Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00289/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00289-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No. 16-CV-00289-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ANDREW R. DUPREE,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-CV-00289-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 39

Plaintiff Andrew Dupree (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Apple, Inc., Tim Cook, 

Brenda Everson, and Suzanne Pierre-Ziles (collectively, “Defendants”). Before the Court is 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss certain causes of action in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. 

ECF No. 39 (“Mot.”); ECF No. 36 (“SAC”). The Court finds this matter suitable for decision 

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and thus VACATES the motion hearing 

set for August 11, 2016, at 1:30 p.m. The case management conference, currently set for August 

11, 2016, at 1:30 p.m., is CONTINUED to October 19, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. Having considered the 

submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

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A. Factual Background

On February 15, 2011, Plaintiff began working as a retail specialist for Apple, Inc. 

(“Apple”) at Apple’s retail store at the Millenia Mall in Orlando, Florida (the “Millenia Mall 

store”). SAC ¶ 5. Plaintiff, an African American, alleges that a manager at the Millenia Mall 

store told him that “[b]lacks don’t make management in this market.” Id. ¶ 9. “[S]hocked, 

embarrassed, and humiliated by this comment,” Plaintiff requested and was granted a transfer to 

the Apple retail store in Sydney, Australia (the “Australia store”). Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff began 

working in Australia on July 27, 2012. Id. ¶ 11. 

On July 9, 2013, Plaintiff decided to transfer back to the Millenia Mall store, and contacted 

Millenia Mall store leadership. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff avers that Millenia Mall store leadership 

indicated that they would be receptive to Plaintiff’s return, and Plaintiff returned to Florida on July 

28, 2013. Id. ¶ 20. On August 22, 2013, however, Millenia Mall store leadership contacted 

Plaintiff and informed him that he would not be rehired. 

Upon learning this news, Plaintiff sent emails to Apple CEO Tim Cook (“Cook”) and 

Apple Human Resources representatives Brenda Everson (“Everson”) and Susan Pierre-Zilles

(“Zilles”). Id. ¶¶ 27–28. In response to these emails, Everson informed Plaintiff on October 10, 

2013 that management at Apple’s retail store in Central Florida “would be contacting him 

regarding a possible position.” Id. ¶ 31. On December 2, 2013, Plaintiff was hired at the Central 

Florida Apple retail store (the “Central Florida store”). Id. ¶ 33. 

While working in Central Florida, Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated based on his 

race and national origin. Plaintiff, for instance, states that he was disciplined for wearing a 

“baseball cap with a logo on store grounds,” while it was “common for [other] employees to wear 

these types of baseball caps with no disciplinary action taken.” Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff also alleges that 

he was falsely reported as being late, that his work schedule was changed without his knowledge, 

and that he was threatened by his manager. Id. 

In September 2015, Plaintiff transferred to the Apple retail store in Los Gatos, California, 

where he is currently employed (the “California store”). ECF No. 28 at 10. During his tenure in 

Los Gatos, Plaintiff alleges that he continues to be subject to racial discrimination. Plaintiff points 

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specifically to four incidents. First, a corporate Apple employee who had asked Plaintiff to help 

fix her Apple device allegedly called Plaintiff “Oakland” because Plaintiff “wasn’t from around 

here” and “must be from Oakland since he is African American.” SAC ¶ 36. Second, another

Apple employee allegedly asked whether Plaintiff was “part of some kind of new diversity 

program” when the employee became frustrated with Plaintiff’s service. Id. ¶ 37. Third, another 

Apple employee “stated [that] she wanted to work with someone more professional looking and 

not someone who looked like they were part of a gang.” Id. ¶ 38. Most recently, in 2016, Plaintiff 

alleges that one of his coworkers threatened to “punch [Plaintiff] in the face,” that another 

coworker yelled at Plaintiff for no reason, and that Plaintiff’s schedule was changed without his 

knowledge or consent. Id. ¶ 39. 

B. Procedural History

On July 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Apple which alleged discrimination on 

the basis of race and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”). 

Dupree v. Apple Inc. (“Dupree I”), No. 14-CV-3294 (N.D. Cal.). The complaint was filed in the 

Northern District of California, but focused on events occurring at the Millenia Mall store. Id. at 

6. Accordingly, on March 11, 2015, U.S. District Judge Edward Davila, to whom Dupree I was 

assigned, granted Apple’s motion to transfer Dupree I to the Middle District of Florida. Dupree I, 

ECF No. 46. As Judge Davila noted, “Apple has demonstrated based primarily on Plaintiff’s 

allegations that most if not all of the critical events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in or 

around [an] Orlando Apple store.” Id. at 3.

