Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02660/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02660-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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28 1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DAVID HALTERMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

EMC CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: C 04-2660 JW (PVT)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

On September 20, 2005, the parties appeared before Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull

for hearing on Defendant’s motion for a protective order to prevent the deposition of David Wright.1

Based on the briefs and arguments submitted, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion is DENIED. However, the deposition

shall be limited to two hours.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts may issue a protective order limiting or prohibiting the deposition of any party

in order to protect that party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or

expense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). However, “[a] strong showing is required before a party will be

denied entirely the right to take a deposition.” Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th

Cir. 1975) (district court erred in granting protective order ordering plaintiff not to depose

Herald-Examiner's publisher when plaintiff suggested possible information publisher might have that

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ORDER, page 2

others did not). Under Rule 26(c), the party attempting to avoid discovery must carry a heavy burden

of demonstrating why the discovery should be denied. Id. 

Because of the potential for abuse by plaintiffs, courts do sometimes protect high-level

corporate officers from depositions when the officer has no first-hand knowledge of relevant facts or

where the testimony would be repetitive. See Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979);

see also, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 (1992). However, where a

corporate officer has first hand knowledge of relevant facts, the deposition should be allowed. See

Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429; see also, Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (9th Cir.

1976) (approving denial of Howard Hughes’ motion for protective order because he “probably had

some knowledge” regarding substance of plaintiffs’ claims); and Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc. v.

Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 203 F.R.D. 98, 102-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (compelling deposition of

Sony’s CEO when plaintiff “presented sufficient evidence to infer that [CEO] had some unique

knowledge on several issues related to its claims”). Further, a claimed lack of knowledge or

recollection does not provide sufficient grounds for a protective order, since the opposing party is

entitled to test that lack of knowledge or recollection. See Amherst Leasing Corp. v. Emhart Corp.,

65 F.R.D. 121, 122 (D. Conn. 1974); and Travelers Rental Co., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 140, 143 (D. Mass.

1987).

II. DISCUSSION

A. David Wright Appears To Have Unique First Hand Knowledge of Relevant

Information

In the present case, Plaintiff has submitted evidence suggesting that David Wright has at least

some unique first hand knowledge of relevant facts. Just days before being placed on administrative

leave, Plaintiff had sent two long emails to both Wright and George Purnell (the head of Legato’s

HR department at the time Plaintiff was fired), expressing among other things his fear that Legato

was about to terminate his employment because he had raised certain concerns about Legato’s

financial reporting. Approximately two weeks after being placed on leave, George Purnell, the head

of Legato’s human resources department at the time Plaintiff was fired, sent an email to Plaintiff

stating: “David, I had an opportunity to discuss your situation with both Noah Mesel and David

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ORDER, page 3

Wright today.” Plaintiff has attempted to discover information about Purnell’s conversation with

Wright by deposing Purnell. However, Purnell was evasive at best about the conversation and

claimed he did not recall anything about it. (Noah Mesel is apparently an attorney, and EMC

asserted privilege objections to Plaintiff asking Purnell what he discussed with Mesel.) 

Plaintiff has also shown that just a few months before he was fired, Wright certified in

Legato’s 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission that he, along with the other

certifying officers, had “designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material

information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by

others within those entities... .” (Declaration of Kathryn Burkett Dickson in Opposition to EMC’s

Motion for Protective Order Preventing Deposition of David Wright, Exh. 10 at DEF-00214.)

Finally, Plaintiff has shown that during the relevant time period Legato and EMC were

negotiating a merger, and that there was at least some consideration of Legato’s renewal rates (which

Plaintiff was raising concerns about) in those negotiations.

In light of the foregoing, it is reasonable for Plaintiff to explore at a minimum what Wright’s

reaction to his emails was, what Wright discussed with the head of HR regarding Plaintiff’s

“situation,” whether the information Plaintiff brought to Wright’s attention raised any concerns in

Wright’s mind in connection with the EMC merger negotiations, and if so, whether any such

concerns played any part in Legato’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.

B. DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN GOOD CAUSE TO PREVENT THE DEPOSITION

Defendant has not carried its burden of showing that the deposition of David Wright would

impose any undue burden on either Defendant or Wright. The declaration submitted by David

Wright provides no information regarding the number of hours he works, nor the number of days per

month he travels. Wright’s conclusory assertion that it would be an “extreme hardship” for him to

attend his deposition is insufficient to outweigh Plaintiff’s right to test Wright’s claims of lack of

knowledge and lack of recollection.

Dated: 9/23/05

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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