Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06051/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMIE DOYLE MAUPIN SR., CASE NO. CV-F-03-6051 REC WMW HC

Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REPETITIONFORWRITOFHABEASCORPUS

vs.

[Document 6]

SYLVIA GARCIA, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a trial in Stanislaus County Superior Court, on July 14, 1999, a jury found Petitioner

guilty of fourteen counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under fourteen years (counts 1 - XIV),

one count of exhibiting harmful matter with intent to seduce a minor (count XV), one count of

possession of methamphetamine (count XVI) and one count of dissuading a witness (count XIX). As

to counts I through XIV, the jury found true a special allegation that Petitioner committed acts set forth

in Penal Code Section 667.61(b). The court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss counts IX,

XVII and XVIII.

On December 6, 1999, the court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 47 years and 8 months

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28 1Unless otherwise specified, all further references to statutory sections are to the California Penal Code.

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to life as follows: count I - fifteen years to life; counts II through IV - fifteen years to life, stayed

pursuant to Section 654; count V - fifteen years to life; counts VI through VIII - fifteen years to life,

stayed pursuant to Section 654; count X - fifteen years to life; counts XI through XIV - fifteen years to

life, stayed pursuant to section 654; count XV - eight months; count XVI - two years, to be served

concurrent to count I; and count XIX - two years. The court further ordered Petitioner to pay a $9,400

restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4(b)1 and imposed an additional $2,520 victim restitution fine

pursuant to Section1202.4(f). A $500 fine was imposed pursuant to Section 288(e) and Petitioner was

ordered to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 290.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

(“Court of Appeal”). On February 25, 2002, the Court of Appeal entered an unpublished decision

modifying the judgment to include a Section 1202.45 parole revocation restitution fine in the amount

of $9,400, suspended unless parole is revoked. Otherwise the judgment was affirmed in its entirety. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. The court denied the

petition without comment.

On August 4, 2003, Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus pending before

this court. The case is proceeding on the amended petition filed on October 30, 2003. Respondent

opposes the petition.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504

fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Stanislaus County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the

court has jurisdiction over the action. 

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On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997);

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769

(5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after

statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed on July 9, 2003, after the enactment of the AEDPA,

thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with respect

to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless

the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123

S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d

1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at

1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations

omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal conviction

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is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual determinations must be

presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made by the state court unless

the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.

99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9

th Cir. 1997). 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity

to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111

S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo

v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9

th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear

a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes,

504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have

specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at

365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9

th Cir.1998). For example, if a

petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only

in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a

constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court.

See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied

circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must

include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which

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entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

In cases such as this in which the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this

Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, the

last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n.

3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption

that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion);

see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last

reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

DISCUSSION

Jury Instruction Regarding Penal Code Section 667.61

Petitioner contends that his three consecutive terms of 15 years to life imposed for the three

convictions under Section 288(a) for committing lewd and lascivious acts with a child under fourteen

years of age must be stricken. Petitioner claims that the jury was inadequately instructed regarding

crucial elements of the Section 667.61, thereby abridging his right to trial by jury. Respondent disputes

this contention.

In addressing this contention, the Court of Appeal held as follows:

In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490, our nation’s high court held that

a defendant has a federal constitutional right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable

doubt, any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. The question presented here is whether that holding

required a jury to determine whether a defendant convicted of a violation of section 288,

subdivision (a) is eligible for probation when the defendant is alleged to come within the

provisions of the one strike law. We find that a jury determination of probation eligibility is

unnecessary under the rule of Apprendi.

Appellant was sentenced pursuant to section 667.61, subd.(b) which provides that 

“a person who is convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one of the

circumstances specified in subdivision (e) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state

prison for life and shall not be eligible for release on parole for 15 years except as

provided in subdivision (j).”

Subdivision(c)(7) states that the section applies to “[a] violation of subdivision (a) of Section

288, unless the defendant qualifies for probation under subdivision (c) of Section 1203.066.”

[Footnote omitted.] Subdivision (e)(5) applies to offenses where the “defendant has been

convicted in the present case or cases of committing an offense specified in subdivision (c)

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against more than one victim.”

