Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01191/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KORI MCCOY, individually and as CoSuccessor-in-Interest to Decedent 

WILLIE MCCOY; et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF VALLEJO, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-001191-JAMCKD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS

On February 9, 2019, City of Vallejo Police Officers fatally 

shot 20-year-old Willie McCoy fifty-five times while he sat 

unconscious in his vehicle. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1. McCoy’s

siblings (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a suit against the 

City of Vallejo and individual police officers (collectively, 

“Defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 12-21. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges six 

causes of action, including various allegations under 42 U.S.C. 

Section 1983 and under the laws of California. Id. ¶¶ 48-69. 

Defendants move to dismiss individual defendants Greg Nyhoff 

and Andrew Bidou in their official capacities, as well as

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 municipal liability claim under Monell 

v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Mot. to 

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Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 6. Plaintiffs filed an opposition, ECF 

No. 8, in which they: opposed the dismissal of the Monell claim, 

stipulated to the dismissal of defendant Nyhoff, and requested

leave to amend their claim as to defendant Bidou. Defendants 

replied. Reply, ECF No. 9. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss.1 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

On February 9, 2019, Vallejo Police Officers responded to a 

welfare check for an unconscious man, slumped over the steering 

wheel of his car, at a Taco Bell drive-thru. Compl. ¶¶ 1,27. 

When officers Mark Thompson, Collin Eaton, Jordan Patzer, Bryan 

Glick, Anthony Romero-Cano, Ryan McMahon, and other yet-to-be 

identified officers (collectively, “officers”), arrived on the 

scene, they found 20-year old Willie McCoy still unconscious in 

his car. Id. ¶¶ 2,27. The Officers approached McCoy’s car. Id. 

McCoy had a handgun on his lap, however the magazine was visibly 

removed. Id. One of the officers commanded his fellow officers 

to shoot McCoy, if he moved. Id. Once McCoy began to rouse from 

his unconscious state, the Officers used deadly force, shooting 

him fifty-five times. Id. McCoy died on the scene. Id. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for January 14, 2020.

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” A suit must be dismissed if the plaintiff 

fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. 

R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). To defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, a plaintiff must “plead enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. 

v. Twmobly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This plausibility 

standard requires “factual content that allows the court to draw 

a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). 

“At this stage, the Court ‘must accept as true all of the 

allegations contained in a complaint.’” Id. But it need not 

“accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Id. In dismissals for failure to state a claim, 

leave to amend the pleading should be granted, unless a 

“pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 

facts.” Cooks, Perkiss, & Leiche, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection 

Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). 

B. Analysis

1. Monell Claim

Municipalities can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice. Monell, 

436 U.S. at 690. To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff 

must show (1) he possessed a constitutional right and was 

deprived of that right, (2) the municipality had a policy, 

(3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 

plaintiff’s constitutional right, and (4) the policy was the 

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moving force behind the constitutional violation. Sweiha v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, No. 19-CV-03098-LB, 2019 WL 48482227 (N.D. 

Cal. Oct. 1, 2019) (citing Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of 

Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). A plaintiff can 

establish the existence of a policy or custom with: (1) proof 

that a municipal employee committed the alleged constitutional 

violation pursuant to a formal government policy, or a 

“longstanding practice or custom,” which constitutes the 

standard operating procedure of the local government entity; 

(2) proof that the individual who committed the constitutional 

tort was an official with final policy-making authority and that 

the challenged conduct was thus an act of official government 

policy; or (3) proof that an official with “final policymaking 

authority” ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or 

action and the basis for it. Gillete v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 

1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs only assert a Monell claim 

under the first and third theories. Compl. ¶¶ 52-63; Opp’n at 

9. 

Failure to train may give rise to a Monell claim under a 

theory of “longstanding practice or custom.” City of Canton, 

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). However, “a 

municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its 

most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” 

Connick v. Thompson, 536 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Therefore, 

inadequacy of police training may only give rise to Section 1983 

liability when it “amounts to deliberate indifference to the 

rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City 

of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. A plaintiff may also prove the 

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existence of a “longstanding practice or custom” with “evidence 

of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant 

municipal officials were not discharged or reprimanded.” 

