Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-00732/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-00732-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHLEEN HANNI, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 08-00732 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND,

GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO FILE AN

AMENDED NOTICE OF

REMOVAL, GRANTING

IN PART

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING

PLAINTIFF LEAVE

TO AMEND 

Plaintiff Kathleen Hanni has filed a motion to remand this

case to state court. Defendant American Airlines, Inc. (AA)

opposes the motion and has filed a motion for leave to file an

amended notice of removal and a motion to dismiss the complaint. 

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motions. The motions were heard on

April 24, 2008. Having considered all of the papers filed by the

parties and oral argument, the Court grants Defendant's motion for

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leave to file an amended notice of removal, denies Plaintiff's

motion to remand, grants in part Defendant's motion to dismiss and

grants Plaintiff leave to amend. 

BACKGROUND

On December 28, 2007, Plaintiff filed this putative class

action in Napa County Superior Court, alleging claims based on her

experiences on a December 29, 2006 American Airlines flight from

San Francisco, connecting at Dallas-Forth Worth Airport, to Mobile,

Alabama. Plaintiff alleges that the seven hour trip took over

fifty hours due to various delays, which included nine-and-one-half

hours confined on the airplane on the runway at the Austin, Texas

airport. 

Plaintiff brings claims for false imprisonment, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach of contract

and intentional misrepresentation and seeks compensatory damages

“according to proof at trial” and punitive damages based on her

false imprisonment, emotional distress and intentional

misrepresentation claims. These claims are based on several

discrete actions or failures to act alleged by Plaintiff: 

(1) Defendant’s decision to allow Plaintiff’s flight from San

Francisco to Dallas to depart in spite of the possibility of

thunderstorms in Dallas; (2) after the flight was diverted to

Austin, Defendant’s refusal to permit passengers to leave the

airplane while it was on the runway in Austin; (3) Defendant’s

failure “to supply the parked aircraft with essentials of water,

food, sanitary waste removal, light, and breathable or fresh air at

normal temperatures” while on the runway in Austin; (4) Defendant’s

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decision not to unload checked baggage when it allowed the

passengers off the airplane in Austin at 9:30 PM; (5) Defendant’s

failure to provide payment for lodging, meals, ground

transportation and other expenses when the passengers were kept in

Austin overnight; and (6) Defendant’s failure to allow passengers

to board their connecting flights in Dallas when they arrived the

following morning. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant caused the delays

through its “intentional or negligent lack of personnel, equipment,

and planning for ordinary weather disruptions by AA.” Complaint 

¶ 63. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s decision to

keep the passengers on the airplane during the extended delay was

made “to avoid expenses and lawful obligations to passengers

associated with strandings, diversions and canceled flights and for

AA’s and its officers, employees, agents and stockholders pecuniary

gain at the expense of Plaintiff and other passengers.” Complaint

¶ 64.

Defendant filed a notice of removal on January 31, 2008. 

DISCUSSION

I. Notice of Removal and Motion to Remand

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to

federal district court so long as the district court could have

exercised original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). District courts have original jurisdiction over all

civil actions "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or

value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between 

. . . citizens of different states." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For

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purposes of class actions, "the claims of the individual class

members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of

interest and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(6). If at any time

before judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over a case previously removed from state

court, the case must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). On a

motion to remand, the scope of the removal statute must be strictly

construed. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.

1992). "The 'strong presumption' against removal jurisdiction

means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that

removal is proper." Id. Courts should resolve doubts as to

removability in favor of remanding the case to state court. See

id.

To support removal based on diversity jurisdiction in cases

where a plaintiff's state court complaint does not specify a

particular amount of damages, the removing defendant bears the

burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the amount in controversy exceeds the threshold amount. Sanchez v.

Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded to state

court because Defendant has not established that the amount in

controversy is the $75,000 needed to support diversity jurisdiction

for her individual claim or the $5 million needed to support

jurisdiction if this case is certified as a class action. 

