Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01079/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01079-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL ASMAR, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case No.: 16-cv-01079-GPC-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NOS. 20, 21]

Plaintiff Miguel Asmar (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s 

applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits 

under Title II and supplement security income payments under Title 

XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff moves the Court for summary 

judgment reversing the Commissioner and ordering an award of 

benefits, or in the alternative, to remand the case for further 

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administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 19). Defendant moves for 

summary judgment affirming the denial of benefits. (ECF No. 20).

For the reasons expressed herein, the Court recommends that 

Plaintiff’s motion be DENIED and Defendant’s motion be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges that he became disabled on December 31, 2008, 

due to several medical and mental conditions, including pain in his 

right foot and knee, both ankles, right elbow, and jaw; numbness in 

both hands and his back; pain and arthritis in his neck; wrist damage; 

loss of concentration; anxiety; and depression. (A.R. at 11, 168).1 

Plaintiff’s date of birth, June 27, 1974, categorizes him as a younger 

individual at the time of filing. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563, 416.963; (A.R. 

216).

B. Procedural History

On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for 

supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act 

(“Act”), and on March 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for 

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act. (A.R. 11). 

Plaintiff has filed four prior applications. (A.R. 16). The third 

application was filed on August 20, 2009, and denied by Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”) J. Carletti on December 27, 20102. (Id., A.R. 102). 

 

1 “A.R.” refers to the Administrative Record filed on August 4, 2016, and 

is located at ECF No. 11.

2 The current ALJ reported December 17, 2010 as the date of the prior 

ALJ decision, but the correct date is December 27, 2010. (Compare A.R. 

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The Appeal’s Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision on January 4, 

2011. (A.R. 16). As to Plaintiff’s 2012 applications, his claims were 

denied initially on October 19, 2012, and denied upon reconsideration 

on April 17, 2013. (A.R. 11). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an 

ALJ, and a hearing was held on June 5, 2014, before ALJ Eric V. 

Benham. (A.R. 29-48). Plaintiff appeared and was represented by 

counsel. (A.R. 29). Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Mark Remas

testified at the hearing. (A.R. 32-47).

On September 18, 2014, the ALJ issued a written decision finding 

Plaintiff not disabled. (A.R. 11-21). Plaintiff appealed, and the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. 

1-3). Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. (A.R. 1).

On May 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court 

seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1). 

On August 4, 2016, Defendant answered and lodged the administrative 

record with the Court. (ECF Nos. 10, 11). On October 18, 2016, 

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 20). On November 

18, 2016, the Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment and 

responded in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF Nos. 20, 21).

 

16, with A.R. 102). In any event, the ALJ’s typographical error is 

inconsequential.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The supplemental security income program provides benefits to 

disabled persons without substantial resources and little income. 42 

U.S.C. § 1382. To qualify, a claimant must establish an inability to 

engage in “substantial gainful activity” because of a “medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” that “has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The disabling impairment must be so severe 

that, considering age, education and work experience, the claimant 

cannot engage in any kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the 

national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner makes this assessment through a process of up 

to five steps. First, the claimant must not be engaged in substantial, 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must 

have a “severe” impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the medical 

evidence of the claimant’s impairment is compared to a list of 

impairments that are presumed severe enough to preclude work. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment meets or is 

equivalent to the requirements for one of the listed impairments, 

benefits are awarded. Id. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet 

or is not equivalent to the requirements of a listed impairment, the 

analysis continues to a fourth and possibly fifth step and considers the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). At the 

fourth step, the claimant’s relevant work history is considered along 

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with the claimant’s residual functional capacity. Id. If the claimant 

can perform the claimant’s past relevant work, benefits are denied. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(f). At the fifth step, if the claimant is found not able to 

perform the claimant’s past relevant work, the issue is whether 

claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national 

economy, considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). If the 

claimant cannot do other work that exists in the national economy, 

benefits are awarded. Id.

Section 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, through Section

405(g) of the Act, allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review 

of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3), 

405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited, and the Commissioner’s 

denial of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less 

than a preponderance. Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 

1997). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala 

53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record 

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from 

the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence 

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supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold 

the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and 

resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the 

Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).

The ALJ has a special duty in social security cases to fully and 

fairly develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a 

claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 

F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Because disability hearings are not 

adversarial in nature, the ALJ must “inform himself about the facts 

relevant to his decision,” even if the claimant is represented by counsel. 

Id. (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983)).

