Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03068/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03068-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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All exhibits referenced herein are the exhibits attached to Doc. #9, Respondent’s

Response to Petition.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Hang Nam Yoon, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Philip Crawford, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 06-3068-PHX-SMM (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

On December 22, 2006, Hang Nam Yoon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, contending that his detention for more than three years while

his removal proceedings have been pending is unlawful (Doc. #1). On February 26, 2007,

Respondents filed their Response in Opposition (Doc. #9), and on March 16, 2006, Petitioner

filed his Reply (Doc. #10). For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Yoon's

petition be granted.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and a citizen of South Korea admitted into the United States as

an immigrant visitor. (Doc. #91

, Exh. 1, 2.) On March 21, 2002, Petitioner was convicted in

California Superior Court, Los Angeles County, for the following offenses: Terrorist

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Threats, in violation of California Penal Code (CPC) section 422, Cutting A Utility Line, in

violation of CPC section 591, and Inflicting Corporal Injury on Spouse/Cohabitant, in

violation of CPC section 273.5(a). (Exh. 3.) He was sentenced to serve 4 years in a

California prison. (Id.)

On November 19, 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Notice

to Appear, charging Petitioner as removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the

Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), as an alien who, after admission had been

convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined in §101(a)(43)(F), a crime of violence for

which the term of imprisonment imposed was at least one year. (Exh. 4.) Petitioner was

served with the notice on December 4, 2003. (Id.) On January 22, 2004, Petitioner appeared

before an immigration judge (“IJ”) at Eloy, Arizona, for removal proceedings. ( Exh. 5.)

During these proceedings Petitioner was advised of his legal rights, including the right to be

represented by an attorney during the proceedings. He requested a postponement of the

hearing in order to retain counsel from California, and the court continued the matter to

January 29, 2007. (Id.)

The hearing continued on January 29th, and Petitioner appeared without counsel. The

IJ denied Petitioner’s request for a further continuance in order to retain counsel. The IJ

found that Petitioner had an aggravated felony conviction, as he had been convicted of a

crime of violence, and sentenced to over one year in prison. The IJ sustained the charge of

removability and designated South Korea as the country of removal. (Id.) Petitioner was

given an application for relief from removal (Form I-589) and his case was postponed until

February 19, 2004. The IJ warned Petitioner that if he did not file the form by February 19,

his application would be considered abandoned and he would be ordered removed to South

Korea without further hearing. (Id.)

On February 13, 2004, Petitioner’s then-retained counsel submitted an application for

Cancellation of Removal [Form EOIR-42(A)], and supplemented it with a pre-hearing brief.

(Exh. 6, 8.) The IJ entered an order on February 20, 2004, removing Petitioner to South

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Korea and finding that Petitioner had abandoned any and all claims for relief by failing to file

the I-589 on or before February 19, 2004. (Exh. 9.)

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on March 13, 2004. (Exh. 10.) On August 9,

2004, after briefing by the parties, the Bureau of Immigration Affairs (BIA) dismissed

Petitioner’s Appeal. (Exh. 11, 12, 13.) On August 17, a travel document for Petitioner was

requested from the South Korean Consulate. (Exh. 14.) Petitioner filed a Petition for

Review of the BIA decision with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 27, 2004, and

the Ninth Circuit denied his request for a stay. (Exh. 15.) Petitioner was afforded a Custody

Review by ICE on November 9, 2004, and was denied release from custody. (Exh. 16.) On

January 21, 2005, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s Petition for Review, for lack of

jurisdiction. (Id.) On March 1, 2005 Petitioner then filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Writ”)

in this court. (Exh. 17.) On April 12, 2005, the government notified this court of its

intention to remove Petitioner to South Korea on April 19, 2005. (Exh. 17.) A stay of

removal was ordered by the District Court on April 15. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s last Custody Review occurred in May, 2006, and resulted in a ruling of

continued detention. The reviewing officer made the decision based upon the following

relevant factors: Petitioner’s criminal convictions, as set forth above, his criminal record

indicating a potential for extremely violent behavior, the fact that he had failed to submit any

documentation in support of release, the fact that Petitioner had a Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals Stay of Deportation in effect, and that his removal to South Korea was imminent

pending the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals final ruling. (Exh. 24.)

Petitioner’s Writ was transferred to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 26,

2005, based upon the passage of the Real ID Act, and the Ninth Circuit granted a continued

stay of removal. (Exh. 17, 22.) Petitioner filed his Opening Brief on June 5, 2006.

Respondent filed ian Answering Brief on July 11, 2006, and Petitioner filed his Reply Brief

on September 8, 2006. (Id.) That case is currently under consideration. Petitioner’s Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the instant case was filed on December 22, 2007. 

