Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04094/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04094-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MI PUEBLO SAN JOSE, INC and

CHA CHA ENTERPRISES, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v

CITY OF OAKLAND,

Defendant. /

No C-06-4094 VRW

ORDER

On June 30, 2006, Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc and Cha Cha

Enterprises, LLC, filed suit against the City of Oakland, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief and damages pursuant to the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 USC §

1983, 42 USC § 1981, California Government Code § 6250, et seq, and

Oakland Municipal Code § 2.20, Article III. Doc #1. The City has

moved to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Doc #20. For reasons

discussed below, the City’s motion is DENIED.

//

//

//

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I

“On a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of

material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party.” Wyler Summit Partnership v

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc, 135 F3d 658, 661 (9th Cir 1998)

(citing Parks School of Business, Inc v Symington, 51 F3d 1480,

1484 (9th Cir 1995)). Accordingly, what follows is drawn from

plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc #1), taking their allegations as true.

In early 2005, Cha Cha Enterprises, LLC, on behalf of

related entity, Mi Pueblo San Jose, Inc, entered into a twenty-year

lease of a commercial building located at 1630 High Street in

Oakland, California with owner Red Mountain Retail Group, Inc. Doc

#1, ¶ 3-4, 7-8. 

Cha Cha leased the property as the location for a fullservice grocery store to be operated by Mi Pueblo. Doc #1, ¶ 8. 

The lease provided for Mi Pueblo to make tenant improvements to the

property which, at the time the parties executed the lease, housed

a vacant grocery store. Id. On July 22, October 3 and December

16, 2005, Mi Pueblo applied for, and the City of Oakland issued,

all building permits necessary for the proposed improvements. Id

at ¶ 10. Soon thereafter, Mi Pueblo began improvements in

preparation for its scheduled June 18, 2006, opening. Id. 

On February 10, 2006 the City notified Mi Pueblo’s

landlord, Red Mountain, that pursuant to an “existing

nonconformity,” the property was subject to a “[m]ajor

[c]onditional [u]se [p]ermit.” Doc #1, ¶ 13. On February 23,

2006, Red Mountain filed an appeal of the City’s determination. Id

at ¶ 16. Approximately one month later, during a meeting between

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the City and Red Mountain, the City explained that the “existing

nonconformity” was due to Mi Pueblo’s lack of a valid liquor

license. Id at ¶ 17(a) and (b). After Red Mountain assured the

City that, as of September 16, 2005, Mi Pueblo held the requisite

license, the City agreed to retract the “nonconforming”

categorization of the property. Id at ¶ 11, 17(c) and (d). Based

on the City’s agreement, Mi Pueblo continued construction in

anticipation of its scheduled June 18, 2006, opening. Id at ¶ 20. 

One week after the City’s meeting with Red Mountain, the

City, through the City Council President, issued a press release

calling for a “[p]rotest of Mi Pueblo [],” by “[u]nions,

[n]eighbors, [and] [m]erchants.” Doc #1, ¶ 19. In its release the

City referred to Mi Pueblo as the “Wal-Mart of the Latino

[c]ommunity.” Id. 

On April 26, 2006, contrary to the City’s promise to

retract the nonconforming categorization, the City notified Red

Mountain that it would hear the appeal regarding the nonconforming

use on June 21, 2006. Doc #1, ¶ 21. The City further notified Red

Mountain that Mi Pueblo’s work constituted an “unauthorized

expansion of an alcoholic beverage sales establishment in violation

[of] Oakland Municipal Code,” revoked all previously issued

building permits due to a violation of Oakland Municipal Code §

17.11 (pertaining to open space zoning regulations), and ordered

Red Mountain to “immediately cease and desist all construction and

demolition work,” as all permits were issued “in error.” Id at ¶

21-22. The order instructed Red Mountain to direct any questions

to the City Attorney’s office. Id at ¶ 23. 

//

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Despite the City’s knowledge of Mi Pueblo’s improvements,

the City failed to notify Mi Pueblo of the revocation until several

days later, when it “red tag[ged]” the property. Doc #1, ¶ 23-24. 

