Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00482/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00482-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405rs Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRECILA CARDINAL CONTRERAS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security,

 Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-cv-00482-GPC-NLS

ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND 

REMANDING FOR FURTHER 

ADMININSTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.

[ECF No. 12, 16, 21.]

Precila Contreras (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the Social Security 

Administration’s (“Defendant”) final decision denying her claim for disability insurance 

benefits. (ECF No. 1.) This case was referred for a report and recommendation on the 

parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); (ECF Nos. 

12, 16, 21.) After careful consideration of Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes’ report and 

recommendation (“R&R”), the pleadings, the supporting documents, and the applicable 

law, the Court DECLINES TO ADOPT the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, GRANTS the 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES the Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment and REMANDS this matter for further administrative proceedings.

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I. Background

A. Procedural Background

On September 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for Social Security 

Disability Insurance, alleging a disability onset date of June 30, 2014. Administrative 

Record (“AR”) at 182. Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from hypertension, kidney 

problems related to high blood pressure, anxiety, panic attacks, depression, a “heart 

condition, prior MI infarction,” high cholesterol, headaches, and “poor sleep.” (AR 248.)

Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied on December 21, 2015 and again upon 

reconsideration on March 2, 2016. (AR 84–108.)

On March 16, 2016, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge 

(“ALJ”), which was held on December 8, 2017. (AR 20, 36.) Plaintiff and vocational 

expert Sonia Peterson testified at the hearing. (AR 36–37.) On March 15, 2018, the ALJ 

found Plaintiff was not disabled and denied her request for benefits. (AR 30.) On May 7, 

2018, Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Hearing Decision. (AR 176–77.) On 

February 13, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the 

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1–3.)

On March 13, 2019, Plaintiff timely commenced the instant action seeking judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1.) On May 17, 2019, Defendant 

answered and lodged the administrative record with the Court. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.) On May 

12, 2019, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment or remand. (ECF No. 12.) On

September 30, 2019, the Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment and 

responded to Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) On October 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed a 

reply to Defendant’s cross-motion and response. (ECF No. 20.) On December 16, 2019, 

the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R and no objections have been filed. (ECF No. 21.)

i. Plaintiff’s Background & Testimony

Plaintiff was born on April 4, 1955. (AR 85.) Plaintiff has received advanced 

education in nursing and has held several jobs in the medical field. (AR 249.) Plaintiff 

worked for fifteen years at Scripps Green Clinic – eight as a telemetry technician from 

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1987 to 1995 and seven as a Registered Nurse from 1995 to 2002. (AR 53–54, 265.) In 

2002, Plaintiff transferred to Palomar Hospital. (AR 265.) 

Plaintiff claims that she suffers from the following mental and emotional 

conditions: depression, anxiety, panic attacks, and “poor sleep.” (AR 85–86.) In addition, 

she suffers from various physical conditions, including hypertension, kidney problems 

related to high blood pressure, “heart condition, prior MI infarction,” high cholesterol,

and headaches. (AR 248.) 

Plaintiff lives in a home with her husband and son. (AR 55–56, 104.) Plaintiff 

occupies herself with housework, including cleaning, laundry, ironing, and cooking, for 

about “an hour or two” daily. (AR 57, 65–66, 280–81.) Plaintiff reports “easily get[ting] 

tired” doing her housework. (AR 280–81.) For about one to two hours per week, she goes 

grocery shopping at the local store, a Sprouts located about five minutes from her home, 

and occasionally drives there. (AR 57–58, 65–66, 282.) She also “engages in gardening,” 

an activity she describes as “talk[ing] to [her] plants [and her] flowers basically.” (AR 57, 

66.) In addition, Plaintiff watches “some television,” though she has trouble

concentrating for more than 20 to 30 minutes at a time. (AR 57, 66, 284.) 

Plaintiff needs to rest for about 10 to 20 minutes after walking every 100 to 200 

feet during her daily activities. (AR 284.) She cannot walk “so far” and, more generally, 

has limitations “driving or thinking or walking.” (AR 61.) Plaintiff’s difficulty walking 

stems from an accident in which she fell from a tree resulting in scoliosis and broken ribs. 

(AR 61–62.)

At the December 8, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she stopped working as a 

nurse at Palomar after an incident where she was wrongfully accused of failing to empty 

the “drippy machine.” (AR 47.) Plaintiff claimed that she had done that, but “just didn’t 

chart it.” (AR 45–47.) Plaintiff was written up for the mistake and then stopped working 

because she “got stressed out.” (AR 46–47.) Plaintiff later suffered from high blood 

pressure due to the stress caused by being accused of making that mistake. (AR 51.) 

Plaintiff attempted to work some months after the incident. (AR 41–42.) She 

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testified that, despite feeling “very stressed out” and “nervous,” she thought she was 

“doing well.” (AR 58–49, 58–59.) Hence, she was surprised when her employer let her 

go after only three days. (AR 59.) Her employer told her that she couldn’t “concentrate,” 

didn’t know what she was doing, and was “very slow.” (AR 59.) Plaintiff testified that 

she would have wanted to remain at Palomar until she reached retirement age if she 

could. (AR 50, 52.)

Plaintiff further testified to hearing and seeing things, including “shadows” and 

“somebody talking in corners of [her] house.” (AR 67.) Plaintiff also attempted to 

commit suicide on two occasions, though the details of those attempts are unclear from 

her testimony. (AR 69.) Lastly, Plaintiff testified to suffering from memory loss, 

including being unable to recall the questions asked by the ALJ or her answers. (AR 67–

68, 72–73.)

In her appeal of the adverse eligibility determination, Plaintiff reported that her 

mental condition had worsened after her son attempted suicide and was involuntarily 

committed in February 2016. (AR 230, 234, 236, 578, 615.) As a result, she struggled to 

get through every day, experienced poorly controlled thought processes, and no longer 

wanted to do any household chores. (AR 234.)

At the hearing, when asked if she could perform the job of being a companion for 

an elderly person for eight hours a day and making sure that they took their medicine, 

Plaintiff testified that she was unable to work because she was afraid she would do 

something wrong. (AR 62.) She repeated, “I’m totally blanked out, and I don’t even have 

any confidence in myself now,” and confessed that she feared she might accidentally “kill 

somebody.” (AR 63.) In response to the ALJ’s question, Plaintiff noted that her mental 

health issues were holding her back. (AR 62–63.)

ii. Lay Testimony from Plaintiff’s Husband, Mr. Neal Contreras

On October 25, 2015, Plaintiff’s husband, Mr. Neal Contreras, filed a functional 

report detailing his observations of Plaintiff’s symptoms and functional limitations. (AR 

292–99). Mr. Contreras described Plaintiff as experiencing limitations in her ability to 

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work mentally, emotionally, and physically. (AR 292.) He noted Plaintiff’s daily 

activities, including cooking, cleaning, laundry, feeding dogs, and doing “patio/yard 

cleaning.” (AR 293–94.) Mr. Contreras stated that Plaintiff had a hobby of watching 

television, though she could only pay attention closely for half an hour. (AR 296–97.) He 

also noted that Plaintiff spent 30 minutes or more cooking daily, about 30 minutes on 

housework daily, and about one to two hours per week out of the house shopping for 

groceries. (AR 294–95.) Mr. Contreras also noted that Plaintiff could sometimes drive 

and did not otherwise opine about her gardening. (AR 295.) Lastly, Mr. Contreras 

observed that Plaintiff was having difficulty maintaining interest or having the energy to 

engage in her daily activities, and had experienced problems with her memory, 

concentration, and understanding. (AR 294–95, 97.)

