Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_07-cv-00172/USCOURTS-almd-1_07-cv-00172-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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A jury found Tharp guilty of the murder of Mary Spivey in violation of Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(4).

1

(Doc. No. 12, Exh. 1.) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 _______________________________

EVESTER THARP, #196 360 *

Petitioner, *

 v. * 1:07-CV-172-WKW

 (WO)

WARDEN KENNETH JONES, et al., *

Respondents. *

 _______________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed on February 23, 2007 by Petitioner Evester Tharp. Tharp challenges his conviction for

capital murder entered against him by the Circuit Court for Houston County, Alabama, on 1

October 19, 2001. The trial court sentenced Tharp to life without the possibility of parole.

(Doc. No. 12, Exh. 1.) 

Tharp filed a direct appeal of his conviction. Tharp maintained on appeal that: (1)

the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for capital murder; (2) the trial court

erred when it denied his motion for change of venue due to pre-trial publicity; and (3) the

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trial court erred in denying his motion challenging the composition of the petit jury which

failed to represent a fair cross section of the community. The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed Tharp’s conviction on August 22, 2003 and denied his application for

rehearing on September 12, 2003. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Petitioner’s

petition for writ of certiorari and issued a certificate of judgment on November 21, 2003.

(Doc. No. 12, Exhs. 2-5.) See Tharp v. State, 886 So.2d 179 (Ala.Cr.App. 2003) (table). 

Tharp filed a Rule 32 petition in the trial court on May 27, 2004 and an amended

petition on August 9, 2004. He presented the following claims for relief: 1) appellate counsel

failed to present in Tharps’s application for rehearing and certiorari petition the issue of the

sufficiency of the State’s evidence; 2) appellate counsel failed to confer with Tharp regarding

which issues to raise on appeal; 3) trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s instruction

on accomplice liability; and 4) trial counsel failed to object to a stipulation entered into by

the parties. On April 22, 2005 the trial court held a hearing on the petition at which Tharp

was represented by counsel. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying

the post-conviction petition. On appeal the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the

lower court’s decision and denied Tharp’s application for rehearing on May 26, 2006. Tharp

v. State, 978 So.2d 73 (Ala.Cr.App.) (table). The Alabama Supreme Court denied his

petition for writ of certiorari and issued a certificate of judgment on December 8, 2006. (Doc.

No. 12, Exhs. 6-10.) 

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In the instant § 2254 petition Tharp presents the following claims: 

1. The trial court erred by allowing the State and defense counsel to stipulate that

Tharp’s co-defendant was the trigger man which relieved the State of its burden of

proof and prevented the jury from fully determining Tharp’s guilt or innocence;

2. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by entering into a stipulation with the

state which implied that Tharp was a participant in the crime but not the trigger man

which was inapposite to Tharp’s defense that he had no knowledge of the offense nor

did he participate in it;

3. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue on rehearing or petition for

certiorari the appellate court’s determination that the evidence was sufficient to

sustain Tharp’s conviction;

4. The trial court erred by denying Tharp’s motion for acquittal where the evidence

was insufficient to demonstrate his involvement in the offense;

5. The trial court denied Tharp a fair trial based on the jury selection process utilized

by the Circuit Court for Houston County which fails to represent a fair cross-section

of the community.

(Doc. No. 1 at 6-9.)

Respondents filed an answer in which they argue that Tharp’s claim that the trial court

erred when it allowed the State and defense counsel to stipulate to the fact that Tharp’s codefendant was the triggerman is procedurally defaulted. In support of their procedural default

argument, Respondents assert that this claim was not presented to the state courts in

accordance with the state’s procedural rules, see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838

(1999), and, thus, Tharp is prohibited from presenting it in the instant petition without a

showing of cause and prejudice for the default. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989);

Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11 Cir. 2003). With respect to the remaining th

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issues, Respondents maintain that Tharp’s claims were properly adjudicated on the merits by

the state courts. (Doc. Nos. 11, 14.) See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000).

