Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06442/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06442-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Injunction

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

‘A’ RECORDINGS LTD, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MATT HOLLYWOOD,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-06442-VC 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND DENYING IN PART 

AND GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 65, 68

1. The plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is denied because there are 

genuine issues of material fact as to when Hollywood’s co-authorship claim accrued. A 

reasonable jury could conclude that at no time prior to the parties’ exchange of letters in late 

2016 did the plaintiffs plainly and expressly repudiate Hollywood’s interests in the sound 

recordings. See Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 1996). There is evidence in the 

record suggesting that before Newcombe founded ‘A’ Recordings his exploitation of the sound 

recordings would have appeared to the reasonable individual in Hollywood’s situation to be 

consistent with, rather than in derogation of, Hollywood’s interests. Then, as ‘A’ Recordings 

began re-releasing the albums – with the original liner notes – Hollywood may have had no 

reasonable expectation of receiving royalties as the new label was getting started. And by the 

time the albums were generating profits, Hollywood had rejoined the band pursuant to a vaguelyarranged compensation structure such that a reasonable jury could determine his ownership

interests in the recordings were not plainly and expressly repudiated.

2. Hollywood’s motion for summary judgment to establish that the plaintiffs’ declaratory 

judgment claim is time-barred is denied. Because Hollywood admits he was not aware of 

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Taylor’s copyright registrations in 2013 and 2014, he cannot reasonably argue that he plainly and 

expressly repudiated Newcombe’s ownership claim at those times. See Hollywood Depo. at 132-

36, Dkt. No. 75-1. The plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim could not have accrued absent an 

element of the claim – Hollywood’s repudiation. And for similar reasons, there was likely no 

actual controversy upon which to file a declaratory judgment action until the exchange of letters 

in 2016.

3. To the extent the plaintiffs claim they had a specific legal right in the form of an 

“implied license” or a “gratis license” to exploit Hollywood’s copyright interests without 

compensating him, Hollywood’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Cf. Bubble Pony, 

Inc. v. Facepunch Studios Ltd., No. CV 15-601(DSD/FLN), 2017 WL 1379326, at *2 (D. Minn. 

Apr. 14, 2017). But to the extent Hollywood’s motion is an attempt to bar the plaintiffs from 

defending against Hollywood’s claim to recuperate profits by arguing, as an evidentiary matter,

that Hollywood implicitly or explicitly informed Newcombe he could exploit the recordings 

without paying royalties to Hollywood, the motion is denied.

4. Lastly, Hollywood’s motion for summary judgment is denied as it relates to the 

plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief because the appropriate form and scope of relief is best 

addressed once liability is established.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2019

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

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