Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-01541/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-01541-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLEN R. BASE,

Plaintiff,

v.

FCA US LLC,

Defendant

JOSE VALENZUELA DE LEON et al.

v.

FCA US LLC,

Defendant

KRISTI M. OBRIEN et al.

v.

FCA US LLC,

Defendant

JESUS BOYZO et al.

v.

FCA US LLC,

Defendant

ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

MOTIONS AND MOTIONS TO 

EXCLUDE

Case No. 17-cv-01532-JCS 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 74, 75

Related Case No. 17-cv-1541-JCS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 72, 73

Related Case No. 17-cv-04042-JCS

Re: Dkt. 60, 62

Related Case No. 17-cv-04154-JCS

Dkt. Nos. 57, 58

Case 3:17-cv-01541-JCS Document 79 Filed 03/11/19 Page 1 of 23
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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs in these related cases1purchased vehicles from FCA USA LLC (“FCA) that were 

factory-equipped with a Totally Integrated Power Module known as the TIPM-7. Plaintiffs allege 

that this component was defective and that at the time they purchased their vehicles FCA knew 

that it was defective but failed to disclose that information to them. Plaintiffs further contend FCA 

failed to promptly offer to repurchase their vehicles after it became apparent that the vehicles were 

defective. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs in all of the related cases assert claims for breach 

of express and implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the SongBeverly Act”) and for fraudulent inducement. FCA brings motions for summary judgment and to 

exclude expert testimony in each of the related cases, which are presently before the Court. A 

hearing on the motions was held on March 8, 2019.2 

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Complaints

Between 2012 and 2014, Plaintiffs purchased new vehicles from FCA that were factory 

equipped with the TIPM-7. See Base Complaint ¶¶ 9, 12 (alleging that Plaintiff Galen Base 

purchased a 2012 Dodge Ram 2500 on December 16, 2012 and that it was equipped with the

TIPM-7); Valenzuela Complaint ¶¶ 9, 11 (alleging that Plaintiffs Jose Valenzuela de Leon and 

Jessica Fuentes Valenzuela purchased a 2014 Jeep Wrangler on September 20, 2014 and that it 

was equipped with the TIPM-7); O’Brien Complaint ¶¶ 8, 11 (alleging that Plaintiffs Kristi M. 

O’Brien and John D. O’Brien purchased a 2012 Jeep Grand Cherokee on January 29, 2012 and 

that it was equipped with the TIPM-7); Boyzo Complaint ¶¶ 9, 12 (alleging that Jesus and Maria 

Boyzo purchased a new 2013 Dodge Grand Caravan on March 6, 2013 and that it was equipped 

with the TIPM-7). Plaintiffs allege that the vehicles they purchased had serious defects associated 

 

1 Case No. 17-cv-4294 JCS, Perez v. FCA US LLC, and Case No. 17-cv-1458 JCS, Bratton v. FCA 

US LLC, are related to the cases listed in the caption of this Order but have settled. In this Order, 

references to “the related cases” refer only to the four cases listed in the caption, that is, Case No. 

17-cv-1532 JCS, Base v. FCA US LLC (“Base”), Case No. 17-cv-1541 JCS, Valenzuela de Leon v. 

FCA US LLC (“Valenzuela”), Case No. 17-cv-4042 JCS, O’Brien v. FCA US LLC (“O’Brien”) 

and Case No. 17-4154 JCS, Boyzo v. FCA US LLC (“Boyzo”).

2 All of the parties in the related cases have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned 

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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with the TIPM-7, which was itself defective, and that they experienced a series of problems with

their vehicles, requiring them to take the vehicles in for repair on numerous occasions. Base 

Complaint ¶¶ 10, 15, 96-98 (alleging that Plaintiff’s vehicle was defective because of theTIPM-7 

and had issues with the check engine light and “numerous recalls,” and describing repair history); 

Valenzuela Complaint ¶¶ 14, 15, 95-97 (alleging that Plaintiffs’ vehicle was defective because of 

the TIPM-7 and had issues with “non-starting” and irregular transmission shifts and describing 

repair history); O’Brien Complaint ¶¶ 10, 14, 15, 95-99 (alleging that Plaintiffs’ vehicle was 

defective because of the TIPM-7 and had issues with irregular transmission shifts, extended crank 

times with no start and multiple recalls due to TIPM failures and describing repair history ); 

Boyzo Complaint ¶¶ 10, 15, 16, 96-98 (alleging that Plaintiffs’ vehicle was defective because of 

the TIPM-7 and had issues with irregular engine noises, leaks, and forward jerking while driving 

and describing repair history). 

Plaintiffs allege that FCA has been aware since at least 2007 that the TIPM-7 was 

defective, pointing to a series of recalls, internal technical service bulletins and consumer 

complaints related to problems caused by the TIPM-7. See Base Complaint ¶¶ 19-90; Valenzuela

Complaint ¶¶ 18-89; O’Brien Complaint ¶¶ 18-89; Boyzo Complaint ¶¶ 19-89. They further 

allege that FCA did not disclose the TIPM-7 defects to them, or instruct dealers to disclose the 

defects to drivers or potential purchasers of vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7, either before they 

purchased their vehicles or after. See Base Complaint ¶¶ 91-95; Valenzuela Complaint ¶¶ 90-94; 

O’Brien Complaint ¶¶ 90-94; Boyzo Complaint ¶¶ 91-95.

In all of the related cases, Plaintiffs assert three claims. In Claim One, they assert a claim 

for breach of express warranties in violation of the Song-Beverly Act. This claim is based on 

allegations that: 1) the vehicles were delivered with serious defects and nonconformities; 2) the 

defects manifested themselves within the warranty period; 3) FCA was unable to conform the 

vehicles to its express warranties after a reasonable number of repair attempts; and 4) FCA did not 

promptly replace the vehicles with new vehicles or make restitution, as is required under the SongBeverly Act. On this claim, Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to reimbursement of the price paid 

for the vehicles less the amount directly attributable to use by Plaintiffs prior to discovery of the 

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nonconformities, as well as consequential damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. They also seek

an award of a civil penalty under the Song-Beverly Act of up to two times the amount of actual 

damages on the basis that FCA willfully failed to comply with its obligations under the SongBeverly Act.

