Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05132/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05132-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION 

STEPHEN JAMES ENGLEMAN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-5132

SHERIFF KEITH FERGUSON;

DEPUTY MURRAY; and

KEITH SMITH, Chief of Police,

Gentry Police Department DEFENDANTS

ORDER

NOW on this 28th day of March 2007, the above referenced

matter comes on for consideration and the Court, being well and

sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows: 

1. This matter was originally initiated by the plaintiff on

July 27, 2005. 

On June 28, 2006, separate defendants Sheriff Keith Ferguson

and Deputy Murray, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment

(document #27). And, on July 18, 2006, separate defendant Keith

Smith filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (document #30). 

To assist plaintiff in responding to the summary judgment

motion, a questionnaire was propounded to the plaintiff (document

#36). The plaintiff’s response to the questionnaire was filed on

February 21, 2007 as his response to the summary judgment motion

(document #56); in addition, the plaintiff filed a supplemental

response to the summary judgment (document #61) on March 1, 2007.

2. The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge

(document #64 -- the “R & R”) addressed the two summary judgment

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motions and was filed on March 5, 2007. It further provided that

“parties have ten days from receipt of the report and

recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).” 

3. The plaintiff has filed several documents which this

Court will consider objections to the R&R. Specifically, on March

13, 2007, Engleman filed document #67; also on March 13, 2007,

Engleman filed document #68; and, on March 14, 2007, Engleman

filed document #69.

4. In this §1983 case, Engleman contends that his

constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested in the

State of Oklahoma, physically assaulted during the arrest, and

then transported to the State of Arkansas. The R&R addresses

both pending motions for summary judgment (documents #27 and 30);

and, recommends that the pending motions should be granted and

that this case should be dismissed. However, the Court, having

reviewed Engleman’s objections, finds that the R&R should be

adopted in part, and rejected in part for the reasons stated

below. 

5. As previously stated, currently pending before this

court are motions for summary judgment filed by separate

defendants Sheriff Keith Ferguson, Deputy Murray, and Keith Smith.

The standard to be applied to a motion for summary judgment is set

forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

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provides for the entry of summary judgment on a claim

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847 (8th

Cir. 2001); Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256 (8 Cir. th

1996). Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence

is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 (1986). Accordingly, all evidence must be viewed in the light

“most favorable to the non-moving party.” F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106

F.3d 258, 263 (8 Cir. 1997); see also Bailey v. United States th

Postal Service, 208 F.3d 652, 654 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Where a movant makes and properly supports a motion for

summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings; rather, the non-movant

must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. The non-moving

party must "make a sufficient showing on every essential element

of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial."

Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir.

1995). 

6. For the purpose of considering the motions for summary

judgment and based upon the pleadings submitted by the parties,

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the Court believes the following material facts appear: 

* On March 23, 2004, a warrant was issued for Engleman’s

arrest by a Bentonville District Court Judge for failure to

comply. The warrant identified Engleman by name, social security

number, date of birth, photograph, and listed his address as 24512

Van Fleet Road, Siloam Springs, Arkansas.

* On January 11, 2005, the Benton County Sheriff’s Office

received a call concerning a “prowler” at 24512 Van Fleet Road,

Siloam Springs, Arkansas. 

* Deputy Murray and a Gentry Police Officer responded to

the call about the prowler. Engleman indicates there were also

two other Benton County deputies present. 

* Engleman’s father was present at 24512 Van Fleet Road.

The police officers searched the house for Engleman. At the time

of the search, Engleman was hiding in a closet inside the garage.

* Engleman was arrested on the warrant issued on March 23,

2004, for failure to comply. Engleman maintains he was taken by

force against his will, across the state line into Arkansas.

Although the defendants indicate that Engleman was arrested at

24512 Van Fleet Road, Siloam Springs, Arkansas, Engleman contends

this is simply a mailing address and that he was actually arrested

at Route 1, Colcord, Oklahoma. 

* Engleman was arrested on January 11, 2005, at 4:30 a.m.

He was booked into the Benton County Detention Center at

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approximately 5:16 a.m. Upon intake at the Benton County

Sheriff’s Office, Engleman gave his address as 24512 Van Fleet

Road, Siloam Springs, Arkansas. Engleman indicates he told

detention center officials that this was a mailing address and not

a physical address. 

* Engleman was the person who placed the call to 911 about

a prowler on his father’s property. His father’s telephone is

assigned an Arkansas number of 479-524-4056. 

* Engleman maintains the property, including the house, is

located in the State of Oklahoma. 

