Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00816/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00816-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERGEANT GARY A. STEIN, United

States Marine Corps, Camp Pendleton,

California 92055,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-0816-H (BGS)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER WITHOUT

PREJUDICE 

vs.

COLONEL C.S. DOWLING,

Commander, Weapons and Field Training

Battalion, Camp Pendleton, California

92055; RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF

THE UNITED STATES NAVY, The

Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; and

BRIGADIER GENERAL DANIEL YOO,

Defendants.

On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff Sergeant Gary A. Stein (“Plaintiff” or “Stein”) filed a

complaint against Defendants, along with an ex parte motion for temporary restraining order

and order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. (Doc. Nos. 1 & 2.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have scheduled administrative separation proceedings against

Plaintiff Stein on Thursday, April 5, 2012. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that he has

inadequate time to present a defense at the administrative separation proceedings and that the

conduct sought to be enjoined, if allowed to occur, will cause Stein immediate and irreparable

- 1 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

injury. (Doc. No. 2.) The Court declined to address Plaintiff’s motion ex parte, and

Defendants filed a response on April 4, 2012. (Doc. No. 5.) 

The Court held a hearing on April 4, 2012. Gary G. Kreep, Nathaniel J. Oleson, David

Loy, and J. Mark Brewer (pro hac vice) appeared for Plaintiff, and Thomas C. Stahl appeared

for Defendants. The Court compliments both sides on the excellent presentation on short

notice. This case was especially complicated because it implicates First Amendment rights,

fundamental rights protected by the United States Constitution. In the Court’s review of the

matter, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff has some valid arguments and Defendants have valid

responses. In this matter, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants seek to discharge Plaintiff on short

notice in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right of free expression and Fifth

Amendment Due Process rights. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated their own rules

and regulations concerning administrative separation procedures. The Plaintiff has been in the

United States Marines for nearly nine years, and the country owes Plaintiff and other Marines

a debt of gratitude for their service. Plaintiff is charged with certain responsibilities as an

active-duty member of the United States Marines and is required to comply with all the lawful

rules and regulations of the United States Marines. On enlistment, Plaintiff took an oath to

comply, among other things, with the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

For the following reasons, the Court declines to enjoin Plaintiff’s scheduled

administrative separation proceedings. 

Background

On April 4, 2012, Plaintiff initiated the instant action against Defendants for declaratory

and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants’ attempts to discharge Plaintiff from the United

States Marine Corps with an “Other Than Honorable” discharge. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants are attempting to discharge Plaintiff on short notice, depriving Plaintiff

of (a) his liberty without due process of law; (b) his right that Defendants comply with their

own rules, regulations, and procedures; and (c) his rights of full American citizenship as

promised by Department of Defense Directive 1344.10 (“DOD Directive 1344.10”). (Id.)

///

- 2 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Since July 15, 2003, Plaintiff has been an enlisted Marine with the United States Marine

Corps. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 6.) On May 1, 2008, Plaintiff attained the rank of Sergeant, and

Plaintiff’s current term of service expires on July 28, 2012. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that during

the period of 2010 through 2012, Plaintiff, through activities unconnected with his duties as

a U.S. Marine, spoke, wrote, and otherwise communicated with other private citizens regarding 

matters of public concern, including public policy issues, along with three other individuals

during his personal time. (Id., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff expressed personal opinions on political

candidates and issues, and Plaintiff and three other individuals maintained an account on the

computer social networking site known as “Facebook.” (Id.) Plaintiff is permitted to do so,

as long as he is not in violation of his military rules and obligations. Plaintiff does have First

Amendment protection for his own personal views and his own personal Facebook account. 

In April 2010, Plaintiff was invited to appear on Chris Matthews’ television show,

Hardball. (Id., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff obtained permission from his immediate superior, his Gunnery

Sergeant, and made travel plans to appear. (Id.) On Plaintiff’s way to appear on the television

show, Plaintiff received a telephone call from Headquarters, Marine Corps, in Quantico,

Virginia, and Plaintiff was ordered to return to his base and did return to the base. (Id.) This

should not be a basis for any separation or discharge. 

