Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00360/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-00360-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

Williams A. Kershaw, State Bar No. 057486

Stuart C. Talley, State Bar No. 180374

Ian J. Barlow, State Bar No. 262213

KERSHAW, COOK & TALLEY PC

401 Watt Avenue

Sacramento, CA 95864

Telephone: (916) 779-7000

Facsimile: (916) 721-2501

Email: bill@kctlegal.com

Email: stuart@kctlegal.com

Email: ian@kctlegal.com

Mark P. Chalos (pro hac vice)

Kenneth S. Byrd (pro hac vice)

LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP

222 Second Avenue South, Suite 1640

Nashville, Tennessee 37201

Telephone: (615) 313-9000

Email: mchalos@lchb.com

Email: kbyrd@lchb.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN ALGER, as an individual and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

FCA US LLC f/k/a CHRYSLER GROUP 

LLC, a Delaware Corporation, and DOES 

1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 

AND APPOINTMENT OF CLASS 

REPRESENTATIVE AND CLASS 

COUNSEL

 Judge: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

Case 2:18-cv-00360-DJC-JDP Document 141 Filed 02/18/20 Page 1 of 21
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification and 

Appointment of Class Representative and Class Counsel, (ECF No. 54, “Plaintiff’s Motion”) and 

Defendant’s Motion to Stay (ECF No. 114) (Defendant’s Motion). 

The Court has reviewed the briefing and record with respect to Defendant’s Motion and 

concludes that no stay is warranted. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Stay is DENIED. 

For his part, Plaintiff moves for certification of two classes of owners and lessees of 

certain Chrysler vehicles that contain allegedly defective spring-loaded headrests that suddenly 

and violently deploy, potentially striking the driver and/or passenger in the back of the head

(“Unintended Deployment”). Having reviewed all the briefing and responses filed with respect to 

Plaintiff’s Motion, and other materials submitted therewith, the Court finds and further rules as 

follows:

BACKGROUND

The Defendant, FCA US LLC (referred to herein as “Chrysler”), sells millions of vehicles 

throughout the United States. Beginning in 2010, Chrysler began equipping some of its vehicles 

with a purported safety device known as an Active Head Restraint System (“AHR System”). 

Chrysler has sold or leased approximately 279,000 vehicles with an AHR System in California.

An AHR System is a mechanism built into the vehicles’ front headrests that allows the headrests 

to “deploy” in the event of a rear-end collision. The AHR System works by splitting the headrest 

into two sections; the padded front and the back. In between the front and back of the headrests 

are two powerful springs. Much like a mouse trap, the spring-loaded headrests stay in place 

through the use of a hook that latches to a metal “striker pin.” When the sensors in the vehicle 

detect a rear-end collision, the hook releases the pin and the spring-loaded headrest launches 

forward. If the AHR System works properly, it is intended to reduce the risk of whiplash in the 

event of a rear-end collision. Plaintiff alleges that, for many Chrysler owners, the AHR Systems 

do not work as intended; instead, the headrests unexpectedly deploy without warning while the 

vehicle is in normal operation and not in the midst of a crash. Plaintiff contends that the AHR 

System failures are the result of a common design defect that Chrysler failed to disclose to 

consumers.

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

On April 23, 2018, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed the 

operative Second Amended Class Action Complaint against Chrysler asserting claims for: (1) 

violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et 

seq.; (2) violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 

17200, et seq.; (3) breach of implied warranty under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer 

Warranty Act (“Song Beverly Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1792, 1791.1, and 1794, et seq.; and (4) 

breach of express warranty. ECF No. 13. 

Plaintiff seeks an order certifying the following classes pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure:

The Damages Class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)1

“All persons in California who currently own or lease, or who have owned 

or leased, any Class Vehicle manufactured by Chrysler or any of its 

subsidiaries or affiliates that is equipped with an Automatic Head Restraint 

(“AHR”) system.” 

The Injunctive Class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2)

 

“All persons in California who currently own or lease any Class Vehicle 

manufactured by Chrysler or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates that is 

equipped with an AHR system.”

Class Vehicles comprise the following make-year and model Chrysler Vehicles:

2010-2018 Dodge Journey

2010-2011 Dodge Nitro

2010-2012 Jeep Liberty

2010-2017 Jeep Patriot or Compass

2010-2012 Dodge Caliber

2010-2018 Dodge Caravan

2011-2018 Dodge Durango

2011-2018 Jeep Grand Cherokee

2010-2014 Sebring/Avenger

 

1 The Court, as set forth in its Conclusion below, will certify the class only as to the 

economic loss claims set forth in the Second Amended Class Action Complaint (Dkt. 13), and will 

not certify any personal injury claims or damages. In addition, the Court will exclude from the 

Class Chrysler, its employees, officers, directors, and legal representatives; Class Counsel and their 

employees; and the judicial officers and their immediate family members and associated court staff 

assigned to this case.

