Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-04221/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-04221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JAVIER GASCA,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MONTEREY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-04221-BLF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[Re: ECF 68]

Plaintiff Javier Gasca, a disabled individual who uses a wheelchair, claims that he was 

discriminated against on the basis of his disability while incarcerated at the Monterey County Jail

(“Jail”) between January 29, 2016 and August 22, 2016. He asserts a variety of claims against 

Defendants County of Monterey (“County”); the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), 

which operates the Jail; and California Forensic Medical Group (“CFMG”), a private corporation 

hired by the County to provide medical services at the Jail.

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on Claim 6, for 

violation of the California Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 54 et seq. The claim 

is grounded in Plaintiff’s assertion that the County and MCSO did not provide him with an 

accessible shower for the first two months of his incarceration. CFMG is not named as a 

defendant in the CDPA claim. 

Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED for the reasons discussed below.

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I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are limited to those relevant to the CDPA claim that is the subject of 

Plaintiff’s motion; they are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff is confined to a 

wheelchair due to a congenital medical condition. Gasca Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 68. He cannot walk or 

stand, and he has limited mobility in his arms. Id. Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Jail from 

January 29, 2016 to August 22, 2016. Ramirez-Padilla Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 69-3. When he was 

booked into the Jail, he was assigned to housing in the K-pod unit due to his status as an active 

Norteno gang member.1 Tongol Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 69-2; Gasca Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 68. There was only 

one shower in that unit, which Plaintiff could not access in his wheelchair. Id. There was a step 

up to the shower, which did not contain a bench or railing. Id. 

Plaintiff asserts that in order for him to shower, other inmates had to physically lift him

from his wheelchair onto a plastic chair placed in the shower. Gasca Decl. ¶ 5, ECF 68. 

According to Plaintiff, it was not until his attorney complained to the Jail in late March 2016 that 

prison staff arranged to transport Plaintiff to the Jail’s infirmary on a daily basis to shower. Id. ¶ 

6. In the infirmary, Plaintiff was able to wheel into the shower and transfer himself to a shower 

chair. Id. On July 21, 2016, Plaintiff was moved to the infirmary and housed there for the 

remainder of his sentence. Id. ¶ 13.

The County and MCSO dispute Plaintiff’s assertion that he was not provided with an 

accessible shower during the first two months of his incarceration; they contend that Plaintiff was 

provided access to the infirmary shower during the entire time he was housed in K-pod. See

Ramirez-Padilla Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, ECF 69-3; Tongol Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 69-2. 

Plaintiff filed this action on July 26, 2016, while he was still incarcerated at the Jail, and he 

filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on January 9, 2017. The FAC asserts claims 

under: (1) Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) Section 

504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); (3) California’s Unruh Civil Rights 

 

1 The parties and witnesses refer to the unit where Plaintiff was housed as “K-pod,” “Unit K,” and 

the “K-4 housing unit.” The Court understands all of these references to be to the same housing 

unit, where Plaintiff was housed upon his arrival at the Jail in January 2016. 

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Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51; (4) the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 

(5) California negligence law; and (6) the CDPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1.

 II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A party is entitled to summary judgment if the ‘movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” City of 

Pomona v. SQM North America Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a)). “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “Where the moving party meets that burden, the 

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence 

of genuine issues for trial.” Id. “[T]he non-moving party must come forth with evidence from 

which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s favor.” Id. “The court 

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of Pomona, 750 F.3d at 1049. However, “‘[w]here the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there 

is no genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

 III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is limited to the narrow issue of whether 

the County and MCSO are liable under the CDPA for failing to provide Plaintiff with an 

accessible shower during the first two months of his incarceration, from January 29, 2016 through 

March 29, 2016. See Reply at 4 (identifying period at issue as January 29, 2016 – March 29, 

2016), ECF 70.

The CDPA provides that individuals with disabilities “shall be entitled to full and equal 

access, as other members of the general public, to . . . places of public accommodation.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 54.1(a)(1). “The CDPA is concerned solely with physical access to public spaces.” 

Wilkins-Jones v. Cty. of Alameda, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2012). A plaintiff suing 

under the CDPA “cannot maintain a claim based on the denial of services (as opposed to denial of 

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physical access).” Id. 

A person or entity that interferes with the rights of an individual with a disability “is liable 

for each offense for the actual damages and any amount as may be determined by a jury, or the 

court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damages but in 

no case less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and attorney’s fees as may be determined by the 

court in addition thereto.” Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3(a). “Intent is not a requirement in actions 

involving money damages brought under the CDPA.” Wilkins-Jones, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. 

The CDPA applies to jails and the accommodations provided therein. Wilkins-Jones, 859 

F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55. In Wilkins-Jones, a jail inmate brought a CDPA claim against the County 

of Alameda and the private company hired by the County to provide medical services to inmates. 

Id. at 1043. The plaintiff inmate alleged that “she could not access the toilets, walkways, and 

other portions of the jail because of her disability, including an accessible cell.” Id. at 1055. She 

also alleged that “Defendants were responsible for ensuring her ability to access the jail’s 

facilities, and that Defendants directly caused her to be denied access by failing to recommend 

accommodations for her.” Id. The district court held that those allegations were sufficient to state 

a claim under the CDPA. Id. at 1056.

Plaintiff presents his own deposition testimony and declaration statement to prove that he 

was not provided an accessible shower when he was booked into the Jail on January 29, 2016, or 

for two months thereafter. Plaintiff stated that the only shower in the K-4 housing unit had a step 

up into the stall, and that he could not enter that shower in his wheelchair. Gasca Dep. 36:20-21, 

ECF 68; Gasca Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 68. There was no bench or railing in the shower. Gasca Decl. ¶ 4. 

