Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02455/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02455-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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supplied by the electronic case filing system.

1 06cv2455 BEN (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY DARNELL ARTHUR,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. TORRES, Correctional

Sergeant; F. GONZALEZ,

Correctional Officer; J.

FLORES, Correctional Officer,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 06cv2455 BEN(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

[DOC. NO. 9]

Plaintiff Larry Darnell Arthur, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights Complaint [doc.

no. 1] on November 7, 2006, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants used excessive force against him

in violation of the Eighth Amendment on January 7, 2006, while he

was incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison. (See Compl. 1-5.)1

Arthur is seeking compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages. 

(Id. at 9-10.)

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2

 Defendant Torres has not been served with a summons and Complaint. (See

doc. no. 6.) Plaintiff attempted service on Torres at Calipatria State Prison,

where Torres formerly worked, but was informed that Torres is no longer employed

by the California Department of Corrections.

2 06cv2455 BEN (RBB)

On May 18, 2007, Defendants Gonzalez and Flores2 filed a

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [doc. no. 9] with a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities. Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s

Complaint must be dismissed because Arthur failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Mot. to Dismiss 2.) 

Defendant Flores also moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to

state a claim against him. (Id.; Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. 7-8.) 

Plaintiff submitted an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion [doc. no.

13], which was filed nunc pro tunc to June 12, 2007. On September

20, 2007, District Judge Roger T. Benitez referred the Motion to

this Court for a report and recommendation [doc. no. 17].

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is suitable for decision without

oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons

set forth below, the district court should GRANT Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an inmate currently incarcerated at Centinela

State Prison, but he was previously incarcerated at Calipatria

State Prison. (Compl. 1; Notice of Change of Address 1 [doc. no.

15] at 1.) On January 7, 2006, Defendant Gonzalez, a Correctional

Officer working at Calipatria, ordered Arthur to disrobe for a

strip search. (Compl. 2-3.) The search did not uncover any

contraband. (Id. at 3.) After the search, Gonzalez told Plaintiff

to turn and face the wall so he could be handcuffed. (Id.) Arthur

alleges he informed Gonzalez that due to a medical condition he

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needed to be restrained in waist chains or with two sets of

handcuffs. (Id.) Nevertheless, Defendants Gonzalez and Torres

restrained Plaintiff with a single set of handcuffs. (Id.) 

Arthur alleges that to relieve pain and pressure from his

right shoulder, he asked if he could reposition his left arm. (Id.

at 3-4.) Defendant Gonzalez intentionally pulled Plaintiff’s left

arm, causing pain to his arm and shoulder. (Id. at 4.) In

reaction, Arthur moved his body to the right, at which point

Defendant Gonzalez grabbed Plaintiff with both hands and slammed

him to the ground. (Id.) Gonzalez then forcefully pressed his

knee into Arthur’s back and punched Plaintiff in the face and head. 

(Id.) Arthur asserts that Defendant Torres kicked him repeatedly

in the face and mouth, causing serious lacerations. (Id.) 

Defendants Gonzalez and Torres continued to punch, kick, and

stomp on Plaintiff until Defendant Flores entered the room. (Id.

at 5.) Defendant Flores asked, “What’s going on?” and Torres

looked up in surprise and told him to push his personal alarm. 

(Id.) After the alarm was activated, Defendants left Arthur on the

floor until other staff arrived and took him to the emergency room. 

(Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE FAILURE TO EXHAUST

A. Motion to Dismiss Unexhausted Claims Pursuant to the 

Unenumerated Portions of Rule 12(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) states: “No action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

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available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The

exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

“‘[A]n action is “brought” for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the

complaint is tendered to the district clerk[]’ . . . .” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners

must “exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers

to the federal courts.” Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement creates an

affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). “[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving

the absence of exhaustion.” Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants in

§ 1983 actions properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Id. 

Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim for which relief may be granted, “[i]n deciding a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id.

at 1119-20 (citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)). “A court ruling on a

motion to dismiss also may take judicial notice of ‘matters of

public record.’” Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001)). But “if the district court looks beyond the

pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust[,] . . . the court must assure that [the

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plaintiff] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record.” 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. 

