Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01993/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01993-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL MACIAS GARCIA.,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv1993 LAB (WMc)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: (1) GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS (DOC. NO. 6) AND (2)

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

TO STAY (DOC. NO. 9)

vs.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State Court

On July 22, 2005, Raul Macias Garcia (“Petitioner”) was convicted of one count of making

criminal threats (Cal. Penal Code § 422) and one count of threatening a witness (Cal. Penal Code §

140). (Lodgment No. 1 at 164-165.) In a separate proceeding, the trial court found Petitioner had

previous convictions for manslaughter and attempted robbery. (Lodgment No. 3 at 1.) Both

constituted strikes (Cal. Penal Code § 667(b)-(i); 1170.12), as well as serious felonies (Cal. Penal

Code § 667.5(a)(1)). The prior manslaughter conviction resulted in a previous prison sentence

(Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b)). 

Accordingly the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 25 years to life in prison and two

consecutive five-year terms. (Lodgment 3 at 3.) Petitioner appealed and the Fourth District Court

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of Appeal, Division One, affirmed the judgment on August 24, 2007. (Lodgment 3 at 1.)

Thereafter, on November 28, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for

Review. (Lodgment 5 at 1.) 

B. Federal Court

On October 27, 2008, Petitioner filed for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 16, 2008, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss.

(Doc. No. 6 at 2.) Respondent contends Petitioner has not fully exhausted all claims within his

petition and, of the two claims which are unexhausted, one claim does not raise a federal issue.

(Doc. No. 6 at 3-4.) As a result, Respondent argues Petitioner must elect either to dismiss his

unexhausted claims or to dismiss his federal action in order to return to state court to exhaust them.

(Doc. No. 6 at 3-4.) On January 12, 2009 Petitioner filed an Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss and concurrently filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance. (Doc. No. 7 and 9.) Respondent

has not filed a reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss, and no opposition in response to

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey has been filed by Respondent. 

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion Requirement

The court must first address whether Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is exhausted or is a

mixed petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 510 (1982). The exhaustion requirement is designed to “encourage state prisoners to seek full

relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts first opportunity to review all claims of

constitutional error.” Id. at 518-19. Courts generally consider a habeas petition exhausted when the

highest state court has had an opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every same claim

raised in the petitioner’s federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(c). The burden is on the

Petitioner to show his or her federal habeas petition satisfies the exhaustion requirement. Rose, 455

U.S. at 519.

On direct appeal, Petitioner raised the following three claims before the California

Supreme Court in his Petition for Review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to show Petitioner was

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guilty of making criminal threats and threatening a witness; (2) the trial court prejudicially erred

by failing to instruct the jury Petitioner must specifically intend the threat to be conveyed to the

victim; and (3) the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of Petitioner’s prior

convictions and prior prison sentence. (Lodgment 2 at 11, 18, and 22); (Lodgment 4 at 4, 8, 9, and

11). Petitioner’s habeas writ contains the above three claims. (Doc. No. 1 at 2-5). Petitioner also

raises two additional claims which he admits were not presented in his state habeas writ: (1) the

trial court failed to sentence him in accordance with California sentencing laws and (2)

prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. No. 1 at 5-6); (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) Accordingly, it is recommended

the Court find the record demonstrates Petitioner’s habeas petition is mixed. 

B. Motion for Stay and Abeyance As An Alternative

Respondent contends Petitioner has not fully exhausted all claims within his petition and,

of the two claims which are unexhausted, one claim does not raise a federal issue. (Doc. No. 6 at

3-4.) Respondent argues, therefore, that Petitioner must elect to abandon his unexhausted claims

and proceed with his exhausted claims or dismiss his federal action in order to return to state court

to exhaust them. (Doc. No. 6 at 3-4.) In response, Petitioner argues a stay and abeyance would be

more appropriate under the circumstances. (Doc. No. 9.)

There are two approaches for analyzing a stay and abeyance motion, depending on whether

the petition is mixed or fully exhausted. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F. 3d. 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005). If the

petitioner files a stay and abeyance motion under a mixed petition containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, the request is analyzed under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). Jackson, 425 F. 3d at 661. If the petition is fully exhausted,

the request for a stay and abeyance is analyzed under the standard set forth in Kelly v. Small, 315

F. 3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). Jackson, 425 F. 3d. at 661. 

Under the total exhaustion requirement set forth in Rose v. Lundy and the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations, petitioners with

mixed petitions “run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their

unexhausted claims.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 269-70. This risk arises because of the limited options

facing a mixed petition. If a petitioner elects to abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with

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Harris would not be controlling in the instant case as it was filed and decided in the Eastern

District of New York.

