Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00801/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00801-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRETT PETERSON, D.D.S.; 

B.O.L.T., an unincorporated 

association of motorcycle 

riders and enthusiasts; JOHN 

DALKE, an individual; MARK 

TEMPLE, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOSEPH A. FARROW, 

Commissioner California 

Highway Patrol; MICHAEL 

GOOLD, in his official 

capacity as Chief of Police 

of the City of Rancho 

Cordova; SCOTT R. JONES, in 

his official capacity as the 

Sheriff of County of 

Sacramento; ROBERT DIMICELI 

a.k.a. ROBERT DI MICELI, 

Officer of the California 

Highway Patrol; STEPHEN 

CARROZZO, Rancho Cordova 

police officer and Deputy 

Sheriff; KAMALA HARRIS, in 

her official capacity as 

California Attorney General,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS

FARROW AND DIMICELI’S MOTION TO 

DIMISS PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Brett Peterson, B.O.L.T. (short for, “Bikers of 

Lesser Tolerance”), John Dalke, and Mark Temple sued the 

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following Defendants—Sheriff of the County of Sacramento Scott R. 

Jones in his official capacity, Chief of Police of the City of 

Rancho Cordova Michael Goold in his official capacity, and Rancho 

Cordova Police Officer Stephen Carrozzo in his individual 

capacity (collectively, “Municipal Defendants”); California 

Highway Patrol Officer Robert Dimiceli in his individual 

capacity, and California Highway Patrol Commissioner Joseph A. 

Farrow in his official capacity (collectively, “State 

Defendants”); and California Attorney General Kamala Harris in 

her official capacity (“Defendant Harris”)—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for alleged violations of the First, Second, Fourth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

State Defendants move to dismiss and/or strike claims in 

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (SAC) (Doc. #44) under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 8 and 12(b)(6), (Doc. 

#54). For the reasons stated below, State Defendants’ motion is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

“Plaintiffs Peterson, Dalke, and Temple . . . are 

individuals with a class M1 motorcycle license who, at all times 

relevant herein, resided in the State of California.” SAC ¶ 10. 

“Plaintiff B.O.L.T. is an unincorporated association of 

motorcycle riders and enthusiasts[,]” “focusing on the 

unconstitutional enforcement [and constitutionality] of helmet 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 17, 2016.

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laws . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants have an unwritten policy, 

custom[,] and practice of allowing officers to stop motorcyclists 

and issue citations for substandard helmets based on visual 

criteria, and the officer’s subjective opinion of whether the 

helmet would, if tested, conform to federal safety standards[,]” 

id. ¶ 44, “regardless of whether the officer has tangible and 

documentary evidence to believe that (i.) there has been a 

determination of non-compliance with [Federal Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standard (FMVSS)] 218[, 49 C.F.R. § 571.218 (2011), the 

federal standard establishing minimum performance requirements 

for motorcycle helmets], or (ii.) that the motorcyclist has 

knowledge that the helmet has been determined not to comply with 

FMVSS 218[,]” id. ¶ 46. Plaintiffs allege they “have been cited 

for wearing helmets that [D]efendants’ officers considered to be 

in violation of the helmet law,” as a result of this unwritten 

policy, custom, and practice. Id. ¶ 47.

On April 10, 2015, Plaintiffs brought this action against 

Defendants (Doc. #1) and on July 1, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their 

First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” Doc. #5). In response, 

Defendants filed motions to dismiss (Doc. ##13, 18) and the Court 

granted the motions under Rule 8, giving Plaintiffs leave to 

amend (Doc. #42). On March 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their SAC 

(Doc. #44). The SAC states nine causes of action brought under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 of which the first three claims are brought 

specifically against one or more of the State Defendants: (1) 

injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendant Farrow for 

Fourth Amendment violations; (2) damages against Dimiceli and 

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Carrozzo for conspiracy and Fourth Amendment violations; and (3) 

damages against Dimiceli and Carrozzo for First Amendment 

violations. The Court now addresses the merits of State 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss these three claims (Doc. #54).

