Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00280/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00280-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EDGAR ALEJANDRO RADILLO, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

DAVID B. LONG, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-280-TLN-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a judgment of conviction entered against him on 

June 4, 2008 in the Yolo County Superior Court on charges of two counts of forcible rape, two 

counts of rape in concert, and one count of assault, false imprisonment, and sexual battery. He 

seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) his constitutional rights were violated 

by the prosecutor’s improper use of peremptory challenges to exclude five Hispanics from the 

jury; and (2) the denial of his motion for a separate trial and the admission into evidence at a joint 

trial of his co-defendants’ statements to police violated his federal constitutional rights. Petitioner 

also “joins all arguments raised by his codefendants which inure to his benefit.” ECF No. 1 at 5. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law and for the reasons set forth 

below, it is recommended that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

///// 

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I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Defendants, Alberto Sanchez (Alberto), Israel Sanchez (Israel) and 

Edgar Radillo (Edgar), picked up a young woman and drove her to 

a remote location in Yolo County where they sexually assaulted 

her. All three were convicted by a jury of two counts each of 

forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and rape in concert (id.

§ 264.1) and one count each of assault ( id. § 245, subd. (a)(1)), 

false imprisonment (id. §§ 236 and 237, subd. (a)) and sexual 

battery (id. § 243.4, subd. (a)). (Further undesignated section 

references are to the Penal Code.) In addition, Alberto and Israel 

were convicted of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), while Edgar was 

found guilty of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment. 

Finally, the jury found as to Alberto and Israel that the rape and 

rape in concert offenses had been committed under circumstances 

involving a kidnapping and movement of the victim which 

substantially increased her risk of harm (§ 667.61). 

Alberto and Israel were sentenced to an aggregate determinate term 

of five years plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years to 

life. Edgar received an aggregate determinate term of 23 years, 8 

months. 

* * * 

The People correctly concede Alberto's two rape convictions 

(counts 2 and 4) and the false imprisonment convictions (count 7) 

of Israel and Alberto must be vacated. We thus accept those 

concessions. We also conclude Edgar's conviction for the lesser 

included offense of false imprisonment on count 1 must be 

dismissed in light of his conviction for the same offense on count 7. 

In all other respects, we affirm the judgments. 

Facts and Proceedings 

On the evening of August 11, 2006, 16–year–old Antonio S. met 

Edgar and Alberto at a school in Dixon and the three smoked 

marijuana. Later, Israel joined them and the four departed in 

Israel's 4–door Acura. They drove around Dixon for a while and 

then headed for Davis. Antonio and Edgar continued to smoke 

marijuana in the back seat of the car. At some point during their 

drive around Davis, they stopped for gas and Antonio purchased a 

bag of Doritos. They then continued their cruise past the local bars. 

That same evening, 23–year–old S.L. and some friends went out for 

a night of dinner and drinking in downtown Davis. At 

approximately 11:00 p.m., S.L. left her friends and went to another 

bar to meet someone. She left that bar at around 1:00 or 1:30 a.m. 

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She was intoxicated, tired and wanted to go home. However, her 

ride for the evening had already gone home. 

S.L. started walking down the street and thinking how she might 

get home. Just then, Israel and the others drove by. They stopped 

and asked if S.L. was alright and if she needed help. S.L. said she 

wanted to go home and they offered to take her there. S.L. 

accepted the offer and told them she lived off Covell and Alvarado 

in Davis. She got in the back of the car between Antonio and Edgar 

and instructed them to take Highway 113 and exit at Covell. She 

repeated that she just wanted to go home. They agreed to take her 

home. 

A couple of minutes after S.L. got into the car, the men began 

passing around a marijuana cigar to smoke. They offered it to S.L. 

and she took a puff. Israel proceeded onto Highway 113 but did not 

take the Covell exit. As they drove, Antonio began touching S.L.'s 

leg and she told him to stop and pushed his hand away. She 

repeated that she just wanted to go home. 

As they drove away from Davis, S.L. asked where they were going, 

but nobody responded. They eventually arrived at a remote area 

and drove up a dirt driveway. Israel turned off the car and the car 

lights. 

What happened thereafter is less certain. Both S.L. and Antonio 

testified at trial and described different versions. According to S.L., 

the four men got out of the car and ordered her out. She refused, 

and one of them yelled at her to get out. She got out of the car and 

began to cry. S.L. pleaded, “Please don't do this. Please don't. I 

beg you, please stop. Don't do this to me.” One of the men pushed 

S.L. onto the ground near the car and then someone got on top of 

her while the others stood around them in a circle. The man on top 

of S.L. told her to take off her skirt. She refused, and he took it off 

for her, along with her underpants. S.L. then heard cheering and 

laughing and “abrela, abrela,” which means open. S.L. began 

moving around trying to get the man off of her and he punched her 

in the left eye. He then penetrated her vagina with his penis. The 

man remained on top of S.L. for five to seven minutes and then told 

her not to tell anyone. 

According to S.L., after the first man got off her another took his 

place. He too penetrated her vagina with his penis. This man 

pulled down her shirt and bra and squeezed her left breast “very 

hard.” After this man got off S.L., the men kicked her in the 

stomach and neck. She laid there until she heard the car engine 

start and heard them drive away. 

Antonio testified pursuant to a plea deal whereby he was permitted 

to plead guilty to two felonies with no particular promise as to 

sentencing. According to Antonio, after they arrived at the remote 

location, S.L. said she was going to be sick and she and Edgar got 

out of the car. Israel and Alberto also got out, but Antonio 

remained in the car. Edgar held S.L. while she vomited. Israel 

eventually walked over to them and took over holding S.L. 

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Meanwhile, Alberto took S.L.'s purse out of the car and emptied it 

on the trunk. He found condoms inside. 

According to Antonio, Alberto and Edgar eventually joined Israel 

and together they removed S.L.'s clothes. Israel and Alberto then 

walked S.L. over to a grassy area and laid her down. Alberto threw 

Israel a condom taken from S.L.'s purse. Israel got on top of S.L. 

and had sexual intercourse with her. According to Antonio, S.L. 

did not appear to be a willing participant. He heard her moaning 

and yelling “no” and “stop.” After Israel finished, he asked, “Who 

is next?” Alberto gave Edgar another condom from S.L.'s purse 

and Edgar got on top of S.L. and had sexual intercourse with her. 

At some point during the foregoing, Antonio got out of the car and 

smoked a cigarette. He also discarded the empty Doritos bag he 

had obtained at the gas station. By the time Edgar finished with 

S.L., Antonio was back in the car. After Edgar rejoined the others 

at the car, they got in and started to drive away. However, at the 

end of the driveway, Alberto told Israel to stop the car. Alberto got 

out and was gone four to five minutes. When he returned, he told 

them he had beaten S.L. up. On the way home, the others 

instructed Antonio not to say anything about what happened. 

After the men left, S.L. blacked out for a short period. When she 

awoke, her stomach hurt and she was cold. She got up and started 

running from the area for fear that the men might return. In the 

distance, she saw the lights of a city and moved in that direction. 

She was wearing only her top and shoes. S.L. was eventually 

discovered by police officers at 4:45 a.m. walking along County 

Road 102. She appeared injured, stated that she had been raped and 

pointed in the direction of where it had occurred. She informed the 

officers that the rest of her clothes and her purse were still at the 

scene. 

Officers eventually located the crime scene and found S.L.'s clothes 

and purse. They also found an empty Doritos bag, a condom 

wrapper, two condoms, and a receipt from one of the bars where 

S.L. had been that evening. They located an area where the grass 

appeared to be pressed down as if someone had been lying on it. 

A fingerprint lifted from the Doritos bag was determined to be a 

match to one on file for Antonio. On August 25, officers served a 

search warrant at Antonio's home. They picked up Antonio and 

took him in for questioning. Antonio admitted picking up S.L. that 

evening and indicated three others had been involved. He identified 

one of the participants as Alberto Sanchez but provided only first 

names, Edgar and Israel, for the other two. 

Officers later picked up Alberto, Edgar and Israel and brought them 

in for questioning. DNA from one of the condoms found at the 

scene was later determined to be a match for Edgar, and DNA from 

the other condom was found to be a match for Israel. 

Alberto testified at trial. He admitted picking up S.L. in the early 

morning hours of August 12, 2006, and taking her to a remote 

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location. According to Alberto, after they arrived at the scene, he 

walked over to a gate at the entrance to the driveway and remained 

there until they departed 15 minutes later. He claimed not to have 

heard or seen anything that was done by the others with S.L. 

