Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00343/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00343-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ALLEN NEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00343-JCS 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 17, 19

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff David Ney appeals an adverse decision from Defendant Carolyn Colvin, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his applications for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d), and for 

Social Security Income under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1383(f). The issue on appeal is 

whether the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ’s”) determination in step four of the 

Commissioner’s five-step analysis was error. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds 

that the ALJ’s step four determination was not based on substantial evidence. The administrative 

decision is therefore REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 

Order. 

II. FACTS

Ney was born on February 19, 1963. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 113. He was fortynine years old as of November 1, 2012, the alleged onset date of disability. Id. at 78. Since April 

15, 2013, Ney had been living in a veterans’ shelter in Santa Rosa. Id. at 239, 265. The timeline 

leading up to his homelessness is punctuated by various and severe personal adversities, including 

divorce, his father’s and fiancée’s deaths, and his brother’s incarceration. Id. at 272. These 

events, Ney reports, exacerbated preexisting difficulties including drug addiction, chronic 

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depression, and anxiety brought on by a history of childhood abuse. Id. at 272, 367. 

The record reveals that Ney held several jobs throughout intermittent periods between 

2000 and 2012. Id. at 259. From October 2000 to March 2003, he worked as a “wet process 

operator”

1—a machine operator—at a manufacturing company. Id. From November 2003 to 

January 2004, he worked as a forklift driver. Id. Ney then later worked as an interoffice mail 

clerk from February 2004 to February 2005; as a forklift driver again from July 2004 to November 

2007; and then finally as a staffing employee from March 2011 to April 2012. Id. The record is 

silent as to Ney’s employment from November 2007 to March 2011. Id. Ney engaged in only 

sporadic, part-time work after April 2012. Id. at 40. 

On May 23, 2013, Ney filed for disability insurance benefits under Title II and 

Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Id. at 78, 95. His 

application reported several debilitating physical impairments including numbness in his right 

hand, high blood pressure, and head, neck, and back injuries. Id. at 78–79. He also complained of 

mental impairments consisting of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), depression, and 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). Id. 

A. The Commissioner’s Determinations at the Initial and Reconsideration Levels

The Commissioner issued two written decisions on November 12, 20132finding that Ney 

did not present a disability pursuant to the Social Security Act. Id. at 159–61. The decisions

stated that relevant medical records contradicted Ney’s complaints of disabling physical 

impairments. Id. at 160. With respect to Ney’s complaints of numbness in his right hand, the 

medical evidence indicated that Ney’s “handgrip [was] adequate,” and did not impede him from 

“us[ing his] hand for basic handling of objects.” Id. Although Ney presented a history of 

hypertension, “there [were] no indications of major damage to [Ney’s] kidneys, eyes, heart or 

nervous system as a result of [his] blood pressure condition.” Id. Finally, despite Ney’s 

 

1

The parties’ briefs interchangeably use the terms, “wet process operator,” and “machine 

operator” to refer to this position. For the sake of clarity, the Court will refer to this position as 

“machine operator,” consistent with the ALJ’s written decision.

2

The two decisions correspond to the Commissioner’s determinations for Ney’s Title II and Title 

XVI applications, and are substantively identical. Compare AR at 159–64, with id. at 165–71. 

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complaints of head, neck, and back injuries, the decision explained “medical evidence show[ed] 

that [he was] able to walk and move about in a satisfactory manner.” Id. There was also “no 

indication of loss of control or muscle wasting in [Ney’s] arms and legs due to nerve damage.” Id. 

Additionally, the decision stated that relevant medical evidence contradicted Ney’s 

allegations of severe emotional and mental limitations. Id. Despite his complaints of PTSD, 

depression, and ADHD, there were “no indications . . . [of] major limitations upon [his] ability to 

think, communicate, and follow basic instructions or to function adequately in [his] usual daily 

activities.” Id. 

The Commissioner concluded that overall, the medical evidence did not preclude Ney from 

performing activities requiring him to occasionally lift objects weighing up to fifty pounds, or to 

stand, walk, or sit for up to six hours in a normal eight-hour workday. Id. Given certain of Ney’s 

documented limitations, however, the Commissioner cautioned that Ney could not perform work 

that frequently required him to crawl, and could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Id. He was 

also unable to perform work that required special skills or training, or frequent contact with others. 

Id. Despite these limitations, however, the Commissioner concluded that Ney could return to 

work in his previous job as a machine operator, in accordance with how that job was generally 

performed in the national economy. Id. Consequently, the Commissioner denied Ney’s Title II 

and Title XVI applications, finding that he was not disabled. Id.

On November 20, 2013, Ney filed applications for reconsideration of the Commissioner’s 

decision. Id. at 173. They referenced his ongoing problems with homelessness, anxiety, and 

depression, but did not indicate any change in medical circumstances. Id. at 176–77. In two 

written decisions dated February 19, 2014, the Commissioner reaffirmed the previous findings 

relating to Ney’s physical and cognitive disabilities:

Based upon the medical findings, it is determined that you are able 

to understand and perform simple tasks. You have the ability to 

maintain the pace, persistence, and concentration needed to perform 

unskilled work over a forty hour week. You are precluded from 

work requiring public contact. You are able to relate to coworkers 

and supervisors. You are able to adapt to routine changes in the 

work place.

