Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01111/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTO JIMENEZ, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case No.: 15cv1111-DMS-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NOS. 15, 22]

Plaintiff Ernesto Jimenez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) 

denying Plaintiff’s second application for a disability and disability 

insurance benefits under Title II for supplement security income 

payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff moves 

the Court for summary judgment reversing the Commissioner and 

ordering an award of benefits, or, in the alternative, to remand the case 

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for further administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 10). Defendant has 

moved for summary judgment affirming the denial of benefits. (ECF 

No. 15).

For the reasons expressed herein, the Court recommends that 

Plaintiff’s motion be GRANTED and benefits be awarded and 

Defendant’s motion be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he became disabled on January 1, 2008, due 

to several medical and mental conditions including a learning disorder, 

pes planus, bilateral feet, chondromalacia patella of the right knee, 

Achilles tendonitis of the right ankle and obesity. (A.R. at 13).1 

Plaintiff’s date of birth of August 16, 1983, categorizes him as a younger 

individual at the time of filing.

A. Procedural History

On May 26, 2011, Plaintiff filed applications for social security 

disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. (ECF 

No. 15-1 at 1). Plaintiff twice continued his hearing due to lack of 

representation. (A.R. at 74-89). On July 12, 2013, Plaintiff appeared 

via video teleconference from San Diego, California before 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Brenton L. Rogozen. (A.R. at 92). 

Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Linda M. Ferra testified. (A.R. 

at 91). 

 

1 “A.R.” refers to the Administrative Record filed on May 4, 2015, and is 

located at ECF No. 8.

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On September 10, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision finding 

Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. at 22). Plaintiff appealed and the Appeals 

Council declined to set aside the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. at 1). 

Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. (Id.).

On May 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court 

seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1). 

On July 31, 2015, Defendant answered and lodged the administrative 

record with the Court. (ECF Nos. 9, 10). On October 21, 2015, Plaintiff 

moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 15). On January 6, 2016, the 

Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment and responded in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF Nos. 20, 22).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The supplemental security income program provides benefits to 

disabled persons without substantial resources and little income. 42 

U.S.C. § 1383. To qualify, a claimant must establish an inability to 

engage in “substantial gainful activity” because of a “medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” that “has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 1383(a)(3)(A). The disabling impairment must be so severe 

that, considering age, education, and work experience, the claimant 

cannot engage in any kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(3)(B).

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The Commissioner makes this assessment through a process of up 

to five-steps. First, the claimant must not be engaged in substantial, 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must 

have a “severe” impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the medical 

evidence of the claimant’s impairment is compared to a list of 

impairments that are presumed severe enough to preclude work. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment meets or is 

equivalent to the requirements for one of the listed impairments, 

benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s 

impairment does not meet or is not equivalent to the requirements of a 

listed impairment, the analysis continues to a fourth and possibly fifth 

step and considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity. At the 

fourth step, the claimant’s relevant work history is considered along 

with the claimant’s residual functional capacity. If the claimant can 

perform the claimant’s past relevant work, benefits are denied. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(e). At the fifth step, reached if the claimant is found 

not able to perform the claimant’s past relevant work, the issue is 

whether claimant can perform any other work that exists in the 

national economy, considering the claimant’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity. If the claimant cannot do 

other work that exists in the national economy, benefits are awarded. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).

Section 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, through Section 

405(g) of the Act, allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review 

of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3), 

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405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited and the Commissioner’s 

denial of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less 

than a preponderance. Sandqathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 

1997). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala 

53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record 

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from 

the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence 

supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold 

the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and 

resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the 

Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).

The ALJ has a special duty in social security cases to fully and 

fairly develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a 

claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 

F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Because disability hearings are not 

adversarial in nature, the ALJ must “inform himself about the facts 

relevant to his decision,” even if the claimant is represented by counsel. 

Id. (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983)).

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Even if a reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ 

failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and 

reaching his or her decision. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th 

Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment 

affirming, modifying or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S. 

C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the 

Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

B. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from January 1, 2008, through the date of the ALJ’s 

decision, September 10, 2013. (A.R. at 21).

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s learning disorder, pes planus, bilateral 

feet, chondromalacia patella of the right knee, Achilles tendonitis of the 

right ankle and obesity severe in combination. (A.R. at 13). The ALJ 

found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or is medically equivalent to the severity of one 

of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526). (A.R. at 14). 

Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “record contains no medical 

evidence to support a finding that [Plaintiff] suffers “a major 

dysfunction of a joint” and “[t]he severity of [Plaintiff’s] mental 

impairment does not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 

12.02 and 12.05.” (Id.).

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The ALJ also found that Plaintiff has mild restrictions in daily 

living activities, moderate difficulties in social functioning, moderate 

difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence or pace and 

experienced no episodes of decompensation of extended duration. (A.R. 

at 14-15). Importantly, the ALJ found that “the evidence does not 

indicate a physical or other mental impairment imposing additional and 

significant work-related limitation of function.” (A.R. at 16). The ALJ 

specified that the claimant has been working regularly since 2002 with 

satisfactory performance reviews. (Id.).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to “lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds 

frequently and is limited to simple repetitive tasks characteristic of 

unskilled work.” (Id.). Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s past 

work experience illustrates an ability to work. For example, Plaintiff 

“worked after his alleged onset date, . . . had earnings at the level of 

S[ubstantial] G[ainful] A[ctivity] for the period 2003 through 2007 [and] 

quit working voluntarily due to harassment from his co-workers.” (A.R. 

at 17). 

Relying on the record and testimony of Vocational Expert (VE)

Ferra, the ALJ found that Plaintiff performed past relevant work long 

enough for him to learn it at a substantial gainful activity level. (A.R. 

at 21). The ALJ stated that the record reflects that Plaintiff worked as 

a stocker and a linen folder at the light exertional level within the 

previous fifteen years. (Id.). The ALJ concluded that the RFC 

“contemplates work at the medium exertional level and represents 

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limitations under which the claimant previously performed this work 

for approximately 10 years.” (Id.).

The ALJ specifically noted the following to be of particular 

relevance:

1. Plaintiff’s Statements and Work History

The ALJ found “that [Plaintiff’s] medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 

symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

credible.” (A.R. at 16). The ALJ found Plaintiff’s 10-year work history 

to be indicative of his ability to work. (A.R. at 17). Plaintiff “had 

earnings at the level of S[ubstantial] G[ainful] A[ctivity] for the period 

of 2003 through 2007,” “quit working voluntarily due to harassment 

from his co-workers,” “participated in a work apprenticeship program to 

assist him in developing work skills,” and while enrolled at the program 

Plaintiff “worked at the Airport Holiday Inn two (2) days per week in 

the area of housekeeping and laundry.” (Id.). The ALJ noted that this 

“lends support to the conclusion that [Plaintiff] would be able to 

perform future work amounting to S[ubstantial] G[ainful] A[ctivity].” 

(Id.). 

2. Third Party Function Reports

The ALJ accorded little weight to the third party function reports 

prepared by Plaintiff’s mother, Maria Jiminez, Plaintiff’s brother, 

Alberto Jiminez, and Plaintiff’s sister, Maria Savcedo. (A.R. at 21). The 

ALJ concluded that these reports represent “the non-medically trained 

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observations of understandably concerned and sympathetic family 

members.” (Id.).

3. Kara Anderson, M.A. CCC-SLP

The ALJ accorded little weight to speech language pathologist, 

Kara Anderson. (A.R. at 17). The ALJ stated that Anderson found 

Plaintiff to have “severe impairment of his cognitive-linguistic skills 

accompanied by phonemic paraphasias and word-finding difficulty.” 

(Id.). The ALJ found “the extreme level of severity suggested by [] 

Anderson” inconsistent with Plaintiff’s “work history over 

approximately 10 years.” (Id.).

4. Ted Shore, Ph.D.

The ALJ afforded great weight to consultative examiner Dr. 

Shore. (Id.). Dr. Shore “performed a complete psychological evaluation 

including the administration of the Trail Making Test – Part A & B, the 

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition and the Wechsler 

Memory Scale – Third Edition.” (Id.). The ALJ noted that these tests 

indicated Plaintiff has “a verbal IQ of 65, performance IQ of 67 and full 

scale IQ of 63.” (Id.). Dr. Shore diagnosed Plaintiff with a “learning 

disorder not otherwise specified (NOS) and mild mental retardation.” 

(Id.). The ALJ took specific note of Dr. Shore’s opinion that:

This is a 26-year-old Hispanic male whose overall 

cognitive ability falls within the mildly retarded range. 

