Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-00384/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-00384-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

2 The Court will address Petitioner’s remaining habeas claims in a separate

order. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Danny Lee Jones, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-01-384-PHX-SRB

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE: CLAIMS 20(O), 20 (P),

AND 20(T)

Danny Lee Jones (Petitioner) is an Arizona inmate seeking federal habeas relief in

connection with his convictions and death sentences for the first-degree murders of Robert

and Tisha Weaver. On March 21-23, 2006, the Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding

Claims 20(O), 20(P), and 20(T) of Petitioner’s amended habeas petition. The claims allege

ineffective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing based on counsel’s failure to investigate

and present mitigating evidence. (Dkt. 54 at 126-29.)1

 On June 9, 2006, the parties

submitted written closing arguments. (Dkts. 218, 219.) For the reasons set forth herein, the

Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.2

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3 Ms. Gumina ultimately died as a result of her injuries, but the State chose not

to amend the indictment. State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 478, 917 P.2d 200, 207 (1996).

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STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

1. Trial and sentencing

In 1993 Petitioner was tried in Mohave County Superior Court for the murder of

Robert Weaver and Weaver’s seven-year-old daughter, Tisha, and the attempted murder of

Weaver’s seventy-four-year-old grandmother, Katherine Gumina.3

 Petitioner was

represented by Mohave County Assistant Public Defender Lee Novak. At the outset of the

case, Novak was assisted by Katie Carty, a young attorney in his office.

The trial evidence showed that all of the victims were attacked with a baseball bat.

The evidence also indicated that the child was dragged out from under a bed, then beaten and

strangled or smothered. After the murders, Petitioner, who was unemployed and the subject

of outstanding warrants, removed the gun collection from the victims’ house and traveled to

Las Vegas, selling the guns to pay for cab fare and living expenses. 

At trial Petitioner testified that he killed Weaver in self-defense and that he struck Ms.

Gumina reflexively when she startled him. He further testified that while he was fighting

with Weaver in Weaver’s garage, Frank Sperlazzo, an acquaintance of Petitioner who was

attempting to collect a drug debt from Weaver, entered the house and killed Tisha as he was

stealing Weaver’s guns. Also testifying on Petitioner’s behalf was Dr. Lisa Sparks, M.D.,

an expert on addictions, who detailed the effects of Petitioner’s long-term substance abuse,

particularly his abuse of methamphetamine. 

On September 13, 1993, the jury convicted Petitioner on all counts. The trial court

set sentencing for November 8, 1993, ordered a presentence report (“PSR”), and granted

Petitioner’s request for a mental health examination pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 26.5. 

At a presentence conference on October 28, 1993, the court granted Novak’s

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4

 “RT” refers to the state court reporter’s transcript; “ROA” refers to the threevolume record on appeal from trial and sentencing prepared for Petitioner’s direct appeal to

the Arizona Supreme Court (Case No. CR-93-541-AP). “ROA-PCR” refers to the fourvolume record on appeal from post-conviction proceedings prepared for Petitioner’s petition

for review to the Arizona Supreme Court (Case No. CR-00-512-PC). The original reporter’s

transcripts and certified copies of the trial and post-conviction records were provided to this

Court by the Arizona Supreme Court. (See Dkt. 14.) “Ex.” refers to the exhibits admitted

at the evidentiary hearing before this Court.

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unopposed request to continue sentencing and ordered Dr. Potts to complete his Rule 26.5

evaluation by November 29, 1993. (ROA at 32; RT 10/28/93 at 3-4.)4

 Because Dr. Potts

wanted to review the probation department’s PSR before completing his evaluation, the court

ordered that the PSR be completed by November 4, 1993, and set a further presentence

conference for December 1, 1993. (RT 10/28/93 at 3-4.) The sentencing hearing was

scheduled to begin on December 8, 1993. (Id.) On November 22, 1993, the court held a

hearing at Novak’s request because Dr. Potts had not yet evaluated Petitioner; following the

hearing, Petitioner was transported to Phoenix for the evaluation. (RT 11/22/93 at 2; ROA

235.) Dr. Potts interviewed Petitioner on November 26, 1993. (RT 12/1/93 at 2.) At the

presentence conference on December 1, 1993, the court informed the parties that it had

transmitted a copy of the PSR to Dr. Potts, who had not previously received it, and indicated

that Dr. Potts was to submit his report on December 6. (Id.) Both parties informed the court

that they were arranging for witnesses to appear at the December 8 hearing. (Id. at 3.)

Although the record does not indicate when the parties received Dr. Potts’s report, it was

dated December 3. (Ex. 23.)

On December 8, 1993, the sentencing hearing was held. As part of Petitioner’s

mitigation case, Novak presented testimony from Petitioner’s stepfather, Randy Jones. Jones

testified that Petitioner’s biological father, the first husband of Petitioner’s mother, physically

abused Petitioner’s mother while she was pregnant – in one instance throwing her down a

flight of stairs – and that during Petitioner’s birth her heart had stopped and forceps had been

used to deliver Petitioner. (RT 12/8/93 at 41, 44-45.) Jones testified that when Petitioner

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was four, he experienced black-outs, and for years thereafter bruised easily due to a calcium

deficiency. (Id. at 42-46, 65.) He testified that Petitioner’s first stepfather, the second

husband of Petitioner’s mother, verbally and physically abused Petitioner, Petitioner’s halfsister, and Petitioner’s mother. (Id. at 42-46.) Jones also testified about various head injuries

suffered by Petitioner, which occurred when Petitioner was approximately thirteen, fifteen,

and nineteen years old. (Id. at 47-48, 49, 50, 65.) In each of the first two incidents,

Petitioner had fallen off roofs; although he was treated for concussions, no medical records

were available. (Id. at 48, 49, 65-67.) The last incident, which, according to Jones, resulted

in unconsciousness and hospitalization, occurred during a mugging while Petitioner was

serving in the Marines. (Id. at 50.) Jones also testified regarding Petitioner’s history of drug

and alcohol use, which began when he was about thirteen, and his participation in drug

treatment programs, including an in-house facility in San Francisco where he stayed for

almost two years. (Id. at 52-61.) Jones described how Petitioner’s behavior deteriorated

after he began abusing substances; he also described Petitioner’s behavior as improving when

he was placed on the drug lithium. (Id. at 51-52, 55-57, 60-61.)

Dr. Potts took the stand after hearing Jones’s testimony. Dr. Potts testified that he had

been unaware at the time he wrote his report that Petitioner had fallen off a roof when he was

fifteen. (Id. at 77-78.) He noted another head injury Petitioner suffered when he was six or

seven in which he was reportedly unconscious for about twenty minutes; this incident had

not been mentioned by Jones. (Id.) Dr. Potts also noted that he had not included in his report

Petitioner’s episodes of passing out when he was four. (Id.) However, Dr. Potts stated that

these additional incidents did not cause him to alter his opinions regarding Petitioner’s

condition. (Id. at 78.) When asked whether he believed he had adequate data to offer an

opinion regarding mitigating findings, Dr. Potts stated that he was always willing to review

additional information, and that: 

I believe everything I reviewed and what I have heard about the case

and reviewed with the defendant, his comments to me. I would have liked, and

I think I have – I think it would be valuable to have had some neurologic

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evaluations, not – by a neurologist, clinical exam, such as a CAT scan,

possibly an MRI, possibly EEG, possibly some sophisticated neurological

testing, because I think there’s very strong evidence that we have – well,

there’s clear evidence that we have, I believe, of traumatic brain injury, and

there’s some other evidence that I believe we may have organic neurologic

dysfunctions here that has gone on since he’s been about 13. So, there’s some

other testing that I think would be valuable to have to pin down the diagnosis.

Again – 

Q. And you think that further testing might shed some additional light on,

perhaps, some of these factors you listed and maybe why Mr. Jones behave[d]

in the way he did on March 26, 1992?

A. Yes. I think it could help in clarifying and giving us etiology as the

behavioral components, the explosive outbursts, the aggression, the mood

changes, and the changes that occurred in his personality as noted by his

mother when he was about 13, 14 years of age. 

Q. In your opinion, could that information possibly provide significant

mitigating, any – a significant mitigating factor as to what would be relevant

to the issues at this hearing?

A. Clearly I think it would be corroborative of my clinical impressions and

my diagnostic impressions in my report. 

(Id. at 78-80.) 

Dr. Potts then identified seven factors that he considered mitigating. (Id.) First was

Petitioner’s “chaotic and abusive childhood” and its effect on his mental health and

development, about which Dr. Potts offered detailed testimony. (Id. at 80-83.) Dr. Potts also

listed as mitigating circumstances Petitioner’s history of significant substance abuse, the

likelihood that he suffered from an attenuated form of bipolar disorder, the fact that he had

a history of multiple head traumas, and genetic loading for substance abuse and affective

disorders. (Id. at 83-92, 94-98, 100-04.) In discussing Petitioner’s head traumas, Dr. Potts

noted that there were usually “long term neurologic sequelae” that can damage the brain and

make it susceptible to other changes, such as lowered thresholds for aggressive outbursts.

