Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01252/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01252-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MOOTRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. G. FLORES, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-01252-LJO-BAM PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

R E C O M M E N D I N G G R A N T I N G

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

(ECF Nos. 32, 36, 40)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

I. Background

Plaintiff Michael Mootry (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed this action on July 20, 2009. 

This action is proceeding on the first amended complaint, filed May 24, 2010, against Defendants

Flores, Hedgpeth, Billings, Tarnoff, Lewis, Grissom, Wegman, and Cabrerra for interfering with

Plaintiff’s exercise of his religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”). On June 10, 2011, Defendants Cabrera, Flores, Grissom, Hedgpeth, Lewis , Tarnoff,

and Wegman filed a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 29, 2011, and

Defendants filed a reply on September 6, 2011. On October 31, 2011, following the issuance of an

order for the United States Marshal to re-serve the complaint and summons, Defendant Billings

waiver of service was returned executed.

II. Complaint Allegations

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Flores, Hedgpeth, Billings, Tarnoff, Lewis,

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Grissom, Wegman, and Cabrera seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and

punitive damages. Plaintiff, a devout and practicing Muslim, arrived at Kern Valley State Prison

(“KVSP”) in June of 2006. On March 2008, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal alleging that his rights

to exercise his religion were being violated. The appeal was screened out by Defendant Billings

stating that it was a request for information, not an appeal. Plaintiff appealed the rejection and

Defendant Billings again screened out his appeal for the same reason.

Plaintiff objected stating that Defendant Billingswas attemptingto keep him from exhausting

his appeal and mailed the form to the Inmate Appeals Branch for Director’s Level review. The

appeal was returned stating it appeared that it may have been improperly rejected. On August 4,

2008, Plaintiff was asked by Defendant Tarnoff to resubmit the appeal, which he did. 

Defendant Wegman interviewed Plaintiff onSeptember 23, 2008, for the first level response. 

Defendant Cabrera was also present. Defendant Wegman partially granted Plaintiff’s appeal stating

that KVSP does not allow Muslim inmates to attend Jumu’ah prayer services due to the lack of a

Muslim chaplain or volunteers. Although services are scheduled for Friday, they are never held. 

Defendants Grissom and Wegman signed off on the appeal. Plaintiff received a second level 1

response from Defendant Lewis on December 5, 2008. The response stated that Defendant Tarnoff

had been assigned to investigate the appeal and a thorough investigation had been conducted. 

Defendant Cabrera had informed Defendant Tarnoff that outside volunteers are available to conduct 

services, and a Jewish chaplain had been hired, but he does not work on Fridays due to religious

reasons. Defendant Cabrera further indicated that volunteer religious personnel conduct services

when they are available. Defendant Lewis indicated that KVSP was in the process of hiring

additional religious personnel.

On December 28, 2008, Plaintiff filed his Director’s Level appeal. The appeal was denied

on March 9, 2009, stating that KVSP only employed one full-time chaplain making it difficult to

meet the needs of the various religious groups and that interviews to fill the vacant chaplain position

Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, the appeal response stated “You are not being denied services, currently

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Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) does not have a Muslim Chaplain however, KVSP does have Jumuah services

scheduled for Fridays at 12:00 pm on A yard chapel.” (First Am. Compl., Attach. H, ECF No. 19.)

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had been completed and hiring was anticipated. Volunteers had been providing coverage, but had

been discontinued for personal reasons.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally participated in the delay in hiring a Muslim

chaplain and refused to allow reasonable accommodation of an inmate minister out of prejudice

against Muslims. KVSP fired the previous Muslim chaplain in October 2007, and he filed a civil

lawsuit alleging discrimination and retaliation. A Muslim chaplain was not provided until April

2009. During the time inmates were without a Muslim chaplain Jumu’ah, Ta’alim, and Ramadan

services were sometimes allowed with supervision. 

ByMarch 2008, Defendant Flores, head of religious programing on the yard, and Defendant

Hedgpeth, had completely disallowed all Muslim religious services and no longer allowed Muslim

inmates to receive prayer oil. After inmates appealed, Defendants Hedgpeth and Flores had

Christian chaplains or volunteers conduct services. These volunteers discontinued their services

after prison guards, under the direction of Defendant Cabrera, began intentionally delaying services

by not allowing Muslim inmates go to the chapel. The services would overlap making it difficult

fortheChristian chaplains to conduct their own services. The volunteers discontinued their services.

