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Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2003 Decided November 14, 2003

No. 02-7100

KINGMAN PARK CIVIC ASSOCIATION AND

CHEVY CHASE CIVIC ASSOCIATION,

APPELLANTS

v.

ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02675)

Frazer Walton, Jr. argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Steven W. Teppler.

John R. Hoellen, Assistant General Counsel, argued the

cause for appellee Council of the District of Columbia. With

him on the brief were Charlotte Brookins-Hudson, General

Counsel, and Katherine Westcott, Assistant General Counsel.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-7100 Document #784927 Filed: 11/14/2003 Page 1 of 16
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Brian K. Flowers, Assistant General Counsel, entered an

appearance.

Michael F. Wasserman, Assistant Corporation Counsel,

argued the cause for appellee Mayor Anthony A. Williams.

With him on the brief was Charles L. Reischel, Deputy

Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed. Donna

M. Murasky, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Edward E.

Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered appearances.

Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: This appeal involves a challenge

to the Ward Redistricting Amendment Act of 2001 (the

‘‘Ward Redistricting Act’’ or the ‘‘Act’’), which redrew the

boundaries of the District of Columbia’s eight electoral wards

following the 2000 census. See D.C. CODE § 1-1041.03 (Supp.

2003). Shortly before the new ward boundaries took effect,

appellants Kingman Park Civic Association (‘‘KPCA’’) and

Chevy Chase Civic Association (‘‘CCCA’’) brought suit in the

District Court against D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams (‘‘the

Mayor’’) in his official capacity and the members of the D.C.

Council (‘‘the Council’’) in their official capacities, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellants claimed that the

Act dilutes African-American voting strength in Ward Six and

citywide in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965

(‘‘Voting Rights Act’’), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2003), and violates

various provisions of D.C. law governing ward redistricting.

The Mayor and the Council moved separately to dismiss, or

in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District

Court first dismissed the complaint against the Council, holding that they are entitled to legislative immunity from suit in

connection with their ‘‘legitimate legislative activity’’ in drafting and adopting the Act. The court then dismissed the

Voting Rights Act counts of the complaint against the Mayor

for failure to state a claim, and dismissed the pendent D.C.

law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Appellants challenge these rulings on appeal, renewing their Voting Rights

Act and D.C. law claims solely as to Wards Three and Six and

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alleging, for the first time, that the Act racially gerrymanders

ward boundaries in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments.

We affirm the judgment of the District Court. We do so,

however, on different grounds than those relied on by the

District Court. We hold that, although it was error for the

District Court to dismiss the Voting Rights Act counts of the

complaint for failure to state a claim, the Mayor is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on those counts on the

record before us. Appellants have made no showing that

minority voters in the relevant wards are politically cohesive

or that the wards are characterized by racially polarized

voting. They therefore fail to establish a triable issue as to at

least two of the three conditions essential to a prima facie

case of vote dilution under § 2. We decline to reach appellants’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims, which

were not raised before the District Court and were therefore

waived. Having resolved the federal claims in the Mayor’s

favor, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the pendent

D.C. law claims against him. Finally, we dismiss appellants’

claims against the Council for lack of a substantial federal

question. It is undisputed that appellants’ federal claims

against the Mayor and the Council are identical. The merits

of these claims having been resolved dispositively against

appellants, there remains no federal question requiring decision. We therefore dismiss the suit against the Council

without addressing their assertion of legislative immunity.

