Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00277/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES ZANATY, and

CYNTHIA ZANATY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:16-CV-0277-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

This case concerns an alleged mishandling of a residential mortgage and an

attempted wrongful foreclosure on Plaintiffs’ home located in Vestavia Hills,

Alabama (Doc. 4-1 at 3 ¶ 5),1and was removed to this court on February 17, 2016,

on the basis of diversity and federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 1-2). Plaintiffs

filed an amended complaint (Doc. 18) on April 14, 2016. This amended pleading

contains 17 separate counts. (See generally Doc. 18). 

Pending before the court is Defendants’Renewed Motion to Dismiss(Doc. 28)

1 All page references to Doc. 4-1 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

FILED

 2016 Nov-09 AM 11:21

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 1 of 29
(the “Motion”) filed on May 11, 2016,

2 which seeks a partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’

case. More specifically, the Motion pertains to Counts One through Twelve and

Fifteen through Seventeen of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc. 28 at 1) and is

supported by a separately filed brief. (Doc. 29). Plaintiffsfiled their opposition (Doc.

31) to the Motion on June 8, 2016. On June 15, 2016, Defendants followed with their

reply. (Doc. 34). Accordingly, the Motion is now under submission, and, for the

reasons explained below, is GRANTED IN PARTand otherwise DENIED. Further,

Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave to replead some claims, but not any of those that are

dismissed with prejudice as a result of Defendants’ Motion. 

II. Standard(s)

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacksthe legalsufficiency of the complaint. See FED.

2 Three Defendants brought the Motion–Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., America’s Servicing

Company, and U.S. Bank, N.A. (Doc. 28 at 1). Because of Plaintiffs’ failure to respond to a show

cause order, on September 23, 2016, the court entered an order that terminated America’s Servicing

Companyand U.S. Bank, N.A. as separatelynamedDefendants and substituted in Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., doing business as America’s Servicing Company as the sole Defendant in the case. (Doc. 35).

Plaintiffs since have implicitly conceded that America’s Servicing Company is simply a doingbusiness-as entity for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., but have contended in a motion that U.S. Bank, N.A.

should be reinstated as an active party in this litigation. (Doc. 36). Defendants’ recent response (Doc.

38) to the court’s show cause order (Doc. 37) on this issue agrees that U.S. Bank, N.A. should be

reinstated as a Defendant as it is the current owner of Plaintiffs’ loan. (Doc. 38 at 2 ¶ 4). Therefore,

Plaintiffs’ Motion To Alter, Amend, or Vacate (Doc. 36) is GRANTED, and the clerk is HEREBY

DIRECTED to reinstate U.S. Bank, N.A. as an active party and “Defendants” within this

memorandum opinion and order shall refer to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., doing business as America’s

Servicing Company (“Wells Fargo/ASC”) and U.S. Bank, N.A. (“U.S. Bank”). 

2

Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 2 of 29
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (6)

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”). The Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide “‘a short and plain statement

of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99,

103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)),

abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007);3

see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (setting forth general

pleading requirements for a complaint including providing “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 

While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8

does not mandate the inclusion of “detailed factual allegations” within a complaint.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.

Ct. at 103). However, at the same time, “it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “[O]nce a claim has been

3 While Plaintiffs’ opposition cites to Twombly and Iqbal, it also incorrectly references the

outdated Rule 12(b)(6) standard that applied before these abrogating decisions. (See, e.g., Doc. 31

at 3 (“A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any

set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1984))). 

3

Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 3 of 29
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the

allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. 

“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to

an entitlement to relief.” Id. (emphasis added). “Under Twombly’s construction of

Rule 8 . . . [a plaintiff’s] complaint [must] ‘nudge[] [any] claims’ . . . ‘across the line

from conceivable to plausible.’ Ibid.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51. 

A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). 

B. Shotgun Pleadings

“The typicalshotgun complaint containsseveral counts, each one incorporating

4

Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 4 of 29
by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situation where most of

the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal

conclusions.” Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305

F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). Another confusing aspect of many shotgun

complaints is the practice of lumping multiple claims and/or multiple defendants

together within the same count or counts. A complaint that contains shotgun

characteristics make it “‘virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are

intended to support which claim(s) for relief’ . . . [and] does not comply with the

standards of Rules 8(a) and 10(b).” LaCroix v. W. Dist. of Kentucky, 627 F. App’x

816, 818 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed sub nom. LaCroix v. U.S. Dist. Court for

W. Dist. of Kentucky, 136 S. Ct. 996, 194 L. Ed. 2d 2 (2016) (quoting Anderson v.

Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)). 

