Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00052/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

 Eric Fanning replaced retired Secretary Michael Donley effective June 21, 2013.

See Pretlow v. Fanning, No. CIV-12-1281-D, 2013 WL 3563679 at, n.1 (W.D. Okla. July

11, 2013). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Angelia Hill, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

Eric Fanning, Acting Secretary,

Department of Air Force, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 12-00052-TUC-CKJ (HCE)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for Improper

Venue and, In the Event of Transfer, For an Extension of Time For Response to Complaint

(“Def.’s Mot.”). (Doc. 21).1 This matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for a

Report and Recommendation.

I. Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint in which she alleges that she was

a probationary employee of the Los Angeles Air Force Base, that she was retaliated against

for exercising her “EEO right to file a complaint based on race and gender,” and that her

employment wasterminated. (Doc. 1, Compl. at 2, 4-7). Although Plaintiff does not identify

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in the Complaint the legal basis of her cause of action, she does allege that she received the

right to file a civil action dated October 18, 2010 from the U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission. (Id. at 1). 

II. Discussion

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claim for relief is based on Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., which governs adverse employment actions

based on complaints of race, national origin, and gender. (Def.’s Mot. at 2). Defendant argues

that Plaintiff has filed her Complaint in the wrong venue, noting that Title VII has its own

specific venue provision and that this specific venue provision applies in cases involving

federal employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3), 2000e-16(d). (Id.). See Phillips v. Rubin,

76 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1082 (D. Nev. 1999) (§ 2000e-16(d) makes Title VII’s provisions

applicable in actions against the federal government). Defendant moves for dismissal of the

Complaint or transfer of the case to the proper venue which is the Central District of

California. (Def.’s Mot. at 3; Doc. 25, Def.’s Reply Supp. Def.’s Mot. at 2). Plaintiff

responds that an attorney informed her that the Complaint could be filed in any Federal

District Court and that the court should determine that she filed her Complaint appropriately.

(Doc. 24, Resp. to Notice Mot. (“Pl.’s Resp.”)). 

Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party may file a

motion based on improper venue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),

regarding a case “laying venue in the wrong division or district,” the court “shall dismiss, or

if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could

have been brought.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the district court, “[f]or the convenience of

parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . may transfer any civil action to any other

district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all

parties have consented.” 

A special venue provision applies to Title VII actions. Wohltman v. Siemens

Generation Servs., No. 10CV2549 DMS (WVG), 2011 WL 3607503 at, *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug.

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 Plaintiff mentions in the Complaint that she “informed the EEOC in her September

2010 appeal that she began working on the Davis Monthan Air Force Base (DMAFB) as a

government contractor . . .” (Compl. at 2). Plaintiff does not seem to allege any retaliatory

conduct with respect to that employment. 

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16, 2011). Title VII’s venue provision states that actions may be brought “in any judicial

district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been

committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice

are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person

would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that “[i]n general, the effect of Title VII’s venue

provision is to allow suit in the judicial district in which the plaintiff worked or would have

worked.” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 504-05

(9th Cir. 2000). 

Title VII’s specific venue provision set forth in § 2000e-5(f)(3) applies rather than the

general venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest,

Inc., 950 F.2d 586, 588-89 (9th Cir. 1991). Title VII’s venue provision does not displace the

§ 1404 analysis but the factors expressly identified as the basis for venue under Title VII are

considered as “key factors in analyzing the ‘interests of justice’ prong” of § 1404(a). Minh

Hong v. Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, No. C12-01756 THE, 2012 WL 5077066 at, *2 (N.D.

Cal. Oct. 18, 2012). 

As Defendant points out, Plaintiff has not alleged any act of discrimination that

occurred in Arizona.2

 Plaintiff’s claim is based on allegations relevant to her employment at

the Los Angeles Air Force Base in El Segundo, California. Plaintiff alleges acts by officials

that occurred there and she alleges the termination of her employment from the Los Angeles

Air Force Base. (Compl. at 2-4). Plaintiff alleges that she lost an employment opportunity

in Texas as a result of her alleged termination at Los Angeles Air Force Base. (Id. at 2-3).

According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity proceeding was filed and

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took place at Los Angeles Air Force Base and the records of that proceeding are maintained

there. (Def.’s Mot. at 3, Ex. 1, Gonzales Decl. ¶¶ 3-5). Plaintiff’s personnel file and

employment records are maintained at the Los Angeles Air Force Base in El Segundo,

California or at the Federal Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri. (Def.’s Mot. at 3, Ex. 2,

Swan Decl., ¶¶ 1-2).

Plaintiff appears to now reside in Arizona. Plaintiff’s Complaint shows her address as

Tucson, Arizona and her Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss shows her address as

Glendale, Arizona. (Compl.; Pl.’s Resp.). “[V]enue is not proper in a district simply because

the plaintiffs reside there.” See McCormack v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C 12-4377 MEJ,

2012 WL 5948965 at, *3 (N. D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012). The alleged discriminatory acts

occurred in El Segundo, California where Plaintiff was employed and where the records

relevant to her claim are maintained. None of the acts Plaintiff alleges occurred in Arizona.

Plaintiff has not alleged that she would have worked in Arizona but for the alleged unlawful

employment practice. The Court recommends that venue is proper in the Central District of

California, not in the District of Arizona.

Having found that venue is improper in the District of Arizona, the Court in its

discretion may dismiss the case or transfer the action to the appropriate jurisdiction. King v.

Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court’s decision of whether to transfer

or dismiss a case under § 1406(a) is reviewed for abuse of discretion). For a case to be

transferred under § 1404, the court must find that the transferee court is one where the action

“might have been brought” and that the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the

interest of justice favor transfer. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir.

1985). Factors relevant to the latter consideration include the plaintiff’s choice of forum, the

convenience of the parties and witnesses, the ease of access to sources of proof, local interest

in the controversy, and the familiarity of the forum with the applicable law. See Jones v. GNC

Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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Plaintiff has chosen to litigate her discrimination claim in the District of Arizona where

she now lives. Plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to preference. Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir 1986). However, except for Plaintiff,

the witnesses with knowledge of the dispute are based in the Los Angeles, California area.

The Court assumes there would be some hardship for Plaintiff to litigate her case in the

Central District of California since she has now moved to Arizona but this same hardship

would exist for the witnesses in California if the case is litigated in Arizona. The witnesses

and events are centered in the Central District of California and this weighs in favor of

transfer. Although the ease with which documents may be accessed electronically has been

considered, the relevant records are maintained in the Central District of California and this

favors transfer. Local interest in the controversy favors transfer since Plaintiff has not alleged

that any wrongful act occurred in Arizona. Each forum has the same familiarity with the

applicable law under Title VII. Based on consideration of the overall circumstances and

relevant factors, transfer of this action to the Central District of California appears

appropriate.

III. Recommendation 

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

decline to dismiss this case. It is further recommended that this action should be transferred

to the Central District of California.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for

Improper Venue and, In the Event of Transfer, for an Extension of Time for Response to

Complaint (Doc. 21) should be granted in part.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this case should be transferred to the

Central District of California and that Defendant should have an extension of time to respond

to the Complaint. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after

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being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. See also LRCiv 7.2(e) (setting

forth page limit for objections). A party may respond to another party’s objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). 

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540

U.S. 900 (2003). 

DATED this 16th day of October, 2013.

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