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

LEGAL STANDARD

It is within the court’s broad discretion to “determine whether a class should be certified, 

and to revisit that certification throughout the legal proceedings.” Salas v. Toyota Motor Sales, 

U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 15-8629, 2019 WL 1940619, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2019) (quoting 

United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, 

AFL-CIO, CLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2010)).

A case may be certified as a class action if it meets the requirements outlined in Rule 23 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 

defenses of the class;

(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Additionally, the proposed class must meet one of three requirements 

specified in Rule 23(b). See Salas, 2019 WL 1940619, at *2. The party seeking class 

certification has an affirmative duty to demonstrate that the Rule 23 elements are satisfied. Id. 

The court is tasked with conducting a “rigorous” analysis before granting or denying class 

certification. This analysis may “entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying 

claim[,]” and the court may find it necessary to, at times, “probe behind the pleadings[.]” WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2011). But, even so, “merits questions may be 

considered to the extent – but only to the extent – that they are relevant to determining whether 

the Rule 23 prerequisites . . . are satisfied.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 

U.S. 455, 466 (2013). Rule 23 does not permit a “free-ranging merits inquir[y] . . . at the 

certification stage.” Id.; see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 

2011) (explaining that a district court’s examination of the merits should take place “only 

inasmuch as [the court] must determine whether common questions exist; not to determine 

whether class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims.”). Class certification 

should not become a “mini-trial.” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983 n.8; see also Salas, 2019 WL 1940619, 

Case 2:18-cv-00360-DJC-JDP Document 141 Filed 02/18/20 Page 4 of 21
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

at *2. 

Having conducted a rigorous analysis, including consideration of all evidence submitted 

in favor of and in opposition to the motion, the Court finds that the class, including the Class 

Vehicles listed above, satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court turns to each of these requirements in turn.

DISCUSSION

Numerosity. Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all class 

members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Although “no specific minimum number of 

plaintiffs asserted” is required to obtain class certification, “a proposed class of at least forty 

members presumptively satisfies the numerosity requirement.” Nguyen v. Radient 

Pharmaceutical Corp., 287 F.R.D. 563, 569 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Plaintiff’s purported class far 

exceeds forty members. He has shown that, within California, Chrysler has sold or leased 

approximately 279,000 Class Vehicles, of various models and years, equipped with an AHR 

System. Even if the Court determined, which it does not, that Chrysler is correct that “only a tiny 

percentage of these vehicles might” have defective AHR Systems, the class would still easily 

satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1).2 

Commonality. Plaintiff also satisfies Rule 23(a)(2), which requires that “there are 

questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The focus of this inquiry 

is “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution 

of the litigation.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (italics and citation omitted). Put another way, a class 

achieves commonality if “an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims” is 

“capable of classwide resolution.” Id. A plaintiff need not show commonality across a class with 

regard to all questions of law or fact. See Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 957 

(9th Cir. 2013); see also Falco v. Nissan North America Inc., No. CV 13-00686 DDP, 2016 WL 

132747, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016). Rather, a plaintiff meets the requirements of Rule 

23(a)(2) by showing that the class has in common “a single significant issue of law or fact.” 

 

2

Indeed, Defendant expressly concedes that the numerosity requirement is met here. See 

Def’s Opp., ECF No. 66, at 11 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

Abdullah, 731 F.3d at 957 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff points to a number of instances in which courts granted class certification when 

faced with similar claims. See, e.g., Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 

1172 (9th Cir. 2010); Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2005); Falco, 

2016 WL 132747, at *5; Salas, 2019 WL 1940619, at *5-10. That standard is “easily” met in 

cases indistinguishable from the case here: where “claims of all prospective class members 

involve the same alleged defect, covered by the same warranty, and found in vehicles of the same 

make and model.” Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1172; see also Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,

1019-20 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding commonality satisfied where claims “stem[med] from the same 

source: the allegedly defective designed rear liftgate latch”); Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 603 F. 

App’x 538, 540 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that “whether a defect existed and whether Ford had a 

duty to disclose the defect were both questions common to the class”); Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 

962 (finding that “whether the [vehicle] design . . . was defective,” “whether [defendant] was 

aware of alleged design defects,” and “whether [defendant] had a duty to disclose” were common 

questions).

Plaintiff identifies multiple significant common issues of law and fact. Principally, a 

common question exists as to whether Class Vehicles suffered from a defective AHR System 

design. Chrysler argues that any alleged defect was a manufacturing error, not a design one, and 

that the presence of the defect-generating agent varied among the Class Vehicles. Plaintiff replies 

that the evidence establishes that the AHR System design, materials, and alleged defect are 

uniform across the class. In support of these claims, Plaintiff proffered several experts, as well as 

pre-litigation documents from Chrysler and its supplier. Having reviewed the expert opinions 

proffered by both parties, the deposition transcripts cited, and the documentary evidence, the 

Court finds that the central questions in this case involving a defective AHR System can be 

resolved by common questions submitted to a jury.3

 

3 This case is somewhat unique in that the purported defect is latent and a class member 

cannot know if his or her car is affected without spending a disproportionate amount to have the 

headrests removed and checked. Given the inability to predict when a particular headrest might 

deploy, all class members are to some extent already suffering from the defect of uncertainty; 

Footnote continued on next page

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

In particular, Plaintiff’s expert Bruce Davis, Ph.D., opined that the design in the AHR 

System in Class Vehicles is identical from an engineering standpoint. Dr. Davis, who has a Ph.D.

in Mechanical Engineering specializing in polymer processing, behavior, and analysis, also 

opined extensively on the defect in the plastic material and pins used by the design of the AHR 

System and how the AHR System is susceptible to a common defect that can lead to failures. 

