Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00594/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00594-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY SYLVESTER RIDEAU, JR,

CDCR #K-32522,

Civil No. 10cv0594 IEG (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6); and

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO SERVE DEFENDANTS

MUDRA AND SMALL

[Doc. Nos. 29, 40]

vs.

TIM OCHOA; LARRY SMALL; G.J.

JANDA; C. BUTLER; J. MUDRA;

KATRINA BALL; DEXTER BELL;

J. MAGNER; S. NIZAMANI;

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In this prisoner civil rights case, Gregory Rideau, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), is proceeding in pro

se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Defendants Ball, Janda, Ochoa, Bell, Butler, Magner, Nizamani and the State of California have

filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No 29].

Plaintiff filed his Opposition on July 15, 2010 but Defendants have not filed a reply. In addition,

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Plaintiff has filed a letter with the Court [Doc. No. 31], a Declaration [Doc. No. 36], and a

“Motion to Serve Defendants Mudra and Small” [Doc. No. 40].

The Court has determined that both Plaintiff and Defendants’ Motion are suitable for

disposition upon the papers without oral argument and that no Report and Recommendation from

Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis is necessary. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(d)(1), 72.3(e). 

II.

PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE AND DECLARATION

On July 9, 2010 and July 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court, along with a

Declaration, in which he claims he is being retaliated against for filing this lawsuit. These

claims cannot be brought or considered by this Court because they involve claims that arose

after Plaintiff initiated this action. Any new claims are subject to the Prison Litigation Reform

Act’s (“PLRA”) exhaustion requirement. The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to provide

that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Once within the discretion of

the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory.” Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) has been construed broadly to “afford

[ ] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing

the initiation of a federal case, id. at 525-26, and to encompass inmate suits about both general

circumstances and particular episodes of prison life--including incidents of alleged excessive

force. Id. at 532. Finally, “[t]he ‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint

under § 1983 may be entertained,” “regardless of the relief offered through administrative

procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738, 741 (2001); see also McKinney v. Carey,

311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that prisoner’s civil rights action must be

dismissed without prejudice unless prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before

he filed suit, even if he fully exhausts while the suit is pending).

/ / /

/ / /

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28 1

 A review of the Court’s docket indicates that Defendant Small has not been properly served

in this matter and therefore has not yet appeared in this action.

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Thus, the Court cannot consider or make any rulings with respect to the merits of the new

claims Plaintiff seeks to bring to this Court’s attention through his correspondence and

Declaration. Any new claims must be brought in a separate action once Plaintiff has properly

exhausted his available administrative remedies.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate currently housed at Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”), alleges that he

suffers from a physical disability known as “obstructive sleep apnea.” See Compl. at 5. As a

result of this disability, Plaintiff claims that he is a “qualified individual” under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). On September 3, 2009, Plaintiff submitted a “Reasonable

Modification or Accommodation Request” form which is also known as a “CDC 1824" form.

Id. at 9. Plaintiff requested that his disability be accommodated by housing Plaintiff in a single

cell, as well as having access to electrical outlets in order for him to use his “continuous positive

airway pressure (“CPAP”) machine.” Id. This grievance was later converted into a “regular

CDCR 602 grievance” by Defendant Bell that was endorsed by Defendant Ochoa. Id. at 6-7. On

October 28, 2009, Defendant Mudra interviewed Plaintiff with regard to his now “regular”

grievance. Id. at 10. Defendant Mudra denied Plaintiff’s request for a single cell. Id. 

In addition to filing grievances, Plaintiff alleges that he “apprised” Defendant Larry

Small1

 of the issues regarding his need for a single cell and informed him that prison doctors

have “purposely withheld” his CPAP machine. Id. at 9. Plaintiff was examined by Defendant

Ball, a prison doctor, whom he alleges informed “Correctional Staff Captain Stratton that

Plaintiff should not be accommodated with a single cell for use of his CPAP machine.” Id. at

12. Plaintiff claims that his sleep apnea “exacerbates Plaintiff’s hypertension.” Id. As a result,

Plaintiff continues to experience “chest pain, anxiety attacks, and headaches.” Id. On

September 5, 2009, Plaintiff was moved to a double cell by Defendant Ochoa which prevented

Plaintiff from being able to use his CPAP machine. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Janda

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and Butler also violated his constitutional rights when they continued to house him in a double

cell knowing that Plaintiff’s physical disability has caused him to have tension with other

cellmates. Id. 

