Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_23-cv-08002/USCOURTS-azd-3_23-cv-08002-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Marzet Farris, III,

Petitioner

-vsDavid Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-23-8002-PCT-JAT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (Doc. 1). The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following summary of the facts is drawn from the decision of the Arizona Court 

of Appeals in disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal.

Petitioner and co-Defendant Stelmasek developed a romance and conspired to 

murder the victim, Stelmasek’s husband. Petitioner went to the Stelmasek house in 

Prescott, Arizona, repeatedly stabbed the victim, severing his jugular vein. The victim 

was wrapped in the bedding, drug through the house, and placed in his own van. Petitioner 

drove the van to Albuquerque, abandoned it at the airport (where it was eventually 

discovered by police) and flew home to North Carolina. When arrested two weeks later, 

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Petitioner had a healing stab wound, and the victim’s blood was found on his shoes. While 

in jail, Petitioner wrote Stelmasek to coordinate a claim of self-defense. (Exh. S, Mem. 

Dec. 10/4/16 at ¶¶ 2-5.) (Exhibits herein are referenced as follows: Exhibits1to the Petition 

(Doc. 1-3 at 28-120) as “Exh. P-__”;2to the Answer (Doc. 1), as “Exh. ___”.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner and co-defendant were indicted in Yavapai Superior Court on July 8, 

2011. (Exh. A, Indictment.) An Amended Indictment (Exh. C) was issued October 19, 

2011, charging Petitioner and co-defendant with first degree murder, conspiracy to commit 

murder, evidence tampering, and moving a dead body. 

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial with counsel, and testified that co-Defendant 

stabbed the victim, and Petitioner was in the home solely to try to stop her. He admitted to 

disposing of evidence and transporting and abandoning the body in the van at the airport. 

(Exh. S, Mem. Dec. 10/4/16 at ¶¶ 6-8.) The prosecution proceeded on an “accomplice” 

theory, avoiding the need to show which co-defendant actually stabbed the victim (id. at 

¶¶ 15-19) and introduced testimony from a friend of Petitioner (who had paid for his airfare 

to Phoenix and from Albuquerque) that four days after the murder Petitioner told her “I 

killed someone.” (Id. at ¶¶22-23.) 

Petitioner was convicted as charged, and he was sentenced on April 8, 2015 to 

consecutive terms of natural life on the murder and life on the conspiracy, and concurrent 

terms of 1 and 1.5 years on the other lesser convictions. (Id. at ¶ 9; Exh. N, Sentence.) 

/ /

1 Petitioner appends to his Petition various transcripts (Doc. 1-1 at 1 to Doc. 1-3 at 27), 

and various decisions and orders in the state courts (Doc. 1 at 15-27). These records have 

been provided with the Answer. The undersigned provides citations to only the copies of 

these exhibits provided with the Answer. 

2 Petitioner identifies but fails to attach Exhibits P-15, -21, and -22. (Doc. 1-3 at 97, 111, 

115.) No reference to these exhibits is made by Petitioner in support of the issues on which 

the Petition is resolved. Accordingly, the undersigned has not directed the 

supplementation of the record to provide them. 

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C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

On April 17, 2015 Petitioner filed a notice of direct appeal. (Exh. O, Notice of 

Appeal; Exh. P Open. Brf.) Petitioner asserted claims of: denial of a complete defense; 

error in including accomplice liability in jury instructions when not included in the 

Indictment; and questioning a witness arguing on her lack of motive to lie, while Petitioner 

could not cross-examine without opening the door to precluded bad act evidence.

In a Memorandum Decision issued October 4, 2016 (Exh. S) the Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exh. T) with the Arizona Supreme Court, 

which summarily denied review on April 18, 2017, with a notice of decision issued April 

19, 2017. (Exh. P-6, Order 4/19/17 (Doc. 1 at 27).) The Arizona Court of Appeals issued 

its Mandate on May 23, 2017 (Exh. U).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On May 15, 2017, Petitioner commenced his post-conviction relief (PCR) 

proceeding by filing a PCR Notice (Exh. V). Counsel eventually filed a PCR Petition 

(Exh. W). On November 6, 2018 the PCR court denied on the merits the claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Exh. Y, Order 11/6/18.) 

Petitioner then filed a pro per Motion to Vacate (Exh. BB), which was granted to 

the extent that counsel was authorized to file a supplement to the PCR petition with any 

additional claims. (Exh. CC, Order 3/27/19.) Substituted counsel eventually filed a 

Supplemental Petition (Exh. EE), but then moved at Petitioner’s insistence to strike it so 

Petitioner could file his own pro per supplemental petition with different claims. The 

motion was granted (Exh. GG), and Petitioner filed his pro per Supplemental Petition 

(Exh. HH). 

On October 30, 2020, the PCR court denied the Supplemental Petition (Exh. KK). 

On December 2, 2020, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review (Exh. LL) seeking 

review by the Arizona Court of Appeals which granted review, but summarily denied relief 

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based on absence of an abuse of discretion or error of law. (Exh. MM, Mem. Dec.

6/15/21.) 

In a Petition for Review filed September 29, 2021 Petitioner sought review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court (Exh. NN), which denied review on January 24, 2022, and the 

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate on February 23, 2022 (Exh. OO).

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

San Luis, Arizona, commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) on January 4, 2023. Petitioner’s Petition 

asserts the following eight general grounds for relief:

Ground One: Prosecutorial misconduct; 

Grounds Two, Three, and Four: Ineffective assistance of 

counsel; 

Ground Five: “judicial abuse of discretion” in violation of 

Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights; 

Ground Six: “The state’s change in its theory of prosecution 

after the conclusion of evidence violated [Petitioner’s] Due Process 

Rights”; 

Ground Seven: “The LC’s summary judgment predicated 

upon counsel’s trial strategy proves baseless, as [Petitioner] 

meritoriously demonstrated trial strategy played no part in trial 

counsel’s decision-making and inaction”; and 

Ground Eight: “Were the LC’s rulings unbiased and without 

prejudice to either [Petitioner] or the interests of justice? And did the 

LC’s due diligence rise to an acceptable level of an objective 

reasonability standard, as defined by Strickland?”

(Order 1/17/23, Doc. 4 at 2.) Respondents break down these grounds into some 25 

subclaims. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 2-4.) Because Petitioner does not oppose this 

construction, except as discussed hereinafter the undersigned adopts it, and addresses the 

following individual claims:

1. Prosecutorial misconduct related to:

a. When the prosecutor “implored the jury to find [Farris] 

guilty based upon his lies under oath” (original

emphasis omitted);

b. The State allegedly offering perjured testimony when it 

offered the testimony of a friend of Farris (Schmidlin); 

and

c. When the prosecutor allegedly vouched for Schmidlin 

by arguing that she had no reason to lie;

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2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel where trial counsel did 

not object “in the instant of the state’s misconduct” during 

Schmidlin’s allegedly improper testimony

3. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel where trial counsel did 

not file a motion to vacate the verdict after Schmidlin allegedly 

admitted to committing perjury

4. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel related to counsel’s 

failure to

a. Retain expert witnesses, specifically

i. An expert to examine cellphone records;

ii. A medical examiner;

iii. An expert to examine bite marks on Farris’ 

hands;

iv. An expert to examine blood evidence; and

v. An expert “from Southwest Airlines to confirm 

the travel itinerary evidence”;

b. Object to the admission of emails and text messages 

that were offered into evidence without a limiting 

instruction;

c. Offer rebuttal evidence during his redirect examination 

of Farris;

d. Offer letters written by, and an audio recording of, 

Farris’ codefendant that, Farris alleges, “obtusely 

confirm[ed]” the codefendant committed the murder;

5. Judicial abuse of discretion that allegedly deprived Farris of a 

fair trial where

a. The trial court did not sua sponte declare a mistrial 

during Schmidlin’s allegedly improper testimony;

b. The trial court emphasized finishing the trial according 

to schedule, thereby

i. Limiting trial counsel’s ability to deliver his 

closing argument by imposing a time limit on 

his argument; and

ii. Inhibiting the jury’s ability to consider the 

evidence during deliberations;

c. The trial court did not provide the jury with a limiting 

instruction related to emails and text messages offered 

into evidence;

d. The trial court advised the prosecutor that the jury 

looked bored;

e. The trial court “reprimanded” Farris while he was 

testifying;

f. The trial court provided an accomplice liability 

instruction in its final jury instructions; and

g. That the court erred in precluding third-party 

culpability evidence;

6. Prosecutorial misconduct where the State allegedly changed 

itstheory of the case to argue accomplice liability in its closing 

arguments;

7. That the post-conviction relief (“PCR”) court erred when it 

dismissed his ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims 

based on finding trial counsel’s decisions to be strategic; and

8. That the PCR court failed to apply Strickland in an objectively 

reasonable manner when it denied his IAC claims.

(Answer, Doc. 11 at 2-4.) 

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Response - On February 24, 2023, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 11). 

Respondents argue: (1) the petition is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations; (2) 

various claims are procedurally defaulted; (3) various claims are non-cognizable state law 

claims or non-cognizable challenges to defects in post-conviction relief proceedings; and 

(4) the balance of the claims are without merit.3

Reply - On July 14, 2023, Petitioner filed his Reply (Doc. 29). Petitioner argues: 

(1) Respondents assert his PCR petition for review was timely (id. at 8); (2) the 

cognizability and merits of his claims and their proper exhaustion (id. at 9-53); (3) cause 

and prejudice to excuse his procedural defaults (id. at 54-55); (4) he is entitled to statutory 

tolling for the entire time his PCR proceeding was pending including any gaps between 

levels of review because his PCR Notice was timely, and he is entitled to tolling for 

unsought review (id. at 55-57); (5) he fairly presented his claims to the state courts, and 

the state’s rules interfered with his ability to do so (id. at 57-60); (6) not all of his claims 

were adjudicated on the merits or were incorrectly resolved (id. at 61-64); (7) any 

differences between his habeas claims and claims presented to the state courts do not 

preclude proper exhaustion (id. at 64-65); (8) he has met the standards for relief under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d) (id. at 65-70); (9) the state courts abused their discretion (id. at 70-72); 

(10) he is actually innocent (id. at 72-74); (11) he has diligently pursued his claims but

was stymied by delays in obtaining records from Verizon wireless beginning in March 

2022, prison transfers in April and May 2022, and the resulting loss of his legal property 

boxes which continued through October 2022, loss of portions of counsel’s file, resulting 

in a delay of at least four months in filing his Petition (id. at 74-76); (12) he can show 

cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural defaults (id. at 76-78); (13) he should be 

3 The Court observed that Respondents’ Answer only identified transcripts “in possession” 

of Respondents (Answer, Doc. 11 at 4-5), and thus failed to comply with Rule 5(c), Rules 

Governing § 2254 Cases. Respondents were ordered to file a notice fully complying with 

that rule, and Petitioner was given an opportunity to amend his reply or supplement the 

record based on the failure to comply with Rule 5(c). (Order 9/1/23, Doc. 33.) 

Respondents filed the required Notice (Doc. 34), and Petitioner filed a Notice (Doc. 36) 

declining to amend his Reply, and Motion to Supplement (Doc. 35) addressed hereinafter.

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permitted to return to the state courts to exhaust his state remedies (id. at 78-79); (14) a 

certificate of appealability should be denied (id. at 80-84); and (15) Respondents should 

be denied leave to amend their Answer (id. at 84-85). 

Original Report and Recommendation – On January 3, 2024, the undersigned 

issued a Report & Recommendation (Doc. 39) concluding the Petition was delinquent and 

barred by the statute of limitations. On February 23, 2024, the Court rejected the Report 

and Recommendation, finding (on the basis of an affidavit regarding the prison mailbox 

rule) that “the petition for review was filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals on 

November 30, 2020,” and again referring for further consideration. (Order 2/23/24, Doc. 

46 at 2.) 

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. ONE YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIOD

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

B. COMMENCEMENT OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).4 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending at least through April 18, 2017, 

4 Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly recognized 

constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Petitioner proffers no argument that any of these apply.

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when the Arizona Supreme Court denied his Petition for Review on direct appeal. (Exh. 

P-6, Order 4/19/17 (Doc. 1 at 27).) Here, however, the Arizona Supreme Court’s notice 

of its decision was not issued until April 19, 2017. (Id.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s one year was running for the nine days between 

his sentencing on April 8, 2015 and his notice of appeal on April 17, 2015. (Answer, Doc. 

11 at 16.) Respondents conflate the standard for “pending” post-conviction applications 

necessary for statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) with the finality of the 

conviction under § 2244(d)(1)(A) which is required to commence the running of the 

statute. The gap between sentencing and a timely notice of appeal is irrelevant to the latter, 

because the limitations period does not begin running until finality, when the appeal is 

concluded.

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244, “direct review" includes the period within which 

a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, 

whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 

134, 150 (2012). The rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, require that a 

petition for a writ of certiorari be filed “within 90 days after entry of the order denying 

discretionary review.” 5 U.S.S.Ct.R. 13(1). In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court’s 

Order was entered on April 19, 2017. Accordingly, because Petitioner did not file a 

petition for a writ of certiorari, his conviction became final 90 days later, on Tuesday, July 

18, 2017.

6

/ /

/ /

5

 “The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the 

judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the mandate 

(or its equivalent under local practice).” U.S.S.Ct.R. 13(3).

6 Despite acknowledging the tolling effect of the time for certiorari review (Answer, Doc. 

11 at 16, no. 9), Respondents argue Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the time between 

his sentencing and his notice of appeal. (Id. at 16.) Respondents are correct. No tolling 

occurred, but only because the limitations period had not yet commenced running.

 

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C. STATUTORY TOLLING 

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, statutory tolling of the 

habeas limitations period only results from state applications that are “properly filed,” and 

an untimely application is never “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). 

Petitioner’s limitations period would have commenced running no earlier than July 

19, 2017. However, no later than May 15, 2017 (before his limitations period began 

running) Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was commenced when his PCR Notice (Exh. V) 

was filed. That proceeding remained pending, and the statute of limitations tolled from its 

inception, until at least October 30, 2020 when the PCR court entered its order (Exh. KK) 

denying the PCR Petition. 

Under Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.16(a)(1), Petitioner had 30 days “after the entry of 

the trial court’s final decision” or until November 30, 2020, to file his petition for review 

with the Arizona Court of Appeals. This Court has concluded that under the prison 

mailbox rule Petitioner filed his PCR petition for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals on that date. (Order 2/23/24, Doc. 46.) Thus it is irrelevant that the Arizona 

Court of Appeals did not address the timeliness of that filing, when it denied the petition 

on June 15, 2021. (See Exh. MM, Mem. Dec. 6/15/21.) 

Petitioner then timely sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court, which 

denied review on January 24, 2022, and on February 23, 2022 the appellate court issued 

its Mandate.7 (Exh. OO, Mandate 2/23/22.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to “gap” tolling between the 

7 Respondents argue that it is the date of the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling, not the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ mandate, that marks the end of the PCR proceedings for 

purposes of tolling. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 17, citing inter alia Hemerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 

1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007).) Because the Petition was filed within one year of the Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ decision, this issue is not reached.

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various decisions in this PCR proceeding and the filing of the ensuing petition for review. 

(Answer, Doc. 11 at 16.) However, the Supreme Court has long held that an application 

for state collateral review is also “pending” during “the time between a lower state court's 

decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 

U.S. 214, 217 (2002). Moreover, in Melville v. Shinn, 68 F.4th 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. May 

23, 2023), the Ninth Circuit held that a post-conviction application remains pending until 

the expiration of time allowed to seek further review, even if such review is not sought. 

Because at each level Petitioner sought such review before the time expired, Petitioner’s 

PCR proceeding remained pending, and his limitations period tolled from its inception,

until at least January 24, 2022. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year commenced running no sooner than January 25, 

2022, and without further tolling expired on January 24, 2023, and his January 4, 2023 

federal Petition was timely. 

IV. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted or been procedurally 

barred on an independent and adequate state ground, on his claims in Grounds 1(a), 1(c), 

4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 4(d), 5(a), 5(b)(i), 5(b)(ii), 5(c), 5(d), 5(e), 5(f), 5(g), and 6, and thus these 

claims are barred from federal habeas review. 8

A. EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

8 Respondents rely on Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010), where a 

panel of the Ninth Circuit denominated an expected future application of a procedural bar 

as an “implied procedural bar,” and an actually applied procedural bar as “explicit.” 

