Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01553/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01553-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed Question: Fed Communications Act of 1934

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DISH NETWORK, L.L.C., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SONICVIEW USA, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 09-cv-1553-L(WVG)

ORDER OVERRULING

DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S AUGUST

30, 2012 ORDER [DOC. 262]

On July 17, 2009, Plaintiffs filed this action for violations of the Digital Millennium

Copyright Act and Communications Act. Plaintiffs, who operate satellite television systems,

allege that Defendants are heavily involved in the manufacture and distribution of hardware and

software used to intercept and steal encrypted satellite signals. On May 31, 2012, the Court

granted Plaintiffs Dish Network L.L.C., Echostar Technologies L.L.C., and Nagrastar L.L.C.’s

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 181.) An order entering judgment against Defendants

Sonicview USA, Inc., Roberto Sanz, Danial Pierce, and Alan Phu (“Sonicview Defendants”) in

the amount of $64,980,200, and against Defendants Duane Bernard and Courtney Bernard in the

amount of $984,800 jointly and severally followed. (Doc. 182.)

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Pending before the Court is Defendants’ objection to United States Magistrate Judge

William V. Gallo’s August 30, 2012 Order denying Defendants’ motion for a protective order to

extend the time to respond to discovery requests (Doc. 256). Judge Gallo denied the motion 1

because Defendants had “not demonstrated due diligence in responding to Plaintiffs’ document

requests.” (August 30, 2012 Order [Doc. 256].) It was also noted that “Defendants filed a last

minute Motion for Protective Order . . . essentially treat[ing] the granting of the Motion for

Protective Order as a forgone conclusion, the Court’s approval being a mere formality in the

process.” (Id.) Judge Gallo emphasized, “[h]owever, the Court is not a mere rubber stamp,

and the Court would be justified in denying the motion because it was filed two days before the

document production at issue was due.” (Id. (emphasis in original).)

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See

Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objection. 

(Doc. 262.)

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge within

fourteen days after service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The magistrate judge’s order

will be upheld unless it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to factual findings and discretionary decisions made in

connection with non-dispositive pretrial discovery matters. F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of

Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 697 (S.D.

Ga. 1996) (reviewing magistrate judge’s order addressing attorney-client issues in discovery for

clear error). Review under this standard is “significantly deferential, requiring a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v.

Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (internal quotation marks

 Courtney Bernard is not a party to this objection. In this order, the Court collectively 1

refers to the Sonicview Defendants and Duane Bernard as “Defendants.”

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omitted).

On the other hand, the “contrary to law” standard permits independent review of purely

legal determinations by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81,

91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates plenary review as to matters of

law.”); Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir.

1994); 12 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3069 (2d ed., 2010

update). “Thus, [the district court] must exercise its independent judgment with respect to a

magistrate judge’s legal conclusions.” Gandee, 785 F. Supp. at 686. “A decision is contrary to

law if it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” United

States v. Cathcart, No. C 07-4762 PJH, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2009).

II. DISCUSSION2

Defendants argues that they have shown good cause, that Judge Gallo’s Order

erroneously made conclusions not supported by the record, and that they made their request in

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable federal laws. Specifically,

regarding the showing of good cause, Defendants point out that Defendants had not sought prior

extensions, there have been difficulties engaging in timely communications between counsel and

Defendants, the subject document requests were “extremely voluminous,” and Defendants’

counsel had family commitments for up to three weeks. (Defs.’ Objection 5:21–13.) Only

Defendants’ good-cause contention addresses Judge Gallo’s conclusion that Defendants had not

demonstrated due diligence in responding to Plaintiffs’ document requests.

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 Defendants contend that in addition to the August 30, 2012 Order being clearly 2

erroneous and contrary to law, that Judge Gallo also abused his discretion. As discussed above,

abuse of discretion is not an applicable standard of review here. Furthermore, though

Defendants also contend that the Order is contrary to law, Defendants fail to identify any

misapplication of relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure. (See Defs.’ Objection

5:10–7:25.) Consequently, the Court reviews the Order only under the clearly erroneous

standard.

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In arguing that good cause was shown, Defendants state that 

[Defendants’ counsel] Mr. Clark’s only child was married last week,

and Mr. Clark has had family and friends coming to visit and attend the

wedding from all over the country, Canada, England, and Wales. Mr.

Clark had necessary family commitments for the last two-three weeks

to attend to in connection with the wedding and out-of-town guests,

which made it impossible to respond to all 240 documents requests at

the same time.

(Defs.’ Objection 5:25–6:2 (emphasis added).) Aside from the fact that Defendants’ counsel did

not respond to document requests because he was overwhelmed by the volume of his work,

could not timely communicate with his clients, and basically took a two-to-three week hiatus

from the duties required of this case, Defendants concede that they were unable to respond to all

of the document requests. (See id.) That appears to be the heart of the problem here:

Defendants did not respond to the document requests as they should have. In light of that

failure, and the list of excuses presented, Judge Gallo found that Defendants did not demonstrate

due diligence in responding to Plaintiffs’ document requests, which also strongly implies that

Defendants had not shown good cause. There is nothing clearly erroneous about that conclusion,

and the Court cannot reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 

See Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 623. Indeed, Defendants’ line of reasoning which

essentially is that Plaintiffs and the Court should be compelled to accommodate Defendants’

counsel’s schedule is unrealistic and meritless.

Accordingly, Defendants fail to show that Judge Gallo’s August 30, 2012 Order is clearly

erroneous. See Concrete Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 623. Furthermore, as the Court noted

above, Defendants also fail to adequately apply the contrary-to-law standard of review in

challenging Judge Gallo’s Order. See Cathcart, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2. 3

 The remaining arguments that Defendants present address admonishments in the August 3

30, 2012 Order directed at Defendants for treating the granting of motions for protective orders

as “mere rubber stamps” and for last-minute filings. The Court need not reach those arguments

because the finding that Defendants failed to demonstrate due diligence in responding to

document requests provides an independent basis to deny Defendants’ motion for a protective

order.

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III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objection to Judge

Gallo’s August 30, 2012 Order. (Doc. 262.) The Court also DENIES Defendants’ renewed

motion for a protective order that they incorporated into their objection. That renewed motion

should be made before Judge Gallo.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 10, 2012

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO:

 

HON. WILLIAM V. GALLO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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