Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00870/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00870-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

COREY MATTHEWS, #168496, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-CV-870-WHA

) [WO]

)

CLARENCE HAYMONS, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Corey Matthews (“Matthews”), a state inmate, 

challenges the constitutionality of actions taken against him during his incarceration at the

Covington County Jail. Matthews names Officer Clarence Haymons, Sheriff Dennis Meeks,

Jail Administrator Preston Hughes, Sgt. BillBlue and Officer David Anderson as defendants. 

In the complaint, Matthews maintains that defendant Haymons used excessive force against

him on the night of August 28, 2012 by throwing him to the floor and repeatedly

punching/kicking him in the face absent provocation or need for the use of force while Sgt.

Bill Blue failed to intervene to protect him from this assault. Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 3. 

Matthews further complains that the defendants denied him medical treatment for injuries

suffered during the incident. Id. Matthews seeks monetary damages for the alleged

violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 4. 

The defendantsfiled a special report, supplemental reports and supporting evidentiary

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 1 of 22
materials addressing Matthews’ claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case,

the court deems it appropriate to construe these reports as a motion for summary judgment. 

Order of March 8, 2013 - Doc. No. 49. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the evidentiarymaterials

filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint and the plaintiff’s response to the motion,

including supporting evidentiarymaterials, the court concludes that the motion for summary

judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving 1

for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 1

summary-judgment motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. 

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Despite these stylistic changes, the

substance of Rule 56 remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable

to the current rule. 

2

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 2 of 22
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings,

discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);

Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (moving party has

initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact for trial). The movant

may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact

or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support

ofsome element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 322-24. 

The defendants assert that they have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated

the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by

the plaintiff. The burden therefore shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate

evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v.

Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly

address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including

affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment

if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed -- show

that the movant is entitled to it.”); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party must then go

3

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 3 of 22
beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, [sworn statements or declarations under

penalty of perjury,] or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,”

demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider

“specific facts” pled in a plaintiff’s sworn complaint when considering his opposition to

summary judgment. Peebles v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir.

2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces

evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. 

Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313

(11th Cir. 2007). 

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to

survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, Matthews is

required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial

supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party

relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may

be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the

4

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 4 of 22
opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier

of fact] could reasonably find for that party. ” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77

(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242). Conclusory allegations based on

subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and,

therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115

F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . . , in the absence

of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”);

Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant ofsummaryjudgment appropriate

where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusoryallegations” challenging actions

of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Mere

verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary

judgment.”); Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory

allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a

plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the

burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarilyrenders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Sw. Forest

Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the

plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact,

5

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 5 of 22
granting ofsummaryjudgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023

(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (summary judgment appropriate where no genuine dispute of

material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must “consider all evidence

in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. -- and can

only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine

[dispute] of material fact exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th

Cir. 2012). In addition, the law is well settled that the evidence before court must at this

stage of the proceedings be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bradley v.

Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., 739 F.3d 606, 608 (11th Cir. 2014). 

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363

F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law

applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children

and Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that are

material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary

judgment.”). “The mere existence ofsome factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment

unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” 

McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation

omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary

judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

6

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 6 of 22
material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence

before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form

indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party moving for summary

judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323-24 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials, and

affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact); Waddell

v. Valley Forge Dental Assoc., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (To establish a

genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a

reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant

does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of

material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir.

1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard of

elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. The court has undertaken a

thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. In this case,

Matthews, through the submission of his sworn complaint and the evidentiary materials

submitted in response to the defendants reports, has demonstrated a genuine dispute of

7

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 7 of 22
material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment on his excessive force and

failure to protect claims. The defendants, however, are entitled to summary judgment on

Matthews’ claim regarding deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

 III. DISCUSSION2

In the instant complaint, Matthews challenges actions taken against him in August of

2012 during his last few days of confinement at the Covington County Jail. He seeks only

monetary damages from the defendants. 

A. Absolute Immunity

To the extent that Matthews lodges claims against the defendants in their official

capacities, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages.3

Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the

The evidentiary materials indicate that the alleged constitutional violations made the basis of the instant 2

complaint occurred during Matthews’ incarceration as a convicted inmate due to his violation of parole on a 2008

conviction for distribution of a controlled substance. Regardless of Matthews’ status in the jail either as a pre-trial

detainee or convicted inmate, the applicable standard of review remains the same. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);

Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490

(11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (“Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are

governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners. . . . However, the applicable standard is the

same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees.”);

Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986) (For analytical

purposes, there is no meaningful difference between the analysis required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that

required by the Eighth Amendment.); Tittle v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (observing

that “[w]hether the alleged violation is reviewed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial.”). 

