Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01935/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01935-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK JAMES CARRIZOSA, JR.,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 05CV1935 IEG (LSP) 

ORDER (1) REJECTING IN PART

PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS, (2)

ADOPTING IN PART

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION, (3)

DENYING IN PART PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

and (4) REQUESTING

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ON

PETITIONER’S EQUALPROTECTION CLAIM

[Doc. No. 35]

vs.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD,

Respondent.

Presently before the Court is Patrick James Carrizosa, Jr.’s (“petitioner”) amended petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner claims the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) wrongfully denied petitioner’s request

for conduct credits (a/k/a “behavioral credits”) and limited petitioner to worktime credit equal to

15% of his sentence. 

The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Leo S. Papas, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On May 11, 2007, Magistrate Judge Papas issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”), concluding this Court should dismiss the petition on the merits. On

July 11, 2007, petitioner filed objections to the Report. The Court has considered the R&R and

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1

 “A certificate of appealability ‘is not required when a state prisoner challenges an

administrative decision regarding the execution of his sentence.’” Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229,

1231 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2004)). Because

petitioner challenges a decision made by CDCR (i.e., an administrative body) rather than a court,

petitioner does not need a certificate of appealability from this Court. Id. at 1231-32. 

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petitioner’s objections. With respect to petitioner’s due process and estoppel claims, this Court (1)

adopts Magistrate Judge Papas’s Report and (2) dismisses petitioner’s § 2254 petition with

prejudice.1

 With respect to petitioner’s equal protection claim, the Court requests supplemental

briefing.

BACKGROUND

On September 2, 2003, petitioner pled guilty in San Diego County Superior Court to

carjacking, auto theft, and hit-and-run with personal injury. (Lodgment No. 2.) By signing the

plea agreement, petitioner acknowledged that his attorney explained the a possible consequence of

the plea was a reduction in “conduct credits” to 15% of the sentence because petitioner pled guilty

to committing a violent felony. (Lodgment No. 1, at 2.) On December 14, 2004, petitioner filed

an administrative appeal, including a self-prepared “time credits waiver” attempting to obtain dayfor-day credits for his participation in the Inmate Work Training Incentive Program (“IWTIP”). 

(Answer, Exhibit 1.) The CDCR rejected petitioner’s proposed waiver and administrative appeal

on December 31, 2004. (Id., Exhibit 2.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego County Superior

Court on February 18, 2005. (Id.) The Superior Court denied the petition by written order on

April 6, 2005. (Lodgment No. 5.) Petitioner next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with

the California Supreme Court on April 1, 2005. (Lodgment No. 8.) The Supreme Court

summarily denied the petition on April 27, 2005. (Lodgment No. 9.) 

Petitioner later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of

Appeal on June 6, 2005. (Lodgment No. 6.) Despite the prior Supreme Court ruling, the Court of

Appeal denied the petition on the merits by written order on July 26, 2005. (Lodgment No. 7.) 

On November 23, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 2, 2005, respondent moved to dismiss

the petition as untimely. (Doc. No. 5.) On July 28, 2006, this Court adopted Magistrate Judge

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2

 Because the California Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s petition for review without any

analysis and reached its decision before the California Court of Appeal, this Court looks to the

decision of the California Superior Court to determine whether the final “reasoned state judgment”

is contrary to, or unreasonably applies, U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803 (1991). 

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Papas’s report and recommendation and denied the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 22.) 

Petitioner moved for leave to file an amended petition on August 30, 2006 (Doc. No. 23),

which the Court granted on September 8, 2006 (Doc. No. 24). The amended petition claimed

petitioner (1) had a federally protected liberty interest in day-for-day credits earned while working

in IWTIP, (2) is entitled to day-for-day credits under principles of government or equitable

estoppel, and (3) was denied equal protection when CDCR awarded day-to-day credits to similarly

situated prisoners. 

