Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00023/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00023-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIDNEY SCOTT HUBBARD,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-02-0023 GEB KJM P 

vs.

TOM CAREY, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with counsel with an application for writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his Sacramento County

conviction for attempted robbery. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of fifty-six years-tolife imprisonment.

I. Background

Petitioner was found guilty by a jury. Petitioner appealed his conviction and

sentence before the California Court of Appeal. In its decision regarding petitioner’s appeal, the

Court of Appeal summarized the facts surrounding petitioner’s conviction as follows:

The attempted robbery victim, Richard Askelson, was an employee

of a convenience store in Rancho Cordova. On January 19, 1996,

at about 2 a.m., defendant entered the store while Askelson was in

the back locking a beer cooler. When Askelson turned to return to

the checkout counter, he saw defendant reaching over the counter

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 At trial, petitioner was also convicted of evading a peace officer. Petitioner does not 1

challenge that conviction in this action. Answer, Ex. D at 1.

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and into an open cash register drawer. Defendant said, “I want

your money.” Askelson replied, “That ain’t going to work.” 

Defendant said, “Do I have to shoot you to get your money?”

Defendant said if Askelson gave him money, they could split it. 

Askelson refused. Defendant said he had warrants and needed to

buy a bus ticket to Oregon. Askelson began to worry that a

customer might enter the store and be hurt so he took two 10 dollar

bills from the register, told defendant that was all there was and

gave the money to defendant. Defendant thanked Askelson,

hugged him and shook hands. Askelson told defendant to get out

of the store.

Askelson called 9-1-1 with a description of defendant’s car. 

During the conversation, he told the 9-1-1 dispatcher that

defendant said he had warrants and needed a bus ticket to Oregon. 

A tape of this conversation was played for the jury at trial.

Police officers identified the suspect vehicle and effected a stop. 

(RT 290-291) A woman was driving. She exited. The passenger,

who was defendant, was told to slide across the front seat and get

out on the driver’s side. He slid over, put his foot out of the door

but then jumped back inside and sped off.

During the pursuit defendant drove through a red light at a fairly

busy intersection. At an even busier intersection, defendant ran

another red light and tried to make a left turn but slid sideways

over the curb and onto the sidewalk. The car hit a tree and

stopped. After a brief chase on foot, defendant was taken into

custody.1

Answer, Ex. D at 2-3.

The Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentence. Id. at 16. 

Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeal’s decision in the California Supreme Court. Id.,

Ex. E. Petitioner’s request for review was denied. Id., Ex. F. Petitioner then sought collateral

relief at all three levels of California courts. Id., Exs. G, I & K. All three requests were denied. 

Id., Exs. H, J & L. 

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of appeal

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held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, the Fourth Circuit has erred. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

70-71; Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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II. Availability Of Habeas Corpus Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Also, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA”). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief). See also Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore

did not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not required to 2

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

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§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show that he is not precluded from obtaining

relief by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an “independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

words, the court assumes the state-court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

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 Respondents argue that petitioner has failed to exhaust state court remedies with respect

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to his claims as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Answer at 10-12. The court declines to

reach respondents’ argument, as a petition for writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits

without exhaustion of state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

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It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. Analysis3

A. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

Petitioner asserts his conviction for attempted robbery must be overturned because

petitioner did not receive effective representation at trial. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), the Supreme Court enunciated the standards for judging ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. First, a defendant must show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel's

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. To this end, the

defendant must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. The court must then determine whether in light of

all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional

competent assistance. Id. Second, a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693. 

Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also

United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schaflander, 743

F.2d 714, 717-18 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).

Petitioner presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the California

Supreme Court on collateral review. Answer, Ex. K at 7-10. The claim was denied without

comment. Id., Ex. L. No court issued a reasoned opinion with respect to petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. 

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 Richard Ward’s declaration is attached to the end of petitioner original petition for writ

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of habeas corpus, which was filed January 4, 2002.

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1. Failure To Investigate

Petitioner claims his trial counsel should have more thoroughly investigated

petitioner’s claim that Richard Askelson gave petitioner money from the register of the

convenience store where Askelson worked so that petitioner could buy drugs for Askelson. Am.

Pet. at 11:1-7. Petitioner does not, however, explain exactly what counsel should have done. 

