Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-02414/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-02414-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 By order filed July 5, 2001, respondents’ motion to dismiss petitioner’s unexhausted 1

claim was granted and petitioner was granted leave to file an amended petition raising only

exhausted claims.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DWAYNE DELUNA,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-00-2414 LKK JFM P

vs.

A.A. LAMARQUE, et al.,

Respondents FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1996 conviction in

Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of first degree murder with a special circumstance

finding that petitioner committed the murder while committing a robbery and robbery with

personal use of a firearm. Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 

Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on seven separate grounds. 

Petitioner’s July 27, 2001 amended petition is now before the court.

1

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 2

District, Division Four, in People v. Deluna, No. C025160 (Oct. 20, 1998). 

2

 FACTS2

On the evening of October 23, 1994, employees of a restaurant

began closing the restaurant when a man wearing a ski mask

entered through the back door. The man walked to the front,

pointed a gun at the employees, and ordered them to the back of

the restaurant. The gunman threw Lamburth, the shooting victim,

to the ground and again ordered the group to the back. Lamburth

rose to his feet with his hands in the air. While he was doing so,

the gunman shot Lamburth in the chest.

Another man wearing a bandanna over his face entered the

restaurant office. He was armed with a handgun. he ordered the

restaurant manager to fill a bag with cash. The man took the

loaded bag and ran out the back door with the gunman who shot

Lamburth. One of the employees, Eric Potts, was a high school

classmate of [petitioner]. He thought he recognized [petitioner] as

the man who shot Lamburth.

On November 2, 1994, Detective Joseph Dean of the Sacramento

Sheriff’s Department took [petitioner] to the police station for

questioning. [Petitioner] denied he was at the restaurant on the

night of the robbery and murder. Dean invited [petitioner] to

telephone his mother. Then Dean taped the conversation. During

the call, [petitioner] said to his mother, “It’s not that I meant to kill

him. He just looked like he was going to do something.”

At trial, [petitioner] testified on his own behalf. He admitted he

planned the robbery with his codefendant. When [petitioner]

ordered the restaurant employees to the back of the establishment,

they looked shocked and did not move. [Petitioner] tried to get

Lamburth to move by grabbing him and pulling. Despite the

physical coercion, Lamburth stood without moving. Then the gun

went off. [Petitioner] claimed that he did not aim the gun or intend

for it to fire.

(People v. Deluna, slip op. at 2-3.) Petitioner was born March 15, 1977; at the time of the

murder petitioner was 17 years old. (Clerk’s Supplemental Transcript on Appeal (“CST”), at 2.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

/////

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

II. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

A. Standards

The standards applicable to petitioner’s federal ineffective assistance of counsel

claim were established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 

In order to prevail on the claim petitioner must show (1) an unreasonable error by counsel and (2)

prejudice flowing from that error. To satisfy the first prong, petitioner must show that,

considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. The court must determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. 

Id. at 690. “Review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and there is a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.” 

United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1986).

To meet the prejudice prong, petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The focus of the prejudice analysis is on “whether

counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding

fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).

B. Failure to Investigate or Challenge the Warrantless Arrest

Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate or

challenge petitioner’s arrest at school without a warrant. Petitioner argues that the police chose

to arrest petitioner at school rather than at home so the police could isolate petitioner from his

family and friends and gain incriminating admissions.

The Sacramento County Superior Court denied petitioner’s petition for habeas

relief, finding that a warrantless arrest for a felony made in any place other than within a

residence may be valid if it is supported by probable cause. (Answer, Appendix F, at 2.) 

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In his traverse, petitioner disputes that his school was a public place and argues he had

3

a legitimate expectation of privacy in his person while on school grounds. However, under

California law, the term “public place” means “any place which is open to common or general

use, participation and enjoyment by members of the public.” See People v. Tapia, 129

Cal.App.4th 1153, 1160 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2005). It is commonly recognized that public school

is open to the public, despite petitioner’s conclusory allegation that the “public cannot move to

and fro through the school grounds.” Just because a school policy requires visitors to check in

with the office first, usually for safety reasons, that policy does not render a public school private.