Respondent answered the petition on December 18, 2006. (Doc. No. 30.) Petitioner filed a

traverse on January 16, 2007. (Doc. No. 34.) The magistrate judge issued the R&R on May 11,

2007. (Doc. No. 35.) Petitioner filed objections to the R&R on July 11, 2007. (Doc. No. 38.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may grant petitioner’s section 2254 petition only if the Court determines that the

California Superior Court2

 decided petitioner’s petition in a manner that was either “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” or “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403, 412-13 (2000). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court reviews

de novo those portions of the Report to which petitioner objects.

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process

A prisoner does not automatically have a constitutionally guaranteed liberty interest in

behavior credits for satisfactory behavior during incarceration. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 557 (1974); Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1997). A state may, however,

create a liberty interest in behavioral credits by provisions in state law (e.g., statutes or prison

regulations). Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453 (1985); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d

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3

 To be precise, § 4019 allows inmates to obtain, for every six-day period of presentence

custody, one day of credit for not refusing to perform assigned labor and an additional day of credit

for complying with rules and regulations. For an inmate receiving all such worktime and good

conduct credits, the total amount of presentence custody credit is computed by dividing the number

of days spent in custody by four and rounding down. This quotient is then multiplied by two and

added to the number of days spent in custody. Philpot, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 908.

4

 Such a reduction is also described as “day-for-day credits” because prisoners can earn credits

for each day they participate in a qualifying program. (Resp. Memo. ISO Answer, at 7.) 

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1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1986). Those liberty interests are limited to protecting “freedom from

restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Keenan v. Hall, 83

F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine whether California law gave petitioner a

protectable liberty interest in behavioral credits, the Court looks for mandatory language in the

applicable state laws. Ky. Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989);

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The magistrate judge reviewed the

applicable state laws and concluded petitioner is ineligible for more credits than he has already

received. Petitioner objects, claiming those laws give him a protectable liberty interest in

additional credits.

The magistrate judge began by reviewing California’s release credits scheme. While in

pre-sentence custody, prisoners may obtain one-third credit for willingness to work and good

conduct.3

 Cal. Penal Code § 4019(b)-(c); People v. Philpot, 122 Cal. App. 4th 893, 907 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2004). The available credits in post-sentence custody vary, depending on the date the

underlying offense was committed. For crimes committed before 1983, inmates could obtain a

one-third reduction in their sentence “for good behavior and participation.” Cal. Penal Code §

2931(a). For crimes committed on or after January 1, 1983, prisoners could obtain a halftime

reduction4 “for performance in work assignments and performance in elementary, high school or

vocational education programs.” Id. § 2933(a). Inmates subject to the one-third reduction of §

2931 could become subject to the one-half reduction of § 2933 by signing a waiver. Id. § 2934. 

Prisoners who signed such a waiver would retain only those behavioral credits “attributable to the

portion of the sentence served . . . prior to the effective date of the waiver.” Id. The CDCR has

the discretion to determine the effective date of the waiver. Id. In some cases, once the inmate

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signed the § 2934 waiver, the CDCR recalculated the § 2931 credits as if the prisoner had been

earning the § 2933 credits since the beginning of the sentence. (See R&R, at 22 n.11.) This

process is known as “auto-revesting.” (Id.) 

In enacting § 2933, the legislature intended for inmates to serve their entire sentence,

except for worktime credits earned through work assignments or educational programs. Cal. Penal

Code § 2933(a). Furthermore, inmates who signed a § 2934 waiver “waived their right to behavior

or participation credits.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3043(c)(4). Therefore, after § 2933 took

effect, the only inmates eligible for behavioral credits while serving their sentence were inmates

convicted of crimes committed before 1983 who did not sign § 2934 waivers. Regardless of the

date of the underlying offense, prisoners continue to receive good conduct credits while in presentence custody. Cal. Penal Code § 4019(c). 

