Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02627/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02627-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER LANE WRIGHT,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT W. FOX, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

RE: MOTION TO DISMISS [DOC. 

NO. 14]

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Motion to 

Dismiss [Doc. No. 14] filed by Respondent Robert W. Fox, Warden, be 

GRANTED and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”)]

filed by Petitioner Christopher Lane Wright (“Wright”) be DISMISSED with 

prejudice. 

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Wright has a lengthy criminal history that involves many plea-bargained 

convictions dating back to 1981. See Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A at 42-46.1

 

1 Wright and Respondent have both provided the Court with copies of records of Wright’s 

criminal history and related state court proceedings. See Doc. No. 1, Petition, pp. 7-42 of 43 

and Doc. No. 14, Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. A – S3. Respondent’s counsel explains some gaps 

exist in Wright’s criminal court records, because a guilty plea often reduces punishment while 

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 15
2

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Wright’s 1990 Conviction 

In July 1990, Wright was charged with several crimes in connection with

two domestic violence incidents. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A at 43 (regarding No. 

CR113332). He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, Cal. Penal Code § 245(a), 

and was granted probation. Id.

B. Wright’s 1995 Conviction

Thereafter, Wright violated the terms of his probation. Id. at 44. He was 

arrested and booked in San Diego County Central Jail in August 1995, at which 

point it was discovered he had smuggled cocaine base into the jail and hidden it 

in his cell. Id. He entered a guilty plea for the crime of possession of a controlled 

substance under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11377(a) and admitted his 1990 

conviction was a “strike.” Id. (regarding No. SDC114914).) He received a prison 

sentence for the drug possession that was enhanced by the 1990 strike. Id.

In May 2003, after his release and after other crimes, Wright was charged with 

arson after setting two small fires during a domestic dispute. Id. at 45 (regarding 

No. SDC175183). He pleaded guilty to arson, Cal. Penal Code § 452(b),

admitted he had once been to prison, Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b), admitted the 

1990 strike, and was granted probation. Id.

C. Wright’s 2004 Conviction

Just a little more than a year later, in June 2004, while he was still on

probation, Wright was arrested for shoplifting. Id. (regarding No. SCS185202).) 

He pleaded guilty to burglary, Cal. Penal Code § 459, and again admitted the 

1990 prior strike. His probation was revoked, and he received a four-year prison 

term for the 2003 conviction, as well as a thirty-two-month prison term for the 

 

preventing the creation of formal appellate records. Mot. to Dismiss, p. 1. The Court has 

reviewed the entirety of the filings made by Wright and Respondent and finds the Court’s 

record is sufficient to rule on the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss. 

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 15
3

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2004 convictions. Id. Thus, by 2007, Wright’s criminal record included a 1990 

strike conviction and he had served two separate terms in prison.

D. Wright’s 2007 Conviction

Wright was arrested again in February 2007, after he and another 

individual sold cocaine base to an undercover peace officer. Id. at 46 (regarding 

SDC204979). The charges filed against him included allegations that Wright had 

the 1990 strike conviction and had twice gone to prison. Id. at 73-77 (regarding 

SDC204979). Wright pleaded guilty to drug transportation, Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 11352(a), and selling cocaine, Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11351.5; 

admitted he served two prior prison sentences; and further admitted his 1990 

conviction was a strike. Id. at 105, ¶1, 105-07. He received a five-year sentence, 

but the court suspended execution and granted Wright probation. Id. at 104. His 

probation included conditions that he spend a year in county jail and he complete 

a rehabilitation program. Id. at 99-104. 

E. Wright’s 2009 & 2011 Probation Hearings

In March 2009, Wright’s probation was revoked and then reinstated as 

modified. Id. at 46 (regarding SDC204979). During a probation and sentencing 

hearing held on June 10, 2011, Wright admitted that he had violated his 

probation and been in possession of a weapon. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. S-1, at 1-2.

Wright’s probation was reinstated as modified. Id., Ex. A at 46.

