Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01249/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01249-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 12:635 Breach of Insurance Contract

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The Court’s previous order admonished Plaintiffs’ counsel to follow Local Rule of Civil

Procedure 7.1(b)(1), which requires that briefing be in proportional font size of 13 points or

greater. Dkt. #131 n. 2. Plaintiffs’ counsel has again disregarded this rule. The motion for

reconsideration is 12-point font or smaller. The Court once again directs Plaintiffs’ counsel

to comply with the Court’s local rules. Further disregard of the rules may result in the

Court’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ future filings.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael L. Bond and Cherie Bond,

husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

American Family Mutual Insurance

Company, a Wisconsin corporation, et

al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-1249-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiffs have filed a motion seeking reconsideration (Dkt. #133) of the Court’s

February 19, 2008, order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for partial

summary judgment (Dkt. #131). The Court will deny the motion.1

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and are not the place for parties to make

new arguments or to ask the Court to rethink its analysis. See Northwest Acceptance Corp.

v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Rezzonico,

32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998). Courts in this district have identified four

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circumstances where a motion for reconsideration will be granted: (1) the moving party has

discovered material differences in fact or law from those presented to the Court at the time

of its initial decision, and the party could not previously have known of the factual or legal

differences through the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) material factual events have

occurred since the Court’s initial decision; (3) there has been a material change in the law

since the Court’s initial decision; or (4) the moving party makes a convincing showing that

the Court failed to consider material facts that were presented to the Court at the time of its

initial decision. Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586

(D. Ariz. 2003). Plaintiffs’ motion fails to establish any of these exceptional circumstances.

Plaintiffs object to the Court’s discussion of the appraisal provision of the insurance

policy, arguing that Defendant never raised that provision as an affirmative defense.

Dkt. #133. But the Court did not treat the appraisal provision as an affirmative defense.

Rather, the Court addressed Plaintiffs’ argument that they are entitled to recover their

appraiser’s estimate of actual cash value under the terms of the insurance policy. The Court

considered all relevant provisions of the policy – which were provided in exhibits by both

parties – and concluded that Plaintiffs’ claim is not consistent with those provisions. As the

Court explained, permitting Plaintiffs to recover their appraiser’s estimate of actual value in

this case “would allow an insured to game the system by accepting an actual cash value

payment, repairing the property for less than the payment, and then seeking to recover more

money by challenging the reasonableness of the actual cash value payment in court without

ever having invoked the policy provisions designed to address inadequate actual cash value

payments – the appraisal and supplemental payment provisions.” Dkt. #131 at 5. Plaintiffs’

motion for reconsideration does nothing to dispel this concern, and in fact supports it.

Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to recover a higher actual cash value amount without

even so much as suggesting that they incurred repair costs in excess of Defendant’s actual

cash value payment. Plaintiffs ask the Court to disregard express terms of the very insurance

policy they put at issue in this case; they seek to make an end-run around policy provisions

clearly designed to protect them in the event an actual cash value payment is too low and to

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recover money for losses they never in fact incurred. The Court continues to conclude that

such a claim is contrary to the terms and intent of the policy.

Plaintiffs argue that they did not have an opportunity to address the appraisal

provision affirmative defense. In addition to the fact that it was not an affirmative defense,

the Court notes that the parties argued extensively about the meaning and effect of the

insurance policy and provided the Court with copies of the policy. It is hornbook law that

courts are to consider all terms when construing an insurance policy. See Liberty Ins.

Underwriters, Inc. v. Weitz Co., LLC, 158 P.3d 209, ¶8 (Ct. App. Ariz. 2007) (“Insurance

policy provisions must be read as a whole, giving meaning to all terms.”). That is precisely

what the Court did in this case. What is more, “a district court ‘may grant summary

judgment on any legal ground the record supports.’” Jackson, Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192,

1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 6 James W. Moore, Walter J. Taggart and Jeremy C. Wicker,

Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.14[1] (1994)). 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Dkt. #133) is denied.

DATED this 5th day of March, 2008.

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