Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-07228/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-07228-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN KEVIN FROST,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. WILCOX, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-07228-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shawn Kevin Frost, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State 

Prison-Sacramento, has filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The operative 

complaint in this action is the amended complaint, in which Plaintiff alleged constitutional rights 

violations at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP” or “Pelican Bay”) where he was previously 

incarcerated. Dkt. 10 at 3-7.

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In his amended complaint, Plaintiff has named the following 

Defendants at PBSP and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”): 

Warden Clark E. Ducart; Chief Deputy Warden D. W. Bradbury; Associate Warden C. Olsen; 

Captain T. S. Buchanan; Lieutenant D. Higgerson; Sergeant J. Schrag; Correctional Officer T. 

Toussaint; Correctional Counselor II D. Wilcox; Office of Appeals (“OOA”) Chief M. Voong; and 

OOA Captain M. Hodges. Id. at 2. Plaintiff has sought declaratory relief and monetary damages. 

Id. at 3, 7. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from the named Defendants’ alleged 

retaliation for his filing a CDCR Form 602 inmate appeal (“602 appeal” or “grievance”). 

In an Order dated January 16, 2019, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s supervisory liability 

claim against Defendant Ducart without prejudice, and it found Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

claims against the remaining Defendants (hereinafter “Defendants”) to be cognizable. 

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Dkt. 30. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion, and Defendants have filed a 

1 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by the parties.

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reply. Dkts. 35, 38. Plaintiff has also filed a document entitled, “Plaintiff’s Request for 

Admissions/Consideration of Addendum/Request for Counsel.” Dkt. 40.

Having read and considered the papers submitted and being fully informed, the Court 

hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES any pending motions 

as moot.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

A. The Parties

At the time of the events set forth in his amended complaint, Plaintiff was housed in 

PBSP. Dkt. 10 at 3. Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, Buchanan, Bradbury, Olson, Higgerson, and 

Toussaint are either current or former PBSP employees. Schrag Decl. at 1:22-23; Wilcox Decl. at 

1:23-24; Buchanan Decl. at 1:22-23; Bradbury Decl. at 1:24-25; Olson Decl. at 1:23-24; 

Higgerson Decl. at 1:22-24; Toussaint Decl. at 1:24-25. Defendants Hodges and Voong are 

employees at the CDCR’s OOA in Sacramento. Hodges Decl. at 1:25-27; Voong Decl. at 1:21-23.

B. Plaintiff’s Version

The following background relating to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims is taken from the 

Court’s January 16, 2019 Order:

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, officials and employees of PBSP

and the CDCR violated his constitutional rights. His claims arise 

from their alleged retaliation for his filing an appeal, log no. PBSP16-01431, on July 6, 2016 naming several supervisorial and custody 

staff as co-conspirators of malfeasance. Plaintiff alleges that three 

days later, on July 9, 2016, he was rehoused in a cell “which lacked a 

seat/stool, no desk or table to eat meals [or] write, no electrical power 

to use his approved personal property . . . and a broken sink . . . .” 

Dkt. 10 at 3. It seems Plaintiff was placed in such inadequate housing 

for approximately 5 months or until around November 2016 before 

he was “moved back to adequate and appropriate/normal general 

population housing.” Id. at 5-6. According to the amended 

2 This Order contains some acronyms or abbreviations. Here, in one place, they are:

602 appeal CDCR Form 602 inmate appeal

CDCR California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Form 22 CDCR Form 22

IHAs Inmate Housing Assignments

OOA Office of Appeals

PBSP Pelican Bay State Prison

SOMS Strategic Offender Management System

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complaint, Plaintiff filed another appeal, log no PBSP-16-01584, in 

which he raised his claims in this action. Plaintiff’s specific claims 

are as follows: (1) Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan

retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of his First Amendment rights;

and (2) Defendants Olsen, Bradbury, Higgerson, Hodges, Voong, and 

Toussaint were aware of the unconstitutional actions but failed to take 

correct action by denying his related grievance, also in violation of 

his First Amendment rights.

Dkt. 11 at 2. To elaborate, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are as follows: (1) against Defendants 

Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan for their part in placing Plaintiff in cell A2-105 on July 9, 2016 as 

punishment for filing PBSP-16-01431; (2) against Defendant Toussaint for refusing to process 

Plaintiff’s July 17, 2016 CDCR Form 22 (“Form 22”), “Inmate/Parolee Request for Interview, 

Item or Service,” directly to the warden; and (3) against Defendants Olson, Bradbury, Higgerson, 

Hodges, and Voong for being aware of the aforementioned alleged retaliatory actions by others

but failing to take corrective action when they denied his grievances. Dkt. 10 at 3-7.

C. Defendants’ Version

1. Cell Assignments With Inmates L. J. Perry and B. J. Ford in Cell A8-102

“[I]nmate housing assignments are made on the basis of available documentation and 

individual case factors.” Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15, § 3269.1. Individual case factors include, but 

are not limited to the inmate’s history of racial violence, their commitment offense, their 

classification score, their custody level, and their disciplinary history. Id. “Inmates shall accept 

Inmate Housing Assignments (“IHAs”) as directed by staff. It is the expectation that all inmates 

double cell[.] If staff determine an inmate is suitable for double-celling [. . .] that inmate shall 

accept the housing assignment or be subject to disciplinary action for refusing. IHAs shall be 

made on the basis of available documentation and individual case factors. Inmates are not entitled 

to single cell assignment, housing location of choice, or to a cell mate of their choice.” Id., § 3269 

(brackets added).

Consistent with the above, at the time of these alleged events, Plaintiff was cleared for 

double-celling. Wilcox Decl. at 3:19-21, Ex. A [Chronos of Plaintiff’s Classification Hearings 

Chair by D. Wilcox]. At the time of these events, Defendant Schrag was a correctional sergeant, 

Defendant Buchanan was acting as a correctional captain, and Defendant Wilcox was correctional 

counselor supervisor, and all three worked at Facility A. Schrag Decl. at 1:22-25; Buchanan Decl.

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at 1:22-25; Wilcox Decl. at 1:23-25. On June 8, 2016, Plaintiff was housed in Cell A8-102, and 

his cellmate was Inmate L. J. Perry. Dewitt Decl., Ex. A [June 8, 2016 Bed Request Batch for 

Inmate Perry]; Schrag Decl., Ex. A [June 8, 2016 Bed Request Batch for Inmate Perry]. Inmate 

Perry’s move had been requested by D. Martinez, and that move was reviewed and approved by 

Sergeant E. Enos. Id. On or about June 15, 2016, inmate B. J. Ford moved into cell A8-102, and 

became Plaintiff’s new cellmate. Dewitt Decl., Ex. A [June 8, 2016 Bed Request Batch for Inmate 

Ford]; Schrag Decl., Ex. A [June 8, 2016 Bed Request Batch for Inmate Ford]. Inmate Ford’s 

move had been requested by M. Patsel, and that move was reviewed and approved by J. Preston.

Id. Plaintiff had no documented enemy concerns with either Inmate Perry or Inmate Ford. Dewitt 

Decl. at 2:17-20. Defendants Schrag, Buchanan, and Wilcox had no personal involvement in 

deciding either of these cellmate assignments. Schrag Decl. at 2:15-20, Ex. A; Dewitt Decl., Ex. 

