Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01954/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01954-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1954

___________

Cyndi McClendon, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Story County Sheriff’s Office; Paul H. *

Fitzgerald; Story County Animal *

Control Department; *

*

Defendants, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Sue McCaskey; Brenda Rogers; * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Defendants-Appellants, *

*

Atkinson, Deputy; Upchurch; Denny *

Watson, Deputy; McKinney, Deputy; *

Thomas, Deputy, *

*

Defendants. *

___________

Submitted: November 18, 2004

Filed: April 4, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, LAY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LAY, Circuit Judge.

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This case originated as a claim alleged against several public officials pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Cyndi McClendon claimed that the Defendants

violated her Fourth Amendment rights by seizing items not identified in the relevant

search warrant. The issue is whether the district court erred in partially denying the

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because it concluded that a genuine issue

of material fact existed as to whether Animal Control Officers Sue McCaskey and

Brenda Rogers were entitled to qualified immunity. Allegations against all other

public officials named as Defendants were dismissed by the district court. We reverse

the decision of the district court and hold that McCaskey and Rogers were entitled to

qualified immunity. We affirm the dismissal of all other Defendants.

I. Background

In May, June, and July of 2001, numerous complaints and reports of animal

neglect were made to various animal welfare agencies, including Iowa’s Story County

Animal Control Department. These complaints alleged that the horses owned by

McClendon were neglected, starving, very ill, and roaming at large on county

property. 

McCaskey and Rogers obtained permission to inspect the McClendon property

on June 6, 2001. They found loose horses; thirty-seven horses in over-crowded pens;

highly dangerous barnyard conditions including collapsing shelters, excessive

manure, broken fences, and dangerous debris (e.g., protruding metal posts, barbed

wire); a lack of water despite hot conditions; and signs of serious illness. See

McCaskey Aff. dated June 10, 2003 (“McCaskey Aff. No. 1”) at passim in Jt. App.

at 27; Rogers Aff. at 2; Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (“Order”)

at 2-3. The Officers’ “first impressions were that the entire herd was malnourished,”

including some pregnant mares and foals. See McCaskey Aff. Attached to Search

Warrant Application (“McCaskey Aff. No. 2”) in Jt. App. at 64; Rogers Aff. at 3.

McClendon was the sole person caring for the herd, yet she lacked the equipment or

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supplies necessary to care for the herd. McClendon claimed she fed the horses alfalfa

cubes because she could not find hay, but there was no horse feed of any sort on the

property at that time, and Animal Control had already been informed that McClendon

was denied hay for failure to pay her bills.

Over the next five weeks, McCaskey and Rogers made additional visits to the

property and found the conditions unchanged. Finally, on July 12, 2001, the Officers

brought Nicole Snider, a Livestock Inspector for the Iowa Department of Agriculture,

and Dr. Kim D. Houlding, D.V.M., to inspect the herd pursuant to McClendon’s

consent. See Photographs of Property and Horses in Jt. App. at 19-26, 33-42;

photographs of water in Jt. App. at 54-56. 

Based on the July 12 inspection, McCaskey applied for a search warrant.

McCaskey submitted her affidavit and a letter by Dr. Houlding in support of the

warrant. McCaskey’s affidavit recounted the facts stated above, and added the

following statement regarding her observations on the July 12th visit:

At least 6-8 horses are in eminent danger, and 10-12 more need

supportive care to save them from strangles . . . . All of the horses there

are at risk, but the older, larger horses who seem to consume most of the

hay, seem to be fairing [sic] much better than the smaller horses,

lactating mares, colts and otherwise sickly ones. Removing 2/3 of the

herd for supportive care seems to be needed to prevent certain death in

many of them.

McCaskey Aff. No. 2 at 65. 

Referring to the entire herd of horses, Dr. Houlding’s letter in support of the

warrant stated that “[t]hese animals are showing definite signs of neglect and some

appear to be abusively neglected.” Houlding Letter dated July 12, 2001 (“Houlding

Letter”) in Jt. App. at 53. She described a “rampant outbreak” of strangles (a deadly

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and highly contagious respiratory disease in horses), and noted the herd received no

treatment for the disease. Id. Houlding identified eight of the horses as “in imminent

need of intervention” due to severe starvation. Id. She also described a general lack

of food; several horses having injuries warranting medical attention, including one

with a serious hock (i.e., lower hind leg) injury; insufficient water; and dangerous

barnyard conditions. Houlding opined that the entire herd was generally neglected

due to “inadequate care, inadequate feed, improper disease control, ignorance of

feeding and nutrition practices . . . .” Id. at 68. Houlding recommended “all the

animals should be removed until proper arrangements can be made for their care or

sale.” Id. 

