Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01285/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01285-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

THOMAS R. WOODSON, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

R.N. ORTIZ et al, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 15cv1285 WQH (RBB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 13]; ORDER 

DENYING [AMENDED] MOTION 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

[ECF NO. 23] 

 Plaintiff Thomas R. Woodson, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 9, 2015 [ECF 

Nos. 1, 3]. Woodson claims that Defendants Ortiz, Orduna, Kim, Stepke, Ball, Gutierrez, 

and Dogonyaro (“Defendants”) violated his rights by failing to treat an injury to his hand 

in a timely manner while he was incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison. (See Compl. 4-

12, ECF No. 1.)1 On October 27, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint [ECF No. 13]. Plaintiff filed an “Opposition Motion” on November 25, 2015 

[ECF No. 15], which the Court construes as his opposition (the “Opposition”). After 

                                                                

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 The Court will cite to documents as paginated on the electronic case filing system.

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being given an extension of time [ECF No. 18], Defendants filed a Reply on December 

10, 2015 [ECF No. 19]. 

 Woodson additionally submitted a “Motion for Appointment of Counsel,” which 

was filed nunc pro tunc to December 3, 2015 [ECF No. 21]. He submitted another 

document entitled “Motion for Appointment of Counsel,” which was filed as an 

“[Amended] Motion for Appointment of Counsel” nunc pro tunc to January 29, 2016 

[ECF No. 23]. This filing is identical to the original Motion for Appointment of Counsel, 

except that it bears a later date. (Compare Mot. Appointment Counsel 1-6, ECF No. 21, 

with [Am.] Mot. Appointment Counsel 1-6, ECF No. 23.) The amended motion 

supersedes the original Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Franklin v. Smalls, Civil 

No. 09cv1067 MMA(RBB), 2012 WL 5077630, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2012) (citations 

omitted) (“This second Motion to Compel is identical to Plaintiff’s first Motion, with the 

exception of an added two-page memorandum of points and authorities. The Amended 

Motion to Compel supersedes the original.”). 

The Court has reviewed the Complaint and exhibits, the Motion to Dismiss, the 

Opposition, the Reply, as well as the Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 13] should be GRANTED 

in part and DENIED in part, and the Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

[ECF No. 23] is DENIED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The allegations in the Complaint arise from events that began in May of 2014 

while Woodson was incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)2

 In 

total, Plaintiff asserts claims against seven Defendants in their individual capacities. (Id. 

at 1-11.) 

// 

//

                                                                

2

 Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. (See Not. Address Change 1, ECF No. 24.) 

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A. Count One 

In count one, Woodson alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment and section 

845.6 of the California Government Code for the failure of Defendants Kim, Ortiz, 

Orduna, and Stepke to timely treat an injury to his hand. (Id. at 4-11.) Plaintiff contends 

that he fractured a bone and dislocated another bone in his left hand on May 27, 2014, 

causing him “serious pain and swelling.” (Id. at 4.) Woodson insists he “immediately 

submitted a Health Care Services request form” directly to prison staff following this 

incident, but was not given immediate care. (Id.) Plaintiff explains he “verbally 

informed [prison staff members] for several days that he was in excruciating pain and 

needed to be seen by a doctor, showing the nurses his swollen and injured hand.” (Id.) 

But it was not until June 3, 2014, that he was seen by Defendant Nurse Ortiz. (Id.) 

Plaintiff characterizes Ortiz as being “agitated and indifferent,” stating that she “rolled 

her eyes and sucked her teeth as Plaintiff showed her his swollen and deformed hand.” 

(Id.) 

 Woodson’s hand was subsequently examined by several doctors. (Id. at 5.) His 

hand was initially evaluated by Dr. Estock, who is not a party to this litigation. (Id.) Dr. 

Estock ordered an x-ray of Plaintiff’s hand, which Woodson argues “confirm[ed] a 

serious medical need.” (Id.) Dr. Estock also “ordered a temporary spica short arm 

[splint] to be placed on Plaintiff’s hand and wrist” and gave Woodson Tylenol. (Id.) 

Plaintiff next saw Dr. Foerster, also not a party to this litigation, on June 5, 2014. (Id.) 

Woodson states that Dr. Foerster “diagnosed Plaintiff’s left thumb metecarpel [sic] 

fracture, trapezium dislocation at dorsal base of metecarpel [sic] with ligament damage,” 

and recommended immediate surgery. (Id. (citing Compl. Ex. A).) Last, Plaintiff was 

seen by Defendant Dr. Kim on June 6, 2014. (Id.) Woodson told Dr. Kim that “he was 

in constant pain and unable to sleep well for fear of rolling onto [his hand] or bumping it, 

as it would send shock waves of acute pain up Plaintiff’s arm and what felt like his entire 

body.” (Id.) Plaintiff explained the urgency of the situation to Defendant Kim, stating 

that he “had been suffering with pain and discomfort for ten days as of that visit without 

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receiving the recommended treatment (surgery).” (Id. at 5-6.) Woodson complains that 

Defendant Kim “simply scribbled some things down on a piece of paper and stoically 

dismissed Plaintiff without an adequate response or mere mention of scheduled date for 

surgery.” (Id. at 6.) Woodson also asserts that this doctor falsified the date that 

Plaintiff’s x-ray was taken, and that the statement in Dr. Kim’s report that Woodson had 

no definite identified fracture contradicts Dr. Foerster’s findings, which “could have led 

to the denial of timely and adequate medical treatment.” (Id. at 11.) 