Shotgun pleadings are strongly disfavored by the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g.,

Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 979 & n.54 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“The complaint is a model ‘shotgun’ pleading of the sort this court has been roundly,

repeatedly, and consistently condemning for years, long before this lawsuit was

filed.”), abrogated on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

5

Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 5 of 29
1950-51, and Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974.

4

In fact, if a

defendant faced with a shotgun complaint fails to move for an order requiring

repleader, the Eleventh Circuit has made it clear that the district court, “acting sua

sponte, should . . . str[ike]the plaintiff’s complaint, and the defendant[’s] answer, and

instruct[] plaintiff’s counsel to file a more definite statement.”Anderson v. Dist. Bd.

of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996). 

III. Analysis

A. Preliminary Considerations

Before addressing the specific claims that Defendants challenge in their

4

 Davis footnote 54 gives numerous examples of Eleventh Circuit anti-shotgun references

and states in full:

See, e.g., United States ex el. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.6

(11th Cir. 2006); M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 n.1 (11th

Cir. 2006); Ambrosia Coal and Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1330 n.22

(11th Cir. 2004); Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp.,

305 F.3d 1293, 1296 nn.9-10 (11th Cir. 2002); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075,

1128–34 (11th Cir. 2001); Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001);

BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998);

GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998);

Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); Ibrahimi v. City of

Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162 passim (11th Cir. 1997); Anderson v. Dist. Bd.

of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir. 1996); Beckwith

v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995); Cesnik v.

Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1996); Oladeinde v. City of

Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (11th Cir. 1992); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d

1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991); T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520,

1543-44 n.14 (11th Cir. 1986) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). This list is just a teaser—since

1985 we have explicitly condemned shotgun pleadings upward of fifty times.

Davis, 516 F.3d at 979 n.54.

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Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 6 of 29
Motion, the court addresses some preliminary issues. First, as a general matter, the

courtfindsthat Plaintiffs’ amended complaint violates anti-shotgun as well asseveral

other fundamental pleading principles. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring

complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief”); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1) (“Each allegation must be

simple, concise, and direct.”). 

Consequently, in repleading, Plaintiffs’ counsel muststudy the Davis decision

and the numerous cases cited therein and draft a much more definite and

comprehendible pleading. Plaintiffs’ claims against each Defendant must be set forth

in separately numbered counts. Further, Plaintiffs’ restated pleading must include

only plausibly stated claims and avoid lumping any causes of action together within

the same count. 

Second, in deciding this Motion, Plaintiffs have objected to the court’s

consideration of “an endorsed note and an assignment” on the basis that Plaintiffs

dispute the authenticity of those specific records. (Doc. 31 at 3 n.3); cf. also

Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (When

deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “[a] court may consider only the complaint itself and

any documents referred to in the complaint which are central to the claims. (citing

Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.

7

Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 7 of 29
1997) (per curiam))). Because those objected-to documents are not pivotal to the

court’s Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, Plaintiffs’ concern about their authenticity is, at least

at this stage, TERMED as MOOT.

B. Counts One and Two–Negligence and Wantonness

Count One asserts that Defendants negligently serviced Plaintiffs’ loan and

Count Two alleges wantonnessin servicing. In any negligence action, Plaintiffs must

show the prima facie elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. See,

e.g., Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 2002) (listing prima facie

elements of negligence); DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., 988 So. 2d

454, 460 (Ala. 2008) (same). 

“To establish wantonness, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with

reckless indifference to the consequences, consciously and intentionally did some

wrongful act or omitted some known duty.” Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567

(Ala. 1994). Further, “[t]o be actionable, that act or omission must proximately cause

the injury of which the plaintiff complains.” Id. (citing Smith v. Davis, 599 So. 2d 586

(Ala. 1992)).

Citing to several cases, Defendants contend that these counts are implausible

because Alabama law does not recognize tort claims when the breach of duty is

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Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 8 of 29
premised upon a contractual agreement. (Doc. 29 at 5-6).5

In Vines v. Crescent

Transit Co., 85 So. 2d 436 (Ala. 1955), the Supreme Court of Alabama observed that:

[A] negligent failure to perform a contract express or implied . . . is but

a breach of the contract. But if in performing it, it is alleged that

defendant negligently caused personal injury or property damage to

plaintiff, the remedy is in tort, for it is not the breach of a contract

express or implied, but the breach of an implied duty to exercise due

care not to injure plaintiff or her property which is the gravamen of the

action.

