Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00254/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00254-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELISSA MALEDY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:10cv254-MHT

) (WO) 

CITY OF ENTERPRISE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Melissa Maledy, a former city revenue

clerk, brings this lawsuit against the following

defendants: the City of Enterprise, Alabama; City Clerk

and Treasurer Steven Hicks; City Mayor Kenneth Boswell;

and City Councilors William Cooper, Tommy Johnson, Jr.,

Kirk Donaldson, Wallace Miller, Jr., and Paul Russell.

The plaintiff claims that the city and all the individual

defendants (in both their individual and official

capacities) violated her rights under the Family and

Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54, and the

Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). She further

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claims that the city and all the individual defendants

(again in both their individual and official capacities)

violated her due-process rights and her federal “right to

privacy” under the Fourteenth Amendment, as enforced

through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is proper

pursuant to, among other provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(federal question).

Now before the court are motions to dismiss filed by

all defendants, who argue, as to all claims, that the

plaintiff has failed to state a claim against them upon

which relief can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The defendants also contend that her two statutory claims

and her “right to privacy” claim are barred by the

statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth below,

the court grants the motions to dismiss.

 

I. MOTION-TO-DISMISS STANDARD

In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss filed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts the

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plaintiff's allegations as true and construes the

complaint in the plaintiff's favor. Duke v. Cleland, 5

F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). Generally, to survive

a motion to dismiss and meet the requirement of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain “detailed

factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but rather “only enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”

id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard

is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556. 

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II. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts as alleged by the plaintiff are as

follows. On May 1, 2007, the plaintiff was charged with

driving under the influence (DUI). The next day, her

husband called defendant Hicks and confidentially told

him about the plaintiff’s DUI charge. The plaintiff also

called Hicks to inform him of the DUI charge and notify

him that she would be seeking medical help for alcoholism

and drug addiction.

Between May 3 and 18, 2007, the plaintiff was

admitted to a rehabilitation facility for substance

abuse. During this time, she was absent from work. The

plaintiff subsequently completed an out-patient

rehabilitation program that required attendance every

night after work for a period of four weeks.

Approximately ten months later, on March 4, 2008,

Hicks issued a letter to the plaintiff giving her notice

that she would be terminated. In the letter, Hicks

stated:

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“As you know, I have been required to

conduct several internal investigations

related to your conduct. The most

recent incident concerned your

conviction for DUI. You were placed on

leave without pay while I considered

what disciplinary action should be

given.

“Based on the totality of circumstances

surrounding this matter and previous

multiple counseling, it is my conclusion

that you have committed the following

violations:

• acts during or outside of duty

hours which are incompatible with

public service

• other acts that would be considered

inappropriate and/or non-conducive

to a safe and productive work

environment for City employees

Based on these findings, it is my

recommendation that your employment with

the City of Enterprise be terminated.”

Compl. Ex. A, Doc. No. 1-1. The letter also informed the

plaintiff that she had a right to address these charges

at a pre-disciplinary hearing before Hicks and that she

could file subsequent appeals to the mayor as well as to

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the city council. The plaintiff’s final appeal was

denied by the city council on October 24, 2008.

On March 22, 2010, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit.

Her original complaint alleged two counts against the

individual defendants in both their individual and

official capacities. She charged that the procedures

Hicks used to notify her that the city intended to

terminate her, as well as the procedures Hicks used to

terminate her, violated her due-process rights. Her

original complaint also alleged that the defendants

violated her constitutional “right to privacy.” She

charged that she had informed Hicks that she had a

substance-abuse problem that would require her to spend

time in rehabilitation. According to the plaintiff, she

was led to believe that this information would be held in

absolute confidence and that, upon her return to work,

she discovered that her coworkers knew about her

rehabilitation stay. The plaintiff claimed that Hicks

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must have told her coworkers about her rehabilitation

stay. 

The plaintiff amended her complaint on April 22,

2011. Her amended complaint adds the City of Enterprise

as a defendant and alleges two new statutory claims:

violations of the FMLA and the EPA. Specifically, the

plaintiff asserts that her termination was in retaliation

for her two weeks of substance-abuse treatment. She

further alleges that, upon her return from substance

abuse treatment, the defendants failed to restore her to

her old position. As to the EPA violation, she alleges

that she made considerably less salary than her male

counterparts. The amended complaint reasserts her

constitutional claims. However, the amended complaint

omits any reference as to who disclosed the plaintiff’s

confidential information; unlike the original complaint,

the amended complaint does not allege that Hicks

disclosed her substance-abuse problem. 

