Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00188/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00188-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG FARLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16CV188 LAB (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO 

DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Craig Farley (“Petitioner” or “Farley”) has filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted of first degree 

murder, robbery, and burglary.

1

 (Lodgment 3, Part 1 at 85, 92, 96.) The jury additionally 

found Petitioner committed the murder while engaged in a robbery and burglary, that

Petitioner committed all three crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and that 

while acting as a principal another principal used and personally discharged a firearm 

proximately causing great bodily injury or death. (Id. at 88-91.) The jury also found 

Petitioner committed the burglary and robbery in an inhabited dwelling. (Id. at 92, 96.) 

 

1 Case No. SCD 229026 in the Superior Court of San Diego County

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 42
2

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus an additional 

consecutive sentence of 25 years to life. (Lodgment 1, Part 14 at 3088.) 

The Court addresses nine claims2for habeas relief: (1) ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel for failing to introduce evidence of witnesses’ failure to identify him in a 

live police line-up; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present 

evidence of innocent explanations for Petitioner’s behavior following the murder; (3) 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise insufficiency of the 

evidence for first degree murder; (4) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel 

for failing to raise a Batson/Wheeler challenge; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

for failing to raise third-party culpability as to Leroy Thomas; (6) admission of 

inadmissible gang expert opinion; (7) juror misconduct; (8) admission of evidence of 

Petitioner’s tattoos; and (9) exclusion of evidence of third-party culpability as to David 

Foster. (Pet. [ECF No. 1]

3

.) Respondent filed an Answer and Petitioner filed a Traverse. 

[ECF Nos. 18, 26.]

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Larry A. Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After consideration

of the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, as well as lodgments and 

exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court recommends the Petition be DENIED.

 

2

In an effort to address all the issues potentially raised by Petitioner, the Court has 

organized the issues raised in the Petition into nine claims. In analyzing each, the Court 

notes where each was identified in the Petition and, if applicable, any corresponding 

ground identified in the Petition. As the Court explains in more detail below, three of the 

claims the Court addresses were not identified as “grounds” for relief in the Petition, but 

rather, were listed as claims that were raised on collateral review before the state courts. 

3 All citations to the Petition are to the ECF chronological page numbers for ease of 

reference.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 42
3

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 

35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn 

from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). Accordingly, the 

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s November 14, 2014

opinion:

A. The murder

Victim Jonathan Pleasant sold marijuana from his apartment. He often 

possessed considerable amounts of marijuana, which he kept in a 

backpack, as well as large amounts of cash. Pleasant kept a gun by his 

bed, and sometimes carried the gun on his person.

Pleasant spent the evening of June 28, 2010 at home with his 

girlfriend, Esther Magnus. During the evening, Pleasant left the 

apartment with about $2,000 in cash. He returned with several bags of 

marijuana. At about 10:30 p.m. that evening, Farley came to 

Pleasant’s apartment. While at the apartment, the two men smoked 

marijuana and discussed a marijuana purchase. Farley said that he did 

not have money, but that he would return. Ten minutes later, Farley 

returned and told Pleasant that he would come back the following 

morning to buy the marijuana. Farley departed the apartment.

The next morning, Pleasant and Magnus discussed their plan to go out 

together that day. At approximately 11:15 a.m., Magnus left 

Pleasant’s apartment. The two planned for Pleasant to meet Magnus at 

her residence just after noon. Magnus testified that before she left, 

Pleasant told her that he was waiting for Farley to come to the 

apartment. Pleasant also told Magnus that his friend, Corey Wishom, 

was planning to stop by the apartment, as well.

As Magnus was leaving, Pleasant’s neighbor, Mark Dobie, came to 

the apartment and smoked marijuana with Pleasant. While the two 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 42
4

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

visited, Pleasant received a phone call. Dobie heard Pleasant tell the 

caller to “hurry up and come” because Pleasant had to leave soon.

Soon thereafter, Wishom arrived at Pleasant’s apartment. Dobie met 

Wishom and then went back to his own apartment. Pleasant showed 

his marijuana to Wishom, who purchased some. Following a short 

visit, Wishom said goodbye to Pleasant and began to leave the 

apartment.

As Wishom was leaving, two men arrived at Pleasant’s door. Pleasant 

said to one of the men, “Oh, I've been waiting for you.” One of the 

men stepped into the living room and said, “This is my brother and 

he’s cool.” Wishom testified that both men were African–American. 

The man who said, “[t]his is my brother and he’s cool” was wearing 

black Nike shoes, black basketball shorts, white socks pulled up to his 

knees, a black hoodie, and a backpack strapped to his chest. The man 

had short clipped hair and a tattoo on the top of one of his arms. Apart 

from his race, Wishom was unable to provide any further description 

of the second man. After this short encounter, which occurred at 

approximately 11:30 a.m., Wishom left the apartment.

Pleasant’s neighbor, Lynshel Reid–Jones, testified that at about this 

time, she heard a melee and a loud “boom” come from Pleasant’s 

apartment. Reid–Jones then heard Pleasant crying for help. Reid–

Jones looked outside and saw two young African–American males 

sprinting from Pleasant’s apartment with a backpack that she believed 

belonged to Pleasant.

At 11:44 a.m., Dobie received a phone call from his sister, Breanna 

Sandle, saying that she had just seen two men running from the 

apartment complex and that it appeared that someone had been 

robbed. Sandle testified that she saw two African–American males, 

who appeared to be in their 20s, running from the apartment complex. 

One of the men was wearing a backpack. When shown a photographic 

lineup by police, Sandle focused on two of the photographs, one of 

which depicted Farley, before telling the officer that she could not be 

sure whether he was one of the men she had seen fleeing the 

apartment complex.

Immediately after the shooting, several neighbors attempted to help 

Pleasant, who was bleeding profusely. Pleasant cried, “ ‘They shot 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 42
5

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

me. They shot me. Oh, God, they shot me.’ ” Emergency personnel 

responded to the apartment and pronounced Pleasant dead at the 

scene.

B. The crime scene

Investigators determined that Pleasant sustained a large gunshot 

wound to his right buttock. The nature of the wound suggested that 

Pleasant had been shot from a range of approximately one to three feet 

away. Pleasant also suffered blunt force trauma to his head, consistent 

with his having been struck by a gun.

Pleasant’s apartment was in disarray, consistent with a struggle or 

fight having occurred. Police found a slide from a firearm, handcuffs, 

and a handcuff key in a hallway. Police also found an open, empty 

safe on the floor of a bedroom and a bag of marijuana on the living 

room floor. In addition, police found a black Pittsburgh Pirates 

baseball cap in the living room and a roll of duct tape in the bathroom.

C. DNA and fingerprint evidence

Investigators determined that Farley’s DNA was on the duct tape. 

Police found DNA from a person named Pierre Terry on the baseball 

cap. Terry’s DNA was also found on the gun slide, on blood samples 

collected from the apartment, and in fingernail scrapings taken from 

Pleasant. Terry’s fingerprints were also found on artwork in the living 

room.

D. Cell phone records

On the morning of the murder, several short calls were made between 

Farley’s and Pleasant’s cell phones, between 10:37 a.m. and 10:39 

a.m. At 11:30 on the morning of the murder, the signal from an 

outgoing phone call made on Farley’s phone that lasted 59 seconds 

terminated at a cell phone tower located on Pleasant’s apartment 

building. A text message was sent from Terry’s phone to Farley’s 

phone at 11:33 a.m. From 11:31 a.m. until 11:48 a.m. there was no 

activity on Farley’s cell phone. Beginning at 11:50 a.m., Farley and 

Terry exchanged numerous text messages. Less than two hours later, a 

request was made to Farley’s cell phone provider for a new phone 

number. The request was granted. Cell phone records for Farley’s new 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 42
6

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

cell phone number showed him leaving California the following 

morning and traveling across the United States to Louisiana.

E. Farley’s arrest, escape and rearrest

Approximately a month and a half after the murder, authorities in 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana arrested Farley and took him to a police 

station. Farley escaped from the station and ran down a nearby street. 

With the assistance of a police dog, police found Farley hiding in a 

garbage can.

While being transported back to San Diego, Farley asked one of the 

officers if he could be charged with a gang crime because the other 

defendant was a gang member. While the officer had made some 

statements about the case to Farley, he had not said anything to Farley 

about the other defendant in the case being a gang member.

Police found several items in a Baton Rouge hotel room where Farley 

had been staying, including a laptop computer. It was later determined 

that searches had been performed on the computer related to the 

murder and the ensuing investigation.