Snider echoed McCaskey and Dr. Houlding. She opined that “all of the horses

were being deprived of care consistent with customary animal husbandry practices,

and deprived of necessary sustenance.” Snider Aff. at 2. 

By July 14, 2001, a search warrant was issued based on Dr. Houlding’s letter

and McCaskey’s affidavit. See Application for Search Warrant, Search Warrant, and

Attachments in Jt. App. at 58-68. The warrant stated that:

Proof has been made before me [the magistrate], as provided by law, on

this day that . . . a number of horses that are sick and in immediate need

of critical care. [sic] These horses are either exhibiting signs of a

disease known as the “strangles”, [sic] a strep infection contagious

among horses[,] or are weak and malnourished. 

Id. at 60. Accordingly, the warrant authorized any state peace officer: 

[T]o make immediate search of . . . the grounds of the acreage including

any of the outbuildings and garage . . . to locate and seize any horses

found on the property in the above described condition. To search the

grounds, outbuildings and house . . . to determine if there are other

horses, fowl or exotic birds in distress or dying. 

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Iowa Code § 717.2A required consultation with a licensed veterinarian prior

to seizure. 

-5-

Id. at 60-61. 

On July 15, 2001, the Defendants, Dr. Houlding, Nicole Snider, and Deputy

Sheriffs arrived at McClendon’s property to execute the search warrant. Two

unfortunate surprises awaited them. First, two horses had died. Their bloating

carcasses were not separated from the herd. One carcass was tossed in a manure pile,

its legs protruding stiffly out of the mound. The other carcass was not covered and

its head was conspicuously afflicted with multiple oozing abscesses (the mark of

strangles). See Photographs of Carcasses in Jt. App. at 69-72. Second, McClendon

admitted she removed some of the most infirm horses from the herd, not in an attempt

to obtain medical care for them or provide better nourishment, but solely to thwart

them from being seized. See Order at 7. She refused to reveal the horses’ location.

On the scene, Nicole Snider “observed that the condition of the horses had not

improved” since her last visit to the property one month ago. Snider Aff. at 3. She

opined that “all of the horses . . . were carriers of strangles,” and that rescue of all the

horses “was necessary to prevent further neglect.” Id. Dr. Houlding concurred. She

“recommended to Story County Animal Control that 23 horses [the entirety of the

remaining herd] be rescued from the premises,” Houlding Aff. at 3, because all

“[t]wenty-three horses were identified as being deprived of care consistent with

customary animal husbandry practices, and deprived of necessary sustenance.” See

id.; Order at 7. The Officers proceeded to seize “[t]wenty-three horses . . . pursuant

to the advice of . . . Dr. Kim D. Houlding, D.V.M.” Rogers Aff. at 4; McCaskey Aff.

No. 1 at 5.1

 

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Because this claim is premised on a Fourth Amendment violation, the court

is equally obligated to adjudicate the facts from an “on-scene perspective,” taking

into consideration everything that the Defendant Officers knew at the time of the

search and seizure, then evaluating the constitutionality of the Defendants’ conduct

from the perspective of a reasonable officer. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 205. 

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Thereafter, McClendon filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She

conceded the search warrant was valid, but argued that Defendants exceeded the

scope of the warrant because all twenty-three horses were not sick with strangles,

weak, or malnourished. Defendants asserted, inter alia, they were entitled to

qualified immunity from suit. 

Both parties brought motions for summary judgment before the district court.

The court denied Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety and granted Defendants’ motion as

to everyone except McCaskey and Rogers, the only Animal Control Officers.

Performing a two-step qualified immunity analysis pursuant to Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194 (2001), the court first held a fact-finder could conclude that Defendants

patently exceeded the scope of the warrant because evidence suggested that the

Defendants’ motive for seizing all the horses was to punish McClendon for removing

some of the horses prior to seizure. See Order at 20-21. Second, the court found a

genuine issue as to whether McCaskey’s and Rogers’ conduct violated a clearly

established constitutional right because they knew or should have known that all

twenty-three horses did not fit the description in the search warrant. See id. at 31-32.

