultimate injury this causation analysis tries to link

to the defendants' actions is "the risk that serious environmental harms were overlooked" in

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promulgating the ETBE tax credit without an EIS. Florida Audubon Soc., 54 F.3d at 883. In other

words, the key injury istruly the omission of the EIS, not whether the tax credit will in fact injure the

plaintiffs' particularized interest. See id. at 882. This view of injury, and the view of causation it

implies, does not conform to the Supreme Court's discussion of procedural-rights standing in

Defenders of Wildlife.

In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court admitted that a procedural right may permit a litigant to

assert that right "without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy." 504

U.S. at 572 n.7. Yet, if the sole injury at issue for "procedural rights" standing was simply some type

of procedural violation, even only one that may risk the party's particularized interest, the Court need

not have modified the normal standard of immediacy or redressability. According to any

demonstrable application of the "normal" standards, a procedural violation is surely imminent, as it

has already happened, and easily redressable, as a court may order the agency to undertake the

procedure. By instead suggesting that the "normal standards" do not apply in these cases, the Court

verified that the showing of injury necessary to determine whether a procedural-rights plaintiff has

standing is not satisfied by the existence of a mere procedural violation, but also requires a

"particularized injury" resulting fromthe government'ssubstantive actionthat breached the procedural

requirement.

Because the Supreme Court thus considered the "particularized injury" as the normal focus

ofstanding analysis even in procedural-rights cases, we must examine the causal connection between

the substantive government action and the asserted injury to the plaintiff's particularized interest.

Defenders of Wildlife again confirms our result. See id. That case specifically noted that, in EIS

suits, a court should not review redressabilitywhether the preparation of the EIS might alter the

decision to license the dam (or, here, grant the tax credit). Yet, that issue resembles what the City

of Los Angeles and Florida Audubon Soc. majorities actually examined, albeit under the guise of

causation. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 497 (opinion of Wald, C.J., for the court). We

cannot accept that Defenders of Wildlife intended to encourage courts to review under the label

"causation" what that same decision indicated they should not review in considering redressability.

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5 Our view of causation also protects the purposes of NEPA. The purpose of NEPA's EIS

requirement is to ensure that federal agencies account for environmental costs and effects of a

major action before undertaking that action, not to provide individuals who can demonstrate no

more than "probable cause" of some risk of environmental injury from federal agency action a

means of forcing the agency to discover whether its action, in fact, poses any actual risk of

causing such harm. The omission of a private right of action for enforcing the EIS requirement in

NEPA, see National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 882, confirms this more sensible view of

NEPA and of the showing of causation necessary for EIS standing. 

To prove causation, a plaintiff seeking the preparation of an EIS must demonstrate that the

particularized injury that the plaintiff is suffering or is likely to suffer is fairly traceable to the agency

action that implicated the need for an EIS. In other words, unless there is a substantial probability,

see Kurtz, 829 F.2d at 1143-44, that the substantive agency action that disregarded a procedural

requirement created a demonstrable risk, or caused a demonstrable increase in an existing risk, of

injury to the particularized interests of the plaintiff, the plaintiff lacks standing. To the extent City

of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 495-98 (opinion of Wald, C.J., for the court), or other decisions are

inconsistent with this requirement, they are overruled.

In fact, once it is understood that an EIS plaintiff must demonstrate a particularized injury to

its personal interests as well as a procedural violation, the necessity of showing causation for that

particularized injury becomesself-evident. Not to require that a plaintiff show that its particularized

injury resulted from the government action at issue would effectively void the particularized injury

requirement. After all, any plaintiff may allege an injury to its own interests if that injury need not be

caused by any act of the defendant. Cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)

(emphasizing that the Supreme Court has "steadfastly adhered to the requirement that ... federal

plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action").

By thus requiring some realshowing of causation, we ensure that NEPA cannot foster a procedural

right "in the air," Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (Holmes, J.), or a right that is distinct

from any concrete injury. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8.5

In this case, even if we were to assume that appellants have provided specific factualsupport

for the proposition that the wildlife areas they enjoy suffer a demonstrably increased risk of

agricultural pollution in the future, appellants have not shown that such particularized injury would

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be fairly traceable to the passage of the tax credit, as is necessary for standing. See City of Los

Angeles, 912 F.2d at 484 (opinion of D.H. Ginsburg, J.); see also Simon, 426 U.S. at 40-42. For

the tax credit to pose a substantial probability of a demonstrably increased risk of particularized

environmentaldamage, the credit must prompt third-partyfuelproducersto undertake the acquisition

of production facilities for ETBE and begin to produce ETBE in such quantities as to increase the

demand for ethanol from which the ETBE is derived. This increased demand for ethanol must then

not simply displace existing markets for currently-produced ethanol, but in fact increase demand for

the agricultural products from which ethanol is made. Again, this demand must not be filled by

existing corn or sugar supplies, but instead spur new production of these products by farmers, who

must be shown to have increased production at least to some measurable extent because of the tax

credit, rather than any one of other innumerable farming considerations, including weather, the

availability of credit, and existing subsidy programs. Moreover, any agricultural pollution from this

increased production must be demonstrably more damaging than the pollution formerly caused by

prior agricultural production or other prior use of land now cultivated because of the ETBE tax

credit. Finally, the farmers who have increased production (and pollution) as a result of the tax credit

must include farmers in the regions visited by appellants, and they must use techniques or chemicals

in such fashion and to such extent asto threaten a demonstrably increased risk of environmental harm

to the wildlife areas enjoyed by appellants.

Such a protracted chain of causation fails both because ofthe uncertainty ofseveral individual

links and because of the number of speculative links that must hold for the chain to connect the

challenged acts to the asserted particularized injury. Most, if not all, of the individual links in the

chain alleged by appellants depend on some allegation that cannot be easily described astrue or false;

as noted, we routinely refuse to permit such predictive assumptionsto establish standing. See United

Transportation Union, 891 F.2d at 911-13. Also, most, if not all, of these links inescapably presume

certain "independent action[s] of some third party not before th[is] court." Simon, 426 U.S. at 42.

The SupremeCourt itself has noted the improbability of establishing the necessary likelihood ofsome

result when that result depends on predicting the acts of even a single "interest group" who is

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unrepresented in the instant litigation, especially when that group, like the farmers, ethanol

distributors, or ETBE producers in this case, is actually composed of dozens of individual actors,

each of whom must react to other market or regulatory inputs. See id. at 42-46.

