Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05695/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05695-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

JIM HAMLET, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

1:03–cv-5695 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS FOLLOWING REMAND

FROM NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF

APPEALS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 27, 2003. 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on September 23, 2003, and Petitioner filed a traverse

on November 17, 2003. (Court Docs. 7, 10.) On December 6, 2004, the Court appointed the

Office of the Federal Defender to represent Petitioner, and directed supplemental briefing in light

of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). (Court Doc.

12.) Respondent filed a supplement on January 3, 2005, and Petitioner filed his supplemental

brief on March 3, 2005. (Court Docs. 15, 19.) On July 26, 2005, the Court issued a Findings and

Recommendation recommending that the petition be granted as to Petitioner’s Crawford claim,

and denied with respect to all other claims. (Court Doc. 21.) After filing of objections, the

Recommendation was adopted in full on November 16, 2005, and the petition was granted in part

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 The Court incorporates the statement of facts as set forth in the prior Findings and Recommendation, 1

issued July 26, 2005. (Court Doc. 21.)

2

and denied in part. (Court Doc. 25.) 

Respondent filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 2005. (Court Doc. 26.) On April 3,

2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in light of the Supreme Court’s

opinion Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007), which overruled its prior opinion in

Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9 Cir. 2005), holding that the Crawford rule does not apply th

retroactively to cases, such as the instant one, that are on collateral review. (Court Doc. 34,

Unpublished Opinion, at 2.) The case was remanded for reconsideration of the claim applying

pre-Crawford principles. (Id.) 

On January 4, 2008, the Court issued an order informing the parties that further briefing

was not necessary, as the petition was fully briefed on the merits applying pre-Crawford

principles. (Court Doc. 35.) 

At the outset the Court clarifies that the instant recommendation is limited to re-analyzing

Petitioner’s second claim regarding the admission of Parraz’s statement of Petitioner’s threat, as

all the other claims were denied on the merits, and remain final rulings as no appeal was taken as

to those issues. (See Unpublished Opinion, at 1.) 

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

Trial Testimony

Captain Michael Weger, an investigator with the California Department of Forestry and

Fire Protection and Tulare County Fire Department, testified that he investigated a fire at 24565

Avenue 82 near Terra Bella in Tulare County. (RT 341-343.) There were two residences on the

property that had been burnt to the ground and an unattached garage sustained major damage. 

(RT 343.) Mr. Weger concluded that the fire in the two residences was caused by arson because

there were multiple points of origin, none near any potential causes for an accidental fire, such as

electrical wiring or a gas outlet. (RT 350.) It was not possible to determine if there was

evidence, such as a pour pattern, of use of an accelerant to start the fire. (RT 410.) Mr. Weger

concluded that the fire in the garage started because it was near the burning residences. (RT 352-

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

353.) 

It was concluded that the fire in the other residence began where a flammable liquid had

been poured on the floor. (RT 354.) A plastic gasoline can was found nearby. (RT 355.) Mr.

Weger was of the opinion that the fire was started by arson. (RT 362.)

There were two vehicles on the premises registered to Jesse Parraz and mail addressed to

him was found in the mailbox. (RT 360-361.) 

On August 13, 1999, Mr. Weger was requested by the Visalia Police Department to

investigate a fire bombing at Petitioner’s family residence. (RT 363-364.) A pipe bomb was

discovered on the floor of the residence. (RT 364.) Petitioner told Mr. Weger that he had

cheated Jesse Parraz in a drug deal, and that Parraz told him to burn down his home so he could

get the insurance money, and Parraz had hired someone to burn Petitioner’s home to retaliate

against him if he did not burn Parraz’s house. (RT 365-367.) Later that day, Mr. Weger received

a phone call from Detective Lopez indicating that Parraz was in custody for selling

methamphetamine and that Parraz stole drugs from Petitioner, and that Parraz thought that

Petitioner burned Parraz’s house. Detective Lopez advised Weger to cease the investigation of

insurance fraud. (RT 387-392.)

