Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-19-99011/USCOURTS-ca9-19-99011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN CATLIN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

RONALD BROOMFIELD, Warden, 

San Quentin State Prison, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 19-99011 

D.C. No. 

1:07-cv-01466-

LJO-SAB 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of California 

Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 26, 2024

San Francisco, California 

Filed December 24, 2024

Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., RYAN D. NELSON, and 

PATRICK J. BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

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2 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of 

California state prisoner Steven Catlin’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

habeas corpus petition challenging his 1990 conviction for 

murdering his fourth wife and his adoptive mother, as well 

as his death sentence.

The panel concluded that the standard of review set forth 

in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act applies 

to Catlin’s claims because they were adjudicated on the 

merits by the California Supreme Court (CSC). That is true 

even though the CSC rejected some claims in Catlin’s state 

habeas petition as procedurally barred because they had 

already been resolved in Catlin’s first state habeas petition.

The panel held: (1) the CSC acted reasonably in 

rejecting Catlin’s claims of error arising from the state trial 

judge’s ex parte discussion with a juror; (2) the CSC acted 

reasonably in concluding that there was no ineffective 

assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of Catlin’s trial; and 

(3) the CSC acted reasonably in concluding that there was 

no ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of 

Catlin’s trial.

The panel declined to issue a certificate of appealability 

as to Catlin’s uncertified claim that the state violated his due 

process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence and 

presenting false evidence.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 3

COUNSEL

Saor E. Stetler (argued), Law Offices of Saor E. Stetler, Mill 

Valley, California; Richard G. Novak, Law Offices of 

Richard G. Novak, Berkeley, California; for PetitionerAppellant.

Kenneth N. Sokoler (argued) and Tami K. Krenzin, 

Supervising Deputy Attorneys General; Sean M. McCoy and 

Ross K. Naughton, Deputy Attorneys General; James W. 

Bilderback II, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rob 

Bonta, Attorney General of California; Office of the 

California Attorney General, Sacramento, California; for 

Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

California state prisoner Steven Catlin appeals the 

district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus 

petition. In two separate trials, Catlin was convicted of 

murdering three family members with paraquat, a poisonous 

agricultural herbicide. The § 2254 petition in this case

challenges Catlin’s 1990 conviction for murdering his fourth 

wife, Joyce Catlin, and his adoptive mother, Martha Catlin, 

as well as his death sentence. 

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the petition. 

Like the district court, we conclude that (1) the California 

Supreme Court (CSC) acted reasonably in rejecting Catlin’s 

claims of error arising from the state trial judge’s ex parte 

discussion with a juror; (2) the CSC acted reasonably in 

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4 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

concluding that there was no ineffective assistance of 

counsel at the guilt phase of Catlin’s trial; and (3) the CSC

acted reasonably in concluding that there was no ineffective 

assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of Catlin’s trial. 

We also decline to issue a certificate of appealability as to 

Catlin’s uncertified claim that the State violated his due 

process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), by withholding 

exculpatory evidence and presenting false evidence. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Factual History of Catlin’s Crimes1

Steven Catlin has been convicted of three murders: the 

1976 murder of his fourth wife, Joyce Catlin; the 1984 

murder of his adoptive mother, Martha Catlin; and the 1984 

murder of his fifth wife, Glenna Kaye Catlin. The habeas 

petition in this case relates to Catlin’s convictions for the 

murders of Joyce and Martha,2 and the death sentence 

handed down for the murder of Martha. Catlin was 

separately tried, convicted, and sentenced to life 

imprisonment for the death of Glenna, and neither his 

conviction nor his sentence for that crime are at issue here. 

However, the facts underlying Catlin’s murder of Glenna are

1 The following factual history is drawn from the CSC’s opinion in 

People v. Catlin, 26 Cal. 4th 81 (2001), as well as “the record before us,”

Fauber v. Davis, 43 F.4th 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2022). We presume that the 

CSC’s findings are correct unless those findings are rebutted by clear 

and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Atwood 

v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 2017).

2 Because Catlin’s wives and his mother share the same surname as 

Catlin, we primarily refer to them by their first names in this opinion.

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 5

relevant because they were presented to the jury at the guilt 

phase of the trial at issue.

3 

A. The Murder of Joyce Catlin

In 1973, Catlin married Joyce, his fourth wife. 

Throughout their marriage, Catlin engaged in extramarital 

affairs, which led to arguments between Catlin and Joyce.

In April 1976, Joyce developed flu-like symptoms and 

was admitted to a hospital in Bakersfield, eventually being 

placed in the intensive care unit. Joyce complained of back 

pain, vomiting, and a sore throat. Doctors, including a lung 

specialist, determined that her lungs were affected, and they 

treated her for a possible viral or bacterial infection with no 

success. Eventually, Joyce’s lungs stopped providing 

sufficient oxygen for her body to function, and she required 

mechanical ventilation. On May 6, 1976—nineteen days 

after her admission to the hospital—Joyce’s lungs failed, and 

she died. 

The pathologist who performed the autopsy observed 

that Joyce’s lungs were extremely heavy and fibrotic, and he 

found no indication of viral or bacterial infection that could 

have caused her death. Joyce’s lung specialist believed that 

the cause of death was pulmonary fibrosis—where the lungs 

develop massive scarring and cannot function. He could not

identify any natural cause for this condition. 

Although it was not listed on Joyce’s death certificate, 

several physicians suspected that she had been fatally 

poisoned with paraquat, a highly toxic herbicide used for 

controlling weeds. According to a clinical toxicologist who 

3 However, the jury was not informed that Catlin had been convicted for 

the murder of Glenna until the penalty phase.

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6 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

testified at Catlin’s trial, when paraquat is ingested, the 

victim usually experiences a burning sensation in the mouth, 

followed by nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. About a week 

after ingestion, paraquat begins to attack the lungs and the 

lungs develop fibrotic scarring.

Multiple experts testified at trial that they believed 

Joyce’s death was caused by paraquat poisoning. Joyce’s 

lung specialist believed that Joyce was killed by paraquat 

poisoning, in part based on Joyce’s course of symptoms, the 

post-mortem appearance of her lungs, and the lack of any 

natural agent that could have caused her death. A different 

expert in lung pathology concluded that fibrosis had almost 

destroyed Joyce’s lung tissue, that the fibrosis had been 

caused by a chemical, and that the only chemical that could 

produce such fibrotic scarring was paraquat. The lung 

pathologist noted that a colleague opined that Joyce’s lung 

tissue constituted a “perfect example of paraquat poisoning.” 

The clinical toxicologist testified that Joyce’s course of 

symptoms was consistent with paraquat poisoning. In 

addition, the Chief Medical Examiner of the City and County 

of San Francisco also testified that Joyce had died of 

paraquat poisoning. 

At the time of Joyce’s death, there were no toxicological 

tests that could identify the presence of paraquat after more 

than seventy-two hours had passed from administration. 

Moreover, the fact that Joyce’s lung tissues were preserved 

in formalin made it impossible to conduct later testing.

Although access to paraquat was controlled under state 

law at the time of Joyce’s death, Catlin had access to the 

poison in 1976 and 1977 when he worked as a mechanic for 

Superior Farming, an agricultural company. Multiple 

witnesses recalled Catlin’s familiarity with paraquat and the 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 7

peril that it posed. The year before Joyce’s death, Catlin had 

warned Joyce’s son about the dangers of paraquat and 

warned him not to enter Catlin’s garage because it contained 

dangerous agricultural poisons. Additionally, some years 

earlier, Catlin had shown his second wife’s father a vial of 

poison that Catlin said would kill anything or anybody, one 

he thought would be an ideal tool for a “perfect murder”

because it was undetectable and had no antidote. 

At the time of her death, Joyce participated in the Credit 

Life Program at the Kern Federal Credit Union, and the 

proceeds of that program were used to pay off a debt on an 

automobile owned by the couple. Additionally, according to 

the CSC, Joyce had an insurance policy paying up to $2,000 

and a $5,000 insurance policy, the benefits of which were 

paid to Catlin.

B. The Murder of Martha Catlin

Martha was Catlin’s adoptive mother, and Catlin 

regularly visited her. Catlin visited his mother on December 

2, 1984. On December 6, Martha phoned a friend to request 

assistance because she was seriously ill. Her friend observed 

that Martha appeared very sick and had swollen purple lips 

as well as dark circles under her eyes. When Martha arrived 

at the doctor’s office, her tongue and throat were reddishpurple, and she had a fever. She died fewer than two days 

later at the age of seventy-nine.

Toxicological testing revealed that Martha had ingested 

a significant amount of paraquat. Multiple experts testified 

that paraquat poisoning had killed Martha, even though she 

did not have the same severe fibrosis that Joyce exhibited. 

Some experts opined that this was because Martha had died 

early in the course of paraquat poisoning due to her frailty. 

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8 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

At Catlin’s trial for the murders of Joyce and Martha, the 

State presented evidence that Catlin had grown tired of

caring for Martha (as well as traveling from Fresno to 

Bakersfield to visit her), and that he had made statements 

indicating that he wished she would “hurry up and die.” 

Catlin was also concerned that Martha was planning to alter 

her will to make the African Violet Society, rather than him, 

her primary beneficiary. At the time of Martha’s death, 

Catlin was still the sole beneficiary of her will.

There were other possible sources of tension between 

Martha and Catlin, including Catlin’s many marriages and

(according to Catlin’s third wife Edith Ballew) Martha’s 

repeated threats to leave Catlin out of her will. Furthermore, 

Catlin had retained possession of money that he had 

withdrawn from his mother’s account even though that 

money was intended to be used as a down payment on a new 

home for Martha. The parties presented evidence that, when 

Catlin was a child, Martha made him dress in girls’ clothing

and made him feel that Martha wished she had adopted a girl 

instead. 

C. The Murder of Glenna Kaye Catlin

Catlin had already been tried, convicted, and sentenced 

to life imprisonment for the murder of his fifth wife, Glenna 

Kaye Catlin, by the time of trial in this case. But the facts 

underlying Glenna’s death remain relevant because they 

were reported to the jury at the guilt phase and the jury 

learned of his conviction at the penalty phase. 

The marriage between Catlin and Glenna was rocky: 

Catlin viewed it as a marriage of convenience and had been 

unfaithful, which made Glenna jealous. On February 16, 

1984, Catlin and Glenna had a public argument, and Catlin 

was described as “smirk[ing]” at Glenna.

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 9

A few days after the argument, Glenna became ill. After 

an illness spanning several weeks, Glenna died on March 14. 

Subsequent toxicological testing showed that Glenna had 

died of paraquat poisoning. Some years before Glenna’s 

death, Catlin had warned Glenna’s half-brother about the 

dangers of paraquat, including that it could damage the 

lungs. 

After Glenna’s death, Catlin received a substantial life 

insurance payout of over $55,000. He also exhibited high 

spirits after Glenna’s death even though he had displayed 

grief at her funeral. 

D. Discovery of the Paraquat Bottle

After Catlin was arrested, his former father-in-law, 

Glenn Emery (Glenna’s stepfather), searched his automotive 

business at the urging of law enforcement. Catlin had access 

to the business because it was located on property where he

had lived and worked. Law enforcement had not previously 

searched that area based on Emery’s representation that he 

was familiar with the premises and would have found 

paraquat (or any other evidence) if there had been anything

to find. But in a later conversation, law enforcement 

officials urged Emery to search the shared premises.

In the subsequent search, Emery found a bottle of 

paraquat in a cabinet. The bottle had been filled or 

manufactured in April 1977 (after the death of Joyce but 

before the deaths of Martha and Glenna). Catlin’s 

fingerprint was on the cap of the paraquat bottle.

Alfred Bettencourt, Catlin’s auto shop partner, testified 

that he had seen that bottle in a box when he and Catlin were 

moving Catlin’s auto shop from the premises shared with 

Emery to a different location, about a month before Glenna’s 

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10 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

death. Bettencourt asked Catlin what to do with the box 

containing the bottle, and Catlin told him to put it back where 

he found it. 

