Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00878/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00878-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BRUCE KNIESPECK, 

CIV. NO. S-01-0878 WBS EFB

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF

AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, plaintiff moves for reconsideration of this court’s

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Findings”) entered on

December 21, 2006, to augment the award of $171,720.00 to

include prejudgment interest. Plaintiff also moves for

attorneys’ fees and costs. The factual history and procedural

background are set forth in detail in the court's earlier

Findings.

A. Motion for Reconsideration of Findings to Include

Prejudgment Interest

 The court did not address the question of prejudgment

interest in its Findings because plaintiff did not discuss the

question in his pretrial briefing, and when specifically asked

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at the conclusion of the hearing whether he was seeking an award

of prejudgment interest, plaintiff's attorney was unable to say

whether plaintiff was seeking such relief, what legal

authorities exist to support such a request, or what amount was

appropriate. 

It is not clear that a request for prejudgment

interest is appropriately raised for the first time on a motion

for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Reconsideration is an

“extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of

finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters.,

Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Reconsideration is ordinarily appropriate only when the

“district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence,

(2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly

unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling

law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5

F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Westlands

Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (citing

389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.

1999)). 

Since plaintiff did request prejudgment interest in

the prayer of the complaint, and the court arguably could have

considered the issue in its Findings notwithstanding plaintiff's

apparent inability to address the issue at the time, with the

issue now properly briefed, the court will consider plaintiff’s

request. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 176

(1989) (finding proper a post-judgment motion for prejudgment

interest, appropriately characterized as a motion to alter or

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amend the judgment).

1. Awarding Prejudgment Interest

“Whether to award prejudgment interest to an ERISA

plaintiff is ‘a question of fairness, lying within the court’s

sound discretion, to be answered by balancing the equities.’” 

Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F.3d 726, 739 (9th Cir. 1995); see also

Shaw v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.

1985). In deciding whether to award prejudgment interest: 

[A] district court will consider a number of factors,

including whether prejudgment interest is necessary to

compensate the plaintiff fully for his injuries, the

degree of personal wrongdoing on the part of the

defendant, the availability of alternative investment

opportunities to the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff

delayed in bringing or prosecuting the action, and

other fundamental considerations of fairness.

Osterneck, 489 U.S. at 176.

The court first concludes that prejudgment interest is

necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff for his injuries. 

Plaintiff has been wrongfully denied his benefits for over eight

years, an excessive period of time. Moreover, as a result of

defendant’s denial of benefits, combined with plaintiff’s

inability to work, plaintiff lost his home to foreclosure and

became homeless. (UACL 00762-763.) Defendant has been

collecting interest since September, 1998, on the money

wrongfully withheld from plaintiff. An award of prejudgment

interest amounts only to the defendant disgorging this illgotten profit. See Nichols v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 287 F.

Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Sweet v. Consol.

Aluminum Corp., 913 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir. 1990)) (noting that

“[f]ailure to award prejudgment interest in such a situation

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The report was, however, issued over eighteen months 1

prior to UNUM’s final denial of plaintiff’s claim, which would have

put UNUM on notice of the propriety of such practices.

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‘would approve of an unjust enrichment’”); see also Gelfgren v.

Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 79, 82 (9th Cir. 1982)

(“To allow appellees to escape the payment of prejudgment

interest would unjustly enrich appellees.”).

Potential wrongdoing by defendant is not as clear--

there is no persuasive evidence of bad faith. The

administrative record contains a report that followed a Targeted

Disability Income Multistate Examination (“TDIME”), which

revealed questionable insurance practices by UNUM. The report,

issued in November, 2004, included instances where “benefits

were denied on the grounds that the claimant had failed to

provide ‘objective evidence’ of a disabling condition,” when the

terms of the policy did not require such evidence. (UACL

00413.) 

The report, however, does not refer to plaintiff’s

claim. There is no specific evidence that UNUM acted 1

inappropriately toward plaintiff. A finding of bad faith is not

implied simply because this court determined that benefits were

wrongly withheld. Although plaintiff provided medical opinions

substantiating his claim for disability, defendant also

proffered physician opinions to the contrary. 

