Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01893/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01893-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES & SUZIE HALL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, et

al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 2:14-cv-01893-KOB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on the Joint Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants

Nationstar Mortgage and U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee. (Doc. 22). 

This case centers on Plaintiffs Charles and Suzie Hall's allegations that the Defendants

have failed to honor the Halls' loan modification agreement. The Halls contend that they had a

binding loan modification agreement with their previous loan servicer, First Franklin Corp.,

which Nationstar, the Plaintiffs' current loan servicer, has refused to honor. The Halls also allege

that the Defendants have misrepresented the amount of the Halls' debt and have failed to

adequately respond to the Halls' requests for additional information about their account.

The Halls have asserted claims against the Defendants for violation of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act; violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; Breach of

Contract; Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Promissory Estoppel;

Fraudulent Concealment; and Unjust Enrichment. Defendants Nationstar Mortgage and U.S.

Bank as Trustee have moved for summary judgment on each of these claims.

For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, the court will GRANT the

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment IN PART and will DENY it IN PART. Specifically,

1

FILED

 2016 Jul-25 PM 02:08

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-01893-KOB Document 28 Filed 07/25/16 Page 1 of 22
the court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion as to all of the Halls' claims against Defendant

U.S. Bank; will GRANT the Defendants' Motion as to Counts III-VII of the Halls' Complaint

against Defendant Nationstar; and will DENY the Defendants' Motion as to Counts I and II of the

Halls' Complaint against Defendant Nationstar.

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment allows a trial court to decide cases when no genuine issues of

material fact are present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56. When a district court reviews a motion for summary judgment, it must determine

two things: (1) whether any genuine issues of material fact exist; and if not, (2) whether the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).

Once the moving party meets its burden of showing the district court that no genuine

issues of material fact exist, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce sufficient

favorable evidence “to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes

summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “If the

evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

249–50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). 

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should view all evidence and 

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Case 2:14-cv-01893-KOB Document 28 Filed 07/25/16 Page 2 of 22
inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

See Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). The evidence of

the non-moving party “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its]

favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising

from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This

standard exists because “the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,

not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). 

After both parties have addressed the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant

the motion only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

II. Procedural History

On October 6, 2014, Plaintiffs Charles and Suzie Hall brought this action against

Defendants Nationstar Mortgage, LLC and U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee. The Halls

asserted claims for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; violation of the Real

Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"); Breach of Contract; Breach of the Implied

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Promissory Estoppel; Fraudulent Concealment; and

Unjust Enrichment.

From August 20, 2015 to October 30, 2015, the court suspended the deadlines in this case

to allow the Halls to submit a loan modification application and supporting documents to

Nationstar. However, Nationstar was ultimately unable to approve the Halls for a modification,

and the court set new deadlines to move the case forward.

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On January 8, 2016, Defendants Nationstar and U.S. Bank filed the Motion for Summary

Judgment that is the subject of this Opinion. That Motion has been fully briefed.

III. Statement of Facts 1

In July of 2007, the Halls purchased a home. To finance the home, the Halls executed a

promissory note and mortgage and borrowed $550,000 from First Franklin Financial Corp. The

note indicates that the Halls' monthly payments would be in the amount of $4,806.33. U.S. Bank

National Association, as Trustee for Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust,

Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-5 is the owner and holder of the Halls'

note and mortgage.

The Halls submitted the monthly mortgage payments due to First Franklin for the first

two years of the agreement, but then began experiencing financial difficulties and began missing

payments.

On September 21, 2010, First Franklin approved the Halls for a permanent loan

modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP"). First Franklin sent

the Halls a letter indicating that, to accept the modification offer, the Halls should return signed

copies of the agreement to First Franklin by October 1, 2010. The agreement indicated that under

the modification, the Halls' new principal balance would be $564,324.38 and that their new

monthly payments would be $4,735.80. 

1

 In their brief, the Plaintiffs failed to respond to the Defendants' Statement of Undisputed

Facts. Therefore, the Defendants' facts are deemed admitted for the purposes of summary

judgment, as set out in the court's requirements for summary judgment briefs in Appendix II,

available at www.alnd.uscourts.gov under the court information for Judge Bowdre.

Additionally, in Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, some of the citations do not correspond to

the facts that are being asserted. Other facts are supported only with a citation to a paragraph in

the Plaintiffs' Complaint. Allegations in a Complaint are not evidence, and the court has not

considered any of Plaintiffs' proffered facts that are not supported by evidence.

