Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04426/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04426-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARPER IMAGE CORPORATION, a

Delaware corporation, and ZENION

INDUSTRIES, INC., a California

corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NEOTEC, INC., a Nevada corporation,

INDOOR PURIFICATION SYSTEMS, INC.,

a Utah corporation, and ASSET

MARKETING SERVICES, INC. d/b/a NEXT

TEN,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-4426 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Indoor Purification Systems, Inc. (IPS) moves for

summary adjudication of the claims of Plaintiffs Sharper Image

Corporation and Zenion Industries, Inc. for patent infringement,

and of Defendant's counter-claim for declaratory judgment of

patent invalidity and non-infringement. Plaintiffs oppose the

motion. The matter was heard on May 20, 2005. Having

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 1 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

considered the parties' papers, the evidence cited therein and

oral argument on the motion, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion

for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

On December 6, 1988, Zenion was issued U.S. Patent No.

4,789,801 ('801 patent). Claim 24 of the '801 patent was not

issued until January 14, 2003, after the original '801 patent

was reexamined by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 

The '801 patent discloses technology that purports to reduce the

amount of ozone and nitrogen oxide produced by electro-kinetic

transducers. Electro-kinetic transducers purportedly convert

electrical energy into the fluid flow of air by, for example,

using a high voltage generator to charge positively one set of

electrodes and to charge negatively another set of electrodes. 

Plaintiffs claim that air molecules become positively charged by

interacting with the positively charged electrodes and are

subsequently attracted to the negatively charged electrodes,

thus creating an electro-kinetic flow of air. 

Plaintiffs apply the technology described in the '801

patent in their Ionic Breeze Air Purifier product line.

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on September 30, 2003,

alleging that Defendants IPS, Neotec, Inc. and Asset Marketing

Services, Inc. had infringed the '801 patent as well as U.S.

Patent Nos. 6,163,098 ('098 patent) and 6,176,977 ('977 patent)

by making and selling the XJ-2000 ionic air purifier. On June

10, 2004, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that did not

include Neotec as a defendant. Plaintiffs have since settled

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 2 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

this action with Asset Marketing Service, Inc., and IPS and

Plaintiffs have settled the claims relating to the '098 and '977

patents; thus, the only remaining patent-in-suit is the '801

patent. The only claim that Plaintiffs assert from the '801

patent is claim 24. The Court issued its claim construction

order in this case on March 21, 2005.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th

Cir. 1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is

no material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard

as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by

affidavits or other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary

judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford

Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary

judgment are those which, under applicable substantive law, may

affect the outcome of the case. The substantive law will

identify which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 3 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The

moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the

absence of a material fact on such issues, nor must the moving

party support its motion with evidence negating the non-moving

party's claim. Id.; see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497

U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404,

1409 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or

admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." 

Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a

prima facie showing in support of its position on that issue. 

See UA Local 343 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471

(9th Cir. 1994). That is, the moving party must present

evidence that, if uncontroverted at trial, would entitle it to

prevail on that issue. See id.; see also Int’l Shortstop, Inc.

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 4 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). Once

it has done so, the non-moving party must set forth specific

facts controverting the moving party's prima facie case. See UA

Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party's "burden of

contradicting [the moving party's] evidence is not negligible." 

Id. This standard does not change merely because resolution of

the relevant issue is "highly fact specific." See id.

DISCUSSION

I. Invalidity

Defendant contends that claim 24 of the '801 patent, which

was added as a result of the patent reexamination process, is

invalid because it broadens the original patent. Defendant

maintains that terms used in claim 24 are broader than

corresponding terms in claim 19; thus, claim 24 encompasses

apparatuses that claim 19 does not. 

Claim 24 of the '801 patent reads, in pertinent part, as

follows:

A diode-type electrokinetic transducer comprising:

a first array of ion emitting surfaces;

a second array of ion receiving surfaces . . .

The corresponding language of claim 19, the claim of the

original patent most similar to claim 24, is:

An apparatus for moving air comprising:

a first array of electrodes;

a second array of electrodes . . .

Specifically, Defendant argues that an apparatus in which the

first array contains a single electrode with multiple ion

emitting surfaces would not infringe claim 19, but would

infringe claim 24.

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 5 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

The parties agree on the applicable case law. Under Title

35 U.S.C. section 305, during the reexamination process, patent

owners are permitted to add new claims in order to distinguish

the invention as claimed from prior art. However, "[n]o

proposed amended or new claim enlarging the scope of a claim of

the patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding under

this chapter." 35 U.S.C. § 305. Whether the scope of a claim

has been impermissibly broadened on reexamination is a matter of

claim construction, Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577,

1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and thus a question of law for the Court. 

Under section 305, "a claim of a reissue application is broader

in scope than the original claims if it contains within its

scope any conceivable apparatus or process which would not have

infringed the original patent." In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459,

1464 (Fed. Cir. 1994). "A claim that is broader in any respect

is considered to be broader than the original claims even though

it may be narrower in other respects." Id. To overcome the

presumption that patents are valid, clear and convincing

evidence is required. Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int'l, 316

F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs, in using the term

"surfaces" in claim 24, impermissibly broadened claim 19, which

uses the term "electrodes." Defendant notes that the Court has

previously rejected the parties' attempts to use the terms

"electrodes" and "surfaces" interchangeably. See Claim Constr.