See id. at 185–91; see also id. at 178–84 (denying Ney’s application for Title II disability 

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insurance benefits). Based on this, the Commissioner concluded that Ney’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) did not preclude him from performing other types of work in the national 

economy: 

Given these limitations, it is determined that you would be unable to 

return to the skills of your past occupation. However, based on your 

age, education and your past work experience, it is determined that 

you should be able to perform other work that falls within the range 

of the above limitations. As your condition should not preclude the 

engagement of all types of work activity, disability is not 

established. 

See id. at 185–91, 178–84. 

B. The Administrative Hearing

Ney requested an administrative hearing to review the Commissioner’s initial and 

reconsideration decisions. Id. at 192–93. Administrative Law Judge Maxine Benmour presided 

over the hearing held on June 18, 2014. Id. at 33. Ney was present with counsel, along with 

Marianne Lahley, a witness. Id at 6, 29. Gerald Belchick, Ph.D., a vocational expert (“VE”), 

appeared telephonically. Id. at 38. 

1. Ney’s Testimony

The ALJ briefly questioned Ney about his work history. Id. at 39–40. Ney recited the 

chronology of positions worked between 2000 and 2012, although the judge did not explore in any 

detail the responsibilities, functions, or physical or mental exertions that those jobs required. Id. 

Following this brief exchange, Ney testified about his alleged disabilities. Id. at 40–45. He 

claimed that there were medically determinable impairments that precluded him from performing 

any work beyond the sedentary level. Id. at 37–38. He claimed that documentation from his 

psychological evaluations supported a finding of disability as they indicated, among other things, 

“moderate to severe problems with concentration, and severe problems with delayed memory.” 

Id. at 38. 

Ney also testified about the extent of his medical symptoms. Id. at 40–42. He explained 

that he first injured his lower back in 2008, and that the pain from that incident had progressively 

worsened since that time. Id. at 40. It had grown so severe that it eventually prevented him from 

working altogether in April 2012. Id. at 40–41. Aside from interfering with his work, the pain 

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also impeded his routine personal tasks on a daily basis. Id. at 42–43. Ney testified that although 

the symptoms were more intense on some days than on others, it was generally most noticeable 

upon waking in the morning. Id. at 41. Physical activity, such as lifting objects for any manner of 

time, would exacerbate those symptoms. Id. 

Ney explained that eventually, the pain grew so severe that it extended downward to the 

backs of his legs. Id. at 41–42. Lying down, stretching, and applying ice and heat packs helped to 

abate those symptoms, but he explained that they would persist nonetheless. Id. at 42. Ney sought 

professional medical treatment in the form of physical therapy with a nurse practitioner, and 

testified that most recently a separate doctor treated his lower back problems. Id. at 42–43. When 

the ALJ questioned Ney about the medications he used to deal with his pain, he conceded that he 

had not sought any prescription medication, but instead used only Tylenol. Id. at 43–44. 

Ney testified about his psychological health issues. Id. at 45. He had been receiving 

counseling for psychological symptoms related to anxiety and depression. Id. at 45–46. Ney 

believed that those issues stemmed from recent adversities in his personal life, including his 

fiancée’s death and his brother’s incarceration. Id. at 51, 56–58. He referenced PTSD-related 

symptoms from his military service, but clarified that his service did not include a combat role. 

Id. at 47. Ney believed that his PTSD arose from an abusive sergeant during that time and until 

his discharge in 1982. Id. at 46–48. Because of these psychological health issues, Ney claimed to 

experience nightmares regularly and had trouble in large settings around other people, particularly 

in unfamiliar groups. Id. at 48–49, 52. Ney had taken Abilify, an antipsychotic medication, to 

alleviate these symptoms, which he explained “helped somewhat.” Id. at 46–47, 50. 

Because of these physical and psychological impairments, Ney claimed that he has been 

unable to find gainful employment. Id. at 57–58. His back and leg injuries required him to rest 

and lay down for periods at a time throughout the day. Id. at 58. Even sedentary jobs that 

involved little to no physical exertion was impossible for him to perform because his mental health 

issues impeded his concentration. Id. at 57–58. Ney testified that these limitations have caused 

him to lead a mostly sedentary daily routine. Id. at 52–53. He spent much of this time either at 

doctor’s visits, or at home meditating or watching television. Id. at 60–61. Although he lived

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alone in the veterans’ home, Ney required regular help from others to complete ordinary tasks 

such as washing laundry, or transporting himself from one place to another. Id. at 52–53. 

2. Lahley’s Testimony

Marianne Lahley, a licensed clinical social worker from the Veterans Affairs Supportive 

Housing program in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, testified on Ney’s 

behalf. Id. at 61–62. Lahley explained that she began working with Ney in December 2013, who 

was homeless at the time. Id. She helped Ney find shelter in the veterans’ home beginning in 

March 2013, and has kept in regular contact with him since. Id. at 63. Lahley presented 

testimony that corroborated the psychological limitations Ney experienced. Id. at 64–70. She 

testified that during her time with him, Ney exhibited outward depressive symptoms including 

reclusion, a lack of motivation to conduct routine tasks, and recurring nightmares centered around 

his deceased fiancée. Id. at 64–65. Moreover, Lahley explained that based on her training and 

expertise in PTSD diagnosis, Ney exhibited “some classic and some not so classic” symptoms of 

post-traumatic stress. Id. at 66–67. Those symptoms included avoidance and isolation, and hyperarousal and guardedness, which affected Ney’s day-to-day activities. Id. at 67–68. She testified 

that those symptoms have prevented Ney from finding employment. Id. at 69.

