Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05023/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05023-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAN VAN DUSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-05023-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 170, 171, 172, 174, 176, 179, 

182, 183, 185, 188, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195,

196, 197

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff Jan Van Dusen’s Second Amended Complaint. 

Defendants primarily argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477 (1994), and Yount v. City of Sacramento, 43 Cal. 4th 885 (2008). The Court agrees with 

Defendant’s argument that Heck mandates dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims. For that reason 

and others explained below, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss without leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The State Court Proceeding

On July 25, 2014, Plaintiff was convicted of animal cruelty under California Penal Code 

Section 597(b). See Dkt. 136. The conviction was based on evidence recovered during the search 

of Plaintiff’s home and the seizure of her animals pursuant to a search warrant executed by the 

Oakland Police Department and Oakland Animal Services in October 2011. See Dkt. 198, Ex. C.1 

 

1 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of several adjudicative facts based on 

documents related to and filed in Plaintiff’s state criminal proceeding, including the search 

warrant, trial transcript, exhibit list, sentencing hearing transcript, and Plaintiff’s motion to 

suppress. See Dkt. 198, Exs. A-D; Dkt. 173, Exs. A-D. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ 

request. Courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel 

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s state criminal proceeding 

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During the course of the criminal proceeding, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence to 

challenge the validity of the search warrant, in part because she contended that there was no 

probable cause. See Dkt. 173, Ex. A. In her motion, Plaintiff described the alleged conspiracy 

that forms the basis of her Section 1983 claims in the SAC. Id. The motion was denied. See id.

Ex. B.

B. The Federal Court Proceeding

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on October 28, 2013 and her First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”) on March 15, 2014, alleging a broad conspiracy among public officials, police officers, 

prosecutors, and non-profit organizations to implement a gossip campaign and conduct an 

unlawful search of her home and seizure of her cats. Plaintiff brought suit against a large number 

of defendants, including the City of Oakland and its officials at the Oakland Police Department, 

Oakland Animal Services, and the Oakland City Attorney; the County of Alameda and its 

prosecutors; various non-profit organizations and their individual employees (collectively, “NonProfit Defendants”); and other individuals. 

On October 24, 2014, the Court issued an Order dismissing the FAC under Heck and Yount

because “[j]udgment in favor of Van Dusen would require finding the search and seizure were 

unlawful and there was no legal basis for charging her with a crime,” which would “necessarily 

imply the invalidity of her conviction.” Dkt. 160. The Court granted Plaintiff “one final 

opportunity” to amend her Complaint “[t]o the extent she is able to assert claims not barred by 

Heck or Yount,” and denied Plaintiff’s request for a stay. Id.

On November 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant 

to the Court’s Order. Dkt. 162. The SAC names the same defendants as the FAC and contains an 

identical 102-paragraph “Statement of Facts.” The FAC and the SAC allege identical California 

state law causes of action. The SAC includes the same four Section 1983 causes of action that are 

alleged in the FAC. The only apparent difference between the SAC and the FAC is the inclusion 

of three additional Section 1983 causes of action based specifically on 1) “Illegal Seizure” (First 

 

is directly related to the Heck analysis and therefore grants Defendants’ request. 

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Cause of Action); 2) “Unreasonable Search and Seizure” (Second Cause of Action); and 3) 

“Abuse of Authority” during the twenty-month time period leading up to and including the 

October 2011 seizure of Plaintiff’s animals (Fourth Cause of Action). The remaining causes of 

action replicate those included in the FAC: Section 1983 - “Abuse of Authority,” October 2011-

Trial; Section 1983, March 2010-Trial, against City of Oakland; Section 1983, March 2010-Trial, 

against individual police officers; Section 1983, against County of Alameda; Malicious 

Prosecution; California Civil Code § 52.1; California Civil Code § 51.7; Negligent Supervision; 

and Negligence.

Defendants collectively filed ten motions to dismiss the SAC in early December 2014.2 

Defendants primarily argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey and Yount v. 

City of Sacramento. In the alternative, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed 

for a variety of other reasons. Plaintiff filed her Opposition on January 30, 2015 and an Amended 

Opposition on February 2, 2015.3 The Court heard arguments on April 2, 2015.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard 

requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

 

2 Defendants also filed seven motions to strike the SAC, in whole or in part. Because the Court 

finds that the SAC must be dismissed in its entirety, the motions to strike are DENIED AS 

MOOT.