Petitioner’s citation to New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) is equally unavailing,

because its facts are distinguishable. T.L.O. dealt with an Assistant Vice Principal who searched

a student’s purse, and does not stand for the broad proposition that all warrants become necessary

when school officials act at the behest of the police. Id. Indeed, the high court held that school

officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority, so

long as the search was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. The Court concluded that the

reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment in this context requires only a reasonable

suspicion, not probable cause, to believe that the search would uncover evidence of a rule or law

violation. Id. at 339-41.

5

Because petitioner did not allege nor show that the arrest was not based on probable cause, the

court found that petitioner had failed to state with particularity the facts upon which he was

relying to justify relief. (Answer, Appendix F, at 2.) The court also found petitioner had failed

to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland as well. (Answer, Appendix F, at 2.) 

Warrantless arrest in a public place, as opposed to the arrestee’s residence, based

upon probable cause that a felony has been committed does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976); see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573

(1980) (warrantless arrest of suspect in his residence presumptively unreasonable).

Here it is undisputed petitioner was arrested at his school, which is a public

place. Petitioner has not asserted there was a lack of probable cause for his arrest. Michael 3

Walthers, who witnessed the robbery and shooting, told Detective Dean he thought petitioner

was the person who shot the victim. (RT 140.) On the basis of that information alone, Detective

Dean had probable cause to go to petitioner’s school and arrest petitioner. Thus, petitioner could

not demonstrate a lack of probable cause for his arrest. Because there was no valid basis for trial

counsel to challenge the warrantless arrest, counsel cannot be found to be ineffective for failing

to take such futile action. Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Boag

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 California Penal Code § 851.5 provides: 4

(a) Immediately upon being booked, and, except where physically impossible, no later than three

hours after arrest, an arrested person has the right to make at least three completed telephone

calls, as described in subdivision (b).

The arrested person shall be entitled to make at least three such calls at no expense if the calls are

completed to telephone numbers within the local calling area.

(b) At any police facility or place where an arrestee is detained, a sign containing the following

information in bold block type shall be posted in a conspicuous place:

That the arrestee has the right to free telephone calls within the local dialing area, or at his own

expense if outside the local area, to three of the following:

(1) An attorney of his choice or, if he has no funds, the public defender or other attorney assigned

by the court to assist indigents, whose telephone number shall be posted. This phone call shall

not be monitored, eavesdropped upon, or recorded.

(2) A bail bondsman.

(3) A relative or other person.

(c) These telephone calls shall be given immediately upon request, or as soon as practicable.

(d) This provision shall not abrogate a law enforcement officer's duty to advise a suspect of his

right to counsel or of any other right.

(e) Any public officer or employee who willfully deprives an arrested person of any right granted

by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Id.

6

v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985)). See also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445

(9th Cir. 1996) ("the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance"). This

claim must fail.

C. Failure to Move to Suppress Evidence

i. Based on Cal. Penal Code § 851.5

Petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion

to suppress evidence based on the grounds that the police violated California Penal Code

§ 851.5 by failing to inform petitioner he had a right to make a post-arrest telephone call and by 4

refusing to allow petitioner to make a telephone call immediately after petitioner was arrested. 

Petitioner further alleges that had the sign required by Cal. Penal Code Section 851.5 been

posted, it would have “afforded him the opportunity to think about calling an attorney (if not

actually calling one). . . . (Amended Petition, at 7.) 

The Sacramento County Superior Court, on habeas review, found that petitioner

failed to allege that more than three hours elapsed before he was allowed to phone his mother, or

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Proposition 8 (Cal. Const. art. I, § 28, subd. (d)), provides, inter alia, that federal 5

constitutional standards govern review of issues related to the suppression of evidence seized by

the police. People v. Lenart , 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1118 (2004).) Thus, "[w]hen the admissibility of

evidence is challenged as being the 'fruit' of an unlawful search and seizure, article I, section 28,

subdivision (d) of the California Constitution requires [California courts] to follow the decisions

of the United States Supreme Court." People v. Bennett, 17 Cal.4th 373, 390 (1998)(citations

omitted.)

 In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that custodial 6

interrogation must be preceded by advice to the potential defendant that he has the right to

consult with a lawyer, the right to remain silent and that anything he says can be used in evidence

against him. Id., 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966). 