3. Belchick’s Testimony

Finally, Belchick, a vocational expert, appeared telephonically and testified about Ney’s 

capacity to work in his previous jobs. Id. at 70. He detailed background information for each of 

the positions Ney previously held, as published in the U.S. Department of Labor Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”). Id. at 71–76. Belchick explained that Ney’s prior work as a forklift 

driver was a semi-skilled position, categorized in the DOT as requiring physical work at the 

medium exertional level. Id. The DOT classified Ney’s mail clerk work as unskilled, rated at the 

light exertional level.3 Id. at 73. Finally, Ney’s work as a machine operator was categorized as a 

skilled position, rated at the heavy exertional level. Id. at 72. Because Belchick later clarified 

 

3 Belchick had initially labeled this position as a technologist, a skilled occupation. Id. However, 

Ney clarified at the administrative hearing that his responsibilities actually involved delivering 

mail and packages within the company. Id. at 72. Based on this information, Belchick 

reclassified the position as an interoffice mail clerk, an unskilled position. Id. at 73. 

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with Ney that, in fact, the position did not require Ney to lift heavy objects, he modified the DOT 

exertional level from heavy to light. Id. 

Following this exchange, the ALJ questioned Belchick about his opinion as to whether 

Ney could return to any of his prior jobs in light of Ney’s demonstrated limited mental 

engagement and exertional capacities:

Q: Okay. All right, so, now, let’s assume a hypothetical individual 

of the claimant’s age, education, and work background [with] the 

following limitations; lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally

and ten frequently. Sitting, standing, walking six hours each in an 

eight-hour day. No climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and no 

crawling. Occasional climbing of ramps and stairs. Occasionally

stooping and crouching. Frequent balancing and kneeling.

And, also, overhead reaching is occasional bilaterally. Frequent 

handling with the left upper extremity. No work around heights. 

Occasional work around moving machinery. Limited to simple, 

repetitive tasks with no contact with the public and occasional 

contact with supervisors and coworkers. Can that person do this 

claimant’s past work? 

A: Not all of it, Your Honor. He could do the past work as he 

described and what we determined later was a mail clerk job which 

was unskilled at the light exertional level, no public contact. The 

contact would be interoffice. He would pick up and deliver mail 

interoffice. He couldn’t do the forklift job because it’s [at the] 

medium exertional level. He could do the wet processing operator 

job as he described it because it is—no, leave that one out. No, 

because it’s not, so, one job, Your Honor. The job of mail clerk he 

could do. 

Id. at 73–74 (emphasis added). The ALJ then asked Belchick whether an individual with those 

proposed limitations could also return to any of his previous work if he or she were to be absent 

from work more than three times a month. Id. at 74. Belchick answered that such a limitation 

would preclude that individual from all jobs: “[T]he general consent [sic] is that if they’re absent 

more than one day a month repeatedly, month after month, that becomes an unacceptable work 

practice and that’s especially true at the unskilled level.” Id. 

Ney also questioned Belchick about the scope of work available to persons with his 

particular limitations. Id. at 75. Belchick explained that even though Ney previously held jobs at 

the skilled and semi-skilled levels (machine operator and forklift driver, respectively), those jobs 

were not transferable because there were no positions requiring the skills for those occupations 

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that could fit the particular physical and psychological restrictions Ney exhibited. Id. Ney 

presented several hypotheticals to Belchick:

Q: Hypo number three, let’s assume a hypothetical individual with 

the same age, education, and work experience as the claimant. 

Further assume the following limitations, that they would be limited 

to sedentary work and must be allowed to elevate their feet to chair 

level on an occasional basis as needed. Is there any work for such a 

hypothetical individual?

A: No, Counselor, the standard is as the job is generally performed 

in the national economy. Any deviation from that standard becomes 

an accommodation. Jobs in the national economy generally are not 

performed with the feet elevated. That’s an accommodation, and 

it’s an accommodated job and it’s not to be considered.

Q: Hypothetical number four, let’s assume a hypothetical individual 

whose only limitation is that they must be allowed to have one 30-

minute unscheduled break per day in addition to breaks required by 

law in order to lay down and take pressure off his spine.

A: Same answer, Counselor. Same answer.

Q: All right. Then, hypothetical number five, let’s assume we have 

a hypothetical person who would be occasionally off task a third of 

the workday—

A: No, that eliminates all jobs. Five percent off task is acceptable, 

maybe. Probably really not, but that’s the standard feeling is 

anything in the excess of 5 percent. 

Q: All right, anything above 5 percent, not acceptable?

A. Right. 

Id. at 75–76. 

C. The ALJ’s Analysis and Factual Findings

The ALJ issued a written decision on September 10, 2014, finding that Ney did not qualify 

for disability benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Id. at 28. The judge 

conducted the five-step analysis established by the Commissioner for Social Security benefits 

determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;4see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 

 

4 Duly promulgated agency regulations are binding and carry the force of law: 

Reasonable regulations, when consistent with the laws that authorize 

them and adopted through proper procedures, have the force of law. 

Watson Land Co. v. Comm’r, 799 F.2d 571, 579 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Federal courts generally defer to an agency’s reasonable 

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1999). 

The ALJ found at step one that Ney had engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

November 1, 2012, the alleged date of disability. Id. 

At step two, the ALJ found that Ney suffered from severe medical impairments that 

consisted of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine (lower back), degenerative disc disease 

of the cervical spine (neck and upper back), obesity, a personality disorder, an anxiety disorder, 

and a depressive disorder. Id. at 16. 

