Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02414/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02414-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESLEY W. HUNTER,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES TILTON, SECRETARY,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 06cv2414-IEG (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. No. 24]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

On April 9, 2007, Petitioner Wesley W. Hunter, a state

prisoner appearing pro se, filed the First Amended Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Amended Petition”) currently before the Court.

Doc. No. 15. In his Amended Petition, Petitioner alleges four

grounds for relief. Id.

On July 11, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss

alleging that the Amended Petition is procedurally defective because

Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies and because

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-2- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

Petitioner failed to file his federal petition within the applicable

one-year statute of limitations set forth under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). Doc. No. 24 at 3. Petitioner timely opposed the

motion. Doc. No. 30.

This Court has considered the Amended Petition, Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss and accompanying memorandum, Petitioner’s

Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and all supporting

documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth

below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 24] be GRANTED. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges a prison disciplinary action taken

against him, which arose from an incident that occurred on April 22,

2002. Am. Compl. at 1 and Ex. E at 17. On that date, Correctional

Officer Quinn attempted to hand Petitioner a form while Petitioner

was engaged in a telephone conversation. Id. Petitioner refused to

take the form, so Officer Quinn dropped it on the floor and turned

to walk away. Id. Petitioner confronted him for dropping the paper

instead of waiting for Petitioner to finish his call and thereafter

bumped Officer Quinn on the chest with his chest. Id. at attached

memorandum at 7 and Ex. E at 17. 

As a result, Petitioner was issued a Rules Violation Report

(“RVR”) for battery on a peace officer. Id., Ex. E at 17. A

hearing on the matter was held on May 22, 2002, at which time

Petitioner was found guilty by a preponderance of the evidence and

assessed forfeiture of 150 days of behavioral credits. Id. 

///

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1 The administrative appeal system for California inmates is described

in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. Under these regulations,

inmates “may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which

they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” 15 C.C.R.

§ 3084.1(a). An inmate wishing to exhaust his or her remedies must complete four

steps: (1) fill out a complaint form (generally termed a “602" form), present it

to the prison official involved, and attempt informal resolution; (2) if not

resolved, file for and receive a first formal level decision; (3) if relief is

not granted at the first formal level, file for and receive a second formal level

decision; and (4) if relief is not granted at the second level, file for and

receive a third level decision from the Director of Corrections. 15 C.C.R.

§ 3084.5. 

2 According to the Second Level Appeal Response, “[t]he Title 15 notes

that the eight points shall not be added for offensive touching or simple battery

where there was no apparent and present ability to inflict injury.” Am. Compl.,

Ex. T at 65.

-3- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

Petitioner appealed and on March 24, 2003, his appeal was

granted in part at the Director’s Level1 and the matter was sent

back for rehearing. Id., Ex. L at 41. On May 20, 2003, a new

hearing on the RVR was held and Petitioner again was found guilty of

battery and assessed forfeiture of 150 days of behavioral credits.

Id., Ex. O at 47-51. 

Petitioner’s second round of appeals challenging the decision

to rehear the RVR and the outcome of the hearing was denied at the

Director’s Level on November 18, 2003. Id., Ex. K at 60. 

On January 26, 2004, Petitioner received a Second Level

Appeal Response granting a separate appeal he had filed, which

sought to have eight points restored to his classification score

because the simple battery did not involve an “apparent and present

ability to inflict injury.”2

On October 27, 2004, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in

the Superior Court for the County of Imperial challenging the

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3 As the Court will discuss more thoroughly below, this petition raised

two claims, one of which appears in his federal petition. Petitioner also filed

an eight-claim habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on May 15, 2006

(Case No. S143421) (Lodgment 8), but none of those eight claims appear in his

federal petition. The California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition in

Case No. S143421 on June 14, 2006. Lodgment 9. 

-4- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

November 18, 2003 Director’s Level denial of his appeal. Lodgment

2 at 3-4 (and page 3 of the attached “supporting facts”). The

superior court denied his petition on March 25, 2005 (Lodgment 3),

and Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of

Appeal on April 20, 2005 (Lodgment 4). The court of appeal denied

his petition on May 23, 2005. Lodgment 5.