7

that he had been at the station in the interview room for an overextensive period of time before

he was allowed to call his mother. (Answer, Appendix F, at 4.) The state court found petitioner

had cited no authority for his theory that a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 851.5 would result in

the exclusion of the recording of the telephone conversation and found Proposition 8 would 5

disallow such an exclusion. (Answer, Appendix F, at 4.) In addition, the state court found that

the mere failure to post signs required by Cal. Penal Code § 851.5 would not result in the

exclusion of this evidence, particularly in light of Proposition 8.

This court finds the state court’s ruling on this claim to be consistent with

Supreme Court authority and reasonable in light of the facts. The record reflects that Detective

Dean notified petitioner’s mother after arresting petitioner at the high school:

A. I had talked with his mom on the phone after picking Tommy

up at school, and in talking with her she indicated that she did want

to talk to him, and I told her that that opportunity would be made

as soon as possible.

Q. All right. Then after this conversation was completed, then did

you bring a phone in so Mr. DeLuna could contact his mother?

A. Yes.

(RT 214.) Petitioner states he was arrested at school at 8:20 a.m. (Amended Petition, at 5.) The

recording of petitioner’s police interview was transcribed, and the transcript reflects that

petitioner’s questioning began at 10:20 a.m. (CST at 1.) Petitioner was read his Miranda rights 6

shortly thereafter. (CST at 3.) After reading petitioner his rights, Detective Dean asked

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The record reflects that trial counsel did move to suppress the telephone conversation 7

itself, which the trial court denied. (RT 41.)

8

petitioner “Understanding that right, do you wish to talk to us now?” Petitioner responded,

“Yes.” (CST at 4.) 

After petitioner signed the form acknowledging he had been read his rights,

Detective Dean asked petitioner to tell him what happened at Bistro Pete’s. (CST at 5.) During

this questioning period, petitioner did not ask to speak with his mother. (CST 1-11.) Petitioner

acknowledges that once he exercised his Miranda right to end the interrogation, he was granted a

phone call to his mother. (Amended Petition, at 5.) Although the record does not reflect at what

time the questioning ended, the transcript reflects about seven pages of questions and answers

before petitioner was allowed to speak to his mother. (CST 5-11.)

Thus, the record reflects petitioner’s mother was notified shortly after petitioner’s

arrest that petitioner had been taken into custody. Petitioner was not held for an unreasonable

length of time prior to being allowed to speak with his mother by telephone. Although petitioner

now states he was held for “some three-plus hours” after his arrest before he was granted his

phone call (Amended Petition at 5), the questioning began at 10:20 a.m. and the entire transcript

totals only 11 pages (double-spaced). It is unlikely this question and answer session exceeded

one hour, but even if it took an entire hour, petitioner was allowed to speak with his mother at

that time, which would have been three hours after his 8:20 a.m. arrest.

Based on this record, any motion to suppress the statement on this basis would

have been futile, so trial counsel was not incompetent for failing to make such a motion.7

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 California Welfare & Institutions Code § 627 provides that: 8

(a) When an officer takes a minor before a probation officer at a juvenile hall or to any other

place of confinement pursuant to this article, he shall take immediate steps to notify the minor's

parent, guardian, or a responsible relative that such minor is in custody and the place where he is

being held.

(b) Immediately after being taken to a place of confinement pursuant to this article and, except

where physically impossible, no later than one hour after he has been taken into custody, the

minor shall be advised and has the right to make at least two telephone calls from the place

where he is being held, one call completed to his parent or guardian, a responsible relative, or his

employer, and another call completed to an attorney. The calls shall be at public expense, if the

calls are completed to telephone numbers within the local calling area, and in the presence of a

public officer or employee. Any public officer or employee who willfully deprives a minor taken

into custody of his right to make such telephone calls is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Id.

 Title 18 U.S.C. § 5033 provides: 9

Whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, the

arresting officer shall immediately advise such juvenile of his legal rights, in language

comprehensive to a juvenile, and shall immediately notify the Attorney General and the juvenile's

parents, guardian, or custodian of such custody. The arresting officer shall also notify the parents,

guardian, or custodian of the rights of the juvenile and of the nature of the alleged offense.

