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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 24-1192 

SHAWN MONTGOMERY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois

No. 19-cv-1300-SMY — Staci M. Yandle, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2024 — DECIDED JANUARY 3, 2025 

____________________ 

Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Shawn Montgomery was severely 

injured when his truck was hit by a tractor-trailer on the 

shoulder of an Illinois highway. Montgomery sued the driver, 

along with the carrier and freight broker that arranged delivery of the shipment. Montgomery claimed that the freight 

broker, C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., had negligently hired 

the driver and carrier and was also vicariously liable for their 

torts. The district court concluded that Robinson was not 

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vicariously liable and granted partial summary judgment in 

its favor. The court later entered judgment for Robinson on 

the negligent hiring claims based on our decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023). Because 

the driver and carrier were Robinson’s independent contractors, and Ye bars Montgomery’s negligent hiring claims, we 

affirm. 

I 

Yosniel Varela-Mojena was hauling a load of plastic pots 

through Illinois when he veered off the road and into Shawn 

Montgomery’s tractor-trailer where it was stopped on the 

side of the road, injuring Montgomery. Varela-Mojena was 

driving for his employer, motor carrier Caribe Transport II, 

LLC, at the time of the accident.* The shipment had been coordinated by C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. Robinson is a 

freight broker, meaning it arranges for transportation between motor carriers such as Caribe and shippers of goods. 

Robinson had brokered this shipment, like many others, pursuant to a standing Broker/Carrier Agreement with Caribe. 

This nonexclusive agreement provided that Caribe was Robinson’s independent contractor and retained exclusive control 

over the manner of performance of transportation services, as 

well as the equipment and personnel it used to perform them.

Montgomery sued Varela-Mojena and Caribe in federal 

court under diversity jurisdiction for the injuries he sustained 

from the collision. Montgomery also sued Robinson (and several of its sister companies, all of which we refer to as 

* Montgomery sued both Caribe Transport II, LLC and Caribe Transport, 

LLC. The distinction between these entities is not significant for this appeal, so we collectively refer to both as Caribe. 

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No. 24-1192 3 

Robinson). He alleged that Robinson negligently hired 

Varela-Mojena and Caribe and was vicariously liable for their 

torts. Robinson moved for summary judgment on the vicarious liability claim, which the district court granted after finding that Varela-Mojena and Caribe were Robinson’s independent contractors, not its agents. Shortly after, we issued 

our decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 

(7th Cir. 2023). There, we held that the preemption provision 

of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act 

(FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), bars state law claims 

against freight brokers for the negligent hiring of motor carriers and their drivers. Id. at 464–66. Citing Ye, the district court 

granted judgment for Robinson on the negligent hiring 

claims. The district court then entered final judgment in favor 

of Robinson on the vicarious liability claim to facilitate Montgomery’s appeal. This appeal followed, while Montgomery’s 

claims against Varela-Mojena and Caribe are stayed in the 

district court pending its resolution.

II

On appeal, Montgomery argues that several aspects of 

Caribe’s relationship with Robinson support finding an 

agency relationship. Conceding that Ye forecloses his negligent hiring claims, Montgomery also asks us to overrule Ye 

and reinstate them. Our review is de novo. Miller v. Chi. 

Transit Auth., 20 F.4th 1148, 1155 (7th Cir. 2021) (summary 

judgment); Hanover Ins. v. R.W. Dunteman Co., 51 F.4th 779, 

785 (7th Cir. 2022) (judgment on the pleadings). Because his 

vicarious liability claim was resolved on summary judgment, 

we view the facts in the light most favorable to Montgomery 

and draw all reasonable inferences regarding the agency relationship in his favor. Miller, 20 F.4th at 1155. Regarding 

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judgment on Montgomery’s negligent hiring claims, we ask 

whether the well-pleaded factual allegations viewed in his favor state a facially plausible claim for relief. Hanover Ins., 51 

F.4th at 785. 

A 

We turn first to the vicarious liability claim. In Illinois, a 

“principal is vicariously liable for the conduct of its agent but 

not for the conduct of an independent contractor.” Sperl v. 

C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 946 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2011). With respect to the broker/carrier relationship, 

“courts applying Illinois law consistently have declined to 

find an agency relationship when a company hires an independent driver to deliver a load to designated persons at designated times but does not reserve the right to control the 

manner of delivery.” Cornejo v. Dakota Lines, Inc., 229 N.E.3d 

546, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023); accord Kolchinsky v. W. Dairy 

Transp., LLC, 949 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 2020). Instead, 

courts typically find that the motor carrier and driver are 

merely the freight broker’s independent contractors. See 

Cornejo, 229 N.E.3d at 556–58. 

