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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-7976

NATHAN A. CHAPMAN, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.

(1:03-cr-00301-WDQ-1; 1:08-cv-01268-WDQ)

Argued: December 1, 2009

Decided: January 29, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and

MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the

majority opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson joined. Judge

Michael wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Lartease Martrell Tiffith, KIRKLAND & ELLIS,

LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jefferson McClure

Gray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

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Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J.

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

After being convicted of numerous charges, including mail

and wire fraud, see United States v. Chapman, No. 04-5010,

2006 WL 3539146 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2006), Nathan Chapman

filed a motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 challenging his convictions on several grounds. The district court denied relief.

We granted a certificate of appealability to permit Chapman

to appeal the district court’s rejection of his claim that trial

counsel was ineffective for ignoring Chapman’s direction to

accept the district court’s offer of a mistrial. For the reasons

set forth below, we affirm.

I.

Chapman was the chief executive officer and majority

shareholder of various financial services companies, and a

portion of the charges against Chapman involved his use of

"business development funds" provided by these companies

for personal rather than business purposes. The government’s

theory of the case was that Chapman needed the business

development funds to support a lifestyle that he could not otherwise afford. The trial court permitted the government to

present, as proof of Chapman’s motive, see Fed. R. Evid.

404(b), evidence of substantial loans (eventually totaling

more than $1 million) that Chapman took from his companies

but never repaid.

After the government’s rebuttal closing argument, counsel

for Chapman objected to a reference by the government to the

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loans, believing the reference went beyond the limitations the

trial court had placed on the use of the loan evidence. The

trial court stated that counsel "might be right," J.A. 20, and

directed counsel for Chapman to draft a curative instruction

to be given to the jury. Counsel for Chapman then, "just for

the record," moved for a mistrial with prejudice. J.A. 20. The

trial court offered to grant Chapman a mistrial without prejudice, but counsel for Chapman declined, insisting that the

mistrial should be with prejudice. The case proceeded, and the

trial court gave the curative instruction to the jury. The jury

ultimately convicted Chapman on 22 of the charges alleged in

the indictment.

In his § 2255 motion, Chapman contended that when the

trial court offered to grant a mistrial without prejudice, he

instructed his attorney to accept the offer. Chapman argued

that his attorney, by rejecting his instructions to accept the

mistrial, was constitutionally ineffective and that Chapman

was therefore entitled to a new trial. The district court rejected

Chapman’s claim, concluding that the decision to go forward

with the trial rather than accept a mistrial without prejudice

was a tactical decision to be made by counsel, not Chapman.

II.

A criminal defendant’s right to counsel as guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment is, of course, a guarantee of the right

to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "the

defendant must show that his counsel’s performance ‘fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness’ in light of the

prevailing professional norms." Lawrence v. Branker, 517

F.3d 700, 708 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688). If the defendant can establish that his attorney’s performance was deficient, the defendant must then demonstrate

that "there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Chapman’s ineffective-assistance claim is a narrow one.

Chapman does not argue that, given the manner in which the

trial had unfolded, the only reasonable decision was to accept

the mistrial offer. Nor does Chapman argue that counsel

should have consulted with him before rejecting the mistrial

offer. Instead, Chapman contends only that counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel ignored Chapman’s

instructions to accept the mistrial offered by the trial court.

The government, however, argues that decisions involving

mistrials—whether to ask for a mistrial and whether to accept

an offer of a mistrial—are tactical decisions that must be

made by the attorney, not the defendant. Because the decision

belongs to the attorney, the government argues that Chapman’s disagreement with the decision made by counsel is

simply irrelevant.* We agree with the government.

It is by now well-established that in a criminal trial, defense

counsel has the authority to manage most aspects of the

defense without first obtaining the consent of the defendant.

