Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02326/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02326-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DANIEL GONZALEZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden, 

Respondent. 

 Case No.: 19-CV-2326-GPC-(WVG) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 7] 

 On December 5, 2019, Petitioner Daniel Gonzalez filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss based on the running of 

the statute of limitations. The matter is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for 

preparation of a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons stated below, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND

On June 18, 2015, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder and assault 

with a deadly weapon, a firearm. The court sentenced him to 40 years to life plus seven 

years, including a 25 years-to-life “firearm enhancement” under California Penal Code 

§ 12022.53, which was amended, effective January 1, 2018, to allow courts “in the interest 

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of justice and at the time of sentencing or resentencing, to strike or dismiss [a gun use] 

enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by [section 12022.53].” Cal. Penal Code 

§ 12022.53(h). 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his sentence with the California Court of Appeal. 

He argued, in part, that the 2018 amendment of section 12022.53 applied retroactively, 

thereby providing the trial court discretion to strike or dismiss the 25 years-to-life firearm 

enhancement that was applied to his sentences. 

On March 28, 2018, the California Court of Appeal issued an initial opinion 

affirming the judgment and holding that remand for resentencing was not necessary. 

Although the court agreed that the section 12022.53 amendment applied retroactively to 

all nonfinal judgments, it found remand is not required if the record shows a trial court 

would not have exercised its discretion to lessen the sentence, even if it had known it had 

that discretion. The court found remand for resentencing in this case was not necessary 

because “the record clearly shows the court would not exercise its new discretion . . . to 

strike or dismiss the section 12022.53 enhancement if we were to remand the matter for 

resentencing.” (Doc. No. 5-7 at 70.) 

However, on April 20, 2018, the California Court of Appeal issued an order 

modifying the aforementioned opinion. It concluded the record did not clearly indicate that 

the trial court would have declined to strike or dismiss the section 12022.53(h) firearm 

enhancement if it had the discretion to do so. Therefore, the court held the appropriate 

remedy was to remand for resentencing. Specifically, the Court of Appeal held: 

Based on our reasoning post, we remand the matter for resentencing 

Gonzalez to allow the trial court to consider whether to exercise its discretion 

to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (h) enhancement under section 

1385. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed. 

. . . . 

Gonzalez argues that because section 12022.53, subdivision (h), applies 

retroactively to his nonfinal judgment, the matter should be remanded for 

resentencing to allow the trial court to decide whether to exercise its discretion 

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thereunder to strike or dismiss the 25-year-to-life section 12022.53 firearm 

enhancement that it originally imposed on him pursuant to former section 

12022.53. We agree. 

“‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise 

of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court 

which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more 

exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have 

been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s 

record.’ [Citation.] In such circumstances, we have held that the appropriate 

remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ 

that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had 

been aware that it had such discretion.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 

Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) 

In this case, the record does not clearly indicate the trial court would 

have declined to strike or dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (h), 

firearm enhancement if it had the discretion to do so at the time of Gonzalez’s 

sentencing. Although the court expressed its concern regarding his criminal 

history, his “senseless” shooting of Crook, and his use of a gun while he 

(Gonzalez) was out on bail on a previous gun charge, the court nevertheless 

exercised its sentencing discretion to impose a lower two-year term for his 

count 2 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon rather than the upper fouryear term recommended by the probation department. The court explained 

that it did not “think that [it] is quite fair” to impose on Gonzalez, as an aider 

and abettor of that offense, an upper four-year term when the probation 

department recommended only a lower two-year term for Chavez, who was 

the actual perpetrator of that offense. Contrary to the People’s assertion, the 

court therefore did not impose the maximum sentence allowed under the law. 

Furthermore, the record does not contain any statement by the trial 

court indicating that it would have imposed the section 12022.53, subdivision 

(h), enhancement even if it had the discretion to strike or dismiss that 

enhancement at the time of Gonzalez’s sentencing. In People v. Gutierrez

(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1894 (Gutierrez), cited by the People, the trial court 

indicated that it would not have exercised its discretion to impose a lesser 

sentence even if it had the discretion to do so. First, the court imposed an 

upper term for the defendant’s robbery conviction. (Id. at p. 1896.) Second, 

noting that the defendant was “‘the kind of individual the law was intended to 

keep off the street as long as possible,’” the court chose not to strike either of 

two section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements. (Ibid.) Because the trial 

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court imposed the maximum sentence on the defendant, Gutierrez concluded 

“no purpose would be served in remanding” for resentencing to allow the 

court to exercise its new discretion to strike or dismiss the three strikes 

allegation under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. 