The causal connection asserted by appellants here, however, is far weaker than even the one

alleged in Simon. In Simon, onlythe independent acts ofone "interest group"hospitalseliminated

the possibility of proving causation. See id. As in a later case in which the Supreme Court denied

standing, see Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-59, these appellants' causal chain relies on the acts of not one,

but several groups of third partiesincluding ETBE producers, ethanol distributors, and farmers in

Florida, Minnesota, and Michigannone of whom are before this court. The greater number of

uncertain links in a causal chain, the lesslikely it isthat the entire chain will hold true. See generally

California Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped, Inc., 778 F.2d at 829 n.4 (Wald, J., dissenting)

(explaining that the "double layer" of speculation in Allen made its causal chain far weaker than the

chain the Supreme Court rejected in Simon). As in Allen, then, the presence and number of

third-party links in this causal chain independently corroborate that appellants' claim of causation is

"entirely speculative" and insufficient for standing. Cf. Simon, 426 U.S. at 46 (Stewart, J.,

concurring) (observing that suits challenging a third party's taxes are not justiciable, except for First

Amendment challenges).

Nor do the theories or testimony advanced by appellants adequately bridge the uncertain

ground found in any causal path that rests on the independent acts of third parties. In particular, the

statements of variousmembers ofCongress prophesying that the new tax rule willstimulate increased

domestic agricultural production do not demonstrate causation. We do not defer to the views of the

IRS or of Congress or its individual members in determining whether a particular rule will cause

injury to a particular plaintiff or as proof of any causal chain necessary for standing. See The

Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. FEC, 13 F.3d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 84 (1994);

Dellums v. NRC, 863 F.2d 968, 978-80 (D.C. Cir. 1988). That members of Congress may have

agreed with agricultural and alternative fuel intereststhat the enactment ofthe ETBE tax credit might

increase demand for corn or sugar does not suffice to establish that the credit is substantially likely

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to stimulate production of ETBE, or that that is substantially likely to stimulate ethanol production,

or that that isin turn substantiallylikelyto result in increased domestic agricultural production, or that

that is then substantially likely to risk some environmental injury to areas that appellants enjoy or to

tap water that appellants use.

We are especially reluctant to blindly accept congressional prophesy as to economic matters

when, as here, sound economic reasoning may well suggest a contrary result. In this case, it is far

from clear that a tax credit for ETBE will stimulate a demand for ethanol, as ETBE, while made

partly of ethanol, is also an ethanol substitute. Other steps along appellants' causal path also lack

support, despite the dissent's contention to the contrary. See Dissent at 21. For instance, the record

does not detail how farmers who might affect these appellants' interests may use additional

agricultural chemicals, which is a criticalfactor in determining whether these chemicals pose any risk

of environmental injury. Jonathan Tolman, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, FEDERAL

AGRICULTURAL POLICY: A HARVEST OF ENVIRONMENTAL ABUSE 12 (1995), as included in

Appellants' Addendum 2 ("The addition of larger quantities of agricultural chemicals to crops does

not directly imply increased environmental harm."). Nor does any evidence answer the telling fact

that, several years after the promulgation of the new rule, ETBE production in the United Statesstill

demanded less than two percent of total domestic ethanol production. In the face of such record

evidence that the new tax rule has not had a substantial impact even on ETBE production, we cannot

credit rosy congressional projections as to the far more tenuous link between the rule and increased

agricultural production or appellants' unconvincing allegationstying the rule to increased agricultural

pollution.

Although the dissent claims support for its conclusions from Duke Power Co. v. Carolina

Env. Study Group, that decision does not contradict our result. See 438 U.S. 59, 75-77 (1978). The

Supreme Court in Duke Power reviewed a lower court's decision to grant standing to parties

challenging an act that limited the liability of companies associated with a nuclear power facility

because a nuclear power plant, which harmed the parties, would not have been built in the absence

of the act. See id. at 73-74. The evidence set forth in support of this admittedly stretched chain of

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causation, however, was still far stronger on several grounds than is the evidence before us. See id.

at 75-77. A brief comment as to a single one of these differences suffices to distinguish Duke Power

from this matter. In Duke Power, the challenging parties put forth testimony from Duke Power

officials, stating that they would have had to consider withdrawing their plansfor new nuclear plants

in the absence of the act. See id. at 76-77. In this case, plaintiffs have put forward no parallel

testimonysupporting each step oftheir attentuated causal path. No corn orsugar farmerin the record

has suggested any link between the ETBE tax credit and increasing his level of production, never

mind a farmer whose actions would actually harm the interests of the plaintiffs. Even at the very first

link of appellants' chain, a link necessary for the rest of the chain to survive, statements of a

prospective ETBE producer instead expressly deny that the tax credit "prompted" his decision to

begin ETBE production. Arco Plant in Texas Soon to Produce MTBE or ETBE, Dow Jones Int'l

News, Oct. 16, 1995, as included in Appellee's Addendum A. When it is remembered that the

evidence in Duke Power wasstronger in other respects, and that the Supreme Court in that case was

merely reviewing the decision to grant standing for clear error, see Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 77, it

becomes evident that Duke Power does not affect our result here.

And though the chain of causation alleged by appellants is not perceptibly more improbable

than that alleged in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures(SCRAP),

412 U.S. 669 (1973), that sole case provides little reason to doubt our result. Not only has the

Supreme Court itself declared it an outlier,see Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871,

889 (1990), but SCRAP was heard on its pleadings, at which point a reviewing court "presumes that

general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Id. As we

review a grant of summary judgment here, we need not accept appellants' alleged chain of events if

they are unable to demonstrate competent evidence to support each link. See Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 561.

CONCLUSION

The federaljudiciaryis not a back-seat Congress norsome sort ofsuper-agency. The absence

of standing for these appellants means that they cannot get their foot in the door of the courthouse

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to pursue their avowed goal of environmental protection. The worthiness of that goal, however,

cannot and should not blind the federal judiciary to the strictures of our own constitutionalrolethe

hearing of only actual cases between proper litigants. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 218, 222

(quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).

In this case, appellants have not demonstrated that either theyor the defendants are the proper

parties for this EIS claim. Unless an EIS plaintiff at least shows, through competent and sufficient

evidence, that the omission of an EIS may cause a government actor to overlook a demonstrably

increased risk ofinjuryto a personal and particularized environmentalinterest ofthe plaintiff, and that

there is a substantial probability that the government act allegedly implicating the EIS requirement

will cause that demonstrably increased risk of injury, that plaintiff cannot have standing. These

appellants, however, have not established that they have suffered or will suffer an injury to their

particularized interest. Also and alternatively, appellants have not demonstrated that it is substantially

probable that the promulgation of the tax credit would cause any such injury. We thus affirm the

district court.

Affirmed.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree with the dissent that the court's opinion

imposes an unduly heavy burden on appellants to establish standing in a NEPA challenge. Quite

simply, the court now requires that a litigant be able to establish the nature and likelihood of the

environmental injury that it is the purpose of an environmental impact statement to identify. We had

it essentially right in City of Los Angeles. Nevertheless, because I agree that appellants have failed

to establish the necessary "nexus" between the tax credit and the injuries they foresee, I must concur

in the judgment of the court. I say "must" because I regret that the court has adopted new criteria

for the establishment of standing in NEPA cases that will erode the effectiveness of one of the most

important environmental measures of the past generation.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, with whom EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and TATEL, Circuit

Judges, join, dissenting: The court holds that appellant Diane Jensen lacks standing to challenge

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1 Because I conclude that Ms. Jensen has standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief

requiring the Secretary to prepare an EIS before implementing the tax credit at issue, I have no

occasion to address the claims to standing for the other appellants: the Florida Audubon Society,

the Florida Wildlife Federation, and the Friends of the Earth. Appellants forthrightly state that if

any one of them has shown sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on standing, the

court need not consider the standing of other appellants. See Watt v. Energy Action Educ.

Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981); National Mining Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Interior, 70

F.3d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") the failure of the Secretary of the

Treasuryand theCommissioner ofthe InternalRevenue Service (together "the Secretary") to prepare

an environmental impact statement ("EIS") prior to promulgating a finalrule to allow a tax credit for

an alternative fuel additive known as ethyl tertiary butyl ether ("ETBE").1In my view, the court has

misapplied the doctrine of standing to the assertion of a procedural right, such as the preparation of

an EIS, with the consequence that it will be effectively impossible for anyone to bring a NEPA claim

in the context of a rulemaking with diffuse impact. Because this result is inconsistent with the

language of the congressional statute and is not required by Article III of the Constitution, I

respectfully dissent.

I.

In order to have standing to sue, a plaintiff must have "such a personal stake in the outcome

of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues

upon which the court so largely dependsfor illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). A plaintiff presents a justiciable "case or controversy" under

Article III only if the plaintiff meets three constitutional standing requirements. First, the plaintiff's

"injury in fact" must be "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical"; second, that injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and third, the

judicialreliefrequested must be likely to redressthe injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian College v.

Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Because

NEPA contains no private right of action, the plaintiffs in the instant case have brought suit under §

10(a) ofthe Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). They must therefore show

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also that the interest they seek to protect falls " "arguably within the zone of intereststo be protected

or regulated by' " NEPA. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 (1987) (quoting

Association of Data Processing Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).

NEPA requires federal agencies, before undertaking "major ... actions significantly affecting

the quality of the human environment," to prepare what has become known as an environmental

impact statement. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1-.25

(1995).

The statutory requirement that a federal agency contemplating a major action

prepare such an environmental impact statement serves NEPA's "action-forcing"

purpose in two important respects. It ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision,

will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning

significant environmentalimpacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will

be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the

decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). The court acknowledges

that appellants have a "procedural right" under NEPA. See Majority Opinion ("Maj. Op.") at 6-8.

In other words, Congress has made the risk of environmental harm from the government's failure to

prepare an EIS a legally cognizable injury. Courts will give effect to that congressional determination

in standing cases: "The actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of

"statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.' " Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.

490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)); see also Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 578; Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373

(1982); see generally William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 253-62

(1988).

In the past, this circuit has applied a two-part test to claims of standing under NEPA,

requiring the plaintiff to show that the agency's failure to prepare an EIS " "creat[es] a risk that

serious environmental harms will be overlooked' " and that he " "ha[s] a sufficient geographical nexus

to the site of the challenged project that he may be expected to suffer whatever environmental

consequences the project may have.' " City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d 478, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975)). The first part of this test

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2 There is no occasion to rely on appellants' alternative theory that they have suffered

"informational injury." See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir.

1991) ("[W]e have never sustained an organization's standing in a NEPA case solely on the basis

of "informational injury,' that is, damage to the organization's interest in disseminating the

environmental data an impact statement could be expected to contain."). 

asks whether the plaintiff has suffered a cognizable injury under NEPAthat is, whether NEPA

affords him a "procedural right." The second part of the test asks whether the plaintiff has suffered

injury in fact forstanding purposes. See Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1500 n.5 (9thCir.

1995) (stating that the "geographic nexus" test is equivalent to "the "concrete interest' test ofLujan"),

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996). Although the court criticizes the City of Los Angeles test for

not clearly requiring a showing of increased risk to "a particularized interest of the plaintiff, rather

than the environment in general," Maj. Op. at 12, the "geographic nexus" test instantiates in the

NEPA context precisely the showing of injury in fact that the court also requires.2It is consistent,

moreover, with instruction from the Supreme Court. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.

In cases involving a procedural right, such as the preparation of an EIS under NEPA, it is

inherently speculative whether the decision maker will reconsider the decision that causes the

plaintiff's injury in fact. Thus, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992), the

Supreme Court acknowledged the special nature of "a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce

a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs

(e.g., ... the procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement before a federal facility

is constructed next door to them)." In such a case, the Supreme Court declared, "[t]he person who

has been accorded a procedural right to protect his [or her] concrete interests can assert that right

without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy." Id. at 572 n.7. By

analogy, appellants need not show that the preparation ofthe EIS would lead the Secretary to rescind

the tax credit, nor that the environmental harm threatened by the tax credit is imminent.

As the opinion for the court states, Maj. Op. at 14-15, the plaintiff in a NEPA case must also

establish that her injury isfairly traceable to the underlying governmental action for which an EIS was

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3

In previous cases, this circuit has held that the causation element of standing can be satisfied

by " "the prospect that the [agency] would rescind its [underlying action] were the environmental

consequences of the [underlying action] spelled out in more detail in an EIS: ... this would supply

the required causal nexus between the agency's actionfailure to prepare an EISand

petitioners' "environmental" injury.' " City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 496 (quoting Public

Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 848 F.2d 256, 263 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 

The court properly abandons that approach, see Maj. Op. at 15, in light of Supreme Court cases,

decided after the Ninth Circuit decision from which this circuit drew its NEPA standing test, that

establish the causation element of standing. The panel opinion conducted the proper causation

analysis, albeit under a different rubric. 54 F.3d at 878-80. 

4 Nine of the ten judges who took part in Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 843

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc), agreed with this proposition. See id. at 856 (opinion of Wald, C.J.); 

id. at 874 (opinion of Buckley, J.) (stating that Congress cannot "conclusively establish[ ]"

causation, but "Congress' understanding might affect the quantum of proof that the [plaintiff]

must provide"). 

not prepared.3See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976);

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975). The causation inquiry in a NEPA case, however,

must be conducted in light of the procedural injury that the statute creates. Because "Congress has

the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or

controversy where none existed before," Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment), the nature of the causation inquiry is shaped by the procedural right

asserted under NEPA.4See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir.

1992) ("The standing examination ... must focus on the likelihood that the defendant's action will

injure the plaintiff in the sense contemplated by Congress."). As this court has explained, NEPA

"includes a strong mandate to anticipate, and where possible, avoid environmental crisesthrough the

explanatory and research device of an EIS." City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 496. The irony of the

rule announced by the court today is that it "in essence ... require[s] that the plaintiff conduct the

same environmental investigation that he seeks in his suit to compel the agency to undertake." City

of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671; see also STEPHEN G.BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 1107 (2d ed. 1985) ("NEPA has been judicially construed as an

essentiallyproceduralstatute designed to generate, through anEIS, information on the environmental

effects of a proposed action. To require plaintiffs to show what those effects are as a prerequisite to

requiring that an EIS be performed seems inconsistent with the basic purpose of NEPA.").

