Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02448/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02448-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2448

___________

David W. Bailey, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Department of Elementary and *

Secondary Education, a branch of the *

government of the State of Missouri; *

Ronald W. Vessell, in his individual *

and official capacities; Neil Scully, in *

his individual and official capacities, *

*

Appellees. *

__________

Submitted: February 14, 2006

Filed: June 23, 2006 

___________

Before RILEY, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

David W. Bailey (Bailey), a former employee of the Missouri Department of

Elementary and Secondary Education, sued his employer and his supervisors

(collectively, DESE), alleging they terminated his contract in response to protected

speech Bailey made on matters of public concern. Following a jury trial, the jury

found certain instances of Bailey’s speech were motivating factors in DESE’s

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The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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decision to terminate Bailey’s contract. After the verdict, the district court1

 entered

judgment as a matter of law against Bailey, holding Bailey’s speech was not protected

under the First Amendment, and even if it were, Bailey’s termination was justified

based on the balancing test enunciated in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S.

563 (1968). Bailey appeals, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Bailey is a psychologist who was under contract with DESE to provide

consultation services for DESE’s Social Security Disability Determinations Unit

(DDU). Bailey’s consulting duties entailed reviewing disability benefits cases to

determine whether the claims contained proper evidence supporting an award or

denial of benefits.

In approximately 1999, Missouri and nine other states began a pilot program

called “prototype” instituted by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to

implement new procedures designed to streamline the benefits application review

process. As part of the procedures, DESE was permitted to use Speech and Language

Pathologists (SLPs) to help assess speech and language pathologies in child benefits

cases. Before this federal regulatory change, consultants like Bailey offered opinions

about an applicant’s mental health as well as speech and language problems raised

in an application. After the change, SLPs could sign off on approval of claims based

on speech and language pathologies; thus, it was common for both an SLP and a

mental health consultant to review the same file for separate consideration.

In implementing the prototype procedures, DDU Deputy Administrator Neil

Scully (Scully) adopted a target allowance rate representing the level of claim

allowance under the old procedures. The goal was that the allowance rate under the

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prototype procedures should be at least equal to the allowance rate under the old

system.

Bailey expressed concerns about what he believed to be a quota system,

contending some claimants, especially children with speech and language

pathologies, were being awarded benefits to which they were not entitled. Bailey

testified he consistently spoke out to supervisors and managers about his concerns.

Others testified Bailey’s position was a “well-known fact.”

In early 2001, Scully called a meeting with Bailey and other management

employees in the office of Bailey’s supervisor, Carolyn Otterson (Otterson), to

address problems with Bailey’s unwillingness to sign off on SLP decisions,

particularly one SLP’s complaint about Bailey’s denial of a case. Bailey testified he

reiterated why I was making the conclusions I was making [about

particular cases], that I looked at things on a case by case basis and that

I was following the regulations. . . . And the main thrust of that meeting

was that Mr. Scully liked the numbers he was getting. . . . He told me

to comply with that in no uncertain terms if I wanted to stay with the

program.

Bailey claims he expressed his concern that “blind adherence to an allowance rate

would conflict with a consultant’s professional judgment and the case by case nature

of the system,” and Scully told Bailey he better “stick with the program.”

In the summer of 2001, Bailey began to have personality clashes and

professional disagreements with a fellow consultant. On August 30, 2001, Bailey and

Scully met at a conference. They privately argued about the SLP program and a

report Scully had received about Bailey engaging in unprofessional conduct with an

SLP. Other complaints about Bailey climbed the supervisory ladder to Scully, who

eventually forwarded the complaints to his boss, DESE Assistant Commissioner

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Ronald Vessell (Vessell). On September 10, 2001, Bailey drafted and sent via

facsimile a letter to Vessell, making “an official complaint in regards to . . . Scully”

and detailing professional disagreements Bailey and Scully had over Scully’s award

target goal and the SLP program. On the same day, Vessell and Scully met to discuss

Bailey, and Vessell terminated Bailey’s contract. Vessell claims he did not read the

letter before terminating Bailey’s contract, but the jury found the letter was a

“motivating factor” in DESE’s decision to terminate Bailey’s contract.

