Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02092/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE CO. PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 05-2092

RUSSELL LAYTON and

PACESETTER TRUCKING COMPANY, INC. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Now on the 24th day of January, 2006, comes on for

consideration Pacesetter Trucking Co.’s Motion to Dismiss (doc.

7). The Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and

orders as follows with respect thereto: 

1. The plaintiff, Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.

(“Progressive”), filed this action on June 20, 2005 against

defendants Russell Layton (“Layton”) and Pacesetter Trucking

Company, Inc. (“Pacesetter”) seeking declaratory judgment as to

whether Progressive’s insurance policy, issued to Layton, covers

an accident involving Layton and Pacesetter. 

According to Progressive’s complaint, the accident took

place on April 13, 2005 while Layton was escorting a tractortrailer owned by Pacesetter. 

Pacesetter now moves to dismiss Progressive’s complaint,

asserting that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. 

2. “When personal jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff

has the burden to show that jurisdiction exists.” Burlington

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Industries Inc. v. Maples Industries, 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th

Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). “[T]he burden does not shift to

the party challenging jurisdiction." Gould v. P.T. Krakatau

Steel, 957 F.2d 573, 575 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 506 U.S. 908

(1992), citing Newhard, Cook & Co. v. Inspired Life Centers,

Inc., 895 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1990). 

In line with the foregoing authorities, Progressive, as the

plaintiff asserting it, has the burden of making a prima facie

showing of this Court’s jurisdiction over Pacesetter. See First

National Bank of Lewisville, Arkansas v. First National Bank of

Clinton, Kentucky, 258 F.3d 727, 729 (8 Cir. 2001); Falkirk th

Min. Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 373 (8 Cir. th

1990). Moreover, “[d]etermining whether jurisdiction exists over

an out-of-state defendant involves two inquiries: (1) whether a

forum’s long-arm statute permits the assertion of jurisdiction

and (2) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction violates

federal due process.” Graphics Controls Corp. v. Utah Med.

Prods., Inc., 149 F.3d 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998)(footnote

omitted). 

Because Arkansas’ long-arm statute permits the assertion of

jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, Ark.

Code Ann. § 16-4-101(B) (Supp. 1995); see also Kilcrease v. Butler,

293 Ark. 454, 455, 739 S.W.2d 139 (1987), the sole inquiry this

Court need make is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is

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 Courts are to apply the “minimum contacts” standard developed in International Shoe and its progeny. Hilderbrand 1

v. Steck Mfg. Co., Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1355 (Fed.Cir. Feb. 7, 2002).

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consistent with the due process clause . See 3D Systems, Inc. V. 1

Aarotech Laboratories, Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998);

see also Epps v. Stewart Information Services Corp., 327 F.3d 642,

647 (8 Cir. 2003). th

“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty

interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum

with which he has no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72

(1985)(quotation omitted). Due process requires sufficient “minimum

contacts” between the defendant and the forum state so that

“maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980). 

To satisfy its burden, a plaintiff asserting jurisdiction must

establish either specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.

Merck & Co., Inc. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 368, 371 (D.Del.

2002); Mason v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 2003 WL 21244160 (W.D.

Missouri)(Slip Opinion)(May 8, 2003)(explaining differences in two

concepts). 

Specific jurisdiction arises when the particular cause of

action arose from the defendant’s activities within the forum state;

general jurisdiction arises when the defendant has continuous and

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systematic contacts with the state, irrespective of whether

defendant’s connections are related to the particular cause of

action. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 414 (1984); see also Viam Corp. V. Iowa Export-Import Trading

Co., 84 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(specific jurisdiction

distinguished from general jurisdiction; general jurisdiction where

defendant’s contacts at issue have no necessary relationship to the

cause of action). Before addressing the issue specifically, it is

important to review the authorities governing the two types of

jurisdiction. 

(a) General Personal Jurisdiction -- Due process focuses on

the fundamental fairness of exercising jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant, and therefore, "it is essential in each case

that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 

The United States Supreme Court has held that to maintain

general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the facts must

establish “substantial” or “continuous and systematic general

business contacts” with the forum state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at

416. Such affiliations are construed in light of the Due Process

Clause which permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction only if

doing so would not “offend traditional notions of fair play and

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substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310, 316 (1945). That is, a defendant must “reasonably anticipate

being haled into court” in the remote forum. World-Wide Volkswagon

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). While lack of physical

presence in a state cannot alone defeat jurisdiction, “random,”

“fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts do not count in the minimum

contacts calculus. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,

475 (1985). If a party is amenable to general jurisdiction, then it

can be said that it has such numerous contacts with the forum that

it may be haled into court in that forum even for a suit not arising

out of its forum contacts. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416. 

A showing of contacts alone, however, is not enough; a foreign

defendant may still defeat jurisdiction by marshaling a compelling

case that its exercise would be unreasonable or contrary to concepts

of fair play and substantial justice. Viam Corp., 84 F.3d at 429. 

