Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03566/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03566-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN C. ATKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, CITY OF ALAMEDA,

OFFICER P. WYETH, EILEEN MCANDREW, and

DOES 1–10,

Defendants. /

No. C-03-3566 MHP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Re: Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment 

On July 31, 2003, plaintiff Steven C. Atkins, proceeding pro se, brought this civil action

against defendants the County of Alameda, City of Alameda, Eileen McAndrew, and Officer Patrick

Wyeth of the Alameda Police Department (collectively the “defendants”). Atkins’ complaint alleges

that defendants participated—individually and collectively—in the false arrest, illegal search, false

imprisonment and malicious prosecution of plaintiff; in the process, plaintiff claims, defendants

violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. For these supposed violations, plaintiff seeks unspecified sums of compensatory and

punitive damages, and he requests an award of costs and attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On March 8, 2004, the court granted defendants’ motion to stay this action pursuant to the

Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 501, et seq., though the court expressly

permitted two defendants (viz., McAndrew and the County of Alameda) to file summary judgment

motions. On April 29, 2004, the court granted McAndrew and the County of Alameda’s motion for

summary judgment—dismissing the malicious prosecution claims against them. Now before the

court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff and by the remaining defendants

(viz., Wyeth and the City of Alameda). Having considered the parties’ arguments fully, and for the

reasons set forth below, the court rules as follows. 

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 1 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

BACKGROUND1 

On November 20, 2002, Stephanie Atkins (who was seventeen years of age at the time)

telephoned the Alameda Police Department (“APD”) to report that her father, plaintiff Steven

Atkins, had been drinking heavily and had left home in his car. In a recording of the 911 call she

made, Stephanie stated: “My dad just left the house and he’s completely plastered and I have his

license plate number and I would really like you guys to pick him up.” Fox Dec., Exh. E

(hereinafter, the “911 Tape”). Speaking with an APD emergency operator, Stephanie described the

make and license number of plaintiff’s car—a Jeep Cherokee—adding that she believed plaintiff was

planning to purchase more alcohol. APD dispatched Officer Wyeth to respond to Stephanie’s call. 

According to dispatch, plaintiff “left after an argument but no weapons involved. [Plaintiff] . . . has

been drinking heavily and is on medication for his alcoholism and should be highly intoxicated.”

JSUF ¶ 6. Officer Wyeth could not locate plaintiff (or plaintiff’s vehicle) in the areas surrounding

plaintiff’s home, most notably at any of the neighborhood’s liquor stores. Fox Dec., Exh. D

(hereinafter “Police Report”) at 4. Still needing to verify Stephanie’s report, Officer Wyeth drove to

the Atkins’ home. Id. Once there, Officer Wyeth spotted a vehicle matching Stephanie’s

description in the driveway of plaintiff’s home. The vehicle’s headlights were on; its engine block

was warm; and it had been parked such that its bumper was pressed against the garage door. Id.

Wearing a micro-cassette recorder, Officer Wyeth approached plaintiff’s front door. Plaintiff

responded to the doorbell and a tense conversation followed. Plaintiff admits that he was “probably

belligerent” and that he raised his voice and used expletives during this conversation. JSUF ¶ 8. 

Officer Wyeth could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from plaintiff’s person. Police

Report at 4. Plaintiff’s eyes were red and watery and he could not stand straight but swayed as he

stood at the door. Id. During the course of the conversation, Wyeth informed plaintiff that his

daughter Stephanie had called 911. According to Wyeth, plaintiff’s already hostile behavior

intensified when he was informed that Stephanie had called the police. Id. At his deposition,

plaintiff testified that he believed that Officer Wyeth’s purpose, in informing him that Stephanie had

made the 911 call, was to make him angry. In any event, Officer Wyeth requested that he be

allowed to enter the house and speak with Stephanie. Even though plaintiff understood that Wyeth

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 2 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

wanted to speak to Stephanie, he told the officer that he could not come in. Id. at 89:24–90:19. 

Plaintiff did not ask Stephanie to come to the door and speak with the police officer. Atkins Dep. at

90:20–24. During this entire exchange, Stephanie and her mother, Sheila, were in the kitchen. 

Stephanie Atkins Dep. at 20:2–5; Atkins Dep. at 10:17–20. Officer Wyeth testified that he saw

some movement and could hear some sounds coming from the kitchen area. Wyeth Dep. at 11:4–5. 

Officer Wyeth also testified that he found it “strange” that Stephanie did not come to the door. 

Police Report at 4.