Upon review of the § 2254 petition, the answer and supplemental answer of

Respondents, and Tharp’s response thereto, the court concludes that no evidentiary hearing

is required and that the petition is due to be denied in accordance with the provisions of

Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Actual Innocence - Independent Claim

To the extent Tharp alleges he is innocent of capital murder, the law is well settled

“that ‘[c]laims of actual innocence ... have never been held to state a ground for federal

habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state

criminal proceeding.’ Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). It is not our role to make

an independent determination of a petitioner's guilt or innocence based on evidence

[presented at trial or] that has emerged since the trial. ‘This rule is grounded in the principle

that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the

Constitution-not to correct errors of fact.’ Id.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th

Cir.2002). In accordance with the foregoing directives, Tharp is entitled to no relief from this

court on any independent claim of actual innocence. (See Doc. No. 16.) 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that:

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An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court; or

(2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

5

B. The Adjudicated Claims

To prevail on his § 2254 claims adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, Tharp

must show that a decision by the Alabama state courts was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States,” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) &

(2); see Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court’s decision can be “contrary to” 2

federal law either (1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies

the controlling authority to a case involving facts “materially indistinguishable” from those

in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at 405-06. A state

court’s decision can involve an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it either (1)

correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that

is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal

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principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Id. at 407. “Federal

habeas relief is available under the ‘unreasonable application’ standard only if the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”

Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831 (11 Cir. 2001) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). It is the th

objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision that this

court must decide. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313

(11 Cir. 2001). th

Federal district courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court

based its findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A responsible,

thoughtful decision that is made after a full opportunity to litigate suffices, “even if it is

wrong.” Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 876-77 (7 Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 521 th

U.S. 320 (1997). A state court’s determinations of fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and

the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “However, the statutory

presumption of correctness applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to

mixed determinations of law and fact.” Parker, 244 F.3d at 835 (citing McBride v. Sharpe,

25 F.3d 962, 971 (11 Cir. 1994)). However, even when the state court addresses a question th

of law, this court is not authorized “to evaluate [a petitioner’s] claim de novo rather than

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through the lens of § 2254(d).” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 639 (2003). The Supreme

Court admonishes that such evaluation “exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review

by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). . . ” Id. at 636. Additionally, a state court’s summary rejection of

a federal constitutional issue qualifies as an adjudication on the merits under § 2254(d) so

that the summary rejection is entitled to the same deference as a written opinion. See Wright

v. Sec. of Dept. Of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11 Cir. 2002). th

i. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Tharp argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it denied his

motion for judgment of acquittal where the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

conviction. Tharp argues that the only evidence that connected him to the offense was his

“association with the aka triggerman.” (Doc. No 1 at 7.) 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a criminal conviction

“except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Under § 2254 , habeas relief on a claim of

insufficient evidence is appropriate only “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced

at trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781

(1990).

But this inquiry does not require a court to “ask itself whether it

believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

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reasonable doubt.” ... [I]nstead, the relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-319. To be sufficient, the “evidence need not exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except

that of guilt.” United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 979 (11 Cir.1984). Sufficiency th

claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

Tharp raised his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the evidence in the record and determined that

the evidence presented by the State showed the following:

The victim, Mary Spivey, owned and operated the Seven Day Food Mart, near

Highway 52, in rural Houston County. She lived in five rooms connected to

the store. The victim drove a green minivan which she kept parked in her front

yard. 

A state’s witness, Deborah Hackett, worked for the victim as her assistant

manager. She testified that around noon, on June 23, 1997, she observed

Shaber Wimberly in the store with several other black males. She knew

Wimberly because he had been in the store before. At approximately 7:00 PM

that evening, Hackett closed out the register, and put all of her cash, which was

approximately $1,000, into a paper sack, took it into the victim’s living

quarters, and placed it on a desk. She testified that when she left for the

evening, the victim’s green minivan was parked in the front yard. 

The State presented evidence that approximately 8:00 PM on June 23, 1997,

the appellant and Shaber Wimberly left Wimberly’s house in Frank Coleman’s

Pontiac because Wimberly’s Buick Regal was low on gas. After running the

[P]ontiac into a ditch, Wimberly called a friend, Ansell Dawsey, to come and

get them. Dawsey set out to pick them up, but ran out of gas in Wimberly’s

vehicle. The State presented evidence tending to show that Wimberly and the

appellant, having already committed the burglary/ murder, had to return to the

crime scene and take the victim’s minivan for transportation. Evidence was

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presented that they did not return to Wimberly’s residence until 3:00AM the

following morning. At approximately 2:45 AM on June 24, the victim’s green

minivan was found burning on Jessie Road, off Highway 52. Upon checking

the car registration, it was determined that the vehicle belonged to the victim.

