Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02280/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02280-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Johnathan Joseph Sutliff, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro and Arizona Attorney

General,

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 06-2280-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 

AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”). The matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Mark E. Aspey for a Report and Recommendation. On April 30, 2007, Magistrate

Judge Aspey filed a Report and Recommendation with this Court. (Dkt. 15.) On May 14,

2007, Petitioner filed his objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. 16.) After

careful consideration, this Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, this Court “must

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,”

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the Magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d

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1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454

(9th Cir. 1983)). 

DISCUSSION

The procedural history of this case is set forth in Respondents’ Answer to the Petition

(Dkt. 13) and the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 15). In June of

2002, Petitioner was convicted of five counts of sexual conduct with a minor. (Dkt. 13, Exh.

B). On August 16, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced by the state trial court to five life terms

of imprisonment with no eligibility for release for 35 years on each count, the sentences to

run consecutively. Dkt. 13, Exh. B). On September 4, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Dkt. 13, Exh. E). Thereafter, Petitioner did not

seek review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court or the United States Supreme

Court. (Dkt. 13, Exh. F) (Order and Mandate of Arizona Court of Appeals).

On December 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a state court petition for post-conviction

relief. In a decision issued February 24, 2005, the Arizona Superior Court denied relief,

concluding Petitioner had not stated a colorable claim that he had been deprived of his right

to counsel and that Petitioner’s other claims were procedurally barred, precluded, or waived.

(Dkt. 13, Exh. I). On March 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion in the Arizona Superior

Court seeking an extension of the time to seek review of the decision seeking post-conviction

relief. (Dkt. 13., Exh. K). This motion was denied by the Arizona Superior Court on May

5, 2005. See id. Petitioner then sought review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction

relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals in a pleading filed May 5, 2005. (Dkt. 13., Exh. L).

The Court of Appeals concluded the petition for review was not timely filed and denied

review in an order issued May 12, 2005. (Dkt. 13., Exh. L.) Thereafter, Petitioner sought

reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. (Dkt. 13., Exh. M). In an order denying

the motion for reconsideration, issued June 6, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals instructed

Petitioner that, to achieve review, he must file a motion in the trial court asking leave to file

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an untimely filed petition.(Dkt. 13., Exh. M). Petitioner filed a second motion in the trial

court seeking permission to file an untimely petition for review, but did not serve the

prosecuting agency or otherwise properly pursue that motion. See id. at 3.

On September 21, 2006, Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition. Therein,

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief because the prosecution knowingly introduced

perjured testimony at trial, including the testimony of the victim and his mother, in violation

of Petitioner’s right to due process of law. Petitioner further contends that he was denied his

right to due process because the Arizona state courts denied numerous post-conviction

motions. Moreover, Petitioner alleges he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance

of counsel. 

After reviewing the filings in this matter, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the

Petition be denied on the basis that the writ is barred by the statute of limitations governing

the filing of petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and there is no basis for tolling the period of

limitations.

Following the issuance of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation,

Petitioner filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 16). Having reviewed

each of Petitioner’s filings and, thereafter, having reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation and the record de novo, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims for

relief are barred by the statute of limitations.

Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation, filed May 14, 2007, assert

that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation contains factual errors concerning

the statutory tolling period. Petitioner further contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

(Dkt. 16). 

With respect to factual errors, Petitioner correctly notes in his Objections to the Report

and Recommendation that the statement that the statute of limitations was tolled until March

25, 2005, and yet it began to run again on February 25, 2005, is factually impossible and

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incorrect. Despite the fact that Petitioner’s assertion is correct, on September 4, 2007,

Magistrate Judge Aspey filed an Amendment to his Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 17)

wherein he acknowledged this factual error and explained that the mis-statement does not

affect the conclusion reached in the Report and Recommendation that Petitioner’s federal

habeas action was not timely filed. Correcting the statement to indicate that the statute of

limitations began to run again on March 25, 2005, and expired on February 8, 2007, results

in the conclusion that Petitioner’s habeas action was filed approximately seven months,

rather than eight months, too late (Dkt. 17). Thus, Petitioner’s objection, although correct,

has previously been remedied by the Court and does not effect the overall outcome for

Petitioner.

