Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00225/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Malik Cornell Prior, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 10-225-TUC-RCC (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On April 21, 2010, Petitioner Malik Cornell Prior, presently confined in the 

Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman, Rynning Unit, in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), which was 

dismissed with leave to amend (Doc. 3) On June 3, 2010, a first amended petition was 

filed (Doc. 5 - (“Petition”)). Respondents have filed an answer to the petition (“Answer”) 

with exhibits A through H attached. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner did not file a reply. 

 Pursuant to this Court’s directive, Respondents filed a supplemental answer on 

May 27, 2011, with Exhibit I through R attached (“Supplemental Answer”). (Doc. 16) 

Petitioner did not file a supplemental reply. 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court enter an order DENYING the Petition. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

a. Conviction and Direct Appeal 

Petitioner was indicted on three counts of sexual assault, two counts of kidnapping, 

one count of aggravated assault, and two counts of residential burglary based for three 

incidents involving adult victims, as well as residential burglary, kidnapping, molestation, 

sexual conduct with a minor, sexual assault, and assault based on an incident involving a 

minor victim. (Supplemental Answer, Ex. I) The counts involving the minor victim were 

severed before trial. (Answer, Ex. A, at 4)1

 A jury found Petitioner guilty of three counts of sexual assault, class two felonies; 

two counts of kidnapping, class two felonies; and burglary of a residential structure, a 

class three felony. (Answer, Ex. A, at 1; Supplemental Answer, Ex. J, at 22-23, Ex. K) 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to aggravated, maximum prison terms of fourteen 

years each for each count of sexual assault, ten years for each count of kidnapping, and 

seven years for the count of burglary, and ordered the aggravated sentences to be served 

consecutively. (Supplemental Answer, Ex. J, at 38-39, Ex. K) 

 Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence raising three grounds 

for relief: (1) The trial court committed reversible error in denying the motion to sever 

the charges as to the adult victims; (2) The court committed reversible error in denying 

Petitioner’s motion pursuant to Rule 404(b); and (3) Petitioner is entitled to be 

resentenced under Blakely2

. (Answer, Ex. B.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the 

convictions and sentences by memorandum decision dated June 26, 2007, and the 

mandate issued on August 22, 2007. (Answer, Ex’s. A, C.) 

// 

// 

// 

 

1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of Petitioner’s case. 

2 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

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b. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on July 23, 2007, and a petition 

on May 19, 2008. The petition was filed on May 8, 2008, raising one issue for review: 

Did the trial court err when it failed to poll the entire jury regarding statements made by 

one juror regarding any possible taint the juror may have had on the panel? (Answer, Ex. 

E) The trial court first found the issue precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3), and second, 

found the claim lacked merit, and dismissed the petition. (Answer, Ex. F) The Court of 

Appeals address Petitioner’s petition for review on March 11, 2009, granting review, but 

denying relief, finding the claim precluded and finding it unnecessary to address the 

alternative ruling on the merits. (Answer, Ex. G) The mandate issued on April 30, 2009. 

c. Federal Habeas Petition 

 Petitioner filed his first federal habeas petition on April 21, 2010, raising three 

grounds for relief: (1) the trial court committed reversible error in denying Petitioner’s 

motion to sever the charges as to the adult victims; (2) the trial court committed 

reversible error in denying Petitioner’s motion pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Arizona 

Rules of Evidence; and (3) Blakely v. Washington entitles Petitioner to re-sentencing. 

