Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01341/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01341-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARCELI HIDALGO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13-CV-1341-H

(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

COMPLAINT AND RESERVE

vs.

AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC;

TFLG, a law corporation; ERIC G.

FERNANDEZ; S. EDWARD

SLABACH; SEAN H. VEDROSIAN;

VIANA G. BARBU; and DOES 1

through 50, inclusive.

Defendants.

On July 2, 2013, Defendants TFLG, A Law Corporation, Eric G. Fernandez, S.

Edward Slabach, Sean H Vedrosian, and Viana G. Barbu (“TFLG”) filed a motion to

dismiss Plaintiff Hidalgo’s complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 6.) On July

30, 2013, Defendant Aurora Loan Services LLC (“Aurora”) made a special appearance

to file a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for insufficient service of process. (Doc.

No. 12.) On August 28, 2013, the Court submitted the motion on the papers. (Doc. No.

14). To date, Plaintiff has yet to file an opposition to Defendants’ motions. For the

reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss without prejudice.

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Background

On November 1, 2005, Plaintiff obtained a home mortgage loan from First

National Bank of Arizona (“Bank of Arizona”) pledging as security property located

at 15751 Lofty Trail Drive, San Diego, California. (Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶16, 19,

20.) The deed of trust listed the Bank of Arizona as the lender and MERS Inc. as

beneficiary. (Id. ¶19.) In February 2011, Defendant Aurora Loan Services LLC

(“Aurora”) received Plaintiff’s loan by assignment from the Bank of Arizona. (Id.

¶21.) 

In December 2012, Aurora, through their counsel, Defendant TFLG, initiated

an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff in California Superior Court in San

Diego County. (Id. ¶51.) The Superior Court issued judgment in favor of Aurora on

May 30, 2013. (Doc. No. 3, Ex. A at p. 4.) Defendants obtained a writ of execution

authorizing the Sheriff or Marshal of the County of San Diego to enforce the

judgment. (Id.) The Sheriff served Plaintiff with a notice to vacate by June 13,

2013. (Id., Ex. A at p. 1.)1

On June 10, 2013, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in this Court

for damages for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (“RESPA”),

12 U.S.C. § 2605; for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §

1641; for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692; and common law claims of lack of standing to foreclose; fraud in the

1

 The Court takes judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, of the following

publicly recorded documents: Verified Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed on December

26, 2012 in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2012-00048326 (Doc. No. 6-2,

RJN Ex. 1); Deed of Trust executed on November 1, 2005 and recorded on November 9, 2005

in the official records of San Diego County as Document No. 2005-0975384 (Id. Ex. 2);

Assignment of Deed of Trust dated February 15th, 2011 and recorded on February 22, 2011

in the official records of San Diego County as Document No. 11-971120 (Id. Ex. 3); Trustee’s

Deed Upon Sale dated September 10, 2012 and recorded on September 13, 2012 in the official

records of San Diego County as Document No. 2012-0552078. (Id. Ex. 4.) See Lee v. City of

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may

take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.’”).

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inducement; fraud in the concealment; and for declaratory and injunctive relief.2

(Compl.) On June 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for a TRO to stay

the eviction and to prevent Defendants from taking possession of the property. 

(Doc. No. 3.) The Court denied the Plaintiff’s request for a TRO after concluding

that the Plaintiff failed to show a “fair chance of success on the merits.” (Doc. No. 5

at p. 5.) On July 2, 2013, Defendant TFLG filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. On July 30,

2013, Defendant Aurora filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for

insufficient service of process.

Discussion

I. Defendant TFLG’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the

pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff

has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The function of this pleading

requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007).

The court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for: (1) “lack of

cognizable legal theory,” or (2) “insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” 

SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted). However, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550

2

Plaintiff also lists claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, quiet title, and

rescission, but Plaintiff does not plead or mention these claims in the body of the complaint. 

(See Compl.)

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U.S. at 570. Nevertheless, the reviewing court need not accept “legal conclusions”

as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. It is also improper for the court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that

[he or she] has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). On the other hand, “[w]hen there

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679. In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court only reviews the contents of

the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956

(9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

A. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims

I. RESPA

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant TFLG violated the Real Estate Settlement and

Procedures ACT (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2605. (Compl. ¶¶57-58.) Under RESPA,

the servicer of a loan has obligations to make a disclosure to the borrower relating to

assignment, sale, or transfer of loan servicing. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(a)-(b). The servicer

also has an obligation to respond to borrower inquiries. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). For

each of these provisions, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) imposes liability on servicers that

violate RESPA and fail to make the required disclosures. The section provides that

“[w]hoever fails to comply with any provision of this section shall be liable to the

borrower for each such failure . . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1).

RESPA defines the term “servicer” as “the person responsible for servicing of

a loan (including the person who makes or holds a loan if such person also services

the loan).” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(2). RESPA defines the term “servicing” as

“receiving any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms

of any loan, including amounts for escrow accounts described in [12 U.S.C. § 2609],

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and making payments of principal and interest and such other payments with respect

to the amounts received from the borrower as may be required pursuant to the terms

of the loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(3).