Subsequently, Plaintiff was approached by his Chief Warrant Officer concerning his

Facebook page, because of the possibility that it could be construed as emanating from military

sources, rather than from private sources. (Id., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff took down his Facebook page

while he reviewed the matter. (Id.) Plaintiff was urged by a Judge Advocate of the First

Marine Expeditionary Force to add a disclaimer to his Facebook page, if he was going to leave

the page up, that all statements therein are personal views, not made in an official capacity, and

not representing the views of the U.S. Marine Corps. (Id.) The Court agrees that this would

be First Amendment protected expression. Plaintiff added a disclaimer to the Facebook page

that he hosted with three other individuals and put the Facebook page back on the Internet.

Plaintiff was not advised at that time, or later, to take down the Facebook page. (Id.)

///

- 3 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

From November 2010, through March 1, 2012, Plaintiff is alleged to have posted on his

Facebook page and on METOC, a Marine weathermen community social media site, various

criticisms of President Barack Obama, questions concerning the Obama Administration’s

policies, and critiques of other politicians. (Id., ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not disobey

or advocate disobeying any particular order actually issued by any superior officer. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges, “[t]hough some of the language he used in discussing certain hypothetical

unlawful orders might have been viewed as intemperate, he subsequently clarified, repeatedly,

and publicly, that he was only discussing the settled principle of military law that service

members should not follow unlawful orders.” (Id.) It is a correct statement of the law that

service members are not required to follow unlawful orders.

Plaintiff alleges that between November 2010 and March 1, 2012, no attempt was made

by any of Plaintiff’s commanding officers, or any other Marine Corps officer, to restrict or

correct Plaintiff’s, and his friends’, Facebook activities. (Id., ¶ 16.) On March 21, 2012,

Plaintiff’s Commanding Officer Dowling (“Defendant Dowling”) notified Plaintiff of the

institution of Administrative Separation Proceedings where Defendant Dowling was

recommending Plaintiff’s discharge from the United States Marine Corps, because of alleged

misconduct. (Id., ¶ 17.) As grounds for discharge, Plaintiff’s Notification of Administrative

Separation Proceedings, dated 21 March 2012 (“Notification”) stated:

The bases for this recommendation are as follows: (1) that on or about 1 March

2012, you allegedly made statements regarding the President of the United

States that are prejudicial to good order and discipline, as well as service

discrediting in violation of Article 134, UCMJ; (2) from on or about November

2010 to the present you allegedly created, administered, and provided content

to a Facebook page, as well as other online media sources, in violation of DOD

Directive 1344.10. 

(Doc. No. 1, Ex. A, at 1.) According to the Notification, Defendant Dowling intended to

recommend that Plaintiff receive a separation from service characterization of “Other Than

Honorable Conditions” (“OTH”). (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 18.) The Notification required Plaintiff to

respond, in default of which his rights would be waived, within two working days, the

minimum time required by Section 6304.4, of the Marine Corps Separation and Retirement

Manual (“MARCORSEPMAN”). (Id., Ex. H.) Plaintiff alleges that the Notification was

- 4 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

served on Plaintiff during a period that Defendants knew that all Judge Advocates serving as

defense counsel at Plaintiff’s base were involved in annual legal training, and thus, were

unavailable to consult with Plaintiff before his response was required to be filed. (Id., ¶ 19.) 

If intentional, this may be a violation of Plaintiff’s Due Process rights.

Plaintiff responded timely to the Notification, and Defendants scheduled a hearing for

March 20, 2012. (Id., ¶ 20, Ex. B.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were aware that any

members of the Judge Advocate who were able to serve as defense counsel to Plaintiff were

at a conference and could not begin work on Plaintiff’s case until March 23, 2012. (Id., ¶ 20.) 

On March 23, 2012, Defendant Dowling counseled Plaintiff regarding his activities. 

Specifically, Plaintiff was advised: “On 1 Mar 12 you made specific disrespectful and

insulting statements about your Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States, in

violation of Article 134, UCMJ, which were prejudicial to good order and discipline and were

of a nature to bring discredit upon the United States Marine Corps and the U.S. armed forces. 

Specifically, you stated:

“As an Active Duty Marine I say ‘Screw Obama’ and I will not follow all orders

from him . . . Will do my job better then [sic] the next guy . . . But has [sic] for

saluting Obama as commander-in-chief . . . I will not” and “Your [sic] right it

said to defend the ‘I will support and defend the Constitution of the United

States against all enemies, foreign and domestic’ Obama is the economic enemy

. . . He is the religious enemy . . . he is the ‘Fundamentally change’ America

enemy . . . he IS the Domestic Enemy.”