Because habeas courts are sometimes called upon to imply an explicit procedural bar from 

a summary state court decision, see Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1992) and 

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188 (2018), and because a procedural default involves a 

forecast of a state court’s future decision, rather an implication about a past decision, the 

undersigned maintains the separate nomenclature of procedural default and procedural bar. 

The principles, however, are the same.

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available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) 

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to 

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 

(9th Cir. 1981).

1. Exhaustion by Fair Presentation

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). Under the 1989 

amendments to the governing state statutes, even cases carrying a life sentence are 

exhausted once ruled on by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. 

Supp. 2d 925, 933 (D. Ariz. 2007)

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before 

bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of 

reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 

1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Factual Basis – A petitioner must have fairly presented the operative facts of his 

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federal claim to the state courts as part of the same claim. A petitioner may not broaden 

the scope of a constitutional claim in the federal courts by asserting additional operative 

facts that have not yet been fairly presented to the state courts. Expanded claims not 

presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas petition. Brown 

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995); see also, Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294 

(9th Cir. 1982). And, while new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim 

unexhausted, a petitioner may not "fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered 

by the state courts." Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). 

Legal Basis - Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the claim 

will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 

(1995). While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,” 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 

750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal 

claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). “[T]he petitioner must make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular provisions of the federal 

Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law,” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 

F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005), or by “a citation to a state case analyzing [the] federal

constitutional issue." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). But a 

drive-by-citation of a state case applying federal and state law is not sufficient. 

For a federal issue to be presented by the citation of a state decision 

dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the 

citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case 

involves federal issues. Where, as here, the citation to the state case 

has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner raises federal 

claims or relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the 

federal claim is not fairly presented. 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 912 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2004).9 

9 This requirement for specifying a federal legal theory is very different from the standard, 

discussed hereinabove in Sections V(A) and (B), applicable to determining whether pro 

se federal habeas petitions adequately state a federal claim.

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Proper Mode - "[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not 'fairly present' a claim to a 

state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that 

does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower 

court opinion in the case, that does so." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). The 

Arizona habeas petitioner "must have presented his federal, constitutional issue before the 

Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing." Castillo v. 

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 

657, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2005) (arguments set out in appendix attached to petition and 

incorporated by reference were fairly presented).

2. Exhaustion by Actual Consideration

Although fair presentation is the normal mode of establishing exhaustion of state 

remedies, it is not the only method. Rather, a petitioner’s state remedies are exhausted 

where the state courts have reached and passed on the merits of a federal claim, regardless 

of whether the petitioner had fairly presented the claim to the state court. “It is reasonable 

to infer an exception [to the fair presentation requirement] where the State has actually 

passed upon the claim.” Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). See Greene v. 

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (“exhaustion does not require repeated 

assertions if a federal claim is actually considered at least once on the merits by the highest 

state court”); Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir.1984) ("[t]here is 

no better evidence of exhaustion than a state court's actual consideration of the relevant 

constitutional issue"); and Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (8th Cir.1990) 

(state court's sua sponte consideration of an issue satisfies exhaustion). 

On the other hand, actual consideration of the claim is not required. “All exhaustion 

requires is that the state courts have the opportunity to remedy an error, not that they 

actually took advantage of the opportunity.” Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 

2009).

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B. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly 

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no 

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of 

a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of justice” 

which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to 

the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s waiver bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. 

Proc. 32.2(a)(3) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 

21, et seq.) 

Petitioner replies that a state procedural default should not be a matter of concern 

to a federal court, and he should be granted a stay to exhaust his state remedies. (Reply, 

Doc. 29 at 78-79.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court disagree. 

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 929 

F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly exhaust 

his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no longer 

available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted" and 

is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a procedurally 

defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would 

excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). This applies whether the claim 

has been presented to the state courts and barred on procedural grounds or has not been 

presented but would now be barred if presented. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 

(1989) (“Of course, a federal habeas court need not require that a federal claim be 

presented to a state court if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally 

barred.”)

Petitioner suggests a stay to permit him to exhaust his state remedies. But as 

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discussed hereinafter, Petitioner no longer has state remedies available to him. Thus a stay 

would be superfluous. 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial or on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply shows 

"that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral 

proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the 

State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' 

[did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those 

constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. 

Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App. Div. 2, 2007). In coming to its 

prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the 

right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a 

twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of claims 

not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

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Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that petitions 

for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety 

days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of 

the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 

185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition and noting 

that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the 

rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(b) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply.10 The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

(b) the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to render 

a judgment or to impose a sentence on the defendant;

(c) the sentence as imposed is not authorized by law;

(d) the defendant continues to be or will continue to be in 

custody after his or her sentence expired;

(e) newly discovered material facts probably exist, and those 

facts probably would have changed the judgment or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) the facts were discovered after the trial or 

sentencing;

(2) the defendant exercised due diligence in 

discovering these facts; and

(3) the newly discovered facts are material and not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony 

that was of such critical significance that the impeachment 

evidence probably would have changed the judgment or 

sentence.

(f) the failure to timely file a notice of appeal was not the 

defendant's fault;

(g) there has been a significant change in the law that, if 

applicable to the defendant's case, would probably overturn the 

10 Even if such exceptions apply, Petitioner would be required to “explain the reasons for 

not raising the claim in a previous notice or petition.” Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 32.2(b). 

Petitioner has not asserted anything to show his ability to “provide sufficient reasons.” Id.

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defendant's judgment or sentence; or

(h) the defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would find the defendant 

guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that no reasonable 

fact-finder would find the defendant eligible for the death penalty in 

an aggravation phase held pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-752.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Petitioner does not assert a lack of jurisdiction, an unauthorized sentence, or being 

held after his sentence has expired. Accordingly, Paragraphs 32.1(b), (c), and (d) do not 

apply. Where a claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been 

presented to the state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered”, and paragraph 

(e) has no application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his 

claims. Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely appeal and 

notice of post-conviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has 

not asserted a change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), 

concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims 

Petitioner asserts in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars would 

prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that were not 

fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

C. PROCEDURAL BAR ON INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE STATE 

GROUNDS

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011)

(citations omitted).

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed the 

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burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application 

of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate burden is the 

state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

Waiver Bar - Petitioner fails to proffer anything to suggest that Rule 32.2(a) is not 

an independent and adequate state ground, sufficient to bar federal habeas review of claims 

a defendant could have but did not raise on direct appeal. The federal courts have routinely 

held that it is. “Arizona's waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for denying 

relief.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Timeliness Bar – Similarly, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to suggest that Rule 

32.4 is not an independent and adequate state ground, sufficient to bar federal habeas 

review of claims a defendant could have but did not raise on direct appeal. See Beaty v. 

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Beaty has not shown that Arizona's time bar 

is not adequate or independent”).

D. APPLICATION TO PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

1. Ground One – Prosecutorial Misconduct

Respondents argue a procedural default of Grounds 1(a) and 1(c). 

In his Reply, Petitioner asserts these claims were presented and considered on direct 

appeal and references his claim on appeal regarding prosecutorial misconduct. (Reply, 

Doc. 21 9 at 21.) 

Ground 1(a) – In Ground 1(a) Petitioner asserts misconduct based on the following 

portion of closing arguments: “Mr. Farris ‘...doesn’t deserve your integrity or your 

respect...after he got on the witness stand and he lied to you...He lied...you don’t get to 

do that...’” (Petition, Attach. B at 1 (Doc. 1 at 32).) 

In contrast Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal was 

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based on presentation of “vouching questions” of Petitioner’s former girlfriend to support 

her testimony that Petitioner had admitted killing someone. At most, as part of that 

argument, Petitioner asserted:

During its closing argument the State argued that the reason 

the jury should find that Appellant was lying was because of “Jennifer 

Schmidlin’s questions.” Specifically it argued: 

Jennifer Schmidlin didn’t want to be here. You saw that 

She said - - do you want to be here testifying? She has no beef 

with the defendant. She still cares about him. She has no ax 

to grind. She has no doubt, no doubt what he said to her on 

June 5th. I killed somebody.

(RT 2/6/15 at 201; see also id. at 203 (“She was very certain about 

what he had said to her. She didn’t want to tell us but she did.”))

(Exh. P, Opening Brief at 26-27.) However, those assertions were not presented as a 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct, but as part of the res gestae of Petitioner’s claim based 

on misconduct from the prosecution’s questioning of Schmidlin. Petitioner summarized 

his misconduct claim as limited to:

3. The prosecutor committed misconduct by portraying a key witness 

during her testimony and in closing arguments in a false and 

misleading light with no "motive to lie" contrary to the truth knowing 

Appellant could not rebut the same without opening the door to 

previously precluded bad act evidence. The trial court abused its 

discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial and the misconduct 

violated Appellant's right to a fair trial and Due Process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 

(Id. at 23.) He argued as the misconduct: “The prosecutor in this case deliberately elicited 

false and misleading statements from Schmidlin that inaccurately portrayed and bolstered 

her credibility before the jury.” (Id. at 32.) 

Indeed, no reference was made to the portions of the prosecution’s closing 

argument which Petitioner cites in the Petition. 

Moreover, it is relevant that Petitioner’s appellate brief was not filed pro se, but by 

counsel. Unlike a pro se filing, a counseled filings should be read in light of deliberate, 

strategic choices. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003). Had counsel 

intended to assert a claim based on an argument for conviction based on assertions of 

Petitioner lying under oath, the state court could presume he would have stated so 

explicitly. 

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A petitioner may not "fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the 

state courts." Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). Changing the purported 

offending conduct is a fundamental change from the claim presented to the state courts. 

Ground 1(a) was not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and 

Petitioner has now procedurally defaulted his state remedies on this claim. 

Ground 1(c) – In Ground 1(c) Petitioner argues the prosecution engaged in 

misconduct when it argued, knowing it to be false, that Schmidlin had no reason to lie, 

referencing arguments that “Schmidlin had no motive to lie...she was his friend”...”She 

still cares about him. She has no axe to grind.” (Petition, Attach. B at 5 (Doc. 1 at 36).) 

Respondents cast his claim as one based on improper vouching and argue that this 

claim was not fairly presented because: (a) it wasn’t fairly presented as a federal claim; 

and (b) the same factual claim was not raised.

Ground 1(c) is not a “vouching” claim. It is true that Petitioner references the 

prosecution’s arguments as “vouch[ing] for its witness.” (Petition, Attach. B at 5 (Doc. 1 

at 36).) But a “vouching” claim is based on assertions that the prosecution has placed the 

prestige of the government behind the witness or refers to matters outside the record to 

bolster a witness’s credibility. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.1980), cert. 

denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981). Petitioner’s claim is not founded upon such assertions, but 

on the argument that the prosecution argued on the basis of testimony it knew to be false, 

i.e. that the prosecution knew Schmidlin did have a reason to lie, including her tumultuous 

past relationship with and fear of Petitioner.

To the extent that Petitioner intended to assert a “vouching” claim in Ground 1(c), 

it would be subject to dismissal for failure to adequately state such a claim. Petitioner’s 

reliance on the state arguing at closing on the basis of testimony presented at trial (truthful 

or perjured) is the antithesis of “vouching.” The essence of a “vouching” claim is 

arguments of veracity based on extra-judicial factors, i.e. the prestige of the prosecution, 

or evidence not presented in court. Similarly, in his Reply, Petitioner’s attempts to paint 

Ground 1(c) as asserting a “vouching” claim fail because he again references only the 

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arguments based on Stelmasek’s purportedly false testimony at trial. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 

10.)11 

So construed, this claim was plainly raised and raised as a federal claim in 

Petitioner’s appellate brief. The issues statement in the Opening Brief described this claim 

as including: “The prosecutor committed misconduct by portraying a key witness...in 

closing arguments in a false and misleading light with no ‘motive to lie’ contrary to the 

truth...and the misconduct violated Appellant's right to a fair trial and Due Process under 

the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Exh. P, Opening Brief at 23.) And the Opening Brief 

referenced the prosecution’s arguments that Schmidlin had no motive. (Id. (“She has no 

beef with the defendant. She still cares about him. She has no ax to grind.”).) The brief 

further argued: “During rebuttal arguments the State argued again that Schmidlin ‘had no 

reason to come into this courtroom and lie.’" (Id. at 29.) Finally, Petitioner quoted from 

both Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 

103 (1976) (Id. at 33), the landmark federal decisions on the use of false testimony. 

Petitioner fairly presented his claim in Ground 1(c) in his appellate brief, and 

thereby exhausted his state remedies on this claim. 

2. Ground Four – Ineffective Assistance

In Ground 4(a) (IAC re Experts) Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to retain a series of experts. (Petition, Attach. B, Doc. 1 at 44, et seq.) 

Respondents argue that while Petitioner raised this claim in the PCR court and his Petition 

for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court, he failed to raise it in his PCR Petition for 

11 If Ground 1(c) could be construed as asserting a “vouching” claim, it was not fairly 

presented to the state courts. As here, on direct appeal Petitioner referred to vouching as 

part of his claim of prosecutorial misconduct but did so without reference to federal law 

apart from his broad reference to Due Process in his section heading. (Exh. P, Open. Brf. 

at 23.) And, his argument was not that the prosecution had used its prestige or asserted 

some extrajudicial information, but rather that the state elicited testimony from Schmidlin 

and Petitioner that it new to be false (i.e. friendship, reluctance, etc.). Moreover, 

Petitioner’s only other reference to federal law pertained to the knowing use of false 

evidence. (Id. at 33 (citing Napue and Agurs).) Tellingly, Petitioner’s reply brief on 

direct appeal made no reference to “vouching.” 

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Review, and it is now procedurally defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 26-27.) Petitioner 

replies that the Arizona Court of Appeals had a duty to review the claim generally, and 

because Petitioner asserted he ”stands by the merits of the claim as put forth within the 

S/PCR.” (Reply, Doc. 29 at 39-40.) 

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Arizona Court of Appeals has no general 

obligation to independently review the record for errors. Such a duty to independently 

review the record for error may occur in certain circumstances, e.g. where counsel in an 

initial direct appeal asserts an inability to find an issue for appeal and thus seeks to 

withdraw. See Anders v. State of California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Such was not the case 

in Petitioner’s PCR petition for review. Moreover, such generalized review for error does 

not result in exhaustion of all claims, only those actually identified and addressed by the 

appellate court. See Smiley v. Ryan, No. CV-12-2525-PHX-FJM, 2014 WL 7272474, at 

*11 (D. Ariz. Dec. 18, 2014) (concluding that absent a mandate for consideration of 

specific claims, a general review for error, including that under Anders, does not result in 

exhaustion). Rather, “the Arizona Court of Appeals was not required to review the parties' 

trial court pleadings to see if it could discover for itself a federal, constitutional issue. To 

exhaust his claim, Castillo must have presented his federal, constitutional issue before the 

Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing.” Castillo v. 

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Petitioner did reference this claim in his PCR Petition for Review (Exh. LL at 3), 

but Respondents assert that Petitioner “expressly declined” to raise Ground 4(a) to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 26.) Petitioner protests he did not do so 

and had no intention to decline to raise this ground. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 39.) A review of 

the Petition for Review supports Respondents assertion.

Petitioner’s Petition for Review included, inter alia, two sections: “II. Issues of 

Superior Court Presented for Review,” and “III. Issues of Superior Court Not Presented 

for Review.” (Exh. LL, PCR PFR. at 2.) Petitioner’s claim regarding failure to retain 

experts was identified in the latter. Petitioner attempts to cast this as a typographical error. 

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However, the next section (“V. Why this Court Should Deny [sic] Review of Superior 

Regarding”) proceeded to discuss in depth the same issues, i.e. re motion to vacate, 

fundamental error, judicial discretion, and trial strategy (id. at 6, et seq.), identified in the 

Section “II. Issues of Superior Court Presented for Review.” Thus, the plain import of 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review was that he was NOT raising the claims identified in 

Section III. Plaintiff protests that in Section III he addressed those claims and asserted he 

stood by his PCR petition. Given the structure and substance of that Petition for Review, 

“stand[ing] by” would be understood by the appellate court as simply an assertion that 

Petitioner was not conceding those claims lacked merit, only that he had chosen not to 

raise them to the appellate court. That Petitioner may have had a different intent is 

irrelevant. What is relevant is what was presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his 

brief. 

Ground 4(a) was not fairly presented to the state appellate court and is procedurally 

defaulted. 