(ECF No. 54-3.) The Court finds his opinions credible in so far as this stage of litigation requires: 

determining whether common questions exist and predominate. See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013) (“There is a single, central, common issue of liability: 

whether the [product] was defective.”). 

Chrysler contends that commonality is lacking principally for two reasons. 

First, Chrysler argues that there are no common questions because the failure rates are 

low and vary across vehicle models. But in that respect this case is on all fours with decisions 

from the Ninth Circuit and other district courts in the Circuit. In Wolin, for example, the Ninth 

Circuit ruled that plaintiffs “easily” satisfied the commonality requirement because they identified 

the following common issues: (a) whether the vehicle’s alignment geometry was defective; (b) 

whether the defendant was aware of the defect; (c) whether the defendant concealed the defect; 

and (d) whether that conduct violated consumer protection laws. See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1172. 

The defendant argued that class certification was nevertheless inappropriate because the defect 

would manifest irregularly or not at all. See id. at 1173. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining 

that “proof of the manifestation of a defect is not a prerequisite to class certification.” Id.

Second, Chrysler takes issue with the fact that a handful of 2010 vehicles tested may not 

have been defective. The Court finds that for certification purposes the evidence shows that the 

same AHR System design and materials were used in model year 2010 vehicles as were used in 

all other Class Vehicles. Additionally, the 2010 vehicles were manufactured in the same facility 

by the same third-party vendor as other model year vehicles. Thus, there remains a common 

question as to the presence of a design defect in these vehicles. 

 

stated another way, the unknown potential for a deployment may be the actual defect that is 

certainly present for every Class Vehicle. 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

The core of Plaintiff’s case is that the design of the AHR Systems in Class Vehicles is

defective, Chrysler knew (or should have known) about the defect, and Chrysler failed to disclose 

material information. As such, there are similar common questions that can be identified, such 

as: (a) whether the AHR System is defective; (b) whether Chrysler was aware of the defect; (c) 

whether Chrysler concealed or omitted information about the defect; (d) whether the defect 

constitutes a safety risk; (e) whether the defect rendered the Class Vehicles unmerchantable; and 

(f) whether Chrysler’s conduct was unlawful and amounted to violation of the CLRA and UCL.4 

See Salas, 2019 WL 1940619, at *5 (finding several questions of fact and law that are common to 

the class, including “whether a defect exists in the Toyota Camry XV 50, whether Toyota knew 

about it, whether Toyota concealed the defect, whether Toyota violated consumer protection 

statutes as a result, and whether the alleged defect rendered [the vehicle] unmerchantable”).

Plaintiff has satisfied the commonality prong.

Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are “reasonably coextensive with those of absent class 

members,” and therefore satisfy the Rule 23(a)(3) requirement. Just Film, Inc. v. Buono, 847 

F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

Plaintiff alleges that the headrest in his 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee unexpectedly deployed while 

he was driving his vehicle. He alleges that the deployment startled and distracted him, causing a 

safety hazard, and injured him. He further claims that the deployment was the result of a design 

defect that affects all of the Class Vehicles. Finally, Plaintiff claims that although the deployment 

took place while his car was under warranty, he was forced to pay out-of-pocket for a new 

headrest that allegedly suffered from the same defect. 

Chrysler argues that Plaintiff’s claims are atypical because the projected failure rate of his 

vehicle differs from that of other Class Vehicles. But, as explained with respect to commonality, 

variations in manifestation are no bar to class certification. And, in any event, the precise details 

of a claim need not be identical across the class; it is enough that they are similar. See, e.g.,

 

4 Plaintiff concedes that for the CLRA claim, a subclass should be created consisting of all 

members of the California class who are “consumers” within the meaning of California Civil Code 

§ 1761(d). This Court agrees and notes that Plaintiff Alger is a “consumer” within the meaning of 

the code. (Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 69, at 11-12.)

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1175 (“Typicality can be satisfied despite different factual circumstances 

surrounding the manifestation of the defect. [Plaintiffs] . . . may have a viable claim regardless of 

the manifestation of the defect.”). Plaintiff’s claims and those of other proposed class members 

are based on the same core facts—the alleged presence of the defective AHR System and 

Chrysler’s concealment of the defect—as well as similar injuries, and he proceeds on the same 

legal theory as other class members’ claims. Typicality is met because the legal interests “are the

same across all potential class members.” Falco, 2016 WL 132747, at *7. 

