Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_03-cv-00100/USCOURTS-almd-1_03-cv-00100-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL L. THOMAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:03cv100-T

) (WO)

J.C. GILES, Warden, and )

WILLIAM H. PRYOR, JR., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER

I.

By judgment entered on May 11, 2005 (Doc. No. 19), the

court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation (to

which petitioner had not filed an objection within the time

allowed) and denied petitioner’s request for habeas relief.

On May 17, 2005 (Doc. No. 20), petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration, seeking additional time to respond to the

magistrate judge’s recommendation. By order entered on May

23, 2005 (Doc. no. 21), the court stated that, before ruling

on petitioner’s reconsideration and additional-time motion,

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it would like to know what objections petitioner intends to

file to the magistrate judge’s recommendation; the court,

therefore, gave petitioner until June 17, 2005, to file with

the court his objections to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation. On June 9, 2005 (Doc. No. 22), petitioner

filed his objections.

II.

The magistrate judge’s recommendation determined that

the instant § 2254 petition was barred from review as it was

not filed within the one-year period of limitation. In his

objections, the petitioner appears to contend that his

failure to file the petition arose from his misunderstanding

of the tolling provision of the limitation period and the

failure of his inmate assistant to provide him adequate

assistance during the state and federal proceedings.

Neither of these assertions constitutes extraordinary

circumstances so as to warrant an equitable tolling of the

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limitation period. See Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d

1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). 

 “Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the

application of AEDPA's statutory deadline when

'extraordinary circumstances' have worked to prevent an

otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his

petition.” Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d

1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001). Such tolling of the limitation

period “will not be available in most cases ...; rather,

extensions of time will be granted only if ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United

States District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997).

Thus, equitable tolling applies in only truly extraordinary

circumstances. Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035,

1039-40 (11th Cir. 2002); Drew v. Department of Corrections,

297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). “The burden of

establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy

plainly rests with the petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286.

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Moreover, neither an inmate’s pro se status nor his reliance

on alleged inadequate inmate assistance during state

collateral proceedings establishes extraordinary

circumstances warranting equitable tolling as counsel is not

constitutionally required during such proceedings.

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Garvey v.

Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776,780 (11th Cir. 1993); Felder v.

Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Marsh v.

Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,

531 U.S. 1194 (2001). Additionally, to the extent that

petitioner here alleges his ignorance of the law as a basis

for equitable tolling, he is likewise entitled to no relief

as this “is not a factor that can warrant equitable

tolling.” Wakefield v. Railroad Retirement Board, 131 F.3d

967, 969 (11th Cir. 1997); Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220 (“[I]t is

well established that ignorance of the law, even for an

incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse

prompt filing.”). The record is therefore devoid of

evidence that petitioner’s delay in filing his § 2254

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petition was the result of extraordinary circumstances that

were beyond his control and unavoidable with the exercise of

diligence. The reasons set forth by petitioner for his

untimeliness are insufficient to establish the extraordinary

circumstances required to toll the limitation period. He

has likewise presented nothing which demonstrates that he

acted diligently in pursuing his federal claims. Thus, this

court “cannot say that [petitioner] has acted with the

‘conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence’ necessary

‘to call into action the powers of the court.’ This

conclusion is based on the longstanding, firmly rooted

principle that a court cannot grant equitable tolling unless

it is satisfied that the party seeking such relief has acted

with diligence.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1291 n.5. Consequently,

petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

limitation period as he has shown neither extraordinary

circumstances nor the diligence necessary to toll the

statute. 

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 Petitioner also makes the conclusory allegation that

this court's failure to address his claims "will be a grave

miscarriage of justrice." The miscarriage of justice

standard which would preclude application of the limitation

period to bar a habeas petition is linked to actual

innocence. “To establish actual innocence, petitioner must

demonstrate that . . . ‘it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him.’ Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d

808 (1995).” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623

(1998). “It is important to note in this regard that

‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339,

112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).” Id. at

623-624. Petitioner has presented no evidence of actual

innocence nor suggested that any exists which entitles him

to relief from the statute of limitations. 

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 Based on the foregoing, the petitioner's objections are

due to be overruled and the motion for reconsideration of

order adopting recommendation denied.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Petitioner Michael L. Thomas’s objections (Doc. No.

22) are overruled.

(2) Petitioner Thomas’s motion for reconsideration and

for additional time (Doc. No. 20) is denied.

DONE, this 13th day of June, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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