Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00064/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00064-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY SALAS,

CDCR No. AT-8924

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO JAIL MEDICAL STAFF; 

R.N. SALGADO,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:16-cv-0064-BAS-JMA

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 4, 2016, Larry Salas (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the 

California Rehabilitation Center located in Norco, California, and proceeding pro se, filed 

a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff 

did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his 

Complaint; instead, he filed two Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF Nos. 3, 5). This Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motions and 

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sua sponte DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could 

be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff was 

granted leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading 

identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) On April 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 7.)

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court stated in its previous Order, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or 

the payment of any filing fees, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires the 

Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced 

for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of 

parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after 

docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court 

must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, which is frivolous, 

malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

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possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n. 7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of 

the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are simply not “sufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

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Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Improper Defendants & Municipal Liability

Upon reviewing the FAC, the Court again finds that to the extent Plaintiff names 

the entire “San Diego County Jail” as a defendant, his claims must be dismissed sua 

sponte pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

Local law enforcement departments, like the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, 

municipal agencies, or subdivisions of those department or agencies, are not proper 

defendants under § 1983. See Vance v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. 

Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means 

of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Powell v. Cook 

Cty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any 

‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County 

Jail is not a ‘person.’”). 

While the County of San Diego itself may be considered a “person” and therefore, 

a proper defendant under § 1983, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978); Hammond v. Cty. of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988), Plaintiff has not 

named the County as a Defendant. Moreover, as a municipality, the County may be held 

liable under § 1983, but only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a constitutional 

deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, 

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the County, or 

a “final decision maker” for the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Bd. of the Cty.

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 

(9th Cir. 1995). In other words, “respondeat superior and vicarious liability are not 

cognizable theories of recovery against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark Cty., Nevada, 

279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002). “Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the 

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alleged constitutional deprivation was inflicted in ‘execution of a government’s policy or 

custom.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might plausibly 

suggest” that the County itself violated his constitutional rights. See Hernandez v. Cty. of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading standards to Monell

claims); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides 

for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by 

affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally 

required duties, cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights).

D. Medical Care Claims 

Plaintiff claims that he was denied adequate medical care because he was “placed 

in confinement and without medication while I detoxed from heroin for 13 days.” (FAC 

at 3.) In addition, Plaintiff claims Defendant Salgado “refused to proscribe [sic] me 

medication to detox from heroin.” (Id.) 

Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Plaintiff’s FAC

fails to meet this standard. First, Plaintiff claims he was “detox[ing] from heroin,” but he 

fails to include any further factual matter sufficient to show or describe how or to what 

extent his medical need was objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 

1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining a “serious medical need” as one which the “failure to treat 

. . . could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain’”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The “existence 

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of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples 

of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 

F.3d at 1059-60.

Second, nothing in Plaintiff’s FAC supports a “reasonable inference that [any 

individual] defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to 

indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 

U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; 

inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a 

constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002)); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 

1334 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that there was a delay in receiving medication. However, a 

delay by itself does not show deliberate indifference unless the delay is alleged to be 

harmful. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff’s FAC is devoid of any facts to describe how 

the alleged delay caused him actual harm. Without more, Plaintiff’s FAC amounts only 

to “unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” which “stop[] 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief’” as to any 

purported medical care claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

557).

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible 

claim for relief against any person subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

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Therefore, his FAC is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS him forty-five (45) 

days leave from the date of this Order in which to file a Second Amended Complaint 

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Second Amended Complaint 

will be considered waived. See Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled”). Defendant is cautioned that repeated failures 

to cure the deficiencies in his pleadings may result in a dismissal with prejudice. In other 

words, if Defendant cannot fix the problems in his complaint, the Court may not give him 

another opportunity to amend. See, e.g., McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 

809-10 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed is [a] valid reason for a district court to deny a party leave to amend.”) (citation 

omitted).

2. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

//

//

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//

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 5, 2016

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