The magistrate judge further explained that California has a separate provision concerning

release credits for prisoners convicted of a “violent felony” that was committed on or after

September 21, 1994. Pursuant to Penal Code § 2933.1(a), such an inmate, “[n]otwithstanding any

other law, . . . shall accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit.” Similarly,

“[n]otwithstanding Section 4019 or any other provision of law, the maximum credit that may be

earned [in pre-sentence custody] shall not exceed 15 percent of the actual period of

confinement[.]” Id. § 2933.1(d). The definition of “violent felony” includes carjacking, the

offense for which petitioner was convicted. Id. § 667.5(c)(17). Therefore, the magistrate judge

found that petitioner was subject to the provisions of § 2933.1 and ineligible for any worktime

credits in excess of 15% of his sentence. (R&R, at 9.) Furthermore, because petitioner is no

longer in pre-sentence custody, he is not entitled to further behavioral credits under § 4019. (Id.) 

Petitioner concedes that § 2933.1 limits him to 15% worktime credits but claims that two

other provisions of state law create a liberty interest in halftime credits. First, petitioner relies on

Penal Code § 1191.3(a), which requires for all felony convictions that “[a]t the time of sentencing 

. . . , the court shall make an oral statement that statutory law permits the award of conduct and

worktime credits up to one-third or one-half of the sentence that is imposed by the court[.]”

Although the transcript of petitioner’s sentencing proceeding contains no such oral statement

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5

 The “balance” is the remaining 35% of credits that petitioner cannot obtain through work or

educational programs because of § 2933.1. (See Am. Pet., at 8.)

6

 Although petitioner insists § 1191.3 entitles him to halftime credits, petitioner fails to address

the statutory language indicating that a convicted felon could also be eligible for one-third release

credits. In any case, the range of outcomes suggested by the “up to” language of § 1191.3 defeats

defendant’s argument that the Penal Code contains “mandatory language” entitling him to halftime

credits.

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(Lodgment No. 11), petitioner is not complaining about the absence of a statement. Instead,

petitioner argues that § 1191.3(a) guarantees him halftime credit as a combination of worktime and

behavioral credits. (Objections, at 3.) Petitioner claims a due process interest in being able to

obtain the “balance”5 of his halftime credits through good conduct. 

The magistrate judge considered § 1191.3 and concluded that it did not create a protectable

liberty interest in release credits. Because the statute directs the sentencing court to explain that the

law “permits” an inmate to obtain credits “up to” half of the sentence, the magistrate judge

determined that the statute “informs an inmate that he may be eligible for credits ranging from 0%

to 50%, not that he is automatically entitled to 50%[.]” (R&R, at 11 (emphasis in the original).) 

The reference to “conduct” credits in conjunction with “one-third” of the sentence simply confirms

what § 2931 already established: the availability of one-third credit for good behavior and

participation for prisoners convicted of a felony prior to 1983. The magistrate judge found the

mere reference to “conduct” credits does not automatically make all inmates eligible for conduct

credits. 

This Court finds the magistrate judge correctly interpreted § 1191.3 not to create a

protectable “liberty interest” in receiving any good conduct credits. In addition to the reasons

stated by the magistrate judge, the Court finds § 1191.3 merely indicates the possible levels of

release credits that California law “permits” an inmate to obtain. It contains no “substantive

predicates” to govern the CDCR’s decision in awarding release credits, nor does it require a

particular outcome if any such predicates are satisfied. See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462-63

(discussing both substantive predicates and mandatory outcomes); Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d

1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). To the contrary, § 1191.3 says the inmate may obtain release

credits equaling “up to one-third or one half”6

 of the sentence, thus creating a broad range of

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7

 The magistrate judge correctly observed that mandatory language in a prison regulation is

insufficient to create a protectable liberty interest. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Therefore, petitioner’s

argument also fails because it relies exclusively on the mandatory language of the Corrections Manual.

Petitioner fails to show that any liberty interest created by the Operations Manual protects inmates

from “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at

484; accord Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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possible outcomes (including the 15% cap dictated by § 2933.1). 

Second, petitioner relies on § 53130.4.2 of the Department of Corrections’ Operations

Manual (2004 edition), which states, “[i]nmates sentenced to prison on non-life terms, whose

crimes are committed on or after 1-1-83, shall automatically be eligible to receive day-for-day

credits under the provisions of [Penal Code §] 2933.” Petitioner argues the language “shall

automatically” is sufficiently mandatory to put petitioner on notice that he can obtain daytime

credits under § 2933, even though his carjacking conviction subjects him to § 2933.1. (Objections,

at 9.)

