Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04495/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04495-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jerry Semmens,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-4495-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Jerry Semmens’s Application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits by the Social Security Administration under the Social Security Act.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court 

now addresses Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 10, Pl. Br.), Defendant Social Security 

Administration Commissioner’s Response (Doc. 11, Def. Br.), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 

12, Reply). The Court has reviewed the briefs and the Administrative Record (Doc. 9, R.) 

and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision (R. at 15–36).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the present Application on June 14, 2016, alleging an onset date of 

December 19, 2014. (R. at 18.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. (R. at 18.) Plaintiff then appeared and testified at a hearing on December 

17, 2018. (R. at 18.) On January 16, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. (R. at 15–36.) 

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That decision became final on April 19, 2019, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review. (R. at 1–6.) 

The Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and finds it unnecessary 

to provide a complete summary here. The pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in 

addressing the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering the medical records 

and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability based on the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease and chronic pain syndrome. (R. at 21.) 

Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. at 30.) The ALJ 

determined that through his date last insured, Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 24.) The ALJ also 

determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work 

as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with some limitations, including: frequently 

climbing ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, and crouching; occasionally climbing 

ladders, kneeling, and crawling; never climbing ropes or scaffolds; avoiding concentrated 

exposure to extreme cold and vibration; and never being exposed to dangerous machinery 

and unprotected heights. (R. at 25.) Based on this RFC, the ALJ concluded that through his

date last insured, Plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as an electrical 

test engineer. (R. at 29.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the Court reviews only those 

issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 

n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination 

only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. To 

determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court must consider the 

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record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting 

evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act, 

the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the 

burden of proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step 

five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At step one, the ALJ determines 

whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id.

At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the 

claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether 

the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, 

the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and 

determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id.

If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she determines whether the 

claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, 

age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is 

not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff raises three issues for the Court’s consideration: (1) the ALJ erred by 

rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony; (2) the ALJ erred by rejecting the lay witness 

evidence; and (3) the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician 

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and nurse practitioner (“NP”). The Court finds that the ALJ’s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence and accordingly affirms her decision. 

A. The ALJ properly rejected Plaintiff’s symptom testimony by providing 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work between 2014 and 2016 because of his 

pain, which had increased in severity and was exacerbated by sitting, standing, and lifting. 

(R. at 55.) The pain was primarily in his low back and down his right leg into his foot. (R. 

at 55.) He estimated he would have to take two to three rest breaks per day for 

approximately 45 minutes to one hour at a time. (R. at 67.) He testified that his pain 

medications caused him side effects, including fatigue and decreased concentration. (R. at 

64, 66.) 

The ALJ gave four reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. (R. at 27–28.) First,

Plaintiff’s statements concerning his symptoms and side effects were inconsistent with 

statements throughout his treatment records. Second, the objective medical evidence did 

not support the full extent of Plaintiff’s alleged limitations. Third, his care was 

conservative, which indicated he was not as limited as alleged. Fourth, his daily activities 

reflected more functionality than alleged. (R. at 27–28.) The Court finds that the first two 

reasons were sufficient.

While credibility is the province of the ALJ, an adverse credibility determination 

requires the ALJ to provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the 

claimant’s testimony.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ may properly 

consider whether the record includes objective medical evidence to support the claimant’s 

testimony, but that cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility finding. Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ may also consider the claimant’s 

daily activities, inconsistent statements, and course of treatment. Id. 

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The ALJ’s first reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony—that it was inconsistent 

with other statements throughout the record—is specific, clear and convincing, and 

supported by substantial evidence. An ALJ may properly discredit a claimant’s symptom 

testimony that is inconsistent with the record. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 

F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiff testified that many of his limitations were 

due to side effects from his medications. (R. at 64.) He specifically testified that he felt

fatigued from his medication. (R. at 66.) However, at his appointments, Plaintiff 

consistently denied any side effects, including fatigue, and often reported that he was doing 

well on his medications. (R. at 28, 369, 370, 372, 373, 375, 378, 420, 457, 459, 461, 475, 

512, 518, 529, 546.) Based on this evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ properly rejected 

Plaintiff’s testimony because of its inconsistency with statements made to his medical 

providers.

Additionally, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s testimony was unsupported by the 

medical records is specific, clear and convincing, and supported by substantial evidence. 

An ALJ cannot reject a claimant’s testimony solely because it is unsupported by objective 

medical evidence, but she may consider it in evaluating credibility. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. 