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Additionally, the agreement stated that the Halls' loan would "not be modified unless and

until [they] receive[d] from the Lender a copy of this Agreement signed by the Lender." (Doc.

24-5, at 6). The agreement further provided that if the Halls needed to make any corrections to

the agreement, a corrected agreement would be provided to them and that the current agreement

would be void and of no legal effect.

Mrs. Hall testified that she returned of a signed copy of the First Franklin modification.

She was not, however, able to produce a copy of the signed version of the document. She also did

not receive a signed copy back from First Franklin. Mrs. Hall further testified that before

returning the modification agreement, she made handwritten alterations to the principal balance

in the agreement because she believed it was incorrect. 

On October 1, 2010, servicing of the Hall's note and mortgage was transferred from First

Franklin to BAC Home Loans Servicing. On July 1, 2011, servicing of the note and mortgage

was transferred from BAC, a subsidiary of Bank of America, to Bank of America, the parent

company. Bank of America offered the Halls a trial period modification, which the Halls

rejected. (See Doc. 24-8 (March 31, 2012 letter from Bank of America to the Halls stating that

the Halls were not being considered for a modification "because after being offered a Trial Period

Plan or modification, [the Halls] notified [Bank of America] that [they] did not wish to accept the

offer.")). The Halls' monthly payments under this trial period modification were to be $4,649.96. 

Between August 2010 and September 2011, the Halls sent, and their loan servicers

accepted, monthly payments in the amount of $4,649.96. The August and September 2010

payments were autodrafted from the Halls' checking account by First Franklin, while the October

to September 2011 payments were made by check written to Bank of America Home Loan.

On July 1, 2013, servicing of the note and mortgage was transferred again from Bank of

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America to Nationstar. On July 12, 2013, Nationstar sent the Halls a letter informing them that

the servicing rights to their note and mortgage had been transferred to it. In this letter, Nationstar

provided the Halls with a breakdown of the debt owed at that time.

Nationstar offered the Halls a trial period modification on October 15, 2013. This

modification agreement indicated that the Halls' new principal balance would be $693,581.62

and that their new monthly payments would be $4,595.24. The Halls rejected the Nationstar trial

modification. Mrs. Hall explained that she thought the principal balance shown in the Nationstar

modification was too high.

In her deposition, Mrs. Hall admitted that when she called and asked questions regarding

her loan modification, she called and spoke to representatives at First Franklin and Bank of

America, not Nationstar. Mrs. Hall testified that the only personal communication she had with

Nationstar was in response to Nationstar's 2013 modification offer. Mrs. Hall further admitted

that the alleged misrepresentations that she mentioned in her Complaint were made by Bank of

America, not Nationstar. Mrs. Hall stated that the only alleged misrepresentation she could

attribute to Nationstar was that Nationstar offered the Halls a modification, but then later

"reneged" on it. However, Mrs. Hall acknowledged that she did not complete or return the

Nationstar modification paperwork.

In her deposition, Mrs. Hall also stated that as far as she was concerned, all of her loan

servicers -- Nationstar, Bank of America, and First Franklin -- were the same company.

Nationstar, however, is not a subsidiary, agent, or business entity related in any way to First

Franklin or Bank of America.

On October 28, 2013 and November 5, 2013, counsel for the Halls sent Nationstar letters

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Case 2:14-cv-01893-KOB Document 28 Filed 07/25/16 Page 6 of 22
purporting to be qualified written requests ("QWRs")

2

 under RESPA. On November 12, 2013,

Nationstar sent a letter to the Halls' counsel acknowledging receipt of the QWR. On November

15, 2013, Nationstar followed up with a substantive response with details about the Halls' loan.

On February 14, 2014 and April 14, 2014, counsel for the Halls sent Nationstar letters

purporting to be notices of error ("NOEs")

3

 under Regulation X of RESPA. In these letters, the

Halls' counsel explained that the Halls believed that Nationstar had failed to provide them with

accurate and complete information as to the loss mitigation options available to them. On April

18, 2014, Nationstar sent a letter to the Halls' counsel acknowledging receipt of the NOE. On

May 2, 2014, Nationstar followed up with a substantive response about the modifications that

had been offered to the Halls.