As noted previously, Antonio was given a plea deal and testified for 

the prosecution. The other three were charged with kidnapping 

(count 1), two counts of rape (counts 2 and 4), two counts of rape in 

concert (counts 3 and 5), assault (count 6), false imprisonment 

(count 7), and sexual battery (count 8). They were also charged 

with enhancements on the rape and rape in concert charges for 

having kidnapped the victim and having moved her so as to 

substantially increase her risk of harm. 

Israel and Alberto were convicted as charged. Edgar was found 

guilty on all charges except kidnapping, for which he was instead 

convicted of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment. The 

jury also found not true as to Edgar all of the enhancements on the 

rape and rape in concert charges. 

Alberto was sentenced on the assault charge (count 6) to the upper 

term of four years and on the sexual battery charge (count 8) to a 

consecutive one-third the middle term of one year, for an aggregate 

determinate sentence of five years. In addition, Alberto received a 

consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years to life for one rape in 

concert charge (count 3) and an identical term to run concurrently 

on the other rape in concert charge (count 5). Sentence on the 

remaining counts was stayed pursuant to section 654. Alberto 

received credit for time served of 356 days plus 53 days of conduct 

credits, for a total of 409 days. 

Israel received the same sentence as Alberto, except instead of 

staying sentence on the rape charges (counts 2 and 4), the court 

struck those charges. Israel received credit for time served of 346 

days plus 51 days conduct credits, for a total of 397 days. 

People v. Sanchez, No. C059763, 2011 WL 3806264, at **1-4 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. Aug. 30, 2011). 

 After the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s judgment of conviction, he filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 13. Therein, 

petitioner raised all of the claims that he raises in the petition before this court. Id. The petition 

for review was summarily denied. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 14. 

 On February 4, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. 

ECF No. 1. 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

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U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

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 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 1 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S.___,___,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 

S. Ct. at 786-87. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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§ 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by 

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

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relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... 

could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden 

to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims

 A. Improper Use of Peremptory Challenges 

 In petitioner’s first ground for relief, he claims that his constitutional rights were violated 

by the prosecutor’s improper use of peremptory challenges to exclude five Hispanics from the 

jury. ECF No. 1 at 4.2 He argues that “the Prosecutor’s expressed reasons for excusing several 

Minority jurors were sham, as is evident from a [comparative] Jury Analysis.” Id. 

 1. State Court Decision 

 In a lengthy and thorough opinion, the California Court of Appeal described the 

background to this claim and its ruling thereon. With citation to People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 

Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson), it accurately recited 

the governing law. It noted that after the prosecution exercised its first five peremptory 

challenges on jurors who self-identified as Hispanic, each defendant raised a Wheeler/Batson

challenge and that the prosecution responded with various nondiscriminatory reasons for the 

peremptory challenges, and the trial court rejected the challenge without prejudice to renewal at a 

later time. The state appellate court observed that “[i]t is well settled that ‘[a] prosecutor’s use of 

peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias – that is, bias against 

 2

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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‘members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds’ ... 

violates the defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution.” Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at *5. In applying Batson to this record, the 

state appellate court explained its reasoning as follows: 

A Wheeler/Batson challenge involves a three-step process. “First, 

the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a 

prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory 

challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the 

burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenges 

were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court 

determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful 

discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial 

motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the 

strike. [Citation.]” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612–

613.) 

Where, as here, the trial court makes no specific finding on whether 

the defendant made the required prima facie showing and the 

prosecutor explains the basis for her challenge, we proceed to the 

second and third steps of the process. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 

Cal.4th 401, 448.) 

“A prosecutor asked to explain his conduct must provide a ‘“clear 

and reasonably specific” explanation of his “legitimate reasons” for 

exercising the challenges.’ [Citation.] ‘The justification need not 

support a challenge for cause, and even a “trivial” reason, if 

genuine and neutral, will suffice.’ [Citation .] A prospective juror 

may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, 

and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons. [Citations.] 

Nevertheless, although a prosecutor may rely on any number of 

bases to select jurors, a legitimate reason is one that does not deny 

equal protection. [Citation.] Certainly a challenge based on racial 

prejudice would not be supported by a legitimate reason.” (People 

v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) 

On direct review, the Batson/Wheeler issue “turns largely on an 

‘evaluation of credibility.’ [Citation.] The trial court's 

determination is entitled to ‘great deference,’ [citation], and ‘must 

be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous,’ [citation].” (Felkner v. 

Jackson (2011) 562 U.S. –––– .) 

“Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the 

prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the 

explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some 

basis in accepted trial strategy.' [Citation.] In assessing credibility, 

the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir 

dire. It may also rely on the court's own experiences as a lawyer 

and bench officer in the community, and even the common 

practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. 

omitted.) 

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“The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry is on the subjective 

genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory 

challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reasons. 

[Citation.] What matters is that the prosecutor's reason for 

exercising the peremptory challenge is legitimate. A ‘“legitimate 

reason” is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not 

deny equal protection. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 903.) 

Prospective Juror Danielle A. 

The prosecutor exercised her first peremptory challenge on Danielle 

A. During the Wheeler/Batson hearing, the prosecutor explained 

she did not feel comfortable having Danielle on the jury because 

“she herself and her husband have been accused and arrested for 

drug offenses.” In her questionnaire, Danielle had answered “yes” 

to the question: “Have you, a close friend, or relative ever been 

ACCUSED or ARRESTED for a crime, even if the case did not 

come to court?” Danielle further indicated the individuals involved 

had been herself, her husband and her son and that there had been 

no trial. Danielle identified the crimes as “drug possession various 

traffic ect. [sic].” In response to the question “What happened?” 

Danielle indicated: “probation, jail time, fines ect [sic].” Finally, in 

response to the question, “How do you feel about what happened?” 

Danielle answered: “Things happened the way they should have[.] 

[Y]ou do something then you deserve the consequences of your 

actions.” 

During voir dire, the court questioned Danielle A. about the prior 

offenses as follows: 

“Q. Now, you make reference in one of the questions to the 

situation involving yourself, your husband and your son. Were any 

charges ever filed in that respect? 

“A. Traffic, a few, but— 

“Q. No felonies or misdemeanors? 

“A. Yes, there were.” 

At the Wheeler/Batson hearing, the trial judge acknowledged that 

perhaps he should have been more assertive in questioning her 

about the prior offenses but he “didn't want to embarrass her.” 

Defendants contend the prosecution had insufficient information 

about the prior offenses to use them as a basis for excusing the 

potential juror. They point out there was no information about the 

age of the offenses, where they occurred, whether there was a 

conviction, or whether they involved misdemeanors or felonies. 

They argue it is uncertain whether Danielle A., her husband or her 

son had been the one involved in the drug offense. Defendants 

further argue the prosecutor failed to question the juror about the 

offenses, thereby demonstrating this was not the motivating factor 

for her challenge. 

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The People acknowledge that the exact nature of the charges 

against Danielle A. and/or her husband and son is not revealed by 

the record but argue the prosecutor need not question a potential 

juror if the prosecutor already has enough information to make a 

decision on whether to allow the person to remain on the jury. 

The People have the better argument. “A prospective juror's 

negative experience with the criminal justice system, including 

arrest, is a legitimate, race-neutral reason for excusing the juror.” 

(People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 450.) This is true 

whether it is the juror herself or a family member who was 

involved. (See ibid.) And while the age of the offense and whether 

it was a misdemeanor or a felony may be relevant considerations, 

they are not determinative. Hence, while a failure to engage in 

meaningful voir dire can in some important circumstances, be 

circumstantial evidence suggesting pretext (People v. Lomax (2010) 

49 Cal.4th 530, 573), we agree with the People it was not necessary 

in this instance for the prosecution to ascertain the details of the 

prior offenses of Danielle A. or her family in order to use this as a 

legitimate basis for a peremptory challenge. 

Defendants argue the pretextual nature of the prosecutor's stated 

rationale is revealed in her failure to challenge two similarly 

situated non-Hispanic jurors, Jurors No. 1 and 11. “‘If a 

prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a [Hispanic] panelist 

applies just as well to an otherwise-similar [non-Hispanic] who is 

permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 

discrimination to be considered’” in the third step of the 

Wheeler/Batson analysis. (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 

pp. 571–572.) In this instance, Juror No. 1's father had been 

accused of sexual misconduct, and Juror No. 11 had received a 

speeding ticket “for no reason.” 

The People counter that Jurors No. 1 and 11 were not similarly 

situated to Danielle A., because elsewhere in their questionnaires 

they demonstrated a pro-prosecution or pro-victim bias. Juror No. 

