Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03327/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3327

PAYSUN LONG,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KIM BUTLER,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:11-cv-1265-MMM — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 27, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and ELLIS,

District Judge.

*

ELLIS, District Judge. Petitioner-Appellant, Paysun Long 

(“Long”) seeks reversal of the district court’s denial of his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

 * The Honorable Sara L. Ellis, of the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 13-3327

§ 2254. Long brings due process claims related to the prosecution’s failure to correct perjured testimony and use of racially-charged and improper comments during the trial, as 

well as ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel 

claims. We reverse and remand with instructions to the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. The district 

court’s writ should order that Long is released unless Illinois 

gives notice of its intent to retry Long within a reasonable 

time to be set by the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND

Long has already been tried twice for the murder of Larriec Sherman (“Sherman”). Sherman was shot in the Taft 

Homes housing development in Peoria, Illinois, on June 11, 

2001. When the responding officer arrived at the scene, 

Sherman lay outside on the ground near a bicycle. Fifty to 

sixty people were gathered around Sherman, who was 

transported to a nearby hospital where he died from multiple gunshot wounds. 

Long was first tried for first degree murder in December 

2001. No physical evidence tied Long to the crime, but the 

state presented four witnesses who identified him as the 

shooter. Two of those four witnesses named Long as the 

shooter during the investigation, but recanted at trial. Witness Brooklyn Irby (“Irby”) identified Long as the shooter, 

but then testified on the stand that she told the State’s Attorneys and their Investigator Frank Walter (“Walter”) that her 

story about seeing Long shoot Sherman was a lie. In closing 

argument, the prosecutor made several improper statements 

not supported by the record evidence, including that two of 

the witnesses changed their stories out of fear, resulting in 

the reversal of Long’s conviction and a new trial.

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No. 13-3327 3

The current petition is based on Long’s second trial in 

January 2004. The State again presented the four eyewitnesses, one of whom maintained her identification of Long. 

That witness, Keyonna Edwards (“Edwards”) stated she was 

walking on the sidewalk when she saw Sherman riding a bicycle behind her. According to her testimony, she then heard 

gunshots, turned around, and from a distance of about six 

feet saw Long shoot Sherman from behind. Edwards stated 

she then cradled Sherman’s head in her hands and noticed 

he had a gun in his pocket. She testified that another individual approached and took that gun, then she left the scene 

before the police arrived. The two witnesses who recanted 

their identifications of Long during the first trial continued 

to deny having seen him shoot Sherman, despite their prior 

videotaped statements that Long approached Sherman and 

shot him from behind. 

The fourth eyewitness, Irby, testified that she was walking through the Taft Homes when she saw Long shoot 

Sherman from behind as Sherman was riding his bicycle. 

Irby did not notice anyone cradling Sherman’s head and 

when she approached Sherman, she saw a gun on the 

ground. Irby stated she then left the area. Although Long’s 

defense counsel cross-examined Irby about her prior trial 

testimony recanting her identification of Long, she denied 

ever telling the State’s Attorneys and State’s Attorney Investigator that her prior identification was false and compelled 

by police threats to have her children removed from her 

care. The same prosecutor who examined Irby in the first 

trial also examined Irby in the second trial, but did not correct Irby’s denial of her prior sworn testimony. After the end 

of the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel presented InvesCase: 13-3327 Document: 39 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 27
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tigator Walter, who testified that Irby recanted her identification of Long at Long’s first trial.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor made a series 

of comments along the theme that no evidence or theory was 

presented that another individual committed the crime. In 

addition, during rebuttal argument, the prosecutor used a 

personal anecdote about her experience with another murder case involving a reluctant witness. Also during rebuttal, 

in the context of discussing the crowd of people surrounding

Sherman’s body, the prosecutor referenced a scene in the 

movie “Gone With the Wind,” where the slave Prissy tells 

Miss Scarlett she “don’t know nothing about birthing no babies,” stating: 

Officer Wetzel told you when he got there 

there were 40 to 60 people around Mr. Sherman. And sorry, Miss Scarlet, but we don’t 

know nothing about birthing no babies, we just 

don’t [know] nothing. 40–60 people standing 

around that night ... So, on the night of June 11, 

2001, although there are 40 to 60 people around 

this dead young man or dying young man, nobody knew nothing, nobody came forward, 

nobody knows nothing. 

