Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01142/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Thomas Glenn Morgan, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 15-01142- PHX-ROS (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Thomas Glenn Morgan (“Petitioner” or “Morgan”) filed a second amended 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) challenging 

his convictions in the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 11) For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court recommends that Morgan’s Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 A. Petitioner’s trial 

 Petitioner was indicted on May 15, 2008 in Maricopa County Superior Court for 

possession of a dangerous drug, a Class 4 felony, in case number CR2008-129836-001 

(“2008 case”). (Doc. 21-1 at 2) He entered a plea agreement and was sentenced to 

probation for three years.1

 (Id. at 90-95) While on probation for the 2008 offense, on 

 

1

 Because the plea agreement and transcript for the change of plea hearing were ordered sealed by the Maricopa County Superior Court, the “Uniform Conditions of 

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December 10, 2010, Petitioner again was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on 

a separate charge of theft, a Class 6 felony. (Id. at 109-110) The case assigned to his 

indictment was CR2010-161928-001 (“2010 case”). (Id.) The State subsequently filed a 

petition to revoke probation in the 2008 case. (Id. at 107) Petitioner denied a probation 

violation (Id. at 9) and pled not guilty to the charge of theft (Id. at 11). 

 Petitioner failed to appear at his initial pretrial conference on February 16, 2011 

but showed up the next day for the rescheduled conference (Id. at 14-20). A settlement 

conference was vacated on March 18, 2011 because Petitioner was hospitalized. (Id. at 

21) A criminal competency hearing was continued on July 7, 2011, after Petitioner failed 

to appear and had also failed to appear at appointments with physicians. (Id. at 22-23) 

Petitioner was present at a criminal competency hearing continuance held on July 14, 

2011, at which the court admonished him to keep appointments with the assigned 

physicians and to appear at the continued competency hearing. (Id. at 24-25) On October 

4, 2011, the trial court granted an unopposed defense motion for continuance of the final 

trial management conference, which was based on the defense’s assertion it was 

attempting to settle the case. (Id. at 26-27) Again, on November 16, 2011, the trial court 

granted another unopposed defense motion to continue the final trial management 

conference due to a trial conflict for defense counsel, and an evidentiary hearing that still 

needed to be scheduled. (Id. at 28-29) The defense moved for trial continuances on 

January 5, January 31, and February 29, prompted by defense counsel’s trial conflicts. 

(Id. at 32, 35, 39-40) 

 On April 11, 2012, the State moved for a trial continuance due to unavailability of 

a State’s witness. (Id. at 41-42) Defense counsel objected, but the court found that 

Petitioner would suffer no unfair prejudice. (Id. at 42) The trial date was reset for May 

21, 2012, a delay of 40 days. (Id.) 

 On May 17, 2012, Petitioner made an oral motion for new counsel and a trial 

continuance, which the court denied, but also advised Petitioner he could put his motions 

 Supervised Probation” form filed in Morgan’s case is relied on instead. 

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in writing for consideration by the Master Calendar Assignment Judge. (Id. at 46) At a 

hearing to set trial on May 21, 2012, Petitioner did not appear and the court ordered trial 

to begin in absentia, over defense counsel’s objection. (Id. at 44) A hearing to set a trial 

date was held on May 30, 2012 and trial was set for June 12, 2012. (Id. at 53-54) The 

court cautioned Petitioner that if he did not appear for trial, a bench warrant would be 

issued for his arrest, and the trial would go forward without him. (Id.) 

 On June 12, 2012, Petitioner’s trial commenced. (Id. at 55, Doc. 21-4 at 2) Before 

the court reporter was set up, Petitioner made an oral motion to represent himself and for 

trial continuance. (Doc. 21-1 at 56, Doc. 21-4 at 4) The court denied the motion. (Id.) The 

minute entry indicates: 

Argument is heard on [Petitioner’s] oral Motion to Represent Self and 

Motion to Continue Trial Date. [Petitioner] was instructed on 5/17/12 by 

Judge Flores to put such motions in writing, which [Petitioner] failed to 

do. 