Deputy Gary Lindsey, of the Houston County Sheriff’s Department, went to

the victim’s residence, and found her dead on the floor. She had been shot

once in the left eye. Her living quarters had been ransacked, and her money

and the cash register had been taken from the store.

The State presented the testimony of Ansell Dawsey, who testified that after

midnight on June 23, 1997, he was visiting Melitta Wimberly, at Shaber

Wimberly’s house. He testified that Wimberly and the appellant drove up in

a green minivan and asked Dawsey to follow them. With Dawsey following

them, Wimberly and the appellant drove out to a dirt road, stopped the

minivan, removed a number of items from it, and loaded the goods into the

trunk. Dawsey testified that some of the items included a cash register, some

cigarettes, and a brown paper sack. 

Jesse Carroll testified that at around 1:00 AM on June 24, 1997, Shaber

Wimberly waked him and his wife, Mary, and asked them if he could borrow

a chain to pull a car from a ditch. He testified that Wimberly was in a green

minivan and the appellant was with him. He testified that Wimberly was

carrying a “large wad” of money.

James Pruitt testified that shortly after 1:00 AM, Wimberly and the appellant

came to his house and asked him to help them take a green minivan “back to

[Wimberly’s] aunt’s house.” He testified that Wimberly proceeded to drive

the vehicle out to Jessie Road, with Pruitt following him in the car. On the

way, Wimberly and Pruitt were stopped by Deputy Jeff Carlisle, when he

observed the minivan lose a hubcap. Pruitt testified that he knew Deputy

Carlisle, and when he vouched for Wimberly, Deputy Carlisle told them to go

home, and answered another call. Wimberly and the appellant drove away, and

stopped just a few yards away to set the van on fire. Pruitt testified that

Wimberly and the appellant then got in the car with him, and that the appellant

had a gun in his possession. Wimberly asked Pruitt to take them to the

location where they had “ditched” Frank Coleman’s Pontiac. Pruitt helped

them rig Jesse Carroll’s chain to the Pontiac, and they pulled it out of the ditch.

Shaber Wimberly then jumped in the Pontiac and drove off, leaving the

appellant and Pruitt on the side of the road. Pruitt then took the appellant to

Wimberly’s house. While there, both Pruitt and Dawsey saw Wimberly, the

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appellant, and Frank Coleman, burning something in a barrel. Later, the

appellant took a cash register out of the trunk of Wimberly’s car and threw it

on the ground, causing it to break open. 

The State presented evidence that the following day, Dawsey was paged by

Melitta Wimberly to come over and help her dispose of a gun. Melitta

Wimberly retrieved a gun from the attic of the house. Dawsey took the gun,

wrapped it in a towel, and buried it at the end of the street. The gun was

retrieved, tested, and determined to be the murder weapon. 

Evidence was presented that Deputy Carlisle’s encounter with Wimberly and

the appellant in the minivan, and the fact that he knew James Pruitt, ultimately

led to the appellant’s arrest.

Here, the jury could conclude from the State’s evidence that the gun used to

kill the victim was transported throughout the night by the appellant.

Assuming arguendo, that the appellant did not enter the victim’s residence, as

he contends, the State still presented overwhelming evidence of the

appellant’s guilt based on an accomplice liability theory. § 13A-2-23, Ala.

Code 1975. See Wilson v. State, 777 So. 2d 856, 932 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)

(“ ‘Actual participation in the crime need not be proved by positive testimony

to convict someone of aiding and abetting. “The jury is to determine whether

the appellant’s participation exists and the extent of it from the conduct of the

parties and all the testimony presented.” ’ ”) Moreover, “[e]vidence of intent

is hardly ever capable of direct proof. Such questions are normally questions

for the jury.” McMurphy v. State, 455 So. 2d 924 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).

The State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to

the murder/burglary. Because the appellant and Wimberly left Wimberly’s

house together, remained together throughout the night, were seen driving the

victim’s minivan, setting it on fire, and later vandalizing its contents, the jury

had ample evidence from which it could reasonably infer that appellant was an

active participant in the crime.

(Doc. No. 12, Exh. 4 at pgs. 1-4.) 

