Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02317/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02317-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT FUENTES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-2317 MCE GGH P

vs.

JAMES TILTON, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma

pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is currently

without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments shall be collected

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and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in

plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). 

“The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235 (3d ed. 2004). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

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Plaintiff generally challenges defendants’ implementation of the California law

permitting inmates to attend criminal hearings audio-visually. Prison inmates are not taken to

court for the hearing, but rather to a room in the prison where they appear at the court hearing via

videoconference. Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants have refused to take him to scheduled audiovisual hearings. Plaintiff also alleges that he was not allowed to consult with his counsel prior to

and during audio-visual hearings. Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to the audio-visual hearings

after the court hearings were over. Plaintiff also alleges that while he attended the audio-visual

hearings, he was not allowed to use the restroom and was forced, on occasion, to attend the

audio-visual hearings wearing his boxer shorts. Plaintiff also complains that he was required to

wear shackles while being transported to the audio-visual hearings.

As legal claims plaintiff alleges 1) denial of his right to access the courts and to

the assistance of counsel; 2) violation of the Eighth Amendment; 3) violation of his right to a

speedy trial; 4) “self incrimination”; 5) violation of the right to equal protection; 6) violation of

right to due process; 7) violation of state law.

Plaintiff’s claims implicate the validity of criminal actions, although it is unclear

whether he is challenging ongoing criminal proceedings or completed criminal proceedings. To

the extent plaintiff is challenging ongoing criminal proceedings, his actions are barred by the

abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The abstention doctrine,

set forth in Younger, prevents a federal court in most circumstances from directly interfering

with ongoing criminal proceedings in state court. Further, the Younger abstention doctrine bars

requests for declaratory and monetary relief for constitutional injuries arising out of a plaintiff’s

ongoing state criminal prosecution. Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986). Further,

the Younger abstention doctrine applies while a case works its way through the state appellate

process, if a prisoner is convicted. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. V. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims challenging ongoing criminal

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proceedings are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine.

To the extent plaintiff seeks money damages for completed criminal actions, his

claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). In Heck, an

Indiana state prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983 for damages. Claiming that state

and county officials violated his constitutional rights, he sought damages for improprieties in the

investigation leading to his arrest, for the destruction of evidence, and for conduct during his trial

(“illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure”). Convicted on voluntary manslaughter

charges, and serving a fifteen year term, plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief or release from

custody. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the

complaint and held that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not

been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court expressly held that a cause of action for

damages under § 1983 concerning a criminal conviction or sentence cannot exist unless the

conviction or sentence has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. Id.

Because there is no claim that plaintiff’s criminal convictions have been

invalidated, expunged or reversed, his claims are barred pursuant to Heck.

If plaintiff challenges completed criminal actions and seeks prospective injunctive

relief, such claims should be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254 because they directly implicate the validity of his criminal conviction. A finding by this

court that plaintiff’s speedy trial rights were violated, for example, would directly implicate the

validity of plaintiff’s criminal conviction.

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In finding that plaintiff’s claims for prospective injunctive relief regarding

criminal convictions should be raised in a habeas corpus action, this court acknowledges Ninth

Circuit case law discussing the divide between civil rights and habeas corpus actions. In Neal v.

Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997), two prisoners challenged their administrative placement

in the Hawaii “Sex Offender Treatment Program” (SOTP), a placement that made them ineligible

for parole. The prisoners brought their claims in a civil rights action, which the Ninth Circuit

affirmed as an avenue of relief:

If Neal and Martinez are successful in their challenge of the SOTP and their

labeling as sex offenders, that decision will not undermine the validity of their

convictions or continuing confinement at all. The only benefit that a victory in

this case would provide Neal and Martinez besides the possibility of monetary

damages, is a ticket in the door of the parole board, thus only making them

eligible for parole consideration according to the terms of their sentences. If Neal

and Martinez win, it will in now way guarantee parole or necessarily shorten their

prison sentences by a single day. The parole board will still have the authority to

deny the inmates’ request for parole on the basis of any of the grounds presently

available to it in evaluating such a request. A victory in this case would not alter

the calculus for the review of parole requests in any way. Because the inmates’

challenge in this case does not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions

or continuing confinement, it is properly brought under § 1983.

131 F.3d at 824 (footnote omitted).

In Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit held

that “when prison inmates seek only equitable relief in challenging aspects of their parole review,

that, so long as they prevail, could potentially affect the duration of their confinement, such relief

is available under the federal habeas statute.” (Emphasis in original.) The Docken court

resolved the holding in Neal, supra, by finding that the rule of Neal is limited to establishing that

§ 1983 is an “appropriate remedy” in the context of a claim implicating at least some relationship

to parole eligibility, without reaching the question of whether it is the exclusive one. 393 F.3d at

1030 (emphasis in original).

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In the instant action, plaintiff challenge procedures used within the criminal

process rather than parole proceedings. A finding in his favor undermines the validity of his

criminal conviction and could result in a new trial. While the Ninth Circuit in Neal found that

claims challenging procedures in parole proceedings may be brought in civil rights cases, the

Ninth Circuit has not found that claims challenging procedures used within the context of a

criminal conviction may be brought in a civil rights action. Accordingly, the court finds that the

reasoning of Neal is not applicable to plaintiff’s claims.

In any event, were the court to find that plaintiff could proceed with a claim for

prospective injunctive relief it would find that he lacked standing because he has failed to

demonstrate a credible threat of immediate future harm. See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d

1411, 1422 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff does not allege that he is likely to engage in future criminal

conduct which would result in him being subject to the audio-visual hearings. See City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)(denying standing for injunctive relief to victim of

police chokehold because he could not demonstrate a real and immediate threat that he would

again be stopped for a traffic offense and illegally choked into unconsciousness). 

It is clear that plaintiff cannot cure the pleading defects discussed above. For that

reason, the court recommends that this action be dismissed.

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to appoint counsel. Because the court

recommends that this action be dismissed, the motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted;

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350 for this action. The

fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith;

3. Plaintiff’s October 29, 2007, motion for appointment of counsel is denied; and

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed with prejudice. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 04/15/08 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

fuentes.56

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