On March 16, 2015, Dupree was officially transferred into the Middle District of Florida

and was assigned to U.S. District Judge Kendall Sharp. Dupree v. Apple Inc., No. 15-CV-0423 

(M.D. Fla.), ECF No. 47. On April 7, 2015, Judge Sharp granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

amend his complaint. Dupree I, ECF No. 62. Plaintiff’s amended complaint added Cook, Zilles, 

and Everson as Defendants, and alleged causes of action based upon violations of Title VII, the 

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

On April 24, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss certain causes of action in Plaintiff’s first 

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amended complaint. On June 30, 2015, Judge Sharp granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Dupree I, ECF No. 69 (“Dupree I MTD”). First, Judge Sharp held that Plaintiff could not move 

forward with Plaintiff’s FEHA claims because FEHA does not apply to conduct occurring outside 

of California. Next, Judge Sharp held that Plaintiff could not bring a Title VII claim against Cook, 

Zilles, and Everson because “individual capacity suits under Title VII are inappropriate.” Id. at 7 

(alterations omitted). Finally, Judge Sharp determined that Plaintiff had failed to state a cause of 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Cook, Zilles, and Everson. Id. at 9. Judge Sharp also 

concluded that amendment would be futile, and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss with 

prejudice. Because Defendants did not move to dismiss all causes of action against all Defendants 

in Dupree I, a portion of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint survived dismissal. 

On September 29, 2015, Judge Sharp granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

surviving claims in Dupree I without prejudice, as “Plaintiff wishe[d] . . . to end litigation of this 

matter without incurring further expenses.” Dupree I, ECF No. 84. 

On January 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed the original complaint in the instant action. ECF No. 1 

(“Compl.”). The Court shall refer to all proceedings in the instant action as Dupree II. Plaintiff 

filed a motion for leave to amend on April 11, 2016, which Defendants did not oppose. ECF No. 

23. Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend on the record at the April 27, 

2016 initial case management conference. ECF No. 32. 

On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed another motion for leave to amend. ECF No. 33. 

Defendants also did not oppose this second motion to amend. ECF No. 37. Plaintiff, however,

referred to the proposed amended complaint as the “First Amended Complaint.” ECF No. 36. As 

the procedural history demonstrates, however, Plaintiff’s May 25, 2016 motion in fact sought 

leave to file a third complaint in Dupree II. Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiff’s May 25, 

2016 motion for leave to amend, but stated that it would refer to the “proposed amended complaint 

as the ‘Second Amended Complaint’ or ‘SAC’ in . . . all future Orders.” ECF No. 38 at 2. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC on June 29, 2016. Plaintiff filed a response on July 

13, 2016, and Defendants filed a reply on July 20, 2016. ECF No. 40 (“Opp’n”); ECF No. 43 

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(“Reply”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an 

action for failure to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). For 

purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

Nonetheless, the Court is not required to “‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely 

because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.’” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Mere 

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Furthermore, “‘a plaintiff may plead [him]self out of court’” if he “plead[s] facts which establish 

that he cannot prevail on his . . . claim.” Weisbuch v. Cnty. of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1997) (quoting Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir. 1995)).

B. Leave to Amend

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend “shall be freely 

granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate 

decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (ellipses omitted). Generally, leave to amend shall be denied 

only if allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be 

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futile, or if the moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 

F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Of the nine causes of action in the SAC, Defendants move to dismiss the first, second, 

fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth causes of action. The Court addresses Defendants’ 

arguments in turn. 

A. First and Fifth Causes of Action: Title VII

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) by 

subjecting Plaintiff to race, color, and national origin discrimination (first cause of action) and by 

retaliating against Plaintiff for complaining about this discrimination (fifth cause of action). SAC 

¶¶ 40, 52. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is time-barred from asserting a Title VII 

claim insofar as it relates to incidents occurring at the Millenia Mall and Central Florida stores. In 

addition, although Plaintiff does not appear to allege that Defendants violated Title VII during 

Plaintiff’s employment in Australia, Defendants also argue that Plaintiff may not bring a Title VII 

claim based on incidents occurring at the Australia store. Defendants do not challenge whether 

Plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim based on incidents occurring at the California store.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e5(e)(1), “a Title VII plaintiff [must] file a charge with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) . . . after the alleged unlawful employment 

practice occur[s].” Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104–05 (2002) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “If the EEOC does not bring suit based on the charge, the EEOC must 

notify the person aggrieved that she can file suit.” Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 

1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The notice is accomplished through a 

right-to-sue letter. Once a person receives an EEOC right-to-sue letter, [he or] she has 90 days to 

file suit.” Id. This “90-day filing period is a statute of limitations,” which is “subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate circumstances.” Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 

1986); accord Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121 (describing Title VII deadline requirements as subject to 

equitable tolling). 