Id. at 440 (emphasis by underlining added); see also Barber v. Bus. Prod. Ctr., Inc.,

677 So. 2d 223, 228 (Ala. 1996), overruled on other grounds by White Sands Grp.,

L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 2009) (“However, a mere failure to perform

a contractual obligation is not a tort.”).

Relying upon the Alabama common-law principles articulated in Vines,

Barber, and other cases, the district court in Blake v. Bank of America, N.A., 845 F.

Supp. 2d 1206 (M.D. Ala. 2012), “found that Alabama law would not recognize a tort

claim for negligent or wanton mortgage servicing.” Barnett v. JP Morgan Chase

Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 1:12-CV-1745-VEH, 2013 WL 3242739, at *11 (N.D. Ala.

June 26, 2013); see also James v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1190,

1199-1200 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (collecting federal cases holding that Alabama law does

not recognize claims for negligent or wanton mortgage servicing and rejecting such

5

 All page references to Doc. 29 correspond with the court’s CM/ECF numbering system.

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Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 9 of 29
claims). 

This court, persuaded by Blake, has similarly found these contract-driven

servicing claims to be implausible tort theories under Alabama law. Barnett, 2013

WL 3242739, at *11; see Vines, 85 So. 2d at 439 (“The fact that [the applicable

contract]was negligently breached does not affect the nature of the cause of action.”).

Further, since Barnett, the Alabama Supreme Court has expressly clarified that a

wanton servicing claim is not cognizable under Alabama law. See U.S. Bank Nat.

Ass’n v. Shepherd, No. 1140376, 2015 WL 7356384, at *13 (Ala. Nov. 20, 2015)

(“The James [district] court has correctly stated Alabama law as it applies to claims

alleging that lenders have acted wantonly with regard to servicing and handling

mortgages.”) (emphasis added). Finally, nothing in Plaintiffs’ opposition persuades

this court that Barnett and similar authorities were wrongly decided. Therefore, the

Motion is GRANTED as to Counts One and Two and those claims are HEREBY

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

C. Count Three–Unjust Enrichment

Count Three asserts unjust enrichment on the basis that Plaintiffs “have been

forced to pay charges that were illegal, wrong in character, wrong in amount,

unauthorized, or otherwise improper under threat of foreclosure . . . .” (Doc. 18 at 10

¶ 39). As the Supreme Court of Alabama has explained this equitable doctrine:

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Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 10 of 29
To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that

the “‘defendant holds money which, in equity and good conscience,

belongs to the plaintiff or holds money which was improperly paid to

defendant because of mistake or fraud.’” Dickinson v. Cosmos Broad.

Co., 782 So. 2d 260, 266 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Hancock–Hazlett Gen.

Constr. Co. v. Trane Co., 499 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Ala. 1986)) (some

emphasis omitted; some emphasis added). “The doctrine of unjust

enrichment is an old equitable remedy permitting the court in equity and

good conscience to disallow one to be unjustly enriched at the expense

of another.” Battles v. Atchison, 545 So. 2d 814, 815 (Ala. Civ. App.

1989) (emphasis added).

Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So. 2d 1111, 1122-23 (Ala. 2003)

(emphasis by underlining added).

In moving to dismissthis equitable claim, Defendants rely primarily upon Fed.

Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Anchrum, No. 2:14-CV-02129-AKK, 2015 WL

2452775 (N.D. Ala. May 22, 2015). Anchrum is factually dissimilar from this case

because the mortgage foreclosure sale at issue there was not merely threatened, but

actually occurred. 2015 WL 2452775, at *2; see id., 2015 WL 2452775, at *6 (“To

the extent the Anchrums argued that Wells Fargo and/or Freddie Mac received the

full market value of their home through a wrongful foreclosure, this raises claims for

breach of contract or wrongful foreclosure, not unjust enrichment.”). Therefore, the

court disagrees with Defendants that Anchrum directly supports a dismissal of this

claim. 

The court also rejects Defendants’ efforts to show that Plaintiffs’ unjust

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enrichment claim is barred by the existence of their loan documents–i.e., the note and

mortgage. AsAnchrumpoints out, the mere mentioning of this proposition byPattans

Ventures. Inc. v. Williams, 959 So. 2d 115, 117 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) in a

footnote “is arguably only dicta.” Anchrum, 2015 WL 2452775, at *5. Further

Defendants have not persuaded the court that “a claim for unjust enrichment is

necessarily predicated on an implied contract theory.” Id.

