Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-03204/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-03204-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JAMES E. TILTON, SECRETARY

(CDCR), BEN CURRY, WARDEN

(CTF), DR. KHAJA, PSYCHIATRIST

(CTF), et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________ 

 

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No. C 08-3204 MMC (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; DENYING MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION;

DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL

DISCOVERY

(Docket Nos. 42, 43, 49, 60)

On July 3, 2008, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional

Training Facility at Soledad (“CTF”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Now pending before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended

complaint (“AC”) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or, alternatively, for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and

defendants have filed a reply. 

Also before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, and plaintiff’s motion

for a preliminary injunction, which motion defendants have opposed. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff claims his safety is being threatened by the failure of prison officials at CTF

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to place him in a single cell. Specifically, plaintiff alleges he suffers from a mental health

disorder for which he is prescribed medication, and that his “reaction to [the] medication

causes problems with other inmates with whom he is double celled, which leaves plaintiff

defenseless and particularly vulnerable to violent attack while under prescribed medication,

because he is incapable of functioning at a level sufficient to protect himself.” (AC at 3:14-

19.) Plaintiff further alleges that he has asked prison psychiatrists either to reduce his

medication dosage or place him in a single cell, but they have refused to do so, informing

plaintiff that he will not be considered for single-cell placement unless and until he is

involved in an altercation with his cellmate. (AC at 3A:3-12.) 

Based on the above allegations, plaintiff brings claims for deliberate indifference to

his safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and for violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on the ground plaintiff has failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies, as is required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).

1. Legal Standard

Non-exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense; defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1119 (9th Cir. 2003). A nonexhaustion defense should be raised in an unenumerated Rule

12(b) motion. Id. In deciding such a motion, the district court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes the

prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper course of action is dismissal of

the complaint without prejudice. Id. at 1120.

2. The Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321

(1996) (“PLRA”) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

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Unless otherwise noted, all further references to code sections are to title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations.

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or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and enforcement of such

requirement is not left to the discretion of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

84 (2006). “Exhaustion gives an agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with

respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court, and it discourages

disregard of [the agency's] procedures.” Id. at 89 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Section 1997e(a) requires a prisoner-plaintiff to present his claims to each level of

administrative review before raising those claims in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal

court. See id. at 88. The exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied by the filing of an

untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. Id. at 84. 

Rather, “proper exhaustion” of available administrative remedies is required. Id. at 92. The

requirements of the prison’s grievance process, not the PLRA, define the boundaries of

proper exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).

The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, (“CCR”),

§ 3084.1(a).1

 In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a

prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal review, (2) first formal

level appeal, submitted on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second formal level appeal to

the institution head or designee, and (4) third formal level appeal to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). See CCR § 3084.5;

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 2009). A final decision from the

Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1265;

Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (S.D. Cal. 1997).

An action must be dismissed unless the prisoner has exhausted his available

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th

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Cir. 2002). 

3. Exhaustion of Plaintiff’s Claims

Defendants argue plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies

because he did not receive, before filing the instant action, a decision on the merits from the

Director’s level of review with respect to the claims plaintiff raises herein. 

In support of their argument, defendants submit a declaration by D. Foston (“Foston”),

Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch (“IAB”) at the CDCR. According to Foston, the IAB

screens all incoming inmate appeals before the appeals receive a Director’s level decision. 

(Decl. D. Foston Supp. Mot. to Dismiss (“Foston Decl.”) ¶ 5.) Specifically, the IAB

determines whether an appeal complies with agency regulations, and may return an appeal to

an inmate if it finds the appeal was not timely filed, fully exhausted or complete. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

The IAB keeps an electronic record of each inmate administrative appeal that has proceeded

through the Director’s level of review, including a record of each administrative appeal that

was received by the IAB but was rejected or screened out. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.) 

Appeals that are screened out can be categorized either as a rejection or a cancellation. 