In its motion to dismiss, Defendant TFLG asserts that TFLG does not qualify

as a servicer subject to RESPA. (Doc. No. 6-1 at p. 5.) Plaintiff’s complaint does not

allege that TFLG demanded or received payments from Plaintiff regarding any loan,

or allege any conduct on the part of TFLG other than its representation of Aurora

and Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”) in an unlawful detainer action.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege wrongful action by TFLG as a servicer

with sufficient facts to give rise to a cognizable claim under RESPA. Accordingly,

the Court GRANTS Defendant TFLG’s motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s

RESPA claim.

ii. TILA

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant TFLG violated the Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g) by failing to notify the plaintiff of the transfer of

Plaintiff’s mortgage loan. (Compl. ¶¶55, 59.) TILA seeks to protect credit

consumers by mandating “meaningful disclosure of credit terms.” 15 U.S.C.

§1601(a). TILA requires that within thirty days of any sale or transfer of a mortgage

loan, the creditor that is the new owner or assignee of the debt must notify the

borrower in writing. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g). The Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the

Plaintiff was never notified of transfer or assignment of the mortgage. (Compl. ¶55.) 

In response, Defendant TFLG asserts it was not acting as a “creditor” as that

term is defined under TILA. (Doc. No. 6-1 at p. 6.) The statute defines a “creditor”

as “a person who both (1) regularly extends . . . consumer credit which is payable by

agreement . . . , and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer

credit transaction is initially payable . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g). “An action under

1641(g) can only be brought against creditors or their assignees.” Rider v. HSBC

Mortgage Corp. (USA), 2:12-CV-925, 2013 WL 3901519 at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 29,

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2013); see also Mourad v. Homeward Residential, Inc., No. 12–1880, 2013 WL

870205 at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013). 

 Plaintiff’s complaint does not show that TFLG holds or ever held an interest

in the note or the Deed of Trust. (Doc. No. 6-2, RJN Ex. 2-4.) Furthermore,

Defendant TFLG demonstrates that the debt secured by the Deed of Trust was

foreclosed prior to TFLG’s involvement in the unlawful detainer action. (Doc. No.

6-2, RJN Ex. 1. at p. 15.)

The Plaintiff’s complaint fails to demonstrate that Defendant TFLG acted as a

creditor under the definition section of TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g). Since TFLG did

not extend credit to plaintiff or become the owner or assignee of Plaintiff’s mortgage

loan, Defendant TFLG could not have had any obligations to Plaintiff under TILA.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS TFLG’s motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s

TILA claim.

iii. FDCPA

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges numerous violations of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., by Defendant TFLG related to

Plaintiff’s foreclosed residential mortgage. (Compl. ¶¶64.)3

 “To be held liable for

violation of the FDCPA, a defendant must-as a threshold requirement-fall within the

Act’s definition of ‘debt collector.’” Izenberg v. ETS Services, LLC, 589 F. Supp.

2d 1193, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995));

but cf. Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 2006)

(“Wilson's ‘debt’ remained a ‘debt’ even after foreclosure proceedings

commenced.”). The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as one who collects consumer

debts owed to another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)(A).

However, an unlawful detainer action regarding holdover occupants after

foreclosure does not qualify as the collection of a debt within the meaning of the

3

The paragraphs in the complaint are not chronologically numbered following paragraph

59. Paragraph 64 referenced above is paragraph 33 on page 17 of the complaint.

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FDCPA. See Cook v. Hamrick, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (D. Co. 2003) (ruling

that unlawful detainer is a non-collection action under the FDCPA); see also

Monreal v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 13CV743 AJB NLS, 2013 WL 2444165 (S.D.

Cal. June 4, 2013) (dismissing FDCPA claim because plaintiff failed to specifically

allege facts indicating that any of the defendants were “debt collectors” as defined

under the FDCPA). 

Plaintiff’s complaint has not properly alleged facts that the FDCPA applies to

Defendant TFLG as a debt collector. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS TFLG’s

motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim.

B. Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that the Defendants are liable for damages

based on unlawful foreclosure; fraud in the inducement; and fraud in the

concealment.

i. Plaintiff’s challenge of foreclosure claim

The entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants acquired their

purported right to foreclose via an unlawful transfer from a trust of pooled

mortgages and through robo-signing. (See generally Compl. ¶¶19-56.) Yet, courts

have consistently concluded that borrowers cannot challenge an allegedly fraudulent

assignment of a deed of trust or an appointment of a successor trustee “because a

borrower is neither a party to nor an intended beneficiary of the challenged

agreements.” Brodie v. Northwest Trustee Services, Inc., Case No. 12-469, 2012

WL 6192723 at *2 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2012); In re MERS Litigation, Case No.