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Constitutional Claims

Although the plaintiff’s complaint is not clear as to

the constitutional bases for the relief sought, the court

discerns two theories for recovery: first, a ‘procedural’

due-process claim predicated on inadequate notice; and,

second, a ‘substantive’ due-process claim predicated on

an alleged violation of her right to privacy in her

confidential medical information. The defendants seek

dismissal on a number of grounds, but the court need

address only their argument that the amended complaint

fails to plead sufficient facts to satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P.

8's plausibility standard.

1. Procedural Due Process

The plaintiff asserts a procedural due-process claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a State shall

not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

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without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,

§ 1. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on

governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ...

‘property’ interests within the meaning of the ...

Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 332 (1976). Analysis of procedural due-process

claims requires a dual inquiry: “Did the plaintiff have

a property interest of which he was deprived by state

action? If so, did the plaintiff receive sufficient

process regarding that deprivation?” Ross v. Clayton

County, 173 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1999). Under this

framework, the plaintiff’s complaint must plausibly

allege two elements: (1) that she had a property interest

in her position as a revenue officer with the city; and

(2) that she did not receive sufficient process regarding

the deprivation of this property interest.

As to the plaintiff’s property interest, a “public

employee has a property interest in employment if

‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an

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independent source such as state law create a legitimate

claim of entitlement.’” Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of

State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972)).

State statutes, rules, and regulations, as well as local

ordinances and mutually explicit understandings, may

create property interests. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.

341, 344 (1976); Ross, 173 F.3d at 1307. The sufficiency

of any claim of entitlement, however, “must be decided by

reference to state law.” Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344. An

entitlement may be supported by a mutually explicit

understanding with the employer; a unilateral expectation

of continued employment is insufficient. Id. at 345-47.

Here, the mere fact that the plaintiff was employed

by the City of Enterprise is not enough to establish that

she had a property interest in her position. She,

however, asserts that the defendants’ actions violated

the city’s employee handbook. Under Alabama law, an

employee's at-will status may be altered when “the

language contained in a[n] [employee] handbook can be

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sufficient to constitute an offer to create a binding

unilateral contract” between the employee and employer.

Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 735

(Ala. 1987). In Hoffman-La Roche, the Alabama Supreme

Court explained:

“The existence of such a contract is

determined by applying the following

analysis to the facts of each case:

First, the language contained in the

handbook must be examined to see if it

is specific enough to constitute an

offer. Second, the offer must have been

communicated to the employee by issuance

of the handbook, or otherwise. Third,

the employee must have accepted the

offer by retaining employment after he

has become generally aware of the offer.

His actual performance supplies the

necessary consideration.”

Id. “‘An employer's general statements of policy are no

more than that and do not meet the contractual

requirements for an offer.’” Harper v. Winston County,

892 So. 2d 346, 351 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Hoffman-La

Roche, 512 So. 2d at 731). Further, “[i]f the employer

reserves in the employee handbook the right to change

policies unilaterally, its reservation operates as a

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disclaimer to negate any inference that the handbook

constitutes an enforceable contract.” Id. 

In interpreting Alabama law on whether language in

handbooks can create a property interest, the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that, “It is on the

substantive restrictions on the employer's discretion to

discharge, rather than on the procedural protections

provided, that the existence of a property interest is

based.” Green v. City of Hamilton Hous. Auth., 937 F.2d

1561, 1565 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991). See also Cleveland Bd.

of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)

(“‘Property’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided

for its deprivation.”) (emphasis added).

The plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish that

language in the city’s employee handbook was “sufficient

to constitute an offer to create a binding unilateral

contract” between the city and the plaintiff. Hoffman-La

Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735. The complaint also fails to

show that the handbook created an obligation of good

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faith and fair dealing or that the handbook contained

“substantive restrictions on the employer's discretion to

discharge.” Green, 937 F.2d at 1565 n.2. Further, her

complaint does not establish a property interest through

some other method, such as by reference to a statute or

local ordinance. In short, the plaintiff’s cursory

reference to the handbook does not establish that she had

a property interest in her job. 

Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to plead a

crucial element of her claim: the basis for her property

interest. (Moreover, even assuming she had a property

interest, the plaintiff has failed to allege that this

property was taken without adequate process.) Because

the plaintiff has failed to plead a Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due-process claim, this claim will be

dismissed against all defendants. 

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1. It does not appear from the amended complaint

that the plaintiff is alleging a state claim of invasion

of privacy under Alabama law. See Johnston v. Fuller,

706 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 1997).

2. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,

1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit

adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the

former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down prior

to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

14

2. Right to Privacy

The plaintiff also asserts a substantive due-process

claim under the Fourteenth Amendment predicated on an

alleged violation of her right to privacy.1

“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized two types of

interests protected by the right to privacy.” Padgett v.

Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005). “First,

the right to privacy guards an individual's interest in

avoiding disclosure of certain personal matters.” Id.