At trial, the jury was instructed that they were required to find whether the section 667.61

allegation applied to appellant and in order to prove the allegation, the People had the burden

of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant committed a violation of section 288,

subdivision (a) against more than one victim. In returning its verdict, the jury specifically found

that appellant had violated section 288, subdivision (a) and that the violations were committed

against more than one victim.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding

probation eligibility pursuant to section 1203.066. He claims that pursuant to the high court’s

decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the trial court was required to submit the issue of probation

eligibility to the jury because the one strike law only applies to a person convicted of a violation

of section 288, subdivision (a), where that person is not eligible for probation under section

1203.066, subdivision(c).(§ 667.61, subd. (C)(7).) As we will explain, we find appellant’s

argument unpersuasive.

Unpublished Opinion in Case No. F034753, 6 -7. After describing the facts underlying Apprendi, the

Court of Appeal went on to explain:

The issue presented to the Supreme Court was “whether the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the

maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 469.) The

court reviewed the importance of having a jury determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This

right, the court explained, extended to any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, which

increased the punishment for a crime. (Id. at pp. 482-485.) In essence, the court treated the

sentence enhancement as the equivalent to an element of the offense. In determining the

“elemental” nature of the factor, the court stated the “relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of

effect – does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that

authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” (Id. at page 494, emphasis added, fn. omitted.) Since

Apprendi’s motive in committing the crime subjected him to a greater penalty, the court held

that Apprendi was entitled to have a jury determine his purpose in committing the crime.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Apprendi only applies to situations where

a defendant is exposed to greater punishment than otherwise authorized by the jury’s verdict.

The courts of our state have recognized this principle and have held a jury need not decide issues

which do not increase the maximum penalty otherwise authorized by the jury’s verdict. (See

People v. Senpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 3165, 325-327 [holding that a defendant did not have

a federal constitutional right to have a jury decide the applicability of a gang enhancement where

the enhancement did not increase the maximum punishment for the underlying crime]; People

v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263, 268-271 [holding a jury was not required to determine

the applicability of section 654 because that section did not increase the penalty for the

underlying crimes].)

Here appellant was exposed to a term of imprisonment for 15-years to life based upon

the jury’s finding regarding the one strike allegation. Section 667.61, subdivision (b) provides

that “a person who is convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one of the

circumstances specified in subdivision (e)shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison

for life . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to this section the applicability of the one strike

law depends upon a determination that the defendant committed an enumerated offense under

an enumerated circumstance. The jury determined that appellant had committed a violation of

288, subdivision (a), which is an offense listed in subdivision (c). In addition, it specifically

found that appellant committed the offense against one or more victims, a circumstance listed

in subdivision (e). (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5).) Pursuant to the provisions of the statute, the

determination of these two facts subjected appellant to the increased punishment.

Appellant argues that he is not subject to the provisions of the one strike law if there is

a determination that he is eligible for probation, therefore, the jury must determine probation

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eligibility. We disagree. Subdivision (b) provides that a person who commits an enumerated

offense under an enumerated circumstance “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state

prison for life and shall not be eligible for release on parole for 15 years except as provided in

subdivision (j).” Therefore, a defendant convicted of a violation of section 288, subdivision (a)

against more than one victim is to be sentenced to a term of 15 years to life. However,

subdivision (c)(7) makes an exception in the case of a defendant who is eligible for probation

under Section 1203.066. Subdivision (h) provides that “[p]robation shall not be granted to, nor

shall the execution or imposition or sentence be suspended for, any person who is subject to

punishment under this section for any offense specified in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of

subdivision (c).” This section demonstrates that the Legislature providedthat a person convicted

of a section 288, subdivision (a) violation may be eligible for probation, notwithstanding the one

strike law. A finding that a defendant is eligible for probation, therefore, does not increase the

penalty authorized by the jury’s verdict. Rather, a finding of probation eligibility does just the

opposite, it mitigates the possible punishment. Since a determination of appellant’s probation

eligibility does not increase the penalty authorized by the jury’s verdict, appellant was not

entitled to have a jury determine this fact. We find no error.

Unpublished Opinion in Case No. F034753, 8 - 10.

The court finds the Court of Appeal’s discussion of the Apprendi decision and its application

to Petitioner’s claim to be a very accurate statement of the law. In addition, the Ninth Circuit held in

United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2002), that Apprendi does not apply

retroactively to cases on collateral review. Thus, even were Apprendi applicable to Petitioner’s

criminal case, he is precluded from invoking Apprendi on collateral review. Therefore, the court finds

that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the Court of Appeal’s adjudication

of this Apprendi claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the court

concludes that this claim provides no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Sentencing Petitioner to Three Fifteen Years to Life Terms

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to three consecutive life sentences

under Section 667.61, for three convictions of violating Section 288(a). Petitioner claims that only two

life sentences were authorized by statute. Respondent disputes this claim.

