Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01647/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01647-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Rand Parshall, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-01647 PHX SMM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. McNAMEE:

On August 2, 2012, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed

a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents’ counsel entered a notice of appearance on

September 19, 2012. Petitioner filed a motion to amend the

petition on November 9, 2012, arguing he was entitled to amend

his petition because Respondents had not yet answered the

petition. See Doc. 7. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 9) on

December 20, 2012. The motion for leave to amend the petition

was denied without prejudice on January 13, 2013. Petitioner

filed a reply to the answer to his petition on March 11, 2013.

See Doc. 13.

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1 Petitioner was contacted by a City of Phoenix police

officer, who was off-duty but in uniform, working as a security

officer at a Food City grocery store in Phoenix at approximately 10:30

p.m. The officer contacted Petitioner, believing he had a weapon

under his shirt based on his observation of a large bulge and that

Petitioner had acted suspiciously. Petitioner told the officer he had

a knife case under his shirt. The officer then “patted down”

Petitioner and discovered a gun. 

2

 Exhibit F to the Answer to the petition is Petitioner’s

state action for post-conviction relief filed April 3, 2009.

3

 Exhibit K to Exhibit F to the Answer to the petition is

a transcript of the November 30, 2004, trial court hearing. At the

end of the hearing the state iterates the plea agreement providing for

a term of six years imprisonment expires that day. Exhibit L to

Exhibit F to the Answer to the petition is a plea agreement signed

only by the state on August 4, 20004, which provides for a sentence

of 4.5 years imprisonment. 

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I Procedural History

On July 20, 2004, Petitioner was charged with two

counts of misconduct involving weapons; the crimes were

classified as a class 4 felony and a class 1 misdemeanor. See

Answer, Exh. A at 2.1 At a pretrial hearing conducted November

30, 2004, Petitioner’s appointed counsel, Ms. Spencer, told the

state court that she did not believe Petitioner had a valid

basis for a motion to suppress and that Petitioner sought

different defense counsel. See id., Exh. F at Exh. K.2 The date

the hearing was conducted was also the last date for Petitioner

to accept a plea agreement providing for a sentence of six years

incarceration. Id., Exh. F at Exh. K.3 Ms. Spencer withdrew

from representing Petitioner in December of 2004.

Petitioner was then appointed Shawn Murray as counsel.

Id., Exh. F at Exh. O. Mr. Murray investigated Petitioner’s

assertions regarding his version of the events giving rise to

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his arrest, inter alia, contacting the manager of the grocery

store outside of which the arrest took place and interviewing

Petitioner’s then-girlfriend. Id., Exh. F at Exh. O. Counsel

also reviewed the store’s security logs, police duty logs,

police patrol car logs, and investigated as to an alleged 911

call. Counsel listened to and advised Petitioner with regard to

a taped interview with the arresting police officer. Id., Exh.

F at Exh. O. Counsel informed Petitioner his version of the

events was unsubstantiated but counsel did move to suppress

evidence based on Petitioner’s version of the events. Id., Exh.

F at Exh. O.

At some time from January of 2005 through April of

2005, Petitioner’s defense counsel, Shawn Murray, advised

Petitioner to ask the state to re-instate a previously-offered

plea agreement. Id., Exh. F at Exh. O. Petitioner did so, but

the state was then only willing to offer a plea agreement

providing for a term of eight years imprisonment. Id., Exh. F

at Exh. O. Counsel advised Petitioner to accept the plea

agreement and, at that time, Petitioner accepted the agreement.

Id., Exh. F at Exh. O. However, at a subsequent change of plea

hearing Petitioner changed mind and withdrew from the plea

agreement. Id., Exh. F at Exh. O. At that time the trial judge

set a date for the suppression hearing and a trial date.

In May of 2005 Petitioner hired private counsel, Mr.

Knowles, to represent him at the suppression hearing, conducted

May 27, 2005. Id., Exh. F at Exh. O & Exh. P. The motion to

suppress was subsequently denied and Petitioner terminated

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4

 The trial court found Petitioner had previously been

convicted of aggravated DUI, possession of narcotic drugs, and

shoplifting.

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representation by private counsel. Id., Exh. F at Exh. O & Exh.

