Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02889/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02889-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN SIMMONS

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv2889 WQHMDD

vs. ORDER

MORGAN STANLEY SMITH

BARNEY, LLC; DOES 1 through 50,

inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the

Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion for Summary Judgment”) filed by

Defendant Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC. (ECF No. 65).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 1, 2011, Plaintiff John Simmons (“Simmons”) initiated this action

in San Diego Superior Court with a Complaint against Defendant Morgan Stanley

Smith Barney, LLC (“MSSB”) – his former employer. (ECF No. 1-1). Simmons

alleges that MSSB unequally compensated him and ultimately fired him on account of

his Mormon religion. The Complaint contains statutory claims for discrimination

pursuant to California Government Code section 12940(a) (“FEHA”) and 42 U.S.C. §

2000e (“Title VII”), and non-statutory claims for fraud, wrongful termination in

violation of public policy, and breach of contract. On December 12, 2011, MSSB

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removed the action to this Court. 

On May 24, 2012, the Court granted in part a motion filed by MSSB to compel

arbitration of Simmons’ claims. (ECF No. 37). The Court stayed the case and

compelled arbitration as to the non-statutory claims, and declined to compel arbitration

of the claims for discrimination in violation of Title VII and FEHA. 

On March 5, 2013, MSSB filed the Motion for Summary Judgment, accompanied

by declarations and exhibits. (ECF No. 65, 76). MSSB moves for summary judgment

on Simmons’ remaining Title VII and FEHA claims. MSSB contends that the

undisputed facts show Simmons was terminated for repeatedly demonstrating “poor

judgment” and for undermining “the inclusive working environment MSSB expected

him to foster, despite repeated counseling.” (ECF No. 65-1 at 7).

On April 29, 2013, Simmons filed an opposition to the Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 78), along with declarations and exhibits. (ECF Nos. 78, 79, 82-1,

84).1

 Simmons contends that he has come forth with evidence creating a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the instances of “poor judgment” raised by MSSB are

merely pretext for religious discrimination.

On May 9, 2013, MSSB filed a reply. (ECF No. 90).2

On July 12, 2013, the Court held oral argument. (ECF Nos. 96, 98).3

//

//

//

1

On April 30, 2013, Simmons filed a Motion for Leave to File Under Seal certain

portions of the exhibits filed on April 29, 2013. (ECF No. 81). On May 6, 2013, MSSB filed a non-opposition. (ECF No. 89). Accordingly, the Motion to File Under Seal (ECF No. 81) is hereby GRANTED.

2

MSSB also filed evidentiary objections pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A)(i) and 37(c)(1). (ECF No. 90–2). On May 10, 2013, Simmons filed a response to the objections. (ECF No. 91).

3

On July 12, 2013, after oral argument, Simmons filed a supplemental declaration with additional evidence. (ECF No. 97). On July 24, 2013, MSSB filed a response to Simmons’ newly submitted evidence, along with additional evidence of its own. (ECF No. 99).

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BACKGROUND FACTS

Simmons is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,

commonly known as the Mormon Church, and a twenty-six year veteran in the finance

industry. (Simmons Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4-5; ECF No. 78-4 at 1). In late 2007, Simmons left

his position with Merrill Lynch in Washington, D.C. to become District Manager of

Morgan Stanley’s Southern California Region.4

 Id. ¶ 6.

I. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC

On June 1, 2009, Morgan Stanley’s Global Wealth Management Group joined

forces with Citigroup’s Smith Barney Division, creating the retail brokerage firm

MSSB. (Ritzcovan Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 76 at 277). “MSSB branch offices are managed

by Branch Managers.... Branch Managers are overseen by Complex Managers....

Complex Managers report to Regional Directors.... Each Regional Director reports to

a Division Director.” Id. “An individual holding the functional Regional Director title

can also hold the corporate title of Executive Director of Managing Director.... To be

elevated from Executive Director to Managing Director, the [Regional Director] must

be nominated by his or her Divisional Director....” (Id. ¶ 6; see also Saperstein Dep. at

175-76, ECF No. 84 at 15-16).

II. Mid-2009: Simmons interviewed for Regional Director position

In mid-2009, Doug Kentfield (“Kentfield”) became the Divisional Director for

MSSB’s Western Division – and Simmons’ immediate supervisor. (Simmons Decl. ¶

9-10, ECF No. 78-4 at 2. Shortly thereafter, Kentfield asked Simmons if he was

interested in a Regional Director (“RD”) position with MSSB. (Kentfield Decl. ¶ 4,

ECF No. 65-3 at 2). Simmons expressed interest and Kentfield interviewed him. Id. 