Petitioner presents an affidavit from Richard Ward, which reads in part as follows: 4

I am also recently paroled from the State Prison system in Solano

where I served a term of 4 years for armed robbery. While at this

prison, I met [petitioner.] We had a lot in common because we

were both from the same neighborhood in Sacramento.

Before my time in prison while I was on the streets I lived in

Rancho Cordova and I would often hang out at the Seven-Eleven

located on Mills Station Road. I knew the woman that was the

manager because for a time we lived next door to her on

Portsmouth in Rancho Cordova. 

She also had an employee at the Seven-Eleven who went by the 

name of “Skitch” or “Sparky”. He was a white male, about 40,

5'10" to 6'0", with a beard. I think they may have been married.

During that time, the early to mid 90's, I would make my money

from selling drugs so I knew what was happening in the Rancho

Cordova. [sic] I knew that “Sparky” was operating a drug

business from the Seven-Eleven. He would trade drugs, usually

crack cocaine and crank for merchandise in the store. I would

trade with him myself on the average of about 2-3 times per week. 

In return I would get cigarettes, food and beer usually. I remember

when his wife found out, she got really mad at him. There were

several other people that I know by name that also traded with

“Sparky”.

One time I remember that “Sparky” was right in the middle of a

transaction when the cops rolled up and “Sparky” told the cops the

same story that he told them about [petitioner], causing that person

to get in trouble.

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26 RT stands for Reporter’s Transcript. 5

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“Sparky” had a reputation in the community for doing drug business

out of the Seven-Eleven. He would work the graveyard shift when

all of the dope fiends would be out.

Ward Decl. at 1-2. Without considering the credibility and relevancy issues associated with the

presentation of this testimony, petitioner has not shown that his trial counsel’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness because he has not shown that any trial counsel

acting in a reasonable manner would have identified Mr. Ward as a potential witness to help

petitioner’s case. As indicated by Mr. Ward, petitioner learned of Mr. Ward’s story when the

two met in prison. Petitioner does not explain how his trial counsel could have or should have

found Mr. Ward any earlier, or any other evidence which might have helped petitioner’s case. 

Petitioner’s first assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel should be rejected.

2. Failure To Object To Video

Petitioner asserts trial counsel should have objected to the presentation of a

videotape recording depicting the events described above as occurring on January 19, 1996, at

about 2 a.m. Am. Pet. at 11:10-25. Petitioner asserts trial counsel should have objected because

the tape did not have audio and the audio portion of the tape would have proved petitioner’s

innocence. However, as indicated below, there is no way of knowing exactly what the audio

portion of the tape would have revealed. In any event, petitioner has not shown that the audio

portion of the tape was available to counsel at trial. 

3. Failure to Object To Evidence That Petitioner Had Outstanding Warrants

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective “because he failed to object

to the admission of hearsay evidence, i.e. that petitioner had an outstanding warrant.” Am. Pet.

at 11:26-28. Richard Askelson testified that, when confronted by petitioner, petitioner told him

among other things that petitioner had an outstanding warrant. RT 186:14-17. Also, a tape of a 5

conversation Askelson had with a 9-1-1 dispatcher was played during which Askelson informed

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26 CST stands for Clerk’s Supplemental Transcript. 6

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the dispatcher that the person who robbed his store said he had outstanding warrants. RT

203:18-204:23; CST 1-3. Petitioner fails to present any California law suggesting the evidence

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referenced above was improperly admitted. Therefore, petitioner has not shown that his

counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable or that counsel’s action’s prejudiced petitioner’s

case in some way. Petitioner claims counsel should have objected because there was not a

warrant for petitioner’s arrest during the relevant time frame. Am. Pet. at 11:28-12:2. However

this would not have been a valid ground for an objection because whether petitioner actually had

a warrant against him had little bearing on whether petitioner told Richard Askelson that he did. 

Finally, petitioner asserts trial counsel should have investigated whether petitioner had a warrant

against him during the relevant time frame. Am. Pet. at 12:2-3. However, petitioner fails to

articulate how this would have helped his case and fails to even show that such evidence would

have been admissible.

B. Lost Evidence

Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated by the prosecution

because someone affiliated with the prosecution lost a videotape with audio depicting petitioner’s

confrontation with Richard Askelson. Am. Pet. at 12:7-11. The tape presented to jurors did not

contain audio. Id. Petitioner claims the audio portion of the tape would have provided jurors

with exculpatory evidence. Id. This claim was presented to the California Supreme Court on

collateral review. Answer, Ex. K at 10-11. The claim was denied without comment. Id., Ex. L. 

