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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 9, 2001 Decided May 1, 2001

No. 00-5035

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Patrick J. Mahoney, et al.,

Appellants

Consolidated with

Nos. 00-5036, 00-5055, 00-5090 & 00-5148

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv01446)

Brian Ricardo Chavez-Ochoa argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Frederick Herbert Nelson, Richard P. Caro, and James Matthew Henderson, Sr.

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James Matthew Henderson, Sr. was on the brief for appellant Patrick J. Mahoney. Mark N. Troobnick entered an

appearance.

Kevin K. Russell, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Bill Lann Lee, Assistant Attorney General, and Jessica D.

Silver, Attorney.

Before: Henderson and Randolph, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Separate concurring statement filed by Circuit Judge

Henderson.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: January 22, 1998, marked the

twenty-fifth anniversary of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

Individuals from around the country arrived in Washington to

participate in the annual "March for Life." Other demonstrations were also planned, including a protest at the Capitol

Women's Center, an abortion clinic in Washington. Among

those who took part in that protest were the seven individuals

who bring this appeal. In a civil action by the United States,

the district court found these defendants guilty of violating

the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C.

s 248. The court issued an injunction forbidding the defendants from "[c]oming within a twenty-foot-radius of any reproductive health facility located within" the Capital Beltway.

They contest their liability and the scope of the injunction.

I.

On January 23, 1998, one day before the demonstration at

the abortion clinic, the defendants attended a rally at a

downtown hotel. Defendants Mahoney and Benham announced the demonstration planned for the Capitol Women's

Center. Mahoney later alerted the police. The next morning

a group led by defendants Benham and Gabriel approached

the clinic. The clinic had three entrances, two in the front

(the north and south walkways) and another in a back alley.

By the time the defendants arrived, volunteers had already

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created a human chain in front of the clinic to assist staff,

patients and other authorized persons who sought to enter

the clinic. Four of the defendants (Gabriel, Heldreth, Tyree

and White), later joined by defendant Newman, knelt in front

of the clinic on the south walkway, bowing their heads and

praying.

Shortly thereafter officers of the Washington Metropolitan

Police Department cordoned off the front of the clinic with

police tape. The enclosed area included both front entrances

to the clinic, as well as the main sidewalk along the length of

the front of the building. Beginning at 8:15 a.m., police

officers issued three warnings to all individuals inside the

tape line that if they did not vacate the cordoned area they

would be arrested for incommoding in violation of D.C. Code

Ann. s 22-1107.1 Mahoney--who until this time had been

outside the cordoned area--approached a police officer and

asked whether anyone was allowed inside the tape line. The

officer told him no. Mahoney then crossed the line, proceeded down the north walkway, knelt near the north clinic door

and prayed aloud, expressing his hope that the demonstration

would prevent abortions from occurring. The police arrested

the individuals inside the cordoned-off area, including the

seven defendants. Each was charged with incommoding, and

was released after pleading guilty and paying a $50 fine.

Throughout the demonstration the clinic continued to treat

patients by admitting them through a rear entrance. Although other demonstrators impeded entry through that

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1 In relevant part, this statute provides: "It shall not be lawful

for any person or persons within the District of Columbia to

congregate and assemble in any street, avenue, alley, road, or

highway, or in or around any public building or inclosure, or any

park or reservation, or at the entrance of any private building or

inclosure, and engage in loud and boisterous talking or other

disorderly conduct, or to insult or make rude or obscene gestures or

comments or observations on persons passing by, or in their

hearing, or to crowd, obstruct, or incommode, the free use of any

such street, avenue, alley, road, highway, or any of the foot pavements thereof, or the free entrance into any public or private

building or inclosure...."

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door, clinic volunteers were able to escort patients into the

facility.

The United States later brought this action in federal

district court, charging the defendants with violating the

Access Act and seeking an injunction (the government

dropped its request for civil penalties and statutory damages).

After a two-day bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the

government and entered a permanent injunction.

II.

The attorneys for the defendants must think that the more

issues they raise, the greater their chance of success. Their

briefs squeeze nine issues out of this case, and many more

sub-issues. Untenable arguments get equal billing with potentially promising ones. Because every contention is treated

equally, none receives much in-depth analysis. We will not

be drawn into providing a written response to every one of

the defendants' contentions. They have displayed no judgment about what is a good argument and what is a bad one.

