Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00094/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ENLOE MEDICAL CENTER, No. 2:07-CV-0094-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CALIFORNIA NURSES ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

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Through the present action, Plaintiff Enloe Medical Center

(“Enloe”) seeks a declaration that it is not obligated to

arbitrate, under the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement

(“CBA”), a grievance filed by Defendant California Nurses

Association (“CNA”). The grievance relates to Enloe’s 1

termination of nurse Lee Rose (“Nurse Rose”).

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 While CNA’s Notice of Motion purports to move for 2

dismissal under Rule 12(c), the Points and Authorities filed in

support of the Motion do not otherwise address the 12(c) claim,

and consequently the Court declines to consider it. 

2

Presently before this Court is CNA’s Motion to Dismiss for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, Motion to

Compel Arbitration. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion 2

to Dismiss is DENIED and the Motion to Compel Arbitration is

GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Nurse Rose was hired as an employee of Enloe in 1993. 

According to Enloe’s complaint, in 2003 and 2004 patients and coworkers lodged several complaints against Nurse Rose for

inappropriate behavior. On or around March 2, 2004, Enloe

terminated Nurse Rose’s employment. On March 3, 2004, CNA filed a

grievance with Enloe’s human resources department, claiming that

Enloe violated a provision of the CBA by terminating Nurse Rose

without reasonable cause. Enloe denied the grievance and the

parties moved to arbitration, selecting Arbitrator Angelo as the

arbitrator in early 2005.

Concurrently with the arbitration proceedings, Nurse Rose

pursued a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Enloe learned of Nurse Rose’s

EEOC complaint on August 31, 2004. On September 7, 2005, the

EEOC issued a Determination finding that Nurse Rose had

reasonable cause to believe she was subjected to harassment and

disparate treatment based on her race and national origin.

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Nurse Rose subsequently filed an employment discrimination

lawsuit against Enloe in Butte County Superior Court on

August 29, 2006.

 On May 31, 2006, Enloe informed CNA that it believed the

claims were no longer arbitrable under the CBA because they were

based on discrimination. On July 18, 2006, Enloe informed

Arbitrator Angelo that it was cancelling the arbitration. On

September 12, 2006, Arbitrator Angelo stated that he would

proceed with the arbitration because CNA had assured him that the

grievance did not raise any prohibited issues. On September 18,

2006, Enloe wrote a letter to Arbitrator Angelo objecting to the

substantive arbitrability of the proceedings and stated the issue

should be determined by a court. Enloe and CNA’s disagreement on

this subject continued through letters to Arbitrator Angelo,

culminating in a letter by Arbitrator Angelo on November 2, 2006,

stating that the grievance was substantively arbitrable.

Enloe filed its Complaint for Declaratory Relief on

January 12, 2007, seeking a judicial determination that Nurse

Rose’s grievance was not subject to arbitration. CNA answered on

February 6, 2007. On February 16, 2007, CNA filed the present

motion.

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STANDARD

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a “facial attack” on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject-matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis (“factual attack”). Thornhill

Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th

Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d

884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion constitutes a factual

attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s

allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will

not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the

merits of jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, supra, 594 F.2d at

733 (quoting Mortensen, supra, 549 F.2d at 891). When resolving

a factual attack, the court “may review evidence beyond the

complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion

for summary judgment.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

ANALYSIS

1. Jurisdiction

In its Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss, CNA argues that this

Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether Nurse Rose’s claim

is substantively arbitrable because the parties submitted the

issue of arbitration directly to the arbitrator. 

The question of whether or not an issue is arbitrable “is

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undeniably an issue for judicial determination.” AT&T Tech.,

Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). The

parties may nonetheless agree to submit that question directly to

the arbitrator. George Day Constr. Co. Inc. v. United Bhd. of

Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471, 1474-

1475 (9th Cir. 1984). An agreement giving the arbitrator

authority to make that determination can be implied from the

conduct of the parties. Id. at 1475. Similarly, a party may

waive the right to a judicial determination of substantive

arbitrability. Id. (discussing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local

117 v. Washington Employers, Inc., 557 F.2d. 1345 (9th Cir.

1977)). However, “unless the parties clearly and unmistakably

provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to

arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”

AT&T Tech. Inc., supra, 475 U.S. at 649. 

CNA argues that Enloe submitted the question of arbitration

to Arbitrator Angelo because it voluntarily participated in

arbitration proceedings in which Arbitrator Angelo decided that

the grievance was substantively arbitrable. Once a party has

voluntarily submitted a claim to arbitration, he cannot challenge

the authority of the arbitrator to act simply because he received

an unfavorable ruling. Ficek v. S. Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657

(9th Cir. 1964). Moreover, once a party voluntarily participates

in arbitration hearings, the legitimacy of the proceedings cannot

be challenged shortly before the decision is announced. Fortune,

Alsweet and Eldridge, Inc. v. Daniel, 724 F.2d 1355, 1357

(9th Cir. 1983). 

In this case, hearings on the merits of the dispute have not

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 Unless, as mentioned above, the parties submit the 3

arbitrability question directly to the arbitrator.

