Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01510/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01510-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 05cv1510

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN SCOTT McCLINTOCK,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 05cv1510-LAB (WMc)

ORDER OVERRULING

OBJECTIONS, ADOPTING

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION, AND

DENYING HABEAS PETITION 

[Dkt Nos. 24, 31, 32]

vs.

JAMES YATES, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

This matter is before the court on the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of

Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. that petitionerJohnScott McClintock's ("McClintock")

Second Amended Petition for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus relief and his request for an

evidentiary hearing be denied. Only McClintock, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed

Objections to the R&R. Respondents filed no Reply. For the reasons discussed below, the

R&R is ADOPTED, and the Petition is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

 MClintock was a forty-year-old reconstructive surgeon at the time of his trial. He was

convicted by a jury in September 2002 of: eight counts of committing a lewd and lascivious

act on a child under the age of fourteen in violation of CAL.PEN. CODE § 288(a); three counts

of molesting a minor in violation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 647.6(a); one count of petty theft in

violation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 484; three counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act on

a child aged fourteen or fifteen years in violation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 288(c)(1); and fifteen

counts of possessing matter depicting a minor in sexual conduct in violation of CAL. PEN.

CODE § 311.11(a). The jury found true more than one victim under the age of fourteen was

involved in the eight CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) counts of which he was convicted.

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 1 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The docket reveals McClintock first filed his federal petition in July 2005. In December

2005. Respondents moved to dismiss or to hold the petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of state

judicial remedies. McClintock opposed the motion. Judge McCurine entered an R&R in March 2006

recommending the motion to stay be denied but the motion for stay and abeyance be granted. This

court rejected the R&R, ordered the filing of explanations and responses from the parties, and the

preparation of a new R&R. This court adopted the new R&R and denied the motion for dismissal or

stay and abeyance in its entirety as moot. McClintock filed a First Amended Petition on

September 1, 2006, and an authorized SAP on September 28, 2006. Respondents filed a Response

on November 2, 2006. McClintock filed a Traverse on December 1, 2006. He moved for

appointment of counsel on June 4, 2007, a request Judge McCurine denied without prejudice on

September 10, 2007. The R&R under review herein issued January 28, 2008, and McClintock filed

the only Objections on February 15, 2008. 

- 2 - 05cv1510

McClintock was acquitted of seven other charged counts: five under CAL. PEN. CODE §

288(a); one under CAL.PEN.CODE § 288(a)(1); and one misdemeanor count under CAL.PEN.

CODE § 647.6(a). R&R 3:2-12, Lodg. 1 at 572, 574-75, 578-79, 582. McClintock was

sentenced on January 9, 2003 to thirty years to life in state prison, consisting of two

consecutive terms of fifteen years to life, with all other counts and sentences ordered to run

concurrently. R&R 3:12-14, Lodg. 1 at 607-08.

In his Second Amended Petition ("SAP"), McClintock asserts six grounds for habeas

relief: (1) denial of a severance motion; (2) admission of expert testimony regarding five

specific issues relating to abused children from a prosecution witness, Deborah Davies, after

an evidentiary hearing; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) prosecutorial misconduct;

(5) denial of a continuance McClintock requested after he became ill during the trial; and (6)

cruel and unusual punishment associated with his 30-years-to-life sentence. Dkt No. 24.

He had appealed his conviction to the state appellate court raising, among other things, four

of his six SAP claims (one, two, five, and six). His conviction was affirmed. Lodg. 3, 6. The

California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review. Lodg. 7. He raised the

other two claims presented in the SAP in a habeas petition to the state supreme court, which

that court summarily denied in June 2006.1 R&R 3:21-24. All the SAP claims are

accordingly exhausted and ripe for federal habeas review.

The R&R takes facts from the California Court of Appeal opinion deciding

McClintock's direct appeal. "[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct" unless the petitioner carries his "burden of rebutting the

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 2 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 In his R&R Objections, McClintock asks this court to "reconsider" the recommended denial

of his Petition in its entirety and to grant an evidentiary hearing so he can demonstrate the merits of

his arguments. Obj. 15:8-12. Since AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) "now substantially restricts the

- 3 - 05cv1510

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

McClintock reargues the grounds of his SAP in his Objections to the R&R, but identifies no

error in the summary of the factual or procedural background recited in the R&R. The court

adopts the R&R summaries of the factual and procedural history of this case. 

The R&R summarizes the underlying criminal conduct in categories: the summer

2001 beach and pool molestations of ten-year-old twins (sons of McClintock's female

acquaintance) and three of their friends and a 2001 bedroom molestation of one of the twins;

the 1999 bedroom molestation of his then-stepson; the July 2001 petty theft charges for

shoplifting two shirts and two envelopes of developed film containing photographs of boys;

and the September 2001 child pornography charges arising from the results of Chula Vista

police officers' executing search warrants at McClintock's medical office, his residence, and

his car (including but not limited to his desktop computer containing many thousands of such

images). Evidence of prior uncharged acts are summarized as a 1994 incident of

molestation of a thirteen-year-old boy and three other incidents that year with a nine-year-old

boy. R&R pp. 4-6. McClintock's defense at trial is summarized at R&R pages 6-7,

essentially an attempt to characterize the contacts as not sexually intended and the

shoplifting as unintentional while he responded to a telephone page from the hospital by

stepping outside the store. 

McClintock does not attempt to specify why the R&R is erroneous or contrary to law.

Rather, his fifteen pages of Objections reargue his explanations for the conduct he admitted,

rationalize his touching of the children, recharacterize some of the contact as not sexually

intended, and describe others as requested contact. He contends the children themselves

took some of the photographic evidence used against him, and reasserts other of his

defense theories. He summarily argues the jury could not have reached their results beyond

a reasonable doubt, among other broad-brush attacks on his convictions and sentence, and

requests an evidentiary hearing to prove his arguments.2 A federal court reviewing a habeas

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 3 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

district court's discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing." Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077

(9th Cir. 1999). If a habeas petitioner "failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings," the federal court cannot hold an evidentiary hearing unless certain statutory

requirements are met. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court finds McClintock advances no support for either required showing, i.e., (A) the claim relies

on "(i) a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court that was previously

unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the

exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Moreover, even

if the court had discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing, it is unpersuaded by McClintock's request

based as it is on his attempts to convince the court the jury simply should have reached different

conclusions, which he proposes to demonstrate at an evidentiary hearing. 

3

 For example, McClintock challenges the prosecutor's charging decision with respect to the

number of counts of child pornography as "extreme and harmful exaggerations," despite the volume

of many thousands of images seized. R&R Obj. pp. 4-5. The charges selected appear to be amply

supported by the evidence, and federal courts do not and cannot involve themselves in legitimate

decisions the State makes about how to prosecute a criminal case. Moreover, federal habeas courts

have no authority to review a state's application of its own laws. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885. The

prosecutor's selection from among charging options supported by the evidence raises no federal

constitutional question. Similarly, the characterization of physical contacts as "soft touch" or "specific

sexual acts" constituting felony molestations (R&R Obj. pp. 4-5) are questions for the factfinder which

will not be disturbed in proceedings seeking collateral relief, absent a demonstrated constitutional

violation in reaching the verdicts not apparent from this record.

