Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06121/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06121-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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28 The “sphere of influence” is the physical boundary that a local government agency is expected to serve. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE COMMITTEE CONCERNING )

COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT, et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiffs )

)

v. )

)

CITY OF MODESTO, et al., )

)

)

)

Defendants. )

 )

1:04cv6121 AWI DLB

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Document 160) 

Plaintiffs Committee Concerning Community Improvement, et al., (“Plaintiffs”) filed the

instant Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint on October 27, 2006. The matter

was heard on December 15, 2006, before the Honorable Dennis L. Beck, United States

Magistrate Judge. Brian P. Bosnahan and Robert Rubin appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. John E.

McDermott appeared on behalf of Defendant City of Modesto. Terence Cassidy appeared on

behalf of Defendants County of Stanislaus and Stanislaus County Sheriff.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this action live in four predominantly Latino neighborhoods (“Plaintiff

Neighborhoods”). Plaintiff Neighborhoods are in the unincorporated area of Defendant

Stanislaus County (“County”) and within in the “Sphere of Influence” of Defendant City of 1

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Modesto (“City”) (collectively “Defendants”). The Plaintiff neighborhoods are surrounded by

the City but are not part of the incorporated City. Plaintiffs allege that the Plaintiff

Neighborhoods do not receive the same level of municipal services as the surrounding

predominantly White neighborhoods. 

Plaintiffs filed this action on August 8, 2004, alleging the following causes of action: (1)

violation of the Fair Housing Act, section 3604(b), based on discrimination in the provision of

services and facilities in connection with Plaintiffs’ housing; (2) denial of equal protection based

on Defendants’ (a) implementation of the annexation scheme; and (b) denial of services that are

available to others in the City and County in a way that intentionally discriminates against

Plaintiffs on the basis of race; (3) violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d based on the City and County’s use of federal funds in providing services in a

discriminatory manner; (4) violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act based

on Defendants’ use of public practices; (5) violation of California Government Code section

11135 based on Defendants’ use of State funds in providing services in a discriminatory manner;

and (6) common law and statutory nuisance based on interference with Plaintiffs’ use and

enjoyment of their land. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss portions of the complaint. On December 30, 2004,

the Honorable Robert E. Coyle issued an order (1) dismissing the Fair Housing Act claim

because the Act did not pertain to claims regarding the provision of services to existing

homeowners and renters, but instead applied only to persons actually obstructed or impeded from

obtaining housing; (2) dismissing all individually-named Defendants; and (3) dismissing any

claims regarding annexation because (a) the City does not approve or disapprove annexations;

and (b) Plaintiffs have no claim against the City for failing to seek annexation because they never

made any application for annexation except in one instance beyond the statute of limitations. 

Judge Coyle also acknowledged Plaintiffs’ concession that the City was not required to provide

municipal services to unincorporated areas and instructed Plaintiffs to remove any such

allegations.

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On April 6, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The City

moved to strike because the FAC was inconsistent with Judge Coyle’s ruling. By stipulation,

Plaintiffs withdrew the FAC and filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on May 24, 2005. 

The SAC does not contain a Fair Housing Act claim, a discriminatory annexation claim,

or a claim that the City is obligated to provide the same services to unincorporated areas that it

provides to incorporated areas. Plaintiffs’ remaining claims were framed as discrimination in the

provision of voluntary municipal services in White unincorporated areas compared to Latino

unincorporated areas. 

County Defendants answered the SAC on June 6, 2005. The City answered on June 7,

2005.

On August 22, 2005, the City moved for summary judgment. In September, the City

withdrew the motion to allow Plaintiffs to conduct discovery.

The parties subsequently entered into an Agreement (“the Agreement”) on August 31,

2005, limiting Plaintiffs’ case to three services voluntarily provided to unincorporated areassewers, police service and bilingual assistance in police service. Exhibit I, attached to

Declaration of John E. McDermott in Support of Opposition. 

On May 23, 2006, the parties entered into a stipulation to extend deadlines. Discovery

closed on October 16, 2006. The non-dispositive motion deadline was November 3, 2006. The

expert discovery cut-off was December 18, 2006. The dispositive motion deadline is January 12,

2006. Trial is currently set for May 8, 2007.

On August 17, 2006, the City filed a motion for summary judgment to eliminate

Plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination in police service and bilingual assistance in police service. 