Next, at step three, the ALJ considered whether the impairments established in the 

previous step satisfied any of the enumerated impairments the Commissioner has recognized as 

disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) & Subpart P, App. 1. The judge found that Ney did not 

meet Section 1.04 of the Commissioner’s recognized impairments for spinal disorders5because 

none of the medical documentation provided any evidence of nerve root or cord compromise. Id.

at 17–18. The ALJ also found that Ney failed to meet Section 12.04 of the Commissioner’s 

recognized impairments for affective disorders,

6

Section 12.06 for anxiety-related disorders,7and 

 

interpretations of its own statutes and regulations. Id. But federal 

courts do not need to defer when the interpretation comes from a 

policy statement, agency manual, or enforcement guideline. Cmty. 

Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 782, 791 

(9th Cir. 2003). Still, a non-controlling interpretation provides 

proper guidance to the extent that it is thorough, logical, persuasive, 

and consistent with related interpretations. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 

323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

Furtado v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-04063-HRL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133636, *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 

2015). 

5

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) & Subpart P, App. 1 § 1.04 (setting forth the criteria needed 

to find a spine-related disability). To satisfy a disorder under Section 1.04, a claimant must meet 

the requirements set forth in paragraphs A, B, or C. Subpart P, App. 1 § 1.04. 

6

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) & Subpart P, App. 1 § 12.04 (setting forth the criteria needed 

to find affective disorders). To satisfy a disorder under Section 12.04, a claimant must meet the 

requirements set forth in paragraphs A and B, or, alternatively, the requirements in paragraph C. 

Subpart P, App. 1 § 12.04. 

7

See id. § 12.06 (setting forth the criteria needed to find anxiety-related disorders). To satisfy a 

disorder under Section 12.06, a claimant must meet the requirements set forth in paragraphs A and 

B, or, alternatively, the requirements in paragraphs A and C. Id. 

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Section 12.08 for personality disorders8because none of the medical documentation provided 

evidence satisfying the respective Paragraph B criteria in those three sections, and additionally 

failed to satisfy the Paragraph C criteria in Sections 12.04 and 12.06. AR at 17–19. Having found 

that Ney’s impairments did not satisfy any relevant recognized impairment, the ALJ moved onto 

the next step of the analysis. 

Step four required the ALJ to make specific factual findings of Ney’s RFC and, given 

those findings, whether he could return to past relevant work. In a detailed and thorough 

discussion, the judge considered Ney’s relevant documented evidence, as well as evidence set 

forth from Ney’s treating and consulting medical physicians and psychologists. Id. at 20–27. The 

ALJ made express credibility determinations on this evidence, finding the record credible as to, 

among other things, portions of Ney’s own testimony as well as the testimony of his witness, 

Lahley. Id. As to Ney’s RFC, the ALJ found that he was able to perform light work, although he 

could do so only with certain physical and cognitive limitations:

. . . [T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform 

light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) 

except that the claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, 

and the claimant can never crawl. Additionally, the claimant can 

occasionally climb ramps or stairs, the claimant can occasionally 

stoop and crouch, and the claimant can frequently balance and kneel. 

Furthermore, the claimant can occasionally reach overhead, 

bilaterally, and the claimant can frequently handle with the left 

upper extremity. Moreover, the claimant can never work at heights, 

and the claimant can occasionally work around moving machinery. 

Finally, the claimant is limited to simple, repetitive tasks with no 

public contact and occasional contact with supervisors and 

coworkers. 

Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 

Next, the ALJ determined whether, given Ney’s RFC, he could return to past relevant 

work—either as Ney actually performed that work, or as that work was generally performed in the 

national economy. The ALJ’s discussion comparing Ney’s RFC to his past relevant work was 

sparse and undeveloped, as it made only minimal findings of his responsibilities, functions, or 

 

8

See id. § 12.08 (setting forth the criteria needed to find personality disorders). To satisfy a 

disorder under Section 12.08, a claimant must meet the requirements set forth in paragraphs A and 

B. Id.

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physical and emotional exertions while working in those previous positions. The relevant portions 

of the ALJ’s discussion here read in full:

The claimant has past relevant work as: a forklift driver (DOT 

number: 921.683-050), a machine operator (DOT number: 

559.382-026), and a mail clerk (DOT number: 209.687-026). The 

demands of the claimant’s past relevant work as a forklift drive[r] 

and a machine operator exceed his residual functional capacity, for 

these occupations are semi-skilled to skilled in nature, whereas the 

claimant is limited to simple, repetitive, tasks. Thus, the claimant 

cannot perform this past relevant work.

Nonetheless, the claimant’s residual functional capacity does not 

restrict him from performing his past relevant work as a mail clerk, 

both as performed by the claimant and as this work is generally 

performed in the national economy. The claimant’s work as a mail 

clerk required physical demands consistent with the light exertional 

level, and the claimant retains the ability to engage in a range of 

light work. Furthermore, this work does not require any nonexertional limitations that the claimant’s residual functional capacity 

precludes. Therefore, the undersigned finds that the claimant is able 

to perform his past relevant work as a mail clerk both as the 

claimant actually performed this work and as it is generally 

performed in the national economy. Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the 

undersigned has determined that the vocational expert’s testimony is 

consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles.

Id. at 28. Because the ALJ found that Ney’s RFC permitted him to return to past relevant work as 

a mail clerk, the judge did not proceed to the fifth step of the analysis and instead concluded that 

Ney was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act. 

