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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 1, 2012 Decided August 20, 2013

No. 11-5316

CONSERVATION FORCE, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

SALLY JEWELL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, IN HER

OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-00495)

John J. Jackson III argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellants. 

James S. Pew and Emma C. Cheuse were on the brief for

amicus curiae Sierra Club in support of appellants.

Michael T. Gray, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee. R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #11-5316 Document #1452450 Filed: 08/20/2013 Page 1 of 13
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Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Chief Judge: This appeal concerns the

straight-horned markhor, an impressive subspecies of wild goat

that inhabits an arid, mountainous region of Pakistan. 

Appellants are safari clubs, hunters, and international

conservationists. For more than a decade, they pressed the

United States Fish and Wildlife Service to take certain

administrative actions regarding the markhor. They allege that

the agency’s failure to take those actions was -- among other

things -- arbitrary and capricious. 

As tempting as it may be to consider an arbitrary and

capricious claim in a case involving a goat, an array of 1

justiciability problems -- mootness, ripeness, and standing --

require us to decline the opportunity.

I

The Endangered Species Act directs the Secretary of the

Interior to determine whether any species is “endangered” or

“threatened.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533. A species is “endangered” if

it is “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant

portion of its range.” Id. § 1532(6). A species is “threatened”

if it is “likely to become an endangered species within the

foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its

range.” Id. § 1532(20).

See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2:868-69 (2d ed. 1989)

1

(tracing the origins of the word “capricious” to the musical term

“capriccioso,” which denotes “a free fantastic style,” and which in turn

is derived from the Italian “capro,” meaning “goat, as if ‘the skip or

frisk of a goat’”).

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In 1976, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) classified the

straight-horned markhor as endangered. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h);

see Endangered Status for 159 Taxa of Animals, 41 Fed. Reg.

24,062, 24,067 (June 14, 1976). By the early 1980s, the

population of straight-horned markhor had reached a “critical

level,” estimated at fewer than two hundred in their primary

habitat, the Torghar Hills along the Pakistan-Afghanistan

border. Reclassifying the Straight-Horned Markhorwith Special

Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,011, 47,017 (Aug. 7, 2012).

In response to the depletion of the markhor population,

local tribal leaders formed the Society for Torghar

Environmental Protection (STEP) and reached out to wildlife

biologists in the United States for support. 77 Fed. Reg. at

47,016-17. The result was the Torghar Conservation Project

(TCP), which, according to the Fish and Wildlife Service,

effectively eliminated poaching of the straight-horned markhor

and led to a greater than ten-fold increase in the subspecies’

population over the past three decades. Id. at 47,017. The

program works by sanctioning a limited number of sport hunts

by primarily foreign hunters, who pay large sums for the

privilege of chasing this wild goat across its rocky and

forbidding terrain. Those revenues benefit the local tribes and

pay the salaries of local game guards, encouraging the

community to invest in the animal’s recovery. Id.

In 1999, the Fish and Wildlife Service received a petition

from one of the individuals involved in the local markhor

conservation effort, Sardar Naseer A. Tareen, who requested

that the straight-horned markhor be reclassified from

endangered to threatened. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A)

(outlining mandatory procedures for responding to petitions to

“add a species to, or remove a species from,” the endangered

and threatened lists). The Service issued a favorable initial

finding on the petition and noted that it would commence a

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status review of the entire markhor species. 90-day Finding on

Petition to Reclassifythe Straight-horned Markhor, 64 Fed. Reg.

51,499, 51,500 (Sept. 23, 1999). But the Service took no further

action, despite its statutory obligation to make a final finding on

the petition’s merit “[w]ithin 12 months” after it was received. 

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B). In 2010, several of the appellants,

including Conservation Force, filed a new petition requesting

the “same action” as Tareen’s 1999 petition -- the issuance of a

rule to downlist the straight-horned markhor from endangered

to threatened. Reply Br. 8.

In the instant suit, Tareen, Conservation Force, and STEP

have joined with an array of safari clubs and individual hunters

to level two sets of claims against the Fish and Wildlife

Service. The first set challenges the Service’s failure to act on 2

Tareen’s 1999 petition to downlist the markhor by issuing a

finding on the merits of that request within the statutorilyrequired 12-month period. The second set of claims challenges

the Service’s allegedly unreasonable delay in processing

applications to import parts of the bodies of slain straight-horned

markhor, which the appellants describe as “trophies.” We

address each in turn.

