Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01983/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01983-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Henryk S. Borecki, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Safeguard Security & Communications,

Inc. et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-1983-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Permit Filing of Administrative

Record in Portable Document Format on Compact Disc (Doc. 3) and Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss. (Doc. 6). For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion is granted and

Plaintiff’s motion is dismissed as moot.

BACKGROUND

From March 22, 2006 through July 30, 2010, Plaintiff worked as an Access Control

Officer for Defendant Safeguard Security & Communications, Inc. (“Safeguard”) at the

Landmark Condominium in Phoenix, Arizona. (Doc. 1-1 at 9–12). Safeguard fired Plaintiff

early in the morning on July 30, 2010. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1).

Plaintiff filed for unemployment insurance, and an administrative hearing was held

on October 15, 2010. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16). According to the complaint, at the hearing, Defendants

testified falsely, produced forged documents, and concealed Plaintiff’s annual performance

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reviews, which documented an “exemplary and unblemished” previous record with

Safeguard. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18–19).

The complaint contains two claims for relief. In Claim One, Plaintiff seeks

compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), alleging that Defendants deprived him of his

constitutional rights of Due Process and Equal Protection, his right to a fair hearing, and his

right to unemployment insurance. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 20–21). In Claim Two, he seeks compensation

for “Outrageous and Contumacious Fraud,” alleging that Defendants made statements and

submitted documents at the hearing that they knew were false, that they intended to deceive

the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) at the hearing, that the ALJ was in fact deceived, and

that Defendant was damaged as a result. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 22–26).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6), “[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996).

However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of

truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient

to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

II. Analysis

Defendant’s two claims will be discussed in turn.

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code provides a cause of action for persons who

have been deprived their constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law. Section

1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights” but only provides a cause of action “for

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1

 Plaintiff does not explain in his complaint how his right to state unemployment

benefits gives rise to a § 1983 claim for the depravation of a federal right.

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vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3

(1979).1

 Ordinarily, private actors cannot be liable in § 1983 cases because the “under color

of law” requirement applies only to public officials or others “clothed with the authority of

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (internal quotation omitted). Private actors

may meet the state action requirement, however, when they are “jointly engaged with state

officials in the challenged action.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980) (holding that

a party who bribed a judge was acting under color of state law because the outcome of the

hearing was “the product of a corrupt conspiracy” between the party and the judge).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants testified falsely, produced fabricated

documents, and concealed relevant documents at Plaintiff’s unemployment hearing. (Doc.

1 ¶¶ 20–21). He does not allege that Defendants acted in concert with the administrative law

judge, or that the outcome of the hearing was the product of a conspiracy between the

administrative law judge and the Defendants. He claims that Defendants intended to deceive

the administrative law judge when they presented false testimony, and that the administrative

law judge would not have ruled in Defendants’ favor had he known that their representations

were false. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 22–25). Plaintiff claims that when they testified, Defendants were

“acting under the color of the Arizona Revised Statutes governing the dispensation of

unemployment compensation.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 21). As Defendants note, “[i]t is beyond question

that, when a private party gives testimony in open court in a criminal trial that act is not

performed ‘under color of law.’” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983). Although the

language in Briscoe is specific to criminal trials, the principle is broad—when a private actor

takes action within the framework of a public tribunal, those actions are not taken “under

color of law” merely because the tribunal is legally authorized. Cf. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454

U.S. 312, 324 (1982) (Public defender does not act under color of state law “in exercising

her independent professional judgment in a criminal proceeding”). Plaintiff argues that the

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2

 Indeed, perjury was a crime long before Briscoe was decided. See Briscoe, 460 U.S.

at 339 n.22 (discussing history of “the imposition of criminal liability on persons for

conspiracy to give false evidence”).

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fact that the Arizona legislature has criminalized making false statements during an

employment hearings has “overturn[ed] and displace[d] the common law rule” set forth in

Briscoe. (Doc. 8 at 8, citing A.R.S. § 23-786). Briscoe discusses the common law in

connection with its holding that police officers—who do act under color of law when they

testify at criminal trials—are afforded absolute immunity from suits for damages based on

such testimony. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 336–38. The holding that private actors do not act

under color of law when they testify was based on a statutory interpretation of Section 1983,

and is not disturbed by criminal perjury statutes.2

B. Fraud

“A showing of fraud requires (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality;

(4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the speaker’s intent that

it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer’s

ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth; (8) the right to rely on it; (9) his

consequent and proximate injury.” Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc., 132 Ariz. 498, 500,

647 P.2d 629, 631 (1982). Plaintiff contends that the allegedly false testimony constituted

fraud because Defendants knew it was false and because the administrative law judge relied

on the testimony’s truth when ruling to Plaintiff’s disadvantage. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 22-26). Plaintiff

notes that the elements of fraud require that “the hearer” be deceived, and contends that his

claim may proceed even though the administrative law judge, rather than Plaintiff, was

deceived by the statements, since the administrative law judge was “the hearer” of the false

statements. (Doc. 9 at 10). If Defendants engaged in fraud by deceiving the ALJ, however,

Plaintiff would not merely be required to show that the ALJ relied on the statement but also

show “his consequent and proximate injury.” Echols, 132 Ariz. at 500. Plaintiff does not

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3

 Even if he were to allege that the ALJ was damaged and therefore defrauded, he has

not claimed that he is bringing suit on the ALJ’s behalf.

4

 Plaintiff argues by way of analogy that a person whose bank deposits are improperly

given to an imposter who deceives a bank teller ought to be able to sue the imposter.

Although the depositor in the analogy may have some avenue of recovery, a fraud suit

claiming that the imposter defrauded the depositor would not succeed. (Doc. 9 at 11).

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allege that the ALJ was damaged by relying on the false statement.3

 Plaintiff claims that

Defendants deceived the ALJ, and that Plaintiff was subsequently injured. These facts do not

state a fraud claim.4

Plaintiff claims that Defendants deceived a third party, and that Plaintiff was injured

when the third party relied on the truth of Defendants’ statements. Even if true, these facts

would not state a claim for fraud, and Claim Two is dismissed.

C. Other Matters

Plaintiff has moved for permission to file the administrative record in a digital format.

(Doc. 3). Plaintiff’s claims cannot succeed because he has filed a § 1983 suit against private

parties who were not acting under color of law and because he has failed to allege the

elements of fraud. The Court therefore need not review the administrative record in this case.

Plaintiff’s motion is dismissed as moot.

Defendants have asked the Court to strike references in Plaintiff’s prayer for relief to

antiquated means of resolving disputes, such as trial by personal combat and Elizabethan-era

punishments for forgery. (Doc. 6 at 13). These references may be irrelevant to Plaintiff’s

complaint, but are not “impertinent and scandalous” and need not be struck. FED. R. CIV. P.

12(f). Likewise, Defendants have asked this court to award attorney’s fees, and have included

documentation detailing Plaintiff’s previous challenges, including appeals of the

administrative hearing and state court litigation. (Doc. 7). Although Plaintiff’s complaint is

hereby dismissed, Defendants have not presented “clear and convincing evidence that the

claim or defense constitutes harassment, is groundless and is not made in good faith.” A.R.S.

§ 12-341.01. No attorney’s fees will be awarded. As the successful party, however,

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Defendants will be permitted to recover their costs. A.R.S. § 12-341.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Permit Filing of Administrative Record in Portable

Document Format on Compact Disc (Doc. 3) is dismissed as moot.

2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is granted.

3. Plaintiff will pay Defendants’ costs, but attorney’s fees will not be awarded.

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2012.

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