Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01023/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01023-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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06cv1023J

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR WILSON,

Petitioner,

v.

G.J. GIURBINO, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Civil No. 06-CV-1023-J (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS BY A PERSON

IN STATE CUSTODY

1. Introduction And Procedural Background.

Petitioner is a state prisoner serving a thirty-one (31)

year to life sentence after a May 16, 2002 jury conviction. 

(Lodgment 1 at 216-217, 249.) He was convicted in a retrial (in

San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCE200144) of assault

with a deadly weapon on a peace officer and resisting an executive officer in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 245(c) and 69,

respectively. (Lodgment 1 at 166-167.) The jury found that

Petitioner personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (Cal.

Penal Code § 12022(b)(1)) and that he had two prior “strike”

convictions pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i) and

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See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Saffold v.

Newland, 224 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000).

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1170.12. (Lodgment 1 at 166-169.)

On June 20, 2002, prior to filing a notice of appeal,

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San

Diego Superior Court, raising claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel and insufficiency of the evidence. (Lodgment 2.) On

July 3, 2002, he filed an “amended” petition in that same court,

adding a claim that his sentence was improper. (Lodgment 3.) On

July 16, 2002, Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge of the Superior Court,

denied the petition. (Lodgment 4.)

On March 24, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, raising the same

claims raised in his petition to the San Diego Superior Court. 

(Lodgment 8.) On May 28, 2003, that court issued an order that

it would consider the habeas petition at the same time as it

considered Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Lodgment 9.) On January

6, 2004, the California Court of Appeal denied both Petitioner’s

direct appeal and his petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(Lodgments 5-7, 10.)

On August 11, 2004, Petitioner constructively filed (by

delivering to prison officials for mailing1

) a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 12.) 

That petition was denied on July 20, 2005. (Lodgment 13.)

On May 2, 2006, Petitioner constructively filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in United States District Court,

contending that: 1) he received ineffective assistance of

counsel; 2) he was denied due process when the prosecution

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) states: “A 1-year period of limitation

shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation

period shall run from the latest of — (A) the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which

the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C)

the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.”

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destroyed evidence; 3) his conviction was based on insufficient

evidence; and 4) his sentence was improper. (Doc. No. 1.) On

June 12, 2006, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition

(Doc. Nos. 5-6), contending that the Petition is time-barred by

the one-year statute of limitations set out in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d).2 In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner

filed a Motion for Equitable Tolling of Time (Doc. Nos. 10-12),

and on August 10, 2006, Respondent filed an Opposition to Equitable Tolling. (Doc. No. 8)

As discussed below, the Petition should be dismissed with

prejudice because it is time-barred, and Petitioner has not shown

cause why the limitations period should be deemed equitably

tolled so as to render his Petition timely-filed.

2. Pursuant to Statutory Law, the Petition Was Not TimelyFiled.

The AEDPA’s statute of limitations applies to Petitioner’s

presentation of claims in this Court. Calderon v. U.S. District

Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-1287 (9th Cir. 1997), as

amended on denial of rhg. and rhg. en banc, cert. denied, 522

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states: “The time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection.”

4

Petitioner’s earlier-filed habeas petitions are irrelevant to a

statutory tolling analysis because the statute of limitations did not

begin to run until February 15, 2004, and the earlier-filed petitions

had by that time already been denied.

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U.S. 1099 (1998), overruled on different grounds in Calderon v.

U.S. District Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

523 U.S. 1063 (1999). The conclusion of direct review of Petitioner’s conviction occurred on February 15, 2004, forty (40)

days after his direct appeal was denied by the California Court

of Appeal. Accordingly, absent any applicable tolling, Petitioner had until February 15, 2005 to file his federal habeas Petition. Id.; see Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir.

2001)(Rule 6(a), F.R.Civ.P., governs the calculation of the 1-

year statute of limitations period of the AEDPA). 

Because Petitioner filed an application for state postconviction relief during the time that the statute of limitations

would otherwise have been running, a tolling analysis pursuant to

§ 2244(d)(2) is necessary.3 Under this analysis, the February

15, 2005 date for expiration of the one-year period within which

Petitioner could timely file his federal Petition is extended by

the number of days the statute of limitations was tolled.