* As set forth in the filings of separate defendants

Ferguson and Murray, “[a]ccording to a GPS map obtained by Benton

County Sheriff’s Office in conjunction with this Complaint, the

house at 24512 Van Fleet Road is in the State of Oklahoma.

However, the state line passes through the property in such a way

that the mail box is in Arkansas. The residents use an Arkansas

address and have Arkansas driver’s license and registration.” 

* Prior to Engleman’s arrest, he attempted to hide from

the officers and resisted their efforts to arrest him. When the

officers saw Engleman fleeing towards the back of the garage, he

refused to comply with the officers’ commands. 

* Officers attempted to apprehend Engleman and in doing so

sprayed him with pepper spray. Engleman was taken to the ground

and handcuffed. 

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* Deputy Murray was present but did not spray Engleman

with pepper spray. Murray transported Engleman to the Benton

County Detention Center. 

* Engleman does not contend that Sheriff Ferguson was

present during the arrest or when he was booked into the Benton

County Detention Center. 

* Engleman does not know which Gentry police officer was

present during the arrest. However, he believes Police Chief

Keith Smith should be liable for his officers. 

* In his supplemental response to the summary judgment

motion, Engleman points out that he was arrested in the Fall of

2003 by two Benton County deputies at his father’s house. He

notes that the charges were ultimately dropped because it was

confirmed that the property was located in Oklahoma. 

* Engleman refers the court to the documents he filed with

the court as supplements to his complaint. These documents

indicate Engleman was arrested on September 27, 2003, and charged

with domestic battery 3, possession of drug paraphernalia, failure

to appear, terroristic threatening, and false imprisonment. With

the exception of the failure to appear and failure to comply

charges, the remaining charges were ultimately dismissed in

January of 2004. It appears the dismissal was based on the fact

that the actions on which the charges were based took place in

Oklahoma. The documents indicate that Engleman’s attorney

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confirmed with Ann Engleman that the farms were on the Oklahoma

side of the line. 

7. The Court will address the pending summary judgment

motions separately with respect to each individual defendant. 

* KEITH SMITH

Gentry Police Chief Keith Smith moves for summary judgment

contending that there was no violation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Further, Smith argues that if a violation

did occur, there is no basis on which he can be held liable.

Finally, with respect to the excessive force claim, Smith contends

Engleman’s claim fails as a matter of law since Engleman suffered

no actual injury. 

“Liability under §1983 requires a causal link to, and direct

responsibility for, the depravation of [constitutionally

protected] rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d. 1203, 1208 (8th

Cir. 1990). Accordingly, a “supervisor is not vicariously liable

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for an employee’s unconstitutional

activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8 Cir. 1994). A th

supervisor is liable only if he “directly participates in a

constitutional violation or if a failure to properly supervise and

train the offending employee caused a deprivation of rights.”

Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8 Cir. 1996). th

The plaintiff has made no allegation that Keith Smith was at

the scene of his arrest on January 11, 2005. Specifically, the

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plaintiff stated that he does not know which Gentry police officer

was present at the scene. Further, the plaintiff has made no

allegation or contention that Keith Smith failed to properly

supervise or train Gentry police employees which then resulted in

a deprivation of rights. The plaintiff only argues that he

believes that Chief Keith Smith should be liable for his officers.

Given these undisputed facts, the Court finds that Engleman’s

claims against Smith are subject to dismissal, and that Smith’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (document #30) should be granted. 

* SHERIFF KEITH FERGUSON

Sheriff Keith Ferguson moves for summary judgment, also on

the grounds that the plaintiff has suffered no constitutional

deprivation. However, as with separate defendant Keith Smith, the

Court finds that the claims against Sheriff Ferguson are subject

to dismissal regardless of whether the plaintiff ultimately

suffered a constitutional deprivation. As set forth above, a

“supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for an

employee’s unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d

277, 280 (8 Cir. 1994). A supervisor is liable only if he th

“directly participates in a constitutional violation or if a

failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee

caused a deprivation of rights.” Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069,

1078 (8 Cir. 1996). Engleman does not contend that Sheriff th

Ferguson was present during his arrest or when he was booked into

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the Benton County Detention Center. Further, Engleman does not

allege that Ferguson failed to properly supervise or train his

employees, and that he therefore, ultimately, caused a deprivation

of constitutional rights. Engleman merely contends that Ferguson

should be liable for the actions of his officers. For the reasons

set forth above, with respect to the plaintiff’s claims against

Sheriff Keith Ferguson, the Motion for Summary Judgment (document

#27) should be granted. 

* DEPUTY MURRAY

With respect to separate defendant Deputy Murray, the

plaintiff appears to assert two constitutional claims: a Fourth

Amendment claim for violation of the right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures; and, an excessive force claim.