The hearing was continued numerous times and on November 2, 2006, the Honorable Anthony

W. Ishii vacated the hearing pending the outcome of the instant motion.

Plaintiffs filed this Motion For Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) on

October 27, 2006. According to Plaintiffs, this motion seeks:

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 Measure M, passed by voters in 1997, requires the City to hold an advisory vote prior to extending sewer 2

services to unincorporated areas. Plaintiffs allege that the City implements the measure in a discriminatory manner,

resulting in few Latino unincorporated neighborhoods getting Measure M votes. 

 The Master Tax Sharing Agreement governs how property tax revenues are shared between the City and 3

County once land passes from the County to the City through annexation. It theoretically encourages annexations

because the tax sharing issue is worked out in advance. Plaintiffs allege that most of the Plaintiff Neighborhoods are

excluded from the scope of the Agreement and therefore face an additional barrier to annexation.

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1. To delete the names of five Plaintiffs who have withdrawn and to clarify that 

Plaintiffs do not seek an award of attorneys’ fees incurred by California Rural

Legal Services;

2. To clarify and make more precise allegations concerning Defendants’ failure to 

provide municipal services in a non-discriminatory manner, including through the

addition of details concerning the City’s implementation of its “Measure M”2

policy, the City and County’s failure to provide infrastructure in the Plaintiff

Neighborhoods, and the role played by the exclusion of the Plaintiff

Neighborhoods from the “Master Tax Sharing Agreement” entered into by the 3

City and County;

3. Make explicit their claim that City and County are jointly liable with respect to

discrimination concerning law enforcement services and bilingual services

relating thereto, based on the Joint Powers Agreement;

4. Make explicit their theory that City and County are jointly liable with respect to

all causes of action based upon their deep entwinement and interdependence; and

5. To add a new claim for perpetual segregation under the Fair Housing Act

(“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

The City and County Defendants filed oppositions on November 28, 2006. Plaintiffs

filed their reply on December 8, 2006. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” The United States Supreme Court has stated:

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[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason – such as undue delay, bad faith or 

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. – the leave sought should, as the

rules require, be “freely given.”

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Ninth Circuit has summarized these factors to

include the following: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) prejudice to the opponent; and (4)

futility of amendment. Loehr v. Ventura County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1319 (9th Cir.

1984). Granting or denial of leave to amend rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Swanson v. United States Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). Despite the policy

favoring amendment under Rule 15, leave to amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is

futile or would be subject to dismissal. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991).

ANALYSIS

A. Deletion of Plaintiffs and Clarification of Award

Defendants do not oppose this request. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend to delete certain

Plaintiffs and clarify the award is therefore GRANTED.

B. Clarification of Allegations Concerning Defendants’ Failure to Provide Municipal

Services in a Non-discriminatory Manner

Plaintiffs next request to amend the SAC to clarify its allegations concerning Defendants’

failure to provide municipal services in a non-discriminatory manner. In doing so, Plaintiffs

wish to add details concerning the City’s implementation of its Measure M policy, the City and

County’s failure to provide infrastructure in the Plaintiff Neighborhoods, and the role played by

the exclusion of the Plaintiff Neighborhoods from the “Master Tax Sharing Agreement”

(“MTSA”) entered into by the City and County. 

Plaintiffs argue that these amendments will not materially alter the nature of the claims

and are made simply to conform the SAC to the evidence. Plaintiffs argue that “recent

investigation has brought to light new facts . . . further clarifying the salient facts regarding the

City’s implementation of its ‘Measure M’ policy, the nature and importance of the ‘Master Tax

Sharing Agreement’ and its predecessor agreement, the City and County’s disparate failure to

provide infrastructure . . .” Motion, at 3-4. As examples, Plaintiffs point to (1) the October 9,

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2006, deposition testimony of County CEO Reagan Wilson, who testified that the City excluded

“previously established” neighborhoods from the MTSA because of infrastructure demands; (2)

the September 27, 2006, deposition testimony of County Supervisor Thomas Mayfield, who

testified that the Keyes storm drain project was $17 million instead of $7.5 million as represented

in produced documents; and (3) that they learned in early October 2006 that the reason the

property tax negotiation concerning the Bret Harte annexation failed is because the City insisted

that it receive 100% of property taxes after annexation, while the County would only offer 50%. 

Plaintiffs further contend that Defendants will not need to pursue further discovery or analysis

because the new factual allegations are based on Plaintiffs’ review of documents in Defendants’

custody and depositions of Defendants’ witnesses. 

