Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00977/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00977-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

REGINALD BURRELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:15-cv-00977-AKK-TMP

)

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The plaintiff, Reginald Burrell, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that rights, privileges, or immunities afforded him under 

the Constitution or laws of the United States were abridged during his 

incarceration at Donaldson Correctional Facility, in Bessemer, Alabama.1

 The 

sole remaining defendant in this action is Mohammad Jenkins, against whom the 

plaintiff brings a claim for retaliation, in violation of his First Amendment Rights.2

 

In accordance with the usual practices of this Court and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the 

amended complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a 

preliminary report and recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 

(1991).

 1

The plaintiff has since been released from prison. (Doc. 20). 

2

All other defendants and claims were dismissed by court order on February 19, 2016. 

(Doc. 25). 

FILED

 2016 Oct-20 PM 12:53

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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I. Procedural History

On February 19, 2016, the court entered an Order for Special Report 

directing that copies of the complaint be forwarded to the named defendant and 

that the defendant file a special report addressing the factual allegations contained 

therein. (Doc. 26). The court advised the defendant that the special report could 

be submitted under oath or accompanied by affidavits and, if appropriate, the court 

would considered it as a motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.). The order advised the plaintiff that, 

after he received a copy of the special report, he would have twenty-one days to 

file his initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. (Id.). 

On May 19, 2016, defendant Jenkins filed a Special Report, supplemented 

by an affidavit and other evidence. (Doc. 35). On May 20, 2016, the parties were 

notified that the court would construe the special report as a motion for summary 

judgment and the plaintiff was notified that he had twenty-one (21) days to respond 

to the motion for summary judgment, by filing affidavits or other material. (Doc. 

36). The court also advised him of the consequences of any default or failure to 

comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (Id.). See Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 

825 (11th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff then filed requests for documents (docs. 37, 38, 

44, 45, 46), which ultimately were granted in part and denied in part (docs. 40, 43, 

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51). On August 1, 2016, the plaintiff filed a response to the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment. (Doc. 47). The court ordered that certain documents be 

produced and the plaintiff was allowed additional time to file any further response 

to the motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 48, 51). The plaintiff then filed an 

additional response to the motion. (Doc. 52).

II. Standard of Review

Because the court has construed the defendant’s special report as a motion 

for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 governs the resolution of the motion. 

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 

proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In making that 

assessment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. 

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). The burden of 

proof is upon the moving party to establish his prima facie entitlement to summary 

judgment by showing the absence of genuine issues and that he is due to prevail as 

a matter of law. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 

1991). Unless the plaintiff, who carries the ultimate burden of proving his action, 

is able to show some evidence with respect to each element of his claim, all other 

issues of fact become immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

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matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Bennett 

v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1990). As the Eleventh Circuit has 

explained:

Facts in dispute cease to be “material” facts when the plaintiff fails to 

establish a prima facie case. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no 

genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of 

proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” [citations omitted]. 

Thus, under such circumstances, the public official is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, because the plaintiff has failed to carry 

the burden of proof. This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually 

unsupported claims prior to trial. 

Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1532. 

However, any “specific facts” pled in a pro se plaintiff’s sworn complaint 

must be considered in opposition to summary judgment. See Caldwell v. Warden, 

FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Perry v. Thompson, 

786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986)). Additionally, because the plaintiff is pro 

se, the court must construe the complaint more liberally than it would pleadings 

drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). “Pro se pleading are 

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, 

therefore, be liberally construed.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th 

Cir. 2006). 

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III. Summary Judgment Facts3

Based on a November 2012 disciplinary report by the defendant, asserting 

that the plaintiff caused other inmates to become disorderly, the plaintiff spent 

seven months and nine days in disciplinary segregation. (Doc. 1 at 38-39). The 

plaintiff was released from segregation on June 24, 2013, and placed in the Crime 

Bill program. (Id., at 43). For reasons unknown to him, he was reassigned to the 

C-D Block on July 26, 2013. (Id.). 

