Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02666/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02666-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Ucited Statf6 Un~n of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruit 

UNITED STATES ·COURT OF APPEALS 

MAY 8- 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

EMERY L. NEGONSOTT 1 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

HAROLD SAMUELS and THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

STATE OF KANSAS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2666 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 88-3049-S) 

Pamela s. Thompson, Kansas City, Kansas,. for~intiff-Appellant. 

Timothy G. Madden, Special Assistant Attorney General, Department 

of Corrections, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 1 
This habeas case requires us to determine the scope of 

criminal jurisdiction granted by 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1988) to the 

State of Kansas over state-law offenses committed by Indians on 

Indian lands. Petitioner Emery L. Negonsott claims that Kansas 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute him for aggravated 

battery because that offense is within exclusive federal 

jurisdiction under the Federal Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 

(1988). The district court held that the State had jurisdiction. 

We agree and conclude that the federal grant of criminal 

jurisdiction to the State of Kansas in section 3243 extends to 

state-law offenses that are also crimes enumerated in the Major 

Crimes Act. 

I. 

Negonsott belongs to the Kickapoo Tribe and resided during 

1985 on the Kickapoo reservation in Brown County, Kansas. He was 

arrested, charged, and convicted in that year of aggravated 

battery in the District Court of Brown County for shooting another 

Kickapoo Indian on the Kickapoo reservation. See Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§ 21-3414 (1988). The state trial judge, relying on State v. 

Mitchell, 231 Kan. 144, 642 P.2d 981 (1982), vacated the 

conviction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, 

the Kansas Supreme Court reversed in a decision overruling 

Mitchell, and Negonsott's case was remanded for sentencing. See 

-2-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 2 
Kansas v. Nioce, 239 Kan. 117, 716 P.2d 585 (Kan. 1986). 

Negonsott was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three to ten 

years. 

Negonsott filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

United States District court for the District of Kansas, 

continuing his claim that the State of Kansas lacked jurisdiction 

to convict him for the offense of aggravated battery as defined by 

Kansas state law. The district court denied the writ and 

Negonsott appeals. 

II. 

The sole issue in this case is whether 18 u.s.c. § 3243 

confers jurisdiction on the State of Kansas to prosecute 

petitioner, a Kickapoo Indian, for the state-law crime of 

aggravated battery against another Indian committed on the 

reservation. This question of statutory interpretation is one of 

law, which we review de novo. See Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 

1352 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

In analyzing the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Kansas 

over crimes involving Indians committed on Indian land, we begin 

with the language of the relevant statutes. It is elementary that 

"[i]n construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if 

possible, to every word Congress used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 

-3-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 3 
442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). If a statute is susceptible to two 

meanings, a court will choose a meaning that gives full effect to 

all the provisions of the statute. See Mountain States Tel. & 

Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985). 

Moreover, statutes should be construed so that their provisions 

are harmonious with each other. See United States v. Stauffer 

Chemical Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1184 (6th Cir. 1982). 

The statute under which the State of Kansas claims subject 

matter jurisdiction provides: 

"Jurisdiction is conferred on the State of Kansas over 

offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian 

reservations, including trust or restricted allotments, 

within the State of Kansas, to the same extent as its 

courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed 

elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws 

of the State. 

"This section shall not deprive the courts of the United 

States of jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws 

of the United States committed by or against Indians on 

Indian reservations." 

18 u.s.c. § 3243 (emphasis added). The second sentence of this 

statute appears to refer in part to the Indian Major Crimes Act, 

which provides: 

"(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or 

property of another Indian or other person any of the 

following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, 

kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, 

incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault 

with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious 

bodily injury, ... within the Indian Country, shall be 

subject to the same laws and penalties as all other 

persons committing any of the above offenses, within the 

exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 4 
"(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of 

this section that is not defined and punished by Federal 

law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

United States shall be defined and punished in 

accordance with the laws of the State in which such 

offense was committed as are in force at the time of 

such offense." 

18 u.s.c. § 1153 (1988) (emphasis added). A separate statute 

governs the jurisdiction and venue of the Major Crimes Act as 

follows: 

"All Indians committing any offense listed in the first 

paragraph of and punishable under section 1153 (relating 

to offenses committed within Indian country) of this 

title shall be tried in the same courts and in the same 

manner as are all other persons committing such offense 

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 

18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1988) (emphasis added).1 

The crimes of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault 

resulting in serious bodily injury, named in the Major Crimes Act, 

are defined for purposes of federal jurisdiction at 18 U.S.C. §§ 

113(c) & (f) (1988). Federal jurisdiction over major crimes 

committed by Indians has been held to be exclusive. See United 

States v. John, 437 u.s. 634, 651 (1978); United States v. 

Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 649 n.12 (1977); Seymour v. 

Superintendent, 368 u.s. 351, 359 (1962); see also Langley v. 

1 The predecessor to sections 1153 and 3242 was initially 

passed in 1885 in response to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex 

Parte Crow Dog, 109 u.s. 556 (1883), which held that the limited 

jurisdiction of the federal courts did not extend to crimes by an 

Indian against another Indian on an Indian reservation. See 

United States v. Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 383 (1886). In the 

original enactment, what are now sections 1153 and 3242 were 

combined in one provision. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 

Stat. 385. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 5 
Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092, 1096 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985)(holding that 

section 1153 preempts state criminal jurisdiction, citing John). 

Negonsott contends that the Kansas Act did not confer jurisdiction 

on the Kansas state courts over those corresponding state law 

offenses which are also included in the Major Crimes Act and which 

are otherwise within exclusive federal jurisdiction. 

The first sentence of the Kansas Act at issue here, see supra 

at 4, unambiguously confers criminal jurisdiction on the State of 

Kansas over offenses committed by Indians against Indians on 

Indian reservation land "to the same extent as its courts have 

jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in 

accordance with the laws of the state." 18 u.s.c. § 3243 

(emphasis added). In other words, the grant of state jurisdiction 

over all types of state crimes is complete. The second sentence 

of the Kansas Act appears intended to ensure that the 

congressional grant of jurisdiction to Kansas state courts over 

state-law crimes contained in the first sentence would not 

"deprive" the United States courts of its jurisdiction over 

federally-defined offenses committed by or against Indians on 

Indian reservations. An ambiguity exists, however, because as we 

have noted federal jurisdiction over major crimes committed by 

Indians would otherwise be exclusive. Thus, we must resolve 

whether Congress intended to grant Kansas courts concurrent 

jurisdiction with federal courts over the crimes enumerated in the 

Major Crimes Act, or whether by the second sentence of the Kansas 

-6-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 6 
Act Congress intended to retain exclusive jurisdiction in the 

federal courts over those specific crimes. 

The second sentence of the Kansas Act is of little help in 

resolving this conflict, since the words "shall not deprive the 

courts of the United States of jurisdiction" may be read in at 

least two ways. Congress may have intended, as argued by 

Negonsott, that the Kansas Act not deprive the federal court of 

any exclusive jurisdiction it enjoyed under existing law. Or, 

Congress may have meant to preserve the scope of federal 

jurisdiction over federally-defined crimes on Indian land, while 

modifying the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts in 

favor of concurrent jurisdiction where the federally defined 

crimes and crimes under Kansas law overlapped. 

In resolving this ambiguity, we are mindful that "'statutes 

passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be 

liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor 

of the Indians.'" Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 u.s. 373, 392 

(1976)(quoting Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 

78, 89 (1918)). However, "statutory provisions which are not 

clear on their face may 'be clear from the surrounding 

circumstances and legislative history.'" Oliphant v. Suquamish 

Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 n.17 (1978)(citing DeCoteau v. 

District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975)); see also Jones 

v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 552 (lOth Cir. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 7 
1986). We accordingly look to legislative history to determine 

whether Congress intended to affect the exclusivity of federal 

jurisdiction over enumerated major crimes committed by Indians by 

passing the Kansas Act. 

In enacting the Kansas Act, both the House and Senate 

Committees on Indian Affairs submitted reports. These reports 

incorporated a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior to 

the Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs concerning 

the bill. The letter explained the problems the legislation was 

designed to address and how the bill intended to solve them. See 

Letter from E.K. Burlew, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to Rep. 

Will Rogers, Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 

reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 1999, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940) 

(House Report); see also Sen. Rep. No. 1523, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 

1-3 (1940). The Secretary noted that federal jurisdiction over 

crimes concerning Indians on Indian land had been limited, leaving 

"some major crimes as well as practically all minor offenses 

outside the jurisdiction of the Federal courts." House Report at 

2. Because the state lacked jurisdiction over such offenses, 

maintenance of law and order depended on the tribal courts, which 

had not functioned on Kansas reservations for many years. To fill 

this void, and 

"[w]ith the approbation of the tribes concerned, the 

State courts of Kansas have in the past undertaken the 

trial and punishment of offenses committed on these 

reservations, including those covered by Federal 

statutes. The legality of this practice being 

-8-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 8 
questioned recently, the tribal councils of the four 

Kansas tribes have recommended the enactment of 

legislation authorizing its continuance by a transfer of 

jurisdiction to the State." 