Defendant counters that shortly after filing the motion to remand,

Plaintiff’s counsel wrote a settlement letter to Defendant offering

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to settle the case for a “global settlement amount” of $5 million. 

Defendant now moves to amend its notice of removal to include

reference to this letter. Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant

should not be permitted to amend its notice of removal or to submit

further evidence that removal was appropriate. Rather, Plaintiff

argues that the letter is not proper evidence for the Court to

consider. However, as Defendant points out, the Ninth Circuit has

held, “A settlement letter is relevant evidence of the amount in

controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the

plaintiff's claim.” Cohen v. Petsmart, 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.

2002). The Court will consider the letter as evidence and grants

Defendant’s motion to file an amended notice of removal. 

Plaintiff argues that Cohen is inapposite because it was

decided before the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) went

into effect. However, the Ninth Circuit has continued to allow

reliance on settlement letters in post-CAFA class actions. See

Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff next argues that the $5 million settlement demand

does not defeat her motion to remand. She points out that the

letter seeks $74,900 in damages on her behalf, which is less than

the $75,000 necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction for an

individual case. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the letter does

not establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million as

required by the CAFA because the $5 million figure includes

attorneys’ fees and costs. However, this Court agrees with other

district courts that have held that “an offer falling just below

the jurisdictional threshold tends to suggest that the amount in

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controversy exceeds this threshold, especially since parties

routinely offer and accept settlement amounts significantly below

the total amount placed into controversy." Osborne v. Sitton Motor

Lines, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17076, *5 (W.D. Ky. 2007)

(internal quotation omitted). 

The Court finds that Defendant has established that the amount

in controversy in either an individual case brought by Plaintiff or

a class action is sufficient to establish jurisdiction in this

Court.

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Preemption

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's claims should be

dismissed because they are preempted by the Federal Aviation Act

(FAA) and the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). 

Under the Supremacy Clause, state law that conflicts with

federal law has no effect. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505

U.S. 504, 516 (1992)(citing U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Federal

preemption of state law may be express or implied. Shaw v. Delta

Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983). "[W]ithin Constitutional

limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in

express terms." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources

Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). Absent

explicit preemptive language, there are two types of implied

preemption, field preemption and conflict preemption. Crosby v.

Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).

Courts will find a state law field-preempted if one of three

circumstances exist. First, state law is preempted where

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"Congress' intent to supercede state law altogether may be found

from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make

reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement

it." Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation

and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983)(internal quotations

omitted). Second, courts will find state law field-preempted if

"the Act of Congress [] touch[es] a field in which the federal

interest is so dominant that the federal system [can] be assumed to

preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Id.

Finally, state law will be field-preempted where "the object sought

to be obtained by the federal law and the character of the

obligations imposed by it may reveal" that the purpose of the law

is to occupy the field entirely. Id.

"[W]here Congress has not entirely displaced State regulation

in a specific area, State law will still be preempted to the extent

that it actually conflicts with federal law." Id. Conflict

preemption exists "when a state law actually conflicts with federal

law or when a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment

and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in

enacting the federal law." Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d

464, 470 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone" of any

preemption analysis, express or implied. Gade v. Nat'l Solid

Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96, 98 (1992). In

determining Congressional intent to preempt, a court must "begin

with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the

ordinary meaning of the language accurately expresses the

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legislative purpose," Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504

U.S. 374, 383 (1992), because “[t]he first and most important step

in construing a statute is the statutory language itself." Royal

Foods Co., Inc. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)). As the Court explained in

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002), the "task of

statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the

plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best

evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent." 537 U.S. at 62-63.

1. Federal Aviation Act

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claims are fieldpreempted by the FAA. The FAA was enacted in response to “a series

of ‘fatal air crashes between civil and military aircraft operating

under separate flight rules.’" United States v. Christensen, 419

F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969) (quoting 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741,

3742). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[t]he FAA, together with

federal air safety regulations, establish complete and thorough

safety standards for interstate and international air

transportation that are not subject to supplementation by, or

variation among, the states." Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 474. 