SA.168–69. The prosecutor also referred to the contents of a 

letter written by Irby that had not been admitted into evidence, at which point the judge sua sponte objected to the 

hearsay reference. During jury deliberations, the jury sent 

the judge a note asking why the letter was not entered into 

evidence, but could still be referenced. The trial judge responded that the jury “should consider the testimony and 

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No. 13-3327 5

exhibits that have been admitted in evidence according to 

the written instructions that you received.” SA.108. 

The jury found Long guilty and the judge sentenced him 

to fifty-one years in prison. 

Long raised two issues on direct appeal. First, appellate 

counsel challenged the Gone With the Wind and personal anecdote references in the prosecution’s closing statement. 

Second, appellate counsel asserted an ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to call 

Long’s sister, who would have corroborated Irby’s statement 

that she did not see anyone cradling Sherman’s head after he 

was shot. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Long’s conviction, finding his arguments regarding the closing argument comments waived because he failed to object at trial 

and raise the issue in post-trial motion practice, and otherwise not so improper as to require reversal, and finding the 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim adequately determined by the judge post-trial. Long filed a petition for leave 

to appeal (“PLA”), which was denied.

Long filed a timely pro se state post-conviction petition

that argued appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

present the claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient 

to convict and that the State allowed the perjured testimony

of Irby. Counsel was appointed, but he did not file an 

amended petition. The petition was dismissed. 

Long appealed this dismissal, arguing that appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the perjured testimony issue, and that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to amend the petition to include claims based 

on the hearsay letter reference, comments in closing arguCase: 13-3327 Document: 39 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 27
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ment that there was no evidence of another perpetrator and 

references to facts not in evidence, and ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel. A divided panel of the Illinois Appellate 

Court upheld the dismissal of Long’s state post-conviction 

petition, holding that Long was not prejudiced by the State’s 

failure to correct the false testimony at trial, therefore appellate counsel was not ineffective, and post-conviction counsel 

provided reasonable assistance because he was not obligated 

to raise additional allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Long’s

PLA. 

Long filed the instant petition pro se on July 19, 2011, arguing: (1) he was denied a fair trial due to the State’s knowing use of Irby’s perjured testimony and improper comments 

in closing argument, including the Gone With the Wind reference; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing 

to argue the perjured testimony issue; and (3) ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel for failing to amend the 

petition to include additional allegations of ineffective appellate counsel. The district court dismissed Long’s petition, 

finding the prosecutorial misconduct claims were procedurally defaulted and meritless, as Long had not shown a reasonable likelihood that Irby’s testimony or the closing argument comments prejudiced the trial outcome. The district 

court also found Long’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, although not procedurally defaulted, to be without 

sufficient merit to overturn the state court. The district court 

dismissed petitioner’s post-conviction counsel ineffective assistance claim as procedurally barred. 

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No. 13-3327 7

II. ANALYSIS

On the appeal of a writ of habeas corpus denial, the 

Court reviews a district court’s rulings on issues of law de 

novo and findings of fact for clear error. Denny v. Gudmanson, 252 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2001). The Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) established 

that a federal court may grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated by a state court on the merits only if that adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). “When the case falls under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary

to’ clause, we review the state court decision de novo to determine the legal question of what is clearly established law 

as determined by the Supreme Court and whether the state 

court decision is ‘contrary to’ that precedent.” Denny, 252 

F.3d at 900. Factual findings by the state court that are reasonably based on the record are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See id.; 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). AEDPA “stops short of imposing a complete 

bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in 

state proceedings,” but imposes a difficult standard that requires the petitioner to show the state court ruling “was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded agreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011). 

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However, a federal court may not consider the merits of a 

habeas claim unless that federal constitutional claim has 

been fairly presented to the state courts through one complete round of review, either on direct appeal or through 

post-conviction proceedings. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

838, 844–45, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999); Malone v. 

Walls, 538 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2008). “Fair presentment 

contemplates that both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles must be submitted to the state court.” 

Malone, 538 F.3d at 753 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Failing to properly present the federal 

claim at each level of state court review results in procedural 

default, which can only be overcome if the petition demonstrates cause for and prejudice from the default, or a miscarriage of justice due to actual innocence. Lewis v. Sternes, 390 

F.3d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 2004). Cause is “ordinarily established by showing that some type of external impediment 

prevented the petitioner from presenting his federal claim to 

the state courts.” Id. “Prejudice is established by showing

that the violation of the petitioner’s federal rights worked to 

his actual and substantial advantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court’s review 

of the question of procedural default is de novo. Malone, 538 

F.3d at 753.