On August 9, 2013, the plaintiff was stabbed six times. (Doc. 1 at 10). The 

plaintiff went to fellow inmate Terence Jackson’s cell because the plaintiff had 

possession of Jackson’s cell phone,4 awaiting Jackson’s repayment of the 

plaintiff’s “green dot.”5

 (Id.). Once in Jackson’s doorway, the plaintiff was 

pushed into the cell by inmates Johny Jones, Douglas McMean and “Moore.” 

(Id.). Jackson demanded his phone be returned, to which the plaintiff replied that 

they had an agreement. (Id.). At that point, Moore told Jackson just to stab the 

plaintiff, and Jackson complied, pulling out a prison knife. (Id.). In the ensuing 

 3

The court considers only the facts relevant to the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation 

claim against defendant Jenkins. 

4 The court judicially knows that possession of cell phones by prisoners is a disciplinary 

infraction as cell phones are considered contraband.

5 “Green Dot” is a prepaid, reloadable credit card provided by Green Dot Bank. See e.g.,

www.greendot.com. The plaintiff explains in one of his responses to the motion for summary 

judgment that he sold various canteen items to other inmates in exchange for Green Dot money 

packs. (Doc. 52 at 8). Because inmate Jackson owed the plaintiff money for his purchases, the 

plaintiff had possession of Jackson’s phone until Jackson made some payments. (Id.). 

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scuffle, McMean grabbed the plaintiff from behind in a choke hold, and Jones 

grabbed the plaintiff’s arms. (Id.). Due to the choke hold, the plaintiff collapsed. 

(Id.). He awoke on the floor, bleeding. (Id.). All four of the other inmates had 

knives. (Id., at 11). Jones told the plaintiff he had to tell them where to find 

Jackson’s cell phone, and that if he lied, he would “get the same thing all over 

again.” (Id.). The phone was retrieved and the plaintiff was released. (Id.). 

The plaintiff was taken to the health care unit with two “puncture wounds,” 

two scrapes, and a laceration. (Doc. 35-4). In contrast, inmate Jackson’s body 

chart showed only a small scratch to his right elbow and noted no complaints of 

pain or discomfort. (Doc. 35-5). 

After the plaintiff’s wounds were treated, the plaintiff was questioned by 

Captain Tew, Captain Baldwin, Officer Felton, Sergeant Taylor, and Sergeant 

Davis. (Doc. 1 at 11-12). While in Captain Baldwin’s office, defendant Sergeant 

Mohammad Jenkins started screaming that nobody actually injured the plaintiff, 

that the plaintiff was lying, and that the altercation between the plaintiff and 

Jackson was because the plaintiff had used Jackson’s mother’s address to file a 

fraudulent IRS claim. (Doc. 1 at 12, 14). The plaintiff told Baldwin that he and 

Jenkins had a history involving sexual complaints and investigations, and therefore 

Jenkins wanted retaliation. (Id., at 12-13). Jenkins “took the investigation away 

from Sergeant Davis, omitted the stabbing from the incident report, and replaced it 

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with what Jackson, Jones, McMean, and Moore claimed, namely that it was “a 

fight without a weapon because I [was] suppose[d] to have used Jackson[’s] 

mother[’s] address and got her in [a] $14,000 debt with the IRS.” (Id., at 14). 

Jenkins told the plaintiff, “we about to run a train on your ass.” (Id.). Jenkins then 

announced he was taking the plaintiff to segregation, and no other inmates would 

be locked up. (Doc. 1 at 14; see also doc. 35-3 at 2). All of the inmates who 

attacked the plaintiff were released back into general population. (Doc. 35-3). 

