Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00948/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00948-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LOUIS JOSEPH BOUDOUSQUIE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, et 

al. 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-00948-DAD-SCR 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant 

to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) 

(ECF No. 16) was submitted without oral argument after full briefing (ECF Nos. 20, 21, & 22). 

The undersigned now recommends that the Motion be granted. 

I. Procedural History and Background 

Plaintiff filed this action on May 22, 2023. ECF No. 1. The complaint alleges that 

Defendant U.S. Department of the Army/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter “Defendant” 

or “Army”) engaged in “prohibited personnel practices” including sexual harassment and his 

removal from employment. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff asserts as the basis for federal jurisdiction 

the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. The complaint does not contain concrete facts alleging 

particular acts or omissions by identified Army staff. Instead, Plaintiff makes references to facts 

in unidentified “court and Agency records” and makes general allegations that working in a 

“hostile, toxic, discriminatory work environment”—without an explanation of what was hostile, 

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toxic, or discriminatory about it—led him to develop an anxiety adjustment disorder and 

depression. Id. at 2, 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully removed from his position as a 

Procurement Analyst on October 29, 2020.1 Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff attached approximately 40 pages of exhibits to his complaint. One of those 

exhibits is a February 11, 2022 decision from the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) in 

Plaintiff’s favor. The MSPB decision details disputes between Plaintiff and a supervisor about 

Plaintiff’s performance and Plaintiff’s requests for medical-related accommodations. The MSPB 

ordered the Army “to cancel [Plaintiff’s] removal and to retroactively restore [Plaintiff] effective 

October 29, 2020.” ECF No. 1 at 322 (MSPB decision at 24). The Army was also ordered to pay 

back pay. Id. 

After Plaintiff’s reinstatement, he filed an administrative tort claim seeking $5 million for 

“deliberately inflicted” “stress” in connection with Army’s actions, including the decision to 

remove him from his position. Army received the tort claim on November 15, 2022. ECF No. 

16-3 (Green Decl. ¶ 3 & Exh. 1). Plaintiff then amended his administrative tort claim on 

February 27, 2023, to ask for $80 million in damages. Id. (Green Decl. ¶ 6 & Exh. 4). Plaintiff 

filed this action on May 22, 2023. Army denied his administrative tort claims in a letter dated 

June 7, 2023. Id. (Green Decl. ¶ 7 & Exh. 5). 

Plaintiff in this action seeks $150 million due to his alleged “ever-accelerating mental and 

physical deterioration,” which he attributes to Defendant’s bad acts. ECF No. 1 at 6. 

II. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) 

Defendant moves to dismiss on three independent grounds: 1) the Civil Servants Reform 

Act (“CSRA”), Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 111, et seq. (codified, as amended in various sections of 5 

U.S.C. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV)) is the exclusive remedy for addressing prohibited personnel 

actions; 2) Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), before filing suit; and 3) the only proper defendant in an FTCA 

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 Defendant’s Motion papers indicates the date was October 27, 2020. ECF No. 16-1 at 1-2. The 

specific date does not matter for purposes of resolving the Motion. 

2

 Page references such as this one are to the page number generated on the CM/ECF header. 

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action is the United States, which is not a named party. ECF No. 16-1 at 1-2. 

A. The Civil Servants Reform Act 

Defendant contends that the CSRA provides the comprehensive remedial scheme through 

which federal employees may challenge prohibited personnel practices, citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 

7512-13, 7701. ECF No. 16-1 at 4. Defendant contends that because Plaintiff challenged his 

removal through the CSRA and ultimately prevailed at the MSPB, his current claim is preempted 

and must be dismissed. 

Congress enacted the CSRA in 1978 “to replace the old civil service system, an outdated 

patchwork of statutes and rules built up over almost a century.” Mangano v. United States, 529 

F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Congress created 

through the CSRA “an integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review, designed to 

balance the legitimate interests of the various categories of federal employees with the needs of 

sound and efficient administration.” Id. at 1246 (citing United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 

445 (1988)). The CSRA “creates a remedial scheme through which federal employees can 

challenge their supervisors’ prohibited personnel practices.” Id. at 1246 (internal quotation and 

citation omitted). Prohibited personnel practices are defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302. If the 

challenged conduct falls within the scope of the CSRA’s prohibited personnel practices, then the 

CSRA’s administrative procedure is the only remedy. See Mangano, 529 F.3d at 1246. The 

CSRA’s remedial scheme is “both exclusive and preemptive” and precludes FTCA claims. Id. 

Personnel-related claims are preempted even if no remedy is available under the CSRA. Id. 

Plaintiff specifically pleads that he challenges “prohibited personnel practices.” ECF No. 