Simmons testified in his deposition that the following occurred during his interview:

Kentfield asked him, “‘how many children do you have?,’” and Simmons told him

“‘six’”; Kentfield responded: “‘Six kids. Oh, my God. Are you Mormon or Catholic?’”;

4

The “District Manager” position for which Simmons was hired “was a precursor to the Regional Director position in the current organizational structure.” (Ritzcovan Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 27 at 278).

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upon telling Kentfield he is Mormon, “the topic changed” and “so did [Kentfield’s]

demeanor.... [T]he temperament or the mood chang[ed] ... from conversational

questions and dialogue to fairly terse, fairly rapid, and the interview didn’t go a lot –

much longer.” (Simmons Dep. at 65-67, ECF No. 84 at 25-28). 

Kentfield interviewed several other managers for the position, ultimately

selecting Bill Lee, from Smith Barney. (Kentfield Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 65-3 at 2;

Ritzcovan Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 76 at 278). Although Kentfield had input in the process,

a group of senior executives in New York made the final hiring decisions for RD

positions. (Kentfield Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 65-3 at 2).

III. June 2009: Simmons reassigned as Divisional Business Development Officer

 In June 2009, the same group of MSSB executives in New York that reassigned

Bill Lee as an RD offered Simmons a position as Divisional Business Development

Officer (“DBDO”). Id. Simmons was told by Kentfield and Rick Skae, also a

Divisional Director, that this was a lateral move and would not affect his compensation

or benefits. (Simmons Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 78-4 at 2). Simmons accepted the DBDO

position. Id.

Simmons testified in his deposition that, during his time as DBDO, Kentfield

made “derogatory statements” about his religion “on several occasions.” (Simmons

Dep. at 69, ECF No. 84 at 28). As a Mormon, Simmons does not drink alcohol.

(Simmons Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 78-4 at 1). Simmons testified that, during the summer

of 2009, the following incident took place at a New York hotel in the presence of other

MSSB executives:

[T]here were drinks before dinner, there was dinner. We returned to the

hotel lobby, and [Kentfield] said, come on. Let’s all go have drinks. 

And I said – I said to him, hey, Doug. I’m going to run upstairs to call my wife and kids, and that’s when he made the comment[:]... ‘Well, God knows there’s enough of them. And plus you don’t drink anyway.’...

You would have to be a Mormon and be asked how many wives you had to understand what a sensitive topic that would be.

(Simmons Dep. at 71-72, ECF No. 84 at 28). Simmons testified that he told Rick Skae

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about the comment, and that Skae responded: “That’s messed up.” Id. at 76. Simmons

testified: “That type of scenario of an uncomfortable parting at night repeated itself over

again every time we got together as a group. It was a common type of feeling.” Id.

Simmons testified that, when he “would be ... separating from the group,” others in the

presence of Kentfield would joke “about not drinking[,] how many wives[,] hah, hah,

hah,” and that “the talk, the banter, the jokes were not cut off by [Kentfield].” Id. at 89. 

Simmons testified that he “would explain to people ... how offensive that is to me,” and

that the jokes nevertheless “intensified.” Id. at 93.

IV. December 2009: Simmons reassigned as Executive RD

Simmons stated in his declaration that he was informed by “Rick Skae and

another high level management executive” in December 2009 that he had been

reassigned to Executive RD following a “meeting and decision by MSSB Management,

including Andy Saperstein, ... Kentfield, Rick Skae, Bill McMahon, and Charlie

Johnston.” (Simmons Decl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 78-4 at 3). Kentfield stated in his

declaration: “I made the decision to promote Mr. Simmons to [RD] ... [while I] was

aware that Mr. Simmons is Mormon.” (Kentfield Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 65-3 at 3). 

Simmons’ compensation remained the same, and he reported directly to Kentfield. (Id.

¶ 16; Simmons Decl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 78-4 at 3). 

As an Executive RD, Simmons’ compensation “consisted of a salary, which was

paid monthly, and an annual bonus based on performance. The other nineteen Regional

Directors were compensated in the same way.” (Simmons Decl. ¶ 45, ECF No. 78-4

at 7). The base salary for Managing RDs is roughly double the base salary of Executive

RDs. (Ritzcovan Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 76 at 279). “To be elevated from Executive

Director to Managing Director, the RD must be nominated by his or her Divisional

Director....” (Ritzcovan Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 76 at 277). Saperstein made the “ultimate

decision” with respect to the performance bonuses. (Id. ¶ 8; Undisputed Fact (“UF”)

No. 95).