F. Gang Evidence

Detective Joseph Castillo of the San Diego Police Department 

testified as a gang expert. Detective Castillo stated that the Skyline 

“Piru” gang is the largest African–American gang in San Diego. Gang 

members wear the color red and sometimes wear Pittsburgh Pirates 

baseball caps. Detective Castillo stated that the primary activities of 

the Skyline Piru gang include murder and robbery.

Castillo testified that Pierre Terry is a documented Skyline gang 

member and that Farley also appeared to be a Skyline Piru gang 

member, although he had not previously been documented. In 

addition, . . . Castillo offered his opinion that a hypothetical crime 

based on the evidence in this case would benefit, promote, assist and 

further the criminal conduct of the Skyline Piru gang.

(Lodgment 6. at 3-8.)

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 42
7

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)); 

robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211); and burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 459). (Lodgment 3, 

Part 1 at 85, 92, 96.) The jury additionally found Petitioner committed the murder while 

engaged in a robbery and burglary, (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)), that Petitioner 

committed all three crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang, (Cal. Penal Code § 

186.22(b)(1)), and that while acting as a principal another principal used and personally 

discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or death, (Cal. Penal Code § 

122022.53(b)-(d), (e)(1). (Lodgment 3; Part 1 at 88-91.) The jury also found Petitioner 

committed the burglary and robbery in an inhabited dwelling, (Cal. Penal Code § 

212.5(a)). (Lodgment 3, Part 1 at 92, 96.) 

B. Procedural Background

Following multiple days of testimony before the trial court on Petitioner’s motion 

for a new trial approximately a year after Petitioner was convicted, including testimony 

from his trial counsel, Petitioner’s parents, and Petitioner, the trial court found Petitioner 

was not entitled to a new trial. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Fourth District Court of 

Appeal in which he argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial 

counsel’s failure to present evidence he was not identified by two witnesses in live police 

line-ups and innocent explanations for his departure to Louisiana immediately after the 

murder, his internet search history, and the changing of his phone number the day of the 

murder. (Lodgment 4 at 9-21.) He additionally argued the trial court erred in admitting 

gang expert testimony, failing to question a juror regarding potential misconduct, 

admitting evidence of Petitioner’s tattoos, and failing to allow evidence of third-party 

culpability as to David Foster, the victim’s brother. (Id. at 21-43.) 

The Court of Appeal found no ineffective assistance of counsel and no error by the 

trial court.

4

(Lodgment 6.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the California 

 

4 The Court of Appeal did strike a parole revocation fine because Petitioner was 

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 42
8

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Supreme Court raising the same claims. (Lodgment 7.) It was summarily denied. 

(Lodgment 8.) 

Petitioner then filed a writ of habeas corpus in San Diego Superior Court.5 

Petitioner raised claims that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to 

raise: (1) third-party culpability as to Leroy Thomas; (2) insufficiency of the evidence for 

First Degree Murder; and (3) a Batson/Wheeler challenge. (Lodgment 9.) The superior 

court denied the petition, finding as to each claim that Petitioner had failed to set forth an 

adequate record to allow the court to conduct a rational review. (Lodgment 10.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition with the Fourth District Court of Appeal raising the same 

claims (Lodgment 11.) The Court of Appeal denied his petition, finding he failed to 

provide any record to support his claims. (Lodgment 12.) Petitioner then filed a Petition 

for Review with the California Supreme Court raising the same claims. (Lodgment 13.) 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied his Petition for Review. (Lodgment 

14.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

applicable to this Petition, a habeas petition will not be granted unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “This is a 

‘difficult to meet’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, 

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 

(2011); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). 

 

5 Case No. HC22111.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 42
9

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“The ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application of’ clauses in § 2254(d)(1) are 

distinct and have separate meanings.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-75 (2003)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause 

of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant relief only when ‘the state court arrives at a 

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.’” Loher v. Thomas, 825 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause of § 2254(d)(1), ‘a state-court 

decision involves an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s precedent if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies it to the 

facts of the particular state prisoners case.’” Id. (quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 

1697, 1705 (2014). Unreasonable application is “not merely wrong” or “even clear 

error.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). It must be “objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. “To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that 

the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Id. at 1377 (quoting Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 103). “[R]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable application 

clause if, and only if, it is obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of 

facts that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” Woodall, 134 S. 

Ct. at 1706-07 (citing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 

(“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in 

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.”). 

Under § 2254(d)(2) “a petitioner may challenge the substance of the state court’s 

finding and attempt to show that those findings were not supported by substantial 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 42
10

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence” or “challenge the fact-finding process itself on the ground that it was deficient 

in some material way.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“Regardless of the type of challenge, ‘the question under AEDPA is not whether a federal 

court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that 

determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.” Id. “[W]hen the 

challenge is to the state courts procedure, . . . [the court] must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect in the state court’s fact-finding process is pointed out 

would be unreasonable in holding that the state courts fact-finding process was 

adequate.’” Id. at 1146-47; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 

2004). (the federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal 

standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported 

by the record.”).

Section 2254(e) (1) provides: “a determination of a factual issue made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The petitioner has “the 

burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. 

Where, as here, there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the 

Court “looks through” to the last reasoned decision and presumes it provides the basis for 

the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

805-06 (1991);6see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 n.1 (2013). Here, 

the California Court of Appeal’s November 14, 2014 decision is the last reasoned 

decision on most of Petitioner’s claims.

7

 

6 The Court notes that the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wilson v. 

Sellers, 2017 WL 737820, on February 27, 2017 to address whether the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Harrington, 562 U.S. 86 silently abrogated Ylst’s direction to look through a 

summary ruling to the last reasoned decision.

7 The Court of Appeal’s October 14, 2015 decision, that takes notice of the November 14, 

2015 decision on direct appeal, is the last reasoned decision on the three claims raised 

only on collateral review: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise thirdparty culpability as to Leroy Thomas; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 42
11

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Petitioner raises numerous claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. He 

argues his trial counsel should have presented evidence that Breanna Sandle and Corey 

Wishom failed to identify Petitioner in live police line-ups. (Pet. at 2, 5; Lodgment 7 at 

5-9.

8

) Petitioner argues his trial counsel should have presented evidence of innocent 

explanations for his trip to Louisiana, his internet search history while there, and his 

change in phone number following the murder. (Pet. at 4; Lodgment 7 at 9-14.) Finally, 

Petitioner argues his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise 

sufficiency of the evidence for first degree murder, third-party culpability as to Leroy 

Thomas, and a Batson/Wheeler challenge. (Pet. at 12; Lodgment 13 at 8-25.) Each claim 

is addressed below.

When evaluating claims for ineffective assistance of counsel under ADEPA, the 

Court’s review is “‘doubly deferential’ in order to afford ‘both the state court and the 

defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quoting Burt v 

Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013)). As explained more fully below, review under 

Strickland, the standard for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, is 

deferential to counsel’s decisions, and review under AEDPA is deferential to the state 

court’s decision finding no violation of Strickland. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 

(“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential and when 

the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.”) 

 

raise insufficiency of the evidence; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

raise a Batson/Wheeler challenge. (Lodgment No. 12.)

8

In addition to the arguments Petitioner makes in the Petition itself, he refers to Exhibit A

attached to his Petition, his December 23, 2014 Petition on direct appeal to the California 

Supreme Court, for more elaboration on numerous claims. The Court’s analysis takes 

into consideration the arguments advanced in that filing, including the final page, not 

included as part of Exhibit A, but provided by Respondent in Lodgment 7. All further 

references are to Lodgment 7. 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 42
12

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Under Strickland, a defendant must “show that counsel’s performance was deficient.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This “first prong sets a high bar.” 

Buck v. Davis, 2017 WL 685534, at *13 (2017). “A defense lawyer navigating a criminal 

proceeding faces any number of choices about how best to make a client’s case.” Id. 

Counsel’s constitutional obligation under Strickland is satisfied “so long as his decisions 

fall within the ‘wide range’ of professionally competent assistance.” Id. (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104 (A reviewing court 

must indulge “a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide 

range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”). “The question is whether an attorney’s 

representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not 

whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom.” Harrington, 562 U.S.

at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.) “It is only when the lawyer’s errors were 

‘so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth 

Amendment’ that Strickland’s first prong is satisfied.” Buck, 2017 WL 685534, at *13 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

The Court need not address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if 

the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

697. However, assuming a defendant can establish deficient performance under this 

highly deferential standard, prejudice must also be shown. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104. 

“It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of 

the proceeding.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). A defendant “must 

demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694); see also Buck, 2017 WL 685534, at *14. “This requires showing that 

counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 42
13

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

When evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under § 2254(d), as the 

Court is here, the court is not considering “whether defense counsel’s performance fell 

below Strickland’s standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. “The pivotal question is 

whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Id. 

