Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02454/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02454-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN W. JONES,

CDCR #BB-6806,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RICHARD J. DONOVAN (CDCR), et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-2454-BTM-BLM

ORDER:

1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO 

STATE A CLAIM AND AS 

FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A(b); 

and 

2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO AMEND 

AS MOOT

I. Procedural History

On November 17, 2017, Kevin W. Jones (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the 

California Medical Facility (“CMF”), in Vacaville, California, and proceeding pro se, 

filed this civil rights action in the Northern District of California (ECF No. 1), together 

with a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2) and a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3).

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Because Plaintiff claimed prison officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California violated his constitutional rights while he was 

incarcerated there, the Honorable Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. transferred his case to this 

Court for lack of proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and § 1406(a) on 

December 5, 2017 (ECF No. 5). 

On February 23, 2018, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, denied 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, and dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff was granted leave to 

file an amended pleading to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s 

Order. (See id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff later filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to 

Amend.” (ECF No. 10.) However, before the Court could rule on this Motion, Plaintiff 

filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No.13.) Because Plaintiff has filed 

his FAC, Plaintiff’s motion is denied as moot. 

III. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 

proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 

a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, __ 

F.3d __, 2017 WL 5180205, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 

malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it “lacks an arguable basis either 

in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff initially alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when he was 

housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in June of 2017. (See

FAC at 1.) In his FAC, Plaintiff names fifty six (56) Defendants in this matter. (See id.

at 2-16.) Thirteen (13) of these Defendants are alleged to reside in Solano County, 

fifteen (15) more are alleged to reside in Los Angeles County, and the final twenty eight 

(28) are alleged to reside in San Diego County. (See id.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendants “knowingly and intentionally acted under the color of 

state law on 6/20/17, 6/21, 6/22, and 6/23/17 with deliberate indifference to serious 

(ADA) medial, health, and safety needs that exposed inmate Jones to unreasonable harm 

and prison conditions.” (Id. at 17.)

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A majority of Plaintiff’s factual claims are not clear. Plaintiff appears to allege 

that on June 20, 2017, Sergeant Diaz responded to an “inquiry” regarding “inventoried 

property” that “Transfer Officer” Charmer “packed up for inmate Jones.” (FAC at 18, 

21.) A “72 hour hold” was placed on Plaintiff by RJD’s “Chief Mental Health 

Psychologist and Chief Medical Physician per policy protocol.” (Id.) 

On June 23, 2017, Plaintiff was “transferred to CSP-LAC Non ADA facility.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that on his arrival to CSP-LAC, “Transport Officers from RJD John 

Doe (1)(2)” were told that CSP-LAC could not “accept [Plaintiff] because this is a non 

(ADA) crisis bed facility without (ADA) cells to accommodate him.” (Id. at 25.) 

However, Plaintiff also alleges that CSP-LAC medical officials “consult[ed] with 

medical staff” and “confirmed” Plaintiff could be housed at CSP-LAC. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that he was “deprived of adequate ADA accessible housing” at 

CSP-LAC. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff further alleges that CSP-LAC prison officials failed to 

“move him within 72 hours of placement.” (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff alleges that he had fallen 

“out of his wheelchair” sometime between June 23, 2017 and June 29, 2017 while he was 

housed at CSP-LAC. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff alleges that CSP-LAC medical personnel 

“allowed him to remain” on the floor of his cell “as they looked on and refused to help 

him.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was later transferred to CMF on July 4, 2017. (See id.) Plaintiff claims 

that CMF Warden, Robert Fox, has “acted with deliberate indifference to serious 

medical, health, and safety needs.” (Id. at 21.)

C. Eighth Amendment claims

Liberally interpreting Plaintiff’s FAC, it appears the only Eighth Amendment 

claims against RJD officials arise from the allegation that the RJD officers who 

transported Plaintiff to CSP-LAC were informed that CSP-LAC could not accommodate 

Plaintiff’s needs. (See FAC at 25.) However, CSP-LAC medical officials were later 

alleged to have determined that they could accommodate Plaintiff’s medical and ADA 

needs. (See id.) 

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Only “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, 104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A 

determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an examination of two elements: (1) 

the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and (2) the nature of the defendant’s 

response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), 

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(en banc) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). 

“Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to 

health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment 

violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), 

citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-104. “A ‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat 

a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 914 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

104). “The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important 

and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that 

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 

substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for 

medical treatment.” Id., citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 

1990); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1989).

At the screening stage of these proceedings, the Court will assume that Plaintiff’s 

has alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that he suffered an objectively serious medical 

need. However, even assuming Plaintiff’s medical needs were sufficiently serious, his 

FAC fails to include any further “factual content” to show that any of the named RJD 

Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to those needs. McGuckin, 914 F.2d at 

1060; see also Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. 