Order at 10. Defendant contends that claim 19, which uses the

phrase "first array of electrodes," and thus encompasses only a

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 6 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

first array consisting of multiple electrodes, would not

encompass an array that included only one electrode with

multiple ion emitting surfaces. Conversely, Defendants argue,

claim 24 would encompass such an apparatus. Thus, Defendant

maintains, under Freeman, claim 24 contains within its scope an

apparatus not contained within claim 19.

In evidentiary support of its argument, Defendant points to

the XJ-202, which is another in its line of ionic air purifiers,

and is the subject of separate litigation between these parties. 

Defendant maintains that the first array in the XJ-202 is a

single electrode with multiple points, or surfaces. This

apparatus, argues Defendant, would not infringe claim 19, but,

in the other litigation, Plaintiffs are claiming that it

infringes claim 24.

Plaintiffs rely upon two arguments that claim 24 does not

broaden the '801 patent. First, Plaintiffs contend that claim

24 is narrower than claim 19 because claim 24 describes a

"diode-type electrokinetic transducer," whereas claim 19

describes only a generic "apparatus." Thus, according to

Plaintiffs, claim 24 does not encompass transducers that are not

diode-type, whereas claim 19, because of its broader language,

does. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the first array in the XJ202 actually does fall within the scope of claim 19 because the

points on the first array "act as separate electrodes."

Plaintiffs' arguments are not persuasive. First, as

Defendant notes, it is irrelevant whether claim 24 is narrower

than the original claims in some respects. See Freeman, 30 F.3d

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 7 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

at 1464. The critical inquiry is whether the newly-added claim

is broader in any respect than the original patent. As to

Plaintiffs' second argument, the Freeman test is whether there

is any conceivable apparatus that is contained within the scope

of claim 24, but not within the original claims of the '801

patent. Here, Plaintiffs offer no argument or evidence to

contradict Defendant's assertion that an apparatus containing a

first array with a single electrode would fall within the scope

of claim 24, but not claim 19. Defendant submits the XJ-202 as

evidence of just such an apparatus. Plaintiffs do argue that

the Court should not consider a product not in suit in assessing

the scope of claim 24. Critically, however, Plaintiffs do not,

and presumably cannot, argue that the Freeman test has not been

satisfied here.

For the foregoing reasons, and notwithstanding Defendant's

burden to show invalidity by clear and convincing evidence,

there is no dispute of material fact that claim 24 of the '801

patent is invalid. See Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer

Morat GMBH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Defendant is

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' infringement claim,

and to declaratory judgment of patent invalidity.

II. Infringement

Defendant also argues that the XJ-2000 does not, as a

matter of law, literally infringe claim 24 of the '801 patent.

A limitation in claim 24 of the '801 patent reads, in

pertinent part, as follows:

the distance between any two adjacent ion emitting surfaces

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 8 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

in the first array being substantially equal to the distance

between any two adjacent ion receiving surfaces in said

second array . . .

In the March 21, 2005 claim construction order, the Court held

that, "because claim 24 contemplates one particular 'distance'

that separates adjacent surfaces . . . The Court construes 'the

distance' to mean 'the length of space.'" Claim Constr. Order

at 26-27. In addition, the Court construed the term "any" to

mean "each and every," and the term "adjacent" to mean "next to

one another." Claim Constr. Order at 27-28. Thus, claim 24

encompasses only those apparatuses in which the distance between

each and every adjacent surface in the ion emitting array is

substantially similar to the distance between each and every

surface in the ion receiving array, and in which there is one

particular distance separating each and every adjacent surface.

Defendant submits evidence that the XJ-2000's first array

consists of adjacent ion emitting surfaces, which are shaped

like pins, that are separated by several distinct distances. 

The sixteen pins in the first array are organized into two rows

and eight columns. The distance between adjacent pins in each

row is different than the distance between adjacent pins in each

column. And, the rows are each divided in half by a single

plastic divider such that there are four columns on each side of

the divider. Defendant submits additional evidence that, in the

XJ-2000's second array, the ion receiving surfaces are three

plates that are not separated by a single distance. The three

plates are positioned parallel to one another, but the two

outside plates each curve inward at their ends to meet the

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 9 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

middle plate. In short, the distance separating adjacent plates

in the second array is different at each point in the curve than

it is in the middle.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the XJ-2000 actually has

four first arrays of ion emitting surfaces; each array consists

of four pins from a row on one side of the plastic divider. 

Plaintiffs note that each adjacent pin in these groupings of

four is separated by a single distance. In their papers,

Plaintiffs did not address Defendant's evidence that the three

surfaces in the second array of ion receiving surfaces are

separated by different distances.

Plaintiffs offer no persuasive argument as to why the first

array in the accused device, the electrode pins which are all

connected to the same power source, should be considered four

first arrays. Using Plaintiffs' reasoning, they would be

permitted to define an array as any arbitrary collection of ion

emitting surfaces in an apparatus, thereby effectively reading

out claim 24's limitation requiring that the distance between

any two adjacent ion emitting surfaces in an array be the same. 

