Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01032/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIDGET WEINTRAUB,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13-CV-1032 W (RBB)

 

 

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A

SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT [DOC. 23] AND

(2) DENYING AS MOOT

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS [DOC. 11]

v.

LAW OFFICE OF PATENAUDE &

FELIX, A.P.C., et al.,

Defendants.

Defendant Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C. (“P & F”) moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (MTD [Doc. 11];

Reply [Doc. 17].) Plaintiff opposes. (Opp’n [Doc. 14].) Also pending before the Court

is Plaintiff’s motion to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Mot. Amend [Doc. 23];

Reply [Doc. 28].) Defendant opposes. (Opp’n [Doc. 27].) The Court decides the

matter on the parties’ briefs and the record. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the

reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to file a Second

Amended Complaint and DENIES AS MOOT P & F’s motion to dismiss.

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I. BACKGROUND

According to the First Amended Complaint, sometime before January 2013,

Plaintiff “allegedly fell behind in payments allegedly owed on [an] alleged debt.” (FAC

¶ 18.) This alleged debt was then “assigned, placed or otherwise transferred []to

Defendants for collection.” (Id. ¶ 19.) On or about January 23, 2013, Plaintiff received

a dunning letter from Defendant P & F. (FAC ¶ 20.) The letter states, in part:

In the event that legal action is pursued and judgment is ultimately

obtained against you, the judgment may include all court costs,

prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees in addition to the principal

amount current owed.

(Id. ¶ 23.) 

On April 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Complaint. (Compl.[Doc. 1]). On July 10,

2013, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint. (FAC [Doc. 7]). The FAC alleges

violations of the Fair DebtCollection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Rosenthal Fair

Debt Collections Practices Act (“Rosethal Act”). All of the alleged violations stem

from the content of the dunning letter. 

On July 29, 2013, P & F moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC. (Mot. Dismiss [Doc.

11].) On September 16, 2013, while the P & F’s motion to dismiss was pending,

Plaintiff filed a motion to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Mot. Amend [Doc. 23].) 

Plaintiff bases her request to amend on the fact that P & F recently provided a copy of

the contract underlying Plaintiff’s alleged debt, which revealed new issues regarding

Defendants’ statute of limitations. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after a

responsive pleading has been served, a party may amend its complaint only with the

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “The court

should freely give leave when justice so requires,” and apply this policy with “extreme

liberality.” Id.; DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, leave to amend is not to be granted automatically. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison

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Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d

1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990)). Granting leave to amend rests in the sound discretion of

the district court. Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Court considers five factors in assessing a motion for leave to amend: (1) bad

faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of the

amendment; and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. 

Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing any

of the factors above. See DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. Of these factors, prejudice

to the opposing party carries the greatest weight. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon,

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). However, absent prejudice, a strong

showing of the other factors may support denying leave to amend. See id.

“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to

amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Futility is a measure of

the amendment’s legal sufficiency. “[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no set

of facts can be proved under the amendment . . . that would constitute a valid and

sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir.

1988). Thus, the test of futility is identical to the one applied when considering

challenges under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Baker v. Pac. Far E. Lines, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 84, 89 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see

Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A district court does not err

in denying leave to amend . . . where the amended complaint would be subject to

dismissal.” (citation omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

According to Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff has “diligently sought, through repeated

written requests and telephone calls to Defendants and/or their agents or affiliates

attempting to collect this alleged debt, a copy of the underlying contract.” (Mot.

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Amend. 2.) On September 6, 2013, well after the filing of the FAC, Defendants

provided a copy of this contract to Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the contract, if

authentic, shows that Plaintiff would have breached the alleged contract before 2007. 

(Id. 3.) If this were the case, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ statute of limitations

to sue Plaintiff for breach of the alleged contract would have run some time in 2011,

well before Plaintiff was in receipt of the dunning letter. (Id.) Therefore, Defendants

would be liable for additional, unplead violations of the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act

because the dunning letter was “a threat to take action that defendants have no legal

right to take.” (Id.) 

P & F first argues that leave to amend would be futile. Specifically, they suggest

that the proposed allegations for the SAC would not withstand a motion to dismiss for

the same reasons that FAC currently fails, as outlined in the pending motion to dismiss. 

(Opp’n 3:10-14.) However, Plaintiff seeks to amend the FAC to add allegations

regarding the statute of limitations, which were not included in the FAC. Because

these claims would be added for the first time in the SAC, Defendant has not addressed

their sufficiency in its pending motion to dismiss. Therefore, this argument fails.

P & F also suggests that amendment is futile because the statue of limitations

would not have expired before it sent the dunning letter or before this suit was filed. 

(Opp’n 3.) According to P & F, Plaintiff breached the contract in March 2011. Under

the California statute of limitations, P & F would have until March 2015 to bring their

claim. (Id.) Additionally, P & F suggest that the contract is governed by Ohio state

law which has a six year statute of limitations, giving them until March 2016 to bring

their claim. (Id. 4.) At best, this argument demonstrates that the parties disagree as to

(1) which statute of limitations applies and (2) when Plaintiff breached the underlying

contract. This is not enough to meet P & F’s burden to show that amendment would

actually be futile. See DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. Moreover, as explained above,

the statute of limitations issue has not previously been raised in this, and thus has not

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been adequately briefed. Therefore, given the record and procedural posture of this

case, the Court cannot find that providing leave to amend would be futile.

Second, P & F argues that leave to amend would be prejudicial. In support of

this argument, they suggest that they have spent “quite a bit of time . . . reviewing each

complaint, preparing each of its motion to dismiss and reply brief.” (Id. ¶ 4.) After

reciting a chronology of the time Defendants have spent on the matter, Defendants

conclude that “Defendant finds this to be judicially un-resourceful and prejudicial to

Defendant.” (Id. ¶ 4.) While the amount of time and resources spent could in some

situations demonstrate that leave to amend would be prejudicial, Defendant has failed

to show that is the case here. Simply claiming that a party has spent time and resources

on litigation is not enough to show prejudice, especially given the fact that time and

resources are expended in all litigation. Defendant has failed to meet its burden in

establishing prejudice. See DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186.

 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For these reasons, and because leave to amend must be freely given, the Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff shall file her SAC by January 22, 2014. In light of this order,

Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 2, 2014

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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