Therefore, the FAA and federal air safety regulations are the only

grounds on which an airline may be held liable for claims related

to safety. 

Defendant argues that the Court should find that Plaintiff's

claims are preempted, characterizing the claims as an attempt "to

utilize state law to establish new legal requirements for health

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1

The exceptions provided for are not relevant to the claims in

this case. 

9

and safety services for passengers during lengthy diversions and

delays of flights." Motion at 6. Defendant notes that the

Plaintiff's claims stem from Defendant's decision to re-route her

flight due to safety concerns and the Federal Aviation

Administration's decision to shut down the Dallas Fort Worth

Airport. 

To the extent that Plaintiff's claims are based on Defendant's

decision to re-route her flight from the Dallas Forth Worth Airport

to the Austin Airport rather than delaying or cancelling it, the

Court finds that they are preempted by the FAA. However, the bulk

of Plaintiff's claims relate to Defendant's actions and decisionmaking after the flight had been diverted. The Court finds that

the complaint alleges these decisions were not directly related to

safety and were not the type regulated by federal air safety

regulations.

2. Airline Deregulation Act

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff's claims are explicitly

preempted by the ADA, which provides,

Except as provided in this subsection, a State,

political subdivision of a State, or political

authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce

a law, regulation, or other provision having the force

and effect of law related to a price, route, or service

of an air carrier that may provide air transportation

under this subpart.1 

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

the Supreme Court interpreted "related to" to mean that actions

"having a connection with or reference to airline 'rates, routes,

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or services'" are preempted under the ADA. 504 U.S. 374, 378-79

(1992). However, the Supreme Court has never interpreted the term

"services" in the context of the ADA, see Northwest Airlines, Inc.

v. Duncan, 531 U.S. 1058 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari) (noting that "the meaning of the term

'service'" has not been addressed by the Supreme Court), and the

Ninth Circuit has defined the term narrowly, Charas v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

In Charas, the Ninth Circuit held that the term "service"

refers to "the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the

point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail" but

not to "an airline's provision of in-flight beverages, personal

assistance to passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar

amenities." Id. at 1261. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that her

claims, which are not related to any actual transportation, are not

preempted by the ADA.

Defendant counters that the Supreme Court's recent decision in

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, 128 S. Ct. 989

(2008), calls into question the Ninth Circuit's definition of

service. In Rowe, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of

preemption related to the deregulation of trucking, which was

modeled after the preemption provision in the ADA. The Court found

that federal law preempts a state law that "forbids licensed

tobacco retailers to employ a 'delivery service' unless that

service follows particular delivery procedures." Id. at 995. The

state statute required such retailers to "'utilize a delivery

service' that provides a special kind of recipient-verification

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service" to ensure that: 

(1) the person who bought the tobacco is the person to

whom the package is addressed; (2) the person to whom

the package is addressed is of legal age to purchase

tobacco; (3) the person to whom the package is addressed

has himself or herself signed for the package; and 

(4) the person to whom the package is addressed, if

under the age of 27 has produced a valid governmentissued photo identification with proof of age.

Id. at 993-94.

Relying on its interpretation of the ADA preemption provision

in Morales, the Court in Rowe held that the state statute was

preempted even though it was directed at the tobacco retailers,

because it would require carriers "to offer tobacco delivery

services that differ significantly from those that, in the absence

of the regulation, the market might dictate." Id. at 996. 

Defendant argues that this holding--that the Maine statute was

preempted because requiring a motor carrier to verify a recipient's

age is related to the "service" provided--undermines Plaintiff's

reliance on Charas. Defendant contends that under such an

interpretation of the term "service," "state requirements for food,

beverages, toilet service, electricity, baggage service,

transportation, overnight lodging, and the other type of matters

about which plaintiff complains in this action equally impinge on

an air carrier's service." Reply at 2. 

As the Second Circuit recently noted, the Ninth Circuit's

definition of "service" in Charas does conflict with the Supreme

Court's subsequent opinion in Rowe, which "necessarily defined

'service' to extend beyond prices, schedules, origins, and

destinations." Air Transport Association of America, Inc. v.

