Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-03583/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-03583-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER STROJNIK (Sr.),

Plaintiff,

v.

GF CARNEROS TENANT, LLC dba

CARNEROS RESORT AND SPA,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-03583-JSC 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 20

Peter Strojnik brings this action for injunctive relief and monetary damages against GF 

Carneros Tenant, LLC dba Carneros Resort and Spa.

1

 Mr. Strojnik alleges (1) a violation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) violation of California’s Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code 

§§51-52; (3) violation of the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54-54.3 

(“DPA”); and (4) a negligence claim. Now pending before the Court is Carneros Resort’s motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). After consideration of the parties’ 

briefing and having had the benefit of oral argument on November 7, 2019, the Court DENIES 

Carneros Resort’s motion to dismiss as Mr. Strojnik has sufficiently pled that he has standing to 

bring this suit. 

BACKGROUND

A. Complaint Allegations

Mr. Strojnik is a disabled person as defined by the ADA. (Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 11.)2In 

particular, Mr. Strojnik is “legally disabled by virtue of a severe right-sided neural foraminal 

stenosis with symptoms of femoral neuropathy, prostate cancer and renal cancer” and 

 

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 7 and 15.)

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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United States District Court

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“degenerative right knee.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) Mr. Strojnik planned to visit “California Wine Country” 

and on or around April 18, 2019 reviewed hotel booking websites. (Id. at ¶ 15 and pp. 13, 16, 17, 

18.) When perusing third-party booking websites, such websites “failed to identify and describe 

mobility related accessibility features and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in 

enough detail to reasonably permit Plaintiff to assess independently whether Defendant’s Hotel 

meets his accessibility needs.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) In addition, the third-party sites “failed to make 

reservations for accessible guest rooms available in the same manner as individuals who do not 

need accessible rooms.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) Mr. Strojnik alleges the same issues with information 

related to accessibility when he accessed Carneros Resort’s first party booking website. (Id. at ¶ 

19, 20.) He also relied on online information and photos on the third-party website and Carneros 

Resort’s website to conclude that the hotel has barriers to accessibility. (Id. at ¶ 21, 22.) Because 

the violations “relate to Plaintiff’s disability and interfere with Plaintiff’s full and complete 

enjoyment of the hotel,” he opted to book a room at a different hotel. (Id. at ¶ 24-25.) Carneros 

Resort’s “failure to remove accessibility barriers prevented Plaintiff from equal access to the 

Defendant’s public accommodation.” (Id. at ¶ 27.) Included in Mr. Strojnik’s complaint are 

photos and descriptions of various barriers to access taken of Carneros Resort. (Id. at 18-33.) 

B. Procedural Background

Mr. Strojnik filed the Complaint against Carneros Resort on June 20, 2019, alleging 

violations of (1) the ADA, (2) the Unruh Act, (3) the California Disabled Persons Act, and (4) 

negligence based on Carneros Resort’s failure to accommodate his disability.

In his initial complaint, Mr. Strojnik did not properly name the Defendant, and thus, filed a 

First Amended Complaint on August 13, 2019 (Dkt No. 1; No. 9.) Carneros Resort answered the 

First Amended Complaint on September 20, 2019 and a week later filed the underlying motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 

(Dkt. Nos. 13; 20.) The motion is fully briefed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a district court must dismiss an action if it lacks jurisdiction 

over the subject matter of the suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “A party invoking federal 

jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that it has satisfied the ‘case-or-controversy’ 

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requirement of Article III of the Constitution [and] standing is a ‘core component’ of that 

requirement.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “The doctrine of 

standing asks whether a litigant is entitled to have a federal court resolve his grievance.” Kowalski 

v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128 (2004). “[T]he Supreme Court has instructed [the court] to take a 

broad view of constitutional standing in civil rights cases, especially where, as under the ADA, 

private enforcement suits are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the act.” Doran v. 

7-Eleven, Inc., F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

Carneros Resort moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction insisting that Mr. 

Strojnik does not have standing. The standing analysis considers whether the plaintiff has 

demonstrated (1) an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 

imminent; (2) causation; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury. 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Carneros Resort makes a facial attack 

on Mr. Strojnik’s complaint as it is not challenging the truth of the complaint’s allegations, but 

instead argues that the allegations are “insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). As such, allegations of the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the complaining party. Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Carneros Resort contends that Mr. Strojnik’s allegations do not satisfy the injury-in-fact 

requirement. Its argument is defeated by Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center v. 

Hospitality Properties Trust, 867 F.3d 1093, 1098-1099 (9th Cir. 2017). There, the Ninth Circuit 

held in an ADA access case:

The Named Plaintiffs have alleged in the First Amended Complaint 

that they intend to visit the relevant hotels, but have been deterred 

from doing so by the hotels’ noncompliance with the ADA. They 

further allege that they will visit the hotels when the non-compliance 

is cured. Thus, the ADA violations have prevented them from staying 

at the hotels. Without such averments, they would lack standing. 

However, “construing the factual allegations in the complaint in favor 

of the plaintiffs,” as we must at this preliminary stage, we conclude 

that the Named Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged injury in fact. Their 

harm is “concrete and particularized,” and their intent to visit the 

hotels once they provide equivalent shuttle service for the disabled 

renders their harm “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical.” 

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Civil Rights Educ. & Enf't Ctr. v. Hosp. Properties Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2017). 

Here, as described above, Mr. Strojnik similarly alleges that he intends to visit the defendant hotel 

but has been deterred from doing so by what he alleges constitutes the hotel’s noncompliance with 

the ADA. He also alleges that he will visit the hotel when the non-compliance is cured. Plaintiff 

has therefore alleged standing sufficient to withstand a facial standing attack. 

Carneros Resort nonetheless insists that Mr. Strojnik cannot demonstrate an injury because 

Mr. Strojnik has not demonstrated a genuine intent to return to the hotel. Its argument, however, 

requires the Court to disregard the Ninth Circuit’s command that it accept Plaintiff’s allegations as 

true. Civil Rights Educ. & Enf't Ctr., 867 F.3d at 1099. If Carneros Resort was making a factual 

attack on standing the Court would not have to accept Mr. Strojnik’s factual allegations. See Safe 

Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). But Carneros Resort’s motion is 

a facial attack on standing on which the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences from 

the alleged facts in Mr. Strojnik’s favor. 

At oral argument Carneros Resort also appeared to argue that Mr. Strojnik had not 

encountered or been made aware of any ADA violations. But to accept this argument the Court 

would again have to violate the directive that it construe the allegations of the complaint in Mr. 

Strojnik’s favor. He specifically alleges the online reservation systems failed to identify the 

hotel’s accessibility and contends that this omission is an ADA violation. He also identifies what 

he contends are other barriers to access. At this stage, Carneros Resort has not proved that 

drawing all factual inferences in Mr. Strojnik’s favor, he has not sufficiently alleged that he 

became aware of accessibility barriers.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Carneros Resort’s motion to dismiss. 

This Order disposes of Docket No. 20.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 13, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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