Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01277/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01277-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. 

Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on August 

6, 2012. Respondent filed an answer on December 31, 2012. Although 

the time for filing a traverse has passed, no traverse was filed.

I. Jurisdiction

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. 

LOUIS TRIMBLE,

 Petitioner,

v.

GARY SWARTOUT,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01277-LJO-SKO-HC

FNDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS AND DENY THE PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1), 

DIRECT THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR 

RESPONDENT, AND DECLINE TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:

THIRTY (30) DAYS

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Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The challenged judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of 

the State of California, County of Merced (MCSC), located within the 

jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84(b), 2254(a), 2241(a), 

(d). Petitioner claims that in the course of the proceedings 

resulting in his conviction, he suffered violations of his 

constitutional rights. The Court concludes it has subject matter 

jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U. S.C. §§ 2254(a) and 

2241(c)(3), which authorize a district court to entertain a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court only on the ground that the custody is in 

violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. 

Corcoran, 562 U.S. - , -, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam). 

An answer was filed on behalf of Respondent Gary Swarthout, 

who, pursuant to the judgment, had custody of Petitioner at his 

institution of confinement when the petition and answer were filed. 

(Doc. 13.) Petitioner thus named as Respondent a person who had

custody of Petitioner within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and 

Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the District 

Courts (Habeas Rules). See, Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 

F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the person of 

the Respondent.

II. Background

A. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted in the MCSC of attempted willful, 

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deliberate, and premeditated murder in violation of Cal. Pen. Code 

§§ 187(a) and 664 (count 1), and attempted robbery in an inhabited 

dwelling house in violation of Cal. Pen. Code §§ 211, 212.5(a) and

664 (count 2) with personal and intentional discharge of a firearm 

proximately causing great bodily injury within the meaning of Cal. 

Pen. Code § 12022.53(d) (count 1 and 2) and a prior battery with 

infliction of serious bodily injury as a serious or violent felony 

or juvenile adjudication within the meaning of Cal. Pen. Code §§ 

243(d), 1170.12(a)-(d), and 1192.7(c)(8) (counts 1 and 2). On 

January 25, 2010, the MCSC imposed a term of life with the 

possibility of parole after fourteen (14) years (double the 

statutory seven-year minimum) on the attempted murder consecutive to 

a term of twenty-five (25) years to life on the accompanying firearm 

enhancement, and imposed and stayed an aggravated term of six years 

(double the statutory three-year term) on the attempted robbery 

consecutive to a term of 25 years to life on the accompanying 

firearm enhancement. People v. Trimble, no. F059703, 2011 WL 

2176906, at *1 (June 6, 2011).

B. Factual Summary

In a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant 

to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue 

made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the 

petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence 

to rebut the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). This 

presumption applies to a statement of facts drawn from a state 

appellate court’s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2009). The following statement of the facts of 

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Petitioner’s case is taken from the opinion of the Court of Appeal 

of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District (CCA) in People 

v. Trimble, case number F059703, filed on June 6, 2011. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Early in the morning on November 5, 2008, Trimble stopped 

by his girlfriend Caydee's motel room in Merced. During 

the year or so she had known him, she had smoked crack 

cocaine with him, slept with him, and, for a month or so, 

lived in his trailer with him. The last time she had slept 

with him was about a week before.

At her motel room that morning, Trimble accused Caydee of 

“messing around” with his cousin Larry. She had never 

slept with him. “You'll get what you deserve,” he said, 

right in front of the manager, “You'll get yours, bitch. 

Watch.” A couple of hours later, he called and told her, 

“Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't mean what I said.” Months before, 

he had told her if she “ever stopped kicking it around” he 

would kill her. Three or four times in the past, he had 

argued with her over his cousin Larry.

Early in the evening on November 5, 2008, Caydee and her 

friends Mark and Anthony stood outside her motel after 

smoking methamphetamine together. Trimble walked from the 

street to the motel, headed toward her room, and offered 

everyone crack cocaine to smoke. After everyone went into 

her room, he checked to make sure the door was locked, 

pointed a gun at her, and said, “This is a robbery.” He 

said he needed $80 to go to Oakland.

Caydee, Mark, and Anthony all said no one had any money. 

Trimble told her he knew she had money. She said, “I don't 

have no money.” He called her a liar, yelled at her again 

for messing around with his cousin Larry, and shot her 

four times. With each shot, he moved closer to her. He 

said, “I'm going to kill you, bitch. I told you I would.” 

He was right in front of her when he shot her the last 

time and told her, “You think I'm playing? You're F-ing 

with my cousin, bitch.” He said he had one more bullet he 

was going to put in her head. He pointed the gun at her 

head and pulled the trigger two or three times, but the 

gun did not fire.

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As Trimble ran to the door, he said, “This is worth seven 

years.” On his way out, he said, “Just remember the Cdog,” referring to his moniker. Shot twice in the stomach, 

once in the shoulder, and once in the leg, Caydee suffered 

a broken collarbone, a broken shoulder blade, and internal 

bleeding in her right chest cavity. Airlifted to a 

hospital in Modesto, she arrived in “very critical” 

condition due to multiple life-threatening gunshot wounds.

Later that evening, a Merced police officer approached 

Trimble on the street and asked him his name. He raised 

his hands in the air and said, “I'm Trimble. I'm the one 

you're looking for.” He had gunshot residue on both of his 

hands.

People v. Trimble, no. F059703, 2011 WL 2176906, at *1-*2 (June 6, 

2011).

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Argument

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when 

he argued to the jury that for Petitioner to be guilty of the lesser 

offense of attempted manslaughter, the shooting had to be 

reasonable. Petitioner contends it is the provocation, and not the 

shooting, that has to be reasonable. Petitioner argues that his 

conviction and the finding of premeditation must be reversed. 

(Pet., doc. 1, 4.)

A. Standard of Decision and Scope of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

 judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as 

distinct from the dicta, of the decisions of the Supreme Court as of 

the time of the relevant state court decision. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011); Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000).

A state court’s decision contravenes clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent if it reaches a legal conclusion opposite 

to, or substantially different from, the Supreme Court's or 

concludes differently on a materially indistinguishable set of 

facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. The state court 

need not have cited Supreme Court precedent or have been aware of 

it, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [it]." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 

(2002). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established 

federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule 

but applies it to a new set of facts in an objectively unreasonable

manner, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal 

principle to a new context in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002); see, 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An application of clearly established 

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federal law is unreasonable only if it is objectively unreasonable; 

an incorrect or inaccurate application is not necessarily 

unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. 

