Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02982/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02982-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STERLING B. SCOTT, II, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

J. BROWN, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-2982 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO DISMISS

This is a habeas case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Petitioner alleges that the

governor’s reversal of the parole board’s grant of parole violated his due process rights in

that it was not supported by sufficient evidence. Respondent has moved to dismiss,

claiming that the case is moot because petitioner has now been released on parole. 

Petitioner has opposed the motion, and respondent has filed a reply. It is ready for

decision.

DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that because the habeas petition requests that petitioner be

released on parole, and he now has been, it is moot. Petitioner argues in opposition that

the governor’s allegedly unconstitutional denial of parole in 2003 means that his present

time on parole runs until a date nineteen months later than it would have been had he been

paroled in 2003. 

Petitioner’s parole period was fixed in the plea agreement – five years. Thus his

being paroled later than 2003 did not extend the time he will spend on parole, which will be

five years in any case, but it does extend the total time he will spend suffering the

consequences of his conviction. That is, the combined time in prison and on parole will, as

a consequence of the governor’s reversal of the parole board, be nineteen months longer

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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than it otherwise would have been. This is an actual injury which stems from the allegedly

unconstitutional act. Should petitioner prevail, this injury could be remedied by shortening

the period of parole by nineteen months, so the case is not moot.

Petitioner cites McQuillion v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (McQuillion II),

in opposition to the motion. Respondent attempts to distinguish McQuillion II and relies on

Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The McQuillion cases, McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002)

(McQuillion I) and McQuillion v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (McQuillion II),

arose from the parole board’s unconstitutional recision of a parole date previously granted. 

Id. at 1014. After the Ninth Circuit reversed in McQuillion I and remanded with instructions

to “grant the writ,” the warden appealed the district court’s order that McQullion be released

immediately, contending that the proper remedy was not release but a new recision

hearing, and that “at a minimum,” McQuillion should be required to serve a period on

parole. Id. at 1014-15. With respect to the contention that a parole period should be

required, the Ninth Circuit said: “This argument overlooks the fact that if McQuillion had

been released on the date to which he was entitled, he would have been released in May

1994. The three-year parole, which he would have been required to serve if he had been

released on time, has long since expired.” Id. at 1015. This seems to support the

proposition that a habeas court can fashion a remedy, including shortening or eliminating a

parole period, if parole has been unconstitutionally denied. 

Respondent argues that this case is more like Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999

(9th Cir. 2005). In Burnett, the petitioner contended that denials of parole in 1998 and 2000

were unconstitutional. Id. at 997-98. By the time the Ninth Circuit considered the case he

had been released on parole, the parole had been revoked, and he was back in prison. Id.

at 998. The court held that the case was moot because Burnett’s current incarceration was

not the result of the denials of parole in 1998 and 2000, but rather of his violation of parole

“after he was released.” Id. at 1000. Therefore a habeas court considering the legality of

the denials of parole could not properly order that petitioner be released from prison earlier

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than he otherwise would have been. Id. The court distinguished McQuillion II, saying that

McQuillion had already served more time than the lawful period of incarceration plus

parole. Id. at 1000. By contrast, if the court accelerated Burnett’s parole release date by

the time he allegedly was unconstitutionally denied parole, that would be to question “either

the validity of the original sentence (or a part of it) or his reimprisonment following his

parole violation – two issues which are not before us.” Id. 

Burnett involved an Oregon conviction and a forty-year sentence under that state’s

indeterminate sentencing law. Id. at 997. Under Oregon’s unusual system, there is no

direct correlation between when a prisoner is released on parole and when the parole

terminates. Id. at 997 n. 1. “‘[T]he parole system allowed the Board to release an inmate

who has not finished serving his or her indeterminate prison sentence, and that person may

be kept on parole until the sentence expires. Thus, a person serving a 10-year

indeterminate sentence who was paroled after five years could be kept on parole for

another five years, whereas a person serving a 10-year indeterminate sentence who was

paroled after seven years could be kept on parole only for another three years.’” Id.

(quoting Burns v. Thompson, 159 Or. App. 383[, 385] (1999)). That is, Burnett could have

been kept on parole until expiration of his forty-year sentence, and that would not have

changed if he had been paroled when he claimed he should have been. His contention in

the case instead had to do with whether he should be on parole or in prison. But his

imprisonment was the consequence of his parole violation, not when the parole began. 

Thus the habeas court could not grant effective relief in a case which was directed to the

earlier denials of parole, rather than to the length of the sentence itself or to the legality of

the revocation.

In contrast, in California when a prisoner is paroled does affect when he gets off

parole -- for a given period of parole, which in this case was fixed at five years by the plea

agreement, the earlier one is paroled, the earlier one gets off parole. Or looked at another

way, the combined prison and parole period is shorter if parole is granted sooner, in

contrast to Oregon. Here, if petitioner can show that he should have been paroled when

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the governor reversed the Board, then his parole can be shortened by nineteen months –

that is, this court can grant effective relief. This case is not moot.

The motion to dismiss (document number 5 on the docket) is DENIED. 

Respondent shall serve an answer to the order to show cause within sixty days of

the date this order is entered. If petitioner wants to respond to the answer, he shall file a

traverse (response) within thirty days of the date the answer is served upon him. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2006. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.04\SCOTT982.MDSMSS

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