Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07016/USCOURTS-caDC-15-07016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 12, 2016 Decided June 21, 2016

No. 15-7016

RENE ARTURO LOPEZ, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS ACTION 

NETWORK, INC.,

APPELLEE

Consolidated with 15-7019

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00023)

(No. 1:10-cv-00022)

David Yerushalmi argued the cause for Appellants. With 

him on the briefs was Robert Joseph Muise.

Jenifer Wicks argued the cause and filed the brief for 

Appellee.

Before: SRINIVASAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

This appeal arises out of the bad acts of Morris Days

(a/k/a Jamil Days), who held himself out to the public as a 

civil rights attorney working for a regional chapter of the 

Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network 

(“CAIR” or “CAIR National”), when he was not, in fact, a 

lawyer. The Maryland/Virginia regional CAIR chapter had 

hired Days to serve as its civil rights manager, and eventually 

Days also took up the role of resident attorney. Days took 

money from CAIR clients in exchange for the promise of 

legal services, but performed none. Plaintiff-Appellants in 

this consolidated action are individual CAIR clients who were 

negatively impacted by Days’s conduct. Their lawsuits 

allege, inter alia, that CAIR is responsible for the bad acts of 

Days because Days was CAIR’s agent. The District Court 

disagreed and granted summary judgment to CAIR National. 

This Court has jurisdiction to review the final decision of 

the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons set 

forth below, we reverse the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

CAIR is a national organization based in Washington, 

D.C. that works to protect the civil rights of Muslims living in

the United States. This work sometimes involves providing 

legal services. The organization has affiliated local and 

regional chapter offices, which exist as independent nonprofits. Local chapters come into being through a written 

application process, submitted to the national headquarters, 

through which CAIR can either grant or deny affiliation. The 

regional chapter serving Maryland and Virginia was granted 

approval by the national organization in 2002. Its operations 

were initially based in Bethesda, Maryland, but eventually 

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moved to Herndon, Virginia. The chapter has been 

alternately referred to in the public as CAIR-MD/VA or 

CAIR-VA. 

During the relevant time period, CAIR-VA’s day-to-day 

operations were supervised by Khalid Iqbal, the chapter’s

executive director and an employee of CAIR National. Iqbal 

was the director of operations for CAIR National, which paid 

his salary, but served simultaneously as the executive director 

of the regional chapter at CAIR-VA, on a volunteer basis. 

Because CAIR National paid Iqbal’s salary, Iqbal was 

considered a sort of in-kind donation from the national 

organization to the chapter. 

Morris Days began working as a volunteer at CAIR-VA 

in approximately June 2006. After volunteering for some 

time, Days approached Iqbal seeking full-time employment 

by the chapter. Iqbal recommended to the CAIR-VA Board 

that they hire Days, and in January 2007, Days began working

as an independent contractor for CAIR-VA’s Civil Rights 

Department, as civil rights manager. Iqbal was Days’s 

immediate supervisor. 

Days was initially hired to perform non-legal advocacy 

for clients who alleged that they faced religious 

discrimination; this work included making phone calls, 

writing letters, and referring clients to attorneys when 

appropriate. It did not require Days to hold a law degree or a 

license to practice law. Yet, as time passed, Days started to 

misrepresent to CAIR, to the public, and to his CAIR-VA 

clients, that he was an attorney and was licensed to practice 

law. Days then began requesting and accepting fees for the 

legal services he claimed to be performing – despite CAIRVA’s policy not to take money from its civil rights clients. 

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Days later admitted that he used this money for his personal 

enrichment. 

Iqbal first learned that Days was violating the 

organization’s policy against accepting money from CAIRVA clients in July 2007, when he received a complaint that 

Days had accepted money for a client’s immigration case, but 

then had been non-responsive to the client. Iqbal sent an 

email to Days, seeking an explanation and asking Days to 

help develop a policy going forward for taking on cases. On 

or around October or November 2007, Iqbal learned that Days 

had again taken money from a CAIR-VA client. Following 

this discovery, Iqbal confronted Days and instructed him to 

return the money. Iqbal conducted no other investigation into 

Days’s misconduct at that time. 