IT IS ORDERED denying [Petitioner’s] Motion to Represent Self and 

Motion to Continue Trial Date. 

(Doc. 21-1 at 56) At that point, the minute entry states: “Defendant informs the Court of 

his dissatisfaction and intention to leave. The Court warns Defendant that the proceeding 

will go forward in his absence should he choose to leave and that his absence will be 

determined to be voluntary.” (Id.) The minute entry further states that Petitioner did, in 

fact, leave. (Id.) Thereafter, Petitioner’s counsel advised the court on the record that 

Petitioner had called and indicated he wanted to take a plea. (Doc. 21-4 at 3) Counsel 

relayed to him that the State was unable to offer the plea at that point. (Id.) Counsel 

advised the court that Petitioner then said he was going to the hospital. (Id.) 

 The trial transcript dated June 12, 2012 reflects that the court documented the 

denial of Petitioner’s motion: 

Before we had [the] court reporter set up today, Mr. Morgan was present. 

He was advised of the range of penalties that he [f]aces if he goes forward 

to trial and if found guilty on the offense as charged. He was also advised 

that he would be found in automatic violation of his probation case and that 

that sentence would run consecutive. He also made a motion, an oral 

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motion to the Court to represent himself, which the Court denied. 

(Id. at 5) 

 The next trial day, June 13, 2012, Petitioner’s counsel advised the court that 

Petitioner was in the hospital for treatment of his ongoing congestive heart failure 

problems, and that Petitioner would like to be present at trial and was requesting a 

continuance. (Id. at 4) The trial court requested Petitioner’s counsel to speak with 

Petitioner’s treating physician for additional detail about when Petitioner was expected to 

be released from the hospital. (Doc. 21-4 at 101-102) The court consulted with jury 

members about their availability, and in an effort to prevent the jury from learning that 

the trial delay was attributable to Petitioner, advised the jury that a delay was necessary 

because a witness was unavailable. (Id. at 102-110) 

 On June 18, 2012, the Petitioner appeared with his counsel. (Id. at 116-121) 

Defendant complained that he was not well enough to endure trial, and that he was 

scheduled to undergo a valve replacement and implant of a defibrillator on June 22, 2012. 

(Id. at 119-120) The court concluded that Petitioner had been released by his physician, 

and was well enough to testify at his trial later that day. (Id. at 120-121) After Petitioner 

absented himself, the court found Petitioner’s absence from trial voluntary. (Id. at 127) 

 Subsequently, the court advised legal counsel that the court had just received a fax 

purporting to be from Petitioner’s physician, which requested the court to continue 

Petitioner’s case until after his surgery on June 22. (Id. at 164) In order to verify the fax, 

the court called Petitioner’s physician identified in the fax, and on the record again 

determined that Petitioner was “voluntarily absent from court without more 

documentation saying that he’s physically unable to be at court today.” (Id. at 166) The 

physician stated, “That is absolutely fine by me. The only thing I will say is that my 

secretaries caught him trying to give them a falsified note from us that they asked our 

office to fax to the courthouse.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner’s trial concluded on June 19, 2012, in his absence. (Doc. 21-5 at 48) The 

jury found Petitioner guilty. (Id. at 52) The court ruled that because Petitioner was 

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already on bond when he voluntarily absented himself from trial, it would issue a warrant 

for Petitioner’s arrest to be held without bond. (Id. at 57-58). The court set a sentencing 

hearing for July 20, 2012 (Id.), and a bond forfeiture hearing on July 24, 2012 (Doc. 21-1 

at 72). In an order dated July 24, 2012, the court amended its June 19, 2012 minute entry 

to reflect that Petitioner was in automatic violation of his conditions of probation in the 

2008 case. (Id. at 76) 

 When bond agents attempted to bring Petitioner into custody on July 6, 2012, he 

escaped in his vehicle, reportedly almost running over two bond agents. (Doc. 21-1 at 

116) On July 24, 2012, bond agents re-attempted to bring Petitioner into custody. (Id.) 