 On several occasions following his appointment with Dr. Kim, Plaintiff attempted 

to ask prison staff about the waiting period for treatment. (Id. at 6-8.) Woodson first 

contends that nursing assistant Evans, who is not a party to this litigation, went to her 

superiors, Defendants Ortiz and Orduna, on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Id. at 6.) Woodson 

asserts that these two Defendants ignored Evans’s “attempts to inform them of Plaintiff’s 

concerns and request for treatment.” (Id.) Woodson additionally indicates that Dr. Kim 

failed to respond to the inmate request form (CDCR 22) from Plaintiff dated June 12, 

2014, where Woodson asked about the waiting period for surgery. (Id. (citing Compl. 

Ex. B).) On June 19, 2014, he submitted an emergency grievance appeal because he still 

had not been treated for his worsening injury. (Id. at 6 (citing Compl. Ex. C).) 

Woodson further complains that on June 30, 2014, he sent Defendant Ortiz an 

inmate request form and inquired as to the waiting period for surgery, but she never 

responded. (Id. at 7 (citing Compl. Ex. C).) On the same day, he asked Defendant Dr. 

Stepke about being scheduled for surgery. (Id.) In response, Dr. Stepke “shrugged his 

shoulders with apathy, stating, ‘I don[’]t do the scheduling.’” (Id. (citing Compl. Ex. D).) 

Woodson argues that Dr. Steptke conspired with the other Defendants to deny and delay 

Plaintiff’s treatment, making his injury worse. (Id. at 10.) Woodson attempts to 

substantiate this claim by referencing his medical records: 

Dr. Stepke circled “Routine” on the initial Health Care Services Physician 

request for services document when the physician report of 6/5/14 clearly 

indicates urgency. Upon further research Plaintiff found policy 

documentation that specifically states, patients “shall” be seen by the 

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physician within 24 hours (urgent), within fourteen (14) calendar days 

(Routine). Dr. Stepke circling “routine” when this was an urgent situation 

can only be to cover up the fact that although Plaintiff submitted the CDCR 

7362 medical request form directly into the hands of nursing staff the day of 

injury[,] Plaintiff was not seen by a physician until 7 or 8 days later. 

(Id. at 10-11 (internal citations omitted).) Also on June 30, 2014, Woodson submitted an 

inmate request form to Defendant Orduna stating that she had not processed his forms for 

off-site medical treatment. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff indicates that in response, Nurse Orduna 

“blam[ed] the off-site specialist surgery schedule.” (Id. (citing Compl. Ex. E).) 

Woodson received surgery on his hand on July 11, 2014, and describes that day as 

follows: 

After 45 days of agony, pain and suffering, discomfort and inability to 

perform mundane . . . or intricate task[s] involving [Plaintiff’s] left hand, on 

July 11, 2014 Plaintiff was transported to [Alvarado] Hospital for 

reconstructive surgery. Plaintiff was quickly put under anesthesia for the 

procedure and never got a chance to talk with the specialist Bruce [Foerster] 

who performed the surgery about the delay and its effects. On the van ride 

back to the institution the transportation officers told Plaintiff that, 

“everything didn’t look good, at one point it looked as if there was an 

emergency.” 

(Id. at 8.) Woodson asserts that in a follow-up appointment with Dr. Foerster, the doctor 

told him that “surgery for injuries such as Plaintiff’s should take place sooner than later.” 

(Id. at 9.) Woodson interprets this statement from Dr. Foerster “as confirmation that the 

denial/delay of timely health care for his serious medical need . . . did in fact adversely 

affect Plaintiff.” (Id.) 

 Woodson concludes “that at every step of seeking adequate diagnosis and 

treatment for his serious medical needs he was met with deliberate indifference by prison 

medical staff and officials.” (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff asserts that “[u]ndue denials, delays, 

runarounds, non-responses or apathetic deferring rendered treatment clearly [a] grossly 

inadequate response to [Plaintiff’s] medical condition.” (Id. at 10.) Woodson contends 

he “suffered prolonged pain and unnecessary suffering that medical officials were 

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continually made aware of and chose to unrecognize [sic].” (Id. (citing Compl. Ex. I).) 

Plaintiff argues that the actions by these Defendants exacerbated his condition, noting 

that his “thumb is permanently unstable, weak, stiff, with a loss of contour and after a 

year later still gives Plaintiff pain when trying to perform every day task[s]. Plaintiff has 

also suffered muscle atrophy with a noticeable size difference from his left hand and his 

right.” (Id.) 

B. Count Two 

In count two, Woodson alleges that Defendants Gutierrez and Dogonyaro, both 

health care appeals coordinators, violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

(Id. at 12.) As to Defendant Gutierrez, Plaintiff asserts that this Defendant harmed him 

by causing “spurious delays, rejections, [and] cancellations, obstructing Plaintiff’s 

attempts to remedy his health care problem in a timely manner after knowledge of 

Plaintiff’s [serious] medical need.” (Id.) Woodson states a nearly identical allegation 

against Defendant Dogonyaro. (See id.) Plaintiff contends that the actions of both 

Defendants had a “chilling effect” on his First Amendment right to file a grievance. (Id. 

at 3.) 

