Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00340/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00340-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Craig Reed is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed March 5, 2014. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

CRAIG REED,

 Plaintiff,

v.

SERGEANT HINSHAW, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:11-cv-00340-AWI-SAB (PC)

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF EITHER TO 

FILE A THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT OR TO 

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO 

PROCEED ONLY ON CLAIM IDENTIFIED 

HEREIN

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names Sergeant S. Hinshaw. Lieutenant B. Odle, Lieutenant J. Gallagher, and officer 

H. Johnson as Defendants in this action. 

Plaintiff is physically disabled and requires the use of a wheelchair. Plaintiff contends that 

retaliatory acts coupled with constant civil rights violations took place by defendants over a period of 

twenty-three months as a result of Plaintiff and his family filing complaints against the defendants for 

their misconduct. Plaintiff sets forth his allegations in chronological order beginning on October 8, 

2004, through February 15, 2006. The Court will briefly summarize Plaintiff’s general complaints and 

will analyze the cognizability of such claims in the sections below. 

On October 8, 2004, Plaintiff requested to speak to a control booth officer regarding the failure 

to acknowledge his ADA medical shower chrono.

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On October 10, 2004, Plaintiff was summoned to the program office to see Sergeant Curtiss 

and officer Boncore. Sergeant Curtiss threatened to issue a counseling chrono against Plaintiff if he 

and his family did not stop their complaints. 

On October 11, 2004, Plaintiff filed an ADA medical accommodation appeal. On October 16, 

2004, Sergeant Curtiss had Plaintiff moved out of his ADA cell into a segregated housing unit in order 

to discourage him from seeking further redress through the grievance system. On this same day, 

Plaintiff filed a grievance against officer Boncore for the failure to comply with his ADA medical 

chrono. Officer Boncore started a rumor among prison inmates and staff that the reason Plaintiff left 

the building so abruptly was because he was a rat and snitch which placed Plaintiff’s safety and liberty 

at risk. The allegations by Sergeant Curtiss and officer Boncore were a direct result of Plaintiff filing 

an ADA medical appeal. 

On November 4, 2004, Sergeant J. Gallagher investigated the ADA medical appeal and entered 

invalid information in the record. On November 10, 2004, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Sergeant 

Curtiss and officers Padilla and Boncore for the continuous harassment and retaliation.

On December 8, 2004, acting appeals coordinator, S. Smith, screened out Plaintiff’s grievance 

filed against officer Boncore on October 16, 2004, for spreading rumors in an effort to induce an 

assault against Plaintiff.

On December 12, 2004, Sergeant Hinshaw denied Plaintiff’s grievance against Sergeant 

Curtiss and officers Padilla and Boncore. On the next day, out of retaliatory animus Plaintiff was 

again moved from his ADA cell to a segregated housing unit. Plaintiff contends the move was another 

tactic to discourage the filing of future grievances. 

On December 14, 2004, Plaintiff was issued two counseling chronos by officer J. Torres which 

ultimately resulted in issuance of a serious rules violation report. On this same day, Plaintiff filed a 

grievance against officer Torres.

On January 1, 2005, Sergeant Hinshaw was assigned to investigate and respond to Plaintiff’s 

staff complaint against officer Torres which had been mis-categorized as a disciplinary issue. 

Sergeant Hinshaw dismissed the action and never addressed the threats and actions of officer J. Torres.

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On January 14, 2005, Plaintiff’s staff complaint against Lieutenant Gallagher for falsifying his 

appeal was screened out by S. Smith.

On January 22, 2005, officer H. Johnson filed a false rules violation report which placed 

Plaintiff’s life in danger because he started a rumor that he was a child molester. Officer Johnson also 

issued a false rules violation report in retaliation claim that Plaintiff masturbated in front of her. 

On January 28, 2005, Plaintiff was moved back to the ADA cell which remained unoccupied 

for the complete 46 days following his retaliatory transfer to segregated housing.

On February 15, 2005, appeals coordinator Hall responded at the second level of review as to 

the grievance filed against J. Torres on December 14, 2004. R. M. Hall circumvented the complaint 

by categorizing and responding to it as a disciplinary issue.

On March 3, 2005, Plaintiff’s family filed a complaint against Sergeant J. Gallagher for 

falsifying his appeal response. 