I. BACKGROUND

The District of Columbia is governed in part by a popularly

elected mayor and a popularly elected Council, the latter

being composed of five members elected at large and eight

members elected from single-member wards. See D.C. CODE

§§ 1-204.01 et seq., 1-204.21 et seq. (2001). D.C. law requires

that the Council, by act after public hearing, adjust the

boundaries of the city’s eight electoral wards as necessary

following each decennial census. D.C. CODE § 1-1011.01(a),

(b) (2001). The resulting wards must be compact, contiguous,

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and approximately equal in population, and must conform to

the greatest extent possible to census tract boundaries. See

D.C. CODE § 1-1011.01(c), (e) (2001). The population of each

ward must be within five percent of the mean ward population, ‘‘unless the deviation results from the limitations of

census geography or from promotion of a rational public

policy, including but not limited to respect for the political

geography of the District, the natural geography of the

District, neighborhood cohesiveness, or the development of

compact and contiguous districts.’’ D.C. CODE § 1-1011.01(f)

(2001). D.C. law prohibits the adoption of any redistricting

plan or amendment to a redistricting plan with the ‘‘purpose

and effect of diluting the voting strength of minority citizens.’’

D.C. CODE § 1-1001.01(g) (2001).

The 2000 census results revealed a marked disproportion in

the population of the District’s eight electoral wards, attributable to population growth in the western wards (Wards One,

Two, and Three) and a corresponding decline in the population of the eastern wards (Wards Four, Five, Six, Seven, and

Eight). See Compl. for Declaratory J. Ex. 8 (map based on

U.S. Census Bureau data showing population changes from

1990 to 2000); see also District of Columbia Population by

Single Race and Hispanic Origin by Ward-2000 (prepared by

the D.C. Office of Planning/State Data Center from U.S.

Census Bureau data) (hereinafter ‘‘Pre-Redistricting Ward

Population By Race’’), reprinted in Joint Appendix (‘‘J.A.’’) C

(First Am. Compl. App. 10).

In June of 2001, the Council adopted and the Mayor signed

the Ward Redistricting Act, which adjusted the District’s

ward boundaries in light of the census results. After review

by both houses of the U.S. Congress, the Act became law on

October 2, 2001, and the ward boundary changes took effect

on January 1, 2002. See D.C. CODE § 1-1041.03 (Supp. 2003)

(legislative history). The Act adjusted ward boundaries to

bring the population of every ward to within five percent or

less of the mean ward population. See June 19, 2001 Final

Redistricting Summary Table, reprinted in J.A. C (First Am.

Compl. App. 5). In so doing, the Act transferred several

neighborhoods or portions of neighborhoods from one ward to

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another and altered the racial composition of several wards.

See Sewell Chan, Proposed Lines Divide D.C. Residents,

WASH. POST, May 7, 2001, at B2, reprinted in J.A. C (First

Am. Compl. App. 3).

Of particular importance for this litigation, the Act transferred approximately 1,840 residents of the predominantly

African-American neighborhood of Kingman Park from Ward

Six, located on the west side of the Anacostia River, to Ward

Seven, which otherwise is located completely on the east side

of the River. This boundary change allegedly was recommended by the Ward Six redistricting task force, appointed in

the spring of 2001 by Sharon Ambrose, the D.C. Council

Member representing Ward Six. The Kingman Park transfer, in conjunction with other boundary changes, reduced the

African-American proportion of the Ward Six population from

68.7% to 62.3%. Compare Pre-Redistricting Ward Population

By Race, supra, with District of Columbia Population by

Single Race and Hispanic Origin by Amended Plan H Ward2000 (prepared by the D.C. Office of Planning/State Data

Center from U.S. Census Bureau data) (hereinafter ‘‘PostRedistricting Ward Population By Race’’), reprinted in J.A. C

(First Am. Compl. App. 10). The African-American proportion of the population in Ward Seven, into which the Kingman

Park residents were moved, changed from 96.9% to 96.8%.

See id.

The Act also moved a significant portion of the Chevy

Chase neighborhood, located on the western side of Rock

Creek Park, from Ward Three to Ward Four. Ward Four is

considered by some to be ‘‘the heart of the city’s upper- and

middle-class black establishment,’’ and, prior to redistricting,

was located completely on the eastern side of Rock Creek

Park. See Chan, supra, at B2. The African-American proportion of the Ward Three population was reduced from 6.3%

to 5.1%. See Pre-Redistricting Ward Population By Race,

supra, and Post-Redistricting Ward Population By Race,

supra.

