Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01380/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01380-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DAVID A. DUGAN, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 

) No. CIV 04-1380 PHX RCB

vs. ) 

)

INTEL CORPORATION, a Delaware ) O R D E R

corporation, authorized to do )

business in the state of )

Arizona, )

)

Defendant. ) )

In this employment discrimination action, originally filed in

the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County, Plaintiff

complains that Defendant Intel Corporation ("Intel") improperly

discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act ("ADA") by failing and refusing to provide him a

reasonable accommodation for his disability. Notice (doc. # 1). 

Defendant removed the case to this Court on July 7, 2004. Id. On

September 13, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Mot. (doc. # 36). On May 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed a response

conceding that his voluntary resignation would preclude him from 

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recovering back pay, front pay, or injunctive relief and also that

the doctrine of after-acquired evidence would preclude him from

recovering damages. Resp. (doc. # 45) at 1. Although Plaintiff

admits that his remedies would be seriously limited, he neither

concedes nor opposes any of Defendant's arguments as to liability. 

Id. at 2. Under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i), the Court

may deem a party's lack of opposition as consent to the granting of

a motion, and may grant the motion summarily if it is facially

meritorious. LRCiv 7.2(i); Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d

943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). Having carefully considered the

arguments raised, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant as a

Manufacturing Technician in August of 1997. On or about November

28, 1997, Plaintiff complained to Intel's Occupational Health

Department regarding knee pain, which prevented him from standing

for extended periods of time. Def.'s Statement of Facts (doc. #

37) ("DSOF") ¶¶ 1-2. On December 17, 2002, Plaintiff began an

approved medical leave of absence. Id. ¶ 3.

On February 6, 2003, a Medical Care Manager in Intel's

Occupational Health Department informed Plaintiff that he would be

provided additional job-protected ADA leave as an accommodation. 

Id. ¶ 4.

From May 7, 2003 until September 29, 2003, Plaintiff was

permitted to perform desk work as an accommodation. Id. ¶ 8. 

During that time he inquired about the possibility of transfer to a

position that would better accommodate his disability, and was

offered an opportunity in the "sort" area. Plaintiff declined that

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opportunity on the basis that it would not allow him to work on

equipment. Id. ¶ 9.

From September 29, 2003 to September 28, 2004, Plaintiff took

another approved medical leave of absence following knee surgery. 

Id. ¶ 10. Much happened during this medical leave.

On February 19, 2004, Plaintiff filed an action in the

Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County alleging

discrimination on the basis of disability. Notice (doc. # 1). 

Defendants later removed the action to this Court. Id.

On March 2, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a doctor's note

indicating that he could return to work as a Manufacturing

Technician subject to the limitation that he could stand for only

10 minutes per hour. The position ordinarily requires standing for

at least 7 hours in an 11.5 hour shift. DSOF ¶ 12. As a result,

on April 22, 2004, Intel offered Plaintiff a position in the

Assembly Technology and Development organization to accommodate his

inability to stand for extended periods of time. Plaintiff

declined this opportunity, also on the basis that it would not

allow him to repair equipment. Id. ¶ 13.

In May of 2004, Intel advised Plaintiff of a different

opportunity in the Assembly Technology and Development

organization. Plaintiff did not respond to this offer, and instead

took an extended summer vacation to visit family. Id. ¶ 14.

Intel's Medical Leave Guidelines provide that employees taking

medical leave longer than 365 days will generally be terminated. 

Instead of termination, Plaintiff was given the option to either

enter Intel's Reassignment Program or voluntarily separate with

long term disability benefits. On October 15, 2004, Plaintiff

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1

 Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court

takes judicial notice of the proceedings in United States v. Dugan as

a matter of public record having a direct relation to the matters at

issue in this case. Fed. R. Evid. 201; United States ex rel.

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244,

248 (9th Cir. 1992).

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elected to separate and receive long term disability benefits. Id.

¶ 15.

Six days later, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), Transmitting Threats Using

Interstate Commerce, in connection with threats he had made against

Intel.1 United States v. Dugan, No. CR 04-1194-PHX-RGS (D. Ariz.

2004) (doc. # 1). Plaintiff and Intel subsequently executed a

stipulation regarding Plaintiff's deposition in this case, which

the Court approved on August 10, 2005, expressing Plaintiff's

intention to invoke blanket assertions of Fifth Amendment privilege

as to any question posed to him by counsel for either party. 

