Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-05427/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-05427-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN ERIC GOULD,

Plaintiff,

v.

VERGARA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05427-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 26, 39

Plaintiff filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court found that the 

amended complaint stated a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim1against Correctional Training 

Facility (“CTF”) officers Vergara and A. Luna when it alleged that they took a DNA sample from 

plaintiff’s mouth without plaintiff’s consent, without probable cause, and without a warrant or 

court order, and against Monterey County District Attorney Investigator (“DAI”) sheriff T. 

Rodriguez when it alleged that he was present to enforce the DNA collection. Dkt. No. 15. Now 

pending before the Court are Defendant Rodriguez’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 26) 

and Defendants Vergara and Luna’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 39). Plaintiff has 

filed oppositions to both motions (Dkt. Nos. 31, 41), and defendants have filed replies in support 

1

In his pleadings opposing the summary judgment motions, plaintiff also alleges that the DNA 

collection violated the Fifth Amendment. See Dkt. No. 31 at 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14; Dkt. No. 37 at 3; 

Dkt. No. 43 at 3, 5. The amended complaint did not state a cognizable Fifth Amendment claim

because forced collection of an inmate’s DNA does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition 

on self-incrimination or the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. See United States v. Reynard, 473 

F.3d 1008, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (compelled extraction of blood for DNA collection does not 

violate prisoner’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because blood samples and 

DNA profiles are physical, rather than testimonial); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1341 (10th 

Cir. 1996) (takings clause does not provide prisoners with protection against unwanted DNA 

testing). Defendants correctly focus their motions on the only cognizable claim – the allegation 

that the DNA collection on March 27, 2018 violated plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 1 of 16
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

of their motions (Dkt. Nos. 32, 42).2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS both 

summary judgment motions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.3

During the relevant time period, plaintiff was incarcerated at CTF pursuant to guilty pleas 

for felony reckless evading and for felony reckless evading by driving in the opposite direction of 

traffic (Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 2800.2, 2800.4). Dkt. Nos. 39-3, 39-4. On September 26, 2017, 

plaintiff signed an Advisement and Waiver of Rights for a Felony Guilty Plea, which included a 

waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights and an acknowledgement that the Orange County Superior 

Court would order him to provide a local DNA sample:

13. Fourth Amendment wavier: I understand under the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States constitution, I have a right to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. I waive and give up this right, and further agree that for the period 

during which I am on probation or mandatory supervision I will submit my person and 

2 Plaintiff has also filed surreplies in oppositions to both motions. Dkt. Nos. 37, 43. Plaintiff did 

not obtain the required Court approval prior to filing his surreplies. Pursuant to N.D. Cal. Local 

Rule 7-3(d), once a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, papers or letters may be filed without 

prior Court approval, except if new evidence has been submitted in the reply or if a relevant 

judicial opinion was published after the date the opposition or reply was filed. Here, no new 

evidence was submitted in the replies, and plaintiff was not submitting notice of a relevant judicial 

opinion in his surreplies. However, the Court has considered plaintiff’s surreplies in deciding the 

pending summary judgment motions. 

3 Plaintiff argues that the Court must accept as true certain allegations because (1) he set forth 

these allegations in his CDCR Form 22s, (2) prison officials failed to respond to the Form 22s 

within the time limits set forth in 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3086, and (3) prison officials’ failure to 

object to these allegations is deemed an acceptance of facts pursuant to the Uniform Commercial 

Code (“UCC”) 3-410. Dkt. No. 37 at 4-5. These arguments fail. The CDCR Form 22 is not a 

discovery pleading. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, the failure to timely respond to a request for 

admission served within the course of prosecuting an action results in the matter being admitted. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. However, the failure to respond to, or deny, allegations made in a Form 22 has 

no evidentiary value or binding effect on parties or the Court in a litigation. In addition, 15 Cal. 