The Court of Appeal rejected this claim, explaining as follows:

Section 667.61 provides that a person convicted of certain enumerated offensesidentified

in subdivision (c) shall be sentenced to 15 years to life where the defendant committed the

offense “against more than one victim.” (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c) & (e)(5).) Appellant was

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convicted of an enumerated offense against three victims. Based on this fact, the trial court

sentenced appellant to three life terms. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing

three life terms and argues that only two life terms were authorized by the statute. He reasons

that since there were three victims, only two could qualify as a second victim under the statute,

thereby mandating only two life terms. We disagree.

In People v. DeSimone (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 693, the Second District was confronted

with a similar issue. There the defendant was convicted of two subdivision (c) offenses against

two victims. The defendant argues that only one life sentence could be imposed per case. He

claimed that it would be unreasonable to allow the multiple victim circumstance to be used more

than once per case because the law would require at least two life terms whenever there was

more than one victim. The court flatly rejected this argument noting that perpetrators who strike

more than one victim are more dangerous than other perpetrators and opined that the Legislature

could conclude that an offender who committed sexual offenses against more than one victim

should be subjected to on life term per victim. (Id. at p. 698.)

Likewise, in People v. Murphy (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 35 the court explained that the

only limitation on the number of life sentences which can be imposed on a defendant pursuant

to section 667.61 is contained in subdivision (g). That section provides in relevant part that if

“there are multiple victims during a single occasion, the term specified in subdivision (a) or (b)

shall be imposed on the defendant once for each separate victim.” There, the defendant had

committed six subdivision (c) offenses against one victim and one offense against another

victim. The only applicable circumstance that triggered punishment pursuant to the one strike

law was that the defendant committed the offenses against more than one victim. (Id. at p. 40.)

Under these circumstances, the defendant should have been sentenced to seven life terms under

the plain meaning of the statute. However, subdivision (g) limited the number of terms in that

case to one life term per victim; therefore, the defendant was properly sentenced to two life

terms. (Id. at pp. 40 -41.)

Here, the jury specifically found that appellant had committed his crimes against more

than one victim as to each offense. The trial court subsequently sentenced appellant to three life

terms, one for each of the victims. As to each victim, appellant committed the offense against

more than one victim. Pursuant to the terms of the statute, appellant was to be sentenced to one

life term per victim. (§ 667,61, subd. (b), (c), (e) & (g); People v. Murphy, supra, 65

Cal.App.4th at pp. 40-41; People v. DeSimone, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 698-699; see People

v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 719.) Thus, we find that appellant was properly sentenced.

Unpublished Opinion in Case No. F034753, 10 -12.

Habeas corpus relief is not available to correct alleged errors in the state court's application or

interpretation of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991);

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1084-85 (9th Cir.1985). Accordingly, the court must agree with

Respondent that this claim presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Sufficiency of Evidence Regarding Violation of Penal Code Section 288.2

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his 

conviction under Penal Code Section 288.2. Specifically, Petitioner claims that the record is

insufficient to establish that the movies seen by the minors were actually “harmful matter” as defined

by the statute. Respondent disputes this contention.

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In addressing this claim, the Court of Appeal found as follows:

Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for

exhibiting harmful matter to a minor because there was no evidence from which the jury could

infer the exact nature of the movies. Further, he claims the description given by the victim was

insufficient for the jury to determine that the movies contained “harmful matter.” We disagree.

The crime of exhibiting harmful matter to a minor is defined in section 288.2 as follows:

“(a) Every person who, with knowledge that a person is a minor, or who fails to exercise

reasonable care in ascertaining the true age of a minor, knowingly distributes, sends, causes to

be sent, exhibits, or offers to distribute or exhibit by any means, including, but not limited to,

live or recorded telephone messages, any harmful matter, as defined in Section 313, to a minor

with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of

that person or of a minor, and with the intent or for the purpose of seducing a minor, is guilty

of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail.”

Section 313 provides:

“(a) ‘Harmful matter’ means matter, taken as a whole, which to the average person,

applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the purient interest, and is matter which,

taken as a whole, depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct and which,

taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”

“Matter” is defined in subdivision (b) as including any “book, magazine, newspaper,

video recording, or other printed or written material . . . .”

