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Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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1~ua t o teso 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS .ROBERT t. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

PUBLISH 

JOHN H. HELD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 89-1206 

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER LEASING 

CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-M-1153) 

Marjorie N. Sloan (John N. McNamara, Jr. with her on the briefs) 

of Baker & Hostetler, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

J. Scott Dyer of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, New York, New York 

(Tonianne Florentino of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, New York, New 

York; Henry C. Cleveland, III and David E. Bellack of Saunders, 

Snyder, Ross & Dickson, P.C., Denver, Colorado, with him on the 

brief) for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MOORE, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant John H. Held appeals the grant of summary judgment 

by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 1 
to appellant's former employer, Manufacturers Hanover Leasing · 

Corporation (MHLC). Appellant's complaint alleges that MHLC 

discharged him after almost ten years of employment, in part to 

prevent him from attaining vested rights under MHLC's retirement 

plan in violation of § 510 of the Employment Retirement Income 

Security Act (ERISA), 29 u.s.c. § 1140. The complaint seeks legal 

and equitable relief. The district court granted MHLC's summary 

judgment motion on the ground that the limitation period 

applicable to appellant's claim had expired. We review the grant 

of summary judgment under the same standards applied by the 

district court, Osgood v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 848 

F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988), and affirm in part, reverse in 

part and remand. 

FACTS 

The salient facts are not in dispute. Mr. Held commenced 

employment with MHLC on February 3, 1975, and resigned on July 13, 

1984, although his salary was continued until October 9 of that 

year. At all times Mr. Held performed his services for the 

corporation outside of the United States, first in Puerto Rico, 

and then in Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. 

Shortly after arriving in Hong Kong, Mr. Held was informed by his 

supervisor that he would not be reassigned to another position. 

He tendered his resignation at that time. His discharge took 

effect in November 1984, one month before the vesting date for his 

pension benefits. 

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Mr. Held graduated from the University of Colorado School of . t. 

Law in 1972 and claims to be a Colorado native. After leaving 

MHLC's employ, Mr. Held returned to Colorado, which he claims he 

had maintained as his domicile throughout his employment with 

MHLC.Appellant currently resides in Colorado. 

Mr. Held filed his first complaint on July 25, 1988, just 

over four years after he resigned. His first complaint 

erroneously named Manufacturers Hanover Corporation as the 

defendant, and that complaint was amended to name MHLC on December 

5, 1988. Mr. Held claimed that he was a participant in MHLC's 

pension plan, which qualifies as an "employee benefit plan" as 

defined in ERISA, 29 u.s.c. § 1002(2)(A). He further claimed that 

MHLC coerced him to resign from his position shortly before 

completion of the ten years of service required for a 

nonforfeitable vested right in accrued benefits in that plan. Mr. 

Held's complaint seeks an order enforcing his rights as a 

participant in the pension plan, a recovery of benefits due him 

under the plan, damages, and attorney fees and costs. 

Mr. Held's claim arises in part under § 510 of ERISA, 29 

U.S.C. § 1140, which states: "It shall be unlawful for any person 

to discharge ••• a participant or beneficiary .•. for the purpose 

of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such 

participant may become entitled under the plan." In addition, 

§ 502 of ERISA, 29 u.s.c. § 1132 (the terms of which are 

applicable to enforcement of a claim under § 510, 29 u.s.c. 

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§ 1140), forms the basis of appellant's claim for benefits due him 

under the pension plan. See§ 1132(1)(B). 

MHLC moved for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss 

the action on the grounds that Mr. Held's claims were barred by 

the New York or Colorado statute of limitation concerning 

employment discrimination. The district court granted the motion 

on the grounds that New York law applied and that the three-year 

New York statute of limitation applicable to claims of employment 

discrimination barred the action. 

ERISA does not expressly provide a limitation period for 

actions (including § 510 actions) brought under § 502. Because 

MHLC's headquarters and principal place of business are in New 

York, the district court determined that New York has the most 

significant relationship to the claim and thus that New York law 

applies. The district court further determined that the most 

analogous claim for relief under New York law is a claim for 

employment discrimination, which is barred after three years. 

District Court Order at 1 (citing N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(2) 

(McKinney Supp. 1989)). The court held that "Colorado has no 

interest in the subject matter of this litigation," and that the 

"place of business of the employer is the dominant factor." Id. 

The district judge concluded that plaintiff's claim was barred by 

New York law as of July 13, 1987. 

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ANALYSIS 

MHLC contends that, because § 510 of ERISA does not provide a 

limitation period for claims arising thereunder, an analogous 

state statute of limitation must be applied. Appellee's Brief at 

5 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 u.s. 261, 266-67 n.12 (1985); 

Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 484 u.s. 979 (1987)). Mr. Held, on the other hand, poses 

the principle somewhat differently. He states that "where there 

is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant federal statute of 

limitations, the controlling period is the most appropriate one 

provided by state law." Appellant's Brief at 4 (citing Reed v. 

United Transp. Union, 109 S. Ct. 621, 622-23 (1989)). This case 

presents not only a question of the most appropriate statute of 

limitation, but also a threshold choice-of-law question, i.e., 

what state's law should apply. Specifically, the parties dispute 

whether we should look to Colorado or New York state law for an 

applicable statute. 1 

ERISA contains two limitation periods, neither of which 

applies by its express terms to appellant's claims in this case. 

