Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00946/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00946-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD RAY JACKSON,

Petitioner, No. 2: 02-cv-0946 FCD KJN P

vs.

TOM CAREY, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 1985 petitioner was convicted of second degree

murder with an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner is serving a sentence of 16

years to life.

In the instant action, petitioner challenges the October 2000 decision by the

California Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) finding him unsuitable for parole. This was

petitioner’s sixth suitability hearing. This action is proceeding on the amended petition filed by

petitioner without counsel on March 30, 2004. (Dkt. No. 10.) Petitioner raises the following

claims: 1) two of the commissioners on the 2000 BPH panel had a conflict of interest;

2) insufficient evidence to support the decision finding petitioner unsuitable; 3) the parole

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authority does not represent a cross-section of the population; 4) the suitability hearing was

untimely.

On June 10, 2005, respondent filed an answer. (Dkt. No. 14.) On July 6, 2005,

petitioner filed a pro se traverse. (Dkt. No. 16.) On December 21, 2007, petitioner’s counsel

filed a supplemental brief. (Dkt. No. 59.) After carefully considering the record, the undersigned

recommends that the petition be denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court defined

the operative review standard in a habeas corpus action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Justice O’Connor’s opinion for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the

court. There is a dichotomy between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the

Supreme Court, and an “unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 405. “Contrary to” clearly

established law applies to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite

that of the Supreme Court on a point of law; or (2) if the state court case is materially

indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is

opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Id. at 407-08. It is this prong of the AEDPA standard of review which directs deference be paid

to state court decisions. While the deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point

is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of

law....[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 410-

11 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

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objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002).

“Clearly established” law is law that has been “squarely addressed” by the United

States Supreme Court. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008). Thus, extrapolations of

settled law to unique situations will not qualify as clearly established. See e.g., Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006) (established law not permitting state sponsored practices to

inject bias into a criminal proceeding by compelling a defendant to wear prison clothing or by

unnecessary showing of uniformed guards does not qualify as clearly established law when

spectators' conduct is the alleged cause of bias injection).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority, in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002). 

Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An unreasonable error is

one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has occurred. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). Moreover, the established Supreme Court authority

reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional principles, or other controlling federal law,

as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules binding only on federal courts. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. at 9.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

When reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a claim, the court “looks

through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234

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F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

A. Insufficient Evidence

In claim two, petitioner alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support the

BPH’s 2000 decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Respondent argues that this claim is

moot because petitioner has had three subsequent parole suitability hearings. Subsequent parole

denials do not render this claim moot. First, petitioner is still in custody as a result of the 2000

decision he challenges in this petition. Second, petitioner's claim challenging the denial of parole

fall within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness. See Hubbart v.

Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that a habeas petition challenging a two-year

commitment under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act “evaded review” because the

duration of the commitment was too short to be fully litigated prior to its expiration). 

Accordingly, respondent’s argument that this claim is moot is without merit.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution prohibits state action that “deprive[s] a person of life, liberty or property without

due process of law.” U .S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. A person alleging a due process violation

must demonstrate that he or she was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and then

show that the procedures attendant upon the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. 

Kentucky Dep't. of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); McQuillion v. Duncan,

306 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due

Process Clause itself or from state laws. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). 

In the context of parole, the United States Constitution does not, in and of itself, create a

protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole date, even one that has been set. Jago v. Van

Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). However, when a state's statutory parole scheme uses

mandatory language, it “‘creates a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when or

unless certain designated findings are made, thereby giving rise to a constitutional liberty

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interest.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S.

1, 12 (1979)).

Under California law, prisoners serving indeterminate prison sentences “may

serve up to life in prison, but they become eligible for parole consideration after serving

minimum terms of confinement.” In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1078, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 

(2005). Generally, one year prior to an inmate's minimum eligible parole release date, the Board

will set a parole release date “in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar

gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 

1202, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 (citing Cal.Penal Code § 3041(a)). A release date will not be set,

however, if the Board determines “that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or

the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration....” Cal.Penal Code § 3041(b).