Under all facets of Alabama law, a county sheriff and his correctional staff act as state officers “when 3

supervising inmates and otherwise operating the county jails.” Turquitt v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1289

(11th Cir. 1998); see Ala. Const. Art. V, § 112 (designates sheriff and, by extension, his staff as members of State’s

executive department); Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442 (Ala. 1987) (county sheriff is executive officer of the State). 

8

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 8 of 22
entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). 

A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School &

Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67

(1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity,see Seminole Tribe v.

Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996). 

Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City

of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and

Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state

officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official

capacities.

Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). 

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the defendants are state actors entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages

from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Harbert Int’l, Inc. v.

James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (state officials sued in their official capacities

are protected from suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment); Edwards v. Wallace

Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (damages are unavailable fromstate official

sued in his official capacity). The court will henceforth address the claims presented against

the defendants in their individual capacities. 

B. Excessive Force and Failure to Protect

(i) Qualified Immunity. With respect to Matthews’ excessive force and failure to

protect claims against defendants Haymons and Blue in their individual capacities, the

defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

9

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 9 of 22
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, if the defendant establishes that he

was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged

excessive force occurred, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the

defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Skop [v. City of Atlanta, 485

F.3d 1130, 1136-1137 (11th Cir. 2007)]. To defeat qualified immunity, a

plaintiff must show both that a constitutional violation occurred and that the

constitutional right violated was clearly established. Fennell [v. Gilstrap, 559

F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)]. In Eighth Amendment

excessive force cases, however, “the subjective element required to establish

[the constitutional violation] is so extreme that every conceivable set of

circumstances in which this constitutional violation occurs is clearly

established to be a violation of the Constitution.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280

F.3d 1308, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2002).

Bowden v. Stokely, 576 F. App’x 951, 954-55 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). “Moreover, an

officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim

of another officer’s use of excessive force can be held personally liable for his nonfeasance.” 

Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002). “While . . . there is no per se rule

barring qualified immunity in Eighth Amendment cases, where the plaintiff has sufficiently

alleged or shown a material dispute of fact as to an excessive force claim, summary judgment

based on qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Bowden, 576 F. App’x at 956. 

Accordingly, this court will consider whether the plaintiff’s allegations that Haymons

maliciouslyand sadisticallyused excessive force against himwhile Blue witnessed the attack

and failed to intervene, which the court must take as true for purposes ofsummary judgment,

sets forth a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

(ii) Excessive Force and Failure to Protect. Claims of excessive force by jail officials

against convicted inmates are governed by the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against

10

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 10 of 22
cruel and unusual punishment. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). 

The standard applied to an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim contains both a

subjective and objective component. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). The

subjective component requires that prison “officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state

of mind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (internal quotations omitted). With respect to the objective

component, a plaintiff must show that “the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful

enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. In addition, “the use of excessive

physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when

the inmate does not suffer serious injury.” Id. at 4. “Injury and force . . . are only imperfectly

correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten

by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has

the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38

(2010). The Court, however, further directed that “the relatively modest nature of [an

inmate’s] alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may recover.” Id. at 40. 

Under the Eighth Amendment, force is deemed legitimate in a custodial setting

as long as it is applied “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline

[and not] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986) (quoting Johnson

v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir.1973)); see also Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992). To determine if an

application of force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, a

variety of factors are considered including: “the need for the application of

force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the

threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made

to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Hudson, at 7-8, 112 S. Ct. 995;

11

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 11 of 22
see also Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S. Ct. 1078; Harris v. Chapman, 97

F.3d 499, 505 (11th Cir. 1996). From consideration of such factors,

“inferences may be drawn as to whether the use of force could plausibly have

been thought necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the

unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that

it occur.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (quoting Johnson, 481

F.2d at 1033). 

Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1300-01. 

“When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,”

the Court recognized, “contemporary standards of decencyalways are violated

. . . whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth

Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic

or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson,

503 U.S. at 9, 112 S. Ct. at 995[.]

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38. Thus, in an excessive force case such as the one at hand, 

the “core judicial inquiry” is “not whether a certain quantum of injury was

sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178, 175 L. Ed. 2d 995

(2010) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted) (concluding that a gratuitous

beating by prison guards, even without injuries requiring medical attention,

violated a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights).

Bowden, 576 F. App’x at 953. 

Matthews asserts that on August 28, 2012 at approximately 10:40 p.m. while confined

in the Covington County Jail defendant Haymons “[t]hrew me down to the floor and beat me

with his boots and fists.” Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 3. In support of this assertion, Matthews

maintains that Haymons approached his cell, threatened him and advised him “to pack his

things, he was going to lock-up.” Statement in Support of Compl. - Doc. No. 1-1 at 2. 

12

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 12 of 22
Matthews questioned Haymons regarding this order but “was complying” with the order

when Haymons “became angry and attacked Petitioner by grabbing him, throwing him to

the concret[e] floor and stomping him with his boot[s] and hitting him with his fist[s].” Id.

at 3. Matthews asserts that Sgt. Blue witnessed the unprovoked attack but did nothing to

protect him from Haymons. Id. 

