Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00504/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00504-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN LAKE,

CDCR #AF-8850,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WARDEN DANIEL PARAMO; 

JOHN DOES, WARDEN JOHN DOE, 

CSP-LAC; PROPERTY ROOM 

CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00504-CAB-NLS

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); 

(2) DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL; and 

(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

John Lake (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently housed in the California State 

Prison - Los Angeles County (“CSP-LAC”) located in Lancaster, California, and 

proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the 

time he submitted his Complaint, but instead he later filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), along with a Motion to Appoint 

Counsel. (See ECF Nos. 4, 5.)

/ / / /

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’s failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a 

prisoner and is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains obligated to pay the 

entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of 

the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his prison 

certificate issued by a CSP-LAC accounting official verifying his account history and 

available balances. See ECF No. 4 at 23. Plaintiff’s statements show that he has had no 

monthly deposits and has carried an average balance of zero in his account during the 6-

month period preceding the filing of this action and had no available funds to his credit at 

the time of filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

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judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 

initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a 

“failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”).

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 4) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees due for this case must be collected by the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff also requests that the Court appoint him counsel in this matter. (See ECF 

No. 5.) All documents filed pro se are liberally construed, and “a pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotations omitted)). But there is no 

constitutional right to counsel in a civil case; and none of Plaintiff’s pleadings to date

demand that the Court exercise its limited discretion to request than an attorney represent 

him pro bono pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) at this stage of the case. See Lassiter v. 

Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 

F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). Only “exceptional circumstances” support such a 

discretionary appointment. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). Exceptional circumstances exist 

where there is cumulative showing of both a likelihood of success on the merits and a 

demonstrated inability of the pro se litigant to articulate his claims in light of their legal 

complexity. Id.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates that while he may not be 

formally trained in law, he nevertheless may be capable of articulating the facts and 

circumstances relevant to his claims, which are typical and not legally “complex.” 

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Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff has yet 

to show he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. Therefore, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 5).

III. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the 

PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP 

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as 

soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under 

these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from 

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

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(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Rule 8

Complaints must also comply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires 

that each pleading include a “short and plain statement of the claim,” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2), and that “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(d)(1). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). In addition to the grounds for 

sua sponte dismissal set out in § 1915(e)(2)(B), the district court may also dismiss a 

complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 if it fails to provide the defendant fair notice 

of the wrongs allegedly committed. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (upholding Rule 8(a) dismissal of complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, 

replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Cafasso, United States ex rel. v. 

General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases 

upholding Rule 8 dismissals where pleadings were “verbose,” “confusing,” “distracting, 

ambiguous, and unintelligible,” “highly repetitious,” and comprised of 

“incomprehensible rambling”)

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint offers very few specific factual allegations, as well as 

being very disjointed and difficult to comprehend. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

Complaint violates Rule 8 of the FRCP. 

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C. Plaintiff’s allegations

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains virtually no specific factual allegations. Plaintiff is 

currently housed at CSP-LAC. See Compl. at 6. Plaintiff alleges his “civil rights” were 

“violated by the actions of Warden at [RJD]” and his “subordinates, as well as the 

“Warden at CSP-LAC” in October and November of 2016. Id. at 6-7. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Warden for RJD is “withholding [his] property and legal 

documents.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff also claims the Warden for CSP-LAC is “withholding 

[his] personal and legal property and documents to litigate [his] criminal case.” Id.

Plaintiff claims the actions of the Warden for CSP-LAC are in “retaliation for filing 602 

grievances of misconduct, sexual assault, ADA, civil rights, and religious right to attend 

(LDS) the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints as facilitator inmate minister.” Id. 

At some point in time, Plaintiff was “taken to Central Medical, then to the Hospital 

for (3) days and then to Ad-Seg for transfer [from RJD] to CSP-LAC.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff 

claims, “both facilities had a responsibility to secure and transfer all [Plaintiff’s] property 

and make sure that property arrived” and “was returned to [Plaintiff] in a timely manner.” 

Id.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief “to inspect to see if any books, legal property, 

artificial appliances” are still in the possession of correctional personnel at RJD. Id. at 2. 

He also seeks unspecified “general and special damages,” as well as punitive damages. 

Id. at 11.

D. Claims arising at RJD

The only claims arising from the time Plaintiff was housed at RJD is his 

speculative belief that correctional officers at RJD may not have transported all of his 

property when he was transferred to CSP-LAC in October or November of 2016 in 

violation of his “due process rights.” Compl. at 10.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / / 

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1. Personal Property

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against 

deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural 

protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 

U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners have a 

protected interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 

1974), but the procedural component of the Due Process Clause is not violated by a 

random, unauthorized deprivation of property if the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 

816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895).