A; Buchanan Decl. at 3:21-22; Wilcox Decl. at 2:19-26, Ex. A [Chronos of Plaintiff’s 

Classification Hearings Chair by D. Wilcox]. D. Martinez, E. Enos, M. Patsel, and J. Preston are 

correctional staff who not parties to this action.

2. Plaintiff’s Cell Move to Cell A2-105 During Facility A’s Bed Compactions

On or about the time of July 1, 2016, Pelican Bay was experiencing an influx of inmate 

transfers that increased the inmate population in Facility A. Schrag Decl. at 2:24-28; Buchanan 

Decl. at 3:10-17. In order to place Facility A’s inmates into available bed space, bed compactions 

were conducted by correctional staff. Id. Cell moves are conducted by correctional staff 

submitting bed batch requests of those inmates that need to be moved. Dewitt Decl. at 2:3-8; 

Schrag Decl. at 3:1-8. Bed requests are entered into Pelican Bay’s Strategic Offender 

Management System (“SOMS”) by correctional staff, and those requests were reviewed and 

approved by correctional sergeants or other supervisorial staff in SOMS. Id. From July 1, 2016 to 

July 9, 2016, Facility A processed an estimated 126 inmate moves to compact available bed 

spaces. Schrag Decl. at 2:28-3:2. During this time, in an effort to appropriately house all inmates 

at Pelican Bay, all vacant cells had to be used, regardless of the functionality of each individual 

cell’s electrical outlets. Buchanan Decl., Ex. B [Buchanan’s Letter Response to Plaintiff’s Form 

22s].

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During the compactions in July 2016, correctional staff attempted to assign a new cellmate 

named Inmate Anthony J. Davis to Plaintiff in Cell A8-102 on or about July 8, 2016. Schrag 

Decl. at 2:28-3:2; Chen Decl., Ex. A [Frost Depo.] 61:19-25. On July 9, 2016, Officer J. Young, 

requested that Plaintiff be bed-swapped with Inmate Oliver in A2-105. Dewitt Decl., Ex. B [July 

9, 2016 Bed Request Batch]; Schrag Decl. at 3:14-17, Ex. B [July 9, 2016 Bed Request Batch]. 

The request was reviewed and approved by Sergeant J. Reynoso. Id. The Court notes that neither 

Officer Young nor Sergeant Reynoso are parties in this case.

Overrides in SOMS are required if correctional staff request to move an inmate to a bed 

inconsistent with their housing factors. Schrag Decl. at 3:10-13; Dewitt Decl. at 2:8-11, 2:23-24. 

No override was necessary to place Plaintiff into that cell, since it matched his housing factors. Id.

More specifically, at the time of these events, Cell A2-105 was designated to house general 

population inmates, which matched Plaintiff’s designated level of programming.3 Schrag Decl. at 

4:1-5; Wilcox Decl. at 3:10-16; Buchanan Decl. at 3:23-26; DeWitt Decl. at 2:23-25; Chen Decl.,

Ex. A [Frost Depo.] at 48:7-10. Plaintiff received the same level of access to programs, services, 

and activities as he did prior to that cell move. Higgerson Decl. at 4:2-3. During Plaintiff’s period 

of placement in A2-105, Plaintiff kept his appliances and was accommodated by their use in 

dayroom.4 Buchanan Decl. at 4:4-5; Chen Decl., Ex. A [Frost Depo.] at 53:16-17.

Defendants Schrag, Buchanan, and Wilcox conducted no personal actions in requesting, 

reviewing, or approving Plaintiff’s July 8, 2016 move to A2-105. Schrag Decl. at 3:14-15; 

Buchanan Decl. at 3:19-20; Wilcox Decl. at 2:22-26. In any case, Defendant Schrag did not 

instruct any correctional staff to destroy Plaintiff’s property if he did not comply with the move to 

A2-105. Schrag Decl. at 3:19-23. Plaintiff was not present himself to observe any alleged 

instruction from Defendant Schrag to prison staff. Chen Decl., Ex. A [Frost Depo.] at 56:3-7.

3. Plaintiff’s Attempt to Submit Form 22 as Confidential Legal Mail 

“Inmates and parolees may request interviews with staff and/or request items and services 

3 Plaintiff “disputes that cell A2-105 is a normal general population cell.” Dkt. 35 at 11.

 

4 Plaintiff disputes that he was allowed to use his typewriter in the dayroom and claims that 

he was denied “every time he asked for this access.” Dkt. 35 at 9. 

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via a written request process. The objective of timely resolution of routine matters through an

effective and non-conflicting communications process shall be facilitated in [title 15, article 8.5][.] 

Departmental staff shall attempt to resolve inmate and parolee issues expeditiously.” Cal. Code. 

Regs., tit. 15, § 3086(a) (2016). “When seeking response to a written request for an interview, 

item, or service, the inmate or parolee shall complete the [Form 22] [and deliver] or mail via 

institutional mail the completed form to any staff member who is able to respond to the issue.”

Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15, § 3086(e) (2016). “[The] written request process does not stay the time 

constraints for filing an appeal, the inmate or parolee is not precluded from filing an appeal on the 

same issue prior to receiving a response to their written request.” Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15, 

§ 3086(e)(2) (2016). 

On or about July 17, 2016, Defendant Toussaint and his partner were processing inmate 

mail in Building 2. Toussaint Decl. at 2:9-11, 2:23-24. At the time, Defendant Toussaint was 

newly employed as a correctional officer at CDCR for less than two months. Id. Plaintiff 

approached Defendant Toussaint to submit a Form 22 that detailed Plaintiff’s allegations 

regarding Facility A staff subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment based on A2-105’s lack 

of electrical power for appliance usage, shelves for his “hygiene-food-etc.,” and a desk for writing. 

Sheldon Decl., Ex. B [Second level Response to PBSP-16-01584]; Chen Decl., Ex. B [Plaintiff’s 

July 17, 2016 Form 22]. Plaintiff requested that Defendant Toussaint submit the Form 22 directly 

to the warden. Toussaint Decl. at 2:24-26. Defendant Toussaint informed Plaintiff that he would 

process the Form 22 but that it would possibly be answered before reaching the warden, 

depending on the issues involved in Plaintiff’s request. Toussaint Decl. 2:26-3:2. Defendant

Toussaint stated that this process was for the purpose of ensuring the expeditious resolution of 

inmate issues in Form 22s. Id. Dissatisfied, Plaintiff placed the Form 22 in a sealed envelope and 

requested that Defendant Toussaint process it as confidential legal mail. Toussaint Decl. at 3:3-7. 

