Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01170/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01170-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GERALD SPENCE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

STAMBAUGH, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-1170 WBS AC P 

ORDER and 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. Introduction 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights 

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California State 

Prison Solano (CSP-SOL), under the authority of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR). This action proceeds on plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC), 

filed October 16, 2014.1

 See ECF No. 12. 

Presently pending is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant L. Voss, a Sacramento County 

Sheriff’s Deputy and one of the three defendants in this action. Defendant Voss’ motion is 

premised on plaintiff’s allegedly ineffective service of process. See ECF No. 21. Plaintiff has 

 

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 Unless otherwise noted, plaintiff’s filing dates referenced herein are based on the prison 

mailbox rule, pursuant to which a document is deemed served or filed on the date a prisoner signs 

the document and gives it to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 

(1988) (establishing prison mailbox rule); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 

2010) (applying the mailbox rule to both state and federal filings by incarcerated inmates). 

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filed an opposition to defendant’s motion, ECF No. 22; defendant has filed a reply, ECF No. 23. 

This matter is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c). For the reasons that follow, this court recommends that 

defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied, and that plaintiff be granted additional time to perfect 

service of process on all three defendants. 

II. Background 

By order filed June 2, 2015, this court screened plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), and found the allegations therein sufficient 

to state cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against each defendant based on conduct that 

allegedly occurred during plaintiff’s booking into the Sacramento County Jail in November 2012. 

The court found that the FAC states a claim against defendant Voss for failure to intervene, and 

claims for excessive force against defendants Stambaugh and Southward, both Sacramento City 

Police Officers. See ECF No. 14. Pursuant to the same order, and premised on plaintiff’s in 

forma pauperis status, the court directed plaintiff to submit the information necessary for the 

United States Marshal to serve process on defendants. Id. Relying on the information submitted 

by plaintiff, see ECF No. 15, and pursuant to subsequent court order, ECF No. 16, the Marshal 

initially attempted to secure defendants’ waivers of service by mail, pursuant to requests sent June 

19, 2015. 

The court directed the Marshall to effect personal service of process on each defendant 

who failed to return a waiver within sixty days, in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 

566(c) and Rule 4, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Receiving no waivers or other responses by 

mail, the Marshal attempted personal service on each defendant at the addresses provided by 

plaintiff. Thereafter, the Marshal submitted three separate “Process Receipt and Return” forms, 

indicating execution of personal service of process on each defendant on December 29, 2015. 

See ECF No. 18. The Marshal requested reimbursement for associated expenses. ECF No. 19. 

By order filed January 12, 2016, the court directed each defendant to reimburse the Marshal for 

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the costs incurred in effecting their respective personal service of process. See ECF No. 20.2 The 

court directed each defendant to pay the appropriate sum to the Marshall within fourteen days 

after the filing date of the court’s order, or, within the same period of time, to file a written 

statement showing good cause for defendant’s failure to waive personal service. Id. at 2. 

The only defendant to respond to the court’s order was Voss, whose attorney has specially 

appeared by filing the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5)3 (authorizing motion 

to dismiss premised on “insufficient service of process”). Defendant Voss asserts that plaintiff 

did not complete service of process within 90 days after the filing of his FAC, as required by Rule 

4(m),4 and requests that the court vacate its January 12, 2016 order imposing costs because he 

was never personally served. See ECF No. 21. 

 Service of process was directed to defendant Voss at the Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Main Jail, at 651 I Street, Sacramento, and personally served on “Peter Crest (sic), Legal 

Division, 711 G Street, Sacramento.” ECF No. 18 at 3. Mr. Peter Cress has filed a declaration in 

support of defendant Voss’ motion to dismiss, wherein he attests he is “the Legal Advisor for the 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department” and has held the position for approximately six years. 

See Declaration of Peter Cress (Cress Decl.), ECF No. 21-2, ¶ 1. Mr. Cress avers that he received 

a mailed Waiver of Service for defendant Voss in June of 2015, but did not accept service of 

process on defendant’s behalf because defendant was not then employed by the Sheriff’s 

Department and had not authorized Cress to accept service of process on her behalf. Id. ¶¶ 4-7. 

Mr. Cress states that defendant Voss was employed by the Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department from May 1998 to March 2015; and retired on March 10, 2015. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Mr. 

Cress avers that he has “never spoken” with defendant Voss, and does not have authority to 

accept service of process on her behalf. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. 

 Significantly, no defendant other than Voss has responded to the Marshal’s putative 

personal service of process, and no defendant has filed a response to the FAC. Due to defendant 

 

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 Specifically, the court directed defendants Southward and Stambaugh each to reimburse $33.07 

to the United States Marshal, and defendant Voss to reimburse $66.15. See ECF No. 20. 

