Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02062/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02062-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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* This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1 Defendant also moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1). However, since Defendant has not shown that the

motion raises a jurisdictional issue, the Rule 12(b)(1) motion need not

be decided. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393

(1982) (where the Supreme Court held “that filing a timely charge of

discrimination with the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] is not

a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a

requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver,

estoppel, and equitable tolling.”) 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA J. SANDEN, )

) 2:04-cv-2062-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary, )

Department of Agriculture, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

(“Complaint”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the

grounds that it is time-barred.1 In the alternative, Defendant moves

for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

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2 Plaintiff also alleges a claim for gender discrimination under

Title VII. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) However, in her Opposition, Plaintiff

says “she is withdrawing any claims related to gender.” (Opp’n at 19.)

2

I. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s employment

discrimination claims alleged under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.2

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following claims: “[d]isparate

treatment because of Plaintiff’s [] disability”; that “Defendant

failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff’s physical

disability”; that Defendant retaliated against her “for writing [] a

letter to the [Natural Resources Conservation Service (“NRCS”)] State

Administrative Officer”; and that “Defendant constructively terminated

[her] by denying [her] request to transfer to another duty station.” 

(Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6.) 

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiff

failed to (1) present a cognizable legal theory, or (2) plead

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When considering the motion, all material allegations in the Complaint

must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cahill v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). In

addition, Plaintiff is given the benefit of every reasonable inference

that can be drawn from the allegations in the Complaint. Retail

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Accordingly, the motion must be denied “unless it appears beyond doubt

that [Plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim

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3 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) provides that “[a]n aggrieved

person must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date

of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel

action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.” 

3

which would entitle [her] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be

dismissed because she failed to consult with an Equal Employment

Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor within the required forty-five days

prescribed in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a).3 (Mot. at 5:10-13.) 

Specifically, Defendant contends that “Plaintiff initiated contact

with an EEO counselor on February 27, 2001” for alleged

“discrimination [that] occurred in May 1992, . . . November 28, 2000

and December 18, 2000.” (Id. at 5:20-22.) Defendant argues that even

considering the last date on which the alleged discriminatory activity

occurred, December 18, 2000, her consultation with the EEO counselor

was “twenty-five days late.” (Id. at 6:16.) 

Plaintiff counters arguing that “she first spoke to an EEO

counselor on January 3, 2001.” (Opp’n at 10.) Plaintiff cites the

“EEO’s Counselor Report,” as support for this argument, which is

attached to her Opposition, and which states that the “date of action”

is “January 2001.” (EEO Counselor’s Report in Supp. of Opp’n at 5.) 

Defendant rejoins that “[w]hile [P]laintiff contends that she spoke to

an EEO counselor in Davis, California, on January 3, 2001, and on

subsequent dates thereafter, [there is] no record of any such

contacts, in person or by telephone.” (Reply at 2:4-7; see Decl. of

Rene Rodriguez in Supp. of Reply ¶¶ 3, 4 at 1 (“I am the only EEO

counselor that works in the Davis, California office . . . I do not

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4 The standards for summary judgment are well known and will

only be repeated as necessary herein. 

5 The undisputed facts in this section are based on Defendant’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed within its Motion. (See Mot. at 2-

5.) Plaintiff did not file a Statement of Undisputed Facts in response

to Defendant’s Statement as required by Local Rule 56-260. (See L.R.

56-260, which provides that “[a]ny party opposing a motion for summary

judgment . . . shall reproduce the itemized facts in the Statement of

Undisputed Facts, and admit those facts that are undisputed and deny

those that are disputed . . . .”) Plaintiff filed a Statement of

Disputed Material Facts within her Opposition. (See Opp’n at 2-9.) All

of the facts in Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts are undisputed

because Plaintiff failed to “present specific facts demonstrating that

there is a factual dispute . . . .” Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693

F.2d 870, 893 (9th Cir. 1982). 