On February 24, 2010, Plaintiff was “finally provided a ‘medical classification chrono’

for permanent electrical access” which allows him use of his CPAP machine, although he

remains housed in a double cell. Id. at 10. 

III.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

Defendants Ball, Janda, Ochoa, Bell, Butler, Magna, Nizamani and the State of California

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.12(b)(6) contending that: (1) the

State of California is immune from money damages under the Eleventh Amendment; (2) Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim against Defendants Bell and Mudra; (3) Plaintiff has failed to state an

Eighth Amendment claim; and (4) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v.

Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other words, the plaintiff’s

complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled

to relief.” Id. (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)).

A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) .

/ / /

/ / /

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In addition, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Thus, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil

rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

B. Eleventh Amendment

Defendant State of California moves to dismiss all claims for money damages brought

by Plaintiff. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue the State of California for money damages

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“It is clear, of course, that in the

absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as

the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

(1978) (finding suit against state Board of Corrections barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

“This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst, 465

U.S. at 100-01 (citing Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933) (“Expressly applying to suits

in equity as well as at law, the [Eleventh] Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the

enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are

asserted and prosecuted by an individual against a State”)).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant State of California’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s monetary damages as barred by the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6).

C. Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Bell and Mudra

Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims

against Defendants Bell and Mudra. Defendant Mudra has not been properly served in this

matter and does not appear to be represented by counsel for the remaining Defendants.

However, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has the authority to

determine whether he has stated a claim against Defendant Mudra pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants Bell and Mudra violated his right to due process

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under the Fourteenth Amendment when they converted the grievance he brought under the ADA

into a “regular” CDCR 602 grievance. 

The procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause apply

only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Ingraham v.

Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997). The

Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest in an inmate grievance

procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due process

claim of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison]

grievance procedure”). A prisoner may only challenge a state action which does not restrain a

[constitutionally] protected liberty interest if that state action “nonetheless imposes some

‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.’” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); see also Neal, 131 F.3d at 827-28.

Here, Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest how Bell and Mudra’s allegedly inadequate

review and consideration of his ADA and inmate grievances amounted to a restraint on his

freedom not contemplated by his original sentence or resulted in an “atypical” and “significant

hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-484. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Bell pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) and

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Mudra pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

D. Eighth Amendment claims

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims on the grounds

that Plaintiff allegations that Defendants refuse to give him a single cell is a mere disagreement

with their medical opinion. See Defs.’ Mot. at 6.

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of

the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with 

deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

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(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). Before it can

be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs

must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support

this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). “[A] complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see

also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny,

delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison

physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc). Where a prisoner alleges delay in receiving medical treatment, he must show that the

delay led to further harm. Id. at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs,

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).

Here, Defendants argue that “the simple fact of the matter is that Plaintiff disagrees with

his doctors and with Defendants over whether his medical condition requires him to be single

celled.” Defs.’ Mot. at 7. This argument only partially relates to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim involves more than the single cell issue and is not

fully addressed in Defendants’ moving papers. Plaintiff alleges that several of the Defendants,

including Defendant Ball, intentionally denied him access to his breathing machine that has led

to exacerbation of his high blood pressure, along with “chest pain, anxiety attacks and

headaches.” Compl. at 7, 12. Defendants fail to argue that Plaintiff did not have a serious

medical need and they failed to address the alleged denial of medical equipment used to treat

Plaintiff’s medical condition. Thus, at this stage, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

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Eighth Amendment claims is DENIED pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

E. Americans with Disabilities Act 

The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, applies in the prison context.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998)

(holding that state prisons fall squarely within the ADA’s Title II’s statutory definition of

“public entity,” which includes “any ... instrumentality of a State ... or local government.”)

In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, however, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) he ‘is an individual with a disability;’ (2) he ‘is otherwise

qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public

entity’s services, programs, or activities;’ (3) he ‘was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public

entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise

discriminated against by the public entity;’ and (4) ‘such exclusion,

denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his]

disability.’

O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing McGary

v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d

890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). Punitive damages are not available in private suits

brought under § 202 of the ADA (prohibiting discrimination against the disabled by public

entities). Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 930

(9th Cir. 2008).

