Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00053/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00053-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cvp Civil Rights (Personal Property)

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18-cv-0053-JAH (BGS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUDITH JEAN HOFFMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID E. MILLER; and RICHARDSON 

GRISWOLD,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-0053-JAH (BGS)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B), DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS 

MOOT, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Plaintiff Judith Hoffman, appearing pro se, has filed a complaint along with an 

application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Additionally, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte 

Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary 

Injunction Should Not Issue. All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a 

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must 

pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a 

plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed 

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th 

Cir. 1999). 

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Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by 

any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a 

mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is “frivolous, 

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 

254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not 

limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that a court reviewing a complaint filed pursuant to the 

in forma pauperis provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss 

before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable 

theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see

also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). Alternatively, a complaint may be 

dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under 

that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 

allegations,” he must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

While the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in 

civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit 

of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), it may 

not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are simply not 

“sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

I. 42 U.S.C. 1983

Here, Plaintiff asserts two causes of actions under 42 U.S.C § 1983, a violation of 

due process and equal protection under the law. “Section 1983 creates a private right of 

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action against individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate federal 

constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 

2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 

liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution 

and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2012).

a. Individual Liability and Causation

As stated above, § 1983 allows actions against individuals who violate constitutional 

or statutory rights, while acting under the color of state law. Plaintiff’s complaint contains 

virtually no factual allegations as to who actually violated her constitutional rights. The 

named Defendants in this case are Deputy City Attorney David E Miller and Richard 

Griswold, however, they are not identified in Plaintiff’s complaint with respect to any 

alleged misconduct. See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff identifies “city code inspectors” and a 

“Superior Court judge” in her statement of the claim, but provides no other identifying 

information for them. Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim fails to allege how, or to what extent, 

any of the named individuals were involved in the alleged constitutional violations. 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . §1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that 

each government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v. Community 

Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even 

pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). 

Plaintiff also fails to properly address the causation element, which is “a required 

element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th 

Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

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responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71 (1976)). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to discuss

how either Defendant caused her constitutional deprivation. As currently alleged, the 

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the 

complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis is DENIED as moot.

II. Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order 

to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue. [Doc. No. 2]. The standard

for issuing a TRO is similar to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction and requires 

that the party seeking relief “establish that [she] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [she]

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The underlying purpose of a TRO is to 

preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm before a preliminary injunction 

hearing may be held. Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 439, 94 S.Ct. 1113 (1974); see also

Reno Air Racing Ass'n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1130–31 (9th Cir.2006).

Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order preventing “the City of San Diego and 

the Receiver appointed by the [California] Superior Court from in any way taking control 

of or gaining access to her assets, home or contents . . . .” [Doc. No. 2, pg. 44]. “Although 

the loss of one's home may constitute irreparable harm, in the absence of a likelihood of 

success on the merits, loss of property alone is not sufficient to obtain a TRO.” Jones v. 

H.S.B.C. (USA), 844 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Plaintiff failed to even 

address the likelihood that she will succeed on the merits of her claims. Having analyzed 

the issue above, and ultimately dismissing the complaint, it is apparent that Plaintiff has no 

likelihood of success. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Restraining Order is DENIED

without prejudice.

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DATED: January 16, 2018 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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