Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01501/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01501-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE WALLACE,

CDCR #P-48941,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SOSA, CCII, Appeals Coordinator, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-cv-01501-BAS(BGS)

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2];

2) DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL

[ECF No. 6];

AND

3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND 1915A(b)(1)

TYRONE WALLACE (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF. No. 1). Plaintiff did not prepay 

the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; instead, 

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he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2). Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 6).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance 

in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no 

assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody 

of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding 

month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 

136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report as well as a prison certificate certified by a Senior Accounting Officer at 

RJD. See ECF No. 2 at 6-10; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 

F.3d at 1119. These statements show that while Plaintiff had an average monthly balance 

of $4.01 and average monthly deposits of $8.82 to his account over the 6-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, he had an available balance of zero at 

the time he filed it. See ECF No. 2 at 10. Thus, the Court assesses Plaintiff’s initial partial 

filing fee to be $1.76 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), but acknowledges he may be 

unable to pay even that small initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 

F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing 

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of 

funds available to him when payment is ordered”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), 

declines to exact the initial $1.76 initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates 

he may have “no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, 

to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 

and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions 

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff 

claims to have a learning disability that makes it difficult for him to understand the 

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“complexity of federal court orders” and he contends he has had other “legal pleadings 

denied” because he has “bad handwriting” that is “hard to decipher.” (ECF No. 6 at 3-4.)

First, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently legible, assures him that all 

documents filed pro se are “liberally construed,” and notes that “a pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded,” is held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e) requires that 

“[p]leadings . . . be construed so as to do justice.”

Second, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of 

Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). While under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts 

have some limited discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil 

litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this 

discretion is rarely exercised and only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional 

circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the 

merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Under these circumstances, the Court must DENY Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint 

Counsel (ECF No. 6) without prejudice because, as discussed below, a liberal construction 

of his Complaint suggests Plaintiff is capable of articulating the factual basis for his claims 

in this case, and that the likelihood of his success on the merits is not at all yet clear at this 

preliminary stage of the proceedings. Id. Therefore, neither the interests of justice nor any 

exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

///

///

///

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III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Finally, in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief, the Court 

may consider exhibits attached to his Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a 

written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 

purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 

n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 

(9th Cir. 1978)) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be 

considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims that RJD Appeals Coordinators Sosa and Self and “I.G.” Robert 

Barton in Sacramento denied his First Amendment right to access the courts by “screening 

out” several CDC 602 inmate appeals related to his requests for single-cell status. (ECF 

No. 1 at 3-6.)

Prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas 

petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may 

arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” 

(forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit that cannot now be tried 

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002); see also 

Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) (differentiating “between two 

types of access to court claims: those involving prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance 

and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate without active interference”).

However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any 

access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual 

injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the “inability 

to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to allege an actual injury is 

“fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to show that a 

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‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 

& n.4). 

In addition, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” 

underlying claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the 

underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently 

pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be 

awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” 

Id. at 415.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege the actual injury required to state an access to 

courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. While Plaintiff does 

claim Defendants’ refusals to process CDC 602 inmate appeal Log No. RJD-C-15-00752, 

in which he requested single-cell status, presented an “obstacle” and “hindrance” to his 

pursuit of those conditions of confinement claims (ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 1-2 at 2-14), 

his exhibits further show that he did successfully file no fewer than five state habeas 

petitions related to his cell status, that San Diego Superior Court Judge Stephanie Sontag 

ordered an evidentiary hearing related to Plaintiff’s cell-status in San Diego Superior Court 

Case No. HSC 11061 on January 21, 2015, despite his difficulties “exhausting his 

administrative remedies,” and that as of August 1, 2015, Plaintiff was, in fact, authorized 

for “single-cell housing.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 2-5, 16-22.) Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

Complaint fails to include any further “factual matter” to show how or why any of the 

individual Defendants in this case caused him to suffer any “actual prejudice . . . , such as 

the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim,” with respect to that case. Lewis, 

518 U.S. at 348;1Jones, 393 F.3d at 936; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

 

1 Although Bounds suggested “that the State must enable the prisoner to discover 

grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court,” Lewis expressly disavowed such a farreaching right. 518 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added). Only materials that would ensure 

meaningful access–the ability to present a claim–are required: “To demand the conferral 

of sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate 

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Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Defendants 

caused him to suffer any “actual injury” with respect to his state habeas case, or any other 

non-frivolous direct criminal appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights action he may have 

filed, see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354, the Court finds Plaintiff’s access to courts claims must 

be dismissed for failing to state a plausible claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

C. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, and he has now been provided with 

notice of his Complaint’s deficiencies, the Court will grant him leave to amend. See Rosati 

v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro 

se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it 

is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)).

IV. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff's prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION.

 

prison population is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which we do 

not believe the Constitution requires.” Id.

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 6).

5. DISMISSES this civil action for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

6. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to re-open his case by filing an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies 

of pleading described in this Order. If Plaintiff elects to file an Amended Complaint, it 

must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR

15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 

F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are 

not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”). 

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, this civil 

action will remain dismissed without prejudice based on his failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 12, 2016

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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