As set out above, Petitioner did not file an “application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review” following

the conclusion of direct review of his conviction until August

11, 2004.4

 At that point, 178 of the 365 days allowed by the

statute of limitations had already expired. Petitioner is

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entitled to tolling of 344 days for the period from August 11,

2004 to July 20, 2005 (the time during which his petition for

writ of habeas corpus was pending before the California Supreme

Court). That tolled time thus extended the deadline for filing a

federal Petition from February 15, 2005 to January 25, 2006.

As set out above, Petitioner did not constructively file

this federal Petition until May 2, 2006, more than three (3)

months after the statute of limitations had expired on January

25, 2006. Accordingly, without a showing sufficient to support a

finding of equitable tolling for a period of at least 97 days,

the Petition was not timely-filed and should be dismissed.

3. Petitioner’s Motion for Equitable Tolling of Time Should be

Granted in Part and Denied in Part.

In his Motion for Equitable Tolling of Time, Petitioner

contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations because, essentially: 1) he was subjected to

institutional lock downs at Calipatria State Prison from February

2004 to August 2004 and from March 2005 to June 2005; 2) at the

time of his transfer from Calipatria to Centinela State Prison,

he was separated from his legal documents from December 16, 2005

to February 6, 2006; and 3) he was denied access to the law

library during lock downs after his transfer to Centinela State

Prison. Petitioner argues that these events constitute extraordinary circumstances outside of his control and that, despite his

diligence, they prevented him from timely filing his Federal

petition.

Petitioner attaches several exhibits to his Motion for

Equitable Tolling of Time. Exhibit 1, dated July 12, 2006, is an

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“Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form,” completed by Petitioner (but

without a response from prison officials), alleging a “Lock Down”

during the periods February to August 2004 and March to December

2005. On the form, Petitioner requests copies of the “Program

Modifications” that would confirm these alleged periods of lock

down, but none are included with the exhibit.

Exhibit 2 is an “Inmate Request for Interview” form, also

dated July 12, 2006, seeking confirmation that Petitioner was on

“orientation” and then “lock down” from December 19, 2005 through

the end of March 2006. The form contains a July 18, 2006 response from “P Serna CCI, Fac B, Bldg-2," stating:

I checked the above and found you were on orientation

status at Centinela from Dec-19-05 thru Jan-5-06;

additionally you were part of the facility lockdown

from 12-29-05 thru April-12-06. All inmates able to

prove a Court deadline were allowed access to the law

library during this time.

Exhibit 2 has been altered from what was presumably its original

form in that the bottom half of the form has been torn off.

The next page of Exhibit 2 is a copy of “Centinela State

Prison, Facility B Bldg. #4 - Unclassified Inmates Guideline,” 

with an underlined portion: “as an unclassified inmate, you can

only count on your meals every day and a shower ... .” Presumably, Petitioner included this page to support his contention

that from December 29, 2005 through April 12, 2006, he had no law

library access. The next six (6) pages of Exhibit 2 are 8 1⁄2 by

14 inch sheets printed on both sides containing copies of “Program Status Reports.” The reports show a maximum of 27 days of

lock down status for Petitioner between January 4, 2006 and

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5

While Exhibit 2 includes “Program Status Reports” for certain

dates between March 1, 2006 and April 12, 2006, the reports show that

library conditions were “normal,” and the reports do not support

Petitioner’s contention that he was on “lock down” status and had no

law library access from March 1, 2006 through April 12, 2006.

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February 28, 2006.5

Exhibit 3 to Petitioner’s motion is an “Inmate/Parolee

Appeal Form” dated February 1, 2006, which appears to have been

submitted by Petitioner to prison officials on February 6, 2006. 

The form states that, during transfer, Petitioner’s legal documents (“my transcripts, Motion and Research”) were removed from

his possession and were not returned to him with his other

belongings on December 21, 2005. As of February 1, 2006, Petitioner states his legal documents have not been returned. An

attached “Property Inventory,” dated December 16, 2005, appears

to confirm that one box of legal documents was part of Petitioner’s belongings on December 16, 2005.