3

In conjunction with her Oppositions, Plaintiff requested that the Court take judicial notice of 

several documents she filed in her state criminal proceeding. See Dkt. 208. For the reasons stated 

above in connection with Defendants’ request for judicial notice, the Court grants Plaintiff’s 

request. However, the Court notes that the emails and other evidentiary documents attached to 

Plaintiff’s state court filings are relevant to the Heck analysis only to the extent they demonstrate 

what evidence and legal argument have already been considered and ruled upon by the state court. 

See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (taking 

judicial notice of written briefs and hearing transcript from related proceeding in order “[t]o 

determine what issues were actually litigated” in context of issue preclusion analysis). Thus, the 

Court considers the documents only for that purpose. 

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has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although courts do not 

require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, a plaintiff must provide 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do,” id. at 555. The plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.” Id.

B. Section 1983 Claims

As an initial matter, the Court observes that the SAC is materially unchanged from the 

FAC. Therefore, Plaintiff has not complied with this Court’s October 24, 2014 Order requiring 

her to “assert claims not barred by Heck or Yount.” The “Statement of Facts” is identical in both 

documents, and the superficially new causes of action in the SAC do nothing more than repackage 

and repeat those allegations that form the basis of the Section 1983 causes of action asserted in the 

FAC. Nor does Plaintiff offer any new legal arguments as to why Heck and Yount do not bar her 

claims in full. Plaintiff has not articulated any reason why the analysis underlying this Court’s 

October 24, 2014 Order should change. However, for the sake of clarity, the Court details below 

the several reasons why Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims must be dismissed. 

1. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims Are Barred By Heck

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court considered a Section 1983 claim brought by a 

plaintiff who was simultaneously pursuing an appeal in state court of his conviction for voluntary 

manslaughter. 512 U.S. at 478. In federal court, the plaintiff sought damages resulting from the 

allegedly “unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation” conducted by state officials leading 

to his arrest, and the destruction and manipulation of evidence during the state criminal proceeding 

by those same officials. Id. at 479. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s Section 1983 

claims, the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for . . . harm caused by actions 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove 

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determinations, or called into question 

by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. The Court directed district courts to 

“consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

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conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can 

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487.

While “the Supreme Court left open the question whether Heck’s bar applies to Fourth 

Amendment violations,” the Ninth Circuit has since “answered that question in the affirmative.” 

Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 583 (9th Cir. 2007). In Harvey v. Waldron, the Ninth Circuit 

held that Section 1983 claims that allege “illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which 

criminal charges are based” must be dismissed under Heck. 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000). 

(affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims seeking damages related to an allegedly 

unlawful search and seizure because the seized gaming devices formed the evidentiary basis of 

plaintiff’s state criminal conviction for illegal possession of gaming devices); see also Whitaker, 

486 F.3d at 584 (“[Plaintiffs] claim that Defendants committed judicial deception to obtain the 

wiretap warrants and then impermissibly hid the existence of, and evidence produced by, those 

wiretaps—evidence that triggered the police investigations and state prosecutions against them. In 

other words, they challenge the search and seizure of the evidence upon which their criminal 

charges and convictions were based. Heck and Harvey bar such a collateral attack through the 

vehicle of a civil suit.”).

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit have found that Heck bars 

Section 1983 claims based on facts analogous to those here. In Blank v. Pennsylvania Society for 

the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the plaintiff alleged that “defendants engaged in a 

conspiracy falsely to accuse and convict [plaintiff] under Pennsylvania law of animal cruelty in 

relation to his licensed dog kennel.” No. 10-3222, 2010 WL 3927590, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 

2010). The Blank Plaintiff brought various causes of action under Section 1983 alleging a civil 

rights conspiracy, unconstitutional search and seizure, and failure to supervise. Id. at *2. The 

Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the claims were barred by Heck, concluding 

that 

[Plaintiff’s] federal claims are contingent on the proposition that 

genuine evidence of the crimes to which he pled guilty did not exist 

and that no investigation or charges would have been brought 

against him but for a deliberate conspiracy carried out by the 

Defendants. Accordingly, [Plaintiff’s] claims are irreconcilable with 

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his guilty plea, and if successful, they would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his convictions.

434 Fed. Appx. 147, 148-49 (3rd Cir. 2011).

In the case at hand, Plaintiff brings seven causes of action under Section 1983, all of which 

seek damages stemming from an alleged widespread conspiracy by the City of Oakland, the 

County of Alameda, numerous non-profit organizations, and other individuals to unlawfully 

remove her cats from her home and maliciously prosecute her for a felony. The Court finds that 

all of the Section 1983 claims alleged in the SAC constitute impermissible collateral attacks on 

Plaintiff’s conviction for animal cruelty. It is telling that much of the substance of Plaintiff’s 

Opposition is devoted to arguing that the October 2011 seizure of her animals, and the 

investigation leading up to it, were illegal—exactly what Heck dictates may not be relitigated in 

federal court. See Dkt. 209 at 4:11-19; 9:1:15; 13:1-12; 14:19-24; 15:18-17:8; 19:1-17. Plaintiff’s 

Section 1983 claims are all premised on the unlawfulness of the search of her home and seizure of 

her animals. That allegedly unlawful search and seizure produced the “evidence upon which 

criminal charges [were] based.” Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1015; see Dkt. 198, Ex. C. Under Ninth 

Circuit precedent, these claims are therefore barred by Heck. See Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1015. 

