Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05157/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05157-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 23, 2013 Decided April 4, 2014 

No. 12-5156 

EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY, 

APPELLANT

NAVAJO NATION, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 12-5157 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-00905) 

Christopher J. Neumann argued the cause for appellant 

El Paso Natural Gas Company. With him on the briefs were 

Troy A. Eid and Jerry Stouck. 

Paul E. Frye argued the cause for appellant Navajo 

Nation. With him on the briefs was David A. Taylor. 

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Michael T. Gray, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the 

cause and filed the brief for federal appellees. 

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

RCRA Claims Relating to the Dump 

The District Court’s Dismissal of Appellants’ RCRA Claims as to the 

Dump “With Prejudice” 

RCRA Claims Relating to the Highway 160 Site 

The Government’s Contingent RCRA Counterclaim 

The Tribe’s Mill Tailings Act Claims 

The Tribe’s Remaining Statutory Claims 

The Tribe’s Breach of Trust Claim 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Mill 

B. The Highway 160 Site

C. The Dump 

II. ANALYSIS

A. RCRA Claims as to the Dump

1. CERCLA § 104 Authority 

2. Frey’s “Objective Indicator” Limitation 

3. Temporal Limitation to “Challenges” 

4. When a Claim Qualifies as a “Challenge” 

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5. The District Court’s Dismissal “With Prejudice” 

B. RCRA Claims as to the Highway 160 Site

C. The Government’s Contingent RCRA Counterclaim

D. Mill Tailings Act

E. The Indian Dump Cleanup Act and the Indian Agricultural Act

1. Private Right of Action 

2. APA 

F. Breach of Trust

1. Governing Principles 

a. Trust Claims under the Indian Tucker Act 

b. Circuit Precedent 

2. The Tribe’s Arguments 

a. 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(a)

b. The Indian Dump Cleanup Act, the Indian 

Agricultural Act, and the Mill Tailings Act 

c. Other Statutes 

III. CONCLUSION

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: This is a weighty case, 

involving numerous claims concerning environmental hazards 

at three sites on Navajo land near Tuba City, Arizona. The 

locations in dispute are (1) the Tuba City Uranium Processing 

Mill Site (“Mill”), which was the site of a Cold War mining 

operation that left behind a radioactive byproduct known as 

mill tailings; (2) the Tuba City Open Dump (“Dump”), a 

federal waste facility located on both Hopi and Navajo land 

that was operated by the United States Bureau of Indian 

Affairs (“BIA”) until 1997; and (3) the Highway 160 Dump 

Site (“Highway 160 Site”), which is situated near the Mill and 

has also been used as a dump. 

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The action giving rise to this appeal was initiated in 2007 

by Appellant El Paso Natural Gas Company (“El Paso”), the 

successor-in-interest to the corporation that mined uranium at 

the Mill. El Paso filed a complaint in District Court against 

the United States and various federal agencies and officials 

raising claims under two statutes: the Uranium Mill Tailings 

Radiation Control Act of 1978 (“Mill Tailings Act”), 42 

U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 

which is commonly referred to as the Resource Conservation 

and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-

6992k. Appellant Navajo Nation (“Tribe” or “Nation”) 

intervened and asserted parallel claims under the Mill Tailings 

Act and RCRA, as well as additional claims against the 

Government. 

In 2009, the District Court dismissed El Paso’s Mill 

Tailings Act claim without discovery and certified its ruling 

for interlocutory appeal. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United 

States (El Paso I), 605 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D.D.C. 2009). This 

court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. El Paso 

Natural Gas Co. v. United States (El Paso II), 632 F.3d 1272 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). 

The District Court then dismissed the balance of 

Appellants’ claims in two memorandum opinions. The trial 

court first dismissed all of the Tribe’s claims, except those 

arising under RCRA. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United 

States (El Paso III), 774 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2011). The 

trial court next dismissed all of Appellants’ RCRA claims 

relating to the Dump for want of jurisdiction due to an 

administrative settlement between the BIA and the United 

States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that was 

formalized three years after the start of litigation. The District 

Court also dismissed the RCRA claims relating to the 

Highway 160 Site as moot. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. 

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United States (El Paso IV), 847 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 

2012). An order accompanying the decision denied a motion 

for discovery and dismissed the RCRA claims regarding the 

Dump and the Highway 160 Site with prejudice. These 

consolidated appeals followed. 

Given the number of statutes, claims, and locations at 

issue, we have summarized below the issues on appeal and 

our holdings with respect to each question before the court. 

SUMMARY

RCRA Claims Relating to the Dump. The District Court 

dismissed these claims after EPA and the BIA entered into 

administrative settlement in 2010 under § 104 of the 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 

The District Court held that this agreement triggered the 

jurisdictional bar in CERCLA § 113(h), which forecloses 

courts from hearing “challenges to removal or remedial action 

selected under [CERCLA § 104].” El Paso IV, 847 F. Supp. 

2d at 116-23 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)). Challenging this 

ruling on four fronts, Appellants argue (1) that the 

Government lacked CERCLA § 104 authority because the 

waste at the Dump was naturally occurring; (2) that the 

Administrative Settlement cannot trigger § 113(h) because the 

settlement lacks an objective indicator of when, if ever, 

remediation will occur; (3) that their RCRA claims cannot be 

“challenges” under § 113(h) because they were filed before 

the CERCLA response action; and (4) that their claims are 

also not “challenges” because the enforcement of 40 C.F.R. 

Part 258 landfill regulations will neither delay nor affect the 

CERCLA response action. In light of Appellants’ own 

pleadings and the clear, if troubling, sweep of § 113(h), we 

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are obliged to affirm the dismissal of the RCRA claims 

related to the Dump. 

The District Court’s Dismissal of Appellants’ RCRA 

Claims as to the Dump “With Prejudice.” Appellants argue 

that, even if their RCRA claims must be dismissed pursuant to 

CERCLA § 113(h), the dismissal should have been without 

prejudice. We agree. We therefore reverse the dismissal “with 

prejudice” of Appellants’ RCRA claims that relate to the 

Dump and remand with instructions to the District Court to 

enter judgment against Appellants “without prejudice.” 

RCRA Claims Relating to the Highway 160 Site. The 

District Court dismissed the Tribe’s RCRA claim as moot 

because Congress authorized and appropriated funds for a 

cleanup at the site in 2009, and because the Tribe assumed 

responsibility for the cleanup and agreed to a release of 

liability. El Paso IV, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 123-24. It then 

concluded that El Paso did not have standing to pursue a 

RCRA claim independent of the Tribe. Id. at 124. Appellants 

argue that the scope of the waiver is much narrower than the 

District Court thought and does not reach groundwater 

remediation, which could be the relief obtained under RCRA. 

We agree with the Tribe that its RCRA claims at the Highway 

160 Site are not moot. We therefore vacate the District 

Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ RCRA claims as to the 

Highway 160 Site and remand the case so that these claims 

can be considered on the merits. Because we conclude that the 

Tribe’s RCRA claims at the Highway 160 Site are not moot, 

we need not consider whether El Paso has standing. 

The Government’s Contingent RCRA Counterclaim.

The Government filed a counterclaim against El Paso under 

RCRA. The District Court dismissed the counterclaim without 

prejudice. El Paso argues that the dismissal should have been 

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with prejudice. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the 

District Court. 

The Tribe’s Mill Tailings Act Claims. The Tribe brought 

two claims under the Mill Tailings Act and its associated EPA 

regulations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942; 40 C.F.R. Part 192. 

The District Court granted the Government’s Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion to dismiss because it thought the Mill Tailings Act 

precludes judicial review of claims that fall within the scope 

of the mandatory waiver in § 7915(a)(1). El Paso III, 774 F. 

Supp. 2d at 52. This conclusion was incorrect because the 

Mill Tailings Act does not preclude review of all claims under 

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). We nevertheless 

affirm the dismissal on other grounds. The terms of the 

waiver executed by the Tribe effectively foreclose its Third 

Claim for Relief. And the Tribe’s Fourth Claim for Relief 

fails to state a cause of action under the APA. 

The Tribe’s Remaining Statutory Claims. The Tribe also 

sued under the American Indian Agricultural Resource 

Management Act (“Indian Agricultural Act”), 25 U.S.C. 

§§ 3701-3746, and the Indian Lands Open Dump Cleanup Act 

of 1994 (“Indian Dump Cleanup Act”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3901-

3908. We analyze these claims together because they present 

the same questions on appeal: namely, whether the statutes 

create private rights of action, and, if not, whether the Nation 

has adequately alleged an APA claim based on the 

Government’s failure to act. With respect to the Indian 

Agricultural Act, the Tribe conceded in its reply brief that the 

Act contains no private right to sue; we also find that the 

Tribe failed to plead a claim that is cognizable under the 

APA. We reach the same conclusions with respect to the 

Nation’s claim under the Indian Dump Cleanup Act. The 

statute creates agency obligations, but it does not focus on the 

rights of protected parties. Therefore, no right of action can be 

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implied in the Act. And the Tribe’s claim raises no viable 

action under the APA because it does not allege that the 

Government failed to act with respect to some discrete duty 

that was legally required. 

The Tribe’s Breach of Trust Claim. The Tribe cites 

several statutes in support of its claim that the Government 

breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation. In particular, 

the Tribe relies on 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(a), which provides that 

designated lands “shall be held in trust by the United States 

exclusively for the Navajo Tribe and as part of the Navajo 

Reservation.” The Tribe argues that this statute, in tandem 

with the Government’s actual control of the trust corpus (i.e., 

the land at the Mill, Dump, and Highway 160 Site), creates a 

trust relationship and a concomitant cause of action for breach 

of trust. We disagree. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in a 

decision not cited by the parties, rejected the very argument 

now pressed by the Tribe. We also conclude that the Tribe’s 

argument is contrary to the principles articulated by the 

Supreme Court in Indian Tucker Act cases. Moreover, we are 

unconvinced by the Tribe’s remaining argument that other 

statutes – including many of the ones that form the basis for 

its other claims – establish a viable action here for breach of 

trust. Therefore, we hold that none of the cited statutes creates 

a cause of action for breach of trust. 

I. BACKGROUND

The three locations that are the subject of this suit are 

located on or near the border between the Hopi and Navajo 

reservations, near Tuba City, Arizona. 

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A. The Mill 

 From 1956 to 1966, Rare Metals Corporation, the 

predecessor-in-interest to Appellant El Paso, mined 

approximately 800,000 tons of uranium at the Mill under a 

contract pursuant to a federal government nuclear weapons 

program. Uranium mining produces a sandy, radioactive 

byproduct called “tailings.” Until the 1970s, there was little 

recognition that tailings were hazardous. They were often left 

at mining sites, thus creating a serious threat to public health. 

 In 1978, Congress sought to address the tailings problem 

by enacting the Mill Tailings Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(2). 

The Act provides for a program to assess and remediate 

inactive mills sites. It establishes the United States 

Department of Energy (“DOE”) as the administering agency 

and requires it to designate inactive uranium mill sites for 

remediation “at or near” twenty locations enumerated in 

§ 7912(a), including Tuba City, Arizona. Consistent with 

these provisions, the Mill was designated as a “processing 

site” to be remediated. The Act further directs EPA to 

promulgate standards to govern the cleanups at the designated 

tailings sites, id. § 7918, which EPA did a few years later, see 

40 C.F.R. Part 192. 

In 1985, before any remedial action at the Mill began, the 

DOE entered into a cooperative agreement with the Navajo 

and Hopi Tribes, on whose land the Mill sits. A cooperative 

agreement is a compulsory component of the Mill Tailings 

Act, which directs that the “Secretary shall, to the greatest 

extent practicable, enter into such agreements.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7915(a). The Act requires that cooperative agreements 

contain liability waivers, id. § 7915(a)(1), pursuant to which 

the Navajo and Hopi Tribes consented in 1985 to release the 

United States of “any liability or claim . . . arising out of the 

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performance of any remedial action on such millsite, vicinity 

property or depository site.” Coop. Agreement Between the 

United States Dep’t of Energy, the Navajo Tribe of Indians & 

the Hopi Tribe of Indians (“Coop. Agreement”) at 17-18, 

reprinted in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 214-15. 

