Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-00726/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-00726-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

A.A., on her own behalf and on 

behalf of her minor child, A.H.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TRACY EUBANKS, et al.,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 2:19-cv-00726-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This action concerns events that took place in 2017 when A.A.’s daughter, 

A.H., was taken into custody by the Alabama Department of Human Resources. 

A.A. has sued seventeen named defendants in their individual capacities. Two of 

the named defendants are employees of the Midfield Police Department. The 

balance of the named defendants are employees of “the Jefferson County Alabama 

Department of Human Resources.” (Doc. 8, pp. 2–5). A.A. has named one fictitious 

defendant. (Doc. 8, p. 3). The defendants have asked the Court to dismiss the claims 

against them. (Doc. 9). 

On a motion to dismiss, a district court must view the factual allegations in a 

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. 

Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d 1197, 1207 (11th Cir. 2018). When, as in 

FILED

 2020 Jan-23 AM 11:06

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:19-cv-00726-MHH Document 20 Filed 01/23/20 Page 1 of 10
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this case, the facts alleged in the complaint relate to state court proceedings, a federal 

district court may take judicial notice of the state court proceedings. United States 

ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 811 n.4 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations 

omitted) (“Courts may take judicial notice of publicly filed documents, such as those 

in state court litigation, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.”).

In her amended complaint, A.A. alleges that on August 23, 2017, she 

contacted the Midfield Police Department to report that A.H. was missing. (Doc. 8, 

p. 6, ¶ 25). Later that evening, Midfield police officers notified A.A. that they had 

found A.H. (Doc. 8, p. 7, ¶ 29). When Midfield Officers Culpepper and Eubanks, 

defendants in this case, interviewed A.H., she reported that “she had been sexually 

abused by an older brother when the family had lived in Illinois.” (Doc. 8, p. 7, ¶ 

31). A.A. “explained to investigators that A.H. had reported the same alleged 

incidents in the state of Illinois and [] the allegations had been investigated by both 

police and [Illinois DHR] and found to be false.” (Doc. 8, p. 7, ¶ 32). A.A. also 

explained to the police officers that A.H. “had a history of making false allegations 

of a sexual nature to avoid parental discipline.” (Doc. 8, p. 8, ¶ 32). A.A. alleges 

that “A.H. never made any allegations of abuse occurring in Alabama.” (Doc. 8, p. 

8, ¶ 35). A.A. gave Officers Culpepper and Eubanks the “names and numbers of the 

Illinois juvenile detectives that had found A.H. sexual abuse allegations untrue.” 

(Doc. 8, p. 8, ¶ 36). 

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In response, defendants Culpepper and Eubanks told A.A. that she needed to 

remove A.H.’s brother, A.A.’s “special needs, school aged, son,” from the home that 

A.A., A.H., and A.H.’s brother shared, or “A.H. would be placed in protective 

custody.” (Doc. 8, p. 9, ¶ 38). When A.A. responded that she could not immediately 

comply because it was late and she had no relatives in Alabama, Officers Culpepper 

and Eubanks, acting without a warrant or court order, “immediately placed A.H. in 

protective custody” with DHR. (Doc. 8, p. 9, ¶¶ 40–41). A.H. remained in DHR 

custody until early February of 2018. (Doc. 8, p. 9, ¶ 43).

On August 25, 2017, two days after Officers Culpepper and Eubanks placed 

A.H. in DHR protective custody, the Juvenile Court of Jefferson County, Bessemer 

Division, held a shelter care hearing concerning A.H. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 4). A.A. 

attended the hearing. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 4). The Juvenile Court judge appointed a 

guardian ad litem to represent A.A.’s interests. The GAL attended the hearing. 

(Sealed Doc. 18, p. 4). So did defendant Sanders. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 4). The 

Juvenile Court vested custody of A.H. in DHR and ordered that the child be 

interviewed. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 6). The interview was scheduled for August 30, 

2017. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 6). The Juvenile Court indicated that A.H. was placed in 

protective custody to investigate allegations. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 7). The Juvenile

Court ordered that there be no contact between D.H. (A.H.’s brother) and A.H. and 

directed DHR to provide medical treatment to A.H. and “supervise the Parties’ 

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compliance” with the court’s order. (Sealed Doc. 18, pp. 8–9). The Juvenile Court 

set a preliminary permanency hearing on November 1, 2017. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 

10). 

A.A. appeared at the November 1, 2017 hearing with her attorney. (Sealed 

Doc. 18, p. 13). The GAL attended the hearing, as did defendant Miller. (Sealed 

Doc. 18, p. 13). At the hearing, DHR moved to amend the dependent petition, and 

the Juvenile Court granted the motion. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 13). The Juvenile Court 

ordered a psychological evaluation of A.A. and directed A.A. to complete a 

parenting skills program. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 15). The Juvenile Court found that 

placement of A.H. with A.A. would be contrary to A.H.’s welfare and interests. 