/ / /

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Plaintiff does not provide any specific factual allegations relating to his medical 

treatment while incarcerated RJD. The only claim appears to be against the RJD 

transport officers who were initially told that CSP-LAC could not accommodate 

Plaintiff’s medical needs. (See FAC at 25.) However, CSP-LAC medical officials later 

determined that they could accommodate his needs. (See id.) 

To state an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must include “further factual 

enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, which demonstrates that Defendants’ “purposeful 

act or failure to respond to [his] pain or possible medical need,” and the “harm caused by 

[this] indifference.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096). There are no facts alleged that any of the named RJD Defendants 

were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state an Eighth 

Amendment inadequate medical care claim against any of the named RJD Defendants, 

and therefore, it is subject to sua sponte dismissal.

D. Duplicative claims

Plaintiff does allege facts, however, that prison officials at CSP-LAC were 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (See FAC at 19, 23, 25.) These 

claims are subject to sua sponte dismissal because they are duplicative of those raised, 

and are currently pending, in another civil action he filed in the Central District of 

California on November 2, 2017. See Jones v. LAC Warden, et al., C.D. Cal. Civil Case 

No. 2:17-cv-08021-AG-SHK (“Jones I”) (ECF No. 2). A court “‘may take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 

1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2002)). A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [formerly § 1915(d)] if it “merely repeats pending or previously 

litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995)

(construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

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In Jones I, Plaintiff alleges, as he does in this case, that he was transferred to CSPLAC on June 23, 2017. (See Jones I, ECF No. 2 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he was 

housed in a “non (ADA) cell” and “confined to his wheelchair” for six days. (Id.) He 

also alleges that he “collapsed” out of his wheelchair and remained on the cell floor for 

five days. (Id. at 3, 5.) Because Plaintiff’s current FAC alleges the same facts, is based 

on the same incidents, and re-alleges the same claims against the identical Defendants as 

did his previously-filed pleadings in Jones I, the Court must dismiss these duplicative and 

subsequently-filed claims as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See 

Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 920 n.1; see also Adams v. Cal. Dep’t 

of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n assessing whether the 

second action is duplicative of the first, [the court] examine[s] whether the causes of 

action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.”), 

overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims brought against all CSP-LAC Defendants are 

dismissed as frivolous because they are duplicative of the claims found in Jones I but 

without prejudice to proceed in his pending action in Jones I in the Central District of 

California.

E. Personal Causation

The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s FAC requires sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and § 1915A(b)(1) to the extent it seeks relief under § 1983 

against both the Warden for RJD and the other RJD Defendants. “To state a claim under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Campbell v. Washington 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Ketchum v. Alameda 

Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). The FAC contains no factual allegations 

describing what Defendant Paramo did, or failed to do. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to 

hold him liable for the actions of his subordinates, there is no respondeat superior liability 

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Rather, “deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a 

municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v. 

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A less stringent standard of fault for a failure-totrain claim ‘would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities . . . 

.’”), quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 

Moreover, Plaintiff alleges no specific constitutional allegations against any of the 

remaining named RJD Defendants. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized 

and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or 

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg 

v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 

F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 

claim.”) A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which [the plaintiff complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Plaintiff has not stated a claim against any of the RJD Defendants because he has failed 

to allege facts regarding what actions were taken or not taken by the Defendants which 

caused the alleged constitutional violations. 

F. CMF Defendants

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold any CMF prison officials liable for 

allegations that his constitutional rights have been violated while housed at CMF, he 

should file a separate action in the Eastern District of California.

Venue may be raised by a court sua sponte where the defendant has not yet filed a 

responsive pleading and the time for doing so has not run. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 

1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1391(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides, in 

pertinent part, that a “civil action may be brought in–(1) a judicial district in which any 

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defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; 

[or] (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise 

to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is 

situated[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488; Decker Coal Co. v. 

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986). “The district court of a 

district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, 

or if it be in the interests of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it 

could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

CMF is located in Solano County, California. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(b) (“The Eastern 

District [of California] comprises the counties of ... Solano, ....”). The proper venue for 

Plaintiff’s claims that arise at CMF, and are unrelated to the claims that arose while housed 

at RJD, would properly be brought in the Eastern District of California pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 84(b).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief can granted and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A;

2. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to file an Amended Complaint 

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned, 

however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by 

itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim not realleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

/ / /

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3. DENIES Plaintiff’s “Motion for Extension of Time to Amend” (ECF No. 

10) as moot.

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved form civil 

rights complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2018

HON. BARRY TED. MOSKOWITZ

United States District Judge

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