Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00209/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00209-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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1 Assuming familiarity with the parallel action of Parra v. Bashas’,

Inc., No. Civ 02-0591 (“Parra”), as well as the prior proceedings herein, and

especially E.E.O.C. v. Bashas’, Inc., 2009 WL 1783437 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2009)

(“E.E.O.C. I”), there is no need to repeat that entire history herein. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment )

Opportunity Commission, )

)

Petitioner, ) No. CIV 09-0209 PHX RCB

)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Bashas’, Inc. )

)

Respondent. ) )

Introduction1

Since at least since May 2006, petitioner, the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), has been

attempting to obtain, inter alia, pay scale information from

respondent, Bashas’, Inc. The EEOC has been seeking that

information as part of its ongoing investigation into whether

Bashas’ has engaged in discrimination against its Hispanic

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employees on the basis of national origin with respect to

wages and promotions. To date, the EEOC has filed a

Commissioner’s Charge (“Charge”) of discrimination against

Bashas’, as well as serving Bashas’ with four administrative

subpoenas, and two Requests for Information (“RFI”). The May

28, 2008, subpoena is the subject of the EEOC’s pending 

“Order to Show Cause why an Administrative Subpoena Should

not be Enforced” (doc. 1).

On September 21, 2009, this court heard oral argument as

to that OSC and as to Bashas’ related “Motion for Leave to

Conduct Limited Discovery” (doc. 10). After carefully

considering all of the submissions, including exhibits

admitted during that hearing, the testimony of the witnesses,

Gregg Tucek, Bashas’ in-house counsel, and Kristy L. Nied,

Bashas’ Director of Communications, and argument of counsel,

the court rules as follows. 

Summary of Arguments

In seeking to have the court enforce the May 28th

subpoena, the EEOC first asserts that because Bashas’ did not

timely file a petition to revoke or modify that subpoena,

Bashas’ has not exhausted its administrative remedies. The

EEOC thus reasons that, except for constitutional challenges,

Bashas’ has waived all objections to enforcement of that

subpoena. Even if Bashas’ is not deemed to have waived its

objections, the EEOC asserts that Bashas’ has “no valid

defenses” for not complying with that subpoena. Memo. (doc.

2) at 6:15-16. Thus, the court should enter an order

directing Bashas’ to respond to the May 28, 2008 subpoena.

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Bashas’ retorts that it has “preserved its right to

challenge this subpoena” by, inter alia, providing detailed

objections by June 13, 2008 -- the production date specified

on the subpoena. Resp. (Doc. 25) at 5 (emphasis omitted). 

Turning to the merits, Bashas’ asserts that this subpoena was

not issued for a legitimate purpose, and hence the court

should not enforce it. Bashas’ seeks leave to conduct

limited discovery to substantiate that argument. 

Additionally, Bashas’ asserts that the court should not

enforce the subpoena because the Charge does not provide it

with adequate notice as to the nature of the allegations. 

Although it recognizes the broad definition of relevancy in

this context, Bashas’ implicitly argues that the court should

deny enforcement of the May 28th subpoena because the

information which the EEOC is seeking therein is “completely

irrelevant.” Resp. (doc. 25) at 12 (emphasis omitted). 

Alternatively, if the court does enforce the subpoena,

Bashas’ “requests that the Court narrow [the] overbroad

requests” therein and enter a confidentiality order “to

prevent improper disclosure of Bashas’ confidential employee

information.” Id. at 16:16-17. 

The court will first address the EEOC’s waiver argument. 

The court will proceed in this way because if it finds that

Bashas’ has waived its objections to the subpoena, such a

waiver would include Bashas’ objection on abuse of process

grounds. Thus, a finding of waiver here would render moot

Bashas’ discovery motion. Only if the court is convinced

that Bashas’ has not waived its right to challenge the

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2 As outlined in E.E.O.C. I, slightly more than eight weeks after this

court denied the Parra plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration on the issue of

certifying a class as to the pay claim, on May 26, 2006, the EEOC served an

administrative subpoena upon Bashas’. One of the bases for Bashas’ objection to

that subpoena was that the EEOC had closed the individual charges in Parra more

than four years prior to the issuance of that subpoena. E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL

1783437, at *2. The EEOC did not respond to any of Bashas’ objections; nor did it

move to enforce that May 2006 subpoena. Id. Seemingly, the EEOC’s response was

to “re-open[] the charges as to the eight individuals who had filed EEOC charges

against Bashas’ in 2002, including plaintiffs Parra and Estrada.” Id. (citations

omitted); see also Mot. (doc. 10), exh. E thereto. Bashas’ objected to that reopening as well, but again, the EEOC never responded or moved to enforce the May

2006 subpoena. Quincy Decl’n (doc. 10-3) at 17, ¶ 8:8-9. 

Partially based upon the foregoing, it appears to the court that Bashas’ is

raising the specter that the EEOC may not have the power to issue a subpoena once

a charging party, such as Jose Parra, institutes litigation based upon that charge.

Fairly recently, however, in E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Express Corp., 558 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.

2009), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3680 (Jun 01, 2009) (No. 08-1500), the

Ninth Circuit held that the EEOC “retains its authority to issue an administrative

subpoena against an employer even after the charging party has been issued a rightto-sue notice and instituted a private action based upon that charge. Id. at 854.

Federal Express thus forecloses Bashas’ suggestion that because the EEOC closed the

Parra charges and then “re-opened” them, the EEOC lacks the authority to issue an

administrative subpoena such as the one at issue herein. Of course, in Federal

Express the Ninth Circuit expressly left open the issue “whether the EEOC [later]

may be barred from bringing a subsequent lawsuit based upon the [original]

charge[.]” Id. Declining to address that issue, the Federal Express Court found

that it was “simply irrelevant to whether the EEOC could issue an administrative

subpoena based upon that charge[]” in the first place. Id. In light of the

foregoing, the court finds that the EEOC had the authority to issue the May 28,

2008 subpoena, despite having previously closed and then re-opened the charges as

to some of the Parra plaintiffs. 

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subpoena on abuse of process grounds, will it consider

whether to allow Bashas’ to proceed with limited discovery. 

Discussion

I. Waiver2

Factual Background

The challenged subpoena directed Bashas’ to mail to the

EEOC “on June 13, 2008 at 4:00 o’clock[,]” compact disks

containing a vast range of employee data, such as

compensation details, ethnicity and union eligibility. 

Manget Aff. (doc. 2-2) at 3, ¶ 14; and attach. 7 thereto at

39. Nowhere on the face of that subpoena is there any

mention of the five day time frame, discussed below, for

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filing a petition to revoke or modify that subpoena. The

only legal authority which that subpoena references is Title

VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9. The May 28th subpoena indicates

that it is being “issued pursuant” to that statute. Id.,

attach. 7 thereto at 39. “That subpoena was served upon

Bashas’ by certified mail the next day, May 29, 2008.” 

