Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01927/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01927-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WORKPLACE TECHNOLOGIES 

RESEARCH, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PROJECT MANAGEMENT 

INSTITUTE, INC., 

Defendant. 

 Case No.: 18cv1927 JM (MSB) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS IN 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 

Defendant Project Management Institute, Inc. (“PMI”) moves the court to dismiss 

the claims in the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) for: (1) breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Services Agreement; (2) fraudulent 

misrepresentation; and (3) tortious interference with prospective business relations. (Doc. 

No. 38.) Plaintiff Workplace Technologies Research, Inc. (“WTRI”) opposes. (Doc. No. 

39.) For the below reasons, PMI’s motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

The court hereby incorporates the detailed recitation of alleged facts in its prior two 

orders. (Doc. Nos. 24, 32.) In short, this action arises out of an unsuccessful endeavor to 

jointly develop educational project management software. On September 8, 2015, PMI 

and WTRI executed a Software Technology Development and Purchase Agreement (the 

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“Development Agreement”) memorializing the parties’ agreement to jointly develop 

educational software. (Doc. No. 37-2, “Dev. Agree.”) The Development Agreement 

provided that WTRI would develop virtual reality software in collaboration with PMI for 

a payment of up to $4,000,000. (Dev. Agree. § 2.5.) The Agreement envisioned five initial 

stages of software development – “Alpha 1” through “Alpha 5.” (TAC ¶ 35; Dev. Agree. 

§§ 2.5, 5.) If the final Alpha 5 version met all “Acceptance Criteria” and PMI accepted the 

Alpha 5 software, WTRI agreed to develop a “Charlie” software. (Dev. Agree. §§ 2.5, 5.)1

 

WTRI alleges PMI failed to fulfill many of its obligations under this Development 

Agreement and prevented development of the Alpha 5 version of the software. After 

allegedly failing to perform its obligations under the Development Agreement, PMI 

demanded a pilot study to assess the marketability of the software before it would move 

forward with software development. On November 30, 2016, the parties amended the 

Development Agreement to provide that, if PMI rejected the Alpha 5 software and retained 

ownership of the software, the parties would execute a Services Agreement in lieu of 

monetary payment to WTRI. (Doc. No. 37-4, Exh. B.) On December 2, 2016, PMI 

informed WTRI it would exercise its right to reject the Alpha 5 software and retain 

ownership. (TAC ¶ 80.) On December 15, 2016, the parties executed a Services 

Agreement memorializing the parties’ agreement to perform a pilot study of the software. 

(Doc. No. 37-5, Exh. C.) WTRI alleges PMI then failed to perform its obligations under 

the Services Agreement, which damaged WTRI’s business relationships. 

WTRI filed this action on August 20, 2018. On October 4, 2018, PMI moved to 

dismiss the Complaint for the first time. (Doc. No. 10.) WTRI responded by filing a First 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 12.) On November 8, 2018, PMI moved to dismiss the 

FAC for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 14.) On 

1

 The “Acceptance Criteria” are 76 “product description and specifications” mutually 

agreed upon by the parties and memorialized in Exhibit A to the Development Agreement. 

(Dev. Agree. § 5.1; Doc. No. 37-2, Exh. A at 22-39.) 

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March 18, 2019, the court declined to grant PMI’s motion to dismiss the FAC on personal 

jurisdiction grounds, but granted the motion for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 24.) On 

April 2, 2019, WTRI filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. No. 25.) On 

August 13, 2019, the court found that WTRI sufficiently pled claims for breach of contract 

for both the Development and Services Agreements, and breach of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing in the Development Agreement. (Doc. No. 32.) The court also 

found, however, that WTRI failed to sufficiently plead claims for breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Services Agreement, fraudulent 

misrepresentation, and tortious interference with prospective business relations. (Id.) The 

court granted WTRI leave to amend, but cautioned that further unsuccessful attempts to 

amend the Complaint may demonstrate that the dismissed claims cannot be cured. (Id. at 

18.) 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the 

legal sufficiency of the pleadings. To overcome such a motion, the complaint must contain 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Facts merely consistent with a defendant’s liability are insufficient to survive a 

motion to dismiss because they establish only that the allegations are possible rather than 

plausible. Id. at 678-79. The court must accept as true the facts alleged in a well-pled 

complaint, but mere legal conclusions are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. The 

court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). 

