Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01236/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01236-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 150
Nature of Suit: Overpayments &amp; Enforcement of Judgments
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, a

non-profit corporation created

by an act of Congress,

 NO. CIV. S-07-1236 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: RULE 56(f) REQUEST

FOR CONTINUANCE

 v.

UNITED WAY CALIFORNIA CAPITAL

REGION, a California 

corporation; VOLEN PROPERTIES 

10, L.L.C., a California 

limited liability company; and 

DOES 1-10, inclusive, 

Defendants,

 /

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS. 

 /

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff and counter-defendant Sacramento-Sierra

Chapter of the American National Red Cross (“Red Cross”) brought

this action to resolve disputes arising from its lease of and

Case 2:07-cv-01236-WBS-DAD Document 178 Filed 05/23/08 Page 1 of 7
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alleged option to purchase an ownership interest in the property

it leases from defendant Volen Properties 10, L.L.C. (“Volen”). 

Red Cross filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication/Judgment on

February 25, 2008. Due to the numerous evidentiary objections

the parties filed, the court vacated the April 14, 2008 hearing

on Red Cross’s motion and established procedures for the parties

to respond to the evidentiary objections. (Apr. 9, 2008 Order.) 

After the court held a hearing on the evidentiary objections on

May 12, 2008, Red Cross withdrew its objections and the court set

Red Cross’s Motion for Summary Adjudication/Judgment for May 27,

2008. In its original opposition and at the hearing on the

evidentiary objections, Volen stated that it needed additional

time for discovery and, on May 16, 2008, Volen requested a

continuance pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides that,

“[i]f a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for

specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify

its opposition, the court may: (1) deny the motion; (2) order a

continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to

be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any

other just order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). For a court to grant

a Rule 56(f) request, the party requesting it “must show (1) that

they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that

they hope to elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts

sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are

‘essential’ to resist the summary judgment motion.” California

v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998). A court must

liberally construe a Rule 56(f) request and “should continue a

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summary judgment motion upon a good faith showing by affidavit

that the continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to

preclude summary judgment.” Id.; Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v.

Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986).

The court’s resolution of Red Cross’s motion revolves

around the interpretation of the Third Amendment to the parties’

lease. Under California law, “a party may present extrinsic

evidence to show that a facially unambiguous contract is

susceptible of another interpretation.” Maffei v. N. Ins. Co. of

N.Y., 12 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see

also Barris Indus., Inc. v. Worldvision Enters., Inc., 875 F.2d

1446, 1450 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[E]ven if a contract appears to be

absolutely clear on its face, the court is required to engage in

preliminary consideration of extrinsic evidence to see whether it

creates an ambiguity.”). If the non-moving party shows that the

contract is reasonably susceptible to a conflicting

interpretation, summary judgment is ordinarily “improper because

differing views of intent of parties will raise genuine issues of

material fact.” Maffei, 12 F.3d at 898 (citation omitted).

In his affidavit, Volen’s counsel, Douglas E. Kirkman,

explains that Volen seeks a continuance to 1) submit evidence

obtained in John Stroud’s deposition; 2) complete Karal

Cottrell’s deposition; and 3) take Gail Goulding, Brian Bolton,

and Dale Ginter’s depositions. Volen contends the depositions of

these individuals are necessary to its opposition of Red Cross’s

motion because Red Cross indicated that the individuals have

knowledge about Red Cross’s intent in entering into the Third

Amendment. Kirkman further explains that Volen needs a

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continuance to allow it to obtain 1) supplemental disclosures Red

Cross indicated it may make; 2) a response to Volen’s

interrogatory about the negotiations giving rise to the Third

Amendment; and 3) responses to several of Volen’s document

production requests. Volen contends this evidence is essential

to its opposition of Red Cross’s motion because the evidence will

contain facts about the parties’ negotiations and Red Cross’s

interpretation of the Third Amendment after the parties executed

it. 

Red Cross argues that these additional facts are not

essential to Volen’s opposition to Red Cross’s motion because

they are merely cumulative of the facts already before the court. 

(See Red Cross’s Opp’n to Volen’s Rule 56(f) Req. 3 (citing 

Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1138 (2d Cir.