Code Regs. § 3086; title 15 of the California Code of Regulations; UCC 3-410; and the Uniform 

Commercial Code do not apply to, or govern, federal civil litigation. Nor do they mandate how 

prison grievance forms and their responses should be treated for evidentiary purposes. 

Plaintiff also claims that the allegations presented in Claim I must be accepted as true 

because defendants failed to deny that they violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Dkt. No. 31 at 6. 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g) authorizes defendants to waive the right to reply to any prisoner action and 

specifies that such a waiver is not an admission of the complaint. Defendants have properly 

exercised their right under 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(g) and filed a waiver of reply. Defendants’ failure to 

file an answer is not an admission of the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Moreover, as 

discussed supra, plaintiff has not stated a cognizable Fifth Amendment claim. Defendants 

therefore were not required to defend against such a claim. 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 2 of 16
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle under my control to 

search and seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer, 

probation officer, post-release community supervision officer, or parole officer with or 

without a warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

. . . 

26.(k) I voluntarily agree and understand that the court will: . . . Order me to provide a 

state DNA sample and prints for the State DNA database pursuant to P.C. 296 and P.C. 

296.1.

26.(l) I voluntarily agree and understand that the court will: . . . Order me to provide a 

local DNA sample, prints, and photograph to the [Orange County District Attorney] for 

permanent retention, analyses and search within any law enforcement database(s) for only 

law enforcement purposes.

Dkt. No. 39-3 at 3-4. Plaintiff initialed item no. 13, the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights, 

and item no. 26(k) indicating his consent to these two items, but declined to initial item no. 26(1), 

indicating that he did not consent to this item. Id. Sometime between September 16, 2017, and 

March 27, 2018, plaintiff provided a DNA sample to Orange County authorities. Dkt. No. 14 at 

40. 

The following facts regarding the March 27, 2018 DNA collection are undisputed. On that 

date, CTF Officer Luna collected a DNA sample from plaintiff by swabbing the inside of his left 

cheek. The purpose of the DNA collection was to obtain a confirmatory buccal swab from 

plaintiff for a case pending in Las Vegas, Nevada in which plaintiff was a suspect. CTF officer 

Vergara and Monterey County DAI Rodriguez were present during the collection. There was no 

court order specifically ordering this DNA collection. The DNA sample was sent to the Las 

Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.

The parties’ accounts differ as to other details of the March 27, 2018 DNA collection. 

According to plaintiff, on or about March 27, 2018, Monterey County DAI Rodriguez 

interviewed plaintiff, with CTF officers Luna and Vergara present. Plaintiff informed defendant 

Rodriguez that he had already provided a DNA sample and was not required to submit to further 

DNA collection. Plaintiff asked if the DNA collection was mandatory, and CTF officer Luna 

stated that it was. Plaintiff responded that he had proof that he complied with the DNA sample 

requirement and showed defendants his abstract of judgment. Plaintiff was seated at the time, and 

Defendant Luna “forcefully and unlawfully” collected his DNA by putting a swab in his mouth. 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 3 of 16
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff did not consent to the DNA collection and immediately protested it afterwards by 

reporting it to another correctional official. Dkt. No. 14 at 4, 19. Plaintiff alleges that DAI 

Rodriguez was the “ringleader” and “initiator” of the “unlawful taking of the DNA,” and that 

Officers Luna and Vergara acted at his direction. Dkt. No. 37 at 1-2, 6.

Defendants claim that that plaintiff consented to the DNA collection, and that the DNA 

was collected without use of force. See generally Dkt. No. 39; Dkt. No. 39-5.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2014). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the 

case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 

fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party. See id.

A court shall grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial [,] . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial 

burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the 

pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, ‘designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See 

id. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party must show more than “the mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence.” In re Oracle Corp Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). “In fact, the non-moving party must come forth 

with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 4 of 16
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

favor.” Id. (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). If the nonmoving party fails to make this 

showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. at 

323. 

For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v. 

