Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00900/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00900-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Jane Doe is a fictitious name and is used herein to protect the true identity of the

juvenile in deference to Arizona law. See, Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) 8-208(F)

(“Except as otherwise provided by law, the records of an adoption, severance or dependency

proceeding shall not be open to public inspection.”) and (G) (“The court may order that the

records be kept confidential and withheld from public inspection if the court determines that

the subject matter of any record involves a clear public interest in confidentiality.”). A.R.S.§

8-208(F) and (G) (emphasis added).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victor O. Dema, on his own behalf and on

behalf of his juvenile daughter, Jane Doe,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-08-0900-PHX-LOA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT,

ORDER AND ORDER TO 

SHOW CAUSE

This matter arises on the Court’s review of the file.

BACKGROUND

 On May 9, 2008, Plaintiff Victor O. Dema (“Dema”) filed a pleading entitled

“Petition for Removal,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), seeking removal of apparently

open and non-final juvenile dependency (JD507198) and, perhaps, juvenile delinquency

(JV542457) proceedings pending in the Maricopa County Superior Court, Juvenile Division,

regarding Jane Doe,1

 age 14 years. (docket # 1; Exhibit 1, at 16-24) Neither the Complaint

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 In addition to this case, Plaintiff has four (4) open cases in the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division: CV-07-0472-PHX-FMJ; CV-07-0726-

PHX-DGC (LOA); CV-07-2441-PHX-DGC (LOA); and CV-08-0359-PHX-DGC (LOA).

On May 18, 2006, Plaintiff attempted to remove a State prosecution of misdemeanor charges

to this federal court in CR-06-503-PHX-EHC. It was dismissed without prejudice on July

17, 2007 as untimely filed because Plaintiff filed his Petition “almost two years after he was

convicted.” (docket # 8) (emphasis in original)

3

 Whether Plaintiff will be permitted to represent the juvenile in this federal lawsuit

will be addressed in the Court’s order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,

filed on May 9, 2008.

- 2 -

nor its Conclusion is clear as to the relief Plaintiff seeks in this lawsuit except for Plaintiff’s

vague claim that the State is “depriv[ing] Juvenile Parent of His Civil rights[]” and a general

objection to the State’s interference in his parental “liberty interest in the care, custody and

management” of his child. (Id. at 4, 14) The Petition for Removal alleges that the minor

child is being “held unlawfully in state custody pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254” and

provides details about the minor child that are very private in nature. (Id. at 6, 8, 10 - 11)

“Traditionally, juvenile proceedings have been confidential.” In the Matter of the Appeal in

Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-132744, 188 Ariz. 180, 182, 933 P.2d 1248, 1250

(Ariz.Ct.App. 1996). Neither the Petition nor its attached, unnumbered exhibit (Dependency

Petition) were filed under seal.

Pro se Plaintiff, a frequent filer in federal court,2

 alleges that subject-matter

jurisdiction exists in federal court pursuant to “the due process clause” because the State of

Arizona, by seeking “to affect relationship of parent and child in furtherance of ‘legitimate’

state interest,” with “implications under title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Id. at 2) It is unclear if

Plaintiff, likely a non-lawyer,3

 is attempting to represent the juvenile by seeking habeas

corpus relief. Likewise, it is unclear whether the referenced juvenile delinquency

proceedings are final or are on-going in the Maricopa County Superior Court and whether

Plaintiff is attempting to remove the juvenile delinquency proceedings to federal court. (Id.

at 8).

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

REMOVAL

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1446 (a) and (b) provide as follows:

(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or

criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court of the

United States for the district and division within which such action is pending

a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for

removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served

upon such defendant or defendants in such action.

(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed

within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or

otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief

upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the

service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been

filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever

period is shorter.

If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal

may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through

service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or

other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which

is or has become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the

basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year

after commencement of the action.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1446 (a) and (b) (emphasis added). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) provides

that “[a] notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than thirty days

after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time before trial, whichever is earlier . . .

.” This provision requiring a petition to be filed before trial “is imperative and mandatory,

must be strictly complied with, and is to be narrowly construed.” United States ex rel.

Walker v. Gunn, 511 F.2d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 1975); State of New Jersey v. Chesimard, 555

F.2d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1977).

Plaintiff’s Petition for Removal alleges the State’s Dependency Petition in

JD507198, docket # 1; Exhibit 1, at 16-24, was served upon Plaintiff on April 11, 2008.

(docket # 1 at 1) Presumably, it is a non-final proceeding. If Plaintiff is also attempting to

remove any open or closed juvenile delinquency proceedings on the juvenile’s behalf, he

shall comply with 18 U.S.C.§ 1446 and shall set forth in the First Amended Complaint

when the juvenile may have had her arraignment and trial (adjudication hearing), when she

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

A copy of the consent/election form was mailed to Plaintiff on May 12, 2008. It may

also be obtained from the District of Arizona’s website at www.azd.uscourts.gov. To find

the consent/election form on the District’s web site, click on “Local Rules” at the top of the

page, then click on “Forms” on the left side of the page and then click on and print the

appropriate form.