P. Petitioner was thereafter represented by appointed counsel.

At the conclusion of a bench trial conducted on July

24, 2006, Petitioner was convicted on both charges. The state

trial court enhanced Petitioner’s sentence for misconduct

involving weapons based on the fact that he had two or more

prior felony convictions.4 The state trial court sentenced

Petitioner to the presumptive term of ten years incarceration

for the felony count of misconduct involving weapons and to six

months incarceration for the misdemeanor count of misconduct

involving weapons. Id.

Additionally, Petitioner’s possession of a weapon

violated the terms of his probation imposed pursuant to a 1999

convictions for aggravated driving under the influence [“DUI”]

and possession of narcotic drugs. As punishment for the

violation of probation imposed pursuant to the 1999 DUI

conviction, the state trial court revoked Petitioner’s probation

and sentenced him to a term of one and a half years

incarceration. Id., Exh. A at 2-3. The sentence for

aggravated DUI and the ten year sentence for felony misconduct

involving weapons were to run consecutively. See id., Exh. A.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences for weapons misconduct. Petitioner

asserted that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence

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based on the existence of prior convictions and that the trial

court erred in calculating credit for presentence incarceration.

The state appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences, but remanded the matter for a recalculation of

presentence incarceration credit. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner did

not seek review of the appellate court’s decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court. Id., Exh. B. The trial court recalculated the

incarceration credit on August 29, 2008, giving Petitioner 464

days of credit. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner initiated an action for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on or about December 21, 2007. Id., Exh. D. Petitioner asked

the trial court to allow him to proceed pro se in his Rule 32

action, which request was granted. Id., Exh. D. In his Rule 32

action Petitioner asserted he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of trial counsel because his counsel

allowed the admission of perjured testimony and also asserted he

was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel. Id.,

Exh. D & Exh. F. Petitioner also asserted a violation of his

Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches,

citing Terry, and that he was denied his right to due process of

law because perjured testimony was admitted at his trial, citing

Brady v. Maryland. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner also alleged that

his trial counsel failed to inform him of a plea agreement.

Petitioner further alleged he was subjected to prosecutorial

misconduct with regard to a suppression hearing.

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On January 4, 2010, the state trial court denied relief

in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. H. The court found

all claims except the ineffective assistance of counsel claims

precluded and denied relief on the merits of Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Petitioner appealed

this decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. K &

Exh. L. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review on August

22, 2011. Id., Exh. M.

On November 10, 2010, the state trial court denied

relief in what it deemed Petitioner’s third Rule 32 action. See

id., Exh. L, Attach. A. The trial court concluded, inter alia,

that Petitioner’s claim of newly discovered evidence was not

viable because the evidence, i.e., Petitioner’s thengirlfriend’s testimony, was not new because she was available to

testify at both the suppression hearing and at Petitioner’s

trial. Exh. I 

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in his habeas

petition. Respondents contend three grounds for relief are

procedurally defaulted and that the other claim may be denied on

the merits.

In his first claim for relief Petitioner contends that

the prosecutor used perjured testimony to gain his convictions

on the weapons misconduct charges. Petitioner’s second claim

for relief asserts that the state failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence to the defense, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. In

his third claim for relief Petitioner asserts that his trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to present a witness at the

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5

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

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suppression hearing and in failing to request a continuance of

the hearing so that counsel could fully investigate the matter.

Petitioner’s fourth claim for relief is an ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim. 

II Standard of review

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted three of his federal habeas claims in the state courts

by failing to present them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a

procedurally correct manner.

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).5 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

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exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.

For purposes of exhausting state remedies, a

claim for relief in habeas corpus must

include reference to a specific federal

constitutional guarantee, as well as a

statement of the facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. The federal claim is

fairly presented if raised in the petition

itself, an accompanying brief, or another

similar document filed with that court.

Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 897 (9th Cir. 2013)(internal

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citations and quotations omitted).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in

the state courts. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-

93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas

petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law,

the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural

default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S.

Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

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adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

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procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar). The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals recently confirmed this conclusion in Hurles v. Ryan,

706 F.3d 1021, 2013 WL 219222 at &6 (9th Cir. 2013), concluding

“Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for

denying relief.” See also Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101

(9th Cir. 2012).

“Federal habeas courts reviewing the

constitutionality of a state prisoner’s

conviction and sentence are guided by rules

designed to ensure that state-court judgments

are accorded the finality and respect

necessary to preserve the integrity of legal

proceedings within our system of federalism.”

Martinez v. Ryan, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct.