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an exhausted petition, once the exhausted petition is decided on the merits, a petitioner may not

include the newly exhausted claims in a subsequent petition due to the strict limitations AEDPA

places on successive motions. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b). If a petitioner elects to dismiss the entire

mixed petition, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations will likely run before a petitioner is

able to fully exhaust state court remedies and return to federal court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. 

Because of the risks facing a petitioner, a federal district court has discretion to stay a

mixed habeas petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. Id. at 278. If the court stays a

mixed petition, a petitioner is allowed to present his unexhausted claims to the state court in the

first instance, and then to return to federal court for review of his “perfected” petition. Id. at 279.

In order for the court to stay a mixed petition, a petitioner must “show good cause for his failure to

exhaust, demonstrate the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious” and show no indication

of “intentional[] dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 270. If the court finds a stay and abeyance

inappropriate, the court may allow a petitioner to dismiss the unexhausted claims and proceed with

the exhausted claims if dismissal of the entire petition would “unreasonably impair” the

petitioner’s right to obtain federal relief. Id.

1. Good Cause

Petitioner contends he has demonstrated good cause for failure to exhaust due to the

ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel to raise the two unexhausted claims. (Doc. No. 9 at 3).

Petitioner cites Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2005) and Harris v.

Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. N.Y.1985) to support his contentions.1

 (Doc. No. 9 at 3-4). 

Good cause for failure to exhaust may be attributable to “procedural default.” Hernandez,

379 F. Supp. 2d at 1207. Procedural default is established when the failure to exhaust state

remedies “resulted from an objective factor external to the petitioner which cannot fairly be

attributed to him or her.” Id. (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753(1991) (quoting

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The showing for “good cause” under procedural default is analogous to the “good cause” test

as established in Rhines v. Weber. Hernandez, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.

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Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478.(2005)).2 The petitioner’s federal habeas writ in Hernandez was

mixed containing two unexhausted claims. Id. at 1206. The first unexhausted claim alleged a

witness for the prosecution falsely testified the petitioner’s brother threatened him to not testify.

Id. The second unexhausted claim was one of prosecutorial misconduct in that the prosecutor

referred to a witness’ allegedly false testimony during closing argument. Id. Petitioner argued that,

until March 2003, he lacked the necessary evidence to support his allegation the witness testified

falsely. Id. Further, he informed his appellate counsel of such information, but his appellate

counsel failed to raise the two unexhausted claims. Id.

The court denied petitioner’s federal habeas writ reasoning the petitioner did not meet the

“external factor” standard set forth under procedural default: “[p]etitioner has not shown that his

failure to exhaust his claims resulted from any external objective factor that cannot fairly be

attributed to him.” Id. at 1207. The petitioner knew the nature of the witnesses testimony at trial

and failed to sufficiently bring forth details of such new evidence. Id. Further, the court noted,

“coincidentally or not, “petitioner's brother Daniel Hernandez was indicted for the alleged

intimidation in mid March of 2003.” Id. at 1206. The court also addressed petitioner’s allegation

that fault should lie with his appellate counsel for failing to bring forth his two unexhausted

claims. Id. at 1207. “[T]he alleged failure of Petitioner's appellate counsel to raise the unexhausted

claims in Petitioner's direct appeal does not establish “good cause.” Id. at 1207. Moreover,

“[a]ppellate counsel's alleged failure did nothing to prevent Petitioner from seeking state habeas

relief for the unexhausted claims.” Id. Consequently, the court held petitioner did not show “good

cause” for his failure to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Id.

Here, the facts are similar to Hernandez. Petitioner brings forth no evidence of his

appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness other than stating counsel failed to present his two unexhausted

claims. Contrary to Petitioner’s statement, the record reflects all appeals were appropriately filed

by appellate counsel. Furthermore, there is no suggestion in the record Petitioner’s counsel

prevented Petitioner himself from seeking state habeas relief for the unexhausted claims.

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3

The Supreme Court of New York denied petitioner’s petition on October 16, 1978.