Even if a reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ 

failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and 

reaching his or her decision. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th 

Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment 

affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the 

Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

B. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from December 31, 2008, through the date of the 

ALJ’s decision, September 18, 2014. (A.R. 20-21). The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff did not make a showing of changed circumstances sufficient to 

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overcome the presumption of non-disability from the prior ALJ decision 

in December 2010. (A.R. 16).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe 

impairments: history of testicular cancer status post right orchiectomy 

without recurrence, cervical spine degenerative disc disease, right hand 

osteoarthritis, right wrist pain and right knee degenerative changes. 

(A.R. 13). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s depression is not severe. 

(A.R. 13-14). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has mild 

restrictions in daily living activities, social functioning and 

concentration, persistence or pace. (A.R. 14). The ALJ also determined 

that Plaintiff experienced no episodes of decompensation of extended 

duration. (Id.). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to drive a car, 

attend school, ride a motorcycle, ride a bike, care for his daughter and 

engage in outdoor activities with her and was a jeweler for a hobby. 

(Id.).

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment 

or combination thereof that meets or is medically equivalent to the 

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926) because “[n]o physician has credibly 

opined that the [Plaintiff’s] conditions meet or equal any listing, and the 

state agency program physicians opined that they do not.” (A.R. 15).

Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to “perform the full range of heavy work as defined in 

20 CFR [§§] 404.1567(d) and 416.967(d)” with no mental limitations. 

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(A.R. 15, 18). In making this finding, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s

statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of 

his symptoms “are not entirely credible” and the objective medical 

evidence does not support Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. (A.R. 16). 

Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of 

performing past relevant work as a newspaper deliverer and auto 

service supervisor because his RFC permits him to perform these jobs

as they are generally performed. (A.R. 20). The ALJ specifically noted 

the following to be of particular relevance:

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

Plaintiff alleged that since December 31, 2008, pain in his neck, 

arm, hand, wrist and knee limits his abilities to perform postural and 

manipulative movements such as sitting, standing, walking and lifting 

and carrying. (A.R. 16). He alleged that his disability is due to mental 

and physical injuries. (Id.). The ALJ, however, found that Plaintiff’s

allegations concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

his symptoms were “not entirely credible”. (Id.). Specifically, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling mental and physical 

limitations are unsupported by objective medical evidence. (Id.).

Plaintiff was diagnosed with and treated for testicular cancer in 

2006, completed chemotherapy by January 2, 2007 and was able to 

resume full-time work delivering newspapers and performing manual 

labor. (A.R. 16-17). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff does not allege 

current impairment due to cancer and no evidence of cancer recurrence 

exists. (A.R. 17).

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Plaintiff alleged three motor vehicle accidents in 2008 and another 

in 2011. (Id.). The ALJ incorporated by reference the prior ALJ’s 2010 

decision and stated that Plaintiff’s “exaggeration of the severity of these 

accidents and the lack of objective evidence of injury impair the 

[Plaintiff’s] credibility.” (Id.). Particularly, the ALJ noted that after 

Plaintiff’s December 20, 2008 motorcycle accident, he complained of 

bilateral knee, wrist and left thumb pain, but radiographs of Plaintiff’s 

pelvis and bilateral knees were negative. (Id.). The ALJ also 

acknowledged that Plaintiff was discharged from the emergency

department with no prescriptions and was walking appropriately. (Id.). 

With respect to Plaintiff’s October 4, 2011 motorcycle accident, the 

ALJ noted that on October 10, 2011, Plaintiff was not taking any 

medications, and that in a November 2011 neurologic exam, Plaintiff

“walked with a limp but was nonetheless able to toe, heel and tandem 

walk” and showed no evidence of focal weakness or atrophy of the upper 

or lower extremities, except for his right thumb muscles. (A.R. 17). On 

May 21, 2012, Plaintiff complained of foot pain, but his radiographs 

were normal, except for hallux valgus. (Id.). The ALJ noted that 

Plaintiff’s behavior during his July 2, 2012 appointment “indicated no 

credible concern for a foot injury.” (Id.). 

On February 11, 2013, Plaintiff reported that he was not taking 

any medications, and his doctor deemed him fully functional and 

independent. (A.R. 17). On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff demonstrated 

attentiveness, intact comprehension, good memory, normal muscle bulk 

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and tone, full motor strength in his upper and lower extremities and an 

antalgic gait with difficulty bearing weight on his left foot. (Id.). 

In July 2013, Plaintiff alleged that he fell in his shower due to

weakness in his right knee. (Id.). Plaintiff’s July 2013 exam revealed 

no cervical spine tenderness and no acute cervical spine injury. (Id.). 

The ALJ noted that although a November 2010 MRI showed evidence of

some degenerative changes to Plaintiff’s right knee’s medial meniscus, a 

later November 2013 examination revealed no tear and his right knee 

exam results were normal. (A.R. 18). The ALJ also mentioned that on 

March 17, 2014, Plaintiff demonstrated five-out-of-five muscle strength 

of his quadriceps. (Id.). Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

continued bike riding suggests “retained function, strength and mobility 

of his lower extremities.” (Id.). 

