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Nature of Suit Code: 892
Nature of Suit: Economic Stabilization Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 20, 2006 Decided June 9, 2006

No. 05-5302

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY

 OF NEW YORK, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

SAMUEL W. BODMAN,

SECRETARY OF UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND

GEORGE B. BREZNAY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND

APPEALS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00382)

Philip P. Kalodner argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants. 

Stephen C. Skubel, Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was

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1 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. O’Leary, 117 F.3d

538, 545 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Consol. Edison Co. v. Herrington, 752 F.

Supp. 1082 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 927 F.2d 1277 (Temp. Emer. Ct.

App. 1991). 

Thomas H. Kemp, Counsel.

Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal is the latest iteration in

a series of related lawsuits that involve the question whether

States and federal agencies can obtain refunds under the 1986

Stripper Well settlement.1

 Consolidated Edison et al. (“the

Claimants”) appeal the dismissal of their complaint against the

Department of Energy (“DOE”) and its Office of Hearings and

Appeals (“OHA”) on the ground that the district court erred in

holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred the suit. In

light of the interpretation by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit of its exclusive jurisdiction of “an appeal

under section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,”

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(11), we hold that this court has jurisdiction

to address the preclusion issue and that the district court did not

err. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint. 

I.

In the early 1970s, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries imposed an oil embargo on the United States, which

caused the price of oil to rise dramatically. See Consol. Edison

Co. of N.Y v. Abraham, 271 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2003). In

response, acting under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970

(“ESA”), Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (former 12 U.S.C. §

1904 note (1971)), and the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act

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(“EPAA”), Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (former 15 U.S.C.

§ 751 et seq. (1973)), the DOE imposed price controls on crude

oil sold in the United States between 1973 and 1981. When

certain producers were found to have violated the price controls

and overcharged for crude oil, the DOE obtained refunds from

them. See Consol. Edison Co. v. O’Leary, 117 F.3d 538, 540

(Fed. Cir. 1997). A long-running and complex lawsuit then

commenced regarding the fate of the refunded overcharges. The

parties to this litigation, which was known as the Stripper Well

suit, were the DOE, the fifty States and six Territories and

Possessions (the “States”), and various non-governmental

entities, including refiners, retailers, and utilities. In re Dep’t of

Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig., 653 F. Supp. 108, 110

(D. Kan. 1986) (“Stripper Well”). In 1986, the parties entered

into a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) that

set forth the scheme for allocating the refunded overcharges, and

the district court in Kansas approved the agreement. See id. 

By the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the DOE’s

Modified Statement of Restitutionary Policy for Crude Oil

Cases, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,899 (Aug. 4, 1986), the refunded

overcharges would be apportioned between parties and nonparties to the Stripper Well suit. The non-governmental entities

that were parties received certain funds that had been placed in

escrow and in return waived all existing and future claims to

refunds. See Stripper Well, 653 F. Supp. at 114. The remaining

funds and any money that was yet to be recovered by the DOE

would be split between the government parties, with half going

to the DOE and half going to the States. Id. at 112-13. For

non-parties, the Settlement Agreement directed the DOE to

“establish an initial reserve . . . amounting to twenty percent of

the funds received by the DOE and to disburse the remaining

eighty percent in advance of the implementation of a claims

procedure.” Id. at 114. The DOE and its OHA allocated the

20% portion—the Reserve Fund—among claimants according

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to a system known as “Subpart V.” See 10 C.F.R. Pt. 205,

subpt. V. 

On March 9, 2004, the Claimants, a group of energy utilities

and manufacturers that are entitled to recover from the Reserve

Fund, filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that the

federal government and State governments, as well as their

respective departments and agencies, are not entitled to recover

from the Reserve Fund because they were parties to the

Settlement Agreement. Alleging that they will be denied more

than $18 million by virtue of past or future distributions to the

federal government and the States, the Claimants also sought an

order prohibiting the DOE from disbursing any funds to

governments and requiring the DOE to seek restitution of funds

already disbursed. The DOE moved to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the

ground the doctrine of issue preclusion barred the Claimants

from re-litigating the matters in their complaint. In response,

the Claimants moved for summary judgment.

The district court dismissed the complaint and denied the

Claimants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the

complaint was barred by the issue preclusive effect of

Consolidated Edison Company of New York v. Abraham, 2002

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26907 (October 16, 2002) (“ConEd IV”),

which it ruled had determined that the States and non-DOE

federal entities were entitled to receive refunds from the Reserve

Fund. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Abraham, 2005 WL

736523, *6 (D.D.C. March 31, 2005). In the alternative, the

district court ruled that the Claimants could not prevail on the

merits of their complaint because the DOE’s participation in the

Settlement Agreement did not waive the rights of non-DOE

federal agencies or the States to claim refunds from the Reserve

Fund. Id. Upon the denial of their motion to alter or amend the

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the

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Claimants filed simultaneous appeals in this court and the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,

successfully moving to stay the latter appeal until this court

determined whether it has jurisdiction. 

II.