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the court reviews the

whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses

substantial evidence - that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value - from

which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 758; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)

We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably

deduce from the evidence, including reasonable inferences based on the evidence and excluding

inferences based on speculation or conjecture. (People v. Tran (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 759, 771-

772.) “The same standard applies to the review of circumstantial evidence. (People v. Bean

(1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932 . . . .)” (People v. Ceja (1993) 3 Cal.4th 1134, 1138.)

The definition of harmful matter, as defined in section 313, incorporates the test for

obscenity articulated in Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24. (People v. Hsu (2000) 82

Cal.App.4th 976, 992; 4 Stats. 1988, Summary Dig., ch. 1378, p. 472.) In Miller, the United

States Supreme Court set out the guidelines for the states in regulating obscene material. The

high court held the states could regulate materials that “taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient

interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as

a whole, do not have a serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (Miller v.

California, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 24.) In determining whether such material is obscene, the trier

of fact must decide “(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community

standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . ; (b)

whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically

defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (Ibid.) The court went on to give some examples

of material that would fall under these standards. These examples included “[p]atently offensive

representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual orsimulated.”

(Id. at p. 25.)

In this case, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that the videos appellant

showed the victims contained “harmful matter.” Each of the victims testified that appellant had

shown them movies. Patricia identified the movies as “nasty” and described them as depicting

naked people lying in bed touching and rubbing each other’s “privates.” In addition they were

rubbing “each others [sic] privates against each other.” Jennifer stated that she watched “dirty”

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movies at appellant’s house. The movies portrayed boys “putting their things into girls and

sometimes putting them into boy’s [sic] butts.” It became clear through questioning that the

term “thing” referred to a penis. Jennifer also testified that appellant would try to kiss her while

watching the movies. Jessica described watching “nasty videos” with appellant. The movies

showed naked boys and girls having sex on the porch.

Deputy Parker interviewed the victims regarding their allegations. Patricia told Deputy

Parker that appellant had shown her “nasty” movies in which men and women were having sex.

While watching the movie, appellant exposed himself to her and placed her hand on his “private

part.” Sergeant Beck testified that he found six pornographic video tapes in appellant’s home.

The videos depicted naked men and women having sex.

Appellant admitted to owning several pornographic movies depicting men and women

engaging in sexual acts. He explained that he had caught the children watching one of the

movies unsupervised when he came home from work. He turned the movie off and told Angela

about the incident, but she never did anything about it. He also stated that he should have kept

the movies in his safe and that he was “stupid” for not doing so.

Appellant contends that this evidence was insufficient because therewas no evidence that

the movies he showed to the children lacked serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value

for minors. He argues that one “man’s pornography may be another’s Oscar-winning

‘Shakespeare In Love’ or ‘The Titanic,’ two award-winning movies both of which depicted men

and women having sex.” We disagree. In addition to describing the acts that were portrayed

in the movies, the victims described the movies as “nasty” and “dirty” and portraying people

doing “[s]ick stuff.” This indicated that the movies lacked any redeeming value. Furthermore,

the movies appeared to be quite explicit in their portrayal of sexual activity. Patricia stated the

movies showed nude men and women lying in bed and rubbing each other’s “privates.”

Although the jury never saw the actual movies appellant showed the victims, their testimony was

sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the films depicted explicit acts of sexual intercourse and

sodomy, which the jury could certainly determine lacked any “serious literary, artistic, political,

or scientific value for minors.”

Unpublished Opinion in Case No. F034753, 12 - 15.

The law on insufficiency of the evidence claim is clearly established. The United States

Supreme Court has held that when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on habeas, a federal

court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Sufficiency claims are

judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324 n. 16. 

The court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the Court of

Appeal’s adjudication of this insufficiency of the evidence claim “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Quite to the contrary, as explained by the Court of Appeal, there was clearly enough

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evidence presented by which a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court concludes that this claim presents no basis for

habeas corpus relief.

Definition of Reasonable Doubt Provided to the Jury

Petitioner contends that the definition of reasonable doubt provided to the jury in his case 

violated his right to due process of law. He claims that it erroneously reduced the prosecution’s burden

of proof in establishing Petitioner’s guilt. Respondent disputes this contention.