In addition, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s description of his daily 

activities contradicts his allegations of disabling symptoms and 

limitations. (Id.). The ALJ specified that Plaintiff “drove a car, went to 

school, rode a motorcycle, rode a bike, was a jeweler for a hobby, cared 

[for] his young daughter [by] taking her to school and engaged in 

outdoor activities with her.” (Id.). Although Plaintiff alleged that he 

requires a cane to assist his ambulation, the ALJ noted that a doctor 

did not prescribe a cane, Plaintiff did not consistently bring his cane to 

his doctor appointments and Plaintiff’s cane did not appear as worn as 

it should be. (A.R. 18-19).

Furthermore, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s concession that his 

doctors did not believe his condition to be permanently disabling, 

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inconsistent statements about his depression and lack of motivation to 

obtain gainful employment during periods of no alleged limitations to 

support his finding that Plaintiff’s allegations are not credible and 

unsupported by objective medical evidence (A.R. 19).

2. Third Party Function Report

On July 29, 2012, Michelle A. Lopez, Plaintiff’s friend, submitted a 

third party function report. (A.R. 19, 267-75). Ms. Lopez reported that 

Plaintiff cares for his daughter, engages in outdoor activities with her, 

cares for two puppies, shops in stores, drives a car and regularly 

attends church. (A.R. 19). The ALJ gave little weight to Ms. Lopez’s 

description of Plaintiff’s debilitation because they are based primarily 

on what Plaintiff reported and displayed to her. (Id.). The ALJ also 

found Ms. Lopez’s description of Plaintiff’s disability inconsistent with 

her description of Plaintiff’s daily activities. (Id.).

3. Joseph Watson, D.O.

Treating physician, J. Watson, D.O., opined that Plaintiff is 

unable to care for his daughter and that his motorcycle accident injuries 

interfere with his attention and concentration, require him to lie down 

during the day, limit him to sitting and standing for only two to three 

hours, require him to take unscheduled breaks, limit his carrying 

capacity to ten pounds and cause significant manipulative limitations. 

(A.R. 19-20, 521-29). The ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. Watson’s 

opinion because his progress notes contain few objective findings and 

appear to be primarily based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports. (A.R. 20). 

The ALJ further noted that Dr. Watson’s opinions were inconsistent 

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with the objective medical record, which indicates that Plaintiff 

maintained his daily activities, retained good strength and mobility and 

had no significant mental deficits. (Id.).

4. Mental Health Examinations

On March 25, 2013, consultative examiner, G. Nicholson, M.D.,

performed a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation on Plaintiff. (A.R. 

14, 485-91). Dr. Nicholson reported that Plaintiff made good eye 

contact, exhibited good social skills, was cooperative, had coherent and 

organized thoughts, was alert and oriented, exhibited recollection and 

ability to spell and had intact insight and judgment. (A.R. 14-15). Dr. 

Nicholson found that Plaintiff had no mental health diagnosis and no 

functional limitations. (A.R. 15). 

Additionally, the State Agency’s Psychological Consultant,

T. Schumacher, Ph.D., opined that Plaintiff had no severe mental 

impairment. (Id.). The ALJ afforded substantial weight to both doctors’ 

opinions because Dr. Nicholson examined Plaintiff and Dr. Schumacher 

reviewed Dr. Nicholson’s reports and other record evidence. (Id.). The 

ALJ further noted that both doctors’ opinions were consistent with and 

corroborate each other. (Id.).

5. State Agency Medical Consultant

State Agency Medical Consultant, D. Subin, M.D., opined that 

Plaintiff “retains the capacity to perform medium exertion work with 

frequent performance of postural movements.” (A.R. 19, 132-44). The 

ALJ accorded some weight to Dr. Subin’s opinion. (A.R. 19). Although

the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff’s physical impairments do not prevent 

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him from performing all work activity, the ALJ did not adopt Dr. 

Subin’s opinion that Plaintiff is limited to medium exertion work. (Id.). 

Instead, the ALJ found that based on other evidence demonstrating 

Plaintiff’s strength, mobility, mental fitness and daily activities, 

Plaintiff has retained capacity for heavy exertion work without postural

limitations. (Id.).