“[When] the district court concludes that the prisoner has not

exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of

the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d at 368 & n.3). 

B. The Administrative Grievance Process

“The California Department of Corrections [CDC] provides a

four-step grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an

administrative decision or perceived mistreatment: an informal

level, a first formal level, a second formal level, and the

Director’s level.” Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005)). The administrative

appeal system can be found in title 15, sections 3084.1, 3084.5,

and 3084.6 of the California Code of Regulations. See Brown, 422

F.3d at 929-30 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a),

3084.5(a)-(b), (e)(1)-(2), 3084.6(c)). 

To comply with the CDC’s administrative grievance procedure,

an inmate must file his grievance at the informal level “within 15

working days of the event or decision being appealed . . . .” Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2006); see also Brown, 422 F.3d at

929. An inmate must proceed through all levels of the

administrative grievance process before initiating a § 1983 suit in

federal court. See Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051. 

III. THE MERITS OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST

A. Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s Opposition requests that the Court take judicial

notice of four facts: (1) Defendant Torres has been terminated by

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the California Department of Corrections; (2) Arthur is acting pro

se and had no means to effect service on Defendant Torres; (3)

Plaintiff is currently “on lock down” in the prison; and (4)

prisoners are not privy to know the result of 602s raising staff

complaints. (Opp’n 1, 3.)

The Court may take judicial notice of any fact that is “not

subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). “A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a

party and supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(d).

The Court need not take judicial notice of any fact that is

not relevant to resolving the pending Motion to Dismiss. See

Trans-Sterling, Inc. v. Bible, 804 F.2d, 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1986);

City of Lodi v. M. & P. Invs., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143 n.6 (E.D.

Cal. 2003). Defendant Torres is not a party to this suit due to

Plaintiff’s failure to serve him. Nor has Torres filed a motion to

dismiss or any other responsive pleading. Accordingly, the Court

declines to take judicial notice of facts relating to Arthur’s

ability to effect service of process on Torres. Although

marginally relevant, at best, the Court will judicially notice the

fact that the results of any investigation into staff misconduct by

the California Department of Corrections are not shared with

inmates. This fact is supported by the May 8, 2006, letter from C.

G. Butler, Associate Warden, to Plaintiff, which is attached as an

exhibit to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Compl. Ex. B at 51.)

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 The same documents were also submitted as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

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B. Defendants’ Contention that Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust

Attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint are documents demonstrating

his attempts to exhaust the available administrative remedies.3

Arthur submitted an inmate grievance form (commonly known as a

“602”) on January 17, 2006, complaining of the January 7, 2006,

attack. (Compl. Ex. B at 45); see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §

3084.2(a). Administrative review of Arthur’s 602 was bypassed at

the informal level and forwarded directly to the first formal level

of review. (See id.); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.5(a)(3)(G)

(stating that informal review is waived for inmate appeals alleging

staff misconduct). 

Correctional Lieutenant R. Din interviewed Plaintiff on

February 17, 2006, about his staff complaints. (Id. at 50.) The

602 grievance was granted in part at the first level of review on

May 17, 2006. (Id. at 50-51.) An inquiry was made by the prison

administrators into Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct, but

Arthur was informed that the results of the inquiry would not be

provided to him because staff personnel matters are confidential. 

(Id. at 51.) Plaintiff was also informed that although he could

not proceed further in the staff complaint process, he could still

appeal the first level decision, and his administrative remedies

would not be exhausted until he proceeded through the director’s

level of review. (Id.) 

Arthur’s 602 was returned to him on May 22, 2006. (Compl. Ex.

B at 46.) Dissatisfied with the response, Plaintiff appealed the

decision on the grounds that he was still in administrative

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segregation, had been held there since the incident, and the

disciplinary report had not been expunged from his file. (Id. at

46, 52.) Arthur intended to pursue his administrative remedies for

all these grievances to the second level. Compare (id.), with

Brown, 422 F.3d at 937-40. He signed the appeal on May 29, 2006,

and it bears a stamp indicating that it was received by the staff

at California State Prison, Los Angeles County (where Arthur was

held at the time) on June 2, 2006, and assigned on the same day. 

(Id. at 46.) 