Before trial, the district court asked the parties to draft proposed jury

instructions that “specifically describe the speech which forms the basis for the

claim.” Bailey failed to identify specifically the particular speech, instead proposing

as an instance of speech, “Plaintiff’s repeated, open criticism about established

allowance quotas and wrongful allowances as stated to Neil Scully and supervisors”

and Bailey’s September 10, 2001, letter to Vessel. The district court then drafted its

own instructions, identifying three specific instances of alleged speech for jury

consideration: (1) Bailey’s statements during the early 2001 meeting in Otterson’s

office; (2) Bailey’s statements to Scully at the conference on August 30, 2001; and

(3) the September 10, 2001, letter to Vessell.

During the four-day trial, the district court, over Bailey’s objection, sua sponte

drafted special jury interrogatories regarding the balancing of Bailey’s interests

against those of DESE, based on the Pickering balancing test. Pickering, 391 U.S.

at 568-73; see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 166-67 (1983). The jury determined

Bailey’s statements during the meeting in Otterson’s office and Bailey’s letter to

Vessell, but not Bailey’s statements to Scully at the conference, were motivating

factors in DESE’s decision to terminate Bailey’s contract. The jury also found, in

response to the Pickering special interrogatories, Bailey’s statements during the

meeting in Otterson’s office and Bailey’s letter to Vessell “cause[d], or could . . . have

caused, disharmony or disruption in the working relationship between those working

for [DESE],” and Bailey’s letter “impair[ed] his ability to perform his duties.”

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To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee

plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in protected speech, that is, speech on a matter

of public concern; (2) his interest as a citizen in commenting on the issue outweighs

the public employer’s interest in promoting efficient public service; and (3) his

speech was a motivating factor in the action taken against him. Howard v. Columbia

Pub. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 956; see

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147,

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). The first issue is a question of law, and was the subject

of the district court’s judgment. See Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d

389, 395 (8th Cir. 1995). The second issue is the Pickering balancing test. It is a

question of law and was also the subject of the district court’s ruling, although its

underlying factual questions should be and were submitted to the jury. See Belk v.

City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 881 (8th Cir. 2000). The third issue is one of fact and

was determined by the jury’s verdicts. See de Llano v. Berglund, 282 F.3d 1031,

1036 (8th Cir. 2002).

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Following trial, the district court directed judgment as a matter of law in

DESE’s favor, holding Bailey’s speech was not entitled to First Amendment

protection, and even if it were, application of the Pickering balancing test favored

DESE.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law.

See Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 1998). In doing so, we draw all

reasonable inferences in Bailey’s favor, and we neither make credibility

determinations nor weigh the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000) (citations omitted).

A. Speech Protected by the First Amendment

Bailey argues the district court erred in directing judgment against him and

holding his speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection.2

 Public employee

speech is protected from retaliation, in certain circumstances, if the speech addresses

a matter of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006) (citing

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Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568); Shands v. City of Kennett, 993

F.2d 1337, 1344-46 (8th Cir. 1993). “So long as employees are speaking as citizens

about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are

necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.” Garcetti, 126 S.

Ct. at 1968. When the state is acting as the employer of a public employee, we focus

“on the role the employee . . . assumed in advancing the particular expressions: that

of a concerned public citizen, informing the public that the state institution is not

properly discharging its duties . . . ; or merely as an employee, concerned only with

internal policies or practices which are of relevance only to the employees of that

institution.” Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986)

(footnote and citation omitted). When the employee’s speech includes matters of

both public concern and personal interest, we

must analyze the content, form, and context of the speech to determine

whether the speaker was acting primarily as a concerned citizen or as an

employee. If the speech was mostly intended to further the employee’s

private interests rather than to raise issues of public concern, her speech

is not protected, even if the public might have an interest in the topic of

her speech.

Schilcher v. Univ. of Ark., 387 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2004).

1. Jury Instructions

Bailey preliminarily claims the district court abused its discretion by failing to

adopt Bailey’s proposed instruction, and instead limiting the jury to three instances

of speech. We review for abuse of discretion a claim of instructional error. B & B

Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2001). “[W]e

must determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole and viewed in light of the

evidence and applicable law, fairly and adequately submitted the issues in the case

to the jury. . . . [J]ury instructions do not need to be technically perfect or even a

model of clarity.” Id. at 1012 (citations and quotations omitted).

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Although provided the opportunity to submit and resubmit proposed jury

instructions, Bailey failed to describe specifically for the district court all the speech

forming the basis for his claim. The district court was well within its discretion to

submit its own instructions, which relied on the evidence submitted at trial and

followed the recommendations of the Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instructions. See

Eighth Cir. Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions § 5.71 n.5 (“To avoid difficult

questions regarding causation, it is very important to specifically describe the speech

which forms the basis for the [retaliation] claim. Vague references . . . often will be

inadequate; instead, specific reference to the time, place and substance of the speech

. . . is recommended.”).

