Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04709/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04709-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

---

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 14-4709

________________

ERIC INSELBERG, 

 Appellant

v.

NEW YORK FOOTBALL GIANTS, INC.; JOHN K. MARA; WILLIAM J. HELLER;

CHRISTINE PROCOPS; EDWARD WAGNER, JR.; JOSEPH SKIBA;

EDWARD SKIBA; ELI MANNING; BARRY BARONE; PARK CLEANERS

INC.; JOHN DOES A-Z

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01317) 

District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini

________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 14, 2016

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Filed: October 6, 2016)

________________

OPINION**

________________

 

 Judge McKee was Chief Judge at the time this appeal was submitted. Judge McKee 

completed his term as Chief Judge on September 30, 2016. 

** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 14-4709 Document: 003112428195 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/06/2016
2

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

Eric Inselberg appeals an order denying his application for attorney’s fees 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). We will affirm.

I.

Inselberg filed a complaint in New Jersey state court on January 29, 2014 against 

the New York Giants and several of their employees. He alleged the Giants falsely 

implicated him in a fraudulent memorabilia scheme, and failed to compensate him when 

they used marketing ideas built upon patented technology owned by Inselberg’s 

company. The current dispute focuses on the latter of those two allegations.

Specifically, Inselberg pled an unjust enrichment claim, alleging “[t]he Giants 

misappropriation of Inselberg’s wireless patent and marketing concepts and integration of 

them into the Giants’ wireless platforms . . . conferred financial benefit upon Defendants” 

for which they “failed to compensate Inselberg . . . resulting in Defendants’ unjust 

enrichment at Inselberg’s expense.” App. 74a-75a. In addition, Inselberg pled a 

misappropriation claim, alleging the Giants failed to “appropriately credit Inselberg for 

the use of Inselberg’s patented wireless marketing concepts and integration of them into 

the Giants’ wireless platforms.” App. 76a. He further alleged the Giants “[f]alsely 

designat[ed] the origin of Inselberg’s patented wireless marketing concepts . . . ,” which 

he claimed were “novel and worthy of protection on grounds that said concepts are both 

innovative and original.” App. 76a.

The Giants attempted to remove the complaint to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 

1441. They argued Inselberg’s unjust enrichment and misappropriation claims were, in 

Case: 14-4709 Document: 003112428195 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/06/2016
3

reality, patent infringement claims. In addition, they argued that even if Inselberg’s 

claims were not patent infringement claims, they would require resolution of a substantial 

and actually disputed question of patent law, making the claims removable under Grable 

& Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 

(2005). Finally, they sought to remove the remaining state law claims, requesting the

District Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. Inselberg filed a motion 

to remand, arguing his claims were not for patent infringement, and thus there was no 

basis for removal.

The District Court referred the dispute to U.S. Magistrate Judge Mark Falk, who 

issued a Report & Recommendation siding with the Giants. Judge Falk concluded that, 

“[i]f not expressly pleaded, patent infringement is certainly the essence of [Inselberg’s] 

claims,” reasoning that “‘[a]rtfully’ omitting words like ‘infringement’ and substituting a 

synonym like ‘misappropriate’ does not change the nature of the claim.” App. 443a. 

Because Inselberg’s complaint alleged patent infringement, Judge Falk further concluded 

that “the complete preemption doctrine sweeps these claims into federal court,” and 

recommended that Inselberg’s motion to remand be denied. App. 443a-444a.

The District Court did not adopt the Report & Recommendation, holding instead 

that the unjust enrichment and misappropriation claims were not claims for patent 

infringement. Relying on Wawryzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., 728 F.3d 1374 (Fed Cir. 2013), 

the Court concluded the “well-pleaded complaint rule applies with full force in the patent 

context.” Inselberg v. New York Football Giants, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01317, 2014 WL 

5814268, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2014). Because the claims were not patent infringement 

Case: 14-4709 Document: 003112428195 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/06/2016
4

claims on their face, and because they were sufficiently dissimilar from patent 

infringement claims, the Court held the claims were properly brought under state law. In 

addition, the Court held that “an interpretation of a disputed issue of federal patent law is 

not a necessary element of Plaintiff’s state law claims,” and thus there was no federal 

jurisdiction under Grable. Id. at *5.

Although the District Court granted Inselberg’s motion to remand, it denied his 

request for attorney’s fees and costs associated with the motion. Reasoning that “the 

distinctions between the jurisprudence governing removal of cases such as this are 

significantly fine,” the Court determined that the Giants had an objectively reasonable 

basis to seek removal. Id. Inselberg now appeals the denial of his application for fees.

II.1

We review a denial of attorney’s fees under section 1447(c) for abuse of 

discretion. Roxbury Condo. Ass’n, 316 F.3d at 226. The Supreme Court has held that, 

“[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only 

where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).

The underlying dispute in this case concerns two complex areas of federal 

jurisdiction law. The first is the complete preemption doctrine, which is sometimes 

referred to as the “artful pleading” doctrine. See Goepel v. Nat’l Postal Mail Handlers, 

36 F.3d 306, 310 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994). “Under this so-called ‘complete preemption 

 

1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to hear Inselberg’s appeal of the denial of 

attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Roxbury Condo. Ass’n v. Anthony S. Cupo 

Agency, 316 F.3d 224, 226 (3d Cir. 2003).

Case: 14-4709 Document: 003112428195 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/06/2016
5

doctrine,’ a plaintiff's ‘state cause of action [may be recast] as a federal claim for relief, 

making [its] removal [by the defendant] proper on the basis of federal question 

jurisdiction.’” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). In this case, the 

complete preemption doctrine would have us decide whether Inselberg’s state law claims 

for unjust enrichment and misappropriation are simply patent infringement claims in 

disguise.

The other complex area of jurisdiction law raised by this case is typically referred 

to as Grable jurisdiction. This doctrine holds that “federal jurisdiction over a state law 

claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) 

substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federalstate balance approved by Congress.” Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013). As 

the Supreme Court recently noted, this doctrine has not been a model of clarity. Id. (“In 

outlining the contours of this slim category, we do not paint on a blank canvas. 

Unfortunately, the canvas looks like one that Jackson Pollock got to first.”). In this case, 

the doctrine would ask whether it is necessary to decide a disputed issue of patent law in 

order to decide the case.

Fortunately, we do not, and indeed cannot, decide these complicated jurisdictional 

questions today. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (“An order remanding a case to the State court 

from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .”). Instead, we 

need only decide whether the Giants had an objectively reasonable basis for seeking 

removal. Given the difficult nature of the jurisdictional issues involved, we conclude 

they did. Reasonable minds can differ as to whether federal jurisdiction was proper in 

Case: 14-4709 Document: 003112428195 Page: 5 Date Filed: 10/06/2016
6

this case, as evidenced by the fact that the Magistrate Judge and District Court came to 

different conclusions. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the District Court 

abused its discretion when it determined the Giants had an objectively reasonable basis to 

seek removal.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Case: 14-4709 Document: 003112428195 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/06/2016