(Doc. 1) The District Court dismissed the petition with leave to amend, stating Petitioner 

failed to allege that his conviction or sentence violated the Constitution, laws or treaties 

of the United States. (Doc. 3) 

Petitioner filed an amended petition on June 3, 2010, raising four grounds for 

relief: (1) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when 

the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to sever the charges involving three adult 

victims; (2) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated 

when the trial court admitted evidence of a separate crime; (3) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, 

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was sentenced based on 

aggravating factors not determined by a jury; and (4) Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment were violated when the trial court failed to poll the entire jury 

regarding prejudicial statements made by one juror. (Doc. 5) The District Court reviewed 

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the Petition and called for an answer from Respondents. (Doc. 6) Respondents submit 

that the Petition is untimely and should be dismissed. (Answer, p.4-10) Alternatively, 

Respondents argue that the first, second and fourth claims are procedurally defaulted; 

that the second claim is non-cognizable in these proceedings because it concerns only 

issues of state evidentiary law, and that the state courts’ rulings denying relief on 

petitioner’s Blakely claim are neither contrary to, nor involve an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal constitutional law as announced by the United States 

Supreme Court. (Answer, at 10-15; Supplemental Answer, at 9-11) 

II. DISCUSSION

a. Standard of Review 

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

(“AEDPA”). 

b. Statute of Limitations 

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus 

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review [.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “The time during which a properly filed application for state 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). 

 The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state 

convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, the statute of limitations 

is tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction relief. 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2244(d)(2). 

An application contemplated by section 2244(d)(2) is properly filed "when its 

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing 

filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits 

upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing 

fee." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (footnote omitted). The United States 

Supreme Court has held that untimely state post-conviction petitions are not “properly 

filed” under AEDPA, and do not toll AEDPA's statute of limitations. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). 

 The AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate 

cases. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct.2549 (2010). A petitioner is entitled to equitable 

tolling only upon a showing of (1) a diligent pursuit of petitioner’s rights; and (2) 

extraordinary circumstances that stood in petitioner’s way, preventing timely filing. Id.

(citing Pace, 544 U.S. at 418) Tolling is appropriate when "extraordinary circumstances 

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Id.; see also, 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002)(stating that "the threshold 

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions 

swallow the rule.") (citations omitted); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 

2003). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the 

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be 

appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999). The extraordinary 

circumstances requirement is a "high hurdle," see Calderon v. United States Dist.Court 

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1289, overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. Kelly, 163 

F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1997), and policy considerations counsel against equitable tolling. 

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling 

must establish two elements: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace, 544 U.S. at 418 (2005). 

Petitioner must also establish a "causal connection" between the extraordinary 

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circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 

499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). 

c. Exhaustion of Remedies 

 Before a federal court may review a petitioner's claims on the merits, a petitioner 

must exhaust his state remedies, which means he must have presented in state court every 

claim raised in his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O'Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (a state prisoner in a federal habeas action must 

exhaust his federal claims in the state courts "by invoking one complete round of the 

State's established appellate review process" before he may submit those claims in a 

federal habeas petition). Exhaustion occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented 

to the highest state court, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing 

that a claim has been procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Exhaustion of state remedies is required in order to 

give the state the "opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' 

federal rights." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

 “To exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the 

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 

1994), and then present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. 

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must "fairly present” his claim 

in each appropriate state court by describing the factual or legal bases for that claim and 

by alerting the state court "to the fact that the ... [petitioner is] asserting claims under the 

United States Constitution." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-366 (1995); Baldwin, 

541 U.S. at 29; see also Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Mere 

similarity between a claim raised in state court and a claim in a federal habeas petition is 

insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. A petitioner must present both the operative 

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facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based, see Kelly v. Small, 315 

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 

1143 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)), “broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal 

protection, and the right to a fair trial” in state court pleadings are not sufficient to 

establish that a federal constitutional claim was fairly presented to the state courts. 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal citations omitted). A 

petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing specific 

provisions of federal law or case, Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2000) as 

amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001), or by citing state cases that plainly analyze the 

federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.2003) (en 

banc). 

i. Procedural Default 

A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two 

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually 

raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). This situation is referred to as 

"procedural bar" or "procedural default." See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 ("A habeas 

petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical 

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him."). 

