Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00243/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GARYON T. NETTLES, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

RON DAVIS, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:16-cv-0243 AC P 

ORDER 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner has paid the filing fee and consented to the 

jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) 

and Local Rule 305(a). ECF No. 4. 

 Petitioner challenges the state court’s denial of his petition for recall pursuant to the Three 

Strikes Reform Act of 2012, California Penal Code § 1170.126, also referred to as Proposition 36. 

Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief. First, he asserts that his due process rights were violated 

when the state court relied on fabricated information to find that two prior convictions for assault 

with intent to commit rape constituted sexually violent offenses, thereby making him ineligible 

for resentencing. ECF No. 1 at 5, 16-21, 33-37. Second, he argues that he was denied his right to 

a jury when the court made additional findings of fact related to his prior convictions and 

concluded that, based on those findings, he was ineligible for resentencing. Id. at 7, 20, 37-38. 

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Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules requires the court to summarily dismiss a habeas petition “[i]f 

it plainly appears from the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled 

to relief in the district court.” 

A state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if he is being held in custody in 

violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Unless 

an issue of federal constitutional or statutory law is implicated by the facts presented, the claim is 

not cognizable under federal habeas corpus. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). 

“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law,” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 

764, 780 (1990) (citations omitted), and a petitioner may not transform a state-law issue into a 

federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process, Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 

(9th Cir. 1996). Alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law, which includes 

alleged errors in state sentencing law, do not warrant habeas relief. Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 

773, 779-80 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Federal habeas corpus relief is generally ‘unavailable for alleged 

error in the interpretation or application of state law.’” (citations omitted)); Miller v. Vasquez, 

868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (whether an offense qualifies as a “serious felony” under 

California law is a question of state sentencing law and not cognizable in habeas). 

In order to be eligible for resentencing under § 1170.126, an inmate cannot have any 

“prior convictions for any of the offenses appearing in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of 

paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph 

(2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12.” Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126(e)(3). In his first ground 

for relief, petitioner argues that the court looked to the specific facts of his convictions for assault 

with intent to commit rape to determine whether they were sexually violent offenses and therefore 

made him ineligible for resentencing under § 1170.126(e)(3). ECF No. 1 at 5, 16-21, 33-37. He 

argues that in doing so the court relied on fabricated information. Id. 

At the time petitioner was convicted of his indeterminate life sentence under the three 

strikes law, assault with intent to rape was not listed as a violent offense. Id. at 32; People v. 

Nettles, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 698, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). Petitioner argued in the state court of 

appeal, as he does here, that the evidence relied on by the state superior court in determining his 

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convictions were sexually violent offenses was unreliable. ECF No. 1 at 16-21, 33-37. While it 

appears that the state court of appeal did evaluate the specific facts of petitioner’s crimes in the 

unpublished portion of its opinion,1 in the published portion the Court of Appeal for the Third 

District of California held that “the determination of whether or not an inmate is disqualified from 

resentencing under section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(3), because he or she has a prior conviction 

for an offense ‘appearing’ in clause (iv) of sections 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C), and 1170.12, 

subdivision (c)(2)(C), is to be determined as of the date the Act became effective.” Nettles, 192 

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 405 (emphasis added). The court went on to find that 

“A ‘sexually violent offense’ as defined in subdivision (b) of 

Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code” appears in 

clause (iv) of these subdivisions (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I); 

1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv)(I)), and so appeared on the date the 

Act became effective. Moreover, on that determinative date, 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 defined “sexually 

violent offense” to include assault with intent to commit rape. 

Id. (emphasis added). In other words, on the date § 1170.126 went into effect, assault with intent 

to commit rape was statutorily defined as a sexually violent offense and was a disqualifying 

offense. The court then held that because petitioner had two prior convictions for assault with 

intent to commit rape he was disqualified from resentencing. Id. The determination that a 

conviction for assault with intent to commit rape, in and of itself, makes an inmate ineligible for 

resentencing makes any determination the court may have made as to the facts surrounding 

petitioner’s specific offenses irrelevant. The state court’s interpretation of § 1170.126, and its 

determination that petitioner’s convictions for assault with intent to commit rape constituted 

sexually violent offenses and therefore disqualified him from being eligible for resentencing, are 

questions of state sentencing law and therefore not cognizable in federal habeas. See Miller v. 

Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Whether assault with a deadly weapon 

 

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 The Court of Appeals for the Third District of California only certified a portion of its opinion 

for publication in petitioner’s case. A copy of the complete opinion is available on the court’s 

website at 

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=3&doc_id=2040744

&doc_no=C073336. 

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qualifies as a ‘serious felony’ under California’s sentence enhancement provisions is a question of 

state sentencing law.”). 

 Petitioner’s claim that he was denied his right to a jury trial on additional facts related to 

his convictions for assault with intent to commit rape also fails to state a cognizable claim. 

Petitioner argues that the court violated his right to a jury trial when it made findings of fact 

outside the elements of his convictions to determine that he was ineligible for resentencing. ECF 

No. 1 at 7, 20, 37-38. Though the state court may have made findings regarding the specifics of 

petitioner’s offenses, in interpreting § 1170.126 it also held that a conviction for assault with 

intent to commit rape renders an inmate ineligible for resentencing. Nettles, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 

405, 409. Petitioner pled guilty to assault with intent to commit rape (ECF No. 1 at 7, 20, 37-38) 

and thereby waived his right to a jury trial. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (a plea 

of guilty waives several federal constitutional rights, including the right to trial by jury). Because 

the mere fact of petitioner’s conviction makes him ineligible for resentencing and petitioner 

waived his right to a jury trial as to those offenses, his claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a 

jury trial was violated is not cognizable. 

Petitioner has also requested the appointment of counsel. However, since the petition will 

be dismissed because it does not state a cognizable claim, petitioner’s motion for counsel will be 

denied. 

Summary 

 The petition is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Petitioner’s first claim fails because 

the state court decided that the fact that he was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape 

was, by itself, enough to make him ineligible for resentencing. The specific facts of his crimes 

are not relevant to that decision. Since this is a question of state law, it does not state a claim for 

federal habeas corpus relief. Petitioner’s second claim also fails because his guilty pleas waived 

his right to a jury and the fact of conviction was what made him ineligible for resentencing, not 

the additional facts. 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Petitioner’s motion for counsel (ECF No. 2) is denied. 

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 2. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is dismissed. 

 3. No certificate of appealability shall issue. 

DATED: September 23, 2016 

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