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

II. Defendants Luna and Vergara’s Summary Judgment Motion

Defendants Luna and Vergara argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because, 

pursuant to the governing Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court caselaw, collecting DNA from 

plaintiff while he was incarcerated for the purpose of confirming his identity was reasonable 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, in the alternative, they are entitled to qualified 

immunity. Dkt. No. 39. Specifically, defendants Luna and Vergara argue that the Ninth Circuit 

has held that the collection of DNA from convicted felons for identification purposes is reasonable 

and has upheld Cal. Penal Code § 296, which mandates that all convicted felons provide a DNA 

sample for identification purposes. Dkt. No. 39 at 4-5 (citing Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 

896 (9th Cir. 2011)). Defendants Luna and Vergara also argue that they reasonably understood 

their conduct to be lawful because plaintiff initialed the portion of the Advisement and Waiver of 

Rights for a Felony Guilty Plea waiving his Fourth Amendment rights and because collection of a 

DNA sample by buccal swab is mandated by California law.

Plaintiff argues that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by “assisting an 

unauthorized outside agency, specifically the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department” in 

collecting his DNA without his consent, probable cause, a warrant, or a court order. Dkt. No. 41 

at 3. Plaintiff states that he never consented to have his DNA taken or to have his DNA shared 

with other entities, such as the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the United States 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 5 of 16
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Post Office. Dkt. No. 41 at 3-4. He denies that his plea agreement authorized the DNA collection, 

stating that the Fourth Amendment waiver in his plea agreement applies only to a period of 

probation or mandatory supervision, neither of which applied on March 27, 2018, and that he 

crossed out and refused to sign the portion of the plea bargain regarding providing a DNA sample 

for the local Orange County District Attorney DNA database. He also argues in the alternative 

that his plea agreement is unlawful, noting that he is challenging his plea agreement in Case No. 

18-cv-01821-JGB-JC (C.D. Cal.). Dkt No. 41 at 8.4 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court presumes that 

plaintiff had previously provided his DNA, that this initial DNA sample was available to 

correctional officials to send to the Las Vegas Police Department, that plaintiff did not consent to 

giving a second DNA sample, that the second DNA sample collected on March 27, 2018 was for 

the purpose of confirming plaintiff’s identity with respect to crimes for which he was charged in 

Las Vegas, and that the second DNA sample was sent to the Las Vegas Police Department.

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is clear that a prisoner’s DNA may be collected without 

his consent, probable cause, a court order, or a warrant for purposes of criminal identification, 

which includes both confirming the prisoner’s identity and determining whether the prisoner has 

committed other crimes. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 443-44, 447-56, 461-62 (2013) 

(discussing Maryland’s DNA collection statute); Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 

2013) (discussing Cal. Penal Code § 299.5). The DNA collection statutes found constitutional in 

Maryland and Hamilton specify that determining whether the prisoner is the person who 

committed another crime is an appropriate use of the DNA samples, and that the DNA samples 

may be shared with outside law enforcement agencies for this purpose. See MD Public Safety § 2-

505(a)(2) (“DNA samples shall be collected and tested . . . as part of an official investigation into 

a crime”); MD Public Safety § 2-508(a)(1) (allowing for DNA samples to be shared with federal, 

4 Plaintiff also argues that his Security Agreement (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 2-7) and Hold Harmless 

Agreement (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 8-9) somehow render the DNA collection invalid or unconstitutional. 

Dkt. No. 41 at 12-13. Both the Security Agreement or Hold Harmless Agreement appear to be 

contracts between plaintiff and himself. See generally ECF No. 22. In any event, neither 

agreement has any binding force on defendants (or has any relevance to the issues in the case). 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 6 of 16
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

State or local law enforcement agencies); Cal. Penal Code § 295 (intent of California’s DNA Act 

is to “assist federal, state, and local criminal justice and law enforcement agencies within and 

outside California in the expeditious and accurate detection and prosecution of individuals 

responsible for sex offenses and other crimes”); Cal. Penal Code § 299.6 (allowing for DNA

samples to be shared with federal, state or local law enforcement agencies). The Supreme Court 

specifically found in Maryland that using DNA samples to identify whether the arrestee had 

committed other crimes was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because there is a legitimate 

government interest in knowing an arrestee’s criminal history so that prison officials can properly 

process an arrestee for detention and determine whether he is wanted elsewhere. Maryland, 569 

U.S. at 449-56, 460. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit specifically found in Hamilton that the collection 

of identifying information under California’s DNA Act, and the use of such information for 

purposes including criminal identification, are not precluded by the Fourth Amendment. 630 F.3d 

at 894. 

