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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

UDlted States Court of AppC-'b Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 0 2 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

HUEY DON ODUM, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

BOBBY BOONE; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

PATRICK FISHER c:~ri; 

No. 94-7184 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CV-93-312) 

Submitted on the brief.* 

Huey Don Odum, pro se. 

Alecia A. George, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Petitioner-appellant Huey Don Odum appeals the district 

court's order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge 

that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. We grant 

* After exam1n1ng the brief and the appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and we also 

grant a certificate of probable cause to appeal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253 to enable us to reach the merits. Finding no error, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Mr. Odum was convicted in Oklahoma District Court in 1979 of 

first degree murder. The jury subsequently sentenced him to 

death, finding one aggravating circumstance: that the murder was 

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. On appeal, the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals upheld his conviction, rejecting several 

of his assignments of error. See Odum v. State, 651 P.2d 703, 707 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1982). The only claim of error relevant to this 

proceeding was a claim the trial court erred in refusing to 

provide the jury with separate not guilty forms for first degree 

murder and the lesser included offense of first degree 

manslaughter. Id. at 704; see also McCormick v. State, 845 P.2d 

896, 899 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (noting first degree manslaughter 

is a lesser included offense of the crime of first degree murder) . 

The court did conclude, however, that the evidence did not support 

the jury's finding that this aggravating circumstance existed, and 

accordingly, Mr. Odum's sentence was modified to life 

imprisonment. See Odum, 651 P.2d at 707. 

Ten years after his direct appeal, Mr. Odum filed a petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The district court 

dismissed this petition due to the failure to exhaust state 

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remedies. Mr. Odum did not appeal this ruling and filed a motion 

for post-conviction relief in Oklahoma state court in an effort to 

exhaust the unexhausted claims. In that motion, he raised two 

claims: (1) jury instruction 14 impermissibly shifted the burden 

of proof from the State to him; and (2) he was denied impeachment 

evidence and his right to present a defense. The Court of 

Criminal Appeals, however, refused to consider these two claims' 

ruling that as a matter of state law "all issues not raised in the 

direct appeal, which could have been raised, are waived." (I d. I 

ex . C pp . 1 - 2 . ) See, e.g., Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 

1349 n.4 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, S. Ct. 1995 WL 

251885 (1995) (discussing the rules governing postconviction 

motions in Oklahoma) . 

Having exhausted his state remedies, Mr. Odum then filed the 

present petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 

Although some of the claims overlap, we read Mr. Odum's petition 

as raising four distinct issues: (1) jury instruction 14 violated 

due process by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof; (2) 

denial of impeachment evidence and the right to present a defense; 

(3) error in refusing to give the jury separate not guilty forms 

for each count; and (4) the district court's dismissal of the 

earlier federal petition was an abuse of discretion.l 

1 Mr. Odum also asserts a claim of cumulative error; however, 

because we find no individual error, we find no cumulative error 

either. See Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1370 n.23 ("'[A] cumulativeerror analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters 

determined to be error, not the cumulative effect [of nonerrors]'") (quoting United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 

(lOth Cir. 1990)). 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (B), the case was referred 

to a magistrate judge who issued a report and recommendation that 

the petition be denied. Specifically, the magistrate judge 

concluded: (1) jury instruction 14 did not unconstitutionally 

shift the burden of proof; (2) the claim regarding impeachment 

evidence was procedurally barred; (3) the jury received a proper 

not guilty form; and (4) the district court did not err in 

dismissing the earlier petition under the "total exhaustion" rule 

of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). The district court 

adopted the recommendation, over Mr. Odum's objections, and this 

appeal ensued. 

DISCUSSION 

All the issues presented in this appeal involve questions of 

law, and, accordingly, our review is de novo. See Thomas v. 

Kerby, 44 F.3d 884, 886 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

I. 

Mr. Odum first argues jury instruction 14 is constitutionally 

infirm under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), because it 

impermissibly established a conclusive presumption. Initially, we 

note it does not appear that Mr. Odum presented this claim in his 

direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 

Moreover, when Mr. Odum attempted to raise this claim in his postconviction motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled it was 

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waived based on his failure to have asserted it on direct appeal. 

While this claim could therefore be procedurally barred, 

respondents have not raised this defense. While this does not 

preclude us from raising the defense sua sponte, Hardiman v. 

Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 505 (lOth Cir. 1992), we believe "the late 

stage of the proceedings," Manlove v. Tansy, 981 F.2d 473, 476 n.4 

(lOth Cir. 1992), the judicial inefficiencies attributable 

thereto, and the delay that would result from having to afford Mr. 

Odum an opportunity to respond to this defense, Hardiman, 971 F.2d 

at 505, warrant us deeming the defense waived and reaching the 

merits of this issue. See id. at 503 (failure to raise the 

procedural bar defense may result in a waiver). Thus, we turn to 

the merits. 

It is settled law that 11 [i]n a habeas proceeding attacking a 

state court judgment based on an erroneous jury instruction, a 

petitioner has a great burden." Maes v. Thomas, 46 F. 3d 979, 984 

(lOth Cir.) (citing Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F.3d 1031, 1035 (lOth Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1074 (1994)), cert. denied, 115 S. 

Ct. 1972 (1995). A federal habeas court may only set aside a 

state conviction on the ground of an erroneous jury instruction 

"when the errors had the effect of rendering the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to cause a denial of a fair trial." Maes, 

46 F.3d at 984; see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 u.s. 141, 146 

(1973). 

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Jury instruction 14 instructed the jury that: 

Should you find from the evidence, under the 

instructions and beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant is guilty of the crime of Murder in the First 

Degree as charged in the Information and as defined in 

these instructions, then you shall find the defendant 

guilty as charged of the crime of Murder in the First 

Degree. 

If you believe from the evidence and circumstances 

in this case that the defendant is not guilty of the 

crime of Murder in the First Degree as heretofore 

defined to you, or if you have a reasonable doubt 

thereof, then it will be necessary for you to consider 

whether or not the defendant is guilty of Manslaughter 

in the First Degree, as heretofore defined to you. 

Should you find from the evidence, under the 

instructions and beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant is guilty of the crime of Manslaughter in the 

First Degree, as defined in these instructions, then you 

shall find the defendant guilty of the lesser included 

offense of the crime of Manslaughter in the First 

Degree. 

Should you find from the evidence, under the 

instructions, and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 

defendant is guilty but entertain a reasonable doubt as 

to which offense he is guilty of, you must resolve that 

doubt in the defendant's favor and you will then find 

him guilty of the lesser offense. 

Should you find that the defendant is not guilty of 

the lesser included offense of Manslaughter in the First 

Degree, or should you have a reasonable doubt thereof, 

then, assuming you have previously determined that the 

defendant is not guilty of the crime of Murder in the 

First Degree, your verdict will be not guilty. 

Because we find this instruction does not fall within the purview 

of Sandstrom, we reject this claim. 

In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court held that in a case where 

intent was an element of the crime charged, a jury instruction 

stating "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary 

consequences of his voluntary acts," violated due process because 

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it relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving "'beyond a 

reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the 

crime'" in question. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 512, 519-21 (emphasis 

omitted) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). If 

the instruction was characterized as creating a conclusive 

presumption on the issue of intent, it was patently invalid under 

Winship. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523. Even if the instruction was 

viewed as merely establishing a permissive inference (i.e., a 

nonconclusive presumption that nonetheless "had the effect of 

shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant," id. at 524), 

it was still invalid under Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 

(1975). See Winship, 397 U.S. at 524. In deciding whether a 

particular instruction is invalid under Sandstrom, the inquiry is 

"whether any 'reasonable juror could have given the presumption 

conclusive or persuasion-shifting effect.'" United States v. 

Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1092 (lOth Cir. 1986) (quoting Sandstrom, 

442 U.S. at 519), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987). Because we 

conclude jury instruction 14 does not establish a presumption, let 

alone a "conclusive or persuasion-shifting" presumption, we reject 

this claim. 

While the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was not 

presented with this precise issue, that court nonetheless 

characterized jury instruction 14 as simply an instruction 

"appris[ing] the jury of all contingent conclusions both favorable 

as well as unfavorable for the defendant." Odum, 651 P.2d at 704 

(citation omitted). We agree with this reading of jury 

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instruction 14. Nowhere in the instruction is the jury told it 

may "presume" the prosecution has proved an essential element of 

the crime charged without actual proof of that element. There is 

simply no language in this instruction permitting the jury to 

conclude an element of the crime has been either conclusively 

established or has been established unless the defendant proves 

otherwise. The instruction simply provides a road map for the 

jury in terms of what its verdict is to be based on what it finds 

to have been proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. While Mr. 

