Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-03310/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-03310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONNIE E. WEATHERS,

Petitioner,

 v.

E. ROE, Warden,

Respondent

 /

No. 02-3310 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Lonnie E. Weathers (“petitioner”), a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the

above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After an initial

review, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted

based on petitioner’s cognizable claims. Respondent has filed an answer, along with a

memorandum and exhibits. Petitioner has filed a traverse, also supported by a memorandum

and exhibits. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, petitioner was charged in Alameda County Superior Court with murder and

possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. Prior to trial, petitioner admitted to a prior felony

conviction for possession of narcotics. At trial, the jury found petitioner guilty of second

degree murder and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, and found true special allegations

as to personal use of a semi-automatic rifle, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and

Case 3:02-cv-03310-MMC Document 34 Filed 11/01/05 Page 1 of 17
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personal infliction of great bodily injury. On November 6, 1998, the trial court sentenced

petitioner to a total term of 30 years to life in state prison. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Petitioner’s

subsequent habeas petitions to the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court

were denied. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts as follows:

Esther Jones was shot and killed at around 2:15 p.m. on October 24, 1995, as

she walked on Hillside Street near 94th Avenue in Oakland. She was the unintended

victim of shots fired at a burgundy or maroon Chrysler Cordova driven by Dennis

Armstrong during a “rolling gun battle” eastbound along Hillside. Jones was struck by a

single .223 Remington bullet.

Shirley Akens heard the shots from her house on 94th Avenue near Hillside. 

She ran into her driveway, from where she saw a “burgundy car in the street,” occupied

by Armstrong, two women and children. Armstrong got out of the car and yelled

“mama.” Akens then ran to the corner of 94th and Hillside, where she observed a “blue

car” occupied by two “Black” people. The car was “going too fast” for Akens to identify

the occupants. More gunshots were fired, apparently at Armstrong, from the

passenger side of the blue car, before it sped away. Akens then noticed Esther Jones

lying on the sidewalk.

Oakland Police Officer Marvin Jackson and Evidence Technician Dan

Hutchinson examined the scene of the shooting. The Chrysler Cordova driven by

Armstrong was found on 94th Avenue north of Hillside with a tire and the back and front

passenger side windows “shot out.” The occupants of the car, Armstrong, two women

and their two small children, were very excited, frightened and upset as they attempted

to explain “what had just happened.” One .380 shell casing was located at the

intersection of 94th Avenue and Hillside, and another to the east at the corner of 98th

Avenue. Two groups of a total of five .223 shell casings were discovered on Hillside

Street just west of 94th Avenue, all fired by “the same firearm.” Expert testimony was

adduced that “7 different 223 rifles or carbines” fire .223 Remington bullets, the most

common of which on the “streets of Oakland” is a Colt AR15 semiautomatic assault

rifle.

The investigation of the homicide was undertaken by Sergeant Michael Clark,

who arrived at the scene shortly after the shooting. Clark soon realized that Armstrong

was the “intended victim,” and asked him some general questions before transporting

him to the “homicide section” where he was interviewed further. Armstrong did not

appear to be under the influence of any narcotics. He was “very helpful,” and answered

questions appropriately.

In a taped interview that same afternoon, Armstrong stated that he drove

Lanette Walker, Cecily Wade, and their two small children in the Chrysler Cordova to

an apartment on 85th Avenue. Just after 2:00p.m., Armstrong saw appellant on 85th in

another vehicle, a Pontiac Grand Am. Appellant just waved so Armstrong “didn’t think

nothing of it.” Armstrong and his group were in the apartment for about five minutes. 

When they left, appellant’s “vehicle was gone,” but a few blocks later as they “headed

back to 94th,” Armstrong noticed that “the AM (sic) was following him.” Armstrong

recognized appellant, so he “threw his hands in the air to indicate, What’s up?” After

several blocks, Armstrong stopped his car, whereupon appellant jumped from the

Grand Am and with an assault rifle that “looked like an AK,” shot first into the ground,

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then at Armstrong. Armstrong “took off,” pursued by the Grand Am, with appellant

shooting at them from the right front passenger seat. On 94th, Armstrong heard

appellant yell, “I got to kill him. I got to kill him.” When Armstrong reached his house, he

laid his head on the steering wheel and pressed on the horn. He saw the Grand Am

drive away down 94th. Armstrong indicated “off-tape” that he thought appellant “might

have hit a lady on the street” during the chase.

