Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00321/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00321-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lorraine Patterson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Department of Economic Security, 

et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00321-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the court is Defendant Maricopa County’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23). 

The Motion will be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff originally filed suit on February 20, 2015, seeking damages for violations 

of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights allegedly suffered during dependency 

proceedings that Child Protective Services initiated for the benefit of Plaintiff’s daughter. 

(See Doc. 1 at 1-3.) In an Amended Complaint submitted on May 29, 2015, Plaintiff 

asserts six causes of action against more than a dozen defendants, including Maricopa 

County (“the County”). 

 Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that the County “established and/or 

followed policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices which policies were the moving 

force behind the violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, including those under the 

First and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Doc. 17-1 at 27.) Among the policies the County 

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allegedly adopted—the full list of which goes on for twelve pages—are the “County 

policy of detaining and/or removing children from their family and homes by County 

accepting false allegations in Juvenile Dependency Petitions,” the “County policy of 

ignoring evidence discounting the allegations in order to support the claims of [Child 

Protective Services] Reports to the court,” the “policy of appointing attorneys that are far 

below the reasonable standards of care and due diligence,” and the “policy of the County 

not requiring [Child Protective Services] to produce files in a timely matter [sic] so they 

can be viewed.” (Id. at 27, 28, 33, 36.) According to the Amended Complaint, the 

“conduct described is so pervasive that it has become common knowledge that they [sic] 

type of misconduct alleged is commonplace within Maricopa County.” (Doc. 17-2 at 3.) 

 Plaintiff’s third cause of action, the only other that is asserted against the County, 

alleges she was deprived of her right to procedural due process during the dependency 

proceedings. (Id. at 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims, among other things, that “the 

hearings denied an opportunity to be heard, present evidence and to dispute the 

allegations in a timely fashion,” that “Plaintiff learned of the allegations after the first 

court hearing on March 15th, 2013 by happenstance disallowing her to dispute them with 

evidence,” and that “Plaintiff was denied a continuance although unprepared to argue her 

case on July 24th, 2013.” (Id. at 16-18.) The Amended Complaint largely fails to make 

clear exactly who allegedly engaged in the acts that denied Plaintiff procedural due 

process. (See id. at 15-20.) Near the end of Plaintiff’s third cause of action, she adds that 

the “County and those individuals with policymaking decisions did not follow established 

protocol and assurances that ensure Plaintiff’s due process civil rights.” (Id. at 20.) 

 The County now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as provided by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 When considering a motion to dismiss, a court evaluates the legal sufficiency of 

the plaintiff’s pleadings. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure can be based on “the lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To avoid dismissal, a complaint need include 

“only enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

 On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are 

assumed to be true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the principle that a 

court accepts as true all of the allegations in a complaint does not apply to legal 

conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Further, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is 

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. To show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, the 

complaint must permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. 

Id. If the plaintiff’s pleadings fall short of this standard, dismissal is appropriate. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff’s claims against the County are rooted in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 

provides, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

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laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress.” Although the statute establishes liability for any “person” who 

deprives a plaintiff of her rights, a municipality such as the County can be held liable 

under § 1983 in limited circumstances. On this theory of municipal liability, named after 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 

436 U.S. 658 (1978), a “municipality cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior 

theory.” Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2008). “Instead, Congress 

intended to hold municipalities liable only when ‘action pursuant to official municipal 

policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.’ The ‘official policy’ requirement was 

intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the 

municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for 

which the municipality is actually responsible.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 

(9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original) (citation and some internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 “For purposes of liability under Monell, a ‘policy’ is ‘a deliberate choice to follow 

a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the official or officials 

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.’ A 

municipality is also liable if a policymaking official delegates his or her discretionary 

authority to a subordinate, and the subordinate uses that discretion.” Fogel, 531 F.3d at 

