Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02381/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02381-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL WILKERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

FUJINAKA PROPERTIES, LP; 

FUJINAKA CASTLE, LP; and 

MONOLITH PROPERTIES, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-02381 WBS CKD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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Plaintiff Michael Wilkerson filed this action against 

defendants Fujinaka Properties, LP, Fujinaka Castle, LP, and 

Monolith Properties, Inc., alleging several federal- and statelaw claims for discrimination stemming from defendants’ failure 

to install a handicap lift by the pool in defendants’ property. 

Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Mot. (Docket 

No. 9).) 

I. Relevant Allegations

Defendants Fujinaka Properties, LP, and Fujinaka 

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Castle, LP co-own Castle Village Mobile Home Park (“Castle 

Village”), a mobile home park located in Ione, California. 

(First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 6, 7 (Docket No. 8).) Defendant 

Monolith Properties, Inc., manages Castle Village. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

In May of 1993, Amador County Health Department granted 

Castle Village a permit to operate a swimming pool. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

The pool specifications listed various safety elements that would 

be included with the installation of the pool, including a 

“handicap lift.” (Id. ¶ 10.) This lift, however, was never 

installed. (Id.)

In September 2014, plaintiff suffered a stroke that 

paralyzed the entire left side of his body. (Id. ¶ 11.) In 

March 2015, plaintiff moved into a mobile home in Castle Village 

because the home “was accessible for him.” (Id. ¶ 12.) The home 

had a ramp and could accommodate his wheelchair. (Id.) 

Plaintiff, however, struggled to get into the pool. 

(Id. ¶ 13.) He tried twice before realizing it was “too hard and 

dangerous a task.” (Id.) In 2016, plaintiff told management 

that he was unable to access the pool because of his disability 

and asked that they install a lift. (Id. ¶ 14.) The park 

“simply said ‘no.’” (Id.) Plaintiff made two additional 

requests to install a list, but defendants denied both. (Id.) 

No owner or agent of Castle Village discussed or inquired into 

possible alternative accommodations that would ensure plaintiff 

could access the pool. (Id. ¶ 15.) In 2017, plaintiff’s left 

leg was amputated, making it impossible for plaintiff to enter 

the pool without accommodation. (Id. ¶ 16.)

In March 2019, Castle Village renovated the pool and 

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installed non-skid tiles on the step, rebuilt the steps to code, 

and installed an ADA handrail. (Id. ¶ 19.) Castle Village did 

not install a pool lift. (Id.) After the pool renovation, 

defendants held an open forum with the residents to air any 

grievances the residents had. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff asked that 

the park do something to make the pool accessible to people with 

mobility disabilities, such as installing a lift. (Id.) The 

owners responded that they would not install a lift because they 

were not obligated to do so. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed suit alleging the following three 

claims: (1) violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3601 et seq.; (2) violation of the Fair Employment and Housing 

Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955 et seq.; and (3) violation of the 

Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq. Defendants 

move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

II. Legal Standard

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the inquiry before the court 

is whether, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true 

and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, 

the plaintiff has stated a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ 

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

III. Discussion

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A. Federal Fair Housing Act Claim (Count 1)

The Fair Housing Act (FHA) makes it unlawful for a

housing provider “[t]o discriminate against any person in the 

terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, 

or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with

such dwelling, because of a handicap of that person.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3604(f)(2)(A). Section 3604(3) defines discrimination as “(A)

a refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, 

reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be 

occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to 

afford such person full enjoyment of the premises”; “(B) a 

refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, 

practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary 

to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 

dwelling”; or “(C) in connection with the design and construction 

of covered multifamily dwellings . . . a failure to design and 

construct those dwellings” to the FHA’s specifications. 42 

U.S.C.A. § 3604(3). Plaintiff proceeds only under § 3604(3)(B) 

and alleges that defendants discriminated against him because, in 

refusing to provide a pool lift, defendants “refus[ed] to make 

reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or 

services.” (FAC ¶ 25.) 

