Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_14-cv-00048/USCOURTS-ared-5_14-cv-00048-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

NICKARLOS ANTWAN BANKS 

ADC #106872 PETITIONER 

VS. 5:14CV00048 BSM/JTR 

WENDY KELLEY, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT 

 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

 The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been 

sent to Chief United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections 

must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of 

this Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of 

the right to appeal questions of fact. 

 Mail any objections to: 

 Clerk, United States District Court 

 Eastern District of Arkansas 

 600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149 

 Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

Case 5:14-cv-00048-BSM Document 22 Filed 01/06/16 Page 1 of 8
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I. Background

 Pending before the Court is a § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

filed by Petitioner, Nickarlos Antwan Banks. Doc. 1. Before addressing Banks’s 

habeas claims, the Court will review the procedural history of the case in state 

court. 

 On August 13, 2012, a Pulaski County jury convicted Banks of aggravated 

robbery and theft of property (Case No. CR 11-4458). Doc. 15-20 at 10, 51. He 

was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate of twenty-six years in the 

Arkansas Department of Correction. Id. Thereafter, Banks filed a timely notice of 

appeal of his conviction. 

 On October 2, 2012, Banks entered a guilty plea in another Pulaski County 

case (Case No. CR 11-4092), to four counts of aggravated robbery and four counts 

of theft of property.1 Doc. 15-20 at 15. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 

forty years on each count, to run concurrently. His aggregate forty-year sentence in 

Case No. 11-4092 was run consecutive to the twenty-six year sentence in Case No. 

11-4458. As part of the negotiated plea agreement, Banks agreed to dismiss his 

pending appeal in Case No. 11-4458. 

 On October 18, 2012, Banks filed a pro se Motion to Vacate Judgment and 

Plea in Case No. 11-4092. He argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his 

 1

 Pulaski County Circuit Judge Chris Piazza presided over both Case Nos. 11-4458 and 11-4092. Banks 

was represented by the same lawyer in both cases. 

Case 5:14-cv-00048-BSM Document 22 Filed 01/06/16 Page 2 of 8
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plea because he was “mislead” by his lawyer and the prosecuting attorney. Doc. 

15-4 at 1-2. 

 On October 24, 2012, Judge Piazza entered an Order denying Banks’s 

Motion to Vacate. Among other things, he noted that, during the October 2, 2012 

plea hearing, Banks stated that he understood his rights, and “agreed to the charges 

as read by the prosecuting attorney were a fair and accurate depiction of the crimes 

to which he pleaded guilty.” Doc. 15-5 at 1. Banks did not appeal Judge Piazza’s 

October 24, 2012 Order denying his Motion to Vacate.2

 Banks subsequently filed numerous other post-conviction motions in Case 

No. 11-4092, all of which were denied by Judge Piazza. See doc. 15-6 through doc. 

15-21. Banks attempted to appeal the denial of a September 29, 2014 Motion to 

Vacate Guilty Plea. Docs 15-15 and 15-16. On October 8, 2015, the Arkansas 

Supreme Court dismissed Banks’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that 

Banks’s September 29, 2014 Motion to Vacate was in substance an untimely and 

successive Rule 37 Petition. Banks v. State, 2015 Ark. 368, 2015 WL 5895392 

(2015) (per curiam). 

 On February 11, 2014, Banks initiated this federal habeas action. Doc. 1. 

However, he neither paid the filing fee nor filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis. After Banks failed to respond to a show cause order, Chief United States 

 2

 Banks claims that the Pulaski County Circuit Clerk did not mail him a copy of the October 24, 2012 

Order, and that he did not receive notice of the Order until several months later, after filing a “Motion to Compel 

Ruling.” 

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District Judge Brian S. Miller entered an Order, on October 15, 2014, dismissing 

the case, without prejudice, based on Banks’s failure to prosecute under Local Rule 

5.5. Doc. 3. 

 On January 28, 2015, Banks filed a motion to reopen the case. Doc. 5. On 

January 29, 2015, Judge Miller granted that motion. Doc. 6. 

 In his habeas Petition, Banks argues that: (1) his lawyer was ineffective in 

failing to advise him of the possibility that Judge Piazza might impose a sentence 

in Case No. 11-4092 that ran consecutive to his sentence in Case No. 11-4458, in 

violation of his alleged understanding that both those sentences would run 

concurrent; and (2) his guilty plea in Case No. 11-4092 was unknowing and 

involuntary because he was not aware that his sentence could be run consecutive to 

the sentence in Case No. 11-4458. Doc. 1.

 Respondent argues that Banks’s habeas claims are: (1) barred by the statute 

of limitations; (2) procedurally defaulted; and (3) fail on the merits. Doc. 15.