E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL 1783437, at *3 (citations and footnote

omitted). 

On the directed production date - June 13th - nearly eight

months prior to the filing of this action, Bashas’ “asserted

its objections to the subpoena, citing relevant authorities,

and reiterat[ing] its prior objections and concerns to this

request for information.” Mot. (doc. 10), exh. F thereto at

19, ¶ 16:6-7. Those objections took the form of a letter to

Chester V. Bailey, EEOC Phoenix District Director, and

Charles J. Rahill, the EEOC investigator to whom the

subpoenaed documents were to be produced. Doc. 25-3 at 103. 

For almost eight months the EEOC did nothing. The EEOC

never contacted Bashas’, for example, to inform Bashas’ that

because it had not timely filed a petition to revoke or

modify the May 28th subpoena, it failed to exhaust its

administrative remedies. Similarly, the EEOC never advised

Bashas’ that failing to exhaust, from the EEOC’s standpoint,

would constitute a waiver of any objections Bashas’ may have

to the subpoena. Nor, in the following months, did the EEOC

ever respond to any of the objections detailed in Bashas’

June 13, 2008 letter. Instead, on February 2, 2009, the same

day this court denied post-April 2004 pay data discovery in

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Parra, the EEOC filed the pending OSC to enforce the May 28,

2008, subpoena. 

Analysis

The EEOC is taking the position, as noted at the outset,

that because Bashas’ has not exhausted its administrative

remedies, it has “waived all objections to enforcement of

th[at] subpoena.” OSC Memo. (doc. 2) at 5 (emphasis added). 

Implicit in that broad assertion is that by failing to

exhaust its administrative remedies, Bashas’ has waived its

right to object to the subpoena on abuse of process grounds;

concomitantly Bashas’ is not entitled to conduct limited

discovery on that issue. 

To support its waiver argument, the EEOC relies upon 29

U.S.C. § 161, which states in relevant part:

Within five days after the service of a 

subpena [sic] on any person requiring the 

production of any evidence in his possession 

or under his control, such person may

petition the Board to revoke, and the Board 

shall revoke, such subpena [sic] if in its 

opinion the evidence whose production is

required does not relate to any matter 

under investigation, or any matter in

question in such proceedings, or if in

its opinion such subpena [sic] does not 

describe with sufficient particularity

the evidence whose production is required.

29 U.S.C. § 161 (1) (emphasis added). The EEOC further relies

upon 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16(b)(1), which states in relevant part:

Any person served with a subpoena who intends

not to comply shall petition the issuing 

Director or petition the General Counsel, 

if the subpoena is issued by a Commissioner, 

to seek its revocation or modification. Petitions must be mailed to the Director 

or General Counsel, as appropriate, within

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five days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and 

Federal legal holidays) after service of 

the subpoena.

29 C.F.R. § 1601(b)(1) (emphasis added). Disregarding the 

inconsistency between the permissive statutory language and

the mandatory language of the regulation, the EEOC contends

that Bashas’ failure to petition to revoke or modify the

subpoena within five days of service (i.e., June 5, 2008),

precludes Bashas’ from challenging that subpoena except on

constitutional grounds. 

Bashas’ counters by accurately pointing out that the

regulation’s mandatory language is at odds with the statute’s

permissive language. Based upon that distinction, Bashas’

asserts that “many courts have held that the exhaustion

requirements of th[at] regulation [29 C.F.R. § 1601.16(b)(1)]

are not binding on respondents.” Resp. (doc. 25) at 6

(emphasis added). Due to the paucity of relevant case law,

this is an overstatement. 

Nonetheless, to support that broad assertion, Bashas’

cites to, but does not discuss, E.E.O.C. v. Lutheran Social

Services, 186 F.3d 959 (D.C.Cir. 1999). There, the D.C.

Circuit held that an employer who did not file a section

1601.16(b)(1) petition did not waive its right to object to an

EEOC subpoena on attorney-client and work doctrine privilege

grounds. E.E.O.C. v. WinCo Foods, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

74521 (E.D.Cal. 2006), however, and not Lutheran Services, is

the cornerstone of Bashas’ argument that despite not filing a

section 1601.16(b)(1) petition, it has not waived its right to

object to the May 28th subpoena. 

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3 WinCo is the only case within the Ninth Circuit of which the court is

aware addressing the issue of whether section 1601.16(b)(1) is jurisdictional. 

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Bashas’ was not alone in giving relatively short shrift

to Lutheran Social Services. Narrowly focusing on the nature

of the employer’s objections in Lutheran Services, the EEOC

contends that Lutheran is inapplicable here. Although the

parties did not deem Lutheran Services worthy of any

meaningful discussion or analysis, the court does. Lutheran

Services warrants fairly close examination because: (1) it is

the seminal wavier case; (2) the WinCo court adopted that

reasoning; and (3) Lutheran Services and WinCo are strikingly

similar to the present case. 

Additionally, Lutheran Services is noteworthy because

that Court held that compliance with 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16(b)(1)

is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, as the EEOC conceded

therein. Lutheran Services, 186 F.3d at 962. The WinCo

court,3 as does this court, found Lutheran Services persuasive

on that point. Compliance with that regulation is not

jurisdictional, the D.C. Circuit explained, because

“[e]xhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite . . . [o]nly

when Congress states in clear, unequivocal terms that the

judiciary is barred from hearing an action until the

administrative agency has come to a decision.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Title VII lacks those

“clear, unequivocal terms,” as the Lutheran Services Court

explained. Title VII, which “confers on the EEOC the same

subpoena authority the National Labor Relations Act gives to

the National Labor Relations Board[,]” provides “only that

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parties ‘may petition the [Commission] to revoke’ a subpoena

on the basis of relevance and particularity; nowhere does [29

U.S.C. § 161(1)] even imply, much less expressly state, that

courts lack jurisdiction to hear objections not presented to

the [EEOC].” Id. at 962 and 963 (citations omitted) (emphasis

added). Therefore, despite the mandatory language of the

regulation, nothing in the governing authorizing statute

unequivocally states that exhaustion is a jurisdictional

prerequisite. Thus, in accordance with Lutheran Services and

WinCo, this court finds that Bashas’ failure to comply with 29

C.F.R. § 1601.16(b)(1) does not deprive this court of

jurisdiction to consider Bashas’ objections. 