“A state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the 

case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Id. “When § 2254(d) applies, 

the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether 

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” 

Id. at 105. 

1. Failing to Introduce Evidence of Live Police Line-Ups

9

Trial counsel did not introduce evidence that Sandle and Wishom failed to identify 

Petitioner in live line-ups. Petitioner argues this would have provided further evidence 

that he was not one of the individuals observed at Pleasant’s apartment before the murder 

or fleeing the apartment following the murder. (Pet. at 5; Lodgment 7 at 5-9) Petitioner 

argues this evidence was significant because the live line-ups occurred on September 17, 

2010 in closer proximity to the murder and when the prosecutor had obtained a “no 

haircut” order to allow witnesses to see him with a hairstyle similar to that he would have 

had at the time of the murder. (Lodgment 7 at 5.) The witnesses in-court nonidentification of Petitioner did not occur until his trial in October 2011. Petitioner 

additionally argues this testimony was significant because both Sandle and Wishom 

testified they tentatively selected Petitioner in photographic line-ups before indicating 

they did not know if he was one of the individuals they saw. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner also 

argues that this evidence could have been presented through the officer that conducted 

 

9 Petitioner raises this issue in Ground One of his Petition with a reference to his 

December 23, 2014 Petition on direct appeal to the California Supreme Court, for more 

elaboration. As noted above, the Court has considered these arguments and all references 

are to Lodgment No. 7. 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 42
14

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the live line-up to avoid having Sandle or Wishom change their mind and identify 

Petitioner. (Id. at 8.) Petitioner also argues trial counsel’s concern that the live line-up 

evidence would emphasize police suspicion was unreasonable because police suspicion 

would be obvious from Petitioner being charged with murder. (Id. at 8.) 

Respondent argues that, given neither witness had identified Petitioner at trial and 

both confirmed on cross examination that they did not identify Petitioner in six-pack 

photographic line-ups conducted shortly after the murder, his trial counsel made a 

reasonable tactical decision not to introduce additional evidence of non-identification in 

the live police line-ups. Respondent emphasizes trial counsel’s testimony during the 

hearing on Petitioner’s motion for a new trial that he did not want to give the witnesses a 

chance to change their testimony by raising the live police line-ups or emphasize the 

police interest in Petitioner. 

The Court of Appeal concluded that counsel’s decision did not fall below 

“prevailing professional norms.” (Lodgment 6 at 13.) The Court considered Petitioner’s 

argument that the live line-up evidence could have been presented through the testimony 

of the officers conducting it, avoiding the risk that the witnesses would reconsider their

non-identification of Petitioner on cross examination and identify him. (Id. at 12.) The

court also considered defense counsel’s testimony that he decided not to offer the live 

line-up evidence because neither witness had identified Petitioner at trial and he wanted 

to avoid emphasizing to the jury that Petitioner was a suspect immediately after the 

murder. (Id. at 12.) The Court of Appeal found trial counsel could reasonably have 

determined that additional evidence of a non-identification was of “marginal benefit.” 

(Id. at 13.) 

The Court of Appeal’s decision was not unreasonable. At the hearing on 

Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, Petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he decided not 

to introduce evidence that Wishom and Sandle had not identified Petitioner at live lineups because neither had identified Petitioner at trial. (Lodgment 1, Part 11 at 2567-68.) 

He explained that “nobody in the courtroom was pointing the finger at him as an offender 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 42
15

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in the case, I didn’t want to go back and rehash the police’s suspicion that he’d been one 

of the offenders and had been in a line-up. I made a conscious decision not to present 

that evidence.” (Id. at 2568.) He indicated he had a lack of in-court identification in 

front of the jury and he did not want to risk giving them an opportunity on cross 

examination to say something different. (Id. at 2604-05.) And, he stated more generally, 

“it is my view that when – when there is a lack of an in-court identification of the 

defendant, of my client, as an offender, that I don’t want to go back and give them 

another chance to make their statement of identification better.” (Id. at 2603.) 

There is certainly at least a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s 

deferential standard. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (“the question is not whether counsel’s 

actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that 

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”) No witness had identified Petitioner 

at the location of the murder at the time of the murder and the two witnesses that did see 

the individuals believe to be responsible for the murder coming and going from the 

apartment did not identify Petitioner in court. There may have been some benefit in 

emphasizing that Petitioner was also not identified at the live line-ups, closer to the time 

to when the witnesses would have seen him. But, when weighed against trial counsel’s 

concerns about the witnesses reconsidering their testimony or emphasizing further that 

Petitioner was a suspect shortly after the murder, there is at least a reasonable argument 

that counsel’s decision fell “within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Id. at 104. The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failing to introduce evidence of the live police line-ups be 

DENIED.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 42
16

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Failing to Introduce Evidence of Innocent Explanations10

At trial, the prosecutor argued Petitioner’s flight from San Diego to Louisiana, his 

searching for information on who was in jail and for warrants issued for himself and 

others, and his phone number change right after the murder reflected consciousness of 

guilt. Petitioner argues his trial counsel should have presented evidence of innocent 

explanations for his trip to Louisiana, his internet search history, and his change in phone 

number the day of murder. (Pet. at 4; Lodgment 7 at 9-14.) The Court considers each.

a) Trip to Louisiana

Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce evidence of 

Petitioner’s calls to and from his wife in Louisiana in the months preceding the murder to 

provide an innocent explanation why Petitioner went to Louisiana — it was a preplanned 

trip to visit his wife rather than flight following a murder. (Pet. at 5; Lodgment 7 at 9-

10.) Respondent argues the innocent explanation for the trip to Louisiana that Petitioner 

wanted his trial counsel to put before the jury was extremely problematic and declining to 

do it was a tactical decision. 

The Court of Appeal found trial counsel’s decision not to present evidence of 

Petitioner’s communications with his wife in the months leading up to the murder was a 

reasonable tactical decision. (Lodgment 6 at 16.) The court noted trial counsel had 

explained he found Petitioner’s story regarding the trip preposterous and did not think it 

would be well received by the jury. (Id.) Petitioner claimed that he preplanned the trip to 

visit his wife, from whom he was separated, for his wedding anniversary, and brought his 

girlfriend, a prostitute, on the trip for “female companionship.” (Id. at 14.) The court 

also explained that trial counsel thought Petitioner’s wife and girlfriend, each of which 

might have had to testify to the trip, particularly given Petitioner elected not to testify a 

 

10 As with the prior claim, Petitioner raises this claim in Ground One of his Petition and 

refers to his Petition to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal for more 

elaboration.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 42
17

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

week before trial, would not have been seen as credible. (Id. at 15.) The court also found 

that while evidence of Petitioner’s communications with his wife in Louisiana might have 

explained his going to that location, as opposed to another, it did not explain the timing of 

the trip, the day after the murder. (Id. at 15-16.) 

As to Petitioner’s wife, trial counsel testified that she “presented big problems, 

potential problems . . . . She’d been interviewed by the police in the case, she was made 

aware that Mr. Farley had come together with his other girlfriend, who was a prostitute, 

and she was decidedly unhappy about that.” (Id. at 2631.) Trial counsel also explained 

that Petitioner’s girlfriend would not have been a good witness. (Id. at 2594.) He 

indicated he could not determine whether she was lying when they spoke and that 

because she was a prostitute, she brought with her significant baggage, including that the

jury might think that Petitioner was her pimp, particularly given that she had apparently 

prostituted herself on their trip. (Id. at 2566, 2590, 2594.) He acknowledges that having 

an innocent explanation for the trip would have been helpful, but the options to present it 

once Petitioner decided not to testify were not good. (Id. at 2594.) Although the Court of 

Appeal did not specifically rely on it, trial counsel also explained that he relied on 

Petitioner’s cell phone records, admitted by the prosecutor, showing calls between 

Petitioner and a phone number with a Louisiana area code prior to the murder and argued 

that this connection to someone in Louisiana prior to the murder showed an alternate 

reason for his trip to Louisiana other than fleeing. (Id. at 2607-08, 2630-31.) 