Sergeant Clark testified that during the interview, Armstrong identified

appellant’s photograph in a lineup as the “one with the assault rifle” who “shot at him.” 

He made a positive identification “fairly quickly,” and Armstrong did not appear

confused or unsure. Armstrong told Clark that he was familiar with appellant, whom he

referred to as “Moore.” Armstrong had previously seen appellant “selling drugs across

the street” from the mini park on 84th Street, but did not know him well. About a week

prior to the shooting of Jones, Armstrong’s cousin Timothy Ross won money from

appellant “shooting dice” on 90th and Bancroft. Appellant became angry and “swung

at” Ross. Then, two days before the shooting, appellant arrived at Armstrong’s house

in a green, older model Malibu with a handgun. He complained about the dice game

with Ross, and warned Armstrong that he “was coming back.” The following two days,

Armstrong saw appellant speed by his house as a passenger in a Grand Am, point a

finger and yell, “I’m going to get you.”

Armstrong subsequently identified appellant’s brother Andre Moore and Charles

Williams in other photo lineups as the rear passengers in the Grand Am. He made an

initially “hesitant” photo identification of Reginald Soriano in another lineup as “the guy

that was driving the car that was chasing him.” During the interview, however,

Armstrong stated that he did not get a good look at the driver, who wore a baseball cap

and sat “real low in the car.” Later, Armstrong identified Soriano as the driver by

stating, “That’s the guy, but I’m afraid of him.” [Armstrong] expressed concern for the

safety of himself and his mother. Sergeant Clark testified that he did not suggest any of

the identifications to Armstrong.

Armstrong also directed the officers to a house on 85th Avenue across from a

“minipark,” where he thought appellant “hung out and sold drugs,” Apprehensive about

Armstrong’s safety, Sergeant Clark gave him $20 for a hotel room after the interview

was concluded.

Armstrong was interviewed again by Sergeant Clark the morning of October 30,

1995, at a house in the San Pablo-Richmond area, where Armstrong was staying after

he heard “they were looking for him and were going to kill him.” Armstrong reiterated

his identifications, particularly his positive identification of appellant as the shooter. 

Armstrong’s fear of Soriano was the reason he did not identify him immediately. 

Again, Sergeant Clark did not detect any symptoms of drug use by Armstrong.

Inspector Jefferey Harvey of the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office

assisted with another interview of Armstrong on July 31, 1998, during trial but before

his testimony. Armstrong proclaimed that “he wasn’t going to help in this case because

he was already dead and there was nothing anybody could do for him.” He expressed

continued concern over “incidents” and “problems” his mother and sister suffered in the

neighborhood “based on this set of circumstances and he didn’t want any part of it.” In

response to questions about the motive for the shooting, Armstrong mentioned that his

cousin had come to his house at 90th and Bancroft to ask for a gun due to a “conflict”

over an acrimonious dice game. Armstrong told his cousin that he alone would use his

gun, and proceeded to a gas station where he “put a gun to a man’s head and told the

person leave my cousin alone; if I have to talk to you again, I won’t be talking.” 

Appellant was among the group of people that he approached with the gun, but

Armstrong did not identify him as the one at whom he pointed the weapon.

Sergeant Clark interviewed Lanette Walker and displayed a photo lineup to her

the evening after the shooting. Walker gave a statement in which she described the

shooting, and made a “hesitant” identification of Jaron Bradshaw, known to her as

“Quincy,” as one of the people involved. She had seen him a “couple of times” before. 

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She made no identifications from two other lineups shown to her. Walker indicated that

she “ducked down” and did not get a view of those who were shooting.

Cecily Wade was interviewed twice by Sergeant Clark, the first occasion by

telephone the day following the shooting, and then two days thereafter in person. 