Within minutes of the altercation, Sgt. Blue contacted the jail’s on-duty nurse, Pam

Gorum, and she conducted an examination of Matthews. Nurse Gorum noted only minor

injuries to Matthews but based on his complaints of “various pains” she ordered that he be

transported to the Andalusia Regional Hospital for evaluation. Defendants’ Exhibit 4 (Aff.

of Pamela Gorum) - Doc. No. 39-4 at 1. The medical records from the Andalusia Regional

Hospital establish that Matthews underwent triage assessment by the hospital’s emergency

room personnel at 12:23 a.m. at which time he complained of left knee pain. Defendants’

Exhibit C - Doc. No. 39-8 at 2. An examination of Matthews’ left knee showed his joint was

normal with normal range of motion. Id. at 5. An x-ray was also taken of his left knee. Id.

at 2-3. The x-ray showed no injury to Matthews’ left knee. Id. at 4. Specifically, the “AP,

lateral, and oblique views show no fracture or effusion [i.e., swelling of the knee]. The joint

spaces are maintained.” Id. Matthews received a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatorymedication

while in the emergency room. Id. at 2. At 1:25 a.m., the attending physician determined

Matthews’ condition was “improved” and “stable” and ordered his release from the

emergency room. Id. at 5. The attending physician did not order any further treatment for

13

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 13 of 22
Matthews. Id. 

The defendants deny Matthews’ claim regarding the use of excessive force and the

alleged failure to protect him from such force. Specifically, the defendants maintain that on

the night in question Matthews charged at Haymons and attempted to run past him which

caused Haymons to grab Matthews. Defendants’ Exhibit D (Statement of Clarence

Haymons) - Doc. No. 39-9 at 2. At this time, Matthews “began to fight and be combative. 

[Haymons] continued to escort him to C-Block [for lock-up]. [Matthews] tried to jump on

[Haymons] again so [Haymons] placed him on the floor and continued to escort him to CBlock.” Id. Sgt. Blue maintains that he did not intervene because “[a]t no time[] did

Correctional Officer Haymons use any greater amount of force than necessary in subduing

the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was the aggressor during the entire incident.” Defendants’ 

Exhibit 1 (Aff. of Bill Blue) - Doc. No. 39-1 at 2. After Haymons advised Matthews that he

would be moved from A-Block to C-Block for his disruptive behavior, “Matthews charged

towards the door” where Haymons was standing and “Haymons grabbed Matthews in an

attempt to keep him in the A-Block part of the Jail. Matthews began physically struggling

with Haymons after Haymons attempted to restrain Matthews. Matthews and Haymons

physically struggled on the floor until Haymons was able to subdue Matthews.” Id. 

Even though the defendants dispute the version of events presented by Matthews, the

court is required at this stage of the proceedings to view the facts in the light most favorable

to Matthews and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in his favor. Bradley, 739

14

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 14 of 22
F.3d at 608. In that vein, Matthews provides that defendant Haymons threw him to the floor

and then repeatedly punched and kicked him without provocation and while he posed no

threat to Haymons or the security of the jail. Matthews further asserts that defendant Blue

witnessed this attack without intervening to protect him from Haymons. Finally, Matthews

contends that the challenged actions resulted in a serious injury to his left knee. In sum,

Matthews contends “that he was the victimof an unprovoked attack in circumstances that did

not present a risk of creating a disturbance or harming staff or other inmates. This version

of the events could support an excessive force claim despite the lack of serious injuries.” 

Bowden, 576 F. App’x at 954.

As previouslyexplained, the defendants denyMatthews’ allegations regarding the use

of excessive force and maintain that at no time during the incident was more force used than

necessary to subdue and gain control of Matthews after he attempted to flee defendant

Haymons. Nevertheless, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Matthews, the court

concludes that defendants Haymons and Blue are not entitled to qualified immunity as the

plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive their motion for summary judgment regarding

the excessive force and failure to protect claims lodged against them. Skrtich, 280 F.3d at

1301. Specifically, disputed issues of material fact exist regarding the need for the use of

force, the nature of the force used and whether the defendants acted “maliciously and

sadistically” to cause harm. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment with respect

to the claims of excessive force and failure to protect lodged against defendants Haymons

15

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 15 of 22
and Blue is due to be denied. 

C. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Matthews alleges that the defendants denied him medical treatment for an injury to

his knee suffered in the physical confrontation with defendant Haymons. The defendants

adamantly deny this allegation and argue that Matthews received medical treatment from the

jail nurse within a short period of time following the incident and was thereafter transferred

to the emergency room at the Andalusia Regional Hospital for additional evaluation and

treatment. The records from the hospital indicate that Matthews arrived at the emergency

room within two hours of the incident. The jail nurse and the hospital’s emergency room

staff examined Matthews and provided treatment to himin accordancewith their professional

judgment. In addition, an x-ray performed at the hospital was negative for any structural

damage to Matthews’ left knee. Defendants’ Exhibit C - Doc. No. 39-8 at 4. 