Adequacy. Rule 23(a)(4) questions whether the named plaintiff and his counsel have

“any conflicts of interest with other Class Members” and whether he and his counsel “will 

prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class.” The Court finds that Plaintiff will

adequately represent the interests of the class and will vigorously prosecute the claims, 

notwithstanding his decision to forego potential personal injury claims. See, e.g., Andren v. 

Alere, Inc., No. 16-cv-1255, 2017 WL 6509550, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (explaining that 

“any risk of preclusion can be mitigated through the opt-out provisions” and “Courts can also 

expressly reserve the plaintiff’s right to maintain a second action”); cf. Benedict v. HewlettPackard Co., 314 F.R.D. 457, 473 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding adequacy satisfied even where, 

unlike here, the named plaintiff “additionally [brought] individual claims” on behalf of himself 

“where there is no evidence that the individual claims will impair his ability to represent the 

interests of the class.”).

Out of an abundance of caution, the Court, as set forth in its Conclusion below, will 

certify the class only as to the economic loss claims set forth in the Second Amended Class 

Action Complaint (ECF No. 13), and will not certify any personal injury claims or damages.

Finally, all counsel for Plaintiff are experienced, qualified, and fully capable of 

representing the interests of the class. (ECF No. 54 at p. 21; Talley Decl. ¶ 21 and Ex. T; see

Byrd Decl. ¶¶ 7-20.) Adequacy is satisfied here. 

Predominance. Plaintiff satisfies the predominance inquiry, which “tests whether 

proposed class actions are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” 

Amchem Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997); see also Tait v. BSH Home

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

Appliances Corp., 289 F.R.D. 466, 478 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Though there is “substantial overlap” 

between the commonality and predominance test, the predominance test is “far more demanding.” 

Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1172. The predominance analysis “asks whether the common, aggregatingenabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than non-common, aggregationdefeating, individual issues.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016). 

This standard is “readily met” in consumer fraud cases. Tait, 289 F.R.D. at 478 (quoting 

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625).

As explained in the Court’s discussion of commonality above, the central issues in this 

case turn on Chrysler’s uniform conduct and the questions key to Plaintiff’s claims will be 

answered by reference to the same set of facts. See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1173 (finding that 

common issues predominated where Land Rover knew about the existence of an alleged defect 

and plaintiff sought relief on a duty-to-disclose theory); see also Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 962; 

Keegan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 284 F.R.D. 504, 521 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Parkinson v. Hyundai 

Motor Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 596 (C.D. Cal. 2008). The Court now addresses predominance with 

respect to each claim at issue in turn.

UCL and CLRA Claims

Courts regularly find predominance satisfied and certify UCL and CLRA class claims. 

See, e.g., Salas, 2019 WL 1940619, at *13-14; Tait, 289 F.R.D. at 480; Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 

532-34. The UCL prohibits “unfair competition,” which is broadly defined as “any unlawful, 

unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The CLRA 

forbids certain “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in the 

sale or lease of goods to consumers for personal or household use. Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). In 

considering UCL and CLRA claims, courts rely on “the same objective test, that is, whether 

‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Tait, 289 F.R.D. at 480. 

This test does not require an individual showing of deception, reliance, or injury under the 

UCL because “unlike common-law fraud claims that focus on the victim’s reliance or damages, 

the UCL focuses on the perpetrator’s behavior[.]” Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 

1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

1702 (2017). Instead, “a violation of the UCL can be proved with common evidence regarding 

the nature of the design defect in question, the likely effect of the defect on class vehicles, its 

likely impact on vehicle safety, what [Defendant] knew or did not know, and what it disclosed or 

did not disclose to consumers.” Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 534. Furthermore, a plaintiff need not 

demonstrate individual reliance; a presumption or inference of reliance arises as to the entire class 

“wherever there is a showing that a misrepresentation was material.” In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 

Cal. 4th 298, 327 (2009) (citation omitted); Steroid Hormone Prod. Cases, 181 Cal. App. 4th 145, 

157 (2010).

Here, Plaintiff will be able to establish through common evidence a violation of the 

UCL’s fraudulent prong by showing the uniformity of the defective AHR System, the effect on 

the class, the defect’s impact on safety, what Chrysler knew and disclosed, and what Chrysler 

knew and did not disclose. See Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 534. These questions predominate over 

any individual concerns related to Plaintiff’s UCL claim. 