4

recall having any contact with [Plaintiff] regarding EEO matters.”).) 

Since a motion to dismiss must be denied “unless it appears beyond

doubt that [Plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of [her]

claim” and it is unclear whether Plaintiff timely contacted an EEO

counselor, Defendant’s motion is denied. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.

II. Summary Judgment4

Defendant also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. 

Plaintiff is legally blind.5 (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts

(“SUF”) ¶ 1.) In 1992, Plaintiff was hired by NRCS, an agency of the

United States Department of Agriculture, in Nebraska. (Id. ¶ 2.) 

Plaintiff was transferred to Massachusetts and Washington, D.C. before

being placed as a Contract Specialist in Davis, California. (Id.

¶¶ 3-5.) To help assist Plaintiff with her disability, NRCS provided

her with a reader for four hours a day and with computer equipment. 

(Id. ¶¶ 6,7.) On October 13, 2000, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Mr.

J.R. Flores, NRCS’s State Administrative Officer, “outlin[ing] her

lack of accommodation.” (Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts (“SDF”) at

4; see Letter to Mr. J.R. Flores in Supp. of Opp’n.) In response to

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5

Plaintiff’s October 13 letter, “[o]n or about November 10, 2000, NRCS

hired the Sensory Access Foundation (“SAF”), an organization which

assists blind or visually impaired people to obtain or retain

employment by providing access to technology assessment, computer

training, job placement and accommodation services, to evaluate

[P]laintiff on the job and make recommendations on how she could be

better accommodated.” (SUF ¶ 8.) 

In November 2000, before SAF completed its report, NRCS’s

Washington, D.C. office determined that certain positions would be

eliminated as they became vacated in an effort to streamline the

agency. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s position was one of the three

positions in Davis to be eliminated. (Id.) However, “the positions

were to be maintained for as long as the employees stayed in the

positions; if the employees vacated the positions, then elimination

would take effect.” (Id.) “On December 18, 2000, [P]laintiff’s

husband, who also worked at NRCS in Davis, voluntarily accepted a

promotion to the Red Bluff Area Office.” (Id. ¶ 12.) However,

“[t]here was no Contract Specialist position available in [Red Bluff]

to reassign [P]laintiff.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff moved to Red Bluff

with her husband and “requested a transfer to [the] Red Bluff

[office], or a nearby location, but there were no vacancies.” (Id.

 ¶¶ 13, 14.) Plaintiff signed an Employee Resignation Form on

December 20, 2000. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff’s “resignation [was

nevertheless only made] effective as of January 2, 2002, approximately

one year later, in order for [P]laintiff to return to her job as a

Contract Specialist at the NRCS office in Davis if she chose before

that date.” (Id. ¶ 14.) 

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6

A. Failure to Accommodate

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to

accommodate claim asserting that “there is sufficient evidence to

demonstrate [its] good faith efforts undertaken . . . to accommodate

[P]laintiff’s disability prior to her resignation in December 2000.” 

(Mot. at 8:4-6, 20-22.) Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

“governmental employers [must] make reasonable accommodation to the

known physical or mental limitations of a qualified handicapped

applicant or employee unless the agency can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its

program.” Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a)). “Determining whether an accommodation is

reasonable depends, to a significant extent, upon determining whether

the employer has acceded to the disabled employee’s requests . . . .” 

Feliberty v. Kemper Corp., 98 F.3d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1996). Further,

“the ‘legislative history makes clear that employers are required to

engage in an interactive process with employees in order to identify

and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations.’” Hadley v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 2001 WL 34039486, at *6 (D. Or. Nov. 19, 2001)

(citing Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1101 (9th Cir.

2000)). “Generally, the interactive process ‘is triggered [] by a

request for accommodation by a disabled employee.’” Id. (citing

Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112). “Once the interactive process has been

triggered, the employer must make a reasonable effort to identify the

precise limitations resulting from the disability and the potential

reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 

Sicoli v. Nabisco Biscuit Co., 2000 WL 1268255, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.