Moreover, as Defendant notes, Plaintiffs' current argument

contradicts its final infringement contention: "The XJ-2000

includes an arrangement of surfaces for giving off ions. The

surfaces consist of two physically separate banks of pin

electrodes, each bank defining an array." Even accepting as

true Plaintiffs' final infringement contention, the XJ-2000's

first array of electrode pins cannot be separated into two

distinct groups in which each adjacent pin is separated by a

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 10 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

single distance. As Defendant notes, in the two-array scenario,

either the sixteen pins are divided into two arrays by the

plastic divider, in which case the distance between adjacent

pins in the same row is different than the distance between

adjacent pins in different rows, or each array consists of one

row, in which case the distance between adjacent pins on either

side of the plastic divider is different than the distance

between the two adjacent pins separated by the plastic divider.

In addition, even if all adjacent electrode pins in the XJ2000's first array were separated by a single distance, there is

not one single distance separating the electrode plates in the

second array. The ends of the two outside plates each curve

inward toward the middle plate; thus, as the two outside plates

curve inward, the distance between those plates and the adjacent

middle plate gets increasingly smaller. Plaintiffs argued for

the first time at the May 20, 2005 hearing that the end portions

of the two outside electrode plates are not part of the second

array. However, Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to

support this argument. There is not one distinct distance

separating adjacent ion receiving surfaces in the XJ-2000's

second array.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules that, as a

matter of law, the XJ-2000 does not literally infringe claim 24

of the '801 patent.

III. Doctrine of Equivalents

Defendant also asserts that the XJ-2000 does not infringe

the '801 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 11 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

The doctrine of equivalents generally applies where the

differences between an element of the accused product and the

asserted claim limitation are "insubstantial to one of ordinary

skill in the art." Searfoss v. Pioneer Consol. Corp., 374 F.3d

1142, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, the doctrine may not be

invoked, and summary judgment of non-infringement is

appropriate, where the theory of equivalents "would entirely

vitiate a particular claim element." Id. at 1150-51 (internal

citations omitted).

Here, Defendant argues that the XJ-2000 is not equivalent

to claim 24. That is true, according to Defendant, because the

XJ-2000 cannot infringe the '801 patent where there is not a

single distance between the adjacent surfaces in its first and

second arrays. To rule otherwise would, Defendant notes,

impermissibly vitiate claim 24's distance limitation.

Defendant is correct that a theory of equivalents that did

not require a single distance between adjacent surfaces in the

first and second arrays would read claim 24's distance

limitation out of the claim. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not, in

their papers or at the hearing, asserted any theory of

equivalents, nor have they disputed Defendant's argument on this

issue. The accused product does not infringe the '801 patent

under the doctrine of equivalents.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules that, as a

matter of law, the XJ-2000 does not infringe claim 24 of the

'801 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. Defendant is

entitled to summary judgment of patent non-infringement and

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 12 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

declaratory judgment of non-infringement.

IV. Time Period for Damages

The parties argue about the appropriate time period for

which Plaintiffs may seek infringement damages. However,

because the Court rules that (1) claim 24 of the '801 patent is

invalid, and (2) the accused product does not, as a matter of

law, infringe the '801 patent, there is no need to consider this

issue. 

V. Defendant's Counterclaims

Defendant has asserted counter-claims for declaratory

judgment that (1) Defendant has not infringed the '801 patent,

(2) the '801 patent is invalid, and (3) the '801 patent is

unenforceable due to prosecution laches. Defendant acknowledges

that its counterclaim for unenforceability is moot in light of

the Court’s ruling on its summary judgment motion. Thus, this

counterclaim for declaratory judgment of non-infringement of the

'801 patent is dismissed without prejudice.

VI. Remaining State Law Claims

Although Plaintiffs' claim for infringement of the '801 is

summarily adjudicated in favor of Defendant, Plaintiffs have

also alleged State law causes of action for (1) false

advertising, and (2) unfair competition. These claims are not

addressed in Defendant's motion for summary judgment. However,

at the May 20, 2005 hearing, Plaintiffs stipulated to dismiss

their State law claims without prejudice to refiling in State

court in the event the Court granted Defendant's summary

judgment motion. Thus, Plaintiffs' claims for false advertising

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

and unfair competition are dismissed without prejudice.

VII. Motion to Amend Case Management Order

On May 6, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the

Court's case management scheduling order. In light of the

Court's order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment,

Plaintiffs' motion to amend the case management order is denied

as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary

judgment of patent non-infringement (Docket No. 88) is GRANTED. 

The Court also GRANTS Defendant summary judgment on its counterclaims for declaratory judgment of patent non-infringement and

of patent invalidity. Defendant's remaining counter-claim and

Plaintiffs' State law claims are dismissed without prejudice. 

Plaintiffs' motion to amend the case management order (Docket

No. 102) is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/3/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:03-cv-04426-CW Document 117 Filed 06/03/05 Page 14 of 14