Upon notification, Mi Pueblo immediately ceased all construction. 

Id at ¶ 24. 

Pursuant to the April 26, 2006, revocation of permits and

order to cease construction, Red Mountain and Mi Pueblo repeatedly

contacted the City Attorney’s office to appeal the decision. Doc

#1, ¶ 26. The City Attorney’s office directed Mi Pueblo to

numerous city attorneys, the city development director, various

city departments and officials, and eventually to outside counsel. 

Id at ¶ 25. During these exchanges, the only concrete information

Mi Pueblo obtained was from the City’s building official, who told

Mi Pueblo that the matter was a “special situation,” and that the

only possible recourse was through the City Attorney’s office. Id

at ¶ 26. Moreover, the City repeatedly denied Mi Pueblo’s attempts

to access the public file regarding the status of its permits. Id

at ¶ 27. 

Mi Pueblo continued to pursue the matter via numerous

telephone calls and letters to the City Attorney’s office. Doc #1,

¶ 25, 28-30. Following over two months of correspondence which

produced no substantive response from the City, plaintiffs filed

this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, 42 USC § 1983, 42 USC § 1981, California Government

Code § 6250, et seq, and Oakland Municipal Code § 2.20, Article

III. Doc #1. 

//

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II

FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss essentially “test

whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint.” 

Scheid v Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc, 859 F2d 434, 436 (6th Cir

1988). FRCP 8(a), which states that a plaintiff’s pleadings must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” provides the standard for judging

whether such a cognizable claim exists. Lee v City of Los Angeles,

250 F3d 668, 679 (9th Cir 2001). This standard is a liberal one

that does not require a plaintiff to set forth all the factual

details of the claim; rather, all that the standard requires is

that a plaintiff give the defendant fair notice of the claim and

the grounds for making that claim. Leatherman v Tarrant County

Narcotics Intell & Coord Unit, 507 US 163, 168 (1993) (citing

Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41, 47 (1957)). To this end, a plaintiff’s

complaint should set forth “either direct or inferential

allegations with respect to all the material elements of the

claim”. Wittstock v Van Sile, Inc, 330 F3d 899, 902 (6th Cir

2003). 

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim

which would entitle [it] to relief.” Hughes v Rowe, 449 US 5, 9

(1980) (citing Haines v Kerner, 404 US 519, 520 (1972)). See also

Conley, 355 US at 45-46. All material allegations in the complaint

must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc Sec Litig, 183 F3d 970,

980 n10 (9th Cir 1999). The court may also consider documents

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attached to the complaint in connection with a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss. Parks School of Business, Inc v Symington, 51 F3d

1480, 1484 (9th Cir 1995). The court may not, however, consider

other documents outside the pleadings. Arpin v Santa Clara Valley

Transp Agency, 261 F3d 912, 925 (9th Cir 2001).

III

A

The City contends that plaintiffs’ claims brought under

42 USC §§ 1983 and 1981 fail because plaintiffs have not alleged

any injury caused by an official policy of the City. Doc #20 at 4. 

Instead, plaintiffs’ claims are said to arise from “isolated or

sporadic incidents,” which, the City argues, cannot form the basis

for section 1983 liability. Furthermore, the City argues the

allegations concerning City Council President De La Fuente are

insufficient to impute liability, because there are no allegations

that he is a final policymaker for defendant. 

Under Monell v Department of Social Services, municipal

liability must be based upon enforcement of a municipal policy or

custom that caused the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ federal

right, and not upon the municipality’s mere employment of a

constitutional tortfeasor. 436 US 658 (1978). “The ‘official

policy’ requirement * * * intend[s] to distinguish acts of the

municipality from acts of employees in order to limit municipal

liability to conduct for which the municipality is actually

responsible.” Pembaur v Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 478 n6 (1986). As

relevant here, municipal liability under this requirement may be

premised upon (1) a single decision by an official with final

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decisionmaking authority or (2) a custom or persistent practice. 