A remedial action plan was then formulated. See App’x B 

to Coop. Agreement, reprinted in J.A. 237-70. The plan, 

which was agreed to by the Navajo and Hopi, included a 

stabilization-in-place strategy, whereby 1.4 million cubic 

yards of tailings were collected in a pile and then covered in a 

disposal cell onsite. The cover of the cell comprised a “radon 

barrier” consisting of compacted sand, topped by a layer of 

bedding, and then a layer of rock (riprap, to be precise) 

designed to protect the radon barrier from erosion. Id. at 43, 

reprinted in J.A. 262. The surface cleanup began in 1988 and 

was completed by 1990. A disposal cell spanning fifty acres 

now stands on the site. In addition, since 2002 DOE has 

actively treated contaminated groundwater by pumping it 

from the aquifer, treating it, and then returning it to the 

aquifer. 

The Tribe now alleges that this remediation is ineffective. 

According to its allegations, the disposal cell allows rain 

water to flow directly through the aggregated tailings. This is 

so because the tailings cover, which consists of sand and 

small rocks, is permeable. And because the tailings sit atop a 

thin geologic layer, the contaminated rainwater drains through 

the tailings straight into the Navajo aquifer, a source of 

drinking water for nearby residents. There is a suggestion in 

the record that covers like the one purporting to shield the 

tailings at the Mill are “100 to 1000 times” more permeable 

than design targets. The Tribe contends that, in light of this 

situation, the Mill does not meet the regulatory requirement 

that it be effective for at least 200 years. 

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B. The Highway 160 Site 

The Highway 160 Site (so-called because it abuts the 

eponymous highway) lies just to the north of the Mill. The 

site comprises sixteen acres of Navajo land. Given its 

proximity to the Mill, it is probably unsurprising that the 

Highway 160 Site is also contaminated by radioactive debris. 

The Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency 

(“Navajo EPA”) discovered the contamination in 2003. 

Follow-up surveys and investigations in 2006 and 2007 linked 

the onsite radioactive waste to the Mill and revealed that the 

site had debris buried below ground. All told, there were 

sixteen distinct areas of disturbance in need of soil 

remediation. In addition, there were drums and containers of 

solid and hazardous wastes that had been left on the ground. 

In 2007, in view of the dumping at the site, El Paso brought 

its RCRA citizen claim, as did the Nation in 2010 in its 

intervenor complaint.

 Meanwhile, in 2009, the discoveries at the Highway 160 

Site led Congress to authorize and fund a cleanup. Congress 

included in the Energy and Water Development and Related 

Agencies Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 

Div. C, 123 Stat. 524, 601-30, a $5 million appropriation to 

the DOE to perform “remedial actions . . . at real property in 

the vicinity of the [Mill].” 123 Stat. at 617-18; see also 42 

U.S.C. § 7922. The language of the appropriation makes clear 

that Congress intended the remediation to be done under the 

framework of the Mill Tailings Act. 

In 2010 and 2011, the Tribe and the DOE adopted two 

amendments to a prior cooperative agreement (different than 

the one governing at the Mill). Amendment 021, reprinted in

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J.A. 325-29; Amendment 026, reprinted in J.A. 420-35. Most 

of the $5 million in appropriated funds was given to the 

Navajo EPA to remediate the Highway 160 Site. And in 

Amendment 026, the Nation agreed to the following waiver: 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7915, as this amendment involves 

remedial action, the Navajo Nation (A) releases the 

United States of any liability or claim thereof by such 

tribe or person concerning such remedial action, and (B) 

holds the United States harmless against any claim 

arising out of the performance of any such remedial 

action. 

Amendment 026 at 2, reprinted in J.A. 421. 

 The remediation selected was to excavate the 

contaminated material and transport it offsite. This work had 

commenced in July 2011, although the Navajo EPA was 

unsure whether the funding would be sufficient to complete 

the task and had not determined if the groundwater 

underneath the site was contaminated. See Decl. of Cassandra 

Bloedel ¶¶ 3-5, reprinted J.A. 436-37. 

In 2011, the Government moved to dismiss as moot the 

Nation’s RCRA based on the congressional appropriation, the 

liability waiver, and the then-ongoing remedial work. The 

motion also asserted that El Paso lacked standing to bring a 

RCRA claim on its own at the site. The District Court agreed 

and dismissed the claims. El Paso IV, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 123-

24. 

C. The Dump 

The allegations concerning the Dump paint a disturbing 

picture of the Government’s inaction in the face of clear 

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violations of environmental regulations – a picture that only 

gains texture and detail from a review of the record. 

The Dump is a thirty-acre landfill to the southwest of the 

Mill. It sits mostly on Hopi land, although two acres belong to 

the Navajo Tribe. It is a federal facility and was operated by 

the BIA for approximately fifty years without a RCRA 

permit. Before the BIA ceased operations at the Dump in 

1997, trenches were excavated and filled with trash, and then 

were periodically covered with soil. The site comprises two 

cells where waste was disposed: the “old cell” is a ten-acre 

plot that received waste until about 1980, and the “new cell” 

is a separate twenty acres that received waste thereafter. 

During its operation, the Dump received all manner of 

waste. Locals left their ordinary household trash. The 

Government disposed of hazardous waste at the site, 

including medical wastes deposited by the Department of 

Health and Human Services and the Indian Health Service. 

And beginning in 1968, the United States discarded residual 

radioactive materials and waste from the Mill into the Dump. 

Unsurprisingly, the Dump site is seriously contaminated. 

Testing has revealed that the shallow groundwater in the area 

contains various constituents – including arsenic, selenium, 

and uranium, to name just a few – that do not meet federal 

drinking water standards. And wells installed in 2007 to 

monitor the contamination plume beneath the Dump have 

confirmed contaminant levels above federally allowable 

levels. 

There is a history of governmental inaction at the Dump. 

In 1993, prompted by bad conditions such as daily fires at the 

Dump, local residents served the BIA with a notice of intent 

to sue for open dumping in violation of RCRA and its landfill 

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regulations in 40 C.F.R. Part 258. The BIA attempted to close 

the Dump before the October 9, 1997 regulatory deadline 

under Part 258, but failed to do so. This was in part due to the 

discovery of ground water contamination, which meant that 

the dump no longer qualified for closure as a small exempt 

landfill under 40 C.F.R. § 258.1(f) and was instead subject to 

more stringent requirements for closure. In February 2000, 

EPA issued a notice of potential landfill closure violation but 

never brought an enforcement action. Meanwhile, the BIA has 

repeatedly promised to close the Dump but has gotten only as 

far as conducting preliminary studies – to date, thirty-two of 

them. 

In September 2010 – three years after El Paso initiated 

this lawsuit – the BIA and EPA entered into an 

Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent 

for Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (“Administrative 

Settlement”), reprinted in J.A. 333-88. EPA invoked its 

authority under CERCLA § 104, delegated from the 

President, “to act, consistent with the national contingency 

plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of” a hazardous 

substance, pollutant, or contaminant that has been released (or 

threatens to be released) into the environment. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9604(a)(1). The settlement incorporates into its terms a 

more detailed plan of action, entitled the Remedial 

Investigation and Feasibility Study Work Plan (“Workplan”). 

See Workplan, reprinted in part in J.A. 391-419, available in 

full as attachment to Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, 

El Paso v. United States (No. 1:07-cv-00905-RJL), ECF No. 

73-6.

Under the terms of the Administrative Settlement, the 

BIA agreed to conduct with EPA oversight a remedial 

investigation and feasibility study. The purpose of the study is 

to “determine the nature and extent of contamination and any 

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threat to the public health, welfare, or the environment,” and 

“to identify and evaluate remedial alternatives to prevent, 

mitigate or otherwise respond to or remedy any release or 

threatened release of hazardous substances, pollutants, or 

contaminants at or from the Site.” Admin. Settlement ¶ 9, 

reprinted in J.A. 337-38. 

Soon after the settlement was executed, the Government 

defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. The 

motion asserted that, under CERCLA § 113(h), the Settlement 

Agreement divested the District Court of jurisdiction to hear 

Appellants’ RCRA claims related to the Dump. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo the District Court’s dismissal of 

claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 

12(b)(1) or for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

Kim v. United States, 632 F.3d 713, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

With respect to each claim, we first consider the Rule 

12(b)(1) grounds for dismissal, if any, as subject matter 

jurisdiction presents a threshold question. Id. (citing Steel Co. 

v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)). 

A. RCRA Claims as to the Dump 

Congress enacted RCRA in response to the “rising tide in 

scrap, discarded, and waste materials.” Am. Mining Cong. v. 

EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal 

quotations omitted). “Primary in RCRA, Congress 

empowered the EPA to regulate solid and hazardous waste.” 

Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 384 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). Citizen suits may be brought against any person, 

including the United States and any other governmental 

instrumentality or agency alleged to be in violation of RCRA. 

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See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a); see also, e.g., Backcountry Against 

Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

Appellants each brought RCRA citizen-suit claims 

against the United States and federal agencies relating to the 

Dump and the Highway 160 Site. El Paso Compl. ¶¶ 94-101, 

reprinted in J.A. 76-78; Navajo Compl. ¶¶ 103-12, reprinted 

in J.A. 114-17; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). The District 

Court dismissed the RCRA claims with respect to the Dump 

because, it concluded, CERCLA § 113(h) divested it of 

jurisdiction. 

CERCLA provides for the prompt and efficient cleanup 

of hazardous substances. See United States v. City & Cnty. of 

Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1511 (10th Cir. 1996). EPA has 

authority under CERCLA to “command government agencies 

and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites by or at 

the expense of the parties responsible for the contamination.” 

Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d 188, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, CERCLA 

§ 104 “authorizes EPA, whenever any hazardous substance is 

released or is threatened to be released into the environment, 

to undertake two types of response actions: (1) to remove or 

arrange for the removal of the hazardous substance; and (2) to 

provide for remedial actions relating to the release or 

‘substantial threat of release’ of the substance.” Id. (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 9604). CERCLA’s definition of “hazardous 

substance” draws on RCRA’s standards. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9601(14)(C); see also Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 

479, 485 (1996). 

CERCLA § 113(h) insulates EPA removal and remedial 

actions taken pursuant to CERCLA § 104 from judicial 

review. Section 113(h) states in pertinent part that: 

 

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No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal 

law . . . to review any challenges to removal or remedial 

action selected under section 9604 of this title . . . in any 

action except one of the following [exceptions] . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added). The statute then 

enumerates five exceptions, none of which apply here. As this 

court has previously stated, § 113(h) “effectuates a blunt 

withdrawal of federal jurisdiction.” Oil, Chem. & Atomic 

Workers Int’l Union v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379, 1382 

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). And 

indeed it does, so long as its predicates are met. 

The District Court determined that the September 2010 

Administrative Settlement entered into between EPA and the 

BIA provided for “removal” actions under CERCLA § 104. 

El Paso IV, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 117. And the District Court 

reasoned that, because Appellants sought an injunction 

ordering cleanup activities, the RCRA claims were barred as 

“challenges” to the removal actions for which CERLCA 

§ 113(h) deprives courts of jurisdiction. Id. at 117-18. 

 Appellants do not contest that EPA and BIA’s activities 

at the Dump constitute “removal” actions, nor could they in 

view of the statutory definition of the term. The definition of 

“removal” broadly includes “actions as may be necessary to 

monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of 

hazardous substances.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). The definition 

also encompasses “action taken under section 9604(b) of this 

title,” id., and this incorporated subsection includes studies 

and investigations that EPA “may deem necessary or 

appropriate” whenever EPA is authorized to act under 

CERCLA 104(a) or whenever EPA “has reason to believe 

that a release has occurred or is about to occur,” id. § 9604(b). 

Moreover “removal” also includes related “enforcement 

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activities.” Id. § 9601(25). Thus, the remedial investigation 

and feasibility study that is a part of the Administrative 

Settlement falls within the compass of a “removal action” 

because the agencies have committed to investigate the 

“nature and extent of contamination” from hazardous 

substances at the Dump. Admin. Settlement ¶¶ 1, 9; accord, 

e.g., Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 F.3d 236, 238-39 

(9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that performing such a study is a 

“removal action”). 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Appellants contend that 

§ 113(h) should not bar their RCRA claims in this case. First, 

Appellants argue the Government has failed to establish that it 

acted within the scope of its CERCLA § 104 authority, which 

cannot be invoked to clean up substances that are naturally 

occurring. Second, Appellants contend the Administrative 

Settlement and incorporated Workplan cannot serve as the 

predicate for the application of § 113(h) because the 

settlement lacks an objective indicator of when remediation 

will occur. Third, Appellants argue that claims that predate 

the Government’s invocation of CERCLA, like their own, 

cannot be “challenges” to CERCLA response actions within 

the meaning of § 113(h). And fourth, the RCRA claims are 

also not “challenges,” in Appellants’ view, because enforcing 

the requirements in Part 258 will not delay or interfere with 

the CERCLA response action. Br. for Appellant El Paso 

Natural Gas Co. (“El Paso Br.”) at 21-55; see also Br. for 

Appellant Navajo Nation (“Navajo Br.”) at 54 n.12 (joining 

El Paso’s arguments). 