“The test of unreasonableness is a multi-factored balancing test

that weighs any burdens on the defendant, against various

countervailing considerations, including the plaintiff’s interest in

a convenient forum and the forum state’s interest in resolving

conflicts flowing from in-state events.” Id., citing Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 477. For these reasons, a

“plaintiff must show significantly more than mere minimum contacts

to establish general jurisdiction.” Molnlycke Health Care AB v.

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Dumex Medical Surgical Prod., Ltd., 64 F.Supp.2d 448, 450 (E.D. Pa.

1999). 

Once defendants’ contacts with the forum have been established,

the Court considers the following factors in deciding whether to

exercise jurisdiction:

(1) the nature and quality of defendants’ contacts with

the forum state; 

(2) the quantity of such contacts; 

(3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; 

(4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum

for its residents; and

(5) the convenience of the parties. 

Epps, 327 F.3d at 648, citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v.

Maple Industries, Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8 Cir. 1996)(addt’l th

citations omitted). In applying these factors, the central inquiry

is the “relationship among the defendant, the forum and the

litigation.” Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture, Inc., 708 F.2d

1338, 1340 (8 Cir. 1983)(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. th

186, 204 (1977)). 

Finally, even where a jurisdictional threshold can be

established, “personal jurisdiction may be defeated if its exercise

would be unreasonable” and in making this determination, the Court

considers factors such as 

(a) the burden on the defendant; (b) the

interest of the forum state; (c) the plaintiff’s

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interest in obtaining relief; (d) the interstate

judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most

efficient resolution of controversies; and (e)

the shared interest of the several states in

furthering fundamental substantive social

policy.

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-14; Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel

Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 374 (8 Cir. 1990). th

(b) Specific Personal Jurisdiction – Specific personal

jurisdiction is distinguished from general personal jurisdiction in

that specific jurisdiction usually refers to a “situation in which

the cause of action arises directly from the defendant’s contacts

with the forum State.” Viam Corp. v. Iowa Export-Import Trading

Co., 84 F.3d 424 (C.A. Fed. 1996). 

4. In light of the foregoing authorities and considerations,

the Court now turns to an examination Progressive’s contentions. 

(a) Specific Personal Jurisdiction -– First, Progressive

asserts that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over

Pacesetter because of Pacesetter’s “relationship with Layton . . .

a resident of Arkansas.” 

It is undisputed that Pacesetter associated Russell Layton, an

Arkansas resident, to escort its tractor and trailer while hauling a

generator and housing unit. The facts indicate that, while Layton

was escorting the tractor and trailer beneath an overpass, the

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Progressive does not assert that the accident occurred in the State of Arkansas. According to Pacesetter, the 2

accident occurred near Slidell, Louisiana. 

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generator and housing unit being transported on the trailer collided

with the overpass and were damaged. 

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Progressive argues that Pacesetter’s relationship with Layton

(which apparently was comprised of the single escort service

described) -- is sufficient to support specific jurisdiction. The

argument seems to be that if an Arkansas resident performs a single

service for another, even outside the state, that single service is

alone sufficient to confer Arkansas jurisdiction over the other

person. The Court knows of no authority to support that

proposition. Pacesetter’s relationship with Layton simply does not

amount to a contact with the forum state such as to confer

jurisdiction on that state. 

(b) General Personal Jurisdiction -– Progressive also argues

that Pacesetter is subject to general personal jurisdiction in

Arkansas because:

* Pacesetter is authorized to operate its trucking business

in all forty-eight contiguous United States and the District of

Columbia;

* Pacesetter has traveled through Arkansas;

* according to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission,

Pacesetter reported that for the time period of July 1, 2003 through

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June 30, 2004, 2.4% of its total miles traveled occurred in and

through the State of Arkansas; and 

* although Pacesetter has not registered a service agent

with the State of Arkansas, Pacesetter has an agent for service of

process in Arkansas pursuant to its operating authority under

federal law.

In response to Progressive’s arguments, Pacesetter asserts

that:

* Pacesetter was served in Oklahoma -- not in Arkansas;

* Pacesetter neither registered with the State of Arkansas

to do business in Arkansas, nor designated with the State of

Arkansas an agent for service in Arkansas; and

* Pacesetter does not have sufficient minimum contacts with

the State of Arkansas.

In the Court’s view, Pacesetter’s contacts with the State of

Arkansas are de minimis and insufficient to support this Court’s

exercise of general personal jurisdiction over it. Unlike the

defendant in Ocepek v. Corporate Transport, Inc., 950 F.2d 556 (8th

Cir. 1991), Pacesetter was served with process in the State of

Oklahoma -- not the putative forum state; and it has never

registered an agent for service with the State Arkansas. Due

process requires more than Progressive has presented and its claim

of jurisdiction must fail. 

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Accordingly, Pacesetter Trucking Co.’s Motion to Dismiss (doc.

7) should be, and hereby is, granted and Progressive’s complaint

against Pacesetter is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jimm Larry Hendren

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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