For a single decision to trigger liability, it must come

from an official with final decisiomaking authority; mere authority

to exercise discretion in the course of implementing a municipal

policy is insufficient. Pembaur, 475 US at 483. “When an

official’s discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not

of that official’s making, those policies, rather than the

subordinate’s departures from them, are the act of the

municipality.” City of St Louis v Prapotnik, 485 US 112, 127

(1988). But if the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s

determination and the basis for it, “their ratification [is]

chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.” 

Id. Whether an official has final decisionmaking authority is

decided by reference to state and local law. 485 US 112 (1988). 

Yet in Bouman v Block, the Ninth Circuit noted that deciding

whether a municipal entity delegated final decisiomaking authority

to a particular official often presents factual issues. 940 F2d

1211 (9th Cir 1991). 

In the present case, plaintiffs allege that the following

city officials were involved in the decision to revoke plaintiffs’

building permits: the acting interim chief building official, the

City Council President, the attorneys in the City Attorney’s office

and the City’s development director. Doc #1, Complaint at ¶ 22,

23, 25, 26, 28, 29 and 30. 

The City appears to argue that plaintiffs’ claims require

dismissal because plaintiffs cannot specifically identify who among

the City’s cast of characters actually retained final

decisionmaking authority regarding the building permits. The court

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disagrees. Under the City’s reasoning, a municipality could avoid

liability by obscuring its organizational structure and suggesting

that the buck stops nowhere. But this, thankfully, is not the law. 

Rather, for dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims, the City must

demonstrate that the complaint presents a situation in which no

final policymaker revoked the permits or approved a subordinate’s

decision to revoke them. Hence, it is not enough for the City to

hide behind its apparently circuitous chain of command.

The City also asserts that “[a]ny suggestion that

[Councilmember De La Fuente] intervened in the process is pure

speculation.” This disregards the proce3dural posture of the case: 

plaintiffs need not prove every assertion to bring suit or to

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. To the contrary, all

material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. See In re

Silicon Graphics Inc Sec Litig, 183 F3d 970, 980 n10 (9th Cir

1999). Moreover, considering City Council President De La Fuente’s

press release issued on April 5, 2006, asking “[u]nions,

[n]eighbors, [m]erchants” to “[r]ally in [p]rotest of Mi Peublo

[m]arket,” Doc #1, Ex I, the proposition that he intervened in the

permit process two weeks later is hardly implausible. In any

event, this is precisely the kind of allegation that requires

discovery.

Section 1983 municipal liability may also be premised

upon enforcement of a well-settled municipal custom or practice,

even though the custom or practice has not been embodied in a

formally promulgated policy, such as an ordinance or regulation. 

Adickes v S H Kress & Co, 398 US 144, 167-68 (1970). Isolated

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instances of wrongdoing by municipal officers or employees do not

constitute a custom, but a series of acts violative of

constitutional rights will in many cases raise an inference of

municipal policy. Gomez v Vernon, 255 F3d 1118 (9th Cir 2001). 

Whether a practice is sufficiently persistent to constitute custom

depends on such factors as how longstanding the practice is, the

number and percentage of officials engaged in the practice, and the

gravity of the conduct. See Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, §

7.16. The rank or importance of the municipal actor would also

appear to figure in this calculus. 

Plaintiffs argue that their dispute with the City itself

constitutes a custom or practice. That an incident comprises

multiple events does not necessarily render it a custom or

practice. Instead, plaintiffs need to show that the underlying

incident — the illegal revocation of building permits — is itself a

custom or practice of the City vis-à-vis other land owners or

represents a practice specifically directed at plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs’ allegation regarding the involvement of a final

decisiomaker is sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Finally, the City argues that the availability of a postdeprivation remedy precludes plaintiffs’ due process claims under

Parrat v Taylor, 451 US 527 (1981) and Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517

(1984). The City identifies its administrative appeals process and

the writ of administrative mandamus provided by state law, Cal Code

Civ Pro § 1094.6, as alternative remedies. 

The Parratt issue arises when a section 1983 plaintiff

alleges a violation of procedural due process and the defendant

asserts that the available state judicial remedies provide all the

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process that is due. The Parratt doctrine holds that an adequate

post-deprivation state judicial remedy satisfies procedural due

process when the deprivation of property is the product of a

“random and unauthorized act” rather than enforcement of an

“established state procedure.” 451 US 527 (1981). 