On March 28, 2005, Plaintiff’s filed a complaint against Boncore for spreading false rumors 

among prisoners and staff that Plaintiff was a rat and/or snitch in an effort to place Plaintiff’s safety at 

risk.

On April 6, 2005, Plaintiff’s family filed a complaint against R.M. Hall for intentionally miscategorizing Plaintiff’s grievances.

On April 9, 2005, Lieutenant Odle interviewed Plaintiff regarding his family’s complaints. On 

April 13, 2005, Lieutenant Odle stated in written response, “in your complaint, you alleged that Sgt. J. 

Gallagher falsified a legal document when he stated he interviewed Reed regarding an appeal and the 

interview never occurred.”

On May 6, 2005, Captain C.L. Cooper, ordered the grievance against officer J. Torres to be 

reheard and categorized as a staff misconduct complaint.

On May 18, 2005, Sergeant Hinshaw issued a serious rules violation report for filing a false 

report. 

After two postponements of the rules violation hearing, a hearing was held on June 28, 2005, 

by Lieutenant Odle who stated in part, “this SHO has considered all the evidence presented and found 

the investigation clearly showed Reed filed a false report. The testimony of and rule violation report 

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by Sgt. S. Hinshaw has substantiated the charge. Specifically, the evidence shows that the investigator 

found the allegations to be false and Reed knowingly made at least one false claim of harassment, 

which he later contradicted.”

Plaintiff contends that Lieutenant Odle was a biased decision maker and there was no evidence 

to support the decision. 

On September 14, 2005, Plaintiff filed a staff complaint against Sergeant Hinshaw to refute the 

fraudulent rules violation report and requested that his actions be referred to the District Attorney’s 

office.

On October 12, 2005, Plaintiff filed a staff complaint against Sergeant Curtiss for falsifying 

documents. 

On October 17, 2005, Plaintiff filed a staff complaint against S. Smith for her continuous abuse 

and misuse of her position of trust to suppress any grievance that contained an allegation of staff 

misconduct. 

 On January 23, 2006, Plaintiff was taken out of his ADA cell and placed in segregated 

housing and when the escorting officer passed officer Johnson she shouted, “it’s not my fault you[’re] 

a child molester.” On this same day, officer J. Torres falsified a counseling chrono that indicated he 

was directed to assist officer Johnson in inventorying Plaintiff’s personal property. Plaintiff contends 

that officer Torres did not properly complete and sign the necessary documentation regarding his 

personal property. 

On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal against officers Johnson and Torres for 

illegally confiscating his personal property which was never returned to him. 

On February 15, 2006, Plaintiff appeared before Lieutenant J. Gallagher for a hearing on the 

rules violation issued by officer Johnson for indecent exposure. At one point, Lieutenant Gallagher 

told Plaintiff that he was “going to enjoy hearing this Rule Violation Report.” Gallagher further stated 

“you are my enemy. You don’t like white people.” Plaintiff contends Lieutenant Gallagher was 

biased and found his guilty of the rules violation without supporting evidence.

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III.

DISCUSSION

A. Retaliation

“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to be 

free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). Also protected by the First Amendment is the 

right to pursue civil rights litigation in federal court without retaliation. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 

1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation 

entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the 

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Based on Plaintiff’s allegations in the second amended complaint, Plaintiff states a cognizable 

claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment against Defendants Sergeant Hinshaw and 

officer Johnson. 

B. Due Process-Rules Violation Report

Plaintiff contends that he was rules violation reports were issued falsely in retaliation for filing 

grievances, and he was not afforded proper due process at such hearings including, an unbiased 

decision maker, ability to call witnesses, and lack of sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt. 

With respect to disciplinary proceedings, it is established that a constitutional claim concerning 

the application of rules administered by a prison or penal administrator that challenges the duration of 

a sentence is a cognizable claim of being in custody in violation of the Constitution pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). The Supreme Court has held that 

challenges to prison disciplinary adjudications that have resulted in a loss of time credits must be 

raised by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus and not in a § 1983 action because such a challenge 

is to the very fact or duration of physical imprisonment. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 

(1973).

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Plaintiff does not indicate whether he suffered a credit loss as a result of the rules violation. 

