Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_04-cv-01022/USCOURTS-arwd-1_04-cv-01022-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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Defendants’ Reply Brief attempts to put three new arguments before the Court: (1) 1

Percefull’s claims are Precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppell; (2) The

doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), bars Percefull’s procedural due process

claims; and (3) Plaintiff has failed to State a Fourth Amendment claim. These arguments should

have been raised in Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, but, for whatever reason, they

were omitted. By this Court’s Order, the parties were given until September 28, 2005, to file

their dispositive motions. Defendants will not be allowed to use their reply brief as a tool to

circumvent the Court’s deadlines and raise arguments that were omitted from their original

Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will not consider the new arguments raised by

Defendants’ Reply when considering the pending Motion for Summary Judgment.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

RICHARD D. PERCEFULL PLAINTIFF

VS. Case No. 04-CV-1022

CHRIS CLAYBAKER, Mayor of Camden,

Arkansas, et al. DEFENDANTS

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Richard D. Percefull brings this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against

Defendants Chris Claybaker, Mayor of Camden, Arkansas; Sam Steelman; and the Board of

Alderman of Camden (collectively referred to as “Defendants”), arising out of the seizure of his

boat from Sandy Beach on the Ouachita River. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Doc. 20). Percefull has responded. (Doc.23). Defendants have also filed

a Reply Brief. The Court finds this Motion ripe for consideration. 1

I. Background

At the time of the events that give rise to this lawsuit, Percefull owned and operated a bait

shop in Camden, Arkansas, near the Sandy Beach Recreational Area on the Ouachita River. 

Sandy Beach is within the city limits of Camden, and Camden leased Sandy Beach from the

United States Army Corps of Engineers. 

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Percefull also owned a fourteen-foot bass boat which he used to reach his houseboat

moored across from Sandy Beach on the west bank of the Ouachita River. On the afternoon of

Sunday, May 18, 2003, after a trip on the river, Percefull moored his bass boat to the Sandy

Beach overlook. The Mayor of Camden, Chris Claybaker, watched Percefull tie his boat to the

overlook. There is a dispute as to what, if anything, was said between Percefull and Mayor

Claybaker. Percefull describes himself as a political rival of Mayor Claybaker, and, apparently,

he unsuccessfully ran against Claybaker for Mayor of Camden, sometime in the mid-1990s. 

On the morning of Monday, May 19, 2003, Mayor Claybaker ordered Percefull’s boat

removed from the river and deposited in the City of Camden Transfer Station. At the time of the

seizure, no statute of the State of Arkansas or Ordinance of the City of Camden authorized the

seizure of Percefull’s boat. On the afternoon of May 19, 2003, Ricky Vaughn, the Street

Superintendent of the Camden Public Works Department, and another unnamed Public Works

Department employee went to Sandy Beach to move the boat. Vaughn did not remove the boat

that afternoon, because his vehicle was not large enough to tow it. On Tuesday, May 20, 2003,

Vaughn returned with a crew from the Public Works Department, put Percefull’s boat on a

trailer, and moved it to the Camden Transfer Station. The Camden Transfer Station was a former

and maybe a present landfill, which is also used to store some city equipment. Vaughn also

contacted Boyd Good, of the Camden Police Department, and told him that a bass boat had been

taken to the Transfer Station for storage, in case anyone called to inquire about where the boat

was located. Percefull reported his expropriated boat stolen to the Camden Police Department on

May 22, 2003. 

Mayor Claybaker offers several reasons why he ordered the boat seized: (1) the boat was

unregistered and uninsured and Percefull did not possess a title for it; (2) the city of Camden

hosts an annual function called “Bargin’ on the Ouachita,” (which was scheduled for May 18,

2003) during which an Army Corps of Engineers inspection barge comes down the Ouachita

River and uses the part of the River located by Sandy Beach to back out of the main channel of

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the River, under the best conditions the maneuvering of the barge in order to back out of the main

channel is difficult, given the dimensions of the area it uses to do so, Percefull’s bass boat was

directly in the area in which the barge backs out of the channel and had the boat been left in the

spot it would have interfered with the operation of the barge, and Percefull’s boat would have

been destroyed; and (3) the boat looked like it had been abandoned.