- 4 -

may have been served with process, all case numbers in which removal is being attempted

and attach as exhibits the required pleadings.

JURISDICTION

A. Voluntary Consent to Magistrate-Judge Jurisdiction

Pursuant to Local Rule (“LRCiv”) 3.8(a), Rules of Practice, effective

December 1, 2007, all civil cases are, and will be, randomly assigned to a U.S. district judge

or to a U.S. magistrate judge. This matter has been assigned to the undersigned U.S.

Magistrate Judge. 

As a result of the aforesaid Local Rule and assignment, if all parties consent

in writing, the case will remain with the assigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

636(c)(1) for all purposes, including trial and final entry of judgment. If any party chooses

the district-judge option, the case will be randomly reassigned to a U.S. district judge or

reassigned to a particular district judge per the Local Rules. To either consent to the

assigned magistrate judge or to elect to have the case heard before a district judge, the

appropriate section of the form, entitled Consent To Exercise Of Jurisdiction By United

States Magistrate Judge4

, must be completed, signed and filed. The party filing the case or

removing it to this Court is responsible for serving all parties with the consent forms. Each

party must file a completed consent form and certificate of service with the Clerk of the

Court not later than 20 days after entry of appearance, and must serve a copy by mail or hand

delivery upon all parties of record in the case.

 Any party is free to withhold consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction

without adverse consequences. 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(2); Rule 73(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v.

Woodcreek Venture Ltd., 351 F.3d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2003) (pointing out that consent is

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

the “touchstone of magistrate judge jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. §636(c). “A party to a

federal civil case has, subject to some exceptions, a constitutional right to proceed before an

Article III judge.” Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Pacemaker

Diagnostic Clinic of Am. Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (en

banc)).

Plaintiff shall have until on or before Friday, May 30, 2008 within which to

make his selection to either consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction or elect to proceed before

a United States district judge. A copy of the appropriate consent form including written

instructions were mailed to Plaintiff by the Clerk’s office.

B. Rooker-Feldman and Younger Doctrines Limiting Federal Jurisdiction

A federal district court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and the burden of

establishing jurisdiction is on the party claiming jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors

Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-183 (1936). “A federal court is presumed to lack

jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stevedoring Servs.

of Am., Inc. v. Eggert, 953 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Stock West, Inc. v.

Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.1989)). “A [district] court has an

obligation to inquire sua sponte into its subject matter jurisdiction, and to proceed no further

if such jurisdiction is wanting.” Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 665 (9th Cir.

2003).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine examines whether a federal district court has the

jurisdiction to review the final decisions of state courts. District courts generally lack the

authority to review state judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, since only the United

States Supreme Court has such jurisdiction. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415

(1923); District of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over

a proceeding in “which a party losing in state court” seeks “what in substance would be

appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing

party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights. Doe v. Mann,

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In simple terms, ‘[u]nder Rooker-Feldman, a federal

district court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a

state court.’”).

The Ninth Circuit has very recently confirmed “that ‘[t]he clearest case for

dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when a federal plaintiff asserts as

a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state

court judgment based on that decision.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., ___ F.3d ___, 2008

WL 1970349, * 2 (9th Cir. 2008). “A federal action constitutes such a de facto appeal where

‘claims raised in the federal court action are inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s

decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or

require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules.’ ” Id.

at * 3 (citing Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)).

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court “espouse[d] a

strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial

proceedings” and held that a federal court should not enjoin pending state criminal

proceedings and, therefore, should abstain from hearing the suit. H.C. v. Koppel, 203 F.3d

610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “Absent extraordinary circumstances, Younger

abstention is required if the state proceedings are (1) ongoing, (2) implicate important state

interests, and (3) provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims.” Id.

The Younger principle applies to both criminal and civil proceedings in which important state

interests are involved. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S.

350, 367-68 (1989); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in the companionship and society of his or her child.” Kelson v. City of Springfield,

767 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding parents, who alleged school officials violated

parents’ protected liberty in continued association with child when school officials allowed

their son to commit suicide, could maintain a section 1983 action to vindicate their

fundamental parental rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment and their right to

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under

the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Title 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343 is invoked with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because § 1983, a civil rights statute, provides a

cause of action and § 1343 gives the federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases arising under

the civil rights statutes. Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F.Supp. 647, 650 n. 5 (N.D.Cal. 1974).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by persons acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).

- 7 -

association with their son guaranteed by the First Amendment, overruled on other grounds,

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418

n. 9 (9th Cir. 1987); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1276 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

445 U.S. 962 (1980) (when county officials removed a mentally ill boy from his mother’s

custody on the ground that she could not adequately care for him, the mother could bring a

section 1983 action for damages to vindicate her “substantive familial rights that have long

been considered the ‘basic civil rights of man. ”) 

Nevertheless, claims related to on-going juvenile proceedings in state court are

properly dismissed in federal court pursuant to Younger abstention. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.