11 stated the following about the crimes charged in the instant case: 

“Rape is a very serious and terrible crime that should be punished 

fully.” He also indicated a friend had previously been raped, but no 

charges had been filed and expressed a belief that rape is an 

underreported crime because of fear. Juror No. 1 disclosed that he 

had been a victim of sexual assault throughout his childhood, but no 

charges had ever been filed. 

Again, we agree with the People. While Juror No. 1's father may 

have been accused of sexual misconduct, it also appears Juror No. 1 

may have been the victim. Thus, he can hardly be considered one 

who believes his family may have been unjustly accused. And 

while Juror No. 11 did indicate he had been unjustly accused of 

speeding, he also demonstrated affinity to victims of the crimes 

charged in this matter. Thus, he too was not necessarily one who 

would have a bias against law enforcement. 

The record supports a race-neutral basis for the prosecutor's 

challenge of Danielle A. 

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Prospective Juror Carlos H. 

The prosecutor exercised her second peremptory challenge on 

potential Juror Carlos H. The prosecutor based this challenge on 

the following factors: (1) as a teenager, Carlos had been kicked off 

of a ladder by a border patrol officer who was chasing illegal aliens; 

(2) Carlos had a bad experience with law enforcement in the 

resolution of a case where his grandson was the victim; (3) Carlos's 

uncle had been accused of and arrested for drug addiction; (4) 

Carlos believes some additional evidence is needed to support the 

testimony of a witness; and (5) Carlos's brother was accused of 

sexual assault. Each of these factors is supported by Carlos's 

questionnaire responses. 

Defendants argue the incident with the ladder, which occurred 42 

years earlier, cannot serve as a valid basis for challenging the 

potential juror and the factor involving the grandson as a victim 

actually cuts against the defense, not the prosecution. They further 

argue the prosecutor's failure to question Carlos H. about any of 

these factors reveals their pretextual nature. Finally, defendants 

argue the prosecutor failed to challenge similarly situated jurors 

who had had negative experiences with law enforcement or 

expressed a belief that additional evidence is necessary to 

corroborate the testimony of a witness. 

Given the many factors cited by the prosecutor, she cannot be 

faulted for failing to question the potential juror. There was 

certainly enough from the questionnaire alone to support the 

challenge. As for the age of the ladder incident, this merely goes to 

the weight of the factor. And while the fact the potential juror's 

grandson was the victim of an unsolved robbery may have biased 

him against criminal defendants in general, the prosecutor was free 

to surmise this would also bias him against law enforcement who 

failed to solve the crime. Finally, as to similarly-situated jurors, 

defendants point to none who have the same or similar combination 

of factors as Carlos H. Thus, there were no similarly-situated 

jurors. 

The record supports the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of 

Carlos H.

Prospective Juror Sarah H. 

The prosecution's next challenge was to Sarah H. The prosecutor 

cited two factors supporting that challenge: (1) Sarah had had a 

negative experience with law enforcement; and (2) she had once 

been arrested for assault and had been required to convince the 

judge of her innocence. 

In her questionnaire, Sarah H. answered “yes” to the question 

whether she ever had a particularly bad experience with law 

enforcement officials. She explained: “A police officer, without his 

lights on, ran a red light in Davis and almost hit me while I was in 

the intersection. He then tried to pull me over and give me a 

speeding ticket when I was not speeding. He let me go after seeing 

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I was not alone in my vehicle and I demanded his badge number.” 

Elsewhere in the questionnaire, Sarah indicated that, in 2004, she 

had been accused or arrested for assault by an ex-girlfriend and 

“had to prove [her] innocence and try to convince the judge that 

[the ex-girlfriend] had fabricated the story.” As to how she felt 

about this experience, Sarah explained: “I feel that anyone can be 

accused of something they didn't do and are treated like a criminal 

even when the police report states otherwise.” 

Defendants contend the two grounds mentioned by the prosecutor, 

although supported by the questionnaire responses, were not in fact 

what motivated the challenge. They point to the fact the prosecutor 

failed to ask Sarah H. any questions about these two items and 

failed to challenge other jurors who had had negative experiences 

with law enforcement. In addition, defendants point out “the 

prosecutor completely ignored other significant grounds which 

were likely sufficient to support a challenge for cause . . . .” For 

example, Sarah indicated in her questionnaire that she “can never 

say someone is guilty unless [she has] personally witnessed them 

commit the crime.” She expressed a belief “that law enforcement 

operates by racial profiling” and indicated she did not believe she 

could be “open minded to judging a stranger.” According to 

defendants, the prosecutor's failure to mention these other potential 

grounds for challenge “is consistent with the conclusion that the 

strike was motivated by a discriminatory purpose rather than an 

assessment of the relevant characteristics of the prospective juror.” 

As discussed above, the fact the prosecutor did not also challenge 

Jurors No. 1 and 11, who had had negative experiences with law 

enforcement, does not render the prosecutor's use of this factor in 

challenging Sarah H. suspect. Those other jurors had other 

questionnaire responses that suggested a pro-prosecution or provictim bias. And as for the prosecutor's failure to question Sarah, 

such questioning is unnecessary if the questionnaire response 

provides sufficient information. Sarah was fairly clear in her 

questionnaire responses regarding the nature of the prior incidents. 

As for the prosecutor's failure to mention other valid grounds for 

excusing Sarah H., we note that the hearing on defendants' 

Wheeler/Batson motion took place the morning after the prosecutor 

made the various peremptory challenges at issue here. When asked 

to comment on the basis for the challenges, the prosecutor began: 

“It might take me a minute because I took out this morning all of 

my Post–It notes in all the areas in justifying these particular areas.” 

In other words, the prosecutor no longer had the notes she used the 

day before to assist her in deciding who to challenge. Therefore, it 

is not surprising that the prosecutor might not recall all of the 

grounds she used to warrant each of the challenges, and no 

particular inference should be drawn from this circumstance. 

We conclude the record supports the prosecutor's peremptory 

challenge of Sarah H. 

 

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Prospective Juror Maria C. 

The next potential juror to be challenged by the prosecution was 

Maria C. The prosecutor explained she was concerned with Maria's 

response to a question about aider and abettor liability. That 

question asked: “The law says that someone who aids or abets a 

crime is equally liable for having committed that offense. Is there 

anyone who has a problem with the concept of law that holds 

someone who aids, facilitates, promotes, encourages, or instigates a 

crime is equally liable for having committed that crime?” Maria 

answered “yes” and explained: “[T]hey can be lying and blaming 

someone else.” 

During voir dire, the prosecutor questioned Maria C. about this 

questionnaire response as follows: 

“Ms. [C.], with regard to your questions on aiding and abetting, you 

indicated that you do have a problem with the concept that 

somebody who aids and abets a crime as being each legally liable 

for that crime. Is that a fair reading of your answer? 

“A. I am not sure. I didn't understand that question really. 

“Q. If the law were to tell you that helping or promoting or 

encouraging a crime that is committed, you are responsible for that 

crime that was committed, even if you are not the person who 

actually committed it. Do you have a problem with that? 

“A. No. 

“Q. And is that with regards to any type of crime or would you 

compartmentalize? 

“In other words, do you know what I mean by that? Would you 

follow the law with regards to that? 

“A. Yes. 

“Q. And would you follow the law on everything? 

“A. Yes.” 

Defendants contend the questionnaire response, when viewed in 

light of the voir dire answers, does not reflect confusion over the 

concept of aiding and abetting but confusion over the wording of 

the question itself and a concern that one defendant may be lying in 

order to get someone else in trouble. They further argue Maria C. 

provided other questionnaire responses that reflect a proprosecution bias, and the prosecutor failed to excuse another 

potential juror, Henry B., who likewise answered “yes” to the 

question whether anyone has a problem with aiding and abetting 

liability. 

We agree the wording of the question could have been clearer. 

Read literally, the question asked whether “anyone” had a problem 

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with aiding and abetting liability. It may reasonably be assumed 

there is someone in the world who has a problem with holding an 

aider and abettor equally liable for a crime. But it does not appear 

Maria C. read the question literally. She expressed a concern that 

one defendant may point the finger at another to get the other in 

trouble without any basis in fact. This, of course, could be a 

potential concern for the prosecution, which intended to use the 

testimony of one of the perpetrators against the others. Thus, 

Maria's response raised less of a concern about her willingness to 

hold aiders and abettors equally liable than a concern with her 

willingness to accept the testimony of a coconspirator. 

As for other questionnaire responses that purportedly reveal a proprosecution bias, we do not share defendants' interpretation of those 

responses. Maria C. answered “yes” to the question whether a 

police officer's testimony will be more truthful than that of a 

civilian witness. She explained: “Sometimes the police either have 

seen what the civilian done [sic] or has a witness for proof.” Aside 

from the incoherence of this explanation, it does not appear to 

reveal a pro-police bias so much as a belief that police may be more 

truthful simply because they either saw what happened themselves 

or have a corroborating witness. In other words, it is not that police 

officers are more truthful, it is just that they often have more firsthand knowledge. 

