Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05407/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05407-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN JOSEPH NOBLE, IV,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. ADAMS, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 5407 AWI SMS P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING THE MOTION TO DISMISS 

(Doc. 34, 37.) 

 Steven Joseph Noble (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the instant action on April 8, 2003. On May 12, 2003, Plaintiff filed an

Amended Complaint. The Court found that the Amended Complaint stated cognizable claims

for relief against Defendants Adams and Cuevas for deprivation of outdoor exercise and denial of

access to the courts, and against Defendants Adams, Espinoza and Pugliese for interference with

Plaintiff’s right to receive mail. (Doc. 13.) On July 28, 2004, the Court ordered service of the

Amended Complaint on Defendants. (Doc. 18.) 

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On September 24, 2004, and October 8, 2004, Defendants waived service. (Docs. 21, 23,

25, 27.) On December 3, 2004, Defendants filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

On December 10, 2004, Plaintiff moved for Entry of Default. (Doc. 35.) Plaintiff filed a

pleading titled “Motion to Oppose Memorandum of Points and Authorities on December 17,

2004. (Doc. 36.) Defendants filed an Amended Notice of Motion to Dismiss on December 21,

2004, and an Opposition to the Motion for Entry of Default. (Doc. 37, 38.) On August 18, 2005,

the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default. (Doc. 39.) 

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a)

exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435

U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of

the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the

administrative process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). “All ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies

need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter, 534

U.S. at 524 (citing to Booth, 532 U.S. at 739 n.5). 

According to the Ninth Circuit, there are two principal policies behind the administrative

exhaustion rule: The first is to protect an administrative agency's authority by giving the agency

the first opportunity to resolve a controversy before a court intervenes in the dispute. Ngo v.

Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). The second is to promote judicial efficiency by

either resolving the dispute outside of the courts, or by producing a factual record that can aide

the court in processing a plaintiff's claim. Id. Thus, exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit

and Plaintiff may not exhaust while the suit is pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198,

1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for

prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084, et seq. “Any inmate or parolee under the

department’s jurisdiction may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can reasonably demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Id. at

3084.1(a). The four levels of appeal within the Department are the informal level, the first

formal level, second formal level, and the third formal level, known as the “Director’s Level.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3084.5 (2004). 

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of

exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to exhaust

nonjudicial administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to an unenumerated Rule

12(b) motion, rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza v.

Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per

curiam)). In resolving a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the

court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119-20. If the court concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies,

the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

C. ANALYSIS

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges (1) that the Defendants violated his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by denying him outdoor

recreation (Amended Complaint at 5); (2) that Defendants violated his right of access to the

courts by denying adequate access to the law library (Amended Complaint at 6); and (3) that

Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by interfering with his mail (Amended

Complaint at 7). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies with respect to all of these

claims because he did not file appeals of these issues at the third formal level. (Motion at 5.) In

support of this assertion, Defendants provide a Declaration of N. Grannis, Chief, Inmate Appeals

Branch (“Grannis Decl.”) and copies of various appeals filed by Plaintiff. (Exh. A, Motion.) The

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Court will examine each claim and the evidence provided by Defendants in turn. 

1. Eighth Amendment - Outdoor Exercise

 According to Defendants, on July 8, 2003, Plaintiff initiated administrative appeal

number SATF-C-03-03179, which asserted that Plaintiff had not been allowed outdoor exercise

since January 29, 2002. (Unmarked Attach.3 at 6, Grannis Decl.) Defendants state that the

appeal at the second level was completed on September 17, 2003, but was not submitted to the

third level until October 27, 2003. (Unmarked Attach. 3 at 11; Grannis Decl.) Thus, the appeal

was screened out as untimely. (Id.; Exh. B at 58, Plaintiff’s Opposition [“Opposition”].) 

Defendants argue that because Plaintiff’s allegation was not reviewed at the third level, it is

unexhausted and must be dismissed. 

Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that an inmate’s administrative remedy is exhausted

when his appeal is denied on the ground that time limits were exceeded and the prison

regulations did not provide for further review of the appeal. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620,

624 (9th Cir.2005). In this case, Plaintiff appealed the issue regarding outdoor exercise to the

third and final level, however, it was denied as untimely. Defendants, who bear the burden of

pleading and proving exhaustion, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003, do not

identify any remedies that remain available to Plaintiff with regard to this claim. Ngo v.

Woodford, 403 F.3d 624 (9th Cir.2005). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claim

concerning outdoor exercise exhausted. 

2. First Amendment - Access to Courts

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with

respect to his claim that he was denied access to the Courts. (Motion at 5.) In support,

Defendants cite to the Declaration of N. Grannis and the attached exhibits showing that on

August 28, 2003, Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal (Log No. SATF-C-03-3786) concerning

the limitations on law library access but he never submitted the appeal to the third level. (Exh.

A, ¶ 9, Grannis Decl.) 

According to the documentation provided by Defendants, Plaintiff submitted the August

28, 2003, appeal to the first level where it was denied. (Unmarked Attach. 3 at 32, Grannis

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Similarly, § 3084.5(d) provides that the “[t]hird level is for review of appeals not resolved at the second

level with the exception provided in Section 3084.7(d)(4)(B) - (concerning involuntary transfers). Cal.Code Regs tit.

15 § 3084.5(d). 