1309, 1316[](2012). One such rule is the

doctrine of procedural default, according to

which a federal court is barred from hearing

the claims of a state prisoner in a habeas

corpus proceeding when the decision of the

last state court to which the prisoner

presented his federal claims rested on an

“independent and adequate state ground.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111

S.Ct. 2546, [](1991). However, federal courts

are to “presume that there is no independent

and adequate state ground for a state court

decision when the decision ‘fairly appears to

rest primarily on federal law, or to be

interwoven with federal law, and when the

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adequacy and independence of any possible

state law ground is not clear from the face

of the opinion.’” Id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546

(quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,

1040–41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, [](1983)). A state

court may overcome the above presumption

simply by stating “clearly and expressly that

its decision is based on bona fide separate,

adequate, and independent grounds.” Id. at

733, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Long, 463 U.S.

at 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted).

 A state court judgment rests on an

independent and adequate state procedural

ground when the “state court decline[s] to

address a prisoner’s federal claims because

the prisoner ... failed to meet a state

procedural requirement.” Id. at 730, 111

S.Ct. 2546 (emphasis added).

 “For a state procedural rule to be

‘independent,’ the state law ground for

decision must not be ‘interwoven with the

federal law.’” Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Long, 463

U.S. at 1040–41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, and citing

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S.Ct.

1038,[](1989) (applying Long to federal

habeas cases)). “A state law ground is so

interwoven if ‘the state has made application

of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent

ruling on federal law [such as] the

determination of whether federal

constitutional error has been committed.’”

Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,

75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, [](1985)) (alteration in

original). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 860, 122 S.Ct. 2578, [](2002) (per

curiam) (noting that, although the rule at

issue there “does not require a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits, if the

state court’s decision rested primarily on a

ruling on the merits nevertheless, its

decision would not be independent of federal

law”). A review of pertinent Supreme Court

case law illustrates that a state court

ruling, even on a state procedural issue,

that necessarily or actually depends on an

antecedent ruling on the merits of a federal

claim is interwoven with federal law and

therefore not independent.

Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (9th Cir.), cert.

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denied, 133 S. Ct. 450 (2012).

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

A petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not cause to

excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). Alleged

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not establish

cause for the failure to properly exhaust a habeas claim in the

state courts unless the specific Sixth Amendment claim providing

the basis for cause was itself properly exhausted. See Edwards

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money,

391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2004). “Attorney ignorance or

inadvertence is not cause, but attorney error rising to the

level of an independent constitutional violation (in the form of

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ineffective assistance of counsel) does constitute cause.”

Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2012).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

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Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Habeas petitioners are “entitled to an evidentiary

hearing only if they allege [] facts that, if proved, would

entitle them to relief and if they did not receive a full and

fair evidentiary hearing in the state court.” Swan v. Peterson,

6 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993). “[I]f the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas

relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary

hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S.Ct.

1933, 1040 (2007).

“[D]iscovery is available only in the

discretion of the court and for good cause

shown.” Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1068

(9th Cir. 1999). “Good cause exists ‘where

specific allegations before the court show

reason to believe that the petitioner may, if

the facts are fully developed, be able to

demonstrate that he is ... entitled to

relief.’” Smith, 611 F.3d at 996 (quoting

Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908–09, 117 S.Ct. 1793).

“We review the district court’s denial of

discovery and an evidentiary hearing for

abuse of discretion.” Id. at 997.

Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 927 (9th Cir. 2011).

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III Analysis

A. Petitioner’s claims for relief in the original

habeas petition

1. Petitioner contends the prosecutor used perjured

testimony to gain Petitioner’s convictions. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his state action for

post-conviction relief. The state trial court found the claim

precluded by Petitioner’s failure to raise the claim in his

direct appeal. Accordingly, the claim is procedurally

defaulted.

Petitioner contends that this claim was not

procedurally defaulted because his claim regarding the use of

perjured testimony was based on evidence not available at the

time of his direct appeal, establishing cause for the default.

Petitioner contends a police officer “fabricated facts”

regarding Petitioner’s arrest when testifying at the suppression

hearing. Petitioner contends these claims were not procedurally

defaulted because the law providing the basis for the default is

not regularly nor consistently applied.

