Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00517/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00517-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ETUATE SEKONA,

Plaintiff,

v.

F. CUSTINO, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-CV-0517-JAM-DMC-P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s renewed motion for the appointment of 

counsel (ECF No. 138). Also before the court is plaintiff’s motion for a settlement conference 

(ECF No. 137).

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to 

require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. See Mallard v. United States Dist. 

Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the 

voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

A finding of “exceptional circumstances” requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success 

on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims on his own in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved. See Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. Neither factor is 

Case 2:16-cv-00517-DMC Document 141 Filed 10/03/19 Page 1 of 2
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dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision. See id. In Terrell, the 

Ninth Circuit concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to appointment 

of counsel because: 

. . . Terrell demonstrated sufficient writing ability and legal knowledge to 

articulate his claim. The facts he alleged and the issues he raised were not 

of substantial complexity. The compelling evidence against Terrell made it 

extremely unlikely that he would succeed on the merits. 

Id. at 1017. 

In the present case, the court does not at this time find the required exceptional 

circumstances. As to success on the merits, while the court has recommended denial of 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment safety claim 

against defendant Custino, plaintiff has not demonstrated any particular likelihood of success on 

the merits of that claim. At this point in the proceedings, the record merely demonstrates that 

there are genuine disputes of material fact as to plaintiff’s claim against defendant Custino, not 

that plaintiff is likely to prevail on that claim. Moreover, the court finds the Eighth Amendment 

safety claim is not complex legally or factually, and plaintiff has demonstrated an adequate ability 

to articulate them on his own. 

Turning to plaintiff’s motion for a settlement conference, the record does not 

indicate that defendants are willing to participate in a settlement conference at this time. Should 

defendants express a desire to discuss settlement, the court will set a settlement conference. In 

the meantime, plaintiff’s motion will be denied. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 138) is denied; 

and

2. Plaintiff’s motion for a settlement conference (ECF No. 137) is denied.

Dated: October 2, 2019

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:16-cv-00517-DMC Document 141 Filed 10/03/19 Page 2 of 2