Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01696/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01696-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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TERMPSREF 28

MDR

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Raymond Earl Rigsby, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-1696-PHX-DGC (ECV)

ORDER

I. Procedural History

On June 27, 2011, Plaintiff Raymond Earl Rigsby, who is confined in the Arizona

State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Yuma in San Luis, Arizona, filed a Complaint in the Superior

Court of Maricopa County, Arizona. On August 26, 2011, Defendant Jan Brewer filed a

Notice of Removal and removed the case to this Court. 

In a September 8, 2011 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint, without

prejudice, because Plaintiff had failed to file his Complaint on a court-approved form, as

required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 3.4. After much litigation, the Court gave Plaintiff

until April 30, 2012, to file an amended complaint on a court-approved form.

On April 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and

a Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit, lodged a First Amended Complaint, and filed a

Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction, a Memorandum of Law in Support, and a

Declaration in Support. In a May 10, 2012 Order, the Court denied as moot the Application

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TERMPSREF - 2 -

to Proceed, denied the Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit, and directed the Clerk of

Court not to file the First Amended Complaint and to strike the Motion for TRO and

Preliminary Injunction and the Memorandum in Support. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days

to file an amended complaint that complied with the Order.

On May 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, which the

Court denied in a May 24, 2012 Order. On June 1, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Court

Order to Return Documents. On June 11, 2012, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time.

In a July 2, 2012 Order, the Court denied the Motion for Court Order to Return Documents

and granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time. The Court gave Plaintiff an additional

ten days to comply with the May 10th Order.

On June 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Extend Time and Motion to Exceed

Page Limit” and attached to it a Second Amended Complaint. He also filed an Application

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, a Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction, a

Memorandum of Law in Support, an Appendix of Exhibits in Support, and a Motion for

Appointment of Counsel. In an August 20, 2012 Order, the Court denied as moot the Motion

to Extend Time and the Application to Proceed, denied the Motion for Appointment of

Counsel and Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction, granted the Motion to Exceed Page

Limit, directed the Clerk of Court to docket the lodged Second Amended Complaint, and

dismissed the Second Amended Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The

Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a third amended complaint that cured the deficiencies

identified in the Order.

On September 21, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Enlarge Time (Doc. 55). On

October 5, 2012, he filed a “Motion for Court Order to Renew or Reconsider Plaintiff’s

Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and the Memo of Law in Support Thereof and

Appendix of Exhibits/Motion for Counsel” (Doc. 56) and a Third Amended Complaint

(Doc. 57). On October 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a “Supplement to Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint” (Doc. 58).

. . . .

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II. Motion to Enlarge Time

In his September 21, 2012 Motion to Enlarge Time, Plaintiff seeks a ten-day extension

of time to file his third amended complaint. Plaintiff seeks the extension of time because he

has limited time to write during the day, has no access to law books or legal assistance, has

no “means or space to conduct private and confidential legal writing,” and had a week-long

flu-like virus. The Court, in its discretion, will grant the Motion to Enlarge Time and will

consider Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint as timely filed.

III. Supplement to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint

In his October 12, 2012 Supplement to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

submits additional allegations that were “inadvertently not stated in the third amended

complaint due to [P]laintiff’s mental disorder.” Plaintiff should have sought leave to file a

fourth amended complaint that included the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint and

the allegations in the Supplement. However, in the Court’s discretion and in the interest of

moving this case forward, the Court will not require Plaintiff to file a fourth amended

complaint that combines the two documents and, instead, will consider the allegations in the

Supplement as part of the Third Amended Complaint.

IV. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

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“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

V. Third Amended Complaint

In his three-count Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants: current

and former Arizona Governors Janice K. Brewer and Janet A. Napolitano, current and former

Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) Directors Charles L. Ryan and Dora B. Schriro,

current and former Arizona Attorney Generals Thomas C. Horne and Terry L. Goddard,

ADOC Access Monitor Daryl Johnson, and Classification Officer Bennie Rollins. He names

as Defendants at ASPC-Lewis: Warden Unknown and Barchey Blue Unit Deputy Warden

Anne Reeder, Librarian II Janet F. Tabor, Paralegal Assistant Unknown, and Corrections

Officer IIIs D. Golder and L. Garner.