Furthermore, the reasonableness of the search and seizure has already been litigated in state court 

pursuant to Plaintiff’s motion to suppress evidence, and the issue was resolved in Defendants’ 

favor. See Dkt. 173, Exs. A & B. Indeed, that motion contained arguments directed not only to 

the unlawfulness of the seizure itself but also to the alleged conspiratorial actions that took place 

during the 20 months leading up to the seizure. Id. Under Heck, this Court must dismiss all of 

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims.

Plaintiff argues that her “claims for actions taken against her before [the search and 

seizure] should have no bearing on her conviction,” and therefore are not barred by Heck. Dkt. 

209 at 3. But even Plaintiff’s claims based on activity occurring before the October 2011 seizure 

are premised on the allegation that Plaintiff was acting lawfully. See SAC ¶¶ 86-89 (alleging that 

Defendants knew there “was no legal basis” to bring charges against her during the course of the 

alleged harassment campaign). Furthermore, it is unclear what damages Plaintiff suffered as a 

result of pre-October 2011 activity, apart from damages arising from the allegedly unlawful search 

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and seizure. If she did suffer any damages independent of the search and seizure, her claims 

seeking such damages are time-barred. See Section II.B.2 below.

Plaintiff further argues that “[t]he Supreme Court suggests abstention rather than dismissal 

when a federal civil rights lawsuit is brought during the pendency of a criminal trial or appeal.” 

Dkt. 209 at 2. Plaintiff cites to a footnote in the Heck opinion noting that “abstention may be an 

appropriate response” in such a situation. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.8. This footnote does not 

mandate abstention, and the Court finds that dismissal—which is the approach actually taken in 

Heck, see 512 U.S. at 490—is the more appropriate course of action here. If—and only if—

Plaintiff’s state conviction is eventually overturned, she may renew her Section 1983 claims to the 

extent they are not otherwise barred for the reasons discussed below.

2. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims Based On Conduct Before October 27, 2011 

Are Time-Barred

A federal claim “accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 

which is the basis of the action.” Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). Since 

Section 1983 does not on its face contain a limitations period, federal courts “look to the statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 

955 (9th Cir. 2004). In California, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two 

years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. 

The search and seizure of Plaintiff’s home occurred on October 27, 2011. SAC ¶ 161. 

Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on October 28, 2013. Dkt. 1. Because of the two-year 

limitations period on Section 1983 claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims based on injuries 

sustained prior to October 27, 2011 must be dismissed. For example, Plaintiff alleges that, 

beginning in March 2010, Defendant Webb “regularly harassed Plaintiff by telephoning and 

demanding to inspect Plaintiff’s home,” and “continued her harassment and threats for the next 12 

to 15 months.” SAC ¶¶ 97-98. Plaintiff thus had reason to know of any alleged injury that 

occurred as a result of the alleged conspiratorial actions well before the seizure occurred on 

October 27, 2011. The Court finds that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff from seeking 

damages for such actions via a Section 1983 claim. 

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3. Prosecutor Defendants Are Immune From Suit Under Section 1983

A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims when he “acts within the 

scope of his prosecutorial duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976). District 

attorneys act in a prosecutorial capacity and are thus immune from suit when they are “preparing 

to prosecute [or are] prosecuting criminal violations.” Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Cnty. of Inyo, 291 

F.3d 549, 565 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff alleges that City of Oakland and County of Alameda prosecutors participated in 

the conspiracy by investigating and prosecuting her for violations of state criminal animal cruelty 

statutes. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 173, 198-202. Plaintiff argues that County of Alameda Defendants and 

Oakland City Attorney Defendants are not protected by prosecutorial immunity because “the 

District Attorney was not acting in a purely prosecutorial capacity in this case at any time: it was 

simultaneously attempting to minimize the county’s liability for Defendant FAMULENER’s 

participation in the harassment campaign against Plaintiff and her participation in the illegal 

seizure.” Dkt. 209 at 8. Leaving aside Plaintiff’s unclear line of reasoning, there are no 

allegations supporting this argument in the SAC. Furthermore, the existence of prosecutorial 

immunity is not affected by the motive of the prosecutor in bringing the charges. Imbler, 424 U.S. 

at 427. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the County of Alameda

Defendants and the Oakland City Attorney Defendants must be dismissed because those parties

are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from Section 1983 claims based on the facts 

alleged in the SAC.