On November 5, 2017, Mr. Contreras submitted a signed letter including twelve 

examples of Plaintiff’s problems and functional difficulties that he had personally 

observed over time. (AR 591.) This letter included apathy, appetite disturbance with 

weight gain, sleep problems, agitation, difficulty concentrating, suicidal thoughts, 

paranoid thinking, anxiety, apprehensive expectations, compulsions, and “recurrent and 

intrusive recollections of a traumatic experience from her former employer.” (Id.)

B. The Medical Record1

i. Dr. Alan Chang

Dr. Alan Chang is Plaintiff’s primary care doctor and treating physician. On 

September 25, 2015, Dr. Chang responded to questions posed by Plaintiff in connection 

with her long-term disability claim to her insurer. (AR 581.) In response to the questions 

“Am I totally disabled from doing my job as a nurse?” and “If so, have I been disabled 

since June 2014?”, Dr. Chang stated that, “Yes, unfortunately you have not been able to 

work due to job stress.” (AR 581.)

 

1 Because Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s physical RFC, the Court sets 

out only the medical record relevant to Plaintiff’s mental impairment. (See ECF No. 20 at 2.)

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On December 10, 2015, Plaintiff first reported her mental health issues to Dr. 

Chang. (AR 561.) Dr. Chang noted that Plaintiff “ha[d] not expressed the extent of the 

stress and how it was affecting her until today’s visit.” (Id.) Dr. Chang gave Plaintiff a 

prescription for Zoloft and referred her to psychiatry. (AR 564.)

On January 11, 2016, Dr. Chang reported that Plaintiff had revealed the full extent 

of her family history of mental illness for the first time. (AR 565.) Plaintiff reported that 

her sister had committed suicide and that her daughters also suffer from depression. (Id.)

Dr. Chang stated that “this seems to be a very strong family history of mental illness.” 

(Id.) Dr. Chang opined that “[a]t this time [Plaintiff] is clearly not able to work or 

function because of the mental illness.” (AR 568.)

On February 24, 2016, Dr. Chang observed that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with 

major depressive disorder with anxiety. (AR 576.) He opined that Plaintiff “is not able to 

work due [her] emotional and mental stress.” (Id.) Dr. Chang described that Plaintiff’s 

recent openness about her mental condition explained why “she was not able to perform 

at her job,” and led him to conclude that Plaintiff “should not work.” (Id.) Dr. Chang also 

noted in his assessment that Plaintiff’s son had attempted to commit suicide and that 

Plaintiff “is now a caregiver at home for him.” (AR 578.)

ii. Dr. Ryan Greytak

On December 2, 2015, Dr. Ryan Greytak performed a Comprehensive Psychiatric 

Evaluation of Plaintiff. (AR 543.) Dr. Greytak determined that Plaintiff’s condition was 

“most consistent with . . . a DSM 5 diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder.” (AR 548.)

With respect to Plaintiff’s mental functional capacity, Dr. Greytak opined that Plaintiff 

was mildly impaired as to her ability to “do detailed and complex instructions,” “relate 

and interact with co-workers and [the] public,” “maintain concentration and attention, 

persistence and pace,” “associate with day-to-day work activity, including attendance and 

safety,” “accept instructions from supervisors,” “maintain regular attendance in the work 

place and perform work activities on a consistent basis,” and “perform work activities 

without special or additional supervision.” (AR 548–49.) Dr. Greytak also found that 

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Plaintiff had no impairment as to her ability to “understand, remember, and carry out 

simple one or two-step job instructions.” (AR 548.) Dr. Greytak opined that Plaintiff’s 

psychiatric prognosis was “fair.” (AR 548.)

iii. Lee Reback Psy. D., P.A. and Brady Dalton, Psy. D.

As part of Plaintiff’s initial disability determination, Lee Reback Psy. D., P.A. 

reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records. (AR 90–92.) On December 20, 2015, Dr. Reback 

concluded that Plaintiff’s mental status was “mildly impaired” in several areas, including 

but not limited to Plaintiff’s ability “to do detailed and complex instructions,” “to relate 

and interact with co-workers and [the] public,” and “to maintain concentration and 

attention, persistence and pace.” (AR 92.) Dr. Reback also opined that, “[f]rom a mental 

health perspective, the claimant appears to have the capacity to perform daily and routine 

activities.” (AR 92.)

In addition, upon reconsideration of Plaintiff’s disability request, Brady Dalton,

Psy. D., reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and her disability determination. (AR 102–

04.) Dalton noted that Plaintiff claimed that her condition began worsening before her 

evaluation by the consultative examiner. (AR 104.) Dalton opined that “it appears both 

initial and recon allegations were appropriately assessed initially and there is no change 

in circumstance at recon.” (Id.) Thus, Dalton concluded that “a non-severe psych rating 

appears reasonable, and initial findings . . . are adopted.” (Id.)

iv. Dr. Karine H. Khatchatrian and Mary Ellen Bennett, LCSW

On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff started receiving treatment from Psychiatric 

Centers at San Diego (“PCSD”). (AR 623.) Plaintiff was seen by two practitioners at 

PCSD, Dr. Karine H. Khatchatrian and Licensed Clinical Social Worker (“LCSW”) Mary 

Ellen Bennett. (AR 569–75, 594–649, 664–72).

From February 16, 2016 to December 30, 2016, Plaintiff had over twenty sessions 

with a therapist, Mary Ellen Bennett. (AR 594–622; 629–631; 636–641; 644–649; 664–

672.) At times, Plaintiff reported that her short-term memory was impaired and that she

was experiencing auditory hallucinations, including “hearing voices of children.” (AR 

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609, 616, 621.) She also was observed to suffer from a tangential thought process. (AR 

598, 610, 613, 645.) On April 18, 2016, Plaintiff’s therapist reported that she agreed with 

Dr. Chang’s opinion that Plaintiff was “too impaired to work as a nurse.” (AR 609.)

On September 21, 2016, Plaintiff had an initial psychiatric evaluation with Dr. 

Khatchatrian. (AR 658.) Plaintiff reported that she was anxious, agitated, and hyper, 

“jump[ing] from one activity to another but [] unable to finish any of them . . .” (AR 658, 

660.) She also reported seeing passing shadows as well as experiencing paranoia, fleeting 

suicidal ideation, ideas of reference, and panic attacks. (AR 658.) Dr. Khatchatrian 

assessed Plaintiff’s appearance as appropriate, behavior as unremarkable, mood as

anxious, irritable, and hyper, and thought processes as showing a “flight of ideas.” (AR 

660.) Dr. Khatchatrian observed that Plaintiff’s short-term memory was impaired, as 

Plaintiff was unable to recall three words in 5 min. (Id.)

On October 5, 2016 Dr. Khatchatrian noted “moderate improvement” in Plaintiff’s 

condition but observed that Plaintiff continued to present with an “impaired memory and 

concentration,” “racing thoughts,” and an “anxious mood.” (AR 654.) Plaintiff also 

demonstrated “less intense” paranoia. (Id.) By October 26, 2016, Dr. Khatchatrian 

reported “good improvement” in Plaintiff’s condition. (AR 650.) Again, Plaintiff 

continued to present an “irritable, hyper and anxious” mood, “impaired memory and 

concentration,” and “racing thoughts.” (Id.) Plaintiff also exhibited “paranoia and visual 

hallucinations (sees shadows).” (Id.) In subsequent visits on November 17, 2016, 

December 8, 2016, and January 6, 2017, Dr. Khatchatrian noted “good improvement” in 

Plaintiff’s condition. (AR 642, 632, 625.)

v. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Vocational Expert (“VE”) Sonia Peterson also testified at the hearing. (AR 36, 73.)

