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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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' ' PUBLISH . FILED 

United States Court or Ai)p~~:.:; Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 3 1 1Cor- ... I,;..J;) 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ANTHONY RAY JENKINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

vs. 

JILL BURTZLOFF and LINDA TRIGGS, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellees. ) 

PATRICK FISHER Cieri~ 

No. 94-3243 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 94-3131-DES) 

Carl E. K. Johnson, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Kenneth R. Smith, Department of Social Services, Topeka, Kansas, 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before EBEL and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and COOK, District Judge* 

COOK, District Judge 

*Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior United States District Judge for 

the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 

The plaintiff, Anthony Ray Jenkins, brought an action 

ostensibly under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. The district court held that 

Jenkins' complaint was, in essence, a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus and dismissed it for failure to exhaust state remedies by an 

order dated April 28, 1994 and filed the same date. 1 Jenkins 

alleges that because of transfers from facility to facility while 

he was in continuous custody he did not receive his copy of the 

order in the mail until after he was returned to the Seward County 

Jail on July 12, 1994. He also alleges that he mailed his notice 

of appeal on the same date; the notice of appeal was date stamped 

by the court clerk: July 20, 1994. 

Jenkins' appeal was dismissed for untimeliness but was 

reopened upon his petition for rehearing and he was appointed 

counsel to discuss, along with such other issues as he might 

consider appropriate, the issue whether the delay in Jenkins' 

receipt of the district court order should be considered in 

determining the timeliness of the appeal. 

After an examination of the record on appeal and other 

relevant papers filed with us in this case we conclude that even if 

we accept as true the unverified allegations in Jenkins' papers he 

failed to meet the requisite time limits for appealing and for 

moving to extend the time for appeal. In short, we cannot address 

In the header of this op1n1on we have styled this case as 

the plaintiff originally did and as he urges us to do on appeal. In 

doing so we do not intend to pass on the merits of his appeal. At 

this time we render no decision on the merits. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 2 
the merits of his appeal because we lack jurisdiction over the 

case. 

XX. WHEN TIME FOR APPEAL BEGINS TO RUN UNDER HOUSTON V. LACK 

In Houston v. Lack, 487 u.s. 266 (1988) the Supreme court held 

that the date of "filing" of a notice of appeal by a prisoner 

appearing pro se is the date the prisoner turns over the notice of 

appeal to prison officials for mailing. The Court noted in its 

opinion the lack of control that the prisoner has over his mail 

once it has left his hands; and the question arises whether a 

similar reasoning might require the time limit for filing a notice 

of appeal to be calculated from the date the prisoner receives 

notice of the entry of the order from which he or she appeals. 

In United States v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1989) the 

Third Circuit held that the logic of Houston applied in reverse. 

The court held that delays in the receipt of mail by a prisoner 

caused by prison officials should not be counted in determining 

when the time period for appeal begins to run, just as delays after 

the mailing of a notice of appeal are not counted in determining 

whether the time limit has been overstepped. 

After due consideration of the Third Circuit's reasoning and 

the arguments made in this case we have determined that we are 

unable to apply the Grana interpretation of Houston to this case. 

Although many or even all of the policy arguments of Houston may 

apply here an attempt to apply the legal justification of the 

Houston holding to the delay in delivery to the prisoner in the 

case before us is like trying to put a square peg in a round hole. 

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Although Grana was a criminal case, the case it relied upon, 

Houston, was, like the case before us, a civil case. The rationale 

of Houston was not constitutional or equitable in nature; rather, 

it was based on an interpretation of the word "filed" in the rule 

and statute governing the timeliness of notices of appeal. The 

Court held that a notice of appeal could be deemed timely "filed" 

upon delivery to the prison authorities for mailing. In order to 

apply this kind of statutory interpretation in reverse we would 

have to look to the language determining when the time for appeal 

begins to run and whether that beginning point could be construed 

to be the time when the prisoner receives notice of the entry of 

the order to be appealed from. 

FED. R. Crv. P. 4(a) (1) provides that a notice of appeal in a 

civil case generally may be filed "within 30 days of the date of 

entry of the judgment or order appealed from." (emphasis added) 28 

u.s.c. § 2107 similarly provides that in such a case a notice of 

appeal may be filed "within thirty days after the entry of such 

judgment, order or decree." The date of entry is the beginning 

point for when the time period begins to run and the question is 

whether the word "entry" can be construed differently in the case 

of prisoners who are pro se litigants. For a number of reasons it 

cannot be so construed. 