On October 25, 2006, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in

the California Supreme Court (Case No. S147550).3 Lodgment 6. That

court denied the petition on November 15, 2006. Lodgment 7.

Petitioner filed a federal petition in this Court on October

30, 2006, but the case was dismissed without prejudice and with

leave to amend due to Petitioner’s failure to pay the filing fee and

name the proper respondent. Doc. Nos. 1 & 2. The Amended Petition,

which is the operative pleading in this case, was filed on April 9,

2007. Doc. No. 15.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2006).

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-5- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

DISCUSSION

Respondent submits that the Amended Petition must be

dismissed because Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court

remedies for all of the claims and because it is barred by the oneyear statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Resp’t

Mem. at 3. Specifically, though Petitioner has filed two habeas

petitions in the California Supreme Court, Respondent argues that

only one relates to the 2003 disciplinary action and even then, the

state petition raised different claims than those presented in the

instant federal petition. Id. at 5-6 and n.9. As such, Respondent

contends that the Amended Petition is unexhausted. Id. at 4-6.

Additionally, Respondent argues that the Amended Petition is

untimely because even if Petitioner is given the benefit of

statutory tolling for the period during which his state habeas

petitions were pending, he still filed his federal petition eightyfive days after the limitations period expired. Id. at 9-10.

Moreover, in Respondent’s view, Petitioner is not entitled to

statutory tolling for the 521 days that elapsed between the court of

appeal’s ruling and the date on which he filed his California

Supreme Court petition in Case No. S147550. Id. at 10-11.

Petitioner responds that Respondent’s calculations are off on

several points. First, Petitioner argues that the appeals process

concerning the matters presented in the Amended Petition was not

completed until January 26, 2004, when Petitioner’s appeal was

granted at the Second Level. Pet’r Opp’n at 1. Next, Petitioner

contends that he filed the applicable California Supreme Court

habeas petition on May 12, 2006, not October 25, 2006. Id. at 2.

In response to Respondent’s allegation that Petitioner did not raise

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-6- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

any of his claims in his state court pleadings, Petitioner argues

that his petitions essentially remained unchanged throughout the

writ/appeal process so all of the claims are exhausted. Id. at 3-4.

Finally, Petitioner notes that he was not always able to access his

legal materials because he was shuffled between prisons between July

26, 2006 and September 29, 2006, and again between December 26, 2006

and April 26, 2007. Id. at 2-3. 

A. The AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), effective April 24, 1996, imposes a one-year statute of

limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state

prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (West Supp. 2006). Section

2244(d)’s one-year limitations period applies to all habeas

petitions filed by persons in “custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court,” see id. § 2244(d)(1), even if the petition

challenges an administrative decision rather than a state court

judgment. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir.

2004). 

The one-year limitations period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

///

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-7- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Where, as here, a habeas petitioner

challenges an administrative decision, section 2244(d)(1)(D)

applies. See Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066 (holding that limitations

period on prisoner’s challenge to disciplinary action began to run

the day after his administrative appeal was denied); Redd v.

McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the

“factual predicate” for Redd’s claim arose when the parole board

denied his administrative appeal); see also Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that under

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitations period begins to run when a

“prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important

facts [on which his claims rely], not when [he] recognizes their

legal significance”).

In this case, the “factual predicate” of Petitioner’s federal

habeas claims arose on November 18, 2003, when his administrative

appeal challenging the decision to rehear the RVR and the outcome of

the hearing was denied at the Director’s Level — the highest level

of administrative review. Thus, the AEDPA limitations period began

running the next day and, absent tolling, expired one year later on

November 18, 2004. Because Petitioner did not file his federal

habeas petition until October 30, 2006, well after the limitations

period expired, this Court will analyze whether Petitioner is

entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.

1. Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations is not tolled from the date the

factual predicate of the claims presented could have been discovered

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4 Under California’s collateral review system, an original habeas

petition challenging a lower court’s adverse decision is the equivalent of a

notice of appeal. See Carey, 536 U.S. at 221.