In Ground 4(b) (IAC re Emails & Texts) Petitioner argues trial counsel was 

ineffective “when he permitted hundreds of incriminating email and text messages to 

simply be read into the record and to the trial jury, without limiting instructions.” (Petition, 

Attach. B, Doc. 1 at 19, et seq.). Like Ground 4(a), this was a claim for which Petitioner 

explicitly declined to seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. LL, PCR PFR 

at 2.) Accordingly, this claim was not fairly presented and is procedurally defaulted. 

In Ground 4(c) (Rehabilitation Evidence) Petitioner argues trial counsel was 

ineffective because he failed to offer rebuttal evidence to rehabilitate Petitioner’s 

credibility. (Petition, Attach. B, Doc. 1 at 21 et seq.) In Ground 4(d) (Exculpatory 

Evidence ) Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce 

exculpatory evidence such as a letter from and recording of co-defendant confessing to her 

responsibility. (Id.) These claims were arguably the subject of the section of Petitioner’s 

Petition for Review captioned “Failure to Offer Critical Evidence.” (Exh. LL, PCR PFR 

at 3.) However, like Grounds 4(a) and 4(b), Petitioner explicitly declined to assert such

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claims in his PCR Petition for Review. Accordingly, these claims were not fairly 

presented, and are procedurally defaulted. 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his remedies on his 

claims of ineffective assistance in Ground 4, and they are procedurally defaulted.

3. Ground Five – Abuse of Discretion

In Ground 5, Petitioner asserts the denial of due process from various trial errors

asserting the trial judge abused his discretion. (Petition, Attach. B at 22 et seq., Doc. 1 at 

53 et seq.) Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to fairly present these to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals as federal claims. Petitioner argues he raised these claims on direct 

appeal and in his PCR Petition for Review. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 46.) 

Evaluating Petitioner’s presentation of these claims requires an understanding of 

the nature of the claims. Petitioner casts these claims as an abuse of discretion. “Abuse of 

discretion” is a general a standard of review used by federal and state courts to draw a 

distinction between decisions which the reviewing court decides de novo, and those where 

it gives deference to the lower court. “A court abuses its discretion when it fails to apply 

the correct legal standard or bases its decision on unreasonable findings of fact.” Nachshin 

v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011). 

So understood, the Constitution does not protect against abuses of discretion. Nor 

is an abuse of discretion, ipso facto, a denial of due process. “Violations of state law, 

without more, do not deprive a defendant of due process.” Cooks v. Spalding, 660 F.2d 

738, 739 (9th Cir. 1981). “A particular abuse of discretion by a state court may amount 

also to a violation of the Constitution, but not every state court abuse of discretion has the 

same effect.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, “abuse of 

discretion claims recast as due process violations do not constitute colorable due process 

claims.” Sanchez-Cruz v. I.N.S., 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2001). “We cannot treat a 

mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due process; otherwise, every 

erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come here as a federal constitutional 

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question.” Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948). Rather, to amount to a violation 

of due process, the abuse of discretion must render “the state court’s action...arbitrary or 

fundamentally unfair.” Cooks, 660 F.2d at 739.

Thus, to fairly present a claim of a due process violation based on an “abuse of 

discretion” a Petitioner must assert not just an abuse of discretion but that the decision was 

not just wrong but so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that due process has been denied. 

In Ground 5(a) (Mistrial re Schmidlin) Petitioner challenges the trial court’s 

failure to declare a mistrial based on the questioning of his ex-girlfriend, Schmidlin. 

Petitioner references the prosecution’s questioning of Schmidlin, casts her testimony as 

“improper,” and references his call for a mistrial. He describes Schmidlin’s pretrial 

interview responses, and her trial testimony (“evasive and extremely noncommittal”). He 

summarizes: “The Trial Court was required to grant a mistrial given the bias and

improprieties garnered by Schnidlin's [sic] testimony.” (Petition, Attach. B at 22-24, Doc. 

1 at 53-55.) In describing the error, Petitioner referenced parts of his motion for mistrial 

made during closing arguments. (Id. at 23, Doc. 1 at 54 (citing “TT#12”, i.e. Exh. DDD, 

RT 2/11/15 Part 2).) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner included claims with the following caption:

3. The prosecutor committed misconduct by portraying a key witness 

during her testimony and in closing arguments in a false and 

misleading light with no "motive to lie" contrary to the truth knowing 

Appellant could not rebut the same without opening the door to 

previously precluded bad act evidence. The trial court abused its 

discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial and the misconduct 

violated Appellant's right to a fair trial and Due Process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment.

(Exh. P, Open. Brf. At 23 (emphasis added).) Petitioner described largely the same factual 

background, and argued prosecutorial misconduct, citing federal authorities on such 

misconduct. With regard to the motion for mistrial, Petitioner argued:

The trial court accordingly abused its discretion in denying 

Appellant's motion for a mistrial on the basis that it was not certain 

whether Schmidlin had lied since the jury was clearly presented false 

testimony of her willingness to testify and incriminate Appellant who 

could not correct this false impression without opening the door to 

the bad act evidence he had previously fought to keep from his trial.

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(Id. at 33.)

Respondents argue that while Petitioner raised a similar claim on direct appeal 

(error for failing to declare a mistrial based on the prosecution’s closing arguments about 

Schmidlin), he did not raise the instant claim. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 29-30.) That 

conclusion, however, is based on Respondents’ conclusion that the Petition references a 

failure to “sua sponte declare a mistrial related to Schmidlin’s testimony.” (Id. at 29.) To 

the contrary, the claim in the Petition is based on the denial of Petitioner’s motion for 

mistrial during closing arguments. 

On the other hand, Petitioner’s Opening Brief fails to identify the federal basis for 

challenging the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. All of Petitioner’s citations were to case 

law addressing claims of prosecutorial misconduct. He simply argued an “abuse of 

discretion” as the basis for trial court error. It is true that in his caption for the related 

claim, Petitioner references Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but he does so 

only with respect to the related claim of prosecutorial misconduct. That claim is the basis 

for Ground 1(c), which the undersigned has determined hereinabove was properly 

exhausted on direct appeal. Additionally, the undersigned observes that Petitioner 

concluded the relevant section of his Opening Brief with the sentence: “Consistent with 

Due Process, Appellant’s convictions must now be vacated.” (Exh. P, PCR PFR at 34.) 

However, this sentence was preceded by a recitation of federal law on prosecutorial 

misconduct. No connection was made with the challenge to the denial of a mistrial and 

due process. "[I]t is not enough to make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as 

broad as due process to present the "substance" of such a claim to a state court." Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996). “Mere general appeals to broad constitutional 

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, do not 

establish exhaustion.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(quotations and citations omitted).12 

12 Appellate counsel’s failure to cast this abuse-of-discretion claim as a violation of due 

process is unsurprising. As discussed supra, an abuse of discretion is not, ipso facto, a 

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Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner failed to present his claim 

in Ground 5(a) as a federal claim on direct appeal. Moreover, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals did not address this claim as a federal one, but under state law regarding mistrials. 

(See Exh. S, Mem. Dec. at ¶¶ 30-31.) 

Petitioner asserts this claim was also raised in his PCR proceeding. The 

undersigned finds nowhere that it was fairly presented. As part of his claims of a denial 

of federal due process based on the trial judge’s abuse of discretion (Exh. HH, PCR Pet. 

at 36, et seq.) Petitioner referenced denials of mistrial. But this was in connection with his 

challenge to the trial court’s time limitations (id. at 38), and his challenge to the trial court 

reprimanding Petitioner during his testimony (id. at 39). No such claim was made based 

on the handling of the Schmidlin testimony. 

Assuming arguendo that Petitioner did, the PCR court found all of Petitioner’s 

claims of trial error or abuse of discretion violating his right to a fair trial “precluded 

because they could have been raised in Defendant’s direct appeal.” (Exh. KK, Order 

10/30/20 at 5.) As such Petitioner’s claim in Ground 5(a) is now procedurally barred under 

Arizona’s waiver bar in Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 32.2(a)(3).13 

If not presented to the PCR court, then the claim could not have been fairly 

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals or Arizona Supreme Court in his petitions for 

review. In Arizona, review of a petition for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court of 

denial of due process.

13 It is irrelevant that the PCR court also appeared to address the merits of many of 

Petitioner’s claims of abuse of discretion. (Exh. KK, Order 10/30/20 at 4-5.) The state 

court may reach “the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding” and still avoid 

habeas review, “as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule.” 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989). Additionally, it is not controlling that the 

PCR court failed to cite to Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 32.2(a)(3). All that is necessary is that 

the state court “clearly and expressly” rely upon the bar. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 

320, 327 (1985) (no procedural bar found where state court merely referenced avoidable 

waiver but made no finding whether waiver applied). See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 266 (1989) (claim not procedurally barred from habeas review where state court 

merely state claims could have been raised on direct appeal but did not assert waiver as a 

ground for rejecting the claims). Here, the PCR court explicitly found a waiver for failure 

to raise the claim in a prior proceeding. A reference to the well-worn waiver in Rule 

32.2(a)(3) was unnecessary to make the meaning of the PCR court plain. 

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Appeals is governed by Rule 32.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which clarifies 

that review is available for “issues which were decided by the trial court.” Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii). See also State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (Ariz.

App., 1980) (issues first presented in petition for review and not presented to trial court 

not subject to review). Similarly, the presentation of a claim for the first time in a 

petitioner’s petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court on direct review is not 

sufficient to fairly present the claim to the Arizona courts. The Arizona Supreme Court 

generally will not consider issues raised for the first time before it, although it has the 

discretion to do so. See Town of South Tucson v. Board of Supv’rs of Pima County, 52

Ariz. 575, 84 P.2d 581 (1938). Raising “federal constitutional claims for the first and only 

time to the state’s highest court on discretionary review” is not fair presentation. Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2004).

In Ground 5(b) (Scheduling) Petitioner argues the trial court abused its discretion 

in pressing a schedule to the point it limited trial counsel’s ability to deliver his closing 

argument and inhibited the jury’s ability to deliberate. Petitioner identifies no place where 

he raised such a claim to the state courts. Petitioner references his direct appeal, and casts 

this (and his other new claims of abuse of discretion) as “simply expanding upon the 

elemental facts of this abuse of discretion claim...demonstrating that the prior incidents (of 

abuse of discretion) were not isolated but part of a distinct and prejudicial pattern.” (Reply, 

Doc. 29 at 47.) However, as with Ground 5(a), Petitioner never asserted as a federal claim 

his challenges to the trial court’s abuse of discretion. 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to show where he asserted a federal claim based on a 

pattern of abuse of discretion. Rather, Petitioner complained of two specific abuses: (1) 

admission of third-party culpability evidence (see Exh. P, PCR PFR at 12); and (2) failure 

to grant a mistrial (id. at 23). Thus, this claim cannot be treated as simply additional facts 

in support of an existing claim. Rather it is effectively a new, expanded claim. Expanded 

claims not presented in the highest state court are not considered in a federal habeas 

petition. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1995). New factual allegations may not 

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"fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. 

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). Claims based on new assertions of conduct of the trial 

court as an abuse of discretion are entirely new claims, with disparate facts and legal 

theories underpinning them. Indeed, in his Reply, Petitioner attempts to preserve his new 

claims in Ground 5 by asserting a wholly new claim of “judicial bias.” (Reply, Doc. 29 at 

48.) 

Finally, as with Ground 5(a), to the extent that Petitioner could show he presented 

this claim in his PCR Petition, the claims were procedurally barred as waived by failure to 

raise them on direct appeal. 

In Ground 5(c) (Limiting Instruction) Petitioner argues an abuse of discretion in 

failing to issue a limiting instruction on emails and texts. (Petition, Attach. B at 26, Doc. 

1 at 57.) Respondents argue this claim was neither presented on direct appeal nor in 

Petitioner’s PCR Petition, and thus is procedurally defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 31-32.)

Indeed, Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal. Petitioner raised the 

related claim of ineffectiveness in his PCR Petition. (Exh. HH at 17.) But he fails to show 

where it was raised as a due process claim. Claims of ineffective assistance and the 

underlying substantive claim are not fungible. “While admittedly related, they are distinct 

claims with separate elements of proof, and each claim should have been separately and 

specifically presented to the state courts.” Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (finding underlying Fifth Amendment claim not fairly presented when argued 

only as instance of ineffective assistance). And as with Ground 5(b), if raised in 

Petitioner’s PCR petition, it was procedurally barred as waived on direct appeal, and if 

only raised to the Arizona Court of Appeals, it was not fairly presented.

In Ground 5(d) (Advice to Prosecutor) Petitioner argues an abuse of discretion 

when the trial court advised the prosecution during its case that the jury appeared bored

and were falling asleep. (Petition, Attach. B at 27, Doc. 1 at 58.) Respondents argue the 

claim was not presented on direct appeal, and although asserted in Petitioner’s PCR 

Petition, it was not fairly presented because it had been waived by failure to present it on 

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direct appeal. 

The undersigned finds Petitioner did not raise the claim on direct appeal but did 

raise it in his PCR Petition (Exh. HH at 38), and it was procedurally barred by the PCR 

Court as waived by failure to raise it on direct appeal. (Exh. KK Order 10/30/20 at 5.) 

In Ground 5(e) (Reprimanding Petitioner) Petitioner argues the trial court abused 

its discretion when it reprimanded Petitioner while testifying. (Petition, Attach. B at 28, 

Doc. 1 at 59.) Respondents again argue the claim was not presented on direct appeal and

was procedurally defaulted because improperly presented in Petitioner’s PCR Petition. 

(Answer, Doc. 11 at 32-33.) 

The undersigned finds Petitioner did not raise the claim on direct appeal, but as 

with Ground 5(d) did raise it in his PCR Petition (Exh. HH at 39), and it was procedurally 

barred as waived on direct appeal. 

In Ground 5(f) (Accomplice Liability Instruction) Petitioner argues the trial 

court abused its discretion by providing an accomplice liability instruction in its final jury 

instructions, despite having previously refused to do so, and without evidence to support 

Petitioner’s aiding or assisting in the victim’s death. (Petition, Attach. B at 29, Doc. 1 at 

59-60.) Respondents argue Petitioner asserted the underlying instructional error claim 

on direct appeal but did not fairly present it as a claim of judicial misconduct, only as a 

Sixth Amendment notice violation, and it is now procedurally defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 

11 at 33.) Petitioner replies that the lack of notice in the indictment has always been the 

substance of this claim. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 41-42.) 

The Petition casts all of Ground Five as a due process claim, references only the 

14th Amendment, and makes no reference in Ground 5(f) to the Sixth Amendment or a 

right to notice of the charges. Nonetheless, because such claim is plainly without merit 

(as discussed hereinafter in Section VI), and thus the outcome is not altered, the 

undersigned assumes arguendo (in Petitioner’s favor) that the Petition adequately states a 

Sixth Amendment Notice claim in Ground 5(f) by referencing the trial court’s initial 

refusal to give an accomplice liability instruction because “the indictment did NOT cite 

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the [statute] or mention this theory of prosecution.” (Petition, Attach. A at 28, Doc. 1 at 

59.) 

Petitioner exhausted his state remedies on a notice claim, but not on a due process 

instructional claim. Error in giving the accomplice liability instruction was the second of 

Petitioner’s three main claims on direct appeal. (Exh. P, Opening Brief at 16 et seq.) But 

it was based on a Sixth Amendment theory of a lack of adequate notice of the charges. 

(Id. at 18-20). Petitioner did not assert a claim on these facts based on instructional error 

amount to a denial of due process. Nor did he assert a claim based on the trial court’s prior 

refusal to offer the instruction. At most he noted that the trial court had declined to give 

such an instruction in the preliminary instructions, instead waiting until the evidence came 

in. (Id. at 17.) Perhaps most importantly, the argument was not based on a lack of 

evidence. The only argument regarding evidence to support the instruction was that there 

was “[n]o direct evidence of Appellant’s guilt of the actual murder,” which did not pertain 

to the accomplice liability theory. (Id.) Thus the due process claim Petitioner now raises 

is fundamentally different from those arguments. Accordingly, Ground 5(f) was not fairly 

presented by Petitioner on direct appeal. 

Petitioner did not address accomplice liability or jury instructions in his PCR 

Petition. Indeed he represented that he “relinquishe[d] all relative claims to Accomplice 

Liability contained within, as it has never been his intention to waste the time of this Court 

or the State's regarding trivial technical arguments, possessing no bearing on the jury's 

verdict.” (Exh. HH, PCR Pet. at 3.) Nor did Petitioner present it in his Petition for Review 

(Exh. LL) to the Arizona Court of Appeals, or his Petition for Review to the Arizona 

Supreme Court (Exh. NN) in that proceeding. 