E. The Jailhouse Informant

While Catlin was being held in the Kern County Jail after 

being arrested (likely for the murder of Joyce), he met an 

inmate named Conward Hardin. Hardin, a jailhouse 

informant, later related to law enforcement that Catlin 

solicited his assistance in intimidating Edith Ballew, Catlin’s 

third wife, who had been a driving force in the investigation 

and prosecution of Catlin. The goal was to persuade Edith 

not to testify, and Catlin suggested that Hardin could wear a 

mask and use a weapon to “persuade” Edith. Hardin also 

reported that, during a conversation with Hardin about their 

difficulties with women, Catlin had stated, “I killed the 

bitches.” But Hardin did not recall much of that 

conversation. 

II. Procedural History

A. Catlin’s 1990 Kern Trial

There was suspicion of foul play following Joyce’s death 

in 1976, but her murder was not prosecuted until some years

later—following the 1984 deaths of Glenna and Martha. 

This delay was due to several factors: the limits of laboratory 

testing, the fact that her tissues were preserved in a manner 

that precluded paraquat testing, and the early caution of 

medical and pathological experts concerning whether they 

could confidently offer an opinion on the cause of Joyce’s 

death. Ultimately, Catlin was charged with the deaths of 

Joyce and Martha in an information filed in Kern County on 

December 23, 1985. The information charged several 

special circumstances for the death of Martha, including that 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 11

Martha had been murdered for financial gain, the murder 

was committed with poison, and the defendant had 

committed more than one murder. 

Catlin’s trial for the deaths of Joyce and Martha (the 

Kern Trial) began on April 23, 1990. Catlin was represented 

in the Kern Trial by attorneys Dominic Eyherabide and 

Michael Dellostritto.4 During the guilt phase of the trial, the 

jury heard testimony from a variety of witnesses, including 

members of law enforcement, doctors and other medical 

personnel, members of Glenna’s family, acquaintances of 

Catlin, Catlin himself, and—particularly important to 

Catlin’s habeas petition—Hardin, the jailhouse informant. 

Catlin’s defense was that he did not poison anyone and 

never knowingly possessed paraquat. He also contended 

that, based on his experts’ testimony regarding the timeline 

of paraquat poisoning, it was impossible for him to have 

poisoned Martha or Glenna. Catlin, who testified in his own 

defense, also tried to paint his relationship with his adoptive 

mother in a positive light, contending that Martha never 

threatened to cut him out of her will. In the same vein, he 

denied that he ever told an acquaintance that his mother 

wished she had adopted a girl or that his mother had dressed 

him in girl’s clothing during his childhood. Catlin also 

presented evidence that his business ventures were 

succeeding, so he lacked a financial motive for the crimes. 

On June 1, 1990, the jury found Catlin guilty of two 

counts of first-degree murder. As to Count 2 (which related 

to the murder of Martha), the jury found true the special 

circumstances that Catlin murdered Martha for financial 

4 Eyherabide’s surname is spelled differently at several points in the 

record. We use the spelling that appears most frequently. 

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12 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

gain, that he did so by the administration of poison, and that 

Catlin had committed multiple murders. See Cal. Penal 

Code § 190.2(a)(1), (3), (19) (West 1989).

The penalty phase took place a few days later. As part 

of the aggravation evidence introduced, Catlin stipulated that 

he had previously been convicted of the first-degree murder 

of Glenna. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(2) (West 1989). 

The State also presented evidence from Catlin’s first wife, 

who testified that Catlin had physically assaulted and choked 

her.

Catlin’s defense counsel presented mitigation evidence. 

Specifically, defense counsel presented the testimony of 

several witnesses: members of a family that Catlin had 

guided and mentored; testimony from a woman whose child 

was saved by Catlin; a psychologist’s opinion about Catlin’s 

good behavior while incarcerated; and prison officials who 

testified as to Catlin’s good behavior and valuable

contributions to the prison workforce. 

The jury deliberated for less than two-and-a-half hours 

before returning a sentence of death for Martha’s murder. 

The state trial court determined that the weight of the 

evidence supported the jury’s findings and verdicts and 

observed that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed 

the mitigating circumstances. It accordingly ordered that 

“the penalty of death is to be inflicted upon the defendant.” 

On automatic appeal, the CSC affirmed Catlin’s 

conviction and sentence. People v. Catlin, 26 Cal. 4th 81

(2001). The CSC later denied Catlin’s petition for rehearing. 

The United States Supreme Court denied Catlin’s petition 

for a writ of certiorari. 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 13

B. Catlin’s Collateral Challenges 

Catlin filed his first state habeas petition in 2000. This 

petition included most of the claims that are now at issue in 

this appeal. The CSC summarily denied the petition in 2007. 

It denied most of Catlin’s claims on the merits, but also 

rejected some of the claims on procedural grounds. 

In 2008, Catlin filed the operative federal habeas petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition raised over sixty 

different claims, challenging various aspects of the guilt and 

penalty phases, as well as other aspects of the proceedings 

against Catlin. As relevant here, Claims 10 and 11 in the 

petition alleged constitutional error arising from an ex parte

conversation between the trial judge and a juror. Claim 23 

alleged that the State had violated its constitutional 

obligations pursuant to Brady and Napue by failing to 

disclose impeachment information relating to Hardin. Claim 

23 further alleged that the State had presented false 

testimony regarding the benefits received by Hardin in 

exchange for his testimony. Claim 26(A) alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel at the guilt phase due to defense 

counsel’s failure to properly impeach Hardin. Claim 35, 

including all subclaims, alleged ineffective assistance of 

counsel at the penalty phase. Subclaim 35(F) was a claim of 

cumulative error from the purported ineffective assistance at 

the penalty phase.

After Catlin filed his § 2254 petition, the district court 

ordered the federal action held in abeyance pursuant to 

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), while Catlin 

exhausted some of his claims in state court. Catlin then filed 

his second state habeas petition, which raised many of the 

same claims as his first state habeas petition, as well as some 

new ones. In 2013, the CSC summarily denied the petition. 

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14 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

It rejected some of Catlin’s challenges on the merits, 

including subclaim 35(F). It rejected other claims—

including Claims 10, 11, 23, 26, and 35(A)–(C)—as 

procedurally barred for a variety of reasons, including that 

they were untimely or had been raised in Catlin’s first state 

habeas petition.5

Catlin returned to federal court, where he filed a motion 

for discovery and evidentiary development. The State filed 

its answer to Catlin’s § 2254 petition, and the motion and 

petition were fully briefed. 

On December 17, 2019, the district court denied Catlin’s 

petition and his motion for discovery and evidentiary 

development. The district court granted a certificate of 

appealability (COA) on Claims 10, 11, 26(A), 35(A), 35(B), 

35(C), and 35(F). Catlin timely filed a notice of appeal. 

5 Before the district court, the State asserted that the CSC’s conclusion 

that many of Catlin’s claims were procedurally barred for various 

reasons, including untimeliness, foreclosed federal habeas relief because 

those procedural bars constituted “adequate and independent grounds” 

to bar review. The State is correct that, as a general matter, federal 

review of procedurally defaulted claims is barred unless the habeas 

petitioner can show cause for the default and actual prejudice (or that a 

failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage 

of justice). See Rodney v. Filson, 916 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 2019). 

But the State has not invoked any procedural bars on appeal, so it has 

forfeited any reliance on them. See McDermott v. Johnson, 85 F.4th 898, 

907 (9th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. McDermott v. Cruz, --- S. Ct. 

----, 2024 WL 4655012 (Nov. 4, 2024) (mem.); see also Clark v. 

Chappell, 936 F.3d 944, 982 (9th Cir. 2019). We accordingly decline to 

reach the question of whether the procedural bars applied by the CSC 

foreclose any of the habeas relief sought by Catlin.

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 15

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Jurisdiction

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (AEDPA), which indisputably applies to Catlin’s 

habeas petition,6 circumscribes our ability to hear appeals in 

habeas corpus proceedings. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 

U.S. 134, 140 (2012); Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 993 

(9th Cir. 2010). Specifically, “before a federal court may 

entertain an appeal from a ‘final order in a habeas corpus 

proceeding,’ a petitioner ‘must first seek and obtain’” a

COA. Rose v. Guyer, 961 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(citations omitted) (first quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); 

then quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–36 

(2003)). “A COA is a ‘jurisdictional prerequisite,’ which 

serves a ‘gatekeeping function’ by ‘screen[ing] out issues 

unworthy of judicial time and attention and ensur[ing] that 

frivolous claims are not assigned to merits panels.’” Id.

(alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting 

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336; then quoting Thaler, 565 U.S. at

145). 

Here, the district court granted a COA on Claims 10, 11, 

26(A), and subclaims A, B, C, and F of Claim 35. We 

accordingly have jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253. See, e.g., Hart v. Broomfield, 

97 F.4th 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2024). 

However, Catlin’s appellate briefing also includes 

arguments related to Claim 23—a claim on which the district 

court did not issue a COA. We accordingly lack jurisdiction 

6 Catlin’s federal habeas petition was filed in 2008, well after AEDPA’s 

April 24, 1996, effective date. Thus, AEDPA applies to his petition. See 

Clark v. Broomfield, 83 F.4th 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2023). 

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16 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

to rule in the first instance on Catlin’s arguments related to 

Claim 23. See Payton v. Davis, 906 F.3d 812, 818 (9th Cir. 

2018). But “[w]hen a brief includes uncertified issues, we 

may treat it as a request to expand the scope of the certificate 

of appealability.” Robertson v. Pichon, 849 F.3d 1173, 1187 

(9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 

919, 930 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Ninth Circuit Rule 22-

1(e). 

“Under AEDPA, a certificate of appealability . . . cannot 

be issued or expanded unless ‘the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’” 

Robertson, 849 F.3d at 1187 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2)). “‘We look to the District Court’s application 

of AEDPA to [the petitioner’s] constitutional claims,’ and 

[the petitioner] ‘must demonstrate that reasonable jurists 

would find the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims debatable or wrong’ in light of 

AEDPA.” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Miller-El, 537 

U.S. at 336, 338). 

II. Standard of Review

“We review a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 petition de novo.” Fauber v. Davis, 43 F.4th 987, 

996 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bolin v. Davis, 13 F.4th 797, 

804 (9th Cir. 2021)), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2585 (2023) 

(mem.). But because Catlin’s petition is subject to AEDPA, 

we must review Catlin’s claims under the deferential 

standard set out by that statute. See id. 

“Under AEDPA, we must defer to the state court’s 

decision on any claim adjudicated on the merits unless the 

decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application’ of ‘clearly established Federal law’ or was 

‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 17

of the evidence presented.’” Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 

1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

This deferential standard “reflects the view that habeas 

corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error 

correction through appeal.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 

86, 102–03 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 

judgment)). 

Section 2254(d)(1) permits habeas relief when the state 

court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Fauber, 43 F.4th at 

996. “Under § 2254(d)(1), ‘clearly established’ ‘refers to the 

holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s 

decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’” 

Marks v. Davis, 106 F.4th 941, 949 (9th Cir. 2024) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 71 (2003)). “A state court’s decision is ‘contrary 

to’ clearly established federal law ‘if the state court arrives 

at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case 

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts.’” Id. (alterations in 

original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413

(2000)). “A state court’s decision involves ‘an unreasonable 

application’ of clearly established federal law ‘if the state 

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from 

[the Supreme] Court’s decision but unreasonably applies 

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). 

Under the unreasonable-application prong, “[t]he state 

court’s application of federal law must stand unless it was 

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18 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Fauber, 43 F.4th at 996–97

(quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99 (2002)). This

standard is intentionally “challenging . . . to meet.” Bolin, 

13 F.4th at 805. To satisfy this standard, a petitioner “must 

show far more than that the state court’s decision was merely 

wrong or even clear error.” Fauber, 43 F.4th at 996 (quoting 

Bolin, 13 F.4th at 804). “Instead, ‘[t]he prisoner must show 

that the state court’s decision is so obviously wrong that its 

error lies “beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.”’” Bolin, 13 F.4th at 805 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020)

(per curiam)). 