After the boat’s seizure, Percefull filed two lawsuits in Arkansas state court against

Mayor Claybaker. The first lawsuit was filed on July 17, 2003, in the Small Claims Division of

the District Court of Ouachita County, in Camden, Arkansas. Mayor Claybaker filed a Motion to

Dismiss Percefull’s Complaint, the District Court entered an Order transferring the lawsuit to the

Civil Division of the Camden District Court, Mayor Claybaker filed a second motion to dismiss

(this time for failure to file a timely response to the first motion to dismiss), and the District

Court entered an Order of Dismissal, finding Plaintiff had failed to timely respond to the

dismissal motions in a timely manner and dismissing the lawsuit.

Percefull’s second state court lawsuit was filed sometime in January or February of 2004,

in the Circuit Court of Ouachita County, Arkansas, Sixth Civil Division, again against Mayor

Claybaker. On February 4, 2004, Mayor Claybaker filed a Motion to Dismiss (based on a failure

to fact-plead and sovereign immunity). On February 27, 2004, Percefull filed a Motion for

Voluntary Non-Suit Without Prejudice. On March 1, 2004, the Circuit Court entered an order

granting Mayor Claybaker’s Motion to Dismiss, finding the complaint failed to state facts upon

which relief can be granted, and dismissing the Percefull’s lawsuit without prejudice.

 Percefull filed this lawsuit against Defendants on March 5, 2004, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the violation of his civil rights. 

Originally, Percefull named the Camden Public Works Department as a Separate Defendant, but

this Court dismissed it with prejudice. On September 28, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment, which the Court presently considers.

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II. Discussion

The standard of review for a motion for summary judgment is familiar and established. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a party moves for summary judgment:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file show that there is no

genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1995). 

The Supreme Court has issued the following guidelines to help determine whether this

standard has been satisfied:

The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is

a need for trial . . . whether, in other words, there are genuine factual 

issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). See also Agristor Leasing v. Farrow,

826 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1987); Niagra of Wisconsin Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus. UnionManagement Pension Fund, 800 F.2d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 1986). 

The burden of proof is on the moving party to set forth the basis of its motion. Donovan

v. Harrah’s Maryland Heights Corp., 289 F.3d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 2002), citing Celotex Corp v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court must view all facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id., citing Matsushia Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, in Scheer Const. Co. v. Greater

Huron Development Corp., 700 F.2d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 1983), quoting Burst v. Adolph Coors

Co., 650 F.2d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1981), in a case involving the entry of summary judgment,

stated:

[w]hen a motion forsummaryjudgment is made and supported by affidavits, the

party opposing the motion may not rest on the allegations in his pleadings but

must resist the motion by setting forth specific facts that raise a genuine issue

of fact for trial. 

 If a plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial on a claim and the defendant has filed a 

motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must identify admissible evidence sufficient to make

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See Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 21: “Sam Steelman, the 2

Director of the Public Works Department, did not learn of the boat’s removal until several days

after the boat was taken to the Transfer Station.” Exhibit 1: Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 148;

Exhibit 3: Deposition of Ricky Vaughn, p. 9; Exhibit 7: Sam Steelman, pp. 4-6. 

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a submissible case at trial. Celotex, at 323-24. If the plaintiff cannot identify such facts, the

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,

884 (1990), quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

To establish a genuine issue of fact sufficient to warrant trial, the nonmoving party “must

do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.., 475 U.S. at 586. Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of

setting forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment in their favor on each of Percefull’s

causes of action, and the Court will consider each of Defendants’ arguments in turn. 

A. Liability of Separate Defendants Sam Steelman and city of Camden

Percefull has presented no evidence that Steelman was involved in the facts giving rise to

this lawsuit in any manner. Accordingly, he is dismissed from this lawsuit. Marchant v. City of 2

Little Rock, 741 F.2d 201, 205 (8th Cir. 1994)(affirming dismissal of individual defendant in 

§ 1983 action where the record indicated defendant was not connected and had no knowledge of

the incident). Second, to maintain a constitutional violation claim against a municipality, a

plaintiff must establish that it was a policy or custom of the municipality which caused the

violation. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). 

