Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-23-03371/USCOURTS-ca7-23-03371-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-3371 

JANIAH MONROE, et al., individually and on behalf of a class of 

similarly situated individuals, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v.

STEVEN BOWMAN, et al., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 3:18-cv-00156-NJR — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 19, 2024 — DECIDED DECEMBER 5, 2024 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. For six years, the district court 

has presided over this class action challenging the treatment 

of prisoners with gender dysphoria by the Illinois Department of Corrections. The defendant prison officials appeal 

several injunctions and a finding of civil contempt by the district court.

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2 No. 23-3371 

Injunctive relief in this case is subject to the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act of 1996, which includes in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3626(a)(2) this provision that governs the outcome of this 

appeal: “Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically 

expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the 

court makes the findings required under subsection (a)(1) for 

the entry of prospective relief and makes the order final before 

the expiration of the 90-day period.” 

The district court issued a preliminary injunction on 

February 7, 2022. Further injunctions followed to supplement 

and modify the terms. On November 16, 2023, more than a 

year and a half after the preliminary injunction was issued, 

and after defendants invoked the 90-day limit in § 3626(a)(2), 

the district court ruled that its original label — literally 

“Preliminary Injunction” — had been a mistake. The judge 

wrote that the February 7, 2022 order was actually in 

substance a permanent injunction. The judge ordered the 

clerk of the court to amend the docket to label the injunction 

permanent and to issue a final judgment consistent with the 

February 7, 2022 decision. 

The court did not use the Latin phrase “nunc pro tunc” 

(“now for then”) but the label fits this attempt to transform 

retroactively a preliminary injunction into a permanent one. 

This substantive, retroactive transformation was not 

authorized. Federal courts may issue nunc pro tunc orders to 

“reflect the reality” of what has already occurred, but the 

court “cannot make the record what it is not.” Missouri v. 

Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 49 (1990), quoted in Roman Catholic 

Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57, 64–65 

(2020); accord, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1241 

(7th Cir. 1990) (“A judge may correct a clerical error at any 

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No. 23-3371 3

time” but “may not rewrite history.”). The attempted 

retroactive change here cannot be deemed a correction of a 

clerical or typographical error. And the attempted retroactive 

change would also impair defendants’ substantive rights. 

Parties are entitled to take federal court orders at face value. 

They are not required to divine what the judge might have 

meant, contrary to what the judge actually said. E.g., Grede v. 

FC Stone, LLC, 746 F.3d 244, 255–58 (7th Cir. 2014) (bankruptcy 

court’s authorization of a post-petition transfer of funds could 

not be “clarified” retroactively to deem the transfer 

unauthorized; despite judge’s later regrets, supposed 

“clarification” of order ran contrary to its plain language). 

Under § 3626(a)(2), the preliminary injunction issued on 

February 7, 2022 expired 90 days later, on May 8, 2022. 

Accordingly, we vacate all existing injunctions and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We must, 

however, dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging the 

finding of contempt. The district court made the finding but 

has not yet imposed any sanctions, which are needed to 

establish appellate jurisdiction.

I. The Lawsuit and the Injunctions

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

The named plaintiffs are transgender women housed in 

Illinois prisons. The plaintiff class is comprised of prisoners in 

the Illinois Department of Corrections who have requested 

evaluation or treatment for gender dysphoria. 

Gender dysphoria is a condition in which a person 

experiences clinically significant distress stemming from 

incongruence between the person’s experienced or expressed 

gender and the person’s assigned gender. The plaintiffs and 

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4 No. 23-3371 

defendants agree that gender dysphoria is a serious medical 

condition. The parties also agree that the Eighth Amendment 

calls for appropriate medical treatment of a prisoner’s gender 

dysphoria. Appropriate treatment options include social role 

transitioning, cross-sex hormone therapy, psychotherapy, 

and surgery.

Plaintiffs contend that the defendant correctional officials 

have acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to their 

gender dysphoria. Plaintiffs have sought injunctive relief to 

ensure timely evaluations and treatment in the form of 

hormone therapy and monitoring, gender-affirming surgery 

where medically necessary, and appropriate support for 

social transitioning, including gender-affirming clothing and 

grooming items, and access to private showers. Plaintiffs also 

seek access to medical and mental health care providers 

competent to treat gender dysphoria, and they seek 

individualized housing placement decisions and an end to 

what they experience as cross-gender strip searches. 