While this court therefore declines to find bad faith

by UNUM, it concludes that the balance of the equities requires

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Although defendant cites to several purported “delays” 2

by plaintiff in the processing of his claim appeal, the court is

convinced that these instances were simply plaintiff’s attempts at

gathering proper medical evidence to support his claim and appeal.

(See, e.g., UACL 00482.)

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awarding prejudgment interest. Defendant would not experience 2

any financial hardship by paying prejudgment interest, nor would

such a payment negatively affect other UNUM policy

beneficiaries. If plaintiff were awarded the past benefits

without prejudgment interest, he would not be adequately

compensated for defendant’s withholding of his payments. See

e.g. Fleming v. Kemper Nat. Servs., Inc. 373 F. Supp. 2d 1000,

1013 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that plaintiff in an ERISA case

was entitled to prejudgment interest on withheld benefits,

despite a finding of no bad faith).

2. Prejudgment Interest Calcuation

“[T]he interest rate proscribed for post-judgment

interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is appropriate for fixing the

rate of prejudgment interest unless the trial judge finds, on

substantial evidence, that the equities of that particular case

require a different rate.” Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere Life

Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001). The interest

rate for awarding prejudgment interest is based on the rate of a

“fifty-two week United States Treasury bill[].” 28 U.S.C. §

1961. For prejudgment interest, as opposed to post-judgment

interest, however, the court should apply the interest rate in

effect at the time payment was due to the plaintiff, not the

rate applicable on the date of judgment. See Nelson v. EG & G

Energy Measurements Group, 37 F.3d 1384, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1994)

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28 4.87% represents the rate on September 1, 1998, not 3

January 1, as that was when plaintiff’s claim was first denied.

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(noting that the more accurate method of calculation would be to

use the “rate at the beginning of each year”).

Attached as Exhibit D to plaintiff’s motion (filed

separately as “Revised Interest Calculation”) is a calculation

of plaintiff’s prejudgment interest according to the above

formula. (Pl.’s Mot. to Amend Ex. C.) Plaintiff notes 52-week

Treasury bill rates, for the beginning of each year between 1998

and 2006, of 4.87%, 4.58%, 6.09%, 5.11%, 2.28%, 1.42%, 1.31%,

2.79%, and 4.38%. Based on these rates, and a monthly benefit 3

of $1,717.20 from September, 1998, until the present, plaintiff

is due $27,147.19 in prejudgment interest.

B. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

1. Awarding Attorneys’ Fees

ERISA provides that “[i]n any action under this

subchapter . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,

the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s

fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g)(1). The Ninth Circuit has established a five-factor

test for awarding attorneys’ fees, which considers: 

(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or

bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing parties to

satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees

against the opposing parties would deter others from

acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the

parties requesting fees sought to benefit all

participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to

resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA;

and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.

Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). 

“No one of the Hummell factors, however, is necessarily

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UNUM’s conduct toward plaintiff, however, bears many 4

similarities to the illegal and improper practices detailed in the

TDIME report. Thus, while this court declines to find bad faith,

it concludes that the absence of bad faith does not weigh strongly

against awarding attorneys’ fees. 

7

decisive, and some may not be pertinent in a given case.” 

Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1416

(9th Cir. 1984). The factors require a balancing of the

equities, and the court need not find that each one supports an

award of fees in granting such relief. Elwain McElwaine v. US

West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999).

As discussed above, the court finds no bad faith by

UNUM. Although the TDIME report listed past fiduciary misdeeds,

there is no indication of such conduct in this case. Thus, this

factor does not weigh in favor of an award of attorneys’ fees.4

Defendant does not contest that they are capable of

satisfying an award of fees. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for

Att’ys Fees 4-5.) Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor

of such an award.

The third factor, the deterrent effect of an award on

other persons in similar circumstances also weighs in favor of

granting attorneys’ fees. Defendant contends that “the award of

the claim benefits to plaintiff represents a more than adequate

deterrence for insurers.” (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for

Att’ys Fees 4.) However, the award of claim benefits represents

an expense which the ERISA insurers already owe the

beneficiaries. Thus, if the maximum amount of an award against

an ERISA insurer were to be capped at the amount of the

beneficiary’s claim, there would be incentive for insurers to

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deny every claim, and try their chances at litigation. “A fee

award would deter other employers from forcing beneficiaries to

undertake costly litigation to preserve their claims.” 