On December 27, 2001, five days before the new boundaries

took effect, appellant KPCA brought suit against the memUSCA Case #02-7100 Document #784927 Filed: 11/14/2003 Page 5 of 16
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bers of the Council in their official capacities and the Mayor

in his official capacity. On July 26, 2002, the complaint was

amended to include appellant CCCA as a co-plaintiff. KPCA

is an unincorporated neighborhood association established in

the 1920s. It has approximately 100 active members, all of

whom were registered voters of former Ward Six and appear

now to be divided between Wards Five, Six, and Seven. See

First Am. Compl. ¶ 4, reprinted in J.A. C; Tr. of Motions

Hearing at 31, Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams

(D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2002) (Civ. Action No. 01-2675) (hereinafter

‘‘Tr. of Motions Hearing’’), reprinted in J.A. E. CCCA is a

recently established unincorporated neighborhood association

with less than 25 active members, all of whom are registered

voters in Ward Three. First Am. Compl. ¶ 5(b), reprinted in

J.A. C.

The gravamen of appellants’ complaint is that the transfer

of the Kingman Park residents from Ward Six to Ward Seven

diluted African-American voting strength in violation of § 2 of

the Voting Rights Act. The complaint alleged, in addition,

that the Act diluted African-American voting strength

throughout the city by reducing African-American majorities

in wards with a significant white minority and ‘‘packing’’

African-American voters into wards with an African-American

supermajority. Appellants further claimed that the Act violated provisions of D.C. law prohibiting adoption of redistricting plans with the purpose and effect of diluting minority

voting strength, and requiring that wards be compact, approximately equal in size, and conform to census tracts.

Appellants initially alleged that the KPCA and its members

were excluded from participation in the Ward Six redistricting task force in violation of the due process clauses of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but withdrew this claim

prior to the District Court’s decision. Kingman Park Civic

Ass’n v. Williams, Civ. Action No. 01-2675, slip op. at 11 n.9

(D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2002), reprinted in J.A. A.

The Council and the Mayor moved separately to dismiss, or

in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District

Court dismissed the complaint against the Council members

on the ground that they were entitled to absolute legislative

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immunity from suit for their official actions in connection with

the adoption of the Act. Id. at 4-5. The court went on to

dismiss all of appellants’ claims against the Mayor. As to the

claim of vote dilution in Wards Six and Seven, in which

appellant KPCA’s members reside, the court dismissed the

complaint for failure to state a claim under § 2 of the Voting

Rights Act. Id. at 6-9. The court held that appellants lacked

standing to challenge ‘‘citywide’’ vote dilution outside of

Wards Six, Seven, and Three, but concluded that, even if they

did have standing, they failed to state a claim under the

Voting Rights Act. Having dismissed appellants’ federal

claims, the court dismissed the pendent D.C. law claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Id. at 11. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Appellants maintain two claims on appeal. First, they

renew their claim that the Act dilutes African-American

voting strength, in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act,

by transferring residents of Kingman Park from Ward Six to

Ward Seven and by transferring residents of Chevy Chase

from Ward Three to Ward Four. Second, they assert, for the

first time on appeal, that the Act results in racially discriminatory gerrymandering in violation of the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments. We hold that the Mayor is entitled

to summary judgment on the first claim, and that the second

claim is not properly before this court because it was not

raised below.

A. Threshold Issues

A threshold concern is presented by the Mayor’s assertion

that he is entitled to legislative immunity from suit, because

his authority and actions in connection with the Ward Redistricting Act are strictly legislative in nature. We decline to

reach the merits of this argument. In proceedings before the

District Court, counsel for the Mayor disavowed any claim to

legislative immunity in this action insofar as the Mayor was

sued in his official capacity. Tr. of Motions Hearing at 56-67.

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Therefore, the legislative immunity claim was expressly

waived and cannot be resurrected on appeal.

We likewise decline to address the merits of the Mayor’s

claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the District of

Columbia is not a ‘‘State or political subdivision’’ to which § 2

of the Voting Rights Act applies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973

(2003). ‘‘It is the general rule, of course, that a federal

appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon

below.’’ Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). The

Mayor’s claim raises a pure question of law, which is within

our discretionary authority to address. See Roosevelt v. E.I.

Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 419 & n.5 (D.C.

Cir. 1992). The issue presented, however, is of sufficient

public importance and complexity to counsel strongly against

deciding it in this posture. Appellants had no opportunity to

address this defense prior to filing their reply brief. See

Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d

685, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that, in exercising its

discretion as to whether to hear an issue not raised below, the

court will look to whether the issue has been fully briefed by

the parties). We need not resolve this question, moreover,

because we decide the Voting Rights Act claims in the

Mayor’s favor without turning to this untimely raised defense.

B. Voting Rights Act Claims

1. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

This court reviews de novo the District Court’s dismissal of

a complaint for failure to state a claim, accepting plaintiffs’

factual allegations as true, and giving plaintiffs ‘‘the benefit of

all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’’

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Sparrow v.

United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

We find that the District Court erred in dismissing appellants’ Voting Rights Act claims against the Mayor under Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A Rule

12(b)(6) motion is intended to test the legal sufficiency of the

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complaint. Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. But the complaint

need only set forth ‘‘a short and plain statement of the claim,’’

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), giving the defendant fair notice of the

claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). ‘‘Such simplified ‘notice pleading’ is

made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the

other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose

more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to

define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.’’ Id. at

47-48. In light of these liberal pleading requirements, ‘‘a

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.’’ Id. at 45-46.

Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act provides, in relevant

part, that ‘‘[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting

or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or

applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner

which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any

citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or

colorTTTT’’ 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2003). A violation of this

prohibition is established

if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is

shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision

are not equally open to participation by members of

a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this

section in that its members have less opportunity

than other members of the electorate to participate

in the political process and to elect representatives

of their choice.

42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2003).

In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

appellants were required only to allege that the Ward Redistricting Act dilutes minority voting strength such that minority voters in the relevant wards have ‘‘less opportunity than

other members of the electorate to participate in the political

process and to elect representatives of their choice.’’ See

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Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1115 (‘‘Because racial discrimination in

employment is ‘a claim upon which relief can be granted,’TTTT

‘I was turned down for a job because of my race’ is all a

complaint has to say to survive a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6).’’ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Appellants were not required on the face of their

complaint to allege every legal element or fact that must be

proven in a vote dilution claim. See id. at 1114-15; Krieger v.

Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (‘‘[C]omplaints

need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal

theory.’’ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));

Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 421-22 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) (‘‘A complaint TTT need not allege all that a plaintiff

must eventually prove.’’).

Appellants’ complaint clearly passes this test. Counts I, II,

and III of the complaint allege that the defendants manipulated ward boundaries with the purpose and effect of ‘‘packing’’

African-American voters into supermajority African-American

wards and decreasing the African-American proportion of the

overall and voting-age population in every ward in which the

white proportion of the population was 10.3% or greater. See

First Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 27-47, reprinted in J.A. C. The complaint specifically alleged that the Act resulted in the reduction of the African-American proportion of the Ward Six

population from 68.7% to 62.3%, in part by transferring 1,840

African-American voters from Kingman Park to Ward Seven,

a supermajority African-American ward. See id. ¶ ¶ 17-26.

No more was necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

We acknowledge that ‘‘it is possible for a plaintiff to plead

too much: that is, to plead himself out of court by alleging

facts that render success on the merits impossible.’’ Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1116. Appellants did not do so here.

Although appellants’ complaint alleges that African Americans remain an absolute majority in Ward Six and in every

other ward in which they were a majority prior to redistricting, this does not suffice to place it ‘‘beyond doubt that the

plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim

which would entitle [them] to relief.’’ Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-

46. Vote dilution claims must be assessed in light of the

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demographic and political context, and it is conceivable that

minority voters might have ‘‘less opportunity TTT to elect

representatives of their choice’’ even where they remain an

absolute majority in a contested voting district.