B. The District Court Proceedings

This case presents issues that have been challenging for 

the district court, the plaintiff class, and the defendant prison 

officials. As one corrections expert testified here, the criminal 

justice system has been “binary in every way,” and 

modifications to deal with transgender prisoners require 

“monumental change.” We provide only a brief summary of 

the years of litigation in the district court, focusing on events 

most relevant to this appeal. 

The case was filed on January 31, 2018 as a putative class 

action. District Judge Herndon screened the complaint as 

required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and found that plaintiffs 

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No. 23-3371 5

had alleged colorable claims for relief. After Judge Herndon’s 

retirement, the case was assigned to Judge Rosenstengel. In 

the spring of 2019, plaintiffs moved for class certification and 

a preliminary injunction. On December 19, 2019, the court 

granted a preliminary injunction, and on March 4, 2020, 

amended that preliminary injunction. Those early orders 

required defendants to provide plaintiffs some limited relief, 

including ensuring that medical decisions about transgender 

inmates would be made by medical professionals, ensuring 

timely hormone therapy where medically necessary, with 

medically appropriate monitoring, allowing social 

transitioning, allowing evaluations for gender dysphoria on 

request, and taking steps toward appropriate staff training 

(which looks like a long-term institutional challenge). On 

March 4, 2020, the court certified a class of all prisoners in the 

custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections who have 

requested evaluation or treatment for gender dysphoria. The 

class seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and was certified 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

The court scheduled a bench trial for August 2021 and 

heard evidence for four days. On August 9, 2021, the court 

issued preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law and 

a modified preliminary injunction. 

Coming to the events most central for this appeal, on 

February 7, 2022, the district court issued an 87-page 

“Memorandum and Order” and a separate 13-page 

“Preliminary Injunction.”1 The court found that the plaintiffs 

1 The court issued the preliminary injunction in a separate document 

to comply with this court’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 in MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 940 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 

2019). The district court docket entry for the document now reads: 

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6 No. 23-3371 

were not receiving appropriate and timely evaluation for 

gender dysphoria and were not receiving timely and 

appropriate care for their condition in many respects. These 

included social transitioning, hormone therapy with 

medically necessary monitoring, individualized assessments 

of housing decisions, and eliminating cross-gender strip 

searches, among others. Testimony also showed significant 

resistance on the part of many correctional officers to training 

on transgender inmates and to appropriate treatment of such 

inmates. 

In the February 7, 2022 preliminary injunction, the court 

also ordered status reports on compliance with the injunction 

and took steps toward appointing a monitor for compliance. 

In April and again in May 2022, about the time the 

preliminary injunction was expiring by operation of law 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2), the court followed up by 

appointing two co-monitors to oversee compliance with the 

injunctive relief. Six months later, on November 14, 2022, 

plaintiffs filed their Motion for Finding of Contempt. The 

motion asserted that defendants in many respects were failing 

to make reasonable efforts to comply with the “preliminary 

injunction.” While the contempt motion was pending, the 

court issued further orders to modify and enforce the 

February 7, 2022 Preliminary Injunction on January 24, 2023, 

April 4, 2023, and May 11, 2023. 

“PERMANENT INJUNCTION (to be interpreted in accordance with the 

Court’s Order at Doc. 678.)” This attempt to rewrite history is a central 

focus of this appeal.

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No. 23-3371 7

C. Retroactive Conversion of the “Preliminary Injunction” 

into a Permanent Injunction with a Final Judgment

The district court confronted the 90-day problem and the 

contempt motion in a Memorandum and Order issued on 

November 16, 2023. The court began by reviewing the history 

of the case, but it ended up rewriting that history in ways 

prejudicial to defendants’ rights. The court wrote that the 

February 7, 2022 “Memorandum and Order” had actually set 

forth what the court now called its “Final Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law,” and it ordered the “Preliminary 

Injunction” of February 7, 2022 to be redesignated as a 

permanent injunction. The court acknowledged that it had 

made mistakes and took responsibility for any confusion. 

Unfortunately, however, the court’s remedy – transforming 

its prior order – has caused only greater confusion.

The court also found that defendants were in contempt for 

failing to act with reasonable diligence to comply with the 

court’s orders. The court declined, however, to impose any 

sanctions: “But because of the confusion that this Court 

unintentionally infused into this case concerning the nature 

of the operative injunction, and given the considerable time 

that has passed since the issuance of the Court’s enforcement 

orders and the filing of the Motion for Contempt Finding, the 

Court is inclined to avoid imposing sanctions at this time.” 