In Hudson, a prisoner alleged that, during a search of

his prison cell, a guard deliberately and maliciously destroyed

some of his property, including legal papers. 468 US at 534-35. 

The Court blocked § 1983 liability due to the availability of a

tort remedy by which the prisoner could have been compensated. Id. 

In Hudson, as in Parratt, the state official was not acting

pursuant to any established state procedure, but, instead, was

apparently pursuing a random, unauthorized personal vendetta

against the prisoner. Id at 521, n2, 532. 

Yet in Zinermon v Burch, 494 US 113 (1990) — a case

neither party cites — the Court subsequently scaled back Parratt

and Hudson. In Zinermon, the Court noted that Parrat and Hudson

only apply “to the unusual case in which * * * the value of

predeprivation safeguards is negligible in preventing the kind of

deprivation at issue.” 494 US at 129. The Court concluded that

Paratt and Hudson do not apply if: (1) the deprivation of property

was not unpredictable, (2) a pre-deprivation process was not

impossible and (3) the improper conduct was not “unauthorized.”

In the present case, unlike the situation in Parrat and

Hudson, the City is able to predict when it will revoke permits. 

Moreover, a pre-deprivation process is far from “impossible,”

Zinermon, 451 US, at 541; to the contrary, the City already

requires certain procedural safeguards for limiting the power to

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revoke permits. Finally, the deprivation here is not

“unauthorized” because the City provided the authority to effect

the very deprivation complained of here, the revocation of

plaintiffs’ building permits. 

In sum, the court disagrees with the City’s contention

that plaintiffs’ section 1983 and 1981 claims require dismissal for

failure to allege an injury caused by an official policy of the

City. 

B

Next, the City argues that plaintiffs’ due process claims

are not ripe because (1) plaintiffs have not obtained a final

decision resulting in the deprivation of a protected property

interest and (2) plaintiffs have not availed themselves of any

post-deprivation procedures under state law. 

In support of the City’s assertion that a final decision

is a prerequisite for a procedural due process claim, the City

cites Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v Hamilton Bank of

Jackson City, 473 US 172 (1985). In that case, a land owner’s

claims against a zoning law were not ripe because he failed to

apply for appropriate variances under municipal law before

embarking on takings and due process claims. Plaintiffs respond

that, unlike the situation in Williamson County, their ability to

appeal the zoning decision was thwarted by the municipal authority. 

Doc #24 at 10. 

Yet both parties are mistaken to focus on Williamson

County. Were this a regulatory takings case, plaintiffs most

likely could not have brought suit until the appropriate

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administrative body rendered a final decision on plaintiffs’

appeal. Williamson County established a heightened ripeness

standard for takings cases because such cases are “fact-intensive,

and require a careful examination of the challenged decision’s

economic impact and the extent to which it interferes with

reasonable investment-backed expectations.” Triple G Landfills,

Inc v Board of Commissioners, 977 F2d 287, 289 (7th Cir 1992)

(explaining why a final decision is not necessary for challenging

permit requirements). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit requires a

final decision for a due process claim if it relates to, or arises

from, a taking claim. See Norco Construction, Inc v King County,

801 F2d 1143 (9th Cir 1986). Otherwise procedural due process

claims are not subject to heightened ripeness constraints. 

Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd v County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d

822, 831 (9th Cir 2003) (“Thus * * * claims under 42 USC § 1983

concerning land use may proceed even when related Fifth Amendment

‘as applied’ taking claims are not yet ripe for adjudication.”). 

See also Harris v County of Riverside, 904 F2d 497, 500-01 (1990). 

Here, plaintiffs’ due process claims do not relate to or arise from

a taking claim; hence, the standard ripeness test is appropriate. 

“The ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III

limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for

refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v

DOI, 538 US 803, 808 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To

satisfy the constitutional requirement, there must exist a case or

controversy, with issues that are “definite and concrete, not

hypothetical or abstract.” Thomas v Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n,

220 F3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation

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marks omitted) (quoting Railway Mail Ass’n v Corsi, 326 US 88, 93

(1945)). Moreover, ripeness “is peculiarly a question of timing.