Ultimately, without plaintiff’s permission, Officer Wyeth entered the home through a screen

door. Before Officer Wyeth entered the house, he felt that he had “exhausted all of [his[ resources

and that Stephanie could have had her safety compromised, and [plaintiff] was delaying [him] from

gathering further information about the 911 call.” Wyeth Dep. at 14:4–9. When he entered the

house, Officer Wyeth approached the women in the kitchen and Stephanie confirmed that she had

placed the call to APD. An extensive exchange involving Officer Wyeth, plaintiff, Stephanie, and

plaintiff’s wife, Sheila, followed. Fox Dec., Exh. F (hereinafter “Micro Cassette Recording”). 

Sheila told the officer that plaintiff had been drinking consistently that evening. She informed

Wyeth that plaintiff was taking prescription medication (Lorazepum, also known as Ativan) to help

curb his drinking habits. Id. at 1. In her citizen arrest statement, Sheila explained that the

prescription medication is an anti-depressant and that in less than one week plaintiff had already

consumed 35 of his 60 pills. Police Report at 5,7; Micro Cassette Recording at 5. Plaintiff

confirmed that he was prescribed Ativan for his alcoholism. Atkins Dep. at 39:8–12.2

The following events had transpired before Wyeth’s arrival: Plaintiff had already consumed

two, and possibly four, Ativan tablets before arriving home from work on the evening of November

20, 2002. Id. at 59:2–8. Soon after arriving home, plaintiff went with his wife to Lucky 13 Bar

where he consumed a double vodka and orange juice. After leaving Lucky 13 Bar, plaintiff

purchased another bottle of vodka and when he reached home he drank another beverage containing

“half the bottle’ of vodka. Not long after, plaintiff consumed the remaining vodka and took at least

one other Ativan tablet. Id. 57:18–59:11; 60:23–62:18; 63:6–68:13; Police Report at 5. Plaintiff

concedes that combining his medication with alcohol constituted “bad judgment.” Atkins Dep. at

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 3 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

68:11–13. After having already consumed a full bottle of vodka, plaintiff informed his wife that he

was going out to purchase more alcohol. Sheila warned plaintiff, stating that “[i]f you go out in the

car, I am going to call the police.” Police Report at 8. Plaintiff left and returned a few minutes later

with another bottle of vodka. 

After Sheila and Stephanie relayed the above events, Wyeth informed the women that if they

saw plaintiff drinking before he got into the car that would provide sufficient basis to arrest him. 

Micro Cassette Recording at 1. Wyeth admits that he did not have any probable cause to make an

arrest. Wyeth Dep. at 12:11–13; 13:7–12. Wyeth told Sheila and Stephanie that the only way that

plaintiff could be arrested is if they put him under citizens arrest. Atkins Dep. at 127:4– 9. Wyeth

then asked the women: “Do you want to go ahead and have him arrested?” and both women

answered in the affirmative. Id. at 2; Sheila Atkins Dep. at 26:24–27:5; Atkins Dep. at 128:8–13. 

Officer Wyeth then placed plaintiff under arrest, handcuffed him and transported him to the APD

jail, where plaintiff spent approximately four hours in a detoxification cell. Sheila and Stephanie

both filled out and signed citizen arrest statements.3 See Police Report at 7–9. That same night,

fearing that plaintiff would return or harm her or her daughter Sheila requested an emergency

protective order (“EPO”). Police Report at 6. Sheila’s EPO request (included in the police report)

states that “Sheila placed Steven under citizens arrest for DUI.” See id. at 10. At 12:35 a.m., after

being cited and after signing a promise to appear, plaintiff was released. 

Within two weeks, the district attorney of Alameda County (Eileen McAndrew) filed charges

against plaintiff for driving under the influence and refusing to take a chemical test. See Cal Veh.

Code §§ 23152(a), 23577. After learning that neither Sheila nor Stephanie wished to proceed with

the prosecution and that neither wanted to testify against plaintiff, the district attorney dismissed the

criminal action on the same day; plaintiff was immediately notified. The criminal complaint that

was filed pursuant to section 740 of the California Penal Code was signed by Officer Al Cofer and

not by Sheila Atkins. Al Cofer Dep. at 4:15–18;5:1–6:11. 

Approximately six months after the dismissal of his case, plaintiff filed a complaint in this

court, alleging numerous civil rights violations for the allegedly unlawful warrantless entry of

Officer Wyeth into his home and his subsequent arrest for DUI. 

