Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00105/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00105-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL RAY HERMAN, No. CIV S-06-0105-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D.L. RUNNELS, et al.,

Respondents.

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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on January 17, 2006, respondent’s answer (Doc. 9), filed

on February 23, 2006, and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 19), filed on July 6, 2006.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 1

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

The victim lived in the back unit of a duplex, and had a carport that

opened onto an alley. A neighbor noticed the carport door was partially

opened, and a bicycle was leaning nearby. When he looked into the

backyard, he saw defendant coming out of the house. Defendant’s left

arm was fully extended to push open the screen door, and his right arm

was behind him as if closing the inner door. Defendant had a backpack

that appeared to be full. The neighbor could see a crowbar and other tools

sticking out of the top of the bag.

When he realized he was being observed, defendant threw the

backpack into some bushes, lit a cigarette, and drank from a can in a paper

bag. The neighbor called 911 and also called some relatives, who joined

him. Defendant picked up the backpack and rode off on his bike. The

neighbors tried to follow him, but lost sight of him.

The victim’s house had been ransacked and several small items

were missing. These included a backpack, a camera, a crystal clock, a

boom box, a telephone answering machine, three watches, and some gold

chains. All of the items could have fit inside the backpack. 

Police officers arrested defendant a short time later. Defendant

initially gave a false name to the officers, but later admitted his actual

identity. The officers found the bicycle, but never recovered the

backpack. 

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted of one count of first degree burglary following a jury

trial. The trial court found true that petitioner had two prior felony convictions. Petitioner was

sentenced to 35 years to life. On direct appeal, petitioner argued: (1) there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction; (2) the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on

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As to this last claim, the Court of Appeal agreed with petitioner that there was an 2

error in the abstract of judgment. The Court of Appeal identified two clerical errors, which it

simply corrected. See People v. Mitchell, 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 (2001). 

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cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) there are errors in the abstract of judgment. The 2

California Supreme Court denied review without comment or citation. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. For instance, when the state court reaches a

decision on the merits, but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas

court independently reviews the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Similarly, when it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim,

because it was not raised in state court or because the court denied it on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de

novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not

apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach petitioner’s claim under its

“relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that,

where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on perjury claim, AEDPA did not

apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the evidentiary hearing in federal

court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing petition de novo where state

court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the claim alleged by petitioner).

 When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, “concerns about comity and

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federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Lockhart v.

Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

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is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

A state court decision is reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot be found

even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly erroneous. 

See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. As

with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal law, where a state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal habeas relief is nonetheless

unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

III. DISCUSSION

In the instant federal habeas petition, petitioner raises two claims: (1) there was

insufficient evidence; and (3) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus

relief is available if it is found that, upon the record of evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

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beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Under Jackson,

the court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on

habeas. See id. It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. “The

question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether

rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d

303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in the

context of the substantive elements of the criminal offense, as defined by state law. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

As to petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, the state court stated:

The test for “determining a claim of insufficiency of the evidence

in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must

presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier

could reasonably deduce from the evidence. 

“Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible,

and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial

judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or

falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. Thus, if the

verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due

deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a

witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.” [citations omitted].

In asserting there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction

for first degree residential burglary, defendant raises a number of claims.

First, he asserts the conviction cannot stand because there was no

evidence that he actually entered the victim’s house. That is not the case. 

A neighbor testified he saw defendant come out of the victim’s house, and

he described defendant as having his left arm fully extended to push the

screen door open, while his right arm was behind him, as if to close the

inner door. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that

defendant had been inside the house and not simply on the porch.

Second, noting that the backpack was never found, defendant

asserts that the pack was described as “stuffed with tools,” and therefore

could not have contained the missing items. Defendant mischaracterizes

the witness’s testimony. The neighbor testified only that he saw tools

sticking out of a full backpack. He did not testify that the backpack was

stuffed with tools. Other witnesses described the missing items and stated

that they were small enough to fit into the backpack. This evidence was

sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant used the backpack to

remove the other stolen items. 

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Finally, defendant emphasizes that he was not found in possession

of the stolen items and that someone else might have committed the

burglary during the time the house was vacant. He also notes that his

fingerprints were not found inside the house. However, police witnesses

described the fingerprint process and explained why fingerprints are not

always found. 

In short, this is not a case of insufficient evidence, but rather a case

of conflicting testimony. The jury rejected defendant’s explanation of

events and credited the testimony of prosecution witnesses. Abundant

evidence was presented at trial to support the jury’s verdict. 

Because the state court applied the correct federal legal rules, this court must review under the

more deferential “unreasonable application of” standard. Having reviewed the entire record, the

court agrees with the state court’s assessment of the evidence. As the state court explained, this

is a case of conflicts in the evidence, which the jury resolved against petitioner. Because there

was sufficient evidence, the state court’s decision was not an “unreasonable application of”

controlling federal law. 

B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

As to petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim, the state court stated:

The United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual

punishment by applying a “‘narrow proportionality principle.’” [citing

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003)]. 

The fact that this crime was committed without violence when no

one was home does not minimize the fact that defendant committed a

serious felony, a residential burglary. Defendant presents only a selective

portion of his criminal record. Not only was defendant convicted of two

prior residential burglaries, he also had three juvenile adjudications and a

string of numerous other adult convictions from 1980 to 1995, including

convictions for disturbing the peace, petty theft, possession of

methamphetamine, possession of stolen property, and spousal abuse. 

Given the facts of this case and defendant’s relenting recidivism, a

sentence of [35] years to life is not grossly disproportionate to the crime. 

The sentence imposed does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 

The court finds that the state court applied the correct legal rules. Therefore, the state court’s

decision is reviewed under the “unreasonable application of” standard. 

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As the state court observed, petitioner’s claim is foreclosed by the Ewing

decision, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

decided at the same time as Ewing. In Ewing, the petitioner had been convicted of grand theft, a

“wobbler” under California law, meaning that it could have been charged as either a

misdemeanor or felony, and had three prior burglary convictions and one prior robbery

conviction. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 16-19. The Court concluded that Ewing’s sentence of 25

years to life under California’s “three strikes law” did not violate the Eighth Amendment. See

id. at 22-24. In Andrade, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of petty theft, also wobblers

because the petitioner had prior theft convictions, and had three prior residential burglary

convictions. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66-68. Mr. Andrade was sentenced to two consecutive

terms of 25 years to life (effectively, 50 years to life). See id. The Supreme Court concluded

that the state court’s rejection of the petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claims was neither an

“unreasonable application of” federal law or “contrary to” federal law. See id. at 72-76. 

Because the facts of petitioner’s case, in particular his two prior convictions for

residential burglary and other criminal conduct, do not present a scenario more sympathetic than

Ewing or Andrade, this court is bound to follow Supreme Court precedent and conclude that

petitioner’s sentence dies not violate the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the court finds that

petitioner’s criminal history is at least as serious as those examined by the Supreme Court in

Ewing and Andrade. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment

and close this file. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 19, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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