Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01780/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01780-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Danielle Shermae Arcadi, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-11-1780-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff, Danielle Shermae Arcadi, 

which challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 

1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court vacates the decision and remands for a 

computation of benefits. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural Background 

 Plaintiff applied for disability benefits on February 25, 2008, alleging disability 

beginning on November 14, 2006. (Doc. 9-3 at 14). She claimed to be disabled because 

of anal fissures, fistula, stenosis, and seven surgeries to the rectum. (Id.). After her 

application was denied upon request and consideration, a hearing was held before 

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Administrative Law Judge John W. Wojciechowski on April 9, 2010. (Doc. 9-3 at 25–

52). On June 9, 2010, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process found 

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because her 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) allowed her to return to her past work. (Doc. 9-3 at 

17–19). The Appeals Council denied her request for review on July 13, 2011. (Doc. 9-3 

at 1). 

 Plaintiff then filed suit in this Court. 1 (Doc. 1). After Plaintiff filed her opening 

brief, Defendant filed a motion to remand for further evidentiary proceedings. (Doc. 14). 

Defendant had not provided evidence demonstrating that remand for further evidentiary 

proceedings was appropriate. The Court therefore denied defendant’s motion and ordered 

Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s opening brief. (Doc. 19). The matter is now fully 

briefed. (Docs. 11, 21, 26). 

II. Factual Background 

 Plaintiff was injured in a fall in 2003, which caused a significant hematoma; from 

the hematoma she developed an abscess and a fistula. (Doc. 9-11 at 456). She 

subsequently underwent multiple fistulotomies, two sphincteroplasties, and “9 or 10” 

other procedures, according to a doctor who treated her in 2009. (Id.). According to 

another treating physician, one result of her condition was incontinence, and another was 

that the procedures had left her with “a large hole in the anterior skin of the sphincter 

 

1

 Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . .”). 

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mechanism;” after bowel movements “stool would deposit in the hole and she couldn’t 

get it out.” (Doc. 9-3 at 430). 

During her hearing, Plaintiff testified that because of her injuries and her surgeries, 

she must clean herself after every bowel movement in a special toilet in her home, and 

that if she does not use the special toilet, she risks both an abscess and an infection. (Doc. 

9-3 at 32–37). She testified that she cannot clean herself adequately in a standard 

restroom or in a shower, that the special toilet was recommended by a doctor, and that 

hospital personnel are unfamiliar with it. (Doc. 9-3 at 46–47). She testified that she has 

five or six bowel movements a day, and that during the period in which she was working 

and did not yet have the special toilet in her home, she could not fully clean herself and a 

as a result would “sit in my own feces at work.” (Doc. 9-3 at 44). The Vocational Expert 

testified that a person who is required to leave the premises of a workplace and travel 

home five or six times a day would not be able to sustain “either [Plaintiff’s] past relevant 

work or other work.” (Doc. 9-3 at 51). The Vocational Expert further testified that 

Plaintiff’s special toilet is not generally available in the work environment. (Id.). No 

testimony was offered contradicting Plaintiff’s description of the special toilet or her need 

to clean herself in that toilet. 

In his decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “has to use the bathroom five or six 

times a day,” and that she “also has to constantly keep that area clean.” (Doc. 9-3 at 17). 

The decision does not mention the special toilet, and does not discuss Plaintiff’s 

testimony that only the special toilet can adequately clean her after she has a bowel 

movement. The ALJ stated that factors relevant to an individual’s symptoms include “the 

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individual’s daily activities, . . . and any other factors concerning the individual’s 

functional limitations.” (Doc. 9-3 at 18). Without discussing the special toilet or 

Plaintiff’s testimony as to the inadequacy of other means of staving off infection after a 

bowel movement, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the “limiting 

effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the 

residual functional capacity assessment.” (Doc. 9-3 at 18). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standard 

 In a claim seeking review of denial of social security benefits, “[t]he court shall 

have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment 

affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, 

with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “If additional 

proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceeding, a social 

security case should be remanded.” Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 

1990). On the other hand, when “the question of whether [a claimant] is eligible for 

benefits turns entirely on the credibility” of a plaintiff’s testimony, and the district court 

finds that the ALJ improperly discredited that testimony, remand for further proceedings 

is inappropriate, and the court should instead remand for a calculation of benefits. Moisa 

v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004). 

