Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-08090/USCOURTS-ca10-94-08090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH P.IfLlEu 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS lUtiUed States Court or A::J-::::'.3 

Tenth Circuit · · 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROHAIDA DUART, as Personal 

representative for John Raymond 

Duart, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FMC WYOMING CORPORATION, a 

Delaware corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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DEC 18.1995 

No. 94-8090 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-349-J) 

Bruce S. Asay, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Stacy D. Shartin (and James A. Breslo of Seyfarth, Shaw, 

Fairweather & Geraldson, with her on the brief), Los Angeles, 

California, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, 

and JENKINS, Senior District Judge.* 

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior District Judge of the 

District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-8090 Document: 01019280409 Date Filed: 12/18/1995 Page: 1 
On November 7, 1991, John Raymond Duart, then the age of 

56 years, 10 months and 23 days, was hired by FMC Wyoming 

Corporation, a Delaware corporation, as an Engineer Electrical IV (Grade 20) at FMC's plant in Green River, Wyoming. On 

February 5, 1993, 1 year, 2 months and 29 days after he was 

hired, Duart was fired by FMC, Duart then being the age 58 

years, 1 month and 21 days. The reason given by FMC for 

terminating Duart was that Duart's job performance was unsatisfactory. 

After his termination by FMC, Duart filed complaints 

with the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Commission and 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After receiving 

a right-to-sue letter, he brought suit against FMC in the 

United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, 

claiming, inter alia, that FMC terminated his employment because of his age. 

In his original complaint, filed on December 16, 1993, 

Duart alleged three causes of action. The first claim was 

based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 

29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. He also alleged two claims based on 

Wyoming 

toppel, 

law; 

and 

namely, 

negligent 

breach of contract and promissory esinfliction of emotional distress. 

These claims were asserted as pendent claims to Duart's age 

discrimination claim, but jurisdiction was also based on diversity. After FMC had filed an answer to the complaint, 

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Appellate Case: 94-8090 Document: 01019280409 Date Filed: 12/18/1995 Page: 2 
Duart filed an amended complaint in which he asserted an additional state claim for breach of the duty of good faith and 

fair dealing. 

Although they are not a part of the record before us, 

FMC next filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b) (6), and a motion for summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In support thereof, 

FMC filed numerous affidavits and depositions, or excerpts 

therefrom. Duart, by way of response, also filed numerous 

affidavits and depositions, or excerpts therefrom. The district court elected to treat the 12(b) (6) motion as a motion 

for summary judgment and granted the motion, entering summary 

judgment for FMC. The district court's order appears as Duart v. FMC wyoming Corp., 859 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Wyo. 1994) .1 

Duart appeals. 

In granting FMC's motion for summary judgment, the district court first considered the question of whether Duart's 

alleged misrepresentations in his resume and employment application with FMC barred recovery on all of his four claims 

based on wrongful termination. Relying on O'Driscoll v. 

Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176 (lOth Cir. 1994), the district 

court concluded that: (1) there were misrepresentations in 

the resume which Duart gave FMC and in his subsequent application for employment; (2) those misrepresentations were 

1 John Raymond Duart died during the course of this litigation. His widow, Rohaida Duart, as personal representative 

for John Raymond Duart, has been substituted for him as 

plaintiff. 

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Appellate Case: 94-8090 Document: 01019280409 Date Filed: 12/18/1995 Page: 3 
material; (3) if FMC had known of the misrepresentations, it 

would not have hired Duart in the first instance; and (4) 

such misrepresentations were adequate grounds for thereafter 

terminating Duart's employment. Notwithstanding, the district court then went on to consider each of Duart's four 

claims on their merits and concluded that each was subject to 

summary judgment in favor of FMC. 

Under these circumstances, we should first consider the 

question of whether there were misrepresentations in Duart's 

resume and employment application, which would themselves bar 

recovery on his four claims based on wrongful termination. 

In concluding that Duart had made material misrepresentations 

in his resume and in his application for employment, the 

district court set forth its rationale in considerable detail. Duart, 859 F. Supp. at 1454-56. Such will not be repeated here. 

As indicated, in granting summary judgment for FMC the 

district court relied, in the first instance, on O'Driscoll 

v. Hercules, supra. In Hercules, Dorothea O'Driscoll brought 

suit for wrongful termination of her employment with Hercules, Inc., basing her claims for relief on the ADEA, along 

with pendent claims for breach of contract and wrongful termination. While preparing for trial, Hercules discovered 

evidence of misconduct on the part of O'Driscoll about which 

it had been unaware when it fired her. This uncontroverted 

after-acquired evidence was described by us in Hercules: 

While preparing for trial, Hercules discovered evidence of misconduct on the part of 

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Appellate Case: 94-8090 Document: 01019280409 Date Filed: 12/18/1995 Page: 4 
Plaintiff that it was unaware of when it terminated Plaintiff. The uncontroverted afteracquired evidence of misconduct included the 

following: (1) on her employment application, 

Plaintiff misrepresented her age so as to appear five years younger, falsely represented 

that she had never previously applied for employment with Hercules, and failed to disclose 

a previous employer; (2) on her pre-employment 

forms, Plaintiff misrepresented her age, date 

of graduation from high school, ages of her 

children, and falsely represented that she had 

completed two quarters of study at Salt Lake 

City Technical College; (3) on her application 

for membership with Blue Cross-Blue Shield of 

Utah, Plaintiff misrepresented the age of her 

son, who would have been otherwise ineligible 

for coverage as Plaintiff's dependent; and (4) 

on her "Application and Authorization for Access to Confidential Information" ("Security 

Clearance"), a United States Government form, 

Plaintiff misrepresented her age. 

