Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20190/USCOURTS-cand-5_00-cv-20190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 1 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 

Case No. C 01-20970 JF

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

(JFEX1)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LANE CAMERON MOLLER,

 Petitioner,

 v.

EDWARD ALAMEDA, Warden,

 Respondent.

Case Number C 00-20190 JF

ORDER1 GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

[Re: Docket No. 91]

I. BACKGROUND

On November 29, 1983, pursuant to a plea bargain in which charges involving three other

alleged victims were dismissed, Petitioner Lane Cameron Moller (“Moller”) pled guilty to one

count of genital penetration by a foreign object in violation of California Penal Code § 289(b)

(1983) (amended 2003). In 1989, new complaints surfaced that Moller had molested three fiveyear-old girls. 

On March 23, 1995, Moller was charged with ten counts of lewd and lascivious conduct

upon a child under age fourteen in violation of California Penal Code § 288(a), one count of lewd

and lascivious conduct committed by force or fear in violation of California Penal Code 

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2 People v. Moller, Santa Cruz County Superior Court, Nos. 40-04336, S5-03283,

and 40-1170.

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Case No. C 01-20970 JF

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

(JFEX1)

§ 288(b)(1), and failure to register as a sex offender as required under California Penal Code 

§ 290(f). On July 30, 1996, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and a prison term

between eight and twelve years, Moller pled no contest to four counts of violating California

Penal Code § 288(a). 

After three continuances were granted, Moller’s sentencing date was set for November

22, 1996. On November 15, 1996, Moller again moved to continue sentencing, asserting that he

wished to withdraw his plea based on newly discovered evidence that a purported prior victim

had recanted her testimony and because he was not told during the plea negotiation that his

conviction would subject him to provisions of the Sexually Violent Predator Act, California

Welfare & Institutions Code § 6600, et seq. On November 21, 1996, the state trial court denied

Moller’s motion for a continuance. 

At sentencing on November 22, 1996, Moller again requested a continuance in order to

prepare a motion to withdraw his plea. The trial court instructed counsel to state with more

specificity the grounds for such a motion, but Moller’s counsel said that he was not prepared to

make the motion at that time. The court subsequently sentenced Moller to twelve years in state

prison.2 The court issued a certificate of probable cause granting Moller’s right to appeal the

ruling on the denial of a continuance to file a motion to withdraw the plea and any sentencing

error.

Moller sought direct review on appeal and filed a concurrent state habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal. On April 3, 1998, the appellate court affirmed the conviction and

denied the habeas petition. Moller then sought review in the California Supreme Court, which

denied a petition for review on July 22, 1998 and denied a habeas petition on November 23,

1999. Moller brought another state habeas petition directly before the California Supreme Court,

which petition was denied on December 9, 1999. 

On February 17, 2000, Moller filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus

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Case No. C 01-20970 JF

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

(JFEX1)

by a person in state custody (“petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Moller claims: (1)

ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to move to withdraw Moller’s pleas of no

contest; (2) denial of due process by the trial court’s ruling that California Evidence Code § 1108

would be applied to allow the prosecution to introduce evidence of four prior alleged incidents of

molestation, “thereby coercing [him] into pleading no contest”; (3) denial of due process because

when he entered the no contest plea he was not informed that as a direct consequence of his plea

he would be subject to the recently enacted Sexually Violent Predator Act; (4) denial of due

process because the prosecution withheld evidence that a prior accuser had recanted her

accusations against him, which “would have caused him to reject the plea offers”; (5) denial of

due process because of bias on the part of the trial judge; (6) ineffective assistance of counsel

because counsel failed to move to disqualify the trial judge for bias; (7) denial of due process “by

the prosecution’s suppression of exculpatory evidence of the complaining witnesses’

psychotherapist, Lida Strong, as a material witness and her notes of exculpatory materials”; (8)

denial of due process and the right to a fair trial “by the suppression of exculpatory evidence by

the parents of the complaining witnesses in collusion with the prosecution”; (9) denial of due

process “by the prosecution’s intentional destruction of documentary materials essential to [his]

defense”; and (10) denial of due process “by the prosecution’s suppression of evidence that the

complaining witnesses had been informed of a prior conviction of [his], and were thus primed to

falsely accuse him.” Petition at 6. On June 6, 2000, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which

the Court denied on December 1, 2000. Respondent filed an answer on February 7, 2001, and

Moller filed a traverse on June 8, 2001. 

Moller was released on parole on October 26, 2001. He subsequently was transferred

from the Santa Cruz County State Parole Unit to the Redwood City State Parole Unit (“RCPU”). 