Exhibit 4 is an “Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form” submitted by

Petitioner on January 30, 2006, complaining that he had been on

lock down status since his transfer to the institution and,

accordingly, had been denied access to the prison law library. 

On February 4, 2006, Petitioner received an “informal level staff

response” that “only inmates with Court deadlines are granted

access to the law library during lockdown.” Petitioner responded

on February 7, 2006, stating “This is very unsatisfactory in that

the [AEDPA] has a deadline of one year, this period of unclassified and lock down is using that time up.” Page three (3) of

Exhibit 4 is an undated Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Memorandum stating Petitioner’s appeal was “partially

granted,” and Petitioner was scheduled to be brought to the law

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library on March 15, 2006.

Exhibit 5 to Petitioner’s Motion for Equitable Tolling of

Time is an “Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form” dated July 14, 2006,

requesting copies of “Program Modifications” for January through

March 2006, presumably for preparation of the motion. Pages two

through four of Exhibit 5 are a copy of a Department of Corrections Memorandum dated September 17, 2004, authorizing the CDC to

copy and mail legal documents for inmates. 

In opposition to Petitioner’s motion, Respondent submits

copies of law library records kept by the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (at Centinela State Prison)

pertaining to Petitioner. The records appear to show that

Petitioner requested and was granted law library access between

March 5, 2006 and May 2, 2006 on ten (10) separate occasions,

while being denied access to the law library on thirteen (13)

additional occasions. (Lodgment 15.)

 Equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations

on habeas petitions is permitted, but Petitioner bears the burden

of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate. EspinozaMatthews, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S.Ct. 1807,

1814 (2005). The relevant periods for purposes of analyzing the

merits of Petitioner’s Motion for Equitable Tolling are February

15, 2004 to August 11, 2004 and July 20, 2005 to January 25,

2006. These are the periods (totaling one year) during which the

statute of limitations ran in Petitioner’s case (the period

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August 11, 2004 to July 20, 2005 having been statutorily tolled

by virtue of the pendency of Petitioner’s habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court).

Petitioner contends that he was separated from his legal

materials during transfer between institutions from December 16,

2005 to February 6, 2006. (Doc. No. 11 at 3.) Exhibit 3 to

Petitioner’s Motion for Equitable Tolling appears to corroborate

this contention, and a lack of access to legal materials may

constitute extraordinary circumstances supporting a finding of

equitable tolling. See Espinoza-Mathews v. California, supra,

432 F.3d at 1026-1027. Accordingly, the undersigned magistrate

judge finds and recommends that Petitioner’s Motion for Equitable

Tolling of Time be granted on this point and that Petitioner is

entitled to 40 days equitable tolling (for the period December

16, 2005 to January 25, 2006 - the end of the statutory limitations period) while his legal materials were held by prison

officials at Centinela State Prison. Deeming this period equitably tolled extends the filing deadline from January 25, 2006 to

March 6, 2006.

Petitioner also contends that he was subject to institutional lock downs from February 2004 to August 2004, March 2005

to June 2005, and December 2005 to March 2006. Notably, the

statute of limitations was already statutorily tolled from August

11, 2004 to July 20, 2005, making the period March 2005 to June

2005 irrelevant for purposes of analyzing Petitioner’s motion. 

As to the first period (February 2004 to August 2004), Petitioner

submits no evidence to support that this alleged lock down

occurred (or that, even if it did, Petitioner was in any way

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precluded from completing and filing his federal Petition as a

result) other than a conclusory declaration in which he states:

That on or about February of 2004, Calipatria State

Prison facility “B,” located in Calipatria, California,

went on “Institutional Lock Down” and remained for six

(6) months. Where all Inmates are restricted to the

cell, without access to the Law Library unless there

was a Court order deadline.

(Doc. No. 11 at 2.)

Even if Petitioner’s declaration sufficiently established

that a lock down occurred between February 2004 and August 2004,

the showing is insufficient to warrant a finding of equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations for that period. Without

more, the mere denial of access to the law library does not

warrant equitable tolling.