DISCUSSION 

In its TAC, WTRI asserts claims for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing in both the Development and Services Agreements; 

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(3) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (4) tortious interference with prospective business 

relations. PMI moves to dismiss WTRI’s claims for breach of the implied covenant in the 

Services Agreement, fraudulent misrepresentation, and tortious interference. In its 

opposition, WTRI withdraws its claim for breach of the implied covenant with respect to 

the Services Agreement. (Doc. No. 39 at 11 n.1.) Thus, the fraud and tortious interference 

claims are the only claims at issue. 

I. Fraud 

PMI argues that WTRI’s fourth attempt to sufficiently plead fraud fails because 

WTRI fails to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

9(b) and fails to plead the required elements of fraud. (Doc. No. 38-1 at 18-23.) In its 

TAC, WTRI repeats its allegations that PMI misrepresented to WTRI that it would 

“continue to perform” under the Development and Services Agreements in good faith, and, 

after the execution of the Services Agreement, would “resume performance to move the 

software project forward.” (TAC ¶¶ 198, 200.) WTRI also repeats its allegation that 

“[d]espite its representations, PMI failed to perform its contractual obligations[.]” (TAC ¶ 

201.) In support of these allegations, WTRI again cites evidence that Mr. Bicak made the 

decisions= to kill the software project by redirecting resources and personnel elsewhere, 

and that PMI would never sell the software.2

 (TAC ¶¶ 202-04.) Finally, WTRI again refers 

to PMI’s fraud as a misrepresentation, omission, inducement, and concealment. (TAC ¶¶ 

197, 204-05.) 

WTRI provides some additional specificity, however, as to the conduct WTRI 

alleges was fraudulent. The TAC alleges that, prior to signing the Services Agreement, 

PMI misrepresented that WTRI would be “involved,” and a “joint participant,” and would 

be “allowed to participate” in the development of the Agile product. (TAC ¶ 197.) WTRI 

also states that at the time these assurances were made, PMI had already been in discussions 

2 The TAC adds, however, that Mr. Bicak made the decision prior to signing the Services 

Agreement on December 15, 2016. (TAC ¶ 202.) 

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with another company, CVP, to handle the development, even though CVP warned PMI 

that without WTRI, the project would not succeed. (Id.) WTRI claims Mr. Bicak and his 

team made the misrepresentations between June and August of 2016. (Doc. No. 39 at 13 

(citing TAC ¶¶ 93-97).) Accordingly, WTRI cures some of the deficiencies in the SAC 

previously identified by the court, i.e. that WTRI failed to identify when the fraudulent 

statements were made, who made the statements, and what was said. (See Doc. No. 32 at 

15.) The TAC also cures the deficiency that the SAC failed to allege PMI’s intent not to 

perform its contractual duties arose before the relevant contract was executed. (See id.) 

WTRI fails, however, to cure all the deficiencies the court previously identified in 

the SAC. The TAC still contains mixed references to PMI’s alleged misrepresentations, 

concealment, and inducement. WTRI still fails to sufficiently plead that PMI had a duty 

to disclose the information it allegedly concealed. Finally, and most importantly, WTRI 

again fails to sufficiently plead PMI’s intent to defraud. The parties do not dispute that 

intent to defraud is a required element of fraud. (Doc. Nos. 38-1 at 18, 36 at 16.) WTRI 

argues that it specifically pled an intent to defraud by pleading that PMI intended to 

“abscond” with the material created by WTRI. (Doc. No. 39 at 16 (citing TAC ¶¶ 99, 

198).) WTRI does not allege, however, that PMI fraudulently came into possession of 

these materials or absconded with them in a manner inconsistent with the contract. To the 

contrary, WTRI alleges only that PMI intended for the project to fail so that it could, under 

the contract, keep the materials and develop its own project after WTRI was “dismissed.” 

