Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02637/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02637-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY LEWIS BELVIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 4:18-cv-02637-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 20

Plaintiff Gregory Lewis Belvin seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of 

the Commissioner’s final decision, and the remand of this case for an immediate award of 

benefits. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment. Having considered the papers filed by the parties, and for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and 

DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 22, 2014, Plaintiff Gregory Belvin filed a Title XVI application for Supplemental 

Security Income (“SSI”) Benefits. Administrative Record (“AR”) 25, 200. Plaintiff alleges a 

disability onset date of February 1, 2014. AR 25. Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied on August 

11, 2014, and upon reconsideration on December 18, 2014. AR 101, 108. Plaintiff filed a Request 

for Hearing on February 18, 2015. AR 115-17. A hearing was held before Administrative Law 

Judge Richard P. Laverdure on December 7, 2016. AR 25-36.

Plaintiff is 25 years old. AR 35. He was born and largely raised in Oakland. AR 673. 

Plaintiff’s parents are divorced, and he witnessed domestic violence in the household prior to their 

separation. AR 673, 693. Although Plaintiff denied being abused himself, records from West 

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Coast Children’s Clinic indicate that he was placed in protective custody by police in 2010 due to 

an altercation with his mother and allegations that he was being abused. AR 835, 843. 

Plaintiff has a family history of mental illness and substance abuse. AR 428, 474. Plaintiff 

first attempted suicide at age 12 by ingesting a bottle of Advil. AR 430, 469, 688. As a teenager, 

he exhibited difficulties with affect regulation, problems controlling his anger, problematic social 

behavior, impulsivity, irritability, and poor insight and judgment. AR 835, 842. Despite poor 

academic performance in high school, Plaintiff excelled in debate and obtained a partial debate 

scholarship to University of Western Georgia. AR 428, 468, 673, 852. 

Plaintiff suffered a psychotic break during his first semester of college. AR 428-30, 468. 

He told college counselors that he was suffering from chronic insomnia and anxiety, feared that 

his room was being broken into, and felt like he was being watched, like in The Hunger Games or 

The Truman Show. AR 428. Counselors noted he exhibited blocking, loose associations, 

pressured speech, agitated affect, and was not adapting socially. AR 428-30. Campus police also 

got involved after Plaintiff wrote a conspiracy-laden paper containing “terrorist-type language.”

AR 468. After failing all but one of his classes, Plaintiff returned to the Bay Area where his father 

reported that he was a “totally different person” who neglected his hygiene, got a tattoo in the 

middle of his forehead, always seemed to be in a “daze,” and was unable to focus or function. AR 

691. 

The subsequent years involved numerous emergency psychiatric hospitalizations, 

including: March 2013 at Alta Bates Hospital for acute psychosis with delusions (AR 457-477); 

inpatient treatment July 26-29, 2013 at Kaiser and John George Psychiatric Hospital for psychosis 

and ongoing suicidal ideation (AR 652-655; 685); inpatient treatment September 9-13, 2013 at 

Alta Bates for auditory hallucinations telling him to hurt himself (AR 480-491); an admission in 

April 2014 at Alta Bates for severe delusions with doctors determining that he posed a threat to 

others if placed at a lower level of care (AR 516); inpatient hospitalization May 1-9, 2014 at John 

George for an intentional overdose on the psychiatric medications Zyprexa and Ativan due to 

hopelessness and racing thoughts (AR 614-625); two admissions at John George in December 

2015 for hallucinations telling him to hurt himself (AR 868-919); a 5150 at Alta Bates Summit 

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April 14-19, 2016 for acute psychosis and paranoia (AR 732-755); and another admission less 

than a month later for ongoing psychosis (AR 768-775). During most of these hospitalizations,

doctors noted that Plaintiff had not been compliant with his psychiatric medications, which have 

included Zyprexa, Risperdal, Ativan, and Depakote. AR 480, 491, 501, 615. Toxicology reports 

during these hospitalizations also noted the presence of THC, and sometimes other substances,

including cocaine and methamphetamine. AR 458-59, 482, 521, 615, 739, 893.

Doctors primarily diagnosed Plaintiff with Schizoaffective Disorder, although he has also 

been diagnosed with other schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, including undifferentiated 

schizophrenia and Psychosis NOS. AR 475, 491, 513, 515, 574, 614, 679, 696, 714, 720, 746, 

826, 856, 862, 1042. In addition, doctors have diagnosed him with polysubstance disorders, 

including cannabis abuse, cannabis dependence, and amphetamine-type substance disorder. AR 

491, 513, 515, 655, 862, 919. Beyond emergency hospitalization, Plaintiff also sought outpatient 

treatment at La Cheim Behavioral Health and Lifelong Clinic. AR 558-81. From January 11 to 

February 10, 2016, he underwent residential psychiatric treatment at Woodroe Place, where he 

received intensive treatment and medication monitoring. AR 789-832, 861. The next month, he 

was admitted to Turning Point, a transitional living facility for young adults with mental health 

issues, where he received triage support from a nurse practitioner, therapist, and residential 

counselor. AR 1044, 1055. In May 2016, Plaintiff was placed on a regimen of Cogentin, 

Zyprexa, and a monthly dose of Invega Sustenna, a long-lasting injectable anti-psychotic. AR 863. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that doctors had recently replaced the monthly injections with a 

three-month dosage, which he described as a “more intense shot.” AR 53.

