Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03586/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03586-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

---

1

The Honorable James R. Marschewski, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3586

___________

Vicky S. Edmondson, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Western District of Arkansas.

*

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner * [UNPUBLISHED]

Social Security Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: July 19, 2010

Filed: July 23, 2010

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Vicky S. Edmondson appeals from an order of the District Court1

 affirming the

denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Edmondson

alleged disability since March 2004 from arthritis, depression, and pain in nearly

every part of her body. After a May 2006 hearing, an administrate law judge (ALJ)

found that (1) Edmondson’s cognitive dysfunction, depression, and chronic lumbar

Appellate Case: 09-3586 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/23/2010 Entry ID: 3686425
2

We decline to consider Edmondson’s conclusory and, at times, irrelevant

assertions. See Meyers v. Starke, 420 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that to be

reviewable, an issue must be presented in a brief with some specificity and that failure

to do so can result in waiver). 

-2-

strain and pain were severe impairments, but alone or combined did not meet or

medically equal the requirements of any listing; (2) her subjective complaints were not

fully credible; and (3) her residual functional capacity (RFC) for less than the full

range of light work precluded her past relevant work, but did not preclude other jobs

that a vocational expert identified in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical. The Appeals

Council denied review, and the District Court affirmed. Having carefully reviewed

the record and considered Edmondson’s arguments for reversal,2

 we affirm. See

Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838, 841–42 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review). 

Specifically, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision to find Edmondson’s

subjective complaints not entirely credible and to discount the cumulative testimony

of her witnesses warrants deference because the decision is supported by several valid

reasons. See Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that

subjective complaints may be discounted based on inconsistencies in the record as a

whole). We also reject Edmondson’s assertions regarding the ALJ’s (1) failure to

develop the record, see id. at 933 (noting that an ALJ need order more medical

examinations and tests only if the medical records presented to him contain

insufficient evidence to determine if the claimant is disabled), and (2) decision to

discount the mental RFC opinion of consulting neuropsychologist Vann Smith, see

Charles v. Barnhart, 375 F.3d 777, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that generally, when

a consulting physician examines the claimant only once, his opinion is not considered

substantial evidence). Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 09-3586 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/23/2010 Entry ID: 3686425