Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06351/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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... 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. 

Clerk 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

July 11, 1996 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-6351 Bell v. Dillard 

June 4, 1996 by The Honorable Robert L. Henry 

Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision: 

On page two, line four, Mr. Bell's name is spelled incorrectly as Mark. The 

correct spelling is Marc. 

Please make the appropriate correction to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, Clerk 

Beth Morris 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-6351 Document: 01019276500 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 1 
Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

June 11, 1996 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-6351 Bell v. Dillard 

June 4, 1996 by The Honorable Robert L. Henry 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Please be advised of the following corrections to the captioned decision: 

The first line of the opinion appears twice. 

Appellant's attorney J.W. Coyle, III's name appears incorrectly as W.J. Coyle III. 

Please make the appropriate corrections to your copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, Clerk 

Beth Morris 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-6351 Document: 01019276500 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 2 
PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

lluitecl Statea Court of Appenls Tentb Circuit 

TENTH CIRCillT JUN -4 1996 

MARC A. BELL, ) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Oerk 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES, INC. ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

No. 94-6351 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-2029-L) 

R. Allen Smith (W.J. Coyle, ill, Gloyd L. McCoy of counsel, and Robert D. Baron, with 

him on the briefs), Coyle & McCoy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for the Appellant. 

G. David Ross (Nathan L. Whatley with him on the briefs), Lytle, Soule & Curlee, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for the Appellee. 

Before HENRY and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and JENKINS1

, Senior District Judge. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal concerns the effect of rulings in a prior, somewhat unusually 

Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior District Judge for the District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by 

designation. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6351 Document: 01019276500 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 3 
,., 

This appeal concerns the effect of rulings in a prior, somewhat unusually 

conducted municipal court case on a diversity action for damages. The district court 

concluded that the municipal court's determination that there was probable cause for the 

arrest of the plaintiff-appellant Mark Bell precluded Mr. Bell from re-litigating his claims 

for assault, battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. The court therefore granted 

summary judgment in favor of the defendant Dillard Department Stores, Inc. ("Dillard"). 

For two reasons, we conclude that Dillard is not entitled to summary judgment: (1) 

because the record does not contain a document that satisfies the requirements of 

Oklahoma law for orders and judgments that may be given preclusive effect; and (2) 

because the record does not establish that Mr. Bell had a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate the issue in municipal court. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Dillard and remand the case for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In March 1993, a security guard arrested Mr. Bell in a restroom at Dillard's store 

in Crossroads Mall in Oklahoma City. The guard alleged that by certain gestures Mr. 

Bell had offered to engage in a lewd act, and Mr. Bell was charged in Oklahoma City 

Municipal Court with violating a municipal ordinance. Mr. Bell's attorney filed several 

pretrial motions, including a motion to quash the arrest and a motion to suppress certain 

statements made by Mr. Bell. Se.e Aplt' s App. at 173. In his motion to quash, Mr. Bell 

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argued that the security guard lacked probable cause to arrest him. & id. 

On November 10, 1993, a municipal judge heard evidence pertaining to Mr. Bell's 

motions to quash and suppress. The judge took the motions under advisement and 

informed the parties that he would issue a ruling in several days. What happened next is 

somewhat unclear from the record. However, a Renewed Motion to Quash and Motion to 

Suppress, filed by Mr. Bell's attorney on November 15, 1993, reports the following 

conversation with the municipal judge: 

:W.. at 175-76. 

3. That on Friday, November 12, 1993, counsel, in a 

telephone conversation (with the permission of the prosecutor 

... ) heard from [the municipal judge] that he was 

overruling the Motions, but he was not specific about whether 

it included both of them, and further felt uncomfortable with 

the case and wanted to recuse himself because of his 

ownership of certain shares of stock in Dillards Department 

Stores. That [the municipal judge] further indicated that he 

even felt somewhat uncomfortable with ruling on the 

Motions. 

4. That counsel, based upon the discomfort of the 

prior Judge with sitting in the case ... , is entitled to renew 

his Motion to Quash and Motion to Suppress. 

According to a handwritten minute entry, a second municipal judge denied Mr. 

Bell's motion to quash and motion to suppress on November 15, 1993. :W.. at 31. On the 

same day, the second municipal judge empaneled a jury, heard opening arguments for 

Mr. Bell and the City of Oklahoma City, and considered testimony from the first witness, 

the security guard who had arrested Mr. Bell. Id.. at 27-28. The judge, upon hearing this 

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testimony, immediately dismissed the case: 

ld.. at 73. 