He presents with a probable learning disability (he 

cannot read). Based on today’s assessment, he would 

be able to understand, remember, and carry out short 

simplistic instructions and make basic work decisions 

without supervision. His ability to perform detailed 

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and complex tasks is moderate to severely impaired. 

His ability to maintain adequate work pace, attention, 

and concentration is mildly impaired. His ability to 

interact appropriately with coworkers, supervisors, and 

the public is mildly impaired. His ability to maintain 

regular attendance, manage stress, and adapt to 

change in a work setting is mildly impaired. His 

ability to manage funds on his own behalf is doubtful.

(Id.).

The ALJ then concludes that Dr. Shore’s opinion “suggests that 

the claimant is capable of work characterized by the performance of 

simple repetitive tasks” and that his opinion is “supported by the 

objective clinical findings and observations of the consultative 

examiner, is consistent with and is well supported by the evidence of 

record taken as a whole.” (A.R. at 18).

5. C. Valette, Ph.D. 

The ALJ afforded little weight to examining psychologist Dr. 

Valette. (Id.). The ALJ found Dr. Valette’s opinion “internally 

inconsistent and less well supported by the evidence of record taken as 

a whole.” (A.R. at 19). 

The ALJ pointed to Dr. Valette’s observation that Plaintiff “last 

worked in February 2012” for “10 years at the Navy Base Store” where 

he “mainly dealt with collecting shopping carts” and “voluntarily quit 

due to harassment by other employees who made fun of him because he 

needed direction repeated from his supervisor.” (Id.). Regarding 

Plaintiff’s attitude and behavior, Dr. Valette opined that “he spoke with

a slight speech impairment, . . . was not very cooperative during the 

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evaluation, . . . did not appear as though he were putting forth his best 

effort into the evaluation [and] relied frequently on ‘I don’t know.’” 

(Id.). Dr. Valette opined that Petitioner’s “poor scores are inconsistent 

with his adequate presentation and adequate interaction.” (Id.). Dr. 

Valette found a malingering learning disorder, but concluded that this 

would not “impede his ability to hold down a job,” and pointed to his 10 

years at the Navy Base as support. (A.R. at 19). Dr. Valette then 

concluded that “there are no mental restrictions regarding” Plaintiff 

and that he is “capable of handling his own finances.” (Id.).

The ALJ was not persuaded that Plaintiff’s “learning disorder is 

so de minimis as to support a finding that he has no mental restrictions 

at all” and particularly disagreed that Plaintiff “can handle his own 

finances if he were to be awarded benefits.” (Id.).

6. Douglas Dolnak, DO

The ALJ afforded less weight to Dr. Dolnak, who performed a 

psychological assessment of Plaintiff on May 11, 2012. (Id.). The ALJ 

noted that Dr. Dolnak’s psychological assessment indicates that

Plaintiff “presented with a history of depression, irritable mood and 

complaining of being unable to control his anger with extreme and 

sudden mood swings.” (Id.). Dr. Dolnak indicated that Plaintiff “is 

alert and normally oriented with slow speech, tangential thought 

processes, restricted affect, below average intelligence, 

depressed/anxious/irritable mood, poor recent memory as well as fair 

judgment and insight.” (Id.) The ALJ noted that Dr. Dolnak indicated 

an “initial diagnosis of bipolor disorder, most recent episode 

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unspecified.” (Id.). However, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s progress notes 

dated August 10, 2012, October 8, 2012, April 2, 2013 and May 7, 2013 

show improvements in mood instability, depression and anger. (Id.).

7. Vincent R. Bernabe, M.D.

The ALJ afforded great weight to Dr. Bernabe, who conducted a 

consultative examination on August 2, 2011. (Id.). The ALJ listed Dr. 

Bernabe’s diagnoses of: (1) pes planus, bilateral feet; (2) chondromalacia 

patella, right knee; (3) patellar tendonitis, right knee; (4) Achilles 

tendonitis, right ankle; and (5) right foot sprain. (A.R. at 19-20). The 

ALJ found Dr. Bernabe’s functional assessment that Plaintiff can push, 

pull, lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, 

can walk six hours per day, does not need an assistive device, has no 

sitting limitation restrictions, no postural limitations, no restrictions 

regarding agility, no hearing and seeing restrictions and no restrictions 

for fine and gross manipulative movements well supported by the 

record evidence as a whole. (A.R. at 20). 