(Id. at 100.) He testified that additional testing would “clearly assist in coming to a more

definitive conclusion” regarding whether Petitioner had brain damage. (Id. at 103.) Dr. Potts

recommended additional testing “specifically for forensic purposes.” (Id. at 137.)

Following Dr. Potts’s testimony, Novak asked the court for a continuance to obtain

the testing recommended by Dr. Potts as additional potential mitigation and to bolster the

basis for Dr. Potts’s opinion, which the prosecution had challenged in part because such

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testing had not been conducted. (Id. at 150-51, 165.) Novak explained that until he had

received Dr. Potts’s report, two days prior to the hearing, and heard his testimony, he had not

realized the significance of Petitioner’s history of head traumas with respect to possible

neurological damage. (Id.) The prosecution opposed the request, arguing that a factual basis

did not exist for neurological testing. (Id. at 153-54.) Novak replied that Dr. Potts had not

had sufficient time prior to the hearing to obtain neurological testing after receiving materials

from the parties. (Id. at 154-55.) After briefly taking the request under advisement, the trial

court denied it, noting that Novak had previously retained Dr. Sparks, who had testified at

trial, and stated that “if there were any follow-up questions of a psychological or neurological

nature, I would think that the defense would have followed them up” prior to sentencing.

(RT 12/8/93 at 165.) The court indicated that it would review the transcript of Dr. Sparks’s

trial testimony before sentencing Petitioner the next day. (Id. at 167-68.) 

The following day, prior to sentencing, Novak renewed his request for a continuance

to obtain the testing recommended by Dr. Potts; to refute the prosecution’s suggestion that

Petitioner’s head injuries and childhood abuse were wholly unsubstantiated, Novak proffered

some of Petitioner’s military medical records documenting Petitioner’s head injury while he

was in the Marines. (RT 12/9/93 at 6-8, 10-11.) The trial court admitted the records, but

denied the renewed request for a continuance, stating that:

I have read the case cited by both the State and defense, and also reviewed Dr.

Potts’ report. What Dr. Potts said in his report is that he believes that the

defendant had head trauma which increases the potential for neurologic

sequela contributing to his behavior. And at the hearing yesterday, my

recollection is he was assuming based on the allegation that the defendant had

fallen from a roof and hit his head, plus other allegations about head injuries,

that he had mild trauma which increased the potential for aggravating the

substance abuse. That’s a long shot away, far away in–both in speculation and

in fact from what’s alleged to have occurred in [State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589,

863 P.2d 881 (1993)].

This case has been pending a long time, and I think the evidence is very

slim, nonexistent, in fact, that the defendant has anything that requires any

kind of neurological examination. So, I am ready to proceed.

(Id. at 16-17.)

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In sentencing Petitioner, the trial court found three aggravating factors as to both

murders: that they were committed (1) for pecuniary gain, (2) in an especially heinous, cruel,

or depraved manner, and (3) during the commission of one or more other homicides. (ROA

117, 118.) With respect to Tisha’s murder, the court found a fourth aggravating factor based

on her age. (ROA 117.) The court rejected Petitioner’s testimony that Sperlazzo killed

Tisha, concluding that Petitioner had “manufactured this tale” and that “[i]n the past

[Petitioner] has shown that he is willing to lie if it benefits him.” (ROA 117 at 4.) The court

found no statutory mitigating circumstances with respect to either murder, but found several

non-statutory factors: that Petitioner (1) suffered from long-term substance abuse, (2) was

under the influence of alcohol and drugs at the time of the offense, (3) had a chaotic and

abusive childhood, and (4) that his substance abuse problem might have been caused by

genetic factors and aggravated by head trauma. (ROA 117, 118.) With respect to each

murder conviction, the court found that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently

substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances or to call for leniency and sentenced

Petitioner to death for each of the murders. (Id.) The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the

convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 917 P.2d 200

(1996).

2. Post-conviction proceedings

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief (“PCR”) from the trial court. In his PCR

petition, he alleged that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to obtain a

defense mental health expert, failing to timely seek neurological and neuropsychological

testing, and failing to present additional evidence of Petitioner’s abusive childhood, head

trauma, and drug abuse; these allegations correspond, respectively, to Claims 20(O), (P) and

(T) in the amended habeas petition. On April 4, 2000, the PCR court held an evidentiary

hearing on Claims 20 (P) and (T), but denied a hearing on Claim 20(O). At the hearing,

Randy Jones and Petitioner’s mother testified, as did trial counsel Novak. Jones testified that

he first spoke with Novak in July 1992 by telephone, talked with him again in October 1992,

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when Novak and Ms. Carty visited the family in Nevada, and spoke a third time just prior

to sentencing in December 1993. (RT 4/4/00 at 10, 11, and 15.) During these conversations,

Jones provided background information about Petitioner’s childhood, head injuries, and

history of drug abuse and treatment. (Id.) Mrs. Jones testified that she informed Novak

about the details of Petitioner’s difficult birth, his head injuries, his drug use, which began

at approximately age thirteen, and the physical abuse he suffered from his first stepfather.

(Id. at 26-36.) She also testified that she told Novak that after she married Mr. Jones,

Petitioner “had a normal childhood as far as school, baseball,” and that they “had a good

home life.” (Id. at 29.) Novak testified that he began work on Petitioner’s defense

immediately, and that one of the tasks undertaken by Ms. Carty was to develop Petitioner’s

life history. (Id. at 53-54.) He testified that he considered Dr. Potts “part of the defense

team.” (Id. at 102.) He conceded, however, that if he were trying the case today he would

immediately seek the appointment of a mitigation specialist. (Id. at 51.) He also testified

that he only considered the need for a neurological exam after Dr. Potts testified at the

sentencing hearing. (Id. at 99.)

In its written order, the PCR court denied relief on Claim 20(O) without explanation

or factual findings. (ROA-PCR 59 at 2.) With respect to Claims 20(P) and (T), the PCR

court stated:

With regard to Claim 24I[6], petitioner alleges that trial counsel was

ineffective at sentencing by failing “. . . to recognize the need for neurological

and psychological testing . . .”

The report and testimony of Dr. Potts who was appointed by the Court,

adequately addressed defendant’s mental health issues at sentencing. ...

In Claim 24I(7), petitioner alleges that “Trial counsel failed to present

meaningful additional witnesses and available evidence to support Jones’

proposed mitigation.”

Testimony at the hearing showed that counsel presented the available

witnesses and evidence to support mitigation. The additional witnesses and

evidence suggested by petitioner would have been redundant.

The Court finds that the petitioner has not met its [sic] burden of proof

of showing deficient performance by trial counsel.

(ROA-PCR 73 at 2-3). The PCR court’s ruling is the only “reasoned” state court decision

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regarding Claims 20(O), (P), and (T). The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied the

petition for review.

EVIDENCE DEVELOPED IN THE HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner has presented expert testimony, based upon, inter alia, the results of

neuropsychological testing, suggesting that Petitioner suffers from several psychological

conditions: cognitive disorder or impairment; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); polysubstance abuse; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); and a mood disorder.

Respondents have countered with expert testimony indicating that the test results and the

record as a whole do not support diagnoses of cognitive disorder, PTSD, or a mood disorder.

Petitioner’s experts further ascribe as a cause of Petitioner’s alleged cognitive disorder or

impairment a series of head injuries that occurred with some regularity throughout

Petitioner’s life prior to the date of the instant offenses. 

1. Petitioner’s witnesses

At the evidentiary hearing three mental health experts testified for Petitioner: Dr.

Potts; Dr. Pablo Stewart, a psychiatrist; and Dr. Alan Goldberg, an attorney and

neuropsychologist. Petitioner’s trial counsel, Lee Novak, also testified. Their findings and

testimony can be summarized as follows.

Dr. Potts: As discussed above, Dr. Potts performed a court-ordered psychiatric

evaluation of Petitioner in November 1993. (Ex. 23.) At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Potts

testified that he had been appointed as an independent expert (RT 3/21/06 at 13); that he was

not a mitigation specialist and did not undertake an adequate mitigation investigation but

instead performed only a “cursory examination” to obtain a “gross overview” of Petitioner’s

condition (id. at 32, 92); and that he had urged Mr. Novak to obtain neuropsychological as

well as neurological testing of Petitioner (id. at 60-61). Dr. Potts acknowledged that when

he prepared his report and testified at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing he had obtained

background information from Petitioner’s parents. (Id. at 52-53.) His report included a

“societal and developmental history,” which set out information about Petitioner’s childhood

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abuse by his first stepfather, his head injuries and extensive drug abuse, and the role geneticloading played in Petitioner’s mental-health difficulties. (Ex. 23 at 2-3.) All of these were

factors that the trial court determined to be mitigating. (ROA 117, 118.) 

Dr. Potts acknowledged that he did not diagnose Petitioner with PTSD, or even

discuss the condition, although as a psychiatrist he was qualified to make such a diagnosis.

