Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02423/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02423-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steve Arthur Martinez,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-13-02423-PHX-DLR (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

On November 26, 2013, Steve Arthur Martinez (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). On June 

19, 2014, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 10). Petitioner did not file a reply. The 

matter is deemed ripe for consideration.1

 

Petitioner raises six grounds for habeas relief in the Petition. The undersigned 

finds that the Petition is time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 

the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (28 U.S.C. § 2244). The 

undersigned further finds that all of the grounds alleged in the Petition are either 

procedurally barred or meritless. It is therefore recommended that the Petition be denied. 

1 The case was reassigned to U.S. Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett on November 14, 2014.

 

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex in 

Florence, Arizona. Petitioner is serving 30.5 years for convictions of the following 

crimes: (i) burglary in the second degree (a class 3 felony); (ii) kidnapping (a class 2 

felony); (iii) aggravated assault (a class 4 felony); and (iv) sexual assault (a class 2 

felony). (Doc. 10-8 at 65-66).2

 As it relates to the merits of two of Petitioner’s claims 

for habeas relief, a brief summary of the facts underlying these convictions is necessary.

A. Facts Underlying Petitioner’s Convictions

In the early morning hours on June 18, 2006, an 88 year old woman named Sally 

called and asked her daughter, Patricia, to come over to her house. (Doc. 10-3 at 49). 

Sally was “very upset” and was “having trouble talking.” (Id.). When Patricia arrived at 

Sally’s house, she noticed that the glass on the kitchen door had been broken and saw a 

rock inside the door that had been used to smash the glass. (Id. at 53-54, 57). Sally was 

still very upset, was shaking, and was holding her left elbow. (Id. at 57). Patricia saw 

blood on the collar area of Sally’s pajamas. (Id. at 60). Patricia then searched the house 

for an intruder, while Sally followed behind. (Id. at 59-60).

When Patricia completed the search, she contacted the police. (Id. at 65-66). 

While on the phone, Patricia saw blood on the back of Sally’s pajamas that she did not 

see before as Sally had been following her throughout the house. (Id. at 66). Seeing the 

blood, Patricia exclaimed to the police dispatcher “[O]h, my God, there’s blood all over 

the back of her pajamas.” (Id. at 69-70). Sally then turned to Patricia and yelled “I’ve 

been raped.” (Id. at 70).

Paramedics arrived and treated Sally, who sustained a fracture of the olecranon 

(the bone at the tip of the elbow where the joint comes together). (Id. at 41-42). Sally 

was also examined by registered nurse Shawn Bonner. (Doc. 10-4 at 25, 31-33). Nurse 

2 Citations to pages within exhibits to Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 10) refer to the page numbers assigned by the Clerk of Court when filed on June 19, 2014. For example, 

Exhibit M to Respondents’ Answer is filed as Document 10-3. A citation to a page within Exhibit M would appear as (Doc. 10-3 at __). 

- 2 -

 

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Bonner noted numerous contusions and abrasions on Sally’s chin, left arm, left and right 

wrists, legs, and one of her breasts. (Id. at 34-46). In addition, Nurse Bonner performed 

a genital and anal exam and found multiple injuries. (Id. at 46-64). 

Nurse Bonner’s examination included swabbing multiple areas of Sally’s body for 

DNA. (Id. at 45, 66-67, 75, 81-83, 100). A forensic scientist at the City of Phoenix 

Police Department determined that the DNA profile from Sally’s right breast was a 

hundred percent match with Petitioner’s known DNA. (Doc. 10-5 at 99, 149). The 

scientist also determined that the DNA profile taken from Sally’s left fingernail could not 

have come from anyone other than Petitioner. (Doc. 10-5 at 154). Moreover, Petitioner 

could not be excluded from the DNA mixture taken from Sally’s left thigh. (Doc. 10-5 at 

155-56). 

B. Direct Appeal, State Post-Conviction Relief, and Petitions for Review

Following his 2008 conviction and sentence, Petitioner appealed to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. In its October 1, 2009 decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed. (Doc. 10-8 at 214-28). On March 16, 2010, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review of Petitioner’s appeal. (Doc. 10-9 at 3).

