Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00500/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00500-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JEFFERY McCARTER, # 176854, )

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:13cv500-WHA 

 ) (WO)

KENNETH SCONYERS, et al., )

 )

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

filed by Alabama prisoner Jeffery McCarter (“McCarter”). Doc. No. 1. For the reasons 1

stated below, the court finds that McCarter’s petition should be denied without an evidentiary

hearing. Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 9, 2011, a Houston County jury found McCarter guilty of second-degree

rape, in violation of § 13A-6-62, Ala. Code 1975. On September 21, 2011, the trial court

sentenced McCarter as a habitual felony offender to 30 years in prison.

McCarter appealed, asserting claims that (1) the trial court, by granting the State’s

motion in limine, denied him the opportunity to present evidence to show that the victim had

a motive and opportunity to fabricate her allegations against him; (2) he was prejudiced by

Document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are those assigned by the Clerk of Court in this action.

1

Exhibits filed by the respondents’ with their Answer are referenced as “Resp’ts Ex.” Page

references are to those assigned by CM/ECF.

Case 1:13-cv-00500-WHA-WC Document 12 Filed 09/11/15 Page 1 of 9
the trial court’s refusal to give his proposed jury instructions; and (3) his sentence was

excessive. Resp’ts Ex. 3.

On August 10, 2012, by unpublished memorandum opinion, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed McCarter’s conviction and sentence. Resp’ts Ex. 4. McCarter’s

application for rehearing was overruled, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied his petition

for certiorari review. Resp’ts Exs. 5-7. A certificate of judgment was issued on October 15,

2012. Resp’ts Ex. 8.

On July 11, 2013, McCarter filed this § 2254 petition, presenting as his sole claim that

the trial court denied his right to present a defense when it granted the State’s motion in

limine to exclude evidence he says would have demonstrated the victim’s motive for

fabricating allegations against him. Doc. No. 1 at 5. 

II. DISCUSSION

McCarter’s claim was fully discussed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in

its memorandum opinion on direct appeal:

McCarter first argues that the trial court arbitrarily denied him the

opportunity to present a complete defense to the charge of rape by granting the

State’s motion in limine. Specifically, he contends that this ruling denied him

his opportunity to present evidence to show that H.C. [the victim] had motive

and opportunity to fabricate her allegations against him. He argues that the

trial court prohibited him from testifying about H.C.’s motive, and the trial

judge arbitrarily admitted portions of H.C.’s taped interview, but excluded the

portions during which she admitted having conversations with the two female

patients about their failed attempts to get transferred from Laurel Oaks

2

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behavioral facility. McCarter maintains that the United States Supreme Court 2

in Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006), has held that a trial

court’s authority to procedurally exclude evidence must give way to a criminal

defendant’s right to present a complete defense and, thus, he should have been

given a chance to present evidence showing H.C.’s motive.

The State argues that the evidence indicating that other female residents

at Laurel Oaks made out-of-court statements accusing McCarter of the same

acts would constitute inadmissible hearsay evidence. The State further claims

that, if the court had allowed McCarter’s counsel to offer collateral act

evidence for admission, that evidence would be violative of Rule 404(b), Ala.

R. Evid., highly prejudicial and not strategically beneficial to McCarter’s

defense.

In the present case, the State made an oral motion in limine prior to trial

asking the circuit court to prohibit defense counsel from discussing whether

there were other victims who made similar allegations against McCarter. The

State argued that the false accusations by others were not relevant and had no

bearing on this case because H.C. never made a false accusation. In response

to the State’s motion, defense counsel argued that evidence of the false

allegations by other girls was relevant and was a substantial part of McCarter’s

defense. Specifically, defense counsel argued that because the false

allegations by the other girls were the exact allegations that H.C. made in this

case, and due to evidence that H.C. wanted to be let out of Laurel Oaks,

McCarter contended that she learned how to make the allegations by talking

to the other girls. Defense counsel also argued that H.C. made known to a

Child Advocacy Center worker during a video-taped interview, as well as in

some other reports, that she knew of these other persons and the allegations,

and that the allegations were made prior to her making the same allegations.

The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine, and also stated that

it would wait for the evidence to be presented at trial before reopening the

issue. During testimony at trial, McCarter’s counsel requested that the court

allow him to present evidence of the existence of the prior false allegations by

Laurel Oaks, in Dothan, Alabama, is a residential treatment facility for children and

2

adolescents with behavioral disorders. At the time of the offense, H.C. was fifteen years old and

a resident-patient at Laurel Oaks. McCarter, thirty-eight years old at the time of the offense,

worked at Laurel Oaks as a mental health technician with the responsibility of providing daily

care and protection for patients.

3

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the other girls, as well as evidence that H.C. knew of these allegations and

formed a motive and plan to make her allegations against McCarter. The

circuit court again denied defense counsel’s motion.

“The decision to grant or deny a motion in limine rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be overturned on appeal

absent an abuse of discretion.” Marshall v. State, 999 So. 2d 762, 775 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2007) (citing Hulsey v. State, 866 So. 2d 1180, 1188 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2003)). “‘Rulings on the materiality, relevancy, and remoteness of

evidence are matters resting within the discretion of the trial court. Such

rulings will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the court’s ruling

was a gross abuse of discretion.’” Marshall, 992 So. 2d at 776 (quoting

Moseley v. Lewis & Brackin, 583 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Ala. 1991)).

“It is the duty of the trial judge to limit the evidence to matters in issue

so that the jury is not distracted from the main issue or to questions which are

of doubtful relevancy.” Lawrence v. State, 443 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1983) (citing Gulley v. State, 342 So.2d 1362 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977)). 

