Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03037/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03037-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CLICK and MARIE CLICK,

Plaintiffs, No. C 06-1936 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS 

DORMAN LONG TECHNOLOGY, LTD.;

MICHAEL CHARLES WADE; DAVID

JOHN ROLTON; ROBERT DODD; and

DAVID JOHN DYER,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and in the alternative to strike plaintiffs’ complaint

came on for hearing before this court on September 6, 2006. Plaintiffs, Robert Click and

Marie Click (“plaintiffs”), appeared through their counsel, Morgan C. Smith. Defendants,

Dorman Long Technology, Ltd., Michael Wade, David Rolton, Robert Dodd, and David

Dyer (“defendants”), appeared through their counsel, Lynn R. Fiorentino. Having read the

parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority,

and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss, for

the reasons stated at the hearing, and as follows.

BACKGROUND

This is a product liability case. It arises out of an accident that occurred on the San

Rafael-Richmond Bridge in April 2004. Plaintiff Robert Click was injured on the job while

working for his employer, Tutor-Saliba/Koch/Tidewater/JV (“TSKT”). Plaintiff was injured by

a strand jack that was manufactured by defendant Dorman Long Technology, Ltd.

(“Dorman”), and which Dorman sold to TKST. 

As a result of plaintiff’s accident and injury, plaintiff and his wife, Marie Click, filed a

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For the Northern District of California

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1 At the hearing on the motion, plaintiffs’ counsel voluntarily dismissed individual

defendants Rolton, Dodd, and Dyer, leaving only defendant Dorman and individual defendant

Wade as defendants named in the second-filed complaint. 

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complaint against defendant Dorman in Contra Costa County Superior Court on April 12,

2005. On July 28, 2005, Dorman removed the complaint on diversity grounds to this court. 

See Click v. Dorman et al., C 05-3037 PJH. On November 15, 2005, plaintiffs amended

their complaint to include Hydrospex Power Equipment BV (“Hydrospex Power”), a Dutch

business entity also alleged to be the designer, distributor, seller and wholesaler of the

strand jack in question, as defendant. See generally First Amended Unverified Complaint

for Damages (“original complaint”). The original complaint alleges four causes of action

against defendants: (1) negligence; (2) negligence per se; (3) strict products liability; and

(4) products liability - negligence. See id. 

Subsequent to the filing of the original complaint, on March 14, 2006, plaintiffs filed

the action presently before the court. The instant action again alleges claims stemming

from the above accident against defendant Dorman, but includes four additional individual

defendants, all of whom are Dorman employees: defendants Michael Wade, David Rolton,

Robert Dodd, and David Dyer. See Unverified Complaint for Damages and Demand for

Jury Trial (“second-filed complaint”). Hydrospex Power is not a named defendant. The

action alleges three causes of action against defendants: (1) negligence; (2) products

liability - negligence; and (3) strict products liability. See id. 

All defendants to the second filed complaint have now filed a motion to dismiss that

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b).1

 Defendants make

three arguments: first, that the second-filed complaint is impermissibly duplicative or

redundant of the original complaint. Second, that personal jurisdiction is lacking over the

individual defendants. Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ complaint must be

dismissed for ineffective service of process. In the alternative, defendants seek an order

striking plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(f). 

Defendants have also requested that the court take judicial notice of certain

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2 Defendants have specifically requested that the court take judicial notice of

certain pleadings filed in connection with the original underlying action, C 05-3037 PJH, and

as well as international law regarding service of process. The court hereby GRANTS

defendants’ request for judicial notice, finding that the request comports with Federal Rule of

Evidence 201.

3

documents.2

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

A court should dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See, e.g., Broam v. Brogan,

320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In evaluating a motion to dismiss,

all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d

661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

On a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has

jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e.g., Harris Rutsky & Co Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Bell &

Clement Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2003). In determining whether a court has

personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court first applies the forum state’s long-arm

statute and then considers whether its application comports with due process requirements.

 Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993). Here,

California’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the outer

limits of federal due process. 

Due process requires that the non-resident defendant have sufficient minimum

contacts with the forum state such that imposition of personal jurisdiction “does not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 315 (1945). The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such

that it is “reasonable . . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is

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brought there.” Id. at 317. In so determining, the court must obtain personal jurisdiction

over the defendant in the form of either general or specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 

B. Duplicative Nature of Second-Filed Complaint

Defendants assert that the instant complaint must be either dismissed pursuant to

FRCP 12(b)(6) or stricken pursuant to FRCP 12(f) in its entirety because it is either

duplicative or redundant of the original complaint filed by plaintiffs. The court has

discretion, where a plaintiff is seeking to maintain identical actions, to dismiss the later-filed

action, to stay that action pending resolution of the former, or to consolidate both actions. 

See, e.g., Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977). 

Here, the original complaint filed by plaintiffs is identical to the instant second-filed

complaint in most respects. The only differences are that the second-filed complaint adds

the four individual defendants and excludes defendant Hydrospex Power, and does not

include a negligence per se cause of action. But these differences are not material, as (1)

the four additional individual defendants are all employees of Dorman, a defendant in both

cases, and (2) the fact that the second-filed complaint excludes one cause of action does

not change the fact that it covers precisely the same three claims as the original action. As

such, the second-filed complaint is in actuality no different from the first. 

