Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00715/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00715-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Interstate Commerce Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED VAN LINES, LLC and 

MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, LLC, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

GAILE EDWARDS, as an individual 

and DOES 1-10, 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

 

No. 2:07-CV-0715 JAM DAD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs United Van Lines, LLC (“United”) and Mayflower 

Transit, LLC (“Mayflower”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought 

this action against defendant Gaile Edwards (“Edwards”) seeking 

to recover the amount due under an interstate-shipping contract. 

Edwards filed a cross-complaint. Plaintiffs now move for 

summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of 

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Civil Procedure. Edwards does not oppose the motion. For the 

reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.1

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Mayflower and United are motor carriers of household goods 

and personal property. Edwards is a former resident of 

California who currently resides in Montana. On or about 

October 6, 2005, Edwards entered into an interstate-shipping 

contract with Mayflower to transport her household goods from 

California to Montana. On or about October 12, 2005, Edwards 

tendered her household goods to Mayflower, which were 

subsequently delivered to Montana in accordance with the Bill of 

Lading at a cost of $8,068.25. Edwards accepted delivery of her 

household goods, but refused to pay Mayflower after allegedly 

discovering that some of her goods had been damaged and stolen. 

On or about August 26, 2006, after repeated attempts to 

secure payment for its services, Mayflower sent a letter to 

Edwards requesting payment. Edwards refused to pay or respond 

to the letter. On April 13, 2007, United filed a breach of 

contract action against Edwards seeking to recover the amount 

due under the interstate-shipping contract, $8,068.25, plus 

interest, pursuant to the terms of the Bill of Lading and the 

1

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 78-230(h). 

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Interstate Commerce Act of 1995, 49 U.S.C. §§ 13706, 13707. On 

May 1, 2007, the complaint was amended to add Mayflower as a 

named party. On July 19, 2007, Edwards filed an answer and 

cross-complaint, alleging that United breached the interstateshipping contract by causing loss or damage to her household 

goods during the shipping process. On October 4, 2007, this 

Court dismissed the cross-complaint on the basis that the claim 

alleged therein was pre-empted by the Carmack Amendment to the 

Interstate Commerce Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14706 et seq. (“Carmack 

Amendment”).2 On April 17, 2008, Edwards amended her crosscomplaint to include a violation of the Carmack Amendment for 

loss and damage to her household goods. On May 2, 2008, 

Mayflower propounded a set of Requests for Admissions pursuant 

to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To date, 

Edwards has not responded to these requests. On June 27, 2008, 

Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. Edwards did not 

oppose the motion. 

2

 “It is well settled that the Carmack Amendment is the 

exclusive cause of action for interstate-shipping contract 

claims alleging loss or damage to property.” Hall v. North 

American Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2007). A 

party must allege three elements to establish a prima facie case 

of violation of the Carmack Amendment: (1) delivery of the goods 

to the initial carrier in good condition, (2) damage of the 

goods before delivery to their final destination, or failure to 

delivery altogether, and (3) the amount of damages. See Beta 

Spawn, Inc. v. FFE Transportation Services, Inc., 250 F.3d 218, 

223 (3rd Cir. 2001). 

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II. ORDER 

A. Legal Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the 

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden 

of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

If the moving party sustains its burden, the burden then shifts 

to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his or 

her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 

324. Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence and 

the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact in 

dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 1989). 

B. Analysis

 Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is unopposed. A 

district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment 

solely because the opposing party has failed to file an 

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opposition. Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95, n. 4 

(9th Cir. 1994) (unopposed motion may be granted only after 

court determines that there are no material issues of fact). A 

court may, however, grant an unopposed motion for summary 

judgment if the movant’s papers are themselves sufficient to 

support the motion and do not on their face reveal a genuine 

issue of material fact. United States v. Real Property at 

Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d on 

other grounds sub nom. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 

(1996); Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 

1993) (same).

In the present case, Plaintiffs maintain that Edwards 

breached the interstate-shipping contract by failing to pay the 

amount due thereunder following Mayflower’s transportation of 

her household goods from California to Montana. The Court 

agrees. The papers filed in support of the motion for summary 

judgment show that the parties entered into an interstateshipping contract, Mayflower fulfilled its obligations under the 

contract pursuant to the terms of the Bill of Lading,3 and 

Edwards failed to pay Mayflower the amount due under the 

 

3

 The bill of lading is the basic transportation contract 

between the shipper-consignor and the carrier. Southern Pac. 

Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 342 (1982). 

Unless the bill of lading provides to the contrary, the 

consignor is liable for the freight charges. Id. at 343. 

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contract. The papers do not reveal a genuine issue of material 

fact. That is, on this undisputed record it is clear that 

Edwards breached the interstate-shipping contract. Moreover, 

the record reveals that Edwards failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ 

Requests for Admissions within the time required by Rule 36, and 

thereby admitted that the transportation of her household goods 

from California to Montana was conducted by Plaintiffs in 

compliance with the Bill of Lading and she is obligated to pay 

Plaintiffs $8,068.25. F.T.C. v. Medicor LLC., 217 F.Supp.2d 

1048, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Failure to timely respond to 

requests for admissions results in automatic admission of the 

matters requested.”). Accordingly, the Court grants summary 

judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their breach of contract 

claim. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover $8,068.25, plus 

prejudgment interest in the amount of 10 percent per annum.4 The 

Court also grants summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on 

Edwards’ cross-complaint. Edwards did not raise a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether she sustained loss or damage to 

her household goods arising out of Plaintiffs’ transportation of 

her goods from California to Montana. There is no evidence in 

 

4 See Cal. Civ.Code § 3289 (providing that contracts entered 

into after January 1, 1986, which do not stipulate a legal rate 

of interest, the obligation shall bear interest at a rate of 10 

percent per annum after a breach). 

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the record indicating that any of Edwards’ household goods were 

lost or stolen. 

III. ORDER 

 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed 

to enter judgment in accordance with this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 13, 2008 

 

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