Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00539/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00539-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act (Definitions)

---

1

19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN GROUND 

TRANSPORTATION, INC. et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES MARINE 

CORPS. COMMUNITY SERVICES et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

TRANSFERRING ACTION TO 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS

[Doc. No. 12]

Before the Court is the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. [Doc. 

No. 12.] The motion has been fully briefed and the Court deems it suitable for 

determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 

7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Federal Defendants’ motion is granted in 

part and this case is transferred to the United States Court of Federal Claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs American Ground Transportation, Inc. (“AGT”) and Liberty Launch, Inc.

(“LLI”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this complaint on March 21, 2019, against the 

Case 3:19-cv-00539-CAB-AHG Document 21 Filed 10/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 8
2

19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

following federal agencies and employees: The United States Marine Corps. Community 

Services, The Marine Corps Installations West, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton 

Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, R.C. German, Jr., Department of Defense, 

Michael C. Dittamo, R.A. Scott, Steven Garbutt, John Kyle, David Busby (collectively the 

“Federal Defendants”), and against the following corporation and individuals: Kevin Kohl 

and Associates, LLC, Kevin R. Kohl, Reza Falahi (collectively the “Private Defendants.”). 

[Doc. No. 1.]

According to the complaint, after submitting an application in response to a request 

for proposal in May 2010, Plaintiffs were awarded the only contract pursuant to that request 

and thereby entered into a written concession agreement (the “Contract”), designated as 

Contract #PNM10-C-0030, with the Marine Corps Community Services (“MCCS”), of the 

United States Government, on or about December 13, 2010. [Id. at ¶¶ 20–21.1] Pursuant 

to this Contract, Plaintiffs operated on the Marine Corps Base West to pick up and transport 

shuttle van and taxicab customers from Camp Pendleton. [Id. at ¶ 2.] In consideration of 

the award, Plaintiffs agreed to pay MCCS the commission amounts counter-proposed by 

the MCCS, which began at 5% of the net sales commissions, and grew by 1% per year, up 

to a total of 9%. [Id. at ¶ 22.] According to Plaintiffs, beginning in or about 2011 and 

continuing to this day, the Federal and Private Defendants allowed other individuals and 

entities to interfere with Plaintiffs’ rights under the Contract to offer taxicab and shuttle 

van services from Camp Pendleton. [Id. at ¶ 27.]

Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that the Private Defendants, who also operate

transport services at Camp Pendleton as Sea Breeze Shuttle, would tell customers they were 

not allowed to use Plaintiffs’ transport services, tell customers Plaintiffs did not have the 

proper licenses or contracts to make pick ups at Camp Pendleton, intimidate or harass 

Plaintiffs’ drivers, and submit false reports of Plaintiffs’ alleged wrongdoing, all in an 

 

1 Document numbers and page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF for the docket entry.

Case 3:19-cv-00539-CAB-AHG Document 21 Filed 10/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 8
3

19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

effort to re-direct customers away from Plaintiffs and to the Private Defendants’ transport 

services instead. [Id.]

Plaintiffs’ principal met with its MCCS representative, an MCCS Officer at Camp 

Pendleton, to discuss these issues, who suggested Plaintiffs should be relived of any duty 

to pay commissions to the MCCS under the Contract. [Id. at ¶ 28.] Thereafter, Plaintiffs 

received a letter from MCCS advising Plaintiffs they would be receiving an automatic sixmonth extension of the Contract without the need to execute any additional paperwork, and 

without the need to pay any commissions. [Id.] Thereafter, in June 2017, MCCS issued 

an Order to ban Plaintiff LLI from Camp Pendleton. [Id. at ¶ 31.] Although Plaintiff 

AGT’s taxicab operations were not the subject of that Order, they too were denied access 

for an approximate two-week period. [Id.] Plaintiffs allege that to this day that Order was 

never served on either of them, but instead they learned of it indirectly when some of the 

Private Defendants who had copies of the Order purported to read it aloud to Plaintiffs’ 

drivers. [Id.]

Plaintiffs allege they have followed the designated administrative review processes 

for their complaints to the best of their knowledge and ability, as well as attended several

meetings and hearings with MCCS representatives. [Id. at ¶ 32.] On September 22, 2018, 

Plaintiffs served their certified claim pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq., on all of the 

MCCS representatives. [Id.] On or about January 24, 2019, Plaintiffs received MCCS’ 

reply, and thereafter, Plaintiffs’ and MCCS’ counsel engaged in additional correspondence. 