Defendants oppose this amendment mainly on the basis of delay, contending that

Plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of the facts underlying these amendments

long ago. In evaluating undue delay, the court must inquire “whether the moving party knew or

should have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading.”

Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (eight month delay from time of

obtaining facts until filing amended complaint unreasonable). Delay is especially relevant when

no reason is given for the delay and the facts were available to plaintiff to allow for a timely

amendment. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir.

1999).

Defendants argument regarding delay assumes that these clarifying amendments seek to

add new facts. However, facts surrounding Measure M, the MTSA and the alleged failure to

provide infrastructure cannot be characterized as new facts. The parties have been aware of these

issues for some time. Indeed, the SAC contains detailed information about Measure M. SAC, ¶

38. Plaintiffs’ amendments simply seek to expand upon facts already known to the parties. 

Plaintiffs’ motion to amend to add facts regarding Measure M, the MTSA and the alleged

failure to provide infrastructure is therefore GRANTED. However, as explained in detail below,

these amendments SHALL NOT be made in connection with Plaintiffs’ assertion of a joint

liability theory or perpetual segregation claim.

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Insofar as Defendants argue that any claims involving services in incorporated territory

should not be allowed (i.e., TAC ¶ 1, 2, 4, 48), such a determination cannot be made at this stage

of the litigation. The Court acknowledges Judge Coyle’s prior ruling and the parties’ stipulation

to withdraw the FAC. However, this inquiry depends on the focus of Plaintiffs’ equal protection

claim- whether it involves Latino unincorporated areas vs. White unincorporated areas, or Latino

unincorporated areas vs. all White areas. This is a determination that should not be made at the

pleading stage, but rather should be made on legal motions or at trial, when the Court can

determine the appropriate comparisons for the equal protection analysis. 

C. Adding Facts to Make Explicit Plaintiffs’ Theory that the City and County are Jointly

Liable with Respect to Discrimination Concerning Law Enforcement Services and

Bilingual Services Relating Thereto

Plaintiffs base this “clarification” on the Joint Powers Agreement between the City and

County, and argue that this theory has been asserted in connection with Defendants’ pending

summary judgment motion and in interrogatory responses served nearly a year ago.

Again, Defendants oppose this amendment based on Plaintiffs’ delay. The City argues

that Plaintiffs give no excuse for delaying in seeking to amend to add a claim disclosed in

discovery a year ago. The City characterizes this as a purposeful delay designed to make it

difficult to move for summary judgment and argues that this claim should be denied entirely. 

Plaintiffs’ own admissions make it apparent that they could have raised this claim long

ago. In arguing in support of this amendment, Plaintiffs state that Defendants were aware of the

new factual allegation, i.e., they have known about the Joint Powers Agreement theory of joint

liability since November 2005, when Plaintiffs disclosed it in discovery. Although Plaintiffs

argue that recent investigation has revealed new facts to support their joint liability theory, the

fact remains that Plaintiffs were aware of the general facts supporting this amendment and could

have made the amendment long ago. Plaintiffs’ request is therefore DENIED.

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D. Adding Facts to Make Explicit Plaintiffs’ Theory that the City and Council are Jointly

Liable with Respect to ALL Causes of Action Based Upon Their Entwinement 

By this amendment, Plaintiffs seek to add allegations to support their theory that the City

and County are jointly liable with respect to all causes of action based on their deep entwinement

and interdependence.

Plaintiffs explain that their theory is a “novel but important one” based on a complex set

of facts, the scope and meaning of which was not readily apparent. Plaintiffs contend that many

of the facts were discovered in the past few months. Plaintiffs further contend that this theory

has been a subject of discussion with the City and a topic of discovery with both Defendants.

In support of their amendment, Plaintiffs argue that this theory of joint liability is

warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension of the principles

applied in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., et al., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) and Brentwood

Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn., 531 U.S. 288 (2001).

In Burton, the Supreme Court found that the discriminatory actions of a private restaurant

could be attributed to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The private

restaurant was under lease in a building financed by public funds and owned by the State parking

authority. The Court based its decision on the fact that the relationship conferred mutual benefit,

that upkeep of the building was the responsibility of the State parking authority, and the fact that

profits earned by the discrimination of the private entity contributed to the financial success of a

government agency. The Court explained that “[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a

position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the

challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so ‘purely private’

as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. The Court

cautioned, however, that this finding was very fact specific and that the conclusion will not be

true of all state leasing relationships. “[I]t must be remembered [that whether a government lease

falls within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment] can be determined only in the framework of

the peculiar facts or circumstances present.” Id. at 726.