C. Allegations Against Dr. Ball 

Woodson’s allegations against Dr. Ball do not appear in count one or count two. 

(See Compl. 4-12, ECF No. 1.) Rather, they appear in the identification of parties on 

page two of the form complaint. (See id. at 2.) There, Plaintiff states that Dr. Ball 

“failed to exercise his/her supervisory liability [sic] after being notified of Plaintiff’s 

serious medical need and callous indifference by subordinates. He/she failed to respond 

to Plaintiff or remedy the wrong causing plaintiff prolonged pain and suffering and 

substantial risk of further harm.” (Id.) 

Woodson seeks $30,000 in compensatory damages and $22,500 in punitive 

damages. (Id. at 14.) 

// 

// 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

 1. Legal standards 

 a. Standards applicable to pro se litigants 

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must 

construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of 

liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In giving liberal interpretation to 

a pro se civil rights complaint, courts “may not supply essential elements of the claim that 

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 

(9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights 

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. 

Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory 

allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The 

plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint 

“‘unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting 

Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights 

complaint may be dismissed, the court is required to provide the plaintiff with a statement 

explaining the complaint’s deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24 (citation 

omitted). But where amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial 

of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

// 

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 b. Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. 

Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A complaint must be dismissed if 

it does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court accepts as true all material allegations in the 

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and construes the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 

(9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 

1995); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

 The court does not look at whether the “plaintiff will ultimately prevail but 

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 

183 (1984); see Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence 

of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 

699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

 The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true; rather, it 

must “examine whether [they] follow from the description of facts as alleged by the 

plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); 

see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 

a court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations 

if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged” (quoting Clegg 

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v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994))). “Nor is the court 

required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions 

of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 

988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts 

may not generally consider materials outside of the pleadings. Schneider v. California 

Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & 

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v. Gen. 

Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes 

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a 

motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 

13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993)). “When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the 

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether dismissal [i]s proper 

. . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc., 51 F.3d at 1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 

1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)).

 c. Stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that 

(1) a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the 

conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2012); Shah v. Cty. 

of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 d. Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 

Deliberate indifference to medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 

(1976). Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs consists of two requirements, 

one objective and the other subjective. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2006); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1132–33 (quoting Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 

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1995)). The plaintiff must first establish a “serious medical need” by showing that 

“failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the 

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin 

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991)). “Second, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 

F.2d at 1060). 

With regard to the objective requirement, “serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy 

of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 

203 F.3d at 1131 (alteration in original) (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60). 

Under the subjective element, prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a 

prisoner’s serious medical needs when they “deny, delay or intentionally interfere with 

medical treatment.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 

“[T]he official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Inadequate treatment due to medical malpractice, 

negligence, or even gross negligence, does not rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

105–06); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A defendant’s acts or omissions will not amount to a constitutional violation unless 

there is reckless disregard of a risk of serious harm to the prisoner. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

836. The inmate must allege that the defendant purposefully ignored or failed to respond 

to his pain or medical needs; an inadvertent failure to provide adequate care does not 

constitute a violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06. The official must have “know[n] that 

[the] inmate[ ] face[d] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[ed] that risk by 

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. 

// 

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e. California Government Code section 845.6 

“By statute, California imposes a duty on government employees who have 

custody of prisoners to provide medical care to the prisoners when needed.” Nobles v. 

U.S. Customs, Civil No. 07cv1231 WQH(RBB), 2008 WL 1944106, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

May 2, 2008) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6 (West 2012)). California Government 

Code section 845.6 provides as follows: 

[E]xcept as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public 

employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the 

scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to 

know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to 

take reasonable action to summon such medical care. 

Gov’t § 845.6. To state a claim under this section, “a prisoner must establish three 

elements: (1) the public employee knew or had reason to know of the need (2) for 

immediate medical care, and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care.” Jett, 439 F.3d 

at 1099 (citing Gov’t § 845.6)). But “[l]iability under section 845.6 is limited to serious 

and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.” Watson v. State of 

California, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262, 265 (1993) (citations 

omitted). 

 2. Discussion 

In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert that there was no unreasonable delay 

in Plaintiff’s medical care. (Mot. Dismiss 10, ECF No. 13.) They argue that despite his 

contention that he was not seen by medical staff until June 3, 2014, Woodson was 

actually first seen on May 30, 2014. (Id. at 7 (citations omitted).) Defendants further 

contend that surgery did not need to be performed on an emergency basis and that 

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is based on his subjective concerns, explaining 

that Woodson was given pain mediation and a brace while waiting for surgery. (Id. at 

13.) They conclude all claims should be dismissed without leave to amend. (Id. at 21.) 

// 

// 

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a. Dr. Kim 

Addressing the allegations against him, Dr. Kim contends that nothing in Dr. 