No court issued a reasoned opinion with respect to this claim.

Petitioner concedes that in order to prevail on his lost evidence claim, he must

show that state officials acted in bad faith when they failed to preserve the tape with sound. See

Arizona v. Youngblood 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). 

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Before trial, the manager of the convenience store indicated that she saw police

officers take one videotape. She was not sure if they took two tapes. RT 44:21-45:10. 

Therefore, it is not clear whether police officers ever took possession of the tape with sound. 

Second, even if the court assumes the police took possession of the tape at the scene, there is

nothing suggesting the police officers knew that the audio was exculpatory or even decipherable. 

The store manager’s testimony regarding the tape with audio is not entirely clear, but it appears

to reflect that no clear audiotape was made of the incident; at most when she played the tape

with audio for police officers, “two voices” could be detected. RT 16:16-19:18. Nothing in the

record suggests that the officers who collected evidence at the convenience store knew what the

audio portion of the tape recording would reveal or whether they would be able to create a

transcription of what was on the tape. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates a tape with

audio track was ever booked into evidence at the police station. 

For the court to find that the officers acted in bad faith there would have to be a

showing that the police officers knew what the audio portion of the tape revealed or that police

officers intentionally discarded the tape in bad faith. No such showing has been made. 

Therefore, petitioner’s claim regarding the loss of the tape with audio must be rejected. 

C. “Outstanding Warrants”

In claim 4, petitioner asserts the prosecution knowingly presented false evidence

at trial. Am. Pet. at 13:18-14:5. Petitioner asserts correctly that, under federal law, a conviction

obtained through the prosecution’s use of evidence known to be false must be reversed. Napue

v. Illinios, 360 U.S. 264, 268 (1959). This claim was presented to the California Supreme Court

on collateral review. Answer, Ex. K at 12. The claim was denied without comment. Id., Ex. L. 

No court issued a reasoned opinion with respect to this claim.

As noted above Richard Askelson testified that, when confronted by petitioner, 

petitioner told him among other things that petitioner had an outstanding warrant. RT 186:14-17. 

Also, a tape of a conversation Askelson had with a 9-1-1 dispatcher was played during which

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Askelson informed the dispatcher that the person who robbed his store said he had outstanding

warrants. RT 203:18-204:23; CST 1-3. This is the evidence petitioner claims was “false”

because, according to petitioner, the prosecution should have known that petitioner did not have

outstanding warrants when petitioner confronted Askelson. 

Petitioner fails to present anything indicating the prosecution had reason to

believe petitioner did not tell Richard Askelson that he had outstanding warrants. Whether

petitioner actually had outstanding warrants is immaterial because Askelson did not tell jurors

that petitioner had outstanding warrants, just that petitioner told Askelson that petitioner did. No

showing has been made indicating false evidence was knowingly presented by the prosecution. 

In other words, nothing suggests anything presented by the prosecution was fabricated with the

help or knowledge of the prosecution. Claim 4 must be rejected. 

In claim 3, petitioner claims the trial court should have sua sponte instructed

jurors with respect to the manner in which they could consider the testimony of Richard

Askelson and the portion of the 9-1-1 tape identified above. This claim also was presented to the

California Supreme Court on collateral review. Answer, Ex. K at 11-12. The claim was denied

without comment. Id., Ex. L. No court issued a reasoned opinion with respect to this claim. 

Petitioner does not assert specifically how jurors should have been instructed. 

Furthermore, petitioner fails to present any legal authority in support of his claim and therefore

has not met his burden of showing that he is not precluded from obtaining relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d).

Even if the court finds that jurors should have been instructed in some manner

other than the way in which they were, petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he can show that

failure to give a particular instruction had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Petitioner

makes no attempt to show injury based on the failure to give a particular instruction. Moreover,

given the eyewitness testimony of Richard Askelson, and petitioner’s flight from police officers,

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any failure to instruct the jury with respect to how they could consider the fact that petitioner told

Askelson about outstanding warrants had limited, if any, effect on the decision reached by the

jury. 

IV. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s

application for writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 6, 2007.

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hubb0023.157

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