C. Issues on Appeal

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) finding that he did not 

meet the requirements of Listing 12.05(C); (2) listing an RFC 

unsupported by substantial evidence; (3) finding his testimony not 

credible; (4) improperly rejecting the third party opinions of Maria 

Jimenez, Alberto Jimenez and Maria Savcedo; and (5) improperly 

analyzing Plaintiff’s past relevant work and substantial gainful activity. 

(ECF No. 15). In light of the Court’s ruling on the first issue, it is 

unnecessary to address the remaining four issues.

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1. Intellectual Disability Requirements of 12.05(C)

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s learning 

disability does not meet the requirements of Listing 12.05(C) lacks 

substantial evidence in support. (ECF No. 15-1 at 11). Plaintiff states 

the ALJ’s finding that “the evidence does not indicate a physical or 

other mental impairment imposing additional significant work-related 

limitation of function” is clear error because the ALJ found six severe 

impairments (1) learning disorder; (2) pes planus; (3) bilateral feet; (4) 

chondromalacia patella of the right knee; (5) Achilles tendonitis of the 

right ankle; and (6) obesity. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff explains that his RFC 

restricts him to medium work, which along with his learning disability 

satisfies the criteria in listing 12.05(C). (Id. at 14). Plaintiff also 

asserts that the ALJ’s finding of a severe impairment of obesity satisfies 

the criteria for a physical impairment imposing an additional and 

significant work-related limitation on its own. (Id.).

Defendant counters that Plaintiff’s regular work since 2002 with 

satisfactory performance reviews “supports a conclusion that Plaintiff’s

mental impairment did not preclude gainful competitive employment 

and, therefore, Plaintiff did not suffer from significantly sub-average 

general functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning.” (ECF No. 22 

at 4). Specifically, Defendant asserts that the ALJ “was entitled to rely 

on Dr. Valette’s analysis” that Plaintiff “had no mental restrictions that 

would impede his ability to hold down a job” and “was entitled to rely on 

[Dr. Bernabe’s functional assessment] analysis to conclude that Plaintiff 

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did not have a significant physical impairment sufficient to meet the 

criteria of Listing 12.05[(C)].” (Id. at 4-5).

Plaintiff is disabled under Listing 12.05(C) if he can demonstrate: 

“(1) sub-average intellectual functioning deficits in adaptive functioning 

initially manifested before age 22; (2) an IQ score of 60 to 70; and (3) a 

physical or other mental impairment causing an additional and 

significant work-related limitation.” Kennedy v. Covlin, 738 F.3d 1172, 

1176 (9th Cir. 2013).2 

The ALJ stated the following in determining that Plaintiff’s 

impairments did not meet the requirements of Listing 12.05(C):

[T]he “paragraph C” criteria of listing 12.05 are not 

met because the claimant does not have a valid verbal, 

performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a 

physical or other mental impairment imposing an 

additional and significant work-related limitation of 

function. While the claimant has verbal, performance, 

or full scale IQ of 60 to 70, the evidence does not 

indicate a physical or other mental impairment 

imposing additional and significant work-related 

limitation of function. Indeed, the claimant has been 

working regularly since 2002 with satisfactory 

performance reviews.

 

2 Paragraph 12.05 contains an introductory element that the plaintiff 

have “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with 

deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the 

developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset 

of the impairment before age 22.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 

12.05. Paragraph (C) requires two additional elements: “[a] valid 

verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or 

other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant workrelated limitation of function. Id. Thus, the third prong in Kennedy is 

the second prong in 12.05(C). 

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(A.R. at 16).

Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning deficits in adaptive function 

initially manifested before Plaintiff turned 11. (A.R. at 379). This 

satisfies the first prong of 12.05(C). A review of the record evidence 

shows that Plaintiff satisfied the second prong of 12.05(C) because his 

verbal IQ was 65, his performance IQ was 67 and his full scale IQ was 

63. (A.R. at 404). Plaintiff contends that the third requirement of the 

Listing 12.05(C) Kennedy test is also satisfied because the ALJ found a 

severe combination of six impairments. (ECF No. 15-1 at 13).

