Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02918/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02918-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ORRIN TYLER COLBOURN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

B. DRAPER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-02918-EFB (PC) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff, a county jail inmate proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1), seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). As discussed 

below, the request is granted, and the court will screen the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, federal courts are authorized to allow certain litigants to sue 

without prepayment of the ordinary filing fee (commonly referred to as “proceeding in forma 

pauperis”). These litigants must demonstrate that they are unable to pay the fee. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(1) and (2). Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) 

and (2). 

Prisoners face additional barriers to proceeding in forma pauperis. One such barrier, 

known as the “three strikes” provision, provides: “In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action 

under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in 

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any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

ground that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Prior cases that fall within the 

categories described by section 1915(g) are known as “strikes.” Thus, under section 1915(g), a 

prisoner with three or more strikes (and who was not under imminent danger at the time of filing 

the complaint) may not proceed in forma pauperis and must instead pay the full filing fee up 

front. Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 

A case is “frivolous” under section 1915(g) “if it is of little weight or importance having 

no basis in law or fact.” King, 398 F.3d at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A case is 

malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Id. And a case “fails to 

state a claim under which relief may be granted” if it fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. 

A court may raise a plaintiff’s three-strikes status sua sponte during screening, and in 

doing so the court must identify the three cases that constitute strikes but need not provide the 

plaintiff additional process. Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2022). The Court has sua 

sponte considered plaintiff’s previous civil actions while incarcerated:1

 

Colbourn v. Done, et al., No. 2:19-cv-02308 (E.D. Cal., filed November 15, 2019). ECF 

Nos. 21 at 7, 36, 43. In this matter, plaintiff’s allegations were so vague and conclusory that the 

Court was unable to determine whether the action was frivolous or failed to state a claim for 

relief. The Court granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Plaintiff failed to file an 

amended complaint after being granted two extensions, and the Court dismissed the action for 

failure to prosecute. This action is a strike because it is clear from the screening order that the 

original complaint failed to state a non-frivolous, actionable claim and plaintiff did not attempt to 

state a non-frivolous, actionable claim in an amended complaint. See El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 

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 Each of these civil actions was dismissed before plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 

14, 2023. 

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F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (in determining whether a dismissal counts as a strike, “the style 

of the dismissal or procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether the 

dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” (citations 

omitted)). 

Colbourn v. California Courts, et al., No. 2:20-cv-00725 (E.D. Cal., filed April 8, 2020). 

ECF Nos. 47 at 3-5, 53. In this matter, plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed because he failed to 

state a cognizable claim under § 1983. Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint could not be “salvaged” 

by converting it into a petition for writ of habeas corpus for multiple reasons including: (1) 

failure to name the warden as a defendant; (2) demand for punitive damages; (3) non-cognizable 

grounds for a habeas action (allegation that the state violated its own laws does not create a 

cognizable federal claim); and (4) plaintiff had raised similar claims in previous habeas corpus 

petitions. ECF No. 47 at 4-5. According to El-Shaddai, 833 F.3d at 1047, a civil claim that is 

“like a habeas petition” is outside the scope of the [Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995].” 

Plaintiff’s civil complaint in California Courts was sufficiently “like a habeas petition” that the 

district court rejected converting the complaint to a habeas petition only for reasons that were 

more technical than substantive, and indeed because plaintiff had raised similar issues in his 

previous habeas petitions. Therefore, the Court will not count California Courts as a strike. 

Colbourn v. Darnell, et al., No. 2:20-cv-01937 (E.D. Cal., filed September 28, 2020). 

ECF Nos. 5 at 2-3, 14, 18, 21 at 1-2. In this matter, the Court’s screening order found that 

plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under federal law. 

The Court granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed three amended 

complaints which failed to comply with pleading requirements. The Court granted plaintiff leave 

to file a fourth amended complaint. Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint was dismissed because, 

to the extent the Court was able to “make some sense” of the fourth amended complaint, it failed 

to state a cognizable federal claim. This action is a strike because it was dismissed for the explicit 

reason that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See King, 398 

F.3d at 1121 (a dismissal for failure to state a claim “plainly qualifie[s] as a strike”).2

 

2

 A fourth earlier lawsuit filed by plaintiff is not a strike because it stated a cognizable 

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The Court concludes that, while it is a close question as to plaintiff’s civil complaint in 

California Courts, plaintiff is not yet a three-strikes litigant for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 

and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(1) and (2). 

Screening Standards 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 

Id. § 1915A(b). 

A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

While the complaint must comply with the “short and plain statement” requirements of Rule 8, its 

allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 679 (2009). 

To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. 

claim for relief. Colbourn v. Mantei, et al., No. 2:11-cv-00340 (E.D. Cal., filed February 7, 

2011). ECF Nos. 4, 71, 72. It was ultimately dismissed on plaintiff’s motion for voluntary 

dismissal. 