Foerster’s report indicates that emergency surgery should be performed. (Id. at 14.) 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument that his delay in having surgery amounted to deliberate 

indifference is contradicted by his medical records. (Id. at 15.) Defendant argues that 

Woodson’s allegations are conclusory, reasoning that even if there were a need for 

immediate surgery, Plaintiff has not alleged that Dr. Kim controlled scheduling for the 

surgery. (Id.) He asserts that Woodson has not alleged a purposeful act by Dr. Kim to 

deny Plaintiff necessary medical care. (Id.) Defendant explains that Woodson was 

already being treated for his injured hand with a splint and medication when he saw Dr. 

Kim on June 6, 2014. (Id.) And the doctor’s actions merely amounted to not giving 

Plaintiff the immediate treatment he wanted, which is not actionable. (Id. at 15-16.) Dr. 

Kim moreover disputes that he falsified documents. (See id. at 16 (citing Compl. 11, 

ECF No. 1).) 

 Woodson responds in the Opposition that he only saw Dr. Kim once, on June 6, 

2014. (Opp’n 4, ECF No. 15.) The day before, on June 5, 2014, Dr. Foerster had 

recommended immediate surgery. (Id. at 5 (citing Compl. Ex. A, at 5, ECF No. 15).) 

Plaintiff asserts that during his visit with Dr. Kim, the doctor did not seem interested and 

did not provide Woodson with any information or response. (Id.) Plaintiff advised Dr. 

Kim of Woodson’s injury, “[from] which an inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of harm and further risk of harm existed.” (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff argues that the 

Defendant disregarded a risk to his health and disputes the assertion that his arguments 

are conclusory. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff additionally argues that Defendants violated 

California Government Code section 845.6, reasoning that there was a delay of seven 

days between notice of the injury and his examination, and thirty-eight days from his 

“telemedicine consultation” to his surgery. (Id. at 6.) Woodson moreover complains that 

he was not given pain medication for seven days, and when he was given Ibuprofen, this 

medication was only administered for a week and was ineffective. (Id. at 7.) 

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 The Reply does not distinguish among the Defendants or address the allegations 

against Dr. Kim in depth. (See Reply 1-6, ECF No. 19.) Instead, the Defendants 

maintain that Plaintiff only waited three days to be seen after his initial injury, and they 

dispute as unfounded the allegation that falsified medical records show that Woodson 

was seen on May 30, 2014. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendants further respond that Woodson was 

actually prescribed Tylenol with codeine, not just regular Tylenol, as Plaintiff alleges. 

(Id. at 3-4.) They deny that Woodson suffered harm resulting from the delay in surgery, 

reasoning instead that he will still experience difficulties with his thumb despite 

undergoing surgery and nothing indicates that surgery was needed on an emergency 

basis. (Id. at 4-5.) 

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s allegation that Dr. Kim falsified the date that 

Plaintiff’s x-ray was taken, (see Compl. 11, ECF No. 1), is wholly conclusory. Woodson 

alleges insufficient facts to support this conclusion. See Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 

F.3d at 973. Nevertheless, “to establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from a 

delay in treatment, a plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful.” Goolsby v. Ridge, 

Civil No. 09cv02654–RBB, 2012 WL 1068881, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (citing 

Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 

1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

“[M]ere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate 

medical indifference . . . .” Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Rather, a prisoner has “no 

claim for deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.” Id. (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). The prisoner does not need to show that the harm was 

substantial, although doing so would provide support for his claim of deliberate 

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). 

Here, Woodson contends that after explaining the urgency of his situation to Dr. 

Kim, the doctor dismissed Plaintiff without mentioning when surgery would be 

scheduled, and failed to respond to his subsequent inquiries regarding the waiting period 

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for surgery. (Compl. 5-6, ECF No. 1.) Woodson additionally asserts that Dr. Kim’s 

statement that there was no “definite facture” contradicts Dr. Foerster’s report, which 

Plaintiff argues could have delayed his treatment. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff maintains that 

these acts caused him several weeks of agony and pain. (Id. at 8.) 

Liberally construing Woodson’s allegations against Defendant Kim as this Court 

must, see Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623, Plaintiff has alleged a medical indifference 

toward him by Dr. Kim, which caused him a harmful delay in obtaining surgery. See 

Shapley, 766 F.2d at 407 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). This is sufficient to allege a 

claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Evans v. Cty. of San 

Diego, No. 06 CV 877 JM (RBB), 2009 WL 3709183, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009) 

(adopting recommendation that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted 

where an inmate “received regular medical care while in the custody of the County, and 

any delay in surgery did not cause him harm”). As a result, Defendant Kim’s Motion to 

Dismiss Woodson’s Eighth Amendment claim against him should be DENIED. 

Plaintiff has not, however, sufficiently stated a claim under California Government 

Code section 845.6 against Dr. Kim. Although Defendants do not address Woodson’s 

section 845.6 claim in the Motion to Dismiss, (see Mot. Dismiss 7-20, ECF No. 13), this 

Court is obligated to sua sponte review this cause of action to assess whether it states a 

claim for relief, see Alve v. Edwards, Civil No. 10–1389 DMS (POR), 2010 WL 

4809339, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) (“The Court must sua sponte dismiss prisoner 

complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted.” (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(b) (West 2006); 

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446–47 (9th Cir. 2000))). 