Petitioner again escaped, this time ramming the bond agent’s car. (Id.) The next day, 

patrol officers located Petitioner and brought him into custody without incident. (Id.) 

Subsequently, the State filed a petition to revoke probation in the 2008 case, based on 

violations of the terms of his probation, including charges of aggravated assault 

associated with his evasion of the bond agents. (21-1 at 121) 

 Sentencing in Petitioner’s 2010 case was continued on December 5, 2012 on 

motion of defense counsel because Petitioner had other charges pending (Id. at 84), and 

again on motion of defense counsel on January 22, 2013 (Id. at 86). 

 The sentencing hearing in Petitioner’s 2010 case was ultimately conducted on 

March 27, 2013. (Doc. 21-5 at 61-81) On the 2010 theft case, Petitioner was sentenced to 

the presumptive term of 3.75 years’ imprisonment with 278 days of presentence 

incarceration credit, and was ordered to pay restitution for the amount of the theft. (Doc. 

21-5 at 74, 21-1 at 124) On the 2008 case, Petitioner’s probation was revoked and he was 

sentenced to the presumptive term of 2.5 years’ imprisonment, to run consecutively with 

his sentence in the 2010 case. (Id. at 74, Doc. 21-1 at 129) 

B. Petitioner’s direct appeal

 Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal (Doc. 21-2 at 17-18), and in his appellate 

brief argued the following issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

failed to conduct a Faretta hearing when Petitioner moved to represent himself; (2) 

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whether the trial court erred by not awarding Petitioner all of the presentence 

incarceration credit due him; and (3) whether the trial court erred by ordering Petitioner 

to pay for DNA testing pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-610. (Id. at 21, 50-68) 

 The State filed its answer, contesting Petitioner’s first two claims and conceding 

the correctness of his third claim, involving the requirement that he pay for DNA testing. 

(Id. at 95, 99-106) Regarding Petitioner’s second claim, involving presentence 

incarceration time, the State argued that “[w]hile the trial court may have erred in failing 

to give [Petitioner] credit for the 132 days in the [2008 case], this Court does not have 

jurisdiction over the [2008] case because it is not part of this appeal.” (Id. at 106) 

 Petitioner’s appellate counsel elected to not file a reply brief, stating that the issues 

had been fully presented. (Id. at 114) Petitioner requested leave of the Arizona Court of 

Appeals to file a “Supplemental Reply Brief’ to augment the record with his “best 

recollection of crucial events and evidence presented and/or offered during pre-trial 

hearing wherein the trial court did not make a record and/or a complete record.” (Id. at 

120) The court of appeals denied Petitioner’s motion on the ground that, because he was 

represented by counsel, he was not entitled to hybrid representation. (Id. at 154) 

 In its reasoned decision, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to represent himself, because the motion was 

untimely and it was apparent that the basis underlying the motion was trial delay. (Id. at 

162 ¶ 18) The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over Petitioner’s 2008 case, and 

ordered the trial court’s sentencing order modified to credit Petitioner 132 days of 

presentence incarceration credit. (Id. at 163 ¶ 22) Additionally, the court of appeals held 

that, based on State v. Reyes, 232 Ariz. 468, 307 P.3d 35 (App. 2013), the trial court had 

erred in requiring Petitioner to pay his DNA testing. (Id.) 

C. Post-Conviction Relief action 

 Petitioner was appointed counsel for his Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) action. 