F. Wright’s 2011 Conviction & Current Prison Sentence

Five days later, on June 15, 2011, Wright was the subject of a car chase, 

when he fled from San Diego police officers who attempted to pull him over after 

witnessing him drive a speeding car with inoperative brake lights and make a 

reckless maneuver with the vehicle. Id. at 40-41. After leading police at high 

speeds on a series of South County freeways and city streets, Wright drove his 

vehicle into a cul-de-sac, where he was hemmed in by the pursuing police cars. 

Id. Wright then turned his car, drove towards a police officer standing near his 

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 15
4

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

stopped vehicle, and rammed into the police cruiser with sufficient force to move 

the car ten feet. Id. When officers attempted to subdue and detain him, Wright 

repeatedly asked to be killed. Id. A pipe with cocaine base residue and a bottle 

of Vicodin were found in the vehicle and a blood test established Wright was 

under the influence of cocaine, amphetamine and opiates. Id. at 41.

In September 2011, Wright pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, admitted 

the 1990 strike, and agreed to a ten-year sentence for the 2011 crimes, which 

was based on the upper term of five years for assault, doubled to ten years due 

to the strike. Id., Ex. A at 26; Ex. S-3 at 36. He agreed the 2011 crimes violated 

the terms of his 2007 probation. Id., Ex. A at 148. He also agreed to a reduced 

term of three years and four months, based upon sixteen months for the 2007 

conviction plus one-year each for the two prior terms in prison, instead of the 

originally imposed, but suspended, term. Id., Ex. A at 26; Ex. S-3 at 37. The 

sentence for both convictions were to be served consecutively, for a total of 

thirteen years and four months in prison. Id. His plea deal was accepted by the 

trial court during a sentencing hearing held in October 2011, at which time the 

court sentenced Wright to incarceration for the agreed-upon term of thirteen 

years and four months for both the 2007 and 2011 convictions. Id., Ex. S-3, at 

36-40.

G. Wright’s Appeal

Wright then filed a notice of appeal that he later formally abandoned. Id., 

Ex. A at 52; Ex. B. The California Court of Appeal accepted Wright’s 

abandonment of the appeal and dismissed the case on April 25, 2012. Id., Ex. B 

& C. 

/ /

/ /

/ /

/ /

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 15
5

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

H. Wright’s Collateral Challenges

On July 1, 2015, Wright constructively filed2 a habeas corpus petition in the 

San Diego Superior Court, challenging his sentence on the basis that it had been 

enhanced by prior convictions from 1996 and 2004 that were eligible to be 

reduced to misdemeanors by Proposition 47, a 2014 voter passed initiative. Id., 

Ex. D; see also Cal. Penal Code § 1170.18. The court denied the petition on July 

17, 2015, finding that although Wright’s request was procedurally flawed, even if 

he had filed a petition for sentence modification, instead of a habeas petition, the 

crimes for which Wright’s sentence was imposed (the 2007 cocaine sale and the 

2011 aggravated assault) were not eligible for relief under Proposition 47. Id., Ex. 

3. The court also found both of Wright’s prior terms in prison rested, at least in 

part, on convictions that remained felonies even after Proposition 47. Id.

On August 3, 2015, Wright filed a similar habeas corpus petition with the 

California Court of Appeal. Id., Ex. F. The California Court of Appeal denied his 

habeas petition for many of the same reasons the Superior Court cited: e.g., 

Wright had not formally requested the trial court reduce his crimes under

Proposition 47; until such a reduction occurred, there was no basis to consider a 

change to his sentence; and Wright’s pleadings did not include sufficient 

documentary evidence for one to believe his sentence rested on crimes that all 

might be reduced. Id., Ex. G (citing, e.g., People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 

(1995)).) Wright then filed a petition for habeas review with the California 

Supreme Court, again invoking Proposition 47. Id., Ex. H. The Supreme Court 

issued a summary denial on January 27, 2016, citing Duvall. Id., Ex. I.

/ /

 

2 See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying “mailbox rule” which 

provides for the constructive filing of court documents as of the date they are submitted to 

prison authorities for mailing to the court). The Court utilizes constructive filing dates herein. 

See also Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D, p. 7 of 7.

