Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00569/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00569-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

JAMES A. STEPHENS, III, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2:14cv569-MEF-WC 

 ) 

GLEN GOGGANS and JO LYNN ) 

BURNETTE, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Injunctive Relief Status Pro Ante. Mot. (Doc. 4). 

Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 65, wherein Plaintiff seeks an injunction. The motion does not set forth 

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff states that he seeks immediate relief 

“because of fear of actions Judge Goggans and or Mrs. Jo Lynn Burnette might make.” 

Id. at 1. Plaintiff then states that “[a] civil lawsuit has been engaged and it would not 

serve to be brought before Judge Goggans for any reason.” Id. It appears Plaintiff may 

be seeking an injunction to bar Judge Goggans from presiding over some matter; 

however, it is unclear whether this relates to a criminal or civil matter and whether those 

proceedings are ongoing or have been concluded. For the reasons that follow, it is the 

recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that the motion be denied. 

Case 2:14-cv-00569-MEF-WC Document 6 Filed 06/16/14 Page 1 of 4
I. DISCUSSION

 The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound 

discretion of the district court.” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). 

The four prerequisites which Plaintiff must demonstrate are: (1) a substantial likelihood 

of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury without the 

injunction; (3) that the harm to Plaintiff outweighs the harm to the non-moving parties; 

and (4) that an injunction would be in the interest of the public. Palmer, 287 F.3d at 

1329; Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber 

& Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1983). “[A] preliminary injunction is an 

extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established 

the burden of persuasion” as to each of the four prerequisites. See McDonald’s Corp. v. 

Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted); see also Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (grant 

of preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule,” and movant must clearly 

carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party’s failure to demonstrate a “substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits” may defeat the party’s claim, regardless of the 

party’s ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 

F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th 

Cir. 2000) (noting that “the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury 

would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper”). 

 The court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction 

and finds that he is unable to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. In an 

Case 2:14-cv-00569-MEF-WC Document 6 Filed 06/16/14 Page 2 of 4
order filed contemporaneously and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court has stayed 

service of process of this action and ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why this case 

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Plaintiff’s inability to even state a claim within his Complaint evidences that he is unable 

to meet his burden of showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his 

claims. The undersigned, therefore, concludes that Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary 

injunction should be denied. 

II. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4) be DENIED. 

 It is further 

 ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before June 30, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

Case 2:14-cv-00569-MEF-WC Document 6 Filed 06/16/14 Page 3 of 4
(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981. 

 Done this 16th day of June, 2014. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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