Section 5 of the EPAA incorporated the judicial-review

provisions of section 211 of the ESA. See EPAA, Pub. L. No.

93-149, 87 Stat. 627, 633 (1973) (codified as amended at former

15 U.S.C. § 754 (1973)). Section 211 of the ESA placed

exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district courts in

“cases or controversies arising under” the ESA in the Temporary

Emergency Court of Appeals (“TECA”). See Economic

Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, §

211(a), 85 Stat. 743, 748-49 (1971). That court was dissolved

by Congress and its jurisdiction over ESA issues was transferred

to the Federal Circuit. See Federal Courts Administration Act

of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 102, 106 Stat. 4506 (codified as

amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(11)).

Consequently, because the Federal Circuit has exclusive

jurisdiction over appeals “under section 211 of the [ESA],” 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(11), the DOE maintains the court must dismiss

the instant appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

A court has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction, Nestor

v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also Atl.

Richfield Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 778 (D.C.

Cir. 1984), and the jurisdictional issue is a matter of law for this

court to decide. See Atl. Richfield Co., 769 F.2d at 778. 

The question whether this court has jurisdiction to address

the DOE’s claim of issue preclusion is resolved by Consolidated

Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (“Ashcroft”). In that case, the court relied on the

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interpretation of section 211 of the ESA by the Federal Circuit

in Texas American Oil Corp. v. United States Department of

Energy, 44 F.3d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). In Texas

American, the Federal Circuit held that its jurisdiction under

section 211 of the ESA is limited to “issue” jurisdiction, not

“case” or “arising under” jurisdiction. Id. at 1564. Affirming

the two-part test adopted by the TECA, the Federal Circuit held

that an issue falls within its exclusive jurisdiction if “(1)

resolution of the litigation must have required application or

interpretation of the EPAA/ESA or its regulations, and (2) the

EPAA/ESA issue must have been adjudicated in the district

court.” Id. at 1563-64; see Ashcroft, 286 F.3d at 603. The

Federal Circuit reaffirmed this test in Consolidated Edison Co.

of New York v. Abraham, 303 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir.

2002), and expressly disparaged, as dictum, a statement by the

Tenth Circuit that any controversy involving the interpretation

of the Settlement Agreement was within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Id. (citing In re Dep’t of

Energy Stripper Well Litig., 206 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.

2000)). 

Analyzing whether a complaint is barred by the doctrine of

issue preclusion does not involve “application or interpretation

of the ESA/EPAA or its regulations,” Texas Am., 44 F.3d at

1563, and hence, “[t]he issue raised here fails the first element

of the Texas American test.” Ashcroft, 286 F.3d at 603. Rather,

issue preclusion analysis requires comparing the issues actually

litigated and determined in an earlier lawsuit with the issues that

the Claimants seek to litigate in their complaint. By the same

token, a court conducting an issue preclusion analysis does not

review the merits of the determinations in the earlier litigation.

Cf. Fogg v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 103, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The

issue preclusion analysis is thus “sufficiently separate” from a

substantive determination under the ESA/EPAA that it lies

within this court’s jurisdiction. See Ashcroft, 286 F.3d at 603

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(citing Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1975)).

III.

Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, “binding effect [is

to be given] to the first resolution of an issue.” Fogg, 254 F.3d

at 110. “The law of collateral estoppel,” of which issue

preclusion is a part, see Jack Faucett Assocs. v. Am. Tel. & Tel.

Co., 744 F.2d 118, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1984), “is intended to protect

the parties from the burden of relitigating the same issue

following a final judgment and to promote judicial economy by

preventing needless litigation.” Freeman United Coal Mining

Co. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Program, 20 F.3d 289, 294 (7th

Cir. 1994). Its objective is “judicial finality.” Yamaha Corp. of

Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and

determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination

is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in

a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or

a different claim.” Fogg, 254 F.3d at 111 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 27 (1981)). In addition, “preclusion in the second case must

not work a basic unfairness to the party bound by the first

determination.” Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 254. Each of these

requirements is met here.

In ConEd IV the parties actually litigated the question of

government claims to the Reserve Fund. The Claimants

concede as much, noting that Claimants had argued that a Stateowned utility, as a “party” to the Settlement Agreement, could

not claim from the Reserve Fund, see Appellant’s Br. at 33-34,

and that Claimants had argued for government party ineligibility

to the Reserve Fund, see id. at 37. If this issue was actually and

necessarily decided, the prior decision would be conclusive and

require dismissal of the Claimants’ complaint, which seeks the

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opposite result. Resolving that the question of government party

ineligibility was “actually . . . determined” and was “necessarily

determined” is clear upon reviewing the district court’s opinion

in ConEd IV. 