10-1547, 2012 WL 932625 at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2012); Javaheri v. JP Morgan

Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 10-8185, 2012 WL 3426278 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13,

2012). Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants could not lawfully foreclose

is discredited by the California Superior Court’s issuance of a writ of execution to

Defendants authorizing the eviction of Plaintiff from the property. (Doc. No. 3, Ex.

A at p. 4.) Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any action by Defendant

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TFLG (the law firm that performed the unlawful detainer action) until after the

foreclosure was completed.

ii. Fraud in the inducement and fraud in the concealment

Plaintiff brings causes of action for fraud in the inducement and fraud in the

concealment against Defendant TFLG. (Compl. ¶¶13-14.) Under California law,

“[t]he elements of intentional misrepresentation, or actual fraud, are: ‘(1)

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2)

knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4)

justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.’” Anderson v. Deloitte & Touche, 56

Cal. App. 4th 1468, 1474 (1997). The elements of fraud in inducement of a contract

are the same elements as actual fraud. See Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 148 Cal. App.

2d 56, 68 (1957).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, a plaintiff must plead fraud with

particularity. “Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to state-law causes of

action.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and

how’ of the misconduct charged.” Id. at 1106 (quoting Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d

616, 627 (9th Cir.1997)). “‘[A] plaintiff must set forth more than the neutral facts

necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false or

misleading about a statement, and why it is false.’” Id. at 1106 (quoting Decker v.

GlenFed, Inc. (In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir.1994)). 

“While statements of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities

are sufficient, mere conclusory allegations of fraud” are not. Moore v. Kayport

Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff has presented only conclusory allegations of fraud in the complaint.

(E.g., Compl. ¶13.) Plaintiff has failed to allege with specificity any fraudulent

statements that were made by Defendants at any time. These allegations fall well

short of the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). 

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Based on the pleadings currently before the Court, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff has failed to make the required minimum showing with regard to the state

law claims included in the complaint. Accordingly the Court dismisses without

prejudice Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

II. Defendant Aurora’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(5)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) and (h)(1)(A) allow a plaintiff filing

in this Court to serve a corporation pursuant to the California state law governing

service. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 415.40, a plaintiff

may serve a person outside the state by mailing the summons “to the person to be

served” by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and return receipt requested. Section

416.10(b) provides a corporation is served by delivering a copy of the summons and

complaint to “a person” holding a specific list of corporate offices, including vice

president.

A court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is acquired through proper service of

process. SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Travelers Cas.

& Sur. Co. of Am. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A federal

court is without personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been

served in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.”) (quoting Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d

489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986).

A defendant may bring a motion to dismiss based on insufficient service of

process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of

service of process, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing valid service.

Brockymeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Once service is

challenged, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that service was valid under

Rule 4.”).

Defendant Aurora argues that Plaintiff never properly served the complaint.

Plaintiff addressed the summons and complaint to two former vice presidents, who

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no longer worked for Aurora at the time Plaintiff attempted to perfect service on

Aurora. (See Doc. No. 12-2 (“McCann Decl.”) ¶¶7-8.) These individuals were no

longer agents of Aurora at the time of attempted service, and therefore could not act

as agents of Aurora and accept process. Alan, Sean & Koule, Inc. v. SV/CORSTA

V, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (“One event that conveys notice of

the termination of apparent authority to a third party is the termination of the agent's

employment”). Nor does Plaintiff make any showing that the named individuals,

Carla Wise and Robert Simpson, actually received the summons and complaint.

“Since a corporation can only be served through a person, the person to be

served is always different from the corporation.” Dill v. Berquist Constr. Co., 24

Cal. App. 4th 1426, 1435-36 (1994). Although Plaintiff also addressed the summons

and complaint to “Aurora Loan Services, LLC” a “summons addressed only to a

corporate entity, not directed by name or by title to an individual listed in § 416.10

and not actually received by such person,” will not satisfy the substantial compliance

requirement for service of process. Watts v. Enhanced Recovery Corp., 10-CV02606-LHK, 2010 WL 3448508 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010).

Although plaintiff’s summons and complaint were accepted through Aurora’s

mail intake procedures, the individual who physically signed the return receipt for

this piece of mail was not authorized to accept service of process on behalf of

Aurora. (See McCann Decl. ¶6.) “[T]he fact that a person is authorized to receive

mail on behalf of a corporation and to sign receipts acknowledging the delivery of

that mail does not mean that the same person is authorized by the corporation to

accept service of process.” Dill, 24 Cal. App. 4th at 1438.

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate proper service on Defendant Aurora as

required by California Code of Civil Procedure Section 416.10(b). Therefore, the

Court grants Defendant Aurora’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(5). However, Plaintiff will have an opportunity to file a second

amended complaint and re-serve it to Defendant Aurora within 30 days.

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Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendants Aurora and TFLG’s

motions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The Court grants Plaintiff 30

days from the date of this order to amend or cure the deficiencies–if she can–in a

first amended complaint with respect to Defendant TFLG and to then effect proper

service of the first amended complaint to Defendant Aurora.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 29, 2013

______________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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