Section 413, 29 u.s.c. § 1113, is applicable to violations of Part 

4 of the Act ("Fiduciary Responsibility"), 2 and§ 4301, 29 u.s.c. 

1 We dismiss as meritless appellant's suggestions that the law of 

other jurisdictions, e.g., Puerto Rico where he lived when first 

employed by MHLC, may be applicable. 

2 29 u.s.c. § 1113 provides: 

(a) No action may be commenced under this title with 

respect to a fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, 

duty, or obligation under this part, or with respect to 

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§ 1451, applies to multiemployer plans. 3 Each statute provides 

two periods--six years and three years--keyed respectively to the 

date the cause of action arose and the date the plaintiff had 

actual or constructive knowledge of the cause of action. 

3 

a violation of this part, after the earlier of--

(1) six years after (A) the date of the last 

action which constituted a part of the breach or 

violation, or (B) in the case of an omission, the 

latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured 

the breach or violation, or 

(2) three years after the earliest date (A) on 

which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 

breach or violation, or (B) on which a report from 

which he could reasonably be expected to have 

obtained knowledge of such breach or violation was 

filed with the Secretary under this title; 

except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such 

action may be conunenced not later than six years after 

the date of discovery of such breach or violation. 

29 u.s.c. § 1451(a)(1), (f) provides: 

(a)(1) A plan fiduciary, employer, plan 

participant, or beneficiary, who is adversely affected 

by the act or omission of any party under this subtitle 

with respect to a multiemployer plan ... may bring an 

action for appropriate legal or equitable relief, or 

both. 

(f) An action under this section may not be 

brought after the later of--

(1) 6 years after the date on which the cause of 

action arose, or 

(2) 3 years after the earliest date on which the 

plaintiff acquired or should have acquired actual 

knowledge of the existence of such cause of action, 

except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such 

action may be brought not later than 6 years after the 

date of discovery of the existence of such cause of 

action. 

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29 u.s.c. §§ 1132 and 1140, under which appellant's claims . ,_ 

arise, are codified in Part 5 of ERISA, "Administration and 

Enforcement," not in Part 4, "Fiduciary Responsibility," to which 

the limitation periods in § 1113 expressly pertain. It may be 

that MHLC is a fiduciary with respect to the company pension plan; 

however, there is no evidence in the record on that question. 

Similarly, there is no evidence that MHLC's pension plan is a 

multiemployer plan, such that 29 u.s.c. § 1451, which pertains to 

actions under Subtitle E of ERISA, "Special Provisions for 

Multiemployer Plans," would necessarily apply. 

The Supreme Court has dealt recently and at length with the 

question of what statute of limitation governs a claim arising 

under federal law when the federal statute does not provide a 

specific limitation period. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 109 s. 

Ct. 621 (1989). When a federal statute fails to prescribe a 

limitation period, the "general rule [is] that statutes of 

limitation are to be borrowed from state law." Reed, 109 S. Ct. 

at 625. However, the Court recognizes a "closely circumscribed 

exception to the general rule." Id. The Court "decline[s] to 

borrow a state statute of limitations only 'when a rule from 

elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than 

available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake 

and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a 

significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial 

lawmaking.'" Id. (quoting DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 u.s. 151, 

172 (1983)). 

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Although this case arguably provides an ideal context for 

considering whether adoption of an ERISA limitation period makes 

more sense than searching for an analogous state statute, we 

believe that inquiry is foreclosed to this panel by this circuit's 

decision in Trustees of the Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan 

v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

There we addressed the question what limitation period is 

applicable to an action under ERISA by trustees of employee 

benefit pension and insurance funds against an employer for 

delinquent contributions. The district court and a panel of this 

court considered several possibly applicable limitation periods 

from Wyoming state law as well as the limitation period in § 413 

of ERISA, 29 u.s.c. § 1113. The district court concluded and we 

concurred that the "Wyoming ten-year statute of limitations for 

actions based on written contracts is the statute of limitations 

'most analogous' to the Trustees' ERISA action." 850 F.2d at 

621. 4 

4 We note that the Morgen & Oswood panel did not consider the 

limitation period provided in § 430l(f) of ERISA, 29 u.s.c. 

§ 145l(f), which applies to actions brought for "appropriate legal 

or equitable relief, or both" by any "plan fiduciary, employer, 

plan participant, or beneficiary, who is adversely affected by the 

act or omission of any party under [subtitle E, Special Provisions 

for Multiemployer Plans] with respect to a multiemployer plan." 

29 u.s.c. § 1451(a)(l). The plaintiffs in Morgen & Oswood--the 

Trustees--were "various multi-employer trust funds." 850 F.2d at 

615. "The Trustees filed this action as 'fiduciaries' to enforce 

the terms of the trust agreements under [ERISA] •.. as amended by 

the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 u.s.c. 

§ 1145." Id. (citation omitted). Because the Trustees were, as 

this court held, "plan fiduciaries" and brought the action in 

Morgen & Oswood for "appropriate legal or equitable relief," i.e., 

to compel the payment of delinquent contributions to employment 

benefit pension and .insurance funds, the limitation period 

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. '· 

Morgen & Oswood, as the dissent suggests, arguably can be 

read as not deciding the precise issue presented here; i.e., 

whether an ERISA statute of limitation should be applied in lieu 

of an analogous state statute to a claim arising under ERISA § 

510. As explained below, however, the majority conclude that the 

case does answer that question. First, we are persuaded that, in 

light of the Morgen & Oswood panel's discussion of DelCostello, it 

must be assumed that the panel at least implicitly considered 

provided in 29 u.s.c. § 1451(f) arguably should have been applied. 