In Claim Two, Plaintiffs assert a claim for breach of implied warranties in violation of the 

Song-Beverly Act on the basis that the vehicles were subject to an implied warranty that they were

merchantable under California Civil Code section 1792. According to Plaintiffs, FCA breached 

this implied warranty by selling them vehicles that were not fit for the ordinary purpose for which 

such goods are used and which did not measure up to the promises or facts stated on the label 

because they were equipped with the defective TIPM-7. They allege that they are entitled to 

revoke acceptance of their vehicles, to rescission of the contract of sale pursuant to California 

Civil Code section 1794 and California Commercial Code section 2711, and to an award of “cover 

damages” and consequential damages.

In Claim Three, Plaintiffs assert a claim for fraudulent inducement/concealment based on 

allegations that FCA intentionally concealed a known defect from Plaintiffs when it sold them 

vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7. Plaintiffs further allege in support of this claim that FCA 

continues to conceal material information about the defects of the TIPM-7. Plaintiffs also allege 

that they relied on FCA’s silence about the TPM-7 defects and that they could not have discovered 

them themselves because FCA kept testing information about the TIPM-7 confidential. On this 

claim, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages.

B. The Expert Reports

In each of the related cases, Plaintiffs have designated as expert witnesses Mr. Thomas 

Lepper and Dr. Barbara Luna, who have provided experts reports. According to his Curriculum 

Vitae, Mr. Lepper is a forensic automotive consultant. See Boyzo, Docket No. 58-2 at ECF p. 21 

(Lepper CV). Dr. Luna specializes in forensic accounting. See Boyzo Docket No. 58-4 at ECF p. 

3. As discussed further below, Mr. Lepper reviewed the repair records of Plaintiffs’ vehicles (and 

in some cases inspected the vehicles), summarized the repair history of the vehicles, and expressed 

opinions about: 1) the impact the problems Plaintiffs experienced with their vehicles had on the 

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value of the vehicles; and 2) the connection between those problems and the TIPM-7 component 

in their vehicles. Dr. Luna addressed FCA’s awareness of the TIPM-7 defects, although she did 

not express any opinions on the questions of whether the TIPM-7 was defective or caused the 

problems Plaintiffs experienced with their vehicles, instead deferring to Mr. Lepper on those 

questions. 

C. The Pending Motions

1. The Summary Judgment Motions

FCA seeks partial summary judgment in the related cases on two primary grounds. First, 

FCA argues that Claim Three, for fraudulent inducement/concealment, should be dismissed 

because Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that FCA intentionally concealed a known defect in 

the TIPM in Plaintiffs’ vehicles. According to FCA, in response to written discovery asking 

Plaintiffs to identify facts and produce documents supporting Claim Three, Plaintiffs failed to 

articulate any specific facts or identify or produce any documents showing that FCA had 

knowledge that the TIPM-7 component in Plaintiffs’ vehicles were defective, either before or after 

Plaintiffs purchased their vehicles. FCA also asserts that neither the deposition testimony nor the 

opinions of Mr. Lepper are sufficient to create a fact issue as to whether the problems Plaintiffs 

had with their vehicles were caused by the TIPM-7. On the other hand, FCA points to opinions 

offered by its own expert, Stan Gozzi, that these problems were not related to the TIPM-7 

component in their vehicles. Neither do the opinions of Plaintiffs’ fraud expert, Dr. Luna, fill this 

gap, FCA asserts, because Dr. Luna relies on Mr. Lepper on the question of whether the TIPM-7 

caused the problems with Plaintiffs’ vehicles. Because there is no evidence to support Claim 

Three, FCA asserts, the Court should grant summary judgment on that claim in favor of FCA and 

should also grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages because such 

damages are sought only under Claim Three.3 

Second, in Base, Valenzuela and Boyzo,

4 FCA argues that because it offered to pay 

 

3 At oral argument Plaintiffs stipulated that their request for punitive damages is based solely on 

Claim Three.

4

In O’Brien, an inspection of the vehicle had not yet occurred at the time of the motion deadline 

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restitution to Plaintiffs soon after they filed their lawsuits, any violation of the Song-Beverly Act 

based on breach of express warranties cannot be willful, and therefore, Plaintiffs cannot recover a 

civil penalty on Claim One under California Civil Code section 1794(c). FCA notes that although 

a civil penalty may be awarded without willful conduct where a manufacturer does not “maintain[]

a qualified third-party dispute resolution process which substantially complies with [Cal. Civ. 

Code] Section 1793.22,” Plaintiffs did not assert claims for civil penalties on that theory in their 

complaints and therefore cannot assert such a claim in the related cases. 

In response, Plaintiffs argue with respect to Claim Three that there is evidence of 

intentional concealment of the TIPM defect in FCA’s own document production and that Plaintiffs 

were not required to disclose information in their discovery responses that FCA already possessed. 

In their Opposition briefs, Plaintiffs do not point to any specific documents or testimony to show 

that there is a genuine issue of material fact on this claim, asserting that FCA does not seriously 

dispute that FCA concealed a known defect with the TIPM. Plaintiffs also assert that the opinions 

of Dr. Luna and Mr. Lepper are sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact and therefore to 

preclude summary judgment on the fraudulent inducement claim.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ request for a civil penalty under the Song-Beverly Act, Plaintiffs 

do not challenge FCA’s assertion that they must demonstrate willfulness to recover such a penalty,

stipulating at oral argument that they did not seek civil penalties under section 1794(c) in their 

complaints and therefore they have waived any claim to civil penalties under that section. They 

contend, however, there is sufficient evidence of willfulness to create a genuine dispute of material 

fact in all of the related cases. Plaintiffs also argue that FCA is prohibited from relying upon a 

Rule 68 Settlement offer to obtain summary judgment in its favor under Rule 408(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence.