 1. CERCLA § 104 Authority 

EPA’s authority under CERCLA § 104 is limited by 

subsection (a)(3), which provides in relevant part that the 

“President [and EPA, by delegation,] shall not provide for a 

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19 

removal or remedial action under this section in response to a 

release or threat of release . . . of a naturally occurring 

substance in its unaltered form, or altered solely through 

naturally occurring processes or phenomena, from a location 

where it is naturally found.” 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3)(A). 

Citing this provision, Appellants argue that “the factual record 

shows that any hazardous substances at the [Dump] most 

likely are naturally occurring, making CERCLA 

inapplicable.” El Paso Br. at 29; see also id. at 25-26 (quoting 

snippets from the Workplan that, in the aggregate, stand for 

little more than the straightforward proposition that some

substances at the Dump are naturally occurring). Appellants 

further contend that, insofar as a material jurisdictional fact is 

in dispute – i.e., whether the substances are “naturally 

occurring” – they are entitled to limited jurisdictional 

discovery. Id. at 30 & n.5 (citing Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. 

Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 

The chief impediments to Appellants’ arguments are their 

own pleadings. El Paso’s complaint repeatedly alleges that 

non-naturally occurring hazardous substances were released at 

the Dump. E.g., El Paso Compl. ¶¶ 13, 17, 19-22, 79-87, 

92-94, 105, 108, reprinted in J.A. 88-116. El Paso would have 

us ignore its own allegations, but factual allegations in 

operative pleadings are judicial admissions of fact. See 

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. 

Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003) 

(“[T]he allegations in the [operative complaint] are judicial 

admissions by which [the pleader] was bound throughout the 

course of the proceeding.” (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted)); Schott Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Am. 

Honda Motor Co., Inc., 976 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1992) (“A 

party’s assertion of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission 

by which it normally is bound throughout the course of the 

proceeding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The same 

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goes for the Tribe, see, e.g., Navajo Compl. ¶ 20, reprinted in 

J.A. 146-47, which has also forfeited this argument by stating 

in its brief that it “understands that non-naturally occurring 

contaminants are present in the . . . Dump,” Navajo Br. at 54 

n.12. 

It is of course true that El Paso was entitled to plead in 

the alternative and, to the extent it did so, to not be bound in 

one claim by an allegation pled only as to its alternative 

claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2); Schott Motorcycle Supply, 

976 F.2d at 61-62 (citing 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1282). But that is not what 

happened. El Paso incorporated all of the allegations cited 

above in its RCRA claim. El Paso Compl. ¶ 103, reprinted in 

J.A. 114. And certain allegations were plainly made in view 

of the RCRA claim. Id. ¶ 13, reprinted in J.A. 88-89 (alleging 

that RCRA was violated due to the Government’s storage and 

disposal of, inter alia, “medical waste”). 

Appellants’ allegations foreclose their arguing that the 

substances at the Dump are only “naturally occurring.” For 

the purposes of this proceeding, their pleadings operate as a 

judicial admission that man-made hazardous waste exists at 

the Dump, a fact that is fatal to their argument under 

CERCLA § 104(a)(3). In light of Appellants’ admissions, 

limited jurisdictional discovery was not required. And we do 

not consider El Paso’s argument, raised for the first time in its 

reply brief, that EPA lacked § 104 authority in light of the 

definition of “release” in CERCLA § 101(22), which excludes 

any “release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material 

from any processing site designated under” the Mill Tailings 

Act. El Paso Reply at 10-11 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)). 

We have no occasion to address, and we certainly do not 

endorse, the Government’s argument that a suit questioning 

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21 

EPA’s authority to invoke CERCLA is itself a “challenge” 

barred by CERCLA § 113(h). Br. for the Fed. Defs. (“Gov’t 

Br.”) at 38-39. The absolutism of the Government’s position 

is striking. At oral argument, in response to a hypothetical, 

counsel for the Government stated that the § 113(h) bar would 

apply even if EPA said that it was invoking § 104 as to a site 

that it knew to be contaminated with substances that were 

exclusively naturally occurring. Later avenues for challenge 

exist, counsel suggested, such as in a defense to a costrecovery action or by bringing a CERCLA citizen suit once 

the response action is completed. When this position is 

coupled with the Government’s additional claim that EPA is 

not constrained by any time limits on when it must finish 

ongoing CERCLA actions, the scope of § 113(h) is stretched 

well beyond what Congress contemplated when the statutory 

bar was enacted. 

In Frey v. EPA, 403 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), the 

Seventh Circuit raised similar concerns about the 

Government’s construction of § 113(h): 

[W]hat if EPA decides to study the contamination for an 

indeterminate period of time without taking any remedial 

action? Counsel had no response when asked whether the 

statute precludes review if EPA claims that it will take 

action, after further study, at some point before the sun 

becomes a red giant and melts the earth. We then asked 

counsel whether a reviewing court could . . . compel 

agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 

delayed, if EPA dragged its feet for decades. Counsel 

informed us that a court could not act under these 

circumstances because CERCLA’s rules governing 

judicial review override the APA. . . . We can only 

conclude from this exchange that EPA considers itself 

protected from review under CERCLA § 113(h) as long 

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as it has any notion that it might, some day, take further 

unspecified action with respect to a particular site. 

Id. at 834. 

 The Government’s position is dubious, to say the least: If

EPA’s ipse dixit is enough to trigger § 113(h), and if EPA can 

also do nothing for as long as it pleases, then CERCLA 

§ 113(h) becomes a license for EPA to do as it will for as long 

as it would like, all the while free of judicial review. And 

where federal facilities are involved, this carte blanche has the 

potential to be used by the Government to avoid liability. We 

doubt this is what Congress intended in CERCLA § 113(h). In 

this case, however, having found that Appellants are in fact 

challenging CERCLA action, it is enough for this court to join 

the Seventh Circuit in highlighting the problem as one that is 

ripe for congressional consideration. 

 2. Frey’s “Objective Indicator” Limitation 

Relying on Frey, Appellants next argue that § 113(h) 

prohibits suits only when the Government provides an 

“objective indicator that allows for external evaluation, with 

reasonable target . . . completion dates, of the required work 

for the site.” El Paso Br. at 31 (quoting Frey, 403 F.3d at 

835). This line of argument is perplexing, both because the 

issue raised in Frey is not the same issue that we face in this 

case and because the limitation it announces would not apply 

to the facts before us. 

Frey addresses the question whether a CERCLA citizen 

suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9659 may proceed under CERCLA 

§ 113(h)(4), which is one of the five enumerated exceptions to 

the subsection’s general ban on challenges to CERCLA 

actions. 403 F.3d at 829. That case concerned a “remedial 

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action,” not a “removal,” a distinction that matters under 

§ 113(h)(4). Id. at 835-36. EPA had concluded one phase of 

its remedial action (excavating polychlorinated biphenyls); 

however, the agency had not “selected” a remedy for the next 

phase, which concerned groundwater or sediment 

contamination. Id. at 833. The court rejected EPA’s argument 

that § 113(h) barred CERCLA citizen suits indefinitely while 

EPA considered its next remedial action. Id. at 834. Unlike in 

Frey, there is no doubt that in this case the actions taken 

pursuant to the Administrative Settlement, including the 

incorporated Workplan, constitute a “removal” that has been 

“selected” under § 113(h). In any case, it would be impossible 

to apply § 113(h)(4), which Frey relied upon for this 

distinction, because Appellants did not bring a CERCLA 

citizen suit. Appellants’ argument thus amounts to a non 

sequitur. 

The Frey argument also fails on its own terms as the 

Administrative Settlement in this case would pass the 

“objective indicator” test articulated in Frey. In Frey, EPA’s 

CERCLA efforts had come to a standstill, although the 

agency continued to claim that it would – someday – take 

remedial action. EPA then attempted to use § 113(h)(4), 

which blocks citizen suits while “a remedial action is to be 

undertaken at the site,” as a fig leaf to cover its indefinite 

delay. This situation is not before us; under the terms of the 

Administrative Settlement, the BIA is required to conduct the 

remedial investigation and feasibility study under a specific 

schedule. Admin. Settlement ¶¶ 11(t), 31, reprinted in J.A. 

343, 349-50. The incorporated Workplan schedule provides 

specific deadlines for the subtasks involved in finishing the 

study. Table 5, Conceptual Project Timeline (attached to 

Workplan), reprinted in J.A. 417. To be sure, these deadlines 

can be modified, see Admin. Settlement ¶ 33, and it appears 

that some have been modified. But this possibility does not 

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render the Administrative Settlement devoid of objective 

indicators for completion. Indeed, the agreement has 

benchmarks that would enable a court to determine if the 

agencies were unduly delaying their removal action and 

distorting § 113(h) into an “open-ended prohibition on a 

citizen suit.” Frey, 403 F.3d at 834.

3. Temporal Limitation to “Challenges” 

 Section 113(h) applies only to “challenges to removal or 

remedial action,” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added), and 

Appellants offer two arguments why their RCRA claims are 

not “challenges.” The first is a temporal argument: Appellants 

contend that the term “challenges” encompasses only suits 

filed after the initiation of a CERCLA response action. (We 

consider the second argument in Section II.A.4, infra.) They 

reason that the jurisdictional bar in § 113(h) does not apply 

here because their RCRA claims predate the initiation of the 

CERCLA removal action. El Paso Br. at 35. In support, 

Appellants invoke the purported plain meaning of the statute, 

congressional intent, and the canon that statutory provisions 

should, if possible, be construed in harmony. Id. at 36-46. We 

are unconvinced. 

The meaning of § 113(h), though not plain, supports the 

Government’s position that the § 113(h) bar applies to 

Appellants’ RCRA claims at the Dump. The operative text 

states that “[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction . . . to 

review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected 

under section 9604 . . . in any action except one of the 

following” five exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis 

added). Appellants assert that “[o]ne cannot issue a challenge 

against something that does not exist,” and, thus, by 

construing “Appellants’ RCRA claims as a challenge to 

EPA’s later-initiated response action, the [District Court] 

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disregarded the ordinary meaning of a ‘challenge.’” El Paso 

Br. at 36. The statute, however, refers to “any challenges,” 

which favors a broad reading of the term to include challenges 

that were so when filed and later-developing challenges. In 

other words, so long as Appellants’ RCRA claims are live, 

they are meant to challenge governmental action (or inaction) 

that is contrary to RCRA, which includes such action taken 

(or forgone) after Appellants’ claims were first advanced to 

initiate this law suit. 

We find no basis in the legislative history to doubt our 

construction of the text. Appellants cite a House Report that 

states that the “purpose of this provision is to ensure that there 

will be no delays associated with a legal challenge of the 

particular removal or remedial action selected under section 

104.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 5, at 25-26 (1985). But this 

reference suffers from the same basic ambiguity as the 

statutory text, i.e., whether a challenge must be intended as 

such from the start or whether a claim can become a challenge 

to a later-filed CERCLA removal or remedial action. If 

anything, this report underscores the importance to Congress 

of minimizing litigation-related delays to CERCLA cleanups, 

and Appellants have offered no persuasive reason why 

Congress would want to treat differently the two types of 

litigation-related delays (i.e., delay caused by preexisting 

claims and delay caused by claims filed after CERCLA 

response actions). Delay is delay, and both the natural reading 

of § 113(h) and the apparent purpose of the subsection 

support our construing “challenges” without regard to the 

strict chronology of when a particular claim is filed. 

Nor are we convinced by Appellants’ assertion that the 

District Court’s interpretation of § 113(h) failed to harmonize 

§ 113(h) with RCRA. Our task is to determine what Congress 

intended when it enacted § 113(h), and we cannot, under the 

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guise of harmonizing statutes, ignore convincing indicia of 

congressional intent. Congress drafted § 113(h) just two years 

after enacting the RCRA citizen suit provision, and yet it did 

not except RCRA from the sweep of § 113(h). See River Vill. 

