Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01695/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01695-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PORTER D. LAND,

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA SCHRIRO, ET AL., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-1695-PHX-PGR (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On July 7, 2006, Petitioner, an inmate confined by the State of Arizona, filed a

pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, pursuant to

Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (Doc. No. 1.) Named as Respondent in the

Petition is Dora Schriro. The Attorney General of the State of Arizona is named as an

additional Respondent. Respondents filed an Answer (“Answer”) to the Petition on

January 12, 2007, with exhibits A through R attached. (Doc No. 13.) No reply was

filed. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order dismissing the Petition. 

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1 Petitioner had been previously convicted of Count 3, one count of

possession or use of narcotic drugs, and found not guilty of Count 4,

misconduct involving weapons, charges which had been severed from

Counts 1 and 2 for trial. (Answer, Ex. A, at 2) Count 3 was consolidated

with the first two counts for sentencing purposes. (Answer, Ex. C) 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Conviction and Sentence

On December 13,2002, Petitioner was convicted by jury in Maricopa County

Superior Court of one count of forgery, and one count of theft of a credit card1

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(Answer, Ex. A, at 1-2) Following the jury’s conviction, the trial court found beyond

a reasonable doubt that Petitioner had been convicted of two prior felony convictions

committed in 1998. (Answer, Ex. B, at 13-14) 

Petitioner was sentenced, under the enhancement provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604,

to a mitigated term of 8 years’ imprisonment on Count 1, and to a concurrent mitigated

term of 4 years’ imprisonment on Count 2. (Answer, Ex. C, at 2) The court further

ordered Petitioner to a term of probation for Count 3, and ordered restitution in the

amount of $1,000. (Answer, Ex. C, at 3)

B. Appeal

Petitioner filed a timely appeal on September 24, 2003, raising only one issue,

that the trial court abused its discretion by not crediting recovered gift cards, purchased

with the stolen credit cards, against the total restitution award. (Answer, Ex. D)

In a memorandum decision dated February 26, 2004, the Arizona Court of

Appeals, held that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to determine the

value of the recovered items before ordering restitution. (Answer, Ex. E at 7) The

Court of Appeals vacated the matter and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary

hearing to determine the appropriate amount of restitution. (Answer, Ex. E, at 7) 

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Following an evidentiary hearing held on July 2, 2004, the trial court vacated the

restitution order. (Answer, Ex. F)

C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, and was appointed counsel on

August 9, 2004 by the trial court. (Answer, Ex. G) The trial court ordered a filing

deadline for the petition sixty days later. Petitioner moved for an extension of time to

file a pro per petition for post-conviction relief, and was granted an extension of time

to, and including December 1, 2004 to file a petition. (Answer, Ex. H) 

On December 16, 2004, the trial court noted that the deadline for filing had

passed and no petition had been filed, with no good cause appearing, and ordered the

petition dismissed. (Answer, Ex. I) 

D. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On April 26, 2005, Petitioner filed a second notice and a petition for postconviction relief. (Answer, Ex. K) Petitioner argued that there had been a significant

change in the law that would probably overturn the conviction or sentence. Petitioner

raised 3 issues: 1) That the doctrine of stare decisis should not limit the court from

applying Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) to Petitioner’s case; 2) that A.R.S.

§ 13-702(c) is unconstitutional on its face; and, 3) Petitioner was denied his

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing; 

The trial court found that Petitioner was sentenced to a mitigated prison term on

all counts, and Blakely does not apply to mitigated sentences under State v. Pena, 209

Ariz. 503 (app. 2005). Therefore, the court held, Petitioner had not shown that he was

entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(g), and dismissed Petitioner’s Notice and Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief. (Answer, Ex. L) 

On May 25, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, seeking relief from the trial court’s denial of his petition. (Answer, Ex. M)

The Court of Appeals summarily denied review on March 16, 2006. (Answer, Ex. N.)

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Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review. (Petition, Doc. No.

