Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-00639/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-00639-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD DAVID JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARIANA LOTERSTEIN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:22-CV-0639-DMC-P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 

Case 2:22-cv-00639-DJC-DMC Document 11 Filed 06/15/22 Page 1 of 6
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means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 

impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff EDWARD DAVID JONES names the following Defendants: (1) Medical 

Doctor MARIANA LOTERSTEIN, (2) Physician NAY AUNG, (3) Chief Medical Officer S. 

GATES, and (4) Registered Nurse MARCUS SMITH. See ECF No. 1, 2.

Plaintiff claims cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, the prison medical personnel, were 

deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs and delayed treating his severe abdominal pain 

for years, causing near death and numbness and bloating from sepsis toxins. See id. Plaintiff’s 

condition ultimately required emergency surgery and the delay caused prolonged pain. See id. 

Plaintiff also brings specific attention to mental and emotional distress, pain and 

suffering, and trauma injuries because of his mental health disorder, which Plaintiff does not 

name. See id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that the medical delay aggravated the disorder and 

Defendants failed to make the proper inquiries required for mentally ill inmate hospital admission 

requests. Id.

Plaintiff claims Defendant Dr. LOTERSTEIN failed to forecast the medical 

complication, did not provide an accurate prognosis, and interfered and contributed to a delay in 

medical treatment “based on her subjectivity.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff also states that Defendant 

AUNG failed to prevent the delay. See id. The complaint does not suggest that either defendant 

acted wantonly for the sake of inflicting harm upon Plaintiff. No allegations are made relating 

Defendants S. GATES and MARCUS SMITH to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

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II. DISCUSSION

As discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff presents a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendants LOTERSTEIN and AUNG. Plaintiff does not, however, 

allege facts to link Defendants S. GATES and MARCUS SMITH to any constitutional violation.

A. Defendants LOTERSTEIN and AUNG:

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 

and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 

of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 

two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 

that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 

injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 

see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 

needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to 

treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled 

on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see 

also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness 

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are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment; (2) 

whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the 

condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 

than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 

medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 

974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 

decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 

1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical 

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate 

that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give 

rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a 

difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate 

course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants LOTERSTEIN and AUNG delayed treating 

Plaintiff’s sepsis issue, leading to the injury’s progression and an “unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain” upon Plaintiff. Thus, this Court finds a valid Eighth Amendment claim. 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Although Plaintiff’s claim could be stronger if it presents facts that 

Defendants intentionally delayed treatment, the claim remains viable because Defendants failed 

to diagnose Plaintiff for a period of “years,” thus suggesting deliberate indifference in the delay. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Plaintiff’s condition also appears to be sufficiently “serious” under 

Lopez because (1) any reasonable doctor would find intestinal sepsis worthy of comment; (2) 

Plaintiff’s prolonged abdominal discomfort affects Plaintiff’s daily life; and (3) Plaintiff remains 

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in “substantial pain.” See id. The claim is also valid because Plaintiff alleges the delay led to 

further abdominal injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

B. Defendants S. GATES and MARCUS SMITH:

This Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants S. GATES and 

MARCUS SMITH should be dismissed for lack of a causal link between Defendants and 

Plaintiff’s claim. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 

specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts relating Defendants S. GATES or 

MARCUS SMITH to a constitutional violation, these Defendants should be dismissed for lack of 

a causal link to Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 

prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 

amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

/ / /

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If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 

complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 

recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 

further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended 

complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

Dated: June 14, 2022

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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