This assessment is reinforced by 29 u.s.c. § 1451(b), which 

provides that "any failure of the employer to make any withdrawal 

liability payment within the time prescribed shall be treated in 

the same manner as a delinquent contribution (within the meaning 

of section 1145 of this title)." Section 1145 is codified in Part 

4, "Fiduciary Responsibility," of Subtitle B, "Regulatory 

Provisions," to which the enforcement provisions of 29 u.s.c. 

§ 1132 apply, while 29 u.s.c. § 1145, as explained above, is 

codified in Subtitle E. This language strongly indicates that the 

time periods for bringing claims for delinquent contributions 

under § 1145 should not differ from those specified in § 1451 for 

withdrawal liability (and presumably other) claims. This language 

further suggests there is no reason to differentiate in the 

"treatment" of ERISA claims simply on the basis of the 

organizational structure of ERISA. 

Nevertheless, we are not called upon in this case to 

readdress the precise question posed in Morgen & Oswood. 

Moreover, this panel is not free (outside the en bane process) to 

reconsider this court's conclusion in that case that applying an 

analogous state statute to an ERISA claim is preferable to 

applying a limitation period found elsewhere in ERISA. Cf. Hawaii 

Carpenters Trust Funds v. Waiola Carpenter Shop, Inc., 823 F.2d 

289, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (following circuit precedent Trustees 

for Alaska Laborers-Construction Indus. Health & Sec. Fund v. 

Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1987), which held that state 

statutes of limitation governing contract actions are to be 

borrowed in ERISA collection actions, although · strongly implying 

that adoption of "a uniform federal rule governing the limitation 

of actions for collection of delinquent ERISA contributions" would 

be preferable). Bound by the precedent in Morgen & Oswood, we 

proceed to consider what state statute(s) of limitations is (are) 

most analogous to appellant's ERISA claims. 

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whether an ERISA statute of limitation was more analogous to a 

trustees' action for delinquent contributions than were the 

arguably analogous state statutes. It follows that in choosing a 

state statute, the panel must have answered that question in the 

negative. 

Second, the majority disagree with the dissent's contention 

that the "underlying substantive rights" in this case and in 

Morgen & Oswood are significantly different. In each case the 

"substantive rights" of concern are those of the employee. The 

principal purpose of ERISA is to protect employees' rights to 

benefits under a covered plan. Employers can interfere with those 

rights in numerous ways, including not making obligatory 

contributions (as in Morgen & Oswood) or discharging an employee 

before he is fully vested in a plan (as in this case). We see no 

distinction between the substantive rights implicated in these two 

cases that is relevant to the task of determining the appropriate 

limitation period for the claims brought by Mr. Held. Thus, we 

consider ourselves bound by Morgen & Oswood to apply an analogous 

state statute, in preference to an ERISA statute of limitation, to 

these ERISA claims for which Congress has not prescribed an 

express limitation period. 

With respect to the threshold choice-of-law issue, Mr. Held 

contends that the district court erred in relying solely on § 6(2) 

of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law (2d ed. 1980) 5 in 

5 Section 6(2) states in pertinent part that 

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-~ 

choosing New York's statute of limitation. He asserts that 

instead the district court should have applied an analogous 

statute of limitation of the forum state, Colorado. Indeed, the 

Second and Fifth Circuits follow this bright-line rule. See 

Vigman v. Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459 (5th 

Cir. 1981); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1977). 

Mr. Held argues in the alternative that we should follow the Third 

and Sixth Circuits, which in cases such as this apply the brightline rule unless application of the forum state's statute of 

limitation would frustrate the federal policy in question or work 

a severe hardship on the litigants. See Champion Int'l Corp. v. 

United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328, 333-34 (6th Cir. 

1985); Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 

Inc., 602 F.2d 494, 507-08 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated on other 

grounds, 448 u.s. 902 (1980). Mr. Held also suggests a third 

the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable 

rule of law include 

(a) the needs of the interstate and international 

systems, 

(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states 

and the relative interests of those states in the 

determination of the particular issue, 

(d) the protection of justified expectations, 

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field 

of law, 

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, 

and 

(g) ease in the determination and application of the 

law to be applied. 

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approach, that we follow the Ninth Circuit and "borrow the 

limitation period set by the state most connected with the federal 

claim." Chung v. Pomona Valley Community Hasp., 667 F.2d 788, 791 

(9th Cir. 1982). According to Mr. Held, each of these approaches 

is preferable to the district court's reliance solely on § 6(2) of 

the Restatement because they avoid an unnecessary excursion into 

the choice-of-law quagmire on an issue that this circuit has 

deemed procedural. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Petersen, 

770 F.2d 141, 142 (lOth Cir. 1985). Mr. Held finally contends 

that following any of these approaches would result in our 

applying Colorado's statute of limitation in this case instead of 

New York's. 

We do not address Mr. Held's final contention because we 

decline to adopt any of the approaches that Mr. Held suggests. We 

agree with the district court that § 6(2) lends some guidance in 

choosing the appropriate statute of limitation, but we reject the 

district court's exclusive reliance on that section. Instead, we 

adopt § 142 of the Restatement as the means of determining which 

state's statute of limitation applies when a federal statute that 

is the basis of a claim does not specify the appropriate 

limitation period. Section 142 provides: 

Whether a claim will be maintained against the defense 

of the statute of limitations is determined under the 

principles stated in § 6. In general, unless the 

exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result 

unreasonable: 

(1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations 

barring the claim. 