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Brentwood involved a similar analysis. There, the Supreme Court determined that

regulatory enforcement actions of an interscholastic athletic association, a nominally private and

non-profit corporation, were considered state action. This finding was based on numerous

factors: the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in the association’s

composition and workings; public schools constituted 84% of its membership; half of council

and board meetings were held during official school hours; public schools provided for the 

association’s financial support by giving up sources of their own income; members of the state

board of education served as members of the association’s governing boards; and the

association’s ministerial employees were eligible for membership in state retirement system. 

Brentwood, 531 U.S. 298-300.

Burton and Brentwood therefore stand for the proposition that private action can be found

to be that of the state in certain factual situations where the acts of the two are difficult to

distinguish. In other words, the holdings make action that would have otherwise been outside the

scope of Fourteenth Amendment into covered state action based on the entwinement of the

entities. The cases do not, as Plaintiffs argue, suggest that two state actors, as joint participants

in public action, could somehow be found jointly and severally liable for their actions. The case

before this Court involves two independent governmental entities whose actions will not confer

joint and several liability unless the actions of each are found to be discriminatory. The Court

need not undertake an analysis of the City and County’s entwinement to determine if private

action constitutes state action, as in Burton and Brentwood, both entities are already within the

purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burton and Brentwood are therefore inapplicable to the

instant case and do not support Plaintiffs’ argument for an extension of the principles set forth

therein. 

It is also likely that Plaintiffs could have made this amendment long ago. The

relationship between the City and County has been apparent (1) from discovery for some time;

and (2) from the common knowledge of the interactions between a city and the county within

which it sits. 

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Plaintiffs’ request to amend the SAC to allege joint and several liability as to all causes of

action is therefore DENIED.

E. Adding a New Claim for Perpetual Segregation

Finally, Plaintiffs request to amend the complaint to add a new claim for perpetual

segregation under FHA section 3406(a). Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or

rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or

otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,

sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). This claim is based on actions of

the City and County that allegedly perpetuate segregation by increasing the concentration of

Latinos in Latino Unincorporated Neighborhoods. They also allege that average home values are

lower and septic systems are more likely to fail, which further decreases property values and

decreases the chances of obtaining a mortgage. This, combined with the lower income, results in

a situation where Latinos are disparately pushed into the Plaintiff Neighborhoods. (TAC, ¶ 75).

First and foremost, Plaintiffs’ claim is not supported by case law. Insofar as Plaintiffs

characterize this as a “free-standing” claim for perpetuation of segregation that does not need to

be made in connection with any particular dwelling, their argument fails. 

Plaintiffs rely mainly on Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of

Arlington Heights: 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) and Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of

Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988). In these cases, the courts analyzed zoning decisions

under section 3406(a). In Arlington Heights, the court noted that the village’s refusal to permit

construction of a low-income housing project, which would have to be racially integrated in

order to qualify for federal subsidization, had a discriminatory effect in that it perpetuated

segregation in the village. The court held that “if there is no land other than plaintiffs’ property

within Arlington Heights which is both properly zoned and suitable for federally subsidized

low-cost housing, the Village’s refusal to rezone constituted a violation of section 3604(a).” In

making this determination, however, the court nonetheless used the “inquiry to whether the

refusal to rezone made unavailable or denied a dwelling to any person because of race within the

meaning of section 3604(a).” Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288.

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In Huntington, the court was called upon to decide whether an overwhelmingly White

suburb’s zoning regulation, which restricted private multi-family housing projects to a largely

minority “urban renewal area,” and the Town Board’s refusal to amend that ordinance to allow

construction of subsidized housing in a White neighborhood, violated the FHA. Using a

disparate impact analysis, the court concluded that the “strong showing of discriminatory effect

resulting from the Town’s adherence to its [] zoning category and its refusal to rezone . . . far

outweigh the Town’s weak justifications.” Huntington, 844 F.2d at 940-941. The court held that

the Town violated the FHA by refusing to amend the zoning ordinance to permit private

developers to build multi-family dwellings outside the urban renewal area and by refusing to

rezone the site. Id. at 940-941.

Plaintiffs compare Measure M and the MTSA to the zoning decisions at issue in

Arlington Heights and Huntington. Just as the ordinances in those cases kept minorities out of

cities, Plaintiffs contend that Measure M and the MTSA effectively keeps Latinos out of the City

of Modesto. While this may be a welcomed comparison, Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the

parameters of the law underlying the holdings of the cited cases. 