The state court rejected Tharp’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence used to

convict him. This court must, therefore, deny habeas relief unless one of the two exceptions

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found in § 2254(d) applies. See Mobley v. Head, 267 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11 Cir. 2001). th

Having independently reviewed the record, the arguments presented by the parties, applicable

statutes, and controlling case law, the undersigned finds that Tharp has not met his burden

in this regard. That is, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals did not decide Tharp’s

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “differently than [the Supreme] Court has [in

a case based] on a set a of materially indistinguishable facts” nor did the state courts apply

a rule that contradicts governing federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Consequently, the

state appellate court’srejection of the sufficiency claim was not contrary to actual Supreme

Court decisions. Further, a thorough review of the evidentiary materials submitted in this

case establishes that the state court’s rejection of Tharp’s argument was objectively

reasonable and likewise constituted a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented by the parties. (See Doc. No. 12, Exh. 1.) Tharp is, therefore, not

entitled to habeas relief on his sufficiency of the evidence claim. 

ii. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To show a violation of his constitutional right to counsel, Tharp must demonstrate

both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective and reasonable professional norm

and that he was prejudiced by this inadequacy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686

(1984); Williams, 529 U.S. at 390. “The same standard applies whether [a court is]

examining the performance of counsel at the trial or appellate level.” Eagle v. Linahan, 279

F.3d 926, 938 (11 Cir. 2001) (citing Matire v. Wainwright, 811 F.2d 1430, 1435 (11 Cir.

th th

1987)); Shere v. Sec. Dept. of Corrections, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 3066738 *5 (11 Cir.

th

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2008) (to establish appellate counsel's ineffectiveness a petitioner must show deficient

performance and, but for appellate counsel's deficient performance, petitioner would have

prevailed on appeal). In applying Strickland, the court may dispose of an ineffective

assistance claim if Tharp fails to carry his burden on either of the two prongs. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697. 

In assessing the performance of counsel, “a court must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct falls “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;

that is, [Tharp] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged

action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation

omitted); see also Dingle v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th

Cir. 2007). Counsel’s conduct must be evaluated from the perspective at the time the

relevant decision was made and without the distortion of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. See Lancaster v. Newsome, 880 F.2d 362, 375 (11 Cir. 1989) (emphasizing that th

petitioner was “not entitled to error-free representation”).

With regard to the prejudice requirement, Tharp must establish that, but for counsel's

deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. Focusing solely on “outcome determination,” however, is insufficient; “[t]o

set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but

for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him.”

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). Tharp, therefore, must establish “that

counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

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reliable.” Id. at 369 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “Even if counsel’s decision

appears to have been unwise in retrospect, the decision will be held to have been ineffective

assistance only if it was ‘so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have

chosen it.’ ” Dingle, 480 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1445

(11 Cir. 1983)). th

Tharp complains that trial counsel performed deficiently by entering into a stipulation

with the State that Tharp’s co-defendant was the actual triggerman. Tharp complains that

such action amounted to assisting the prosecution in its case because it implied that Tharp

was involved in the crime albeit he was not the individual who actually shot the victim.

Tharp asserts that counsel’s conduct “went against” his defense that he had no knowledge

of the crime nor did he participate in it. 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this challenge to trial counsel’s

conduct on Tharp’s appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition. The relevant portion

of this opinion reads as follows:

Tharp testified that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing a stipulation

that conceded that it was Tharp’s codefendant, Shaber Chamond Wimberly,

who fired the fatal gunshot into the victim and not Tharp. Tharp asserted

that the State should have had to prove the facts of the case. The circuit

court interrupted and the following transpired.

“THE COURT: Let me interrupt you just a minute, Mr. Lamere

[(defense attorney)]. Do you understand that probably saved

your life?

“THE WITNESS (Tharp): I understand that, too, Judge.

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“THE COURT: Okay.”

(R. 8-9.)

. . . .

After the hearing, the circuit court issued the following order denying relief

to Tharp:

“The matter before the Court is Evester Tharp’s petition for

Rule 32 relief. An evidentiary hearing was conducted April

22, 2005. The Defendant was represented through appointed

counsel, Mr. Matt Lamere. The State was represented through

its assistant district attorney, Mr. David Atwell.