The magistrate judge reviewed the Operations Manual and concluded that it did not create

a protectable liberty interest in release credits.7 The magistrate judge began by explaining that

petitioner could not benefit from the Operations Manual provision because petitioner was not

subject to § 2933, but instead § 2933.1. The magistrate judge further pointed to another clarifying

provision that limited the scope of the provision on which petitioner relies. Specifically,

Operations Manual § 53130.4 explains, “[e]ligibility to earn day-for-day credits shall be

determined by the type of crime committed and the specific date on which the commitment offense

occurred.” Because one section of the Operations Manual conditioned eligibility for day-to-day

credits on the type and date of the offense, the magistrate judge refused to conclude that another

section of the manual entitled petitioner to halftime credits as a matter of due process. 

This Court finds the magistrate judge correctly interpreted Operations Manual § 53130.4.2

not to create a protectable “liberty interest” in receiving any good conduct credits. In addition to

the reasons stated by the magistrate judge, the Court finds that petitioner’s argument would result

in an impermissible construction of Penal Code § 2933. Petitioner recognizes that he can only

obtain worktime credits up to 15% of his sentence because he is a violent felon subject to §

2933.1. Because the Operations Manual mentions the availability of day-to-day credits under §

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2933, petitioner essentially asks the Court to let him accrue good conduct credits under this statute. 

However, the only credits allowed under § 2933 are worktime credits for participation in work

assignments or qualifying educational training programs. The words “conduct” and “behavior” do

not appear in the statute. Awarding behavioral credits based on a statute limited in scope to

worktime credits would exceed the scope of the statute. 

Besides the conclusions of the R&R and the additional reasoning supra, the overarching

reason for the failure of petitioner’s due process argument is the plain language of § 2933.1. 

Subsections (a) and (c) both begin with the phrase, “[n]otwithstanding any other law”. Therefore,

§ 2933.1(a) unambiguously “limited to 15 percent the rate at which [a prisoner] could earn

worktime credit as long as he [serves] the term for [a] violent offense,” In re Reeves, 35 Cal. 4th

765, 769 (Cal. 2005), and limits pre-sentence good conduct credit to 15% of the period of

confinement, People v. Caceres, 52 Cal. App. 4th 106, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). Section 2933.1

governs petitioner’s case because the California Penal Code includes carjacking within the

definition of “violent felony”.

Petitioner urges the Court to apply canons of construction to interpret § 2933.1 as limiting

a prisoner’s ability to earn worktime credits while imposing no limit on the ability to earn postsentence behavioral credits. While the plain language is indeed silent on the question of

behavioral credits, extrinsic evidence makes clear the statute does not allow an inmate to

accumulate such credits after placement in the custody of the Department of Corrections. First,

the overall statutory scheme contradicts the construction petitioner urges. Section 2933.1 applies

to offenses committed on or after its effective date, i.e., September 21, 1994. Prior to the

enactment of § 2933.1, any inmate convicted for an offense committed in 1983 or later could

obtain a halftime post-sentence reduction in sentence only by “performance in work assignments

and . . . education programs.” Cal. Penal Code § 2933. In other words, section 2933 “eliminat[ed]

good behavior credits for defendants committing crimes on or after January 1, 1983 and

substitut[ed] in their place only ‘worktime’ credits for participation in qualifying programs.” 

People v. Caruso, 161 Cal. App. 3d 13, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Therefore, § 2933.1's silence on

the question of behavioral credits makes perfect sense: all violent felons covered by § 2933.1 were

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8

 Petitioner claims, if § 2933.1 does not allow inmates to obtain postsentence behavioral

credits, it effectively repeals § 1191.3, which directs the Court to mention at sentencing the

availability of behavioral credits. The provisions, however, do not conflict because § 1191.3 pertains

to all convicted felons, regardless of the date of their offense. Felons convicted of an offense

committed before 1983 remain eligible for behavioral credits; therefore, they would be entitled to

know about such credits at their sentencing. Section 1191.3 is merely a general directive to the

sentencing court; it does not convey any substantive rights to particular release credits. Indeed,

subsection (a) directs the sentencing court to explain further that other law enforcement entities (i.e., the sheriff and the Department of Corrections) actually calculate and award the credits. 