Percefull argues “the constitutional injury against the Board of Aldermen is that there were no

pre or post-deprivation procedures in place and the injury complained of is the denial of

procedural due process.” Percefull has made no showing that some affirmative policy or custom

of the city of Camden caused the constitutional violation, so the Board of Aldermen, city of

Camden, and Mayor Claybaker in his Official Capacity are properly dismissed from this lawsuit,

leaving only Mayor Claybaker in his individual capacity as a Defendant.

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An exception to the pre-seizure notice requirements exist when an important 3

public interest is at stake and early notice is impracticable. Apparently, without expressly saying

so, the Defendants believe Mayor Claybaker’s actions fit within this exception, because he

needed to move Percefull’s boat to make room for the “Bargin’ on the Ouachita” Army Corps

Barge. The factual record on this point is undeveloped at this stage, and the Court is unwilling to

grant summary judgment based on this exception.

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B. Qualified Immunity for Mayor Claybaker

Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law. Duffy v.

Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1035 (8th Cir. 1997). Governmental officials performing discretionary

functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should

have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The test for qualified immunity

involves an objective inquiry. Id. at 815-819. In the context of a summary judgment motion, the

Court must engage in a three-step analysis: (1) whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a

constitutional or statutory right; (2) if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of

the violation; and (3) whether, given the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, there are no genuine

issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would have know that the alleged

action violated the right. Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 673-674 (8th Cir. 1997)(en banc).

Percefull has asserted a violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable

searches and seizures and of due process. With respect to Percefull’s procedural due process

claim, closely analogous cases from this circuit have held that an automobile owner is entitled to

meaningful post-deprivation notice following the state’s seizure of the vehicle. See Coleman v.

Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 260 (1994)(recognizing in cases involving the impoundment of vehicles,

courts have uniformly found due process requires, at a minimum, a prompt hearing before an

impartial decisionmaker). Although procedural due process requires it, Percefull was never

given any notice or opportunity for a hearing either before or after the seizure of his boat. In 3

fact, no ordinance of the city of Camden specifically authorized the seizure of Percefull’s boat,

and the evidence suggests Mayor Claybaker was acting pursuant to little more than his executive

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fiat when he ordered the seizure. 

With respect to Percefull’s claim that Mayor Claybaker violated his Fourth Amendment

right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Defendants have not advanced an argument as

to qualified immunity on Percefull’s Fourth Amendment claim in their motion for summary

judgment. The Court does note that it is well-settled that a seizure carried out without judicial

authorization is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a well-defined exception to this

requirement. See Dixon v. Lowery, 302 F.3d 857, 862 (8th Cir. 2002). Also, it is worth noting

that when there is a genuine dispute as to the predicate facts material to the qualified immunity

issue, there can be no summary judgment. Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir.

1995). Many of the predicate facts underlying Mayor Claybaker’s Fourth Amendment and

procedural due process qualified immunity are at issue. Mayor Claybaker has offered at least

three separate reasons for the seizure of Percefull’s boat. Genuine issues remain as to whether

Mayor Claybaker is entitled to qualified immunity, so summary judgment will be denied on this

point.

C. Parratt/Hudson Doctrine and Percefull’s Procedural Due Process Claims.

Defendants argue Percefull’s claim is not ripe for adjucation and cites the Court to a

number of cases where courts have refused to find a cause of action under § 1983 where a

plaintiff alleges a taking of his property by the state without due process without first attempting

to avail himself of the state mechanisms for compensation. This argument is wholly misplaced. 

Percefull is not making a claim under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution, he is making a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Perhaps Defendants were attempting to invoke the rule of Paratt, 451 U.S. 527 (establishing that

where deprivations of property interests are random and unauthorized and it is therefore

impossible for the state to provide a meaningful predeprivation hearing, due process is satisfied

by the existence of an adequate postdeprivation state remedy) but because Defendants have not

fully briefed or argued this issue in their Motion, Defendants are not entitled to summary

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judgment. Even if we were to decide this issue by invoking the Parratt doctrine, the summary

judgment evidence contains genuine questions as to whether Mayor Claybaker could have

feasibly provided a predeprivation hearing before taking Percefull’s boat and whether there was a

need to quickly remove the boat sufficient to excuse a hearing prior to the boat’s impoundment. 