II. Qualified Immunity

This court reviews a denial of qualified immunity de novo. See Tuggle v.

Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 719 (8th Cir. 2003). Qualified immunity is a question of law

not a question of fact. The threshold issue in a qualified immunity analysis is whether

the facts viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff2

 show that the state actor’s

conduct violated a federal constitutional or statutory right. See id. at 720 (citing

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Defendants argue that the district court denied qualified immunity to

McCaskey and Rogers because it applied the wrong test. They claim the correct test

is whether “a reasonable officer, identically situated, could have believed the conduct

was lawful.” Brief for Appellants at 8.1 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 210).

Defendants’ proposed standard does not match the majority’s holding in Saucier

(quoted above). 

-7-

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). In the context of a Fourth Amendment case alleging an

unreasonable seizure, the initial analysis simply entails (1) an examination of the text

of the warrant, (2) an examination of the defendants’ conduct, and (3) a determination

as to whether that conduct exceeded the terms of the warrant. 

If the initial analysis results in a conclusion that the official’s conduct indeed

exceeded the warrant, then the second step is to ask whether the (violated) right was

“clearly established.” Tuggle, 348 F.3d at 720 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).

“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established

is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his [or her] conduct was

unlawful in the situation . . . confronted.”3

 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (emphasis

added). Conduct does not violate a clearly established right unless it is “plainly

incompetent” or a knowing violation of a clearly established precedent. Saucier, 533

U.S. at 202; id. at 205 (“[R]easonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints

on particular police conduct. . . . If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires

is reasonable, . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.”); see also Smithson

v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000). 

III. Violation of A Constitutional Right

An officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant to the question of whether her or his

conduct violated a constitutional right by exceeding the scope of a warrant. Indeed,

an officer’s subjective intent is never relevant under a Fourth Amendment analysis,

so long as an objective basis for the seizure exists. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 210

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This has long been the standard, for instance, in Fourth Amendment search

cases wherein defendants claimed that an officer’s “Terry” stop or protective search

was motivated by pretext. As this circuit has held: 

The ultimate test [of whether a protective pat-down search is supported

by reasonable suspicion] is not what the searching officer actually

believed but what a hypothetical officer in exactly the same

circumstances reasonably could have believed. The Supreme Court in

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 . . . (1996), for example, ruled that

an officer’s “subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id. at 813. Whren and other

Supreme Court cases . . . stand for the proposition that under Fourth

Amendment analysis it is of no consequence “that the motivation for the

search did not coincide with the legal justification” for the search. Scott

v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 . . . (1978); cf. Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 397 . . . (1989) (“An officer’s evil intentions will not

make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable

use of force . . . .”) . . . These cases thus foreclose [the] argument . . .

that an otherwise-justified search and seizure violates the Fourth

Amendment because the legal justification . . . was simply a pretext for

law-enforcement officers to investigate their hunches . . . . 

United States v. Roggeman, 279 F.3d 573, 581 n.5 (8th Cir. 2002) (some internal

citations omitted). 

-8-

(emphasizing that underlying intent or motive are not relevant to the inquiry; rather,

“the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of

the facts and circumstances confronting them.”) (J. Ginsburg, concurring and citing

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).4

 Yet, the district court found a

genuine issue as to whether a constitutional violation occurred based solely on the

Defendants’ possible subjective intent. See Order at 20. Even if we assume,

arguendo, that McCaskey and Rogers seized the entire herd solely to punish

McClendon for attempting to thwart the seizure, this cannot negate the uncontested

fact that two professionals, Dr. Houlding and Nicole Snider, recommended removal

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of all the horses. On this basis alone, the decision of the district court warrants

reversal.

We also hold that the Defendants did not violate McClendon’s constitutional

rights because the horses seized fit the description in the warrant. Adjudication of

whether items seized fit within the warrant’s description “ultimately turns on the

substance of the items seized ‘and not the label assigned to it by [McClendon].’”

