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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 20a0216n.06

No. 19-3766

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DAVID M. COOK, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LAURA TAKACS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, GIBBONS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. David M. Cook, Jr., appeals the district court’s decision granting summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants on his procedural due process claim. As set forth below, we 

AFFIRM.

On Saturday, August 18, 2018, Cook went to sleep, forgetting that he had left his dog 

outside. Early the next morning, City of Middleburg Heights Animal Control Officer Laura 

Takacs received a call that a dog was running at large and sent her emergency assistant to pick up 

the dog. Takacs later learned that the unlicensed dog belonged to Cook. At the kennel, Takacs 

observed that the dog’s behavior was “extremely skittish and extraordinarily fearful.” R. 44-3 at 

1. Takacs had the dog examined by a veterinarian. The dog appeared healthy except for her fearful 

behavior, marks around her rear and vaginal area, and ears that “appeared to be a home crop job.” 

Id. at 2. In the meantime, Takacs received several anonymous calls from Cook’s neighbors 

expressing concern for the dog’s safety. The law director, who had also received complaints from 

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neighbors about Cook’s treatment of his dogs, instructed Takacs to keep the dog pending an 

investigation. The city prosecutor subsequently decided to cite Cook. On August 21, 2018, Takacs 

handed Cook two misdemeanor citations: (1) a citation for animal at large in violation of 

Middleburg Heights Ordinance § 618.02(a) with a violation date of August 18, 2018, and a court 

date of September 5, 2018, and (2) a citation for animal cruelty in violation of Middleburg Heights 

Ordinance § 618.05(a)(1) with a violation date of August 18, 2018, and no court date. On August 

25, 2018, Cook received, by certified mail, citations for the same offenses but with a different 

court date. On September 5, 2018, Cook appeared at the Middleburg Heights Mayor’s Court, 

where the charges were dismissed. The dog was released to Cook that same day.

Cook filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Takacs and her 

supervisor Rose Volpe, in their individual and official capacities, and against the City of 

Middleburg Heights. Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages, Cook alleged 

that the defendants unreasonably seized his dog in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the 

Ohio Constitution, that the defendants deprived him of his property in violation of his right to due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment, that Middleburg Heights Ordinances § 618.02 and 

§ 618.05 were unconstitutional both facially and as applied, that Middleburg Heights Ordinance 

§ 618.02 was preempted by Ohio Revised Code § 955.12, and that the City of Middleburg Heights 

was liable for the violations of his constitutional rights under Monell v. Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The defendants and Cook filed motions for summary judgment. 

Granting the defendants’ motion and denying Cook’s motion, the district court concluded that no 

constitutional violation occurred; that, even if a constitutional violation occurred, Takacs and 

Volpe were entitled to qualified immunity; and that the ordinances were neither unconstitutional 

nor preempted by Ohio law. 

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This timely appeal followed. On appeal, Cook argues (1) that the district court should have 

granted summary judgment in his favor on his claim that the defendants violated his right to due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) that the district court should not have found that 

Takacs and Volpe were entitled to qualified immunity. 

We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. See Winkler v. Madison 

Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 890 (6th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Cook challenges the district court’s summary judgment ruling only as to his claim that the 

defendants violated his right to due process. “To establish a procedural due process claim, a 

plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a protected property interest at issue, (2) a deprivation of 

that protected property interest, and (3) that he or she was not afforded adequate procedures.” 

Paterek v. Village of Armada, 801 F.3d 630, 649 (6th Cir. 2015). 

Cook argues that he had a protected interest in receiving the process set forth under Ohio 

Revised Code § 959.132 for seizure and impoundment of companion animals. When an officer 

seizes and impounds a companion animal that the officer has probable cause to believe is the 

subject of an animal cruelty offense, the officer must give written notice of the seizure and 

impoundment to the owner; that notice must “include a statement that a hearing will be held not 

later than ten days after the notice is provided or at the next available court date to determine 

whether the officer had probable cause to seize the companion animal.” Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 959.132(C). The court must hold a probable cause hearing “[n]ot later than ten days after notice 

is provided or at the next available court date.” Id. § 959.132(E)(1). Cook contends that he had a 

“claim of entitlement” to a probable cause hearing under Ohio Revised Code § 959.132 and that 

he was deprived of such a hearing.

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“But the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that an interest in process itself warrants 

process, holding that ‘an expectation of receiving process is not, without more,’ an ‘interest 

protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Phillips v. McCollom, 788 F.3d 650, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 n.12 (1983)). “Process is not an end in itself,” 

but a means “to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of 

entitlement.” Olim, 461 U.S. at 250. “To rule otherwise creates this tail-chasing dilemma: ‘If a 

right to a hearing is a [protected] interest, and if due process accords the right to a hearing, then 

one has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that the state may not deprive a person of 

a hearing without providing him with a hearing.’” Phillips, 788 F.3d at 653-54 (quoting Levin v. 

Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1996)).

Although Cook did not have a protected interest in a probable cause hearing under Ohio 

Revised Code § 959.132, he did have a protected property interest in his dog. See O’Neill v. 

Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 662 F.3d 723, 733 (6th Cir. 2011). Cook was temporarily 

deprived of that interest for eighteen days until the charges against him were dismissed and his 

dog was released to him. 

“[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, ‘the question remains what 

process is due.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (quoting 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). Cook contends that he was due the process set 

forth under Ohio Revised Code § 959.132—that is, he was entitled to a probable cause hearing 

within ten days of his dog’s seizure. However, “the question regarding ‘what process is due’ is 

not answered by state law or local ordinances but by constitutional benchmarks.” Chandler v. 

Village of Chagrin Falls, 296 F. App’x 463, 471 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 

541-42)). 

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“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) 

(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Because “due process is flexible and 

calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 

481, we balance the following factors to determine what process is due:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 

of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 

probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 

the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 

would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 

Applying the Mathews balancing test, we conclude that the temporary seizure and 

impoundment of Cook’s dog did not violate due process. Although Cook has a substantial interest 

in his pet, see O’Neill, 662 F.3d at 733, he was not totally deprived of his property as the dog was 

returned to him after eighteen days. See United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 768 F.3d 

464, 486 (6th Cir. 2014); Wall v. City of Brookfield, 406 F.3d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 

temporary deprivation of property of slight value requires only modest process, consistently with 

the sliding scale approach of Mathews v. Eldridge . . . .”). There is a strong governmental interest 

in being able to seize and impound animals that may be in imminent danger of harm. See United 

Pet Supply, Inc., 768 F.3d at 487. The risk of an erroneous deprivation through the procedures 

used was slight. A pre-seizure hearing was not feasible because Cook’s dog was picked up on the 

street. See Wall, 406 F.3d at 460. Within two days of his dog’s seizure, Cook received notice of 

the seizure, the charges against him, and the court date. Cook asserts that a criminal arraignment 

does not offer a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the merits of his dog’s seizure. Cook could 

have pleaded not guilty to the violations of the local ordinances at his initial court appearance and 

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proceeded to a trial on the merits. Instead, the charges were dismissed and his dog was returned 

to him.

Under these circumstances, the temporary seizure and impoundment of Cook’s dog did not

violate due process. Because there was no due process violation, we need not address Cook’s

qualified immunity argument. See Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 916 (6th Cir. 

2009). 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

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