At the hearing on this matter, counsel for plaintiffs indicated that, as a solution to

defendants’ challenge, plaintiffs would prefer to proceed in accordance with the secondfiled complaint, and are willing to dismiss the original complaint. Accordingly, the court

hereby DISMISSES the original complaint, and plaintiffs shall proceed under the instant

second-filed complaint. 

C. Personal Jurisdiction

The parties dispute whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised over individual

defendant Michael Wade. Defendants argue that no personal jurisdiction exists in view of

the fact that defendant Wade is a United Kingdom resident and employee of defendant

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Dorman, whose only few contacts with the state of California occurred as an employee

representative, rather than in an individual capacity. Plaintiffs for their part concede that

general jurisdiction does not exist, but contend that specific jurisdiction does. 

Specific personal jurisdiction exists over a non-resident defendant where the

following three prong test is met: (1) the non-resident defendant purposefully directed its

activities toward residents of the forum state or otherwise established contacts with the

forum state for purposeful availment of the privileges of conducting activities within the

forum; (2) plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant’s forumrelated conduct; and (3) the forum state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in the particular

case would be reasonable. See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain

Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 477-78 (1985). These requirements protect non-residents from being sued in foreign

courts as a result of “random, fortuitous or attenuated contacts” over which they had no

control. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78. 

Here, the extent of defendant Wade’s contacts with California are not disputed: 

Wade, who acts as an Operations Director for defendant Dorman in the United Kingdom,

supplied information to TSKT, plaintiff Click’s California employer, through email, phone

and mail correspondence regarding the types of strand jacks sold by Dorman; he faxed a

quote to TSKT regarding available equipment; and he traveled to California twice for a

period of 4 days in order to finalize the sale of Dorman’s strand jack to TSKT. See

Declaration of Paul Lankford in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Lankford

Decl.”), Ex 1. With respect to actual design of the strand jack, defendant Wade participated

in the re-drawing of the equipment details, which needed to be converted from the original

detail format that Dorman purchased from another company, into a Dorman detail format. 

See id. In short, all of Wade’s contacts with California came in connection with his duties

on behalf of Dorman, regarding Dorman’s sale of the strand jack to TSKT. 

The issue that the parties dispute, and that the court must decide, is whether these

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3 Defendants rely to a great extent on Seagate v. A.J. Kogyo Co., 219 Cal. App.

3d 696, 703-04 (1990). While that case is relevant in that it held that a court must ascertain

personal jurisdiction under a similar scenario by assessing whether a non-resident employee’s

contacts are acts for which they are personally liable, and set forth a unique test by which to

do so, that case is only persuasive authority, as it deals with a procedural issue. While federal

courts look to relevant state law on questions of substantive law in certain circumstances, they

do not generally look to state law for questions of procedure. 

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acknowledged contacts, which were undertaken by Wade on behalf of his employer, are

sufficient to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over defendant Wade in

his individual capacity. 

Plaintiffs assert that the above contacts are sufficient to satisfy the purposeful

availment prong in the first instance, since Wade’s “action of re-drawing original equipment

details for a defective strand jacking system and then effectuating the sale of this defective

equipment to a business entity in California are clearly tortious actions.” See Opp. Br. at

7:23-26. Moreover, “the fact that this defective equipment eventually caused serious bodily

injury” in California further supports purposeful availment, according to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs

also contend that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant Wade is reasonable

under the facts of the case, and that plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the contacts, all of which

collectively supports the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Wade. 

The court is not persuaded by these arguments. First, as defendants point out,

defendant Wade’s contacts on behalf of corporate defendant Dorman are not necessarily

enough to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction as to defendant Wade individually. 

See, e.g., M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Communications, LLC, 149 Fed. Appx. 612, 615 (9th

Cir. 2005)(under the fiduciary shield doctrine, “a person's mere association with a

corporation that causes injury in the forum state is not sufficient in itself to permit that forum

to assert jurisdiction over the person”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790

(1984)(“Petitioners are correct that their contacts with California are not to be judged

according to their employer's activities there.”).3

 Rather, in order for fiduciary shield

protections to be unavailable to defendants acting on behalf of their employer – i.e., in

order for personal jurisdiction to be exercised over a defendant such as Wade – a

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defendant’s contacts must give rise to some identifiable theory of liability pursuant to which

the defendant’s contacts on behalf of the corporate employer may justifiably be imputed to

the defendant individually. See, e.g., Davis v. Metro Prod., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 521 (9th Cir.

1989). Accordingly, plaintiffs here must make a prima facie showing that some theory of

liability allows for Wade’s contacts, which were conducted on defendant Dorman’s behalf,

to be imputed to him in his personal capacity. 