Simmons stated in his declaration that Kentfield continued to make “many

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discriminatory comments about [his] religion” after he was reassigned as Executive RD. 

(Simmons Decl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 78-4 at 3). Simmons stated that “[t]he frequency and

intensity of these comments increased over time and the majority and harshest

comments came after my reassignment to the Regional Director position.” Id.

V. February and March 2010: Complaints regarding Simmons’ comments

In March 2010, Simmons gave a presentation on “individual greatness,” in which

he referenced numerous historical, sports and religious figures, including Mormon

prophet David O. McKay. (Simmons Decl. ¶ 30, ECF No. 78-4 at 5). Susan Dixon,

another MSSB employee, testified in her deposition that she complained about

Simmons’ reference to McKay and that she resigned in part because of the presentation. 

(Id. ¶ 31; Dixon Dep. at 29-30, 34-36, ECF No. 76 at 10-14).

In April 2010, Kentfield and Beth Fehmel, a MSSB human resources manager,

counseled Simmons and instructed him to limit the sports, historical, and religious

references in his speeches. (Simmons Dep. at 155-56, ECF No. 76 at 132-33). Simmons

testified in his deposition that Kentfield told him, without Fehmel present, that “[y]ou

can never fucking talk about your fucking religion again at this firm because everybody

hates your fucking religion.” (Id. at 161-64; Simmons Decl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 78-4 at 3). 

Simmons testified that the incident is “seared into my memory.” Id. In his deposition,

Kentfield denied making those remarks. (Kentfield Dep. at 46, ECF No. 76 at 37). 

Simmons received no written reprimand regarding this matter. (Simmons Dep. at 164,

ECF No. 76 at 138).

VI. Summer 2010: Comments regarding Simmons’ religion

Simmons testified in his deposition that, at a dinner with 20-30 MSSB employees

during summer of 2010, Jim Tracy, a MSSB executive and “good friend” of

Kentfield’s, made the following remarks upon learning that Simmons was Mormon:

“[W]hat a disaster. My father-in-law is a Mormon. It’s a disaster. Does Doug

[Kentfield] know you’re a Mormon?” (Id. at 95-97, ECF No. 84 at 39-40). Simmons

testified that when he “said yes,” Tracy responded: “[W]ell, I’ll bet he didn’t when he

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hired you.” Id. at 97.

VII. August 2010: Ferrante/Wilson matter

In August 2010, Kentfield told Simmons about an ongoing human resources

investigation into Michael Ferrante and Scott Wilson — MSSB employees and friends

of Simmons. (Kentfield Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 65-3 at 3). Ferrante was suspected of

having a sexual relationship with a subordinate female employee and sending sexually

suggestive e-mails about the relationship to Wilson. (Id. ¶ 10; Simmons Dep. at 173-74,

ECF No. 76 at 146-47). Simmons requested, and was permitted, to sit in on Wilson’s

human resources interview. Id. at 179. At the conclusion of the investigation, Kentfield

told Simmons that Ferrante and Wilson had to go. Id. at 194-96. Simmons disagreed

at first, but ultimately agreed to fire them. Id. Simmons cried while telling Ferrante and

Wilson they were fired, and told Ferrante shortly afterwards to “keep your chin up.” 

Id. at 200-01.

In September 2010, Kentfield counseled Simmons about his “poor judgment” in

his handling of the Ferrante and Wilson matter. (Kentfield Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 65-3

at 4). Kentfield criticized Simmons for “being soft” with Ferrante and for sitting in on

Wilson’s human resources interview. (Simmons Dep. at 213, ECF No. 76 at 166).

Kentfield felt Simmons has “exposed the firm to risk.” (Id.; Kentfield Decl. ¶ 11, ECF

No. 65-3 at 4). Simmons received no written reprimand. (Simmons Decl. ¶ 33, ECF

No. 78-4 at 6). 

VIII. 2010 mid-year performance review

 In August 2010, Kentfield drafted a mid-year review of Simmons’ performance

as Executive RD, concluding that he “sometimes meets expectations.” (Def. Ex. A,

ECF No. 65-3 at 13). Kentfield’s comments stated in part:

John is results oriented and has maintained a strong focus on achieving

key firm objectives. John works hard to effectively motivate his

employees challenging them to achieve and surpass their stated goals....

John continues to demonstrate challenges regarding his judgment in both business and personnel matters.... When problems have been identified, John has worked to effectively address individual performance issues....

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Id. at 12-13. Kentfield discussed the review with Simmons, but Simmons did not

receive a copy. (Simmons Decl. ¶ 36, ECF No. 78-4 at 6).