McElwaine, 176 F.3d at 1173; see also Carpenters, 726 F.2d at

1416 (9th Cir. 1984).

The fourth factor also weighs in favor of an award of

attorneys’ fees. While plaintiff’s motivation in bringing his

claim was rooted in his desire to recover his own benefits, this

action required a significant legal interpretation of the

Policy. Phase 1 of the trial settled apparent ambiguities in

the Policy, both as to the meaning of “partial disability,” as

well as to what proof of disability is required. (May 29, 2002

Order.) Such “a decision clarifying the terms of a plan after

litigation would ‘benefit all participants and beneficiaries’ by

settling a disputed provision or an ambiguity. This would be

helpful to the trustees in future administration, but ‘often

depend[s] on a plaintiff’s initiative in bringing suit.’” 

Smith, 746 F.2d at 590 (citing Carpenters, 726 F.2d at 1416).

The final factor, the relative merits of the parties’

positions, also weighs in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees. 

The court determined that plaintiff’s claim should be been

considered as one for “partial disability,” and that UNUM’s

denial was improper. (Dec. 21, 2006 Order.) Despite

defendant’s repeated assertion that their position has been

“meritorious,” (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Att’ys Fees 6-7),

plaintiff prevailed on all issues before the court. 

Accordingly, this factor also counsels that an award of

attorneys’ fees is proper.

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A finding of bad faith is not required in order to

award attorneys’ fees under ERISA. Smith, 746 at 590 (“Although

bad faith is a factor that would always justify an award, it is

not required. As there was no bad faith on either side, this

factor should not have been considered decisive.”); McElwaine,

176 F.3d at 1173 (noting that “bad faith is not a prerequisite

to an ERISA fee award”). With the exception of this first

factor, all other four Hummell factors weigh in favor of

granting plaintiff’s request. Moreover, “absent special

circumstances, a prevailing ERISA employee plaintiff should

ordinarily receive attorney’s fees from the defendant.” Smith

v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Accordingly, the court will award plaintiff reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs.

2. Amount of Attorneys’ Fees

The Ninth Circuit has adopted the hybrid

lodestar/multiplier approach for determining reasonable fees in

an ERISA action. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214

F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983)). First, a court calculates the “lodestar”

amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 433. The party seeking an award must submit evidence

supporting the hours worked and the rates requested--and a

district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours

that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id.

at 434. 

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Second, the court may adjust the award upward or

downward using a “multiplier” based on the Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4)

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time

limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results

obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability

of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the

case, (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases.

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.8 (9th Cir.

1996) (citing Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70

(9th Cir. 1975)). Many of the Kerr factors have been subsumed

in the lodestar approach. Id. (citing Cunningham v. County of

Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1988)). Moreover,

while the court should consider the factors established by Kerr,

it need not discuss each factor. Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc.,

704 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1983). Under federal law, there

is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable--

only in rare instances should it be adjusted based on other

factors. Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 n.8; Fischer v. SJB-P.D.,

Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). 

a. Hours Reasonably Expended

An attorney in an ERISA action may recover fees for

services provided in conjunction with litigation, including

costs prior to filing the complaint. Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974, 987 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, a

party can recover fees for work done by paralegals. Trustees of

Const. Indus. and Laborers Health and Welfare Trust v. Redland

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Plaintiff’s attorney augmented his total request for 5

217.8 hours, with a billing summary for 19.8 more hours of attorney

time expended since filing this motion. (Supp. deVries Decl. Ex.

1.)

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Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2006). However, a

party may not recover for services provided in relation to the

administrative proceedings required to exhaust administrative

remedies. Dishman, 269 F.3d at 987 n.51 (citing Cann v.

Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal., 989 F.2d 313, 314

(9th Cir. 1993)).