See United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1366 (7th

Cir. 1993). We hope this opinion will provide some guidance:

those defense arguments not specifically addressed have been

considered and found so untenable that they do not warrant

comment.

A.

We have sustained the Access Act against a facial constitutional challenge. Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Defendants do not ask for reconsideration of Terry.

They do claim that the district court erred in finding that

they had violated the Act. To make out a violation the

government had to prove that the defendants (1) "by physical

obstruction," (2) "intentionally" (3) "injure[d], intimidate[d] or

interfere[d] with or attempt[ed] to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person," (4) "because that person is or has been

... obtaining or providing reproductive health services." 18

U.S.C. s 248(a)(1). "[P]hysical obstruction" is defined as

"rendering impassable ingress to or egress from a facility

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that provides reproductive health services ... or rendering

passage to or from such a facility ... unreasonably difficult

or hazardous." 18 U.S.C. s 248(e)(4). The record leaves no

doubt that the government established its case against six of

the seven defendants--Benham, Gabriel, Heldreth, Tyree,

Newman, and White. Their argument--or more accurately,

their bare assertion--is that they did not obstruct or block

access to the clinic. The evidence is to the contrary. When

they arrived at the clinic, Gabriel, Heldreth, Tyree, Newman,

and White knelt or sat within five feet of the south door, the

main entrance to the clinic. Benham was pacing just behind

them. When the police tried to remove them they offered

passive resistance and had to be carried away.

B.

The seventh defendant, Mahoney, seeks to differentiate

himself from the others. He contends that he was familiar

with the operation of the Capitol Women's Center, having

protested there before, and that as an experienced demonstrator he knew the north walkway led to a locked door. And

so he claims that when he crossed over the police tape,

walked to the north door, positioned himself three feet from it

and prayed aloud he did so without intending to obstruct

anyone. The district court found that this door and its

connected walkway were "rarely used," that the door served

"largely [as] an exit for emergencies" and that it was "generally locked." United States v. Alaw, No. 98-1446, mem. op.

at 8 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2000). The fact that the door was

locked, Mahoney argues, meant that it was impossible for him

to "render[ ] impassable ingress to or egress from" the facility. 18 U.S.C. s 248(e)(4) (defining "physical obstruction").

He also claims that his selection of the north door shows that

he did not intend to obstruct or attempt to obstruct entrance

to the clinic, and was there to express his solidarity with

those who were protesting.

The district court found that Mahoney interfered or attempted to interfere with ingress or egress from the facility,

mem. op. at 28, and that he did so with the requisite specific

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intent. Id. at 30. We may set aside a district court's factual

findings only if they are "clearly erroneous." Fed. R. Civ. P.

52(a); United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir.

2000). At trial Mahoney repeatedly stated that he selected

the north door of the clinic specifically so he would not

interfere with ingress or egress. On direct examination,

when asked why he elected to kneel and pray before the

north door, he answered: "The reason I chose that [door is]

because I know that that door is never used, that no patients

or staff ever go in there, so I could be assured that I would

not interfere, harass or intimidate or block anyone wanting to

use the clinic." The district court refused, however, to credit

this "post hoc self-serving explanation." Mem. op. at 30. We

have no basis for setting aside what amounted to the district

court's assessment of Mahoney's credibility. Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The

court also noted that while on the walkway in front of the

north door, Mahoney said "let's pray right now for any

woman who was thinking about coming here this morning ...

as she sees all this going on, oh God, that she would make the

decision to save her child ... Father, we pray that even as

they come driving down this street and saw the police tape

and saw the folks out, that Father they would make the

decision for life." Mem. op. at 30. In light of this evidence

and the other circumstances of the protest, including Mahoney's organizational role in the event, id. at 9, the district

court's determination that Mahoney acted with the requisite

specific intent is not clearly erroneous.

The question remains whether the government proved the

other elements of a statutory violation. The district court

found that Mahoney intentionally interfered with persons

seeking reproductive care by physically obstructing access to

the clinic, or at least attempting to do so. We agree that he

accomplished his goal. The fact that Mahoney elected to

kneel and pray before a door that was mainly used as an

emergency exit does not mean that he did not render ingress

or egress "unreasonably difficult" given the circumstances.

