Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04074/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04074-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Case No. C 06-4074 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

(JFLC2)

**E-Filed 12/18/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RICARDA SORIA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

GLORIA HENRY, Warden,

 Respondent.

Case Number C 06-4074 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION AS AN

UNAUTHORIZED SECOND OR

SUCCESSIVE PETITION

[re: doc. no. 11]

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition as untimely and as an unauthorized second or

successive petition. The Court has considered the motion and opposition (Respondent elected

not to file a reply), as well as the oral arguments presented at the hearing on December 15, 2006. 

For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted on the ground that the instant

petition is an unauthorized second or successive petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Ricarda Soria (“Soria”) was charged with two counts of kidnaping and two

counts of murder with special circumstances for the kidnapings and murders of Patty Geddling

and Stacy Benjamin. On November 9, 1981, she entered a negotiated plea of no contest to a

single charge of second degree murder in the San Mateo Superior Court. As part of her plea

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Case No. C 06-4074 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

(JFLC2)

agreement, she agreed to testify against her four male co-defendants, one of which was her

boyfriend. Soria’s plea was “open,” without a guaranteed sentence. The written plea agreement,

which Soria signed while represented by counsel, stated that the maximum penalty that she could

receive was fifteen years to life in a state prison with a ten year minimum, unless she was

committed to the California Youth Authority (“CYA”), in which case her sentence would be a

maximum of seven years. The trial court was to hold a sentencing hearing and decide whether

Soria would be sentenced to the CYA or to state prison.

Judge Thomas Jenkins held the sentencing hearing on April 7, 1983. Judge Jenkins

discussed the differences in the amount of time that Soria would serve if sentenced to the CYA

as opposed to state prison. As noted above, the maximum term for a sentence to the CYA was

seven years. Judge Jenkins stated on the record that the maximum term for a sentence to state

prison was fifteen years and that Soria would serve half that time, or seven and one-half years. 

Actually, at the time Soria was sentenced, California Penal Code § 190 required that a defendant

convicted of second degree murder be sentenced to an indeterminate term of fifteen years to life. 

Additionally, the law required that a defendant so sentenced would not serve at 50% time, but

rather at 33% time. Judge Jenkins subsequently provided a declaration stating that if he had

understood that the sentence required for second degree murder was an indeterminate term of

fifteen years to life, to be served at 33% time, it was “most probable” that he would have

committed Soria to the CYA rather than to state prison.

First Round Of State Habeas Petitions

Soria asserts that she believed she would be released after fifteen years, and that it was

only when she was not released that she realized she had a claim. She filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the San Mateo Superior Court on January 19, 2001. That petition, which

asserted that Soria was denied the informed discretion of the sentencing court in violation of her

due process rights, was denied on February 15, 2001. Soria filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeal on September 18, 2001, which petition was denied on

September 27, 2001. She filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on February 15, 2002. On May 14, 2003, the California Supreme Court issued an order to

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Case No. C 06-4074 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

(JFLC2)

show cause, directing the California Department of Corrections to show cause before the San

Mateo Superior Court why Soria was not entitled to a new sentence because the trial court

pronounced an unlawful and unauthorized sentence that must be corrected. The superior court

held an evidentiary hearing on August 1, 2003, but ultimately determined that Soria was not

entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the sentence she received was lawful and

authorized.

First Federal Habeas Petition

Soria filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on February 14, 2002,

alleging two claims: (1) a claim that her due process rights were violated by the sentencing

judge’s mistake as to the applicable law; and (2) a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Respondent moved to dismiss the petition as time-barred. Soria’s counsel apparently abandoned

her at that point, and no opposition to the motion was filed. This Court granted Respondent’s

motion on July 16, 2002 and entered judgment. That judgment was not appealed.

Second Round Of State Habeas Petitions

Soria began a second round of state habeas petitions by filing another petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the San Mateo Superior Court on June 10, 2004, which petition was denied as

successive on July 21, 2004. She then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeal on September 30, 2004, which petition was summarily denied on October 29,

2004. She filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on May 13,

2005, which petition was summarily denied on April 19, 2006. 

Second Federal Habeas Petition

Soria filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of

California on June 8, 2006, again challenging her sentence although this time framing the

challenge as a claim that her plea agreement was violated. The case subsequently was transferred

to this Court. Respondent moves to dismiss the instant petition as time-barred and as a second or

successive petition. 

