Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01064/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01064-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THE JEFFERSON COUNTY 

BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRYAN M. AND DARCY M., 

individually and as parents, 

guardians, next friends and legal 

representatives of R.M., a minor,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:14-cv-1064-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction and Factual Background

This case is an appeal from an administrative due process hearing conducted 

under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Bryan M. and 

Darcy M. initiated the administrative proceeding against the Jefferson County 

Board of Education under 20 U.S.C. § 1415. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Bryan and Darcy

allege that the Board failed to design and implement an individualized education 

plan (an IEP) for their son, R.M., consistent with the requirements of the IDEA. 

(Doc. 1, pp. 2–3). The administrative hearing concerning the IDEA petition 

focused primarily on R.M.’s school assignment and the implementation of his IEP. 

(Doc. 1, pp. 3–4).

FILED

 2015 Sep-21 AM 10:05

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-01064-MHH Document 20 Filed 09/21/15 Page 1 of 11
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The order and opinion that the hearing officer entered on April 5, 2014

included findings partially adverse to the Board. (Doc. 16-15, pp. 69–71). The 

Board filed a complaint in this Court on June 5, 2014, challenging the hearing 

officer’s decision. The Board contends that the hearing officer misapplied the 

governing law and ignored or failed to properly credit the evidence in the 

administrative record. (Doc. 1, pp. 6–7). The Board also contends that the 

Eleventh Amendment immunizes the Board from due process hearings and other 

actions, and 20 U.S.C. § 1415 violates the United States Constitution.

R.M.’s parents answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. (Doc. 9). 

R.M.’s parents seek attorneys’ fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 and other relief. (Doc. 

9, pp. 26–27). The Board filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim. In that 

motion, the Board argues that the Eleventh Amendment gives the Board immunity

from the counterclaim because the Board is an arm of the state. (Doc. 15). This 

opinion concerns the Board’s motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, 

the Court denies the motion.

II. Standard of Review

“Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits brought in federal court when 

the State itself is sued and when an ‘arm of the State’ is sued.” Pellitteri v. Prine, 

776 F.3d 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 

(11th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to 

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“counties, municipal corporations, or similar political subdivisions of the state.” 

Lightfoot v. Henry Cnty. Sch. Dist., 771 F.3d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 2014). To 

determine for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity whether an entity, like a 

school district, was acting as an arm of the state or a political subdivision, a court 

must examine “the particular function in which [the school district] was engaged 

when taking the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise.” Lightfoot, 771 

F.3d at 768 (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308); see also Stewart v. Baldwin 

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Whether a local school 

board is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . turns on the question of 

whether the board is properly classified as an ‘arm of the state’ or as a ‘municipal 

corporation or other political subdivision.’”) (quoting Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. 

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). “As the governmental entity invoking the 

Eleventh Amendment, the [Board] bears the burden of demonstrating that it 

qualifie[s] as an arm of the state entitled to share in its immunity.” Haven v. Bd. of 

Trustees of Three Rivers Reg'l Library Sys., No. 15-11064, 2015 WL 5040174, at 

*4 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

The Board argues that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with 

respect to Bryan and Darcy’s counterclaim because the Board is either an “arm of 

the state” or at least performs a “state function.” (Doc. 15, pp. 1–3). Based on this 

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immunity defense, the Board asks the Court to dismiss Bryan and Darcy’s

counterclaim and to invalidate the judgment of the hearing officer.

1

 (Doc. 15, pp. 

7–8). The Board acknowledges that the IDEA contains a clause that abrogates

state sovereign immunity, but the Board argues that that provision “speaks only to 

[suits in] federal court and says nothing about [] due process [hearings],” and the

Board contends that the IDEA is unconstitutional. (Doc. 15, p. 10) (emphasis in 

original). R.M.’s parents respond that the Board failed to raise the immunity 

argument at the due process hearing, and the Board waived Eleventh Amendment 

immunity, if it is an available defense, by bringing this case in federal court. 

