Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00785/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00785-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luis Mariano Martinez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-785-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On September 17, 2008, the Magistrate Judge to whom this

case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the

Petition be denied. Doc. #12. Petitioner filed objections to the R&R, to which Respondents

responded and Petitioner replied. Because objections have been filed, the Court will review

the Petition de novo. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)

(en banc).

Pages 1 through 9 of the R&R recite the factual and procedural history of this case.

R&R at 1-9. Neither party has objected to this account and the Court hereby accepts it.

Next, pages 9-16 of the R&R lay out the law governing exhaustion, procedural default

(including adequate and independent state grounds), and cause and prejudice. R&R at 9-16.

This discussion correctly summarizes the law governing what must occur for a federal court

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1

 With the exception that the Court may consider a claim on the merits if the Court

will deny relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

2

 There is also an actual innocence exception, but in his Objections Petitioner

specifically rejects that he is pursuing this exception. Doc. #13 at 3-4.

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to consider the merits of a habeas claim arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and the Court hereby

accepts and adopts this legal framework.

As a preliminary observation, the Court notes that the framework governing when a

federal court may consider the merits of a habeas claim arising from a state court conviction

is driven by the principles of comity. See, e.g., Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir.

1979). Specifically, the federal court should give the state court the first opportunity to

consider a claim unless certain very specific exceptions apply. In both his Petition and in his

Objections, Petitioner seems to disregard this framework by making arguments without

attempting to apply the governing law, or by objecting to the R&R applying the governing

law. However, the Court is not free to consider the merits of claims, unless the principles of

comity are satisfied.1

 Thus, Petitioner’s attempt to make a claim outside of this legal

framework must be rejected. Accordingly, this Court, like the R&R, will address Petitioner’s

arguments within the legal framework governing habeas petitions.

Specifically, as recounted in detail in the R&R, for this Court to consider the merits

of a habeas claim, the claim must have been exhausted in state court. Doc. #12 at 9-10. If

the claim was exhausted in state court, but denied by the state courts for procedural reasons,

this Court cannot reach the merits of the claim (unless cause and prejudice is shown2

) if the

state’s procedural ruling, or procedural bar, was based on an adequate and independent state

law ground. R&R at 10-14. As indicated in the preceding sentence, the federal court may

still reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted state court claim if the petitioner can show

cause and prejudice to excuse his default. R&R at 14-16.

As Petitioner notes in his Objections, Petitioner’s claim is that his state court trial

level counsel was ineffective. Doc. #13 at 8. Further, Petitioner argues that this Court

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should reach the merits of that claim because his first post-conviction-relief counsel was

ineffective for not raising the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Doc. #13 at 8-9.

Petitioner bases his ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-relief-counsel claim on Halbert

v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005); Doc. #13 at 4.

However, at no point does Petitioner attempt to make his ineffective-assistance-ofpost-conviction-relief-counsel argument within the habeas framework described above.

Specifically, in his Petition he states:

In sum, Petitioner’s valid claim of ineffective assistance of first postconviction relief counsel prohibits procedural default of his valid claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Doc. #1 at 36.

In his Objections, Petitioner states:

Petitioner ... argued [in state court]... that his ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claims could not be “precluded” because he was entitled to effective

assistance of first post-conviction counsel with respect to the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims... .

Doc. #13 at 8.

Petitioner offers no citation within the habeas parlance to support either of these two

statements. In fact, it appears that Petitioner is attempting to argue his Halbert based

(ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-relief-counsel) claim completely removes him

from the habeas framework. To the extent that is Petitioner’s argument, it is rejected. This

Court will consider Petitioner’s argument within the legal framework governing habeas.

Thus, to fit Petitioner’s argument into the habeas framework, the Court must interpret the

Halbert argument in one of two ways: either 1) Petitioner is arguing that the Halbert decision

causes the state’s procedural bar of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel-claim to not

be an adequate state law procedural bar; or 2) Petitioner is arguing that his Halbert based

(ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-relief-counsel) claim is cause to excuse his

procedural default of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel-claim.