At the same time, the court agrees with Defendants that this part of Plaintiffs’

complaint is insufficiently alleged. For example, “[Plaintiffs] do not allege . . . that

they were tricked or defrauded into paying any amounts . . . .” Id. at *6 (emphasis

added). Additionally, Plaintiffs need to provide more detail about the amounts and

timing of the alleged improper fees and other charges that they claim Defendants

received from them that were not due under the note and mortgage during the

pendency of the threatened foreclosure. Cf. id. (“That they made payments they were

contractually obligated to make is hardly an unjust enrichment of Wells Fargo.”).

Importantly, if Defendants derived no actual financial benefit from Plaintiffs beyond

what was contractually due to be paid under the terms of the note and mortgage, then

no plausible claim for unjust enrichment will lie. Therefore, the Motion is

GRANTED as to Count Three with leave for Plaintiffs to replead their unjust

enrichment claim in a non-shotgun manner that also satisfies the Twiqbal standard.

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Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 12 of 29
D. Count Four–Wrongful Foreclosure

The parties agree that no foreclosure hastaken place and that Plaintiffs are still

residing in their Vestavia Hills home. The Supreme Court of Alabama has explained

that “[a] mortgagor has a wrongful foreclosure action whenever a mortgagee usesthe

power of sale given under a mortgage for a purpose other than to secure the debt

owed by the mortgagor.” Reeves Cedarhurst Dev. Corp. v. First Am. Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass’n, 607 So. 2d 180, 182 (Ala. 1992). Courts interpreting Alabama law

consistently have held that, unless a foreclosure sale actually occurs, the power of

sale has not been exercised, and a claim based only on pre-sale proceedings cannot

satisfy the Reeves standard. See, e.g., Hardy v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., No. CIV. A.

06-0687-WS-B, 2007 WL 174391, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 18, 2007) (“[T]he clear

weight of authority from other jurisdictions is that wrongful foreclosure actions are

not recognized unless a foreclosure actually takes place.”); see also McKinley v.

Lamar Bank, 919 So. 2d 918, 930 (Miss. 2005) ( “There was no wrongful foreclosure

because there was never a foreclosure at all.”); Reese v. First Missouri Bank and

Trust Co. of Creve Coeur, 736 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Mo. 1987) (reporting that only three

of the 29 jurisdictionsin the United States permitting nonjudicialforeclosure through

power of sale have found actionable a lender’s attempted foreclosure that does not

result in a sale).

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In the absence of any Alabama authority to the contrary, the court is

persuasively guided by the reasoning in Hardy, Reeves, and McKinley, and findsthat

Plaintiffs’ wrongful foreclosure count does not state a claim upon which relief can

plausibly be granted under the allegations of their case. Accordingly, the Motion is

GRANTED on wrongful foreclosure and Count Four is HEREBY DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

E. Count Five–Slander of Title

To establish a claim for slander of title, Plaintiffs must show:

(1) Ownership of the property by plaintiff; (2) falsity of the words

published;(3) malice of defendant in publishing the false statements;(4)

publication to some person other than the owner; (5) the publication

must be in disparagement of plaintiff’s property or the title thereof; and

(6) that special damages were the proximate result of such publication

(setting them out in detail).

Merchants Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Steiner, 404 So. 2d 14, 21 (Ala. 1981). Plaintiffs

premise their slander of title claim on Defendants’ threatened foreclosure. (See Doc.

18 at 11 ¶ 46 (“Defendant, in attempting foreclosure has caused a cloud to be placed

on the title of the property of the Plaintiff.”)). 

To the extent that a threatened foreclosure can support a slander of title claim

under Alabama law,6 Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged this count. For example,

6

 Defendants hint that such a claim is not cognizable, but cite to no supporting authority. 

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Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 14 of 29
Plaintiffs do not claim special damages or assert factsthat could conceivably support

that element. See Ebersole v. Fields, 62 So. 73, 75 (Ala. 1913) (“The nature and

essential effect of the special damage suffered, if the action is maintainable, isthat the

false and malicious matter charged interrupted, or injuriously affected, some dealing

of the plaintiff with his property, or naturally, reasonably, and proximately

superinduced the necessity for his pecuniary expenditure . . . .”). Similarly, they

neither have claimed maliciousness on the part of Defendants nor alleged facts that

establish the existence of that element. Therefore, the Motion is GRANTED as to

Count Five with leave for Plaintiffs to replead their slander of title claim in a nonshotgun and Twiqbal-satisfying format.

F. Count Six–Breach of Contract

To establish a breach of contract, Plaintiffs must show:

(1) a valid contract binding the parties; (2) the plaintiffs’ performance

under the contract; (3) the defendant’s nonperformance; and (4)

resulting damages.