If the district court did not have the opportunity to consider an argument on the merits, it is forfeited in this Court. 

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A party 

may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.”).

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No. 13-3327 9

A. The Napue Claim & The Ineffective Assistance of 

Appellate Counsel Claim Based on the Napue Claim

1. Prosecution’s Failure to Correct Perjured Testimony

Long asserts that he was denied a fair trial because of the 

prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony. According 

to Butler, the perjured testimony claim is procedurally defaulted because, although Long’s post-conviction briefs argued appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present 

this argument, the failure to raise this issue separately from 

an ineffective assistance claim is not fair presentment to the 

state court, citing Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 

2004). Long argues that he presented the Illinois courts with 

the operative facts and controlling legal standards necessary 

to evaluate this claim and therefore it is not defaulted, citing 

Malone v. Walls, 538 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2008). 

In Lewis, this Court found that petitioner had defaulted 

claims raised in his post-conviction petition only as examples of ineffective assistance of counsel, explaining, “[a] meritorious claim of attorney ineffectiveness might amount to 

cause for the failure to present an issue to a state court, but 

the fact that the ineffectiveness claim was raised at some 

point in state court does not mean that the state court was 

given the opportunity to address the underlying issue that 

the attorney in question neglected to raise.” 390 F.3d at 1026. 

We went on to find that the ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims were themselves defaulted because they were not 

presented in the correct appellate proceeding. Id. at 1026, 

1029–30. Although we found procedural default in Lewis, 

that case did not announce a broad rule that a constitutional 

claim embedded in an ineffective assistance claim has never 

been fairly presented to the state courts.

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On the contrary, in Malone, we reviewed Lewis and another ineffective assistance of counsel/embedded constitutional claim fair presentment challenge, finding for the petitioner. The State argued the ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not 

been presented as independent from the claim that appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise that claim. 538 

F.3d at 753–54. However, we found that “a fair reading of 

the record” revealed the state courts had been given a full 

opportunity to consider this issue because the petitioner 

made it clear that he was seeking redress of his trial counsel’s 

errors in failing to present certain witnesses by extensively 

detailing the factual basis of trial counsel’s errors, and by citing the appropriate federal case and standard for a trial 

counsel ineffective assistance finding. Id. at 754. We distinguished Lewis by explaining there the claims had been defaulted “because they had not been presented as independent claims for relief, but only as examples of counsel’s failures.” Id. at 755. Malone’s presentation of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was “as a means for the 

court to reach the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, i.e., 

as the cause for failing to raise the ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel claim.” Id. Because Malone “makes clear that 

he is asking the court to redress the failure of his trial counsel, an issue the court can reach if it determines that his appellate counsel also was ineffective[,] [h]is presentation, 

therefore, does not suffer from the infirmities that we identified in the petitioner’s submissions in Lewis.” Id. 

As in Malone, Long has raised an ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel claim as a means for the Court to reach the 

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No. 13-3327 11

perjured testimony claim. See 538 F.3d at 75.1 Long’s operative petition is his self-drafted petition because appointed 

counsel never amended, therefore it should be given a “generous interpretation” in this Court. See Lewis, 390 F.3d at 

1027. The ineffective assistance of Long’s appellate counsel, 

discussed below, gave him “cause” for failing to raise the 

Napue claim in the state courts. Although embedded in his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Long fairly presented 

the factual and legal basis for the perjured testimony claim

to the Illinois state court and, importantly, that court considered the issue on its merits. 

The Court examines four factors to determine whether a 

petitioner has fairly presented his federal claim to the state 

courts: “1) whether the petitioner relied on federal cases that 

engage in a constitutional analysis; 2) whether the petitioner 

relied on state cases which apply a constitutional analysis to 

similar facts; 3) whether the petitioner framed the claim in 

terms so particular as to call to mind a specific constitutional 

right; and 4) whether the petitioner alleged a pattern of facts 

 

1 Butler also argues that Malone should be considered an outlier because there the Illinois Appellate Court considered the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim only by relaxing its state procedural requirements because appellate counsel filed an affidavit admitting his error in 

not bringing the claim. However, this reasoning is not reflected in the 

Malone decision. And appellate counsel’s mea culpa would not have been 

the trigger for that review. Rather, any appellate ineffective assistance 

claim would spark a similar analysis of an allegedly waived issue, 

whether or not the claiming petitioner had such straightforward evidence of ineffectiveness. See Malone, 538 F.3d at 750 (explaining, 

“[g]enerally, defendant’s failure to raise this issue on direct appeal 

would result in waiver. However, the waiver rule is relaxed when a defendant alleges that failure to raise an issue on appeal constituted the 

ineffective assistance of counsel”). 