- 4 - 05cv1510

challenge to a state prisoner's conviction or sentence is not empowered to retry the case or

to substitute its judgment for that of a jury or the state court. The court attempts to extract

from McClintock's SAP and his Objections to the R&R potentially cognizable claims under

the applicable federal standards, but rejects his gratuitous rearguing of the evidence and of

his defense theories where they are immaterial to any federal constitutional claims he

attempts to raise.3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Habeas Relief

"The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254

habeas proceedings thus measure state convictions against federal constitutional

requirements applicable to the states. Only errors of constitutional magnitude will support

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 4 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 05cv1510

federal intervention in state judicial proceedings, and only to correct such errors. See

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882,

885 (9th Cir. 1990). 

A writ petition decided under the 1996 standards enacted through the Antiterrorism

And Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") will not be granted unless the state court

decision denying a claim on the merits "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Baylor v. Estelle, 94

F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996); Carey v. Musladin, -- U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. 649 (Dec. 11, 2006).

To satisfy the AEDPA requirement the federal law the petitioner relies on was "clearly

established," a reviewing court must look to the law as it existed in United States Supreme

Court rulings at the time the challenged state court decision was rendered. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000); see Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if the decision

"contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases." Williams, 529 U.S.

at 405. The "unreasonable application" test is objective unreasonableness of the state

court's application of "the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases" to "the facts

of the particular state prisoner's case," irrespective of whether the decision was "erroneous"

or "incorrect." Id. at 407, 411; Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Nunes v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 485 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 2007) ("In order for a federal court to find a

state court's application of [the Supreme Court's] precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's

decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous"), quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539

U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). 

When no "reasoned state court judgment rejecting a federal claim" against which the

federal court can measure the constitutionality of the state court's adjudication of the claim's

merits, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the result was "objectively reasonable." Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982; see Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Independent review of the record is not de

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 5 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 05cv1510

novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather the only method by which we can

determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable"). In this case,

McClintock's federal claims in Ground Three (ineffective assistance of counsel) and Ground

Four (prosecutorial misconduct) were only presented to the California Supreme Court and

only on collateral review. Each of those claims was summarily denied. In re McClintock, No.

S136618, Cal. LEXIS 7246 (Cal. June 14, 2006). The R&R reflects the independent review

of the record associated with those two grounds for habeas relief, as required when there

has been no reasoned state court ruling rejecting a federal claim against which the court

may apply federal habeas standards. Cf. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991)

(when there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, the federal court "looks

through" to the last reasoned state-court decision). 

2. Reports And Recommendations

A district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive

further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions" on a

dispositive matter prepared by a magistrate judge proceeding without the consent of the

parties for all purposes. Rule 72(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). An objecting party may

"serve and file specific objections to the proposed findings and recommendations," and "a

party may respond to another party's objections." Rule 72(b).

In reviewing an R&R, "the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions

of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made."

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980) (when objections

are made, the court must make a de novo determination of the factual findings to which

there are objections). "If neither party contests the magistrate's proposed findings of fact,

the court may assume their correctness and decide the motion on the applicable law."

Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). The court reviews de novo the

magistrate judge's conclusions of law. Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1995);

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007) ("determinations of law by the

magistrate judge are reviewed de novo by both the district court and [the court of appeals]").

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 6 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 05cv1510

B. Ground One: Denial Of Severance Motion And Prior Bad Acts Evidence

McClintock challenges the state court's denial of his motion to sever the beach and

pool molestations from the other charged counts and the use of prior bad acts "propensity"

evidence. He argues the "innocuous touches" were unrelated to counts "aggravated by

prior bad acts," so his due process rights were violated, allegedly resulting in a

"fundamentally unfair trial." SAP 13:3-6. He argues the evidence was "never crossadmissible" and was allegedly "modified" to "fit the prosecutor's story." SAP 13:11-13. 

 An error involving misjoinder affects substantial rights, but requires retrial only if the

simultaneous trial of more than one offense resulted in actual prejudice.

Improper joinder [of separate counts] does not, in itself, violate

the Constitution. Rather, misjoinder would rise to the level of a

constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as to

deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. 

United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986) (holding misjoinder is subject to

harmless error analysis). 

McClintock argues "all acts were explained as non-sexual in content," an explanation

the jury obviously rejected with respect to the guilty verdict counts and one falling far short

of the required demonstration to satisfy the standards for Section 2254 habeas relief. He

argues "it was not individual acts that convicted the Petitioner of felonious acts, but the

'interference-assumption'overa collectionof innocuous acts mitigating into suddenly serous,

felonious acts a year later at trial." SAP 24:20-24. He insists, despite his acquittal of several

charged counts, the "jury could not reasonably have been expected to 'compartmentalize the

evidence of one crime to not taint the jury's consideration of another crime' or innocuous

act." SAC 14:17-22, citing Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding

improper joinder of two indictments deprived that petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial). 

However, Bean is distinguishable. The Bean court found the misjoinder for trial of an

indictment for a weak murder case with an indictment for a stronger murder case required

reversal of the conviction in the weaker case only. In concluding the misjoinder deprived

defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial, the court emphasized it was "mindful

that prejudice generally does not arise from joinder when the evidence of each crime is

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 7 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 05cv1510

simple and distinct, even in the absence of cross-admissibility" of evidence. Bean, 163 F.3d

at 1085, citing Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("The federal courts,

including our own, have . . . found no prejudicial effect from joinder when the evidence of

each crime is simple and distinct, even though such evidence might not have been

admissible in separate trials"); see also United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th

Cir. 1987) ("in light of the relative simplicity of the issues and the straightforward manner of

presentation, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

defendant's motion to sever offenses"). The Bean court reaffirmed the "assumption that, if

properly instructed, a jury can compartmentalize the evidence, rather than considering it

cumulatively," but found the Bean jury was not properly charged, permitting the prosecution

prejudicially to bootstrap the weak murder case to bolster the strong murder case. 

In McClintock's case, unlike in Bean, acquittal of some joined charges and conviction

on others "establishes the jury successfully compartmentalized the evidence." Bean, 163

F.3d at 1085, citing Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding

joinder of charges caused no fundamental unfairness: "it is apparent from the jury's

discerning verdict that it followed the court's instructions to regard each count as separate

and distinct"). Moreover, as traced by the Court of Appeal, simple and direct evidence

supported the distinct counts against McClintock. This court finds the discrete acts lent

themselves to compartmentalization by the jury, and the presentation and evidence of each

crime was simple and distinct, even in the absence of cross-admissibility. His jury acquitted

him of seven molestation counts, substantiating they gave individualized attention to each

count. The state court's decision to affirm denial of his motion to sever was accordingly not

objectively unreasonable nor contrary to controlling authority elucidating the applicable

constitutional standard. The court accordingly ADOPTS the R&R conclusion that even if

some of the evidence would not have been cross-admissible, McClintock fails to

demonstrate the requisite prejudice for a finding of fundamental unfairness. 