II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

State Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice 

(Doc. #56) of the following documents: Exhibit A-“California 

Highway Patrol (CHP) General Order 100.68, Chapter 4-3, also 

known as CHP’s ‘Enforcement Policy’,” id. at 2:4-7; Exhibit B-

“[t]he contents of California Penal Code Sections cited in 

Attorney General Harris’s Motion to Dismiss[,]” id. at 2:8-9; and 

Exhibit C-“[t]he contents of three publicly available webpages: 

(a) https://oag.ca.gov/firearms/exemptpo, posted on the Attorney 

General’s website . . .; 

(b) http://www.boltofca.com/files/Enforcement_Policy.pdf, posted 

on Plaintiff B.O.L.T.’s website; and 

(c) http://www.boltofca.com/NutsandBolts.html, posted on 

Plaintiff B.O.L.T.’s website[,]” id. at 2:10-15. Plaintiffs do 

not oppose State Defendants’ request. Exhibit A is a judicially 

noticeable public record, and State Defendants’ request for 

judicial notice is GRANTED. See United States v. Thornton, 511 

F.3d 1221, 1229 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (taking judicial notice of a 

Bureau of Prisons policy statement). The documents in Exhibit B 

are part of the record in this case, and the request is DENIED as 

unnecessary. State Defendants’ request for judicial notice of 

Exhibit C—publicly available webpages—is GRANTED “but not for the 

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truth of [the webpages’] contents.” Brodsky v. Yahoo! Inc., 630 

F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also United States 

v. Kane, No. 2:12-cr-250-JAD-VCF, 2013 WL 5797619, *9 (D. Nev. 

Oct. 28, 2013) (citations omitted) (“When a court takes judicial 

notice of publications like websites and newspaper articles, the 

court merely notices what was in the public realm at the time, 

not whether the contents of those articles were in fact true.”).

B. Analysis

1. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 8

State Defendants contend that all three claims against them 

in Plaintiffs’ SAC should be dismissed for failure to abide by 

Rule 8(d)(1)’s requirement that “[e]ach allegation must be 

simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). The Court 

disagrees and finds that the SAC meets the minimal requirements 

of Rule 8 by identifying which claims are being brought against 

which defendants. State Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 

8 is therefore denied. 

2. Fourth Amendment Violations

State Defendant Farrow seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ first 

claim for relief—that he violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 

right to be free from unlawful seizure by effectuating an 

unlawful practice and policy amongst California Highway Patrol

(CHP) in the stopping and citing of motorcyclists for suspected 

helmet law violations—under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

viable claim.

a. CHP’s Stop Policy

State Defendants contend: “Even if [Plaintiffs’] bare 

allegation [challenging CHP’s policy for stopping motorcyclists] 

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w[as] taken as both true and sufficient, a policy of stopping 

motorcyclists on the basis of ‘visual criteria’ nonetheless meets 

the Fourth Amendment standard for reasonable suspicion.” Def. 

Farrow & Def. Dimiceli’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) 7:12-14, ECF 

No. 54-1.

Plaintiffs allege in their SAC that “Defendants have an 

unwritten policy, custom[,] and practice of allowing officers to 

stop motorcyclists . . . for substandard helmets based on visual 

criteria.” SAC ¶ 45.

In Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, the Ninth 

Circuit held that “an officer need not have a particularized 

suspicion that a motorcyclist has actual knowledge that his 

helmet does not comply with [FMVSS] 218 if other objective 

evidence, such as the appearance of the helmet, sufficiently 

supports an investigatory stop.” 92 F.3d 1486, 1497 (9th Cir. 

1996). Because Easyriders holds that “the CHP may stop 

motorcyclists based on the appearance of their helmets[,]” 

Plaintiffs have failed to plead a claim related to the stopping 

of motorcyclists that entitles them to relief and cannot do so 

under the governing law. See id. State Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss is granted with prejudice as to the CHP’s policy of 

stopping motorcyclists based on visual criteria.

b. CHP’s Policy for Citing Motorcyclists

1. Written Policy

State Defendants contend that “[s]ince [the] Easyriders

[decision], CHP has adopted a formal written policy that limits 

helmet law citations to situations when probable cause is wellCase 2:15-cv-00801-JAM-DB Document 71 Filed 07/07/16 Page 6 of 20
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established.” Mot. 8:16-17.

CHP’s Enforcement Manual states that enforcement of the 

helmet law is limited to when a motorcyclist is (a) “not wearing 

any type of head covering,” or (b) “wearing a head covering which 

is obviously not a motorcycle helmet, such as a Styrofoam bicycle 

helmet, football helmet, ball cap, scarf, stocking cap, leather 

aviator cap, or any variation of a fabric cap, et al.” Ex. A—CHP 

General Order 100.68, Chapter 4-3, § 2(c)(8).