Here, other than mentioning this code section at the top of every page in count one 

of his Complaint, Plaintiff does not address the requirements for stating a claim under 

section 845.6. (See Compl. 4-12, ECF No. 1.) As discussed above, there are three 

elements under this code section, see Jett, 439 F.3d at 1099 (citing Gov’t § 845.6)), but 

the Court may not supply missing elements in liberally construing Woodson’s Complaint, 

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see Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Accordingly, this claim is insufficiently pleaded and should be 

DISMISSED. Courts must give a plaintiff leave to amend a pleading unless he could not 

possibly cure the claim by asserting other facts. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. A plaintiff 

should not be granted the opportunity to amend when doing so would be futile. Gardner 

v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009). Because it is unclear whether Woodson 

could amend his pleading to include further facts to state a claim under section 845.6 

against Dr. Kim, he should be given leave to amend his section 845.6 claim against this 

Defendant. 

b. Nurse Ortiz and Nurse Orduna 

In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Ortiz and Orduna contend that the 

allegations against them are conclusory. (Mot. Dismiss 17, ECF No. 13.) They reason 

that “[t]here is no allegation that either Nurse Ortiz [or] Nurse Orduna had any control 

over scheduling plaintiff’s surgery, or were otherwise involved in providing care for his 

thumb injury after Nurse Ortiz saw plaintiff on his initial visit for medical treatment on 

June 3, 2014.” (Id.) Defendants conclude that Plaintiff has not met the standard for 

stating a claim against them under the Eighth Amendment. (See id. at 17-18.) 

 Woodson responds in the Opposition that Defendants Ortiz and Orduna’s actions 

were deliberately indifferent and “led to prolonged pain and suffering.” (Opp’n 8, ECF 

No. 15.) Plaintiff explains that the failure of these Defendants to process his paperwork 

denied and delayed his treatment “and has extended the pain suffering and risk of further 

harm.” (Id. at 8-9 (citing Compl. Exs. C, D, E, G, H, ECF No. 1).) As with Dr. Kim, 

Defendants Ortiz and Orduna do not discuss Woodson’s allegations against them in depth 

in the Reply. (See Reply 1-6, ECF No. 19.) 

 Like Plaintiff’s allegations of deliberate indifference against Dr. Kim, Woodson 

has sufficiently stated a claim for deliberate indifference against Defendants Ortiz and 

Orduna. According to Plaintiff, these Defendants ignored his requests for treatment, 

(Compl. 6-7, ECF No. 1), which caused him weeks of pain and suffering, (id. at 8.) This 

is sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. See Shapley, 766 F.2d at 407 

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(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Woodson’s Eighth Amendment claims against Nurses Ortiz and Orduna should be 

DENIED. 

 Woodson has not, however, adequately stated a claim that these Defendants 

violated California Government Code section 845.6. As mentioned, nowhere in the 

Complaint does Plaintiff address the requirements for stating a claim under this code 

section. (See Compl. 4-12, ECF No. 1.) The Court cannot supply these requirements for 

Woodson, see Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268, and for this reason this claim should be 

DISMISSED. Because it is not clear whether Plaintiff could amend his pleadings to 

include facts sufficient to state a claim under section 845.6 against these Defendants, he 

should be given leave to amend this claim. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

c. Dr. Stepke 

Addressing the allegations against Dr. Stepke, this Defendant argues that despite 

the contention that he circled “routine” on a medical form dated June 2, 2014, Plaintiff 

was seen by medical staff the following day. (Mot. Dismiss 18, ECF No. 13.) The 

doctor states that Woodson does not allege any purposeful actions by this Defendant to 

deny Plaintiff necessary care. (Id.) Dr. Stepke argues that his involvement was minimal 

and does not provide a basis for liability: 

[T]he only allegation that Dr. Stepke was involved in plaintiff’s medical care 

is in ordering a follow up appointment, which occurred the next day. That 

Dr. Stepke did not order surgery done on an emergency basis, establishes 

only that that [sic] Dr. Stepke did not provide the immediate treatment that 

plaintiff wanted. 

(Id. at 18.) This Defendant characterizes Woodson’s complaint against him as one for 

not pursuing alternative treatment options, which Dr. Stepke argues does not amount to 

deliberate indifference. (Id. at 18-19 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107).) 

 In the Opposition, Plaintiff reiterates that Dr. Stepke’s deliberate indifference was 

manifested by the doctor’s June 24, 2014 statement to Woodson regarding scheduling. 

(Opp’n 9-10, ECF No. 15 (citing Compl. Ex. D, at 36, ECF No. 1).) Plaintiff disputes 

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that he saw Dr. Stepke on June 2, 2014, or that events on that day are the basis for his 

claim against the doctor. (Id. at 10.) Instead, Woodson explains that Dr. Stepke was 

aware of Plaintiff’s pain but acted apathetically toward him. (Id.) Woodson asserts that 

this “equates to an ‘I [don’t] care attitude.’” (Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 837).) 