When determining whether the broker/carrier relationship has stepped outside this norm, the “cardinal consideration” is whether the broker retained the right to control the 

manner of delivery, rather than its “mere result.” Id. at 553. 

Other factors include the right to make hiring decisions, the 

right to discharge or otherwise terminate the relationship, the 

method of payment and whether taxes are deducted, the provision of equipment, the level of skill required, and the relative nature of the work and supervision between the parties. 

Id.; Sperl, 946 N.E.2d at 1058. The labels the parties assign 

themselves in a written agreement do not decide their agency 

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No. 24-1192 5 

status, though they “cannot be ignored.” Cornejo, 229 N.E.3d 

at 555. 

According to Montgomery, there are significant indicators 

that Caribe and Robinson deviated from the typical broker/carrier relationship such that Robinson was not just assigning transportation but controlling the performance of the 

transportation services. We agree with the district court that, 

as a matter of law, none establish an agency relationship. 

First, Montgomery says Robinson controlled communications with the shipper and recipient of the loads and arranged 

all pickup and delivery times. In his view, this equates Robinson to a dispatcher controlling all matters leading up to and 

during the delivery. Illinois courts, however, have held that 

these delivery instructions pertain to “ancillary aspects of the 

transportation itself” and are merely specifications of “the 

particular hauling task.” Id. at 557, 559. They do nothing to 

control how the job is done and therefore fail to demonstrate 

agency. Id. Montgomery also points to status updates that 

Robinson expected from Caribe and Varela-Mojena during a 

delivery. These were typical status calls required by every 

broker; Robinson did not give instructions or directions during them. Montgomery emphasizes, however, that Robinson 

had drivers enable a program called MacroPoint on their cell 

phones while hauling a load and that this gave Robinson additional control over the deliveries. But the record makes clear 

that MacroPoint is a passive tracking technology without 

two-way communication, not a platform for Robinson to provide instructions or directives to drivers. Contrary to Montgomery’s argument, a broker does not dictate how a driver 

performs a delivery when it uses software applications or 

check-in calls to monitor its status. Id. at 554, 559. 

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Montgomery presses on, saying that Caribe was required 

to provide Robinson with information about who was hauling a load, their hours of service, and the location of trucks. 

But this argument highlights a lack of control: Caribe, not 

Robinson, assigned drivers and set their hours of service. Cf. 

Kolchinsky, 949 F.3d at 1012. Robinson needed this information to estimate a load’s delivery time and coordinate its 

delivery, not to exercise control. Although Robinson could request that a different driver transport a load, this is not evidence that Robinson controlled how the load was hauled. 

Cornejo, 229 N.E.3d at 555. 

Next, Montgomery points to language in the load confirmation that the rate was “contingent upon successful and ontime completion” and that anything short of this could “jeopardize ... future business opportunities” with Robinson. He 

equates this to Sperl v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., where 

the broker (also Robinson) had imposed such an impossible 

fine-enforced schedule on the driver that she was forced to 

violate federal hours-of-service regulations to deliver the load 

on time and avoid fines. 946 N.E.2d at 469, 472. The court 

viewed this fine system as one way Robinson could control 

the entire transportation process. Id. at 472. By contrast, there 

was no testimony by Varela-Mojena that he knew of any fine 

system or that the threat of a fee reduction influenced his driving. The so-called fines available to Robinson here are standard rate adjustments, which pertain to billing for transportation services and do not control the transportation itself. 

Cornejo, 229 N.E.3d at 554, 559 (fees for late or damaged goods 

are ancillary aspects of the transportation and do not establish 

an agency relationship). The fact that Robinson tracked the 

percentage of Caribe’s on-time deliveries and assigned it a 

performance score also fails to establish agency. Id. at 559 

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(“Evidence regarding performance metrics scoring delivery 

drivers has also been rejected as legally insufficient to establish agency.”). It is immaterial that Robinson could choose not 

to use Caribe in the future. Id. at 554, 559 (performance scores 

that could jeopardize future freight orders do not show the 

requisite degree of control over the work performed). 