[¶] Although it is well established that prisoners have

a constitutional right of access to the courts, the

Supreme Court has clarified its decision in Bounds v.

Smith [citation omitted], stating that access to the

law libraries is not required of prisons, but rather is

one way of assuring the constitutional right of access

to the courts. [Citation omitted.] The mere inability

of a prisoner to access the law library is not, in

itself, an unconstitutional impediment. The inmate

must show that this inability caused an actual harm, or

in other words, unconstitutionally prevented him from

exercising that fundamental right of access to the

courts in order to attack his sentence or to challenge

the conditions of his confinement.

Akins v. U.S., 204 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th Cir. 2000). “[A] prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the

but-for and proximate cause of his untimeliness.” Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798 at 800 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Marsh v.

Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000)(rejecting equitable

tolling claim because, even if temporary closure of prison

library constituted extraordinary circumstances, prisoner “has

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28 6 Minus the 40 days during which he was separated from his legal

materials prior to January 25, 2006.

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not shown how this lack of access caused his delay in filing”). 

Because Petitioner makes no showing that the alleged lock down

and lack of access to the prison law library made it impossible

for him to timely file his federal Petition, the Court should not

find equitable tolling for the period February 2004 to August

2004. Further, while Petitioner has made a showing sufficient to

establish that he was “locked down” and denied access to the

prison law library for 27 days between January 4, 2006 and

February 28, 2006 (see Doc. No. 12 at Exh. 2), that showing of

lock down status, without more, is likewise insufficient for a

finding of equitable tolling.

Even if the Court found that Petitioner had made a sufficient showing to establish all of the lock downs alleged, at most

Petitioner would have shown that he was locked down and denied

law library access from February 2004 continuing “for about six

(6) months,” or at the latest (if six months is calculated from

February 28, 2004) August 29, 2004, and for 27 days between

January 4, 2006 and February 28, 2006. In other words, after his

habeas petition was denied by the California Supreme Court on

July 20, 2005, Petitioner had more than seven (7) months6

 during

which he was not on lock down status and could have timely filed

his federal Petition. As a practical matter, by March 6, 2006

Petitioner was simply required to copy the claims he had already

raised in the California courts to a federal form and submit that

form for filing in this Court in order to have timely filed the

Petition.

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Petitioner’s conclusory contention that denial of access to

the prison law library made it impossible for him to file his

federal Petition on time is meritless. The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies precludes Petitioner from altering his

claims (legally or factually) from those presented to the state

courts. No legal research was required (or allowed) after

Petitioner’s habeas petition was denied by the California Supreme

Court on July 20, 2005. Even assuming Petitioner was required to

access the prison law library to retrieve a form or make copies

of the Petition, he had more than adequate time to do so.

Finally, Petitioner’s declaration implies that he may have

mistakenly believed that the statute of limitations began to run

in his case after the California Supreme Court denied his habeas

petition on July 20, 2005, and not on February 15, 2004, when his

conviction became final. (Doc. No. 11 at 5.) However, a Petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the statute of limitations is not an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable

tolling. See Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1054 (9th Cir.

2006).

In accordance with the foregoing, the undersigned magistrate

judge finds and recommends that Petitioner’s Motion for Equitable

Tolling of Time be GRANTED IN PART insofar as the statute of

limitations was equitably tolled for 40 days from December 16,

2005 to January 25, 2006, and that Petitioner’s Motion be DENIED

as to the remainder. Because the period of allowable equitable

tolling extended the limitations period from January 25, 2006 to

March 6, 2006, and Petitioner did not constructively file his

federal Petition until May 2, 2006, the Petition was not timely

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filed.

4. Conclusion and Recommendation.

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds and recommends that Petitioner

did not timely file his Petition under the AEDPA and that he has

not made a showing to warrant a finding of equitable tolling

sufficient to render the Petition timely filed. Therefore, the

undersigned magistrate judge hereby recommends that Petitioner’s

Motion for Equitable Tolling be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition be GRANTED, and

that judgment be entered accordingly.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Napoleon A. Jones, Jr., United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 28, 2007, any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed no later than March 9, 2007. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 31, 2007

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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