(Gutierrez, at p. 1896.) 

Unlike the trial court in Gutierrez, the trial court in this case did not 

impose on Gonzalez the maximum sentence possible and, in particular, 

imposed a lower two-year term for his count 2 conviction for assault with a 

deadly weapon. Also unlike the trial court in Gutierrez, the court in this case 

did not state that Gonzalez should be “[kept] off the street as long as possible” 

or make any other statement clearly indicating that it would not have exercised 

discretion to strike or dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (h), 

enhancement even if it had the discretion to do so at the time of Gonzalez’s 

sentencing. (Gutierrez, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1896.) Absent such a clear 

indication, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing to allow the 

trial court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the 

section 12022.53, subdivision (h), enhancement under section 1385. (People 

v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.) We express no opinion regarding 

how the trial court should exercise its discretion under section 12022.53, 

subdivision (h). 

. . . . 

Gonzalez’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for 

resentencing for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to consider 

whether the section 12022.53, subdivision (h), enhancement should be 

stricken or dismissed under section 1385. The trial court is directed to issue a 

new minute order and an amended abstract of judgment after such 

resentencing to reflect the correct consecutive two-year term imposed for 

count 2 and whether it strikes or dismisses, or imposes, the section 12022.53, 

subdivision (h) enhancement. The court shall forward the amended abstract of 

judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other 

respects, the judgments are affirmed. 

(Order Modifying Opinion and Denying Rehearing Change in Judgment, Doc. No. 6-1 at 

4-7; see also People v. Chavez, No. D069533, 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 

Apr. 20, 2018).) 

In accordance with the modified opinion, the superior court held a resentencing 

hearing. Before the hearing, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the section 12022.53 

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firearm enhancement (“motion to reduce sentence”), and Respondent filed a Statement in 

Aggravation. 

After receiving briefing and holding an oral argument hearing, the superior court 

denied Petitioner’s motion to reduce his sentence on December 7, 2018. The present 

Petition was filed on December 5, 2019. Respondent now moves to dismiss the Petition 

on the basis that it is untimely. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 2244 mandates a one-year statute of limitations within which an inmate 

must file a federal habeas corpus petition, subject to tolling provisions and certain 

exceptions. It states: 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of-- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under 

this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

III. DISCUSSION

The parties disagree on the date from which the one-year statute of limitations began 

to run. Petitioner contends the statute of limitations began to run on December 7, 2018, 

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when the superior court issued its minute order denying Petitioner’s motion to reduce his 

sentence. Respondent contends it began to run on September 25, 2018,1

 ninety days after 

Petitioner’s direct appeal matter was decided. Petitioner is correct. 

A. The Statute of Limitations Was Tolled. 

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides that the “time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction or collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 

claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year statute of limitations period for 

a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court defines “collateral review” as “a form of 

review that is not part of the direct appeal process.” Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 552 

(2011). 

 The phrase “collateral review,” as used in section 2244(d)(2) refers to a judicial 

reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process, 

including a motion seeking a discretionary sentence reduction. Id. at 551. In Wall v. Kholi, 

a prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition after the date his conviction became final on direct 

review. Id. at 550. However, in addition to taking a direct appeal, the prisoner filed a Rule 

35 motion to reduce his sentence. Id. The Supreme Court found the petition was timely 

because the motion to reduce sentence triggered the tolling provision. Id. at 556. The Court 

reasoned that “not only is a motion to reduce sentence . . . ‘collateral,’ but it also 

undoubtedly calls for ‘review’ of the sentence. The decision to reduce a sentence, while 

largely within the discretion of the trial justice, involves judicial reexamination of the 

sentence to determine whether a more lenient sentence is proper.” Id. at 555-56. 

 Here, the running of the statute of limitations was tolled until December 7, 2018, 

when the superior court issued the order denying Petitioner’s motion to reduce his sentence. 

The fact that the California Court of Appeal directed the trial court to reexamine the issue 

                                                                

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 Both parties agree that “under ordinary circumstances, the one-year limitations period 

would have expired . . . on September 25, 2019.” (Doc. No. at 1-2.) However, as Petitioner 

argues and as addressed in this R&R, Respondent ignores very salient procedural facts 

which makes this case not ordinary.