[Id.] Plaintiffs interpret the reply and MCCS counsel’s subsequent correspondence as a 

denial of their claim and believe they have fulfilled their administrative duties prior to 

bringing the pending action in this Court. [Id.] Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges claims against 

the Federal and Private Defendants for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing, violation of unfair competition law, intentional interference with prospective 

economic relations, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, intentional 

interference with contractual relations, and negligence.

Case 3:19-cv-00539-CAB-AHG Document 21 Filed 10/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 8
4

19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. APPLICABLE LAW

“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” 

United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). Two waivers of sovereign immunity 

are pertinent here. First, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives the United States’ 

immunity “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent 

or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the 

scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a 

private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place 

where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Second, the Tucker Act

waives the United States’ immunity and bestows exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of 

Federal Claims (“COFC”) in all actions “founded . . . upon any express or implied contract 

with the United States . . . in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Unlike 

with FTCA causes of action, “[i]t has long been established that the law to be applied in 

construing or applying provisions of government contracts is federal, not state law.” 

Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963).

The Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”), enacted in 1978, covers any claim based upon 

“any express or implied contract . . . made by an executive agency for—(1) the procurement 

of property, other than real property in being; (2) the procurement of services; (3) the 

procurement of construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of real property; or (4) the 

disposal of personal property.” 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a). Under the CDA, “procurement” 

means “the acquisition by purchase, lease or barter, of property or services for the direct 

benefit or use of the Federal Government.” New Era Constr. v. United States, 890 F.2d 

1152, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quotation and emphasis omitted). The CDA sets forth its own 

jurisdictional requirements. See M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 

1323, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Under the CDA, claims by a government contractor 

against the United States must first be the subject of a decision by the contracting officer, 

defined as “any person who . . . has the authority to make and administer contracts and to 

make determinations and findings with respect to contracts.” 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7103. 

Case 3:19-cv-00539-CAB-AHG Document 21 Filed 10/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 8
5

19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The decision by the contracting officer may be appealed to an agency board of contract 

appeals or to the United States Court of Federal Claims. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103, 7104. Further 

appeals from these bodies must be filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit. 41 U.S.C. § 7107; see United States v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., 795 F.Supp. 

1131, 1134 (N.D. Ga. 1992).

To determine if the CDA applies, the Court must look to whether the dispute at issue 

is one of contract. See Ingersoll–Rand Co. v. United States, 780 F.2d 74, 76 (D.C. Cir. 

1985). The court in Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1982), explained 

that courts should attempt “to make rational distinctions between actions sounding 

genuinely in contract and those based on truly independent legal grounds.” 672 F.2d at 

969–70. The Megapulse court further noted that, when examining “competing” 

jurisdictional bases, the issue is “to determine if the claim so clearly presents a disguised 

contract action that jurisdiction over the matter is properly limited to the Court of Claims.” 

Id. at 968. It is well-established that disguised contract actions may not escape the CDA. 

See, e.g., Ingersoll–Rand, 780 F.2d at 77; Am. Science & Eng., Inc. v. Califano, 571 F.2d 

58, 61 (1st Cir. 1978). Neither contractors nor the government may bring a contract action 

in federal district court simply by recasting claims in tort language or as some statutory or 

regulatory violation. See Sealtite Corp. v. General Services Admin., 614 F.Supp. 352, 354 

(D. Colo. 1985) (rejecting attempt to “circumvent the [CDA] by characterizing dispute as 

an action in replevin”). Effective enforcement of the jurisdictional limits of the CDA 

mandates that courts recognize contract actions that are dressed in tort clothing. United 

States v. J & E Salvage Co., 55 F.3d 985, 987–88 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Dalton v. 

Sherwood Van Lines, Inc., 50 F.3d 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“When the Contract 

Disputes Act applies, it provides the exclusive mechanism for dispute resolution; the 

Contract Disputes Act was not designed to serve as an alternative administrative remedy, 

available at the contractor’s option.”).

III. DISCUSSION

The Federal Defendants contend Plaintiffs claims allege a contract dispute against 

Case 3:19-cv-00539-CAB-AHG Document 21 Filed 10/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 8
6

19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the federal government which should be presented in the Court of Federal Claims pursuant 

to the Contract Disputes Act and/or the Tucker Act. Plaintiffs respond that this is not a 

contract dispute but a tort action and therefore this Court has jurisdiction under the Federal 

Tort Claims Act. Further, Plaintiffs contend that this case also involves the wrongful acts 

of the Private Defendants and that the Federal Defendants, who drafted the Contract, have 

already admitted in writing that the Contract at issue here is a concessionaire contract that 

is not subject to the CDA. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that any deficiency to the complaint 

can be cured by amendment and if this case must proceed before the COFC then it should 

be transferred, rather than dismissed. While the Federal Defendants also appear to move 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, their six-page motion and four-page reply almost 

entirely addresses only the issue of jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Order addresses only 

the issue of jurisdiction and does not make any findings as to the merits of Plaintiffs’ 

claims, any statute of limitations arguments, or whether any individual defendants must be 

dismissed.