Reynolds Metals Co. v. Hill, 825 So. 2d 100, 105 (Ala. 2002) (citing State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 303 (Ala.1999)). Plaintiffs’ shotgun complaint

purports to bring this claim collectively against Defendants for misapplying or

misplacing mortgage payments made by Plaintiffs and failing to provide them with

proper notices of default and acceleration. (Doc. 18 at 11-12 ¶¶ 52-54). Plaintiffs

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have not plausibly asserted this claimagainstWells Fargo/ASC because they have not

alleged the existence of a valid contract with that entity. Instead, they have only

identified Wells Fargo/ASC as the mortgage servicing company.

At least one court has dismissed a breach of contract claim brought against a

mortgage servicing company under circumstances similar to Plaintiffs’ allegations

here and this court finds that authority to be persuasive. See Webb v. Ocwen Loan

Servicing, LLC, No. CIV. A. 11-00732-KD-M, 2012 WL 5906729, at *8 (S.D. Ala.

Nov. 26, 2012) (granting summary judgment on breach of contract claim brought

against loan service provider). As the court explained its reasoning in Webb:

Webb must first establish the existence of a valid contract with Ocwen.

The parties do not dispute the absence of a contract between Webb and

Ocwen. Webb relies upon a theory of agency under Alabama law based

in part on Ocwen’s alleged failure to disclose to Webb that it was acting

as Freddie Mac’s agent by servicing the mortgage. However, the

Alabama cases cited by Webb involve the circumstance where the agent

entered into a contract on behalf of an undisclosed principal. Under that

theory, Ocwen could be liable only if it had entered into the mortgage

on behalf of Freddie Mac. That did not occur. Webb also argues that

Ocwen stepped into Freddie Mac’s position upon assignment of the

mortgage. However, Webb’s mortgage was assigned to Ocwen on June

29, 2010, after the conduct creating the alleged breach had occurred.

Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Ocwen as to

Webb’s claim for breach of the mortgage agreement.

2012 WL 5906729, at *8 (emphasis by underlining added). 

Akin to Webb, Plaintiffs seek to impose contractual liability against Wells

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Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 16 of 29
Fargo/ASC even though there is no allegation that Plaintiffs ever had a valid contract

with that Defendant. Further, Plaintiffs offer no alternative theory why Wells

Fargo/ASC could plausibly be contractually liable to them under Alabama law in the

absence of an express contract. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED on breach of

contract and Count Six isHEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICEto the extent

it is brought against Wells Fargo/ASC in its role as a mortgage servicing company.

To the extent that Plaintiffs are pursuing a breach of contract claim against an entity

or entities that loaned them money or have ever held their mortgage during a period

of time when an alleged breach occurred, the Motion is GRANTED as to Count Six

with leave for Plaintiffs to replead that specific breach of contract claim in a nonshotgun and Twiqbal-satisfying format.

G. Count Seven–Fraud

Plaintiffs assert a bare-boned fraud claim against “ALL DEFENDANTS” on

the basisthat “Defendant misrepresented that the loan wasin default.” (Doc. 18 at 13

¶ 57). Plaintiffs’ vaguely-worded allegations of fraud are entirely lacking under FED.

R. CIV. P. 8 and, more importantly, FED. R. CIV. P. 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In

alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake.”). Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Count

Seven with leave for Plaintiffs to replead their fraud claim in a non-shotgun format

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Case 2:16-cv-00277-VEH Document 39 Filed 11/09/16 Page 17 of 29
that simultaneously satisfies Twiqbal and the requirements of Rule 8 and Rule 9.

H. Count Eight–False Light 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ oral and written negative and untrue credit

remarks about their loan unreasonably placed them in a false light. (Doc. 18 at 14 ¶¶

61, 64). Plaintiffs do not expressly allege to whom Defendants made these false-light

communications, but the implication is that these negative comments were reported

to credit agencies or bureaus. 

As Defendants correctly point out, the undersigned has previously held in

Barnett that 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)

preempts “defamation, libel, or slander claims . . . that arises out of any false reports

made to credit agencies.” 2013 WL 3242739, at *13. Further, nothing in Plaintiffs’

opposition persuades this court that Barnett and similar authorities were wrongly

decided. Therefore, because Plaintiffs’false light claim is akin to one for defamation,

the Motion is GRANTED as to Count Eight and Plaintiffs’ false light claim for

inaccurate reports made to credit agencies or bureaus is HEREBY DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE as preempted by the FCRA. 

