Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02925/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02925-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA CHRISTOPHER DIAZ,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11-CV-02925-H (JMA)

ORDER DENYING

PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2254

AND DENYING CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

vs.

MIKE D. MCDONALD, Warden,

Respondent.

On November 29, 2011, Joshua Christopher Diaz (“Petitioner”), a California state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the constitutionality of his conviction. (Doc. No. 1

at 6-7.) On April 13, 2012, Mike D. McDonald (“Respondent”) filed a response in opposition. 

(Doc. No. 17.) On August 20, 2012, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

to deny the petition. (Doc. No. 19.) No objection to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation has been filed to date. For the following reasons, the Court denies the

petition for writ of habeas corpus.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to support the gang

enhancements to his felony convictions. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner also argues that the court

prejudicially erred by supplementing the standard jury instruction with additional language. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 7.) The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal decision

in People v. Ruiz et al., No. D053520, 2010 WL 3749195 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept 28, 2010). 

(Lodgment No. 5.) The facts are presumed to be correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1):

In November 2006 Ruiz and his girlfriend, Ebony Miranda, lived in

a house in Alpine, which was owned by Natasha Darby. Ruiz and Darby

were cousins through marriage. Rachel Cohen also lived in the house. 

Cohen’s sister, Angelica R., and Cohen’s brother-in-law, Joseph Sanchez,

stored their belongings at the house and occasionally stayed overnight at

the house. Although they did not live there, Diaz and Jose Morales spent

a lot of time at the house in Alpine. All of these individuals had two things

in common: theysmoked methamphetamine daily; and theysupported their

drug habit by stealing vehicles and selling the rims and stereos from the

vehicles. Ruiz was the leader of “shot caller” of the vehicle-stealing

operation. Cohen sometimes served as lookout when the men stole

vehicles.

Ruiz was a member of the Imperial Beach Dukes gang, and his

moniker was “Big Drowzy.” Diaz and Morales were members of the El

Cajon Locos gang. Diaz’s moniker was “Little Drowzy,” and Morales’s

moniker was “Peewee.”

. . . .

On the day after Thanksgiving, Cohen, Ruiz, Miranda and Darby

were in the Alpine house. Ruiz summoned Cohen in an angry voice and

asked: “What kind of sick person do you think I am?” Ruiz accused Cohen

of telling Miranda that he had slept with Darby. When Cohen denied this,

Ruiz pushed her head into the wall and then pulled her by the hair into his

bedroom, where Miranda and Darby were sitting on the bed. Ruiz threw

Cohen on the floor and punched her in the head a few times while

threatening to kill her, her sister and her brother-in-law. Ruiz then told

Darby to get some trash bags and tape the bags on the floor. After

complying with this order, Darby rolled Cohen onto the taped bags. Ruiz

threw Cohen some handcuffs and zip ties and told her to put them on, but

she was unable to do so. Ruiz het her and directed Darby to put them on

Cohen. Darby put the handcuffs on Cohen’s ankles and the zip ties on her

wrists.

Next, Ruiz told Darby and Miranda to leave the room, and he turned

up the radio. Ruiz punched Cohen and then showed her some bolt cutters

and asked her if she wanted to lose a finger or toe. Cohen replied by

crying and Ruiz hit her again. When Cohen said she [would] rather lose a

toe, Ruiz started to squeeze the bolt cutters around her little toe, but was

interrupted by a phone call and left the room. When he returned, Ruiz

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blindfolded Cohen and moved her into the closet of Darby’s room, where

he left her for what seemed like hours. Cohen awoke when water was

splashed on her face. She heard Ruiz, Darby and Miranda laughing and

joking that she was dead. Ruiz hit Cohen and placed a chair over her so

she could not move her arms. Ruiz also told Cohen, who was blindfolded,

that Diaz and Morales were there. Cohen heard Ruiz tell Diaz and Morales

she had informed Miranda that Ruiz and Darby had slept together. Ruiz

then ordered Cohen: “Tell my two homies what kind of sick [f - - -] you

think I am.” Ruiz told Cohen he was going to teach her a lesson and turned

up the radio. Ruiz, Diaz and Morales began hitting and kicking Cohen on

all sides of her body. Although Cohen could not see because of the

blindfold, she recognized the voices of Diaz and Morales.