2. The Motions to Exclude

In the Motions to Exclude, FCA seeks to exclude under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 

 

and no offer of restitution or replacement had been made. Therefore, FCA does not seek summary 

judgment on this basis in the O’Brien case.

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Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) any opinion by Mr. 

Lepper that the issues involving Plaintiffs’ vehicles were related to the TIPM-7 in the vehicles and 

that the TIPM-7 in Plaintiffs’ vehicles were defective.5 They assert that Mr. Lepper has no 

experience or expertise with TIPMs generally and that he offered no basis or methodology for his 

opinions that any of the problems or repairs on the vehicles were related to a defect in the TIPM-7. 

FCA also asks the Court to exclude the opinions of Dr. Luna because she has no knowledge or 

understanding of TIPMs and does not know if any of the repair issues experienced by Plaintiffs 

were related to the TIPM-7 in those vehicles. FCA argues that even if the Court does not exclude 

these opinions under Rule 702 and Daubert, it should exclude them under Rule 403 of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence on the basis that they are more confusing, misleading and prejudicial than they 

are probative.

III. THE MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE

A. Legal Standards Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert

Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness may offer expert testimony if 

the following requirements are met:

a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier 

of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. In determining whether expert testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702, 

courts follow the approach set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., in which the 

Supreme Court described the relevant inquiry as follows:

Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial 

judge must determine . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to 

(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to 

understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary 

assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 

 

5 FCA stipulated at oral argument that it does not seek to exclude Mr. Lepper’s opinions about the 

repair history of the vehicles and the impact of the problems Plaintiffs experienced with their 

vehicles on the value of the vehicles so long as those opinions do not concern the TIPM-7 as the 

cause of the problems with Plaintiffs’ vehicles.

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testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 

methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.

509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 

With respect to the first requirement, that an expert must testify to “scientific knowledge,” 

the Court in Daubert explained that “[t]he adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the 

methods and procedures of science . . . [while] the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than 

subjective belief or unsupported speculation . . . [and] ‘applies to any body of known facts or to 

any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.’” Id. (quoting 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986)). The Court declined to set forth a 

definitive test but offered some “general observations” about the types of factors that might be 

considered in determining whether this requirement is met. Id. at 593. These include: 1) whether 

the methodology can be or has been tested; 2) whether the theory and technique has been 

subjected to peer review; 3) if a “particular scientific technique” is involved, the known or 

potential rate of error; and 4) the degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific community. 

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.

The Ninth Circuit has noted that the “scientific knowledge” requirement is usually met by 

“[e]stablishing that an expert’s proffered testimony grows out of pre-litigation research or that the 

expert’s research has been subjected to peer review.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 

Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Daubert II”). However, when such evidence is not 

available, the proponent’s experts may satisfy this requirement by “explain[ing] precisely how 

they went about reaching their conclusions and point[ing] to some objective source – a learned 

treatise, the policy statement of a professional association, a published article in a reputable

scientific journal or the like – to show that they have followed the scientific method, as it is 

practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in their field.” Id. at 1319.

The second requirement under Rule 702, that expert testimony must “assist the trier of fact 

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” “goes primarily to relevance.” Id. at 

591. This is a question of “fit,” and “is not always obvious.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. The 

Court cautioned that “scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for 

other, unrelated purposes.” Id. To meet this requirement there must be “a valid scientific 

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connection to the pertinent inquiry.” Id. In other words, the expert testimony must “logically 

advance[ ] a material aspect of the proposing party’s case.” Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315. This 

requirement is more stringent than the relevancy requirement of Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence, “reflecting the special dangers inherent in scientific expert testimony.” Jones v. U.S., 

933 F. Supp. 894, 900 (N.D. Cal., 1996) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 

1321 n. 17). In particular, expert testimony “‘can be both powerful and quite misleading because 

of the difficulty in evaluating it.’” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted)).

“Therefore, a federal judge should exclude scientific expert testimony under the second prong of 

the Daubert standard unless he is ‘convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in 

dispute in the case.’” Id. (quoting Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321 n. 17).

B. The Opinions of Mr. Lepper

FCA challenges Mr. Lepper’s opinions about the TIPM-7 component in Plaintiffs’ vehicles 

on two grounds: 1) Mr. Lepper does not have specific expertise in TIPMs; and 2) his opinions are 

unreliable and speculative. Based on the experience reflected in Mr. Lepper’s CV, the Court finds 

that Mr. Lepper is sufficiently qualified to offer expert opinions about the causes of the problems 

Plaintiffs experienced with their vehicles, including whether they were caused by defects 

associated with the TIPM-7. On the other hand, as to the Base, Valenzuela and Boyzo cases, Mr. 

Lepper’s opinions about the TIPM-7 in Plaintiffs’ vehicles and their connection to the problems 

Plaintiffs experienced are conclusory and speculative and are not based on any reliable 

methodology. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motions to exclude as to the opinions of Mr. 

Lepper on the question of whether the TIPM-7 caused the problems Plaintiffs had with their 

vehicles in those cases. 

1. Base

In Base, Mr. Lepper’s expert report begins with the following description of the 

assignment Plaintiffs asked Mr. Lepper to perform: 

We were assigned to review documentation followed by an inspection 

[of] photographs involving Galen R. Base’s . . . 2012 Dodge Ram 

2500 . . . and determine if the repairs performed as described in the 

supplied repair orders and observed in the physical inspection indicate 

ongoing manufacturing defects that could substantially impair the 

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value, use or safety of the vehicle prior to its purchase on December 

16, 2012.

Shepardson Decl. (Base Motion to Exclude), Ex. 1 (Lepper Expert Report (Base)) at 3.

6

 From this 

description, it is not clear that Plaintiffs even asked Mr. Lepper to consider whether the repairs on 

their vehicle were related to the TIPM-7 installed in it. 

Nor did Mr. Lepper express any clear opinions on that question in his report. Rather, the 

three-paragraph “Conclusions” section that follows his description of the assignment makes only a 

cryptic statement about the possible role of the TIPM-7. The “Conclusions” are reproduced in 

their entirety below:

A continuous safety and emissions problem associated with the 

subject 2012 Dodge Ram 2500 was documented repeatedly 

throughout Galen Base’s ownership of the vehicle. An electrical 

problem within the Oxygen sensor system and other issues were 

addressed on multiple visits to various FCA dealers.