(Doc. 21-3 at 18) Appointed counsel filed a notice in Maricopa County Superior Court of 

her completion of PCR and finding of no colorable issue, and requesting an extension of 

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time to allow Petitioner to file a pro per petition for PCR. (Id. at 38-39) The court 

ordered counsel to remain as advisory counsel and ordered the filing date for Petitioner’s 

PCR pro per petition. (Id. at 23-24) Petitioner filed his petition, arguing the following 

four grounds for relief: (1) that his absence from trial was involuntary, due to his health 

issues; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing Petitioner’s medical 

records and for not calling certain witnesses; (3) that he did not receive 248 days of 

presentence incarceration credit applicable to his 2008 case; and (4) a bare reference to 

“closing arguments,” lacking any supporting explanation or argument. (Id. at 55) 

 The trial court denied the petition. (Id. at 144-145) The court found Petitioner’s 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was precluded from relief under Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 because it addressed “substantive legal arguments which 

he did not raise in his direct appeal.” (Id. at 145) Additionally, the court found 

Petitioner’s “allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel claiming his attorney 

performed below a reasonable standard of prevailing competency by not giving the court 

medical records and not calling witnesses regarding his absences from the proceedings 

are unsubstantiated and without merit.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals in 

February 2015. His petition for review argued: (1) his right to be present at trial was 

improperly denied; (2) he was owed 248 days of presentence incarceration credit; and (3) 

new evidence shows that his theft victim had lied in police reports. (Id. at 151) The 

record before this Court indicates that Petitioner’s petition for review is pending before 

the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 21 at 9) 

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

A. Exhaustion of Remedies & Procedural Default 

 A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before this Court 

may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

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526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Arizona’s “established appellate 

review processes” consist of a direct appeal and a PCR proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

31, et. seq. and Rule 32, et. seq.; see also Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 

1994) (“To exhaust one’s state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the 

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.”). 

To be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and 

the specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The mere similarity between a claim of state and 

federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.”). Articulating the specific federal 

theory is often referred to as federalizing a claim. To federalize a claim, it is not enough 

to simply cite the general federal constitutional provision and/or buzzwords 

unaccompanied by federal constitutional analysis. See Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 

1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Exhaustion demands more than a citation to a general 

constitutional provision, detached from any articulation of the underlying federal legal 

theory”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 2005) (habeas petitioner 

did not give the state appellate court a fair opportunity to rule on a federal due process 

claim by concluding brief with “drive-by” citation of federal constitutional provisions, 

“detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory”); Hiivala, 195 F.3d 

at 1106 (“[G]eneral appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal 

protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion.”); Galvan 

v. Alaska Dep’t Corr., 397 F.3d 1198, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To exhaust a federal 

constitutional claim in state court, a petitioner has to have, at the least, explicitly alerted 

the court that she was making a federal constitutional claim.”) (emphasis added). 

 A claim can also be subject to an express or implied procedural bar. Robinson v. 

Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express procedural bar exists if the state 

court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural bar “that is both ‘independent’ of 

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the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s 

“Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of federal law because they do not 

depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 

U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist when a state strictly or regularly follows 

its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 

595 F.3d at 1100. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). “Cause” is something that “cannot be fairly 

attributable” to a petitioner, and that this “objective factor external to the defense 

impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

753 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice a “habeas 

petitioner must show ‘not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting 

Frady, 456 U.S. at 170) (emphasis in original). “Such a showing of pervasive actual 

prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other than a showing that the 

prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial”. Id.

 The miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default “is limited to those 

extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his [actual] innocence and establishes 

that the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.” Johnson v. 

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Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). To pass through the 

actual innocence/Schlup gateway, a petitioner must establish his or her factual innocence 

of the crime and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 623 

(1998); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner “must 

show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in 

the light of the new evidence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013) 

(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. See also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 

2011); McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1927 (2013) (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). Because of “the rarity of such 

evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily 

rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Calderon v. 

Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)). 

 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 Under clearly established Federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel 

(“IAC”), a petitioner must show that his trial counsel’s performance was both (a) 

objectively deficient and (b) caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). This results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s performance. 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (explaining that in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

case, deference is due both to defense counsel’s performance and to the state court’s 

ruling). The Court has discretion to determine which Strickland prong to apply first. 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998). A habeas court reviewing a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must determine “whether there is a reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard, such that the state 

court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist could disagree that the state court erred.” 

Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations 

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omitted). 

C. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition – Legal Standard of Review 

 On habeas review, this Court can only grant relief if the petitioner demonstrates 

prejudice because the adjudication of a claim on the merits in state court either “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

This is a “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings’ which demands 

that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 

(1997)).

III. Petitioner’s habeas claims 

 Petitioner’s federal habeas petition raises the following three grounds for relief: 

(Ground 1) Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to 

self-representation at his 2010 trial. (Doc. 11 at 6-7) 

(Ground 2) Petitioner was entitled to a credit of 248 days of presentence 

incarceration in his 2008 case, and the failure to award it amounts to cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 8-10) 

(Ground 3) Petitioner’s speedy trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 

were violated. 

For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s claims are denied. 

A. Ground One: Petitioner was denied his right to self-representation

 Petitioner argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to selfrepresentation when he moved to represent himself before trial, and the trial court denied 

his motion without providing him a Faretta hearing. (Doc. 11 at 6) He asserts that he was 

deprived of his right to control his own trial strategy, present his own witnesses, or to 

confront witnesses. (Id.) Petitioner argued this claim on direct appeal, which the Arizona 

Court of Appeals denied on the merits in a reasoned opinion. (Doc. 21-2 at 158-162) This 

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Court must decide whether the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was either contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, U.S. Supreme Court law, or was an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the record supported an inference 

that the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for self-representation and for a continuance 

because “it believed [Petitioner’s] request was made simply in an effort to delay the trial. 

The record shows [Petitioner] had requested no fewer than eight previous continuances, 

two of them due to his failure to appear on the previously scheduled first day of trial.” 

(Doc. 21-2 at 160 ¶12) The court of appeals held that in denying Petitioner’s motion to 

represent himself, the trial court had not abused its discretion. That court explained: 

The trial court made several statements on the record indicating the court 

found Appellant’s various requests were aimed at delaying the trial. On 

June 13, the day after the court denied Appellant’s motions to 

represent himself and continue the trial, the court noted it appeared the 

absent Appellant had been “dragging his feet on trial” and that when 

“[h]e was asking for new counsel at the last minute, he was grasping at 

straws,” which is why the court had warned him on June 12 that the 

trial would proceed in his absence if he did not appear. Similarly, on 

the afternoon of June 18, when Appellant failed to appear after the court 

denied his request for a continuance that morning based on his medical 

excuse, the court noted, “[I]t’s clear to this Court that he’s trying to delay 

the trial.” Given the record before us, we conclude the trial court’s denial 

of Appellant’s motion to represent himself on the first day of trial, 

coupled with his motion to continue, was based on the court’s concern 

regarding the further disruption and delay of the trial that would result if 

the motion was granted. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s 

denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion. See McLemore, 230 

Ariz. at 576-77, ¶ 17, 288 P.3d at 780-81. 

(Id. at 162 ¶18. See also Doc. 21-4 at 99, 100, 135) 

 The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right to self-representation 

in criminal proceedings. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Supreme Court 

has instructed, “[a]s the Faretta opinion recognized, the right to self-representation is not 

absolute. The defendant must ‘voluntarily and intelligently’ elect to conduct his own 

defense, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 (1938)), and 

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most courts require him to do so in a timely manner.” Martinez v. Court of App. Of Cal., 

528 U.S. 152, 161-62 (2000) (internal quotation marks and some citations omitted). The 

Court further instructed that “the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and 

efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own 

lawyer.” Id. at 162. 

The Ninth Circuit requires a request for self-representation to be “timely” and not 

“a tactic to secure delay.” Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1985) The 

Ninth Circuit has also noted that “Faretta does not articulate a specific time frame 

pursuant to which a claim for self-representation qualifies as timely. It indicates only that 

a motion for self-representation made ‘weeks before trial’ is timely.” Stenson v. Lambert, 

504 F.3d 873, 884-885 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835). Given the lack of 

a definition for “timeliness” in Faretta, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that “[b]ecause the 

Supreme Court has not clearly established when a Faretta request is untimely, other 

courts are free to do so as long as their standards comport with the Supreme Court’s 

holding that a request ‘weeks before trial’ is timely.” Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058, 