Plaintiffs do not challenge this official policy nor do they 

dispute its compliance with the Fourth Amendment. However, 

Plaintiffs still allege that CHP has an “unwritten” policy or 

custom allowing unlawful citations to be issued. SAC ¶ 45.

2. Unwritten Policy

State Defendants contend that “the SAC contains nothing more 

than conclusory allegations of unconstitutionality and formulaic 

recitations of the elements of the probable cause standard 

outlined in Easyriders, namely that CHP policy allows officers to 

cite motorcyclists without regard to actual knowledge of noncompliance and ‘leaves it up to [the citing] officer[’]s use of 

good judgment’ about compliance with the [helmet] law.” Mot. 

10:9-13. State Defendants argue that “[m]issing from the [SAC] 

are any allegations that CHP officers lacked probable cause to 

believe that Plaintiffs had actual knowledge to justify any 

citations[,]” id. at 11:12-14; the SAC contains, “at best, 

allegations of sporadic and isolated events that cannot, as a 

matter of law, establish a widespread practice throughout CHP of 

constitutional violations[,]” id. at 12:2-4; and “Plaintiffs fail 

to allege any specific facts to support their bare assertion that 

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Defendant Farrow failed to train CHP officers[,]” id. at 14:5-7.

Plaintiffs respond: “The pleadings are very detailed about 

defendant policymaker’s lack of action and persistent abuse, even 

when complaints are lodged against individual officers.” Opp’n 

to Mot. (“Opp’n”) 3:19-20, ECF No. 59.

In Easyriders, the Ninth Circuit held that in order to issue 

a citation “the ticketing officer must have probable cause to 

believe that the specific intent, caused by the motorcyclist’s 

actual knowledge of non-conformity, exists.” 92 F.3d at 1499.

A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a local entity 

under § 1983 is required “to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or 

‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cty. 

Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978). “[T]o establish an official policy or custom sufficient 

for Monell liability, a plaintiff must show a constitutional 

right violation resulting from (1) an employee acting pursuant to 

an expressly adopted official policy; (2) an employee acting 

pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom; or (3) an employee 

acting as a ‘final policy maker.’” Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 

F.3d 1069, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2010); rev’d on other grounds

Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012).

Absent a formal governmental policy, [a plaintiff] 

must show a “longstanding practice or custom which 

constitutes the standard operating procedure of the 

local government entity.” Gillette[v. Delmore], 979 

F.2d [1342,] 1346–47 [(9th Cir. 1992)]. The custom 

must be so “persistent and widespread” that it 

constitutes a “permanent and well settled city 

policy.” Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 

U.S. 658, 691 . . . (1978). Liability for improper 

custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic 

incidents; it must be founded upon practices of 

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sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that 

the conduct has become a traditional method of 

carrying out policy. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 

F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984); see also, Meehan v. 

[L.A. Cty.], 856 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1988) (two 

incidents not sufficient to establish custom); Davis 

v. Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1989) (manner 

of one arrest insufficient to establish policy).

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). In order to 

survive dismissal, Monell allegations must “identify . . . 

specific policies or customs, explain how those policies or 

customs were deficient, [and] explain how they specifically 

caused plaintiff harm.” Rodelo v. City of Tulare, No. 1:15-cv01675-KJM-BAM, 2016 WL 561520, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2016).

The SAC contains the following pertinent allegations: 

“[D]efendant Farrow had actual knowledge of CHP statewide 

Enforcement Guidelines since at least 1995 as mandated by 

[Easyriders,]” SAC ¶ 61; “[D]efendant Farrow has intentionally 

disregarded the constitutional limitations on helmet law 

enforcement, and by inaction and failing to discipline, allowed 

CHP officers to cite motorcyclists for violation of the helmet 

law without probable cause[,]” id. ¶ 66; Peterson was wrongfully 

arrested and filed an internal affairs complaint to the CHP, id.

¶¶ 68, 69; “[a]ll [D]efendants have been placed on notice of the 

violations by way of internal affairs complaints[,]” id. ¶ 80; 

“Defendants have failed to provide their officers with any list 

of helmets which have been tested and have failed the DOT 

Certification[,]” id. ¶ 81; and “Defendants have failed to 

provide their officers with any training with respect to the 

collection of evidence necessary to support a [h]elmet 

[t]icket[,]” id. ¶ 82.

