Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02013/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-02013-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GORDON DALE MEADOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

DOES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-02013 DLB PC

ORDER FINDING COGNIZABLE CLAIMS 

AND DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS 

AND DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff Gordon Dale Meador (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se 

and in forma pauperis in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his complaint on

December 18, 2014.1

Pursuant to Court order, he filed a First Amended Complaint on June 12, 2015. Plaintiff 

names California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Correctional Sgt. Doe 1, 

CDCR Correctional Officer Doe 2, Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4 and the Springfield 

Handcuff Company as Defendants.

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on January 16, 2015.

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 

(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions or 

omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 

1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim 

for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison. The events at issue occurred 

while Plaintiff was hospitalized at San Joaquin Hospital.

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Plaintiff alleges that on May 24, 2014, he was hospitalized at San Joaquin Hospital due to 

heart problems. CDCR Correctional Officer Doe 2 called supervising CDCR Correctional Sgt. Doe 

1 and informed him that the waist chains on Plaintiff’s right arm were broken and would not come 

off. CDCR Correctional Sgt. Doe 1 called Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4 and requested bolt 

cutters. Plaintiff told both CDCR Correctional Sgt. Doe 1 and Correctional Officer Doe 2 not to let 

the security guards cut off the handcuffs.

Plaintiff contends that the request was ignored. Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4 

began to cut the cuff off, causing severe pain and injury. Plaintiff had tears in his eyes and told 

CDCR Correctional Sgt. Doe 1 that he was in severe pain and suffering immensely. CDCR 

Correctional Sgt. Doe 1 and CDCR Correctional Officer Doe 2 told Plaintiff to stop crying and 

“suck it up.” ECF No. 18, at 5.

The pain made Plaintiff throw up, but Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4 continued to 

cut. Plaintiff again told CDCR Correctional Sgt. Doe 1 and CDCR Correctional Officer Doe 2 that 

the pain was too much, but they told Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4 to continue cutting. 

Plaintiff states that blood was all over his hospital gown and was gushing from a major cut on his 

arm.

Finally, after an hour and a half, the handcuff was removed. The cuffs were forced off of 

Plaintiff’s arm, causing more severe pain. Plaintiff states that white bone was visible where his arm 

was cut. He contends that this caused permanent damage to his right arm, and he can no longer 

move his right thumb.

Plaintiff further alleges that CDCR contracts with Springfield Handcuff Company, and that 

handcuffs and waist chains come with a lifetime guarantee. Plaintiff contends that the waist chain 

broke, causing severe pain and suffering.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments.

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C. DISCUSSION

1. Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4

As explained above, section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 

580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In the first screening order, the Court explained that the presumption is that “conduct by 

private actors is not state action.” Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 

922 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s original complaint did not contain facts which would support a 

finding that Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4 were acting under color of state law when they

removed Plaintiff’s broken handcuffs.

Plaintiff has not corrected this deficiency in amending, and again fails to allege any facts that 

could support a finding that Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4 were acting under color of state 

law. The act of treating an incarcerated patient does not, by itself, transform individuals into state 

actors. It is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate state action. Florer, 639 F.3d at 922.

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Hospital Security Guards Does 3 and 4.

2. Springfield Handcuff Company

Unlike his allegations relating to the hospital staff, Plaintiff does allege that Springfield 

Handcuff Company contracted with CDCR to perform services. However, even though Plaintiff has 

alleged a relationship that may support a finding that it was acting under color of state law, section 

1983 is only applicable to persons acting under color of state law.

Even if Springfield Handcuff Company could be a proper defendant under section 1983, 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would suggest deliberate indifference. In the prior complaint, 

Plaintiff named Smith and Wesson as the handcuff company, but the Court nonetheless explained 

that he failed to allege any facts to support liability under any legal theory. Plaintiff’s citation to a 

lifetime warranty is not sufficient to state a claim.

Plaintiff has not corrected these deficiencies and he therefore fails to state a claim against the 

Springfield Handcuff Company.

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3. Eighth Amendment

Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials are . . . prohibited from being deliberately 

indifferent to policies and practices that expose inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm.” 

Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 

(1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (prison official violates Eighth Amendment if 

he or she knows of a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate and fails to take reasonable 

measures to avoid the harm). “Deliberate indifference occurs when ‘[an] official acted or failed to 

act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Solis v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 514 

F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2008). A prisoner may state “a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment 

by alleging that [prison officials] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to [environmental 

conditions] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.” Helling v. 

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993).

Plaintiff has added sufficient facts to demonstrate that CDCR Defendants Does 1 and 2 were 

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

However, Plaintiff has not identified either of these Defendants. 

Ordinarily, where the Court finds at least one cognizable claim after Plaintiff has had an 

opportunity to amend, the Court will dismiss the claims that are not cognizable and order Plaintiff to 

return service documents. In this situation, however, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint 

because the United States Marshal cannot proceed with service. The Court will open limited 

discovery by separate order.2

4. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges an unspecified violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, he has not 

set forth any facts that would support a claim for denial of procedural due process, or any type of 

equal protection claim. 

Insofar as Plaintiff attempts to state a substantive due process claim, he cannot do so. If a 

constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, the claim must be analyzed 

under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 

 

2

 Plaintiff filed a motion for limited discovery to ascertain the names of the Doe Defendants in April 2015, prior to the 

screening of his original complaint. The motion was denied as premature on May 6, 2015. 

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process. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint states an Eighth Amendment claim against CDCR 

Defendants Does 1 and 2. It does not state any further claims. Plaintiff has been given an 

opportunity to correct the deficiencies, but has failed to do so. 

Accordingly, this action SHALL PROCEED on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against 

CDCR Correctional Sgt. Doe 1 and CDCR Correctional Officer Doe 2. All other claims and 

Defendants are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 21, 2016 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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