1061 (9th Cir. 2005). In Stenson, the Ninth Circuit further discussed the timeliness limits 

to assertion of a Faretta right: 

We have found that a state court’s denial of a motion made on the morning 

trial began as untimely was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law. See Marshall v. Taylor, 395 

F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has never held that 

Faretta’s “weeks before trial” standard requires courts to grant requests for 

self-representation coming on the eve of trial. The trial court’s 

determination that Stenson’s request to proceed pro se was untimely is not 

objectively unreasonable under AEDPA. 

Stenson, 504 F.3d at 884-885. 

 Petitioner does not argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ holding on his selfrepresentation claim was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Citing the U.S. Supreme Court caselaw, the Ninth Circuit has stated: 

Section 2254(d)(1) provides that a state-court decision may be “contrary” to 

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Supreme Court precedent in two circumstances. First, a state-court decision 

is contrary to Federal law if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite 

to that reached by th[e Supreme] Court on a question of law,” or “the state 

court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant 

Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme 

Court].” Williams [v. Taylor], 529 U.S. [362] at 405 [2000]. Thus, the 

“contrary to” prong requires a direct and irreconcilable conflict with 

Supreme Court precedent.

Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 997 (9th Cir. 2014). In light of Ninth Circuit caselaw 

addressing timeliness of an assertion of the right to self-representation (e.g., Stenson, 

Marshall, and Armant), the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision on the trial court’s ruling 

regarding Petitioner’s motion to represent himself clearly provides no grounds for relief 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision finding the trial court’s denial of 

Petitioner’s motion for self-representation was not an abuse of discretion was based on 

the trial “court’s expressed concern regarding the further disruption and delay of the trial 

that would result if the motion was granted.” (Doc. 21-2 at 162 ¶18) The court of appeals 

relied on the record for the inference that the trial court’s denial was based in part on the 

trial court’s belief that the Petitioner made the motion “in an effort to delay the trial.” (Id.

at 160 ¶12) The court of appeals then discussed portions of the record supporting that 

inference, including: that Petitioner had requested “no fewer than eight previous 

continuances”; Petitioner’s oral motion for new counsel on May 17, 2012 and his failure 

to put the motion in writing as the trial court had ordered; his failure to appear on May 21 

and 22, 2012 for trial; his forging a fraudulent physician’s note on June 18, 2012; and the 

trial court’s statements on the record that it clearly believed Petitioner was attempting to 

delay his trial. (Id. at 160-162) 

 The U.S. Supreme Court instructs that the 

question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state 

court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was 

unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 410 (2000). AEDPA also requires federal habeas courts to 

presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants 

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rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” § 2254(e)(1). 

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007). On the record before this Court, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision to deny Petitioner’s motion for self-representation 

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts pursuant to § 2254(d)(2). 

Although Petitioner argues that he was not attempting to delay his trial, he has not 

rebutted the state court’s factual findings with clear and convincing evidence. 

 B. Ground Two: Denial of additional presentence incarceration credit 

 Under Ground Two, Petitioner argues that his due process rights, equal protection 

rights, and his right to be free from the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment under 

the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution were violated 

when the State did not credit him with an additional 248 days of presentence 

incarceration relating to his 2008 case, as it had done regarding his sentence after trial in 

his 2010 case. This is a state law question that is not a cognizable claim under federal 

habeas review. Petitioner’s appellate counsel did not raise this claim on direct appeal,2

but Petitioner did raise it in his PCR action. (Doc. 21-3 at 55) 

 The calculation of presentence incarceration credit is a state law matter which 

Petitioner cannot transform into a federal claim by citing federal law. See Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“it is not the province of a federal habeas court to 

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions”); Poland v. Stewart, 169 

F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998); A.R.S. § 13–709(B) (stating that “[a]ll time actually spent 

in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such 

offense shall be credited against the term of imprisonment otherwise provided for by this 

chapter.”). On habeas corpus review, the Ninth Circuit has refused to consider state law 

errors in the application of state sentencing law. See Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926, 