D. The Appeals Council and Ney’s Complaint

Ney filed an appeal on October 8, 2014 with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)

Appeals Council, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (“Appeals Council”). Id. at 7–10. 

The Appeals Council denied the request on December 16, 2014,9finding no error in the ALJ’s 

decision. Id. at 1–4. 

On January 23, 2015, Ney filed a Complaint in the Northern District of California pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3), seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. Complaint 

(“Compl.,” dkt. 1). The Commissioner filed an Answer on May 11, 2015. Answer (“Ans.,” dkt. 

 

9 An ALJ’s denial is final when the Appeals Council denies a request to review the decision. 

Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004).

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15). Ney and the Commissioner filed Motions for Summary Judgment on June 5, 2015, and July 

6, 2015, respectively. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Ney’s MSJ,” dkt. 17); 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Commissioner’s MSJ,” dkt. 19). 

E. The Motions for Summary Judgment

In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Ney disputes the ALJ’s step four determination, 

arguing that the judge failed to base her determination on substantial evidence in the record. Ney 

does not dispute the ALJ’s RFC findings, but instead alleges that the judge failed to make the 

requisite findings of fact that he could return to his past relevant work as a mail clerk, as he had 

actually performed it. Ney’s MSJ at 29–31. Moreover, he argues that the judge’s conclusion that 

he could return to the mail clerk position, as the position was generally performed in the national 

economy, was also legal error because it required a reasoning level incompatible with his 

cognitive RFC. Id. at 31–37. Ney argues that the ALJ failed to make any findings of fact to 

resolve this inconsistency, as she was required to do. Id. at 33. These defects, Ney concludes, 

warrants a reversal of the administrative opinion, and a remand for an award of disability benefits. 

Id. at 37.

The Commissioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking this Court to uphold the 

administrative decision. She argues that, notwithstanding the inconsistency between cognitive 

reasoning levels and Ney’s RFC, the ALJ’s decision was substantially supported by other medical 

evidence in the record “overall.” Commissioner’s MSJ at 6. Moreover, the Commissioner argues 

that the ALJ’s failure to identify or address the inconsistency was harmless error. Id. at 5–7. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A district court may review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether the judge’s findings 

are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bray v. Comm’r 

of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). The court may set aside the 

Commissioner’s denial of benefits only if the ALJ’s “findings are based on legal error or are not 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vasquez v. 

Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 

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223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but 

less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).

In determining whether substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s subsidiary factual 

determinations, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the judge. Connett v. 

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); Ceguerra v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs, 933 

F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A reviewing court can evaluate an agency’s decision only on the 

grounds articulated by the agency.”). Rather, the court must review the record as a whole and 

consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not 

affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” (quoting Hammock v. 

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989))); see also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 

(9th Cir. 2007). Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s 

decision must be upheld. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

B. The Commissioner’s Five-Step Analysis

The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 

12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is found to be disabled only 

if “his physical or mental impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his 

previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process to determine whether a 

claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. “If a claimant is 

found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider 

subsequent steps.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. The burden of proof rests on the claimant for steps 

one through four, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id.

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At step one, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the ALJ finds that the claimant is not disabled, 

regardless of his medical condition or age, education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(b). If 

the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ proceeds to the next step. 

At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has “a severe medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment,” or combination of such impairments, which meets the durational 

requirement set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. Unless the impairment is expected to result in 

death, it must have lasted, or must be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least twelve 

months. Id. Moreover, an impairment is severe if it “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical 

or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a 

severe impairment, disability benefits are denied at this step. Id. If it is determined that one or 

more impairments are severe, the ALJ continues to the next step of the analysis.

At step three, the ALJ compares the medical severity of the claimant’s impairments with a 

compiled listing of impairments that the Commissioner has designated as disabling. 

Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) & Subpart P, App. 1. If one or a combination of the claimant’s 

impairments meet or equal a listed impairment, the claimant is found to be disabled. 

Id. 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Otherwise, the analysis proceeds to the next step.

At step four, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC in light of his impairments. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1560(b) (defining past relevant work as “work . . . done within the 

past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for you to learn to 

do it”). Then, taking into consideration the extent of that RFC, the ALJ determines whether the 

claimant can perform past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can do so, he 

or she is found to not be disabled. Id. If the claimant cannot do so, the analysis proceeds to the 

fifth and final step of the analysis. 

At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant, in light of his 

RFC, can nevertheless perform other jobs. Id. § 404.1520(f); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. A 

claimant who is able to perform other jobs that are available in significant numbers in the national 

economy is not considered disabled, and will not receive disability benefits. 

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Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(f). Conversely, where there are no jobs available in significant 

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is found to be 

disabled. Id.

C. Whether the ALJ’s Step Four Determination Was Supported by Substantial 

Evidence

Ney argues that the ALJ’s step four determination was error because it was not supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. He does not dispute the ALJ’s RFC findings, but instead 

claims that the judge improperly used those findings to conclude that he could return to past 

relevant work as a mail clerk. He argues that the ALJ failed to make specific factual findings 

about how he had actually performed work in that position in the past. He also claims that the 

judge failed to resolve an inconsistency between his cognitive RFC and the reasoning level 

required for the mail clerk position as it was generally performed in the national economy. Ney 

argues that without these findings, the ALJ’s conclusion that he could return to past relevant work 

was unsupported by substantial evidence.