Trial counsel chose to avoid an undesirable and potentially unbelievable 

explanation for the trip and having that less-than-appealing story presented by bad 

witnesses to a jury. “[I]t is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it 

has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was 

unreasonable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. But, the reviewing court must make every 

effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at 

the time.” Id. Counsel identified significant problems with Petitioner’s explanation for 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 42
18

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the trip in both the trip itself and the witnesses that would have to testify to it. He 

decided not to attempt to get that explanation in front of the jury, and instead emphasized 

evidence that Petitioner knew someone in Louisiana that he was communicating with 

prior to the murder to suggest he was not fleeing. If trial counsel had sought to admit 

evidence of Petitioner’s calls to his wife in advance of the murder to show the trip was 

preplanned, the trip itself, with all its baggage, might have been presented to the jury. If 

that had happened, Petitioner would surely be arguing now that counsel was ineffective 

for putting that unfavorable and less-than-credible story in front of the jury instead of just 

relying on phone records showing his calls to a Louisiana number prior to the murder for 

an innocent explanation. It is exactly the type of decision that should not be secondguessed, particularly under AEDPA’s doubly deferential review. See Woods, 135 S. Ct. 

at 1376 (explaining doubly deferential review based on deference to both the state court 

and the defense attorney’s decisions). The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that counsel did 

not provide ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence of Petitioner’s calls to his 

wife prior to the murder was not unreasonable. The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim 

for ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to introduce evidence of Petitioner’s 

communications with his wife prior to the murder be DENIED.

b) Evidence of Petitioner’s Communications with His Parents

Petitioner asserts trial counsel failed to introduce evidence Petitioner’s parents told 

him about the murder and the execution of a search warrant at their home related to the 

murder while he was in Louisiana and evidence his mother changed his phone number.

11

 

 

11 As to the issue of counsel failing to present testimony from Petitioner’s mother that she 

changed his phone number, the claim is not clearly raised. The only reference in the 

Petition or Traverse to it is under a section where he lists the claims he raised on direct 

appellate review. (Pet. at 4.) In listing the claim raised on direct appeal for ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failing to provide innocent explanations for the trip to Louisiana 

and his internet searches, he also includes “the change in phone number.” (Id.). Unlike 

the remainder of that claim, that he raises in Ground One in his Petition, he does not 

otherwise raise this issue in his Petition or Traverse. Additionally, there is nothing else in 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 42
19

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Pet. at 5; Lodgment 7 at 11-14.) He asserts that this information would have provided an 

innocent explanation for his internet searches for warrants and on the “Who’s in Jail” 

website for himself and his co-defendant Terry as well as his question to a police officer 

that escorted him from Louisiana to San Diego concerning whether he could be charged 

with a gang crime because the other defendant was a gang member. (Pet. at 5; Lodgment

7 at 11-12.) 

Respondent argues trial counsel’s decision not to introduce evidence Petitioner’s 

mother told him about Pleasant’s killing and that Petitioner was a suspect was a tactical 

decision. Specifically, Respondent argues that trial counsel assessed she would have 

been a horrible witness because of her hostile and uncooperative demeanor. 

Additionally, Respondent argues that this story was inconsistent with the story Petitioner 

told counsel a week before trial — that he arranged for others to rob Pleasant.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel’s decision not to introduce evidence 

that Petitioner’s mother had informed him that the police were investigating him was a 

reasonable tactical choice. (Lodgment 6 at 19.) In summarizing trial counsel’s 

testimony, the Court of Appeal explained that he had spoken with Petitioner’s parents 

numerous times and found Petitioner’s mother to be hostile and assessed her as “likely to 

be a ‘terrible witness.’” (Id. at 18.) The court also noted that evidence his mother 

informed him about the police investigation was not necessarily inconsistent with his 

guilt. (Id. at 19) As to Petitioner’s father, the Court of Appeal found Petitioner had not 

claimed that trial counsel could have presented an explanation for the computer searches 

 

the exhibits attached to his Petition, exhibits referenced in the Petition, or subsequent 

filings with the Court suggesting he is raising a claim on this basis in his Petition. 

Although Respondent does not address it and the Court could find it was not raised, the 

Court gives the Petition the benefit of a very liberal construction and addresses the issue. 

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007) and finding “[p]risoner pro se pleadings are given the benefit of liberal 

construction.”).

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 42
20

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

solely through Petitioner’s father, rather it was his mother’s testimony that was important. 

(Id. at 18.) The court does, however, note that trial counsel indicated that Petitioner’s 

father had little to say and he did not recall having any discussions with him about 

communications with Petitioner while Petitioner was in Louisiana. (Id. at 18.) Finally, 

the Court of Appeal notes that Petitioner did not argue on appeal that trial counsel failed 

to properly investigate his parents as potential witnesses. (Id. at 19 n.6.) 

The Court of Appeal did not specifically address the potential testimony from 

Petitioner’s mother that she had Petitioner’s phone number changed. Nor does 

Respondent specifically address this argument. This is likely because the issue was noted

only in a single paragraph amidst Petitioner’s briefing to the Court of Appeal on trial 

counsel’s decision not to present the testimony about Petitioner’s parents’ 

communications with him. (Lodgment 4 at 15-16.) The Court of Appeal’s conclusion 

that trial counsel did not err in not having Petitioner’s mother testify because she would 

be a bad witness would similarly apply to her testifying as to the phone number change. 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that his counsel’s failure to present this evidence 

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Harrington, 562 U.S at 104. This 

Court notes that the record also reflects that had this testimony been presented, it might 

have been harmful. Petitioner’s mother testified during the hearing on his motion for a 

new trial that she was frustrated in speaking with Petitioner on the day of the murder 

because he was getting so many calls. (Lodgment 1, Part 11 at 2451-52.) The many calls

were causing the phone to keep cutting off what Petitioner was saying, what she 

described as the interference from the continual beeping as calls kept coming in. (Id.) 

And when she asked him if he was going to answer the calls, he replied “No. I’m not 

trying to hear crazy stuff.” (Id. at 2452.) Even if Petitioner’s statements to his mother 

were not admitted, that he was receiving such an unusually high volume of calls that day 

that his mother changed his phone number to stop it, could suggest he was receiving calls 

related to the murder. A jury might have also thought she was just a mother making up a 

story to protect her son. If the explanation — changing a phone number because of call 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 42
21

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

volume in one conversation — seemed odd, the jury might have even found it suggested 

she was covering up something for him. Although it might have been helpful to have an 

explanation for Petitioner’s phone number changing the day of the murder, the 

explanation itself from his mother might have been more harmful to Petitioner’s case, 

particularly given counsel’s assessment of her as a witness. Under these circumstances, 

trial counsel’s representation did not “amount[] to incompetence under ‘prevailing 

professional norms.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.) 

The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing 

to introduce testimony from Petitioner’s parents that they informed him about the murder 

was not unreasonable. Id. at 105 (“the question is not whether counsel’s action were 

reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”). Given trial counsel’s assessment of 

Petitioner’s parents, electing not to have them testify, assuming it was error at all, was not 

the type of “error[] so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Trial 

counsel, having assessed Petitioner’s mother on many occasions, considered her a terrible 

witness and it does not appear that he was aware Petitioner’s father had communicated 

with Petitioner about the murder investigation while he was in Louisiana. Although not 

specifically noted by the Court of Appeal, the proceedings on Petitioner’s motion for a 

new trial also support counsel’s assessment. During questioning that does not appear to 

be going smoothly, the prosecutor requests Petitioner’s mother be directed to answer his 

questions and notes “this goes back to the same dynamic we had for three and a half 

weeks in trial. This witness sat in the back gallery, as well as in the hallway, frequently 

interrupted proceedings, even up to closing argument.” (Lodgment 1, Part 11 at 2423.) 

The trial judge noted he had already made that direction, before giving it again. (Id.) 

The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 

to introduce evidence of innocent explanations for Petitioner’s conduct be DENIED.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 42
22

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Raised on Collateral 

Review in State Court

a) Whether These Claims Were Raised in the Federal Petition

Petitioner does not clearly assert these claims in his Petition. The claims —

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise: sufficiency of the 

evidence for First Degree Murder; third-party culpability as to Leroy Thomas; and a 

Batson/Wheeler challenge — are referenced in his federal Petition in two places, but they 

are under listings for grounds raised on collateral review in state court. (Pet. at 3, 12.) 

He references Exhibit B to his Petition “for more established,” but as with the listing

above, it is under a heading for collateral review in state court. (Id. at 12.) Exhibit B is 

his habeas Petition to the California Supreme Court, which raise these claims. 

(Lodgment 13.) Another exhibit attached to his Petition, a request for stay and abeyance, 

suggests he is raising these claims in his federal Petition because he is seeking to exhaust 

these claims. (ECF No. 1 at 15-19.) Petitioner’s filings after Respondent Answered also 

suggest he is raising these claims. Petitioner references and seeks relief on the claims, 

including noting that Respondent failed to respond to them in his Answer. (ECF Nos. 28, 

38-39.) Respondent’s Answer indicates that he did not address these claims because 

Petitioner only raised them in the request for stay and abeyance attached as an exhibit to 

his Petition, rather than in his Petition. (Answering Brief at 1, n.1 and 7 n. 5.) 