The Court does not have to reach the parties’ arguments because the 

Jefferson County Board of Education is not an “arm of the state,” and thus it is not 

entitled to sovereign immunity. The Court analyzes three factors to determine if an 

entity is an “arm of the state”: (1) how state law identifies the entity; (2) the degree 

of state control over the entity; and (3) the entity’s fiscal autonomy. Stewart, 908 

F.2d at 1509. “[T]he third Stewart factor . . . has now been subdivided into a third 

factor (where the entity derives its funds) and a fourth factor (who is responsible 

for judgments against the entity).” Walker v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 771 

F.3d 748, 752–53 (11th Cir. 2014). The Court must assess “[w]hether [an entity] is 

 

1

The Board raised the immunity defense below, (Doc. 16-17, p. 27), but the hearing officer did 

not rule on the constitutional argument. (Doc. 16-15, p. 72).

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an ‘arm of the state’” based on “the particular function in which the [entity] was 

engaged when taking the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise.” 

Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308.

In Stewart, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal of 

sovereign immunity for a local school board in Alabama in a § 1983 retaliatory 

termination action. 908 F.2d at 1499. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Mt. Healthy, the Eleventh Circuit found that under Alabama law, a local school 

board is more like a county or a city than a state. Id. at 1509–10 (quoting Mt.

Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280–81).

2

 The Eleventh Circuit also found that the school 

board had “a substantial amount of control over their own affairs,” including the 

“power to establish general education policy for the schools.” Id. at 1510–11. 

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit found that the local board had “a degree of fiscal 

autonomy comparable to that of the school boards at issue” in other cases in which 

courts had denied sovereign immunity. Id. at 1510 (citations omitted). That fiscal 

autonomy included “a significant amount of flexibility in raising local funds.” Id. 

The Eleventh Circuit noted that many Alabama district courts have held that local 

 

2

The Eleventh Circuit recognized that “Alabama state courts provide county boards of education 

with sovereign immunity in state tort law actions,” but “that does not require a similar treatment 

under the Eleventh Amendment.” Stewart, 908 F.2d at 1510 n.6. The Eleventh Circuit observed 

that when the United States Supreme Court decided Mt. Healthy, “the case law in Ohio was clear 

that a local school board was cloaked in sovereign immunity to the same degree as the state itself 

from suits arising in tort.” Id. (citations omitted).

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school boards are not arms of the state for the purposes of sovereign immunity. Id.

at 1511 (citations omitted). 

Shortly after the parties briefed the Board’s motion to dismiss, a panel of the 

Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in Walker v. Jefferson County Board of Ed., 

771 F.3d 748 (11th Cir. 2014). Applying the expanded Stewart four-factor test, the 

Walker court held that the Jefferson County Board of Education was not an “arm 

of the state” and thus not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context 

of employment decisions. 771 F.3d at 757. The panel relied heavily on Ex parte 

Madison Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 1 So. 3d 980 (Ala. 2008), a decision in which the 

Alabama Supreme Court held that a local school board is “not an arm of the [s]tate 

for the purposes of § 1983 liability.” 1 So. 3d at 989–90.

With guidance from Walker and Stewart, this Court must determine whether 

the Board is an arm of the state with respect to “the particular function” that the 

Board performed in regard to R.M. Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308.

A. Sovereign Immunity and the IDEA

The IDEA was enacted in part “to ensure that all children with disabilities 

have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special 

education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare 

them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 

1400(d)(1)(A). In pursuit of this goal, the IDEA makes federal financial assistance 

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available to states that comply with the provisions of the IDEA and “confers upon 

disabled students an enforceable substantive right to public education in 

participating States.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988).

3

When a child has been identified as disabled, “[a] team that includes, at a 

minimum, the parents of the child, one regular-education teacher of the child, one 

special-education teacher of the child, and a representative of the local educational 

agency develops” an IEP to serve the child’s needs. Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. 

Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2008). An IEP may include “a behavior 

intervention plan or a behavior modification plan” if behavioral issues threaten to 

interfere with the education of a disabled student or the education of fellow 

students. Barnett v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1227 (S.D. 

Ala. 2014).

To the extent that it provides a means for enforcing certain federal 

constitutional and statutory rights, the IDEA parallels 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

substantial overlap between the IDEA and § 1983 in the educational arena 

prompted the Supreme Court to find that a previous version of the IDEA, the EHA, 

was “the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection 

claim to a publicly financed special education.” Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 

 

3 Honig concerns the Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”), “the materially similar 

predecessor statute to the IDEA.” K.A. ex rel. F.A. v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 741 F.3d 1195, 

1200 (11th Cir. 2013).