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As noted in the factual background, Plaintiff worked (1) at the Millenia Mall store from 

February 2011 to July 2012; (2) at the Australia store from July 2012 to July 2013; (3) at the 

Central Florida store from December 2013 to September 2015; and (4) at the California store from 

September 2015 to the present. Plaintiff has, over the course of his employment at Apple, filed 

four charges with the EEOC, on May 16, 2014; October 13, 2015; December 1, 2015; and May 5, 

2016. SAC ¶ 3; ECF No. 39-1 at 1–2. As discussed in greater detail below, none of these four 

EEOC charges pertains to Plaintiff’s employment at the Australia store—the first two charges 

(May 16, 2014 and October 13, 2015) pertain to incidents at the Millenia Mall and Central Florida 

stores, and the latter two charges (December 1, 2015 and May 5, 2016) pertain to incidents at the 

California store.

First, in Plaintiff’s May 16, 2014 EEOC charge, Plaintiff alleged unlawful practices which 

took place at the Millenia Mall store. The May 16, 2014 EEOC charge did not allege any 

discrimination arising from Plaintiff’s employment at the Australia or Central Florida stores, and

Plaintiff had not yet transferred to the California store. The EEOC did not bring suit based on 

Plaintiff’s May 6, 2014 charge, and issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter on June 12, 2014. 

Next, in Plaintiff’s October 13, 2015 EEOC charge, Plaintiff alleged unlawful practices 

that took place at the Millenia Mall and Central Florida stores. ECF No. 1-1 at 29–30. Plaintiff’s 

October 13, 2015 EEOC charge did not allege any discrimination arising from Plaintiff’s 

employment at the Australia or California stores. The EEOC declined to bring suit on Plaintiff’s 

October 13, 2015 charge, and issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter on October 15, 2015. 

Finally, both the December 1, 2015 and May 5, 2016 EEOC charges alleged unlawful 

practices which took place at the California store. ECF No. 39-1 at 4–8. These charges do not 

mention any discrimination arising from Plaintiff’s employment at the Millenia Mall, Australia, or 

Central Florida stores. As before, the EEOC declined to bring suit, and issued right-to-sue letters 

on December 2, 2015 and May 12, 2016. ECF No. 36-3 at 9–12. 

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in the instant action on January 19, 2016. As such, the 

June 12, 2014 and October 15, 2015 right-to-sue letters, which relate to incidents that occurred at 

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the Millenia Mall and Central Florida stores, fall outside the 90-day filing period: there are 586 

days between June 12, 2014 and January 19, 2016, and 96 days between October 15, 2015 and 

January 19, 2016. Consequently, Plaintiff’s first and fifth causes of action under Title VII would 

be time-barred by Title VII’s statute of limitations unless equitable tolling applies. 

In opposing Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff argues that he filed Dupree I on July 22, 2014, 

which was within 90 days of the EEOC’s June 12, 2014 right-to-sue letter. On September 29, 

2015, Dupree I was dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff was “under [the] legal 

advisement that as long as it was without prejudice he could file it again [i]f he so chose.” Opp’n 

at 4. The advice Plaintiff received “proved to be inaccurate,” and Plaintiff is “now hoping to get 

his complaint tolled to include certain events from Florida relevant to California that show a 

disturbing pattern of behavior in regards to his employment with Apple.” Id.1 

Plaintiff’s arguments are foreclosed in light of Ninth Circuit precedent. Specifically, in 

O’Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), plaintiff filed her original 

Title VII complaint against her employer “within ninety days after the issuance of her right-to-sue 

letter by the EEOC.” Id. at 1109. The case was eventually stayed and placed on inactive status, 

pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding. The magistrate judge presiding over plaintiff’s 

Title VII claims gave plaintiff “180 days to move to lift the stay, seek to reduce the claims against 

[d]efendant to judgment in the bankruptcy court, or otherwise demonstrate a reasonable basis to 

continue the case on inactive status.” Id. at 1110. The magistrate judge warned plaintiff that 

failure to comply with the magistrate judge’s order “would result in dismissal of [plaintiff’s] 

complaint for failure to prosecute.” Id. 

