Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00580/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00580-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRACY MEANS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08-cv-00580 WQH (POR)

ORDER

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal

corporation and a Political Subdivision of the

State of California, and DOES 1-30,

inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge: 

The matter before the court is the motion to dismiss (Doc. # 5) filed by Defendant City of San

Diego.

Procedural Background

On February 5, 2008, Plaintiff Tracy Means filed a Complaint against Defendant City of San

Diego in the California State Superior Court in San Diego, California. (Doc. #1 at Ex. A). The

Complaint alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when it filed suit against

her in California State Superior Court. (Doc. # 1 at Ex. A). Specifically, the Complaint alleges that

Defendant violated Plaintiff’s equal protection rights, procedural due process rights, and substantive

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Doc. # 1 at

Ex. A). On March 27, 2008, Defendant removed the action to this Court. (Doc. # 1).

On April 3, 2008, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, and in the alternative, motion for a more definite statement and

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1 City of San Diego v. Tracy Means, SDSC Case No. GIC 858344.

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motion to strike. (Doc. # 5). On May 23, 2008, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion.

(Doc. # 9). On June 2, 2008, Defendant filed a reply in support of the motion. (Doc. # 10). 

Allegations of the Complaint

“Defendant City of San Diego is, and at all times mentioned was, a municipal corporation and

a Political Subdivision of the State of California.” First Amended Complaint (FAC) (Doc. #1 at Ex.

A), ¶ 1. Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant for approximately eight years, holding the position

of Deputy Director, Airports Division. FAC, ¶ 4. Plaintiff “left her employment with [Defendant]

City of San Diego in November, 2005.” FAC, ¶ 5.

On December 13, 2005, Defendant City of San Diego filed a lawsuit1 (Suit 1) against Plaintiff

in the California State Superior Court in San Diego, California, alleging that Plaintiff improperly

awarded “fourteen written purchase order contracts for consulting services.” FAC, ¶¶ 7-8. On

January 13, 2006, Plaintiff filed an answer to the complaint. FAC, ¶ 7. Defendant City of San Diego

ultimately amended the complaint on three occasions, and Plaintiff filed an answer to the 4th

Amended Complaint. FAC, ¶ 7. On February 27, 2006, and again on March 7, 2006, the San Diego

City Council addressed the question of whether Defendant City of San Diego would provide Plaintiff

a defense in Suit 1. FAC, ¶ 12. In March, 2006, the San Diego City Council denied Plaintiff a defense

on conflict of interest grounds. FAC, ¶ 12. On September, 7, 2006, Plaintiff asked Defendant City

of San Diego to withdraw the suit against Plaintiff. FAC, ¶ 13. The City of San Diego declined to

withdraw the suit. FAC, ¶ 13. In response, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. FAC, ¶

9. On August 10, 2007, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in Suit 1 was granted and judgment

was entered in Plaintiff’s favor on September 20, 2007. FAC, ¶ 9. On October 9, 2007, Defendant

City of San Diego appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which appeal is still pending. FAC,

¶ 10. 

On April 14, 2006, while Suit 1 was pending and following the City Council’s decision not

to provide Plaintiff with legal counsel, Plaintiff filed a “Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Mandamus,

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2 Tracy Means v. City of San Diego, SDSC Case No. GIC 864419

3Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows courtsto take judicial notice of mattersthat

are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). Court files are good examples of documents of

which courts can take judicial notice. Mullis v. U.S. Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court hereby takes judicial notice of the complaint and judgment in Tracy Means v. City of San

Diego, SDSC Case No. GIC 864419. (Doc. # 5 at Ex. 2 & Ex. 3); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001); Janas v. McCracken (in Re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig.), 183

F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999).

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and Attorney’s Fees”2 (Suit 2) against Defendant in the California State Superior Court in San Diego,

California. (Doc. # 5 at Ex. 2).3

 Plaintiff sought a declaration that Defendant was required to pay for

her defense in Suit 1, and an order of mandate compelling Defendant to provide Plaintiff a full and

complete defense from the allegations in Suit 1. (Doc. # 5 at Ex. 2, ¶¶ 19, 25). Plaintiff and

Defendant filed cross-motions for summary judgment in Suit 2. (Doc. # 5 at Ex. 3). On November

8, 2007, the State Superior Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in Suit 2. (Doc.