Similarly, Plaintiff’s claim regarding the UCL’s unfairness prong is predominated by 

common questions. That prong requires showing a violation of “established public policy” or 

business practices that are “immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and cause injury to 

consumers, which outweigh its benefits.” McKell v. Wash. Mut., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 

1473 (2006). Plaintiff will be able to show a violation of this prong with common evidence, 

because the claims all stem from the same uniform defect that creates similar safety risks across 

all Class Vehicles and the same conduct of Chrysler related to the defect and customers of Class 

Vehicles. See Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 533 (“all class members received the same information 

from defendant[] regarding the purported defect – which is to say, no information[.]”; see also 

Parkinson, 258 F.R.D. at 596 (predominance satisfied as to all three UCL prongs in case 

involving defectively designed and uniformly used clutch flywheel); see also Salas, 2019 WL 

1940619, at *13-14 (predominance satisfied as to UCL and CLRA claims involving defect with 

vehicle HVAC system leading to foul odors and potential mold). Plaintiff has put forth experts 

who opined that the Unintended Deployment of the AHR Systems pose great risks to consumers. 

Experts have found that the AHR defect can cause injuries, such as concussions, and can cause 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

drivers to be distracted, potentially leading to wrecks and creating a safety risk. ECF No. 54-4. 

Finally, Plaintiff has produced credible evidence that Chrysler’s uniform practice of refusing to 

cover the cost of an AHR repair outside of the warranty period, creates a potential safety risk 

since many consumers who cannot afford a repair may remove their headrests, drive with it 

deployed, or strap it shut. Hence, the question of whether the Unintended Deployments create a 

safety risk is a common one that can be answered in one stroke by a jury. See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 

1172.

To establish that Chrysler has engaged in an “unlawful” act or practice, Plaintiff must 

show an underlying violation of another law. Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 533. Here, Plaintiff 

predicates his UCL unlawful act claim on violations of the CLRA and the breach of implied 

warranty under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act. Thus, predominance is satisfied with respect to 

the UCL for the same reasons it is satisfied for those claims.

For similar reasons, Plaintiff satisfies predominance with respect to his CLRA claim. 

Among the deceptive acts and practices prohibited by the CLRA are: (i) representing that goods 

(i.e. Vehicles) have characteristics or benefits, which they do not have (section 1770(a)(5)); (ii) 

representing that goods are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, when they are of another 

(section 1770(a)(7)); and (iii) advertising goods with the intent not to sell them as advertised 

(section 1770 (a)(9)). And, like the UCL, the CLRA prohibits fraudulent omissions. See Salas, 

2019 WL 1940619, at *7; see also Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 

824, 833 (2006).

For a CLRA claim, Plaintiff has to show that Chrysler had a duty to disclose an alleged 

defect because Defendant had exclusive knowledge of “material facts.” Collins v. eMachines, 

Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 255-56 (2011). This duty is not limited by an express warranty if the 

nondisclosure creates an “unreasonable safety risk.” See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. 

Supp. 2d 1145, 1191 n.25 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[t]he risk of injury ... is the type of ‘unreasonable 

risk’ that leads to a duty to disclose under California law”). A CLRA claim also “requires each 

class member to have an actual injury caused by the unlawful practice.” Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 

529. Also like the UCL, however, causation on a class-wide basis “may be established by 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

materiality.” Id. An omission is material if “a reasonable [person] would attach importance to its 

existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in

question.” Id. Because materiality is determined according to a reasonable person standard, the 

question of whether the omitted information is material is a common question of fact suitable for 

treatment in a class action. See id. at 530-31; Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 956 (identifying as a 

common, predominant issue “whether the facts that [Defendant] allegedly failed to disclose were 

material.”); see also Tait, 289 F.R.D. at 480 (“claims under the UCL, ... and CLRA [are] ideal for 

class certification because they will not require the court to investigate class members’ individual 

interaction with the product”). 

As to the safety issue related to the UCL and CLRA, Plaintiff proffered opinions from

expert, Dr. Francisco Biondi, a professor of Applied Cognition and Cognitive Ergonomics, who 

stated that a noisy, forceful Unexpected Deployment of an AHR System can lead to driver 

distraction. ECF No. 54-4. Dr. Biondi, who has conducted extensive research in the area of 

distracted driving, has reviewed scores of complaints from consumers who have reported 

inadvertent headrest deployments and has concluded that an Unexpected Deployment can result 

in driver distraction that could lead to a vehicle accident.5

In addition, Dr. Mariusz Ziejewski, a biomechanical engineer who has published 

numerous studies concerning the dynamics of head injuries, conducted testing on behalf of 

Plaintiff by deploying headrests against a crash test dummy. Talley Decl. ISO Reply, ECF No.

69, Ex. Y. Dr. Ziejewski tested more than 140 combinations to identify positions that were most 

likely to cause injury. Id. Based on his testing, Dr. Ziejewski concluded that “an inadvertently 

deployed headrest has the potential to cause a mild traumatic brain injury in certain individuals.” 

Id.

Because Plaintiff contends the common defect poses a safety risk (itself a common 

question), Chrysler is incorrect that the individual questions of whether Chrysler’s alleged 

omissions were material and whether class members relied on Chrysler’s representations 

 

5 The Court notes that this conclusion is also supported by common sense. Having a 

headrest unexpectedly deploy while operating a motor vehicle would undoubtedly cause a great 

distraction with the potential to lead to catastrophic results. 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

predominates and precludes class certification. 

