Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00795/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00795-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 23:134 P.I.- Auto Negligence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION

LUTHER L. BILLINGSLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:06-cv-795-WKW

)

MCWHORTER FARMS, LLC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. # 10) this action to state court.

For the reasons that follow, the motion is due to be GRANTED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 14, 2006, Luther L. Billingsley (“Billingsley”) was involved in an accident on

Interstate 85 with Michael L. Adkins (“Adkins”), a truck driver employed with McWhorter Farms,

LLC (“McWhorter”). Billingsley claims that “Defendant Adkins negligently and/or wantonly caused

or allowed [his] vehicle to collide with a motor vehicle being driven by Billingsley.” (Compl. ¶ 6.)

Billingsley also brought suit against Lifestar Response of Alabama, Inc., d/b/a Car Ambulance

(“Lifestar”). In his complaint, Billingsley alleges that:

Following the accident made the basis of this suit, the Plaintiff Billingsley was attended to

by ambulance personnel employed by Defendant Lifestar. During the time said Billingsley

was being attended to by said employees of Lifestar, Billingsley was attended to and/or

transported in such a way so as to cause and/or contribute to cause the pain and/or injuries

that were suffered by Billingsley in the wreck made the basis of this suit.

(Compl. ¶ 7.) 

Case 3:06-cv-00795-WKW-TFM Document 32 Filed 04/25/07 Page 1 of 5
 Fictitious defendants are not permitted in federal cases, and as such the citizenship of the fictitious

1

defendants are ignored for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. See New v. Sports & Rec., Inc., 114 F.3d 1092,

1094 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997).

2

Billingsley originally filed this action against Lifestar, McWhorter, Adkins, and various

fictitious defendants in the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama. It is undisputed that 1

Billingsley and Lifestar are citizens of Alabama, and Adkins is a citizen of Kentucky. Defendants

have correctlyasserted that McWhorter’s citizenship is the citizenship of all ofits members. Because

there is only one member of the limited liability company, and he is a resident of Kentucky,

McWhorter is therefore a citizen of Kentucky. See Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH

Holdings, L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that for purposes of diversity

jurisdiction, a limited liability company’s citizenship is the citizenship of its members). 

 On September 5, 2006, McWhorter and Adkins (collectively “defendants”) removed this

case to the Middle District of Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Defendants based removal

upon their collective assertion of federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Defendants argue that Billingsley fraudulently joined Lifestar, an Alabama corporation, to

purposefully defeat original federal jurisdiction. Billingsley then filed the instant motion to remand.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress.

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). However, federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, with

respect to motions to remand cases removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the law of

this Circuit favors remand where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. “[R]emoval statutes are

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construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved

in favor of remand.” Id.

In determining whether to remand a case, “the district court must evaluate the factual

allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must resolve any uncertainties about state

substantive law in favor of the plaintiff.” Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citation omitted). These determinations should be “based on the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of

removal; but the court may consider affidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.”

Id.

III. DISCUSSION

“In a removal case alleging fraudulent joinder, the removing party has the burden of proving

that either: (1) there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident

defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring the resident defendant

into state court.” Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538. “[A] third situation of fraudulent joinder was identified -

i.e., where a diverse defendant is joined with a nondiverse defendant as to whom there is no joint,

several or alternative liability and where the claim against the diverse defendant has no real

connection to the claim against the nondiverse defendant.” Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154

F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Defendants argue only the first prong of

Crowe. They contend that Billingsley is foreclosed from maintaining an action against Lifestar

under the heightened pleading requirements of the Alabama Medical Liability Act (“AMLA”). Ala.

Code § 6-5-541 (1975).

“The burden of establishing fraudulent joinder is a heavy one. Where a plaintiff states even

a colorable claim against the resident defendant, joinder is proper and the case should be remanded

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to state court.” Pacheco de Perez v. AT & T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998). “The

plaintiff need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only have

a possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be legitimate.” Triggs, 154

F.3d at 1287. “[A]ny ambiguity or doubt about the substantive state law favors remand to state

court.” Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1539. The question that this court must answer is whether Billingsley

has the possibility of stating a valid cause of action against Lifestar. The court finds that he does.

Defendants label Billingsley’s cause of action against Lifestar as one arising under the

AMLA. Additionally, because the action allegedly arose under the AMLA, defendants argue that

Billingsley has failed to state a cause of action because he did not plead his case with specificity.

The AMLA governs most theories of legal liability against health care providers in Alabama.

Section 6-5-542 defines health care provider as “[a] medical practitioner, dental practitioner, medical

institution, physician, dentist, hospital, or other health care provider as those terms are defined in

Section 6-5-481.” Ala. Code § 6-5-542(1) (1975). Further, the term “other health care provider”

is defined as “[a]ny professional corporation or any person employed by physicians, dentists, or

hospitals who are directly involved in the delivery of health care services.” Ala. Code § 6-5-481

(1975). Noticeably absent in the Alabama statute and precedent is the inclusion of ambulance

services. 

Defendants do not cite, nor can the court find, any published Alabama opinion holding that

an action against an ambulance service is governed by the AMLA. Defendants cite various cases

holding that pharmacists, nursing homes, etc., are health care providers, but no case mentions

ambulance services. Defendants implicitly argue that this case should be decided on the merits as

to Lifestar. However, the court’s duty at this stage is to determine whether there is a possibility that

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an Alabama court could find that plaintiff’s complaint states a claim against Lifestar. This appears

to be an issue of first impression, and because Alabama law is unsettled, this case is one that should

be remanded. See Florence v. Crescent Resources, LLC, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 1138393 (11th Cir.

Apr. 18, 2007) (remand is appropriate when state law is unsettled as to an issue in the complaint).

Defendants’ contentions that Billingsley fails to plead a cause of action under the AMLA

with specificity is also an issue for Alabama state courts. If it is later determined that ambulance

services are not included within the AMLA, then simple notice pleading is required, and defendants’

contention that Billingsley failed to comply with the heightened pleading standard of the AMLA is

moot. 

Because there is a lack of complete diversity between the parties, the question whether the

amount in controversy is above $75,000 will not be considered. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants have not met their burden of establishing fraudulent

joinder. It is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Billingsley’s Motion to Remand (Doc. # 10) is GRANTED;

2. This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama;

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand; and 

4. Any pending motions are left for resolution by the Circuit Court of Macon County,

Alabama.

Done this 25th day of April, 2007.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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