Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01824/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01824-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Donald Edward Anderson,

Plaintiff,

v.

City of Fresno; Alfred Campos;

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

1:06-CV-01824 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PORTIONS OF FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE

TO STATE A CLAIM; AND MOTION

TO STRIKE PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE

DAMAGES

1. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Donald E. Anderson (“Plaintiff”) brings this

lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourth,

Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments against the City of

Fresno and Officer Alfred Campos (“Campos”). Campos was at all

relevant times employed as a police officer of the Fresno Police

Department (“Police Department”), and was allegedly acting for

and on behalf of the City of Fresno. The lawsuit alleges that

Defendant Campos is responsible, in both his official and

individual capacities, for Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest. The

lawsuit further alleges that Defendant Campos’ abusive behavior

toward Plaintiff, including verbal harassment and use of

unnecessary physical force, caused Plaintiff injuries to his leg

that required surgery and five days of hospitalization, acute and

prolonged physical and mental pain and suffering, wage loss, and

economic damages for medical and hospital care. Plaintiff also

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asserts various state causes of action against Defendants. 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due

process claim for failure to state a claim. Defendants also move

to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on the ground that 

Eighth Amendment applies only to punishment after conviction, not

prior to an adjudication. Lastly, Defendants move to strike

Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages against the City of

Fresno. 

1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on April 18,

2007. (Doc. 10, First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).) On April 26,

2007, Defendants City of Fresno and Campos filed a motion to

dismiss. (Doc 12-2, Motion to Dismiss.) On May 22, 2007,

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc 14, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.) On May 24, 2007, Defendants filed their reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc.

15, Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss.)

2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on November 2, 2005, Plaintiff’s

sister, Jeannie Williams (“Williams”), called the Police

Department. (Doc 10, FAC, ¶ 11.) Williams reported to the

Police Department that Plaintiff had taken her vehicle without

her permission. (Id.) Later that day, Williams learned that her

car was in fact taken by her boyfriend and promptly informed the

Police Department of her mistake. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on November 25, 2005, Campos showed

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up at Plaintiff’s residence and arrested Plaintiff for car theft.

(Doc 10, FAC, ¶ ¶ 13-14.) Campos stated that he had an arrest

warrant but claimed he did not have to present the warrant. (Doc

10, FAC, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was told to sit on the curb down the

street while waiting to be transported to jail. (Doc 10, FAC, ¶

14.) Williams claims it was then that all five of the Fresno

Police Department vehicles present left the scene. (Doc 10, FAC

¶ 15.) 

Plaintiff maintains Williams attempted to advise Campos

about the misunderstanding surrounding her previous car theft

report. (Doc 10, FAC, ¶ 14.) During this time, Plaintiff also

recognized Campos to be the officer who had stopped and harassed

him in the past. (Doc 10, FAC, ¶ ¶ 15.) After waiting for

approximately thirty minutes, Campos informed Plaintiff that he

was going to personally transport Plaintiff to jail and ordered

Plaintiff to stand up. ((Doc 10, FAC, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff had

trouble standing up because of a knee injury and requested some

assistance from Campos. (Id.) Campos refused to give assistance

and verbally abused Plaintiff. (Id.) While seating himself in

the police car, Plaintiff alleges he had trouble placing his leg

inside the car because of his knee pains. (Doc 10, FAC, ¶ 19.) 

Campos then slammed the car door on Plaintiff’s leg. (Id.) 

At the Police Station, Plaintiff continually requested to

speak to a supervisor, but his request was never granted. (Doc

10, FAC, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was then transferred to the Fresno

County Jail where a jail doctor examined him for booking. (Doc

10, FAC, ¶ 20.) Based on the result of the doctor’s examination,

the booking sergeant requested that Officer Funk transport

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Plaintiff to the hospital. (Doc. 10, FAC ¶ 22.) 

At the University Medical Center, Plaintiff alleges Officer

Funk attempted to locate a wheelchair for Plaintiff. Campos

appeared and stated to Officer Funk, in reference to Plaintiff,

that “the asshole is going right back to jail unless he tells me

what he said that I did ... the asshole does not need a wheel

chair, he can walk.” (Doc. 10, FAC ¶¶ 25-26.) When Officer Funk

asserted Plaintiff needed a wheelchair, Campos responded, “the

asshole is my prisoner and I’ll make the ass walk or crawl.” 