ConEd IV involved the Claimants’ challenge to the DOE’s

payment of funds from the Reserve Fund to the Puerto Rico

Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”). The Claimants argued

that “as a governmentally owned utility company, PREPA is

disqualified from receiving any portion of the 20% of crude oil

refunds reserved for individual claimants,” and, “in the

alternative, that even if PREPA is a qualified claimant, OHA

failed to discharge its responsibility to investigate the particulars

of PREPA’s claims.” ConEd IV, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26907,

at *6. In rejecting the first claim, the district court addressed the

“variety of contextual arguments” made by Claimants, id. at

*11, and found them to be unsupported by “law, regulatory

decision, or provision of the settlement,” id. at *12. The district

court determined that if the parties to the Settlement Agreement

had intended to waive their rights to recover from the Reserve

Fund “they would have incorporated such a waiver as was

incorporated in the waivers signed by the other

[non-governmental] signatories to the [Settlement]

[A]greement.” Id. at *12 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court then analyzed the “only textual support” for

Claimants’ argument, id. at *15, which consisted of two

statements by the Stripper Well district court to the effect that

the Reserve Fund was created to benefit “individuals” and “nonparties.” Id. at *14 (citing Stripper Well, 653 F. Supp. at 114,

117). The district court determined that the mention of “nonparties” “does not specifically exclude reimbursement to

party-owned entities” because, in approving the Settlement

Agreement, the Kansas district court was “merely not[ing] that

the [A]greement provides for reimbursement by entities not

entering into the [S]ettlement [A]greement.” Id. at *17-*19.

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After disposing of the rest of the Claimants’ arguments, the

district court in ConEd IV concluded:

In summary, [Claimants] have presented for the

Court’s review a number of theories in support of

their contention that government-owned utilities are

not entitled to partake in Subpart V refunds. Their

arguments lack legal, textual and factual support. As

such, this Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have

presented more than a “scintilla of evidence” in

support of their position.

Id. at *22-*23 (emphasis added). 

The Claimants’ suggestion that ConEd IV established only

the rights of “‘governmentally owned’ ‘utilities’” and not of

“‘governmental entities,’” Reply Br. at 13, is untenable. In

ConEd IV, the district court rejected the Claimants’ argument

that the fact that the Settlement Agreement barred

governmentally owned utilities from recovering from an escrow

account created for non-governmental utility companies meant

that the Settlement Agreement also barred governmentally

owned utilities from recovering from the Reserve Fund. ConEd

IV, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26907, at *12. The district court

reasoned that the government parties to the Settlement

Agreement had signed no waiver of their rights to

reimbursement from the Reserve Fund and that if these parties

had intended to waive their rights to the Reserve Fund “they

would have incorporated such a waiver as was incorporated in

the waivers signed by the other [non-governmental] signatories

to the [Settlement] [A]greement.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). In other words, in ConEd IV the district court ruled

that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a party to the Settlement

Agreement, did not sub silentio waive its right to claim from the

Reserve Fund. Consistent with this conclusion, the district court

allowed OHA to disburse Reserve Funds to PREPA. The

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district court could not have done so if PREPA’s state-owned

status precluded recovery because Puerto Rico was barred from

claiming from the Reserve Fund. The proposition that a nonDOE government party, or its owned entities, may claim from

the Reserve Fund was therefore both actually determined and

necessarily determined by ConEd IV.

Likewise, the Claimants’ suggestion that the district court

in ConEd IV did not resolve the rights of a “government party

. . . which is claiming for itself, and not for individuals to whom

it must pass on any recovered refunds,” Reply Br. at 16, is a

distinction having no support in ConEd IV. It is true that after

noting that OHA was permitted to make refunds conditioned on

the pass-through of the refunds to customers, the district court

pointed out that OHA had exercised its discretion in approving

PREPA’s application and that by so doing OHA had ensured

that “individuals” would receive the benefits of the refunded

amounts. ConEd IV, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26907, at *16-*17.

But the district court determined that “the term ‘individuals’ is

not defined in the [S]ettlement [A]greement,” and there was “no

indication” that the Kansas district court, which approved the

Settlement Agreement, used that word to indicate its

understanding that “Subpart V funds not set aside for the State

or federal governments were precluded from being dis[bu]rsed

to state-owned utilities as their government ownership denies

them the ability to claim they are ‘non-parties’ or ‘individuals.’”

 Id. at *15. Further, regarding the non-party issue, the district

court stated in ConEd IV that the Settlement Agreement, as

interpreted by the Kansas district court, “does not specifically

exclude reimbursement to party-owned entities.” Id. at *19.

This statement again establishes that, as construed by the

district court in ConEd IV, party-owned entities, such as other

State and federal departments and agencies, may obtain

reimbursement from the Reserve Fund. Id. 

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For these reasons, we conclude that the district court in

ConEd IV actually addressed the issue posed by the Claimants

here—whether States and non-DOE parts of the federal

government, and their departments and agencies, are eligible to

obtain reimbursement from the Reserve Fund—and necessarily

resolved the question in a manner adverse to the Claimants.

Because the other elements for a finding of issue preclusion are

also met, and because the Claimants had “one fair and full

opportunity to prove a claim and [have] failed in that effort,”

they may not re-litigate the claim a second time, see

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.

313, 324-25 (1971), and we affirm the dismissal of the

complaint. 

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