-8- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

through the exercise of due diligence to the time the first state

collateral challenge is filed. See Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084-85; see

also Watson v. Woodford, 2007 WL 2693846, *1 (9th Cir. 2007)

(acknowledging that statutory tolling during the pendency of state

collateral review also applies to federal petitions challenging

administrative decisions). Here, the limitations period commenced

on November 19, 2003, and did not stop until Petitioner filed his

first state habeas petition in the superior court on October 27,

2004. Thus, this 343-day period is not tolled.

The AEDPA does toll its one-year limitations period for the

“time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999);

Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084. In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002),

the Supreme Court determined that the time an application for state

post-conviction review is “pending” includes the interval between

the lower state court’s adverse decision and the prisoner’s filing

of a notice of appeal in the higher state court, provided that the

filing of that notice is timely under state law. See Carey, 536

U.S. at 222-23. Under California’s system of collateral review, a

request for review4 is considered timely if it is filed within a

“reasonable time.” Id. at 222. The Carey Court explained that

where a state’s law, like California’s, fails to clarify what

constitutes a “reasonable time,” federal courts must examine the

reasonableness of any delay in filing for successive state

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-9- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

collateral review on a case by case basis. Id. at 222, 226-27.

However, the Carey Court did not clearly delineate what that

reasonableness analysis should entail. Id. at 226-27.

The Supreme Court revisited the problem presented by

California’s indeterminate, “reasonable time” rule and its effect on

the tolling of the AEDPA’s limitations period in Evans v. Chavis,

546 U.S. 189 (2006). In Evans, the Court not only reiterated the

reasoning it set forth in Carey, but also provided guidance on how

to conduct the aforementioned “reasonableness” analysis.

Specifically, the Evans Court instructed that until California

courts provide otherwise, federal courts reviewing habeas petitions

must assume that California’s timeliness law does not differ

significantly from those states with determinate appeal periods.

Id. at 199-200. The Evans Court underlined that most states provide

determinate appeal periods of thirty to sixty days. Id. at 201

(repeating this assertion from Carey). From this, the Court held

that the Evans petitioner’s unjustified and unexplained six-month

delay in filing was more than the California courts would consider

reasonable. Id. As such, the Evans Court concluded that an

unexplained delay of six months is presumptively unreasonable. Id.

(emphasizing that it could not “see how an unexplained delay of this

magnitude could fall within the scope of the federal statutory word

“pending” as interpreted in [Carey]”).

In this case, Petitioner filed his first state habeas

petition in the superior court on October 27, 2004. Lodgment 2.

When the superior court denied the petition on March 25, 2005, he

promptly filed a habeas petition in the court of appeal on April 20,

2005. Lodgments 3 & 4. The appellate court denied his petition on

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-10- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

May 23, 2005. Lodgment 5. Given that less than thirty days elapsed

between the denial of his first petition and his filing of the next,

Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the entire period

between October 27, 2004 and May 23, 2005. Evans, 546 U.S. at 201.

However, Petitioner did not apply for collateral review in

the California Supreme Court until October 25, 2006 - 521 days after

the court of appeal’s adverse decision on his prior habeas petition.

Lodgment 6. Evans dictates that an unexplained delay of six months

or more is presumptively unreasonable. Evans, 546 U.S. at 201.

Thus, absent an acceptable explanation, Petitioner’s delay of nearly

a year and a half is unreasonable and this time period should not be

tolled. Id.

The only argument Petitioner presents in response is that he

actually filed his habeas petition in the California Supreme Court

on May 12, 2006, not October 25, 2006. However, the petition to

which Petitioner refers (Case No. S143421) does not contain any

claims related to the April 22, 2002 RVR and subsequent disciplinary

hearings. See Lodgment 8. To the contrary, the eight claims in

that habeas petition relate to an RVR issued on April 23, 2004,

which addressed Petitioner’s possession of a controlled substance

(and the subsequent order reclassifying the RVR to include the

intent to distribute). Id. And, none of the claims asserted in the

S143421 petition are presented in Petitioner’s federal petition at

issue in this case. Finally, even using the May 12, 2006 date,

Petitioner’s one-year delay in filing his habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court still would be presumptively unreasonable

under Evans. 