At step 2 of the sequential process the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

“has the following severe combination of impairments: learning 

disorder, pes planus, bilateral feet, chondromalacia patella of the right 

knee, Achilles tendonitis of the right ankle and obesity (20 CFR 

404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).” (A.R. at 13). The ALJ explained that 

“[t]hese impairments are established by the medical evidence and are 

‘severe’ within the meaning of the Regulations because they are more 

than a slight abnormality or combination of abnormalities that cause 

the claimant more than minimal functional limitations.” (A.R. at 14).

“The definition of a severe impairment under section 404.1520(c) 

closely parallels that portion of section 12.05(C) of Appendix 1 which 

requires a showing of a physical or other mental impairment imposing 

additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” 

Edwards v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1984). As such, the ALJ’s 

finding of “a severe physical or other mental impairment [or 

combination of impairments], as defined at step two of the disability 

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analysis, apart from the decreased intellectual function, meets the 

[third] prong of the § 12.05(C) listing.” Beaupre v. Astrue, No. CIV S-11-

0459 GGH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58099, 2012 WL 1435032, *19 (E.D. 

Cal. April 25, 2012); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (“[W]e also consider the 

medical severity of your impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) 

that meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart 

and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are 

disabled.”).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “a person who has a severe 

physical or other mental impairment, as defined at step two of the 

disability analysis, apart from the decreased intellectual function, meets 

the [third] prong of the §12.05(C) listing.” Fanning v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 

631, 633 (9th Cir. 1987). As noted herein, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

combination of severe impairments, including his learning disability, 

did not qualify as a severe physical or other mental impairment under 

12.05(C). (A.R. at 16). However, it is clear that:

[a] learning disability is an impairment in its own 

right, distinct from mental retardation, and the 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 

Fourth Edition, Text Revision (“DSM-IV-TR”) has 

separate diagnoses for Learning Disorder and Mental 

Retardation. It stands to reason that a learning 

disorder can exist even in the presence of a primary 

diagnosis of mental retardation, and thus may satisfy 

the [third] prong of § 12.05(C).

Kennerson v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-6591(MAT), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

109158, 2012 WL 3204055, *29 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 32, 2012) (internal 

citations omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff’s learning disability does not 

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render the ALJ’s determination of his severe combination of 

impairments inapplicable to Listing 12.05(C) because “it is plain that 

mental retardation is different from a learning disorder.” Williams v. 

Astrue, No. 07CIV4134JGK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86779, 2008 WL 

4755348, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2008); see Beaupre, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 58099, 2012 WL 1435032, at *21 (finding that the plaintiff’s 

severe impairment was his learning disability, but that 12.05(C) is not 

met because his IQ was above 70); see also Robinson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., No. 2:14-cv-0051-KJN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26032, 2015 WL 

925609, * 16 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 2015) (finding that Plaintiff’s learning 

disability did not satisfy § 12.05(C) because the ALJ did not find it or 

other combined impairments severe). 

Some courts have found some learning disorders are not an 

additional impairment, but rather a symptom or manifestation of 

mental retardation. See Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir. 

2000). To determine whether Plaintiff’s learning disability is an 

additional impairment apart from the decreased intellectual function, 

“the Court must look to testimony to decide whether it is medically 

considered a separate disability from mental retardation.” Michael v. 

Apfel, No. C-99-3936-CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10070, 2000 WL 

10006534, *13 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 

Dr. Shore, whom the ALJ afforded great weight, listed Plaintiff’s 

mild mental retardation as a separate impairment from his learning 

disorder. (A.R. at 405). On November 30, 2009 Dr. Shore conducted a 

complete psychological evaluation of Plaintiff. (A.R. at 401). Under 

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present illnesses, Dr. Shore noted that Plaintiff “is applying for 

disability benefits due to a learning disability.” (Id.). After Plaintiff 

completed the psychological evaluation and took The Trail Making Test 

– Part A & B, The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition 

and The Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition Dr. Shore concluded 

that Plaintiff’s “overall cognitive ability appears to be within the mildly 

retarded range.” (A.R. at 405). He then found Plaintiff’s probable 

DSM-IV diagnoses are as follows:

AXIS I: Learning Disorder, NOS

AXIS II: Mental Retardation (Mild)

AXIS III: Deferred

AXIS IV: Inability to read

AXIS V: GAF 68

(Id.). This constitutes the necessary medical evidence to show that 

Plaintiff’s learning disorder is a separate disability from his mental 

retardation.

The ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s work experience is similarly 

inapplicable to the ALJ’s determination of disability under Listing 

12.05(C). Fanning, 827 F.2d. at 634 (“If Fanning suffers from the 

impairment listed in section 12.05(C), and the impairment meets the 12 

month duration requirement specified by statute, he must be found 

disabled without consideration of his age, education, and work 

experience.”) (internal citations omitted). Where the impairment on its 

own is non-disabling, the Court must determine whether it imposes 

additional and significant work-related limitation of function. See

Michael, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10070, at *13 (“Plaintiff argues that his 

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reading disorder satisfies the requirement of an ‘additional impairment’ 

in the listing because, although it is not in and of itself disabling, nondisabling conditions can meet listing 12.05(C).”). Here, Plaintiff’s 

combination of six impairments was found to be severe, effecting his 

ability to perform basic work activities in more than a slight or minimal 

way. (A.R. at 13-14); See Fanning, 827 F.2d at 633 (stating that the

additional impairment satisfies the 12.05(C) requirement when “its 

effect on a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities is more 

than slight or minimal.”). The fact that Plaintiff worked regularly since 

2002 with satisfactory performance reviews does not render Plaintiff 

non-disabled. Id.; (A.R. at 16).3

 

3 There is also evidence that supports Plaintiff’s past employment as 

benevolent, which also decreases the indicia of reliability of Plaintiff’s 

work experience. In an exchange between the ALJ and the VE, the ALJ 

posed the following hypothetical:

Q [by the ALJ]: . . . [W]hat would your reaction be if 

you found out that over a course of 10 years, an 

employee had been written up 20 times, but had not 

been fired?

A [by the VE]: I would say that it’s consistent with the 

testimony I heard that his mother was involved in 

getting him the job, and he was in what’s called a 

benevolent situation where the employer was giving 

him an unusually larger number of chances.

(A.R. at 115-16); see Lynch v. Colvin, No. 2:13-cv-01855-CKD, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 12877, 2014 WL 4370676, *21-22 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding 

the ALJ erred in failing to determine whether the plaintiff’s 

employment was benevolent because his father is an executive at the 

company and the plaintiff may have received special assistance and

been held to a lower productivity standard).

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In conclusion, Plaintiff’s sub-average intellectual functioning with 

deficits in adaptive functioning manifested before Plaintiff turned 11, 

Plaintiff has an IQ score between 60 and 70 and Plaintiff has a severe 

combination of impairments causing additional and significant workrelated limitation. (A.R. at 404, 379, 13); see Luckey v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Services, 890 F.2d 666, 669 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The 

Secretary’s finding that Luckey suffers from a severe combination of 

impairments also established the [third] prong of 12.05(C).”). Plaintiff 

satisfies Listing 12.05(C) and is disabled. The ALJ erred in his 

determination that Plaintiff’s other mental and physical impairments, 

including Plaintiff’s learning disorder, were not sufficiently severe to 

warrant a finding that Plaintiff met or equaled Listing 12.05(C).

2. Remand v. Reversal

Remanding for further proceedings or simply awarding benefits “is 

within the discretion of [the] court.” McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 

599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “If additional proceedings can remedy defects 

in the original administrative proceedings, a social security case should 

be remanded. Where, however, a rehearing would simply delay receipt

of benefits, reversal is appropriate.” Lewin v. Schweicker, 654 F.2d 631, 

635 (9th Cir. 1981). “More specifically, the district court should credit 

evidence that was rejected during the administrative process and 

remand for an immediate award of benefits if (1) the ALJ failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; (2) there are 

no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 

disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ 

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would be required to find the [Plaintiff] disabled were such evidence 

credited.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 

Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000).

As discussed above, the ALJ erroneously concluded that Plaintiff 

did not satisfy the requirements of Listing 12.05(C). Further, it is clear 

from the record that Plaintiff must be found disabled at step three 

because he meets the requirements of Listing 12.05(C). As such, there 

are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination 

of disability can be made. Additional proceedings would serve no useful 

purpose. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the proper remedy is a remand 

for the payment of benefits. Plaintiff’s other assignments of error are 

not addressed as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion be 

GRANTED and that Defendant’s Motion be DENIED, and the case be 

REMANDED for an award of benefits. This Report and 

Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to 

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than March 22, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections 

to the Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections 

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shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

March 29, 2016. The parties are advised that failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 

on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). 

Dated: March 7, 2016

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