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The removal period begins on the latest of the following: . . .(ii) If the removal order

is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the

court’s final order. 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)

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DISCUSSION

The amount of time that Petitioner has been detained pending administrative

proceedings, between December 4, 2003, and August 9, 2004 (time between arrest and the

BIA's dismissal of the appeal) is 248 days, or 8 months. The amount of time Petitioner has

been detained awaiting removal after a final order of removal, between August 9, 2004, and

April 15, 2005 (time between final order of removal and stay of proceedings issued by the

district court, and later continued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) is 248 days, or 8

months. The amount of time Petitioner has been awaiting a decision by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, after briefing was completed, between September 8, 2006, and the date of

this report, is 343 days, or almost one year. Petitioner’s total time is custody is approximately

three years and eight months.

Petitioner current status is considered that of “pending removal proceedings,” because

a stay of proceedings was issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals at Petitioner’s

request.2

 Thus, the issue of his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. §1226(c), which provides,

in pertinent part, that “(t)he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who . . .(B)

is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section

1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title. . . .” The INS alleged Petitioner’s

conviction for Corporal Injury Spouce/Cohabitant as an aggravated felony, under

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and thus, he was subject to mandatory detention.

In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Court addressed the detention of criminal

aliens while removal proceedings are ongoing but before the statutory removal period begins.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) mandates detention during removal proceedings for deportable aliens

convicted of an aggravated felony. Demore, 538 U.S. at 517-18. "Such detention necessarily

serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during

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their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will

be successfully removed." Id. at 528. Detention of a criminal alien during removal

proceedings is, therefore, a constitutional part of the process. Id. at 531.

In Demore, however, the Court operated on the assumption that the period of

detention under § 1226(c) is relatively short. See Id. at 528-29. In distinguishing the

potentially lengthy periods of detention at issue in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689-697

(2001), the Court stated:

 Under § 1226(c), not only does detention have a definite termination

point, in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days we considered

presumptively valid in Zadvydas. The Executive Office for Immigration

Review has calculated that, in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained

pursuant to § 1226(c), removal proceedings are completed in an average time

of 47 days and a median of 30 days. Brief for Petitioners 39-40. In the

remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the

Immigration Judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an

average of four months, with a median time that is slightly shorter. Id., at 40.

These statistics do not include the many cases in which removal

proceedings are completed while the alien is still serving time for the

underlying conviction. Id., at 40, n. 17. In those cases, the aliens involved are

never subjected to mandatory detention at all. In sum, the detention at stake

under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases

in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which

the alien chooses to appeal.

Demore, 538 U.S. at 529-30 (footnotes omitted). The alien in Demore had been held for six

months, which the Court, although acknowledging was "somewhat longer than the average,"

found constitutionally permissible. Id. at 530-31.

Despite the mandatory language of § 1226(c), it is "constitutionally doubtful" that

Congress has the authority to imprison for excessively long periods lawfully admitted

criminal aliens who are subject to removal. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir.

2005). In Tijani, the alien had "been deprived of his liberty by the government for a period

of over two years and eight months." Id. The court avoided deciding the constitutional issue,

but interpreted "the authority conferred by § 1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of

criminal aliens." Id. Because the alien's proceedings were not expeditious, the court

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remanded the case to the district court to grant the habeas petition unless the government

provided the alien a bail hearing before an Immigration Judge. Id.

The government argues that Tijani should be distinguished because in that case,

administrative proceedings dragged on for 20 months, and in that case the petitioner was not

an aggravated felon. The Tijani court, however, did not premise their decision on the length

of the administrative proceedings or the failings of the government. The court simply said,

“[W]e interpret the authority conferred by 1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of

criminal aliens. Two years and eight months of process is not expeditious; and the

foreseeable process in this court, where the government’s brief in Tijani’s appeal of the

removal was only filed last month after two extensions of time, is a year or more.” In this

case, Petitioner’s administrative proceedings lasted eight months, and his appeal has been

pending now for nearly a year. His entire time in custody is now three years and eight

months. His process has not been expeditious. 

The government also argues that detention is proper because it has been prolonged by

Petitioner’s own litigation, citing Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 211 (2nd Cir. 1991).

In Doherty, the Second Circuit held that an eight year detention prior to deportation was

justified in part because petitioner’s extended detention was caused by his own litigation,

noting that the petitioner “has possessed, in effect, the key that unlocks his prison cell . . .if

Doherty had agreed to deportation in the first place, he would not have been detained at

MCC for the past eight years.” Id. at 212.

The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Doherty, however, is inconsistent with the holding

in Tijani. See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242. In the latter case, the Ninth Circuit held a detention

of two years and eight months was not permissible under section 1226, even though that

detention was extended by the petitioner’s attempts to avoid removal. Id. This court is

obliged to follow Tijani. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1) be granted as follows:

That the District Court Judge order Respondent, within 60 days of the District Court's

Order, to provide a hearing to Petitioner before an Immigration Judge with the power to grant

him bail unless Respondent establishes that he is a flight risk or will be a danger to the

community;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 22nd day of August, 2007.

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