Defendant Toussaint, unsure as to the appropriate procedure for processing a Form 22 through the 

confidential mailing process, took the envelope to his partner to discuss. Toussaint Decl. at 3:8-

10. Defendant Toussaint’s partner informed Defendant Toussaint that Form 22s could not be 

processed through the institution’s legal mail. Id. Defendant Toussaint returned the sealed 

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envelope back to Plaintiff. Toussaint Decl. at 3:10-14. Defendant Toussaint, in turn, informed 

Plaintiff that he could not process his Form 22 as legal mail as submitted. Id. Plaintiff stated 

Defendant Toussaint was denying his right to correspond with the warden. Toussaint Decl. at

3:14. Defendant Toussaint replied that Plaintiff could write the warden a letter and submit it as 

confidential legal mail for processing, or that Plaintiff could submit a Form 22 through its standard 

non-confidential process. Toussaint Decl. at 3:14-16. Plaintiff repeated that Defendant Toussaint 

had denied his right to correspondence and walked away, which Defendant Toussaint took as 

Plaintiff ending the conversation. Toussaint Decl. at 3:17-18.

4. Plaintiff’s Grievances Relating to Plaintiff’s Allegations of Retaliation 

a. PBSP-16-01431

On or about June 22, 2016,5 Plaintiff submitted appeal no. PBSP-16-01431 alleging that 

his assignments to Inmate Perry on June 8, 2016, and Inmate Ford on June 15, 2016, were 

retaliatory cell assignments by Defendants Schrag and Buchanan, among other individuals, for his 

past filed grievances. Ramos Decl., Ex. D [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]. On July 

16, 2016, Sergeant T. Combs interviewed Plaintiff regarding those allegations, during which 

Plaintiff stated that he had nothing further to add. Royal Decl. at 4:21-23; Ramos Decl., Ex. D 

[Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]. Defendant Buchanan conducted the first level inquiry 

and recommended that the appeal be partially granted at the first level of review, based on his 

review of Plaintiff’s submitted documents in support of the first level grievance, his review of 

Plaintiff’s central file indicating association with the Del Paso Heights Bloods, Plaintiff’s related 

Form 22s submitted on the same allegations, and Plaintiff’s July 16, 2016 interview by Sergeant 

Combs. Buchanan Decl. at 2:22-28, Ex. A [First Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]. Defendant 

Olson reviewed and approved Defendant Buchanan’s recommendation at the first level based on 

all relevant information provided to the first level inquiry. Olson Decl. at 2:22-28, Ex. A [First 

Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]; Ramos Decl., Ex. D [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-

5 The Court notes that the record contradicts Plaintiff’s claim as to the date that he filed 

PBSP-16-01431 (he states he filed it on July 6, 2016, see dkt. 10 at 3), but there is no need to 

highlight such a discrepancy because the actual June 22, 2016 filing date still took place before the 

July 9, 2016 cell move.

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01431]. Outside of this administrative review and approval, Defendant Olson was not otherwise 

involved in Plaintiff’s housing assignments in June 2016 and had no involvement in assigning 

Plaintiff to any particular facility, building, or cell. Olson Decl. at 4:1-3. Plaintiff was dissatisfied 

and sought a second level review. Royal Decl. at 4:25-26, Ex. A [Plaintiff’s Pelican Bay Appeals 

Tracking Log]. Appeals Coordinator A. Sheldon, conducted the second level inquiry and agreed 

with the first level review in finding that Plaintiff was a documented non-validated Del Paso 

Heights Bloods associate, and had not been housed with an enemy. Sheldon Decl. at 2:12-24, Ex. 

A [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]. Appeals Coordinator Sheldon provided her 

findings and recommendations for Defendant Bradbury’s review and approval on behalf of the 

hiring authority. Sheldon Decl. at 2:24-26, Ex. A [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]; 

Bradbury Decl. at 2:21-25, Ex. B [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]. Plaintiff remained 

dissatisfied and submitted the grievance to the CDCR’s OOA for a third level of review, where 

Appeals Examiner J. Dominguez conducted the inquiry and recommended that no modification 

order was necessary. Hodges Decl. at 3:6-8, Ex. A [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]; 

Ramos Decl., Ex. A [Plaintiff’s Third Level Appeals Tracking Log]. Defendant Hodges reviewed 

that recommendation, which included consideration of the findings and recommendations of the 

first and second levels of review, Plaintiff’s central file, relevant title 15 sections, and Plaintiff’s 

housing and classification factors, and approved the recommendation that no modification order 

was necessary; she approved the recommendation on behalf of Defendant Voong, Chief of the 

OOA. Hodges Decl. at 3:6-10, Ex. A [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]; Voong Decl. at 

3:10-14; Ramos Decl., Ex. D [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]. Defendants Hodges and 

Voong had no involvement in Pelican Bay’s housing operations and had no authority to conduct 

Plaintiff’s cellmate assignments or bed moves. Hodges Decl. at 3:19-26; Voong Decl. at 2:21-25. 

Defendant Voong was not involved in reviewing or approving this grievance, as he designated 

Defendant Hodges to act on his behalf. Voong Decl. at 3:2-4. 

b. PBSP-16-01584

On or about July 19, 2016, Plaintiff submitted appeal no. PBSP-16-01584 alleging that his 

cell move to Cell A2-105 was in retaliation for his filing of appeal no. PBSP-16-01431.

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Higgerson Decl. at 2:12-16; Sheldon Decl., Ex. B [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]. 

Of these Defendants, Plaintiff named only Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan, in this 

grievance as among those alleged to be responsible for this cell move. Id. These allegations were 

treated as a staff complaint. Olson Decl. at 3:3-8, Ex. B [First Level Response to PBSP-16-

01584]. Defendant Higgerson conducted the first level inquiry and interviewed Defendant on 

August 7, 2016 in relation to this grievance; Defendant Higgerson provided his findings to the 

non-staff complaint allegations to Defendant Olson. Higgerson Decl. at 3:2-4:8; Olson Decl. at 

3:3-8, Ex. B [First Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]. Defendant Olson reviewed Defendant 

Higgerson’s recommendation and approved the first level’s partial grant of this grievance, 

agreeing that staff were found to have not violated CDCR policy. Olson Decl. at 3:5-8, Ex. B 

[First Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]. Defendant Olson’s approval of this response was 

based on a review of the issues contained in Plaintiff’s appeal and Defendant Higgerson’s August 

7, 2016 interview with Plaintiff. Id. Defendant Olson had no personal participation in Plaintiff’s 

housing assignments or moves. Olson Decl. at 4:1-3.

Defendant Higgerson provided his findings and recommendations, that Plaintiff’s staff 

complaint allegations be denied, to the second level. Sheldon Decl. at 3:4-8, Ex. B [Second Level 

Response to PBSP-16-01584]. Defendant Higgerson’s recommendation was based on, among 

other things, his interviews of Plaintiff, Defendant Schrag, Officer Branion, an inspection of A2-

105, its work order history, and a review of Plaintiff’s access to services, programs, and activities. 