Plaintiffs, however, fail to identify any legal theory that would allow the court to

impute Wade’s contacts to him individually. Plaintiffs allege no alter ego relationship, nor

any sufficient identity of interests between Wade and defendant Dorman, to make such a

claim. Nor do they allege a viable theory of liability under which a suit might be brought

against defendant Wade individually. Plaintiffs allege only that defendant Wade’s actions in

re-drawing equipment details for the strand jack and in effectuating the sale of the

purportedly defective strand jack in California are “tortious” in nature, appearing to rely on

their broad allegations that defendant “negligently and carelessly construct[ed], inspect[ed],

maintain[ed], supervis[ed], engineer[ed], design[ed], perform[ed], plann[ed] the work and

equipment” relating to plaintiffs’ injury, and that defendant “knew the [strand jack] would be

purchased and used without inspection for defects.” See second filed complaint, ¶¶ 17, 23. 

While these allegations are premised on negligence-based causes of action, they do

not sufficiently set forth any grounds that justify imputing Wade’s contacts to him

personally. This is because, even if true, plaintiffs’ allegations do not allege any

intentionally targeted activity by Wade towards a California resident, nor do they

demonstrate that Wade expressly aimed his conduct at a California resident. Plaintiffs’

allegations allege only untargeted negligence, which courts have expressly held insufficient

to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. See Davis v. Metro Prod., 885 F.2d at 521; Calder v.

Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). Indeed, in Davis, although the Ninth Circuit ultimately

found that specific jurisdiction existed over two officers and directors and sole shareholders

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of a corporation, it first found the fiduciary shield doctrine inapplicable, based on the

individuals’ intentionally targeted tortious activity towards the forum state. See 885 F.2d at

522. The court distinguished the defendants’ conduct from general untargeted negligence

such as that alleged by plaintiffs here. Id. 

Furthermore, unlike in Davis, defendant Wade is not alleged to be an executive

officer or director of defendant Dorman, or a primary shareholder. He is alleged to be only

an employee of Dorman’s. See second filed complaint, ¶ 12. Accordingly, the court is not

compelled in the same way as in Davis to disregard the fiduciary shield doctrine. 

Moreover, the court notes that plaintiffs themselves appear to take an inconsistent

position on the issue. Although they argue that defendant Wade’s contacts on behalf of

Dorman should be imputed to Wade personally, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that reference

to “any act of any corporate or other business [d]efendant ... shall mean that such

corporation or other business did the acts alleged in the complaint through its officers,

directors, employees, agents and/or representatives while they were acting within the

actual or ostensible scope of their authority.” See second filed complaint, ¶ 7. This

allegation appears to state that all contacts on behalf of defendant Dorman should

specifically be interpreted as acts of Dorman, rather than as acts of the individual

employee. 

For all these reasons, the court is not satisfied that defendant Wade has purposefully

availed himself of the privilege of doing business within the state of California, and that his

contacts on behalf of Dorman should be imputed to him for purposes of establishing

specific jurisdiction over him individually. 

Even if, however, plaintiff were able to satisfy the court that Wade’s contacts with the

state should be imputed to him individually, the court would still find the exercise of

personal jurisdiction unreasonable under the circumstances. Defendant Wade is a foreign

resident of the United Kingdom, his contacts with the state were of limited duration and

nature, and requiring him to litigate the present action in California, particularly in view of

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4 Despite its holding, the court notes that plaintiffs’ counsel stated at the hearing

on the instant motion that service of process has now been properly made on defendant Wade,

pursuant to the proper protocols applicable under the Hague Convention. To date, however,

no proof of service has yet been filed with the court. 

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the fact that Wade’s limited contacts were undertaken at the behest of his employer, would

place a substantial burden upon him that is not outweighed by the interests of either the

state or the plaintiffs. And where, considering the international context, there is a heavy

burden on an international defendant, compared with slight interests on the part of

plaintiff(s) and the forum state, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is deemed

unreasonable and unfair. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,

115 (1987)(“Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of

personal jurisdiction into the international field.”). So here.

In sum, and for all the above reasons, the court finds that the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over defendant Wade would not comport with traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaint is DISMISSED with respect to him. 

D. Service of Process

Defendants have also argued that the complaint should be dismissed as to individual

defendant Wade because service of process as to him was faulty. However, in view of the

court’s finding that personal jurisdiction may not be exercised over defendant Wade, it is

unnecessary for the court to reach this argument, and it accordingly declines to do so

here.4

 

E. Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the court orders as follows: plaintiffs’ original complaint,

filed in Click v. Dorman et al., C 05-3037 PJH, is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice as to

defendant Dorman, and without prejudice as to defendant Hydrospex, who may be added

to the second-filed complaint if appropriate. Plaintiffs shall now proceed with their claims in

connection with the instant second-filed action. However, plaintiffs shall proceed against

defendant Dorman only. Individual defendants David John Rolton, Robert Dodd, and David

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John Dyer are DISMISSED, in accordance with plaintiffs’ voluntary stipulation at the

hearing, and individual defendant Michael Charles Wade is DISMISSED for lack of

personal jurisdiction, as stated above. 

A case management conference will be held on October 26, 2006 at 2:30 p.m., in

Courtroom 3, 17th Floor, Federal Building, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco,

California. A joint case management statement shall be filed one week before the

conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2006 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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