Plaintiff names as Defendants at ASPC-Tucson: Warden Sally Walker, Cimarron Unit

Deputy Warden A. Davenport; Santa Rita Unit Deputy Warden Anna Jacobs; Santa Rita Unit

Corrections Officers Russo, Mendoza, Arbitia, Dassel, and Snyder; Santa Rita Unit

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1

Plaintiff contends that the prison gang rules are cruel, debilitating, oppressive, and

barbaric; promote racism; censor verbal and written communication with prison officials,

medical staff, and the “outside world”; monitor inmate housing areas, jobs, and all inmate

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Corrections Officer III Capati; and Santa Rita Unit Librarians Jon K. Mead and William

Wilson. Plaintiff names as Defendants at ASPC-Yuma: Paralegal Assistant Betty Ulibarri

and Cibola Unit Warden R. Allen Bock, Deputy Warden Adam Bradley, and Corrections

Officer III Stevwing. Plaintiff also names as Defendants Unknown Security Officers at

ASPC-Lewis Barchey Blue Unit and ASPC-Tucson Cimarron and Santa Rita Units, and

Unknown Security Officers in the ASPC-Tucson Santa Rita Unit Clothing Room.

In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary

damages, and his attorneys fees and costs.

A. Count One

1. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment. He claims that a former ADOC Director created and

implemented a Security Threat Group policy, Defendant Ryan revised ADOC’s disciplinary

policy, and Defendants Napolitano and/or Brewer enacted criminal laws requiring the

segregation and punishment of dangerous inmates who violate ADOC’s policies and state

law. He asserts that Defendant Goddard and Horne seldom prosecute dangerous inmates

who violate state criminal statutes; Defendants Schriro and Ryan seldom segregate dangerous

inmates from general population inmates or each other; and Defendants Warden Unknown,

Reeder, Unknown Security Officers, Walker, Davenport, Jacobs, Bock, and Bradley seldom

enforce ADOC’s disciplinary policy or refer to appropriate authorities inmates who violate

ADOC’s disciplinary policy or state criminal statutes by threatening, extorting, or assaulting

other inmates. 

Plaintiff alleges that while he was confined at ASPC-Lewis Barchey Blue, ASPCTucson Santa Rita, and ASPC-Yuma Cibola, dangerous inmates imposed and continue to

impose “prison gang rules”1

 on Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Schriro, Ryan,

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activities with threats of violence or death; extort inmate property; and require inmates to

produce legal documents identifying their criminal offenses. 

2

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Schriro, Ryan, Warden Unknown, Reeder, Walker,

Jacobs, Davenport, Bock, and Bradley either observed or received reports about the assaults

and read written statements by “thousands of inmates” who complained about the dangerous

inmates, the prison gang rules, and inadequate safety; that he filed a grievance and grievance

appeal; and that he and “hundreds of other inmates” spoke to mental health personnel about

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Warden Unknown, Reeder, Walker, Davenport, Jacobs, Bock, Bradley, and Unknown

Security Officers are aware of these prison gang rules and that when he complains to

correctional officials about these prison gang rules he is transferred for months or years from

medium custody to maximum custody punitive segregation, while the dangerous inmates

remain in medium custody confinement without sanctions.

Plaintiff asserts that at ASPC-Tucson Santa Rita, Defendants Ryan, Walker, and

Jacobs confined Plaintiff in a two-man cell that exceeded design capacity for 18-22 hours a

day. Plaintiff claims the unit was grossly understaffed and overcrowded, that security

corrections officers seldom made security walks to supervise inmates and monitor their

behavior, and that inmate-on-inmate violence occurred daily. Plaintiff alleges that at ASPCLewis Barchey Blue, Defendants Schriro, Unknown Warden, and Reeder confined Plaintiff

for 18-22 hours per day in double-bunked, overcrowded dormitories that exceeded design

capacity. He claims that the double bunks obscured prison officials’ view of inmates and

their behavior; the unit was grossly understaffed; security officers fell asleep on duty and

seldom made security walks; inmate tension, hostilities, and noise levels were high; and

inmate-on-inmate violence occurred daily. Plaintiff asserts that at ASPC-Yuma Cibola,

Defendants Ryan, Bock, and Bradley confined Plaintiff in the same conditions.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Schriro, Ryan, Warden Unknown, Reeder, Walker,

Davenport, Jacobs, Bock, Bradley, and Unknown Security Officers had knowledge of the

substantial risk of serious harm Plaintiff faced while confined in the aforementioned

conditions and that the risk was “longstanding, pervasive, and apparent to any knowledgeable

observer.”2

 Plaintiff claims that, as a result of the substantial risk of serious harm, “numerous

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the issue and sought counseling and assistance.