California state prisoners who have been sentenced to prison with the possibility

of parole have a clearly established, constitutionally protected liberty interest in receipt of a

parole release date. Allen, 482 U.S. at 377-78 (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12); Irons v.

Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006)); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003); McQuillion,

306 F.3d at 903.

In the context of parole proceedings, it is well established that inmates are not

guaranteed the “full panoply of rights” afforded to criminal defendants under the Due Process

Clause. See Pedro v. Or. Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless,

inmates are afforded limited procedural protections. The Supreme Court has held that a parole

board's procedures are constitutionally adequate so long as the inmate is given an opportunity to

be heard and a decision informing him of the reasons he did not qualify for parole. Hayward v.

Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 560 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). As a matter of

state constitutional law, denial of parole to California inmates must be supported by “some

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evidence” demonstrating future dangerousness. Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (citing In re

Rosencrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 128, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 (2002)); see also In re Lawrence, 44

Cal.4th 1181, 1191, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 (2008) (recognizing the denial of parole must be

supported by “some evidence” that an inmate “poses a current risk to public safety”); In re

Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1254, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 (2008) (same). “California's ‘some

evidence’ requirement is a component of the liberty interest created by the parole system of [the]

state,” Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), and compliance with this

evidentiary standard is, therefore, mandated by the federal Due Process Clause. Pearson v.

Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 611 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, a federal court undertaking review of a

“California judicial decision approving the ... decision rejecting parole” must determine whether

the state court's decision “was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some evidence’

requirement, or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence.’” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).

When assessing whether a state parole board's suitability decision was supported

by “some evidence,” the analysis “is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole

suitability determinations in the relevant state.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. The court must

look to California law to determine what findings are necessary to deem a petitioner unsuitable

for parole, and then must review the record to determine whether the state court decision holding

that these findings were supported by “some evidence” or whether it constituted an unreasonable

application of the “some evidence” principle. Id.

Title 15, Section 2402 of the California Code of Regulations sets forth various

factors to be considered by the Board in its parole suitability findings for murderers. The

regulation is designed to guide the Board's assessment regarding whether the inmate poses an

“unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,” and thus whether he or she is

suitable for parole. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1202, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169. The Board is

directed to consider all relevant, reliable information available, including the circumstances of

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the prisoner's: social history; past and present mental state; past criminal history, including

involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other

commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; any conditions of

treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the prisoner's suitability

for release. 15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The regulation also lists several specific circumstances which tend to show

suitability or unsuitability for parole. 15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c)-(d). The overriding concern

is public safety, In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1086, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 (2005), and the

focus is on the inmate's current dangerousness. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1205, 82

Cal.Rptr.3d 169. Thus, under California law, the standard of review is not whether some

evidence supports the reasons cited for denying parole, but whether some evidence indicates that

a parolee's release would unreasonably endanger public safety. In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241,

1254, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 (2008). Therefore, “the circumstances of the commitment offense (or

any of the other factors related to unsuitability) establish unsuitability if, and only if, those

circumstances are probative to the determination that a prisoner remains a danger to the public.”

In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169. In other words, there must be some

rational nexus between the facts relied upon and the ultimate conclusion that the prisoner

continues to be a threat to public safety. Id. at 1227, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169.

The BPH found petitioner unsuitable for parole in 2000 for the following reasons. 

First, the BPH stated that the “number one” reason for finding petitioner unsuitable was the 

gravity of the offense which it characterized as an “extended brutal and violent attack on the

victim...” (Dkt. No. 14-5, p. 47.) The BPH also found that petitioner did not have adequate

parole plans. (Id., p. 48.) The BPH further found that petitioner needed additional therapy to

deal with the causative factors of the offense. (Id., p. 49.) In order to determine whether these

findings were supported by “some evidence,” the undersigned will summarize the testimony and