Higgerson Decl. at 3:2-4:8. That recommendation was reviewed and approved by Appeals 

Coordinator A. Sheldon. Sheldon Decl. at 3:4-11, Ex. B [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-

01584]. Appeals Coordinator Sheldon agreed with Defendant Higgerson’s recommendation that 

there was no evidence of staff wrongdoing, based on information from a review of Plaintiff’s 

central file and Defendant Higgerson’s interviews. Id. Appeals Coordinator Sheldon’s 

recommendation was reviewed and approved by Defendant Bradbury on behalf of the hiring 

authority. Bradbury Decl. at 3:7-9, Ex. D. [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]; Sheldon 

Decl. at 3:10-12, Ex. B [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]. Plaintiff remained 

dissatisfied and submitted his grievance to the CDCR’s OOA for a third level review, where 

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Defendant Hodges, as the Appeals Examiner, conducted the inquiry and recommended that no 

modification order was necessary. Hodges Decl. at 3:12-15, Ex. B [Third Level Response to 

PBSP-16-01584]; Ramos Decl., Ex. E [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]. Defendant 

Hodges based her consideration of the findings and recommendations on the institutions’ review, 

Plaintiff’s central file, and relevant sections of the California Penal Code, title 15, and the CDCR’s 

Operations Manual. Hodges Decl., Ex. B [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]. Defendant 

Hodges’ recommendation was approved by OOA Acting Chief S. Hemenway and thus Defendant 

Voong was not involved in reviewing or approving this grievance, as he designated Acting Chief 

Hemenway to act on his behalf. Hodges Decl. at 3:15-17, Ex. B [Third Level Response to PBSP16-01584]; Voong Decl. at 3:2-4, 3:24-4:1, Ex. B [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]. 

c. PBSP-16-01757

On or about August 2, 2016, Plaintiff submitted appeal no. PBSP-16-01757 alleging 

Defendant Toussaint had obstructed Plaintiff from pursing his First Amendment right to write 

Warden Ducart through confidential legal mail. Royal Decl., Ex. D [Second Level Review to 

PBSP-16-01757]; Olson Decl., Ex. C [First Level Appeal Response to PBSP-16-01757]. Sergeant 

T. Combs interviewed Plaintiff in relation to this grievance on September 18, 2016 and provided it 

to the first level. Id. At the first level, Captain C. J. Parry conducted the inquiry and provided his 

recommendation to Defendant Olson that the grievance be denied. Olson Decl. at 3:15-17, Ex. C 

[First Level Appeal Response to PBSP-16-01757]. Defendant Olson reviewed and approved 

Parry’s recommendation in denying the grievance at the first level, based on a review of Plaintiff’s 

allegations and a review of relevant regulations discussing Form 22 and mailing procedures. Id.

Defendant Olson had no personal participation in processing this Form 22. Olson Decl. at 4:3-5. 

Plaintiff was dissatisfied and submitted the grievance for a second level review, which was 

received on October 4, 2016. Royal Decl. at 5:20-22, Ex. D [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-

01757]; Bradbury Decl., Ex. F [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01757]. Appeals Coordinator 

K. Royal conducted the second level inquiry by considering all relevant sections of title 15 and the 

CDCR’s Department Operations Manual, and agreed with the first level’s response; Appeals 

Coordinator Royal’s recommendation was reviewed and approved by Defendant Bradbury at the 

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second level on behalf of the hiring authority. Royal Decl. at 5:20-24, Ex. D [Second Level 

Response to PBSP-16-01757]; Bradbury Decl. at 3:22-24, Ex. F [Second Level Response to 

PBSP-16-01757]. Plaintiff remained dissatisfied and appealed to the third level of review, where 

Appeals Examiner J. Vila conducted the inquiry and recommended that no modification order was 

necessary. Voong Decl. at 4:3-4, Ex. C [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01757]; Ramos Decl.,

Ex. F [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01757]. That recommendation was reviewed and 

approved by OOA Acting Chief R. Briggs, whom Defendant Voong designated to review on his 

behalf. Voong Decl. at 4:5-9; Ramos Decl. Ex. F [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01757]. 

Defendant Voong was not involved in reviewing or approving this grievance. Voong Decl. at 3:2-

4, 4:5-8.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate 

that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a 

material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving 

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 

reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue for which the 

opposing party by contrast will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving 

party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 

case.” Id. at 325. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the 

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court is only concerned with disputes over 

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material facts and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the court to scour the record in search of a genuine 

issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party 

has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary 

judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to 

a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Only admissible evidence may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 

Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). Submitted by Defendants in support of the 

motion for summary judgment are Plaintiff’s deposition (Dkt. 34-2 at 111-115, Chen Decl., Ex. A)

as well as declarations and all attached exhibits from the following: OOA Chief T. Ramos; PBSP 

Appeals Coordinators A. Sheldon and K. Royal; Deputy Attorney General Joanne Chen; and 

Defendants Voong, Hodges, Bradbury, Olson, Wilcox, Buchanan, Higgerson, Schrag, and 

Toussaint. Dkts. 31-1 – 31-3, 34-1 – 31-2 at 106. Meanwhile, Plaintiff has filed his verified 

amended complaint (dkt. 10) and his verified opposition to Defendants’ motion (dkt. 35). The 

Court will construe these filings as affidavits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as 

they are based on personal knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See 

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). Finally, Plaintiff has 

submitted various exhibits and declarations filed in support of his opposition. Dkt. 38-1. 

Defendants have filed objections to Plaintiff’s evidence in support of his opposition. Dkt. 38-1 at 

1-7. Defendants assert some of Plaintiff’s supporting exhibits and declarations either: (1) lack a 

foundation of personal knowledge or expertise; (2) show that Plaintiff is not an expert with 

knowledge as to the information contained in the exhibit; (3) constitute speculation; (4) contain 

inadmissible hearsay; (5) have not been authenticated; and (6) are irrelevant and outside the scope 

of this action. Although the Court may discuss some of Plaintiff’s evidence in question in its 

analysis, the Court points out within its analysis why this evidence is not sufficient to defeat 

summary judgment. The Court finds that even if any of Plaintiff’s aforementioned evidence was 

admitted and accepted at face value, Defendants still would be entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law, as set forth below. Accordingly, Defendants’ objections are DENIED as moot. Dkt. 38-1.

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IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff cites the First Amendment and alleges in his complaint that Defendants’ actions

were in retaliation for Plaintiff submitting formal grievances. Dkt. 10 at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff

states retaliation claims: (1) against Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan for their part in 

placing Plaintiff in cell A2-105 on July 9, 2016 as punishment for filing PBSP-16-01431; 

(2) against Defendant Toussaint for refusing to process Plaintiff’s July 17, 2016 Form 22 directly 

to the warden; and (3) against Defendants Olson, Bradbury, Higgerson, Hodges, and Voong for 

being aware of the aforementioned alleged retaliatory actions by others but failing to take 

corrective action when they denied his grievances. Dkt. 10 at 3-7.

Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under 

section 1983, even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper. See Mt. 

Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). Retaliation is 

actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill individuals’ exercise of constitutional 

rights, even though retaliation is not expressly referenced in the Constitution. See Perry v. 

Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under 

section 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his 

constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, 

such as preserving institutional order and discipline); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (same); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985) (contention 

that actions “arbitrary and capricious” sufficient to allege retaliation). The prisoner must show 

that the type of activity he was engaged in was constitutionally protected, that the protected 

conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory action, and that the

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retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 

267-68 (9th Cir. 1997).

Retaliation claims brought by prisoners must be evaluated in light of concerns over 

“excessive judicial involvement in day-to-day prison management, which ‘often squander[s] 

judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone.’” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)) (brackets added). In 

particular, courts should “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the 

evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Id.