Odum might wish to debate the utility or the wisdom of giving such 

an instruction, this presents nothing more than an issue of state 

law, which we are powerless to review on habeas. See, e.g., 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); accord Lujan, 2 

F.3d at 1036 (citing cases). For purposes of the present case, it 

is sufficient for us to conclude that no error of a constitutional 

dimension is presented by this instruction so as, to warrant habeas 

relief. 

II. 

Mr. Odum's second claim, regarding the alleged denial of 

impeachment evidence, was found to be procedurally barred because 

it was not presented on direct appeal. We agree. Mr. Odum did 

not raise this claim in his direct appeal, and although he 

attempted to raise it for the first time in his motion for postconviction relief, the State asserted, and the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals concluded, he had waived this claim under state 

law by failing to raise it on direct appeal. See generally Steele 

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v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1521-22 (lOth Cir. 1993). This 

determination by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was 

clearly "independent" of federal law, and it is regularly invoked 

by that court so as to constitute an "adequate" ground. See id.; 

see also Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1349 n.4 (collecting Oklahoma cases 

demonstrating the regularity with which the failure to present a 

claim on direct appeal constitutes a waiver of that claim) . 

Because Mr. Odum has not demonstrated either one of the two 

recognized exceptions to the procedural bar rule is applicable, we 

conclude this claim is procedurally barred. 

III. 

Mr. Odum's third claim, regarding the "not 

forms, was exhausted on direct appeal. On 

guilty" verdict 

the merits, the 

district court rejected this claim. Once again, we agree. 

In his direct appeal, Mr. Odum asserted the state trial court 

violated his right to due process by "refusing to provide the jury 

with separate not guilty verdict forms for murder in the first 

degree and the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the 

first degree." Odum, 651 P.2d at 704 (emphasis added). The Court 

of Criminal Appeals rejected this claim, stating "[t]he record 

discloses that the trial court gave the jury three verdict 

forms: Guilty of Murder in the First Degree; Guilty of 

Manslaughter in the First Degree; and Not Guilty." Id. 

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In his federal petition, Mr. Odum asserted the state trial 

court violated his right to due process by refusing to provide "a 

not guilty verdict form" to the jury. The magistrate judge 

concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals' factual finding that a 

"not guilty" verdict form was provided to the jury was entitled to 

a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See 

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981). The magistrate judge 

also noted that the respondents attached to their brief a copy of 

the "not guilty" verdict form submitted to the jury, thereby 

providing further support for the Court of Criminal Appeals' 

finding. 

To the extent Mr. Odum's due process argument is the state 

trial court failed to give any type of a "not guilty" verdict form 

to the jury, we agree with the magistrate judge's determination 

that there is no merit to this claim based on the record. But 

because Mr. Odum is proceeding pro se, a liberal construction of 

his petition, coupled with his argument in his direct appeal, lead 

us to believe he is attempting to assert a due process claim based 

on the trial court's failure to give the jury separate verdict 

forms for each count (i.e., murder and manslaughter). In support 

of this claim, Mr. Odum relies on Dyke v. State, 716 P.2d 693 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1986). 

In Dyke, the defendant was convicted in Oklahoma state court 

of robbery and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. On appeal, he 

argued, inter alia, "the trial court committed fundamental error 

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by failing to issue to the jury verdict forms of 'not guilty,' on 

each count." Id. at 698 (emphasis added). The Court of Criminal 

Appeals rejected this claim, finding the jury had in fact received 

a "not guilty" verdict form for each count. See id. But in so 

doing, the court stated "[w]e agree with appellant that the 

failure to submit 'not guilty' verdict forms to the jury 

constitutes fundamental reversible error." Id. 

Assuming, arguendo, the failure to provide a jury with any 

type of a "not guilty" verdict form constitutes a denial of due 

process, we nonetheless believe Dyke is distinguishable from the 

situation in this case. Mr. Dyke was charged with two entirely 

unrelated offenses, and therefore, a separate "not guilty" verdict 

form would be necessary for the jury to decide his guilt or 

innocence as to each count. In contrast, the two counts Mr. Odurn 

was charged with were related: first degree murder and the lesser 

included offense of first degree manslaughter. Because Mr. Odurn 

was charged with a lesser included offense, it follows that if the 

jury were to find him guilty of that lesser included offense of 

manslaughter, that finding of guilt necessarily implies a finding 

of not guilty on murder, the greater offense. Thus, the jury 

would need only one not guilty verdict form, in the event they 

found Mr. Odum not guilty of both murder and manslaughter. It is 

precisely because Mr. Odum was charged with related offenses, 

whereas Mr. Dyke was not, that we find Dyke distinguishable. 