6. Robert J. MacArthur, M.D.

On March 23, 2013, consultative examiner, R. MacArthur, M.D.,

performed an orthopedic evaluation on Plaintiff. (A.R. 18, 476-82). The

physical exam showed that Plaintiff (1) had no atrophy of any muscle 

group, (2) walked with normal posture, (3) had no difficulty rising on his 

toes and heels, (4) did not have an antalgic gait, (5) had normal range of 

motion and full motor strength in his upper and lower extremities, (6) 

had full range of motion in his neck and back, (7) retained full range of 

motion of all of his fingers, (8) had normal exam results for his feet, (9) 

had normal sensations and reflexes and (10) had normal exam results 

for his cervical and lumbar spine, as well as his right knee. (A.R. 18). 

Dr. MacArthur diagnosed Plaintiff with right hand moderate 

osteoarthritis, right foot mild scarring of the medial arch status post 

injection and debridement with no findings of loss of motion. (Id.). The 

ALJ afforded substantial weight to Dr. MacArthur’s opinions, given 

that Dr. MacArthur had the opportunity to personally examine Plaintiff 

and review his diagnostic imaging, is board certified in orthopedics and 

familiar with Social Security rules and regulations. (Id.). The ALJ 

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further found that Dr. MacArthur’s findings are supported by objective 

medical evidence. (Id.).

7. Vocational Expert

At Plaintiff’s July 15, 2014 hearing, VE Mark Remas testified that 

Plaintiff’s past relevant work in newspaper delivery is classified as 

unskilled and light exertion, and his work in lubrication service is 

classified as semi-skilled and medium work. (A.R. 20, 44-47). The ALJ 

found that Plaintiff is able to perform the physical and mental demands 

associated with his past relevant work as a newspaper deliverer and an 

auto service supervisor because his RFC allows for a full range of heavy 

exertion work. (A.R. 20).

C. Issues on Appeal

1. Effect of the Prior ALJ’s Decision

a. Res Judicata Presumption of Non-Disability

As noted by the Defendant, the ALJ’s decision clearly states, “the 

presumption of non-disability is not rebutted.” (A.R. 16) (emphasis 

added). A review of the record shows Plaintiff erred in claiming that 

“[t]he ALJ found the continuing presumption of non-disability

rebutted”. (Compare A.R. 16, with ECF No. 20-1 at 8). Plaintiff does 

not specifically argue any changed circumstances to overcome the 

presumption of non-disability. (See ECF No. 20-1 at 7-8). Defendant 

maintains that the current ALJ is bound by the prior ALJ’s finding of 

non-disability because Plaintiff failed to establish changed 

circumstances to rebut the presumption of non-disability. (ECF No. 

21-1 at 5). For the sake of thoroughness, the Court will nonetheless 

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evaluate whether Plaintiff has rebutted the presumption of 

non-disability since the December 27, 2010 ALJ decision.

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he principles of res 

judicata apply to administrative decisions, although the doctrine is 

applied less rigidly to administrative proceedings than to judicial 

proceedings.” Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1988)

(italics added). With respect to social security claims involving the 

same parties, facts and issues as a prior claim, a presumption of nondisability arises if an ALJ found the claimant not disabled in a prior 

final decision. Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9)3 accord Chavez, 844 F.2d at 

693. 

To overcome the presumption of continuing non-disability, the 

claimant “must prove ‘changed circumstances’ indicating a greater 

disability.” Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693 (citing Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 

872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985)). Changed circumstances include a change in 

the claimant’s age category, an increase in the severity of the claimant’s 

impairments, existence of new impairments not previously considered

or a change in the criteria for determining disability. Acquiescence 

Ruling 97-4(9). Moreover, a prior ALJ’s findings concerning the 

claimant’s RFC, education and work experience are afforded some res 

judicata consideration and will not be disturbed in a subsequent 

 

3 Acquiescense Rulings “are binding on all components of the Social 

Security Administration,” except under specified circumstances, and 

accorded deference by a reviewing court. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(2).

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disability claim, absent new and material evidence related to such 

finding. See Chavez, 844 F.2d at 694; Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9).

As noted earlier, Plaintiff does not specifically argue the existence 

of changed circumstances and consequently provided no evidence in 

support thereof. (See ECF No. 20-1 at 7-8). Defendant maintains that, 

notwithstanding the current ALJ’s additional findings of severe 

impairments of cervical spine degenerative disc disease, right hand 

osteoarthritis, right wrist pain and right knee degenerative changes, 

Plaintiff did not establish changed circumstances indicating greater 

disability because objective evidence demonstrated negative or at most 

mild findings and no indication of disability with respect to these

impairments. (ECF No. 21-1 at 5-6).