On Sunday, Diaz picked up Angelica and Sanchez from a hotel in

La Mesa and drove them to the Alpine house. When they arrived, Ruiz

asked Angelica and Sanchez if they had been talking about him sleeping

with Darby. Angelica said she did not know what Ruiz was talking about,

which angered him. After Angelica asked where her sister was, Ruiz

escorted her to his bedroom where Cohen was lying on the floor on top of

plastic bags and underneath a chair. She was blindfolded with her wrists

and ankles bound, and she was crying. Diaz removed Cohen’s blindfold,

helped her get up and walked her to the living room, where everyone was

gathering. Ruiz then punched Sanchez, knocking him to [the] floor. Ruiz

started kicking Sanchez. Angelica started screaming, and Miranda

punched her in the mouth. Sanchez was dragged to one of the bedrooms,

Angelica was thrown into a closet and ties to the clothes rod, and Cohen

was taken back to Ruiz’s bedroom, where she fell asleep.

When Cohen woke up, she was blindfolded and started shaking. 

Ruiz and Diaz told her to stop playing around. Three people started hitting

and kicking her. They stopped when Cohen said she was going to throw

up. Diaz and Morales took Cohen to the bathroom where she vomited. 

When they brought her back to the bedroom, Cohen passed out.

Meanwhile, after allowing Angelica to use the bathroom, Ruiz

moved a mattress into the room and placed her on it. Ruiz told Angelica

he would let her escape out the window and handed her his revolver. He

asked her to shoot him with the gun. When Angelica tried to shoot him,

Ruiz said, “Tricked you,” and showed her the bullets were in his hand.

Shortly thereafter, Cohen and Angelica heard a shotgun blast. 

Morales had accidently shot himself, grazing his testicles. Ruiz told Diaz

to take Morales to the hospital, and Miranda and Darby accompanied them. 

Ruiz stayed behind in the house and segregated Sanchez, Cohen and

Angelica. Ruiz placed Angelica on the bed and lay down next to her. 

Angelica testified that Ruiz raped her at this point. After a few minutes,

Ruiz told Angelica she had five minutes to get herself, Cohen and Sanchez

out of the house before he killed them. Angelica managed to extricate

Cohen and Sanchez and the three of them left the house. The trio stole a

neighbor’s car and drove to the residence of Sanchez’s brother in Lemon

Grove and later to a motel, paying for the room with money from a purse

that was in the car they had stolen.

. . . .

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ElCajon Police Detective Royal Bates ofthe department’s gang task

force testified the El Cajon Locos gang’s primaryactivities included assault

with a deadly weapon, auto theft, murder, narcotics sales and vandalism. 

Diaz and Morales were members of the El Cajon Locos, and their monikers

were “Drowzy” and “Pee Wee.” Ruiz had been closely associated with the

El Cajon Locos since the early 1990s, and most of his criminal activity was

with members of this gang.

Detective Michael Speyrer of the sheriff’s department testified that

Ruiz was a member of the Imperial Beach Dukes gang, and his monikers

were “Drowzy,” “Mr. D.,” and “Big Drowzy.” Speyrer said that if more

than one gang member has the same moniker, the less senior typically will

add a prefix such as “little” to his moniker. The primary activities of the

Imperial Beach Dukes are vandalism, auto thefts, burglaries, robberies,

assaults and homicides.

Gang members commonly work as a crew in their money-making

activities, Speyrer testified. Sometimes the crews include gang members

from different gangs. Among other things, “mixed crews” are used in car

thefts.

Speyrer told the jury that respect within their gang is very important

to gang members. Gang members gain respect by “putting in work” or

committing crimes and earn more respect for committing serious crimes. 

Gang members are expected to back up fellow gang members, especially

older ones, to maintain their status within the gang. Not doing so puts them

at risk of being beaten up, ostracized and losing the trust and respect of the

gang. Gangs practice a code of silence: If a gang member or an associate

of a gang talks to law enforcement they typically will be labeled a “rat,”

which puts them at a great danger–even of being murdered, especially if

that person is incarcerated.

