Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01794/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01794-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAUL BARRIOS PEREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

DILL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-01794-LJO-SMS PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND TO BE

COGNIZABLE

(Doc. 1)

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Saul Barrios Perez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

December 5, 2007. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, “the liberal pleading

standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330

n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements

of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff is currently housed at Salinas Valley State Prison. The events giving rise to the

claims at issue in this action allegedly occurred at Kern Valley State Prison. Plaintiff alleges

violations of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution stemming from the conditions

of his confinement on contraband watch and the failure to provide him with medical treatment for

the injuries he sustained as a result of the tape and shackles used on him. Plaintiff names Associate

Warden Dill; Sergeants Harden, Sobbe, and Sandoval; Captain Tyson; and Correctional Officers

Chan, Vieth, and Brown as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and injunctive relief.

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of

confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). “[W]hile conditions

of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they ‘must not involve the wanton and

unnecessary infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct.

2392 (1981)). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement,

prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk

of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970

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(1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991)). Second, the prison

official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying

humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Defendants based on the

conditions he was subjected to while on contraband watch. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Erickson v. Pardus,

127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2008). However,

Plaintiff has not linked any of the defendants to the denial of medical care. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations omitted). In this instance, Plaintiff has not alleged

any facts which would support a claim that any of the defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health or safety” arising out ofmedical needs. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

III. Claim for Injunctive Relief

In addition to money damages, Plaintiff alleges a claim for injunctive relief. A federal court

has no authority to issue opinions upon moot issues. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S.

625 (1979); Aguirre v. S.S. Sohio Intrepid, 801 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1986). When an inmate seeks

injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the prison where he is incarcerated, his claims for such

relief become moot when he is no longer subjected to those conditions. See Weinstein v. Bradford,

423 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1975) (finding prisoner’s due process claim to be moot once he obtained a

full release from prison supervision); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding

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prisoner’s suit for library access to be moot upon his transfer to another prison); Chronicle

Publishing Co. v. Rison, 962 F.2d 959, 960 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding a prisoner’s suit challenging

prison’s publication regulations to be moot upon prisoner’s release on parole). Because Plaintiff

is no longer on contraband watch at Kern Valley State Prison, his claim for injunctive relief is moot

and this action shall proceed as one for damages only. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint states a claim under the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Dill,

Harden, Sobbe, Sandoval, Tyson, Chan, Vieth, and Brown based on the conditions of confinement

on contraband watch. However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts linking one or more of the

defendants to the failure to provide treatment for serious medical issues. The Court will provide

Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

Court in this order. 

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only

against Defendants on his contraband watch claim, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing, and

the Court will issue a Findings and Recommendations recommending dismissal of the medical claim,

and will forward Plaintiff summonses and USM-285 forms for completion and return. Upon receipt

of the forms, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process.

If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in brief but specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability unless there is some affirmative link or connection

between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);

May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978). 

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must leave adequate space between his

sentence lines. In the current complaint, Plaintiff has crammed three lines of sentences into spacing

intended for one line. The Court will not strictly hold Plaintiff to the formatting requirements set

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forth in Local Rule 7-130, but neither will the Court overlook formatting that unreasonably burdens

its ability to read a filing.

 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing

to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at

1474.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in

this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only on his Eighth Amendment claim

arising from the conditions on contraband watch; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 3, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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