In 2010, ALJ Carletti found that Plaintiff was not disabled, as 

defined in the Act, from October 28, 2008 through December 27, 2010, 

the date of his decision. (A.R. 101). ALJ Carletti determined that 

Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: (1) status-post 

testicular cancer and (2) a depressive order. (A.R. 96). The ALJ found 

that Plaintiff had the RFC “capacity to perform the full range of light 

work”. (A.R. 97). In support of his findings, ALJ Carletti specifically 

noted Plaintiff’s 2006 testicular cancer, three motor vehicle accidents in 

2008, depressive disorder diagnosis, complaints of continued pain and 

objective medical opinions and examination results relating to these 

events. (A.R. 97-100).

ALJ Carletti explained that Plaintiff finished cancer treatment in 

2007, and no evidence of recurrence was present. (A.R. 98). The ALJ 

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further mentioned that although Plaintiff was involved in a motor 

vehicle accident in March 2008, a hospital cleared Plaintiff with only 

benign findings. (A.R. 97, 99). The ALJ noted that on Plaintiff’s June 

1, 2010 follow-up examination for another 2008 accident, the doctor 

reported that Plaintiff retained full range of motion of his neck and 

prescribed physical therapy for him. (A.R. 98). ALJ Carletti also

explained that there was no evidence of Plaintiff’s current mental 

status because the therapist had not examined Plaintiff since 2008, and 

there was no evidence that Plaintiff was receiving mental health 

services. (A.R. 99-100). As to Plaintiff’s complaints of pain in his knees, 

neck, right hand and right foot, the ALJ noted that his x-ray 

examination revealed a loss of normal cervical lordosis without 

compression fracture and mild multilevel degenerative disc disease 

without subluxation, and the remaining radiographs were grossly 

normal. (A.R. 100). ALJ Carletti ultimately found that Plaintiff’s 

objective medical record does not establish impairments likely to 

produce disabling pain or other limitation as alleged for a period of 

twelve or more months. (Id.). 

The current ALJ found that, after reviewing Plaintiff’s objective 

medical evidence and opinion evidence, Plaintiff has not established 

“changed circumstances” to overcome the continuing presumption of 

non-disability arising from ALJ Carletti’s 2010 decision. (A.R. 16). The

present ALJ determined that the record evidence did not reflect a more 

adverse profile than that previously considered by ALJ Carletti. (Id.). 

In an effort to meet his burden, Plaintiff alleged that, since the prior 

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decision, he was involved in an additional motorcycle accident, fell in 

the shower due to his weak right knee and had worse pain in his neck, 

back, hand and knee. (A.R.16-18). 

On October 4, 2011, Plaintiff was admitted to a hospital due to a 

third motorcycle accident and complained of pain in his chest, right 

shoulder, pelvic, thigh and leg. (A.R. 542). However, the radiographs of 

Plaintiff’s right shoulder, wrist, forearm, knee and chest were negative, 

and he was discharged from the hospital that same day. (A.R. 531-35, 

540). Plaintiff’s November 2011 radiographs of his right ankle, knee, 

wrist and hand similarly do not support his claims of disabling pain

because these examinations revealed no abnormalities, except for a few 

cysts in Plaintiff’s right knee, dorsal subluxation of the distal radial 

ulnar joint and bone cyst, diffusely macerated and torn ulnar, some 

mild edema and ganglion cyst and mild osteoarthritis. (A.R. 322-23, 

354-56).

In July 2013, Plaintiff allegedly fell in the shower due to his weak 

right knee. (A.R. 621). Plaintiff’s complaints of his knee locking, 

popping and causing excruciating pain, however, are inconsistent with 

his refusal to receive pain medication and the examiner’s finding of

five-out-of-five muscle strength in Plaintiff’s quadriceps on March 17, 

2014. (A.R. 633-32). Additionally, Plaintiff’s statement that he rides 

his bike to keep in shape indicates retained function, as well as strength 

and mobility of his lower extremities. (A.R. 638).

Following the prior ALJ decision, Plaintiff continued to drive his 

truck, went to school, rode his motorcycle, rode his bike, worked on 

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jewelry as a hobby, cared for his young daughter, attended church and 

went to the movie theater, parks and beaches often. (A.R. 41, 339, 485, 

545-46, 269-62). Plaintiff’s daily activities contradicts his claim that his 

ability to sit, stand, walk, lift and carry and perform postural and 

manipulative movements is severely limited. (A.R. 34-39, 41, 43-44). 

Additionally, objective medical evidence does not support Plaintiff’s 

allegations that the pain in his neck, back, hand and knee have 

worsened. For example, Plaintiff had a supple neck, no jugular venous 

distention and no thyromegaly. (A.R. 633). Despite Plaintiff’s report of 

chronic neck pain, a doctor found moderate degenerative disk disease 

but no significant spinal stenosis and no acute cervical spine injury. 

(A.R. 705). Further, Plaintiff had only mild arthritis on his right hand, 

which had no effect on his fingers’ full range of motion. (A.R. 480). 

