Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02889/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02889-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Sanchez, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Warden Bartos, et. al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 04-2889-PHX-SRB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge on May 13, 2005. 

For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

deny the Petition.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner's Conviction and Summary of the Case

Petitioner Christopher Sanchez has filed the instant Petition regarding convictions

arising from his simultaneous entry of guilty pleas pursuant to two plea agreements in

Arizona state court for two separate cases: one involved events occurring on October 30,

2000 (hereinafter "CR2000-018114"); and the other involved events occurring on November

10, 2000 (hereinafter "CR2000-017811"). (Answer, Ex. A, N, O) In CR2000-018114,

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Petitioner was charged with burglary, armed robbery and kidnapping resulting from

allegations that Petitioner and a co-defendant invaded a family's home, held guns on the

occupants, stole personal property and the family's car, a Honda Civic. (Answer, Ex. AA)

In CR2000-017811, Petitioner and a co-defendant were charged with armed robbery, two

counts of theft of means of transportation, two counts of aggravated assault, and unlawful

flight from law enforcement resulting from allegations that eleven days after the home

invasion, police officers saw Petitioner and co-defendant driving the stolen Honda; while

fleeing from police pursuit, Petitioner and co-defendant collided with another vehicle;

Petitioner and co-defendant then exited the stolen Honda and, at gunpoint, pulled the

occupants from that other vehicle and Petitioner and co-defendant then drove off in it.

(Answer, Ex. D, E, F, AA) The prosecution alleged that the armed robbery and aggravated

assault involved the "discharge, use, or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument, to wit: a gun." (Answer, Ex. G) The prosecution also alleged that

Petitioner had two prior felony convictions and that the crimes in CR2000-017811 were

committed while Petitioner was on release from confinement pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

604.02(B). (Answer, Ex. E, H, I) 

On February 14, 2001 Petitioner entered a guilty plea in CR2000-017811 to one count

of armed robbery and a guilty plea in CR2000-018114 to one count of armed robbery.

(Answer, Ex. N, O) Pursuant to both plea agreements: (1) Petitioner would be sentenced to

"A TERM NO LESS THAN THE PRESUMPTIVE"; (2) the sentences were to run

concurrently; and (3) all other charges against Petitioner in both cases were to be dismissed.

(Answer, Ex. A, N, O, Q, R) (emphasis in original) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to

two aggravated sentences of 18 years of incarceration to run concurrently. (Answer, Ex. Q,

R.) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings

The trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner during post-conviction relief

proceedings. (Answer, Ex. V) Thereafter, Petitioner's counsel filed a Notice of Completion

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Elsewhere in the record, Petitioner restated this claim as: "The use by the state in

determining sentence of a prior conviction obtained in violation of the United States of

Arizona [sic] constitutions." (Answer, Ex. DD)

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of Post-Conviction Review indicating that upon review of the record, she was "unable to find

any claims for relief to raise in post-conviction relief proceedings" and requesting that

Petitioner be permitted to file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. W)

The trial court granted counsel's request. (Answer, Ex. X). On June 25, 2002, Petitioner

filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter "PCR Petition"). (Answer, Ex.

Y) Petitioner's PCR Petition consisted of a form on which Petitioner checked boxes

indicating his grounds for relief, written argument, and exhibits. Petitioner checked boxes

indicating that he was "eligible for relief because of:"

1. "The denial of the constitutional right to representation by a competent lawyer

at every critical stage of the proceeding"; and

2. "The use by the state in determining sentence of a prior conviction obtained in

violation of the United States of Arizona [sic] constitutions".1

(Id.) Petitioner argued that pursuant to the plea agreement, prior felony convictions were not

to be used against him at sentencing, yet, during sentencing, the prosecutor argued that the

prior convictions should factor into the court's sentencing decision. Petitioner further stated

that: it was his intention to proceed to trial on the home invasion charge and to plea "on the

other case" but his attorney told him that he had to either enter a plea in both cases or proceed

to trial in both cases; "I wasn't helped in any way with my case, I was rushed into both plea

bargains...I'm doing 18 years which is a lot of time"; "[t]here's been so many mistakes with

the prosecuting attorney," and Petitioner's own attorney; and his co-defendant received "10.5

years" even though there was no difference between their plea agreements. (Id.) Petitioner

requested a "[c]orrection of sentence...'time reduction.'" (Id.)

