Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06051/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

APPEALS United StatC!& Court of Appea,ls 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 2 0 1990 

:ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JOHNNY LEO HILL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

vs. 

U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION; 

and T.C. MARTIN, Warden, 

of the Federal Correctional 

Institute at El Reno, 

Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

No. 90-60 51 

(D.C. No. Civ-88-2104-P) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

f d . . d ** Be ore ANDERSON, BALDOCK an EBEL, Circuit Ju ges. 

Petitioner, Johnny Leo Hill, appeals from the district 

court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hill is currently in the custody of 

federal authorities as a parole violator. He claims entitlement 

to credit for the period December 1, 1972 to October 26, 1976, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-6051 Document: 010110036852 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 1 
against his current sentence because he was in the custody of 

Texas state- authorities while on parole from his federal sentence. 

In a thorough memorandum opinion, the district court 

explained why Hill was not entitled to relief. We have carefully 

reviewed both the parties' briefs and the appellate record, and 

agree that Hill's petition is meritless for substantially the 

reasons proffered by the district court in its opinion, a copy of 

which is attached hereto. Accordingly, we dismiss Hill's appeal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 1 

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

1 Although the district court initially granted Hill's motion 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis, Hill failed 

to move either before the district court or this court for IFP 

status on appeal. This failure, however, is rendered moot by our 

dismissal under§ 1915(d). 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-6051 Document: 010110036852 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 2 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

JOHNNY LEO HILL 

Petitioner 

vs . 

UNITED STATES PAROLE 

COMMISSION, ET AL., 

Respondents 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) CIV-88-2104-P 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

FIL~F-- . ~-~u 

JAN.2 6 90 

~BERT i), DENi'!!S 

CLERK, U.S. DiSTRICT C ·· 

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The Petitioner, a federal prisoner appearing prose and in 

forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241, 

seeking habeas corpus relief. The Respondents have filed a motion 

to dismiss, to which the Petitioner has responded. Thus, the 

motion is at issue. The Court finds that the relevant facts are 

not in dispute, and the matter can be resolved on the basis of the 

record and the law, and an evidentiary hearing is not required. 

See Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1216 (10th Cir. 1986), 

aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 

By this action, the Petitioner seeks credit on his federal 

sentence for a period from December 1, 1972 to October 26, 1976, 

when he was allegedly on parole from his federal conviction, but 

remained in state custody. The relevant facts are that the 

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for 

the Western District of Texas for the offense of bank robbery, and 

he was sentenced on April 6, 1965 to fifteen years imprisonment. 

\ 5 

Appellate Case: 90-6051 Document: 010110036852 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 3 
On or about July 8, 1965, the Petitioner received a 25-year 

sentence from the state of Texas for the offense of robbery by 

assault, apparently arising out of the same transaction as the 

Petitioner's federal offense. A Texas state prison facility was 

designated for service of both the state and federal sentences, 

with the sentences to run concurrently. On November 1, 1972, the 

United States Board of Parole issued a certificate of parole, 

ordering that the Petitioner be released on parole on December 1, 

1972. However, as Petitioner was still serving his state sentence, 

he remained in state custody until on or about October 26, 1976, 

when he was released on parole by the state of Texas. 

On February 12, 1979, a parole violator warrant was issued 

based upon the Petitioner's arrest by Texas state authorities for 

the offenses of aggravated assault upon a police officer and 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. By a notice 

of action dated November 2, 1981, the Petitioner's federal parole 

was revoked following a revocation hearing, and he received no 

credit for the time spent on parole. The decision was based upon 

Petitioner's conviction for the two state offenses listed above. 

Petitioner was paroled again on February 19, 1982 and he was 

directed to remain within the limits of the western district of 

Texas until December 8, 1988. By notice of action dated April 14, 

1983, Petitioner's parole was again revoked based upon the filing 

of charges against him alleging public intoxication and driving 

while under the influence. This time, however, the Petitioner 

received credit for the time he had spent on this parole, since he 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-6051 Document: 010110036852 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 4 
did not receive a new conviction. 

On May 31, 1984, the Petitioner was reparoled for the second 

time. However, he again violated the law and was convicted by the 

Texas state courts of aggravated assault. Based upon this 

conviction, the Petitioner's federal parole was revoked and he was 

not credited with any of the time spent on this parole. Petitioner 

is currently projected for release on July 17, 1990 via mandatory 

release. 

As noted, Petitioner seeks credit for the time period from 

December 1, 1972 to October 26, 1976, when he was on federal 

parole, but still serving his state sentence. It is undisputed 

that his initial federal parole was subsequently revoked because 

of the commission of a new offense, and that he was not credited 

with the time spent on federal parole. Petitioner seems to agree 

that under 28 C.F.R. §2.52(c) (2), the Parole Commission must order 

forfeiture of time whenever a parolee is convicted of a new 

offense. See Decuir v. United States Parole Commission, 800 F.2d 

1021, 1023 (10th Cir. 1986). See also, Harris v. Day, 649 F.2d 755 

(10th Cir. 1981) (parolee who has been convicted of a new crime 

automatically forfeits time spent on parole, and determination is 

to be made by Parole Commission whether such time is to be served 

concurrently or consecutively with time spent serving new 

sentence). However, Petitioner contends that he was not 

effectively paroled on December 1, 1972, since he was serving the 

federal and state sentences concurrently, and he remained in state 

custody until on or about October 2 6, 197 6. In support of his 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-6051 Document: 010110036852 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 5 
argument, Petitioner notes that although the parole certificate 

reflects that he is to be paroled on December 1, 1972, the 

certificate further indicates the parole is not to be effective 

until the date of release shown on the back of the form, which in 

this case is left blank. The Petitioner thus contends that the 

parole certificate never became effective. 

Courts have rejected the contention that a prisoner is paroled 

within the meaning of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act 

of 1976 only when he is released to the community on parole. See 

Weeks v. Quinlan, 838 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1988); Garafola v. 

Wilkinson, 721 F.2d 420 (3d cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 

(1984). In Garafola, the Court held that a federal prisoner 

paroled to a state detainer is on parole within the meaning of the 

Parole Commission and Reorganization Act. Garafola v. Wilkinson, 

721 F.2d at 424-425. The Court further held that upon revocation 

of the federal parole, the Petitioner was liable to serve the full 

amount of time remaining on his federal sentence from the date he 

was paroled from federal prison to the state detainer. The only 

distinction in the Petitioner's case is that he was already in 

state custody, concurrently serving both his federal and state 

sentences. As the Respondents note, this is a distinction without 

a difference. The state and federal governments are separate and 

distinct sovereigns, each with the right to define offenses and to 

impose sentences in the exercise of their independent sovereignty 

so that the federal parolee in state prison fulfills two separate 

obligations, each owed independently to the state or federal 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-6051 Document: 010110036852 Date Filed: 06/20/1990 Page: 6 
government. see Stanbridge v. Quinlan, 595 F.Supp. 1145, 1150 

(S.D. N.Y. 1984). 

Based upon the above, the Court finds that the Defendant was 

initially paroled on December 1, 1972, and that when the parole was 

revoked, he was properly denied credit for the time spent on that 

parole. Thus, the petition for habeas corpus relief is without 

merit and will be denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this day of January 1990. · 

JUDGE 

5 

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