A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court declined to address the issue on the 

merits for procedural reasons such as waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 802-805 (1991); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). Second, 

the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if the petitioner failed to present 

the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to which the petitioner would be 

required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; Smith v. Baldwin, 

510 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) This is often referred to as "technical" 

exhaustion, because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the 

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petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. 

ii. Cause and Prejudice/ Fundamental Miscarriage 

If a claim is procedurally defaulted, it may not be considered by a federal court 

unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default in state court, 

or demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750; Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992). 

Cause is defined as a "legitimate excuse for the default," and prejudice is defined 

as "actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Thomas v. Lewis, 

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (a 

showing of cause requires a petitioner to show that "some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule"). Prejudice 

need not be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. 

To bring himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner "must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual 

innocence," Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), which can be shown when "a petitioner ‘presents 

evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of 

the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 

constitutional error.'" Id. at 673 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 

d. Standard of Review : Merits 

Petitioner's habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas 

relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state 

and federal criminal sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475 (2007) 

(quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA's “‘highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt .” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

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(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7). 

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim 

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party's 

claim which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other 

non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker 

v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04); 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a 

rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became 

final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under 

subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if 

any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” 

federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's state 

court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 

U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas relief 

cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a 

constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have 

decided the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77; Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court 

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authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law 

is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 

F.3d at 1069. 

III. ANALYSIS

a. Timeliness 

 Petitioner had until one year after his conviction and sentence became final 

to file his federal petition. The Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the 

Petition filed in this Court is timely as to all grounds raised in the petition, except Ground 

Four. 

i. Date on which conviction and sentence became final 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review [.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). On June 26, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied 

Petitioner’s direct appeal on the merits. (See generally Answer, Ex. A) Petitioner did not 

seek review of that decision. (Id., Ex.C) Petitioner’s conviction became final on July 26, 

2007, 30 days after his direct appeal was denied by the court of appeals, when the time 

for filing a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, absent 

tolling, Petitioner had one year, or until July 26, 2008, to file a timely Petition. 

ii. Statutory Tolling 

 “The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall 

not be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Respondents 

concede that Petitioner’s notice of petition for post-conviction relief, filed on July 23, 

2007, tolled AEDPA’s timeclock before it began to run. (See Answer, p.6) Respondents 

submit, however, that Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings were no longer pending 

after the March 11, 2009, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief from the trail 

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court’s denial of post-conviction relief and Petitioner decided to forego review. The 

Magistrate Judge disagrees. 

 The court of appeals granted review but denied relief of Petitioner’s petition for 

review from the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this 

situation, it is the mandate, issued on April 30, 2009, not the memorandum decision, that 

concludes the tolling period. See Celaya v. Stewart, 691 F.Supp.2d 1046 (D.Ariz. 

2010)(For tolling purposes under § 2244(d), state law determines finality, and in 

instances where a petition for review is granted, but relief denied, a decision of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals is final upon the issuance of the mandate). Accordingly, 

Petitioner had until April 30, 2010 to file his federal petition. 

 Petitioner’s first petition, filed on April 21, 2010, was timely. Petitioner, however, 

raised only three grounds for relief in the petition filed on April 21, 2010, and all three of 

those claims were dismissed and presented in an amended petition, filed June 3, 2010, 

after the deadline had expired. 

iii. Relation back 

 Respondents argue that the Petition filed on June 3, 2010 is untimely. Ordinarily, 

Respondents would be correct. It is unclear, however, whether Respondents have 

overlooked the first petition filed on April 21, 2010, or are simply assuming the new 

claims do not relate back to the previously pleaded claims. Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15(c) governs amendments to pleadings in habeas proceedings, which are 

characterized as civil in nature. 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Rule 15(c) instructs: “An amendment 

of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... the amendment 

asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set outor attempted to be set out-in the original pleading.” Fed. Rule Civ. P. 15(c). 

 This Court must examine the amendment to determine if the claims arise “from 

the same core facts as the timely filed claim” such that they relate back to the original, 

timely petition. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 657 (2005); Valdovinos v. McGrath, 598 

F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2010), cert granted, judgment vacated, 131 S.Ct. 1042 

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(2011)(remanding for further consideration in light of Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 

770 (2011)). 

