Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00903/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00903-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1985 Consipracy to interfere with civil rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS BALDWIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JACOB CUTTING et al.,

Defendants.

Civil No.: 3:16-CV-903-L-KSC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court in this civil rights action are Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6). (Docs. no. 24 & 25.) The 

motions are fully briefed. They are submitted on the briefs without oral argument 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons which follow, Defendants’ motions 

to dismiss are granted with leave to amend.

I. Background

According to the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff is employed by the United 

States Border Patrol (“Border Patrol”). In the course of his employment, he befriended 

San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Jessica Leon. Subsequently, Leon’s relative David 

William Centrone became a suspect in an investigation of the West Coast Crips, 

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commenced by the East County Gang Task Force (“ECG Task Force”). The ECG Task 

Force believed that Leon provided sensitive law enforcement information to Centrone. 

They tapped her mobile phone. 

Because of the wiretap, the ECG Task Force members were able to read text 

messages exchanged between Plaintiff and Leon, including messages about Plaintiff's 

romantic relationship with San Diego County Sheriff's Deputy Sharlene Wilson. The 

messages made disparaging remarks about the ECG Task Force investigation, the 

competency of the officers involved, Plaintiff's plans to apply for a job with the San 

Diego County Sheriff's Department, and about Defendant Jacob Cutting, El Cajon Police 

Department SWAT officer and Wilson's former husband. 

In 2014, Defendants Kai Mandelleh, El Cajon Police Department SWAT officer, 

and Zeath Sanchez, San Diego County Deputy Sheriff, both detectives with the ECG

Task Force, investigated Plaintiff's association with Leon. They believed that Leon 

sought to extract law enforcement sensitive information from Plaintiff. They called 

Plaintiff for an interview. He claims that although the ECG Task Force considered him a 

suspect, they treated him as a witness, because it afforded fewer procedural protections. 

The interview was recorded. The questions did not relate to leaking sensitive information 

to Leon, but to Plaintiff's relationship with Wilson. The ECG Task Force concluded that 

Plaintiff did not pass sensitive law enforcement information to Leon. Plaintiff claims the 

suspicion was unreasonable to begin with and contrary to evidence, because he had no 

contact with ECG Task Force members during the relevant time. 

After the interview, the ECG Task Force informed the Border Patrol, Plaintiff's 

employer, that he had been questioned for associating with Leon, but was uncooperative 

and not forthcoming with information. Border Patrol opened an internal investigation. 

Although Plaintiff's interview with Mandelleh and Sanchez was recorded, the ECG Task 

Force refused to provide the recording to the Border Patrol for its investigation. Plaintiff 

denies that he was uncooperative or less than forthcoming with information.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to pursue unfounded allegations against 

him and passed them to the Border Patrol because Cutting believed it would precipitate 

the termination of Plaintiff’s relationship with Wilson. In pursuit of this goal, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants intentionally circumvented his constitutional due process rights 

and rights under federal labor laws.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants' false allegations about him caused damage to his 

professional reputation and career prospects. He believes the allegations were made in 

retaliation by Cutting, who was jealous, and by Sanchez for pointing out to him he had 

made an error in collecting evidence.

As a result of this conduct, Plaintiff claims he was removed from the United States 

Marshal's San Diego Regional Fugitive Task Force (“SDR Task Force”), and would not 

be assigned to another task force. Plaintiff was informed by his superior that the San 

Diego Sheriff's Department considered him untrustworthy. Because the Sheriff's 

Department was a partner in most local task forces, Plaintiff would no longer be assigned. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff's duties with the Border Patrol were downgraded, and he was 

passed over for promotion. Plaintiff alleges that because a perjury allegation had been 

made against him, he is also no longer able to pursue a state law enforcement career or 

testify as an agent in federal court. Although Plaintiff was able to secure a position as a 

Criminal Investigator with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, his acceptance was 

delayed pending the conclusion of Border Patrol's internal investigation. He is pursuing a 

grievance through the National Border Patrol Council.

On April 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Cutting, Mandelleh and 

Sanchez alleging (1) violations of his constitutional due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 

§1983; (2) conspiracy to deny him due process under 42 U.S.C. §1985; and (3) 

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conspiracy to interfere with federal officer's duties under 42 U.S.C. §1985(1).1(Compl. 

[Doc. 1].) Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (Docs. no. 24 & 25.)

