Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01323/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01323-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICARDO A. WHITE, SR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KING, et.al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F05 1323 AWI LJO P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM 

Ricardo A. White, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil action. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a remedy for

violation of civil rights by federal actors. Plaintiff filed the instant action on October 20, 2005,

naming Officer King, SIS Officer Cole, Warden Schultz, and the United States of America as

Defendants. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff states that on October 11, 2004, while confined at the U.S. Penitentiary in

Atwater, California, Officer King deliberately and with malice closed an electronic steel metal

door on Plaintiff while he was standing in the doorway resulting in serious injury to his back and

violating his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff alleges that he filed

grievances and a tort claim in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. On November 12,

2004, Officer Cole contacted Plaintiff and threatened to place him in the Special Housing Unit

because of his filing grievances against Officer King. Plaintiff states these threats violated his

First and Eighth Amendment rights. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

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to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

2. Eighth Amendment

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and

responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim,” and “deliberate indifference to medical needs” violates the Eighth

Amendment “only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to these

types of claims, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay

for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” 

Id. at 9 (quotations and citations omitted). With respect to excessive force claims, however, the

malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of

decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v.

Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force standard examines

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de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)).

Here, although Plaintiff states that he was injured by Defendant King, he fails to provide

sufficient facts giving rise to an Eighth Amendment violation for cruel and unusual punishment. 

2. Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

FTCA liability is alleged under theories of public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass,

and negligence. 

In this case, Plaintiff not only fails to identify the tort under which he intends to proceed,

but he fails to allege sufficient facts so as to support any recognizable tort claim. To the extent

Plaintiff is intending to allege a claim of negligence, he fails to allege facts sufficient to give rise

to a negligence claim. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to link any named Defendant to an act or

omission giving rise to any allegation of negligence. 

3. Retaliation

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support a claim under Section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9 Cir. 2003. "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation th

entails five elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir.2005) (citations

omitted). 

In assessing the fourth requirement, the court at the pleading stage should ask " 'whether

an official's acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First

Amendment activities." ' Id. at 568, quoting Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino

County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir.1999). "The 'government' to which the First Amendment

guarantees a right of redress of grievances includes prison authorities, as it includes other

administrative arms and units of government." Bradley v. Hall,64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th

Cir.1995), citing Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1989). An

allegation that a defendant subjected a prisoner to "[v]erbal harassment or abuse ... is not

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sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero,

830 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir.1987) (internal quotations omitted). However, in the context of a

prisoner's retaliation claim, threats of discipline or transfer for the plaintiff's exercise of his First

Amendment rights are sufficient adverse action to state a claim. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d

1118, 1123 (9th Cir.2001); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir.1989).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Cole had him transferred to USP Victorville in

retaliation for filing claims against Defendant King. (Compl.at 6.) Plaintiff’s allegation is

sufficient to state a cognizable claim against Defendant Cole for retaliation. 

4. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege

some facts that would support a claim that supervisory Defendants either: personally participated

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts

must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that Defendants personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v.

Black at 646. 

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5. Official Capacity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars his claims for monetary damages against federal

government entities and federal officials sued in their official capacities. “It is axiomatic that the

United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a

prerequisite for jurisdiction. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). “Absent a 

waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d

89, 103 (D.C.Cir.1984) (concluding that sovereign immunity “bar[s] suits for money damages

against officials in their official capacity absent a specific waiver by the government”); see Kline

v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F.Supp. 1313, 1317 (D.D.C.1985) (Federal Tort Claims Act does

not waive immunity for constitutional tort violations allegedly committed by government

employees). “[T]he United States simply has not rendered itself liable ··· for constitutional tort

claims.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478 (concluding that constitutional tort

claim brought under Federal Tort Claims Act not cognizable). Accordingly, Plaintiff may not

proceed in this action against federal government officials or employees in their official

capacities. 

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendant Cole for retaliation. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain any

other cognizable claims for relief. As such, the Court will grant Plaintiff the opportunity to file

an Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies, or, in the alternative, notify the Court in writing

whether Plaintiff intends to proceed directly with those claims found to be cognizable. Plaintiff

should note that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint be complete in itself

without reference to prior pleadings. 

In the event Plaintiff wishes to proceed on the cognizable claims, the Court will issue

Findings and Recommendations to dismiss those claims not cognizable. The Court will then

forward Plaintiff a summons and USM-285 form to fill out and return to the Court in order to

effect service on the Defendants. Upon the return of these forms, the Court will direct the US

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Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendants. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within THIRTY (30) days

from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL either:

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and instead wishes to proceed on the cognizable claims for

relief set forth in this Order.

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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