I'm going to dismiss this case on the Demurrer or the Motion 

to Dismiss of the Defense Attorney for the fact that the case is 

not proved. A prima facie case which would stand alone has 

not been proved by this witness and this is the only witness 

that can present such evidence. 

Following the dismissal of the municipal charge, Mr. Bell filed the instant 

diversity action against Dillard asserting claims for assault, battery, false arrest, false 

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. In its motion for summary judgment, Dillard 

argued that the denial of Mr. Bell's motions to quash by both municipal judges 

constituted a finding that his arrest was supported by probable cause. Dillard maintained 

that because Mr. Bell had had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the probable cause 

issue in municipal court, he was precluded from asserting any of his claims. 

The district court agreed with this reasoning, concluding that "probable cause was 

fully and fairly litigated in the prior municipal court proceeding and cannot be relitigated 

in this action." ld.. at 239. Because a lack of probable cause for Mr. Bell's arrest was an 

essential component of each of his claims, the court reasoned, Dillard was entitled to 

summary judgment on all of them. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

Mr. Bell now argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to 

Dillard because he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of probable 

cause in the municipal court. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same standards as did the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). Franklin 

v. Thompson, 981 F.2d 1168, 1169 (lOth Cir. 1992). The movant has the burden of 

establishing that it is entitled to summary judgment, and we examine the record in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. ld.. at 1169-70; Deepwater Invs .. Ltd. v. 

Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (lOth Cir. 1991). Additionally, the legal 

question of whether issue preclusion bars the relitigation of the issue of probable cause in 

a subsequent action is reviewed de novo. Franklin, 981 F.2d at 1170. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1738, a federal court must give the same full faith and 

credit to state judicial proceedings "as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 

State ... from which they are taken." 28 U.S. C. § 1738; see also Kremer v. Chemical 

Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980); 

Ruyle v. Continental Oil Co., 44 F.3d 837, 843 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 

272 (1995); Thournir y. Meyer, 803 F.2d 1093, 1094 (lOth Cir. 1986). "Under the 

doctrine of issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel), once a court has decided an issue of 

fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same parties or their privies may not relitigate 

the issue in a suit brought upon a different claim." Fent v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 

898 P.2d 126, 133 (Okla. 1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Wilson v. Kane, 852 P.2d 

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717, 722 (Okla. 1993); Yeiser v. Armstrong, 688 P.2d 796, 800 n.9 (Okla. 1984). 

However, the doctrine of issue preclusion bars an attack on a judgment only when the 

issue in question has been "'fully and fairly' litigated" in the prior proceeding. Yeiser, 

688 P.2d at 800; see also Carris v. John R. Thomas & Assocs, P.C., 896 P.2d 522, 529 

n.17 (Okla. 1995) ("Issue preclusion cannot apply when the party against whom the 

earlier decision is interposed did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the critical 

issue in the earlier case."). 

In the instant case, there are two reasons why the doctrine of issue preclusion is 

inapplicable. First, the minute entry on which Dillard relies is not signed by the municipal 

judge, and under Oklahoma law it therefore may not be afforded preclusive effect. 

Second, because the first municipal judge recused and because the record does not 

establish that the second municipal judge reviewed the transcript of the motions hearing 

conducted by the first judge, we cannot conclude that Mr. Bell had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the probable cause issue in municipal court. Additionally, there is 

some question under recent case law (which echoes policy concerns advanced by courts 

and scholars) whether issue preclusion may be applied to litigants such as Mr. Bell who, 

because they ultimately prevail at trial, do not have an opportunity to appeal adverse 

rulings on pretrial motions. 

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A. A minute entry not si&ned by the muncipal jud&e is not entitled to preclusive effect. 

In Depuy y. Hoeme, 775 P.2d 1339 (Okla. 1989), the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

concluded that a ruling pronounced by a judge at a hearing, transcribed by a court 

reporter, and memorialized in a "bench docket entry" could not be afforded preclusive 

effect because the ruling was not set forth in an order signed by the judge. ld. at 1342-44. 

The Depuy court explained the kind of evidence necessary to determine the effect of a 

judgment or order: 

A judgment or order is rendered and begins its legal life as 

soon as it is pronounced from the bench and before it is ever 

reduced to writing for entry of record by the clerk While any 

judgment or order is operative from the moment it is 

announced, the only legitimate evidence of the adjudication's 

legal existence, of its terms and of its legal effect is the record 

entry bearing the judge's signature. 

ld.. at 1343 (footnotes omitted)~ see also Elliott v. City of Guthrie, 725 P. 2d 861, 863 n. 