1, at 2) 

Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the District Court on

July 7, 2006. (Doc. No. 1) The Petition raises one ground for relief:

1. Petitioner’s sentence was enhanced in violation of the

United States Constitution 4th, 5th, 6th, 14th Amendments

for State Court’s failure to have jury find beyond a

reasonable doubt his prior felony convictions. 

(Petition, Doc. No. 1 at 5) )

Respondents filed an answer to the Petition on November 28, 2006. Petitioner

submitted a reply on January 12, 2007. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). 

B. Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1).

C. Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted the state court remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b);

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The

exhaustion inquiry focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the

petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel,

526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion generally requires that a prisoner give the state courts

an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court.

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Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim for relief so long as the petitioner has a right

under state law to raise the claim by available procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

A habeas petitioner may exhaust his claims in one of two ways. First, a claim

is exhausted when no remedy remains available to the petitioner in state court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Second, a claim is exhausted if there is an absence of available

state corrective process or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to

protect the rights of the petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have "fairly present[ed]

his claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature

of the claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995). A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the

factual or legal bases for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that

the...[petitioner is] asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513

U.S. at 365-366. See also Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001)

(same). Mere similarity between a claim raised in state court and a claim in a federal

habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. 

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts

one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete

round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.

Once a federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas

petitions, other than those concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of

Arizona state prisoners are exhausted if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona

Court of Appeals either on appeal of conviction or through a collateral proceeding

pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Swoopes v. Sublett,

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1124 (2200). 

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2 Although the Ninth Circuit recently suggested that under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2, there are exceptions to the rule that a district court can decide whether

state remedies remain available for claims that require a knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent waiver see Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 1336 (2006), this Court need

not address such waiver because it has not been affirmatively raised by

Petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2002),

cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

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In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state

court did not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or

"procedural default." A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court declined to

address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d

1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not

presented to the state court and it is clear the state would now refuse to address the

merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id. The procedural bar provides an

independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and sentence and, thus,

prevents federal habeas corpus review unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and

prejudice for failing to raise the claim in the state proceedings. Gray v. Netherland,

518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-495

(1986); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine

prevents state prisoners from obtaining federal review by allowing the time to run on

available state remedies and then rushing to federal court seeking review. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-732 (1991).

If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available.2

 See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

263 n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination often

involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

governing post-conviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1

specifies when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on

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3 Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in custody after his

sentence has expired; (2) certain circumstances where newly discovered

material facts probably exist and such facts probably would have changed

the verdict or sentence; (3) the petitioner's failure to file a timely notice of

post-conviction relief was without fault on his part; (4) there has been a

significant change in the law that would probably overturn petitioner's

conviction if applied to his case; and (5) the petitioner demonstrates by

clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b) (citing

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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federal constitutional challenges to convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief

is barred on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for postconviction relief, with the exception of certain claims3

 which were justifiably omitted

from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2.

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be

required to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that

when a petitioner fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present

his claims there. Id. In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred

and a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice for the default...the district court

dismisses the petition because the petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id.

at 1231.

D. Cause and Prejudice

A petitioner may be relieved from a procedural default on a showing of cause

and prejudice. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-87 (1977). “[T]he existence of

cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply

with the State's procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). The

following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2)

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a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3)

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. To establish prejudice, a prisoner

must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation "worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Where petitioner fails

to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice prong. To establish a

"fundamental miscarriage of justice" resulting in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence.

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

E. Standard of Review: Merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the AEDPA, the Court may grant a writ of

habeas corpus only if the state court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions

resolved by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.

denied 546 U.S. 963 (2005). Therefore, the question whether a state court erred in

applying the law is a different question from whether it erred in determining the facts.

Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 342 (2006). In conducting its review, the Court "look[s]

to the last-reasoned state-court decision." Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th

Cir. 2003) cert. denied 541 U.S. 1037 (2004).

