Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00309/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00309-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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1 In its papers, Synthes cited to the deposition testimony of Marin dos Reis, Jr.,

GMReis CEO, and filed an excerpt of the transcript. However, the deposition excerpt filed by

Synthes, even when read together with the excerpt filed by GMReis in its reply papers, did not

include all the pages referenced in the points and authorities. The court considered only the facts

supported by the deposition excerpts.

07cv309

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYNTHES (U.S.A.), a Pennsylvania

partnership,

Plaintiff,

v.

G.M. DOS REIS JR. IND. COM. DE

EQUIP. MEDICO A/K/A GMREIS, a

Brazilian corporation,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 07-CV-309-L(AJB)

ORDER (1) GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE

APPLICATION TO FILE

DECLARATION OF I.V. HALL; (2)

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND (3)

DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT

PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

In this patent infringement action, Defendant G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip.

Mexico a/k/a GMReis (“GMReis”), a Brazilian corporation, brought a motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Synthes (U.S.A.) (“Synthes”) opposed the motion.1

 After the

close of briefing, Synthes filed an ex parte application for leave to file declaration of I.V. Hall in

opposition to GMReis motion to dismiss. For good cause having been shown, Synthes’ ex parte

application is GRANTED. In deciding GMReis’ motion to dismiss, the court considered Mr.

Hall’s declaration, attached as Exhibit A to Synthes’ ex parte application. For the reasons which

Case 3:07-cv-00309-L-AJB Document 51 Filed 03/21/08 Page 1 of 11
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follow, GMReis’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The case is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Synthes is a global medical device company which designs, manufactures and markets

skeletal fixation devices. Synthes is the assignee of United States Patent No. 7,127,744 (the

“‘744 Patent”). GMReis is a Brazilian company headquartered in Brazil. It designs,

manufactures and sells orthopedic and neurosurgical medical devices. Synthes alleges GMReis

is subject to personal jurisdiction in this court because it imported into the United States and/or

offered to sell locking bone plates which infringe the ‘744 Patent. Specifically, Synthes alleges

that GMReis displayed the locking plates at the 2007 American Association of Orthopaedic

Surgeons (“AAOS”) Annual Meeting in San Diego, California for the purpose of generating

interest in infringing products to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee. 

The court granted Synthes’ motion to compel jurisdictional discovery. In discovery,

Synthes learned that GMReis attended several trade shows in the United States since 2003. It

exhibited every year for the last five years at the AAOS annual meeting, and exhibited again at

the beginning of March 2008. It exhibited at least once and possibly more often at the North

American Spine Society conference, once at the World Spine, and once at the Brazilian North

American Spine Meeting in New York. In addition, GMReis CEO Geraldo Marin dos Reis, Jr.,

made a presentation at the In Spine and Orthopedics conference. GMReis has made one sale of

its products in the United States to a veterinary supply company, which did not result in repeat

business. GMReis has purchased parts from two suppliers in the past and currently purchases a

product from one supplier in the United States. GMReis resells in Brazil one product it

purchases in the United States. GMReis has purchased one machine in the United States, which

is used in its manufacturing process in Brazil. In addition, GMReis representatives have met and

consulted with two companies in the United States to explore potential suppliers and product

development. Synthes does not contend that the sale for veterinary application in the United

States, any of the parts, products or the machine purchased in the United States or exploratory

contacts in the United States involved the alleged infringing product.

/ / / / /

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GMReis contends it has no offices, employees, distributors or assets in the United States. 

All of its manufacturing is in Brazil. It sells the products it manufactures and also resells some

products purchased elsewhere. The resale part of the business is limited to customers in Brazil. 