W. LLC v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 618 F. Supp. 2d 

847, 852-53 (N.D. Ill. 2008). And it is clear that Congress 

knew how to preserve RCRA rights when it so desired. See 42 

U.S.C. § 9620(i) (“Nothing in this section shall affect or 

impair the obligation of [the Government] to comply with any 

requirement of [RCRA].” (emphasis added)). But it did not. 

And like many other circuits, we are satisfied that Congress 

did not intend to afford RCRA citizen suits special protection 

from the preemptive sweep of § 113(h). See, e.g., Cannon v. 

Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1332-36 (10th Cir. 2008); OSI, Inc. v. 

United States, 525 F.3d 1294, 1297-99 (11th Cir. 2008); 

APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 2003); Clinton 

Cnty. Comm’rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1026-28 (3d Cir. 

1997); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 

F.3d 325, 328-30 (9th Cir. 1995); Ark. Peace Ctr. v. Ark. 

Dep’t of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1217-

18 (8th Cir. 1993). 

 

4. When a Claim Qualifies as a “Challenge” 

 

 Appellants also suggest that their claims are not 

“challenges” under § 113(h) because requiring the BIA to 

comply with RCRA’s Part 258 landfill regulations at the 

Dump will not delay or affect any CERCLA cleanup at the 

site. El Paso Br. at 47. In other words, Appellants aim to 

answer this important question: Under what circumstances 

does a claim qualify as a “challenge” under § 113(h)? 

Other circuits that have addressed this question have 

applied a “broad standard for what constitutes a challenge.” 

Cannon, 538 F.3d at 1336. These courts have found that 

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lawsuits qualify as “challenges” under § 113(h) when they 

would create “the kind of interference with the cleanup plan 

that Congress sought to avoid or delay by the enactment of 

Section 113(h).” McClellan, 47 F.3d at 330; see also, e.g.,

Cannon, 538 F.3d at 1335 (“[A] suit challenges a removal 

action if it interferes with the implementation of a CERCLA 

remedy because the relief requested will impact the removal 

action selected.” (emphasis added) (alteration, internal 

quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Broward Gardens 

Tenants Ass’n v. EPA, 311 F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(“To determine whether a suit interferes with, and thus 

challenges, a cleanup, courts look to see if the relief requested 

will impact the remedial action selected.” (emphasis added)). 

We believe the approach taken by these circuits is 

consistent with the operative language and purpose of 

§ 113(h). We therefore hold that a claim is a § 113(h) 

“challenge” if it will interfere with a “removal” or a “remedial 

action.” In some situations, the nature and degree of 

interference are sufficiently direct and clear that it will be 

obvious that the suit is a “challenge” barred by § 113(h). See, 

e.g., Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1012 (3d 

Cir. 1991) (concluding that § 113(h) barred jurisdiction over a 

request to stay a CERCLA cleanup until EPA conducted a 

review of the site as required under the National Historic 

Preservation Act). In other situations, it may be necessary to 

assess the nexus between the nature of the suit and the 

CERCLA cleanup: the more closely related, the clearer it will 

be that the suit is a “challenge.” See McClellan, 47 F.3d at 

330. As the Ninth Circuit explained, 

every action that increases the cost of a cleanup or diverts 

resources or personnel from it does not thereby become a 

“challenge” to the cleanup. The enforcement of minimum 

wage requirements, for example, might increase the cost 

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of a cleanup and even divert personnel from cleanup 

duties without becoming a challenge to the cleanup. [The 

plaintiff’s RCRA] lawsuit, however, is far more directly 

related to the goals of the cleanup itself than is the 

hypothetical minimum wage action. [The plaintiff], for 

all practical purposes, seeks to improve on the CERCLA 

cleanup as embodied in the [agreement]. 

Id. (emphasis added); see also Gen. Elec., 360 F.3d at 194 

(concluding that pre-enforcement judicial review of a facial 

constitutional challenge to CERCLA was permissible under 

§ 113(h), notwithstanding the concern that the challenge, if 

successful, “would have the effect of hindering or delaying 

EPA’s cleanup of hazardous waste sites” (emphasis added)).

 Under this framework, there can be little doubt that 

Appellants’ RCRA claims are “challenges.” This conclusion 

is evident from Appellants’ pleadings. See El Paso Compl. 

¶ H, reprinted in J.A. 118 (seeking “a permanent injunction 

ordering that Defendants perform cleanup activities”); Navajo 

Compl. ¶¶ I.3, I.6, reprinted in J.A. 174 (seeking an 

injunction requiring Defendant to “perform clean-up 

activities” and to “provide financial and technical assistance 

to the Navajo Nation to carry out the activities necessary to 

effect clean closure” of the Dump). The requested relief in 

this case goes beyond interfering with an ongoing CERCLA 

removal action. The injunction that Appellants seek would 

require specific cleanup activities that would threaten to 

obviate the very point of the remedial investigation and 

feasibility study. As noted above, the point of the study is to 

analyze the extent of contamination and to evaluate different 

remedial alternatives so that the Government will be able to 

choose the “remedial action” that is “appropriate under the 

circumstances presented” and that will “assure[] protection of 

human health and the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d); see 

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also id. § 9601(23) (A “removal” includes “actions as may be 

necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat 

of release of hazardous substances.”). 

 Nor does our conclusion change if we assume that 

Appellants’ RCRA claims are limited to enforcing “the 

ground water monitoring, interim measures, corrective action 

and other requirements of Part 258.” El Paso Br. at 47. These 

regulations require groundwater sampling, analysis, and, if 

contaminants are detected above allowable standards, an 

assessment and implementation of a “corrective action” – all 

on a specified timetable. 40 C.F.R. §§ 258.53(e), 258.53(i) 

258.54(c), 258.55(g), 258.57(a)-(b). Claims based on these 

regulations invariably would interfere with the remedial 

investigation and feasibility study and, thus, the CERCLA 

removal. The relief requested by Appellants would alter how 

EPA monitors and assesses the extent of contamination, see 

42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), and, more importantly, would threaten 

to preempt EPA’s ability to choose the best remedial action 

among a panoply of remedial alternatives that have been 

analyzed in a completed remedial investigation and feasibility 

study according to criteria articulated in CERCLA, not Part 

258. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii) (listing nine 

criteria for analyzing remedial alternatives as part of the 

feasibility study), with 40 C.F.R. § 258.57(b) (listing factors 

for selecting corrective remedies under RCRA’s Part 258). 

That the RCRA claims are “directly related to the goals 

of the cleanup itself” bolsters our conclusion that they are 

“challenges” under § 113(h). McClellan, 47 F.3d at 330. One 

of the four express purposes of the Administrative Settlement 

is to “ensure compliance with the groundwater monitoring 

requirements of 40 C.F.R. Part 258.” Admin. Settlement 

¶ 9(d), reprinted in J.A. 338. It is true that CERCLA § 121(d) 

directs compliance with RCRA standards only with respect to 

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the “remedial action” selected (not as to a “removal” 

selected), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A); however, the Workplan 

structures the remedial investigation and feasibility study in 

light of EPA’s eventual obligation under the statute. See 

Workplan at 36 (“Section 121(d) of CERCLA requires 

attainment of federal, state and Tribal [requirements].”); 

Table 2, “Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate 

Requirements” (attached to Workplan) at 5 (listing 40 C.F.R. 

§ 258.58 as an applicable requirement and summarizing the 

requirement as follows: “Municipal landfill groundwater 

monitoring, provides substantive requirements for 

groundwater detection monitoring, assessment monitoring, 

remedy selection and implementation of corrective actions”). 

In other words, because the remedial action must comply with 

RCRA, it is reasonable to assume that EPA must conduct its 

remedial investigation and feasibility study to evaluate 

remediation which will comply with these obligations. The 

remedial investigation and feasibility study is thus guided, 

albeit indirectly, by the very regulations that Appellants seek 

to enforce judicially. 

Appellants cite United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 

(10th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that bringing a RCRA 

enforcement claim does not constitute a “challenge” under 

§ 113(h). However, Colorado is readily distinguishable 

because that case involved a state’s attempt to enforce its 

hazardous waste requirements. Id. at 1576 (citing 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9614(a), providing that “[n]othing in [CERCLA] shall be 

construed or interpreted as preempting any State from 

imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect 

to the release of hazardous substances within such State”); see 

also Ark. Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1217 (noting that in 

Colorado “the court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a)” which is 

not implicated here). 

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5. The District Court’s Dismissal With Prejudice

 Finally, Appellants argue that, even if their RCRA claims 

must be dismissed pursuant to CERCLA § 113(h), the 

dismissal should have been without prejudice. We agree. 

Although § 113(h) effects a withdrawal of jurisdiction 

whenever its predicates are met, the statutory provision – 

covering only the “Timing of review” – does not permanently 

withdraw jurisdiction over otherwise viable RCRA claims and 

claims arising under one of the exceptions to § 113(h). 

The Government acknowledges that after a remedial 

investigation and feasibility study is completed, “EPA could 

determine that no further remediation work is necessary.” 

Gov’t Br. at 47. We can find nothing in the statute that 

obviously bars a renewed RCRA claim after a removal or 

remedial action has concluded. The Government simply 

states, in conclusory terms, that RCRA claims arising after a 

removal or remedial action has concluded should be barred by 

CERCLA § 113(h) as impermissible “challenges” to the 

removal or remedial actions. This seems contrary to the 

statute because once a removal or remedial action has 

concluded there would be no “removal” or “remedial action” 

contemplated by the Government that a renewed suit would 

“challenge.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 

If the Government were to choose not to pursue remedial 

action, Appellants concededly might elect to bring a claim 

under CERCLA’s citizen suit provision. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 9613(h)(4) (exempting CERCLA citizen suits from the 

subsection’s jurisdictional bar), § 9621(d)(2) (requiring 

CERCLA remedial action to meet RCRA standards that are 

“legally applicable”), § 9659(a)(2) (authorizing citizen suits if 

EPA fails to perform a non-discretionary duty); see also 

Gov’t Br. at 35-36. That a cause of action under CERCLA’s 

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32 

citizen suit provision may be available, however, does not 

mean that this cause of action must be the exclusive vehicle 

for seeking additional remedial action at the Dump. 

In any event, we need not decide whether renewed 

RCRA claims may be brought after a removal or remedial 

action has concluded. As we have explained, the Appellants’ 

position on this point is far from untenable, but this is a 

difficult issue that admits of no easy answer. Therefore, we 

agree that Appellants’ current RCRA claims should be 

dismissed without prejudice because any question regarding 

the applicability of CERCLA § 113(h) to renewed RCRA 

claims is unripe for review at this time. We leave resolution of 

this question for another day. The District Court’s dismissal 

with prejudice is therefore reversed. 

B. RCRA Claims as to the Highway 160 Site 

The RCRA claims at the Highway 160 Site remain for 

our consideration. The District Court ruled that the Nation’s 

RCRA claim was mooted by the congressional appropriation 

for site remediation and by the Tribe’s agreeing to the liability 

release in Amendment 026. El Paso IV, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 

123-24. This was error. The congressional appropriation and 

the agreements between the Nation and the DOE are 

insufficient to moot the Nation’s RCRA claim. 

The mootness limitation is constitutional: 

Because the exercise of judicial power under Article III 

depends upon the existence of a case or controversy, a 

federal court may not render advisory opinions or decide 

questions that do not affect the rights of parties properly 

before it. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 

(1971) (per curiam). A court’s judgment must resolve “a 

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real and substantial controversy admitting of specific 

relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 

distinguished from an opinion advising what the law 

would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Id. This 

means that an actual controversy must exist at all stages 

of judicial review, not merely when the complaint is 

filed. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). 

EDWARDS, ELLIOTT & LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF 

REVIEW 134 (2d ed. 2013). And a court must “refrain from 

deciding [a case that was live when filed] if ‘events have so 

transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the 

parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of 

affecting them in the future.’” Clarke v. United States, 915 

F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting 

Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 897 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. 

Cir. 1990)). 

The congressional appropriation for site remediation 

certainly did not render the Tribe’s claim moot. The 

appropriation merely offers some support for relief efforts, 

but it does not guarantee remedial results, nor by its terms 

does it bar the Tribe’s present action. Likewise, the Tribe’s 

execution of the liability release in Amendment 026 did not 

moot its current claim as to the Highway 160 Site. The release 

in Amendment 026 does not sweep nearly so broadly as the 

District Court thought. 