The Commissioner concedes the argument to the extent that Ney’s RFC precluded him 

from returning to work as a mail clerk, as he actually performed it. However, she argues that Ney 

could still work in the position, as it was generally performed in the national economy. The 

Commissioner also acknowledges that the ALJ failed to address an inconsistency between Ney’s 

RFC and the cognitive requirements generally needed for the mail clerk position; however, she 

argues that other evidence in the record substantially supported the judge’s step four 

determination. Moreover, the Commissioner argues that the oversight was harmless error. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the ALJ’s analysis in step four was 

reversible error because it was not based on substantial evidence in the record. 

1. Step Four of the Commissioner’s Five-Step Analysis Required the ALJ to 

Make Specific Factual Findings about Ney’s Past Relevant Work, and to 

Resolve Conflicts Between The Vocational Expert’s Opinion and the 

Occupational Requirements Published in the Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles

As noted above, step four of the Commissioner’s five-step analysis required the ALJ to 

consider whether Ney retained the RFC to perform past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 

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404.1560(b); Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990). The inquiry required the ALJ to 

make “specific factual findings” as to the claimant’s RFC, the physical and mental demands of the 

claimant’s past work, and whether, given that RFC, the claimant could return to past work—either 

as the work was actually performed or as that work is generally performed based on a national 

standard. SSR 82-62, 1982 SSR LEXIS 27 (Aug. 20, 1980);

10 see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 

416.920(e). 

Under the SSRs, past relevant work is considered in two contexts—work as the claimant 

actually performed it, and work as it is generally performed in the national economy. SSR 82-61, 

1982 SSR LEXIS 31 (Jan. 1, 1982). To determine work as actually performed, the SSRs require 

the ALJ to make specific and detailed findings for such factors as the claimant’s responsibilities, 

functions, and physical exertions in that position. SSR 82–62. When mental or emotional 

impairments are at issue, “care must be taken to obtain a precise description of the particular job 

duties which are likely to produce tension and anxiety,” including such factors as the speed, 

precision, complexity required of certain tasks, and whether the job necessitates a worker to 

exercise independent judgment. Id. 

To determine work as generally performed, the SSRs specify that the ALJ should “rely 

primarily on the DOT . . . for information about the requirements of work in the national 

economy.” SSR 00-4p, 2000 SSR LEXIS 8 (Dec. 4, 2000). VEs are often consulted at this stage 

to provide supplemental evidence, and may be particularly helpful “to resolve complex vocational 

issues” during the administrative hearing. Id. The SSRs caution, however, that neither the VE’s 

opinion nor the DOT classifications supersedes the other; rather, the ALJ is tasked with the 

responsibility to develop the record with specific factual findings and to resolve conflicts between 

 

10 Social Security Rulings (“SSRs”), according to the governing regulations, “are binding on all 

components of the Social Security Administration” and “represent precedent[ial] final opinions 

and orders and statements of policy and interpretations” of the SSA. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1); see 

also Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.3 (1984) (noting the function of SSRs). “SSRs 

reflect the official interpretation of the [SSA] and are entitled to ‘some deference’ as long as they 

are consistent with the Social Security Act and regulations.” Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 

1124 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

SSRs do not carry the “force of law,” but they are binding on ALJs nonetheless. Quang Van Han 

v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989).

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the expert’s opinion and the occupational requirements listed in the DOT:

Occupational evidence provided by a VE or VS [vocational 

specialist] generally should be consistent with the occupational 

information supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent 

unresolved conflict between VE or VS evidence and the DOT, the

adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict 

before relying on the VE or VS evidence to support a determination 

or decision about whether the claimant is disabled. At the hearings 

level, as part of the adjudicator’s duty to fully develop the record, 

the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to whether or not 

there is such consistency.

Neither the DOT nor the VE or VS evidence automatically “trumps”

when there is a conflict. The adjudicator must resolve the conflict by 

determining if the explanation given by the VE or VS is reasonable 

and provides a basis for relying on the VE or VS testimony rather 

than on the DOT information.

Id. (emphasis added).

The SSRs underscore the importance of specific factual findings at this stage of the 

analysis. SSR 82–62 (“Since this is an important and, in some instances, a controlling issue,” the 

ALJ’s determination has “far-reaching implications and must be developed and explained fully.”). 

They elaborate:

Determination of the claimant’s ability to do [past relevant work] 

requires a careful appraisal of (1) the individual’s statements as to 

which past work requirements can no longer be met and the 

reason(s) for his or her inability to meet those requirements; (2) 

medical evidence establishing how the impairment limits [his or her] 

ability to meet the physical and mental requirements of the work; 

and (3) in some cases, supplementary or corroborative information 

from other sources such as employers, the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles, etc., on the requirements of the work as 

generally performed in the economy. 

Id. at 4. Although the claimant bears the burden in step four to show that he or she cannot perform 

such work, the ALJ nevertheless has a duty to make sufficient findings of fact to support the 

determination. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 & 416.971, 404.1574 & 416.974, 404.1565 & 

416.965; see also Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2001). In the absence of 

explicit findings regarding the claimant’s prior job, a statement that he or she can or cannot 

perform the prior job “is conclusory and not supported by substantial evidence.” Banks v. 

Barnhart, 434 F. Supp. 2d 800, 807 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see also Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845 (“We may 

set aside a denial of benefits if ‘it is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based on legal 

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error.’” (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted))).