The Oxygen sensor system displayed faults that were brought to the 

attention of the FCA dealership and verified by the dealerships. The 

attempted repair services performed by the dealerships were 

ineffective in resolving this issue.

The power flowing through the Oxygen sensor system is controlled by 

the Totally Integrated Power Mode (TIPM), which is the distribution 

box for nearly the entire electrical system within the subject vehicle. 

The inability of the various FCA dealers, with and without the 

assistance of Fiat Chrysler (FCA), STAR, and Cummins indicates that 

the power supply from the TIPM has been, and still is, a complex 

electrical problem.

Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). Similarly, the declaration of Mr. Lepper supplied in support of 

Plaintiff Base’s opposition brief, see Case No. C-17-1532, Docket No. 76-1, does not state that 

TIPM-7 caused the problems Plaintiff Base experienced with his vehicle.

Further, to the extent Mr. Lepper’s vague statement about the TIPM in his report can even 

be construed as an opinion that the TIPM-7 in Plaintiff’s vehicle caused the problems he 

experienced with it, that opinion is supported by no specific facts linking the repairs that were 

performed on Plaintiff’s vehicle to the TIPM-7. Rather, the brief opinions offered by Mr. Lepper 

 

6 Although Mr. Lepper’s sentence, as written in the report, is ambiguous, the Court has inserted 

the word “of” based on Mr. Lepper’s description of the inspection, see Shepardson Decl. (Base 

Motion to Exclude), Ex. 1 (Lepper Expert Report (Base)) at 49-50, indicating that Mr. Lepper’s 

inspection involved only a review of photographs that had been taken of the vehicle and that he 

did not conduct the inspection himself. 

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for each repair make no mention of the TIPM-7; nor do they address the underlying causes of the 

problems that required repair. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“The is [sic] the first water leak repair. Water 

leaking into the cab can cause many problems such as corrosion and possible short-circuits in the 

wiring harness and enhancement of conditions conductive [sic] to the formation of mold.”); 8 

(“The is [sic] the first Oxygen sensor repair. When the P2271 code has set, the emissions might 

not meet either Federal emission standards or California Air Resources Board Standards”); 9 

(“The [sic] could be the second Oxygen sensor problem. When the Check Engine Light is ON, the 

emissions might not meet either Federal emission standards or California Air Resources Board 

Standards.”).

Likewise, Plaintiff Base has pointed to no deposition testimony by Mr. Lepper that 

explains how he reached his conclusions with respect to the TIPM-7 in Plaintiff’s vehicle. To the 

contrary, at his deposition Mr. Lepper acknowledged that the oxygen sensor problems with 

Plaintiff Base’s vehicle could have been related to the power supply but might, in the alternative, 

have been the result of bad oxygen sensors, poor repair work or “programming reasons.” 

Shepardson Decl. (Base Motion to Exclude), Ex. 2 (Lepper Dep.) at 32. Mr. Lepper opined that 

these possibilities “should have been investigated” but did not testify that it was more likely than 

not that the oxygen sensor problem was caused by the power supply. Id. He testified further that 

a test could have been performed to test the amperage and volts that were being supplied to the 

oxygen sensor controller and to each oxygen sensor to see if there was a “common cause” for the 

repeated problems with the oxygen sensor, but that neither he nor anyone else performed that test. 

Id. 

In light of the vague nature of Mr. Lepper’s statement about the TIPM in his report and the 

absence of specific facts supporting that statement in the record, the Court finds that Mr. Lepper’s 

opinions linking the TIPM-7 to the problems with Plaintiff’s vehicle do not meet the “scientific 

knowledge” requirement of Daubert. In particular, in the absence of any explanation of how Mr. 

Lepper reached his conclusion, it is not clear that it is the product of reliable principles and 

methods, as is required under Daubert. Nor is does the Court find persuasive Plaintiffs’ assertion

in their Opposition brief that Mr. Lepper’s methodology is reliable because he has done what all 

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“lemon law experts” do, namely, review the repair records for the vehicle, documents about 

“known issues in the same (or similar) model vehicle or its components,” and the report of the 

opposing expert and “filter[ ] all that information through the lens of automotive knowledge and 

experience to arrive at an opinion that is grounded on factual data.” Opposition at 8. This 

argument suggests that so long as an individual has sufficient expertise to address an issue it is 

permissible to offer ultimate conclusions on that subject without offering any explanation of how 

the expert’s opinions were reached or the methodology that was used. That is not the law. 

Accordingly, Mr. Lepper may not offer any testimony in the Base case on the question of whether 

the TIPM-7 in Plaintiff’s vehicle was the cause of the problems he experienced with the vehicle.

2. Valenzuela

In Valenzuela, Mr. Lepper was asked to review the repair history of Plaintiffs’ vehicle to 

“determine if the repairs performed as described in the supplied repair orders indicate an ongoing 

manufacturing defect involving the Totally Integrated Power Modul (TIPM) that could 

substantially impair the value, use, or safety of the vehicle prior to its purchase on September 20, 

2014.” Shepardson Decl. (Valenzuela Motion to Exclude), Ex. 1 (Lepper Expert Report 

(Valenzuela)) at 3. Mr. Lepper’s conclusions in the Valenzuela case are as follows:

A review of the supplied documentation indicates that the 2014 Jeep 

Wrangler Unlimited, was hampered by various electrical based 

malfunctions due to the unsteady supply of power through the Totally 

Integrated Power Module (TIPM) to the various electrical systems in 

the vehicle. The number of repairs and the repeated repairs brings into 

clear vision how untrustworthy and dangerous the Fiat/Chrysler 

TIPM is in everyday driving situations.

Most of the electrical power in the 2014 Jeep Wrangler Unlimited is 

controlled through the TIPM, which is the power distribution box for 

nearly the entire electrical system within the subject vehicle. The 

inability of San Leandro Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, with and without 

the assistance of Fiat Chrysler (FCA) and STAR, indicates that the 

TIPM has been, and still is a complex and dangerous electrical 

problem.