The court also instructed the clerk of the court to enter a final 

judgment for plaintiffs “as should have been done after the 

entry of the February 2022 Order.” The court concluded: “The 

Court recognizes that these solutions are not perfect and 

apologizes for the procedural confusion created with its prior 

orders.” The court also scheduled a status conference to see 

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8 No. 23-3371 

how to move forward. Defendants have appealed from that 

final judgment and the finding of contempt.

II. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposed a range of new 

restrictions on cases challenging prison conditions. Section 

3626 of Title 18 of the United States Code imposed requirements and limits for injunctive relief on prison conditions. An 

important substantive requirement is that injunctive relief is 

permitted only to the extent necessary to correct the violation 

of the plaintiffs’ federal rights. In most civil cases requiring 

injunctive relief, a court has considerable discretion to shape 

the relief to ensure it is effective, especially where defendants 

have persisted in wrongful conduct or inaction. E.g., McComb 

v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949) (injunction 

barring violations of labor law was justified based on defendant’s “record of continuing and persistent violations” of law);

Russian Media Group, LLC v. Cable America, Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 

307 (7th Cir. 2010) (“district court has the discretion to issue a 

broad injunction” where “a proclivity for unlawful conduct 

has been shown”); Lineback v. Spurlino Materials, LLC, 546 F.3d 

491, 506 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming injunction against specified 

violations of labor laws and against actions violating the law 

“in any like manner”).

Under § 3626(a), however, the court has less discretion: 

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect 

to prison conditions shall extend no further than 

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 

right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The 

court shall not grant or approve any prospective 

relief unless the court finds that such relief is 

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No. 23-3371 9

narrowly drawn, extends no further than 

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 

right, and is the least intrusive means necessary 

to correct the violation of the Federal right. The 

court shall give substantial weight to any 

adverse impact on public safety or the operation 

of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A); see Rasho v. Jeffries, 22 F.4th 703, 713 (7th Cir. 

2022) (“the PLRA requires that courts give prison 

administrators wide latitude to set constitutionally adequate 

procedures”); Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(vacating injunction that failed to comply with PLRA’s 

narrow-tailoring requirement).

Section 3626(a)(2) includes a similar substantive requirement for preliminary injunctive relief:

Preliminary injunctive relief. — In any civil 

action with respect to prison conditions, to the 

extent otherwise authorized by law, the court 

may enter a temporary restraining order or an 

order for preliminary injunctive relief. 

Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly 

drawn, extend no further than necessary to 

correct the harm the court finds requires 

preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive 

means necessary to correct that harm. The court 

shall give substantial weight to any adverse 

impact on public safety or the operation of a 

criminal justice system caused by the 

preliminary relief and shall respect the 

principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B) 

in tailoring any preliminary relief. * * * 

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10 No. 23-3371 

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). As noted, that paragraph also includes 

a time limit: “Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically 

expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the 

court makes the findings required under subsection (a)(1) for 

the entry of prospective relief and makes the order final before 

the expiration of the 90-day period.” Id.

III. Analysis

A. The Reason to Reverse

The principal issue in this appeal is simple. On February 

7, 2022, the district court issued a document called a 

“Preliminary Injunction.” Within the next 90 days, the court 

never made a finding that might have allowed extension of 

that preliminary injunction. Under § 3626(a)(2), that 

preliminary injunction expired 90 days after it was issued, on 

May 8, 2022. After that date, the injunction no longer had any 

legal effect. 

On the other hand, the expiration of the February 7, 2022 

Preliminary Injunction did not conclude the case, and the 

court did not lose the power to issue further preliminary 

injunctions or a permanent injunction. But any such further 

injunctions had to satisfy the requirements of § 3626(a), 

including its time limits.

B. The District Court’s Reasons

In the memorandum of November 16, 2023, the district 

court recognized that it had created a procedural mess. Its 

solution was (a) to transform the February 7, 2022 preliminary 

injunction retroactively into a permanent injunction, (b) to 

order entry of a final judgment on November 16, 2023 

consistent with the terms of the February 7, 2022 documents 

that it now called its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

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No. 23-3371 11

permanent injunction, (c) to decline to impose sanctions on 

defendants for the contempt it found, and (d) to set a status 

conference to get the case back on track to achieve protection 

of plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights.

The district court and plaintiffs did not cite, and we have 

not found, any precedent in federal law for such a retroactive 

transformation of a preliminary injunction into a permanent 

injunction, or, frankly, any comparably substantive retroactive transformation of a court order.