Speyrer opined that all of the charged crimes except the rape were

gang-related crimes that benefit[t]ed the gang. According to Speyrer, the

crew of car thieves was more than a group of drug addicts committing

crimes to support their habits because it involved gang members working

together at the direction of a more senior gang member and shot caller. 

The gang members are intentionally assisting each other in committing

crimes. The gang benfits because the crimes enhance the status of the gang

as well as each individual participating gang member. Speyrer also

testified that a crime that might have started between a single gang member

and a victim becomes gang related when other gang members later assist

in the crime. 

The prosecution also introduced numerous letters written by

Miranda, Diaz and Ruiz while they were in jail, which were replete with

gang references.

. . . .

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal on the grounds of

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for torture and for the application of gang

enhancements, prejudicial error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury concerning the

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elements of aiding and abetting, and error by the trial court in failing to stay his sentence. On

September 28, 2010, the appellate court issued a decision affirming Petitioner’s conviction. 

See Ruiz, 2010 WL 3749195, at *23. On January 19, 2011, the California Supreme Court

denied the petition for review of the appellate court’s decision. People v. Ruiz, No. S187890,

2011 Cal. LEXIS 556 (Cal. S. Ct. Jan. 19, 2011).

On November 29, 2011, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in this Court. (Doc.

No. 1.) Petitioner did not file a state petition for habeas corpus in California courts. (Doc. No.

1 at 3.) Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to relief because there was insufficient evidence

to support the application of gang enhancements and that the trial court’s instructions to the

jury were erroneous as to the elements of aiding and abetting. (Doc. No. 1 at 6-7.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A petitioner in state custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may challenge his

detention only on the grounds that his custody is in violation of the United States Constitution

or the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)), applies to § 2254 habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Pursuant to the AEDPA, when a petitioner does not

challenge a state court’s determination of the evidence, a § 2254 habeas corpus petition must

not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court, unless the

adjudication resulted in a decision that “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme

Court,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

To determine what constitutes “clearly established federal law” under 28 U.S.C

§ 2254(d)(1), courts look to Supreme Court holdings existing at the time of the state court

decision. Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A state court decision is contrary

to clearly established federal law when the court applies a rule that contradicts the governing

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law set forth in United States Supreme Court cases. Id. at 73 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). A state court decision is also contrary to clearly established federal

law when the court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a United

States Supreme Court decision but reaches a result different fromthat Supreme Court decision. 

Id. A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law when it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the

facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (quoting

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be an unreasonable

application of federal law, the state court decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous;

it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyear, 538 U.S. at 75. 

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the last reasoned state court decision. Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). When the state court does not supply reasoning for its decision, an independent review

of the record is required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of

controlling federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This

independent review is not de novo; the federal court defers to the state court’s ultimate

decision. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

The district court may accept, reject, or modify the findings and recommendations of

the magistrate judge, in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). If neither party objects

to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, the district court is not required

to make a de novo determination. See id. (“A judge shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the [findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge] to which

objection is made.”).

II. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support Gang Enhancements

Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to

support gang enhancements as to counts one, two, and four. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Specifically,

Petitioner argues that the testimony of the prosecution’s two gang experts was insufficient to

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner’s conduct was for the benefit of, at the

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direction of, or in association with a criminal gang. Id. Petitioner argues that the violence was

motivated by personal issues between Ruiz and Cohen and not gang-related. Id. Petitioner

unsuccessfully raised this issue on direct appeal. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) The California Court of

Appeal concluded that the detectives’ testimony was not the only gang evidence presented to

the jury and found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. (Doc. No.

19 at 8-10.) (Lodgment No. 5 at 38-42.) 

A habeas petitioner challenging a state criminal conviction based upon insufficiency of

the evidence is entitled to relief “if it is found that upon the evidence adduced at the trial no

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The critical inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt when

the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 318-19. If the

record contains facts that support conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must presume that

the trier of fact resolved any conflicts in favor of the prosecution and defer to that

determination. Id. at 326. In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the reviewing

federal court must look to the applicable state law defining the substantive elements of the

crime. Id. at 324 n.16. 