Petitioner’s Due Process claim in Ground 5(f) is now procedurally defaulted. 

In Ground 5(g) (Third Party Culpability Evidence) Petitioner argues the trial 

court abused its discretion when it precluded third party culpability evidence, i.e. that just 

prior to reuniting with Petitioner the co-defendant had an affair with a former boyfriend. 

(Petition, Attach. B at 29-30, Doc. 1 at 60-61.) Respondents argue that on direct appeal 

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Petitioner argued the underlying facts as a claim of denial of a complete defense, not as a 

claim of judicial misconduct, and thus did not fairly present the instant claim, and it is now 

procedurally defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 34.) Petitioner’s Reply argues the claim as 

one based on denial of a complete defense. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 44, et seq.) 

As with Ground 5(f), the undersigned assumes arguendo that “complete defense” 

claim is adequately stated in the Petition and addresses it on the merits hereinafter in 

Section VI.

The evidentiary Due Process claim clearly asserted in the Petition is procedurally 

defaulted. This claim was the subject of the first of Petitioner’s three main arguments on 

direct appeal. (Exh. P, Opening Brief at 12, et seq.) The claim was primarily based on 

the specific federal right to present a complete defense. But, after summarizing the facts 

and the trial court’s grant of the state’s motion in limine, Petitioner made the assertion: 

“The trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion and reversible error for the following 

reasons.” (Id. at 13.) He then identified state evidentiary rules on relevance and 

admissibility (id. at 13-15) and the federal right to present a complete defense (id. at 15), 

and then cast the trial court’s ruling as factually mistaken and legally erroneous and thus 

an abuse of discretion (id. at 15-16). 

Critically, what Petitioner did not argue was that the trial court’s decision was 

arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, which is necessary for trial error, including an abuse of 

discretion, to amount to a denial of due process. At most, Petitioner analogized to Holmes 

v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-31 (2006) (right to complete defense violated by 

state rule precluding third party culpability evidence if state produces forensic evidence 

that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict). In doing so, Petitioner described the 

rule in Holmes as “arbitrary.” (Exh. P, Opening Brief at 15.) That was not fair presentation 

of a claim that the trial court’s decision in this case was so “arbitrary” to amount to a due 

process violation.

Further, this claim was not raised in Petitioner’s PCR Petition (Exh. HH), or his 

PCR petitions for review (Exhs. LL, NN). 

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Accordingly, Petitioner failed to fairly present his due process claim in Ground 5(g) 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals and has now procedurally defaulted on this claim. 

In summary, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted or been procedurally barred on 

all of the due process claims raised in Ground 5.

4. Ground Six – Prosecutorial Misconduct re Accomplice Liability

In Ground 6 Petitioner argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct, violating 

his due process rights, when it changed its theory of the case to “accomplice liability” after 

the conclusion of the evidence. (Petition, Attach. B. at 30-33, Doc. 1 at 61-64.) As with 

Ground 5(f), Respondents argue Petitioner raised accomplice liability on direct appeal 

based only on the lack of notice of the charges, and thus Ground 6 is now procedurally 

defaulted. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 34-35.) Petitioner does not reply.

As noted above regarding Ground 5(f), Petitioner’s arguments regarding 

accomplice liability on direct appeal was based on the federal theory of a lack of adequate 

notice of the charges. Petitioner made no assertion of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

on this basis. And Petitioner relinquished claims regarding accomplice liability in the 

PCR court and did not raise any related claims in his Petition for Review. 

Accordingly, Petitioner failed to fairly present his claim in Ground 6 to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, and he has now procedurally defaulted on this claim. 

5. Summary Re Exhaustion

Respondents assert no exhaustion defenses to Grounds 1(b), 2, 3, 7 or 8. 

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes Petitioner:

a. properly exhausted his state remedies on Grounds 1(c);

b. has procedurally defaulted his state remedies or has been procedurally 

barred on independent and adequate state grounds on Grounds 1(a), 4(a), 

4(b), 4(c), 4(d), 5(a), 5(b)(i), 5(b)(ii), 5(c), 5(d), 5(e), and 6, and the Due 

Process claims in Grounds 5(f) and 5(g).

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E. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of both “cause and prejudice” sufficient to 

excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13). The 

Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily turn on some 

objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural defaults 

based on his having asserted challenges to his conviction during appellate review, thereby 

espousing his innocence and showing prejudice. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 77-78.) Petitioner’s 

bare assertions of having asserted other claims to the state courts does not show any 

reason why he could not have raised raise the claims now asserted herein. (Petitioner’s 

assertions of procedural actual innocence are addressed hereinafter in Section IV(F).)

Petitioner argues that he was unaware of the “non-statutory” exhaustion 

requirements. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 79.) However, the requirement of exhaustion of state 

remedies is a statutory requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Moreover, the “cause 

and prejudice” standard is not satisfied simply by being an untrained, pro se litigant, 

Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986), whether 

literate and assisted by “jailhouse lawyers”, Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th

Cir. 1988); illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or non-English speaking. 

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Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Petitioner also argues that ineffective assistance of counsel, including that of PCR 

counsel under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), can establish cause to excuse a 

procedural default. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 54-55.) However, Petitioner fails to offer any 

particulars to establish such ineffectiveness. 

Moreover, “[t]o constitute cause for procedural default of a federal habeas claim, 

the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must first have been presented 

to the state courts as an independent claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 

2003). Petitioner has not properly exhausted any claims of the ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel to the state courts, and thus cannot assert it now as “cause.”

Petitioner asserts as cause the ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. Ordinarily, 

to meet the “cause” requirement, the ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an 

independent constitutional violation. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, where no constitutional right to an attorney exists, ineffective assistance will 

not amount to cause excusing the state procedural default. Id. The Supreme Court has 

recognized two exceptions to the general rule that ineffectiveness of PCR counsel is not 

cause. Petitioner relies on the exception in Martinez.

14

In Martinez v. Ryan, 455 U.S. 1 (2012), the Court permitted an ineffective 

assistance of PCR counsel claim to be used to establish cause for a procedural default of a 

claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Such a claim need not be exhausted itself. 

Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1322 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2014). This exception would apply 

only to the failure to exhaust Petitioner claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in 

Ground 4.

However, as discussed hereinabove, Petitioner raised his claims in Ground 4 in his 

14 The other exception applies when PCR counsel was not merely negligent but abandoned 

the representation without notice to the petitioner, resulting in the loss of his state 

remedies. Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012). There is no suggestion this exception 

applies. 

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PCR petition, and the procedural default of them occurred in the subsequent petition for 

review where Petitioner explicitly declined to seek such review. (See supra Section 

IV(D)(2).) Thus, the procedural default was not caused by any deficient performance by 

PCR counsel, but because of Petitioner’s own actions in the subsequent appellate court 

proceedings. Martinez made clear that the limited exception it was creating did not extend 

outside the initial PCR proceeding, i.e. in the PCR court.

The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other 

kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral 

proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and 

petitions for discretionary review in a State's appellate courts. It does 

not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first 

occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral 

proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.

Martinez, 566 U.S. at 16. Consequently, Martinez does not provide cause for Petitioner’s 

failure to exhaust the claims in Ground 4, or any other claim.

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to 

establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.15

F. ACTUAL INNOCENCE

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure 

to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional 

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited 

to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of 

justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, 

15 Although "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, but a 

court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. 

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 

10 (9th Cir.1991). 

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Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. 

Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson 

v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found the 

defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, to pass 

through the Schlup gateway, not just any evidence of innocence will do; the petitioner 

must present “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at 

trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

Here, Petitioner makes sporadic assertions of his innocence. As to procedural 

actual innocence, Petitioner argues he has met this standard by “the simple act of initiating 

appellate review, the presentment therein of grounds and claims of constitutional 

infringement for that of the court’s legitimate consideration, represents a definitive, precise 

and conscientious statement of actual innocence, by the petitioner, in proclaiming one’s 

custody be in violation of the U.S. Constitution.” (Reply, Doc. 29 at 73.) 

Petitioner confuses legal innocence with factual innocence. “It is important to note 

in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal 

insufficiency.” Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623-624 (1998). “Without any new 

evidence of innocence, even the existence of a concededly meritorious constitutional 

violation is not in itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice that would allow a 

habeas court to reach the merits of a barred claim.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 

(1995). 

Moreover, in making this determination, this Court is required to consider all the 

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evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would 

necessarily be admitted under rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. House v. 

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). Thus, event to the extent that Petitioner’s claims might 

suggest various evidence should have been excluded, this Court must nonetheless consider 

such evidence, “but with due regard to any unreliability of it.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 

U.S. 436, 455 n. 17 (1986).

Petitioner fails to support his contention of procedural actual innocence with any 

new, credible evidence of his factual innocence. Moreover, his claims are not supported 

by such evidence. Ground 4(a) asserts counsel performed deficiently by failing to present 

various expert witnesses. But Petitioner only speculates about the testimony such 

witnesses would offer. Ordinarily, a petitioner may not merely speculate but must show 

what testimony would be, e.g. by affidavit or declaration. Petitioner has not done so, and 

instead offers only speculation about what the testimony might be. 

Petitioner fails to make the necessary showing, based on new credible evidence, 

that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. Accordingly his procedurally 

defaulted and procedurally barred claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

V. COGNIZABILITY

A. PURPORTED STATE LAW CLAIMS

In Ground 5(c) Petitioner argues a denial of due process resulting from an abuse 

of discretion in failing to issue a limiting instruction on emails and texts. (Petition, Attach. 

B at 26, Doc. 1 at 57.) Respondents argue that these are state law claims because the rules 

of evidence and jury instructions are matters of state law. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 37.) 

Petitioner replies that this claim is not a state law claim but is founded upon a Sixth 

Amendment right of confrontation. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 43.) 

The Petition does not assert a Sixth Amendment confrontation claim in Ground 5. 

Petitioner asserts: “Multiple incidents of judicial abuse of discretion deprived Mr. Farris 

of a fair trial, in violation of his 14th Amendment Due Process Rights.” (Petition, Attach. 

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B at 22, Doc. 1 at 53.) Nowhere in the portion of Ground 5 discussing the emails and texts 

did Petitioner assert a denial of his right of confrontation. At best, he asserted the evidence 

was wrongly admitted “with little to no foundational context, supporting testimony, cross 

examination, adversarial confrontation and, most importantly, without ANY limiting 

instruction.16 (Id. at 27, Doc. 1 at 58.) In contrast, “[t]he Confrontation Clause provides 

two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who 

testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 

480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) Petitioner alleges no facts in Ground 5 asserting a denial of his 

right to physical face or cross-examine a witness called against him. At most, his 

complaint is that some witnesses were not called to be a witness against him. 

It is true that a state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only 

if he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 

Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). “We have repeatedly held that a state 

court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the 

challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 

546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

Moreover, it has long been understood that a state may violate its own law without 

violating the United States Constitution. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948).

We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as 

a denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state 

16 Even if this Court could ignore Petitioner’s plain description of his claim in Ground 5(c) 

as one founded upon a denial of due process, Petitioner never presented a Sixth 

Amendment Confrontation Clause claim on these facts to the state courts. Although 

Petitioner referenced confrontation, it was only as part of his claim of ineffectiveness, “to 

prove the inefficiency of Shapiro to protect Mr. Farris’ constitutional rights to Due Process 

and Confrontation.” (Exh. HH, PCR Pet. at 21.) As noted hereinabove in Section 

IV(D)(3), Petitioner raised claims related to the emails and texts only in his PCR 

proceeding, and only as part of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See e.g. Exh. 

HH, PCR Pet. at 21 (“inefficiency of Shapiro to protect Mr. Farris’ constitutional rights 

to Due Process and Confrontation”).) As discussed hereinabove, that was not sufficient to 

fairly present any underlying Confrontation Clause claim.

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court on state law would come here as a federal constitutional 

question. 

Id., 334 U.S. at 731. 

However, an error of state law may be “sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial 

of equal protection or of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 

Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). To sustain such a due process claim founded on 

state law error, a habeas petitioner must show that the state court "error" was "so arbitrary 

and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 

926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 

(9th Cir.1986)). To receive review of what otherwise amounts to nothing more than an 

error of state law, a petitioner must argue “not that it is wrong, but that it is so wrong, so 

surprising, that the error violates principles of due process”; that a state court’s decision 

was “such a gross abuse of discretion” that it was unconstitutional. Brooks v. Zimmerman, 

712 F.Supp. 496, 498 (W.D.Pa.1989). 

These principles apply to claims of error in admitting evidence and issuing jury 

instructions. "Although evidence questions are questions of state law, improper admission 

of evidence can amount to a due process violation if it ‘is clearly prejudicial and 'rendered 

the trial fundamentally unfair.' ' " Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 775 (9th Cir. 2002).

Similarly instructional error will not support a petition for federal habeas relief unless it is 

shown "not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even `universally 

condemned,' " but that by itself the instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-147 (1973).

Here, Petitioner plainly argues in Ground 5(c) that the error rose to the level of 

being a violation of due process. To the extent that Petitioner may fail to show as much 

goes to the viability of the claim, not its cognizability.

Respondents similarly argue that Ground 5(g) (third party culpability evidence) is 

founded upon state evidentiary law. Again, however, Ground 5 asserts the error amounted 

to a denial of due process, thus alleging a cognizable federal claim. 

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B. PCR ERRORS

In Ground 7, Petitioner alleges that in his PCR proceedings the state courts’17

summary rejection (based on counsel’s trial strategy) of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective 

assistance were baseless, because Petitioner “demonstrated trial strategy played no part in 

trial counsel’s decision-making and inaction.” (Petition, Attach. B at 33, Doc. 1 at 64.) In 

Ground 8, Petitioner complains that the summary rulings on his PCR petitions for review 

violated Due Process. (Id. at 37, Doc. 1 at 69.) 

Respondents argue that claims of error in PCR proceedings do not challenge the 

Petitioner’s custody, and thus do not state a claim cognizable on habeas review. 

Respondents acknowledge, however, that the underlying arguments asserted might be 

properly asserted in support of an assertion that the state courts’ decisions were 

sufficiently erroneous to merit relief under the deferential standards in 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). (Answer, Doc. 11 at 38-40.) 

Petitioner replies that his claims are claims of an “abuse of discretion.” He further 

argues the merits of his claims. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 49, 51.) 

The claims in Grounds 7 and 8 are not attacks on Petitioner’s detention, and thus 

are not cognizable habeas claims.

A habeas petition must allege the petitioner's detention 

violates the constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty. Whether errors 

in a state post-conviction review proceeding are addressable through 

federal habeas corpus is an issue of first impression in this circuit. 

Four circuits have held they are not. Only one circuit has held to the 

contrary.

We join the majority and affirm the district court's holding that 

a petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process 

is not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.

Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Likewise, alleged errors by state courts in state postconviction processes do not raise a constitutional issue cognizable in 

17 Petitioner’s references in Ground 7 and 8 the rulings of the “LC.” The undersigned has 

located no explanation of this abbreviation. The Reply, however, clarifies that Petitioner 

is referring to his “collateral review proceedings” and the “PCR court.” (Reply, Doc. 29 

at 49, 51.) 

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a federal habeas application. Rather, federal habeas relief is available 

only to remedy constitutional errors at the trial or direct review level. 

Federal Habeas Manual § 1:44 (2023 Update). While errors in the PCR proceedings might 

have precluded Petitioner’s release, they did not result in his detention. Petitioner’s 

detention is not pursuant to the PCR court’s errors, but because of the sentence and 

judgment of the trial court. Thus, it is only errors in the trial court that would form a basis 

for habeas relief. And, to the extent that Petitioner’s claims in the PCR court were of 

errors in the trial court, his remedy is to assert in his Petition habeas claims directly 

challenging the trial court errors, not claims complaining of the failure of the PCR courts 

to rectify those errors.

Grounds 7 and 8 are not cognizable habeas claims. 

VI. MERITS OF CLAIMS

A. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every error justifies relief. 

Deferential Review of Merits Decisions – Where the state court has rejected a 

claim on the merits, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied [the law] 

incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). See Johnson 

v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 293 (2013) (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal 

claim rejected by a state court without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the 

merits).

Rather, in such cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides restrictions on the habeas 

court’s ability to grant habeas relief based on legal or factual error. This statute “reflects 

the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 

justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington 

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011). 