Courts in this circuit refer to this interest as the

“right to confidentiality.” Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d

1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978).2

 “Second, it protects an

individual's personal autonomy in making certain

important decisions, such as those involving marriage,

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contraception, and procreation.” Padgett, 401 F.3d at

1280.

The plaintiff’s claim is predicated on the first

strand of the right to privacy: her interest “in avoiding

disclosure of certain personal matters.” Id. (emphasis

added). Her complaint, however, does not contain factual

allegations against any individual defendant. Her

factual allegation is as follows: “While this hearing was

confidential with her supervisor, Defendant(s) Steven

Hicks, everyone at City Hall and the city government in

Enterprise, Alabama knew about her addiction/alcohol

problems.” Am. Compl., Doc. No. 20, ¶ 23.

Significantly, the plaintiff does not allege that any

individual defendant, or the city itself, disclosed her

confidential medical information. She merely states that

other individuals found out about her substance-abuse

problem; she does not identify the source of the

information. Her reference to meeting with Hicks stops

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3. While not dispositive, the court notes that the

plaintiff’s amended complaint differs substantially from

her original complaint in this respect. The original

complaint alleged that Hicks disclosed her confidential

medical information. Compl., Doc. No. 1, at 5 (“Since

she had only told the Defendant, Steven Hicks, in his

capacity of being her supervisor, Plaintiff contends that

the Defendant, Steven Hicks, violated her right to

privacy while acting under the color of state or

territorial law as a municipal employee.”).

16

short of alleging that he was the person who actually

leaked her confidential medical information.3

In the absence of an allegation of disclosure by a

defendant, the court need not address the metes and

bounds of a right to privacy in confidential medical

information. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513

n.26 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the scope of the

“right to privacy in preventing the non-consensual

disclosure of one’s medical condition” is “far from

settled”). Because the plaintiff does not provide a

factual allegation as to which defendant, if any,

disclosed her confidential medical information, she has

failed to plead an essential element of her right to

privacy claim.

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B. FMLA

The plaintiff asserts two interrelated FMLA claims.

First, she claims alleges that, after returning from her

FMLA-protected leave (her two-week stay in the substanceabuse program), the defendants did not restore her to her

old position. Second, she claims that she was terminated

ten months later in retaliation for taking medical leave.

The defendants respond that the plaintiff’s FMLA

claims are barred under the statute of limitations. The

FMLA provides that an action must be brought “not later

than 2 years after the date of the last event

constituting the alleged violation for which the action

is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). If an employer’s

violation was willful, the statute of limitations is

extended to three years. Id. § 2617(c)(2). 

The court construes the plaintiff’s amended complaint

as alleging a willful violation. Am. Compl., Doc. No.

20, ¶ 24 (“Defendant(s) unlawful conduct was committed

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with malice or reckless indifference to the federally

protected rights of the Plaintiff.”). See also Edwards

v. Ford Motor Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 714, 719 (W.D. Ky.

2001) (Heyburn, J.) (“Federal courts do recognize that a

general averment as to willfulness is sufficient to

trigger the [FMLA’s] three-year statute of

limitations.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent,

knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be

alleged generally.”).

Here, the “last event” for statute-of-limitations

purposes was the plaintiff’s termination on March 4,

2008. Urrutia v. BNSF Railway Co., 2010 WL 4259246, *4-5

(W.D. Wash. Oct. 22, 2010) (Martinez, J.) (concluding

under the FMLA that termination date, not date when

appeals ended, was “last event”). Cf. Delaware State

College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980) (holding that

statute of limitations periods for claims under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e–17), and the Civil Rights Act of

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4. Because the plaintiff’s amended complaint added

the City of Enterprise as a defendant, she also needs to

satisfy Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s notice requirements for

(continued...)

19

1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981) commenced when professor’s tenure

was denied not when his appeals process ended). The

plaintiff’s FMLA claims were first raised in her amended

complaint on April 22, 2011. Because she filed her

amended complaint over three years after her termination,

her FMLA claims are barred unless they “relates back” to

her original complaint filed on March 22, 2010.

“‘Relation back’ causes an otherwise untimely claim

to be considered timely by treating it as if it had been

filed when the timely claims were filed.” Davenport v.

United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000).

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B), an “amendment to a

pleading relates back to the date of the original

pleading when ... the amendment asserts a claim or

defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or

occurrence set out–-or attempted to be set out-–in the

original pleading.”4

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(...continued)

“relation back” of amendments to any new defendant. The

court does not reach this issue as it concludes that the

plaintiff’s amendments do not relate back under Rule

15(c)(1)(B). 

