Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05070/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05070-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY W. HUNTSINGER, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

NORTHERN INYO COUNTY LOCAL )

HOSPITAL DISTRICT, a public )

entity; HERMAN J. SPENCER, an )

individual; MARSHA WINSTON, )

an individual; and DOES 1-25, )

INCLUSIVE, )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-03-5070 REC DLB

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS

ELEVEN, TWELVE, THIRTEEN &

FOURTEEN AS AGAINST

DEFENDANT DISTRICT.

(Doc. 83)

On June 27, 2005, the court heard Defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings as to certain of Plaintiff’s claims. 

Upon due consideration of the written and oral arguments of the

parties, the court rules as follows. 

I. Factual Background

The detailed facts of this case are set forth in the court’s

prior orders. See Doc. 48 (“dismissal order”). To summarize,

Plaintiff Anthony Huntsinger (“Plaintiff”) was an employee in the

Radiology Department of the Northern Inyo Hospital (“the

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Hospital”) from approximately 1987 through December 27, 2001. 

The Hospital is a part of Defendant Northern Inyo County Local

Hospital District (“the District”). Defendant Marsha Winston was

Plaintiff’s former supervisor and Defendant Herman Spencer was

the former administrator of the Hospital.

Plaintiff alleges generally that Spencer and Winston

retaliated against him because Plaintiff made numerous reports

during his employment of shortcomings on the part of the Hospital

in terms of patient care, safety, and compliance with applicable

state and federal regulations. Plaintiff alleges that Winston

and Doe Defendants fabricated charges surrounding Plaintiff’s

attendance record and that this resulted in his termination. The

termination was later found to be unjustified by the District’s

Board. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Winston sexually harassed

him and that his working conditions became so intolerable that he

was constructively terminated and forced to resign. Plaintiff

further alleges that when he gave written notice of his

termination he requested part-time, per diem employment, and that

the request was denied by Defendant Winston. Plaintiff’s

grievance as to this denial was subsequently denied. 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff’s FAC contained seventeen causes of action. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted in part

and denied in part on June 15, 2004. See Doc. 48. The claims at

issue in this motion are claims eleven through fourteen. These

claims are based on California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”),

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 All further statutory references are to the Business & 1

Professions Code unless otherwise specified.

 With the exception of claim fourteen, which was against the 2

District only.

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Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.. These claims were 1

dismissed as against Defendants Winston and Spencer in the

dismissal order. See Doc. 48 at 24-26. 2

Plaintiff alleges that the District’s actions - retaliation

for whistle-blowing, sexual harassment, denial of the request for

per diem employment and denial of the grievance - amount to

unfair (claim eleven), unlawful (claim twelve) and fraudulent

(claim thirteen) business practices, all in violation of section

17200. Plaintiff also alleges that the District made false and

misleading representations to patients that the Hospital was safe

and in compliance with state and federal laws in violation of

section 17500 (claim fourteen).

III. The Current Motion

The parties dispute the character of the current motion. 

The District moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule

12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District

argues that after the court ruled on the motion to dismiss, the

California Court of Appeal determined that a public entity could

not be liable under the UCL as a matter of law. The District

maintains that because it is a public entity, Plaintiff cannot

bring an unfair competition claim against it and claims eleven

through fourteen now fail. The District also argues that the UCL

claims fail because Plaintiff seeks damages in the FAC, a remedy

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 The District argued in its reply that it’s motion is not 3

one for reconsideration because the law has changed. Defs.’ Reply

at 3. This is, of course, the standard for reconsideration.

See E.D. Cal. R. 78-230(k); Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop, 229

F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating reconsideration proper if

“court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear

error, or if there is an intervening change in controlling law”).

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unavailable under the UCL. 

Plaintiff asserts that what the District filed is a motion

for reconsideration because it is asking the court to reconsider

its prior ruling based on an intervening California Court of

Appeal decision. Plaintiff asserts that this is inappropriate

because the case is not a California Supreme Court case and

because the court indicated earlier that the proper vehicle for

determination of this issue is a motion for summary judgment. 

Whether the motion is characterized as a motion for

reconsideration of the dismissal order or a motion for judgment

on the pleadings is immaterial. A Rule 12(c) motion is 3

essentially a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that is made after the close

of the pleadings. See 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.38. A

defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted may be raised at any time, including via a Rule 12(c)

motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). The question is, viewing the

allegations in the FAC as true, whether it is “beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.” Enron Oil Trading & Transp.

Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 529 (2d Cir.

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1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d

80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957))).

Accordingly, the court will construe the District’s motion

as one raising the defense of failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(h), appropriately

brought via a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Again, the

question is whether, considering the new decision, it is beyond

doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

UCL claims.

IV. Discussion

A. California’s UCL

Section 17206 of the UCL provides that “[a]ny person who

engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition

shall be liable for a civil penalty . . ..” Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code § 17206. Section 17201 defines “person” as “all natural

persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock

companies, associations and other organizations of persons.” Id.

at 17201. 

The dismissal order stated that it was inappropriate to

grant dismissal at the time due to insufficient information. The

court was guided by the California Supreme Court’s statement in 

Regents of the Univ. Of California v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.3d

533, 536 (1976), that: 

in the absence of express words to the contrary,

neither the state nor its subdivisions are included

within the general words of a statute. [Citations.] 

But this rule excludes governmental agencies from the

operation of general statutory provisions only if their

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inclusion would result in an infringement upon

sovereign governmental powers.

See Doc. 48 at 24. The court stated that a summary judgment

motion with information regarding infringement on sovereign

governmental powers would be necessary. 

The District argues that a recent Court of Appeal decision

clarified that public entities are not “persons” within the

meaning of the UCL. Plaintiff argues that under the Erie

doctrine the court is only bound on questions of state law by

decisions of the California Supreme Court and that decisions of

appellate courts have only persuasive value. Plaintiff’s

contention is correct that the decisions of the Court of Appeal

are persuasive and not binding. See Comm’r of Internal Revenue

v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 18 L. Ed. 2d 886, 87 S.

Ct. 1776 (1976). It remains true that there is no California

Supreme Court case directly on point. 

At the time of the dismissal order, a few appellate courts

had held that public entities could not be sued under the UCL. 

See California Med. Assn. v. Regents of the Univ. of California,

79 Cal. App. 4th 542, 551 (2000); Janis v. California State

Lottery Com., 68 Cal. App. 4th 824 831 (1998); Trinkle v.

California State Lottery, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1198, 1202-04 (1999);

Community Memorial Hosp. v. County of Ventura, 50 Cal. App. 4th

199 (1996); Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Bluvshtein, 230 Cal.

App. 3d 308, 318 (1991). These cases are from the second and

third appellate districts. 

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After the dismissal order was issued, the First Appellate

District decided the case People for the Ethical Treatment of

Animals, Inc. v. California Milk Producers Advisory Board, 125

Cal. App. 4th 871 (2005) (hereinafter “PETA”), on which the

current motion is based. In PETA, an animal rights group

challenged an advertising campaign by the California Milk

Producers Advisory Board (“CMAB”). 125 Cal. App. 4th at 874. 

The appellate court determined that the CMAB was a public entity

operating under California’s Secretary of Food and Agriculture

and that public entities are not subject to liability under the

UCL. Id. at 879.

The court in PETA based its decision on the plain language

of the UCL, particularly as compared with language used in other

statutes. 125 Cal. App. 4th at 881. The court stated: 

In all of these cases [finding UCL inapplicable], the

courts noted that the definition of the term “person”

in the operative statutes did not include any public

entities, and concluded that the UCL did not otherwise

evidence any intent to impose governmental liability.

We agree. “Statutory interpretation begins with the

text and will end there if a plain reading renders a

plain meaning: a meaning without ambiguity,

uncertainty, contradiction, or absurdity.” [Citation] 

Section 17201 does not include any references to

governmental agencies or political entities. Thus,

only through an unreasonable, strained construction can

CMAB, an administrative adjunct to a governmental body,

be deemed encompassed by the statutory definition of

“person” as included within “natural persons,

corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock

companies, associations” or “other organizations of

persons.” (§ 17201).