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Errors of Law – To justify habeas relief based on legal error, a state court’s meritsbased decision must be “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” before 

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 

The Supreme Court has instructed that a state court decision is “contrary to” 

clearly established federal law “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state court confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To show an unreasonable application, “a state prisoner must show that the state 

court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification 

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Errors of Fact – Similarly, the habeas courts may grant habeas relief based on 

factual error only if a state-court merits decision “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a 

state court's fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines 

that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 

366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). “Moreover, implicit findings of fact are entitled to 

deference under § 2254(d) to the same extent as explicit findings of fact.” Blankenship v. 

Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008). See also Watkins v. Rubenstein, 802 F.3d 637, 

649 (4th Cir. 2015).

De Novo Review – Where there is no state-court merits-based decision, Johnson v. 

Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091-92 (2013), or the standards of § 2254(d) have been met, 

the habeas court reviews the state judgment de novo.

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established presumption of correctness of state court findings of fact. This presumption 

has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which states that "a determination of a factual 

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the 

burden of proof to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." This 

presumption of correctness applies not only to the explicit factual findings by the state 

court, but to the implicit factual findings as well. See Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 

(9th Cir.1990) (implicit factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness in 

appropriate circumstances); see also Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 433 (3d Cir.2007) 

(“Implicit factual findings are presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1) to the same extent as 

express factual findings.”).

Applicable Decisions – In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas court 

looks through summary opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 

F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Briefing Order – In the Order setting a date-certain deadline for a reply, the Court 

discussed the deferential standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Respondents’ reliance 

on it, and directed:

For claims for relief addressed on the merits, Petitioner’s Reply 

should, at a minimum, demonstrate for each such claim how the 

standard in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is met, or why it does not apply. 

(Order 2/27/23, Doc. 12 at 2.) 

B. EXPANSION OF RECORD UNAUTHORIZED AND UNNECESSARY

Petitioner has sought to conduct discovery regarding records from Verizon 

Wireless concerning the state’s “cell phone evidence,” arguing he has never received 

“pristine” copies of such records. Such records might be relevant to Petitioner’s claim of 

ineffective assistance in Ground 4(a) and the related underlying claim in Ground 5(c), but 

those claims were procedurally defaulted. 

Petitioner seeks to introduce interviews of Schmidlin. Petitioner fails to show that 

such records were before the Arizona Court of Appeals to permit their consideration under 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). He also does not show that he did not fail to develop the state court 

record by introducing such transcripts, so as to allow new evidence under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1), i.e. by timely seeking admission of such evidence in connection with a 

properly-presented, colorable claim to the state courts. Nor does he show such evidence 

relates to a claim based on a new rule of constitutional law or a factual predicate not 

previously discoverable with diligence, and that but for the asserted error Petitioner would 

be deemed actually innocent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Rather, Petitioner asserts these 

transcripts were known to defense counsel. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 2.) 

Petitioner seeks to introduce the May 16, 2020 hearing in the PCR court regarding 

Petitioner’s proceeding pro per in that proceeding. But Petitioner fails to explain the 

relevance of such transcript to the procedural defenses asserted herein or Petitioner’s 

exhausted and cognizable claims. At most, he conclusorily asserts the transcript will 

“assist in this Court’s analysis and understanding of the prejudicial nature of prior events, 

while demonstrating the extenuating circumstances which have persisted throughout.” 

(Reply, Doc. 29 at 2.) 

Petitioner fails to show that any expansion of the record is necessary or authorized.

C. APPLICATION TO GROUNDS 

1. Ground 1(b) – Perjured Testimony

Parties Arguments - In Ground 1(b), Petitioner argues the prosecution engaged 

in misconduct when it offered false testimony from Petitioner’s friend, Schmidlin, that she 

had no desire to get Petitioner in trouble, and they had an amicable friendship through June 

of 2011. Petitioner contends this was contrary to her pretrial statements describing 

Petitioner as an enemy she gave money to so he would leave her alone, kept in touch with

him to know whether she was in danger from him, was afraid of him after he called her in 

June 2011, she had threatened to shoot him, and was relieved when he was arrested. 

(Petition, Attach. B at 1-4, Doc. 1 at 32-35.) 

Respondents assert this claim was presented on direct appeal, rejected on the merits, 

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and Petitioner fails to show a remediable error under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Respondents 

further argue that Petitioner in any event fails to show prejudice from the misconduct, 

because Petitioner’s own testimony was that he and Schmidlin were good friends, and 

Schmidlin was adequately impeached on whether she was aware of Petitioner’s plans to 

travel to Arizona. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 43-46.) 

Petitioner replies that the state court’s conclusion of a lack of prejudice is 

unreasonable given the primacy of Schmidlin’s testimony to the prosecution’s case and 

her contested credibility, failure to consider the combined effect of the instances of 

prosecutorial misconduct, and the appellate court’s failure to “investigate” or conduct an 

evidentiary hearing.18 (Reply, Doc. 29 at 21-23.) 

State Court Decision – The last reasoned decision19 of the state courts on the 

claims in Ground 1(b) and 1(c) was that of the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct 

appeal.20 (Exh. S, Mem. Dec. 10/4/16.) That court made the following findings of fact:

¶22 Two years before trial, the State filed a notice of intent 

to introduce, under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence that 

Farris had assaulted the same friend twice in 2005, once with a knife, 

and had beat up her lover. The State noted that the friend had stated 

that she paid Farris’s airfare because she was afraid of him and 

wanted to keep him away from her, and that the evidence of the 2005 

assaults was relevant to show the reason for her fear, as well as 

relevant to Farris’s claim of self-defense. The State withdrew its Rule 

404(b) notice after Farris withdrew his claim of self-defense and 

moved in limine to preclude other act evidence unless Farris opened 

the door by putting his character at issue at trial. The court then 

18 In his Reply, Petitioner intermingles his arguments on the merits of Grounds 1(a) 

(arguments re Petitioner lying), 1(b) (perjury from Schmidlin) and 1(c) (argument based 

on Schmidlin perjury). The undersigned focuses on Petitioner’s arguments under § 

2254(d) but does not fail to consider Petitioner’s generalized arguments.

19 Petitioner complains that the Arizona Supreme Court issued an unreasonable 

determination because it issued a summary ruling. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 20-21.) In such an 

instance, however, this habeas court looks through the summary ruling to the last reasoned 

decision “presume[s] the higher court agreed with it and adopted the reasons given by the 

lower court.” Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 

20 In his PCR proceeding Petitioner raised related claims that were addressed on the merits, 

but they were claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which are not fungible with the 

related underlying claims of error. Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

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advised the State not to present “other act” evidence without first 

seeking permission from the court. 

¶23 At trial, Farris’s friend testified on direct examination 

that she had paid for Farris’s plane ticket to Arizona and his return 

trip to North Carolina, and that on June 5, he had called and told her, 

“I killed someone.” The prosecutor also elicited testimony—without 

objection—that the friend had a 17-year relationship with Farris, they 

were friends, they confided in each other, she talked to him “probably 

every day,” she had no desire to get him in trouble, and she was not 

happy testifying against him.

* * * 

¶26 Here, Farris failed to show that the friend’s 

testimony was false. Farris testified that he and the friend were 

“good friends,” and that he had confided in her about his relationship 

with Stelmasek. Farris also conceded that the friend was reluctant to 

testify against him. Although the friend had stated in pretrial 

interviews that Farris had twice assaulted her in 2005, that allegation 

was not necessarily inconsistent with their ongoing 

relationship/friendship, as related by both Farris and the friend during 

their trial testimony. Moreover, although Farris testified that the 

friend lied when saying that she did not know the plane ticket was for 

a trip to Arizona, the superior court later noted—and both the 

prosecutor and defense counsel agreed—that the friend “did an artful 

job of dancing around any possibility of perjured testimony,” at least 

with respect to whether she knew the plane ticket was for a trip to 

Arizona. Finally, Farris fails to cite any evidence supporting his claim 

that the 2005 allegations were false or that she lied repeatedly during 

the investigation and pretrial discovery. Accordingly, Farris has not 

shown prejudicial error on this basis.

(Id. at ¶¶23, 26 (emphasis added).) 

The appellate court related the applicable law as follows:

¶21 Prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal only if “(1) 

misconduct is indeed present[,] and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists 

that the misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict, thereby 

denying defendant a fair trial.” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 459, ¶ 

145 (2004) (citation omitted). We consider alleged instances of 

misconduct cumulatively to determine whether the misconduct 

became “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire 

atmosphere of the trial,” thereby resulting in a denial of due process. 

State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335, ¶ 46 (2007) (citation omitted). 

* * * 

¶25 Prosecutors may not present or knowingly encourage 

false testimony, and must correct false testimony when it appears. 

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); State v. Rivera, 210 Ariz. 

188, 194, ¶ 28 (2005). But a witness’s inconsistent statements alone 

do not establish perjury, much less that the prosecutor knowingly 

presented perjured testimony. See Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 

18, 40 (1st Cir. 2011); see also State v. Ferrari, 112 Ariz. 324, 334 

(1975). The witness’s credibility is an issue for the jury absent a 

showing that the testimony was false and that the prosecutor was 

aware it was false. Rivera, 210 Ariz. at 194, ¶ 28.

(Id. at ¶¶ 21, 25.) In sum then, based on the findings regarding evidence (including that 

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from Petitioner) of a friendship between Petitioner and Schmidlin, the state court rejected 

this claim both because Petitioner had failed to show Schmidlin’s testimony was false, and 

because Petitioner failed to show prejudice. (Id. at ¶ 26.)

Not Contrary to Supreme Court Law – Petitioner fails to show how the decision 

of the Arizona Court of Appeals was contrary to Supreme Court law. The state noted the 

essential elements of such a claim are misconduct and prejudice (considered 

cumulatively), and that the relevant form of misconduct was presenting testimony the 

prosecutor knew to be false, and that short of such knowledge, credibility was for the jury 

to decide.

In comparison, the Supreme Court has “consistently held that a conviction obtained 

by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside 

if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 

judgment of the jury.” U. S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). This reflects the same 

standard of misconduct which was espoused by the state court.

Petitioner argues that the state court failed to consider the cumulative effects of the 

alleged misconduct. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 22.) The undersigned assumes arguendo that 

Supreme Court holdings mandate that the effects of instances of prosecutorial misconduct 

must be assessed cumulatively to determine prejudice. Even so, where misconduct has 

not been shown, there is no “error” from which the “effect” may be accumulated to show 

prejudice. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002).

No Unreasonable Determination of the Facts – Petitioner fails to show that the 

appellate court made an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence 

before it. A state court makes an unreasonable determination of the facts if it: (1) 

neglected to make a finding of fact when it should have done so; (2) made factual findings 

under a misapprehension as to the correct legal standard; (3) utilized a defective factfinding process itself, e.g. by making evidentiary findings without holding a hearing to 

give the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence, or by plainly misapprehending or 

misstating the record; and (4) has before it, yet apparently ignores, evidence that supports 

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petitioner's claim, or fails to consider key aspects of the record. Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 

939, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2020). 

Petitioner offers nothing to show (1) neglected findings or (2) misapprehension 

of the legal standard.

Petitioner asserts a (3) defective fact-finding process. Petitioner complains that 

the prosecution and Respondents have not “directly addressed or spoken to that of 

Schmidlin’s interview sessions.” (Reply, Doc. 29 at 14.) But that pertains to the 

presentation of facts, not the appellate court’s consideration of the record or its fact-finding 

process. 

Petitioner complains that the appellate court failed to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 22.) But Petitioner fails show that such a hearing was 

requested in the state court. Rather, Petitioner’s only request from the Arizona Court of 

Appeals was for reversal and remand for a new trial. (Exh. P, Open. Brf. at 34; Exh. R, 

Reply Brief at 22.) In the absence of such request (e.g. for remand for a hearing on the 

issue), the appellate court was not obligated to sua sponte conduct such a hearing. A state 

court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve every disputed factual question.21

See Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir.2012). And need not do so where 

no request for such a hearing is made. Cook v. Kernan, 948 F.3d 952, 972 (9th Cir. 2020). 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to suggest what evidence might have been admitted at 

such a hearing. At best, he suggests the court should have had a hearing to weigh 

Schmidlin’s trial testimony and pretrial statements. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 23.) But that 

would have merely been oral argument, not an evidentiary hearing. No evidentiary hearing 

is required where “the evidence already adduced was sufficient to resolve the factual 

question.” Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1147. Thus Petitioner has failed to show that failure to 

21 Three are some issues that require a court to undertake further factual development sua 

sponte, e.g. incompetence, attorney conflict of interest, etc. See e.g. Sims v. Rowland, 414 

F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (state court had no obligation to order evidentiary hearing 

sua sponte on claim of juror bias). But Petitioner offers nothing to show that prosecutorial 

misconduct is one of them. 

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hold an evidentiary hearing was erroneous, let alone that it was unreasonable, as required 

by § 2254(d)(2). Id. at 1148. 

Thus, Petitioner must show the state court (4) ignored key evidence. Petitioner 

fails to do so.

Petitioner insists the appellate court did not read the Schmidlin interview 

transcripts. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 22.) But Petitioner offers nothing to show that was the 

case. The Interview was made a part of the trial court record as an exhibit to the 

Supplement to States’ Rule 404(b) Motion, and thus was available to the appellate court 

as part of the record on appeal. (Exh. F, 404(b) Supplem. at Exhibit D, Doc. 11-1 at 78, 

et seq.)

Petitioner complains that Schmidlin had never, “pretrial,” asserted a friendship with 

Petitioner. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 12.) But this ignores that the relevant misconduct does not 

arise from presenting testimony the prosecution does not know to be true, but from 

presenting evidence it knows to be false. 

Petitioner points to various contradictory evidence of Schmidlin’s fear of Petitioner, 

and their strained relationship. But Petitioner proffers nothing to prove it was Schmidlin’s 

trial testimony which was false, as opposed to her other conflicting statements. See e.g. 

United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2003) (no Napue violation where 

witness with conflicting version “changed his story back and forth several times,” and thus 

defendant failed to show testimony was false). Rather, Petitioner tellingly complains that 

“the testimony of Schmidlin was and remains arguably perjurious.” (Reply, Doc. 29 at 12 

(emphasis added).) 

Moreover, Petitioner ignores the finding by the appellate court that the tumultuous 

parts of the relationship between Petitioner and Schmidlin did not preclude the veracity of 

her assertions of continuing friendship, lack of desire to have him prosecuted, and 

discomfort with testifying against him. Friendships and romances (especially long-term

ones) seldom involve unalloyed positive or negative emotions. This is true even in the 

face of violence. See e.g. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to 

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Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 

1191, 1220 (1993) (“For many reasons, some battered women ‘tolerate‘ abuse for a period 

of time, in the sense that they make excuses or generate ‘understandable‘ reasons for it, or 

in some way come to believe that there is a ‘good‘ reason to give the batterer another 

chance to stop the violence.”). 

Moreover, here, the state court had before it Petitioner’s own admission of the 

continuing friendship between he and Schmidlin. Petitioner suggests that his testimony 

(including his protestations of innocence of the actual killing) had to be accepted as 

credible in total or not at all. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 15.) But he offers no support for that 

proposition. He complains that his testimony was not credible because the pertinent fact 

was Schmidlin’s mindset, not his own. (Id. at 16.) This argument belies the bilateral 

nature of an assertion of friendship. See “Friend,” Oxford English Dictionary (2013), 

available at https://www.oed.com/dictionary/friend_?tab=meaning_and_use#3722148, 

last accessed 5/15/24 (“person with whom one has developed a close and informal 

relationship of mutual trust and intimacy”). Implicit in an assertion of such a relationship 

is purported knowledge of the other party’s mindset. While certainly Petitioner’s 

credibility would be open to attack, he fails to show the state court acted unreasonably in 

relying on his statements when corroborated by Schmidlin’s testimony under oath.

Petitioner argues the prosecution’s “mindset” could be “ascertained” from “the 

Grand Jury Records.” (Reply, Doc. 29 at 12.) But Petitioner fails to point to any particular 

testimony from the grand jury proceedings which would establish the prosecution had 

knowledge of the falsity of Schmidlin’s testimony, as opposed to just additional conflicting 

but inconclusive evidence that would leave the prosecution without knowledge that the 

limited facts testified to by Schmidlin were false.22 

22 Petitioner discusses perceived inequities in being forced to acknowledge the content of 

Schmidlin’s testimony regarding a desire to testify against Petitioner. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 

17-18.) But he fails to show the state court relied on such testimony. That court focused

instead on Petitioner’s own assertions of relevant facts regarding the friendship. 

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No Unreasonable Application of Law – Nor does Petitioner show there was an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. At best he contends that the state court 

should have concluded from Schmidlin’s purportedly conflicting statements that the 

prosecutor had knowledge her testimony was false. 