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1992).

An isolated constitutional violation can give rise to 

municipal liability under a theory of ratification by a person 

with “final policymaking authority.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 

1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999). In determining what constitutes 

final policymaking authority, “delegating discretion is not 

equivalent to delegating final policymaking authority.” Id. at 

1239. Moreover, to show ratification, a plaintiff must prove 

“that the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s 

decision and the basis for it.” Id. (quoting City of St. Louis 

v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). Therefore, 

ratification requires knowledge of the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. Id. 

The crux of Plaintiffs claim is that the Vallejo Police 

Department (“VPD”) has a pattern and practice of using excessive 

force, giving rise to Monell liability under the theories of 

inadequate training and ratification. Id. As support, 

Plaintiffs adduce twenty-one incidents in which VPD officers 

allegedly used excessive force. Id. ¶ 41. Six of those 

incidents involve officer-related shootings; one of those 

involve an officer that shot McCoy, Officer McMahon. Id. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs “have failed to allege facts 

that, if proven, would support a Monell claim under either 

theory.” Mot. 4-5. Specifically, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ 

claim should be dismissed because their allegations are not 

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sufficiently plead and not sufficiently similar. Id. at 6-7.

a. Sufficient Allegations

The Parties differ on the level of scrutiny that should be 

applied to allegations when facing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Plaintiffs believe a relaxed standard may be applied, allowing 

claims that are “based on nothing more than a bare allegation. 

. . .” Opp’n at 9-10 (quoting Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa 

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)). Defendants argue 

this standard no longer applies. Reply at 2-3.

The Ninth Circuit had previously interpreted claims of 

municipal liability under Section 1983 “based on nothing more 

than a bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct 

conformed to official policy, custom, or practice,” as 

“sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Galbraith, 307 

F.3d at 1127. However, the Ninth Circuit has since established 

two more stringent principles. 

First, “to be entitled to the presumption of truth, 

allegations in a complaint . . . may not simply recite the 

elements of a cause of action but must contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to 

enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr

v. Bacca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Second, those 

allegations taken as true, “must plausibly suggest an 

entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the 

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and 

continued litigation.” Id. These principles “appl[y] to Monell

claims.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 

637 (9th Cir. 2012). This District has also recognized that

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“the allegation of a casual relationship on ‘information and 

belief’ may be sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage, where 

the facts that might demonstrate the causal connection . . . are 

not available to the pleading party prior to discovery.” 

Philips v. County of Fresno, No. 1:13-cv-0538, 2013 WL 6243278, 

at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). 

Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ allegations do not withstand 

requisite pleading standards, since they are lawsuits and claims 

against the VPD that have “not result[ed] in a finding or 

admission of any wrongdoing.” Mot. at 7. They cite a string of 

cases within the Ninth Circuit and other circuits, finding that 

lawsuits alone without more fail to demonstrate Monell

liability. Mot. at 5; see, e.g., Davis v. Clearlake Police 

Dep’t, No. C-07-033365 EDL, 2008 WL 4104344, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 3, 2008); Gillam v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:14-CV-2217-KJMKJN PS, 2016 WL 4059184 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2016); Whitfield v. 

City of Newburgh, No. 08-CV-8516 RKE, 2015 WL 9275695 (S.D.N.Y. 

Dec 17, 2015). The cases Defendants rely on, however, have made 

this finding on motions for summary judgment—not on motions to 

dismiss. See, e.g., Davis, 2008 WL 4104344 at *3. 

The standards for review under summary judgment greatly

differ from those of a motion to dismiss. A motion for summary 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) is concerned with the 

evidence or absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s 

case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A 

motion to dismiss, on the other hand, is only concerned with 

whether there are “‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable 

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ to support the 

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allegations.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556). Therefore, in light of this standard the court 

finds Plaintiffs’ allegations “satisfy the [pleading] standard 

of Rule 8(a).” Id. at 1216. 