Although the Lutheran Services Court held that section

1601.16(b)(1) did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to

consider the employer’s objections to the EEOC’s subpoena, it

did recognize the discretionary nature of exhaustion

thereunder. In other words, “courts may exercise their

authority to hear issues not presented to the agency if the

circumstances surrounding noncompliance with agency procedures

are sufficiently compelling.” Id. at 963 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). This means that “‘the

exhaustion requirement continues to apply as a matter of

judicial discretion[,]’” as opposed to a mandatory

jurisdictional doctrine, “‘in cases not governed by the APA

[Administrative Procedure Act].’” Lutheran Services, 186 F.3d

at 963 (quoting Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 153-54, 113

S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993)) (emphasis added by

Lutheran Services Court). Simply put: “Where Congress

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specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. But where

Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial

discretion governs.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144,

112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992). 

Invoking those well-settled principles, the Lutheran

Services Court held that the “mandatory language” of section

1601.16(b)(1) “creates a strong presumption that issues

parties fail to present to the agency will not be heard in

court.” Lutheran Services, 186 F.3d at 964 (citation

omitted). At the same time, though, the D.C. Circuit found

that there was “no categorical bar prevent[ing] [it] from

considering whether the facts surrounding Lutheran’s failure

to file a section 1601.16(b)(1) petition constitutes

circumstances sufficiently extraordinary to defeat this

presumption[.]” Id. 

For three reasons, the Lutheran Services Court excused the

employer’s failure to file a § 1601.16(b)(1) petition

objecting to the EEOC’s subpoena. First, the form subpoena at

issue therein did not “stat[e] that a subpoena recipient has

five days to object or even point[] the recipient to section

1601.16(b)(1)[.]” Id. That subpoena stated “only that it ‘is

issued pursuant [to] (Title VII) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9.’” Id.

The Court persuasively reasoned that “[n]othing on the face of

the subpoena or in the statutes to which it referred would

have led [Lutheran] . . . to believe that [it] must petition

the EEOC within five days, particularly given that Lutheran’s

objection rested not on relevance or particularity, but on the

attorney-client and work product privileges.” Id. (citation

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omitted). Relevancy and lack of particularity are the two

grounds which 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16(b)(1) identifies as bases

for filing a petition to revoke. 

The second reason for excusing timely filing of a 

§ 1601.16(b)(1) petition in Lutheran Services was that the

EEOC investigator “seem[ed] to have been unaware” of

Lutheran’s “obligation” under that regulation. Id. at 965. 

That seeming unawareness arose from the fact that the EEOC

investigator “never said, ‘Sorry, you’re too late. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1601.16(b)(1) requires your client to have filed a petition

with the District Director within five days of receiving the

subpoena.]’” Id. Instead, according to Lutheran’s counsel,

the investigator took a more conciliatory approach,

“agree[ing] to ‘keep [the lawyer] posted on the EEOC’s

decision and to contact [the lawyer] before taking further

action.’” Id. (citation omitted). It was “[n]ot until the

EEOC filed th[at] enforcement action [that] . . . [the EEOC]

mention[ed] section 1601.16(b)(1).” Id.

The Lutheran Services Court also found it significant that

Lutheran had “repeatedly claimed the [subpoenaed] document to

be privileged.” Id. 186 F.3d at 965 (citation omitted). Not

only that, “the EEOC official with whom the regulation

required Lutheran to file its petition, . . . , was aware of

the nature of Lutheran’s objections.” Id.

Importantly, the Court in Lutheran Services further

explained that its holding “would do little if any damage to

the integrity of the Commission’s section 1601.16(b)(1)

procedures.” 186 F.3d at 965. The Court recited the wellCase 2:09-cv-00209-DJH Document 40 Filed 09/30/09 Page 11 of 38
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settled tenet that “[t]he basic purpose of the exhaustion

doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform

functions within its special competence.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “No such benefit

would flow from requiring exhaustion[,]” the Lutheran Services

Court found, because “the EEOC has no expertise with respect

to the attorney-client and work product privileges.” Id.

Such expertise “resides in the federal courts.” Id. (citation

omitted). Consequently, the Court noted that “even if

Lutheran had filed a section 1601.16(b)(1) petition, [it]

would not defer to the EEOC’s disposition of Lutheran’s

privilege claims.” Id. (citations omitted). Declining to

defer to agency expertise made Lutheran Services “quite

different from the more typical situation where a subpoena

recipient’s objections rest on relevancy or particularity, the

two factors listed in 29 U.S.C. § 161.” Id.

Bolstering the Court’s holding in Lutheran Services was

the “important role” that the attorney-client and work product

privileges “play . . . in Title VII’s enforcement scheme[,]”

along with the fact that “rejecting the [EEOC’s] waiver claim

w[ould] not deny it access to any sources of possible evidence

of discrimination.” Id. at 966. “[U]nder th[os]e combined

circumstances,” the D.C. Circuit found that it would be “both

unfair and unwise to penalize Lutheran for failing to file a

section 1601.16(b)(1) petition.” Id. at 966-967. 

Accordingly, it did not deem “Lutheran’s failure to file a

section 1601.16(b)(1) petition as a waiver of its privilege

claim.” Id. at 965. 

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As in Lutheran Services, the issue here is “whether the

facts surrounding [Bashas’] failure to file a section

1601.16(b)(1) petition constitute circumstances sufficiently

extraordinary to defeat” the presumption that the court should

not consider issues which Bashas’ did not present to the EEOC. 

See id. Stated differently, the court must consider whether

“the circumstances surrounding [Bashas’] noncompliance with

[EEOC] procedures are sufficiently compelling[]” so that, in

the exercise of its discretion, the court may consider those

issues. See id. at 963 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). The remarkable similarities, set forth

below, between Lutheran Services and the present case,

persuade this court that Bashas’ has preserved its right to

challenge the May 28, 2008 subpoena, regardless of its failure

to file a § 1601.16(b)(1) petition. 

Significantly, the Lutheran Services subpoena, which is an

appendix to that decision, is identical to the subpoena which

the EEOC issued to Bashas’. And, just like the Lutheran

Services subpoena, the subpoena to Bashas’ merely stated that

it was issued “pursuant . . . (Title VII) 42 U.S.C. 2000e9[.]” Manget Aff. (doc. 2-2), attach. 7 thereto at 39. There

is nothing on its face which would have led Bashas’ to believe

that it had only five days to petition to revoke or modify

that subpoena.

Evidently the EEOC is attempting to distinguish Lutheran

Services on the basis that although the challenged subpoena

did not mention the five day rule, Bashas’ was “aware of [its]

ability to petition to revoke or modify the subpoena because

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[she] had previously attempted to do so on behalf of [Bashas’]

in Jose Parra’s charge.” Reply (doc. 28) at 4, n. 3 (citation

omitted)(emphasis added). The flaw with that reasoning is

that Bashas’ awareness of its ability to file a petition is

fundamentally different than its awareness of the time frame

in which to do so. 