Defendants argue that “many courts have held that sleep apnea is not a disability under

the ADA.” Defs.’ Mot. at 7 (citing Blue v. Scavetta, 372 Fed.Appx. 754 (9th Cir. 2010)). This

was not the holding of the unpublished decision cited by Defendants. This case merely affirmed

a finding of the lower court that the plaintiff had not raised a triable issue of fact on summary

judgment. There was no holding that sleep apnea is not a disability. 

One definition of a “disability” under the ADA is “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2)(A). Sleep has been held to be a “major life activity.” See McAlindin v. County of San

Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, because the Court must rely solely on the

claims set forth by Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he has a

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physical disability that impairs a major life activity. Whether Plaintiff would be able to prove

this claim or Defendants would be able to prove otherwise is better suited by providing a fully

developed record.

However, in order to adequate allege an ADA claim, Plaintiff must also be able to allege

facts sufficient to show that he was discriminated against because of his physical disability.

Plaintiff has alleged no facts that support his claim that he was denied a single cell or medical

treatment because of his physical disability. See Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz. 609 F.3d

1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010).

Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claims is GRANTED pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

IV.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SERVE DEFENDANTS SMALL AND MUDRA

In addition, Plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Serve Defendants Mudra and Small” [Doc.

No. 40]. A review of the Court’s docket indicates that these Defendants have yet to be served

in this action. While the claims against Defendant Mudra are currently dismissed, Plaintiff will

be given the opportunity to correct the deficiencies of pleading by filing an Amended Complaint.

In cases involving a plaintiff proceeding IFP, a United States Marshal, upon order of the

court, shall serve the summons and the complaint. FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

“‘[A]n incarcerated pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to rely on the U.S.

Marshal for service of the summons and complaint and ... should not be penalized by having his

action dismissed for failure to effect service where the U.S. Marshal or the court clerk has failed

to perform his duties.’” Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Puett,

912 F.2d at 275), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). “So

long as the prisoner has furnished the information necessary to identify the defendant, the

marshal’s failure to effect service is ‘automatically good cause....’” Walker, 14 F.3d at 1422

(quoting Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1990)). Here, because Plaintiff

has not yet been able to ascertain the proper location where Defendants Small and Mudra may

now be served, he must remedy the situation or face dismissal of his claims against them. See

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Walker, 14 F.3d at 1421-22 (holding prisoner failed to show cause why prison official should

not be dismissed under Rule 4(m) where prisoner failed to show he had provided Marshal with

sufficient information to effectuate service). 

Accordingly, as long as Defendants Small and Mudra are currently employed by the

CDCR and/or their forwarding addresses can be easily ascertained by reference to the CDCR’s

personnel records, Plaintiff is entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon both

these Defendants on his behalf. See Puett, 912 F.2d at 275. The Court hereby directs the

Deputy Attorney General assigned to this case to contact either the Litigation Coordinator at

Calipatria State Prison or the CDCR’s Legal Affairs Division, if necessary, and provide current

addresses within the CDCR’s records or possession, and to forward those addresses to the USMS

in a confidential memorandum.

V. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:

1) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 29] all claims for monetary

damages against the State of California pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6);

2) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 29] Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment due process claims against Defendant Bell pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6);

3) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against

Defendant Mudra for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);

4) DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 29] Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6);

5) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 29] Plaintiff’s ADA claims

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6);

6) GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave to file and serve upon Defendants an

Amended Complaint which addresses each deficiency of pleading identified in this Order.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original

Complaint. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR15.1. Any Defendant not named and any claim not re-alleged

in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

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(9th Cir. 1987).

7) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Serve Defendants Mudra and Small and

DIRECTS the Deputy Attorney General assigned to this case to provide the forwarding address

for Defendants Mudra and Small to the U.S. Marshal in a confidential memorandum indicating

that the summons and complaint is to be delivered to that address. The Attorney General shall

provide the U.S. Marshal with any such information on or before October 1, 2010. 

Within thirty (30) days of receipt of any available address from the Attorney General,

the Court ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint and summons

upon Defendants Mudra and Small. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States

pursuant to the Court’s Order granting Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and directing service

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court provide a copy of: (1) the

Court’s March 30, 2010 Order [Doc. No. 3]; (2) this Order; (3) the Complaint, summons and a

blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 to the Attorney General for purposes of re-attempting service as

to Mudra and Small.

DATED: September 16, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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