McClintock also argues under his First Ground that he was denied a fair trial because

of allegedly prejudicial and improper prior bad acts evidence presented against him. SAP

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 8 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 "In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the

defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section

1101, if the evidence is not in admissible pursuant to Section 352." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a).

Section 1101 addresses the admissibility of character or character trait evidence. Section 352

addresses exclusion of time-consuming, prejudicial, confusing, or misleading evidence.

- 9 - 05cv1510

14:24-25. He contends the prosecution improperly relied on CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 to

introduce evidence of prior instances of uncharged sexual molestations in alleged violation

of his due process and equal protection rights.4 He contends "special intent" argument

coupled with the inflamatory nature of the child pornography constituted "overkill," whereas

a severance would have limited that "prejudicial impact." SAP 15:22-16:12. His argument

is unavailing; the half-day of evidence of instances of his prior sexual misconduct, in

consideration of the length of his trial, was admissible under CAL.EVID. CODE § 352 and was

not a constitutional violation.

McClintock relies in his R&R Objections on Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065 with respect to

the use of uncharged crime evidence. That case, however, was not a sexual offense case

covered by an evidentiary statute expressly permitting introduction of evidence of

commission of other sexual offenses in some circumstances. Moreover, Johnson held

evidence of an uncharged third bank robbery was admissible against the defendant in his

trial for two counts of bank robbery, and the defendant was not entitled to severance of

charges, finding the trial court "implicitly balanced the probative value against he prejudicial

effect." Id. at 1069 (distinguishing United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1981),

admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) on the ground the trial court had found the challenged

evidence was relevant to knowledge, plan, and motive whereas the reviewing court fund the

evidence admissible to prove opportunity, a ruling the trial court never made under

FED.R.EVID. 404(b), so it could not have considered the FED.R.EVID. 403 prejudice and

probative value factors the court must weigh before admitting the evidence, applying

standards similar to the California standards). 

McClintock's argument fails to distinguish between admissible evidence that is

probative of the charged crimes and unfairly prejudicial propensity evidence introduced for

purposes of improperly influencing a jury. Respondent argues there was no reasonable

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 9 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 05cv1510

likelihood the jury convicted McClintock on the basis of the evidence of uncharged prior

molestations. The R&R reports the United States Supreme Court has expressly declined

to rule on the constitutionality of the use of propensity evidence (R&R 10:23-28), citing

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) ("we express no opinion on whether a state

law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the 'prior crimes' evidence to show

propensity to commit a charged crime"); see also Alberni v. Daniels, 458 F.3d 860, 863-64

(9th Cir. 2006) (observing the Supreme Court expressly reserved determination of the

question, and thus there is no "clearly established federal law" a habeas petitioner can rely

on for relief). There remains just the general principle that evidence "so extremely unfair that

its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice" may violate due process. Alberni,

458 F.3d at 864, quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). 

The Court of Appeal rejected McClintock's argument the admission of two prior

incidents of molestation as propensity evidence pursuant to CAL.EVID.CODE § 1108 deprived

him of due process or a fair trial, finding the jury would not have been inflamed and, as

traced below, the prior incidents evidence created no undue prejudice. Lodg. 6 pp. 10-12.

That court also found from the record "strong factors favoring consolidation," not severance.

Lodg. 6 at 9. These included: "the beach and pool counts and bedroom counts not only

involved all child molestation charges but also involved an overlapping victim, Brian P.,"

explaining the cross-admissibility of the relationship evidence; the cross-admissibility of the

pornography and molestation counts under CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (propensity evidence),

and § 1101(b) (as relevant to show intent); the petty theft count was related to the other

counts inasmuch as the photographs were of child molestation victims and led to the search

of McClintock's home and seizure of the child pornography, so a transactional relationship

existed and the evidence would have been admissible at any trial of the child pornography

counts; none of the counts was particularly inflammatory relative to any of the others (they

involved similar types of touching and none was a violent or forcible offense); "proof of the

child pornography and petty theft charges was straightforward and strong;" no reasonable

possibility exists the jury might have convicted him of those charges on the basis they

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 10 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 05cv1510

thought he was a child molester rather than based on the simple, strong evidence to support

the other types of claims; and the verdicts undercut his prejudice argument because the jury

acquitted him of seven child molestation counts. Lodg. 6 pp. 9-10. 

This court agrees with the determinations of the state courts and the Magistrate Judge

finding the decision to deny McClintock's Motion to sever was not objectively unreasonable

nor contrary to controlling United States Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, the court

ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety with respect to Ground One and DENIES that basis for

relief.

C. Ground Two: Improper Expert Testimony

McClintock's Objections appear to contain no challenge to the R&R analysis or

recommendation with respect to SAP Ground Two. The court need not conduct de novo

review or any lesser review of the facts when no objections are made to the R&R. Orand,

602 F.2d at 208 ("If neither party contests the magistrate's proposed findings of fact, the

court may assume their correctness and decide the motion on the applicable law"). This

court has reviewed the Court of Appeal's determination of this issue (Lodg. 6 pp. 12-14) and

has reviewed the Magistrate Judge's conclusions of law with respect to admission of expert

testimony from Deborah Davies, a licensed clinical social worker and forensic interviewer,

after an evidentiary hearing regarding her qualifications and anticipated testimony, and

ADOPTS the recommendation habeas relief is not warranted under Ground Two.

D. Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

1. Legal Standards

As noted in the R&R, when no "reasoned state court judgment rejecting a federal

claim" exists against which the federal court can measure the constitutionality of the state

court's adjudication of the merits of the claim, the federal court must conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the result was "objectively reasonable" and

applied correct legal analysis. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d at 981-82; see Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853. The clearly established federal law governing claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel ("IAC") is articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 11 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 05cv1510

on an IAC claim, a petitioner must show (1) counsel's errors or omissions resulted from a

failure to exercise the skill, judgment, or diligence of a reasonably competent attorney, and

(2) counsel's conduct prejudiced the result. Id. at 687-88, 693. To show prejudice, the

petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient

performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 693-94.

2. Four Discrete IAC Claims Discernable

McClintock characterizes his counsel's assistance as "riddled with error and

incompetence to the point at which it constitutes a violation of the right to have an attorney."