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already ineligible for behavioral credits under § 2933. Section 2933.1 further reduced the

worktime credits that violent felons could obtain and preempted any conflicting release credit

provisions in the Penal Code. See Caceres, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 112-13 (holding that specific

statute on credit limits for violent felons prevails over statute governing credit limits for felons

generally). And, if all this were not enough, the sponsor of the bill codified as § 2933.1 submitted

a letter of intent into the legislative record, which explained “the maximum reduction . . . from a

defendant’s term of imprisonment imposed as a result of conviction of a violent felony . . . [is]

fifteen percent (15%).” 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 713 (A.B. 2716). Because fifteen percent is

also the maximum amount of worktime credit a violent felon can accrue, § 2933.1 clearly

forecloses an inmate from obtaining behavioral credits after sentencing.8

 

California law does not give petitioner, who committed a violent felony in 2003, a right to

obtain post-sentence behavioral credits. To the contrary, California law expressly limits petitioner

to obtaining worktime credits equal to 15% of his sentence. Because petitioner cannot accrue

behavioral credits while serving his sentence in state prison, the denial of such credits is not a

“restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Therefore, with respect to petitioner’s

due process claim, the Court rejects petitioner’s objections, adopts the R&R, and denies this claim

on the merits. 

B. Estoppel

Petitioner spends the bulk of his objections arguing that provisions of California law give

him a protectable liberty interest in behavioral credits. In the alternative, petitioner argues that,

even if he is not entitled to such credits under state law, the Court should estop respondent from

denying such credits under the doctrines of government and equitable estoppel. Petitioner claims

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9

 Petitioner cites a statement in the declaration of Pamela Webster, case records manager in

the state prison where petitioner is incarcerated. Ms. Webster explained that petitioner receives a copy

of his legal status summary (LSS) sheet “anytime he receives a serious rule violation in which he

forfeits behavioral credits.” (Webster Decla. ¶ 6 (emphasis added).) 

10 The magistrate judge considered and distinguished Monigold in his discussion of petitioner’s

due process claim. (R&R, at 14-16.) Having denied petitioner’s due process claim, the Court agrees

with the magistrate judge’s analysis distinguishing Monigold. 

However, the Court reads the petition and supporting memoranda to argue that Monigold and

its progeny support an equitable estoppel claim. Furthermore, the opinions in Monigold and Diaz

discuss estoppel principles, and the phrase “due process” does not appear in either opinion. In any

event, these opinions decide questions of state law and, therefore, cannot support habeas relief. 

11 Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s Contract Clause analysis because petitioner

believes there is statutory authority entitling him to halftime credits. Having established supra that

petitioner has no statutory entitlement to credits exceeding 15% of petitioner’s sentence, much less

any post-sentence good conduct credits, the Court rejects petitioner’s objections to the R&R’s

Contract Clause analysis. 

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that, whenever he was assigned work in the IWTIP, he received written promises that he would

obtain behavioral credits. Furthermore, petitioner claims he was threatened with the loss of

behavioral credits if he violated prison rules and regulations and he actually lost behavioral credits

during his prison term. Petitioner reasons that he cannot lose behavioral credits, unless respondent

has first awarded them.9 

Petitioner objects that the magistrate judge failed to address his estoppel claim. 