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Cuomo, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6130, *12 (2d. Cir.). In Air

Transport, the Second Circuit found that New York state legislation

affirmatively "requiring airlines to provide food, water,

electricity, and restrooms to passengers during lengthy ground

delays does relate to the service of an air carrier and therefore

falls within the express terms of the ADA's preemption provision." 

Id. at *13. 

However, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Charas was based on

more than its definition of "service." The Charas court concluded

that 

when Congress enacted federal economic deregulation of

the airlines, it intended to insulate the industry from

possible state economic regulation as well. It

intended to encourage the forces of competition. It

did not intend to immunize the airlines from liability

for personal injuries caused by their tortious conduct.

160 F.3d at 1266 (emphasis in original). It was in this context

that the Charas court held that "'service' does not refer to the

pushing of beverage carts, keeping the aisles clear of stumbling

blocks, the safe handling and storage of luggage, assistance to

passengers in need, or like functions." Id. The court reasoned

that "[t]o interpret 'service' more broadly is to ignore the

context of its use; and, it effectively would result in the

preemption of virtually everything an airline does. It seems clear

to us that this is not what Congress intended." Id.; see also

Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 475 (interpreting Charas to hold "that state

claims that do not significantly impact federal deregulation are

not preempted"). 

It is based on this interpretation of congressional intent

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that other circuits have allowed personal injury claims against

airlines, even while interpreting "service" more broadly than the

Ninth Circuit does. For example, in Hodges v. Delta Airlines,

Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), the Fifth Circuit held

that a passenger's negligence claim, based on injuries sustained

when a carton containing several bottles of rum fell out of an

overhead compartment and cut the passenger's arms and wrist, was

not preempted. In Hodges, the court held, "Elements of the air

carrier service bargain include items such as ticketing, boarding

procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in

addition to the transportation itself." Id. at 336. Nonetheless,

the Fifth Circuit noted that "neither the ADA nor its legislative

history indicates that Congress intended to displace the

application of state tort law to personal physical injury inflicted

by aircraft operations, or that Congress even considered such

preemptions," and allowed the plaintiff's claim to proceed. Id. at

338; see also, Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248,

1257 (11th Cir. 2003) (adopting Hodges' definition of "service" but

holding that plaintiff's state whistle blower claim was not

preempted). 

Moreover, Charas and Hodges, like this case, involved injured

passengers seeking compensation for past tortious conduct rather

than a challenge to a state statute creating an affirmative

requirement as in Rowe and Air Transport. Affirmative regulations

restricting how a carrier does business will by definition result

in a "direct substitution of [the state's] governmental commands

for competitive market forces." Rowe, 128 S. Ct. at 995. In

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2As discussed below, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is

dismissed to the extent it relies on the Customer Service Plan,

because that document explicitly states that it does not create any

contractual liability. 

14

contrast, allowing individuals to recover for injuries suffered

does not create any such regulation. Further, while it is true

that allowing such state claims might lead to individuals from

different states recovering varying amounts depending on the

particular states' decisional law, there is no danger that allowing

such recovery could "lead to a patchwork of state

service-determining laws, rules, and regulations" that the

Rowe court found to be "inconsistent with Congress' major

legislative effort to leave such decisions, where federally

unregulated, to the competitive marketplace." Id. at 996.

Therefore the Court finds that, to the extent they are not

controlled by specific regulations, Plaintiff's claims are not

preempted by the ADA. However, as Defendant argues, some of

Plaintiff's claims involve issues about which the government has

promulgated regulations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant should

have compensated her for lodging, meals, substitute transportation

and similar expenses. However, the Department of Transportation

has issued regulations requiring such compensation when the

expenses are due to an oversold flight but not when they are due to

bad weather. See 14 C.F.R. § 250. Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiff's claims related to such compensation are preempted. 