On August 10, 2010, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed an untimely notice of 

post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 10-9 at 5-8). Counsel claimed that the untimely 

PCR filing was due to “ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” (Id. at 6-7). The 

Superior Court allowed the untimely PCR filing to proceed, but stated that the “allowance 

does not constitute any expression of opinion that defendant has met the requirements to 

file an untimely petition, or on the merits of any such claim, or that any claims raised in 

the petition are not procedurally precluded.” (Id. at 11-12). The court also appointed the 

Office of the Legal Advocate to represent Petitioner in his PCR matter. (Id. at 12).

After PCR review, Petitioner’s PCR counsel did not find any claims for relief to 

raise in PCR proceedings. (Id. at 16-17). On February 11, 2011, the Superior Court 

granted Petitioner 45 days in which to file a pro per PCR petition. (Id. at 20). After 

multiple deadline extensions, on July 5, 2011, Petitioner filed a PCR petition that raised 

- 3 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

five claims. (Id. at 25-95). On November 14, 2011, the Superior Court denied his 

petition, finding that four of the five issues are “all matters that could have been raised on 

direct appeal under Rule 31, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and/or a post-trial 

motion under Rule 24, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure” and are therefore precluded 

from postconviction relief under Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 

109). As to the final issue, which alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court 

found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a colorable claim. (Id. at 109-10). 

After the denial for PCR relief, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 122-30). On June 24, 2013, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals denied relief, explaining that Petitioner failed to comply with Rule 32.9 of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires a petitioner to present issues and 

material facts supporting a claim in a petition for review. (Id. at 144-45). The Court also 

found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying post-conviction relief. 

(Id.). On November 13, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

review. (Id. at 170). 

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

There are a number of bars that may prevent a federal court from reviewing the 

merits of claims alleged in a federal habeas petition. Respondents argue that the Petition 

is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 

Respondents also argue that the majority of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred 

under the exhaustion-of-state-remedies and procedural default doctrines. While 

Respondents concede that two of Petitioner’s claims are not barred under those doctrines, 

Respondents assert that those two claims lack merit. 

A. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) became effective. 28 U.S.C. § 2244. AEDPA requires a state prisoner to 

file his or her federal habeas petition within one year of the latest of: 

1. The date on which the prisoner’s judgment of conviction 

became final in state court;

- 4 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

3. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

4. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hammerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007) . 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, however, is tolled during the “time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction relief or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(limitations period is tolled while the state prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state 

court and state post-conviction remedies are pending) (citation omitted). A state postconviction petition is “properly filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance 

with the state rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. 

McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court looked to Nevada state filing 

requirements in determining whether habeas petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition 

was a “properly filed” application that is eligible for tolling).

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

- 5 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

B. Exhaustion-of-State-Remedies Doctrine

The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine is another potential bar to federal 

habeas relief. For over 100 years, it has been settled that a “state prisoner must normally 

exhaust available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the 

federal courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. 

Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state 

judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). 

The rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 

U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to 

review and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s words, “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 

federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state 

courts to correct a constitutional violation.” Darr v. Burford, 70 S. Ct. 587, 590 (1950); 

see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“we have long recognized that in some 

circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 

criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power”) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

Case law has clarified that in order to “exhaust” state court remedies, a petitioner’s 

- 6 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

federal claims must have been “fully and fairly presented” in state court. Woods v. 

Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To “fully and fairly present” a federal 

claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal 

theory on which his or her claim is based. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63

(1996) (claims for relief in habeas corpus must reference a specific federal constitutional 

guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief); 

Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To fairly present a federal 

claim, a state prisoner must present to the state courts both the operative facts and the 

federal legal theories that animate the claim.”). This test turns on whether a petitioner 

“explicitly alerted” a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. 

Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the 

state courts or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 

459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 

(9th Cir. 2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal basis of a claim 

must be “explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the 

federal basis is self-evident or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on 

the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds”); 

Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a petitioner must 

plead the federal nature of a claim with considerable specificity).

C. Procedural Default Doctrine

Procedural default may also bar habeas relief. If a claim was presented in state 

court, and the court expressly invoked a state procedural rule in denying relief, then the 

claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 

247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a 

claim may be procedurally defaulted in a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would 

now be barred in state court under the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. 

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

- 7 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine 

is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 

based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 

(2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state’s procedural requirements 

for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to 

address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). 