(Objections, at 18.) To the extent petitioner based his argument on California equitable estoppel

principles, the magistrate judge properly declined to review the state court’s denial of petitioner’s

claim. (See Memo. ISO Am. Pet, at 11-12 (discussing In re Monigold,

10 205 Cal. App. 3d 1224

(Cal. Ct. App. 1988), and In re Diaz, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)), & Traverse, at

24-26 (discussing same cases).) Instead, the magistrate judge construed petitioner’s argument as a

Contract Clause claim. The magistrate judge rejected this claim because a court cannot enforce a

contract against a public agency “unless it appears the agency was authorized by the Constitution

or statute to incur the obligation[.]” Miller v. Rowland, 999 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal

quotation omitted). Applied to the facts, even if respondent contracted with petitioner for halftime

release credits, such a contract would be void and unenforceable because the Penal Code barred

petitioner from obtaining credits exceeding 15% of his sentence.11 (R&R, at 25.) 

In addition to relying on state-law principles and the Contract Clause, petitioner asserts a

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12 By asserting an independent ground of relief founded on petitioner’s agreements with

respondent, petitioner comes perilously close to asserting a cause of action for promissory estoppel.

Petitioner cannot allege a cause of action against the government for promissory estoppel. Jablon v.

United States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1981); Rodriguez v. United States, No. CV 04-2312-

PHX-RGS, 2007 WL 2022010, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jul. 10, 2007). “[E]quitable estoppel is used to bar a

party from raising a defense or objection it otherwise would have[.]” Jablon, 657 F.2d at 1068.

Equitable estoppel does not support its own cause of action, but instead precludes the opposing party

from asserting a defense to an independent cause of action. Id. Acknowledging that petitioner is

proceeding pro se, the Court construes the petition in the light most favorable to petitioner. Plausibly

read, the petition argues respondent should be equitably estopped from asserting petitioner is

statutorily ineligible for halftime credits. (See Traverse, at 30 (arguing that petitioner “should be

entitled to his halftime credits under promissory or equitable estoppel principles accordingly”).) 

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separate argument for equitable estoppel12 which the R&R does not address. The Court considers

this claim de novo and finds that it fails as a matter of law. First, the Supreme Court has not yet

decided “whether an estoppel claim could ever succeed against the government.” Office of Pers.

Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423 (1990). Instead, the Supreme Court has only stated, “it is

well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.” 

Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984). Until the

Supreme Court definitively states the government can be estopped, a state court’s refusal to estop

the government is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law[.]

Second, petitioner does not satisfy the threshold requirements for maintaining an equitable

estoppel claim against the government. Petitioner must show the government engaged in

“affirmative misconduct” and that the misconduct “will cause a serious injustice, and the public’s

interest will not suffer undue damage by imposition of the liability.” Watkins v. United States

Army, 875 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted); Danoff v. United

States, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2004). To commit “affirmative misconduct,” the

government must engage in an “affirmative misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of a

material fact[.]” Carrillo v. United States, 5 F.3d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1993); accord Meinhold v.

United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). This misrepresentation or

concealment must rise to the level of “ongoing active misrepresentations” or “pervasive pattern of

false promises,” rather than simply “an isolated act of providing misinformation[.]” Purcell v.

United States, 1 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 1993); S & M Inv. Co. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,

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911 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1990). Affirmative misconduct does not include “the failure to inform

an individual of his or her legal rights nor the negligent provision of misinformation[.]” Suilt v.

Schiltgen, 213 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 2000); Gengler v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Defense &

Navy, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 

Having reviewed the documents submitted in support of the petition, the Court finds

petitioner has not shown that respondent engaged in affirmative misconduct. None of the CDCR’s

“Inmate Job Description” forms promises behavioral credits. (Am. Pet., Exhibit D, at 57-59.) To

the contrary, each form warns of the loss of “work time credit” if the inmate fails to meet

performance expectations. (Id.) Petitioner also includes one page from what appears to be a

multi-page document concerning the requirements of educational training programs. (Am. Pet.,

Exhibit D, at 56.) This document explains “[d]ay for day time credit is based on” attendance and

participation. (Id.) Without any information concerning what this document might be or what its

other pages might say, the Court finds this isolated statement—which really states the criteria for

obtaining credit, rather than making any enforceable promises about the amount of available

credit—is not an affirmative misrepresentation or concealment of material fact. Nor does one

sentence on one page of an incomplete document establish “ongoing active misrepresentations” or

a “pervasive pattern of false promises.” Furthermore, any purported “misconduct” by respondent

did not work a “serious injustice” against petitioner, who was statutorily foreclosed from obtaining

the additional behavioral credits he seeks. 