While this vehicle was not subject to the TIPM Recalls, the problems 

exhibited indicate that the TIPM in this vehicle should have been 

diagnosed, examined or replaced.

Id. at 3-4.

While somewhat more definite than the statements in Base discussed above, the 

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conclusions offered by Mr. Lepper in Valenzuela are, nonetheless, extremely vague with respect to 

whether the TIPM-7 in Plaintiffs’ vehicle actually caused the specific problems that they 

experienced. The declaration of Mr. Lepper offered in support of the Valenzuela Plaintiffs’ 

opposition brief also does not state that it is more likely than not that the TIPM-7 in their vehicle 

caused the problems they experienced. See Case No. C-17-1541, Docket No. 74-1. Moreover, the 

only further opinion Mr. Lepper supplied on this question in his report was that problems with 

“hard starting” “could be traced to the unsteady power supply through the TIPM.” Id. at 6, 18 

(emphasis added). Similarly, he opined in his deposition only that the problems the Valenzuelas 

experienced with their vehicle “could be” caused by the TIPM. See Shepardson Decl. (Valenzuela 

Motion to Exclude), Ex. 2 (Lepper Dep.) at 41. He also testified that he had “developed a theory” 

of what would cause the problems the Valenzuelas experienced but conceded that he had 

performed no tests to determine the cause of the problems. Id. at 25. Nor did Mr. Lepper provide 

details about his “theory” showing that it satisfied the requirements of Daubert and Rule 702 of 

the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

As in Base, Mr. Lepper has offered no explanation in Valenzuela of how he reached his 

conclusion and as a consequence, it is impossible to determine whether his opinions are the result 

of reliable methods and principles. Furthermore, to the extent that the opinion Mr. Lepper 

expresses is only that a link between the TIPM-7 and Plaintiffs’ vehicle is a possibility, that 

testimony would not does not satisfy the “fit” requirement of Daubert because expert opinion 

must “logically advance[ ] a material aspect of the proposing party’s case” and testimony that the 

TIPM-7 might cause the problems Plaintiffs experienced will not do that. Consequently, Mr. 

Lepper’s opinion that the TIPM-7 caused the problems with Plaintiffs’ vehicle does not meet the 

requirements of Daubert. 

3. Boyzo

In Boyzo, Mr. Lepper’s description of his assignment is virtually identical to the 

description in Base, with no express reference to the TIPM-7 or whether that component caused 

the problems the Boyzos had with their vehicle. Shepardson Decl. (Boyzo Motion to Exclude), 

Ex. 1 (Lepper Expert Report (Boyzo)) at 3. The “Conclusions” state that Plaintiffs’ vehicle “could 

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have been hampered by electrical based malfunctions caused by the Totally Integrated Power 

Mode [sic] (TIPM) unsteady supply of power to the electrical system of the automatic 

transmission.” Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Lepper goes on to opine:

Most of the electrical power is controlled by the Totally Integrated 

Power Mode [sic] (TlPM), which is the electrical distribution unit for 

nearly the entire electrical system within the subject vehicle. The 

inability of Normandin Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram, with and without 

the assistance of Fiat Chrysler (FCA) and STAR, indicates that the 

vehicle has been, and still presents complex electrical problems.

Id. at 4. In Boyzo, as in Base and Valenzuela, Mr. Lepper’s conclusion is vague and to the extent 

he even finds that the TIPM-7 caused the problems the Boyzo Plaintiffs experienced, he offers no 

supporting facts or explanation of how he arrived at his conclusion in his report. And as in Base 

and Valenzuela, neither his deposition testimony nor his opposition declaration fills in these gaps. 

In the Boyzo deposition, as in the other cases, Mr. Lepper testified only that the transmission 

problems the Boyzos experienced with their vehicle “could” have been caused by the power 

supply. Shepardson Decl. (Boyzo), Ex. 2 (Lepper Dep.) at 43. Mr. Lepper’s opposition 

declaration also does not state that the TIPM-7 in the Boyzo’s vehicle caused the problems they 

experienced with it. See Case No. C-17-4154, Docket No. 59-1.

The Court finds that in Boyzo, as in Valenzuela and Base, Mr. Lepper’s opinions linking 

the TIPM-7 to the problems Plaintiffs experienced do not satisfy Daubert and Rule 702 of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence. There is nothing in his report showing that his opinions are the result 

of reliable principles and methods. Moreover, the opinions will not assist the jury as Mr. Lepper 

only opines that the TIPM-7 might have the problems Plaintiffs experienced.

4. O’Brien

In this case, FCA brings a motion to exclude even though Mr. Lepper has not yet 

produced an expert report or been deposed. The deadline for expert disclosures, including expert 

reports, in all of the related cases was November 19, 2018. See Case No. 17-4042, Docket No. 57. 

The close of expert discovery was December 28, 2019. These deadlines were set to allow 

sufficient time to conduct motion practice, including Daubert motions, before the scheduled trials. 

The first of these trials is in the O’Brien case and is set to commence on May 28, 2019. Under 

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Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the O’Brien Plaintiffs were required 

to produce an expert report that included, among other things, “a complete statement of all 

opinions [Mr. Lepper] will express and the basis and reasons for them” and “the facts or data 

considered by [Mr. Lepper] in forming [these opinions.]” As the deadline has now passed and 

Plaintiffs have not asked for or been granted an extension of the expert discovery deadlines in the 

case, Mr. Lepper may not offer any opinions in the O’Brien case. Therefore, the Motion to 

Exclude in O’Brien is GRANTED and Mr. Lepper will not be permitted to testify as an expert in 

that case.