///

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5 The result would be the same even if the Court accepted Petitioner’s

argument that the limitations period did not begin to run until January 26, 2004,

when the prison granted his appeal and restored eight points to his

classification score. See Pet’r Opp’n at 1. Under Petitioner’s reasoning, 274

days would have expired on the limitations period before he filed in the superior

court. This figure, added to the 521 untolled days following the court of

appeal’s denial, still greatly exceeds the AEDPA’s one-year cutoff. 

6 The Supreme Court has “never squarely addressed the question whether

equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005) (assuming without deciding that

equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA’s limitations period).

-11- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

Therefore, this Court finds that statutory tolling is

warranted in this case only for the periods between October 27, 2004

and May 23, 2005, when Petitioner’s habeas petitions were pending in

the superior court and court of appeal, and October 25, 2006 to

November 15, 2006, when his petition was pending before the

California Supreme Court. Given that 343 days of the one-year

limitations period had expired before Petitioner even filed his

petition in the superior court, the limitations period that began to

run again on May 23, 2005, expired long before Petitioner filed his

petition in the California Supreme Court 521 days later on October

25, 2006.5 Thus, in order for the federal petition to be considered

timely, Petitioner must demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable

tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling

In the Ninth Circuit, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations is subject to equitable tolling.6 See Roy v. Lampert,

465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). While equitable tolling is

“unavailable in most cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999), it is appropriate where a habeas petitioner

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7 Petitioner makes the same claim for the period between December 26,

2006 and April 26, 2007, but because this time period falls after Petitioner

filed his tardy California Supreme Court petition, it does nothing to advance his

argument.

-12- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

demonstrates two specific elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

“[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under the

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Petitioners face such a high bar in order to effectuate the “AEDPA’s

statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in

order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear stale

claims.” Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 226). As a result, when assessing a

habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable tolling, courts

must conduct a “highly fact-dependent” inquiry. Whalem/Hunt v.

Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002).

While Petitioner does not request the benefit of equitable

tolling specifically, he does note in his opposition that from July

26, 2006 to September 29, 2006, he was shuffled between three

different prisons and did not have access to his property, including

his legal documents.7 Pet’r Opp’n at 2-3. Petitioner attaches a

chronological history from the Department of Corrections as

documentary evidence of this fact. The Ninth Circuit repeatedly has

concluded that equitable tolling may be appropriate when a prisoner

is denied access to his legal files. See Espinoza-Matthews v.

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-13- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

California, 432 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d

918, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). However, in Petitioner’s case, even if

the Court found that this excuse constituted an “extraordinary

circumstance” and equitably tolled this sixty-six day period, see

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, the limitations period that began to run

again on May 23, 2005, still expired long before Petitioner filed

his petition in the California Supreme Court on October 25, 2006.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s federal petition is untimely even with

statutory and equitable tolling and, therefore, this Court

RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED on this

basis.

B. Exhaustion

Respondent also argues that the Amended Petition is

unexhausted because Petitioner did not fairly present any of the

four claims in the Amended Petition in the habeas petitions he filed

in the California Supreme Court. Resp’t Mem. at 3. Petitioner

submits that his claims are exhausted because his petitions

essentially remained unchanged throughout the writ/appeal process.

Pet’r Opp’n at 3-4.

The exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is a

prerequisite to a federal court’s consideration of claims presented

in habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). Exhaustion of a habeas petitioner’s federal

claims requires that they have been “fairly presented” in each

appropriate state court, including a state supreme court with powers

of discretionary review. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

However, claims are not exhausted by mere presentation to the state

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8 Though federal courts have not been entirely consistent in specifying

the quantum of federal authority a habeas petitioner must present to the state

court, the Supreme Court’s decision in Baldwin implies that a relatively

undeveloped reference to federal principles suffices. But see, Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (unelaborated appeals to broad

constitutional principles insufficient to alert state court to particularized

federal claims); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Gray v. Netherland).