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1009 (1984) (holding that § 1983 and other federal claims were precluded by the 

comprehensive remedial scheme of the EHA), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 

99–372, 100 Stat 796, as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 

211, 235 (1995). Dissatisfied with the result in Smith, Congress amended the 

IDEA to clarify that the statute does not “restrict or limit the rights, procedures, 

and remedies available under the Constitution . . . or other Federal laws protecting 

the rights of children with disabilities,” so long as the IDEA’s administrative 

exhaustion requirement is met. Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat 796 (codified as 

amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)). Congress also added a section, similar to 42 

U.S.C. § 1988, providing for the award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in 

an action under the IDEA. Id.4 The Eleventh Circuit has held that the amendment 

to the IDEA dictates that violations of the IDEA may not be pursued under § 1983, 

but § 1983 may be available to enforce related rights “conferred by the 

Constitution or other federal laws.” K.A. ex rel. F.A. v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 

741 F.3d 1195, 1210 (11th Cir. 2013). In other words, claims that arise under the 

Constitution or other federal statutes—but which could be pursued under the 

IDEA—need not be pursued as IDEA claims. In contrast, claims alleging violation

of the IDEA itself must be brought under the IDEA’s remedial framework.

 

4 This section forms the basis of Bryan and Darcy’s counterclaim. (See Doc. 9, p. 25).

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Stewart and Walker establish that for purposes of employment suits under 

§ 1983, local school boards are not arms of the state. Given the nature of the IDEA 

and the strong similarities between the IDEA and § 1983, the reasoning of those 

cases applies when students’ substantive rights under the IDEA are at issue. 

Beginning with the first Stewart factor, Alabama law characterizes local school 

boards in the same way for purposes of the IDEA and § 1983. From either 

perspective, local school boards function as largely self-contained entities. See 

Walker, 771 F.3d at 755. Voters in each county determine the composition of the

local school board, and “a school board determines its own educational policy and 

prescribes rules and regulations for the schools in its jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, this 

factor weighs in favor of denying school boards sovereign immunity to suits 

brought under § 1983 and under the IDEA.

In discussing the second Stewart factor, the degree of state control over the 

entity, Walker focused on the local school board’s ability to make employmentrelated decisions. Id. at 756. This portion of the Walker analysis is relatively 

inapposite to the IDEA, but the Supreme Court has filled the gap. While noting the 

significant role that states play in administering the IDEA, the Supreme Court 

describes the “core of the statute [as] the cooperative process that it establishes 

between parents and schools.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 

(2005). Moreover, the “central vehicle” for the collaboration between parents and 

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schools is the development of an IEP. Id. Because the IDEA mandates local—

even family-level—decision-making, and because this highly individualized 

decision-making process forms the basis of Bryan and Darcy’s counterclaim, the 

second Stewart factor weighs strongly in favor of finding that the Board is not an 

arm of the state.

Walker frames the fiscal autonomy of local school boards in terms of “where 

the board of education derives its funds and who is responsible for judgments 

against the board,” but largely fails to address the issue. Walker, 771 F.3d at 756. 

Stewart, however, found that “[c]ounty school boards in Alabama possess a 

significant amount of flexibility in raising local funding” and that “it cannot be said 

that a judgment against a county school board will come from state funds.” 

Stewart, 908 F.2d at 1510–11. The Board has offered no reason to believe that a 

judgment for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA would be satisfied from funds other 

than those used to satisfy a judgment in an employment action under § 1983. 

Therefore, these factors, like the other Stewart factors, weigh in favor of finding 

that the Board is not an arm of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment 

immunity from suit under the IDEA.

IV. Conclusion

The Jefferson County Board of Education is not an arm of the state, and 

therefore it is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment

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for purposes of this IDEA proceeding. The Court DENIES the Board’s motion to 

dismiss Bryan and Darcy’s counterclaim. (Doc. 12).

DONE and ORDERED this September 21, 2015.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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