On October 16, 2002, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's PCR Petition. (Answer,

Ex. CC) In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found that Petitioner

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was sentenced in accordance with the terms of the Plea Agreement after

pleading guilty to crimes that were not enhanced by allegations of prior

convictions under A.R.S. 13-604. The fact that the State advised the Court of

[Petitioner's] prior convictions and argued they should be considered in

imposing a sentence within the Plea Agreement did not violate the Plea

Agreement in any manner.

***

The Court is [sic] exercising its sentencing discretion was under no duty to

impose an identical sentence on co-defendant. Both received substantial

prison sentences. The sentencing considerations brought to the Court's

attention were not identical.

(Id.) The court also found that Petitioner "failed to raise any viable issue which would justify

holding an evidentiary hearing." (Id.)

On November 12, 2002, Petitioner sought appellate review of the trial court's decision.

(Answer, Ex. DD) In his petition for appellate review, Petitioner argued that the trial court

improperly rejected his contentions regarding:

1. "The denial of the constitutional right to representation by a competant [sic]

lawyer at every critical stage of the proceeding"; and

2. "The use by the state in determining sentence of a prior conviction obtained in

violation of the United States of Arizona [sic] constitutions."

(Id.)

On January 6, 2004, the Arizona appellate court denied review. (Answer, Ex. GG)

C. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On December 13, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner raises the following claims:

1. "The denial of the constitutional right to be represented by a competent lawyer

at every critical stage of the proceeding. Amendment VI." (Petition, p.5);

2. "The use by the state in determing [sic] sentence of a prior conviction obtained

in violation of the United States of Arizona [sic] constitutions. Amendment

V." (Petition, p.6).

On July 29, 2005, Respondents filed their Answer. Respondents concede that the

Petition is timely filed. (Answer, p.6) Respondents argue that Petitioner's claims are

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procedurally defaulted resulting from his failure to exhaust his claims in state court and,

alternatively, that Petitioner's claims are not cognizable as federal habeas claims and/or lack

merit.

On October 31, 2005, Petitioner filed a Traverse.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard: Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state court remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The exhaustion inquiry

focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion

generally requires that a prisoner give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims

before he presents those claims to a federal court. Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim

for relief so long as he has a right under state law to raise the claim by available procedure.

See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

A habeas petitioner may exhaust his claims in one of two ways. First, a claim is

exhausted when no remedy remains available to the petitioner in state court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). Second, a claim is exhausted if there is an absence of available state

corrective process or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have "fairly present[ed] his

claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995).

A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the factual or legal bases

for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that the...[petitioner is] asserting

claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. See also

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). Mere similarity between a

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Respondents argue that Baldwin "appears to overrule" Swoopes and, thus, to satisfy

the exhaustion requirement Petitioner herein must present his claim to the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Answer, pp. 10-14) That argument is addressed infra at Section C.1.

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claim raised in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-366. 

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts one

full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Once a federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas petitions, other than those

concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted

if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on appeal of

conviction or through a collateral proceeding pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure.2

 Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

529 U.S. 1124 (2000). 

In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state court did

not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or "procedural

default." A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on

the merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the federal claim was not presented to the state court and

it is clear the state would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for procedural

reasons. Id. The procedural bar provides an independent and adequate state-law ground for

the conviction and sentence and, thus, prevents federal habeas corpus review unless the

petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for failing to raise the federal claim in the

state proceedings. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996); see also Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-495 (1986); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, the

procedural default doctrine prevents state prisoners from obtaining federal review by

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Although the Ninth Circuit recently suggested that under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there

are exceptions to the rule that a district court can decide whether state remedies remain

available for claims that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver see Cassett v.

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 1336 (2006), this

Court need not address such waiver because it has not been affirmatively raised by Petitioner.

See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053

(2003).