A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 

precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could 

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision. 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Even 

a strong case for relief does not render the state court’s 

conclusions unreasonable. Id. To obtain federal habeas relief, a 

state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on a claim 

was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. 

The § 2254(d) standards are “highly deferential standard[s] for 

evaluating state-court rulings” which require that state court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt, and the Petitioner bear 

the burden of proof. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. 

Habeas relief is not appropriate unless each ground supporting the 

state court decision is examined and found to be unreasonable under 

the AEDPA. Wetzel v. Lambert, -–U.S.--, 132 S.Ct. 1195, 1199 

(2012).

In assessing under section 2254(d)(1) whether the state court’s 

legal conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

federal law, “review... is limited to the record that was before the 

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state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Evidence introduced in federal court 

has no bearing on review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas 

proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of 

a state court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state 

court shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden 

of producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption 

of correctness. A state court decision on the merits based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state proceedings. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 340 (2003). For relief to be granted, a federal habeas court 

must find that the trial court’s factual determination was such that 

a reasonable fact finder could not have made the finding; that 

reasonable minds might disagree with the determination or have a 

basis to question the finding is not sufficient. Rice v. Collins, 

546 U.S. 333, 340-42 (2006). 

To conclude that a state court finding is unsupported by 

substantial evidence, a federal habeas court must be convinced that 

an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate 

review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported 

by the record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 

2004). To determine that a state court’s fact finding process is 

defective in some material way or non-existent, a federal habeas 

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court must be satisfied that an appellate court would be 

unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact finding process 

was adequate. Id. at 1000.

With respect to each claim, the last reasoned decision must be 

identified to analyze the state court decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 

2005); Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2003). Where 

there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal 

claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting 

the same claim are presumed to rest upon the same ground. Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).

Where the state court decides an issue on the merits which is 

not accompanied by an explanation, a habeas petitioner burden must 

show there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784. This Court 

should then perform an independent review of the record to ascertain 

whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable. 

Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 863 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. 

denied, 552 U.S. 1316 (2008); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 

(9th Cir. 2003). Independent review is not the equivalent of de

novo review; the Court must still defer to the state court’s 

ultimate decision. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 

2002).

However, the deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies only to 

claims that have been resolved on the merits by the state court. If 

a claim was not decided on the merits, this Court must review it de

novo. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir. 2004); Lewis 

v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2004). The deferential 

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standard of § 2254(d) sets a substantially higher threshold for 

relief than does the standard of de novo review, which requires 

relief for an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law. 

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).

B. The State Court’s Decision

The decision of the CCA on direct appeal was left undisturbed 

by the decision of the California Supreme Court (CSC) to deny 

review. (LD 10-LD 11; ord. summarily denying petn. for rev., People 

v. Trimble, case no. S194041, dated August 10, 2011.)1 The CCA’s 

decision was thus the last reasoned decision in which the state 

court adjudicated Petitioner’s claims on the merits. This Court 

will thus “look through” the unexplained decision of the CSC to the 

CCA’s last reasoned decision as the relevant state court 

determination. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803-04; Taylor v. 

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 998 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004).

The decision of the CCA is in pertinent part as follows: 

1. Jury Argument

Trimble argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in 

argument to the jury. The Attorney General argues the 

contrary.

The crux of Trimble's argument is that the prosecutor's 

bid to persuade the jury that he committed an attempted 

murder, rather than an attempted voluntary manslaughter, 

 

1

The Court takes judicial notice of the docket as posted on the official website 

pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 

333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 

999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the docket 

sheet of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010), 

cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010). The address of the official website of the 

California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov.

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focused on the reasonableness of his response to the 

provocation. Arguing that “there's no sudden quarrel or 

heat of passion,” the prosecutor urged the jury to “look 

at how the defendant responded to his belief that Caydee, 

a prostitute, had had sex with his cousin Larry. That's 

what you have to do.”

“And then if you think that's how an ordinary, average 

person would react to the situation, then this is the 

lesser included offense for you people,” the prosecutor 

went on. “If you think that his actions were appropriate 

under that circumstance where you find out that his cousin 

Larry was sleeping with somebody or cousin Larry was 

sleeping with Caydee and the appropriate thing is to go 

get a gun and go to the motel room and rob her and shoot 

her, then this is the jury instruction that you want. I 

submit to you that that's ridiculous.” Trimble's attorney 

objected and characterized the prosecutor's argument as “a 

misstatement of the law.” The court instructed the jurors 

“that if what counsel argues conflicts with the Court” 

they “are to follow what the Court instructs them,” 

informed the jurors “they will get a copy of the 

instructions,” and overruled the objection.

After characterizing his own comments as “condensed down 

of what the law says,” the prosecutor quoted CALCRIM No. 

603 (“Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—

Lesser Included Offense”) on the jury's duty, in 

determining whether the provocation was sufficient, to 

“consider whether an ordinary person of average 

disposition would have been provoked and how such a person 

would react in the same situation knowing the same facts.”

On that record, Trimble argues that “the prosecutor 

misstated the law.” We disagree. After asking the jury to 

“look at how the defendant responded to his belief that 

Caydee, a prostitute, had had sex with his cousin Larry,” 

the prosecutor emphasized that Trimble “cannot create his 

own provocation.” (Italics added.) “Would it be 

reasonable,” he asked, “for a man to accuse a woman of 

sleeping with someone else and then, based on that, go and 

shoot her and try to kill her just because of some wild 

speculations that she's having sex with another man?” 

(Italics added.) “You must consider,” he argued, “whether 

an ordinary person of average disposition would have been 

provoked and how such a person would react in the same 

situation.” (Italics added.)

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A person kills on sudden quarrel or heat of passion if a 

provocation that was sufficient to cause an ordinary 

person of average disposition to act rashly and without 

deliberation obscured his or her reason. (People v. 

Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163 (Breverman).) The 

primary authority on which Trimble relies, People v. 

Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 (Najera), applies 

the rule of law in Breverman and notes, “The focus is on 

the provocation—the surrounding circumstances—and whether 

it was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to act 

rashly. How the killer responded to the provocation and 

the reasonableness of the response is not relevant to 

sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Id. at p. 223.) Here, 

the prosecutor argued that Trimble's wild speculations

could not let him create his own provocation since the 

jury's responsibility was to “consider whether an ordinary 

person of average disposition would have been provoked and 

how such a person would react in the same situation 

knowing the same facts.” Trimble's reliance on Najera is 

misplaced.

The question in a prosecutorial misconduct claim focusing 

on a prosecutor's comments to a jury is whether there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury applied or construed 

any of those comments in an objectionable fashion. (People 

v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) The appellate 

court's duty is to view those comments in the context of 

the prosecutor's argument as a whole. (People v. Lucas

(1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 475.) A prosecutor's argument is an 

advocate's point of view that generally carries less 

weight with a jury than a court's instruction, which is a 

binding and definitive statement of the law. (Boyde v. 

California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 384–385.) So an appellate 

court will not infer lightly a jury drew a damaging 

inference from a single comment in a prosecutor's entire 

exhortation. (Id. at p. 385.) After the prosecutor's 

argument, the court instructed the jury, “You must follow 

the law as I explain it to you, even if you disagree with 

it. If you believe the attorneys' comments on the law 

conflict with my instructions, you must follow my 

instructions.” (CALCRIM No. 200.) “We presume that jurors 

understand and follow the court's instructions.” (People 

v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 231 (Gray).) By the 

applicable standard of review, the record persuades us 

that the jury did not apply or construe any of the 

prosecutor's comments in an objectionable fashion.

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People v. Trimble, 2011 WL 2176906, at *2-*4.

C. Analysis

A prosecutor’s improper remarks violate the Constitution only 

if they so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process. Parker v. Matthews, – U.S. -, 

132 S.Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012) (per curiam); see Darden v. Wainwright, 

477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 960, 988 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Prosecutorial misconduct deprives the defendant of a 

fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause if it prejudicially 

affects the substantial rights of a defendant. United States v. 

Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1539 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982)). The standard of review of 

claims concerning prosecutorial misconduct in § 2254 proceedings is 

the narrow standard of due process, and not the broad standard that 

applies in the exercise of supervisory power; improper argument does 

not, per se, violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. Mancuso 

v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Thompson v. 

Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1996)). This Court must 

determine whether the alleged misconduct has rendered a trial 

fundamentally unfair, Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 183, and 

whether the prosecutor’s actions constituted misconduct which 

violated Petitioner’s right to due process of law. Drayden v. 

White, 232 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir. 2000).

To grant habeas relief, this Court must also conclude that the 

state court’s rejection of the prosecutorial misconduct claim “was 

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

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fairminded disagreement.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 

(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 767-87). The standard 

of Darden v. Wainwright is a very general one that leaves courts 

with more leeway in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 

determinations. Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In determining 

whether remarks in argument rendered a trial fundamentally unfair, a 

court must judge the remarks in the context of the entire proceeding 

to determine whether the argument influenced the jury’s decision. 

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 385 (1990); Darden v. Wainwright, 

477 U.S. at 179-82. In Darden, the Court considered whether the 

prosecutor manipulated or misstated evidence, whether specific 

rights of the accused were implicated, the context of the remarks in 

light of both parties’ arguments, the instructions given by the 

trial court, and the weight of the evidence. Darden, 477 U.S. at 

179-82.

Here, to the extent that the state court interpreted or applied 

state law concerning the substantive law of homicide, this Court is 

bound by the state court’s decision, and any error under state law 

provides no basis for relief in this proceeding. Federal habeas 

relief is not available to retry a state issue that does not rise to 

the level of a federal constitutional violation. Wilson v.

Corcoran, 131 S.Ct. at 16; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 

(1991). Alleged errors in the application of state law are not 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 

616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court accepts a state court's 

interpretation of state law. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1180, 1389

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(9th Cir. 1996). This Court is, therefore, bound by the state 

court’s statement of the elements of voluntary manslaughter. 

With respect to the federal issue, the CCA stated a legal 

standard consistent with the foregoing federal standards. The state 

court’s decision that there was no prejudicial misconduct on the 

part of the prosecutor was objectively reasonable. The state court 

viewed the challenged statements in the context of the entire 

argument. Although the prosecutor made reference to the 

Petitioner’s response to the provocation, he then focused on the 

nature of the provocation, reiterated the instruction on 

provocation, and directed the jury to consider how an ordinary 

person would react to the situation to determine if the provocation 

was sufficient. 

The state court also considered the instructions given. Both 

before closing argument and after Petitioner’s counsel objected, the 

court instructed the jury that if counsel’s statements conflicted 

with the court’s instructions, the jury was to follow the court’s 

instructions. (LD 5, 3 RT 512-13, 564-65.) The jury was also 

instructed that nothing the attorneys said was evidence. (3 RT 

515.) The jury was instructed on the elements of attempted murder 

and attempted voluntary manslaughter (3 RT 528-32, 537-39) and that 

the prosecution had the burden of proving each element beyond a 

reasonable doubt (3 RT 514-15, 523, 532, 534-35). Federal courts 

presume that juries follow instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 

U.S. 225, 234 (2000). A fairminded jurist could conclude that the 

jurors followed the instructions, which were authoritative. See

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. at 384-85. 

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To the extent there was any transient uncertainty created by 

the prosecutor’s remarks, the arguments of advocates are somewhat 

improvisational and must not be unduly restrained. “Counsel are 

given latitude in the presentation of closing arguments, and courts 

must allow the prosecution to strike hard blows based on the 

evidence presented and all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ceja 

v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United 

States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1415 (9th Cir. 1993)). A reviewing 

court should consider challenged remarks in light of the realistic 

nature of closing arguments at trial. “Because ‘improvisation 

frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than 

crystal clear,’ ‘a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor 

intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or 

that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that 

meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.’” 

Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).

In sum, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s 

claim that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct in 

argument that resulted in fundamental unfairness.

IV. Instruction on Voluntary Manslaughter

Petitioner argues that CALCRIM 603, the instruction on 

voluntary or “heat-of-passion” manslaughter, was confusing and

misleading because it suggested that the response to provocation 

must be reasonable, and it was reasonably likely that the jury 

interpreted the instruction in such a manner. (Pet., doc. 1, 4-5.)