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that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation.” Ellsworth v. Levenhagen, 248 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 

2001). Long cited Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 

1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959), which examines a prosecutor’s 

knowing use of perjured testimony as a Fourteenth 

Amendment issue. Long used Illinois cases on the same issue. See, e.g., People v. Olinger, 680 N.E.2d 321, 331, 176 Ill. 2d 

326, 223 Ill. Dec. 588 (1997) (citing Napue); People v. Jimerson, 

652 N.E.2d 278, 284, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 209 Ill. Dec. 738 (1995) 

(same). Long explicitly framed this as a due process issue 

and his facts fit squarely within the Napue framework. 

Furthermore, when considering Long’s case, the appellate court engaged in the same kind of analysis as in Malone, 

discussing whether the perjured testimony issue was so 

prejudicial that the verdict should be overturned. SA.81–84. 

In so doing, the court reiterated the circumstances of Irby’s 

testimony at both trials, the State’s failure to correct that testimony, and Long’s rebuttal witness. SA.83–84. The court 

concluded petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood 

that Irby’s false testimony would have changed the verdict 

and declared, “[b]ecause this issue was not meritorious,” 

appellate counsel was not ineffective. SA.84. It is clear from 

the opinion that the Illinois Appellate Court squarely considered the factual and legal basis of this claim. We find, 

therefore, that Long’s due process claim is not procedurally 

defaulted and consider its merits. 

A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus on an 

issue adjudicated on the merits by the state court only if the 

adjudication of that claim “resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the SuCase: 13-3327 Document: 39 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 27
No. 13-3327 13

preme Court of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). We review the state court’s legal conclusions de 

novo. Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 1997). In 

Hall, we explained: 

The statutory “unreasonableness” standard allows the state court’s conclusion to stand if it is 

one of several equally plausible outcomes. On 

the other hand, Congress would not have used 

the word “unreasonable” if it really meant that 

federal courts were to defer in all cases to the 

state court’s decision. Some decisions will be at 

such tension with governing U.S. Supreme 

Court precedents, or so inadequately supported by the record, or so arbitrary, that a writ 

must issue.

Id. at 748–49. 

The Illinois Appellate Court’s finding that the Irby perjury issue was “not meritorious” was an unreasonable application of clear Supreme Court precedent holding that “a 

conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is 

any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could 

have affected the judgment of the jury.” See United States v. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976). 

“[A] conviction obtained through use of false evidence, 

known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall 

under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. 

A constitutional violation occurs if the State allows perjured 

testimony to go uncorrected, even if it did not solicit the 

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false evidence. Id. Either way, the perjured testimony prevents “a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair.” Id.

at 270 (quoting People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 855, 1 

N.Y.2d 554, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. 1956)). 

During Long’s first trial, Irby identified Long as the 

shooter, but then testified that she told the State’s Attorneys 

and Investigator Walter that she lied about seeing Long 

shoot Sherman in the back. During the second trial, the 

same State’s Attorney put Irby on the stand, where Irby told 

her initial story about seeing Long shoot Sherman. The 

State’s Attorney did not ask Irby any questions about her recantation under oath at the first trial. Defense counsel crossexamined Irby on her prior assertion that her story was a lie, 

but Irby denied telling anyone from the State’s Attorney’s 

Office that she did not, in fact, see Long shoot the victim. 

Again, the State’s Attorney did not correct Irby’s testimony. 

Rather, in closing, the prosecutor referenced the defense’s 

cross-examination of Irby on her statements to Walter, without mentioning the prior trial testimony. SA.149–50. The 

prosecutor then argued that Irby was credible and affirmatively relied on Irby’s changing story to bolster her credibility, arguing: “Maybe [Irby] thought if she told the State’s Attorney’s Office she wasn’t telling the truth she wouldn’t have 

to testify. But when she came in here and was under oath, 

she told you what she saw[.]” SA.150. 