10 (Okla. 1986) ("A minute entry unsigned by the judge is not a legally sufficient 

memorial of the trial court's ruling."). 

In the instant case, the record does not contain an order or a judgment that is 

signed by either of the municipal judges and that addresses the issue that Dillard now 

seeks to preclude Mr. Bell from litigating--whether the security guard had probable cause 

to arrest him. As we have noted, the record before us does contain two documents that 

memorialize the municipal court's rulings on Mr. Bell's pretrial motions to quash and 

suppress: (1) Mr. Bell's Renewed Motion to Quash and Suppress (in which Mr. Bell's 

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Appellate Case: 94-6351 Document: 01019276500 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 9 
attorney reports his discussion with the first municipal judge); and (2) a handwritten 

minute entry (not signed by either municipal judge), dated November 15, 1993. 

However, neither document satisfies the requirements set forth in Depuy for orders and 

judgments that may be given preclusive effect under Oklahoma law. Cf.. Elliott, 725 P.2d 

at 863 (concluding that an unsigned minute order is not a sufficient memorial of a trial 

court's ruling); Wetsel y. Independent Sch. Dist. I-1, 670 P.2d 986, 993 (Okla. 1983) 

(''Neither minute entries nor statements by counsel, whether in briefs or in a transcript, 

can be invoked as a legally sufficient memorial of the court's ruling."). Therefore, the 

district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the municipal court's rulings on the basis 

of the minute entries and statements by counsel contained in this record. 

B. The first judge recused and the second judge heard no evidence before ruling on 

Mr. Bell's pretrial motions. 

In addition to the lack of an order or judgment signed by a municipal judge, there 

is a second reason why the doctrine of issue preclusion may not be applied in this case: 

the record does not establish that Mr. Bell had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

probable cause issue in municipal court. As we have noted, it appears that both 

municipal judges ruled on the motions in which Mr. Bell raised the probable cause issue. 

However, the record indicates that the first judge recused from the case because he owned 

stock in Dillard and that the judge reported to Mr. Bell's attorney that he "felt somewhat 

uncomfortable with ruling on the Motions." Aplt's App. at 175. As Dillard's counsel 

correctly acknowledged at oral argument, it was "anomalous" for the first judge to rule on 

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-. 

a disputed (and potentially dispositive) factual issue and then, immediately after 

announcing his ruling, to recuse from the case on the basis of his relationship with one of 

the parties. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Mr. Bell had a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate the probable cause issue before the first municipal judge. 

As to the second municipal judge, the record does not support the inference that he 

heard any evidence regarding Mr. Bell's pretrial motions. As noted above, the only 

document reporting the second judge's denial of Mr. Bell's pretrial motions to quash and 

suppress is the minute entry dated November 15, 1993, which does not state that any 

evidence was taken before the judge ruled. Moreover, the transcript of the November 10, 

1993 hearing before the first municipal judge (at which Mr. Bell did present evidence in 

support of his contention that he was arrested without probable cause) was certified by 

the court reporter on December 6, 1993, approximately three weeks after the second 

municipal judge's ruling on the pretrial motions. ~ Aplt' s App. at 17 4. Thus, there is 

no evidence in the record before us indicating that the second municipal judge reviewed 

the testimony presented at the November 10, 1993 hearing. 2 

2 In its appellate brief: Dillard states that the testimony from the November 10, 1993 hearing 

was "readily available" for the second municipal judge to review in considering Mr. Bell's 

renewed motion to quash. Aplee's Br. at 11. As authority for this statement, Dillard cites the 

second paragraph ofMr. Bell's renewed motion, which states that "testimony [at the November 

10, 1993 hearing before the first municipal judge] was received by five witnesses and a transcript 

prepared of the testimony of those witnesses." Aplt's App. at 175. 

For several reasons, this statement does not establish that the second municipal judge 

actually reviewed the November 1Oth hearing transcript before ruling on the pretrial motion. First, 

there are no references to the transcript anywhere else in Mr. Bell's renewed motion to quash and 

suppress. In addition, at oral argument, Dillard's counsel conceded--as credibility and candor 

demanded--that there was no evidence in the record indicating that the second municipal judge 

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In light of the disputed factual contentions pertaining to Mr. Bell's arrest and our 

examination of the record provided to us, both at oral argument and subsequently, we 

cannot agree with the district court that the second municipal judge afforded Mr. Bell a 

full and fair opportunity to litigate the probable cause question before ruling on Mr. 