As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the 

relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See Id. at 729-30. An 

adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at 

the time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th 

Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. 

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by 

proving one of two exceptions. 

In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 

768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate “cause,” a petitioner must show that some 

objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. 

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate “prejudice,” the petitioner 

must show that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a 

showing of pervasive actual prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other 

than a showing that the prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”).

- 8 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the 

federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. 

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 

1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The 

exception occurs where a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim.” 

Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

D. Reviewing Federal Habeas Claims on the Merits 

In reviewing the merits of a petitioner’s claims, AEDPA requires federal courts to 

defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Henry v. Ryan,

720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show 

that the state court’s adjudication of his claims either:

1. [R]esulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

2. [R]esulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). 

As to the first entitlement to relief above, “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price, 

538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). 

- 9 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As to the second entitlement to relief above, factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, a state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s decision. 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). 

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. The Petition is Time-Barred by AEDPA

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the time to file a U.S. 

Supreme Court petition for writ of certiorari regarding a conviction has expired. Bowen 

v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1999). Supreme Court Rule 13 provides that a 

“petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is 

subject to discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed 

with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review.” 

Here, on March 16, 2010, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of 

Petitioner’s appeal. (Doc. 10-9 at 3). Therefore, under Supreme Court Rule 13, 

Petitioner had 90 days from that date, or until June 14, 2010, in which to file a petition 

for writ of certiorari. The one-year statute of limitations therefore was due to expire on 

June 14, 2011, subject to possible statutory or equitable tolling. 

Tolling, however, does not apply in this case. Nor does Petitioner argue that it 

should apply. Petitioner has the burden of showing that AEDPA’s statute of limitations 

period was sufficiently tolled. Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Nonetheless, the undersigned will address the issue of tolling as the Court is to “construe 

pro se habeas filings liberally.” Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005); 

see also Belgarde v. State of Montana, 123 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1997). 

First, a “properly filed” PCR petition may toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. An 

- 10 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

untimely filed PCR petition is not properly filed. Petitioner filed an untimely notice of 

PCR on August 10, 2010. (Doc. 10-9 at 5-8). Although the Superior Court allowed the 

untimely filing to proceed, the court expressly stated on October 11, 2010 that it was not 

finding that Petitioner “has met the requirements to file an untimely petition.” (Id. at 11-

12). In its June 24, 2013 decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that Petitioner’s 

PCR petition was untimely. The Arizona Court of Appeals stated that Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly denied “because it was raised in an 

untimely [PCR] proceeding.” (Id. at 145). 

“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that [is] the end of 

the matter for purposes of [AEDPA’s statute of limitations].” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 414 (2005). As Petitioner’s notice of PCR was filed untimely under Arizona 

law, that is the end of the court’s inquiry as to whether the PCR petition was “properly 

filed” under AEDPA. See Rudin v. Myles, 766 F.3d 1161, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding 

that a federal habeas petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling where the Nevada 

Supreme Court determined that the petitioner’s PCR petition was untimely). Petitioner’s 

untimely PCR petition therefore had no statutory tolling effect on AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. 

Regarding equitable tolling, the Petitioner has the burden to show that 

extraordinary circumstances beyond the Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to 

file a timely federal petition. Roy, 465 F.3d at 969; Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 888 n.8. A 

petitioner’s pro se status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., 

Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (“[W]e have never accepted pro se

representation alone or procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when 

a statute's clear policy calls for promptness.”). As Petitioner has not met his burden of 

showing that extraordinary circumstances made it impossible for him to file a timely 

federal petition, equitable tolling is therefore unavailable. 

Accordingly, as tolling does not apply, AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired on 

June 14, 2011. As the Petition was filed long past that deadline (on November 26, 2013), 

- 11 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 11 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the Petition on the basis that it is timebarred. 

B. Grounds One, Two, Three, and Five are Barred under the Procedural 

Default Doctrine. A Portion of Ground Six is also Barred under the Procedural 

Default Doctrine. 

Respondents argue that the majority of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred. 

For the following reasons, the undersigned agrees. Ground Four and a portion of Ground

Six, which are not procedurally barred, should be denied on the merits as discussed in 

Section C below. 