IX. September 2010: Decision not to promote Simmons 

On September 14, 2010, Fehmel sent an e-mail to Ritzcovan which stated: “Dana,

Doug [Kentfield] verified that he will NOT be looking to promote John Simmons to

MD - shocker.” (Pl. Ex. 16, ECF No. 97 at 5).

X. 2010 year-end performance review

In January 2011, Kentfield drafted Simmons’ 2010 year-end review, concluding

that Simmons “meets expectations.” (Def. Ex. B, ECF No. 65-3 at 17). Kentfield’s

comments stated in part:

John is strongly results oriented. He is very focused on achieving the

goals established for his region and demonstrates the competitive drive to outperform his peers. John has worked to build a strong management team and a culture focused on both performance and teamwork....

John and I have had several meetings to address specific developmental issues over the course of the year. While John may not always agree, he has worked diligently to address my issues of concern. John has a strong competitive drive, the experience and skill set to be a very effective Regional Director. I’m concerned about the lapses of judgment John occasionally demonstrates and will be working closely with him to help

him improve his decision making process going forward. 

Id. at 15-16. Kentfield discussed the review with Simmons, but Simmons did not

receive a copy. (Simmons Decl. ¶ 36, ECF No. 78-4 at 6). During the meeting,

Kentfield commented positively on Simmons’ job performance, and noted that the

overall review would have been better had it not been for the Ferrante/Wilson and

Dixon matters. (Simmons Dep. at 243-44, ECF No. 76 at 175-76).

XI. Early 2011: Las Vegas branch office meeting

In late 2010 or early 2011, Jeff Branch, a Complex Manager for MSSB, told

Simmons that he wanted to hold a meeting over dinner with a group of financial

advisors reporting to Doug Ireland, MSSB’s Las Vegas Branch Manager. (Simmons

Dep. at 331-33, ECF No. 76 at 200-202). Branch told Simmons that he did not want to

invite Ireland to the meeting. Id. at 330-31. Simmons testified in his deposition that he

had reservations about excluding Ireland, told Branch to inform Ireland, and otherwise

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approved the meeting. Id. at 332. Branch did not inform Ireland. (Id.; Kentfield Decl.

¶ 13). After learning of the meeting, Ireland complained to Kentfield that the meeting

had undermined his ability to manage the Las Vegas branch. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. As a result,

Ireland was reassigned elsewhere. Id. ¶ 14.

On February 16, 2011, Kentfield told Simmons that he showed “poor judgment”

in approving the dinner, and that he was to blame for Ireland leaving Las Vegas. Id. 

Simmons received no written reprimand. 

XII. February 2011: Simmons sets meeting for Greg Fleming and new recruits

In February 2011, Simmons arranged for Greg Fleming, President of MSSB, to

meet with several high level recruits in New York. (Simmons Dec. ¶¶ 38-39, ECF No.

78-4 at 6-7; Simmons Dep. at 361-63, ECF No. 76 at 208-10). After setting the meeting,

Simmons arranged background checks for the recruits. Id. at 362-63. The recruits

ultimately met Fleming in New York “with Kentfield’s approval.” (Simmons Dec. ¶

41, ECF No. 78-4 at 7). Kentfield believed Simmons exercised “poor judgment” by

setting up such a meeting without first having completed the background checks. 

(Kentfield Decl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 65-3 at 5). Simmons received no written reprimand. 

XIII. January-February 2011: Simmons complains to Kentfield and Saperstein

about compensation

“As of year-end 2010, five RDs reported to Doug Kentfield in the Western

Division,” including Simmons. (Ritzcovan Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 76 at 279). For the

year 2010, Simmons received the highest bonus ($680,000) of the five RDs reporting

to Kentfield, but the lowest salary. Id. The other four, who were Managing RDs and

who Ritzcovan stated had more experience than Simmons, earned a salary of over

double Simmons’ salary. (Id.; ECF No. 82-1 at 12-17).

[Simmons] expect[ed] [his] performance bonus for year 2010 to be paid in January 2011. [Simmons] was informed by Kentfield in or about January 2011 that although [his] bonus amount increased from $630,000

to $680,000 based on [his] superior performance, that unfortunately a large portion of the payment of those monies would be deferred, and would be

paid in increments over the next year and into 2012. 

(Simmons Decl. ¶ 47, ECF No. 78-4 at 7). 

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In February 2011, Simmons complained to Kentfield and Saperstein that he was

the only RD without the title of Managing RD. (Simmons Decl. at 325-26, ECF No.