Bell's pretrial motions. £e.e Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he 

determination of a factual issue on an interlocutory appeal based on naught but the 

pleadings would have deprived [the plaintiff] of a full and fair opportunity to litigate his 

claim .... "). Significantly, it appears that the first time that the second municipal judge 

heard the evidence offered to support the charge against Mr. Bell (i&., the trial testimony 

of the security guard), he took the case away from the jury and dismissed the charge 

himself. Accordingly, for this reason as well, the district court erred in holding that the 

municipal court's finding of probable cause was entitled to preclusive effect. 

C. Mr. Bell did not have an o:wortunity to appeal the pretrial ruling. 

Finally, even if the second municipal judge had reviewed the transcript of the prior 

hearing or conducted a second hearing regarding the probable cause issue, an occurrence 

reviewed the transcript before ruling on the pretrial motions. (Rather than repeating the 

contention that the second judge reviewed the transcript, Dillard's counsel relied on the 

''presumption of regularity" in arguing that the minute entry recording the denial of the pretrial 

motions should be given preclusive effect.) Moreover, on appeal, Mr. Bell's counsel agrees with 

Dillard that "[ t ]he ruling on the motions by [the second judge] was made without hearing 

evidence on the issues." Aplt' s Br. at 11. Finally, because the only transcript of the November 

1Oth hearing that is contained in our record was certified by the court reporter on December 6, 

1993, we cannot conclude that the second judge reviewed a previously completed transcript that 

we have not seen, and have no reason to believe existed. 

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that has not been proved and seems highly unlikely, there is still some question as to 

whether Mr. Bell would have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. In particular, we 

note that in light of the second judge's dismissal of the charge against Mr. Bell after the 

security guard's trial testimony, Mr. Bell had no opportunity to appeal the pretrial 

probable cause finding. Had he attempted to appeal the finding prior to trial, the appeal 

would be subject to dismissal as interlocutory. ~Hardin y. State, 649 P.2d 799, 804 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1982) ("A ruling binding appellant over for trial is not a final order of 

judgment. It is an intermediate order made in the progress of the case and cannot be 

appealed from, except by review after pronouncement of judgment and sentence."); ~ 

.alsQ Okla Stat. tit. 22 § 1051(a) (establishing defendant's right of appeal "from any 

judgment against him"). After the dismissal of the charges at trial, an appeal of the 

probable cause determination would be subject to dismissal as moot. ~ State v. 

Thomason, 345 P.2d 908, 911 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (noting that the dismissal of 

criminal charges rendered moot a prior ruling on a change of venue motion). 

In analogous circumstances, this circuit has concluded that a Colorado court's 

denial of a pretrial motion to suppress did not preclude litigation in a subsequent civil 

rights action of the issue of probable cause to arrest. ~Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 

1456, 1459 (lOth Cir. 1991). Speaking for the court, Judge Anderson reasoned that the 

plaintiffs in the civil rights action had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

probable cause issue because their acquittal in the prior criminal case deprived them of 

the opportunity to appeal. ~ i.d.. ("Before a final judgment, such an interlocutory appeal 

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would have been improper, and after the judgment [of acquittal], an appeal was rendered 

moot."). A number of courts have followed similar reasoning, holding that the lack of 

opportunity to appeal an issue establishes that there has not been a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate it and that, as a result, issue preclusion should not be applied. & 

Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1458 (2d Cir. 1995) (''Under New York law, a party 

has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue if it has had no opportunity to 

appeal the adverse finding."); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399,406 (7th Cir. 1989) ("As our 

court has recognized on prior occasions, a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate' includes 

the right to appeal an adverse decision."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990); Disher v. 

Information Resources, Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that "unless [a 

judgment] is appealable the defendant was denied an opportunity to contest it fully in the 

previous litigation"); Block v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1568, 1572 

(Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that an order is not preclusive when ''there has been no 

opportunity for appellate review''); Luben Indus .• Inc. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1037, 

1040 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e are convinced that the Government did not have a 'full and 

fair opportunity to litigate' its claim because it could not appeal the interlocutory 

memorandum .... ");Williams v. Weber, 905 F. Supp. 1502, 1509 (D. Kan. 1995) 

("Before the jury's final judgment, any appeal of the state judge's ruling on the motion to 

suppress or on the motion to acquit would have been unripe; after final judgment was 

entered, any appeal on the issue of probable cause was rendered moot. Thus, plaintiff did 

not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the probable cause issue, and collateral 