Monica Rivera, Jesse Parraz’s wife, testified that she married Jesse in 1999, and resided

at the home that was burned on August 12, 1999. The night it was burned she and her family

stayed at a motel because she had a doctor’s appointment the next morning. (RT 418-419.) She

testified that she had never been threatened or warned to stay away from her house. (RT 418-

419.) Ms. Rivera met Petitioner through her husband and regarded him as a friend. (RT 420.) 

She indicated that she talked to Petitioner approximately twice a week. (RT 441.) Although

Ms. Rivera spoke with Petitioner the day before the fire occurred, she could not recall the

contents of that conversation. (RT 422.) 

Subsequent to the fire, Ms. Rivera and Jesse Parraz were arrested in Visalia by Detective

Corey Sumpter. (RT 426.) Police found a quarter pound of “dope” during the search. (RT 449-

450.) 

Ms. Rivera admitted telling Detective Sumpter that Jesse told her Petitioner had warned

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

them to stay away from the house the night of the fire. (RT 427.) She admitted that was one of

the reasons why they stayed in a motel that night. (RT 428.) She testified that Petitioner said he

was sorry, but she could not remember if Petitioner told her he caused the fire and at trial she did

not believe he had. (RT 430-433.) 

Ms. Rivera was aware that methamphetamine was being manufactured in the smaller

residence at her home; however, she never observed it. (RT 450-452.) Jesse and Petitioner were

partners in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. (RT 467.)

Jesse told Rivera that he did not plant the pipe bomb at Petitioner’s residence. However,

Jesse told her that he had been arrested for it, along with Gaby (later identified as Gabriel

Alvarez) and Jose (later identified as Jose Mendez). (RT 446-447, 580.) Jesse told her that he

stole ten pounds of methamphetamine from Petitioner because he owed him money. (RT 445,

458-459.) 

After Rivera was released from jail she talked to Detective Lopez about trying to locate a

boxed methamphetamine laboratory, which was owned by Petitioner. (RT 465-466.) 

Detective Sumpter, of the Visalia Police Department, arrested both Parraz and Rivera for

selling methamphetamine on August 12, 1999. (RT 478.) Sumpter testified that Rivera told him

that Petitioner had burned her house and had warned her that it would be burned. (RT 478-482.)

Parraz told Sumpter that he worked with Petitioner manufacturing methamphetamine and

that he supplied Petitioner with chemicals in exchange for methamphetamine and money. 

Petitioner owed Parraz $24,000, and the two had a falling out because Petitioner failed to pay the

money. (RT 528-529.) Jose and Gaby also supplied Petitioner with pseudoephedrine. (RT 531.) 

Parraz told Sumpter that he had stolen the quarter pound of methamphetamine found in

his possession at the time of his arrest from Petitioner. (RT 528.) Parraz admitted that on

August 10, 1999, he, along with Jose and Gaby, stole several pounds of methamphetamine from

Lauro Haro’s residence, who was storing the methamphetamine for Petitioner. (RT 530-531.) 

Parraz claimed that Petitioner was angry because he had taken his methamphetamine. 

Petitioner told Parraz that he would burn his house. (RT 533-534.) After the house was burned,

Petitioner admitted to Parraz that he had done it in retaliation and Parraz said he would burn his

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

house in return. (RT 535-536.) 

Parraz had previously worked with the Visalia Police Department as an informant. (RT

487.) As a result of this drug transaction, multiple individuals were arrested. (RT 516.) 

Detective Mark Lopez, with the Visalia Police Department, executed a search warrant on

September 1, 1999, at the Porterville apartment Petitioner occupied with his girlfriend. (RT

548.) Several items were seized including pay/owe sheets, plastic wrap, a receipt for denatured

alcohol, a list of phone numbers and names, a card describing MSM which is a diluting agent,

and a bag of creatine which is a cutting agent. (RT 548-566.) All of which are consistent with

the manufacturing of methamphetamine. (Id.) 

