Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02828/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02828-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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United SFor thtates District e Northern District of CaCourt lifornia

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SELF-INSUREDS’ SECURITY FUND,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC.

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-02828 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR

HEARING

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON JANUARY 26, 2007, AT 9:00 A.M.:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on legal authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and

opposing counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies

available at the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to

submit the citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. Cf. N.D.

Civil Local Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain

their reliance on such authority.

The Court tentatively GRANTS Defendant’s motion.

The parties each shall have fifteen (15) minutes to address the following questions:

Case 3:06-cv-02828-JSW Document 29 Filed 01/24/07 Page 1 of 3
United SFor thtates District e Northern District of CaCourt lifornia

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1. a. Does Defendant concede that Plaintiff has plead facts to show that it has

been injured in fact by the alleged conduct regarding HomeBase? 

b. If so, why are those facts not sufficient to establish the standing

requirements under Section 17200, i.e. why is the question of whether

Plaintiff ultimately will be entitled to the remedy it seeks not better

addressed on summary judgment?

c. The Court notes Plaintiff’s reliance on Isuzu Motors, Ltd. v. Consumers

Union of United States, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (C.D. Cal. 1998), and that

court’s conclusion that the question of whether the plaintiff had an

adequate remedy at law was best addressed on summary judgment. Id. at

1049 n.5. That case arguably involved conduct that could have affected

the plaintiff’s good will and reputation. In this case, damages do seem to

be an adequate remedy with respect to plaintiff’s allegations. Thus, what

facts set forth in the Amended Complaint pertain to Plaintiff’s claim that

the alleged injury is irreparable, and what additional facts, if any, could

Plaintiff alleged to show that the alleged injury is irreparable? 

2. On whose behalf is Plaintiff seeking injunctive relief, i.e. is it Plaintiff’s

contention that it is seeking injunctive relief on behalf of the general public and,

therefore, it need not allege that it would suffer irreparable injury?

a. If it is Plaintiff’s contention that it is acting on behalf of the general

public, why does Plaintiff’s subrogation argument not undermine the

assertion that the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint would support

a finding that the public is irreparably harmed by Defendant’s alleged

conduct?

3. Plaintiff contends that there are no procedures for the DIR to review the conduct

of TPAs, but Defendant points to the DIR website, which shows that TPAs,

including Defendant, have been audited on a regular basis. 

a. Given that it appears the DIR does regulate and/or monitor the conduct of

TPAs, why could the alleged future harm to Plaintiff not be remedied by

the revocation of Defendant’s certificate to administer on the grounds set

forth in Cal. Labor Code §§ 3702(a)(4) or 3702(a)(5)? 

b. What is Plaintiff’s best argument that the Court would not be required to

adjudicate matters within the particular expertise of the DIR, such that the

Court should not exercise its discretion to stay the 17200 claim, pending a

referral of the dispute to the DIR? See, e.g., South Bay Creditors’ Trust

v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 69 Cal. App. 4 1068, 1081 (1999) th

(noting that court erred in dismissing then referring matter to New Motor

Vehicle Board and suggesting that proper procedure would have been to

stay action pending referral). Is there a procedure by which this Court can

refer this aspect of the dispute to the DIR?

c. Conversely, given that Defendant does not move to dismiss the remaining

causes of action, what is Defendant’s best argument that the Court needs

the expertise of the DIR to resolve the dispute in this matter?

d. Would Plaintiff admit that 8 Cal. Regs. § 15210.1(d), which permits the

Manager of the DIR to require employers to post additional security

deposit upon inter alia a finding of “a pattern of understated liabilities in

Case 3:06-cv-02828-JSW Document 29 Filed 01/24/07 Page 2 of 3
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claim files,” could address Defendant’s alleged pattern and practice in

this case? If not, on what basis would it support its position?

4. Are there any other issues the parties which to address?

Dated: January 24, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-02828-JSW Document 29 Filed 01/24/07 Page 3 of 3