During the second interview, Wade selected appellant’s photograph as “the one with

the assault weapon.” She expressed no uncertainty in her identification. Wade also

selected a photograph of Charles Williams from a lineup as a person “in the car that

was chasing them.” She did not identify Reginald Soriano, whose photograph was

present in another lineup.

Following his arrest, on November 2, 1995, Reginald Soriano gave statements

to Sergeant Clark. Soriano told Clark that on 85th Avenue at around 2:00 p.m on the

day of the shooting he loaned his rental car, a green Grand Am, to appellant. In

exchange and to repay a debt, appellant gave $50 to Soriano. Soriano then left to visit

his cousin, and went from there to an appointment with his probation officer in Hayward

at 3:00 p.m. Later that afternoon, he returned to 85th Avenue to reclaim his car. He

heard that the Grand Am was parked on 99th Avenue, but had been involved in a

shooting, so he exchanged it for a “red one.” In the statement, Soriano mentioned that

he also heard appellant “was supposed to have been the shooter.”

At trial, Armstrong testified that he “didn’t want to come” to the trial to appear as

a witness. He admitted numerous prior convictions and current incarceration in state

prison for a parole violation: failure to register as a drug offender. Armstrong testified

that he knew appellant and considered him a friend. He recanted his previous

identifications of appellant as the shooter, and his statements to Sergeant Clark that he

feared for his safety. Armstrong denied or did not recall the prior statements he made

to Clark, except the description of the dice game in which his cousin Timothy Ross was

involved. He testified that he made and signed the identifications only after Clark

suggested that he do so, and to “get it over with.” The identifications of appellant as the

shooter were mistaken. He remembered the shooting incident, but testified, “I don’t

know who shot at me.” He was under the influence of heroin at the time of the shooting

and when he gave statements to Clark. He used the $20 Clark gave him after the first

interview to purchase heroin.

Cecily Wade was also reluctant to testify at trial. She was nervous [and] did not

want to be considered a “snitch.” Wade had known appellant and his brother Andre for

a long time and saw them often in her neighborhood. On the day of the shooting, Wade

was with Lanette Walker and their two children at a store on 96th and Olive. There she

encountered her friend Armstrong, who agreed to drive the whole group in a “big

burgundy car” to the house of Wade’s godmother at 85th and Birch. On the way, at the

minipark on 85th Wade exchanged greetings with appellant and his brother Andrew,

who were “hanging around” outside appellant’s house with “some more people” she

did not recognize. Pointing to appellant, Armstrong mentioned that he had “put a gun

up to his mouth” and “robbed him,” but spared his life.

After a brief stay at Wade’s godmother’s house, the group returned to the

burgundy car and proceeded along 85th to Birch Street with Armstrong again driving. 

He was “burning about something,” although Walker did not know what. At the

intersection of 85th and Birch, they saw appellant’s brother Andre “smiling and

laughing” as he pointed behind them. As Armstrong drove into the intersection, a dark

green or gray car approached closely from the rear with “4 or 5 Darcy boys in the

back.” When Armstrong realized that the car behind was apparently pursuing him, he

backed his car up, stopped, got out, threw his hands in the air, and yelled “What’s up?” 

When Wade and Walker looked back, they saw guns, then heard gunshots. Armstrong

jumped back in the driver’s seat and warned everyone “to get down.” Walker

immediately ducked to the floor of the back seat with the children, and directed

Armstrong “to go.” Walker could not identify the “guy with the big gun” she observed on

the right passenger side of the car, but Wade testified that she “saw Lonnie with the

gun.” They heard more gunshots in rapid succession as Armstrong drove away,

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1Except where noted, the matters in this paragraph were observed by, and testified to

at trial by, both Walker and Wade. 

5

chased by the other car. Shots continued past them, and two of the windows were

“shot out” as Armstrong drove to his mother’s house on Hillside, where he said,

“everybody get out.” Walker looked up to see Armstrong’s head against the horn. 