To justify this rewrite, the district court said that it had understood the four-day hearing in August 2021 to have been 

the final trial on the merits. The court acknowledged that its 

order had been entitled “Preliminary Injunction” and that the 

accompanying memorandum set forth and applied the legal 

standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.

In the November 2023 opinion, however, the court went 

on to write that, in its February 2022 memorandum, it had 

found that plaintiffs had shown actual success on the merits 

of their claims, as needed for a permanent injunction. See

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 

(2008) (“it would be an abuse of discretion to enter a 

permanent injunction, after final decision on the merits, along 

the same lines as the preliminary injunction.”); Vaughn v. 

Walthall, 968 F.3d 814, 824–25 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Since a 

permanent injunction is a form of relief on the merits, the 

plaintiff must also show not just a probability of success on 

the merits but actual success.”). The court noted it had also 

made the PLRA findings of necessity, narrowness, and least 

intrusive means, which are needed for any covered 

injunction, preliminary or permanent.

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12 No. 23-3371 

When a United States District Court exercises its power to 

grant injunctive relief, the difference between preliminary 

and permanent relief is fundamental. The choice between 

them is elementary, with substantial, even dramatic, practical 

and legal consequences. Different legal standards apply. 

Different standards of appellate review apply. Different 

requirements for a bond or other security apply. And under 

§ 3626(a)(2), one is limited to 90 days at a time and the other 

is not.

A district court issuing an injunction must be 

unmistakably clear about whether the injunction is 

permanent or preliminary. See Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 

847, 859 (7th Cir. 2018) (reversing grant of permanent 

injunction because “the district court sent extremely mixed 

messages about the nature of the hearing itself. The record 

reveals that none of the participants understood exactly what 

the court was deciding—preliminary or permanent injunctive 

relief.”). Parties have a right to take the court’s action at face 

value. See Matter of Wade, 991 F.2d 402, 408 (7th Cir. 1993) (“the 

order of a district court that is final in form and is, to all 

appearance, proper, will be taken at face value and will be 

regarded as final”).

The plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal and the district court’s 

memorandum of November 16, 2023 highlight various 

features of the Memorandum and Order of February 7, 2022 

and the “Preliminary Injunction” issued on February 7, 2022 

that supposedly should have told the defendants that the 

court had actually issued a permanent injunction. The court 

wrote:

Admittedly, the Court, throughout its February 

2022 Order, referred to either “preliminary 

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No. 23-3371 13

relief” or simply “injunctive relief,” outlined the 

standard for preliminary injunctive relief, and 

titled the accompanying injunction a 

“Preliminary Injunction.” Simply put, this was 

a mistake. 

But from the substance of the February 2022 

Order and operative injunction, along with the 

context and ongoing actions of the Court and 

the parties, it is clear that the relief was intended 

and understood to be permanent injunctive relief 

resulting from the evidence presented at the 

bench trial. (Footnote omitted.)

Among these features, the court emphasized that it had 

found not only a likelihood of success on the merits but actual 

violations of plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights. The court 

also referred to its statement at the close of the August 2021 

bench trial that the court would “follow up with permanent 

injunctive relief and may at some point consider the 

appointment of an independent monitor to ensure ongoing 

compliance ....” Apparently, this statement should have been 

understood at the time as a signal that the court would be 

entering a permanent injunction. The court also referred to 

the subject of the just-completed trial as “permanent 

injunctive relief.”

None of those comments or findings were sufficient to tell 

the parties that the document labeled “Preliminary Injunction” was not actually a preliminary injunction subject to Rule 

65 and § 3626(a)(2). See Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 193 

(7th Cir. 1995) (“The United States does not ask us to correct 

records to show what happened; it wants us to change 

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14 No. 23-3371 

history. Incantation of Latin phrases [e.g., nunc pro tunc] does 

not bestow such an Orwellian power.”). 

