Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02724/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02724-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARON MARIE REED,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv2724 JM(WMc)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT; GRANTING

LEAVE TO AMEND

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO; COUNTY OF 

SAN DIEGO; SAN DIEGO UNIFIED 

PORT DISTRICT; OFFICER CARLOS

OLGUIN; SAN DIEGO HARBOR POLICE

DEPARTMENT; and 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

Defendant County of San Diego (“County”) moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) or, alternatively, for a more definite statement on Plaintiff Sharon Marie Reed’s civil rights

complaint brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule

7.1(d)(1), this matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the reasons set forth

below, the motion to dismiss is granted with 15 days leave to amend from the date of entry of this

order. 

BACKGROUND

On December 15, 2006 Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action alleging that she was

wrongfully arrested on a warrant issued in the name of Colleen Ann Conerty, not Sharon Marie Reed.

(FAC ¶11). Plaintiff was placed under arrest on December 18, 2005 when a records check of a

California D.O.J. database revealed that Plaintiff’s name was identified as an alias used by Colleen

Case 3:06-cv-02724-JM-WMC Document 30 Filed 06/28/07 Page 1 of 6
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Ann Conerty. When arrested she repeatedly told the San Diego Harbor Police Department and the

arresting officer that she was Sharon Marie Reed but the “Harbor Police did not listen to her.” (FAC

¶12). She showed the Harbor Police her passport and other identification verifying her identity as

Reed. (FAC ¶15). Plaintiff was then transported to Los Colinas jail where the Sheriff’s Department

allegedly refused to check her fingerprints, date of birth, or social security number. (FAC ¶7). 

Plaintiff alleges that Harbor Police Officer Carlos Olguin “was negligent, that she was arrested

without cause, that the officer was improperly trained or supervised, her civil rights were violated, she

was falsely imprisoned and battered.” (FAC ¶16). Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Olguin was

following the customs and practices of the San Diego Sheriff’s Department “to arrest individuals by

using improper means, including the use of excessive force, even when no reasonable basis exists for

believing that use of force would be required. Said policy, pattern, practice, and custom amounted

to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights and the policy was the

moving force behind the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. (FAC. ¶19). Plaintiff also alleges that each

Defendant “maintain[s] an official policy, custom or practice of issuing facially invalid arrest warrants

without taking proper steps, if any, to ensure that the particular person in custody was actually the

person sought.” (FAC ¶20). Based upon these generally described events, Plaintiff alleges a single

federal claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 based upon alleged violations of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments and three state law claims for assault and battery, false arrest and

imprisonment, and negligence. 

On March 23, 2007 this court granted the State of California’s motion to dismiss the Complaint

on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On April 24, 2007 this court granted County’s motion to dismiss

the original complaint. County now moves to dismiss the FAC on grounds that (1) Plaintiff has not

sufficiently alleged an unconstitutional detention/arrest; (2) the complaint fails to provide sufficient

allegations with respect to the excessive force claim; and (3) the complaint fails to adequately allege

the facial invalidity of the arrest warrant. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in "extraordinary" cases.

United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief

only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a

cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

While a complaint challenged under Rule 12(b)(6) need not set forth detailed factual allegations, a

plaintiff must provide sufficiently detailed allegations to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Identified grounds for relief

must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Id. The defect must appear on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts

may not consider extraneous material in testing its legal adequacy. See Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc.,

950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted

as part of the complaint. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1710 (1996).

Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable

inferences to be drawn from them. See Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992).

However, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule

12(b)(6) motion. See In Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Motion

Under 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil liability may be imposed on any person who, under color of state

law, subjects another to the deprivation of rights “secured by the constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C.

§1983. Plaintiff appears to make three claims under §1983: first, Defendants violated her Fourth

Amendment rights when she was arrested and detained; second, Defendants violated her Fourth

Amendment rights when she was battered by Defendants; and third, the arrest warrant was facially

invalid under the Fourth Amendment. (Compl. ¶29). Each claim is discussed in turn.