Id. (emphasis added). 

The Secretary also noted that the issuance of unrestricted 

patents for alloted lands interspersed with tribal and restricted 

lands created a jurisdictional checkerboard, resulting in 

practical difficulties. These difficulties 

"can be most effectively met by conferring criminal 

jurisdiction over the entire area on the State. These 

considerations of administrative convenience extend to 

those offenses which are now cognizable in the Federal 

courts under the reservation statutes as well as those 

which are not." 

Id. (emphasis added). Although the proposed legislation extended 

to the types of offenses then cognizable under federal law, the 

Secretary specifically observed that "[e]nactment of the bill will 

not prevent the prosecution in the Federal courts of those acts 

which are within the cognizance of these courts under existing 

law." Id. at 2-3. These comments in the House and Senate Reports 

reflect an understanding that the proposed legislation would 

legalize the State's assertion of complete criminal jurisdiction 

under state law over the Indian tribes without depriving the 

federal court of its more limited criminal jurisdiction by virtue 

of preexisting jurisdictional grants such as the Major Crimes Act. 

Like the court in Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. 

Iowa 1976), aff'd, 549 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1977)(construing 

-9-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 9 
analogous Iowa Act), 2 Negonsott relies heavily on a letter from 

Representative W.P. Lambertson of Kansas to the House Committee on 

Indian Affairs in support of his position that the scope of the 

Kansas State Court's jurisdiction under the Kansas Act does not 

extend to offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act. In his 

letter in support of the legislation, Lambertson stated that 

"[t]he Government here relinquishes to the state full jurisdiction 

over the Indians for small offenses." House Report at 1-2 

(emphasis added). Negonsott interprets this letter as necessarily 

implying that federal courts were to retain exclusive jurisdiction 

over major offenses. Although it is possible, of course, that 

Congressman Lambertson meant to imply by this statement that the 

State of Kansas would assume no jurisdiction over the types of 

crimes covered in the Major Crimes Act, this implication is by no 

means a necessary one. It is also possible that Representative 

Lambertson understood the bill to confer "full" jurisdiction over 

small crimes occurring among Indians to fill the void left by the 

tribal courts, while conferring concurrent power to prosecute the 

types of crimes covered by the Major Crimes Act. If we give 

Negonsott's interpretation credence, we are at a loss to explain 

2 The Eighth Circuit in Younqbear interpreted a Congressional 

grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state courts of Iowa over 

the Sac and Fox Indians virtually identical to the grant of 

jurisdiction to the Kansas State Courts at issue here. See Act of 

June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161, Pub. L. No. 846. The court 

relied on the legislative history of the Kansas Act, after which 

the Iowa Act was modeled, to support its conclusion that the Iowa 

Act did not confer state court jurisdiction over crimes enumerated 

in the Major Crimes Act. See 549 F.2d at 76. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 10 
why it contravenes the memorandum and letter from the Secretary of 

the Interior, incorporated along with Representative Lambertson's 

letter into the House and Senate Reports, which clearly evince an 

understanding that Kansas under the Act as amended could exercise 

criminal jurisdiction over all state-law crimes occurring on 

Indian lands. 

The Eighth Circuit in Youngbear and Negonsott also attach 

much significance to the amendment of the title of the bill, 

replacing the phrase "concurrent jurisdiction" with the word 

"jurisdiction," 3 and eliminating the reference to modification of 

the Major Crimes Act. See 86 Cong. Rec. 5596-97, 76th Cong. 3d 

Sess. (May 6, 1940). 4 However, the Secretary, who recommended the 

3 As originally drafted, the Kansas Act was entitled a "bill 

relinquish concurrent jurisdiction to the State of Kansas to 

prosecute Indians or others for offenses committed on Indian 

reservations." H.R. Rep. No. 1999, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 

accompanying H.R. 3048. This language was amended to read: "A 

bill to confer jurisdiction on the State of Kansas over offenses 

committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations." Id. 

to 

4 As originally drafted, the Kansas Act would have provided as 

follows: 

"Be it enacted . . . that concurrent jurisdiction is 

hereby relinquished to the State of Kansas to prosecute 

Indians and others for offenses by or against Indians or 

others, committed on Indian reservations in Kansas, 

including trust or restricted allotments, to the same 

extent as its courts have jurisdiction for offenses 

committed elsewhere within the State in accordance with 

the laws of the State; and section 328 of the Act of 

March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1151) as amended by the Act of 

June 28, 1932 (47 Stat. 337) and sections 2145 and 2146 

of the United States Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 18, 

section 548, title 25, sees. 217, 218), are modified 

accordingly insofar as they apply to Indian reservations 

-11-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 11 
revisions, offered an explanation in his letter. Regarding 

amendment of the title "for clarification," he stated: 

"[T]he bill, as now worded, does not express with entire 

accuracy the legal situation as it now exists or as 

intended to be created. The bill proposes to relinquish 

concurrent jurisdiction to the State of Kansas, 

intending thereby to give the State jurisdiction of all 

types of crimes, whether major or minor, defined by 

state law. However, the Federal Government has 

exercised jurisdiction only over major crimes. 