Bashas’ May 25, 2006 petition to revoke the EEOC’s May 11,

2006 subpoena, to which the EEOC points, shows Bashas’

awareness of its ability to petition to revoke; but, that

petition does not show Bashas’ awareness of the five day time

frame. Apparently Bashas’ received the May 11th subpoena on

May 15th, but its petition to revoke is dated May 25th, and

evidently faxed to the EEOC that same date. Doc. 25-3 at 75-

76; and 78. Bashas’ petition to revoke thus was not mailed

within five days after service of the May 11th subpoena, as

section 1601.16(b)(1) mandates. Perhaps that is because, like

the other EEOC subpoenas before this court, the May 11th

subpoena did not specify the five day time frame, or the

statutory or regulatory basis for that requirement. 

Interestingly, Bashas’ concluded its May 25, 2006 petition

by requesting to be “advise[d]” if the EEOC “believe[d] [that]

for some reason . . . [Bashas’] . . . overlooked a relevant

fact or legal authority[.]” Id. at 82 (emphasis added). 

Despite that explicit request, the EEOC never advised Bashas’

that that petition was not timely. In fact, the EEOC did not

directly respond to that petition, and it never filed an

action to enforce the May 11, 2006 subpoena. Thus, the court

disagrees with the EEOC’s suggestion that the timing of

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Bashas’ prior petition to revoke supports a finding that

Bashas’ was aware of the five day rule. Obviously the court

also does not agree that Bashas’ awareness of its ability to

file such a petition is an adequate basis for distinguishing

Lutheran Services. 

In addition to serving subpoenas which did not notify the

recipients of the five day rule, Lutheran Services and the

present case are alike in that seemingly the EEOC

investigators in both were unaware of the recipients’ section

1601.16(b)(1) obligations. As in Lutheran Services, the EEOC

never informed Bashas’ that its June 13, 2008 response was too

late. Moreover, as just explained, here, the EEOC also never

advised Bashas’ of its failure to comply with the five day

rule even when in May 2006 Bashas’ filed a petition to revoke

pursuant to section 1601.16(b)(1). 

The EEOC’s failure to mention section 1601.16(b)(1)

becomes even more problematic given that between May 2006 and

May 2008, the EEOC served Bashas’ with four subpoenas,

including the one at issue herein. None of those subpoenas

advised Bashas’ of the five day time frame, or the

consequences of failing to comply therewith. In fact, as to

Bashas’ response to the two July 27, 2007 subpoenas,

completely disregarding the timing issue, the EEOC addressed

the merits in some detail, finding that response “inadequate.” 

Id., attach. 5 thereto at 30. 

The bottom line here, which the EEOC cannot refute, is

that Bashas’ timely responded to the only deadline in the

subpoena - June 13, 2008. At any point in the process, it

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4 In Lutheran Services, the Court pointedly observed:

[I]f the [EEOC] wishes to ensure (regardless 

 of the actions of its General Counsel) that 

 it has an opportunity to review all subpoena 

 enforcement issues before they get to court, 

 it can easily do so by adding to the face of the

 subpoena, which already contains a “Notice to 

 Person Subpoenaed,” something like the following:

 If you have any objections to this subpoena, 

 you must include them in a petition filed with 

 the issuing official pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 

 § 1601.16(b)(1). Petitions must be mailed 

 within five days of receiving this subpoena. 

 Failure to follow these regulations may result 

 in loss of any ability to raise such objections in court.

Lutheran Services, 186 F.3d at 966-67 (citation omitted). 

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would not have been difficult for the EEOC to have advised

Bashas’ of the section 1601.16(b)(1)’s requirements, but it

did not. Intentional or not, the effect of the EEOC’s silence

was to lead Bashas’ into a false sense of security as to the

necessity of timely filing a petition to revoke or modify. 

The court will not countenance such behavior. After all, at

least since 1999, when the D.C. Circuit wisely suggested a

simple addition to the EEOC’s form subpoena,4 the EEOC has been

well aware of the risks inherent in continuing to use a

subpoena which does not notify the recipient of section

1601.16(b)(1)’s time frame. 

 Moreover, as in Lutheran Services, in this case the EEOC

did not mention the five day time frame until the February 2,

2009, filing of its application for an OSC. Even then, the

supporting affidavit only avers that Bashas’ “has not filed a

Petition to Revoke or Modify the Subpoena, and the five-day

period for filing such a petition with respect to a Title VII

subpoena has expired.” Id. at 4, ¶ 18. In making that

averment, EEOC Enforcement Manager Manget does not cite to any

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5 See Doc. 25-3 at 81-82.

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statute or regulation. 

Finally, as earlier alluded to, like Lutheran Services,

Bashas’ has repeatedly and continually made its objections

known to the EEOC. Those objections included not only

relevancy and overbreadth, but abuse of process. In fact, at

least as early as May 25, 2006, Bashas’ informed the EEOC of

its abuse of process argument.5 That response, as well as

Bashas’ June 13, 2008, response to the challenged subpoena

were both addressed, among others, to Chester V. Bailey who

issued the May 28, 2008 subpoena. Thus, although Bashas’ did

not timely file a petition to modify or revoke in accordance

with § 1601.16(b)(1), its response to the challenged subpoena,

which is dated June 13, 2008 - the production date directed in

the subpoena - put Mr. Bailey, the “issuing Director,” on

notice of Bashas’ objections, which surely is the underlying

intent of that regulation. Indeed, during the hearing the

EEOC agreed with the court’s observation that as a practical

matter it has known of Bashas’ objections for months prior to

the filing of this action. It thus strikes the court that

this is a classic example of the sporting maxim, “No harm, no

foul.” 

WinCo upon which Bashas’ predominately relies to refute

Bashas’ waiver argument provides further support for the

court’s conclusion that Bashas’ has not waived its right to

object to the EEOC subpoena at issue herein. Applying the

Lutheran Services analysis, the court excused WinCo from

filing its objections within five days of service of an EEOC

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6 See E.E.O.C.v. Cuzzens of Georgia, 608 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir. 1979);

E.E.O.C. v. City of Milwaukee , 919 F.Supp.1247 (E.D.Wis. 1996); E.E.O.C. v. County

of Hennepin, 623 F.Supp. 29 (D.Minn. 1985); and E.E.O.C. v. Roadway Express, 569

F.Supp. 1526 (N.D.Ind. 1983)). 