To begin, before this Court will consider the Halbert based (ineffective-assistance-ofpost-conviction-relief-counsel) claim for either reason listed above, the Court must determine

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whether Respondent’s contention that this claim has not been exhausted in the state courts

has merit. Doc. #10 at 10. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000), holds that

before ineffective assistance of counsel can form “cause” to excuse procedural default, the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be exhausted as an independent claim in the state

courts. Here, Petitioner never exhausted this claim directly in that he never asked any state

court to grant him a new “first-round” of post-conviction-relief based on his claim that his

first post-conviction-relief counsel was ineffective. Instead, Respondents assert that

Petitioner argued (in state court) that the alleged ineffectiveness of first post-conviction-relief

counsel was the reason that, in a second post-conviction-relief petition, the state trial court

and appellate court should reach the merits of the ineffectiveness-of-trial-counsel claim.

Conversely, Petitioner argues:

Petitioner’s previous filings already have shown that his federal ineffectiveassistance-of-first-post-conviction-counsel claim was clearly and

unambiguously asserted at every relevant stage of the state court proceedings...

and the state courts considered the claim (but rejected it on the merits) without

suggesting that it was procedurally barred under state law. ... Consequently,

there is no legitimate exhaustion issue in this case.

Doc. #15 at 9.

Thus, the issue is whether exhausting the Halbert based claim (ineffective-assistanceof-post-conviction-relief-counsel) as cause for defaulting in state court also exhausts such

claim as cause for defaulting in federal court, when a free-standing ineffective-assistance-ofpost-conviction-relief-counsel claim was not raised in state court or in federal court. Based

on the facts of this case, the Court finds that Petitioner presented the claim to the state court

sufficiently to meet the exhaustion requirement because the state court was put on notice of

the ineffective-assistance-of-first-post-conviction-relief counsel claim via the second postconviction-relief petition.

Having determined that the Halbert based (ineffective-assistance-of-post-convictionrelief-counsel) claim was exhausted in state court, the Court must now consider whether

alleged ineffective-assistance-of-first-post-conviction-relief counsel is a basis for finding the

state’s procedural bar is not adequate and independent, as is required to treat the claim as

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3

 Similarly, in Summers, the Court of Appeals suggested that to the extent Halbert has

any applicability to Arizona law, such application is for a pleading defendant. Summers, 481

F.3d at 713. Specifically, the Court stated, “the Supreme Court held in Halbert... that a firsttier ‘of-right’ review procedure available to a plea-convicted Michigan defendant in lieu of

a conventional direct appeal is a form of ‘direct review’ to which a constitutional right to

counsel attaches... . The of-right proceeding available to plea-convicted defendants in

Michigan is analogous, though not identical, to a Rule 32 of-right proceeding [in Arizona].”

Id. “To bring an of-right proceeding [in Arizona] under Rule 32, a plea-convicted

defendant... .” Id. at 715 (emphasis added). And the Arizona courts appear to agree. See

Arizona v. Pruett, 912 P.2d 1357, 1359-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).

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procedurally defaulted in federal court. As the R&R recounts, Arizona’s procedural rule

precluding post-conviction review of issues that could have been raised earlier but were not

has been determined to be adequate and independent by the United States Supreme Court.

R&R at 12-14. Therefore, the issue is whether Halbert, which was interpreting Michigan

law, effectively overruled the line of cases on adequate and independent cited in the R&R

(on the issue of the right to post-conviction-relief counsel).

Halbert involved a defendant in Michigan who pleaded guilty. Under Michigan law,

the Supreme Court found that for a pleading defendant, the discretionary appeal to the

Michigan Court of Appeals was a “first-tier” of review. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 612-14. And,

because this review was “first-tier” the defendant was entitled to counsel. Id. at 619.

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held, albeit on a different issue than the

right to counsel, that for a pleading defendant, the first post-conviction-relief petition in

Arizona is a “first-tier” of review. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 2007).