20

“Congress intended Rule 15(c) to be used for a

relatively narrow purpose.... [W]hile Rule 15(c)

contemplates that parties may correct technical

deficiencies or expand facts alleged in the original

pleading, it does not permit an entirely different

transaction to be alleged by amendment.” Dean v. United

States, 278 F.3d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The

“‘critical issue in Rule 15(c) determinations is whether

the original complaint gave notice to the defendant of

the claim now being asserted.’” Marko Capital of

America, Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir.

2008) (quoting Davenport, 217 F.3d at 1345 n.8). 

The plaintiff’s original complaint focused

exclusively on the defendants’ termination procedures and

the disclosure of her confidential medical information.

The facts presented in the original complaint were

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targeted to those claims. Given this background, the

defendants lacked notice of the plaintiff’s FMLA claims

for two reasons.

First, the original complaint does not mention the

plaintiff’s being demoted following her two-week stay at

the rehabilitation center. This claim raises distinct

legal considerations under the FMLA and necessitates

additional factual inquiries into what positions the

plaintiff had before and after her FMLA leave.

Second, the original complaint challenged the

adequacy of the defendants’ termination procedures,

specifically with regards to notice. By contrast, the

plaintiff’s FMLA claims relate to the substantive reasons

for her termination. A retaliation claim under the FMLA

goes to the motive behind the plaintiff’s termination,

not the notice she was given.

The court finds Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129 (11th

Cir. 1993), instructive. There, a plaintiff’s original

complaint brought a claim against a surgeon for lack of

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informed consent. The plaintiff’s amended complaint

alleged negligence during the surgery and post-operative

care. Id. at 1131. The Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals held that the amendment did not “relate back”

because the “alleged acts of negligence occurred at

different times and involved separate and distinct

conduct. In order to recover on the negligence claim

contained in her amended complaint, [plaintiff] would

have to prove completely different facts than would

otherwise have been required to recover on the informed

consent claim in the original complaint.” Id. at 1132.

Similarly, the plaintiff here would have to prove

“completely different facts” to establish either of her

FMLA claims as compared to her constitutional claims.

The plaintiff would have to prove facts related to her

demotion as well as the defendants’ motive in terminating

her. 

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Because the plaintiff’s FMLA claims do not “relate

back” to the original complaint, these claims are barred

by the statute of limitations. 

C. EPA

For similar reasons, the plaintiff’s EPA claim fails.

Like the FMLA, the EPA has a two-year statute of

limitations for most claims and a three-year statute of

limitations for willful violations. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 255(a); Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club,

Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1164 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he FLSA’s

statute of limitations and liquidated damages provisions

apply to EPA claims.”). As with the plaintiff’s FMLA

claims, the court construes the amended complaint in her

favor as alleging a willful violation.

“Sex-based, discriminatory wage payments constitute

a continuing violation of the Equal Pay Act.” Hodgson v.

Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1050 (5th Cir. 1973).

Accordingly, “each paycheck represents a fresh violation

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commencing a separate limitations period.” Morris v.

Wallace Cmty. College-Selma, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1341

(S.D. Ala. 2001) (Vollmer. J).

The plaintiff’s limitations period commenced upon her

last paycheck. However, she was terminated on March 4,

2008, and Hicks’s letter makes clear that the plaintiff

had been on leave without pay pending a disciplinary

investigation. Compl. Ex. A, Doc. No. 1-1. Because the

plaintiff’s amended complaint was filed on April 22,

2011, it is past the three-year statute of limitations

period for a willful EPA claim. (The plaintiff’s amended

complaint is deficient of allegations to counter the

picture the amended complaint paints that the EPA claim

is time-barred. Indeed, in the brief the plaintiff filed

in opposition to the dismissal motions, she does not

suggest that there is evidence, or even possible

evidence, that would support a further amendment to the

complaint to allege that her last pay check fell within

the limitations period.)

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Like her FMLA claims, the plaintiff’s untimely EPA

claim may be saved if it “relates back” to the original

complaint, which was filed on March 22, 2010. The

original complaint focused exclusively on the plaintiff’s

alcoholism and the defendants’ termination procedures and

alleged disclosure of confidential medical information.

It does not refer to any gender discrimination or pay

gap. Thus, the defendants were not on notice that any of

the plaintiff’s allegations related to gender

discrimination or wages; nor were defendants on notice

that any type of wage comparison would be necessary in

this litigation.

Because “Congress did not intend Rule 15(c) to be so

broad as to allow an amended pleading to add an entirely

new claim based on a different set of facts,” the

plaintiff’s EPA claim must be dismissed as untimely.

Dean, 278 F.3d at 1221.

* * *

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Accordingly, for the above reasons, the defendants’

motions to dismiss will be granted and this lawsuit

dismissed. As appropriate judgment will entered.

DONE, this the 26th day of March, 2012.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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