 For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that the Petition for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied, and that the case be dismissed, with prejudice.3

 

 3

 In countering Respondent’s statute of limitations and procedural default arguments, Banks contends that 

the state impeded the timely exhaustion of his habeas claims when the Pulaski County Circuit Clerk allegedly failed 

to mail him a copy of the October 24, 2012 Order denying his first postconviction motion. Because it is more 

efficient to simply proceed to the merits of Banks’s habeas claims, the Court is not required to resolve Respondent’s 

statute of limitations and procedural default arguments. See Kemp v. Hobbs, 2012 WL 250229 (E.D. Ark. June 28, 

2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) and McKinnon v. Lockhart, 921 F.2d 830, 833 n.7 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam) 

( “Where it is more efficient to do so . . . this Court may resolve [habeas] claims on the merits rather than navigating 

through a procedural-default thicket.”). 

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II. Discussion

 A habeas challenge to a conviction that results from a guilty plea is limited 

to the “voluntariness” of the guilty plea and whether the defendant understood the 

charges and the consequences of the guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-

57 (1985). A defendant who enters a valid and voluntary guilty plea is barred from 

raising pre-plea constitutional violations in a habeas corpus action. Tollett v. 

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). This means that pre-plea constitutional 

claims, including pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claims, are waived by a 

valid and voluntary plea in state court. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266-267; see also 

Whitepipe v. Weber, 536 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1082-1083 (D. S.D. 2007) (citing 

Thundershield v. Solem, 565 F.2d 1018, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 1977)). A habeas 

petitioner “may only present [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims relating to 

the plea advice” and those claims must relate to the voluntariness of the plea. See 

Whitepipe, 536 F. Supp.2d at 1082; see also Bass v. United States, 739 F.2d 405, 

406 (8th Cir. 1984) (“after a guilty plea, the focus of collateral attack is limited to 

the nature of counsel’s advice and the voluntariness of the plea”). 

 The transcript of the plea colloquy establishes that Judge Piazza informed 

Banks of the sentencing range he faced on the pending charges in Case No. 11-

4092. Banks acknowledged that he understood the rights he was waiving on a 

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written plea statement, including the right to a jury trial.4 Doc. 15-22 at 4-5. Banks 

also affirmed, on the record, that he was not threatened in any way to plead guilty, 

and was pleased with the services of his lawyer. Doc. 15-22 at 5. As to whether the 

sentence imposed in Case No. 11-4092 would run consecutive to the earlier 

sentence imposed in Case No. 11-4458, the plea colloquy reveals that this element 

was negotiated and agreed to by Banks: 

COURT: And, this was a negotiated plea? 

PROSECUTOR: Yes, your honor. 

COURT: And, what’s the negotiation? 

PROSECUTOR: State would recommend forty years in the [ADC] 

 consecutive to his previous sentence.

COURT: And, what was, do you know the case number? 

PROSECUTOR: 2011 — 

DEF. COUNSEL: 4458. 

PROSECUTOR: 4458. 

* * * 

COURT: And, forty years, is that on each count? 

PROSECUTOR: Yes. 

COURT: Concurrent [as to each count in Case No. 11-4092], and 

 then consecutive [as to the sentence in Case No. 11-4458]? 

PROSECUTOR: Yes, your honor. 

* * * 

 4

 Defense counsel also stated that, “as part of this negotiation, the defense is going to be withdrawing his 

appeal in his earlier conviction that was in front of this Court about a month and half ago. Is that correct, Nickarlos? 

[BANKS:] Yes, sir.” Doc. 15-22 at 3.

Case 5:14-cv-00048-BSM Document 22 Filed 01/06/16 Page 6 of 8
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COURT: Okay. Mr. Banks, is that what you bargained for? Was that 

 the bargain you made with the State? 

BANKS: Yes, sir. 

COURT: Be the judgment and sentence of this Court that pursuant to 

 the negotiated plea that you receive forty years in the 

 [ADC] on each of these counts, they will be concurrent 

 with each other, but consecutive to 11-4458. Show that the 

 appeal is going to be withdrawn[.] 

Doc. 15-22 at 8-10 (emphasis added). 

Thus, Banks’s contention that he was “unaware” that Judge Piazza could 

impose consecutive sentences, or that it was contrary to his understanding of his 

plea agreement, is directly refuted by his answers during the plea colloquy in Case 

No. 11-4092. A defendant’s “representations during the plea-taking carry a strong 

presumption of verity and pose a ‘formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral 

proceedings.’” Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting 

Voytik v. United States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, 

Banks’s habeas claims have no merit. 

III. Conclusion

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT the Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be DENIED, and this case be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT a Certificate of Appealability be 

DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

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 Dated this 6th day of January, 2016. 

 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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