2. The ALJ’s Findings as to Whether Ney’s Residual Functional Capacity 

Permitted Him to Return to Past Relevant Work Was Unsupported By 

Substantial Evidence.

a. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Findings

Here, neither party disputes the ALJ’s RFC findings. The judge undertook a detailed 

analysis of Ney’s physical and mental limitations by considering relevant medical evidence and 

making specific credibility determinations with respect to medical opinions from his treating 

physicians. As to Ney’s cognitive limitations, the ALJ credited the diagnoses of his treating 

psychologists, explaining that Ney’s “limit[ation] to simple tasks is consistent with findings of 

impaired delayed recall and impaired serial seven testing through the psychological consultative 

examination, and it has support from the claimant’s frequent reports of distractibility.” AR at 26. 

The judge therefore determined that Ney’s cognitive limitations precluded him from work beyond 

“simple, repetitive tasks.” Id. These findings for Ney’s RFC are well supported in the record. 

The ALJ was next required to consider Ney’s past relevant work, including the functions, 

exertions, and responsibilities those positions entailed. However, the ALJ made only minimal 

inquiry into the nature of Ney’s past work as a forklift driver, machine operator, and mail clerk. 

b. The Forklift Driver and Machine Operator Positions

With respect to the forklift driver and machine operator positions, the ALJ made no 

findings whatsoever as to how Ney previously performed those jobs, and only minimal findings as 

to how those jobs were generally performed in the national economy. She noted that those 

positions were characterized as semi-skilled to skilled work, and were therefore incompatible with 

Ney’s cognitive limitation to simple, repetitive tasks. Based on this factor alone, the judge 

concluded that Ney’s RFC precluded him from returning to work both as a forklift driver and 

machine operator. Based on this record, the ALJ has not set forth “specific factual findings” to 

support her determination, as she was required to do. 

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c. The Mail Clerk Position, as Actually Performed

For the mail clerk position, the ALJ similarly failed to make sufficient factual findings to 

support her determination that Ney’s RFC did not preclude him from returning to that position as 

he actually performed that work in the past. Here, the extent of the ALJ’s analysis is the following 

two sentences: “The claimant’s work as a mail clerk required physical demands consistent with 

the light exertional level, and the claimant retains the ability to engage in a range of light work. 

Furthermore, this work does not require any non-exertional limitations that the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity precludes.” AR at 20. Absent from this is any discussion of Ney’s specific 

responsibilities as a mail clerk, his functions in that position, or the degree of physical or cognitive 

exertion that the position required. SSR 82-62 cautioned that “care must be taken to obtain a 

precise description of the particular job duties,” including such factors as the speed, precision, 

complexity required of certain tasks, and whether the job necessitated a worker to exercise 

independent judgment. None of that was done here. The transcript from the administrative 

hearing reflects this observation as well, as the ALJ made no inquiry into the specific demands the 

mail clerk position actually required from Ney. Without more, the judge’s determination that 

Ney’s RFC did not preclude him from returning to work as actually performed in the mail clerk 

position “is conclusory and not supported by substantial evidence.” Banks, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 

807. 

In fact, the record evidence contradicts the ALJ’s conclusion. The judge determined that 

Ney’s RFC limited him to stooping and crouching only “occasionally.” AR at 20. However, 

Ney’s work history report indicates that his previous work as a mail clerk required him to stoop 

three hours and crouch six hours during each work day. AR at 277. Indeed, the Commissioner, in 

her motion papers, concedes that Ney’s RFC precludes him from returning to this work as he 

actually performed it: “[B]ecause Plaintiff reported in his Work History report that he actually 

performed the mail clerk job . . . with crouching six hours and stooping three hours (as opposed to 

just occasionally (AR 277), Plaintiff could not perform the job as actually performed (compare 

with [sic] RFC at AR 20).” Commissioner’s MSJ at 3.

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d. The Mail Clerk Position, as Generally Performed

The ALJ also determined that Ney’s RFC did not preclude him from performing work as a 

mail clerk, as that work was generally performed in the national economy. Ney argues this was 

error because the mail clerk position, as it was generally performed, required a cognitive reasoning 

level incompatible with Ney’s RFC. Ney cites to a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, Zavalin v. 

Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015), to argue that the DOT’s classification of that position at 

Level 3 reasoning was incompatible with his cognitive limitation to “simple, repetitive tasks.” See 

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles, App. C (“Components of the Definition 

Trailer”) (1993) (defining Level 3 reasoning). Because the ALJ overlooked this inconsistency, she 

made no findings to resolve the discrepancy. The ALJ’s determination, Ney argues, was not 

supported by substantial evidence, and was therefore error. The Court agrees.

Zavalin presented the Ninth Circuit with circumstances similar to those here, in which the 

ALJ determined that the claimant’s RFC restricted him to performing only “simple, routine, or 

repetitive tasks.” 778 F.3d at 845. Notwithstanding this finding, the ALJ in Zavalin concluded

that the claimant was capable of performing work the DOT categorized as requiring Level 3 

reasoning. Id. The claimant argued that this determination was inconsistent with his cognitive 

RFC. Id. 

The Zavalin court agreed, holding that “there [was] an apparent conflict between the 

residual functional capacity to perform simple, repetitive tasks, and the demands of Level 3 

Reasoning.” Id. at 847. In reaching that conclusion, the court compared Level 2 reasoning to 

Level 3 reasoning: 

LEVEL 2

Apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but 

uninvolved written or oral instructions. Deal with problems 

involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations.

LEVEL 3

Apply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions 

furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form. Deal with 

problems involving several concrete variables in or from 

standardized situations.