On July 23, 2014, counsel for the Halls sent Nationstar a letter purporting to be a debt

verification request under the FDCPA.4 Nationstar responded to the debt verification request on

August 8, 2014, and then followed up with a more substantive response on August 20, 2014.

2

 A "qualified written request" is "a written correspondence, other than notice on a

payment coupon or other payment medium supplied by the servicer, that . . . includes, or

otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name and account of the borrower, and . . . includes

a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account

is in error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by the

borrower." 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B).

3

 A "notice of error" is "any written notice from the borrower that asserts an error and

includes the name of the borrower, information that enables the servicer to identify the

borrower's mortgage loan account, and the error the borrower believes has occurred." 12 C.F.R. §

1024.35. 

4

 Under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), if a consumer notifies the debt collector in

writing within thirty days of an initial notice of debt that he disputes his debt, the debt collector

must "cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains

verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor,

and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is

mailed to the consumer by the debt collector."

7

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As of February 2016, a billing statement from Nationstar indicates that the Halls' regular

monthly payment amount is currently $5,460.76 and that the Halls owe $333,175.99 in overdue

payments.

IV. Discussion

A. Claims Against Defendant U.S. Bank as Trustee

The Halls brought this action against Defendant Nationstar, the current servicer of their

loan, and Defendant U.S. Bank, as Trustee of their loan. 

Count I of the Halls' Complaint explicitly refers to Defendant Nationstar only. It does not

mention Defendant U.S. Bank. Accordingly, the court interprets Count I of the Halls' Complaint

to apply only to Defendant Nationstar.

 To which Defendant(s) the remaining Counts apply is less clear. In Counts II-VII, the

Halls assert claims against the "Defendant," without indicating whether they are referring to

Defendant Nationstar, Defendant U.S. Bank, or both. The Halls do not refer to either Defendant

by name in Counts II-VII.

The factual allegations and the context of the claims do not help to clarify which claims

apply to U.S. Bank. All of the Halls' factual allegations relate only to Defendant Nationstar, or to

previous servicers, who are not parties to this action. In the Halls' Complaint, Defendant U.S.

Bank is mentioned only in the case style and in the introduction of the parties. The Halls have

pled no factual allegations that relate to Defendant U.S. Bank. The Halls have also asserted no

theory of liability as to Defendant U.S. Bank in any of their Counts.

Now, at the summary judgment stage, the Halls have likewise failed to offer any evidence

relating to Defendant U.S. Bank's actions.

Accordingly, the court finds that the Halls' allegations and evidentiary submissions are

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insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the claims they have asserted

against U.S. Bank. Consequently, the court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment as to the claims asserted against Defendant U.S. Bank and will DISMISS all claims

against Defendant U.S. Bank.

B. Claims Against Defendant Nationstar 

Next, the court will address the extent to which genuine issues of material fact exist as to

the Halls' claims against Defendant Nationstar, the servicer of their loan.

1. Count I - Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Violation

In Count I of their Complaint, the Halls allege that Nationstar violated several sections of

the FDCPA. The Halls contend that Nationstar violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f "by using unfair and

unconscionable means to collect the debt owed by the Halls;" § 1692e(2) "by misrepresenting the

character, amount and legal status of the Plaintiff's debt;" §§ 1692e(5) and 1692f(6) "by

threatening to foreclose on the Halls' home even though Defendant Nationstar has no present

right to possession of the property under its security agreement;" and § 1692g(a)(1) "by failing to

accurately and fully state in communication to the Halls 'the amount of the debt'." (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 80-

82).

The court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendant

Nationstar complied with these provisions of the FDCPA. In her deposition, Mrs. Hall testified

that the amount of the principal balance shown in the Nationstar modification offer was inflated.

Mrs. Hall stated that Nationstar represented her balance to be "six hundred and something

thousand," while she believed her balance should have been $550,000. (Doc. 24-21, 48:7-18).

Mrs. Hall explained that her initial balance was $550,000, but that she had made some payments

before the modification, which she believed would have brought her balance to roughly

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$535,000. Mrs. Hall acknowledged that she would likely incur some penalties and interest for her

missed payments, but said that she thought these penalties would take her balance back up to

about $550,000, not the $693,581.62 that Nationstar represented her balance to be. (Id., 48:23-

49:10).