C. The Opinions of Dr. Luna

In all of the related cases, Dr. Luna offers opinions about whether FCA concealed known 

defects with the TIPM. However, she deferred to Mr. Lepper on the question of whether the 

TIPM-7 is defective and whether the TIPM-7 in Plaintiffs’ vehicles did, in fact, cause the 

problems they experienced. Because the Court finds that Mr. Lepper’s opinions on that subject do 

not pass muster, the report of Dr. Luna also must be excluded under Daubert because the premise 

of Dr. Luna’s reports in all of the related cases is that the TIPM-7 was the cause of the problems 

Plaintiffs experienced. Without a reliable basis for that assumption, her opinions that FCA 

concealed information related to Plaintiffs’ vehicles is also unreliable. Therefore, the motions to 

exclude are GRANTED as to the opinions of Dr. Luna.

IV. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

A. Legal Standard Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of 

persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has 

made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to designate 

“specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. On summary judgment, the court 

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draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

378 (2007). Neither conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits nor arguments in moving 

papers are sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill 

Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). A party need not present 

evidence to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment in a form that would be admissible 

at trial, but the contents of the parties’ evidence must be amenable to presentation in an admissible 

form. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036−37 (9th Cir. 2003). 

B. Whether FCA is entitled to Summary Judgment on Claim Three 

One of the elements for fraud and deceit based on concealment is that the defendant must 

have intentionally concealed or suppressed a material fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff. 

See Moncada v. W. Coast Quartz Corp., 221 Cal. App. 4th 768, 775 (2013) (quoting Marketing 

West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp., 6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612-613 (1992)). FCA contends 

Claim Three, for fraudulent inducement/concealment should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have 

not demonstrated that there is a material dispute of fact on the question of whether FCA 

intentionally concealed facts from Plaintiffs with the intent to defraud them. The Court agrees. 

In order to survive summary judgment on the question of whether FCA intentionally 

concealed a material fact with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs must point to evidence that 

FCA knew that the TIPM-7 component in Plaintiffs’ vehicles was defective. FCA has introduced 

the testimony of its own expert, Stan Gozzi, that “TIPMs are specific to each Chrysler vehicle” 

and “[t]here is no defect common to all TIPMs in all vehicles manufactured by [FCA].” Gozzi 

Decl. (Boyzo) ¶ 6; see also Gozzi Decl. (O’Brien) ¶¶ 5-6 (explaining that TIPM is specific to each 

make and model of Chrysler vehicle because it “must be configured to match the electrical 

components of the vehicle” and the software in it must be configured to the software of the make 

and model of the vehicle and the options specific to the vehicle; also explaining that the location 

of the TIPM in the engine department varies between Chrysler vehicles and that the TIPM must be 

specially designed for the location); Gozzi Decl. (Valenzuela) ¶¶ 4, 6 (same); Gozzi Decl. (Base)

¶¶ 4, 6 (same). Plaintiffs do not point to any evidence or testimony to the contrary. Consequently, 

Plaintiffs cannot rely on evidence that TIPMs in other Chrysler vehicles were defective to show 

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that the TIPM-7 in their own vehicles caused the problems they experienced. Rather, they must 

point to evidence sufficient to create a question for the jury that the TIPM-7 in their particular 

vehicles were defective. They have not done so.

Plaintiffs do not point to any specific documents showing that FCA knew the TIPM-7 in 

their vehicles was defective. Rather, they contend Mr. Lepper’s expert testimony is sufficient to 

demonstrate that there is a material issue of fact. This argument fails because Mr. Lepper’s expert 

opinions do not satisfy Daubert and Rule 702 for the reasons discussed above. Accordingly, the 

Court concludes that FCA is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Claim Three in all of 

the related cases. The Court dismisses Claim Three with prejudice and grants summary judgment 

in FCA’s favor with respect to the request for punitive damages.

C. Whether FCA is entitled to Summary Judgment on the Request for a Civil 

Penalty on Claim One

Plaintiffs seek civil penalties under Cal. Civ. Code section 1794(c), which provides for 

civil penalties for consumers of goods who were damaged by the manufacturer’s failure to comply 

with any obligation under the Song-Beverly Act, or under an implied or express warranty. Cal. 

Civ. Code § 1794(a). In order to collect civil penalties under subsection (c), the buyer must 

establish that the defendant’s failure to comply with the Act was willful. 

Plaintiffs allege that FCA willfully failed to comply with Cal. Civ. Code section 

1793.2(d)(2), which provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the manufacturer or its representative . . . 

is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle . . . to conform to the applicable express 

warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace 

the new motor vehicle . . . or promptly make restitution to the buyer . . . .” FCA, however, asserts 

in Base, Boyzo and Valenzuela that as a matter of law, its conduct was not willful because in all 

three cases it offered to repurchase the vehicles soon after litigation commenced. Defendants rely 

on Hatami v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., No. 08-0226, 2009 WL 1396358 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2009) 

and Dominguez v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 160 Cal. App. 4th 53, 60 (2008). For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court finds that there are questions of fact in Base that preclude summary 

judgment as to the availability of a civil penalty under section 1794(c) but that in Boyzo and 

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Valenzuela Plaintiffs have not established a material issue of fact.

7

As a general rule, whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car 

or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury. Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 90

Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1104 (2001) (citing Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc., 35 Cal.App.4th 

112, 134-136 (1995)). To establish that a violation of the Song-Beverly Act was willful, a 

plaintiff is not required to establish “blame, malice or moral delinquency.” Schreidel v. Am. 

Honda Motor Co., 34 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1250 (1995) (citing Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co., 214 

Cal. App. 3d 878, 894 (1989)). Further, the standard “does not require the plaintiff to prove the 

defendant actually knew of its obligation to refund or replace” a vehicle when attempts to repair 

the vehicle have failed as manufacturers are required to maintain service and repair facilities in the 

state and are therefore “capable of knowing every failed repair attempt by reading the dealer’s 

service records.” Robinson v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., No. 10-3187, 2011 WL 1459016, at *5 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 15, 2011) (citing Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 23 Cal. App. 4th 174, 185 

(1994)). In addition to the repair history of the vehicle, policies on the part of a manufacturer that 

are inconsistent with its obligation under the Song-Beverly Act to promptly repair and replace 

after a reasonable number of repair attempts have failed may also support a finding of willfulness. 