30, 2000). 

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6 Plaintiff also cites to her expert, Dr. Frederic K. Schroeder,

in support of her failure to accommodate claim. However, his

propositions, that had Plaintiff been given better computer

accommodations she would have received better evaluations and that

managers very rarely understand the needs of blind workers, are not

relevant on the issue whether Plaintiff made requests for accommodation

to NRCS before her October 13 letter. (See Opp’n at 15.) 

7

It is undisputed that Defendant commenced a process of

ascertaining if Plaintiff could be better accommodated in response to

her October 13, 2000 letter. (See Mot. at 9:1-3; see also Opp’n at

14, in which Plaintiff acknowledges that as a result of her letter to

Mr. Flores, NRCS hired SAF to conduct a full analysis of her

accommodation needs.) Specifically, NRCS hired SAF to evaluate

Plaintiff’s situation and make recommendations as to how Plaintiff

could be better accommodated. (Mot. at 9:1-3; Decl. of Sharon Bost in

Supp. of Mot. (“Bost Decl.”) ¶ 10.) Plaintiff resigned prior to the

completion of the SAF report. (See Mot. at 9:1-3, 16-19; Bost. Decl.

¶¶ 15, 17; Ex. G, Aff. of Sharon Bost in Supp. of Mot. at 251.) 

Although Plaintiff argues that her “requests for reasonable

accommodation were not granted” she does not support this argument

with evidence of specific requests made to NRCS prior to the October

13 letter she sent to Mr. Flores. (See Opp’n at 15.) Plaintiff

points to her own affidavit and that of Cathy Murtha, “an outside

trainer from the Sacramento Society for the Blind,” to support her

failure to accommodate claim.6 (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff states that

she had computer problems and “trouble getting adequate reader time.” 

(Id. at 13; Aff. of Brenda Sanden in Supp. of Opp’n (“Sanden Aff.”) at

150-55, 156-58.) In addition, although Plaintiff states “that [NRCS]

would not listen to [Cathy Murtha’s] [accommodation] recommendations,”

Ms. Murtha’s affidavit states that she did not talk “to management

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about [Plaintiff’s] problems” because Plaintiff asked her not to, and

she also “didn’t submit a written report.” (Opp’n at 14; Aff. of

Cathy Anne Murtha in Supp. of Opp’n (“Murtha Aff.”) at 300.) 

Accordingly, since there is no genuine issue of material

fact that NRCS was in the process of ascertaining how it could respond

to Plaintiff’s request for accommodation when she left her position in

Davis and moved to Red Bluff with her husband, Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim is granted. See

Rennie v. United Parcel Serv., 139 F. Supp. 2d 159, 172-73 (D. Mass.

2001) (stating that plaintiff’s resignation from her employment before

her employer could evaluate her request to be reasonably accommodated

constituted “a complete failure [on plaintiff’s part] to continue to

engage in the interactive process and prevented [her employer] from

making any further attempts to reasonably accommodate her [;

consequently plaintiff could not] prove that [her employer] failed to

accommodate her.”); see also Witt v. N.W. Aluminum Co., 117 F. Supp.

2d 1127, 1133 (D. Or. 2001) (“[S]ummary judgment [on a failure to

accommodate claim may be granted] where there is no genuine dispute

that the employer has engaged in the interactive process in good

faith.”) 

B. Disability Discrimination

Defendant also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

disability discrimination claim arguing that “Plaintiff cannot

establish that she was the subject of an adverse action by NRCS and

that she was treated adversely because of her disability.” (Mot. at

14:9-11.) Further, Defendant contends that even assuming “[P]laintiff

could meet her prima facie burden” on this claim, NRCS has

“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.” (Id. at

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7 Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s reference to the statements

made by Barbara Ammon, arguing that they are hearsay, and to the “double

hearsay statements of Sarah Chavez-Magalong . . . whose [affidavit]

. . . is unsigned and therefore inadmissible.” (Reply at 9:20-21, n.9)

These objections are sustained. See Mason v. Clark, 920 F.2d 493, 495

(8th Cir. 1990) (“We have no hesitation in stating that an unsigned

affidavit is not sufficient evidence [to defeat] a motion for summary

judgment.”).