From out of the shattered back windshield, she looked at the other car driving away on

94th Avenue. Walker and Wade grabbed the children and ran into an apartment for

help.[1]

Reginald Soriano testified unwillingly that just after 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of

the shooting he drove a rented green Grand Am to 85th Avenue, where he met

appellant and two other people he knew “by face.” Soriano trusted appellant, so he left

the Grand Am with him while he went to his cousin’s house, and from there to keep an

appointment with his probation officer at 3:00 p.m. He did not see appellant get in the

car or drive it before he left. When Soriano returned to 85th Avenue after 3:30 p.m.,

appellant was not present. He was told by others that his car was “on 99th.” When he

found the green Grand Am on 99th, parked “in front of somebody’s house,” the keys

were “left in it.” Soriano heard “rumors” that the car had been used in a shooting, so he

exchanged it for another Grand Am, a red one. When he was first arrested for the

murder of Jones, Soriano “didn’t want to be involved with nothing,” so he falsely told

Sergeant Clark he had never been in the green Grand Am, and was with his girlfriend

during the entire day of the shooting. In a subsequent interview a few days later,

Soriano told Clark the truth, which was essentially the same version of the incident he

described in his trial testimony. He denied that he was the driver of the green Grand

Am during the shooting.

Appellant presented an alibi defense, in part with the testimony of his sister,

Michele, who lived with her mother and brother Andre at a house on 85th Avenue on

October 24, 1995. On that day at about 1:30 p.m. she left her brown, 1984 Buick

Skylark, and $25 with appellant with instructions to get the car “detailed.” Appellant

drove away from the house and did not return until 4:00 p.m., with the car cleaned.

The owner of the “Sprinkle ’em Detail Center” located at 91st Avenue and East

14th Street in Oakland testified that appellant was a regular customer in October of

1995. According to a “work order” from October 24, 1995, a brown Buick that matched

the description of Michele’s car was given a “detail wash” at the shop that day. The

work order also bore a handwritten notation of partial payment of $20 made by “Lonn.” 

The work order did not have a vehicle license number or customer name on it. A detail

wash takes from one to two hours, and some customers leave while the work is done.

Appellant testified that he took Michele’s brown Buick to the detail shop at 2:00

p.m. the afternoon of the shooting. Appellant waited at the shop while the detail work

was done. The work took “about an hour,” after which he drove directly home to 85th

Avenue, arriving there at almost 3:30 p.m. He did not have a gun in his possession that

day, never saw the green Grand Am, and did not take part in the shooting.

On cross-examination, appellant denied that he had participated in a dice game

five days before the shooting, that he was acquainted with Armstrong “at all,” or that

Armstrong had robbed him and his friends at gunpoint at the Shell gas station on

Bancroft on October 19, 1995. Appellant repeatedly claimed that the prosecution

witnesses were “lying” when they connected him with the shooting and preceding

events. He admitted that he had previously been convicted of a “felony.” Although

appellant denied that he ever used the name Moore, his “rap sheet” indicated use of

the aliases Maurice Lonnie Moore and Andre Moore in conjunction with prior felony

convictions.

People v. Weathers, No. A085327, slip op. 1, 1-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2001) (“Slip Op.”)

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(attached as Respt.’s Ex. G).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court “may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413. “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 412-13.

B. Legal Claims

Petitioner claims he is entitled to habeas relief because his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Specifically,

petitioner claims his counsel: (1) allowed the jury to hear and consider evidence that petitioner

had been convicted of a felony; (2) failed to object to out-of-court statements identifying

petitioner as the shooter; (3) failed to object to the prosecutor’s references to petitioner’s

admissions to a third party; (4) failed to object when the prosecutor asked petitioner whether

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2

In this case, the Court reviews the opinion of the California Court of Appeal because it

is the last reasoned state court opinion to deny petitioner’s claims. (Slip Op. at 8-9); see

LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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the prosecution witnesses had lied; and (5) failed to object to testimony that petitioner sold

drugs. Petitioner also contends he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of these

deficiencies in counsel’s performance. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of the denial of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to

prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two

things. First, he must establish that his attorney’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell

below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. See

id. at 688. The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have presented, but rather

whether the choices made by defense counsel were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon,

151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by

his attorney’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. See id. It is unnecessary for a federal court considering an

ineffective assistance claim to address the prejudice element of the Strickland test if the

petitioner is unable to establish incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v.

Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). Conversely, a court need not determine

whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the

defendant as the result of the alleged deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

Here, in denying petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims, the California Court of

Appeal applied the Strickland standard.2 As this is the correct federal standard for evaluating

such claims, the state court’s denial of petitioner’s claims was not “contrary to” clearly

established federal law within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406

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3The California Court of Appeal explained that a felony conviction for simple

possession of narcotics could not be used for impeachment because it does not necessarily

involve moral turpitude. (Slip Op. at 11.) 

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(holding state court's Strickland analysis generally does not fall within the "contrary to” clause);

Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that where state court

applies Strickland, federal habeas petitioner’s claims should be analyzed under

"unreasonable application" prong, not “contrary to” prong, of § 2254(d)). For the reasons

explained below, the state court’s denial of petitioner’s claims did not “involve an

unreasonable application of” federal law within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1).

1. Evidence of Petitioner’s Prior Conviction

Petitioner claims his attorney was ineffective in allowing the jury to hear evidence of his

prior felony conviction. One of the counts charged against petitioner was possession of a

firearm by an ex-felon, the prior felony being possession of narcotics. Prior to trial, petitioner

admitted the prior felony in order to take advantage of California case law that precludes the

introduction at trial of evidence concerning the nature of the prior conviction, which evidence

otherwise would have been admitted to prove the prior felony element of the firearm charge. 

See People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173. At trial, petitioner’s attorney asked

petitioner about this felony conviction, and petitioner admitted to its existence; petitioner did

not, however, divulge the nature of such conviction. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel

referred to the existence, but not the nature, of the conviction in their closing arguments. 

a. Severance or Bifurcation of the Firearm Possession Count

Petitioner claims his attorney should have protected him from the prejudice associated

with his prior felony conviction, by requesting either severance or bifurcation. Had counsel

done so, petitioner argues, the felon-in-possession count would have been tried after the

murder charge, thereby obviating the need for the jury to know petitioner had a prior felony at

the time they were considering the murder charge.3

In rejecting this claim, the California Court of Appeal found that neither a motion for

severance nor for bifurcation would have been granted under California law. (Slip Op. 10-13)

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4Armstrong had been convicted of felony car theft, attempted robbery and possession

for sale of narcotics. Soriano had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and

possession for sale of a controlled substance.

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(citing Cal. Pen. Code §§ 954, 954.1, 1044, and California case law). Such determination of

state law is binding on this Court on habeas review. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629,

630 n.3 (1988) (holding determination of state law by intermediate state appellate court is

binding on federal court conducting habeas review). As this Court is bound by the state

court’s conclusion that a motion for severance or bifurcation would not have succeeded under

state law, counsel’s failure to bring such a motion does not constitute ineffective assistance. 

See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding counsel cannot have been

ineffective for failing to raise meritless motion). 

b. Failure to Inform Jury of the Nature of the Prior Conviction

Petitioner also argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to disclose to the jury the

“non-serious” nature of his prior conviction for narcotics possession. He asserts the

withholding of this information led the jury to equate his prior conviction with the more serious

prior convictions of the other witnesses at trial.4 

There are legitimate tactical reasons for counsel’s decision not to inform the jury of the

nature of petitioner’s prior conviction. Counsel could not have been sure how the jury would

react to, or what inferences it would draw from, evidence of petitioner’s prior involvement with

drugs. In particular, there was a significant risk that the jury would associate petitioner’s drug

involvement with violence. In short, a reasonable determination could be made that the jury’s

reaction to the evidence of drug possession was too unpredictable to risk disclosure of that

evidence. As there were valid tactical reasons for counsel’s failure to disclose the nature of

petitioner’s prior conviction, counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable in this

respect.

c. Questioning Petitioner About Prior Conviction

Petitioner further contends that his counsel should not have asked him on direct

examination about his prior conviction. During direct examination, petitioner’s counsel asked

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5The existence of petitioner’s prior conviction also became part of the evidence when

the prosecutor questioned petitioner regarding his aliases. RT 524-25, 542-44. 