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5 The circuits are divided over the issue whether challenges to forest management plans under

NEPA and the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994), are justiciable

when the government has yet to develop site-specific projects implementing the plan. Compare

Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 610-14 (7th Cir. 1995) and Idaho Conservation League v.

Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1992) (yes) with Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d

386, 389-91 (11th Cir. 1996) and Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 757-60 (8th Cir. 1994)

(no). That consideration is not present in the instant case because the Secretary will not take any

site-specific action. 

II.

The opinion for the court imposes so heavy an evidentiary burden on appellants to establish

standing that it will be virtually impossible to bring a NEPA challenge to rulemakings with diffuse

impacts. The quantum of proof that the court requires finds no support in the procedural rules on

summary judgment, nor in the case law on standing. It also places this circuit in conflict with the

NinthCircuit, which hasfrequently found standing in casessimilar to this one.5See Douglas County,

48 F.3d at 1499-1501; Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1302-03 (9thCir. 1993); Salmon

River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1351-55 (9th Cir. 1994); Portland Audubon

Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d

699, 702-03 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1513-18.

Our review of the district court's grant of the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on

standing is de novo. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 45 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To survive such

a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff "must "set forth' byaffidavit or other evidence "specific facts,'

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be

true." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561; see also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n,

497 U.S. at 889. Of course, the Secretary bears the burden "to show initially the absence of a genuine

issue concerning any material fact." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970); see

generally 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2739 (2d ed.

1983). Because appellants have presented ample evidence to show that they have suffered an injury

in fact, fairly traceable to the Secretary's action, and the Secretary has presented no genuine issue of

materialfact asto Ms.Jensen'sstanding, appellants are entitled to summaryjudgment on the standing

issue.

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6 The letter was signed by all sixty-one senators who had been in the Senate when the Crude

Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act was enacted in 1980 and continued in office in 1988. 

A.

The ETBE tax credit. The statutory purpose of the tax credit, as well as the Secretary's

rationale for extending the tax credit to ETBE, set the context for demonstrating the lack of merit

to the Secretary's challenge to Ms. Jensen's standing.

In 1980, Congress enacted the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 96-223, §

232(b)(1), 94 Stat. 229, 273-75, in order "to encourage the development of energysources other than

petroleum products for use in motor fuels" by providing a refundable income tax credit on "alcohol

(other than alcohol derived from petroleum, natural gas, or coal)" used in motor fuels. S. REP. NO.

394, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 410, 499-500. Section 40 of

the Internal Revenue Code thus provides a tax credit of 60 cents for each gallon of alcohol used in

the production of a "qualified mixture" of alcohol and gasoline. 26 U.S.C. § 40(a), (b)(1) (1994).

ETBE is a chemical compound produced in a reaction between ethanol(an alcohol usually produced

by fermenting sugar contained in crops such as corn, sugar beets and sugarcane) and isobutylene (a

petroleum by-product); the ETBE is then typically blended with gasoline for use as a fuel. Before

1990, ETBE did not qualify for the § 40 tax credit because, chemically speaking, it is a compound

rather than a "mixture" of ethanol and isobutylene. Without the tax credit, ETBE could not compete

commerciallywith a similarfuel additive, methyltertiarybutyl ether. In 1988, sixty-one United States

senators6urged the Secretaryto announce that ETBE qualifiesfor the tax credit, explaining that "[b]y

establishing the eligibility ofthe credit, commercialization can occur immediately, and, in accordance

with the intent of the original Act, America's dependence on foreign oil can be further reduced."

In 1989, the Secretary issued a proposed rule that would re-interpret "qualified mixture" to

include chemical compounds derived from alcohol. See Alcohol Fuels Credit; Definition of Mixture,

54 Fed. Reg. 48,639 (Nov. 24, 1989). Stating that the rule was based on "policy considerations," id.

at 48,639, the Secretary's notice indicated that the proposed ETBE tax credit would have five

benefits:

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First, allowing the credit will increase the substitution of ETBE for other octane

enhancers that cause more pollution. Second, it makes ETBE a more viable means

of increasing the oxygen content of gasoline, which should help smooth the transition

to oxygenated fuels in those areas that are not in compliance with carbon monoxide

standards. Third, it encourages the substitution of ETBE-gasoline blends (gasohol).

ETBE does not absorb water, which means it is easier to transport than gasohol, and

it can be blended into the gasoline with less pollution than the "splash blending" of

gasohol. Fourth, it may increase the demand of domestic ethanol because ETBE is

easier to use than ethanol, which would expand this alternative market for America's

farmers. Fifth, ETBE is a fuel, not just an octane enhancer, and it will displace some

gasoline consumption. Substituting a renewable and domestically-produced fuel for

imported petroleum will enhance national energy security and will improve the trade

balance.

Id. at 48,640 (emphasis added). In comments submitted to the Secretary, the National Corn Growers

Association stated that the new rule would "help open the door to a whole newmarket for the nation's

corn farmer." Letter from Alan Kemper, President, National Corn Growers Ass'n, to the

Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 8, 1989).

In 1990, the Secretary promulgated a final rule. Identical to the proposed rule, it interpreted

section 40's reference to a "qualified mixture" to include products derived from alcohol "even if the

alcohol is chemically transformed in producing the product so that the alcohol is no longer present

as a separate chemical in the final product, provided that there is no significant loss in the energy

content of the alcohol." Alcohol Fuels Credit; Definition of Mixture, 55 Fed. Reg. 8946, 8946

(1990) (codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.40-1 (1995)). In the notice accompanying the final rule, the

Secretary rejected the suggestion that NEPA required him to prepare an environmental impact

statement because Treasury Directive 75-02, 45 Fed. Reg. 1828 (Jan. 8, 1980), provided a

"categorical exception" from the EIS requirement for IRS regulations "interpreting, implementing,

or clarifying" Internal Revenue Code provisions. 55 Fed. Reg. at 8947.

Appellants disagree, and they challenge the Secretary'sfailure to prepare anEIS before taking

the non-site-specific government action that appellants assert is likely to cause widespread

environmental harm. The only question now before the court is whether appellants have standing.

B.