Plaintiff in O’Donnell failed to respond to the magistrate judge’s order and failed to appear 

at a status conference. Consequently, the magistrate judge dismissed plaintiff’s Title VII 

complaint without prejudice, a decision which plaintiff did not appeal. Plaintiff eventually filed a 

second Title VII complaint, which was more than 90 days after receiving her right-to-sue letter. 

 

1 Notably, Plaintiff does not argue that Dupree I tolled the allegations in his October 13, 2015 

EEOC charge, which related to alleged discrimination at the Central Florida store.

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The Ninth Circuit determined that “[t]he Title VII . . . claims asserted in [plaintiff’s] 

second complaint [were] untimely,” because plaintiff “filed her second complaint more than 

ninety days after the EEOC’s issuance of her right-to-sue letter.” Id. at 1111. Plaintiff’s 

complaint did not “relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an 

amendment to her first complaint, but rather a separate filing.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). As to tolling, the Ninth Circuit held that, “[i]n instances where a complaint is timely 

filed and later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not ‘toll’ or suspend the 90-day 

limitations period.” Id. “In such cases, dismissal of the original suit, even though labeled as 

without prejudice, nevertheless may sound the death knell for the plaintiff’s underlying cause of 

action if the sheer passage of time precludes the prosecution of a new action.” Id. Moreover, even 

if equitable tolling were to apply, “the ninety day limitations period [in O’Donnell] had run before 

the . . . automatic stay was issued.” Id. “At that point, there was no longer any time left in the 

ninety-day limitations period to equitably toll.” Id. 

The reasoning in O’Donnell governs the instant case. As in O’Donnell, Plaintiff’s attempts 

to apply tolling based on the filing and dismissal without prejudice of a prior complaint is 

unavailing. As the O’Donnell court noted, “dismissal of the original suit, even though labeled as 

without prejudice, nevertheless may sound the death knell for the plaintiff’s underlying cause of 

action if the sheer passage of time precludes the prosecution of a new action.” Id. Morever, even 

if equitable tolling were to apply, Plaintiff’s causes of action would still be untimely: Plaintiff 

filed Dupree II on January 19, 2016, 112 days after Dupree I was dismissed without prejudice. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and fifth causes of action 

insofar as they concern alleged Title VII violations that occurred at the Millenia Mall, Australia,

and Central Florida stores, is GRANTED. In addition, the Court denies Plaintiff leave to amend. 

Courts within the Ninth Circuit continue to follow O’Donnell, and O’Donnell is in accord with 

other circuit courts to have considered the question. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Bellevue Sch. Dist., 

553 F. App’x 745, 746 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing O’Donnell and noting that plaintiff’s claims were 

time-barred because they were filed outside the 90-day statutory period); Mann v. Standard Motor 

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Prods.. Inc., 532 F. App’x 417, 418 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“The ninety-day statute of 

limitations period for Title VII actions is not tolled because the initial action was dismissed 

without prejudice.”). Amendment would therefore be futile. Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s first and fifth causes of action as they relate to Title VII violations which occurred at the 

Millenia Mall, Australia, and Central Florida stores is therefore GRANTED with prejudice.

B. Second Cause of Action: FEHA

Next, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action, for racial 

discrimination in violation of FEHA, to the extent that this cause of action is based on 

discrimination that occurred at the Millenia Mall, Australia, and Central Florida stores. As 

Defendants note, FEHA is a California law which does not apply to conduct “that occurs outside 

of California. 

Judge Sharp addressed this very argument in dismissing Plaintiff’s FEHA claims with 

prejudice in Dupree I. As Judge Sharp observed, “California courts have unequivocally declined 

to apply . . . FEHA to non-residents employed outside of California when the tortious conduct at 

issue did not occur in California.” Dupree I MTD at 5.

Judge Sharp’s analysis is well taken. Indeed, in opposing the instant motion, Plaintiff 

acknowledges “that FEHA doesn’t apply to events that occurred in Florida since California law of 

course can’t be applied to laws broken in Florida.” Opp’n at 11. Accordingly, Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief for 

discrimination under FEHA at the Millenia Mall, Australia, and Central Florida stores, is 

GRANTED with prejudice. 