On July 23, 2014, counsel for the Halls sent Nationstar a letter requesting verification of

the Halls' debt, pursuant to the FDCPA. Nationstar responded to this letter on August 8, 2014,

and then followed up with a more substantive response on August 20, 2014. The August 20 letter

says that it contains, as enclosures, a copy of the Plaintiffs' complete Payment History, as well as

several other documents, including Plaintiffs' most recent billing statement, Plaintiffs' servicing

transfer notices, and Plaintiffs' payoff quote. These enclosures, however, were not included in the

evidence Defendants offered to the court. 

Nationstar contends that it complied with all of the provisions of the FDCPA. However,

without the enclosures sent to the Plaintiffs, the court is unable to verify whether Nationstar did

in fact provide the Plaintiffs with a complete payment history and the other documents referenced

in its letter, in satisfaction of the FDCPA. The court is also unable to confirm whether the

amount of the debt that Nationstar claims it is owed matches the records in the Plaintiffs'

payment history.

Consequently, Mrs. Hall's deposition testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether Nationstar complied with the provisions of the FDCPA. See, e.g., Feliciano v. City of

Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) ("As a general principle, a plaintiff's

testimony cannot be discounted on summary judgment unless it is blatantly contradicted by the

record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a matter of law, meaning that it relates to facts that

could not have possibly been observed or events that are contrary to the laws of nature."); Price

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v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) ("Courts routinely and properly deny

summary judgment on the basis of a party's sworn testimony even though it is self-serving.")

(citations omitted). Because no evidence in the record blatantly contradicts Mrs. Halls' deposition

testimony, the court may not discount it.

Accordingly, the court will DENY the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to

the Halls' FDCPA claim against Defendant Nationstar.

2. Count II - Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 

Next, in Count II of their Complaint, the Halls allege that, on multiple occasions, they,

through counsel, sent Nationstar "qualified written requests," as defined in RESPA, 12 U.S.C. §

2605(e)(1)(B), and that Nationstar failed to adequately respond to these QWRs. 

The Halls specifically allege that Nationstar violated RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(A)

"by failing to make appropriate correction to the Plaintiff's account in response to the qualified

written request;" § 2605(e)(2)(C) "by failing to provide the Plaintiff with the information and

documentation requested;" § 2605(e)(2) "by refusing to cease its collection efforts and

foreclosure proceedings after receiving the Plaintiff's qualified written request;" and 

§ 2605(e)(3) "by providing information to consumer credit reporting agencies regarding overdue

payments allegedly owed by the Plaintiff that were related to the qualified written request."

As discussed previously, Mrs. Hall testified in her deposition that the amount of the

principal balance shown in the Nationstar modification offer was inflated.

Based on this belief that the balance shown was too high, counsel for the Halls sent

Nationstar letters purporting to be QWRs on October 28, 2013 and November 5, 2013.

Nationstar responded to the Halls on November 12, 2013, and November 15, 2013. In its

November 15 letter, Nationstar indicated that it was enclosing a number of documents, including

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a copy of the Halls' payment history. However, these enclosures were not presented to the court

as evidence.

On February 14, 2014 and April 14, 2014, counsel for the Halls sent Nationstar letters

purporting to be NOEs under Regulation X of RESPA. Nationstar responded to the Halls on

April 18, 2014 and May 2, 2014. In its May 2 letter, Nationstar indicated that it was enclosing

documents such as the Nationstar servicing transfer notice, the 2013 proposed Nationstar

modification agreement, and the 2014 modification denial letter. Again, these enclosures were

not provided to the court as evidence.

Without these enclosures, the court is unable to assess whether Nationstar did in fact

provide complete responses that complied with the provisions of RESPA. The court is also

unable to determine whether the amount of the Halls' principal balance and total debt, as

represented by Nationstar, was supported by Nationstar's records and the Halls' payment history,

or whether Nationstar should have made a correction to the Plaintiffs' account, as required by

RESPA.

Accordingly, the court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether

Defendant Nationstar complied with the provisions of RESPA. Therefore, the court will DENY

the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Halls' RESPA claim against

Nationstar.5

5

 As discussed above, the court finds that the Halls have not presented evidence sufficient

to create a genuine issue of material fact as to their claims against Defendant U.S. Bank.

However, even if the Halls had presented some evidence related to Defendant U.S. Bank, their

RESPA claim against U.S. Bank would fail as a matter of law because RESPA only places

obligations on the servicer to respond to QWRs. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A); see also Jesse v.

Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 882 F. Supp. 2d 877, 881 (E.D. Va. 2012). The Halls have not

alleged that U.S. Bank serviced their loan.

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3. Count III - Breach of Contract

In Count III of their Complaint, the Halls assert that Nationstar breached its contract with

the Halls by failing to provide them with the loan modification to which they claim they are

entitled.

Under Alabama law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: "'(1) a valid contract

binding the parties; (2) the plaintiffs' performance under the contract; (3) the defendant's

nonperformance; and (4) resulting damages.'" Shaffer v. Regions Fin. Corp., 29 So. 3d 872, 880

(Ala. 2009) (quoting Reynolds Metals Co. v. Hill, 825 So. 2d 100, 105 (Ala. 2002)). A valid

contract requires: "'an offer and acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the terms

essential to the formation of a contract.'" Ex parte Grant, 711 So. 2d 464, 465 (Ala. 1997)

(quoting Strength v. Ala. Dep't of Fin., Div. of Risk Mgmt., 622 So. 2d 1283, 1289 (Ala. 1993)).

In this case, the Halls' breach of contract allegations are premised on Nationstar's failure

to honor the modification First Franklin offered to the Halls. However, this claim fails because

the Halls are unable to demonstrate that the First Franklin modification became a valid, binding

contract. 

Mrs. Hall testified that, upon receiving the First Franklin modification documents, she

signed and returned the documents to First Franklin. Nationstar has no record of First Franklin

receiving a signed copy of the documents from Mrs. Hall, and Mrs. Hall is likewise unable to

produce a signed copy of the agreement.

However, even if the court takes Mrs. Hall's assertion that she signed and returned the

agreement as true, the Halls have failed to demonstrate that the First Franklin modification

agreement was a valid, binding contract because they have failed to show that a condition

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precedent in the First Franklin agreement was met. The First Franklin modification agreement

stated that the Halls' loan would "not be modified unless and until [they] receive[d] from the

Lender a copy of this Agreement signed by the Lender." (Doc. 24-5, at 6). The Halls did not

receive a copy of the modification signed by First Franklin. Because the Halls did not receive a

copy of the modification signed by First Franklin, this condition precedent was not met, and a

valid contract was not formed. See, e.g., Ex parte Payne, 741 So. 2d 398, 403 (Ala. 1999) ("In

negotiating a contract the parties may impose any condition precedent, the performance of which

is essential before they become bound by the agreement; in other words, there may be a condition

precedent to the existence of a contract.") (citations omitted).

Additionally, the First Franklin modification did not become a valid, enforceable contract

because Mrs. Hall admitted that she made handwritten alterations to the modification agreement.

Alabama law provides that "[o]ne party cannot unilaterally alter the terms of a contract . . . . Both

parties must mutually assent to a modification." Ex parte Amoco Fabrics & Fiber Co., 729 So.

2d 336, 340 (Ala. 1998) (citations omitted). Because Mrs. Hall altered the principal balance

contained in the modification agreement, no mutual assent existed, and the agreement did not

become a binding contract.

The First Franklin modification agreement also fails to satisfy the statute of frauds.

Alabama law provides that "[e]very agreement or commitment to lend money, delay or forebear

repayment thereof or to modify the provisions of such an agreement or commitment" must be in

writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. Ala. Code § 8-9-2(7).

Alabama courts have specifically held that loan modification agreements are subject to the statute

of frauds. See, e.g., Coleman v. BAC Serv., 104 So. 3d 195, 207 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012); see also

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Manker v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-1012-WKW[WO], 2012 WL 999611, at *5 (M.D.

Ala. March 23, 2012) (finding that "[t]he lack of signatures on the purported contracts is fatal to

Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim"). Because the Halls have not provided any evidence that the

contract was signed by First Franklin, the contract is void and unenforceable under the statute of

frauds.

The Halls contend that the doctrine of partial performance applies as an exception to the

statute of frauds because they made payments in accordance with the First Franklin modification

offer. However, the partial performance doctrine applies only to oral agreements for the sale of

land. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. EBR Investments LLC, No. 2:14-CV-01578-

WMA, 2015 WL 225457, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2015) ("Although Alabama courts have long

recognized a 'part performance' exception to the statue of frauds under Ala. Code § 8-9-2(5) for

oral agreements to buy or sell land, Darby v. Johnson, 477 So. 2d 322, 326 (Ala.1985), Alabama

courts have declined to expand the exception beyond subsection (5). Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951

So. 2d 638, 652–53 (Ala.2006)."). The Halls have cited, and the court knows of, no authority to

the contrary. Accordingly, the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds does not save

the Halls' breach of contract claim.