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(2) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations 

permitting the claim unless: 

(a) maintenance of the claim would serve no 

substantial interest of the forum; and 

(b) the claim would be barred under the statute of 

limitations of a state having a more 

significant relationship to the parties and 

the occurrence. 

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Supp. 1988). 

We prefer § 142 to the bright-line rule because simply 

applying the statute of limitation of the forum state would 

encourage forum shopping. Our adoption of the Restatement 

position, moreover, does not conflict with the exception to the 

bright-line test recognized by the Third and Sixth Circuits 

because we remain bound by Reed not to borrow a state's statute of 

limitation "'when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly 

provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when 

the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation 

make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for 

interstitial lawmaking.'" Reed, 109 s. Ct. at 625 (quoting 

DelCostello, 462 u.s. at 172). Finally, we find the Ninth 

Circuit's approach, which creates no presumption in favor of the 

application of the forum state's statute of limitations, 

inappropriate in this circuit where the statute of limitation is 

characterized as procedural for purposes of conflicts-of-law 

analysis. See Petersen, 770 F.2d at 142. 

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Applying § 142(2) to Mr. Held's claim, we agree with the 

district court that "New York has the most significant 

relationship to the claim in this case." MHLC at all times during 

Mr. Held's employment maintained its headquarters and principal 

place of business in New York, the decision not to continue Mr. 

Held's employment was made there, and Mr. Held's personnel records 

were maintained there. In contrast, Colorado has no interest in 

this matter other than that of forum to the litigation and an 

arguable, but tenuous, concern as Mr. Held's alleged domicile. 

Clearly, New York has "a more significant relationship" to one of 

the parties, MHLC, and to the "occurrence," the effective 

discharge of Mr. Held, than does Colorado. Arguably, New York's 

relationship to Mr. Held may also be more significant than was 

Colorado's during the-period relevant to the action. Moreover, in 

our view, Colorado has "no substantial interest in Mr. Held's 

claim. Thus, we must next determine whether the applicable New 

York statute of limitation bars Mr. Held's claim under ERISA 

§ 510. 

Before proceeding with a consideration of the most analogous 

state statute, however, we must address a preliminary matter 

concerning the characterization of appellant's claims. The 

district court apparently assumed that plaintiff had a single 

cause of action that accrued on the date appellant tendered his 

letter of resignation, i.e., July 13, 1984. See District Court's 

Order at 1. 6 We are of the conviction, however, that appellant 

6 The district court stated: "Mr. Held submitted a letter of 

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has two distinct causes of action. If discharging him was 

"unlawful" under § 1140, plaintiff was entitled to bring (and did 

bring) an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under 29 

u.s.c. § 1132, which authorizes a civil action "to enjoin any act 

or practice which violates any provision of (subchapter I of 

ERISA]" or "to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 

redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of 

(subchapter I of ERISA]." 29 u.s.c. § 1132(a)(3). Such an action 

is clearly one for equitable relief. But appellant is also 

entitled under 29 u.s.c. § 1132 to bring (and again, did bring) a 

civil action to "recover benefits due to him under the terms of 

his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to 

clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the 

plan." Id. § (a)(l)(B). 7 Thus appellant has two distinct causes 

of action and claims for relief under ERISA. 

Admittedly, the parties' briefs emphasize Mr. Held's § 510 

claim and give short shrift to the issue of Mr. Held's separate 

claim for benefits due under the plan. However, plaintiff clearly 

claimed such benefits in his complaint. Nowhere in his briefs or 

resignation on July 13, 1984 

analogous claim for relief under 

three years Clearly the 

New York law and was on July 13, 

1. 

It is clear that the most 

New York law ... is barred after 

plaintiff's claim is barred under 

1987." District Court's Order at 

7 Although appellant alleges he "would have [had] a nonforfeitable right to 100% of accrued [pension] benefits 

contributed by (MHLC] upon completion of ten years of service with 

[MHLC]," Amended Complaint at ,, 6, the parties have not argued 

whether Mr. Held has a colorable claim to something less than 

"100% of accrued benefits" based on his employment of more than 

nine years with MHLC. 

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at oral argument did appellant concede that as a result of his 

premature discharge he lost his rights to all benefits under the 

company pension plan. The dissent mischaracterizes appellant's 

position in this regard. See Dissent at note 1. Rather, 

appellant stated in his complaint only that if his employment had 

continued he would have earned "a non-forfeitable right to 100% 

of accrued benefits." Thus, this case presents an example of the 

situation referred to in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), i.e., a "judgment 

..• not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked." 

Clearly, the district court's order did not resolve all of Mr. 

Held's claims for relief. Nor has defendant borne its burden of 

proving that there are no issues of material fact with respect to 

this claim and that it is entitled as a matter of law to judgment 

on this claim. 

Having concluded that appellant has two causes of action 

under the Act, we must next determine when each cause of action 

accrued before we can determine whether either or both claims are 

time-barred. 

Determining when a particular cause of action accrues 

requires answering certain preliminary questions, in particular 

whether administrative remedies have been exhausted. Neither this 

circuit nor the Supreme Court has directly addressed the question 

whether ERISA contains an implicit exhaustion of remedies 

requirement. 8 But several circuits have distinguished between 

8 The Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of 

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actions brought to enforce a statutory right under ERISA (for 

example, claims for injunctive relief arising under § 510) and 

actions brought to recover benefits under a plan, with respect to 

the question whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is 

required prior to seeking judicial relief. 