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Such claims include that: (1) the petitioner is being held in custody after his sentence

has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered material facts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's

failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there

has been a significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's conviction

if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence

that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)

(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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allowing the time to run on available state remedies and then rushing to federal court seeking

review. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-732 (1991).

If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available.3

 See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263

n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination often involves

consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governing postconviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 specifies when a petitioner

may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on federal constitutional challenges to

convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on any claim which could have

been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain

claims4

 which were justifiably omitted from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2.

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be required

to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that when a petitioner

fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present his claims there. Id.

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In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred and a petitioner cannot show

cause and prejudice for the default...the district court dismisses the petition because the

petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id. at 1231.

B. Standard: Review of Merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA"), the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state

court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied __

U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 484 (2005). Therefore, the question whether a state court erred in

applying the law is a different question from whether it erred in determining the facts. Rice

v. Collins, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 969 (2006). In conducting its review, the Court "look[s] to

the last-reasoned state-court decision." Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir.

2003) cert. denied 541 U.S. 1037 (2004).

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the "contrary to" test and the

"unreasonable application" test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court's "decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-414 (2000)). Additionally, a state court's

decision is "'contrary to' Supreme Court case law if the state court 'applies a rule that

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"[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the

Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied." Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original).

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contradicts the governing law set forth in' Supreme Court cases."5

 Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at

738 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "Whether a state court's interpretation

of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a question of federal law as to

which [the federal courts]...owe no deference to the state courts." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929

(emphasis in original) (distinguishing deference owed under the "contrary to" test of section

(d)(1) with that owed under the "unreasonable application" test).

Under the second test, " '[a] state court's decision involves an unreasonable application

of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle...but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Van Lynn, 347 F.3d

at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the "'unreasonable application clause...a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly...[r]ather that application must be objectively

unreasonable.'" Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)).

When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable application of

federal law, "[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court interpretations of

federal law." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929. 

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, "the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

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Under section 2254(e) "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct." The "AEDPA spells out what this presumption means: Statecourt fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence presented for the first time in

federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof that the statecourt finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of correctness and the clear-andconvincing standard of proof only come into play once" it is found that the state court

reasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. 

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000.

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cert. denied 534 U.S. 1038 (2004) ("a federal court may not second-guess a state court's factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.") Section (d)(2) "applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court's findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective,...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citations omitted). In

examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court "must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues... [M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court's

findings of fact is insufficient; 'we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court's fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court's fact-finding process was adequate.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972

(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000) (emphasis in original). Once the federal court is satisfied

that the state court's fact-finding process was reasonable, or where the petitioner does not

challenge such findings, "the state court's findings are dressed in a presumption of

correctness, which then helps steel them against any challenge based on extrinsic evidence,

i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal court."6

 Taylor, 366 F.2d at 1000. See

also 28 U.S.C. section 2254(e). 

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions "receive similarly mixed review; the state

court's ultimate conclusion is reviewed under [section] 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

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Under Swoopes, Petitioner herein need only seek review from the Arizona Court of

Appeals and not the Arizona Supreme Court. 

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findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under [sections] 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)." Lambert, 393

F.3d at 978.

C. Review of Petitioner's Claims

1. Exhaustion: failure to seek review before the Arizona Supreme Court

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust his claims for relief because he did

not seek review before the Arizona Supreme Court as required by Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27. (Answer, pp. 10-14) In Baldwin, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision from the Ninth

Circuit to address the question of what constituted notice of the federal nature of a claim

sufficient to satisfy the fair presentment requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). In

setting out the groundwork for its decision, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]o provide the

State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each

appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review),

thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29

(citations omitted). Respondents rely on the Baldwin Court's general statements of the law

of exhaustion and assert that they support a finding that Swoopes, at least insofar as it

addresses whether habeas petitioners must seek review in the highest state court, is no longer

valid.7

 However, an examination of the rationale employed in the Swoopes decision readily

distinguishes that case from the general statements of law referred to by Respondents.