Because the Halls cannot show that the First Franklin modification was a valid,

enforceable contract, which complies with the statute of frauds, their breach of contract claim

fails. Therefore, the court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Count III of the Halls' Complaint.

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4. Count IV - Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing

In Count IV of their Complaint, the Halls allege that Nationstar breached the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

The court finds that this claim fails as a matter of law because Alabama law does not

recognize a cause of action for breach of good faith and fair dealing in the context of a dispute

regarding a mortgage loan. See, e.g., Wallace v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 974 F. Supp. 2d 1358,

1368 (S.D. Ala. 2013) ("Defendant is correct that Alabama has refused to recognize a tort claim

for breach of the duty of good faith outside the insurance context.") (citing Lake Martin/Ala.

Power Licensee Ass'n, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 601 So. 2d 942, 944 (Ala. 1992)); Buckentin v.

SunTrust Mortg. Corp., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1287 (N.D. Ala. 2013) ("Because the contract at

issue is not an insurance contract, Plaintiff's breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing claim fails as a matter of law . . . ."); Grant v. Butler, 590 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1991)

("Although every contract contains either an express or an implied covenant that the parties will

act in good faith in performing the contract, in Alabama only insurance contracts give rise to a

duty imposed by law on which a tort claim for bad faith performance can be based.").

Accordingly, the court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Count IV of the Halls' Complaint.

5. Count V - Promissory Estoppel

The Halls next assert a claim against Nationstar for promissory estoppel. The Halls allege

that the "Defendant intentionally represented that Plaintiffs could obtain loan modifications, and

that Plaintiffs could make modified, reduced payments that would satisfy existing loan

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obligations for the terms set forth in the loan modification agreements, if they followed the

requirements specified in Defendant's offer." (Doc. 1, ¶ 109).

In Alabama, to state a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that the

defendant made a promise (2) that the defendant should have reasonably expected to induce

action or forbearance of definite and substantial character; (3) the promise did, in fact, induce

action or forbearance; (4) and injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise." Sykes v.

Payton, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (M.D. Ala 2006) (citing Bush v. Bush, 177 So. 2d 568, 570

(Ala. 1964)).

The Halls fail to offer evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

the first element of their claim. The Halls have failed to show that Nationstar made them a

promise.

In their Complaint, the Halls assert that the "Defendant" made representations to them

regarding their loan modification, without specifying which defendant made those

representations or when those representations were made. Accordingly, the court is unclear as to

what the Halls intended to assert as the basis for their promissory estoppel claim against

Nationstar.

However, the Halls' pleading deficiencies aside, in reviewing the evidence before it, the

court can find the existence of no promise by Nationstar that would support a claim for

promissory estoppel.

Nationstar's 2013 modification offer was not a promise. It was an offer that was rejected

by the Halls. Accordingly, that offer cannot serve as the basis for the Halls' promissory estoppel

claim. 

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First Franklin's modification was also not a promise. As discussed above, the First

Franklin modification offer was never fully executed and did not become a binding contract. No

evidence exists to suggest that First Franklin or Nationstar promised to carry out the loan

modification agreement as modified by the Halls or promised to unilaterally modify the loan

agreement. The Halls have not identified any other promises made by First Franklin that would

support a claim for promissory estoppel.

Additionally, Nationstar's alleged statements or promises to accept reduced payments

from the Halls would be void under the statute of frauds. Under Alabama law, Plaintiffs may not

circumvent the statute of frauds by asserting their reliance on unsigned or unwritten statements in

a promissory estoppel claim. See, e.g., Bruce v. Cole, 854 So. 2d 47, 58 (Ala. 2003) ("[A]n oral

promise that is void by operation of the Statute of Frauds will not support an action against the

promisor for promissory fraud."); Durham v. Harbin, 530 So. 2d 208, 213 (Ala. 1988)

("Although allowing a plaintiff's reliance on nonfraudulent representations to abrogate the Statute

of Frauds is a widespread phenomenon . . . Alabama has rejected this approach to date.").