3

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Napolitano and Brewer enacted criminal laws

requiring the segregation and punishment of dangerous inmates who violate ADOC policies

and state law. Enacting these laws does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, such

an allegation erodes, rather than supports, a claim that Defendants Napolitano and Brewer

were deliberately indifferent to inmate safety.

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inmates (including Plaintiff although this is not a claim herein)” were brutally assaulted, died,

had property losses, and suffered mental and psychological injuries or the exacerbation of

preexisting mental and psychological injuries. Plaintiff contends that these Defendants

“failed to take reasonable measures to abate the substantial risk of serious harm and violence

at the above prison facilities.”

Plaintiff also contends that the ADOC, Defendants Schriro and Ryan, and other

individuals, informed Defendants Napolitano and Brewer of the need for more funds for

security staff, training, and improvements in inmate safety, but the requests for more funds

were denied.

Plaintiff asserts that he has feared and continues to fear for his safety, his mental

illness has worsened, and he has suffered mental and psychological injuries and monetary

loss.

2. Defendants Brewer and Napolitano 

To the extent Plaintiff is suing Defendants Brewer and Napolitano for failing to

allocate additional funds for security staff and training and inmate safety improvements,

Defendants Brewer and Napolitano are entitled to absolute immunity.3

 See San Pedro Hotel

Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The disbursement of

public funds in support of one project necessarily means that other projects are not being

funded. A legislator’s decision can almost always be criticized for not funding some worthy

group. This is precisely the type of decision for which a legislator must be given

immunity.”). Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendants Brewer and

Napolitano.

. . . .

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3. Defendants Horne and Goddard

Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Defendants Horne and Goddard is that they seldom

prosecute dangerous inmates who violate state criminal statutes. “[A] decision whether to

prosecute or not prosecute is entitled to absolute immunity.” Slater v. Clarke, ___ F.3d ___,

2012 WL 5834968, *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012). Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendants Goddard and Horne.

4. Defendant Unknown Security Officers

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v.

Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further,

a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific

injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the

injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377

(1976). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.

Conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of Defendants have violated a

constitutional right are insufficient.

Plaintiff’s allegations in Count One against Defendants Unknown Security Officers

are nothing more than vague and conclusory allegations against a group of Defendants. This

is insufficient to state a claim against them. In addition, Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to include the names of the parties in the action. As a

practical matter, it is impossible in most instances for the United States Marshal or his

designee to serve a summons and complaint on a group of unidentified defendants.

Therefore, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendant Unknown Security Officers.

. . . .

. . . .

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5. Defendants Schriro, Ryan, Warden Unknown, Reeder, Walker,

Davenport, Jacobs, Bock, and Bradley

 An Eighth Amendment claim requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind by the

Defendants, known as “deliberate indifference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. To state a claim of deliberate indifference,

plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. First, the alleged constitutional deprivation must be,

objectively, “sufficiently serious”; the official’s act or omission must result in the denial of

“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834. Second, the prison official

must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate

indifference to inmate health or safety. Id. In defining “deliberate indifference” in this

context, the Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

“[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying

humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id.

at 847. A plaintiff “may demonstrate deliberate indifference by showing that the risk of harm

was ‘longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the

past’ such that the defendants ‘must have known’ about the risk.” Betts v. New Castle Youth

Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3rd Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

A prisoner facing unsafe prison conditions and seeking injunctive relief to “prevent

a substantial risk of serious injury from ripening into actual harm” need not wait for an event

such as an assault before obtaining relief. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845. Liberally construed,

Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Defendants

Schriro, Ryan, Warden Unknown, Reeder, Walker, Davenport, Jacobs, Bock, and Bradley.

The Court will require these Defendants to answer Count One.

. . . .

. . . .

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4

The Court notes that by alleging two completely separate violations in Count Two

(as well as alleging multiple claims in Count Three), Plaintiff has violated the “one claim per

count” rule set forth in the form Complaint and accompanying instructions. See LRCiv 3.4

(complaint must be in accordance with the instructions provided with the form). The Court,

in its discretion, will disregard this requirement on this occasion in order to move this case

forward.

TERMPSREF - 10 -

B. Count Two

1. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges two separate violations4

 of the Eighth Amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment regarding his basic necessities. 