Notably, this standard applies even where the state’s 

highest court summarily denies the petitioner’s state habeas 

claims on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 

187 (2011); Fauber, 43 F.4th at 999. Thus, even when the 

“state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, 

the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing 

there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Fauber, 43 F.4th at 999 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. 

at 98). In these situations, our inquiry is two-fold: “what 

arguments or theories . . . could have supported the state 

court’s decision,” and then “whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 

theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision 

of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. (omission and alteration in 

original) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102). 

We conclude that the AEDPA standard of review applies 

to Catlin’s claims because they were adjudicated on the 

merits by the CSC.

7 That is true even though the CSC 

7 There is some complexity associated with whether subclaim 35(F), 

which asserts a claim of cumulative error related to ineffective assistance 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 19

rejected some claims—including Claims 10, 11, 23, 26(A), 

and 35(A) through (C)—in Catlin’s second state habeas 

petition as procedurally barred because they had already 

been resolved in Catlin’s first state habeas petition. See 

Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 466 (2009) (“When a state court 

declines to review the merits of a petitioner’s claim on the 

ground that it has done so already, it creates no bar to federal 

habeas review.”); see also Guillory v. Allen, 38 F.4th 849, 

856 (9th Cir. 2022). 

We reject Catlin’s argument that AEDPA is inapplicable

because the summary denial of his claims without the 

opportunity for evidentiary development indicates that there 

was no adjudication on the merits. As a starting point, this 

argument was not raised with any clarity until Catlin’s reply 

brief, which is reason enough for us to decline to consider it. 

See Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 959 (9th Cir. 

2021) (“[B]y failing to develop the argument in his opening 

brief, Iraheta forfeited it.”); Rowland v. Chappell, 876 F.3d 

of counsel at the penalty phase, was adjudicated on the merits in response 

to Catlin’s first state habeas petition or his second. The CSC’s 2013

summary denial of Catlin’s second state habeas petition indicated that it 

was denying subclaim 35(F) on the merits. But claims that were 

substantively the same as subclaims 35(A), 35(B), and 35(C) were 

denied on the merits in the first habeas petition. If subclaim 35(F) was 

“sufficiently related” to or “intertwined” with these claims, it would have 

been considered raised in the first habeas petition. See Wooten v. 

Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). This appears to be the 

position that Catlin takes on appeal. But we need not decide which of 

the two CSC denials—the 2007 opinion rejecting the first state habeas 

petition or the 2013 opinion rejecting the second state habeas petition—

is the operative one with respect to subclaim 35(F) because the AEDPA 

standard of review would apply in either circumstance. See Avena, 932 

F.3d at 1247.

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20 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

1174, 1193 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Rowland has waived this 

argument by not raising it in his opening brief.”).

But even overlooking Catlin’s waiver, this argument 

fails. As explained above, the AEDPA standard of review 

applies to summary merits denials of a petitioner’s claims. 

See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 187; Fauber, 43 F.4th at 999. 

Contrary to Catlin’s contentions, this rule applies even 

where a state’s highest court—including the CSC—has 

summarily determined, without holding an evidentiary 

hearing, that a party has failed to state a prima facie case. 

See Ochoa v. Davis (Ochoa II), 50 F.4th 865, 888 (9th Cir. 

2022), cert. denied sub nom. Ochoa v. Smith, 144 S. Ct. 381 

(2023) (mem.); see also Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 187; Bolin, 

13 F.4th at 805. Indeed, we recently addressed this specific 

question and concluded that “the California Supreme 

Court’s summary denial . . . is a decision on the merits and 

thus entitled to AEDPA deference.” Ochoa II, 50 F.4th at 

888. 

Thus, we must view all of Catlin’s claims through the 

deferential prism of AEDPA review.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Catlin raises arguments on all claims covered 

by the district court’s certificate of appealability—Claims

10, 11, 26(A), and subclaims (A), (B), (C), and (F) of Claim 

35. He also seeks to expand his COA to encompass 

Claim 23. 

All of Catlin’s claims are meritless. As to the certified 

claims, Catlin has not shown that the CSC acted contrary to 

or unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. As 

to Catlin’s request to expand his certificate of appealability, 

we conclude that no reasonable jurist could debate the 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 21

district court’s resolution of Claim 23. We thus affirm the 

district court’s denial of Catlin’s § 2254 habeas petition.

I. Certified Claims

A. Claims 10 and 11

1. Overview

Claims 10 and 11 arise from an incident that occurred 

during the guilt phase of Catlin’s Kern Trial. Specifically, 

Catlin contends that during the Kern Trial, one juror became 

concerned after Hardin, the jailhouse informant, apparently 

followed her for several blocks after the trial adjourned for 

the day. The juror was frightened and intimidated, and she 

brought the incident to the attention of the state trial judge 

and bailiff. The trial judge questioned her about the incident 

in the presence of other jurors—but apparently not in the 

presence of defense counsel. The trial judge stated that 

“[t]his won’t be tolerated.” The trial judge later informed 

the juror that Hardin “was supposed to be taking the bus to 

Fresno” and that “nothing would happen to [her].” This 

interaction was not captured in the trial transcript; instead, 

Catlin relies on juror declarations, including a declaration 

from the juror who was concerned that Hardin was following 

her.

Claim 10 alleges that the ex parte communication 

between the trial judge and the juror, outside of the presence 

of defense counsel, violated Catlin’s due process rights, as 

well as a variety of other rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Eighth Amendments. The focus of Claim 10 is that this 

event resulted in the denial of Catlin’s right to an impartial 

jury. According to Catlin, the exclusion of him and his 

defense counsel from the communication with the juror 

constituted structural error. Claim 11 alleges that the ex 

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22 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

parte communication resulted in the denial of Catlin’s right 

to counsel during a critical stage of the proceeding. 

Catlin originally raised these claims in his first state 

habeas petition, and the CSC summarily denied them on the 

merits. In his second habeas petition, Catlin raised these 

claims again, and the CSC dismissed them as untimely, 

successive, and repetitive. As such, the AEDPA standard of 

review applies. See Cone, 556 U.S. at 466.

The district court rejected Claims 10 and 11 (along with 

several related claims that Catlin does not press on appeal). 

Regarding Claim 10, the district court concluded that the 

CSC could have reasonably rejected Catlin’s due-process 

claims and observed that the claims would fail even under a 

de novo standard. The district court reasoned that the ex 

parte communication, which was short, was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt and did not rise to the level of 

structural error. The district court also reasoned that the 

alleged incident would be more likely to prejudice the State, 

which had called Hardin as a witness, than Catlin. 

Regarding Claim 11, the district court determined that 

the CSC reasonably could have concluded that there was no 

denial of Catlin’s right to counsel. It reasoned that, in light 

of the minor nature of the ex parte communication, the CSC 

could conclude that the communication “did not deny

[Catlin] a fair trial or constitute a critical stage of the trial.” 

And even if there was error, the CSC could reasonably find 

it harmless. 

2. Analysis

Under AEDPA, Catlin must show that the CSC acted 

contrary to or unreasonably applied clearly established 

federal law in rejecting Claims 10 and 11. Catlin cannot 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 23

make this showing: to the contrary, the CSC’s denial of these 

claims fully accords with applicable Supreme Court 

precedent. 

In Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 (1983) (per 

curiam), the Supreme Court made clear that “[w]hen an ex 

parte communication,” including a judge’s discussion with 

a juror, “relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge 

generally should disclose the communication to counsel for 

all parties.” But it also made clear that ex parte

communications do not necessarily entitle a criminal 

defendant to relief; instead, like most trial errors, improper 

ex parte communications are subject to harmless-error 

review. See id. at 118–19; see also Medina v. Hornung, 386 

F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Improper ex parte remarks 

made by the judge to the jury are subject to harmless error 

analysis.”).

In this case, we need not decide whether the state trial 

judge’s ex parte communication with the juror was

improper. Even assuming that the communication 

constituted error, the CSC reasonably could have concluded 

that the error was harmless. 

Indeed, it is hard to see how there could be prejudice to 

Catlin’s case under the circumstances of the ex parte

communication here. As the district court observed, the 

brief ex parte communication revealed information that was 

likely to accrue in Catlin’s favor—namely, that a 

prosecution witness (Hardin) had possibly followed a juror. 

This evidence would be more likely to cause the jury to look 

with disfavor on Hardin, a prosecution witness, than it would 

be to have any negative effect on Catlin’s defense.

Notably, Catlin does not develop any argument that there 

was actual prejudice to him stemming from the ex parte

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24 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

communication. He has thus waived any argument that there 

was actual prejudice. See Iraheta-Martinez, 12 F.4th at 959; 

Rowland, 876 F.3d at 1193 n.6. Instead, he contends that a 

showing of prejudice was unnecessary for two reasons. Both 

are unavailing. 

Catlin first insists that, due to the lack of a record about

what was actually said between the trial judge and the juror, 

the ex parte communication constituted structural error 

requiring reversal regardless of prejudice. Put differently, 

Catlin contends that the ex parte communication was a 

“structural defect[] in the constitution of the trial 

mechanism, which def[ies] analysis by ‘harmless-error’ 

standards.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 

(1991). 

Catlin’s argument, which relies heavily on outdated case 

law, is squarely foreclosed by Rushen. There, the Supreme 

Court rejected the position that “an unrecorded ex parte 

communication between trial judge and juror can never be 

harmless error,” observing that such a rule would 

“ignore[] . . . day-to-day realities of courtroom life” and 

“undermine[] society’s interest in the administration of 

criminal justice.” Rushen, 464 U.S. at 119. It concluded 

that, consequently, ex parte communications could be 

harmless errors, depending on the circumstances of the case. 

See id. at 119–20. Thus, Catlin’s appeal to the structuralerror doctrine fails. This is not one of the exceedingly

narrow circumstances in which a structural error can be 

found. See Medina, 386 F.3d at 877. Moreover, Catlin has 

not even attempted to show that the error actually prejudiced 

him. 

Catlin next contends that the ex parte communication 

was presumptively prejudicial under the doctrine of Remmer 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 25

v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). But the 

presumption of prejudice referred to in Remmer applies in 

cases of jury tampering—not in cases involving run-of-themill ex parte communications between a trial judge and 

juror. See United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 895 (9th 

Cir. 1999); see also Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 968

n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (observing that the Remmer 

presumption of prejudice applies when there is “outside

contact raising a credible risk of influencing the verdict” 

(emphasis added)). 

For those reasons, the CSC reasonably could have 

concluded that even if the state trial court erred in having an 

ex parte communication with a juror, such an error would be 

harmless. The district court properly denied Claims 10 and 

11. 

B. Claim 26(A)

1. Claim Overview

Claim 26(A) alleges ineffective assistance of counsel at 

the guilt phase of Catlin’s Kern Trial due to defense 

counsel’s failure to investigate and effectively impeach

Hardin, the jailhouse informant witness. 

In Claim 26(A), Catlin contends that his defense counsel 

(1) failed to properly investigate all benefits that the State 

provided Hardin in exchange for his testimony against Catlin 

and (2) failed to adequately use the impeachment material 

within his possession. This claim was initially presented to 

the CSC in Catlin’s first state habeas petition and rejected on 

the merits, so the AEDPA standard of review applies. See

Cone, 556 U.S. at 466.