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estoppel should not be applied")~ Hemy v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 252 (N.D. TIL 1991) 

("In similar situations where a defendant's opportunity for appellate review has been 

foreclosed, lllinois courts have excepted the litigant from general collateral estoppel rules 

and allowed the matter to be relitigated."). But see Coogan v. City of Wixon, 820 F.2d 

170, 175 (6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that pretrial probable cause finding was entitled to 

preclusive effect even though the defendant in the criminal case was subsequently 

acquitted)~ Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1984) (same),~ 

denied, 469 U.S. 1212 (1985). See generally 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 44 21, at 201 ( 1981) ("Since appellate review is an integral part 

of the system, there is strong reason to insist that preclusion should be denied to findings 

that could not be tested by the appellate procedure ordinarily available.") 

In a decision applying federal common law, the United States Supreme Court has 

likewise indicated its concern about giving preclusive effect to nonappealable rulings. In 

Standefer y. United States, 44 7 U.S. 10 (1980), the Court held that the acquittal of a 

principal did not preclude the prosecution of another individual for aiding and abetting in 

the same offense. The Court emphasized the government's lack of opportunity to appeal 

the principal's acquittal: "[I]n civil cases, post-trial motions and appellate review provide 

an aggrieved litigant a remedy~ in a criminal case the Government has no similar avenue 

to correct errors. Under contemporary principles of collateral estoppel, this factor 

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strongly militates against giving an acquittal preclusive effect." Id.. at 23. 3 

Nevertheless, as Dillard and the district court have correctly noted, a decision of 

this court and a decision of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals suggest that the availability 

of an appeal to the losing party is not always required in order to apply the doctrine of 

issue preclusion. In Hubbert v. City of Moore, 923 F.2d 769 (lOth Cir. 1991), this circuit 

applied Oklahoma law to conclude that the plaintiffs in a civil rights action were 

precluded from litigating the issue of probable cause for their arrest because the judge in 

a prior criminal case had determined the issue at a preliminary hearing. Id.. at 773. 

Significantly, the plaintiffs in Hubbert were in the same position as Mr. Bell and as the 

plaintiffs in Dixon: because they were not convicted of the criminal charges, they had no 

opportunity to appeal the finding of probable cause. 

Hubbert's application of issue preclusion is based on Adamson v. Dayton Hudson 

.Go.ul.,, 774 P.2d 478 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989). ~Hubbert, 923 F.2d at 773 (applying 

Adamson). In that case, just as in Hubbert, the court held that a finding of probable cause 

at a preliminary hearing precluded the plaintiff from re-litigating the issue in a subsequent 

civil rights action--even though the plaintiff was eventually acquitted in the criminal case 

and therefore did not have the opportunity to appeal. Adamson, 774 P.2d at 480. The 

Adamson court concluded that the plaintiff "had every opportunity to litigate this issue," 

3 The Court in Standefer added that it did not mean ''to suggest that the availability of 

appellate review is always an essential predicate of estoppel." Standefer, 447 U.S. at 23 n. 18. 

However, "[i]n the absence of appellate review, or of similar procedures, such confidence [in the 

result of the prior litigation] is often unwarranted." ld.. (emphasis added). 

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id..,but it did not discuss the plaintiffs lack of an opportunity to appeal. 4 

Hubbert and Adamson are distinguishable from the case at hand. Hubbert notes 

the requirement implicit in all preclusion claims: "[T]he question of probable cause is 

conclusively determined at a preliminary hearing when the parties have had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate that issue." Hubbert, 923 F.2d at 773. As we have stated above, 

the lack of properly memorialized orders, the recusal of the first judge, and the lack of 

evidence that the second judge reviewed the relevant transcript before ruling on Mr. 

Bell's pretrial motion to quash make it impossible to determine that a "full and fair 

opportunity to litigate" was available. 

Further, it is not clear whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court would now adopt the 

approach suggested by Dixon and other cases (concluding that availability of an appeal is 

a necessary component of a full and fair opportunity to litigate) or of Hubbert and 

Adamson (concluding that one may have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate even if 

one could not pursue an appeal). However, some statements in the Oklahoma cases 

suggest that issue preclusion may not be applicable in the absence of an opportunity to 

appeal. For example, in Lee v. Knight, 771 P.2d 1003 (Okla. 1989), a decision cited in 

4 Under Oklahoma law, ''No opinion of the Court of Appeals shall be binding or cited as 

precedent unless it shall have been approved by the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court 

for publication in the official reporter." Okla. Stat. tit. 20 § 30.5; see also Taylor y. Chubb 

Group of Ins. Cos., 874 P.2d 806, 809 n.5 (Okla. 1994). Adamson was approved for publication 

by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, but there is no indication that it has been approved by a 

majority of the Justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Accordingly, Adamson does not 

constitute binding precedent under Oklahoma law. 

