Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04566/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04566-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN FERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

A. P. KANE, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-4566 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Martin Fernandez, a prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, filed this

pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before

the court for consideration of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the reasons discussed

below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Martin Fernandez was convicted in Los Angeles County Superior Court of second degree

murder and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to a term of 15-tolife plus three years in prison in 1981. His habeas petition does not concern that conviction

directly, but instead focuses on an August 23, 2002 decision by a panel of the Board of Prison

Terms ("BPT") finding him not suitable for parole. 

The BPT identified several factors in support of its determination that Fernandez was not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public

safety if he was released. The factors identified included the circumstances of the offense, preoffense behavior, in-prison behavior, and inadequate parole plans. The specifics regarding the

crime and the circumstances supporting the finding of unsuitability are described in the

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Discussion section later in this order.

Fernandez sought relief in the California courts. The Los Angeles County Superior Court

denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2004 in a reasoned order. See Lodgment # 7.

The California Court of Appeal summarily denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus and the

California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review.

Fernandez then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This action started

in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and, after some proceedings were

held and the matter was fully briefed, was transferred to this district. In his First Amended

Petition, Fernandez alleges the following claims: (1) the BPT's denial of parole based on the

evidence presented and the Governor's failure to review and reverse that decision violated his

right to due process, (2) there is no evidence that his crime was more egregious than other

second degree murders, (3) there is no evidence that he poses a threat based on psychological

reasons or failure to participate in programming, and (4) the BPT failed to apply the matrix.

Claims 1-3 involve a question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the decision, claim

1 also presents an argument that due process required the Governor to review the decision, and

claim 4 concerns the state law requirements regarding a sentence matrix. Respondent filed an

answer. Petitioner did not file a traverse. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action occurred at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, in Monterey County, California,

within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

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judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that

state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner challenging

the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency Of Evidence Claim

1. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support a Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process in

the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1

(1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

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supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. Id. at 1128 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that 'the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). The some evidence

standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law in the parole context for purposes

of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

Furthermore, and of key importance, the parole board is not precluded from relying on

unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the petitioner's preoffense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. at 1129 (commitment offenses in

combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support denial of parole). The

familiar argument that the BPT cannot rely on these factors is based on the Ninth Circuit's

statements in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), that suggested that the value of

the criminal offense fades over time as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s

decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors

considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance

of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at

916-17. In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release date based solely

on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before incarceration, but cautioned that

“[o]ver time . . . , should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of

rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and

prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916.

These statements were dicta and not clearly established federal law as set forth by the Supreme

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Court, such that the state court's refusal to adopt the Biggs reasoning would be a decision

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as set forth by the

Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit recently backed away from the Biggs statements, and

confirmed that these statements from Biggs were dicta and were inappropriate under § 2254.

See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. "Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about how future

parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. What little guidance has come

from the Supreme Court suggests that judicial review should be extremely deferential to the

original decision-maker in the parole context. In addition to the very low evidentiary standard

that Superintendent v. Hill imposes, other Supreme Court comments suggest that the judiciary

should be quite mindful of the subjective and predictive nature of a parole board's decision. See

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13. "No ideal, error-free way to make parole-release decisions has been

developed; the whole question has been and will continue to be the subject of experimentation

involving analysis of psychological factors combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical

experience of the actual parole decisionmakers in predicting future behavior. Our system of

federalism encourages this state experimentation." Id.; see also id. at 8.

Past criminal conduct is not some arbitrary factor like eye color that has nothing to do

with present dangerousness. Recidivism concerns are genuine. See Ewing v. California, 538

U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (O'Connor J.) (noting a report stating that over 60% of violent offenders were

arrested again within three years of their release). California's parole scheme does not offend

due process by allowing the BPT to predict that an inmate presents a present danger based on

a murder he committed many years ago.

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets the

criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to answer the

question, "'some evidence' of what?"

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The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the prisoner has an

unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual offense, the prisoner

has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and negative institutional

behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances tending to show suitability

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2. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A first

degree murder conviction yields a minimum term of 25 years to life and a second degree murder

conviction yields a base term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1061, 1078 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 92 (2005); Cal. Penal Code § 190. The upshot

of California's parole scheme described below is that a release date normally must be set unless

various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPT panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect

to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial

Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release

dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the panel "shall

set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code

§ 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for offenses

of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."1

 The regulation also

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for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social history, signs of remorse, a stressful

motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered from battered woman's syndrome, lack

of criminal history, the present age reduces the probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or developed marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

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provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on

parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). The panel may

consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes.

See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For example, for second degree murders, the matrix of base

terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years to a high of 19, 20, or 21 years, depending on

some of the facts of the crime. Some prisoners estimate their time to serve based only on the

matrix. However, going straight to the matrix to calculate the sentence puts the cart before the

horse because it ignores critical language in the relevant statute and regulations that requires him

first to be found suitable for parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th at 1070-71. Under state law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the prisoner is

found suitable for parole. Id. at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he panel shall set

a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). The California Supreme

Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this federal habeas action. See

Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can alone

support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the prisoner

is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before

concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for

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the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th

616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he nature of the prisoner's

offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole" but might violate due process

"where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or

violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense"). 