Applying this standard, the district court rejected Claim 

26(A). The district court determined that the CSC 

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26 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

reasonably could have concluded that Catlin had not shown 

deficient performance or prejudice, both of which are 

required for a claim based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

Regarding deficient performance, the district court

observed that defense counsel investigated Hardin’s deals 

with law enforcement and repeatedly brought up the benefits 

received by Hardin on cross-examination, so the CSC 

reasonably could have concluded that defense counsel did 

not perform deficiently. Regarding prejudice, the district 

court observed that defense counsel did impeach Hardin 

about his informant status, the circumstances of the alleged 

confession, and the benefits he received. It also observed 

that prejudice was unlikely given that there was a substantial 

amount of other evidence against Catlin. Considering these 

realities, the district court determined that the CSC 

reasonably could have concluded that there was no 

likelihood of prejudice. 

2. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

on Habeas Review

“Strickland v. Washington and its progeny constitute the 

clearly established federal law governing claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Andrews v. Davis, 944 

F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (citing Pinholster, 

563 U.S. at 189). Under the Strickland standard, a petitioner 

must show that “(1) his trial counsel’s performance ‘fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and 

(2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.’” Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 870 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

688, 694 (1984)). “A ‘[f]ailure to make the required 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 27

showing of either deficient performance or sufficient 

prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.’” Id. (alteration 

in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700). “The 

‘ultimate focus’ of the Strickland standard is ‘the 

fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being 

challenged.’” Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1108 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 

Under the deficient-performance prong of Strickland, 

“[o]ur review ‘of counsel’s performance must be highly 

deferential.’” Livaditis v. Davis, 933 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

“‘[P]revailing professional norms’ at the time of the 

representation serve as the objective standard of 

reasonableness under which counsel’s performance is 

measured.” Avena, 932 F.3d at 1248 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). “We must ‘indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” 

Livaditis, 933 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689). Counsel’s “strategic choices made after thorough 

investigation of law and facts” are “virtually 

unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

Under the prejudice prong, the inquiry is whether “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Ayala v. Chappell, 829 F.3d 1081, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

The deferential Strickland standard is modified by 

AEDPA, which makes it even more difficult for petitioners 

to succeed. “When reviewing a state court’s decision on a 

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28 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

Strickland claim under AEDPA, the federal court’s review 

must be ‘doubly’ deferential.” Livaditis, 933 F.3d at 1045

(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Ross v. Davis, 

29 F.4th 1028, 1042 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The standards created

by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” 

(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105)). This is because of the 

generality of the Strickland standard, which gives state 

courts “greater leeway” in exercising their judgment. 

Livaditis, 933 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Cheney v. Washington, 

614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

Thus, “[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the question is not 

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is 

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Ochoa II, 50 

F.4th at 889 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also 

Livaditis, 933 F.3d at 1045–46 (framing the inquiry when an 

ineffective-assistance claim is summarily denied as 

“‘whether there is any reasonable argument’ that could have 

supported that decision under the deferential standard that 

applies in this context” (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105)). 

The evidence that we may look to in reviewing an 

ineffective-assistance claim is also circumscribed by 

AEDPA. “Under § 2254(d)(1), our review is ‘limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the 

claim on the merits.’” Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 998 

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181). This 

is because “AEDPA’s ‘backward-looking language requires 

an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was 

made.’” Id. (quoting Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182).

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 29

3. Analysis

The district court’s denial of Claim 26(A) was 

appropriate. The CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

Catlin had satisfied neither the ineffective-assistance prong 

nor the prejudice prong of Strickland. 

a. Ineffective Assistance

As noted, Catlin contends that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because (1) he failed to investigate or impeach 

Hardin regarding the benefits that Hardin received in 

exchange for his testimony; and (2) he failed to present 

evidence that Hardin had a reputation for dishonesty, as well 

as substance abuse issues and a history of criminal behavior. 

Under the “doubly deferential” standard of review 

applicable here, we have no trouble rejecting these

arguments. The CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

defense counsel’s performance fell within the wide latitude 

of reasonable representation.

We reject Catlin’s argument that defense counsel acted 

ineffectively in failing to adequately impeach Hardin with

evidence of all the benefits he received in exchange for his 

testimony. Importantly, defense counsel did impeach 

Hardin based on a number of benefits—including having 

charges dismissed or otherwise reduced—that he received in 

exchange for his testimony. On cross-examination, defense 

counsel brought out the fact that Hardin had previously 

served as a police informant in exchange for having charges 

against him dropped. Defense counsel had an opportunity to 

examine Hardin’s criminal record, and he cross-examined 

Hardin on multiple charges that were dropped or may have 

been dropped in exchange for Hardin providing testimony 

against Catlin. Defense counsel questioned Hardin about the

myriad charges that he faced—and which of them were 

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30 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

dropped—including assault with a deadly weapon and

multiple failures to appear. 

Hardin was evasive and claimed he did not recall some 

of the charges that defense counsel suggested had been 

dropped. He also suggested, at times, that some of the 

charges had been dropped for reasons other than his deal 

with the prosecution. But, under defense counsel’s crossexamination, Hardin contradicted himself about whether 

certain charges had been dismissed and gave implausible 

testimony.

Defense counsel asked Hardin whether it was “true that 

since 1985, [he had] got virtually every charge[] made 

against [him] dismissed.” When Hardin denied that claim, 

defense counsel pressed him on specifics and brought out 

inconsistencies in his testimony. Hardin eventually admitted 

that he “basically got out of jail” as part of the deal he made 

with the State and did not have to serve any more jail time 

on any of the charges pending against him in 1985.

Catlin contends that defense counsel failed to establish 

that specific charges, such as a charge for petty theft, were 

dismissed in exchange for Hardin’s testimony. He further 

argues that counsel should have dug deeper and obtained 

records about some of Hardin’s convictions.

We owe a great deal of deference to the informed 

strategies of counsel, including on the scope of crossexamination. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Dows v. 

Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, in a crossexamination that spanned almost thirty pages of trial 

transcript, defense counsel repeatedly questioned Hardin 

about the benefits he received and his criminal history. 

Faced with Hardin’s evasive answers, defense counsel cast 

Hardin as an incredible and biased witness. Defense counsel 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 31

reasonably could have concluded that further crossexamination on the benefits received by Hardin would be 

redundant or even—given the confusing nature of Hardin’s 

voluminous criminal history and list of pending charges—

confusing to the jury. “[A]n attorney is not required to offer 

evidence that is unnecessary or redundant,” Lopez v. Allen, 

47 F.4th 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2022), and it was reasonable 

for defense counsel to decline to conduct further 

investigation or continue cross-examining Hardin on a topic 

that had already been aired before the jury. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 690–91; Lopez, 47 F.4th at 1050; Turner v. 

Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 875 (9th Cir. 2002); cf. Doe v. 

Ayers, 782 F.3d 425, 431 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We agree with 

the district court that while [the attorney] could have done a 

much better job of impeaching [the witness], his efforts in 

this respect were not constitutionally inadequate. The 

additional impeachment evidence would have been largely 

cumulative, albeit stronger, but the failures regarding 

impeachment . . . are of comparatively little 

consequence[] . . . .”); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 334 

(9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (concluding that it was not 

ineffective assistance for an attorney to decline to present 

redundant impeachment evidence that a witness had felony 

convictions).

We are also unpersuaded by Catlin’s arguments that 

defense counsel acted deficiently in failing to investigate or 

present evidence regarding Hardin’s reputation for lying, 

substance abuse issues, and criminal past. We agree with the 

district court that defense counsel reasonably could have 

concluded that issues of Hardin’s credibility—and pattern of 

criminality, as well as his history of violence against 

women—were already before the jury and further discussion 

would be unnecessary or counterproductive. Hardin himself 

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admitted that he had lied to Catlin, and he responded 

evasively to defense counsel’s questions. Moreover, he was 

cross-examined about his charges for abuse and battery, 

clearly implicating his violence and pattern of criminality. 

Considering that, defense counsel reasonably could have 

concluded that further impeachment evidence on Hardin’s 

character for dishonesty and his other negative 

characteristics was unnecessary.

In sum, applying the deferential AEDPA standard of 

review, the CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

defense counsel’s performance was not constitutionally 

deficient under Strickland.

b. Prejudice

Even if we were to agree with Catlin that defense counsel 

acted deficiently—which we do not—there is an 

independent reason to affirm the district court’s denial of 

Claim 26(A): the CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

Catlin failed to show prejudice. That is so for several 

reasons. 

First, the testimony that Hardin gave about Catlin’s 

jailhouse confession was only a small piece of the evidence 

against Catlin. In addition to Hardin’s testimony, the State 

presented evidence that (1) Martha, Joyce, and Glenna were 

close relatives of Catlin; (2) all three victims died of 

paraquat poisoning; (3) a bottle of paraquat with Catlin’s 

fingerprint was found in an area that Catlin had access to; 

(4) Catlin was familiar with, and had access to, paraquat; 

(5) Catlin had previously mentioned the possibility of using 

poison as a murder weapon; (6) Catlin benefitted financially 

and in other ways from the deaths of Martha, Joyce, and 

Glenna; and (7) Catlin had quarreled with or expressed 

discontent about the victims before their deaths. The fact 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 33

that Hardin’s testimony was only one facet of the 

considerable evidence against Catlin means that any failure 

to impeach Hardin would almost certainly not be prejudicial. 

See Dickey v. Davis, 69 F.4th 624, 646 (9th Cir. 2023); Doe, 

782 F.3d at 431–32; cf. Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 308 

(9th Cir. 2010); Hart, 97 F.4th at 654–55. 

Although Catlin frames Hardin’s jailhouse informant 

evidence as the “centerpiece” of the State’s case and 

describes Hardin’s testimony as “central” to the proceedings, 

those characterizations are inaccurate. The State’s direct and 

re-direct examinations of Hardin were relatively brief—

particularly when judged against the voluminous testimony 

presented throughout the Kern Trial. And even though the 

lead prosecutor stated that the jury would “have to believe” 

Hardin to convict Catlin, that does not transform Hardin’s 

testimony into the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case. 

Second, as mentioned above, defense counsel did

impeach Hardin on cross-examination. The jury heard about 

many of the benefits that he received in exchange for his 

testimony. And it heard about Hardin’s previous history of 

serving as a jailhouse informant. Any additional 

impeachment on this point likely would have been 

cumulative, so the failure to present additional impeachment 

is unlikely to have prejudiced Catlin. See Doe, 782 F.3d at

431 (“The additional impeachment evidence would have 

been largely cumulative, albeit stronger, but the failures 

regarding impeachment of [the witness] are of 

comparatively little consequence[] . . . .”); Matylinsky v. 

Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2009) (“While it 

appears that [defense counsel] could have introduced 

additional impeaching evidence, this extra information 

would not have changed the outcome of the trial because [the 

witness’s] credibility was already squarely before the 

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34 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

jury.”); Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(“In short, [the witness’s] credibility was so undermined 

anyway that evidence that he also had a conviction for 

possession with intent to sell PCP would not have affected 

the outcome.”). 

Third, the jury could have viewed Hardin’s evidence as 

being of limited value, which means that further 

impeachment of Hardin would be unlikely to affect the 

outcome. To be sure, “[c]onfessions are indisputably 

damning evidence[.]” Doody v. Schriro, 548 F.3d 847, 869 

(9th Cir. 2008). But not all confessions are created equal. 

Here, Hardin’s testimony that Catlin said he had “killed the 

bitches” was cursory and largely devoid of details. 

Additionally, the statement was uncorroborated and 

unrecorded—and the state trial court instructed the jury that 

“[e]vidence of unrecorded oral statement[s] ought to be 

viewed with caution,” and that the same was true for 

“unrecorded oral confession[s].” We presume that the jury 

followed these instructions. See Deck v. Jenkins, 814 F.3d 

954, 979 (9th Cir. 2016).

Moreover, as courts have recognized, confessions 

reported by jailhouse informants are, to a degree, inherently 

suspect given the obvious motive for fabrication and the 

difficulty of cross-examination. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Roe, 

628 F.3d 486, 505–06 (9th Cir. 2010); Carriger v. Stewart, 

132 F.3d 463, 479 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); United States 

v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 334–35 (9th Cir. 1993);

accord Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 810 (6th Cir. 2006); 

State v. Diaz, 25 A.3d 594, 602 (Conn. 2011). Indeed, the 

state trial court instructed the jury in this case that “[t]he 

testimony of an in-custody informant should be viewed with 

caution and close scrutiny.” It is doubtful that any additional 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 35

impeachment would have changed how the jury viewed

Hardin’s already-dubious evidence.