Swoopes, which examines the habeas exhaustion requirement specifically with regard

to Arizona's discretionary review system, was decided on remand to the Ninth Circuit for

consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in the O'Sullivan case. Swoopes, 196

F.3d 1008. In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit, like the Baldwin Court, began its analysis by

reiterating the general rule stated in O'Sullivan that, "in order to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement for federal habeas relief, state prisoners must file for discretionary review in a

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state supreme court when that review is part of ordinary appellate review." Swoopes, 196

F.3d at 1009 (citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847). The Swoopes court recognized, however,

that the Supreme Court in O'Sullivan had "acknowledged an exception to the exhaustion

requirement," by making it clear that "'the creation of a discretionary review system does not,

without more, make review' in a state supreme court 'unavailable.'" Swoopes, 196 F.3d at

1009 (quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847) (emphasis added in Swoopes). The Ninth Circuit

proceeded to consider Arizona's discretionary review system and found that Arizona case law

made it clear that "in cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, review need not

be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies." Swoopes,

196 F.3d. at 1010. Thus, the court concluded, "post-conviction review before the Arizona

Supreme Court is a remedy that is 'unavailable' within the meaning of O'Sullivan." Id. There

is nothing in Baldwin that suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that this analysis is flawed or

that the Swoopes holding has been overruled. 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit continues to cite Swoopes for the very proposition

Respondents suggest was overruled. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2005) ("[i]n cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 'claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them.'" (quoting Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010)). Therefore, Respondents

do not prevail with their argument that Petitioner's claims are unexhausted because he failed

to seek review before the Arizona Supreme Court.

2. Claim One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner alleges that he was denied the "constitutional right to be represented by a

competent lawyer at every critical stage of the proceeding. Amendment VI." (Petition, p.

5) 

a. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Petitioner raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his PCR Petition by:

checking a box indicating that he was denied "the constitutional right to representation by

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a competent lawyer at every critical stage of the proceeding." (Answer, Ex. Y) In his written

statement accompanying the PCR form petition, Petitioner makes no specific reference to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim; however, Petitioner's comments appear to address the

alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel. (Id.) Additionally, Petitioner's petition for review by

the Arizona appellate court states that he was denied his "constitutional right to

representation by a competent lawyer at every critical stage of the proceeding." (Answer,

Ex., DD)

A habeas petitioner fairly presents a federal claim only if he alerts the state court to

the federal nature of his claim. Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir.) cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 738 (2005). "A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can

easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief, for

example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies

or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim 'federal.'"

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32. Petitioner herein did not identify the federal basis for his claim.

He did not cite state or federal cases that would alert the state court to his federal claim. Nor

did he label "the claim 'federal'" or in any other way indicate the federal nature of his claim.

Id. Respondents also correctly point out that neither the prosecution in its response to

Petitioner's PCR Petition nor the state court addressed Petitioner's claim as a federal claim.

(Answer, p.15 )(citing Ex. AA, CC) Under such circumstances, where Petitioner has not

fairly alerted the state court to the federal nature of his claim, such claim is unexhausted for

federal habeas purposes. Further, Petitioner herein is now barred pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure from returning to state court. See Coleman, 501

U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. See also Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Petitioner also fails to show

cause or prejudice for the default. 

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Pursuant to the AEDPA, the Court may deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus

"on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available

in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

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b. Respondents' alternative argument on the merits

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that "[t]he Supreme Court has left open the question

whether raising a state claim that is 'identical' to a federal claim suffices to fairly present the

federal claim." Fields, 401 F.3d at 1022 (citing Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 34). Petitioner herein

does not argue that he has raised identical state and federal claims. Even assuming that the

Arizona state court treats ineffective assistance of counsel claims "under the federal and state

constitutions as coextensive," Respondents are correct that Petitioner's claim fails on the

merits.8

 Id.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Supreme Court established

a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Strickland test

applies to a petitioner's challenge of his guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of

counsel. Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied __ U.S. __

126 S.Ct. 1778 (2006), (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)). In such a context, "the

ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether the alleged ineffective assistance impinged on the

[petitioner's] ability to enter an intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea of guilty." Lambert,

393 F.3d at 980. To prevail, Petitioner must show that: (1) counsel's representation fell

below the range of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases; and (2) the Petitioner

suffered actual prejudice as a result of counsel's incompetence. Id.; Washington, 422 F.3d

at 873. 