United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Word,

806 F.2d 658, 661 (6th Cir. 1986); see also United Sates v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383

(10th Cir. 1986) (stating that seizure of a specific item characteristic of a generic class

mentioned in the warrant is acceptable). Here, the warrant authorized seizure of “any

horses,” Warrant at 61, that were “sick and in immediate need of critical care,” id. at

60, but it defined horses in “immediate need of critical care” by designating them as

“horses [that] are either exhibiting signs of a disease known as the ‘strangles’, [sic]

. . . or are weak and malnourished.” Id. (emphasis added). As the district court

noted, “[t]he description in the warrant track[ed] the descriptions as set forth in the

supporting affidavits,” which meant that “the execution of the warrant called for a

subjective determination as to which animals fit the description.” Order at 19. 

Because the warrant did not identify exactly how many horses should be

seized, but instead described the horses to be seized using disease, wellness, and body

condition criteria, it was imminently reasonable for the Officers to rely upon the

professional opinions of Dr. Houlding and Snider in determining which horses to

seize. According to their opinions, the warrant description applied to the entirety of

the seized herd. In Dr. Houlding’s letter supporting the warrant application, she

opined that the entire herd suffered from “inadequate care, inadequate feed, [and]

improper disease control . . . .” Houlding Letter at 68. She recommended that “all

the animals should be removed until proper arrangements can be made for their care

or sale.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Houlding Aff. at 3 (describing herd as

“deprived of necessary sustenance”). Snider also opined “all of the horses were being

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. . . deprived of necessary sustenance,” Snider Aff. at 2 (emphasis added), and that

“all of the horses . . . were carriers of strangles.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). The

statement that an animal suffers from “inadequate feed” or is “deprived of necessary

sustenance” is sufficient to qualify as a “malnourished” animal. McClendon cannot

legitimately challenge the Defendants’ decision to seize all the horses because the

descriptive label used in the warrant was not identical to that used by Dr. Houlding

or McCaskey and Rogers. See Hill, 19 F.3d at 988. 

These statements establish a clear nexus between the horses seized and the

warrant description, yet McClendon fails to address them. Instead, she construes the

warrant narrowly, arguing that the warrant’s express terms and the substance of the

two attachments to the warrant (i.e., Dr. Houlding’s letter and McCaskey’s affidavit),

focus only upon a removal of some horses, not all of them, and that this construction

is clear. We disagree. That construction contradicts the plain language of the warrant

and its supporting attachments. The warrant authorized seizure of “any horses” fitting

the description and never quantified the horses to be seized. Although McCaskey’s

affidavit and Dr. Houlding’s letter both quantified the number of horses that would

clearly die without immediate intervention, they did not stop there. They ultimately

recommended seizure of the entire herd. Second, officers executing a search warrant

are “not obliged to interpret it narrowly.” See United States v. Stiver, 9 F.3d 298, 302

(3d Cir. 1993) (citing Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1992)). The

concept of a “narrow construction” is a convention of legal jurisprudence and would

be an unworkable demand to place upon law enforcement and the experts with whom

they consult. 

McClendon claims that since she removed the most infirm horses, it is obvious

that the remaining horses were healthy and that Defendants exceeded the scope of the

warrant for the purpose of retaliating against her. We strongly disagree. At the scene

of the seizure, Dr. Houlding, Snider, McCaskey, and Rogers never stated that the

remaining horses were healthy or otherwise beyond the scope of the warrant. Indeed,

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Although the district court raised this point in step two of its Saucier analysis,

we address the evidence here since its substance actually related to step one of the

Saucier analysis. 

-11-

two horses had just died. The district court relied heavily on transcripts from an Iowa

state court disposition of McClendon’s livestock purportedly documenting

McCaskey’s admission that she knew – at the time of the seizure – some of the horses

failed to fit the warrant description.5

 See Order at 31-32 & n. 19; Partial Tr. of

Proceedings in the Iowa Dist. Ct. for Story County (“S.C. Tr.”). But the transcript

does not actually support such an admission. At the proceeding, Plaintiff’s counsel

interrogated McCaskey and counsel claimed that several horses were not exhibiting

signs of malnutrition or strangles, then asked McCaskey, “[I]sn’t that correct?” S.C.