First, he claims that on November 22, 2011, while confined at ASPC-Tucson Santa

Rita, he submitted his laundry bag with his only two bed sheets for washing, but neither the

laundry bag nor the sheets were returned to him. The following day, Plaintiff requested

replacement sheets and a laundry bag, but Defendants Mendoza, Arbitia, and Dassel told him

that they could not replace the items and that Plaintiff would need to talk to another

correctional officer. Plaintiff claims that he attempted to speak with that correctional officer

and submit an inmate letter, but the correctional officer refused to accept the letter and told

Plaintiff that it needed to be submitted through the inmate letter box. Five days later, the

correctional officer told Plaintiff that an incident report would need to be written before he

could issue the replacement items.

On November 30, 2011, Plaintiff submitted an inmate letter to Defendant Capati.

Thirty-five days later, Defendant Capati responded to the letter, stating that Plaintiff would

need to wait 15 days for a response from “support services.” Plaintiff submitted an inmate

grievance that same day. The following day, the grievance coordinator gave Plaintiff the

replacement items. Plaintiff contends that he was forced to sleep on a mattress, without

sheets, for 45 days during the winter.

Second, Plaintiff contends that on January 23, 2010, all of his “orange clothing, except

the pant[s] and shirt he was wearing,” were stolen when he turned them in to be washed.

Plaintiff states that he submitted an inmate clothing request to Defendant Snyder, who

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informed Plaintiff that someone was stealing inmate clothing and that he did not have any

clothing or laundry bags to issue to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that he also requested a pillow,

pillowcase, footwear, and a mattress. Plaintiff contends that he utilized the grievance system

and five months later was given the requested mattress, clothing, linens, and a pair of deck

shoes. Plaintiff claims that for five months he was forced to wear the same dirty clothing,

sleep on the same dirty sheets and worn out mattress, and wear his own tennis shoes.

Plaintiff contends that both events aggravated his depression and caused him distress.

He claims that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his right to adequate clothing,

linen, bedding, and footwear.

2. Discussion

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that any of the named Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Although

inconvenient and even distressing, the events described in this claim do not rise to the level

of a substantial risk of serious harm. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count

Two and Defendants Mendoza, Arbitia, Dassel, Capati, and Snyder.

C. Count Three

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges multiple violations of his First Amendment right of

access to the courts. The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits officials from

actively interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The right of access to the courts is only a right to bring

petitions or complaints to federal court and not a right to discover such claims or even to

ligate them effectively once filed with a court. Id. at 354. The right also includes the ability

to litigate claims “without active interference by prison officials.” Silva v. DiVittorio, 658

F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original).

As a matter of standing, for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he

suffered an “actual injury” – “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518

U.S. at 348-49 (citation omitted). “[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type

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5

In the Court’s May 10, 2012 Order, the Court directed the Clerk of Court not to file

Plaintiff’s lodged First Amended Complaint because Plaintiff had not complied with the page

limitation specifically identified in the court-approved form the Court previously sent

Plaintiff. In the Court’s August 20, 2012 Order, the Court dismissed the Second Amended

Complaint because Plaintiff made conclusory allegations against a group of defendants,

rather than specific allegations regarding the specific conduct of specific defendants. The

Court had previously informed Plaintiff, in the Court’s September 8, 2011 Order, that

Plaintiff must write short and plain statements telling the Court exactly what each Defendant

did or failed to do and explained that conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of

Defendants have violated a constitutional right are not acceptable and will be dismissed.

TERMPSREF - 12 -

of frustrated legal claim.” Id. at 354. The nonfrivolous claim must be a direct or collateral

attack on the inmate’s sentence or a challenge to the conditions of his confinement. Id. at

355; see also Silva, 658 F.3d at 1103. 

1. Legal Books and Assistance

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Brewer, Ryan, Bock, and Bradley do not provide him

with law books containing court decisions, “shepardizers,” legal self-help books, or a trained

legal assistant. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Brewer, Ryan, Bock, and Bradley’s failure

to provide him with law books or a legal assistant made it impossible for him to prepare

adequate first and second amended complaints in this case, an adequate state court notice of

post-conviction relief based on newly discovered material facts, and a timely notice of postconviction relief regarding “[a] significant change in state law.” Plaintiff also contends that

Defendant Golder refused to process a grievance Plaintiff filed regarding a lack of legal

books and assistance.

As to his First and Second Amended Complaints, Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the

lack of legal books or assistance made it impossible “to prepare adequate effective first and

second amended complaint[s] in this action.” These allegations are too vague to state a

claim. Moreover, this case is ongoing and Plaintiff therefore has not suffered an actual

injury. In addition, both the First and Second Amended Complaints were dismissed because

of defects about which the Court had previously advised Plaintiff.5

. . . .