I. Count Nine–Defamation, Libel, and Slander 

For the same rationale relied upon in dismissing Count Eight, the Motion is

GRANTED as to Count Nine and Plaintiffs’ defamation, libel, and slander claim for

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inaccurate reports made to credit agencies or bureaus is HEREBY DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE as preempted by the FCRA. 

J. Count Ten–Truth in Lending Act 

Plaintiffs maintain that Wells Fargo/ASC violated the Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”) by failing to provide them with certain statutorily-required notices. (Doc.

18 at 17-18 ¶ 85). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ TILA count is time-barred and

further that Wells Fargo/ASC cannot be liable under TILA because it never extended

any credit to Plaintiffs.

Turning to Defendants’ statute of limitations contention first, 15 U.S.C. §

1640(e) provides that:

Except as provided in the subsequent sentence, any action under this

section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any

other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of

the occurrence of the violation or, in the case of a violation involving a

private education loan (as that term is defined in section 1650(a) of this

title), 1 year from the date on which the first regular payment of

principal is due under the loan. Any action under this section with

respect to any violation of section 1639, 1639b, or 1639c of this title

may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court

of competent jurisdiction, before the end of the 3-year period beginning

on the date of the occurrence of the violation.

15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (emphasis added). None of the disclosure violations mentioned

by Plaintiffs in Count Ten invoke § 1639, § 1639b, or § 1639c so the alternative 3-

year statute of limitations period is not triggered.

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Further, Plaintiffs’ underlying mortgage documents reflect that they closed on

their loan with AmSouth Bank on September 23, 2005. (Doc. 29-1 at 1). Therefore,

to the extent that certain TILA-mandated disclosures were not provided to Plaintiffs

at the onset of the loan, their time to sue for those violations expired on September

23, 2006, or shortly thereafter. 

While equitable tolling can sometimes operate to save an otherwise stale TILA

claim under § 1640(e), see Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 708

(11th Cir. 1998) (“We therefore agree with the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits that

the statute of limitations in TILA is subject to equitable tolling.”), Plaintiffs have not

mentioned equitable tolling in their complaint or their opposition to Defendants’

Motion or explained why that exception, e.g., some affirmative act of deception on

the part of Wells Fargo/ASC, should apply to their facts. Indeed, in their opposition

to the Motion, Plaintiffs do not even acknowledge that the Motion seeksto have their

TILA claim dismissed on untimeliness grounds. Therefore, Plaintiffs have, through

this significant omission, implicitly conceded that their TILA claim is, indeed, timebarred.

Alternatively, Defendants contend that Wells Fargo/ASC cannot be liable for

any disclosure violations because it does not qualify as a creditor under TILA and

therefore cannot be liable under § 1640. As defined in § 1602(g):

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The term “creditor” refers only to a person who both (1) regularly

extends, whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services,

or otherwise, consumer credit which is payable by agreement in more

than four installments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or

may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from the

consumer credit transaction is initially payable on the face of the

evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such evidence of

indebtedness, by agreement. 

15 U.S.C. § 1602(g).

Nowhere do Plaintiffs assert that Wells Fargo/ASC ever extended credit to

them or loaned them money. Instead, Plaintiffs affirmatively allege in their amended

complaint that AmSouth Bank wastheir creditor when the loan originated. (See Doc.

18 at 2-3 ¶ 5 (“[O]n September 30, 2005[,] the Zanatys refinanced their property with

AmSouth Bank and received and executed a mortgage and also signed a promissory

note with AmSouth Bank.”)). Further, Plaintiffs entirely fail to respond to this

alternative argument when opposing the Motion.

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Count Ten and Plaintiffs’ TILA

claim asserted against Wells Fargo/ASC is HEREBY DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

K. Count Eleven–Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 

Plaintiffs maintain that Wells Fargo/ASC violated the Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act (“RESPA”) “by failing to acknowledge or respond to Zanaty’s

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Qualified Written Request (QWR).” (Doc. 18 at 19 ¶ 91). Defendants acknowledge

that such a claim is cognizable under 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e). 

Nonetheless, they maintain that Plaintiffs have not plausibly supported that

claimby either attaching the QWRs upon which they rely or alleging factsthatsatisfy

the content-based requirements of § 2605(e)(1)(B). See Patrick v. CitiFinancial

Corp., LLC, No. 3:15CV296-WHA, 2015 WL 3988860, at *3 (M.D. Ala. June 30,

2015) (“Courts have concluded that if plaintiffs do not attach a QWR to the

complaint, they should plead facts which show that their written request included the

information required by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B).” (citing Tallent v. BAC Home

Loans, No. 12CV3719, 2013 WL 2249107, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 21, 2013))). This

court is persuaded by Patrick, Tallent, and other cases which require a plaintiff to

substantiate the validity of a QWR’s contents as part of his complaint.