 3. Some Evidence Supports The BPT's Decision In Fernandez's Case

The BPT identified several factors supporting its decision to find Fernandez unsuitable

for parole, i.e., the circumstances of the offense, pre-offense behavior, in-prison behavior, and

inadequate parole plans. The Los Angeles County Superior Court upheld the decision in a

reasoned order. See Lodgment # 7. The Los Angeles court stated that some evidence had to

support the decision and found that some evidence did support the decision. See id. at 1-2. The

state court applied the correct legal standard, as evidenced by its citation to In re Rosenkrantz,

29 Cal. 4th at 667, which had cited and adopted the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence

standard as the proper standard for judicial review of evidentiary sufficiency for parole denial

cases. See Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 665-67. Because the Los Angeles County Superior

Court's decision is the last reasoned decision, that is the decision to which 2254(d) applies. See

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92

(9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041 (2006). 

a. Commitment Offense

The BPT considered the circumstances of the murder and concluded that it was an carried

out in an especially cruel manner. The BPT determined that the offense was carried out in a

manner that demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering and was for

a trivial motive. In response to some boys chasing him off high school grounds where he was

playing handball, the 19-year old Fernandez went home, got his two brothers and a knife, and

went back to the school. A fight ensued, during which Fernandez stabbed the 14-year old

victim. RT 52-53. Fernandez does not challenge the recitation of the facts of the crime by the

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BPT or by the state court, although he may disagree with the meaning of those facts. 

A circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for parole is that the prisoner "committed

the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in determining whether that circumstance exists are

that there were multiple victims, "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder," "[t]he victim was abused, defiled or mutilated

during or after the offense," "[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering," and "[t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). The

BPT considered a circumstance and factors proper under California law. 

There was some evidence in the record to support the BPT's determination that the

circumstances of the commitment offense indicated unsuitability. The record supported a

determination that murder was committed in a very cruel and callous manner in that multiple

victims were attacked, even if only one was killed. The motive for the killing was very trivial:

Fernandez killed a boy for chasing him off a playground. There also was some evidence that

Fernandez and possibly the victim had different gang affiliations. RT 9. The BPT identified

more than the minimum elements of a second degree murder when it determined that Fernandez

committed the murder in a very cruel manner and with an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering, as Fernandez had gone home after the initial encounter with the victim, had

retrieved human support and weapons (i.e., he and his two brothers returned with a knife and

steel bars, according to one report, see Lodgment #2) to return to deal with the people who had

just chased him off the playground. See RT 8-9. That evidence suggests a planned attack, and

that planning as well as the assault with a deadly weapon on two other victims shows more than

the minimum elements of a second degree murder. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071. 

b. Pre-Offense Behavior

The BPT also relied on Fernandez's pre-offense history for its determination that he was

not suitable for parole. Fernandez committed the murder while he was on parole from the

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California Youth Authority. RT 53. "The prisoner has, on previous occasions, inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim. An escalating pattern of conduct and he has failed

previous grants of probation. He also has failed to profit from society's previous attempts to

correct his criminality. Such attempts include juvenile probation, a CYA commitment, and

parole." RT 53. He had an unstable social history and prior criminality including arrests for

grand theft auto, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon." RT 53. The record supported

these findings. 

Consideration of and reliance on Fernandez's pre-offense criminal history was not

improper. Although the prisoner's "previous record of violence" on a victim is a specifically

listed circumstance and non-violent criminal history is not specifically listed as a circumstance

that tends to indicate unsuitability, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(2), the list of circumstances

in § 2402(c) is non-exclusive, and § 2402(b) specifically allows the BPT to consider a great

range of relevant and reliable information, such as the prisoner's "past criminal history, including

involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented." Fernandez's prior

criminal activity, as well as the fact that he was on parole could be considered by the BPT as

tending to show unsuitability. See RT 10-14 (describing numerous encounters with police).

Although the state court referred to Fernandez's juvenile record as including "convictions" for

burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, drunk driving and robbery, see Lodgment # 7, p. 1, none

of these crimes led to actual convictions because he was a juvenile. See Lodgement # 2.

Fernandez had admitted a significant history of criminal activity before committing this crime,

regardless of the disposition of the charges: when he was 15 he was put on probation for being

in a place where marijuana was smoked, he took his uncle's car without permission, he had

burglarized a truck, he had gone joyriding, he had been drunk in public, he had been drunk

driving, he had been arrested while in a stolen car, and he had been committed to the CYA after

being arrested for robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. RT 10-14. When he killed his

victim, he had been on parole for about seven months. RT 14. And he had stabbed someone

else a few years before the murder. RT 41.