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The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to

sufficiently identify specific instances of purported misconduct

from which it can be inferred that the CHP has an unwritten 

custom or policy which systematically condones or endorses the 

improper citing of motorcyclists; instead Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges 

isolated events from which no inference can be drawn that the 

practice violates the requirements set forth in Easyriders or is

widespread.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ failure to train theory of 

liability, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to set 

forth facts that demonstrate that the CHP acted with “deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained 

employees] come into contact.” See City of Canton, Ohio v. 

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). A policy amounts to deliberate 

indifference “‘when the need for more or different action ‘is so 

obvious, and the inadequacy [of the current procedure] so likely 

to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the 

policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have been 

deliberately indifferent to the need.’’” Mortimer v. Baca, 594 

F.3d 714, 723 (9th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477-78 (9th 

Cir. 1992) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 390)). Plaintiffs allege

that the CHP fails to provide officers with a list of decertified 

helmets and fails to provide training on the collection of 

evidence necessary to support a “Helmet Ticket.” SAC ¶¶ 81-82. 

Taken as true, these allegations are still insufficient and 

irrelevant. The Court also finds State Defendants’ arguments 

persuasive. First, “given CHP’s official policy of citing 

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motorcyclists only if they do not wear any motorcycle helmets, a 

failure to provide officers with a list of de-certified 

motorcycle helmets is not an ‘obvious’ deficiency[,]” Mot. 15:2-

5, and second, “[a]n officer can easily have grounds to issue a 

ticket without training on collecting the evidence to support a 

ticket challenged later in court,” id. at 15:8-10.

For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail 

to set forth a claim against Farrow upon which relief can be 

granted, and State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the first claim 

against Farrow is granted with prejudice.

c. Conspiracy

State Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs’ conspiracy 

allegation in paragraph 115 of their second claim for relief 

should be dismissed. Specifically, State Defendants argue: “The 

SAC contains no allegation, nor can it, that enforcement of the 

helmet law is designed to deprive a protected class of the same 

rights enjoyed by others[,]” as required to successfully assert a 

conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Mot. 21:23-24. 

State Defendants also argue that there is “no allegation that 

Officer Dimiceli was motivated by a racial, or perhaps otherwise 

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Id. at 21:26-

27.

Plaintiffs brief response in opposition to this argument 

states in a conclusory fashion that “Plaintiffs make it perfectly 

clear that they were subjected to unconstitutional targeted 

enforcement of the state’s helmet law[;] Defendants Dimiceli and 

Carrozzo have shown great animus towards Plaintiffs and 

specifically mention B.O.L.T. at each contact.” Opp’n 8:3-6.

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To bring a cause of action successfully under § 1985(3), 

Plaintiffs must allege four elements: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for 

the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any 

person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, 

or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an 

act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is 

either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right 

or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” United Bhd. of 

Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 

(1983); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 

1992). To satisfy the second element requires not only the 

identification of a legally protected right, but also a 

deprivation of that right motived by “some racial, or perhaps 

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind 

the conspirators’ action.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 

102 (1971). “Generally, . . . section 1985(3) is extended beyond 

race ‘only when the class in question can show that there has 

been a governmental determination that its members ‘require and 

warrant special federal assistance in protecting their civil 

rights.’’” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536 (quoting Schultz v. Sundberg, 

759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir.1985) (quoting DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & 

Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir.1979))). Thus, in 

attempting to bring a cause of action under § 1985(3), plaintiffs

must show that they are in a class that the courts have 

designated as a suspect or quasi-suspect class “requiring more 

exacting scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through 

legislation that the class required special protection.” Id. 

The term “class,” as used in the statute “unquestionably connotes 

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something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to 

engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors.” Bray 

v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993); 

Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

conspiracy in question must specifically “aim at a deprivation of 

the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.” Orin, 

272 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102).

Plaintiffs have not cited § 1985(3) as the basis for their 

conspiracy claim. Rather, they have simply alleged that: “Based 

upon information and belief, Dimiceli and Carrozzo have conspired 

to violate Plaintiffs’ rights be using the helmet law as a 

vehicle to violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from unreasonable search and seizures.” SAC ¶ 115. To the 

extent Plaintiffs intended this paragraph to be a separate claim 

for conspiracy, the claim fails since Plaintiffs have not alleged

that Dimiceli and Carrozzo were motivated by racial, or some 

other class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. All 

motorcycle riders are subject to helmet laws and motorcycle 

riders have not been singled out by the government as needing

enhanced federal protection. Plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegation 

in their second claim is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

3. First Amendment Retaliation

State Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ third claim for 

relief-- alleging Dimiceli committed First Amendment violations 

by retaliating against Temple and Peterson for engaging in 

protected First Amendment activity--should be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In order to state a First Amendment retaliation claim under 

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§ 1983, Plaintiffs “must establish that (1) [they] engaged in 

[First Amendment activity]; (2) the government officials took an 

adverse action against [them]; and (3) [their protected conduct] 

was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action.” 

Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 

2004) (citing Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th 

Cir. 2004)). The above test has traditionally been applied in 

the context of public employment, but a similar analysis is 

appropriate in situations such as here where the parties do not 

share an employment relationship. See Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 

1462, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. 

Mendocino Cty., 14 F.3d 457, 459–60 (9th Cir. 1994); Cain v. 

Tigard-Tualatin School Dist. 23J, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 n.1 

(D. Or. 2003) (applying test found in context of public 

employment to non-employment First Amendment retaliation claim). 

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs allege that Dimiceli and 

Carrozzo “have been in communication with each other, sharing 

filed notes and research on members of B.O.L.T., or purported 

members.” SAC ¶ 160. Further, “Dimiceli and Carrozzo have 

conspired to violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment associational 

rights by using the helmet law as a vehicle to punish 

[P]laintiffs . . . .” Id. ¶ 161. The above allegations are 

conclusory and not accepted as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (A court is not required to accept as true 

a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”) The Court 

will thus consider the plausibility of Peterson and Temple’s 

First Amendment retaliation claims against Dimiceli separately.

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a. Peterson’s Claim Against Dimiceli

Plaintiff Peterson’s claim against Dimiceli appears to be 

premised only on freedom of association. The SAC alleges that 

Peterson was arrested by Dimiceli based on a perceived 

association with B.O.L.T. State Defendants contend that “no 

allegations in the SAC . . . identify any way in which Officer 

Dimiceli has allegedly prevented Plaintiff[] Peterson . . . from 

associating with . . . other[s] for motorcycle rides or any other 

activity in which [Plaintiffs] allege B.O.L.T. engages.” Mot. 

18:5-8. State Defendants also argue that “there is no 

constitutional right to ‘social association.’” Id. at 18:11 

(citing Kohlman v. Village of Midlothian, 833 F. Supp. 2d 922, 

939 (N.D. Ill. 2001)). Further, State Defendants contend that 

Peterson’s claim should be dismissed because as the SAC alleges, 

“Peterson . . . was not a member of B.O.L.T. nor an associate of 

Temple and Dalke[,]” id. at 18:22-23 (citing SAC ¶ 146); “[i]t 

stands to reason that Peterson’s right to associate with B.O.L.T. 

could not have been violated when he was not a member of B.O.L.T. 

and not associating with B.O.L.T. in the first place[,]” id. at 

18:23-25.

As to State Defendants’ first argument, expressive 

association involves association “for the purpose of engaging in 

protected speech or religious activities.” Bd. of Dirs. of 

Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987); 

see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) 

(protection for collective “pursuit of a wide variety of 

political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural 

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ends”). While the State Defendants cite Kohlman, 833 F. Supp. 2d 

at 937, in support of their argument, their reliance on this case 

is misplaced. In Kohlman, the court found that “[t]he 

plaintiffs . . . [did] not identify any expressive activity as 

they [had] not pointed to any political, religious, or other 

viewpoints advocated or commonly held by members of the Chicago 

Chapter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club.” Id. Unlike the 

allegations in Kohlman, in the instant case, Plaintiffs’ 

allegation that “B.O.L.T. is . . . a civil rights organization 

focusing on the unconstitutional enforcement . . . [and] 

constitutionality of helmet laws.” (SAC ¶ 4) is sufficient to 

avoid dismissal simply on the basis of Kohlman.

State Defendants’ next argument that this claim should be 

dismissed because Peterson did not actually associate with 

B.O.L.T., also fails because the Supreme Court recently held that 

in a freedom of association case a plaintiff need not engage in 

actual First Amendment activity so long as defendants perceived, 

and were unlawfully motivated by, protected conduct. Heffernan 

v. City of Paterson, N.J., 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (April 26, 2016) 

(“When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent 

the employee from engaging in political activity that the First 

Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge that 

unlawful action under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—

even if, as here, the employer makes a factual mistake about the 

employee’s behavior.”). Accordingly, it is immaterial whether 

Peterson associated with B.O.L.T. before the issuance of 

motorcycle citations so long as Dimiceli mistakenly believed he 

was engaged in such association and was motivated by unlawful 

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aims when citing Peterson. Thus, dismissal based only upon the 

fact that Peterson was not associated with B.O.L.T. is not 

warranted. 

