Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04552/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04552-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACOB JOHN PIPPIN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DETECTIVE STEVEN FOX,

Defendant. /

No. C 13-4552 EDL (PR)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket No. 12.)

Jacob John Pippin, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an amended

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss

this action as barred by the statute of limitations and a request for judicial notice. 

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted. Plaintiff has filed an informal brief in

opposition to the motion to dismiss. Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons that

follow, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

BACKGROUND

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Detective Fox provided

false testimony during a prosecution and false statements in a police report regarding an

alleged hand to hand transaction that was prosecuted under California Health and Safety

Code § 11379. Plaintiff argued that Defendant falsified Plaintiff’s arrest and lied during a

preliminary hearing as well as during trial. Plaintiff was later acquitted of this charge. This

court concluded that, liberally construed, Plaintiff presented claims of false arrest and

malicious prosecution.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the

grounds on which it rests. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007)

(abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). Although a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

usually is not available to raise an affirmative defense, it may be used when the complaint

contains allegations showing a complete defense or bar to recovery, such as a statute of

limitations problem. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). 

The court may grant a motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations

“only if the assertions in the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the

plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d

1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all factual allegations as true. See Cahill v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.1996). Federal courts are particularly

liberal in construing allegations made in pro se civil rights complaints. See Thompson v.

Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court

may not consider any material outside the complaint but may consider exhibits attached

thereto. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th

Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (treating exhibits attached to complaint as part of complaint

for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

ANALYSIS

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is

that of the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia,

471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). In California, the general residual statute of limitations for

personal injury actions is the two-year period set forth at California Civil Procedure Code §

335.1 and is the applicable statute in § 1983 actions. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d

945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). It is federal law, however, that determines when a cause of action

accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run in a § 1983 action. Wallace v. Kato,

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 That section provides: No person charged by indictment, information, complaint, or

other accusatory pleading charging a criminal offense may bring a civil action for money or

damages against a peace officer or the public entity employing a peace officer based upon

conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for which the accused is charged, including

an act or omission in investigating or reporting the offense or arresting or detaining the

accused, while the charges against the accused are pending before a justice, municipal or

superior court.

Any applicable statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting these actions shall be

tolled during the period that the charges are pending before a municipal or superior court.

2

 Although the file-stamped date on Plaintiff’s complaint is October 2, 2013, it was

received at the Northern District Clerk’s office on September 23, 2013. To make matters more

convoluted, Plaintiff signed both his complaint and motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis on August 28, 2013. Plaintiff did not declare under penalty of perjury or include any

evidence to affirmatively demonstrate that he submitted the complaint to jail authorities for

mailing on that date, but purposes of this motion to dismiss, the court will assume that he did

so.

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549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, a claim generally accrues when the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. See TwoRivers

v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s statute of limitations period did not begin until after

he received a favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding, based on

California Government Code § 945.3.1

 The tolling provision of Section 945.3 operates only

so long as the criminal charges are “pending,” which means until the date of judgment and

conviction. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). Here,

Plaintiff was arrested on March 17, 2011. (Am. Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff was acquitted on

August 2, 2011, of the charges against him. (Defs.’ Req. for Jud. Notice, Exs. A, B.) Thus,

argues Defendant, Plaintiff’s deadline for initiating this action was August 2, 2013. 

However, Plaintiff did not commence this lawsuit until August 28, 2013.2 See Douglas v.

Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the mailbox rule applies to

the filing of a federal civil rights complaint).

Thus, absent some exception such as equitable tolling, Plaintiff’s complaint is timebarred. Generally speaking, whether equitable tolling applies in a case is not amenable to

resolution on a motion to dismiss because the determination often depends on matters

outside of the pleadings. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.

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1993). However, where factual and legal issues are sufficiently clear to permit the court to

determine as a matter of law that the equitable tolling doctrine cannot be successfully

invoked, the court may dismiss an action on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See id. at 1276-77. 

Such a motion may be granted only “if the assertions of the complaint, read with the

required liberality, would not permit a plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon,

614 F.2d at 682. 

Here, in an exhibit to Plaintiff’s original complaint, it appears that Plaintiff was not

released on the day he was acquitted. (Docket No. 1-1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff stated that while

he was detained pending charges, he was notified that he was being charged with violating

his parole. On August 2, 2011, Plaintiff requested a parole violation hearing in the hopes

that he would receive the hearing the following day. (Id. at 5.) However, Plaintiff intimates

that he was held until August 26, 2011, when he was seen at a probable cause hearing at

San Quentin State Prison. (Id.) Ultimately, Plaintiff was released from San Quentin State

Prison on August 29, 2011. 

California Civil Procedure Code section 352.1 recognizes imprisonment as a

disability that tolls the statute of limitations when a person is “imprisoned on a criminal

charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for

life.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). The tolling is not indefinite, however; the

disability of imprisonment delays the accrual of the cause of action for a maximum of two

years. See id. Here, if Plaintiff indeed was imprisoned from the date of his arrest up

through August 29, 2011, it is possible that the statute of limitations could be tolled up to

that date. Moreover, if Plaintiff delivered his complaint to jail authorities for mailing on

August 28, 2013, the date Plaintiff signed his complaint, Plaintiff’s complaint would not be

time-barred. 

Thus, the allegations of the complaint, read with the required liberality, might permit

Plaintiff to establish tolling. That is, the court cannot say that “it appears beyond doubt that

Plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of his claims.” See

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Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995). For that

reason Defendant’s argument that the claims are time-barred will have to be resolved, if at

all, on a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. 

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

No later than sixty (60) days from the filing date of this order, Defendant shall file a

motion for summary judgment. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by

adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

Defendant is advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified immunity

found, if material facts are in dispute. If Defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be

resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the court prior to the date the summary

judgment motion is due. 

Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the court and served

on Defendant no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date Defendant’s motion is filed. 

 Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)

(holding party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing

triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). 

Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after Plaintiff's

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date. 

It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the court and all

parties informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January , 2015. 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Chief Magistrate Judge

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