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subpoena. The essential facts of WinCo are practically

identical to those here, as well as to those in Lutheran

Services. In all three cases, the EEOC subpoena did not

notify the recipient of the five day rule. Nor did the EEOC

notify any of those recipients, after they served their

objections, that there was “any compliance issue or failure to

exhaust.” See WinCo, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 75421, at *12

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). WinCo, as

did Bashas’ also “consistently objected, . . . , to EEOC’s

information requests and WinCo’s formal written objections to

the challenged subpoena[.]” Id. Further, the subpoena

recipients served responses “to the subpoenas on the date for

which production was demanded, long before the filing of

th[o]s[e] enforcement action[s].” See id.

Given that the WinCo facts were “analogous” to those in

Lutheran Services, and that “the balance of factors weigh[ed]

strongly in WinCo’s favor[,]” the court found WinCo did not

waive its objections to the challenged EEOC subpoena. Id.

Furthermore, the WinCo court convincingly distinguished the

line of cases to which the EEOC cites in its memorandum on the

basis that none of them6 “involved defendants who lodged

objections prior to the EEOC’s filing of an enforcement

action[;]” and none “examine[d] the inconsistencies between 29

C.F.R. § 1601.16(b) and its authorizing statute, 29 U.S.C. §

161.” Id. at *13 (citations omitted). 

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In any event, what is perhaps most significant about WinCo

is that court adopted the Lutheran Services reasoning despite

the fact that WinCo did not object on privilege grounds. 

Indeed, the WinCo court was presented with the “more typical

situation” of objections based upon, inter alia, relevancy and

lack of particularity - the two factors which 29 U.S.C. § 161

identifies as grounds for petitioning for revocation of an

EEOC subpoena. Thus, the WinCo court did not take into

account the basic purpose of exhaustion - deference to agency

expertise, which was a critical underpinning of the Court’s

reasoning in Lutheran Services.

Tellingly, in its reply the EEOC did not mention WinCo at

all. Instead, the EEOC attempts to distinguish Lutheran

Services and another case to which Bashas’ cites, E.E.O.C. v.

Guess?, Inc., 176 F.Supp.2d 416, 422 (E.D.Pa. 2001), based on

the nature of the objections - both involved claims of

attorney client and work product privilege. The EEOC

stresses, in contrast, that “Bashas’ position is that the

information subpoenaed is not relevant and is overbroad[.] 

Reply (doc. 28) at 4. The EEOC thus reasons that those

objections are waived because “they are matters in which the

EEOC has expertise.” Id.

WinCo disposes of this argument though. As just stated,

the WinCo court applied the Lutheran Services rationale even

though WinCo objected to the EEOC subpoena on overbreadth and

relevance grounds. Moreover, in addition to overbreadth and

relevance, Bashas’ is objecting on abuse of process grounds. 

The significance of this particular objection is that, as with

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the privilege objections in Lutheran Services, an abuse of

process objection is “quite different from the more typical

situation where a subpoena recipient’s objections rest on

relevancy or particularity, the two factors listed in 29

U.S.C. § 161.” See 186 F.3d at 965. Abuse of process it not

among the section 161 factors. Thus, concern over deference

to agency expertise is not implicated here, at least as to

Bashas’ abuse of process objection. Indeed, understandably,

it might be difficult for the EEOC to remain wholly objective

if confronted with the abuse of process objection. 

Additionally, it should be noted that in City of

Milwaukee, one of the cases to which the EEOC cites, the court

addressed the merits of the City’s objections to an EEOC

subpoena, despite a finding of waiver. That court candidly

noted that “one might be tempted to order enforcement . . .

without any further discussion or analysis,” in light of the

waiver. City of Milwaukee, 919 F.Supp. at 1255. 

“[D]eclin[ing] to succumb to that temptation[,]” the court

soundly stated that “the parties and the public are entitled

to a more thorough treatment of the issues presented” therein. 

The same can certainly be said here. 

For all of these reasons, the court finds that the

circumstances surrounding Bashas’ failure to timely file a

petition to revoke or modify the May 28, 2008 subpoena are

“sufficiently extraordinary” to defeat the presumption that

Bashas’ has waived its right to object because it did not

timely file such a petition. The court stresses that it is

not adopting a per se rule that an abuse of process objection

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or, for that matter, any objection other than the two set

forth in 29 U.S.C. § 161 will automatically suffice to excuse

timely filing of a section 1601.16(b)(1) petition. Rather,

primarily because of the somewhat unique facts of this case,

including this court’s extensive familiarity with the

background of this action, resulting from the fact that it has

presided over the related Parra action for more than seven

years, the court finds that Bashas’ has not waived its right

to object to the May 28, 2008 subpoena, despite failing to

file a § 1601.16(b)(1) petition.

Before turning to Bashas’ discovery motion, it should be

noted that in its Reply the EEOC cites to, but does not

analyze, E.E.O.C. v. Sunoco, 2009 WL 197555 (E.D.Pa. 2009). 

Sunoco, on the face of it, might appear to compel a different

result here. There, the court found that Sunoco did waive its

objections to enforcing an EEOC subpoena where it failed to

timely file a petition to revoke or modify. The court in

Sunoco found that Lutheran Services was not “controlling”

because of the nature of Sunoco’s objections. More

specifically, Sunoco objected on the “ground that [it] ha[d]

not been given fair notice of the existence and nature of any

pending charge against it[.]” Id. at *4 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The court found that objection

to be “the more typical” situation recognized by the Lutheran

Court. Id. 

As in Sunoco, Bashas’ is making a lack of notice

objection. The EEOC overlooks the fact that, in sharp

contrast to the present case, Sunoco did not object to the

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EEOC’s subpoena until 25 days after service. On the other

hand, in the present action not only did Bashas’ make its

objections to the subpoena on the same date as that

subpoena directed a response, but, for over a year before,

it had made nearly identical objections to substantially

similar EEOC Requests and two prior EEOC subpoenas. That

critical distinction renders Sunoco inapplicable here.

In sum, despite the EEOC’s contrary assertion, the

court finds that Bashas’ did not waive its right to object

to the May 28, 2008 subpoena. Therefore, the court will

next address Bashas’ abuse of process objection, and more

particularly, Bashas’ motion for leave to conduct limited

discovery on that issue. 

II. “Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery”

Primarily because it could not “ignore the broader

context in which this particular dispute has arisen, and

the timing of this OSC[,]” in Parra I this court deemed it

necessary to conduct a hearing on Bashas’ discovery

motion. E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL 1783437, at *11. Before

considering the impact of that hearing on Bashas’ motion,

the court will reiterate the parties’ respective burdens. 

A. Administrative Subpoena Enforcement Requirements

The EEOC must satisfy four requirements to establish

its entitlement to enforcement of an administrative

subpoena by this court. The EEOC must show:

[1] that the investigation will be conducted

pursuant to a legitimate purpose, [2] that 

the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, 

[3] that the information sought is not already 

within the [agency's] possession, and [4] that 

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the administrative steps required by the

[agency's statutes or rules] have been followed.