The Eleventh Circuit in Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 

F.2d 1219 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986), and the 

Seventh Circuit in Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238 

(1983), have held that beneficiaries of an ERISA plan must exhaust 

internal plan remedies before suing plan fiduciaries on the basis 

of alleged violations of duties imposed by the statute. 

In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Amaro v. Continental Can 

Co., 724 F.2d 747 (1984), has held that a plaintiff alleging a 

statutory violation as opposed to a mere denial of benefits under 

an ERISA plan need not exhaust internal remedies. Amaro rejected 

the defendant company's claim that a § 510 ERISA claim is 

essentially "a contractual claim for a breach of an implied 

covenant of good faith." 724 F.2d at 749. The court also 

rejected the argument that a § 510 claim is one for "benefits 

under a collective-bargaining agreement." Id. Instead, the court 

held a § 510 "ERISA action is to enforce statutory rights designed 

certiorari in the case of Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 

F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), which posed this question. 474 u.s. 

1087 (1986). Justices White and Brennan dissented in the denial 

of certiorari, arguing that "the conflict among the circuits over 

the issue of an exhaustion requirement under ERISA can hardly be 

passed over as an unimportant one unworthy of this Court's 

attention." 474 U.S. at 1087-88. 

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to protect the employees from actions which interfere with their 

attainment of eligibility for [certain] benefits." Id. The court 

was "persuaded that in enacting section 510, Congress created a 

statutory right independent of any collectively bargained rights." 

Id. (citing Kross, 701 F.2d at 1242-43). The court further 

concluded that a participant in an employee benefit plan "is not 

required to exhaust grievance or arbitration procedures prior to 

bringing an action under Section 510 of ERISA." Id. at 752. 

Similarly, in Zip£ v. A.T. & T., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986), 

the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff is "not required first to 

exhaust her benefit plan's internal procedures before bringing her 

claim [under ERISA § 510] that her employer fired her to prevent 

her from obtaining disability benefits." Id. at 894. The court 

reasoned that a "Section 510 claim asserts a statutory right which 

plan fiduciaries have no expertise in interpreting. Accordingly, 

one of the primary justifications for an exhaustion requirement in 

other contexts, deference to administrative expertise, is simply 

absent." Id. at 893. The court acknowledged, however, that cases 

might arise in which a § 510 claim is "so closely intertwined with 

a serious issue requiring interpretation of a benefit plan that a 

trial court could properly stay the statutory action pending 

resolution of the issue by the plan fiduciaries." Id. at 894 n.6. 

We agree with the Ninth and Third Circuits that a plaintiff 

need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing an 

action under § 510 of ERISA. Here, appellant has clearly raised a 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 18 
claim under that statute, alleging in his complaint that a 

"purpose of the defendant in coercing the plaintiff's resignation 

was to prevent the plaintiff from receiving retirement benefits 

under the defendant's pension plan." Requiring appellant to press 

this claim with MHLC prior to bringing a legal action would serve 

little purpose. We conclude appellant's cause of action under 

§ 510 arose (and the limitations clock began running) when MHLC 

allegedly "discharge[d] [appellant] for the purpose of 

interfering with the attainment of any right to which [appellant] 

may become entitled under the plan." 29 u.s.c. § 1140. 

Limiting the district court's ruling to only appellant's 

§ 510 claim for injunctive relief, we agree that the "most 

analogous claim for relief under New York law is a claim for 

employment discrimination which is barred after three years under 

N.Y. C.P.R. § 214(2)." District Court's Order at 1; see also 

Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 

N.E.2d 86, 58 N.Y.2d 293 (1983) (holding that the limitation 

period for commencing a judicial action for unlawful 

discrimination in employment is the three-year period of N.Y. Civ. 

9 Prac. L. & R. § 214(2)). Thus, we agree with the district court 

that appellant's cause of action under § 510 arose when Mr. Held 

was constructively discharged on July 13, 1984, and was barred 

after July 14, 1987. We have already concluded that New York has 

9 N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(2) provides in relevant part: 

"The following actions must be commenced within three years: ... (2) An action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture 

created or imposed by statute " 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 19 
a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence 

than Colorado, the forum state, and that maintenance of this claim 

would serve no substantial interest of the forum state. 

We have also concluded that Mr. Held's claim under ERISA 

§ 510 would be time-barred under New York law. Restatement 

§ 142(2), therefore, requires us to apply New York's statute of 

limitation to this claim. Accordingly, summary judgment for MHLC 

with respect to this claim was proper. 

We turn next to consider appellant's claim for benefits due 

him . under the MHLC pension plan. Whether this claim is also 

time-barred depends on when the claim accrued and what statute of 

limitation is applicable. The accrual of a claim for benefits 

under the plan does not necessarily coincide with the timing of 

the employer's alleged violation of § 510, nor does the same New 

York statute necessarily govern both of appellant's claims. 

"Uniformly, courts recognize that an ERISA cause of action 

accrues when an application for benefits is denied." Dameron v. 

Sinai Hospital, 595 F. Supp. 1404, 1413 (D. Md. 1984) (citing 

Jenkins v. Local 705, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); Paris v. 

Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 

F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 u.s. 836 (1981); 

Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1978); Oates 

v. Teamster Affiliates Pension Plan, 482 F. Supp. 481, 484 n.7 

(D.D.C. 1979)). See also Miles v. New York State Teamsters 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 20 
Conference Pension & Retirement Fund Employee Pension Benefit 

Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir.) ("ERISA cause of action accrues, 

and the ..• limitations period begins to run, when there has been 

'a repudiation by the fiduciary which is clear and made known to 

the beneficiar[y]'" (citations omitted; emphasis in original), 

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983). Therefore, exhaustion of 

administrative (i.e., company- or plan-provided) remedies is an 

implicit prerequisite to seeking judicial relief. If the rule 

were otherwise, lawsuits likely would be--and should be--dismissed 

for lack of ripeness. See Paris, 637 F.2d at 361. 

The record on appeal contains a letter from Mr. Held to Mr. 

Martin H. Zuckerman, E.V.P., Personnel Department, Manufacturers 

Hanover Corporation, dated November 20, 1986, in which Mr. Held 

stated: "Before initiating legal action, I would like to request 

a lump sum settlement of my retirement benefits from [MHLC]." Mr. 

Held's letter specified a pension amount he alleged he was 

entitled to and requested a written reply. We have found nothing 

in the record that indicates whether or when MHLC responded to 

this application for benefits. However, MHLC makes a cryptic 

reference to this letter in its Answer. ("[MHLC] [d]enies the 

allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint 

[i.e., that "plaintiff has written to the defendant requesting 

benefits owed to him under the plan" and that defendant "denied 

the plaintiff's request"], and refers to plaintiff's letter to 

Martin H. Zuckerman, dated November 20, 1986, for its contents."). 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 21 
Thus, MHLC does not deny the existence of Mr. Held's letter, but 

apparently disputes its significance. 

Moreover, in its Answer MHLC also denies Held's allegation 

that he had "met all conditions precedent to filing this action," 

and asserts as an affirmative defense that Held had "failed to 

invoke or exhaust the Plan's administrative remedies prior to the 

commencement of this action," These questions--whether and when 

the company denied Mr. Held's application for benefits and whether 

Mr. Held has exhausted his remedies pursuant to the plan--present 

a genuine issue of material fact, resolution of which is crucial 

to the determination of when (or even whether) Mr. Held's cause of 

action for a recovery of benefits arose. Because the record does 

not enable us to answer these questions, we hold. summary judgment 

for MHLC on appellant's claim for benefits is inappropriate at 

this time. 

The purely legal issue of what statute of limitation is 

applicable to appellant's 

fairly raised by this appeal. 

claim for benefits is nevertheless 

excursion before this court 

We may forestall an additional 

if we address the question at this 

time. First, we note that the legislative history suggests 

Congress intended "actions brought under ERISA to be interpreted 

by the courts 'in similar fashion to those brought under section 

301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.'" H.R. Conf. 

Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 u.s. Code 

Cong. & Admin. News 5038, 5107, quoted in Morgen & Oswood, 850 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 22 
F.2d at 621. "Actions under section 301 of the [LMRA] have 

typically been analogized to actions for breach of contract." 850 

F.2d at 621; cf. Robbins v. Iowa Road Builders Co., 828 F.2d 1348, 

1353-54 (8th Cir. 1987) (adopting statute of limitation applicable 

to actions on a contract in preference to statute applicable to 

wage payment collection actions, and citing cases holding 

similarly), cert. denied, 487 u.s. 1234 (1988); Annotation, 

Limitations of Actions Applicable to Action by Trustees of 

Employee Benefit Plan to Enforce Delinquent Employer Contributions 

Under ERISA (29 USCS 1132(1)), 90 A.L.R. Fed. 374, 378 (ERISA 

claims commonly treated as non-"hybrid" § 301 LMRA claims, and 

state contract action limitation applied). But~ Teamsters 

Pension Trust Fund v. John Tinney Delivery Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d 

319, 322-23 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying statute of limitation in 

Pennsylvania's wage payment and collection law). In Morgen & 

Oswood this circuit held an action by pension fund trustees 

against an employer for delinquent contributions analogous to an 

action on a written contract. 850 F.2d at 620-21. 

The New York statute of limitation applicable to actions on a 

contract has been applied to an ERISA action for benefits. In 

Miles, 698 F.2d at 595, 598, four employees and one former 

employee of Continental Can Co. sought a determination of their 

eligibility for pension benefits, and the former employee 

requested the court to order the company to pay him a pension 

benefit. The Second Circuit held that N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 

§ 213 is the "controlling limitations period." Subparagraph (2) 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 23 
of this statute provides that an "action upon a contractual 

obligation or liability express or implied" must be commenced 

within six years. Id. § 213(2)). Although neither Miles nor 

Valle v. Joint Plumbing Industry Bd., 62~ F.2d 196, 202 n.10 (2d 

Cir. 1980), which Miles cites, provides any explanation of this 

choice of a statute of limitation, their holdings are consistent 

with the observation above--that cases typically hold that an 

ERISA action for benefits is analogous to a state-law action upon 

a contract. We conclude that the six-year limitation period in 

N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 213(2) applies to appellant's action for 

recovery of pension benefits and for damages. 

Accordingly, the district court's decision is AFFIRMED with 

respect to Mr. Held's claim for equitable relief under 29 u.s.c. 