Accordingly, the Halls' claim for promissory estoppel fails because the Halls have not

offered any evidence to show that a promise to accept reduced payments existed and because any

such promise to modify the Halls' loan would be void and unenforceable under Alabama's statute

of frauds. Therefore, the court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Count V of the Halls' Complaint.

6. Count VI - Fraudulent Concealment

In Count VI of their Complaint, the Halls allege that the Defendant committed fraud "by

promising [the Halls] opportunities for loan modifications when they had no intention of

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providing such permanent modifications." (Doc. 1, ¶ 114).

The Halls' fraud claim falls short of the heightened pleading standard for fraud in Rule

9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that, "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a

party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." (emphasis

added). 

When pleading a fraud claim, to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b), “a plaintiff must

allege: ‘(1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place,

and person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in which these statements

misled the [p]laintiff; and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged fraud.’” Am. Dental

Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brooks v. Blue Cross &

Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1380-81 (11th Cir. 1997)).

The Halls have failed to satisfy these requirements. The Halls have brought their fraud

claim against the "Defendant," without specifying to which Defendant they are referring -- be it

Nationstar, U.S. Bank, or one of the previous loan servicers who are not parties to this suit. The

Halls have also failed to state in specific terms what statements or omissions they contend were

fraudulent. In their Complaint, the Halls simply allege that the "Defendant used fraud and artifice

to induce Plaintiffs to enter and keep Plaintiffs in default" and that the "Defendant did not

disclose to Plaintiffs its motives." (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 115, 117). These general allegations are

insufficient to sustain a claim for fraud.

Moreover, now, at the summary judgment stage, the Halls have presented no evidence of

specific statements or omissions by Nationstar or U.S. Bank that would support a fraud claim. In

her deposition, Mrs. Hall admitted that any alleged misrepresentations referenced in her

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Complaint were made by Bank of America, not Nationstar. Mrs. Hall testified that the only

alleged misrepresentation or concealment she could attribute to Nationstar was that Nationstar

offered the Halls a loan modification and then later reneged on it. However, Mrs. Hall

acknowledged that the real reason the Nationstar trial modification was not implemented was

that the Halls had refused to accept the offer and did not sign and return the documents.

Nationstar's retraction of a rejected offer does not constitute fraud.

Accordingly, the court finds that the Halls have failed to offer evidence sufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact as to their fraudulent concealment claim. The court will,

therefore, GRANT the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count VI of the Halls'

Complaint.

7. Count VII - Unjust Enrichment

Finally, in Count VII of their Complaint, the Halls allege that the "Defendant was unjustly

enriched at the expense of each of the Plaintiffs." (Doc. 1, ¶ 126).

Under Alabama law, "[t]o prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must

show that the defendant holds money which, in equity and good conscience, belongs to the

plaintiff or holds money which was improperly paid to the defendant because of mistake or

fraud." Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988, 1011 (Ala. 2006) (internal quotations and citations

omitted) (emphasis in original).

The Halls premise their unjust enrichment claim on the First Franklin modification. The

Halls contend that Nationstar was unjustly enriched because it prevented the Halls "from making

reduced monthly payments and by failing to honor the First Franklin Modification and by failing

to offer the Halls a permanent modification." (Doc. 26, at 42); see also (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 127-28).

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As set out above, the Halls have neither demonstrated that the First Franklin entered into

a binding modification agreement with the Halls, nor that First Franklin made a promise to

accept reduced payments from the Halls. The Halls have also failed to show that Nationstar

entered into a binding contract or made a promise to accept reduced payments from the Halls.

Accordingly, Nationstar was not obligated to allow the Halls to make reduced monthly

payments. The Halls have asserted no other basis for an unjust enrichment claim. 

Consequently, the court will GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Count VII of the Halls' Complaint.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment IN PART and will DENY it IN PART.

The court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion as to all claims against Defendant U.S.

Bank. 

The court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion as to Counts III-VII of the Halls'

Complaint against Defendant Nationstar. The court will, however, DENY the Defendants'

Motion as to Counts I and II of the Halls' Complaint against Defendant Nationstar because the

court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Nationstar complied with

the provisions of the FDCPA and RESPA.

The only claims remaining in this action will be the Halls' claims in Counts I and II of

their Complaint, alleging violations of the FDCPA and RESPA by Defendant Nationstar.

The court will enter a separate Order along with this Opinion.

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DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of July, 2016.

 ____________________________________

 KARON OWEN BOWDRE

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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