However, in order for Peterson’s claim against Dimiceli to 

survive, Peterson must still demonstrate the requisite causal 

connection between his perceived expressive association and the 

citations that were issued to him by Dimiceli. In attempting to 

satisfy this requirement, Plaintiffs have alleged that Dimiceli 

specifically referenced B.O.L.T., Temple and Dalke when he 

arrested Peterson. But, Peterson was cited for failing to comply 

with helmet law requirements, and Dimiceli’s alleged off-hand 

comments about B.O.L.T. do not show that he was motivated by any

unlawful retaliatory aims. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ conclusory 

allegation, associational animus is not evident from this fact 

alone. Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient specific

factual allegations to support a plausible inference that 

Peterson’s perceived membership in B.O.L.T. substantially 

motivated Dimiceli to arrest him. Plaintiffs have been given 

three chances to properly plead this claim and any further 

attempt to amend would be futile. Peterson’s claim against 

Dimiceli for First Amendment retaliation is dismissed with 

prejudice.

b. Temple’s Claim Against Dimiceli

In support of their motion to dismiss Temple’s First 

Amendment claim against Dimiceli, State Defendants argue that the 

claim cannot be based on Temple’s freedom of association because 

“there are no specific allegations by Temple that Officer 

Dimiceli’s citations/arrest of him were based on association with 

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B.O.L.T.” Mot. 19:5-7. Further, “there are no allegations of 

conduct specific to Officer Dimiceli concerning any associational 

animus to Temple” and “the sweeping conclusions are insufficient 

to state a claim.” Id. at 19:7-8.

State Defendants also argue that Temple’s retaliation claim 

based on his right to petition should be dismissed for the 

following reasons: “the citations occurring before the [filing 

of Temple’s] internal affairs complaint could not have been in 

retaliation for the subsequently submitted internal affairs 

complaint[,]” id. at 19:27-28; the 2010 events “are outside the 

prevailing two-year statute of limitation, making them unviable 

as basis for a cause of action[,]” id. at 20:1-2; and “to the 

extent Temple would try to argue that the May 2013 arrests were 

in retaliation for the June 2010 internal affairs complaint, the 

three-year period in between fails to satisfy the requirement 

that the internal affairs complaint filing was the motivating or 

substantial factor in Temple’s arrests three years later[,]” id.

at 20:10-13.

Plaintiffs’ opposition does not directly address these 

arguments and, instead, merely repeats Temple’s allegations in 

the SAC or focuses primarily on Temple’s claim against Defendant 

Carozzo rather than Defendant Dimiceli. Indeed, the opposition 

spends four paragraphs talking about apparent actions of 

Carrozzo, not Dimiceli, and mixes in Plaintiff Dalke, who has 

made no claim against Officer Dimiceli. 

Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that any First 

Amendment activity caused Dimiceli to issue citations to or 

arrest Temple. Temple’s internal affairs complaints were filed 

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after each arrest not before and thus could not have motivated 

such behavior. Further, the three year gap between Temple’s 2010 

complaint and 2013 arrests renders it implausible that any First 

Amendment activity was a substantial motivating factor in 

Dimiceli’s issuance of helmet citations. No actionable 

retaliation by Dimiceli against Temple has been properly alleged 

in the SAC and any further attempt to amend this claim would be 

futile. Temple’s claim against Dimiceli for First Amendment 

retaliation is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

d. Qualified Immunity

State Defendants argue that Officer Dimiceli is entitled to 

qualified immunity from Peterson and Temple’s First Amendment 

claims. Since the Court above finds that Plaintiffs have failed 

to plausibly allege any claim against Dimiceli for First 

Amendment retaliation, the Court need not, and does not reach 

this issue.

///

///

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES State 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 8; the Court GRANTS WITH 

PREJUDICE State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ first 

cause of action against Defendant Farrow; the Court GRANTS WITH 

PREJUDICE State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

conspiracy allegation in the second cause of action; and the 

Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ third cause of action against Defendant Dimiceli. The 

only remaining claim against either of these State Defendants is 

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Plaintiffs second cause of action against Defendant Dimiceli for 

alleged Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure violations. Defendant 

Dimiceli shall file his answer to this claim within twenty days 

of the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2016

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