Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01322/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-01322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

OSCAR HILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Commissioner,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:14-cv-01322-SGC

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

The plaintiff, Oscar Hill, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying his application for Supplemental 

Security Income (“SSI”). Hill timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies, and the 

Commissioner’s decision is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1383(c)(3). For the reasons 

discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed.

I. Procedural History

Hill has at least a high school education and has previously worked as a production 

assembler, laborer, and repairman. (Tr. at 29, 138-39, 159). In his application for SSI as 

amended, Hill alleged he became disabled on February 17, 2010, as a result of gout, sciatic nerve 

pain, arthritis, diabetes, foot and leg pain, high blood pressure, and tuberculosis. (Id. at 131-32, 

137, 158). After his claim was denied, Hill requested a hearing before an administrative law 

judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 54-59, 66). Following a hearing, the ALJ denied Hill’s claims. (Id. at 7-

18). Hill was 55 years old when the ALJ issued his decision. (Id. at 18, 25, 27). After the 

Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision (id. at 1-3), that decision became the 

 

1 The parties have consented to the exercise of full dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 14).

FILED

 2015 Sep-18 AM 11:05

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-01322-SGC Document 15 Filed 09/18/15 Page 1 of 12
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final decision of the Commissioner, see Frye v. Massanari, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1251 N.D. 

Ala. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). Thereafter, Hill

initiated this action. (Doc. 1).

II. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To establish his eligibility for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

416(i)(1)(A); see also id. at § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). The Social Security 

Administration employs a five-step sequential analysis to determine an individual’s eligibility for 

disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial 

gainful activity.” Id. at § 416.920(a)(4)(i). “Under the first step, the claimant has the burden to 

show that [he] is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.” Reynolds-Buckley v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 Fed. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2012). If the claimant is engaged in 

substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 416.920(a)(4)(i) and (b). At the first step, the ALJ determined Hill has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since his amended alleged onset date of February 17, 2010. (Tr. at 

12).

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner must next 

determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe physical or mental impairment or 

combination of impairments that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at 

least twelve months. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment “must result from 

Case 2:14-cv-01322-SGC Document 15 Filed 09/18/15 Page 2 of 12
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anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Furthermore, it “must be established 

by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [the 

claimant’s] statement of symptoms.” Id. at § 416.908; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D). An 

impairment is severe if it “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do 

basic work activities . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).2 “[A]n impairment can be considered as not 

severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it 

would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, 

education, or work experience.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 

20 C.F.R. § 416.921(a). A claimant may be found disabled based on a combination of 

impairments, even though none of the individual impairments alone is disabling. 20 C.F.R. §

416.923. The claimant bears the burden of providing medical evidence demonstrating an 

impairment and its severity. Id. at §§ 416.912(a) and (c). If the claimant does not have a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments, the Commissioner will find the claimant is not 

disabled. Id. at §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii) and (c). At the second step, the ALJ determined Hill has the 

following severe impairments: obesity, gout, disorders of the back, and osteoarthritis. (Tr. at 12).

If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the 

Commissioner must then determine whether the impairment meets or equals one of the 

“Listings” found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 

 

2 Basic work activities include:

(1) [p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, 

carrying, or handling; (2) [c]apacities for seeking, hearing, and speaking; (3) [u]nderstanding, 

carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) [u]se of judgment; (5) [r]esponding 

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) [d]ealing with changes 

in a routine work setting.

20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b).

Case 2:14-cv-01322-SGC Document 15 Filed 09/18/15 Page 3 of 12
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see also id. at §§ 416.925 and 416.926. The claimant bears the burden of proving his impairment 

meets or equals one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. App’x at 863. If the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals one of the Listings, the Commissioner will find the claimant is 

disabled. 20 C.F.R §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii) and (d). At the third step, the ALJ determined Hill does

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 

severity of one of the Listings. (Tr. at 13-14).

If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the Listings, the 

Commissioner must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before 

proceeding to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); see also id. at § 416.945. A claimant’s 

RFC is the most he can do despite his impairments. See id. § 416.945(a)(1). At the fourth step, 

the Commissioner will compare his assessment of the claimant’s RFC with the physical and 

mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. Id. at §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv) and (e), 

416.960(b). “Past relevant work is work that [the claimant] [has] done within the past 15 years, 

that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do 

it.” Id. § 416.960(b)(1). The claimant bears the burden of proving his impairment prevents him

from performing his past relevant work. Reynolds-Buckley, 457 Fed. App’x at 863. If the 

claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work, the Commissioner will find the 

claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.960(b)(3). Before proceeding to the 

fourth step, the ALJ determined Hill has the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 

416.967(b),3except he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can only occasionally climb 

ramps or stairs; can only occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, or balance; and should avoid 

 

3

“Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing 

up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good 

deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg 

controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).