1994); Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 998 F.2d

1550, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993)).) Specifically, Red Cross contends

that, because Volen has attempted to prove that the Third

Amendment is reasonably susceptible to its interpretation with

extrinsic evidence in James F. Anderson’s declaration, Volen does

not need to submit additional extrinsic evidence to support its

interpretation. If Volen’s request relied solely on the fact

that the court might find extrinsic evidence from other witnesses

or documents more credible than Anderson’s declaration, the

additional evidence would not be essential to Volen’s opposition

because the court cannot make credibility determinations on a

motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); see also Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods.,

Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[Summary judgment is

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improper if interpreting the contract] turns upon the credibility

of conflicting extrinsic evidence, or if ‘construing the evidence

in the nonmovant’s favor, the ambiguity can be resolved

consistent with the nonmovant’s position.’”) (citations omitted).

Volen’s request, however, is not limited to seeking

potentially more credible evidence that would serve a purpose

identical to Anderson’s declaration. For example, Volen seeks to

discover internal Red Cross memoranda written after June 2001 to

show that Red Cross believed it was entitled to only a share in

the proceeds of a post-2001 sale. See Employers Reinsurance Co.

v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 4th 906, 920 (2008) (“The use of

‘course of performance’ evidence as extrinsic evidence is

acknowledged in case law and was ultimately codified in Code of

Civil Procedure section 1856. As with all extrinsic evidence,

course of performance evidence can be used not only to interpret

an ambiguity, but also to reveal one in language otherwise

thought to be clear.”). Volen also seeks to obtain evidence

about the “circumstances under which the agreement was made.” 

See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1856(g) (“[The parol evidence rule]

does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances under which

the agreement was made or to which it relates . . . .”); id. §

1860 (“For the proper construction of an instrument, the

circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of

the subject of the instrument, and of the parties to it, may also

be shown, so that the Judge be placed in the position of those

whose language he is to interpret.”). 

Therefore, because Volen can withstand Red Cross’s

motion if the court concludes that the Third Amendment is

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1 Red Cross also argues that the court should deny

Volen’s Rule 56(f) request because Volen has not been diligent in

obtaining discovery. See Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified

Sav. Bank, 914 F.2d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district

court does not abuse its discretion by denying further discovery

if the movant has failed diligently to pursue discovery in the

past . . . .”). The court will not deny Volen’s request on this

ground because, on May 2, 2008, Magistrate Judge Drodz found the

requisite good cause to grant Volen’s motion to extend the

discovery deadline to July 30, 2008. (May 2, 2008 Order 3:21-

23); see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604,

609 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard

primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the

amendment.”). 

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reasonably susceptible to Volen’s interpretation, Volen is

entitled to offer extrinsic evidence to this effect for all of

the purposes that the parol evidence rule permits. While Red

Cross understandably desires a decision on the motion it filed

almost three months ago--and the court gains no pleasure in

having to continually postpone a potential resolution to the

issue at the forefront of this case--Rule 56(f) entitles Volen to

obtain the evidence it needs to oppose Red Cross’s motion. 

Accordingly, the court will grant Volen’s Rule 56(f) request and

continue the hearing on Red Cross’s Motion for Summary

Adjudication/Judgment.1

 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the hearing on Red Cross’s

Motion for Summary Adjudication/Judgment be, and the same hereby

is, CONTINUED to September 15, 2008 at 2:00 p.m. The parties may

conduct discovery until July 30, 2008. Volen shall submit an

amended opposition to Red Cross’s motion by August 11, 2008 and

Red Cross shall submit an amended reply no later than August 18,

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2 When deciding Red Cross’s Motion for Summary

Adjudication/Judgment, the court will not consider any of the

materials the parties submitted in support of or opposition to

Volen’s Rule 56(f) request unless such materials are included in

Volen’s opposition or Red Cross’s reply. 

3 In electing to file evidentiary objections, the parties

are instructed to adhere to this court’s April 9, 2008 Order and

limit such objections to evidentiary issues. (Apr. 9, 2008 Order

3:22-25.) 

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2008.2 The parties may then file any objections to newlysubmitted evidence by August 18, 2008;3

 the non-objecting party

shall file a response to any objections by August 25, 2008; and

the objecting party may file a reply by September 1, 2008. The

parties are admonished that if their evidentiary objections are

too numerous, the court may have to limit the September 15, 2008

hearing to the evidentiary objections and reset the hearing on

Red Cross’s Motion for Summary Adjudication/Judgment once the

evidentiary objections have been resolved.

DATED: May 23, 2008

 

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