Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00696/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00696-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner John Allen Ontjes, who is confined in the Arizona State PrisonKingman, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (Doc. 1). 

BACKGROUND

 On April 3, 2008, Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Maricopa County 

Superior Court (“Superior Court”), Case No. CR 2007-00169570, on six counts: two 

counts for sale or transportation of dangerous drugs (Counts 1 and 2); one count 

possession of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine) for sale (Count 3); one count of 

misconduct involving weapons (Count 4); one count of theft (Count 5); and one count of 

possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 6). (Doc. 14-1, Exh. A.) In a memorandum 

decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals (“Appellate Court”) summarized the facts leading 

to the charges as follows: 

John Allen Ontjes, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-12-00696-PHX-GMS (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 2:12-cv-00696-GMS Document 45 Filed 10/16/13 Page 1 of 18
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In two separate transactions occurring on two separate 

occasions, November 15, 2006 and December 6, 2006, 

defendant sold a Mesa Police Department undercover 

narcotics detective one quarter ounce of crystal 

methamphetamine for $250. Mesa police arrested defendant 

on December 8, 2006. At the time of his arrest, police found a baggie of crystal meth and a glass smoking pipe on defendant's person and additional crystal meth in defendant's wallet located inside the vehicle defendant was driving. 

Defendant admitted using crystal meth for about two years and also admitted that he had started selling it about six months prior to his arrest. During a subsequent search of defendant's residence, police found several weapons, including a “Glock brand pistol” that had been reported stolen 

by its owner, as well as several “micro baggies” typically 

used by dealers to package methamphetamine. 

(Doc. 14-1, Exh. L); State v. Ontjes, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0185, 2010 WL 2540491, *1 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. June 24, 2010). 1

 Following a 4-day jury trial, on November 25, 2008, Petitioner was found guilty 

on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6, and was acquitted of Counts 4 and 5. (Doc. 14-1, Exh. F and I.) 

At a presentencing hearing held on January 6, 2009, Petitioner admitted to three prior 

felony convictions for aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.2

(Doc. 14-1, Exh. G.) On February 26, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to four concurrent 

terms of imprisonment, totaling 14 years. (Doc. 14-1, Exh. I.) The Superior Court further 

ordered restitution on Count 1 in the amount of $500, and fines in the amount of $2,000 

each on Counts 1, 2, and 3. (Id.) 

 Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Appellate Court, and filed an opening brief 

on or about November 9, 2009. (Doc. 14-1, Exh. J.) Petitioner, through counsel, raised 

three issues: (1) the Superior Court failed to properly offset his restitution; (2) the 

Superior Court erroneously ordered “$5,000” in oral recitation of his sentence; and (3) 

the Superior Court erred by not polling each separate juror on each individual count. (Id.) 

 1

 Petitioner does not appear to contest the Appellate Court’s recitation of the facts. Therefore, the Court presumes the state court’s factual determinations are correct because 

Petitioner has not “rebutt[ed] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

2

 Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CR 1995-90186, CR 1995-090149, and 

CR 1999-095620. 

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In a memorandum decision filed on June 24, 2010, the Appellate Court affirmed 

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 14-1, Exh. L; Ontjes, 2010 WL 2540491 at 

*5.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court on August 23, 

2010 (Doc. 14-1, Exh. M), which was summarily denied on February 17, 2011 (Doc. 14-

2, Exh. N). 

 Prior to the issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision, on July 26, 2010, Petitioner 

filed a pro se Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 14-2, Exh. O.) Petitioner, through 

counsel, filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on February 3, 2011. (Doc. 14-2, Exh. 

P.) The petition presented three claims: (1) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel during plea negotiations when counsel failed to properly advise him on the 

sentencing range for his offenses; (2) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel at the time of sentencing when counsel failed to object to the fines imposed; and 

(3) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when he failed to 

challenge the fines imposed at sentencing on direct appeal. (Id.) The Superior Court 

found that Petitioner had presented a colorable claim for relief with regard counsel’s 

advisal on sentencing ranges, and held an evidentiary hearing on May 20, 2011. (Doc. 14-

2, Exh. S and T; Exh. 31-1, Exh. A.) During the hearing, the Superior Court heard 

testimony from trial counsel; at its conclusion, the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

was denied and dismissed. (Id.) 