 Grounds One, Two and Three are essentially the same three claims raised in the 

first petition, arising from the same core operative facts as those alleged in the first 

petition, with the additional allegation that the court committed “reversible error” erred in 

violation of the “5th, 6th and 14th Amendments” of the United States Constitution (first and 

second claims), and that Petitioner was sentenced in violation of the “5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th

Amendments” of the United States Constitution (third claim). (Compare Grounds One, 

Two and Three, Doc 1 and Doc. 5) 

 The Magistrate Judge finds that Grounds One, Two and Three of Petitioner’s 

untimely petition relate back to the original, timely petition, and thus are timely. 

 The operative facts of Ground Four, however, were not alleged in the first petition. 

(Compare Doc. 3, Ground Four, with Doc. 1, Ground Four). In fact, Petitioner raised no 

fourth ground for relief at all in his original petition. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge 

finds that this claim does not relate back to the original petition and should be dismissed 

from the amended petition. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 662 (citing with approval United 

States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 338 (3rd Cir. 1999)(“A prisoner should not be able to 

assert a claim otherwise barred by the statute of limitations merely because he asserted a 

separate claim within the limitations period.”)). 

iv. Equitable Tolling 

 The burden is on Petitioner to demonstrate that equitable tolling should apply in 

his case. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (citing Miranda, 292 F.3d 

at 1066). Petitioner raises no grounds for equitable tolling in either his petition, his reply, 

or his responses to Respondent’s notices. Petitioner has not met his burden of showing 

that there are "extraordinary circumstances" that would have caused the untimely filing of 

his Petition. "A pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling." Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, this Court finds no cause for equitably tolling 

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the limitations period in this case. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss Ground Four as untimely 

b. Grounds One and Two 

 Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to sever 

the charges as to the adult victims, and in denying his motion pursuant to Rule 404(b). 

Petitioner argues that both of these errors resulted in a violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

 Respondent argues that these two claims are procedurally defaulted because, in 

state court proceedings, Petitioner argued only that the trial court had violated state law. 

(Answer, at 12) Respondents concede that Petitioner, regarding Ground One, at the end 

of his arguments citing almost exclusively Arizona law, added the phrase “It is submitted 

that the trial court’s refusal to grant a severance as to the adult female victims unduly 

prejudiced [Petitioner] and thereby denied him his constitutional rights of due process as 

guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as 

Article 2, Section 24 of the Arizona Constitution.” (Answer, at 12, Ex. B at 20) Similarly, 

at the end of his argument regarding Ground Two, Petitioner stated that “the [trial] court 

abused its discretion and denied [Petitioner] his constitutional right to a fair trial.” (See

Id. at 23.) This, however, is precisely the conclusory, "scattershot" type of citation, 

"divorced from any federal legal theory" the Ninth Circuit found insufficient to fairly 

present a federal legal claim in Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Petitioner did not clearly articulate federal law as the basis for the claims raised in 

state court. (See Answer, Ex. B, at 18-20, 20-22) The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that "a 

state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state 

court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal 

law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (opinion amended by Lyons 

v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 

(9th Cir. 2000)). Further, the court found that a "petitioner must make the federal basis of 

the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if 

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the federal basis is "self-evident"," Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668 (citing Gatlin v. Madding, 189 

F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1982), or the 

violation of federal law obvious. Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668 (citing Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 "The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to 

establish exhaustion." Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 

529 U.S. 1009 (2000).(citing Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366. "Moreover, general appeals to 

broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a 

fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion." Id. (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 

U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)). 

 As previously noted by the Ninth Circuit, the "failure to comply with the state's 

rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting habeas relief. 

While adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a 

procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state 

standards are violated; conversely, state procedural and evidentiary rules may 

countenance processes that do not comport with fundamental fairness ... The issue for us, 

always, is whether the state proceedings satisfied due process; the presence or absence of 

a state law violation is largely beside the point." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918 

(9th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted). 