Rule 4 (a) (7) defines entry, providing that a judgment or order 

is "entered" under Rule 4(a) when entered in compliance with Rules 

58 and 79(a). Rule 79(a), in turn, provides that the clerk shall 

keep a book in which all "orders, verdicts, and judgments shall be 

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• I Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 4 
entered." The Supreme Court has interpreted the Rules to provide 

that entry means entry on the docket. Acosta v. Louisiana, 478 

u.s. 251 (1986). 2 We realize that the Rules of Appellate Procedure 

do not purport to affect the jurisdiction of this court. FED. R. 

APP. P • 1 (b) • However, we see no reason why any different 

definition of "entry" should apply under 28 u.s.c. § 2107. 

Even if there were no definition of the word "entry" in the 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure we would not find it a 

reasonable definition of "entry" that the date of entry of a notice 

of appeal could be the date upon which it is received by a prisoner 

because such a construction defies the plain language of 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2107. The absurdity of such a definition could be seen most 

clearly where a single order or judgment applies to several parties 

who are incarcerated. The date of entry for a single order could 

be different for each of the incarcerated parties. 

Where a paper is deemed filed on the date it is mailed there 

is one filing date for the document so there is no similar problem. 

Although when a paper is deemed served3 on a particular party on 

the date it is mailed there may be more than one date of service 

2 Further support for this interpretation is given by Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 77(d), which provides: "Lack of notice of the entry by 

the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or 

authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within 

the time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 4(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure." 

3 We need not address in this op1n1on whether Houston v. 

Lack applies to the service of papers on other parties but note 

merely that such an interpretation is far more reasonable than the 

extension of the rule to postpone the moment that the time limit 

begins to run. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 5 
for each party, service is a concept that relates to individuals 

and documents simultaneously while entry is a concept that relates 

solely to the document. When a court clerk is asked what the entry 

date is of an order or judgment it should not be necessary for the 

clerk to give a different answer depending on who asks the 

question. Accordingly, we hold that Houston v. Lack, 487 u.s. 463 

(1988) does not affect the date on which the time for appeal begins 

to run. 

XXX. RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 4(a) (6) 

We next address the question whether Jenkins' appeal is timely 

under the provisions of 28 u.s.c. § 2107 and FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). 

Both provisions require that a notice of appeal be filed within 

thirty days of the entry of a judgment, order or decree and both 

contain exceptions to this time limit. 28 u.s.c. § 2107(c) 

provides (in part): 

"[I]f the district court finds--

(1) that a party entitled to notice of the 

entry of a judgment or order did not receive 

such notice from the clerk or any party within 

21 days of its entry, and 

(2) that no party would be prejudiced, 

the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days 

after entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days 

after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, 

reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from 

the date of entry of the order reopening the time for 

appeal." 

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure contain a similar 

exception: 

"The district court, if it finds (a) that a party 

entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order 

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Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 6 
did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party 

within 21 days of its entry and (b) that no party would 

be prejudiced, may, upon motion filed within 180 days of 

entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days of 

receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the 

time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of 

entry of the order reopening the time for appeal." 

FED • R. APP • P • 4 (a) ( 6) • 

There is no dispute that Jenkins failed to file a motion for 

extension or any document resembling such within the required seven 

day period. Jenkins did file a notice of appeal that is stamped by 

the clerk eight days after the date on which he alleges he received 

notice of the entry of the order below. We will assume, solely for 

purposes of argument, that his allegations are true and that he 

mailed the notice of motion the same day he received notice. We 

will further assume that if the notice of appeal he filed had been 

instead a motion for extension of time that the motion would have 

been timely. Even assuming all of that, we would still be 

compelled by established Tenth Circuit precedent to dismiss his 

appeal because the filing of his notice of appeal cannot be treated 

as the equivalent of the filing of a notice of motion for extension 

of time where a request for additional time is not manifest. This 

is the rule we have applied to pro se litigants seeking relief 

under Rule 4(a)(5) --which has a 30 day time limit for appeal 

worded similarly to the 7 day time limit in Rule 4(a) (6). Senjuro 

v. Murray, 943 F.2d 36 (lOth Cir. 1991); Mayfield v. United States 

Parole Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1053 (lOth Cir. 1981). 4 We now hold that 

4 It is true that we found the filing of a notice of appeal 

within a required extension period sufficient in United States v. 