Thirteen days later, on June 15, 2006, the prison’s Inmate

Appeals Office forwarded the appeal to the staff at Calipatria

State Prison. (Id. at 54.) The appeal forms were received by the

Calipatria appeals office on June 23, 2006, eight days later. (Id.

at 45-46, 50-54.) On July 20, 2006, the Appeals Coordinator at

Calipatria issued a memorandum stating that Plaintiff’s appeal was

screened out because there was “too great a TIME LAPSE between when

the action or decision occurred and when [Arthur] filed [his]

appeal . . . .” (Id. at 48-49.) The memorandum was forwarded to

California State Prison, Los Angeles County, where the staff issued

another screen-out letter on August 9, 2006, repeating that

Plaintiff’s appeal was cancelled because it was untimely. (Id. at

47-48.) Arthur then filed his federal Complaint on November 11,

2006.

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires “proper

exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387

(2006). Thus, a prisoner cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement

“by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective

administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 2382. Defendants

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contend that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies because his 602 was denied as untimely. 

(Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. 6.)

Arthur had fifteen working days after he received notice that

his appeal was granted in part at the first level to submit his

appeal to the second level of review. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.6(c). Plaintiff’s 602 form bears a stamp showing that it

was returned to him on May 22, 2006. (Compl. 46.) Arthur

completed and signed his appeal on May 29, 2006; it was received by

prison staff on June 2, 2006. (Id.) Therefore, it would appear

that Plaintiff’s appeal was screened out in error because it was

actually submitted on time, eleven days after the first level

decision was returned to him. 

The California Code of Regulations describes the procedure for

rejecting an appeal. “When rejecting an appeal, the appeals

coordinator shall complete an Appeals Screening Form, CDC Form 695

(rev. 5-83), explaining why the appeal is unacceptable. If

rejection is based on improper documentation, the form shall

provide clear instructions regarding further action the inmate must

take to qualify the appeal for processing.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.3(d).

Both of the screen-out letters sent to Arthur on form 695

informed him of the proper procedure to follow if he believed that

his 602 should not have been screened out as untimely. Both

stated: “This screening decision may not be appealed. If you

believe this screen out is in error, please return this form to the

Appeals Coordinator with an explanation of why you believe it to be

in error, and supporting documents. You have only 15 days to

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comply with the above directives.” (Compl. 47, 49.) Plaintiff did

not follow this procedure. Arthur had a means available to him to

proceed further in the administrative process, but he chose instead

to abandon his administrative appeal and file this lawsuit. This

does not constitute proper exhaustion.

Plaintiff claims that his Complaint should not be dismissed

for failure to exhaust because the partial grant of his 602 at the

first level of review should be construed as exhaustion, especially

because the remedy he was seeking (monetary damages) was not

available through the prison’s administrative grievance procedure. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n 2.) This argument is foreclosed by recent Supreme

Court precedent. The Court has held that administrative remedies

must be properly exhausted before an inmate can file suit in

federal court, regardless of whether the inmate’s requested remedy

is available through the administrative process. Booth, 532 U.S.

at 741 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). 

Arthur was required to pursue his grievance through the director’s

level of review, even if the CDC had no power to award him the

monetary relief he requested, so long as some form of relief

remained available. Plaintiff was advised that the partial grant

of his appeal did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies,

and further relief remained available to him through the

administrative process. (Compl. Ex. B at 51.) He was also

informed of the procedure to follow if he thought his appeal was

erroneously cancelled. He did not follow these available

procedures.

Arthur also alleges that his time period for submitting

administrative appeals should have been extended when his 602 was

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assigned a second log number. (Pl.’s Opp’n 2-3.) Plaintiff’s 602

was initially given the log number CAL 06-0237. (Compl. Ex. B at

45.) When Arthur was transferred from Calipatria State Prison to

California State Prison, Los Angeles County, his 602 was assigned a

second log number, LAC 06-01792, at the new prison. (Id.) But

Plaintiff was transferred before he was interviewed on February 17,

2006, about his appeal. (See id. at 50.) Plaintiff was not under

a deadline to submit an appeal at that time, so there is no reason

why assigning a second log number to track his 602 would impair

Arthur’s ability to comply with the applicable time restraints.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the California Department of

Corrections has a pattern of refusing to answer 602s submitted by

prisoners, which limits their ability to fully exhaust

administrative remedies. (Pl.’s Opp’n 2.) In this case, however,

there is no allegation that Defendants failed to respond to

Arthur’s 602. Indeed, the record includes several staff responses. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any conduct by Defendants that would

excuse his failure to exhaust. Cf. Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d

829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding prisoner had no available

remedies where prison officials failed to respond to his

grievances); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001)

(holding remedies were not available where prison officials

prevented prisoner from utilizing grievance system).