II. Discussion

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted where the complaint 

lacks a cognizable legal theory. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 622 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Alternatively, 

a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory, yet fails to 

plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 

F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must assume the truth of all factual 

allegations and construe them most favorably to the nonmoving party. Huynh v. Chase 

Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997, 999 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006). However, legal 

conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are couched as factual 

allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Similarly, 

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a 

motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

A. Section 1983 Violations

In his first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due 

process rights2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing false reports and making false 

 

1 Plaintiff also purports to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim. However, he

did not raise this claim directly in his complaint and also failed to address Defendants’ 

arguments against such a claim in his opposition. To the extent Plaintiff intends to allege 

a First Amendment claim, he must articulate it in his amended complaint.

2 Plaintiff does not specify whether his Section 1983 claim is based on procedural or 

substantive due process. Defendants assume that he asserts only a procedural due process 

claim. Nevertheless, liberally construed, the complaint can be read as raising a 

substantive due process claim based on the proposition that “[e]very citizen has a clearly 

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complaints to the Border Patrol, his employer, resulting in removal from his SDR Task 

Force assignment and denial of further employment opportunities. (Compl. ¶¶ 44 & 45.)

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff

failed to plead a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest, and (2) Plaintiff 

was afforded due process. (Sanchez MTD [Doc. 24-1] at 6-8.)

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that (1) defendants,

acting under color of state law, (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution 

or federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986); see 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). The parties do not dispute that

the first prong has been met. (See Compl. ¶ 45.) With respect to the second prong, a

threshold requirement of a procedural due process claim is a liberty or property interest 

protected by the Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); 

Stiesberg v. State of Cal., 80 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted).

1. Property Interest

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead a constitutionally protected property 

interest. Plaintiff alleges he had a property interest in his SDR Task Force assignment, 

promotions, and overtime opportunities. (Compl. ¶ 49.)

For a constitutionally cognizable property interest, a plaintiff must show more than 

“an abstract need or desire” or a “unilateral expectation of it,” but “a legitimate claim of 

entitlement.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. In this regard, property interests are not created by 

the Constitution. Id. 

Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law--rules 

or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of 

entitlement to those benefits.

 

established due process right not to be subjected to accusations on the basis of false 

evidence that were deliberately fabricated by the government.” (Compl. ¶ 43; Opp’n at 3-

4.) Because Defendants did not brief this theory of Plaintiff’s case, it is not addressed 

herein. 

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Id.; see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (existing law, 

rule, or understanding that makes the conferral of benefit mandatory). While state law 

defines the underlying substantive interest, “federal constitutional law determines 

whether that interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by 

the Due Process Clause.” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 

(1978) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 

F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir.1993).

Although Plaintiff briefly alludes to having a two year “tenure” in his SDR Task 

Force assignment (Compl. ¶ 36), he neither identifies nor cites any contractual or 

statutory provision that might be construed as creating a binding right to or property 

interest in his assignment or overtime opportunities. Further, “[u]ntil someone actually 

receives a promotion, or at least a binding assurance of a forthcoming promotion, he 

cannot claim a property interest in the promotion.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 

F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1998). Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to allege a 

constitutionally protected property interest.

2. Liberty Interest

Plaintiff alleges two protected liberty interests: (1) his interest in pursuing the 

occupation of his choice; and (2) his interest in his reputation for honesty and morality. 

Defendants contend that this is not sufficient because Plaintiff was not terminated. 

(Compl. ¶ 37; Sanchez MTD at 7:24-25.)

The liberty interest in pursuing one’s chosen profession has been recognized where 

a state seeks permanently to bar an individual from public employment. See Roth, 408 

U.S. at 573; Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 954 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has not

alleged that he was barred from his chosen profession. To the contrary, he continued 

employment with the Border Patrol, but on a different assignment. Neither his transfer 

nor his inability to apply to one particular division imposed a complete bar on his ability 

to be a public employee nor excluded him from the public officer profession. See Llamas 

v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a 

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janitor fired from his job and “barred from all future employment with the District” was 

not deprived of his liberty interest in pursuing the occupation of his choice because he 

had “not been banned from pursuing a janitorial position [or other public employment] 

elsewhere”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for deprivation of a protected 

liberty interest in pursuing the occupation of his choice.

Plaintiff’s second interest is his interest in reputation for honesty and morality. To 

succeed on a Section 1983 defamation-based claim, Plaintiff must satisfy the “stigmaplus” test. Under the stigma-plus test, a liberty interest is implicated if a charge leveled 

by the government against an individual impairs that person’s reputation for honesty or 

morality. Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 1982). Due 

process protections will apply if (1) the accuracy of the charge is contested; (2) there is 

some public disclosure of the charge; and (3) it is made in connection with the 

termination of employment or the alteration of some right or status recognized by state 

law. Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1129 (citing Vanelli, 667 F.2d at 777-778).