Excessive force: With respect to the excessive force claim,

Engleman has alleged that Deputy Murray took the follow action:

assisted in capturing Engleman; placed his knee in Engleman’s back

to handcuff him; and assisted in dragging Engleman out of the

garage. As set forth in the R&R, “[i]n addressing an excessive

force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying

the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the

challenged application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386

(1989). “[T]he constitutional standard applied may vary depending

upon whether the victim is an arrestee, a pretrial detainee, or a

convicted inmate of penal institution.” Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d

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1052, 1060 (8 Cir. 2001). In this case, Engleman was an th

arrestee. Engleman’s claim should therefore be analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. See e.g., Samuelson v.

City of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2006)(citation

omitted). Clearly, because Engleman attempted to hide from the

officers and resisted their efforts to arrest him, some amount of

force was reasonable to secure Engleman and place him in the car.

See Samuelson, 455 F.3d at 875-876; Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d

1062, 1067 (8 Cir. 2006); Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm’n, th

914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8 Cir. 1990). Further, given the minimal th

medical injury, if any, suffered by Engleman, summary judgment is

appropriate with respect to Engleman’s excessive force claim.

Andrews v. Fuoss, 417 F.3d 813, 818 (8 Cir. 2005); Crumley v. th

City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8 Cir. 2003). th

Unreasonable search and seizure: The Fourth Amendment of the

United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches

and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. This includes the right to

be free from arrest without probable cause. The reasonableness of

a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is measured in

objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.

See e.g. United States v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 718 (8 Cir. th

2002). Arrest pursuant to a valid warrant normally establishes

probable cause for arrest. Luckes v. County of Hennepin, 415 F.3d

936, 938 (8 Cir. 2005). th

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In this case, Engleman was arrested pursuant to a warrant and

he does not dispute the validity of the arrest warrant. Further,

although Engleman agrees that the police were at his property in

response to his report of a prowler, he contends that the officers

were without jurisdiction to arrest him because he was physically

in Oklahoma at the time the arrest was made. Engleman says that

the officers were repeatedly told that they were in Oklahoma prior

to the arrest. He also maintains that they should have been aware

of the fact that the property was located in Oklahoma since

criminal charges that were filed against him in Benton County in

2003 were dismissed because -- he says -- the actions on which

the charges were based occurred on the property which was at the

time shown to be in Oklahoma. Further, in response to an

observation by the Magistrate Judge that Engleman offers no

explanation for why he summoned the Benton County police to the

property instead of calling the appropriate authorities in

Oklahoma, Engleman states that he did not call the Benton County

police, but instead called 911 and Benton County officers were

simply the ones that answered the 911 call. 

The R&R opines that “[t]he mere fact that the arrest may have

been effected in the State of Oklahoma does not equate to a

violation of the Fourth Amendment.” See e.g., Abbott v. City of

Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998 (8 Cir. 1994). Based upon the th

reasoning of the Abbott case, the Magistrate Judge then concludes

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The Court in Abbott noted “the existence of some inconsistency in the rulings of 1

the Circuit on this issue.” Abbott, 30 F.3d 998, FN3. See Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d

812, 816 (1986); Cole v. Nebraska State Board of Parole, 997 F.2d 442, 444 (8 Cir. th

1993). 

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that there are no “genuine issues of material fact as to the

reasonableness of the extra-jurisdictional arrest.” 

This Court is not persuaded and believes that Abbott is

distinguishable on the facts of this case. 

In Abbott, the plaintiff brought suit for violations of his

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based upon the alleged use

of excessive force and alleged unauthorized arrest. The claim of

unauthorized arrest stemmed from an arrest made by a municipal

police officer while outside the city limits -- and in the

jurisdiction of the county sheriff’s department. It was

undisputed that such an arrest was unauthorized by state law.

Nevertheless, a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held

that the court below “erred in determining, as a matter of law,

that the arrest in violation of state law necessarily also

constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Abbott, 30 F.3d

at 998.1

In Abbott, the late Richard S. Arnold, then Chief Judge of

the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, issued a separate opinion,

concurring in part and dissenting in part. Specifically and

significantly, Judge Arnold dissented with respect to the issue at

bar, finding that “even though a violation of state law in the

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course of an arrest is not a per se constitutional violation, it

can be ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, depending on the

nature of the violation.” Id. at 1000. Under the circumstances

of Abbott, Judge Arnold reasoned:

Perhaps the most important reason why a state might

limit the jurisdiction of city and town officers to

their respective communities is that smaller communities

are unlikely to have the resources to provide their

officers with proper training in the elements of

probable cause or arrest procedures. By limiting an

officer’s jurisdiction to the community in which she

serves, a state helps ensure not only that the power of

the police over individuals will be appropriately

restricted, but also that an officer will be

sufficiently trained for the types of arrests likely to

occur in her community. This type of restriction helps

to protect the very interests underlying the Fourth

Amendment, those of the individual in privacy and

personal freedom, and, at the same time, balances the

interests of government in protecting society and making

arrests in a safe, efficient, and constitutional manner.