Accordingly, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff may proceed by way of § 1983 for alleged 

due process violations at his rules violations hearing conducted by Lieutenants Odle and Gallagher, 

and the claim is not cognizable. 

C. Due Process-Confiscation of Personal Property

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due 

process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected interest 

in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, while an 

authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson 

v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984), neither negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations 

of property by a state employee “constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is 

available,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. California provides such a remedy. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 

813, 816-817 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Authorized deprivations or property are permissible if 

carried out pursuant to a regulation that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations allege an unauthorized intentional or negligent deprivation of his 

property by defendant Johnson. Such unauthorized deprivation is not actionable under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because California provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

D. Inmate Appeals Process

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of 

life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one 

of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Plaintiff does not a 

have protected liberty interest in the processing his appeals, and therefore, he cannot pursue a claim 

for denial of due process with respect to the handling or resolution of his appeals. Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

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The majority of Plaintiff’s claims stem from the processing and handling of his inmate 

grievances and complaints. However, as Plaintiff was advised in the Court’s January 8, 2014, order,

Plaintiff cannot proceed on a claim of denial of due process regarding the handling and/or resolution 

of his inmate appeals. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim. 

E. Deliberate Indifference

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate indifference to 

an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled

in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. 

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that 

“the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing 

Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind 

is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d 

at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

Plaintiff alleges only that he was taken out of ADA cell and placed in a segregated housing 

unit. Plaintiff fails to provide any details, and the Court cannot assume, regarding the housing 

conditions in the segregated housing unit and to what extent his medical needs were or were not meet 

during such placement. Without such factual support, Plaintiff has not provided any basis to find that 

any of the named defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

F. Americans with Disabilities Act

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, 

or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

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Title II applies to the services, programs, and activities provided for inmates by jails and prisons. 

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208-13, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998); Simmons 

v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2010); Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 

1190, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2008). “To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show 

that (1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or 

otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and 

(3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 

1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1021; McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 

1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff’s complaint does not set forth any facts supporting a claim that he was excluded from 

or discriminated against with regard to services, programs, or activities at Corcoran State Prison by 

reason of his disability. To the contrary, the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit appear related solely 

to the medical need or lack thereof concerning his housing placement. Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations 

stem from his belief that defendants were discriminating against him in retaliation for filing 

grievances. Furthermore, Plaintiff has provided no factual support to demonstrate that any alleged 

benefit of housing services necessary to accommodate his disability was due to his disability or that 

any harm was caused as a result. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. 

Authority, 114 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court also notes that individual capacity suits 

against individual prison employees in their personal capacities are precluded under the ADA. See, 

e.g., Heinke v. County of Tehama Sheriff’s Dept., No. CVI S-12-2433 LKK/KJN, 2013 WL 3992407, 

at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013); White v. Smyers, No. 2:12-cv-2868 MCE AC P, 2012 WL 6518064, at 

*6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012); Mosier v. California Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:11-CV-01034-MJS 

(PC), 2012 WL 2577524, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 2012); Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 

OWW LJO, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 

F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D. Haw. 2000)). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

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IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim against Defendants Hinshaw and Johnson for 

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts for any 

other claims against any of the other named Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the 

opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this 

suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only on 

the claim for retaliation against Defendants Hinshaw and Johnson, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in 

writing, and the Court will issue a recommendation for dismissal of the other claims and Defendants, 

and will forward Plaintiff two (2) summons and two (2) USM-285 form for completion and return. 

Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of 

process.

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Plaintiff must identify how each individual defendant caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional or other federal rights: “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on 

the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to 

have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). With 

respect to exhibits, while they are permissible if incorporated by reference, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), they 

are not necessary in the federal system of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other words, it is 

not necessary at this stage to submit evidence to prove the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint because 

at this stage Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true.

Although Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true and “the pleading standard 

Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

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“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556).

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Forsyth v. 

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded 

pleading.” Local Rule 220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original 

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing 

London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. 

In other words, even the claims that were properly stated in the original complaint must be completely 

stated again in the amended complaint. Finally, Plaintiff is advised that, should he choose to amend, 

he may not bring unrelated claims in the same action. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint 

and wishes to proceed only against Defendants Hinshaw and Johnson for 

retaliation; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to 

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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