Around the time Plaintiff filed his initial appeal a Jewish chaplain was hired to minister to

the Jewish inmates and Muslim population, although a majority of inmates were Muslim. Plaintiff’s

request for the reasonable accommodation of an inmate minister was ignored. From 2006 until

March 2008, an inmate minister was allowed to conduct Muslim services in the absence of a

chaplain and volunteers. During the thirty days of Ramadan unsupervised services were allowed to

be conducted for two hours by an inmate minister, and on June 6, 2008, an inmate minister was

allowed to conduct Jumu’ah services.

During this time period inmates were allowed to vote for and be represented by the Mens

Advisory Counsel. Muslim inmates were the only class of people to be excluded from the right to

be represented by an appointed minister.

III. Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally considers

only the pleadings and must accept as true the allegations in the complaint. Marder v. Lopez, 450

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F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006); Shaver v. Operating Engineers Local 428 Pension Trust Fund, 332

F.3d 1198, 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2002). A court may consider evidence that the complaint relies on,

where the complaint refers to a document that is central to the complaint and no party questions the

authenticity of the document. Marder, 450 F.3d at 448; see United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903,

908 (9th Cir. 2003). Additionally, the court is to “construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those

drafted by attorneys. Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342. 

A motion to dismissfor failure to state a claim is properly granted where the complaint lacks

“a cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotingBalistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). There are two requirements to survive a motion

to dismissfor failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). While accepting factual allegations in the

complaint as true, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions as true, and the factual

allegations must state a plausible claim for relief. Maya v. Centex Corp., __ F.3d __, WL 4381864,

*3 (9th Cir. 2011). 

IV. Argument

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants bring this motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on

the grounds that 1) Plaintiff cannot recover damages or injunctive relief under RLUIPA; 2) Plaintiff

failed to state facts demonstrating that Defendants Tarnoff, Lewis, Grissom, Wegman, or Cabrera

participated in conduct that deprived Plaintiff of his rights under RLUIPA or the U. S. Constitution;

3) Plaintiff failed to state facts to demonstrate that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and 4) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

because they violated no constitutional or statutory right and their conduct was reasonable. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff maynot bring suit against Defendants seeking damages under

RLUIPA. Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether a RLUIPA claim can

be brought against a defendant in his individual capacity, courts that have considered the issue have

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not permitted suits against individuals in their individual capacities under RLUIPA and district

courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally adopted the same reasoning to conclude the RLUIPA does

not create a cause of action for monetary damages.

Plaintiff has been transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) and has not alleged

that his rights are being violated by officials at SVSP. Once an inmate transfers to a different

institution his claims for injunctive relief becomemoot because anydispute or controversyregarding

his conditions of confinement have been extinguished. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are

moot as Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at KVSP. 

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Tarnoff, Lewis, Grissom, Wegman, and

Cabrera for their involvement in adjudicating his administrative appeals. Plaintiff fails to state any

facts that show these defendants personally participated in the imposition of any restrictions that

interfered with his ability to practice his religion. Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant

Cabrera are based upon supervisory liability, which is not actionable under section 1983. 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state facts to show that Defendants’ acted with a discriminatory

motive. Plaintiff suggests that KVSP intentionally delay hiring a Muslim Chaplain and delayed

services to frustrate Christian volunteers. The allegations in the complaint demonstrate that KVSP

officials took reasonable measures to ensure that Muslim inmates had an opportunityto practice their

faith. 

Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants Tarnoff,

Lewis, Grissom, Wegman and Cabrera did not violate Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA or the U. S.

Constitution. Additionally, Defendants conduct was reasonable under the circumstances presented

in the complaint. Defendants did not have any authority or duty to act beyond their roles in

adjudicating Plaintiff’s administrative appeals. 

B. Plaintiff’s Opposition

Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing that punitive damages can be obtained under RLUIPA

and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff argues that he was denied his rights to practice

his sincerely held religious beliefs by Defendants’ policy of an outright ban on inmate ministers

which resulted in Plaintiff being denied Jumu’ah services. Title 15 of the California Code of

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Regulations allows for an inmate to minister to the religious needs of a specific faith when a chaplain

cannot be obtained to conduct services. Defendants refused to follow the law and Plaintiff was

denied his right to practice his religion.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Cabrera maintained an underground anti-Muslim policy. 