In this statement, Plaintiff identified himself as an active-duty Marine. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s statements go beyond his individual capacity because he identifies himself as an

active-duty Marine. His defense is that he is simply articulating the existing law that he is not

required to follow any unlawful order. His defense is that he is making these statements in the

context of public policy discussions. 

According to the Commanding Officer, Defendant Dowling: “Your comments were

clearly disrespectful in tone and tenor toward your Commander-in-Chief and unquestionably

constitute a lack of personal and professional discipline on your part as an active-duty Marine. 

Furthermore, your specific statement that ‘I will not follow all orders from him’, which you

made while on active duty as a Sergeant of Marines, is unquestionably prejudicial to the good

- 5 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

order and discipline of this command and our Corps. You posted these inappropriate and

disrespectful statements to a Facebook page designed for discussion among active-duty

Marines in the METOC community and were in fact viewed by active-duty Marines at that

time. Your disrespectful and insulting comments also constitute a serious deviation from our

core values of honor, courage, and commitment and have unquestionably brought discredit

upon yourself, this Command, and our Corps.” 

These statements are the views of Plaintiff’s Commanding Officer, Defendant Dowling,

on the base. Plaintiff’s Commanding Officer belatedly counseled Plaintiff on March 23, 2012,

after initiating Plaintiff’s administrative separation procedures on March 21, 2012, based on

Plaintiff’s specific METOC statement on March 1, 2012. Plaintiff’s METOC statements were

not made on Plaintiff’s own Facebook page that included the banner disavowing any

connection to the military. Plaintiff attributed the METOC statements to himself “as an

Active-Duty Marine.” Plaintiff’s counsel may explain the full defense to the administrative

separation board. If Plaintiff is simply articulating well-established law that a Marine is not

required to comply with unlawful orders, Plaintiff will win. If however, Plaintiff’s statements

go beyond that, and deviate from the military core values of honor, courage, and commitment,

or discredit the service, then Plaintiff may face the appropriate consequences for these

statements. The Court concludes that the initial decision as to whether these statements violate

Article 134 or DOD Directive 1344.10, or whether these statements are protected speech,

should be made through the military process. For the Court to step in and decide as a

preliminary matter that Plaintiff’s statements are protected free speech, unrelated to any

violation of any military rule and regulation, would be premature. 

The Commanding Officer, Defendant Dowling, further counseled Plaintiff as follows:

“On 5 Mar 2012 your Company 1stSgt read you your Article 31(b) rights and informed you

that you were suspected of violating the UCMJ for making disrespectful comments about the

President of the United States on your recent 1 Mar 12 Facebook posts. After 1stSgt

completed his Art 31(b) rights advisement, you indicated that you did not desire to discuss this

topic any further until you had the opportunity to speak with a military attorney. Your

- 6 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

company 1stSgt approached you later that week on or about 9 Mar 12 and specifically advised

you that as an active-duty U.S. Marine, you were required to comply with the provisions of

DOD Directive 1344.10, entitled “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces”, and

the UCMJ.”

The Court requests further briefing from both parties, as soon as reasonably possible,

on the applicability of any injunction prohibiting the military from violating First Amendment

rights under DOD Directive 1344.10. See Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150, 166 (D. D.C.

1997) (enjoining the defendants “from interpreting DOD Directive 1344.10, or any similar law

or regulation in a manner that prohibits the plaintiffs from exercising their free speech and free

exercise rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution.”) In the Court’s view, DOD

Directive 1344.10 would be authorized if it is narrowly tailored and not overly broad, in order

to avoid suppressing legitimate First Amendment rights of the military. Plaintiff’s counsel

may raise these constitutional arguments to the military board. 

 Plaintiff’s Commanding Officer, Defendant Dowling, further counseled Plaintiff: “This

was after you attended a mandatory class on DOD Directive 1344.10 and Social Media

guidance. You informed your Company 1stSgt again that you understood the provisions of

DOD Directive 1344.10 and you acknowledged that you were required to comply with the

provisions of that Directive while you remained on active duty. You personally informed the

1stSgt that you knew “what you could and could not do and that you still planned to do

interviews.” You have since disregarded that counseling on numerous occasions and engaged

in partisan political activities in violation of DOD Directive 1344.10 and Article 92, UCMJ,

to include purposefully speaking before a partisan political gathering on 22 Mar 12 and

continuing to utilize various media sources to advocate partisan politics and undermine the

chain of command.” 