The California gang enhancement statute allows for additional punishment to apply if

the defendant’s conviction was gang related. See Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(b)(1). The

enhancement is applicable when the defendant is convicted of a felony committed (1) “for the

benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang” and (2) “with the

specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.” Id. 

Expert testimony regarding the importance of status and respect within gang

membership can be sufficient to support gang enhancements for convictions of known gang

members. People v. Albillar, 51 Cal. 4th 47, 59-63 (2010). In Albillar, a gang specialist

testified that status and respect are two of the most important elements of gang membership,

and committing criminal acts with fellow gang members is beneficial to the status of both the

individual and the gang. Id. The court held that the testimony, in light of the factual evidence

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showing gang affiliation, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendants

committed a crime for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang. Id. at 62. 

The court further held that if there is sufficient evidence that the defendants intended to

commit and did commit the crimes with known gang members, then the jury may fairly infer

that the defendants had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by

those gang members, including the conduct charged. Id. at 68. In Emery v. Clark, similar

testimonywas found to support gang enhancements on a defendant’s murder conviction arising

out of a situation involving a fellow gang member and the victim. Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d

1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The expert testified that the defendant needed to use lethal force

against the victim because the victim had disrespected a fellow gang member and the use of

lethal force would help the defendant maintain his status as a hard-core gang member within

his gang and other gangs in the area. Id. at 1214. Other courts have found similar testimony

and factual findings of known gang affiliation to be sufficient to support gang enhancements. 

See People v. Romero, 43 Cal. App. 4th 15, 20 (2006) (finding officer’s testimony that

defendant’s drive-by shooting outside a liquor store in territory known to belong to a rival gang

would serve to boost defendant’s status as a gang member was sufficient to support gang

enhancements).

Petitioner has failed to show that there was insufficient evidence to support gang

enhancements on his conviction. The appellate court found that Petitioner was known as

“Little Drowzy.” Ruiz, 2010 WL 3749195, at *6. El Cajon Police Detective Royal Bates

testified for the prosecution as to Petitioner’s known gang affiliation with the El Cajon Locos

street gang and his moniker as “Drowzy.” Id. Sheriff’s Department Detective Michael Speyrer

testified for the prosecution as to Mr. Ruiz’s affiliation with the Imperial Beach Dukes gang,

his moniker as “Drowzy” and “Big Drowzy,” and that if more than one gang member has the

same moniker the junior member would add the prefix “little” to his moniker. Id. Detective

Speyrer also testified as to the importance of respect within gang membership, explaining that

gang members maintain and gain status within the gang by committing serious crimes with

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other gang members, are expected to assist fellow gang members, and raise the gang’s status 1

in the community by committing criminal acts with fellow members. Id. The expert testimony

presented in Petitioner’s case is almost identical to the testimony presented in Albillar,

Romero, and Emery. In each case, the experts testified as to the importance of status and

respect within gang membership. In none of the cases was there a dispute as to the defendants’

ties to criminal street gangs. Petitioner contends that the crimes arose out of a personal issue

between Mr. Ruiz and Ms. Cohen and were therefore not gang-related. However, like the

defendant in Emery, Petitioner’s actions were in retaliation for Ms. Cohen’s perceived

disrespect of Mr. Ruiz and important for Petitioner to perform in order to maintain his status

and respect within the gang. Therefore, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to

support gang enhancements. Emery, 643 F.3d at 1214, 1216.

A reasonable jury could find on the evidence presented that Petitioner committed the

crimes with the required intent under the gang enhancement statutes. The California Court of

Appeal reasonably applied the Supreme Court standard for claims of insufficient evidence. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s insufficiency of the evidence claim fails.

III. No Prejudicial Error in Jury Instructions

Petitioner argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by supplementing the standard

jury instruction with language that misdirected the jury as to the elements of aiding and

abetting torture. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) The California Court of Appeal found that the instruction

was proper when viewed in the context of all the instructions given. (Doc. No. 19 at 16.)

A habeas petitioner alleging a constitutional violation because of instructional error

must show that the instruction was not merely erroneous, “but itself . . . so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.

145, 154 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). An instruction that

is allegedly erroneous solely under state law is insufficient for habeas review. Estelle v.

