Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04131/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04131-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

 James Lee Stewart, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

Leland Stanford Junior University, and

Julie Hardin-Stauter, and Does 1 through

100, inclusive,

Defendant(s).

 /

NO. C 05-04131 JW 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH

PREJUDICE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James Lee Stewart (“Plaintiff”) initiated this suit against Defendant Stanford

University (“Stanford”) and Julie Hardin-Stauter (collectively “Defendants”), alleging (1) wrongful

termination against both Defendants; (2) breach of contract against Stanford; and (3) breach of

implied contract against Stanford. Defendants removed the instant action to this Court, as Plaintiff’s

suit is governed by the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185) (“LMRA”). Presently

before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) for preemption and for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. This Motion was heard before the Court on March 20,

2006. Upon consideration of the briefs filed to date and the oral arguments of counsel, the Court

GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. 

Case 5:05-cv-04131-JW Document 31 Filed 04/05/06 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant Stanford, where he worked as a painter from

November of 1997 through his termination in October of 2004. Defendant Hardin-Stauter was

Plaintiff’s supervisor during his employment at Stanford. (Compl., ¶¶ 12-15.) 

Plaintiff’s employment was governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”),

entered into between United Stanford Workers Local 715, S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO (“Union”) and

Defendant Stanford. (Compl., ¶¶ 6, 10.) Plaintiff acknowledges that the CBA designated Plaintiff’s

position as being within the collective bargaining unit, and Plaintiff’s membership with the Union

was a condition precedent to his employment by Defendant Stanford. (Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, hereinafter “Opp’n,” Docket Item No. 16, at 2:13-14.) The CBA

defines the terms of Plaintiff’s employment, and establishes procedures for the evaluation of his job

performance, discipline, and termination. The CBA provisions relevant to this matter are as follows:

C. Grievances and Arbitration

Paragraph 12

The purpose of the procedure set forth below is to provide the University and the

Union with an orderly means of resolving disputes which may arise between them.

Paragraph 13

The Union agrees that this [grievances and arbitration] procedure shall be in lieu

of any other formal procedure established by the University for the resolution of

grievances and shall be the exclusive means for the resolution of workers’ and

Union grievances or claims against the University.

Paragraph 15

A grievance is a claim by a worker against the University concerning the worker’s

wages, hours, working conditions, or any other conditions of employment and

involving the interpretation or application of this Agreement.... The term

“grievance” does not include any claim or dispute concerning an action or inaction

by one or more other workers.

Paragraph 40

A worker shall have the right at all Steps specified in the grievance and arbitration

procedure to have the assistance of up to two representatives of the Union (the

steward designated by the Union for the Grievant’s unit pursuant to I.E., a Union

office or the worksite organizer.

Case 5:05-cv-04131-JW Document 31 Filed 04/05/06 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 A court may consider the text of a collective bargaining agreement in ruling on a motion for

failure to state a claim where, as here, the collective bargaining agreement is referred to in the

complaint and its authenticity is not at issue. Stone v. Writer's Guild of America West, Inc., 101

F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996).

3

(emphasis added) (Declaration of Melissa Burke in Support of Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, hereinafter “Burke Declaration,” Docket Item No. 6-2.)1

On July 1, 2004, Defendant Stanford issued Plaintiff a warning letter and suspended him

from employment for overuse of sick leave, slow work pace, and excessive break time. (Compl. at

¶¶ 15-16.) On August 18, 2004, Defendant Stanford issued Plaintiff a second warning letter based

on failure to color match door stains. (Id. at ¶ 18.) On September 20, 2004, Defendant Stanford

issued Plaintiff a final warning for excessive time to perform work. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Defendant

Stanford terminated Plaintiff’s employment on October 1, 2004. (Id. at ¶ 19-20). 

Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants on June 21, 2005 in the Superior Court

of the State of California in and for the County of Santa Clara, claiming (1) wrongful termination

against both Defendants; (2) breach of contract against Stanford; and (3) breach of implied contract

against Stanford. (Compl. at 4:6, 6:14, 9:10.) Defendants removed the instant action to this Court

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b), as this is a suit for an alleged violation of a

contract between an employer and a member of a labor organization, and therefore raises a federal

question under the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185). (Notice of Removal,

Docket Item No. 1, ¶ 3.) 

Defendants subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss for preemption and for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

III. STANDARDS

The strict standard for granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is set forth in Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must not be granted

"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 45-46. As the Ninth Circuit observed, a "motion to dismiss

Case 5:05-cv-04131-JW Document 31 Filed 04/05/06 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Gilligan v. Jamco

Develop. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations or legal

characterizations. Pareto, 139 F.3d at 699. Also, the court need not accept unreasonable inferences

or unwarranted deductions of fact. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.

2001).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Preemption by Labor Management Relations Act 

Plaintiff admits that he was a member of the Union as a condition precedent to employment,

and does not deny that he was subject to the CBA. (Opp’n at 2:9-12.) Further, there is no dispute

between the parties regarding the proper statutory authority and case law that governs conflicts 

under collective bargaining agreements. (Opp’n at 3:6-7.)

Rather than utilizing the grievance procedures set forth in the CBA, Plaintiff brought an

action in Superior Court for the State of California, County of Santa Clara, alleging breach of

contract, breach of implied contract and wrongful termination. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’

actions constituted a breach of the CBA before the grievance and arbitration procedure commenced,

and therefore his suit in a civil court of law is proper. (Opp'n at 11-12.) Defendants contend that

because Plaintiff’s grievances are governed by the terms of the CBA, any remedy must be sought

through exhaustion of the processes outlined in the CBA. (Mem. at 9:19-20.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims will inevitably involve interpretation of the CBA. The

substance of Plaintiff's claims are whether he performed his job satisfactorily and whether Defendant

Stanford gave him adequate notice and opportunity to improve his job performance. These rights

and obligations derive from, and are defined by, the rights and obligations set forth in the CBA,

Case 5:05-cv-04131-JW Document 31 Filed 04/05/06 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

which governed Plaintiff’s employment. 