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 Unless otherwise noted, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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 Rule 4(m) previously accorded 120 days within which to complete service of process, as 

demonstrated by inconsistent references in the pending motion. 

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Voss’ motion, and the failure of any defendant to file a response to the FAC (required within 21 

days after personal service, see Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i)), court staff contacted the Marshal to 

determine whether any defendant had provided reimbursement for the costs of personal service; 

none have. Thus, with the exception of defendant Voss’ current special appearance, no defendant 

has appeared in this action.5 It appears, therefore, that all of the information submitted by 

plaintiff for the purpose of serving process on defendants was inaccurate. 

 III. Legal Standards 

 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to dismiss an action based on 

“insufficient service of process.” The sufficiency of service is assessed according to the 

requirements of Rule 4, which include the procedures for obtaining a waiver of service, and for 

effecting personal service of process. See Rule 4(d) and (e), respectively. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accords the provisions of Rule 4 “a liberal and 

flexible construction.” Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 447 (9th Cir. 1984). A party’s failure 

to strictly comply with Rule 4’s personal service requirement “does not require dismissal of the 

complaint if (a) the party that had to be served personally received actual notice, (b) the defendant 

would suffer no prejudice from the defect in service, (c) there is a justifiable excuse for the failure 

to serve properly, and (d) the plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if his complaint were 

dismissed.” Id. (fn. omitted). A party’s “pro se status, alone, is not a justifiable excuse” for a 

defect in service. Graham v. United States, 79 Fed. Appx. 992, 994 (9th Cir. 2003). 

If a court determines that service of process was not timely made on a defendant, the court 

has discretion to “dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service 

be made within a specified time.” Rule 4(m). “[I]f the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, 

the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Id. 

 IV. Discussion 

 It is clear that no defendant has been served process in this action, or otherwise properly 

 

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 Service of process was directed to defendant Sacramento Police Officers Stambaugh and 

Southward at the office of the Sacramento City Attorney, 915 I Street, Room 4010, Sacramento, 

and personally served by the Marshal at that address on “Council Clerk Staff Assistant Carole 

James.” See ECF No. 18 at 1-2. 

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informed of this action, either by receipt of a mailed request to waive service of process or 

pursuant to the Marshal’s attempts to effect personal service. Because none of the requirements 

of Rule 4 have been met, there has been “insufficient service of process” as to each defendant, 

authorizing dismissal of this action under Rule 12(b)(5). However, the undersigned recommends 

that this court exercise its discretion under Rule 4(m) to accord plaintiff additional time within 

which to submit accurate information for the Marshal to serve process on each defendant. 

 Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion is limited to his assertion that defendant Voss now has 

actual notice of this action. See ECF No. 22. However, this factor alone is not persuasive, 

particularly because plaintiff has not offered a justifiable excuse for failing to provide accurate 

service information for any defendant. Nevertheless, plaintiff would be prejudiced by dismissal 

of this action, and it does not appear that any defendant would be prejudiced by according 

plaintiff additional time to obtain the information necessary to achieve proper service of process. 

Review of these factors weighs against dismissal. See Borzeka, 739 F.2d at 447. Moreover, it is 

common in pro se cases, particularly pro se prisoner cases, for plaintiffs to require additional time 

to identify defendants’ accurate service information. 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that this court deny defendant Voss’ motion to 

dismiss, and accord plaintiff additional time within which to submit accurate information for the 

United States Marshal to serve process on each defendant. 

 V. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. This court’s order filed January 12, 2016, ECF No. 20, is vacated; no defendant is 

required to reimburse the U.S. Marshal for the attempts of his staff to effect personal service on 

any defendant. 

 Additionally, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Defendant Voss’ motion to dismiss filed January 21, 2016, ECF No. 21, be denied 

without prejudice; and 

 2. Should the district judge adopt these findings and recommendations, it be further 

ordered that: 

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a. The Clerk of Court be directed to send plaintiff, together with a copy of the 

district judge’s order, three (3) USM-285 forms.6

 b. Plaintiff be directed to submit to the court, within sixty days after the filing date 

of the district judge’s order, a newly-completed USM-285 form for each defendant, or 

show good cause why he cannot provide such information.7

c. This case be referred back to the undersigned magistrate judge for further 

proceedings. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: May 17, 2016 

 

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 Plaintiff need not submit another summons or additional copies of his seven-page FAC, ECF 

No. 12. 

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 Plaintiff may attempt to obtain such information through the California Public Records Act, 

California Government Code § 6250 et seq., or by other means available to plaintiff, e.g., a direct 

inquiry to CDCR and/or specially appearing counsel for defendant Voss. If access to the required 

information is denied or unreasonably delayed, plaintiff may request judicial intervention. 

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