C. Fourth Cause of Action: Civil Rights Act of 1991

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action seeks recovery for employment discrimination under the 

Civil Rights of 1991. SAC ¶ 49. The 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, does not provide plaintiffs 

a substantive right or cause of action. Rather, the statute merely provides additional remedies for 

unlawful discrimination that is prohibited by some other federal law. Huckabay v. Moore, 142

F.3d 233, 241 (5th Cir. 1998). In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff acknowledges that he can not 

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bring a cause of action under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and agrees to remove this cause of action 

in future pleadings. Opp’n at 11. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth 

cause of action, for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is GRANTED with prejudice. 

D. Sixth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. “Under California law, there is a two-year statute of limitations for intentional infliction 

of emotional distress claims.” Soliman v. CVS RX Servs., Inc., 570 F. App’x 710, 711 (9th Cir. 

2014). Defendants thus move to dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 

claim insofar as it arises from incidents occurring prior to January 19, 2014. Plaintiff 

acknowledges this two-year statute of limitations, and his opposition focuses only upon conduct 

which occurred after January 19, 2014. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action for incidents occurring prior to January 

19, 2014 is GRANTED with prejudice.

As to incidents occurring after January 19, 2014, in order to sustain a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead the following elements: “(1) extreme and 

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional 

distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s 

outrageous conduct.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 819 (Cal. 1993). 

Outrageous conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a 

civilized community.” Id.

In the instant case, the SAC’s allegations can be grouped into three categories: (1) 

Plaintiff’s issues with Apple’s internal training, scheduling, and discipline systems; (2) raciallycharged comments directed at Plaintiff; and (3) a verbal threat directed at Plaintiff. In moving to 

dismiss the SAC, Defendants do not challenge whether the verbal threat directed at Plaintiff, 

which occurred at the California store, constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Mot. at 8. Defendants, however, argue that incidents falling within the first two categories do not 

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support a cognizable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court examines 

each category below. 

1. Internal Training, Scheduling, and Discipline

First, Plaintiff alleges that he could not log onto Apple’s internal training system, that his 

work schedule was changed without his knowledge or permission, and that he was falsely reported 

for being late to work. SAC ¶¶ 35, 39. Plaintiff also avers that he was given a verbal warning for 

wearing a baseball cap at work, even though other similary-situated employees were not so 

warned. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that, after Plaintiff’s manager in Central Florida determined that 

Plaintiff “was tardy coming back from [a] break,” Plaintiff’s manager told Plaintiff to “be careful, 

you’re on my radar now.” Id. ¶ 35. 

With respect to these allegations, California courts have held that “personnel management 

actions such as hiring and firing, job or project assignments, office or work station assignments, 

promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the provision of support, the assignment or nonassignment of supervisory functions, deciding who will and who will not attend meetings, 

deciding who will be laid off, and the like,” does not constitute “outrageous conduct beyond the 

bounds of human decency.” Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 746, 756 (Ct. 

App. 1996). As the Janken court noted, “[m]anaging personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond 

the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of 

society.” Id. at 756. Thus, “[a] simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient 

to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is 

alleged. If personnel management decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against 

the employer for discrimination.” Id. 

“Numerous federal courts have applied Janken to foreclose claims for IIED when the 

supervisor’s conduct falls within the confines of her managerial role.” Gomez v. Rehabilitation, 

2016 WL 370692, *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016). These courts have specifically held that 

“management-level decisions involving employee placement, workplace investigations, 

performance evaluations, and staffing” do not give rise to a cause of action for intentional 

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infliction of emotional distress. Id.; accord Brock v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 21 F. App’x 647, 

649 (9th Cir. 2001) (“At best, [plaintiff] has made a simple pleading of discriminatory or 

retaliatory personnel management activity, which in California is insufficient to support a claim of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

Janken, Gomez, and Brock govern Plaintiff’s complaints about Defendants’ training, 

scheduling, and discipline. In particular, Plaintiff’s complaints about his work schedule and 

ability to access Apple’s training system fall clearly within the purview of personnel management 

actions, as they involve employee placement and staffing. 2016 WL 370692, *3. In addition, the 

verbal warning Plaintiff received about wearing a hat constitutes the sort of supervisory conduct 

common at many workplaces. Janken, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756 (noting that performance 

evaluations and job or project assignments constitute personnel management actions).