194-95). In his declaration, Simmons stated that when he asked Kentfield about being

promoted to Managing RD, Kentfield responded, “No.” Id. at 326. On February 13,

2011, Saperstein sent Simmons an e-mail which stated in part: “Support for the MD

must come from your DD[, i.e. Kentfield].... You were not put up for nomination this

year.” (Pl. Ex. 15, ECF No. 82-1 at 89).

XIV. March 2011: MSSB terminates Simmons’ employment

In March 2011, “shortly after complaining to ... Kentfield and Andy Saperstein

about [his] disparate salary,” Simmons’ employment was terminated by Kentfield “with

the concurrence” of Saperstein, Fleming and human resource managers Dana Ritzcovan

and Rob Hampton. (Simmons Decl. ¶ 44, ECF No. 78-4 at 7; UF Nos. 84, 229). 

Kentfield told Simmons that he had lost confidence in Simmons’ judgment. (UF No.

86). “Simmons has no reason to believe that Saperstein has any animus toward him

based on his religion, and neither Hampton nor Ritzcovan have ever said or done

anything indicating to Simmons that they have any ill-will towards Mormons.” (UF No.

85). Kentfield stated: “I understand that based on offering the severance package to Mr.

Simmons, that we coded [his termination] as ‘not for cause.’” (Kentfield Dep. at 32,

ECF No. 79 at 31; see also ECF No. 79-2 at 35-39 (“Form U5 Uniform Termination

Notice for Securities Industries Registration” re: Simmons’ termination, dated June 8,

2011)). 

Simmons stated in his declaration that he “never received any written warning,

written reprimand, or written discipline while employed at MSSB regarding any job

performance issues.” (Simmons Decl. ¶¶ 18-19, ECF No. 78-4 at 3). During his

employment at MSSB, Simmons and his management team “interfaced often with the

MSSB Human Resources department regarding employee discipline issues. 

[Simmons’] experience was such that MSSB had a firmly entrenched progressive

discipline process that provided for progressively more severe sanctions.” Id. ¶ 21. 

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Simmons’ management team had “serious issues with employees that management

wanted to terminate but we were prohibited from doing so by HR because they required

us to follow steps in progressive discipline.” Id. ¶ 22.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of fact is “genuine” only

if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving

party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it may affect the outcome of the case. See id. at 248. The party moving

for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the

pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the

moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own evidence, “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for

trial” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In order to make this showing, the non-moving party must

“identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” 

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). “In considering a motion for

summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility

determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997).

DISCUSSION

Under Title VII and FEHA,5

 it is unlawful for an employer or employer’s agent

“to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because

5

“California law under the FEHA mirrors federal law under Title VII....” Godwin

v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1998).

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of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §

2000e–2(a)(1). “In responding to a summary judgment motion in a Title VII disparate

treatment case, a plaintiff may produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating

that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the defendant’s decision,

or alternatively may establish a prima facie case under the burden-shifting framework

set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” 

Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005).

I. McDonnell Douglas

In this case, Simmons relies on the McDonnell Douglas analysis. “Under

McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under Title VII must first

establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv., Inc.,

580 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). “If the plaintiff establishes

a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. ... If the employer

offers a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the

articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination.” Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). 

A. Prima Facie Case

Simmons may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell

Douglas framework by showing that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he

was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and

(4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more

favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise

to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 604

(9th Cir. 2004). “The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case

for Title VII ... claims on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise

to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d

885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).

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As a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints and a twenty-six

year veteran in the finance industry, Simmons belongs to a protected class and was

qualified for his position at MSSB. See Christian Sci. Reading Room Jointly

Maintained v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 784 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Simmons has provided evidence that he was employed as an “Executive RD” with a

base salary of less than half that of the other four “Managing RDs” in his region. 

(Ritzcovan Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 76 at 279). Accordingly, Kentfield’s decision not to

promote Simmons to Managing RD constitutes an adverse employment action. (ECF

No. 97 at 5; Saperstein Dep. at 175-76, ECF No. 84 at 15-16); see also Fonseca v. Sysco

Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We define ‘adverse

employment action’ broadly.... We have recognized that an adverse employment action

exists where an employer’s action negatively affects its employee’s compensation.”

(collecting cases)). Simmons’ subsequent termination also constitutes an adverse

employment action. Finally, Simmons has provided evidence that, on several occasions,

he was singled out and subjected to jokes and ridicule about his religious beliefs. 

(Simmons Dep. at 69, 71-72, 89, 83, ECF No. 84).

