Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02572/USCOURTS-ca10-85-02572-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 

) 

Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;) 

JAMES H, BURNLEY, IV, in his capacity as ) 

the Administrator of the Department of ) 

Transportation; FEDERAL HIGHWAY ) 

ADMINISTRATION; RAY BARNHART, Administrator) 

of FHWA; MORRIS REINHARDT, as Regional ) 

Administrator of FHWA, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

FILED 

Unit.ed St.ates Oourt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 4 1988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 85-2572 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(Civ. No. 83-2009) 

Lynn B. Obernyer, First Assistant Attorney General-Colorado, 

Natural Resources Section, Denver, Colorado, and Leland D. Ford, 

Assistant Attorney General-Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah (Duane 

Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Charles B. Howe, Deputy 

Attorney General, Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, Denver, 

Colorado, and David L. Wilkins, Attorney General of Utah, Salt 

Lake City, Utah, with them on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Christine R. Whittaker, Attorney, Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. (Richard K. Willard, Assistant Attorney General, 

Robert N. Miller, United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, and 

Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C. with her on the brief) for Defendants-Appellants. 

Before McKAY, MCWILLIAMS and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

Appellate Case: 85-2572 Document: 010110018289 Date Filed: 02/24/1988 Page: 1 
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs-appellees Colorado Department of Highways 

(Colorado) and Utah Department of Transportation (Utah) challenged 

the accounting method which the defendant-appellant Federal 

Highway Administr.ation (FHWA), an entity within the Department of 

Transportation, determined the states must use to calculate 

federal reimbursement for construction engineering costs under the 

Federal-Aid Highway Act (Highway Act). 23 u.s.c. §§ l0l-408 

(1983). Under the Highway Act, the FHWA is required to apportion 

authorized reimbursement costs among the states as prescribed by 

statute. For interstate roads, the portion of the costs that the 

federal government will reimburse is ninety percent and, for all 

other roads, is seventy-five percent. Id. § 120. The statute 

limits the amount that may be reimbursed to the states for 

construction engineering costs. A state will be reimbursed only 

up to ten percent of the federal share of the cost of 

construction, but the Secretary may approve a higher limit of 

fifteen percent if necessary for a particular state. Id. 

§§ 106(c), 12l(d). Both Colorado and Utah were approved at the 

higher rate. 

The Highway Act provides two methods by which the federal 

government can reimburse a state for construction engineering 

costs. A state may request reimbursement of the actual amounts 

spent or it may use the optional method provided in 23 u.s.c. 

§ 120(h). Under the optional method, a state may use a percentage 

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Appellate Case: 85-2572 Document: 010110018289 Date Filed: 02/24/1988 Page: 2 
of actual construction costs rather than actual engineering costs 

to calculate the reimbursement, subject to evaluation by the 

Secretary of the reasonableness of the cost allocation. 23 u.s.c. 

§ 120(h). Both Colorado-and Utah have been using the percentage 

method since 1982. 

On October 25, 1983, Colorado filed a complaint in federal 

district court alleging that the FHWA's interpretation of the 

0 

percentage allowable under the optional method was contrary to the 

Highway Act. Specifically, Colorado and Utah alleged that in 

utilizing the optional method, they should be allowed to compute 

the rate based upon actual construction engineering costs. The 

FHWA, however, maintains that the applicable rate must be based 

upon only reimbursable costs, i.e., those construction engineering 

costs that do not exceed the fifteen percent maximum allowable 

costs specified in 23 u.s.c. § 12l(d). Utah intervened as a party 

plaintiff, raising similar challenges to the Secretary's 

interpretation and seeking similar relief. Both Colorado and Utah 

requested relief in the forms of an injunction forbidding the 

agency from continued implementation of its interpretation of the 

optional method, and monetary damages to reimburse them for the 

money not allocated under the Highway Act due to the FHWA's 

allegedly incorrect accounting method. 

The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. Colorado and Utah also moved for summary judgment. The 

district court denied the government's motion to dismiss. After 

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oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 

denied the government's motion for summary judgment and granted 

summary judgment for Colorado and Utah on the merits. After 

stipulation by the parties, the district court entered judgment 

for Colorado and Utah in the amount of $845,454.05 and 

$4,816,772.21, respectively. 

The Department of Transportation appeals the judgment. 

First, it contends that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) 

because the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346~ vests the Claims Court 

with exclusive jurisdiction for civil actions against the United 

States where the amount at issue exceeds $10,000. See 23 u.s.c. 

§ 1346(a)(2). Second, it claims that a state may not include 

nonreimbursable construction engineering costs in calculating a 

percentage rate under 23 u.s.c. § 120(h). We do not reach the 

second issue because we agree with appellants that the district 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, and we 

therefore reverse. 

The Tucker Act (codified at 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346, 1491) is a 

jurisdictional statute and does not create any substantive right 

enforceable against the United States for money damages. United 

States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). It grants concurrent 

jurisdiction to the district court and to the Claims Court over 

money claims against the United States involving amounts less than 

$10,000, but exclusive jurisdiction to the Claims Court for 

monetary damages greater than that amount. Amalgamated Sugar Co. 

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Appellate Case: 85-2572 Document: 010110018289 Date Filed: 02/24/1988 Page: 4 
v. Bergland, 664 F.2d 818, 823 (10th Cir. 1981); see Richardson v. 

Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1973). Three conditions must be 

satisfied for the Claims Court to have exclusive jurisdiction: 

"(l) the action is against the United States; (2) the action seeks 

monetary relief in excess of $10,000; and (3) the action is 

founded upon the Constitution, federal statute, executive 

regulation, or government contract." Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d 430, 

433 (10th Cir. 1985); see 28 u.s.c. § 1346(a)(2). The Claims 

Court has exclusive jurisdiction where the "'prime objective' or 

'essential purpose'" of the plaintiff in bringing th~ suit is to 

obtain money from the federal government in an amount exceeding 

$10,000. Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d at 434 (quoting New Mexico v. 

Regan, 745 F.2d 1318, 1322 (10th Cir. 1984)). Of course, for 

concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court, the 

substantive law upon which the suit is based must permit money 

damages. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983); 

United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 398. 

A party cannot avoid the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims 

Court under the Tucker Act merely by artfully pleading injunctive, 

declaratory or mandatory relief when the purpose of the suit is to 

obtain money from the United States in excess of $10,000. Rogers 

v. Ink, 766 F.2d at 434; New Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d 1318, 1322 

(10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985). Nor may a 

plaintiff transform a claim for monetary relief into an equitable 

action simply by requesting injunctive relief that may result in 

the payment of money. Rogers v. Ink, 766 F.2d at 434 (holding 

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Appellate Case: 85-2572 Document: 010110018289 Date Filed: 02/24/1988 Page: 5 
that although plaintiffs' first prayer seeks declaratory relief, 

the underlying purpose of the action was to obtain money from the 

United States); accord New Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d at 1322 

(holding that State suit to recover federal royalties used to pay 

a windfall profits tax was within the exclusive jurisdiction of 

the Claims Court because the States' declaratory relief request 

was "incidental and subordinate to the basic suit for money"); 

Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Bergland, 664 F.2d at 824 (holding 

exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court even when plaintiff 

sought only a declaratory judgment because the actual controversy 

remaining after the equitable issues were settled concerned 

monetary relief). The fact that equitable remedies are 

inadequate, even where requested in the complaint, is one factor 

that courts may consider in determining whether the claim actually 

is one for money damages. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 

at 227-28. 

In the instant case, the three prongs of the Rogers test are 

met. First, the claim was brought against the United States. 

Second, the suit is based upon a government contract because the 

Highway Act, the substantive law underlying the action, 

specifically creates a contractual relationship between the 

federal government and the state once the Secretary approves the 

project: 

[T]he State highway department shall submit to 

the Secretary for his approval, as soon as 

practicable after program approval, such surveys, 

plans, specifications, and estimates for each 

proposed project included in an approved program 

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Appellate Case: 85-2572 Document: 010110018289 Date Filed: 02/24/1988 Page: 6 
as the Secretary may require. The Secretary shall 

act upon such surveys, plans, specifications, and 

estimates as soon as practicable after the same 

have been submitted, and his approval of any 

such project shall be deemed a contractual 

obligation of the Federal Government for the 

payment of its proportional contribution thereto .. 

23 u.s.c. § 106(a) (emphasis added). Finally, the action is for 

monetary damages because both Colorado and Utah requested monetary 

relief in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief. Colorado 

requested "judgment in favor the plaintiff for $1,205,040.06, and 

for further damage(sic) in fiscal years 1984 and beyond." Rec. 

vol. I, doc. 1 at 7. Similarly, Utah requested "judgment in favor 

of the Intervenor flaintiff for the sum of $4,976,843.79 for 

fiscal year 1982-83 and for the sum of $3,953,643.68 for fiscal 

year 1983-84 for a total of $8,939,487.47 and for further damages 

in fiscal year 1985 and beyond as may be appropriate." Id. at 

doc. 4 at 10. In addition, the district court, by awarding 

equitable relief, granted monetary damages exceeding $10,000. 

Appellees attempt to distinguish the cases in which Claims 

Court jurisdiction was held exclusive and to analogize the cases 

finding original or concurrent jurisdiction of the district court. 

The majority of these cases, however, either support appellant's 

argument for exclusive Claims Court jurisdiction, are factually 

distinguishable or are not helpful because the issue of Claims 

Court jurisdiction was not discussed. For instance, some cases 

cited did not involve Tucker Act jurisdiction because the action 

was not founded on the Constitution, a federal statute, an 

executive regulation, a government contract or a federal question. 

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These cases are inapplicable because, here, the Highway Act 

creates a contractual relationship between the appellees and the 

United States. See,~, Maryland Dep't.of Human Resources v. 

Department of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441, 1451 (D.C. 

Cir. 1985) (Title XX found not to mandate compensation by the 

federal government); B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 

F.2d 713, 727 (2d Cir. 1983) (no Tucker Act jurisdiction because 

there was no underlying contract between the plaintiff and the 

government); Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Dole, 749 F.2d 331, 335 

(6th Cir. '1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985) (monetary 

relief based on restitution did not create a "contract-based 

claim" sufficient to render exclusive Claims Court jurisdiction 

under the Tucker Act). 

Other cases cited by appellees either do not support their 

argument or, conversely, support the appellants' argument. See, 

~, California ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Department of 

Transp., Federal Highway Admin., 561 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1977) 

(Tucker Act jurisdiction not at issue); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. 

Martin, 643 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1981) (no Claims Court 

jurisdiction because money damages not sought by plaintiff); 

Louisiana Dep't of Highways v. United States, 604 F.2d 1339 (Ct. 

Cl. 1979) (additional contractual obligation accepted by Louisiana 

Department of Highways was not part of contract provisions and 

specifications approved by FHWA and thus FHWA was not 

contractually obligated to provide settlement funds). 

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Appellate Case: 85-2572 Document: 010110018289 Date Filed: 02/24/1988 Page: 8 
The district court shall vacate the judgment and dismiss the 

complaints. 

REVERSED. 

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