(RT 3/21/06 at 66-69.) Dr. Potts further acknowledged that Petitioner, whose memory was

intact, did not provide any information regarding physical abuse by Randy Jones or head

injuries resulting from car accidents. (Id. at 79-80.) Finally, Dr. Potts did not note any

“gross” or “obvious” cognitive deficits (id. at 49), and estimated that Petitioner’s IQ was in

the normal range (id. at 49-50; Ex. 23 at 3).

Dr. Stewart: Dr. Stewart evaluated Petitioner in March 2002 and testified on his

behalf at the evidentiary hearing. In his declaration and testimony, Dr. Stewart concluded

that Petitioner suffers from cognitive dysfunction; PTSD; poly-substance abuse, which Dr.

Stewart described as a product of genetic predisposition and self-medication; and mood

disorder NOS (not otherwise specified). (Ex.1; RT 3/21/06 at 172.)

Dr. Stewart reached his conclusion that Petitioner suffers from cognitive impairment

based primarily upon two pieces of data: the low scores Petitioner achieved on standardized

tests from the eighth grade (RT 3/21/06 at 175-76), and the results of neuropsychological

testing performed by Dr. Goldberg, specifically the gap between Petitioner’s performance

and verbal IQ scores (id. at 177). With respect to Petitioner’s performance on standardized

tests, however, Dr. Stewart acknowledged that absenteeism and drug use could have

contributed to Petitioner’s low scores. (Id. at 211-14.) 

Dr. Stewart also offered his opinion regarding the causes of Petitioner’s cognitive

impairment, among which Dr. Stewart listed pre-natal exposure to chrome, caffeine, and

nicotine; childhood physical, sexual, and mental abuse, including emotional and physical

abuse by Randy Jones; and cumulative head injuries. (Ex.1 at 21-27; RT 3/21/06 at 178-87.)

However, as Dr. Stewart conceded, the record contains contradictory information regarding

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many of these circumstances. For example, Petitioner’s mother reported that, while

Petitioner’s birth was difficult, he was delivered full-term, weighing seven pounds seven

ounces, and thereafter developed normally. (RT 3/21/06 at 208-09; see Ex. 56, Interview

with Peggy and Randy Jones, 12/3/01 at 6.) The record also includes inconsistent

information with respect to Randy Jones’s treatment of Petitioner and other family members.

While Dr. Stewart reports that Jones was extremely abusive, both mentally and physically,

to the entire household, elsewhere Petitioner had reported that he came from a good family

and was not abused (Ex. 26) and characterized Jones as his “real dad, . . . the only one that

has treated me good. He has never hit me or anything.” (Ex. 14). Similarly, Petitioner’s

mother described Randy Jones as controlling but not physically abusive. (Ex. 56, Interview

with Peggy Jones, 12/10/01 at 2, 4, 10, 11.)

Finally, as Dr. Stewart acknowledged, there is no documentation to support

Petitioner’s claims of multiple head injuries. (See RT 3/22/06 at 233-34.) With the

exception of the 1983 “mugging,” no medical records exist regarding any of the incidents,

and the only source corroborating Petitioner’s self-report is his mother’s account of three

head injuries Petitioner suffered as a child and adolescent. Moreover, although Petitioner has

described the 1983 incident as a beating in which he was struck with a two-by-four, suffered

convulsions, remained unconscious for three days (see, e.g., Ex. 12 at 2), and was “almost

killed” (Ex. 53 at 3), contemporaneous medical records present a very different account. The

records indicate that Petitioner was hospitalized for two days after being found lying

unresponsive. (Ex. 15.) Petitioner was intoxicated; there “was no apparent accident

involved.” (Id.) Initially, Petitioner “appeared to be sleeping” and responded only to

physical stimuli; however, after receiving Narcon, a medication that counteracts the effects

of intoxication, he responded to questions, denying that he felt any local pain and admitting

that he had consumed “many beers.” (Id.) He exhibited “no apparent trauma,” and his head

was “atraumatic.” (Id.) Further examination revealed only a “minor abrasion and a tender

area over the right parietal scalp.” (Id.) The results of neurological exams were “normal.”

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5 “DSM-IV” refers to the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

(4th ed. 1994).

6 Two of Petitioner’s experts prepared reports but did not testify at the

evidentiary hearing: psychologist David Foy and neuropsychologist Shoba Sreenivasan. Dr.

Foy conducted a psychosocial history and evaluation of Petitioner. (Ex. 5.) He concluded

that Petitioner suffers from PTSD, Polydrug Abuse, Depressive Disorder, as well as

compromised cognitive and emotional functioning and learning deficits. (Id.) Dr.

Sreenivasana did not perform any tests but prepared a report, based upon his review of the

record and Dr. Goldberg’s test results, concluding that Petitioner suffered from long-term

poly-substance abuse as well as compromised cognitive functioning due to early onset of

substance abuse and the cumulative impact of repeated head traumas. (Ex. 8.)

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(Id.) His discharge diagnosis listed “head trauma,” “alcohol intoxication,” and “resolved

apparent concussion.” (Id.) Significantly, Petitioner’s medical records further reveal that

during his subsequent treatment for alcohol abuse, his “[c]ognitive testing was normal.” (Id.;

see RT 3/23/06 at 401.)

Dr. Stewart also concluded that Petitioner suffers from PTSD. In his report, Dr.

Stewart discussed only the first of the four criteria that must be satisfied to reach a diagnosis

of PTSD according to the DSM-IV; i.e., that Petitioner had experienced a traumatic event,

having witnessed and been the victim of abuse during his childhood.5

 (Ex. 1 at 27; see RT

3/22/06 at 237.) In his testimony, however, Dr. Stewart insisted that Petitioner also met the

remaining criteria – re-experiencing of the trauma, avoidance, and hyperarousal. (RT

3/22/06 at 240.) Although he did not attempt to determine whether Petitioner experienced

these conditions at the time of the murders, Dr. Stewart testified that the effects of PTSD

were present in all aspects of Petitioner’s life. (RT 3/22/06 at 237-43.) Thus, according to

Dr. Stewart, Petitioner was “acting under the effects of PTSD” when he beat Weaver and Ms.

Gumina to death with a baseball bat. (Ex. 1 at 32.) Dr. Stewart also adopted Dr. Foy’s

conclusions regarding PTSD.6

 As Respondents note, however, it is unclear whether Dr. Foy

actually diagnosed Petitioner with PTSD; for example, in his report he described his finding

as “probable chronic PTSD” (Ex. 5 at 10), and in his deposition Dr. Foy characterized his

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opinion only as suggesting that “there’s a very high probability that [Petitioner] would be

diagnosed by anyone with PTSD” (RT 3/22/06 at 247-48). Finally, Dr. Stewart

acknowledged that Petitioner’s conduct at the time of the murders could also be attributed

to substance abuse, and that he could not determine the degree to which Petitioner’s behavior

was the result of PTSD as opposed to the use of methamphetamine and alcohol. (RT 3/22/06

at 243–44.)

Dr. Stewart also diagnosed Petitioner with a mood disorder NOS. (Ex. 1 at 24.) This

diagnosis is based upon Petitioner’s mental-health history, which includes a suicide attempt,

psychiatric treatment using the drug lithium, and Arizona DOC records indicating that

Petitioner was diagnosed with a bipolar disorder and treated with mood-stabilizing drugs and

anti-psychotics. (RT 3/21/06 at 201-06.) Dr. Stewart acknowledged, however, that

Petitioner’s DOC records discuss Petitioner’s depressive symptoms but include no direct

indications that Petitioner exhibited symptoms of mania. (Id. at 260.)

Also included in Dr. Stewart’s declaration is information detailing Petitioner’s

allegation that he had been sexually assaulted by his grandfather. (Ex. 1 at 15, 22.) The

source of this information is Dr. Foy’s report, which indicates that Petitioner suffered severe

sexual abuse for a period of five years, from age nine to fourteen. (RT 3/22/06 at 234.)

However, Randy Jones and Petitioner’s mother “never saw any indication that [Petitioner]

may have been sexually abused by anyone, nor were they aware of any sexual perpetrators

in the family.” (Ex. 56, Interview with Peggy and Randy Jones, 12/10/01 at 6.) Dr. Stewart

conceded that the information concerning sexual abuse was most likely based upon

Petitioner’s self-report to Dr. Foy. (RT at 3/22/06 at 234-35.)

Finally, in his declaration Dr. Stewart concluded that, “The result of these mental

illnesses, biological, environmental, social and other compromising factors, culminated in,

at the time of the murder, an impairment in Danny’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness

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7 In the Conclusions Section of his declaration Dr. Stewart went even further,

including a paragraph endorsing Petitioner’s account of the crimes. (Ex. 1 at 31-34.)

