Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-02293/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-02293-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES MAURICE DUCKETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORIZON PHS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02293-KAW (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Plaintiff James Maurice Duckett, a state prisoner incarcerated at Santa Rita County Jail 

(“SRCJ”), has filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the violation 

of his constitutional rights by SRCJ and Corizon PHS. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of 

the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge over this action. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis is granted in a separate order. The Court now reviews Plaintiff’s 

complaint.

DISCUSSION

I. Preliminary Review of Complaint

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

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United States District Court

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the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 

plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the 

deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation, 756 

F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City 

of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a constitutional 

right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's 

affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes the 

deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 

Under no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Lemire, 756 

F.3d at 1074. Or, in layman's terms, under no circumstances is there liability under section 1983 

solely because one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 

680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 

1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). It is 

insufficient for a plaintiff only to allege that supervisors knew about the constitutional violation 

and that they generally created policies and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging 

“a specific policy” or “a specific event” instigated by them that led to the constitutional violations. 

Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012).

II. Plaintiff’s Claim

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff has a long history of glaucoma and has pain in both 

eyes and vision problems. He needs eye drops and eye glasses. He has requested to be seen by an 

optometrist, but was only put on a list. Finally, he saw an optometrist at Corizon Health Care. 

The optometrist diagnosed his glaucoma but denied Plaintiff the eye drops he needs. 

These allegations indicate that Plaintiff is attempting to state an Eighth Amendment claim 

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for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth 

Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 

1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two 

requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the 

official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a 

prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference 

when he knows of and disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health or safety. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Such indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown in the way in which prison 

officials provide medical care. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062.

Plaintiff’s allegations appear to meet the objective prong of the Farmer test in that his 

glaucoma appears to be a serious medical need. However, even liberally construed, the allegations 

do not meet Farmer’s subjective prong because they do not indicate that any individual knew of 

Plaintiff’s glaucoma and delayed or denied him treatment for it. Plaintiff states that the Corizon 

optometrist diagnosed his glaucoma and did not prescribe the necessary eye drops. If Plaintiff 

named this optometrist as a defendant, the allegations, liberally construed, would appear to state a 

claim against her. However, the allegations do not state a claim against SRCJ or Corizon Health 

Care because there is no supervisorial liability under § 1983.

Therefore, the claims against SRCJ and Corizon are dismissed. However, Plaintiff is 

granted leave to amend to name as defendants the individual or individuals who denied, delayed or 

intentionally interfered with his medical treatment. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. The Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need 

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(glaucoma) is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set forth above. 

The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this Order is filed 

and must include the caption and civil case number used in this Order and the words AMENDED 

COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original 

complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the original 

complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the specified time period will result in this claim 

being dismissed with prejudice. 

2. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 

Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so 

may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2016

______________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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