Considering the other evidence against Catlin, the 

substantial impeachment of Hardin that defense counsel did 

conduct, and the already questionable value of Hardin’s 

evidence, the CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

there was no reasonable probability that Catlin would have 

been acquitted of the murders of Martha and Joyce if Hardin 

had been impeached more fulsomely. Thus, the district court 

did not err in rejecting Claim 26(A). 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty 

Phase

1. Overview

Catlin next contends that the district court erred in 

rejecting his claims based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel at the penalty phase. This encompasses Claims 

35(A), 35(B), 35(C), and 35(F), which raise somewhat 

overlapping arguments.8 

Subclaim (A) alleges that penalty-phase defense counsel 

failed to do any significant work on the penalty phase, 

including investigating. Catlin contends that Michael 

Dellostritto, the counsel primarily responsible for the 

penalty phase, was unqualified and did not spend sufficient 

time investigating potential mitigating evidence. Catlin 

further argues that defense counsel’s preparation was so 

lackluster that it denied him a fair trial at the penalty phase.

8

 For example, defense counsel’s failure to present information related 

to Catlin’s time at Camp Erwin Owen and other facilities is raised in both 

subclaim (B) and subclaim (C). 

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36 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

In subclaim (B), Catlin contends that defense counsel 

failed to present mitigation evidence on a variety of issues. 

The myriad arguments that Catlin raises in this subsection 

are too numerous to recount. But, in broad strokes, Catlin

first faults defense counsel for not introducing evidence 

about Catlin’s life history, including, inter alia, evidence 

about Catlin’s biological parents, the “downward spiral” of 

the family’s prospects evident during Catlin’s childhood, 

and that Martha made Catlin dress in girl’s clothing and 

stand by the roadside so as to suffer “public humiliation” as 

a child. Catlin also contends that defense counsel failed to 

introduce mitigation evidence regarding Catlin’s sexual 

abuse at the hands of John Brown, a family friend. 

Furthermore, Catlin argues that defense counsel failed to 

introduce evidence that Catlin had risk factors for, and 

suffered from, serious mental health issues, including brain 

damage. Relatedly, Catlin argues that defense counsel failed 

to have a proper neuropsychological examination conducted 

on Catlin. He points to a declaration from Dr. Natasha 

Khazanov, which states that Dr. Khazanov had given Catlin 

a neuropsychological evaluation in 2000. Based on that 

evaluation, Dr. Khazanov opined that Catlin suffered from 

brain damage and that there are “strong indicators” of 

possible risk factors for brain damage in Catlin’s history, 

including Catlin’s purported exposure to neurotoxins. Dr. 

Khazanov further stated that, in her opinion, the cognitive 

deficiencies caused by Catlin’s brain injury were present at 

the time of Catlin’s trials.

In subclaim (C), Catlin contends that the defense counsel 

failed to present mitigating evidence regarding his 

confinement as a youth at Camp Erwin Owen, the California 

Youth Authority’s Youth Training School, and the 

California State Prison at Chino. Catlin emphasizes the poor 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 37

conditions at these institutions and argues that, had the jury 

known of these conditions, it would have affected their view 

of his character, psychological state, and crimes. 

Subclaim (F) is a claim of cumulative prejudice resulting 

from defense counsel’s ineffective assistance during the 

penalty phase.9 

The AEDPA standard of review applies because these 

claims were originally raised in Catlin’s first state habeas 

petition and denied on the merits. See Cone, 556 U.S. at 466;

see also supra n.7. Applying this standard, the district court 

rejected the subclaims at issue in this appeal, reasoning that 

the CSC’s “summary rejection of claims 35(A–C and F) was 

not unreasonable.” In relevant part, the district court 

reasoned that the CSC “reasonably could find the mitigation 

defense presented was consistent with the primary guilt 

phase defense of innocence” and that presenting mental-state 

defenses would have been fruitless or counterproductive. 

The district court also determined that the CSC reasonably 

could have concluded that Catlin would not be prejudiced by 

any ineffective assistance because of the substantial 

aggravating evidence, including the heinous circumstances 

of the crimes and Catlin’s previous criminal history. 

2. Legal Standards for Ineffective Assistance at 

the Penalty Phase

As with Catlin’s guilt-phase claim, the clearly 

established law to apply to claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel—including claims of ineffective assistance at the 

penalty phase of a capital case—is Strickland v. Washington

9

 The district court did not grant a COA with respect to subclaims 35(D) 

and 35(E), and Catlin has not raised arguments that the COA should be 

expanded to cover those subclaims. 

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38 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

and its progeny. Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1107–08; Livaditis, 

933 F.3d at 1045. As with ineffective-assistance claims 

relating to the guilt phase, AEDPA’s deferential standard 

works together with Strickland’s deferential standard to 

make a habeas petitioner’s path to relief “doubly difficult.” 

Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1108.

At the penalty phase, “counsel has a duty to present and 

explain all available mitigating evidence, absent a tactical 

reason for not doing so.” Ross, 29 F.4th at 1053 (quoting 

Demetrulias v. Davis, 14 F.4th 898, 913 (9th Cir. 2021)). 

“After all, ‘fail[ing] to present important mitigating evidence 

in the penalty phase—if there is no risk in doing so—can be 

as devastating as a failure to present proof of innocence in 

the guilt phase.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 

Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

“To uncover mitigating evidence, ‘counsel has a duty to 

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’” 

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). “Satisfying this 

duty requires counsel ‘to conduct a thorough investigation of 

the defendant’s background.’” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 

U.S. at 396)). Importantly, in determining whether penaltyphase counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment, 

the key inquiry “is not whether counsel should have 

presented a mitigation case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 

510, 522–23 (2003). “Rather, we focus on whether the 

investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce 

mitigating evidence of [the defendant’s] background was 

itself reasonable.” Id. at 523.

To assess prejudice at the penalty phase, we “reweigh the 

evidence in aggravation against the totality of available 

mitigating evidence” and ask whether, had defense counsel 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 39

provided competent representation, “there is a reasonable 

probability that at least one juror would have struck a 

different balance.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 537; see also 

Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1108 (“In the context of the penalty 

phase of a capital case, it is enough to show ‘a reasonable 

probability that at least one juror’ would have recommended 

a sentence of life instead of death.’” (quoting Wiggins, 539 

U.S. at 537)). But “[t]he likelihood of that result must be 

‘substantial, not just conceivable.’” Andrews, 944 F.3d at 

1108 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 112). 

3. Analysis

Did the CSC unreasonably apply Strickland and its 

progeny in rejecting Catlin’s claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel at the penalty phase? Applying the requisite 

doubly deferential standard of review, we conclude that the 

CSC reasonably could have concluded that Catlin’s claims

failed both prongs of the Strickland test.

a. Claim 35(A)

We begin with Claim 35(A), which alleges that defense 

counsel spent insufficient time on the case and failed to 

conduct an adequate investigation. The CSC reasonably 

could have concluded that defense counsel’s investigation 

and preparation was adequate, so Catlin is not entitled to 

habeas relief on this basis.

We reject Catlin’s assertion that the hours billed by 

defense counsel Michael Dellostritto demonstrate 

insufficient preparation. Catlin is correct that when counsel 

spends only a “small number of hours” in preparing for a 

capital case, it can be a “striking initial indication” of 

“deficient investigation for the penalty phase.” Avena, 932 

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40 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

F.3d at 1248.

10 But Catlin has not shown that Dellostritto 

spent inadequate time on this case. In Avena, counsel spent 

fifty-three hours up through jury selection and then another 

forty-one hours between jury selection and the end of 

sentencing. Id. Here, Dellostritto billed well over a hundred 

hours prior to the beginning of jury selection and more 

thereafter. Moreover, Dellostritto was not the sole defense 

counsel; Dominic Eyherabide was heavily involved in the 

guilt phase of the trial, and there are indications that 

Eyherabide was involved in the penalty phase as well. 

Defense counsel also hired an experienced “mitigation 

investigator” to assist with the penalty phase. 

We also reject Catlin’s argument that the record shows 

that defense counsel failed to adequately investigate Catlin’s 

background. The CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

defense counsel conducted an adequate investigation. To 

begin, given the notoriety of Catlin’s crimes—and the 

substantial time that passed between the murders—evidence 

about Catlin’s background was readily available. Numerous 

witnesses were interviewed by police and testified in the 

preliminary hearings and during the guilt phases of both 

trials (as well as the penalty phase of the trial in Monterey 

County for the death of Glenna), including Catlin’s

surviving wives, multiple parents-in-law, siblings-in-law, 

stepchildren, friends, colleagues, employees, a customer, 

and Catlin’s mistress.

10 We doubt, though, that this could be sufficient, by itself, to show 

insufficient preparation and investigation. See Avena, 932 F.3d at 1248 

(categorizing this as an “initial indication”); see also Bower v. 

Quarterman, 497 F.3d 459, 469 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Raineri, 

42 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1994). 

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Turning to Catlin’s specific contentions, the CSC 

reasonably could have concluded that defense counsel

adequately investigated Catlin’s early upbringing and was 

aware of his sexual abuse at the hands of John Brown. 

Catlin’s counsel in the Monterey County trial for the death 

of Glenna hired an investigator to interview Brown, who 

discussed the allegations and his interactions with Catlin. 

Catlin seems to concede that the defense team in the Kern 

Trial was aware of his sexual abuse and had notes of the 

discussions with Brown. Moreover, Brown died before the 

beginning of the Kern Trial, and there is no indication in the 

record that Catlin (who, of course, knew of the abuse) was 

willing to testify about the abuse.

Likewise, the CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

defense counsel adequately investigated Catlin’s 

incarceration during his youth. Catlin points only to general 

information about conditions in the various institutions in 

which he was incarcerated (as well as information of dubious 

relevance regarding other institutions). This is insufficient 

to show that defense counsel failed to uncover something 

regarding these institutions that would have been mitigating. 

General information about conditions in the California 

corrections system at various times is not relevant mitigating 

evidence because it does not bear on Catlin’s character, prior 

record, or the circumstances of his offense. Lockett v. Ohio, 

438 U.S. 586, 597, 604 n.12 (1978).

Finally, the CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

defense counsel adequately investigated Catlin’s mental 

state and neuropsychological health. The record indicates 

that Catlin was examined in 1986 by at least two doctors, 

Drs. Leifer and Peal, who found no evidence of brain 

damage. Although Catlin now contends that additional 

testing should have been conducted, he does not suggest that 

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42 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

Drs. Liefer and Peal were incompetent or unqualified—or 

even produce their report. Defense counsel reasonably could 

have relied upon their views and concluded that no further 

investigation of Catlin’s mental state and health was 

necessary. See Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 966 (9th 

Cir. 2010). 

Catlin relies heavily upon a declaration from Dr. 

Khazanov (who examined Catlin in 2000), which indicates 

disagreement with the methodologies used by Drs. Leifer 

and Peal and opines that Catlin had signs of brain damage. 

The declaration, however, is insufficient to show that 

defense counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation 

into Catlin’s mental health. A difference in medical opinion 

is not enough to show a failure to investigate. See Mitchell 

v. United States, 790 F.3d 881, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (“At 

most, [a doctor’s] new diagnosis of [the defendant’s] mental 

state, eight years after-the-fact, is a ‘difference in medical 

opinion, not a failure to investigate.’” (quoting Crittenden, 

624 F.3d at 965)); Crittenden, 624 F.3d at 965–66 (“‘At the 

end of the day,’ [the defendant’s] ‘argument turns on a latterday battle of experts’ that is insufficient to warrant federal 

habeas relief.’” (quoting Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 584 

(9th Cir. 2005))); cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 

(1985) (“Psychiatry is not[] . . . an exact science, and 

psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what 

constitutes mental illness[] . . . .”). That is particularly true 

here, where the difference in opinion arises from a new 

diagnosis, years after the events at issue and the original 

examination. See Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 893. 