It is therefore clear that under many circumstances law enforcement’s collection and 

sharing of DNA from a prisoner, including where the purpose of these acts is to determine whether 

the prisoner committed other crimes, does not violate the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law. 

The wrinkle presented here is whether it is constitutional for an individual correctional officer to 

take a DNA sample from an inmate to share with an out-of-state law enforcement agency for 

investigative purposes, when the inmate has previously provided a centrally-maintained DNA 

sample that could be used in that manner. The Court declines to conclusively answer this 

question, because it finds that defendants Luna and Vergara are entitled to qualified immunity 

with respect to their March 27, 2018 DNA collection. 

Qualified immunity is an entitlement, provided to government officials in the exercise of 

their duties, not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

200 (2001). The doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to balance two important and sometimes 

competing interests—“the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 

perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 7 of 16
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

quotation marks and citation omitted). The doctrine thus intends to take into account the realworld demands on officials in order to allow them to act “‘swiftly and firmly’” in situations where 

the rules governing their actions are often “‘voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory.’” Mueller 

v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984)). 

“The purpose of this doctrine is to recognize that holding officials liable for reasonable mistakes 

might unnecessarily paralyze their ability to make difficult decisions in challenging situations, 

thus disrupting the effective performance of their public duties.” Id.

To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider 

whether (1) the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was clearly 

established at the time of the incident. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Courts are not required to 

address the two qualified immunity issues in any particular order, and instead may “exercise their 

sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 236.

With respect to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Supreme Court 

has recently held that “[a]n officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless 

the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in his shoes would have 

understood that he was violating it, meaning that existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” City & Cty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 135 S. 

Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is an “exacting 

standard” which “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 

judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this analysis, the Court must 

determine whether the pre-existing law provided defendants with “fair notice” that their conduct 

was unlawful. Id. at 1777.

“[A] right is clearly established only if its contours are sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable 

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ In other words, ‘existing 

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Carroll v. 

Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 16 (2014) (citations omitted). The inquiry of whether a constitutional right 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 8 of 16
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

was clearly established must be undertaken in light of the “specific context” of the case, not as a 

broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in 

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id.; see, e.g., Pearson, 555 

U.S. at 243-45 (concluding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct 

was not clearly established as unconstitutional as the “consent-once-removed” doctrine, upon 

which the officers relied, had been generally accepted by the lower courts even though not yet 

ruled upon by their own federal circuit).

The Court finds that defendants Luna and Vergara are entitled to qualified immunity 

because, at the time they collected plaintiff’s DNA, there was no clearly established law that 

established “beyond debate” that the conduct alleged (accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true) 

violated the Constitution. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“under either prong [of 

the qualified immunity analysis], courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the 

party seeking summary judgment”). The crux of plaintiff’s argument is that the collection of his

DNA for the use of a third-party law enforcement agency without his consent, probable cause, a 

warrant, or a court order is a per se unreasonable search, especially where he has already provided 

a DNA sample. Plaintiff has not cited any case, and the Court is not aware of any, that holds that 

an inmate’s DNA cannot be collected without his consent, probable cause, a warrant, or court 

order for the purposes at issue here, or that holds that a second collection of an inmate’s DNA 

cannot occur without the inmate’s consent, probable cause, a warrant, or a court order. Rather, 

Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has specifically held that DNA collection from 

persons under police supervision without the person’s consent, probable cause, or a court order is 

not a per se unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because 

individuals taken into police custody are subject to a diminished expectation of privacy; DNA 

collection by buccal swab is a minimal intrusion; and the parolees’ privacy interests are 

outweighed by government interests in inter alia determining whether the parolees had been found 

guilty of other crimes. 