Despite Iqbal’s prior warnings to Days not to take money 

from clients, around January 2008, Iqbal discovered that Days 

had again received funds from an individual who had come to 

CAIR-VA for legal assistance. Iqbal again confronted Days, 

again instructed Days not to accept money from clients, and 

gave Days a written warning. But the very next week, in 

early February 2008, Iqbal received a report that Days had 

solicited funds from yet another individual. Following this 

discovery, Days was barred from entering the CAIR-VA 

office, his office keys were taken from him, and he was 

informed that his relationship with CAIR was terminated 

effective immediately. 

It was only after Days was fired that CAIR started to 

inquire regarding his status as an attorney. After discovering 

that Days was not a lawyer, CAIR took possession of CAIRVA’s civil rights case files, as CAIR-VA no longer had 

anyone that could handle the matters. CAIR had its own 

personnel review the files. Once CAIR National’s staff had 

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reviewed all of the files, Iqbal then informed the individuals 

with open cases that Days was no longer with CAIR-VA, and 

recommended attorneys with whom those individuals could 

consult regarding their cases. 

At various times during Days’s employment at CAIRVA, each of the Plaintiffs approached Days in search of legal 

counsel. Unsurprisingly, Days did not perform the legal work 

promised. Plaintiffs allege that they have suffered financial 

loss and emotional distress as a result of this action. CAIR 

filed a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs opposed, 

asking the court to treat their filing as a de facto cross-motion 

for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(f). The District Court granted CAIR’s motion 

for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion, 

holding that the Plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue 

of material fact regarding whether Days was the agent of 

CAIR National. 

II.

We review the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 

(D.C. Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriately granted 

when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences 

accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in their

favor. See Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 

878 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The evidence presented must show 

“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. “[T]he 

mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the 

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion 

for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no 

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genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). 

“[M]ateriality is only a criterion for categorizing factual 

disputes in their relation to the legal elements of the claim and 

not a criterion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of 

those disputes.” Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. 

Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be 

counted.” Id. 

In conducting our analysis, we review the record taken as 

a whole. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is 

no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quotation 

marks omitted). “We are not to make credibility 

determinations or weigh the evidence.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 

895; see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249 (“[A]t the summary 

judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh 

the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to 

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”).

III.

As the District Court held below, Virginia law applies to 

the Plaintiffs’ tort claims. See Lopez v. Council on AmericanIslamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 222, 

235 (D.D.C. 2010). In Virginia, an agency relationship may 

be established by one of two theories: (1) actual agency; or 

(2) apparent or ostensible agency. See Wynn’s Extended 

Care, Inc. v. Bradley, 619 F. App’x 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2015).

The Plaintiffs are only pursuing their claim under a theory of 

actual agency. Accordingly, we must determine if the 

Plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to 

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whether an actual agency relationship existed between Days 

and CAIR National.

Actual agency is established when one person (the 

principal) manifests consent to another person (the agent), 

that the agent “shall act on his behalf and subject to his 

control,” and the agent likewise manifests “consent so to act.”

Reistroffer v. Person, 439 S.E.2d 376, 378 (Va. 1994); accord

Wynn’s Extended Care, 619 F. App’x at 218. “The question 

of agency vel non is one of fact for the fact finder unless the 

existence of an agency relationship depends upon 

unambiguous written documents or undisputed facts.” 

Reistroffer, 439 S.E.2d at 378; cf. Ashland Facility 

Operations, LLC v. NLRB, 701 F.3d 983, 990 (4th Cir. 2012) 

(“Generally, whether an agency relationship exists is a factual 

determination.”). 

Plaintiffs point to a number of facts that they believe 

support a reasonable inference that Days was CAIR’s agent. 