This principle is fundamental enough that closely similar 

cases seem to be rare. This court rejected analogous revisionist 

arguments in Grede v. FC Stone, 746 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 2014),

and Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2013). In 

Grede, this court held that a bankruptcy court had abused its 

discretion when it tried to “clarify” that an earlier order 

authorizing a transfer of funds had not actually authorized the 

transfer, at least for purposes of preventing clawbacks. 746 

F.3d at 255. We explained that “the post-petition transfer was 

clearly authorized by the bankruptcy court,” and that the 

“court’s later clarification of its order ran contrary to the plain 

language of its order.” Id. “Parties and non-parties alike 

should be able to rely on the text of a court order where the 

text is clear, rather than having to dig through the docket and 

record to determine the order’s true meaning. Especially 

where, as here, the issues were urgent and the stakes were 

high.” Id. at 257, citing Mendez, 725 F.3d at 663; see also In re 

Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litigation, 741 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 

2014) (“Litigants as well as third parties must be able to rely 

on the clear meaning of court orders setting out their 

substantive rights and obligations, and appellate courts 

should interpret those orders in the same manner.”).

A different approach would invite confusion and would 

unnecessarily upset the reliance interests of the parties and 

others. See Grede, 746 F.3d at 257–58. As in Grede, the issues 

here carried some degree of urgency, and the stakes were 

high. Those circumstances, however, do not allow a court to 

correct, clarify, or modify retroactively the substance of its 

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No. 23-3371 15

order in ways that cause substantive prejudice or upset reliance on the plain language of the court’s order. Id. 

To be fair, the district court also pointed out that both 

plaintiffs and defendants had behaved after February 2022 as 

if that injunction had been permanent. Most important, after 

the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on 

May 8, 2022, defendants “continued to acknowledge the role 

of the Co-Monitors, engaged in status conferences and many 

other communications with the Co-Monitors, Plaintiffs, and 

the Court, and responded to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Finding of 

Contempt.” Defendants did not invoke the expiration of the 

preliminary injunction for over a year, at the end of May 2023. 

They first did so when the district court was considering finding them in contempt of court for failing to comply with that 

preliminary injunction.

The district court treated defendants’ delay in raising the 

90-day limit as waiving that limit. A145–46, quoting Carr v. 

O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (“But a party’s 

unreasonable delay in advancing a good ground for a change 

in a previous ruling is normally a compelling ground for 

deeming even a good ground waived.”). Carr addressed the 

state’s failure to raise a timely defense under Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), but ultimately found that Heck

did not provide a good defense in any event. Carr is not 

sufficient authority for the retroactive rewrite of history in this 

case. Here, the February 2022 injunction’s expiration 

governed and limited defendants’ legal obligation to follow 

the injunction’s terms. 

Treating defendants’ cooperation with the court in this 

case as a waiver of an important limit in the PLRA would also 

create a harmful disincentive. The district court created the 

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16 No. 23-3371 

procedural confusion, as it candidly admitted. Yet, despite the 

procedural confusion, the merits issues were not going away. 

The case would be continuing whether the district court had 

issued a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, or no 

injunction. Under these circumstances, parties should not be 

faulted for erring on the side of cooperation. Neither the 

district court nor plaintiffs have shown how they relied to 

their prejudice on the defendants’ earlier silence on the PLRA 

time limits. We must also note that plaintiffs never asked the 

district court to fix the 90-day limit inherent in the court’s 

preliminary injunction of February 7, 2022. 

Also, to be fair, defendants have not offered even an 

explanation for their delays in raising the 90-day limit. 

Accordingly, we appreciate that there is a sense in which 

defendants too are asking us to rewrite history, as if the 

district court had not issued what amounts to a series of 

preliminary injunctions. For example, the district court 

appointed the co-monitors, and they worked under the 

court’s aegis without defendants having objected to the 

timing of their appointments. They are entitled to be paid 

accordingly for the work they did.

We are confident, however, that defendants’ failure to 

raise the 90-day issue earlier did not amount to a waiver of 

the issue going forward in the case. All of the orders are now 

older than 90 days. No findings sufficient to extend any of 

them have been issued as required under § 3626(a)(2). None 

of the preliminary injunctions are in effect now. 

The 90-day limit and our enforcement of it do not mean 

that the case is over. Our decision today remands this case to 

the district court for further proceedings. If plaintiffs believe, 

as they argue here, that defendants have been continuing to 

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No. 23-3371 17

violate their Eighth Amendment rights, they may ask the 

district court for a new injunction, preliminary or permanent. 