The body of federal common law authorized under the Labor Management Relations Act,

section 301, 29 U.S.C. S. 185(a) completely preempts state law claims based on a collective

bargaining agreement. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,

23 (1983). The subject of plaintiff's state law breach of contract claims will require interpretation of

terms covered by the CBA. Resolution of plaintiff's wrongful termination state law claim also

requires the Court to construe provisions of the CBA. Plaintiff's Complaint is therefore preempted

by section 301 of the LMRA.

Federal labor policy requires that employees wishing to assert contract grievances must

attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by the parties. Republic Steel Corp. v.

Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for

any grievance he has against Defendant Stanford is the process outlined in his CBA.

B. Wrongful Termination by Defendant Hardin-Stauter

Plaintiff further alleges that his claim against Defendant Hardin-Stauter does not require

interpretation of the CBA because the factual determination has nothing to do with the CBA, and the

grievance procedures of the CBA are not applicable to disputes between fellow employees. (Opp’n

at 4:21-27.) At the hearing, counsel for Plaintiff contended that Defendant Hardin-Stauter carried

out Plaintiff’s termination for personal reasons, in a willful and malicious manner. However, in the

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges no actionable wrong against Defendant Hardin-Stauter, other than that

she executed Defendant Stanford’s termination. Defendant Hardin-Stauter was not Plaintiff’s

employer. At best, she was acting in a role on behalf of Defendant Stanford, who was the mutual

employer of both parties. Accordingly, the claim, as alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, may not be

maintained individually against the supervisor, Defendant Hardin-Stauter.

C. The Grievance and Arbitration Process

Plaintiff contends that paragraph 40, setting up the grievance procedure, is ambiguous, as it

fails to state that “two representatives of the Union shall be the sole representatives of the worker.” 

Case 5:05-cv-04131-JW Document 31 Filed 04/05/06 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

(Opp’n at 3:13-24.) Plaintiff further contends that since the CBA does not provide any prohibition

against a worker’s right to representation by independent legal counsel, Defendants had no

contractual basis to deny Plaintiff such counsel. (Id. at 18-24.) Defendants respond that the CBA

must be read in its entirety and, in doing so, paragraph 40 unambiguously excludes the right to

independent representation regarding disputes covered by the CBA. (Defendants’ Reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, hereinafter “Defs.’ Reply,” 4:1-27.) 

Under the CBA, the exclusive means for resolution of workers' and union grievances or

claims against Stanford is grievance and arbitration process culminating in final and binding

arbitration. (Burke Declaration, ¶¶ 12-13.) In allowing worker representation by “up to two

representatives of the Union” at grievance proceedings in paragraph 40, the CBA, as a whole,

necessarily excludes the right to representation other than by “two representatives of the Union” for

such proceedings. 

It is fundamental union law that the Union is the exclusive representative of all employees in

the bargaining unit for the purposes of the CBA terms. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a); Emporium Capwell Co.

v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61-65 (1977). Furthermore, Ninth Circuit

authority provides that federal labor statutes disfavor the involvement of privately retained attorneys

in grievance proceedings because such participation would undermine the policy of exclusive

representation. Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft, 752 F.2d 1483, 1484 (1985). If Defendants had

communicated with Plaintiff’s independent attorney, such actions would bypass the collective

bargaining representative and could risk a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor

Relations Act (“NLRA”). 29 U.S.C. § 158. Defendants’ conduct was therefore consistent with the

terms of the CBA and the law providing that the Union was Plaintiff’s exclusive representative.

Although Plaintiff claims that “constitutional issues remain,” he fails to articulate any basis

for his argument. (Opp’n at 3:20.) Defendants’ alleged refusal to communicate with Plaintiff’s

outside counsel did not prevent Plaintiff from consulting with counsel of his choice. See Malone v.

U.S. Postal Service, 526 F.2d 1099, 1107 (6th Cir. 1975) (neither section 9(a) of the NLRA nor the

Case 5:05-cv-04131-JW Document 31 Filed 04/05/06 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

CBA required employers to meet with independently retained counsel in grievance proceedings

where the Union had been designated as the exclusive bargaining representative)). Moreover, Ninth

Circuit and California legal authority have found that due process is satisfied by collective

bargaining agreements with grievance and arbitration procedures similar to that of the CBA in this

case. See e.g., Jones v. Omnitrans, 125 Cal. App. 4th 273 (2004) (due process is satisfied by CBA

that affords the employee notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the opportunity for arbitration of

his grievances); Armstrong v. Meyers, 964 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1992) (three-step grievance and

arbitration procedure provided employee with due process). Therefore, the Court finds that the

unambiguous terms of the CBA, as well as fundamental union law, require Plaintiff to seek a remedy

through exhaustion of the processes outlined in the CBA.

Because Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for the grievance he has against Defendants is the

process outlined in the CBA, his claims are improvidently raised here. The Court does not believe

that any amendment would cure this defect in Plaintiff's Complaint.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, with

prejudice. 

Dated: April 5, 2006

05cv4131mtd

 /s/ James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-04131-JW Document 31 Filed 04/05/06 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Carol Capri Copsey ccopsey@gordonrees.com

Michael Terence Lucey mlucey@gordonrees.com

Steven D Zavodnick szavodnick@verizon.net

Dated: April 5, 2006 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:_/s/ JW Chambers___________

Melissa Peralta

Courtroom Deputy

Case 5:05-cv-04131-JW Document 31 Filed 04/05/06 Page 8 of 8