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petitioner, “Mr. Weathers, you’ve been convicted of a felony haven’t you?”, to which petitioner

responded, “Yes.” (Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) (attached as Respt.’s Exh. B) 514). During

closing argument, counsel stated, “Mr. Weathers came to you. He admitted he had been

convicted of a felony. You can use that to judge his credibility. You can also use a lot of other

things he told you [that were] corroborated by other evidence.” (RT 643). 

Again, there were legitimate tactical reasons for counsel’s preemptively questioning

petitioner about the prior felony conviction. First, such questioning serves to take some of the

sting out of the fact of the prior conviction. Second, the existence of a prior felony conviction

was a necessary element of the prosecution’s case for the felon-in-possession charge, which

element the prosecution was entitled to prove. Indeed the parties entered into a stipulation as

to the existence of a felony conviction, and the jury was so informed. RT 587-88.5 Moreover,

petitioner’s admitting the prior conviction provided his counsel the opportunity to argue that

petitioner is forthright about his past, has nothing to hide, and when he is guilty of something,

he admits to it. Counsel reasonably could have decided that such early admission would be

preferable to petitioner’s having to admit to the prior conviction on cross-examination, at which

point it might appear to the jury that petitioner had been trying to conceal it from them. In light

of the legitimate tactical reasons for petitioner’s early admission of his prior conviction,

counsel’s decision to ask petitioner about that conviction on direct examination did not

constitute deficient performance. 

 2. Evidence that Others Identified Petitioner as Shooter

Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective in failing to object to evidence of “anonymous

persons” identifying him as the shooter. Soriano testified that he heard “rumours” that the

rented green Grand Am, which he had loaned to petitioner, was “involved” in a shooting, and

that he thereafter retrieved the green Grand Am and exchanged it for a red one. (RT 41-42). 

Additionally, a portion of Soriano’s taped interview with the police was played for the jury,

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6Defense counsel had asked Armstrong if he identified petitioner in the lineup

“because that was the person involved in the shooting?” (RT 279-80). Armstrong responded

as indicated. 

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which portion contained a statement by Soriano that he had heard from unidentified sources

that “Lonnie . . . was supposed to [be] the shooter.” Armstrong testified during crossexamination that he picked petitioner’s photograph from a photo lineup because Sergeant

Clark “asked me to and told me that some people told him that was the shooter.” (RT 279-

80).6 Petitioner asserts that such evidence constitutes inadmissible hearsay, and that counsel

therefore should have objected to its introduction.

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim after finding the testimony was not

hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter stated, see People v. Sanders,

11 Cal.4th 475, 511-12 (1995), but rather as evidence of the witness’s state of mind. In

particular, the evidence was relevant to the jury’s assessment of the credibility of Soriano and

Armstrong as witnesses. (See Slip Op. 16.) Consequently, counsel cannot be faulted for

failing to object to the evidence on hearsay grounds. Nevertheless, counsel could have, and

did not, request a limiting instruction. A limiting instruction that the evidence could not be

considered for its truth, but only for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining the actions of

Soriano and Armstrong, would have helped ensure that the jury did not use the evidence for an

impermissible hearsay purpose. 

Counsel’s failure to seek a limiting instruction does not, however, provide a basis for

habeas relief, because there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would

have been different if such an instruction had been given. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694

(setting forth prejudice standard necessary to establish a violation of Sixth Amendment right to

counsel). Such rumours and other unattributed statements, even if considered by the jury

without limitation, are unlikely to have made a difference in this case, given the strength of the

other evidence against petitioner. In a police interview shortly after the shooting, Armstrong,

who knew and recognized petitioner, identified petitioner as the shooter; and he reiterated that

identification in a subsequent interview with the police. Although Armstrong recanted this

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identification at trial, he provided the prosecution with a plausible explanation for any changes

in his account, namely that he feared for his safety. Wade likewise was an eyewitness to the

shooting who knew and recognized petitioner; and she also identified petitioner as the

shooter, both to the police and at trial. In addition, Soriano, although an unwilling witness,

provided testimony that shortly before the shooting, he had loaned petitioner a car matching

the description of the car from which the shots were fired. Finally, Wade testified as to

petitioner’s motive for shooting Armstrong, namely that Armstrong had previously threatened

petitioner with a gun and robbed him. By contrast, petitioner’s alibi defense, that he was

having his sister’s car washed at the time of the shooting, was relatively weak, in that the work

order from the “Sprinkle ‘em Detail Center” was, at best, sketchy and, in particular, contained

no reference to the time the work was done. Under such circumstances, petitioner has failed

to demonstrate a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the case would have been

different if the trial court had given a limiting instruction. Accordingly, under Strickland,

petitioner was not prejudiced by the failure to request such instruction.