However, Courts have consistently held that there is no right to counsel for postconviction petitions when such petition is not a “first-tier” of review; i.e. when there was a

direct appeal. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, - - - , 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085

(2007); Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, because

Petitioner went to trial, he also had a direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals that was

a “first-tier” of review. R&R at 3. Therefore, the Court finds Halbert inapplicable to this

case.3

 Because Halbert is inapplicable to Petitioner’s situation, the Court further finds that

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under these facts, Halbert does not overrule the line of cases finding Arizona’s procedural

bar to be adequate and independent. Therefore, this Court finds that Petitioner’s ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim is procedurally defaulted.

As the R&R correctly recounts, and as indicated above, because the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim has been procedurally defaulted, this Court cannot consider

the merits of the claim unless Petitioner shows cause and prejudice to excuse this procedural

default. See R&R at 12-16. The R&R concludes, and this Court agrees, that Petitioner’s

ineffective-assistance-of-post-conviction-relief counsel claim does not show cause to excuse

this procedural default. R&R at 21-22. The Court reaches this conclusion because the Court

finds, as discussed above, that Halbert is inapplicable to this case. Thus, this case is

controlled by the cases finding there is no right to post-conviction-relief counsel.

Accordingly, even assuming post-conviction-relief counsel was in fact ineffective, such

alleged ineffectiveness is insufficient to establish cause to excuse Petitioner’s procedural

default of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Therefore, this Court cannot

reach the merits of the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.

Because the Court has reached the conclusion that the ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim is procedurally defaulted and that Petitioner has not shown cause that would

permit this Court to consider the merits of the claim, there are four additional arguments

raised by Respondents that this Court need not address. Specifically, first, because Petitioner

cannot show cause to excuse his procedural default, this Court need not consider whether he

can establish prejudice. Second, because the Court has found Halbert inapplicable to this

case, the Court need not reach Respondent’s argument that under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

288, 310 (1989), Halbert is not available to cases on collateral review. Doc. #14 at 8. Third,

because this Court has found that Petitioner has not shown cause to excuse his default, this

Court need not reach Respondent’s argument that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i), ineffective

assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot form the basis of habeas relief. Doc. #14 at 5-6.

Fourth, because the Court has found that even assuming post-conviction-relief counsel was

ineffective Petitioner cannot show cause, the Court need not reach the Respondent’s

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4

 And specifically the Court would want briefing on whether the AEDPA’s

deferential standard of review would be applicable to an alternative holding of the state court

as noted in sub-issue four (not addressed) above.

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argument, as applied in the R&R, that post-conviction-relief counsel was NOT ineffective

because trial counsel was NOT ineffective; therefore, post-conviction-relief counsel could

not have been ineffective for failing to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

because Petitioner cannot establish prejudice (under either theory) as required by Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). R&R 21-22. Additionally, this Court need not consider

the sub-issue to the fourth issue, which is whether this Court would be required to defer to

the state court’s finding that neither counsel was ineffective (unless such finding was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,”

or an unreasonable determination of the facts, see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71

(2003)) when the state court made this finding only as an alternative holding, and the state

court’s decision was actually based on a the procedural bar. 

Alternatively, under 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(2), a federal court can reach the merits of a

defaulted claim if the court denies relief. Applying this principle, the R&R recommended

that relief on the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim could be denied on the merits.

R&R at 26-28. Petitioner objected to this conclusion. In responding to Petitioner’s

objection, Respondents noted that they filed a limited answer addressing only procedural

default, but agreed that the claim could be denied on the merits. Doc. #14 at 13. Petitioner

objects to reaching the merits in this fashion because there has not been full briefing of the

issue. Doc. #15 at 10. Petitioner goes on to argue that if this Court intends to consider the

merits, it should order supplemental briefing and an evidentiary hearing. Id. While the Court

does not agree that Petitioner has shown that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary to

adjudicate the merits of this claim, the Court will not reach the merits without an opportunity

for further briefing by the parties.4

 Thus, while the Court does not necessarily disagree with

the recommendation of the R&R in this regard, because this Court need not alternatively

reach the merits, this Court will not adopt the R&R on this point.

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Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the R&R (Doc. #12) is accepted to the extent indicated above,

the objections (Doc. #13 & 15) are overruled to the extent indicated above, the Petition is

denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 12th day of December, 2008.

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