(Doc. 10, FAC ¶ 27.) As a result, Plaintiff walked unassisted

and with much difficulty, due to his pain and injuries, to the

hospital emergency room. (Doc. 10, FAC ¶ 28.) Plaintiff was

admitted to the hospital for a period of five days. (Doc. 10,

FAC ¶ 29.) While at the hospital, Plaintiff was informed that no

criminal charges were filed and that any parole hold had been

dropped. (Doc. 10, FAC ¶ 30.) 

4. Motion to Dismiss

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) are disfavored and rarely granted. The

question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff could

prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). A complaint may be dismissed if it “appears beyond doubt

that the non-movant can prove no set of facts to support its

claims.” Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1046

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(9th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, dismissal can be based on the

lack of a cognizable theory. Smilecare Dental Group v. Delta

Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

In order to sue a local government entity or its employees

in a federal court for civil rights violations, a plaintiff must

rely on statutory provisions that permit individuals to seek

relief in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which Plaintiff

brings this suit, provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizens

of the United States...to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress... 

Section 1983 “creates a cause of action against a person who,

acting under color of state law, deprives another of rights

guaranteed under the Constitution.” Henderson v. City of Simi

Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002).

To prevail under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and

ultimately prove that a government official acting under color of

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state law deprived him of a right secured by the United States

Constitution or the laws of the United States. Flagg Bros., Inc.

V. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). Here, Plaintiff alleges

deprivations of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Plaintiff implicates both the local government

and a police officer in his official as well as individual

capacity. 

B. Municipal Liability

Local government entities can be directly liable under §

1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, but only

if the allegedly unconstitutional actions were taken pursuant to

a “policy statement, ordinance, or decision official adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659, 690 (1978). Alternatively, local

government entities can be liable for adopting an

unconstitutional custom, even if such custom has not received

formal approval through the body’s official decision-making

channels. Id. At 691. 

A local government entity cannot be liable under § 1983

solely because it employs a tort-feasor. Monell, 436 U.S. at

649. Instead, it is when the execution of government’s policy or

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or

acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts

injury that government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. 

Id. That is, municipal liability is limited to acts that the

local government has “officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 at 470. If the decision to

adopt a particular course of action is directed by municipal

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policymakers, the local government may be liable whether that

action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly. Id. 

C. Official Capacity Claims Against Officer Campos

Local government officials can be named as defendants either in

their individual or official capacities. A suit against an

individual officer in his or her official capacity is “only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985). Thus, to state a claim against a local government

officer in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege an

unlawful “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436

U.S. at 659, 690. 

In contrast, a plaintiff suing a local government official

in his individual capacity is not required to establish any

connection between the alleged unlawful act and a governmental

policy or custom. Rather, the court must perform a two-step

analysis in determining whether the official is entitled to

qualified immunity, if the defense is asserted. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, the court must ask whether

there is a violation of a Constitutional or federal statutory

right. If so, the court must ask whether the right violated was

“clearly established” by inquiring whether a reasonable

individual could believe that the defendant’s actions were

lawful. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff sues Officer Campos in his official and

individual capacity. Doc. 10 ¶ 23. Plaintiff also brings a

claim against the City of Fresno. The claims against Officer

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Campos in his official capacity are “only another way of pleading

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent” and

are therefore redundant. Gram, 502 U.S. at 25. 

Plaintiffs official capacity claims against Officer Campos

are DISMISSED. 

D. Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Claim 

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim

under the Fifth Amendment. (Doc 12-2, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, 23.) The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part,

“[n]o person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law...” The Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment applies only to actions of the federal government

and “not to those of state or local governments.” Lee v. City of

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (2001). A claim of excessive

force is treated exclusively under the Fourth Amendment. See,

Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007)(“a claim of

excessive force in the course of making a ‘seizure’ of a person

is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective

reasonableness’ standard.) Further, Plaintiff does not allege

that any of the named Defendants are federal actors. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment

claim is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

E. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim

In his complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants

deprived him of due process of law under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Doc. 10, FAC, ¶ 33.) It is unclear whether

Defendants are also moving to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process claim. Defendants move to dismiss

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Plaintiff’s claims arguing, “Plaintiff has alleged no facts from

which it can be inferred that he was denied adequate procedural

due process.” 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

encompasses two types of protections: substantive rights

(substantive due process) and procedural fairness (procedural due

process). See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-28 (1990). 