According to Dr. Stewart, “Danny’s psychological profile supports the events as described

by Danny on the night of the crimes, including Frank’s responsibility for Tisha Weaver’s

murder.” (Id. at 33.) In assessing Dr. Stewart’s credibility, the Court takes into account his

willingness to present an opinion on a factual issue which concerns only the guilt phase of

the trial and which was resolved, with a result contrary to that reached by Dr. Stewart, by the

jury, the trial court, and the Arizona Supreme Court.

The Court also takes note of Dr. Stewart’s reliance on the following factors to support

his assertion that Petitioner did not kill Tisha. First, Dr. Stewart explains, without reference

to corroborating sources, that Petitioner “was by all accounts a good step-father and is now

a good father.” (Id. at 32.) Dr. Goldberg reports, by contrast, that Petitioner “had a child with

a girlfriend subsequent to his divorce. This child is now 9 years old, and he has never met

her.” (Ex. 12 at 2.) Second, Dr. Stewart states that he believes Petitioner’s version of his

activities on the night of the murders because Petitioner “has a history of submissive, almost

child-like behavior, against older males.” (Ex. 1 at 32-33.) Yet in the same section of his

declaration, Dr. Stewart observes that Petitioner “at least twice in his young life defended

himself in a life-threatening situation with a baseball bat.” (Id. at 32.) In these instances,

Petitioner is alleged to have responded to abuse from adult males not in a submissive manner

but by confronting them and threatening them with violence.

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of his actions and/or to conform his conduct to that required by law.”7

 (Ex. 1 at 32.) 

Dr. Goldberg: Dr. Goldberg performed a neuropsychological evaluation of Petitioner

in February 2002 and testified at the evidentiary hearing. In his declaration, Dr. Goldberg

offered “diagnostic impressions” of “attention deficit disorder and learning disability.” (Ex.

12 at 7; see RT 3/22/06 at 303.) These impressions are based upon the results of

neuropsychological examinations, including, most significantly, the difference in Petitioner’s

performance and verbal IQ scores as well as subtest “scatter” within test results from each

category. (See RT 3/22/06 at 284-85.) Dr. Goldberg testified that such scatter is seen in only

five percent of the population. (Id. at 284, 338.) Dr. Goldberg further noted a “significant

change” for the worse in Petitioner’s grades from the first to the eighth grade. (Id. at 284.)

According to Dr. Goldberg, a bipolar disorder “can also be diagnosed,” as well as “[s]ome

‘soft’ neurological signs” that might be “sequelae of repeated blows to the head.” (Ex. 12

at 7.) Based upon these impressions, Dr. Goldberg opined, with respect to the issue of

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premeditation, that “it is unlikely that this man would’ve been capable of violent acts without

the influence of drugs and alcohol” and that “[t]his would be quite different from

methodically carrying out criminal activity with intention, and after reflection.” (Id. at 8.)

In his testimony, Dr. Goldberg acknowledged that many of Petitioner’s scores on the

neuropsychological tests were in the average or above-average range (RT 3/22/06 at 309-14,

321-23); that Petitioner’s full-scale IQ score – 97 – is normal (id. at 321); that the decline in

Petitioner’s grades from elementary to high school could be attributable to drug use,

absenteeism, and lack of interest as well as to cognitive impairment (id. at 334-35); that, with

the exception of the “mugging” while Petitioner was in the Marines, there was no medical

documentation of any of Petitioner’s reported head injuries, and that the information that

Petitioner had been unconscious for three days after the “mugging” was based upon his selfreport rather than the contemporaneous records of the incident (id. at 330-34). Dr. Goldberg

also acknowledged that, despite the voluminous record documenting the extensive efforts to

evaluate Petitioner’s mental status, and despite the recommendations from Dr. Potts in 1993

and from Dr. Goldberg in 2002, he, Dr. Goldberg, was not aware that Petitioner had ever

been subjected to any neurological testing. (Id. at 336-37.) Dr. Goldberg also conceded that

Petitioner’s rating of “severely depressed,” as scored on the Beck Depression Inventory,

might reflect a normal emotional response to life as a death row prisoner. (Id. at 319.) 

Lee Novak: Trial counsel Novak testified that he did not seek appointment of a

mitigation specialist. (RT 2/21/06 at 107.) According to Novak, at the time of Petitioner’s

trial, it was not “common practice” in Mohave County to employ a mitigation expert, and in

any case there was no funding available for such an appointment. (RT 3/21/06 at 150.) He

indicated, however, that co-counsel, Ms. Carty, and his investigator, Austin Cooper, gathered

information about Petitioner’s background. (Id. at 107-08.) He testified that funding through

the Public Defender’s Office was limited and that his superior advised him to seek funding

for experts from the trial court. (Id. at 110.) As a result of Novak’s requests, the court

authorized limited funding for a crime-scene investigator and for Dr. Sparks, the

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addictionologist who testified at the guilt stage of trial. (Id. at 110-14.)

Novak also testified that Dr. Potts, although appointed and funded by the trial court,

in fact served as the equivalent of Petitioner’s mitigation specialist. Novak explained that

Dr. Potts “did not act as a neutral, detached court-appointed expert.” (RT 3/21/06 at 121.)

Instead, Dr. Potts “indicated that his role was going to be to help us.” (Id.) In fact, Dr. Potts

“actively assisted developing mitigation, planning strategy” (id.); he urged Novak to move

for a continuance for additional neurological testing, and advised Novak to cite the case of

State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 863 P.2d 881 (1993) in support of the motion (id. at 123).

According to Novak, his discussion of strategy with Dr. Potts the night before Dr. Potts

testified at the sentencing hearing “was more like meetings I’ve had since with

aggravation/mitigation experts who are part of our defense team.” (Id. at 122-23, 125.)

2. Respondents’ witnesses

Respondents called three experts to testify at the evidentiary hearing: Dr. Steven

Herron, a psychiatrist formerly employed by the Department of Corrections; Dr. Anne

Herring, a neuropsychologist; and Dr. John Scialli, a psychiatrist. Their findings and

testimony can be summarized as follows.

Dr. Herron: Dr. Herron treated Petitioner from 2003 to 2005. The treatment

consisted primarily of the management of Petitioner’s medication. (RT 3/23/06 at 362, 374.)

Based upon a working diagnosis of bipolar disorder, Dr. Herron treated Petitioner for

depression and anxiety. (Id. at 363-64.) Dr. Herron stated that both depression and anxiety

are common among death-row inmates. (Id. at 364.) He testified that he believed the

diagnosis of bipolar disorder was reasonable, although he did not observe any manic or

hypomanic episodes. (Id. at 363.) Finally, Dr. Herron detected no signs of neurological

dysfunction, cognitive impairment, or PTSD, though he could not rule those conditions out.

(Id. at 366-68, 375-76.)

Dr. Herring: Dr. Herring, a clinical neuropsychologist, interviewed and tested

Petitioner and prepared a report dated November 2, 2005. (Ex. 51.) Based upon the results

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of the tests she performed and her review of test results obtained by Dr. Goldberg, Dr.

Herring concluded that Petitioner does not suffer from cognitive impairment or ADHD. (Id.

at 7-8; see RT 3/23/06 at 443.) 

Dr. Herring did not repeat the tests Dr. Goldberg administered on which Petitioner

performed in the average or above-average range. (RT 3/23/06 at 404-05.) She administered

tests designed to measure “executive function”; according to Dr. Herring, the results of such

tests would indicate whether Petitioner suffers from “even subtle cognitive dysfunction as

a result of head injuries.” (Id. at 405.) On two of these tests, the Category Test and the

Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Petitioner performed in the “well above average range.” (Ex.

51 at 6.) On tests implicating another category of executive functioning (“working

memory/divided attention”), Petitioner scored in the low-average to average range, with one

exception. (RT 3/23/06 at 408-11, 431; Ex. 51 at 6-7.) On that test, Petitioner scored in the

borderline-impaired range for shorter delay intervals. (Id.) However, his performance

improved to the average range for the longer, more difficult delay intervals, suggesting to Dr.

Herring that Petitioner’s “attention and working memory really are intact.” (RT 3/23/06 at

431.) 

On other tests measuring memory, Petitioner’s performance “fluctuated somewhat but

revealed largely intact abilities.” (Ex. 51 at 5.) Petitioner’s scores were lower on tests

measuring immediate as opposed to delayed recall. (Id.; RT 3/23/06 at 413-16; Ex. 12.)

According to Dr. Herring, this “atypical presentation,” by which Petitioner was able to recall

information more successfully after a delay, is inconsistent with memory loss due to brain

injury and may indicate that Petitioner experienced anxiety or was distracted during the

testing. (RT 3/23/06 at 415-16.) On tests measuring attention, Petitioner scored in the

average to very superior range, with one exception, a test administered by Dr. Goldberg but

“not compared to any norms.” (Id. at 421.) While acknowledging that these tests are not

“differentially diagnostic” of ADHD, Dr. Herring testified that the results Petitioner achieved

are not consistent with a diagnosis of attention deficit. (Id. at 423.) In this context Dr.