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 4 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the

opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving

party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New

Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The moving party may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

DISCUSSION

I. Officer Wyeth’s Warrantless Entry was Lawful

Defendants contend that the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement is applicable in the instant action. Thus, they assert that they are entitled to summary

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 5 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

judgment that Officer Wyeths’ warrantless entry into the Atkins’ home was lawful. Plaintiff

disputes this, asserting in his summary judgment motion that Officer Wyeth’s warrantless entry was

a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In general the Fourth Amendment bars a warrantless

search of or entry into a residence unless (1) there is probable cause and (2) exigent circumstances

are present. United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “numerous

state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from

making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need

of immediate aid.” Mincey v. State of Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). 

The Ninth Circuit adopted this exception in Cervantes (a case involving the warrantless entry

of police officers into an apartment after they observed fumes and smelled what they feared to be

inflammable material), noting that “[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is

justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” 219 F.3d at

888. The Ninth Circuit found that this duty on the part of the police to “protect[] against [the]

serious bodily injury” of public citizens stems from their “community caretaking function.” Id. at

889. Further, in United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tierney v.

Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998)), the Ninth Circuit noted that “courts have recognized

the combustible nature of domestic disputes and have accorded great latitude to an officer’s belief

that warrantless entry was justified.” 

Under this emergency aid exception, so long as (1) the police have reasonable grounds to

suspect that there is an emergency, (2) the primary motive of the search is not to find evidence, and

(3) there is “some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with

the area or place to be searched,” then the search is valid. Cervantes, 219 F.3d at 889; see also

Martin v. City of Oceanside, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 360 F.3d 1078 (2000),

cert denied., __U.S.__, 128 S. Ct. 55 (2004) (holding that warrantless entry and search of home

following request by a father who feared for the safety of his daughter and after there was no

response to heavy knocking on the front door met all the requirements of the emergency aid

exception); Johnson v. City of Bellevue, No. 05-1070 C, 2006 WL 223797 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30,

2006) (finding that police had reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff might commit suicide and

thus emergency aid exception was applicable). In determining the applicability of this emergency

aid exception, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly rejected” a subjective intent approach. Brigham

City v. Stuart, et al., __ U.S. __, 2006 WL 1374566 (May 22, 2006). “An action is ‘reasonable’

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 6 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long a the

circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” Id. at *4 (citing Scott v. United States, 436

U.S. 128, 138 (1978)) 

In his response to defendants’ motion (and in his own summary judgment motion), plaintiff

makes no attempt to apply the applicable law to the undisputed facts. However, it appears that

plaintiff’s contention is that Officer Wyeth’s conduct cannot meet the second prong of the

emergency aid exception—specifically that his warrantless entry was not primarily motivated by a

concern for the welfare of Stephanie. Plaintiff asserts that Wyeth entered the Atkins home not only

to check on Stephanie but also to further investigate the 911 DUI call. This argument—that

somehow Officer Wyeth’s expressed motivation was pretextual— is unpersuasive and unsupported. 

It is true that Officer Wyeth stated that he believed that plaintiff, by refusing to let him speak with

Stephanie was “delaying the welfare check of the caller, the 911 call . . . and also possibly

investigation of the DUI, that was driving under the influence that was reported to the police.” 

Wyeth Dep. at 13–16. However, this suspicion on the part of Officer Wyeth about the intentions of

plaintiff does not dispel what, as discussed below, was a reasonable concern about the welfare of

Stephanie. The only other evidence in the record that plaintiff points to in support of his contention

that Officer Wyeth’s warrantless entry was motivated by either an attempt to arrest or to gather

evidence against him is the un-compelling fact that the first question that the officer asked was:

“Why did you call 911?” In fact, the weight of the evidence supports the opposite conclusion. 

More importantly, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected a similar

argument by respondents in the recently decided Brigham case, noting that the subjective intent of

the particular officer is irrelevant in determining the “reasonableness” of his or her actions. It is

clear from the facts of this case that Officer Wyeth’s actions are objectively reasonable and fall

squarely within the ambit of the emergency aid exception. The undisputed facts are: (1) Wyeth was

informed that there had been an argument among members of the Atkins household prior to the 911

call, (2) he was greeted at the door by an intoxicated and belligerent individual who became

increasingly hostile after discovering that it was his daughter who had called the police, (3) this

individual flatly refused to allow the officer to speak to his daughter, and (4) Stephanie did not come

to the door after the doorbell rang or throughout the entire loud exchange between Wyeth and

plaintiff. Under these circumstances, Officer Wyeth reasonably suspected that an emergency was at

hand and that Stephanie was in danger or may have already been harmed. Additionally, Officer

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 7 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Wyeth testifies that throughout his confrontation with plaintiff, his concern was heightened by the

fact that plaintiff repeatedly glanced nervously in the direction of the kitchen, where the women

were located. As Wyeth stated in his deposition, “I could not leave in good conscience . . . walk

away from that house and not make sure that she was okay.” Wyeth Dep. at 41:17–18. 