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Id. The court explained that the limitation to simple, routine tasks was at odds with Level 3’s 

requirements because “it may be difficult for a person limited to simple, repetitive tasks to follow 

instructions in ‘diagrammatic form’ as such instructions can be abstract.” Id. (citing Adams, No. C 

10-2008 DMR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51662, *12–13 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2011)). Rather, the 

court explained that those cognitive limitations were more akin to Level 2 reasoning. Id. The ALJ 

had not recognized the inconsistency, and concluded without further discussion that the claimant’s 

RFC did not preclude him from doing work requiring Level 3 reasoning. Id. at 844–45. On these 

bases, the court remanded the case. Id. at 846–48.

The circumstances Ney presents here are analogous to those in Zavalin. Here, the ALJ 

relied on the DOT to determine whether Ney’s RFC precluded him from returning to work as a 

mail clerk. She explained that the position required physical demands rated at the “light”

exertional level, consistent with the physical limitations in Ney’s RFC. She cited also to 

Belchick’s expert opinions and concluded, without any discussion, that the expert’s findings were 

“consistent with the information contained in the [DOT].” Based on this undeveloped analysis, 

the ALJ concluded that Ney could to past relevant work as a mail clerk, as that position was 

generally performed in the national economy. 

This analysis was incomplete, as it focused only on Ney’s physical RFC and failed to 

address his cognitive limitations in relation to the mental demands of the mail clerk position. Like 

in Zavalin, the position here required Level 3 reasoning, which demanded from Ney the ability to 

“apply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or 

diagrammatic form,” and “deal with problems involving several concrete variables in or from 

standardized situations.” Ney’s cognitive RFC, however, precluded him from performing work 

beyond “simple, repetitive tasks.” As Zavalin explained, this “inherent inconsistency” arises, 

particularly because the mail clerk position, as it was generally performed, could require Ney to 

follow abstract, diagrammatic instructions, incompatible with his RFC. Because the ALJ failed to 

recognize this discrepancy, she did not ask Belchick why a person with Ney’s limitations could 

nevertheless meet the demands of Level 3 reasoning. See Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846 (“When there 

is an apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT—for example, 

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expert testimony that a claimant can perform an occupation involving DOT requirements that 

appear more than the claimant can handle—the ALJ is required to reconcile the inconsistency.”

(citing Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

The Commissioner argues that notwithstanding this oversight, the Court should affirm the 

administrative decision because other evidence in the record provided substantial evidence 

“overall” for the ALJ’s determination. Commissioner’s MSJ at 6. As support, the Commissioner 

references the published Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) and skill levels listed in the 

DOT corresponding to the mail clerk position. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that 

the SVP and skill level designations measure occupational demands different from the DOT’s 

listed reasoning level. SVP levels are used to gauge the amount of time generally needed for a 

new worker “to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for 

average performance in a specific job-worker situation.” DOT, App. C (II). Moreover, the 

Commissioner uses published skill level designations—“unskilled,” “semi-skilled,” and “skilled”

work—primarily as a way to determine a worker’s ability to transfer from one occupation to 

another. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568. In contrast, the purpose of the DOT’s published reasoning levels

is to gauge the cognitive demands “required of the worker for satisfactory job performance” in 

each particular job occupation. DOT, App. C (II). It is a designation that measures whether the 

worker possesses the requisite reasoning ability to perform work typically needed in that job. The 

ALJ’s failure to address the incompatibility between the mail clerk’s Level 3 reasoning and Ney’s 

cognitive RFC was error, notwithstanding the fact that the SVP or skill level designations might

otherwise have been compatible with Ney’s qualifications. 

Finally, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s oversight was harmless. “A reviewing 

court cannot consider an error harmless unless it can conclude confidently that no reasonable ALJ, 

when properly crediting the testimony, could not have reached a different disability 

determination.” Jones v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-05260-EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139366, *29–31 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2015) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 

2006)). An error is harmless only if it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1051. Here, it cannot be said that the ALJ’s errors were 

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harmless. The judge concluded that Ney retained the RFC to return to past relevant work as a mail 

clerk, both as he actually performed that work in the past, and as that work was generally 

performed. But, Ney’s self-reported work history report suggested that returning to that past 

work, as he actually performed it, would require physical demands beyond his RFC. Also, as 

Zavalin held, returning to work as a mail clerk as that job was generally performed in the national 

economy would require cognitive demands inconsistent with Ney’s limitation to simple, repetitive 

tasks. Therefore, the Court cannot confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when properly 

crediting the testimony, would not have reached a different disability determination here. 

D. Remand

Ney argues that the Court should remand for a reinstatement of benefits. Whether to 

remand for further proceedings or award benefits is within the discretion of the Court. Salvador v. 

Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 

1989). Remand for further proceedings is warranted where additional administrative proceedings 

could remedy defects in the decision. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984). The 

Ninth Circuit has devised a three-part credit-as-true standard, each part of which must be satisfied 

in order for a court to remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits: (1) the 

record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful 

purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, 

whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence 

were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. See

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2014); Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 

1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008). Because the record has not been fully developed here, the Court may 

not remand for reinstatement of benefits. Moreover, further proceedings may remedy the defects 

discussed in this Order. Ney’s request to remand for a reinstatement of benefits is therefore 

denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the ALJ’s step four determination 

was error, and the administrative decision is therefore reversed. The Court GRANTS Ney’s 

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Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The Court REMANDS the matter (1) for a determination of whether Ney’s residual functional 

capacity precludes him from returning to past relevant work, and (2) an award of benefits 

consistent with that determination and this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 8, 2015

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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