In response to a question about whether the fact charges have been 

filed against the defendants causes her to conclude they are more 

likely guilty than not guilty, Maria C. answered “yes,” but 

explained, “because depending on what that person has done.” This 

explanation makes no sense in the context and, therefore, provides 

little or no guidance on the issue. 

Maria C. indicated the testimony of one witness would be enough 

for a conviction, but then followed up by answering “yes” to the 

question whether she would require additional evidence to 

corroborate the testimony of a witness. Likewise, Maria expressed 

a belief that cases of sexual assault are over-reported but then 

explained that such cases are nevertheless important and that the 

law regarding sexual assault “could be a little too weak.” In our 

view, the foregoing responses do not reveal a pro-prosecution or 

anti-prosecution bias. 

Finally, as to the prosecutor's failure to excuse Henry B., who also 

answered “yes” to the question about anyone having a problem with 

aider and abettor liability and explained that “[t]his will very [sic] 

from case to case,” we note that defendants themselves excused 

Henry B. just before the prosecutor excused Maria C. Hence, we 

have no way of knowing if the prosecutor would have challenged 

Henry B. as well. 

We conclude the record supports the prosecutor's peremptory 

challenge to Maria C. 

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Prospective Juror Monica V. 

The last potential juror to be excused by the prosecution before the 

Wheeler/Batson motion was Monica V. The prosecutor identified 

the following factors informing her decision: (1) Monica is young; 

(2) she has no children; (3) a police officer once battered her father; 

and (4) she believes someone who accepts a ride from strangers is 

responsible for what happens to them. According to the 

questionnaire, Monica was 26 years old and had no children. She 

explained the incident with her father as follows: “A police officer 

battered my dad in Los Angeles . . . he sat my dad in hot the curb 

[sic] and my dad was wearing shorts my dad slide front [sic] to try 

to move from the hot curb and the police hit my dad really bad.” 

She answered “yes” to the question whether she believes one who 

accepts a ride from a stranger is responsible for whatever happens 

to them, and explained: “Because you decided to accept the ride so 

you are responsible if anything happens.” 

Defendants contend the factors cited by the prosecutor did not in 

fact motivate the peremptory challenge, inasmuch as the prosecutor 

failed to challenge non-Hispanic jurors who were young and had no 

children, had had negative experiences with law enforcement, or 

indicated that a person who accepts a ride from a stranger is 

responsible for what happens to them. However, while it may be 

true that the prosecutor failed to excuse certain jurors whose 

questionnaire responses revealed circumstances similar to Monica 

V. as to age, lack of children, prior experiences with law 

enforcement, or responsibility of one who accepts a ride from a 

stranger, defendants cite no juror who had the same combination of 

these factors. 

While comparative juror analysis is certainly relevant in assessing 

the third step of the Wheeler/Batson analysis, “‘we are mindful that 

comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record has inherent 

limitations.’ [Citation.] In addition to the difficulty of assessing 

tone, expression and gesture from the written transcript of voir dire, 

we attempt to keep in mind the fluid character of the jury selection 

process and the complexity of the balance involved. ‘Two panelists 

might give a similar answer on a given point. Yet the risk posed by 

one panelist might be offset by other answers, behavior, attitudes or 

experiences that make one juror, on balance, more or less desirable. 

These realities, and the complexity of human nature, make a 

formulaic comparison of isolated responses an exceptionally poor 

medium to overturn a trial court's factual finding.’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 887.) 

We cannot say on the record before us that the trial court erred in 

concluding the prosecutor utilized a valid, race-neutral rationale for 

excusing Monica V. We therefore conclude the trial court did not 

err in denying defendants' Wheeler/Batson motion. 

Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at **4-12. 

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2. Legal Standards Regarding Petitioner’s Batson Claim 

 Purposeful discrimination on the basis of race or gender in the exercise of peremptory 

challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See Batson, 

476 U.S. at 79; Johnson, 545 U.S. at 62. So-called Batson claims are evaluated pursuant to a 

three-step test: 

First, the movant must make a prima facie showing that the 

prosecution has engaged in the discriminatory use of a peremptory 

challenge by demonstrating that the circumstances raise “an 

inference that the prosecutor used [the challenge] to exclude 

veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” [Citation 

omitted.] Second, if the trial court determines a prima facie case 

has been established, the burden shifts to the prosecution to 

articulate a [gender]-neutral explanation for challenging the juror in 

question. [Citation omitted.] Third, if the prosecution provides 

such an explanation, the trial court must then rule whether the 

movant has carried his or her burden of proving the existence of 

purposeful discrimination. 

Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 

 In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, petitioner must show that 

“(1) the prospective juror is a member of a “cognizable racial group,” (2) the prosecutor used a 

peremptory strike to remove the juror, and (3) the totality of the circumstances raises an inference 

that the strike was motived by race.” Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 and Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 

2001)). A prima facie case of discrimination “can be made out by offering a wide variety of 

evidence, so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory 

purpose.’” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.) Both Hispanics and 

African-Americans constitute cognizable groups for Batson purposes. Fernandez v. Roe, 286 

F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 At the second step of the Batson analysis, “the issue is the facial validity of the 

prosecutor’s explanation.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). “A neutral 

explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on something other 

than the race of the juror.” Id. at 360. “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 

prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.” Stubbs v. Gomez, 189 

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F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360). For purposes of step two, 

the prosecutor’s explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 

U.S. at 765, 768 (1995). Indeed, “to accept a prosecutor’s stated nonracial reasons, the court need 

not agree with them.” Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 In the third step of a Batson challenge, the trial court has “the duty to determine whether 

the defendant has established purposeful discrimination,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, and, to that end, 

must evaluate the “persuasiveness” of the prosecutor’s proffered reasons. See Purkett, 514 U.S. 

at 768. In determining whether petitioner has carried this burden, the Supreme Court has stated 

that “a court must undertake ‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of 

intent as may be available.’” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. “[A]ll of the 

circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.” Snyder v. 

Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). See also Cook v. Lemarque, 593 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (stating the “totality of the relevant facts” 

should be considered “to decide whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation . . . should be 

believed.”). In step three, the court “considers all the evidence to determine whether the actual 

reason for the strike violated the defendant’s equal protection rights.” Yee v. Duncan, 463 F.3d 

893, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 A prosecutor’s reasons for striking a juror may be “founded on nothing more than a trial 

lawyer’s instincts about a prospective juror . . . so long as they are the actual reasons for the 

prosecutor’s actions.” United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United 

States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Excluding jurors because of their 

profession, or because they acquitted in a prior case, or because of a poor attitude in answer to 

voir dire questions is wholly within the prosecutor’s prerogative.” United States v. Thompson, 

827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 1987). It is not improper for a prosecutor to rely on his instincts 

with respect to the voir dire process. See Power, 881 F.2d at 740 (quoting Chinchilla, 874 F.2d at 

699). In short, instinct and subjective factors have a legitimate role in the jury selection process. 

///// 

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Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252; Burks, 27 F.3d at 1429, n.3 (“peremptory strikes are a legitimate 

means for counsel to act on . . . hunches and suspicions”). 

 The defendant in the criminal prosecution bears the burden of persuasion to prove the 

existence of unlawful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. “This burden of persuasion ‘rests 

with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.’” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 2417 (quoting 

Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768). 

 “Any constitutional error in jury selection is structural and is not subject to harmless error 

review.” Williams v. Runnels, 640 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Windham v. 

Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998) and Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.3 

(9th Cir. 1997). See also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (stating that among those 

constitutional rights so basic “that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error” is a 

defendant's “right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury”) (citation and internal 

quotations omitted); Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (“because a 

Batson violation is structural error, actual harm is presumed to have resulted from the alleged 

constitutional violation”). 

 3. Analysis

 This court need not address the preliminary issue of whether petitioner established a prima 

facie case of purposeful discrimination because both the state trial and appellate courts ruled on 

the ultimate question of intentional discrimination under the Batson analysis. Hernandez, 500 

U.S. at 359; United States v. Gillam, 167 F.3d 1273, 1278 (9th Cir. 1999). The trial judge 

apparently concluded that petitioner established a prima facie case of racial discrimination 

because he asked the prosecutor to respond to defendants’ Batson motion. Reporter’s Transcript 

on Appeal (RT) at 105. The sole issue before this court, therefore, is whether the California 

courts unreasonably concluded that petitioner failed to meet his ultimate burden of establishing 

that the prosecutor’s challenges were motivated by racial discrimination under the third step of 

the Batson analysis. 