While Detective Lopez was at the residence, Petitioner’s cell phone rang and pursuant to

the search warrant Lopez answered it pretending to be Petitioner. (RT 568.) The other party

identified himself as “Contratista” (later identified as Alfredo Corpus) and offered to provide 

Petitioner with 40 nectarines. (RT 569.) A meeting was set up. (Id.) As Detective Lopez

believed the caller was speaking in code terms, Petitioner acknowledged the transaction was

about “bud.” (RT 572.) After several more phone calls Lopez met Corpus in the parking lot of a

Shell station where Corpus appeared with pseudoephedrine tablets in his vehicle and he was

arrested. (RT 576-578.)

One of the phone numbers contained in the phone list obtained from Petitioner’s bedroom

at his girlfriend’s apartment belonged to Gabriel Alvarez. Police located Alvarez, who told

Detective Lopez that he was involved in manufacturing methamphetamine and supplying

chemicals. Alvarez said that he, Parraz and a third individual stole nine pounds of

methamphetamine from Petitioner that was stashed at Haro’s house. (RT 580.) 

On September 1, 1999, Lopez interviewed Petitioner at the Visalia Police Department. A

videotaped statement of the interview was shown to the jury. (RT 603, 604, 614, 802.) 

On September 2, 1999, Lopez went to Haro’s house in Tonyville and obtained his consent

to search the residence. Haro admitted that he held methamphetamine for Petitioner. Haro

admitted that Parraz, Gaby and Jose had taken 8-10 pounds of methamphetamine from him at

gunpoint. (RT 581-583.) 

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

On September 1, 2000, Petitioner was interviewed by Detective Lopez at the Visalia

Police Department, Petitioner was advised and waived his Miranda rights. (CT 436.) 

Petitioner admitted that he knew people who sold ephedrine. (CT 442.) Petitioner

indicated that Alfredo Corpus was bringing ephedrine to him, and that he was going to give it to

somebody else or put Corpus together with another person. (CT 444.)

Petitioner introduced Parraz to Ruben Ventura, and Parraz stole $20,000 from Ventura. 

(CT 458.) The night before Parraz’s house burned, Petitioner took Ventura to Parraz’s home and

he believed Ventura was going to steal from the home. (CT 462-462, 467.) Petitioner told

Rivera not to go to her house. (CT 471.) Petitioner believed that Ventura burned Parraz’s house

to send a message that Ventura wanted his money back. (CT 484.) 

Petitioner told Detective Lopez that he knew the pipe bomb came from Parraz. (CT 442.) 

Petitioner believed that a methamphetamine user from Visalia made the bomb. (CT 559.) 

Petitioner said he would kill Parraz if he could, and that he would get to Parraz in prison. (CT

491.) 

Petitioner admitted that he lied when he told Officer Camacho that Parraz’s home was

burned for insurance purposes. (CT 499.)

Petitioner claimed to owe Parraz $2,000 for a BMW automobile. (CT 505.) 

Petitioner told Lopez that the night before Parraz’s house burned, he and Parraz were

supposed to meet at a Taco Bell at Mary’s Vineyard. When Parraz did not arrive, Petitioner

phoned Ventura and the other men who were at Parraz’s house and told them to burn it. (CT

592.) 

Petitioner acknowledged Lauro Haro’s house was used as a “stash” house. He

acknowledged the theft of methamphetamine occurred the day before Parraz’s house burned. 

(CT 638.) Approximately ten pounds of methamphetamine were taken. (CT 640.) Lauro told

Petitioner that Parraz, Gaby and Jose, took it. (CT 644.) Petitioner claimed the X-Men, who

cooked the methamphetamine, owned it. (CT 652-653.)

Petitioner told Detective Lopez that Parraz admitted to stealing the methamphetamine and

had agreed to return it to him at a meeting at Taco Bell. (CT 659.) When Parraz did not show

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

up, the X-men burned Parraz’s house. (CT 664.)

Petitioner admitted that he sold dope because it was easy money. (CT 668.)