2. Meeting in Otterson’s Office

Bailey argues the statements he made during the meeting with Scully and

others in Otterson’s office in early 2001 touched upon matters of public concern.

Bailey claims he was acting as “a concerned citizen expressing reservations about

improper methods used by a public program which could lead to the misuse of public

funds,” specifically disagreeing with how SLPs were handling speech and language

issues, and expressing “his concern that blind adherence to an allowance rate would

conflict with a consultant’s professional judgment and the case by case nature of the

system.”

While Bailey’s speech may have tangentially involved a matter of public

concern, his speech was concerned primarily with furthering his own interests.

Bailey spoke about how the prototype and SLP programs, as implemented by Scully

through the target allowance rate, conflicted with a counselor’s professional judgment

and would lead to false positives and misapplication of public funds by DESE. We

generally regard expenditure of public funds to be a matter of public concern, see

Kincade, 64 F.3d at 396; however, Bailey’s protests only peripherally pertained to

public fund payouts. Bailey’s testimony about the meeting demonstrates he was

concerned not with how DESE was discharging its public duties, but with how

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Scully’s implementation of new SSA policies affected such internal DESE policies

as how counselors such as Bailey could make case by case benefits determinations.

The circumstances of the meeting also demonstrate Bailey’s motivation in

raising these concerns was not for public interest. The private meeting was called by

Scully and arose not out of Bailey’s “efforts to bring these [concerns] to light,” see

Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 959 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Connick,

461 U.S. at 148), but out of an SLP’s complaint against Bailey concerning Bailey’s

denial of a particular case, and Bailey’s general unwillingness to sign off on SLP

decisions. Scully directed pointed questions at Bailey who generally responded with

yes or no answers. The meeting’s focus was Bailey’s unwillingness to follow DESE

rules. Any public interest issues Bailey expressed were secondary, never appealed,

and not made public. The district court therefore correctly concluded Bailey’s

statements during the meeting in Otterson’s office did not deserve First Amendment

protection. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.

3. Letter to Vessell

Bailey also argues the statements he made in his September 10, 2001, letter to

Vessell touched upon matters of public concern. The letter contained such phrases

as (1) consultants being asked “to sign off on cases, saying we agree with cases we

really do not”; (2) “Mr. Scully has gone against federal rules and regulations”;

(3) “Mr. Scully’s behaviors and actions in relation to me, the SLP project, and state

and federal laws and guidelines have been inappropriate, and may in fact be

fraudulent”; (4) “Mr. Scully has acted unprofessionally and unethically with me”;

(5) “some of the policies and actions being taken by Mr. Scully will have state and

national impact and implication”; and (6) Bailey considered himself “a perceived

government whistle blower.”

Bailey’s letter appears tangentially to touch upon a matter of public concern,

but the letter primarily involved personal conflicts with Bailey’s supervisor Scully.

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The letter discusses (1) Scully’s actions toward Bailey and the fact Scully had Bailey

under investigation; (2) Scully’s “angry, accusatory, and threatening manner”; and

(3) Bailey’s “primary complaints with Mr. Scully.” Bailey’s vague comments

regarding fraud and legal violations appear only as support for Bailey’s personal

problems with Scully. Furthermore, Bailey did not address the letter to the public

outside of DESE, but only to Vessell, the agency’s Assistant Commissioner, a “factor

to be considered.” Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1999). Finally,

and perhaps most importantly, Bailey’s letter concluded with the statement, “I

consider any time I spend addressing this matter with you or the agency to be services

I am giving the state as a consultant,” clearly pointing to a conclusion Bailey was not

acting as a concerned public citizen, but as an employee concerned with being paid

for his time. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 (“[W]hen public employees make

statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens

for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their

communications from employer discipline.”) Buazard, 172 F.3d at 548 (“When a

public employee’s speech is purely job-related, that speech will not be deemed a

matter of public concern.”). As with Bailey’s statements during the meeting in

Otterson’s office, we hold the district court correctly concluded Bailey’s letter to

Vessell did not touch upon a matter of public concern.