Although the claims were arguably only identified in the actual Petition as part of 

the procedural history of the proceedings in state court, when viewed in the context of the 

exhibits attached to the Petition and Petitioner’s later filings it appears he is likely 

attempting to raise these claims. And, because “[p]risoner pro se pleadings are given the 

benefit of liberal construction” the Court addresses these claims.12 Porter, 620 F.3d at

958 (citing Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94). 

 

12 The Court does not address whether these claims are procedurally defaulted. 

“Procedural default is an affirmative defense” that the state must generally assert. Vang 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 42
23

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

b) Failing to Raise Third-Party Culpability as to Leroy 

Thomas 

Petitioner argues13 that based on the evidence found in a search of Leroy Thomas’

residence and the close relationship between Thomas and Terry, Petitioner’s codefendant, his trial counsel should have presented a third-party culpability defense as to 

Leroy Thomas and his appellate counsel should have raised his trial counsel’s failure to 

do so on appeal. (Lodgment 13, ECF No. 19-29 at 14.14) 

Petitioner explains that Thomas gave a statement to police indicating that Terry 

was with Petitioner the day of the murder, things went bad, and Petitioner fired a shot. 

(Id. at 11.) Petitioner points to testimony from Wishom indicating that one of the two 

men that came to Pleasant’s apartment as Wishom was leaving just before the murder 

stated “This is my brother, he’s cool.” (Id.) Petitioner argues the brothers referenced in 

this statement were Terry and Thomas because Thomas indicated in a statement to police 

 

v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003). Respondent has not asserted it here. 

However, the Court does have the “discretion to consider the issue sua sponte if the

circumstances warrant. Id. (citing Boyd v. Thompson, 47 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 

1998)). In Boyd, the procedural default was obvious from the face of the petition and the 

state had not waived the defense because the court raised it before the state responded. 

Id. (citing Boyd, 147 F.3d at 1127-28). And in Vang, the court reversed the district court 

for raising it sua sponte when the state did not raise the defense despite full briefing on 

the claims. Id. Here, procedural default as to these claims is not obvious from the 

Petition and the state has already responded to the Petition. While the Court would not 

necessarily find the defense waived as in Vang — given how questionable it is Petitioner 

even properly raised these claims in his federal Petition — the state has fully briefed the 

Petition and did not assert the procedural default defense. Additionally, even if it were 

proper to raise the defense sua sponte, courts may address the merits, as the Court does 

here, instead of a potential procedural bar. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S 518, 525 

(1997). 

13 This argument is drawn from the filing attached as Exhibit B and referenced for support 

in the Petition, Petitioner’s Petition for Review filed with the California Supreme Court. 

The same filing is before the Court as Lodgment 13. Further references are to Lodgment

13.

14 All references to Lodgment 13 are to the ECF page numbering.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

 42
24

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that he spoke with Terry regularly and lived next door to him. (Id.) Petitioner 

additionally argues that Terry utilized the assistance of another inmate, Miguel Gonzaba, 

to get a letter out of the prison to have Thomas killed for snitching on Terry. (Id. at 12-

14.)

The Court of Appeal’s October 14, 2015 decision rejected Petitioner’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise third-party culpability as to Leroy 

Thomas because Petitioner failed to provide any records or documents to support the 

claim. (Lodgment 12 at 1-2.) The Court notes that it appears the only document 

submitted in support of the state petition was a picture of Leroy Thomas. (Lodgment 12 

at 15-16.) The Court cannot find the “state court’s determination was . . . unreasonable.” 

Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1146. 

The Court also finds the claim has no merit. Although this claim was not raised on 

direct appeal, Petitioner’s appointed counsel for purposes of his motion for a new trial did 

question Petitioner’s trial counsel concerning third-party culpability as to Thomas during 

the hearing on Petitioner’s motion for a new trial. Petitioner’s counsel testified that he 

considered and chose not to introduce evidence of third-party culpability as to Leroy 

Thomas for numerous reasons. (Lodgment 1, Part 11 at 2560-61.) As explained in more 

detail below, trial counsel knew that Thomas could connect Petitioner to Terry and he 

was trying to distance Petitioner from Terry. (Id. at 2561-62.) Additionally, trial counsel 

found Petitioner’s own account of events, different a week before trial than it had been 

prior, further supported trial counsel’s decision not to raise third-party culpability as to 

Thomas at trial. (Id. at 2569.)

Trial counsel explained that he knew that Thomas had made statements to the 

police. (Id. at 2561.) Thomas had indicated that Petitioner and his co-defendant Terry 

were together on the day of the murder. (Id.) Additionally, Thomas had claimed to police 

that Terry told him that Terry and Petitioner had been at Pleasant’s to rob him and that 

Petitioner came out of the bathroom with a shotgun and shot Pleasant. (Id. at 2561, 2610-

11.) Trial counsel was concerned that if he raised third-party culpability as to Thomas, 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

 42
25

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Thomas might testify and the connection between Petitioner and Terry might have been 

presented to the jury. (Id. at 2574.) 

Thomas’ potential to create a connection between Petitioner and Terry was very

problematic for trial counsel. Counsel wanted to distance Petitioner from Terry for 

numerous reasons. The scientific evidence against Terry was stronger. (Id. at 2562.)

Trial counsel needed to avoid any connection between the two to persuade the prosecutor 

to sever Petitioner and Terry for trial, which he did. (Id. at 2573.) 

Trial counsel was also aware there might be additional charges against Terry based 

on allegations Terry had sent messages out of the jail asking that Thomas be dissuaded 

from testifying, including, that he be hurt, and that Thomas was in fact hurt. (Id. at 

2573.) Although not entirely clear, it appears this is the letter Petitioner describes 

Gonzaba helping Terry get out of the prison. Trial counsel explained that a letter he was 

aware of before trial indicated Terry thought Thomas had inculpated he and Petitioner. 

(Id. at 2614.) He explains that the letter from Terry complained about “motor mouth,” 

that he interpreted to be Thomas, “blound me and, even worse, the other boy,” and later 

says he “let it all out on me and the other boy too.” (Id. at 2613-14.) It also references 

Terry being charged as a gang member. (Id. at 2613.) Trial counsel was concerned that 

if he raised third-party culpability as to Thomas, there might be evidence introduced 

connecting Petitioner with Terry’s attempts to intimidate Thomas. (Id. at 2574.) 

Counsel also explained that third-party culpability as to Thomas was itself weak. 

The only evidence connecting Thomas to the murder was what counsel considered weak 

DNA evidence linking Thomas to a piece of physical evidence in the apartment. (Id. at 

2562.) 

Counsel also indicated in his testimony that his decision not to raise third-party 

culpability as to Thomas was bolstered when Petitioner told him, one week before trial,

that he had arranged for Thomas to buy marijuana from Pleasant the day before the 

murder. (Id. at 2569.) Petitioner had previously claimed that he did not know Thomas. 

(Id. at 2535.) A week before trial, Petitioner told trial counsel he did know Thomas —

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

 42
26

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

met Thomas outside a barber shop and they had become acquaintances — and that 

Thomas had asked Petitioner to arrange for him to purchase marijuana from Pleasant. 

(Id. at 2538-39.) Petitioner additionally explained to his counsel that he made 

arrangements with Pleasant the night before Pleasant was murdered for Thomas to make 

a purchase from Pleasant. (Id. at 2539.) Petitioner also told his trial counsel that when he 

tried to call Thomas the morning of the murder he got someone else — he thought it 

might have been Terry, but did not know — and that person gave Petitioner a different 

number for Thomas. (Id. at 2546.) Counsel was concerned this new version of events 

involving Thomas might open Petitioner up to being an aider and abettor of the shooting 

if Petitioner had made the arrangements for a drug buy that resulted in someone being 

shot and killed. (Id. at 2569.)

Trial counsel made a strategic decision to, at a minimum, avoid connecting 

Petitioner to his co-defendant against which the evidence was stronger. As with 

Petitioner’s other claims, there might have been some benefit in attempting to introduce 

evidence suggesting someone else was responsible, but counsel would have been calling 

a witness that put Petitioner with the individual against whom the evidence was stronger 

and who had stated Terry and Petitioner had robbed and shot Pleasant. Additionally, as 

discussed more fully below, trial counsel unsuccessfully tried to admit third-party 

culpability evidence as to Pleasant’s brother, David Foster. Attempting to raise thirdparty culpability as to numerous individuals might have presented additional risks. Trial 

counsel reasonably elected not to take these significant risks with little likely benefit.