The juvenile shall be taken before a magistrate judge forthwith. In no event shall the

juvenile be detained for longer than a reasonable period of time before being brought before a

magistrate judge.

Id.

9

ii. Based on Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 627

Petitioner further contends that California Welfare and Institutions Code § 627(b)8

requires that a minor be informed no later than one hour after he has been taken into custody that

the minor has the right to make at least two phone calls from where he is being held to his parent,

guardian, relative or employer, and another to his attorney. (Amended Petition, at 7-8.) 

Petitioner contends the police also violated Cal. Welf. and Inst. Code § 627(a) because they

failed to take immediate steps to notify petitioner’s parents that he had been arrested, and alleges

his mother attempted to call petitioner at the jail, but was refused because petitioner was being

questioned. (Ex. E, Amended Petition.) Petitioner also states the police failed to notify his

parents of the nature of the alleged offenses as well as petitioner’s rights, allegedly in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 5033. (Amended Petition, at 8.) 9

/////

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

The state court did not address this claim specifically, but did find that petitioner

had not been held for an overextensive period of time prior to being allowed to phone his mother. 

The state court also found that petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to immediate access to his

mother by phone was only supported by case law that had been abrogated by the passage of

Proposition 8. (Answer, Appendix F, at 4.) And, because petitioner alleged no grounds that

would have led to the exclusion of the telephone conversation, the state court also found

petitioner had failed to demonstrate trial counsel’s deficient performance. (Id.)

“To show prejudice under Strickland resulting from the failure to file a motion, a

defendant must show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable that the trial court

would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable that

there would have been an outcome more favorable to him.” Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 373-74). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that a motion to suppress would have been granted as meritorious. As noted above, petitioner

was not held for an unreasonable amount of time prior to being granted a phone call to his

mother. Detective Dean testified that he informed petitioner’s mother about petitioner’s arrest

shortly after taking him into custody. (RT 214.) Moreover, in the transcription of petitioner’s

phone conversation with his mother, his mother acknowledges that she was informed of all the

charges leveled against petitioner. (CST at 12.) In addition, petitioner has provided no legal

authority to demonstrate that even if his rights under Cal. Welf. and Inst. Code § 627 or 18

U.S.C. § 5033 had been violated, that the trial court would have excluded petitioner’s uncoerced

confession to his mother. This claim must also fail.

iii. Based on Expectation of Privacy

Petitioner argues trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress evidence of

the recorded telephone conversation between him and his mother while petitioner was in custody

at the Sheriff’s Department. Petitioner contends the telephone call was a confidential

communication in which he had an expectation of privacy, and claims the telephonic evidence

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

should have been excluded under Cal. Penal Code § 632 (governing eavesdropping on or

recording confidential communications) and 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (governing authorization for

interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications). (Amended Petition at 9-12.) 

The Sacramento County Superior Court rejected this claim as follows:

First, petitioner claims the conversation would have been

suppressed because he believed he was being afforded privacy and

neither he nor his mother was advised that their “confidential”

communication was being recorded. This is not borne out by the

facts, however, as the transcript of the telephone conversation

indicates at least five different times during the conversation in

which the petitioner, his mother, and an unidentified female who

appears to have been petitioner’s girlfriend all stated their beliefg

that their conversation was probably being listened to by the

authorities and even being taped by them. Nor does petitioner

present any evidence that he was told by any officer that his call

would be confidential. It has long been held that recording a jail

conversation is not a Fourth Amendment violation (Lanza v. New

York (1962) 370 U.S. 139, 143-144), and since the passage of

Proposition 8 (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(d)) in 1982, this rule has

applied in California. (Ahmad A. v. Superior Court (1989) 215

Cal.App.3d 528, 534). Nor was this a case in which a privilege

was involved, or petitioner lulled into a sense of privacy (People v.

Von Villas (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 212-223). 

Petitioner also claims that under Penal Code 632(c), the telephone

conversation was a “confidential communication,” because it was

carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any

party to it desired it to be confined to the parties to the

conversation. Penal Code § 632(c), however, also provides that a

conversation is not a “confidential conversation” if made “in any . .