II. Analysis

 The Ninth Circuit follows the “credit-as-true” rule, in which a court credits a 

plaintiff’s evidence and remands a case for an award of benefits when “(1) the ALJ has 

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failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no 

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, 

and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant 

disabled were such evidence credited.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 

1996).2

 Even when “there may exist valid grounds on which to discredit a claimant’s pain 

testimony” in the record, the Ninth Circuit invokes the credit-as-true rule because “it is 

both reasonable and desirable to require the ALJ to articulate them in the original 

decision.” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Varney v. 

Sec’y of Health and Human Svc’s (Varney II), 859 F.2d 1396, 1398–99 (9th Cir. 1988)) 

(emphasis in original). As discussed, here the ALJ failed to provide any reasons for 

rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony that only the special toilet can adequately clean her after 

she has a bowel movement. And given the Vocational Expert’s testimony that this toilet 

is not available in the workplace, and that Plaintiff cannot sustain either her past work or 

other relevant work if she needs to travel home to clean herself several times a day, “it is 

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were 

[Plaintiff’s testimony] credited.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. (Doc. 9-3 at 51). 

 Defendant argues that the record presents outstanding issues that must be resolved, 

and that it is not clear the ALJ would be required to find disability because “the record 

 

2

 The Court is aware of the Commissioner’s position regarding the credit-as-true rule, but notes that even a Ninth Circuit judge who shares some skepticism of the rule’s validity has noted that “because the crediting-as-true rule is part of our circuit’s law, only an en banc court can change it.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 602 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(O’Scannlain, J. dissenting). A district court is not at liberty to ignore the rule based upon Defendant’s claims that it conflicts with the Social Security Act and “improperly usurps the ALJ’s role as finder of fact.” (Doc. 15 at 5). 

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contains evidence inconsistent with a finding of disability under Social Security criteria.” 

(Doc. 21 at 9). For instance Defendant notes that a Dr. McConnell, after treating Plaintiff 

for incontinence, wrote in June 2007 that Plaintiff could return to work if she wore a 

diaper. (Doc. 9-8 at 243). McConnell also stated that Plaintiff’s difficulty with wiping 

and stool collection might be alleviated if she maintained optimal stools through a high 

fiber diet and medication. (Doc. 9-11 at 434–35). McConnell further stated, however, that 

“getting a well-formed stool [is] sometimes very, very difficult to do” and answered 

affirmatively when asked “if [Plaintiff] doesn’t have these optimal stools, even though 

your surgery was successful, she will have this wiping issue, potentially, for the rest of 

her life?” (Id. at 435, 439). Moreover, in his decision the ALJ did not articulate any of 

McConnell’s statements as reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. See Harman, 211 

F.3d at 1179 (stating that the ALJ must “articulate” the grounds for discrediting a 

claimant’s testimony “in the original decision.”) (emphasis in original). 

 Defendant also argues, citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), that “the Congressionally 

mandated disability standard requires more than Plaintiff’s own self-serving statements.” 

(Doc. 21 at 9–10). Section 423(d)(5)(A) states, in relevant part, that: 

An individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall 

not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in 

this section; there must be medical signs and findings, 

established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory 

diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical 

impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be 

expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and 

which, when considered with all evidence required to be 

furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the 

individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence 

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of such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be 

accepted as consistent with the medical signs and findings), 

would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a 

disability. Objective medical evidence of pain or other 

symptoms established by medically acceptable clinical or 

laboratory techniques (for example, deteriorating nerve or 

muscle tissue) must be considered in reaching a conclusion as 

to whether the individual is under a disability. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). 

 In other words, an ALJ cannot find disability based solely on the claimant’s 

testimony. Id. There must also be medically acceptable clinical or laboratory evidence 

which “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id.

In this appeal, however, it is not disputed that Plaintiff has a medical impairment which 

has created the alleged symptoms. (See Doc. 9-3 at 18: “After careful consideration of the 

evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairment 

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.”). Rather, the relevant issue 

is the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of those symptoms. (Id.). And Section 

423(D)(5)(A) states that such effects may be established by “statements of the individual 

or his physician.” The Court will credit Plaintiff’s and the Vocational Expert’s evidence 

as true and remand this case for an award of benefits. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is VACATED. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED for a computation 

of benefits. 

 Dated this 4th day of September, 2012. 

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