Accordingly, this court finds that it was reasonable and lawful, under the emergency aid exception,

for Officer Wyeth to enter the Atkins household without a warrant. Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment with respect to the lawfulness of the warrantless entry. 

Plaintiff’s motion, aside from conclusory statements regarding Officer Wyeth’s motivations,

cites to no evidence in the record to support his claim that the warrantless entry was unlawful—aside

from Wyeth’s statement regarding plaintiff’s intentions. Plaintiff has failed to meet his initial

burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

II. Citizen’s Arrest of Plaintiff was Lawful

 Pursuant to the California Penal Code section 837, 

a private person may arrest another (1) for a public offense committed or attempted in his

presence, (2) when the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence,

(3) when a felony has been in fact committed and he has reasonable cause for believing the

person arrested to have committed it. 

Cal. Penal Code § 837. In Padilla v. Meese, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1030 (1986), the California

Court of Appeal found that under section 837, a citizen “may lawfully make an arrest for a

misdemeanor committed in his presence and then may delegate to a law enforcement officer the act

of taking the suspect into custody.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d

912, 920 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Padilla, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1030). As noted by the Ninth Circuit,

the Padilla court emphasized that no “magic words” were required and that the fact of an arrest

could be “implied from the citizen’s act of summoning an officer, reporting the offense, and pointing

out the suspect.” Meyers v. Redwood City, 400 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Arpin, 261

F.3d at 920 (citing Johanson v. Dept of Motor Vehicles, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1209, 1216–17(1995)).

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that his arrest was

unlawful because it was not a valid citizen’s arrest—the basis for this assertion is that the arrest was

not actually “performed” by plaintiff’s wife Sheila but by Officer Wyeth and that plaintiff’s wife did

not intend to make an arrest. However, as discussed above, the fact that a peace officer performs the

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 8 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

actual arrest does not invalidate a citizen arrest—a citizen “may delegate” this function. Padilla, 184

Cal. App. 3d at 1030. Additionally, plaintiff’s argument that the words used by Officer

Wyeth—namely, “do you want to have him arrested”— were insufficient to effect an arrest, is

unavailing. In order for the arrest to be valid, plaintiff contends, his wife (Sheila) had to have

asserted that “she was arresting [him].” Atkins, Dep. at 127:17–128:7. However, this precise

argument has been rejected by California courts. See, e.g., Johanson 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1217

(where the court noted that no “magic words” were required, but rather the relevant inquiry was into

the “substance” of the actions taken);Arpin, 261 F.3d at 920. 

In the present action, although Sheila Atkins now contends that she did not authorize a

citizens arrest, it is evident from the surrounding circumstances that a finding of a valid arrest is

proper. Sheila and Stephanie, having observed Steven Atkins commit the misdemeanor offense of

driving under the influence, notified a peace officer and when asked if they would like to have him

arrested, they responded in the affirmative. Given these facts, a valid citizens arrest occurred. This

is so even if Sheila had not intended to effect a citizens arrest. See Padilla (finding citizens arrest

valid even though citizen did not intend to arrest the individual). Plaintiff’s assertions do not

support a finding that he is entitled to summary judgment. Defendants, on the other hand, are

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to the validity of the citizens arrest. 

Consequently, as this court has determined that both the warrantless entry and the citizens

arrest are lawful and valid, plaintiff has suffered no constitutional injury and thus he has no basis

upon which to advance a section 1983 claim against Officer Wyeth.4

III. Plaintiff’s Malicious Prosecution Claims

Defendant City of Alameda seeks summary adjudication that plaintiff cannot sustain a claim

against the City of Alameda for allegedly engaging in malicious prosecution. Plaintiff asserts that

the City of Alameda and the APD engaged in malicious prosecution because they issued a criminal

complaint that was signed by Officer Al Coker as opposed to one signed by his wife Sheila Atkins. 

Pursuant to section 740 of the California Penal Code, “all misdemeanors and infractions must be

prosecuted by written complaint under oath subscribed by the complainant. Such complaint may be

verified on information and belief.” Cal. Penal Code § 740. Although Officer Cofer concedes that

he was not the “complainant” in this case, plaintiff cites to no authority in support of his contention

that the “complainant” must, for purposes of section 740, be the individual who effects a citizens

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 9 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

arrest. Further, as defendants note, plaintiff provides no support for why, if such a requirement is

breached, it would rise to the level of a constitutional injury. In any event, the court need not reach

this issue. As the APD and Officer Coker are not parties to this action, plaintiff may only advance

these claims against the City of Alameda. As discussed below, however, the City of Alameda is

entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims. 