§§ 1132 and 1140, but is REVERSED with respect to Mr. Held's claim 

for recovery of benefits under § 1132 and REMANDED for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 24 
Ebel, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

I agree with the majority's treatment of all but the 

following two issues. First, I do not agree that plaintiff has 

asserted a separate contractual claim for wrongful denial of 

benefits. In my opinion, plaintiff's sole claim is predicated 

upon a violation of his rights under section 510 of ERISA (29 

u.s.c. § 1140), as enforced through 29 u.s.c. § 1132. 

Accordingly, I would not reverse and remand for further 

consideration of a claim under section 502(a)(1)(B). 

Admittedly, there are some vague references in the record 

which, if considered in isolation, could arguably provide some 

support for the majority's view that plaintiff has filed a 

separate claim for benefits due him under the terms of the 

retirement plan. However, after examining the record in its 

entirety, and particularly upon review of the briefs on appeal, I 

believe it is clear that plaintiff's request for benefits is 

linked only to his discriminatory termination claim under section 

510 of ERISA. 

At the trial level, plaintiff stated in his brief in 

opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment that he 

"filed the present case under section 510 of the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act." R. Doc. 5 at 1. In addition, 

defendant characterized plaintiff's claim as follows: 

"[p]laintiff's sole claim arises under section 510 of the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act." R. Doc. 4 at 1 (Memorandum of 

Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). 

Nowhere did plaintiff dispute this characterization. Indeed, the 

Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 25 
district court itself apparently understood the limited nature of 

plaintiff's claim because the order granting defendant's motion 

for summary judgment only described plaintiff's claim as one under 

section 510 for discriminatory constructive discharge. 1 

It is even clearer on appeal that plaintiff is asserting only 

a claim under section 510 of ERISA and that the only issue raised 

before us is the appropriate statute of limitations for a section 

510 ERISA claim. 2 Appellee's brief on appeal once again 

1 The thrust of plaintiff's claim is that his employment was 

terminated before he could qualify for retirement benefits under 

the plan. He alleges that his employer caused his termination so 

as to preclude him from ever acquiring any nonforfeitable rights 

under the plan. Thus, he does not appear to be seeking to enforce 

a separate contractual claim to "benefits due to him under the 

terms of his plan," 29 u.s.c. § 1132(a)(l)(B), but rather he is 

suing because his termination allegedly prevented him from ever 

acquiring such benefits, in violation of section 510 of ERISA. 

The majority refers to paragraph 6 of the complaint, in which 

plaintiff alleged that he would have had "a non-forfeitable right 

to 100% of [his] accrued benefits upon completion of ten years of 

service with the defendant." R. Doc. 1 at 2, ,, 6. As paragraph 7 

of the complaint makes clear, however, plaintiff alleges that it 

was his discriminatory constructive discharge, in violation of 

section 510, which prevented him from completing the requisite ten 

years of service. R. Doc. 1 at 2, ,, 7. Nevertheless, the 

majority argues that it is at least possible that plaintiff "has a 

colorable claim to something less than '100% of accrued benefits' 

based on his employment of more than nine years with MHLC." Maj. 

Op. at ___ n.7. It is true that on appeal plaintiff has not 

"concede[d] that as a result of his premature discharge he lost 

his rights to all benefits under the company pension plan." Maj. 

Op. at ___ (emphasis in original). However, it is equally true 

that plaintiff nowhere affirmatively asserts that he has a vested 

contractual right to any plan benefits, either in his complaint or 

on appeal. It is plaintiff's duty affirmatively to state his 

claims and to preserve them on appeal. A claim is not made and 

preserved merely by failing to expressly deny its existence. 

2 See,~' Appellant's Br. at 12 ("Congress designed 

section 510 of ERISA to protect the employment relationship that 

gives rise to an individual's pension rights and its prohibitions 

were aimed primarily at preventing employers from discharging or 

harassing their employees in order to keep them from obtaining 

vested rights."); id. at 14 ("[C]ourts faced with the selection of 

[Footnote continued ... ] 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 26 
characterizes plaintiff's claim as one solely under section 510 of 

ERISA. See Appellee's Br. at 2-3 ("Mr. Held's sole claim arises 

under section 510 of the Employment Retirement Income Security 

Act . • . • " (emphasis added)) . Once again, plaintiff does not 

dispute this characterization of his claim. Indeed, in his reply 

brief, plaintiff ratifies this description. See Appellant's Reply 

Br. at 1 ("The parties agree: (a) that the controlling federal 

statute, section 510 of ERISA, lacks a statute of limitations 

provision ... " (emphasis added)); see also id. at 2-3, 11, 13 

(making clear that plaintiff is asserting rights only under 

section 510 of ERISA). Not once in any of the briefs on appeal 

does plaintiff ever assert a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) 

for benefits under the terms of his plan, nor is that statutory 

provision ever cited to us. So far as I can tell, it was never 

cited to the district court either, and it is perfectly clear that 

neither the district court nor either party thought that the case 

was being tried for recovery of benefits "due . . . under the 

terms of his plan." 3 

[ ... footnote continued] 

a statute of limitations have variously characterized section 510 

cases as contract actions; liability created by statute; and 

actions of employment discrimination or breach of fiduciary 

duty. • . • A section 510 action is brought under the authority 

of 29 u.s.c. § 1132 •.•. " (citations omitted)); id. at 16 

("Because the heart of a section 510 claim is restitution of the 

employee's retirement income, it is evident that Puerto Rico law 

provides a five-year limitations period for the plaintiff's 

claim."). 