Plaintiff alleges violation of both substantive and procedural

due process rights. (Doc 14, Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 8:19-21.) 

i. Substantive Due Process 

Substantive due process is violated when government conduct

“can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience

shocking.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128

(1992). Substantive due process has been construed to protect

personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,

contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and

education. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003). The

open-ended concept of substantive due process is rarely expanded

beyond the traditionally established scope. Collins, 503 U.S. at

125. To avoid the unnecessary expansion of substantive due

process, the Supreme Court has held that where a particular

Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection” against a particular sort of government behavior,

“that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive

due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” 

Albright v Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (quoting Graham v.

Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). This doctrine of restricting

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See Morgan v. Komers, 151 Fed. Appx. 546, 548 (9 Cir. 1 th

2005)(quoting Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir.

1996)) (analyzing claim under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment but

not under substantive due process); Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d

1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing claim under the First

Amendment but not under substantive due process); Ramirez v.

Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing

claim under the Fourth Amendment but not under substantive due

process). 

Defendants’ conduct includes: allegedly refusing to give 2

assistance after Plaintiff requested help standing up due to his

knee pains, verbally abusing Plaintiff for requesting help

(Plaintiff does not allege specifics), slamming the car door on

Plaintiff’s leg, refusing to give Plaintiff a wheelchair at the

hospital, calling Plaintiff an “asshole” and other names, and

threatening the Plaintiff with jail time if Plaintiff did not

answer Defendant’s Campos’ questions. (Doc 10, FAC, ¶¶ 18-27.) 

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a plaintiff’s claim to a particular Amendment where it applies is

also well established in the Ninth Circuit. 

1

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Campos’ refused to produce

an arrest warrant. From this refusal, Plaintiff infers that

there was never a warrant. Further, if a warrant did exist,

Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew the warrant was invalid the

police department was notified of error in accusing Plaintiff of

taking his sister’s car. (Doc. 14, Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 8:20-23.) 

Plaintiff alleges that the seizure of Plaintiff’s body

without probable cause or a valid warrant are “arbitrary” or

“conscience shocking.” Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant

Campos’ abusive behavior towards him en route to the Fresno

Police Station and at the hospital also constitute conduct that

shocks the conscience. However, all seizures, or arrests, of 2

the person where “a police officer accosts an individual and

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If this case had not involved an arrest, it would have 3

been appropriately analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Fontana, 262 F.3d at 882. Plaintiff is treated as having been

arrested here because police had restrained “his freedom to walk

away,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, even though the booking process

was not completed and Plaintiff was released after his treatment

at the hospital. 

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restrai[s] his freedom to walk away,” even if such seizures do

not result in prosecution for crime, are governed by the Fourth

Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). The Fourth

Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures continues to

apply after the initial arrest and throughout the time that the

arrestee is in the custody of the arresting officer. Fontana v.

Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 879 (holding that sexually harassing the

arrestee on the way to the police station and while the arrestee

was in custody of the arresting officer raises a Fourth Amendment

claim). Defendant Campos’ harassing and abusive behavior towards

Plaintiff took place after Plaintiff was arrested and while 3

Plaintiff was in custody. The trip to the Fresno Police Station

and events that took place before Plaintiff was checked into the

hospital therefore constitute a “continuing seizure” during which

Plaintiff is entitled to be treated in a reasonable manner under

the Fourth Amendment. See Fontana, 262 F.3d at 880. Since the

Fourth Amendment provides explicit constitutional protection

against unlawful arrest and unreasonable force during the

“continuing seizure” of the arrestee, Plaintiff’s claim must be

scrutinized under the Fourth Amendment rather than the more

generalized substantive due process protection found under the

Fourteenth Amendment. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

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Amendment substantive due process claim is GRANTED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

ii. Procedural Due Process 

To assert a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must

allege (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the

Constitution; (2) a deprivation of that interest by the

government; and (3) lack of due process of law with regard to

that deprivation. Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th

Cir. 2000). Procedural due process requires, at a minimum, notice

and an opportunity to be heard. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579

(1975). 

It is undisputed that Defendant Campos had deprived

Plaintiff of his liberty by arresting him and subsequently

detaining him at the Fresno Police Station before Plaintiff was

transported to the hospital. (Doc. 10, FAC, ¶ 20; Doc. 12-2,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 26-28.) There is a factual

dispute as to whether there was an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 14, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, 7:21-22.) Plaintiff also appears to argue that he was

deprived of his liberty and denied procedural due process while

“detained” at the hospital for five days “without being free to

leave.” (Doc. 14, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, 8:13-14.) However, the argument that Plaintiff was

“detained” at the hospital without due process is contradicted by 

Plaintiff’s own admission that he was informed while at the

hospital that no charges had been filed and any hold was released 

(Doc. 10, FAC ¶ 30). This suggests Plaintiff was free to leave

whenever the doctors released him. 