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8 The record indicates that Petitioner’s parents “did not consider him to have any

periods of hyperactivity.” (Ex. 56, Interview with Peggy and Randy Jones, 12/3/01 at 11.)

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Herring also noted that there was nothing in the record suggesting that Petitioner displayed

symptoms of ADHD prior to the age of seven, one of the criteria for a diagnosis of ADHD;

to the contrary, the record indicated that Petitioner was a good student and that his teachers

“loved” him, the latter not being a phenomenon characteristic of children with ADHD.8

 (Id.)

To supplement the testing performed by Dr. Goldberg and to measure additional

aspects of Petitioner’s executive ability, Dr. Herring administered a series of subtests of the

Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System. (RT 3/23/06 at 434-35.) To measure cognitive

flexibility, Dr. Herring administered the Verbal Fluency and Design Fluency tests. On the

former, analogous to the Controlled Word Association Test administered by Dr. Goldberg

on which Petitioner achieved low-average scores, Petitioner’s scores were all in the average

range. (Id. at 436.) On the latter, Petitioner’s scores were in the average to high-average

range. (Id.) On a test designed to measure “inhibitory capacity” and “impulse control,”

Petitioner performed in the borderline-impaired range; however, in another test measuring

the same domain, Petitioner’s score placed him in the high-average range. (Id. at 436-37; Ex.

51 at 7.) With respect to the latter test, Dr. Herring testified that it was significant that in

completing the test Petitioner obeyed all of the rules; Dr. Herring noted that subjects with

ADHD or frontal lobe damage find it difficult to perform the test without breaking the rules.

(Id. at 437; Ex. 51 at 7.) To measure Petitioner’s verbal thinking and abstract reasoning

abilities, Dr. Herring administered a “proverb-interpretation” test, on which Petitioner scored

in the high-average range. (Id.)

Petitioner’s scores on achievement tests administered by Dr. Goldberg ranged from

low average (math) to average (spelling) and high average (passage comprehension). (Id.

at 425.) On reading tests administered by Dr. Herring, Petitioner performed at the average

level when compared with his age peers and the low-average level in comparison with his

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education peers. (Ex. 51 at 6; RT 3/23/06 at 433.) His math performance was in the lower

half of the average range with respect to his age peers and in the borderline and low-average

range with respect to his education peers. (Id.)

On tests assessing visuospatial organization and construction, administered by Dr.

Goldberg, Petitioner’s performance was superior. (Ex. 51 at 5; RT 3/23/06 at 426.) Dr.

Herring administered a test requiring Petitioner to copy a complex drawing and then draw

it from memory. Petitioner’s performance in copying the figure was moderately impaired

but did not “suggest that there was a major distortion in his visuospatial processing.” (RT

3/23/06 at 432.)

On tests measuring sensory and motor abilities, Petitioner performed in the average

range for fine motor speed and manual dexterity but in the borderline-impaired range on the

TPT, a “complex perceptual motor task.” (Id. at 5-6; RT 3/23/06 at 427-29.) The latter test

measures several cognitive domains, including memory and speed of information-processing,

as well as tactile perception. (Id. at 428.) Taking into account Petitioner’s performance on

other tests measuring cognitive ability, Dr. Herring opined that Petitioner’s low score on the

TPT reflected a difficulty with his tactile perceptual abilities rather than a problem with

processing information. (Id.)

In her testimony Dr. Herring addressed the bases for Dr. Goldberg’s conclusion that

Petitioner suffers from cognitive deficiency. She explained that a child’s grades in school

can be affected by a variety of factors unrelated to cognitive ability. (RT 3/23/06 at 391-92.)

She further noted that Petitioner’s scores on his eighth grade standardized achievement tests,

which placed him in the average or low-average range (id. at 393), were not low enough to

meet the definition of cognitive impairment (id. at 400).

With respect to the gap in Petitioner’s performance and verbal IQ scores, Dr. Herring

testified that such a disparity, while significant, is not “uncommon,” with eighteen-point or

greater disparities in scores occurring in “ten percent of normal people.” (Id. at 418.) More

importantly, Dr. Herring noted that Petitioner’s higher score occurred on the performance

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subtest, which measures speed and is “sensitive to any disorder that impairs mental

processing,” whereas his lower score occurred on the verbal subtest, which, to a greater

extent than performance IQ, “assesses past learned information.” (Id.) Therefore, according

to Dr. Herring, “the fact that [Petitioner] did so much better on the performance IQ than the

verbal IQ is probably more suggestive of the fact that he did not do well in school than that

he is cognitively impaired, which would tend to slow people up, slows their processing speed

and slows their memory.” (Id. at 418-19.) 

Finally, in addition to neuropsychological tests, Dr. Herring, like Dr. Goldberg,

administered the Beck Depression Inventory II. (Id. at 442.) Petitioner’s score placed him

“in the range of normal mood.” (Id.) This represents a stark contrast with the result reported

by Dr. Goldberg, who, as noted above, found Petitioner to be severely depressed.

Although Petitioner’s test results included a few scores in the impaired range on

individual tests or subtests, Dr. Herring explained that these low scores were “outliers”; they

could not form the basis for a finding of cognitive disorder because they did not consistently

occur in any one cognitive domain. (Id. at 470-72, 478-79.) Dr. Herring observed that, given

the number of tests Petitioner was subjected to, sixty percent of the population would have

two or more test scores in the impaired range. (Id. at 470.)

Dr. Scialli: Dr. Scialli examined Petitioner on October 28, 2005, and prepared a

“Psychiatric Examination Report to Determine Mental State at Time of Alleged Offense,”

dated November 10, 2005. (Ex. 53.) Dr. Scialli testified that, based on his psychiatric

evaluation of Petitioner and a review of all the records, he could diagnose Petitioner as

suffering from the following conditions at the time of the murders: alcohol, amphetamine,

and cannabis dependence, and ADHD, residual type. (RT 3/23/06 at 511.)

Dr. Scialli disputed the diagnoses of Petitioner’s experts. He disagreed with the

diagnosis of PTSD, observing that Petitioner’s experts based their conclusions exclusively

on a finding that Petitioner had experienced a traumatic event; they did not, according to Dr.

Scialli, consider the remaining factors necessary to complete a diagnosis of PTSD. (RT

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3/23/06 at 496-99.) Dr. Scialli further noted that during his examination of Petitioner there

was no indication that Petitioner had “re-experienced” the traumatic event at the time of the

murders. (Id. at 499.)

Dr. Scialli testified that none of the experts had diagnosed Petitioner with cognitive

disorder as defined by the DSM-IV. (Id. at 500.) Dr. Scialli explained that phrases such as

“cognitive dysfunction” or “cognitive impairment” are not diagnostic definitions but instead

are used “idiosyncratically” as “terms of art” with no fixed meaning (Id. at 499-500.)

According to Dr. Scialli, Petitioner could not be classified under any of the categories of

cognitive disorder established by the DSM-IV; i.e., no expert had diagnosed Petitioner with

delirium, dementia, amnesiac disorder, or with cognitive disorder NOS. (Id. at 500-02.) 

Dr. Scialli also concluded that Petitioner did not suffer from bipolar disorder. Most

significant to this finding was the absence of evidence of manic or hypomanic symptoms.

(Id. at 504.) Dr. Scialli testified that Petitioner’s description of his “highs and lows”

“sounded like having an average day as opposed to a down-and-out day, and that’s not mania

or hypomania.” (Id.) In addition, the fact that Petitioner was prescribed, and responded

positively to, lithium, did not indicate to Dr. Scialli that Petitioner suffers from bipolar

disorder, because the drug is successfully used to treat a number of other conditions. (Id. at

502-03.)

Dr. Scialli diagnosed Petitioner with residual symptoms of ADHD. (Id. at 504-05.)

He testified, however, that there is no link between ADHD and violent behavior. (Id. at 505.)

He further testified that, had he been aware of Dr. Herring’s testimony on the issue of ADHD

before he prepared his report, he might have “come to a different conclusion.” (Id. at 512.)

In any event, the presence or absence of ADHD, residual type, is, in Dr. Scialli’s opinion, a

“very minor point,” because the condition is not related to the offenses. (Id.) 

Finally, Dr. Scialli’s report discusses the impact of the new evidence obtained during

the habeas proceedings on the issues raised in Petitioner’s claims. (Ex. 53 at 8-10.) First,

Dr. Scialli found that Dr. Potts was qualified to evaluate Petitioner for neurological disorders

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9 In previous appointments Drs. Herring and Scialli addressed some of the key

issues present in Petitioner’s case. Dr. Herring testified on behalf of the petitioner in Correll

v. Stewart, 2-CV-87-1471-PHX-SMM. At an evidentiary hearing on Correll’s IAC claim,

Dr. Herring testified that neurological testing indicated that Correll suffered from brain

dysfunction, problems with impulse control, and possible prefrontal lobe impairment. (See

Mem. of Decision and Order dated 3/5/03.) In State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 608, 863 P.2d

881, 900 (1993), Dr. Scialli, although retained by the State, testified that the defendant’s

boxing career could have caused brain damage and that the resulting mental impairment was

causally related to the murders; according to Dr. Scialli, Stuard, suffering from dementia,

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and organic mental illness. (Id. at 8.) Dr. Scialli also testified that Dr. Potts’s call for

“sophisticated neurological testing” could not have been interpreted as a request for a

neuropsychological examination. (RT 3/23/06 at 496.) Dr. Scialli also opined that the

neuropsychological testing performed during these habeas proceedings fails to provide any

information in addition to that which was included in Dr. Potts’s 1993 report and testimony

at sentencing. (Ex. 53 at 8.) Dr. Scialli also wrote and testified that Petitioner’s experts

failed to establish a stronger nexus between Petitioner’s alleged disorders and the murders

than the connection made by Dr. Potts at sentencing. (Id.)