To begin with, Plaintiffs have asserted that Days manifested 

consent to serve as CAIR’s agent by expressly stating to them 

that he was an attorney for CAIR, not just for CAIR-VA.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Plaintiffs, there is no reason not to take this as true; indeed,

CAIR does not challenge whether Days manifested his

consent to serve as CAIR’s agent. The question then remains 

to what extent, if any, CAIR National manifested its consent 

that Days was to act on CAIR’s behalf, and subject to CAIR’s 

control. See Reistroffer, 439 S.E.2d at 378. While such 

manifestation may be made directly or indirectly, it 

nonetheless must be made by the principal to the agent. The 

Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence in this case to 

raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CAIR 

National manifested its consent to Days that he was to act on 

CAIR’s behalf, and subject to CAIR’s control.

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A.

The manifestation of assent to action by the agent with 

legal consequences for the principal “may be made directly by 

the principal to the agent or may reach the agent through a 

more circuitous route.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 

§ 3.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). “A person manifests 

assent or intention through written or spoken words or other 

conduct.” Id. § 1.03. Where there is no direct evidence of an 

agency relationship, circumstantial evidence may be relied 

upon. See Acordia of Va. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Genito Glenn, 

L.P., 560 S.E.2d 246, 250 (Va. 2002) (“[D]irect evidence is 

not indispensable—indeed frequently is not available—but 

instead circumstances may be relied on, such as the relation of

the parties to each other and their conduct with reference to 

the subject matter of the contract.” (quotation marks 

omitted)). Precisely what evidence will be sufficient to 

establish agency in a given case “must be determined in view 

of the facts in each particular case.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted). Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that, 

viewed together, could provide a reasonable basis for a jury to 

conclude that CAIR National had manifested its consent for 

Days to act on its behalf, specifically: (1) CAIR’s web 

publications relating to Mr. Days; (2) CAIR’s handling of 

Days’s case files both before and after discovering the full 

extent of his fraud; and (3) CAIR’s statements regarding the 

organization’s decision to provide financial settlements to 

some of the affected individuals. 

First, Plaintiffs point to news articles that CAIR 

publicized on its website relating to Days’s work, which refer

to Days as a CAIR lawyer. Notwithstanding that these 

articles were published after Days started working for CAIR, 

and after the Plaintiffs initiated their individual relationships 

with Days, Plaintiffs contend that this is corroborating 

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evidence indicating CAIR’s earlier manifestation of consent. 

Plaintiffs also argue that CAIR’s intent can be inferred from 

the fact that Days showed them other publications by CAIR, 

similarly lauding Days as a CAIR attorney. Such publications 

could certainly support an inference that CAIR National had, 

at some point, made a decision to advertise the work that 

Days was doing, thereby associating CAIR National with 

Days and his work. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Plaintiffs, this is not an unreasonable 

inference. 

It would also not be unreasonable to conclude that CAIR 

National manifested consent for Days to act on its behalf 

based on CAIR’s conduct with respect to the civil rights cases 

opened and handled by the CAIR-VA chapter. Information 

regarding all of the CAIR-VA cases that Days worked on was

entered into a central database, which was maintained by 

CAIR National. One could infer that, because CAIR tracked

the status of cases handled by its affiliates, the national 

organization had some stake in the outcomes of those cases. 

In other words, the successes or failures of CAIR-VA 

reflected in some meaningful way upon CAIR National. 

Further substantiating such a view is the fact that CAIR took 

possession of all of the client files that belonged to CAIR-VA 

after the chapter was dissolved, and had its own personnel go 

through and review the files. A jury could reasonably view 

these facts as supporting the conclusion that CAIR had 

manifested its consent for Days to act on its behalf, and 

considered the work that Days did on behalf of CAIR-VA as 

an extension of the work of CAIR National.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that CAIR National’s consent to 

have Days act on its behalf is evidenced by the fact that CAIR 

compensated some of the victims of Days’s fraud. As 

CAIR’s corporate designee testified, CAIR paid settlement 

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money to some of Days’s clients because the organization

was “trying to right a wrong that was done by one of our 

employees.” J.A. 1287-88. Whether or not Days was 

technically an employee or an independent contractor for 

CAIR-VA, this testimony is evidence that a reasonable jury 

could rely on in concluding that CAIR National did, in fact, 

view Days as acting on the organization’s behalf. 