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The False Arrest/Detention Claim

As set forth in this court’s previous order, incorporated herein, Plaintiff must comply with the

requirements of Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) in stating a false arrest/detention claim

based upon misidentification. As noted by the County, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the

County because she fails to adequately allege that Officer Olguin, a County employee, or the County

violated her constitutional rights – under either the Fourth Amendment or the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. In Baker, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), as here, an individual was arrested

pursuant to a warrant in the mistaken belief that plaintiff was the person identified in the warrant. The

individual was imprisoned for 72 hours over a holiday weekend. When county officials learned of the

mistaken identify, the individual was released from custody. The individual then commenced a §1983

action against the county. The Supreme Court noted that §1983 “imposes liability for violations of

rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” Id.

at 146. The court held that the deprivation of liberty suffered by McCollan did not violate a

constitutional right, explaining that 

[a] reasonable division of functions between law enforcement officers, committing

magistrates, and judicial officers -- all of whom may be potential defendants in a

§1983 action -- is entirely consistent with ‘due process of law.’ Given the

requirements that arrest be made only on probable cause and that one detained be

accorded a speedy trial, we do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is

required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence,

whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite

intent. Nor is the official charged with maintaining custody of the accused named in

the warrant required by the Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of such

a claim. 

Id. at 145-46. 

To the extent Plaintiff continues to assert a due process liberty claim based upon her continued

detention after her misidentification, the Supreme Court noted in Baker that “mere detention pursuant

to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain

amount of time deprive the accused of ‘liberty . . . withe due process of law.’” Id. at 145. The

Supreme Court noted that a “detention of three days over a New Year’s weekend does not and could

not amount to such a deprivation.” Id. Here, the court dismissed the original Complaint on the ground

that the Complaint was silent on the length of Plaintiff’s detention and circumstances surrounding her

arrest and detention. The FAC sheds no light on whether Plaintiff was released after hours, days, or

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1

 In her opposition, Plaintiff requests leave to file a first amended complaint.

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weeks. A simple allegation within Plaintiff’s knowledge, will clarify whether Plaintiff states a claim.

Accordingly, the court is unable to assess the viability of this claim.

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss without prejudice and with 15 days leave to

amend from the date of entry of this order.1

Excessive Force

As set forth in this court’s previous order, incorporated herein, an officer’s right to make an

arrest necessarily includes the right to use some degree of force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396;

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1290 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the basis for the excessive force

claim appears to rest upon Plaintiff’s allegations that she was battered. (FAC ¶¶ 16, 33). As a battery

may result from simple impermissible touching, see Austin B. v. Escondido Union School District,149

Cal.App.4th 860, 871 (2007), Plaintiff must allege something more than the use of ordinary force

incident to an arrest. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, “[f]actual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. The simple

battery allegations here are insufficient to raise a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act.

 Consequently, the court grants the motion to dismiss this claim with leave to amend.

Validity of the Warrant

Plaintiff also alleges that she was arrested pursuant to a facially “invalid warrant.” (FAC ¶¶11,

14, 20,33). Plaintiff’s allegation of facial invalidity appears to be nothing more than a bare legal

conclusion. As noted in Bell Atlantic,

a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.

Id. at 1964-65; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). The warrant requirement

of the Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported

by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . . . persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const.

Amend. IV. “Probable cause for an arrest warrant is established by demonstrating a substantial

probability that a crime has been committed and that a specific individual committed the crime.”

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Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1562 (10th Cir. 1996). Here, if Plaintiff seeks to allege that the

warrant was invalid because it misidentified Plaintiff then the appropriate framework for analysis

would be the standard identified in Baker v. McCollen, as set forth above.

As an alternative to the misidentification theory, Plaintiff may allege that the warrant lacked

probable cause and explain how that is so. The FAC fails to explain the lack of probable cause but

simply alleges that the “lack of probable cause arose from defendants’ deliberate indifference.” (FAC

¶34). This allegation misses wide of the mark. Probable cause is a determination by a judicial officer

who issued the warrant that the totality of the circumstances supports a finding that the reasonably

identified named individual likely committed a crime. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371

(2003). Here, Plaintiff fails to articulate the basis for her claim of invalid warrant.

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss with 15 days leave to amend from the date of

entry of this order. Plaintiff is informed that her failure to state a claim in a second amended

complaint may result in the dismissal of her claims with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 28, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

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