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 In 2005, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for 1

the Central District of California challenging the 2003 decision by the BPH finding him

unsuitable for parole. See Jackson v. Carey, 2:05-cv-3327 NM E. In that case, petitioner argued

that the 2003 decision finding him unsuitable based on the circumstances of his commitment

offense was not supported by sufficient evidence. The Central District Court found that the BPH

properly relied on the circumstances of the offense to find petitioner unsuitable. Id., Dkt. No. 28,

p. 7 of 12. In 2007, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Central District:

Jackson contends that the California Board of Prison Terms' (the “Board”)

decision to deny him parole violated his due process rights. We disagree because

there was “some evidence” to support the Board's denial of parole, including not

only the gravity of the commitment offense, but also inadequate parole plans and a

failure to adequately participate in self-help programs such as Alcoholics

Anonymous. See Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th

Cir.2006).

Jackson v. Carey, No. 05-56734, 2007 WL 2088279 at * 1 (9th Cir. 2007).

Because the law regarding due process in the parole suitability context has been

recently clarified, the undersigned will consider the merits of petitioner’s claims rather than adopt

the reasoning of the Central District and Ninth Circuit. 

8

evidence from the 200 suitability hearing. 

1

At the beginning of the 2000 hearing, the BPH described petitioner’s crime: 

At 11:45 p.m. on October 24, 1984, Elizabeth Wilson, a resident of 2100 East 99th

Place in the Jordan Downs Housing Project of Los Angeles was awakened by

shouting outside of the residence. She heard Ray Brown, whom she had know[n]

for five years, repeated[ly] yelling, in quote, I’m not going, unquote. She got up

from her bed, went downstairs and looked outside. She saw appellant – in this

case, Mr. Jackson, and Brown, fist fighting but did not see that either man had a

weapon. Wilson went upstairs to get her robe and returned to the front door about

three minutes later. She observed Brown laying on the ground. Jackson was

bending over him, cutting his face. She did not see a knife in Jackson’s hand. 

Wilson said, don’t do that, don’t do that. Jackson looked at her and moved away

from Brown. He pointed a finger at her and said, move that car, in an apparent

reference to Brown’s car. Brown lay motionless on the ground. Wilson returned

to her residence to get her door key and then went to Betsy House’s home. She

asked Mrs. House, the mother of Jackson’s girlfriend, to stop the fight. Mrs.

House sent her son Curtis to walk back to the fight scene with Wilson. Wilson

testified that Jackson was still cutting and kicking Brown when she and Curtis

House reached the scene of the fight. Curtis asked Jackson, can’t you see you’re

killing the man? Jackson stood up and responded quote, he deserved to die,

unquote. He also said that Curtis would, quote, get the same, unquote, if he did

not get away from him. Curtis testified that Jackson was standing over Brown,

holding a knife, when he and Wilson arrived at the scene of the fight. He told

Jackson, look what you have done, the man is dying. Jackson responded, if only

you knew what he’d done. He also said, you deserve to die. You will die too. 

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(Id., pp. 7-9.)

Petitioner told the committee that he did not remember making the statements

quoted above, but it was possible that he made them. (Id., p. 10.) Petitioner stated that he did

not remember making the statements because it had been 16 years and he had been drinking

alcohol and smoking marijuana on the night of the killing. (Id.) Petitioner went on to tell the

committee that on the night of the killing he and Brown, who he had met that day, went to a bar

together. (Id., p. 11.) Brown told petitioner that he wanted to drive his girlfriend home. (Id.) 

Petitioner went with Brown and fell asleep in the car. (Id.) Petitioner told the committee that

when he woke up, Brown had petitioner’s knife and wallet in his hand and was going through

petitioner’s pockets. (Id., pp. 11-12.) The fight then ensued that led to petitioner stabbing

Brown. (Id., p. 11.) Petitioner was able to get the knife away from Brown. (Id.) Petitioner later

told the police that he acted in self-defense. (Id., p. 13.) Petitioner was found guilty after three

trials. (Id., p. 15.) 

At the hearing, petitioner was asked by Commissioner Hepburn if he was trying to

kill Brown:

Commissioner: Were you trying to kill him?