Furthermore, Robinson did not provide any equipment to 

Caribe or Varela-Mojena and did not pay for maintenance or 

related expenses. While a fuel surcharge was included in the 

rate Robinson paid, this is not the provision of equipment 

Montgomery makes it out to be. See id. at 559 (“[F]uel surcharges relate to billing for transportation services and do not 

dictate control over the transportation itself.”). Though the 

load confirmation specified what equipment the customer required for the delivery and could include other basic instructions, these generalized instructions only served to specify the 

contours of the hauling task, not to control the manner in 

which it was accomplished. See id. at 550–51, 557–58. Montgomery compares simple instructions Robinson gave Caribe 

in prior, unrelated loads (for instance, that the driver had to 

re-stack tipped product or keep the inside of the trailer a certain temperature) to Sperl. But Robinson also owned the shipment in Sperl, and in its capacity as owner required the driver 

to continuously measure the internal temperature of the product itself to ensure it maintained its prescribed temperature 

range. 946 N.E.2d at 468, 471. Sperl thus involved a far more 

domineering dynamic than these previous loads. Regardless, 

any agency relationship Robinson might have had with Caribe during a prior delivery is irrelevant. Our inquiry is 

whether Robinson controlled the subject load at the time of 

the accident. Brettman v. M & G Truck Brokerage, Inc., 127 

N.E.3d 880, 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (agency relationship must 

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exist at the time negligence occurs, even if one existed previously). For this same reason, Montgomery’s undeveloped argument that Robinson was more involved than Caribe after 

the crash is immaterial to its control during the accident. And 

frankly, any independent arrangements Robinson may have 

made regarding the cargo after the accident say nothing about 

Robinson’s control over Caribe or Varela-Mojena.

The remaining facts Montgomery marshals do not support 

finding an agency relationship. That the bills of lading listed 

Robinson, not Caribe, as the carrier might help Montgomery 

in an apparent agency claim, see Kolchinsky, 949 F.3d at 1014–

15, but it says nothing about Robinson’s control over the delivery. As Robinson explained, many shippers create the bills 

of lading before a carrier is assigned, so they list the broker 

for convenience. Montgomery also argues that the job description of a Robinson carrier account manager is proof that 

Robinson controlled carriers such as Caribe. However, corporate jargon about “impactful capacity solutions” and “operational execution” is irrelevant to establishing an agency relationship between Robinson and Caribe. Last, the opinion of 

Montgomery’s trucking expert, Dr. Thomas Corsi, that Robinson exerted extensive control over Caribe’s operations is 

similarly unhelpful. Dr. Corsi’s expert report just relays the 

same facts which we have already concluded do not establish 

an agency relationship. Cf. Cornejo, 229 N.E.3d at 556. 

At best, any requirements Robinson imposed demonstrate 

control over the result of the work performed or matters ancillary to it. Cf. id. Robinson exercised little, if any, control 

over Caribe and its drivers. Robinson did not provide or 

maintain their equipment. It did not choose the driver, route, 

hours of service, or locations of rest and fuel stops, including 

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No. 24-1192 9 

for the subject load. Varela-Mojena drove under Caribe’s insurance at all times. Robinson did not make hiring or firing 

decisions for Caribe. Robinson did not pay drivers or even 

Caribe directly for the loads, and did not withhold taxes or 

benefits from these payments. Either party could terminate 

the relationship at any time. Robinson did not provide drivers 

with any training, instruction manuals, or uniforms. And, importantly, Caribe was prohibited from subcontracting or delegating work given to it by Robinson or otherwise contracting 

on its behalf. Courts decline to find an agency relationship under these circumstances. Id. at 550, 554–55, 559–60; Kolchinsky, 

949 F.3d at 1012–14. 

Finally, Robinson and Caribe adhered to their Broker/Carrier Agreement, which specified that Caribe was to be Robinson’s independent contractor, not agent. These labels “cannot 

be ignored.” Cornejo, 229 N.E.3d at 555. Ultimately, the undisputed evidence shows that Caribe and Varela-Mojena were 

not Robinson’s agents and vicarious liability does not attach. 

Summary judgment was proper. 

B 

As to his negligent hiring claims, Montgomery asks us to 

reconsider our court’s decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, 

Inc. In Ye, we determined that the FAAAA preempts state law 

claims that a freight broker negligently hired a motor carrier. 

74 F.4th at 466. Montgomery’s only argument on appeal is 

that Ye was wrongly decided and should be overturned, 

which would permit his negligent hiring claims to move forward. “‘We do not take lightly suggestions to overrule circuit 

precedent,’ and therefore ‘require a compelling reason to do 

so.’” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Loc. 139 v. Schimel, 863 F.3d 

674, 677 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). Montgomery 

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points only to pre-Ye or out-of-circuit decisions and a statement by the Solicitor General for support. These are not compelling reasons to revisit a case we decided only one year ago. 

Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[S]imply showing that a point is debatable is not enough to meet 

the compelling-reasons standard for overturning circuit precedent.”). We decline to overrule Ye, though Montgomery’s argument is preserved for further review should he seek it. 

AFFIRMED

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