But falsity is a prerequisite to Petitioner’s claim, and Petitioner fails to show such 

falsity. Even now, Petitioner proffers no way for this Court to discern whether Schmidlin’s 

trial testimony was false. Rather, he leaves this Court (as he did the state court) to supplant 

its own credibility determinations for those of the jury. And then he asks this Court to 

assume the prosecutors reached the same conclusions. 

But Napue does not require that a prosecutor be a guarantor of the truthfulness of 

every witness. Witnesses regularly offer inconsistent or even directly conflicting versions 

of the facts, or their versions may be consistent, but contradicted by other evidence. Thus, 

“[m]ere inconsistencies...generally do not satisfy the falsehood requirement.” United 

States v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 752 (9th Cir. 2014). Frankly, the prosecutor often has no 

means to “know” what is actually true or false.23 

Indeed, in this case, the defense repeatedly argued to the Court that it was in the 

interview that Schmidlin was lying. (See Exh. H, 404(b) Response at 5 (“The state knows 

that Schmidlin lied in her interview in North Carolina at which co-defendant's counsel and 

the prosecutor were present, has lied about important aspect of her relationship with Farris, 

has lied about the facts involved in the two incidents that the state wishes to admit as 

404(b) evidence, and has lied about the assistance-in fact and in its nature given to Farris 

(and Stelmasek) by Schmidlin in North Carolina after the murder. The state would engage 

23 For example, in this case Schmidlin was not without her own interests in the interview 

in presenting herself as having acted under duress from fear of Petitioner. Schmidlin 

admitted having financed Petitioner’s escape to home, and after his having confessed to 

killing someone to continuing to provide him money (see Exh. YY RT 129/15 at 45-46) 

potentially exposing herself to charges as an accomplice. A reasonable prosecutor could 

have believed her interview protestations of bad blood and duress as self-serving fiction, 

and her testimonial admission of friendship and goodwill credible, particularly given 

evidence showing the long term, daily and confidential contact between the two. (Id. at 

36-37.) 

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in the improper conduct of suborning perjury if it called what it knows to be a liar to the 

stand to testify and lie in ways that she has already lied.”); and Exh. CCC, R.T. 2/6/15 at 

204 (“Jennifer Schmidlin lied in her interview. She lied all over her interview because she 

was worried that she would be caught up in murder for helping Marzet Farris.”).) 

Thus, the prosecutor is not precluded from presenting the testimony and leaving it 

to the jury to determine the credibility of the testimony in light of the conflicting or 

impeaching evidence. See e.g. United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970, 976 and nn. 19, 20 

(9th Cir. 1987) (misconduct not shown by contradictory testimony); Moore v. Illinois, 408 

U.S. 786, 797 (1972) (no misconduct in presenting evidence apparently contradicted by 

other evidence); United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1208 (11th Cir. 2010) (“a prior 

statement that is merely inconsistent with a government witness's testimony is insufficient 

to establish prosecutorial misconduct”); United States v. Thompson, 117 F.3d 1033, 1035 

(7th Cir. 1997) (same); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 249 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); 

and United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir.1981) (“it is not enough that the 

testimony is challenged by another witness or is inconsistent with prior statements”).

24

Petitioner invites the Court to presume from the prosecution’s efforts to present 

evidence from the 2005 episodes of violence between him and Schmidlin that the 

24 Arguably, in Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 2010) the Ninth Circuit retreated 

from the position that the prosecution had to know the testimony was false, appearing to 

rely on evidence that the witness was a perennial jailhouse snitch with a history of false 

testimony. On denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia (joined by J. Alito) dissented opining: 

To make matters worse, having stretched the facts, the Ninth Circuit 

also stretched the Constitution, holding that the use of Storch's false 

testimony violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 

whether or not the prosecution knew of its falsity. See 628 F.3d, at 

506–507. We have never held that, and are unlikely ever to do so. All 

we have held is that “a conviction obtained through use of false 

evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall 

under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 

269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (emphasis added). This 

extension of due process by the Ninth Circuit should not be left 

standing.

Cash v. Maxwell, 565 U.S. 1138 (2012). Here, however, the state court was only obliged 

to adhere to the holdings of the Supreme Court, and as observed by Justice Scalia those 

holdings require knowledge of falsity, not just reason to suspect. 

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prosecution must have known her testimony of friendship and lack of motive to inculpate 

Petitioner was false. But, as noted hereinabove, domestic violence does not preclude 

friendship or goodwill.

Finally, Petitioner fails to explain why, in light of his own admissions about 

Stelmasek’s friendship and reluctance to testify against him, the state court’s finding of a 

lack of prejudice was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court Law. At best, he 

points to the effect of Schmidlin’s testimony regarding his admission of killing someone. 

(Reply, Doc. 29 at 21-22.) But that is not the testimony that Petitioner has painted as false. 

In any event, prejudice was an alternative, but not necessary, basis for the state court to 

reject Petitioner’s claim. 

Conclusion – Petitioner fails to show that the Arizona Court of Appeals committed 

remediable error in rejecting the claim in Ground 1(b), and that claim must be denied.

2. Ground 1(c) – Closing Arguments 

Parties Arguments - In Ground 1(c), Petitioner asserts the prosecution engaged in 

misconduct when it argued at closing, knowing it to be false, that Schmidlin had no reason 

to lie, referencing arguments that “Schmidlin had no motive to lie...she was his 

friend”...”She still cares about him. She has no axe to grind.” (Petition, Attach. B at 5 

(Doc. 1 at 36).) 

As discussed hereinabove, Respondents incorrectly address this claim as one of 

“vouching.” As such, Respondents fail to address the merits of the claim in Ground 1(c) 

of misconduct based on the prosecution’s arguments founded upon Schmidlin’s 

purportedly false testimony about her friendship and lack of motivation to testify against 

Petitioner. Nonetheless, the record shows this claim is without merit.

State Court Decision – The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the claim in Ground 

1(c) as Part B of its discussion of Prosecutorial Misconduct. It did so in the context of the 

trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial on the basis of the misconduct, reasoning:

¶30 Farris also argues that the court erred by denying a 

mistrial after the prosecutor argued in closing that the friend’s 

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testimony showed “She has no beef with the defendant. She still cares 

about him. She has no ax to grind. She has no doubt, no doubt what 

he said to her on June 5th. I killed somebody.” Farris again argues 

that this argument that the friend had no motive to lie was false and 

took unfair advantage of the risk that Farris would open the door to 

the other acts evidence if he impeached her credibility. 

¶31 A declaration of mistrial is “the most dramatic remedy 

for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice 

will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” 

Dann, 205 Ariz. at 570, ¶ 43. In assessing whether a prosecutor’s 

remarks are improper, the court considers whether the remarks called 

to the jurors’ attention matters they would not be justified in 

considering, and the probability, under the circumstances, that the 

jurors were influenced by the remarks. Jones, 197 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 37. 

The superior court exercises broad discretion in this context because 

it “is in the best position to determine whether the evidence will 

actually affect the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 304, ¶ 32. 

¶32 Here, Farris testified that he and the friend remained 

“good friends” and that she was reluctant to testify against him, which 

was consistent with the prosecutor’s argument that the witness did 

not want to testify against Farris, “has no beef with the defendant[,] . 

. . still cares about him[, and] . . . has no ax to grind.” Accordingly, 

the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Farris’s mistrial 

request.

(Exh. S, Mem. Dec. at ¶¶ 30-32.) 

Application of Law – Prosecutorial misconduct claims based on arguments on 

false evidence are evaluated under the same rubric applied to the presentation of the false 

testimony. Indeed, Napue described the misconduct as the “use of false evidence,” and 

noted that it was not necessary that the prosecution have “solicited” the testimony. Napue, 

360 U.S. at 268. See Dow v. Virga, 729 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2013) (Napue violation 

based, in part, on prosecution’s use of false evidence in closing arguments). 

The state court properly rejected this claim because; (1) it had found Petitioner had 

failed to show Schmidlin’s testimony was false; and (2) given Petitioner’s comparable 

testimony, there was no prejudice (i.e. no effect on “the outcome of trial”). 

Conclusion – Ground 1(c) is without merit and must be denied. 

3. Ground 2 – Ineffectiveness re Misconduct

In Ground 2, Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 

the purported misconduct of the prosecution: (1) in eliciting Schmidlin’s “false” 

testimony; and (2) in arguing on the basis of that testimony in closing arguments. (Petition, 

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Attach. B at 6-10, Doc. 1 at 37-41.) 

Respondents assert this claim was rejected on the merits in Petitioner’s PCR 

proceeding, having been presented to the PCR court and the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

and the latter’s silent rejection must be deemed on the merits. Respondents argue 

Petitioner fails to show any error was remediable under § 2254(d) deference to the PCR 

court’s reasoned decision, citing the PCR court’s determination of reasonable trial strategy 

and lack of prejudice. Respondents further argue Petitioner fails to specify a ground for 

objection, and ignores the significant evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 

49-53.) 

Petitioner’s arguments in reply are addressed hereinafter.25

State Court Decision – Both the Arizona Supreme Court and the Arizona Court of 

Appeals rejected Petitioner’s PCR claims in summary decisions. That the Arizona Court 

of Appeals addressed the general standard of review and found it not met does not preclude 

it from being treated as a summary decision. 

As argued by Respondents, the summary decisions by the appellate courts must be 

presumed to have been on the merits on the same grounds as asserted by the PCR court. 

“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied 

relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the 

absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington 

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). Moreover, in analyzing the reasons for the decision, 

“the federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related statecourt decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the 

unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 

(2018).

25 In addressing this claim, Petitioner complains page 4 of the PCR court’s findings have 

not been produced. (Reply, Doc. 29 35.) While Petitioner has omitted a page 4 from his 

copy of the PCR court’s order (see Petition, Decisions, Doc. 1 at 22-25), Respondents have 

provided with their answer the entire order, including “Page 4 of 5.”. (Exh. KK, Order 

10/30/20 at 4, Doc. 11-1 at 240.) 

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Here, Petitioner posits no reason to believe the decision of Arizona’s appellate 

courts were not on the merits. The undersigned finds none. Accordingly, this Court must 

look through those decisions to the merits-based decision of the PCR court and accord it 

deference under § 2254(d).

The PCR court referenced the governing standard:

"To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below 

objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced 

the defendant." State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). "Failure to satisfy either prong 

of the Strickland test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim." _Id. To establish a colorable claim of prejudice, a defendant 

must "show a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.' " Id. quoting Strickland.

(Exh. KK, Order 10/30/23 at 1.) The PCR court also addressed the applicable presumption 

of sound trial strategy:

When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

Court presumes "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance" that " 'might be considered sound 

trial strategy.'" Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 

U.S. 91, 101 (1955). "To overcome this presumption, Denz was 

required to show counsel's decisions were not tactical in nature, but 

were instead the result of "ineptitude, inexperience or lack of 

preparation.", State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441 (App. 2013, quoting State 

v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582,586 (1984).

(Id. at 5.) 

With regard to the Schmidlin testimony, the PCR court reasoned:

Defendant cites multiple examples where his trial attorney 

"was deficient and derelict in [his] performance" resulting in 

fundamental error which this Court is required to correct. He 

complains the State intentionally mislead the jury by allowing its key 

witness, Ms. Schmidlin, to provide testimony that conflicted with her 

pretrial statements. Defendant faults trial counsel for not objecting to 

the conflicting testimony. 

Defendant's trial counsel is an experienced and highly 

respected defense attorney, well versed in trial advocacy. Allowing 

the State's witness to testify on direct examination without objection, 

only to then impeach the witness with prior inconsistent statements is 

a perfectly normal and effective trial tactic. Defendant also claims his 

attorney failed to object "to the State's misconduct and purposeful 

deception of the jury" again citing to the prosecution's direct 

examination of Ms. Schmidlin. Defendant characterizes the State as 

knowingly presenting false evidence to the jury and he asserts his trial 

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counsel should have requested a mistrial. Again, assuming the 

witnesses' testimony conflicted with her pretrial interview statements, 

it was not unreasonable for Defendant's counsel to intentionally allow 

the witness to commit to her story only to impeach her on cross 

examination. Moreover, it is purely speculation whether the trial 

court would have granted a mistrial.

(Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).) 

Thus, the PCR court rejected Petitioner’s claim regarding failure to object to 

Schmidlin’s testimony based on a trial strategy of impeaching rather than objecting, 

characterizing the discrepancies between Schmidlin’s interview and testimony as 

“conflicting.” Finally, the trial court rejected any finding of prejudice based on the loss of 

a mistrial, as speculative. 

Regarding the closing arguments, the PCR court reasoned:

Defendant claims the State was taking conflicting positions 

and vouching for one of its witnesses during its closing argument. 

According to Defendant, his attorney should have objected and 

requested the Court strike that portion of the State' closing argument. 

What is said during closing argument is not evidence and the 

jury is instructed accordingly. Defendant does not claim the State 

argued evidence not admitted during the trial. Instead, he claims the 

State argued two inconsistent theories. That is the State's prerogative 

and it is for the jury to reconcile any conflicting or opposing theories.

(Exh. KK, Order 10/30/20 at 3-4.)

Not Contrary to Supreme Court Law – Petitioner does not assert the PCR court’s 

decision was contrary to Supreme Court law. The undersigned finds it was not. See Ochoa 

v. Davis, 50 F.4th 865, 888 (9th Cir. 2022) (summarizing applicable Supreme Court law 

on ineffective assistance). 

Indeed, the PCR court properly identified the two-part standard of deficient 

performance and prejudice mandated by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

(which the court cited), that both prongs were required to be met, and that prejudice had 

to be shown by a reasonable probability of a different result. (Exh. KK, Order 10/30/20 

at 1.) The court further identified the presumption of reasonableness that applies to 

counsel’s performance. (Id. at 5.) 

No Unreasonable Determination of the Facts – Petitioner’s Reply addresses 

Grounds 2 and 3 jointly. The undersigned addresses the factual arguments separately as 

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to Ground 3 only in so far as the analysis significantly differs and concludes that Petitioner 

fails to show an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Petitioner argues that the PCR court unreasonably failed to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing or investigate, and its determinations were unreasonable. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 36-

38.) However, the PCR court declined to develop the facts further because Petitioner had 

failed to state colorable claims. (Exh. KK, Order 10/30/20 at 1.) Moreover, even now, 

Petitioner fails to identify what evidence he could present at an evidentiary hearing to yield 

a different result. He suggests no evidence regarding the adequacy of counsel’s 

performance. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011) (court need not discern 

actual reasons to find counsel’s conduct reasonable). And he has posited nothing that 

would allow him to show prejudice, i.e. that a mistrial would have been granted. See 

Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2003) (“there may be instances where the 

state court can determine without a hearing that a criminal defendant's allegations are 

entirely without credibility or that the allegations would not justify relief even if proved”). 

Petitioner argues the PCR court’s ruling was unreasonable because it ignored the 

critical nature of Schmidlin’s testimony to the prosecution’s case, and that it resulted in 

his conviction. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 32-33.) To the contrary, neither of the court’s findings 

(of reasonable strategy or speculation about a mistrial) indicate a lack of appreciation of 

the significance of Schmidlin’s testimony. The former simply recognizes that counsel had 

available different modes of attacking Schmidlin’s inconsistent statements and reasonably 

chose to do so through impeachment. The latter merely recognizes that mistrials are not 

automatically granted every time something goes awry in a trial. Indeed, in Petitioner’s 

direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals observed: “A declaration of mistrial is ‘the 

most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice 

will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged, and a new trial granted.’” (Exh. S, Mem. 

Dec. at ¶ 31.) Here, Petitioner does not explain why, given the lack of evidence as to 

which of Schmidlin’s sets of statements were true, that the trial court would not have

properly responded to any objection by finding the opportunity for cross examination of 

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Schmidlin was sufficient to avoid any prejudice. 

Petitioner asserts the PCR court was unreasonable for casting counsel’s decision as 

a matter of trial strategy, pointing to counsel’s admission of being ambushed by the 

testimony. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 32-33.) But counsel’s assertion he was being “ambushed” 

by the testimony does not establish counsel’s response was deficient, or that prejudice 

resulted from his response.

Moreover, Petitioner ignores that the court must “must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus it is Petitioner who bears the burden of 

persuasion, not the court. “[T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. 