9

15:22, 27.) Plaintiff responds that NRCS’s “unwillingness to secure

[Plaintiff’s] transfer [to the Red Bluff area] is tied directly to

[Plaintiff’s] disability.” (Opp’n at 16.) Plaintiff argues that “all

married couples who worked for the agency of which she was aware were

able to secure transfers as a ‘package deal.’” (Id.) Plaintiff

points to the affidavit of Sarah Chavez-Magalong, who avers that

“[n]ormally when a married person is transferred, they find a job for

the spouse” and that she “believe[d] that [management] could have

found a place for [Plaintiff] to work [in Red Bluff].” (Aff. of Sarah

Chavez-Magalong in Supp. of Opp’n at 293, 292.) However, belief alone

is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Columbia

Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d

1525, 1529 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that a declarant stating “I

believe” is insufficient when speculating as to motivation behind

decision). 

Plaintiff also argues that “work existed in the Red Bluff

region that she could have performed.” (Opp’n at 17.) In support of

this assertion, Plaintiff argues that Barbara Ammon “who worked in the

Red Bluff region actively sought information from [Plaintiff]

regarding how a back log of contract work could be handled[,]” and

that “[t]his evidences the need for a contract specialist in that

region.” (Id. at 16-17; see Sanden Aff. at 166-69.)7 Plaintiff also

argues that “Robert Bailey, a lead person for the Red Bluff region, []

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expressed interest in creating a new administrative position to

support him and his team.” (Opp’n at 17.) Plaintiff argues that

“[h]e interviewed [her] and was very excited about hiring her, but all

that changed once he consulted with individuals in the state office.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff supports this argument with her averment that she

“suspect[ed] that when Mr. Bailey contacted management in the State

Office, he was told about [her] complaint and accommodation issues and

they told him they didn’t want to deal with [her] any longer.” 

(Sanden Aff. at 167.) (emphasis added). Such speculation is not

evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute. See Columbia

Pictures Indus., Inc., 944 F.2d at 1529. 

“To establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) [s]he is disabled within the

meaning of the statute; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified for the

position; (3) [s]he was adversely treated because of h[er] disability;

and (4) [s]he worked for the federal government.” Wilborn v.

Ashcroft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1207 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Reynolds

v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1987)). If Plaintiff can

establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, “the burden

shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the employment decision. The burden then shifts back to

the plaintiff to produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable

factfinder to conclude that defendant’s articulated reason is

pretextual.” Id. “In other words, [] plaintiff ‘must tender a

genuine issue of material fact as to pretext in order to avoid summary

judgment.’” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir.

1983) (quoting Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.

1983)). Therefore, “when evidence to refute the defendant's

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legitimate explanation is totally lacking, summary judgment is

appropriate even though plaintiff may have established a minimal prima

facie case.” (Id. at 890-91.) 

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff has established a prima

facie case, Defendant has successfully demonstrated a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for NRCS’s actions. Specifically, Defendant

asserts, with supporting evidence, that “[t]he decision to create a

new staffing plan for the consolidation of the administrative staffs

of three agencies was a National Headquarters project independent of

any involvement of [P]laintiff’s supervisors at the NRCS office in

Davis.” (Mot. at 15:27-28, 16:1-2; see Bost Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. A, Aff.

of Jeffrey Vonk in Supp. of Mot. at 180; Ex. B, Aff. of Henry C. Wyman

in Supp. of Mot. at 188.) Defendant also contends, with supporting

evidence, that “[P]laintiff was not transferred or reassigned to Red

Bluff, or a nearby location, because no vacant positions existed” and

“[h]ad [Plaintiff] not moved from Davis, her Contract Specialist

position would have not have been eliminated.” (Mot. at 16:4-5, 15:5-

6; see Bost Decl. ¶¶ 13, 11.) Defendant also states that it “has no

[] custom or policy of keeping spouses together when one spouse

transfers to another office.” (Reply at 9:14-15, n.9; see Bost. Decl.