Section 3406(a), like section 3406(b), makes it unlawful to “make unavailable or deny, a

dwelling” for reasons such as race. 42 U.S.C. § 3406. As such, it is directed at the unavailability

and denial of housing to buyers, rather than the impact of habitability or value of already

acquired property. In his order granting the motion to dismiss, Judge Coyle found the reasoning

in Cox v. City of Dallas 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005) persuasive in dismissing the section

3604(b) claim. This Court also finds Cox persuasive in determining the reach of section 3604(a).

In Cox, the plaintiffs alleged that the city of Dallas violated section 3604(a) when it failed

to prevent dumping at a site near their homes. The issue was whether the failures and omissions

by the City violated the FHA by “otherwise mak[ing] unavailable or deny[ing]” a dwelling to any

person because of race.” Plaintiffs argued that the City violated section 3604(a) because the

dump made it more difficult for them to sell their homes and lowered the value of their homes. 

The court recognized that the claim had factual support, but that it was not a claim of

“unavailability” or “den[ial]” of housing under a proper reading of the FHA. Cox, 430 F.3d at

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740. The Fifth Circuit explained that “the failure of the City to police the Deepwood landfill

may have harmed the housing market, decreased home values, or adversely impacted

homeowners’ ‘intangible interests,’ but such results do not make dwellings ‘unavailable’ within

the meaning of the Act.” Id. “We hold only that § 3604(a) gives no right of action to current

owners claiming that the value or ‘habitability’ of their property has decreased due to

discrimination in the delivery of protective city services.” Id.

Applying Cox to the instant case, Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment is futile. Section

3604(a) does not protect Plaintiffs against a decrease in the value of their homes because it does

not make the dwellings unavailable to them. As Judge Coyle found, Plaintiffs already own their 

homes. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, a perpetual segregation claim does not do away with

the requirement that Plaintiffs be denied housing. In both Arlington Heights and Huntington, the

courts analyzed the facts within the framework of a denial of housing even though the cases

involved the perpetuation of segregation through zoning decisions. In other words, the

segregation resulted from the denial of housing. Here, the alleged segregation is a result of the

allegedly discriminatory annexation decisions, not from a denial of housing. 

Defendants argue, and this Court agrees, that this amendment is an attempt to resurrect

their annexation claim and their claim to all services for unincorporated areas that the City

provides to incorporated areas. Although Plaintiffs argue that this new claim is distinguishable

because it is based on a broader series of actions and policies, i.e., Measure M and the MTSA,

the core of the argument revolves around the fact that Defendants have not annexed the Plaintiff

Neighborhoods. 

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to restate an annexation argument

and seek relief relating to services other than the three covered by the Agreement, their attempt is

contrary to the parties’ stipulation and Agreement in which Plaintiffs admitted that the City has

no duty to provide services to a non-annexed area. By attempting to return to the issue that the

failure to annex the Plaintiff neighborhoods caused the alleged harm, Plaintiffs are unfairly

attempting to resurrect an issue that Defendants believed to be put to rest. Indeed, Defendants

refused discovery on services not covered by the Agreement. 

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Finally, although Plaintiffs contend that this claim is based upon the same set of facts as

the other claims and therefore would not require new discovery, this new claim would likely

require a significant amount of new discovery. Defendants state that there have been 39

annexations since 1984. The parties would likely have to undertake discovery on facts relating to

segregation and the valuation of houses as a result of each annexation. Additional experts would

certainly be needed. This amendment would also likely result in a new round of motion practice,

which would be quite prejudicial given that Defendants have already briefed summary judgment.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request to amend the complaint to add a cause of action for

perpetual segregation is DENIED.

F. Prejudice

As to each of the proposed amendments Plaintiffs maintain that little, if any, new

discovery would be necessary. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that significant new

discovery in the form of interrogatories on the new claims, depositions and new and different

analyses by experts would be necessary. The Court agrees that significant additional discovery

and analyses by experts would be necessary if Plaintiffs’ motion were granted. It is also apparent

that existing deadlines, including the trial date, would have to be extended many months. Finally

it appears form the timing of this motion that it is indeed an effort to moot the pending motion

for summary judgement. In Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing this motion is this prejudice requires the

Court to deny the motions to amend. 

ORDER

For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint

is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs SHALL file a Third Amended

Complaint in compliance with this order within ten (10) days of the date of service of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 27, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06121-LJO -DLB Document 177 Filed 12/29/06 Page 13 of 13