Defendants also attack Plaintiffs’ RESPA claim for inadequately pleading

damages. Concerning damages and costs, RESPA provides that individuals may

recover:

(A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure; and

(B) any additional damages, as the court may allow, in the case of a

pattern or practice of noncompliance with the requirements of this

section, in an amount not to exceed $2,000.

12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1).

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Plaintiffs’ allegations of damages attributable toRESPA are cast in generalized

terms and do not assert any actual damages that were caused by the alleged QWR

violations. (See Doc. 18 at 19 ¶ 92 (“Because of said violations of said acts, the

Zanatys were damaged because they were not informed of the information regarding

their loan.”)).

Therefore, the court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ RESPA claim for

QWR violations is pleaded inadequately. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as

to Count Eleven with leave for Plaintiffs to replead their RESPA claim, including

their allegation of damages, in a non-shotgun and Twiqbal-satisfying format.

L. Count Twelve–FCRA 

Plaintiffs’ Count Twelve appears to assert two different types of potential

FCRA violations against Wells Fargo/ASC–one for making inaccurate reports to

credit reporting agencies (15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)) and the other for failing to

investigate and promptly respond to Plaintiffs’ notices of dispute (15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(b)). At the same time, Plaintiffs’ complaint contains no references to the specific

provision(s) of the FCRA under which they are pursuing relief.

An unpublished panel of the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]he FCRA . . .

does not provide a private right of action to redress. . . a violation [of § 1681s–2(a)],”

because “[e]nforcement of this provision is limited to federal agencies, federal

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officials, and state officials.” Green v. RBS Nat. Bank, 288 F. App’x 641, 642 & n.2

(11th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs do not dispute the validity of the § 1681s–2(a) holding in

Green.

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Count Twelve and any FCRA

claim premised upon 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) is HEREBY DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. Further, Plaintiffs are given leave to replead their FCRA claim in a

non-shotgun and Twiqbal-satisfying format, including a specific reference to which

statutory provision(s) (other than § 1681s-2(a)) that Plaintiffs maintain Wells

Fargo/ASC has violated.

M. Count Fifteen–Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

Count Fifteen asserts a claim arising under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act

(“ECOA”) against Wells Fargo/ASC. Section 1691(a)(1) of the ECOA makes it

“unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any

aspect of a credit transaction–(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,

sex or maritalstatus, or age . . . [.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). Relying upon the 12(b)(6)

district court reversal in Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir.

2013), Plaintiffs more specifically maintain that Wells Fargo/ASC violated §

1691(d)(2) because Plaintiffssuffered an “adverse action” concerning the termination

of their loan modification agreement (Doc. 18 at 27 ¶ 122), but were never provided

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“a statement of reasons for such action . . . .” 15 U.S.C. Section 1691(d)(2). As

Plaintiffs point out, several courts have held that the statement of reasons provision

can be violated even in the absence of a substantive discrimination claim. See, e.g.,

Costa v. Mauro Chevrolet, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 720, 728 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Without

regard to allegations of discrimination, a creditor’s failure to provide a written

rejection notice is actionable under the ECOA.”); see id. at 728-29 (collection of

cases cited therein that stand for same general proposition). 

In theirMotion,Defendants acknowledge Schlegel, butmaintain that Plaintiffs’

case is more comparable to Gomez v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No.

3:14-CV-04004-CRB, 2015 WL 433669 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015), because Plaintiffs

were in default when the acceleration letter was sent to them and, therefore, no

cognizable adverse action within the scope of the ECOA occurred. See 15 U.S.C. §

1691(d)(6) (clarifying that “[s]uch term[, i.e., adverse action,] does not include a

refusal to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement where the

applicant is delinquent or otherwise in default, or where such additional credit would

exceed a previously established credit limit”). Defendants also note several other

casesthat generally observe the same § 1691(d)(6) proposition, but do not discuss any

facts of those decisions. (Doc. 29 at 26 n.14). 

Further, in advancing their argument, Defendants fail to acknowledge that the

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Gomez court dismissed the ECOA claim before it because the plaintiff did not make

any debt-modification allegations and, therefore, “ha[d] not sufficiently alleged that

he [wa]s an ‘applicant’ within the plain meaning of the ECOA and c[ould not]invoke

the protections of the Act.” 2015 WL 433669, at *4. Here, Plaintiffs have expressly

tied their ECOA claim to the revocation of a purported loan modification agreement.

