Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00050/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

 

GLEN A. STACKHOUSE, #150174, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-50-WKW 

 ) [WO] 

CAPTAIN CARGLE, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This cause of action is pending before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint 

filed by Plaintiff, an indigent state inmate incarcerated at the Ventress Correctional 

Facility. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that sometime in 2014 Defendant Cargle 

called him “a sissy ass bitch” and put her hands on him. Doc. No. 1 at 2. Due to the 

vague nature of this claim, the court entered an order directing Plaintiff to file an 

amendment to the complaint which described how Defendant’s conduct in “putting her 

hands on [him]” violated his constitutional rights. See Doc No. 4. Plaintiff complied 

with this order. Upon review of the complaint and amendment thereto, the court 

concludes this case is due to be summarily dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 As best as the court can discern from the amendment to Plaintiff’s complaint, 

Captain Cargle made disparaging remarks about not “hiring” Plaintiff to work for the 

State “with his ugly ass” and that she would clean or clear “the room with [his] sissy ass” 

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and he could do nothing about it. Plaintiff then asserts that Defendant Cargle put her 

hand in his face with her finger and pushed him in the face. He asked her to “please get 

your finger out of my face.” Doc. No. 5 at 1-2. This claim provides no basis for relief. 

 To state a viable claim for relief in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the conduct 

complained of must have deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by 

the Constitution. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); Parratt v. 

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Willis v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th 

Cir. 1993). Derogatory, demeaning, profane, threatening or abusive comments made by 

an officer to an inmate, no matter how repugnant or unprofessional, do not rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation. Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274 n.1 (11th 

Cir. 1989) (mere verbal taunts, despite their distressing nature, directed at inmate by 

jailers do not violate inmate’s constitutional rights); Ayala v. Terhune, 195 F. App’x 87, 

92 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]llegations of verbal abuse, no matter how deplorable, do not 

present actionable claims under § 1983.”); McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 n.3 

(10th Cir. 2001) (“[A]cts . . . resulting in an inmate being subjected to nothing more than 

threats and verbal taunts do not violate the Eighth Amendment.”); Sims v. Hickok, 185 

F.3d 875 (10th Cir. 1999) (district court’s summary dismissal of inmate’s complaint for 

failure to state a claim appropriate because officer’s insults and racial slurs did not 

amount to a constitutional violation); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954-55 (6th Cir. 

1987) (verbal abuse alone is not violative of the Eighth Amendment); Purcell v. 

Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986) (mere name-calling did not violate inmate’s 

constitutional rights); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (verbal abuse, 

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including threat of harm, not actionable under § 1983). Because this claim lacks an 

arguable basis in law, it is due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim 

regarding his contention that Defendant Cargle pushed him in the face with her finger, 

this claim is without merit. Plaintiff’s complaint and amendment thereto fail to allege in 

any manner that Defendant Cargle’s action was done violently or that he suffered any 

injury. Although the lack of serious injury does not preclude an Eighth Amendment 

claim, the extent of injury suffered is one factor to be considered in determining whether 

the use of force was wanton and unnecessary. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 

Consequently, de minimis uses of physical force do not implicate the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 

“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the 

peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights. The 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments 

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of 

physical force, provided the use of that force is not of a sort repugnant to 

the conscience of mankind.” (internal quotation marks and parenthesis 

omitted). 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10. 

While the conduct about which Plaintiff complains may be described as 

unprofessional, there is nothing before the court which shows that it rose above a level of 

mere de minimis use of physical force or that the type of force used was “of a sort 

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Minor amounts of force, even if applied 

unnecessarily, do not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. See Johnson v. Moody, 

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206 F. App’x 880, 885 (11th Cir. 2006). This is especially true where, as here, Plaintiff 

can point to no injury. Taking all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, he still has only 

established a de minimis use of force without injury which does not offend the Eighth 

Amendment. 

 In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant 

Cargle is due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge this case be 

dismissed with prejudice prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & 

(ii). 

 It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before April 7, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

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(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

Done this 24th day of March, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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