Jenkins brought two disciplinary charges against the plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 20, 

24). The first charge was “fighting without a weapon.” (Id., at 16, 20-22). The 

hearing officer, Lester Murray, noticed that although the body chart showed stab 

wounds, the incident report omitted any such injury. (Id., at 16). Murray further 

noted that the plaintiff was the only one in the incident charged and placed in 

segregation.6

 (Id., at 16). However, after hearing testimony from Jenkins and 

other officers, the hearing officer found the plaintiff guilty. (Id., at 16-17). 

Warden Cedric Specks disapproved that finding because he believed the plaintiff’s 

wounds to be consistent with the plaintiff’s version of events. (Id. at 21, doc. 35-6 

at 3). The plaintiff was also charged with and found guilty of “intentionally 

creating a security, safety or health hazard” in a separate disciplinary hearing 

 6 According to Jenkins, “Burrell had just come out of detentions (seg.) which indicates he 

was more of a constant or regular threat to security (more so than Jackson). Burrell was an 

inmate who stayed in trouble, the same was not as much the case with inmate Jackson.” (Doc. 

35-9 at 3). The plaintiff disputes this. (Doc. 47 at 1-4). 

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conducted by Sgt. Davis, based on Jenkins’ testimony that inmate Jackson’s 

mother told him that the plaintiff was involved in a tax scam which left her 

$14,000 in debt with the IRS. (Id., at 17, 24; doc. 35-7). Jenkins testified at the 

hearing that Jackson’s mother had sent him sworn statement concerning the 

plaintiff’s involvement in that tax scam.7 (Id., at 24). 

The plaintiff responds that he knew nothing about a tax scheme. (Doc. 52 at 

8). Rather, the plaintiff asserts he had inmate Jackson’s cell phone as collateral for 

payments Jackson owed the plaintiff for purchases Jackson made from the plaintiff 

for commissary type items. (Id.). 

IV. Analysis

A. First Amendment Claim

“The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating against 

prisoners for exercising the right of free speech.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 

1248 (11th Cir. 2003). An inmate raises a First Amendment claim of retaliation by

showing that a prison official disciplined him for filing a grievance or lawsuit 

concerning the conditions of his imprisonment. Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 

1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989). To prevail on a claim for retaliation under the First 

Amendment, a prisoner must establish that “(1) he engaged in constitutionally 

 7

Although Jenkins was ordered to produce inmate Jackson’s mother’s statement, Jenkins 

has informed the court “[t]he documents supporting the charge that Plaintiff had been involved in 

a tax scheme related to Inmate Jackson’s mother (including any affidavit or statement from her) 

have not been located at this time, despite their reference in the disciplinary report.” (Doc. 41).

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protected conduct; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory act adversely affected the 

protected conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between the retaliatory act

and the adverse effect on the conduct.” Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 713 F.3d 

1059, 1063 (11th Cir. 2013). Such a causal connection may be shown by a 

chronology of events that create a plausible inference of retaliation. Cain v. Lane, 

857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1988). Should the plaintiff satisfy this burden, 

demonstrating that his protected conduct was a motivating factor behind the harm, 

the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he would have taken the 

same action in absence of the protected activity. Smith, 713 F.3d at 1063.

Thus, to prevail on a claim for retaliation, the plaintiff must show that 

defendant Jenkins retaliated against him for his prior protected activity, specifically 

his grievances and other complaints about Jenkins to Jenkins’ supervisors. See

Woodyard v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 606 Fed.App’x 572, 574 (11th Cir. 2015)

(citing Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2006)) (retaliating 

against a prisoner by punishing him for filing a grievance concerning the 

conditions of his confinement violates the First Amendment)). The plaintiff asserts 

incidents dating back to 2010, when another officer had to intervene and order 

defendant Jenkins to stop harassing the plaintiff.

8

 (Doc. 1 at 30). Jenkins then 

labeled the plaintiff as a “rat” and a “snitch.” (Id.). In 2011 someone filed a 

 8

This harassment included stalking the plaintiff and targeting him for personal searches. 

(Doc. 1 at 30). 