Plaintiff also alleges a breach of contract claim based on two

documents, Defendant's Conditions of Carriage and its Customer

Service Plan.2 Although Defendant acknowledges that the ADA does

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3

As discussed further below, the Court grants Defendant's

motion to dismiss each of the claims upon which Plaintiff seeks

punitive damages.

15

not preempt routine breach of contract claims, it argues that

Plaintiff's claim is preempted because it alleges, among other

things, a "breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing." FAC ¶ 93. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, the

Supreme Court held that the ADA "confines courts, in

breach-of-contract actions, to the parties' bargain, with no

enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external

to the agreement." 513 U.S. 219, 233 (1995). Therefore,

Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is preempted to the extent it

is based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. 

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim for punitive

damages is preempted because "[s]tate law punitive damages are

based on state policy decisions." Motion at 17. However, the

cases Defendant cites are those in which courts found that punitive

damages for contract claims were preempted under Wolens. Plaintiff

does not seek punitive damages based on her breach of contract

claim. To the extent Plaintiff seeks punitive damages on tort

claims that are not preempted by the ADA, the prayer for damages is

not independently preempted.3

B. Failure to State a Claim

In the alternative, Defendant argues that each of Plaintiff's

causes of action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964

(2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to

state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

1. Applicable Law

Plaintiff has plead her claims under California law. 

Defendant argues, without citation, that Texas rather than

California law should apply to Plaintiff's claims. For purposes of

this motion, the Court will consider both State's laws. 

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2. False Imprisonment

Under either California or Texas law, false imprisonment

consists of "the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a

person, without lawful privilege." Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal.

4th 701, 715 (1994); see also, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez,

92 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002). Defendant argues that Plaintiff

alleges no facts to support a finding that she validly withdrew her

consent to remain on the aircraft. However, Plaintiff alleges that

a bus came to the airplane but could only hold fifteen people and

"all passengers who [did] not have Austin as a final destination

were rejected and forced to remain in the aircraft against their

will." Complaint ¶ 13. Plaintiff also alleges that she "and other

passengers express[ed] their desire to exit the aircraft but

Captain Fodero claim[ed] to be powerless to permit deboarding due

to AA management." Id. at ¶ 18. Taken as true, these allegations

form a sufficient basis to establish that Plaintiff withdrew her

consent. 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to allege facts to

establish that Defendant lacked the legal authority to keep the

passengers on the airplane. Plaintiff argues that Defendant lied

about the reasons it was keeping passengers on the airplane. 

Therefore, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant kept the passengers on

the plane through false pretenses. However, this does not address

the question of whether Defendant was acting with lawful privilege

when it kept Plaintiff on the plane. The Court grants Defendant's

motion to dismiss Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim. If

Plaintiff can allege, consistent with her original complaint,

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additional facts sufficient to establish that Defendant lacked

legal authority to keep her on the airplane, she may replead this

claim in her first amended complaint. 

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under California law, the elements of a cause of action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) are (1) extreme

and outrageous conduct; (2) intended to cause or done in reckless

disregard for causing; (3) severe emotional distress; and 

(4) actual and proximate causation. See Cervantez v. J.C. Penney

Co., Inc., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979). The conduct must be so

extreme as to "exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a

civilized community," id., and the distress so severe "that no

reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to

endure it." Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d

376, 397 (1970). Under Texas law, "a plaintiff must establish

that: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the

defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's

actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the

resulting emotional distress was severe." Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.

v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004). 

Plaintiff has not alleged intentional conduct sufficiently

extreme to support a claim for IIED. Plaintiff acknowledges that

Defendant was initially responding to inclement weather at the

Dallas Fort Worth Airport when it re-routed her airplane and that a

substantial number of flights were similarly disrupted. In light

of this situation, Defendant's actions cannot be said to have

"exceed[ed] all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized

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community." See Cervantez, 24 Cal. 3d at 593. Moreover, Plaintiff

has not alleged that Defendant acted with the intent of causing her

distress. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's IIED claim is

granted. If Plaintiff can allege, consistent with her original

complaint, additional facts to support her claim, she may replead

this claim in her first amended complaint. 