(Foston Decl. ¶ 6.) A rejected appeal is one that has been returned to the inmate with

instructions to correct a deficiency prior to further consideration. (Id.) Because the inmate

has the ability to resubmit the appeal, the rejection “screen out” letter is not appealable. (Id.) 

A cancelled appeal, by contrast, informs the inmate that his appeal has been cancelled and

may not be resubmitted; a separate appeal, however, can be filed on the cancellation

decision. (Id.) 

Attached to the Foston declaration is a copy of the IAB computer printout report

showing each appeal that was submitted by plaintiff to the Director’s level of review, and

whether the appeal was received, accepted, or screened out at the Director’s level. (Foston

Decl. Ex. A.) The report lists Director’s level appeal No. CTF-08-00308, in which appeal

plaintiff raised the claims that are the subject of the instant action, and shows such appeal

was screened out because of incomplete documentation. (Id.)

Based on the above, defendants argue plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his

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administrative remedies. In response, plaintiff concedes that appeal No. CTF-08-00308 is

the administrative appeal in which plaintiff raised the claims herein, and also that such appeal

was screened out at the Director’s level of review. He argues, however, that the instant

claims should not be dismissed as unexhausted, because defendants obstructed his efforts to

file a procedurally proper Director’s level appeal, thereby rendering further administrative

remedies unavailable. 

4. Available Administrative Remedies

The PLRA requires that an inmate exhaust only those administrative remedies “as are

available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the PLRA does not

require exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies “effectively

unavailable.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Nunez v. Duncan,

591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir.2010)). In Sapp, the Ninth Circuit held that “improper

screening of an inmate’s administrative grievances renders administrative remedies

‘effectively unavailable’ such that exhaustion is not required under the PLRA.” Id. at 823. 

As the Ninth Circuit noted, if prison officials screen out an inmate’s appeals for improper

reasons, the inmate cannot pursue the necessary sequence of appeals, and, as a result, his

administrative remedies become unavailable. Id.

To fall within the noted exception to exhaustion, a prisoner must show he attempted to

exhaust his administrative remedies but was thwarted by improper screening. Id.

Specifically, the inmate must establish (1) that he actually filed a grievance or grievances

that, if pursued through all levels of administrative appeals, would have sufficed

to exhaust the claim he seeks to pursue in federal court, and (2) that prison officials

screened his grievance or grievances for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by

applicable regulations. Id. at 823-24.

The Court next considers whether plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies falls within the exception set forth in Sapp.

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a. Federal Claims

A grievance suffices to exhaust a claim if it puts the prison on adequate notice of the

problem for which the prisoner seeks redress. Id. at 824. “To provide adequate notice, the

prisoner need only provide the level of detail required by the prison’s regulations.” Id. The

California regulations require only that an inmate “‘describe the problem and the action

requested.’” Id. (quoting CCR § 3084.2(a)). Thus, a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison

to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought. Id.

As set forth above, plaintiff alleges he suffers from a mental health disorder for which

he is prescribed medication, and that his reaction to the medication causes him to have

problems with his cellmates, which leaves plaintiff vulnerable to attack, and, further, that

prison psychiatrists have refused either to reduce his medication dosage or place him in a

single cell, informing him that he will not be considered for single-cell placement unless and

until he is involved in an altercation with his cellmate. 

The Court finds plaintiff’s administrative grievances bearing appeal No. CTF-08-

00308 alerted prison officials to the nature of plaintiff’s complaint regarding his request for

single-cell placement. As discussed below, plaintiff explained in his grievances the reasons

why he feared for his safety and sought single-cell placement, and also that he had been told

he would not be considered for single-cell placement absent an altercation. Based on such

assertions, and barring a procedural deficiency, plaintiff’s grievances would suffice to

exhaust his federal claims both for deliberate indifference to his safety and for failure to

accommodate his mental health needs in violation of the ADA.