A government lawyer’s use of perjured evidence is a 

threat to the concept of ordered liberty. See Napue, 360 U.S. 

at 269. This threat is just as pernicious if the testimony goes 

only to the credibility of the witness, because “[t]he jury’s 

estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness 

may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is 

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No. 13-3327 15

upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may 

depend.” Id. Illinois separately acknowledges the State’s obligation in this regard, see, e.g., People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 

1335, 1345, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 226 Ill. Dec. 592 (1997) (“If a prosecutor knowingly permits false testimony to be used, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.”), and has incorporated this 

concept into its rules of professional conduct, see Ill. Supreme Ct. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(a) (“The duty of a 

public prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”). 

That defense counsel later did what he could to minimize 

the damage of Irby’s perjured testimony does nothing to reduce the State’s duty to correct the perjured testimony. Just 

because the jury heard Walter explain during the defense 

case that Irby’s story had changed does not turn “what was 

otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 

270; see also United States v. Freeman, 650 F.3d 673, 680–81 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (finding reasonable possibility that perjured testimony affected jury decision, even though the government

stipulated to facts contradicting that testimony at a later 

point in the case). Additionally, the fact that the jury heard 

from another witness who challenged Irby’s recollection 

merely set up the kind of credibility comparison that is the 

bread and butter of a trial—it does not address the problem 

that the jury should never have heard that testimony in the 

first place. Even if this evidence was only used by the jury to 

assess Irby’s credibility, the State’s failure to correct that evidence was a clear due process violation and the Illinois 

court’s decision to the contrary was unreasonable. Napue, 

360 U.S. at 270. 

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But the import of this evidence goes beyond credibility. 

The case against Long was weak. The Illinois Appellate 

Court itself noted the evidence against Long was “not overwhelming.” SA.83. Without any physical evidence linking 

Long to the crime, the State had to rely on the testimony of 

two eyewitnesses, Irby and Edwards. Edwards’ testimony 

about the scene—that she saw Long shoot Sherman, that she 

then cradled his head until officers arrived at the scene—was 

brought into question by the other witnesses’ stories and was 

also different from her testimony at the first trial. The State’s 

other two witnesses refused to name Long as the shooter at 

the second trial. So that left Irby as the only witness whose 

testimony was not directly contradicted or questioned. The 

Court considers the trial record as a whole when evaluating 

the effect of the perjured testimony on the jury’s verdict. See 

Napue, 360 U.S. at 266, 272 (eyewitness’s testimony “extremely important” to State’s case); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 

150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972) (perjured testimony was key to prosecution’s case). Irby’s testimony and 

credibility were vital to the State’s case.

Furthermore, Irby’s recantation—had the State honestly 

presented it to the jury—would have corroborated the other 

two eyewitnesses who also changed their initial testimony 

naming Long as the shooter. The cumulative weight of Irby’s 

perjured testimony creates a reasonable likelihood that, with 

so little other evidence, the State’s failure to fairly present her 

shifting story influenced the jury’s verdict. 

Therefore, even though our review is deferential under 

AEDPA, the Illinois Appellate Court’s determination that the 

State’s failure to correct the perjured testimony did not influCase: 13-3327 Document: 39 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 27
No. 13-3327 17

ence the jury’s decision was an unreasonable application of 

Napue. Long is entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Long also brings a separate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim based on the perjured testimony claim. 

Butler does not argue that this claim is procedurally defaulted—indeed, the appellate court specifically considered and 

rejected it. SA.78. 

On habeas review, a federal court determines whether 

the state court’s application of the ineffective assistance 

standard was unreasonable, not whether defense counsel’s 

performance fell below Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), standards. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 

2d 624 (2011) (“Under AEDPA, though, it is a necessary 

premise that the two questions are different. For purposes of 

§ 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The state 

court is granted “deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland 

standard itself.” Id. To find a state court’s application of 

Strickland unreasonable is a high bar requiring “clear error.” 

See Allen v. Chandler, 555 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2009). The 

unreasonable application of federal law will lie “well outside 

the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion” and 

will be a clearly established Supreme Court precedent unreasonably extended to an unsuitable context or the unreasonable refusal to extend that rule somewhere it should have 

applied. Id. at 602.