See Gentry v. Lee’s Summit, City of Missouri, 10 F.3d 1340 (8th Cir. 1993), quoting Zinermon

v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)(recognizing the proper inquiry under Parratt is whether the

state feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing before taking the property, which it generally

must do so regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the

taking). Percefull’s procedural due process claims will proceed as against Mayor Claybaker.

D. Substantive Due Process

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses three kinds of federal

claims enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) claims for the deprivation of certain specific

rights denoted in the Bill of Rights and made applicable to the states through incorporation; (2)

claims under the substantive component of the due process clause “that bars certain arbitrary,

wrongful government actions, ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement

them’”; and (3) claims under the procedural component of the due process clause that prohibits

the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without fair procedure. Karen M. Blum & Kathryn R.

Urbonya, Section 1983 Litigation 13-1 (2005), citing Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124. It is worth

noting that when a § 1983 plaintiff asserts a violation of a right specifically identified in the Bill

of Rights, the state law remedies provided are irrelevant, because the violation is complete at the

time of the challenged conduct. Id., citing Zinermon at 125.

Some of the confusion is created by the wording of Percefull’s Complaint. The Title of

Percefull’s Complaint reads “Complaint for Violation of the United States Constitution’s Fourth

Amendment Prohibitions of Illegal Seizure, and the Substantive and Procedural Violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Guarentee.” Under the “Causes of Action,” heading, are

the subheadings “Fourth Amendment Violation,” “Substantive Due Process Violation,” and

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“Procedural Violation of Due Process.” Now it appears taht Percefull is arguing that his

substantive due process claim is merely a vehicle for his allegation that Defendants violated the

text of the Fourth Amendment to the constitution, prohibiting unreasonable seizures. In other

words, Percefull’s § 1983 claim falls under the Zimmermon category (1) and not category (2). 

The Court agrees with Defendants to the extent that Percefull has not shown that he is asserting a

claim under the substantive component of the due process clause “that bars certain arbitrary,

wrongful government actions, ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement

them’.” On the other hand, Percefull may assert his Fourth Amendment claim using § 1983. See

County of Sacremento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998)(“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered

by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth . . . Amendment, the claim must be

analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of

substantive due process.”)

The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, 506 U.S. 56,

61 (1992). The Fourth Amendment’s protections apply to both civil and criminal proceedings. 

Id. In the context of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure of property occurs whenever there is

“some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest in that property.” 

Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corporation, 172 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1999). The fact that Percefull’s

boat was seized cannot be in dispute. However, because Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment claim in its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will not pass on its

propriety at this stage of the litigation. 

As the Court stated earlier, Percefull has failed to state a substantive due process claim

outside of his procedural due process claim and his Fourth Amendment claim. Summary

judgment on that point is appropriate. 

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E. Legislative Immunity

Defendants finally argue that Mayor Claybaker is entitled to legislative immunity for his

actions. Legislators are protected by absolute immunity for actions taken in their legislative

capacity. Brown v. Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1992). The Court finds it difficult, even

under the functional approach used to analyze immunity law, to conceive how Mayor

Claybaker’s actions in seizing Percefull’s boat could be characterized as legislative in nature (or

how he was acting in a legislative capacity). Mayor Claybaker is not entitled to legislative

immunity. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in

part and denied in part. Separate Defendants Sam Steelman, and the Board of Alderman of

Camden, Arkansas, are hereby dismissed from this lawsuit with prejudice. Further, Plaintiff’s

Claims against Separate Defendant Chris Claybaker, Mayor of Camden, Arkansas, in his official

capacity are dismissed with prejudice. This lawsuit will proceed to trial as against Mayor

Claybaker in his individual capacity for Plaintiff’s claims of violations of his Fourth Amendment

rights and his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. To the extent Plaintiff

stated a claim arising under the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is

hereby dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of October, 2005.

 /s/ Harry F. Barnes 

Hon. Harry F. Barnes

U.S. District Judge

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