Plaintiff also had a negative right knee exam. (A.R. 650).

On this record, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s impairments have 

not increased in severity since the prior ALJ decision. The Court,

therefore, finds that Plaintiff has not presented any persuasive evidence 

indicating a greater disability since ALJ Carletti’s decision in 2010. See

Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to rebut the 

continuing presumption of non-disability.

b. The ALJ’s Finding of a Less Restrictive RFC 

Plaintiff contends that the current ALJ did not properly consider 

the previous ALJ’s decision because he did not point to evidence of 

medical improvement to support his finding of a greater functional 

ability than what the prior ALJ found. (ECF No. 20-1 at 7-8). 

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Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider 

Plaintiff’s previous impairments of testicular cancer and depressive 

order. (ECF No. 20-1 at 8). Defendant asserts that “the ALJ is not 

bound to find the same RFC as the previous ALJ decision.” (Id. at 7).

As indicated earlier, a prior “administrative law judge’s findings 

concerning [a] claimant's [RFC], education, and work experience are 

entitled to some res judicata consideration in subsequent proceedings.”

Chavez, 844 F.2d at 694 (italics added). Accordingly, the Commissioner 

has instructed that where the ALJ’s final decision of non-disability on 

the prior claim “contained findings on the claimant’s [RFC], education, 

and work experience, [the Social Security Administration] may not 

make different findings in adjudicating the subsequent disability claim 

unless there is new and material evidence relating to the 

claimant’s [RFC], education or work experience.” Acquiescence 

Ruling 97-4(9) (emphasis added); see Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 

F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that in Chavez, 844 F.2d at 694, 

the Ninth Circuit explained that a previous ALJ's RFC finding can be 

reconsidered upon “new information not presented to the first judge.”).

In the present decision, the ALJ adopted a less restrictive RFC for 

Plaintiff than the one adopted by ALJ Carletti in 2010. (A.R. 16). ALJ 

Carletti found that Plaintiff had the RFC for light work. (Id.). The

current ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC for heavy work. (Id.). 

Here, the ALJ explained that “evidence supports greater functional 

ability than previously determined by Judge Carletti.” (Id.).

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First, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the present ALJ did 

consider Plaintiff’s history of testicular cancer and depressive order. 

(See A.R. 16, 17, 19). The ALJ cited medical reports indicating that

Plaintiff completed cancer treatment in 2007 and that no evidence of 

cancer recurrence exists (A.R. 692-93, 700). The ALJ also noted that 

Plaintiff does not allege any impairments related to his cancer. (See

A.R. 40). As to Plaintiff’s depressive disorder, the ALJ noted that 

during a March 2013 psychiatric examination, Plaintiff reported to Dr. 

Nicholson that “he has not been feeling depressed” and denied any 

history of suicidality and symptoms related to psychosis, mania or 

anxiety disorders. (A.R. 486). Indeed, Dr. Nicholson stated that 

Plaintiff does not appear to have any psychiatric disorder. (A.R. 489). 

Second, the ALJ specifically found that objective record evidence 

no longer supported Plaintiff’s more restrictive RFC from 2010. (A.R. 

16). For example, the ALJ noted that at a February 2013 medical 

check-up, Dr. Millard reported that Plaintiff was “fully functional and 

independent” and not taking any medications. (A.R. 699). As noted 

previously, on March 23, 2013, Dr. MacArthur physically examined 

Plaintiff and opined that Plaintiff demonstrated no difficulty rising on 

his toes and heels, normal posture, no antalgic gait, normal range of 

motion and full motor strength in his upper and lower extremities. 

(A.R. 479-80). Dr. MacArthur further determined that Plaintiff can lift 

and carry up to 100 pounds, that he can stand and walk without 

limitations during a normal workday, that he does not need a cane for 

ambulation assistance, that he can sit, climb, balance, kneel, crawl and 

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crouch without restrictions and that he can reach, feel and perform

gross and fine manipulation without limitations. (A.R. 481-82). The 

ALJ also pointed to Plaintiff’s own description of his daily activities 

such as driving his truck, riding his bike to keep in shape, engaging in 

outdoor activities with his young daughter and caring for her as further 

evidence that Plaintiff’s capacity is not limited to light work. (A.R. 19). 

The ALJ concluded that based on objective medical evidence, Plaintiff 

has demonstrated greater functional ability than in 2010 and retains 

the capacity to perform heavy exertion work with no mental or postural

limitations. (See A.R. 16-19). 

The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in failing to adopt 

Plaintiff’s December 2010 RFC because the ALJ relied on sufficient new 

and material evidence in the record to support a new RFC finding. 

Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9) (instructing that an adjudicator may adopt 

a different RFC if there is new and material evidence relating to that 

determination); see also Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1173; Chavez, 

844 F.2d at 694.

2. Plaintiff’s Need for an Assistive Device

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of 

Dr. Brownell, a treating physician, regarding Plaintiff’s need for an 

assistive device, namely a cane. (ECF No. 20-1 at 9). Plaintiff appears 

to concede that a cane was not medically necessary until November 

2013,

4 when Dr. Brownell reported “gait abnormality with cane 

 

4 “What was true in March 2013 ceased to be true by November 2013.” 

(ECF No. 20-1 at 10).

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dependence”. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s failure to 

consider Plaintiff’s need for a cane in assessing his RFC materially 

affects the disability analysis and constitutes reversible error. (Id.)

Defendant argues that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

RFC finding, which did not include a limitation for an assistive device. 

(ECF No. 21-1 at 9-10). Specifically, Defendant asserts that Dr. 

MacArthur’s opinion that Plaintiff has no standing or walking 

limitations and did not need an assistive device is consistent with 

several other medical reports stating that Plaintiff does not need an 

assistive device despite his mild antalgic gait. (Id. at 10-11). Defendant 

further contends that Plaintiff’s daily activities contradict the need for a 

cane. (Id. at 12-13).

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three types 

of physicians: (1) those who treat the Plaintiff (“treating physicians”); 

(2) those who examine but do not treat the Plaintiff (“examining 

physicians”); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the Plaintiff 

(“non-examining physicians”). Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 

Cir. 1996). As a general rule, more weight is given to the opinions of a 

treating source than to that of a non-treating physician. Id. (citing 

Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). Likewise, the 

opinion of an examining physician is typically entitled to greater weight 

than that of a non-examining physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 

502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990).

In Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit 

held:

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If a treating physician's opinion is not given ‘controlling 

weight’ because it is not ‘well-supported’ or because it is 

inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, 

the Administration considers specified factors in 

determining the weight it will be given. Those factors 

include the ‘length of the treatment relationship and the 

frequency of examination’ by the treating physician; and the 

‘nature and extent of the treatment relationship’ between 

the patient and the treating physician. Generally, the 

opinions of examining physicians are afforded more weight 

than those of non-examining physicians, and the opinions of 

examining non-treating physicians are afforded less weight 

than those of treating physicians.

Id. at 631 (internal citations omitted).

Where a non-treating, non-examining physician’s opinion 

contradicts the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ may only reject the 

treating physician’s opinion “if the ALJ gives specific, legitimate reason 

for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.” 

Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041). “The ALJ may meet this burden by setting 

out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” 

Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 600-601 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1989)). Reports of 

consultative physicians requested by the Commissioner may serve as 

substantial evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041.

Here, there is no medical documentation in the record establishing 

the need for an assistive device. Although Plaintiff is correct that the 

record contains references to his use of a cane, those notations are 

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traceable to Plaintiff’s own subjective reports5 and to the examiner’s 

mere observations that Plaintiff presented with an assistive device. 

Plaintiff would have the Court interpret Dr. Brownell’s November 7, 

2013 medical observation that Plaintiff is a “39yo male with falls and 

gait abnormality cane dependent” as establishing the need for a cane, 

but this statement is neither a prescription for a cane nor medical 

advice to use a cane. (A.R. 628). It was simply an observation. 

Nowhere in Dr. Brownell’s treatment report does it indicate that a cane 

is medically necessary. (See A.R. 627-29). In addition, on November 13, 

2013, Frank B. Hamlett, M.D. examined Plaintiff’s right knee images 

and opined that the results were negative. (A.R. 650 (reporting normal 

bones, normal soft tissues, normal alignment and position and 

well-maintained joint spaces)). Notably, Dr. Brownell’s most recent

treatment report in May 2014 makes no mention of Plaintiff’s cane or 

gait. (See A.R. 638-40). It does, however, mention that Plaintiff “rides 

[his] bike to keep in shape”. (Id. at 638). Because Dr. Brownell did not 

make any objective determinations with respect to Plaintiff’s need for a 

cane, there was nothing for the ALJ to reject or discredit. (See A.R. 

627-29, 638-40).

Instead, the ALJ properly relied on examining physician, Dr. 

MacArthur, who did make objective determinations regarding Plaintiff’s 

use of and need for a cane. (See A.R.476-82). Like Dr. Brownell, Dr. 

 

5 In Plaintiff’s Function Report, he indicated that a doctor prescribed a 

cane in 2001. (A.R. 264). Plaintiff, however, has not presented any 

medical prescriptions for a cane to support his assertions.

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MacArthur noted that Plaintiff presented with a cane. (A.R. 479). Dr. 

