Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01421/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01421-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1255 Immigration: Failure USCIS To Adjudicate Permanent Residency Petition

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERESA CEDILLO MARTINEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFFERSON B. 

SESSIONS, III, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 17cv1421-LAB (MDD)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

After living in the country illegally for ten years, Teresa Cedillo traveled to Mexico to 

escort her sick father back to the United States. When she attempted to reenter illegally, the 

Department of Homeland Security stopped her and ordered her expedited removal. Cedillo 

sneaked back in ostensibly because she needed to care for her father and her children—all 

U.S. citizens. When she applied for status adjustment ten years later, Homeland Security 

denied her application, reinstated her removal order, but granted her deferred action for two 

years.

After twice deferring Cedillo’s deportation, Homeland Security denied Cedillo

deferred action last year. She and her family then filed this case. Her complaint challenges 

the decision by Homeland Security to reinstate her removal, and to deny her deferred action. 

The linchpin of her argument is this: her reentry was legally justified by necessity. She wants 

the Court to make a finding to that effect, which would vitiate the reinstated removal order 

and deferred action decision. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review these decisions, 

and the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief, it must be dismissed.

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I. Reinstatement of Removal

Cedillo alleges Homeland Security violated her procedural due process rights in the 

course of reinstating her removal and denying her adjustment application. She asks the 

Court to invalidate the reinstatement order, and refer her case to an immigration judge to 

reconsider her status adjustment based on her necessity defense. The Court declines 

because Cedillo hasn’t shown she’s entitled to an order granting either of her requests.

A. Removal Orders

Cedillo maintains the Court has jurisdiction to consider her claim because she’s not 

asking for review of her removal orders—instead, she wants her 2003 illegal reentry

declared legally justified by necessity. But that requires the Court to review the 

circumstances underlying her 15-year-old expedited removal order. That’s not allowed: “no 

court shall have jurisdiction to review” “any individual determination or to entertain any other 

cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or operation” of an expedited 

removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i) and (e)(5); § 1231(a)(5); see Garcia de Rincon 

v. Dep't of Homeland, 539 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2008) (no jurisdiction where Homeland

Security denied adjustment and reinstated expedited removal order after mother with citizen 

children illegally reentered following visit to sick parent in Mexico). 

Even if the Court had jurisdiction, Cedillo hasn’t stated a claim for relief. For example, 

Cedillo hasn’t offered plausible allegations she had “no other legal alternatives to violating 

the law” when she reentered illegally. United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119, 1126 

(9th Cir. 2001). The Court doesn’t doubt Cedillo’s compelling motivation to leave the United 

States to rescue her father in Mexico, then to reenter this country to care for him and her 

children. But a necessity defense requires an imposing burden: Cedillo must demonstrate 

that she had no other legal option. She hasn’t met that burden.

B. Adjustment of Status

To the extent Cedillo is challenging the denial of her adjustment application, the Court 

lacks jurisdiction to review it. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see Hassan v. Chertoff, 593 F.3d 

785 (9th Cir. 2010). But even assuming there was jurisdiction, there’s only one clear due 

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process allegation in the complaint: Homeland Security reinstated Cedillo’s removal before 

her adjustment application denial was final. She says this violated “her right to renew her 

application in proceedings under 8 C.F.R part 240” by going to immigration court. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 245.2(a)(5)(ii). But the last sentence of that regulation states: “Nothing in this section shall 

entitle an alien to proceedings under section 240 of the Act who is not otherwise so entitled.” 

Id. Cedillo isn’t so entitled because she’s subject to an expedited removal order—that means 

she has no right to a hearing before an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(5); see Padilla 

v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2003).

1

What’s more, it’s not good enough to point to a procedural violation—Cedillo must 

show how that violation prejudiced her. Id. at 925. She hasn’t show this. And it’s difficult to 

see how she could: she’s not entitled to status adjustment under § 1255(i)—despite her 

approved visa petition—because she reentered the United States after Homeland Security 

ordered her expedited removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C); In Re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 

355, 371 (BIA 2007); Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (denying 

adjustment to alien who left to care for sick parent in Mexico).

II. Deferred Action

Cedillo attempts to attack Executive Order 13768, but the Court construes her 

complaint as challenging Homeland Security’s decision to deny her request for deferred 

action. In other words, the relief here ultimately asks the Court to review Homeland 

Security’s discretionary decision to execute the removal orders against Cedillo. This type of 

challenge isn’t allowed: “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on 

behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to” “execute 

removal orders against any alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); see Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485 (1999) (“Section 1252(g) seems clearly designed 

to give some measure of protection to ‘no deferred action’ decisions and similar

discretionary determinations”); Fabian-Lopez v. Holder, 540 F. App'x 760, 761 n.2 (9th Cir. 

 

1 Cedillo’s opposition raises several other theories for procedural violations. Since they’re 

not in the complaint, the Court doesn’t consider them.

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2013). To the extent Cedillo is requesting deferred action under DAPA, that program was

enjoined by the Fifth Circuit which found DAPA unconstitutional. See Texas v. United States, 

809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). The Court agrees with that finding and therefore will not rely 

on provisions of that unconstitutional executive order.

Cedillo argues the new Executive Order “transformed denial of her Deferred Action 

extension request from an unreviewable discretionary act to a reviewable ministerial act.” 

But she doesn’t offer any plausible allegations or authority for this interpretation, and the 

Court finds none in the plain wording of the Executive Order. While Homeland Security is 

“expected to exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement 

process,” Cedillo hasn’t offered authority suggesting this Court can second-guess whether 

it did. Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Even if the Court had 

jurisdiction to review Homeland Security’s decision, Cedillo’s complaint fails to offer 

plausible allegations to support her causes of action for violations of the INA and APA. She 

likewise fails to offer any argument in opposition on the various problems Defendants 

pointed out with these causes of actions in their motion to dismiss. 

Disposition

Cedillo’s action is dismissed without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). If she

thinks she can fix her complaint, she may file a motion for leave to amend by June 1, 2018. 

Defendants must file an opposition within two weeks of her motion. The Court will decide 

the motion on the papers. If Cedillo doesn’t file anything, the Court will dismiss her case with 

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2018

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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