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Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed questions of fact and law reviewed de novo, “with a strong presumption that the attorney performed effectively.” Allen, 555 

F.3d at 600. When considering ineffective assistance claims, 

a court must determine whether counsel’s performance fell 

below an “objective standard of reasonableness” and that 

this performance prejudiced the petitioner, i.e. “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. 

The Illinois Appellate Court held that appellate counsel 

was not ineffective because the issue of whether Irby’s uncorrected testimony prejudiced the trial was not meritorious. 

For the same reasons discussed supra, the Illinois Appellate 

Court’s finding that the prosecution’s actions did not prejudice the trial outcome, and therefore that this issue was not 

meritorious, was clear error and a misapplication of the Supreme Court’s holding in Napue. 

Furthermore, appellate counsel’s failure to bring this 

claim cannot be considered trial strategy or objectively reasonable performance. See Sanders v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 585 

(7th Cir. 2005) (failure to make “an obvious and clearly 

stronger argument” was deficient performance (citation 

omitted)). Appellate counsel is not required to raise every 

non-frivolous issue and her performance “is deficient under 

Strickland only if she fails to argue an issue that is both ‘obvious’ and ‘clearly stronger’ than the issues actually raised.” 

Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 898 (7th Cir. 2015). The Napue 

issue was obvious from the trial record itself. The question 

of whether the perjured testimony prejudiced Long’s defense 

was also clearly stronger than the claims that were raised. 

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No. 13-3327 19

Appellate counsel brought only two issues on direct appeal: (1) challenging the “Gone With the Wind” and personal 

anecdote references in the prosecution’s closing statement 

and (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call 

Long’s sister as a witness to corroborate Irby’s testimony that 

she did not see anyone cradling Sherman’s head at the scene. 

The appellate court rejected both arguments, although over a 

strongly worded dissent that described the prosecutor in 

closing as having “put her thumb on the scale and tip[ped]

the balance in favor of the State with a wholly improper—

and I submit grossly prejudicial—argument.” SA.69. A 

challenge to the prosecutor’s misconduct in allowing the perjured testimony would have been a powerful challenge to 

the conviction. Considering the dissenting justice’s reaction 

to the other comments, it is likely that this claim, especially 

when considering the weak case against Long, would have 

prompted a finding of prejudice. 

The second issue was not strong: the testimony of Long’s 

sister would have been used to corroborate Irby’s version of 

the scene and to undermine the prosecution’s only eyewitness who did not eventually recant. However, the detail of 

Edwards’ testimony that this evidence would attack—the 

cradling of the victim’s head—does not directly call into 

question her identification of Long as the shooter or significantly undercut her credibility. Long’s sister was a family 

member and therefore open to allegations of bias. In addition, trial counsel’s strategy would not have been to bolster 

Irby’s testimony: this witness would eventually name Long 

as the shooter and her changing story made her an unpredictable witness. This claim was weak at best. It was most 

likely that the appellate court would not have found prejuCase: 13-3327 Document: 39 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 27
20 No. 13-3327

dice even if this choice of witnesses could be considered ineffective assistance.

Appellate counsel brought one claim on appeal that 

prompted a strong dissent, therefore this case does not rise 

to the level of Shaw v. Wilson, where counsel argued a frivolous claim rather than one that was “genuinely arguable under the governing law.” See 721 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2013). 

However, the failure to bring the strong Napue due process 

claim on appeal cannot be characterized as strategic, rather it 

was deficient performance.

We hold the State’s failure to correct Irby’s denial of her 

recantation prejudiced Long and the Illinois Appellate 

Court’s finding otherwise is not a reasonable application of 

the Strickland prejudice standard. Long is entitled to habeas 

relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on the failure to challenge the State’s use of perjured testimony. 

B. Remaining Claims

1. Prosecution’s Use of Quote from Gone With the 

Wind & Personal Anecdote From Another Trial

Long also asserts violations of his due process rights under Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 91 L. 

Ed. 2d 144 (1983), because, during closing argument, the 

prosecution used a reference to Gone With the Wind to comment on the professed ignorance of the crowd of witnesses 

to the shooting and a personal anecdote from another murder trial to imply that Long had intimidated witnesses. Butler contends these claims are procedurally defaulted because 

the Illinois Appellate Court disposed of them on an independent and adequate state ground. We agree that because 

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No. 13-3327 21

these claims are defaulted and Long has not shown excuse 

for the default, the Court cannot consider them.