SAP 19:22-25. The court rejects any incipient denial of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel

claim as inchoate and conclusory. McClintock acknowledges counsel's authority over

tactical and strategic decisions, but superimposes on that flexibility a requirement that he be

entitled to "fully inform[] his/her counsel" (SAP 21:5) and "proactively" direct the defense of

his case. He attempts to legitimize his IAC grounds for relief by representing: 

This is not an attempt to say effective counsel is an errorless

counsel; nor an ineffective counsel by hindsight. . . . Petitioner

is not questioning counsel's competency, ability, tactical errors,

confusion of witnesses with specific facts, failure to object (which

may or may not be argued in itself an [sic] inherently tactical);

likewise, petitioner has no expectations for any court to: second

guess counsel's tactics, grade the counsel's performance, or set

rules and specific standards (i.e. a checklist) for guidelines.

SAP 21:6-23.

He summarily alleges his counsel's errors violated his constitutional rights because

of the purportedly " 'reasonable probability' of defendable issues" he attempts to assert. 

SAP 21:14-16. He advances in hopeful but hopelessly conclusory fashion: "certain

witnesses testimonies alone when 'compartmentalized by the jurors' would reveal nonfelonious acts of molestation and the jurors would either reduce the charge to a lesser crime

or rule not guilty of even the lesser crime," so that "defense counsel's choice of not needing

cross-examining details made all the more evident the need for proactive steps by the

petitioner during the trial to participate and remain fully attentive," which he contends he was

unable to do because of illness, although he attended trial each day. R&R Obj. 8:15-27. As

discussed below, his showing falls short of a cognizable IAC ground for habeas relief.

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 12 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 05cv1510

The R&R identifies in the SAP four discrete areas of alleged defense counsel

deficiency, recommending each be rejected for failure to make the requisite showing of

prejudice. McClintock never advances beyond unsupported conclusory allegations that but

for the alleged deficiencies, the outcome of his trial would have been more favorable to him.

a. Permitting Defendant To Be Visibly Restrained

 McClintock suggests he was somehow visibly restrained during the trial, but does not

specify in what manner or why. He also appears not to have developed that claim in state

court. He fails to link his SAP case law discussion to his own circumstances in any manner

permitting comparative analysis. See SAP pp. 22-23. The issue of restraints only appears

in his statement of his IAC claim. Unless the use of restraints actually prejudiced his trial,

McClintock's argument defense counsel's purported failure to object to their use cannot rise

to the level of a constitutional violation. 

The R&R observes McClintock "offers nothing to support the allegation that he was

visibly restrained," but assuming, arguendo, he was restrained "and that counsel's failure to

object to Petitioner's restraints was deficient [performance], Petitioner has not met his

burden of demonstrating prejudice." R&R 21:21-24. The jury acquitted him of several

charged counts, demonstrating they gave individualized attention to each charge rather than

adopting some generalized adverse conclusion they drew from his appearance. He in no

way describes how any physical restraint interfered with his "ability to partake in his defense

proactively." SAP 22:26-28. Thus, not only does he fail to show he experienced "such

unnecessary, unmerited displays by the court" (SAP 22:26-27 (emphasis added)), but also

he fails to elaborate either his counsel's purported involvement in such "displays" or

prejudice in the verdicts resulting from counsel's alleged failure to object. 

McClintock's Objections to the R&R allude in passing only once to his having been

"visibly chained" with a reiteration that he "knew the case – the details of the events and

individuals – and had no intention to play a passive role while visibly chained." R&R Obj.

7:20-22. The court can only surmise he needed to be rendered more "passive" by some

court intervention not attributable to his counsel's conduct, but the claim is entirely inchoate.

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 13 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 05cv1510

The court accordingly ADOPTS the R&R recommendation this theory be rejected as a

legitimate ground for habeas relief. 

b. Failure To Adequately Investigate

While disclaiming his IAC ground for relief arises from tactical or strategic choices his

counsel made, his specific complaints about her conduct reveal otherwise. McClintock

represents: "Petitioner's counsel did limited investigations, and the little that was done was

never followed through." SAP 23:4-5. In particular, he alleges, among other things:

"mitigating testimonies by witnesses and experts were neither sought after nor attempted,"

such as from "lifeguards at specific sites where the 'felonious acts' occurred; adult and child

psychologists; police records of existing temporary restraining orders against particular

individuals – not against petitioner – who regularly entered two of the children's home late

at night; . . . and a computer technician[] to explain to jurors about: Bot. files, rapid loading,

and adult entertainment terminology from legal adult web-sites, and the virtualness of pixels

and the way images were modified by the prosecutor." SAP 22:4-18.

Grossly deficient preparation for trial or a complete failure to investigate may give rise

to a viable IAC claim. However, McClintock's complaints about his representation are on

their face either tactical or strategic choices within the scope of decisions reasonably

competent counsel can legitimately make (e.g., whether to call expert witnesses to testify

and the like), or are explained by inadvertence (e.g. the occasional confusion of one victim's

name for another's), and all are demonstrably harmless in consideration of the entire body

of evidence presented to the jury. He does not support his claim of failure to perform pretrial investigation, as opposed to simply electing not to present as part of the defense case

certain potentially plausible kinds of witnesses McClintock suggests could have been called.

Counsel's decision not to put on certain witnesses does not show the decision was the result

of failure to investigate rather than conscious choice predicated on the results of the

investigations or some other reasonable tactical decision. Moreover, as in this case, "[w]hen

the record clearly shows that the lawyer was well-informed, and the defendant fails to state

what additional information would be gained by the discovery she or he now claims was

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 14 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 - 05cv1510

necessary, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails." Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d

1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, "ineffective assistance of counsel claims based

on a duty to investigate must be considered in the light of the strength of the government's

case." Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The R&R notes McClintock fails to provide any indication what the purportedly

erroneously omitted witnesses would have offered as their testimonial evidence. Claims of

failure to investigate must be supported by a showing of the information that would have

been obtained through the investigation and, assuming the evidence to be admissible, how

it would have produced a different result. See, e.g. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 909 (9th

Cir. 2006). As McClintock proffers no indication of what information could have been but

was not elicited, or how the information would changed the result of his trial, he has not

satisfied an element required to prevail on an IAC claim. The R&R recommendation to reject

this theory of IAC relief is accordingly ADOPTED.

c. Inattentiveness

McClintock alleges his claims of "trial errors" show his counsel's "pattern of

inattentiveness." SAP 23:19-20. He cites such examples as allegedly forgetting crucial facts

in preparing for cross-examinations, mixing the facts with different witnesses, and failing to

impeach testifying witnesses with their prior statements to police or social workers. SAP

23:20-23. He also appears to suggest his counsel did not notice he was allegedly in

restraints during voir dire and at trial because she allegedly did not object, as he includes his

argument about the restraints in the "inattentiveness" portion of his IAC claim. SAP pp. 23-

24. He summarily contends "defense counsel [was] not in tune to the details" in the

evidentiary record so "did not serve defendant effectively." R&R Obj. 8:15-17.