Injury in fact. Appellants have demonstrated concrete and particularized injury by

establishing that they have a "geographical nexus" to the threatened environmental injury. The court

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7 Since 1985, Ms. Jensen has been employed by, and since 1987 has been a co-director of, the

Minnesota branch of Clean Water Action, a national environmental organization that advocates

protection of natural resources. She was a member of a 1989 advisory group that prepared

legislation (later adopted by the state legislature) to protect groundwater in Minnesota, and has

served, by appointment, on three state environmental advisory groups. In addition, since 1989

she has been the Minnesota State Governor's appointee to the Great Lakes Protection Fund

Board. From 1990 to 1992, she served as the Governor's appointee to the Minnesota Board of

Water and Soil Resources, which administers the state soil and water conversation districts,

county water planning and the state's farmland set-aside programs. 

rejects their showing of proof, however, on the ground that they "have not provided competent

evidence that corn farmers in particular areas of Minnesota or Michigan or sugar producers in

particular regions of Florida" will increase their crop production. Maj. Op. at 14. Unfortunately, the

court ignores the voluminous evidence that appellants have provided.

In hersworn declaration, Ms.Jensen explained that she and her family regularly use and enjoy

particular locations in Minnesota, including the Sherburne National Wildlife Refuge, Sand Dunes

State Forest, and Lac Qui Parle Wildlife Area. At her deposition, in response to the government's

request, she identified ten areas, with an average diameter of twenty-five miles, that she regularly

visits for her recreational activities. In her declaration she stated that these activities include hiking,

canoeing, cross-country skiing, birdwatching and photography, and fishing throughout undeveloped

natural areas adjoining Minnesota land used for corn farming and susceptible to increased corn

production. The Secretary does not dispute that Ms. Jensen has more than " "some day' intentions"

to visit these areas, cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564, and that she has alleged that

these particular locations, and not land in the general vicinity, are likely to be adversely affected by

the ETBE tax credit, cf. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990).

Furthermore, Ms.Jensen has proffered unrefuted evidence that the ETBE tax credit will affect

areas she uses. Based on her experience on several Minnesota environmental task forces, state

environmental advisory groups, and the state Board of Water and SoilResources,7 Ms. Jensen states

in hersworn declaration that localfarmers, who now receive state subsidiesto leave some land fallow

and rotate fields, are likely to abandon the subsidy and develop these landsin order to take advantage

of the tax credit. As a result, Ms. Jensen states, marginally productive lands, which require more

fertilizer and pesticides to farm and are more susceptible to erosion, are likely to be cultivated. She

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further states that greater yields can be obtained from Minnesota farmland already devoted to corn

farming through increased use of pesticides and fertilizer, which would threaten wildlife habitats by

causing greater soil erosion and water pollution. Ms. Jensen also refers to meetings in which State

representatives have advised her that the ETBE tax credit is likely to increase corn farming in

Minnesota and that an EIS could destroy market opportunities for Minnesota corn. From this

unrefuted evidence, the likelihood that the ETBE tax credit willstimulate increased corn production

on lands neighboring those used by Ms. Jensen, and the fact that Minnesota is the fourth-largest

corn-producing state in the United States, it reasonably follows that Ms. Jensen uses lands likely to

be affected by the ETBE tax credit.

Ms. Jensen's second basis for standing rests on the unrefuted evidence that the ETBE tax

credit will affect her drinking water. In her affidavit, she states that the pesticide atrazine, which is

commonly used on corn crops, can be found in groundwater as well asin drinking water. According

to a national study that appellants have submitted, about 72 million pounds of atrazine were applied

in 1992, of which over 60 million pounds were used on corn. National Center for Food and

Agricultural Policy, Pesticide Use in U.S. Crop Production tbl. 18 (Feb. 1995). Given that,

according to this study, 68% of acres planted with corn are treated with atrazine, id., it is likely that

increased corn production would be accompanied by increased use of atrazine. The Environmental

Protection Agency, in initiating a Special Review of atrazine and related pesticides, has concluded

that "atrazine is the most frequently detected pesticide in the ground water in the midwestern United

States, including ... Minnesota." 59 Fed. Reg. 60,412, 60,427 (Nov. 23, 1994). Appellants have also

submitted a drinking-water study that shows that atrazine, which the Environmental Protection

Agency has classified as a possible human carcinogen, was found in 58% of tap water samples

collected between May 25 and July 1, 1995, in Minneapolis. Environmental Working Group, Weed

Killers By the Glass 63 (Aug. 1995). Because Ms. Jensen resides in the Minneapolis metropolitan

area, it reasonably follows that Ms. Jensen's drinking water is likely to be affected by the ETBE tax

credit.

It is true that Ms. Jensen has not pointed to a particular Minnesotan corn farmer whose

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8 Nor could Ms. Jensen produce such a farmer, given that the impersonal laws of supply and

demand would increase corn production without the particular farmer being able to attribute the

increase in production to demand for ETBE. Ms. Jensen has, however, produced statements from

the National Corn Growers Association, speaking on behalf of farmers, as well as evidence that

elected officials in Minnesota expected that farmers would benefit from the ETBE tax credit. 

possible increased corn production will injure the lands she uses or the water she drinks.8 Maj. Op.

at 21. But her showing of a localized impact of the ETBE tax credit is more than sufficient to

establish the requisite "geographical nexus." In Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 817

F.2d 484, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1987), residents of Oregon challenged an EIS for a federal program for

spraying gypsy moths. The court concluded that the plaintiffs "reside in a state with an actual gypsy

moth problem and thus may challenge a nationwide EIS that is applicable to them." Just so, Ms.

Jensen has shown that she is likely to be concretely affected by the ETBE tax credit in a way that

distinguishes her from other potential plaintiffs; she seeks redress not for a generalized grievance,

but for a particularized interest. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573-74.

Because it cannot be disputed that Ms. Jensen has a concrete, particularized interest in the

wildlife areas that she uses and in the water that she drinks, the remaining question is whether the

threatened harm to her is sufficiently imminent. The reasoning in the opinion for the court, holding

that appellants have not established injury in fact, Maj. Op. at 11-14, may be directed toward this

requirement of imminence. Cf. Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he

likelihood of injury, whether or not that likelihood depends upon a single event or a chain of events,

is properly a concern of the personal injury inquiry, not the causation inquiry...."). As the Supreme

Court made clear in footnote seven of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, however, a plaintiff asserting

a procedural right need not wait for the threatened injury to befall her before bringing suit to force

the government to conduct the procedure designed to protect the plaintiff's concrete interest. The

"normal standards for ... immediacy" are relaxed, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7, because NEPA injury entails

simplythe "risk ofserious environmentalharm," not the certaintyof environmentalharm. See Salmon

River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1355 n.14 (9th Cir. 1994) ("There is no

requirement that a plaintiff prove that an injury to his or her concrete interests will occur."); Sierra

Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1995).

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9

Inexplicably, the court notes that Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife suggests that homeowners

upstream from a dam would have standing in a NEPA case, Maj. Op. at 10, but holds that Ms.

Jensen, who drinks the affected water, does not. Surely the pollution of one's drinking water is a

concrete and particularized injury. See Maj. Op. at 13 n.4. 