[Its] basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through premature

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract

disagreements.” Thomas v Union Carbide Agric Prods Co, 473 US 568,

580 (1985) (citation omitted) (omission in original).

The prudential aspect of ripeness is considered in a two

prong test: first, whether the relevant issues are sufficiently

focused so as to permit judicial resolution; and, second, whether

the parties would suffer any hardship by the postponement of

judicial action. Abbott Laboratories v Gardner, 387 US 136, 149

(1967). The Supreme Court has explained that the rationale behind

the prudential aspect of the ripeness doctrine is to “protect

agencies from judicial interference until an administrative

decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way

by the challenging parties.” Id at 148-49. 

The first factor is inconclusive in the present case. On

the one hand, this litigation would interfere with the City’s

administrative procedures because plaintiffs have not been able to

appeal. But, on the other hand, in revoking the building permits

and impinging plaintiffs’ efforts to appeal, the City’s

administrative decision was formalized and its effects concretely

imposed on plaintiffs. 

The City asserts that Manufactured Home Communities, Inc

v City of San Jose, 420 F3d 1022 (9th Cir 2005), controls this

issue. In MHC, a landlord’s claims were held to be unripe because

he did not first attempt to raise rent through administrative

procedures. In its decision, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that MHC

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“never engaged in the administrative process.” Id at 1033. Hence,

the court reasoned, “[d]ue process has not been denied because no

process was pursued.” Id. But unlike the situation in MHC,

plaintiffs have extensively pursued the City’s complex permit

procedures. This case is not made unripe simply because the City

can point to a few stones unturned. 

The second factor, hardship to the parties of delaying

review, clearly weighs in plaintiffs favor. Plaintiffs were in the

midst of construction when the permits were revoked. And

plaintiffs continue to wait in legal limbo, all the while they

remain liable for $37,600 per month in rent. This situation

demonstrates that plaintiffs have a direct, tangible and not merely

a hypothetical interest in the subject matter of this litigation,

Abbott Laboratories, 387 US at 153-54, for the revocation

categorically prohibits plaintiffs from following through with its

current plans. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiffs’

procedural due process claims are not unripe. 

C

The City contends that plaintiffs have not pled race

discrimination under section 1981 with sufficient particularity. 

As such, the City urges the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim for

intentional discrimination on the basis of race or national origin

due to insufficient factual allegations. 

The City argues that plaintiffs’ section 1981 claims rest

solely on the alleged statement of City Council President De La

Fuente. Based on Kawaoka v City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F3d 1227 (9th

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Cir 1994), the City argues that use of a racial epithet is

insufficient to state an intentional discrimination claim against

the City of Oakland as a matter of law. Yet Kawaoka is not

determinative here because it was a decision for summary judgment

and dealt with off-duty remarks. Id.

Even though a plaintiff’s allegations are deemed admitted

for purposes of a motion to dismiss, these allegations may not be

mere legal conclusions. Plaintiff must plead an “overt act which *

* * gives substance to his claim of discrimination and takes it

from the realm of purely unsupported conclusory allegations.” 

Sherman v Yakahi, 549 F2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir 1977). See also

Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F2d 646 (9th Cir 1984)

(finding insufficient plaintiffs’ allegations that he had been

deprived of the right to bid on government contracts without any

allegations regarding how “race” entered into the decision making

process or any mention of contracts for which he applied and was

denied).

In the instant action, plaintiffs’ broadly allege the

following: 

[T]he City intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs

by, among other things, revoking the building permits,

failing to make any remedy or recourse available to

plaintiffs to address the City’s actions, and denying

plaintiffs access to public records for no valid reason,

based on the race and national origin of plaintiffs’

principal owners. Doc #1, Complaint, ¶ 75.

The lone specific allegation is a statement by City Council

President De La Fuente, calling on small business owners, unions and

neighbors to “protest the Wal-Mart of the Latino [c]ommunity.” Id

at ¶ 75, Ex I. 