1. Grounds One and Two

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his rights under the Sixth Amendment of 

the U.S. Constitution were violated by allegedly being denied a jury panel of his peers. 

To support this claim, Petitioner states: 

Petitioner was denied the inclusion of minorities of either 

Latino, or African American descent to be considered 

potential jurors to judge in this case. Petitioner was denied a 

fair and impartial jury as a result of this violation and had an 

expectation of receiving full constitutional protections but 

was denied, as a result the jury was not impartial and the 

Judge had contact with jurors outside counsel or defendant’s 

presence. 

(Doc. 1 at 6). 

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his right to “due process of law” under the 

Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was violated. In support of this claim, 

Petitioner states:

Petitioner was subjected to prosecutorial misconduct where 

the prosecution to [sic] expressed his personal feelings 

regarding my guilt and credibility. Prosecutorial comments 

about Petitioner were designed to prejudice him before the 

jury. The court never corrected such conduct and thus error. 

 (Doc. 1 at 7). 

Petitioner presented the above claims in his July 5, 2011 PCR Petition. (Doc. 10-9 

at 36-39). In its November 14, 2011 ruling, the Superior Court found that those claims

- 12 - 

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“could have been raised on direct appeal under Rule 31, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure and/or a post-trial motion under Rule 24, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure.” (Doc. 10-9 at 109). The court therefore found that the claims were

precluded from PCR relief (Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure). Id. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals, in its June 24, 2013 ruling, affirmed the Superior

Court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals also denied relief on the grounds that Petitioner 

failed to comply with Rule 32.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 144-

45). These constitute “adequate and independent” state grounds for denying review. 

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (per curiam) (preclusion of issues for failure 

to present them at an earlier proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.2(a)(3) “are independent of federal law because they do not depend upon a federal 

constitutional ruling on the merits.”). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends a 

finding that Grounds One and Two are barred from habeas review under the procedural 

default doctrine. 

2. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated as he was allegedly “subjected to ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel.” To support this claim, Petitioner states:

Petitioner’s counsel failed to secure an expert witness to 

confront, refute or explain inconsistencies as to DNA

evidence. Counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the 

State’s search warrant based on erroneous evidence. Denial 

of appellate counsel to move for evidentiary hearing to 

ascertain the substance of his colorable claims.

(Doc. 1 at 8). 

In his July 5, 2011 PCR Petition, Petitioner argued that he received the ineffective 

assistance of counsel at trial. Petitioner stated that his trial counsel failed to obtain an 

expert witness “to better explain [counsel’s] theory and cause of ‘transference of DNA.’” 

(Doc. 10-9 at 40). Petitioner also challenged the sufficiency of the search warrant in his 

PCR Petition. (Id. at 39-40). The PCR Petition, however, does not include a claim 

regarding the last sentence of Ground Three above (the alleged “[d]enial of appellate 

- 13 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

counsel to move for evidentiary hearing to ascertain the substance of his colorable 

claims”).

The Superior Court, on November 14, 2011, denied the Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim as Petitioner did not show that “trial counsel’s performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as defined by prevailing professional 

norms, or that, but for counsel’s actions, there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the case would have been different.” (Id. at 110). The Superior Court also

denied relief as to the sufficiency of the search warrant. The court stated that the claim is 

precluded from PCR relief under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because the 

issue could have been raised on direct appeal or in a post-trial motion. (Id. at 109). 

On June 24, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s 

denial of relief regarding Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court 

stated that the “claim also was properly denied as precluded- not because it was omitted 

on appeal, but because it was raised in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” (Id. at 145). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals also affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling that relief 

regarding the sufficiency of the search warrant was precluded by the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. (Id.) As these constitute adequate and independent state grounds 

for denying review, Petitioner’s claims in Ground Three regarding (i) the ineffective 

assistance of counsel, (ii) counsel’s alleged failure to secure a DNA expert, and (iii) the 

sufficiency of the search warrant are procedurally defaulted. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860. 

Petitioner did not challenge in Arizona state court the alleged “[d]enial of 

Appellate counsel to move for evidentiary hearing to ascertain the substance of his 

colorable claims.” Yet returning to Arizona state court for determination of that issue 

would be futile. The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure discussed above would

preclude relief. The claim is therefore procedurally defaulted. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (a 

claim is procedurally defaulted “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the 

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”) (quoting 

- 14 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1)). 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Ground Three of the Petition be 

denied.

