Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01028/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01028-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Stuart Burris,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-1028-PHX-MHM (VAM)

ORDER

Petitioner has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (Dkt.# 1). The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Virginia Mathis who issued a

Report and Recommendation that recommends that the Petition be denied as untimely.

(Dkt.#13). Petitioner has not filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court must review the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations

de novo if objection is made but not otherwise. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)("[a] judge of the court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made"). "Failure to object to a magistrate

judge's recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact." Jones v.

Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Case 2:05-cv-01028-MHM Document 15 Filed 08/24/06 Page 1 of 5
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DISCUSSION

The Court has considered the pleadings and documents of record in this case.

Petitioner plead guilty to two counts of attempted child molestation on September 26, 1997.

(Counts II and IV). On December 30, 1997, the Court sentenced Petitioner to a 13-year

aggravated term on Count II and lifetime probation on Count IV, finding that the Petitioner

previously molested other children in addition to the victims in this case. Petitioner asserts

three grounds in support of his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus: (1) his notice of postconviction relief was improperly dismissed; (2) the judge improperly aggravated the

petitioner's sentence; and (3) The Arizona Supreme Court was in error dismissing the

petitioner's petition for review.

 Petitioner filed his first petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 10, 1998,

within the one-year statute of limitations provided by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). The District Court dismissed his petition without prejudice on

February 17, 1999 since Petitioner had not exhausted the applicable state remedies. On July

7, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1

claiming the information in a letter submitted by Deanna Flanders, one of Petitioner's former

step-children, at sentencing was "improper and inaccurate," and was therefore an unlawful

basis for imposing an aggravated sentence. According to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a), a notice

of Post-Conviction Relief must be filed within 90 days after the entry of judgment, unless it

raises claims pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1 (d)-(h). Defendant claims an exception to the

90-day rule based on subsections (e): "Newly discovered material facts exist which probably

would have changed the verdict or sentence," and (f): "The defendant's failure to file a timely

notice of post-conviction relief or notice of appeal was without fault on the defendant's part."

Defendant's notice of post-conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court on July 17, 2003,

finding that Defendant's claim "does not constitute newly discovered evidence or any other

exception that entitles him to raise an untimely claim." Review was denied by the Arizona

Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court on August 5, 2004 and October 19, 2004

respectively. 

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According to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which codifies the one-year statute of limitations

provided by AEDPA: 

(d)(1): A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

 or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action

 in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

 applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by 

 the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

 and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

 have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted to any period of limitation under this subsection.

Unless any other provisions of §2244(d) apply, Petitioner had until December 30,

1998 to file a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus after properly exhausting the applicable

state remedies, subject to tolling as provided by subsection (d)(2), as long as the appropriate

application was filed before the end of the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) ( holding that "section 2244(d) does

not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition

was filed.). In Ferguson, Petitioner filed the appropriate state petition before the expiration

of the state limitations period but after the expiration of AEDPA's one-year period. In the

instant case therefore, even if the state court had accepted Petitioner's notice of PostConviction Relief filed on July 7, 2003 as permissible under Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1, it would

have no tolling effect on the AEDPA limitations period. 

Because Petitioner pleaded guilty to the two counts of child molestation, subsection

(d)(1)(A) does not apply. See A.R.S. § 13-4033 (B) (stating that a defendant in a non-capital

case may not appeal a sentence entered pursuant to a plea agreement). Petitioner makes no

claims pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(B) (newly recognized constitutional rights). 

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Petitioner has not demonstrated that State action impeded the timely filing of either

his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief or Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. He cites the lack

of legal representation and failure to obtain case files as bars to his timely filing. Petitioner

however, is not constitutionally entitled to post-conviction counsel. According to the Ninth

Circuit in Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1993), "the protections of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel do not extend to either state collateral proceedings or federal

habeas corpus proceedings." Additionally, Petitioner's inability to obtain case files did not

necessarily prevent the filing of a timely notice of Post-Conviction relief. Superior Court of

Arizona form 24(c) "(Amended) Notice of Post Conviction Relief" does not require

applicants to provide specific information for which a case file would be necessary, while

the federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus asks only for a brief statement of the facts

supporting the claim, "without citing cases or legal arguments."

Petitioner claims to have new evidence, in the form of affidavits from three of his

adult children, that would discredit Deanna Flanders' letter and challenge the basis for

aggravating his sentence. While Petitioner refers to these witness statements as "new

evidence," they do not justify tolling the limitations period as provided by subsection

(d)(1)(D) of 28 U.S.C. §2244. Petitioner does not explain why, with due diligence, he could

not have discovered that James Burris, John Burris III, and Christina Seely had information

to prove Flanders' letter "disingenuous" prior to the expiration of the one-year statute of

limitations. 

In addition to statutory tolling, equitable tolling may be available to extend the

expiration of the limitations period. However, extensions will only be granted if

"'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition

on time." Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist.- Ca., 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), citing

Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997). The circumstances of

the instant case do not meet the high threshold necessary to warrant equitable tolling.

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Petitioner knew of Flanders' letter at the time of sentencing and was made aware of the 90-

day period for filing the appropriate petition for relief. He has not demonstrated any

"extraordinary circumstances" that would have prevented him from filing the Notice of Post

Conviction Relief or subsequent petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on time. 

 Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Mathis, the

Court concludes that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied as

untimely. The Court hereby incorporates and adopts the Magistrate’s Report and

Recommendation.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation of

Magistrate Judge Mathis; (Dkt. #13).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

is denied. (Dkt.#1). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 18th day of August, 2006.

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