On the one hand, McClintock criticizes his counsel for an imperfect grasp of all the

details associated with each victim and each of the multiple instances of alleged molestation

and the like, while on the other hand asserting: his counsel's " 'flight plan[]' did not

necessitate the need for details. . . ." R&R Obj. 8:15-18. The vagueness of his allegations

of deficient performance due to counsel's "inattentiveness" prevents any finding either prong

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 15 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 - 05cv1510

of the Strickland test is satisfied. The court accordingly ADOPTS the R&R recommendation

habeas relief be denied on that IAC theory.

d. Failure To Counter Inconsistencies In Witness Testimony

Despite his SAP preamble to the IAC claim contending he is not challenging defense

counsel's trial tactics or strategy, McClintock's complaints are mostly that. For example, he

criticizes his counsel for failing to impeach witnesses' testimony with prior statements they

gave to police or social workers at interviews during the investigation of the charged acts of

child molestation. SAP 23:21-23. He fails, however, to isolate any particular witness or any

particular testimonial evidence where any material inconsistency occurred, other than Ms.

Shores' and her sons' initial representations to authorities that they did not think McClintock

did anything wrong. All three, however, later recanted that opinion. Apparently, McClintock

thinks they should be bound by an initial expression of an opinion despite their explanations

at trial for that discrepancy. See Brady discussion under Ground Four, below. Moreover,

if McClintock intends to refer to some particular victim's testimony, dealing with young or

vulnerable witnesses at trial often requires less prolonged or probing cross-examination

particularly likely to upset or confuse the witness, a result which also risks eliciting testimony

more damaging than helpful to the defense. Absent any particularity to support his criticism

of counsel's cross-examinations, the deferential standard of Strickland scrutiny is not

satisfied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," a

presumption that the defendant must show should not be "considered sound trial strategy").

McClintock neither identifies particular instances of inconsistent testimony nor how any such

impeaching evidence could have altered the result at trial. 

Considering McClintock's IAC theories individually and cumulatively, the court finds

he fails to show any reasonable probability that but for counsel's alleged errors, the result

would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 688. Accordingly, the court ADOPTS the

R&R recommendation habeas relief be denied on IAC grounds.

\\

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 16 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 - 05cv1510

E. Ground Four: Prosecutorial Misconduct

1. Legal Standard

A habeas petitioner can prevail on a claim for relief due to prosecutorial misconduct

only upon a showing first, the prosecutor's alleged conduct was improper, and second, the

misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to render the resulting conviction a denial

of due process. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,

416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). 

2. Trial Publicity

McClintock alleges he was denied a fair trial due to the prosecutor's purported feeding

of unspecified misinformation to news media before trial: "Petitioner entered his trial

depicted as a thief, a liar, and a homosexual." Pet. 26:23-27. He provides no specificity in

support of that contention. Even assuming he presented this claim in state court as an

alleged federal constitutional violation, such conclusory characterizations fall short of the

factual showing necessary to raise even a colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct

associated with pretrial publicity. He directs the court to no particular newspaper or other

media publicity about his case to support such a contention. The claim is devoid of any

specificity from which the court could decide whether any remarks or communications from

the prosecutory to the media were improper, let alone whether they resulted in an unfair trial.

Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970) ("Allegations of fact, rather than

conclusions, are required"); see also Tam v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005).

The court need not reach the issue in the absence of "proper allegations of fact showing that

the alleged newspaper articles in fact violated the precepts stated in Sheppard v. Maxwell,

284 U.S. 333 (1966) and its offspring." Boehme, 423 F.2d at 1058 (full citation omitted).

The court ADOPTS the R&R recommendation the court find McClintock has not identified

any particular conduct by the prosecutor on this theory, let alone shown misconduct that so

infected his trial with unfairness as to have denied him due process.

3. Redacting Taped Interviews With Two Minor Victims

McClintock alleges the prosecutor edited out "pertinent portions of the social worker

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 17 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 - 05cv1510

[video]tape interviews with Brian P. and Steven P. which confirm testimony of the temporary

restraining order filed by their mother against an 'old boyfriend, Mike' because he kept

entering our room at night." Pet. p. 27 (emphasis added). He apparently seeks to have the

court infer that had the boys' recorded interview "confirmation" been played to the jury, it

would have suggested Mike rather than he was the actual abuser. However, the manner of

his presentation of the claim suggests there was testimony at trial on the TRO issue.

Moreover, as substantiated in the R&R from the trial record, the redactions were known to

McClintock's counsel and were discussed at a sidebar associated with Ms. Shore's

testimony. In fact, at least the redaction of the Brian P. videotape was "based upon

Petitioner's request to exclude statements the child made about being afraid of Petitioner

coming over to his house." R&R 12:24-26, citing Lodg. 2 at 161-165, 545. The court gave

McClintock's counsel the opportunity to object to the redactions before the video tapes were

played to the jury and received a stipulation instead, presumably because associated

testimony could harm the defense. Lodg. 2 at 589. Even though McClintock represents in

his R&R Objections he objected to the redaction and communicated that opinion to his

counsel (R&R Obj. 12:14-20), defense counsel is not required to adopt a client's preferences

in matters of evidentiary decisions or trial strategy.

This court finds on the record as a whole the boys' alleged testimony they feared their

mother's boyfriend "Mike" coming into their bedrooms at night could not have operated to

exonerate McClintock from the charges he molested those and other boys. McClintock

acknowledges he went to the boys' room to say goodnight around 9 p.m. during the time he

was with their mother, removing any inference the boys could only have meant "Mike," not

McClintock, was ever there. Obj. 8:7-9. The court ADOPTS the R&R recommendation it

find the redactions in these circumstances do not support even an inference the prosecutor

thereby so infected the trial with unfairness as to render McClintock's his conviction a denial

of due process. R&R 24:13-16, citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181.

\\

\\

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 18 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 - 05cv1510

4. Key Police Witness Was Not "Withheld"

In his R&R Objections, McClintock reprises his allegation the "prosecutor committed

misconduct because she knowingly, purposely, and deliberately withheld exculpatory

evidence" in the form of testimony from Detective Pike of the Chula Vista Police Department.

 He alleges a Brady violation on grounds it "was only confirmed post-trial" that Detective Pike

got from Ms Shore a purportedly "emphatic denial of any offensive behavior of the twins,"

whereas the prosecutor "knowingly kept him from relaying those facts before trial." R&R Obj.

13:22-14:4; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). McClintock alleges the

prosecutor "knew of this exculpatory detail[]" but failed to disclose it, purportedly because

she "knew such testimony would have hurt her campaign" to obtain a conviction. R&R Obj.

14:8-9. He contends Detective Pike would have been included on his own witness list "if

such exculpatory evidence was known and confirmed." R&R Obj. 14:4-7. The latter

representation goes to a trial strategy or tactic over which McClintock would not have

exercised primary control, and he presumes Detective Pike had no damaging evidence that

could have been elicited at trial had he been called as a witness by either side. Moreover,

defense counsel actually questioned the lead detective in the case, Mike Helvie, about

Detective Pike's involvement. Lodg. 2 at 878.