To state a claim of disability discrimination under the 

FHA, the plaintiff must allege: “(1) that the plaintiff or his 

associate is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 

3602(h); (2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be 

expected to know of the handicap; (3) that accommodation of the 

handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person an 

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equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the 

accommodation is reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to 

make the requested accommodation.” Dubois v. Ass’n of Apt.

Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a claim under the FHA. 

Plaintiff alleges that he is handicapped (FAC ¶ 26), that 

defendants knew of the handicap because plaintiff informed 

defendants that plaintiff’s disability prevented him from 

accessing the pool (id. ¶ 14), that plaintiff cannot enjoy the 

pool without accommodation (id. ¶¶ 14, 20), that the 

accommodation is reasonable (id. ¶ 14), that plaintiff requested 

a pool lift (id. ¶¶ 14, 20), and that defendants refused to make 

the requested accommodation (id.).

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s request for a pool 

lift constitutes a “modification” and not an “accommodation” 

under the statute because it modifies the physical property. 

(Mot. at 3-6.) However, defendants cite no authority to 

substantiate this distinction or, if this distinction does exist, 

to persuade the court that the distinction compels the court to 

dismiss this claim at this stage. In the Americans with 

Disabilities Act context, for example, the Ninth Circuit uses the 

terms “reasonable modification” and “reasonable accommodation” 

“interchangeably.” Wong v. Regents of Univ. of California, 192 

F.3d 807, 816 n.26 (9th Cir. 1999). Further, to the extent that 

a distinction does exist, whether a pool lift is a modification 

appears to be a question of fact because pool lifts do not 

necessarily involve physical changes to the premises. (See, 

e.g., Opp’n at 5 (listing examples of pool lifts) (Docket No. 

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13).) At this stage, the court cannot conclusively determine 

that a pool lift is not an accommodation as a matter of law or 

that a refusal to provide a pool lift cannot sustain a claim for 

discrimination under the FHA as a matter of law. Accordingly, 

the court will not dismiss this claim.1 

1 Plaintiff also alleges, under his FHA claim, that 

defendants failed to engage in an interactive process. (FAC ¶ 

28.) Defendants do not appear to contest that plaintiff 

sufficiently alleges such a failure. There is a split among the 

courts, however, as to whether the FHA imposes upon landlords an 

obligation to engage in an interactive process. Compare

Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 

1996) (“If a landlord is skeptical of a tenant’s alleged 

disability or the landlord’s ability to provide an accommodation, 

it is incumbent upon the landlord to request documentation or 

open a dialogue.”), with Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apts., 250 

F.3d 1039, 1047 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hile some courts have 

imposed an obligation on employers and employees to engage in an 

interactive process, there is no such language in the Fair 

Housing Act . . . that would impose such a duty on landlords and 

tenants.”). FEHA, by contrast, explicitly requires an 

interactive process. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n). Because 

plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for discrimination

under the FHA, the court need not determine at this point whether 

a failure to engage in an interactive process gives rise to an 

independent claim for disability discrimination under the FHA. 

Instead, the court agrees with other district courts in the Ninth 

Circuit and finds that defendants’ failure to engage can be

relevant to whether they failed to reasonably accommodate 

plaintiff. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Morgan, No. CV 09-8939-GW 

CWX, 2012 WL 253867, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012) (“[T]his 

Court would not find that the interactive process is a separate 

requirement under the FHAA. . . . However, a landlord's 

nonfeasance in that regard can be considered in determining 

whether he or she failed to reasonably accommodate the tenant's 

disability/handicap.”); Elliott v. QF Circa 37, LLC, No. 16-CV0288-BAS-AGS, 2018 WL 2933467, at *12 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2018) 

(“The Court believes that even if the FHA imposes no affirmative 

obligation, evidence of a housing provider engaging in an 

interactive process with a tenant is relevant to the refusal 

inquiry.”); see also Smith v. Powdrill, No. CV 12-06388 DDP RZX, 

2013 WL 5786586, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013) (“If Defendants 

felt that the accommodation imposed unreasonable costs, they were 

required to engage in an ‘interactive process’ with Plaintiff to 

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B. Fair Employment and Housing Act Claim (Count 2)

“The provisions of FEHA . . . protect substantially the 

same rights as the FHA provisions at issue and are subject to the 

same analysis.” Cabrera v. Alvarez, 977 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975 

(N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 

1114, 1131 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth Circuit therefore 

“appl[ies] the same standards to FHA and FEHA claims.” Pac. 

Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 

1156 n.16 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Walker, 272 F.3d at 1131 n.8 

(9th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, because the complaint 

sufficiently alleges a claim for discrimination under the FHA, it 

also sufficiently alleges one under FEHA. The court therefore 

will not dismiss this claim.

C. Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim (Count 3)

Plaintiff alleges a violation of Section 51(b) of the 

Unruh Act.2 (FAC ¶ 46.) Defendants argue that the Unruh Act 

bars claims that, like the present claim, “require any 

construction, alteration, repair, structural or otherwise, or 

modification of any sort.” Cal Civ. Code § 51(d). Plaintiff in 

turn argues that Section 51(d) does not bar his claim because 

defendants’ failure to install a lift is in violation of the 

California Code of Regulations. The court agrees with plaintiff.

Section 51(d) reads as follows:

Nothing in this section shall be construed to 

require any construction, alteration, repair, 

explore alternatives.”)

2 Plaintiff does not claim a violation of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (ADA) as incorporated into the Unruh Act, 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). (FAC ¶ 46.)

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structural or otherwise, or modification of any 

sort whatsoever, beyond that construction, 

alteration, repair, or modification that is 

otherwise required by other provisions of law, to 

any new or existing establishment, facility, 

building, improvement, or any other structure, 

nor shall anything in this section be construed 

to augment, restrict, or alter in any way the 

authority of the State Architect to require 

construction, alteration, repair, or 

modifications that the State Architect otherwise 

possesses pursuant to other laws.

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(d) (emphasis added). The other “provision[] 

of law” which requires defendants to install a lift is California 

Code of Regulations § 1044, which applies to “Mobile Home Parks 

and Installations,” and requires that “[a]ll construction . . . 

be performed in accordance with approved plans and 

specifications.” That provision also prohibits changes, 

modifications or alterations “without the express prior approval, 

when possible, of the person or entity which provided the 

original approvals, and the enforcement agency.” Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 1044. According to plaintiff, defendants’ failure to install a 

pool lift when the approved pool plans included one is in 

violation of that provision.

Defendants contend that the complaint lacks factual 

support for the allegations that support this claim. 

Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot support 

allegations that defendants submitted construction plans, that 

defendants owned Castle Village when the construction plans were 

approved, and that the construction plans were never properly 

altered, among others. (Reply at 8 (Docket No. 16).)

Defendants’ arguments challenge the veracity of the complaint, 

not its sufficiency. Further, defendants do not request judicial 

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notice of any construction plans or documents to establish that

plaintiff’s allegations are factually incorrect. At this stage, 

plaintiff alleges with sufficient particularity that defendants 

submitted construction plans that included a pool lift and that, 

as a result, the California Code of Regulations is “[an]other

provision of law” that requires construction of a pool lift. See

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(d). Accordingly, Section 51(d) does not bar 

plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. Cf. Moore v. Equity Residential 

Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 16-CV-07204-MEJ, 2017 WL 2670257, at *6 (N.D. 

Cal. June 21, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Unruh 

Act claim “premised on specific violations of the Building Code 

pertaining to elevator access and egress from the Property”).

In their reply, defendants argue, for the first time, 

that even if Section 51(d) does not bar plaintiff’s claim, 

plaintiff fails to adequately plead discriminatory intent. 

(Reply at 9.) Because courts “need not consider arguments raised 

for the first time in a reply brief,” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 

990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007), the court will disregard this argument.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss (Docket No. 9) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: April 1, 2020

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