Petitioner contends in his traverse that the prosecutor

“capitalized” on perjured testimony at the suppression hearing

to “obtain his conviction.” Petitioner contends this claim (and

his Brady claim) are based on facts “outside the appellate

record” and that the cause for his default of this claim is his

appellate counsel’s deficient performance. Petitioner again

argues, as he did at the suppression hearing, at his trial, in

his appeal, and in his Rule 32 action, that he was approached by

a police officer in a police vehicle when he was in the parking

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lot of a grocery store and that the police officer testified at

the suppression hearing that he approached Petitioner while

working in plain clothes as a security officer at the store

while Petitioner and the officer were inside the store.

Petitioner asserts that he repeatedly sought discovery,

including police department payroll records, to refute the

officer’s testimony regarding whether he was on or off duty on

the day in question. Accordingly, Petitioner asserts, the “sole

basis” for his conviction was the perjured testimony of the

officer and that his conviction must be vacated. 

With regard to the evidence Petitioner provides to

support his position that he has established cause for his

procedural default, Petitioner contends he now has evidence that

the police officer who took the weapon in question as evidence

did not impound the weapon until the following day, breaking the

chain of evidence and requiring his conviction be vacated.

Petitioner also asserts he has now provided evidence that the

police officer who stated she transported Petitioner to be

booked filed a duty log stating she had spent “0" hours

transporting and “0" hours booking on that date. Petitioner

contends he has produced evidence that the weapon involved in

his offense was not logged into the evidence room until 63 hours

after he was arrested.

Petitioner extensively litigated in state court the

facts and legal theories alleged in his habeas petition, with

regard to his assertions that the police officer who arrested

him lied about the circumstances surrounding his arrest, that

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the officer who Petitioner asserts transported him and the gun

and impounded the gun lied, that the store manager lied about

the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s arrest, and that

there was evidence, i.e., a tape of a 911 recording and police

logs which “prove” Petitioner’s version of the facts surrounding

his arrest. An investigator was appointed and counsel

investigated Petitioner’s version of events. A suppression

hearing was conducted regarding Petitioner’s version of events.

Although Petitioner’s then-girlfriend was available to testify

at the suppression hearing in support of Petitioner’s version of

events, Petitioner’s retained counsel made a strategic decision

not to call the girlfriend as a witness.

The state trial court found Petitioner’s first habeas

claim procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not shown cause

for his procedural default of the claim and, accordingly, the

claim should be denied. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown

prejudice arising from his default of the claim nor has

Petitioner established a fundamental miscarriage of justice will

occur absent consideration of the claim. 

2. Petitioner asserts the state failed to disclose

exculpatory evidence to the defense, in violation of Brady v.

Maryland. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his state action for

post-conviction relief. The state trial court found the claim

precluded by Petitioner’s failure to raise the claim in his

direct appeal.

Petitioner contends that this claim was not

procedurally defaulted because his Brady claim was based on

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evidence not available at the time of his direct appeal,

establishing cause for the default. 

Petitioner repeatedly argued the issues and facts

raised in his second claim for habeas relief in the state

courts. When Petitioner raised the specific claim raised in his

habeas petition in the state courts in his Rule 32 action, the

state trial court found the claim precluded by Petitioner’s

failure to raise the claim in his direct appeal. 

The state trial court found Petitioner’s second habeas

claim procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not shown cause

for his procedural default of the claim and, accordingly, the

claim should be denied. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown

prejudice arising from his default of the claim nor has

Petitioner established a fundamental miscarriage of justice will

occur absent consideration of the claim.

3. Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to present a witness at the suppression

hearing and in failing to request a continuance of the hearing

so that counsel could fully investigate the matter. 

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel’s performance

was unconstitutionally inadequate because counsel failed to call

Petitioner’s girlfriend as a witness at a suppression hearing

and failed to request a continuance of a suppression hearing for

additional investigation. Petitioner contends a continuance was

required because counsel entered an appearance as counsel for

Petitioner on the day of the suppression hearing, May 27, 2005.

Petitioner raised an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim in his first Rule 32 action. The state trial court denied

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the claim on the merits, a decision Petitioner challenged in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the claim was properly

exhausted in the state courts. The Arizona state courts’

decision that Petitioner was not denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of federal law.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a habeas petitioner must show both that his attorney's

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel's conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064.

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id., 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. See

also, e.g., Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786–88. Counsel’s

performance will be held constitutionally deficient only if the

habeas petitioner proves counsel’s actions “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness,” as measured by

“prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

104 S. Ct. at 2065. See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d

987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2010).