In Maryland, the Supreme Court applied these principles to Maryland’s requirement that 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 9 of 16
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

individuals arrested for a crime of violence or burglary, or an attempt to commit these crimes, 

provide a DNA sample. Neither the individual’s consent nor a court order, warrant, or probable 

cause was required: the individual’s arrest triggered the DNA collection requirement. Maryland, 

569 U.S. at 443-44, 447-48. The Supreme Court held that using a swab on the inner tissues of a 

person’s cheek to obtain DNA samples is a search under the Fourth Amendment, but that it was a 

reasonable search within the meaning of that amendment because there is a legitimate government 

interest in processing and identifying the persons arrested in a safe and accurate way; the intrusion 

of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is minimal; and the privacy expectations of an individual 

taken into police custody “‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.’” Id. at 450-54, 447-56, 461-

62 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)). In addition, the Maryland court included the 

parolee’s criminal history in the definition of “identifying information,” noting that the use of 

fingerprint databases which make a computerized comparison of an arrestee’s fingerprints against 

electronic databases of known criminals and unsolved crimes has been recognized as a reasonable 

search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and that “the only difference between DNA 

analysis and the accepted use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.” 

Id. at 450–51. Maryland does not limit states to a one-time collection of the arrestee’s DNA. 

Pursuant to Maryland, defendants Luna and Vergara could at least plausibly believe that it was 

lawful to collect plaintiff’s DNA to determine whether plaintiff was the individual who committed 

the crimes in Las Vegas, even though a DNA sample had previously been collected from plaintiff

and presumably was available to them under the procedures set out in California’s statute. 

It is unclear whether a court may consider binding circuit precedent in determining clearly 

established law. The Ninth Circuit has defined “clearly established law” as Supreme Court and 

circuit precedent. See Community House, Inc. v. Bieter, 623 F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To 

determine whether a right was clearly established, a court turns to Supreme Court and Ninth 

Circuit law existing at the time of the alleged act.”) (citing Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 

(9th Cir. 1996)); Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). In Hope v. 

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), the Supreme Court relied on circuit precedent in finding that the 

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, specifically that the defendants’ conduct violated 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 10 of 16
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

clearly established law in light of binding circuit precedent. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741–45 (“in light 

of binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, an Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) 

regulation, and a DOJ report informing the ADOC of the constitutional infirmity in its use of the 

hitching post, we readily conclude that the respondents’ conduct violated “clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”) (citing 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In recent cases, the Supreme Court has assumed 

for the sake of argument, without explicitly holding, that “controlling Court of Appeals’ authority 

could be a dispositive source of clearly established law,” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665-

66 (2012); see also Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 17 (2014). Neither case overruled Hope or 

called its exclusive reliance on circuit precedent into question.

Regardless, circuit precedent also fails to establish that the conduct alleged here violated 

clearly established law. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that prisoners have diminished 

expectations of privacy, and that the forced collection of DNA from convicted felons without 

consent, a warrant, or probable cause, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. As early as 1995, 

the Ninth Circuit held that an Oregon statute requiring certain prisoners to provide blood samples 

to a DNA data bank was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because 

felons have reduced expectations of privacy, blood extractions constitute a “relatively minimal 

intrusion into these persons’ privacy interests,” and there is a legitimate public interest in 

establishing a DNA bank to prevent recidivism and identify and prosecute murderers and sexual 

offenders. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559-63 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by 

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 

A decade later, the Ninth Circuit continued to find that similar laws requiring DNA 

samples from prisoners or parolees satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 

Amendment. In United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit applied 

a totality of circumstances analysis and found that the requirement under the DNA Analysis 

Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 that certain federal offenders on parole, probation, or supervised 

release submit to compulsory DNA profiling was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment, even where there was no individualized suspicion that they had committed additional 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 11 of 16
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

crimes. 379 F.3d at 833-40. In United States v. Hugs, 384 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth 