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A. The State Court’s Decision

The decision of the CCA on direct appeal was left undisturbed 

by the CSC’s denial of review. (LD 10-LD 11.) The decision of the 

CCA on the issue is as follows:

2. CALCRIM No. 603

Trimble argues that CALCRIM No. 603 improperly suggests 

that a response to provocation be reasonable. The Attorney 

General argues the contrary.

The fundamental problem with CALCRIM No. 603, Trimble 

argues, is that the instruction “says opposite things at 

the same time.” He acknowledges the initial focus on the 

provocative acts of the victim “correctly informs the 

jury” provocation would have caused a “person of average 

disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, 

that is, from passion rather than from judgment.” He 

argues, however, that the instruction errs by stating, “It 

is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked,” and 

by requiring the jury to “consider whether a person of 

average disposition would have been provoked and how such 

a person would react in the same situation knowing the 

same facts.”

Contrary to Trimble's argument, CALCRIM No. 603 correctly 

tracks the law of provocation and heat of passion. The 

factor that distinguishes voluntary manslaughter in the 

heat of passion from murder is provocation. (People v. Lee

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59.) Just as the provocation must 

“cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act 

rashly or without due deliberation and reflection,” so the 

cause of the provocation must be either the victim or the 

conduct in which the defendant reasonably believed the 

victim was engaged. (Ibid.) The law requires no specific 

type of provocation. (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 

101, 108.)

Heat of passion arises when passion so disturbs or 

obscures the defendant's reason at the time of the killing 

or attempted killing as to cause the ordinarily reasonable 

person of average disposition to act rashly, without 

deliberation and reflection, and from passion rather than 

from judgment. (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 

201.) The passion the provocation causes may be any 

violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion 

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other than revenge. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 

163.) The legal requirement of heat of passion has both an 

objective and a subjective component. (People v. Steele

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252.) Just as, objectively, heat 

of passion must naturally arise in the mind of an 

ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and

circumstances, so, subjectively, the defendant must 

actually kill or attempt to kill on heat of passion. 

(Ibid.) CALCRIM No. 603, rather than saying “opposite 

things at the same time,” correctly incorporates both the 

objective and the subjective components of heat of 

passion. “We presume that jurors understand and follow the 

court's instructions.” (Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 

231.)

On a challenge for ambiguity, our duty is to view the 

instruction at issue in the context of the overall charge 

to the jury, rather than in artificial isolation, to 

determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 

the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction. 

(People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 777.) Our 

review of the record satisfies us there is no reasonable 

likelihood that the jury misunderstood or misapplied 

CALCRIM No. 603 .FN2

FN2. Our holding moots the Attorney General's 

forfeiture and invited error arguments.

People v. Trimble, 2011 WL 2176906, at *4-*5.

B. Analysis

Insofar as Petitioner’s claim rests on the California court’s 

definitions of provocation and heat of passion, or any other precept 

of state law, Petitioner is not entitled to relief in this 

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(a); Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d at 623. 

With respect to Petitioner’s claim of fundamental unfairness 

resulting from a perceived error in jury instructions, the only 

basis for federal collateral relief for instructional error is that 

the infirm instruction or the lack of instruction by itself so 

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 

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147 (1973); see Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 643 (it must 

be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, 

erroneous or even “universally condemned,” but that it violated some 

right guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment). The 

instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation; it must be 

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the 

trial record. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. It must be determined 

whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied 

the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72-73 (reaffirming the standard as stated in 

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). The Court in 

Estelle emphasized that the Court has defined the category of 

infractions that violate fundamental fairness very narrowly, and 

that beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of 

Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. Id. at 72-73.

Even if there is instructional error, a petitioner is generally 

not entitled to habeas relief for the error unless it is 

prejudicial. To determine whether a petitioner pursuant to § 2254 

suffered prejudice from an instructional error, a federal court must 

determine whether a petitioner suffered actual prejudice by 

assessing whether, in light of the record as a whole, the error had 

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 62 (2008); Brecht 

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993).

Here, this Court is bound by the state court’s determination of 

the governing law of provocation and heat of passion. The 

instruction as given was correct. There was nothing in the 

circumstances attending the trial proceedings that would suggest the 

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existence of any basis for concluding that despite the accuracy of 

the instructions, the jury was confused. The state court’s decision 

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s claim of a fundamentally unfair instruction.

V. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel regarding

 Jury Instruction

Petitioner alleges his right to the effective assistance of 

counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was 

violated by trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction that 

relates provocation to the absence of premeditation. (Pet., doc. 1, 

5.) 

A. The State Court’s Decision

The last reasoned decision on this issue is the CCA’s decision 

on direct appeal, which was left undisturbed when the CSC denied 

review. The CCA’s decision in pertinent part is as follows:

3. Assistance of Counsel

Trimble argues that his attorney rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel by not requesting an instruction on 

provocation and the absence of premeditation. The Attorney 

General argues the contrary.

Since a court has no sua sponte duty to give a pinpoint 

instruction like the one Trimble puts at issue, he 

challenges the absence of that instruction on the ground 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Rogers

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 877–878 (Rogers); People v. 

Middleton (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 30–33, disapproved on 

another ground by People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 

745, 752, fn. 3.) The right to counsel protects the due 

process right to a fair trial by guaranteeing “access to 

counsel's skill and knowledge” and implementing the 

constitutional entitlement to an “‘ample opportunity to 

meet the case of the prosecution.’” (Strickland v. 

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Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684–686 (Strickland).) To 

establish ineffective assistance, the defendant must show 

that counsel's performance both “fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness” and prejudiced the defense. 

(Id. at pp. 687–692; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 

171, 216–217 (Ledesma).) To establish prejudice, the 

defendant must show a “reasonable probability” “sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome” that but for 

counsel's performance “the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” (Strickland, supra, at pp. 693–694; 

Ledesma, supra, at pp. 217–218.) A reviewing court can 

adjudicate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

solely on the issue of prejudice without evaluating 

counsel's performance. (Strickland, supra, at p. 697 .) We 

do so here.