Only one to two percent of GMReis income is derived from sales abroad. The remaining 98 to

99 percent is derived from sales in Brazil. GMReis sales abroad are made in Latin America,

Europe and Middle East. GMReis attends trade shows and conferences in those regions. With

the exception of a one-time sale to a veterinary supplier, GMReis does not ship to or sell its

products in the United States because they are not approved by the Food and Drug

Administration (“FDA”). GMReis has not applied for FDA approval. The GMReis booth and

its product literature at trade shows in the United States state that the products are not FDA

approved and are not for sale in the United States. GMReis exhibits at trade shows in the United

States to generate interest in the products among surgeons, medical device distributors and other

medical professionals from outside the Untied States, who often attend conferences and trade

shows in the United States. No United States residents provided contact information at GMReis’

booth at the 2007 AAOS annual meeting to obtain information about its products. Two inquiries

from United States after the 2007 AAOS annual meeting came to GMReis website. The

inquiries were whether certain products will be available in the United States in the future or will

participate in clinical trials for approval in the United States. GMReis responded that its

products are not FDA approved, not available in the United States market, and will not be

launched in the United States. There were no further communications with these two parties. 

Synthes does not contend that the products involved were the allegedly infringing products. No

product sales were made as a result of GMReis’ attendance of the 2007 AAOS annual meeting.

Synthes argues this court has personal jurisdiction based on GMReis’ contacts with

California, or in the alternative, based on GMReis’ contacts with the United States pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). 

The regional circuit law typically applies to “procedural matters that are not unique to

patent law.” Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir.

1994). However, “where the personal jurisdiction inquiry is intimately involved with the

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substance of the patent laws,” Federal Circuit law applies. Elec. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340

F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1564. 

The plaintiff has the burden to show personal jurisdiction. 

[W]here the district court's disposition as to the personal jurisdictional question is

based on affidavits and other written materials in the absence of an evidentiary

hearing, a plaintiff need only to make a prima facie showing that defendants are

subject to personal jurisdiction. In the procedural posture of a motion to dismiss, a

district court must accept the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff's complaint

as true and resolve any factual conflicts in the affidavits in the plaintiff's favor. 

Elec. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1349 (internal citations omitted). 

“There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction - specific and general. Specific jurisdiction

arises out of or relates to the cause of action even if those contacts are isolated and sporadic. 

General jurisdiction arises when a defendant maintains continuous and systematic contacts with

the forum state even when the cause of action has no relation to those contacts.” Trintec Indus.,

Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Prod., Inc., 395 F.3d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). 

Rule 4(k)(2) provides in pertinent part:

Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises under

federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal

jurisdiction over a defendant if: 

(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general

jurisdiction; and

(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and

laws.

The parties cite to no Federal Circuit case law applying Rule 4(k)(2) and the court has not found

any. Furthermore, Rule 4(k)(2) does not involve procedural issues unique to patent law and is

not intimately involved with the substance of the patent laws. The court therefore looks to Ninth

Circuit case law for application of this rule. 

Rule 4(k)(2) applies to general and specific jurisdiction. See Holland Am. Line Inc. v.

Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted), citing

Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sheritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing both

general and specific jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2)). 

Rule 4(k)(2) is not limited to the contours of a state longarm statute. Instead, a

court may exercise jurisdiction when three requirements are met. First, the claim

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against the defendant must arise under federal law . . .. Second, the defendant

must not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general

jurisdiction. Third, the federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction must

comport with due process.

Holland Am. Line, 485 F.3d at 461 (internal citations omitted). 

As to the first requirement, it is undisputed that Synthes’ patent claim arises under federal

law. As to the second requirement, 

If . . . the defendant contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses

to identify any other [state] where suit is possible, then the federal court is entitled

to use Rule 4(k)(2). This procedure makes it unnecessary to traipse through the 50

states, asking whether each could entertain the suit. 

Id., quoting ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2001). 

GMReis strenuously argues it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in California, and asserts that

no forum in the United States would be appropriate. (Def.’s Mem. of P.&A. at 13 n.8.) 

Accordingly, the second requirement does not preclude the use of Rule 4(k)(2).

