Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00833/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00833-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS PERFINO AND JESS

ZURANICH,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

STEVE HARDY, DIRECTOR; ELIZABETH

GAVIA, LORI AJAX, 

 Defendants.

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2:09-cv-00833-GEB-KJM

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION*

Plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the Court’s July 2,

2010, “Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff Perfino’s Federal Claim & Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Remaining

State Claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)” under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b). In essence, Plaintiffs argue they should be

excused from failing to submit certain evidence in opposition to

Defendants’ summary judgment motion because they were not on notice of

the “class of one” equal protection issue raised in the July 2, 2010,

Order. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ reconsideration motion

is DENIED.

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I. BACKGROUND

Defendants argued in their summary judgment motion that they

were entitled to prevail on Plaintiff Perfino (“Perfino”)’s federal

equal protection claim and Plaintiffs’ state interference with contract

claim. Summary judgment was granted on Perfino’s equal protection claim

on July 2, 2010, on two grounds: 1) Perfino was not “ready and able to

apply for the [subject] liquor license[,]” and 2) Perfino’s “class of

one” allegations were unsupported by facts in the summary judgment

record. (Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Order”) 9:7-16,

10:10-12, ECF No. 64.) Plaintiffs’ remaining state law interference

with contract claim was dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.

section 1367(c)(3). (Id. 12:12-16.)

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue the Court should reconsider the July 2, 2010,

Order based upon their “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect” in not supplying available evidence to support Perfino’s “class

of one” claim because the “issue/doctrine was not raised by the

defendants in their moving papers . . . nor . . . during the course of

litigation in this matter.” (Pls.’ Mem. of P.&A.’s in Supp. of Mot. for

Reconsideration (“Mot.”) 7:10-12, 7:14-16, 7:26-27.) Plaintiffs also

argue in their reply brief that reconsideration is warranted “for any

other reason that justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6). (Pls.’ Reply

Brief in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration (“Reply”) 6:1-2.) However,

since the Rule 60(b)(6) argument was made for the first time in

Plaintiffs’ reply, it is considered waived and need not be addressed.

See United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Issues raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief are

generally deemed waived.”); Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th

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Cir. 2007)(“The district court need not consider arguments raised for

the first time in a reply brief.”) 

Defendants oppose the motion, arguing “[n]one of the three

criteria [permitting reconsideration] exist in this case.” (Defs.’ Opp’n

to Mot. for Reconsideration (“Opp’n”) 2:2-3.) Defendants contend, inter

alia, they showed Perfino cannot prevail on his equal protection claim

since he was not “ready and able to apply for a liquor license,” and the

evidence Plaintiffs seek to present in opposition to Defendants’ summary

judgment motion is not “new evidence” required to justify

reconsideration since it was available at the time Plaintiffs opposed

Defendants’ summary judgment motion. (Opp’n 3:20-26, 4:13-16.)

“A district court may reconsider its grant of summary judgment

under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (motion to alter or

amend a judgment) or Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment).” School Dist.

No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th

Cir. 1993). However, “[a]bsent ‘highly unusual circumstances,’

reconsideration of a final judgment is appropriate only where (1) the

court is presented with newly-discovered evidence, (2) the court

committed ‘clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust,’

or (3) there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Calif.

Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Davis, 302 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1140 (E.D. Cal.

2002)(quoting ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d at 1263). 

Plaintiffs have not shown that reconsideration is appropriate.

The evidence Plaintiffs argue justifies reconsideration is not “newlydiscovered” evidence since it was available before Plaintiffs filed

their opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. (Mot. 9:5-8,

9:14-16, 10:13-20.) See Frederick S. Wyle Prof. Corp. v. Texaco, Inc.,

764 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1985)(stating evidence available to party

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before it filed its opposition to a summary judgment motion was not

“newly discovered evidence” warranting reconsideration.) 

Further, Plaintiffs have not shown that the Court committed

clear error in granting summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ argument that the

“class of one” doctrine “had not been raised at all throughout the

litigation of this matter” is incorrect. (Mot. 5:6-9.) The March 29,

2010, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint expressly construed

Perfino’s equal protection claim as a “class of one” claim. (Docket No.

53, 11:15-12:5.) Even assuming arguendo, that Plaintiffs did not have,

and should have been provided, notice of the “class of one” equal

protection issue, the evidentiary record makes it manifestly clear that

it was Ayala’s decision to withdraw his liquor license application that

prevented Perfino from being able to apply for the liquor license at

issue, not the Defendants’ alleged arbitrary treatment of Perfino.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied.

Dated: August 24, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

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