Petitioner: I was kind of scared. You know how it is, when you’re full of alcohol 

and rambling out the mouth and fighting. It was a drunk fight.

Commissioner: Well, I don’t really know how it is, but you accept that that’s

probably true, that you stabbed him?

Petitioner: Oh yes, Sir. 

Commissioner: I mean, if had those injuries, you believe that you inflicted them?

Petitioner: Yes, yes.

Commissioner: All right. Give me one second here, because I’m looking back at

the transcript from ‘99.

Petitioner: Keep in mind now, it was a little knife. A little pocket knife.

(Id., pp. 39-40.) 

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At the conclusion of the hearing the deputy district attorney in attendance asked

petitioner why, if it was self-defense, did he then continue slashing at the victim’s face once the

victim had stopped attacking him, and why he continued stabbing the victim in the chest and

abdomen. (Id., p. 42.) Petitioner answered, “Insanity.” (Id.) When asked if he thought he was

crazy at the time, petitioner answered, “Yes. I mean, from his aggressions and the fight

pursuing, yes.” (Id.) 

The committee later discussed petitioner’s psychological report dated August 16,

2000. A copy of this report is attached as an exhibit to the original petition filed May 2, 2002. 

(Dkt. No. 1.) Dr. Taylor, who performed the psychological evaluation assessed petitioner’s

future dangerousness as follows:

In 1991, it was noted that he had programmed favorably with no disciplinary

write-ups. He was found to “be relatively well adjusted and stable personality

without any manifestations of anger or hostility,” and “There was no evidence of a

potential for violence,” in a report of June 1995. He currently has a classification

score of 0 with a “familiarity with staff” disciplinary note in 1995. He completed

courses in welding (multiple aspects), and has been active in the past such as in

AA and NA, and it was reported that there are a number of laudatory chronos in

his file.

He appears to minimize, to some degree, the intensity of the assault on the victim,

but also voices intentions of better decision making in the future and has been

active in dealing with substance abuse issues. He appears to have adjusted and

performed well while in prison with little evidence of difficulties controlling any

feelings of anger, acting impulsively or aggressively, or resisting custody

regulations and demands.

(Dkt. No. 1, attached exhibits). 

During the hearing, the committee also noted that petitioner had no criminal

record as an adult or juvenile. (Dkt. No. 14-15, p. 17.) 

The committee also discussed petitioner’s prison record, which was favorable. In

particular, petitioner had participated in Alcohol and Narcotics Anonymous programs. (Id., p.

24.) Petitioner had also become a certified welder and participated in legal studies. (Id., pp. 24-

25.) Petitioner had received several laudatory work chronos. (Id., p. 28.) Petitioner had received

only one prison disciplinary while in prison and that was in 1995. (Id., p. 31.) Petitioner also

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had three “very dated” counseling chronos. (Id.) 

The committee told petitioner that its report indicated that he had no clear parole

plans. (Id., p. 32.) Petitioner told the committee that he had been working on his parole plans

since 1998. (Id.) Petitioner gave the committee a copy of his form requesting that his county of

parole be transferred to a different county. (Id., pp. 32-33.) Petitioner told the committee that he

had not yet received a response to the request. (Id., p. 33.) This request was dated August 7,

2000. (Id., p. 34.) The committee also noted that petitioner had no letters of support from family

members in Richmond, where he wanted his parole transferred. (Id., p. 35.) Petitioner told the

committee that his family had written letters in support of his 1998 suitability hearing. (Id., p.

36.) The committee told petitioner that each time he had a hearing, he had to have new letters of

support. (Id.) 

The undersigned first considers whether “some evidence” supported the BPH’s

finding that petitioner required additional therapy to deal with the “causative factors” of the case. 

(Dkt. No. 14-5, p. 49.) In making this finding, the committee went on to state that, 

Mr. Jackson, I think the Panel believes that you’re still having difficulty coming to

terms with the facts of the case, at least as they are known and as they are written

in the appellate decision. And certainly what the – what the jury concluded

occurred in this case, because they did find you guilty of murder, and that is

inconsistent with your version of what occurred. And hopefully, you’ll be able to

develop additional insight into the factors that caused this incident.