2. Summary Judgment

While we find that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was

improper, we nevertheless affirm the District Court’s judgment in favor of the Mayor on summary judgment grounds.

See Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (‘‘Here

in fact the [defendant’s] motion to dismiss requested summary judgment in the alternative [to dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6)], and if summary judgment is the correct disposition,

we may convert and affirm on those grounds.’’).

Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate where

the pleadings and the record ‘‘show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’’ FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-

51 (1986). The moving party is not required to support its

motion for summary judgment with ‘‘affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.’’ Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (emphasis in original).

Rather,

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.

Id. at 322.

Where the moving party has properly supported its motion,

Rule 56 does not permit the nonmoving party to rest upon its

pleadings. Rather, the nonmoving party’s opposition must,

by affidavits or otherwise, ‘‘set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’’ FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).

The District Court may deny or defer ruling on the motion

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for summary judgment in order to permit discovery. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5 (noting

that summary judgment should be refused ‘‘where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition’’).

In order to make out a prima facie case of vote dilution

under § 2, appellants must satisfy the three threshold conditions set forth by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). They must establish: (1) that the

minority group in question is ‘‘sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district’’; (2) that the minority group is ‘‘politically

cohesive’’; and (3) that the ‘‘majority votes sufficiently as a

bloc to enable it TTT usually to defeat the minority’s preferred

candidate.’’ Id. at 50-51. While Gingles itself involved a

multimember district, the Supreme Court has made clear that

these conditions must likewise be met in actions, such as this,

challenging one or more single-member districts. See Growe

v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993). If the Gingles conditions are met, a court then must determine whether the

‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ indicates that minority voters

have been denied equal opportunity to participate in the

political process. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,

1009-12 (1994).

To satisfy the first Gingles condition, appellants must show

‘‘the possibility of creating more than the existing number of

reasonably compact districts with a sufficiently large minority

population to elect candidates of its choice.’’ Id. at 1008.

Appellants fail to establish a triable issue as to this condition

with regard to Ward Three. African Americans represented

6.3% of the Ward Three population prior to redistricting, and

5.1% after redistricting. Appellants have not identified, nor

on the record does it appear possible to identify, an alternative plan creating more than the existing number of majority

African-American wards in the area shared by Ward Three

and the adjacent wards (i.e., Wards One, Two, and Four).

We will assume, without deciding, that appellants have met

the first Gingles condition with respect to Ward Six. Cf. id.

at 1009 (assuming, without deciding, that the first Gingles

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condition has been satisfied). While African Americans remain the majority in the post-redistricting Ward Six population, it is at least conceivable that the reduction in the

African-American proportion of the population from 68.7% to

62.3% might deprive African Americans of an ‘‘effective’’ or

‘‘safe’’ voting majority in that ward. Given the high proportion of African Americans in adjacent Ward Seven (96.8%), it

is possible that two ‘‘safe’’ majority-minority wards could be

created in the area shared by Ward Six and Ward Seven.

Even if appellants are given the benefit of this assumption,

however, they fail to establish a triable issue as to the second

and third Gingles conditions with regard to Ward Six or

Ward Three. Appellants have not alleged that AfricanAmerican voters in Ward Six or Ward Three are politically

cohesive or that Ward Six or Ward Three is characterized by

racially polarized voting. Nor have appellants submitted

affidavits or any other evidence supporting such a conclusion.

There is no evidence in the record relating to the breakdown

by racial group of voting preferences or patterns in Ward Six,

Ward Three, or elsewhere in the District. See Growe, 507

U.S. at 41-42 (holding that ‘‘Section 2 ‘does not assume the

existence of bloc voting: plaintiffs must prove it’ ’’) (quoting

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46). Appellants did not seek discovery

on this issue, either before or after defendants submitted

their motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.