The Court of Appeal rejected this contention, finding in part as follows:

Appellant contends the 1994 revision to CALJIC No. 2.90 contains an incorrect and

incomplete definition of reasonable doubt. He claims the instruction is incorrect because it

defines reasonable doubt in terms of an “abiding conviction” rather than a “moral certainty.”

Prior to 1994 the second paragraph of CALJIC no. 2.90 stated:

“Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because

everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some

possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire

comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that

condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of

the truth of the charge.”

In Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court upheld this version of

CALJIC No. 2.90, but criticized as archaic the instruction’s use of the phrase “moral certainty.”

“We do not think it reasonably likely that the jury understood the words ‘moral

certainty’ either as suggesting a standard of proof lower than due process requires or as

allowing conviction on factors other than the government’s proof. As modern dictionary

definitions of moral certainty attest, the common meaning of the phrase has changed

since it was used in the Webster instruction, and it may continue to do so to the point that

it conflicts with the Winship standard. Indeed, the definitions of reasonable doubt most

widely used in the federal courts do not contain any reference to moral certainty.” (511

U.S. at pp. 16 -17.)

After Victor was decided, the California Supreme Court in People v. Freeman (1994) 8

Cal.4th 450 recommended the use of a reasonable doubt instruction which deleted the phrases

“and depending on moral evidence” and “to a moral certainty.” The Freeman instruction thus

defined reasonable doubt as follows:

“It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to

some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire

comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that

condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the

charge.’” (People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 504, fn. 9.)

The second paragraph of CALJIC No. 2.90 was then revised in 1994 in accordance with

the California Supreme Court’s suggestion in Freeman. The jury in appellant’s case was

instructed with this 1994 revision of the second paragraph of CALJIC NO. 2.90 as follows:

“Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because

everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is

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that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the

evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel

an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.”

In People v. Light (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 879, this court considered and rejected the

contention that the 1994 revision of CALJIC No. 2.90 deprived a defendant of due process of

law by allowing a finding of guilt on the basis of a lesser standard of proof of guilt than due

process requires. We also noted that the United States Supreme Court held that the use of the

term “abiding conviction” was the proper standard. (People v. Light, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at

p. 887.) As the Court in Victor stated:

“Although in this respect moral certainty is ambiguous in the abstract, the rest of the

instruction . . . lends content to the phrase. The jurors were told that they must have ‘an

abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.’ . . . An instruction cast

in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly

states the government’s burden of proof. [Citations.]” (Victor v. Nebraska, supra, 511 U.S. at

pp. 14 - 15, italics added.) Therefore, for the reasons expressed in Light, we reject appellants

claim.

Unpublished Opinion in Case No. F034753, 15 -17.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which

he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). The United States

Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used

in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions must

correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114

S.Ct. 1239 (1994). The Victor Court further held that an instruction cast in terms of an “abiding

conviction” as to guilt, without reference to “moral certainty,” correctly stated the state’s burden of

proof.” Id. at 14-15. The jury instruction at issue in this case is the revised version of CALJIC 2.90

recommended by the California Supreme Court following the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Victor

v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (1994), and Sandoval v. California, 511 U.S. 1, – S.Ct. –

(1994). 

In Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument

that the California Supreme Court’s usage of “abiding conviction” to describe the “clear and

convincing” standard no longer supported the level of proof required for reasonable doubt. Lisenbee v.

Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999) (referencing Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316, 104

S.Ct. 2433, 2437-38 (1984)). The Court then expressly held the 1994 version of CALJIC 2.90

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constitutional. 

Although the [Supreme] Court [in Colorado v. New Mexico] did use the phrase

“abiding conviction” in its definition of the clear-and-convincing evidence

standard, it did so in tandem with the use of the phrase “highly probable.”

[citation omitted] The language in the jury instruction in this case, on the other

hand, does not. We therefore conclude that there is no reason to depart from

established precedent expressly affirming jury instructions cast in terms of an

abiding conviction. 

Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999). In light of Victor and Lisenbee, the court finds

the 1994 version of CALJIC 2.90 used at Petitioner’s trial was appropriate and did not reduce the

burden of proof. Thus, the trial court’s issuance of this instruction was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, the court concludes that this claim does not

provide a basis for habeas corpus relief.

In light of the above, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DENIED, that judgment be entered for Respondent, and that the Clerk of the Court be directed

to close this case.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District Court

Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules

of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days

after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on

all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus

three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2005 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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