The Court finds that Simmons has come forward with sufficient evidence to

establish a prima facie case. See Wallis, 36 F.3d at 889. The burden shifts to MSSB to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Simmons’ compensation and

termination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

B. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

According to MSSB, Simmons was fired because he “repeatedly showed poor

judgment” and “undermined [MSSB’s] inclusive working environment.” (ECF No. 65-

1 at 7). MSSB has produced evidence that Simmons was “repeatedly counseled” by

Kentfield for showing “poor judgment” in his public speaking; in his disputes with

other employees; and in his handling of the Ferrante/Wilson matter, the Las Vegas

dinner, and the Greg Fleming meeting. (Kentfield Decl. ¶¶ 7-12, ECF No. 65-3 at 3-6).

MSSB asserts that Simmons’ compensation was based on his job title, his length of

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experience, and the revenues of his region.

The Court finds that MSSB has sufficiently articulated facially nondiscriminatory

reasons for Simmons’ compensation and termination. See, e.g., Pottenger v. Potlach

Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

for termination where supervisor lacked confidence that employee “could make the hard

decisions necessary” to turn his division of the company around). Accordingly, the

burden shifts back to Simmons to show that these reasons are merely pretext for

discrimination.

C. Pretext

At this step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, “[t]he plaintiff ... must

produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.” 

Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1037 (citation omitted). 

1. Same actor inference

MSSB contends “it is undisputed” that Kentfield, while aware of Simmons’

religion, acted as the primary decision maker in both Simmons’ promotion and

subsequent termination. MSSB contends that Simmons must therefore overcome a

“strong inference” that his termination was not based upon a discriminatory motive. 

Simmons contends that the inference is inapplicable in this case because (1) he was

reassigned and then terminated by two distinct groups of MSSB executives, and (2) a

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Kentfield, although part of each

group, was actually responsible for both decisions. 

“[W]here the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a

discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong

inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace

& Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing, inter alia, Buhrmaster v. Overnite

Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995) (“An individual who is willing to hire and

promote a person of a certain class is unlikely to fire them simply because they are a

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member of that class.”), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1078 (1996)). 

In this case, the executives involved in reassigning Simmons as Executive RD

were not identical to those involved in terminating his employment. The evidence

shows that Kentfield, Saperstein, Skae, Bill McMahon and Charlie Johnson were

involved in the reassignment decision, while the termination decision was made by

Kentfield, Saperstein, Fleming, Ritzcovan and Hampton. While the parties agree that

the evidence shows Kentfield was the primary decisionmaker with respect to Simmons’

termination, see UF 229; ECF No. 90 at 7, the evidence is not clear as to whether

Kentfield was the primary decisionmaker for Simmons’ reassignment. MSSB

submitted a “2009 MD Promotion Write-Up,” which shows that Simmons was

“[n]ominated” by both John Campbell and Kentfield in October 2009. (ECF No. 99-3

at 2). Kentfield stated in his declaration: “I made the decision to promote Mr. Simmons

to Regional Director ... [while I] was aware that Mr. Simmons is Mormon.” (Kentfield

Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 65-3 at 3). However, Kentfield also stated: “While I had input on

the hiring decisions for the Regional Directors ..., the final decision as to who would be

offered which Regional Director positions was made by a group of senior executives

in New York.” Id. ¶ 4. Simmons stated in his declaration that he was first made aware

of the reassignment decision by “Rick Skae and another high level management

executive,” who told him that the decision was made “as result of a management

meeting and decision by MSSB Management, including Andy Saperstein, Doug

Kentfield, Rick Skae, Bill McMahon, and Charlie Johnson.” (Simmons Decl. ¶ 14, ECF

No. 78-4 at 3).

Based upon the conflicting evidence of Kentfield’s decisionmaking role in the

reassignment decision, the Court cannot conclude that the “same actor” was

“responsible” for both actions within the meaning of the same actor inference. Bradley,

104 F.3d at 270; see also Juell v. Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1141

(E.D. Cal. 2006) (“[T]he actors involved in Plaintiff’s transfer from Denver to Phoenix

and in Plaintiff’s subsequent termination were not identical.... The Court accordingly

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cannot conclude that Durrett’s participation in both actions invokes the same actor

inference and requires heightened proof by Plaintiff.”); Pluss v. Safeway, 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 56013 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006) (declining to apply the same actor inference

where there was no evidence that “the common employee in both actions ... was the sole

or primary decision maker [for plaintiff’s termination]”). The Court declines to invoke

the same actor inference and will not apply a heightened standard of proof for pretext. 

See, e.g., Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 221 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Hunt

Wesson also disputes that Stipetic was involved in the employment decision, but this

dispute is for the trier of fact....”).