Indeed, in Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff does not argue that the above incidents can

sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Opp’n at 8. Instead, Plaintiff 

focuses upon “the verbal threat” he received from Central Florida store manager Mark Urban 

(“Urban”), who stated “you’re on my radar now” after finding Plaintiff “tardy coming back from 

[a] break.” Id.; SAC ¶ 35. As alleged in the SAC, “Plaintiff took this [warning] as either a 

physical threat or a threat on his employment with Apple.” Id. “Plaintiff asked Mr. Urban’s 

manager Toni David to attend a meeting with himself and Mark Urban so Plaintiff could voice the 

stress being threatened by Mark Urban [was] causing him.” Id. “During this meeting, Mark 

Urban admitted to saying ‘be careful, you’re on my radar now’. Despite this meeting, the hostile 

work environment created had become too stressful for Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff eventually 

“contacted Apple Corporate HR to complain about being threatened by Mr. Urban. Human 

Resources agreed that Mr. Urban was wrong in threatening Plaintiff and stated that Mr. Urban had 

been disciplined for his comments against Plaintiff.” Id. In spite of his meetings with David and 

with Apple HR, Plaintiff alleges that he continued to suffer various health consequences as a result 

of the incident with Urban, and asked for a transfer to California. 

In order to bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must 

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allege “extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress.” Potter, 863 P.2d at 819. “Conduct to 

be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized 

community.” Id. Thus, “[l]iability for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not extend 

to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Hughes v. 

Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Simply put, under this legal framework, Urban’s admonition to Plaintiff is—at best—a 

mere insult, indignity, or annoyance that does not give rise to a cause of action for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff does not allege that Urban acted in a physically 

threatening manner or, for that matter, that Urban even raised his voice. Plaintiff also does not 

allege that Urban intended to cause or acted with reckless disregard at the probability of causing 

Plaintiff emotional distress. Finally, Plaintiff has cited no legal authority to support his intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim. Thus, as currently alleged, Urban’s words—that Plaintiff 

should “be careful, you’re on my radar now”—do not represent conduct that is “so extreme as to 

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Potter, 863 P.2d at 819. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims about Apple’s internal training, scheduling, 

and discipline do not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as it pertains to Apple’s 

internal training, scheduling, and discipline is GRANTED.

2. Racially-Discriminatory Comments

Next, Plaintiff alleges that various Apple employees at the California store directed 

racially-discriminatory comments at Plaintiff. One employee allegedly called Plaintiff “Oakland.” 

SAC ¶ 36. Another employee allegedly “looked at Plaintiff and stated ‘what are you part of some 

kind of new diversity program here or something.’” Id. ¶ 37. Finally, an employee allegedly said 

that Plaintiff looked like he was “part of a gang.” Id. ¶ 38. 

Together, Plaintiff alleges that these incidents resulted in Plaintiff suffering intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Importantly, in this particular cause of action, Plaintiff does not

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allege that he was subject to racial discrimination under federal law (Title VII) or under state law 

(FEHA). As noted above, Defendants did not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s racial discrimination 

causes of action under federal law (first cause of action) or under state law (second cause of 

action) as they pertain to incidents occurring at the California store.

With respect to Plaintiff’s alleged infliction of emotional distress, Defendants contend that, 

as Plaintiff’s employers, Defendants can not be held liable for the tort of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress of these unnamed Apple employees because “[a]n employer may be held liable 

for the torts of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior only if the tort was 

committed ‘within the scope of the employment.’” Mot. at 10 (quoting Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo 

Newhall Mem’l. Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 360 (Cal. 1995)). 

On this point, the California Supreme Court has held that, “the scope of employment has 

been interpreted broadly under the respondeat superior doctrine. For example, the fact that an 

employee is not engaged in the ultimate object of his employment at the time of his wrongful act 

does not preclude [employer] liability.” Farmers Ins. Gp. v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 

448 (Cal. 1995) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Hence, “where the employee is 

combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the 

same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually engaged in at the 

time of injury, unless it clearly appears that neither directly nor indirectly could he have been 

serving his employer.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, “an employer will not be held vicariously liable for an employee’s malicious or 

tortious conduct if the employee substantially deviates from the employment duties for personal 

purposes.” Id. at 449. “Thus, if the employee inflicts an injury out of personal malice, not 

engendered by the employment or acts out of personal malice unconnected with the employment, 

or if the misconduct is not an outgrowth of the employment, the employee is not acting within the 

scope of employment. Stated another way, if an employee’s tort is personal in nature, mere 

presence at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to 

the offense will not give rise to a cause of action against the employer under the doctrine of 

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respondeat superior.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