///

///

///

///

- 7 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

It is clear to the Court that if given a specific lawful order by a Commanding Officer,

a person in the military may not disregard the order. Plaintiff may have a difference of opinion

as to whether his activities constitutes partisan political activities. If Plaintiff received

guidance on the parameters of partisan political activities, Plaintiff disregarded that advice at

his peril. Plaintiff may, however, assert that his activities were not in violation of the order. 

The Court believes that the military should properly evaluate these contentions in the

administrative separation proceedings.

Plaintiff’s Commanding Officer, Defendant Dowling, additionally advised Plaintiff: 

“You have been formally notified that you will be subject to an administrative separation

proceeding for commission of serious offenses for violating DOD Directive 1344.10 and for

those aforementioned disrespectful and insulting statements about your Commander-in-Chief.” 

Plaintiff’s counsel believe that these statements are not “serious offenses” under the

applicable military regulations. The lawyers may present at the hearing the maximum

punishment chart, appendix 12, defining serious offenses. The lawyers may make their

arguments that these statements, including the case interpreting disloyal statements, do not

apply to this instance. Plaintiff may also present to the administrative separation board that

the Secretary of the Navy did not issue implementing instructions for the DOD Directive

1344.10. Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel may make the argument that Defendant Dowling’s

counseling should have occurred prior to instituting the administrative separation because these

offenses are not appropriately classified as serious within the military’s own rules and

regulations. “[A]n agency of the government must scrupulously observe its own rules,

regulations and procedures.” Blassingame v. Sec’y of the Navy, 866 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir.

1989). “With respect to the armed forces, this requirement ‘does not involve any undue

interference with the proper and efficient operation of our military forces because we only

require that the [Navy] carry out the procedures and regulations it created itself.” Id.; see also

Wisotsky v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 299, 305, 2006 U.S. Claims LEXIS 5, ** 17-**18

(2006). 

///

- 8 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Commanding Officer, Defendant Dowling, made recommendations as follows:

“Specific recommendations for corrective action are to refrain from engaging in partisan

political activity in accordance with DOD Directive 1344.10, to comply with the UCMJ and

refrain from conduct that is prejudicial to good order and discipline or is of a nature to bring

discredit upon the armed forces. Your conduct is not what is expected of a Marine NonCommissioned Officer and sets a poor example for junior Marines and the Corps as a whole.”

Plaintiff’s Commanding Officer, Defendant Dowling, advised Plaintiff, “You may seek

assistance, which is available through the chain of command and the Office of the Staff Judge

Advocate.” Plaintiff acknowledged, “I understand that I am being processed for the following

judicial or adverse administrative action: Involuntary Administrative Separation for

Misconduct for Commission of a Serious Offense per paragraph 6210.6, MCO P1900.16F. 

I was advised that within 5 working days after acknowledging this entry I may submit a written

rebuttal which will be filed on the document side of the service record. I choose to ____/ not

to __x__ make such a statement.”

Following the counseling, Plaintiff was appointed military counsel. On March 23,

2012, Plaintiff’s military attorney notified the hearing officer that he had a scheduling conflict

on Friday, March 30, 2012. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 21.) In response, by letter dated March 26, 2012,

the hearing was delayed one day, until Saturday March 31, 2012. (Id.) On March 25, 2012,

Plaintiff requested an additional one week in order to allow more adequate preparation for the

hearing. (Id.) On March 26, 2012, that request was denied. (Id., Ex. C.)

On March 26, 2012, Plaintiff retained, as civilian counsel, J. Mark Brewer, one of

Plaintiff’s undersigned counsel, pursuant to MARCORSEPMAN, Section 6304.4(c). (Id., Ex.

H.) On March 27, 2012, Plaintiff’s civilian counsel requested an extension of the hearing date

for ten days. (Id., Ex. I.) On March 28, 2012, that request was denied, but the hearing date

was moved to April 5, 2012. (Id., Ex. D.)

