Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02830/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02830-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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 The amounts claimed in plaintiff’s exhibit two submitted in support of the motion do 1

not add up to the total amount claimed in the body of the motion. In determining the proper

amount of fee to be awarded in this matter, the court has relied on the itemized amounts in the

exhibit.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD CASEY, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-08-2830 KJM

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to

Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1), is pending before the court. Plaintiff seeks fees in

the amount of $6,607.34 based on 2.2 hours for 2008 at the rate of $172.85 per hour for attorney 1

time and 38.65 hours for 2009 and 2010 at the rate of $172.24 per hour for attorney time. 

Defendant contends fees under the EAJA should not be awarded because the government’s

position was substantially justified. In the event fees are awarded, defendant contends that

plaintiff cannot be compensated for hours spent on issues not reached by the court in deciding the

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motion for summary judgment. In addition, defendant contends any fee that is awarded must be

made payable to the plaintiff.

A. Substantial Justification

The EAJA provides that the prevailing party in a civil action against the United

States may apply for an order for attorneys’ fees and expenses within thirty days of final

judgment in the action. An applicant for Social Security benefits receiving a remand under

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether the applicant later

succeeds in obtaining the requested benefits. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993). In this

case, the matter was remanded under sentence four for immediate payment of benefits pursuant

to the order of the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. See Order filed March 29,

2010. Plaintiff thus is entitled to an award of fees under the EAJA. The court must allow the fee

award unless it finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified. Flores v.

Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1995).

The burden of establishing substantial justification is on the government. Gutierrez

v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), the

Supreme Court defined "substantial justification" as

‘justified in substance or in the main’))that is, justified to a degree

that could satisfy a reasonable person. That is no different from the

'reasonable basis in both law and fact' formulation adopted by the

Ninth Circuit and the vast majority of other Courts of Appeals that

have addressed this issue.

Id. at 565. A position does not have to be correct to be substantially justified. Id. at 566 n.2; see

also Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991), receded from on other grounds,

Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th

Cir. 2002).

In determining substantial justification, the court reviews both the underlying

governmental action being defended in the litigation and the positions taken by the government

in the litigation itself. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987), disapproved on

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other grounds, In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the underlying government

action was not substantially justified, it is unnecessary to determine whether the government's

litigation position was substantially justified. Andrew v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir.

1988).

Defendant contends the government’s position was substantially justified. In

support of this contention, defendant argues the same contentions submitted in support of the

government’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Although defendant is correct that the

government can lose on the merits and its position still be substantially justified for purposes of

EAJA, defendant’s argument in this instance is unavailing. In reviewing the entire evidentiary

record, briefing on the cross-motions for summary judgment and order granting remand in this

case, the court has determined defendant’s position had no reasonable basis in either law or fact. 

The ALJ ignored significant aspects of the medical evidence despite an Appeals Council remand

for specific evaluation of plaintiff’s chronic fatigue syndrome. See, e.g., Sampson v. Chater, 103

F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (position not justified where ALJ mischaracterized medical evidence). 

Although there were repeated assessments by plaintiff’s treating physician that plaintiff was

severely limited in several functional capacities, the ALJ rejected this opinion and adopted

instead the opinion of a nontreating, nonexamining physician, who had no particular expertise in

the medical area of concern. The government’s position thus was not substantially justified and

fees under the EAJA will be awarded. 

B. Reasonable Fee

The EAJA directs the court to award a reasonable fee. In determining whether a

fee is reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the reasonable hourly rate, and the

results obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant does not contest

the hourly rate claimed but contends the fee award provisions of EAJA are not available with

respect to issues not actually adjudicated. This contention is well taken. See Hardisty v. Astrue,

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592 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010). In remanding this matter for immediate payment of

benefits, the court found dispositive the issue of the ALJ’s rejecting the opinion of a treating

physician. With respect to plaintiff’s counsel’s time reviewing the transcript, briefing on the

cross-motions for summary judgment and order granting remand in this case, as well as the time

expended on tasks as set forth in counsel’s schedule of hours, the court has determined the hours

claimed are reasonable. The court has determined, however, that six of the hours claimed in

2009 were devoted to issues not addressed by the court. Accordingly, the number of hours

compensated will be reduced to 32.65 hours at the hourly rate of $172.24 plus 2.2 hours at the

hourly rate of $172.85. The EAJA award must be made by this court to plaintiff, and not to

counsel. See Astrue v. Ratliff, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that fees pursuant to the EAJA are

awarded to plaintiff in the amount of $6,003.91.

DATED: July 22, 2010. 

006

casey.fee

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