Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01592/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01592-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE ROBERT JAMES,

Booking # 15746082,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BARBARA LEE, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01592-AJB-JLB

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT AS 

FRIVOLOUS AND FOR FAILING 

TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND 

§ 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On June 21, 2016, Plaintiff, Kyle James, currently incarcerated at the California 

State Prison - Los Angeles County located in Lancaster, California, filed a civil rights 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). Because Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Proceed IFP complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court granted him 

leave to proceed without full prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1914(a), but dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). On November 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 6.) In this FAC, Plaintiff names only Defendant Barbara 

Lee, John Doe Doctor, Jane Doe Doctor and “S.D.C.J. Med. Supervisor” as Defendants. 

II. Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

B. Duplicative claims

Plaintiff broadly alleges that during the two and one-half years he was in the 

custody of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department (“SDCSD”), he was subjected to 

“multiple injuries to his body” due to “multiple documented occasions of physical abuse 

and harm inflicted on Plaintiff by deputies.” (FAC at 3.) Plaintiff does not provide any 

specific factual allegations or identify any of the SDCSD deputies whom he claims are 

responsible for his alleged injuries. 

However, the Court does take judicial notice that Plaintiff has two pending actions 

involving use of force by SDCSD deputies and therefore, Plaintiff’s FAC is subject to sua 

sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) because it contains 

claims which are duplicative of these two other actions. See James v. Agnew, et al., S.D. 

Cal. Civil Case No. 3:15-cv-00409-AJB-MDD and James v. Emmens, et al., S.D. Cal. 

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Civil Case No. 3:16-cv-2823-WQH-NLS. A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in 

other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings 

have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous if it “merely repeats pending or 

previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 

1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations 

omitted). Because Plaintiff appears to be litigating the identical claims presented in the 

instant action in James v. Agnew, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:15-cv-00409-AJBMDD and James v. Emmens, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:16-cv-2823-WQH-NLS, 

the Court must dismiss these duplicative claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See 

Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1.

C. Retaliation claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Lee “retaliated against him” by refusing to provide 

medical care after she was “served with civil action 15cv0409-AJB-MDD.” (FAC at 4.) 

Retaliation against a prisoner for exercising his rights to speech or to petition the

government may violate the First Amendment. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable 

claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a 

state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, while Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Lee was motivated to retaliate against 

him because he had named her in a lawsuit. However, the Court again takes judicial 

notice of James v. Agnew, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:15-cv-00409-AJB-MDD and 

finds that Defendant Lee is not a named Defendant in that matter nor has she been served 

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with any documents in that case. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant Lee was 

motivated to act against Plaintiff because of a lawsuit that she is not involved in does not 

raise a plausible retaliation claim. Therefore, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against 

Defendant Lee must be DISMISSED for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1).

D. Medical Care Claims 

In addition, Plaintiff contends that he has been denied adequate medical care 

because Defendants allegedly refused to allow Plaintiff to see a specialist for nerve pain 

in his hand and instead provided “useless, cheap, and dangerous medication.” (FAC at 6-

7.) 

Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Clouthier 

v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle’s 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims 

alleged to violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights). 

Here, Plaintiff claims he suffers from “nerve damage” but he fails to include any 

further “factual matter” sufficient to show or describe how or to what extent his medical 

needs were objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1991) (defining a “serious medical need” as one which the “failure to treat ... could result 

in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”), 

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The “existence of an injury that a reasonable 

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence 

of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a 

‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059-60.

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Moreover, even if the Court assumes Plaintiff’s medical conditions were

“objectively serious,” nothing in his FAC supports a “reasonable inference that [any 

individual] defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to 

indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 

U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; 

inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a 

constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990)). A difference of opinion between a pretrial detainee and the doctors or 

other trained medical personnel at the Jail as to the appropriate course or type of medical 

attention he requires does not amount to deliberate indifference, see Snow v. McDaniel, 

681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989)), and any delay in providing an appropriate course of treatment does not by itself 

show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is alleged have caused harm. See 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).

Thus, Plaintiff’s FAC, as currently pleaded, does not include facts to show that any 

individual San Diego Jail official actually knew of, yet disregarded any serious medical 

need. See Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“[D]eliberate indifference requires the defendant to be subjectively aware that serious 

harm is likely to result from a failure to provide medical care.”). Nor does it allege that 

any decision to refuse or delay a particular course of medical treatment caused him actual 

harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Without more, Plaintiff’s FAC currently amounts 

only to “unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” which 

“stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief’” as 

to any constitutionally inadequate medical care claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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E. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC fails to 

state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix the 

pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC as frivolous and for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

1915A(b).

2. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be 

complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim 

not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2017

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