As to the third requirement, “[t]he due process analysis under Rule 4(k)(2) is nearly

identical to traditional personal jurisdiction analysis with one significant difference: rather than

considering contacts between the [defendant] and the forum state, we consider contacts with the

nation as a whole.” Holland Am. Line, 485 F.3d at 462 (citations omitted). 

To be subject to general jurisdiction, a defendant’s contacts with the forum must be

“continuous and systematic.” Helicopteros Nacionles de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,

416 (1984); LSI Indus. Inc. v Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has outlined a specific test to follow

when analyzing whether a defendant’s activities within the state are ‘continuous and

systematic.’” LSI Indus., 232 F.3d at 1375.

The totality of Synthes’ general jurisdiction argument is, “Notwithstanding the failure of

GMReis to provide adequate discovery regarding its business activities in the United States, the

evidence uncovered to date demonstrates the ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts that justify

the

/ / / / /

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2 This argument is followed by the statement, “But, in this patent infringement

action, the issue whether general jurisdiction exists is irrelevant.” (Opp’n at 14.) It is unclear

whether Synthes intended to assert a general jurisdiction argument at all.

3 To the extent the court’s order filed January 8, 2008 is inconsistent with this

authority, it is hereby amended.

07cv309

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/ / / / /

exercise of general jurisdiction.”2

 (Opp’n at 14.) GMReis’ contacts with the United States are

no more continuous and systematic than the contacts found to be insufficient in Helicopteros

Nacionles de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall. The court therefore finds that GMReis is not subject to

general jurisdiction in the United States.

The court next considers whether GMReis’ contacts subject it to specific jurisdiction.

To determine whether jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant comports with

due process, we look to whether (1) the defendant purposefully directed its

activities at residents of the forum state, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the

defendant's activities with the forum state, and (3) assertion of personal jurisdiction

is reasonable and fair. The first two factors correspond to the “minimum contacts”

prong of the . . . analysis [under Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)],

and the third factor with the “fair play and substantial justice” prong. While the

plaintiff bears the burden to establish minimum contacts, upon this showing,

defendants must prove that the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable.

Elec. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1350. For purposes of specific jurisdiction in a patent

infringement case, the court may consider defendant’s contacts with the forum before the grant

of the patent.3

 See Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1458 (Fed. Cir.

1997). 

It is undisputed that GMReis displayed its products at several trade shows in the United

States over several years. Synthes does not dispute that GMReis did not have FDA approval for

sale or use of its products in the United States, that its trade show displays and brochures

prominently disclosed that fact or that its intent was to attract interest from potential foreign

purchasers and not purchasers from the United States. Synthes relies heavily on 3D Systems Inc.

v. Aerotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), to support its argument the GMReis is

subject to specific jurisdiction. 3D Systems is not analogous, however. In 3D Systems the

defendant, among other contacts, sent offers to sell to and solicited orders of the allegedly

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infringing product from the forum residents. 160 F.3d at 1378. The court therefore found that

its actions were purposefully directed at the forum state residents. Id. This is not the case here,

where GMReis expressly discouraged the forum residents from purchasing its products. Based

on the foregoing, the court cannot find that GMReis’ trade show activity demonstrates that

GMReis purposefully directed its activities at United States residents. 

On the other hand, GMReis had other contacts with the United States. It purchased

certain parts and products, it made a sale to one customer for a veterinary application, and it

explored supplier and product development options in the United States. In contrast with trade

shows, these additional activities appear to have been purposefully directed at United States

residents. GMReis’ contacts with the United States therefore meet the first element of the

minimum contacts analysis.

As to the second element, Synthes must show that its patent infringement claim arises out

of or relates GMReis’ activities in the United States. In support of its argument that Synthes’

patent infringement claim does not arise out of and is not related to its activities in the United

States, GMReis argues that its activities in the United States were insufficient for patent

infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) by offering to sell or importing an infringing device. The

court need not address this issue. “It is jurisdiction that is at issue, not liability for patent

infringement.” Genetic Implant Sys., 123 F.3d at 1458. 