Appellants’ statement of material facts in dispute, submitted with their motion opposing summary judgment, repeatedly states the legal conclusion that the redistricting plan

‘‘unlawfully diluted’’ minority voting strength, but it makes no

mention of minority political cohesiveness or racially polarized

voting. See Statement of Material Facts as to Which Exist

Genuine Issues in Dispute, reprinted in J.A. B. The four

declarations and 10 exhibits accompanying appellants’ opposition to summary judgment are likewise devoid of any statement or evidence related to minority political cohesiveness or

racially polarized voting. See Opp’n to Council Def. and Def.

Williams’ Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J., reprinted in J.A.

B. Finally, in the hearing before the District Court on the

motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, counsel for

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appellants expressly stated that the only facts at issue in the

case were ‘‘missing’’ statistics as to the breakdown by race of

the voting-age population in the new wards created by the

Act. Tr. of Motions Hearing at 37-38. With that exception,

appellants maintained, ‘‘[e]verything else is undisputed.’’ Id.

at 37.

In sum, appellants have made no showing that there exists

a triable issue as to minority political cohesiveness or racially

polarized voting. As a result, they fail to make the required

showing as to the second and third Gingles conditions, which

are ‘‘element[s] essential to’’ their case upon which they will

bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322. The Mayor therefore is entitled to summary judgment

on the Voting Rights claims against him.

C. Remaining Issues

In addition to the Voting Rights Act claims, appellants

assert, for the first time on appeal, that the Ward Redistricting Act violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

They allege that race was the ‘‘predominate factor’’ in redrawing ward boundaries under the Act, and that the Act had

the purpose and effect of discriminating on the basis of race.

We decline to address the merits of this untimely claim.

Racial gerrymandering claims of this nature involve highly

complex factual inquiries, focusing on the interaction of geography, demography, and politics. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241-58 (2001) (evaluating and overturning a

three-judge district court’s finding that race was the predominant factor in redistricting). The general presumption

against deciding claims not raised below is particularly strong

where, as here, the claim turns upon factual questions not yet

passed upon by the district court. See Boehner v. Anderson,

30 F.3d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (declining to reach a claim

predicated on a factual assumption not established below);

Texas Rural Legal Aid, 940 F.3d at 697 (in deciding whether

to hear a claim not raised below, the court will look to

‘‘whether decision of the issue would be aided by the development of a factual record in the district court’’).

Having determined that the Mayor was entitled to summary judgment on the sole federal claim properly before this

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court, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1367 of the pendent D.C. law claims against him.

That provision authorizes a district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent claims if ‘‘the

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdictionTTTT’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1993). Dismissal of the pendent claims was appropriate here, where all

of the federal claims were properly resolved against appellants. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 726 (1966).

Finally, we turn to appellants’ claims against the Council.

As noted above, appellants withdrew their due process claims

regarding the Ward Six redistricting task force before the

District Court issued its decision. Appellants’ only remaining

federal claim against the Council is the challenge, under § 2

of the Voting Rights Act, to the lawfulness of the Ward

Redistricting Act. This claim is identical to the Voting

Rights Act claim decided in favor of the Mayor. Because the

merits of the Voting Rights Act claim have been dispositively

resolved against appellants, the identical claim against the

Council no longer raises a substantial federal question.

Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the

Voting Rights Act counts of the complaint against the Council

on the alternative ground that there was no substantial

federal question conferring jurisdiction. See World Wide

Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154,

1167 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affirming the dismissal of claims

against one defendant for lack of a substantial federal question, because the court had ‘‘dispositively resolve[d] the identical claims’’ against the other defendant on the same appeal),

cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1250 (2003). We affirm dismissal of

the pendent D.C. law claims against the Council on the same

basis. Consequently, we need not address the Council members’ assertion of legislative immunity.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of

the District Court in favor of the Mayor with respect to

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appellants’ Voting Rights Act claims. On the record before

us, the Mayor is entitled to summary judgment on these

claims. We likewise affirm the District Court’s dismissal of

the pendent D.C. law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Finally, having dispositively resolved the merits of appellants’

Voting Rights Act claims in favor of the Mayor, we affirm

dismissal of the identical federal and pendent D.C. law claims

as to the Council for lack of a substantial federal question

conferring jurisdiction.

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