-14- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

appellate system. A petitioner also must “alert[] [the state] court

to the federal nature of the claim.” Id. at 29. A petitioner may

indicate a federal claim by citing the source of federal law upon

which he relies, or by merely labeling the claim as “federal.” Id.

at 32.8

In his Amended Petition, Petitioner presents four claims for

relief, which may be summarized as follows: (1) Petitioner was

denied due process when he was subjected to harsh penalties for the

battery charge without first being issued fair warning and notice

that any contact with an officer is a battery; (2) the disciplinary

finding resulting from the battery charge was not supported by a

preponderance of the evidence because no evidence showed that

Petition committed a “willful act of violence” (a Fourteenth

Amendment violation); (3) Respondent violated his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights by (a) refusing to locate witnesses,

(b) allowing witnesses to refuse to testify, and (c) not requiring

all witnessing officers to file reports; and (4) Respondent violated

his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive force

against him (i.e. Correctional Officer Quinn should have asked him

to turn and cuff up instead of throwing him to the ground). Am.

Pet. at 6-9. As previously noted, Petitioner did not present any of

these claims to the California Supreme Court in Case No. S143421,

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which relates only to an RVR issued on April 23, 2004, for

possession of a controlled substance and the subsequent order

reclassifying the RVR to include the intent to distribute. See

Lodgment 8. Nor do any of these claims correspond to the

allegations set forth in the second of the two claims presented to

the California Supreme Court in Case No. S147550. 

Petitioner did, however, fairly present Claim 2 of the

Amended Petition to the California Supreme Court in Case No.

S147550. The first claim of that petition avers that Petitioner

suffered disproportionate penalties in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment because there was no act of “willful force and violence”

and no injury attempted or intended. Lodgment 6 at 3. While

Respondent argues that this claim materially differs from Claim 2 of

the Amended Petition because the state claim focused on Petitioner’s

opinion that the evidence supported only a charge of attempted

battery while the federal claim focused on the fact that there was

no evidence that Petitioner’s conduct was willful (Resp’t Mem. at

6), Respondent construes the claims too narrowly. Claim 1 of the

state petition alerted the California Supreme Court to the

Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds upon which the claim is

based, Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, and to the fact that Petitioner

believes the penalties he suffered as a result of being found guilty

of battery were unduly harsh in light of the fact that the evidence

did not support a battery charge (because it did not show that he

acted with willful force or violence, as these terms are described

in the prison regulations). In other words, the thrust of

Petitioner’s claims in both courts is that the evidence did not

support the offense charged and, therefore, the penalty he suffered

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9 On November 8, 2006, this Court issued a Notice Regarding Possible

Failure to Exhaust and One-Year Statute of Limitations in this case. Doc. No.

3. Therein, the Court notified Petitioner that “[g]enerally, applications for

writs of habeas corpus that contain unexhausted claims must be dismissed.” Id.

at 1 (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 522). The Court further informed Petitioner that

if he knew of one or more claims in his federal petition that were unexhausted,

he should consider either (1) filing a request for voluntary dismissal of the

unexhausted claims or (2) filing a request for dismissal without prejudice of the

current federal action and returning to state court to exhaust the unexhausted

claims. Id. at 3. Petitioner did not exercise either of these options. 

-16- 06cv2414-IEG (BLM) 

was disproportionately harsh. This Court must liberally construe

pleadings by pro se litigants, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972) (instructing that courts must construe pro se habeas

filings liberally) and Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2005) (same), and in light of this fact, the Court finds that

Claim 2 of the Amended Petition is exhausted.

However, because Claims 1, 3 and 4 of the Amended Petition

are unexhausted and habeas petitions containing unexhausted claims

generally must be dismissed, see Rose, 455 U.S. at 522, this Court

also RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Amended

Petition be GRANTED on this basis.9

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, (2) granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and

(3) dismissing this action in its entirety.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 27, 2007 any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 18, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: December 4, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge 

COPY TO:

HONORABLE IRMA E. GONZALEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL AND PARTIES

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