To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that counsel made errors so

serious "that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. The relevant inquiry

is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the decisions made by

defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998);

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Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) ("in plea situations...the question [is]

not whether counsel's advice [was] right or wrong, but...whether that advice was within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.") In considering this factor,

counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s performance is highly

deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide

range of reasonable representation.'” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995)). "The reasonableness of counsel’s

performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and

in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential."

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Additionally, “a fair assessment of

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

In the context of a guilty plea, "'[i]n order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the

[petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he

would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d at

980 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). See also Washington, 422 F.3d at 873 (same).

Because failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or

prejudice defeats the claim, the court need not address both factors where one is lacking.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-700. 

In the instant Petition, Petitioner states:

[t]hroughout my case I was clueless...of things going on. I was told I would

receive 10.5 years, specialy [sic] after going through a metigated [sic] hearing.

My sentence was agravated [sic] I received 18 years. I was dealing with two

separate cases that occurred on two different dates. On one of those cases I

was innocent. I was lead [sic] to believe if I took that case to trial I would be

forced to take both to trial. I had no choice. Based on what my Public

Defender told me I pled guilty to both cases under a plea agreement. I was

Case 2:04-cv-02889-SRB Document 16 Filed 01/19/07 Page 15 of 22
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young; and knew nothing of what was going on. I was taken advantage of, I

knew nothing of what I was going through.

(Petition, p.5). 

Petitioner points to no evidence demonstrating that his agreement to enter the plea was

not voluntary, knowing or intelligent. See Washington, 422 F.3d at 873 (denial of habeas

relief on ineffective assistance of counsel claim where plea colloquy revealed that state court

"explained the rights that [petitioner] was agreeing to waive...and that [petitioner] understood

the nature of the waiver.") The transcript of the colloquy demonstrates that the trial court

explained the rights that Petitioner was agreeing to waive, including his right to a jury trial,

and that Petitioner understood the nature of the waiver. (Answer, Ex. A) The trial court also

specifically addressed the applicable range of sentence:

Both plea agreements provide that you're to be sentenced to the Department of

Corrections for a term of no less than the presumptive sentence,...which, by the

way, is a 10-and-a-half-year sentence. When I say no less, that means that

you're agreeing to receive a sentence of somewhere between 10 and a half and

21 years. Is that your understanding?

(Id. at p.5) (emphasis added). Petitioner answered, "Yes." (Id.) During the proceeding, the

trial court established that Petitioner was 18 years old, was not on any drugs or medications,

had completed ninth grade, had not been promised anything that was not in the plea

agreement, had not been threatened into giving up his right to a jury trial, and wished to plead

guilty to the charges at issue. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court found that

Petitioner's "pleas are made knowing, intelligently and voluntarily. The Court finds there are

factual bases to accept the pleas. " (Id. at p.11) 

Petitioner has neither alleged nor demonstrated that but for counsel's alleged

incompetence, he would not have pled guilty. That Petitioner desired to enter a guilty plea

in one case and proceed to trial in the other does not establish counsel's ineffectiveness given

Petitioner's concession that the state extended a package deal, i.e. the plea offer required him

"to plea on both or go to trial on both." (Answer, Ex. Y) Petitioner's counsel met his duty

by conveying to Petitioner the information that Petitioner was entitled to have, that is the plea

Case 2:04-cv-02889-SRB Document 16 Filed 01/19/07 Page 16 of 22
9

The plea agreement also provided that the prosecutor would not allege Petitioner's

prior felony convictions. (Answer, Ex. N) Review of the both plea agreements indicates that

the prosecutor would "not allege [Petitioner's] prior felony convictions or that he was on

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offer, and explained to Petitioner that his option was to go to trial in both cases or plea to

both cases. Compare Turner, 281 F.3d at 880-881 (petitioner's counsel was not ineffective

given that counsel, among other things, conveyed the plea offer to defendant) with Nunes v.

Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may lie

where counsel failed to accurately convey terms of a plea offer); United States v. Blaylock,

20 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 1994) (counsel's failure to communicate plea offer to defendant

satisfied the first part of the Strickland test). The record establishes that Petitioner exercised

the option to plea to both cases. That defense counsel could not broker the plea agreement

that Petitioner desired, does not in and of itself establish that counsel's assistance was not

within the range of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases. The result obtained

by Petitioner's defense counsel was considerably more favorable than what Petitioner would

have faced had he gone to trial in one case. Had Petitioner been convicted at trial on either

one of the criminal cases and the prosecutor had proven two historical dangerous prior

convictions (See Answer, Ex. I (allegation of historical dangerous priors)), Petitioner would

have faced 21 to 35 years of incarceration with a presumptive sentence of 28 years. See

A.R.S. §13-604(K). Moreover, had the prosecution also proven that Petitioner committed

a felony while under release status Petitioner would have been facing an additional two years

incarceration consecutive to the sentence imposed on underlying charge. See A.R.S. § 13-

604(R).

The plea colloquy undercuts Petitioner's statement that "I agreed with everything in

the plea agreement due to the fact, I had already been informed I would only receive 10.5

years." (Traverse, p. 3) The record reflects that Petitioner was fully advised that he faced a

potential sentence from 10.5 years to 21 years and Petitioner stated that this was his

understanding as well.9

 (Answer, Ex. A at p.5) Petitioner also stated that no other promises

Case 2:04-cv-02889-SRB Document 16 Filed 01/19/07 Page 17 of 22
parole at the time of" the offenses. (Id.) At the sentencing, the prosecutor advised the court

of Petitioner's prior felony convictions and argued that they should be considered in imposing

a sentence within the range specified in the plea agreements. Petitioner was sentenced within

that range. Had the prosecutor alleged Petitioner's prior felony convictions in order to

enhance his sentence, Petitioner would have been subjected to a higher range of possible

incarceration than that specified in the plea agreements. Such an act would have been

outside the terms of the plea agreements. That did not happen here. Instead, the prosecutor

discussed Petitioner's prior felony convictions when arguing that Petitioner should receive

the higher end of the range specified in the plea agreements. (See Answer, Ex. B) The trial

court stated to Petitioner that it was "going to impose an aggravated sentence, and this

sentence is going to be fairly close to the sentence that your co-defendant received in terms

of the number of years, and that I believe that, regardless of how you slice it, who did what,

that the sentence in these cases should have some parity in terms of the number of years to

be served. The aggravated circumstances here, that outweigh the mitigating circumstance

of age, is that this involves accomplices. It involved an extreme effect and lasting and

permanent effect of the victims...The Court is also sentencing you in consideration of the fact

that weapons were held by you and co-defendant and used in a manner which created

extreme danger to the individuals who are listed as victims." (Answer, Ex. B, pp. 19-20) The

court also noted that on the charges in common with Petitioner, the co-defendant was

sentenced to two terms of 10.5 years to run concurrently and was given 3.5 years each on two

other matters–all the sentences to run consecutive, for a total of 17.5 years of incarceration.

(Id. at p. 16) Petitioner's sentence to 18 years of incarceration was within the range identified

in the plea agreements . (See Answer, Ex. A)

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had been made to him. (Id. at p.6) Petitioner's contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in determining whether his

entry of a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,

74 (1977) ("Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The

subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to

summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.");

United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We attach substantial weight to

contemporaneous on-the-record statements in assessing the voluntariness of pleas.")

Petitioner has established no facts which support a finding of ineffective assistance of

counsel on this issue. 

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Further, Petitioner's assertion that he was young and knew nothing of what was going

on, without more does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel in light of the plea

colloquy and the entire record before the Court. It is well-settled that “[c]onclusory

allegations [of ineffective assistance of counsel] which are not supported by a statement of

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994);

see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (a petitioner “making a claim of ineffective assistance

must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment”). 

On this record, Petitioner has not established that his counsel's performance was

deficient. Nor has Petitioner established that absent his counsel's actions Petitioner would

have rejected the plea agreement and continued to trial facing a presumptive term of at least

28 years in either case. 

