Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02260/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02260-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331cr Fed. Question: Civil Rights (Race Discrimination)

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1 NOV 0 4 2016

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CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN QI&CRICT 0F CALIFORNIA 3 BY DEPUTY

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 Stacey Mouton, Case No.: 3:16-cv-02260-BEN-NLS

Plaintiff, 12 ORDER:

v. 13 (1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Wells Fargo Bank et al., 14 Defendant.

15 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

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18 On September 7, 2016, Plaintiff Stacey Mouton filed a civil complaint and a

motion to proceed informapauperis (“IFP”). (Docket Nos. 1-2). For the reasons stated

below, Plaintiffs Motion is granted and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action in a district court must pay a filing fee. 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to prepay the entire

fee only ifthe plaintiffis granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),

any court ofthe United States may authorize the commencement,

prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding ... without

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prepayment offees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit

that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person

is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.

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4 Plaintiffis a full-time student and does not receive any income. (Docket No. 2 at

If 1, 11.) She pays rent, utilities, food, and other monthly expenses amounting to a little

over $1,700.00 per month. (Docket No. 2 at f 8.) Accordingly, Plaintiffhas sufficiently

stated that she cannot afford to pay the filing fee. (Docket No. 2 at f 11.) The Motion is

therefore GRANTED.

Section 1915 Screening

A. Legal Standard

Under section 1915(e) oftitle 28 ofthe United States Code, the Court mustsua

sponte dismiss IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious,

fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)). “[T]he provisions ofsection 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing i?e// Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679; see Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that section 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language ofFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]... a context-specific task that

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requires the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility ofmisconduct” falls short ofmeeting this

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009).

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While a plaintiffs factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doelv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler,

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citingBretzv. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially

pled.” hey v. Bd. ofRegents ofthe Univ. ofAlaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Discussion

Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which

reliefmay be granted. 28U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Here, Plaintiff alleges claims ofracial discrimination, sexual discrimination and

retaliation, pursuant to title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, against her former

employer and some of her former co-workers. (Compl. at p. 1.) A plaintifflitigating a

Title VII claim in a federal district court is required to exhaust her administrative

remedies. Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v.

General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976)). This includes including

regulatory and judicially imposed exhaustion requirements. Id. The procedural

requirements for Title VII actions are “neither interpreted too technically nor applied too

mechanically.” Id. (citing Ongv. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal

citations omitted).

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Generally, a Title VII complainant must file a complaint with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within one hundred and eight (180)

days ofthe alleged violation. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(1). If a complainant’s charges arise

in a jurisdiction that has a FEP agency, alternative procedures may apply. 29 C.F.R. §

1601.13(a)(3). An FEP agency is “a State or local agency which the Commission has

determined satisfies the criteria stated in section 706(c) oftitle VII.” 29 C.F.R. §

1601.3(a).

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According to Plaintiffs Complaint, all ofthe alleged discriminatory and/or

retaliatory conduct occurred in Atlanta, Georgia. (Compl. at pp. 2-5.) The conduct

discriminatory and/or retaliatory occurred between January or February 2014 and August

2014, with the most recent violation occurring “[a]t or around August 2014.” (Id.) Thus,

all potentially actionable charges occurred in the State of Georgia.

The Court’s review ofthe EEOC website reflects that there is an EEOC office in

Atlanta, and there is no FEP agency with jurisdiction over Plaintiffs charges. Therefore,

Plaintiffwas required to file a complaint with the EEOC office within one hundred and

eighty (180) days of each ofthe alleged violations. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(1). Plaintiffs

Complaint does not indicate whether she had filed a complaint with the EEOC office for

any ofthe alleged violations. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because she

failed to establish that she exhausted all ofher administrative remedies, which is a

prerequisite to her title VII claims. Greenlaw, supra, 59 F.3d at 997 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citations omitted).

Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED. However, the Court grants Plaintiff

leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies noted above.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED

without prejudice for failing to state a claim. Plaintiffis granted thirty (21) days from

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the date ofthis Order to amend her Complaint. IfPlaintiff does not file an amended

complaint, this action shall remain closed without further Order ofthe Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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5 DATED: ///(////i/te

HON. ROefER T. BENITEZ

United States District Court Judge 6

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