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sexual misconduct and harassment report, bearing the plaintiff’s name, against 

defendant Jenkins. (Id.). Defendant Jenkins asserts he knew the plaintiff had not 

actually made this report. (Doc. 35-9 at 1-2). However, the plaintiff claims that 

defendant Jenkins “was mad and called me out my cell block threatening to destroy 

me . . .” the day this report was investigated. (Doc. 1 at 30). 

In November 2012 the plaintiff again complained of defendant Jenkins’ 

misconduct, after which Jenkins “cursed me out and tried to assault me and 

resulted into writing a false report against me adding and taking away from my 

words causing me to be put in lock up and closed custody for 7 months and 9 

days.” (Id.). The plaintiff wrote to the Classification Director and Commissioner 

of the Alabama Department of Corrections in January 2013 concerning defendant 

Jenkins’ treatment of him. (Doc. 1 at 35). The plaintiff also complained to Grant 

Culliver, Institutional Coordinator, about defendant Jenkins in November 2013, to 

which Culliver responded “I recall addressing a similar issue with you in a 

previous letter about Officer Jenkins. I would suggest if you find yourself in some 

type of disagreement with Officer Jenkins . . . you notify the shift commander on 

duty.” (Doc. 1 at 32). 

By affidavit, defendant Jenkins first asserts that the plaintiff, prior to August 

9, 2013, had not filed complaints against him, and therefore Jenkins had no reason 

to retaliate. (Doc. 35-9 at 1). He then agrees that someone wrote a 2011 grievance 

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against him, addressed to the Warden and accusing him of sexual harassment. 

(Doc. 35-9 at 1-2). While this grievance bore the plaintiff’s name, he states that 

the plaintiff denied writing it, and Jenkins did not think he wrote it. (Doc. 35-9 at 

2). Therefore, Jenkins asserts he had no reason to retaliate against the plaintiff

based on the 2011 grievance. (Id.). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 

drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, the 2012 and 2013 complaints by the 

plaintiff, specifically about Jenkins to his superiors, were protected activity. There 

is no evidence that the 2011 grievance against Jenkins was protected activity by the 

plaintiff, as it seems to be undisputed that the plaintiff did not file that grievance.

As to the second element, the standard the court must apply is whether the 

discipline the prisoner received “would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness 

from the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 

1254 (11th Cir. 2005). See also Pittman v. Tucker, 213 Fed.App’x 867, 870 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (holding that “a plaintiff need not show that his own exercise of First 

Amendment rights have been chilled, but instead a plaintiff can establish an injury 

if he can show that the retaliatory acts are sufficiently adverse that a jury could find 

that the acts would chill a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First 

Amendment rights.”). As the court ruled in Pittman, a jury could find that “the 

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prolonged campaign of harassment . . . could have such a chilling effect.” Id., 213 

Fed.App’x at 870. 

Defendant Jenkins asserts that being placed in segregation for “a few days” 

does not meet this standard. He further disputes that being charged with two 

disciplinaries would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in 

protected speech. Defendant Jenkins relies on speculative, inappropriate 

commentary, misapplication of Eleventh Circuit standards, and misrepresentation 

of the punishment the plaintiff received to support his arguments. The defendant 

states 

Jenkins disputes that being charged with two disciplinaries (one of 

which was nullified) and being temporary placed in segregation might 

deter a person of ordinary firmness (especially if this person is an 

inmate like Burrell who spends a lot of time in segregation anyway) 

from engaging in protected speech. See Szemple v. Talbot, 141 F. 

App’x 52, 54 (3d Cir. 2005) (reasoning that “confinement [to 

segregation] limited to a few days ... would [not] deter a person of 

ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights.”); Bright 

v. Thompson, No. 4:10CV-P145-M, 2011 WL 2215011, at *5 (W.D. 