b. Proper Screening

In California, an appeals coordinator at the prison screens each appeal before

forwarding it for review on the merits. Sapp, 623 F.3d at 818 (citing CCR § 3084.3(a)). The

appeals coordinator may reject, or screen, an appeal for various reasons, including failure to

comply with the fifteen-day time limit, incompleteness or omission of necessary supporting

documents, or failure to attempt to resolve the grievance informally. Id. (citing CCR §§

3084.3, 3084.6(c)). When the appeals coordinator rejects an appeal, he must complete a form

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The appeals coordinator may bypass the first formal level for appeal of: (1) a policy

or procedure implemented by the institution head; (2) a policy, procedure or regulation

implemented by the department; (3) an issue that cannot be resolved at the division head’s

level; or (4) serious disciplinary infractions. CCR § 3084.5(b).

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that explains why the appeal is unacceptable and instruct the inmate as to what the inmate

must do to qualify the appeal for processing. Id. (citing CCR § 3084.3(d)). Once the appeals

coordinator allows an appeal to go forward, the inmate must pursue it through three levels of

formal review. Id. (citing CCR § 3084.5). 

The Court next considers whether the IAB screened out plaintiff’s grievance at the

Director’s level of review for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable

regulations. Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823-24.

i. Plaintiff’s Appeals

On January 2, 2008, plaintiff submitted an administrative appeal at the informal level

of review. (Pl.’s Statement of Exhaustion of Admin. Remedies (“Docket No. 13”) Ex. 1A. ¶

A.) Plaintiff complained that, at a hearing held by the Interdisciplinary Treatment Team of

the Mental Health Classification Committee (“IDTT”) on December 27, 2007, plaintiff’s

request for single-cell status based on mental health and safety concerns was denied. (Id.) In

the appeal, plaintiff objected to the IDTT’s decision, explaining: (1) he was at risk of being

seriously harmed or injured by his cellmate because of the side-effects caused by plaintiff’s

psychiatric medications; (2) he had a history of prior fights with cellmates because of his

sleep disorder; and (3) Dr. Khaja, the prison psychiatrist, told plaintiff he would not be

considered for single-cell placement unless and until he was involved in an altercation with

his cellmate. (Id. ¶ A & Supplemental Attachment.) Plaintiff asked that his central file be

reviewed for documented in-cell aggression and that he be given single-cell status. (Id. ¶ B.) 

Plaintiff’s appeal was rejected at the informal level of review, after which the first

formal level of review was bypassed and the appeals coordinator forwarded plaintiff’s first

level appeal directly to the second level of review. (Docket No. 13 Ex. 1A ¶¶ C, D, E.)2

 

At the second level, the reviewer denied plaintiff’s appeal, stating as follows:

A thorough review of your appeal package and all of your attachments has

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been completed and reveals the following:

(1) That on 12-13-07, you appeared before Unit III Unit Classification

Committee (UCC) for your Initial Review. You were approved for double cell

placement by Committee.

(2) A review of your Central File reveals that on 1-25-00 and 3-16-99 you were

charged and found guilty of Mutual Combat while in a cell.

(3) You have not demonstrated predatory behavior that depicts aggressive,

repeated attempts to physically or sexually abuse another inmate. Acts of

mutual combat in itself does not warrant single cell status.

(4) You have been disciplinary free since starting your current term on 5-17-04. 

Additionally, you were seen by the Interdisciplinary Treatment Team (IDTT)

on 12-27-07 with no recommendation for single cell.

Therefore, based on the aforementioned, your appeal is being PARTIALLY

GRANTED at the Second Level of Review in that your Central File was

reviewed.

(Docket No. 13 Ex. 4A at 1-2.)

Plaintiff next submitted an appeal form with a request for Director’s level review. 

(Docket No. 13 Ex. 1A ¶ H.) On April 9, 2008, the IAB, acting for the Director at the third

level of review, returned plaintiff’s appeal to him, explaining the appeal was being screened

out pursuant to CCR § 3084.3 for missing documentation. (Docket No. 13 Ex. 5A. at 1.) 