As to appellate counsel, the claim fails for the same reasons noted above. Because 

trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the issue, appellate counsel reasonably 

elected not to argue he was. Additionally, appellate counsel “need not (and should not) 

raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to 

maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 

(2000). “Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented,

will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Id. at 288. Given 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 26 of

 42
27

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the many significant reasons trial counsel provided for not asserting third-party 

culpability as to Leroy Thomas, particularly the possibility that he might inculpate 

Petitioner, appellate counsel’s election to pursue stronger claims was not unreasonable. 

The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective 

for failing to raise third-party culpability as to Leroy Thomas be DENIED.

4. Failing to Raise Insufficiency of the Evidence to Support First 

Degree Murder

Petitioner argues his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective because each 

failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he was in the apartment at the time 

of the shooting. (Lodgment 13 at 17.) Petitioner concedes the prosecution presented 

evidence of Petitioner’s cell phone activity around the time of murder, evidence 

Petitioner was at Pleasant’s apartment the night before the murder, evidence Pleasant was 

expecting him to return the next morning, evidence Petitioner’s DNA was on a roll of 

duct tape in the bathroom of the apartment that Pleasant’s girlfriend did not recall seeing 

before the murder, and Petitioner escaped from custody in Louisiana. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s argument relies largely on listing the items in the apartment that were 

tested for DNA and he was excluded as a source of the DNA. (Id. at 18-20.) He also 

dismisses the significance of his DNA being on the duct tape because duct tape is used to 

package marijuana and he had previously been in the apartment. (Id. at 17) He disputes 

the significance of the evidence that his cell phone was “pinging” off a cell tower near the 

apartment as not being specific enough given the evidence that a phone could ping off a 

tower from as far away as two miles. (Id. at 21-23.) Petitioner additionally notes the 

prosecutor’s argument concerning Petitioner’s phone activity ceasing for approximately 

eleven minutes that coincide with when the robbery and murder were taking place, but 

seems to only challenge that evidence as it relates to his being in the location. (Id. at 22-

23.) He also argues there was no evidence of blood on his clothes at the time of his arrest 

or in his car. (Id. at 20.) Petitioner also argues Pleasant’s statement, “they got me, oh 

God they shot me” immediately after the shooting, before he died, establishes Petitioner 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 27 of

 42
28

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

did not shoot him because Pleasant, having seen Petitioner the night before, would have 

identified him by name. (Id. at 24.) 

As recited above in the Court of Appeal’s summary of the evidence presented at 

trial, there was evidence from which a jury could find Petitioner was at the apartment at 

the time of the murder. Petitioner was at the apartment the night before and Pleasant was 

expecting him to return the next morning. Pleasant’s girlfriend indicated that when she 

left the apartment at approximately 11:15 a.m. she and Pleasant planned to meet at noon, 

but Pleasant had indicated he was waiting for Petitioner to come to the apartment. A 

visiting neighbor heard Pleasant tell a caller to hurry up and come because he was leaving 

soon. When another visitor, Wishom, was leaving, two other men arrived, to which 

Pleasant responded “Oh, I’ve been waiting for you.” Wishom left as the men entered the 

apartment and at approximately the same time, a neighbor heard a melee and a loud boom 

from Pleasant’s apartment, heard Pleasant crying for help, and looked outside to see two 

African American males running from the apartment with a backpack. Pleasant sustained 

a large gunshot wound to the buttocks and blunt force trauma to the head consistent with 

being struck with a gun. He died at the scene. A jury could infer from this evidence that 

Petitioner was one of the individuals that arrived at the apartment right before the murder 

and was seen fleeing immediately after. Petitioner is dismissive of the cell phone records 

presented, but as the Court of Appeal explained, they showed several short calls between 

Petitioner and Pleasant that morning between 10:37 and 10:39 a.m. This further supports 

the expectation that Petitioner was expected at Pleasant’s apartment that morning and was 

the person Pleasant stated “Oh, I’ve been waiting for you” to. 

The apartment was in disarray, including an open empty safe in the bedroom and a 

bag of marijuana on the living room floor. Police also found a slide from a firearm, 

handcuffs, and a handcuff key in the hallway. As Petitioner acknowledges above, 

Petitioner’s DNA was found on duct tape in the bathroom that Pleasant’s girlfriend did 

not recall seeing in the apartment before. This is further evidence from which the jury 

could infer Petitioner was in the apartment. Although a jury might conclude his DNA 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 28 of

 42
29

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was on duct tape in the apartment from a prior visit as Petitioner now argues, that does 

not mean a jury could not reach a different conclusion about the duct tape and the reason 

it might have been in the apartment, particularly given the presence of handcuffs and a 

robbery. 

As previously noted, there was stronger DNA evidence as to Terry — his DNA 

was found on a baseball cap, gun slide, blood samples from the apartment, and fingernail 

scraping taken from Pleasant, in addition to his fingerprints being on artwork in the living 

room. This is of consequence as to Petitioner because cell phone records show an 11:30 

a.m. call placed from Petitioner’s phone that lasted 59 seconds and terminated at the cell 

tower at Pleasant’s apartment. Terry’s phone also sent a text to Petitioner’s phone at 

11:33 a.m. There was no activity on Petitioner’s phone from 11:31 to 11:48 a.m. 

followed by Petitioner and Terry’s phones exchanging numerous text messages. Two 

hours later Petitioner’s phone number is changed. The next morning, cell records on the 

new phone show Petitioner leaving California and traveling to Louisiana. 

Petitioner was arrested a month and a half later in Louisiana. This lengthy gap 

makes Petitioner’s emphasis on the absence of blood on his clothes and in his car less 

compelling. Additionally, as discussed above, there was evidence Petitioner asked an 

officer about whether he could be charged with a gang crime if the other person involved 

was in a gang and internet search history reflects Petitioner was searching for information 

about the murder and investigation. 

Petitioner identifies ways in which the evidence presented could be interpreted in 

his favor, but that does not make an interpretation unfavorable to him wrong. For 

example, he argues that because the maximum distance his cell phone could have been 

from the tower was two miles this evidence was insufficient to show that he was in the 

apartment. In isolation, he might be right, but in the context of all the other evidence, a 

jury could interpret his phone pinging off a tower at the apartment as supporting or 

confirming he was in that location that morning.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 29 of

 42
30

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As with the prior claim, the Court of Appeal’s October 14, 2015 decision rejected 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to 

raise insufficiency of the evidence for First Degree Murder because Petitioner failed to 

submit any records or documents to support the claim. (Lodgment 12 at 1-2.) And, as 

with his prior claim, the Court cannot find this was unreasonable. 

The Court also cannot find trial or appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to 

raise insufficiency of the evidence. Although the evidence against him was 

circumstantial, there was certainly sufficient evidence from which a jury could find 

Petitioner was in the apartment and to support his murder conviction. “[E]vidence is 

sufficient to support a conviction so long as “after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 7 

(2011). (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Not raising sufficiency of 

the evidence, given the evidence against Petitioner, “falls within the ‘wide range’ of 

professionally competent assistance.” Buck, 2017 WL 685534, at *13. 

Similarly, because the evidence was sufficient, insufficiency of the evidence would 

not have been stronger than the claims appellate counsel raised on direct appeal. 

Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288 (“Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than 

those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.”) 

The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 

counsel for failing to raise insufficiency of the evidence be DENIED. 

5. Failing to Raise Batson/Wheeler Challenge

Petitioner argues his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise 

a Batson/Wheeler challenge.15 (Lodgment 13 at 25.) More specifically, Petitioner argues 

 

15 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978). 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 30 of

 42
31

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the absence of African Americans on 

the jury.16 (Id.) 

The issue here is not whether there was a Batson violation, but whether trial and 

appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise a challenge on this basis. The 

standards articulated above, particularly the “‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s 

representation was within the ‘wide range’ range of reasonable professional assistance”

apply. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104. However, the Court concludes that trial and 

appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise a Batson challenge because 

what Petitioner alleges does not constitute the kind of purposeful discrimination in the 

selection of a jury that warrants relief under Batson. 

A Batson violation occurs when there is purposeful discrimination in the selection 

of the jury. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. “[A] defendant has no right to a ‘petit jury composed 

in whole or in part of persons of his own race,” but rather the right to be tried by a jury 

whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.” Id. at 85-86. It is a 

challenge to the use of preemptory strikes to exclude jurors based on their race. Id. at 89. 

There are three steps that guide the review of the preemptory strikes: (1) a prima facie 

“showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 

purpose;” (2) if defendant makes that showing, the state must offer “permissible raceneutral justifications for the strikes;” and then (3) the court must decide whether 

defendant “has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 

162, 168 (2005). 