Lucas, 597 F.2d 243 (lOth Cir. 1979). However, Rule 4(a) (6), like 

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the rule of these cases for construing notices of appeal as notices 

of motion under Rule 4(a) (5) also applies under Rule 4(a) (6). 

We have examined Jenkins' notice of appeal and found nothing 

in it remotely suggesting a request for extension of time or even 

a recognition of the lateness problem. Subsequent documents 

dealing with these issues were filed in this court long past the 

deadline and there has been no allegation that any were mailed 

within the seven day period. Accordingly, we hold that Jenkins 

failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 4(a) (6) by failing 

to file a timely motion for extension of time; and his appeal 

cannot be deemed timely under that rule. 

IV. EQUITABLE RELIEF AND FALLEN V. UNITED STATES 

We also reject the notion that general equitable 

considerations such as the policy arguments of Houston can allow a 

tolling of the time limit for appeal under some rationale separate 

from the interpretation of the words of the relevant rule and 

statutory provision. 

As important as the policies of Houston may be, as we 

mentioned in the previous section, Houston is a case of 

interpretation of the language of the rules. It provides no 

authority for equitable tolling. Although several justices have 

characterized the Court's decision in Fallen v. United States, 378 

Rule 4 (a) (5) (and unlike old rule 4 (a) which was controlled by 

Lucas) defines the length of the time period in which a motion can 

be made not the length of the time period of the extension. The 

interpretations of Rule 4(a) (5) are therefore controlling on this 

Rule 4(a) (6) issue. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 8 
u.s. 139 (1964) as a case of equitable tolling5 they also said that 

it had no applicability to a civil context governed by the 

jurisdictional limit of 28 u.s.c. § 2107. 6 

In deciding the case before us it is enough to note that 

Fallen was a narrow decision providing relief where a prisoner had 

done all he reasonably could have done to comply with the rules. 

It did not expressly or effectively provide additional time for 

appeal to all prisoners regardless of their ability to comply with 

the rules as written. 

In our case, the prisoner, by his own admission, mailed the 

notice of appeal the same day he received notice of entry of the 

judgment in the court below. He had seven days under FED. R. APP. 

P. 4(a) (6) to file a motion for extension of time and clearly could 

have done so about as easily as he filed the notice of appeal. 

Under these circumstances we note that there was an adequate remedy 

at law and that the prisoner's failure to qualify for relief was 

5 Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 281 (1988) (Scalia J. 

dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, 0' Connor and Kennedy) • An 

alternative view is that Fallen was based on a rule of construction 

in the applicable rules of criminal procedure permitting an 

interpretation that would secure justice. In our case, the rules 

expressly prohibit the court from enlarging the amount of time for 

filing a notice of appeal. FED. R. APP. P. 26(b). However, we need 

not and do not at this time decide whether the Fallen case, 

properly characterized, might apply to civil appeals because even 

if it does apply the prisoner is still required to do all he or she 

reasonably can to comply with the rules, which Jenkins did not do. 

6 The time limit of 28 u.s.c. § 2107 was held 

jurisdictional in Browder v. Director Dep't of Corrections, 434 

u.s. 257, 264 (1978). In stone v. Immigration and Naturalization, 

u.s. I 115 s.ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) the Court held 

that such Jurisdictional time limits are not subject to equitable 

tolling. 

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due to his own default, not matters outside of his control. In 

short, Fallen would not save this appeal regardless of whether or 

not the relief it provided is properly characterized as equitable 

in nature and regardless of whether the rationale of that case or 

some similar rationale could conceivably save this appeal under 

more compelling facts. The time limit has run and we are without 

jurisdiction under the facts of this case in any event. 7 

V. RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b) (1) 

Notwithstanding the language of FED. R. CIV. P. 77{d) 

(precluding extensions of time for appeal unless authorized by FED. 

R. APP. P. 4{a)) we held in Wallace v. McManus, 776 F.2d 915 {lOth 

Cir. 1985) that relief was available under FED. R. Civ. P. 60{b) {1) 

7 we also reject the notion that procedural avenues subject 

to district court discretion {such as FED. R. APP. P. 4{a) {6)) are 

not adequate to deal with the right of appeal lost due to prison 

delay. u.s. v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312 n. 6 {3d Cir. 1989). Although 

the procedural avenues do not address the problem of prison delay 

specifically they are at least adequate as they apply to the facts 

of this case. 