Additionally, defense counsel could consider the theory 

of defense in determining the scope of the pretrial 

investigation. See Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 473 (5th

Cir.) (“The scope of a defense counsel’s pretrial 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 43

investigation necessarily follows from the decision as to 

what the theory of defense will be.”), amended on denial of 

reh’g, 391 F.3d 703 (5th Cir. 2004) (mem.). Here, after 

gathering the information discussed above, defense counsel 

reasonably could have concluded that further investigation 

into the avenues suggested by Catlin, including his sexual 

abuse, tumultuous family life, and possible brain damage,

would have been unnecessary in light of the primary theme 

(discussed more fulsomely below) of the penalty phase 

defense: that Catlin had redeeming qualities and had 

adjusted well to incarceration, and thus could be an asset to 

society who deserved life rather than death. 

Catlin “was entitled to a reasonable investigation, not a 

perfect one.” Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 892 (citing Yarborough 

v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). The CSC reasonably could 

have concluded that he received that here. 

b. Claim 35(B)

We next address Catlin’s related argument that defense 

counsel failed to adequately present mitigation evidence. 

Specifically, Claim 35(B) alleges that defense counsel 

performed deficiently by failing to present mitigating 

evidence on a variety of topics, including (1) information 

about Catlin’s birth parents’ troubles; (2) evidence of

Catlin’s mistreatment by his adoptive parents, including 

Martha; (3) the fact that Catlin was repeatedly sexually 

abused by Brown; and (4) Catlin’s risk factors for mental 

illness and brain damage. These facts, if proven, could all

arguably bear on mitigation.11 See, e.g., Porter v. 

11 We note, though, that many of the facts presented in Catlin’s appellate 

briefing are not properly supported by citations to the record before the 

state habeas court—which, of course, is all we are permitted to consider, 

see Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182–83. For example, some of the facts 

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44 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (per curiam). However, 

we reject Catlin’s arguments and hold that the CSC 

reasonably could have concluded that there was no deficient 

performance from defense counsel’s failure to present this 

mitigation evidence. 

At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that defense 

counsel made a strategic decision to focus the penalty-phase 

defense on Catlin’s positive qualities, potential to contribute

to society, and lack of danger. And strategic choices, made 

after a reasonable investigation, are “virtually 

unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. To support 

the argument that Catlin had redeeming qualities and did not 

deserve death, defense counsel presented penalty-phase 

testimony from members of a family that Catlin had 

befriended and mentored; a woman whose child Catlin 

saved; a psychologist; and prison officials who testified 

about Catlin’s exemplary behavior and contributions to the 

prison workforce. This strategy accorded with Catlin’s 

guilt-phase defense of actual innocence. To support that 

defense, counsel tried to paint Catlin as having a good 

relationship with his family and as having considerable 

business acumen (and thus lacking a financial motive). 

Defense counsel reasonably could have declined to present 

mitigation evidence that would be inconsistent with this 

theme. See Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 893 (“[The defense team] 

reasonably chose not to present evidence that ‘would detract 

from, or destroy,’ the chosen strategy.” (quoting Elmore v. 

Sinclair, 781 F.3d 1160, 1171 (9th Cir.), amended and 

superseded on denial of reh’g, 799 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir.

2015))). 

presented about Catlin’s early history and assertions about Martha’s 

mental illnesses are entirely unsupported.

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 45

We turn now to the specific mitigation evidence that 

Catlin contends should have been presented. With respect 

to information about Catlin’s history and early life,

information about Catlin’s birth parents is of little—if any—

value. Catlin was adopted as an infant, and there was no 

concrete evidence presented that he had any kind of genetic 

disorder from his birth parents. Defense counsel did not err 

in declining to present such weak mitigating evidence. See 

Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 892. 

Also, defense counsel reasonably could have chosen not 

to introduce evidence of Catlin’s troubled upbringing and his 

conflicts with Martha. Highlighting these aspects of Catlin’s

childhood and relationship with his mother—including the 

allegation that Martha punished Catlin by forcing him to 

dress in girls’ clothing—would have been entirely 

inconsistent with the strategy at both the guilt and penalty 

phases. At the guilt phase, Catlin had emphasized his good 

relationship with his mother, denying that she ever 

threatened to cut him out of her will or dressed him in girls’

clothing. Defense counsel reasonably could have made a 

strategic decision not to reverse course on this point, which 

may well have inflamed the jury against Catlin. 

Additionally, suggesting that Catlin may have been damaged 

by his childhood trauma would be at odds with the strategy

at the penalty phase that he was no longer a danger to society. 

In fact, defense counsel reasonably could have considered 

that this kind of evidence would backfire and remind the jury 

of the matricidal nature of Catlin’s crime. 

Defense counsel also could have reasonably decided not 

to present evidence that Catlin had been sexually abused by 

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46 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

John Brown.12 To be sure, “[c]hildhood sexual abuse can be 

powerful evidence in mitigation.” Wharton v. Chappell, 765 

F.3d 953, 977 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 

534–35. But it may well have been difficult for defense 

counsel to present evidence of Catlin’s sexual abuse in light 

of Brown’s death before the beginning of the Kern Trial—

particularly since the record is devoid of any indication that 

Catlin himself would have been willing to testify on this 

matter. 

Moreover, defense counsel reasonably could have 

concluded that, tactically, introduction of this evidence 

would not accord with the broader penalty-phase strategy of 

demonstrating that Catlin was not a danger to society. 

Introducing this evidence might well have been 

counterproductive—particularly since it could have opened 

the door to the introduction of additional damaging 

information, such as Catlin’s dishonesty, substance abuse 

problems, and theft, during the years that he was abused by 

Brown. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 201 (“To the extent the 

state habeas record includes new factual allegations or 

evidence, much of it is of questionable mitigating value. . . . 

The new evidence relating to [the defendant’s] family—their 

more serious substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal 

problems—is also by no means clearly mitigating, as the jury 

might have concluded that [the defendant] was simply 

beyond rehabilitation.’” (citation omitted)); see also Bolin, 

13 F.4th at 816.

12 There is no evidentiary support for Catlin’s implicit contention that 

his parents, including Martha, were aware that Brown was a sexual 

abuser when they sent Catlin to live with him. And even if there was, 

defense counsel reasonably could have concluded that presentation of 

such evidence would be counterproductive.

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 47

We also reject Catlin’s argument that defense counsel 

acted ineffectively by failing to present evidence that Catlin 

had brain damage or that he had risk factors for brain 

damage. The brain-damage diagnosis from Dr. Khazanov 

came in 2000—about twenty-four years after the murder of 

Joyce—and was thus of minimal value, especially because it 

conflicted with the previous examinations conducted by Drs. 

Leifer and Peal. See Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 892–93; 

Crittenden, 624 F.3d at 965–66; cf. Runningeagle v. Ryan, 

825 F.3d 970, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that posthoc medical reports indicating that a defendant may have 

had PTSD were “not of material mitigating weight”).

Moreover, defense counsel reasonably could have 

concluded that the jury would not be persuaded by evidence 

of possible brain damage. Specifically, brain-damage 

evidence would have rung hollow given that, by all 

indications, Catlin presented as intelligent and smoothtalking. Additionally, the jury had heard evidence and 

argument at the guilt phase regarding Catlin’s business 

acumen. Furthermore, the idea that Catlin had brain damage 

would have been inconsistent with the State’s portrayal of 

Catlin’s crimes, which the jury seemingly accepted as true 

by rendering their guilty verdicts. The prosecutor argued 

that over the course of nine years, Catlin engaged in an 

elaborate scheme to murder his wives and adoptive mother 

using a highly lethal poison, while playing the role of a 

grieving husband, son, and stepfather. Any evidence of 

brain damage would have been unpersuasive given the 

planned and deliberate nature of Catlin’s crimes. Cf. Wong 

v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 24–25 (2009) (concluding that 

“the cold, calculated nature” of the crime would have 

“served as a powerful counterpoint” to any mitigation 

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48 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

evidence based on the claim that the defendant was suffering 

from rheumatic fever affecting his cognitive abilities).

Finally, evidence of brain damage (or that Catlin had risk 

factors for brain damage) would be contrary to the penaltyphase strategy of emphasizing Catlin’s lack of present 

dangerousness and the benefits to society that sparing him 

could provide. See Bolin, 13 F.4th at 817. Indeed, such 

evidence could have had the effect of making Catlin seem 

more dangerous, not less. See Crittenden, 624 F.3d at 969; 

accord Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1249–50 (10th 

Cir. 2008).

We find guidance in our decision in Crittenden. There,

defense counsel followed the strategy of trying to humanize 

the defendant, emphasizing his positive qualities, and 

downplaying his future dangerousness. 642 F.3d at 968–69. 

Defense counsel decided not to emphasize the defendant’s 

history of brain dysfunction, concluding that presenting 

extensive evidence on this point “would just have given the 

jury more ‘reason for imposing the death penalty.’” Id. at 

969. We concluded that there was no ineffective assistance 

of counsel, observing that counsel chose a reasonable 

penalty-phase strategy and could have concluded that “[t]o 

dwell on [the defendant’s] extensive history of behavioral 

problems and his brain dysfunction[] . . . would have 

undermined this strategy.” Id. 

In sum, the CSC reasonably could have concluded that 

defense counsel did not act deficiently in failing to present 

the mitigation evidence pointed to by Catlin.

c. Claim 35(C)

Claim 35(C) alleges that defense counsel acted 

ineffectively in declining to present information about 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 49

Catlin’s confinement, when he was a young man, at Camp 

Owen, the California Youth Authority’s Youth Training 

Center, and the California State Prison at Chino. Catlin 

contends that if the jury had been informed of the horrific 

nature of these institutions and how they traumatized him, it 

could have affected the outcome of the penalty phase. 

Again, the CSC reasonably could have rejected this 

claim. Before the state habeas court, Catlin presented only 

cursory evidence about the conditions at these institutions—

and little (if any) of the evidence he did present related to his 

experience at these institutions. This evidence was thus of 

minimal value at the mitigation phase. See Lockett, 438 U.S. 

at 597, 604 n.12. Moreover, emphasizing Catlin’s history of 

incarceration would be clearly inconsistent with the themes 

of the penalty-phase defense. Evidence that Catlin began a 

life of crime at a young age and was repeatedly incarcerated 

is a double-edged sword, and counsel did not act 

unreasonably in declining to wield it.

We may not simply second-guess defense counsel’s 

strategy with the benefit of hindsight. Defense counsel did 

not act unreasonably in declining to present this evidence, 

and this is fatal to Claim 35(C). See Burger v. Kemp, 483 

U.S. 776, 793–94 (1987). 

d. Prejudice (Claim 35(F))

Even if there was ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Catlin would be entitled to relief only if he could make a 

showing that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced 

him. But even if Catlin were able to show that defense 

counsel acted deficiently in preparing his penalty-phase 

defense, the CSC reasonably could have concluded that there 

was not a reasonable probability that it would convince any

juror to recommend life instead of death. See Wiggins,

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50 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

539 U.S. at 537; Andrews, 944 F.3d at 1108. We undertake 

the prejudice inquiry by “reweigh[ing] the evidence in 

aggravation against the totality of available mitigating 

evidence” and asking whether, had defense counsel provided 

competent representation, “there is a reasonable probability 

that at least one juror would have struck a different balance”

in the question of life versus death. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 

534, 537.

The aggravation evidence in this case is considerable. 

Catlin stipulated that he was convicted of a third murder—

that of Glenna. “Evidence that a capital defendant ‘had 

committed another murder’ is ‘the most powerful 

imaginable aggravating evidence.’” Fauber, 43 F.4th at 

1012 (quoting Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 28). And, of course, 

this case involved three murders of people close to Catlin. 