As respondent notes, had the Legislature wanted to

include governmental entities in its definition of

“person” for purposes of the UCL, it would have done

so. We agree. The Unfair Practices Act (commencing

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with § 17000), which was enacted in 1941, contains its

own definition of “person” to include “any person,

firm, association, organization, partnership, business

trust, company corporation or municipal or other public

corporation.” (§ 17021, italics added.) In contrast,

the UCL (commencing with § 17200), which was enacted

later in 1977, omitted “municipal or other public

corporation” from its definition of “person.” (§

17201). Therefore, had the Legislature wished to

include governmental entities, such as the CMAB, in its

definition of “person[s]” subject to UCL liability it

would have done so by using language similar to that in

section 17021.

125 Cal. App. 4th at 878-79 (italics original, underlining added,

footnotes omitted).

The PETA court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a

public entity is excluded from the statutory definition of

“person” only if a civil action seeks to interfere with a “valid

exercise of the state’s sovereign powers.” Id. at 879. In so

doing, the court discussed another appellate decision that had

reached the same result but that had applied the interference

with sovereign powers test from Regents, supra. The PETA court

determined that such an inquiry was unnecessary based on the

plain language of the statute and it distinguished Regents

because it did not involve the UCL.

B. Analysis

1. The District as a Public Entity

The FAC alleges that the District is “a local hospital

districts [sic] formed under the laws of the State of

California.” FAC ¶ 4. The District has clarified that it is a

public entity formed under and subject to the regulations in the

California Health and Safety Code. Section 32121 of the Health

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and Safety Code defines the powers of local health districts. It

appears without dispute that the District is a public entity.

2. Liability Under the UCL

As to the question of whether, as a public entity, the

District cannot be liable under the UCL, the court agrees with

the reasoning in the PETA case. As PETA pointed out, the plain

language of the statute, unlike other statutes that provide for

public entity liability, contains no language making public

entities liable under the UCL. As the court in PETA stated, if

the legislature had intended public entity liability, it knew the

language to use. Moreover, the court in PETA noted that “it is

difficult to imagine a scenario whereby in one context, a

governmental body could be considered a ‘person’ as defined by

section 17201, while in another context, it is not.” 125 Cal.

App. 4th at 883 n.11. Following the PETA reasoning avoids an

unnecessary inquiry on summary judgment into the degree of

sovereignty. 

Although Plaintiff is correct that appellate authority is of

only persuasive value, the fact that all of the California

appellate courts to consider the issue of public entity liability

under the UCL have determined, for one reason or another, that it

does not exist is highly persuasive authority. No case has been

cited to the contrary. Additionally, the general rule stated in

the Regents of California case on which the dismissal order was

based is, on closer inspection, a fairly specific holding. In

Regents, the California Supreme Court held that a constitutional

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prohibition against usury applied to the University of

California. The court stated the general principle quoted above,

but also relied on the fact that the constitutional provision

specifically exempted some entities and provided for general

regulation by the legislature as follows:

Our conclusion is supported by an examination of the

constitutional provision itself. There the drafters

established a generally applicable usury limit,

exempting certain types of lenders, but providing for

their regulation by the Legislature. (Cal. Const.,

art. XX, 2d § 22.) The provision for regulation of

even the exempt classes indicates an intent to regulate

all loans for the protection of the public. There is

no indication of any intent that the University should

not fall within the general class of nonexempt money

lenders. 

17 Cal. 3d at 537. Regents is thus distinguishable from cases

decided under the UCL because it involves an area that the

legislature intended to regulate in its entirety. As discussed

by the court in PETA, the Legislature omitted language from the

UCL that would have included public corporations such as the

District. Unlike the constitutional provision, there is no

indication in the UCL that the Legislature intended it to apply

to public entities.

Accordingly, the District’s motion to dismiss claims eleven

through fourteen for failure to state a claim is GRANTED.

3. Restitution Issue

The damages issue argued by the District does not present an

alternative basis for dismissal. The District argues that only

injunctive relief and restitution are available under the UCL and

Plaintiff is seeking “damages” in the FAC. The District cites

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Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163,

173 (2000), for the proposition that damages are unavailable

under the UCL. Although this point is correct, Cortez

specifically held that “orders for payment of wages unlawfully

withheld from an employee are also a restitutionary remedy

authorized by section 17203.” Id. at 177. As explained in the

dismissal order, Plaintiff may seek restitutionary recovery from

his employer, the District, for back wages pursuant to Cortez. 

The District is not entitled to dismissal on this basis. 

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim is hereby GRANTED.

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims eleven, twelve,

thirteen and fourteen as against the District are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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