1 at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff has already successfully pursued a remedy under the CSRA before 

the MSPB under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701, et seq. “The CSRA preempts [Plaintiff’s] FTCA claims in 

this case [because] the conduct underlying his complaint can be challenged”—and was in fact so 

challenged—“as ‘prohibited personnel practices’ within the meaning of the CSRA.” Mangano, 

529 F.3d at 1247; see also Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5 (2012) (finding CRSA 

“provides the exclusive avenue for judicial review” even where employee framed challenge as a 

constitutional claim). “[P]ermitting FTCA claims to supplant the CSRA’s remedial scheme 

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would defeat Congress’ purpose of creating a single system of procedures and remedies, subject 

to judicial review.” Mangano, 529 F.3d at 1246 (internal citation and quotation omitted). The 

CSRA provides the exclusive remedy and Plaintiff’s FTCA claim is preempted. The Court 

recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted on this basis. 

B. Federal Tort Claims Act 

An independent basis for dismissal is failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the 

FTCA. The FTCA provides, in part: “An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the 

United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused 

by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government . . . unless the 

claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall 

have been finally denied by the agency in writing.” 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). Plaintiff submitted his 

administrative tort claim on November 15, 2022. ECF No. 16-3 (Green Decl. at ¶ 3). Plaintiff 

amended his claim on February 27, 2023. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff then filed this action in May 2023, 

before the six months for administrative review had lapsed or his claim had been denied. An agency 

is allowed six months, calculated from the date the claim is received by the agency, to review and 

resolve the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). If a claimant submits an amended 

claim, the six-month period starts anew. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(c) (“Upon the timely filing of an 

amendment to a pending claim, the agency shall have six months in which to make a final 

disposition of the claim as amended and the claimant’s option under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) shall not 

accrue until six months after the filing of an amendment.”). 

 The requirement of administrative exhaustion is jurisdictional in nature. See McNeil v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110-13 (1993) (affirming dismissal of FTCA case for lack of 

jurisdiction when it was instituted prior to “complete exhaustion” of administrative remedy 

process set forth in § 2675(a)). In McNeil, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the approach 

that had been taken by some Circuits to “permit a prematurely filed FTCA action to proceed if no 

substantial progress has taken place in the litigation before the administrative remedies are 

exhausted.” Id. at 110. Following McNeil, this Court has consistently held that a plaintiff may 

not cure this jurisdictional defect by prematurely filing an FTCA suit and then seeking to amend 

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his complaint after the administrative agency has denied the tort claim or the six months have 

expired. See, e.g., Sparrow v. U.S. Postal Serv., 825 F. Supp. 252, 254 (E.D. Cal. 1993) 

(“Because 2675(a) of the FTCA requires that an administrative claim be finalized at the time the 

complaint is filed, plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured through amendment, but instead, plaintiff 

must file a new suit.”); Soto v. United States, No. 2:07-cv-0066 FCD DAD, 2007 WL 2601411, at 

*1, *3 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 6, 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s request “to file an amended complaint 

after the administrative complaint requirement has been fulfilled” because the administrative 

exhaustion requirement “is jurisdictional in nature and must be fulfilled prior to the institution of 

an action”).3 

 Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant denied his tort claim in a letter dated June 7, 

2023. ECF No. 20 at 5. Plaintiff also agrees that he amended his claim on February 7, 2023. Id.

at 7. Plaintiff appears to concede that he filed the suit prior to exhaustion of administrative 

remedies, but did so with a “good faith but mistaken understanding an administrative remedy had 

been exhausted.” Id. In substance, Plaintiff requests the Court excuse his mistake. But the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional and non-waivable. D.L. by and through 

Junio v. Vassilev, 858 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[t]he FTCA’s exhaustion requirement is 

jurisdictional and may not be waived”) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies prior to filing this action and Defendant’s motion should be granted on 

this basis as well. 

III. Conclusion 

The Court recommends that Defendant’s Motion be granted and this action dismissed 

because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the CSRA. Even if his FTCA claim was not 

preempted by the CSRA, Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA, 

which further supports dismissal. 

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 By contrast, where a plaintiff has already instituted an action establishing federal court 

jurisdiction for other non-FTCA causes of action, that plaintiff may permissibly file an amended 

or supplemental complaint to add FTCA causes of action after administrative exhaustion is met. 

See Martin v. Naval Criminal Inves. Service, No 10-cv-1879 WQH, 2012 WL 1570840 (S.D. 

Cal., May 3, 2012). 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

(ECF No. 16) be GRANTED and this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

and that this case be closed. 

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, either party may file written objections 

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and 

Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may result in waiver of the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 27, 2024 

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