Chrysler’s contention that individual inquiries are required to determine when each class 

member became aware of the AHR System defect also fails. Plaintiff puts forth a theory of 

liability premised on Chrysler’s omissions. In such an instance, individual questions about “when 

class members actually discovered or ‘should have discovered’ the elements of their claims do 

not predominate.” Tait, 289 F.R.D. at 485. Because “common proof includes Defendant’s failure 

to inform consumers of the design defect,” the question of whether Chrysler knew about and 

failed to disclose the defect predominates Plaintiff’s CLRA and UCL claims. Id. at 485-86; see 

also Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 962 (holding in a CLRA claim that predominant common issues 

existed as to “whether [defendant] was aware of alleged design defects” and “whether [defendant] 

had a duty to disclose its knowledge.”). 

Here, as in Chamberlan, the predominance of common issues is “readily apparent.” 402 

F.3d at 962 (affirming class certification where district court identified such common issues as 

“(1) whether the design . . . was defective; (2) whether Ford was aware of the alleged design 

defects; (3) whether Ford had a duty to disclose its knowledge; (3) whether it failed to do so; (5) 

whether the facts that Ford allegedly failed to disclose were material; and (6) whether the alleged 

failure to disclose violated the CLRA.”). Common proof can establish the elements of the CLRA 

claim, such as whether Chrysler had a duty to disclose the defect in the AHR System, whether 

there was an unreasonable safety risk, and whether consumers would find such an omission 

material in their transactions.

Breach of Implied Warranty Claims

The Song-Beverly Act provides that “every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail 

in [California] shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and retail seller’s implied warranty 

that goods are merchantable,” Cal. Civ. Code section 1792, which means here that goods are “fit 

for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.” Id. § 1791.1(a)(2). For vehicles, the 

question “is whether the vehicle is fit for driving.” Keegan, 284 F.R.D. at 537. The warranty of 

merchantability is met if the vehicle is “in safe condition and substantially free of defects.” See

Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 155 Cal. App. 4th 19, 25 (2007). “The implied warranty of 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of the sale.” Mexia 

v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1304-5 (2009).

Here, all Class Vehicles were sold with the same latent defect and the same likelihood of 

the AHR System experiencing an Unintended Deployment and the safety risks that come with 

such deployment. This can be shown by common evidence. Moreover, the Unintended 

Deployments and cracking of the headrests are more likely to occur as time progresses. That 

some Class Vehicles have not yet experienced problems associated with the AHR System is 

insufficient to defeat predominance on this and the other claims brought by the class. See Wolin, 

617 F.3d at 1773 (“proof of the manifestation of the defect is not a prerequisite to class 

certification.”). The court in Keegan illustrated how the manifestation of the defect was a “merits 

inquiry” that was particularly suited to resolution as a class action.” See 284 F.R.D. at 536. In 

this case, the manifestation of the defect is also a merits inquiry that is particularly suited to be 

determined on a class basis. See id.

Breach of Express Warranty

Predominance is satisfied under the breach of express warranty claims. To prove breach 

of express warranty under the U.C.C., Plaintiff must show that the seller “(1) made an affirmation 

of fact or promise or provided a description of its goods; (2) the promise or description formed 

part of the basis of the bargain; (3) the express warranty was breached; and (4) the breach caused 

injury to the plaintiff.” Keegan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 949

(2012) (citation omitted). Here, Chrysler furnished class members with a standard warranty that 

“covers the cost of all parts and labor needed to repair any item on your vehicle when it left the 

manufacturing plant that is defective in material, workmanship or factory preparation. . . . You 

pay nothing for these repairs. These warranty repairs or adjustments – including all parts and 

labor connected with them – will be made by your dealer at no charge, using new or 

remanufactured parts.” Docket 54-1 at p. 28.

Plaintiff’s claim is that Chrysler breached this warranty by replacing failed headrests with 

not-yet-failed, but still defective headrests, and that Chrysler is obligated to provide all current 

owners replacement, defect-free headrests.

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

The core liability question is common to all proposed class members: whether the Class 

Vehicles are defective such that Chrysler’s replacements did not render the Vehicles nondefective. Every liability element is common. First, the terms of the standard warranty do not 

vary materially, if at all, among class members. Second, the promise-to-repair, the core of any 

warranty, either was or was not part of the basis of the bargain for all class members. Third, 

every class member has an identical claim for breach—they are entitled to replacement of their 

defective headrests with non-defective headrests. And fourth, every Class Vehicle contains 

defective headrests and so every class member has been injured by the breach. 

Not all class members received deficient replacement headrests under the warranty, and so 

some class members, but not all, have out-of-pocket costs recoverable upon proving the merits of 

their express warranty claims. But this slight variation in damages is no bar to class certification. 

Indeed, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have each held expressly that even when all

damages require individual hearings (unlike in this case), it does not defeat class certification. 