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Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

Screening Order 

 Plaintiff’s garbled and disjointed allegations are presented as three distinct claims. Each 

of plaintiff’s three claims implicates its own set of plausible defendants, although plaintiff’s style 

of handwriting and of describing his claims creates uncertainty in determining the actual identities 

of most of the defendants, as well as which defendants plaintiff intends to sue on which of his 

claims.3

 

First, plaintiff alleges he has been illegally arrested and imprisoned pursuant to false 

police reports, and held at the Butte County Jail, by the unspecified actions of the “CHP”4

 and the 

“OPD”5

, Judge Caraway, prosecutors, and attorneys. ECF No. 1 at 5. It might plausibly be 

inferred that the defendants who plaintiff intends to associate with this claim may also include: 

3

Plaintiff’s handwriting style has led to apparent misidentification of several defendants 

on the docket. See ECF No. 1 at 3-4. For example: (1) the actual name of the defendant 

identified as “Pauh Vue” may be “Paul Vue”; (2) the actual title and name of the defendant 

identified as “Amorney Harry Pihgrim” may be “Attorney Harry Pilgrim”; (3) the defendant 

identified as “Amorney” may be an (otherwise unidentified) “Attorney”; and (4) the defendant 

identified as “Ejidence Amorney” may or may not be an intended defendant, and may be 

plaintiff’s reference to an attorney and/or to evidence and/or to an alleged issue with evidence. 

Some of the individual defendants’ names also appear to be spelled inconsistently throughout the 

complaint. 

This screening order tentatively refers to the individual defendants as they are identified 

on the docket. 

4

 Plaintiff uses only the acronym “CHP” to identify this defendant. Although the court 

infers this as a reference to the California Highway Patrol. 

5

 Plaintiff uses only the acronym “OPD” to identify this defendant. Presumably, this is a 

reference to the Oroville Police Department. 

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(1) the defendant tentatively identified as Judge Copregaza; (2) police officers who may include 

the defendants identified as B. Draper, Z. Tarris, Darnelle, Collins, Paul Vue, M. Stokes, 

Halierman, Chad Stewart, and Frank Rivera; and (3) prosecutorial and/or defense attorneys 

including the attorney tentatively identified as Harry Pihgrim. However, such inferences are 

speculative because plaintiff has named only Judge Caraway in stating this claim. 

Second, plaintiff alleges one or more deputies at the Butte County Jail are ejaculating in 

the food served at the Jail and/or that plaintiff is being given contaminated and/or poisoned food. 

Id. at 6. Plaintiff does not identify which, if any, of the defendants are responsible for the alleged 

food contamination. Although it might be possible to infer that the defendants separately 

described as “bad deputies” (Ryan Nohand, Khols, Done,6

 and Steve T. Colbourn), see id. at 4, 

are responsible for the food contamination, such an inference would be speculative. Plaintiff does 

imply that Judge Caraway, the Parole Board, and unspecified “Courts” are (perhaps indirectly) 

responsible for holding him captive and falsely imprisoned. Id. at 6. 

Third, plaintiff alleges he has been refused a California Parole Board hearing to present 

evidence and witnesses, possibly relating to false police reports and the unspecified actions of 

defendant officers whose names plaintiff mentions in this claim (Draper, Tarris, Collins, and 

Darnelle), and possibly also that plaintiff’s speedy trial rights have been violated. Id. at 7. 

Plaintiff designates each of his three claims as stating violations of his constitutional rights 

under the Eighth Amendment, and as unspecified forms of retaliation. Id. at 5, 6, 7. Plaintiff 

seeks money damages and to be “released A-SAP.” Id. at 8. 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a federal 

constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under 

the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 

940, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

//// 

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 In Colbourn v. Done, et al., No. 2:19-cv-02308 (E.D. Cal., filed November 15, 2019), 

plaintiff alleged a Deputy Sheriff Done, along with other Butte County Jail and Sheriff’s 

Department officials, were poisoning his food with snake venom. See ECF No. 21 at 3. 

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As drafted, plaintiff’s complaint presents no cognizable federal claims. It is largely 

incomprehensible, lacks substance, and fails to specify how any particular defendant was 

involved in violating plaintiff’s federal statutory or constitutional rights. 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). “Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731-32 

(9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted). To state a failure-to-protect claim against an 

official, an inmate must allege: (1) that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial 

risk of serious harm; and (2) that the official was deliberately indifferent to his safety. Id. 

“Deliberate indifference” occurs when an official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an 

inmate's safety. Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Id. A claim for damages against a prison official requires a showing that the 

official’s deliberate indifference actually and proximately caused deprivation of the plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff's allegations of contaminated food are too vague and conclusory to state a viable 

Eighth Amendment claim. The contaminated food allegation is that: “Butte County Judge 

Caraway laten [sic] klots [sic] & Butte jail deputies are jacking off in the food & poisoning the 

food & holding me captive.” ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff fails to allege a factual basis showing that 

any individual, identifiable prison official is responsible for the food contamination he alleges. 