See Oregel, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 1105. “However, ‘a violation is not willful if the defendant’s 

failure to replace or refund was the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts imposing 

the statutory obligation were not present.’” Schreidel, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 1250 (quoting Kwan, 23 

Cal. App. 4th at 185). 

Although willfulness is usually a factual question for the jury, in Hatami and Dominguez, 

cited by FCA, the courts granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturers with respect to 

civil penalties under section 1794(c) on the basis that there was no evidence that the manufacturers 

had acted willfully. In Hatami, the court granted summary judgment in favor of a manufacturer on 

 

7 The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that FCA is barred under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence from introducing evidence of its offers to repurchase Plaintiffs’ vehicles. Rule 408 

prohibits parties from introducing offers of compromise to prove or disprove the validity of a 

claim but makes an exception for evidence offered for another purpose, including “negating a 

contention of undue delay.” Fed. R. Evid. 408. As FCA introduces evidence of its offers to pay 

restitution to show that it acted “promptly” that exception applies here.

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a claim for civil penalties under section 1794(c) where the owner of the vehicle alleged that he 

made five attempts to have his vehicle repaired during the warranty period and then demanded, 

through counsel, that the defendant replace the vehicle. Hatami, 2009 WL 1396358, at *1. 

Although the manufacturer offered to inspect and repair the vehicle, the plaintiff did not respond 

to the offer, instead initiation litigation within six weeks of the earlier demand for replacement. 

Id. Within another two months, and before discovery in the action had commenced, the 

manufacturer had offered to repurchase the vehicle and pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees. Id. A 

month later, the manufacturer offered to buy the vehicle back at a higher price. Id. Under those 

circumstances, the court found that there was a material dispute of facts as to whether the offer to 

repurchase the vehicle was made “promptly” as required by Section 1793.2(d)(2), but that the 

manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment that its conduct was not willful. Id. at *3, 5. 

The Hatami court found that the manufacturer did not act willfully, as a matter of law, 

because there had been two buy-back offers and the timing of the offers was consistent with the 

manufacturer’s assertion that it “wanted to ensure that the vehicle truly was non-conforming and 

that restitution was applicable.” Id. at *5. The court noted that “[a]lthough Plaintiff did demand 

restitution and Defendants initially responded with a request for further repair, this does not create 

a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, the Court finds willful conduct absent as Defendants 

initial response to Plaintiff’s request and subsequent buy back offers do not evidence an intent to 

avoid fulfilling its duty under the Song-Beverly Act.” Id.

In Dominguez, the California Court of Appeal found that the trial court had erred in 

denying summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer on the issue of willfulness under section 

1794(c). There, the plaintiff purchased a new motorcycle from Suzuki in November 2004 and 

began to experience problems with it within a few days. Dominguez v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 

160 Cal. App. 4th 53, 55 (2008), as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 10, 2008), as modified (Apr. 

3, 2008). He called Suzuki’s customer service line but the representative terminated the call when 

Dominguez became verbally abusive. Id. Over the six months that followed, Dominguez took the 

motorcycle to Suzuki-authorized service and repair facilities on at least five occasions. Id. On 

June 13, 2005, Dominguez’s attorney sent a letter to Suzuki demanding that it “repurchase or 

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replace the [motorcycle] and pay his attorney fees and costs.” Id. A week later, on June 21, 2005, 

Suzuki sent a letter to the attorney explaining why its customer service representative had ended 

the call with Dominguez and stating “that the repair mechanics were never able to duplicate the 

reported problem, the excessive mileage on the Motorcycle did not indicate there was a ‘recurrent 

problem[,]’ and Dominguez brought in the [m]otorcycle for issues unrelated to the alleged 

problem.” Id. at 56. The letter went on to request that Dominguez bring the motorcycle “to an 

authorized Suzuki dealer of his choosing to have a technical service manager inspect and repair 

the Motorcycle to resolve the matter.” Id. A month later Suzuki offered to buy back the 

motorcycle for the purchase price, and a month after that it also offered $750 in attorneys’ fees, 

rejecting the request by Dominguez’s counsel for $2,500 in fees on the basis that he had only 

written a letter. Id. When Suzuki refused to pay a higher amount in fees on the basis that the 

attorney had not actually incurred the fees he sought, Dominguez filed an action under the SongBeverly Act, including a claim for civil penalties under section 1794(c). Id.

The court found that Suzuki had complied with the requirements of the Song-Beverly Act 

before the action was even filed and that the purpose of the suit was only to recover the civil 

penalty under section 1794(c). Id. at 60. It further found that there was no evidence that the 

manufacturer acted willfully, relying heavily on the fact that only six weeks elapsed between the 

time Dominguez requested replacement and the time Suzuki made its first offer to repurchase the 

motorcycle. Id. The court further relied on the fact that Dominguez had not complained that the 

number of attempts to repair the vehicle (five) was unreasonable. Id.

On the other hand, in Robinson v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., No. 10-3187, 2011 WL 1459016 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011), the court found that there was a material dispute of fact on the question 

of whether the manufacturer had engaged in willful conduct for the purposes of section 1794(c), 

distinguishing Hatami and Dominguez. There, the plaintiff began to experience problems with her 

vehicle within the warranty period and took her vehicle for repair five times in a month. 2011 WL 

1459016, at *1. None of the repair attempts was successful and the notes from the fifth visit 

reflect that the dealer did not know what was wrong with the vehicle. Id. After the fifth visit, the 

plaintiff contacted the manufacturer and requested a buy-back under the Song-Beverly Act, saying 

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she did not want to keep bringing the vehicle in for repair. Id. The customer service agent told the 

plaintiff she would have to pursue her “lemon law” claim in arbitration. Id. Soon after that, 

another agent called and scheduled a vehicle inspection. Id. Although the plaintiff initially agreed 

to the inspection, she canceled the inspection before the scheduled date saying that she did not 

want to keep bringing the vehicle in for repairs. Id. At that point, the agent called plaintiff and 

told her that the vehicle was not a lemon and would not be replaced. Id. The plaintiff then

initiated a lawsuit under the Song-Beverly Act. Id.