. circumstance in which the parties to the communication may

reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or

recorded.” As discussed above, petitioner, his mother, and his

girlfriend all mentioned throughout the telephone call their belief

that the call was being overheard and/or recorded. Further, Penal

Code § 632(e) also provides that Penal Code § 632 does not apply

at all “to any telephonic communication system used for

communication exclusively within a state, county, city and county,

or city correctional facility.” Thus, the call was not a “confidential

communication” under Penal Code § 632(c). 

Next, petitioner claims that the recording of the call violated

wiretap laws under 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. and § 2516(2). 

However, the federal courts have long held that 18 U.S.C.

§ 2510(5)(a)(ii) allows routine prison monitoring of inmates’

telephone calls as a prison security measure, as this is an activity

by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

course of his or her duties (see U.S. v. Daniels (7th Cir. 1990) 902

F.2d 1238; Bunnell v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1811,

1821). Thus, the recording of the call in this case did not violate

these federal wiretap laws.

(People v. Deluna, slip opin. at 2-3.) 

The court record reflects that trial counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence of

petitioner’s telephonic conversation with his mother on the grounds that petitioner had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation. (CT 222-27.) During argument on the

motion to suppress, the trial court noted it had “watched very carefully to see if there was any

indication by the officers that this was going to be a private conversation, and it would be

confidential between he and his mother. . . .” (RT 29.) “[G]enerally there should not be any

expectation of privacy in a jail.” (RT 29.) Trial counsel argued that petitioner had been held in a

police station and not a jail, and that the phone had been brought in to petitioner and made

available to petitioner to converse with his mother, and then the officer left the room and shut the

door, arguably creating a reasonable expectation of privacy. (RT 31.) The trial court denied this

motion. (RT 41.) 

The state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to

be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The right

protects against state intrusion into a realm where a person has a legitimate expectation of

privacy, i.e., a subjective expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as

reasonable.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); United States v. Van Poyck, 77

F.3d 285, 290 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996)(pretrial detainee did not have

subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone calls from jail at Metropolitan

Detention Center). A prisoner has no legitimate expectation of privacy in public jail visiting

rooms or in his cell. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); United States v. Hitchcock, 467

F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973). While the Fourth Amendment

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

protects against electronic eavesdropping on telephone conversations sought to be kept private,

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, “no prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone

calls.” Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 290-92.

Under the federal wiretap statute, an expectation of privacy is defined as “an

expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying

such expectation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). This expectation of privacy must be both (1)

subjectively entertained and (2) objectively reasonable, just as it must under the Fourth

Amendment. See Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 211-216 (5th Cir. 2001); see also United

States v. Clark, 22 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1994).

Here, petitioner’s claims that he had an expectation of privacy are belied by the

telephone conversation itself. Petitioner’s mother remarked early in the conversation that “you

never know about these phones.” (CST at 15.) Petitioner replied, “Oh, well, it’s going to have to

come out sometime anyways.” (CST at 15.) Later, petitioner’s mother warned, “I’ll have to talk

to you when I see you ‘cause I don’t trust these phones.” (CST at 16.) His mother also stated,

“There’s a couple questions I’d ask you, but I don’t trust these phones.” (CST at 19.) Petitioner

later remarked, “Man, I think they’re fuckin’ doing something with this phone call.” (CST at

22.) Another female on the phone, apparently petitioner’s girlfriend, responded, “They’re

recording it, Tom.” (CST 22.) The woman warned petitioner again later, stating “Oh, they are

probably listening in on the phone call,” and petitioner replied, “I know they are, probably, but

oh, well.” (CST 24.) 

These statements made throughout the phone conversation belie any assertion

petitioner subjectively believed law enforcement created a reasonable expectation of privacy in

the phone call. California Penal Code § 632(c) states that a recorded conversation need not be

excluded where “the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the

communication may be overheard or recorded.” Id. Thus, trial counsel’s failure to argue 

/////

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

Cal. Penal Code § 632 in support of his motion to suppress would not have changed the outcome

of the motion to suppress the conversation between petitioner and his mother.