Additionally, the identity of the victims is significant. 

Martha was the defendant’s adoptive mother, and 

“[m]atricide provokes strong, visceral emotions, a fact used 

many times in ancient and classic stories, books, and movies 

to heighten dramatic tension and instill a sense of revulsion 

in the reader or viewer.” People v. Carasi, 44 Cal. 4th 1263, 

1331–32 (2008) (Werdegar, J., concurring and dissenting)

(footnotes omitted). That Catlin killed not just his own 

adoptive mother but Joyce, the mother of his multiple 

stepchildren of various ages, and Glenna, the mother of 

another stepchild, further aggravates the situation. So does 

the fact that Catlin had physically assaulted yet another one 

of his wives. 

Additionally, Catlin’s motive, the manner of death, and 

Catlin’s lack of remorse could all be considered as additional 

aggravation evidence (or, at the least, could undercut the 

strength of the mitigation evidence on which Catlin now 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 51

relies). The jury found special circumstances that Catlin had 

committed Martha’s murder for financial gain. See Noguera 

v. Davis, 5 F.4th 1020, 1053 (9th Cir. 2021) (upholding the 

consideration of the financial-gain special circumstance as 

an aggravating factor). The jury could also conclude, based 

on the medical evidence introduced about paraquat 

poisoning, that Martha, Joyce, and Glenna died a slow, 

painful death over the course of days or weeks. And the jury 

could also have concluded that, as the trial court observed, 

Catlin did not show remorse for his crimes, which could 

undercut the strength of the additional mitigating evidence 

on which he now relies. See People v. Davis, 46 Cal. 4th 

539, 621 (2009) (“[T]he presence or absence of remorse may 

be considered as relevant to the evaluation of mitigating 

evidence and to the penalty determination[] . . . .”). 

Thus, the aggravation evidence in this case was strong. 

Even if defense counsel presented the mitigation evidence 

relied upon by Catlin in his habeas petition, it would have 

been insufficient to overcome the dramatic weight of the 

aggravating evidence—particularly because the additional 

mitigating evidence would have been entirely inconsistent 

with the general thrust of the penalty-phase defense. See 

Bolin, 13 F.4th at 817 (“[T]he prejudicial impact of not 

presenting certain potentially mitigating evidence is 

lessened if that evidence would ‘undercut’ a mitigation 

theory that counsel did present.” (quoting Pinholster, 563 

U.S. at 202)).

Additionally, the penalty-phase jury did not debate for 

long. In total, deliberation lasted less than two-and-a-half 

hours. That the jury did not struggle in coming to a decision 

at the penalty phase suggests that the failure to present 

additional mitigation evidence did not prejudice Catlin. See 

Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (en 

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52 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

banc); cf. Stankewitz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“Another indicator of prejudice[] . . . is the difficult 

time the jury had reaching a unanimous verdict on death.”). 

Accordingly, weighing this aggravating evidence against 

the mitigating evidence adduced at trial and in Catlin’s 

habeas proceedings, the CSC reasonably could have 

concluded that there was no reasonable probability that at 

least one juror would have voted for life if defense counsel 

had presented the additional mitigating evidence relied upon 

by Catlin. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537; see also 

Runningeagle, 825 F.3d at 988. Thus, the CSC reasonably 

could have concluded that Catlin failed to show the prejudice 

required by Strickland. 

In arguing against this conclusion, Catlin relies on juror 

declarations stating that the jurors wanted to hear about what 

could have “drive[n]” Catlin to commit the crimes. Even 

assuming that these declarations can be considered, but see 

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), we are unpersuaded that they make a 

difference. The evidence Catlin now offers would not 

provide the jury with an explanation for Catlin’s calculated, 

planned criminal behavior and would not lessen his moral 

culpability in the eyes of the jurors.

4. Conclusion 

Under the deferential AEDPA standard of review, Catlin

is not entitled to habeas relief based on ineffective assistance 

of counsel at the penalty phase. The CSC reasonably could 

have concluded that Catlin failed under both prongs of the 

Strickland test. We thus affirm the district court’s denial of 

Claim 35, including all relevant subclaims.

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 53

II. Uncertified Claim

Next, we turn to Claim 23 of Catlin’s § 2254 petition. 

The district court did not grant a COA on this claim, and we 

will treat Catlin’s briefing on the subject “as a request to 

expand the scope of the certificate of appealability.” 

Robertson, 849 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Delgadillo, 527 F.3d 

at 930). To be entitled to expand his COA, Catlin “‘must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of [Claim 23] debatable or wrong’ in 

light of AEDPA.” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Miller-El, 

537 U.S. at 336, 338).

Catlin has failed to surmount this burden because he 

cannot show that reasonable jurists could debate the district 

court’s resolution of Claim 23. Accordingly, we decline to 

expand the certificate of appealability to encompass this 

claim, and we dismiss this aspect of Catlin’s appeal for lack 

of jurisdiction. 

A. Overview of Claim 23

Like several of Catlin’s other claims, Claim 23 relates to 

Hardin, the jailhouse informant who testified, inter alia, that 

Catlin admitted that he had “killed the bitches.” Claim 23 

comprises multiple interrelated claims. First, Catlin 

contends that the State violated its duties under Brady v. 

Maryland because it did not disclose the full extent of the 

benefits received by Hardin—including the dropping or 

reducing of various specific charges and the receipt of meals 

and hotel rooms from law enforcement—in exchange for his 

testimony against Catlin. Second, Catlin contends that the 

prosecution knew of Hardin’s mental health problems and 

should have disclosed information related to those problems 

pursuant to Brady. Third, Catlin contends that the lead 

prosecutor, Deputy Attorney General Witt, and Fresno 

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54 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

County Sheriff’s Deputy Johansen knowingly presented 

false testimony and evidence and thus violated their dueprocess obligations under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264

(1959). 

Claim 23 was originally raised in Catlin’s first state 

habeas petition, and the CSC denied it on the merits. In 

Catlin’s second state habeas petition, the CSC rejected the 

claim in part because it had been raised in the first petition. 

As such, Claim 23 must be viewed through the lens of the 

deferential AEDPA standard. See Cone, 556 U.S. at 466.

Applying this standard of review, the district court 

rejected the Brady and Napue claims presented in Claim 

23.13 As to Catlin’s Brady claims, the district court 

determined that the CSC reasonably could have concluded

that Catlin had not presented sufficient evidence to show that 

the State actually failed to disclose exculpatory or 

impeachment evidence, such as Hardin having received 

additional benefits in exchange for his testimony. The 

district court further determined that the CSC reasonably 

could have concluded that there was no Brady violation with 

respect to the information about Hardin’s mental health 

because Catlin did not adduce evidence showing that the 

13 The district court also concluded that “[a]spects of Petitioner’s claim 

23 not adjudicated by the state supreme court fail on de novo review” for 

the same reasons that they failed AEDPA review. It appears, however, 

that the district court essentially treated all of Claim 23 as having been 

raised in Catlin’s first state habeas petition and rejected on the merits by 

the CSC. Based on our review of the portions of Catlin’s first state 

habeas petition in the record, we agree. And Catlin has not explained 

why the district court’s conclusion on this point was wrong or pointed to 

any aspects of Claim 23 that were not raised in his first state habeas 

petition. We accordingly will treat all of Claim 23 as having been raised 

in the first state habeas petition and rejected on the merits by the CSC.

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 55

State possessed that information. As to Catlin’s Napue 

claims based on the false presentation of testimony, the 

district court concluded that the record suggested simple 

confusion and inconsistencies that did not rise to the level of

the knowing presentation of false testimony.

Finally, the district court concluded that even if Catlin 

could show that the State had failed to disclose exculpatory 

evidence or had presented false testimony, the CSC 

reasonably could find that there was no risk of prejudice to 

Catlin from these errors. In other words, the district court 

reasoned that the CSC “could find no reasonable probability 

that the allegedly suppressed evidence, considered 

cumulatively, would have produced a different result at trial, 

and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the allegedly 

false testimony could have affected the judgment of the 

jury.” (Citations omitted).

B. Catlin’s Napue Claim

1. Legal Standards for a Napue Claim

Longstanding Supreme Court precedent makes clear that 

convictions violate due process if they are the result of the 

knowing presentation of perjured testimony. See Dickey, 69 

F.4th at 636 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112–

13 (1935) (per curiam)). The key case relied upon by Catlin 

is Napue. “In Napue, the Supreme Court held ‘that a 

conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to 

be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the 

Fourteenth Amendment.’” Panah v. Chappell, 935 F.3d 

657, 664 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 269); 

see also Dickey, 69 F.4th at 636 (“[T]he Supreme Court 

established that a conviction is invalid if the State is aware 

of a material falsity and fails to correct it, regardless of 

whether the State intentionally solicited the false evidence or 

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56 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

testimony.” (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269–70)). This 

principle applies even when “the false testimony goes only” 

to witness credibility. Dickey, 69 F.4th at 636 (quoting 

Napue, 360 U.S. at 269); see also Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 

500, 520 (9th Cir. 2011). 

To prevail on his Napue claim, Catlin must show that 

“(1) [the] testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the 

prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony 

is false, and (3) . . . the false testimony was material.” 

Dickey, 69 F.4th at 636 (omission in original) (quoting 

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en 

banc)). 

Under the first requirement, the presented testimony 

must have actually been false. See id. Testimony that is 

simply inconsistent or equivocal may not rise to the requisite

level of actual falsity. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d at 520–

21; United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 

1995) (“Discrepancies in the testimony about the details . . . 

could as easily flow from errors in recollection as from 

lies.”), overruled on other grounds by Valerio v. Crawford, 

306 F.3d 742, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); cf. United States 

v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 

evidence . . . does not establish that the government knew, 

or should have known, that [the witnesses’] testimony was 

false. At most, two conflicting versions of the incident were 

presented to the jury.” (citation omitted)).

Additionally, “[o]n a Napue claim, the existence of 

constitutional error does not alone justify relief.” Clements 

v. Madden, 112 F.4th 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2024). The false 

testimony must be material. Id. The Supreme Court has 

“explained that the materiality analysis for a Napue violation 

requires that a conviction ‘must be set aside if there is any 

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reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 

affected the judgment of the jury.’” Dickey, 69 F.4th at 636 

(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103–04 

(1976)). The materiality inquiry is “focused on the potential 

impact of the false testimony.” Clements, 112 F.4th at 804. 

But “a Napue claim fails if, absent the false testimony or 

evidence, the petitioner still ‘received a fair trial, understood 

as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’” 

Panah, 935 F.3d at 664 (quoting Brown, 399 F.3d at 984). 

2. Analysis

No reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s 

resolution of the Napue claims. First, no reasonable jurist 

could debate the district court’s determination that the CSC 

reasonably could have concluded that Catlin failed to 

establish the first two elements of a Napue claim—that the 

testimony presented was false and that the State knew or 

should have known that the testimony was false. See 

Clements, 112 F.4th at 801. 

Catlin first argues that one of the prosecution witnesses, 

Fresno County Sheriff’s Deputy Johansen, presented false 

testimony when, inter alia, he stated that he did not intercede 

on Hardin’s behalf in Fresno County cases except for 

specific spousal abuse charges. Catlin contends that Deputy 

Johansen interceded more than he represented. However, 

the record supports a conclusion that there was, at most, 

inconsistent testimony. Hardin had a voluminous criminal 

history and had faced a variety of charges in multiple 

jurisdictions. It is not clear that there was a knowing 

presentation of false testimony or that the State knew or 

should have known that Johansen’s testimony was false. 

Catlin’s argument that Hardin presented knowingly false 

testimony that went uncorrected fails for the same reason. 