For these reasons, I would hold that the violation of

state law in this case made the arrest unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment.

Abbott, 30 F.3d at 1000. 

Similarly, in Cole v. Nebraska State Board of Parole, a

separate panel of the Eighth Circuit analyzed an arrest conducted

by a parole supervisor. 997 F.2d 442 (8 Cir. 1993). In that th

case, the Court found that under Nebraska law “a warrantless

arrest of a parole violator is lawful only if the parole officer

‘has reasonable cause to believe that a parolee . . . will attempt

to leave the jurisdiction or will place lives or property in

danger . . .’” Id. at 444. There was no basis to believe that the

parole officer had reasonable cause to hold such a belief; and,

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subsequently, the Court concluded that “[a]n arrest by a state

actor that is not authorized by state law is actionable under §

1983 as a seizure contrary to the Fourth Amendment.” See

Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d 812, 816 (8 Cir. 1986); United th

States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289 (8 Cir. 1986). th

Based upon the above cited case law, this Court believes that

if, in fact, the arrest in question in this case was accomplished

in the State of Oklahoma -- by Arkansas police officers acting

pursuant to an Arkansas warrant -- it was not authorized by the

laws of either the State of Arkansas or the State of Oklahoma. If

that should prove to be the case, then it would appear that

plaintiff can and does state a viable claim under § 1983 and the

Fourth Amendment which would withstand a summary judgment

challenge. At this point, the Court believes material questions

of fact remain in dispute -- as to whether the arrest was, in

fact, accomplished in Oklahoma and whether there are any other

relevant facts which would inform the Court as to whether Abbott

or Bissonette, and its progeny, should control.

As the matter now stands, there is evidence from which the

Court could conclude that the arrest occurred in Oklahoma and,

therefore, that it was not authorized by applicable law. However,

there is also evidence which might show that the arrest occurred

in Arkansas since both an Arkansas address and an Arkansas phone

number are associated with the premises on which Engleman was

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arrested. 

Before addressing this issue further, the Court is obliged to

discuss another preliminary issue which, because of the ultimate

recommendation made on the unlawful arrest claim, was not

addressed by the Magistrate Judge.

Deputy Murray argues that even if a constitutional claim has

been stated, he is entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

According to the United States Supreme Court in Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, “government officials performing discretionary

functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Where a defendant

seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made so

that the cost and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense

is dispositive, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), because

qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face

the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 526 (1985). The privilege is “an immunity from suit rather

than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity,

it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial.” Id. According to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,

qualified immunity triggers a three-prong inquiry:

(1) whether the plaintiffs have asserted a violation of

a constitutional or statutory right; (2) if so, whether

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that right was clearly established at the time of the

violation; and (3) whether, given the facts most

favorable to the plaintiffs, there are no genuine issues

of material fact as to whether a reasonable official

would have known that the alleged action violated that

right.

Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 673 -674 (8 Cir. 1997)(en banc). th

As discussed above, if the arrest actually occurred in

Oklahoma the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a

constitutional right. The right to be free from an unreasonable

seizure was clearly established at the time of the violation; and,

there is no question that a reasonable official would know that an

unauthorized arrest – i.e., an arrest by a police officer outside

of that police officer’s jurisdiction wherein he is commissioned

and authorized to act -– would amount to a violation of an

individual’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure. For

those reasons, the Court finds that Deputy Murray is not entitled

to qualified immunity and that, with respect to the plaintiff’s

claim for unreasonable seizure, the Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. #30) should be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of

the Magistrate Judge (document #64) is adopted in part and

rejected in part, and, in accordance therewith, the Court finds

that:

1. the Motion for Summary Judgment (document #27) of

separate defendants Sheriff Keith Ferguson and Deputy Murray

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should be granted in part, and denied in part, as follows:

* with respect to all claims against Sheriff Keith

Ferguson, the motion is granted;

* with respect to the excessive force claim against Deputy

Murray, the motion is granted; and,

* with respect to the unreasonable seizure claim against

Deputy Murray, the motion is denied. 

2. the Motion for Summary Judgment (document #30) of

separate defendant Keith Smith should be granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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