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in that the

attorney failed to object to a joint stipulation of fact that codefendant Wimberly fired the murder weapon instead of

Petitioner Tharp. This allegation of ineffectiveness is

preposterous. This Court tried both capital cases. The

Petitioner in the present case was sentenced to life in prison

without the possibility of parole. The co-defendant Wimberly

was sentenced to death. Having actually presided over the

trial, this Court is of the opinion that this joint stipulation was

instrumental in the jury’s recommendation of life without

parole and the Court’s sentence. 

Citing to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, the trial court concluded that

Petitioner failed to meet the first prong of the Strickland standard with regard to his

challenge to counsel’s performance. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the

lower court’s decision concluding that the trial court’s reasons for rejecting Tharp’s claim

of ineffective trial counsel were supported by the record. (Doc. No. 12, Exh. 9 at pgs. 2-6;

see also Doc. No. 1 at TR. 797-822.) 

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In order for Tharp to obtain relief on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim,

this court must find that the state court’s dismissal of his claim involved an unreasonable

application of Strickland. As noted, under Strickland, the standard by which the state court

was required to review Tharp’s claim is a two-prong test in which Tharp must prove both

ineffective assistance (incompetence) and prejudice. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,

381 (1986). In order to grant relief, therefore, the state court had to find that Tharp’s trial

attorney’s performance fell below the range of competence demanded of lawyers in criminal

cases, and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient

performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690,

694.

With respect to Strickland’s first prong - counsel’s performance - the record indicates

that trial counsel performed adequately. The record reflects that Tharp’s trial counsel, as a

matter of strategy, made a decision to enter into the challenged stipulation in order to, as the

trial court put it, “save[] [Tharp’s] life.” (Doc. No. 1, TR. at 797-822.) In reviewing Tharp’s

ineffectiveness claims under the Strickland standard, the state courts did not decide his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “differently than [the Supreme] Court has [in a

case based] on a set a of materially indistinguishable facts” nor did the state courts apply

a rule that contradicts governing federal law. Williams, 362 U.S. at 412. Consequently,

the state appellate court’s rejection of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not

contrary to actual Supreme Court decisions. Additionally, based on the record before it, this

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court cannot say that counsel’s strategic decision to enter into the stipulation with the State

was unreasonable. Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim was objectively reasonable. See Williams v. Taylor, supra.

This decision was likewise a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Consequently, Tharp is not entitled to habeas relief on

this challenge to trial counsel’s performance.

Tharp also challenges the performance of his appellate counsel. Specifically, Tharp

argues that appellate counsel failed to pursue review to the Alabama Supreme Court with

regard to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ “misapplication” of federal law where it

assumed a material fact in reaching its determination that the evidence was sufficient to

support the jury’s guilty verdict. 

The record in this matter reflects that the state courts adjudicated Tharp’s challenge

to his appellate counsel’s performance. The Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision affirming

the trial court’s denial of Tharp’s post-conviction petition noted that appellate counsel

testified at Tharp’s Rule 32 hearing. Appellate counsel testified that while he had never

spoken with Tharp directly concerning his appeal, they had corresponded by mail. Appellate

counsel further testified that he filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama

Supreme Court which listed only one ground for review and that issued concerned selection

of the jury panel. Appellate counsel indicated that he did not pursue certiorari review

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The court notes that Respondents argue that Petitioner exhausted his sufficiency of the evidence 3

claim which he presented on direct appeal. (Doc. No. 11 at pg. 5.) Respondents, therefore, have waived any

requirement of exhaustion or claim of procedural default as to this issue inasmuch as the evidence before the

court indicates that appellate counsel did not pursue the sufficiency of the evidence claim in his application

for rehearing or in the petition for writ of certiorari which was required to properly exhaust this claim in the

state courts. Will v. Secretary for Dept. of Corr., 2008 WL 2067452 n. 4 (11 Cir. 2008); see also Williams,

th

529 U.S. 362. To the extent the court has the discretionary authority to sua sponte raise the exhaustion

requirement, see e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), the court finds no reason to do so in this case

and has, accordingly, addressed the merits of the issue.

In its order denying Tharp’s Rule 32 petition, the trial court found:

4

“Petitioner Tharp also alleges that appellate counsel Mr. Charles Decker

was ineffective in his representation of the Petitioner on appeal. However,

Petitioner testified that appellate counsel Decker did a fine job in the original

appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. His main complaints were that Mr.