3. Findings based on the new evidence

Faced with conflicting diagnoses resulting from a “latter day battle of the experts,”

Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 584 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court necessarily takes into account

the credibility of the parties’ witnesses. Cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 415

(explaining the value of cross-examination in assessing “inconsistent” psychiatric evidence).

Testimony elicited during the hearing indicated that Dr. Stewart’s forensic work is done

“primarily for the defense” (RT 3/22/06 at 231-32), and that Dr. Goldberg has never been

retained by the prosecution in a capital case and presently has a “working relationship” with

the Federal Public Defender’s Office (id. at 306). By contrast, Drs. Herring and Scialli have

offered testimony on behalf of both the State and criminal defendants or habeas petitioners,

with Dr. Scialli having been retained with equal frequency by the defense and the

prosecution.9

 (Id. at 388-89, 486.) With these considerations in mind, the Court makes the

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“reacted suddenly and overwhelmingly when he confronted and was confronted by his

victims.” Id. at n.12. 

10 The Court uses the term cognitive “impairment” as synonymous with

“dysfunction,” recognizing both as terms of art describing a condition distinct from

cognitive disorder, a condition recognized by the DSM-IV but which none of the experts

diagnosed in Petitioner.

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following findings regarding the factual bases of Petitioner’s claims of IAC at sentencing.

Cognitive impairment:10 The Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that he suffers

from cognitive impairment. This finding is based upon the reports and testimony of Drs.

Herring and Scialli, the test results offered by both parties, and the Court’s review of the

entire record. 

Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence regarding either the existence or the

cause of his alleged cognitive impairment. In making their diagnosis of cognitive

impairment, Petitioner’s experts relied upon Petitioner’s school performance, both his grades

and his scores on standardized tests; the discrepancy in his performance and verbal IQ scores;

and the results of other neuropsychological tests. As discussed above, alternative

explanations exist with respect to Petitioner’s declining school performance, including

absenteeism, family stresses, substance abuse, and lack of motivation. Moreover, as Dr.

Herring testified, Petitioner’s standardized test scores were within the average range and do

not, by themselves, suggest impairment. The gap between Petitioner’s IQ scores, while

notable, is not uncommon, and the fact that Petitioner scored higher on the performance

subtest militates against a finding of impairment, as does the fact that Petitioner’s overall IQ

is solidly in the average range. Finally, in the vast majority of instances Petitioner’s scores

on neuropsychological tests were in the average range or above. The few scores that fell in

the impaired range did not implicate any particular cognitive domain, suggesting that they

were aberrations and not indicative of impairment.

The experts ascribed as the primary cause of Petitioner’s cognitive impairment a series

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11 A complete list of the head or brain injuries alleged by Petitioner and referred

to in the record includes, in chronological order: prenatal exposure to neurotoxins in

Petitioner’s mother’s workplace (see, e.g., Ex. 1 at 25); beatings of his pregnant mother by

his father (id. at 7); strangulation by the umbilical cord while in utero and injuries from use

of forceps at delivery (id. at 7, 13); beatings to the head at age three by Petitioner’s first stepfather (id. at 8-9; Ex. 8 at 2); a fall off a slide (or a blow from his stepfather) at age five-andhalf, six, or seven, which left Petitioner unconscious for “approximately twenty minutes”

(Ex. 51 at 2; see, e.g., Ex. 1 at 9, 21); a motor vehicle accident at age ten which left Petitioner

unconscious (Ex. 53 at 2); a fall from a roof at age nine, ten, eleven, or thirteen, which

rendered Petitioner unconscious for a “couple of minutes”(Ex. 53 at 3) or five minutes to ten

minutes (Ex. 1 at 14), or did not result in loss of consciousness (Ex. 51 at 2); another fall, off

a second-floor scaffold or roof, at age fifteen or sixteen, leaving Petitioner unconscious for

three or four minutes (see, e.g., Ex. 53 at 4) or not resulting in unconsciousness (Ex. 51 at 2);

a fight in high school in which Petitioner was “knocked out” (Ex. 8 at 2; Ex. 12 at 2); the

1983 “mugging” (see, e.g., Ex. 12 at 2); a fight at a wedding in 1985, which left Petitioner

unconscious for “more than five minutes” (Ex. 53 at 4); “at least” three car accidents as an

adolescent or young adult, all producing head injuries and unconsciousness (Ex. 1 at 21); and

fights in Nevada bars (see, e.g., Ex. 12 at 2).

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of head injuries. With the exception of the 1983 “mugging,” there is no medical

documentation to corroborate any of these injuries. In addition, the dates and details – and

even the occurrence – of the injuries, as reported by Petitioner and his family, are

inconsistent and hence difficult to credit.11 This difficulty is compounded by the contrast

between Petitioner’s account of the 1983 incident, in which he was mugged, struck by a twoby-four, and left unconscious for three days, and the contemporaneous medical records,

which indicate that Petitioner was discovered passed out or asleep from the effects of

intoxication, that he responded upon being administered medication that counteracted those

effects, that he suffered no neurological damage and his only injury was a small abrasion, and

that if he suffered a concussion it was “resolved” upon his discharge. In any event, even if

Petitioner’s self-reported head injuries did occur, they did not, as discussed above, result in

cognitive impairment. 

Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: The Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that he

suffered from PTSD at the time of the murders. The Court reaches this conclusion based

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upon the fact that none of Petitioner’s experts completed an appropriate diagnosis using all

of the criteria set forth in the DSM-IV; instead, their reports focused simply on the presence

of the first criterion, the experience of a traumatic event. Both Dr. Stewart and Dr. Foy failed

to draw any connections between the traumatic events Petitioner experienced in his

childhood and the remaining PTSD criteria. While Dr. Stewart testified that Petitioner’s

condition satisfied the remaining criteria, he acknowledged that he never discussed with

Petitioner the effect of those criteria on Petitioner’s conduct at the time of the murders. (Id.

at 236.) Dr. Stewart also acknowledged that Petitioner’s conduct during the murders could

be attributed to his use of methamphetamine and alcohol, and that he could not determine

with certainty the extent to which PTSD, as opposed to drugs and alcohol, caused Petitioner’s

behavior. (Id. at 243-44.) 

Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: The Court finds that at the time of the

crimes Petitioner suffered from ADHD, residual type. The Court finds, however, based upon

Dr. Scialli’s testimony (RT 3/23/06 at 512), that the condition is unrelated to violent behavior

and, therefore, the fact that Petitioner suffered from the condition does not serve as

persuasive mitigation evidence. 

Mood disorder: The Court finds that the evidence does not support a determination

that Petitioner suffers from a major affective disorder, such as bipolar disorder. Specifically,

the record does not show that Petitioner has experienced episodes of mania or hypomania.

The record and the findings of the experts support a determination that Petitioner may suffer

from a chronic, low-level mood disorder such as dysthymia. Again, the Court does not

consider this to be persuasive evidence in mitigation. None of the experts suggested a causal

relationship between the condition and Petitioner’s conduct during the crimes. 

Substance abuse: The Court finds, based upon the undisputed testimony, that at the

time of the crimes Petitioner suffered from dependence on alcohol, amphetamine, and

cannabis.

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GOVERNING LAW

Because the PCR court denied relief on Claims 20(O), (P), and (T) based on the

substantive issues, the claims were “adjudicated on the merits” and are subject to the standard

of review established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA). 

1. Standard for habeas relief

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

With respect to § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court has explained that a state court

decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s clearly established precedents if the decision

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby

reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or

if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the

Supreme Court but reaches a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000); see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). Under the “unreasonable

application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant relief where a state

court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or “unreasonably extends a

legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply

or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. 

Application of these standards presents difficulties when the state court decided the

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merits of a claim without providing its rationale. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). In those circumstances, a federal court independently

reviews the record to assess whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable

under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although

the record is reviewed independently, a federal court nevertheless defers to the state court’s

ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

2. Clearly established federal law

The parties agree that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is the relevant

clearly established Supreme Court authority. Strickland requires a petitioner alleging

ineffectiveness of counsel to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the

deficiency prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687.