To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the accusing party 

must show: (1) the prospective juror is a member of a cognizable group, (2) the 

prosecutor used a peremptory strike to remove the juror, and (3) the totality of the 

circumstances raises an inference that the strike was motivated by race. Boyd v. Newland, 

 

16 For purposes of this analysis, the Court assumes that there were no African Americans 

on the jury. As noted above, Respondent did not address this issue. 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 31 of

 42
32

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

476 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, Petitioner has made no showing that would 

give rise to a discriminatory purpose in the use of preemptory strikes. There are no facts 

or allegations that a prospective juror that was a member of a cognizable group was 

struck by the prosecutor. And certainly no circumstances raising an inference a strike 

was motivated by race. The first step, the prima facie showing has not been made. 

Given the absence of any basis for a claim, trial and appellate counsel’s failure to 

raise it cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court recommends 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to 

raise a Batson/Wheeler challenge be DENIED. 

B. Admission of Gang Expert Testimony17

Petitioner argues the trial court erred in admitting gang expert testimony 

addressing whether the charged offenses were committed for the benefit of a gang. (Pet. 

at 6.) Petitioner argues the witness essentially testified, based on his review of all the 

reports and evidence in the case, that Petitioner and Terry committed the robbery for the 

benefit of a gang because the individual referenced in the hypothetical scenario presented 

to the witness was obviously Petitioner. (Lodgment 7 at 19.) Petitioner argues this could 

give the jury the impression the charges were supported by evidence known to the 

witness, but not before the jury. (Id. at 21.)

Respondent argues that this is a state evidentiary rule that does not present a 

federal question and there was no violation of Petitioner’s due process rights recognized 

by the Supreme Court in the admission of the evidence. Additionally, Respondent argues 

the evidence was properly allowed under California law. 

In evaluating this claim, the Court of Appeal included a portion of the testimony 

Petitioner relied on in arguing the trial court erred in allowing the testimony. The 

prosecutor asks a series of questions that involve a hypothetical in which two individuals, 

 

17 Petitioner raised this claim under Ground Two in his Petition.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 32 of

 42
33

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

one a documented gang member, and the other not documented as a gang member, 

commit armed robbery of a drug dealer. Applying California law, People v. Vang, 52 

Cal. 4th 1038 (2011), the Court of Appeal found no error in the testimony because the 

expert was allowed to testify that the conduct described was committed for the benefit of 

a gang “based on assumed hypothetical facts rooted in the evidence.” (Lodgment 6 at 

24.) The court also rejected Petitioner’s claim that the testimony was improperly based 

on evidence in the case, rather than being limited to hypothetical questions based on 

evidence as required under Vang. (Id.) The court found the testimony “was offered in 

response to ‘the prosecutor’s hypothetical questions . . . based on what the evidence 

showed these defendants did, not what someone else might have done.’” (Id. (quoting 

Vang, 52 Cal. 4th at 1046.).) 

The admission of evidence is an issue of state law. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 

F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Even if the Court assumes there was any error in the 

admission of this evidence, “[s]imple errors of state law do not warrant federal habeas 

relief.” Id. (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 US. 62, 67 (1991)). “The admission of 

evidence does not provide a basis for habeas relief unless it rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Sublett, 63 

F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1995)). And, “[u]nder AEDPA, even clearly erroneous 

admissions of evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant 

of federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as 

laid out by the Supreme Court. Id. (quoting § 2254(d)). 

The gang expert’s testimony did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. 

The testimony was phrased in terms of a hypothetical throughout.18 The opinion that an 

armed robbery of a drug dealer committed by one documented and one undocumented 

gang member was committed for the benefit of a gang only mattered if the jury found 

 

18 In the one instance when the witness identified Petitioner by name, Petitioner’s counsel 

objected and the objection was sustained. (Lodgment 1, Part 8 at 1981.) 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 33 of

 42
34

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner committed the armed robbery of the drug dealer with a documented gang 

member. This was not fundamentally unfair because the prosecutor still had to prove 

Petitioner’s conduct matched the hypothetical. Additionally, no Supreme Court authority 

forbids the admission of testimony from a gang expert to assist a jury in determining 

whether a crime was committed for the benefit of a gang. 

The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim that the admission of the gang expert’s 

testimony violated Due Process be DENIED. 

C. Juror Misconduct19

Petitioner argues the trial court erred in failing to question a juror regarding 

potential bias or misconduct.20 (Pet. at 4; Lodgment 7 at 21-22.) He argues an exchange 

between the prosecutor and a juror showed that a juror was biased in favor of the 

prosecution. (Lodgment 7 at 21-22.) During the prosecutor’s closing he is recounting the 

evidence that Petitioner was conducting internet searches for warrants and on the Who’s 

in Jail website. The following exchange occurred:

Prosecutor: But the important question you can’t get around, and 

there’s no reasonable alternate explanation for it, it why, why is he 

going to these databases? Because at the end of the day he’s not just 

putting in Pierre Terry’s name, is he? What other name did he put in 

when it came time to look for warrants? Who was he worried about 

for getting warrants.

Unidentified juror: Himself.

 

19 Petitioner raised this claim under Ground Three in his Petition.

20 To the extent Petitioner argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

the alleged juror misconduct, the record reflects that his trial counsel did not hear the 

juror respond to the rhetorical question. Additionally, as the trial court noted, he might 

have elected not to object to avoid drawing more attention to it even if he had heard it. 

As the Court of Appeal and the trial court explained, it was not a disputed issue and 

objecting might have just led the entire jury to believe it was more significant. To the 

extent there was any error in missing it or not objecting, it was not the kind of error “so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.” Buck, 2017 WL 685534, at *13.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 34 of

 42
35

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Prosecutor: That’s right, himself. Why am I looking up warrants for 

myself when I didn’t do anything?

(Lodgment 1, Part 9 at 2223-24.)21 

The Court of Appeal found the remark did not suggest that the juror had formed an 

opinion on the case or that good cause existed to remove the juror. The court explained 

that the remark was brief and just provided an answer to a rhetorical question. The court 

also agreed with the trial court that the answer to the question was not in dispute. 

Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, does not 

require state or federal courts to hold a hearing every time a claim of juror bias is raised 

by the parties. Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Remmer 

v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) and Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217–18 and 

finding no error where trial court, during questioning of one juror about potential 

misconduct, declined to inquire about other jurors who were potentially subject to 

misconduct); Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (trial court need not 

order a hearing sua sponte whenever presented with evidence of juror bias). When 

considering a claim of juror bias, federal district courts “should ‘consider the content of 

the allegations, the seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of 

the source’ when determining whether a hearing is required.” Sims, 414 F.3d at 1148

(quoting Tracey, 341 F.3d at 1044). Certainly no more is required of a state court to 

comply with Due Process. Id. (“It would be anomalous to require more of a state trial 

judge in order to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”) 

Here, the juror misconduct issue was raised as part of Petitioner’s motion for a new 

trial. The trial court considered it. (Lodgment 1, Part 11 at 2389-2395.) Because the 

 

21 Petitioner’s counsel did not hear the response from the juror and although the trial 

judge did, he elected not to raise it out of concern that he would draw more attention to 

the issue. (Lodgment 1, Part 11 at 2393.) The issue was not raised until Petitioner’s 

motion for a new trial approximately a year later.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 35 of

 42
36

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exchange was undisputed and in the transcript, the content of the allegation and the 

credibility of the source of the alleged misconduct were not at issue. The only real issue 

was how serious the alleged misconduct or bias was. In short, the juror answered a 

rhetorical question that substantively concerned whether Petitioner was searching online 

to find out if there was a warrant out for his arrest. Petitioner’s counsel for the motion for 

a new trial argued it showed the juror had already made up his or her mind about 

Petitioner’s guilt. (Id. at 2392.) The trial court was not even convinced it was 

misconduct. (Id. at 2395.) The trial court considered whether the juror speaking up 

indicated the juror had drawn a conclusion about Petitioner’s guilt and explained that at 

most, it showed that this juror may have made up their mind that Petitioner was searching 

online to see if there were warrants out for his arrest. (Id.) In the alternative he 

suggested the juror may have just been caught up in the closing argument. (Id. at 2394.) 

The trial court noted that this, Petitioner searching for warrants for himself online, was 

not in dispute. (Id. at 2394.) He contrasted the question here with something that was 

disputed, “who fired the gun,” and suggested a response to a question like that would be 

significant. (Id.) 

The Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the brief, spontaneous remark on 

an undisputed issue “did not suggest that the juror had formed an opinion on the case.” 

(Lodgment 6 at 27.) The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct or 

bias be DENIED.