The Reply does not discuss Plaintiff’s allegations against Dr. Stepke, other than to 

reiterate that the statement to Woodson regarding scheduling does not state a claim for 

relief. (Reply 5-6, ECF No. 19.) 

 Having reviewed the Complaint, it is unclear to the Court when Plaintiff saw Dr. 

Stepke for his evaluation. The “Health Care Services Physician Request for Services” 

form completed by this Defendant contains multiple dates, but none are June 2, 2014, the 

date Dr. Stepke appears to allege that Woodson had his consultation with the doctor. 

(See Compl. Ex. J, at 63, ECF No. 1.) Rather, it appears that Dr. Stepke completed his 

“Notification of Diagnostic Test Results” on June 2, 2014. (See id. Ex. K, at 79.) 

Neither party does an adequate job in their briefing to address what day Plaintiff saw Dr. 

Stepke, but this factual dispute is not one the Court needs to resolve on Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss. 

 In reviewing Woodson’s Complaint, the Court accepts as true Plaintiff’s 

allegations and construes the Complaint in the light most favorable to him. See Cholla 

Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Karam, 352 F.3d at 1192); Parks Sch. of Bus., 

Inc., 51 F.3d at 1484; NL Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d at 898 (citation omitted). Here, the crux 

of Woodson’s allegations against Dr. Stepke is that by circling the words “routine” 

instead of “urgent” on the request for services document, this Defendant prevented 

Plaintiff from receiving the immediate care that he needed until seven or eight days later. 

(See Compl. 10-11, ECF No. 1.) This is sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth 

Amendment, because Woodson alleges he had a serious medical need, Jett, 439 F.3d at 

1096, and that Dr. Stepke delayed his medical treatment for this need. Hutchinson, 838 

F.2d at 394. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED as to 

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Stepke. 

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 For the reasons outlined above, Woodson again has not stated a claim under 

California Government Code section 845.6. Because it is unclear whether Woodson 

could amend his Complaint to include enough facts to state a claim against Dr. Stepke 

under section 845.6, he should be given leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

d. Dr. Ball 

In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Dr. Ball contends that Plaintiff’s allegations 

against him are vague and conclusory. (Mot. Dismiss 19, ECF No. 13.) He alleges that 

the allegations “fail to provide the necessary elements to allege supervisor liability under 

section 1983.” (Id.) Woodson responds that Dr. Ball was notified of Plaintiff’s serious 

medical needs and the delay of care by Dr. Foerster. (Opp’n 10, ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff 

explains that he tried to notify Dr. Ball of his medical needs, but received no response. 

(Id. at 10-11.) In the Reply, Dr. Ball does not directly address the allegations against 

him. (See Reply 1-6, ECF No. 19.) 

“A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the 

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed 

to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). But there is 

no vicarious liability under § 1983. Id. (citing Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home 

Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680–81 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Woodson’s allegations against Dr. Ball are conclusory and vague. Although 

Plaintiff states that this Defendant failed to respond to Woodson’s concerns after being 

notified of them, (see Compl. 2, ECF No. 1), Plaintiff does not allege any specific facts 

regarding his interactions with Dr. Ball. Without more from Woodson, his allegations 

against Dr. Ball are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 

268; Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED

as to Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Ball. Because it is unclear whether Woodson would be 

able to amend his Complaint to include sufficient facts to state a claim against Dr. Ball, 

he should be given leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

// 

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e. Defendants Gutierrez and Dogonyaro 

Finally, Defendants Gutierrez and Dogonyaro assert in the Motion to Dismiss that 

Plaintiff’s claims against them are conclusory and vague. (Mot. Dismiss 19, ECF No. 

13.) Defendants explain that “[w]hile the Exhibits include several letters from both L. 

Gutierrez and J. Dogonyaro responding to various medical appeals, plaintiff makes no 

factual allegations regarding the content of the letters nor any specific allegations of 

wrongful conduct against L. Gutierrez and J. Dogonyaro.” (Id. at 19-20 (citing Compl. 

Ex. re: Exhaustion, at 72, 76, 77, 82, 95, 96, 98, 101, ECF No. 1).) Defendants conclude 

that the allegations against them are insufficient to show deliberate indifference. (Id. at 

20.) 

 Woodson responds that Defendants Gutierrez and Dogonyaro violated his First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights “by creating barriers by way of spurious delays, rejections, 

[and] cancellations to Plaintiff’s attempts to file grievance appeal seeking aide and help 

to receive medical treatment.” (Opp’n 12, ECF No. 15.) Woodson contends that these 

Defendants attempted to chill his due process right to file a grievance and exhaust his 

remedies. (Id. (citing Compl. Ex. re: Exhaustion, at 71-100, ECF No. 1).) Defendants do 

not directly address the allegations against Defendants Gutierrez and Dogonyaro in the 

Reply. (See Reply 1-6, ECF No. 19.) 

Inmates have a First Amendment right to meaningful access to the courts, which 

includes the right to invoke established prison grievance procedures. Trueman v. State, 

No. CV 09–2179–PHX–RCB (DKD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67847, at *12 (D. Ariz. 

June 15, 2010) (citing Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

Government officials may not retaliate against prisoners who exercise their First 

Amendment rights. Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1997); see also

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that 

suspension of permits because of Soranno’s public criticism of defendants is a First 

Amendment violation). 