Tr. at 76. McCaskey did not concede this ground. She maintained her belief that

several of the horses were exhibiting signs of illness. She explained, however, that

she did not personally examine all of the horses for signs of illness because “[w]e

were trying to do several things at the same time.” Id. McCaskey also stated, “I

wouldn’t call any of the horses in good condition. . . . I’m not a vet. I would say they

were all thin, but they were probably not all malnutritioned [sic] horses.” Id. 

We hold, as a matter of law, this testimony does not constitute an admission

that McCaskey knew on-scene that some of the horses seized did not fit within the

warrant’s description. First, the warrant did not require all horses seized to be

malnourished. Second, even if there was some discrepancy between the Officers’ and

their experts’ opinion on the body condition of some of the horses, it was reasonable

to rely on the experts’ recommendation. After all, McCaskey’s and Rogers’ “first

impressions were that the entire herd was malnourished.” McCaskey Aff. No. 2 at

64; Rogers Aff. at 3. McCaskey’s testimony regarding her lay opinion of the horses’

body conditions, offered ex post and punctuated by disclaimer, does not evidence

violation of a constitutional right. 

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One must also note that McClendon’s preemptive removal of twelve horses

complicated the seizure process because the Officers and others could not verify

which of the thirty-seven previously examined horses were missing or their condition.

The district court acknowledged the complications brought on by McClendon’s

preemptive removal as it discussed other Defendants involved in the seizure. 

The Court finds it was objectively reasonable for Upchurch and

Atkinson [two sheriff’s deputies] to believe all the horses should be

seized. The duties of sheriff’s deputies typically do not require

knowledge of equine health; therefore, reliance on the expertise of a

licensed veterinarian to determine which animals fit the description set

forth in the search warrant was objectively reasonable. McClendon

obscured the identification of which animals were subject to seizure by

removing twelve of them in anticipation of the seizure. Since

McClendon would not divulge which animals had been removed or their

current location, the deputies’ reliance on Dr. Houlding’s determination

was all the more reasonable.

Order at 27. 

The district court did not extend this reasoning to McCaskey and Rogers.

Because they were Animal Control Officers, the court apparently assumed that

McCaskey and Rogers knew a great deal about equine health, and therefore were less

justified in relying on Dr. Houlding’s expertise as compared to the other Defendants.

See Order at 31. There was absolutely no basis for assuming that McCaskey and

Rogers possessed expertise on equine health. The record reveals that both Officers

own horses, but this makes them no more of a veterinary expert than the average dog

owner. See S.C. Tr. at 4, 9, 15. Even if McCaskey and Rogers did possess a lot of

knowledge, there was no legal basis for holding them to a higher legal standard than

the other Defendants. Clearly the best course of action was to rely on the professional

recommendation of a third party licensed veterinarian on the scene, not their own

personal impressions, which could obviously be attacked at a subsequent hearing as

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lacking veterinary expertise. Moreover, Iowa Code § 717.2A required consultation

with a licensed veterinarian prior to rescuing neglected livestock. We will not bar

McCaskey and Rogers from the benefits of qualified immunity because they followed

the law of their jurisdiction and obtained a veterinarian’s opinion, as any reasonable

Animal Control Officer would. The district court’s finding that the deputies’ reliance

on Dr. Houlding’s expertise was “all the more reasonable” in light of McClendon’s

efforts to thwart the seizure, see Order at 27, was equally applicable to McCaskey and

Rogers. 

In light of the above, McClendon’s constitutional rights were not violated and

the qualified immunity inquiry ends here. The judgment of the district court is

REVERSED as to McCaskey and Rogers and AFFIRMED as to the dismissal of all

other Defendants. 

MELLOY, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.

I respectfully dissent because I believe the district court properly denied

qualified immunity to officers McCaskey and Rogers. I concur in the majority’s

affirmance of the dismissal of the remaining defendants.

As stated by the majority, we undergo a two-step process when we review a

denial of qualified immunity. At the outset, we determine whether the facts as

asserted by the plaintiff “show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.”

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the answer is no, that ends the inquiry.

If the answer is yes, we go on to determine “whether the right was clearly

established.” Id. The test for deciding whether a right was clearly established is

“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his [or her] conduct was

unlawful in the situation he [or she] confronted.” Id. at 202. “This inquiry must be

undertaken in the ‘proper sequence.’” Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 582 (8th Cir.

2004) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200). 