“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Rule

401, Ala. R. Evid. “The trial court may exclude evidence when it is such as

to furnish a basis for nothing more than mere conjecture or remote inferences

to the transaction under investigation.” Trawick v. State, 431 So. 2d 574, 578

(Ala. Crim. App. 1983). Moreover, “. . . a trial court is allowed to limit the

admission of relevant evidence during trial if the evidence’s ‘probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’ Rule 403, Ala. R.

Evid.” Adams v. State, 821 So. 2d 227, 235 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001).

The record indicates that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the proffered evidence was not relevant to the case at hand. 

The fact there may have been other false allegations against this defendant by

other individuals and that the victimmayhave known about the allegations has

no bearing on any issue in the present case and does nothing more than present

conjecture or remote inferences. Accordingly, the trial court properlyexcluded

such evidence and did not abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s

motion in limine.

4

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Resp’ts Ex. 4 at 2-4 (footnote added).

“As a general rule, a federal court in a habeas corpus case will not review the trial

court’s actions concerning the admissibility of evidence,” Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541,

1555 (11 Cir. 1994), since the state court “has wide discretion in determining whether to th

admit evidence at trial, and may exclude material evidence when there is a compelling reason

to do so.” Lynd v. Terry, 470 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Baxter v. Thomas,

45 F.3d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1995) (evidentiary ruling claims reviewed only to determine

whether the alleged error “was ofsuch magnitude as to deny fundamental fairness”). Where

the petitioner claims that the state court’s evidentiary ruling deprived him of due process, the

habeas court asks only whether the error was of such magnitude as to deny the petitioner his

right to a fair trial, i.e., whether the error “was material as regards a critical, highly significant

factor.” Alderman, 22 F.3d at 1555; see also Kight v. Singletary, 50 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th

Cir.1995). Claims in this regard are subject to a harmless error analysis and will not support

federal habeas relief unless the asserted error “had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993) (quotation omitted).

At trial, H.C. testified that McCarter had sexual intercourse with her in a linen room

in a residential unit at Laurel Oaks. Resp’ts Ex. 2-C at 17-19. H.C. was fifteen years old

5

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when the incident occurred and McCarter was thirty-eight. A rape-kit examination 3

performed on H.C. revealed the presence of semen in her panties with a DNA profile

matching McCarter’s DNA. Resp’ts Ex. 2-B at 107-08.

McCarter’s trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined H.C. and attempted to impeach

her testimony through inconsistencies or by suggesting that she did not like being at Laurel

Oaks, wanted to be transferred to a facility closer to her father, and was motivated to

fabricate allegations against McCarter to obtain a transfer out of Laurel Oaks. Resp’ts Ex.

2-C at 24-41.

McCarter testified and claimed that H.C. “came on” to him during the linen-room

incident, pulled her pants down, and indicated she wanted to have sex with him, but that he

rebuffed her sexual advances and told her to put her clothes back on. Resp’ts Ex. 2-C at 51-

53. According to McCarter, H.C. then pulled her pants up and, as he was telling her the

situation was inappropriate, he masturbated in front of her until he ejaculated. Id. at 54-55. 

McCarter maintained that he never touched H.C. during the incident or made any sexual

contact with her. Id. at 54-55, 61, 91. He could not explain the presence of his semen in

H.C.’s panties. See id. at 82, 86-88. 

Here, it was within the trial court’s discretion to find that supposedly false allegations

McCarter was tried for second-degree rape, in violation of § 13A-6-62, Ala. Code 1975.

3

That statute makes it an offense for a person “16 years old or older [to] engage[ ] in sexual

intercourse with a member of the opposite sex less than 16 and more than 12 years old . . .

provided . . . the actor is at least two years older than the member of the opposite sex.” § 13A-6-

62(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975.

6

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against McCarter by other individuals in unrelated incidents – even if H.C. knew of those

allegations – was not relevant to any issue in the case at hand. The notion that H.C.’s

awareness of such allegations formed a motive to make her allegations against McCarter is

based entirely on conjecture and thinly supported inferences. Moreover, even without

bringing in evidence of the unrelated incidents, McCarter’s trial counsel suggested during

cross-examination that H.C. was motivated to fabricate allegations against McCarter to

obtain a transfer out of Laurel Oaks – supposedly, McCarter’s purpose for seeking to

introduce the evidence of the unrelated incidents. Furthermore, even if the evidence was

relevant, the state court found it inadmissable under the reasoning of Ala.R.Evid. 403, which

allows the exclusion of relevant evidence if the probative value is outweighed by unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Evidence of false allegations

against McCarter by other individuals in unrelated cases was substantially less probative to

show a motive for H.C.’s allegations than it was likely to confuse the issues and mislead the

jury by unfairly – and improperly – suggesting that H.C.’s allegations were false merely

because other individuals had made false allegations in unrelated cases. Thus, this court

cannot say that McCarter was denied a fundamentally fair trial because of the exclusion of

this evidence. Alderman, 22 F.3d at 1555. Consequently, he is not entitled to habeas relief

based on this claim.

4

The court also finds that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision rejecting 4

McCarter’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

(continued...)

7

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION ofthe Magistrate Judge that the petition

for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by McCarter be DENIED and that this

case be DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before September 25, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District

Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and,

therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 1982); see Stein v.

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11thCir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions

 (...continued) 4

United States Supreme Court precedent, and it was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) & (2);

see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 & 412-13 (2000).

8

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of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30,

1981). 

Done this 11th day of September, 2015.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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