 To fairly present a federal claim, a petitioner must describe both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that all of the 

facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state court or that a 

"somewhat similar" state law claim was raised. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that a 

reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of 

the claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific 

constitutional guarantee upon which he basis his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. 

Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Petitioner cited solely to Arizona 

law in support of his challenge to the evidentiary rulings, he has not exhausted a federal 

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challenge to the ruling. 

 In this case, the Petitioner failed to apprise the state court of appeals that the 

violation of which he complained was a violation of federal law. Petitioner did not 

directly articulate or argue a federal constitutional issue in the opening brief. Petitioner's 

argument and authority were grounded in state law and procedure and devoid of any 

express reference to a federal claim, except for the single, conclusory sentence at the end 

of each argument, devoid of anything more than a general appeal to broad constitutional 

principles. Because Petitioner did not make any federal basis of the Ground One or Two 

explicit in his appeal to the state courts, he failed to exhaust these claims. 

The Magistrate Judge further concludes that if Petitioner returned to state court 

and attempted to litigate Ground One or Two, these claims would be found waived and 

untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

because they do not fall within an exception to preclusion. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(b); 

32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, Ground One and Two are “technically” exhausted but 

procedurally defaulted because Petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n. 1; Smith, 510 F.3d at 1138. Petitioner’s right to direct 

review having been completed, he would have to present these claims to the state courts 

in a petition for post-conviction relief in order to exhaust the claim. Under Arizona law, 

notice of post-conviction relief must be filed within ninety days after the entry of 

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or 

mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief 

proceeding. Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. If Petitioner were to present these issues in 

another petition for post-conviction relief, such presentation would be untimely, Rules 

32.1 and 32.4(a), and precluded, Rule 32.2. Such a new petition, therefore, would be 

subject to summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266 (App.1999); State v. 

Jones, 182 Ariz. 432 (App.1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135 (1998) 

(timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). These claims, therefore, are 

procedurally defaulted. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) 

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(federal habeas review is precluded where prisoner has not raised his claim in the state 

courts and the time for doing so has expired). 

Alternatively, Respondent correctly asserts that Petitioner’s claim that the trial 

court erred by admitting into evidence information about the videotapes found at his 

home is not cognizable in these proceedings because it concerns only issues of state 

evidentiary law. “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” 

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Generally, a federal court will not entertain 

allegations of violations of state evidentiary rules. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–

68 (1991); see also Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A] federal 

habeas court may not prescribe evidentiary rules for the states. We may grant relief only 

if there is serious constitutional error”); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“We are not a state supreme court of errors; we do not review questions of 

state evidence law”). Federal due process is violated only if there are no permissible 

inferences to draw from the evidence. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920 (in federal habeas 

review, federal court will consider only whether the admission of the evidence in 

question “so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair”). 

Petitioner's passing reference to his constitutional rights does not transform this claim 

into a federal claim. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)(Petitioner 

may not transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a constitutional 

violation; alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal 

habeas corpus.) Petitioner does not demonstrate that the complained-of evidence 

documenting his sexually aberrant propensities violated his due process rights by “so 

fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair” at his trial for 

multiple violent sexual assaults. Accordingly, this claim is not cognizable in federal 

habeas review. 

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c. Ground Three 

 Petitioner argues that Blakely v. Washington3 entitles Petitioner to be resentenced 

because the court relied on a number of aggravating factors, none of which were Blakelyexempt. 

 At sentencing, the trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: 1) 

the emotional and psychological harm to the victims and their families; 2) that Petitioner 

committed at least one of the crimes in the presence of a child; 3) that Petitioner had 

placed the victims in the immediate apprehension of physical harm; 4) that Petitioner had 

entered private residences to commit sexual assault; and 5) the existence of multiple 

victims. (Supplemental Answer, Ex. J at 34–37.) The trial court weighed the aggravating 

and mitigating evidence, and imposed a maximum, consecutive sentence on each count. 