The District Court relied on clause (A) of the waiver but 

omitted key phrasing. In relevant part, the waiver states: 

“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7915, as this amendment involves 

remedial action, the Navajo Nation (A) releases the United 

States of any liability or claim thereof by such tribe or person 

concerning such remedial action . . . .” Amendment 026 at 2, 

reprinted in J.A. 421 (emphasis added). The first clause refers 

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34 

to the Mill Tailings Act, and the phrasing of the second clause 

establishes a link between “remedial action” and the Act. This 

language makes clear that the Tribe and DOE contemplated in 

this release a specific type of remedial action, namely that 

taken under the authority of the Mill Tailings Act. 

Simply put: the agreement does not contemplate a release 

of liability “concerning any remedial action,” it only releases 

liability “concerning such remedial action.” And the Tribe’s 

RCRA claim is not one “concerning such remedial action.” 

Among other things, the Tribe seeks to enforce RCRA 

regulations that require the implementation of a “ground 

water monitoring” program. Navajo Compl. ¶ 76, reprinted in 

J.A. 162-63. Ground water remediation “concerns such 

remedial action” only insofar as it would take place at the 

same location, albeit on different strata. As the Tribe 

explained, the remedial action selected at the Highway 160 

Site “only concerns soil,” Navajo Br. at 58, which the 

Government does not dispute in its brief. Indeed, it would 

make no sense to say that the remediation covered 

groundwater, as it was unclear at the time whether the 

groundwater beneath the site was contaminated. See Bloedel 

Decl. ¶ 5. 

The bottom line is that the Tribe still has an injury caused 

by the Government that can be remediated by requiring 

compliance with RCRA’s groundwater compliance 

regulations. And no events have transpired to moot its claim. 

The District Court’s additional rationale concerning the 

broad purpose of the cooperative agreement is unconvincing. 

It credited the “broad statement of purpose” in Amendment 

026 “to complete remediation of the Highway 160 Site.” El 

Paso IV, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 123. But this quote is but an 

isolated statement from a document which otherwise makes 

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35 

clear that the remedial action would entail excavating the 

contaminated materials from the soil, and not some allencompassing remedial action. See Attach. A to Amendment 

026 at 5, reprinted in J.A. 429. More fundamentally, under 

the District Court’s reading, the phrase “concerning such 

remedial action” means the same thing as “concerning the 

Highway 160 Site” or “concerning any remedial action ever.” 

This is not what the waiver says. 

 Even if the disputed waiver were ambiguous on the 

question whether it covers the Tribe’s RCRA groundwater 

claims – which it is not – we would resolve the ambiguity in 

the Tribe’s favor. See Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 

F.3d 1054, 1062 (10th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2181 

(2012) (agreements dealing with Indian affairs have been 

construed liberally in favor of establishing Indian rights). 

 Because we conclude that the Tribe’s RCRA claims at 

the Highway 160 Site are not moot, we need not consider 

whether El Paso has standing. Mountain States Legal Found. 

v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“For each 

claim, if constitutional and prudential standing can be shown 

for at least one plaintiff, we need not consider the standing of 

the other plaintiffs to raise that claim.”). We therefore reverse 

the District Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ RCRA claims as 

to the Highway 160 Site and remand the case so that these 

claims can be considered on the merits. 

C. The Government’s Contingent RCRA Counterclaim

The Government filed a counterclaim against El Paso 

under RCRA pursuant to the citizen endangerment provision, 

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Am. Countercl., reprinted in J.A. 

176. Before the District Court, the Government characterized 

its claim as “a protective reciprocal counterclaim,” and 

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36 

explained that the claim “ensures that there is a vehicle for the 

Court to equitably apportion cleanup responsibility for the 

properties among responsible parties, including [El Paso], 

should [El Paso] succeed on its RCRA claims.” United States’ 

Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Countercl. at 2, 14-

15, El Paso v. United States (No. 1:07-cv-00905-RJL), ECF 

No. 59. 

El Paso moved to dismiss the counterclaim, and the 

District Court denied the motion in a minute order. Later, 

however, in light of the dismissal of Appellants’ RCRA 

claims, the District Court dismissed the Government’s 

counterclaim without prejudice. El Paso argues that the 

Government’s counterclaim should have been dismissed with 

prejudice. Even though El Paso prevailed on the 

counterclaim, it is within its rights to “appeal a dismissal 

without prejudice on the grounds that it wants one with 

prejudice.” See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. DOT, 137 F.3d 640, 

647 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). El Paso provides 

two grounds why the dismissal should have been with 

prejudice. First, it contends that the Government is not 

authorized to bring a RCRA “citizen suit” under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6972(a)(1)(B). El Paso Br. at 57-61. Second, El Paso argues 

that the claim is inadequately pled. Id. at 61-62. 

We start with the language of the statute. Subsection 

(a)(1) of the citizen suit provision states: 

Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, 

any person may commence a civil action on his own 

behalf . . . (B) against any person, including the United 

States and any other governmental instrumentality or 

agency . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to 

the past or present handling, storage, treatment, 

transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous 

USCA Case #12-5157 Document #1486964 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 36 of 65
37 

waste which may present an imminent and substantial 

endangerment to health or the environment. 

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (emphasis added). RCRA defines 

“person” to include not just individuals but also, inter alia, 

“each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United 

States.” Id. § 6903(15). The question for us is whether the 

Government is a “person” who “may commence a civil 

action.” Or, more precisely, whether the federal defendants – 

who, until now, we have referred to as, collectively, the 

“Government” – are “persons” entitled to bring suit. 

The plain import of the operative text of § 6972(a)(1)(B) 

and § 6903(15) settles the issue. The express definition of 

“person” includes the counterclaimants. And subsection 

(a)(1)(B) only confirms this application: the “including” 

clause in § 6972(a)(1)(B) indicates that “person” as used in 

the subsection encompasses the United States. Id.

§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (“against any person, including the United 

States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency” 

(emphasis added)). We read the first use of “person” in pari 

materia with the second mention of the term, which includes

governmental agencies. 

 El Paso’s arguments are unavailing in the face of this 

clear statutory command. It contends that allowing 

governmental entities to bring citizen suits runs contrary to 

the statutory scheme that separately authorizes EPA to bring 

suits on behalf of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a). This 

is a fair point, but EPA is not a counterclaimant and nothing 

in § 6973 expressly limits alternative action taken under the 

citizen suit provision. Permitting federal agencies to sue under 

§ 6972(a)(1)(B) will not undermine EPA’s primary 

enforcement authority because a citizen suit, including one 

brought by a federal agency, cannot proceed until 90 days 

USCA Case #12-5157 Document #1486964 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 37 of 65
38 

after EPA is given notice of the endangerment. Id.

§ 6972(b)(2)(A); see also id. § 6972(d) (giving EPA right to 

intervene). 

El Paso also cites legislative history to suggest that the 

amendment in 1992 that added federal agencies to RCRA’s 

definition of “person” was for a limited purpose: to make 

clear that RCRA waived sovereign immunity for citizen suits 

against federal facilities. El Paso Br. at 60 (citing H.R. REP.

NO. 102-111, at 5-6 (1991)). The inference El Paso would 

have us draw is that the amendment is therefore not intended 

for other purposes, such as allowing federal agencies to bring 

RCRA citizen suits. But the evidence is mixed or, if anything, 

more supportive of the Government’s interpretation. See S.

REP. NO. 102-67, at 5 (1991) (“[T]he bill amends the 

definition of person in section 1004(15) of the Solid Waste 

Disposal Act [i.e., RCRA] so that all of the provisions of that 

Act apply in the same manner and to the same extent to both 

Federal and non-Federal persons.”). With the statute as clear 

as it is, El Paso’s arguments on appeal are insufficient for us 

to forgo giving effect to the plain import of the provision. The 

counterclaim was valid under RCRA. 

 

 We are also unconvinced by El Paso’s second argument, 

that the counterclaim is “legally deficient because it contains 

only conditional allegations that do not actually allege an 

endangerment.” El Paso Br. at 61. El Paso observes that the 

counterclaim alleges that “[t]o the extent that either [El Paso] 

or the Navajo Nation establishes, as alleged in their 

complaints, that solid or hazardous waste [at one of the 

relevant sites] may present an imminent and substantial 

endangerment to health or the environment, then [El Paso] is 

liable under [RCRA] section 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. 

6972(a)(1)(B).” Id. (quoting Am. Countercl. ¶ 24). In El 

Paso’s view, this is insufficient under Rule 8(a)(2) because 

USCA Case #12-5157 Document #1486964 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 38 of 65
39 

the counterclaim does not show that the Government is 

entitled to relief. 

 If El Paso conceded that its own RCRA claim was not 

plausible, then perhaps it would have a point. But it does not. 

Its argument is therefore meritless. Counterclaims made 

contingent on the outcome of the principal action are 

permissible. See Springs v. First Nat’l Bank of Cut Bank, 835 

F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[A] counterclaim is not 

barred because recovery will depend on the outcome of the 

main action.”); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 1411 (“A counterclaim will not be denied 

treatment as a compulsory counterclaim solely because 

recovery on it depends on the outcome of the main action, 

however. This approach seems sound when the counterclaim 

is based on pre-action events and only the right to relief 

depends upon the outcome of the main action.”). 

 We therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the 

Government’s counterclaim without prejudice. 

D. Mill Tailings Act 

Only claims brought by the Nation remain. Of these, we 

turn next to the two claims that allege violations at the Mill of 

the Mill Tailings Act and related regulations. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 7901-7942; 40 C.F.R. Part 192. The Third Claim for Relief 

contends that the DOE failed to comply with EPA regulations 

requiring the Mill’s remediation to “meet certain design 

criteria and environmental standards,” including the 

requirement that the remediation be designed to “be effective 

. . . for at least 200 years.” Navajo Compl. ¶¶ 90-93 (citing 40 

C.F.R. § 192.02(a)). And the Fourth Claim for Relief alleges 

that the DOE “failed to complete remedial action at the Mill 

before September 30, 1998,” which is the deadline for such 

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40 

action under the statute. Id. ¶¶ 96-98 (citing 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7912(a)(1)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7922(a)(1). It further 

alleges that DOE failed to “take appropriate action to restore 

groundwater at and near the Mill.” Navajo Compl. ¶ 98. 

The Government argues that these claims are barred for 

want of subject matter jurisdiction because the Mill Tailings 

Act precludes judicial review. Gov’t Br. at 71-75. 

Alternatively, the Government says the Tribe has failed to 

state a claim for relief. Id. at 73 n.7, 76-77. The District Court 

agreed that it lacked jurisdiction. El Paso III, 774 F. Supp. 2d

at 45-47. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 

District Court had jurisdiction but that dismissal was 

nevertheless appropriate because the two counts fail to state 

viable claims for relief. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier 

Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 

(“Although the district court erroneously dismissed the action 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), we could nonetheless affirm the 

dismissal if dismissal were otherwise proper based on failure 

to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6).”). 

We can make quick work of the Government’s 

suggestion that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. The 

Tribe does not argue that the Mill Tailings Act affords a 

private right of action; rather, it stakes its claim on a cause of 

action under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. Furthermore, as 

the Supreme Court has made clear, a plaintiff’s claim under 

the APA is not barred by another statute if the other statute 

does not cover the type of grievance the plaintiff seeks to 

assert under the APA. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 

Pottawatomi v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 & n.3 (2012). 

The APA expressly does not afford a cause of action “to 

the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. 

USCA Case #12-5157 Document #1486964 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 40 of 65
41 

§ 701(a)(1). And the Government contends that the Mill 

Tailings Act “precludes judicial review.” We disagree. We 

can find nothing in the Mill Tailings Act that precludes the 

Tribe’s APA claims here. When considering whether a statute 

bars judicial review, “[w]e begin with the strong presumption 

that Congress intends judicial review of administrative 

action.” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 

667, 670 (1986). Overcoming this presumption is no easy 

task; indeed, “where substantial doubt about the congressional 

intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review 

of administrative action is controlling.” Id. at 672 n.3. 