She characterized Plaintiff’s vocational background as a general duty nurse at the 

medium exertion level, with a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) of 7. (AR 48.)

The ALJ asked the VE for other jobs to which Plaintiff’s skills could transfer, and the VE 

offered (a) home attendant at the medium level with an SVP of 3 and 800,000 jobs 

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available; (b) phlebotomist at the medium level with an SVP of 3 and 120,000 jobs 

available; (c) hospital admitting clerk at the light level with an SVP of 4 and 80,000 jobs 

available; and (d) cardiac telemetry at the light level with an SVP of 5 and 60,000 jobs 

available. (AR 74–77.) The VE also suggested home attendant with an SVP of 3 and 

“about 400,000 jobs nationally.” (AR 77–78.)

The ALJ posed various hypotheticals to the VE. First, he asked whether an 

individual with the same age, education, and experience as Plaintiff, who “can perform at 

the medium exertional level” but suffers from mental health issues such that they can

only perform work that requires simple or detailed tasks, but not complex tasks, could 

perform Plaintiff’s past work as a nurse. (AR 78–79.) The VE answered no and opined 

that this person could perform the other jobs, except the cardiac monitor. (AR 79.)

Next, the ALJ asked the VE whether the same person in the first hypothetical, 

could perform the VE’s suggested jobs, excluding the jobs of home attendant and cardiac 

monitor, if limited to “light exertion work.” (AR 79.) The VE said yes. (AR 79.)

Lastly, the ALJ asked the VE whether her evaluation would change if the 

hypothetical person suffered from more severe mental health issues, resulting in one day 

per week where they “are not giving conscientious work performance” and “where 

they’re 30 percent off task.” (AR 79–80.) The VE responded “that person would not pass 

a probationary period. So, there would be no work available.” (AR 80.)

Plaintiff’s attorney asked the VE how many days per month a person could miss 

and retain their employment. (AR 80-81.) The VE replied that, assuming a job requires a 

five-day work week, “missing two days a month consistently” would mean no work. (AR 

81.) Finally, Plaintiff’s attorney asked the VE what her assessment would be if a person 

was “consistently off task . . . at least 15 percent of the day.” (AR 81.) The VE answered 

that such a person would not be able to work. (Id.)

C. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ applied the five-step sequential framework to determine that Plaintiff did 

not have a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from June 30, 2014

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through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AR at 20–35.) At step one, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 30, 2014. (AR at 22.)

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from three severe impairments:

depression, anxiety, hypertension with kidney disease. (AR at 23.) At step three, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met 

or medically equaled one of the impairments listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments. (AR at 23–24.) 

The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to “perform medium work . . . involving simple or detailed tasks but not jobs 

involving complex tasks or decisions.” (AR at 24.) At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff 

was unable to perform her past relevant work. (AR at 28.) At step five, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff could perform various jobs which exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy, and thus was not disabled. (AR at 29.) These include a home 

attendant, phlebotomist, hospital admitting clerk, and personal attendant. (AR at 29–30.)

II. Legal Standards

A. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge’s R&R

The district court’s duties in connection with an R&R of a magistrate judge are set 

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district judge 

must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which [an] 

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district 

court need not review de novo those portions of an R&R to which neither party objects. 

See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 114, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). When no objections are filed, the Court 

may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the 

motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 

(9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

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Because no objections have been filed, the Court assumes the correctness of 

Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes factual findings. See Campbell, 501 F.2d at 206. 

B. Standard of Review of the Commissioner’s Decision 

A court “will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error 

or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The “evidence 

must be more than a mere scintilla but not necessarily a preponderance.” Connett v. 

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The court will uphold an 

ALJ’s findings when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. 

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995)). “When evidence reasonably supports either confirming 

or reversing the ALJ’s decision, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.” 

Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)).

The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 

supports and detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence is inconclusive, 

“questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely 

for the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting 

Waters v. Gardner, 452 F.2d 855, 858 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971)). 

III. Analysis

For purposes of the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if she is unable “to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant carries the initial burden of proving disability. Id. at 

§ 423(d)(5); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR at 29–30.) Plaintiff 

challenges that finding on two bases.2 First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide 

clear and convincing reasons to reject her symptom testimony. (ECF No. 12 at 12–15.)

Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of her 

treating physicians. (Id. at 15–19.) Based on a review of the record, this Court finds that 

the ALJ committed harmless error in its treatment of Dr. Chang’s opinion, but that the 

matter must nonetheless be remanded as the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and failed to adequately develop the 

record. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2014).

A. The ALJ Improperly Rejected Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony.

In deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective pain or symptom testimony, 

an ALJ must perform a two-step analysis. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 

1996). First, the ALJ must assess “whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce 

the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)). Second, if the 

first test is met and there is no evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject the 

claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear 

and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. 

The ALJ determines “credibility, resolve[s] conflicts in the testimony, and 

resolve[s] ambiguities in the record.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 

1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must 

identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 

complaints.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

 

2 Plaintiff styles his motion for summary judgment as containing three separate arguments. (ECF No. 

12.) However, as Plaintiff’s one-paragraph argument articulation makes clear, Section I is merely an 

introduction to the two substantive arguments that follow. (Id. (“for the reasons set forth below . . .”)).

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Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)). The decision “must contain 

specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case 

record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to . . . any subsequent reviewers 

the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that 

weight.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted); see also Lester v Chater, 81 F.3d 

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (“General [credibility] findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ 

must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 

claimant’s complaints.”); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[An ALJ] 

must state which pain testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the 

complaints are not credible.”); Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990)

(noting that the ALJ must provide “specific, cogent reasons for the disbelief” when it 

rejects the claimant’s complaints”). 

While “an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a 

lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain . . . it is a factor 

that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 

680 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ “[m]ay consider a range of factors in assessing credibility, 

including (1)‘ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s

reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately 

explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) 

the claimant’s daily activities.’” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges a variety of mental impairments stemming from depression, 

stress and anxiety, including difficulty with her concentration, memory and auditory 

hallucinations. (AR 281, 284–85, 561, 597–98, 609–615, 654, 660.) After reviewing 

Plaintiff’s testimony and medical record, the ALJ found “that the claimant’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” 

(AR 25); Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The ALJ then rejected Plaintiff’s symptom 

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testimony, finding that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical 

evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 25.)

Therefore, the Court must determine whether the ALJ supplied clear, specific and 

convincing reasons for disregarding Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. See Lingenfelter, 

504 F.3d 1036. In analyzing the ALJ’s opinion and the Magistrate’s R&R, the ALJ 

appears to reject Plaintiff’s symptom testimony for three reasons: (i) that Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony is not supported by the medical record; (ii) that Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony is inconsistent with her activities of daily living; and (iii) that Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony is not to be believed because she did not seek psychiatric treatment 

prior to 2016. In light of the record below and the applicable law, the Court finds that 

these reasons are not clear, specific, and compelling, and remands for further analysis 

consistent with this Order.

i. Medical Record

In determining Plaintiff’s RFC and rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony that 

was presented on December 8, 2017, the ALJ summarized the “opinion evidence” and

failed to identify specific statements from Plaintiff’s testimony or functional report that 

were not credible. (AR 26–28); (see also ECF No. 21 at 12–13 (describing the ALJ’s

summary of the medical record)). “An ALJ’s vague allegation that a claimant’s testimony 

is not consistent with the objective medical evidence, without any specific findings in 

support of that conclusion, is insufficient . . .” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). “The ALJ must identify the testimony that was not 

credible, and specify what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id. (citing 

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (internal quotations omitted)). Given the ALJ’s failure to 

identify specific statements in Plaintiff’s testimony as incredible, the ALJ’s summary of 

the medical record and opinion evidence here are legally insufficient to discount 

Plaintiff’s credibility. See, e.g., Stone v. Saul, No. 2:18-CV-02862-CKD, 2020 WL 

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1332946, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2020) (finding ALJ’s general summary of the medical 

record inadequate). 

