Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03676/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03676-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YUZHEN OU, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-07-3676 MMC

ORDER TRANSFERRING ACTION TO

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT

OF COLUMBIA

Before the Court is plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 16,

2007, and defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 30, 2007. 

The matter came on regularly for hearing on February 29, 2008. Justin X. Wang of

Baughman & Wang appeared on behalf of plaintiffs. Melanie L. Proctor, Assistant United

States Attorney, appeared on behalf of defendants. Having considered the papers filed in

support of and in opposition to the motion, and the arguments of counsel, the Court rules

as follows.

In their complaint, plaintiffs seek an order compelling defendants to decide whether

plaintiffs Shiwang Yang and Huimin Yang are entitled to receive “travel documents,”

following defendants’ prior approval of “Refugee Asylee Relative Petitions” filed on behalf of

said plaintiffs by plaintiff Yuzhou Ou (“Ou”). (See Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12.) Plaintiffs bring their

claims under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the

Case 3:07-cv-03676-MMC Document 26 Filed 03/12/08 Page 1 of 4
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1

As was discussed at the February 29, 2008 hearing, the events and omissions on

which the instant claim is based occurred in China. Accordingly, subsection (b) is

inapplicable.

2

Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, (see id. ¶ 11), and allege venue is proper in the

Northern District of California because plaintiff Ou resides in San Francisco, (see id. ¶ 6). 

In their motion, defendants, in addition to addressing the merits of the complaint, argue

venue is improper in the Northern District of California.

Because plaintiffs have sued officers of the United States, the propriety of venue is

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(3), which provides:

A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United

States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of

legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may,

except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in 

which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of

property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides

if no real property is involved in the action. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(3). Defendants argue subsection (3), upon which plaintiffs rely, is

inapplicable because an alien, for purposes of establishing venue, is not considered a

resident of any district. Consequently, defendants argue, venue for the instant action is

only proper in the District of Columbia, the district in which defendants reside.1

Courts have long held that, for venue purposes, an alien is “assumed not to reside in

the United States.” See Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496, 506-07

(1894) (holding alien plaintiff “must resort to the domicile of the defendant”); Arevalo-Franco

v. INS, 889 F. 2d 589, 590 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Federal courts have interpreted [§ 1391] to

deny venue to aliens, holding that for purposes of venue, aliens are not residents of any

district despite where they might live.”) (emphasis in original); Williams v. United States,

704 F. 2d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1983) (“An alien, for purposes of establishing venue, is

presumed by law not to reside in any judicial district of the United States regardless of

where the alien actually lives.”); Prudencio v. Hanselman, 178 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Minn.

1959) (“[I]t is a basic venue principle that an alien is presumed not to reside in any

district.”).

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3

Plaintiffs argue the above-stated rule does not apply to Ou, because she is a

permanent resident alien. In support of this proposition, plaintiff relies on two cases

wherein a district court, in the course of considering a transfer for convenience, appeared

to assume the action could have been brought in the district in which the plaintiff, a

permanent resident alien, was living. See Abusadeh v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 2111036, at *5

(D. D.C. 2007); Gelin v. Ashcroft, 2003 WL 23515993, at *2-3 (D. Ct. 2003). Plaintiffs’

reliance on those two decisions is unavailing, however, as the issue raised herein was not

raised in either of said cases, and, in each instance, the action was transferred to the

district where the defendant resided. See Abusadeh, 2007 WL 2111036, at *5; Gelin, 2003

WL 23515993, at *3.

Plaintiffs also rely on the principle that a permanent resident alien is entitled to the

“same constitutional protections of due process that [courts] accord citizens.” See Hellenic

Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970). Plaintiffs’ citation to such authority

likewise is unavailing. Because an alternative forum exists, Ou will not be denied due

process if her claim is not heard in this district. Cf. Williams, 704 F. 2d at 1224, 1227 (11th

Cir. 1983) (noting “possible constitutional implications” where resident alien filed action

challenging tax assessment and applicable venue statute provided for venue only “in the

judicial district where the plaintiff resides”).

Further, as defendants point out, when Congress intends to distinguish between

categories of aliens, or to allow aliens to bring an action in the district of their residence,

Congress has expressly done so. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (providing that for

purposes of diversity jurisdiction, interpleader actions, and removal jurisdiction, “alien

admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the

State in which such alien is domiciled”); 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (providing alien whose

application for naturalization is denied may bring action for judicial review “before the

United States district court for the district in which such person resides”). Congress did not

use similar language in the statute under which plaintiffs sought asylum, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158, nor in the Administrative Procedures Act or the Mandamus Act, the statutes under

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4

which the instant claims are brought.

Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiffs have failed to establish venue is proper in the

Northern District of California, and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), hereby TRANSFERS

the action to the District Court for the District of Columbia.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-03676-MMC Document 26 Filed 03/12/08 Page 4 of 4