 In evaluating habeas petitions premised on step three of a Batson violation, the standard of 

review is “doubly deferential: unless the state appellate court was objectively unreasonable in 

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concluding that a trial court’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, we 

must uphold it.” Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 

This court can only grant petitioner’s Batson claim “if it was unreasonable to credit the 

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson challenge.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 

338 (2006). In this case, when asked, the prosecutor expressed a neutral, reasonable basis for the 

use of her peremptory challenges of all five of the Hispanic jurors. RT at 105-07. The 

prosecutor’s reasons were “clear and reasonably specific” and were “related to the particular case 

to be tried.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69. They are also supported by the record. The California 

Court of Appeal analyzed each juror’s answers to the juror questionnaire, the prosecutor’s voir 

dire of each stricken juror, and the characteristics of other similar jurors who were not stricken. 

After a thorough comparison, the court concluded that the record supported a race-neutral basis 

for each strike. This court has also reviewed the record and agrees with the characterization of 

the Court of Appeal with respect to the characteristics of the other jurors on the panel who were 

not stricken by the prosecutor. 

 The fact that one or more of the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking the Hispanic 

jurors also applied to other jurors who were not stricken is “evidence tending to prove purposeful 

discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241. However, the 

fact that an excused juror shares one or more characteristics with seated jurors does not end the 

inquiry into discrimination in jury selection, nor does it establish that the prosecutor was acting 

with discriminatory intent. Rather, the court must evaluate the “totality of the relevant facts” to 

decide whether “counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be 

believed.” Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2009). For the reasons stated by the 

California Court of Appeal, the similarities between the stricken jurors and several of the seated 

jurors do not undermine the prosecutor’s stated reason for excusing the five Hispanic jurors. 

 This court also notes that petitioner’s jury did contain one Hispanic juror. Although not 

decisive, “[t]he fact that African-American jurors remained on the panel ‘may be considered 

indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive.’” Gonzalez v. Brown, 585 F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Burks v. 

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Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1994) (fact that jury contained an African-American member 

is “a valid, though not necessarily dispositive, consideration in determining whether a prosecutor 

violated Batson”). 

 After reviewing the record, this court finds that the state court’s disposition of petitioner’s 

Batson claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

nor did it result in a decision that is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. The record reflects that the state trial judge 

performed an adequate evaluation of the prosecutor’s reasons for challenging the Hispanic jurors 

and appropriately denied petitioner’s Batson/Wheeler motion. After a review of the entire 

relevant record, the court agrees with the state court that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for her 

exclusion of five Hispanic jurors were her genuine reasons for exercising a peremptory strike, 

rather than a pretext invented to hide purposeful discrimination. Petitioner has failed to carry his 

burden of proving the existence of unlawful discrimination with respect to the prosecutor’s 

challenge to these jurors. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

B. Violation of Right to Confrontation/Trial Severance

 In his next ground for relief, petitioner claims that the denial of his motion for a trial 

severance and the admission at a joint trial of the redacted police statements of co-defendants 

Israel Sanchez and Alberto Sanchez violated his right to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses 

against him. ECF No. 1 at 4. He further argues the trial court’s error in admitting these 

statements was not cured by a limiting instruction given by the trial court. ECF No. 22 at 10.3

 

///// 

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 That limiting instruction read as follows: “You have heard evidence that the defendants 

made statements out of court and before trial. You may consider that evidence only against the 

declarant and not against any other defendant,” Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 978. 

However, immediately preceding the introduction into evidence of the audiotapes containing 

Israel and petitioner’s police statements, the trial court misread the instruction and informed the 

jury that “these statements may be used as evidence only against the defendant and not against 

other defendants.” RT at 1301, 1303. Petitioner argues that “the court erroneously instructed the 

jury that the pretrial statements of a defendant could only be considered as evidence against a 

defendant.” ECF No. 22 at 10. This limiting instruction was correctly conveyed to the jury later 

during the giving of jury instructions. 

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 1. State Court Decision 

 Following the defendants’ arrests, each was interviewed by the police and the interviews 

were recorded. The prosecution sought to introduce those recording at defendants’ joint trial. 

The California Court of Appeal observed that under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right “to be confronted with the witnesses 

against him.” Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at *12 (citing U.S. CONST., amend. VI, and Pointer v. 

Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). The court noted that the “central concern” of this right is “to ensure 

the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in 

the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Id. (citing Maryland v. Craig, 

497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)). It also noted that the confrontation clause applies to hearsay 

statements that are “‘testimonial’ in nature, including statements made during police 

interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Crawford)). It also 

acknowledged that such hearsay may be admitted at trial only if the declarant is unavailable and 

the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id. The petitioner 

argued that the trial court should have severed the trials because of the cross-incrimination of the 

defendants’ out-of-court statements and that the failure to do so violated petitioner’s right of 

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The California Court of Appeal rejected that 

argument, reasoning as follows: 

In People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 (Aranda), the California 

Supreme Court held that when the prosecution seeks to introduce an 

extrajudicial statement of one defendant that implicates other 

defendants, the trial court has three options: (1) in a joint trial, 

delete any direct or indirect identification of codefendants from the 

statement; (2) grant a severance; or (3) if severance is denied and 

effective deletion is impossible, exclude the statement altogether. 

(Id. at pp. 530–531.) In Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 

123 (Bruton), the United States Supreme Court held that 

introduction of an incriminating extrajudicial statement by a 

codefendant violates the defendant's confrontation right, even 

where the jury is instructed to disregard the statement in 

determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. 

Edgar moved in limine to exclude the pretrial statements of his 

codefendants. He argued any statements by the other defendants 

implicating him would have to be redacted in a joint trial and, 

therefore, the court had three options: (1) separate trials, (2) 

redaction, or (3) separate juries. Edgar further argued “there is no 

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reasonable means by which the People can redact the statements” of 

the other defendants. By inference, Edgar argued that if the court 

was inclined to admit the pretrial statements, it was required either 

to sever or to use separate juries. Israel and Alberto joined in 

Edgar's motion. 

The trial court refused to sever the defendants' trials and, 

apparently, did not consider using separate juries. Thus, the court 

relied on redaction to protect defendants' constitutional rights. The 

court instructed the jury that the pretrial statements of a given 

defendant could only be considered as evidence against that 

defendant. 

Defendants present a multi-pronged attack on the trial court's 

decision to try them jointly and to permit introduction of redacted 

versions of their out-of-court statements. They contend the court 

had essentially two choices, separate trials or exclusion of the 

statements altogether. They argue the redacted versions of the 

custodial interviews did not adequately eliminate references to 

codefendants, as required by Aranda/Bruton. Israel further argues 

the court erred in excluding from his custodial interview various 

exculpatory statements, which he was entitled to have admitted in 

evidence. As we shall explain, we find no abuse of discretion in 

denying defendants' motion to sever or in admitting redacted 

versions of defendants' out-of-court statements. 

“When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any public 

offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, 

unless the court order [sic] separate trials.” (§ 1098.) Under this 

provision, the Legislature has stated a preference for joint trial of 

codefendants charged with the same offense. At the same time, the 

trial court retains discretion to grant separate trials. (People v. 

Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1286.) 

“The court should separate the trial of codefendants ‘in the face of 

an incriminating confession, prejudicial association with 

codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple 

counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial 

a codefendant would give exonerating testimony.’” (People v. 

Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 312, overruled on other grounds in 

People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1149–1150.) “Whether 

denial of a motion to sever the trial of a defendant from that of a 

codefendant constitutes an abuse of discretion must be decided on 

the facts as they appear at the time of the hearing on the motion 

rather than on what subsequently develops.” (People v. Isenor

(1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 324, 334.) 

Defendants contend the trial court erred in failing to sever their 

trials. However, the only ground asserted for separate trials was the 

cross-incrimination of defendants' out-of-court statements. This is 

also the basis for defendants' separate contention that the trial court 

erred in admitting redacted versions of those statements. Thus, the 

resolution of both issues turns on whether the redacted versions of 

defendants' out-of-court statements eliminated any crossincrimination. 

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In Bruton, two defendants – Evans and Bruton – were tried jointly 

for robbery. Evans did not testify, but the prosecution introduced 

into evidence Evans's confession in which he stated he and Bruton 

committed the robbery. (Bruton, 391 U.S. at p. 124.) The trial 

judge instructed the jury it could consider the confession only as 

evidence against Evans. (Id. at p. 125.) The United States Supreme 

Court held that, despite the limiting instruction, the introduction of 

Evans's out-ofcourt confession violated Bruton's Sixth Amendment right to crossexamine witnesses. (Id. at p. 137.) 

In Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 (Richardson), Marsh 

and Williams were jointly tried for murder and the prosecution 

introduced a redacted confession by Williams that omitted all 

references to Marsh and all indications that anyone other than 

Williams and a third person named Martin participated in the crime. 

(Id. at p. 202–203.) The trial court instructed the jury not to 

consider the confession against Marsh. (Id. at p. 205.) As redacted, 

the confession indicated Williams and Martin had discussed the 

murder in the front seat of a car while they traveled to the victim's 

home. (Id. at pp. 203–204.) However, later in the trial, Marsh 

testified that she was in the back seat of the car at the time. (Id. at 

p. 204.) 

The Supreme Court held the redacted confession of Williams fell 

outside the scope of Bruton and was admissible (with an 

appropriate limiting instruction). The court distinguished the 

confession in Bruton as one that was “incriminating on its face,” 

and had “expressly implicat[ed]” Bruton. (Richardson, 481 U.S. at 

p. 208.) By contrast, Williams's confession in Richardson

amounted to “evidence requiring linkage” in that it “became” 

incriminating in respect to Marsh “only when linked with evidence 

introduced later at trial.” (Ibid.) According to the court: “[T]he 

Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a 

nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting 

instruction when . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate not only 

the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence.” 

(Id. at p. 211].) 

In Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185 (Gray), Gray and Bell 

were tried jointly for the murder of Stacey Williams. Bell did not 

testify at trial. However, the trial court permitted the prosecution to 

introduce a redacted version of Bell's confession. In the original, 

Bell indicated he, Gray and a third person, Vanlandingham, 

participated in the beating that led to Williams's death. The police 

detective who read the confession into evidence substituted the 

word “deleted” or “deletion” wherever the names of Gray and 

Vanlandingham appeared. Immediately after the redacted 

confession was read to the jury, the prosecutor asked, “after he gave 

you that information, you subsequently were able to arrest Mr. 

Kevin Gray; is that correct?” The officer responded, “That's 

correct.” (Id. at pp. 188–189.) The prosecution produced other 

witnesses who said that six persons, including Bell, Gray, and 

Vanlandingham, participated in the beating. The trial judge 

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instructed the jury that the confession was evidence against Bell 

alone. (Id. at p. 189.) 

The Supreme Court concluded the redaction was inadequate under 

the circumstances because, although the names of the other 

participants were eliminated, the redacted version continued to refer 

directly to the existence of the nonconfessing defendant. (Gray, 

supra, 523 U.S. at p. 192.) The court explained: “Redactions that 

simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such 

as ‘deleted’ or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of 

alteration . . . leave statements that, considered as a class, so 

closely resemble Bruton's unredacted statements that, in our view, 

the law must require the same result.” (Id. at p. 192.) According to 

the court: “Bruton's protected statements and statements redacted to 

leave a blank or some other similarly obvious alteration, function 

the same way grammatically. They are directly accusatory. Evans' 

statement in Bruton used a proper name to point explicitly to an 

accused defendant . . . . The blank space in an obviously redacted 

confession also points directly to the defendant, and it accuses the 

defendant in a manner similar to Evans' use of Bruton's name or to 

a testifying codefendant's accusatory finger. By way of contrast, 

the factual statement at issue in Richardson – a statement about 

what others said in the front seat of a car – differs from directly 

accusatory evidence in this respect, for it does not point directly to a 

defendant at all.” (Id. at p. 194.) 

In Gray, the Supreme Court noted that Richardson placed outside 

the scope of Bruton those statements that incriminate inferentially. 

(Gray, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 195.) However, the court cautioned 

that not all such statements fall outside Bruton. According to the 

court: “[I]nference pure and simple cannot make the critical 

difference, for if it did, then Richardson would also place outside 

Bruton's scope confessions that use shortened first names, 

nicknames, descriptions as unique as the ‘red-haired, bearded, oneeyed man-with-a-limp,’ [citation], and perhaps even full names of 

defendants who are always known by a nickname. This Court has 

assumed, however, that nicknames and specific descriptions fall 

inside, not outside, Bruton's protection. [Citation.] . . . [¶] That 

being so, Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind 

of, not the simple fact of, inference. Richardson's inferences 

involved statements that did not refer directly to the defendant 

himself and which became incriminating ‘only when linked with 

evidence introduced later at trial.’ [Citation.] The inferences at 

issue here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously 

refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which 

involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, 

even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” 

(Id. at pp. 195–196.) 

Defendants point to a number of statements in the redacted versions 

of their interview statements that, they argue, continue to implicate 

the others in the crimes. Thus, they contend, introduction of the 

redacted versions violated Aranda/Bruton. We shall consider the 

interview statements of each defendant in turn. 

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Israel Sanchez 

In his interview with police, Israel initially denied ever being in 

Davis, but then acknowledged that he was in Davis around 11:00 

p.m. in his car and saw a “drunk ass girl” come out of one of the 

bars. Israel told the officers the woman got in his car, asked for 

“weed” and then they went cruising. He initially denied having sex 

with her, claiming instead that he had masturbated while standing 

behind her. He initially denied using a condom but then said that 

he had. Later, Israel admitted lying on top of the girl and 

attempting to have sexual intercourse with her. However, he 

claimed not to have been able to penetrate her. Later, Israel 

admitted that he was able to penetrate her “a little bit.” He denied 

striking the woman. Finally, Israel acknowledged that Antonio was 

in the car when this was occurring. 

After explaining that the woman got in the car, asked for “weed,” 

wanted to go home, but then wanted to cruise, Israel said: “So we

cruised around in the fuckin cutties [FN1] and stuff. After that we

post because I guess she wanted to throw up and stuff, she wasn't 

feeling well so we got out of the car and then she was about to 

throw up but she didn't. And she was just saying ‘I don't feel 

well.’” (Italics added.) 

FN1. The term “cutties” in this context “Refers to an area far away 

in distance or in the middle of nowhere.” (Urban Dict. (1999–

2011) <http:// www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Cutties> 

[as of Aug. 30, 2011].) 

Defendants argue the foregoing statement implicated them because, 

by the time the jury heard it, evidence had already been presented 

that both Edgar and Alberto were also in the car with Israel, 

Antonio and S.L. and, therefore, they fell within the reference to 

“we.” 

It is readily clear Israel's statement that “we” cruised around and 

“we” got out of the car did not implicate Edgar or Alberto on its 

face, especially when Israel had previously indicated that both 

Antonio and the victim were with him in the car and he did not 

mention anyone else. The fact that the statement may implicate the 

others, when considered in conjunction with other evidence placing 

Edgar and Alberto in the car, does not bring the statement within 

the scope of Aranda/Bruton. (Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 

208.) 

Defendants contend the foregoing evidence is “remarkably similar” 

to that in People v. Song (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 973, where this 

court found a violation of Aranda/Bruton. Defendants are 

mistaken. In Song, a detective testified that one defendant told him 

he saw a codefendant force the victim into the car. (Song, at p. 

979.) The People conceded error but argued it was not prejudicial. 

(Id. at p. 981.) 

Song is clearly distinguishable from the present matter. In Song, 

the codefendant's statement implicated the defendant directly by 

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name, whereas in the present matter Israel's statement did not 

mention the codefendants by name or suggest the presence of any 

unidentified perpetrators at the time of the offenses. Only by 

reference to other evidence could the “we” mentioned by Israel be 

considered to include Edgar and Alberto. 

Defendants also take issue with a statement made by Israel about 

smoking marijuana. When asked how much marijuana he smoked 

that evening, Israel answered: “Um I think we had like two blunts 

yeah we only had like two blunts rolled up.” (Italics added.) He 

was then asked if he handed a blunt to S.L., and Israel answered: 

“No we were just rotating.” (Italics added.) 

Again, there is no direct reference to either Edgar or Alberto or any 

unidentified persons being present, and the “we” can easily be 

interpreted as referring to Israel, Antonio and S.L. Edgar and 

Alberto are implicated only by virtue of other evidence placing 

them in the car at the time. Under Richardson, this falls outside of 

Aranda/Bruton. 

Finally, defendants take issue with a number of statements made by 

Israel that amounted to admissions by him that he committed the 

various charged crimes. For example, defendants cite Israel's 

admission that, while lying on top of S.L., he attempted to penetrate 

her for six to seven minutes. They further cite Israel's statement 

that S.L. told him to stop and she was too drunk to fight back. 

Defendants argue that, by implicating himself in a forcible rape, as 

alleged in count 2, Israel also implicated them as aiders and abettors 

in that crime as well as rape in concert, as alleged in count 3. 