The Court, nonetheless, considers the weight of the evidence as it is a “relevant 

factor.” Black v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 433 F. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001)). Here, Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony is undermined by some portions of the medical record and supported 

by others. On one hand, the medical record from December 2, 2015 and March 2, 2016 

shows that three doctors – one doctor who assessed Plaintiff’s functional limitations, and 

two others who reviewed her records – concurred that Plaintiff had only mild limitations 

resulting from her mental impairment. After examining Plaintiff on December 2, 2015, 

Dr. Greytak, for example, opined that Plaintiff was mildly impaired as to her ability to 

“do detailed and complex instructions,” “relate and interact with co-workers and public,” 

“maintain concentration and attention, persistence and pace,” “associate with day-to-day 

work activity, including attendance and safety,” “accept instructions from supervisors,” 

“maintain regular attendance in the work place and perform work activities on a 

consistent basis,” and “perform work activities without special or additional supervision.” 

(AR 548–49.) Dr. Greytak also found that Plaintiff had no impairment as to her ability to 

“understand, remember, and carry out simple one or two-step job instructions.” (AR 548.) 

Two psychiatrists from the Social Security Administration who reviewed Plaintiff’s 

medical records, Dr. Lee Reback and Dr. Brady Dalton, concurred with Dr. Greytak as to 

Plaintiff’s functional limitations. (AR 92, 103–05.) 

On the other hand, there is a significant amount of evidence that followed the 

December 2015 evaluation which corroborates Plaintiff’s testimony. First, there are the

opinions of Dr. Chang, Plaintiff’s primary care doctor. Dr. Chang opined on four separate 

occasions that Plaintiff was could not, or should not, be working. On February 24, 2016, 

for example, Dr. Chang opined that Plaintiff was dealing,

“with significant emotional stress and depression . . . She clearly is not able 

to work due to the emotional and mental stress. This is inhibiting her ability 

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to concentrate. She works as a nurse and this will clearly affect her ability to 

perform work as a nurse as concentration is required to avoid medication 

errors . . . Given her current situation I agree that she should not work . . .” 

(AR 576.) Six weeks prior, on January 11, 2016, Dr. Chang similarly opined that 

Plaintiff, “is suffering from major depressive disorder . . . [It] has been interfering with 

her sleep and she has been having difficulty concentrating. At this time, she is clearly not 

able to work or function because of the mental illness and how it affects her thought 

process.” (AR 568.) One month before that, on December 10, 2015, Dr. Chang also

opined that Plaintiff “is clearly suffering major depressive disorder. It is interfering with 

her sleep and she is having difficulty concentrating. She is clearly not able to function or 

work at this time due to her condition.” (AR 564.) Even as early as September 22, 2015, 

Dr. Chang had opined that Plaintiff “ha[d] not been able to work due to job stress” and 

was “totally disabled.” (AR 581.)

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony also derives support from the 2016 treatment notes 

of LCSW Mary Ellen Bennett, even if her opinion as a licensed social worker is entitled 

to less deference than that of a medical doctor. See Giese v. Barnhart, 55 F. App’x 799, 

800–01 (9th Cir. 2002; Casner v. Colvin, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2013).

LCSW Bennett maintained diagnoses of depressive and anxiety disorders throughout

Plaintiff’s treatment, regularly noted that Plaintiff struggled to manage the stressors in her 

life, and repeatedly found no change or improvement in Plaintiff’s “mental status”

throughout 2016. (AR 569–75, 594–649, 664–72).

Ultimately, the Court finds that the disparity between Plaintiff’s testimony and the 

contradictory evidence in the medical record does not entitle the ALJ to discredit Plaintiff 

entirely. First, Dr. Greytak’s medical examination, Dr. Dalton’s opinion, and Dr. 

Reback’s opinion all took place more than two years before the ALJ’s hearing and well 

before Plaintiff began therapy. Further, an “ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective 

complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence . . .” Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (citing 

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345); Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th 

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Cir. 1997) (“[A] finding that the claimant lacks credibility cannot be premised wholly on 

a lack of medical support for the severity of his pain”); Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16–

3p (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017) (stating that SSA adjudicators should “not disregard an 

individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms 

solely because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate the degree of 

impairment-related symptoms alleged by the individual”). Instead, an ALJ’s decision to 

discount symptom testimony must be predicated on more “specific reasons.” BrownHunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493–94 (9th Cir. 2015). Consequently, the Court rejects 

the ALJ’s reliance on the medical record and finds that it is not a clear, specific, and 

convincing reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680.

ii. Daily Activities

In addition to relying on the “opinion evidence,” the ALJ also asserts that “the 

claimant’s reported activities” support his RFC determination and implicitly contradict 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (AR 28.) The Magistrate Judge concurs, finding that the 

ALJ properly “addressed inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s reported disabilities and her 

self-reported activities of daily living, when assessing the credibility of her subjective 

testimony.” (ECF No. 21 at 15.) The Court, however, disagrees. Upon a review of the 

record, the Court finds that the ALJ mischaracterized Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and 

then erroneously concluded that Plaintiff’s symptoms were inconsistent with her 

activities of daily life. 

The ALJ refers to various specific activities of daily living. The ALJ notes, for 

example, that Plaintiff “engages in gardening, some television watching, and cooking,” 

and “is able to do grocery shopping.” (AR 25.) The ALJ also recognizes that Plaintiff’s 

“son had been released to [her] custody following a suicide attempt” and that she now 

“provide[s] care to” him. (AR 26.) The ALJ also mentions that Plaintiff “continued to 

travel to see family members and spend time with others.” (AR 26.) 

In providing these descriptions, however, the ALJ ignores testimony necessary to 

understand the scope of Plaintiff’s activities. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 

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(9th Cir. 2014) (finding ALJ’s selective presentation of daily activities was erroneous for 

failing to note plaintiff had to rest between activities, needed help to do the activities, and 

could not always complete the activities given her pain). In Plaintiff’s functional report, 

she offers limitations similar to those in Garrison. For example, Plaintiff states that she 

needs reminders to conduct some of her daily activities, including showering and taking 

medicine. (AR 280.) She submits that she spends only “an hour or two” daily on 

cleaning, laundry, ironing, and cooking, and that she “easily get[s] tired” doing her 

housework. (AR 280–81.) She limits her grocery shopping to one to two hours per week. 

(AR 282.) She also states that she needs to rest for 10 to 20 minutes after walking every 

100 to 200 feet, and that she cannot concentrate for more than 20 to 30 minutes at a time

during her housework. (AR 284.) At the hearing, Plaintiff added that her gardening is 

limited to watching and talking to her plants and that the local grocery store, Sprouts, is 

only five minutes away. (AR 57–58, 65–66.)3 She affirmed that she cannot walk “so far,” 

has limitations “driving or thinking or walking,” and only “sometimes” drives. (AR 61.) 

The ALJ has not addressed these limitations to Plaintiff’s daily activities, (AR 23–

28), and has not offered specific, clear and convincing reasons for disregarding them.