For the sake of convenience, this opinion collectively refers to 2

the following appellants as “safari clubs”: Conservation Force, the

Wild Sheep Foundation, the Dallas Safari Club, the Houston Safari

Club, the African Safari Club of Florida, Inc., the Grand Slam

Club/Ovis, and the Conklin Foundation. We collectively refer to

STEP and Tareen as “international conservationists,” and to Barbara

Lee Sackman, Alan Sackman, Jerry Brenner, and Steve Hornady as

“hunters.”

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II

The appellants’ first set of claims challenges the Fish and

Wildlife Service’s “failure to consider and proceed with”

Tareen’s 1999 petition for a rule downlisting the straight-horned

markhor. Second Am. Compl. 25. Specifically, the appellants

argue that the Service violated both the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA) and the Endangered Species Act by failing

to issue a 12-month finding on that petition. See id. at 24-26

(alleging violations of 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), (2), and 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1533, 1537(b)). The district court dismissed those claims as

time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), which states that “every

civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred

unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of

action first accrues.” See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 811 F.

Supp. 2d 18, 27-28 (D.D.C. 2011). On appeal, the parties

extensively briefed the issue of whether the claims can and

should be heard notwithstanding the statute of limitations. 

Unfortunately -- in light of the effort the parties have invested --

resolution of the statute of limitations issue will have to await

another day because the claims themselves have become moot.

In general, a case becomes moot “when the issues presented

are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest

in the outcome.” Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir.

2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). This occurs when,

among other things, the court can provide no effective remedy

because a party has already “obtained all the relief that [it has]

sought.” Monzillo v. Biller, 735 F.2d 1456, 1459 (D.C. Cir.

1984). “Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases

because their constitutional authority extends only to actual

cases or controversies.” Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler,

464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983).

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On August 7, 2012 -- seven days after the reply brief in this

appeal was filed -- the Service issued a “12-month finding”

(albeit, not within 12 months) on Conservation Force’s 2010

petition for a rule to downlist the markhor. Reclassifying the 3

Straight-Horned Markhor with Special Rule, 77 Fed. Reg.

47,011 (Aug. 7, 2012). That finding was favorable to the

appellants. Indeed, it was accompanied by a proposed rule to

downlist the species, “based on a review of the best available

scientific and commercial data which indicates that the

endangered designation no longer correctly reflects the status of

the straight-horned markhor.” Id. The finding included a

lengthy background section that referenced Tareen’s 1999

petition and acknowledged that a “12-month finding was never

completed” on that earlier petition. Id. at 47,012-13.

The Service’s publication of a 12-month finding on

Conservation Force’s 2010 petition renders moot the appellants’

challenges to the Service’s failure to publish such a finding with

respect to Tareen’s 1999 petition. It is true that the Service

never technically completed a 12-month finding on Tareen’s

petition. But that alone cannot preserve appellants’ claims for

our review. Both Tareen’s and Conservation Force’s petitions

sought precisely the same thing: a rule to downlist the straighthorned markhor. By taking action with respect to the latter

petition, the Service effectively took action with respect to the

former petition as well. See Oral Arg. Recording at 12:55 -

13:20 (statement by FWS counsel that the agency “considered

the information brought in [the 1999] petition,” that the recent

finding “resolve[s] everything that was brought in the 1999

petition,” and that “any decision at this point on the 1999

petition would be the same”). Accordingly, because the

That action wastaken pursuant to a settlement in a parallel case,

3

Conservation Force v. Salazar, No. 11-cv-2008 (D.D.C. 2011). See

FWS Br. 17-18.

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appellants have “obtained all the relief that they sought,” their

claims relating to the 1999 downlisting petition are moot. 

Monzillo, 735 F.2d at 1459.4

III

The appellants’ second set of claims concerns the alleged

failure of the Fish and Wildlife Service to timely process four

applications to import straight-horned markhor trophies. 

Although the Endangered Species Act generally prohibits the

importation of an endangered species, see 16 U.S.C.

§ 1538(a)(1)(A); see also id. § 1532(8), (6), individuals may

apply for a permit if importation furthers “scientific purposes”

or “enhance[s] the propagation or survival of the affected

species,” id. § 1539(a)(1)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22. 