Leyva v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513-14 (9th Cir. 2013).

Damages Model

When moving for class certification, a plaintiff seeking to prove damages on a classwide 

basis “need only show that such damages can be determined without excessive difficulty and 

attributed to their theory of liability.” Just Film, Inc., 847 F.3d at 1121; see also Comcast 

Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35 (2013). Plaintiff’s damages model need not be perfect and it 

need not be “precisely correct.” See Vaccarino v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., No. 2:11-CV05858, 2014 WL 572365, at *10-13 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014) (“Comcast requires that courts 

determine whether damages are susceptible of class-wide measurement, not whether the 

measurement is precisely correct.”)

Here, Plaintiff’s proffered expert, Susan Thompson, C.P.A., a certified public accountant 

who has opined on similar damage models for classes that have been certified in similar cases, 

see Salas, 2019 WL 1940619, at *11, developed a damages model that provides a reliable and 

generally accepted methodology for determining reasonable damages on a classwide basis. ECF 

No. 54-5. Specifically, she opines that in order for each class member to receive the “benefit of 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

their bargain” they should receive sufficient compensation to allow them to remediate the defect. 

Significantly, the evidence shows that defective headrests cannot be “repaired,” but instead both 

headrests in each vehicle must be replaced to remove the risk of a dangerous failure, and Ms. 

Thompson calculates damages accordingly. Should the fact finder determine that the original 

AHR System had some value even in a defective state, Ms. Thompson also has a damages model 

that will account for that scenario. See ECF No. 54-5 (Thompson Report) ¶ 26 (“Plaintiffs 

believe the defective AHRs, as originally sold, should not be attributed value under the benefit of 

the bargain model. However, if the finder of fact concludes that the original AHR had some 

value, [Thompson] has prepared a classwide methodology to account for the ‘useful life’ of the 

AHRs. This methodology could also be applied to Plaintiffs who have incurred out-of-pocket 

expenses to take into account the value, if any, of the defective part that was replaced.”).

Chrysler contends that Plaintiff has not met the requirements for class certification 

because Plaintiff’s theory of damages is unsatisfactory. But Chrysler’s arguments here have been 

entirely rejected by the Ninth Circuit in reversing the central case Chrysler relied upon in its brief. 

See Nguyen v. Nissan North Am. Inc., 932 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. July 26, 2019). In that case, plaintiff 

alleged a defect hidden in the vehicle’s hydraulic clutch system. Id. at 813. The district court 

denied plaintiff’s motion for class certification, asserting predominance was not satisfied due to 

an improper damages model that was based on the cost to replace the defective clutch with a nondefective clutch. See id. at 815-16. Ms. Thompson’s damages model is parallel to the model in 

Nguyen. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court shortly after Defendant filed its opposition 

in this case, and instead found that the class should be certified on the CLRA, Song-Beverly Act, 

and Magnuson-Moss Act claims. The Ninth Circuit ruled, in part:

Plaintiff alleges that Nissan concealed the clutch system’s defects from consumers, 

that the defect was material because it adversely affected the “safety and reliability” 

of the Class Vehicles, and that he did not get what he bargained for—a transmission 

“fit for [its] intended use.” A benefit-of-the-bargain model of damages aligns with 

this legal theory; that measure

is concerned with satisfying the expectancy interest of the defrauded 

plaintiff by putting him in the position he would have enjoyed if the 

false representation relied upon had been true; it awards the 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

difference in value between what the plaintiff actually received and 

what he was fraudulently led to believe he would receive.

Stout v. Turney, 22 Cal.3d 718, 150 Cal.Rptr. 637, 586 P.2d 1228, 1232 (1978). 

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages equaling the amount he purportedly overpaid in 

purchasing a vehicle with a defective clutch; he “is not seeking a full refund for the 

vehicle purchase, but for the cost of replacing [ ] a defective component, which is a 

proxy for [his] overpayment of the vehicle at the point of sale.” Whether his 

proposed calculation of the replacement cost is accurate, whether the clutch was 

actually defective, and whether Nissan knew of the alleged defect are merits 

inquiries unrelated to class certification. For now, it is sufficient that Plaintiff has 

demonstrated the nexus between his legal theory—that Nissan violated California 

law by selling vehicles with a defective clutch system that was not reflected in the 

sale price—and his damages model—the average cost of repair.

See id. at 821. The Nguyen Court also noted that “class wide damages calculations under 

the . . . CLRA are particularly forgiving. California law ‘requires only that some reasonable basis 

of computation of damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the result is an 

approximation.’” Id. at 818.

Ms. Thompson’s damages model is similar to the model in Nguyen. Moreover, as Ms. 

Thompson testified in her deposition, her calculations can be readily adjusted once the 

appropriate repair costs and time are obtained from Chrysler and related third-parties. Here, as 

there, whether the proposed calculation is accurate, whether the AHR was actually defective and 

whether Defendant knew of the defect “are merits inquiries unrelated to class certification.” Id.

at 821. For now, Plaintiff has sufficiently established a nexus between his theories of liability 

and his damages model. Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement is satisfied. 