(Id., at 38-39) 

On direct appeal4

, Petitioner argued that the trial court had violated Blakely 

because the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence without a jury’s determining any 

of the aggravating factors. (Answer, Exhibit B at 23–24.) The court of appeals found that 

the trial court’s finding of multiple victims was inherent in the jury’s verdicts finding 

Petitioner guilty of sexually assaulting two women and burglarizing the home of a third. 

(Answer, Ex. A, ¶ 15) The Arizona Court of Appeals found that the “multiple victims” 

aggravating factor satisfied the “catch-all” provisions of A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(21) (Id., ¶ 

14) In doing so, the court relied upon the decision in State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578 

 

3

 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

4

 The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a 

claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

803-04); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner did not 

seek review from the court of appeals’ decision. 

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(2005) that “once a jury implicitly or explicitly finds one aggravating factor, a defendant 

is exposed to a sentencing range that extends to the maximum punishment available 

under section 13-702.” (Answer, Ex. A, ¶ 14) The latter determination was based upon 

the Martinez court's interpretation of the Arizona sentencing scheme, which although it 

called upon the sentencing judge “to balance all the aggravators and mitigators in 

determining what sentence to impose,” Martinez, 210 Ariz. at 584 (citing A.R.S. § 13-

702(D)), it also authorized an increase of the presumptive sentence to the maximum 

“upon a finding of one or more of the aggravating circumstances,” id. (citing A.R.S. § 13-

702(A)). “Thus, a jury finding of a single aggravating factor establishes the facts legally 

essential to expose the defendant to the maximum sentence prescribed in section 13-702.” 

Id.

Under Blakely, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 

the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Under the applicable Arizona sentencing scheme, if one or more 

aggravating factors is found, the court may impose an aggravated sentence State v. 

Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578 (2005). Under this sentencing scheme, once a single Blakelycompliant aggravating factor is found, a defendant is exposed to the fully aggravated 

sentencing range and the trial court may consider additional factors relevant to the 

imposition of a sentence within the statutory sentencing range. A.R.S. § 13-702. This 

procedure comports with Apprendi/Blakey jurisprudence because the Supreme Court has 

reaffirmed that trial judges may consider any relevant evidence in determining the 

appropriate sentence within the applicable statutory range. Harris v. United States, 536 

U.S. 545, 549 (2002) (stating that "[a]fter the accused is convicted, the judge may impose 

a sentence within a range provided by statute, basing it on various facts relating to the 

defendant and the manner in which the offense was committed.”). The Ninth Circuit has 

held in considering a similar sentencing issue under California law that, when there are 

multiple aggravating factors, the relevant questions is not “what the trial court would

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have done, but what it legally could have done. After one aggravating factor was validly 

found, the trial court legally could have imposed the upper term sentence. That the judge 

might not have done so in the absence of an additional factor does not implicate the Sixth 

Amendment, as that consideration concerns only the imposition of a sentence within an 

authorized statutory range.” Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 648-49 (2008)(emphasis in 

the original). Though these facts may have a substantial impact on the sentence, they are 

not elements, and are thus not subject to the Constitution's indictment, jury, and proof 

requirements. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (explaining that "[w]e should be clear that 

nothing in [the history of the right to a jury trial] suggests that it is impermissible for 

judges to exercise discretion--taking into consideration various factors relating both to the 

offense and offender-- in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We 

have often noted that judges in this country have long exercised discretion of this nature 

in imposing sentences within the statutory limits in individual cases."). 

Accordingly, the state courts’ rulings denying relief on Petitioner’s Blakely claim 

are neither contrary to, nor involve an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal constitutional law as announced by the United States Supreme Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, federal habeas relief is not appropriate. Id. 

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent 

review, deny this claim on the merits. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court DISMISS Petitioner’s 

Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the 

following case number: CIV 10-0225-TUC-RCC. 

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If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 7th day of March, 2012. 

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