See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). "Decisions

that may be made without the defendant’s consent primarily

involve trial strategy and tactics, such as what evidence

should be introduced, what stipulations should be made, what

objections should be raised, and what pre-trial motions should

be filed." Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 885 (4th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, "certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are

*The government seems to challenge the factual underpinnings of

Chapman’s claim, questioning whether the trial court was serious in its

offer of a mistrial and noting that one of Chapman’s trial attorneys stated

in an affidavit that he consulted with Chapman about the mistrial and that

Chapman agreed with his decision. Because the district court rejected

Chapman’s claims without holding an evidentiary hearing, we must

review the facts in the light most favorable to Chapman. See United States

v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2007). 

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of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant

by a surrogate." Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187.

The only decisions that have been identified by the

Supreme Court as belonging exclusively to the defendant are

"whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her

own behalf, or take an appeal." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.

745, 751 (1983). The Supreme Court has never suggested that

decisions about mistrials are "of such a moment" that they can

be made only by the defendant himself, and every circuit to

consider the question has concluded that decisions regarding

mistrials belong to the attorney, not the client. See United

States v. Burke, 257 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) ("We

. . . reject Defendant’s contention that the decision to request

a mistrial is a fundamental decision that only a defendant can

make."); United States v. Washington, 198 F.3d 721, 723 (8th

Cir. 1999) ("Washington argues that the defendant must be

allowed to make the ultimate decision on whether to request

a mistrial. We disagree and hold that the decision to make

such a request is a strategic decision for counsel."); Watkins

v. Kassulke, 90 F.3d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[W]here . . .

defense counsel consents as a matter of trial strategy to a mistrial, that consent binds the defendant . . . , regardless of

whether the defendant participates in the decision.");

Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The

decision whether to move for a mistrial or instead proceed to

judgment with the expectation that the client will be acquitted

is a matter of trial strategy."). As the Eighth Circuit explained,

the decision to move for a mistrial often must be

made in a split-second and it involves numerous

alternative strategies such as remaining silent, interposing an objection, requesting a curative instruction, or requesting an end to the proceeding.

Moreover, counsel is generally in a better position

than a lay person to judge the impact of a potentially

prejudicial incident in the context of the entire trial.

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Washington, 198 F.3d at 724 (citation omitted).

We likewise conclude that decisions regarding a mistrial

are tactical decisions entrusted to the sound judgment of

counsel, not the client. Preliminarily, we note that mistrial

issues bear no similarity, in nature or significance, to the decisions that the Supreme Court has identified as belonging

solely to the defendant. Moreover, deciding whether to seek

a mistrial (or whether to accept or reject a mistrial offered by

the trial court) involves an on-the-fly balancing of the probable damage caused by the trial error against the likelihood that

a different jury might be more inclined to acquit—a question

that itself requires considering how receptive the current jury

is to the defendant, whether key witnesses have testified as

anticipated, etc. Given the many issues that must be identified, evaluated, and weighed when determining whether to

seek or accept a mistrial, we think it clear that the decision is

a tactical one to be made by counsel, not the client.

As noted above, Chapman does not contend otherwise —

that is, he does not argue that decisions regarding mistrials are

so fundamental that they must be made by the client rather

than the attorney. Chapman nonetheless insists that if a mistrial is offered by the trial court and the defendant expresses

his opinion on whether the offer should be accepted, counsel

is obligated to follow the defendant’s instructions. We disagree.

A criminal defense attorney is obligated to follow his client’s wishes only with regard to the fundamental issues that

must be personally decided by the client. As to those limited

issues—pleading guilty, waiving a jury, taking the stand, and

appealing a conviction or sentence—"an attorney must both

consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action." Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187. If the decision is a tactical one left to the sound judgment of counsel, the

decision must be just that—left to the judgment of counsel.

Counsel need not consult with the client about the matter or

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obtain the client’s consent. See id. (The "duty to consult with

the client regarding important decisions . . . does not require

counsel to obtain the defendant’s consent to every tactical

decision." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sexton, 163

F.3d at 885 (whether to file a motion to suppress "is a classic

tactical decision" for which consent from the defendant was

not required).