Circuit held that a condition of supervised release requiring certain felons to provide a DNA 

sample via blood collection pursuant to the procedures set forth in the DNA Act, 42 U.S.C. § 

14135a, did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy. 384 F.3d at 769. In United 

States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit applied the totality of the 

circumstances test and found that the 2004 amendment of the federal DNA Act, which required all 

persons convicted of felonies to submit to DNA collection, did not violate the Fourth Amendment 

as applied to the plaintiff, a parolee. 508 F.3d at 946-49. The Kriesel court found that as a 

supervised releasee (parolee), the plaintiff had “a diminished expectation of privacy in his own 

identity specifically, and tracking [a convicted felon’s] identity is the primary consequence of 

DNA collection.” Id. at 948. The court further noted that the legitimate concerns that DNA 

samples might be used other than for identification purposes were mitigated by the federal DNA 

Act’s privacy protections, and found that the intrusion caused by a blood test was “not significant” 

given the commonplace nature of blood tests. Id. at 948. 

More recently, the Ninth Circuit found in Hamilton that California’s DNA and Forensic 

Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act (“California DNA Act”), which requires convicted 

felons on supervised release to provide blood samples for DNA identification and allows for these 

DNA samples to be shared with outside law enforcement agencies, did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning set forth by the plurality in United States v. 

Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004), and found that the California DNA Act did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment for the following reasons. First, the California DNA Act is limited to the 

collection of identifying information. Second, the privacy intrusion resulting from DNA 

identification is small because it only establishes a record of the defendant’s identity. Third, a 

prisoner can claim no right of privacy once convicted and arrested because the prisoner’s identity 

has become a matter of state interest. Finally, there are compelling state interests in obtaining 

DNA identification from individuals on supervised release, such as “(1) ensuring compliance with 

the conditions of supervised release (by making it more likely that violations will be detected); (2) 

deterrence (by alerting the supervised releasee that the government will be able to identify him if 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 12 of 16
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

he re-offends); (3) ‘contributing to the solution of past crime’ to ‘help[ ] bring closure to countless 

victims of crime who have languished in the knowledge that perpetrators remain at large.’” 

Hamilton, 630 F.3d at 894-96 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 838-39). 

And in Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit held that 

Maryland compelled a finding that the California DNA Act’s application to anyone arrested for, or 

charged with, a felony offense, was constitutional, both facially and as-applied. Haskell, 745 F.3d 

at 1271.

None of these Ninth Circuit cases address whether a DNA sample may be collected more 

than once. 

Plaintiff argues that Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1996), and 

United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1987) “prove” that defendants’ collection of 

his DNA was “an obvious instance of constitutional misconduct.” Dkt. No. 37 at 7-8. Neither 

case addresses the circumstance present here: the second collection of DNA from a prisoner for 

law enforcement purposes. Liston found that there was a Fourth Amendment violation where 

there was judicial deception in the search warrant affidavit, and Kerr dealt with an automobile 

stop. The Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts against defining clearly established law at a 

high level of generality:

“‘We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of 

generality.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742. The dispositive question is “whether 

the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Ibid. (emphasis added). 

This inquiry “‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a 

broad general proposition.’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 

L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam ) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 

2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth 

Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that “[i]t is sometimes difficult for an 

officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the 

factual situation the officer confronts.” 533 U.S., at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015). It follows that neither case is relevant to the 

qualified immunity analysis here, because neither case addresses whether the particular conduct 

alleged violated the Constitution. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants Luna and Vergara are entitled to qualified 

immunity for their alleged conduct and GRANTS summary judgment in their favor.

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 13 of 16
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

IV. Defendant Rodriguez’s Summary Judgment Motion

Defendant Rodriguez argues that he is entitled to summary judgment for the following 

reasons. 