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. At certain points, the record directly contradicts the ALJ 

findings. The ALJ, for example, states repeatedly that “claimant identified no difficulties 

engaging in personal care, preparing simple meals, doing laundry and ironing, cleaning, 

driving, managing finances, and maintaining contact with family.” (AR 24.) But, as 

 

3 Notably, though the ALJ does not cite this as a reason to disregard Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, 

Plaintiff’s testimony changes slightly as to gardening. In her functional report, Plaintiff answers 

“cooking favorite menu & gardening” in response to question 10, “What were you able to do before 

your illnesses, injuries, or conditions that you can’t do now?”. (AR 280.) At the hearing, she testifies 

that she is “still doing gardening,” but that she only “talk[s] to [her] plants [and her] flowers basically.” 

(AR 57.) This contradiction is not so glaring as to persuade the Court that Plaintiff lacks credibility. Cf.

Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2010) (discrediting plaintiff for claiming 

his “back pain limited his ability to stand, sit and walk,” and then testifying to working on a ranch by 

“building fences, running a tractor, feeding cattle, and laying irrigation waterlines”). In any event, the 

Court is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 

(9th Cir. 2003).

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noted, Plaintiff’s functional report and testimony reveal limitations as to the time, energy, 

and focus which she can devote to those activities. 

The ALJ’s conclusion is also erroneous because Plaintiff’s activities are consistent

with her symptom testimony. The Ninth Circuit’s caselaw is clear that “if a claimant is 

able to spend a substantial part of [her] day engaged in pursuits involving the 

performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting,” the ALJ may 

be justified in disregarding the claimant’s symptom testimony. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 

597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); accord Fritz v. Berryhill, 685 F. App’x 585, 

586 (9th Cir. 2017); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001); Morgan v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the 

fact that a Plaintiff regularly engages in some activity does not disprove a disability. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1287 n.7 (“The Social Security Act does not require that claimants be 

utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits . . .”). No court should penalize claimants 

“for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations,” Reddick, 157 F.3d at

722, especially where they do so “for therapeutic reasons.” Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050.

Here, Plaintiff’s regular, daily activities fit precisely into this category. The ability 

to spend “an hour or two” per day on cleaning, laundry, ironing, and cooking, to engage 

in daily gardening where Plaintiff merely “talk[s] to [the] plants,” to occasionally drive a 

car to a grocery store located five minutes away, and to otherwise speak with family over 

the phone, or watch television regularly, are consistent with the symptoms that Plaintiff 

describes in her testimony and functional report. (AR 56–65, 280–82.) Outside of the 

television watching and phone calls, and in light of Plaintiff’s stated limitations, 

Plaintiff’s daily activities do not appear to take up a “substantial” part of her day, 

Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049, and it is not clear from the description of Plaintiff’s activities 

of daily living that she could accomplish similar tasks in the workplace. Fair, 885 F.2d at 

603 (“[M]any home activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more 

grueling environment of the workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest 

or take medication”). Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, moreover, align with the 

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activities recommended to Plaintiff to aid in her recuperation. (AR 603, 627, 634.) Even 

Plaintiff’s ill-advised decision to visit a casino does not undermine her credibility

altogether because that single trip was “not performed consistently” and does not “mirror 

the demands of a full-time job.” Meier v. Astrue, 404 F. App’x 150, 152 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(finding ALJ’s rejection of claimant’s testimony was erroneous even where claimant 

“occasionally engage[d] in more strenuous activities such as lifting bags of salt and 

garbage and shoveling snow” because those activities were intermittent). Accordingly, 

the supposed inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s daily activities and her testimony do not 

satisfy the requirement of a clear, specific, and convincing reason to discredit her 

symptom testimony. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281; see Smith v. Berryhill, 704 F. App’x 652, 

653 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The ALJ did not make findings as to the pervasiveness of these 

activities, what they entailed, or how the physical functions displayed during the 

activities are transferrable to a work setting.”)

The Court observes, moreover, that the ALJ’s special reliance on Plaintiff’s 

childcare responsibilities, among other daily activities, is misplaced. Discussing one of 

Plaintiff’s daily activities, the ALJ emphasizes that Plaintiff “retained [the] ability to 

provide care to at least her son . . . [which] indicates [a] retained capacity to function in 

other vocational aspects of caregiving.” (AR 26.) Plaintiff, however, does not explain, 

nor does the ALJ elicit testimony on, what conduct or skills Plaintiff displays in caring 

for her son that would be transferable to a role in “caregiving.” In other words, there is 

nothing in the record to indicate exactly what it is that Plaintiff does “to provide care to” 

her son. (AR 576); cf. Sapp v. Berryhill, No. 8:18-00077-ADS, 2019 WL 1877446, at *2, 

*9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2019) (affirming ALJ’s reliance on plaintiff’s daily activity of 

childcare for a two-year-old infant where plaintiff was “alone with him most of the time 

during the day” and the record included more detail as to what was entailed in his care); 

see also Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Absent specific details 

about Trevizo’s childcare responsibilities, those tasks cannot constitute substantial 

evidence . . .”) (citation omitted). Consequently, because “the ALJ must make [a] specific 

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finding relating the transferability of the daily activities to a work setting in order to 

conclude that the claimant’s daily activities warrant an adverse credibility 

determination,” the Court finds that Plaintiff’s undefined and seemingly temporary 

responsibility to care for her 24-year-old son, (AR 236), does not provide a specific, 

clear, and convincing reason for disregarding Plaintiff’s testimony. Froom v. Colvin, No. 

12-CV-276-JLS, 2013 WL 3780155, at *12 (S.D. Cal. July 18, 2013) (citing Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 

(9th Cir. 1999)).

Lastly, contrary to the Magistrate’s conclusion, the Court is not persuaded that the 

precedents cited by the Commissioner – Stubbs-Danielson and Morgan – compel a 

different conclusion here. (ECF No. 21 at 17.) As the Magistrate Judge notes, the Ninth 

Circuit in Stubbs-Danielson found that “normal activities of daily living, including 

cooking, house cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband in managing finances . . 

. suggest[ed] that the claimant may still be capable of performing the basic demands of 

competitive, remunerative, unskilled work on a sustained basis.” Stubbs-Danielson v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008). And, though the Ninth Circuit’s brief

reasoning in Stubbs-Danielson fails to cite a single case for the applicable standard, 

Morgan makes clear that such a conclusion requires an implicit finding that the plaintiff 

“spen[t] a substantial part of his day engaged in” those activities and that those activities 

entailed “physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.” Morgan v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). For the foregoing reasons, the 

Court cannot make that “specific finding” here as the record does not show that 

Plaintiff’s activities of daily living constitute a substantial part of her day. Id.; Vertigan, 

260 F.3d at 1049.

iii. Failure to Seek Treatment

The ALJ also rejects Plaintiff’s symptom testimony because she did not seek 

psychiatric treatment prior to 2016. After summarizing Plaintiff’s “[p]sychiatric treatment 

records,” the ALJ commented that Plaintiff’s “lack of reported problems prior to 2016 

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suggest caution in finding significant persistent issues.” (AR 27.) In concluding the RFC 

analysis, the ALJ again noted “the limited and conservative treatment record as to both 

physical and mental impairments.” (AR 28.) Though the Magistrate Judge did not issue a 

separate recommendation on this reason, it is cited in the R&R’s discussion of the 

medical record as a reason to affirm the ALJ. (ECF No. 21 at 14.)

The Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion is not compelling because the ALJ does 

not address Plaintiff’s explanation for not seeking treatment earlier – an inability to 

process her mental impairment. Certainly, “a claimant’s failure to assert [a reason for not 

seeking treatment], or a finding by the ALJ that the proffered reason is not believable, 

can cast doubt on the sincerity of the claimant’s pain testimony.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 

597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). And, courts are less likely to credit a plaintiff who only seeks 

treatment “after she applied for disability benefits” or whose “resistance [to seeking 

treatment] was attributable . . . her own personal preference” rather than her “mental 

impairment.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). 

However, “[w]here a claimant provides evidence of a good reason for not taking 

medication for her symptoms, her symptom testimony cannot be rejected for not doing 

so.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Courts have found a number of reasons adequate in this 

context. See, e.g., Smith, 704 F. App’x at 653 (declining to take medication with which 

plaintiff had previously attempted to commit suicide); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (declining 

to seek treatment because plaintiff did not have insurance and thus could not afford 

treatment). The Ninth Circuit, moreover, counsels against discrediting Plaintiffs with 

mental impairments for failing to proactively seek treatment. See Schiaffino v. Saul, No. 

18-35853, 2020 WL 110527, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2020) (“[I]t is a questionable practice 

to chastise one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking 

rehabilitation.”); Crose v. Berryhill, 737 F. App’x 333, 335 (9th Cir. 2018) (same);

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996) (“depression is one of the most 

underreported illnesses in the country because those afflicted often do not recognize that 

their condition reflects a potentially serious mental illness . . . that claimant may be one

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of millions of people who did not seek treatment for a mental disorder until late in the 

day is not a substantial basis” to discount the claimant’s testimony); 

Here, Plaintiff adequately explains her reasoning for failing to seek treatment prior 

to December 2015, and the ALJ does not reject Plaintiff’s “proffered reason.” Fair, 885 

F.2d at 603. As Dr. Chang notes following Plaintiff’s December 10, 2015 visit, Plaintiff

had not been “open about her overall medical condition” prior to that date, and was only 

able to express “the extent of the stress and how it been affecting her [at that] visit.” (AR 

561.) At Plaintiff’s January 11, 2016 visit, Dr. Chang again remarked that Plaintiff was 

tearful and depressed, “like she was keeping secrets,” and was only recently “more open 

about her overall condition.” (AR 565.) Plaintiff’s own testimony at her hearing before 

the ALJ corroborates Dr. Chang’s observations, i.e., that Plaintiff was unable to 

adequately process her mental impairment and did not recognize she needed treatment:

[ALJ] When did you first tell [Dr. Chang] this?

[Plaintiff] I forgot. He said, [Plaintiff], I’ve known you for 20 years. What’s going 

on with you? And then I told him, I’m sorry to say, but I think -

[ALJ] Okay. But it took a while for you to even tell your primary care doctor 

about those issues.

[Plaintiff] Yeah. He was mad. He said, [Plaintiff], I know you for how many years

[ALJ] Well, sometimes, people feel ashamed. Maybe --

[Plaintiff] Yeah. That’s --

[ALJ] you felt embarrassed or ashamed.

[Plaintiff] what I say.

[ALJ] There’s no reason to, but people sometimes feel that way.

[Plaintiff] Yeah. And then I told my history of my family.

[ALJ] Okay. I understand.

(AR 65.) This passage is doubly instructive as it also shows that the ALJ himself 

understood Plaintiff’s reasoning for failing to seek treatment. And, despite this 

understanding, Plaintiff’s own statements, and the medical record, the ALJ nonetheless 

did not even consider Plaintiff’s reasoning, much less reject it. (AR 24–29.)

Furthermore, the record presents additional indicia of reliability for Plaintiff’s 

belated effort to seek treatment of her mental problems. First, there is what Dr. Chang 

described as the “very strong family history of mental illness.” (AR 568.) Plaintiff’s sister 

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“suffered from severe major depression” and committed suicide. (AR 561.) Plaintiff’s 

children also suffer from mental health issues: her eldest daughter takes “psychiatric 

meds” and suffers from “major depression”; her son was diagnosed with schizophrenia; 

and her youngest daughter takes “medication for major depression.” (AR 65, 230, 565, 

574, 629.) Plaintiff had earlier withheld this information, just as she had her own mental 

struggles, out of embarrassment, shame and denial. (AR 64.)

In addition, the events leading to Plaintiff’s departure from work demonstrate her

ongoing mental health issues, including her difficulty with concentration and memory 

loss, and denial about her impairment. In 2014, Plaintiff was accused of making a 

mistake while treating a patient. (AR 45–46.) Plaintiff denied making the mistake but, in 

the aftermath, found herself consumed with the fear that she “might accidently kill 

someone” if she returned to work as a nurse. (AR 46, 664.) Though at odds with the 

Plaintiff’s denial of responsibility for making any mistake, this fear reflects the 

depression and anxiety that the ALJ accepted as severe mental impairments. (AR 23.)

Consequently, as Plaintiff’s reasoning for delaying treatment is plausible in light of 

her background and history, and the ALJ does not address it, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s alleged failure to seek medical treatment earlier is not a specific, clear, and 

convincing reason for disregarding Plaintiff’s testimony.4 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.

B. The ALJ Improperly Rejected Plaintiff’s Husband’s Testimony.

“In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness 

testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to work.” Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 

 

4 In addition, given the ALJ’s characterization of Plaintiff’s treatment as “limited and conservative” 

prior to 2016, it bears noting that her treatment was not comparably “limited and conservative” in 2016 

or 2017. From December 2015 to October 2017, Plaintiff was prescribed multiple medications to 

address her diagnosed mental impairments, including Sertraline (i.e., Zoloft), Risperidone, Alprazolam, 

Oxcarbazepine (i.e., Trileptal). (AR 267, 270–71, 572, 647.) The Court finds her treatment relevant to 

the ALJ’s conclusion here. See Drawn v. Berryhill, 728 F. App’x 637, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting 

ALJ’s characterization of plaintiff’s treatment as “limited and conservative” where she “she was 

prescribed a number of psychiatric medications”). 

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1053 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(4). Such testimony is competent 

evidence and “cannot be disregarded without comment.” Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 

1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). If an ALJ disregards the testimony of a lay witness, the ALJ 

must provide reasons “that are germane to each witness.” Id. Germane reasons must be 

sufficiently specific. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054 (explaining that “the ALJ, not the district 

court, is required to provide specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony”).

Here, the ALJ erred in rejecting Mr. Contreras’s testimony.

5 Mr. Contreras offered

lay witness testimony twice in the record, first in his initial functional report dated 

October 25, 2015, (AR 292–99), and then again via a signed letter dated November 5, 

2017. (AR 591.) Mr. Contreras’s functional report largely mirrors Plaintiff’s own report, 

and as such corroborates her symptom testimony. (Compare AR 279–87 with AR 292–

99.) Mr. Contreras’s letter repeats some of the same symptoms as the two functional 

reports – e.g., anxiety, memory issues, lack of sleep, difficulty concentrating, loss of 

interest – and also alleges additional symptoms, including “[t]houghts of suicide . . .” and 

“recurrent and intrusive recollections of a traumatic experience from her former 

employer,” found elsewhere in the record. (AR 68, 591, 658.) The ALJ assigned “little 

weight” to Mr. Contreras’s statements for three reasons: his relationship to the Plaintiff, 

the alleged lack of support in the medical record, and the ALJ’s perception that Mr. 

Contreras’s exaggerated Plaintiff’s symptoms given her own testimony. (AR 28.)