(Doc. 18 at 27 ¶ 122). This means that Plaintiffs’ case is not closer to Gomez, as

Defendants contend. 

Having considered both sides’ positions and in the absence of any on-point

controlling authority, the court concludes that the viability vel non of Plaintiffs’

ECOA claim is better dealt with on a more developed record that establishes a

timeline of key events regarding the status of Plaintiffs’ residential loan and any

application to restructure that debt as well as clarifies the extent to which any aspect

of that timeline is materially disputed. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED with

respect to Count Fifteen.

N. Count Sixteen–Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Count Sixteen of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint seeks to impose liability

against all Defendants for violating an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing

concerning the handling of their mortgage and their application for a loan

modification. (Doc. 18 at 29 ¶¶ 127, 128). Defendants contend that this type of claim

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is not cognizable outside of the insurance context. (Doc. 29 at 27).

In Lake Martin/Alabama Power Licensee Ass’n, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co.,

601 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 1992), the Supreme Court of Alabama explained: 

This Court has explicitly held that there is no good faith contractual

cause of action, Tanner v. Church's Fried Chicken, supra; Government

Street Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank, supra; that means that bad faith is

not actionable absent an identifiable breach in the performance of

specific terms of the contract. There is no identifiable breach in the

performance of the specific terms of the license agreement by Alabama

Power; and there is no contractual cause of action for breach of an

implied duty of good faith that nebulously hovers over the contracting

parties, free from the specific terms of the contract.

Lake Martin, 601 So. 2d at 945 (emphasis added); accord Kennedy Elec. Co., Inc. v.

Moore-Handley, Inc., 437 So. 2d 76, 81 (Ala. 1983) (“The plaintiff argues that this

court should extend to the area of general contract law the tort of bad faith that has

already been recognized in the context of insurance policy cases.” (citing Prudential

Insurance Co. of Am. v. Coleman, 428 So. 2d 593 (Ala.1983))); Kennedy, 437 So. 2d

at 81 (“Although every contract doesimply good faith and fair dealing (see § 7-1-203,

Code 1975), it does not carry with it the duty imposed by law which we have found

in the context of insurance cases.”) (emphasis added); Kennedy, 437 So. 2d at 81

(“We are not prepared to extend the tort of bad faith beyond the area of insurance

policy cases at this time.” (citing Brown-Marx Associates, Ltd. v. Emigrant Savings

Bank, 527 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Ala. 1981))). 

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Moreover,Plaintiffs have not provided anycountervailing controlling Alabama

authority that confirms their ability to assert a claim for implied breach of good faith

and fair dealing in the context of lender liability under Alabama law. Therefore,

Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED asto Count Sixteen and Plaintiffs’ good faith and

fair dealing claim is HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

O. Count Seventeen–Declaratory Relief

The last count of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint asserts a claim for declaratory

relief in the form of an order that would preclude Defendants from foreclosing on

their home. (Doc. 18 at 30 ¶ 131). Defendants contend in their Motion that this

equitable count should be dismissed because of Plaintiffs’ “failure to do

equity”–come to the court with clean hands by curing their defaulted status under

their residential loan. (Doc. 29 at 28). While Defendants cite to three cases that

generally support this commonly understood equitable principle, they do not delve

into any comparison of Plaintiffs’ case with the allegations or procedural postures of

those decisions. Further, this court is not inclined to dismiss this declarative count on

such an underdeveloped record.Cf. McCulley v. Countrywide Homes Loans, Inc., No.

CIV. A. 12-0359-CG-C, 2013 WL 3187995, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 21, 2013) (cited by

Defendants) (claim for declaratory relief dismissed on a summary judgment record).

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED with respect to Count Seventeen.

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IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the Motion is GRANTED IN

PART and otherwise is DENIED. Further, Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Six (as

brought against Wells Fargo/ASC in its capacity as a mortgage servicing entity),

Eight, Nine, Ten, Twelve (to the extent premised upon 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)), and

Sixteen are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and are no longer a part

of this action. Plaintiffs’ deadline to replead their complaint in a manner that fully

complies with Rule 8, asserts only plausible and non-shotgun claims, and comports

with the court’s other repleader requirements is no later than 5:00 p.m. on

December 2, 2016. Finally, consistent with footnote 2 above, Doc. 36 is GRANTED

and the clerk is HEREBY DIRECTED to reinstate U.S. Bank, N.A. as a Defendant. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 9th day of November, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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