Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02432/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02432-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ernest Lee Coleman, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02432-PHX-PGR (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Ernest Lee Coleman has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

On April 18, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced after a jury trial. Petitioner’s AEDPA 

clock ran from August 10, 2010 (the date the judgment became final after direct appeal) 

to March 11, 2011 (the date of Petitioner’s first PCR notice), which was 213 days. The 

clock was tolled from March 11, 2011 to February 14, 2012 (the date the trial court 

dismissed Petitioner’s PCR notice because Petitioner never filed a petition). The instant 

Petition was due 152 days later (July 15, 2012), but it was not filed until November 3, 

2014. Because there are no grounds for equitable tolling, the Court concludes that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition 

be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 1 of 10
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. BACKGROUND

a. Facts of the Crimes 

In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarized the facts as follows: 

 On April 12, 2006, Coleman approached an 

undercover officer and asked if he would like to buy a “G- Ride,” also known as a stolen vehicle. The officer expressed 

interest, and an exchange was arranged. At the appointed time and place, Coleman directed the officer toward a 1993 Nissan 

Sentra that had been reported stolen two days before. Coleman showed the officer how to use a screwdriver to 

manipulate the lock in the cracked steering wheel column in order to start the car. Coleman accepted $300 from the officer 

in exchange for the car. A police undercover team videotaped the entire transaction. 

 On April 20, the same undercover officer arranged a 

meeting to buy another vehicle. Coleman was present at the meeting and declared his desire to be the middleman. A Ford 

Escort was produced; it too had been reported stolen. The 

officer gave Coleman $200; he also gave the other person $100 in exchange for the car. This transaction also was 

videotaped by an undercover team. 

 (Doc. 8-1, Ex. A, at 3.) 

b. Charges, Convictions, and Sentencing of Petitioner 

 Coleman was indicted and arraigned on December 11, 2006, on two counts of 

trafficking in stolen property in the second degree. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. A, at 3.) A jury trial 

began on December 17, 2007, and the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. (Id.) On 

April 18, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. H, at 29.) The State proved 

Petitioner had two historical prior felony convictions. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. A, at 3.) Petitioner 

was sentenced to presumptive, concurrent terms of 11.25 years imprisonment. (Id.) 

c. Petitioner’s Direct Appeal

 On July 6, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. 

The court found that Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial was not violated and the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for hybrid representation. 

(Doc. 8-1, Ex. A, at 5.) The court also “reviewed the entire record for reversible error” 

and found none. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner did not appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 2 of 10
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 at 3.) 

d. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

On March 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Notice. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. B, at 8.) 

On May 10, 2011, Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice with the trial court stating that 

counsel had reviewed the entire record and was “unable to discern any colorable claim 

upon which to base a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Doc. 8-1, Ex. C, at 12.) 

Counsel requested a 45-day extension of time to allow Petitioner to file a pro se pleading. 

(Id.) The court gave Petitioner until December 12, 2011, to file his PCR petition. (Doc. 8-

1, Ex. D, at 15.) On February 14, 2012, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR 

proceeding because Petitioner “has not filed any petition.” (Doc. 8-1, Ex. E. at 18.) 

 On June 8, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. On June 15, 2012, the court dismissed the petition for review as “untimely.” 

(Doc. 8-1, Ex. F, at 20.) The court noted that the “trial court may ‘after being presented 

with proper evidence, allow a late filing,’ if it finds that petitioner was not responsible for 

the untimely filing.” (Id.) There is no record before the Court that Petitioner 

subsequently filed a petition or presented evidence to allow for a late filing. 

e. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On May 12, 2014, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. 

(Doc. 8-1, Ex. G, at 24.) On June 24, 2014, the trial court dismissed the proceeding as 

“both untimely and successive.” (Doc. 8-1, Ex. H, at 29.) The court found that 

“Defendant’s notice of post-conviction relief does not state any claims for which Rule 32 

can provide relief.” (Id.) 

f. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition 

 On November 3, 2014, Petitioner filed this Petition. (Doc. 1.) On May 11, 2015, 

Respondents filed a Limited Answer to the Petition. (Doc. 8.) Petitioner did not file a 

Reply. Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: 

1. Petitioner’s “defense was harmed” due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial; 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 3 of 10
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2. The jury instruction regarding premeditation incorrectly required no “actual reflection” in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights; 

3. The trial court failed to strike the entire jury panel after a prospective juror made a prejudicial comment; and 

4. Petitioner was denied a right to counsel in his PCR proceedings. 

(Doc. 1.) 

III. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY. 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

a. Time Calculation 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

 On April 18, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. H, at 29.) On July 6, 

2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. A, 

at 5.) Petitioner then had 35 days to file a petition for discretionary review with the 

Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (“Within 30 days after the Court 

of Appeals issues its decision, any party may file a petition for review with the clerk of 

the Supreme Court . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3 (expanding time limits by five days after 

service by mail); State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 261, 782 P.2d 737 (1989). Because Petitioner 

did not file a petition for review, the judgment became final on August 10, 2010. See

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (“[W]ith respect to a state prisoner who 

does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ under § 

2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking such review expires . . . .”); White v. Klitzkie, 

281 F.3d 920, 923 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is the decision of the state appellate court, 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 4 of 10
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

rather than the ministerial act of entry of the mandate, that signals the conclusion of 

review.”). Petitioner’s AEDPA clock began running on August 10, 2010, which was the 

date the judgment became final. See Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1074 (stating “Hemmerle’s 

direct appeal was final on . . . the date that he allowed his time for seeking review in the 

Supreme Court to expire.”). 

b. Statutory Tolling 

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

(“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

 On March 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a timely PCR Notice. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. B, at 8.)1

 

The one-year deadline to file a federal habeas will be tolled while “a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction . . . review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

The trial court gave Petitioner until December 12, 2011 to file his PCR petition. (Doc. 8-

1, Ex. D, at 15.) On February 14, 2012, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR 

proceeding because Petitioner “has not filed any petition.” (Doc. 8-1, Ex. E. at 18.) 