Detective Speyrer testified that gang members are expected to assist fellow gang 1

members, especially more senior members of the gang. Ruiz, 2010 WL 3749195, at *6.

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McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71 (1991). The reviewing district court must inquire as to “whether

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that

violates the Constitution.” Id. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). 

The contested instruction must be viewed alongside all instructions given and the entire record. 

Id. 

For the crime of torture, the prosecution must prove that a defendant (1) inflicted great

bodily injury on someone else; (2) with the intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering

for revenge or any sadistic purpose. Cal. Pen. Code § 206. Any person aiding and abetting in

the commission of a crime is guilty as a principal in the crime. See Cal. Pen. Code § 31 (“All

persons concerned in the commission of a crime . . . whether they directly commit the act

constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission . . . are principals in any crime so

committed.”). When the offense charged is a specific intent crime, such as torture, the

prosecution must show that the defendant (1) acted with knowledge of the criminal purpose

of the perpetrator and (2) gave aid or encouragement with the intent of facilitating the

commission of the crime. People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 4th 1111, 1118 (2001).

Petitioner has failed to show that the supplemental jury instruction so infected the trial

that the conviction violates due process. The court first instructed the jury that a defendant

may be found guilty of a crime by either directly committing the crime or aiding and abetting

the perpetrator who did commit the crime. Ruiz, 2010 WL 3749195, at *18; see CALCRIM

No. 400. Next, the court instructed the jury that to prove a defendant is guilty of a crime based

on aiding and abetting, the prosecution must show (1) the perpetrator committed the crime; (2)

the defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; (3) before or during the

commission, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;

and (4) the defendant’s words or actions did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator in committing

the crime. Ruiz, 2010 WL 3749195, at *18-19; see CALCRIM No. 401. The jury was

therefore instructed as to the proper elements required to convict a defendant of a crime for

aiding and abetting the perpetrator. After instructing the jury as to the required elements for

the crime of torture, the court added language stating:

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“An aider or abettor of the crime of torture does not have to have

personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim, so long as you find

beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one principal in the commission of

the crime did personally inflict great bodily injury and that, when inflicting

the injury, said principal intended to cause cruel or extreme pain and

suffering for the purpose of revenge or for any sadistic purpose . . . .”

(Doc. No. 19 at 13.) This instruction cannot be viewed alone, but must be viewed in context

with all the other instructions and the record. Estelle, 502 U.S at 72. Before delivering the

supplemental instruction, the court instructed the jury that a defendant may be found guilty by

aiding and abetting the perpetrator of a crime, the elements required for a conviction based on

aiding and abetting, and the elements required for the crime of torture. There was sufficient

evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for torture based on aiding and abetting liability. 

The jury found Mr. Ruiz guilty of torture. Ruiz, 2010 WL 3749195, at *1. Petitioner was

present when Mr. Ruiz informed Ms. Cohen that he was going to teach her a lesson for

disrespecting him. Id. at *2. Petitioner actually did aid in Ms. Cohen’s torture by blindfolding

Ms. Cohen and following Mr. Ruiz’s instructions to move her around the house. Id. at *2-3. 

Petitioner continued to assist Mr. Ruiz after learning that he intended to take revenge on Ms.

Cohen, showing Petitioner’s intention to aid or abet Mr. Ruiz in torturing Ms. Cohen. Id. at

*2. 

The state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s prejudicial error claim regarding the jury

instructions was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. Because there

was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, Petitioner fails to show that there was a

reasonable likelihood the jury applied the supplemental language in a way that violates the

Constitution. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim of prejudicial error based on an erroneous jury

instruction fails.

IV. Denial of Certificate of Appealability

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s denial of a habeas

petition must obtain a certificate of appealability (“COA”) from the district court judge or a

circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A court may issue a COA only if the applicant has

made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

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To satisfythis standard, the petitioner must show that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In the present case, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not made

such a showing and therefore the Court denies Petitioner a COA. 

CONCLUSION

The California Court of Appeal did not rule contrary to, or unreasonably apply, clearly

established federal law. Based on the foregoing, the Court denies with prejudice Petitioner’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus and denies a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 25, 2012

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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