3 The majority suggests that this may be a case where there is 

a "'judgement ... not rendered upon the whole case or for all 

the relief asked.'" Maj . Op. at __ (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(d)). Yet, the district court's order dismissed the entire 

complaint pursuant to defendant's motion for summary judgment. If 

[Footnote continued ... ] 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 27 
I do not think it is appropriate to expand the plaintiff's 

claim sua sponte on appeal after briefing and oral argument. 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that portion of this 

court's opinion reversing and remanding "with respect to Mr. 

Held's claim for recovery of benefits under§ 1132." Maj. Op. at 

To the extent that plaintiff's claim under section 1132 is 

premised upon a violation of section 510 of ERISA, I agree with 

the majority opinion (and the district court) that it is barred by 

N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(2). Because I believe that is the 

only way in which section 1132 is implicated in this case, I would 

affirm the district court's June 5, 1989 judgment in its entirety. 

Second, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the most 

analogous statute of limitations in an action under section 510 of 

ERISA is the state limitations provision applicable to employment 

discrimination cases. However, unlike the majority, I do not read 

Trustees of the Wyoming Laborer'S Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen 

& Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613 (lOth Cir. 1988), as precluding 

us from considering whether any of the alternative limitation 

provisions in ERISA should be applied in lieu of a state statute 

of limitations. Morgen & Oswood involved only the issue of what 

limitations period should be applied in an action brought under 

[ .•. footnote continued] 

plaintiff's complaint included a claim for vested contractual 

benefits, it, of necessity, was also dismissed, and that dismissal 

was not appealed. Therefore, it would be final. If the complaint 

did not contain such a claim, I believe that any subsequent 

attempt to bring such a claim would be barred by the doctrine of 

res judicata. If, notwithstanding the unqualified dismissal of 

the entire case, the district court's order was not a resolution 

of the entire case (as the majority apparently suggests) we would 

lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because it would be 

interlocutory in nature. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 28 
ERISA by trustees of certain multiemployer pension and insurance 

funds against an employer for delinquent contributions. The 

substantive provision involved in that case was 29 u.s.c. § 1145, 

which requires employers to make their agreed contributions to 

multiemployer plans, and the statute of limitations analysis 

involved the determination of the cause of action that was most 

analogous to the substantive obligations under section 1145. 

Here, by contrast, we are dealing with an entirely different 

substantive obligation--one that arises under section 510 of ERISA 

(29 u.s.c. § 1140). That provision prohibits an employer from 

firing an employee or otherwise taking action against him in order 

to interfere with his protected rights under an employee benefit 

plan. This is quite a different underlying substantive right, and 

it is analogous to different state and/or federal rights. 

Accordingly, the result in this case is not dictated by Morgen & 

Oswood. 

In any event, the court in Morgen & Oswood did not even 

consider other possible statute of limitations provisions in ERISA 

that might be analogous except for a brief conclusion that the 

limitations period contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (which applies to 

actions brought to redress a fiduciary's breach of its 

obligations) should not be applied. Morgen & Oswood, 850 F.2d at 

618 n.8. Rather, the court briefly directed its attention to the 

limitations period contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor 

Relations Act (29 u.s.c. § 160(b)) and then turned its attention 

to analogous state statutes of limitation. The court acknowledged 

that it was appropriate to borrow a state statute of limitations 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 29 
only "'if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do 

so.'" Id. at 618 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 

(1985)). The question we need to resolve, which was not decided 

by Morgen & Oswood, is whether it "frustrate(s] or significantly 

interfere(s] with federal policies" to borrow a state statute of 

limitations to bar a claim under section 510 of ERISA. Reed v. 

United Transp. Union, 109 s. Ct. 621, 627 (1989). 

When, as is the case under section 510 of ERISA, there is no 

federal statute of limitations for a particular substantive right, 

we have been admonished that "the general rule [is] that statutes 

of limitation are to be borrowed from state law." Id. at 625. 

The only exception to this general principle is "'when a rule from 

elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than 

available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake 

and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a 

significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial 

lawmaking.'" Id. (quoting DelCostello v. International Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 462 u.s. 151, 172 (1983)). 

The limitation provisions contained in other sections of 

ERISA are not sufficiently analogous to a section 510 claim to 

justify overriding the general rule that the most analogous state 

statute of limitations should be incorporated. Indeed, neither 

party argues here that there is an analogous limitations provision 

found in other sections of ERISA or elsewhere in federal law that 

should be adopted instead of a state law provision. I believe 

that a claim of retaliatory discharge under section 510 is more 

closely related to a state-law employment discrimination suit than 

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Appellate Case: 89-1206 Document: 01019381445 Date Filed: 08/16/1990 Page: 30 
I 

to an action under other sections of ERISA for breach of fiduciary 

duty, see 29 U.S.C. § 1113; for the termination of a singleemployer plan, see 29 u.s.c. § 1370(f); for an action involving a 

multiemployer pension plan, see 29 u.s.c. § 1451(f); or for an 

action initiated by, or brought against, the Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation, see 29 u.s.c. §§ 1303(e)(6), (f)(5); 

1368(d)(2). Therefore, although I believe that we have to 

consider the applicability of federal statutes of limitation 

(particularly those found in ERISA), nothing in Morgen & Oswood 

precludes such an analysis. There are no federal provisions more 

suitable for application to a claim under section 510, and, as a 

result, I concur .in the majority's conclusion that the three-year 

statute of limitations period of N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(2) 

was properly applied to plaintiff's claim under section 510. 

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