First, Plaintiffs “make detailed factual allegations that 

go well beyond reciting the elements of a [Monell Claim].” 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1217. Plaintiffs specifically allege 

numerous incidents—twenty-one to be precise—in which the VPD

used excessive force. Compl. ¶¶ 41(a)-(u). These instances 

“are listed for the purpose of demonstrating [the City of 

Vallejo’s] awareness of this pattern . . . and its ongoing 

failure to supervise, discipline and/or retrain the officers who 

engage in such conduct, as evidence of . . . a custom, policy or 

practice that is encouraged and ratified by the City.” Opp’n at 

4. The allegations are “sufficiently detailed,” to give 

Defendants “fair notice” granting them the opportunity “to 

defend [themselves] effectively.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1217. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations are entitled to the 

presumption of truth. Id. 

Second, these allegations plausibly suggest that Defendants 

were aware of this pattern of “failure to discipline or retrain 

Defendant Officers,” and that the failure itself “serves as 

ratification of Defendants’ policy violations and unlawful 

conduct.” Opp’n at 11. Defendants have not provided an 

“alternative explanation” that would require the Court to 

conclude Plaintiffs’ explanation “is not a plausible 

conclusion.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 

at 1951-52). Rather, Defendants merely argue these allegations 

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are unsubstantiated because of their nature as lawsuits that 

have not resulted in findings of wrongdoing. Mot. at 7. At 

this stage, “Plaintiff’s explanation [need not] be true or even 

probable,” rather “[t]he factual allegations of the complaint 

need only ‘plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Starr, 

652 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951). 

Accordingly, the Court finds the allegations in Plaintiffs’ 

complaint satisfy the requisite pleading standard. 

b. Sufficient Similarity

Defendants further argue Plaintiffs’ allegations are not 

sufficiently similar to the facts in this case to establish a 

Monell claim. Mot. at 7-8. The Court disagrees. 

A Monell claim premised under a failure to train requires 

“a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained 

employees” to demonstrate “deliberate indifference.” Connick, 

563 U.S. at 62. Otherwise, “without notice that a course of 

training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers 

can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training 

program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” 

Id. Both Parties embrace Magistrate Judge Kim’s analysis, from 

the Northern District of California, in Breen v. City of 

Concord, et al., USNDC Case No. 3:19-cv-05622-SK, ECF No. 19

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2019). Opp’n at 13; Reply at 5. They ask 

the Court to do the same. Id. Although that decision is not 

binding, the Court adopts this analysis since it comports with 

Ninth Circuit precedent. See e.g., Meehan v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) (Cited in Breen,

3:19-cv-05622-SK at *5). 

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In Breen, the plaintiff sued the City of Concord for 

municipal liability under Monell after two police officers 

punched him, kicked him, and slammed his face, while he was 

handcuffed in the police station. Id. at *1. Plaintiff adduced 

five other cases where City of Concord police officers were 

accused of violent beatings; two of those involved one of the 

police officers in question. Id. at 5. Judge Kim found these 

cases to be “factually pertinent” and “more than sufficient to 

survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.” Id. at 5-6.

Plaintiffs’ believe the incidents they included in their 

complaint are just as “factually pertinent” as those of the 

Plaintiff in Breen, Opp’n at 13, while Defendants contend the 

opposite, Reply at 5. Defendants argue the instances 

Plaintiffs’ refer to have “markedly different facts,” since only 

six of the twenty-one incidents “concern officer-involved 

shootings.” Reply at 5. They further argue that even those 

involving shootings are not sufficiently similar, since “[n]one 

involved the circumstances here: multiple officers coming upon a 

subject with a gun in his lap.” Id. at 5-6. But the Plaintiff 

in Breen also did not cite cases that involved exactly two 

police officers, punching, kicking, and slamming a plaintiff 

against the head in a police department while handcuffed. 

Instead, the cases the Breen plaintiff offered involved use of 

force incidents under different circumstances such as: tasing, 

breaking someone’s neck, elbowing, rear-ending someone, etc. 

Breen, USNDC Case No. 3:19-cv-05622-SK, ECF No. 1 (“Breen 

Compl.”) ¶¶ 31(a)-(f). Yet, Judge Kim still found these 

“factually pertinent” enough to survive a motion to dismiss, 

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because they all involved “brutal beatings administered by 

officers similar to the one Plaintiff alleges he suffered.” 