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Decl.) Plaintiff appealed to the formal level on September 4, 2003, arguing that the denial of

access to the law library because his “cellie” was a gang member violated his constitutional

rights. Id. On October 6, 2003, Plaintiff’s appeal was granted and Plaintiff was informed that

“[t]he next time Housing Unit 3 attends the law library you will be allowed to attend.” Id. The

Appeal Form reflects no further appeals. Id. The Court notes further that Attachment 1 to the

Grannis Decl. listing the appeals that were screened out and/or filed at the third level does not

reflect appeal number SATF-C-03-3786. (Attach. 1, Grannis Decl.) This supports Defendant’s

contention that the appeal was not taken to the third formal level. However, the Defendants do

not address the fact that Plaintiff’s appeal was granted at the first formal level or the impact the

grant might have on Plaintiff’s exhaustion requirement. Instead, Defendants rely solely on the

fact that Plaintiff did not file an appeal at the third level as the basis for dismissal of this claim. 

The receipt of a Director’s Level decision is not always necessary for exhaustion to occur. 

In some circumstances, the granting of an inmate appeal at a lower level may satisfy the

exhaustion requirement. See Ross v. County of San Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir.

2004); Clement v. California Dept. of Corr., 220 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1106 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9,

2002); Brady v. Attygala, 196 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1019 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2002); Gomez v.

Winslow, 177 F.Supp.2d 977, 985 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2001). 

Here, Plaintiff sought law library access which was granted him at the first formal level of

his appeal. Presumably, Defendant’s position is that Plaintiff must continue to appeal even a

favorable finding to the third level to adequately exhaust his administrative remedies even where

he obtains a favorable result at the first formal level. However, the California grievance process

requires only that an inmate to appeal to the second formal level if the appeal was denied at the

first level or is otherwise waived by the regulations, neither of which happened here. See, Cal.

Code.Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.5(c).1 The California Regulations appear to indicate that Plaintiff need

not exhaust further as his administrative grievance was granted at the first formal level. 

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2Attachment 3 shows Log Nos. SATF-C-03-4897, 03-2420, 03-2548 (appearing on both the “Screenout

Query” and “AG Request” were also filed by Plaintiff. Attach. 3, Grannis Decl.

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Defendants do not identify any further relief available to Plaintiff were he to appeal his favorable

finding at any higher level. Accordingly, “[w]ithout the possibility of some relief” remaining

available to Plaintiff, Booth requires the Court find Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative

remedies with respect to his access to courts claim. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 n. 4

(2001). 

3. First Amendment - Interference with Mail

Although Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not file an appeal at the third level and thus,

did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the Motion does not specifically address the mailinterference allegation. Defendant’s provide a short paragraph in the Motion that states only that

Plaintiff submitted two other appeals besides the one regarding outdoor exercise. (Motion at 5.)

Appeal number SATF-C-03-03786, concerns law library access, and number SATF-C-03-3903

concerns a denial of out of cell exercise as part of a disciplinary finding. Id. Defendants state

that neither of these appeals were appealed to the Director’s level. (Motion at 5.) 

According to the documentation provided by Defendants, it appears that besides the three

actions cited by Defendants in the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed at least four (4) other

actions. (Attach. 1, Grannis Decl.) Further, these other actions appear to have occurred in 2003

as did Plaintiff’s mail interference claim. Attachments reflecting actions filed by Plaintiff and

those screened out clearly indicate that Plaintiff filed at least four actions not referred to by

Defendants and filed in 2003, when the alleged interference occurred.2 (Attach. 3, Grannis Decl.) 

As Defendants do not address the issue of mail interference in relation to the evidence provided

and there appears to be other grievances filed within the relevant time frame that might concern

this claim, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies

on the mail-interference claim. 

In his Opposition, Plaintiff asserts and provides the Court with a copy of an

administrative grievance filed on March 23, 2003, and concerning the interference with his mail. 

(Opposition at 6; Exh. C at 76, Opposition.) However, the Log No. is illegible. Id. The

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document does, however, reveal that Plaintiff’s grievance was “partially granted” at the informal

level on April 4, 2003, by “P. Dias, OSSI Mailroom.” Id. Plaintiff further states and provides a

copy of a letter he wrote to the Warden concerning this issue. (Exh. C at78, Opposition.) 

Defendants, in their Reply to the Opposition, argue that Plaintiff fails to provide a copy of

the Warden’s response and that at most, Plaintiff only shows he received a response at the formal

level but never pursued it further. (Reply at 3.) Defendants do not address the fact that the

evidence cited to and provided by them omits this grievance nor do they address this grievance in

any detail in their Reply. Thus, the results of the grievance are entirely unknown to the Court. In

any event, the absence of exhaustion under the PLRA is an affirmative defense on which the

Defendants have the burden of proof. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants have provided no evidence to the Court that demonstrates the lack of exhaustion with

respect to the interference with mail claim. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss this claim on

exhaustion grounds must be denied. 

D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative

remedies with regard to his Eighth Amendment claim and his First Amendment access to court

claim. The Court further finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving the

absence of exhaustion with regard to Plaintiff’s mail-interference claim. The Court therefore

RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be DENIED in its entirety and the case be referred

back to the undersigned for further proceedings. 

The Court HEREBY ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted

to the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States

District Court, Eastern District of California. Within TWENTY (20) days after being served

with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with

the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served

and filed within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

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Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 18, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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