The Government argues that the Mill Tailing Act 

impliedly precluded the District Court from entertaining the 

Tribe’s APA claims because § 7915(a)(1) states that, if the 

Secretary of Energy enters into a cooperative agreement with 

a tribe, the tribe “shall execute a waiver (A) releasing the 

United States of any liability or claim thereof by such tribe or 

person concerning such remedial action and (B) holding the 

United States harmless against any claim arising out of the 

performance of any such remedial action.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7915(a)(1) (emphasis added); Gov’t Br. at 72. This 

argument makes little sense because there is nothing in 

§ 7915(a)(1) to indicate that it bars all APA claims. Section 

7915(a)(1) does not by its terms preclude anything; rather, it 

says that, upon entering into a remedial action agreement 

under the Mill Tailing Act, the Tribe must sign a waiver 

agreement that might serve to limit or bar future suits. Section 

7915(a)(1) does not categorically bar all claims under the 

APA, nor does it address the scope of permissible actions 

under the APA. The scope of any waiver that the Tribe signs 

will be relevant in determining whether it may pursue an 

action under the APA, but that is a different matter entirely. 

USCA Case #12-5157 Document #1486964 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 41 of 65
42 

Furthermore, Congress did explicitly bar review as to 

some DOE action under the Mill Tailings Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7912(d). This implies that it did not intend judicial review to 

be foreclosed as to other DOE actions, like those challenged 

here. The Government’s arguments have not removed the 

“substantial doubt” that Congress meant to foreclose judicial 

review in these circumstances. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 672 n.3. 

As a result, the presumption of reviewability controls, and the 

District Court had jurisdiction. 

Nonetheless, we agree with the Government that the two 

counts must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). See St. Francis 

Xavier, 117 F.3d at 624. To begin with, the particular terms of 

the waiver in the cooperative agreement here control the 

disposition of the Third Claim for Relief. See Coop. 

Agreement at 17-18, reprinted in J.A. 214-15. The waiver 

releases the United States of “any liability or claim . . . arising 

out of the performance of any remedial action.” Id. (emphasis 

added). In the Third Claim for Relief, the Tribe asserts that 

the Government failed to meet certain design criteria and 

environmental standards. These are clearly matters arising out 

of the “performance” of the “remedial action,” which is 

covered by the waiver. See id. at 4, reprinted in J.A. 200 

(defining “remedial action” as “the assessment, design, 

construction, renovation, reclamation, decommissioning, and 

decontamination activities of DOE” (emphasis added)). 

In the Fourth Claim for Relief, the Tribe alleges that the 

DOE “failed to complete remedial action at the Mill before 

September 30, 1998.” Navajo Compl. ¶ 98. This alleged 

failure to act does not arise out of “performance” under the 

waiver, so it is not directly covered by the waiver. The claim 

is nonetheless flawed because it does not assert any discrete 

duties which the DOE failed to take and which it was obliged 

to take with respect to remedial action. Norton v. S. Utah 

USCA Case #12-5157 Document #1486964 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 42 of 65
43 

Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (“[A] 

claim under § 706(1) [of the APA] can proceed only where a 

plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency 

action that it is required to take.”). A plaintiff may not rely on 

§ 706(1) of the APA to advance “broad programmatic 

attack[s].” Id.; see also Section II.E, infra (amplifying the 

holding in SUWA). 

In sum, we conclude that the Mill Tailings Act does not 

preclude judicial review of the Tribe’s claims. But we affirm 

on alternative grounds. The terms of the waiver executed by 

the Tribe plainly bars the Third Claim for Relief. And the 

Fourth Claim for Relief fails to state a claim since it alleges 

no discrete duty to act incumbent on the DOE. 

E. The Indian Dump Cleanup Act and the Indian 

Agricultural Act 

 

The Tribe pursued two other statutory claims. Its Second 

Claim for Relief alleges that § 3712(b) of the Indian 

Agricultural Act imposes a duty on the Secretary of the 

Interior to comply with tribal law, and that the Secretary has 

violated this duty by violating various incorporated tribal 

laws. Navajo Compl. ¶¶ 84-88, reprinted in J.A. 165-66. And 

its Ninth Claim for Relief alleges that the Indian Health 

Service “failed and refused to consult with the Navajo 

Nation” and thereby violated duties imposed by § 3904 of the 

Indian Dump Cleanup Act. Id. ¶ 120, reprinted in J.A. 170. 

Although this claim mentions only the Dump, id. ¶ 118, we 

assume that, broadly construed, it reaches the Highway 160 

Site as well. 

We evaluate both claims inasmuch as they apply to sites 

other than the Dump (where CERCLA § 113(h) has divested 

the court of jurisdiction). And like the District Court, we 

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44 

consider the claims together as they raise issues that fit neatly 

in the same analytical framework. For both, the real dispute is 

whether the Tribe has a viable cause of action, which, in turn, 

depends on two issues: (1) whether the particular statute 

affords an implied private right of action, and, if not, (2) 

whether the Tribe has alleged “final agency action” sufficient 

to invoke APA review. 

1. Private Right of Action 

After contending before the District Court and in its 

opening brief here that the Indian Agricultural Act creates a 

private right of action, the Tribe concedes in its reply that it 

does not. Navajo Reply at 9 n.5 (acknowledging that the 

statutory language preserving sovereign immunity “is 

inconsistent with a private right of action and the Nation no 

longer asserts that [the Indian Agricultural Act] creates one”); 

see also 25 U.S.C. § 3712(d). 

 The Tribe argues instead that Congress created a right of 

action in the Indian Dump Cleanup Act. If so, it is implied. 

See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3908 (containing no express right of 

action). The guiding principle with respect to implied rights of 

action is legislative intent; the “judicial task is to interpret the 

statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays 

an intent to create not just a private right but also a private 

remedy.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 

To determine whether Congress intended to afford a private 

remedy against the Government, we look to Cort v. Ash, 422 

U.S. 66, 78 (1975), and “the long line of cases stemming” 

from that decision. Tax Analysts v. Comm’r, 214 F.3d 179, 

185 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 

(reaffirming the vitality of Cort, 422 U.S. 66). 

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45 

The Supreme Court in Cort specified four factors to 

determine whether Congress intended to provide an implied 

private right of action: 

(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose 

benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether some 

indication exists of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, 

either to create or to deny a private remedy; (3) whether 

implying a private right of action is consistent with the 

underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) 

whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated 

to state law, such that it would be inappropriate for the 

court to infer a cause of action based solely on federal 

law. 

Tax Analysts, 214 F.3d at 185-86 (citing Cort, 422 U.S. at 

78). Applying this test, we conclude that no private right of 

action can be inferred. 

First, private remedies follow private rights, and we 

agree with the District Court that the Act “focuses on the 

regulating agency’s obligations, and not on the rights of the 

protected party.” El Paso III, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (citing 

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289). We see nothing to indicate that 

the statute implicitly confers a right of action. See Godwin v. 

Sec’y of HUD, 356 F.3d 310, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As the 

Godwin court explained, 

“In fact, it is difficult to understand why a court would 

ever hold that Congress, in enacting a statute that creates 

federal obligations, has implicitly created a private right 

of action against the federal government, [as] there is 

hardly ever any need for Congress to do so” given that 

agency action can normally be reviewed by a district 

court pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction. 

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46 

Id. (quoting NAACP v. Sec’y of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 152 (1st 

Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.) (emphasis omitted)). 

We hold below that the Tribe has no viable action under 

the APA in this case, but that does not change our analysis 

here. Indeed, if anything, the absence of an APA claim here 

“only reinforces our view that the [statute] creates no implied 

right of action, for it would be quite odd to hold that Congress 

implicitly created a cause of action despite another statute’s 

preclusion of such an action. Given Congress’s presumed 

awareness of the APA’s provisions, we believe – in 

accordance with the holdings of other circuits – that Congress 

would make explicit any intent to create a cause of action in 

these circumstances.” Id. at 312 (citations omitted). 

In the absence of clear indicia of intent to the contrary, 

we hold that the Indian Dump Cleanup Act does not provide 

an implied right to sue. 

2. APA 

There being no private right of action in either statute, the 

viability of the Tribe’s Second and Ninth Claims for Relief 

turns on whether the Tribe has adequately pled its claims 

under the APA. Both claims allege failures to act. See 5 

U.S.C. § 706(1) (“The reviewing court shall . . . compel 

agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”). 

Such failures to act “are sometimes remediable under the 

APA, but not always.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 61. Drawing on the 

“agency action” language in sections 702, 704 and 706(1) of 

the APA, the Supreme Court made clear that to bring a 

“failure to act” claim under § 706(1) of the APA, a plaintiff 

must sufficiently allege “that an agency failed to take a 

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47 

discrete agency action that it is required to take.” SUWA, 542 

U.S. at 64; see also Montanans for Multiple Use v. 

Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2009). With these 

two requirements in hand – that the allegedly withheld action 

be (1) “legally required” and (2) “discrete” – we turn to the 

Tribe’s claims and allegations. 

First, with respect to the Indian Agricultural Act claim, 

the Tribe argues that § 3712(a)-(b) imposes on the Secretary 

of the Interior a legal obligation to take discrete agency 

action. This provision states: 

(a) Tribal recognition– The Secretary shall conduct all 

land management activities on Indian agricultural land 

. . . in accordance with all tribal laws and ordinances, 

except in specific instances where such compliance 

would be contrary to the trust responsibility of the United 

States. 

(b) Tribal laws– Unless otherwise prohibited by Federal 

law, the Secretary shall comply with tribal laws and 

ordinances pertaining to Indian agricultural lands, 

including laws regulating the environment and historic or 

cultural preservation, and laws or ordinances adopted by 

the tribal government to regulate land use or other 

activities under tribal jurisdiction. The Secretary shall— 

. . . 

(3) upon the request of an Indian tribe, require 

appropriate Federal officials to appear in tribal 

forums. 

25 U.S.C. § 3712(a)-(b). The Nation argues it has stated a 

viable APA claim because it “alleged that the Secretary was 

not complying with the permitting requirements of the Navajo 

Clean Water Act and was violating the Navajo Nation Civil 

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48 

Trespass Act by failing to remove hazardous wastes from the 

Open Dump and the Highway 160 Dump Site.” Navajo Br. at 

28; see also Navajo Compl. ¶¶ 85-88. 

 We think these allegations are insufficient to state a claim 

for relief. The chief problem with the Tribe’s argument is that 

the language above does not appear to endow the agency with 

a duty to act; rather, it requires that when the agency does act, 

its action must comport with tribal law. The portion of 

§ 3712(b) cited by the Tribe (“the Secretary shall comply with 

tribal laws”) contains only a general follow-the-law directive. 

Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 3712(b)(3) (which does set forth discrete 

agency action). This sort of provision flunks SUWA’s 

discreteness test. As the District Court put it, the “statute 

simply requires that when the agency acts, it act in 

compliance with tribal law. It does not impose an affirmative 

duty to act for the purpose of preventing violations of tribal 

law.” El Paso III, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 50. Meanwhile, 

subsection (a) applies only when the Interior Secretary 

conducts “land management activities,” § 3712(a), but the 

Nation has not alleged that the Interior Secretary’s failures to 

act came in the context of such activities. 

 Furthermore, insofar as the claim is premised on the 

Navajo Nation Civil Trespass Act and the Government’s 

failure to remove waste from the Dump or Highway 160 Site, 

we lack jurisdiction to hear it. Seeking an injunction to 

remove the hazardous waste from the Dump would plainly 

constitute a “challenge” under CERCLA § 113(h). And such a 

request would be moot as to the Highway 160 Site because, 

unlike with the Tribe’s RCRA claim, the remedial project that 

was implemented there is the very thing that the Tribe says is 

required under tribal law – removing the waste. See Navajo 

Br. at 28. Nor can we comprehend the Tribe’s passing 

reference to the BIA’s discharge of pollutants from the Mill. 

USCA Case #12-5157 Document #1486964 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 48 of 65
49 

Id. at 45-46. The complaint suggests that the DOE – and not 

the Interior Department – is in charge of the Mill and the 

remedial project there. See Navajo Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25, 

reprinted in J.A. 147-48. And the DOE is free of the duties 

imposed on the Department of Interior under the Indian 

Agricultural Act. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3703(15) (defining 

“Secretary” as the Secretary of the Interior), 3712(a)-(b) 

(imposing requirements on the “Secretary”). 