Our analysis begins with other instructions on mental 

state. One was CALCRIM No. 600 (“Attempted Murder”), 

authorizing the jury to find Trimble guilty of attempted 

murder only on proof that he “intended to kill” Caydee, 

and another was CALCRIM No. 601 (“Attempted Murder: 

Deliberation and Premeditation”), elaborating on 

deliberation and premeditation: “If you find the defendant 

guilty of Attempted Murder under Count 1, you must then 

decide whether the People have proved the additional 

allegation that the Attempted Murder was done willfully, 

and with deliberation and premeditation. [¶] The defendant 

acted willfully if he intended to kill when he acted. The 

defendant deliberated if he carefully weighed the 

considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the 

consequences, decided to kill. The defendant premeditated 

if he decided to kill before acting. [¶] The length of 

time the person spends considering whether to kill does 

not alone determine whether the attempted killing is 

deliberate and premeditated.” As the instruction noted, 

“The test is the extent of the reflection, not the length 

of time.”

Additionally, the charge to the jury included CALCRIM No. 

603 (“Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—

Lesser Included Offense”) elaborating on provocation (cf. 

ante, part 2): “An attempted killing that would otherwise 

be attempted murder is reduced to Attempted Voluntary 

Manslaughter if the defendant attempted to kill someone 

because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. [¶] 

The defendant attempted to kill someone because of a 

sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if: [¶] 1. The 

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defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step 

toward killing a person; [¶] 2. The defendant intended to 

kill that person; [¶] 3. The defendant attempted the 

killing because he was provoked; [¶] 4. The provocation 

would have caused a person of average disposition to act 

rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion 

rather than from judgment; [¶] AND [¶] 5. The attempted 

killing was a rash act done under the influence of intense 

emotion that obscured the defendant's reasoning or 

judgment. [¶] Heat of passion does not require anger, 

rage, or any specific emotion. It can be any violent or 

intense emotion that causes a person to act without due 

deliberation and reflection. [¶] In order for heat of 

passion to reduce an attempted murder to attempted 

voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted 

under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as 

I have defined it. While no specific type of provocation 

is required, slight or remote provocation is not 

sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short 

or long period of time. [¶] It is not enough that the 

defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not 

allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. You must 

decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the 

provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether the 

provocation was sufficient, consider whether an ordinary 

person of average disposition would have been provoked and 

how such a person would react in the same situation 

knowing the same facts. [¶] If enough time passed between 

the provocation and the attempted killing for an ordinary 

person of average disposition to ‘cool off’ and regain his 

or her clear reasoning and judgment, then the attempted 

murder is not reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter 

on this basis.”

On that record, Trimble suggests CALCRIM No. 522 

(“Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder”) as the 

instruction his attorney should have requested on 

provocation and the absence of premeditation: “Provocation 

may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree and 

may reduce a murder to manslaughter. The weight and 

significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to 

decide. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed 

murder but was provoked, consider the provocation in 

deciding whether the crime was first or second degree 

murder. Also, consider the provocation in deciding whether 

the defendant committed murder or manslaughter.” Arguing 

there was no need for CALCRIM No. 522, the Attorney 

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General notes that the instruction “is primarily concerned 

with the effect of provocation on the degree of murder” 

but “could have been modified” to inform the jury that 

“provocation may reduce an attempted murder to an 

attempted manslaughter.”

The crux of Trimble's argument is that although 

“provocation was the only defense offered” the 

instructions did not authorize the jury to “consider 

provocation on the separate premeditation allegation.” The 

Attorney General argues that the charge to the jury 

adequately covered provocation and premeditation. We 

agree. Our Supreme Court has rejected an argument like 

Trimble's involving CALJIC instructions analogous to the 

CALCRIM instructions here (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 

880): “[T]he standard manslaughter instruction is not 

misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation 

and deliberation is the factor distinguishing first and 

second degree murder. Further, the manslaughter 

instruction does not preclude the defense from arguing 

that provocation played a role in preventing the defendant 

from premeditating and deliberating; nor does it preclude 

the jury from giving weight to any evidence of provocation 

in determining whether premeditation existed.”

Here, as Trimble argues, his attorney “relied exclusively 

on the provocation defense at trial,” as his closing 

argument to the jury shows. In addition, the jury found 

true the allegation that the attempted murder he committed 

“was willful, deliberate and premeditated.” By making that 

finding, the jury necessarily rejected his defense that 

provocation negated deliberation and premeditation. The 

requisite showing of prejudice is lacking since the record 

shows no reasonable probability that, even if his attorney 

had requested CALCRIM No. 522, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. (Strickland, supra, 

466 U.S. at p. 697.) His ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument is meritless.

 

People v. Trimble, 2011 WL 2176906, at *5-*7.

B. Analysis

The law governing claims concerning ineffective assistance of 

counsel is clearly established for the purposes of the AEDPA 

deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d). Premo v.

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Moore, 131 S.Ct. at 737-38; Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 n.2 

(9th Cir. 1998).

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in violation 

of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a convicted defendant must 

show that 1) counsel=s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms in 

light of all the circumstances of the particular case; and 2) unless 

prejudice is presumed, it is reasonably probable that, but for 

counsel=s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); 

Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994).

With respect to this Court’s review of a state court’s decision 

concerning a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme 

Court has set forth the standard of decision as follows:

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel “a 

defendant must show both deficient performance by counsel 

and prejudice.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. ––,––,129 

S.Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). In addressing 

this standard and its relationship to AEDPA, the Court 

today in Richter, –– U.S., at –– – ––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 

gives the following explanation:

“To establish deficient performance, a person 

challenging a conviction must show that 

‘counsel's representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.’ 

[Strickland,] 466 U.S., at 688 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. 

A court considering a claim of ineffective 

assistance must apply a ‘strong presumption’ 

that counsel's representation was within the 

‘wide range’ of reasonable professional 

assistance. Id., at 689 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. The 

challenger's burden is to show ‘that counsel 

made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’ Id., at 687 

[104 S.Ct. 2052].

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“With respect to prejudice, a challenger must 

demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.’ 

...

“ ‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an 

easy task.’ Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ––, ––

[130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284] (2010). 

An ineffective-assistance claim can function as 

a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture 

and raise issues not presented at trial [or in 

pretrial proceedings], and so the Strickland

standard must be applied with scrupulous care, 

lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the 

integrity of the very adversary process the 

right to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 

466 U.S., at 689–690 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. Even 

under de novo review, the standard for judging 

counsel's representation is a most deferential 

one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the 

attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew 

of materials outside the record, and interacted 

with the client, with opposing counsel, and with 

the judge. It is ‘all too tempting’ to ‘secondguess counsel's assistance after conviction or 

adverse sentence.’ Id., at 689 [104 S.Ct. 2052]; 

see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 

S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Lockhart v. 

Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 

L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The question is whether an 

attorney's representation amounted to 

incompetence under ‘prevailing professional 

norms,’ not whether it deviated from best 

practices or most common custom. Strickland, 466 

U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

“Establishing that a state court's application 

of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) 

is all the more difficult. The standards created 

by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly 

deferential,’ id., at 689 [104 S.Ct. 2052]; 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7, 117 

S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and when the 

two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so, 

Knowles, 556 U.S., at ––––, 129 S.Ct., at 1420. 

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The Strickland standard is a general one, so the 

range of reasonable applications is substantial. 

556 U.S., at –––– [129 S.Ct., at 1420]. Federal 

habeas courts must guard against the danger of 

equating unreasonableness under Strickland with 

unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) 

applies, the question is not whether counsel's 

actions were reasonable. The question is whether 

there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.”

Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. at 739-40 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 

131 S.Ct. 770).

This Court is bound by the state court’s determination that the 

jury was correctly instructed. The record supports the state 

court’s finding that Petitioner’s counsel was permitted to argue 

that Petitioner acted in a rash manner without due deliberation (3 

RT 578, 575-80) and that the conduct that resulted from provocation 

was not performed with the requisite state of mind required for 

attempted murder (3 RT 575-80, 584-92). In light of the defense 

argument and the common sense notion that provocation is the sort of 

phenomenon that would affect how deliberate and premeditated a 

subsequent action was, it is not persuasive to assert that the trier 

of fact would not understand it could consider circumstances of 

provocation in determining whether or not Petitioner’s action was 

the product of premeditation and deliberation. The jury 

instructions given permitted the jury to consider not only whether 

provocation mitigated intent to kill, but also whether it negated 

premeditation and deliberation. The jury rejected the provocation 

defense with respect to negation of both malice and premeditation. 

The evidence of threatening to kill the victim earlier in the day as 

well as planning and arming strongly supports the jury’s verdict 

that Petitioner committed a premeditated, deliberate, and 

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intentional attempt to kill. The state court properly concluded 

that counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint instruction on 

provocation’s relationship with premeditation and deliberation was 

neither objectively unreasonable nor prejudicial. Cf. James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s claim that his counsel was incompetent for failing to 

request a pinpoint instruction relating provocation and 

premeditation. 

VI. Trial Court’s Response to Jury’s Question

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

respond adequately and correctly to the jury’s question about 

premeditation. (Pet., doc. 1, 5.)

A. The State Court’s Decision

The CSC left undisturbed the CCA’s decision on this claim that

issued on direct appeal. The pertinent portion of the CCA’s 

decision is as follows:

4. Jury Request

Trimble argues that the court's failure to elaborate on 

the law after the jury requested clarification of 

premeditation prejudiced him. The Attorney General argues 

the contrary.

After deliberating for over an hour and a half, the jury 

sent the court the request, “Clarification on the law: If 

someone goes to rob someone else and commits a shooting, 

is the shooting considered premeditated?” The court read 

the request to both counsel and asked if either had “any 

objection to stating, ‘Please refer to the jury 

instructions'?” Both replied, “No.” The court answered the 

jury's question as agreed.

Trimble's opening brief argues the court violated section 

1138 by failing to ensure that the jury understood the 

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law.FN3 (See People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 96–

97.) The Attorney General argues Trimble forfeited his 

right to appeal the issue by failing to object. (See 

People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 729, disapproved 

on another ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 

390, 421, fn. 22 [“When a trial court decides to respond 

to a jury's note, counsel's silence waives any objection 

under section 1138.”]) With commendable candor, Trimble's 

reply brief acknowledges the Attorney General's response 

“appears to be correct” but argues, for the first time, 

his attorney's silence was ineffective assistance of 

counsel. To raise an issue for the first time in a reply 

brief is to waive the issue on appeal. (Campos v. Anderson

(1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.)

FN3. Section 1138 provides: “After the jury have 

retired for deliberation, if there be any 

disagreement between them as to the testimony, 

or if they desire to be informed on any point of 

law arising in the case, they must require the 

officer to conduct them into court. Upon being 

brought into court, the information required 

must be given in the presence of, or after 

notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the 

defendant or his counsel, or after they have

been called.”

Even so, to obviate possible later litigation of Trimble's 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we choose, in 

the interest of judicial efficiency, to address his 

argument. (People v. Williams (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 649, 

657, citing, e.g., People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 

799, 831.) Again we do so solely on the issue of prejudice 

without evaluating counsel's performance. (Strickland, 

supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) The evidence of Trimble's 

guilt of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated 

murder was overwhelming. The court adequately instructed 

the jury on premeditation. The jury asked no other 

questions about premeditation. To establish prejudice, 

Trimble must show a “reasonable probability” “sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome” that but for 

counsel's performance “the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” (Strickland, supra, at pp. 693–694; 

Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217–218.) Since the 

record shows no reasonable probability that, even if the 

court had elaborated on the law, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different, the requisite 

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showing of prejudice is lacking. (Strickland, supra, 466 

U.S. at p. 697.) His ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument is meritless.

People v. Trimble, 2011 WL 2176906, at *7-*8.

B. Analysis

Although Petitioner’s claim may have been subject to procedural 

default in state court, Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim 

is nevertheless subject to denial because it is not colorable. 

In a habeas case, the issue of procedural bar need not be 

resolved if another issue is capable of being resolved against the 

petitioner. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997). 

Likewise, the procedural default issue, which may necessitate 

determinations concerning cause and miscarriage of justice, may be 

more complex than the underlying issues in the case. In such 

circumstances, it may make more sense to proceed to the merits. See

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, because Petitioner also asserts ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on counsel’s failure to challenge the court’s response 

to the jury question, the Court will proceed to the merits of 

Petitioner’s claim. 

As previously set forth, Petitioner’s claim of inadequate or 

erroneous instruction of the jury warrants relief only if the 

instructions so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. The 

totality of the instructions are considered in light of the trial 

record in determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 

the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that 

violates the Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72-73.

///

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These standards apply in the context of a court’s response to a 

jury’s question concerning application of the law to specific facts. 

In Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 232-33 (2000), a capital case, 

the court considered the adequacy of instructions given to the jury 

regarding consideration of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase 

and the sufficiency of the court’s response to a jury’s question

concerning application of the instructions to specific facts. The 

Court held that the Constitution was satisfied by the trial court’s 

legally adequate instruction on the law and then directing the 

jury’s attention to the portion of the instruction that related to 

their question. Id. at 234. The Court relied on the presumptions 

that jurors follow instructions and they understand a judge’s answer 

to a question. Id. at 234. The Court noted that the presumption 

was unrebutted because after the jury received the response to its 

question, it continued to deliberate without any indication of any 

continuing misunderstanding or confusion. Id.

Here, the jury had been instructed correctly on the law of 

homicide, including murder, voluntary manslaughter, premeditation 

and deliberation, provocation, and the relationship among them. 

When faced with a question regarding a specific application of the 

law to the facts, the trial court acted in conformity with Supreme 

Court precedent by directing the jury to the law that corresponded 

with their question. (3 RT 611-12.) After the Court answered the 

jury’s question, the jury continued to deliberate without any 

indication that there was continued misunderstanding, confusion, or 

other need for information. There was no objection by Petitioner’s 

counsel to the court’s handling of the question. The record 

reflects that the jury understood the answer and proceeded to 

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deliberate in accordance with the instructions.

In sum, there is no showing of an instructional inadequacy that 

rendered Petitioner’s trial unfair. Whether the claim is judged 

under the deferential standard of § 2254(d) or under the more 

demanding standard of de novo review, Petitioner has not shown a 

violation of his right to a fair trial. Cf. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 

556 U.S. 111, 123-24 (2009). Accordingly, it will be recommended 

that the Court deny Petitioner’s claim concerning the trial court’s 

response to the juror’s question.

VII. Cumulative Error

Petitioner alleges that the cumulative errors set forth above 

deprived him of his right to due process of law protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment because they confused the jury regarding key 

elements of provocation, premeditation, and manslaughter. (Pet., 

doc. 1, 6.) 

A. The State Court’s Decision

The CSC’s denial of review left undisturbed the CCA’s decision 

on direct appeal on this issue, which was the last reasoned state 

court decision. The pertinent part of the CCA’s decision is as 

follows:

5. Cumulative Error

Trimble argues that reversal of the judgment is imperative 

since the cumulative impact of individual errors was 

prejudicial. The Attorney General argues the contrary. 

Since Trimble fails to persuade us that any error 

occurred, his cumulative error argument is meritless. 

(People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 982.)

People v. Trimble, 2011 WL 2176906, at *8.

///

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B. Analysis

The Supreme Court has established that the combined effect of 

multiple trial court errors violates due process where it renders 

the resulting criminal trial fundamentally unfair, even though no 

single error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or 

would independently warrant reversal. Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 

922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 

284, 298, 302-03 (1973)). Traditional principles of due process 

provide that cumulative errors warrant habeas relief only where the 

errors have so infected the trial with unfairness that the resulting 

conviction denies due process, such as where the combined effect of 

the errors had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on 

the jury=s verdict, id. (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 

637, 643 (1974) and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)), 

and where the combined effect of individually harmless errors 

renders a criminal defense far less persuasive than it might 

otherwise have been, id. (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 302-03).

Here, the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt of the offense is very 

strong. Petitioner was given the benefit of a defense that was

fully argued and submitted to jurors who were properly instructed on 

the law. Petitioner has not shown how any error or combination of 

errors has interfered with Petitioner’s defense or had a substantial 

or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. See Parle 

v. Runnels, 505 F.3d at 927-28. Accordingly, it will be recommended 

that the Court deny Petitioner’s claim of a denial of due process 

from cumulative error.

///

///

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VIII. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in Failing

 to Investigate Witnesses

Petitioner alleges he suffered the ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel when counsel failed to investigate the victim, Mark 

Serrano, the witnesses at the motel, and an expert witness; 

permitted the jury to view Petitioner in chains; and failed to set 

forth an unspecified defense or defenses. (Pet, doc. 1, 6.)

Respondent disputes Petitioner’s allegations that Petitioner 

exhausted state court remedies as to these claims. Respondent 

argues that although these claims are unexhausted, they are 

nevertheless subject to denial because they are not colorable 

claims. 

Although generally a habeas petitioner will not be afforded 

relief in the courts unless he has exhausted available state

judicial and administrative remedies, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 

475, 494-95 (1973), a court may reach the merits of a claim even in 

the absence of exhaustion where it is clear the claim is not 

colorable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the 

applicant’s failure to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

of the state); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987); 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court 

will proceed to analyze Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims.

///

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A. The State Court’s Decision

The last reasoned decision on these claims is that of the MCSC,

which in ruling on a petition for writ of habeas corpus rejected 

Petitioner’s claims in pertinent part as follows:

On May 23, 2012, petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in this Court alleging the following two 

grounds for relief: (1) that his trial defense counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate and prepare a 

defense; and (2) that his request to represent himself was 

denied in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the United States Constitution and Faretta v. 

California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.

Ground 1 of the petition alleges several claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. To show a denial of the 

right to effective assistance of counsel, petitioner must 

show: (1) that counsel’s performance was below an 

objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms; and (2) that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant. (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 691-692 (Strickland); 

People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.) To show 

prejudice, a defendant has the burden of showing, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that there is a reasonable 

probability he or she would have received a more favorable 

result had his or her counsel’s performance not been 

deficient. (Strickland, supra, at pp. 693-694; People v. 

Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 218.) 

“When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is 

whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the 

errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt 

respecting guilt.” (Strickland, supra, at p. 695.) “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” (In re Avena (1996) 

12 Cal.4th 694, 721.)

Even if this Court assumed, without making a finding, that 

the instances of ineffective assistance of counsel cited 

by petitioner constituted ineffective assistance, it is 

not reasonably probable that petitioner would have 

received a more favorable result than the jury’s verdict 

of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder

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and attempted robbery in an inhabited dwelling house. 

(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694.) Petitioner 

has not satisfied the second prong of the Strickland test 

and therefore was not denied his constitutional right to 

effective assistance of counsel. (Strickland, supra, at 

pp. 687, 691-692.)

(LD 14, 2-4.)

