Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00083/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00083-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

K.D., a minor, by and through his 

Guardian ad Litem, LAQUANTAE 

DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIBER CHANGEMAKERS 

ACADEMY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-00083-DJC-JDP

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff, a minor, alleges he was bullied and sexually harassed by fellow 

students at the public charter school he attended from 2021–2022. Based on these 

allegations, Plaintiff brought claims against the school, school district, and individual 

teachers for negligent supervision and failure to address the harassment. The school 

district now moves to dismiss the claims against them, arguing they are immune from 

vicarious liability under Cal. Educ. Code § 47604(d) and that Plaintiff has failed to 

plausibly plead his claims. (ECF Nos. 27, 29.) 

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If true, the allegations in the Complaint are shocking. But at this stage of the 

proceedings, Plaintiffs have not shown that the Vallejo City Unified School District 

bears liability for those alleged wrongs. Rather, the Court finds that the school district 

is immune from vicarious liability under section 47604(d), and that Plaintiff has failed 

to plausibly plead his claims premised on the district’s direct liability. The Court

GRANTS the District’s motion with leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff K.D., a minor, was a fourth-grade student during the 2021–2022 

school year at Defendant Caliber Changemakers Academy (“CCA”), a public charter 

school operated by Defendant Caliber Public Schools pursuant to authorization from 

Defendant Vallejo City Unified School District (“District”). (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) 

(ECF No. 22) ¶¶ 4–7, 18, 21.) During his time at CCA, Plaintiff alleges he had a speech 

and language impairment, which qualified him to receive special education services. 

(Id. ¶¶ 5, 17.) Plaintiff alleges CCA was aware of his disabilities and the additional 

accommodations and support he required. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Instead of receiving this support, Plaintiff alleges that he was bullied, 

threatened, sexually abused, and sexually assaulted throughout the year by another 

student, K.J.W., as well as other students, due to his disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 25–27, 29, 31.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges K.J.W. and the other students repeatedly harassed him

about his disabilities, stole his backpack, and chased him into the bathrooms and 

other areas of the school’s campus. (Id. ¶ 26.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges K.J.W. 

fondled his genitals, forced a pencil and his fingers into Plaintiff’s buttocks, and 

squeezed Plaintiff’s penis. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges that the bullying and harassment 

was open and obvious, and frequently occurred in the presence of CCA staff. (Id. 

¶ 27.) Plaintiff alleges the District knew or should have known about the bullying and 

sexual harassment occurring on campus but failed to ensure students were 

adequately supervised or intervene to stop the conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 37–38.) Plaintiff 

also alleges the District negligently failed to monitor and oversee CCA. (Id. ¶ 35.)

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Based on these allegations, Plaintiff sued the District on January 13, 2023, filing

his operative First Amended Complaint on May 2, 2023. On May 23, 2023, the District 

moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12201, et seq.; third cause of action under

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; fourth cause of action 

for negligent supervision under Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2; and sixth cause of action for 

intentional discrimination based on sex and disability under Cal. Educ. Code § 220. 

(See Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) (ECF No. 27) at 3–5; Reply (ECF No. 29) at 1–5.) The 

Court submitted the Motion without oral argument. (ECF No. 33.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint 

lacks a “cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 

While the court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 

1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)), if the complaint's allegations do not “plausibly give rise to 

an entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

679 (2009).

A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed 

factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, 

this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must 

make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory 

or formulaic recitations of elements alone do not suffice. Id. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This 

evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and 

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common sense.” Id. at 679. However, a court may not assume that the plaintiff “can 

prove facts that it has not alleged . . . .” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. 

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must also decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be freely given where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue 

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility 

of amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent prejudice, or a strong 

showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 

15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend”). Dismissal without leave to amend is 

proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” In 

re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

Plaintiff claims that the District failed to “provide services, programs, and 

activities in a full and equal manner to disabled persons . . . including failing to ensure 

that educational services are provided on an equal basis to children with disabilities 

and free of hostility toward their disability . . . [and] by subjecting Plaintiff K.D. to a 

hostile educational environment” in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. 

(FAC ¶¶ 50–60.)

A. Immunity Under Cal. Educ. Code § 47604(d)

The District argues that it is immune from liability for these claims under Cal. 

Educ. Code § 47604(d), which provides that a “chartering authority that grants a 

charter to a charter school to be operated as or by a nonprofit public benefit 

corporation is not liable for the debts or obligations of the charter school or for claims 

arising from the performance of acts, errors, or omissions by the charter school if the 

chartering authority has complied with all oversight responsibilities required by law . . 

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. .” (MTD at 3–5.) However, this provision only immunizes the District from vicarious

liability for claims brought against CCA. Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims 

are premised on the District’s direct liability for their failure to provide educational 

services in a non-discriminatory manner. The District has provided no authority that 

section 47604(d) bars claims against a school district for their own acts or omissions. 