3. Ground Five

In Ground Five, Petitioner claims that his rights to “due process” and “equal 

protection” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution were 

violated “where the trial court abused its discretion.” In support of this claim, Petitioner 

alleges: “The State was allowed to introduce the daughters [sic] alleged statement ‘I was 

raped’ as a hearsay statement that had no exception[,] was unreliable, prejudicial and 

outweighed any probative value.” (Doc. 1 at 10). The claim was presented as Issue No. 2 

on Petitioner’s direct appeal: 

The statements of the victim to her daughter were unreliable 

hearsay evidence which did not qualify as any exception to 

the hearsay rule and its prejudicial effect substantially 

outweighed its probative value. Did the trial court err in 

denying Appellant’s motion and objection to exclude the 

statements of the victim to her daughter?

(Doc. 10-8 at 79).

Significantly, Petitioner presented the claim as a question of state law, not federal 

law. Petitioner’s failure to alert the Arizona state court to the federal nature of the claim 

amounts to a failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 

(1995). While a petitioner is not required to recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. 

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary 

to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state 

law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (per curiam). 

In his 2008 Appellant’s Opening Brief, Petitioner discusses Arizona law and 

makes no mention of a violation of federal law. (Doc. 10-8 at 121-26). Petitioner thus 

deprived the Arizona state court of the initial opportunity to review and correct the 

federal rights violation Petitioner now alleges. Moreover, because Petitioner would be 

precluded from PCR relief on Ground Five under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of 

- 15 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Criminal Procedure, Ground Five is technically exhausted and deemed procedurally 

defaulted. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987. The undersigned accordingly recommends that 

Ground Five of the Petition be denied.

4. Ground Six

In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that he “was subjected to a violation of the 5th and 

14th Amendment U.S. Constitutional protections of due process and equal protection 

where the evidence was in fact insufficient to sustain guilty verdicts for aggravated 

assault.” Respondents concede that the portion of this claim relating to due process is 

not procedurally barred. 

Regarding the remainder of Ground Six, Petitioner did not explicitly alert the state 

court to the alleged federal “equal protection” violation on direct appeal. (Doc. 10-8 at 

127-35). Accordingly, the undersigned agrees with Respondents that the “equal

protection” portion of Ground Six was not fairly presented in state court and is thus 

procedurally barred for the same reasons discussed in analyzing the last sentence of 

Ground Three above. It is recommended that the equal protection portion of Ground Six 

be denied.

C. Petitioner’s Procedural Default is Not Excused 

In spite of the procedural defaults, the merits of Petitioner’s Grounds One, Two, 

Three, and Five are to be reviewed if Petitioner (i) shows cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or (ii) shows that the failure to 

consider the federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. McKinney 

v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 (9th Cir. 2013) (although finding the petitioner’s claims to be 

procedurally defaulted, stating that “[n]onetheless, we will review the merits if [the 

petitioner] can show cause and prejudice or, alternatively, a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice.”) (quoting Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987)). 

Petitioner offers no reason to excuse the above procedural defaults. Although 

Respondents extensively briefed the procedural default issue in their Answer (Doc. 10),

Petitioner has chosen not to file a reply. 

- 16 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Moreover, a petitioner does not have a federal constitutional right to effective 

assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 

481 U.S. 551 (1987); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1993). The narrow 

exception set forth in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1039 (2012) does not apply in this 

case. Under Martinez, “cause” to excuse a petitioner’s procedural default may be found 

where:

(1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was a

“substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being

“no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state

collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review

proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in respect to

the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and (4)

state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial

counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral

proceeding.”

Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318–19, 

1320–21) (alterations in original).

Here, Petitioner’s underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 

speculative and without factual support. Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims are therefore insubstantial. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1319 (a claim is insubstantial if 

it “does not have any merit or . . . is wholly without factual support”). Because 

Petitioner cannot meet the “substantial” claim requirement of the four-part test, the 

Martinez exception does not apply. It is recommended that the procedural default 

determinations set forth above for Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, and a portion of 

Ground Six not be excused.

