Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08112/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08112-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 16 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Milton Omar Lima-Fuentes, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CIV 15-8112-PHX-PCT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Milton Omar Lima-Fuentes, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 16), but despite having the opportunity to do

so, Petitioner has not filed a reply.

BACKGROUND1

On December 11, 2008, the State indicated Petitioner in Mohave County Superior

Court with: sexual assault, a class 2 felony (count 1) and two counts of sexual conduct with

a minor under fifteen years of age, a class 2 felony (counts 2 and 3). (Exh. A.) Petitioner

pleaded guilty to count 3 on the condition that the sentencing range would cap at the

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presumptive of 20 years’ imprisonment. (Exh. B at 4, 13.) Petitioner agreed to the following

factual basis:

[T]he defendant was in town for a wedding and had been partying throughout

the weekend, both drinking and using illegal substances, based on his own

admission. On the date and location alleged, after the wedding, everyone was

milling about the hotel and mingling.

The defendant pulled the 14-year old victim into the hotel laundry room, he

pinned her against the wall, he both fingered her and proceeded to have sex

with her. As she asked for him to stop, he said he wasn’t going to stop when

he was in the middle of it; and the defendant’s DNA was ultimately found in

the vaginal swabs that were taken of[f] the victim that night.

(Id. at 14.) The trial court found that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Id.)

On August 24, 2009, the court sentenced Petitioner to a mitigated term of 16 years. (Exh. C

at 40.)

Petitioner filed a PCR notice, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, on November 25, 2009.

(Exh. D.) The notice did not allege any specific grounds for relief. (Id.) The trial court

extended the deadline to file a PCR petition until April 19, 2010. (Exh. E.) On April 15,

Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a Rule 32 notice of completion, stating she found no

grounds for post-conviction relief. (Exh. F.) She also requested additional time for Petitioner

to file a pro se PCR petition, and the superior court extended the deadline to do so until June

3. (Id.; Exh. G.)

Petitioner filed a pro se PCR notice on June 10, 2010, alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel and that Petitioner was illegally sentenced under Arizona’s statutory scheme and

in violation of federal due process. (Exh. H.) Because this was past the filing deadline, the

court summarily dismissed it as untimely. (Exh. I.) Petitioner then requested leave to file a

delayed PCR petition, and the court extended the deadline to do so until September 2, 2010.

(Exh. J.) Petitioner requested another extension on August 27, 2010, which the court denied.

(Exhs. K, L.) Petitioner failed to file a PCR petition, and the superior court dismissed the

PCR proceedings.

On June 10, 2014, Petitioner filed a new PCR notice, alleging there was cause for a

“discretionary sentence reduction.” (Exh. N.) The court summarily dismissed the notice as

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untimely and successive in violation of Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32. (Exh. O.) On July 7, 2014,

Petitioner filed a PCR petition, alleging newly discovered “circumstances” that caused him

to not have understood the guilty plea. (Exh. P.) On July 17, 2014, the court dismissed the

petition as untimely and successive. (Exh. Q.)

Petitioner then filed a “motion to allow a delayed notice of appeal” on August 26,

2014. (Exh. R.) The superior court construed this as a request for Petitioner to file a notice

of appeal from his conviction. (Exh. S.) As such, the court rejected the motion because

Petitioner waived his right to appeal when pleading guilty. (Id.) Petitioner filed a notice of

appeal on May 14, 2015. (Exh. T.) The court of appeals construed this as a petition for

review from the denial of the July 7, 2014 PCR petition and summarily dismissed the petition

as untimely on May 26, 2015. (Exh. U.)

In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief. He alleges that his

attorney provided ineffective assistance (Ground One), that his due process and equal

protection rights were violated (Ground Two), and that the prosecution committed

misconduct and the trial court abused its discretion (Ground Three).

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

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Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See id.

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

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period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for

equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented

him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely. On

August 24, 2009, the trial court sentenced Petitioner under the plea agreement. By pleading

guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal, and had 90 days to file an “of-right”

petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief on November 25, 2009, thereby

tolling the limitations period on that date. See Isley, 383 F.3d at 1055-56 (in Arizona, filing

a notice of post-conviction proceedings begins tolling under AEDPA). The trial court

extended the deadline to file a PCR petition until April 19, 2010, which was again extended

to June 3, 2010, pursuant to a request for an extension of time.

However, instead of filing a PCR petition, Petitioner filed another PCR notice on June

10, 2010. The court subsequently dismissed the notice as untimely, but extended the deadline

until September 2, 2010 to file his PCR petition. Petitioner never filed a PCR petition and the

court dismissed the PCR proceedings. Thus, Petitioner’s case became final on September 2,

2010 – the day the time expired for filing a PCR petition. Petitioner was required to file the

instant habeas petition on or before September 2, 2011. Petitioner did not file his habeas

petition until June 23, 2015. Accordingly, absent any tolling, his habeas petition is over

three-and-a-half years too late.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Petitioner’s subsequent untimely PCR

proceedings and other filings were filed after the limitations period had expired, and, thus,

did not toll the limitations period. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823 (“[S]ection 2244(d) does

not permit the re-initiation of the [federal 1-year] limitations period that has ended before the

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state petition was filed.”); see also Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-17 (“Because the state court

rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not

entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”)

In sum, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition just over three-and-a-half years after

the 1-year limitations period expired. The Petition is therefore untimely.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Petitioner asserts no valid reason for the untimeliness of his habeas petition, and

therefore demonstrates no entitlement to equitable tolling. And, Petitioner’s pro se status,

indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, or lack of representation during the

applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se

petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance

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warranting equitable tolling.”). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and

his habeas petition is untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

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or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 29th day of February, 2016.

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