First, defendant Rodriguez argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because there is 

no clearly established law which prohibits a district attorney investigator from being present 

during the collection of an inmate’s DNA. In response, plaintiff argues that defendant Rodriguez 

is an expert in the law because he is an investigator for the Monterey County District Attorney’s 

Office and therefore knew that his conduct was illegal and unconstitutional; and that all defendants 

knew that their conduct was unconstitutional because they were presented with evidence that 

plaintiff’s DNA had already been collected. Dkt. No. 31 at 12-13; Dkt. No. 37 at 6-10.

Second, defendant Rodriguez argues that he did not personally participate in the collection 

of plaintiff’s DNA, as the DNA was collected by defendant Luna. See Dkt. Nos. 26, 32. Plaintiff 

argues that defendant Rodriguez is liable under Section 1983 because defendants Luna and 

Vergara collected plaintiff’s DNA pursuant to defendant Rodriguez’s orders. See Dkt. No. 31 at 5. 

Plaintiff also argues that his DNA cannot be collected without his consent, a warrant, or a court 

order, and that his DNA cannot be shared with agencies outside of the state of California or with 

employees of the United States Postal Service.5 See id. at 13. Defendant Rodriguez argues that 

plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he directed the DNA collection is insufficient at summary 

judgment to establish his casual connection in the allegedly unconstitutional DNA collection. 

The Court agrees that plaintiff has failed to present evidence from which it could be 

reasonably inferred that defendant Rodriguez directed the DNA collection, or is otherwise liable 

under Section 1983 for the DNA collection. Plaintiff’s only evidence supporting defendant 

Rodriguez’s liability for the DNA collection is his conclusory allegation that defendant Rodriguez 

5 Plaintiff also argues that that he has “freeborn rights as a sovereign” and that the DNA collection 

deprived him of his “rights as a sovereign living man.” Dkt. No. 31 at 13. A sovereign is a 

“person, body, or state vested with independent and supreme authority.” See Black's Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Plaintiff appears to be arguing that the collection of his DNA and the

sharing of his DNA with third parties without his consent were illegal because he has independent 

and supreme authority over himself. But as discussed supra, under many circumstances, DNA 

collection from prisoners is constitutional and legal even if the individual has not consented, and 

there is neither probable cause nor a court order authorizing the collection. 

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 14 of 16
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

was the ringleader and directed defendants Luna and Vergara to collect the DNA. However, it is 

undisputed that all the actions regarding the DNA collection were taken by defendant Luna. 

Defendant Luna informed plaintiff that a buccal swab needed to be taken, took the buccal swab, 

and then mailed the sample to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. There are no 

factual allegations regarding defendant Rodriguez’s involvement in the buccal swab collection 

other than his witnessing the collection and interviewing plaintiff afterwards. 

Moreover, even assuming defendant Rodriguez directed the DNA collection or is 

otherwise liable for the DNA collection, he is entitled to qualified immunity for the same reasons 

that defendants Luna and Vergara are entitled to qualified immunity. As discussed supra, as of 

March 27, 2018, there was no clearly established law that established “beyond debate” that the 

collection of an inmate’s DNA for law enforcement purposes without the inmate’s consent, 

probable cause, a warrant, or a court order, where a DNA sample had already been taken and 

presumably was available to correctional officials and law enforcement, was a per se unreasonable 

search. Both the governing Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and Ninth Circuit 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence at the time specifically authorized DNA collection from persons 

under government supervision without the person’s consent, probable cause, or a court order. It 

follows that even if the conduct alleged here violated the Constitution (which the Court does not 

decide), it would not have been clear to any reasonable officer based on clearly established law 

that the conduct was unlawful. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendant Rodriguez.

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 15 of 16
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Luna and Vergara’s motion for 

summary judgment (Dkt. No. 39) and GRANTS Defendant Rodriguez’s motion for summary 

judgment (Dkt. No. 26). The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the file.

This order terminates Dkt. Nos. 26 and 39.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/3/2020

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 4:18-cv-05427-HSG Document 46 Filed 02/03/20 Page 16 of 16