3. The Prosecutor’s References to Petitioner’s Admissions to a Third Party

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor’s

questions regarding petitioner’s admissions to a third party. During cross-examination, the

prosecutor asked petitioner if information Jaron Bradshaw, a.k.a. Quincy (“Quincy”), had

imparted to Sergeant Clark was true. In particular, during cross-examination of petitioner, the

following exchange occurred:

Q. Someone named Quincy, also known as Ron Bradshaw, told Sergeant

Clark that you admitted to being in that car, he would be lying?

A. Yes.

Q. If someone told Sergeant Clark that you said that you were

shooting at the guy who robbed you, that would be a lie

too?

A. Yes.

Q. If someone named Quincy said that you told him that while the

shooting was going on, you thought you might have hit a lady on

the street, that would have been a lie, too?

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7Although the form of the questioning was argumentative to the extent the prosecutor

asked petitioner whether Quincy was “lying,” the substance of the questioning was a legitimate

inquiry into prior inconsistent statements by petitioner to Quincy, assuming the prosecutor had

a good faith belief that such conversation took place. 

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A. Yes. 

(RT 539.)

Petitioner claims the prosecutor’s questions suggested a “non-evidentiary hearsay

confession” by petitioner without any good faith belief that petitioner had in fact made those

statements to Quincy. Because counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper inquiry,

petitioner contends, his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated.

Under California law, the prosecutor must have a good faith belief in the foundation of

the evidence he seeks to elicit from a witness. See People v. Ramos, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1173

(1997). Consequently, it is “improper” for the prosecution to pose questions to a witness that

suggest facts adverse to a defendant, absent a good faith belief that such facts exist. See

People v. Osband, 13 Cal.4th 622, 695 (1996). Here, petitioner argues, the prosecutor was

not required to provide a justification for his questions because petitioner’s counsel made no

objection. The record is silent as to whether the prosecutor would have been able to

demonstrate he had a good faith belief in the foundation of his questions.7 

Even assuming, arguendo, the prosecutor would not have been able to make such a

showing, however, petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object, in light of the

trial court’s instruction to the jury pursuant to CALJIC 1.02, by which the jury was expressly

admonished that questions and statements by attorneys are not to be considered as

evidence. The jury is presumed to have followed this instruction, see Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d

1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2005), and, consequently, not to have considered as evidence any

statement contained in the prosecutor’s question. Under such circumstances, there is no

reasonable probability that had defense counsel objected, the outcome of the case would

have been different. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

4. The Prosecutor’s Questioning of Petitioner

Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel

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8See Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1115 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e presume jurors follow

the court’s instructions absent extraordinary circumstances”).

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failed to object to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper questions during cross-examination. On

cross-examination, the prosecutor asked petitioner if Armstrong, Soriano, Wade and

Sergeant Clark had lied in their previous testimony in which they identified and referred to

petitioner as the shooter, and if so, how petitioner might know they were lying. Petitioner

answered that the witnesses and Sergeant Clark were lying, although he offered no reason for

them to do so.

The California Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecutor’s questioning was

improper because seeking petitioner’s opinion on the veracity of the witnesses whose

testimony differed from his own contravened the jury’s role as “the sole judge of the credibility

of the witnesses.” (See Slip Op. at 19-20) (quoting People v. Watts, 76 Cal.App.4th 1250,

1258-59 (1999), and citing, inter alia, United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 643 (9th Cir.