in Supp. of Reply ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff has not provided substantial evidence refuting

Defendant’s legitimate explanations. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim is

granted. See Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890 (“‘[A] plaintiff cannot defeat

summary judgment simply by making out a prima facie case’” and

“‘[plaintiff] must do more than establish a prima facie case and deny

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the credibility of the [defendant's] witnesses.’”) (internal citations

omitted). 

C. Constructive Discharge Claim

Defendant argues that “Plaintiff cannot establish a prima

facie case of constructive discharge because she does not even

intimate that she was subjected to a hostile work environment or that

she was compelled to resign because the working conditions at the NRCS

office in Davis were so intolerable that a reasonable person likewise

would have felt compelled to resign.” (Mot. at 17:14-17.) Plaintiff

introduces the same arguments and supporting evidence as she did in

response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

disability discrimination claim, arguing that “[b]ecause there was no

transfer, she was forced to resign” and “the lack of accommodations

made it very difficult for [Plaintiff] to do her job and advance

within the organization.” (Opp’n at 16.) 

“‘A constructive discharge occurs when a person quits his

job under circumstances in which a reasonable person would feel that

the conditions of employment have become intolerable.’ Thus, an

employee need not demonstrate that his employer intended to force him

to resign, but merely that his conditions of employment were

objectively intolerable.” Lawson v. Wash., 296 F.3d 799, 805 (9th

Cir. 2002) (quoting Draper v. Coeur Rochester, 147 F.3d 1104, 1110

(9th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff has not shown that her conditions of

employment were so intolerable as to force her to resign in light of

her indication that she “applied for a transfer so that she could

remain with the agency and transfer with her husband.” (Opp’n at 8.) 

Accordingly, summary judgment on the constructive discharge claim is

granted. 

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D. Retaliation

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim, arguing that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case of

reprisal and that it “articulates legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions.” (Mot. at 18:6-12, 19:5-6.) Plaintiff

contends that “the evidence . . . shows that [Plaintiff] was the only

one not reassigned when the new staffing plan came out[,] that she did

not receive a transfer to the Red Bluff region[,]” and that “[a]ll of

this occurred shortly after the issuance of her [October 13, 2000]

memo wherein she complained of her lack of accommodation.” (Opp’n at

18.) 

“To make out a prima facie case [of retaliation, Plaintiff]

must establish that she acted to protect her [] rights, that an

adverse employment action was thereafter taken against her, and that a

causal link exists between these two events.” Steiner v. Showboat

Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994). Once Plaintiff has

made a prima facie case, “[t]he burden of production then shifts to

[Defendant] to advance legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for any

adverse actions taken against [Plaintiff]; she has the ultimate burden

of showing that [Defendant’s] proffered reasons are pretextual.” Id.

Even assuming that Plaintiff has made a prima facie case on

her retaliation claim, Plaintiff has not introduced substantial

evidence to rebut Defendant’s legitimate reasons for NRCS’s actions. 

(See Mot. at 15:27-28, 16:1-2, 4-5, 15:5-6 and supporting evidence

(“The decision to create a new staffing plan for the consolidation of

the administrative staffs of three agencies was a National

Headquarters project independent of any involvement of [P]laintiff’s

supervisors at the NRCS office in Davis”; “[P]laintiff was not

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transferred or reassigned to Red Bluff, or a nearby location, because

no vacant positions existed”; “[h]ad [Plaintiff] not moved from Davis,

her Contract Specialist position would have not have been

eliminated.”).) Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s reprisal claim is granted. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is

denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The

clerk shall enter judgment for Defendant.

Dated: March 27, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

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