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Cf. Clements, 112 F.4th at 801–02 (finding a Napue violation 

where it was “quite clear” that an informant received 

benefits from the prosecution and lied in saying otherwise); 

Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1182 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(observing that the state went to “elaborate lengths” to 

suggest that no benefit was received in exchange for an 

informant’s testimony). No reasonable jurist could debate 

the district court’s resolution of this issue.14 

Catlin also contends that the lead prosecutor, Witt, 

provided “false and misleading” answers regarding the 

scope of the benefits received by Hardin. To the extent that 

Catlin contends that this rises to the level of a Napue claim, 

we are unconvinced. The inconsistencies that Catlin has 

pointed to are minor matters, easily explained by the 

complexity of the various charges faced by Hardin. 

Second, as the district court concluded, even if Catlin 

could show that the State knowingly presented false 

testimony, that testimony would simply not be material. It 

is important to situate the allegedly false testimony in the full 

context of the trial: it is about the existence of a few specific 

benefits received by Hardin, a jailhouse informant. But this 

is not a case where the fact that Hardin received benefits was 

withheld from the jury or only other, unrelated impeachment 

evidence was presented. Cf. Clements, 112 F.4th at 804–05. 

To the contrary, the fact that Hardin received substantial 

benefits in exchange for his testimony against Catlin, 

14 To the extent that Catlin’s claim is based on an argument that Deputy 

Johansen knew that Hardin’s testimony was false (or that Johansen knew 

that he or Hardin were testifying falsely), we note also that “it is not

clearly established that a police officer’s knowledge of false testimony 

may be attributed to the prosecution under Napue.” Reis-Campos v. 

Biter, 832 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Browning v. Baker, 

875 F.3d 444, 461 (9th Cir. 2017).

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including the dropping or reducing of charges, was squarely 

before the jury. The benefits received by Hardin and the 

possible resulting bias comprised the majority of the 

questioning of Hardin. All that the allegedly false testimony 

relates to is the specific contours of which charges were 

dismissed or dropped in exchange for Hardin’s testimony. It 

is hard to see how this could be characterized as material 

under any standard. 

The lack of materiality is underscored by the fact that 

Hardin’s testimony was not crucial to the State’s case. As 

we discussed above with respect to Claim 26(A), there was 

substantial evidence of Catlin’s guilt. And when there is 

substantial evidence of guilt, false testimony bearing on the 

credibility of a single witness is less likely to be material. 

See Phillips, 673 F.3d at 1190–91; Sivak v. Hardison, 658 

F.3d 898, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2011); Panah, 935 F.3d at 664–

66.

Considering these realities, no reasonable jurist could 

debate that the CSC reasonably could have concluded that, 

notwithstanding the allegedly false testimony, Catlin 

“received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 

verdict worthy of confidence.” Panah, 935 F.3d at 664 

(quoting Brown, 399 F.3d at 984).

C. Catlin’s Brady Claim Based on the Benefits 

Received by Hardin

1. Legal Standards for a Brady Claim

For Catlin’s claims based on the State’s failure to 

disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence, the clearly 

established federal law at issue is Brady and its progeny. See 

Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); cf.

Hooper v. Shinn, 985 F.3d 594, 615–16 (9th Cir. 2021). 

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“Brady established the three elements of a due process 

violation based on the suppression of evidence: (1) the 

evidence is favorable to the accused, (2) the prosecution 

suppressed the evidence, and (3) the evidence is ‘material.’” 

Hooper, 985 F.3d at 616 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).

“‘Any evidence that would tend to call the government’s 

case into doubt is favorable for Brady purposes,’ including 

exculpatory and impeachment evidence.” Ochoa v. Davis

(Ochoa I), 16 F.4th 1314, 1326–27 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations 

omitted) (quoting Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1012 (9th 

Cir. 2013)). 

The materiality requirement for Brady is also called the 

“prejudice” requirement. See id. at 1327 (describing these 

terms as “interchangeable[]”). “Evidence is prejudicial or 

material ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had 

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.’” United States v. 

Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2011) (footnote 

omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 

473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “There is a ‘reasonable 

probability’ of prejudice when suppression of evidence 

‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Id. 

(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). “But 

‘a reasonable probability’ may be found ‘even where the 

remaining evidence would have been sufficient to convict 

the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 

1057, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008)). Notably, the standard for 

materiality under Brady is distinct from the standard for 

materiality under Napue; it is more challenging to show 

materiality in the Brady context. See Phillips, 673 F.3d at 

1188–90.

In sum, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant 

would more likely than not have received a different verdict 

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 61

with the evidence, but whether in its absence [the defendant] 

received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict 

worthy of confidence.” Hart, 97 F.4th at 654 (second 

alteration in original) (quoting Ochoa I, 16 F.4th at 1327).

2. Analysis

Catlin points to documents purportedly showing that 

Hardin received specific benefits in exchange for his 

testimony that were not disclosed to Catlin, such as having a 

disturbing-the-peace charge dropped. Many of these 

documents relate to benefits that Hardin allegedly received 

between the time he struck a deal to testify and the actual 

trial of Catlin. We conclude that no reasonable jurist could 

debate the district court’s rejection of Claim 23 because it is 

clear beyond peradventure that, even assuming that this 

evidence is favorable and the State suppressed it—which we 

do not decide15—the failure to disclose the evidence was not 

material. See id. (“If we determine that evidence is not 

15 We pause to observe that some of the evidence that Catlin relies upon 

in arguing that there was a Brady violation is quite speculative. For 

example, Catlin contends that a 1988 charge for carrying a loaded 

weapon was dismissed in exchange for Hardin’s testimony. And he 

argues that law enforcement failed to enforce a restraining order against 

Hardin. But Catlin relies entirely upon speculation as support for his 

conclusion that these were benefits for Hardin’s testimony against 

Catlin. Such speculation is likely insufficient to support a Brady claim. 

See Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 769–70 (9th Cir. 2012); see 

also Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 902 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing that 

there was no “actual evidence” of a deal for an informant’s testimony). 

However, for purposes of assessing whether Catlin is entitled to a COA, 

we assume that Catlin has shown that reasonable jurists could debate the 

district court’s conclusion that Catlin had failed to satisfy the first and 

second prongs of the Brady test.

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material under Brady, we need not address the other 

elements of a Brady claim.”).

Our discussion of materiality tracks, but is not governed 

by, our discussion of materiality with respect to Claim 

26(A)16 and the Napue component of Claim 23. Again, all 

Catlin points to is evidence suggesting that there were 

additional undisclosed benefits that Hardin received in 

exchange for his testimony. But Hardin’s “credibility had 

already been seriously challenged during cross-examination 

at trial,” Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 504 (9th Cir. 

2010), using evidence that Hardin received benefits in 

exchange for his testimony. The defense’s impeachment of 

Hardin based on the benefits he received from law 

enforcement, was, in fact, the focus of cross-examination. 

Evidence of additional benefits that Hardin may have 

received (including information related to additional charges 

being dismissed or fringe benefits such as meals) would have 

been cumulative of other impeachment evidence of the same 

type that was already before the jury. Catlin’s proffer is 

insufficient to establish materiality under Brady. See id.;

Kohring, 637 F.3d at 908; Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 741 

(9th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 598–

99 (9th Cir. 2004); cf. Horton, 408 F.3d at 579–80 

(concluding that the failure to disclose that an informant 

received leniency in exchange for testimony was material 

because it was “powerful and unique” and a “different kind 

of impeachment evidence” from that already presented). 

In Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 

2005), we considered similar facts to those present here and

16 The materiality/prejudice inquiries for ineffective assistance of 

counsel and Brady are identical. See Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 919 

(9th Cir. 2010). 

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concluded that “[e]ven if the prosecution did hide one of the 

benefits it gave [the witness], a deal involving the residential 

burglary charge would have very nearly replicated evidence 

already admitted that showed [the witness] received 

significant benefits for his testimony.” Id. We reasoned that 

“[a]dding the dismissal of one additional charge to that list 

of already substantial benefits would not add to the 

impeachment value of the evidence.” Id. That reasoning 

applies here, even though Catlin claims that multiple 

dismissals were undisclosed. Similarly, in Hooper, we 

concluded that testimony that a witness received undisclosed 

benefits was not material when that witness was “vigorously 

impeached.” 985 F.3d at 617–18.

Moreover, as we have already indicated, there was 

substantial evidence of Catlin’s guilt even leaving aside 

Hardin’s testimony, which was brief and—as the jury was 

instructed—already suspect insofar as it involved an 

uncorroborated confession to a jailhouse informant. The fact 

that there is substantial other evidence of Catlin’s guilt and 

that Hardin’s testimony was not “central” to the State’s case, 

see Horton, 408 F.3d at 578–79, makes it hard to see how 

additional (cumulative) impeachment evidence would have 

impacted the jury’s decision. See Hart, 97 F.4th at 655; 

Morris, 447 F.3d at 741. 

Thus, no reasonable jurist could debate that the CSC 

reasonably could have concluded that the non-disclosure at 

issue in this case was not material under Brady.

17

17 That remains true even if we consider the evidence purportedly 

suppressed in violation of Brady and the purported Napue violations 

together. See Phillips, 673 F.3d at 1189 (explaining that, when Napue 

claims and Brady claims are both raised, materiality is analyzed 

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64 CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD

D. Catlin’s Brady Claims Based on Hardin’s Mental 

Health 

Claim 23 also contains an assertion that the State 

violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose 

information related to Hardin’s mental health. We need not 

linger long over this claim. Catlin’s assertion that Hardin 

had mental health problems relies entirely on declarations 

from Hardin’s family members, and he does not show that 

the State actually possessed this information. Thus, there 

could be no suppression of the evidence. No reasonable 

jurist could debate the district court’s rejection of this claim.

E. Conclusion

In sum, no reasonable jurist could debate the district 

court’s resolution of Claim 23 or any of its facets. We 

accordingly decline to expand the COA and thus dismiss for 

lack of jurisdiction the portion of Catlin’s appeal challenging 

the district court’s disposition of Claim 23.

18

collectively); Sivak, 658 F.3d at 914 (“We reach the same result under 

Brady and our collective Napue-Brady analysis.”).

18 Catlin’s brief purports to challenge the denial of his request for an 

evidentiary hearing, primarily because such a hearing would have 

permitted him to further develop Claim 23. Catlin’s argument is cursory, 

though, and it is not clear that he has squarely challenged the district 

court’s ruling on this point. But even if we were to reach the merits of 

this argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Catlin’s request for an evidentiary hearing. See Earp v. Ornoski, 431 

F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). When, as here, the state court’s 

decision does not violate AEDPA, the federal court is limited in most 

circumstances to the record before the state court. See Shinn v. Ramirez, 

596 U.S. 366, 378 (2022); Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 183 (“[W]hen the 

state-court record ‘precludes habeas relief’ under the limitations 

of § 2254(d), a district court is ‘not required to hold an evidentiary 

hearing.’” (quoting Schiro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007))).

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CATLIN V. BROOMFIELD 65

CONCLUSION

The jury found Steven Catlin guilty of murdering his 

fourth wife and his adoptive mother with poison. He 

stipulated that he had previously been convicted of 

murdering his fifth wife. At the penalty phase of Catlin’s 

capital trial, the jury sentenced him to death. 

In his § 2254 federal habeas petition, Catlin lodges a 

variety of challenges to the guilty verdict and the death 

sentence. But when we analyze Catlin’s challenge under the 

deferential standard of review dictated by AEDPA, it is clear 

that Catlin is not entitled to habeas relief. The California 

Supreme Court reasonably could have rejected (1) Catlin’s 

arguments in Claims 10 and 11 based on the existence of an 

ex parte communication between a trial judge and a juror;

(2) Catlin’s argument in Claim 26(A) that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase; and 

(3) Catlin’s argument in various subsections of Claim 35 that 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty 

phase. Additionally, we decline to expand the certificate of 

appealability to encompass Catlin’s challenges in Claim 23

based on the State’s alleged presentation of false testimony 

and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 19-99011, 12/24/2024, ID: 12917748, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 65 of 65