D. Admission of Evidence of Petitioner’s Tattoos22

Petitioner argues the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights in admitting evidence of Petitioner’s tattoos. (Pet. at 8; Lodgment 7 at 22-24.) 

Petitioner argues the admission of the tattoos portrayed Petitioner as greedy and 

disrespectful of women. (Lodgment 7 at 24.) 

 

22 Petitioner raised this claim under Ground Four in his Petition.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 36 of

 42
37

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondent argues the tattoos were probative of Petitioner’s membership in a gang 

for purposes of proving the gang enhancement under California Penal Code § 186.22(b) 

because evidence of gang-related tattoos tends to prove gang membership. Respondent 

emphasizes the prosecution had to prove Petitioner committed his crimes for the benefit 

of the Skyline Piru gang and Petitioner disputed he was a gang member or had done 

anything to benefit a gang. The gang expert testified that Petitioner’s tattoos — MOB for 

“money over bitches” and a gun with the words “dead presidents”— were common 

among gang members, but not a specific gang. 

The California Court of Appeal found the tattoo evidence was highly probative to 

prove the gang enhancement. (Lodgment 6 at 32.) The court noted the gang expert’s 

testimony that these and similar tattoos were common among gang members. (Id.) The 

court also explained that having gang-related tattoos was highly relevant to demonstrate 

membership in a gang for purposes of proving the gang enhancement. (Id.) The court 

rejected Petitioner’s argument that the tattoos should have been excluded because the jury 

might have thought he was greedy, violent, or valued money over women. (Id.) The 

court concluded the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence. 

As previously noted, the admission of evidence is an issue of state law. Holley, 

568 F.3d at 1101. Even if the Court assumes there was any error in the admission of this 

evidence, “[s]imple errors of state law do not warrant federal habeas relief.” Id. (citing 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67). “The admission of evidence does not provide a basis for habeas 

relief unless it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.” Id.

(quoting Johnson, 63 F.3d at 930). The Court cannot find the admission of this evidence 

rendered Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. His gang membership was disputed. 

The gang expert testified that Petitioner was not a documented gang member, the police 

had no gang-related contacts on file for him, and the gang expert assigned to the gang 

Petitioner was alleged to be associated with had no knowledge of Petitioner prior to this 

case. (Lodgment 1, Part 8 at 2005-07.) It was not fundamentally unfair to admit 

evidence that was probative of proving the gang enhancement.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 37 of

 42
38

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Additionally, “[u]nder AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of evidence that 

render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of federal habeas corpus 

relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as laid out by the Supreme 

Court. Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 (quoting § 2254(d)). Absent clearly established Federal 

law forbidding the admission of evidence under these circumstances, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief. The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim that the admission of 

his tattoos violated Due Process be DENIED. 

E. Exclusion of Evidence of Third Party Culpability23

Petitioner argues the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights by excluding evidence of third party culpability as to David Foster. (Pet. at 9; 

Lodgment 7 at 24-27.) Petitioner’s trial counsel sought to admit evidence that Pleasant

got into a physical altercation with his half-brother, Foster, who at the time was living in 

the apartment. (Pet. at 9; Lodgment 7.) The altercation was apparently about Foster not 

having a job. (Pet. at 9.) At Pleasant’s demand, Foster moved out following the 

altercation and Pleasant’s girlfriend believed they never reconciled. (Id.) Additionally,

DNA from blood stains in the apartment matched DNA from Foster. (Id.)

The California Court of Appeal noted the above background proffered by 

Petitioner’s counsel. (Lodgment 6 at 36.) The court also noted that the blood recovered 

was no more than a speck, Foster often visited the apartment to clean up after 

skateboarding accidents, that Foster had indicated to police that he and Pleasant had 

reconciled after the altercation and spent Earth Day together. (Id. at 36-37.) The 

prosecutor produced a date-stamped picture corroborating they spent Earth Day together. 

(Id. at 37.) 

The Court of Appeal found the trial court could reasonably find the speck of blood 

from Foster in the apartment doorway was no more than a remote connection to the crime 

 

23 Petitioner raised this claim under Ground Five in his Petition.

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 38 of

 42
39

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

scene, particularly given he lived in and visited the apartment and in the absence of any 

evidence connecting him to the scene near the time of the murder. (Lodgment 6 at 37.) 

The court also found the trial court could reasonably conclude that the single altercation 

months prior was nothing more than mere motive and insufficient to raise reasonable 

doubt as to Petitioner. (Id. at 38.) 

As previously noted, “a federal habeas court cannot review questions of state 

evidence law and it is well settled that a state court’s evidentiary rule, even if erroneous, 

is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so 

fundamentally unfair as to violate due process.” Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 371, 977-78 

(9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he Constitution permits judges ‘to exclude evidence that is repetitive 

. . . only marginally relevant, or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or 

confusion of the issues.’” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-27 (2006). 

Third party culpability evidence “may be excluded where it does not sufficiently connect 

the other person to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is speculative or 

remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact at issue at the defendant’s 

trial.” Id. at 327 (quoting 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide § 286, pp 136-38 (1999) as 

“widely accepted” rules). 

The Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that the evidence as to Foster was too 

remote and speculative. Foster’s only recent connection to the crime scene was a speck 

of blood in an apartment he had previously lived in and his previous adversarial 

connection to Pleasant was apparently resolved. The Court cannot find the exclusion of 

this evidence rendered the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due 

process. Nor can the Court find the Court of Appeal’s decision was unreasonable. 

Additionally, it is not clear Petitioner still intends to pursue this claim. As noted 

above, in listing the claims he raised on collateral review, Petitioner references Exhibit B, 

attached to his Petition. Exhibit B is his Petition for Review to the California Supreme 

Court raising the claims discussed above on collateral review, also Lodgment 13. In that 

filing Petitioner indicates “trial counsel should have moved to present evidence of thirdCase 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 39 of

 42
40

16CV188 LAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

party culpability, the third party being not David Foster, but Leroy Thomas.” (Lodgment 

13 at 11.) 

The Court recommends Petitioner’s claim that the exclusion of third-party 

culpability evidence violated Due Process be DENIED.

F. Stay and Abeyance

In addition to numerous other documents attached to the Petition, Petitioner 

included a document requesting stay and abeyance to exhaust the three new claims he 

raised on collateral review in state court. (Pet. at 15-19.) Respondent filed an Opposition 

to the request. (ECF 14.) Respondent cited the Lodgments filed in support of 

Respondent’s Answer to the Petition that showed the Superior Court, Court of Appeal, 

and California Supreme Court had all denied the claims for failing to provide any

evidentiary support for the claims. (Id.). Petitioner then filed an Opposition for Stay in 

which indicates he has exhausted the three claims raised on collateral review and notes 

that Respondent failed to address those claims. (ECF 28.) 

To the extent there is a stay and abeyance motion properly before the Court, it is 

moot. Petitioner and Respondent agree there is no need for a stay because the claims were 

exhausted. To the extent they do not, the Court has considered the merits of these claims 

and recommends they be denied. The Court recommends that any request before the 

Court for stay and abeyance be DENIED.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner does not request an evidentiary hearing in his Petition. In his Traverse 

under the section addressing third party culpability as to Foster, Petitioner notes the need 

for an evidentiary hearing to address whether Foster and Pleasant had reconciled. 

AEDPA prescribes the manner in which federal habeas courts must approach the 

factual record and “substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an 

evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] 

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” 

with the petitioner having “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 40 of

 42
41

16CV188 LAB (BGS) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Section 2254(e)(2) limits “the 

discretion of federal habeas courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing.” 

Cullen, 563 U.S. at 185. 

“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas 

petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that 

state court.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 185(“[E]vidence introduced in federal court has no 

bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review”). If a claim subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) does not 

satisfy that statutory requirement, it is “unnecessary to reach the question whether § 

2254(e)(2) would permit a [federal] hearing on th[at] claim.” Id. at 184 (citation 

omitted). “In practical effect, . . . this means that when the state-court record ‘precludes 

habeas relief’ under the limitations of § 2254(d), a district court is ‘not required to hold 

an evidentiary hearing.’” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 183. (citation omitted). Since Cullen, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that a federal habeas court may consider new evidence only on de 

novo review, subject to the limitations of § 2254(e)(2). See Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 

802, 808 (9th Cir.2011). 

As explained above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2254(d) and has not 

met any of the exacting requirements for an evidentiary hearing on federal habeas review. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be 

DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) 

denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 24, 2017, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than April 7, 2017. 

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 41 of

 42
42

16CV188 LAB (BGS) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 3, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-00188-LAB-BGS Document 50 Filed 03/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 42 of

 42