The ALJ’s first two proffered reasons for dismissing Mr. Contreras’s testimony are 

not “germane” to the witness. First, the ALJ states that Mr. Contreras’s “assessment of 

[Plaintiff’s] limitations appears exaggerated given the objective medical evidence . . .” in 

the record. (AR 28.) However, “[c]ontradictory medical evidence is not a germane reason 

 

5 Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, this argument is not waived. (ECF No. 16-1 at 11.) Plaintiff relies 

on Mr. Contreras’s statements, Defendant objects to Plaintiffs’ reliance on them, and the Magistrate 

discusses the ALJ’s treatment of the statements. (Id.; ECF No. 12 at 12; ECF No. 21 at 18–19.) 

Consequently, because the Parties have sufficiently addressed the issue, the Court considers this “simple 

and straightforward question of law” ripe for adjudication. See Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 

1100 (9th Cir. 2013).

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to reject lay witness testimony.” Burns v. Berryhill, 731 F. App’x 609, 613 (9th Cir. 

2018); Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that a lack of 

support from the “overall medical evidence” is also not a proper basis for disregarding 

lay testimony); Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Nor under our law 

could the ALJ discredit [the witness’s] lay testimony as not supported by medical 

evidence in the record.”). Moreover, much of Mr. Contreras’s reported memory issues, 

lack of sleep, anxiety, and difficulties concentrating are accepted and parroted by Dr. 

Chang, Dr. Khatchatrian, and LCSW Bennett. (AR 576, 609, 615, 658.)

The ALJ also impermissibly asserts that Mr. Contreras’s statements “are not from 

an unbiased individual nor a medical source.” (AR 28.) That inference is plainly based on 

Mr. Contreras’s marital relationship to the Plaintiff, and a familial relationship is not a 

“germane” reason to dismiss lay testimony. See Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115–16 

(9th Cir. 2009) (finding that an ALJ gave “inadequate reasons for rejecting the wife’s lay 

opinion testimony”); Diedrich, 874 F.3d at 640 (finding that claimant’s close relationship 

with her fiancé was not a germane reason to discount the weight of his observations). 

Afterall, “regardless of whether they are interested parties, friends and family members in 

a position to observe a claimant’s symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify 

as to his or her condition.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918–19 

(9th Cir. 1993). And, an ALJ’s “rejection of the testimony of [the claimant’s] family 

members because [the claimant’s] medical records did not corroborate her” subjective 

testimony “violates SSR 88–13, which directs the ALJ to consider the testimony of lay 

witnesses where the claimant’s alleged symptoms are unsupported by her medical 

records.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original); 

see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(4) (stating that evidence provided by lay witnesses may 

be used to show “the severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) and how it affects [the 

claimant’s] ability to work”).

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Lastly, the ALJ also erred in dismissing Mr. Contreras’s lay testimony on the basis 

that it is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statements that she has “an ability to engage in 

gardening and hobbies,” and that “she has cared for her adult son when he needed care.”

(AR 28.) First, these activities are not discussed in Mr. Contreras’s November 5, 2017 

letter and, second, Mr. Contreras’s functional report does not deny that Plaintiff engages 

in those activities. (AR 292–99, 591.) Likewise, Mr. Contreras’s assertion that Plaintiff 

engages in “patio/yard cleaning” does not contradict Plaintiff’s assertion that she engages 

in limited gardening consisting mostly of looking at her flowers and plants. (AR 281, 

294.) The two are compatible and not inconsistent. Consequently, the ALJ’s assertion 

that Mr. Contreras’s functional report is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony is based 

on a misreading of the record and cannot serve as a “germane” to dismiss his statements. 

C. The ALJ Improperly Disregarded Some of the Opinion Evidence.

Lastly, the Parties dispute whether the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not 

disabled lacks substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ disregarded 

the opinions of “Dr. Chang and the treaters at PCSD,” which include LCSW Bennett and 

Dr. Khatchatrian, without providing a specific reason for doing so. (ECF No. 12 at 17; 

ECF No. 20 at 5–6.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s analysis is adequate. 

(ECF No. 16 at 20–25.) Here, the Court finds that the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Chang’s 

medical opinions lacked necessary specificity and failed to account for his assertions that 

Plaintiff could not work.

i. Legal Standard for Rejecting Conflicting Medical Opinions

Courts distinguish between three types of physicians who may provide medical 

opinions in a social security case: “(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); 

(2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those 

who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the 

opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” 

Id. (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). While the opinion of a 

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treating physician is thus entitled to greater weight than that of an examining physician, 

the opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than that of a nonexamining physician. Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

A treating physician’s medical opinion is given controlling weight where it “is 

well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and 

is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case record . . .” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527. If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another 

doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that 

are supported by substantial evidence. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198). “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 

(9th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). In other words, the ALJ “must do more than state 

conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than 

the doctors’, are correct.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. (citation omitted). The need for a 

specific and legitimate reason reflects a recognition that the treating or examining 

physician’s opinion is still owed deference and will often be “entitled to the greatest 

weight . . . even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 

F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, 

legitimate reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, the ALJ commits error. 

See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996). “In other words, an ALJ errs 

when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more 

than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more 

persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis 

for his conclusion.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012–13.

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ii. The ALJ’s Treatment of Dr. Chang, Dr. Khatchatrian, and LCSW 

Bennett’s Opinions

The ALJ begins his discussion of Dr. Chang’s medical opinions by referring 

explicitly to a letter dated September 22, 2015 that Plaintiff sent to Dr. Chang to 

complete. (AR 27, 581.) There, in response to the questions “Am I totally disabled from 

doing my job as a nurse?” and “If so, have I been disabled since June 2014?”, Dr. Chang 

states, “Yes, unfortunately you have not been able to work due to job stress.” (AR 581.) 

The ALJ attributes “little weight” to Dr. Chang’s opinion because it “falls short of a 

detailed vocational assessment.” (AR 27.) As the September 22, 2015 letter “is 

conclusory and brief and unsupported by clinical findings,” the Court finds that the ALJ 

did not err in rejecting it. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992)); accord Burrell v. 

Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2014).

However, at the same time, the ALJ’s cursory review of Dr. Chang’s other medical 

opinions fails to account for the gravamen of his concerns and expressly address other, 

relevant portions of the record. (AR 27.) For example, the ALJ broadly cites to Exhibits 

1F, 16F, 8F, and 9F in asserting that his RFC determination “is based upon the claimant’s 

overall records and improvement in symptoms with provided mental health care.” (AR 

27.) That summary conclusion elides several statements from Dr. Chang that Plaintiff 

was not able to work in light of her mental impairments.6 See, e.g., (AR 564 (“She is 

clearly not able to function or work at this time due to her condition.”)); (AR 568 (“At 

this time she is clearly not able to work or function because of the mental illness and how 

 

6 Earlier in his opinion, when discussing Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, the ALJ cites to two of the 

three progress notes mentioned here as absent. (AR 26.) The ALJ’s prior citations summarize that 

evidence for the purposes of asserting that Plaintiff’s symptom testimony conflicts with her childcare 

responsibilities, a reason earlier dismissed as insufficiently specific by this Order. Consequently, in 

contrast to the Magistrate Judge, the Court does not see how the ALJ’s prior references to these progress 

notes provide a “specific and legitimate” reason to disregard Dr. Chang’s opinion or absolve the ALJ of 

his responsibility to do so. (Cf. ECF No. 21 at 22.)

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it affects her thought process.”)); (AR 576 (“She is clearly not able to work due to the 

emotional and mental stress.”)). The ALJ likewise fails to mention Dr. Chang’s notations 

that Plaintiff needed psychiatric treatment, see, e.g., (AR 564 (“I am going to schedule 

her for follow-up with psychiatry to help with management.”)); (AR 576 (“She should 

continue to follow with outpatient psychiatric specialty care.”)), or that Dr. Chang 

successfully referred Plaintiff for mental health treatment. (AR 230.) And, even if the 

ALJ’s RFC is “consistent with” Dr. Chang’s concern that Plaintiff cannot return to her 

past work as a nurse, that does not help explain how the ALJ accounts for Dr. Chang’s 

repeated assertions that Plaintiff was unable to perform any work. (AR 27, 561–64, 565–

68, 576–78.)