Plaintiffs first argue that this action is one in tort brought under the FTCA and not 

under the CDA. The Court is not persuaded. It is not clear how the FTCA applies as the 

complaint does not allege any injury or loss of property. Rather, a rational reading of 

Plaintiffs’ claims necessarily requires the interpretation of Plaintiffs’ Contract with the 

MCCS and its terms which appears to be an express contract made by an executive agency 

for the procurement of services. Moreover, contractors with the government may not bring 

contract actions in federal district court by recasting and disguising claims in tort language 

or as statutory or regulatory violations. See, e.g., Ingersoll–Rand, 780 F.2d at 77; see also

Sealtite Corp., 614 F.Supp. at 354. As Plaintiffs state in the complaint, “This action seeks 

damages . . . arising out of a governmental concessions contract . . .” and “tort claims 

arising from [the Contract].” [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 5.] Plaintiffs also contend that paragraph 

37 of the complaint alleged compliance with the prerequisite for bringing an action under 

the FTCA as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). However, paragraph 37 of the complaint states, 

“[Plaintiffs] served their [certified claim pursuant to] 41 U.S.C. [§] 7101 et seq.” which is 

Case 3:19-cv-00539-CAB-AHG Document 21 Filed 10/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 8
7

19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in fact in reference to the CDA and not the FTCA. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 37.] Further references 

to the CDA and 41 U.S.C. § 7101 are attached to Plaintiffs’ complaint and the purported 

certified claim. [Id. at 64, 66.]

Plaintiffs’ contention that the Federal Defendants’ should be bound by their written 

admission that the Contract was a concession contract not subject to the CDA in accordance 

with controlling law is erroneous. “[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . 

empowered to hear only those cases that (1) are within the judicial power of the United 

States, as defined in the Constitution, and (2) that have been entrusted to them by a 

jurisdictional grant by Congress.” United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 951 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522, at 60 (2d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted)). 

Defects in the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction “go to the inherent power of the court 

and cannot be waived or forfeited.” Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d at 952. Although the Federal 

Defendants’ previous assertions to the Plaintiffs that the Contract was not subject to the 

CDA and the inclusion of such language within the Contract itself is indeed disconcerting, 

such actions cannot bestow jurisdiction upon this Court. As stated in the same cases the 

Federal Defendants improperly relied upon for their previous assertions, “only Congress 

can waive sovereign immunity; parties may not by contract bestow jurisdiction on a court.” 

Pacrim Pizza Co. v. Pirie, 304 F.3d 1291, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Ins. Corp. of 

Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701–02 (1982) (“[Federal 

court jurisdiction is] limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of 

jurisdiction . . . [N]o action of the parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a 

federal court.”).

Furthermore, the cases relied upon that hold concession contracts are not subject to 

the CDA are uninstructive. As a preliminary matter, the CDA does not distinguish between 

concession and nonconcession contracts. These cases also rely on an inapplicable 

regulation involving concession contracts with the National Park Service, see Coffee 

Connections, Inc. v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 741, 751 (2013) (relying in part on 36 

Case 3:19-cv-00539-CAB-AHG Document 21 Filed 10/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 8
8

19-CV-539-CAB-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C.F.R. § 51.3, relating to concession contracts under the National Park Service Concession 

Policies Act of 1965); Terry v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 736, 737 (2011) (same). The 

Contract at issue in this case does not involve the National Park Service, and Plaintiffs have 

not explained why regulations limited to the National Park Service Concession Policies 

Act of 1965 should inform this Court’s analysis. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims cannot overcome this Court’s lack of jurisdiction by 

framing them as sounding in tort. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims relates to both the

Private and Federal Defendants’ actions as they pertain to Plaintiffs’ Contract with the 

United States, and therefore jurisdiction exists exclusively with the COFC pursuant to the 

CDA, or alternatively, the Tucker Act.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part2and 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the Clerk of Court SHALL TRANSFER this action to the

United States Court of Federal Claims.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 15, 2019

 

2 Accordingly, the Court does not make any findings with respect to the merits of Plaintiffs’ allegations, 

any statute of limitations argument, or whether any individual defendants must be dismissed.

Case 3:19-cv-00539-CAB-AHG Document 21 Filed 10/15/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 8