Case 2:14-cv-01322-SGC Document 15 Filed 09/18/15 Page 4 of 12
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all exposure to the use of hazardous machinery, operational control of moving machinery, and 

unprotected heights. (Tr. at 14-16). At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Hill is capable of 

performing his past relevant work as a production assembler. (Id. at 16-17). Nonetheless,4the 

ALJ proceeded to the fifth step and additionally determined that in light of Hill’s age, education, 

work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that Hill can perform, such as those of a laundry worker, table worker, and ticket taker. 

(Id. at 17-18). Based on his determinations at steps four and five of the sequential evaluation, the 

ALJ concluded Hill is not disabled. (Id. at 18).

III. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination of whether that 

decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied correct

legal standards. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). A 

district court must review the Commissioner’s findings of fact with deference and may not 

reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); 

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, a district court must “scrutinize 

the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by 

substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal 

citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a 

 

4 Generally, if the claimant can perform his past relevant work, the Commissioner will determine the claimant is not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv) and (f). If the claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work, the 

Commissioner must finally determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other work that exists in 

substantial numbers in the national economy in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1), 416.960(c)(1). If the claimant is capable of performing other work, the 

Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1). If the claimant is not 

capable of performing other work, the Commissioner will find the claimant is disabled. Id.

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preponderance.” Id. A district court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial 

evidence, even if the preponderance of the evidence is against those findings. Miles v. Chater, 

84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 

1990)). 

A district court reviews the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo. Davis v. Shalala, 

985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). “The [Commissioner’s] failure to apply the correct law or to 

provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal 

analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 

(11th Cir. 1991). 

IV. Discussion

On appeal, Hill argues (1) the ALJ improperly discredited his testimony regarding the 

disabling effects of his back and leg pain and (2) the ALJ’s determination of Hill’s RFC is not 

supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 11 at 3-11).5 

A. Credibility Determination

When a claimant attempts to establish disability through his own testimony of pain or 

other subjective symptoms, the pain standard articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Holt v. 

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1991), applies. See also Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 

1210 (11th Cir. 2005). 

The pain standard requires “(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and 

either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain 

arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical 

condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the 

alleged pain.” 

 

5

In his conclusion, Hill states without elaboration or citation that the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the 

record. (Doc. 11 at 11). “[An] ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly.” Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 

1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, the ALJ did just that. In making his disability determination, the ALJ had the 

benefit of Hill’s medical records; evaluations completed by an independent medical consultant, a state agency 

physician, and a state agency psychiatrist; and Hill’s testimony. (Tr. at 23-51, 199-509).

Case 2:14-cv-01322-SGC Document 15 Filed 09/18/15 Page 6 of 12
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Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223). Provided the Holt pain standard is met, 

an ALJ considers a claimant’s testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. Foote v. Chater, 

67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). 

An ALJ is permitted to discredit a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain or other 

symptoms if he “clearly ‘articulate[s] explicit and adequate reasons’” for doing so. Dyer, 395 

F.3d at 1210 (quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561-62). “A clearly articulated credibility finding with 

substantial supporting evidence will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 

1562. In determining credibility an ALJ may consider objective medical evidence and a 

claimant’s reported daily activities, amongst other things. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c).

Here, the ALJ found Hill’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause his alleged symptoms but that Hill’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms are not entirely credible. (Tr. at 16). He 

made this finding after considering Hill’s medical records, the medical opinion evidence, and 

Hill’s statements and testimony, and he articulated a number of reasons for affording Hill only 

partial credibility. (Id. at 14-16).