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 15
6

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

While these habeas petitions were proceeding, Wright had some success 

in the trial court when, on September 14, 2015, the San Diego Superior Court

granted his Petition for Resentencing and reduced two of his convictions

(possession of a controlled substance in jail, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 

11377(a), and burglary, Cal. Penal Code § 459) to misdemeanors. Id., Ex. J.

In January 2016, Wright filed another habeas corpus petition with the 

California Court of Appeal, in which he argued he was entitled to resentencing 

because the prison terms he served for the convictions that were reclassified as 

misdemeanors could no longer be used as a basis to enhance his current prison 

sentence. Id., Ex. K & L. He also argued his most recent conviction must be 

vacated because the trial court did not advise Wright of his rights, i.e., “the 

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the

right to confront one’s accusers,” before accepting his stipulation regarding the 

prior convictions and, therefore, Wright did not properly waive these rights. Id., 

Ex. K at 9-10 of 21.

The California Court of Appeal denied this habeas petition on January 29, 

2016, holding Wright’s trial rights claim was procedurally barred because, among 

other reasons, Wright was untimely by waiting more than four years to raise it. 

Id., Ex. L at 1 (citing In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 459 (2012) and In re Swain, 34 

Cal. 2d 300, 302 (1949). The Court of Appeal held this claim was further barred 

because Wright failed to obtain the certificate of probable cause necessary to 

challenge the validity of a guilty plea on appeal. Id. at 2 (citing In re Brown, 9 Cal. 

3d 679, 683 (1973). Relief on both claims was also denied because Wright had 

not provided sufficient evidence to establish the facts were as he had alleged 

regarding either the plea colloquy or the nature of all of his prior convictions and 

sentence. Id. at 2 (citing Duvall, at 474).

Wright next filed a similarly framed habeas corpus petition in the California

Supreme Court. Id., Ex. M. The California Supreme Court issued a summary 

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 15
7

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

denial of this petition on May 11, 2017, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-69 

(1993). Id., Ex. N 

On June 18, 2016, Wright constructively filed another habeas corpus 

petition with the California Court of Appeal, in which he reasserted his prior 

claims that the prison term enhancements should be vacated due to the 

reclassification of his convictions, and because the trial court accepted his 

admission of the prior conviction allegations without advising him of his trial rights 

on those allegations or eliciting his waiver of those rights. Id., Ex. O at 9-12 of 22. 

He also raised a new claim, arguing prosecutors had introduced false evidence 

of his prior conviction. Id. The California Court of Appeal denied this petition on 

July 5, 2016, holding his claims were procedurally barred as untimely and 

successive. Id., Ex. P. (citing Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 459, 496-97, 501, Swain, 34 

Cal. 2d at 302, and Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 769).)

Thereafter, on July 16, 2015, Wright constructively filed another petition for 

habeas review with the California Supreme Court, again raising the falseevidence claim, and alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure 

Wright’s admission of the prior conviction allegations was appropriate. Id., Ex. Q. 

The California Supreme Court denied relief on this petition on September 21, 

2016. Id., Ex. R (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998), and Clark, 5 

Cal. 4th at 467-69).

F. Federal Petition

Wright constructively filed the Petition currently before the Court on 

October 4, 2016,3 in which he asserts three claims: (1) the prosecution 

introduced false evidence of his prior conviction; (2) the trial court wrongfully 

accepted Wright’s admission of the prior conviction allegations without first 

 

3 See Petition, p. 43 of 43.

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 15
8

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

advising him of his trial rights on those allegations or eliciting his waiver of those 

rights; and (3) a double-jeopardy violation involving the destruction of evidence. 

Petition, pp. 4-5 of 43.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Wright’s First and Second Claims are Procedurally Defaulted 

Under the doctrine of procedural default, a federal court may not review the 

merits of a claim, including a constitutional claim, that a state court declined to 

consider because the petitioner failed to comply with a state procedural rule. 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). So long as the decision of the 

state court rests on a state law ground that is “independent” of federal law and is 

“adequate” to support the judgment, a federal habeas court will not review a 

claim rejected by a state court on procedural grounds. Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 

53 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). When the 

adequate and independent ground for a state court’s rejection of a federal claim 

involves a violation of state procedural requirements, a habeas petitioner is said 

to have procedurally defaulted his claim, and the court cannot reach the merits of

the federal claim. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-730. To do so would not only be an 

end run around the limitation on direct review by the Supreme Court, but would 

also permit avoidance of the exhaustion requirement and infringe upon “the 

States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes.” Id. at 730-732. 

