Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-08-01603/USCOURTS-ca7-08-01603-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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* Appellees notified this court that they were not served with process in the district

court and would not be filing a brief or otherwise participating in this appeal.  After

examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus the appeal is submitted on the appellant’s brief and the record.  FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted October 2, 2008*

Decided October 3, 2008

Before

        FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

    ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

    DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐1603

NATHAN J. PETTIGREW,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

RICK RAEMISCH and ALFONSO

GRAHAM,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:07‐cv‐00690‐bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 08‐1603 Page 2

1 In his appeal, Pettigrew names as appellee Matthew Frank.  Rick Raemisch

replaced Frank as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections in September 2007,

and therefore we substitute Secretary Raemisch as appellee in this action.  See FED. R. APP. P.

43(c).

O R D E R

Wisconsin inmate Nathan Pettigrew sued Rick Raemisch1

, Secretary of the Wisconsin

Department of Corrections (“DOC”), and Alfonso Graham, Chairman of the Wisconsin

Parole Commission, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending that Wisconsin state officials

violated his due process rights when they labeled him a sex deviate and then denied him

parole for not participating in sex‐offender treatment.  The district court screened his

complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it for failure to state a claim.  We affirm.

For purposes here we accept as true the allegations in Pettigrew’s complaint.

See Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 589 (7th Cir. 2005).  In 1995 a Wisconsin jury found

Pettigrew guilty of first degree sexual assault.  He was sentenced to sixteen years’

imprisonment, with a maximum discharge date of May 2011.  Wisconsin inmates are

entitled to mandatory release on parole after serving two‐thirds of their sentence.  WIS.

STAT. § 302.11(1).  But for any inmate serving a sentence for sexual assault, the mandatory

release date is only presumptive, subject to the discretion of the parole commission.  WIS.

STAT. § 302.11(1g)(am).  The DOC set Pettigrew’s release date at January 2006, when he

would have served two‐thirds of his sentence.  

A DOC social worker determined shortly after sentencing that Pettigrew required

long‐term sex‐offender treatment.  Pettigrew refused to participate in the treatment

program because, he said, it would undermine his claim of innocence on appeal.  In 1999

the parole commission deferred parole consideration until 2003, citing Pettigrew’s failure to

participate in the program.  In November 2005, two months before Pettigrew’s presumptive

mandatory release date, the parole commission conducted a hearing and denied Pettigrew’s

release.  According to the commission’s report that Pettigrew attached to his complaint, he

did not complete essential offense‐related programming and thus remained an extreme risk

to re‐offend, requiring continued incarceration to protect the public.

Pettigrew filed this suit in December 2007, claiming that the DOC and parole

commission denied him due process by refusing to consider him for parole release until he

completed sex‐offender treatment.  The district court disagreed and dismissed his complaint

because Pettigrew did not have any liberty interest in parole that would entitle him to due

process protection.

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No. 08‐1603 Page 3

Pettigrew then moved for reconsideration under Rule 59, arguing that the district

court misunderstood his claim.  This time he asserted that he had a liberty interest in not

being characterized as a “sex deviate” without first receiving due process.  The court denied

the motion, concluding that Pettigrew was labeled a sex offender only after a full criminal

trial at which he had an opportunity to be heard and could argue before impartial decision‐

makers.  In any event, the court added, Pettigrew had no liberty interest in avoiding being

classified as a sex offender.

On appeal Pettigrew does not specify particular disagreement with the district

court’s handling of his claims, and instead renews his general argument that the DOC and

parole commission violated his procedural due process rights by classifying him as a “sex

deviate” needing treatment and then detaining him beyond his release date for not

participating in sex‐offender treatment.

To make out a due process claim, Pettigrew must show that he has a liberty interest

at stake, and the Supreme Court has held that there is no general constitutional right to

parole.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).  A state may,

but need not, create a liberty interest by establishing an entitlement to parole based on

certain criteria.  Id.; Thompson v. Veach, 501 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2007). But as this court has

noted, Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 444 (7th Cir. 2006), Wisconsin has adopted a

completely discretionary parole regime.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 3.04.06(1)(b) (“the parole

commission may parole an inmate” who has completed 25% of his sentence).  A Wisconsin

inmate is not guaranteed parole by meeting set criteria; he must rely on the discretion of the

parole board.  Grennier, 453 F.3d at 444.  Thus regardless of whether Pettigrew is

characterized as a “sex offender” or “sex deviate,” he has no liberty interest in being

considered for parole and cannot make out a due process claim.

Pettigrew also argues without elaboration that prison officials violated the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment.  We therefore

treat these undeveloped claims as waived.  See Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 691‐92 (7th Cir.

2006).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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