First, the ALJ noted Hill’s medical records do not support the degree of limitation Hill 

alleges. (Id. at 16). Specifically, the ALJ noted healthcare providers have consistently treated 

Hill’s impairments conservatively with medication, by referring him to a pain clinic and physical 

therapy, and by encouraging him to exercise and alter his diet for purposes of weight loss. (Id. at 

14-15). This is true. (See, e.g., id. at 203, 205, 208-10, 230, 234-39, 244, 246-49, 263-66, 268-

306, 327, 336-48, 353-74, 385, 452-65, 467-69, 471, 473, 475-78, 485-92, 495-98, 502-03). In 

April of 2009, imaging of Hill’s lumbosacral spine revealed a mild degenerative change of the 

lumbar spine. (Id. at 314). Shortly thereafter, Hill successfully completed approximately one 

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month of physical therapy for lower back pain. (Id. at 404-10). His discharge note indicates he 

reported feeling much better. (Id. at 404). A treatment record signed just a few days before 

Hill’s discharge from physical therapy notes a normal back exam and, specifically, a normal 

range of motion, no CVA tenderness, no lower back pain, no muscle spasms, and no vertebral 

tenderness. (Id. at 323). By February of 2010, imaging of Hill’s lumbar spine revealed a broadbased disc bulge, disc herniation, and mild epidural lipomatosis. (Id. at 350). However, the ALJ 

found that treatment notes associated with this diagnosis indicated no resulting functional 

limitations. (Id. at 15). Contrary to Hill’s claim (Doc. 11 at 5), substantial evidence supports

this finding. Records of examinations performed after the February 2010 imaging of Hill’s 

lumbar spine lack documentation of functional limitations associated with his back problems. 

(Tr. at 376-80,382-92, 467-507). Additionally, Hill reported no musculoskeletal symptoms in 

November of 2010. (Id. at 377). Although he did report “pain all over” in August of 2012, a 

contemporaneous physical exam revealed normal spine curvature, symmetry, mobility, and 

tenderness; that his extremities showed no atrophy, tremor, cyanosis, clubbing, edema, redness, 

tenderness, limitation of joint motion, or deformities; and that his gait was normal. (Id. at 468). 

It was also noted during that exam that while Hill reported his back pain limits his functioning, 

he also reported opiates helped. (Id. at 469). Finally, imaging of Hill’s knees performed in 

August of 2011 showed the joint spaces were well-maintained medially and laterally on both 

sides and that both knees were symmetrical and unremarkable. (Id. at 481). 

Second, the ALJ noted medical opinions provided by David Aarons, M.D., an 

independent medical consultant who evaluated Hill in person in January of 2011, and Robert 

Heilpern, M.D., a state agency employee who assessed Hill’s medical records in March of 2011, 

do not support the degree of limitation Hill alleges. (Id. at 16). Dr. Aarons diagnosed Hill with 

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mild right sciatica, left knee pain probably caused by degenerative joint disease of the left knee 

and post-traumatic osteoarthritis, and intermittent gout. (Id. at 424). Dr. Heilpern diagnosed Hill 

with obesity, lumbar radiculopathy, gout, arthritis, diabetes mellitus, and hypertension. (Id. at 

430). As a result of these impairments, Dr. Heilpern opined Hill is limited to light work with 

some postural limitations and should avoid all exposure to hazards. (Id. at 431-34). The ALJ 

gave significant weight to these medical opinions because Hill’s medical records do not indicate

Hill is more limited than Dr. Aarons or Dr. Heilpern opined. (Id. at 15). Furthermore, the ALJ 

noted that although Dr. Heilpern only examined Hill’s medical records, Dr. Aarons evaluated 

Hill in person, and neither opinion contradicts the other. (Id.). Finally, the ALJ noted Hill’s 

activities of daily living support the opinions of Dr. Aarons and Dr. Heilpern. (Id.).

Hill challenges the weight given to the opinions of Dr. Aarons and Dr. Heilpern on a 

variety of grounds. (Doc. 11 at 7-8). He notes Dr. Heilpern did not examine Hill. (Id. at 7). 

However, state agency medical consultants are highly qualified physicians who are also experts 

in Social Security disability evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2)(i). Their opinions may be 

entitled to considerable weight if sufficiently supported by the record. SSR 96-6p. Hill claims 

Dr. Heilpern did not have the benefit of objective medical evidence—specifically, the February 

2010 imaging of his lumbar spine—when forming his opinions. (Doc. 11 at 7). This is 

speculation undercut by Dr. Heilpern’s citation to Hill’s medical records. (Tr. at 431). Although 

Dr. Heilpern did not explicitly cite to the February 2010 imaging of Hill’s lumbar spine, he did 

cite an October 2010 medical record noting lumbar radiculopathy. (Id.). Hill also speculates Dr. 

Heilpern relied on only three medical records and Dr. Aarons’s evaluation in forming his 

opinions. (Doc. 11 at 7). Even if true, Hill fails to articulate how that undermines the weight 

afforded those opinions, which the ALJ found to be consistent with Hill’s medical records. 