D. Ground Four and a Portion of Ground Six Should be Denied on the 

Merits

1. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that “[p]ursuant to the 6th Amendment of the 

U.S. Constitution petition [sic] was denied the essential right to confront his accuser.” 

(Doc. 1 at 9). In considering potential state court error, the Court looks to the “last 

- 17 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reasoned decision of the state court as the basis of the state court’s judgment.” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 

F.3d 1223, 1233 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the last reasoned decision of the Arizona 

state court regarding Petitioner’s claim is the Arizona Court of Appeals’ October 1, 2009

decision. (Doc. 10-8 at 214-28). To be granted habeas relief on Ground Four, the State 

court’s decision must be (i) contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law (as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court) or (ii) based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

First, it must be decided what constitutes “clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” for purposes of Petitioner’s 

Confrontation Clause claim. Meras v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 2012). The 

relevant U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the Confrontation Clause is Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the 

Confrontation Clause prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who 

did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior 

opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 53-54. Such “testimonial” statements are 

subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause even if they meet a “firmly rooted 

hearsay exception” or bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 40, 59, 

68. As to “nontestimonial hearsay,” however, the Court concluded, “it is wholly 

consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of 

hearsay law.” Id. at 68. As to what defines a “testimonial” statement, Crawford provides 

that “[t]estimony” ... is typically, “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 

purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 51.

In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified its 

Crawford decision in the context of victims’ statements elicited by police questioning. 

The Court held that statements are “nontestimonial” when they are “made in the course of 

police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose 

- 18 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id. at 

822. Statements are “testimonial” when the “circumstances objectively indicate that 

there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 

to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to criminal prosecution.” Id.

The Court must next determine whether the Arizona Court of Appeals’ application 

of the above holdings was “objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez, 282 F.3d 1132. The

Arizona Court of Appeals applied Crawford and Davis to Sally’s statement “I’ve been 

raped,” finding:

In the case at bar, the circumstances, objectively viewed, 

suggest S.S. shouted, “I’ve been raped” as a cry for help 

instead of an effort “to identify (or provide evidence to 

convict) the perpetrator.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 826. [Sally] gave 

no details about her assailant, and her statement was not made 

in response to anything the police officer said or did. It was 

made spontaneously when P.S. exclaimed, “[O]h my God, 

there’s blood all over the back of her pajamas.” P.S. inquired 

whether the officer had heard her mother’s statement because 

she wanted to ensure medical help would be sent. Paramedics 

were indeed dispatched and were the first responders on the 

scene; they immediately attended to [Sally]. 

(Doc. 10-8 at 223).

Based on the above considerations, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that Sally’s 

statement, “I’ve been raped,” was spontaneous and nontestimonial and that its admission 

therefore did not violate defendant’s confrontation rights. (Id. at 224).

While Petitioner may argue that Sally’s statement is “testimonial,” a state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s decision. 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664. There is record that could 

cause a “fair-minded jurist” to conclude that Sally’s statement was not testimonial—i.e. 

not made as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 

proving some fact.” The Arizona Court of Appeals’ application of Crawford and Davis

to Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause challenge is therefore objectively reasonable. 

Additionally, the violation of the Confrontation Clause is subject to harmless error 

- 19 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). If the error did not have a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” Petitioner 

is not entitled to habeas relief. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). In 

determining such effect or influence, it is considered whether the weight of the evidence 

is counterbalanced with the statement admitted into evidence in violation of the 

Confrontation Clause. For example, in considering whether a prosecutor’s comments 

“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” the 

Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]f the evidence is at least in ‘virtual equipoise’ on this 

question, such that we have grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the constitutional trial 

error, the [habeas] petition must be granted.” Deck v. Jenkins, 768 F.3d 1015, 1030 (9th 

Cir. 2014).

Nurse Bonner, who examined Sally, testified that someone or something had 

penetrated Sally’s vulva, leaving two “penetration injuries” on the inner aspect of her 

labia majora, a third that tore her posterior fourchette, and an area of erythema that 

encompassed “everything inside the labia minora.” (Doc. 10-4 at 48, 51-53, 55-57). 