Plaintiff’s counsel presents an itemized list totaling

237.6 hours of attorney work, 132.70 hours of work by an

“assistant,” and 4.85 hours of work by a secretary. (deVries 5

Decl. Ex. 1.) Defendant challenges the reasonableness of the

amount of time spent on two tasks: 1) the creation of a detailed

index of the administrative record; and 2) plaintiff’s extensive

preparation for the December 18, 2006, trial. (Def.’s Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. for Att’ys Fees 15-16.) Defendant additionally

objects to numerous tasks that defendant contends were performed

as part of UNUM’s administrative review. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s

Mot. for Att’ys Fees 9-14.)

i. Excessive Hours 

In October and November, 2006, the “assistant” of

plaintiff’s counsel billed fifty hours for the creation of a

“detailed index of second (final) administrative record and

entry into summation litigation support system; production of

detailed chronological index, numerical index, and sub-indexes.”

(deVries Decl. Ex. 1.) Plaintiff does not provide any further

detail explaining the division of these hours or what specific

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Plaintiff’s billing itemization contains one entry on 6

page 11 which reads, “11/07/06-11/17/06 (Atty) ‘Prepare, finalize

and file Trial brief’ - 30 hours x $350 = $10,500,” and one entry

on page 12, which reads, “12/13/06-12/16/06 (Atty) ‘Trial

preparation; detailed review of administrative record and trial

briefs; outline analysis/argument’ - 20 hours x $350 = $7,000.”

Such vague and condensed entries, for services totaling over

$17,000, are insufficient to support the reasonableness of the fee

requests.

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tasks were performed. The court agrees that spending fifty

hours to organize the administrative record is excessive, and

accordingly will reduce this amount by half (i.e. twenty-five

“assistant” hours). 

Plaintiff also asserts that its attorneys spent fiftyfive hours in preparation for the Phase 2 trial before this

court, including thirty hours drafting the trial brief. The

court finds this to be excessive, especially in light of the

twenty-one hours it took plaintiff’s counsel to prepare for the

Phase 1 trial. This court is unpersuaded that thirty hours is

reasonable to prepare the Phase 2 trial brief, or that an

additional twenty hours were necessary for general trial

preparation. Moreover, plaintiff counsel’s singular line item

for both of these expenses is an insufficient itemization to

convince this court that such an expenditure of time was

reasonable. Accordingly, the court will also reduce these 6

hours by half (i.e. twenty-seven and a half attorney hours).

ii. Unrecoverable Administrative Fees

Defendant contends that many tasks in plaintiff’s

bills are unrecoverable because they relate to the

administrative review process. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for

Att’ys Fees 9-14; see Cann, 989 F.2d at 314.) While it is

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undisputed that attorneys’ fees are not recoverable for

administrative work done prior to filing a complaint, it is an

issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit whether

attorneys’ fees in an ERISA case may be recovered for work

related to administrative review after a complaint is filed,

i.e. pursuant to a court-ordered remand. Plaintiff asks this

court to follow the Second Circuit in Peterson v. Continental

Casualty Company, where the court awarded attorneys’ fees

incurred during administrative proceedings ordered by the court. 

282 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2002).

Upon review of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

precedent, this court declines to follow the Second Circuit in

Peterson. The Second Circuit based its holding on

interpretation of two Supreme Court cases, Pennsylvania v.

Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) and

Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989). However, the Ninth

Circuit addressed the general issue of awarding attorneys’ fees

for administrative work, noting that:

[In Delaware Valley and] Hudson, the attorneys’ fees

were incurred in prosecuting a remand through an

administrative agency after the claimant’s attorney

prevailed in the district court. In these

circumstances, a court has already decided that the

party is entitled to prevail, but in the

pre-adjudication phase at issue before us, such a

determination has not yet been made. Also, the

administrative proceedings in those cases were before

administrative agencies of government. In the case

before us . . . they are actually part of a private,

albeit regulated, claims process within the pension

fund trust, enabling a claimant to obtain review of a

denial within the trust before having to litigate. 29

U.S.C. § 1133(2).

Cann, 989 F.2d at 317 (emphasis added).

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Noting the need to promote “the soundness and stability 7

of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits.”

29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). 

