Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05097/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05097-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United Srllr , Court of Appeals Ttnrh Ciro.tit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JUN 2 8 1991 

ROY L. JACKSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INTEGRA, INC., doing business as 

Residence Inn; MARRIOTT, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ROY L. JACKSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

INTEGRA, INC., doing business as 

Residence Inn; MARRIOTT, INC., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

> Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 90-5097 

) (D.C. No. 89-C-816-E 

) ( N. D. Okla. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-5029 

) (D.C. No. 89-C-816-E) 

) ( N. D. Okla. ) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, BARRETT, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5097 Document: 010110128261 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

These two appeals arise 

proceeding. In appeal No. 

from the same 

90-5097, plaintiff 

district court 

challenges the 

district court's dismissal, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), of his 

action seeking damages for breach of contract, wrongful discharge, 

and several related torts. In appeal No. 91-5029, defendants seek 

review of the district court's subsequent denial of their 

application for attorney fees. 

Appeal No. 90-5097 

Plaintiff's appeal must be dismissed for lack of appellate 

jurisdiction. On March 30, 1990, the district court entered an 

order granting defendants' motions to dismiss and directing 

counsel to prepare an appropriate form of judgment for filing. 

Within ten days of the district court's order, plaintiff submitted 

a "Motion to Vacate Order and Judgement," in which he argued that 

the court had erred in several substantive respects. On April 23, 

1990, the district court signed and entered the judgment prepared 

by defendants in accordance with the court's earlier direction, 

and a few days later plaintiff appealed. The motion to vacate was 

not denied until August 23, 1990, however, and plaintiff did not 

file a notice of appeal following that ruling. 

Despite its nominal designation, plaintiff's motion to vacate 

was clearly a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 59(e). See Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th 

Cir. 1986)("regardless of how it is characterized, a post-judgment 

motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that 

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Appellate Case: 90-5097 Document: 010110128261 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 2 
> 

questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a 

motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)"); see also Martinez v. 

Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 1989). The fact that the 

motion was filed after the district court indicated the action it 

would take but before formal entry of a judgment embodying that 

action does not alter its status under Rule 59(e). See Hilst v. 

Bowen, 874 F.2d 725, 726 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Any motion deemed to have been made pursuant to Rule 59(e) 

triggers the tolling provision of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). 

Martinez, 874 F.2d at 753. Thus, the time for appeal in this case 

did not commence until August 23, 1990, when the motion to vacate 

was denied. See, e.g., Hilst, 874 F.2d at 726. Accordingly, 

plaintiff's notice of appeal filed in the interim is a nullity, 

and his failure to file a separate notice following disposition of 

the motion to vacate leaves this court with no jurisdiction and no 

choice but to dismiss the appeal. 

753-54. 

See Martinez, 874 F.2d at 

Appeal No. 91-5029 

Defendants claim they are entitled to attorney fees as 

prevailing parties under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936, which states: 

In any civil action to recover on an open account, 

a statement of account, account stated, note, bill, 

negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the 

purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for 

labor or services, unless otherwise provided by law or 

the contract which is the subject [of] the action, the 

prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney 

fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as 

costs. 

Specifically, defendants contend that this case, brought primarily 

to redress an alleged wrongful discharge in breach of plaintiff's 

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Appellate Case: 90-5097 Document: 010110128261 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 3 
employment contract, constitutes an action to recover on a 

contract for labor or services and, therefore, falls within the 

scope of section 936. The district court rejected this 

contention, holding that section 936 generally does not apply to 

wrongful termination suits. We agree. 

The courts of Oklahoma have held for some time that section 

936 applies only to actions for unpaid labor or services rendered, 

not to suits for damages otherwise arising from breach of a 

contract relating to labor or services. See Russell v. Flanagan, 

544 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1975); see also ABC Coating Co. v. 

J. Harris & Sons Ltd., 747 P.2d 271, 273 (Okla. 1987)(reaffirming 

principle established in Russell). Compare Ferrell Constr. Co. v. 

Russell Creek Coal Co., 645 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Okla. 1982)(section 

936 inapplicable to claim for profits lost when defendant breached 

contract for plaintiff's services and thereby precluded plaintiff 

from performing) with Hamilton v. Telex Corp., 576 P.2d 769, 770 

(Okla. 1978)(section 936 applicable to claim seeking compensation 

for plaintiff's services rendered). Indeed, we recently 

recognized and applied this principle in an action alleging 

wrongful termination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34, where we held that such a 

claim seeks "damages for the alleged breach of a labor contract 

and not for the value of services rendered," and, therefore, does 

not come within the terms of section 936. Merrick v. Northern 

Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 434 (10th Cir. 1990). These 

authorities control our analysis of section 936 and confirm the 

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.... 

correctness of the district court's denial of defendants' 

application for attorney fees thereunder. 

Defendants' argument for the existence of a contrary line of 

Oklahoma case law establishing the applicability of section 936 to 

the wrongful termination context is unpersuasive. Two of the 

three cases they cite in this regard are, for evident procedural 

reasons, restricted in analysis to the specific question of who 

was the "prevailing party," and do not address the issue with 

which we are concerned. See Hicks v. Lloyd's General Ins. Agency, 

Inc., 763 P.2d 85, 85-87 (Okla. 1988)(certiorari granted and 

proceeding resolved solely on question whether successful 

plaintiff's failure to recover in excess of pretrial offer of 

judgment shifted prevailing party status to defendant); Quapaw Co. 

v. Varnell, 566 P.2d 164, 167 (Okla. App. 1977)(parties agreed on 

application of section 936 and disputed only who could be 

considered a prevailing party where defendant succeeded on 

interlocutory appeal in having two of four causes of action 

dismissed and plaintiff subsequently recovered on remaining two 

claims). The third case, Doyle v. Kelly, 801 P.2d 717 (Okla. 

1990), is the most recent Oklahoma Supreme Court pronouncement on 

the scope of section 936, and it does permit an award of attorney 

fees for successful pursuit of a breach of employment contract 

claim. However, a careful reading of the opinion reveals that the 

damages recovered by the insurance agent plaintiff were (1) 

premium-renewal commissions owed to the plaintiff based on 

policies he had sold and (2) earned bonus commissions, id. at 720, 

both of which clearly involve compensation for services rendered. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5097 Document: 010110128261 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 5 
Doyle is thus entirely consistent with the general principles 

established in Russell and followed in the line of cases extending 

through this court's decision in Merrick, to which we adhere. 

Accordingly, plaintiff's appeal (No. 90-5097) is DISMISSED, 

the district court's order denying defendants' application for 

attorney fees (appeal No. 91-5029) is AFFIRMED, and all pending 

motions are DENIED as moot. 

Entered for the Court 

James E. Barrett 

Senior Circuit Judge 

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