And if consultation and consent by the client are not

required with regard to these tactical decisions, the client’s

expressed disagreement with counsel’s decision cannot somehow convert the matter into one that must be decided by the

client. For example, which witnesses to call is a classic tactical decision left to counsel, see Boyle v. McKune, 544 F.3d

1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he decision of which witnesses to call is quintessentially a matter of strategy for the

trial attorney."), and it remains a decision for counsel even

when the client disagrees, see Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d

1477, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he trial court overreached its

authority and infringed upon the relationship between Blanco

and his attorneys by requiring defense counsel to call two

additional witnesses [as requested by the defendant]. Generally, trial tactics are for defense counsel to formulate. The

decision as to which witnesses to call is an aspect of trial tactics that is normally entrusted to counsel." (footnotes omitted)). Likewise, we believe that whether to seek or accept a

mistrial is a matter left to the sound judgment of counsel, even

if the client disagrees with counsel’s decision. See Burke, 257

F.3d at 1324 ("[T]he decision to refrain from asking the court

for a mistrial is a tactical decision entrusted to defense counsel, binding the defendant even when the defendant expressed

a contrary wish to his lawyer." (emphasis added)). The reasonableness of the tactical decision actually made by counsel

is of course subject to challenge, but the decision is not unreasonable simply because the client expressed a contrary view.

Chapman, however, views his position as a necessary consequence of the agency relationship between the defendant

and his attorney:

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[A]s defendant’s counsel and agent, defense counsel

is permitted to make decisions that bind the defendant as agents generally do with regard to matters

within the scope of their authority. However, that

authority is binding only unless and until revoked.

When the defendant specifically instructs his agent

to accept a court’s offer of a mistrial on his behalf,

to the extent that the defendant’s request is reasonable, defense counsel as his agent is obligated to do

so — his agency to do otherwise is revoked.

Brief of Appellant at 19. While it is of course true that an

attorney is the agent of his client, the attorney’s obligations in

a criminal case do not precisely mirror the obligations of a

general agent representing his principal on civil matters. Notwithstanding the fact that an agent is generally authorized to

act for the principal in all matters within the scope of the

agent’s authority, the law requires the criminal defendant, not

his attorney, to make the critical decisions about whether to

plead guilty or go to trial, whether to testify, and whether to

appeal. And notwithstanding the fact that a principal generally

has the authority to dictate the manner in which his agent will

carry out his duties, the law places certain tactical decisions

solely in the hands of the criminal defense attorney. This reallocation of rights and duties is necessary to give effect to the

constitutional rights granted to criminal defendants and to

insure the effective operation of our adversarial system, where

defense attorneys must protect the interests of their clients

while also serving as officers of the court. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) ("Although there are basic

rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully

informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the

lawyer has—and must have—full authority to manage the

conduct of the trial. The adversary process could not function

effectively if every tactical decision required client approval."

(footnote omitted)). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained,

Defense counsel in a criminal trial is more than an

adviser to a client with the client’s having the final

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say at each point. He is an officer of the court and

a professional advocate pursuing a result—almost

always, acquittal—within the confines of the law; his

chief reason for being present is to exercise his professional judgment to decide tactics.

. . . . When the defendant is given the last word

about how his case will be tried, the defendant

becomes his own trial lawyer. If we add to the list of

circumstances in which a defendant can trump his

counsel’s decision, the adversarial system becomes

less effective as the opinions of lay persons are substituted for the judgment of legally trained counsel.

The sound functioning of the adversarial system is

critical to the American system of criminal justice.

We intend to defend it.

Burke, 257 F.3d at 1323. We therefore reject Chapman’s

claim that an attorney loses the right to make tactical decisions about the conduct of a criminal trial if the client

expresses disagreement with the attorney’s decision.

III.

To summarize, we conclude that decisions involving mistrials — whether to seek a mistrial or accept a mistrial offered

by the trial court — are tactical decisions left to the sound

judgment of counsel. The decision remains counsel’s to make

even if the client expresses disagreement with the decision,

and counsel’s decision is not unreasonable simply because the

client disagrees. The district court therefore properly rejected

Chapman’s claim that his attorney provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel by refusing, over Chapman’s

instructions to the contrary, the trial court’s offer of a mistrial

without prejudice. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the district

court’s order denying Chapman’s § 2255 motion.