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further supports tolling in this case. The trial court’s consideration of the discretionary 

sentence reduction was a judicial reexamination of a judgment, consistent with the 

Supreme Court’s definition of “collateral review,” and thus triggers the tolling provision 

of section 2244(d). 

1. The December 7, 2018 Order Did Not Correct a Clerical Error. 

 Respondent contends that the California Court of Appeal ordered the superior court 

to issue a new minute order to “correct a clerical error on the abstract of judgment.” (Doc. 

No. 4-1 at 2.) Generally, correcting a clerical error does not reset the statute of limitations. 

Brownlee v. Rommoro, No. 14-CV-1990-LJO-SAB(HC), 2015 WL 1013154, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. March 6, 2015). However, judicial evaluation or change in judgment does toll the 

statute of limitations. See Brumfield v. Cate, No. C-09-4914-MHP, 2010 WL 2267504, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2010). In California, a clerical error is one inadvertently made, 

whereas a judicial error is one made advertently in the exercise of judgment or discretion. 

People v. Jack, 213 Cal. App. 3d 913, 915 (1989); In re Candelario, 3 Cal.3d 702, 730 

(1970). 

 For example, in Brownlee v. Romorro, the state trial court orally sentenced the 

defendant to seventeen years-to-life. No. 14-CV-1990-LJO-SAB(HC), 2015 WL 1013154, 

at *4 (E.D. Cal. March 6, 2015). However, the sentence was erroneously recorded as fifteen 

years-to-life. Id. The state court then issued an amended judgment correcting the error. Id. 

On habeas review, the district court found this to be clerical error, specifically noting that 

“[t]he trial court did not reconsider the correctness of the original sentence and 

independently decide to impose a seventeen years to life sentence. The trial court did not 

receive evidence or reopen any issue . . . [it] simply exercised its ability to correct a clerical 

error by amending the judgment.” Id. Thus, the statute of limitations period was not reset 

by the entry of the amended judgment. Id. at *5. 

 Here, in contrast, the California Court of Appeal remanded the matter for 

resentencing, expressly “to allow the trial court to consider whether to exercise its 

discretion to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (h) enhancement.” (Doc. No. 5-11 at 

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126-27) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court of Appeal’s order modifying its original 

opinion is replete with references to “resentencing” and the trial court’s exercise of its 

discretion to impose the firearms enhancement. Although the court also directed the trial 

court to “issue a new minute order and an amended abstract of judgment after such 

resentencing to reflect the correct consecutive two-year term imposed for count 2,” (Doc. 

No. 6-1 at 7), this directive clearly was by far dwarfed by the court’s discussion related to 

remanding the matter for resentencing to allow the trial court an opportunity to exercise its 

discretion with respect to the firearms enhancement. And although Respondent ignores all 

of this and disingenuously characterizes the trial court’s subsequent action as simply 

correcting a clerical error, the Court of Appeal made clear the dual purpose of the remand: 

“The trial court is directed to issue a new minute order and an amended abstract of 

judgment after such resentencing to reflect the correct consecutive two-year term imposed 

for count 2 and whether it strikes or dismisses, or imposes, the section 12022.53, 

subdivision (h) enhancement.” (Id. (emphasis added).) 

 Finally, the fact that the superior court received briefing, held a hearing, and heard 

argument prior to issuing the minute order demonstrates its exercise of judicial discretion 

and that the proceedings involved judicial evaluation and were substantive in nature. The 

record shows that the superior court exercised judgment in ordering that Petitioner’s 

sentence was to remain unchanged after it considered whether the firearms enhancement 

should remain in force. Therefore, the superior court’s December 7, 2018 sentencing order 

clearly cannot be said to be merely correcting a clerical error. 

B. The Petition is Timely. 

 This Court finds the California Court of Appeal’s order to remand the matter for 

resentencing, and the superior court’s subsequent consideration, is consistent with the 

Supreme Court’s definition of “collateral review.” Thus, the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d) was triggered, and the statute of limitations began to run when the minute order 

was issued on December 7, 2018. Thus, the present petition is timely because it was filed 

on December 5, 2019—less than one year later. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss be DENIED. 

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 72(b). 

 IT IS ORDERED that no later May 8, 2020, any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document shall be captioned 

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than May 29, 2020. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 8, 2020 

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