Second, an APA claim premised on the Indian Dump 

Cleanup Act also fails. In particular, the Tribe relies on 25 

U.S.C. § 3904. This provision directs the Indian Health 

Service to “provide financial and technical assistance to the 

Indian tribal government . . . to carry out the activities 

necessary to (1) close such dumps; and (2) provide for 

postclosure maintenance of such dumps.” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 3904(b). The Nation argues that the Indian Health Service’s 

failure “to provide the mandated financial and technical 

assistance” is cognizable under the APA. Navajo Br. at 32. 

 This claim falters because the purportedly mandatory 

duty is contingent on a series of predicate acts in subsection 

(a). That is, the duty to provide assistance in subsection (b) 

can only be invoked “[u]pon completion of the activities 

required to be performed pursuant to subsection (a).” 25 

U.S.C. § 3904(b). There is no indication that the outlined 

activities were in fact completed. The District Court so held,

El Paso III, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 50-51, and the Tribe did not 

challenge this conclusion in its brief. What is more, the 

assistance required in subsection (b) is made conditional on 

the “priorities developed by the Director.” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 3904(c). Because there is a predicate to imposing the duty to 

provide assistance, and because the Director of the Indian 

Health Service has discretion in doling out assistance, the 

Nation has not pled any “legally required” duty to act. SUWA, 

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542 U.S. at 63. As such, the dismissal of the Ninth Claim for 

Relief – like that of the Second Claim for Relief – was 

appropriate. 

F. Breach of Trust 

The final matter at issue in this case is the Tribe’s breachof-trust claim. With respect to all three sites, the Tribe alleged 

in its Tenth Claim for Relief that the Government breached 

various duties owed to it under federal common law, assorted 

statutes, and the 1850 Treaty between the Tribe and the 

United States. Navajo Compl. ¶¶ 121-26, reprinted in J.A. 

171. The District Court dismissed the claim based in part on 

its conclusion that the sources of law relied upon by the Tribe 

did not create a cause of action. El Paso III, 774 F. Supp. 2d 

at 52-53. We hold, for the reasons discussed below, that the 

Tribe has failed to state a claim for relief because the Tribe 

has not identified a substantive source of law establishing 

specific fiduciary duties, a failure which is fatal to its trust 

claim regardless of whether we read the claim as brought 

under the APA or under a cause of action implied by the 

nature of the fiduciary relationship itself. 

It helps to take a step back. Because the Government is a 

defendant here, the Tribe faces three threshold requirements 

to stating a viable claim for relief at the pleading stage: it 

must establish federal subject matter jurisdiction, a waiver of 

sovereign immunity, and a cause of action. See Floyd v. 

District of Columbia, 129 F.3d 152, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The 

first of these is simple because the Tribe’s claim turns on 

questions of federal law and, as such, the District Court 

properly enjoyed “arising under” jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. Nor is sovereign immunity in dispute. The 

Government has not argued that its immunity precludes the 

trust claim, Gov’t Br. at 78-87, which comes as no surprise 

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since the second sentence of § 702 of the APA waives 

sovereign immunity not just for APA claims but also, more 

broadly, for claims “seeking relief other than money 

damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also Chamber of Commerce of 

the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The 

APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to any suit 

whether under the APA or not.”). The only threshold issue in 

dispute, then, is the third requirement: whether the Tribe has 

identified a viable cause of action and alleged facts sufficient 

to state a plausible claim under that cause of action. 

The Tribe appears to argue that its claim can be 

maintained either (1) under the APA or (2) under a cause of 

action inferred from the fiduciary responsibilities undertaken 

by the Government. See Navajo Br. at 48, 49 n.9. On either 

conception of the claim our inquiry is largely the same 

because, under controlling precedent, a cause of action will be 

inferred from a fiduciary relationship only where a plaintiff 

can identify specific trust duties in a statute, regulation, or 

treaty. And this analysis overlaps with the APA’s requirement 

that a plaintiff allege “that an agency failed to take a discrete

agency action that it is required to take.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 

64. 

Before addressing the Tribe’s specific arguments on 

appeal, we turn to the Supreme Court’s case law concerning 

Indian trust claims, and then to the law of the circuit, to 

ascertain the principles that govern. 

1. Governing Principles 

The existence of a general trust relationship between the 

Government and Indian tribes is long established. See, e.g., 

Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); 

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). But this 

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general trust relationship alone does not afford an Indian tribe 

with a cause of action against the Government, as the Nation 

acknowledges. Navajo Br. at 53. Something more is needed. 

In decisions addressing Indian trust claims arising in the 

context of the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505, the 

Supreme Court has inferred causes of action for money 

damages where statutes and regulations establish a 

conventional fiduciary relationship with the Government as 

trustee. We start with these decisions to see when statutes and 

regulations establish a conventional trust relationship and, as 

a result, imply a cause of action for breach of trust. Next, we 

turn to our own Indian trust law precedent, which confirms 

that we apply these same principles to trust claims brought 

under the APA. 

a. Trust Claims under the Indian Tucker Act 

The Supreme Court, in two pairs of cases, delineated 

what an Indian tribe must establish to bring a breach-of-trust 

claim for money damages against the Government under the 

Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505. See United States v. 

Navajo Nation (Navajo I), 537 U.S. 488 (2003); United States 

v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); 

United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206 (1983); 

United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535 (1980). 

Mitchell I and Mitchell II were decided in the same case, 

which was brought by members of the Quinault Tribe alleging 

that the Government mismanaged timber resources and 

thereby breached its duty as trustee. The posture of Mitchell I 

presented the question whether the Indian General Allotment 

Act of 1887 (“Allotment Act”), also known as the Dawes Act, 

authorized an award of money damages against the United 

States for its mismanagement of forests on land allotted under 

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the statute. 445 U.S. at 536. Section 5 of the Allotment Act 

provided that “the United States does and will hold the land 

thus allotted . . . in trust for the sole use and benefit of the 

Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made.” Id. at 

541 (quoting Allotment Act). But the Supreme Court 

concluded that this language created only a “limited trust 

relationship” that did not impose a judicially enforceable trust 

duty. Id. at 542. Rather than enacting particular governmental 

duties, the Court read the Allotment Act as entrusting the 

management of the land to the allottees themselves. Id. at 543. 

And the Court was persuaded that the “in trust” language was 

not intended to impose fiduciary duties on the United States, 

but to protect allottees from state taxation. Id. at 544. 

Although it rejected the trust claim predicated on the 

Allotment Act, the Court nevertheless allowed that other

statutes could succeed where the Allotment Act failed. Id. at 

546 & n.7. 

Mitchell II considered these other statutes and held that 

they imposed enforceable fiduciary duties, i.e., that they 

created a cause of action for breach of trust. The Court 

distinguished Mitchell I, stating that “[i]n contrast to the bare 

trust created by the General Allotment Act, the statutes and 

regulations [here] clearly give the Federal Government full 

responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the 

benefit of the Indians. They thereby establish a fiduciary 

relationship and define the contours of the United States’ 

fiduciary responsibilities.” 463 U.S. at 224. The statutes at 

issue established “comprehensive” federal responsibilities to 

manage the harvesting of Indian timber and instructed that 

sales of Indian timber should be “based upon the Secretary’s 

consideration of ‘the needs and best interests of the Indian 

owner and his heirs.’” Id. at 222, 224 (quoting 25 U.S.C. 

§ 406(a)). 

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Together, Mitchell I and Mitchell II make clear that 

neither the general trust relationship between the federal 

government and Indian Tribes nor the mere invocation of trust 

language in a statute (as in the Allotment Act) is sufficient to 

create a cause of action for breach of trust. As the Court later 

explained, “[a]lthough the undisputed existence of a general 

trust relationship between the United States and the Indian 

people can reinforce the conclusion that the relevant statute or 

regulation imposes fiduciary duties, that relationship alone is 

insufficient to support jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker 

Act. Instead, the analysis must train on specific rights-creating 

or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions.” 

Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added) (alteration, 

internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 

In Navajo I and White Mountain – decided the same day 

– a divided Supreme Court further fleshed out these trust 

principles. In Navajo I, the Tribe asserted that the Secretary of 

the Interior committed a breach of trust by approving a substandard royalty rate in a coal lease on a tract of Indian land. 

537 U.S. at 493. The Tribe argued that the Indian Mineral 

Leasing Act of 1938 assigned to the Secretary a fiduciary 

obligation to maximize returns from coal leases on Indian 

land whenever he exercised his statutory responsibility to 

approve mining leases. Id. at 496. The Court disagreed, 

notwithstanding that it was aware of the fact that the “Tribe’s 

reservation lands . . . are held for it in trust by the United 

States.” Id. at 495. Like the Allotment Act in Mitchell I, the 

Indian Mineral Leasing Act and associated regulations did not 

“assign to the Secretary managerial control over coal leasing.” 

Id. at 508. In fact, the statute and regulations did not “even 

establish the ‘limited trust relationship’” embodied under the 

Allotment Act. Id. (quoting Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 542). 

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White Mountain, in contrast, allowed a trust claim to 

proceed. There the Tribe predicated its breach-of-trust claim 

on the “1960 Act,” a paragraph-long statute that declared that 

a 400-acre parcel of land, which had been used as a military 

post and then as a school, was to be “held by the United States 

in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the 

right of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land 

and improvements for administrative or school purposes for 

as long as they are needed for [that] purpose.” 537 U.S. at 469 

(quoting Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960)). The Secretary 

exercised his statutory right of use but allegedly failed to 

maintain the property, and the Tribe sued. The Court allowed 

the claim to proceed. Unlike the Allotment Act in Mitchell I, 

the 1960 Act, if sparsely worded, nevertheless went “beyond 

a bare trust” by investing the United States with 

“discretionary authority to make direct use of portions of the 

trust corpus.” Id. at 474-75. Acknowledging that “the 1960 

Act does not, like the statutes cited in [Mitchell II], expressly 

subject the Government to duties of management and 

conservation,” the Court reasoned that “the fact that the 

property occupied by the United States is expressly subject to 

a trust supports a fair inference” of an obligation to preserve 

the trust property. Id. at 475.

Important to the Court’s conclusion in White Mountain 

that the 1960 Act created a cause of action for money 

damages was the fact that the Act afforded the Secretary with 

a right of use and occupancy. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, 

who joined the majority opinions in both Navajo I and White 

Mountain and who were the deciding votes in both cases, 

authored a concurrence in the latter explaining how the two 

opinions were “not inconsistent.” Id. at 479 (Ginsburg, J., 

concurring). In the White Mountain concurrence, Justice 

Ginsburg explained that the “threshold set by the Mitchell

cases is met” because the 1960 Act “expressly and without 

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qualification employs a term of art (‘trust’) commonly 

understood to entail certain fiduciary obligations . . . and 

‘invest[s] the United States with discretionary authority to 

make direct use of portions of the trust corpus.’” Id. at 480 

(emphasis added) (quoting 537 U.S. at 475); see also id. 

(“The dispositive question . . . is whether the 1960 measure, 

in placing property in trust and simultaneously providing for 

the Government-trustee’s use and occupancy, is fairly 

interpreted to mandate compensation for the harm caused by 

maladministration of the property.” (emphasis added)). 

Collectively, Mitchell I, Mitchell II, White Mountain, and 

Navajo I make clear that, while a cause of action for money 

damages under the Indian Tucker Act can be inferred as a 

concomitant to a specific fiduciary duty owed by the 

Government, a Tribe must first “identify a substantive source 

of law that establishes” that specific fiduciary duty. Navajo I, 

537 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added). This “analysis must train 

on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or 

regulatory prescriptions.” Id. A statute’s invocation of trust 

terminology is not itself dispositive, since the statute may 

create either a judicially enforceable trust as in White 

Mountain or a “bare trust,” not judicially enforceable, as in 

Mitchell I. What separates a “bare trust” from a bona fide one 

is a matter of statutory interpretation, and the real question is 

whether the particular statute or regulation establishes rights 

and duties that characterize a conventional fiduciary 

relationship. 

These principles control here, even though the claim is 

for equitable relief (not money damages) and even though 

sovereign immunity is waived under § 702 of the APA (and 

not the Indian Tucker Act). A bit of explanation is called for 

since this conclusion is not inevitable. We therefore turn to 

the law of the circuit. 

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b. Circuit Precedent 

The Indian Tucker Act confers jurisdiction to the Court 

of Federal Claims and waives sovereign immunity only for a 

limited subset of claims, namely those “arising under the 

Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or 

Executive orders of the President, or . . . [claims] which 

otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims 

if the claimant were not an Indian tribe.” 28 U.S.C. § 1505. 