A. Alleged Retaliation By Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan In Moving 

Plaintiff to Cell A2-105

To reiterate, Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in cell A2-105 as punishment for filing a 

grievance, log no. PBSP-16-01431, naming several supervisorial and custody staff as coconspirators of malfeasance. Dkt. 10 at 3. In its Order of Service, the Court found that Plaintiff’s 

aforementioned allegations raised a cognizable retaliation claim against Defendants Schrag, 

Wilcox, and Buchanan in violation of his First Amendment rights. Dkt. 11 at 2. 

Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s move to cell A2-105 was “for reasons unrelated to 

Plaintiff’s grievance activities” and instead it was because “Facility A was experiencing an 

increased number of inmate transfers and needed to compact beds in order to accommodate the 

institution’s goal of efficient use of bed space and accommodating the program needs of Facility 

A’s inmates.” Dkt. 30 at 21 (citing Schrag Decl. at 2:24-28; Buchanan Decl. at 3:10-17). Thus, 

Defendants argue “Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation against [them] fail as he cannot establish that 

his cell move during bed compactions advanced no legitimate correctional goal of the institution.” 

Id. at 22.

As to the first and second elements of retaliation listed above, Plaintiff claims that 

Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan took the following adverse actions against him because 

after he filed PBSP-16-01431: (1) he was rehoused on July 9, 2016 in cell A2-105 “which lacked a 

seat/stool, no desk or table to eat meals [or] write, no electrical power to use his approved personal 

property . . . and a broken sink . . . ,” dkt. 10 at 3; and (2) Plaintiff was placed in such inadequate 

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housing for approximately 5 months or until around November 2016 before he was “moved back 

to adequate and appropriate/normal general population housing,” id. at 5-6. In contrast,

Defendants argue that their actions were not adverse to Plaintiff, stating as follows:

Plaintiff alleges that the cell move was adverse because he was a 

general population inmate and A2-105 was a “management cell.” 

(Pl.’s First Amended Compl., ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff cannot provide 

a consistent account of what he means by “management cell,” but 

concedes he learned about the “management” term through “random 

people in prison.” (Chen Decl. Ex. A [Frost Depo.] at 53:6-12.)

There can be no dispute that A2-105, was designated for general 

population inmates, and that Plaintiff was a general population 

inmate. [Schrag Decl. at 4:2-3; Wilcox Decl. at 3:11-13; Buchanan 

Decl. at 3:23-25; DeWitt Decl. at 2:24-25;; Chen Decl., Ex. A [Frost 

Depo.] at 48:7-10.] No override was necessary to move Plaintiff into 

A2-105 and the cell was further appropriate for Plaintiff’s placement 

in that it matched all of his housing factors. [Schrag Decl. at 3:10-13;

Dewitt Decl. at 2:8-11; 23-24.] Plaintiff was confirmed to have 

received the same level of access to programs, services, and activities 

in A2-105 as he did prior. [Higgerson Decl. at 4:2-3.]

And to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging physical plant defects in 

A2-105 constituted adverse action, this argument must again fail, 

because inmates have no expectation to be housed in a particular cell. 

See Cal. Code. Regs., tit 15, § 3269 (2016) (stating that inmates are 

not entitled to a housing location of their choice). It is further 

undisputed that during his inquiry of Plaintiff’s administrative 

grievance, Defendant Higgerson also placed work orders to help 

remedy physical plant defects to restore the cell’s electrical use after 

Plaintiff complained about them. (Higgerson Decl. at 3:2-4:8.) 

Moreover, Defendant Higgerson, in conducting his inquiry, offered 

Plaintiff the possibility of potentially being able to move to another 

cell if Plaintiff could find someone he was willing to cell with, and 

Plaintiff refused. [Higgerson Decl. at 2:26-3:1.] During this time, 

Plaintiff kept his appliances and was accommodated by their use in 

the dayroom. [Buchanan Decl. at 4:4-5; Chen Decl., Ex. A [Frost 

Depo.] at 53:16-17.] Plaintiff eventually moved to another cell on 

October 26, 2016. (Buchanan Decl., Ex. D [Plaintiff’s Bed 

Assignment History].)

Dkt. 30 at 23-24 (brackets added). 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff points out that after he was assigned to cell A2-105, he “requested, 

several times, to be allowed use of his typewriter for an hour in the dayroom, every third day, but 

was denied, each, and every time he asked for this access.” Dkt. 35 at 9. Moreover, Plaintiff 

“disputes that cell A2-105 is a normal general population cell.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff claims that cell 

A2-105 “serves as a punishment cell, worse than the security housing unit, or administrative 

segregation, because an inmate does not have electrical power to utilize his otherwise authorize 

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personal appliances, as Plaintiff did.” Id. Plaintiff adds that “Defendants Schrag, Buchanan and 

Wilcox conducted these cell moves in retaliation to punish Plaintiff for his willingness to file 

CDCR 602 [appeals] . . . .” Id. at 5. The Court finds that such action could be sufficient to 

constitute adverse action. See e.g., Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (noting that arbitrary confiscation and 

destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation for filing 

grievances was sufficient to plead an adverse action); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (re-affirming that an 

allegation of retaliatory prison transfer and double-cell status sufficiently states a claim of 

retaliation). Retaliatory motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedly retaliatory act and 

inconsistency with previous actions, as well as direct evidence. See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003). In the instant matter, Plaintiff has shown that his July 9, 2016 cell move 

to cell A2-105 occurred after he filed PBSP-16-01431. Dkt. 10 at 3.

As to the third of the above-referenced five elements, Plaintiff has submitted evidence 

sufficient to show the asserted retaliatory cell move on July 9, 2016 occurred after he filed PBSP16-01431. Dkt. 10 at 3. Prisoners may not be retaliated against for exercising their “First 

Amendment right to pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.” See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 

F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995). The right of access to the courts extends to established prison 

grievance procedures. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).

With respect to the fourth element, although Plaintiff must show his First Amendment 

rights were “chilled,” a prisoner need not show a total chilling of his First Amendment rights in 

order to establish a retaliation claim. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (rejecting argument that 

inmate failed to state retaliation claim where, after alleged adverse action, plaintiff nonetheless 

had been able to file inmate grievances and lawsuit). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that after he filed

PBSP-16-01431, he was moved to cell A2-105, which lacked certain items, like a seat/stool, a 

desk/table, electrical power, and a working sink. See Dkt. 10 at 3. Such action is sufficient to 

chill Plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights, irrespective of whether Plaintiff was actually inhibited. 

See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 569. 

Lastly, for his retaliation claim to survive, Plaintiff must also prove the fifth element, i.e., 

that there was no legitimate penological reason supporting Plaintiff’s cell move to A2-105. See 

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Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. As explained above, Defendants argue that based on the evidence 

“Pelican Bay advanced a legitimate goal of the institution when Facility A staff moved Plaintiff to 

cell A2-105.” Dkt. 30 at 21-22. Defendants elaborate on this as follows:

Contrary to Plaintiff’s claims, his move to A2-105 was in fact for 

reasons unrelated to Plaintiff’s grievance activities. It is undisputed 

that, at the time of these events, Facility A was experiencing an 

increased number of inmate transfers and needed to compact beds in 

order to accommodate the institution’s goal of efficient use of bed 

space and accommodating the program needs of Facility A’s inmates. 