The opinion for the court disputes the connection between evidence of the existing extent of

corn farming in Minnesota, near the areas that Ms. Jensen uses, and the likelihood that an expansion

of corn production would also take place near those same areas. Similarly, the court would deny any

connection between evidence of the existing prevalence of atrazine in the drinking water in

Minneapolis and the likelihood that an expansion of corn production would increase those atrazine

levels. Yet the Supreme Court has stated that "past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there

is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974).

Indeed, it should go without saying that appellants "need not be omniscient and pinpoint precisely

where the next infraction will occur." International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v.

Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In a NEPA case, where the asserted interest is inherently

probabilistic in nature, the plaintiff need show only that the heightened risk to her interest is not

conjectural or hypothetical. See Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516.

By concluding that Ms. Jensen has failed to demonstrate a geographic nexus to the risk of

serious environmental harm, the court erroneously requires her to demonstrate certainty of injury to

her concrete interest in the wildlife areas that she uses and in the water that she drinks. The court is

in agreement that, because of the diffuse impact of a rulemaking such as the ETBE tax credit, a

prospective plaintiffsuffers a particularized injury only ifshe can show that a localized impact is more

likely where she lives than simply anywhere in the country. See Maj. Op. at 13; cf. Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (stating that "persons who live (and propose to live) at

the other end of the country from the dam" "have no concrete interests affected"). But Ms. Jensen's

affidavit, taken together with appellants' expert testimony, establishes a greater likelihood of a

localized impact where Ms.Jensen lives. If appellants' showing is insufficient, as the court concludes,

then it is difficult to imagine who would be able to satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing in a

procedural-rights case involving a nationwide rulemaking.9 The standing doctrine, designed to

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respond to concerns about the separation of powers and avoiding advisory opinions, see Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 559-60, does not lead to such an incongruous result.

C.

Causation. The court holds, in the alternative, that the increased likelihood of harm to the

plaintiffs' concrete interests is not fairly traceable to the ETBE tax credit. Maj. Op. at 17-19.

According to the court, the plaintiffs' "protracted chain of causation fails both because of the

uncertainty of several individual links and because of the number ofspeculative links that must hold

for the chain to connect the challenged acts to the asserted particularized injury." Maj. Op. at 18.

In deciding whether harm caused directly by the actions of a third party are fairly traceable

to the defendant, courts must assess the incentivesthat the defendant's conduct provided to the third

party. "While the personal injury inquiry focuses on concrete facts about harm to the plaintiff,

causation questions concern the directness of the link between the defendant's challenged action and

the alleged injury, and focus on the incentive structure to which the intervening third party, who

directly causes the injury, is responding." Griles, 824 F.2d at 17; see also Community for Creative

Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1987). There is no perse rule that intervening

acts by a third party breaks the chain of causation. " "[M]ere indirectness of causation is no barrier

to standing, and thus, an injury worked on one party by another through a third party intermediary

may suffice.' " Telephone & Data Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 42, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting

National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see also Heldman v. Sobol,

962 F.2d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1992). In addition, " "[w]e are concerned here not with the length of the

chain of causation, but [with] the plausibility of the links that comprise the chain.' " Autolog Corp.

v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Public Citizen v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 565

F.2d 708, 717 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).

The Secretary maintains that a complex and improbable sequence of events must ensue in

order for the ETBE tax credit to affect appellants' concrete interest: namely, that the ETBE tax credit

must prompt ETBE production, which must increase demand for ethanol, which must increase

demand for corn, which must increase corn farming, which must cause environmental harm. With

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10 The low-end estimate for increased crop acreage is derived from estimates by corn industry

groups in letters to the Secretary of Treasury and testimony at a House Ways and Means

Committee hearing that corn production would increase by about 100 million bushels and is based

on a low estimate of the elasticity of the supply of corn. 

11 The Secretary presented a report by Professor Leo Polopolus and Professor Andrew

Schmitz that "review[ed] the allegations of this lawsuit concerning sugar crops" but did not

address Professor Berck's conclusions concerning corn crops. 

12 Other sources indicate that ETBE production continues to increase. According to 21st

Century Fuels, ETBE production capacity increased from 35,000 barrels a day in late 1994 to

66,100 barrels a day in late 1995a growth ascribed to tax credits for ETBE. ETBE Capacity

Grows, Carb Fuel Offers New Blending Prospects, 21st Century Fuels, vol. 15, no. 12 (Dec. 1,

1995). In addition, uncertainty about the tax credit's continued viabilitystemming in part from

this litigation, commenced very shortly after the Secretary's announcement of the final rule, Maj.

Op. at 2may explain the ethanol industry's decision to delay investment in ETBE production. 

Cf. Lawsuit Challenging Credit Still Alive; ETBE Credit Hangs in Balance as Congress Fails to

Clarify Issue in Budget Bill, 11 Alcohol Week's New Fuels Report No. 44, at 1 (Nov. 5, 1990). 

only one exception, however, the Secretary has failed to dispute appellants' proffered evidence

establishing the likelihood of each of these causal links and the connections between them. The

Secretary does not dispute record evidence that increased corn farming would adversely affect the

environment by, among other things, increasing erosion and water pollution as farmers plant crops

on now idle or underused land and expand their use of pesticides and fertilizers. It is also undisputed

that an increased demand for ethanolwould increase domestic corn production. Appellants presented

a study by Professor Peter Berck, an agricultural and resource economist at the University of

California at Berkeley, who estimated that, as a result of the tax credit, the acreage of farm land

devoted to growing corn would increase by between 281,000 acres to 14 million acres, depending

on which of several projections regarding increased demand for ethanol proves to be correct.10

Insofar as estimates regarding increased ethanol production prove correct, the Secretary does not

dispute Professor Berck's conclusions.11

As a result, the questionwhether appellants have established the causation element ofstanding

depends solely on the likelihood that the ETBE tax credit will stimulate demand for ethanol.

According to data released by the Department of Energy in May 1995, production of ETBE as of

January 1, 1995, was 3,980 barrels per day, located at three plants in Virginia, Illinois and

Minnesota.12 1 Energy Info. Admin., Petroleum Supply Annual 1994, at 125 tbl. 52 (May 1995).

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13 The compound ETBE consists of about 42% ethanol. 

14 See Letter from Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture, to Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary

of the Treasury (Mar. 20, 1989) ("ETBE, with the blender tax credit, will enable the domestic

ethanol industry to expand and provide a growing market for U.S. feed grains."); Letter from

Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture, to J. Bennett Johnston, Chairman, Committee on

Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate (Nov. 3, 1989); Letter from Alan Kemper,

President, National Corn Growers Ass'n, to Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Dec.

8, 1989) ("Every six gallons of ETBE produced will consume approximately one bushel of corn. 

As you can see, in an expanded ETBE market, the potential for the utilization of one of

American's greatest renewable resources (corn) would be significant."); Letter from Criss Davis,

President, Wisconsin Corn Growers Ass'n, to Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service

(Dec. 20, 1989); Outline of Comments on Tax Credits for ETBE, Frederick C. Spreyer, State of

Hawaii, Dep't of Business and Economic Development; Letter of Daryl Reid, President, Illinois

Corn Growers Ass'n, to Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 12, 1989); see also

Market Hinges on Favorable Treasury Dep't Ruling, Alcohol Week 6-7 (Oct. 24, 1988). 