Specifically, plaintiff was told that in order to have his appeal considered at the Director’s

level, he needed to “include the following documentation: CDC Form 128-G, Classification

Chrono(s), Unit Classification Committee (12/13/2007.).” (Id.) 

Plaintiff did not resubmit his appeal to the Director’s level of review before filing the

instant action. 

ii. Analysis

Based on the above evidence, plaintiff contends the IAB improperly screened out his

appeal for failure to provide the above-referenced December 13, 2007 classification chrono

approving plaintiff’s placement in a double cell. Specifically, plaintiff maintains the

screening decision was improper because defendants “obstructed [plaintiff’s]] efforts to have

his appeal heard by with-holding [sic]” the chrono from him. (Opp’n at 6:20-21, 8:8-10.) In

support of his assertion that he was unable to obtain the chrono, plaintiff does not identify or

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provide evidence of specific attempts he made to do so; rather, the only evidence submitted

by plaintiff in support of his assertion is a screening memo sent to plaintiff at the first level of

review. According to said memo, plaintiff’s first level appeal was being screened out

because plaintiff failed to attach the 128-G classification chrono approving plaintiff’s

placement in a double cell (Docket No. 13 Ex. 5A. at 2); in response, plaintiff wrote the first

level reviewer, stating he had requested but never received a copy of the noted chrono, and

asking that his appeal proceed to a review on the merits. (Id.) 

The Court finds plaintiff has failed to present evidence showing his appeal was

improperly screened out at the Director’s level of review. As the Ninth Circuit held in Sapp,

an appeal is properly screened out if “‘necessary supporting documents are not attached.’” 

Sapp, 623 F.3d at 826 (quoting CCR § 3084.3(c)(5)). Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff

failed to attach to his Director’s level appeal a copy of the 128-G classification chrono from

the December 13, 2007 classification hearing at which it was determined plaintiff could be

double-celled, and plaintiff does not contend the IAB improperly requested an opportunity to

review such chrono in connection with plaintiff’s appeal. 

Moreover, plaintiff has presented no evidence showing he attempted either to comply

with the IAB’s request, i.e., by returning his appeal with the chrono attached, or to contest

the screening decision, i.e., by informing the IAB he was unable to obtain a copy of the

chrono. Plaintiff’s evidence that he previously had informed the first level reviewer that he

was unable to obtain the chrono does not suffice to show the IAB was aware of plaintiff’s

asserted difficulty in obtaining the chrono. Indeed, plaintiff’s evidence suggests that had he

informed the IAB of such inability, the IAB may well have proceeded to review the appeal

on the merits. In particular, even though plaintiff’s first level appeal was screened out for

failure to provide the chrono, the appeal was forwarded to the second level of review and

reviewed on the merits after plaintiff explained he could not obtain a copy. (See Docket No.

13 Ex. 4A.) 

If plaintiff had taken steps to inform the IAB that he was unable to obtain the chrono,

but the IAB again refused to review his appeal, such evidence might suggest that plaintiff’s

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failure to exhaust should be excused. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Sapp, a proper

screening decision does “not foreclose the possibility that exhaustion might also be excused

where repeated rejections of an inmate’s grievances at the screening stage give rise to a

reasonable good faith belief that administrative remedies are effectively unavailable.” Sapp,

623 F.3d at 826. Such excuse is not available to plaintiff here, however, as plaintiff’s appeal

was screened out only once at the Director’s level of review. Further, the screening decision

informed plaintiff as to what he needed to do to remedy the situation, and there is no

evidence indicating plaintiff attempted either to comply with or to contest that decision. 

Consequently, as plaintiff has not presented evidence that he ever responded to the Director’s

level screening decision, thereby affording the IAB an opportunity to reconsider its rejection

of plaintiff’s appeal, the Court concludes plaintiff could not have had a reasonable good faith

belief that further administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. 

Lastly, as in Sapp, nothing in the record suggests that the CDCR has “created

draconian procedural requirements that would ‘trip[ ] up all but the most skillful prisoners’”

and render administrative remedies effectively unavailable, so as to excuse a failure to

exhaust. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 827 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006)). 