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 To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. A court

considering a claim of ineffective assistance

must apply a strong presumption that

counsel’s representation was within the wide

range' of reasonable professional assistance.

The challenger's burden is to show that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.

Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (internal citations

and quotations omitted), citing Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Cheney, 614 F.3d at 994. Therefore, to

succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was deficient

because counsel failed to raise a particular argument, the

petitioner must establish the argument was likely to be

successful, thereby establishing that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144

(9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th

Cir. 2006). “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the

errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.

Counsel’s performance is not deficient nor prejudicial when

counsel “fails” to raise an argument that counsel reasonably

believes would be futile. See Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 741;

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. Accordingly, prejudice from

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counsel’s allegedly deficient performance is less likely when

the case against the defendant is strong. See, e.g., Wong v.

Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390–91 (2009); Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 923–24 (9th Cir. 2002); Godwin v. Johnson,

632 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2011).

It is Petitioner’s burden to establish both that his

counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced

thereby. See, e.g., Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 384–85. “Surmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 555 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010), quoted in

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788

Petitioner has not established that any of his

counsels’ performances were deficient or that he was prejudiced

by any alleged deficiency. Petitioner asserts that his

attorney, Anthony Knowles, was ineffective because he failed to

call Petitioner’s girlfriend as a witness at the suppression

hearing and because counsel did not request a continuance of the

hearing so that counsel could investigate the matter. Petitioner

claims that a continuance was required because counsel entered

his appearance as counsel on the day of the suppression hearing,

May 27, 2005.

Petitioner has not established that counsel’s decision

not to call Petitioner’s girlfriend was not a reasonable

strategic decision. Petitioner testified at the suppression

hearing regarding his version of the events that occurred and

his counsel vigorously argued that the officer’s initial “pat

down” of Petitioner, at which time the weapon was recovered, was

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outside the bounds of the United States and Arizona

constitutions and Petitioner’s rights pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.

Neither has Petitioner shown that the absence of the proposed

testimony was prejudicial or that the outcome of the hearing

would have been different had it occurred at a later date. 

4. Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of appellate counsel.

Petitioner contends his appellate counsel’s performance

was unconstitutionally ineffective because counsel failed to

raise several arguments Petitioner asserts would have resulted

in his convictions and sentences being reversed. Petitioner reurges the merits of arguments raised by his various counsel

prior to his trial and subsequent to his trial and these

arguments have repeatedly been rejected by the Arizona trial

court and Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Petitioner has

not established that any alleged “failure” on the part of any of

his appellate counsel was prejudicial.

B. Claims in the motion to amend the habeas petition

Petitioner filed a motion to amend his habeas petition

after Respondents were served but before Respondents answered

the petition. The Court denied the motion to amend without

prejudice after the date Respondents answered the petition.

Respondents assert the claims raised in the proposed

amended petition are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on or about

September 22, 2011, when the time expired for seeking review of

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the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Petitioner’s Rule 32

action issued August 22, 2011. Accordingly, the one-year

statute of limitations regarding Petitioner’s habeas claims

expired on or about August 22, 2012. Respondents allow that the

claims filed in the petition docketed August 2, 2012, are timely

but assert that the additional claims stated in the amended

petition are not timely. 

A timely filed petition for writ of habeas corpus does

not preserve claims that are not included in the timely petition

and which are presented for the first time after the expiration

of the statute of limitations. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S.

644, 657–664, 125 S. Ct. 2562, 2571-75 (2005) (holding habeas

claims not presented in original, timely habeas petition but

only after the one-year limitations period expired are untimely

and not cognizable on habeas corpus review. Additionally, a

timely filed habeas corpus petition does not toll the statute of

limitations with respect to claims not included in that

petition. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–81, 121 S.

Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001).

The claims stated in the amended petition, to the

extent they do not duplicate the claims stated in the original

petition, are not timely and the tardiness of the claims is not

cured by the theory of relation-back. See King v. Ryan, 564

F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009).

IV Conclusion

Except for his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, Petitioner procedurally defaulted his federal habeas

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claims is the state courts. Petitioner has not shown cause for,

nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of his claims

nor has Petitioner established he is actually innocent of the

charges against him. The Arizona state court’s decision that

Petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law because Petitioner has not shown any

alleged deficiency was prejudicial. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Parshall’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2013.

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