# 5 at Ex. 3).

Plaintiff is “informed and believes” that Defendant City of San Diego’s attorney “did not ask

for or receive permission” to file the suit against Plaintiff in the first instance, and further, that “in

spite of knowing these facts, the City Counsel repeatedly ratified the continuation of the frivolous and

unlawful actions.” FAC, ¶ 11. “Despite repeated attempts by [Plaintiff] Ms. Means to have the

lawsuit withdrawn, dismissed or otherwise ended, the Mayor, City Council and City Attorney

separately and together failed and refused to do so.” FAC, ¶ 14. The San Diego “City Council

allowed [Suit 1] to continue and was deliberately indifferent to the fact and knowledge which the City

Council had that [the City Attorney] had insufficient evidence to support the allegations against

[Plaintiff] Ms Means.” FAC, ¶ 15. “In failing and refusing to end [Suit 1] and in passing and refusing

to pass various resolutions regarding [Suit 1], Defendant made official policy which violated

Plaintiff’s [c]onstitutional rights.” FAC, ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that the City Attorney has initiated

lawsuits against other current and former employees of the City of San Diego and that the City of San

Diego has provided a defense for those other employees. FAC ¶ 19.

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal

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sufficiency of the pleadings. De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978). A complaint

may be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) where the factual allegations do not

raise the “right of relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965

(2007). Conversely, a complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim where the

allegations plausibly show “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2)). In ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the pleadings in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, and must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint,

as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023,

1028 (9th Cir. 2003). Legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the

form of factual allegations. Robertson v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1981). “Nor is

the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.

2001), amended by 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).

Discussion

1. Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim (Claim 1)

In the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated her rights under the

Equal Protection Clause by singling her out for unfair and inequitable treatment. Plaintiff alleges that

the City Attorney has initiated lawsuits against other current and former employees of the City of San

Diego; and that the City of San Diego has provided a defense for those other employees “while

simultaneously refusing to provide her with a defense to the underlying action.” FAC ¶ 19. 

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claim on grounds that res judicata

prohibits lawsuits on any claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action.

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s claim to a full and complete defense by the City raised in first cause

of action is the same claim raised by the Plaintiff in Suit 2 and that nothing prevented Plaintiff from

raising her current claim in Suit 2. Id. at 8. 

Plaintiff contends that res judicata is not applicable because the primary right asserted in Suit

2 is distinct from the primary right asserted in the current suit. Plaintiff further contends that res

judicata is not applicable because Suit 2 was a mandamus proceeding, and is therefore a “special

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proceeding” to which res judicata does not apply. Opposition, p. 5-6. 

Claim preclusion may appropriately be argued and decided on a motion to dismiss in a case

where the material facts are not disputed. See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984)

(holding that claim preclusion is appropriately raised on a motion to dismiss if the defendant does not

raise issues of disputed facts). 

The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, “bars all grounds for recovery

that could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same parties on

the same cause of action.” Robertson v. Isomedix, Inc. (In re Int’l Nutronics, Inc.), 28 F.3d 965, 969

(9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Fields v. Sarasota

Manatee Airport Authority, 953 F.2d 1299, 1309 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Attempting [silently to] reserve

federal issues by failing to raise them in a state court complaint is clearly insufficient to preserve

federal court review of unraised constitutional issues.”). The purpose of res judicata is to protect

litigants from multiple lawsuits, to conserve judicial resources, and to encourage certainty and reliance

upon judicial decisions. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322

F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003). A federal court deciding whether a claim is precluded by a prior

state court claim must use the claim preclusion law from the state from which the prior judgment was

taken. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2003); Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681

F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In California, claim preclusion prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit

between the same parties or parties in privity with them. See Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal.

4th 888, 896 (2002). Claim preclusion applies when: (1) the claim or cause of action raised in the

prior adjudication is identical to the claim or cause of action presented in the later action; (2) the prior

proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is

being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Federation of Hillside

& Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1202 (2004). Whether two suits are

based on the same claim or cause of action under California law is based on the “primary right

theory.” See Mycogen Corp., 28 Cal. 4th at 904. As the Ninth Circuit has explained,

a cause of action is comprised of a primary right of the plaintiff, a corresponding

primary duty of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a

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breach of that duty. The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is

indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of

action.

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mycogen Corp., 28 Cal. 4th at 904

(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party may bring only one cause of action to vindicate

a primary right. Mycogen Corp., 28 Cal. 4th at 904. Claims not raised in this single cause of action

may not be raised at a later date. Id. Different theories of recovery are not separate primary rights.

Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

Mycogen Corp., 28 Cal. 4th at 903).

The Court finds that there are no material facts in dispute relating to the application of res

judicata in this case. Plaintiff does not dispute that Suit 2 resulted in a final judgment on the merits

and that the current parties are the same as the parties in Suit 2. The primary right litigated by the

Plaintiff in Suit 2 was the right of Plaintiff to have Defendant provide Plaintiff with a full and

complete defense to the claims made against her by the City in Suit 1. (Doc. # 5 at Ex. 2, ¶¶ 19, 28).

