Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03771/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03771-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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Citations are to the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pin cites are to the ECF-generated page

numbers at the tops of the documents.

15-cv-3771 LB

ORDER

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

San Francisco Division

DELMOS WHITLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

HARRY WEBS, CEO; et al., 

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. 15-cv-3771 LB

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

[Re: ECF Nos. 1, 1-3]

INTRODUCTION

Delmos Whitley, an inmate at the California State Prison - Solano, filed this civil action. He

consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1-1.)1 This order screens the complaint

and dismisses it with leave to amend, requiring Mr. Whitley to file an amended complaint. This

order also denies Mr. Whitley’s motion for default judgment.

STATEMENT

In the portion of the form complaint where the plaintiff is directed to write a statement of his

claim, Mr. Whitley wrote that he had a colon resection surgery to remove a cancerous tumor in

October 2010, and had another surgery on February 24, 2011 to repair an incisional hernia, which

was partially successful. Mr. Whitley further wrote that, during his recuperation from the surgeries,

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 2

he discovered “his inability to release semen,” which he states is referred to as a “retro-grade

ejaculation.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Mr. Whitley additionally asserted that he was informed of a 4- to 5-

year period to “self-correct” from the problem, but the self-correction did not occur. (Id.) The

complaint does not mention any defendant’s role in Mr. Whitley’s problems. The complaint does

not allege the violation of a federal constitutional provision or otherwise allege that the federal court

has subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. 

The complaint directs the reader to “see exhibits A thru F” for more information about his claim. 

(ECF No. 1 at 4.) Exhibits A-F do not appear to have anything to do with the substance of Mr.

Whitley’s medical care claim and are instead the sort of documents occasionally generated by tax

protesters, “constitutionalists,” and others claiming to be operating under an alternative legal system. 

For example, Exhibit A is addressed to the defendants as “libelee/s” from the plaintiff “libelant

Delmos Whitley, Secured Party Creditor Executive Trustee for the Trust known as Delmos

Whitley.” (ECF No. 1-5 at 2.) The document is labeled as an “administrative affidavit of specific

negative averment - opportunity to cure and counterclaim,” mentions admiralty, a secured party

creditor, and asserts such points as “[t]here is no proof that the State of California does not operate

under the United States Bankruptcy confirmation on June 5, 1933, also known as the National

Emergency and memorialized in Executive Proclamation Number #3972; and Affiant believes there

is no proof that exists.” (ECF No. 1-5 at 3.) Another document is a “demand for settlement as per

agreement” for $33,000,000; the document appears to demand payment in “superior currency

backed by gold” and warns that failure to settle “is a commercial dishonor [UCC 3-505.] This is a

UCC confirmatory writing and statute staple and is a perfected contract upon the completion of this

commercial process.” (ECF No. 1-7 at 4.) Many of the exhibits are signed by “Robin Knox POA

for Delmos Whitley.” (E.g., ECF No. 1-6 at 4; ECF No. 1-7 at 4, 5.) 

ANALYSIS

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

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For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 3

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro se

complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As relevant here, the court only has jurisdiction

to entertain this action if it raises a federal question, such as a civil rights claim asserted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (There are other federal statutes that grant other bases of federal court jurisdiction,

but none are applicable to this action.) In simple terms, this action can go forward in federal court if

a claim is stated under § 1983; if the complaint does not state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff

should pursue his claims in state court. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988).

Mr. Whitley’s claim concerns his medical care, which suggests that the Eighth Amendment

might apply. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that

prison officials take reasonable measures for prisoner health and safety. See Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). For an Eighth Amendment claim based on the response to a prisoner's

medical needs, the prisoner must plead and prove: (1) that he had a serious medical need, and (2)

deliberate indifference to that need by the defendant, i.e., the prison official knew of and disregarded

an excessive risk to prisoner health and safety. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th

Cir. 2014). A serious medical need may exist if the "failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Wilhelm v.

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Mere

negligence does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060-61

(9th Cir. 2004). In his amended complaint, Mr. Whitley must link each proposed defendant to his

claim by explaining what each defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of his rights. See

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). If he wishes to pursue an Eighth Amendment

claim, he should allege that his complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to show that the court

has federal question jurisdiction. 

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ORDER 4

Mr. Whitley filed an “affidavit for entry of default” and a motion for default judgment at the

same time he filed his complaint. (ECF Nos. 1-2 and 1-3.) His motion for default judgment against

the defendants are DENIED. (ECF No. 1-3.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) contemplates

that a default judgment may be sought after default has been entered against a defendant. See New

York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996) ("After defendant's default has been

entered, plaintiff may apply for a judgment based on such default. This is a default judgment."); Lee

v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 139 F.R.D. 376, 380 (D. Minn. 1991). No

defendant was in default as of the day the complaint was filed nor as of today. 

Insofar as plaintiff sought default judgment, his motion was premature because default had not been

entered against any defendant. Plaintiff's request for entry of default will be denied because plaintiff

failed to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the defendants had been served with process

and are in default. The deadline for any response from the defendants has not yet been set, let alone

missed by the defendants. 

As mentioned in the “Statement” section above, the exhibits to the complaint had nothing to do

with the substance of the complaint. It is not appropriate to submit filings irrelevant to a party’s

claims or defenses. Mr. Whitley is directed to read Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, regarding

the duties of a litigant in submitting papers to the court, and the sanctions that may follow for failure

to comply with that rule.

Finally, the court notes that Mr. Whitley lists his address as “c/o Robin Knox-P.O.A.” in North

Las Vegas, Nevada. This causes two concerns. First, Mr. Whitley has not stated what “P.O.A.”

means or whether Robin Knox is doing something besides providing a mailing address, although

Ms. Knox’s signature on many exhibits suggests she may be guiding the litigation efforts. Mr.

Whitley can appear pro se (i.e., represent himself) or he can be represented by a licensed attorney,

but he cannot be represented by a third party who is not a licensed attorney. See N. D. Cal. Local

Rule 3-9(a) If he is proceeding pro se, Mr. Whitley must sign all his filings to satisfy his

obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The court will not accept motions and

pleadings filed by Ms. Knox on Mr. Whitley’s behalf unless Ms. Knox is a licensed attorney who

satisfies the requirements of Local Rule 11-1. Second, it is highly unlikely that Mr. Whitley will be

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COURT

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER 5

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

able to comply with normal court schedules if his mail is sent to someone in another state, rather

than directly to him at the prison at which he resides. At the time he files his amended complaint,

Mr. Whitley must either (a) provide his prison address so that mail from the court and opponents

may be sent to him directly, or (b) explain how he will obtain materials that are mailed to a third

party address in North Las Vegas so that he will be able to timely comply with the court’s deadlines. 

Although the court generally sets longer deadlines when one of the parties is in custody, the court

nonetheless may require action within one to two weeks on occasion. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The

amended complaint must be filed no later than September 30, 2015, and must include the caption

and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. 

Mr. Whitley is cautioned that his amended complaint will supersede existing pleadings and must be

a complete statement of his claims, except that he does not need to plead again any claim the court

has dismissed without leave to amend. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir.

2012) (en banc). If Mr. Whitley does not file an amended complaint, the action will be dismissed.

Mr. Whitley’s motion for default judgment is DENIED. (ECF No. 1-3.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2015 _______________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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