A state procedural rule is “independent” if the state law basis for the 

decision is not interwoven with federal law. La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 

704 (9th Cir. 2000). A state procedural rule is “adequate” if it is firmly established 

and regularly followed. Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011). 

A habeas petitioner may obtain federal review of a procedurally defaulted 

claim only by demonstrating “cause” for the failure to comply with the state 

procedural rule and “prejudice” arising from the default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

750. Adequate "cause" for a default must be an "external" factor that cannot 

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 15
9

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fairly be attributed to the petitioner. Id., at 753. If insufficient cause is shown, the 

Court need not reach the prejudice question. Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 

1147 (9th Cir. 2007).

A procedural default bars consideration of a federal claim on either direct or 

habeas review “only if the last state court rendering a judgment in the case 

clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). Wright’s first claim, that he is entitled 

to federal habeas relief due to the prosecution’s presentation of false evidence 

regarding Wright’s prior conviction, was raised in his third petition for habeas 

review that was constructively filed with the California Supreme Court on July 21, 

2015. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. Q. His second claim, in which he contends the trial 

court failed to advise him of his trial rights prior to his admission of the prior 

conviction allegations, was presented to the California Supreme Court in his 

second petition for habeas review. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. M. In both instances, 

relief was summarily denied under Clark and, with respect to his second claim, 

relief was also denied under Robbins. In California, “[a] summary denial citing 

Clark and Robbins means that the petition is rejected as untimely.” Walker, 562 

U.S. at 313. 

California’s timeliness bar has been held to be independent. See Bennett 

v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 2003). In Walker, the U.S. Supreme Court 

found California’s timeliness requirement for habeas petitions to be adequate as 

it is clearly established and consistently applied. Walker, 131 S.Ct at 1128-31. 

Therefore, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s second and third 

habeas petitions as untimely rests upon on a state law ground that is 

“independent” of federal law and is “adequate” to support the judgment, and 

Petitioner’s first and second claims are procedurally defaulted unless he can 

show cause and prejudice to excuse the default, neither of which he alleges 

exists.

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 15
10

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Wright’s Third Claim is Procedurally Defaulted

Wright’s third claim, for double jeopardy, was not raised with the California 

Supreme Court at all. His failure to do so implicates the exhaustion and 

procedural default doctrines. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) bars the granting of habeas corpus relief "unless it 

appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of 

the State." The exhaustion doctrine, like the procedural default doctrine, is 

principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal 

law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 518 (1982). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied by providing the state 

courts with a "fair opportunity" to rule on Petitioner's constitutional claims. 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). In most instances, a claim is 

exhausted once it is presented to a state's highest court, either on direct appeal 

or through state collateral proceedings. See Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 

376 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Although Wright did not raise his double jeopardy claim with the state 

courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, “if it is clear that (the habeas 

petitioner’s) claims are now procedurally barred under (state) law.” Grey, 518 

U.S. at 161, quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Engle v. 

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26 n.28 (1982) (noting that the exhaustion requirement 

applies “only to remedies still available at the time of the federal petition.”); 

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 770 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), citing Phillips v. 

Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the district court

correctly concluded that [the] claims were nonetheless exhausted because ‘a 

return to state court for exhaustion would be futile.’”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 

F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his 

federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; 

/ /

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 15
11

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”), quoting Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 732.

Wright has already filed multiple state habeas petitions which were denied 

with citations to numerous procedural bars, including specifically timeliness under 

Clark and Robbins. Furthermore, his direct appeal has been final since May 6, 

2012.

4 Because it has been over five years since his conviction became, and

because the state courts have already specifically denied Wright’s prior habeas 

petitions due to untimeliness, it is clear any attempt by Wright to return to state 

court at this time in order to seek further post-conviction relief with respect to his 

double jeopardy claim would also meet with the imposition of a procedural bar. 

See Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 797-98 (1993) (“the general rule is still that, absent 

justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single, timely petition 

for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or untimely petitions will be summarily 

denied,” and describing the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to that 

rule); See also Huynh v. Lizarraga, 2016 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 67489 *7 (S.D. Cal., 

Mar. 1, 2016) (petitioner’s habeas claim was procedurally defaulted where it was 

clear any attempt to return to state court would meet a procedural bar under 

Clark). 

C. Wright’s Federal Habeas Petition was Untimely Filed

Wright’s federal habeas petition also runs afoul of the AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations, which applies to his presentation of claims in this Court. Calderon v. 

U.S. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended 

on denial of rhg. and rhg. en banc, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998), overruled 

on other grounds in Calderon v. U.S. District Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1063 (1999). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1): 

/ /

 

4 See section II.C, infra, p. 11, re: Cal. R. Ct. 8.366(b)(2)(B) and Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1). 

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 15
12

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented 

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Here, subparagraphs (B) through (D) 

plainly are not applicable, and Wright has provided no argument that they 

apply. Thus, subparagraph (A) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) applies to his 

claims. Since Wright did not pursue direct review with the California 

Supreme Court, the conclusion of direct review is tied to the Court of 

Appeal’s acceptance of Wright’s abandonment of the appeal and dismissal 

of the case on April 25, 2012. The Court of Appeal’s decision became final 

on that day. Cal. R. Ct. 8.366(b)(2)(B). At that point, Wright had only ten 

days to file a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. Cal. R. 

Ct. 8.500(e)(1). He did not, so his judgment became final on Monday, May 

6, 2012, when the time for him to seek such review expired. Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-654 (2012). The federal statute of limitations

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), then began to run and expired one year later, 

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 15
13

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on Monday, May 6, 2013, absent circumstances that would merit statutory 

or equitable tolling.

Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time during which a 

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is 

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “An application for post-conviction review is 

pending while a California petitioner completes a full round of state collateral 

review, including during the period between (1) a lower court’s adverse 

determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the 

filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 

729, 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis in 

original). In California, “[a]s long as the prisoner filed a petition for appellate 

review within a ‘reasonable time,’ he could count as ‘pending’ (and add to the 1-

year time limit) the days between (1) the time the lower state court reached an 

adverse decision, and (2) the day he filed a petition in the higher state court.” 

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 

222-23 (2002)). 

Here, Wright did not file his first state habeas petition until July 1, 2015, 

well after the AEDPA statute of limitations ended. Thus, the pendency of that 

petition, or any other habeas petition filed subsequently by Wright, could not toll 

the already-expired limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that statutory tolling is 

not available when first state habeas petition is filed after the AEDPA limitations 

period has expired). Statutory tolling cannot revive a limitations period that has 

already ended; it can only serve to pause a clock that has not already run. 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Patterson, 251 F.3d at 

1247. Once the federal limitations period has ended, the filing of a state habeas 

petition cannot revive it. Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823; Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482. 

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 15
14

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Therefore, none of Wright’s collateral filings had any effect on the AEDPA statute 

of limitations as they were each filed after the statute of limitations had expired 

on May 6, 2013, and his federal petition is time-barred unless he is entitled to 

equitable tolling.

Equitable Tolling 

Equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions is 

permitted in the Ninth Circuit, but a petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate. Espinoza-Matthews v. State of California, 432 

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to receive equitable tolling, Wright must 

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and 

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 

418. Equitable tolling is available only if some “external force” beyond the 

Petitioner’s direct control caused the untimeliness. Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 

F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2011). Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases, and 

“the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling . . . is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Wright has not set forth any facts or arguments that equitable tolling should 

apply, and thus he has not demonstrated diligence or extraordinariness. 

Accordingly, the AEDPA’s statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled in 

his case.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion 

to Dismiss be GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is 

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 

the provision of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1).

/ /

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 15
15

16CV2627-LAB(JMA)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 28, 2017, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed 

with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 4, 2017. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: July 11, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-02627-LAB-JMA Document 15 Filed 07/11/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 15