Although minimal, the factual allegations in the complaint

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are sufficient to survive the City’s 12(b)(6) motion. Section 1981

does not necessarily require that the plaintiffs’ ethnic

characteristics be the source of the alleged discrimination. The

only requirement is that the discrimination be in fact motivated by

racial considerations. See Alizadeh v Safeway Stores, Inc, 802 F2d

111 (5th Cir 1986) (permitting a white female to claim

discrimination due to her marriage to an Iranian male). Here,

plaintiffs appear to allege that City Council President De La Fuente

discriminated against Mi Pueblo and its owners for betraying their

Latino roots. This prejudice led De La Fuente to saddle Mi Pueblo

with bureaucratic red-tape he would not impose on a non-minority

grocery store. See Doc #24 at 11 n7 (“Plaintiffs believe that the

City and Council President De La Fuente would have little opposition

if a Safeway, Whole Foods or Andronicos sought to occupy the former

Albertsons location”). 

An alternative theory suggested by plaintiffs is that City

Council President De La Fuente discriminated against Mi Pueblo for

not being authentic compared to the “small mom-and-pop” Latino

stores scattered throughout the City of Oakland. Some commentators

term this phenomenon the “trap of cultural authenticity,” which

describes the tendency of certain minority cultural traits to

become, in effect, canonized and for the authorities of that culture

to demand its members to comply with these traits or face exclusion

for being inauthentic. See Richard T Ford, Racial Culture: A

Critique. As applied here, De La Fuente viewed Mi Pueblo as an

inauthentic Latino store for operating like Wal-Mart, rather than

conforming to the standard mold. Although this alternative theory

may run afoul of Supreme Court instruction that section 1981

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proscribes “intentional discrimination solely because of [a

person’s] ancestry or ethnic characteristics,” Al-Khazraji v Saint

Francis College, 481 US 611, 613 (1987), it is sufficient to survive

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

By contrast, the City’s argument attempts to convert this

motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. The relevant

inquiry is not whether plaintiffs have made a prima facie claim

under section 1981, but whether there are no grounds for relief if

all allegations made are assumed to be true. Here, if all

plaintiffs’ factual assertions are true, it is not “beyond doubt

that * * * plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of * *

* [their] claim which would entitle * * * [them] to relief." Lewis,

87 F3d at 1545.

Accordingly, the City is not entitled to dismissal of

plaintiffs’ allegations of race discrimination under section 1981. 

D

The City briefly argues that the court should dismiss

plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief because it is unripe and

because it is identical to the claims raised in plaintiffs’ claims

for damages. Doc #26 at 11. In their opposition to the City’s

motion to dismiss, plaintiffs assert that the court has discretion

to issue a declaration that the City’s actions were unconstitutional

in order to “send a strong message” to the City that it acted

inappropriately. Doc #24 at 11-12. 

The court’s prior discussion of ripeness, supra III(B),

determines the outcome of this argument. Indeed, in the motion and

reply, the City’s argument on declaratory judgment consists of

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citation to its prior argument on ripeness. Accordingly, the court

applies its prior reasoning and declines to dismiss plaintiffs’

declaratory judgment claim. 

E

The City argues that plaintiffs’ cause of action for

injunctive relief should be dismissed because plaintiffs’ complaint

fails to demonstrate any irreparable injury. 

In its August 17, 2006, order denying plaintiffs’ ex parte

motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), the court concluded

that plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to support a

claim for provisional relief. Doc #23 at 3. In its reply

memorandum to the present motion, the City argues “[plaintiffs’]

contentions have no greater purchase now than [in their motion for

TRO] * * *.” Doc #26 at 12. While the record at the time of

plaintiffs’ motion lacked sufficiency, the court did not indicate

that such a record could not exist. Indeed, subsequent discovery

may reveal facts sufficient to support a claim for injunctive

relief. 

Accordingly, the City’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

claim for injunctive relief is DENIED. 

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IV

In sum, the court DENIES the City’s motion to dismiss (Doc

#20, 21). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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