(Sealed Doc. 18, p. 16). The Juvenile Court ordered that A.A. and D.H. were 

restrained from having contact with A.H. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 17). The Juvenile 

Court directed DHR to supervise the parties’ compliance with its order and directed 

that DHR should not allow A.A. to interfere in A.H.’s medical treatment. (Sealed 

Doc. 18, p. 18). The Juvenile Court set the matter for a permanency hearing on 

February 1, 2018. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 19).

Counsel for A.A. filed a motion to dismiss the Juvenile Court matter and a 

motion to amend the November 1, 2017 Juvenile Court order. With respect to the 

motion to dismiss, counsel for A.A. argued that the allegations of sexual abuse that 

gave rise to A.H.’s protective custody had been resolved in Illinois. (Sealed Doc. 

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18, p. 25). In response, the GAL stated that A.A. “had a 20-year history with the 

equivalent of ‘DHR’ in Illinois” and that a 2015 police report indicated that A.H. 

was cutting herself. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 26). Despite evidence of self-harm and 

suicidal ideations, A.A. had not “sought out any mental health doctors to treat her 

child.” (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 25). On November 21, 2017, the Juvenile Court denied 

the motion to dismiss but amended the November 1, 2017 order to eliminate the 

requirement of a mental health evaluation for A.A. and to restore A.A.’s visitation 

privileges with A.H. (Sealed Doc. 18, pp. 25–26). The Juvenile Court set the A.H. 

matter for trial. (Sealed Doc. 18, p. 26). 

During the February 12, 2018 hearing in the A.H. Juvenile Court matter, A.A. 

acknowledged that A.H. was dependent because A.H. needed services. The Juvenile 

Court ordered A.A. to “complete in-home services” and directed DHR to supervise 

the parties’ compliance with the order. The Juvenile Court placed A.H. in the 

custody of A.A. (Sealed Doc. 18, pp. 39–40, 43). 

A.A. alleges that while A.H. was in DHR custody, A.H. “was subjected to 

living in unstable living environments, subjected to neglect, abuse, failure of adult 

supervision, failure of medical care, and failure of mental health case.” (Doc. 8, p. 

9, ¶ 43). A.A. contends that she “specifically informed” defendants Reliford, 

Eubanks, Culpepper, and McClintock about A.H.’s suicidal tendencies. (Doc. 8, p. 

10, ¶ 44). A.A. asserts that while A.H. was in DHR custody, A.H. “was admitted to 

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Children’s Hospital after taking 28 birth control pills” that another child in a group 

home gave A.H., (Doc. 8, p. 10, ¶ 46); “received chemical burns to her hair, scalp 

and neck” when a “staff person [] attempted to perm A.H.’s hair without A.A.’s 

permission,” (Doc. 8, p. 10, ¶ 48); and cut herself while sitting “in a tub of water 

fully clothed,” (Doc. 8, p. 11, ¶ 49). A.A. complains that “A.H. was prescribed 

medication for depression against A.A.’s consent.” (Doc. 8, p. 11, ¶ 52). 

A.A. alleges that nearly four months before DHR returned A.H. to her 

custody, she (A.A.) received a letter from DHR that stated: “We did not find 

sufficient evidence to support that you caused sexual abuse: sexual molestation to 

said child. Our agency did not find sufficient evidence to prove that sexual abuse 

occurred.” (Doc. 8, p. 12, ¶ 56). According to A.A., “[d]espite the fact that no abuse 

occurred and no basis existed to support a claim of dependency, A.H. remained in 

protective custody illegally detained by the Defendant’s [sic] until 2/2/2018.” (Doc. 

8, p. 12, ¶ 57). A.A. asserts that “[a]s a result of the conduct of Defendants,” she 

and A.H. “have been caused to suffer physical and emotional injuries and damages, 

including embarrassment and humiliation, and has been caused to incur medical and 

legal bills and other expenses.” (Doc. 8, p. 16, ¶ 75).

A.A. asserts claims against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for illegal 

protective custody, unlawful seizure, and malicious prosecution under the First, 

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

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(Doc. 8, pp. 17–20). A.A. also asserts state law claims for negligence, wantonness, 

malice, and deliberate indifference. (Doc. 8, pp. 20–21). 