///

///

///

- 9 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff’s military attorney submitted to Defendants a Request for

Legal Ethics Opinion, which would respond to three questions relevant and necessary to the

conduct and outcome of Plaintiff’s Notification hearing:

1. Has the Defense Department’s Directive Number 1344.10 and other

interpretative documents been modified to fully comply with the Order ... in

Rigdon v. Perry, 963 F. Supp. 150, 164 (D.D.C. 1997)....

2. May an active duty, non-commissioned, U.S. Marine maintaining a Facebook

web page bearing a clear disclaimer that all statements are personal views, not

made in an official capacity and not representing the views of the Marine Corps,

make statements thereon supporting or opposing either (i) a political party or (ii)

a candidate for federal, state or local office or (iii) both?

3. May such a Marine make statements critical of a candidate for political office

when that candidate is also currently serving in office? Does a separate rule

apply to criticisms of a candidate for political office serving as President of the

United States? 

(Doc. No. 1, Ex. E.)

On April 4, 2012, the military denied Plaintiff’s Request for a Legal Ethics Opinion. 

The military also denied counsel’s request to continue Plaintiff’s administrative separation

hearing in order to prepare an adequate defense. Plaintiff sued all Defendants in their official

capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 on April 3, 2012. (Id.,

¶ 12.)

Defendant Dowling is a colonel in the United States Marine Corps and serves as the

Commanding Officer of the Weapons and Field Training Battalion, Marine Corps Recruit

Depot, San Diego, California. (Id., ¶ 7.) Defendant Dowling is Plaintiff’s Commanding

Officer and the Convening Authority with regards to Plaintiff and the Administrative

Separation Board. (Id.)

Defendant Ray Mabus (“Mabus”) is the Secretary of the United States Navy, one of the

military branches within the Defense Department in the United States Government, whose

office is charged by DOD Directive 1344.10, with the legally enforceable duty to “issue

appropriate implementing documents” for the purpose of enforcing DOD Directive 1344.10,

with respect to service members of the United States Marine Corps. (Id., ¶ 8.) Defendant

Mabus’ office has immediate supervision over Defendant Dowling in ensuring compliance

- 10 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with DOD Directive 1344.10. (Id.)

Defendant, the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”), is a department of the

Executive Branch of the United States Government, which adopted, and is in charge of

enforcing the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and DOD Directive 1344.10. (Id.,

¶ 9.)

Defendant United States of America (“United States”) is a government entity

supervising the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and this is the entity

empowered to enforce sanctions for knowing and willful violations of the law. (Id., ¶ 10.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant United States’ agents are responsible for regulating and

enforcing the UCMJ and DOD Directive 1344.10, including their enforcement as challenged

by Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Defendant Brigadier General Daniel Yoo (“Yoo”) is the Commanding General of the

United States Marine Corps Depot, San Diego, and as a result of this position, exercises

authority over the separation of Plaintiff from service with the Marine Corps. (Id., ¶ 11.) The

Court now turns to the applicable legal standards.

Legal Standards

An injunction is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as

a matter of course.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761 (2010).

Plaintiffs have the burden to that injunctive relief is appropriate. See Granny Goose Foods,

Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 442–43 (1974). Because they are extraordinary remedies, a

plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or preliminary injunction “must

establish: (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and

(4) that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see

also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008) (“a party seeking a preliminary injunction must

demonstrate, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits”) (citations omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 971, 976 (1997)

(overturning a preliminary injunction issued when a plaintiff had established only a fair chance

- 11 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of success on the merits of his claim).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes the Winter test. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los

Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the Ninth Circuit has articulated an

alternate version of this test whereby “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of

hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary

injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and

that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d

1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).

Under this approach, “serious questions going to the merits” requires more than

showing that “success is more likely than not,” it requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a

“substantial case for relief on the merits.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.

2011). And even where success on the merits is likely or “serious questions” are raised an

injunction “is not a remedy which issues as of course.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456

U.S. 305, 311 (1982).

In this context, Plaintiff seeks the Court to enjoin a military administrative separation

proceeding. (Doc. Nos. 1 & 2.) “Military discharge decisions are subject to judicial review.” 