B. Pickering Balancing Test

Even when a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern,

“the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests

surrounding the speech and its consequences.” Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961. In

directing judgment against Bailey, the district court held, even if Bailey’s speech did

touch upon a matter of public concern, judgment against him was appropriate because

the Pickering balancing test weighs in DESE’s favor. Bailey disagrees, arguing

(1) the Pickering test does not apply to his case; (2) even if it did, the district court’s

special interrogatories were in error; and (3) even if they were not, application of the

test weighs in his favor.

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1. Whether the Pickering Balancing Test Applies

Bailey first argues the Pickering balancing test does not apply to his case

because DESE (1) did not terminate Bailey’s contract for making protected speech,

thus the speech could not have disrupted the workplace; and (2) failed to proffer

sufficient evidence that Bailey’s speech had an adverse impact on his department.

See Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 911-12 (8th Cir. 2000).

Bailey’s first argument fails. Just because DESE denied Bailey made protected

speech or it terminated his contract for making the speech does not mean DESE is

then estopped from alternatively arguing Bailey’s speech disrupted the workplace.

Employee speech can disrupt a workplace without rising to a level meriting discipline

by termination.

Bailey’s second argument also is unpersuasive. Regarding Bailey’s speech

during the meeting in Otterson’s office, Bailey argued with his supervisor Scully and

other management level employees about the role SLPs were playing in disability

determinations. The meeting became quite heated, with Scully eventually giving

Bailey an ultimatum to behave or be fired. Bailey’s speech regarding the SLPs

eventually led to another confrontation with Scully at a conference. This is sufficient

evidence of disruption.

Regarding Bailey’s letter to Vessell, in determining whether particular speech

caused disruption in the workplace and therefore is not protected, we have held

“[e]vidence of actual disruption . . . is not required in all cases.” Shands v. City of

Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1344 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Germann v. City of Kansas

City, 776 F.2d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1985) (“It is not necessary ‘for an employer to allow

events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of

working relationships is manifest before taking action.’” (quoting Connick, 461 U.S.

at 152)). Although such evidence is not required, sufficient evidence of disruption

exists in this case. Here, despite Vessell’s claim he did not read Bailey’s letter before

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firing him, the jury found the letter was a motivating factor behind Bailey’s

termination. The letter accused Bailey’s superiors of fraud and legal and ethical

violations. Such accusations are sufficient evidence of potential workplace

disruption.

2. Jury Instructions

Bailey argues the district court abused its discretion in submitting the special

interrogatories. We disagree. As described supra, the interrogatories were based on

sufficient evidence at trial Bailey’s speech disrupted the workplace. The

interrogatories asked whether Bailey’s speech “cause[d], or could . . . have caused,

disharmony or disruption in the working relationship between those working for

[DESE],” or “impair[ed] [Bailey’s] ability to perform his duties.” The interrogatories

properly stated the first and sixth factors of the Pickering balancing test. See

Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1983)

(listing first factor as “the need for harmony in the office or work place” and sixth

factor as “whether the speech impeded the employee’s ability to perform his or her

duties” (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52)).

3. Application of the Pickering Balancing Test

Finally, Bailey argues the district court improperly applied the Pickering

balancing test. The test balances the competing interests of the government-employer

and citizen-employee by analyzing six factors:

(1) the need for harmony in the office or work place; (2) whether the

government’s responsibilities require a close working relationship to

exist between the plaintiff and co-workers when the speech in question

has caused or could cause the relationship to deteriorate; (3) the time,

manner, and place of the speech; (4) the context in which the dispute

arose; (5) the degree of public interest in the speech; and (6) whether the

speech impeded the employee’s ability to perform his or her duties.

Id.

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Here, the jury answered affirmatively when asked whether Bailey’s speech

during the meeting in Otterson’s office and Bailey’s letter to Vessell caused or could

have caused workplace disharmony. The evidence regarding Bailey’s numerous

conflicts with SLPs, fellow counselors, and his supervisors shows the working

relationships within the DDU were required to be close. Bailey’s speech arose in the

context of a meeting to discuss his conflicts with SLPs, and in the context of an

accusatory letter sent as a complaint criticizing Bailey’s behavior. Bailey’s speech

also lacked sufficient counterbalancing public interest, and was more concerned with

his conflicts with Scully over internal procedures. The jury found Bailey’s speech

“impair[ed] [his] ability to perform his duties.” For these reasons, we hold even if

Bailey’s speech did touch upon a matter of public concern, the Pickering balancing

test weighs in favor of DESE.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s entry of judgment as a

matter of law in DESE’s favor.

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