(Id.)

In essence, the BPH found petitioner unsuitable because he minimized the

circumstances of the offense. The 2000 psychological report made this finding which was also

reflected in petitioner’s testimony at the hearing. While petitioner admitted stabbing Brown, he

told the BPH that he only used a “little pocket knife.” Petitioner’s statement that the fight was

caused by his drinking and that it was a “drunk fight” also minimized his involvement. 

The BPH cannot require petitioner to admit guilt in order to be found suitable for

parole. Cal.Penal Code § 5011(b); 15 Cal Code Regs. § 2236. However, the BPH must consider

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his “past and present attitude toward the crime” and any lack of remorse or understanding of the

nature and magnitude of the offense (15 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 2402(b), 2402(d)(3). 

 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(d)(3)). See In re McClendon, 113 Cal.App.4th 315, 322, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d

278 (2003); see also In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1261 n. 20, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 (2008)

(“petitioner's failure to take full responsibility for past violence, and his lack of insight into his

behavior, establish that the circumstances of petitioner's crime and violent background continue

to be probative to the issue of his current dangerousness.”) “Lack of insight” is probative of

unsuitability only to the extent that it is both (1) demonstrably shown by the record and 

(2) rationally indicative of the inmate’s current dangerousness. In re Calderon, 184 Cal.App.4th

670 690, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 229 (2010). 

Petitioner’s comments to the BPH at the hearing, as well as the psychological

report, demonstrated a lack of understanding of the magnitude of the offense. In addition,

petitioner’s lack of insight, as demonstrated by his minimizing his involvement, is rationally

indicative of his current dangerousness. Petitioner’s lack of insight is directly related to his

conduct during the offense. Accordingly, the finding that petitioner required additional therapy

to address this lack of insight was supported by some evidence. 

The BPH also relied on the circumstances of the 16 year-old-offense to find

petitioner unsuitable. In its decision, the BPH stated, 

And the number one reason was the gravity of the commitment offense, which the

Panel finds was an extended brutal and violent attack on the victim in this

particular case. And these conclusions are drawn from the Statement of Facts,

wherein the prisoner had a knife and according to him, he was intoxicated at the

time, and he attacked the victim, according to the Statement of Facts. And he

repeatedly slashed and stabbed the victim, resulting in extensive injuries,

including four deep stab wounds to the victim’s upper torso, resulting in the

victim’s death. And this occurred over an extended period of time because

witnesses yelled at him to stop, and he continued doing what he was doing and

witnesses approached him while all this was going on. And they did testify that it

was continued over a period of time.

(Dkt. No. 14-15, pp. 47-48.)

The reliance on the circumstances of the offense was not improper because

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petitioner’s continued lack of insight regarding his participation in the offense indicated that the

violent nature of the offense was still probative of the risk he posed to public safety. 

Finally, the BPH found petitioner unsuitable because he did not have adequate

plans for release. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(8) (realistic plans for release tends to

show suitability). In particular, the BPH found that petitioner had not properly completed the

parole transfer process and did not have updated letters of support from his family. This finding

was supported by some evidence. 

For the reasons discussed above, some evidence supported the 2000 decision by

the BPH finding petitioner unsuitable parole. After conducting an AEDPA review, the

undersigned recommends that this claim be denied. 

In support of claim two, petitioner also argues that he was not provided with onethird time credits to reduce his sentence. Petitioner makes no other argument in support of this

claim. In any event, for the following reasons, petitioner is not entitled to earn credits at this time

for the reasons stated herein:

To fully appreciate the limitations of Petitioner's credit-earning capacity as a life

prisoner as it relates to the term of his incarceration, it is necessary to examine

how California's parole system for life prisoners interacts with a life prisoner's

credit-earning potential. A life prisoner's “Minimum Eligible Parole Date,” or

“MEPD,” is the “earliest date on which an Indeterminate Sentence Law or life

prisoner may be legally released on parole.” See Cal.Code Regs., titl. 15, § 3000;

see also Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2000(b)(67). The CDCR determines the MEPD.