6

yet occurred. After originally agreeing to arbitration, Enloe

changed its position because of its belief that CNA intended to

arbitrate a discrimination claim. Enloe first made this clear in

an e-mail to CNA on May 31, 2006 and then subsequently on

July 18, when Enloe wrote to Arbitrator Angelo and cancelled the

arbitration. Enloe further stated in its letter of September 18,

2006 that the arbitration dispute was over substantive issue of

whether the matter should be decided by arbitration and should be

decided by a court. Consequently, Enloe never “clearly and

unmistakably” submitted the issue of arbitration directly to

Arbitrator Angelo. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to

determine whether arbitration is appropriate in this case.

CNA further argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction under

section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because

Arbitrator Angelo has not issued a final award. Under

section 301, once an arbitrator has asserted jurisdiction over a

claim, a district court cannot review the arbitrator’s rulings

until a final award has been made. Orion Pictures Corp. v.

Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc., 946 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir.

1991). However, a district court may resolve disputes about an

arbitrator’s jurisdiction, even after the arbitrator has asserted

jurisdiction, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. at

725. Since Enloe’s complaint seeks relief under the Declaratory 3

Judgment Act, the arbitrator’s assertion of jurisdiction is

reviewable by this Court.

CNA also contends that Enloe’s request for declaratory

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relief is really an “Employer’s Grievance” under the CBA and

subject to arbitration. However, Enloe has made no claim that

CNA has breached any terms of the CBA. Enloe is merely seeking a

declaration that it does not have to arbitrate Nurse Rose’s

grievance. Therefore, this is not an Employer’s Grievance and is

not subject to arbitration.

In light of the fact that Enloe did not submit the

substantive arbitration claim to Arbitrator Angelo and Enloe is

seeking declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act,

CNA’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is denied.

Accordingly, the Court may address the merits of CNA’s Motion to

Compel Arbitration.

2. Motion to Compel

When a contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a

presumption of that the matter will be submitted to arbitration. 

AT&T Tech. Inc., supra, 475 U.S. at 650. Arbitration should be

compelled unless it is clear that the dispute is not covered by

the arbitration agreement. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior

& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583 (1960). Any doubts

should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. In making this

decision, the court looks only at whether the parties agreed to

arbitrate the claim, not to the merits of the of the claim

itself. AT&T Tech. Inc., supra, 475 U.S. at 649-650. 

In addition to the grievance filed by CNA, Nurse Rose has

filed a complaint in state court that her termination was due to

racial discrimination. Both parties acknowledge that they are

subject to the terms of the CBA which calls for arbitration of

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grievances. A grievance, as defined in Article 16(A)(1) of the

CBA, includes disputes “concerning whether or not discipline,

including discharge, is for reasonable cause.” However, Enloe

argues that claims of racial discrimination are not arbitrable

under the CBA. Article 4(B), which requires Enloe and CNA to

comply with all applicable discrimination laws, states that the

discrimination provision “do[es] not give rise to an independent

contractual right that would serve as the basis for a contractual

claim or grievance....” 

Enloe’s concern is that CNA is planning to use claims of

racial discrimination as the basis for stating that Nurse Rose

was terminated without reasonable cause. Enloe therefore refused

to carry on with the arbitration proceedings on the ground that

such a claim is not substantively arbitrable. However, CNA has

made assurances to both Arbitrator Angelo and this Court that it

does not intend to arbitrate a claim based on racial

discrimination. CNA contends that Enloe predicated Nurse Rose’s

termination on complaints and incidents that did not occur, and

is seeking to arbitrate on those grounds. Nurse Rose’s

discrimination claim is an additional claim that she is pursuing

separately from this arbitration. Consequently, there is no need

to reach the question of whether racial discrimination claims are

arbitrable, because that claim is not what is being arbitrated

here. 

Since the basis of the grievance is that Nurse Rose was

terminated without reasonable cause, the parties must arbitrate

that issue.

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3. Motion for Expedited Discovery

Enloe’s opposition to CNA’s Motion included its own Motion

for Expedited Discovery. Enloe requests that it be allowed to

conduct limited discovery to determine whether CNA intends to

argue or present evidence at the arbitration that Nurse Rose was

subjected to race discrimination. However, CNA has already

stated that it does not intend to pursue a discrimination claim

at the arbitration. Moreover, Enloe will have the opportunity to

discover much of that information in Nurse Rose’s Superior Court

action. Therefore, Enloe’s Motion for Expedited Discovery is

DENIED.

4. Attorney’s Fees

Attorney’s fees may be appropriate “when a party frivolously

or in bad faith refuses to submit a dispute to arbitration.”

United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736

F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, Enloe objected to the

arbitration because of its belief that the dispute involved

claims of discrimination. That belief was based on the fact that

Nurse Rose filed an EEOC claim alleging discrimination, in

addition to the grievance filed through CNA. 

While arbitration is required in this case, Enloe’s claim

for declaratory relief was nevertheless not frivolous or in bad

faith. Therefore, CNA’s request for attorney’s fees is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, CNA’s Motion to Dismiss is

DENIED and it’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. CNA’s

request for Attorney’s Fees is DENIED. Enloe’s Motion for

Expedited Discovery is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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