Officer Gerdes, of the Visalia Police Department, testified that he assisted in the search of

Petitioner’s girlfriend’s apartment in Porterville and arrest of Mr. Corpus. He recovered a paper

from Corpus’s wallet with Petitioner’s phone number on it, and found several hundred loose

tablets and bottles of pseudoephedrine. (RT 620-628.) He indicated that pseudoephedrine is a

nasal decongestant that can be mixed with denatured alcohol and heated in order to extract

ephedrine, as part of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine. (RT 629-634.)

Lauro Haro, testified that he met Petitioner in August of 1999, and indicated that

Petitioner asked him to store methamphetamine. (RT 647, 688.) Haro picked up a quantity of

methamphetamine from a residence in Terra Bella and took it to his residence in Lindsay and

stored it. (RT 648.) Petitioner gave Haro a pound of methamphetamine in return for his service. 

(RT 649.) A couple weeks before September 2, 1999, three other men came to his house, and

took the methamphetamine at gunpoint. (RT 651-657.) Haro told Petitioner that his friends had

taken the methamphetamine. (RT 658.)

Mark Kalchik, a criminalist for the California Department of Justice, examined the tablets

found in Corpus’s vehicle and confirmed that they contained pseudoephedrine. (RT 788, 794.)

Officer Jerry Diaz, of the Woodlake Police Department, assisted in the search of

Petitioner’s family residence in Woodlake, where he confiscated more pay/owe sheets, lye, and a

breathing apparatus. (RT 804-806.) 

Ann Kromberg, of the Drug Enforcement Agency, testified that it is illegal to sell more

than 30 grams of pseudoephedrine. (RT 834.) Kromberg arranged for the subpoena of telephone

records and residences of Gaby and Jose. Gaby was interviewed on September 23, 1999, and

Jose was interviewed on September 28, 1999. (RT 856.) Jose told Kromberg that he supplied

chemicals to manufacture methamphetamine. (RT 838, 845.) She testified that the method of

manufacture used in this case was called the Mexican cook or pseudoephedrine red phosphorus

method. (RT 853.) 

///

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Parraz’s Out of Court Statements Regarding Petitioner’s Threat

Petitioner contends that the admission of Parraz’s out of court statement that Petitioner

threatened to burn down Parraz’s house was inadmissible hearsay. Petitioner further contends

that Parraz’s out of court statements implicating him in the manufacture and sale of

methamphetamine, were improperly admitted and constituted prejudicial error. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against

him.” U.S. Const. am. VI. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Supreme Court set forth

the requirements for admission of a hearsay statement in a criminal trial when the declarant is

unavailable, consistent with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. The Court explained

that such a statement “is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’” Id. at 66;

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). Adequate reliability, the Court

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 California Evidence Code, section 1370 states: 2

(a) Evidence of a statement by a declarant is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if

all of the following conditions are met:

(1) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain the infliction or threat of

physical injury upon the declarant.

(2) The declarant is unavailable as a witness pursuant to section 240.

(3) The statement was made at or near the time of the infliction or threat of physical

injury. Evidence of statements made more than five years before the filing of the current action or

proceeding shall be inadmissible under this section.

(4) The statement was made under circumstances that would indicate its trustworthiness.

(5) The Statement was made in writing, was electronically recorded, or made to a

physician, nurse, paramedic, or to a law enforcement official.

10

continued, can be demonstrated in one of two ways. First, “[r]eliability can be inferred without

more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Id. Second, if

the evidence does not fall within a firmly rooted exception, it may be admitted if there is a

sufficient “showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id.; Hernandez, 282 F.3d at

1137. 

The determination of whether Parraz’s statement was “sufficiently reliable to be admitted

without violating [Roberts] is a mixed question” of law and fact. Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373,

1379 (9 Cir. 1993). Reliability may be “inferred without more” where the statements fall th

within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815 (1990). Reliability

is to be judged by a review of the totality of the circumstances that “surround the making of the

statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.” Id. at 820. California

Evidence Code section 1370 limits admittance of hearsay statements to “circumstances that

would indicate its truthworthiness.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1370, subd. (4).