[Schrag Decl. at 2:24-28; Buchanan Decl. at 3:10-17.] Plaintiff’s 

move to A2-105 was one among an estimated 126 bed moves 

conducted during these July 2016 bed compactions. [Schrag Decl. at 

2:28-3:2.] All vacant cells had to be utilized to accommodate 

institutional and program needs on Facility A, regardless of whether 

electrical outlets were available in each one. [Buchanan Decl., Ex. B 

[Buchanan’s Letter Response to Plaintiff’s Form 22s].] The impetus 

behind Plaintiff’s particular bed move to A2-105—during these bed 

compactions occurred by Plaintiff’s objection to a newly assigned 

cellmate, Inmate Davis. [Chen Decl., Ex. A [Frost Depo.] at 61:24-

25.] Plaintiff’s July 9, 2016 refusal thereby prompted the need for 

staff to identify other housing arrangements for him, as he was 

explicitly refusing to cooperatively house with another inmate. This 

resulted in Officer J. Young requesting a bed swap for Plaintiff, thenhoused in A8-102, with Inmate Oliver, then-housed in Cell A2-105. 

[Dewitt Decl., Ex. B [July 9, 2016 Bed Request Batch]; Schrag Decl. 

at 3:14-17, Ex. B [July 9, 2016 Bed Request Batch].] Plaintiff’s 

claims of retaliation against Defendants fail as he cannot establish that 

his cell move during bed compactions advanced no legitimate 

correctional goal of the institution.

Dkt. 30 at 21-22 (brackets added). 

However, Plaintiff claims that he “disputes any of Defendants’ claims that these [cell] 

moves were done for legitimate institution goals, and [he] reiterates the fact that Defendants’ sole 

purpose was to cause harm, harass, and chill Plaintiff from exercising his First Amendment right 

secured by the United States Constitution.” Dkt. 35 at 16. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the 

“[cell] swap of A2-105 occupied by Inmate Oliver on July 9, 2016 to A8-102 occupied by Plaintiff 

was vengeful and retaliatory,” stating as follows:

By swapping Plaintiff with [inmate] Oliver, who had no electrical 

appliances, to cells that contradict each other’s need[s], was simply,

and obviously malicious, and spiteful, because the lack of electrical 

power, inmate Oliver did not need, because he had no appliances, at 

the time. Everyone knew why the cell move was done, because 

Plaintiff had filed several complaints on staff, which they were very 

hostile in their dealings with him, and all the inmate[s] knew.

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Dkt. 35 at 16-17 (citing Pl.’s Exs., Inmate Anthony J. Davis Decl. (dkt. 35-1 at 58-60) and Inmate 

Henry Albanez (dkt. 35-1 at 64)) (brackets added). Inmate Albanez, who was housed next door in 

A2-103, states under penalty of perjury as follows:

. . . I personally observed cell #105 while Mr. Frost was housed and 

assigned to that cell, which was in no way similar to [Inmate 

Albanez’s] assigned cell and all other cells. The cell Mr. Frost was 

assigned had no seat, no desk, not even a mirror, or electrical power 

to plug-in appliance[s], which Mr. Frost had in his possession inside 

the cell by was unable to utilize.

Dkt. 35-1 at 64. Meanwhile, Inmate Davis, who was originally assigned as Plaintiff’s cellmate in 

cell A8-102 on July 8, 2016 (when he was moved from A6-103 to A8-102), states under penalty of 

perjury as follows:

After arriving at cell #102, I spoke to Mr. Frost and immediately 

learned that we were incompatible due to religious beliefs, 

geographical areas of contrast, because I snore loud, and finally 

because of my “alleged,” street gang affiliation, “Blood,” which the 

CDCR has erroneously labeled me and has failed to correct thus far! 

Mr. Frost, stated adamantly that he is non-affiliated with any street 

gangs and does not want to be celled up with anyone that is. I 

communicated all of this information to Correctional Officer 

Guietierrez [sic], the “A” yard, Bldg. #6, floor office that escorted me 

to Bldg. 8. He stated, “I don’t care. You don’t have a choice! Are 

you refusing to go into the cell with him? I could not refuse because 

to do so I knew would result in a serious rules violation report (CDCR 

[Form] 115) and that would have ruined my chances at a transfer to 

a prison closer to Sacramento, where my mom lives. She’s d[y]ing 

of kidney failure and I’m trying to see her again before she dies. 

Ultimately, Mr. Frost and I were “forced” under duress and fears of 

retaliation/reprisal by Correctional Staff here at PBSP, to cell up 

together. At approx.. 1:04 PM on 7/8/2016, they released Bldg. #8 

“A” yard for afternoon yard. I went immediately out to the program 

office and spoke to a Sgt. For unknown reasons, the Sgt. moved Frost 

to A Yard’s Bldg[.] #2, Cell #105. That cell has no electrical power 

system, no mirror . . . .

Dkt. 35-1 at 58-59 (brackets added).

Defendants argue that based on Inmate Davis’s declaration, the record shows that on July 

8, 2016, “there was a legitimate correctional goal in separating Plaintiff and his cellmate in cell 

A8-102, which resulted in Plaintiff being moved to cell A2-105 (and Inmate Oliver being moved 

to cell A8-102 with Inmate Davis).” Dkt. 38 at 5. Defendants argue as follows:

Plaintiff does not dispute that Facility A was conducting bed 

compactions in July 2016, during which Facility A staff were directed 

to utilize all available bed space in the most efficient way possible. 

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(Schrag Decl. at 2:28-3:2, Buchanan Decl., Exh. B.) Utilizing 

available bed space is a legitimate penological interest. 

Prison officials also have a legitimate interest in the safety and 

security of inmates and the institution—interests that were advanced 

by Plaintiff’s transfer from cell A8-102 to cell A2-105, which was 

prompted by information received by staff that Plaintiff was 

incompatible with his cellmate in cell A8-102. Indeed, Plaintiff’s 

own evidence—the declaration of his former cellmate Anthony 

Davis—demonstrates that Plaintiff’s move from cell A8-102 was 

performed in furtherance of the safety and security of inmates and the 

institution. 

Dkt. 38 at 4-5. Defendants point out that Inmate Davis recount of his July 8, 2016 encounter with 

Plaintiff, who stated he did not want to be in the same cell as Inmate Davis once they “learned that 

[they] were incompatible due to religious beliefs, geographical areas of contrast, because [Inmate 

Davis] snore[d] loud[ly], and finally because of [Inmate Davis’s] ‘alleged,’ street gang 

affiliation[.]” Id. at 5 (quoting Dkt. 35-1 at 58). 