Ky. June 6, 2011), aff’d, 467 F. App'x 462 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding, 

inter alia, that where “Plaintiff was only in segregation for nine days” 

there was insufficient adverse action for a retaliation claim). In the 

instant case, it appears that Burrell was held in administrative hearing

(sic) for only 15 days between the time of the August 9, 2013 incident 

and his August 24, 2013 disciplinary hearing where Burrell was 

sentenced to 30 days in disciplinary segregation. (See Exhibits 3 and 

7). Of course, Jenkins was not the hearing officer so there is no causal 

link between him and the latter segregation. Obviously, none of these 

events deterred Burrell from filing this action.

(Doc. 35 at 6-7).

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However, the proper inquiry is not whether the plaintiff was deterred, but 

rather whether an ordinary prisoner would be deterred. Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1254. 

Based on the August 9, 2013, incident, the plaintiff received 30 days segregation, 

on top of defendant Jenkins’ decision to place the plaintiff in administrative 

segregation for fifteen days prior to the disciplinary hearing. This is not a situation 

where the plaintiff received “a few days” or “nine days,” like the cases the 

defendant cites, or even 15 days, as the defendant represents, but rather a total of 

45 days in segregation.

9

 Thus, in contrast to the “few days” as suggested by 

Jenkins, forty-five days in segregation is certainly within the realm of deterring 

ordinary prisoners from filing grievances, regardless of whether it had that effect 

on the plaintiff. The defendant’s arguments otherwise are contradicted by the law 

of this circuit.10 See e.g., Pittman, 213 Fed.App’x at 870; Bennett, 423 F.3d at 

1254 (noting that this Circuit adopts an objective test to prove retaliation and 

stating “there is no reason to ‘reward’ government officials for picking on 

unusually hardy speakers.”)). 

 9

 Defendant Jenkins argues that, because he was not the hearing officer, no causal link 

exists between him and the 30 days segregation the plaintiff received. (Doc. 35 at 7). This 

argument defies logic. Defendant Jenkins brought both of the disciplinary actions against the 

plaintiff and then testified against the plaintiff at both hearings. But for Jenkins’ decision to 

charge the plaintiff with the infractions, the plaintiff would not have been in segregation at all. 

10 The court may not consider the effects of the defendant’s actions on the plaintiff in 

particular when considering whether the actions had a chilling effect, but rather must consider 

the likely effect on a prisoner of ordinary firmness, “as it would be unjust to allow a defendant to 

escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined 

plaintiff persists in his protected activity. . . .” Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1252 (citation omitted). 

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The third prong of the inquiry considers whether Jenkins was subjectively 

motivated to charge the plaintiff, but not the other prisoners involved, with fighting 

without a weapon, because of the plaintiff’s prior complaints against Jenkins. To 

establish this causation, the plaintiff must demonstrate evidence which supports a 

finding that Jenkins was actually motivated to discipline him because of his prior 

complaints about Jenkins’ treatment of him. Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 

(11th Cir. 2008) (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999)). 

“In other words, the prisoner must show that, as a subjective matter, a motivation 

for the defendant’s adverse action was the prisoner’s grievance or lawsuit.”

Jemison v. Wise, 386 Fed.App’x 961, 965 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mosley, 532 

F.3d at 1278). 

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, evidence of 

Jenkins’ motivation includes the plaintiff’s testimony that Jenkins “took the 

investigation away from Sergeant Davis, omitted the stabbing from the incident 

report, and replaced it with what Jackson, Jones, McMean, and Moore claimed, 

namely that it was “a fight without a weapon because I [was] supposed to have 

used Jackson[’s] mother[’s] address and got her in [a] $14,000 debt with the IRS,” 

and Jenkins statement to the plaintiff that “we about to run a train on your ass.” 

(Doc. 1 at 14). See e.g., Pittman, 213 Fed.App’x at 870 (“It is reasonable to 

discern that the threat was intended to deter [the plaintiff’s] filing of a grievance.”). 

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Thus, the question of discriminatory intent by Jenkins in completing an allegedly

false disciplinary report is a question for the trier of fact. See Harris v. Ostrout, 65 

F.3d 912, 917 (11th Cir. 1995). 