See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2400. Conversely, “[t]he length of time a prisoner

must serve prior to actual release on parole is determined by the [BPH].” Id.

California law provides that, one year prior to a prisoner's MEPD, a BPH panel

shall meet with the prisoner and shall set a release date “unless it determines that

the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity

of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual,

and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” Cal.Penal Code

§ 3041(a). Thus, the prisoner's MEPD is the basis for the timing of the initial

suitability hearing.

Following a parole denial, the BPH “shall hear each case annually thereafter,”

except that the BPH may schedule a subsequent hearing up to five years “after any

hearing at which parole is denied” if the prisoner has been convicted of murder

and the BPH finds “that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted

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at a hearing during the following years and states the bases for the finding in

writing.” Cal.Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2).

Following a finding of parole suitability for an inmate convicted of a murder

committed on or after November 8, 1978, the BPH sets a base term “established

solely on the gravity of the base crime, taking into account all of the

circumstances of that crime.” Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2403(a). The BPH sets a

base term by taking into account the “matrix” of suggested base terms,

circumstances in aggravation and mitigation, and adjustments for enhancements

or other offenses. See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2403-2411. However, the BPH

may impose a base term other than one provided in the matrix “if justified by the

particular facts of the individual case....” Id. Once a base term is set, the BPH may

consider awarding post-conviction credit to reduce the base term, up to four

months for each year served, depending on the prisoner's performance,

participation, and behavior while in prison. See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, §

2400-2410.

California Penal Code § 190(a) mandates the application of good behavior credits

by the CDCR against the minimum term for first degree murder, i.e., twenty-five

years, that is imposed by statute for purposes of establishing the MEPD. In re

Dayan, 231 Cal.App.3d 184, 188, 282 Cal.Rptr. 269 (1991). However, nothing in

the statute requires the BPH, or CDCR, to reapply those same credits to the actual

term it eventually sets for Petitioner's sentence if, and when, it determines that

Petitioner is eligible for parole. Id.; see also Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2400 (“The

[Department of Correction and Rehabilitation's] decisions pursuant to Penal Code

§§ 2930 et seq. do not affect the [BPH's] decision concerning post-conviction

credit pursuant to these rules.”). Thus, in theory, if a prisoner were determined to

be parole eligible at the earliest possible time, credits might be of some use in

actually reducing the amount of time a prisoner served before his initial parole

suitability hearing was set. See People v. Rowland, 134 Cal.App.3d 1, 13-14, 184

Cal.Rptr. 346 (1982). However, the question of Petitioner's actual release on

parole will be determined only by the BPH, and no matter how much time

Petitioner has served, he will not be released until he has been found suitable for

parole. Cal. Pen.Code § 3041(b); Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(a).

Burton v. Adams, No. 1: 09-cv-0354 JLT HC, 2010 WL 703182 at *5-6 (E. D. Cal. 2010).

Petitioner is not entitled to earn time credits at this time because he has already

passed his MEPD date. Once petitioner is found suitable for parole, the credits may reduce the

amount of time he must serve. Because petitioner has not been found suitable for parole, a claim

by petitioner that he is entitled to these credits is not ripe.

Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to earn time credits is without merit. After

conducting an AEDPA review, the undersigned recommends that this claim be denied.

//// 

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B Conflict of Interest

In claim one, petitioner alleges that two of the BPH members who attended the

2000 hearing, Commissioners Hepburn and Ortega, had a conflict of interest because they had

previously denied his appeal of the 1999 BPH decision finding him unsuitable. Respondent

argues that this claim is moot because petitioner has had three subsequent parole hearings. The

instant claim is not moot for the same reasons that petitioner’s claim challenging the sufficiency

of the evidence is not moot.