Decker should have argued that the evidence was not sufficient to convict;

that the evidence was circumstantial; and that Mr. Decker did not correspond

with him. Mr. Decker testified that he made application for certiorari to the

Alabama Supreme Court but was denied. He further testified that he notified 

Petitioner of the same.

“A review of Mr. Decker’s brief to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

presents five issues for review. The first two issues set out in the brief are

as follows: (1) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the

conviction of capital murder; and (2) Whether the circumstantial evidence

was sufficient to justify a verdict of guilt in this capital murder case. 

Therefore, Mr. Decker did present these issues on appeal contrary to 

Petitioner’s allegations. . . .

“The standard to be applied in a Rule 32 petition is set out in Strickland v. 

(continued...)

17

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence claim because he found no basis under the

applicable rules to pursue the claim further. (Doc. No. 12, Exh. 9 at pgs. 2-6.) 3

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Tharp’s challenge to appellate

counsel’s performance concluding that the trial court’s reasons for rejecting the claim was

supported by the record. The appellate court further held that because Tharp was not entitled 4

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(...continued) 4

Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The 

Petitioner in this case has failed to produce any evidence to indicate that the 

attorney’s performance was deficient. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot even

meet the first prong of the Strickland test.”

(Doc. No. 12, Exh. 9 at pg. 4.) 

18

to counsel on discretionary review, he could not prevail on his challenges to appellate

counsel’s performance regarding the filing of an application for rehearing and petition for

writ of certiorari. Specifically, the appellate court held:

“[A] rehearing is a discretionary review; thus, there is not right

to counsel on application for rehearing. Kinsey [v. State, 545 S.

2d [200,] at 205 [(Ala. Cr. App. 1989)] quoting Wainwright v.

Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 71 L.Ed.2d 475, 102 S. Ct. 1300 (1982).

Where there is no right to counsel, there can be no claim of

ineffective assistance. Patty v. State, 652 So. 2d 337 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1994).” 

Elliot v. State, 768 S. 2d 422, 424 (Ala. Cr. App. 1999). Because Tharp was

not entitled to counsel on rehearing, Tharp cannot prevail on his claim that

counsel was ineffective regarding the application for rehearing.

Additionally,

“ ‘The right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on

the right to counsel itself.’ Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 369

n.7, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836 n.7, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). There is no

constitutional right to counsel on a discretionary appeal to the

state supreme court. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610, 94

S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); Wainwright v. Torna, 455

U.S. 586, 587, 102 S. Ct. 1300, 1301, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982).

‘Review by certiorari is entirely discretionary with our Supreme

Court (except in [cases in which the death penalty has been

imposed]). See A.RA.P. Rule 39.’ Kinsey v. State, 545 So. 2d

200, 203 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989).”

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19

Jackson v. State, 612 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). Because

Tharp was not entitled to counsel for certiorari review, Tharp cannot prevail

on his claim that counsel was ineffective regarding the petition for writ of

certiorari.

(Doc. No. 12, Exh. 9 at pgs. 5.) 

The State of Alabama authorizes appointment of counsel for a convicted defendant

who files a first appeal as of right following his conviction. See Johnson v. State, 584 So.2d

881, 883 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). In affirming the denial of Tharp’s post-conviction petition,

the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that this right to appointed counsel is not further

extended for a defendant who seeks either discretionary review in the Supreme Court of

Alabama or a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Ross, 417 U.S. at 610-

12, 615-18; Wainwright, 455 U.S. at 587 (“a criminal defendant does not have a

constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or application for review

in the [United States Supreme] Court.” Because Tharp’s challenge to appellate counsel’s

conduct provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief as no question of a constitutional

nature is involved, the claim is due to be dismissed. 

iii. The Jury Selection Claim

Tharp complains that trial court violated his right to a fair trial under the Sixth

Amendment due to the manner in which juries are selected in the Circuit Court for Houston

County. Specifically, Tharp argues that potential jurors are chosen from citizens who either

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20

possess a driver’s license or a non-drivers-license identification card and this method of

choosing jurors excludes persons who have neither due to “social reasons of poverty.” 

