Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00167/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00167-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner also filed a motion requesting appointment of counsel, an evidentiary hearing, and 1

discovery. (Doc. 21.) Because this Court adopts the R&R, the motion is DENIED, as Petitioner has

failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. See Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th

Cir. 1983) (court evaluates likelihood of success on the merits and petitioner’s ability to articulate his

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN EDWARD WALTERS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv0167 DMS (AJB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND

DENYING PETITIONERS’

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

D.K. SISTO, Warden,

Respondent.

Martin Edward Walters (“Petitioner”) is a California prisoner proceeding pro se, who filed a

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his conviction for

first degree murder. Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes issued a Report and Recommendation that the

petition be denied. (“R&R,” Doc. 17). Petitioner filed objections. (Doc. 19.) Respondent did not file 1

a Reply. The Court now adopts the R&R and denies the Petition.

I.

BACKGROUND

The full factual and procedural history has been comprehensively set forth in the R&R, which

this Court adopts. Of particular relevance to Petitioner’s claim are the following undisputed facts. On

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 Petitioner pled guilty to federal charges of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and 2

possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, aiding and abetting the possession of an

unregistered firearm, and aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during the commission

of a drug trafficking crime. (Pet’n. Ex. 8, at 122.)

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May 9, 1990, Petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder. (R&R at 2.) Petitioner sought to withdraw

his guilty plea, asserting mutual mistake of fact. He argued that he mistakenly pled guilty to the state

charge as part of a package plea deal involving federal charges, because he was told that he faced life

without parole for the federal crimes. (Id.) On January 10, 1991, the state trial court denied his 2

motion and sentenced Petitioner to a term of “25 years to life.” (R&R at 2.) Petitioner filed the instant

petition on January 28, 2008. (Doc. 1.)

II.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for first degree

murder. Petitioner challenges his confinement on four grounds: “(1) Petitioner’s guilty pleas were

obtained in violation of his due process or equal protection rights; (2) the statute under which

Petitioner was convicted or sentenced was unconstitutionally vague in violation of his due process or

equal protection rights; (3) California enacted a new law that increased Petitioner’s punishment, in

violation of the ex post facto or equal protection clauses of the Constitution; and (4) California’s

“penal consequence parole” directly conflicts with clearly established United States Supreme Court

law, in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights.” (R&R at 1.) Respondent asserts Petitioner’s claim

is barred by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's (AEDPA’s) one-year statute of

limitations. Magistrate Judge Stormes agreed with Respondent, and recommended that the Court grant

Respondent’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, claiming that his

petition was timely filed, and entitled to statutory and equitable tolling. 

A. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing an R&R is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute,

the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

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recommendations made by the magistrate.” Id. In this case, Petitioner filed objections to the R&R.

Accordingly, this Court will make de novo determinations of those portions of the R&R to which

objection is made.

B. Statute of Limitations

AEDPA sets out a one-year period of limitation for state habeas corpus petitions. See 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1). It provides:

The limitation period shall run from the latest of B

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant

was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d)(1).

 Magistrate Judge Stormes concluded that the Petition was filed nearly 11 years too late.

Petitioner’s judgment became final on August 2, 1992. (R&R at 3.) The factual circumstances giving

rise to Petitioner’s claims involved his conviction and sentence on January 10, 1991 (grounds 1,2, and

4) and the enactment of California Penal Code §2805.5 on September 29, 1994 (ground 3). These

facts arose before the enactment of AEDPA. (Id. at 6.) Absent tolling, state petitioners whose

judgments became final before AEDPA was enacted had until April 24, 1997 to file a petition in the

federal court. Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner objects to these findings by arguing that his Petition was timely filed, because

Magistrate Judge Stormes misidentified the factual predicates of his claims, and therefore, erroneously

computed the limitation period under 28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d)(1)(D). As to the first ground asserted –

guilty plea secured in violation of due process – Petitioner argues that he discovered the basis of his

claim on January 19, 2008, “the first date upon which petitioner was factually denied the benefit(s) of

his plea agreement.” (Obj. at 2.) Petitioner advances alternative dates for the discovery of the “factual

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predicate” of his claim: (1) August 17, 2007 (California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s second

state habeas petition, requesting for “enforcement of the terms” of his plea arrangement); (2) May 24,

2007 (California Court of Appeal denied same); (3) June 21, 2006 (California Superior Court denied

same, subject to equitable tolling); or (4) January 8, 2008 (California Board of Parole Hearings

declines to conduct hearing). (Obj. at 2.)