During Long’s direct appeal the Illinois Appellate Court 

rejected these two claims as waived because Long had not 

objected at trial or included these claims in his post-trial motions. SA.62. A state court’s rejection of an argument on this 

basis is an adequate and independent state law ground that 

results in default for federal habeas purposes. See Kaczmarek 

v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2010). That the appellate court then reviewed the waiver for plain error does not 

create a merits determination that would cure default. See 

Miranda v. Leibach, 394 F.3d 984, 992 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n Illinois court does not reach the merits of a claim simply by 

reviewing it for plain error.”). These two claims are procedurally defaulted. 

Long cannot escape this clear default, and so instead 

seeks to excuse it by asserting that his trial, appellate, and 

then post-conviction counsel were ineffective in bringing 

these claims. A state court procedural default may be excused if the petitioner can demonstrate “cause,” defined as 

“some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded 

counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule,”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. 

Ed. 2d 640 (1991), and “prejudice,” that the errors at trial 

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting” the trial with “error of constitutional dimensions,” Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1026. However, Long did not raise the claims 

of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel 

through one complete round of state court review and therefore these claims, too, are defaulted. See Gray v. Hardy, 598 

F.3d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 2010) (“But to use the independent 

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22 No. 13-3327

constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel as cause to excuse a procedural default, [petitioner] was required to raise the claims through one full 

round of state court review, or face procedural default of 

those claims as well.”).

Long argues, however, that ineffective assistance by postconviction counsel is the cause for the default of the ineffective appellate counsel claim, and the Court should consider 

this issue now because post-conviction proceedings were the 

first time that particular claim could have been brought, citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012) 

and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1044 

(2013). As we recently explained, “[i]n Martinez and Trevino, 

the Supreme Court held that procedural default caused by

ineffective postconviction counsel may be excused if state 

law, either expressly or in practice, confines claims of trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness exclusively to collateral review.” 

Nash v. Hepp, 740 F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting Wisconsin law required defendants to bring ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct review and finding default). This is because “the collateral proceeding is in many 

ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to the 

ineffective assistance claim.” Hodges v. Colson, 727 F.3d 517, 

531 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Despite the narrow holding of Martinez and Trevino, Long 

argues that this Court should extend these cases beyond 

those instances where state procedural rules dictate ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be brought on collateral 

review to cover post-conviction counsel’s failure to bring ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. The majority 

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No. 13-3327 23

of other circuits that have examined this question have refused to expand this narrow exception to the general prohibition against excusing procedural default via postconviction ineffective assistance claims. See Dansby v. Hobbs, 

766 F.3d 809, 833 (8th Cir. 2014) (joining the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Tenth Circuits in refusing to extend Martinez to appellate ineffective assistance claims); Hodges, 727 F.3d at 531. Long argues that we should instead follow the Ninth Circuit in finding the reasoning in Martinez applies equally to a claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 2013). However, 

this Court has recently interpreted Martinez and Trevino as 

holding “that procedural default caused by ineffective postconviction counsel may be excused if state law, either expressly or in practice, confines claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness exclusively to collateral review,” Nash, 740 F.3d at 

1079, and we do not see any reason to depart from that understanding, or the majority of circuits, here. The default of 

these claims is not excused under Martinez.

2. Prosecution’s Reference to a Letter Not in Evidence

& Improper Shifting of the Burden of Proof

Long further argues that the prosecutor referenced the 

contents of a letter that was not in evidence to bolster the 

credibility of a key witness. In rebuttal closing, the prosecution explained that Irby wrote a letter to a friend in which 

she stated that she saw a man shoot another man four times 

in the back. SA.170–71. Neither the letter nor its contents 

had been admitted into evidence, so the judge sua sponte

made and sustained an objection to the prosecution’s improper reference to facts not in evidence. SA.171. Long argues the prosecutor’s statements had a clear effect on the juCase: 13-3327 Document: 39 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 27
24 No. 13-3327

ry, because the jurors sent a note to the trial judge asking 

why the letter was not entered into evidence but could be 

referenced. SA.108. Long also asserts that the State improperly shifted the burden of proof to him by repeatedly referencing the lack of evidence of another shooter.