To prevail on a Brady violation theory, the defendant must show: (1) the evidence at

issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) such

evidence was suppressed by the state when it should have been but was not produced; and

(3) the suppressed evidence was material to his guilt or punishment. See Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) ("such evidence is material 'if there is a reasonable

probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding

would have been different'"), quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); see

also Paradise v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1997). 

McClintock was fully aware of Detective Pike's existence, of the officer's familiarity

with him personally, and of the initial denial of offensive conduct Ms. Shores and her sons

made to police before trial because Ms. Shores herself told him. SAP 27:8-19 (Ms. Shores

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 19 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 McClintock's new argument in his Objections to the R&R does not change the analysis or

result. He contends "Ms. Shores informed Petitioner that a police friend asked questions but the

identity of 'Mr. Pike' as that individual was not revealed /confirmed until after trial." R&R Obj. p. 14

fn. Moreover, he could have asked her the name of her "police friend" at the time, and he indicates

he himself had known Detective Pike for at least two years prior to his arrest.

6

 The court rejects as gratuitous and immaterial McClintock's self-serving representation

Detective Pike would have made a good witness because he purportedly "knew of multiple false

reports by petitioner's ex-spouse. . . ." SAP p. 27.

- 20 - 05cv1510

"told him of Mr. Pike's queries immediately" and told him at the time she told Detective Pike

she and her sons "emphatically denied any offensive behavior"). He identifies Detective

Pike as "the primary investigator of McClintock v. Sigler divorce and custody trial for over two

years – just prior to Petitioner's arrest." Pet. 27:8-10. He imputes to the prosecution a duty

to call Detective Pike as a trial witness. The prosecutor not only had no such duty,

McClintock's actual knowledge of the allegedly suppressed information defeats his claim of

a Brady violation, and he presumably had equal subpoena access to Detective Pike.5 R&R

Obj. 14:10-17. Ms. Shores and her sons, as trial witnesses, were available for crossexamination. All three admitted the boys initially denied being touched (Lodg. 2 at 259, 349-

50, 550-53), dissolving any argument Detective Pike's testimony confirming their initial

statements could have provided valuable impeachment evidence or was so material a

different result would have been "reasonably probable" had he testified to simply corroborate

the Shores' family's admissions.6 See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995)

(conclusory allegations with no reference to the record or documentation such as an affidavit

cannot support habeas relief); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) ("conclusory

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief"). This court is not remotely persuaded, even had the evidence not been known to the

defense, disclosure would have altered the result of his trial. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.

419, 433-34 (1995); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 

The facts as McClintock alleges them to be defeat the Brady element the government

suppressed exculpatory evidence. See Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 99th Cir. 2006)

("Where the defendant is aware of the essential facts enabling him to take advantage of any

exculpatory evidence, the Government does not commit a Brady violation by not bringing the

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 20 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 - 05cv1510

evidence to the attention of the defense") (citations omitted). The court ADOPTS the R&R

recommendation prosecutorial misconduct amounting to a constitutional violation cannot be

found on this ground. 

5. Coaching Minor Witnesses

The R&R demonstrates the record reflects the prosecution arranged for Ms. Shores

to go a hotel and to be monitored to ensure she would be sober for her trial testimony. Lodg.

2 at 514. Both the court and defense counsel were informed of the placement, without

objection. Id. McClintock attempts no showing how that conduct prejudiced his defense in

any way, but for an unsupported inference the prosecutor's motive was to isolate her minor

boys to "coach" them for their trial testimony while separated from their mother. SAP 27:25-

28:1. He argues the desired inference should be "confirmed by the children's exact use of

[unspecified] terminology during trial." SAP 27:28-28:1. He reprises the same vague and

conclusory argument in his R&R Objections, adding he relies on purported "inconsistencies

in the boy's use of language," contending " 'their words' were simply Ms. Prior's words." R&R

Obj. 14:18-22 (emphasis added). He does not identify what "words" he refers to, nor how

those words were used in testimony that in any way can be imputed to prosecutorial

misconduct. He offers no specific facts to substantiate his suspicions. See James, 24 F.3d

at 26. Accordingly, the court ADOPTS the R&R recommendation habeas relief on this

theory of prosecutorial misconduct be denied.

6. Permitting Witness Communications

McClintock contends the "prosecutor. . . permitted intercommunication between

witnesses prior to and during the trial," adding only: "[n]otably on the record was the

intercommunication between petitioner's ex-spouse with the other witnesses." SAP 28:1-5.

The R&R carefully culls from the record the apparent target of McClintock's allegations, a

communication from Brian D. Moore, a prosecution witness who testifiedMcClintock sexually

molested him when he was thirteen. Lodg. 2 at 621-23. Mr. Moore asked the prosecutor

for permission to say "hello to the mom and the other victim," then introduced himself to

them and exchange a few words, outside his testimonial presence at the trial. Lodg. 2 at

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 21 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 - 05cv1510

634-35. His actual testimony was subject to cross-examination with the opportunity for the

defense to expose any bias. Id. McClintock also pretends his ex-wife or the Moore family

communicated six months prior to trial (Traverse at 20), but he does not show how any such

communication could be construed as so infecting his trial as to render it fundamentally

unfair. The R&R confirms the record does not support McClintock's allegation his ex-wife

also communicated with a juror, citing Lodg. 2 at 1168, where a juror approached the District

Attorney's investigator to ask permission to speak with Ms. Sigler after the case concluded.

The juror never spoke with Ms. Sigler directly. R&R 28:19-24. The court ADOPTS the R&R

recommendation nothing in these theories of prosecutorial misconduct can support federal

habeas relief.

7. Ex Parte Chambers Meeting With Judge

McClintock attacks an unsubstantiated ex parte communication by the prosecutor with

the trial judge he identifies as having involved the court's review, before his counsel arrived,

of 15 "virtual images used as evidence." SAP 28:6-12. He concedes this alleged event

occurred "before commencement of trial," and he acknowledges "the judge's right to review

evidence prior to trial." SAP 28:9-13. He relies for this theory on the "inflammatory" nature

of that evidence and the alleged timing of the review when the "evidence had not yet been

cross-reviewed and was not available anywhere but the prosecutor's personal 'lap-top'

computer in her own Files/Subdirectories," to suggest the prosecutor's "walk-through" of "the

evidence with the judge alone raises more than just subtle concern for misconduct to parties

involved." SAP 28:13-21 (emphasis added). The R&R finds "[n]othing in the record

indicates [the trial judge] reviewed the images with the prosecutor, but not defense counsel,

present." R&R 29:9-10. Moreover, the alleged prejudice is insufficient to support relief.