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint should be GRANTED

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust all available administrative

remedies before filing suit.

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IV. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Motions to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Davis v. Monroe County

Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A claim can only be

dismissed “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 n.7 (1980) (quotations and

citations omitted). The Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The Court looks not at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where

there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient

facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

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v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Clegg v.

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994))

(stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not required to

accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the Court may not generally consider materials

outside the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 12.34[2] (3d ed. 1997) (“The court may not . . . take

into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the

motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute

pleadings under Rule 7(a).”). 

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But “[w]hen a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484

(citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

The Court may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged

in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading . . . .” Branch v.

Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th

Cir. 2002); Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312,

1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). 

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and give the

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of

liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, however, the Court may not “supply essential elements of

claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” 

Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

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insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint unless it is “absolutely clear that the

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the Court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. Where amendment

of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave

to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077

(9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting under color of state law

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

V. THE MERITS OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Defendant Flores asserts that he should be dismissed from this 

suit because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any wrongdoing

by him. (Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. 7.) Defendants claim the Complaint

alleges only that Flores entered the room and asked “What’s going

on?” (Id.) Then, Defendants Gonzalez and Torres stopped their

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assault, and Flores pushed his personal alarm and watched Arthur on

the floor until other staff arrived. (Id.) Defendants argue that

“[t]here are no allegations that Defendant Flores joined in the

alleged assault, failed to prevent confirmed beatings, or refused

to summon help.” (Id. at 8.) They maintain that this is

insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant

Flores; rather, the allegations show that Flores took action to

stop the alleged civil rights violation. (Id. at 7-8.) 

Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss does not address

this argument. 

“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right . . . if he does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an

act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation

of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

(9th Cir. 1978) (citing Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.

1976)). Thus, to state a claim for monetary damages under § 1983,

Plaintiff must allege that each of the Defendants committed some

act, or failed to act in some way, which caused Arthur’s alleged

injury. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the

duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts

or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 633 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants Gonzalez and

Torres physically attacked him, and Defendant Flores entered the

room while the attack was in progress. (See Compl. 4-5.) There is

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no allegation that Defendant Flores physically harmed Arthur in any

way. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant Flores saw

what was occurring, he activated his personal alarm to summon other

staff members and waited for responding staff to arrive. (Id. at

5.) 

“A prison official may be liable for failure to protect an

inmate from a use of excessive force if he is deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.” 

Estate of Davis v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1395 (8th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted); see also Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271,

1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000); Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407 (11th

Cir. 1998). Arthur’s Complaint, however, does not state a claim

against Flores for failure to prevent the attack on Plaintiff;

instead, his Complaint alleges that the attack stopped when Flores

entered the room, and Flores responded to the attack by calling for

additional staff members. (Compl. 5.)

There are no allegations that Defendant Flores knew the attack

was going to occur or could have prevented it. See Ting v. United

States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1511 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that officers

did not cause plaintiff’s injuries where there was no evidence they

knew another officer was going to shoot plaintiff, so they could

not prevent the shooting). Rather than turning a blind eye to the

alleged attack, Plaintiff contends that the beating stopped when

Flores asked Gonzalez and Torres, “What’s going on?” and pushed his

alarm to summon other staff members. (Compl. 5.) 

The Court is required to construe all factual allegations in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff and to draw all reasonable

inferences from the Complaint in his favor. Doe v. United States,

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419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005). But even accepting Arthur’s

allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated

a claim against Defendant Flores, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all

claims against Defendant Flores should be GRANTED.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED and this action should be DISMISSED in its

entirety. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before January 18, 2008. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 31, 2008. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: December 21, 2007 _____________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Benitez

All Parties of Record

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