This Court must apply the rule of the California Supreme Court, as a federal court 

“interpreting state law can not change or ignore the decisions of the highest state court because the 

highest state court is the final authority on state law.” Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 

545 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, the SAC 

demonstrates that the unidentified Apple employees at issue substantially deviated from the scope 

of their employment. The Apple employee who called Plaintiff “Oakland” had asked Plaintiff to 

fix her personal Apple device. SAC ¶ 36. Similarly, the Apple employee who made the “diversity 

program” comment was in the process of “return[ing] an item [that] he [had] purchased using his 

Apple corporate discount.” Id. ¶ 37. Finally, the Apple employee who made the “gang” comment 

had asked Plaintiff to perform “a personal pickup.” Id. ¶ 38. In sum, the SAC does not suggest 

that these Apple employees were acting within the scope of their employment. These employees 

sought assistance with their personal Apple devices and personal Apple purchases.

As noted above, in such circumstances, the California Supreme Court has held that an 

employee’s torts which are “personal in nature” do not create employer liability. Farmers Ins. 

Gp., 906 P.2d at 449. Indeed, in applying this rule, the California Court of Appeal has determined 

that “[i]f the main purpose of the injury-producing activity was the pursuit of the employee’s 

personal ends, the employer is not liable.” Sunderland v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Sys. 

Support Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 665, 672 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If an 

employee’s act is purely personal, it is not typical of or broadly incidental to the employer’s 

enterprise.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 

1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We must follow the decision of the intermediate appellate courts of 

the state unless there is convincing evidence that the highest court of the state would decide 

differently.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff challenges this finding by arguing that the unidentified Apple employees showed 

their Apple employee badges and were thus treated as Apple employees during their interactions 

with Plaintiff. Opp’n at 8. Such arguments, however, have been considered and rejected by the 

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California Court of Appeal, in Le Elder v. Rice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 (Ct. App. 1994), and in 

Hoblitzell v. City of Ione, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 8 (Ct. App. 2003).

In Rice, the California Court of Appeal determined that an employer was not liable for 

injuries arising from a car accident even though the employer had provided the employee the car 

for work purposes. As the Rice court noted, the employee’s “purpose was to take his children to 

school, a purely personal activity.” 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752. “The existence or nonexistence of 

employer benefits is” therefore “not dispositive in determining vicarious liability.” Id. 

Similarly, in Hoblitzell, another California Court of Appeal case, plaintiff worked as a 

contractor at a construction site. While at the site during working hours, plaintiff was approached 

by defendants, one of whom was a law enforcement officer and the other of whom was a

municipal building inspector. 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 10. Defendants “identified themselves as building 

inspectors, and told the property owner that plaintiff had been performing the construction without 

permits and that the site should be shut down.” Id. One defendant specifically stated, while 

examining a retaining wall, that he was a building inspector from the City of Ione. Id. at 11. 

Defendants, moreover, arrived and left in an unmarked City government vehicle. Unbeknownst to 

plaintiff, defendants had not been sent to plaintiff’s property to perform an inspection; defendants 

had been sent to harass plaintiff “at the request of a disgruntled former employee.” Id. at 10.

Plaintiff in Hoblitzell brought suit against the City of Ione and alleged that the City was 

liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the respondeat superior doctrine. The 

California Court of Appeal rejected plaintiff’s argument. As the court explained, “it makes no 

difference that [a defendant] identified himself as a building inspector from Ione or used an 

unmarked City car: The purported misconduct did not arise from the employer’s enterprise but 

arose for personal reasons.” Id. at 14. “While the employee need not have intended to further the 

employer’s interests, the employer will not be held liable for an assault or other intentional tort 

that did not have a causal nexus to the employee’s work.” Id. (ellipses omitted). 

Rice and Hoblitzell govern the instant case. The unidentified Apple employees in the 

instant case who made racially discriminatory comments were on personal errands. The SAC does

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not allege that these employees were acting within the scope of their employment. As such, 

Defendants can not be held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress under respondeat 

superior. 

To summarize, neither category of allegations at issue—Plaintiff’s issues with Defendants’ 

training, scheduling, and discipline, and the racially-charged comments directed at Plaintiff—

provides Plaintiff a basis to pursue a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress as to incidents occurring after January 19, 2014, is therefore GRANTED. Plaintiff, 

however, shall have leave to amend. It is possible that Plaintiff will be able to show that 

Defendants’ conduct went beyond personnel management activity or that certain Apple employees 

were acting within the scope of their employment. Accordingly, amendment would not be futile. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress as to incidents occurring after January 19, 2014 is GRANTED without prejudice. 