Appellants Barbara Lee Sackman, Alan Sackman, Jerry

Brenner, and Steve Hornady each hunted and killed a

straight-horned markhor and filed an application with the

Service to import his or her trophy. See Second Am. Compl. 9-

11. They allege that the Service’s unreasonable delay in

processing their applications violated the APA and the

Endangered Species Act (and related agency regulations). See

id. at 29-30 (alleging violations of 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), (2); 16

U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1537(b); and 50 C.F.R. §§ 13.11(c), 13.21,

17.22(a)). They also allege that the Service’s delay violated

their due process rights, by constructively depriving them of

their property interests in possessing their markhor trophies. Id.

Appellants’ requested remedy was limited to injunctive and 4

declaratory relief; appellants did not seek monetary damages. Cf.

LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.2d 974, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that

the mooting of requests for injunctive relief does not moot a case in

which claims for damages remain). See generally City of Los Angeles

v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).

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at 26-29 (alleging violations of the 5th Amendment and 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)). 

While this case was pending in the district court, the Fish

and Wildlife Service processed and denied all four applications. 

Conservation Force, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 30. Thereafter, the

district court dismissed the appellants’ APA and Endangered

Species Act claims as moot. Id. at 30-31. The court reached the

merits of appellants’ due process claims, however, dismissing

those on the separate ground that “plaintiffs are unable to

demonstrate that they have a fundamental right to or a

constitutionally-protected property interest in the markhor

trophies.” Id. at 30.

On appeal, the appellants concede that, because the Service

has now acted, the four individual hunters’ unreasonable delay

claims are moot. Oral Arg. Recording at 4:30 - 4:33; see also

Appellants’ Br. 59 (acknowledging that “these particular

individuals . . . will likely not hunt markhor again”). We agree. 

But the hunters’ related due process claims are necessarily moot

as well. As noted, those claims rest on a theory that the

agency’s delay constructively deprived the hunters of their

markhor trophies. Because the complained-of delay has now

ended, any constructive deprivation that the delay generated has

also necessarily ceased. And because the individual hunters’ 5

due process claims are moot, so too are the same claims raised

by the safari clubs in their capacity as representatives of those

hunters. See Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 584

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that, when an association sues on

At least in this case, the appellants do not assert that the 5

agency’s denial of their permits violated their due process rights. See

Second. Am. Compl. 26-29; compare Conservation Force v. Salazar,

878 F. Supp. 2d 268, 270 (D.D.C. 2012) (challenging permit denials

under a due process theory).

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behalf of its members, its claims become moot if its members’

claims become moot). As for Tareen and STEP: they have

failed to articulate any theory of standing to raise a due process

argument. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir.

2002).

IV

What remains? Quite a bit, the appellants contend. 

Although the specific import applications have now been

processed, the appellants maintain that the Fish and Wildlife

Service’s pattern of unreasonable delay persists. The

appellants’ complaint alleged that the Service maintains a

“practice” of “fail[ing] and neglect[ing] to process or approve”

permits to import straight-horned markhor trophies. Second

Am. Compl. 23; see Appellants’ Br. 48-51. That pattern or

practice of delay, they allege, “devalue[s] the trophies and

obstruct[s] the conservation effort” of STEP and related

organizations. Second Am. Compl. 23. 

6

On appeal, the appellants have amplified this argument in a

6

subtle but significant way. They now claim that the “[d]efendants

have an ongoing policy of ignoring trophy import permit applications,

then denying them only when faced with legal action.” Appellants’

Br. 50 (emphasis added). We are not obliged to consider this

late-stage reformulation of appellants’ challenge. See Singleton v.

Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It isthe general rule, of course, that

a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon

below.”). Indeed, our “general presumption against deciding claims

not raised below is particularly strong where, as here, the claim turns

upon factual questions not yet passed upon by the district court.”

Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1043 (D.C.

Cir. 2003). In this case, the record is bare on several key factual

issues, including: how many times the FWS has thwarted litigation

midstream by processing an import permit; whether agency officials

have been instructed, via an express or implied policy, to delay

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The appellants argue that their “pattern” challenge is not

moot because “it seeks declaratory relief as to an ongoing

policy.” Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570

F.3d 316, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2009). But plaintiffs who challenge an

ongoing policy must still demonstrate both that “the request for

declaratory relief is ripe” and that they have “standing to bring

such a forward-looking challenge.” Id. (quotingCity of Houston

v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1429 (D.C. Cir.

