Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00280/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00280-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The allegations are taken from the plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint, filed June 14, 2007. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVARIS MARQUEZ TUBBS,

NO. CIV. S-06-280 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v.

 O R D E R

SACRAMENTO COUNTY JAIL, et al

Defendants.

 /

The plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Sacramento County

Main Jail who has brought suit against the defendants under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged excessive force used against him and

deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Defendants Isenogle,

Parker, Shelly, and McMahon move for judgment on the pleadings. The

court resolves the motion on the papers and after oral argument.

I. ALLEGATIONS AND BACKGROUND1

The plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Sacramento County

Main Jail on January 21, 2006. On that date, several of the

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individual defendants, who were officers at the jail, extracted the

plaintiff from his cell. He alleges that they “slammed him against

the jail floor” and “snapped [his] right elbow.” Second Amended

Complaint, ¶ 29. This caused the plaintiff’s arm to be broken. He

received medical attention for his arm, but the plaintiff alleges

that it was inadequate and that the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his continued need for additional medical treatment.

He has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged

excessive force used in the cell extraction and the inadequate

medical care he received.

The plaintiff filed his complaint pro se on February 9, 2006

and filed an amended complaint on March 24, 2006. On April 11,

2006, the Magistrate Judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claims as to

defendants Isenogle, Parker, and Mendoza, granting the plaintiff

thirty days to file an amended complaint. The plaintiff did not do

so and on July 7, 2006, the Magistrate Judge recommended those

defendants be dismissed from the action. The court issued an order

dismissing those defendants on November 28, 2006.

On February 27, 2007, the Magistrate Judge appointed counsel

to the plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on

June 14, 2007, which named Isenogle and Parker as defendants. The

court issued a scheduling order on August 1, 2007. 

II. STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 

UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(C)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought “[a]fter

the pleadings are closed but within such time as to not delay the

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trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). All allegations of fact by the party

opposing a motion for judgment on the pleadings are accepted as

true. Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th

Cir. 1984). A “dismissal on the pleadings for failure to state a

claim is proper only if ‘the movant clearly establishes that no

material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ’ Id. (quoting 5 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1368,

at 690 (1969)); see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d

802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988).

When a Rule 12(c) motion is used to raise the defense of

failure to state a claim, the motion is subject to the same test

as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 810; Aldabe

v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the court is

bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable

inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the

complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO

v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). The plaintiff need

not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id.; see also

Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963) (inferring fact from

allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The

court may not dismiss the complaint if there is a reasonably

founded hope that the plaintiff may show a set of facts consistent

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As a preliminary matter, the plaintiff has agreed that his

claims are not directed against defendant McMahon. The court

grants this defendant's motion.

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with the allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1967-69 (2007). In spite of the deference the court is bound

to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper

for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which

[he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated

the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated

General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). The complaint must allege

sufficient facts to provide “‘fair notice’ of the nature of the

claim [and] also ‘grounds’ upon which the claim rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp., 127 S.Ct at 1965 n. 3.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants Isenogle, Parker, Shelly, and McMahon move for

judgment on the pleadings and seek to be dismissed from the

plaintiff’s action without leave to amend. For the reasons stated

herein, the court grants the motion.2

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants Isenogle and Parker

Were Not Previously Dismissed With Prejudice

Defendants Isenogle and Parker assert that the plaintiff’s

claims against them had previously been dismissed with prejudice

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The court does not

agree.

Rule 41(b) provides that a plaintiff’s claims may be dismissed

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if the plaintiff fails to comply with the Rules or with a court

order. Such a dismissal is an adjudication on the merits unless the

court states otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Dismissal under this

rule is a sanction against the plaintiff, and should only be

imposed “in extreme circumstances,” when less severe sanctions are

inadequate. Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th

Cir. 1996). Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is only appropriate if the

following factors weigh in its favor: “(1) the public’s interest

in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4)

the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits;

and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.” Hernandez

v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). 

If a court has dismissed a complaint with leave to amend and

the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the dismissal may

operate as an adjudication on the merits under Rule 41(b). Yourish

v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 986-88 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth

Circuit has noted, however, that such an approach is “problematic”

since a plaintiff’s failure to amend his complaint after having

received leave to do so it not the type of disobedience to a court

order to which Rule 41(b) is typically directed. See id. at 987 n.

4. In Yourish, the court concluded that the district court had not

abused its discretion in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint under

Rule 41(b) because the record showed that the court had weighed the

five Hernandez factors in reaching its decision. See id. at 990-92.

Here, Magistrate Judge Hollows ordered dismissal of defendants

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Isenogle and Parker after a review of the adequacy of the

plaintiff’s allegations against them. See Order, April 11, 2006

(Docket No. 7). Specifically, the Magistrate Judge concluded that

the plaintiff had “set[] forth no allegations” against these

defendants. Id. at 3. The court granted the plaintiff thirty days

to file an amended complaint. Id. at 5. The plaintiff did not file

an amended complaint within thirty days. Accordingly, on July 7,

2006, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of defendants

Isenogle and Parker, “for the reasons set forth in the Order, filed

on April 11, 2006.” See Findings and Recommendations, July 7, 2006

(Docket No. 9), at 1. The court conducted no analysis of the

Hernandez factors. See id. This court subsequently adopted the

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations. See Order,

November 28, 2006 (Docket No. 17). In its order, the court

conducted no independent analysis of the appropriateness of

dismissal nor did it weigh whether dismissal was proper under

Hernandez. See id.