18 U.S.C. s 248(e)(4). Mahoney entered the cordoned-off

area in part so that he would be arrested with the other

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demonstrators, and that is precisely what happened. It

required fourteen police officers to take Mahoney and the

other defendants into custody. In crossing the police line

after the officers warned those within the cordoned area that

they would be arrested, Mahoney contributed to the disruption and to the interference with those trying to enter or

leave the clinic. The Access Act does not limit physical

obstruction to bodily obstruction, but rather is broadly

phrased to prohibit any act rendering passage to the facility

unreasonably difficult. 18 U.S.C. s 248(e)(4); see United

States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir. 1996). By

contributing to the demonstration within a few feet of the

clinic entrances, Mahoney's actions compelled patients to

enter the clinic through the "crowded and chaotic" rear

entrance. Mem. op. at 24; see United States v. Lindgren,

883 F. Supp. 1321, 1328 (D.N.D. 1995). This was a foreseeable

and intended consequence of his action, and it constitutes

"physical obstruction."

Further, Mahoney does not dispute that he used his body

to obstruct the north door. While that door was not normally

used for ingress, the testimony was that the door was an

emergency exit--which is clearly a method of egress. In

light of the rash of attacks on women's health clinics, an

emergency exit may be a particularly important means of

egress. See Terry, 101 F.3d at 1416. The statute does not

distinguish between frequently used and infrequently used

means of egress, and we decline to write in such a distinction.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment against

defendant Mahoney.

C.

Defendant Tyree also tries to distinguish herself from the

other defendants. On the first day of trial, December 14,

1999, Tyree's counsel informed the court that the day before

he had reached a settlement with the government on behalf of

his client, but that government counsel had backed out that

morning. After hearing from the government, the district

court judge indicated that she was inclined to send the matter

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to the magistrate judge to determine whether settlement had

in fact been reached. On January 12, 2000, Tyree filed a

"Motion Requesting Compliance with Mediation Order," repeating her contention that she had reached a settlement with

the government and requesting that the court refer the

matter to Magistrate Judge Facciola for resolution. On

January 21, 2000, the district court entered an order against

Tyree and issued an accompanying memorandum opinion,

neither of which addressed her motion. On January 24, 2000,

the government filed an opposition to Tyree's motion, denying

that any settlement had been reached. Attached to the

motion was a copy of a facsimile transmitted to government

counsel by Tyree's counsel on December 13, 1999. In part,

the facsimile stated that "Ester Tyree [is] willing to accept

the terms of settlement we discussed." On February 15,

2000, the district court issued an order dismissing Tyree's

motion as moot. In relevant part, the order states: "Given

the fact that judgment was granted ... against Defendant

Tyree (who has not appealed that judgment)," the motion is

moot. The district court appears to have assumed that the

time for appeal had run, and that this failure to take appeal

from the judgment mooted Tyree's motion.

The district court erred in dismissing the motion as moot.

Tyree's notice of appeal had to be filed within sixty days after

the district court's order of January 21, 2000. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(B). By the date of the court's dismissal order (February 15) that time had not run. Whether parties have reached

a settlement is a question of contract law. Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wilson v.

Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1995). In the District of

Columbia, an enforceable contract exists when there is an

agreement about all material terms and an intention of the

parties to be bound. Quijano v. Eagle Maintenance Serv.,

Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1998). When there is a

genuine dispute about whether the parties have entered into

a binding settlement, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing that includes the opportunity for crossexamination. Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1202-03

(D.C. Cir. 1969); Wilson, 46 F.3d at 664. The district court

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here failed to direct such a hearing before the magistrate

judge and failed to rule on the merits of Tyree's motion. We

therefore must vacate the judgment against Tyree and remand with instructions to determine whether a valid settlement had been reached.2

III.