(TAC ¶ 198.) WTRI admits that PMI had the option, in the Development Agreement, to 

decline to continue supporting WTRI and retain the rights to the materials. (TAC ¶ 99.) 

Furthermore, as pointed out by PMI, the TAC also does not detail how WTRI was 

prevented from being “involved” or a “joint participant,” or was not “allowed to 

participate” in the development of the product. (Doc. No. 40 at 7.) WTRI also does not 

explain why this prevention was inconsistent with the contract or why these terms, if 

essential to the bargain, were not explicitly included in the contract. Based on the TAC, it 

was PMI’s decision to exercise an option in the contract that prevented WTRI from being 

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involved. (TAC ¶ 99.) Without greater detail than is provided here, PMI’s decision to 

exercise an option in a contract does not show plausible fraud or that PMI’s alleged 

statements were more than mere puffery. 

WTRI also argues that an intent to defraud can be shown by pleading a “plausible 

fraudulent scheme.” (Doc. No. 39 at 17 (citing Electric Prop. E., LLC v. Marcus & 

Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2014).) The “scheme” alleged by WTRI is, 

however, simply that PMI entered into a contract, leading up to which PMI allegedly made 

promises that it did not intend to keep that ultimately led to PMI’s possession, under the 

contract, of the “main deliverable” WTRI was contracted to produce for PMI. (TAC ¶ 99.) 

WTRI cites no authority supporting that such conduct plausibly constitutes an intent to 

defraud or a “plausible fraudulent scheme.” Promises that are part of a contract, regardless 

of the promisor’s sincerity, are enforceable through a breach of contract claim. Based on 

the foregoing, WTRI fails to plausibly plead fraud as an independent claim from its claims 

of breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 

the Development Agreement. 

II. Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations 

PMI argues that WTRI’s fourth attempt to plead tortious interference fails because 

it insufficiently pleads independently wrongful conduct or that WTRI would have entered 

into new business relationships but for PMI’s conduct. (Doc. No. 38-1 at 23-28.) In its 

SAC, WTRI alleged PMI knew WTRI enlisted 21 companies, including six specific 

companies, to participate in a pilot program. (SAC ¶ 183.) WTRI alleged that PMI 

“severely damaged WTRI’s professional reputation and business relations” with at least 

six specific companies, as well as the National Science Foundation (NSF), by 

“intentionally reneging on its obligations” under the Development and Services 

Agreements, and because of PMI’s “intentional misrepresentations and omissions to 

WTRI” and “attempted concealment of its wrongdoing.” (SAC ¶ 184.) WTRI also claimed 

PMI “intentionally misrepresented to WTRI its intent to perform” under the Development 

and Services Agreements and “intentionally sabotaged” the Development Agreement by 

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“uploading false ‘bug’ reports. . . . to impede WTRI’s progress on development of the 

software.” (SAC ¶¶ 188, 193.) As a result of this “wrongdoing,” WTRI alleged: (1) six 

companies “stopped working and collaborating” with WTRI; (2) it became “harder” to 

obtain funding from the NSF and the NSF declined two of WTRI’s proposals, which was 

“highly unusual;” (3) WTRI made “false promises to its C-suite customers;” (4) WTRI 

incurred loss of “good will and damage” to WTRI’s “business relations” with the NSF; 

(5) WTRI incurred “monetary and reputational damages regarding the fallout of its 

business relationships” with the six companies participating in the pilot program; and (6) 

McKinsey & Company ended its business relations with WTRI. (SAC ¶¶ 185-88, 194-95.) 