Breen, 3:19-cv-05622-SK at *5-6. 

Here too, the Court finds the six incidents involving 

officer shootings, are just as factually pertinent to the facts 

at hand to survive a motion to dismiss. All six of those 

incidents involve deadly officer shootings. Compl. ¶¶ 41(a)-

(d), (j), (o). McCoy was also shot to death by police officers. 

Id. ¶ 1. Moreover, as was the case in Breen, one of these 

incidents also involves one of the police officers in question:

Officer McMahon. Compl. ¶ 41(o). That fact is absent in 

Defendants’ Motion and Reply. See generally Mot. and Reply. 

Defendants’ attempt to differentiate these instances through 

surrounding circumstance, such as how Officer McMahon’s other 

shooting was during a bicycle stop, is unavailing. Reply at 5. 

Breen did not require that level of similarity; these incidents 

are sufficiently similar to survive a motion to dismiss.

c. Conclusion

The Court finds Plaintiffs allegations are sufficiently 

plead and sufficiently similar to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 municipal liability claim under 

Monell. 

2. Dismissal of Defendants Bidou and Nyhoff

It is well-established that official-capacity suits 

“generally represent only another way of pleading an action 

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. 

Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a defendant 

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that has been sued in an official capacity alongside the entity, 

may be dismissed “as a redundant defendant.” Center For BioEthical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780, 

786 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Defendants request that individual Defendants Bidou and 

Nyhoff be dismissed as redundant because Plaintiffs have sued 

them in their official capacity, alongside the City of Vallejo. 

Mot. at 11; Compl. ¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiffs stipulate to Defendant 

Nyhoff’s dismissal, primarily because he was misrepresented as 

“the final decision-maker for the Vallejo Police Department.” 

Opp’n at 13. Although they do not stipulate to Defendant 

Bidou’s dismissal, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they 

“improperly listed” his capacity. Opp’n at 13. Accordingly, 

the Court DISMISSES both individual Defendants. Because 

Plaintiffs stipulate to Nyhoff’s dismissal, he is dismissed WITH 

PREJUDICE. For the reasons discussed below, Bidou is dismissed 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs request leave to amend their Complaint “to sue 

Chief Bidou in his individual capacity as the final decisionmaker related to the subject incident.” Opp’n at 13. 

Defendants object, arguing “this would be an invalid and futile 

amendment.” Reply at 6. The Court disagrees.

Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(a), leave to amend “shall be 

freely given when justice so requires.” The Ninth Circuit has 

“repeatedly stressed” that the Court must adhere to “the 

underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . to facilitate decision on 

the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” 

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, leave to amend should be granted, “unless [the 

Court] determines that a pleading could not possibly be cured by 

the allegation of other facts.” Id. (citing Doe v. U.S., 58 

F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Defendants believe Plaintiffs’ claim against Chief Bidou 

could not be cured by including him as a defendant in his 

individual capacity, since “Monell is a cause of action against 

public entities; not individuals.” Reply at 6. They further 

argue, the only way Plaintiffs could sue him in his individual 

capacity would be for supervisory liability under Starr, 652 

F.3d at 1207-208. Id. at 6-7. Nevertheless, they maintain 

amending to a supervisor liability claim should not be allowed 

because Plaintiffs have not “proffered any such facts.” Id. at 

6. But by pinpointing a theory that could cure an individual 

capacity claim, Defendants have demonstrated amendment would not 

be futile. Leave to amend would allow Plaintiffs the 

opportunity to proffer the facts necessary for a supervisor 

liability claim, should they choose to do so. Accordingly, the 

Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend to add Chief 

Bidou. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part 

and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court:

1. DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Monell Claim;

2. GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Defendant Nyhoff

WITH Prejudice ; and 

3. GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Defendant Bidou 

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WITHOUT Prejudice.

If Plaintiffs elect to amend the complaint, they shall file 

an Amended Complaint within twenty days of this Order. 

Defendants’ responsive pleading is due twenty days thereafter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2020

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