2. Sufficiency of Simmons’ evidence

Simmons contends that he has produced “significant” direct and indirect evidence

of pretext, including, inter alia, numerous “derogatory, ... patently clear, discriminatory,

insidious, [and] ugly” comments made by Kentfield. MSSB contends that Simmons

cannot show pretext in this case on the grounds that Kentfield’s alleged comments

constitute “stray remarks” unrelated to the termination or compensation decisions at

issue. (ECF No. 65-1 at 24-25).

To survive summary judgment, Simmons “must produce enough evidence to

allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude either: (a) that the alleged reason for

[Simmons’] discharge was false, or (b) that the true reason for [his] discharge was a

discriminatory one.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir.

1996); see also Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining

that a plaintiff can show pretext by “either directly persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that

the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”). This burden is

“hardly an onerous one,” Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1170, and “any indication of

discriminatory motive ... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a

fact-finder.” McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted).

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Direct evidence, which “proves the fact of discriminatory animus without

inference or presumption,” creates a triable issue as to the employer’s motives “even if

the evidence is not substantial.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. Direct evidence “typically

consists of clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the

employer.” Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). 

However, where the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the evidence must be

“specific and substantial.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222. In Godwin, female employees

were not invited to company hunting and fishing trips; the plaintiff’s supervisor

commented that he “did not want to deal with another female;” and the company’s

president made derogatory comments about women. Id. The plaintiff in Godwin also

presented indirect evidence suggesting that the employer’s proffered reason for not

hiring her – that the selected male applicant had a more pleasant personality – was mere

pretext. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found this combination of direct

and indirect evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the

employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was legitimate.

In this case, similar to Godwin, Simmons has demonstrated an issue of fact as to

pretext both directly, with evidence of discriminatory animus, and indirectly, by

demonstrating that MSSB’s explanation may not be worthy of credence. 

First, Simmons has provided direct evidence creating an issue of fact as to

whether a discriminatory reason more likely motivated MSSB. Simmons has provided

evidence that could, if found credible, show that Kentfield harbored animus against him

because he is Mormon. Simmons points to “repeated and insidious” statements that

Kentfield made about Simmons’ religion, including references to his “wives”, his six

children, and his abstinence from alcohol on religious grounds. (Simmons Dep. at 71-

72, 76, 89, ECF No. 84 at 28). Simmons testified that Kentfield told him, shortly before

his termination: “You can never fucking talk about your fucking religion again at this

firm because everybody hates your fucking religion.” (Simmons Dep. at 161-64, ECF

No. 76 at 132-33). Comments such as these directly suggest the existence of bias and

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require no inferences to find discriminatory animus. See Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221.

The Court does not find that these alleged comments constitute “stray remarks”

unrelated to the decisional process that courts have held insufficient to establish

discrimination. Cf. Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th

Cir. 1989) (noting that stray “remarks, ... when unrelated to the decisional process, are

insufficient to demonstrate that the employer relied on illegitimate criteria, even when

such statements are made by the decisionmaker in issue”); Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994

F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (corporate officer’s statement that “we don't necessarily

like grey hair” not sufficient to withstand summary judgment in age discrimination suit

where comment had no direct relationship to plaintiff). Kentfield stated, and MSSB

acknowledges, that he was the primary decisionmaker with respect to Simmons’

termination. “Where a decisionmaker makes a discriminatory remark against a member

of the plaintiff’s class, a reasonable factfinder may conclude that discriminatory animus

played a role in the challenged decision.” Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1038 (citation

omitted); see also Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400 F.3d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“An agent’s biased remarks against an employee because of his or her gender are

admissible to show an employer’s discriminatory animus if the agent was involved in

the employment decision.”). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

“ha[s] repeatedly held that a single discriminatory comment by a plaintiff’s supervisor

or decisionmaker is sufficient to preclude summary judgment for the employer.” 

Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1039 (citing, e.g., Chuang v. Univ. of California Davis,

Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a decisionmaker’s

remark that “‘two Chinks in the pharmacology department were ‘more than enough’”

was “an egregious and bigoted insult ... that constitutes strong evidence of

discriminatory animus on the basis of national origin”); Cordova v. State Farm Ins.

Companies, 124 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer’s reference

to an employee as a “dumb Mexican” “could be proof of discrimination against

[plaintiff] despite their reference to another agent and their utterance after the hiring

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decision”)). 