14

 In Delaware Valley, the subsequent administrative

action sought to enforce, through administrative proceedings, a

judicially-approved consent decree. The post-remand

administrative procedures were necessary and integral to

accomplishing the relief already ordered by the district court. 

See also Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 571 (9th Cir. 1995)

(noting the severely limiting effect of Shalala v. Schaefer, 509

U.S. 292 (1993), on the holding of Hudson, such that an award of

fees for post-remand administrative work is only proper in the

very limited case “in which the court incorrectly retains

jurisdiction and this retention of jurisdiction goes

unchallenged”).

In this case, like in Cann, when this court remanded

the claim back to UNUM, it had not ruled on the primary

substantive dispute, only the proper context for plaintiff’s

claim. Plaintiff’s claim was then sent back for administrative

review consistent with that interpretation. This review under

ERISA was part of a private claims process under ERISA which

does not require litigation. See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d

559, 576 (9th Cir. 1980). As noted by the Cann court, allowing

recovery of attorneys’ fees incurred during administrative

review runs counter to the stated purpose of ERISA , because it 7

would “encourag[e] plans to pay questionable claims in order to

avoid liability for attorneys’ fees, [thereby] reduc[ing] their

‘soundness and stability.’” Cann, 989 F.2d at 317. This

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The court finds that the following six tasks, objected 8

to by plaintiff, appear to be reasonably related to the litigation:

(1) “6/07/02 - Letter to Client re decision in Phase I trial;” (2)

“3/04/04 - Review Court’s Minute Order, follow up;” (3) “4/26/04 -

Status Conference;” (4) “6/17/04 - Review letter from Anna Martin

and stipulation to continue trial date;” (5) “7/08/04 - File

stipulation to continue trial;” (6) “5/19/05 - T/c from Judge

Shubb’s clerk.”

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reasoning applies whether the administrative review occurs

before or after a complaint has been filed. The court therefore

declines to award attorneys’ fees for post-remand work related

to the administrative review of plaintiff’s claim.

The party seeking fees bears the burden of submitting

evidence to support their request. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 

Upon review of the tasks to which defendant objects, the court

agrees that most relate to administrative review of plaintiff’s

claim. These items all occurred between the two phases of

trial, while plaintiff’s claim was before UNUM on remand. 

Moreover, the descriptions evince general communications between

plaintiff’s attorney, plaintiff, and defendant--there is nothing

to contradict the reasonable presumption that work done during

this period related to the administrative review. This court

finds that, with six exceptions, all of the tasks highlighted in

defendant’s opposition are related to the administrative

process. These unrecoverable tasks total 67.55 attorney hours, 8

53.3 assistant hours, and will accordingly be subtracted from

plaintiff’s request. 

b. Reasonable Rate

To determine the reasonableness of hourly billing

rates, the court looks to the prevailing market rates in the

relevant community for similar work performed by attorneys of

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is, this court will interpret an assistant to be a paralegal.

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comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796

F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986). Under federal law, the

relevant community is the forum in which the district court

sits, as opposed to where counsel is located. Barjon v. Dalton,

132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a rate of $350 per hour for

Mr. deVries, $100 per hour for an unnamed “assistant,” and $30

per hour for an unnamed secretary. Defendant asks this court 9

to lower Mr. deVries’ rate to $190 per hour, and the assistant’s

rate to $70 per hour. Upon consideration of the prevailing

market rates for similar work, this court concludes that

plaintiff’s requested rate for those services is reasonable. 

In cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300, this court has held the

attorneys fees to $250 per hour for an experienced attorney,

$150 for associates, and $75 for paralegals, pointing out that

the work is relatively standardized and plaintiffs are

reasonably assured of being the prevailing parties in those

cases. White v. GMRI, Inc., CIV. S-04-0620 slip op. at 16 (E.D.

Cal. Jan. 19, 2006). In contrast, ERISA cases such as this are

typically unique in their facts and plaintiffs are far from

assured of prevailing. Consistent with these considerations, a

judge of this court recently approved rates in a class action

ERISA case of $495 per hour for a partner, $295 per hour for an

associate, and $150 per hour for a paralegal See Aguilar v.