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Hubbert and Adamson, the court held that a criminal conviction should be afforded 

preclusive effect. ld.. at 1006. In explaining that holding, the court noted that "where the 

criminal sanctions are appropriately severe, . . . the criminal defendant has every 

incentive to defend the prosecution vigorously and to exercise the right of appeal from a 

conviction. Id.. (emphasis added). Moreover, in Benham y. Plotner, 795 P.2d 510 (Okla. 

1990), a case decided after Adamson and not discussed in Hubbert, the Oklahoma 

Supreme Court held that a felony conviction could not be given preclusive effect in a 

subsequent civil case when an appeal of the conviction was pending. Id.. at 512-13. The 

court reasoned that the doctrine of issue preclusion could only be applied to final 

judgments and that, in light of the pending appeal, there was no final judgment: 

A judgment is not final in the sense that it binds the parties 

until the losing party has failed properly to perfect an appeal, 

or until the highest court, whose jurisdiction in invoked by 

either party, upholds the decision of the trial court. Because a 

case does not become final until the appeal or the right to 

appeal is exhausted, and because [the defendant's] criminal 

conviction was on appeal at the time of the civil trial, [the 

defendant's] conviction was not a final judgment. Therefore, 

it could not be introduced as conclusive proof [that the 

defendant committed the offenses of which he was 

convicted]. 

Id.. at 512 (footnotes omitted). 5 

5 The Benham court also held that the felony conviction could be introduced '"for what it is 

worth."' Benham, 795 F.2d at 513. ''If the defendant is unable to offer a satisfactory 

explanation, it is presumed that the jury will give the conviction substantial weight and effect." 

Id.. 

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The reasoning of Benham, provides some support for the view that the right to 

appeal is a required component of the full and fair opportunity to litigate under the 

Oklahoma law of issue preclusion. As the United States Supreme Court observed in 

Standefer, the doctrine of issue preclusion "is premised upon an underlying confidence 

that the result achieved in the initial litigation was substantially correct." Standefer, 44 7 

U.S. at 23 n.18. If, as Benham suggests, the courts lack confidence in the correctness of a 

ruling when an appeal is pending, it is not clear why they should be any more confident 

when, as in this case, the lower court's ruling cannot be appealed by the losing party. 

In any event, because the municipal court's ruling is not entitled to preclusive 

effect for the other reasons we have outlined above, we need not resolve this matter here. 

Whether, under the Oklahoma law of issue preclusion, a party has had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate an issue if he cannot appeal the ruling of the court that initially 

decides it is a question that awaits definitive resolution by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 6 

III. CONCLUSION 

In the absence of an order or judgment signed by a municipal judge, the 

municipal court's rulings regarding probable cause to arrest Mr. Bell are not entitled to 

6 We also note that Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1343 allows merchants and their agents to detain a 

customer if there is "reasonable grounds or probable cause" to believe that the customer has 

wrongfully taken merchandise from the store. Subsection 1343( d) states that such a 'l"easonable 

detention shall not constitute an unlawful arrest or detention for purposes of civil liability." Okla. 

Stat. tit. 22 § 1343(d). This statute offers an additional defense to merchants in false arrest cases. 

17 

Appellate Case: 94-6351 Document: 01019276500 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 19 
preclusive effect. Additionally, in light of the first municipal judge's recusal and the 

absence of any indication that the second municipal judge heard any evidence pertaining 

to probable cause before ruling on Mr. Bell's pretrial motion, we cannot conclude that 

Mr. Bell had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Accordingly, the municipal 

court's rulings do not preclude Mr. Bell from litigating the issue of probable cause for his 

arrest in the instant case. 7 

The district court's order granting summary judgment to Dillard is therefore 

VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

7 In his appellate brief: Mr. Bell also argues that, even if the municipal court's finding of 

probable cause is preclusive, he may still pursue his claim for false imprisonment. He maintains 

that probable cause to arrest is not a complete defense to a false imprisonment claim In light of 

our conclusion that the municipal court's rulings are not entitled to preclusive effect, we do not 

address this argument. 

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