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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 13, 2009 Decided December 29, 2009

No. 08-5431

LONI CZEKALSKI,

APPELLANT

v.

RAYMOND L. LAHOOD, SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:02-cv-01403)

Ellen K. Renaud argued the cause for the appellant. David

H. Shapiro and Richard L. Swick were on brief.

Darrell C. Valdez, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United

States Attorney, was on brief.

Before: GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Loni

Czekalski sued the Department of Transportation (DOT),

alleging that her supervisor at the Federal Aviation

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Administration (FAA) discriminated against her on the basis of

sex by reassigning her to an inferior position. Czekalski’s claim

went to trial and the jury found for the DOT. Czekalski now

appeals the jury verdict as well as the district court’s denial of

her motion for a new trial. We affirm.

I.

Czekalski started working at the FAA in 1970. By 1995 she

had risen to Director of the Office of Communications,

Navigation, and Surveillance Systems—a Senior Executive

Service (SES) position. According to Czekalski, that position

supervised 269 federal employees and approximately 500

contractors, oversaw 96 programs and managed a budget of over

$300 million. In June 1997, George Donohue—the FAA’s

Associate Administrator for Research and

Acquisitions—reassigned Czekalski to the Office of Information

Technology, where she was to serve as Program Manager for the

Year 2000 (Y2K) Project. According to Czekalski, the new

position supervised four federal employees and four contractors,

had no budget and reported to one of her former peers. 

Donohue explained his reasons for the reassignment in a

memorandum to Czekalski dated June 12, 1997. Pl.’s Trial Ex.

1. He cited, inter alia, “fail[ure] to provide . . . direction and

support,” “allowing [a] program to languish” and a general lack

of “leadership qualities.” Id. Despite these criticisms, Donohue

assured Czekalski that the “reassignment is a lateral move

involving no loss of pay or SES status.” Id. Donohue said the

move reflected his belief that Czekalski’s “background and

technical knowledge could be of substantial assistance” to the

Y2K Project. Id.

Czekalski took early retirement at the end of 1997 after

occupying her new position for only six months. According to

multiple trial witnesses, the position proved vital. Czekalski

herself acknowledged that it became a highly visible position,

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1

Both parties consented to disposition of Czekalski’s claim by a

United States magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

2

“A plaintiff ‘makes out a prima facie case of disparate-treatment

discrimination by establishing that: (1) she is a member of a protected

class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the

unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.’”

Czekalski I, 475 F.3d at 364 (quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405,

412 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation omitted).

entailing contact and coordination with other agencies, the FAA

Administrator and the Congress. Trial Tr. 57-60 (Nov. 8, 2007).

One FAA employee described it as “probably . . . the single

most significant office in the entire agency” and noted that the

office-holder “was interviewed by everything; Wall Street

Journal, New York Times; every magazine; every government

publication.” Trial Tr. 36-37 (Nov. 15, 2007). He explained that

the position “had huge visibility because everyone was

concerned about what was going to happen with aviation. No

one wanted an airplane dropping on their house . . . at the stroke

of midnight on 2000.” Id. at 37.

Czekalski filed this lawsuit in July 2002, after exhausting

her administrative remedies. See Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d

360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Czekalski I). She alleged that her

reassignment constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§

2000e et seq. In April 2005, the magistrate judge1 granted

summary judgment to the DOT on the ground that Czekalski

“cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination.”2

Czekalski v. Sec’y of Transp., C.A. No. 02-1403, 2005 WL

975679, at *12 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2005). We reversed, concluding

that a reasonable juror could find that she had suffered an

adverse employment action and could infer that the reason for

the action was discrimination. Czekalski I, 475 F.3d at 365, 369.

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The parties tried the case before a jury for ten days in

November 2007. At the close of evidence and after arguments

the magistrate judge instructed the jury as to the relevant law

and provided it with a written version of the charge, including

the applicable standard for determining an adverse employment

action. The jury found for the DOT. It returned a special verdict

form stating that Czekalski had not “proved by a preponderance

of the evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action

as a result of her reassignment.” Verdict Form, Czekalski v.

Sec’y of Transp., C.A. No. 02-1403 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2007).