834 (ellipsis in original) (citation omitted). In addition, a plaintiff may establish liability 

by proving “the existence of a widespread practice that . . . is so permanent and well 

settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” Gillette v. Delmore, 

979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (ellipsis in original). Where a § 1983 

plaintiff “provide[s] no evidence that [the municipality] maintained an official policy of 

[violating constitutional rights] or that any final policymaking official made a decision to 

violate h[er] rights,”—and where that plaintiff “also [does] not establish[] that any of the 

officers involved . . . were official policymakers with final decision making authority for 

[the municipality], or that any official policymaker ‘either delegated that authority to, or 

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ratified the decision of, a subordinate,’”—a “municipal liability claim . . . fails.” See 

Fogel, 531 F.3d at 835. 

 By this standard, Plaintiff’s first cause of action fails to state a Monell claim. 

Plaintiff lists nearly two dozen “policies” allegedly adopted by the County, but she offers 

no concrete facts to support her conclusory allegations. Nowhere does Plaintiff allege 

which County decision-makers adopted the supposed policies, the precise content of 

those policies, how they were communicated to County employees, or any other 

information that would render plausible the idea that the County has adopted such 

policies. A vague assertion that the County’s conduct “is so pervasive that it has become 

common knowledge that they [sic] type of misconduct alleged is commonplace within 

Maricopa County” (Doc. 17-2 at 3) does not bridge the plausibility gap. Some of the 

alleged “policies” are so nebulous that it is difficult to imagine how they could ever be 

articulated, broadcast, or enforced. (See, e.g., Doc. 17-2 at 2 (describing the “‘policy’ of 

County using deceptive tactics that deceive all who view the paperwork”).) Others are so 

expansive that they amount to little more than bald assertions of illegality, in defiance of 

the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard. (See, e.g., Doc. 17-1 at 31 (asserting that “County 

has a ‘policy’ of denying due process within the meaning of the right to be heard in a 

competent, impartial tribune within a meaningful time when deprivation of a liberty 

interest is at stake”).) 

 Nor has Plaintiff alleged that any of the individual defendants were “official 

policymakers with final decision making authority” for the County or that the County’s 

official policymakers delegated their authority to the employees involved in Plaintiff’s 

case. Absent more particularized factual allegations, a bare statement that the County 

“established and/or followed policies” that were “the moving force behind the violations 

of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights” (Doc. 17-1 at 27) is insufficient. 

 Plaintiff’s third cause of action fares no better. The Amended Complaint asserts a 

§ 1983 procedural due process claim against “Defendant COUNTY and those individuals 

with official policy making capacity and decision making acting under color of state law 

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when committing the acts alleged herein.” (Doc. 17-2 at 16.) But the third cause of 

action does not directly allege the County adopted any particular policies that resulted in 

the violation of Plaintiff’s rights. The closest the Amended Complaint comes to such an 

allegation is Plaintiff’s contention the “County and those individuals with policymaking 

decisions did not follow established protocol and assurances that ensure Plaintiff’s due 

process civil rights.” (Id. at 20.) To the extent the third cause of action alleges County 

policies, then, it seeks damages for the County’s failure to follow those policies, not 

actions taken pursuant to those policies. Because this falls far short of an adequate 

Monell claim, dismissal of the Amended Complaint is appropriate. 

 The court screened Plaintiff’s complaint three times before permitting it to be 

served (Doc. 3, 7, 13), and it appears there is little, if anything, she could include in a 

further amended complaint to address the deficiencies identified in this Order. 

Nevertheless, because she is proceeding in propria persona, the court will allow Plaintiff 

twenty-one days in which to submit an amended complaint that states a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. If Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6), no 

further leave to amend will be granted. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Maricopa County’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 23) is granted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file by September 2, 2015, an 

amended complaint that states a claim upon which relief can be granted. If by that date 

Plaintiff has not submitted an amended complaint, the Clerk shall terminate this case as 

against Defendant Maricopa County. 

 Dated this 12th day of August, 2015. 

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