Defendants further argue these statements negated their own 

assertions at trial that S.L. had gone with them voluntarily and had 

engaged in consensual sex. 

Defendants seek to stretch Aranda/Bruton far beyond its legal 

bounds. The evil those cases seek to avoid is the admission of 

statements by one defendant that identify another defendant, either 

directly or indirectly, as having been involved in the crime without 

that other defendant having an opportunity to test those statements 

through cross-examination. Aranda/Bruton does not seek to keep 

out all statements by one defendant that might somehow prove to be 

harmful to another defendant once that other defendant's 

participation in the crimes is established through other evidence. In 

this instance, Israel's statements implicating himself alone would 

have an adverse impact on the other defendants as aiders and 

abettors only if Israel also identified those others as having 

participated. However, such participation was established through 

other evidence. Under Richardson, introduction of Israel's 

statements did not violate the confrontation rights of these other 

defendants. 

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Edgar Radillo 

Edgar first denied having been in Davis at any time during the past 

year, but then admitted recently picking up a girl in Davis. 

According to Edgar, when they arrived at the crime scene, “She 

gets out of the car screaming” and “started tripping out saying she 

was going to call the cops.” Edgar claimed that, after they arrived 

at the scene, he stayed in the car with Antonio and denied touching 

S.L. However, Edgar later admitted putting a condom on and 

intending to have sexual intercourse with her. But, according to 

Edgar, he changed his mind and took the condom off. He denied 

ever getting on top of S.L. but then admitted doing so and rubbing 

his penis on her. He at first denied penetrating S.L. but then 

acknowledged having done so once. Edgar denied getting into 

S.L.'s purse but then admitted taking the condom from the purse. 

He identified Antonio as being present and asserted that Antonio 

remained in the car the whole time. 

After acknowledging that he picked a girl up off the street in Davis, 

Edgar indicated he talked to her and she said “she was going to the 

university or something.” The following colloquy ensued: 

“DETECTIVE HERNAN OVIEDO: Okay. What else did you guys 

talk about in the car? 

“EDGAR RADILLO: Nothing she just talked about uh well what 

we were going to do with our life that she had something but I don't 

know stuff. She was telling me about her life. That she don't like 

white guys and I don't know she was telling me. 

“DETECTIVE HERNAN OVIEDO: Were you guys drinking in the 

car? 

“EDGAR RADILLO: No she was already drunk. We didn't drink at 

all.” 

Defendants contend that, by the time Edgar's interview tape was 

played, the jury was already aware Alberto and Israel were in the 

car with Edgar, Antonio and S.L. Thus, the foregoing implicated 

them in the offenses despite the use of the neutral pronoun “we.” 

However, as explained earlier, the fact that evidence outside of an 

out-of-court statement can be used to link unnamed defendants to 

the statement does not implicate Aranda/Bruton. In the context 

where Edgar had just explained that he and S.L. were talking to 

each other in the car, the officer's questions about “you guys” and 

Edgar's statement that “we” didn't drink could reasonably be 

viewed as referring to Edgar and S.L. alone. Only when coupled 

with other evidence outside the interview, are Israel and Alberto 

arguably implicated. 

The same goes for Edgar's statement shortly thereafter about how 

S.L. jumped out of the car and was “tripping out: “We were 

already out in the cuts [[[FN2] we didn't know where we going. I 

don't even know the cuts. I was lost. And then we just ended up 

somewhere. And then she started tripping out saying she was going 

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to call the cops and I don't know.” The “we” there could easily 

have referred to Edgar, Antonio, and S.L., whom Edgar 

acknowledged were present. Only by reference to evidence outside 

Edgar's interview are Israel and Alberto implicated. 

FN2. In this context “cuts” means, “A term to describe a remote 

area that is either hidden, distant, or both.” (Urban Dict. (1999–

2011) <http:// www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=cuts & 

page=2> [as of Aug. 30, 2011]. 

Likewise, Edgar's statement that “[n]obody” helped S.L. out of the 

car and over to where she was sexually assaulted did not refer to 

either Israel or Alberto and did not suggest anyone else was present 

besides Edgar and Antonio. 

The remaining statements defendants cite as violating 

Aranda/Bruton all implicated Edgar alone in the crimes. As with 

Israel's statements of a similar nature, defendants argue that by 

implicating himself in a rape, Edgar likewise adversely impacted 

their consent defenses. However, as with Israel's statements, 

Edgar's self-implication is only adverse to Israel and Alberto if 

other evidence outside Edgar's interview placed them at the scene. 

Under these circumstances, there is no Aranda/Bruton error. 

(Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 208.) 

Alberto Sanchez 

Apparently, the prosecution concluded it could not redact Alberto's 

pretrial interview sufficiently to present it at trial. Instead, Alberto's 

pretrial statements were presented through the testimony of the 

questioning officer. Alberto admitted picking up S .L. but denied 

touching her. Then he admitted shaking hands with her and 

touching her clothing. Alberto claimed S.L. got into the car 

willingly and asked for marijuana. He also admitted touching a 

condom and a pair of panties. 

Defendants contend two of Alberto's statements came in that 

referred to “they” as having done something, as in “they” went to 

the “cutties” and, as Alberto was holding S.L. up while she threw 

up, “they” came over. The remaining statements to which 

defendants object all implicated Alberto alone in the offenses, and 

the others by implication as aiders and abettors. However, as 

discussed above, none of these statements violated Aranda/Bruton. 

The use of “they” implicates the others only when coupled with 

evidence outside of Alberto's statements, and the self-incriminating 

statements do not fall within Aranda/Bruton even if they might 

ultimately harm the others. 

Furthermore, Alberto eventually testified at trial and was therefore 

available for cross-examination by the other defendants. 

Defendants contend this does not matter, because at the time the 

officer testified about what Alberto said, Alberto had not yet 

testified and therefore was unavailable as a witness and could not 

be cross-examined on his out-of-court statements. But we fail to 

see what the timing of defendants' opportunity to cross-examination 

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Alberto about his out-of-court statements has to do with it. The 

ability to cross-examination is the ability to cross-examine, 

whenever it occurs. Aranda/Bruton is not implicated if the 

declarant is available at trial. 

Defendants claim introduction of the pretrial interview statements 

of each of them violated Crawford, even if those statements did not 

implicate them directly. In Crawford, the United States Supreme 

Court “repudiated [its] prior ruling in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 

U.S. 56, under which an unavailable witness's statements were 

admissible against a criminal defendant if the statement bore 

‘adequate “indicia of reliability.”’ [Citation.] . . . Crawford held that 

out-of-court statements by a witness that are testimonial are barred 

under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause unless the 

witness is shown to be unavailable and the defendant has had a 

prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of 

whether such statements are deemed reliable by the trial court.” 

(People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 763.) 

There is no question the interview statements of defendants were 

testimonial within the meaning of Crawford and, at least as to 

Edgar and Israel, the declarants were unavailable as witnesses. 

However, “Crawford addressed the introduction of testimonial 

hearsay statements against a defendant.” (People v. Stevens (2007) 

41 Cal.4th 182, 199, italics added.) As explained above, none of 

defendants' interview statements admitted at trial contained 

evidence against any of the others. Thus, they did not implicate the 

confrontation clause. (Ibid.) “The same redaction that ‘prevents 

Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’” (Ibid.; 

accord, People v. Song, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) 

Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at **12-19. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards 

 a. Severance 

 A court may grant habeas relief based on a state court’s decision to deny a motion for 

severance only if the joint trial was so prejudicial that it denied a petitioner his right to a fair trial. 

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993) (court must decide if “there is a serious risk 

that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the 

jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence”); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 

438, 446 n.8 (1986) (“misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it 

results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial”); 

Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see also Comer v. Schiro, 

480 F.3d 960, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (in the context of the joinder of counts at trial, habeas relief 

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will not be granted unless the joinder actually rendered petitioner’s state trial fundamentally 

unfair and therefore violative of due process). Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the 

denial of severance rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 

(9th Cir. 1997), and must establish that prejudice arising from the failure to grant a severance was 

so “clear, manifest, and undue” that he was denied a fair trial. Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 

1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1071-72 (9th 

Cir. 1996)). On habeas review, federal courts neither depend on the state law governing 

severance, Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370 (citing Hollins v. Dep't of Corrections, State of Iowa, 969 F.2d 

606, 608 (8th Cir. 1992)), nor consider procedural rights to a severance afforded to criminal 

defendants in the federal criminal justice system. Id. Rather, the relevant question is whether the 

state proceedings satisfied due process. Id.; see also Cooper v. McGrath, 314 F. Supp. 2d 967, 

983 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

 b. Right to Confrontation 

 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal defendant the 

right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The ‘main and 

essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.’” Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections for California, 692 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause 

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 

(1965). 