// 

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By contrast, a plaintiff may not advance a substantive due process claim if “a 

particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’” 

against government misconduct. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) 

(Rehnquist, C.J., for plurality) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). 

Courts may limit the inquiry to the amendment that more specifically addresses a 

plaintiff’s claim in lieu of general notions of substantive due process. See id. at 286 

(Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (refraining from evaluating petitioner’s due 

process claim under § 1983 because his allegations could be addressed under the state’s 

malicious prosecution law); Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (“Any protection that 

‘substantive due process’ affords convicted prisoners against excessive force is, we have 

held, at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment.” (citing Whitley v. 

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986))). 

Here, as a preliminary matter, Defendants Gutierrez and Dogonyaro are incorrect 

to analyze Plaintiff’s claims against them under the Eighth Amendment. (See Mot. 

Dismiss 20, ECF No. 13.) Rather, Woodson asserts his claims against these Defendants 

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Compl. 12, ECF No. 1.) Nevertheless, 

the claims against these Defendants are subject to dismissal. As to Plaintiff’s substantive 

due process claim, the First Amendment already provides protections for Woodson 

regarding the alleged misconduct by Gutierrez and Dogonyaro. See Trueman, 2010 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 67847, at *12 (citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567). This protection precludes 

Plaintiff from pursuing a substantive due process claim against these Defendants. See 

Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., for plurality) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 

395). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants 

Gutierrez and Dogonyaro should be DISMISSED without leave to amend. See Easter v. 

CDC, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1187 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (citations omitted) (finding that a 

plaintiff’s due process claim was preempted by the Eighth Amendment where the 

plaintiff “attempted to raise a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based 

// 

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on the same conduct by the Defendants,” as “the Eighth Amendment provides an explicit 

source of protection from the type of conduct Plaintiff alleges[]”). 

Although Plaintiff attaches several pages of correspondence with these Defendants 

as exhibits to his Complaint, (see Compl. Ex. re: Exhaustion, at 71-103, ECF No. 1), 

Woodson does not identify the specific conduct by these Defendants that he believes 

violated the First Amendment. (See Compl. 12.) Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim 

against these Defendants is conclusory and should be DISMISSED. See Ramirez v. 

Giurbino, No. 10CV1292-WQH MDD, 2011 WL 2669484, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 

2011) (citation omitted) (“While Plaintiff asserts in his Reply that the prison regulations 

regarding validation of gang members violates the First Amendment, this mere 

conclusory statement is insufficient to survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.”). As it is 

not clear whether Woodson could amend his Complaint to include enough facts to state a 

First Amendment claim against these Defendants, he should be given leave to amend. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

B. Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Counsel

 On December 15, 2015, Woodson filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

[ECF No. 21]. While his motion was pending, on February 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed a 

second motion requesting the appointment of counsel. (See [Am.] Mot. Appointment 

Counsel 1-6, ECF No. 23.) The Court will address Woodson’s latest filing, which 

supersedes his original Motion for Appointment of Counsel. See Franklin, 2012 WL 

5077630, at *1. 

1. Legal standard 

The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford 

counsel.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(1) (West 2006). But “it is well-established that there is 

generally no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases.” United States v. Sardone, 94 

F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). There is also no constitutional right 

to appointed counsel to pursue a § 1983 claim. Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 

(9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)), 

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partially overruled on other grounds by 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). Federal courts do 

not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. U.S. Dist. 

Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989) (discussing § 1915(d)).

Nevertheless, district courts have discretion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to 

request attorney representation for indigent civil litigants upon a showing of exceptional 

circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citing Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)). “A finding of the 

exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance requires at least an 

evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of 

the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal issues 

involved.’” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

“‘Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching 

a decision.’” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wilborn, 

789 F.2d at 1331). When examining a plaintiff’s ability to proceed pro se, courts 

generally require, as a threshold matter, the plaintiff to show that (1) he is indigent, and 

(2) he “has made a reasonably diligent effort to secure counsel.” Bailey v. Lawford, 835 

F. Supp. 550, 552 (S.D. Cal. 1993); see Cota v. Scribner, Case No. 09cv2507-AJB 

(BLM), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20460, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012). 

2. Discussion 

a. Likelihood of Woodson’s success on the merits 

To receive court-appointed counsel, Plaintiff must present a nonfrivolous claim 

that is likely to succeed on the merits. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. Woodson’s Complaint 

purports to allege causes of action arising under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments of the Constitution, as well as section 845.6 of the California Government 

Code. (See Compl. 4-12, ECF No. 1.) 

As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims under the Eighth 

Amendment against Defendants Kim, Ortiz, Orduna, and Stepke. Although the Court 

recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Woodson’s deliberate indifference 

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claims against these Defendants be denied, it is too early to determine the likelihood of 

Plaintiff’s success on the merits on these claims. Without more, it is not certain whether 

any of Woodson’s causes of action will survive summary judgment. See Harris v. Duc, 

CASE NO. S CIV 06-2138 DOC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68786, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 

21, 2009) (denying motion to appoint counsel due to insufficient information to assess 

likelihood of success on merits); see also Bailey, 835 F. Supp. at 552 (same). This factor 

does not support his request for an appointed lawyer. 

b. Plaintiff’s ability to proceed without counsel 

To be entitled to appointed counsel, Woodson must also show he is unable to 

effectively litigate the case pro se in light of the complexity of the issues involved. See 

Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. Courts have required that “indigent plaintiffs make a 

reasonably diligent effort to secure counsel as a prerequisite to the court’s appointing 

counsel for them.” Bailey, 835 F. Supp. at 552. 