Consequently, while the ALJ’s proffered reason for disregarding Dr. Chang’s 

September 22, 2015 letter is not error, the ALJ fails to provide a “specific and legitimate” 

reason to discount Dr. Chang’s equally concerning observations during treatment. 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. The ALJ’s cursory discussion of Dr. Chang’s treatment, 

moreover, eschews settled guidance from the Ninth Circuit that treating physicians are 

entitled to greater deference among competing medical opinions. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 

633–34 (concluding that a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to great weight even 

when not deemed controlling). And, the ALJ fails “to apply the appropriate factors in 

determining the extent to which the opinion should be credited,” which “alone constitutes 

reversible legal error.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 2017); see 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (listing factors to be considered in determining the weight of a 

treating physician’s opinion). Thus, the ALJ erred in assessing Dr. Chang’s opinions.

In contrast to the treatment of Dr. Chang, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. 

Khatchatrian’s opinion and LCSW Bennett’s opinion are not error. First, the Court 

concurs with the magistrate judge that the ALJ did not err in assigning “limited probative 

value” to the September 22, 2017 jury service note as it is summarily stated and offers no 

medical insight. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. More generally, and in contrast to 

Plaintiff’s uncited claims, neither Dr. Khatchatrian nor LCSW Bennet “opined that 

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[Plaintiff] is significantly limited by her mental impairment.” (Cf. ECF No. 12 at 17.) At 

most, the Court’s review of the record indicates that LCSW Bennett opined that Plaintiff 

could not continue to work as a nurse, and the ALJ’s RFC here is not inconsistent with 

that opinion. (AR 609 (“Precila’s primary care physician, Dr. Alan Chang, has 

determined that she is too impaired to work as a nurse. After meeting with this patient for 

six visits, I am in agreement with Dr. Chang’s assessment.”)) Consequently, Plaintiff’s 

argument that the ALJ improperly discredited their opinions is misplaced.

D. Harmless Error Analysis

The Court now turns to the analysis of whether the ALJ’s errors were harmless.

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)). An error is harmless “where it is 

inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115 (citations 

omitted). In other words, a Court must determine whether the ALJ’s conclusion is 

supported by substantial evidence despite the error. Blacksher v. Berryhill, 762 F. App'x 

372, 376 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 

1162 (9th Cir. 2008)). Courts look to the record as a whole to determine whether the error 

alters the outcome of the case. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.

Here, the record establishes that the ALJ’s assessments of Plaintiff and her 

husband were not harmless. As to the rejection of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the 

Court has found each of the ALJ’s proffered reasons are insufficiently “specific, clear and 

convincing.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Consequently, the 

ALJ’s credibility assessment lacks substantial evidence. Cf. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1163 

(finding the ALJ’s inadequate assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility survived harmless 

error analysis because it was nonetheless supported by a specific, clear and convincing 

reason). Similarly, because Mr. Contreras’s report and letter substantially corroborate 

Plaintiff’s testimony, and the ALJ provided no “germane” reason to disregard them, the 

Court “cannot say the ALJ’s error here was nonprejudicial.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056. 

These errors are harmful, moreover, in light of the medical record supporting 

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Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. For example, Dr. Chang’s insistence that Plaintiff was 

unable to work, and discussion of her family’s medical history, corroborate Plaintiff’s 

stated symptoms. (AR 561, 564–65, 568, 576 578, 581.) Dr. Chang, Dr. Khatchatrian, 

and LCSW Bennett’s observations of Plaintiff’s mental impairments are also based upon 

examinations closer in time to Plaintiff’s December 2017 hearing than were Dr. Reback, 

Dr. Dalton, and Dr. Greytak’s opinions, and thus may provide a more accurate reflection 

of Plaintiff’s current mental health. Lastly, in light of the Vocational Expert’s opinion 

that no work would be available in the national economy for “someone [who] was 

consistently off task or unable to concentrate outside of normal breaks at least 15 percent 

of the day,” (AR 81), Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and Mr. Contreras’s lay opinion, if 

credited, may be sufficient to establish that Plaintiff is disabled. At a minimum, the ALJ’s 

rejection of their testimony is not “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006). 

As to the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Chang’s medical opinions, the ALJ’s error was

likewise not harmless. First, the ALJ failed to provide an adequate reason for discounting

Dr. Chang’s multiple opinions that Plaintiff was unable work. Cf. Williams v. Berryhill, 

728 F. App'x 709, 711 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding ALJ’s reason for discounting a 

physician’s opinion was erroneous but harmless because other legitimate reasons 

supported the opinion’s treatment). Second, the ALJ’s error is not rendered harmless by

relying on Plaintiff’s “overall records,” (AR 27), or the Commissioner’s observation that 

the decision comports with the opinions of other, non-treating physicians, including Dr. 

Greytak. (ECF No. 17-1 at 14.) Rather, because Dr. Chang served as Plaintiff’s long-term 

family doctor and treating physician, and opined various times that Plaintiff could not 

work, Dr. Chang may have been entitled to greater deference. See Pearce v. Astrue, No. 

C09-04MJP, 2009 WL 3698514, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2009) (finding that an ALJ’s 

failure to attribute treating physician status to a doctor was not harmless); Logan v. 

Colvin, No. ED CV 12-107-PJW, 2013 WL 5332454, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013)

(“As to the Agency’s argument that Dr. Turner’s opinion was properly ignored because it 

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was contradicted by at least four other doctors, that argument misses the point. All things 

being equal, where the doctors’ opinions are in conflict, it is the treating doctor’s opinion 

that is entitled to deference—even if it happens to be the minority view—unless there is a 

valid reason for questioning it.”) Consequently, the Court cannot conclude that, were Dr. 

Chang’s opinions fully credited, “no reasonable ALJ could have found Plaintiff 

disabled.” Id. (citing Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056; Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162–63).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DECLINES TO ADOPT the Magistrate 

Judge’s R&R, GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and REMANDS this matter for further 

proceedings consistent with this Order, including directing the Commissioner to (1) 

request an updated medical source statement from Plaintiff’s treating physician inclusive 

of any limitations on her ability to work as a home attendant, phlebotomist, hospital 

admitting clerk or personal attendant; (2) allow Plaintiff to supplement the record with 

any additional relevant medical records; (3) reassess Plaintiff’s credibility in light of any

newly obtained information; and (4), if warranted by the expanded record, obtain 

evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on 

Plaintiff’s occupational opportunities.

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2020

 

7 At the end of the December 2017 ALJ hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel observed that the record lacked chart 

notes within the last year and suggested a psychiatric, consultative exam (“CE”) with testing to round 

out the record. (AR 82.) As the Greytak CE took place in December 2015, the Court finds that updated 

information is necessary to properly evaluate the credibility of Plaintiff and her husband. Cf. Rosa v. 

Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir.1999) (“[W]here there are deficiencies in the record, an ALJ is under 

an affirmative obligation to develop a claimant’s medical history even when the claimant is represented 

by counsel or by a paralegal.”); Guillen v. Berryhill, 697 F. App’x 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2017) (vacating 

decision of the district court with instructions to remand the matter to the Commissioner for further 

proceedings consistent with the order, including supplementing the medical record and reassessing 

claimant’s credibility in light of newly obtained information).

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