In its TAC, WTRI now alleges that, prior to signing the Services Agreement, Dr. 

DiBello of WTRI informed Ms. Redden, Mr. Carter-Bey, and Mr. Weiss of PMI, that 

WTRI intended to recruit C-suite executives from at least five companies. (TAC ¶ 212.) 

WTRI also alleges that Dr. DiBello informed PMI that it could “not screw up the test” 

because doing so would irreparably harm the relationships that WTRI had painstakingly 

created based on years of trust. (Id.) PMI allegedly reassured Dr. DiBello that PMI was 

approaching the Services Agreement in the “utmost good faith” and that the relationships 

would be “well taken care of.” (TAC ¶ 215.) WTRI alleges that: (1) prior to signing the 

Services Agreement, PMI had “no intention of developing a successful working test 

product;” (2) PMI intended to “cut WTRI out of the process entirely in an effort to cause 

the test to fail such that PMI could declare the project a failure, not have to pay WTRI, and 

then retain the technology for itself such that PMI could later launch its own product 

without WTRI;” (3) PMI “failed to disclose that it had already made alternate arrangements 

to proceed with the Agile product without WTRI;” and (4) CVP warned PMI that, without 

WTRI, the project would be a failure. (TAC ¶¶ 214-16.) In its TAC, WTRI also repeats 

its allegations regarding damage to its business relations. (TAC ¶¶ 218-222.) 

The additions to WTRI’s Complaint merely provide some specifics to support its 

allegation that PMI had knowledge of WTRI’s various business relations or its desired 

business relations. While knowledge of a business relationship is an element of tortious 

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interference, Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1153 (2003), 

WTRI does not sufficiently show independently wrongful conduct. The court has already 

found that WTRI’s allegation of fraud and intentional misrepresentation do not show 

independently wrongful conduct. (Doc. No. 32 at 13-15.) The court also already found 

that WTRI did not allege a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. (Id. at 9 n.6.) Without some duty to disclose, WTRI’s additional allegation that 

PMI failed to disclose that it had already made “alternative arrangements” to proceed 

without WTRI, (TAC ¶ 215), adds little, if anything, to its previous claim that PMI failed 

to disclose that it “some time ago” decided to “kill” the project, (SAC ¶¶ 189-91). 

Furthermore, WTRI does not allege that PMI intended to interfere with WTRI’s business 

relationships. Instead, WTRI alleges that PMI intended to “cut out” WTRI so it could 

avoid paying WTRI, and that PMI acted with “reckless disregard” for WTRI’s business 

relationships. (TAC ¶¶ 214, 217.) Finally, as the court previously found, WTRI’s 

allegations simply do not plausibly show that, but for PMI’s conduct, it would have entered 

into a business relationship, would have likely gained an economic advantage, or would 

have received NSF funding. The fact that PMI was allegedly warned the project would fail 

if WTRI was “cut-out” goes more to PMI’s knowledge than its intent. WTRI cites no 

authority that knowledge of potential disruption to business relations satisfies the intent 

element in a tortious interference claim. Accordingly, WTRI fails to plead a plausible 

claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations. 

CONCLUSION 

The court previously cautioned WTRI that further unsuccessful attempts to amend 

the Complaint may demonstrate that the dismissed claims cannot be cured by amendment. 

(Doc. No. 32 at 18.) In its TAC, Plaintiff again unsuccessfully attempts to plead fraud and 

tortious interference. (See Doc. Nos. 24, 32.) Therefore, and for the forgoing reasons, 

PMI’s motion to dismiss WTRI’s claims in the TAC for: (1) breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing in the Services Agreement; (2) fraud; and (3) tortious 

interference with prospective business relations, is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

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AMEND. After discovery commences, however, WTRI is free to request leave to amend 

its Complaint, as consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules, 

based on evidence obtained through discovery. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 22, 2020 JEFFREY T. MILLER 

United States District Judge 

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