 Petitioner filed a timely pro se Petition for Review on June 20, 2011. (Doc. 14-2, 

Exh. U.) See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). Finding that the petition did not identify: (1) 

“[t]he issues which were decided by the trial court and which [he] wished to present [the] 

court for review;” (2) [t]he facts material to a consideration of the issues which are 

presented;” and (3) “[t]he reasons why the petition should be granted,” on June 24, 2011, 

the Appellate Court returned the petition and provided Petitioner 30 days to “file a proper 

petition for review.” (Doc. 14-2, Exh. V.) On August 24, 2011, the Appellate Court 

dismissed the proceedings because it had “received neither a compliant petition for 

review, no[r] a request for extension of time.” (Doc. 14-2, Exh. W.) 

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 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 2, 2012. 

(Doc. 1.) Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 14, 31), to which Petitioner filed a Reply 

(Doc. 37, 44). 

DISCUSSION

 In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief. 

Respondents argue in their Answer that in Ground One is not cognizable on federal 

habeas review. Respondents further contend that Petitioner’s claims in Grounds Two and 

Three are procedurally barred and otherwise fail on their merits. In response, Petitioner 

argues the merits of all three claims. He concedes that Grounds Two and Three are 

unexhausted, but contends that they should not be barred from review. As set forth 

below, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally barred from 

federal review or lack merit, and will recommend that all three grounds be denied. 

I. Applicable Law 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).3

 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

 A. Standard for Habeas Relief 

Under AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits4

 in State court proceedings” unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 3

 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date, 

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

4

 The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party’s claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In applying these standards, the federal habeas court reviews “the 

last reasoned state court decision addressing the claim in question.” Henry v. Ryan, 720 

F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 

2005). “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation,” the 

petitioner bears the burden to show that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court 

to deny relief” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 

770, 784 (2011). See also Johnson v. Williams, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013) 

(“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a 

federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits—

but that presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.”). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” refers to holdings 

of the Supreme Court in effect at the time the state court rendered its decision. Greene v. 

Fisher, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 

(2003); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010) (“A legal principle is ‘clearly 

established’ within the meaning of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding 

of this Court.”). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if 

(1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme 

Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a 

result different from [its] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A 

state court decision involves an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but applies that rule to the facts of a particular case in an 

objectively unreasonable manner. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-408; Lockyer v, 538 U.S. at 

75. “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was 

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. 

at 786-87. 

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 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), “a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state 

court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court 

proceeding[.]” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). See Maxwell v. Roe, 628 

F.3d 486, 500 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 611 (2012); Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). “[W]here the state courts plainly 

misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension 

goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension 

can fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding 

unreasonable.” Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Taylor v. 

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 However, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state law. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). 

“[T]he Supreme Court has long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure 

immunity from judicial error or uniformity of judicial decisions.” Little v. Crawford, 449 

F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006). As emphasized by the Supreme Court, “it is only 

noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to 

collateral attack in the federal courts. The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a 

federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (original emphasis) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Federal courts accept a state court’s interpretation of state 

law “and alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). It is not the policy of the 

federal courts to re-examine state court determinations of state law questions. Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 67-68. Moreover, a habeas petitioner cannot “transform a state law issue into a 

federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 

573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389). 

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 B. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

A federal court may not grant habeas relief under AEDPA if the petitioner has 

failed to exhaust his claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); see O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to 

the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the 

claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the 

proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 

(9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

 First, a petitioner must present his claims to the state’s highest court in a 

procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848. A petitioner “must give 

the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one 

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” Id. at 845. “[C]laims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them” either on direct appeal or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. 