Tharp presented this challenge on appeal of his conviction. The Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals addressed Tharp’s contention that the trial court erred in denying his

motion challenging the composition of his petit jury which he claimed is derived from a

“combination of county residents who hold driver’s licenses, and a list of residents who hold

identification cards other than driver’s licenses, [and] improperly excludes those persons who

may be too poor to afford the $20 cost of a non-driver-license identification card.” (Doc. No.

12, Exh. 4 at pg. 5.) The appellate court held:

The Sixth Amendment requires that petit juries be drawn from a source fairly

representative of the community. See Acklin v. State, 790 So. 2d 975, 985

(Ala. Crim. App. 2000). “When the raising of a claim under this requirement,

a defendant has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of a ‘fair cross

section’ violation.” Acklin, supra at 985, quoting Sistrunk v. State, 630 So. 2d

147, 149 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). In Alabama, “[r]andom selection from a list

of licensed drivers has been held to be an acceptable manner in which to select

a jury.” Acklin v. State, supra at 985. Additionally, § 12-16-55, Ala. Code

1975 provides, that “. ..all qualified citizens (shall) have the opportunity, in

accordance with this article, to be considered for jury service.” Possession of

a drivers license, or identification card, is a reasonable criterion under state law

for the qualification of a person for jury service.

(Doc. No. 12, Exh. 4 at pg. 5.) 

Case 1:07-cv-00172-WKW-TFM Document 20 Filed 10/13/09 Page 20 of 28
Const. Amend. VI states in relevant part, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

5

right to a ... trial ... by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”

21

The Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right 5

to have the jury pool from which grand and petit juries are selected represent a “fair crosssection” of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527-531 (1975). To establish

a prima facie case of a violation of this requirement of the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner

must show that: (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community;

(2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and

reasonable in relation to the number of persons in the community; and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Duren

v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Failure to establish any one of these elements is fatal

to the claim. United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 648 (11 Cir. 1984). However, the Taylor th

Court clarified that there is no constitutional requirement that petit juries actually chosen

must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. 419

U.S. at 538.

Tharp’s challenge to the jury selection process is unavailing as he has presented no

evidence, just speculation, that under-representation in his case was due to the systematic

exclusion of “impoverished” persons, nor has Tharp produced evidence that impoverished

persons are a cognizable class. Tharp has also failed to produce any statistical evidence to

establish that the representation of persons considered to be living below the poverty line was

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22

not fair and reasonable or that this group of persons was under-represented to an

unconstitutional degree for a significant period of time. Accordingly, the court concludes that

the state court’s determination that Petitioner failed to demonstrate trial court error in

denying his motion challenging the composition of this petit jury is neither “contrary to”

nor an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, supra. Accordingly, Petitioner

is due no relief on his Sixth Amendment challenge.

C. Procedural Default

Respondents assert that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim that the trial

court erred when it allowed the State and trial counsel to enter into a stipulation that his codefendant, Shaber Wimberly, was the “triggerman.” The procedural default doctrine ensures

that “state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in

a federal habeas proceeding." Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). Thus, claims

which have never been presented to a state court or claims which were not exhausted

properly in the state courts are procedurally defaulted if presentation of the claims in state

court would be barred by state procedural rules. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-162

(1996) (where state-court remedies are no longer available because petitioner failed to file

a direct appeal or initiate timely state post-conviction action, petitioner has procedurally

defaulted on his claims and is generally barred from asserting claims in a federal habeas

proceeding); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1 (1991) (citations omitted) (“[I]f

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23

the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be

required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find

the claims procedurally barred[,] ... there is a procedural default for purposes of federal

habeas.”); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11 Cir. 2003) (when petitioner fails th

to properly exhaust claims in state court and is barred from raising claims in state court by

applicable procedural rules, such claims are procedurally defaulted). In the instant action,

Petitioner’s challenges to his convictions are defaulted due to his failure to present his claims

in accordance with the state’s procedural rules.