DefendantCabrera or his subordinates would act to prevent Muslim inmates from attending religious

services.

Plaintiff submitted grievances complaining that the lack of a Muslim chaplain was depriving

him of the right to practice his religion by attending Jumu’ah services. Defendants Wegman and

Lewis denied his appeals. Defendant Hedgpeth is liable because he promulgated a policy that

prevented Plaintiff from exercising his right to attend Jumu’ah services. Defendant Flores enforced

the illegal policy. Defendant Cabrera participated in and promulgated an underground policy of

discrimination and he and his subordinates violated Plaintiff’s right to free exercise. Defendants

Tarnoff and Grissom neglected their duty to properly investigate Plaintiff’s inmate appeals. 

Plaintiff argues that the ban on inmate ministers violates his equal protection rights. 

Defendants did not hire a chaplain for over a year and the Muslim population suffered from the lack

of a minister. Plaintiff states that the mens advisory counsel continued to be lead by their

representatives appointed by the inmates, but Muslim inmates were not allowed the same rights. 

Members of other religions had access to inmate ministers and chaplains. Muslim inmate needs

could not be accommodated without the hiring of a Muslim minister or appointing an inmate

minister. 

The failure to provide an inmate minister or chaplain substantially burdened Plaintiff’s right

to exercise his religion for well over a year. Due to the blanket policy banning inmate ministers

prevented Plaintiff from being led by a Muslim in accord with the Qur’an. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because he has

produced cognizable claims that his rights were violated and Defendants violated clearly established

law. Courts have allowed damages in cases involving violations of RLUIPA. Plaintiff may receive

monetary and punitive damages based upon the constitutional violations and RLUIPA. 

///

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C. Defendants’ Reply

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to produce any facts or authority to defeat the

motion to dismiss. The cases Plaintiff argues allow damages under RLUIPA neither affirmatively

rejected or addressed the reasons for barring damages under RLUIPA. The majority of courts that

have considered the question have found that damages are not available under RLUIPA because the

intent to create such an action was not expressly intended by Congress as a condition of receiving

federal funds. 

Plaintiff did not address the issue that his request for injunctive relief is moot as he is no

longer housed at KVSP, nor does Plaintiff state facts to show that Defendants Tarnoff, Lewis,

Grissom, or Wegman were involved in Plaintiff’s attempts to obtain Jumu’ah services or an inmate

minister beyond processing his appeals. Plaintiff has failed to state any facts to show that groups

other than Muslims were allowed to gather in the chapel without supervision, nor that the failure to

hire a Muslim minister was for the purpose of preventing Muslim inmates from gathering for

services or other activities.

While Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to complywith Title 15 regulations, a violation

of regulations does not give rise to an action under section 1983. Plaintiff has failed to state facts

that the regulation at issue was discriminatory against Muslims. The plain language of the policy

states that unsupervised religious services or other activities in the chapel are forbidden for all

religious groups. Additionally, the regulation cited by Plaintiff merely states that prison officials

“may at their discretion” appoint an inmate minister to attend to the religious needs of inmates.

Finally, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to show that Defendants Tarnoff, Lewis,

Grissom, or Wegman violated his rights under RLUIPA or the Constitution.

V. Discussion

A. RLUIPA

Defendants argue that Plaintiff may not seek damages under RLUIPA and his claims for

injunctive relief aremoot, therefore Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim should be dismissed. To state a claim

under RLUIPA a plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of state law “imposed a

substantial burden on his religious exercise. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639

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F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). Under RLUIPA a plaintiff bears the initial burden of setting forth a

prima facie claim that there is a substantial burden on the exercise his religious beliefs.” Warsoldier

v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005.) Once the initial burden is met then the burden

shifts to defendant to show that any substantial burden on plaintiff’s “exercise of his religious beliefs

is both in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of

furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 (quoting 42 U.S.C

§ 2000cc-1(a); § 2000cc-2(b)). RLUIPA is to be broadlyconstrued in favor of protecting the inmates

right to exercise his religious beliefs. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995. 