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Because the jury was provided with a "not guilty" verdict 

form, and Mr. Odum was charged with two related offenses, we find 

no due process violation based on the submission of a single "not 

guilty" verdict form to the jury. 

IV. 

Mr. Odum's fourth and final claim of error alleges the 

district court abused its discretion in dismissing his earlier 

federal petition. His argument, in essence, is the State waived 

the defense of none~~austion by failing to raise it in response to 

his petition and it was improper for the court to raise the issue 

sua sponte. In rejecting this claim, the magistrate judge noted 

"the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the state court 

interest in the exhaustion principle is so important that it 

cannot be conceded or waived by state prosecutors. Naranjo v. 

Ricketts, 696 F .2d 83, 86-87 (lOth Cir. 1982) [ (per curiam) ] . " 

Mr. Odum, however, did not appeal the order dismissing his earlier 

petition for failure to exhaust, and thus did not challenge the 

propriety of the district court's decision to raise the nonexhaustion issue sua sponte.2 Instead, he complied with the 

2 We agree with the magistrate judge's conclusion that a court 

may raise the defense of nonexhaustion sua sponte. But we believe 

the magistrate judge's reliance on Naranjo for the related 

proposition that the defense of nonexhaustion cannot be waived --

and therefore must be raised sua sponte if the State does not 

raise the defense warrants a brief discussion. To be sure, 

this is a correct reading of Naranjo; however, the Supreme Court's 

subsequent decision in Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987), 

effectively overruled that aspect of Naranjo. See id. at 130 n.2 

(citing Naranjo as an example of the circuit split over this issue 

that formed the basis for the grant of certiorari) . In Granberry 

the Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances, "the 

court of appeals [may] hold that the nonexhaustion defense has 

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district court's directive and filed a motion for post-conviction 

relief in the state court in an effort to exhaust the otherwise 

unexhausted claims. As a result of these actions by Mr. Odurn, all 

of the claims that were previously unexhausted have now been 

exhausted. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether dismissal of his 

first petition was correct; that issue is now moot because all of 

the previously unexhausted claims are now exhausted. 

been waived." Id. at 135. To the extent Naranjo held otherwise, 

it cannot be viewed as good law after Granberry. 

The principle of intra-circuit stare decisis, which requires 

us to follow the decisions of prior panels of this court, see In 

re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. 

Ct. 53 (1994), is subject to an exception in cases where a 

subsequent, intervening Supreme Court decision on point is 

decided. Id. Based on the Supreme Court's citation to Naranjo in 

Granberry, we are convinced these two decisions are directly on 

point. While Granberry dealt with the power of the courts of 

appeals to raise the nonexhaustion defense sua sponte, we have 

recognized that its holding is not confined to the power of the 

courts of appeals and that it extends to the power of the district 

courts as well. See Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 504 n.6 

(lOth Cir. 1992). Accordingly, given the divergent holdings of 

Naranjo and Granberry, we must treat Granberry as controlling, 

which we have done, albeit implicitly, in several post-Granberry 

decisions. See, e.g., Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1554 

(lOth Cir. 1994) ("The State may waive a prisoner's failure to 

exhaust by failing to raise the defense in federal district 

court."); Hannon v. Maschner, 981 F.2d 1142, 1146 (lOth Cir. 1992) 

("When the respondents fail to assert an exhaustion argument 

before the district court, 'we may consider it waived if the 

interests of comity, federalism, and justice would be served.'") 

(citations and internal quotations omitted); Smith v. Moffitt, 947 

F.2d 442, 445 (lOth Cir. 1991) (discussing Granberry). 

Thus, after Granberry, the defense of nonexhaustion may in 

fact be waived if the State fails to assert it, but a federal 

court may, but need not (in the sense of a jurisdictional issue) 

raise the defense sua sponte. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 131, 135 

(nonexhaustion defense is not a jurisdictional bar to review of 

the merits of a habeas petition and a court may, under certain 

circumstances, deem the defense waived if it is not raised by the 

State); cf. Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 504 ("We hold here only that a 

court may raise the state procedural bar defense sua sponte, not 

that it must raise such a defense if the parties fail to raise it 

on their own.") (emphasis in original). 

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Accordingly, the district court's order dismissing Mr. Odum's 

petition is AFFIRMED. 

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