Petitioner’s situation defied an objective belief he had a reasonable expectation of

privacy as well. Petitioner was handcuffed to a table in an interview room at the sheriff’s

department at the time of the conversation, and had just been arrested and questioned about his

involvement in the robbery and murder. Thus, petitioner had no objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy in his conversation with his mother, either. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 35

F.3d 1308, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994)(no expectation of privacy where police surreptitiously recorded

defendant’s telephone call while defendant was in custody at police station). 

Because petitioner could not demonstrate he had a subjective expectation of

privacy that was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, this court cannot find trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to include in the motion to suppress the application of Cal.

Penal Code § 632 or the legitimacy of the wiretap. This claim must also fail.

iv. Based on Privilege

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to move

to suppress the evidence of the telephone conversation on the grounds that the communication

between petitioner and his mother was privileged. Petitioner claims his mother was a “religious

adviser” within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 636. (Amended Petition at 11-12.) Petitioner

claims communications between a minor and his parent should be privileged. (Amended Petition

at 12-14.) 

The Sacramento County Superior Court rejected both of these claims:

[P]etitioner claims that the recording of the call violated wiretap

laws under Penal Code § 636(a), which prohibits the recording of a

person in physical custody of a law enforcement officer when the

person is engaged in a conversation with his “religious advisor.”

Petitioner claims that his mother is qualified as his “religious

advisor.” Petitioner, however, offers no proof that petitioner’s

mother is a clergyperson of any type. Nor does the content of the

phone conversation indicate at any point in time that he and his

mother ever discussed religion or any religious value. And,

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

petitioner talked not only with his mother but also with at least two

other persons during the phone conversation, and made admissions

to them.

. . .

Petitioner next claims that his conversation with his mother was

“privileged.” He cites no statutory provision, however, providing

for a parent-child privilege. Indeed, none exists, and he admits that

none exists. Instead, he argues that one should exist. That,

however, is a decision for the Legislature and not the courts.

(People v. Deluna, slip op. at 4-5.)

The above state court decisions were not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, nor were they based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Petitioner’s telephone conversation with his mother was devoid of

religious content. Moreover, there is no recognized parent-child privilege under California law

or federal law. In re Terry W., 69 Cal.App.3d 745, 747-49 (1976); United States v. Penn, 647

F.2d 876, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1980)(en banc). Thus, trial counsel cannot be found to be ineffective

for failing to raise these claims in a motion to suppress. 

v. Based on Fifth Amendment

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to move to

exclude evidence on the grounds that petitioner’s request to speak with his mother amounted to

an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. (Amended Petition, at 14-15.) 

The Sacramento County Superior Court rejected this claim as follows:

Finally, petitioner argues that under People v. Burton (1971) 99

Cal. Rptr. 1, he was entitled to talk to his mother immediately upon

request. Again, he has not demonstrated that an overextensive

period of time elapsed between his arrival at the station and his

being allowed to call his mother. In any event, Burton was based

on state constitutional grounds, and has been abrogated by the

passage of Proposition 8 (Ahmad A. v. Superior Court, supra, p.

533-534; see People v. Rivera (1985) 41 Cal.3d 388, 395).

(People v. Deluna, slip opin. at 4.) 

/////

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Under California law, when a minor asks to speak to his parent at some point before 10

questioning, there is no indication of a desire to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege where the

defendant talked to detectives for an extended time without requesting to talk to his mother. 

People v. Lewis, 26 Cal.4th 334, 385 (2001).

16

The California Supreme Court held that, based on Miranda, supra, when a minor

is taken into custody and interrogated without an attorney present, the minor’s request to see one

of his parents, made at any time prior to or during questioning, must be construed as a desire to

invoke the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, absent evidence demanding a contrary

conclusion. People v. Burton, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1971). But at the time of petitioner’s arrest,

California had eliminated all state judicial remedies for violations of the privilege against selfincrimination and right to counsel except to the extent the federal constitution compelled them. 

Ahmad v. Superior Court, 263 Cal.Rptr747 (Cal. App. 1990). Moreover, in 1979, the United

States Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s request to talk with a parent does not necessarily

constitute an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707

(1979). The Court stated that whether statements obtained during subsequent interrogation of a

juvenile who has asked to see his probation officer, but who has not asked to consult an attorney

or expressly asserted his right to remain silent, are admissible on the basis of waiver is a question

to be resolved on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Id. at 725-26. 