Muhammad v. Sec’y of Army, 770 F.2d 1494, 1495 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court may review

unlawful military decisions if the plaintiff alleges (a) violation of a constitutional right, federal

statute, or military regulations, and (b) exhaustion of administrative remedies, unless

exhaustion is excused. Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights, as well as

various military regulations. (Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 32-46.) Therefore, Plaintiff meets the first part

of the test because Plaintiff alleges violations of constitutional rights and military regulations. 

Because Plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies, however, exhaustion must be

excused. 

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is excused if “(1) if the intraservice remedies do

not provide an opportunity for adequate relief; (2) if the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm

if compelled to seek administrative relief; (3) if administrative appeal would be futile; or (4) if

- 12 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

substantial constitutional questions are raised.” Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1073. Plaintiff raises

substantial Constitutional questions, so the Court would have the authority to enjoin the

administrative separation proceeding after balancing the appropriate factors under the law. See

Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1072. 

Under Wenger, where plaintiff alleges constitutional violations and exhaustion is

excused, “a court weighs four factors to determine whether judicial review of his claims is

appropriate. These factors include: (1) The nature and strength of the plaintiff’s claim; (2) The

potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused; (3) The extent of interference with military

functions; and (4) The extent to which military discretion or expertise is involved.” Wenger,

282 F.3d at 1072. 

From Plaintiff’s point of view, he is being administratively separated from the service

after almost nine years, solely because of his exercise of protected speech. The Court notes

that the country is in the middle of a presidential campaign, where people hold strongly held

beliefs for and against the sitting President of the United States. In the military context, the

President is the Commander-in-Chief, further complicating the analysis. Nevertheless, from

the Plaintiff’s perspective, Plaintiff is simply exercising his constitutional right of free speech

involving issues of public policy. From the Defendants’ point of view, Plaintiff has crossed

the line by violating direct orders, by engaging in activities that are contrary to the good order

of the Marines, and by disregarding military regulations. 

Speech “on issues of social and political concern . . . has been recognized as ‘the core

of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’” United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442,

446-47 (C.A.A.F. 2008). As a result, “members of the military are not excluded from the

protection granted by the First Amendment,” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). The

First Amendment therefore protects speech in the military unless it “interferes with or prevents

the orderly accomplishment of the mission or presents a clear danger to loyalty, discipline,

mission, or morale of the troops.” Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448. To violate Article 134, the

government must show a “direct and palpable connection” between the “statements of the

military mission” and the statements must be taken in their full context. Id. at 447-48.

- 13 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court, after having concluded that the Plaintiff has alleged serious constitutional

concern, now turns to the alleged violations. The administrative separation proceedings

against Plaintiff are based on alleged violations of Article 134 and DOD Directive 1344.10.

Article 134 prohibits disloyal statements. Article 134 states that disloyal statements include:

(b) Elements.

(1) That the accused made a certain statement;

(2) That the statement was communicated to another person;

(3) That the statement was disloyal to the United States;

(4) That the statement was made with the intent to promote disloyalty or

disaffection toward the United States by any member of the armed forces or to

interfere with or impair the loyalty to the United States or good order and

discipline of any member of the armed forces; and 

(5) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the

prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to

bring discredit upon the armed forces. 

(c) Explanation. Certain disloyal statements by military personnel may not constitute an

offense under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387, and 2388, but may, under the circumstances, be

punishable under this article. Examples include praising the enemy, attacking the war aims

of the United States, or denouncing our form of government with the intent to promote

disloyalty or disaffection among members of the armed services. A declaration of personal

belief can amount to a disloyal statement if it disavows allegiance owed to the United States

by the declarant. The disloyalty involved for this offense must be to the United States as a

political entity and not merely to a department or other agency that is part of its administration.

In this instance, Defendant Dowling, filed a declaration indicating why the

administrative board needs to convene promptly, why a continuance is not in the best interest

of the military, and why, in his view, Plaintiff violated Article 134. In defense, Plaintiff’s

counsel indicates that the cases and authorities support his view that Plaintiff’s statements do

not constitute serious offenses, that the exercise of First Amendment rights must be protected

by the military, and any restrictions must be narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary limitations

on Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, and therefore, Plaintiff has not violated Article 134.

The second ground is an alleged violation of DOD Directive 1344.10. DOD Directive

1344.10 addresses permissible “Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces.” 