In addressing the manufacturer’s request for summary judgment on the claim for civil 

penalties under section 1794(c), the court in Robinson emphasized that “[t]he question addressed 

at this stage is not whether Defendant was in fact willful and subject to § 1794(c) civil penalties, 

but instead, whether a reasonable jury could find that it acted willfully.” Id. at *5. It also noted 

that “case law in this area is highly fact-specific, and one or two slight differences between cases 

can change the outcome.” Id. The court found that there was a material issue of fact on the 

question of willfulness. Id. It pointed out that in contrast to Dominquez, where the problem could 

not be duplicated and there was evidence that the problems were due to excessive wear, the record 

in Robinson reflected that the mechanics who tried to repair the vehicle recognized the problem 

and did not know what was wrong with the vehicle. Id. As the agent in Robinson who scheduled 

the inspection had access to the service records, the court found that a jury could reasonably

conclude the inspection requirement was not a product of good faith, unlike in Dominguez. Id. It 

pointed out that manufacturers are charged with knowledge of the repair history of a vehicle for 

the purposes of determining wither conduct was willful. Id. at *5 (citing Krotin v. Porsche Cars N. 

Am., Inc., 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 303 (1995)). The court also distinguished Hatami on the basis that 

in Hatami, the manufacturer had offered to repurchase the vehicle whereas in Robinson the 

manufacturer had not made such an offer. Id. at *4.

In Boyzo, Plaintiffs have offered evidence that they took their vehicle in for repair five 

times between the time they purchased their Dodge Caravan, in 2013, and March 15, 2017. See 

Lepper Decl. (Boyzo) ¶¶ 7, 8 & Lepper Report (Boyzo), attached as Exhibit A. They filed their 

complaint on March 30, 2017. On June 6, 2017 FCA served an offer of compromise of $50,000

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plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Shepardson Decl. (Boyzo) ¶ 3 & Ex. A. According to 

FCA, the total cost of the vehicle, including all finance charges, was $39,998.53. Id. Plaintiffs 

have not disputed that amount or presented any evidence to the contrary. It is also undisputed that 

prior to initiating this action the Boyzos never requested that FCA buy back their vehicle. The 

Court finds the facts of this case are similar to those in Hatami and Dominguez and that Plaintiffs 

have not offered evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that FCA acted willfully 

with respect to the timing of its offer to buy back Plaintiffs’ vehicle, even if a jury might conclude 

that it did not do so promptly.

The Court reaches the same conclusion in Valenzuela. In that case, the evidence shows 

that Plaintiffs took their vehicle in for repair five times between the time they purchased their Jeep 

Wrangler, in September 2014, and April 2, 2016. Rozensweig Decl. (Boyzo) ¶¶ 3-9. In addition, 

Plaintiff Jessica Fuentes Valenzuela testified at her deposition that she called Chrysler on a 

number of occasions to inform them of the difficulties they were having with their vehicle and 

their dissatisfaction with it. Rozensweig Decl., Ex. F (Valenzuela Dep.) at 73-74. There is no 

evidence in the record that Plaintiffs requested reimbursement or replacement prior to filing their 

lawsuit against FCA, on November 22, 2016. On February 8, 2017, FCA served an Offer to 

Compromise in the amount of $67,000 plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Shepardson 

Decl. (Valenzuela) ¶ 3 & Ex. A. While the evidence shows that FCA was aware of the problems

the Valenzuela Plaintiffs were experiencing with their vehicle, there is nothing in the record that 

would support the conclusion that FCA was intentionally avoiding its obligations under the FCA. 

Again, this case is similar to Hatami and Dominguez.

On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence in the record in Base to create a jury 

question as to FCA’s willfulness. In that case, Plaintiff took his Dodge Ram in for repairs eight 

times between the time he purchased it, in December 2012, and December 8, 2015, when Plaintiff 

contacted FCA and asked that it be repaired or replaced. See Higgins Decl. (Base) ¶¶ 9-18. At 

that point, his concerns were “escalated” but he continued to experience problems with the 

vehicle, with two more repair visits in December 2015 and January 2016. Id. ¶ 20, 21. On

January 28, 2016, FCA sent Plaintiff a letter that did not offer to replace the vehicle or to pay 

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restitution, instead offering him $1,500 for a release from all liability for the problems he was 

experiencing. Id. ¶ 22 & Ex. S. On October 21, 2016, Plaintiff initiated this action and on 

November 16, 2016 FCA made an Offer of Compromise in the amount of $50,012.56 plus 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Shepardson Decl. (Base) ¶ 3 & Ex. A. The evidence that 

Plaintiff in Base had to take his vehicle in for so many repairs, and the fact that FCA’s escalation 

process resulted only in an offer to pay $1,500 despite the repeated repair attempts are sufficient to 

distinguish this case from Hatami and Dominguez and create a question for the jury as to whether 

FCA’s conduct was willful. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court’s rulings are as follows. First, the Court GRANTS the motions to exclude in all 

of the related cases and therefore excludes: 1) opinion testimony by Mr. Lepper regarding whether 

the TIPM-7 in each vehicle was defective, and linking the TIPM-7 to the problems Plaintiffs 

experienced with their vehicles; and 2) opinion testimony by Dr. Luna that FCA intentionally 

concealed from Plaintiffs the defects associated with the TIPM-7. In addition, Mr. Lepper may 

not offer any expert opinions in O’Brien because no expert report was produced in that case and 

the deadline to do so has now passed.

Second, the Court GRANTS the summary judgment motions with respect to Claim Three, 

for fraudulent concealment, which is dismissed in all of the related cases. Because Claim Three is 

dismissed, Plaintiffs also may not seek punitive damages in any of the related cases. With respect 

to FCA’s request for summary judgment in Boyzo, Valenzuela, and Base on Plaintiffs’ request for 

civil penalties under Cal. Civ. Code section 1794(c), the motion is GRANTED as to Boyzo and 

Valenzuela and DENIED as to Base. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2019

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

Case 3:17-cv-01541-JCS Document 79 Filed 03/11/19 Page 23 of 23