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An appeal of a denial of qualified immunity does not concern “the correctness

of the plaintiff’s version of the facts, nor even . . . whether the plaintiff’s allegations

actually state a claim.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985). Our analysis

is limited to “a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the

defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.” Id.; see also

Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311

(1995); Nebraska Beef v. Greening, 398 F.3d 1080, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 2005)

(discussing the jurisdictional limits prescribed in Mitchell, Johnson, and Behrens).

Thus, our task is to ask, first, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. I believe McClendon clears this first

hurdle easily. McClendon alleges that officers intentionally exceeded the scope of

the warrant by seizing healthy horses. If this allegation is true, then the officers’

conduct violated McClendon’s constitutional rights. Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton

First Nat. Bank, 245 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2001) (“A seizure of property that is

unsupported by a warrant or other court order is presumptively unreasonable within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). Assuming McClendon’s version of the

facts is correct, as we must, she has “show[n] the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, and we move on to the second part of

the inquiry.

At one point, the majority appears to recognize the initial inquiry is limited in

this way. (Majority Opinion at 7 (“In the context of a Fourth Amendment case

alleging an unreasonable seizure, the initial analysis simply entails (1) an examination

of the text of the warrant, (2) an examination of the Defendants’ conduct, and (3) a

determination as to whether that conduct exceeded the terms of the warrant.”).)

However, the opinion goes on to discuss at length whether the horses were in fact

outside the scope of the warrant, various statements made about the horses at various

times, and the likely levels of knowledge the individuals involved had about equine

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health. In my view, much of the analysis done by the majority is inappropriate under

the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, which is confined to determining

whether a constitutional violation could be shown if all the facts, as presented by the

plaintiff, are true. 

Our second task is to determine whether a reasonable officer would know the

seizure of the horses was unlawful, “in light of clearly established law and the

information the searching officers possessed.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

641 (1987). At the summary judgment stage, the burden of proof is on the moving

party, so the party seeking immunity must establish the relevant predicate facts. Pace

v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000). “Once the predicate

facts are established, the reasonableness of the official’s conduct under the

circumstances is a question of law.” Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir.

2001); accord McVay ex rel. Estate of McVay v. Sisters of Mercy Health System, 399

F.3d 904, 2005 WL 497180, *2 (8th Cir. 2005). “In the event that a genuine dispute

exists concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, the

defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on that ground.” Pace, 201 F.3d at

1056.

“[P]ublic officials are permitted to claim on appeal that their actions were

objectively reasonable in light of their knowledge at the time of the incident.”

Mueller v. Tinkham, 162 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Lyles v. City of

Barling, 181 F.3d 914, 917 (8th Cir. 1999) (“A law enforcement officer is entitled to

qualified immunity from suit for actions that are objectively reasonable in light of

clearly established law and the facts known by the officer at the time of his [or her]

actions.”). “[W]e will affirm the denial of a qualified immunity claim if there exists

a genuine issue of material fact concerning the officers’ knowledge or if the moving

party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lyles, 181 F.3d at 917; accord

Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir. 2001). Thus, though we assess the

reasonableness of the officers’ actions from an objective standpoint, we do so taking

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into account the “specific context of the case,” including the officers’ knowledge.

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

I believe that, in this case, there is an issue of material fact as to the predicate

facts surrounding qualified immunity, namely, what the officers on the scene knew

when seizing the horses. It is undisputed that a veterinarian on the scene

recommended removal of all the horses. (Affidavit of Dr. Kim D. Houlding, DVM,

at Jt. App. 17 (“Twenty-three horses were identified as being deprived of care

consistent with customary animal husbandry practices, and deprived of necessary

sustenance. Accordingly, I recommended to Story County Animal Control that 23

horses be rescued from the premises.”).) The majority states that this fact alone

dictates the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. I respectfully disagree

because the details of the exchange are unknown. 