415 (1979) (Younger abstention appropriate in context of state child removal proceedings due

to allegations of child abuse); Safouane v. Fleck, 226 Fed. Appx. 753, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“There does not seem to be a genuine dispute between the parties that at the time this action

was filed, proceedings regarding two of the minor children were pending in the state court,

In re Dependency of A.S., 101 Wash.App. 60, 6 P.3d 11 (2000); Order of Dependency, Cause

No. 99-7-01849-2 KNT, entered August 19, 1999, or that the Safouanes had the opportunity

to raise their claims in those proceedings. The claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief

related to those proceedings were subject to dismissal pursuant to Younger abstention.”));

contra, Dwayne B. v. Granholm, 2007 WL 1140920 (E.D. Mich. 2007).

As discussed below, Plaintiff will also be required to timely file a First

Amended Complaint which shall set forth, among others, a basis for federal jurisdiction of

Plaintiff’s case.5

 Plaintiff is forewarned that failure to allege an independent basis for federal

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

jurisdiction of this case may result in the dismissal of this lawsuit. Rule 12(h)(3), FED.R.

CIV.P. (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.”).

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Federal Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent

part:

 Claims for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim

needs no new jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the

alternative or different types of relief.

Rule 8(a), FED.R.CIV.P. (emphasis added). 

Even though pro se pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,” pro se litigants must become familiar, and comply, with the

Rules of Civil Procedure (“FED.R.CIV.P.”) and the Local Rules of Practice for the District

Court for the District of Arizona (“LRCiv”). Carter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

Litigants proceeding pro se “must meet certain minimal standards of pleading.” Holsey v

Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Maryland, 1981). “A complaint [or petition] that . . . fails to

plainly and concisely state the claims asserted and fails to give the dates and places of the

alleged events of which the plaintiff complains, falls short of the liberal and minimal

standards set out in Rule 8(a).” Walton v Shanelec, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1210 (D. Kansas

1998). Plaintiff must set forth a “short” but specific facts establishing the basis for each

defendant’s liability. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980). 

“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it

is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

Henderson v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 2007 WL 3332067 (D. Hawaii 2007) (citing Noll

v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.1987), superceded by statute, Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (determining that a district court retains its discretion to dismiss a pro

se prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint with or without leave to amend under the Prisoner's

Litigation Reform Act)). Plaintiff will be ordered to file a First Amended Complaint that

complies in all aspects with this Order, Rule 8(a), FED.R.CIV.P., and Local Rules of Practice

or this lawsuit may be dismissed without prejudice for failing to comply with court orders.

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial courts have the inherent power

to control their dockets and in the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions

including, where appropriate, dismissal of a case). “District courts have inherent power to

control their dockets and may impose sanctions, including dismissal, in the exercise of the

discretion.” Oliva v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272, 273 (9th Cir. 1992). 

D. Pro se Representation

Because Plaintiff is pro se and, therefore, is representing his own interests, the

Court expressly advises him that the United States Supreme Court has made clear that federal

“judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants” because requiring

trial judges to explain the details of federal procedure or act as the pro se’s counsel “would

undermine [federal] judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

226-227 (2004). “A [pro se litigant] does not have a constitutional right to receive personal

instruction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure” and that “the Constitution [does not]

require judges to take over chores for a pro se [litigant] that would normally be attended to

by trained counsel as a matter of course.” Id. (citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal.,

Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)). 

 Accordingly,

 IT IS ORDERED that on or before Friday, May 30, 2008 Plaintiff shall

file his written election to either consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction or elect to proceed

before a United States district judge.

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon the Defendant

the appropriate consent form.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall either consent to

magistrate judge jurisdiction or elect to proceed before a district judge within twenty (20)

days of Defendant’s formal appearance herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a First Amended

Complaint on or before Friday, May 30, 2008 that complies in all aspects with this Order,

Rule 8(a), FED.R.CIV.P., and the Local Rules of Practice or this lawsuit may be dismissed

without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel and any party, if unrepresented,

shall hereinafter comply with the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for

the District of Arizona, as amended on December 1, 2007. The District’s Rules of Practice

may be found on the District Court’s internet web page at www.azd.uscourts.gov/. All other

rules may be found as www.uscourts.gov/rules/. The fact that a party is acting pro se does

not discharge this party’s duties to “abide by the rules of the court in which he litigates.”

Carter, 784 F.2d at 1008.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel and any party, if unrepresented,

shall use the above caption, number and initials until further order of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff show cause in writing on or

before 5:00 p.m. on Monday, June 16, 2008 why this lawsuit should not be dismissed

without prejudice due to the Rooker-Feldman or Younger doctrines.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall seal the Petition for

Removal and its attached, unnumbered exhibit (Dependency Petition) until further order of

the Court.

DATED this 16th day of May, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-00900-LOA Document 6 Filed 05/16/08 Page 10 of 10