Therefore, strictly speaking, this is not a case of 

relinquishing to a State a jurisdiction concurrent with 

that of the United States, but a case of conferring upon 

the State complete criminal jurisdiction, retaining 

however, jurisdiction in the Federal courts to prosecute 

crimes by or against Indians defined by Federal law." 

House Report at 3 (emphasis added). The term "concurrent 

jurisdiction" was thus removed because it did not accurately 

describe the bill in any of its forms. Federal courts did not 

exercise jurisdiction over all state-law offenses, and therefore 

those courts would not be sharing concurrent jurisdiction with 

Kansas over all crimes. Conversely, federal courts under the 

Major Crimes Act possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes 

enumerated therein. At the time of its enactment, therefore, the 

Kansas Act was to confer concurrent jurisdiction only as to those 

crimes covered by the Major Crimes Act. As explained by the 

Secretary, Congress' decision to excise the word "concurrent" from 

the title of the Act was to clarify rather than to change its 

substance. Reference to modification of the Major Crimes Act was 

or Indian country in the said State of Kansas." 

86 Cong. Rec. 5596, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. (May 6, 1940) (emphasis 

added). 

-12-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 12 
apparently dropped as unnecessary when the second sentence of the 

Kansas Act was added instead. 

Negonsott maintains that construing the Kansas Act to confer 

jurisdiction on the state courts over crimes enumerated in the 

Major Crimes Act is inconsistent with the well-settled rule that 

"'statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes .•. 

are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved 

in favor of the Indians."' 426 U.S. at 392 (quoting Alaska Pac. 

Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89. If we were to adopt the state's 

interpretation, Negonsott contends, the historically exclusive 

stewardship of the federal government over major crimes committed 

on a reservation would be eliminated, and Indians could be subject 

to double prosecution under both federal and state law. 

We do not believe that our interpretation is inconsistent 

with this canon of statutory construction. The Kansas tribes 

themselves, in the interest of establishing law and order on 

Indian lands, "expressed a wish that the jurisdiction hitherto 

exercised by the State courts [over both major and minor crimes] 

be continued." House Report at 4-5. We are unwilling to conclude 

that state court criminal jurisdiction conferred by Congress in 

response to tribal requests invades the special relationship 

between the tribes and the federal government. If anything, the 

Kansas Act reflects congressional responsiveness to Tribal needs 

for unified law enforcement as expressed by the Tribes themselves. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 13 
As to any prejudice the tribes may suffer from overlapping 

state and federal jurisdiction, the overlap resulted from 

legislation requested of Congress by the Tribes. No instance of 

double prosecution under the scheme in Kansas has been brought to 

our attention and, in any event, this hypothetical burden is not 

peculiar to Indian lands, but applies to nearly all Americans who 

live under overlapping federal and state jurisdictions. 5 

In sum, we conclude that the purpose of the Kansas Act as 

reflected in its legislative history indicates that Congress 

intended to confer jurisdiction on the Kansas state court to 

prosecute petitioner for aggravated battery, a state-law crime 

also enumerated and defined for purposes of federal court 

jurisdiction in the Major Crimes Act. We therefore AFFIRM the 

district court's dismissal of the petition. 

5 It is arguable that double jeopardy would attach to 

successive prosecutions under the Kansas Act and the Major Crimes 

Act. Negonsott cites United States v. Wheeler, 435 u.s. 313 

(1978), in support of his double jeopardy argument. Wheeler 

concerned successive prosecutions under tribal law in tribal court 

and under federal law in federal court. The Court held that 

double jeopardy did not attach because the Tribe retained inherent 

tribal sovereignty apart from the exercise of federal sovereignty 

in the subsequent prosecution. Id. at 329-30. The present case, 

by contrast, involves the exercise of state authority pursuant to 

a congressional delegation of authority under federal sovereign 

power. The Kansas state court is arguably an arm of the federal 

government when it prosecutes under the Kansas Act, thereby 

barring subsequent federal prosecutions in federal court. See id. 

at 327 n. 26. We need not and do not decide this issue. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 88-2666 Document: 01019292083 Date Filed: 05/08/1991 Page: 14