Because of this limited language, facets of the Supreme 

Court’s Indian Tucker Act jurisprudence may be unique to the 

Indian Tucker Act and, accordingly, not binding on Indian 

trust claims brought outside the Act. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK 

OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.05[3][c]. 

Although we appreciate this possibility, we nevertheless 

apply the lessons articulated in the Mitchell cases. We do so 

for two reasons: because this been our approach in past cases 

and, as important, because the Tribe has not marshaled an 

argument that we should reconsider our approach. We 

amplify both points below. 

First, we have consistently relied on principles 

announced in Indian Tucker Act cases in trust cases not 

arising under the Act. We stated in North Slope Borough v. 

Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980), that a “trust 

responsibility can only arise from a statute, treaty, or 

executive order; in this respect we are governed by [Mitchell 

I] holding that the United States bore no fiduciary 

responsibility to Native Americans under a statute which 

contained no specific provision in the terms of the statute.” Id. 

at 611 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted); 

accord Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 

1482 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he government’s fiduciary 

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responsibilities necessarily depend on the substantive laws 

creating those obligations.” (citing the Mitchell cases)). 

Our decision in Cobell VI, upon which the Tribe relies, is 

not to the contrary. Cobell v. Norton (Cobell VI), 240 F.3d 

1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). It is true that there we quoted Mitchell 

II to say that a “‘fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when 

the Government assumes such elaborate control over forests 

and property belonging to Indians. All of the necessary 

elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the 

United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust 

corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds).’” Id. at 1098 

(quoting 463 U.S. at 225). However, we said this not to 

suggest that an actionable fiduciary relationship arises merely 

by operation of federal common law. Rather, we explained 

that the common law informs the interpretation of statutes that 

establish the elements of a common-law trust without 

employing the terms of art. The Mitchell II rule, we said, 

“operates as a presumption,” such that “‘where the Federal 

Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal 

monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally 

exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless 

Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said 

expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other 

fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or 

fiduciary connection.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 463 

U.S. at 225). We then reiterated that a fiduciary relationship 

depends on substantive laws, stating that “the government’s 

obligations are rooted in and outlined by the relevant statutes 

and treaties.” Id. at 1099. 

Second, the Tribe has not argued that the principles 

enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Indian Tucker Act 

cases do not control here. To be sure, it drops hints of 

disagreement in its brief – a footnote stating parenthetically 

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that some courts “fail to distinguish between” claims for 

money damages and those for equitable relief, Navajo Br. at 

53 n.10, and a clause referring to the “even more rigorous 

jurisdictional requirements of the . . . Indian Tucker Act.” 

Navajo Reply at 12; see also Navajo Br. at 16. But the Tribe 

never propounds a viable theory to contest the applicability of 

the established law of the circuit. Therefore, we are 

constrained to apply the standards articulated in the Indian 

Tucker Act cases to the trust claim before us. 

2. The Tribe’s Arguments 

The Tribe argues that various statutes establish an 

enforceable fiduciary duty. We disagree. 

a. 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(a) 

The Tribe’s primary contention on appeal is that, because 

the land in question is subject to an “express trust” under 25 

U.S.C. § 640d-9(a), the Government uses the land subject to 

an enforceable fiduciary duty to manage and preserve the trust 

res, i.e., the occupied tribal land. See Navajo Br. at 50 (citing 

White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 475). The Tribe’s position

reduces to a simple formula: an express trust plus actual 

governmental control equals enforceable trust duties. 

This argument has surface-level appeal based on a loose 

congruence between the claims in White Mountain and here. 

Both involve allegations of governmental control over Indian 

property designated by statute as some sort of trust. And both 

statutes say precious little. Section 640d-9(a) provides that 

certain designated lands “shall be held in trust by the United 

States exclusively for the Navajo Tribe and as a part of the 

Navajo Reservation.” 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(a) (emphasis 

added). Meanwhile, the statute in White Mountain stated that 

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“all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the 

lands, together with the improvements thereon, included in 

the former Fort Apache Military Reservation . . . are hereby 

declared to be held by the United States in trust for the White 

Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary 

of the Interior to use any part of the land and improvements 

for administrative or school purposes for as long as they are 

needed for that purpose.” 74 Stat. at 8 (emphasis added). 

But § 640d-9(a) differs in a crucial respect from the 1960 

Act in White Mountain: It does not afford the government the 

right to use the land in question. This difference, far from 

inconsequential, leads to the conclusion that § 640d-9(a) is a 

“bare trust” in the realm of Mitchell I, i.e., one that does not 

afford the Tribe with a cause of action. As noted above, the 

Supreme Court relied on the Government’s express right of 

use in concluding that the 1960 Act created an enforceable 

cause of action for breach of trust. See White Mountain, 537 

U.S. at 475; id. at 480 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). This makes 

sense: It is natural to infer that Congress intended that a 

correlative duty to maintain trust property would attach to an 

expressly provided right of use (if invoked). Unlike the 1960 

Act, § 640d-9(a) offers no hook to find a correlative duty of 

management; the statute includes only the phrase “shall be 

held in trust.” This is not enough, even if paired with 

allegations of governmental control at the Mill, the Dump, 

and the Highway 160 Site, because nothing in the pleadings 

or record suggest that the Government took control of the 

premises pursuant to § 640d-9(a). 

Unable to infer specific fiduciary duties from 

§ 640d-9(a), we conclude that the section does not create a 

cause of action for the Tribe. In reaching this conclusion, we 

do not, of course, suggest that an express right of 

governmental use is always necessary to find that a statute 

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affords a cause of action for breach of trust. However, 

governmental use may be relevant when a statutory reference 

to “trust” does not itself indicate whether Congress intended 

to establish specific fiduciary duties or a “bare trust” instead. 

Our conclusion in this case is mandated by the Supreme 

Court’s decision in United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo 

II), 556 U.S. 287 (2009), which was not brought to our 

attention by the parties. On remand after Navajo I rejected a 

trust claim predicated on the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, the 

Federal Circuit relied on 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(a) combined 

with allegations of control – the very argument pressed here – 

to conclude that the Tribe’s claim was viable after all. Navajo 

Nation v. United States, 501 F.3d 1327, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 

2007). The Federal Circuit reasoned that where “the 

government exercises actual control within its authority, 

neither Congress nor the agency needs to codify such actual 

control for a fiduciary trust relationship that is enforceable by 

money damages to arise.” Id. at 1343 (citing White Mountain, 

537 U.S. at 475). 

The Supreme Court reversed. Although the Supreme 

Court did not specifically address 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(a) in 

Navajo II, it rejected the Federal Circuit’s reasoning 

wholesale: “None of the sources of law cited by the Federal 

Circuit and relied upon by the Tribe provides any more sound 

a basis for its breach-of-trust lawsuit against the Federal 

Government than those we analyzed in Navajo I. This case is 

at an end. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, 

and the case is remanded with instructions to affirm the Court 

of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the Tribe’s complaint.” 

Navajo II, 556 U.S. at 302. 

Simply put, Navajo II forecloses the Tribe’s arguments 

that § 640d-9(a) plus the Government’s control establishes an 

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actionable fiduciary relationship. The Court also makes clear 

that it reached its conclusion without regard to considerations 

unique to money damages. See id. (“Because the Tribe cannot 

identify a specific, applicable, trust-creating statute or 

regulation that the Government violated, we do not reach the 

question whether the trust duty was money mandating.”). As 

the Court explained: 

If a plaintiff identifies such a [rights-creating or dutyimposing statutory or regulatory] prescription, and if that 

prescription bears the hallmarks of a “conventional 

fiduciary relationship,” White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 473, 

then trust principles (including any such principles 

premised on “control”) could play a role in “inferring that 

the trust obligation [is] enforceable by damages” . . . . But 

that must be the second step of the analysis, not (as the 

Federal Circuit made it) the starting point. 

Id. at 301. 

b. The Indian Dump Cleanup Act, the Indian 

Agricultural Act, and the Mill Tailings Act 

The Tribe next argues that the Indian Agricultural Act, 

the Indian Dump Cleanup Act, and the Mill Tailings Act also 

impose enforceable trust duties. Navajo Br. at 50. We need 

not tarry long over these claims. 

The Mill Tailings Act does not purport to establish a 

conventional fiduciary relationship with an attendant cause of 

action for breach of trust. To begin with, as we observed in El 

Paso II, the Mill Tailings Act’s “statement of purpose reveals 

that Congress passed the statute to protect public health in 

general rather than tribal health in particular.” 632 F.3d at 

1278 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7901(b) (a 

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purpose is to “minimize or eliminate radiation health hazards 

to the public” (emphasis added)). Furthermore, unlike the 

statutory language in Mitchell II, which plainly created a 

conventional fiduciary relationship, see 463 U.S. at 224 

(observing how a section of a 1910 act mandated that timber 

sales be based on “the needs and best interests” of the Indian 

owners), the language in the Mill Tailings Act manifests no 

similar “hallmarks of a conventional fiduciary relationship,” 

Navajo II, 556 U.S. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To the contrary, Congress took pains to insulate the 

Government from liability concerning the remediation, see 42 

U.S.C. § 7915(a)(1), and from judicial review with respect to 

the Secretary of Energy’s designation of sites, see id.

§ 7912(d). The legislative history reinforces our conclusion 

because it suggests that Congress did not intend to alter any 

trust duties, one way or the other. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1480, 

pt. 2, at 39 (1978) (“The committee does not intend by this act 

to affect the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior as 

trustee for any Indian Tribe.”). 

Nor does the Indian Agricultural Act impose 

independently enforceable trust duties. Although the Act 

mentions the Government’s “trust responsibility” in stating its 

findings and purposes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701, 3702, Congress 

was quite clear that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be 

construed to diminish or expand the trust responsibility of the 

United States toward Indian trust lands or natural resources, 

or any legal obligation or remedy resulting therefrom,” id. 

§ 3742 (emphasis added). To construe the Act as 

independently creating an enforceable trust responsibility 

would contravene the plain intent of Congress. 

Any trust claim founded on the Indian Dump Cleanup 

Act fares no better. Granted, this statute, like the previous 

one, states in its findings that “the United States holds most 

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Indian lands in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes and Indian 

individuals.” 25 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(5). But the statute does not 

vest in the Government – either expressly as in Mitchell II or 

by implication as in White Mountain – any responsibility for 

management or control of Indian property. To the contrary, 

the statute imposes a duty upon the Director of the Indian 

Health Service to assist tribal governments as they “carry out 

the activities necessary” to close open dumps. Id. § 3904(b). 

Because the statute contemplates management and control in 

the hands of tribal governments, the Indian Dump Cleanup 

Act falls comfortably within the ambit of Mitchell I. 

To summarize: none of the cited sources of law – 25 

U.S.C. § 640d-9(a), the Indian Agricultural Act, the Indian 

Dump Cleanup Act, and the Mill Tailings Act – create a 

conventional fiduciary relationship that is enforceable as a 

breach of trust either under the APA or as a separate cause of 

action implied from the nature of the trust relationship as 

provided by the Mitchell doctrine. We therefore have no 

occasion to determine the contours of the fiduciary duties 

owed by the Government. See Navajo Br. at 52 (arguing that 

the cited statutes “establish the contours of trust duties to be 

complemented with principles of general trust law”). 

c. Other Statutes 

Finally, the Tribe argues that federal agencies, as a 

component of their fiduciary responsibilities, have a minimum 

duty to comply with generally applicable laws if their actions 

affect trust property. Navajo Br. at 52-54. This argument has 

no traction. The Tribe does not contend that, under the 

Mitchell doctrine, these generally applicable statutes afford it 

a cause of action for breach of trust, and for good reason. The 

generally applicable statutes – e.g., RCRA and the Clean 

Water Act – do not establish a conventional fiduciary 

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relationship. Therefore, the Tribe’s last argument is without 

merit. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of 

the District Court on all but two points. First, we reverse the 

dismissal “with prejudice” of Appellants’ RCRA claims that 

relate to the Dump. We hereby remand with instructions to 

the District Court to enter judgment against Appellants 

“without prejudice.” Second, we vacate the District Court’s 

dismissal of Appellants’ RCRA claims as to the Highway 160 

Site and remand the case so that these claims can be 

considered on the merits. 

 So ordered. 

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