The search warrant allowed for removal of horses that were “sick and in

immediate need of critical care.” (Search warrant, Jt. App. 60) The warrant

described these horses as “either exhibiting signs of a disease known as the

“strangles” . . . or . . . weak and malnourished.” Id. So, for a horse to be legally

seized, it needed to be (1) “sick and in immediate need of critical care” and (2) either

(a) exhibiting signs of the “strangles” or (b) weak and malnourished. Id. (emphasis

added). If the defendants had shown Dr. Houlding had stated that all the horses were

weak, malnourished, and in immediate need of critical care, or alternatively that all

the horses were showing signs of the strangles and were sick and in immediate need

of critical care, and therefore that they should be seized, I would join in the majority’s

grant of qualified immunity. Under those circumstances, I agree with the majority

that “it was imminently reasonable for the Officers to rely upon the professional

opinion[] of Dr. Houlding . . . in determining which horses to seize.” (Majority

Opinion at 9.) Under such circumstances, it would not be clear to a reasonable officer

that his or her behavior was unlawful, even if some of the seized horses were healthy,

and the officer would be entitled to qualified immunity.

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6

As support for its finding that all the horses were properly seized, the majority

offers the statement of Dr. Houlding that “all the animals should be removed until

proper arrangements can be made for their care or sale.” (Majority Opinion at 9-10.)

I would find that this statement is of no help to the defendants’ case because this

statement appears in a letter written by Dr. Houlding and attached to the warrant

application. The court that drafted the description of the horses to be seized had Dr.

Houlding’s recommendation before it, and it chose not to simply empower the

officers to rescue all of the horses, but instead only to rescue horses in a particular

condition. This shows that Dr. Houlding had the opinion that all horses should be

seized even before the warrant was issued and before its terms were set, not that she

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However, the defendants have not made that showing in this case. Instead, we

have a statement from Dr. Houlding that the horses “were identified” (the passive

voice making it unclear whether she was the one doing the identification) “as being

deprived of care consistent with customary animal husbandry practices, and deprived

of necessary sustenance.” It was for this reason that Dr. Houlding recommended their

removal, according to her statement. Even assuming that Dr. Houlding and not some

other individual identified the horses as such, her description of the horses during

execution of the warrant does not match the description in the warrant. It is possible

that Dr. Houlding knew the scope of the warrant and told the officers on the scene

that the horses all fit the terms of the warrant, but this is not shown by the evidence

before us. Instead, the evidence shows that the veterinarian on the scene found the

horses were deprived of “necessary substenance” and “care consistent with customary

animal husbandry practices.” In my view, this observation is not close enough to the

terms of the warrant for the officers to reasonably rely on it in seizing all the horses.

I agree with the majority that the officers could reasonably rely on a recommendation

that did not match the warrant language verbatim. However, this is not a case in

which the expert used slightly different terms but in essence made the observation

required for seizure. This is a case in which the veterinarian found a sub-standard

quality of care and not enough food available, when the warrant required the horses

be (1) sick and in immediate need of critical care and (2) either (a) showing signs of

the strangles or (b) weak and malnourished.6

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believed they all fit the terms of the warrant.

7

This fact dispute also raises the issue of willfulness. We note that willful

violations of law are not subject to qualified immunity protection. “Qualified

immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.’” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986))

(emphasis added).

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Thus, I believe there is a question of material fact as to what the officers knew

on the scene, that is, what Dr. Houlding told them about the horses and how this

matched up with the terms of the warrant. Adding to the uncertainty are facts that

suggest that the officers knew the horses were healthy, but seized them anyway,

perhaps because McClendon had moved some of her horses before their arrival.7

McCaskey testified that they “loaded them up because we didn’t want any more

animals disappearing.” (McCaskey testimony, First Supp. Jt. App. at p. 217.) She

also testified that “for the protection of the horses and because the others had been

moved, we removed them.” (McCaskey testimony, Jt. App. at 144 (emphasis added).)

In addition, the video footage submitted shows an exchange between McClendon and

one of the officers during the execution of the search warrant. McClendon says that

the Notice stated that only the sick horses would be seized and the officer replies,

“We were going to take the ones showing signs of disease, but the ones showing the

greatest signs of disease have disappeared.”

As stated above, “we will affirm the denial of a qualified immunity claim if

there exists a genuine issue of material fact concerning the officers’ knowledge.”

Lyles, 181 F.3d at 917. I believe these facts, taken in the light most favorable to

McClendon, are sufficient to leave a genuine issue of material fact as to the

knowledge the officers had on the scene. This precludes a finding of summary

judgment at this stage. 

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-19-

I would affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to McCaskey

and Rogers. I would also affirm the dismissal of the other defendants.

______________________________

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