Under the burden-shifting formula from Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), “[o]nce the plaintiff has met his burden of 

establishing that his protected conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm 

[i.e., disciplinary action], the burden of production shifts to the defendant.” 

O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1217 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Mosley, 532 F.3d 

at 1278). “Then, if the defendant can show that he would have taken the same 

action in the absence of protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on his motion 

for summary judgment as a matter of law....” Id. (alternations omitted). “In other 

words, if the official can show that he would have taken the disciplinary action in 

the absence of the prisoner’s protected conduct, he cannot be held liable.” Id.

(citing Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1278 n.22).

By sworn complaint, the plaintiff has averred that defendant Jenkins omitted 

facts from the disciplinary report, such as that he was stabbed multiple times, made 

up a tax fraud allegation against the plaintiff, and made comments to the plaintiff 

such as “we about to run a train on your ass.” In contrast, defendant Jenkins has 

not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate he would have taken the same 

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actions in the absence of the plaintiff’s prior protected conduct.11 This conclusion 

is supported by defendant Jenkins’ failure to address the plaintiff’s grievances 

against him, his own sworn statement that evidence in support of Jenkins’ 

testimony at the disciplinary hearing is now “missing,”12 his hearsay affidavit 

statements, and his further statements that the basis for the disciplinary report 

against the plaintiff, the tax fraud, was not the real reason for that report. He now 

asserts that

[T]here was a legitimate basis for the allegation about Burrell and the 

tax fraud involving [] inmate Jackson’s mother. First, this accusation 

was made by inmate Jackson as one cause of the fight. Additionally, I 

investigated the allegation about the tax fraud by calling Jackson’s 

mother who verified the claim by Jackson. The main reason for the 

fight, however, was the cell phone that belonged to Jackson. Jackson 

had loaned the phone to Burrell . . . and Burrell had refused to return it 

to Jackson. Jackson thought Burrell had either loaned the phone to 

another inmate or sold the phone to another inmate. . .

 11 Defendant Jenkins argues that the plaintiff does not deny that he was involved in an 

altercation, a dispute over a cell phone, or a tax fraud scheme. (Doc. 35 at 7). He continues that 

“[h]e only wants to add to that mix use of a knife as if that fact made a huge difference in this 

context.” (Id.). The plaintiff denies any knowledge of a tax fraud scheme. (Doc. 52). He denies 

participation in an altercation, rather he asserts he was attacked and stabbed. (Doc. 1 at 10-11). 

And given the facts before the court, the use of a knife by defendant Jackson, while the plaintiff 

was held in Jackson’s cell by inmates Moore, McMean, and Jones, certainly does “ma[ke] a huge 

difference in this context.” 

12 As explained in Report and Recommendation dated November 23, 2105 (doc. 19), and 

adopted by the District Judge on February 19, 2016 (doc. 26), the plaintiff may not base his First 

Amendment claim on the disciplinary hearing for creating a security, safety, or health hazard 

because he was found guilty of the charge. See e.g., O’Bryant, 637 F.3d at 1216. However, the 

court does consider defendant Jenkins’ stated reasons for bringing that disciplinary action against 

the plaintiff as evidence of defendant Jenkins’ subjective motivation in bringing the “fighting 

without a weapon” charge against the plaintiff. 

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(Doc. 35-9 at 3).13

 

Although Jenkins charged the plaintiff with fighting without a weapon, and 

the plaintiff was found guilty of this charge by the hearing officer, Warden Specks 

overturned this ruling, finding that the plaintiff’s injuries were consistent with the 

facts as alleged by the plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 21). Jenkins asserts that just because 

Warden Specks found the fighting without a weapon charge against the plaintiff to 

lack merit, “does not mean I did not have a factual basis for the charge.” (Doc. 35-

9 at 4). Defendant Jenkins then states that the plaintiff’s allegations, namely that 

