Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03153/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03153-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Willie James Mitchell, Jr.,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 18-03153-PHX-ROS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On October 4, 2018, Petitioner Willie James Mitchell, Jr., through counsel, filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The Court,

subsequently, dismissed the Petition with leave to amend. Petitioner, thereafter, filed a pro

se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 9).

Respondents filed an Answer on June 13, 2019 (Doc. 10), but despite having the opportunity

to do so, Petitioner has not filed a reply.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner was convicted in Maricopa County Superior

Court, case #CR2013-452091, of one count of driving under the influence and was sentenced

to a 7.5-year term of imprisonment.

After sentencing, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief (PCR) (Exh.

K), and the court appointed counsel for Petitioner. After having investigated the matter,

counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction Review, stating that he had

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reviewed the record and found no colorable claims for relief. (Exhs. L, M.) The court ordered

appointed counsel to remain on the case in an advisory capacity and set a date for Petitioner

to file a pro per PCR petition. (Exh. N.)

Petitioner filed his pro per PCR petition on January 20, 2016, arguing: (1) he had not

rejected the State’s plea offer for 4.5 years’ imprisonment; (2) the State had incorrectly

alleged that he had three prior DUI convictions in presentence pleadings; (3) the State had

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by illegally drawing his blood; and (4) his trial

attorney and appointed PCR counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. (Exh.

O.)

After the State responded, private counsel appeared in the case for Petitioner and filed

a Notice of Intent to Supplement Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (Exh. Q.) According

to the record, no additional supplement was filed. The court denied the PCR petition on July

27, 2016. (Exh. R.) Although Petitioner filed a request for an extension of time to file a

petition for review (Exh. S), the record fails to reflect that such a request was granted or that

any petition for review was ever filed.

Instead, almost one year later, on July 19, 2017, Petitioner, through private counsel,

filed a second PCR petition. (Exh. T.) Petitioner argued ineffective assistance of counsel due

to counsel’s alleged failure to properly advise him of the consequences of the State’s plea

offers and investigate his case. (Exh. U.) Petitioner also alleged, among other things, that

counsel failed to: speak with him about the facts of his case or his available defenses;

investigate witnesses in his case; file pretrial motions; and advise him of the merits and risks

of the plea agreement, or tell him why his plea offers changed. (Exh. U.)

The court dismissed Petitioner’s second PCR petition on August 7, 2017, finding that

Petitioner failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted in a successive and untimely

Rule 32 proceeding. (Exh. V.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review on September 14, 2017, arguing that his second

PCR petition was appropriate because it was his first opportunity to challenge the actions of

his court-appointed PCR counsel. (Exh. X.) He then argued that he had a colorable claim of

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ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Exh. X.) The Arizona Court of Appeals granted

review, but denied relief on March 13, 2018. (Exh. Y.)

In his Amended Petition, Petitioner names Charles L. Ryan as Respondent and the

Arizona Attorney General as an Additional Respondent. Petitioner raises one ground for

relief, in which he asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of

the Sixth Amendment.

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

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Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See id.

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for

equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented

him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely. After

sentencing, Petitioner filed a timely PCR notice. The court denied the PCR petition on July

28, 2016. Petitioner’s conviction became final 30 days later – on August 29, 2016 – when

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the time expired for Petitioner to file a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Although Petitioner filed a request for an extension of time to file a petition for review, the

record fails to reflect that the request was granted or that any petition for review was filed.

Thus, the statute of limitations began running – and expired on August 29, 2017. Petitioner

initiated habeas proceedings on October 4, 2018 – over 400 days too late. Absent any tolling,

his habeas petition is untimely.

Petitioner’s commencement of his second PCR proceeding on July 19, 2017, did not

toll the limitations period. The Rule 32 proceeding was dismissed as successive and untimely

and, as such, was not “properly filed” and did not toll the limitations period. See Pace, 544

U.S. at 413-14.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Petitioner fails to address his untimeliness, and there is nothing in the record

explaining why Petitioner waited over 400 days to file his habeas petition – or indicating that

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an external force prevented him from timely filing the habeas petition. And, a petitioner’s pro

se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, or lack of representation

during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro

se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling.”).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any tolling and his habeas petition is

untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 9) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

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in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2019.

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