Significantly, defendants have submitted evidence demonstrating plaintiff has prosecuted 

appeals through the Director’s level of review, both before and after pursuing the appeal at

issue herein. (See Foston Decl. Ex. A)

In sum, the Court concludes that although plaintiff’s appeal was screened out at the

Director’s level of review, administrative remedies remained available to plaintiff because

the screening decision was proper, such decision would not lead plaintiff to hold a

reasonable, good-faith belief that further administrative remedies were effectively

unavailable, and the CDCR grievance procedure was not so complex as to render further

administrative remedies effectively unavailable. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 827. Accordingly,

the Court finds plaintiff’s failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies is not excused

because of improper screening.

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5. Equitable Exception to Exhaustion

The Court next considers whether plaintiff is entitled to an equitable exception to the

exhaustion requirement. See id. In particular, plaintiff asserts he should not be precluded

from proceeding with his unexhausted claims because he did not deliberately bypass the

administrative grievance process and had a good-faith belief that further review was

unavailable to him. (Opp’n, 6:17-19.) 

In Sapp, the Ninth Circuit found no equitable exception to exhaustion based on similar

assertions by the plaintiff therein. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found no equitable

exception was available where the evidence suggested the plaintiff believed in good faith that

he could not pursue further administrative remedies after his appeal had been screened out,

but such belief was not reasonable. Sapp, 623 F.3d at 827. Similarly, in the instant case, the

Court has found plaintiff’s belief, even if held in good faith, was not reasonable. As

discussed above, plaintiff could not have had a reasonable belief that he could not pursue

further administrative remedies after the Director’s level screening decision, as plaintiff’s

appeal was screened out only once by the IAB, the screening decision expressly informed

plaintiff as to what he needed to do to remedy the situation, and there is no evidence plaintiff

attempted either to comply with or to contest the decision. 

Based on the above, plaintiff’s failure to exhaust is not excused on equitable grounds. 

6. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds defendants, by showing plaintiff’s appeal

was properly screened out at the Director’s level of review, have met their burden of raising

and proving the absence of exhaustion. Plaintiff, in response, has not produced evidence to

the contrary, nor has he shown (1) that he could have had a reasonable good faith belief that

further administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him, (2) that the CDCR’s

procedural requirements rendered administrative remedies effectively unavailable, or (3) that

his failure to exhaust should be excused on equitable grounds. Accordingly, the Court finds

plaintiff has not properly exhausted his administrative remedies, and defendants’ motion to

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In light of such finding, the Court does not reach defendants’ alternative argument

that the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

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dismiss the claims against them as unexhausted will be granted.3 

C. Motion to Compel Discovery

By order filed September 2, 2010, the Court granted defendants’ request to stay

discovery pending resolution of the instant motion to dismiss. That same date, plaintiff filed

a motion to compel production of documents. 

The Court has reviewed plaintiff’s discovery requests, and has determined such

requests are unrelated to the question of whether plaintiff properly exhausted his

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Rather, the requests pertain to the factual bases

of plaintiff’s underlying Eighth Amendment and ADA claims. (See Pl.’s Mot. to Compel,

Ex. A.) Because the requested discovery is not relevant to the instant motion and plaintiff’s

claims will not proceed to a decision on the merits, plaintiff’s motion to compel will be

denied.

D. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Together with his opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff has filed a

motion for a preliminary injunction directing prison officials to move him to a single cell

pending resolution of the instant action and to abolish the prison’s current single-cell policy. 

In light of the Court’s ruling granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s motion for

injunctive relief will be denied.

//

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby GRANTED, and the abovetitled action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to plaintiff’s refiling his claims after all

available administrative remedies have been exhausted. 

2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery is hereby DENIED.

3. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED. 

This order terminates Docket Nos. 42, 43, 49 and 60. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 4, 2011

_________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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