Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04146/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04146-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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Zhao’s “Motion for Permission to Appear by Telephone at Plaintiff’s Motion for

Attorneys Fees and Costs on June 29, 2007" is DENIED as moot.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KOON CHUN HING KEE SOY & SAUCE

FACTORY, LTD.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

EASTIMPEX, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C 04-4146 MMC

ORDER VACATING JUNE 29, 2007

HEARING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR FEES AND COSTS; DENYING AS

MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

APPEAR BY TELEPHONE; SETTING

FURTHER BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Before the Court is plaintiff’s “Motion Re: Proof of Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Fees and

Costs,” filed May 22, 2007. Defendants L.A. Victory, Inc. and Joe P. Zhao (collectively,

“Zhao”) have filed opposition, to which plaintiff has replied. Having reviewed the papers

filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court finds, for the reasons set forth

below, that supplemental briefing is necessary and, accordingly VACATES the hearing

scheduled for June 29, 2007 and sets a further briefing schedule.1

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $774,019.33 and costs in

the amount of $105,008.98, for a total award of $879,028.31. Plaintiff further seeks an

award directing that such total award be entered against Zhao and defendant America

Food International Corp. (“AFIC”), jointly and severally.

Case 3:04-cv-04146-MMC Document 239 Filed 06/26/07 Page 1 of 4
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Similarly, with respect to AFIC, plaintiff cites no authority to support its argument

that AFIC is liable for the entirety of the fees and costs incurred, for example, that AFIC is

liable for the fees and costs plaintiff incurred to prosecute its claims against Zhao at trial.

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As Zhao points out in his opposition, plaintiff has not attempted to apportion the total

fees and costs it incurred in connection with the instant litigation. Specifically, plaintiff has

not identified the portion of those fees and costs that were incurred to prosecute its claims

against Zhao, as distinguished from the portion of those fees and costs it incurred to

prosecute its claims against the other defendants, namely, AFIC, Eastimpex, EBJ

Wholesale Corporation, Well Luck Co., Inc., Super Luck Co., Inc. and Giant Union

Company, Inc. Plaintiff, in its reply, does not directly address Zhao’s argument, although

plaintiff appears to assert that Zhao is jointly and severally liable for all fees and costs

incurred, irrespective of whether the fees and costs were incurred with respect to plaintiff’s

claims against Zhao. Plaintiff cites no authority for such proposition, and the Court has

found none.

Although there may exist certain expenditures that are fairly attributable to the

claims against all defendants, for example, the filing fee, there exist other fees and costs

not properly attributable to plaintiff’s claims against Zhao. To take but two examples,

plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees incurred to prepare and file a court document

“requesting that the settlement deadline be extended to June 24 [2005] due to Giant

Union’s delay in executing that Settlement Agreement,” (see Gorelnik Decl., filed May 21,

2007, Ex. C at 20), and fees incurred to prepare and file a motion for default judgment

against AFIC, (see id. Ex. C at 30). Plaintiff cites no reason why such fees can be said to

have been incurred to prosecute plaintiff’s claims against Zhao, and no reason is

apparent.2

Consequently, the Court agrees with Zhao that plaintiff must provide an

apportionment between the amount of the fees and costs incurred to prosecute its claims

against Zhao and the amount of fees and costs incurred to prosecute its claims against the

other defendants. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F. 3d 1139, 1157 (9th Cir.

Case 3:04-cv-04146-MMC Document 239 Filed 06/26/07 Page 2 of 4
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In some instances, plaintiff has identified the general nature of certain meetings for

which it seeks to recover attorney’s fees, for example, “[c]onfer with Mr. Gorelnik re: pretrial

action items.” (See Gorelnik Decl. Ex. C at 1 (referring to work performed March 30,

2006).) Zhao has not challenged the sufficiency of such descriptions.

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2002) (holding where district court awarded defendant fees as to some but not all

trademark infringement claims asserted against it, district court properly “adjust[ed] fee

award in an effort to reflect an apportionment” between recoverable and non-recoverable

claims). To the extent plaintiff is of the view that certain fees and costs cannot be

apportioned among the defendants, either because they were equally applicable to all

defendants or for other reasons, plaintiff shall set forth its basis for such position. See

Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F. 3d 1060, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding party cannot recover

attorney fees incurred in litigating non-recoverable claim unless recoverable and nonrecoverable claims are “so intertwined that it is impossible to differentiate between work

done on claims”; observing, however, “impossibility of making an exact apportionment does

not relieve the district court of its duty to make some attempt to adjust the fee award in an

effort to reflect an apportionment”).

Additionally, the Court agrees with Zhao that plaintiff has not provided a sufficient

explanation of the work described as “confer,” “conference,” “telephone,” “teleconf,” or

similar terms referring to a meeting, to the extent plaintiff does not provide, even in general

terms, the subject of the conference or meeting.3

Accordingly, plaintiff is hereby afforded leave to file, no later than July 20, 2007, a

supplemental declaration to set forth a proposed apportionment of fees, specifically, to set

forth the fees and costs attributable to plaintiff’s claims against Zhao and the fees and costs

attributable to plaintiff’s claims against AFIC, and, further, to provide a sufficient explanation

of the work described solely as “confer,” “conference,” “telephone,” “teleconf,” or similar

terms referring to a meeting.

Defendants may file, no later than August 3, 2007, a supplemental opposition.

As of August 3, 2007, the matter will be deemed under submission; if, after

considering the supplemental filings, the Court is of the view that oral argument would be of

Case 3:04-cv-04146-MMC Document 239 Filed 06/26/07 Page 3 of 4
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assistance, the Court will set a hearing at which all parties shall personally appear.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 26, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-04146-MMC Document 239 Filed 06/26/07 Page 4 of 4