Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03040/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03040-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d), Michael J. Astrue is substituted for his

predecessor, Jo Anne Barnhart, as the Commissioner of Social Security.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOSE S. BRIBIESCA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant. /

Case No. C05-03040 HRL

ORDER ON CLAIM FOR FEES AND

EXPENSES UNDER THE EQUAL

ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

[Re: Docket No. 22]

Plaintiff Jose Bribiesca challenged the Social Security Administration’s denial of

benefits. On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, this court remanded the matter

to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Plaintiff now moves for his attorney’s fees under

the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). He further requests that

the fees be made payable to his attorney as the payee. There is no dispute here as to the amount

and proffered justification of plaintiff’s claimed fees. Defendant1

 objects to the request only

insofar as plaintiff seeks to have the fees paid to his attorney.

The parties have had an opportunity to brief the issue. Plaintiff did not file a reply. This

court now deems the matter submitted on the papers without oral argument. Having considered

the papers filed by the parties, and for the reasons stated below, the requested fees shall be made

*E-FILED 1/3/2008*

Case 5:05-cv-03040-HRL Document 29 Filed 01/03/08 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2 Defendant’s papers indicate that the parties have discussed other issues,

including whether any EAJA award might, hypothetically, be offset for any debts under the

Debt Collection Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. § 3716 and whether it properly may be taxed as

income to plaintiff. However, it is not apparent that there is a live dispute as these issues,

which were raised tangentially by defendant here. Moreover, there is nothing presently

before this court to indicate what debts plaintiff has, much less whether and how they might

be subject to the Debt Collection Act. Accordingly, the court does not reach these other

issues.

3 Courts have recognized that fee awards under the EAJA are distinct from

those awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796

(2002) (holding that fee awards may be made under both statutes, but the claimant’s attorney

must refund to the claimant the smaller amount); see also Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443,

1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that “an award of fees under both statutes does not amount to

double recovery for the attorney” because the award under § 406(b) allows fees to be

collected from the claimant’s past-due disability benefits, whereas an EAJA award is paid by

the government to the claimant to defray the cost of legal services), abrogated on other

grounds by Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).

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payable directly to plaintiff. Nevertheless, the payment may be delivered to plaintiff’s

counsel’s custody.

The EAJA directs courts to award fees and other expenses to private parties who prevail

in litigation against the United States, unless the government’s position was substantially

justified:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award

to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses,

in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that

party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including

proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the

United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court

finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). As noted above, the only issue before the court is whether the fee

award should be paid to plaintiff or to his attorney.2

“The term ‘prevailing party,’ as found in EAJA and other fee-shifting statutes, is to be

interpreted consistently.” McCarty v. Astrue, 505 F. Supp.2d 624, 629 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing

McQuiston v. Marsh, 790 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1986)). This court is persuaded that, under

the plain language of the EAJA and statutory interpretation by other courts, the award of

attorney’s fees is to be paid to plaintiff as the “prevailing party,” and not to his attorney.3 See,

e.g., Panola Land Buying Ass’n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4 Defendant advises that the Department of Treasury interprets a warrant for

payment to be a payment voucher, which is prepared after an award is made. See

Defendant’s Opp. at 6 n.4.

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that the EAJA “clearly manifests Congress’ intent that the prevailing party’s lawyer is not

considered to be an applicant under the EAJA”); FDL Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 967

F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that an attorney cannot claim or be entitled to

a fee award under EAJA section 2412(d)(1)(A)); Phillips v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577,

1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“As the [EAJA] requires, any fee award is made to the ‘prevailing

party,’ not the attorney.”); McCarty, 505 F. Supp.2d at 629 (holding that an award of attorney’s

fees under the EAJA belongs directly to the plaintiff as the “prevailing party”). The Supreme

Court and the Ninth Circuit have also interpreted other fee-shifting statutes to mean that an

award of attorney’s fees are to be paid directly to the “prevailing party” and not the party’s

attorney. See, e.g.,Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1986) (concluding that 42 U.S.C. §

1988 bestows fee awards upon the prevailing party, not attorneys); Pony v. County of Los

Angeles, 433 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) (reaffirming that “the right to seek attorney’s fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 belongs to clients, not to attorneys”); Gilbrook v. City of Westminster,

177 F.3d 839, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is to be

made directly to the prevailing party, with the ultimate disposition of the award to be

determined by contract between the lawyer and client) (citing Evans, 475 U.S. at 731-32)).

In the instant case, there is no indication that there has been a valid assignment or that

payment properly may be made to plaintiff’s counsel as the payee. At any rate, defendant has

cited authority indicating that no valid assignment can be made until after the fees are awarded

and a warrant4

 for payment is issued. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b) (“An assignment may be made

only after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of

the claim has been issued”); Bentley v. Glickman, 234 B.R. 12, 20 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (assuming

there was a valid EAJA claim against the government, “such a claim could only have been

assigned to the Plaintiff after satisfaction of the requirements laid out in § 3727.”).

Based on the foregoing, the award of attorney’s fees shall be paid to plaintiff, and not to

his attorney. Accordingly, the Commissioner is ordered to pay $3245.98 to plaintiff Jose

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Bribiesca. However, there being no objection by defendant, he may deliver the payment to the

custody of plaintiff’s counsel.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

January 2, 2008

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5:05-cv-3040 Notice has been electronically mailed to: 

James Hunt Miller jim_miller0@yahoo.com 

Mary Patricia Parnow mary.parnow@ssa.gov 

Angelina Valle angelina@valle-law.com, ralph@valle-law.com 

Sara Winslow sara.winslow@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have

not registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Case 5:05-cv-03040-HRL Document 29 Filed 01/03/08 Page 5 of 5