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In the criminal context, a seizure that complies with the

Fourth Amendment also complies with procedural due process. 

Sanders v. City of San Diego, 93 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Pleading violation of both procedural due process and Fourth

Amendment is redundant. See id. Since Plaintiff also asserts a

Fourth Amendment claim, (Doc. 10, FAC ¶ 33), the availability of

relief under the Fourth Amendment should preclude Plaintiff’s

procedural due process claim. 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

G. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment

against those convicted of crime. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.

651, 664 (1977). The Eighth Amendment applies only to punishment

imposed after conviction, not prior to an adjudication of guilt. 

Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004); Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The Plaintiff in this case

was not convicted of any crime. 

Plaintiff argues that Bell should be distinguished from the

present case because Bell deals with whether pre-adjudication

confinement is, in fact, punishment. (Doc. 14, Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 9:11-12.) Even

assuming, arguendo, that the Eighth Amendment could apply to a

pretrial detainees, Plaintiff still fails to allege any facts

that an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. 

The cruel and unusual punishment clause is restricted to

cases challenging the length of a sentence or the nature of a

punishment. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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Plaintiff’s assertion that the length of his detention was cruel

and unusual falls outside the scope of the clause since no

sentence was imposed. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s assertion that the conditions of

his detention constituted cruel and unusual punishment, he must

first allege that the deprivation was “sufficiently serious” to

form the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “[S]ufficiently serious”

deprivations under the Eighth Amendment include denial of the

‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’ Id. (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 335, 347 (1981)) Prison officials

must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing,

shelter, and medical care, and must make reasonable measure to

guarantee the safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994). Second, Plaintiff must allege that the prison

official acted “with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 198. With respect to this inquiry, the

Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference” to

prisoners’ serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). To act with

deliberate indifference, an official must have actual knowledge

of an excessive risk to inmate health or safety and must

deliberately disregard that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s excessive and unreasonable

force while Plaintiff was “detained” for five days at the

University Medical Center constituted cruel and unusual

punishment. (Doc. 10, FAC, ¶¶ 6-9.) Applying the cruel and

unusual standards set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to allege

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a violation. Plaintiff was not incarcerated, jailed, or

confined. Plaintiff was not “detained” at the hospital; rather,

he was treated for his injuries. 

Even if Plaintiff was so-called “detained” at the hospital,

he still failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the twoprong analysis. With respect to the “sufficiently serious”

deprivation prong, Plaintiff was neither denied life’s

necessities nor exposed to unreasonable danger while at the

hospital. The facts as alleged show that Plaintiff was

intimidated by Defendant and denied a wheel chair at the

hospital. (Doc. 10, FAC, ¶¶ 27-28.) But these alone do not show

deprivations “sufficiently grave” to constitute cruel and unusual

punishment. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. With respect to the

culpability prong, Defendants were not deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Plaintiff was promptly transported

to the hospital after the booking sergeant recommended that

Plaintiff be treated for his injuries. There is no basis for

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim is GRANTED. 

3. MOTION TO STRIKE PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) provides that “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matters” may be “stricken from any

pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[O]nly pleadings are

subject to motions to strike.” See Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, a

“motion to strike” materials that are not part of the pleadings

may be regarded as an “invitation” by the movant “to consider

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whether [proffered material] may properly be relied upon.”

United States v. Crisp, 190 F.R.D. 546, 551 (E.D. Cal. 1999)

(quoting Monroe v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 641, 645 (D. Conn.

1975).

Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted. 

See Pease & Curran Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp.

945, 947 (C.D. Cal. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Stanton

Road Ass'n v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).

“[M]otions to strike should not be granted unless it is clear

that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on

the subject matter of the litigation. Colaprico v. Sun

Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991)

(citation omitted). 

While punitive damages are available in action against a

local government official in his or her personal capacity, they

are not available in action against municipality under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. City of Newport v. Facts Concert, Inc., 453 U.S. 247

(1981). The City of Fresno is thus immune from punitive damages.

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Punitive Damages against the City of

Fresno is unopposed by Plaintiff. 

Defendants’ motion to strike prayer for punitive damages

against the City of Fresno is GRANTED.

4. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs official capacity claims against Officer Campos

are DISMISSED. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment

claim is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process claim is GRANTED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim is GRANTED. 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff prayer for punitive

damages against the City of Fresno is also GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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