 To establish deficient performance under Strickland, a petitioner must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness “under prevailing

professional norms.” Id. at 687-88. As Petitioner correctly notes, failure to adequately

investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing may constitute deficient

performance. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).

 To establish prejudice under Strickland, a petitioner must “show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Under the prejudice

prong, “an error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting

aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id.

at 691. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that assessing prejudice in the context of capital

sentencing requires the reviewing court to “reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the

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totality of available mitigating evidence.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. Thus, in assessing

Petitioner’s allegations of prejudice, this Court must “evaluate the totality of the available

mitigation evidence – both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas

proceeding – in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

397-98. To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show there “is a reasonable probability that,

absent the errors, the sentencer – including an appellate court, to the extent it independently

reweighs the evidence – would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. In making such a

determination, the Court is further guided by the principle that a sentencing decision that is

supported by “overwhelming record support” is less likely to be affected by deficient

performance than a decision that is weakly supported by the record. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

696.

The Ninth Circuit has elaborated on the standards governing a habeas court’s review

of a claim of IAC at sentencing, emphasizing that the sentencing court’s decision “will stand

if supportable” and that “[r]eviewing courts . . . conduct their review to see if the decision

can be supported, rather than to see if they would have reached the same decision.” Smith

v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court of Appeals further explained

that:

In assessing prejudice in a case like this one, we are presented with a

particularly difficult practical and jurisprudential question because we are not

asked to imagine what the effect of certain testimony would have been upon

us personally. We are asked to imagine what the effect might have been upon

a sentencing judge, who was following the law, especially one who had heard

the testimony at trial. Mitigating evidence might well have one effect on the

sentencing judge, without having the same effect on a different judicial officer.

Id.

ANALYSIS

Claims 20(O), (P), and (T) allege that Novak rendered ineffective assistance of

counsel (“IAC”) at sentencing. In Claim 20(O), Petitioner asserts that he was denied

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effective assistance of counsel when Novak failed to secure the appointment of “partisan”

mental health experts, in the form of a neuropsychologist and neurologist who could have

revealed Petitioner’s “neurological disorders and organic mental illness.” (Dkt. 54 at 126.)

Claim 20(P) alleges that Novak’s failure to make a timely motion seeking neurological and

neuropsychological testing constituted IAC. (Dkt. 54 at 126.) In Claim 20(T), Petitioner

alleges that his right to effective assistance of counsel was denied due to Novak’s failure to

present additional mitigation evidence focusing on Petitioner’s abusive childhood and the

effects of his head trauma and drug abuse. (Dkt. 54 at 129.) Petitioner alleges that this

information could have been established through testimony of his ex-wife, friends, family

members, and former drug counselors. (Id.)

Petitioner alleges that the state court’s denial of his IAC claims constituted an

unreasonable application of Strickland. (Dkt. 66 at 70, 71, 76.) The PCR court did not

specifically cite the authority upon which it relied in denying relief on the claims, but the

parties predicated their arguments on Strickland. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that

the PCR court made its decision pursuant to Strickland. However, the rationale it applied in

doing so cannot be discerned. Therefore, this Court independently reviews the record before

the PCR court, in conjunction with its de novo review of new evidence presented at the

evidentiary hearing, to assess whether the state court, in denying Petitioner’s IAC claims,

“applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court has determined that it is unnecessary to

assess the quality of counsel’s performance under the first prong of Strickland because

Petitioner has failed to meet his burden under the second prong, which requires that he

“affirmatively prove prejudice.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. As the Strickland Court

explained, “A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”

Id. at 697 (“if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of

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sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed”); see Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,

286 n.14 (2000); Fields v. Brown, 431 F.3d 1186, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Court has assessed prejudice with respect to Petitioner’s sentencing-stage IAC

claims by reevaluating Petitioner’s sentence in the light of the evidence introduced in these

habeas proceedings. The Court concludes that the new information is largely inconclusive

or cumulative: it “barely . . . alter[s] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing

judge.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. Petitioner has failed, therefore, to affirmatively

demonstrate a reasonable probability that this additional information would alter the trial

court’s sentencing decision after it weighed the totality of the mitigation evidence against the

strong aggravating circumstances proven at trial. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on the following claims.

1. Claim 20(O)

The PCR court’s order denying this claim was not objectively unreasonable under

Strickland. After independently reviewing the record, the Court concludes that counsel’s

failure to seek the appointment of a mental health expert in a more timely manner did not

prejudice Petitioner. This is because Dr. Potts served as a de facto defense expert at

sentencing and also because, as discussed below with respect to Claim 20(P), the results of

subsequent examinations performed by the parties’ mental health experts have not

established a more-persuasive case in mitigation than that presented through the report and

testimony of Dr. Potts. Therefore, even if Novak had persuaded the trial court to appoint a

partisan mental health expert, there is not a reasonable probability that the court, presented

with the report of a defense expert in addition to Dr. Potts, would have imposed a life

sentence rather than the death penalty. 

At the evidentiary hearing Novak testified that, after speaking with Dr. Potts and

reviewing his report, he came to regard Dr. Potts as a mitigation expert and a member of the

defense team. (RT 121-22, 134-35, 151.) Novak worked closely with Dr. Potts. He

provided Dr. Potts with medical and military records and the trial testimony of Dr. Sparks.

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(Id. at 47-48, 141-44.) He also provided Dr. Potts with information relating to Petitioner’s

family history, and Dr. Potts spoke with Petitioner’s mother and step-father about Petitioner’s

history of drug use, his early childhood, and his head injuries. (RT 3/21/06, at 46-47.) In

turn, Dr. Potts actively assisted Novak in developing a case in mitigation. As noted above,

it was Dr. Potts who recommended that Novak seek a continuance to obtain additional

neurological testing. (RT 3/21/06, at 121-23, 125.)

In his report and during his testimony at sentencing, Dr. Potts offered accounts of

Petitioner’s chaotic and abusive childhood, including details of the abuse Petitioner suffered

at the hands of his first step-father. (Ex. 23 at 2; RT 12/9/93 at 80-83.) Dr. Potts reported

that Petitioner’s mother told him that Petitioner’s personality changed when he was around

fourteen years old, and that he started to get into trouble in his early teens, around the same

time he started drinking alcohol and experimenting with drugs. (Ex. 23 at 4; RT 3/21/06 at

53.) Dr. Potts referred in his report to three head injuries Petitioner suffered as a child (Ex.

23 at 3), and in his testimony at the sentencing hearing he described two additional incidents

(RT 12/8/93 at 77-78, 90-91).

Dr. Potts’s findings and testimony were clearly favorable to Petitioner. He concluded

in his report that Petitioner’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law

was impaired at the time of the murders, and that Petitioner’s use of drugs and alcohol

significantly contributed to his conduct. (Ex. 23 at 5.) He also identified seven mitigating

factors, on the basis of which he recommended against an aggravated sentence. (Id. at 5-6;

RT 12/8/93 at 73.) 

The record developed since Dr. Potts’s report has added detail but also ambiguity to

the diagnoses Dr. Potts offered in mitigation. Dr. Potts’s report, unchallenged by other

expert testimony at sentencing, found that Petitioner suffered from substance abuse and that

there was a “likelihood that he suffers from a major mental illness – cyclothymia.” (Ex. 23

at 5.) The report also noted many of the issues which arose during these habeas proceedings,

including the genetic factor underlying Petitioner’s substance abuse and mood disorder and

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12 Petitioner’s body apparently contains metallic “pellets” which prevent him

from being subjected to an MRI test. (RT 3/23/06 at 380.) However, other brain-imaging

processes are available. (Id. at 383.)

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the likelihood that Petitioner’s drug and alcohol use represented an attempt at selfmedication. (Id. at 4.) Similarly, Dr. Potts’s report placed substantial emphasis on

Petitioner’s head injuries; although Dr. Potts spoke of the head trauma merely as

“increas[ing] the potential for neurologic sequelae contributing to [Petitioner’s] behavior”

(id. at 6), the Court has not been presented with evidence confirming that Petitioner suffers

from neurological damage caused by head trauma or other factors. Therefore, Dr. Potts’s

finding at sentencing remains the most persuasive statement in the record that neurological

damage constituted a mitigating factor. In addition, the diagnoses not specified in Dr. Potts’s

report, PTSD and ADHD, are the conditions about which the parties’ experts were unable

to agree; and, with respect to ADHD, even a finding that Petitioner suffers from a residual

form of the condition is a fact of little or no mitigating value, because, as Dr. Scialli testified,

it bears no causal relationship to violent conduct. 

 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 20(O).

2. Claim 20(P)

The PCR court’s decision denying this claim – alleging a failure to timely seek

neurological or neuropsychological testing – was not objectively unreasonable under

Strickland.

Neurological testing

As Respondents note, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

failure to make a timely request for neurological, as opposed to neuropsychological, testing.

Petitioner has presented no evidence that neurological tests such as a CAT scan, MRI, or

EEG have been performed, let alone that their results would support a finding of cognitive

impairment.12 Petitioner cannot, therefore, demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial

counsel’s failure to secure such testing.