We need not address at this time the extent of the discretion 

of the district court in deciding whether to allow an extension 

under Rule 4{a) {6). It is enough for purposes of the decision we 

reach at this time to note that appellate review for abuse of 

discretion might also be used to give effect to the policies of 

Houston v. Lack where the statutory exceptions do apply and that 

such review would not do the kind of violence to principles of 

statutory interpretation as would an equitable rule of tolling -- fashioned without regard to statutory language -- that benefits all 

prisoners {including those who could have complied with the 

existing rules in the absence of any such relief) . 

Because the prisoner defaulted on the 7 day requirement which 

was within his power to comply with and otherwise qualified for 

relief under Rule 4{a) {6) (there was no allegation of prejudice to 

the opposition resulting from the delay) we need not address at 

this time the question whether relief might be available in some 

form to a prisoner who loses his right to appeal under Rule 4{a) in 

a civil case through no fault of his or her own. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 10 
when Rule 4(a) did not provide relief. However, where relief was 

available under Rule 4(a) (5) and the party failed to timely file a 

motion under that rule we held that Rule 60(b) (1) did not apply. 

Senjuro v. Murray, 943 F.2d 36 (lOth Cir. 1991). We now similarly 

hold that where relief is available under the newer Rule 4(a) (6), 

Rule 60(b) (1) is not available. In the case before us we do not 

have a prisoner who is disqualified from relief under Rule 4(a) (6) 

through no fault of his or her own (Jenkins was not disqualified 

for receiving notice more than 180 days after entry or because 

prejudice to the other party precluded a rule 4(a) (6) extension8 ). 

Accordingly, Rule 60(b) (1) cannot save his appeal. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

We hold that the time limit for appeal commences to run 

on the date of entry with the clerk of the order to be appealed 

from for all parties regardless of their incarcerated status. 

Where, as is the case here, a prisoner could reasonably have 

complied with Rule 4(a) (6) but failed to file a timely motion for 

extension of time and also failed to file a notice of appeal within 

the normal time limit the prisoner is in default and we are without 

jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 

Appeal dismissed. 

8 We need not and do not state an opinion pro or con 

regarding whether any remedies or relief would be available to a 

prisoner with delayed mail who fails to qualify for a FED. R. APP. P. 

4(a) extension through no fault of his or her own. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 11 
No. 94-3243, JENKINS v. BURTZLOFF and TRIGGS 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

After review of the relevant precedents, I respectfully must 

dissent. If I were counting noses in the Supreme Court, I might 

come to a different conclusion. However, the only sound way to 

predict future Supreme Court action is to apply standard interpretive principles to its past decisions. Following that practice, I am persuaded that the Third Circuit in United States v. 

Grana, 864 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1989), correctly applied Houston v. 

Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), to a similar fact situation. 

In the case before us, the court puts great emphasis on the 

fact that the operative and controlling word is "entry" while in 

Houston the operative and controlling word was "filed." As the 

dissent in Houston so ably pointed out, the barriers to interpreting "filed" to mean anything other than receipt by the clerk 

were as formidable as the barrier to interpreting "entry" to mean 

anything other than the clerk's act of lodging the Judgment in its 

docket. Effectively, the majority in Houston acknowledged that in 

every situation except pro .§.g prisoner cases, "filed" still means 

receipt by the clerk no matter the e~uities. The net effect is 

that the court relied on the uniqueness of the fact that prisoners 

are under control of the state itself to give "filed" a meaning in 

their cases that it did not, and still does not, have in any other 

litigant's case. That is the precise parallel for precisely the 

same reason for US to hold that lientry 1 1l while retaining its "act 

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Appellate Case: 94-3243 Document: 01019280726 Date Filed: 10/31/1995 Page: 12 
of the clerk" meaning in all other cases, means "delivery of 

notice to the prisoner" in pro se prisoner cases. 

It may be argued that the plain meaning of "entry" is somehow 

plainer or more emphatic than the plain meaning of "filed." I 

believe a reading of Houston, especially the dissent, and the 

majority's implicit conclusion that "filed" still really means 

"filed" in all but prisoner cases adequately answers any assertion 

that the plain meaning of the one word is more emphatic than the 

plain meaning of the other. 

I would apply Houston, as set out in Grana and expanded on in 

this brief dissent, to the facts of this case. Thus I would partially remand to the trial court to determine the truth of the 

time allegations and retain jurisdiction until that task is completed. If the trial court verifies the allegations, I would 

proceed to the merits. 

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