Additional evidence supporting that Sally was sexually assaulted was also presented, 

such as Sally’s fractured elbow, a bite mark, and injuries to Sally’s wrists, legs, arm, 

breast, and chin. (Id. at 34–45, 56; Doc. 10-3 at 41-42, 75-76). Sally’s statement “I’ve 

been raped” is therefore cumulative to Nurse Bonner’s testimony and other evidence. 

Unlike in Deck, the record is not so evenly balanced that there is grave doubt as to 

whether Sally’s statement had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Given the evidence in the record, the undersigned does 

not find that Sally’s statement had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citation omitted). Accordingly, 

even if the admission of Sally’s statement was an unreasonable application of Crawford, 

it is harmless. Therefore, the undersigned recommends for the reasons set forth above 

that Ground Four be denied on the merits.

- 20 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Ground Six

In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that he “was subjected to a violation of the 5th and 

14th Amendment U.S. Constitutional protections of due process and equal protection 

where the evidence was in fact insufficient to sustain guilty verdicts for aggravated 

assault.” (Doc. 1 at 11). Specifically, Petitioner challenges the finding that Petitioner 

broke Sally’s elbow, stating that:

The victim when viewed initially by her daughter was seen to 

be holding her elbow. The victim could never articulate how, 

when or why her arm was injured. The examination by 

medical professionals (doctor) could not determine the cause 

of the fracture. No testimony was ever provided that 

petitioner was in fact responsible for the injury.

As in the merits review of Ground Four, the Petitioner must show that the State’s 

decision is (i) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law (as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court) or (ii) based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

The relevant U.S. Supreme Court case as to Petitioner’s Ground Six is Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In Jackson, the Court held that a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction must be rejected unless based on the 

evidence presented at trial, “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. In making this evaluation, a court must not only 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, but must also presume 

the trier of fact resolved conflicting evidence in favor of the prosecution. Id. at 319, 326; 

Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1994). This “gives full play to the 

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” U.S. v. 

Milwitt, 475 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that sufficient circumstantial evidence 

- 21 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 21 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

supports Petitioner’s aggravated assault conviction, stating that: 

The evidence established that an intruder broke into [Sally’s] 

home by using a rock to shatter a glass door; then he sexually 

assaulted her, causing numerous injuries that were not 

apparent less than nine hours earlier, including a broken 

elbow that was demonstrably painful to the victim. Given the 

violent nature of the attack and the evidence presented, a 

reasonable trier of fact could find defendant guilty of 

aggravated assault. (Doc. 10-8 at 225). 

There is sufficient evidence supporting a finding that Petitioner fractured Sally’s 

arm. First, Patricia saw no indication that Sally was injured on the night of June 17, 

2006. (Doc. 10-3 at 33, 48). Then at 4:45 a.m. on June 18, 2006, Sally called and asked 

her daughter, Patricia, to come over to her house. (Id. at 49). Sally was “very upset” and 

was “having trouble talking.” (Id.). When Patricia arrived at Sally’s house, Sally was 

upset, shaking, and holding her left elbow. (Id. at 57). 

As Patricia was speaking with the police dispatcher, Patricia commented on the 

blood on the back of Sally’s pajamas, and Sally yelled, “I’ve been raped.” (Id. at 69-70). 

Medical personnel diagnosed Sally with numerous injuries, such as a fractured elbow, 

contusions and abrasions on her chin, left arm, wrists, legs, and one of her breasts, a bite 

mark, three “penetration injuries,” and areas of erythema on her labia minora and around 

her anus. (Id. at 41-42; Doc. 10-4 at 34-64). At trial, orthopedic surgeon Dr. Greg Keller, 

M.D. testified that a fractured elbow could be sustained if a person is knocked down. 

(Doc. 10-3 at 44). Finally, Petitioner’s DNA was found on Sally’s body. (Doc. 10-5 at 

99, 149, 154-56). 

Considering all of the evidence, it cannot be concluded that “no rational trier of 

fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The undersigned thus 

finds that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ reasoning is neither contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of Jackson. As such, the undersigned recommends that the 

Court deny Ground Six on the merits. 

- 22 - 

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 22 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny and 

dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) with prejudice. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and because Petitioner has not made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his remaining claims for relief. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143,1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 21st day of January, 2015. 

- 23 -

Case 2:13-cv-02423-DLR Document 13 Filed 01/22/15 Page 23 of 23