Plaintiff described other inmates lifting him from his wheelchair onto a plastic chair placed in the

K-pod shower stall. Gasca Dep. 38:12-22; Gasca Decl. ¶ 5. Other inmates also had to turn on the 

water for Plaintiff. Gasca Dep. 38:25. 

According to Plaintiff, an accessible shower was not made available to him until after his 

attorney complained to the Jail in late March 2016. Gasca Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff stated that in early 

April 2016, Jail staff began transporting him to the Jail’s medical unit every day so that he could 

shower. Id. Plaintiff could wheel his wheelchair directly into the shower in the medical unit and 

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transfer himself to a shower chair. Id. Plaintiff stated that on July 21, 2016, he was moved out of 

the K-4 unit and into the infirmary for the remainder of his incarceration. Gasca Decl. ¶ 13. 

This evidence is sufficient to meet Plaintiff’s initial burden of proving that an accessible 

shower was not made available to him for the first two months of his incarceration. The burden 

thus shifts to Defendants County and MCSO to present evidence sufficient to create a factual 

dispute as to whether Plaintiff was provided an accessible shower during that period.

Defendants offer no evidence to dispute Plaintiff’s statement that there was only one 

shower in K-pod when he was housed there, or Plaintiff’s characterization of the K-pod shower as 

inaccessible. Defendants present evidence that: the reason Plaintiff was housed in K-pod was 

because he was a Norteno gang member; Plaintiff had been housed in K-pod on many prior 

occasions and he had never complained about the shower, although he had complained about other 

issues; and when Plaintiff did complain about the K-pod shower in 2016, he was moved to the 

infirmary. See Tongol Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 69-2; Thornburg Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, ECF 69-4. None of that 

evidence is relevant to Plaintiff’s motion. To the extent that Defendants suggest there is a 

grievance requirement under the CDPA, or that Defendants’ obligation to provide an accessible 

shower was not triggered until Plaintiff complained, Defendants have not cited any supporting 

authority and the Court has located none.

Defendants argue that because of the age of the Jail, the law permits them to house 

Plaintiff in an “integrated setting” such as K-pod while making available an accessible shower 

located elsewhere. Defendants submit the expert report of Larry Wood, who concluded that the 

County’s improvements to certain buildings, accommodations provided by staff, and assignments 

of detainees rendered the Jail compliant with accessibility requirements. See Wood Report at 3, 

Exh. A to Holmes Decl., 69-1. Mr. Wood also stated that the County’s new ADA-complaint jail is 

nearing completion. See id. Defendants’ argument based on Mr. Woods’ conclusions the Jail 

generally is in compliance with accessibility requirements does not address the specific issue 

raised by Plaintiff’s motion – whether an accessible shower was made available to him during his 

first two months of incarceration commencing January 29, 2016.

With respect to that issue, the only evidence submitted by Defendants consists of two 

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declarations provided by Jail staff members. Deputy Sheriff Josue Ramirez-Padilla stated as 

follows: 

While Plaintiff, Javier Gasca, was housed in K-pod, from January 29, 2016 through 

mid-July of 2016, deputies were tasked with escorting Mr. Gasca to the jail 

infirmary specifically for the use of the shower found inside the Out-patient 

Housing room #4, which is accessible for those needing the assistance of a 

wheelchair. Deputies were directed for Mr. Gasca to be escorted to Out-patient 

Housing Room #4, during our daily team briefings during the time Mr. Gasca was 

housed in K-Pod.

I specifically remember escorting Mr. Gasca on several occasions during this time 

period to the infirmary and Mr. Gasca using the accessible infirmary shower to 

bathe while he was housed in K-pod.

Ramirez-Padilla Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, ECF 69-3. Commander Ray Tongol stated that “[d]uring the time 

Mr. Gasca was housed in K-pod, he had access to an accessible shower in the infirmary.” Tongol 

Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 69-2.

Plaintiff argues that these declarations are insufficient to create a factual dispute, because

they do not refute his specific testimony and declaration statements that he was not escorted to the 

infirmary shower during the period January 29, 2016 through March 29, 2016. While it is a close 

call, the Court concludes that a reasonable trier of fact, drawing all reasonable inferences in the 

non-moving Defendants’ favor, could find that the declarations establish that the infirmary shower 

was made available to Plaintiff during the entirety of his incarceration, including the period 

January 29, 2016 through March 29, 2016. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to strike the declarations of Deputy Ramirez Padilla and 

Commander Tongol, as well as the declaration of Captain Johnathan Thornburg, for failure to 

comply with Rule 26 disclosure requirements. The Court advised the parties at the hearing that it 

was not prepared to rule on Plaintiff’s request, which was raised in the reply brief. The Court 

observed that a potential cure to Defendants’ allegedly late disclosure of witnesses would be to 

permit Plaintiff to depose them. When Defendants indicated that they could not agree to 

depositions at this time, the Court advised Defendants that it would entertain a motion in limine to 

exclude the witnesses if Defendants’ late disclosure deprived Plaintiff of an opportunity to take 

their depositions. However, unless and until an appropriate motion is brought, the Court declines 

to address these issues, and it will consider the declarations in evaluating the present motion.

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 IV. ORDER

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on Claim 6, asserting violation of the 

CDPA, is DENIED.

Dated: April 2, 2019

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:16-cv-04221-BLF Document 80 Filed 04/02/19 Page 7 of 7