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Melkonian Enters., Inc., CIV. No. 05-0032 slip op. at 8 (E.D.

Cal. Jan. 24, 2007). 

Mr. deVries has been a civil litigation attorney for

over thirty years, specializing in insurance claims cases, and

is a widely published author and speaker on the subject. 

(deVries Decl. 4.) DeVries’ declaration establishes that his

customary hourly billing rate is $300-350 per hour. See Davis

v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1547 (9th Cir.

1992) (concluding that declarations of prevailing market rate in

relevant community are sufficient to establish appropriate rate

for lodestar purposes). While not dispositive, a court may also

look to surrounding districts for guidance “because ERISA cases

involve a national standard, and attorneys practicing ERISA law

in the Ninth Circuit tend to practice in different districts.” 

Mogck v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1181,

1191 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (approving rates for ERISA attorneys of

$350 and $325 per hour); see e.g., Mardirossian v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2006)

(awarding $400 per hour for an ERISA attorney with over twenty

years experience); Farhat v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co.,

CIV. No. 05-0797 slip op. at 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2006)

(finding that a reasonable rate for experienced ERISA attorneys

falls between $400 and $495 per hour). 

Where a plaintiff submits affidavits regarding

prevailing rates in the community, the Ninth Circuit has implied

that defendants cannot simply disagree with this evidence, but

should “support their arguments with any affidavits or evidence

of their own regarding legal rates in the community.” See

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United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403,

407 (9th Cir. 1990). Other than a single case from the Northern

District, defendant provides no affidavits or persuasive legal

authority that suggests plaintiff’s requested rate is

unreasonable. Accordingly, the court will award attorneys’ fees

based on a rate of $350 per hour for Mr. deVries, $100 per hour

for “assistant.” 

Mr. deVries' request to be reimbursed for work done by

his secretary, however, will be disallowed. In Eiden v. Thrifty

Payless Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (E.D. Cal., 2005)

this court denied a request to include fees for work performed

by legal secretaries, upon the theory that the salaries and

benefits paid to support staff are “a part of the usual and

ordinary expenses of an attorney in his practice,” and are

properly classified as overhead. (Citing In re Pac. Exp., Inc.,

56 B.R. 859, 865 (Bkrtcy. E. D. Cal., 1985)). Admittedly, there

may be communities where such salaries and benefits are

customarily passed on to clients in the form of legal bills, and

thus would be recoverable as part of attorneys' fees. See

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989). However, it is

not the court's understanding that such is generally the

practice in the Sacramento community. 

3. Costs

In an ERISA action, courts may award “only the types

of ‘costs’ allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and only in the amounts

allowed by section 1920 itself, by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 or by

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28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides: 10

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs

the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the

stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily

obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of

interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special

interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.

A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance,

included in the judgment or decree.

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similar such provisions.” Agredano v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 75 10

F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff submits a bill of

costs totaling $442.45, for filing, service, and court reporter

fees.

Defendant’s challenges plaintiff’s request for

reimbursement of $232.45 in court reporter fees, for a

transcript of UNUM’s field investigator’s interview with

plaintiff. The field visit (sought in conjunction with an

“independent medical examination”) occurred at the urging of

UNUM as part of its claim investigation process. (UACL 00654.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel insisted the court reporter attend, although

the interview did not require it. (Id.) The court therefore

concludes that the field interview (and accompanying transcript)

was part of the administrative review process and thus, as per

this court’s previous discussion, supra Section

(II)(B)(2)(a)(ii), not recoverable. Accordingly, the court will

allow plaintiff to recover costs in the amount of $210.00.

///

///

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IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing discussion,

attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs are awarded in

the following amounts:

Mr. deVries:

237.6 hrs -(27.5 + 67.55) x $350/hr = $49,892.50 +

Assistant:

132.7 hrs -(53.3 + 25) x $100/hr = $5,400.00 +

Costs $210.00 =

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TOTAL $55,502.50

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to

amend the judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on benefits

withheld in the amount of $27,147.19.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

attorneys’ fees and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED,

in the amount of $55,502.50.

DATED: February 12, 2007

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