A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with

“deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s health or safety when the official knows that the

inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm” and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). A

constitutional violation occurs onlywhen a plaintiff establishesthe existence of “a substantial

risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, . . . and [that] the official

does not respond[] reasonably to the risk[.]” Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028

(11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). To obtain relief, the plaintiff must also present evidence that the

16

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 16 of 22
constitutional violation caused him to suffer an injury. Id. at 1014. 

In Farmer, the Court identified both objective and subjective elements necessary to

establish an Eighth Amendment violation. With respect to the requisite objective elements, 

an inmate must first show “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm . . . exist[ed]. 

Second, once it is established that the official is aware of this substantial risk, the official

must react to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Marsh, 268 F.3d 1028-1029. 

As to the subjective elements, 

the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference. . . . The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual

“conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” . . . [A]n official’s

failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did

not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be

condemned as the infliction of punishment.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38 (emphasis added); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th

Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) (“Proof that the defendant should have perceived

the risk, but did not, is insufficient.”); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir.

1996) (same). The conduct at issue 

must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests

or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in

good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with

establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring

official control over a tumultuous cellblock.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (emphasis added). 

17

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 17 of 22
To be deliberatelyindifferent, Defendants must have been “subjectively

aware of the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have had a

‘“sufficiently culpable state of mind.”’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38, 114 S.

Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25,

115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991). . . . Even assuming the existence of a serious risk

of harm and legal causation, the prison official must be aware of specific facts

from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists - and the prison official must also “draw that inference.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. 

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). “The known risk of injury must

be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before [the responsible official’s] failure

to act can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th

Cir. 1990) (citations and internal quotations omitted). As the foregoing makes clear,

“[m]erely negligent [conduct] . . . does not justify liability under section 1983.” Id. 

Pursuant to the aforementioned criteria, Matthews is “required to produce sufficient

evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant[s’] deliberate

indifference to that risk; and (3) causation[]” in order to survive summary judgment on a

claim arising from alleged deliberate indifference by the defendants. Hale v. Tallapoosa

Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38 (To circumvent

entry of summary judgment on a properly supported motion, a plaintiff must produce

sufficient evidence which demonstrates (1) an objectively substantial risk of serious harm;

(2) a subjective awareness of this risk on the part of the defendant; (3) the defendants

responded to such risk in an objectively unreasonable manner; and (4) the actions/omissions

of the defendants caused his injuries); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028-29 (same). When seeking

18

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 18 of 22
relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an objectively

serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts

signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts.” Taylor, 221

F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official must know of

and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs

onlywhen a defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;

the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendant must have

actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge ofsymptoms, and ignore known

risk to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an

official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,

while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of

punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

The record before the court demonstrates that Matthews received medical treatment

for his injuries from both the jail’s nurse and free-world medical personnel at the Andalusia

Regional Hospital. Matthews has failed to present any evidence which indicates the

defendants knew that the manner in which Matthews received treatment created a substantial

risk to his health and that with this knowledge consciously disregarded such risk. The record

is therefore devoid of evidence, significantly probative or otherwise, showing that the

19

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 19 of 22
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Matthews’ medical needs. Consequently,

the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants

on the deliberate indifference claim presented by Matthews. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350;

Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564 n.6; Harris, 65 F.3d at 916.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment be GRANTED in part andDENIED

in part as follows.

2. The defendants’ motion for summaryjudgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claims

for monetary damages lodged against them in their official capacities be GRANTED and

these claims be DISMISSED with prejudice as the defendants are entitled to absolute

immunity against monetary damages. 

3. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claim of

deliberate indifference to his medical needs be GRANTED and this claim be DISMISSED

with prejudice.

4. The motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of defendants Dennis Meeks,

Preston Hughes and David Anderson with respect to the remaining claims presented against

these defendants in all aspects of their individual capacities be GRANTED.

5. The motion for summaryjudgment filed on behalf of defendants Clarence Haymons

and Bill Blue with respect to the plaintiff’s excessive force and failure to protect claims

20

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 20 of 22
lodged against them in their individual capacities be DENIED.

6. This case be referred to the undersigned for an evidentiaryhearing on the plaintiff’s

surviving claims of excessive force and failure to protect lodged against defendants Clarence

Haymons and Bill Blue. 

It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before August 26, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District

Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and,

therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 1982); see Stein v.

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11thCir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30,

1981). 

21

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 21 of 22
Done this 12th day of August, 2015.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

22

Case 2:12-cv-00870-WHA-WC Document 90 Filed 08/12/15 Page 22 of 22