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4 "[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as

of the time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While

circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for purposes of determining

whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999),

only the Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only

those holdings need be reasonably applied." Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069

(emphasis in original).

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Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the "contrary to" test and

the "unreasonable application" test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir.

2003). Under the first test, the state court's "decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the

controlling authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those

in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result." Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-414

(2000)). Additionally, a state court's decision is "'contrary to' Supreme Court case law

if the state court 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in' Supreme

Court cases."4

 Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002)). "Whether a state court's interpretation of federal law is contrary to Supreme

Court authority...is a question of federal law as to which [the federal courts]...owe no

deference to the state courts." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original)

(distinguishing deference owed under the "contrary to" test of section (d)(1) with that

owed under the "unreasonable application" test).

Under the second test, " '[a] state court's decision involves an unreasonable

application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle...but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'"

Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the "'unreasonable

application clause...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that

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court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly...[r]ather that

application must be objectively unreasonable.'" Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)). When evaluating whether the state decision

amounts to an unreasonable application of federal law, "[f]ederal courts owe substantial

deference to state court interpretations of federal law...." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929. 

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by

the state court, "the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the

normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is

supported by the record." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1038 (2004) ("a federal court may not

second-guess a state court's fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court

record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually

unreasonable.") Section (d)(2) "applies most readily to situations where petitioner

challenges the state court's findings based entirely on the state record. Such a challenge

may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by sufficient evidence,...that

the process employed by the state court is defective,...or that no finding was made by

the state court at all." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citations omitted). When examining the

record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court "must be particularly deferential to

our state court colleagues... [M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court's findings

of fact is insufficient; 'we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect

[in the state court's fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court's fact-finding process was adequate.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d

at 972 (quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000) (emphasis in original). Once the federal court

is satisfied that the state court's fact-finding process was reasonable, or where the

petitioner does not challenge such findings, "the state court's findings are dressed in a

presumption of correctness, which then helps steel them against any challenge based

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6 Under section 2254(e) "a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The

"AEDPA spells out what this presumption means: State-court fact-finding

may be overturned based on new evidence presented for the first time in

federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing

proof that the state-court finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption

of correctness and the clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come

into play once the state-court’s fact-findings survive any intrinsic

challenge; they do not apply to a challenge that is governed by the

deference implicit in the ‘unreasonable determination’ standard of section

2254(d)(2)." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000.

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on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal court."6

Taylor, 366 F.2d at 1000. See also 28 U.S.C. section 2254(e). 

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues

of mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions "receive similarly mixed review;

the state court's ultimate conclusion is reviewed under [section] 2254(d)(1), but its

underlying factual findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the

deferential protection ordinarily afforded factual findings under [sections] 2254(d)(2)

and (e)(1)." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978.

To assess a habeas claim under § 2254(d)(1), the Court must identify the “clearly

established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claim on habeas

review. “Clearly established” federal law includes the holdings of the Supreme Court

at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction became final. See Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has

not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by a

petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. See id. at 381. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness

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Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the habeas petition. A review of

the petition suggests that it is timely. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Petition is

timely.

B. Exhaustion

Respondents argue that because Petitioner did not present the claim he raises in

his habeas petition to the Arizona Supreme Court through the available procedure of a

petition for review from the court of appeals memorandum decision denying the petition

for review, the claim is not subject to habeas review under Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27 (2004). 

In Baldwin, which was a case appealed from the Ninth Circuit out of Oregon, the

Supreme Court addressed the question of what constituted notice of the federal nature

of a claim sufficient to satisfy the fair presentment requirement found in 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1). In laying the groundwork for its decision, the Supreme Court states that

"[t]o provide the State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present'

his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers

of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim."

541 U.S. at 29 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Peterson, the Ninth Circuit held that

"[i]n a state like Oregon, where review in the highest court is discretionary, a prisoner

must still petition the highest court for review in order to exhaust his claim properly."