 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the state 

from introducing into evidence out-of-court statements which are “testimonial” in nature unless 

the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, 

regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 

(2004). The Crawford rule applies only to hearsay statements that are “testimonial” and does not 

bar the admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements. Id. at 42, 51, 68. See also Whorton v. 

Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (“the Confrontation Clause has no application to” an “out-ofcourt nontestimonial statement.”) Although the Crawford court declined to provide a 

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comprehensive definition of the term “testimonial,” it stated that “[s]tatements taken by police 

officers in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard.” 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 

 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held 

that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when a facially 

incriminating confession of a non-testifying co-defendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if 

the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 135. 

“Under Bruton and its progeny ‘the admission of a statement made by a non-testifying 

codefendant violates the Confrontation Clause when that statement facially, expressly, or 

powerfully implicates the defendant.’” United States v. Hernandez-Orellana, 539 F.3d 994, 1001 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 (9th Cir. 2007)). Bruton 

presented a “context[ ] in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so 

great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human 

limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 135. 

Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) extended Bruton to a codefendant’s confession, 

under similar joint-trial circumstances, that was “redacted . . . by substituting for the defendant’s 

name in the confession a blank space or the word ‘deleted.’” Gray, 523 U.S. at 188. The Court 

held that these redactions made no constitutional difference. Id. However, in Richardson v. 

Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the admission of a nontestifying 

codefendant's confession did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause 

where the trial court instructed the jury not to use the confession in any way against the 

defendant, and the confession was redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any 

reference to her existence. In People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518 (1965), the California Supreme 

Court held that at a joint trial, a co-defendant’s extrajudicial statements inculpating another 

defendant must be excluded, even if the co-defendant testified at trial. Aranda was abrogated in 

part in 1982 by an amendment to the California Constitution. See People v. Boyd, 222 Cal. App. 

3d 541, 562 (1990) (“Thus, to the extent Aranda required exclusion of inculpatory extrajudicial 

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examination at trial, Aranda was abrogated by Proposition 8.”). The Crawford decision “did not 

overrule Bruton and its progeny.” United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2005). 

See also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57-58. 

 Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis. Whelchel v. 

Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2000). “In the context of habeas petitions, the 

standard of review is whether a given error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict.’” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Factors to be considered when assessing the 

harmlessness of a Confrontation Clause violation include the importance of the testimony, 

whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 

contradicting the testimony, the extent of cross-examination permitted, and the overall strength of 

the prosecution's case. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).4

 3. Analysis

 Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by 

admitting into evidence the police statements of Israel and Alberto Sanchez, wherein they 

referred to the people in the car as “we” and made other statements that provided crucial evidence 

to support the kidnapping, rape and sexual battery charges. As set forth above, the California 

Court of Appeal, in a thorough analysis, concluded that the admission of Israel and Alberto’s 

statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because they implicated petitioner only when 

coupled with other evidence outside of those statements. The state court concluded that the word 

“we” could have been interpreted by the jury to refer to petitioner, S.L., and Antonio, who the 

jurors were already aware were in the car, and that the other incriminating statements only 

implicated petitioner in the crimes because his participation had been established by other 

evidence. These conclusions by the Court of Appeal are based a reasonable interpretation of the 

///// 

 4

 Although Van Arsdall involved a direct appeal and not a habeas action, “there is nothing 

in the opinion or logic of Van Arsdall that limits the use of these factors to direct review.” 

Whelchel, 232 F.3d at 1206. 

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facts of this case and are not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the holdings in Bruton, 

Richardson, and Gray. 

 Further, unlike the situation in Gray, the statements of Edgar Radillo and Israel Sanchez 

were not altered by the trial court to insert a pronoun for petitioner’s name. Rather, their 

statements were introduced as they spoke them, with any reference to petitioner being supplied by 

other evidence outside of those statements. In addition, petitioner’s jury received a limiting 

instruction that informed the jurors the admitted statements could only be considered against the 

declarant and not against any other defendant. Although the trial judge originally misspoke when 

delivering this instruction, substituting the word “defendant” for the word “declarant,” the error 

was corrected during the formal recitation of jury instructions. 

 Further, as noted by the California Court of Appeal, Alberto Sanchez testified at trial and 

was subject to cross-examination. Because petitioner was given the opportunity to cross-examine 

Alberto about his statements to police, the admission of those statements did not violate 

petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (2004) (“when 

the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 

constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements”); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 

149, 162 (1970) (“where the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and to submit to 

cross-examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion that the admission of his out-ofcourt statements does not create a confrontation problem”); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 

21-22 (1985) (“the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full 

and fair opportunity to probe and expose . . . infirmities through cross-examination, thereby 

calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' 

testimony”); United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We are aware of 

no Supreme Court case, or any other case, which holds that introduction of hearsay evidence can 

violate the Confrontation Clause where the putative declarant is in court, and the defendants are 

able to cross-examine him”). Because there is no violation of the right to confrontation when the 

declarant is available for cross-examination, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims 

directed to Alberto Sanchez’s police statements. 

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 The decision of the California Court of Appeal that the admission of Alberto and Israel 

Sanchez’s statements did not violate petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause is not 

contrary to or based on an unreasonable determination of clearly established federal law. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.5

 Because there was no Confrontation Clause error at petitioner’s trial, the trial court did not 

violate petitioner’s federal constitutional rights in denying petitioner’s motion to sever his trial 

from that of his co-defendants. The joint trial was not “so prejudicial that it denied a petitioner 

his right to a fair trial.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief on his severance claim. 

C. Joinder in Claims of Co-Defendants

 In his last ground for relief, petitioner states that he “joins all arguments raised by his 

codefendants which inure to his benefit.” ECF No. 1 at 5. 

 Petitioner’s co-defendants Israel Sanchez and Alberto Sanchez also filed habeas petitions 

challenging their state court convictions in this court. See Sanchez v. Paramo, Case No. 2:13-cv0491-TLN-EFB P, and Sanchez v. Spearman, Case No. 2:12-cv-2869-TLN-EFB P. Petitioner’s 

case and that of Israel Sanchez and Alberto Sanchez are related under Local Rule 123(a). 

However, compliance with Local Rule 123(a) merely results in assignment of all three cases to 

the same judge. There has been no consolidation of these three actions. 

///// 

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 Because the trial court did not commit error under Bruton in admitting the statements of 

Edgar Radillo, there is no Crawford error. See, e.g., United States v. Rakow, 286 F. App’x 452, 

454 (9th Cir. 2008) (court denies Crawford violation where prior testimony of co-defendant was 

admitted against co-defendant, because “. . . absent Bruton error, Crawford has no work to do in 

this context . . . .”) (citing United States v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 854, 856 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002); 

United States v. Chen, 393 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (the same factual circumstances 

surrounding admission of co-defendant's statement “that prevent Bruton error also serves to 

prevent Crawford error.”); United States v. Gould, No. CR 03–2274 JB, 2007 WL 1302593, at *3 

(D.N.M. Mar. 23, 2007) (“If a limiting instruction is given to the jury, a properly redacted 

statement of a co-defendant, one that satisfies Bruton . . . , does not raise a Confrontation Clause 

issue pursuant to Crawford ..., because such a statement is not offered against the defendant.”); 

Bolus v. Portuondo, No. 9:01–CV–1189, 2007 WL 2846912, at *21 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2007) 

(“Since this court finds no Bruton error, there would be no Crawford error, even if Crawford

were applicable.”). 

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 Petitioner may not incorporate by reference any claims raised by his co-defendants. The 

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 

(“Habeas Rules”), require that each habeas petition specify all the grounds for relief, state the 

facts supporting each ground, and state the relief requested. See Habeas Rule 2(c). Further, the 

form for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court advises that all claims raised 

therein must allege facts in support of each claim. Petitioner’s vague and unsupported statements 

fail to demonstrate entitlement to federal habeas relief. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“It is well-settled that 

‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant 

habeas relief’”)). The court notes that petitioner’s attempt to join in the federal habeas claims 

raised by Israel and Alberto Sanchez is based on California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a) (5), 

which allows a co-appellant to “join in or adopt by reference all or part of a brief in the same or a 

related appeal.” The California Rules of Court are inapplicable to federal habeas petitions. 

 In any event, in connection with their respective federal habeas actions, this court has 

concluded that none of the claims raised by Israel and Alberto Sanchez have merit. Accordingly, 

petitioner has failed to demonstrate entitlement to federal habeas relief based on the claims of his 

co-defendants. 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that 

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

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1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: May 21, 2015. 

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