Defendants do not contest that the charge was sufficiently serious to damage 

Plaintiff’s standing or associations in his community or that the accuracy of the charge is

contested. Amend other things, Defendants made the charge that Plaintiff “was no longer 

considered trustworthy.” (Compl. ¶¶ 29 & 34.) Plaintiff asserts that this is false. (Id. ¶ 

30.) The parties dispute whether the charge was publically disclosed and whether 

disclosure was made “in connection with the termination of employment or the alteration 

of some right or status recognized by state law.” Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1129.

As to the former, Plaintiff fails to allege any public disclosure of stigmatizing 

statements beyond a limited internal dissemination. Plaintiff alleges that the ECG Task 

Force “reported to” the Border Patrol that he had been questioned and was uncooperative 

and not forthcoming. (Compl. ¶ 20.) It is unclear from the complaint how such 

information was “reported,” and any subsequent dissemination or record keeping of the 

information is unclear. Disclosure of stigmatizing information internally within or 

between government agencies is not a “public” disclosure. See Wenger v. Monroe, 282 

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F.3d 1068, 1074 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc 

(Apr. 17, 2002) (information disclosed between branches of the military were not 

“public”); see also Millman v. Inglish, 461 Fed. App’x 627, 628 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(notification of allegations of fraud against other public agencies was not a public 

disclosure).

Alternatively, Plaintiff does not allege that disclosure was made in connection with 

the termination of his employment or the alteration of a status or right to which he was 

entitled by law. Plaintiff was assigned to a different position, at a different location, with 

different responsibilities. This is analogous to a transfer or reassignment, which does not 

implicate due process considerations. See Mustafa v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 

1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no due process violation where the plaintiff, a 

teacher, “was not terminated, but rather was transferred,” to another school within the 

same school district); Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1988)

(finding no liberty deprivation where the plaintiff remained employed by the same 

employer and maintained the same salary, albeit with decreased responsibilities). 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutionally protected 

property or liberty interest. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is dismissed.

The Court must next consider whether to grant leave to amend. See Schreiber 

Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Rule 

15 advises leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason – such as undue delay, bad 

faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the 

amendment, etc. – the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely 

given. 

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Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Dismissal without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear the complaint cannot be saved by amendment. See id.

Because it may be possible for Plaintiff to allege a constitutionally protected interest, 

leave to amend is granted.

B. Section 1985 Violations 

In his second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §

1985 when they conspired to violate his rights under § 1983 with intent to cause him 

professional harm. (Compl. ¶ 54.) In his third cause of action, he alleges that Defendants 

violated § 1985(1) when they “conspired to interfere with Plaintiff’s person or property 

on account of the discharge of his duties or to prevent him from doing so.” (Id. ¶ 66.)

Both claims must allege conspiracy, and "must allege facts to support the 

allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without 

factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff’s claims are based on the 

theory that Defendants circumvented his constitutional rights to facilitate retaliation by 

Cutting, who was jealous, and by Sanchez, because Plaintiff had criticized him for an 

error in collecting evidence. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants took several acts in 

furtherance of the conspiracy, including but not limited to acting, agreeing and/or 

conspiring to unlawfully examine, investigate, threaten plaintiff, make false reports 

resulting in the removal of Plaintiff from the SDR Task Force, and by procuring false 

testimony, fabricating evidence, and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence in preparing 

and presenting reports. (Compl. ¶¶ 58, 60 & 68.) Plaintiff also alleged that (1) Defendants 

Cutting and Mandelleh were both El Cajon SWAT Police Officers and “know each 

other” (id. ¶ 4(a)), and (2) Defendants Mandelleh and Sanchez were both assigned to the 

ECG Task Force and jointly interrogated Plaintiff (id. ¶¶ 16 & 19). (See also Opp’n at 

8:14-17; Compl. ¶¶ 14, 19-20, 24-25.) Although he stated that Defendants agreed and 

conspired, Plaintiff alleged no facts to support a reasonable inference of mutual 

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agreement or understanding among Defendants to retaliate against Plaintiff. The 

complaint therefore does not sufficiently allege conspiracy.

Finally, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails for the same reasons as the underlying 

Section 1983 claim. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(allegations insufficient to support a Section 1983 violation preclude a conspiracy claim 

predicated upon the same allegations) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1985 claims. Because it appears 

that Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts in support of his Section 1985 claims,

leave to amend is granted. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. 

III. Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted with leave 

to amend. If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, he must do so no later than 

April 23, 2018. Defendants shall file a response, if any, to the first amended complaint 

within the time set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2018

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