Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00900/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00900-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY PAUL HORSTMAN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0900 FCD CMK P

vs.

CHERYL K. PLILER, Warden 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On November 1, 2006, respondent filed a motion

to dismiss petitioner’s application on the grounds that it was filed beyond the one-year statue of

limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and (2). Petitioner filed an opposition to the

motion to dismiss on November 13, 2006.

I. Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. AEDPA places a one year statute of limitations on the filing of

petitions for writs of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year limitations period

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 applies to all federal petitions filed after the effective date of AEDPA. Untimely petitions are

barred from federal review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). As this petition was filed on April 26,

2006, the AEDPA’s statue of limitations applies. 

Generally, a state prisoner challenging his custody has one year to file his federal

petition from the date on which his conviction became final by the conclusion of direct review,

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Although

petitioner’s conviction became final over five years prior to Congress passing the AEDPA,

petitioner was given the benefit of the one-year limitation period after its enactment on April 24,

1996, to file his habeas petition. See Calderon v. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir.

1997). Therefore, petitioner’s limitation period began to run on April 25, 1996. Calculating the

timeliness of the federal petition requires more than simply looking at the date of the final state

court judgment and the date the federal petition was filed. That is because the proper filing of a

state habeas petition application concerning the pertinent conviction tolls the one-year

limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations provision is subject to equitable tolling. 

See United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d at1288, overruled in part on other grounds

by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). In order

to win equitable tolling, a prisoner must demonstrate (1) extraordinary circumstances beyond the

prisoners control that (2) made it impossible to file a petition on time. Miranda v. Castro, 292

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “the threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). This high bar is necessary to effectuate the “AEDPA’s statutory

purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal system from

being forced to hear stale claims.” See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The burden of demonstrating grounds for equitable tolling rests with the prisoner. See id. 

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II. Discussion

Petitioner plead no contest to first-degree murder and admitted the special

allegation that he used a knife during the commission of the crime in September 1991 and was

sentenced to 26 years to life in October 1991. (Resp. Ex. A.) Petitioner did not appeal his

conviction. As noted above, petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the passage of the

AEDPA in 1996. Petitioner was given the full benefit of the one-year period after its enactment

on April 24, 1996 to file a federal habeas petition. See District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1283. 

Accordingly, petitioner’s one year limitation period began to run on April 25, 1996 and, absent

any tolling, his federal petition was due on April 24, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Petitioner filed his first state habeas application on November 5, 1997, nearly

seven months after the one-year limitations period had run. Petitioner’s state habeas application

was denied on May 22, 1998. (Resp. Exs. A and B.) On March 26, 1999, petitioner filed an

amended petition for habeas relief in state court. (Id., Ex. C.) This habeas petition was denied

on August 15, 2000. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandate on July 30, 2001 requesting

transcripts of the evidentiary hearing held on his March 1999 habeas petition, and the superior

court granted that petition on August 16, 2001. (Id., Ex. F.) Petitioner took no further action

until September 24, 2004, when he filed a petition for habeas relief in the California Court of

Appeal, First Appellate District. (Id., Ex. G.) The Court of Appeal denied that petition on

October 1, 2004. (Id.) Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court on

November 24, 2004. (Id., Ex. H.) The Supreme Court denied that petition on December 14,

2005. (Id.) Petitioner filed the instant petition on April 26, 2006. 

In short, petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition within the one-year

statute of limitations—by April 24, 1997. As petitioner did not file a state habeas petition until

nearly seven months after the one-year limitation, he is not entitled to tolling under See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

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Petitioner, however, argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because

extraordinary circumstances justified his delay in filing his state habeas petition. As noted

above, petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

See Guillory, 329 F.3d at 1018. In support of his assertion, petitioner argues that “it was newly

discovered evidence, which was discovered by petitioner while he was diligently pursuing his

appeal” that provides good cause for his delay in filing his federal habeas petition. (Opp’n, 4:12-

19.) He also appears to contend that he had retained an attorney and that his attorney was

preparing his habeas petition between 1995 and September 1997. (Id., 7:4-23.) Petitioner

further states that, in 2000, his attorney failed to file an appeal as promised and refused to answer

any of petitioner’s letters. (Id., 16:23-28; 17:1-25.) 

Despite his lengthy opposition, petitioner has not demonstrated any extraordinary

circumstances which made it impossible for him to file his federal habeas petition by April 24,

1997. Ordinary negligence of counsel, which petitioner appears to assert as the justification for

his delay, does not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. 

See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001); see also, Jurado v. Burt, 337 F.3d

638, 642 (6th Cir. 2003)(petitioner not entitled to equitable tolling of one-year limitations period,

even though counsel undertook extensive investigation and preparatory actions during 19 month

period between affirmance on direct appeal and filing of state habeas petition). Although it is

true that petitioner’s attorney’s failure to file an appeal as promised could constitute egregious

misconduct, which could trigger equitable tolling, this alleged misconduct did not occur until

three years after petitioner’s one-year limitations period had passed. In short, petitioner has not

presented extraordinary circumstances which prevented him from filing his federal habeas

petition within the one year deadline. The court finds that he is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

See Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107, Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d at 1063. 

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s habeas application with prejudice on the grounds that

it was filed beyond the one year statute of limitations be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 9, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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