Petitioner further averred in his Objections that the Magistrate Judge erred by stating

that Petitioner failed to seek review of the Superior Court’s denial of post-conviction relief

(Dkt. 16, at 2). Petitioner is incorrect in his objection. Page three of the Report and

Recommendation provides:

Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief by

the Arizona Court of Appeals in a pleading filed May 5, 2005. [Answer], Exh.

L. The Court of Appeals concluded the petition for review was not timely filed

and denied review in an order issued May 12, 2005. Id., Exh. L.

Petitioner’s final objection concerns the application of equitable tolling to his case.

The Court rejects Petitioner’s assertion that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the deadline

for filing a federal habeas petition. Based on the record, Petitioner did not file his federal

habeas action within the period specified by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Consequently, as Magistrate Judge Aspey correctly pointed out

in his Report and Recommendation, the petition for habeas relief may only be considered if

the AEDPA’s time limitation may be “equitably” tolled. See Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798,

800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that equitable

tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only if extraordinary

circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.

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See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); Malcom, 281 F.3d at 962.

Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external forces account for the failure to file a

timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, it is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417

F.3d at 1034; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002). This Court agrees with

Magistrate Judge Aspey’s conclusion that Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing

that there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made it impossible for

him to file a timely federal habeas petition or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125 S. Ct. at

1815 (concluding the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he was misled

or confused about timing of exhausting his state remedies and filing his federal habeas

petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Each of the cases in

which equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state

officials or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that counsel’s errors in miscalculating the statute of

limitations and mis-advising the petitioner did not warrant equitable tolling). Compare

Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333

(2006); Faught v. Butler, 135 Fed. App. 92, 93 (9th Cir. 2005). “Equitable tolling applies

principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action

or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” United States v.

Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930-31 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Compare Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner claims that the state court’s failure to decide his motion seeking review in

a more timely manner constitutes wrongful conduct and that such conduct “actively misled

the petitioner into believing that the motion...was under consideration and kept the Petitioner

in limbo, awaiting the Courts [sic] reply.” (Dkt. 16 at 6). Thus, Petitioner contends that he

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The Court is unable to discern from Petitioner’s filing whether he diligently pursued

his remedies. Furthermore, the Court has found nothing in the record to establish any

extraordinary conduct on the part of the trial court that would prejudice the Petitioner in his

quest for relief. It appears that the court notified Petitioner of the status of his motions upon

decision of the motions by the court. The Petitioner has not established anything otherwise.

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is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because he diligently pursued his

remedies and because the state failed to adequately inform him of the status of his postconviction motions.1

 In fact, the Court had nothing to inform Petitioner of until the time the

decisions came down, at which time Petitioner was in fact notified. It is therefore

Petitioner’s lack of legal experience that leads Petitioner to his conclusion that he is entitled

to such tolling. However, lack of legal experience does not give rise to extraordinary

circumstances under the law. A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, or lack of

legal representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710,

714–716 (5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that

petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s “rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein

do not justify equitable tolling”). As established by Magistrate Judge Aspey, Petitioner’s

assertion that the state’s “failure” or delay in acting on his various post-conviction motions

was a state-created impediment to the filing of his federal habeas action fails as a matter of

law, because the state actions, or inactions, were not violations of federal law or the United

States Constitution. Petitioner has not established that the state’s alleged “failure” prevented

Petitioner from filing a timely habeas action. See Lott, 304 F.3d at 923-24 (collecting Ninth

Circuit cases concluding the petitioner was entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

based on an “impediment” to timely filing); Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1248 (11th Cir.

2006), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2007 WL 121124 (Apr. 16, 2007); Scott v. Johnson, 227

F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding the state had created an impediment by confiscating

the petitioner’s legal files and providing on an inadequate prison law library); Marengo v.

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Conway, 342 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Lloyd v. Miller, 152 F. Supp. 2d

1119, 1122 (N.D. Ind. 2001). An individual convicted by a state court has no federal

constitutional right to due process in state post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Shipley v.

Oklahoma, 313 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002). Petitioner has failed to establish

otherwise.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge, including the Amendment thereto.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be sent to Magistrate

Judge Mark E. Aspey.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action

accordingly.

DATED this 17th day of September, 2007.

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