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Respondent submitted evidence that Fernandez received two new CDC-115s after the

denial of his parole in 2002. See Lodgment #5. CDC-115s received after the hearing were not

considered by the BPT at the 2002 hearing (as they did not then exist), were not relied upon by

the state court and were not relied upon by this court. They may be of great significance in

consideration of a challenge to the 2004 BPT decision, but have no bearing on the challenge to

the 2002 decision. 

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c. In-Prison Behavior

The BPT found that Fernandez had not demonstrated sufficient positive change in prison.

He had received seven CDC 128s (counseling reports, the last of which was in 1994), and six

CDC-115s (serious rules violation reports, the last of which was in 1997).2

 The 1997 CDC-115

was for possession of about a half pound of yeast which he was attempting to hide, which the

BPT reasonably saw as preparatory to making home-made alcohol. The psychological report

indicated a few problems, such as that Fernandez's "'understanding of this crime is rather

superficial and concrete'" and he had a significant risk of return to crime if he continued to abuse

alcohol and/or drugs. RT 54.

Consideration of and reliance on Fernandez's prison behavior was not improper. His

CDC-115s properly could be considered under § 2402(c)(6), which states that serious

misconduct in prison tends to indicate unsuitability. His CDC-128s properly could be

considered under § 2402(b) as pertaining to his social history and mental state. His superficial

understanding of his crime is certainly not a "serious mental problem" within the meaning of the

circumstance specifically enumerated as tending to show unsuitability, see § 2402(c)(5), but

could be considered under § 2402(b), which specifically allows the BPT to consider a great

range of relevant and reliable information, such as the prisoner's "past and present attitude

toward the crime," social history and mental state. 

Fernandez strongly disputes this finding of the BPT and argues that there was no evidence

that he had psychological problems that could support the denial of parole. The court disagrees.

Fernandez's lack of insight into the crime would not alone support denial of parole, but could

with the other information tend to show unsuitability. The BPT was reasonably concerned about

the risk of Fernandez returning to alcohol abuse. Although Fernandez stated he had participated

in AA and NA 12-step type programs whenever he had the opportunity, he was unfamiliar with

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basic parts thereof. See RT 20-28, 32, 46. The BPT reasonably could view the overall picture

based on the individual parts -- i.e., the prisoner's lack of insight into the crime, plus the risk of

him returning to alcohol abuse that would increase the likelihood of failure on parole, plus his

institutional involvement with alcohol manufacture, plus his questionable commitment to alcohol

education program – as one that tended to indicate unsuitability. "Circumstances which taken

alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results

in a finding of unsuitability." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

 

d. Parole Plans

The BPT's decision to find Fernandez unsuitable was based also on the BPT's belief that

his parole plans were lacking in certainty in that he had no letters actually offering him a job or

a place to live, and he had not made arrangements for AA participation after he was released.

RT 54. 

The BPT properly could consider the uncertain nature of the parole plans in support of

its decision under § 2402(b), which allows the BPT to consider "any other information which

bears on the prisoner's suitability for release." As the BPT noted, there was no evidence in the

record, such as letters of support, that supported Fernandez's stated plan that he was going to live

with his brother and obtain a job in his father's landscaping business.

e. There Was Enough Evidence To Support The Decision 

The BPT noted that Fernandez had various in-prison achievements, but concluded that

the positive factors did not outweigh the factors discussed above showing unsuitability. The

factors listed by the BPT in support of its determination that Fernandez was not suitable for

parole had some evidentiary support. And the factors were factors that could be considered in

determining parole suitability. The Los Angeles County Superior Court's rejection of

Fernandez's insufficient evidence claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard. Fernandez is not entitled to the writ on this

claim.

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B. Other Claims

Fernandez claims that the Governor's failure to review and reverse the decision of the

BPT violated his right to due process. This claim is meritless. The preceding section explains

that there was sufficient evidence to support the BPT's decision, so the claim fails insofar as it

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. To the extent he claims that the Governor had to

review his case, state law provides for discretionary review by the Governor and federal law

does not require any review by the Governor. Fernandez therefore had no federal due process

right to further review by the Governor. Due process does not include a requirement that there

be a further review a parole board's decision within the executive branch of a state government

after a parole board has made. The state court's rejection of the claim that due process required

gubernatorial review of the BPT's decision will not be set aside because there is no clearly

established federal law as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court for the state court to have acted

contrary to or to have applied in an unreasonable way. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Fernandez's fourth claim is that the matrix was not properly applied. As explained earlier,

the matrix is not consulted and a term is not set under state law unless and until the prisoner is

found suitable for parole. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2403(a). Fernandez was not found suitable for parole and therefore the matrix did not need to

be consulted. Even if Fernandez had a due process right in having state law followed by the

parole authority, state law was followed by the parole authority. The claim has no merit. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. The clerk shall close the

file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 20, 2006 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-04566-SI Document 2 Filed 10/24/06 Page 14 of 14