2000); United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1999)). Even assuming

the prosecutor’s questions were improper, petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

raise an objection. The jurors were instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.20, that they were the

sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the testimony of each

witness, and were further instructed, pursuant to CALJIC 1.02, that the statements and

argument of counsel are not evidence. The jury is presumed to have followed these

instructions,8 and thus not to have based their assessment of petitioner’s credibility on the

wording of the prosecutor’s questions. Given these instructions, as well as the strong

evidence of petitioner’s guilt discussed above, there is no reasonable probability that the

verdict would have been different if counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s questions. See,

e.g., United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3 868, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding jury instructions and

strength of other evidence precluded finding of prejudice from prosecutor’s improper

questioning of defendant as to whether police officer witness was lying). 

5. Armstrong’s Statement that Petitioner Sold Drugs

Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of outCase 3:02-cv-03310-MMC Document 34 Filed 11/01/05 Page 14 of 17
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9During the playing of the tape recording, the jurors were allowed to follow along with a

transcript of that recording, which they were required to return to the court at the conclusion of

the playing.

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of-court statements by Armstrong that petitioner sold drugs. In explaining how he located

petitioner, Sergeant Clark testified that on the afternoon of the shooting, Armstrong directed

him to a nearby minipark and “indicated that [petitioner] hung out there and sold drugs.” (RT

387.) Petitioner contends that Armstrong’s statement, as testified to by Sergeant Clark, was

inadmissible hearsay and prejudicial. 

Counsel’s failure to object to this testimony by Sergeant Clark was not deficient within

the meaning of Strickland. The statement by Armstrong was not offered for the truth of the

matter stated. Rather, it was offered for the non-hearsay purposes of explaining how Sergeant

Clark located petitioner and to show Armstrong’s familiarity with the shooter and strength of

his initial identification. Although, as discussed earlier in connection with the introduction of

other out-of-court statements, counsel could have requested a limiting instruction directing the

jury not to consider Armstrong’s statement for its truth, tactical reasons for counsel’s failure to

request such an instruction exist, in particular, the risk that an objection would draw attention to

the statement. 

Moreover, Armstrong’s actual statement was contained in a taped interview by

Sergeant Clark, which tape was played to the jury shortly after the above-described testimony,

as a prior identification by Armstrong of petitioner.9 (RT 399; see Clerk’s Transcript (Respt.’s

Exh. A) Exh. 15-B at 2 .) On the tape, Armstrong’s statement to Sergeant Clark with respect

to the matter of drugs was equivocal; he told Sergeant Clark he had seen petitioner at the

minipark “maybe selling drugs” (emphasis added). (See id.) The jury was instructed, pursuant

to CALJIC 1.00, that they “must not be influenced by

. . .conjecture.” As noted, the jury is presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions. 

See Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d at 1105. 

Finally, given the brevity of the reference and the fact it was not emphasized by the

prosecution at the time of its admission or used by the prosecution in argument, the statement

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is unlikely to have had an impact on the jury’s verdict. As described above, the evidence of

petitioner’s guilt was strong. Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability exists that

counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction affected the verdict. Consequently, even if

counsel was deficient in failing to seek a limiting instruction, petitioner was not prejudiced

thereby. 

6. Cumulative Prejudice

Lastly, petitioner contends he is entitled to habeas relief based on the cumulative

prejudice arising from all of the above alleged errors. Petitioner has cited no Supreme Court

decision, and the Court is not aware of any, that recognizes cumulative prejudice as an

independent constitutional violation. In the absence of “clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” habeas relief is not available under §

2254(d)(1). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (finding, under § 2254(d)(1), federal

habeas claims must be based on Supreme Court authority, not decisions of lower federal

courts). Moreover, to the extent such a claim has been recognized in the circuit courts,

cumulative prejudice is generally found where the government’s case is weak. See Thomas v.

Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1179-81 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959,

961-62, 968 (6th Cir. 1983). Here, for the reasons explained above, the government’s case

against petitioner was sufficiently strong that petitioner was neither prejudiced by the errors

considered separately, nor was he prejudiced by the errors considered cumulatively. See,

e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 1509, 1525 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[F]inding no prejudice from

the errors considered separately, we also find no cumulative prejudice.”) Accordingly, the

cumulative prejudice from counsel’s asserted errors does not form a basis for habeas relief in

this case.

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CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2005

 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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