Based on this, the court concludes that its dismissal of

defendants Isenogle and Parker was not an adjudication on the

merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Although, like

the plaintiff in Yourish, the plaintiff here did not amend his

complaint when given leave to do so, there is nothing in this

court’s nor the Magistrate Judge’s orders to suggest that the

dismissal of the plaintiff’s causes of action against defendants

Isenogle and Parker was intended to be with prejudice. The Ninth

Circuit has emphasized the severity of the sanction of dismissal,

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and that it would be an abuse of discretion for a district court

to dismiss under Rule 41(b) without weighing the Hernandez factors.

See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990; Ferdick v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the Magistrate Judge and this court

recommended dismissal solely on the grounds that the plaintiff had

not alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action against the

defendants. See Order, April 11, 2006; Findings and

Recommendations, July 7, 2006; Order, November 28, 2006.

Consequently, defendants Isengole and Parker were not dismissed

with prejudice by the court’s November 28, 2006 order. 

B. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint Does Not State a Cause

of Action Against Defendants Isenogle, Parker, and Shelly

In his Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiff makes shotgun

allegations against defendants Isenogle, Parker, and Shelly. He

alleges that each “was negligent and/or watched and/or encouraged

and/or directed and/or enabled and/or ordered other Defendant

Deputies to use excessive force, assault and batter” the plaintiff

at the Sacramento County Main Jail. Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶

10-12. Additionally, he alleges that defendant Shelly used

excessive force and assaulted and battered him. Id. ¶ 12. In his

more specific factual allegations, in which he alleges the sequence

of events giving rise to his causes of action, the plaintiff

alleges that each of these defendants approached his cell for the

purpose of performing a cell extraction of the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 28.

Although the court construes a complaint in favor of the

plaintiff, Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, the allegations against

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Though the court construes liberally the pleadings of a pro

se plaintiff, see Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982), at the

time the plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint he was

represented by counsel.

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Because Shelly is accused of employing excessive force, it

is reasonable to construe the complaint against him as relying on

the two excessive force causes of action.

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defendants Isenogle and Parker are not sufficient to give notice

of the claims against them and the factual basis thereof.3

 See Bell

Atlantic Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1967-69. First, the plaintiff has

alleged four causes of action, two of which derive from his

allegations of excessive force and two of which derive from his

allegations of deliberate indifference to his medical needs. See

Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 43-55. Although each cause of action

lists the defendants against which it is directed, no cause of

action states that it is directed against defendants Isenogle and

Parker. See id.4 Consequently, these defendants have been left to

speculate as to which claims are alleged against them, which cannot

suffice as adequate notice pleading. See Bell Atlantic Corp., 127

S.Ct at 1965 n. 3.

Second, although the plaintiff makes factual allegations about

defendants Isenogle’s, Parker’s, and Shelly’s conduct that indicate

that these defendants were involved in the cell extraction, see

Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 10-12, in his specific allegations

describing the cell extraction, the plaintiff does not allege these

defendants’ involvement. See id. at ¶ 29 (identifying other

individual defendants as the persons who grabbed the plaintiff,

pinned him down, slammed him against the floor, and “snapped” his

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arm). Consequently, defendants Isenogle, Parker, and Shelly have

not been given notice of what conduct the plaintiff alleges they

performed during the cell extraction, which would give rise to the

causes of action. This does not suffice to allege the factual

“grounds upon which the claim rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 127 S.Ct

at 1965 n. 3 (internal quotations omitted). 

The court, therefore, grants the defendants’ motion.

C. The Court Grants Leave to Amend

The plaintiff proposes, in his opposition to the defendants’

motion, that any defects in the complaint can be cured if he is

granted leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. The court grants

leave to amend.

In its August 1, 2007 scheduling order, the court informed the

plaintiff that amendment of the pleadings would only be permitted

upon a showing of good cause, citing Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1992). “Good cause” is

shown where the party seeking leave to amend has demonstrated

sufficient diligence. Id. at 609. Good cause may be found to exist

where the moving party shows diligence in assisting the court with

creating a workable scheduling order, that the party is unable to

comply with the scheduling order’s deadlines due to matters that

could not have reasonably been foreseen at the time of the issuance

of the scheduling order, and demonstrates diligence in seeking an

amendment. Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D.

Cal. 1999)(citations omitted). A court may supplement its

determination by noting the prejudice to the other party. Johnson,

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975 F.2d at 609. If good cause is found, then the court turns to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to determine whether the

amendment sought should be granted. Id. at 608. 

Here, the court is mindful that the plaintiff initiated his

action in early 2006 and was appointed counsel over a year later.

The court issued its scheduling order in August 2007, only a few

months after the appointment of counsel. At the time of the

creation of the scheduling order, therefore, it is understandable

the plaintiff’s counsel had not yet become fully aware of the

nature of and factual basis for the plaintiff’s claims. See

Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608. Moreover, amending the complaint does

not seem unduly burdensome to the defendants. See Johnson, 975 F.2d

at 609. Good cause appearing, the court grants the plaintiff leave

to amend his Second Amended Complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS the

defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff is given thirty (30)

days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 27, 2008.

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