Jenkins made up the reason for the fight, are untrue. (Doc. 35-9 at 2). He claims 

that the plaintiff’s injuries, described in the body chart as “puncture wounds,”14

could have resulted from the inmates fighting and bumping into sharp objects, 

because this “happens all the time.” (Id.; doc. 35-4). Therefore, Jenkins states he 

was justified is charging the plaintiff with fighting without a weapon. (Doc. 35-9 

 

13 Both the defendant’s special report and defendant Jenkins’ affidavit contains several 

statements that are wholly speculative, inappropriate, and rank hearsay. (Docs. 35 at 4, 35-9 at 

3). These comments, which appear in both documents, include “Jackson had loaned the phone to 

Burrell (maybe so he could commit the tax fraud)” and “Jackson thought Burrell had either 

loaned the phone to another inmate or sold the phone to another inmate (maybe because Burrell 

was mad that he had not made any money off the tax fraud plan).” These comments, which are 

rank hearsay, are STRICKEN. Moreover, cell phones are contraband in prison. Thus, if the 

plaintiff was placed in segregation for violating prison rules because he had a cell phone, then 

Jenkins failure to charge Jackson, as the known owner of the phone, with possession of 

contraband, raises a further inference of retaliation against the plaintiff.

14 Specifically, the injuries are described as “puncture wound one inch deep L hamstring,” 

“puncture wound 1⁄2 inch deep L center quad,” scrapes, scratches, and “one inch laceration R 

upper forearm.” (Doc. 35-4). That body chart records the plaintiff as stating “Some guys out 

there held me hostage in the cell for 30 minutes after I was stabbed by these guys.” (Id.). 

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at 2-3). However, Jenkins also recognizes that Warden Specks “threw out the 

charge because the facts . . . were inconsistent with the fighting without weapon 

charge. . . .” (Id., at 4). Additionally, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff went 

to administrative segregation while inmate Jackson was released to population 

because the plaintiff had just come out of segregation “which indicates he was 

more of a constant or regular threat to security.”15 (Id., at 3). 

The court must consider “all evidence and reasonable factual inferences . . . 

in the light most favorable to the party opposing [summary judgment].” Warren v. 

Crawford, 927 F.2d 559, 561-62 (11th Cir. 1991). Defendant Jenkins has failed to 

show that the plaintiff would have been charged with the same offense and placed 

in administrative segregation in absence of the plaintiff’s prior complaints against 

Jenkins. For the reasons set forth above, and considering all of the evidence of 

record, a trier of fact could reasonably find that Jenkins retaliated against the 

plaintiff for the plaintiff’s prior complaints. See e.g., Smith, 713 F.3d at 1064 

(finding summary judgment improper where the defendant could not provide a 

non-retaliatory explanation for its actions.). The motivation under which 

defendant Jenkins’ acted is a genuine issue of material fact, properly left for the 

trier of fact in this action. 

 15 The defendant’s explanation that the plaintiff was “more of a constant or regular threat 

to security (more so than Jackson)” (doc. 35-9 at 3), provides no rational basis for placing 

plaintiff in administrative segregation prior to his hearing, but returning Jackson --- charged with 

the identical infraction --- to population. 

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B. Official Capacity Claims

To the extent the plaintiff brings claims against defendant Jenkins in his

official capacity, those claims are due to be dismissed. Official capacity lawsuits 

are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.” 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state 

has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State 

School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or 

Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. 

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, [59] (1996). Alabama has not waived its 

Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 

F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress 

has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state 

officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official 

capacities. 

Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Because in his official capacity defendant Jenkins is a state actor, and thus 

entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking 

monetary damages from him, any such claim the plaintiff brings is due to be 

dismissed. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)

The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(e). Under that section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a 

prisoner must have physical injuries to pursue compensatory or punitive damages. 