But even if section 47604(d) applies to the claims at issue, the Ninth Circuit has made

clear that “state law cannot provide immunity from suit for federal civil rights 

violations.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1144 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Roe ex rel. 

Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1017–20 (E.D. Cal. 2009)

(concluding Cal. Educ. Code § 35330 did not apply to federal claims). Thus, section 

47604(d) is inapplicable to these federal claims.

B. Liability for ADA and Rehabilitaion Act Claims

While the District is not immune from suit, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed 

to plead sufficient facts to state an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim. “In order to state a 

claim under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he 

or she is an individual with a disability under the Act; (2) he or she is ‘otherwise 

qualified’ to participate in or receive the benefit of the entity's services, programs, or 

activities, i.e., he or she meets the essential eligibility requirements of the entity, with 

or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he or she was either excluded from 

participation in or denied the benefits of the entity's services, programs, or activities, 

or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity solely by reason of his or 

her disability; and (4) the entity is a public entity (for the ADA claim) or receives federal 

financial assistance (for the Rehabilitation Act claim).” D.K. ex rel. G.M. v. Solano Cnty. 

Off. of Educ., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Zukle v. Regents of 

University of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.1999)). If a plaintiff seeks 

damages, as Plaintiff does here, he must also prove the discrimination was intentional 

by discriminatory animus or deliberate indifference. A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified 

Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2016). 

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Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a speech and language impairment that qualified 

him to receive special education services from the District. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 51–52.) 

Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges the District is a public entity and recipient of federal 

funds. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 58.) 

However, Plaintiff fails to allege with particularity how the District’s failure to 

prevent or address his abuse was motivated by discrimination toward his disability. As 

in M.P.G. by and through Guzman v. Antioch Unified School District, ”there are no 

factual allegations in the complaint to suggest” that the District’s failure to protect 

Plaintiff from this severe mistreatment was “motivated by a discriminatory animus 

based on his disability.” No. 23-cv-01176-TSH, 2023 WL 4053794 at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 

16, 2023). While Plaintiff “has alleged that he is disabled and that he was mistreated 

as a result of purported negligence by” the District, he fails to allege facts that show 

the District’s actions resulted from discrimination “by reason of” his disability. Id.

Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim against the District under the 

ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Even if Plaintiff had properly plead discrimination by reason of his disability, the 

Court finds that the Plaintiff has not shown he is entitled to damages. To recover 

damages, the plaintiff must also prove the discrimination was intentional by 

discriminatory animus or deliberate indifference. A.G., 815 F.3d at 1204. Deliberate 

indifference requires (1) “knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is 

substantially likely,” and (2) “a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Duvall v. Cnty. of 

Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001). This standard has been described as “a 

stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known 

or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. 

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). This standard is “even higher than gross 

negligence—deliberate indifference requires a culpable mental state.” Patel v. Kent 

Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). “The state actor must ‘recognize[ ] [an] 

unreasonable risk and actually intend[ ] to expose the plaintiff to such risks without 

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regard to the consequences to the plaintiff.’” Id. “In other words, the defendant

‘knows that something is going to happen but ignores the risk and exposes [the 

plaintiff] to it.’” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges the District was “on notice” of the harassment, but negligently

failed to supervise or stop the conduct. (FAC ¶¶ 32–33, 78, 83.) However, Plaintiff 

fails to allege with particularity either how the District knew about the ongoing abuse

as a chartering authority or how they could be aware that the abuse was highly likely. 

Plaintiff also consistently refers to the District’s action as negligent, (FAC ¶¶ 32–33, 38),

but negligence is not sufficient to plead the “stringent standard of fault” and actual 

intent required for deliberate indifference. See M.P.G., 2023 WL 4053794, at *4. If 

Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged how the District knew about the harassment and failed 

to act, then Plaintiff would have met the deliberate indifference standard. See also

A.G., 815 F.3d at 1207 (When the plaintiff is seeking damages, “she must show the 

defendant had notice of her need for an accommodation and ‘fail[ed] to act.’”). But 

without sufficient allegations demonstrating knowledge, the District cannot be held 

liable for damages. See M.P.G., 2023 WL 4053794, at *4. 

For these reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s second and third causes of 

action with leave to amend.

II. Plaintiff’s Negligent Supervision Claim

Plaintiff also alleges that the District is liable “for injuries proximately caused by 

the negligence of district and school personnel responsible for student supervision” 

under Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a), which establishes liability for public entities for 

injury “caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the 

scope of his employment.” (FAC ¶¶ 61–68.) The District again argues that it is 

immune from vicarious liability under Cal. Educ. Code § 47604(d), which provides that 

a “chartering authority that grants a charter to a charter school to be operated as or by 

a nonprofit public benefit corporation is not liable for the debts or obligations of the 

charter school or for claims arising from the performance of acts, errors, or omissions 

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by the charter school if the chartering authority has complied with all oversight 

responsibilities required by law, including, but not limited to, those required by 

Section 47604.32 and subdivision (m) of Section 47605.” (MTD at 3–5.) The District 

argues that it has complied with all oversight responsibilities under sections 47604.32 

and 47605(m). (Id. at 4–5.)