Statute of Limitations Concerns

Chrysler’s theory that statutes of limitations prevent class certification also fails. 

Adjudication of individualized affirmative defenses typically does not defeat predominance under 

Rule 23(b)(3) because “[t]he Court has various tools at its disposal to manage resolution of those 

issues to the extent that they arise.” In re Myford Touch Consumer Litigation, No. 13-cv-03072, 

2018 WL 3646895, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2018). Even if statute-of-limitations questions must 

be addressed individually - and Defendant has not provided evidence establishing that they must 

be - common questions, including the presence of a defect and Chrysler’s knowledge of and

failure to disclose the defect, remain central to the issues in this case. 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

Predominance is not defeated because the doctrines used by Plaintiff for “tolling the 

statute of limitations,” such as the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, involve proof “common to 

the defendants,” namely, “the act of concealing” defendant’s wrong. See Tait, 289 F.R.D. at 485.

(citing In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 305 F.3d 145, 163 (3d Cir. 2002). Indeed, “[c]ourts 

have been nearly unanimous ... in holding that possible differences in the application of a statute 

of limitations to individual class members, including the named plaintiffs, does not preclude 

certification of a class action.” Id. (quoting Schramm v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., LA CV09–

09442 JAK, 2011 WL 5034663, *11-12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (holding that statute of 

limitations defense did not result in individual inquiries about when class members had actual or 

inquiry notice of their claims and noting that defendant’s “speculation that some class members’

claims may be barred on the basis of actual knowledge is not sufficient to defeat certification”).

For all the reasons set forth above, the predominance requirement is met.

Superiority. Plaintiff meets the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) because, among 

other reasons, “recovery on an individual basis would be dwarfed by the cost of litigating on an 

individual basis.” Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1175. In this case, each class member is entitled to recover 

only a small amount of money—potentially less than $800—while litigation costs for each 

individual class member would be substantial, especially given the need for expert analysis. 

Given this fact, class members are unlikely to pursue individual actions. Moreover, the array of 

common questions and legal theories here renders adjudication in a single action both effective 

and efficient. And while Chrysler has identified some issues that affect some class members but 

not others, such as statutes of limitations or whether Chrysler sufficiently fixed the defect after 

2017, such issues do not make class certification inappropriate. These issues are insignificant 

relative to the central, common questions that will drive resolution of class members’ claims. Nor 

does the need to resolve such questions present intractable manageability problems. Thus, there 

are not any significant manageability issues here. See id. at 1175-76 (discussing the factors 

outlined in Rule 23(b)(3)(A-D) as they apply to a case raising a common issue of design defect 

and misrepresentation).

Rule 23(b)(2) class. Plaintiff also seeks to certify a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(2) 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

for injunctive relief as a remedy on the class’s express warranty claims. Because the certified 

23(b)(3) class may seek injunctive relief, the Court does not certify a separate 23(b)(2) class at 

this time. See Salas, 2019 WL 1940619, at *14 (“Under the circumstances here, it is unnecessary 

for the court to address whether certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate here since the

court is certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3).”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Stay (ECF No. 114) 

and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class Representative 

and Counsel (ECF No. 54). The Court orders the following:

1. The Court certifies a Rule 23(b)(3) class and subclass below as to the economic 

damages claims set forth in the Second Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 

13) and will not certify any personal injury claims or damages. The class and subclass

are defined as:

(1) A California Class consisting of all persons in California who currently own or 

lease, or who have owned or leased any Class Vehicle manufactured by Chrysler, or 

any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, that is equipped with an Automatic Head Restraint 

System; (2) a California CLRA Subclass consisting of all members of the California

Class who are “consumers” within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1761(d).

The Court excludes from the Class and Subclass: Chrysler, its employees, officers, 

directors, and legal representatives; Class Counsel and their employees; and the 

judicial officers and their immediate family members and associated Court staff 

assigned to this case.

2. The Court designates as Class Vehicles the following model and year FCA/Chrysler 

vehicles: 2010-2018 Dodge Journey; 2010-2011 Dodge Nitro; 2010-2012 Jeep 

Liberty; 2010-2017 Jeep Patriot or Compass; 2010-2012 Dodge Caliber; 2010-2018 

Dodge Caravan; 2011-2018 Dodge Durango; 2011-2018 Jeep Grand Cherokee; and 

2010-2014 Sebring/Avenger.

3. The Court hereby appoints Shawn Alger as the representative of the certified Class

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 2:18-CV-00360-MCE-EFB

and Subclass.

4. The Court hereby appoints the law firms of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP 

and Kershaw, Cook and Talley PC as Class Counsel for the Class and Subclass.

5. The Court orders Class Counsel to prepare notice to the Class and Subclass and submit 

the notice and plan for notice distribution to the Court.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2020

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