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Therefore, under the Hernandez “external factor” standard, Petitioner has not demonstrated good

cause for his failure to exhaust.

In Harris, a petitioner was granted habeas relief after ineffectiveness of counsel prevented

petitioner’s appeal from being heard six years and three months after it was due. Harris, 601 F.

Supp at 889. Specifically, petitioner was sentenced on May 23, 1977 and filed his appeal

concurrently. Id. On February 16, 1978, petitioner moved the Supreme Court of New York to set

aside his conviction due, in part, to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.3 Id. Because of his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, trial counsel was relieved from further representation.

Id. New appellate counsel was then appointed on December 15, 1978 to assist petitioner in his

federal habeas petition. Id. Appellate counsel was given trial materials and told of the 120-day

time limit in which he had to perfect petitioner’s federal habeas writ, and if an extension was

needed, appellate counsel was to submit a request in writing seeking a time extension. Id.

Appellate counsel made no effort to perfect petitioner’s federal habeas writ for six years and

sought no time extension during the permissible 120-day time period. Id. After seven full years,

petitioner filed his own federal habeas writ on June 19, 1984. Id.

 The district court granted petitioner’s federal habeas writ on February 5, 1985. Id.

Appellate counsel explained his failure to present petitioner’s federal habeas writ in a timely

manner was due to familial problems. Id. Appellate counsel suffered from depression, his mother

had passed away, his father was severely ill, his wife had miscarried, and he experienced

difficulties starting his own firm. Id. Yet, appellate counsel was able to timely perfect another

client’s appeal before the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit which had strict time limits. Id. The

district court noted “[i]t is clear from the hearing that the Second Circuit appeal was given prompt

attention by counsel because he knew that the federal Court of Appeals would not tolerate delay.”

Id. “In contrast, the Appellate Division, Second Department did not... monitor delays in appeals”

and it was the attorney’s responsibility to file timely appeals. Id. at 899-90. Moreover, petitioner

tried several times to contact his appellate counsel during the writ process, including using his

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family members to contact appellate counsel. Id. at 990. Petitioner had also relied on other

inmates’ advice that seeking different counsel would result in additional years of delay. Id. 

In granting petitioner’s writ, the court reasoned such “intolerable” delay amounted to a

denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 993 (citing United States ex rel. Hankins v.

Wicker, 582 F. Supp. 180, 183-85 (W. D. Pa. 1984). The court reasoned that “having made the

right of appeal available ... the state is obligated by the United States Constitution to avoid

impeding effective access to the appellate process.” Id. at 990 (citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.

305 (1966)). Because the state-appointed ineffective counsel resulted in inordinate delay and the

petitioner detrimentally relied on the state’s procedures, the state must take responsibility. Id. at

992. Petitioner’s right to relief was appropriate because he relied on the court’s instruction to

direct all inquiries to appellate counsel and was not informed of his right to petition the court to

change counsel. Furthermore, “where the delay between conviction and the hearing of an appeal

exceeds 50 percent of a petitioner's ten year minimum sentence, the court can assume that the

delay is prejudicial.” Id. at 993. Lastly, the court held the “core problem was an institutional

defect” and “gross ineffectiveness of petitioner’s counsel.” Id. As such, the petitioner was entitled

to relief. Id. at 994. 

Here, Petitioner’s case is distinguishable. Petitioner has not supported his contentions with

evidence of dilatory conduct by counsel. In addition, Petitioner’s appeal process has so far been

timely. Finally, there is no evidence in the record the state impeded access to the appellate process.

Thus, Petitioner has not shown good cause for failure to exhaust under Harris. It is therefore

recommended the Court find Petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for failure to exhaust his

petition resulting from ineffectiveness of appellate counsel.

2. Potential Merit of Unexhausted Claims

A) Sentencing Errors Under State Law

Even if Petitioner could demonstrate good cause, a “district court would abuse its

discretion if it granted a stay when the unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.”Rhines at 270.

Petitioner’s first unexhausted claim alleges the trial court failed to sentence him in accordance

with California sentencing law. (Doc. No. 7 at 4.) In particular, petitioner maintains: (1) California

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Penal Codes sections 3, 5, 667(d) and 667.7(b) requires “strike” convictions to be labeled as such

when “strikes” are incurred; and (2) his past convictions are not to be used as recidivist

enhancements. (Doc. No. 7 at 2.) Petitioner alleges the failure to label his past convictions as

“strikes” and concomitant use of past convictions constitutes an improperly enhanced sentence.