MacArthur, however, went further and pointed out that the cane shows 

no wear and was not medically prescribed. (Id.). Dr. MacArthur 

observed Plaintiff get on and off the examination table without 

assistance, rise on his heels and toes without difficulty and walk 

steadily without his cane. (Id.). In light of his observations, Dr. 

MacArthur explicitly determined that Plaintiff does not need a cane for 

ambulating. (Id. at 481); Rounds v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 

996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that an ALJ may rationally rely on 

specific unambiguous imperatives regarding a claimant’s limitations). 

No medical documentation in the record is expressly contrary. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in making an RFC 

finding that does not include a limitation for an assistive device.

3. Plaintiff’s Ability to Engage in Manipulative Activity

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to articulate specific and 

legitimate reasons for rejecting former treating physician, Dr. Watson’s 

September 2011 medical opinion that Plaintiff could engage in 

manipulative activity with his right hand for only five percent of the 

day. (ECF No. 20-1 at 11-12). Plaintiff asserts that the record contains

ample objective evidence demonstrating Plaintiff’s right hand 

limitations, including Dr. MacArthur’s finding of moderate 

osteoarthritis in Plaintiff’s right hand. (Id. at 11). Defendant argues 

that substantial evidence support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Watson’s 

assessment was inconsistent with other evidence in the record. (ECF 

No 21-1 at 14). Defendant further maintains that although Dr. 

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MacArthur found subluxation in Plaintiff’s right hand, Dr. MacArthur 

ultimately determined that it had no effect on the range of motion of 

Plaintiff’s fingers. (Id. at 16).

Here, the ALJ rejected Dr. Watson’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s 

right hand manipulative limitations because they appeared primarily 

based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports and contained few objective 

findings to support his diagnoses. (A.R. 523-26 (documenting mostly 

Plaintiff’s own descriptions of his pain and limitations)). The ALJ 

further explained that Dr. Watson’s opinion that Plaintiff could not lift 

more than ten pounds and has significant manipulative limitations is 

inconsistent with evidence demonstrating Plaintiff’s retained strength 

and mobility and his ability to maintain his daily activities. (A.R. 

19-20). Specifically, in February 2013, Plaintiff was found to be “fully 

functional and independent”. (A.R. 699). In March 2013, Plaintiff could 

“move all extremities”, his right hand arthritis or subluxation had “no 

effect on [the] range of motion of all fingers” and “manipulation [could] 

be done without limitations.” (A.R. 701, 480-82). In July 2013, Plaintiff 

had full motor strength of all hand muscles, and in May 2014, Plaintiff 

reported that he “rides [his] bike to keep in shape.” (A.R. 705, 638).

Because a review of Dr. Watson’s reports reveal that they contain 

conclusory diagnoses and are largely based on Plaintiff’s self-reports,

the ALJ properly afforded little weight to Dr. Watson’s opinions.

6 The 

 

6 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements regarding the limiting effects of 

his medical condition “not entirely credible”. (A.R. 16). “An ALJ may 

reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a 

claimant's self-reports that have been properly discounted as 

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ALJ’s adoption of Dr. MacArthur’s opinion that Plaintiff’s manipulative 

ability warrants no restriction constitute substantial evidence. The 

Court finds such reliance was not error because, as the ALJ pointed out, 

Dr. MacArthur examined Plaintiff, specializes in orthopedics, is familiar 

with Social Security rules and regulations and his finding is consistent 

with objective medical evidence of record. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(3)-(6). The Court, therefore, finds that the ALJ offered 

specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Watson’s opinion based 

on substantial evidence. Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066.

The ALJ clearly relied on the findings of the treatment record and 

reports cited in the administrative record. The ALJ’s findings are 

consistent with the record as a whole. Section 416.920b of Title 20 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations states that after reviewing all of the 

evidence relevant to a claimant’s claim, the ALJ makes findings about 

what the evidence shows. The ALJ is also “responsible for making the 

determination or decision about whether [a claimant] meet[s] the 

statutory definition of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1). The 

Court’s review of the administrative record revealed no ambiguity or 

error indicating that the ALJ’s decision was based on less than 

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, including Plaintiff’s RFC, is supported by 

substantial evidence and free of legal error. Additionally, the Court 

 

incredible.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)) 

(internal citations omitted)).

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finds that there are no changed circumstances warranting a different 

outcome from the 2010 ALJ decision.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion be DENIED

and that Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED. This Report and 

Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to 

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

report must be filed with the court and served on all parties no later 

than April 24, 2017. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections 

shall be filed with the court and served on all parties no later than May 

1, 2017. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specific time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal 

of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 10, 2017

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