928 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting Gray v. Warden of Montana State Prison, 523 F.2d 989, 990 

(9th Cir.1975) (stating that “[t]he origin of the modern concept of pre-conviction jail time 

 

2

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credit upon the term of the ultimate sentence of imprisonment is of legislative grace and 

not a constitutional guarantee.”)); Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002); 

Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Arizona, 462 F.2d 1352, 

1353–54 (9th Cir.1972) (rules of sentencing adopted by state court do not raise 

constitutional issues that may be reached by habeas corpus).

 Even if this claim were cognizable in Petitioner’s habeas action, he procedurally 

defaulted the claim. The trial PCR court noted that Petitioner was “precluded from relief 

under Rule 32.3(a)(3) on the substantive claims because he could have, but failed to, raise 

those claims on direct appeal.” (Doc. 21-3 at 145) Petitioner has failed to establish cause 

and prejudice or actual innocence sufficient to overcome the procedural default of this 

claim. See Section II.A, supra. 

 C. Ground Three: Petitioner’s speedy trial rights 

 Petitioner argues that his speedy trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the State requested, and was granted, a short 

trial continuance in April 2011. (Doc. 11 at 11) Petitioner never raised this claim in state 

court. He failed to exhaust the claim, which was also procedurally defaulted. Petitioner 

argues here that he only recently received minute entries and trial transcripts that 

Petitioner contends show that the trial continuance granted the State was based on an 

improper representation about a witness’s whereabouts. (Doc. 25 at 24) However, even 

assuming he could establish cause for not raising the issue, Petitioner has failed to show 

prejudice. 

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial.” The speedy-trial right is “amorphous,” 

“slippery,” and “necessarily relative.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). In 

Barker, the Court refused to quantify the right or to predicate the right on a defendant’s 

explicit request for a speedy trial. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89–90 (2009). 

Rejecting such “inflexible approaches,” Barker established a “balancing test, in which the 

conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” 407 U.S. at 529-30. 

 Some of the factors that should be weighed when considering such claims include 

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the length of and reasons for delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the 

prejudice to the defendant from the delay. Brillon, 556 U.S. at 89–90; Barker, 407 U.S. at 

530. To trigger a speedy trial inquiry, an accused must show that the period between 

indictment and trial passes a threshold point of “presumptively prejudicial” delay. See, 

e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Prejudice normally is presumed if the delay in bringing the 

defendant to trial has exceeded one year. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1 

(1992). If this threshold is not met, the Court need not proceed with the other Barker

factors. Id. at 651–52. Deliberate delay “to hamper the defense” weighs heavily against 

the prosecution. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “[M]ore neutral reason[s] such as negligence or 

overcrowded courts” weigh less heavily “but nevertheless should be considered since the 

ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than 

with the defendant.” Id. Because defense counsel is defendant’s agent, delay caused by 

the defendant’s counsel is charged against the defendant. See Brillon, 556 U.S. at 90–91. 

This rule applies even where counsel is assigned. Id. at 94. 

 Almost all of the delay resulting in the presumptively prejudicial delay between 

Petitioner’s indictment and trial was attributable to Petitioner and his defense. See 

discussion in Section I.A, above. Accordingly, even if the Court assumed as true 

Petitioner’s reason for not raising this claim in state court, Petitioner cannot succeed in 

establishing prejudice. Petitioner does not argue, and the facts would not support, a 

finding that the 40-day delay occasioned by the State’s request for a continuance infected 

his trial with constitutional error. Moreover, applying the Barker balancing test, 

Petitioner would fail on the merits of a speedy trial violation claim, because nearly all of 

the trial delay was attributable to him. Further, Petitioner has not argued and otherwise 

fails to establish actual innocence to excuse his procedural default. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Thomas Glenn Morgan’s Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 11) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be

denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists 

of reason would not find the ruling debatable. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the 

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 15th day of December, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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