Under Rhodes, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that the adverse action he 

suffered was because of his protected conduct, i.e., filing PBSP-16-01431. See 408 F.3d at 567-

68. Further, the only non-speculative assertion which Plaintiff could rely upon to link his conduct 

to Defendants’ adverse action of moving him cell A2-105 is that cell move occurred after Plaintiff 

filed PBSP-16-01431. But retaliation is not established simply by showing adverse activity by a 

defendant after protected speech; rather, the plaintiff must show a nexus between the two. See 

Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the 

logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of this”). Plaintiff 

has not shown a nexus here. Furthermore, Plaintiff has presented no facts indicating Defendants 

knew about PBSP-16-01431. Mere speculation that Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan

must have acted out of retaliation because they knew about PBSP-16-01431 is not sufficient. 

Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing cases) (affirming grant of summary 

judgment where no evidence that defendants knew about plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, or that 

defendants’ disparaging remarks were made in reference to prior lawsuit). Although Plaintiff 

alleges that he submitted PBSP-16-01431 on July 6, 2016, just three days before his July 9, 2016 

move to A2-105, it appears in the actual grievance documents that he in fact submitted it on or 

about June 22, 2016. See Ramos Decl., Ex. D [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01431]. The 

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July 6, 2016 date more accurately reflects the date in which the Appeals Office assigned it to the 

Associate Warden’s Office for the first level response. See Olson Decl. Ex. A [First Level 

Response to Appeal Log No. PBSP-16-01431]. In any case, Defendants argue that they “could 

not have known about that appeal since the first level’s inquiry began on July 16, 2019.” Dkt. 30 

at 15 (citing Royal Decl. at 4:21-23; Ramos Decl., Ex. D [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-

01431]). Defendants further argue as follows:

By the time Lieutenant Combs started his investigations into Facility 

A, Plaintiff was already housed in A2-105. [Dewitt Decl., Ex. B [July 

9, 2016 Bed Request Batch]; Schrag Decl. at 3:14-17, Ex. B [July 9, 

2016 Bed Request Batch]; Royal Decl. at 4:21-23; Ramos Decl., Ex. 

D [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01431].] Because of the 

aforementioned events—that were independent from his grievance 

activity—Plaintiff would have been moved to A2-105 even without 

his submission of that appeal. 

Dkt. 30 at 22-23 (brackets added). 

Additionally, even if Plaintiff could show he was moved to cell A2-105 as retaliation for 

exercising protected conduct, he cannot show that Defendants’ actions did not reasonably advance 

the legitimate penological goal of utilizing all available bed space in the most efficient way 

possible, as well as ensuring safety and security of inmates and the institution due to 

incompatibility of the cellmates. It is undisputed that, at the time of these events, Facility A was 

experiencing an increased number of inmate transfers and needed to compact beds in order to 

accommodate the institution’s goal of efficient use of bed space and accommodating the program 

needs of Facility A’s inmates. See Schrag Decl. at 2:24-28; Buchanan Decl. at 3:10-17. 

Plaintiff’s move to cell A2-105 was one among an estimated 126 bed moves conducted during 

these July 2016 bed compactions. See Schrag Decl. at 2:28-3:2. All vacant cells had to be utilized 

to accommodate institutional and program needs on Facility A, regardless of whether electrical 

outlets were available in each one. See Buchanan Decl., Ex. B [Buchanan’s Letter Response to 

Plaintiff’s Form 22s]. Finally, Defendants have pointed out and the evidence shows that that the 

“impetus behind Plaintiff’s particular bed move to A2-105—during these bed compactions 

occurred by Plaintiff’s objection to a newly assigned cellmate, Inmate Davis.” Dkt. 30 at 22 

(citing Chen Decl., Ex. A [Frost Depo.] at 61:24-25) ; Dkt. 38 at 4-5 (citing Dkt. 35-1 at 58 [Davis 

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Decl.]) Thus, the evidence shows that Plaintiff’s July 9, 2016 objection to be housed with Inmate 

Davis thereby prompted the need for staff to identify other housing arrangements for him. See 

Dkt. 35-1 at 58-59. This resulted in Officer Young requesting a bed swap for Plaintiff (in A8-102)

with Inmate Oliver (in Cell A2-105). See Dewitt Decl., Ex. B [July 9, 2016 Bed Request Batch]; 

Schrag Decl. at 3:14-17, Ex. B [July 9, 2016 Bed Request Batch]. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 

carried his burden of pleading and proving the last Rhodes factor—that his cell move did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.

Having viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that he 

has failed to produce specific evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to his 

retaliation claim against Defendants for allegedly moving him to cell A2-105 as punishment for 

filing PBSP-16-01431. Accordingly, these Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan are entitled 

to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim. 

B. Defendant Toussaint’s Alleged Retaliation Against Plaintiff for Refusing to 

Process Plaintiff’s July 17, 2016 Form 22 Directly to the Warden

Plaintiff next claims that Defendant Toussaint retaliated against him by refusing to process 

Plaintiff’s July 17, 2016 Form 22 directly to the warden. Dkt. 10 at 6-7. Meanwhile Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Toussaint “necessarily fail because Defendant 

Toussaint was acting with a legitimate penological purpose in returning Plaintiff’s July 17, 2016 

Form 22.” Dkt 30 at 24-25. Defendants argue as follows:

It is undisputed that Defendant Toussaint first gave Plaintiff the 

explanation that Form 22s were intended to resolve inmates’ requests 

expeditiously so it would not necessarily reach the warden’s level for 

resolution. [Toussaint Decl. at 2:26-3:1.] In providing this 

explanation, Defendant Toussaint was reiterating the purpose of Form 

22s, as articulated in title 15, wherein departmental staff must work 

to expeditiously resolve those inmate issues submitted through 

written request by providing the Form 22 to any staff who is able to 

respond to the issue. [Toussaint Decl. at 2:19-21; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, § 3086(a) (2016).] Moreover, when Plaintiff apparently attempted 

to circumvent this process by sealing the Form 22 into an envelope 

for processing as confidential legal mail, Defendant Toussaint went 

to ask his mail processing partner if such a request was possible.

[Toussaint Decl. at 3:8-10.] When he was informed that it was not, 

Defendant Toussaint provided the Form 22 back to Plaintiff with 

added information that Plaintiff could submit an addressed letter to

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the warden through confidential legal mail, or submit the Form 22 

through its usual non-confidential process. [Toussaint Decl. at 3:8-

16.]

Id. (brackets added). Defendants further argue that “Defendant Toussaint, by returning the Form 

22 and encouraging Plaintiff follow the appropriate Form 22 procedures, as detailed in title 15, 

section 3086, was acting in furtherance of a legitimate penological goal detailed in California’s 

regulations.” Id. at 25.

Here, even if Plaintiff could show that Defendant Toussaint’s aforementioned actions were 

in retaliation for exercising protected conduct, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant Toussaint’s 

actions of encouraging Plaintiff follow the appropriate Form 22 procedures (as explained in 

Section 3086 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations) was in furtherance of a legitimate 

penological goal. Therefore, Plaintiff has not carried his burden of pleading and proving the last 

Rhodes factor—that Defendant Toussaint’s actions did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.