E. Seventh and Ninth Causes of Action: Hostile Work Environment and Harassment

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action states a claim for hostile work environment, and 

Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action states a claim for harassment. SAC ¶¶ 61, 70. These causes of 

action suffer from the same defect: they do not state which statutes Defendants allegedly violated. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) states that a complaint must include “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In 

interpreting this provision, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] complaint need not identify the 

statutory or constitutional source of the claim raised in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” 

Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, litigants must still “provide 

the defendant fair notice of the provision under which relief is sought.” Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 

1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The SAC fails to provide such notice. As Defendants note, the SAC does not state whether 

Plaintiff is bringing his hostile work environment and harassment claims under (1) Title VII, (2) 

FEHA, (3) both statutes, or (4) neither statute. Plaintiff’s opposition, for instance, appears to state 

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that he is bringing these causes of action under the Ralph Civil Rights Act, even though the SAC 

does not mention the Ralph Civil Rights Act in either the seventh or ninth causes of action. Opp’n 

at 10. 

This ambiguity prevents Defendants from marshalling and asserting a viable defense. It is 

unclear, for instance, whether Plaintiff’s causes of action are time-barred (under Title VII) or 

whether Plaintiff’s causes of action do not apply to conduct outside of California (under FEHA) or 

whether some other defense might apply. As such, because Plaintiff has not provided fair notice 

of the provision under which relief is being sought, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the seventh and 

ninth causes of action is GRANTED.2

Plaintiff, however, shall have leave to amend. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, in many 

cases, “responsive pleadings may be necessary for a pro se plaintiff to clarify his legal theories.” 

Id. (ellipses and alteration omitted). Plaintiff could, via amendment, specify the statutory bases 

behind Plaintiff’s hostile work environment and harassment causes of action. Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss is therefore GRANTED without prejudice. 

Nevertheless, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Plaintiff has been given 

leave to amend. Plaintiff has now filed five complaints against Defendants arising out of 

Defendants’ alleged discrimination. Plaintiff filed two complaints in Dupree I. Plaintiff filed the 

original complaint in the instant action—Dupree II—on January 19, 2016. At the April 27, 2016 

initial case management conference, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the FAC. 

ECF No. 32. Finally, on June 8, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the 

SAC. ECF No. 38. “[W]hen a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its 

discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad.” Chodos v. W. Publ’g 

Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although amendment 

here may not be futile, the Court recognizes the need to move this action forward in an expeditious 

 

2 Because the Court has granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to provide fair notice, 

the Court need not address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s seventh and ninth causes of 

action are duplicative. Mot. at 11. In any event, Plaintiff’s causes of action do not appear entirely 

duplicative: Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action refers to incidents in Florida and California, SAC ¶ 

52, while Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action appears to refer only to incidents in California.

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manner. Accordingly, the Court warns Plaintiff that failure to correct the deficiencies in this 

Order and in Defendants’ motion to dismiss shall result in a dismissal with prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

To conclude:

1. As to the SAC’s first and fifth causes of action, for violations of Title VII, Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims insofar as they arise from incidents occurring at the Millenia 

Mall, Australia, and Central Florida stores is GRANTED with prejudice. 

2. As to the SAC’s second cause of action, for violation of FEHA, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims insofar as they arise from incidents occurring at the Millenia Mall, 

Australia, and Central Florida stores is GRANTED with prejudice. 

3. As to the SAC’s fourth cause of action, for violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice. 

4. As to the SAC’s sixth cause of action, for intentional infliction of emotional distress,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice as to incidents occurring prior to 

January 19, 2014. For incidents occurring after January 19, 2014, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

5. As to the SAC’s seventh and ninth causes of action, for hostile work environment and 

harassment, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

Defendants did not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action, for violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1981, and Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action, for violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act. 

In addition, Defendants did not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action, for 

violation of Title VII and FEHA, insofar as these causes of action arise from incidents occurring at 

the California store. These causes of action thus survive dismissal. 

Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

herein, Plaintiff shall do so within thirty days of this Order. Failure to meet this thirty-day 

deadline will result in a dismissal of this action with prejudice. In addition, as noted above, failure 

to cure the deficiencies identified will result in a dismissal with prejudice of the deficient claims or 

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theories. Plaintiffs may not add new causes of actions or parties without leave of the Court or 

stipulation of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2016

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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