Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02540/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cheryl Haley, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Infinity Hospice Care, 

Defendant.

No. CV 10-2540-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant Infinity Hospice Care moves to dismiss Plaintiff Cheryl Haley’s 

retaliation claim (i.e., Count III of the complaint) under Rule 12(b)(1) due to lack of 

jurisdictional exhaustion. Doc. 6. Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 8), the motion has been fully 

briefed (Docs. 6, 8, 9), and the parties have not requested oral argument.1

 Dismissal for lack of jurisdictional exhaustion is an affirmative defense that may 

be raised at any time. See Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 

1983). In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court 

is not limited to the allegations in the pleadings if the “jurisdictional issue is separable 

from the merits [the] case.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Where such issues are intertwined, the Court must find that jurisdiction exists and address 

the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment attacking the merits of the 

plaintiff’s case. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 & n.3 

 

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 Defendant’s reply informs the Court that Plaintiff has filed an amended EEOC 

charge alleging retaliation, and asks this Court to stay the motion and convert it to a motion for summary judgment as an alternative to dismissal. Doc. 9. The Court denies 

these requests as moot in light of this order. 

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(9th Cir. 2004). 

 To administratively exhaust an employment discrimination claim a plaintiff must 

file a timely charge with the EEOC. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 

644 (9th Cir. 2003). “Subject matter jurisdiction extends to all claims of discrimination 

that fall within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation 

that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.” Id.

 In this case, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not administratively exhaust her 

retaliation claim because, essentially, she did not check off the “Retaliation” box on the 

Title VII and ADEA charge she filed with the EEOC. See Docs. 6, 6-1. Defendant 

attached a copy of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge to its motion to dismiss. Doc. 6-1 at 2. The 

charge states, among other things, that Plaintiff “was called into Marie Bianca’s office,” 

that Plaintiff “told Bianca that [Plaintiff] felt that their actions were discriminatory,” that 

Plaintiff “subsequently received a text from Bianca to report to the office . . . to meet with 

CEO Darren Bertram,” and that Plaintiff was told by Bertram “we are letting you go.” 

Id. The charge goes on to state Plaintiff’s belief that she was “discriminated against on 

the basis of [her] age . . . and because of [her] sex/female.” Id.

 Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleges she complained 

of discriminatory actions, that subsequent to that complaint she was asked to meet with 

Defendant’s CEO, and that the CEO told Plaintiff her employment was terminated. 

Docs. 6, 6-1, 9. Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation falls 

within the scope of an EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out 

of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge, and retains jurisdiction of this action. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 

644. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is denied. 

 Dated this 17th day of March, 2011. 

Case 2:10-cv-02540-DGC Document 10 Filed 03/17/11 Page 2 of 2