Simmons also provides circumstantial evidence from which discriminatory intent

can be inferred. According to Simmons, when Kentfield learned of his Mormon

religion during his first interview for the Regional Director position, the tenor of the

conversation changed and the interview quickly drew to a close; Simmons was not

offered the job. (Simmons Dep. at 65-67, ECF No. 84 at 25-28). There is evidence that

Kentfield failed to intervene when he witnessed other MSSB employees joking about

Simmons’ religion. Id. at 89. “[An employer’s] permissive response to harassing

actions undertaken by coworkers and supervisors, combined with the absence of [other

members of plaintiff’s protected class] in the workplace, ... is circumstantial evidence

of pretext.” McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1123. Simmons submits the deposition transcript

of David Fields, a former colleague of Kentfield’s at Smith Barney, who stated that

Kentfield once explained to him: “[I do] not trust people who don’t drink” because “it

either means [they have] a drinking problem and [cannot] control it, or it mean[s] [they

are] overly religious. And those ‘holier than thou’s,’ I don’t trust them. They’re the first

ones to fuck ya.” (Fields Dep. at 32, ECF No. 76 at 26). Based on this evidence, a

reasonable factfinder could infer that Kentfield harbored animosity towards Simmons

because of Simmons’ Mormon beliefs.

Simmons has provided indirect evidence creating an issue of fact as to whether

MSSB’s explanations are worthy of credence. Simmons submits his 2010 mid-year and

end-year performance reviews conducted by Kentfield, which are in many ways

positive. (Def. Ex. A-B, ECF No. 65-3 at 10-17). Simmons stated, based on his own

unsuccessful attempts at firing MSSB employees, that MSSB deviated from its “firmly

entrenched progressive discipline process” in his case because he “never received any

written warning, written reprimand, or written discipline” prior to his termination. 

(Simmons Decl. ¶ 18-22, ECF No. 78-4 at 3-4). “A plaintiff may ... raise a triable issue

of pretext through evidence that an employer’s deviation from established policy or

practice worked to her disadvantage.” Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d

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1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011). Simmons submits evidence showing that MSSB initially

classified his termination as “not for cause,” only to change that position after this

litigation commenced. “Fundamentally different justifications for an employer’s action

... give rise to a genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext.” Pottenger, 329 F.3d at

740. Although Kentfield stated that Simmons’ termination was coded as “not for

cause” “based on ... the severance package to Mr. Simmons” (Kentfield Dep. at 32, ECF

No. 79 at 31), the weight to give Kentfield’s testimony is a question for the trier of fact. 

See Payne v. Norwest Corp., 113 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that,

while “shifting explanations are acceptable when viewed in the context of other

surrounding events ... such weighing of the evidence is for a jury, not a judge”).

With respect to compensation, the evidence shows that Simmons, out of the five

RDs overseen by Kentfield, received the largest performance bonus for 2010 – as

determined by Saperstein (UF No. 95) – but the lowest base salary. (Ritzcovan Decl.

¶ 10, ECF No. 76 at 279-80). Ritzcovan stated that in order for an Executive RD to be

promoted to Managing RD and receive the corresponding base salary increase, the

Executive RD’s Divisional Director, e.g. Kentfield, had to first recommend that

promotion to Saperstein. (Ritzcovan Decl. ¶ 6). The evidence shows that Kentfield told

Ritzcovan that he would “NOT” promote Simmons to Managing RD. (Pl. Ex. 16, ECF

No. 97 at 5).

Viewing all the direct and indirect evidence cumulatively, in the light most

favorable to Simmons and resolving all inferences in his favor, the Court concludes

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the adverse employment

determinations at issue were motivated by religious bias rather than the

nondiscriminatory explanations proffered by MSSB. See Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1170

(“All of the evidence as to pretext ... is to be considered cumulatively.”).

II. Punitive Damages

MSSB moves for summary judgment on Simmons’ request for punitive damages

on the ground that “there is no merit to his underlying claims.” (ECF No. 65-1 at 30). 

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MSSB contends that Simmons’ allegations “amount to a few stray remarks, ... none of

which, when taken in context, evidence any bias against Simmons’ religion.” Id. 

 To recover punitive damages, Simmons must establish oppression, fraud or

malice by clear and convincing evidence. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). Viewing all

the evidence in the light most favorable to Simmons, the Court concludes that

reasonable jurors could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Kentfield’s alleged

conduct was oppressive or malicious. Summary judgment on punitive damages is

denied.

III. Evidentiary Objections

The Court’s denial of MSSB’s Motion for Summary Judgment is not based on

any evidence to which MSSB filed objections. Accordingly, MSSB’s objections (ECF

No. 90-2) to evidence submitted by Simmons in opposition to the Motion for Summary

Judgment are denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.

65) filed by Defendant Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC is DENIED. 

DATED: July 25, 2013

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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