Butler contends these claims are forfeited because neither 

was presented to the district court as either a claim of prosecutorial error or ineffective assistance of trial or appellate 

counsel. See Pole, 570 F.3d at 937 (“[W]here a party raises a 

specific argument for the first time on appeal, it is waived 

even though the ‘general issue’ was before the district 

court[.]” (citing Domka v. Portage County, Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 

783 (7th Cir. 2008))). However, a petition prepared without 

the assistance of counsel is owed a “generous interpretation,” see Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1027, and these claims—although 

not listed separately—were presented as part of the prosecutorial misconduct count. See SA.10, 15–16. Therefore, even if 

the district court did not specifically address these claims in 

its opinion, Long did not forfeit these claims. 

Butler further argues that these claims are procedurally 

defaulted because Long failed to present them through one 

complete round of state court review. Butler maintains Long 

asserted these claims as examples of a state law-based postconviction counsel ineffective assistance claim, which did 

not fairly present what is now a federal due process claim to 

the Illinois state courts. 

We agree and find that these claims are procedurally defaulted. During his state post-conviction appeal, Long included these two alleged prosecutorial missteps in his claim 

for failure of post-conviction counsel to render reasonable 

assistance. See Doc. 13-7, at Count II. Long based his claim 

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No. 13-3327 25

on Illinois law, which provides that appointed postconviction counsel must give a reasonable level of assistance 

to the petitioner. See People v. Owens, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1189, 

139 Ill. 2d 351, 151 Ill. Dec. 522 (1990) (explaining, “[t]he 

right to the assistance of counsel at trial is derived from the 

sixth amendment of the United States Constitution, whereas 

the assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings is a 

matter of legislative grace and favor which may be altered 

by the legislature at will” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This claim was presented only as a 

state claim—Long cited no federal law and the Illinois Appellate Court treated it only as a state law claim. See SA.85–

86. The Illinois courts did not have a fair opportunity to 

consider a federal basis for these two claims. See Malone, 538 

F.3d at 753 (fair presentment of a claim requires that “both 

the operative facts and the controlling legal principles must 

be submitted to the state court” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. 

Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 2001) (claim not fairly presented when petitioner failed to cite any federal cases). Long

makes a general argument that his trial and appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness should excuse this default. However, as 

discussed supra, the Court declines to extend Martinez and 

Trevino beyond their narrow holdings focused on the first 

opportunity to challenge trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on 

collateral review. These claims are procedurally defaulted 

and we will not consider them.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Long asserts an ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

claim for counsel’s failure to object to the prosecution’s improper statements during closing argument and an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failing to bring 

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26 No. 13-3327

this claim against his trial counsel. Butler contends these 

claims are procedurally defaulted because Long did not present them through one complete round of state review. 

In his post-conviction appeal, Long included a claim that 

post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring an 

appellate counsel ineffective assistance claim. Doc. 13-7 at 

74–89. Although it may be broadly argued that this claim 

subsumes within it the facts of an ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel claim, as discussed above, the post-conviction 

ineffectiveness claim was based solely on Illinois law, therefore it did not fairly present both the factual and legal basis 

of this claim to the state court. See Malone, 538 F.3d at 753. 

The appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim is closer to the 

surface, but again, this claim was never presented as a federal claim, and the Illinois Appellate Court did not have the 

opportunity to consider it, therefore there is no exhaustion 

and the claim is defaulted. And although Long argues generally that this default should be excused by those same 

counsels’ ineffectiveness, the trial counsel issue should have 

been brought on direct appeal, see Nash, 740 F.3d at 1079; 

Murphy v. Atchison, No. 12 C 3106, 2013 WL 4495652, at *22 

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2013) (“In Illinois, collateral proceedings 

are not the first opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim. Thus, numerous courts in this district have 

held that Martinez is inapplicable to federal habeas corpus 

petitions filed by Illinois prisoners.” (citations omitted)), and 

the Court declines to extend Martinez/Trevino to cover the 

appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim.

Long’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on 

due process violations by the prosecution during closing arCase: 13-3327 Document: 39 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 27
No. 13-3327 27

gument are procedurally defaulted and will not be considered.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the state courts unreasonably 

applied Supreme Court precedent in finding that the State’s 

knowing use of perjured testimony did not prejudice Long 

at trial and that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s use of perjured testimony. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment on those issues and REMAND with instructions to grant the writ. The 

district court’s writ should order that Long is released unless 

Illinois gives notice of its intent to retry Long within a reasonable time fixed by the district court. 

Case: 13-3327 Document: 39 Filed: 10/27/2015 Pages: 27