And “among the factors relevant to deciding whether particular strategic choices are 

reasonable are the experience of the attorney.” Id. at 681. See also Ochoa, 50 F.4th at 890 

(“the presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable is even stronger when an 

experienced trial counsel is involved”). Moreover, the PCR “need not determine the actual 

explanation for trial counsel's failure to object, so long as his failure to do so falls within 

the range of reasonable representation.” Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456-457 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

Trial counsel’s protestations about being ambushed regarding evidence concerning 

his attacks on Schmidlin does not detract from the PCR court’s finding that not objecting 

was a reasonable strategy. Schmidlin’s statements regarding her relationship with 

Petitioner were problematic for both sides. The prosecution’s case was diminished if 

Schmidlin was painted as vengeful, the defense’s case was diminished if the reasons for 

the vengeance (Petitioner’s assaults on Schmidlin) were brought before the jury. By 

objecting, Petitioner’s counsel ran the risk that he might open the door to evidence on the 

assaults coming into the case. He could have thus reasonably believed that the defense 

was better off without doing so, allowing him to control the risk of disclosure of the 

reasons for Schmidlin’s ill will, and utilizing Schmidlin to paint Petitioner in a favorable 

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light, as Schmidlin’s friend and rescuer of Stelmasek. Indeed, counsel’s questioning of 

Schmidlin did exactly that, focusing on Schmidlin’s confidential friendship with Petitioner 

and understanding he wanted to rescue Stelmasek. (Exh. YY, R.T. 1/29/15 at 54-56.) And 

Schmidlin’s bothersome testimony (that Petitioner told her he killed someone) was 

addressed by the benign (if perhaps unsuccessful) testimony from Plaintiff that Schmidlin 

had simply misheard Petitioner, who was calling from a payphone next to a busy highway. 

(Exh. AAA, R.T. 2/24/15 at 19-20.) 

Petitioner argues the state court’s decision was unreasonable because: (1) it was 

based on Petitioner’s failure to provide an affidavit; and (2) it vouched for and advocated 

for trial counsel. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 36-37.) The first argument ignores that Petitioner bore 

the burden of asserting a colorable claim to be entitled to a state court hearing, and that 

Petitioner bore the ultimate burden of proof. The second argument ignores the 

presumption of effective representation that Strickland required the state court to employ. 

Petitioner argues that the court ignored key evidence, including: (1) his proffered 

explanations for having the victim’s blood on his shoes; (2) his protestations that his emails 

planning the murder were only to make sure no one was harmed, the plans were put off 

resulting in a series of plans, and none of the elements of the May 1, 2011 plans were put 

in effect; and (3) Petitioner’s denials of any intent to kill the victim. (Id. at 35-36.) These 

arguments appear directed to the possibility of prejudice in the guilty verdict. The state 

court, instead, properly relied on the lack of prejudice in the form of a mistrial. Indeed, a 

mistrial was the prejudice on which Petitioner’s brief to that court relied. 

Petitioner complains his attorney’s trial notes were not admitted because of 

Petitioner’s “legal concerns” and his belief that an evidentiary hearing would be granted. 

(Id. at 37.) Petitioner’s failure to present his attorney’s notes were Petitioner’s strategic 

choice. To the extent based on Petitioner’s desire to maintain attorney client privilege, 

that is a quandary which prisoners regularly must face in challenging their convictions, 

particularly on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. For example, even now if 

Petitioner were to be granted an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner would likely be required 

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to waive his attorney client privilege with regard to matters affecting his ineffectiveness 

claims. See Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2003). To the extent

Petitioner’s choice was based on his erroneous assumption an evidentiary hearing would 

be granted, Petitioner cannot fault the state court for such assumption.

In sum, Petitioner fails to establish that the state court made an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in rejecting Ground 2. 

No Unreasonable Application of Supreme Court Law - Finally, Petitioner fails 

to show that the rejection of his claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland. At 

best, Petitioner simply asks this Court to adopt Petitioner’s reasoning and reach a contrary 

conclusion. This Court cannot do so under the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Conclusion – Ground 2 is without merit and must be denied. 

4. Ground 3 – Ineffectiveness re Motion to Vacate

In Ground 3, Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to vacate the verdict after the defense investigator’s advice to counsel that 

Schmidlin admitted after trial that she perjured herself about her knowledge of Farris’ 

intention to go to Arizona to get Stelmasek out of Arizona. (Petition, Attach. A at 10-11, 

Doc. 1 at 41-42.) 

Respondents argue this claim was presented in Petitioner’s PCR petition and PCR 

petition for review, and the PCR court’s explicit rejection was on the merits and subject to 

deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Respondents argue the PCR court applied 

Strickland, the controlling Supreme Court law, and reasonably relied on the failure of 

Petitioner to support his assertions with an affidavit. Respondents argue a lack of prejudice 

because the new evidence did not justify vacating the judgment because: (1) it did not 

affect the trial court’s jurisdiction; (2) was on a collateral issue, useful solely for 

impeachment of a witness already subject to other substantial impeachment evidence 

before the jury, precluding a likelihood a jury would have reached a different result; and 

(3) a lie by Schmidlin would constitute a constitutional violation only if the prosecution 

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knew it was a lie, which Petitioner does not establish. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 53-56.) 

State Court Decision – This Court must look through the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ summary ruling (Exh. MM) to the reasoned decision of the PCR court, which 

opined:

According to Defendant, several weeks after the jury rendered 

its verdict, a defense investigator told his trial attorney that a key 

witness had admitted to giving perjured testimony. Defendant claims 

this information is newly discovered evidence supporting a motion 

under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 24.2(a)(2). Defendant argues once his attorney 

had this information, he should have immediately filed a Motion to 

Vacate Judgment and sought a new trial. 

First, Defendant does not support this claim with an affidavit 

from the purported witness, the defense investigator or his trial 

attorney that the alleged statements about perjured testimony were 

made or even true. See State v. Bordon [sic], 146 Ariz. 392, 399 

(1985). Second, assuming a motion had been timely filed, Defendant 

has not demonstrated a reasonable probability the motion would have 

been granted. Defendant's own Petition describes the witnesses' trial 

testimony as conflicting at times. Conflicts in the testimony is for the 

jury to evaluate and ultimately resolve.

(Exh. KK, Order 10/30/20 at 2.) 

Applicable State Law - Arizona authorized a motion to vacate judgment on three 

grounds:

(1) That it was without jurisdiction of the action;

(2) That newly discovered material facts exist, under the standards of 

Rule 32.1; or

(3) That the conviction was obtained in violation of the United States 

or Arizona Constitutions. 

Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 24.2(a) (2015). 

No Unreasonable Determination of Facts - The state courts factual findings are 

addressed by Petitioner in his Reply with Ground 2 and are generally addressed

hereinabove with Ground 2.

Petitioner goes on to complain about the state court’s reliance on the absence of an 

affidavit. The case cited by the state court, Borbon, addressed the direction in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proced. 32.6(c) for a summary disposition of a PCR petition based on the existing 

record, and the petitioner’s failure to provide “the names of witnesses nor include 

affidavits containing what testimony they would have offered.” Borbon at 399, 706 P.2d 

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at 725. “Rule 32 does not require the trial court to conduct evidentiary hearings based on 

mere generalizations and unsubstantiated claims that people exist who would give 

favorable testimony.” (Id.) Petitioner fails to explain why the state court’s reliance on 

this procedural requirement resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Not Contrary to Supreme Court Law – Petitioner fails to show how the state 

court’s decision on Ground 3 was contrary to Supreme Court law. As discussed with 

regard to Ground 2, the state court applied Strickland, the controlling Supreme Court law, 

to Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance. 

No Unreasonable Application of Supreme Court Law - Petitioner also fails to 

show that the state court made an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

The state court asserted two reasonsfor rejecting the claim: (a) the failure to provide 

supporting evidence in the form of an affidavit; and (b) the lack of prejudice, because of 

failure to show any such motion to vacate would have been granted given the conflicting 

testimony from Schmidlin already before the jury.

As discussed hereinabove, Petitioner fails to show that the state court’s reliance on 

the lack of a supporting affidavit was improper, let alone unreasonable. 

Petitioner also fails to show that the determination of a lack of prejudice was 

unreasonable. To establish such prejudice, Petitioner was required to show a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would have been different. In this instance, the relevant 

outcome is whether the motion to vacate would have been granted. 

As pointed out by Respondents, the only applicable ground for vacating the 

judgment was “[t]hat newly discovered material facts exist, under the standards of Rule 

32.1.” Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 24.2(a)(2). Schmidlin’s purported perjury did not deny the 

court jurisdiction, Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 24.2(a)(1), and did not of itself constitute a 

constitutional violation, id. at 24.2(a)(3), at least absent evidence that the prosecution knew 

at the time of the trial that Schmidlin had lied about not knowing the purpose for 

Petitioner’s trip. 

In 2015, the relevant portion of Arizona’s Rule 32.1 provided a remedy based on a 

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showing that:

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts 

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after 

the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the 

newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely 

cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony 

which was of critical significance at trial such that the 

evidence probably would have changed the verdict or 

sentence.

Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 32.1(e) (2015). 

Petitioner does not show Schmidlin’s knowledge of Petitioner’s intent in going to 

Arizona would have come from a source other than Petitioner. Therefore the “fact” of 

such knowledge would have been known to Petitioner and thus could not be “newly 

discovered material facts” only newly discovered evidence. 

Moreover, under Arizona’s rules, an admission of perjury does not automatically 

justify a new trial.

Appellant's final claim was made in his petition for post-conviction 

relief. He contended that he should be granted a new trial because 

Snowden admitted perjuring himself on a particular item of 

testimony. A petition for post-conviction relief is addressed to the 

discretion of the trial court. State v. Kidwell, 106 Ariz. 257, 475 P.2d 

241 (1970). At the trial, Snowden stated that he did not know where 

appellant went after he left Tucson. This was not true. There is no 

legal requirement that a new trial be granted even when a witness 

himself states that he has perjured himself. State v. Scott, 113 Ariz. 

423, 555 P.2d 1117 (1976). Whether or not Mr. Snowden knew 

appellant's whereabouts after he left Tucson was of little or no 

relevance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

State v. Littles, 123 Ariz. 427, 430, 600 P.2d 40, 43 (Ct. App. 1979)

As in Littles, Schmidlin’s latest version was, at best, impeachment on a collateral 

issue, i.e. Schmidlin’s knowledge of the reason for Petitioner’s travel to Arizona. Because 

any knowledge Schmidlin would have had regarding such reasons came only from 

Petitioner, which would be suspect as self-serving, it would have carried diminished 

weight in assessing Petitioner’s real intent. Further, even if the jury were to accept the 

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truth of Petitioner’s assertion at the time made to Schmidlin, Petitioner’s intent when 

soliciting Schmidlin for funds to travel to Arizona did not preclude an alteration of that 

intent at some point prior to the murder. 

Petitioner argues that in his case the importance of Schmidlin’s perjury admission 

derives from the importance placed on Schmidlin’s testimony in the prosecution’s case. 

(Reply, Doc. 29 at 6.) This argument suffers several defects.

First, Petitioner complains that it was unfair for Respondents to argue Schmidlin’s 

mendacity on this point is not prejudicial, while at the same time relying on her assertion 

of Plaintiff’s confession to killing someone to sustain his conviction. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 

28.) This ignores that juries must routinely sift through a given witness’s testimony itemby-item to discern which is credible and which is not. Indeed, the trial court instructed the 

jury:

In deciding the facts of this case, you should consider what testimony 

to accept and what to reject. You may accept everything a witness 

says or part of it or none of it. 

(Exh. SS, RT 1/14/15 at 24.)

Second, Petitioner argues Schmidlin’s admission of lying would constitute proof of 

her lying. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 30.) But Schmidlin’s admission of lying, while relevant, 

was not definitive proof of which version was the truth. Indeed, the version before the 

jury was made under oath. The assertion of perjury to the investigator was not. 

Third, the jury already had before it evidence of Schmidlin changing her story, e.g.

whether she had financed Petitioner’s trip to Arizona. Petitioner presents no reason why 

an additional instance of self-contradiction would have made the difference for the jury 

such that it “probably would have changed the verdict or sentence,” Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 

32.1(e)(3). 

Fourth, Petitioner attempts to tie this testimony to the prosecution’s attempts to 

bolster Schmidlin’s testimony on the basis of her friendship with Petitioner. But this 

particular evidence was not indicative of any particular bond or animosity between 

Schmidlin and Petitioner. If the jury were to believe Schmidlin did know Petitioner’s 

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reason for going to Arizona, the jury could have reasonably interpreted her failure to admit 

such knowledge to have been motivated by her own self-interest (i.e. in avoiding 

prosecution as an accessory-before-the-fact) rather than by any animosity toward 

Petitioner. 

Finally, all of Petitioner’s protestations ignore the other substantial evidence of his 

guilt, such as: emails between Petitioner and Stelmasek regarding their romance and plans 

to murder the victim, Petitioner’s testimony of being present in the home at the time of the 

murder, Petitioner’s assertion that Stelmasek killed the victim, a knife wound on Petitioner 

he admitted occurred in the attack on the victim, evidence (including Petitioner’s 

admissions) of Petitioner’s involvement in disposing of the victim’s body, and jailhouse 

communications between Petitioner and Stelmasek fabricating a claim of self-defense. 

(See Exh. S, Mem. Dec. 10/5/16 at ¶¶ 2-8.) Moreover, even if the jury disbelieved 

Schmidlin’s testimony about Petitioner confessing to killing someone, there was ample 

evidence showing that (even if Farris did not personally kill the victim) he was an 

accomplice to Stelmasek doing so. (Id. at 19.) 

In sum, Petitioner fails to show that it was unreasonable for the state court to 

conclude there was not a probability of a different result at trial from the “new material 

fact,” and thus not a probability of a grant of the motion to vacate, and to therefore find no 

prejudice from counsel’s failure to bring the motion. 

Conclusion – Ground 3 is without merit and must be denied.

5. Ground 5(f) – Accomplice Liability Instruction

In Ground 5(f) Petitioner assumedly argues his Sixth Amendment right to notice of 

the charges was violated when the trial court included an accomplice liability instruction 

in the closing jury instructions, despite the prosecution failing to suggest such liability and 

a lack of “evidence from the state that even remotely indicated Mr. Farris aided or assisted 

in the death of the victim.”26 (Petition, Attach. A at 29, Doc. 1 at 60.) 

26 See supra Section IV(D)(3) finding the Due Process claim in Ground 5(f) unexhausted 

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Respondents argue the state court’s rejection of this claim on direct appeal survives 

deferential review under the standard from controlling Supreme Court law of providing 

the elements sufficiently to inform the defendant and to avoid double jeopardy. 

Respondents argue the requisite notice was in the Indictment and clear from pretrial 

motions, and contemplated (but not instructed on) at the time of preliminary jury 

instructions. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 56-59.) 

Petitioner replies that accomplice liability was neither referenced nor the applicable 

statute cited in the Indictment, and never referenced during the prosecution’s presentation 

of the evidence. Petitioner argues that the state court’s determination that the Indictment 

“suggested” accomplice liability was insufficient to establish the required notice. He 

argues that giving the instruction permitted his conviction without a showing that he was 

the actual murderer. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 41-42.) 

Indictment – Here, Count I of the operative Indictment alleged: 

On or between May 23, 2011 and June 2, 2011, MARZET FARRIS, 

Ill, AND LAURA JEANNE STELMASEK, acting with 

premeditation, caused the death of Craig Stelmasek, intending or 

knowing that such conduct would cause death, in violation of A.R.S. 

§ 13- 1105, a class 1 felony.

(Exh. C, Indictment 10/19/11.) 

State Court Decision – This claim was raised by Petition on direct appeal. The 

Arizona Court of Appeals ruled:

¶15 Farris argues the superior court erred by instructing the jury 

on accomplice liability because the State did not provide pretrial 

notice of its intent to argue an accomplice theory of liability and 

because the trial evidence did not support the theory that Farris acted 

as an accomplice. Although we ordinarily review the court’s decision 

to instruct on accomplice liability for an abuse of discretion, State v. 

King, 226 Ariz. 253, 258, ¶ 14 (App. 2011), here, Farris did not object 

to this instruction at trial, so we review only for fundamental, 

prejudicial error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567–68, ¶¶ 

19–20 (2005). 

¶16 Even though the indictment did not expressly refer to 

accomplice liability, the State provided ample pretrial notice of its 

theory that Farris either personally killed C.S. or acted as an 

and assuming arguendo a Sixth Amendment notice claim was adequately stated in the 

Petition.