II. DISCUSSION

The Court addresses the latter challenge first, because if the instant petition is a second or

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Case No. C 06-4074 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

(JFLC2)

successive petition, this Court lacks jurisdiction over it absent authorization from the Ninth

Circuit for the filing of a second or successive petition.

No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ

of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment

of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of such detention has

been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for

a writ of habeas corpus, except as provided in section 2255.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(a). A claim presented in a second or successive petition under § 2254 that was

presented in a prior habeas petition “shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). A claim

presented in a second or successive petition under § 2254 that was not presented in a prior habeas

petition “shall be dismissed” unless: 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law,

made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered

previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as

a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that,

but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the

applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). However, even with respect to claims that were not presented in a prior

habeas petition and otherwise satisfy the above requirements, a petitioner may not file a second

or successive petition under in this Court without first obtaining prior permission from a threejudge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). As explained by the

Supreme Court, this requirement: 

creates a “gatekeeping” mechanism for the consideration of second or successive

applications in district court. The prospective applicant must file in the court of

appeals a motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas application in the

district court.

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996); see also Nevius v. McDaniel, 104 F.3d 1120, 1121

(9th Cir. 1996) (discussing procedures for obtaining authorization to file second or successive

petition from Ninth Circuit); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding

that district court must dismiss second or successive petition unless court of appeal gave approval

for its filing).

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Case No. C 06-4074 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

(JFLC2)

Soria previously filed a federal habeas petition challenging her conviction and sentence,

which petition was dismissed as time-barred in 2002. A second habeas petition is not considered

“successive” if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for a technical or procedural reason

rather than on the merits. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-487 (2000) (holding that a

habeas petition filed after a prior habeas petition was dismissed without adjudication on the

merits for failure to exhaust state remedies was not a “second or successive petition”); In re

Turner, 101 F.3d 1323, 1323 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). There do not appear to be any Ninth Circuit

cases addressing directly whether a dismissal based upon the statute of limitations constitutes an

adjudication on the merits for purposes of determining whether a subsequent petition is

successive under the AEDPA. However, several cases from district courts within the Ninth

Circuit and from other circuits have held that dismissal of a petition as untimely is sufficient to

render a subsequent petition second or successive. See, e.g., Altman v. Benik, 337 F.3d 764, 766

(7th Cir. 2003); Villanueva v. United States, 346 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a denial

of a § 2255 petition as untimely under the AEDPA constitutes an adjudication on the merits for

successive purposes); Reyes v. Vaughn, 276 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1029 (C.D.Cal. 2003). This Court

finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive. Soria thus must seek an order from the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this Court to consider a second petition.

Soria asserts that the instant petition is not second or successive because it raises a new

claim not raised in her earlier federal habeas petition, i.e., a claim that her plea agreement has

been violated. As noted above, even if Soria in fact does raise a new claim, she still must apply

to the Ninth Circuit before filing a second federal habeas petition challenging the same

conviction and sentence as were challenged in her prior federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3).

Soria also asserts that this Court erred in dismissing her earlier federal habeas petition as

time-barred. Soria asserts that her earlier federal habeas petition in fact was unexhausted and

should have been dismissed on that ground instead of on the ground of untimeliness. However,

because Soria did not appeal the dismissal of her earlier federal habeas petition, she cannot now

attack the validity of that dismissal absent a showing that the state prevented her from opposing

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 Having concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the instant petition, this Court need not

address Respondent’s argument that the petition additionally is time-barred. The Court notes,

however, that the one-year limitations period does not begin to run until “the date on which the

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D). If Soria did not discover the alleged

sentencing error or violation of her plea agreement until the California Department of

Corrections declined to release her fifteen years into her prison term, she may have a viable

argument that her claim is not time-barred despite the fact that it was filed so long after her

conviction became final. 

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Case No. C 06-4074 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

(JFLC2)

the dismissal. See Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2005).

This Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the instant petition. 

Accordingly the petition will be dismissed without prejudice to Soria’s filing a proper application

for consideration of a second or successive petition in the Ninth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3).1

III. ORDER

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED on the ground that the instant petition is

an unauthorized second or successive petition.

DATED: 12/18/06

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 06-4074 JF

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

(JFLC2)

Copies of Order served on:

Joseph Vincent Camarata joseph@camaratalaw.com, parolelaw@sbcglobal.net

Glenn R. Pruden glenn.pruden@doj.ca.gov, DocketingSFAWT@doj.ca.gov

Case 5:06-cv-04074-JF Document 23 Filed 12/18/06 Page 7 of 7