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6

In an April 30, 2012 Order, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Randall W.

Warner stated:

This is Defendant’s tenth request for post-conviction relief.

Defendant claims . . . that he has newly discovered facts to present to

the Court. However, the facts put forth by Defendant do not constitute newly

discovered facts. Rather, Defendant has raised a claim . . . that his conviction

and sentence were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. . . .

Additionally, Defendant previously raised these exact claims in two prior Rule

32 proceedings.

See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/052012/m5223898.pdf (last

visited Dec. 11, 2012).

TERMPSREF - 13 -

As to his state-court notice of post-conviction relief regarding newly discovered

material fact, Plaintiff states that he “needed” to file this document and “finally was able to

do so on April 9, 2012.” Plaintiff states that the notice of post-conviction relief was

dismissed because the failure to provide him with law books or legal assistance made it

impossible for him to “prepare an adequate state court notice of post[-]conviction relief based

on newly discovered material facts.” Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to

state a claim. Moreover, Plaintiff’s April 9, 2012 notice of post-conviction relief was

dismissed because the facts Plaintiff presented did not constitute newly discovered facts.6

As to Plaintiff’s state-court notice of post-conviction relief based on a change in the

law, Plaintiff contends that he learned, for the first time on April 25, 2012, that a significant

change in the law occurred in 2000 when the Arizona Court of Appeals decided Arizona v.

Donald, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. App. 2000), and held that the right to the effective assistance

of counsel extended to the decision to reject a plea offer. Plaintiff asserts that he was denied

effective assistance of counsel at the time of his decision to reject a plea offer in his criminal

case and that, if he had access to law books containing court decisions, he could have filed

a petition for post-conviction relief on this issue 12 years ago.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because the right of access to the courts does not

include the right to discover claims. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Moreover, the general right

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to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations existed before Plaintiff was

sentenced, see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985), and Donald “was not a significant

change in the law,” see Baldonado v. Ryan, 2011 WL 6328694, *1 (D. Ariz. 2011).

2. Delays

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Ryan implemented a Departmental Order requiring

that inmates be provided with legal supplies regardless of their ability to pay. He asserts that

Defendant Ulibarri, in violation of that policy, denied Plaintiff’s request for legal supplies

to prepare his First Amended Complaint and denied Plaintiff’s request for legal copies to

timely file the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff states that in each instance, he needed to

file a motion with the Court to extend the deadline for filing the First Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Ulibarri caused unreasonable or unnecessary delays in

preparing and filing the First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff also asserts that contrary to

ADOC policy, Defendants Stevwing, Bradley, and Bock, approved Defendant Ulibarri’s

denial of Plaintiff’s requests for legal supplies and copies. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state an access-to-the-courts claim. See Davis

v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) ( “Mere ‘delay in being able to work on one’s

legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation.’”) (citations omitted); Cf. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104 (actual injury where plaintiff

claimed pending lawsuits had been dismissed as the result of defendants’ actions).

3. Limited Access to Prison Resource Center

Plaintiff contends that while he was confined at ASPC-Tucson Santa Rita, Defendants

Jacobs, Mead, and Wilson only allowed Plaintiff 45 minutes per week of access to the prison

resource center to conduct legal research and writing, and did not allow any access if the

prison was on lockdown. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because he does not allege that

he suffered any actual injury due to limited access, or no access during lockdowns, to the

prison resource center. See Davis, 320 F.3d at 352; Cf. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. See also

Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342-43 (reversing dismissal of access claim where prisoner claimed he

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was denied access to prison library while the prison was on lockdown and the denial

prevented him from filing a brief in support of his state court criminal appeal). 

4. Indigency Policy and Outdated Forms

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ryan’s “indigent policy” forces Plaintiff to choose

between needed hygiene supplies and legal supplies, especially in light of a state law passed

by either Defendant Napolitano or Brewer that requires certain deductions from an inmate’s

account. Plaintiff contends that deductions are made to pay for utilities and healthcare

requests, that 5% of an inmate’s earned monies are deducted from his trust account, and that

1% of all deposits are deducted from the trust account. 

Plaintiff also asserts that while he was confined at ASPC-Tucson Santa Rita,

Defendant Mead provided him with an outdated civil cover sheet, application to defer or

waive court costs, and a summons form for filing a state court case. He also contends that

Defendant Johnson failed to keep these forms updated. 

These allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a claim. Plaintiff has failed

to explain how Defendant Ryan’s “indigent policy” denied him access to the courts or how

being provided with outdated forms (or failing to keep those forms updated) deprived him

of access to the courts.

5. Lack of Access to Private Space for Research and Writing

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Ryan, Walker, Jacobs, Bock, Bradley, Mead, and

Wilson do not provide Plaintiff with a means or space to conduct private and confidential

legal research and writing. Plaintiff has failed to state an access-to-the-court claim; there

is no right for a prisoner to have private space to conduct legal research and writing.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered an actual injury from the lack of private

space to conduct his legal research and writing. 

6. Sealing Envelopes and Sending Certified Mail

Finally, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Russo refused to allow Plaintiff to seal

envelopes to the Court that contained legal documents and refused to send Plaintiff’s legal

documents to the Attorney General by certified mail. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim; he

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does not allege that Defendant Russo refused to mail Plaintiff’s legal documents to the Court

or failed to send legal documents to the Attorney General by regular mail. In addition, he

has failed to allege that Defendant Russo’s conduct caused him any actual injury. 

VI. Motion for Court Order to Renew or Reconsider

In his “Motion for Court Order to Renew or Reconsider Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO

and Preliminary Injunction and the Memo of Law in Support Thereof and Appendix of

Exhibits/Motion for Counsel,” Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an Order “to renew or

reconsider” Plaintiff’s June 27th Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and Motion for

Appointment of Counsel and to consider his Memorandum and Appendix of Exhibits in

support of the Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. He states that his request is

“based on the allegations and claims presented in the third amended complaint.”

“Motions to reconsider are appropriate only in rare circumstances.” Defenders of

Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). “The purpose of a motion

for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered

evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Such motions

should not be used for the purpose of asking a court “‘to rethink what the court had already

thought through – rightly or wrongly.’” Defenders of Wildlife, 909 F. Supp. at 1351

(quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.

1983)).

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Court Order to Renew or Reconsider.

Plaintiff has presented no basis for reconsidering either motion. 

VII. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

. . . .

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. . . .

B. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

C. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s September 21, 2012 Motion to Enlarge Time (Doc. 55) is granted;

the Court will consider Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint as timely filed.

(2) Plaintiff’s October 5, 2012 “Motion for Court Order to Renew or Reconsider

Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and the Memo of Law in Support

Thereof and Appendix of Exhibits/Motion for Counsel” (Doc. 56) is denied without

prejudice.

(3) Counts Two and Three of the Third Amended Complaint are dismissed without

prejudice.

(4) Defendants Brewer, Napolitano, Horne, Goddard, Johnson, Rollins, Tabor,

Paralegal Assistant Unknown, Golder, Garner, Russo, Mendoza, Arbitia, Dassel, Snyder,

Capati, Mead, Wilson, Stevwing, Ulibarri, Unknown Security Officers at ASPC-Lewis

Barchey Blue Unit and ASPC-Tucson Cimarron and Santa Rita Units, and Unknown Security

Officers in the ASPC-Tucson Santa Rita Unit Clothing Room, are dismissed without

prejudice.

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7

If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of Corrections,

Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or employee works.

Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central Office of the Arizona

Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works there.

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(5) Defendants Schriro, Ryan, ASPC-Lewis Warden Unknown, Reeder, Walker,

Davenport, Jacobs, Bock, and Bradley must answer Count One of the Third Amended

Complaint. 

(6) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the Third

Amended Complaint (Doc. 57), the Supplement (Doc. 58) this Order, and both summons and

request for waiver forms for Defendants Schriro, Ryan, ASPC-Lewis Warden Unknown,

Reeder, Walker, Davenport, Jacobs, Bock, and Bradley.

(7) Plaintiff must complete7

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(8) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons, Third Amended Complaint, and Supplement on a

Defendant within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of

this Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(I).

(9) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Third

Amended Complaint, the Supplement, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(10) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver

of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned by a Defendant

within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

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(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Third Amended Complaint,

Supplement, and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Third Amended Complaint, Supplement, or this Order and for

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(11) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons, Third Amended

Complaint, and Supplement must return the signed waiver forms to the United States

Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(12) Defendants Schriro, Ryan, ASPC-Lewis Warden Unknown, Reeder, Walker,

Davenport, Jacobs, Bock, and Bradley must answer the Third Amended Complaint or

otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable

provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(13) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

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(14) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 2nd day of January, 2013.

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