E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL 1783437, at *6 (quoting, inter alia,

United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58, 85 S.Ct. 248, 

13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964)). The sole basis for Bashas’

discovery motion is that the EEOC is not conducting this

particular investigation for a legitimate purpose. Thus,

from Bashas’ perspective, enforcement of this subpoena

would amount to an abuse of this court’s process. 

Likewise, in its response to the OSC (filed after

E.E.O.C. I), Bashas’ continues to insist that this

investigation is not being conducted for a legitimate

purpose. Hence, Bashas’ maintains that the court also

should deny enforcement on abuse of process grounds. 

Interestingly, the EEOC did not address this issue until

the hearing when it responded, in essence, that this

investigation is being conducted for a legitimate purpose,

i.e. to aid in determining whether Bashas’ has engaged in

discrimination against Hispanics. 

B. Bashas’ Burden of Proof

 Bashas’ may be allowed to engage in “‘[a] limited

amount of discovery . . . if, for example, [it] makes a

preliminary and substantial demonstration of abuse[.]’” 

Id. (quoting Reich v. Montana Sulphur & Chemical Co., 32

F.3d 440, 449 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)). This requires Bashas’ to “‘present[]

meaningful evidence that the [EEOC] is attempting to abuse

its investigative authority.’” Id. (quoting Reich, 32 F.3d

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at 449 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

Agreeing with Bashas’, this court has previously found

that the “preliminary and substantial demonstration

standard does not mean actual proof.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in

original). Still, Bashas’ “needs to . . . develop facts

from which [this] court might infer a possibility of some

wrongful conduct” by the EEOC. Id. at *7 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in

original). The court has reviewed all of the record proof

with an acute awareness that Bashas’ has a “relatively

heavy” burden to satisfy before even limited discovery

will be permitted here. See E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL 1783437,

at *6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

C. Legitimacy of Purpose

As thoroughly discussed in E.E.O.C. I, Bashas' based

its claimed need for discovery upon three factors: (1) the

timing of the EEOC’s investigation and this enforcement

action; (2) purported sharing of information between the

EEOC and the Parra attorneys and/or the United Food and

Commercial Workers’ Union (“UFCW”); and (3) the EEOC’s

alleged “improper ulterior motive” for issuing the Charge

and this subpoena. See id. at *7 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). In its response to the OSC

and during the hearing, Bashas’ elaborated upon some of

those factors. 

Bashas’ views this enforcement action as nothing more

than “[a] course of conduct” by the EEOC “intended to

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harass . . . and to pressure” it with respect to the Parra

litigation and UFCW unionization efforts. Resp. (doc. 25)

at 11:5-6. To support this view, Bashas’ notes that

during the past eight years the EEOC has periodically

conducted “‘investigations’” of Bashas’ either through

individual charges or this Charge; yet, to date, the EEOC

has found no violations. Id. at 9:25-27. In terms of

the interplay between this enforcement action and Parra,

from Bashas’ perspective, those “investigations” and the

“various subpoenas” which the EEOC has directed to

Bashas’, have “not so coincidentally coincided with set

backs in the Parra litigation and parallel the UFCW’s . .

. union campaign against” it. Id. at 10:27-11:1 (citation

omitted). 

Bashas’ attempted to cast further doubt on the EEOC’s

motives in pursuing this enforcement action by noting at

the hearing that it recently filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

Petition. Bashas’ “believes” that a “large part of the

reason” the EEOC continues to pursue this action is

because it can “evade the bankruptcy court[,]” unlike

Parra, which as a result of Bashas’ bankruptcy, is now

subject to a stay. Audio Tr. (Sept. 21, 2009) at 10:04

a.m. 

The EEOC maintains that the Charge and the subpoena at

issue are part of its investigative authority to determine

whether Bashas’ has engaged in discriminatory conduct. 

This view would be much easier to embrace if it were not

for several factors, such as the striking similarity

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between Parra and this action. The present Charge is

“from at least May 2004,” whereas at least as to the pay

claim, April 2004 is the cut-off date in the Parra action. 

Manget Aff. (doc. 2-2), attach. 1 thereto. Other than

that, this Charge is practically indistinguishable from

the allegations in Parra. Also, there is the fact that

for some inexplicable reason, the EEOC did not intervene

in Parra. 

Moreover, as highlighted below, the EEOC has not been

continuously and actively pursuing this investigation. 

Ordinarily the EEOC would have the prerogative to decide

at what pace and how vigorously to pursue a given

investigation, and it would be of little or no consequence

to the court. Under the unique circumstances of this

case, however, and taking into account the extremely close

link between this action and Parra, the court cannot

disregard the manner in which the EEOC has conducted this

investigation. For months at a time the EEOC allowed this

investigation to lay dormant. Then, when the Parra

plaintiffs have sustained a setback, seemingly the EEOC

has a renewed interest in pursuing this investigation.

With the advantage of full briefing on the OSC and the

recent hearing, the court finds that Bashas’ has made the

requisite showing so as to justify limited discovery. The

primary basis for this finding is timing - not just the

timing of the OSC vis-a-vis this court’s February, 2, 2009

ruling precluding discovery, but the timing of this EEOC

investigation more generally. The timing of the EEOC’s

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actions which eventually resulted in the filing of this

OSC take on even greater import when viewed in conjunction

with the Parra action. Motive, too, is a consideration in

this court’s finding that Bashas’ may proceed with

limited discovery. The EEOC’s motives for filing this

Charge and enforcement action become questionable when,

again, they are viewed in the larger context of Parra and

the UFCW’s unionization efforts aimed at Bashas’.

Turning first to the Charge, both its timing and its

content raise concerns as to the EEOC’s underlying purpose

and motive. The Charge is dated May 9, 2007, which, Mr.

Tucek testified, was at the “height of the UFCW’s campaign

against Bashas[.]” Audio Tr. (Sept. 21, 2009) at 10:18:23-

10:18:29 a.m. Of equal if not more import is the content

of that Charge. Not only does it substantially mirror the

Parra allegations, but it seems that its scope was largely

attributable to the Parra’s April, 2004 time limitation on

discovery of Bashas’ wage data. 

During the hearing, the EEOC candidly admitted that it

“certainly does not operate totally in a vacuum.” Id. at

1:57 - 2:00 p.m. As an agency, it is “aware” of other

cases that are being litigated. Id. at 2:00:32 p.m. 

Potentially significant here is the EEOC’s indication that

it communicates with other plaintiffs’ counsel. As the

EEOC describes it, it is “in touch with what is going on

in the litigation field.” Id. at 2:02 p.m. So, “if the

Commissioner has an interest in an area” that is “being

litigated[,]” the EEOC “will often field questions[.]” 