In their motion to dismiss, the defendants rely on, among other things, the 

affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The availability of this affirmative 

defense is a “question of law” for the court to determine. Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 

1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008). Qualified immunity protects public employees “from 

suit in their individual capacities for discretionary actions performed in the course 

of their duties.” Carter v. Butts Cty., Ga., 821 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2016). 

“‘Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in 

their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 

Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 733 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Qualified immunity allows government officials, including police officers, 

“‘to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or 

harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who 

is knowingly violating the federal law.’” Brown, 608 F.3d at 733 (quoting Lee v. 

Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). “Qualified immunity ‘does not 

offer protection if an official knew or reasonably should have known that the action 

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he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional 

rights of the [plaintiff].’” Carter, 821 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Holmes v. Kucynda, 

321 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir. 2003), in turn quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 815 (1982)) (alteration in Holmes).

To establish the defense, a defendant must demonstrate that she “was acting 

within the scope of [her] discretionary authority.” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 

1325 (11th Cir. 2009). Once that showing is made, “[t]he burden then shifts to the 

plaintiff to overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” Case, 555 F.3d at 1325; 

see also Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 

2004) (“[T]he burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled 

to qualified immunity”) (emphasis in original). To carry this burden, the plaintiff 

must demonstrate that the defendant “‘violated clearly established law based upon 

objective standards.’” Gonzalez v. Lee Cty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th 

Cir. 1998) (quoting Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1997)). 

A.A. argues that the defendants “are not eligible for qualified immunity” 

because they acted “beyond the scope of their authority.” (Doc. 12, p. 2). Still, A.A. 

acknowledges that under Alabama law:

A child may be removed by a law enforcement officer from the custody 

of a parent . . . if there are reasonable grounds to believe . . . [t]he child 

. . . is in imminent danger from the surroundings of the child and that 

the removal of the child is necessary for the protection of the health and 

safety of the child.

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(Doc. 12, p. 3) (quoting Ala. Code § 12-15-306(a)(1)). Section 12-15-306 states that 

a when a law enforcement officer removes a child from a parent’s custody, the 

officer “shall immediately deliver the child to the Department of Human Resources.” 

(Doc. 12, p. 3) (quoting Ala. Code § 12-15-306(b)). It is undisputed that Midfield 

Police Officers Culpepper and Eubanks placed A.H. in protective custody with DHR 

because A.H. reported that her brother had sexually abused her. The officers acted 

within their statutory authority in doing so because the officers had “reasonable 

grounds to believe” that A.H. was in “imminent danger” from her surroundings in 

her home and that her removal was necessary for her safety. 

As discussed at the hearing in this matter, as part of its investigation of A.H.’s 

sexual abuse allegation per Alabama Code § 26-14-7, DHR could not accept at face 

value A.A.’s assertion that A.H. had made the same allegation years before in Illinois 

and that the allegation had proven baseless. Within three days of the date on which 

DHR received A.H. in custody, the Juvenile Court of Jefferson County, Bessemer 

Division held a 72-hour shelter hearing. From that point forward, the DHR 

defendants acted pursuant to orders from the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court 

ordered that DHR maintain custody of A.H., even after DHR’s investigation 

allegedly established that there was not “sufficient evidence to prove that sexual 

abuse occurred.” (Doc. 8, p. 12, ¶ 56). The Juvenile Court found as grounds for 

A.H.’s continued protective custody that A.H. required mental health treatment, and 

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that A.A. had refused to provide treatment.1 The GAL believed that DHR protective 

custody was in A.H.’s best interest. Thus, the DHR defendants did not exceed their 

authority in maintaining custody of A.H. after DHR concluded that there was not 

sufficient evidence of sexual abuse. 

The defendants have established that they acted within their discretionary 

duties, and A.A. has not demonstrated that the defendants “‘violated clearly 

established law based upon objective standards.’” Gonzalez, 161 F.3d at 1295 

(quoting Evans, 117 F.3d at 1320). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the federal 

claims against the defendants based on the affirmative defense of qualified 

immunity. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over A.A.’s state law claims. The Court will dismiss those 

claims without prejudice.2 The Court will enter a separate order closing this case. 

DONE and ORDERED this January 23, 2020.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

1 A.A. alleges a variety of purported deficiencies in the Juvenile Court proceedings. (Doc. 8, pp. 

13–15, ¶¶ 64–69). None of the defendants named in the complaint in this matter is an appropriate 

defendant with respect to a due process claim concerning the state court proceedings. 

2 The Court has not disregarded A.A.’s allegations concerning A.H.’s alleged suicide attempts 

while she was in DHR custody. Those allegations are extremely serious, but A.A. has not tied 

those factual allegations to her federal constitutional claims. Those allegations relate to A.A.’s 

state law claims. If she wishes, A.A. may pursue those claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). 

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