Here, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s physical examinations were largely unremarkable, 

reflecting good range of motion, no clubbing, no edema, and no focal neurological deficits. 

(R. at 26–27.) Additionally, diagnostic imaging between 2014 and 2016 reflected mild 

abnormalities. (R. at 26.) Finally, Plaintiff often denied or did not report fatigue or 

difficulty with ambulating. (R. at 27.) In sum, the Court finds that substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s testimony was not well-supported by 

objective medical evidence. Though Plaintiff argues for a more favorable interpretation of 

the evidence, the ALJ’s findings were rational and supported by substantial evidence, and 

therefore the Court will defer to the ALJ. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 

1989).

The ALJ’s remaining reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony—that his treatment 

and daily activities were inconsistent with the alleged severity of his limitations—are not 

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supported by substantial evidence. For example, though Plaintiff did not pursue more 

aggressive treatment between 2014 and 2016, he explained to his treatment providers and 

the ALJ that he was financially unable to do so until 2018 when his insurance changed. (R. 

at 73–78, 417, 454, 459, 463, 469, 471.) Accordingly, this was an improper basis for the 

ALJ to rely on. See Regenitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 166 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(finding that a claimant cannot be denied benefits because he is unable to pay for medical 

treatment that could improve his condition). Additionally, though Plaintiff performed some 

household chores, the ALJ did not determine, as was required, how frequently he did them 

and the extent to which he took breaks. Therefore, it was improper for her to rely on this 

as evidence that Plaintiff was less disabled than alleged. See Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 

842, 848 (9th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, the ALJ’s errors were harmless because substantial 

evidence supports her overall adverse credibility finding. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162

(“So long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusions on 

credibility and the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate credibility 

conclusion, such is deemed harmless and does not warrant reversal.”) (citations and 

quotations omitted). 

B. The ALJ properly assigned partial weight to the lay witness evidence by 

providing germane reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. 

Plaintiff’s friend, David Cucuzella, completed a Third-Party Function Report in 

August 2016. (R. at 315–22.) The ALJ gave partial weight to Mr. Cucuzella’s statement 

for the same reasons he rejected Plaintiff’s testimony—inconsistency with the medical 

evidence and other evidence of record—and, additionally, because Mr. Cucuzella did not 

report the source of his observations. (R. at 27.) The Court finds that the ALJ properly 

rejected Mr. Cucuzella’s statement. 

The ALJ must consider lay witness evidence when evaluating a claimant’s 

disability. Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006). The 

ALJ may disregard lay witness evidence by providing germane reasons. Nguyen v. Chater, 

100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Here, the ALJ properly rejected Mr. Cucuzella’s statement because it was 

inconsistent with the medical evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (finding that the ALJ need not consider a lay witness statement that is 

inconsistent with the medical evidence of record). Moreover, though the ALJ did not 

discuss the objective evidence in the context of Mr. Cucuzella’s statement, he was not 

required to do so upon finding that Mr. Cucuzella’s statement was similar to Plaintiff’s 

testimony. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012). Finally, the ALJ 

properly discounted Mr. Cucuzella’s statement on the basis that the source of some of his 

observations was unclear given that they only saw each other once per week. See Dodrill 

v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that testimony by a lay witness 

who does not observe the claimant daily may be given some weight) (emphasis added). 

In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ properly assigned partial weight to Mr. 

Cucuzella’s lay witness statement.

C. The ALJ properly rejected the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician 

and NP because she provided sufficient reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence.

In August 2014, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. James Nichols, completed a 

medical assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities. (R. at 394–95.) 

He opined that Plaintiff can sit, stand, and walk for fewer than two hours in an eight-hour 

workday; and can lift and carry fewer than 10 pounds in an eight-hour workday. (R. at 

394.) He opined that it is medically necessary for Plaintiff to alternate between sitting, 

standing, and walking at least every 20 minutes and must rest for at least 15 minutes after 

changing positions. (R. at 394.) He noted that Plaintiff has severe fatigue caused by his 

medications and that he would miss six or more days of work per month due to his 

impairments. (R. at 395.) In July 2015, Plaintiff’s treating NP, Michelle Barnett, completed 

a medical assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities in which she 

opined to the same limitations as Dr. Nichols. (R. at 446–47.) 