IV. City of Alameda is Entitled to Summary Judgment

For the same reasons articulated in the granting of summary judgment with respect to claims

against Officer Wyeth, plaintiff has no basis upon which to sue the City of Alameda for the

warrantless entry or the citizens arrest. “If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands

of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the

use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475

U.S. 796, 799 (1986). 

The only avenue plaintiff has for holding the City of Alameda liable is if he can prove (1)

that Officer Wyeth or any other officer or employee of the City violated his constitutional rights;

and (2) that the officer’s or employee’s action was pursuant to an official custom or policy. Having

failed to establish prong one of this inquiry, plaintiff does not open the door to prong two. In his

second amended complaint plaintiff alleges that the fact that officers in the Alameda Police

Department were poorly trained and supervised led to the infliction of plaintiff’s injuries. Second

Amended Complaint at 8:2–14. However, the Supreme Court has held that “a local government may

not be sued under [section] 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also McMillian v. Monroe County,

520 U.S. 781, 783 (1997). “Instead,” the Supreme Court noted, a municipal entity may be liable

under section 1983 only where the individual employee is executing official “policy or custom.” Id.;

see also Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has

presented no evidence to suggest that his putative injuries were “inflicted” by anyone—or

anything—other than Officer Wyeth (and in the case of his malicious prosecution claims, Officer Al

Cofer). Id. Indeed, as discussed above, plaintiff fails on prong one for he has not even suffered a

constitutional injury. 

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 10 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Even if plaintiff had been able to demonstrate a constitutional violation, it is of note that he

has offered no evidence of an official policy or pattern of practice by the City of Alameda that gave

rise to any deprivation of his constitutional rights. Id. Plaintiff merely asserts that the department

did not reprimand Officer Wyeth—an action which implies a ratification of the officer’s actions. 

However, this assertion is also offered without a shred of evidentiary support.5 Similarly, with

respect to his malicious prosecution claims, plaintiff offers no evidence to support a finding of an

official policy. Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate that there are any genuine issues of

fact, see Gasaway, 26 F.3d at 960, and thus defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter

of law. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 7, 2006 _________________________ 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 11 of 12
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

1. Unless otherwise noted, all facts in this section have been culled from the Joint Statement of

Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”). 

2. Plaintiff disputes the amount of alcohol that he consumed. However this is not a material fact

relevant to the current motions. It is undisputed that plaintiff was intoxicated after consuming a

significant amount of alcohol and prescription drugs.

3. Even though she signed a citizen arrest form, Sheila Atkins now contends that she did not “make

a citizen’s arrest that night” and that Officer Wyeth’s assertion that he explained to her what

constituted a “citizens arrest” is untrue. Sheila Atkins Dec. ¶¶ 3, 7. Sheila Atkins also asserts that

after Officer Wyeth took her husband outside of the house, (Wyeth) re-entered the house without her

consent and she cooperated so that he would leave. Sheila asserts, inter alia, that she was under

duress and had consumed several glasses of wine and thus her recorded conversation with Officer

Wyeth as well as her citizens arrest statement are unreliable. Notably, Sheila claims that “[she]

purposefully miss-spelled [her] name to Officer Wyeth so at a later date [she] could show that [she]

was under duress.” Id. ¶ 4. This contention (found in Sheila’s declaration) that her citizens arrest

statement was induced and that it was not her intention to effect a citizens arrest is inconsistent with

the evidence in the record—specifically her deposition testimony and her statements on the Micro

Cassette Recording—and ultimately irrelevant to the question of whether a valid citizens arrest

occurred. See section II infra. Finally, a deponent cannot create a dispute of fact by saying one

thing in her deposition and then contradicting it in a declaration. See Scamihorn v. General Truck

Drivers,

282 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th

Cir. 1991)). Mrs. Atkins was under oath and subject to cross-examination at her deposition. This,

together with her spontaneous, unrehearsed statements at the time of the incident, far outweighs her

subsequent self-serving declaration. 

4. Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim is predicated upon a finding that his arrest was improper. 

Thus, given that the citizens arrest was valid and lawful, plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim must

also fail.

5. In his untimely reply to defendant’s opposition brief, plaintiff argues that another factor

supporting a finding that there was ratification of the Officer’s conduct is the instruction by Officer

Wyeth’s supervisor that Wyeth return to the Atkins home and obtain further evidence. However, as

discussed supra, in the absence of a constitutional injury, the court need not reach this issue. 

ENDNOTES

Case 3:03-cv-03566-MHP Document 75 Filed 06/07/06 Page 12 of 12