Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00438/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00438-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The proceedings were assigned to this Court, but all post-service matters have been referred

to Magistrate Judge Leo S. Papas by Local Rule 72.3(e), “Assignment of § 1983 Prisoner Civil Cases

to United States Magistrate Judges,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d

1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001). 

-1- 07cv0438

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY A. FRANKLIN,

CDC #E-66269,

Civil No. 07-0438 BTM (LSP)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE, GARNISHING $350

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 2-1]; 

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

[Doc. No. 3-1]; AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE OF

COMPLAINT

vs.

L.E. SCRIBNER, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Gregory Franklin, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison (“Calipatria”) in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

 Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2], as well as a Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order [Doc. No. 3].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only

if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however,

remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is

ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must

collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit sufficient to show that he has no

funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n

no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay

the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts

as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay

. . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court

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GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing

fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated

shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must

subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening

and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that

fails to state a claim). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s retaliation and equal protection claims survive the

sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and that Plaintiff is therefore

automatically entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27;

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all

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2

 While Plaintiff’s Complaint is not entirely clear, he does appear to allege that his property was

removed on some occasions in response to administrative grievances he has filed. The Court liberally

construes these claims as retaliation claims and finds that these factual allegations may state a claim

upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. However, some of Plaintiff’s claims regarding the removal

of his property appear to occur prior to the filing of any administrative grievance. In order to state a

retaliation claim, one element Plaintiff must be able to show is he was retaliated against for exercising

his constitutional rights. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Thus,

the Court dismisses the claims relating to lost property that occurred prior to Plaintiff alleging that he

was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights during the administrative grievance process.

-4- 07cv0438

duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2) (providing that “service be effected by a United

States marshal, deputy Untied States marshal, or other officer specially appointed by the court

... when the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

However, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s property claims for failing to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were

violated when prison officials removed some of his property from his cell.2

 To the extent that

Plaintiff wishes to bring a claim relating to the negligent or unauthorized deprivation of his

property, such a claim will not state a federal cause of action under § 1983 if the plaintiff has an

adequate post-deprivation state remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The

California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) provides an adequate post-deprivation state remedy for

the random and unauthorized taking of property. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th

Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiff has an adequate state post-deprivation remedy and his claims relating

to the taking of his property are not cognizable in this § 1983 action, and must be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) [Doc. No. 3]

Plaintiff also filed a Motion for TRO [Doc. No. 3], along with several exhibits in support

of his motion for a TRO.

The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo before a

preliminary injunction hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely

to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software,

Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a

temporary restraining order may be granted “only if (1) it clearly appears from the specific facts

shown ... that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant

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before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in opposition.” FED.R.CIV.P.

65(b). A party seeking a TRO must satisfy the same test required for the issuance of a

preliminary injunction. See Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309, 1313

(E.D. Cal. 1996); Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320,

1322 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction the movant must demonstrate “(1) a strong

likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if

preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4)

advancement of the public interest (in certain cases).” Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064,

1067 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th

Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Alternatively, injunctive relief could

be granted if the movant “demonstrates ‘either a combination of probable success on the merits

and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in his favor.’” Id. (citation omitted). “These two alternatives represent

‘extremes of a single continuum,’ rather than two separate tests.” Clear Channel Outdoor Inc.

v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

A federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has personal

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros.,

Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one “becomes a party

officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or other

authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear to

defend.”). The court may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.

See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS,

753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983); Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel,

817 F. Supp. 953, 961 (M.D. Fl. 1993); Kandlbinder v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 337, 339 (W.D.

Mo. 1989); Suster v. Marshall, 952 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Califano v.

Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (injunctive relief must be “narrowly tailored to give only

the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled”); 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (“In any civil action with

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respect to prison conditions, ... [p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend

no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be

the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.”). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), an injunction binds only “the parties to the

action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and ... those persons in active

concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order.” The district court

must, therefore, tailor the injunction to affect only those persons over which it has power. See

Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 481 (1978); see also 11A Wright &

Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2941 (2d ed. 1995). At this time, Plaintiff has not

effected proper service on any of the named Defendants. 

Moreover, even if this Court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendants Plaintiff seeks

to enjoin, he has failed to establish either an imminent irreparable injury, or the likelihood of

success on the merits. See Beardslee, 395 F.3d at 1067. First, while Plaintiff claims to have

suffered injuries as a result of actions taken by prison officials in 2005, the threat of injury

required to justify extraordinary injunctive relief must be imminent and not merely speculative.

Caribbean Marine Services Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition,

where a temporary restraining order is sought against actions by a governmental actor or agency

which has allegedly violated the law in the past, as is the case here, Plaintiff must establish that

the threat of future or repeated injury is both “real and immediate,” not just “conjectural” or

“hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). This he has not done.

Thus, for all these reasons, the Court must DENY without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 3] pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 65(b). However, the

Court will permit Plaintiff to file a Motion for Preliminary Injunction once all named Defendants

have been served with the Complaint and appeared in this action. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO [Doc. No. 3] is DENIED without prejudice;

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2. Plaintiff’s non-retaliatory property claims are DISMISSED without prejudice for

failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);

3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]

is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. The Clerk shall issue the summons, provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of both

this Order and his Complaint, and forward them to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal

Form 285 for each Defendant named in his Complaint. Plaintiff shall complete the Form 285s

and forward them to the United States Marshal. The U.S. Marshal shall then serve a copy of the

Complaint and summons upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on each U.S. Marshal Form

285. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2).

5. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to the Complaint within the time

provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(g)(2) (while Defendants may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to

any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under

section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face

on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,”

Defendants are required to respond).

6. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document

submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be

filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy

of any document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, and the date of service.

Any paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails

to include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

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7. If Plaintiff wishes to amend his Complaint to correct any deficiencies in pleading

identified by the Court in this Order, he may file a First Amended Complaint thirty (30) days

after Defendants have appeared in this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 21, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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