Petitioner maintains he asked to contact his mother during his transportation from

school to the police station. The record does not reflect that petitioner asked to speak to his

mother prior to questioning. Detective Dean was not asked whether petitioner had requested to 10

speak to his mother prior to questioning. (RT 210-18.) The record reflects, however, that

petitioner did not ask to speak to his mother during police questioning. (CST 1-11.) 

Even assuming, arguendo, petitioner had asked to speak to his mother, under a

totality of the circumstances analysis, petitioner did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to

remain silent. Petitioner was informed the detectives wanted to speak with him about the events

at Bistro Pete’s before questioning. (CST at 3.) Detective Dean then advised petitioner of his

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

Miranda rights and petitioner acknowledged he understood he had the right to remain silent. 

(CST at 4.) Before questioning petitioner, Detective Dean specifically asked petitioner whether

he wished to talk to the detectives. (CST at 4.) Petitioner was 17 years old at this time. Based

on this record, petitioner cannot demonstrate that the trial court would have granted a motion to

suppress had trial counsel made such a motion.

Moreover, had trial counsel filed such a motion and succeeded, it is likely that the

only evidence that would have been suppressed would have been petitioner’s statements to

Detective Dean. Because petitioner’s incriminating statements were voluntarily made to his

mother outside of custodial interrogation, it is unlikely those statements would have been

suppressed. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate the prejudice prong of Strickland on this

claim as well.

D. Motion to Exclude Testimony

Petitioner contends that trial counsel should have filed a motion to exclude

testimony from David Warfield and Michael Walthers. The Sacramento County Superior Court

did not address these claims in its denial of petitioner’s habeas application. (Answer, Appendix

F.) The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s claims without comment. (Answer,

Appendix J.) Thus, this court has reviewed the record to determine whether the denial was in

error. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner contends Mr. Warfield’s testimony concerning petitioner’s classroom

statements about the death penalty and murder should have been excluded because it was “used

to inflame the minds of the jurors.” (Amended Petition at 16.) 

Mr. Warfield testified that in the spring of 1994, during a history class discussion

about a murder trial in the 1920's, petitioner had expressed the view that killing someone would

not bother petitioner, and petitioner had wondered what it would be like to kill someone. (RT

176-77.) Mr. Warfield further testified that in the fall of 1994, during a Government

/////

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

International Relation class, petitioner expressed his opinion that the death penalty was not a

deterrent to killing someone. (RT 178.) 

Mr. Warfield also testified that after the murder at Bistro Pete’s Pizza, several

students noticed that a number of people connected to Bistro Pete’s were absent from school after

the murder. (RT 179.) In a conversation about why these students were absent, Mr. Warfield

testified that Mike Walthers was not in class because he was shook up. (RT 179.) Mr. Warfield

testified that in response to other students’ asking “how come?” petitioner responded that it

would not bother him. (RT 179.) Mr. Warfield testified that the context of the conversation was

there had been a shooting, and Mr. Warfield had expressed that it was a big deal in people’s lives

because not many had witnessed a murder or even been around someone who had been killed. 

(RT 180.) Mr. Warfield stated that “[u]nless you have been in a situation like that . . . – you

can’t judge somebody for being emotionally distraught or whatever reason he is gone today and

they are gone today.” (RT 180.) Mr. Warfield then testified that petitioner had “turned around

and looked at [him] and said you don’t know what I have been through. You don’t know what I

know.” (RT 180.)

The record reflects that trial counsel objected to the admission of this evidence on

the grounds of relevance and inadmissible character evidence, and argued that the evidence was

more prejudicial than probative under Cal. Evid. Code § 352. (RT 170.) The trial court stated it

was not troubled with relevance, but was troubled with the remoteness and the prejudicial aspect

of this evidence. (RT 172.) The court ultimately allowed admission of this evidence. (RT 173.) 

Because trial counsel made a timely objection to the admission of this evidence, this court cannot

find he was ineffective for failing to move to strike the testimony after the trial court overruled

counsel’s initial objection. 