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accomplice. An indictment must provide the defendant notice of the 

charges alleged, but it need not specify the theory by which the State 

intends to prove them, provided that the defendant receives notice 

sufficient to develop a reasonable defense to the allegations. State v. 

Rivera, 207 Ariz. 69, 73, ¶ 12 (App. 2004). Although not explicit, the 

indictment itself suggested an accomplice theory because it charged 

Farris and Stelmasek jointly with premeditated murder, as well as 

with conspiracy to commit premeditated murder. Moreover, the State 

noted in several pretrial filings that it intended to rely on accomplice 

liability as well as on evidence that Farris himself held the knife and 

administered the fatal wounds. And defense counsel expressed no 

surprise when the prosecutor argued to include accomplice liability 

in the preliminary instructions on the basis that “obviously this is a 

case where accomplice liability has been a large part of the case from 

the onset.” 

¶17 Although the court declined to instruct on accomplice liability 

in the preliminary instructions, it did so not because the accomplice 

theory was improper, but rather based on its concern that the jury 

might become confused between conspiracy and accomplice liability. 

The court’s ruling expressly contemplated instructing on accomplice 

liability in final instructions, and allowed the parties to discuss 

accomplice liability in opening statements and in voir dire. And 

defense counsel did not allege lack of pretrial notice of the 

accomplice theory; instead counsel simply argued that the court 

should not instruct on the elements of the offenses until closing. The 

record thus shows that Farris received sufficient notice of the State’s 

accomplice theory.

¶18 Moreover, the trial evidence supported an accomplice liability 

instruction. An accomplice is a person “who with the intent to 

promote or facilitate the commission of an offense . . . [s]olicits or 

commands another person to commit the offense; or . . . [a]ids, 

counsels, agrees to aid or attempts to aid another person in planning 

or committing an offense[; or] . . . provides means or opportunity to

another person to commit the offense.” A.R.S. § 13-301. An 

accomplice may be a principal participant, may provide assistance in 

committing or completing the offense, or may simply assist in 

planning the offense. See State v. McNair, 141 Ariz. 475, 480 (1984). 

¶19 Here, Farris and Stelmasek discussed different ways to kill 

C.S. over the course of hundreds of emails exchanged over a period 

of several months before the murder. Farris acknowledged being in 

the bedroom when C.S. was stabbed to death, and told a friend 

afterward, “I killed someone.” Although he testified that Stelmasek 

was solely responsible for the murder and that he was trying to 

prevent it, the jury could have disbelieved his testimony. The trial 

evidence provided ample basis to suggest that, if Farris did not 

actually kill the victim, he assisted Stelmasek in doing so. 

Accordingly, the superior court did not err by instructing on 

accomplice liability.

(Exh. S, Mem. Dec. 10/4/16 at ¶¶ 15-19.) Thus, the state court found that Petitioner was 

provided adequate notice because:

1. both Petitioner and his co-defendant were charged with causing the death;

2. the prosecution indicated in pretrial filings that it intended to rely on 

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accomplice liability; 

3. counsel expressed no surprise when the prosecutor requested an accomplice 

liability instruction; and

4. the trial court did not refuse to give an accomplice liability instruction, but 

at defense counsel’s request merely deferred doing so until closing 

instructions.

Applicable Law - The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that a 

defendant has the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” U.S. 

Const. Amend. VI. The Supreme Court has said little about this right. 27 Gautt v. Lewis, 

489 F.3d 993, 1004 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). Gleaning from the few decisions available, the 

Ninth Circuit has opined:

for purposes of AEDPA's “clearly established Federal law” 

requirement, it is “clearly established” that a criminal defendant has 

a right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and applied against the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, to be informed of any 

charges against him, and that a charging document, such as an 

information, is the means by which such notice is provided. To satisfy 

this constitutional guarantee, the charging document need not contain 

a citation to the specific statute at issue; the substance of the 

information, however, must in some appreciable way apprise the 

defendant of the charges against him so that he may prepare a defense 

accordingly.

Gautt, 489 F.3d at 1004. 

Although Gautt asserted that charging document was “the means” to provide the 

required notice, it went on to hold that notice of the particular theory of commission can 

be given by other means. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has long held that the required notice 

can “be provided to a defendant by means other than the charging document,” Morrison 

v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1992), although “the court looks first to the [charging 

27 Respondents rely on several Supreme Court cases involving federal prosecutions and 

discussing indictments. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 56-57.) While such cases may be persuasive 

examples of what is sufficient notice, they are impacted by the interplay between the Fifth 

Amendment’s indictment requirement (applicable only to federal prosecutions) and the 

Sixth Amendment’s notice requirement. See LaFave, et al., Providing notice, 5 Crim. 

Proc. § 19.2(c) (4th ed.). Consequently, reliance on them is problematic in a state habeas 

case addressing a claim subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) deference. 

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document],” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir. 1994). Such notice must, however, 

be given with sufficient time for the defense to act upon it. Stephens v. Borg, 59 F.3d 932, 

935 (9th Cir. 1995). 

No Unreasonable Application of Supreme Court Law – Petitioner makes no 

argument that the state court’s decision was contrary to Supreme Court law or based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Rather, he argues only that the state court 

unreasonably applied Supreme Court law in finding there was adequate notice. The 

undersigned concludes the state court’s decision was not unreasonable. 

The state court’s reliance on the Indictment was not unreasonable. The notice 

required by the Sixth Amendment is not a matter of technical pleading. It does not require 

notice of particular statutory provisions or of every element of an offense. Gautt, 489 F.3d 

at 1003. Rather, it requires that the defendant have “a description of the charges against 

him in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.” James, 24 F.3d at 24. 

Under Arizona law, accomplice liability does not comprise a separate offense. 

Rather it is a feature of every Arizona crime that makes someone criminally responsible 

for an offense whether “committed by such person’s own conduct or by the conduct of 

another.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-302. Effectively, it is an alternative means of committing 

every Arizona offense.

The indictment charges appellant as a principal. It does not allege 

that appellant committed the charged offenses as an accomplice, nor 

does it cite A.R.S. § 13–301 or § 13–303, from which the disputed 

instruction was derived. Nevertheless, appellant's contention is 

without merit. There is no requirement that the indictment charge 

appellant as an accomplice in order to permit a jury instruction to that 

effect. Under Arizona law, an accused is a principal regardless of 

whether he directly commits the illegal act or aids or abets in its 

commission.

State v. McInelly, 146 Ariz. 161, 162–63, 704 P.2d 291, 292–93 (Ct. App. 1985) (citations 

omitted). See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189 (2007) (“every 

jurisdiction—all States and the Federal Government—has ‘expressly abrogated the 

distinction’ among principals and aiders and abettors [at the scene and before the fact]”); 

and Alfred v. Garland, 64 F.4th 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2023) (“In general, under modern 

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accomplice liability theory, aiding and abetting is a different means of committing a single 

crime, it is not a separate offense itself, and the government ha[s] no obligation to elect 

between charging a substantive offense and charging liability on an aiding and abetting 

theory. Accordingly, aiding and abetting is embedded in every federal indictment for a 

substantive crime.” (cleaned up)).) Notice of such alternative means is not required. See 

Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987) (detailing cases not requiring notice 

regarding accomplice liability/aiding and abetting). 

Moreover, here the Indictment identified both co-defendants as responsible for the 

murder, which effectively asserted they either both killed the victim, or one did and the 

other was the accomplice. 

Further, assuming arguendo that the allegations of the Indictment were insufficient 

to provide adequate notice of the prosecution’s theory of liability, the state court properly 

relied on the post-indictment events. For example, in Morrison, supra, the Ninth Circuit 

found sufficient notice of a felony murder despite only murder being charged in the 

indictment, distinguishing Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir.1989) where 

the theory had not been raised in pretrial proceedings, opening statements, taking of 

testimony, or initial instructions conference, but was first broached in the final jury 

instructions conference. Morrison, 981 F.2d at 427-428. See Felix v. Ryan, CV-19-1885-

PHX-MTL-MTM, 2021 WL 5534882, at *13 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2021), report and 

recommendation adopted sub nom. Felix v. Att'y Gen. of Arizona, CV-19-01885-PHXMTL, 2021 WL 4785913 (D. Ariz. Oct. 14, 2021) (adequate notice of theory of accomplice 

liability by request for accomplice liability instruction week before trial). In Petitioner’s 

case, in the Motion in Limine filed December 14, 2019, the State asserted it had “argued 

in numerous prior motions and responses, because both Defendants are both charged under 

accomplice liability, it is of no consequence which of the two actually inflicted the fatal 

wounds.” (Exh. J, Motion 12/13/19 at 3.) Thus, even if the Indictment was inadequate 

notice, that motion provided Plaintiff with notice a full month prior to the preliminary jury 

instructions, and additional notice was given at voir dire (Exh. PP, R.T. 1/7/15 at 6) and at 

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the preliminary instructions conference (Exh. RR, R.T. 1/9/15 at 3), prior to opening 

statements or admission of any evidence. 

Finally, the state court properly noted that neither the trial court nor the defense 

were surprised by the theory when raised in discussing preliminary instructions. The only 

reason for deferring the instruction was to avoid confusing the jury. The trial court ruled:

At this point I'm going to deny the State's motion to accomplice 

liability. I believe it belongs in the final instructions, not preliminary 

instructions. I believe you can discuss accomplice liability. You can 

discuss it in openings. You already discussed it in the voir dire. We'll 

instruct the jury after they receive the evidence so we don't end up 

with a situation where they are completely confused with conspiracy, 

with accomplice liability. That's my ruling.

(Exh. RR, R.T. 1/9/15 at 8.) Thus “no ambush occurred at [Petitioner’s] trial.” Morrison, 

981 F.2d at 428. 

Plaintiff complains that the prosecution did not actively pursue the theory in 

opening statements or in evidence. The degree of attention given to an alternative means 

of commission by the prosecution does not undo the notice given to Petitioner that the 

means of commission would be argued in closing. To the extent that Petitioner simply 

argues that there was no evidence to support an accomplice liability instruction, that is not 

relevant to a Sixth Amendment notice claim. 

Ground 5(f) is without merit and must be denied. 

6. Ground 5(g)

In Ground 5(g) Petitioner assumedly argues he was denied his right to a complete 

defense when the trial court precluded third party culpability evidence, i.e. that just prior 

to reuniting with Petitioner the co-defendant had an affair with a former boyfriend. 

(Petition, Attach. B at 29-30, Doc. 1 at 60-61.) 

Respondents argue Petitioner’s claim was rejected on the merits on direct appeal, 

and, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)’s deferential review, the claim is without merit. 

Respondents argue that state court found the probative value of the evidence was 

outweighed by the prejudicial effect, which was appropriate under controlling Supreme 

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Court law, namely Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006). (Answer, Doc. 

11 at 59-62.) 

Petitioner replies that this evidence was not offered to show Stelmasek’s character, 

but “to demonstrate a pattern and practice of conduct which showed it more probable than 

not that Stelmasek had indeed murdered her husband.” He argues the state court acted 

unreasonably in not setting an evidentiary hearing. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 44.)

State Court Decision – The Arizona Court of Appeals disposed of this claim, 

reasoning:

¶11 Farris argues that the superior court erred by precluding 

flirtatious emails between Stelmasek and her former boyfriend B.S., 

which Farris characterizes as third-party culpability evidence. We 

review the court’s ruling on the admissibility of third-party 

culpability evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Prion, 203 

Ariz. 157, 161, ¶ 21 (2002). 

¶12 Third-party culpability evidence is relevant if, viewed in the 

light most favorable to its proponent, it “tend[s] to create a reasonable 

doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, 324, 

¶ 16 (2002) (emphasis omitted). The defendant must, however, show 

something more than mere speculation. State v. Bigger, 227 Ariz. 

196, 208, ¶ 42 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). Moreover, the superior 

court may exclude third-party culpability evidence under Arizona 

Rule of Evidence 403 if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 

misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. at ¶ 41. 

¶13 Farris argued in superior court that the emails demonstrated 

Stelmasek had “duped, lied to, and manipulated [Farris] into a 

situation not of his choosing.” Farris asserted that the emails showed 

Stelmasek had made the same professions of love to B.S., thus 

showing her manipulative character. The court granted the State’s 

motion to preclude the emails, reasoning that evidence undercutting 

Stelmasek’s claims of love for Farris added little to the extensive 

evidence that Stelmasek was manipulating Farris, was only 

marginally relevant as to Farris’s guilt of the charged offenses, and 

would confuse the jury. 

¶14 The State’s theory was that Farris and Stelmasek had 

conspired and were accomplices in the murder of her husband. 

Although the emails in question arguably showed Stelmasek had 

previously manipulated a former boyfriend, they had little if any 

exculpatory value for Farris given the cumulative nature of evidence 

of manipulation by Stelmasek and in light of his acknowledged 

presence at the crime scene and his prior correspondence with 

Stelmasek. Thus, the superior court reasonably found the evidence to 

be only marginally relevant. See Bigger, 227 Ariz. at 208, ¶ 43. 

Moreover, given the tenuous and speculative nature of the evidence, 

the court also reasonably concluded that the risk of confusion from 

admitting the emails in evidence would substantially outweigh any 

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arguable relevance. See State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 569, ¶ 36 

(2003). Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion 

by precluding evidence of the emails from Stelmasek to B.S.

(Exh. S, Mem. Dec. 10/4/16 at ¶¶ 11-14.) 

Applicable Law – “The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful 

opportunity to present a complete defense, but we have also recognized that state and 

federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding 

evidence from criminal trials.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013) (cleaned up). 

“While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that 

serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted 

to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if 

its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury...A specific application of this 

principle is found in rules regulating the admission of evidence proffered by criminal 

defendants to show that someone else committed the crime with which they are charged.” 

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-327 (2006). 

No Legal Error - Petitioner offers nothing to show that the state court’s decision 

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Indeed, the state 

court properly relied on the state’s Rule 403 allowing preclusion of evidence whose 

probative value was outweighed by prejudicial effect. 

Here, any attempts by Stelmasek to manipulate her former boyfriend had limited 

probative value. Stelmasek’s manipulation of Petitioner was not disputed, and it did not 

preclude Petitioner’s liability for the murder, particularly where Petitioner did not deny 

his discussions with Stelmasek of pursuing the crime, presence at the scene, and 

participation in attempting to cover up the crime. The potential for prejudice was 

significant, given the irrelevance to guilt that Petitioner was manipulated, and the lack of 

any evidence to suggest the former boyfriend was involved in the crime. In such a 

situation, imposition of the state’s evidentiary rule was not precluded by Petitioner’s right 

to a complete defense.

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Petitioner argues that the application of Arizona’s Rule 403 was incongruous with 

the trial court’s finding that the emails between Petitioner and Stelmasek were relevant 

and admissible. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 45-46.) But that is comparing apples to oranges. 

Whether Petitioner was involved in the victim’s murder was hotly contested, unlike the 

former boyfriend’s lack of involvement. Moreover, the emails with Petitioner were 

relevant not just to Stelmasek’s manipulation, but also to showing Petitioner’s succumbing 

to any such manipulation and participating in planning and carrying out the murder. 

No Unreasonable Determination of the Facts – Petitioner argues the state court’s 

failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing was unreasonable. But Petitioner fails to suggest 

what relevant evidence would have been produced from such a hearing. Further, the state 

court’s decision was not founded upon a rejection of Petitioner’s assertions of fact (e.g.

that Stelmasek attempted to manipulate the former boyfriend), but upon the irrelevance 

and prejudice of any such evidence. 

Conclusion – Ground 5(g) is without merit and must be denied. 

VII. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is whether the 

applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the 

merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching 

the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner 

shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a 

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. 

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the district court’s 

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judgment, that decision will be in part on the merits and in part on procedural grounds. 

Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find the court’s assessment 

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong or whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & 

Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

(A) Grounds 1(a), 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 4(d), 5(a), 5(b)(i), 5(b)(ii), 5(c), 5(d), 5(e), 5(g), and 6, 

and the Due Process claim in Grounds 5(f) and 5(g) of Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as procedurally 

defaulted.

(B) Grounds 7 and 8 of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as noncognizable. 

(C) Alternatively, any Notice claim in Ground 5(f) or Complete Defense claim in Ground 

5(g) of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED on the 

merits.

(D) The remainder of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), including 

Grounds 1(b), 1(c), 2, and 3 be DENIED on the merits.

(E) To the extent the foregoing findings and recommendations are adopted in the District 

Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

IX. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

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which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right 

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: June 20, 2024

23-8002r RR 24 05 03 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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