Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00761/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00761-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Western Alliance Bank, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:14-cv-0761 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

Richard Jefferson, ) [Re: Motion at Docket 113]

)

Defendant. )

)

)

Richard Jefferson, )

)

Counter-claimant, )

)

vs. )

)

Western Alliance Bank, )

)

Counter-defendant. )

)

)

Richard Jefferson, )

)

Third-party plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

Theodore Kritza & Michelle Lee )

Kritza, )

)

Third-party defendants. )

)

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Case 2:14-cv-00761-JWS Document 187 Filed 08/07/15 Page 1 of 3
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I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 113, plaintiff Western Alliance Bank (“Bank”) moves to preclude expert 

opinion testimony by James Tucciarone (“JT”). Third-party defendant Kritza filed a

joinder at docket 114. Defendant Richard Jefferson (“Jefferson”) opposes the motion at

docket 138. Bank replies at docket 147. Oral argument was requested but would not

assist the court. 

II. BACKGROUND

The background giving rise to this litigation has been described in detail in the

order at docket 183. It need not be repeated here. However, some procedural

background needs to be set out.

Rule 26(a) and the court’s Scheduling Order at docket 26 set out numerous pretrial tasks to be accomplished by the parties.1

 Jefferson does not dispute the accuracy

of the following:

1) Jefferson supplied the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A) on July

14, 2014 and did not identify JT as a person likely to possess

discoverable information.

2) Jefferson provided a supplemental disclosure of information required by

Rule 26(a)(1)(A) on October 14, 2014 and did not identify JT as a person

likely to possess discoverable information.

3) On November 10, 2014, the date set by the court for Jefferson’s expert

disclosures, Jefferson identified only William J. Flynn as an expert. JT

was not mentioned.

4) Jefferson filed the witness list required by the court’s order on February

27, 2015, at docket 74. In it he listed numerous lay witnesses, including

JT. The witness list identified only William J. Flynn as an expert witness.

5) Also on February 27, 2015, Jefferson supplied a second supplement to

the disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(A) which indicated for the first time

that JT might possess discoverable information.

6) JT’s deposition was noticed for May 7, 2015. About 12 hours before

JT’s deposition was to commence, Jefferson disclosed a report and other

papers containing JT’s opinions, summaries and analyses regarding

certain accounts.

1Some dates in the original Scheduling Order were extended by subsequent orders.

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7) At the deposition on May 7, 2015, it was learned that Jefferson had

hired JT prior to commencement of this lawsuit which was filed in state

court on February 20, 2014. Jefferson had possession of JT’s report and

the related documents containing his opinions since January of 2014, if

not earlier.

8) Jefferson has not moved to amend the Scheduling Order to permit him

to name JT as an expert witness.

9) Discovery has closed.

The recitation of uncontested facts above establishes the conduct of Jefferson’s

counsel to be among the worst “sand-bagging” the assigned judge has seen since

taking the bench in 1992. In a separate order addressing motions aimed at excluding

the testimony of William J. Flynn, the court noted that the late disclosures by

Jefferson’s counsel were not substantially justified, but nevertheless allowed Jefferson

to use Flynn as an expert witness because a lesser sanction than exclusion of his

opinion testimony was deemed appropriate. Here that is not the case. Nothing short of

foreclosing use of JT as an expert witness pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) is an appropriate

sanction for the egregious behavior by Jefferson’s lawyers and the prejudice to Bank,

Kritza, and the court’s efforts to provide for the orderly development of this litigation. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the motion at docket 113 is GRANTED. Plaintiff may not

call James Tucciarone to offer opinion testimony. If he is called as a lay witness, any

testimony which purports to summarize documents or events must be strictly limited to

lay testimony and may not be used as a back door through which opinion testimony is

elicited.

DATED this 6th day of August, 2015.

 /s/ 

JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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