319 F.3d at 1156, citing O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Respondents

seize on these general statements of the law of exhaustion and assert that they support

a finding that Swoopes, at least insofar as it addresses the need for habeas petitioners

to seek review in the highest state court, is no longer valid. However, an examination

of the rationale employed in the Swoopes decision readily distinguishes that case from

the general statements of law cited by the Respondents.

Swoopes was decided on remand to the Ninth Circuit for consideration in light

of the Supreme Court's decision in the O'Sullivan case. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

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1008 (9th Cir. 1999) In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit, just like the Baldwin and Peterson

courts did, began by reiterating the general rule stated in O'Sullivan that, "in order to

satisfy the exhaustion requirement for federal habeas relief, state prisoners must file for

discretionary review in a state supreme court when that review is part of ordinary

appellate review." Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009, citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at . The

court recognized, however, that the Supreme Court in O'Sullivan had "acknowledged

an exception to the exhaustion requirement," by making it clear the "'the creation of a

discretionary review system does not, without more, make review' in a state supreme

court 'unavailable.'" Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009, quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at

(emphasis added in Swoopes). The Ninth Circuit proceeded to review Arizona's

discretionary review system and found considerations that compelled a finding that, in

other than capital cases, appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court was unnecessary.

Specifically, the court found that two Arizona cases, State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582,

684 P.2d 154 (1984), and State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), made

it clear that, "in cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, review need not

be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies."

Swoopes, 196 Ariz. at 1010. Thus, the court concluded, "post-conviction review before

the Arizona Supreme Court is a remedy that is 'unavailable' within the meaning of

O'Sullivan. There is nothing in either Baldwin or Peterson that suggests, implicitly or

explicitly, that this analysis is flawed or that holding has been overruled. 

Also strongly suggestive of the continued vitality of Swoopes is that the Ninth

Circuit continues to cite the case for the very proposition Respondents suggest was

overruled. In Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2005), the court stated as a

matter of fact that "[i]n cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 'claims

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.'" Id. at 998 n. 3, quoting Swoopes, 196

Ariz. at 1010. At least one other circuit has also cited Swoopes for this proposition

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without questioning its continuing validity. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210

(3rd Cir. 2004). These considerations make clear that Respondents' argument that the

reliability of the holding in Swoopes is questionable is incorrect. The Magistrate Judge

finds that the Petitioner properly exhausted the claim.

C. Merits

Petitioner argues that his sentence, enhanced after a bench trial to determine that

he had two prior convictions, was imposed in violation of the federal constitution.

Petitioner argues that, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the

Supreme Court drew an exception to the Apprendi line of cases for judicial factfinding

that concerns a defendant’s prior convictions, and despite the fact that AlmendarezTorres has been eroded by the Supreme Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment

jurisprudence, “a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was

wrongly decided.” (Petition, Doc. No. 1, at 7-8)(citing Shepard v. United States, 125

S.Ct. 1254, 1264 (2005). 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim does not warrant habeas relief because

the state courts’ findings were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the holdings of the United States

Supreme Court.

Respondents are correct. Although recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has

perhaps called into question the continuing viability of Almendarez-Torres, see, e.g.,

Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1263-64 (Thomas, J., concurring), the lower courts are bound to

follow a controlling Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly overruled by that

Court. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 258 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917,

104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,

yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of

Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the

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prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”); United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234

F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir.2000) (“Unless and until Almendarez-Torres is overruled by the

Supreme Court, we must follow it.”).

In Almandarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998), the United States

Supreme Court explicitly held that the fact of prior convictions may be found by a

judge, even if it increases the statutory maximum sentence. 

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States Supreme

Court exempted prior convictions from the requirement that any fact which increases

the penalty for a crime beyond the legislatively-prescribed “statutory maximum” must

be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490. Likewise,

in Blakely, the Almendarez-Torres prior conviction exception was explicitly preserved.

See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, dismiss this action in its entirety. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with

a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the

following case number: CIV 06-1695-PHX-PGR.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2008.

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