Stipulation (doc. # 32); Order (doc. # 34).

On March 6, 2006, based upon its review of stipulated facts,

the court in United States v. Dugan found Plaintiff guilty of

violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and set the matter for sentencing on

June 5, 2006. United States v. Dugan, No. CR-04-1194-PHX-RGS (D.

Ariz. 2004) (doc. ## 1, 65-66).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate "when there is no genuine

issue of material fact" such that "the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In determining

whether to grant summary judgment, a district court must view the

underlying facts and the inferences to be drawn from those facts in

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the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita

Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

If a party will bear the burden of proof at trial as to an

element essential to its claim, and fails to adduce evidence

establishing a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the

existence of that element, then summary judgment is appropriate. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Not

every factual dispute is capable of defeating a properly supported

motion for summary judgment. Rather, the party opposing the motion

must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A

factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a rational

trier of fact could resolve the dispute in favor of the nonmoving

party. Id. at 248. A fact is material if determination of the

issue might affect the outcome of the case under the governing

substantive law. Id. Thus, a party opposing a motion for summary

judgment cannot rest upon bare allegations or denials in the

pleadings, but must set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue for trial. See id. at 250. If the nonmoving party's

evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, a

court may grant summary judgment. See id. at 249; see also Cal.

Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d

1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

III. DISCUSSION

The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

against a "qualified individual with a disability because of the

disability . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "'Qualified individual

with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with

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or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position that such individual holds or

desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). An employer discriminates against

a qualified individual with a disability by "not making reasonable

accommodations to the [individual's] known physical or mental

limitations . . . , unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of

the business of [the employer]." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A);

accord 20 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a).

Reasonable accommodations may include "reassignment to a

vacant position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also US Airways,

Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 396 (2002). An employer is not

required to create a new position to accommodate a disabled

employee, see Wellington v. Lyon County Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150,

1155 (9th Cir. 1999), or "to provide an employee the accommodation

he requests or prefers. . . ." Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302

F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). By the same token, an employee is

not compelled to accept every reasonable accommodation offered. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d). However, an employee's refusal of a

reasonable accommodation may result in the loss of standing under

the ADA as a "qualified individual with a disability."

[I]f such individual rejects a reasonable

accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or

benefit that is necessary to enable the

individual to perform the essential functions

of the position held or desired, and cannot, as

a result of that rejection, perform the

essential functions of the position, the

individual will not be considered a qualified

individual with a disability.

Id.

In this case, Intel provided Plaintiff with reasonable

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accommodations including extended medical leaves of absence, jobprotected ADA leave, the opportunity to perform desk work, and

offers of reassignment to vacant positions. Mot. (doc. # 36) at

11; DSOF ¶¶ 3-4, 8-10, 13-14. Intel contends that Plaintiff's

refusal of these reasonable accommodations, coupled with his

inability to perform the essential functions of the Manufacturing

Technician position, renders him ineligible to recover under the

ADA. See Mot. (doc. # 36) at 11; DSOF ¶ 12. The Court agrees.

For all that appears, Intel engaged an interactive process to

find suitable accommodations for Plaintiff's disability. The

ultimate breakdown of that process can be traced to Plaintiff's

failure to respond to Intel's third offer of reassignment in May of

2004. See DSOF ¶ 14. The fact that the accommodations offered did

not provide Plaintiff with as much opportunity to work with

equipment as he apparently would have liked did not render them

unreasonable, or obligate Intel to create a new position dictated

by Plaintiff's preferences. See Wellington, 187 F.3d at 1155;

Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1089. More importantly, without these

accommodations, Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions

of a Manufacturing Technician by standing only 10 minutes per hour

when that position demanded the ability to stand for most of an

11.5 hour shift. See DSOF ¶ 12. Therefore, as a result of

rejecting those reasonable accommodations, Plaintiff cannot be

considered a qualified individual with a disability, and cannot

maintain suit under the ADA. See 20 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d). Because

Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence presenting a genuine issue

of material fact for trial, the Court finds that Defendant's

unopposed motion (doc. # 36) is facially meritorious and that

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summary judgment is appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48;

Henry, 983 F.2d at 950.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. # 36) is GRANTED.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to

enter judgment in favor of Defendant and terminate this case.

DATED this 1st day of June, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

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