Czekalski moved for a new trial on the grounds that “the jury’s

verdict was against the weight of the evidence” and “the Court

deprived Plaintiff of a fair and impartial trial.” Pl.’s Mot. for

New Trial, Czekalski v. Sec’y of Transp., C.A. No. 02-1403, at

3 (D.D.C. Dec. 26, 2007). The magistrate judge denied the

motion. This appeal timely followed.

II.

Czekalski argues that the magistrate judge committed

reversible error in (1) instructing the jury on the standard to be

used in determining an adverse employment action vel non

under Title VII; (2) not instructing the jury that it could draw an

adverse inference from DOT’s failure to produce certain

evidence; (3) denying her motion for a new trial and (4) making

biased statements and rulings that deprived her of a “fair and

impartial” trial. 

A. Jury Instructions Regarding Adverse Employment Action

“An alleged failure to submit a proper jury instruction is a

question of law subject to de novo review; the choice of the

language to be used in a particular instruction, however, is

reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” Joy v. Bell Helicopter

Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The harmless

error rule applies; to warrant reversal, “‘the error must have

been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the

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The relevant instructions, in their entirety, read: 

Next, you are instructed that the burden is on the

Plaintiff to show that she suffered an adverse employment

action. The Civil Rights Act does not apply and is not

intended to apply to every workplace reassignment. An

employer's decision that does not have a tangible effect on

an employee does not qualify as an adverse action, even if

the employee considers it insulting or offensive.

Moreover, changes in duties or working conditions,

including reassignments that do not have a tangible effect

on the terms, conditions or privileges of employment are

not adverse actions. Even if an action is contrary to an

employee’s personal preferences, that does not make it an

adverse employment action. However, it is for you to

district court proceedings.’” Muldrow ex rel. Estate of Muldrow

v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)); see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 61. 

Czekalski contends that the magistrate judge improperly

instructed the jury on what constitutes an adverse employment

action under Title VII. Jury instructions are proper if, “when

viewed as a whole, ‘they fairly present the applicable legal

principles and standards.’” Joy, 999 F.2d at 556 (quoting EEOC

v. Atl. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1989)). This

circuit’s standard for an adverse employment action is wellestablished: “[A]n employee suffers an adverse employment

action if he experiences materially adverse consequences

affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or

future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of

fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio v. Powell,

306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The magistrate judge

relayed this standard in the third paragraph of the relevant

instructions.3 Thus, the jury had the guidance necessary to

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determine whether the reassignment of the Plaintiff to the

Year 2000 Program was a reassignment to a position with

significantly different responsibilities.

An employee suffers an adverse employment action

if she experiences materially adverse consequences

affecting the terms, conditions or privileges of employment

such that you find objectively tangible harm. Whether a

particular assignment of duties constitutes an adverse

action, for purposes of Title VII, is a jury question, that is,

one for you to determine.

Trial Tr. 181-82 (Nov. 16, 2007).

4

The sentence, properly punctuated, would read: “Moreover,

changes in duties or working conditions, including reassignments, that

do not have a tangible effect on the terms, conditions or privileges of

employment are not adverse actions.”

render its special verdict as to whether Czekalski suffered an

adverse employment action. 

It is true that the second paragraph of the charge wants for

clarity. Most troubling is its first sentence, which, as punctuated

in the transcript included in the Joint Appendix, reduces to the

proposition that “changes in duties and working conditions . . .

are not adverse actions.” See Trial Tr. at 182. But we believe

this perceived defect is simply the result of faulty

punctuation—a mere comma corrects it4

—and we therefore

decline to read the instruction in such a manner as to give it a

commonsensically false meaning. While the record does not

contain the written charge that was sent to the jury, assuming

that version has the same punctuation as the one we are

reviewing, we are nevertheless assured that the jury did not

misread its meaning, especially given its position in the charge.

Indeed, regardless of its punctuation, the sentence is largely

superfluous. As noted above, it is followed by a paragraph that

lays out the adverse employment action standard as articulated

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Czekalski asserts that the magistrate judge should have

instructed “the jury that if it found that Czekalski’s duties dramatically

declined in quality or quantity, then it should find she suffered an

adverse employment action.” Appellant’s Br. 32.

in Forkkio. Further, the preceding sentence conveys much the

same meaning, even though it refers to “[a]n employer’s

decision” instead of “changesin duties and working conditions”

and it emphasizes the irrelevance of an employee’s subjective

reaction in place of reassignments per se. 