Although the nexus necessary to satisfy the “arise out of or related to” requirement

of the due process inquiry has not been clearly delineated by the Supreme Court, 

. . . it is significant that the constitutional catch-phrase is disjunctive in nature,

indicating an added flexibility and signaling a relaxation of the applicable standard

from a pure “arise out of” standard.

Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The “arise out of or related to”

requirement is not as stringent as to require a plaintiff to show liability or that plaintiff’s

allegations be sufficient to state a claim. See 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351 at 269 (3d ed. 2004). Because GMReis’ trade show

activity was not directed at the United States residents, the trade show contacts do not support

jurisdiction. GMReis’ other contacts with the United States, however, are unrelated to Synthes’

patent infringement claim, which is entirely based on GMReis’ alleged display of certain

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infringing locking bone plates at the 2007 AAOS annual meeting.

For the foregoing reasons, Synthes has not met its burden to make a prima facie showing

that GMReis’ minimum contacts with the United States were sufficient to establish specific

personal jurisdiction. The court therefore need not consider whether the assertion of personal

jurisdiction in the United States would be reasonable and fair or whether GMReis’ contacts with

the State of California would be sufficient for specific jurisdiction.

In a footnote, Synthes argues that personal jurisdiction could be based on personal service

in the forum. While Mr. Reis was attending the AAOS trade show in February 2007, Synthes

served him with the summons and the complaint. 

Synthes relies on the proposition that a non-resident’s transitory physical presence in the

forum is one of the traditional bases of personal jurisdiction:

Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American

tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are

physically present in the State. The view developed early that each State had the

power to hale before its courts any individual who could be found within its

borders, and that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by properly

serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to enter judgment

against him, no matter how fleeting his visit. 

Burnham v. Super. Ct. (Burnham), 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 

However, in Burnham this principle was applied only to an individual in his individual capacity. 

It has not been applied to corporations. Although Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining

Company alludes to it in the context of a corporation, 342 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1952), its holding

that due process did not preclude the exercise of personal jurisdiction was based on the analysis

of the corporation’s contacts with the forum, see id. at 447-48. The reasoning of Burnham is

consistent. It noted that “corporations . . . have never fitted comfortably in a jurisdictional

regime based primarily upon ‘de facto power over the defendant’s person.’” Burnham, 495 U.S.

610 n.1, quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 

Synthes’ argument is also based on Oyuela v. Seacor Marine (Nigeria), Inc., 290 F. Supp.

2d 713 (E.D. La. 2003). For the relevant proposition, Ouyela relies on Northern Light

Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001). Northern Light held that

personal service on an individual defendant in the forum state was sufficient to confer personal

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jurisdiction over that defendant. Id. at 63-64. The personally served defendant was sued in his

individual capacity but was also an officer of the remaining two defendants who were business

entities. Id. at 63 n.10. Without discussing the issue or citing any legal authority, the court

expressed its belief that personal service on the individual also conferred personal jurisdiction on

the entity defendants. Id. Defendants had not briefed and had waived this issue. Id. at 64. 

Northern Light is therefore not persuasive on the point that personal service in the forum on a

corporate officer confers personal jurisdiction over the corporation. Furthermore, Oyuela is not

binding and, based on the foregoing, not persuasive. See also Wenche Siemer v. Learjet

Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Burnham did not involve a corporation

and did not decide any jurisdictional issue pertaining to corporations.”) The court therefore

finds that Synthes cannot base personal jurisdiction over GMReis solely on personal service of

its CEO in the United States.