Plaintiff’s has no due process claim based on Defendants’ purportedly 

unauthorized deprivation of his personal property—whether intentional or negligent—

however, since a meaningful state post-deprivation remedy for his loss is available. See 

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. California’s tort claim process provides that adequate postdeprivation remedy. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (“[A] negligent or intentional deprivation 

of a prisoner’s property fails to state a claim under section 1983 if the state has an 

adequate post deprivation remedy.”)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims relating to the 

deprivation of his personal property are DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. 

2. Access to Courts claim

Plaintiff also alleges that the alleged deprivation of his legal property has denied 

him access to the courts. See Compl. at 10. Prisoners have a constitutional right to 

access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the 

filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. 

Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a 

litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of 

a suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

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U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2011) (differentiating “between two types of access to court claims: those involving 

prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate 

without active interference.”).

However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any 

access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual 

injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the 

“inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to allege an actual 

injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to 

show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 353 & n.4). 

In addition, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” 

underlying claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the 

underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently 

pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be 

awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be 

brought.” Id. at 415.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege the actual injury required to state an access to 

courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. Thus, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to include any “factual matter” to show how or why 

any of the individual Defendant in this case caused him to suffer any “actual prejudice” 

“such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim,” with respect to any 

case. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; Jones, 393 F.3d at 936; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any 

Defendant caused him to suffer any “actual injury” with respect to any non-frivolous 

direct criminal appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights action he may have filed, see Lewis, 

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518 U.S. at 354, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s access to courts claim for failing to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

3. Personal Causation

In addition, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and § 1915A(b)(1) to the extent he fails to 

identify any specific action or inaction taken on the part of the named Defendants. “To 

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 

Campbell v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011), 

citing Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). The Complaint 

contains no factual allegations describing Defendants did or failed to do. 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), 

citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 

460 (9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 

1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) A person 

deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does 

an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff 

complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not 

stated a claim against Defendants because he has failed to allege specific facts regarding 

what actions were taken or not taken by the Defendants which caused the alleged 

constitutional violations. 

E. Claims arising at CSP-LAC

Plaintiff also raises claims against CSP-LAC officials that are unrelated to the 

claims he alleges against RJD officials. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges retaliatory actions, 

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denial of “Freedom of Religion,” Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment, and 

negligence on the part of CSP-LAC officials. See Compl. at 10.

Venue for these claims is not proper in the Southern District of California. Venue 

may be raised by a court sua sponte where the defendant has not yet filed a responsive 

pleading and the time for doing so has not run. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 

(9th Cir. 1986). 

Section 1391(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides, in pertinent part, that a 

“civil action may be brought in–(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if 

all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; [or] (2) a judicial 

district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated[.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488; Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison 

Co., 805 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986). “The district court of a district in which is filed a 

case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interests 

of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been 

brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations arising out of events or omissions alleged 

to have occurred at CSP-LAC, which is located in Los Angeles County. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 84(c)(2) (“The Western Division [of the Central District of California] comprises the 

counties of Los Angeles, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura.”). 

Therefore, venue for Plaintiff’s claims against CSP-LAC is proper in the Central 

District of California, Western Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(2), but not in the 

Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(d). See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); 

Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488.

In fact, Plaintiff has filed a separate civil rights action against CSP-LAC officials 

in the Central District of California which is currently pending and appears to contain 

similar claims brought in this action. See Lake v. Asuncion, et al. C.D. Cal. Civil Case 

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No. 2:18-cv-06434-GQ-RAO.1 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES all claims arising 

from events that occurred at CSP-LAC for lack of proper venue and as duplicative of 

claims Plaintiff is also litigating in the Central District of California.

F. State law claims

Plaintiff also seeks to bring “negligence” claims against “Correctional Officers 

John Does.” See Compl. at 10. The Court may “decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction” over any supplemental state law claim if it “has dismissed all claims over 

which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 

625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are 

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 

jurisdiction doctrine ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 

remaining state-law claims.”).

Because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal law claims, the Court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

G. Leave to Amend

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is dismissed for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted and for failing to comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 

Because he is proceeding pro se, however, the Court having now provided him with 

“notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also grant Plaintiff an opportunity to 

amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, Plaintiff may not re-allege any 

claims against Defendants arising from events allegedly occurring while housed at CSPLAC in an amended pleading filed in this Court.

 

1 A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, 

Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 5) without 

prejudice;

2. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 4).

2. DIRECTS the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect 

from Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph Diaz, Acting 

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883, 

Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

and for failing to comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 8.

5. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be 

complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim 

not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

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amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

If Plaintiff fails to follow these instructions and/or files an Amended Complaint 

that still fails to state a claim, his case may be dismissed without further leave to amend. 

See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take 

advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved civil rights complaint 

form for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2019

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