AFFIRMED

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MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I concur in the judgment but write separately to express my

belief that we should be resolving this case on much narrower

grounds. As the majority recognizes, "Chapman’s ineffectiveassistance claim is a narrow one." Ante at 4. Chapman simply

argues that under the particular circumstances of this case, he

received ineffective assistance when his lawyer refused to follow his express instruction to accept the district court’s offer

of a mistrial without prejudice. Instead of affirming on the

narrow ground that Chapman’s lawyer acted reasonably, the

majority sweeps broadly and decides that a lawyer’s decision

to refuse a mistrial over his client’s wishes and without consultation can never constitute ineffective assistance. I believe

such a broad rule is both ill-advised and unnecessary to

resolve this case.

There are at least three types of decisions where counsel’s

failure to seek or follow client input before acting could result

in constitutionally ineffective assistance: (1) fundamental

decisions requiring informed consent from the client; (2)

important decisions requiring consultation with the client; and

(3) decisions where the client has expressly instructed counsel

on a particular course. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175,

187 (2004); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Gov’t

of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1437 (3d

Cir. 1996). The majority has focused exclusively on the first

type, that is, the fundamental decisions described in Jones.

Nothing in this case has convinced me that the list of fundamental decisions in Jones should be expanded. But focusing

exclusively on the fundamental decision category inappropriately ignores the other two categories. In Florida v. Nixon the

Supreme Court expressly recognized counsel’s "duty to consult with the client regarding important decisions" as independent from the duty to both consult with the client and obtain

his consent on fundamental decisions. 543 U.S. at 187

(emphasis added). The majority misreads this very portion of

Nixon to support the proposition that for non-fundamental

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decisions "[c]ounsel need not consult with the client about the

matter or obtain the client’s consent." Ante at 6-7 (emphasis

added). There will be important decisions that require consultation with, but not consent from, the client. See, e.g., Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1436 (duty to consult with client

concerning possible mistrial motion after client’s family

raised fact that juror was reading prohibited materials). Similarly, there will be decisions on which counsel and client disagree that will at least require some form of accommodation.

See, e.g., United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 560 (4th Cir.

1984) (defendant’s right to self-representation on appeal satisfied by allowing him to submit supplemental brief).

In assessing counsel’s failure to consult with his client or

follow an express instruction, I would follow the Third Circuit’s analysis in Weatherwax. There, the court held that

"[t]he constitutional duty to consult regarding issues on which

counsel has the last word requires only that counsel act reasonably in light of the circumstances and what is likely to be

accomplished by a consultation." 77 F.3d at 1437. In assessing reasonableness, the Third Circuit weighed the lawyer’s

actions against the "number of important purposes" served by

the duty to consult, including ensuring the client’s ability to

assist in his own defense, promoting open lawyer-client communications, and safeguarding the client’s right to forgo his

current representation if he disagrees with his lawyer. Id. at

1436-37. The reasonableness assessment is, of course, fact

intensive and case specific.

I conclude that while the decision whether to accept a mistrial offered by the court will sometimes require a lawyer to

consult with his client, it was nevertheless reasonable here for

Billy Martin to refuse the offer against Chapman’s expressed

wishes and without consultation. The record does not indicate

that Chapman even understood the difference between a mistrial with prejudice and a mistrial without prejudice, let alone

the consequences of each in his case. Under these circumstances, following Chapman’s instruction might well have

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constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. A closer question is whether Martin should have asked the court for time

to consult with Chapman concerning the offer, but I again

conclude that Martin’s actions were reasonable. The district

court was demanding an answer from Martin then and there.

Martin had to make a decision on the fly, and there is no evidence that consultation would have prompted Chapman to

hold his position and request new counsel.

I would not foreclose the possibility that, in other situations, counsel’s failure to consult with his client or follow his

express, informed wishes would constitute constitutionally

ineffective assistance. Because I agree with the majority that

counsel was effective in Chapman’s case, however, I concur

in the result.

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