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Second, if a petitioner fails to invoke the 

required procedure, exhaustion is not satisfied even if the petitioner raises the claim 

through an alternative procedure. See e.g., Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38 (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies when he presented claim in the state habeas petition 

instead of Arizona Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding).

In addition to presenting a claim in the proper forum and vehicle, to satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement, “a petitioner must ‘present the substance of his claim to the state 

courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts 

that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 1026, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582-83 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Bland v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other 

grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In presenting 

the factual basis of a claim, a petitioner need not present “every piece of evidence 

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supporting his federal claims,” but must “provide the state court with the operative facts, 

that is, all of the facts necessary to give application to the constitutional principle upon 

which [the petitioner] relies.” Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 28 

(2004). In presenting the legal basis of a claim, a petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that he is asserting a federal claim and cite to the specific constitutional guarantee 

upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 

(9th Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Our rule is that a 

state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state 

court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal 

law”) amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” 

such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial” is 

insufficient); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (finding a mere reference 

to the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a federal claim). 

 If a petitioner fails to fairly and fully present his federal claim in state court, and 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state courts’ procedural rules would 

bar consideration of the claim, the claim is procedurally defaulted and is barred from 

federal review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); 32.1(a)(3) (post-conviction review is precluded for claims 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); 32.9 (stating 

that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state 

post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. 

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, 

distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as 

“technical” exhaustion because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state 

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court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 732 (1991). 

 A claim may also be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review if it 

was actually raised in state court, but found by that court to be defaulted on an adequate 

and independent state procedural ground, such as waiver or preclusion. Beard v. Kindler, 

558 U.S. 53 (2009); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991). Arizona courts 

have been consistent in their application of procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and 

independent procedural bar); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) is independent of federal law and has 

been regularly and consistently applied, so it is adequate to bar federal review of a 

claim.”); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review “if the 

petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546). See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as 

well as to those represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish 

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 488-89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional 

violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish 

prejudice, a petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or 

prejudice, the court need not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 

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1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 fn. 13. Lastly, “[t]o qualify for 

the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the procedural default rule” a 

petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in the 

conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 

(quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) 

(petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the 

district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have 

voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be credible, such a claim 

requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, 

or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

II. Analysis 

 A. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred when it failed to poll 

each jury member on each individual count for which he was found guilty. Following the 

reading of the verdicts, the Superior Court 

sua sponte asked the court clerk to “poll the jury with regard to the four guilty verdicts,” also stating: “You don’t have to do it separately. Just as to all counts.” The court clerk then 

asked Juror Number One, “As to the guilty verdict on Count 

one; the guilty verdict on Count two; the guilty verdict on 

Count three; and the guilty verdict on Count six, is this [your] true verdict?” To which Juror Number One replied, “Yes.” Thereafter, the clerk asked each individual juror either “As to 

the guilty verdicts, [are] these your true verdicts?” or, more simply, “Are these your true verdicts?” Each juror responded, “Yes.” 

(Doc. 14-1 at 113-114, Exh. L; see also Doc. 14-1 at 28-30, Exh. F.) 

 Petitioner presented this claim to the Appellate Court on direct appeal. In 

concluding that the Superior Court did not commit error, the Appellate Court reasoned as 

follows: 

¶ 18 Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the 

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trial court erred by grouping the offenses together when polling the jurors and not polling each separate juror individually on each individual count. Defendant has forfeited 

his right to relief on this issue unless he can prove both that 

fundamental error occurred and that it caused him prejudice. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 20, 115 P.3d at 607. Fundamental error is error that goes to the foundation of the 

case, error that takes from a defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such magnitude that a defendant could not have received a fair trial. Id. at ¶ 19. The trial court committed no error, let alone fundamental error, in polling the 

jurors as it did. 

¶ 19 Prior to deliberation, the jurors were instructed by the trial court that the State had to prove each element of each 

charge beyond a reasonable doubt; that each count was a 

“separate and distinct offense” and the jurors were to decide each count separately uninfluenced by their decision on any other count; and that, to return a verdict, all jurors had to agree on what that verdict was. Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court's instructions, State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 

439, 924 P.2d 441, 443 (1996), and nothing in the record 

persuades us that they did not do so in this case. 