The first step is to identify the religious exercise that is being affected and then determine

if the policy at issue is a substantial burden on that religious exercise. Greene v. Solano County Jail,

513 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion,

whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 

Plaintiff allegesthat although the prison had services scheduled everyFriday, he was denied Jumu’ah

services because there was no chaplain or volunteer available to conduct services and the prison

would not allow an inmate minister to conduct services. To violate RLUIPA Plaintiff must show

that the denial of services placed a substantial burden on his right to exercise his religion. “[A]

‘substantial burden’ on ‘religious exercise’must impose a significantlygreat restriction or onus upon

such exercise.” Warsoldier, 481 F.3d at 995 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. Of the Ind.

Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981)). An outright ban of a

religious exercise has been held to place a substantial burden on an inmates right to exercise his

religious beliefs. Greene, 513 F.3d at 988. While Plaintiff alleges that he was completely denied

access to religious services after March of 2008, he also states that Jumu’ah, Ta’alim, and Ramadan

services were sometimes allowed with supervision and services were held in June 2008 and from

August through September 2008 for Ramadan. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to show that

there was a substantial burden on his right to exercise his religious beliefs. 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) an individual may assert a claim under RLUIPA “and

obtain appropriate relief against a government.” The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit for damages

under RLUIPA against defendants in their official capacity. Sossamon v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 131 S.

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Ct. 1651, 1655 (2011); Holley v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 599 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.

2010). The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether RLUIPA provides an action for damages against

prison officials in individual capacity suits. Florer, 639 F.3d at 922 n.3. However the Fifth, Seventh,

and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to the Spending

Clause and did not indicate with sufficient clarity an intent to create an individual capacity action

for damages, moreover, such a reading of the statute would raise serious constitutional concerns

regarding the extent of Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause. See Sossamon v. Lone Star

State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 329 (5th Cir. 2009) (Congressional enactments pursuant to the

spending clause do not impose direct liability on an individual who is not a party to the contract

between the state and federal government); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009)

(“Construing RLUIPA to provide for damages actions against officials in their individual capacities

would raise serious questions regarding whether Congress had exceeded its authority under the

Spending Clause”); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ection 3 of RLUIPA-a

provision that derives from Congress’ Spending Power-cannot be construed as creating a private

action against individual defendants for monetary damages”), abrogated on other grounds,

Sossamon, __ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1651. The Fourth Circuit has also held that no individual

capacity claim can be brought under RLUIPA. Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir.

2009) (“[I]t would be a novel use of the spending clause to condition the receipt of federal funds on

the creation of an individual capacity damages action”).

The Ninth Circuit has found that RLUIPA is constitutional as an enactment under the

Spending Clause. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Implicit in the

Ninth Circuit’s holding is recognition of limits on Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause.

Thus, the Court finds the reasoning of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits persuasive

and concludes that RLUIPA does not create a suit for damages against defendants in their individual

capacities. See also Williams v. Book, No.2:10-cv-0423, 2011 WL 2173743, *2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. June

2, 2011); Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1045 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010); Hypolite v. CDCR, No.

2:05-cv-0428, 2010 WL 1729736, *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2010). Accordingly, Plaintiff may not

recover damages against defendants in their individual or official capacities under RLUIPA and may

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only seek injunctive relief.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to be allowed to attend Jumu’ah prayer and for an inmate

minister to be allowed to conduct Jumu’ah services in the absence of a Muslim chaplain or

volunteers. When an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the prison where he

is incarcerated, his claims for such relief become moot when he is no longer subjected to those

conditions. Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368

(9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991). The incidents alleged in the

complaint occurred while Plaintiff was housed at KVSP. On August 10, 2010, Plaintiff submitted

a change of address form indicating that he is now housed at SVSP. Since Plaintiff is no longer

incarcerated at KVSP the injunctive relief he is seeking is moot. 

Plaintiff also seeks a declaration that his rights were violated. “A declaratory judgment, like

other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised

in the public interest.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S. Ct.

641, 644 (1948). “Especially where government action is involved, courts should not intervene

unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative.” Id. “Declaratory relief

should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal

relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and

controversy faced by the parties.” United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir.

1985). Defendants in this action have no control over the policies at SVSP and Plaintiff has not

demonstrated a reasonable expectation that he would be transferred back to KVSP. Therefore

Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment is moot. Since Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under

RLUIPA, as discussed above, the Court should grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

RLUIPA claim.

B. Free Exercise

“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the

Constitution.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2259 (1987). Nevertheless,

prisoners’ constitutional rights are subject to substantial limitations and restrictions in orderto allow

prison officials to achieve legitimate correctional goals and maintain institutional security. O’Lone

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v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 546-47, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1878 (1979). 

“Inmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that

no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348,

107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The protections of the Free

Exercise Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially burden the practice of an inmate’s

religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with

his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732,

737 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. 

While Plaintiff complains that he was unable to participate in Jumu’ah services, he fails to

allege that attending Jumu’ah services was a sincerelyheld religious belief. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884. 

Additionally, while Plaintiff alleges that he was denied the ability to participate in Jumu’ah services,

he fails to demonstrate that he was denied access to other Muslim services or religious ceremonies.

O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352, 107 S. Ct. at 2406. The Court notes that services were provided for

Ramadan and occasionallywhen volunteers were available. Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable

claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

C. Equal Protection Clause

The Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons who are similarly situated should be

treated alike. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (2001); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985). An equal protection claim may be

established by showing that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on

the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, Lee, 250 F.3d at 686; Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (1998), orthat similarlysituated individuals were intentionallytreated differentlywithout

a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158,

1167 (2005); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000).

Plaintiff does not set forth factual allegations that he is a member of a protected class. The

allegation that Muslim inmates were not allowed to have a inmate minister while inmate

representatives were allowed to represent inmates on the Mens Advisory Counsel does not state a

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cognizable claim. All inmates are not similarly situated to Muslim inmates. Plaintiff may not state

a claim based upon Muslim inmates being treated differently than all inmates in the prison who are

not similarly situated. Thornton, 425 F.3d at 1168. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts supporting a

claim that he was intentionally discriminated against or that other similarly situated inmates were

treated differently.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were

reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials from civil liability where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.

Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (citations

omitted). To determine if an official is entitled to qualified immunity the court uses a two part

inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2001) overruled in part by ” 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808. The court determines if the facts as alleged state

a violation of a constitutional right and if the right is clearly established so that a reasonable official

would have known that his conduct was unlawful. Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. This does not

require that the same factual situation must have been decided, but that existing precedent would

establish the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Id.; Mattos v. Agarano, __ F.3d __,

2011 WL 4908374, *6 (9th Cir. 2011). “The linchpin of qualified immunity is the reasonableness

of the official’s conduct.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 654 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The inquiry as to whether the right was clearly established is “solely a question of law for the

judge.” . Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro.

Police Dep’t. 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009)). A district court is “permitted to exercise their

sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236,

129 S. Ct. at 818. 

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Since Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for a violation of his federal rights, there

has not been sufficient factual development for a determination of whether Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity. Defendants motion for qualified immunity should be denied. 

E. Due Process

In the amended complaint Plaintiff alleged a violation of due process that was not addressed

in the order issued on March 3, 2011. The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of

liberty without due process of law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2393

(2005). In order to state a cause of action for a deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first

identify a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Id. The Due Process Clause does not

confer a liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within a prisoner’s imposed sentence. 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2298 (1995). However, a state may “create

liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84, 115

S. Ct. at 2300. A prisoner has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause only where the

restraint “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinaryincidents

of prison life.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at

484, 115 S. Ct. at 2300). 

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to state a due process claim based upon the processing

of his appeals, there is no liberty interest in a prison grievance procedure. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). The prison

grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing

appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494,

495 (8th Cir. 1993).

Finally, where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” 

Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets

omitted) overruled on other grounds by Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. V. Swift –Eckrick, Inc., 546

U.S. 394, 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S. Ct.

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1708, 1714 (1998). In this case, the First Amendment “provides [the] explicit textual source of

constitutional protection . . . .” Patel, 103 F.3d at 874. Therefore, the First Amendment rather than

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs Plaintiff’s claims. 

F. Linkage Requirement

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim, it declines to

address Defendants arguments that Plaintiff has not sufficiently linked the named defendants to

conduct that violated Plaintiff’s rights. However, Plaintiff is advised that in determining whether

a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a). UnderRule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule

8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)).

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires

the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint [that]

pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations

contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1949. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

VI. Conclusion and Recommendation

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed June 10, 2011, be GRANTED IN PART as

follows:

a. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA be dismissed, without leave to amend, as moot;

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b. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint be dismissed, with leave to amend, for

failure to state a claim; and 

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss to dismiss based upon qualified immunity be

DENIED, without prejudice.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 16, 2011 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe 

10c20k UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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