1994)). Appellants can do neither.

In determining whether a case is ripe, we generally evaluate

two factors: “[1] the fitness of the issues for judicial decision

and [2] the hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149

(1967). “[W]hen an agency [policy] may never have its effects

felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties[,] . . . the

prospect of entangling ourselves in a challenge to such a [policy]

is an element of the fitness determination.” Devia v. Nuclear

Regulatory Comm’n, 492 F.3d 421, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Here,

that element is dispositive.

In addition to proposing a rule to downlist the markhor, the

Fish and Wildlife Service has also proposed a rule “to allow the

import of sport-hunted markhor trophies taken from established

conservation programs without a threatened species permit.” 

Reclassifying the Straight-Horned Markhor with Special Rule,

77 Fed. Reg. 47,011, 47,025 (Aug. 7, 2012) (emphasis added). 

As appellants concede, once the rulemaking is finalized,

“presumptively” no permit would be required to import

straight-horned markhor trophies. Oral Arg. Recording at 23:00

- 23:18. Hence, any previous policy of delay in processing such

processing until sued; and whether such a strategy was employed with

respect to the particular applications at issue here.

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permits would no longer be relevant to these, or any, appellants

again.

Of course, it may come to pass that the Service will decide

not to finalize the proposed rule that liberalizes the importation

of markhor trophies. It may then come to pass that one of the

appellants will file a new application for a markhor import

permit. And then it may come to pass that the Service will

unreasonably delay the processing of that application. But we

see no reason to “entangl[e]” ourselves in the issue based on

such a speculative possibility. Devia, 492 F.3d at 424; see also

id. (noting that part of the rationale for a determination that a

claim is not ripe is that, “[i]f we do not decide [the claim] now,

we may never need to.”). That is particularly so because we see

no hardship to the parties from withholding our consideration at

this time. None of the appellants has an outstanding permit

application that is presently being delayed. Nor does any have

a concrete plan to apply for such a permit in the future. See

Appellants’ Br. 59.

Moreover, even if the appellants’ “practice of delay” claim

is ripe, they do not have standing to raise it. The “irreducible

constitutional minimum” of standing contains three elements:

(1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). And as we

have held, “[t]he petitioner’s burden of production in the court

of appeals is . . . the same as that of a plaintiff moving for

summary judgment in the district court: it must support each

element of its claim to standing ‘by affidavit or other

evidence.’” Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 899 (quoting Lujan, 504

U.S. at 561). 

In this case, there is no record evidence to support the claim

that any of the appellants suffers an injury-in-fact from the

Service’s alleged ongoing policy of delay. Neither Tareen nor

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STEP submitted any affidavit or evidence at all. The four

individual appellants whose applications have already been

processed have indicated that they do not intend to hunt for

markhor again. See Appellants’ Br. 59. The declaration

submitted by an additional hunter does not aver that he has such

future plans. See Smith Decl. (J.A. 177). Nor do the affidavits

of the safari clubs name any other members who have such

plans. See Thornton Decl. (J.A. 178); Jackson Decl. 1-6 (J.A.

209-214); see also Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. EPA, 642

F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“When a petitioner claims

associational standing, it is not enough to aver that unidentified

members have been injured. Rather, the petitioner must

specifically identify members who have suffered the requisite

harm.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We have repeatedly held that general allegations of injury

are insufficient at this stage of the proceedings. See, e.g.,

Americans for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir.

2013); Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d

102, 123-24 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 899. We

do not insist on record evidence and affidavits to establish

standing because we are misguided nitpickers, but rather

because we must respect the limits of our jurisdiction. See

Chamber of Commerce, 642 F.3d at 199. As we said long ago,

“standing must be carefully controlled” to ensure “a practical

separation of the meritorious sheep from the capricious goats.” 

Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir.

1970).

V

For the foregoing reasons, the case is remanded with

instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 

The portions of the district court’s order addressing the claims

raised on appeal are vacated. See Nader v. Fed. Election

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Comm’n, No. 12-5134, 2013 WL 3956997 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2,

2013); Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 181, 184-

85 (D.C. Cir. 2008); City of Houston, 24 F.3d at 1432.

So ordered.

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