Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00785/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00785-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES ANTHONY WILLIAMS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JANELLE REYNOSO, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00785-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge 

Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.) No other parties have appeared in the action. Plaintiff’s 

complaint (ECF No. 1) is before the court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

Case 1:15-cv-00785-MJS Document 6 Filed 06/17/15 Page 1 of 7
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determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that 

a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id. at 667-68.

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III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s essential allegations are summarized as follows:

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Corcoran Substance Abuse Treatment Facility.

On April 16, 2015, Defendant Garcia, a correctional officer, acted on the orders of 

Defendant Curtiss, a correctional lieutenant, and told Plaintiff that his requests to be 

housed with “an inmate with whom [he was] comfortable” would be denied. When 

Plaintiff asked Curtiss for an explanation on April 23, Curtiss asserted that Plaintiff was 

trying to manipulate the housing assignment process in order to be celled with a 

transgender inmate whom staff believed to be Plaintiff’s “girlfriend.” Plaintiff alleges that 

other inmates in his facility are permitted to be housed with whomever they choose, and 

that Plaintiff will be forced to share a cell with inmates who are “inept or incongruous,” or 

who are uncomfortable with Plaintiff’s gender preferences and/or sexual orientation. He 

alleges that such undesirable placements would have “the potential to create an unsafe 

living environment within the housing unit.” Plaintiff complained about his housing 

restrictions to Defendant Associate Warden Reynoso and Defendant Correctional 

Captain Marsh. Plaintiff does not elaborate on the conditions of his current housing 

placement.

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff does not specify which constitutional standards Defendants’ “egregious 

and ignominious” housing restrictions allegedly violate. Construed liberally, however, his 

pleading could be characterized as an attempt to allege violations of the Eighth 

Amendment and the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. 

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Because Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to be housed with an inmate 

of his choice, and because there appears to be a rational basis for his housing 

restrictions, the Court will dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. 

A. Inmates Do Not Have a Right to Housing of Their Choice.

Neither the Eighth nor the Fourteenth Amendment endows prisoners with a right 

to be housed in a particular part of the prison or with a particular inmate. See Meachum 

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224–25 (1976)(no liberty interest in placement in particular 

facility); Allen v. Figueroa, 56 F.3d 70, at *7 (9th Cir. 1995)(unpublished disposition)(no 

Eighth Amendment or Due Process right to be housed with inmate of one’s choice); 

Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 1993)(no Due Process right to be housed

with compatible inmate); Bjorlin v. Hubbard, No. CIV S-09-1793 2010 WL 457685, *1 

(E.D.Cal. Feb. 4, 2010)(same). 

“While the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide prisoners with 

the basic human needs, including reasonable safety, it does not require that the 

prisoners be comfortable and provided with every amenity.” Allen, 56 F.3d at *7 (citing 

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)). A housing assignment may be 

“restrictive and even harsh,” but will not violate the Eighth Amendment unless it “either 

inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of 

crimes warranting imprisonment.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-349 (1981)

(finding inmates had no constitutional right to be housed in single cells). Only where 

prison officials knew or should have known that a housing assignment posed an 

excessive risk to an inmate’s safety will placement with a particular inmate have 

constitutional implications. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th 

Cir. 2002); Cotta v. Cty. of Kings, -- F.Supp.3d --, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 2015).

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The Due Process Clause also fails to protect an inmate’s right to housing of his 

choice. “An inmate’s liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his conviction” that 

the state may change his place of confinement without implicating the inmate’s due 

process rights, even where the change results in more disagreeable conditions. Rizzo v. 

Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985); Wilson v. Tilton, No. CIV S-07-1192 2009 

WL 3246430, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009). 

Here, Plaintiff has no right to a particular housing arrangement, and the refusal to 

house him with someone with whom he shares interests or proclivities cannot be said to 

have inflicted unnecessary pain or disproportionate punishment. Nor does Plaintiff claim 

that his current housing arrangement is unconstitutional. Although Plaintiff observes that 

housing him with an incompatible cellmate could create an unsafe environment, he does 

not indicate that his present housing arrangement is actually unsafe or that prison staff 

have recklessly or knowingly celled him with someone dangerous. Therefore, the Court 

will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and Due Process claims.

B. Plaintiff’s Housing Restrictions Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause.

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An

equal protection claim may be established by showing that the defendant intentionally 

discriminated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's membership in a protected 

class, Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir.2003), Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.2001), or that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Lazy Y 

Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir.2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of 

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Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir.2008). Plaintiff alleges that he was intentionally

treated differently from inmates not in, or suspected of being in, relationships: he claims 

all other inmates are allowed to choose their cellmates, while he has been forbidden 

from doing so. Because the differential treatment is not based on membership in a 

protected class, rational basis review applies. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 

at 564. 

Here, there appears to be a rational basis for the differential treatment. Prisoner 

classification decisions take into account an “inmate’s needs, interests, and desires,” but 

are ultimately based on a combination of factors, including the institution’s “security 

missions and public safety.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3375(a). Numerous criteria, 

including an inmate’s sexual orientation, may warrant special placement. Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3375.2(b)(26). Moreover, California law does not look favorably on 

inmates’ sexual activity, even if it is consensual. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3007 

(prohibiting inmate engagement in illegal sexual acts); Cal. Penal Code §§ 286(e), 

288(e) (criminalizing sodomy and oral copulation by anyone “confined in any state 

prison”); People v. Santibanez, 91 Cal. App. 3d 287, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)(finding 

that “prisoners have no cognizable right to sexual privacy in a jail cell”). Thus, 

Defendants’ refusal to house Plaintiff with a suspected partner appears to be rationally 

related to the legitimate interest in preventing criminal activity and/or ensuring inmate 

safety. 

V. CONCLUSION & ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim for relief under the Eighth or 

Fourteenth Amendments. Nevertheless, the Court will grant Plaintiff one opportunity to 

file an amended complaint alleging facts that would bring it within the pleading standards 

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outlined above. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not change 

the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaint). An 

amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 

896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's signed first amended complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his complaint filed May 22, 2015;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from service 

of this order, and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this 

action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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