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The ALJ gave four reasons for rejecting these opinions. (R. at 28.) First, the opinedto limitations, particularly those resulting from medications, were inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s treatment records. Second, the opinions were not adequately explained. Third, 

the course of treatment prescribed by Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett was conservative given 

the severity of their proffered limitations. Fourth, the opinions were inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s “independent living situation” and “activity level.” (R. at 28.) The Court finds 

that the first two reasons are (1) specific and legitimate, (2) germane, and (3) supported by 

substantial evidence. 

In general, an ALJ must consider medical opinions from multiple sources, 

including treating physicians, examining physicians, nonexamining physicians, and “other 

sources.” See, e.g., Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ is 

responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical evidence. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164

(citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31). In general, a treating physician’s opinion should be 

given controlling weight and may only be rejected “for specific and legitimate reasons that 

are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. The ALJ does so by thoroughly summarizing 

and interpreting the facts and conflicting evidence and making findings. Magallanes v. 

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). “Other sources” are not entitled to the same 

deference as treating physicians, and the ALJ may properly reject their opinions by 

providing a germane reason that is supported by substantial evidence.1 Molina, 674 F.3d at

1111 (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less 

than a preponderance.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).

The ALJ’s first reason for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett—

that they were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s treatment records—was specific and legitimate, 

germane, and supported by substantial evidence. “The ALJ need not accept the opinion of 

any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, or 

inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. Here, the ALJ 

1 For cases that were filed before March 27, 2017, a nurse practitioner is defined as 

an “other source.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1) (2013.)

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observed that the limitations that Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett opined to were due, in part, 

to side effects from Plaintiff’s medications. (R. at 28.) However, treatment records from 

Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett do not contain information to support their opinions. Moreover, 

Plaintiff consistently denied adverse side effects and often reported that he was doing well 

on his medications. (R. at 28, 370, 373, 420, 457, 459, 461, 475, 546.) Though Dr. Nichols 

and NP Barnett opined that Plaintiff’s severe fatigue limited his functionality, Plaintiff 

denied fatigue on numerous occasions. (R. at 369, 372, 375, 378, 512, 518, 529.) In sum, 

the ALJ’s finding that these providers’ opinions were inconsistent with treatment records 

is supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, because the ALJ’s rationale met the 

more exacting specific and legitimate standard required to reject a treating physician’s 

opinion, the Court necessarily finds that the ALJ’s rationale was germane to NP Barnett’s 

identical opinion. 

The ALJ also properly considered the lack of explanation in both opinions. When 

evaluating how much weight to afford a medical opinion, regardless of the source, the ALJ 

should consider, among other factors, how well-supported the opinion is. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(3) (“The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the 

more weight we will give that medical opinion.”). The opinions of Dr. Nichols and NP 

Barnett were in check-box form with no narrative explanation. Plaintiff argues that the 

format of the opinions is inconsequential because the providers’ treatment relationships

with Plaintiff underpinned their assessments. (Pl. Br. at 15.) Plaintiff is correct that the 

regulations permit the ALJ to consider the nature of the treatment relationship and other 

relevant evidence that may support the opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(3). 

However, as the Court previously discussed, the opinions of Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett 

were not well-supported by their own treatment records. Accordingly, the Court finds that 

the ALJ properly rejected their opinions due to inadequate explanation. 

The ALJ’s remaining reasons for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Nichols and NP 

Barnett are not supported by substantial evidence, but her reliance on them was harmless 

error. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162. The ALJ found that the prescribed course of 

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treatment was “inconsistent with what might be expected if the claimant were truly as 

significantly limited” as Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett opined. (R. at 28.) However, as with 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the ALJ improperly considered Plaintiff’s conservative 

treatment where he explained that he could not afford more aggressive treatment. 

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162. Moreover, records reflect that Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett 

recommended additional treatment, but that Plaintiff declined it for financial reasons. (R. 

at 459, 463, 454, 417.) Accordingly, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s 

finding that Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett prescribed a conservative course of treatment. 

Nor does substantial evidence support the ALJ’s finding that the opinions of Dr. 

Nichols and NP Barnett were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s “independent living situation” 

and “activity level.” As with Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the ALJ failed to develop the 

record as to Plaintiff’s daily activities and the extent to which he engaged in them. Without 

more information or explanation, the Court does not find that the medical opinions are 

undermined by Plaintiff’s daily activities. See Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 848.

Nevertheless, despite the two erroneous reasons the ALJ gave for rejecting the 

opinions of Dr. Nichols and NP Barnett, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports 

her decision and therefore affirms it. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the January 16, 2019 decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge. (R. at 15–36.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case.

Dated this 1st day of May, 2020.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

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