Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00856/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00856-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH BLACKWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-00856-AWI-SMS-P

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OR

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO

PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE CLAIM

AGAINST DEFENDANT VO, WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 63)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

(Doc. 63)

I. Screening Order

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Keith Blackwell (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on June

20, 2005. On June 5, 2006, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for

failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). After obtaining extensions of time,

plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 12, 2006. 

B. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff attached a motion for the appointment of counsel to his amended complaint.

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland,

113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent plaintiff

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District

of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989). However, in certain exceptional

circumstances the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section

1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek

volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether

“exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity

of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if

it is assumed that plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This court is faced with

similar cases almost daily. Further, at this early stage in the proceedings, the court cannot make a

determination that plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the record

in this case, the court does not find that plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. Id.

Plaintiff’s motion shall therefore be denied.

C. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

D Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

1. Linkage Deficiencies

Plaintiff names a multitude of defendants located at Avenal State Prison, California

Correctional Institution, and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in Sacramento.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

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affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In

order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with

some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

The court has reviewed plaintiff’s amended complaint and with the exception of defendant

Vo, discussed below in subsection 2, plaintiff has not alleged facts linking any other defendants to

a violation of his rights under federal law. Although the federal system is one of notice pleading,

plaintiff must allege some facts demonstrating that each named defendant either acted or failed to

act in a manner that led to the violation of plaintiff’s rights (e.g., a link between actions or omissions

and the violations complained of). In the subsections that follow, the court will address plaintiff’s

individual claims for relief. 

2. Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or COPD, and

his rights were violated by defendants with respect to medical care for his condition. To constitute

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve

“the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’”

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732,

744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent

manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in

which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.

1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have

led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious

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medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk ofserious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”

Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the

risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the

risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff’s allegations that defendant Vo failed to follow the medical management plan

created for plaintiff, which placed plaintiff at risk and resulted in plaintiff’s hospitalization in the

intensive care unit, are sufficient to state a claim under section 1983 against defendant Vo.

However, plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to give rise to claims against any other named

defendants, as plaintiff has not alleged any facts linking them to events demonstrating that they

“[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

3. Conditions of Confinement Other Than Medical Care

Plaintiff complains very generally about conditions of confinement other than medical care.

Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347;

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement,

prison officials maybe held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk

of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

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of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to give rise to any claims for relief under section 1983

for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on conditions of confinement other than medical care.

4. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges generally that reprisals were taken against inmates for complaining about

staff. Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts giving rise to a cognizable retaliation claim. Plaintiff must

allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that adverse action was taken against him because he exercised

his First Amendment rights and that the adverse action did not advice a legitimate penological goal.

Further, the allegations must link defendants by name to the adverse acts complained of. 

5. Inmate Appeals Process

Plaintiff complains generally of faulty inmate appeals decisions, cover-ups, and “greenwall”

tactics. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for

which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests

which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).

Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes

///

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atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive

right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)) (emphasis added); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to

a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of

grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural

protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10;

Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing prisoner’s

administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d

at 495. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting a claim under section 1983 relating to his use

of the inmate appeals process.

6. Equal Protection

Plaintiff’s alleges that a person may not be denied equal protection of the law. “The Equal

Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated

alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457

U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with

an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected

class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Intentional discrimination means that a

defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345

F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.

1994)) (emphasis in original). 

///

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Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which give rise to a cognizable equal protection claim.

7. Supervisory Liability

Finally, under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds

a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state

a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts

indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and

is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.

1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although

federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section

1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff will, by this order, be provided with the opportunity to file a second amended

complaint. Plaintiff names as defendants in his current complaint supervisory and/or high level

management personnel. Plaintiff may not pursue claims against individuals holding those types of

positions on the mere basis that they hold those positions. Section 1983 requires that their acts or

omissions be linked to the violation of plaintiff’s rights.

E. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint contains a cognizable claim for relief

against defendant Vo for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, the court finds that plaintiff’s amended complaint

does not contain any other claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The court

will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and wishes to proceed against

defendant Vo on his Eighth Amendment medical care claim only, plaintiff may so notify the court

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in writing. The court will then issue Findings and Recommendations recommending that the

remaining claims and defendants be dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff one

summons and one USM-285 form to fill out and return to the court. Upon receipt of these

documents, the court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process on defendant

Vo.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel, filed December 12, 2006, is

DENIED;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

court in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file a second amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against defendant Vo on Eighth

Amendment medical care claim; and

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4. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 15, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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