Last, Synthes argues the court should assert personal jurisdiction over GMReis as a

sanction for failure to comply with its jurisdictional discovery requests as ordered in the January

8, 2008 order. Sanctioning a party pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) for failure to comply with

jurisdictional discovery orders by presuming it is subject to personal jurisdiction does not in

itself violate due process. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinea, 456

U.S. 694 (1982). Because the court finds that the sanction would be unjust under the

circumstances of this case, the court declines to sanction GMReis by finding it subject to

personal jurisdiction.

Synthes contends that GMReis failed to produce several categories of documents

pertaining to trade shows and communications with persons in the United States about the

purchase or sale of products or components to or by GMReis. (Opp’n at 5-6.) In addition,

Synthes was unable to depose Jose Luiz Landa Lecumberri. 

Synthes deposed Mr. Reis in his personal capacity and on behalf of GMReis pursuant to

Rule 30(b)(6). He testified that his staff and Mr. Lecumberri made a search for the documents

requested and produced all the responsive documents GMReis had. (See Reis Dep. at 40 et seq.) 

To the extent documents were not produced, Mr. Reis testified on the subject matter of the

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/ / / / /

document requests. The court therefore cannot find that GMReis violated the January 8, 2008

order.

On January 8, 2008, the court ordered that Messrs. Reis and Lecumberri’s depositions be

taken in the United States under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than in Brazil under

discovery laws of Brazil. The court also informed the parties that due to their four prior joint

motions to continue the briefing schedules and hearing dates on GMReis’ motion to dismiss, it

would not entertain any further requests for continuances related to this motion. 

Pursuant to GMReis’ offer, Synthes noticed the depositions for February 11, 2008. On

February 10, GMReis informed Synthes counsel that Mr. Lecumberri’s wife had been

hospitalized with Dengue fever. Mr. Lecumberri therefore could not travel to the United States

for deposition, but could be made available upon his wife’s recovery. On February 11, Mr. Reis

was deposed. On February 19, Synthes filed its opposition papers without the benefit of Mr.

Lecumberri’s deposition. From March 5 to 8, GMReis exhibited at the AAOS annual meeting in

San Francisco, California, with Mr. Lecumberri in attendance. GMReis’ counsel explains that

due to a miscommunication with his client, Mr. Lecumberri was not offered for deposition at that

time. At some time prior to Synthes’ ex parte application to file declaration of I.V. Hall, the

counsel met and conferred regarding the declaration, but did not discuss resolving the issue of

Mr. Lecumberri’s deposition.

The cooperation and communication between counsel in this case leaves much to be

desired. GMReis was aware of Synthes’ request to depose Mr. Lecumberri, but apparently did

not adequately follow through with him to provide Synthes with available dates. On the other

hand, it appears that Synthes did not follow through after February 11 in an attempt to

reschedule Mr. Lecumberri’s deposition, but silently waited for a call from GMReis. In

addition, Synthes did not contact the Magistrate Judge for resolution of this discovery issue, see

Civ. Loc. R. 72.1(b) & 26.1(e), and did not meet and confer with GMReis in an attempt to

resolve it as required by Civil Local Rule 26.1(a) prior to filing any Rule 37 motions. Moreover,

after the close of briefing , Synthes sought leave to file Mr. Hall’s declaration to further support

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its opposition to GMReis’ motion to dismiss. It did not seek leave to do the same with any

information it may have obtained from Mr. Lecumberri’s belated deposition. Synthes’

predicament is therefore at least in part caused by its own conduct. Imposing sanctions on

GMReis would therefore be unjust.

Furthermore, not deposing Mr. Lecumberri does not prejudice Synthes. Synthes intended

to depose Mr. Lecumberri about communications with customers and potential customers before,

during and after trade shows, including communications about pricing. (Id. at 6-7.) Because

GMReis’ trade show activities were not directed to United States residents, Mr. Lecumberri’s

deposition would not change the court’s findings regarding personal jurisdiction. 

For the foregoing reasons, Synthes’ ex parte application to file declaration of I.V. Hall is

GRANTED. GMReis’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of personal jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 21, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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