4. Plaintiff Fails To Allege Sufficient Facts To Demonstrate That Non-Profit 

Defendants Acted Under Color of State Law

Only those persons acting “under color of” state law are subject to Section 1983 liability. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, “absent some showing that a private party had 

some control over state officials’ decision [to commit the challenged act], the private party did not 

proximately cause the injuries stemming from [the act].” King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 829 

(9th Cir. 1986). 

Non-Profit Defendants are private entities and individuals. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 40, 42, 46, 

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50, 58. While Plaintiff alleges that certain East Bay SPCA Defendants participated along with the 

Oakland Animal Services Defendants in the allegedly unlawful search and seizure, see SAC ¶ 161,

the SAC does not allege that any of the Non-Profit Defendants had “control” over the decision of 

the OAS and OPD to execute the search warrant and seize Plaintiff’s animals, or any other alleged 

actions taken by state officials. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient 

facts to state a claim for Section 1983 liability against Non-Profit Defendants. 

5. Plaintiff Fails To State Section 1983 Monell Claims

Section 1983 suits against local governments alleging constitutional rights violations by 

government officials cannot rely solely on respondeat superior liability. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 

486 F.3d at 581; see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, 

plaintiffs must establish that “the local government had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice 

that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [they] suffered.” Whitaker, 486 F.3d 

at 581 (citations omitted). In order to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipal entity, a 

plaintiff must therefore plead four elements: 1) the plaintiff possesses a constitutional right of 

which he or she was deprived; 2) the municipality had a policy, custom, or practice; 3) the policy, 

custom, or practice amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and 4) 

the policy, custom, or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See 

Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. #40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). In order to survive 

a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, Monell claims “must not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, 

but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 

631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012).

The SAC contains formulaic allegations that, for example, the Oakland Police Department 

and Oakland Animal Services had a “custom, policy, or repeated practice of condoning and tacitly 

encouraging the abuse of police authority, and disregard for the constitutional rights of citizens.” 

SAC ¶ 201. But Plaintiff does not plead specific facts that support the existence of a custom, 

policy, or practice of the County of Alameda or the City of Oakland that exhibits deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed 

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to state Section 1983 Monell claims against the County of Alameda and the City of Oakland.

C. State Claims

All of Plaintiff’s remaining claims are based upon state law. A district court may decline 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 

2010). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance 

of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 

remaining state-law claims.” Sanford, 625 F.3d at 561 (citations omitted). Because the Court has 

dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal Section 1983 claims, the Court declines to assert supplemental 

jurisdiction over her pendent state law claims and dismisses those claims without prejudice. 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Santos v. L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 200 Fed. Appx. 681, 

683 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that district court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims after granting motion to dismiss all 

federal claims).

D. Leave to Amend

In its October 24, 2014 Order, the Court granted Plaintiff “one final opportunity” to amend 

her complaint to assert claims not barred by Heck and Yount. Dkt. 160. As described above, 

Plaintiff’s amendments in her SAC did not cure the deficiencies in her FAC. The Court denies 

Plaintiff’s request for further leave to amend because it is clear that any such amendment would be 

“futile.” Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff has been given multiple opportunities to cure the deficiencies in her complaint. Her latest 

attempt to amend confirms the futility of allowing further amendment, as none of the changes

made appropriately responds to the Court’s October 24, 2014 Order. 4

 

4

The Court also has reviewed Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), which she 

attempted to file without leave of court on January 30, 2015. See Dkt. 206. In the TAC, Plaintiff 

drops all but one of her state claims and condenses her Section 1983 causes of action down to 

four: “Conspiracy to Abuse Official Authority and to Threaten to Deprive of Constitutional 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss the SAC are GRANTED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendants’ motions to strike are DENIED AS MOOT. 

Plaintiff may renew any Section 1983 claims not dismissed in sections II.B.2-5 of this Order and 

any accompanying state law claims in this Court only in the event her state criminal conviction for 

animal cruelty is invalidated. The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. Both parties shall 

bear their own costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 20, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

Rights”; “Illegal Seizure”; “Unreasonable Seizure”; and the Monell claim. Plaintiff also includes 

more factual allegations related to alleged conspiratorial actions taken during the twenty months 

leading up to the October 2011 seizure. None of these changes affects the Court’s analysis above. 

The TAC therefore confirms the Court’s conclusion that further amendment would be futile. 

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