Trial counsel similarly objected to the admission of Mr. Walthers’ testimony

surrounding unusual pager messages he received shortly after the murder. Mr. Walthers was

friends with petitioner; they attended the same high school, saw each other just about every day

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

and played sports together. (RT 127-28.) At one time, Mr. Walthers, petitioner and their friend

Richard Pinola, all worked at Bistro Pete’s Pizza at the same time. (RT 129-30.) On a

weeknight about a week before October 23, 1994, Mr. Walthers was at Richard Pinola’s house. 

(RT 130; 132.) Mr. Pinola showed Mr. Walthers two guns, one of which was a wooden-handled

revolver .357, which Mr. Pinola testified was the same weapon admitted into evidence as the

murder weapon (People’s Ex. 20-A). (RT 131-32.) Mr. Walthers was working at Bistro Pete’s

on the night of the robbery and murder. (RT 133.) Mr. Walthers saw a guy with a mask come in

and witnessed the shooting of David Lamburth. (RT 134.) 

A few days after the shooting, Mr. Walthers concluded he knew the shooter was

petitioner, “because of the size; the way he was built, the way he – I thought that the guy

disguised his voice.” (RT 138-39.) 

Shortly after the robbery and murder, Mr. Walthers got together with the people

who were at Bistro Pete’s that night at a house owned by a woman named Ellie. (RT 142.) 

Richard Pinola was there. (RT 142.) At that time, Mr. Walthers had a pager, which he was

wearing that night. (RT 143.) During this meeting, Mr. Walthers had a discussion with Richard

Pinola about the guns. (RT 143.) 

A couple of days after this meeting, the number 187 appeared on Mr. Walthers’

pager. (RT 144.) Although Mr. Walthers’ testified he did not know that 187 was the Penal Code

section for murder, he testified that 187 meant murder to him. (RT 144.) On cross-examination,

Mr. Walthers’ testified that he did not remember ever giving his pager number to petitioner. (RT

146.) 

The record reflects that trial counsel timely objected to the admission of the three

pager messages, “187.” (RT 143.) The court called an unrecorded sidebar conference, after

which the trial court overruled counsel’s objection to the admission of this evidence. Because

trial counsel made a timely objection to the admission of this evidence, this court cannot find he

/////

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Petitioner argues this was because an evidentiary hearing was never held, and asks the 11

court to hold an evidentiary hearing now. However, it is incumbent upon petitioner to

demonstrate there is a factual dispute warranting an evidentiary hearing. Townsend v. Sain, 372

U.S. 293, 313-14 (1963). 

20

was ineffective for failing to move to strike the testimony after the trial court overruled counsel’s

initial objection. 

Moreover, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that had trial counsel moved to

strike either or both Mr. Walthers’ or Mr. Warfield’s testimony, such a motion would have been

granted, or that the outcome of petitioner’s trial would have been different. Given the other

overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s guilt, petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice from trial

counsel’s failure to move to strike the specific testimony of Mr. Walthers or Mr. Warfield. This

claim must also fail.

E. Failure to Make Closing Argument

Finally, petitioner contends trial counsel’s failure to make a closing argument

amounts to ineffectiveness of counsel. (Amended Petition at 16.) The Sacramento County

Superior Court did not address this claim in its denial of petitioner’s habeas application. 

(Answer, Appendix F.) The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s claim without

comment. (Answer, Appendix J.) Thus, this court has reviewed the record to determine whether

the denial was in error. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

Given the weight of the evidence against petitioner, this court cannot find trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to make a closing statement. Petitioner has failed to set forth

what counsel might have said that would have had a reasonable probability of changing the

result. Petitioner concedes he did not do so in his traverse. (Traverse at 16.) “Failure to make 11

a closing argument is not ineffective assistance per se; there must be a reasonable probability that

the omission affected the outcome.” Nutall v. Greer, 764 F.2d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 1985). 

Because the jury heard petitioner’s telephone conversation with his mother

wherein he admitted killing the victim, and petitioner then took the stand and admitted to

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

planning the robbery and shooting the victim, it is hard to imagine what a defense attorney might

say in a closing argument. But certainly petitioner was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s

failure to make a closing statement when faced with this overwhelming evidence. Thus, this

claim must also fail.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 5, 2005. 

1

delu2414.157

Case 2:00-cv-02414-LKK -JFM Document 44 Filed 08/05/05 Page 21 of 21