Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02638/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02638-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES D. HENRY, F00408, 

Plaintiff(s),

 vs.

STEVE ALLBRITTON,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 16-2638 CRB (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, a prisoner at San Quentin State Prison (SQSP), has filed a pro se

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that SQSP Associate Warden Steve

Allbritton violated his federal constitutional right to due process by improperly

denying him an opportunity to begin the process of recalling his prison

commitment for “exceptional behavior” pursuant to section 3076(a) of title 15 of

the California Code of Regulations. Plaintiff contends that he qualifies for the

recall of his prison commitment under section 3076(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which

prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable

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claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint

“is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

In the context of parole, the Supreme Court has held that although there is

no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally

released before the expiration of a valid sentence, see Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), a state’s statutory parole

scheme, if it uses mandatory language, may create a presumption that parole

release will be granted when or unless certain designated findings are made, and

thereby give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest, see Board of

Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (Montana parole statute providing

that board “shall” release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due

process liberty interest in release on parole); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12

(Nebraska parole statute providing that board “shall” release prisoner, subject to

certain restrictions, creates due process liberty interest in release on parole). In

such a case, a prisoner gains a legitimate expectation in parole that cannot be

denied without adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen, 482 U.S.

at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16.

/

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California Penal Code section 1170(d) authorizes a court, at any time

upon recommendation of the Secretary of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation or Board of Parole Hearings, to recall a sentence

and commitment. 

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The same rationale applies to the process of recalling a prison commitment

on account of a prisoner’s “exceptional behavior,” as California law provides. It

is not a constitutional right, but if California’s statutory/regulatory scheme uses

mandatory language that creates a legitimate expectation that a prisoner’s

commitment will be recalled if certain substantive predicates are met, the

statutory scheme may create a protected liberty interest that cannot be denied

without adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen, 482 U.S. at

373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16.

The regulation plaintiff relies on, California Code of Regulations title 15,

section 3076(a), provides that the Secretary of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, or designee, “may recommend at any time to the

sentencing court the recall of an inmate’s commitment pursuant to Penal Code

section 1170(d)” for one or more of the following reasons: 

(1) It is evident from the inmate’s exceptional behavior that is so

extraordinary beyond simply complying with all regulations and

procedures during incarceration that they have changed as a person

and would be a positive asset to the community.

* * * 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3076(a).1

 According to plaintiff, he qualifies for the

recall of his commitment under § 3076(a) and defendant violated his right to due

process by recommending otherwise to the Secretary and thereby denying him an

opportunity to begin the recall process in the sentencing court.

Unfortunately for plaintiff, the regulation upon which he relies does not

create a liberty interest triggering federally enforceable procedural rights. 

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Section 3076(a) does not contain “substantive predicates” governing official

discretion and does not employ “explicitly mandatory language” specifying the

outcome that must be reached upon finding that substantive predicates have been

met. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63

(1989); accord Allen, 482 U.S. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16. Put

simply, section 3076 provides “no private cause of action” under the Due Process

Clause. Larson v. Runnels, No. CIV S-07-0806 FCD DAD P, 2007 WL

4557103, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2007).

In addition, it is well-established under California law that the recall of a

prisoner’s commitment pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(d) is “permissive,

not mandatory,” People v. Delson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 56, 62 (1984), and that

section 1170(d) does not confer any right on a defendant to seek the recall of his

commitment. See People v. Pritchett, 20 Cal. App. 4th 190, 193-94 (1993). Not

surprising, federal courts presented with the issue consistently have held that

there is no basis for finding that section 1170(d) gives rise to a liberty interest

enforceable as a matter of federal due process. See Harris v. Valenzuela, No. CV

14-7692-R (MAN), 2014 WL 4988150, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014) (citing

cases).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED for failure to

state claim under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 

The clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this order, terminate all

pending motions as moot, and close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 30, 2016 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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