See e.g., Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003). Here, the plaintiff 

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does not assert any physical injury from the alleged violations of his First 

Amendment rights by defendant Jenkins. Thus, § 1997e(e) presents a bar to the 

plaintiff’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages because his claims were 

filed during his confinement. Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 

2011). See also Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 979 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(distinguishing between claims filed during confinement, and claims filed after 

release from prison). 

However, the PLRA does not preclude an award of nominal damages if a 

plaintiff establishes the violation of a constitutional right. Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 

1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 

537 U.S. 277 (2011); Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1162 (citation omitted). In this case, the 

plaintiff has alleged no physical injury in connection with his retaliation claims. 

He is therefore barred by the PLRA from seeking compensatory and punitive 

damages. See Allen, 502 F.3d at 1271. Thus, the plaintiff’s claims for damages, 

other than nominal damages, are due to be DISMISSED.

16 However, because the

PLRA does not bar the plaintiff’s claims completely, his claims, as compensable 

by nominal damages, survive.17 

 16 Because the plaintiff has been released from custody, his claims for injunctive relief are 

MOOT.

17 The Eleventh Circuit has suggested that the liberal construction due pro se complaints 

combined with Rule 54, Fed.R.Civ.P., requires that claims for nominal damages be read into pro 

se complaints. See e.g., Williams v. Brown, 347 Fed. App’x 429, 436 (11th Cir. 2009). 

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D. Qualified Immunity

Finally, defendant Jenkins asserts he is protected by qualified immunity. 

(Doc. 35 at 8). Qualified immunity offers complete protection for individual 

government officials performing discretionary functions “insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982). Once a public official establishes that he was acting within the scope of 

his discretionary authority, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant 

violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time. 

Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 272 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, defendant Jenkins was clearly acting 

within his discretionary authority at the time he wrote the disciplinary reports. 

Additionally, the facts as alleged by the plaintiff describe a violation of the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Thus, the court must decide whether that right was 

“clearly established” at the time in question. Clearly established law is law that is 

“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violated that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). “This is not to say 

that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in 

question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. Multiple cases in this Circuit 

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have put prison officials on notice that they may not retaliate against inmates for 

filing lawsuits or administrative grievances. See e.g., Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 

1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2006); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 

1997); Wildberger, 869 F.2d at 1468. This body of case law is sufficient to clearly 

establish this right and to provide fair warning as to the general unlawfulness of 

defendant Jenkins’ actions in this case. His request for qualified immunity is 

therefore due to be DENIED.

V. Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the 

motion for summary judgment (doc. 35) be DENIED, that the plaintiff’s request 

for injunctive relief be dismissed as MOOT, and that the plaintiff’s request for 

compensatory and punitive damages be DISMISSED under the PLRA. The 

undersigned further recommends that this action be referred to the magistrate judge 

for further proceedings. 

VI. Notice of Right to Object

Any party may file specific written objections to this report and 

recommendation. Any objections must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 

fourteen (14) calendar days from the date the report and recommendation is 

entered. Objections should specifically identify all findings of fact and 

recommendations to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. 

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Failure to object to factual findings will bar later review of those findings, except 

for plain error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 

1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Objections also should specifically identify all claims 

contained in the complaint which the report and recommendation fails to address. 

Objections should not contain new allegations, present additional evidence, or 

repeat legal arguments. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections on 

each other party to this action.

Upon receipt of objections, a United States District Judge will make a de 

novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which 

objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the 

findings of fact and recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The district 

judge must conduct a hearing if required by law. Otherwise, the district judge may 

exercise discretion to conduct a hearing or otherwise receive additional evidence. 

Alternately, the district judge may consider the record developed before the 

magistrate judge, making an independent determination on the basis of that record. 

The district judge also may refer this action back to the magistrate judge with 

instructions for further proceedings.

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A party may not appeal the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation 

directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. A party 

may only appeal from a final judgment entered by a district judge.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of the foregoing to the plaintiff.

DONE this 20th day of October, 2016.

_______________________________

T. MICHAEL PUTNAM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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