Although the court emphasizes that this level of production remains relatively low, Maj. Op. at 20,

the increase in ETBE production fromzero when the tax credit was adopted in 1990 to 3,980 barrels

per day by the end of 1994 tends to support appellants' claim that the tax credit is likely to stimulate

demand for ethanol. The tax credit of 60 cents per gallon of ethanol amounts to a credit of 25 cents

per gallon of ETBE,13 which reduces the cost of production of ETBE, according to Secretary

Yeutter's 1989 estimate, from about 95 cents a gallon to around 70 cents a gallon. Letter from

Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture, to J. Bennett Johnston, Chairman, Committee on Energy

and Natural Resources, United States Senate, attachment at 5 (Nov. 2, 1989). Moreover, this is not

a case where a plaintiff hasseized on a possible incidentalside-effect of a government action; rather,

increasing demand for ethanol was one of the Secretary's stated purposes in proposing extension of

the tax credit to ETBE. See Alcohol Fuels Credit; Definition of Mixture, 54 Fed. Reg. 48,639,

48,640 (Nov. 24, 1989). The record is replete with evidence that proponents of the ETBE tax credit

expected the tax credit to increase demand for ethanol and corn production.14 The Secretary's own

experts, Professor Leo Polopolus and Professor Andrew Schmitz, indicated that the "development

and growth of the corn based U.S. ethanol industry is due to the various federal and state tax

incentives,subsidies, and loan guarantees." Indeed, unless we assume that the Secretary promulgated

the ETBE tax credit as nothing more than an empty gesture, it is difficult to understand his argument

that an effective reduction in the price of production from 95 cents to 70 cents a gallon will have no

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15 Although the court is correct that we "do not defer to the views of the IRS ... in determining

whether a particular rule will cause injury to a particular plaintiff or as proof of any causal chain

necessary for standing," Maj. Op. at 19-20, the statements by the Secretary of the Treasury and

the Secretary of Agriculture simply support the common-sense inference that the tax credit is

likely to lead to an increase in the production of ETBE. For standing purposes, contrary to the

court's dictum, the court may consider congressional definitions of injury or congressional

articulations of chains of causation. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 578 (stating

that Congress can "elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries

that were previously inadequate in law"); id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment). 

16 In Allen v. Wright, the plaintiffs alleged that the conduct of the Internal Revenue Service

(IRS) violated the Internal Revenue Code, civil rights laws, and the Constitution, 468 U.S. at 745

n.12; in Simon, the plaintiffs alleged that the conduct of the IRS violated the Internal Revenue

Code and the APA, 426 U.S. at 33-34. 

17 Although SCRAP has been limited, see Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at

889, it remains binding law in the NEPA context. Because we consider the evidence the plaintiffs

have submitted in this case sufficient to warrant summary judgment in their favor on the standing

impact on ETBE production.15 In light of appellants' evidence of a substantial effect from the tax

credit, it ismore than "somewhat curious" for the Secretaryto "minimiz[e] the importance and impact

of his own decision[ ]" in order to defeat standing. SecuritiesIndus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034,

1041 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).

The court relies on the analyses of causation in the Supreme Court's decisions in Allen v.

Wright and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization. See Maj. Op. at 18-20. The

Supreme Court has explained, however, that both those decisions were motivated by

separation-of-powers concerns that "counsel[ ] against recognizing standing in a case brought, not

to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring

of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties." Allen v. Wright, 468

U.S. at 761; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM.

L. REV. 1432, 1451-61 (1988). By contrast, appellants challenge not the ETBE tax credit,16but

rather the Secretary's failure to prepare an EIS. The Supreme Court has been far more generous in

its causation analysis outside the context of constitutional challenges to a third party's tax liability.

In a NEPAstanding case, United States v. StudentsChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures, 412

U.S. 669 (1973) (SCRAP), the Supreme Court allowed standing despite what the opinion for the

court acknowledges, Maj. Op. at 21-22, is a similarly indirect chain of causation.17 See Defenders

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issue, the distinction noted by the courtthat SCRAP was decided on its pleadingsdoes not

reduce that case's support for our conclusion that the plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated

standing. 

of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1043 (8th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing Allen v. Wright on the

ground that it was a "constitutional challenge, whereas this case involves, as did SCRAP, questions

of statutory interpretation"); see also Fletcher, supra, at 258-60 (explaining SCRAP as a NEPA

case). To take another example, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,

438 U.S. 59, 75-77 (1978), in which the plaintiffs challenged a federalstatutory limitation on liability

for nuclear accidents, the defendants denied that there was causation by asserting that the nuclear

power plants near which the plaintiffs lived might have been constructed and operated even without

the federal statute. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's conclusion that, based on

congressional testimony by corporate officials and expert testimony presented by the plaintiffs, there

was a "substantial likelihood" that the power plants would not have been constructed and operated

if it were not for the federal statute. The statements by Cabinet officials about the purposes of the

ETBE tax credit and appellants' expert testimony similarly establish a substantial likelihood that the

tax credit will increase the risk of serious environmental harm.

The separation-of-powers concerns that underlay Allen v. Wright and Simon v. Eastern

Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization do not apply to appellants' NEPA claim. The causation

element of standing, as employed by the Supreme Court, is "something of a term of art, taking into

account not merely an estimate of effects but also considerations related to the constitutional

separation of powers asthat concept defines the proper role of courtsin the American governmental

structure." Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (opinion of Bork,

J.). Appellants' NEPA claim, however, asks the court to enforce a procedural right of the sort that

courts are accustomed to adjudicating and are well-equipped to handle. Vindication of appellants'

proceduralright would entail no judicial intrusion into the workings ofthe executive branch, as might

have occurred in Allen and Simon. Moreover, the separation-of-powers concerns in the standing

inquiry are different when a plaintiff seeks to enforce a statutory, rather than a constitutional, right.

Although the court maintains that hearing this lawsuit would set us up as "a back-seat Congress,"

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18 The other links in the chain of causation need not be treated separately. See Maj. Op. at 17-

18. An increase in the production of ETBE necessarily leads to an increase in the demand for

ethanol (which comprises 42% of the ETBE compound). Such an increase in the demand for

ethanol is highly likely to lead to an increase in the production of ethanol, which necessarily leads

to an increase in the demand for the constituent agricultural products (corn or sugar) used in the

production of ethanol. In turn, it is highly likely that an increase in the demand for corn or sugar

will lead to an increase in the production of corn or sugar. Finally, it is highly likely that much of

the increased production of corn or sugar will occur on previously unused lands instead of

displacing prior agricultural production of another kind. 