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Id. 2:02:25-34. Moreover, although the EEOC vehemently

denies that it publicly discusses a charge prior to its

filing, it readily conceded that the existence of EEOC

charges may become known in the community through

witnesses, intervening charging parties, or the

respondents themselves. See id. at 2:05:42-2:06:00 p.m. 

Given this undoubtedly realistic depiction of how the EEOC

operates, it stands to reason that the EEOC could not

assure the court that the temporal scope of discovery in

Parra “did not have an effect on the time periods” set

forth in the Charge. Id. at 2:00:53-2:01:15 p.m.

(emphasis added). 

Shifting to the OSC, the court remains skeptical,

despite the EEOC’s repeated assurances, that it is simply

coincidental that on February 2, 2009 - “the same day this

court denied discovery in Parra as to Bashas' post-April

2004 pay policy, the EEOC decided to file an OSC to

enforce a subpoena encompassing such pay data, a subpoena

which had been served over eight months earlier.” See

E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL 1783437, at *7. This skepticism

stems, in part, from the EEOC’s candid responses to the

court’s inquiries during the hearing. 

As the EEOC explained it, the trial attorney

responsible for drafting this OSC completed it in October,

2008. Audio Tr. (Sept. 21, 2009) at 2:03:14 p.m. After

that, the OSC remained in the office of the supervisory

trial attorney for a “long time[.]” Id. at 2:03:15-26

p.m. Based upon the foregoing, the EEOC insists that the

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February 2, 2009 filing of this OSC “really” was just a

“coincidence[.]” Id. at 2:03:27 p.m. 

Querying the EEOC, it readily acknowledged the court’s

concern, but stressed that as an agency it would not delay

the filing of a court document. Id. at 2:03:34-37 p.m. 

The EEOC strongly suggests that the “coincidental” timing

of the filing of the OSC came about because of the EEOC’s

workload priorities. Litigation takes precedence over

subpoena enforcement matters, so there is “often a long

lapse” between the issuance of a subpoena and its

enforcement. Id. at 2:03:43-46 p.m. 

While the EEOC’s explanation is plausible, like the

EEOC, this court does not operate in a vacuum. It, too,

must take into account “the broader context[.]” See

E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL 1783437, at *11. When the court does

that, the fact that, with the exception of a supervisor’s

review, the OSC was complete in October, 2008, undermines

the EEOC’s position. If the OSC was essentially complete,

it strikes the court as odd that the EEOC would not have

filed this action sooner, especially if, as it professes,

it has an interest in eradicating workplace

discrimination. 

The delay also cannot be justified based upon the

content of the OSC. The OSC itself is three pages of

boilerplate language. The supporting affidavit is

similarly terse and does not include voluminous exhibits. 

Lastly, the EEOC’s memorandum of law also is rather

cursory. Thus, it strains credulity that even with

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limited institutional resources, this particular OSC could

not have been reviewed and filed until eight months after

service of the subpoena. 

Apart from the OSC, the issue of timing continues to

be “troublesome” because the EEOC never sought to enforce

the three preceding subpoenas. See E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL

1783437, at *8. The first subpoena, in the matter of

eight individuals including plaintiffs Parra and Estrada,

is dated May 11, 2006, slightly more than eight weeks

after this court denied the Parra plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration on the issue of certifying a class as to

the pay claim. That timing alone is curious. 

Furthermore, the EEOC never responded to Bashas’ petition

to revoke that subpoena. In that petition, among other

grounds, Bashas’ asserted that the May 2006 subpoena was

based upon the improper re-opening of the Parra and

Estrada charges. See Doc. 25-3 at 79-81. Instead of

responding to that petition, the EEOC “re-opened” the

charges of those individuals, which it had closed in 2002

after the filing of Parra. 

Lastly, the court is well aware that the EEOC denies

that there is anything improper in its having

communication with third-parties. Audio Tr. (Sept. 21,

2009) at 2:2:54-2:03:07 p.m. Assuming, as the EEOC

assured the court, that it abides by its confidential

obligations, in the abstract the court would agree that

such communications are not improper. The court is not

concerned with some theoretical communication between the

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EEOC and third-parties, however. Here, the concern arises

because on this record the court can “infer a possibility

of some wrongful conduct” by the EEOC in terms of its

outside communications and motives. E.E.O.C. I, 2009 WL

1783437, at *7 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted) (emphasis in original). For that reason, among

others, limited discovery is needed here. After the

completion of discovery, it may be that the court finds

that the EEOC has acted with a legitimate purpose in

filing this Charge and enforcement action. That

determination cannot be made in a factual vacuum, however.

To conclude, in E.E.O.C. I this court found that,

“without more, . . . timing was not a sufficient basis for

allowing . . . discovery.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 

Now, however, the timing factor tips decidedly in favor of

allowing Bashas’ to conduct limited discovery. Likewise,

the motive factor also augurs in favor of allowing such

discovery. That is so because on the record as presently

constituted, Bashas’ has made “a preliminary and

substantial demonstration of abuse[]” so as to justify

limited discovery on the issue of whether the EEOC has

filed this Charge and enforcement action for a legitimate

purpose. See id. at *6 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Although not

determinative, the court has taken into account, as

Bashas’ put it, the “reality” under which it is

“operating” in that currently it has access to a “limited

amount of evidence[.]” Audio Tr. (Sept. 21, 2009) at

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7 The Charge itself does not allege a “pattern and practice” of

discrimination by Bashas’, but that is a reasonable construction. And, evidently

that is how Bashas’ is construing the Charge as it invokes the Shell Oil standard,

which expressly applies to pattern and practice allegations. Moreover, the EEOC

has not disputed that characterization or Bashas’ reliance upon that standard.

Accordingly, for now, the court will adopt construction which the EEOC advances and

apply the Shell Oil standard.

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10:04:23-29 a.m. Bashas’ ability to conduct such

discovery will be fairly circumscribed, however, as set

forth in the next section.

D. Sufficiency of Notice

Before delineating the scope of discovery, the court

recognizes that Bashas’ also contends that this court

lacks jurisdiction to enforce the May 28, 2008 subpoena

because the Charge does not provide Bashas’ with

sufficient notice of the allegations against it. This

argument need not detain the court for long. 

In E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 104 S.Ct.

1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984), the Court held that an EEOC

charge must meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(b), which “is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial

enforcement of a subpoena issued by the EEOC.” Id. at 65

(footnote omitted). The court adopted the following

standard in the “pattern-and practice” context:7

Insofar as he is able, the Commissioner

should identify the groups of persons that 

he has reason to believe have been 

discriminated against, the categories of

employment positions from which they have 

been excluded, the methods by which the 

discrimination may have been effected, and 

the periods of time in which he suspects 

the discrimination to have been practiced.