See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 

2001) (affirming second preliminary injunction under PLRA: 

“Nothing in the statute limits the number of times a court may 

enter preliminary relief. If anything, the provision simply 

imposes a burden on plaintiffs to continue to prove that 

preliminary relief is warranted.”). The district court need not 

forget what has happened in the last six years of litigation, but 

new injunctive relief will need to address the current 

situation. Any such relief will need to comply with the PLRA, 

including § 3626. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Counterarguments

Plaintiffs’ counterarguments do not rescue the district 

court’s attempted solution for this procedural mess. First, 

plaintiffs cite French v. Duckworth and argue that the district 

court’s reference to “the standards for a preliminary, not a 

permanent injunction” was merely a “mis-citation” of “no 

practical consequence, since the findings of the February 2022 

Order supported the entry of permanent injunctive relief.” 

178 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 

Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000). 

French does not support the attempt at rewriting history in 

this case. In French, we found that “the district court simply 

cited the wrong statutory section [in its preliminary 

injunction order], a mistake to which we need not attach any 

significance unless it affects the substantial rights of the 

parties....” 178 F.3d at 440. We emphasized that the court’s 

order set “forth in plain English what it was doing.” Id. at 441. 

The district court made clear which statutory provision of the 

PLRA it had intended to enjoin. Id.

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18 No. 23-3371 

In this case, by contrast, the district court did not merely 

cite the preliminary injunction standard. It took care to apply 

that standard and titled its order as a preliminary injunction. 

The court first tried to rewrite the order more than twenty 

months later, and only in response to a compelling motion to 

vacate by defendants. Moreover, the attempted retroactive 

transformation here would have affected defendants’ substantial rights. Whether an order is preliminary or permanent 

has a dramatic effect on the calculus for deciding whether to 

pursue an interlocutory appeal.

Plaintiffs also cite Rose v. Franchetti, 979 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 

1992), to argue that the February 2022 Order was “a functional 

equivalent of a permanent injunction.” In Rose, the district 

court had said “default” when it meant to say “order to show 

cause,” and entered default before rather than after the 

needed hearing. 979 F.2d at 86. We found those errors harmless, though. The court had given the defendant fair notice 

and an opportunity to be heard, we said, and had reasonably 

found that the defendant was lying on material points. The 

court’s procedural missteps did not affect the defendant’s 

substantial rights because the hearing ultimately occurred, 

and the defendant had an opportunity to avoid default. Id. 

This case, by contrast, is not one of sequencing. Instead, our 

focus is the very existence of the injunction at relevant times, 

including the present.

Plaintiffs also rely on the district judge’s statements in the 

August 2021 bench trial transcript that foreshadow a potential 

permanent injunction. This is exactly the type of argument we 

rejected in Grede, 746 F.3d at 255–58, Mendez, 725 F.3d at 663, 

and Trans Union, 741 F.3d at 816. Those decisions prudently 

sought to protect parties, lawyers, and non-parties from 

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No. 23-3371 19

uncertainty created by weighing the plain language of court 

orders against the meaning of ambiguous statements in court 

transcripts. The judge’s oral comments here about future 

permanent injunctive relief do not undermine the later order 

that clearly announced it was a preliminary injunction.

D. The District Court’s Contempt Finding

In the memorandum of November 16, 2023, the district 

court found that defendants were in civil contempt of its prior 

orders, but the court imposed no sanctions at that time. As 

noted, the court acknowledged its own responsibility for the 

procedural confusion in the case. Defendants challenge the 

contempt finding on appeal. In the absence of any sanction, 

however, the finding alone does not support appellate 

jurisdiction. Motorola, Inc. v. Computer Displays International, 

Inc., 739 F.2d 1149, 1154 (7th Cir. 1984) (“An order finding a 

party in civil contempt disposes of all the issues raised only if 

it includes both a finding of contempt and the imposition of a 

sanction.”), accord, e.g., United States for & on Behalf of Small 

Bus. Admin. v. Torres, 142 F.3d 962, 969–70 (7th Cir. 1998), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 

F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013); Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford 

Enterprises, Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 1987). For lack of 

appellate jurisdiction, we therefore dismiss the portion of this 

appeal challenging the contempt finding.

IV. Conclusion

We appreciate the district court’s and the parties’ efforts in 

this challenging case. We also recognize that our decision 

today does not resolve anything about the merits of the 

parties’ claims and defenses. Nevertheless, for the reasons we 

have explained, we must VACATE all existing injunctions 

Case: 23-3371 Document: 50 Filed: 12/05/2024 Pages: 20
20 No. 23-3371 

and REMAND this action for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. We must also DISMISS the portion of the 

appeal challenging the district court’s interlocutory finding of 

contempt, without having imposed sanctions. 

Case: 23-3371 Document: 50 Filed: 12/05/2024 Pages: 20