Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00035/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00035-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONTY R. STANLEY, 

individually and doing 

business as NORTH WEST

SURFACING,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOBO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

a California corporation; 

CITY OF ELK GROVE, and DOES 1 

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 14-cv-00035 JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING THE CITY OF ELK 

GROVE”S MOTION TO DISMISS 

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Elk 

Grove’s (the “City”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. #21). Plaintiff Monty R. 

Stanley, individually and doing business as North West 

Surfacing, (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion (Doc. #23) and the 

City replied (Doc. #26).1

 For the reasons set forth below, the 

City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC is granted.

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for June 18, 2014.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed this action on September 9, 

2013, in Sacramento County Superior Court (Doc. #1) against Bobo 

Construction, Inc., (“BCI”) and the City (collectively 

“Defendants”). This action was removed to this Court on January 

6, 2014, based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. Id. On April 10, 2014, the Court granted BCI’s Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action with leave to amend 

and granted the City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC with 

leave to amend. Order, Doc. #18. On April 28, 2014, Plaintiff 

filed his SAC, the operative complaint in this case, alleging 

six causes of action: (1) breach of contract as to BCI; 

(2) deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to Defendants; (3) common counts against 

BCI; (4) interference with contractual relations against the 

City—the Subcontract Between Plaintiff and BCI; (5) interference 

with contractual relations against Defendants—Contract with 

Freddis Paving; and (6) interference with prospective economic 

advantage against Defendants (Doc. #19). 

According to the allegations in the SAC, the City awarded 

BCI a contract for a public works construction project, the 

Special Waste Collection Center and Disposal Lane Project 

(“Project”) in May 2012. SAC ¶¶ 6-7. In or about May 2012, BCI

and Plaintiff entered into a subcontract agreement, under which 

Plaintiff was to perform demolition work at the Project and haul 

debris off the Project site. Id. ¶ 8. After commencing work, 

Plaintiff and his employees encountered contaminants at the 

Project site. Id. ¶ 9. Defendants denied the presence of the 

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contaminants. Id. ¶ 11. 

Beginning in or about August 2012 and continuing through 

September 21, 2012, the City and BCI discharged him as a 

subcontractor because he complained about potentially hazardous 

and toxic contaminants at the Project site and requested that 

appropriate protective measures be taken. Id. ¶ 19. On August 

10, 2012, the City served Plaintiff with a written notice, under 

California Public Contract Code section 4107 (“Section 4107”), 

of BCI’s request for the City’s consent to remove and replace 

Plaintiff on the Project. Id. ¶ 13. On August 10, 2012, 

Plaintiff served a written request for a hearing in response to 

the written notice pursuant to Section 4107. Id. ¶ 14. The 

hearing was scheduled for August 21, 2012, but was postponed to 

allow for informal discussions. Id. On September 10, 2012, the 

parties met to resolve the issue. No further discussions were 

held. Id.

On or about August 31, 2013, Plaintiff presented a written 

claim for economic damages to the City. Id. ¶ 17. On or about 

February 19, 2014, Plaintiff presented an additional written 

claim for economic damages against City. Id. ¶ 18. 

II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

The City requests judicial notice of Plaintiff’s two 

government claims dated August 31, 2013, and February 19, 2014. 

Government Claims, Ex. A-B, Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), 

Doc. #21. Courts may consider extrinsic evidence when the 

plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of a document and the 

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parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document. See, 

e.g., Sherman v. Stryker Corp., 2009 WL 2241664, at *2 (C.D. 

Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 

668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), and Fed. R. Evid. 201). Here, 

Plaintiff refers to the government claims in the SAC and 

Plaintiff does not dispute their authenticity. Accordingly, the 

Court grants the City’s request for judicial notice.

B. Discussion

1. Section 4107

Preliminarily, the City argues that Plaintiff cannot sue it 

for violation of Section 4107. Plaintiff argues that the 

Section 4107 allegations are part of his § 1983 claim. 

Section 4107 “limits the right of the prime contractor to 

make substitutions and the discretion of the awarding authority 

to consent to substitutions” of subcontractors. S. California 

Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc., 71 Cal.2d 719, 726 (1969).

“The consequences of an unauthorized substitution can be severe 

for the prime contractor: the subcontractor may sue the prime 

contractor (but not the public entity) for damages.” Titan 

Elec. Corp. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 160 Cal.App.4th 

188, 203.

Although the City correctly asserts that Plaintiff may not 

sue the City for damages under Section 4107, Plaintiff has not 

alleged any cause of action for breach of Section 4107 against 

it. As Plaintiff points out, in the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that 

the City violated his due process rights under the U.S. 

Constitution while acting under Section 4107 to satisfy the 

“under the color of law” requirement of § 1983 claims. Further, 

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the City does not request any specific claim be dismissed based 

on this argument. 

2. Intentional Tort Causes of Action

The City argues that Plaintiff’s fourth, fifth, and sixth 

causes of action (collectively “intentional tort claims”) fail 

as a matter of law because the City is immune pursuant to 

Government Code section 815 (“Section 815”) and Plaintiff fails 

to establish vicarious liability. In the opposition, Plaintiff 

does not oppose the City’s request that the sixth cause of 

action against the City be dismissed. Opp. at 10.

With respect to the fourth and fifth claims, Plaintiff

first argues that the City is vicariously liable for the 

intentional torts of its employees. Opp. at 5. Although a 

public entity is not liable for any injury except as provided by 

statute under Section 815, under Government Code section 815.2 

(“Section 815.2”), a public entity may be vicariously liable

under respondeat superior for acts or omissions of employees. 

See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815; 815.2. “Under the doctrine of 

respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for his 

employee’s torts committed within the scope of the employment.” 

Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal.3d 962, 967 (1986). 

To determine the scope of employment, courts use a two-prong 

test: whether “the employee’s action is (1) either required or 

incident to his duties or (2) could be reasonably foreseen by 

the employer in any event.” Bailey v. Filco, Inc., 48 

Cal.App.4th 1552, 1559 (1996).

The City argues that Plaintiff has failed to specify any 

employees or actions. However, under Section 815.2, it is not 

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“necessary in every case to identify the particular employee 

upon whose act the liability of the public entity is predicated. 

All that will be necessary will be to show that some employee of 

the public entity tortiously inflicted the injury in the scope 

of his employment under circumstances where he would be 

personally liable.” Legislative Committee Comments, Cal. Gov't 

Code § 815.2. Even though particular employees do not have to 

be identified, Plaintiff has failed to provide any specific 

factual allegations concerning an employee or employees of the 

City responsible for the alleged tortious acts. Generally, 

Plaintiff alleges that the City acted “through one or more 

authorized officers of [the] City charged with the supervision 

of the construction of the Project,” (SAC ¶ 25), but does not 

allege any underlying actions. 

Second, Plaintiff argues that the City is vicariously 

liable because the City and BCI conspired to commit the 

underlying tortious acts, citing Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. 

Sherwood Partners, Inc., 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823 (2005). In 

Berg, the court held the civil conspiracy is a “legal doctrine 

that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually 

committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate 

tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” Id. 

Further, “it is merely a mechanism for imposing vicarious 

liability; it is not itself a substantive basis for liability.” 

Id. To establish a conspiracy, “a plaintiff must allege (1) 

that the defendant had knowledge of and agreed to both the 

objective and the course of action that resulted in the injury, 

(2) that there was a wrongful act committed pursuant to that 

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agreement, and (3) that there was resulting damage.” Id.

(numbering added).

In the reply, the City argues that Berg does not apply in 

this case because Berg involved a conspiracy between a principal 

and an agent, not an independent contractor. Reply at 3 n. 1. 

Nevertheless, assuming that Berg applies, Plaintiff has failed 

to allege sufficient facts. In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that 

the City and BCI conspired to remove him from the Project and 

induced other parties not to buy construction material from 

Plaintiff to “eliminate Plaintiff as a source of the complaints 

regarding the presence of contaminants on the Project.” SAC ¶¶

12-14; 25. However, Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations are

legal conclusions. No facts to show the formation or operation 

of a conspiracy have been alleged. See State ex rel. Metz v. 

CCC Info. Servs., Inc., 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 419 (2007)(stating 

that “[i]n order to state a cause of action based upon a 

conspiracy theory the plaintiff must allege the formation and 

operation of the conspiracy, the wrongful act or acts done 

pursuant to it, and the damage resulting from such acts. . . . 

In making such allegations bare legal conclusions, inferences, 

generalities, presumptions, and conclusions are insufficient”)

(citations omitted). 

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to allege vicarious 

liability. Because Plaintiff has not indicated any other facts 

that he may be able to allege to pursue this cause of action, 

and he has had two opportunities to properly plead these claims, 

further amendment is futile and these claims are dismissed with 

prejudice. The Court also does not need to consider the City’s

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remaining arguments on these causes of action. 

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In its previous Order granting the City’s motion to 

dismiss, the Court held that Plaintiff did not allege any facts 

to establish that there was a policy as required under Monell. 

Order at 8-9. The City once again moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

second cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in 

part, because Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to 

establish the requisite elements of a claim under Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). 

Plaintiff argues that the City had final policy-making authority 

to remove him under Section 4107.

To prevail in a civil action against a local governmental 

entity, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that he possessed a 

constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the 

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to 

deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional 

right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the 

constitutional violation.’” Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. 

Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of 

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). For the second 

element, a single decision may constitute an act of official 

government policy. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 

480 (1986). However, “[m]unicipal liability attaches only where 

the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish 

municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Id. at 

481.

In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that the decision to remove 

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Plaintiff was a deliberate chosen course of action by the City 

as the “awarding authority” under Section 4107, and therefore, 

the City is the final decision making authority under Section 

4107. SAC ¶ 28. The City argues that Plaintiff has nonetheless 

failed to identify a final policymaker, citing Gillette v. 

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992). In Gillete, the Ninth 

Circuit held that the fire chief, who fired the plaintiff, was 

not a final policymaker because his discretionary authority to 

hire and fire employees, standing alone, was “not sufficient to 

establish a basis for municipal liability.” Id. at 1350. The

court also noted the fact that the “City Charter and ordinances 

grant authority to make City employment policy only to the City 

Manager and the City Council.” Id. Without evidence that the 

fire chief made policy, the court found he was not a final 

policymaker. Id.

In this case, Plaintiff has not identified any individual 

actors; at most, Plaintiff alleges that decision “was made by 

one or more of its duly authorized officers vested by the City 

with final decision-making authority to remove and replace 

Plaintiff.” SAC ¶ 28. Although there is no requirement that a

decisionmaker be identified by name, sufficient facts must be 

alleged to allow the Court to determine whether the official or 

officials responsible for establishing final policy made a 

deliberate choice to follow a course of action among various 

alternatives. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347. Because the 

allegations are conclusory and lack concise factual allegations 

describing the events that underlie Plaintiff’s claim, his claim 

is deficient. See SAC ¶¶ 25-28. 

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Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim 

against the City. Because Plaintiff has had two opportunities 

to allege a Monell claim, the Court does not grant leave to 

amend. Furthermore, the Court need not address the City’s 

remaining arguments on this claim. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the 

City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC without leave to amend. 

This case will proceed against the remaining Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2014

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