Even assuming the ex parte review occurred, the judge was not the trier of fact at

McClintock's trial. Any impressions the judge personally may have formed of the evidence

at that time, or at any other time, had no bearing on the verdicts. McClintock does not

contend his counsel never had an opportunity to review and object to any of that evidence

before trial. In fact, the Magistrate Judge's independent review of the record revealed

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 22 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 The R&R clarifies the actual genesis of McClintock's claim the prosecutor disobeyed the

court's order to draw no inferences of his sexual orientation from the websites he frequented.

"Although a prosecution witness made unsolicited references to 'gay porn sites, sexually-oriented

sites' (Lodgment 2 at 929), the trial court cured any error or potential prejudice by striking portions

of the witness' testimony. (Lodgment 2 at 1005-06). Further, the parties stipulated that the reference

to gay materials was really a reference to 'images on web sites involving sexual activities between

male children.' (Id.)." R&R 30:2-8.

- 23 - 05cv1510

McClintock's representation the images were solely contained in the prosecutor's computer

directories is untrue. Rather, "the images were burned on a computer disc and sealed as

exhibit nine." R&R 29:4-6, citing Lodg. 1 at 519, 531. The record reveals Exhibit 9 was

unsealed and reviewed by the judge prior to defense counsel's motion to dismiss the child

pornography counts. Lodg. 1 at 531; Lodg. 2 at 15. 

A petitioner must do more than surpass "just subtle concern" that an incident

associated with trial was improper in order to raise any cognizable constitutional issue.

McClintock makes no showing how such an ex parte incident could have prejudiced his trial

or in what manner some error of constitutional magnitude could be eked out from the alleged

event. The court ADOPTS the R&R recommendation this theory be rejected as providing

any ground for habeas relief, both because the contentions lack evidentiary support and,

even if the incident occurred and even if it were improper, the court finds it could only be

construed as harmless. 

8. Allegedly Modified Evidence

McClintock also alleges prosecutorial misconduct in the form of displaying titles of

web sites without the images, or formatting web images to fit a computer screen, which

allegedly took photos out of context and misled the jury, including through inferences of

homosexuality, thus violating his due process and fair trial rights. 7 The R&R highlights the

speculative nature of McClintock's imputation to the jury of thoughts and beliefs not

supported by any evidence, the lack of any explanation how the formatting of images to fit

a computer screen (even if that resulted in any modification of the image) constitutes

actionable "misconduct." The fact of defense counsel's access to, discussion of, and

acquiescence in admitting evidence of the website titles without objection undermines his

allegations of reversible error for prosecutorial misconduct. Nothing in McClintock's

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 23 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 - 05cv1510

Objections to the R&R alters this court's determination to ADOPT the recommendation

habeas relief on this theory must be denied.

9. No Constitutional Violation Cumulatively

McClintock contends the "flagrant and collective behavior in front of jurors" and the

"use of deception or unambiguous reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the

court or the jury is unconstitutional – irregardless of any objections or not." SAP 26:3-10.

That is an incorrect statement of the law, especially when applied to "methods" he has not

shown were so "deceptive" or "reprehensible" as to have infringed his constitutional rights.

Considering each area or instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct individually, the court

has adopted the recommended finding none standing alone so infected McClintock's trial

with unfairness as to constitute a violation of his due process or fair trial rights. The court

also assesses the cumulative effect of the discrete instances of alleged misconduct. Taken

together, and assuming for this narrow purpose the alleged misconduct occurred, the court

finds the effects were innocuous and did not prejudice him at trial, in the face of the quantity

and quality of evidence against him, the jury instructions, and admonitions of the court. It

is well settled defendants are not guaranteed perfect trials, only fair ones.

F. Ground Five: Refusal To Grant Continuance When Defendant Ill

McClintock was taken ill in the presence of the jury during his trial, on a Friday. He

was treated with fluids over the weekend. Trial resumed the following Monday after the

judge observed he looked much improved from the week before. The court denied a motion

for continuance, having obtained a medical report of McClintock's fitness to continue.

McClintock nevertheless alleges the "OK for trial" physician's order was made "without any

examinations." SAP 30:26-27. McClintock had attributed his stomach distress to having

eaten tainted food one week prior to trial. He contends his condition worsened by mid-trial.

He contends he was "subsequently diagnosed having active hepatitis" (SAP 30:8-24), but

simultaneously contends "to date, Petitioner never has been seen by a physician" and the

order of a "'STAT abdomen x-ray' to date never was done" (SAP 30:27-31:1). He admits he

"received 8 liters of I.V. fluids" over that weekend, "but still not seen by any physician nor any

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 24 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 - 05cv1510

diagnosis." SAP 31:10-12. The record reflects he notified the court on September 30, 2002,

after the jury began deliberating, of his Hepatitis A diagnosis. Lodg. 2 at 1296. The record

also reflects he remained cleared for trial by the medical team at all times, and the court

found him fit to proceed. Lodg. 2 at 1295-96.

McClintock protests his illness introduced a "structural defect" in the trial proceedings

purportedly warranting "reversal per se." SAP 32:1-7. His authority for that proposition

actually supports an opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 821 F.2d 986

(4th Cir. 1987) ("For a denial of a continuance to constitute an abuse of discretion. . . the

impending trial must pose a substantial danger to a defendant's life or health"), citing United

States v. Daly, 716 F.2d 1499, 1511 (9th Cir. 1983). Even if the trial court had abused its

discretion, habeas relief requires a petitioner to show a resulting constitutional violation. As

noted in the R&R, clearly established federal law commits to the trial judge's discretion the

determination whether or not to grant a continuance. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589

(1964) (only if a continuance is so arbitrary in the particular circumstances as to violate due

process will a cognizable constitutional issue arise). Challenges to the denial of a

continuance must be viewed from the perspective of "the reasons presented to the trial judge

at the time the request was denied." Id. at 589-90. 

The record reveals the court properly considered its own observations of the

defendant in the courtroom and a medical opinion he was "okay for trial." McClintock clearly

understood the nature of the charges against him, he conferred with this counsel before and

during trial, and the nature of his discomfort does not suggest he would be "unable to

properly and adequately assist his lawyers in the defense of his case." United States v.

Silverthorne, 430 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1970) ("continuance of a criminal trial based upon

physical disability is within the sound discretion of the trial judge"). McClintock's argument

he has a "fundamental right to play a proactive role in his defense" but was constrained to

"play a passive role" (R&R Obj. 7:18-22) raises no constitutional concern. He was

represented by competent counsel at his trial, and his IAC allegations are rejected above.

\\

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 25 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 - 05cv1510

 The Court of Appeal carefully reviewed McClintock's challenge to the denial of a

continuance to determine "whether [the] denial was so arbitrary as to deny due process" by

looking to "the circumstances of the case and the reasons presented for the request." Lodg.

p. 16, citing People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894, 1012-1013 (1998) (applying Ungar, 376 U.S.