¶ 20 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 23.4 provides that a jury may be polled, at the request of the parties or on the courts own initiative, and that the court may direct the jurors 

to retire for further deliberations or discharge them if their responses do not support the verdicts. It does not require that each individual juror be polled as to the verdict on each 

individual offense ad seriatum. Thus, as long as the record is clear, as it was here, that the guilty verdicts reflected each juror's individual decision on the four offenses with which 

defendant was charged, we see no error in the mere fact that 

the trial court grouped the counts together. 

¶ 21 In support of his arguments, defendant cites State v. 

Diaz, 221 Ariz. 209, 211 P.3d 1193 (App. 2009), which defendant maintains found that fundamental error occurred 

when the trial record established that “all the jurors had not been polled.” Defendant's reliance on Diaz is misplaced for two reasons. First, in this case, the record indicates that all of 

the jurors were polled by the trial court. Second, and more 

importantly, the finding of fundamental error in Diaz was not 

based on the manner in which the jurors were polled but focused instead on whether the proper number of jurors were empanelled and deliberated. Id. at 214, ¶ 15, 211 P.3d at 1198; vacated by State v. Diaz, 223 Ariz. 358, 361-62, ¶¶ 14- 17, 224 P.3d 174, 177-78 (2010). Therefore Diaz is not 

dispositive to our considerations. 

¶ 22 Defendant fails to establish that the trial court committed 

any error, let alone fundamental error, in its polling of the jurors in this case. See Lavers, 168 Ariz. at 385, 814 P.2d at 

342. 

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(Doc. 14-1 at 114-116, Exh. L.) 

 Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner exhausted his claim in Ground One in 

state court. Instead, they argue that his claim is purely a question of state law, citing the 

Appellate Court’s reliance on Rule 23.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure in its 

decision. Consequently, Respondents maintain that Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable. 

The Court agrees that, to the extent Petitioner challenges the group-count polling as a 

violation of state procedural rules, his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. 

However, although a challenge to the application of state law is not a basis for federal 

habeas relief, a state law error may be cognizable if it “so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 75 (finding the 

question of whether the jury instruction “so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny 

due process of law” cognizable in federal habeas”); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 

637, 643 (1974). 

 A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is violated when the “essential 

feature” of the jury is not preserved. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). “Due 

process dictates that each defendant in a federal criminal case has the right to have his 

guilt found, if found at all, only by the unanimous verdict of a jury of his peers.” United 

States v. Nelson, 692 F.2d 83, 85 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). “Although their jury 

room votes form the basis of the announced verdict, the jurors remain free to dissent from 

the announced verdict when polled. In short, a jury has not reached a valid verdict until 

deliberations are over, the result is announced in open court, and no dissent by a juror is 

registered.” Nelson, 692 F.2d at 84-85 (internal quotation omitted). The object of jury 

polling is “to ascertain for a certainty that each of the jurors approves of the verdict as 

returned; that no one has been coerced or induced to sign a verdict to which he does not 

fully assent.’” Humphries v. Dist. of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194 (1899). However, it is 

a delicate line between ensuring that a defendant has been convicted by a unanimous 

verdict and coercing a unanimous verdict. See Harrison v. Gillespie, 640 F.3d 888, 903 

fn. 12 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gambino, 951 F.2d 498, 502 (2nd Cir. 1991) 

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(“[t]he purpose of the poll is not to interfere with the deliberative process, but rather to 

insure that the defendant was convicted by a unanimous verdict”) (citing Humphries, 174 

U.S. at 194). “Whether the comments and conduct of the state trial judge infringed 

defendant’s due process right to an impartial jury and fair trial” turns upon whether jurors 

were coerced “‘into relinquishing their views in favor of reaching a unanimous 

decision.’” Jiminez v. Myers, 40 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Locks v. Sumner, 

703 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1983)). In making that determination, the Court considers the 

trial court’s conduct “‘in its context and under all the circumstances.’” Lowenfield v. 

Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988) (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 

(1965) (per curiam)). 

 Petitioner has not specified any way in which the state-court decision 

unreasonably applied or was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, nor does he establish 

that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable factual determination. While 

the Appellate Court performed its fair-trial analysis in the context of fundamental error, 

its analysis was consistent with Lowenfield and existing Supreme Court precedent. See 

supra. The Appellate Court properly considered the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the polling of the jury, emphasizing that, prior to deliberation, the Superior 

Court correctly instructed the jury on the law, advised the jury that they were to decide 

each count separately uninfluenced by their decision on any other count, and that to 

return a verdict, the jurors had to all be in agreement. See DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 

995, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying habeas relief based on consideration of all 

circumstances surrounding trial court’s interaction under Lowenfield). The Appellate 

Court properly concluded that no error had occurred because that the record was clear 

“that the guilty verdicts reflected each juror’s individual decision on the four offenses 

with which defendant was charged.” (Doc. 14-1 at 115, Exh. L.)

Petitioner argues in his reply that the judge advised she “[doesn’t] like to stay past 

5:00 p.m.” and instructed “the bailiff to go check on jury to see if they were going to be 

much longer.”(Doc. 44 at 1-2.) Thus, Petitioner presumably contends that the groupCase 2:12-cv-00696-GMS Document 45 Filed 10/16/13 Page 13 of 18
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polling implicitly coerced verdicts because “[t]o say that this entire portion of the trial 

was rushed would be an understatement.” (Doc. 44 at 2.) As cited by the Appellate Court, 

here, all twelve jurors were individually polled by the Superior Court. The record does 

not reflect that the judge advised the jury concerning a desire to promptly conclude 

proceedings, or that any juror expressed hesitation, doubt, or confusion. The 

circumstances as a whole do not compel that the group-count polling coerced a 

unanimous verdict nor deprived the jurors of an opportunity to voice dissent such that it 

denied Petitioner due process of law. The Court therefore concludes that neither the 

Appellate Court’s reasoning nor result was contrary to Supreme Court precedent. 

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Ground One be denied. 

B. Grounds Two and Three

Next, in Ground Two, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel because counsel’s advice improperly led him to reject a plea agreement 

which offered a lesser sentence than the one he received following trial. Petitioner argues 

that trial counsel failed to provide him with a written copy of the plea bargain, failed to 

advise Petitioner of the full range of possible of sentences if he lost at trial, and instead, 

advised him to reject the plea offer. In Ground Three, Petitioner further argues that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to excessive fines that were part of 

Petitioner’s sentence. 

 As he concedes, Petitioner did not exhaust these claims in state court. Claims are 

exhausted “for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled 

on them” either on direct appeal or through appropriate post-conviction relief. Swoopes, 

196 F.3d at 1010. Although Petitioner presented his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims to the Superior Court in post-conviction relief proceedings, he did not present any 

of those claims for review to the Appellate Court. Petitioner’s time to appeal has expired, 

see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c), and a return to state court would otherwise be futile under 

Arizona’s procedural rules. The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state 

court under Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Petitioner has 

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not shown that any of the exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or 

(h) apply to him. As a result, Petitioner’s claims are technically exhausted and 

procedurally defaulted. 

 Petitioner urges that the Court should excuse his failure to present his ineffective 

assistance of counsel arguments on appeal, because he did not obtain a copy of the 

evidentiary hearing transcript in time to articulate his claims. He provides: 

In 2011, Petitioner was housed at the Meadows Unit, 

Florence. Petitioner had an evidentiary hearing on 5/20/11 and shortly after that he received a letter from his public 

defender, Terry Reid, stating, if Petitioner wanted to appeal the decision of the court he would have to do it on his own, 

and because the only document [provided] by Terry Reid, was a court minute entry, stating, as in the record, PCR, is 

denied. And as Petitioner did[’]t know how to do this on his 

own, he made an appointment with the paralegal at the 

Meadows Unit. 

