Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01597/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01597-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 06cv1597 BTM(WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE TRUNK and PHILIP K.

PAULSON,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06cv1597 BTM(WMc)

(consolidated with 06cv1728)

ORDER DENYING PACIFIC

JUSTICE INSTITUTE’S MOTION TO

INTERVENE

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA, DONALD H. RUMSFELD,

Secretary of Defense and DOES 1

through 100, Inclusive,

Defendants.

MOUNT SOLEDAD MEMORIAL

ASSOCIATION, Real parties in interest.

JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.,

RICHARD A. SMITH, MINA SAGHEB,

and JUDITH M. COPELAND,

Plaintiffs,

 vs.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD, Secretary of

Defense, in his official capacity,

Defendant.

Pacific Justice Institute (“PJI”) has filed a motion to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(a) and (b). On September 21, 2006, the Court held a hearing on the motion. For the

Case 3:06-cv-01597-LAB-WMC Document 43 Filed 09/26/06 Page 1 of 5
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reasons discussed below, PJI’s motion to intervene is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

PJI seeks to intervene as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). In the

alternative, PJI seeks permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). PJI’s motion is

opposed by Plaintiffs and Defendants in both Trunk v. City of San Diego, Case No. 06cv1597

and Jewish War Veterans v. Rumsfeld, Case No. 06cv1728. The Court finds that PJI does

not satisfy the requirements for intervention under Rule 24(a) or 24(b).

A. Intervention as a Matter of Right

Rule 24(a) provides that upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action “when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the

disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to

protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing

parties.”

The Ninth Circuit applies a four-part test under Rule 24(a): (1) the application for

intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have a “significantly protectable” interest

relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must

be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede

the applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must not be

adequately represented by the existing parties in the lawsuit. Northwest Forest Resource

Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 1996). 

PJI describes itself as a non-profit legal organization dedicated to the preservation of

religious and civil liberties. PJI believes it is its “solemn duty to defend our nation’s religious

heritage against overly-restrictive interpretations of the Establishment Clause.” PJI has been

involved (as amicus) in litigation concerning the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance

and displays of the Ten Commandments. PJI is an intervenor and defendant in the National

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Motto Case, Newdow v. The Congress of the United States of America, which is currently

pending before the Ninth Circuit.

With respect to the instant case, PJI takes the position that the religious icons included

in the Mt. Soledad War Memorial are “invaluable and unique expressions of our nation’s

history and heritage” and that the removal of these religious icons from these types of public

war memorials would “have a serious, detrimental effect on Americans’ awareness and

appreciation of our nation’s religious heritage.” PJI fears that its mission to defend

“expressions of religious heritage against misuse of the Establishment Clause” would be

severely hindered if the Court found in favor of Plaintiffs.

Although PJI’s interest in the case is undoubtedly genuine, it falls short of a

“significantly protectable” interest. PJI does not have any property interest in the Memorial.

PJI’s ideological interest is no greater than that of other religious organizations, public

interest groups, and private citizens who feel strongly about the issues in this case.

PJI compares its stake in the case to that of environmental groups permitted to

intervene in cases such as Idaho Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir.

1995) and Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983). However, in

these cases, the environmental groups not only had an interest in preserving wildlife and

their habitat, but also had participated in administrative processes leading up to the litigation.

See Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“[T]he cases in which we have allowed public interest groups to intervene generally share

a common thread . . . these groups were directly involved in the enactment of the law or in

the administrative proceedings out of which the litigation arose.”) 

Moreover, PJI has not shown that its interest in the case would not be adequately

represented by the existing defendants. There is a presumption of adequate representation

when the representative is a government acting on behalf of its constituency. United States

v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 401 (9th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, a presumption of

adequacy arises where an existing party and the applicant for intervention have the same

“ultimate objective.” Northwest Forest, 82 F.3d at 838. 

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Here, PJI, the City, and the United States have the same ultimate objective – to

establish that (1) the transfer of the Memorial to the federal government did not violate the

United States Constitution or the California Constitution; and (2) the presence of the cross

on federal property does not violate the Establishment Clause. The fact that the government

defendants are not religious organizations and might make different arguments than PJI does

not mean that they cannot adequately represent PJI’s interest. See League of United Latin

American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1306 (9th Cir. 1997) (“When a proposed

intervenor has not alleged any substantive disagreement between it and the existing parties

to the suit, and instead has vested its claim for intervention entirely upon a disagreement

over litigation strategy or legal tactics, courts have been hesitant to accord the applicant fullparty status.”).

PJI is particularly concerned that Defendants will not challenge Plaintiffs’ standing

under Article III of the Constitution. However, whether or not Defendants raise the issue of

standing in a motion to dismiss, the issue will be confronted and resolved before this case

concludes.

There is nothing in the history of this case that indicates that either the City or the

United States will not vigorously defend this suit. To the contrary, the City has fought to

preserve the Memorial over almost two decades of litigation. The federal government is a

new party in this dispute. However, in light of the fact that the federal government took active

steps to acquire ownership of the Memorial and the land under it, the Court has no reason

to believe that the federal government would not mount a full defense against Plaintiffs’

constitutional challenge. 

PJI has not satisfied the requirements for intervention as a matter of right. Therefore,

its motion to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) is denied.

B. Permissive Intervention

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2), upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to

intervene in an action “when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a

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question of law or fact in common.” In exercising its discretion under Rule 24(b), the court

“shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the

rights of the original parties.”

Here, PJI does not have a separate defense or claim but, rather, seeks to weigh in on

the issues presented by the case. As discussed above, PJI’s ideological interest in the case

does not justify inclusion of PJI as a party to the case. If the Court were to allow PJI to

intervene, the Court would receive numerous motions to intervene from other organizations

and individuals who want to have their voices heard. The addition of extraneous parties

would complicate the proceedings before the Court and could very well cause delay and

prejudice to the existing parties. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, denies PJI’s motion

for permissive intervention.

However, the Court will allow PJI to appear as amicus. As amicus, PJI will have

ample opportunity to present its views on the pertinent legal issues. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, PJI’s motion to intervene is DENIED. However, the

Court grants PJI leave to appear as amicus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 26, 2006

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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