Hercules, 12 F.3d at 177-78. 

In Hercules, as in the instant case, the employee had 

signed a declaration to the effect that the employee understood that misrepresentation in the employment application 

could be grounds for cancellation of the application, or, if 

already employed, for termination of the employment. 

The defendant in Hercules filed a motion for summary 

judgment. The district court, relying on Summers v. State 

Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (lOth Cir. 

1988), granted summary judgment for Hercules, and O'Driscoll 

appealed. 

On appeal, we affirmed. In so doing, we commented as 

follows: 

In summary, we conclude that, under Summers, Hercules' after-acquired evidence of 

Plaintiff's misconduct precludes Plaintiff 

from obtaining relief for her termination. 

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This is so because Hercules successfully demonstrated that it did not know of Plaintiff's 

misconduct when she was terminated, it would 

have been justified in terminating Plaintiff 

for the misconduct, and it would, in fact, 

have terminated Plaintiff had it known of her 

misconduct. 

Hercules, 12 F.3d at 180-81. 

We agree with the district court that under O'Driscoll 

v. Hercules, Inc., supra, if Duart made material misrepresentations in his resume and application for employment which 

were not known to Ft-:IC when it hired Duart, but were later 

discovered by FMC, such would constitute adequate grounds for 

FMC to terminate Duart's employment and would preclude recovery on all of Duart's four claims. However, subsequent to 

the district court's order granting summary judgment to FMC, 

which was entered on August 5, 1994, the Supreme Court on 

February -21, 1995, granted O'Driscoll's petition for certiorari, vacated our opinion and remanded for further consideration in light of McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing 

Co., 513 U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995). See O'Driscoll v. 

Hercules, Inc. , u.s. , 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995). 

On remand, we, on March 29, 1995, recalled the mandate 

and vacated our earlier opinion. On April 6, 1995, we reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against 

O'Driscoll and remanded the case to the district court for 

further proceedings consistent with McKennon v. Nashville 

Banner, supra. See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 52 F.3d 294 

(lOth Cir. 1995). 

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McKennon, supra, held that an employee discharged in 

violation of ADEA is not barred from all relief when, after 

the discharge, the employer discovers evidence of wrongdoing 

which would have, in any event, lead to the employee's termination on lawful and legitimate grounds. However, the Supreme Court further held that such after-acquired evidence 

might bear on "the specific remedy to be ordered." McKennon, 

115 S. Ct. at 885. In this latter regard, the Court concluded that as a general rule in such cases, neither reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate remedy, and that 

the "beginning point in a trial court's formulation of a 

remedy should be calculation of backpay from the date of the 

unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered." Id. at 886. 

So, the rationale of our earlier O'Driscoll opinion is 

no longer a basis for granting summary judgment to FMC on 

Duart's ADEA claim. However, as noted, the district court 

held in the alternative that, disregarding the material 

misrepresentations in Duart's resume and application, FMC was 

still entitled to summary judgment on Duart's ADEA claim. We 

agree. 

The district court in Duart, 859 F. Supp. at 1456-58, 

evaluated the affidavits and other evidentiary matter before 

it on FMC's motion for summary judgment as such relate to 

Duart's ADEA claim, and after reviewing the applicable law 

relating thereto, concluded that though Duart may have made a 

prima facie showing of age discrimination, FMC had thereafter 

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articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment, i.e. unsatisfactory job performance, 

and that Duart had failed to show that the reason advanced by 

FMC for termination was pretextual. Without endorsing all of 

the district court's reasoning, we are in general accord. 

We are uncertain whether Wyoming would adopt the rationale of McKennon and hold that a terminated employee's claims 

for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, and breach of duty of good 

faith and fair dealing are not totally barred because the 

employer later discovers material misrepresentations in the 

employee's resume and application which would themselves 

justify termination. Such being the case, we will consider 

on their merits Duart's claims based on breach of contract 

and promissory estoppel, negligent infliction of emotional 

distress, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, 

as did the district court. 

The district court carefully considered Duart's claim 

based on breach of contract and promissory estoppel and at 

pages 1458 to 1462 set forth its basis for concluding that 

FMC was entitled to summary judgment. We are in general accord with the district court's disposition of this claim, and 

its rationale will not be repeated here. 

The district court considered Duart's claim based on 

negligent infliction of emotional distress and at page 1464 

set forth its reasons for granting summary judgment to FMC on 

that particular claim. Again, we are in general accord with 

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the district court and see no need to here repeat that which 

the district court has already well said. 

The district court at pages 1463 to 1464 considered 

Duart's claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair 

dealing and concluded that FMC was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. We are in general accord with the district court's disposition of this particular claim, too. 

Therefore, Judgment affirmed. 

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