Plaintiff’s earnings history is limited, with his most recent earnings report indicating that 

the most he had made in any one year was a total of $4327.88 from various temp agencies. AR 

220-21, 246-47. Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he had been employed full time for two 

months as a municipal sewer inspector for “AIMS PIWC” and moonlighted as a warehouse 

worker for Macy’s. AR 48-49. However, the new hire wage information report generated by 

Social Security on December 28, 2016 only reflected $1441 in third-quarter earnings from 

Macy’s, and did not indicate recent employment with AIMS PIWC. AR 250.

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In a decision dated January 11, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 25-

36. On March 2, 2017, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision. 

AR 197. The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals 

Council denied review on March 6, 2018. AR 1-6. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

On October 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment. (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 

No. 14.). On December 26, 2018, Defendant filed its opposition and cross-motion for summary 

judgment. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 20.) On February 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a reply. (Pl.’s 

Reply, Dkt. No. 23.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may reverse the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits only when the 

Commissioner's findings are 1) based on legal error or 2) are not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 

(9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance”; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th 

Cir. 1996). In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial 

evidence, the Court must consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 

supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion. Id. “Where 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be 

upheld.” Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, disability claims are evaluated 

according to a five-step sequential evaluation. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 

1998). At step one, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. Id. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At 

step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment 

or combination of impairments,” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 

721. If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If the answer is yes, the Commissioner 

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proceeds to step three, and determines whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment 

under 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If this requirement is 

met, the claimant is disabled. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. 

If a claimant does not have a condition which meets or equals a listed impairment, the 

fourth step in the sequential evaluation process is to determine the claimant's residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) or what work, if any, the claimant is capable of performing on a sustained basis, 

despite the claimant’s impairment or impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can 

perform such work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). RFC is the application of a legal 

standard to the medical facts concerning the claimant's physical capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). 

If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an inability to perform prior work, the 

Commissioner must show, at step five, that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 

work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. The claimant bears the 

burden of proof in steps one through four. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-954 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five. Id. at 954. 

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since May 22, 2014, the application date. AR 27. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 

following severe impairments: paranoid schizophrenia, and polysubstance abuse. AR 27. At step 

three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments, including the substance use disorders, met 

or medically equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 27. The 

ALJ found that if Plaintiff stopped the substance use, he would not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. AR 32.

Before considering step four, the ALJ determined that if Plaintiff stopped the substance 

use, he would have the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional 

levels, except that he would be limited to simple, repetitive tasks with no public interaction 

required. AR 33. At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work 

experience. AR 35. At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform a significant number 

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of unskilled work at all exertional levels. AR 36. 

Lastly, the ALJ found that the substance use disorder was a contributing factor material to 

the determination of disability, because Plaintiff would not be disabled if he stopped the substance 

use. AR 36. Thus, Plaintiff was not disabled pursuant to the Social Security Act. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff makes three arguments in his motion for summary judgment: (1) that the ALJ 

erred in determining that his substance use was material to a finding of disability; (2) that the ALJ 

erred in evaluating the medical evidence by not giving sufficient weight to the opinions of the 

examining and treating doctors; and (3) that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility.

A. Whether Plaintiff’s substance use was material

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that his use of drugs was material to the 

disability determination. (Pl.’s Mot. at 8.) A claimant is not eligible for disability benefits if 

alcohol or drug addiction is a “contributing factor material to” the disability determination. 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535 (describing how the agency assesses materiality of 

drugs and alcohol); Social Security Ruling, SSR 13-2p.; Titles II and XVI: Evaluating Cases 

Involving Drug Addiction and Alcoholism (DAA), 78 FR 11939-01.

Under SSR 13-2p, the ALJ must evaluate the disabled effects of all medically determinable 

impairments, including substance use disorders, and if they find the claimant disabled, they must 

then conduct a second sequential evaluation to determine whether they would be disabled if they 

were not using drugs or alcohol. 78 Fed. Reg. 11941. If claimant has another medically 

determinable impairment and that other impairment is disabling by itself while the claimant is 

dependent upon or abusing drugs or alcohol, Drug Addiction and Alcoholism (“DAA”) is not 

material. Id. If DAA causes or effects the claimant’s other medically determinable impairments, 

but the other impairment is irreversible or could not improve to the point of nondisability, DAA is 

not material. Id. If the record is fully developed and the evidence does not establish that the 

claimant’s co-occurring mental disorders would improve to the point of non-disability in the 

absence of DAA, DAA is not material to the determination of disability. 78 Fed. Reg. 11944. 

Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from severe paranoid schizophrenia and 

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polysubstance abuse, and that his mental impairments, including the substance use disorders, meet 

the criteria for Section 12.03 (Schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders), 12.04 

(Depressive, bipolar and related disorders) and 12.09 (Substance–related Disorders) of the 

impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, or the “listings.” AR 27-32. At the 

second step, however, the ALJ determined that if Plaintiff stopped his substance use, he would 

continue to have severe impairments, but those impairments would not render him “disabled” 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 32-35. In making these findings, the ALJ 

largely relied on the testimony of the non-treating, non-examining medical expert, Dr. Strahl, 

because he was “the only medical source who has had the opportunity to hear reports of claimant’s 

functionality during periods of abstinence and medical compliance.” AR 31-32. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assigning the most weight to Dr. Strahl’s opinion, 

because Dr. Strahl’s testimony “did not demonstrate the separate effects of Plaintiff’s treatment for 

substance abuse and treatment for his co-occurring mental disorders in accounting for Plaintiff’s 

reported functional improvement by the time of the hearing, [due to his reported abstinence,] 

including new evidence of medication compliance in a structured care setting.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 10.) 

Indeed, under SSR 13-2p, a claimant’s

[i]mprovement in a co-occurring mental disorder in a highly 

structured treatment setting, such as a hospital or substance abuse 

rehabilitation center, may be due at least in part to treatment for the 

co-occurring mental disorder, not (or not entirely) the cessation of 

substance use. We may find that DAA is not material depending on 

the extent to which the treatment for the co-occurring mental disorder 

improves the claimant's signs and symptoms. If the evidence in the 

case record does not demonstrate the separate effects of the treatment 

for DAA and for the co-occurring mental disorder(s), we will find that 

DAA is not material....

78 Fed. Reg. 11945. In opposition, Defendant argues that the period of sobriety is more than 

sufficient to support a finding of materiality, because Plaintiff was able to hold down a full-time 

job. (Def.’s Opp’n at 2-3.) 

At the time of the hearing, in December 2016, Plaintiff testified that he had been employed 

full-time for approximately two months as a municipal sewer inspector, and held a part-time 

warehouse position with Macy’s for five months. AR 48, 55. In May 2016, Plaintiff was placed 

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on a monlty dose of Invega Sustenna, a long-lasting injectable anti-psychotic. AR 863. Shortly 

before the hearing, Plaintiff testified that his medication was switched from the monthly injection 

to a three-month injection cycle. AR 53. At the hearing, Dr. Strahl opined that the injection 

medications obviated Plaintiff’s prior compliance problems, wherein Plaintiff would stop taking 

his medication once he felt better. AR 60. Dr. Strahl believed that Plaintiff’s mental condition was 

“much improved because compliance has improved, and the use of substances is minimized 

because he gets drug tested....” AR 60. Even so, Dr. Strahl does not solely attribute Plaintiff’s 

apparent ability to function to not using drugs. Rather, Dr. Strahl acknowledged that Plaintiff had

at times met “a listing” before he ever used illicit substances. AR 61. Thus, in assigning great 

weight to Dr. Strahl’s opinion, there is no way to separate Plaintiff’s schizophrenia from his 

substance use, which the medical professionals agree was a product of his mental disorder. See AR 

60-62.

Lastly, Dr. Strahl testified that, while Plaintiff was doing “better” on the injectable 

medication, he could not say that Plaintiff would not suffer another psychotic break even if he 

continues with his injections. AR 60. The Court also notes that, at the time of the hearing, 

Plaintiff was residing in a highly structured treatment setting, which undoubtedly improved the 

symptoms of his co-occurring mental disorder. See 78 Fed. Reg. 11945. 

SSR 13-2p requires a finding that DDA is not material “[i]f the evidence in the case record 

does not demonstrate the separate effects of the treatment for DAA and for the co-occurring 

mental disorder(s).” 78 Fed. Reg. 11945. Here, it is impossible to separate the effects of 

Plaintiff’s medication compliance and his residential placement from his abstinence, which, 

pursuant to SSR 13-2p, requires a finding of immateriality. As a result, the ALJ erred in finding 

Plaintiff’s drug use material, and the case must be remanded.

B. Remaining arguments

In light of the finding that the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s drug use material, 

the Court need not address Plaintiff’s remaining arguments.

C. Remand for an award of benefits is appropriate

While remand is required, it is only proper to remand for an immediate award of benefits if

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there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 

made. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

Meeting a “listing” at step three entitles a claimant to benefits. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 

721. Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments, including the substance use disorders, met 

or medically equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 27. 

Since the ALJ’s only reason for finding that Plaintiff did not meet a listing was due to an 

erroneous finding that his DDA was material, the Court finds that remand for an award of benefits 

is proper, since Plaintiff otherwise meets the listings for Section 12.03 (Schizophrenia spectrum 

and other psychotic disorders), 12.04 (Depressive, bipolar and related disorders) and 12.09 

(Substance–related Disorders) in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and satisfies the 

paragraph B duration requirement. AR 27-32.

V. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and this 

action is REMANDED to the Commissioner, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for 

an immediate award of benefits. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2019

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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