(Doc. 44 at 7-8.) While Petitioner timely filed a pro se appeal, he only stated in the 

Petition for Review form: “I would like to ask for an extension to file. Also I would like 

information on what’s needed to file. I have not received any court transcripts.” (Doc. 14-

2, Exh. U.) Petitioner argues he made various attempts to meet with a prison paralegal 

and to obtain a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, but was unable to timely articulate 

his claims and complete a compliant petition. (Doc. 44) After the appeal was dismissed, 

Petitioner purports that he obtained some assistance, and then submitted a letter 

requesting to file a delayed appeal on September 16, 2011 (Doc. 18-1 at 8, Exh. Y), 

which appears to have been denied (Doc. 1 at 13). 

 Because the absence of the transcript did not impede Petitioner’s ability to 

properly file a Petition for Review in order to challenge the Superior Court’s decision, it 

does not excuse his failure to present his claims to the Appellate Court. See Boyd v. 

Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir 1998) (“the cause of Boyd’s procedural 

default is his insistence on having a transcript before filing a notice of appeal. Boyd’s 

unfamiliarity with state appellate rules is no excuse....”) 

When a pro se petitioner is able to apply for post-conviction 

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relief to a state court, the petitioner must be held accountable 

for failure to timely pursue his remedy to the state supreme court. To hold that illiteracy is a legitimate cause for failing to appeal to the state supreme court would allow petitioners to wait until the jurisdictional period lapsed and then proceed directly to federal court. Such a result would be contrary to the principles of comity underlying the cause and prejudice 

rule. 

Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1153-1154 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hughes v. 

Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)). Even if Petitioner 

may argue that without the transcript he was prevented him from prevailing on his 

claims, he fails to allege that he was prevented presenting his arguments. See Schneider, 

674 F.3d at 1153 (“cause is ordinarily shown by demonstrating that ‘some objective 

factor external to [petitioner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’”) 

(quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). In fact, Plaintiff’s inability to present his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims in state court is controverted by their presentation in the 

instant habeas petition, in that Petitioner maintained that he was without a transcript of 

the evidentiary hearing at the time of filing. Consequently, the Court finds that Petitioner 

has not demonstrated cause to excuse his default. Because Petitioner cannot show cause, 

the Court need not consider whether he suffered actual prejudice. See Cook, 538 F.3d at 

1028 fn. 13 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982) (“Since we conclude 

that these respondents lacked cause for their default, we do not consider whether they 

also suffered actual prejudice.”).5

 

 Lastly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that review of the merits of the claims is 

 5

 To the extent that post-conviction relief counsel timely notified Petitioner of the conclusion of representation (see Doc. 18-1 at 12, Exh. Y) and Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Review, neither Maples nor Martinez apply in this case to excuse his default. 

See Maples v. Thomas, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 912, 924 (2010) (finding that where an attorney abandons his client without notice, it constitutes “extraordinary circumstances beyond his control,” and may be “cause” to excuse procedural default); Martinez v. Ryan, __U.S. ,132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (finding that where ineffective assistance of 

counsel in a post-conviction relief proceeding results in a failure to assert that there was 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial proceedings, it may be “cause” to excuse procedural default... However, “[t]he holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral 

proceedings...”). 

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necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Here, Petitioner essentially 

seeks to challenge the fairness of the sentences and fines he received. Undoubtedly, 

Petitioner would prefer a lesser sentence and fine than the one he received, and he may 

have achieved both had he accepted a plea offer instead of going to trial. However, he 

does not argue nor has he offered any supporting evidence of actual innocence, and thus 

has not presented new evidence that excuses his default under this exception. See Cook, 

538 F.3d at 1028; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

 Because Petitioner has failed to show that cause precluded him from properly 

presenting his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in state court or that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would result if the claims were not heard on their merits, the Court 

will recommend that Ground Two and Three be denied. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed, and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 fn. 13 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 

2010); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2). 

Based on the above analysis, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are either 

procedurally barred from review or fail on their merits. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of October, 2013. 

 

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