2

On collateral review, this Court’s review is limited to whether the state courts’

adjudication of this claim “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

and California Supreme Court. Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

nature, however, this Court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning

of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991)

(establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower

court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson,

217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court

th

opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

Prior to trial, Mr. Parraz invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify and incriminate

himself at Petitioner’s trial. (RT 99.) The court found that Mr. Parraz was unavailable within

the meaning of the Evidence Code. (Id.) The court allowed the statements by Parraz to come in

through the Detectives that interviewed him. Specifically, the court ruled that Parraz’s statement

that Petitioner had threatened to burn Parraz’s house was admissible as a threat of injury. (CT

266-268; RT 19, 238-240.) 

The Fifth District Court of Appeal properly found that Parraz was unavailable as a

witness because he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. The Court of Appeal’s

findings of facts are not unreasonable in light of the evidence in the record. The Court of Appeal

found that the threat was issued on or about August 11, and the fire took place over the night of

the 11 through 12 . (RT 534.) Parraz’s statement of the threat was recorded by Detective th th

Sumpter who testified to the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement. (RT 527-

537.) The reliability of Parraz’s statement is strengthened by the fact that it was reported

relatively soon after they were made, and as found by the state court before Parraz knew that his

house had actually been burned. The fire took place when Parraz was not at home because he

was taking part in a drug deal with an undercover police officer, for which he was arrested on the

12 . (RT 434.) As Detective Sumpter testified, [Parraz] indicated that [Petitioner] had th

threatened him that he was gonna burn his house down. Told him that essentially watch your

back. With this [Parraz] knew that his house was going to be burnt down on the night of the 11 ,

th

and that was why he had taken his wife to the Motel 6 in Tulare and had spent the night there.”

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Court of Appeal specifically noted that Petitioner conceded “that the ‘threat’ exception to the bar on 3

hearsay has been sufficiently likened to the exception allowing admission of spontaneous utterances, a firmly rooted

exception to the bar on hearsay, so that the admission of testimony under this statutes does not necessary violate the

confrontation clause.” (quoting People v. Hernandez, 71 Cal.App.4th 417, 423-424 (1991).) (Exhibit D, Opinion, at

13.) 

12

(RT 534.) In terms of trustworthiness and reliability, Parraz’s account of Petitioner’s threat was

corroborated by Petitioner’s “own admission to police that he told Ventura to burn down Parraz’s

home, as well as Rivera’s report of [Petitioner’s] threat and Haro’s testimony that [Petitioner]

was angry at Parraz for the theft of drugs.” (Exhibit D, Opinion, at 15.) The mere fact that

Petitioner was being arrested for selling methamphetamine to an undercover agent the day the

threats were reported does call into doubt the reliability of such statement. As stated by the Court

of Appeal, “[t]he fact that Parraz reported [Petitioner’s] threats to police when he confessed to

participation in an array of drug manufacturing, dealing, and theft supports the credibility of his

account, as he apparently decided to come clean on matters related to his drug operation.” 

(Exhibit D, Opinion, at 15.) Based on these circumstances, the state court’s findings of facts are

not unreasonable. 

Nor is the Court of Appeal’s decision contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court authority. Applying the clearly established pre-Crawford law as explained supra,

Parraz was unavailable as a witness and the statements under California Evidence Code 1370 are

akin to the firmly rooted spontaneous utterance hearsay exception and not necessarily

inadmissible. In any event, as explained above, the statements contained particularized 3

guarantees of trustworthiness. Because the Court of Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to or

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court nor an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented, the Court need not and does not address the alternative harmless

error analysis, and the instant claim should be denied. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in admitting Parraz’s statement

regarding his threat of arson be DENIED; and

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

2. The Clerk of Court enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 24, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-05695-OWW -DLB Document 36 Filed 03/25/08 Page 13 of 13