Similarly, plaintiff inserts words and phrases such as “retaliation,” “false imprisonment,” 

and “due process” in his complaint, without connecting them to any allegations showing any 

factual basis for any retaliation, false imprisonment, or due process claim. Such untethered 

claims are not sufficient to survive screening. 

The complaint fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim because it does not allege 

that any defendant took an adverse action against plaintiff because plaintiff had engaged in 

conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

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568 (9th Cir. 2005). If plaintiff intends to pursue a retaliation claim in an amended complaint, he 

must allege facts showing: (1) conduct that is protected by the First Amendment (such as filing 

or intending to file a complaint against a defendant); (2) that a defendant was aware of his First 

Amendment protected conduct; and (3) that the protected conduct was “the ‘substantial’ or 

‘motivating’ factor” behind defendant’s allegedly adverse actions. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 

1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). 

To the extent plaintiff is alleging claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or lack of 

due process in his criminal proceedings, these claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477 (1994). Heck holds that if success in a section 1983 action would implicitly question the 

validity of confinement or its duration, the plaintiff must first show that the underlying conviction 

was reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, 

or questioned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 

751 (2004). Some of the defendants may also have immunity from false arrest and/or false 

imprisonment claims. Acres Bonusing, Inc. v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 915 (9th Cir. 2021) (judges 

enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits for damages); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 

(1976) (prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages under § 1983 challenging 

activities related to the initiation and presentation of criminal prosecutions); Buckley v. 

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (prosecutorial immunity extends to pretrial preparation). 

Thus, plaintiff's claims for damages based on false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or lack of due 

process in his criminal proceedings against Judge Caraway, Judge Copregaza, and any defendants 

who are prosecuting attorneys are not cognizable. 

The complaint also attempts to impermissibly join claims that may not be pursued in a 

single action. Plaintiff’s claims about the criminal proceedings resulting in his confinement are 

completely unrelated to his claims about his conditions of confinement at the Jail. Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 18(a) allows a plaintiff to assert multiple claims when they are against a single 

defendant. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants 

to a lawsuit where the right to relief arises out of the same “transaction, occurrence, or series of 

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transactions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise 

in the action.” Unrelated claims against different defendants must therefore be pursued in 

separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended 

“not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but 

also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment 

of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id. 

Some of plaintiff’s allegations in this lawsuit - about being refused a Parole Board hearing 

and/or not being allowed to present evidence and witnesses - appear to be duplicative of the claim 

he has alleged in his earlier-filed pending lawsuit at Colbourn v. Butte Courthouse Parole Board, 

et al., No. 2:23-cv-02316 (E.D. Cal. filed October 23, 2023). ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claim in the Butte Courthouse Parole Board lawsuit is alleged against several of the 

same defendants here, including CHP, OPD, B. Draper, A. Farris [i.e., Tarris], Collins, and 

Darnell [i.e., Darnelle]. Plaintiff may not “maintain two separate actions involving the same 

subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant[s].” Adams v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). 

 Plaintiff’s complaint, as drafted, fails to state a cognizable claim for violation of any 

constitutional right, improperly joins unrelated claims, and appears to present one or more claims 

that duplicate plaintiff’s earlier-filed Butte Courthouse Parole Board lawsuit currently pending in 

this Court. Plaintiff will be granted an opportunity to amend his complaint to state cognizable 

claims that are not duplicative of his earlier-filed Butte Courthouse Parole Board lawsuit. 

Leave to Amend 

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If plaintiff chooses to file an 

amended complaint it should observe the following: 

Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 

participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 

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constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is 

legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). The amended complaint must contain 

a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The amended complaint 

should also describe, in sufficient detail, how each defendant personally violated or participated 

in the violation of his rights. Full names of institutional defendants must be stated and not just 

abbreviations or acronyms such as “CHP” or “OPD.” The Court will not infer the identity of 

defendants, nor the existence of allegations that have not been explicitly set forth in the amended 

complaint. 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Nor may he bring multiple, unrelated claims 

against more than one defendant. Id. The amended complaint should include only claims that are 

related because they concern the same event (or series of related events) or the same defendant. 

The amended complaint may not duplicate the claims plaintiff has alleged in his Butte 

Courthouse Parole Board lawsuit pending before this Court. 

Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it is complete in itself without 

reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 

complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 

earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being 

treated thereafter as non-existent[]’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)). 

Finally, the court notes that any amended complaint should be as concise as possible in 

fulfilling the above requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should avoid the inclusion of 

procedural or factual background which has no bearing on his legal claims. 

Conclusion 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 

2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected 

in accordance with the notice to the Butte County Jail filed concurrently herewith; 

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3. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend within 30 

days of service of this order; and 

4. Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of this action for the 

reasons stated herein. 

Dated: May 7, 2024 

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