Maj. Op. at 22, the court, by denying standing, effectively second-guesses Congress' determination

to create an inherently predictive right in NEPA.

The opinion for the court principally identifies two links in the chain of causation that it

concludes are too weak to sustain standing. First, fuel producers may decide to increase production

of ETBE for reasons independent of the challenged tax credit. Second, even if the tax credit causes

production of ETBE and ethanol to increase, the resulting marginal effect on corn production may

be dwarfed by other causalfactors(such as weather) that either increase or reduce the production of

corn.18 See Maj. Op. at 18.

The question whether the fuel producers' decisions to increase the production of ETBE are

fairly traceable to the ETBE tax credit depends on the importance of the tax credit in their decision.

The record showsthat fuelproducers alreadyhave substantialETBE production capacity,see ETBE:

Ethanol'sMotorFuelHope?, ChemicalBusiness 38, 38 (Oct. 1988) (stating that methyltertiarybutyl

ether production facilities can be converted to produce ETBE), so that the decision at the margin

whether to produce more ETBE turns on its profitability. If the ETBE tax credit were insufficient

to stimulate production of ETBE because the production of any ETBE remained unprofitable, then

the plaintiffs' case for causation would fail. But the plaintiffs have provided evidence that ETBE is

in fact now being produced and that the tax credit was designed to be large enough to stimulate

production. See supra Parts II A & B. In City of Los Angeles, Judge D.H. Ginsburg would have

denied standing because the plaintiffs "ma[de] no allegations ... concerning the incremental harm

wrought by the agency's decision." 912 F.2d at 484 (D.H. Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). By

contrast, in the instant case it is precisely the injury caused by the marginal increase in the production

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19 Even if the aggregate increase in corn farming is not significant, given the total acreage

devoted to corn farming in the United States, the devotion of now idle or underused land to corn

farming can dramatically affect the particular environments where it occurs. The resultant harm

can include "effects on surface and ground water from changes in water run-off patterns, soil

erosion, wildlife effects, and effects on forests if more land is cleared for crop production." 

Environmental Protection Agency, Analysis of the Economic and Environmental Effects of

Ethanol as an Automotive Fuel, at iv (Apr. 1990). It is that localized incremental impact that

appellants directly challenge. 

of ethanol on which the plaintiffs rely.19

The court rejects much of the plaintiffs' evidence as "speculation," relying on United

Transportation Union v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1024

(1990), in which the court stated that, "[w]hen considering any chain of allegations for standing

purposes, we may reject as overly speculative those links which are predictions of future events

(especially future actionsto be taken by third parties) and those which predict a future injury that will

result from present or ongoing actionsthose types of allegations that are not normally susceptible

of labelling as "true' or "false.' " See Maj. Op. at 13-14, 19. Yet the United Transportation Union

court noted also that "application[s] of basic economic logic" are not "speculative": "Allegations

founded on economic principles ..., while perhaps not as reliable as allegations based on the laws of

physics, are at least more akin to demonstrable factsthan are predictions based only on speculation."

891 F.2d at 912 n.7; see also Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 923 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that

economic predictions are routinely used in standing cases). For example, the proposition that the

supply of a commodity (here, ETBE) will increase if the government subsidizes the cost of its

production is uncontroversial. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS

64 (12th ed. 1985). Similarly, the proposition that an increase in the demand for a certain commodity

(here, corn) will normally cause the price for that commodity to rise, which will in turn cause the

quantity of the commodity supplied to increase until supply again equals demand, is commonly

accepted and certainly not "speculative." Id. at 67. Although the magnitude of the price effects may

vary by commodity (depending on the elasticity of demand and of supply, see id. at 379-84), courts

may assume for purposes of standing, unless a contrary reason is shown, that a defendant's actions

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20 For example, in Branton v. FCC, 993 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.

1610 (1994), the court held that a plaintiff challenging the Federal Communication Commission's

failure to levy a fine against a licensee for broadcasting indecent language lacked standing because

it was speculative whether the imposition of a fine would redress the plaintiff's injury. The court

denied that its opinion was "inconsistent with the fundamental principle that increasing the price

of an activity ... will decrease the quantity of that activity demanded in the market" because the

court concluded that there was a low "elasticity of demand for broadcast indecency." Id. at 911-

12 (explaining that non-profit broadcast journalists often ignore monetary incentives). By

contrast, appellants have presented uncontroverted expert testimony from Professor Berck as to

the demand and supply elasticities for corn. 

will have the effect that economics would foretell.20 We need not shut our eyes from the reality, as

predicted by the two other branches of government as well as the affected industry, that the ETBE

tax credit will likely increase the production of ETBE, which in turn will likely increase the

production of corn.

The second weak link, in the court's view, is the relation between a marginal increase in the

production of corn fairly traceable to the ETBE tax credit and an overall increase in fact that is not

confounded by independent causal factors. Although it is certainly conceivable that a change in

weather patterns or a restriction of credit available to farmers could result in a net decrease in the

production of corn, it is sufficient for standing purposes that the marginal impact from the tax credit

increases the risk of environmental injury to the plaintiffs. Even if in a given year the increase fairly

traceable to the ETBE tax credit is dwarfed by other factors, the production of corn in that year is

still highly likely to be higher than it would have been without the ETBE tax creditor at least higher

over a period ofseveral yearsthan it would have been without the tax credit. This incremental impact

satisfies the causation element of the standing inquiry. As the Supreme Court has observed,

"[n]othing in our prior casesrequires a party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction to negate the kind

of speculative and hypothetical possibilities suggested." Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 78.

D.

Redressability. The nature of the plaintiffs' NEPA injury demonstrates its redressability. The

plaintiffs have met their burden to show that the procedural injury they claimthe risk that serious

environmental harms were overlooked in promulgating the ETBE tax creditwill be redressed by

having the court order the Secretary to prepare an EIS. As the opinion for the court agrees, Maj. Op.

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at 6, the plaintiffs need not establish that, in response to a court order to prepare an EIS, the

Secretary would rescind or modify the ETBE tax credit and thereby alleviate the threatened injury

to their concrete interest. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; Idaho

Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 18; City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 499.

E. 

Zone of interests. In enacting NEPA, Congress declared that, in view of

the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the

natural environment ... [and] the critical importance of restoring and maintaining

environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, ... it is the

continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means and

measures ... in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare....

NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). To carry out this policy, Congress "direct[ed] that, to the

fullest extent possible, ... all agencies of the Federal Government shall ... include in every ... major

Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of human environment, a detailed [environmental

impact statement]. Id. § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The environmental harms stemming

from increased corn farming suggested by appellants' proffers, and no less by Ms. Jensen's sworn

declaration, fall within NEPA's zone of interests. See City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 495.

Accordingly, because Ms. Jensen has adequately demonstrated all the elements for standing,

I would reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Secretary on standing, and remand the case

to the district court to enter summary judgment for appellants on standing and to address the

remaining issues.

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