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Neuropsychological testing

As discussed above, the results of neuropsychological tests presented by the parties

are largely ambiguous and inconclusive. They do not demonstrate that Petitioner suffered

from cognitive impairment or PTSD at the time of the murders. Because the results of

neuropsychological tests actually performed do not support these diagnoses, Petitioner cannot

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to seek neuropsychological testing.

In addition, while this Court has found that Petitioner suffers from a residual type of

ADHD and a low-level mood disorder, these conditions do not constitute persuasive evidence

in mitigation because they do not bear a relationship to Petitioner’s violent behavior. As the

Supreme Court has directed, the sentencer in a capital proceeding must consider all relevant

mitigation evidence. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.

104 (1982). Therefore, if Petitioner had presented the trial court with evidence that he

suffered from ADHD and a low-level mood disorder, the court would have been obligated

to consider such information, whether or not Petitioner could establish a connection between

the conditions and his crimes. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004); State v. Newell,

212 Ariz. 389, 132 P.3d 833, 849 (2006) (“We do not require a nexus between the mitigating

factors and the crime to be established before we consider the mitigation evidence.”).

However, the court would have been “free to assess how much weight to assign to such

evidence.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 1998); see Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-

15 (“The sentencer . . . may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence”).

In “assessing the quality and strength” of Petitioner’s mitigation evidence, therefore, the trial

court could have taken into account Petitioner’s “failure to establish a causal connection”

between the murders and his ADHD and low-level mood disorder. Newell, 212 Ariz. at 389,

132 P.3d at 849. This Court concludes that the trial court would have assigned minimal

significance to testimony indicating that Petitioner suffered from ADHD and a low-level

mood disorder, and that this weight would not have outbalanced the factors found in

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13 At the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Petitioner indicated that Petitioner was

not asserting a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call for testimony from

Petitioner’s mother at sentencing. (RT 3/23/06 at 531.)

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aggravation. 

Novak’s failure to seek testing that could have revealed conditions causally unrelated

to the crimes did not prejudice Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

Claim 20(P).

3. Claim 20(T) 

The PCR court’s decision denying this claim was not objectively unreasonable under

Strickland. This claim consists of Petitioner’s allegation that he was prejudiced by Novak’s

failure to present additional lay witnesses to support his case in mitigation. According to

Petitioner, such witnesses could have “substantiate[d] claimed mitigation based on

Petitioner’s traumatic birth, abusive early childhood, history of drug abuse, head injuries and

the effects thereof on his behavior.” (Dkt. 54 at 129.) The information “could have been

established through Petitioner’s ex-wife, friends, family members, and former drug

counselors.”13 (Id.) Petitioner also alleges that he was prejudiced by Novak’s failure to

obtain additional birth, school, military, and prison records. (Id.; Dkt. 218 at 23.) 

At the sentencing hearing, Novak presented the testimony of Randy Jones, who

related the circumstances of Petitioner’s traumatic birth; his abusive early childhood; his

history of drug abuse and drug treatment, including his introduction to drugs by his

grandfather; his history of head injuries; and the apparent effect of the drugs and head

injuries on his behavior. (RT 12/8/93 at 39-68.) Novak admitted records from the Washoe

Medical Center where Petitioner was treated for drug withdrawal in 1986 and evaluated after

a suicide attempt in 1987 (RT 3/21/06 at 144; Ex. 64); he also admitted records from the

military hospital relating to the 1983 “mugging” (RT 12/9/93 at 6-7; Ex. 65). Novak obtained

additional records which he provided to Dr. Potts but did not present at sentencing because

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14 Although the Court’s analysis relies on the prejudice prong of Strickland, with

respect to information concerning sexual abuse by Petitioner’s grandfather and physical

abuse by Randy Jones, the Court additionally finds that Novak did not perform deficiently

by failing to uncover information not shared by Petitioner until nearly ten years after his trial.

Novak was never put on notice that sexual abuse was an issue. See Babbit v. Calderon, 151

F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998) (counsel’s failure to uncover defendant’s alleged family

history of mental illness was not unreasonable because none of the family members

interviewed reported the occurrence of such illness).

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the information in them “could cut both ways as far as mitigation goes.” (RT 3/21/06 at

145.) These records include a letter from a drug treatment program stating that Petitioner

was discharged for “noncompliance with a very hostile, angry, and threatening attitude

toward staff.” (Ex. 25; RT 3/21/06 at 147.) Novak chose not to admit additional military

records which described the details of Petitioner’s bad conduct discharge from the Marines.

(RT 3/21/03 at 145.) Novak did not obtain school records, but elicited testimony from Randy

Jones indicating that Petitioner’s grades declined when he reached adolescence. (Id. at 145;

RT 12/8/93 at 51-52.) 

At the evidentiary hearing before the PCR court, both Randy Jones and Petitioner’s

mother testified in support of Petitioner’s IAC claims. (RT 4/4/00 at 7-38.) Mrs. Jones

provided additional details of the abuse she and Petitioner suffered at the hands of

Petitioner’s father and first step-father. (Id. at 29-32, 36.) She testified that Petitioner’s

grades began to decline at age fifteen or sixteen. (Id. at 33.) She also testified that

Petitioner’s grandfather got him hooked on drugs. (Id. at 32.) PCR counsel also presented

Petitioner’s eighth-grade school records. (ROA-PCR 45, Ex. L.)

Among the new mitigation information Petitioner has offered during the habeas

proceedings are allegations that he was abused, emotionally and physically, by Randy Jones

and that he was sexually molested by his grandfather. The information detailing the sexual

abuse appears for the first time in Dr. Foy’s 2002 report (Ex. 5), which Dr. Stewart relied on

in his declaration and testimony (Ex. 1; RT 3/22/06 at 234-35).14 Information concerning

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physical abuse by Randy Jones also appears in Dr. Foy’s report and in an affidavit from

Petitioner’s sister. (Ex. 13.) 

Although Petitioner alleges that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to offer

testimony of witnesses to corroborate this abuse, at the evidentiary hearing before this Court,

Petitioner did not present the testimony of any of the witnesses cited in his petition; nor, with

the exception of the affidavit from his sister, did Petitioner indicate what mitigation

information could have been offered by his ex-wife, friends, family members, and former

drug counselors. Petitioner did not testify at the hearing, although his self-report of the

sexual abuse is presumably the basis for the information contained in the reports of Drs. Foy

and Stewart. (RT 3/22/06 at 234-35.)

The Court cannot conclude that Petitioner was prejudiced by the failure of Novak to

call witnesses the contents and credibility of whose testimony is unknown. The Court further

observes that the sentencing judge would likely have viewed with skepticism Petitioner’s

more-recent allegations of sexual and physical abuse, given their late disclosure, their

inconsistency with other information in the record, and Petitioner’s “obvious motive to

fabricate.” State v. Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192, 194, 914 P.2d 225, 227 (1996) (defendant’s

“self-serving testimony is subject to skepticism and may be deemed insufficient to establish

mitigation”); see State v. Sharp, 193 Ariz. 414, 425, 973 P.2d 1171, 1182 (1999) (selfreported, uncorroborated evidence “may be given little or no mitigation weight”). Also

reducing the import the sentencing judge might have assigned to such information is the lack

of a causal connection between the crimes and the new allegations of abuse. See Sharp, 193

Ariz. at 425, 973 P.2d at 1182 (explaining, in case involving a defendant who claimed that

he had been regularly sodomized by his stepbrother over a period of eight years, that Arizona

courts “require a causal connection to justify considering evidence of a defendant’s

background as a mitigating circumstance”) (citing Jones, 185 Ariz. at 490-91, 917 P.2d at

219-20). As noted above, in diagnosing Petitioner with PTSD, Petitioner’s experts attempted

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to link his childhood physical and sexual abuse with his conduct while committing the

murders. However, the experts failed to extend their diagnoses beyond a finding that

Petitioner experienced traumatic events in his childhood, and therefore did not establish a

nexus between the abuse and the murders.

With respect to records not previously obtained and presented at the state-court level,

the Court agrees with Respondents that the records accumulated during these habeas

proceedings – Petitioner’s school records from first grade, medical and military records – are

largely cumulative and of little mitigating value. Petitioner speculates that additional school

records, drug-treatment and mental-health records, and accident reports might have been

available at the time of Petitioner’s trial, but such speculation, as to both the existence and

the favorable contents of such records, is not sufficient to affirmatively establish prejudice.

Moreover, to the extent that the information contained in unavailable records might address

Petitioner’s claims of cognitive impairment or other mental conditions, the results of the

neuropsychological tests performed during the habeas proceedings constitute a more accurate

and meaningful measure of Petitioner’s functioning and thereby render such records

superfluous.

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 20(T).

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED dismissing Claims 20(O), 20(P), and 20(T) with prejudice.

DATED this 29th day of August, 2006.

Case 2:01-cv-00384-SRB Document 220 Filed 08/31/06 Page 37 of 37