575). That court concluded McClintock's illness did not prevent him from being "mentally

present" at his trial and "able to assist his counsel," a standard comparable to the federal

standard. Id., citing People v. Rogers, 150 Cal.App.2d 403, 410-12 (1957), His trial judge

found, despite McClintock's obvious illness, he had visibly improved by the following Monday

after he had received intravenous fluids and was cleared by medical staff for trial. Lodg. 6

p. 16. From the record, it is apparent "he was able to participate in the proceedings; he took

notes and conferred with his counsel during the proceedings;" the following day "he was in

a sufficiently good condition to be able to talk and laugh with the bailiff;" and at "no time,

even after he was diagnosed with Hepatitis A, was McClintock not cleared for trial,"

foreclosing any reasonable conclusion McClintock's condition so prevented him from

participating in his own defense as to have denied him due process. Lodg. 6 p. 16. The

court rejects his contention his illness interfered with some constitutional right to be

"proactive" when he could not direct the presentation of his defense in the detail he wished.

McClintock does not show the state court's determination on this claim was contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the decision was

so arbitrary as to have denied McClintock a fair trial. As traced in the R&R, the trial court

relied for its determination to deny a continuance on: a fax from the jail's attending physician

informing the court he was "okay for court;" the court's own observation McClintock's

appearance had improved over the weekend; at the conclusion of the Monday court session,

the court stated on the record McClintock had not manifested "ill behavior;" and his trial

counsel stated she had no indication he was unable to meaningfully assist in evaluating and

conceptualizing the evidence. R&R pp. 12-13. For all the foregoing reasons, the court

ADOPTS the R&R recommendation habeas relief be denied on the ground of prejudicial

denial of a continuance.

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 26 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 - 05cv1510

G. GroundSix:SentenceLength Constitutes CruelAndUnusualPunishment

McClintock contends his sentence of 30 years to life violates the Eighth Amendment

because the punishment is excessive based on the absence of any prior criminal record, his

"lifetime in the medical/surgical field," his "contributions to society locally, nationally, and

internationally," disproportionality of the sentence compared to the gravity of the offense, the

nature of the offenses "otherwise innocuous and passive" compared to "rape and murder,"

and the like. SAP pp. 33-35. Respondent (and the Court of Appeal) recharacterized the

actual circumstances and jury findings as demonstrating McClintock's "abuse of a position

of trust to repeatedly molest young boys over a period of years, as well as Petitioner's

continued inability to accept responsibility for his illegal behavior." Ans. at 36; Lodg. 6; see

R&R 13:20-26. That court found the record substantiated McClintock habitually molested

boys, and the lewd acts did not involve mere "grooming" as he attempted to argue. Lodg.

6 at 18-19. McClintock objects to the R&R recommendation by simply rearguing the

innocence of his conduct, contending Respondent's characterization "is neither true nor

consistent with the testimonies," as there "was never any covert attempts of concealing any

acts because the acts were nothing that defendant needed to conceal." R&R Obj. 12:1-11.

The United States Supreme Court discussed the standards for Eighth Amendment

habeas review in the sentencing context in Lockyear, 538 U.S. 63, acknowledging its

precedents in the area "have not been a model of clarity." "[T]he only relevant clearly

established law amenable to the 'contrary to' or 'unreasonable application of' framework is

the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable

only in the 'exceedingly rare' and 'extreme' case." Id. at 73, quoting and applying Harmelin

v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (supplying the

proportionality principles applicable to all Eighth Amendment sentencing challenges,

including outside the recidivist context). The Lockyear Court "makes no mention of any

constitutional imperative requiring that courts make the various intra- and inter-jurisdictional

comparisons recommended by" the Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); see

Nunes, 485 F.3d at 438.

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 27 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 - 05cv1510

"[S]uccessful challenges to sentencing proportionality are exceedingly rare." Ramirez

v. Castro 365 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ramirez court held that petitioner's most

recent offense, the nonviolent shoplift of a $199 VCR, chargeable as a "wobbler" felony only

by virtue of his prior theft-related conviction and for which he was sentenced to 25 years in

prison, was punished with an extreme sentence not justified by the gravity of his offense due

to the relatively minor nature of his recidivist history, in consideration of Rummel v. Estelle,

445 U.S. 263 (1980), Solem, 463 U.S. 277, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15-17 (2003),

Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, and Lockyear, 538 U.S. 63. Once "gross disproportionality" of the

sentence is established, federal reviewing courts examine whether the decision was contrary

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court

authority. Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. Unlike in Ramirez, this court does not find "gross

disproportionality" to be an issue. McClintock was not sentenced as a recidivist offender

under California's Three Strikes law. Rather, the sentence he received was for his multiple

specific convictions in the same case for abuse of minor boys and child pornography

possession, among other things. Whereas the Ramirez court was able to conclude neither

the gravity of that defendant's "wobbler" offense nor of his past two offenses could justify a

25-year sentence, McClintock's convictions permit no such minimizinganalysis. His multiplecount convictions amply support the sentence he received, and most of the individual count

sentences were ordered served concurrently.

This court is unable to conclude McClintock's sentence is cruel and unusual for

habeas relief purposes. The state court results upholding the sentence were not objectively

unreasonable nor contrary to controlling authority, in consideration of the number and nature

of the crimes of which McClintock was convicted, the proven duration of the conduct, the

abuse of a position of trust as a physician, and the like. See Lodg. 6 at 18-19. Moreover,

as noted in the R&R, the trial court expressly considered and credited McClintock's lack of

prior convictions and his professional achievements, choosing to run most of the sentences

concurrently rather than consecutively. The Court of Appeal amply demonstrated

McClintock's is not "one of those extremely rare cases" warranting relief based on a

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 28 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 - 05cv1510

proportionality challenge. Lodg. 6 p. 17. In particular, although he had no prior criminal

convictions, court noted "the evidence presented at trial shows these were not his first

molestations," as he "had molested at least two other boys in two other states in 1994."

Lodg. 6 p. 18. The case involved multiple molestations of multiple victims occurring over

a period of years, and "the record belies McClintock's assertion 'he is simply not a recidivist'"

because "the record shows McClintock habitually molested boys." Lodge 6, p. 18. That

court also reasonably rejected his characterization that he was being imprisoned for his

"'addiction' -- that is, for being a pedophile." Lodg. 6 p. 19. Rather he "is being imprisoned

because he took the further steps of seeking out and possessing child pornography and

committing lewd acts on innocent children." Id. 

All the considerations before the state courts and their objectively reasonable

conclusions in selecting, imposing, and upholding the sentence preclude a finding the

sentence should be disturbed on collateral review for any Eight Amendment violation.

Accordingly, the court ADOPTS the R&R recommendation habeas relief be denied on this

ground. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Petitioner's Objections to

the R&R are OVERRULED, the recommendation the Petition be denied is ADOPTED, and

the Petition is hereby DENIED, terminating this case in its entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 22, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-01510-LAB-WMC Document 33 Filed 04/23/08 Page 29 of 29