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Confusingly, at the same time, Hill claims Dr. Heilpern’s opinions contradict Dr. Aarons’s 

findings of positive straight leg raising and decreased sensation. (Doc. 11 at 7-8). Dr. Heilpern 

noted both of these findings. (Tr. at 431, 534). Hill fails to articulate how these findings are 

inconsistent with Dr. Heilpern’s opinion he could perform light work with some restrictions. 

Finally, Hill claims medical records post-dating Dr. Aarons’s evaluation and Dr. Heilpern’s 

assessment, which were completed in early 2011, reveal Hill is more limited that Dr. Aarons or 

Dr. Heilpern opined. (Doc. 11 at 8). Hill does not indicate which medical records he believes 

demonstrate his limitations beyond those found by Dr. Aarons or Dr. Heilpern or what those 

limitations are. The weight given the opinions of Dr. Aarons and Dr. Heilpern is supported by 

substantial evidence, including but not limited to the absence of functional limitations 

documented in Hill’s medical records.

Third, the ALJ noted Hill’s testimony that he is capable of doing a range of activities of 

daily living and performing various chores at a varied pace does not support the degree of 

limitation he alleges. (Id. at 16). Specifically, Hill testified he cooks, cleans, does laundry, 

watches television, and plays chess. (Id. at 38-39). He further testified he cares for his mother, 

who suffers residual complications from a stroke, and his grandmother, who has dementia. (Id.

at 37-39, 43-44). Hill argues the ALJ mischaracterized the extent of his participation in these 

activities. (Doc. 11 at 8-9). For example, he notes he testified his aunt handles most of the 

repairs at the home where he lives with his mother and grandmother and comes over all of the 

time to take care of his mother. (Id. at 8; see also id. at 36-37). While this may be true, Hill also 

testified he provides care for his mother and grandmother within his limitations (id. at 36-39, 43-

44), which is consistent with the ALJ’s characterization of his daily living activities. He further 

argues his ability to participate in daily living activities does not preclude a finding of disability. 

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(Id. at 9-10). An ALJ may not rely on a claimant’s daily activities alone in making a disability 

determination. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1997). However, an ALJ 

may consider these activities when making a credibility determination as to a claimant’s 

testimony of pain and its limiting effects. 20 C.F.R. 416.929(c); Strickland v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 516 Fed. App’x 829, 832 (11th Cir. 2013) (ALJ’s credibility finding as to claimant’s 

subjective complaints of symptoms and their limitations was supported by evidence of claimant’s 

daily living activities). Here, the ALJ properly considered Hill’s daily living activities as one of 

several factors cutting against Hill’s testimony as to his pain and its limiting effects.

In sum, the ALJ clearly articulated his reasons for discrediting Hill’s testimony of his 

symptoms and their limiting effects and that credibility determination is supported by substantial 

evidence.

B. RFC, Generally

Hill generally argues the ALJ’s determination he has the RFC to perform light work with 

certain limitations is not consistent with his medical records, but rather the ALJ picked and chose 

records to support his determination. (Doc. 11 at 10). The only specific piece of evidence Hill 

cites is the February 2010 imaging of his lumbar spine. (Id.). He claims the ALJ ignored the 

findings documented by this imaging. (Id.). In fact, the ALJ discussed this evidence explicitly. 

(Tr. at 15). An ALJ is not required to refer to every piece of evidence in his decision. Dyer, 395 

F.3d at 1211. Here, the ALJ’s determination of Hill’s RFC is supported by the medical records, 

medical opinions, and daily living activities discussed above. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3) 

(RFC is assessed based on all relevant medical and other evidence). Accordingly, contrary to 

Hill’s claim (Doc. 11 at 10-11), Grid Rule 201.12 is not implicated here.6

 

6 The “Grids,” also known as the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, are found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 

2. An ALJ may use them to determine at the fifth step whether other work exists in substantial numbers in the 

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V. Conclusion

Having reviewed the administrative record and considered all of the arguments presented 

by the parties, the undersigned find the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence and in accordance with applicable law. Therefore, that decision is due to be 

AFFIRMED. A separate order will be entered.

DONE this 18

th day of September, 2015.

 ______________________________

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

national economy that a claimant is capable of performing. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 

2004). 

The [G]rids provide for adjudicators to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or 

light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience. Each 

of these factors can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available to an individual. 

Combinations of these factors yield a statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” 

Id. at 1240; see also Gibson v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir. 1985). Grid Rule 201.12 provides that an 

individual between the ages of 50 and 54 with a high school education and a history of unskilled work who is 

limited to sedentary work is disabled. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, § 201.12. 

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