The Court concludes that the allegations of the complaint in first cause of action in this case assert the

same primary right, that is, Plaintiff’s right to have Defendant provide Plaintiff with a full and

complete defense to the claims made against her by the City in Suit 1. Plaintiff’s contention that a

mandamus proceeding is a special proceeding which is not subject to the doctrine of res judicata is not

supported by law. The California Courts have ruled that there is “no reason to distinguish between

actions and special proceedings for purposes of res judicata if the requirements of the doctrine are

satisfied and if the issues asserted in the later proceeding could have been asserted in the prior

proceeding.” See Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 4th

1180, 1205 (2004) (internal citations omitted); see also Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Dep’t of Alcoholic

Beverage Control, 55 Cal. 2d 728, 361 (1961) (“the doctrine of res judicata applies to judgments on

the merits in proceedings in mandamus”). Viewing the allegations of the Complaint in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim for violation of her equal protection

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is barred by res judicata. Defendant’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s first claim is granted.

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2. Plaintiff’s Substantive & Procedural Due Process Claims (Claims 2 & 3)

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claims on the grounds that the Complaint

fails to allege that Defendant had a custom or policy which deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional

rights. Mot. to Dismiss, p. 10. Defendant notes that a municipality cannot be found liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is a custom or policy which infringes upon constitutional rights. Id.

Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s due process claims “are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983" because a due process claim requires the assertion of a liberty or property interest and neither

a liberty nor property interest was at stake when Defendant City of San Diego sued Plaintiff for

improperly awarding contracts in Suit 1. Id. at 10-11.

Plaintiff contends that she has adequately alleged sufficient facts underlying her claim for due

process violations because at the pleading stage, “everything [pled] in the complaint [must] simply

be accepted as true.” Opposition, p. 11.

A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “A threshold requirement to a

substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiff’s showing of a liberty or property interest

protected by the Constitution.” Wedges/Ledges of Cal. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir.

1994) (citing Bd. Of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). “To have a property interest, a

person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire.” Nunez v. City of L.A., 147 F.3d 867,

872 (9th Cir. 1998). “A mere ‘unilateral expectation’ of a benefit or privilege is insufficient; the

plaintiff must ‘have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” Id. (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).

Protected property interests are not created by the Constitution, but by “existing rules or

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law, rules or understandings that

secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Thorton v. City of St.

Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). “A reasonable expectation

of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the

entitlement is couched in mandatory terms.” Wedges/Ledges of Cal., 24 F.3d at 62 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Plaintiff contends that she “has protected liberty and property interests in a career, profession

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and job conferred by the California State Constitution,” and that “Plaintiff was deprived of her liberty

and property interests to be free of unlawful interference with her career without due process of law.”

FAC, ¶¶ 29, 30. Plaintiff also contends that her “career, profession and job opportunities have been

negatively impacted along with her income, emotional health and physical health” because “Defendant

did not follow the minimum procedures required by the Constitution,” and that Defendant

demonstrated “deliberate indifference to the harassment and impediments to [Plaintiff’s] liberty and

property interests by rendering her more vulnerable to [physical, financial and emotional harm] by

allowing the underlying action [in Suit 1] to continue.” FAC, ¶¶ 34, 45. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to properly allege due process violations in the

FAC because the claims as alleged are not ripe for review. Plaintiff’s contentions that Defendant

demonstrated “deliberate indifference to the harassment and impediments to [Plaintiff’s] liberty and

property interests by . . . allowing the [action in Suit 1] to continue,” and that Defendant’s filing of

Suit 1 resulted in “unlawful interference” with Plaintiff’s career are premised on the fact that the

California Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor in Suit 1 will be upheld

by the California Court of Appeal. See FAC, ¶¶ 30, 45. In other words, Plaintiff’s due process claims

are premised on the unresolved notion that Defendant’s suit against Plaintiff in Suit 1 was frivolous

and entirely without merit. The problem, however, is that Suit 1 is currently pending before the

California Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the pending due process claims

are not ripe for review and should be dismissed without prejudice. See Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch.

Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 662 (9th Cir. 2002) (claim is not ripe if it rests upon future events that may not

occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all).

In addition to ripeness, in order to claim a property interest in her job, Plaintiff must have a

legitimate entitlement to continued employment and not merely a unilateral expectation of continued

employment. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. While Plaintiff contends that she has liberty and property

interests in her employment, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support a claim that she has a

legitimate entitlement to continued employment. 

Viewing the allegations of the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court

concludes that Plaintiff failed to allege due process claims because the claims are not ripe for review.

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and third claims for failure to state a claim is granted.

Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (Doc. # 5) is GRANTED. This case

is dismissed without prejudice.

DATED: August 6, 2008

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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