The Court finds that the District is immune from liability for Plaintiff’s state-law 

negligent supervision claim. Plaintiff alleges that Caliber Public Schools “is a nonprofit 

public benefit corporation, which is the legal entity that was granted the charter for 

[CCA].” (FAC ¶ 7.) Thus, CCA is a charter school subject to the immunity provisions in 

section 47604(d). Plaintiff argues that the District “was required to monitor CCA to 

ensure the school’s compliance with applicable laws, fulfillment of charter terms and 

provision of a high-quality educational program for students” under section 47604.32,

as well as the District’s board policies 420.4 and 420.41, but “negligently failed to do 

so.” (FAC ¶¶ 19, 35, 65.) Compliance with these oversight requirements is required 

for the District to gain the benefit of the immunity provided by section 46704(d). 

However, Plaintiff does not allege with particularity what obligations the District failed 

to fulfill under section 47604.32 and how. Nor does Plaintiff specify what obligations 

board policies 420.4 and 420.41 imposed on the District or how the District failed to 

fulfill them. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678.

As Plaintiff has failed to allege the District did not comply with the oversight 

requirements imposed under section 47604(d), the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth 

cause of action with leave to amend.

III. Plaintiff’s Intentional Discrimination Claim

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he was bullied and sexually harassed by fellow 

students, the District had knowledge of Plaintiff’s harassment, and the District had 

authority to end the harassment but did not. (FAC ¶¶ 71–84.) The District argues that 

Cal. Educ. Code § 47604(d) immunizes it from liability. (MTD at 3–5.) However, as 

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with Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, immunity under section 47604(d) is 

inapplicable here as Plaintiff’s claim is premised on the District’s direct liability. 

That said, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. To plead intentional discrimination 

under Cal. Educ. Code § 220, a plaintiff must allege “(1) he or she suffered ‘severe, 

pervasive and offensive’ harassment, that effectively deprived plaintiff of the right of 

equal access to educational benefits and opportunities; (2) the school district had 

‘actual knowledge’ of that harassment; and (3) the school district acted with 

‘deliberate indifference’ in the face of such knowledge.” Donovan v. Poway Unified 

School Dist., 167 Cal. App. 4th 567, 579 (2008). 

The Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged “severe, pervasive, and 

offensive” harassment that deprived him of educational access. Plaintiff alleges that 

during the 2021–2022 school year he faced ongoing bullying in the presence of 

school staff and sexual harassment from K.J.W., which included fondling his genital 

and squeezing his penis. (FAC ¶¶ 25–27, 29, 31.) This is sufficient to allege “severe, 

pervasive, and offensive” harassment. See, e.g., M.M. v. San Juan Unified Sch. Dist., 

No. 2:19-cv-00398-TLN-EFB, 2020 WL 5702265, at *4–6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2020)

(finding plaintiff’s allegation that another student pushed the plaintiff, jumped on the 

plaintiff, and grabbed plaintiff’s breasts on four separate occasion was sufficient to 

establish severe and pervasive harassment); J.E.L. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 

185 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1200 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Plaintiff has alleged ‘severe’ and 

‘pervasive’ peer harassment in excess of ‘a single instance.’”). Plaintiff also sufficiently 

alleges that, as a result of the harassment, he was deprived of educational access 

because he suffered severe anxiety, psychological injuries, and diminished academic 

performance. (FAC ¶¶ 40, 77); see also M.M. v. San Juan Unified Sch. Dist., 2020 WL 

5702265, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2020) (“Examples of a negative impact on access 

may include dropping grades, being diagnosed with behavioral and/or anxiety 

disorders, and becoming homebound or hospitalized due to harassment, physical 

violence, or sexual assault.”). 

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As with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the Court finds that the Plaintiff 

has insufficiently pled the District had actual knowledge or acted with deliberate 

indifference. Plaintiff alleges, on “information and belief,” that the District were “on 

notice” and had “knowledge of this bullying, sexual harassment, and sexual 

misconduct,” but negligently failed to supervise or intervene to stop the conduct. 

(FAC ¶¶ 32–33, 37, 78.) However, Plaintiff fails to allege with particularity how and 

when the District gained actual knowledge of these incidents as a chartering authority. 

As Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled actual knowledge, the District cannot be held 

liable for acting indifferently to incidents of which it was unaware. See also R.N. by & 

through Neff v. Travis Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:20-cv-00562-KJM-JDP, 2020 WL 

7227561, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020) (“[Plaintiff] must also show the District acted 

with deliberate indifference in the face of ‘actual knowledge’ of such discrimination or 

harassment.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678.

For these reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action with 

leave to amend.

CONCLUSION 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the District’s Motion to 

Dismiss (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED. Specifically, Plaintiff’s second, third, fourth, and 

sixth causes of action against the District are DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff 

is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2024 

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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