It is unclear whether the state trial court addressed Petitioner's ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. The court made no specific reference to such claim. Instead, the October

16, 2002 order dismissing Petitioner's PCR Petition primarily addressed Petitioner's

dissatisfaction with his sentence and the state's reference to his prior felony conviction at

sentencing. The court also stated: "THE COURT FINDS the defendant has failed to raise

any viable issue which would justify holding an evidentiary hearing." (Answer, Ex. CC)

(emphasis in original) Respondents herein state that the trial court "saw the claims raised

by Petitioner as a question of Petitioner's awareness and unhappiness with his sentences, not

with any other aspect of his representation." (Answer, p.15) (emphasis in original) 

As set forth supra in section II.B., the AEDPA limits federal court review to the last

reasoned state-court decision. Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738. To the extent that the state court's

last reasoned decision provides no reason for its decision on the federal claim, "an

independent review of the record is necessary." Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089-

1090 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Case 2:04-cv-02889-SRB Document 16 Filed 01/19/07 Page 19 of 22
10It is well-settled that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-examine

state court determinations on state law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67

(1991). Therefore, federal habeas review is not available for Petitioner's claims if they do

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Based on this Court's review of the record and pertinent authority as set forth above,

to the extent that the state court's October 16, 2002 Order dismissing Petitioner's PCR

Petition may be construed as a ruling on the merits dismissing Petitioner's ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, that decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. See Washington, 422 F.3d at 873. Nor did the state

court's proceeding result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the evidence presented. Moreover, an independent review of the record reveals that

Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. 

3. Claim Two: use of Petitioner's prior conviction in determining sentence

Petitioner claims that the trial court's use of Petitioner's prior convictions to impose

an aggravated sentence violated the "United States of Arizona [sic] constitutions" and

"Amendment V." (Petition, p. 6) Respondents contend that Petitioner failed to exhaust this

claim because he failed to fairly present the federal nature of his claim to the state court. 

In his PCR Petition, Petitioner argued that the use of his prior convictions in

determining his sentence violated "the United States of Arizona [sic] constitutions."

(Answer, Ex. Y) Petitioner's petition for review filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals

includes virtually identical language as his PCR Petition regarding this claim. Petitioner did

not assert any violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution before the

state court, nor did he cite federal cases or state cases that engaged in a federal constitutional

analysis of the issue. See Fields, 401 F.3d at 1021 ("In order to alert the state court, a

petitioner must make reference to provisions of the federal Constitution or must cite either

federal or state case law that engages in a federal constitutional analysis."). Further,

Respondents correctly point out that the trial court addressed Petitioner's Claim Two as a

state law claim.10 (Answer, p. 17) To any extent that Petitioner may argue that reference to

Case 2:04-cv-02889-SRB Document 16 Filed 01/19/07 Page 20 of 22
not involve the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right. See Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 67.

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the "United States of [sic] Arizona constitutions" included reference to the United States

Constitution, such argument is unavailing given that sole reference to the United States

Constitution without more does not satisfy the fair presentment requirement. See Fields, 401

F.3d at 1021 ("Petitioner's mere mention of the federal Constitution as a whole, without

specifying an applicable provision, or an underlying federal legal theory, does not suffice to

exhaust the federal claim."); Castillo, 393 F.3d at 999 ("Mere general appeals to broad

constitutional principles...do not establish exhaustion."). Petitioner's failure to fairly present

the state court with the federal nature of his Claim Two renders that claim unexhausted for

purposes of federal habeas review. Further, Petitioner is now barred pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure from returning to state court and, thus, Petitioner

is procedurally barred from pursuing such claim here. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735

n.1. See also Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231 ("the procedural default rule barring

consideration of a federal claim applies...if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim

procedurally barred."). Petitioner also fails to show cause or prejudice for the default.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(B), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-04-2889-PHX-SRB.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

Case 2:04-cv-02889-SRB Document 16 Filed 01/19/07 Page 21 of 22
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1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to

the parties and/or their counsel.

DATED this 18th day of January, 2007.

Case 2:04-cv-02889-SRB Document 16 Filed 01/19/07 Page 22 of 22