(Doc. No. 7 at 2:14-20.) Petitioner cites In re Birdwell in support of his contention, 58 Cal. Rptr.

2d 244 (1996), and contends his due process rights were violated. (Doc. No. 7 at 2:16.) 

A five-year sentence enhancement is applied under California’s three strikes law if a

defendant was previously convicted of a serious felony. Brewer v. Kramer, 2009 WL 635667, *3

(2009); Cal. Penal Code § 667(a)(1). Whether a petitioner’s previous conviction qualifies as a

serious felony conviction under California’s three strikes law is a question of state sentencing law.

Brewer, at *3 (citing Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989)). The purpose of

federal habeas review is limited to deciding whether a conviction violates the Constitution, laws or

treaties of the United States. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68

(1991)). Under Brewer, “[f]ederal courts must defer to the state court’s interpretation of state

sentencing laws.” Id. Accordingly, “absent a showing of fundamental unfairness that violates due

process, [a petitioner’s state sentencing] claim is not cognizable under federal habeas review.” Id.

Here, Petitioner has not shown the fundamental unfairness in his sentencing necessary to

justify federal habeas relief. According to the August 24, 2007 California Court of Appeal decision

affirming as modified the judgment of the state Superior Court, the enhancements made in

Petitioner’s sentence were reviewed at the state appellate court level and corrected with respect to

the prior prison enhancement. [Lodgment 3 at 2, fn. 2 (noting “[a]t oral argument, the parties

agreed that because such enhancement should have been stricken rather than stayed (citations

omitted) . . . [w]e therefore order the prison prior enhancement stricken and the abstract of

judgment modified accordingly.”); and at 14 (ordering “[t]he judgment is affirmed as modified. 

The prison prior enhancement is stricken rather than stayed.”)]

Moreover, Petitioner’s statement of the case in his December 22, 2006 appellate brief to

the California Court of Appeal indicates, with direct reference to the Clerk’s Transcript, that in

addition to charging Petitioner with two serious felony priors, “[t]he information also alleged two

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‘strike’ priors.” [Lodgment 2 at 1.] Given that any inaccuracy in Petitioner’s sentencing was

briefed, reviewed, argued and thereafter corrected on appeal by the California state courts, he has

not shown fundamental unfairness violative of due process which would warrant federal habeas

review. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to a stay of this federal court action to pursue his first

unexhausted claim based on alleged state sentencing errors. Accordingly, it is recommended that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s first unexhausted claim be GRANTED. It is further

recommended Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey as to his first unexhausted claim be DENIED. 

B) Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner’s second unexhausted claim alleges his conviction was a result of three specific

instances of prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. No. 7, Exhibit A at 3.) In the motion to dismiss,

Respondents do not address the merits of Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim. Instead,

Respondents argue only that Petitioner’s petition be dismissed because it is mixed. In the

opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues a stay and abeyance should be issued as to

Petitioner’s unexhausted claim because he filed a protective petition and would be procedurally

barred from returning to federal court if a stay and abeyance was not issued. (Doc. 7 at 3.); see

also Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

However, stays, as explained above, are not automatic. As held in Rhines, there must be

good cause to warrant a stay. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause and the merits of his

second unexhausted claim for prosecutorial misconduct are unclear. Because Petitioner is required

to show both good cause for failure to exhaust and meritorious claims, lack of good cause alone is

sufficient to deny a stay. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. Accordingly, it is recommended that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s second unexhausted claim be GRANTED. It is

further recommended that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey as to his second unexhausted

claim be DENIED. 

III.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Once it is found that a stay and abeyance is not appropriate, a petitioner must be afforded

the opportunity to amend his petition to delete the unexhausted claims before dismissing the action

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without prejudice due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust his available state remedies. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).

For the forgoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

1. Respondent’s December 16, 2008, motion to dismiss be granted;

2. Petitioner’s January 12, 2009, motion for stay and abeyance be denied; 

3. The petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust all claims presented; and

4. Petitioner be granted thirty days in which to file an amended petition containing only his

exhausted claims.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 1, 2009, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy to all parties. The document should be captioned,

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than May 22, 2009. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 10, 2009

Hon. William McCurine, Jr. U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court

Copy to:

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS, UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE

PRISONER PRO SE

ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD

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