3. Negligence

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not identified any duty

owed by it to her, independent of the duties set forth in the

Conditions of Carriage, which forms the basis for Plaintiff's

breach of contract claim. Under both California and Texas law,

absent the breach of an independent extra-contractual duty,

negligence claims are not permitted where a defendant's conduct

violates a contractual duty. See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana

Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 990-91 (2004); DeWitt County Elec. Coop.,

Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 105 (Tex. 1999). The Court grants

Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim. 

Plaintiff may replead this claim if she can allege facts sufficient

to establish the existence of a duty beyond that created by the

contract. 

3. Breach of Contract

As Defendant argues, Plaintiff's reliance on the Customer

Service Plan is misplaced because the document expressly states

that it "does not create contractual or legal rights." Terrell

Decl., Ex. B at 20. Therefore, Plaintiff's breach of contract

claim is dismissed to the extent it relies on the Customer Service

Plan. Because amendment would be futile, the dismissal of this

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4At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that she only relied on the

Customer Service Plan to the extent it was explicitly integrated

into the Conditions of Carriage. If this is so, Plaintiff shall

clarify that position in her amended complaint. 

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portion of the claim is with prejudice.4

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff's breach of contract

claim based on the Conditions of Carriage also fails as a matter of

law because all of the damages she claims are expressly excluded by

the terms of the document. Moreover, Defendant contends that it

does not guarantee its schedule and expressly disclaims liability

for weather-related delays. Plaintiff argues that the complaint

"provides sufficient notice of the alleged breaches" but states

that she agrees "to provide Defendant with a more definite

statement setting forth further details of the breaches of contract

cause of action." Opposition at 24. As currently plead, the

complaint does not state a claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff

may replead this claim with further detail regarding Defendant's

failure to comply with specific terms of the Conditions of

Carriage. 

 4. Fraud

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's fraud claim is not plead

with sufficient particularity. “In all averments of fraud or

mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be

stated with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The allegations

must be “specific enough to give defendants notice of the

particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud

charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just

deny that they have done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780

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F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Statements of the time, place and

nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are sufficient, Wool v.

Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987),

provided the plaintiff sets forth “what is false or misleading

about a statement, and why it is false.” In re GlenFed, Inc., Sec.

Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994). Scienter may be

averred generally, simply by saying that it existed. See id. at

1547; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and

other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally”).

Plaintiff argues that she has sufficiently identified the

statements she alleges are fraudulent. However, as the basis for

this claim, she has alleged only that Defendant "assert[ed] a

weather emergency". She has not identified who made this statement

or how she intends to prove that the statement was false when made. 

Moreover, under either California or Texas law, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that she relied to her detriment on the allegedly

fraudulent statements. Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 414

(1941); Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486 (5th Cir.

19999). Plaintiff has not made any such allegation. Plaintiff's

fraud claim is dismissed with leave to amend. In order to restate

these claims against Defendant, Plaintiff must plead "'the who,

what, where, and how' of the misconduct charged," Vess v.

Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff

must also identify who made the allegedly misleading statements,

how she will prove that they were knowingly false when made, and

how she relied on those statements to her detriment. 

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5Defendant’s motion to strike the declarations of Kathleen

Hanni and Paul Hudson (Docket No. 41) is DENIED without prejudice. 

The Court did not rely on any improper or inadmissible evidence in

deciding this motion.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion

for leave to file an amended notice of removal (Docket No. 28),

DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remand (Docket No. 20) and GRANTS in

part Defendant's to dismiss (Docket No. 25).5 Plaintiff may file

an amended complaint consistent with this order within twenty days

of the date of this order. In her opposition to the motion to

dismiss Plaintiff mentions various claims that she wishes to add to

her complaint. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides, "A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter

of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served." A

motion to dismiss is not a "responsive pleading" within the meaning

of Rule 15. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters., Inc., 479

F.3d 1099, 1104 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); Crum v. Circus Circus Enters.,

231 F.3d 1129, 1130 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Plaintiff may

include additional claims in her amended complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/25/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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