B.

Plaintiffs have also presented evidence that a reasonable 

jury could rely on to conclude that CAIR National maintained 

the power to control Days, and Days was thus CAIR’s agent. 

The power to control is a critical factor in determining 

whether an actual agency relationship exists under Virginia 

law. See Wynn’s Extended Care, 619 F. App’x at 218 (“In 

deciding whether an actual agency exists, ‘the power of the 

alleged principal to control is the determining factor in 

ascertaining the alleged agent’s status.’” (quoting Allen v. 

Lindstrom, 379 S.E.2d 450, 454 (Va. 1989) (brackets 

omitted)); see also Reistroffer, 439 S.E.2d at 378 (power of 

control is an important factor). 

The element of control in this context refers to the “right 

to control the methods or details of doing the work, not 

control of the results.” Wells v. Whitaker, 151 S.E.2d 422, 

429 (Va. 1966); accord Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 219 

S.E.2d 874, 877 (Va. 1975). “Actual control . . . is not the 

test; it is the right to control which is determinative.” Perry v. 

Scruggs, 17 F. App’x 81, 89 (4th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks 

omitted)). From an operational standpoint, it would not be 

unreasonable for a jury to conclude that CAIR National had 

the right to control the methods or details of Days’s work. 

Upon being hired by CAIR-VA, Days participated in several 

training sessions on how to handle civil rights cases, including 

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one session held at CAIR National and a number of one-onone follow-up sessions with Iqbal. And, as discussed above,

all of the CAIR-VA civil rights cases that Days worked on 

were tracked by the national organization via CAIR 

National’s central database. Finally, the role of Khalid Iqbal, 

who supervised Days while wearing two hats – one as CAIR

National’s operations director, and one as CAIR-VA’s 

executive director – raises genuine questions about the extent 

to which CAIR National maintained or exerted control over 

Days. 

Specifically, Iqbal’s conduct upon discovering Days’s 

misconduct provides evidence upon which a reasonable jury 

could conclude that CAIR National exerted control over 

Days. Notably, when Iqbal sought information from Days via 

email following the first accusation of misconduct, Iqbal used 

his CAIR title and contact information in his signature despite 

sending the email from his CAIR-VA account. It would not be 

unreasonable to infer from this evidence that Iqbal disciplined 

Days in his capacity as director of operations for CAIR 

National, and therefore that CAIR National both had the 

power to exercise control over Days and in fact exercised that 

power. Additionally, Iqbal exchanged emails with other 

CAIR National employees about how to address Days’s 

misconduct. For example, Iqbal sought the CAIR National 

Director’s input and waited for her approval before sending a 

letter to Days. A jury could infer from these emails that 

Iqbal’s supervisors at CAIR National oversaw his 

management of Days.

And finally, CAIR National’s handling of Days’s client 

files after the exposure of his fraud is evidence that a 

reasonable jury could rely on in concluding that CAIR had

control over Days. CAIR took possession of the CAIR-VA 

client files, and had its own personnel review those files 

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without first contacting the clients for permission to do so –

conduct that would have constituted a breach of ethical duties 

unless CAIR National previously had the power to control 

Days’s conduct with respect to those cases.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Plaintiffs, and drawing all inferences in their favor, it would 

be reasonable to infer based on these facts, taken together,

that CAIR National had the ability to control Days, and in fact 

exerted that control.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that genuine issues of 

material fact exist as to whether or not Morris Days was the 

agent of CAIR National. We reverse the judgment of the 

District Court and remand for further proceedings.

So ordered.

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