In the Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Plaintiff indicates that he 

cannot afford an attorney and that “[h]e has requested leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis.” ([Am.] Mot. Appointment Counsel 1, ECF No. 23.) Woodson additionally 

indicates that he “has made repeated efforts to obtain a lawyer,” (id. at 2), and he attached 

to his amended motion a letter from a law firm declining Plaintiff’s request for legal 

assistance, (id. at 3.) As Woodson has shown both that he is indigent and that he has 

made efforts to obtain representation, he has met the threshold requirements for obtaining 

appointed counsel. Bailey, 835 F. Supp. at 552; see Cota, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20460, 

at *2–3. 

Plaintiff makes two other arguments as to why he should be appointed counsel. 

(See [Am.] Mot. Appointment Counsel 1-2, ECF No. 23.) First, Woodson argues that his 

incarceration will inhibit his ability to litigate. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff reasons that he “has 

limited access to the law library.” (Id. at 1-2.) But this argument is contradicted by 

Woodson’s subsequent notice to the Court that his address has changed [ECF No. 24]. In 

light of this notice, it appears that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, (see Not. Address 

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Change 1, ECF No. 24), undermining the argument that his imprisonment will interfere 

with his ability to litigate. 

But even if Woodson were still incarcerated, he has not demonstrated that he is, or 

will be, denied “reasonable” access to the law library. See Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. 

of Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). “[T]he Constitution does not guarantee a 

prisoner unlimited access to a law library. Prison officials of necessity must regulate the 

time, manner, and place in which library facilities are used.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff has not shown that he does not have reasonable access to a law library or other 

means of conducting legal research, or that he is subjected to burdens beyond those 

ordinarily experienced by pro se plaintiffs. 

Second, Plaintiff contends that “[t]he issues involved in this case are complex, and 

will require significant research and investigation.” ([Am.] Mot. Appointment Counsel 1, 

ECF No. 23.) Woodson states that he has “limited Knowledge of the law” and that “[a] 

trial in this case will likely involve conflicting testimony[.]” (Id. at 2.) He concludes that 

“counsel would better enable Plaintiff to present evidence and cross examine witnesses.” 

(Id.) Yet, Woodson is only entitled to appointed counsel if he can show “that because of 

the complexity of the claims[,] he [is] unable to articulate his positions.” Rand, 113 F.3d 

at 1525. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged his claims in the Complaint [ECF No. 1]. 

There, Woodson recited the facts underlying his claims against multiple Defendants. See 

Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (explaining that a finding of exceptional circumstances 

justifying appointment of counsel requires an evaluation of plaintiff’s ability to articulate 

his claims); Pough v. Almager, CASE NO. 08cv1498 JM(RBB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

51782, at *1-3 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2010) (finding no exceptional circumstance due to 

factual complexity because plaintiff grasped “the legal issues involved” and was able to 

“adequately set[] forth a factual basis for his claims”); Shields v. Davis, No. C 07-0157 

RMW (PR), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90687, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2008) (denying 

motion for appointment of counsel because the case was “not particularly complex”). 

// 

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 Further, among other filings in this case, Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis, an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and two 

motions requesting appointment of counsel [ECF Nos. 2, 15, 21, 23]. Woodson has 

proven able to adequately represent himself. See Plummer v. Grimes, 87 F.3d 1032, 

1033 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying plaintiff counsel, in part because plaintiff adequately filed a complaint and other 

pretrial materials); Harris, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68786, at *11-13 (finding no 

exceptional circumstances, in part, because plaintiff was able to submit adequate 

documentation and motion work). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances, 

including that he is likely to succeed on the merits and that he is unable to represent 

himself (beyond the ordinary burdens encountered by persons representing themselves). 

As a result, Woodson’s Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED

without prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Woodson’s Eighth Amendment claims against 

Defendants Kim, Ortiz, Orduna, and Stepke should be DENIED, but Plaintiff’s 

California Government Code section 845.6 claims against these Defendants should be 

DISMISSED with leave to amend. Defendant Dr. Ball’s Motion to Dismiss Woodson’s 

conclusory Eighth Amendment claim against him should be GRANTED with leave to 

amend. Defendants Gutierrez and Dogonyaro’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment claim against them should be GRANTED without leave to amend. Their 

motion to dismiss Woodson’s First Amendment claims against them should be 

GRANTED with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED without 

prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Woodson’s Motion for 

Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 21] because it has been superseded by Plaintiff’s 

Amended Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 23]. 

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This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or 

before May 6, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before 

May 20, 2016. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 

Cir. 1991) 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 8, 2016 ___________________________________ 

 Hon. Ruben B. Brooks 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

cc: Judge Hayes 

 All Parties of Record 

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