B. Investigation

Petitioner’s allegation of failure to investigate is not 

supported by specific facts as to the nature and extent of any 

investigation undertaken, or that should have been undertaken, by 

counsel. 

There is no showing of what information or testimony any 

witness at the motel would have contributed. Petitioner has also 

failed to show what additional information would have been 

discovered during an investigation of victim Caydee Mawhorr or 

witness Mark Serrano, whom trial counsel effectively cross-examined. 

(LD 3, 1 RT 178-201 [cross-examination of the victim concerning her 

opportunity to perceive, perceptions, and memory, including detailed 

questioning concerning her physical condition and ingestion of

alcohol and illicit substances at and near the time of the offenses 

and impeachment with respect to specific testimony]; LD 4, 2 RT 341-

49 [cross-examination of witness Mark Serrano concerning his 

relationship with the parties, ingestion of drugs and alcohol at the 

time of the offenses, repeated failures to appear in court, and a 

prior identification ].) The record permits an inference that 

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defense counsel had received evidence in advance of trial, such as 

photographs of the victim, and had received the criminal histories 

of Petitioner and witness Serrano. (LD 3, 1 RT 54-59.) 

Petitioner has also failed to show that any such investigation 

or testimony would have been reasonably likely to have made a 

difference in the outcome of the trial. Finally, Petitioner has 

failed to show what expert witnesses should have been called, what 

their testimony might have been, and whether they would have 

testified on behalf of the defense. The Court is left to speculate 

as to all these matters, which is insufficient to establish 

prejudice. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 

2001) (failure to retain an arson expert was not shown to be 

prejudicial where there was no evidence that the expert would have 

testified on the petitioner’s behalf). 

The evidence against Petitioner was very strong. Petitioner’s 

repeated threats and planning warranted a conclusion that the 

homicide was not committed under the influence of intense emotion 

that obscured Petitioner’s reasoning or judgment so as to permit a 

finding of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Under governing 

California law, an ordinary person of average disposition would not 

have been provoked sufficiently to attempt to kill a prostitute 

because of unfounded speculation that the prostitute had slept with 

a cousin. A fair-minded jurist could agree with the state court

that in light of all the circumstances, Petitioner had not 

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established any prejudice.

C. Viewing Petitioner in Chains

The incident from which Petitioner’s claim arises involved a 

single juror’s observation of Petitioner being transported from 

court and across a street to jail by law enforcement officers. The 

witness saw this after court while awaiting a ride, and she informed 

an officer of her observation and moved to a new location. (LD 4, 2 

RT 447-55.) The trial judge examined both a law enforcement officer 

and the juror, who informed the court during voir dire that she had 

mentioned to other jurors that she had seen everyone after court but 

had not said anything more. (Id. at 458-60.) 

The trial judge admonished the juror not to say anything to the 

remaining jurors, declined defense counsel’s request to dismiss the 

juror, and instructed the jurors not to take the defendant’s 

custodial status into their deliberations. (Id. at 461-62, 464-65.) 

Petitioner had been dressed in street clothes throughout the trial. 

(Id. at 463.) Evidence of telephone calls made while Petitioner had 

been in custody was already before the jury. (Id. at 448-49.)

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of 

physical restraints visible to the jury unless the trial court has 

determined in the exercise of its discretion that the restraints are 

justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial. Deck 

v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005). The Court in Deck was 

concerned with the need for a defendant to assist counsel, the 

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formal dignity of the courtroom, and the presumption of innocence.

Id. at 630–31. In the absence of a particularized determination 

that shackling is justified, visible shackling in the courtroom is 

inherently prejudicial. Id. at 635. However, occasional 

observations by some jurors of a defendant in shackles while being 

transported requires a showing of actual prejudice for relief. 

Wharton v. Chappell, 765 F.3d 953, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(collecting similar cases). 

Here, with respect to the effect of the appearance of 

Petitioner in shackles, there is no testimony or other evidence 

indicating prejudice. It is likely that jurors understood that 

shackling during transportation was a regular incident of custody, 

and there was no indication that Petitioner was singled out for 

special treatment. The observation was made by only one juror, who 

appeared ready to follow the trial court’s instructions. There is 

no basis for an inference that any other juror saw Petitioner in 

custody. Petitioner was clearly implicated in the charged offense. 

Under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable to conclude 

that brief observation of shackling outside the courtroom was not 

prejudicial. 

Even though the shackling did not appear to be prejudicial, 

counsel diligently moved to dismiss the single juror who observed 

Petitioner in shackles. Petitioner has not shown that with respect 

to the shackling, counsel engaged in objectively unreasonable 

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conduct or that any such conduct resulted in any injury to 

Petitioner. Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation 

to Petitioner’s being observed while shackled.

IX. Denial of Request for Self-Representation

Petitioner alleges he requested to represent himself because he 

could not trust his counsel, and the denial of his clear request was 

prejudicial to his defense. (Pet., doc. 1, 6.) Respondent contends 

that although Petitioner’s claim was unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted, the claim should be denied because it is not colorable. 

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20, 832-33 (1975), 

the Court held that the Sixth Amendment extends to the accused a 

right to represent himself in his defense of criminal charges, which 

may be exercised once the accused is made aware of the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation and thereafter knowingly and 

intelligently waives the right to counsel. Id. at 835.

Here, the trial court granted Petitioner’s motion to represent 

himself on July 7, 2009. (LD 6, ART 2-6.) On September 2, 2009, 

the time set for trial, Petitioner stated he was not ready to defend 

himself and that he needed help. (ART 13-14.) He stated he wanted 

a lawyer appointed to represent him, even if his previous lawyer 

resumed representation of him. (ART 15-17.) The court granted his 

request and appointed the public defender to represent him. (ART 15-

20.)

Because the Court granted Petitioner’s motion to represent 

himself, Petitioner does not have a colorable claim that the trial 

court wrongfully denied Petitioner’s motion. Accordingly, it will 

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be recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s claim concerning the 

allegedly wrongful denial of his motion to represent himself. 

X. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Habeas Rule 11(a). 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

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applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. 

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Accordingly, it will be recommended that 

the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

XI. Recommendations 

Based on the foregoing analysis, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED insofar 

as Petitioner raises state law claims; 

2) The petition for writ of habeas corpus otherwise be DENIED; 

3) Judgment be ENTERED for Respondent; and 

4) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 

with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 

mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C).

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

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Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 19, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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