Plaintiff challenges the DOD Directive 1344.10 on several grounds. (See Doc. Nos. 1 & 2.) 

Plaintiff’s challenge raises an interesting question: does attendance at a Tea Party event

- 14 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

constitute “partisan political activity?” Many constitutional scholars could disagree whether 

participation by a service member, not in uniform, at a Tea Party event, constitutes partisan

political activity with a recognized political party. In contrast to an established political party,

Plaintiff’s counsel maintains that the Tea Party is not a partisan political organization, but

rather, a loose affiliation of individuals with varying views. In this instance, the military

contends that Plaintiff crossed the line into partisan political activity and counseled Plaintiff

not to attend these events. 

In reviewing military decisions that raise constitutional issues, “a court weighs four

factors to determine whether judicial review of his claims is appropriate. These factors

include: (1) The nature and strength of the plaintiff’s claim; (2) The potential injury to the

plaintiff if review is refused; (3) The extent of interference with military functions; and (4) The

extent to which military discretion or expertise is involved.” Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1072. 

Plaintiff’s counsel has suggested that the outcome of the administrative separation

proceeding is foregone, rendering Plaintiff’s efforts futile. The Court does not hold that belief. 

Plaintiff’s counsel may raise his challenges to both Article 134 and DOD Directive 1344.10

to the administrative separation board and present their briefing and arguments to the board.

The Court further notes that the board, under the administrative separation proceedings,

is not required to separate Plaintiff. At the administrative separation proceedings, the board

may: (1) find that the government has not met its burden and retain Plaintiff; (2) find that the

government has met its burden and recommend retention; (3) find that the government has met

its burden and recommend discharge and then recommend the character of the discharge as

either honorable, general under honorable conditions or under other than honorable conditions. 

It is not a foregone conclusion that Plaintiff will be separated from the service. The board may

conclude that Plaintiff should receive an honorable discharge. 

If, however, the board finds that the government has met its burden and recommends

discharge under other than honorable conditions, Plaintiff may also seek a review process

initially to the Convening Authority and ultimately to the Board for Correction of Naval

Records where Plaintiff may seek redress for any injustice or error. (Doc. No. 1, Ex. H,

- 15 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Marine Corps Separation Manual.) Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing of irreparable injury. See Wenger, 282 F.3d at

1072. If the board rules in his favor, he will not suffer irreparable injury. Plaintiff could also

seek appeal. Plaintiff has defense counsel, can articulate his defense, and the members of the

board should listen to counsel’s arguments and evaluate the merits of the matter. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing under Wenger. 

The Commanding Officer, Defendant Dowling, contends that Plaintiff has interfered with

military functions by influencing junior Marines, and the regulations at issue may involve

military discretion and expertise. Wenger, 282 F.3d at 1072. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not

satisfied his burden under Wenger.

The Court notes, however, that this may be a case capable of repetition, yet evading

review. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980). If, for example,

the government is attempting to squelch Plaintiff, and other military personnel, from speaking

out on matters of public concern, this would violate the First Amendment. If the basis for

Plaintiff’s separation is his protected speech, or if the military persists in violating other service

members’ free speech rights, this case may proceed. If, at the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s

administrative separation proceeding, Plaintiff was not permitted to present his defense,

Plaintiff may renew his Due Process arguments and again request the Court to enjoin

Plaintiff’s discharge or reinstate Plaintiff. See, e.g., Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235 (9th

Cir. 1996). As a result, the Court denies Plaintiff’s current request for a temporary restraining

order without prejudice.

Moreover, Plaintiff may renew his request for continuance to the administrative

separation board. The Court questions the government’s insistence on proceeding so

expeditiously after Plaintiff’s nearly nine years of service. At a minimum, the Court strongly

recommends that the military voluntarily provide Plaintiff’s counsel a continuance of twentyfour hours or more to permit review of this Court’s order. Given the fact that the Court was

presented with this matter late yesterday and has been in a trial today, the Court only had a

limited time to review the matter. As a result, the Court believes that Plaintiff should be

- 16 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

provided the opportunity to have the Ninth Circuit review this Court’s order. Based on the

current record, however, the Court denies Plaintiff’s application for temporary restraining

order without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2012

 

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

- 17 - 12cv816

Case 3:12-cv-00816-H-BGS Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 17 of 17