Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05356/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05356-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

ABDELLATIFF HADJI,

Plaintiff-Intervener, 

 v.

ALBION RIVER INN, INC,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-05356 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE A

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

AND FOR STAY

On September 4, 2007, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery of

communications between defendant’s owners and David H. Jones, Jr. Defendant now requests leave

to file a motion for reconsideration of that Order. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES

defendant’s request.

In the Northern District of California, no motion for reconsideration may be brought without

leave of court. See Civil L.R. 7-9(a). Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) provides, in pertinent part:

The moving party must specifically show: 

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists

from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order

for which the reconsideration is sought. The party must also show that in the

exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know

such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or 

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time

of such order; or 

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal

arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order. 

Case 3:06-cv-05356-SI Document 38 Filed 09/06/07 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 See Civil L.R. 7-9(b). 

Defendant presumably brings its request pursuant to subsection (3). The Court has reviewed its

prior Order, and all of the papers previously submitted by the parties, and finds that it did not fail to

consider any material facts or dispositive legal arguments. As discussed in the underlying Order, to the

extent that there is a uniform federal common law mediation privilege, it does not extend to the

communications at issue here. As the Supreme Court stated, in discussing the appropriateness of a

“psychotherapist privilege”:

The common-law principles underlying the recognition of testimonial privileges can be

stated simply. “‘For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a

fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence. When we

come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption

that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any

exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from

a positive general rule.’” United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 94 L. Ed. 884, 70

S. Ct. 724 (1950) (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, p. 64 (3d ed. 1940)). See

also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).

Exceptions from the general rule disfavoring testimonial privileges may be justified,

however, by a “‘public good transcending the normally predominant principle of

utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.’” Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, quoting

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996). In this case, the “public good” at issue is protecting and

encouraging the use of mediators by dead-locked shareholders of corporations. Defendant cited no

authority, and the Court found none, supporting the proposition that this unique “public good” is

sufficient to “transcend[] the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for

ascertaining the truth.” Id.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s request for leave to file a motion for

reconsideration. [Docket No. 37] No stay of this action is warranted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6 , 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-05356-SI Document 38 Filed 09/06/07 Page 2 of 2