In essence, petitioner is arguing that Commissioners Hepburn and Ortega were

biased against him based on their participation in his appeal of the 1999 decision. Although

petitioner has a due process right to parole consideration by a neutral, impartial decision-maker,

his claim of bias must be supported by the record. See O'Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422

(9th Cir. 1990) (an inmate is “entitled to have his release date considered by a Board that [is] free

from bias or prejudice”); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) ( “[c]onclusory

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief.”). 

That Commissioners Hepburn and Ortega participated in petitioner’s appeal of an

earlier BPH decision did not automatically render them biased at the 2000 hearing. Nothing in

the record demonstrates that Commissioners Hepburn and Ortega were biased at the 2000

hearing. See Bettencourt v. Knowles, 2009 WL 4755403, *17-18 (E.D.Cal. 2009) (unpublished)

(holding where petitioner has offered no evidence to support claim of parole bias his claim

should be denied). The BPH’s decision in this case was thorough and factually specific. 

After conducting an AEDPA review, the undersigned recommends that this claim

be denied.

C. Cross Section/No Parole Policy

In claim three, petitioner alleges that he was denied parole pursuant to former

Governor Davis’ “no parole” policy. He also alleges that the members of the BPH do not reflect

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a cross-section of the population. Petitioner argues that the BPH is made up of former police

officers.

Regarding petitioner’s claim that he was found unsuitable pursuant to former

Governor Davis’ “no parole policy,” the record indicates that petitioner has had at least one

parole suitability hearing since Governor Davis left office. Petitioner does not claim that the

BPH has operated under a no-parole policy for life prisoners since Governor Davis left office. 

Therefore, petitioner has already received all the relief he would be entitled with respect to this

claim: a new parole hearing before a BPH panel that does not apply the no-parole policy

allegedly followed while Governor Davis was in office. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

relief as to this claim. 

Petitioner also alleges that the members of the BPH do not reflect a cross-section

of the general population. In essence, petitioner is alleging that the BPH is made up of biased

members. Respondent argues that this claim is moot because petitioner has had three subsequent

parole hearings. The instant claim is not moot for the same reasons that petitioner’s claim

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is not moot.

As stated above, petitioner has a constitutional right to decision makers who are

unbiased. See O'Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir.1990). However, in support of the

instant claim petitioner does not allege that any of the BPH members at the 2000 hearing were

biased against him. The fact that the “cross-section of community” which petitioner desires has

not evidently been the source of selection for parole commissioners does not implicate a federal

constitutional claim for biased decision makers.

After conducting an AEDPA review, the undersigned recommends that this claim

be denied.

D. Untimely Hearing

Petitioner argues that the 2000 hearing was untimely. In particular, petitioner

argues that the 2000 hearing was held six months later than it was supposed to have been held. 

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Respondent argues that this claim is moot because petitioner has had three

subsequent parole hearings. The remedy for the BPH’s failure to hold a timely parole hearing is

for the court to order a parole hearing. Because petitioner has received at least three parole

hearings since the 2000 hearing, the instant claim is moot.

Moreover, to demonstrate that the six month delay in his receipt of his parole

hearing violated due process, petitioner must demonstrate that the delay was unreasonable and

prejudicial. Hopper v. United States Parole Comm’n., 702 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1983). 

“However, due process ‘does not include receiving a parole hearing in exact accordance with the

specific time period required by [state regulations.]” Johnson v. Paparozzi, 219 F.Supp.2d 635,

652 (D.N.J. 2002). The denial of a timely parole proceeding is not a per se violation due process. 

Jefferson v. Hart, 84 F.3d 1314, 1316-17 (10th Cir. 1996). To show a due process violation from

a delayed hearing, a prisoner must show prejudice from the delay. Cf. Camacho v. White, 918

F.2d 74, 78-80 (9th Cir. 1990). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the six month delay in

his receipt of the 2000 suitability hearing was prejudicial.

After conducting an AEDPA review, the undersigned recommends that this claim

be denied.

Conclusion

The undersigned recommends that petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas

corpus be denied. If petitioner files objections, he shall also address whether a certificate of

appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to which issues. A certificate of appealability

may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 12, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

jackson.hab

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