Petitioner argues that he discovered the second ground for his petition on April 3, 2007. (Obj.

at 6.) It was on that date that he discovered that he could not determine whether he was sentenced

under California Penal Code § 1168(b) or § 1170 after reviewing the statutes. (Id.) Petitioner admits

to having interpreted these statutes incorrectly, but points to a dissent in an unnamed California

Supreme Court decision that supports his position, and concludes from this that the statutes are

unconstitutionally vague because neither “lay persons nor professionals can[] interpret” them. (Id.)

Petitioner argues that he discovered the factual predicate of his third ground for habeas relief

on April 7, 2007. Petitioner was sentenced to make restitution to his victims pursuant to California

Penal Code § 2808.5. In 1994, that section was amended to allow the CDC to effectively impose a

10% administrative fee on prisoners’ wages that are garnished to pay restitution fines. Petitioner does

not identify what events occurred on April 7, 2007, but notes that in September, 2005, the CDC failed

to deduct an administrative fee from the total amount owed. However, he does not identify when he

first learned that the CDC imposed this new fee upon him. Finally, Petitioner argues that he learned

of his fourth asserted ground on January 20, 2008. On that date, Petitioner’s request that his lifetime

parole be reduced to 60 months was denied, in violation of his plea agreement. 

Petitioner’s arguments are unavailing. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(D), the limitation period

begins to run at the “[t]ime . . . when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the

important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d

1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner knew of the facts underlying his claims in 1991 or 1994,

prior to AEDPA’s enactment. Thus, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s finding that, absent

tolling, the Petition is time-barred. 

Magistrate Judge Stormes found that statutory tolling did not apply to the Petition. Petitioner

objects,“assert[ing] he is also entitled to tolling on all grounds including tolling pursuant to §

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2244(d)(2).” (Obj. at 13.) Under § 2244(d)(2), the limitation period does not run while a “properly

filed” state habeas corpus petition is “pending” in state court. “[A] state postconviction petition

rejected by the state court as untimely is not ‘properly filed’ within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2).”

Allen v. Siebert, 128 S. Ct. 2, 3 (U.S. 2007). Petitioner’s first and second state court habeas petitions

were denied as untimely. (R & R at 3.) Therefore, the tolling provision would not apply, if at all, until

March 5, 2007, when Petitioner filed his third state habeas petition. (R &R at 4.) However, the

limitation period had already expired on his claims on April 24, 1997. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (§ 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of limitation period that has

expired before state petition was filed). Accordingly, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s finding

that Petitioner’s claims are not statutorily tolled. 

Magistrate Judge Stormes found that Petitioner did not claim entitlement to equitable tolling.

(R&R at 7.) Petitioner objects, noting that he asserted that his claims were equitably tolled “because

[he] was brainwashed into believing that he would be released from prison on August 2, 2005.” (Obj.

at 13.) The alleged brainwashing occurred when prison officials told Petitioner that he had a “25 year

term” and that he could “reduce the (presumably fixed) term by participating in work, education or

vocational” programs and through good behavior. (Opp. at 3.) Attached to his opposition papers is

a term computation worksheet, presumably prepared by prison officials on February 26, 1991, which

computes his release date based on a “total term” of “25 years.” (Opp. Ex. A.) Following

conversations with prison staff, inmates, and law clerks, Petitioner came to believe that he had

received a determinate 25 year sentence. (Opp. at 4-5.)

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations bears the

burden of establishing: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see

 Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (tolling available when

“extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on

time”). Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive, because he fails to establish how prison “staff and

inmates, law clerks, etc.” prevented him from timely filing his Petition. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2003) (“if the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable

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diligence in attempting to file, after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation

between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken”). Similarly, Petitioner’s

confusion over or ignorance of the law does not excuse him. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“It is clear that pro se status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling.”);

Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is well established that ignorance of the

law, even for an incarcerated pro se prisoner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.”). Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the findings, conclusions and

recommendations contained in the Magistrate Judge=s R&R, Because Petitioner’s claims are barred

by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and he is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, the

Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES this case with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 29, 2008

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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