On October 29, 2001, Moller reported to the RCPU and registered as a sex offender. On May 27,

2002, Moller sent a letter to Detective Gary Ramos informing him that he was no longer residing

within the United States, thus ending, in Moller’s opinion, the legal requirement that Moller

register as a sex offender under California Penal Code § 290. On June 9, 2002, an RCPU officer

unsuccessfully attempted to contact Moller at his residence. On June 11, 2002, the same RCPU

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Case No. C 01-20970 JF

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

(JFEX1)

officer received a telephone message from Moller stating that he was no longer residing in the

United States and that he would no longer be in contact with the RCPU. That same day, the

RCPU officer again unsuccessfully attempted to contact Moller at his residence and observed

that the residence appeared vacant. On May 19, 2002, the California Board of Prison Terms

(“BPT”) suspended Moller’s parole, issued a warrant for his arrest, and listed him as a fugitive. 

Moller is still wanted and remains a fugitive. 

On June 28, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss Moller’s petition pursuant to the

fugitive disentitlement doctrine. On August 10, 2005, Moller filed opposition, claiming that the

fugitive disentitlement doctrine is not applicable to federal habeas actions and that, even if the

doctrine applies, dismissal would be an abuse of discretion. On August 12, 2005, Respondent

filed a reply. 

Having considered the briefs and relevant evidence, the Court will grant Respondent’s

motion to dismiss.

II. DISCUSSION

Federal courts “have authority to dismiss an appeal or writ of certiorari if the party

seeking relief is a fugitive while the matter is pending.” Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820,

824 (1996). The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is based on several grounds. “First, so long as

the party cannot be found, the judgment on review may be impossible to enforce.” Id. Second, a

party’s escape “‘disentitles’ him ‘to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his

claims.’” Id. at 824 (citing Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam)). 

Third, “[d]isentitlement ‘discourages the felony of escape and encourages voluntary surrenders,’

and ‘promotes the efficient, dignified operation’ of the courts.” Id. at 824 (citing Estelle v.

Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975) (per curiam)). “Fourth, the adversary character of criminal

litigation may be compromised when the defendant is a fugitive.” Parretti v. United States, 143

F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). While there is no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit

authority on point, four circuit courts and at least three district courts have applied the fugitive

disentitlement doctrine in this context. See Bagwell v. Dretke, 376 F.3d 408, 409 (5th Cir. 2004)

(concluding that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is applicable to a federal habeas petition and

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Case No. C 01-20970 JF

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

(JFEX1)

remanding for determination of whether the doctrine’s underlying justifications supported

dismissal); Dently v. Lane, 720 F.2d 472, 473 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (remanding with

instructions to dismiss the petition as moot for fugitivity); Gonzalez v. Stover, 575 F.2d 827 (10th

Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (holding that since petitioner was a fugitive for failing to report to

sentencing as ordered following his state court conviction for reckless driving, the federal courts

were without power to grant habeas corpus relief); Bailey v. U.S. Commanding Officer of the

Office of Provost Marshal, U.S. Army, 496 F.2d 324 (1st Cir. 1974) (affirming dismissal of

petitioner’s habeas petition because petitioner escaped from military custody and refused to

return); Nelson v. Cozza-Rhodes, No. 05-CV-60128, 2006 WL 83064, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11,

2006) (finding that “federal district courts may dismiss habeas petitions if the petitioner is a

fugitive from justice”); Torres v. New York, 976 F.Supp. 249, 250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

(dismissing petitioner’s petition pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine because

petitioner absconded from parole and failed to respond to court order mailed to his last known

address); Clark v. Dalsheim, 663 F.Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing petition

for writ of habeas corpus where petitioner was a fugitive from parole on a state conviction he

wished to challenge and from arrest warrants on other charges); United States v. Collins, 651

F.Supp. 1177, 1180 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (vacating relief order and reinstating petitioner’s conviction

and sentence once the court learned of petitioner’s fugitive status after the court had already

granted petitioner’s Section 2255 petition). 

Application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is inappropriate under certain

circumstances, for example: (1) if there is an insufficient nexus or connection between the

conviction from which the party has fled and the claim with respect to which disentitlement is

being considered, see, e.g., Degen, 517 U.S. at 826-29 (explaining that a fugitive was not

disentitled from defending against civil forfeiture action when he was a fugitive from a related

criminal prosecution); or (2) if the fugitive is recaptured, see, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez v. United

States, 507 U.S. 234, 251 (1993) (finding that the fugitive status of defendant who fled and was

recaptured lacks the kind of connection to the appellate process warranting dismissal). 