Id. at 73 (emphasis added). Especially given the

prefatory phrase, “[i]nsofar as he is able,” that standard

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is fairly lenient by any measure. 

The Commissioner’s Charge against Bashas’ satisfies

that standard. It identifies “Hispanics” as the “group of

persons” the Commissioner “has reason to believe have been

discriminated against.” See Manget Aff. (doc. 2-2),

attach. 1 thereto. The Charge also sets forth the alleged

methods of discrimination, i.e., “failing to pay Hispanic

employees comparable wages to non-Hispanic employees and

failing to promote Hispanics into Management positions.” 

Id. Further, that Charge includes a time frame - “since

at least May 2004[.]” Id. 

The Charge does not, however, as Bashas’ emphasizes,

“identify the categories of employment positions

effected[.]” See id. At this point in the proceeding, the

court does not find that that omission renders the Charge

jurisdictionally defective, especially given that a charge

“is not the equivalent of a complaint initiating a

lawsuit.” See id. at 68. The function of a charge

differs from that of a complaint in an adversary

proceeding. A Title VII charge “place[s] the EEOC on

notice that someone (either a party claiming to be

aggrieved or a Commissioner) believes that an employer has

violated the title.” Id. The Commissioner’s Charge

against Bashas’ serves that function.

Likewise, there is no merit to Bashas’ suggestion that

the Charge should have “indicat[ed] . . . which of

[Bashas’] 41,000 individuals have allegedly been subjected

to discrimination.” Resp. (doc. 25) at 11:20-21. 

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Imposing a duty on the Commissioner to, among other

things, “specify the person discriminated against, . . .

would radically limit the ability of the EEOC to

investigate allegations of patterns and practices of

discrimination.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 70. Such a

specificity requirement, along with other requirements,

“would cut short most of [the EEOC’s pattern and practice]

investigations[,]” which, as the Shell Oil Court found,

“would be manifestly inconsistent with Congress’ intent.” 

Based upon the Shell Oil rationale, the court finds that

the Charge at issue herein is not jurisdictionally

defective because it does not specify the individuals

alleged to have been the subject of discrimination by

Bashas’. In short, the court is convinced that this

Charge meets the Shell Oil standard. Consequently, there

is no merit to Bashas’ assertion that this court does not

have jurisdiction to enforce the May 28th subpoena because

the Charge does not provide it with adequate notice of the

allegations against it.

E. Relevancy

Lastly, Bashas’ contends that the subpoena “seeks

information that is completely irrelevant to the

allegations of the Charge.” Resp. (doc. 25) at 12:11-12

(emphasis omitted). Bashas’ does not explicitly seek

denial of enforcement on that basis, although its response

could be so construed. The court therefore is compelled

to at least comment upon that assertion.

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Most recently in Federal Express, the Ninth Circuit

reiterated, “[C]ourts must enforce administrative

subpoenas unless the evidence sought by the subpoena is

plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of

the agency.” Federal Express, 558 F.3d at 854 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted)). Relevancy in

this context “is determined in terms of the investigation

rather than in terms of evidentiary relevance.” Id.

(citation omitted). “Moreover, the relevancy requirement

is ‘not especially constraining.’ Id. (quoting Shell Oil,

466 U.S. at 68) “The term ‘relevant’ is ‘generously

construed’ to ‘afford[ ] the Commission access to

virtually any material that might cast light on the

allegations against the employer.” Id. (quoting Shell

Oil, 466 U.S. at 68-69). 

Given the expansive definition of relevancy in this

context, at least at this juncture, the court is unable to

find that the May 28, 2008 subpoena should not be enforced

because it is seeking information which, assuredly, is not

relevant to its investigation. Again, at least for the

moment, the court is satisfied that the subpoenaed

information, while perhaps “not necessarily relevant in an

evidentiary sense[,] . . . will help the EEOC craft

additional information requests that may produce evidence

of discriminatory treatment.” See id. 

F. Scope of Discovery

Having found that Bashas’ is entitled to conduct

limited discovery, the court will further define the scope

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of that discovery. Bashas’ expressly sought leave to

serve written discovery requests upon the following:

[T]he EEOC, the named plaintiffs and plaintiffs'

counsel in the Parra action, including the Impact

Fund and Davis, Cowell & Bowe, as well as Jocelyn

Larkin, of the Impact Fund, and Elizabeth A.

Lawrence, of Davis, Cowell & Bowell [sic]

individually [firm] ... individually, and the

UFCW[.]”

Mot. (doc. 10) at 11:12-15. Bashas’ shall be allowed to

serve written discovery requests upon the foregoing

entities and individuals, but the court is limiting the

scope of those requests. Bashas' seeks to obtain

“documents pertaining to any communications, information

or documents provided between the EEOC and these third

parties relating to this Commissioner's Charge or any

other charges currently under investigation by the EEOC.” 

Id. at 11:15-18 (emphasis added). The documents which

Bashas’ is seeking shall be limited to the Commissioner’s

Charge dated May 9, 2007, which is the basis for the

EEOC’s investigation and the issuance of the subpoena

which forms the basis for this enforcement action. 

Bashas’ shall not be allowed to obtain documents

pertaining to “any other charges currently under

investigation by the EEOC.” See id. 

Bashas' also “seek[s] any documents relating to the

Parra litigation, which may or may not be subject to the

Parra court’s confidentiality order, provided to the EEOC

by the Parra plaintiffs or their counsel.” Id. at 11:18-

20. The court will allow this discovery. It will not,

however, allow depositions without leave of court. 

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 Bashas' anticipates completing this discovery within

six weeks. Given that Bashas’ is seeking discovery

against multiple non-parties, the court will establish a

limitation on the time frame for service of discovery. 

More specifically, Bashas’ shall have twenty-five (25)

days from the date of entry of this order in which to

serve its written discovery requests. Response to those

requests shall be in accordance with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and all other applicable legal authority. 

Accordingly, Bashas’ has six weeks from the date of entry

of this order in which to complete the discovery which the

court is permitting. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the court hereby

ORDERS that:

(1) the “Application for an Order to Show Cause why an

Administrative Subpoena Should not be Enforced” (doc. 1)

filed by petitioner, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, is DENIED without prejudice; and 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(2) the “Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited

Discovery” (doc. 10) by respondent, Bashas’, Inc. is

GRANTED. Bashas’ shall proceed with such discovery within

/ / /

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the parameters set forth herein, including the six week

time frame, which commences on the entry date of this

order. 

DATED this 30th day of September, 2009.

Copies to counsel of record

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