Perhaps the magistrate judge could have focused more

attention on what an adverse employment action is as opposed

to what an adverse employment action is not. The first four

sentences describing an adverse action are framed in the

negative. Trial Tr. 181-82 (Nov. 16, 2007). Not until the end of

the second paragraph does the instruction begin to equip the jury

with a positive description of an adverse employment action. Id.

Nevertheless, we believe that a juror who both heard and read

the instructions in their entirety—especially the concluding

paragraph—would have had a correct understanding of what

constitutes an adverse employment action. “[W]hen viewed as

a whole,” therefore, the instructions “‘fairly present the

applicable legal principles and standards.’” Joy, 999 F.2d at 556

(quoting Atl. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d at 436). 

Czekalski also argues that the magistrate judge erred in

failing to include certain alternate articulations of the adverse

employment action standard.5

 She expressly relies on the

concurring opinion in Lutkewitte v. Gonzales, which states that

“[a] party is entitled to an instruction on any legal theory that

has a basis in the law and the record.” 436 F.3d 248, 255 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (Brown, J., concurring) (citing Joy, 999 F.2d at 556).

Her argument ignores the fact that “‘[a]s long as a district

judge’s instructions are legally correct . . . he is not required to

give them in any particular language.’” Joy, 999 F.2d at 556

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Czekalski also claims that “it was reversible error for the judge

to refuse to tell the jury that if it found that the reassignment was to a

position with significantly different responsibilities, it should find

there was an adverse employment action.” Appellant’s Br. 34. This is

not an accurate recitation of the “‘applicable legal principles and

standards.’” Joy, 999 F.2d at 556 (quoting Atl. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 879

F.2d at 436); see discussion of Czekalski I infra Part II.C. Thus, it was

not error for the magistrate judge to omit it.

(quoting Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1978))

(ellipsis in original). As discussed above, the magistrate judge

correctly instructed the jury on the relevant legal theory. The

fact that she did so without including the precise language

Czekalski requested was not an abuse of discretion. See Joy, 999

F.2d at 556.6

B. Jury Instruction Regarding Missing Evidence

Czekalski next argues that the magistrate judge erred by not

instructing the jury that it could infer from the DOT’s failure to

produce certain evidence that the evidence would be unfavorable

to the DOT. We review the trial court’s decision not to issue a

“missing-evidence instruction” for abuse of discretion. United

States v. West, 393 F.3d 1302, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Such an

instruction “is appropriate if it is peculiarly within the power of

one party to produce the evidence and the evidence would

elucidate a disputed transaction.” Id. The party complaining of

the missing evidence bears the burden of demonstrating that it

is peculiarly in the opposing party’s control. Id. at 1309-10.

Czekalski has not shown that such an instruction would be apt

in this case; she has not identified any evidence peculiarly

available to the DOT—evidence which it did not produce—that

would shed light on her claim. Nor has she described any

attempt on her part to obtain said evidence. See id. at 1310

(noting that party failed to carry its burden by, for instance,

seeking or subpoenaing “missing” document). In addition, it

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appears that the “missing evidence” she describes is not missing

at all but in fact resides in the record. Czekalski points to

Donohue’s testimony in which he refers to a “memorandum

[that] said that an SES would be responsible for each agency to

report directly to the administrator.” Trial Tr. 156 (Nov. 14,

2007). She complains that “no documentary evidence was

introduced to show that the position of Y2K Program Manager

was going to, or ever did, report directly to the Administrator.”

Appellant’s Br. 36. But the record contains such a memorandum

and it states, “Administrators will appoint a senior executive to

sponsor their Year 2000 effort. Sponsors will report directly to

the Administrator . . . .” Pl.’s Trial Ex. 44. Accordingly, the

magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in omitting the

instruction.

C. Motion for a New Trial

Next, Czekalski argues that a new trial is warranted because

the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. “This

court reviews de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion . . . for

a new trial. The jury verdict stands ‘unless the evidence and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so onesided that reasonable men and women could not disagree on the

verdict.’” Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 658-59

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Smith v. Wash. Sheraton Corp., 135

F.3d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (citation omitted). Czekalski

asserts that “[t]he evidence at trial was uncontroverted that [she]

had significantly different responsibilities when she was

transferred.” Appellant’s Br. 37-38. Because she had

“significantly different responsibilities,” she argues, she

necessarily suffered an adverse employment action. Id. at 37-40.