While we affirm the judgment against all defendants except

Tyree, we vacate the injunction as overbroad and violative of

the First Amendment. The injunction precludes the defendants from:

1. Standing, sitting, lying, or kneeling in front of entrances to reproductive health facilities, or otherwise

physically blockading or obstructing access to reproductive health facilities, located within the boundaries

of Interstate 495, popularly known as the Capital

Beltway;

2. Attempting, inducing, directing, aiding, or abetting in

any manner, others to take any of the actions described in paragraph 1 above, or any actions that

would violate the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. s 248;

3. Coming within a twenty-foot-radius of any reproductive health facility located within the boundaries of

Interstate 495;

4. "Reproductive health facility" means any hospital,

clinic, physician's office, or other facility that provides medical, surgical, counseling, or referral services relating to the human reproductive system,

including services relating to pregnancy, or the termination of pregnancy. 18 U.S.C. s 248(e)(1 & 5).

Injunctions against speech have long been disfavored. See

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Some legal histori-

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2 We wish to make clear that we have considered defendant

Tyree's other claims and rejected them. To the extent that she did

not enter into a settlement with the government, we would affirm

the judgment against her.

ans believe that the essential purpose of the First Amendment was to banish such prior restraints. Actions for injunctions are equitable and so no jury is present, unlike criminal

prosecutions for speech already given. The burden of proof

is also different. And because of the rule of Walker v. City of

Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), those subject to injunctions, even invalid injunctions, must comply until the injunction is overturned on appeal. The unconstitutionality of an

injunction is no defense to a contempt prosecution. Despite

these considerations the Supreme Court has decided not to

use prior restraint analysis to determine the validity of

injunctions regulating anti-abortion protestors, at least when

the injunctions are based on past violations by those subject

to the court's decree. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,

Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 n.2 (1994); Schenck v. Pro-Choice

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Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 374 n.6 (1997).

"Content-neutral" injunctions are to be tested under the First

Amendment by determining "whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary

to serve a significant government interest." Madsen, 512

U.S. at 765.

The significant government interests here are about the

same as those spelled out in Schenck: "ensuring public safety

and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and

sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services," 519 U.S. at

376. The question, then, is whether the injunction burdens

"more speech than necessary." Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.

The injunction prohibits the defendants from coming within

a twenty-foot radius of any facility inside the Capital Beltway

that provides counseling, medical or referral services "relating to the human reproductive system." Although the defendants have not challenged the geographic scope of the injunction (compare Schenck, 519 U.S. at 366 n.3, which upheld an

injunction for the entire Western District of New York) or its

lack of any temporal limits, there are other problems. The

buffer zone is fixed at twenty feet, compare Schenck, 519 U.S.

at 367, but it lacks the necessary correlation between the

provision and the government interests. The language definUSCA Case #00-5148 Document #593297 Filed: 05/01/2001 Page 10 of 13
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ing a covered facility is extraordinarily broad. On its face,

the injunction would preclude a female defendant from visiting the offices of a gynecologist or obstetrician, even for the

purpose of receiving medical care. It would preclude the

defendants from visiting any place of religious worship where

"counseling" is provided to pregnant women considering an

abortion. To give another example, it would preclude the

defendants from volunteering at an Operation Rescue facility

in the District of Columbia where they could counsel individuals to carry a pregnancy to term. Such burdens on speech

are unrelated to the interests in public order and unimpeded

access to medical care reflected in the Access Act.

We are also concerned that the injunction could be violated

unknowingly. Whenever a defendant wandered within twenty feet of a covered facility he would be in technical violation

of the injunction. The injunction contains no intent requirement. Yet we cannot see how this sort of liability without

fault is necessary to promote the government interests the

Supreme Court identified. Some element of intent must be

inserted in the injunction in order to avoid curtailing legitimate activities like walking down the street.

There is another problem. No one can be sure how the

injunction applies when the covered facility is in a multi-story

building. Would it be a violation of the injunction if a

defendant visited a different office within the same building?

From what point does one measure the twenty feet--the

doctor's office, or the entire structure? At oral argument

counsel for the government assured us that the district court

meant the office to be the point of measurement, but the

record leaves the subject in considerable doubt. To avoid

chilling legitimate speech, the question must be clarified. Cf.

Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2510 (2000) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).

We do not reject the proposition that an injunction may be

appropriate in this case to ensure that women in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area can continue to exercise their

constitutional rights. But this injunction is considerably

overbroad. Compare Schenck, 519 U.S. at 366 n.3. We

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therefore vacate the injunction and remand this case to the

district court.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion except that I would strike

the first paragraph of Part II and in its place add the

following final sentence to the opinion:

The appellants' remaining arguments are without merit and

warrant no discussion.

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