The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is not jurisdictional, but rather discretionary. United

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Case No. C 01-20970 JF

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

(JFEX1)

States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Armentero v.

I.N.S., 412 F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Under this doctrine, appellate courts may, at

their discretion, dismiss an appeal or writ in a criminal matter when the party seeking relief

becomes a fugitive.” (citation and internal quotation omitted)). For example, the Ninth Circuit in

exercising its discretion to dismiss for fugitivity in Antonio-Martinez v. I.N.S., 317 F.3d 1089,

1093 (9th Cir. 2003), held that “[t]hose who invoke our appellate jurisdiction must take the bitter

with the sweet: They cannot ask us to overturn adverse judgments while insulating themselves

from the consequences of an unfavorable result.” 

There is no question that Moller is a fugitive and that there is a substantial connection

between the underlying conviction and parole from which Moller has fled and his instant

petition. Moller was released on parole and reported to the RCPU as a registered sex offender. 

Moller then informed the proper authorities by letter and a telephone message that he was no

longer residing within the United States and that in his opinion he no longer needed to register as

a sex offender under California Penal Code § 290. An RCPU officer twice unsuccessfully

attempted to contact Moller at his residence, and even observed that the residence appeared

vacant. After Moller violated parole, the BPT suspended Moller’s parole, and determined that he

was a fugitive. More than three years later, Moller is still at large. As the Supreme Court has

observed:

We cannot say that the dismissal . . . is not justified by the

abandonment of his case by the plaintiff in the writ. By escaping

from legal custody, he has . . . committed a distinct criminal

offense; and it seems but a light punishment for such an offense to

hold that he has thereby abandoned his right . . . ; otherwise he is

put in a position of saying to the court: ‘Sustain my writ, and I will

surrender myself, and take my chances upon a second trial; deny

me a new trial, and I will leave the state, or forever remain in

hiding.’ We consider this as practically a declaration of the terms

upon which he is willing to surrender, and a contempt of its

authority, to which no court is bound to submit. It is much more

becoming to its dignity that the court should prescribe the

conditions upon which an escaped convict should be permitted to

appear and prosecute his writ than that the latter should dictate the

terms upon which he will consent to surrender himself to its

custody.

Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141 (1897). Because no one knows where Moller is, “his

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3 The Court need not address the merits of a petitioner’s claims if it finds that the

fugitive disentitlement doctrine bars the petition. See Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366 (“No persuasive

reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the

convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant

to the conviction.”); Clark, 663 F.Supp. at 1096 (discussing that courts will typically dismiss a

fugitive’s case before reaching the merits of a fugitive’s claims). The Court notes, however, that

it has considered the merits of Moller’s petition in exercising its discretion. Were the Court to

reach the merits of the petition, it would find that the state appellate court’s rejection of his

claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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Case No. C 01-20970 JF

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

(JFEX1)

petition has the same ‘heads I win, tails you’ll never find me’ quality that justifies 

disentitlement . . . .” Antonio-Martinez, 317 F.3d at 1093. This Court will exercise its discretion

and dismiss Moller’s petition pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.3 See Smith v.

United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876) (“It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal

case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out of the writ, is where he can be made to

respond to any judgment we may render. . . . If we affirm the judgment, he is not likely to appear

to submit to his sentence. If we reverse it and order a new trial, he will appear or not, as he may

consider most for his interest. Under such circumstances, we are not inclined to hear and decide

what may prove to be only a moot case.”).

III. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent’s motion to

dismiss for fugitivity is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 24, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Court

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Case No. C 01-20970 JF

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FUGITIVITY

(JFEX1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Cynthia Lie 

Federal Public Defender’s Office 

160 W Santa Clara St Ste 575 

San Jose, CA 95113 

(408) 291-7753 

Email: cynthia_lie@fd.org 

Barry J. Portman 

Federal Public Defender’s Office 

160 W Santa Clara St Ste 575 

San Jose, CA 95113 

Bill Lockyer, Catherine A. Rivlin, David P. Druliner, Ronald B. Bass 

CA State Attorney General’s Office 

455 Golden Gate Ave, Suite 11000 

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 

Glenn Pruden 

CA State Attorney General's Office 

455 Golden Gate Ave, Suite 11000 

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 

Email: glenn.pruden@doj.ca.gov 

Case 5:00-cv-20190-JF Document 97 Filed 03/24/06 Page 8 of 8