Her argument misunderstands the inquiry. She relies on a

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 The passage reads:

“[W]ithdrawing an employee’s supervisory duties,”

for example, “constitutes an adverse employment

action.” [Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 426

(D.C. Cir. 2003)]; see Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513,

522 (D.C. Cir. 2002). So, too, does “reassignment

with significantly different responsibilities.” Forkkio

v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.

742, 761 (1998)); see Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d

889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

Czekalski has raised a genuine issue as to

whether the reassignment left her with “significantly

different”—and diminished—supervisory and

programmatic responsibilities.

Czekalski I, 475 F.3d at 364. 

8

Holcomb and Forkkio both cite Burlington for the proposition

that “reassignment with significantly different responsibilities . . .

generally indicates an adverse action.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 902

(emphasis added) (quoting Forkkio, 306 F.3d at 1131 (quoting

Burlington, 524 U.S. at 761)). Neither case supports Czekalski’s

argument that, if she experienced a “reassignment with significantly

different responsibilities,” she necessarily suffered an adverse

employment action. Rather, both cases indicate that an adverse

employment action results from a “significant change in

responsibilities” if it effects objective harm. Indeed, Burlington itself

invokes the Seventh Circuit’s statement that “‘[a] materially adverse

change might be indicated by . . . significantly diminished material

responsibilities.’” 524 U.S. at 761 (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat’l

passage from Czekalski I7 but she does not heed that opinion or

the precedent it invokes. Neither Forkkio, Burlington nor

Holcomb suggests that the entire adverse-action standard can be

reduced to the question whether a change in position entails

“significantly different responsibilities.”8

 Nor, for that matter,

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Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.3d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993))

(emphasis added). 

does Czekalski I. It does not articulate a new rule; it simply lays

out authority for the uncontroversial point that, under certain

circumstances, a lateral transfer may qualify as an adverse

action; whether it does or not is “generally a jury question.” See

475 F.3d at 364-65. The court was as good as its word inasmuch

as it remanded for trial on, inter alia, the issue of “whether the

reassignment left her with ‘significantly different’—and

diminished—supervisory and programmatic responsibilities.” Id.

at 364 (emphasis added). Had the Czekalski I court meant what

Czekalski contends, it of course would not have remanded for

trial on that issue.

As we noted above—and as the magistrate judge informed

the jury—we determine whether an action constitutes an adverse

employment action by asking whether the employee

“experiences materially adverse consequences affecting the

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future

employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact

could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio, 306 F.3d at

1131. Under this standard, the record contains more than enough

evidence to uphold the jury’s determination that Czekalski’s

reassignment was not an adverse employment action. Czekalski

retained her pay grade and her SES status and there is evidence

that her new position—far from harming her current or future

professional prospects—in fact proved vital, visible and

prestigious. Although Czekalski put on evidence and argued that

the new position lacked import when Donohue assigned her to

it in 1997, the DOT countered with evidence that the position

wasregarded as critical even at that early date. We see no reason

to disturb the jury’s verdict as to this dispute. Because the

evidence is not “‘so one-sided that reasonable men and women

could not disagree,’” Curry, 195 F.3d at 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

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(quoting Smith, 135 F.3d at 782), on whether Czekalski

“experience[d] materially adverse consequences affecting the

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future

employment opportunities,” Forkkio, 305 F.3d at 1131, we agree

with the magistrate judge that a new trial is not warranted on this

ground.

D. Bias

Czekalski also argues that a new trial is required because

the magistrate judge made several statements and evidentiary

rulings that manifested bias against her and deprived her of “a

fair and impartial trial.” Appellant’s Br. 40. Judicial comments

during trial establish bias if “they reveal such a high degree of

favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.”

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see United

States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “Not

establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of

impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are

within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after

having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display.”

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56. Having reviewed the trial transcript,

including the portions Czekalski highlights, we see no indicia of

“a high degree of favoritism or antagonism” requiring a new

trial in this case. Id. at 555. Moreover, “judicial rulings alone

almost never constitute a valid basis” for an allegation of bias,

id., and we see none here that would support reversal on that

ground.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

So ordered.

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