 The AEDPA clock ran from August 10, 2010 (the date the judgment became final) 

to March 11, 2011 (date of PCR notice), which was 213 days. Petitioner was entitled to 

statutory tolling from March 11, 2011 (date of PCR notice) through February 14, 2012 

(dismissal of PCR proceeding). The clock resumed on February 14, 2012, and the instant 

 

1

 The Mandate from Petitioner’s direct appeal issued on March 23, 2011. (Doc. 8-

1, Ex. H, at 29.) Pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a), Petitioner’s “notice must be filed 

within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” Because Petitioner filed his PCR notice before the Mandate 

issued, the Court assumes Petitioner’s notice was timely. The Court also notes that the trial court did not dismiss Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding as untimely. Instead the record reflects that the trial court granted Petitioner until December 12, 2011 to file his 

PCR petition. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. D, at 15.) 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 5 of 10
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petition was due 152 days later. The instant Petition was due July 15, 2012. 

 On June 8, 2012, Petitioner filed an untimely petition for review with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. F. at 20.) On June 15, 2012, the court of appeals 

dismissed the petition for review as “untimely.” (Id.) This filing was not a “properly 

filed” state action for post-conviction relief because it was untimely. See Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“[W]e hold that time limits, no matter their 

form, are ‘filing’ conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition 

as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 

2244(d)(2).”). Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed state 

post-conviction proceeding cannot restart the statute of limitations. Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 2244(d) “does not permit 

the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was 

filed”). 

 Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding also did not toll Petitioner’s deadline. This 

filing was not a “properly filed” state action for post-conviction relief because it was 

dismissed as “both untimely and successive.” (Doc. 8-1, Ex. H, at 29.). Petitioner’s 

second PCR was not a continuation of the first PCR petition, thus gap tolling does not 

apply. See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (gap tolling between 

successive rounds of state proceedings only applies if second petition limited to seeking 

review of first petition). Petitioner never filed a petition in his first proceeding, and there 

were no merits to review in the second PCR petition. Although Petitioner does not argue 

for gap tolling, it nonetheless does not apply. 

 Here, the instant petition was due July 15, 2012, absent equitable tolling. 

c. Equitable Tolling 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1–year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 

S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 6 of 10
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2015). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. 

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling 

is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, 

account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 

1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–

Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 Here, Petitioner asserts no grounds for equitable tolling in his Petition. (Doc. 1.) 

In the Petition, regarding “timeliness of petition,” Petitioner asserts “a 1-year period of 

limitation shall not apply for writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody.” (Doc. 1 

at 11.) This is an incorrect statement of the law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-year 

period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”). Petitioner was capable of filing 

this Petition within the deadline. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 

2005) (affirming conclusion that “[b]ecause [Gaston] was capable of preparing and filing 

state court petitions [during the limitations period], it appears that he was capable of 

preparing and filing a [federal] petition during the [same time]”); Waldron–Ramsey, 556 

F.3d at 1014 (stating that petitioner “could have prepared a basic form habeas petition 

and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline”). 

 Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the habeas deadline does not warrant equitable 

tolling. A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of representation 

during the applicable filing period do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable 

tolling because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See Waldron–Ramsey, 556 

F.3d at 1013 n.4 (“a pro se petitioner’s confusion or ignorance of the law is not, itself, a 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 7 of 10
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

circumstance warranting equitable tolling”), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 897 (2009); Rasberry 

v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling.”); Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (“[W]e have never 

accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged 

inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for promptness.”). 

 The Petition is untimely because it was not filed within the deadline established by 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Absent equitable tolling or other exception, the Petition will be 

dismissed with prejudice, regardless of the margin of untimeliness. See United States v. 

Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas petition submitted one day 

late was properly dismissed as untimely under AEDPA, noting that a “missed” deadline 

“is not grounds for equitable tolling”); Hartz v. United States, 419 Fed. Appx. 782, 783 

(9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of federal habeas petition where 

petitioner “simply missed the statute of limitations deadline by one day”); Lookingbill v. 

Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[w]e consistently have denied tolling even 

where the petition was only a few days late”); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 100–

01 (1985) (“If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late filings might be equally 

acceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the 

filing deadline . . . A filing deadline cannot be complied with, substantially or otherwise, 

by filing late––even by one day.”). 

 This Petition was due July 15, 2012. It was filed on November 3, 2014. The 

Petition is untimely. 

IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

An evidentiary hearing is not warranted regarding Petitioner’s claims, including 

equitable tolling, because the record is sufficiently developed to resolve this question. A 

habeas petitioner asserting equitable tolling “should receive an evidentiary hearing when 

he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’” 

Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 8 of 10
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner has not asserted grounds for equitable tolling, and an 

evidentiary hearing is not required. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

/// 

/// 

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 9 of 10
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of December, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-02432-PGR Document 9 Filed 12/16/15 Page 10 of 10