This court may reach the merits of Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claim “only in

two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal review of a procedurally

defaulted claim if he can show both ‘cause’ for the default and actual ‘prejudice’ resulting

from the default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2644, 91

L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); [Wainwright v.] Sykes, 433 U.S. [72,] 87 [(1977)]. . . . Second, a

federal court may also grant a habeas petition on a procedurally defaulted claim, without a

showing of cause or prejudice, to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Murray, 477

U.S. at 495-96, 106 S.Ct. at 2678. A ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ occurs in an

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of someone

who is actually innocent. Id.” Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. 

i. Cause and Prejudice

“To establish ‘cause’ for procedural default, a petitioner must demonstrate that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the

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Even if the claim was not defaulted, based on the court’s disposition of Tharp’s claim regarding trial 6

counsel’s performance, the issue concerning the trial court’s conduct in allowing the challenged stipulation

appears equally without merit. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Osborne v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d

1237, 1238 (11 Cir. 1983).

th

24

claim properly in the state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th

Cir.1999). To establish “prejudice,” a petitioner must show that there is at

least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id.; Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1327-28 (11 Cir.2002). th

Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.

The court afforded Petitioner an opportunity to demonstrate the existence of cause for

his failure to raise his defaulted claim in the state courts properly and prejudice resulting

from this failure. In his response, Tharp simply asserts that his claim of trial court error in

allowing the parties to enter into a stipulation is not procedurally defaulted and “bears” on

his allegation of actual innocence. (Doc. No. 16 at pg. 7.) 

Tharp has not established the existence of any “objective factor external to the

defense that prevented [him] from raising the claim and which cannot be fairly attributable

to his own conduct.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Tharp has, therefore, failed to demonstrate

cause for his failure to present his claim of trial court error to the state courts in compliance

with applicable procedural rules. Furthermore, Tharp has not shown the existence of actual

prejudice emanating from infringement of federal law. Nevertheless, this court may still

reach the merits of Tharp’s procedurally defaulted claim in order to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. 

6

ii. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

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25

Tharp maintains that he is not guilty of capital murder. In support of this contention,

Tharp argues that nothing puts him at the scene of the crime except the unreliable testimony

of State witness, James Pruitt, that he “just happened to be in association with ‘Wimberly’

on the day of the event,” that being friends with Wimberly did not establish the necessary

intent to commit murder, and that he simply helped Wimberly remove a car from a ditch and

bust a cash register that Wimberly removed from the victim’s store (Doc No. 16 at pgs. 2,

3, 8.) 

The miscarriage of justice standard is directly linked to innocence. Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). Although an actual innocence claim “can itself be defaulted is not

to say that the procedural default may not itself be excused if the petitioner can satisfy the

cause-and-prejudice standard [or fundamental miscarriage of justice exception] with respect

to that claim.” Edwards, 529 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original). Innocence is not an

independent claim; instead, it is the “gateway” through which a petitioner must pass before

a court may consider constitutional claims which are defaulted. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315.

This exception applies where a petitioner establishes that “a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray, 477 U.S. at

496; Schlup v. Delo, supra. “[T]he Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only

in the 'extraordinary' case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (citations omitted).

Thus, “[i]n the usual case the presumed guilt of a prisoner convicted in state court counsels

against federal review of defaulted claims.” Id. at 537. 

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“To establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must demonstrate that . . . ‘it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.’ Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).” Bousley v.

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); House, 547 U.S. at 538. In this context, Tharp must

show constitutional error coupled with newly discovered evidence that was not presented at

trial that would establish factual innocence rather than mere legal insufficiency. Bousley, 523

U.S. at 623-24; Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11 Cir. 2001). See also Schlup, th

513 U.S. at 324.

Schlup observes that

a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the

conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. . . . To be

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence –

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not

presented at trial.

Id. at 324.

The instant claims of innocence are based on the same defenses and evidence

presented by Tharp at trial. The jury rejected these arguments and found Tharp guilty of

one count of capital murder. The court has carefully reviewed the allegations submitted in

support of Tharp’s actual innocence argument. From that review, the court finds that Tharp

does not assert that he has “new” reliable evidence of factual innocence, and there is nothing

in the record that suggests a miscarriage of justice will occur if the court does not reach the

merits of his defaulted claim. Tharp simply presents no evidence nor suggests that any exists

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27

which could satisfy the difficult standard set forth in Schlup. His procedurally defaulted

claim is, therefore, foreclosed from federal habeas review.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petition

for habeas corpus relief filed by Evester Tharp be DENIED and DISMISSED with prejudice.

 It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before October 26, 2009. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects.

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The

parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore,

it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein th

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the th

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

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Done, this 13 day of October 2009. th

 /s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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