Having viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that he 

has failed to produce specific evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to his 

retaliation claim against Defendant Toussaint for his alleged refusal to process Plaintiff’s July 17, 

2016 Form 22 directly to the warden. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment as to this claim. 

C. Defendants Olson’s, Bradbury’s, Higgerson’s, Hodges’s, Voong’s Alleged 

Retaliatory Actions in Reviewing Plaintiff’s Grievances 

Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Olson, Bradbury, Higgerson, Hodges, and Voong

were aware of retaliatory actions by others, but failed to take corrective action when they denied 

his grievances. Dkt. 10 at 4-7. 

As against Defendant Olson, Plaintiff’s claim is based only on Defendant Olson’s apparent 

participation in reviewing the related grievances: PBSP-16-01431, PBSP-16-01584, and PBSP-16-

01757. Dkt. 10 at 5-6. Defendant Olson’s approvals to the recommended responses, to the three 

grievances at issue in this case, were given to Plaintiff after a methodical consideration of the 

inquiry’s findings and proposed recommendations. See Olson Decl. at 3:5-8, 3:15-17, 3:21-28, 

Ex. A [First Level Response to PBSP-16-01431], Ex. B [First Level Response to PBSP-16-

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01584], Ex. C [First Level Response to PBSP-16-01757]; Ramos Decl., Ex. D [Third Level 

Response to PBSP-16-01431]. 

Meanwhile, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Bradbury is based solely on his 

involvement in the institution’s second level review of Plaintiff’s grievances. Dkt. 10 at 5. 

Defendant Bradbury’s involvement in these events was restricted only to approving and signing 

Pelican Bay’s Appeals Coordinators’ recommended second level responses, on behalf of the hiring 

authority. See Sheldon Decl. at 2:24-26, 3:10-12, Ex. A [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-

01431], Ex. B [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]; Bradbury Decl. at 2:22-24, 3:7-9, 

3:22-24, Ex. B [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01431], Ex. D. [Second Level Response to 

PBSP-16-01584]; Royal Decl. at 5:22-24, Ex. D [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01757]. 

These approvals were given only after the Appeals Coordinators reviewed all submitted and 

relevant documents and information for each of Plaintiff’s allegations. See Sheldon Decl. at 2:11-

24, 3:4-8, Ex. A [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01431], Ex. B [Second Level Response to 

PBSP-16-01584]; Royal Decl. at 5:20-22, Ex. D [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01757]; 

Bradbury Decl., Ex. F [Second Level Response to PBSP-16-01757].

As against Defendant Higgerson, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Higgerson’s 

administrative involvement into the first level grievance response to PBSP-16-01584 should have 

led to the discovery of actual knowledge indicating Facility A staff’s retaliatory intent in 

Plaintiff’s housing placement into A2-105. Dkt. 10 at 4-5. Defendant Higgerson was assigned to 

conduct the interview of Plaintiff and the first level inquiry to PBSP-16-01584, and Defendant 

Higgerson based his recommended response on information obtained through interviews with 

Plaintiff and pertinent key witnesses, a visual inspection of A2-105, and his review of the work 

order logs for that cell. Higgerson Decl. at 2:12-16, 3:2-4:8; Sheldon Decl., Ex. B [Second Level 

Response to PBSP-16-01584]. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hodges and Voong, who work for the OOA in 

Sacramento, relate to their alleged retaliatory denial of his grievances at the third level of appeal. 

Dkt. 10 at 6. Defendant Hodges was not involved in the Pelican Bay’s housing operations and had 

no authority to conduct Plaintiff’s cellmate assignments or bed moves. Hodges Decl. at 3:19-26. 

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Defendant Hodges’ involvement is only in a retrospective administrative capacity as an Appeals 

Examiner (and an episodic designated equivalent of Defendant Voong), and her third level

examination of PBSP-16 01431, and her review and approval of the third level response to PBSP16-01584, included considerations of the findings and recommendations of all levels of review, 

relevant statutory and regulatory authority, departmental operations, and other facts relevant to 

Plaintiffs’ grievances. See Hodges Decl. at 3:8-10, Ex. A [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-

01431], Ex. B [Third Level Response to PBSP-16-01584]; Ramos Decl., Ex. D [Third Level 

Response to PBSP-16-01431]. Meanwhile, it is undisputed that Defendant Voong did not 

personally review or approve the third level responses to the grievances at issue, as the record 

shows that Defendant Voong designated other OOA staff to approve and sign those third level 

responses on his behalf. See Voong Decl. at 3:2-4. 

Defendants argue that their involvement in the review and resolution of inmate grievances, 

without more, is not actionable under section 1983. Dkt. 30 at 25-28 (citing Shallowhorn v. 

Molina, 572 Fed. Appx. 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (claims against defendants involved in appeals 

process properly dismissed because “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a 

specific grievance procedure”); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (same)). 

However, during its initial review of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court determined that Plaintiff had 

stated a cognizable claim by alleging that Defendants’ denials of his appeals violated his rights 

under the First Amendment because they had the authority to remedy the alleged violations but 

failed to do so. Dkt. 11 at 2.

However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact relating to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against 

Defendants Olson, Bradbury, Higgerson, Hodges, and Voong based on their individual actions. 

These Defendants’ involvement was in reviewing Plaintiff’s grievances related to his retaliation 

claim, and as the explained above, the Court has already found that Plaintiff has failed to produce 

specific evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to his aforementioned 

retaliation claims: (1) against Defendants Schrag, Wilcox, and Buchanan for allegedly moving him 

to cell A2-105 as punishment for filing PBSP-16-01431; and (2) against Defendant Toussaint for 

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his alleged refusal to process Plaintiff’s July 17, 2016 Form 22 directly to the warden. Therefore, 

it follows that Plaintiff has also failed to produce specific evidence to show that a genuine issue of 

material fact exists as to his retaliation claim against Defendants Olson, Bradbury, Higgerson, 

Hodges, and Voong based on their participation in reviewing the related grievances to those 

retaliation claims: PBSP-16-01431, PBSP-16-01584, and PBSP-16-01757. Again, mere 

speculation that these Defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient. See Wood, 753 F.3d at

904.

In sum, none of the aforementioned actions by Defendants Olson, Bradbury, Higgerson, 

Hodges, and Voong would lead a reasonable jury to find that these Defendants’ actions of

reviewing Plaintiff’s grievances violated his First Amendment rights. In opposition, Plaintiff has 

failed to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment. See 

Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, Defendants Olson, Bradbury, Higgerson, Hodges, and 

Voong are entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claim against them based on their 

involvement in the grievance process. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment as to this claim. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s evidence are DENIED as moot. Dkt. 38-1.2

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims,6and 

judgment will be entered in their favor. Dkt. 30.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate as moot all pending motions, including 

Plaintiff’s motion entitled, “Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions/Consideration of 

Addendum/Request for Counsel,”7(dkt. 40), and close the file.

6 The Court’s finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 

on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims obviates the need to address these Defendants’ alternative 

arguments.

7 Plaintiff seems to attempt to raise additional claims in his motion, which are not relevant 

to the claims before the Court. See Dkt. 40 at 3. If Plaintiff wishes to raise these claims, he must 

file a new civil rights action after he exhausts his administrative remedies. 

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4. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 30 and 40.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 23, 2020

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