Third, petitioner’s claim similarly fails because “estoppel against the government is

unavailable where petitioner[] ha[s] not lost any rights to which [he] was entitled.” Suilt, 213 F.3d

at 454; accord Morgan v. Gonzales, — F.3d —, 2007 WL 2127707 (9th Cir. July 26, 2007). As

explained supra, California law did not entitle petitioner to post-sentence behavioral credits and

instead limited petitioner to credits totaling 15% of his sentence. Petitioner does not claim he was

deprived of those 15% credits, i.e., the amount of credits to which California law entitles him. 

Therefore, petitioner has not suffered a cognizable loss to justify government estoppel. 

Fourth, even if petitioner established the prerequisites of government estoppel, petitioner’s

underlying equitable estoppel claim fails. The four elements of an equitable estoppel claim are:

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13 The Court further finds that respondent did not actually intend to make petitioner believe

he was eligible for halftime credit.

14 Rounding to the nearest whole number, petitioner is eligible for 493 days of credit (i.e., 9

years * 365 days/year * 0.15). Petitioner’s December 1, 2003 LSS reflects a balance of 449 release

credits, plus 37 days of Penal Code § 4019 credit, plus 7 days of post-sentence credit, for a total of 493

available credits. (See Webster Decla., Exhibit D, at 7.) Petitioner has received the credits to which

he is entitled–no more, no less. 

15 Petitioner does not object to the magistrate judge’s finding that respondent validly deducted

credits because petitioner violated internal prison rules. (R&R, at 16 & n.9.) 

16 The Court likewise rejects petitioner’s argument that he must have earned “behavioral

credits” merely because the Webster Declaration mentions that phrase in passing.

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(1) the party to be estopped knows the facts, (2) he or she intends that his or her

conduct will be acted on or must so act that the party invoking estoppel has a right

to believe it is so intended, (3) the party invoking estoppel must be ignorant of the

true facts, and (4) he or she must detrimentally rely on the former’s conduct.

Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v.

Hemmen, 51 F.3d 883, 892 (9th Cir. 1995)); accord Heckler, 467 U.S. at 59. Petitioner fails to

establish the second and fourth elements. Petitioner has no legal right to assert, based on a passing

reference to day-for-day credit in one document, that respondent intended to make petitioner

believe he was eligible for halftime credit.13 Also, petitioner cannot establish detrimental reliance

because petitioner concedes he must participate in IWTIP, regardless of the level of credits that he

earns. (Objections, at 5, 15). The record refutes petitioner’s claim that he must have earned

behavioral credits because respondent took away behavioral credits. Petitioner’s legal status

summary (LSS) sheets show that petitioner’s balance of release credits never exceeded the amount

of credits for which a violent felon would be eligible (i.e., 15% of his 9-year sentence).14 When

respondent deducted “behavioral credits,” respondent actually deducted from petitioner’s balance

of worktime credits for violations of prison rules and regulations.15 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§

3323, 3043.3 (establishing schedule for forfeiting behavioral or worktime credits for enumerated

rule violations); The use of the acronym “BCL” (for “behavioral credit loss”) on the LSS does not

mean respondent previously awarded behavioral credits to petitioner.16

For all these reasons, with respect to petitioner’s estoppel claim, the Court rejects

petitioner’s objections, adopts the R&R, and denies this claim on the merits. 

//

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C. Equal Protection

Petitioner claims respondent’s system of awarding credits denies petitioner the equal

protection of the laws. The CDCR allegedly allows inmates convicted for offenses committed

after 1982 (but not petitioner) to sign a § 2934 waiver and, therefore, obtain halftime credit for

which they otherwise would not qualify. 

The magistrate judge began by analyzing the validity of § 2933.1, which limits the

availability of early release credits for violent felons, under equal-protection analysis. The

magistrate judge determined the correct legal standard was rational-basis review, rather than strict

scrutiny, because “there is no per se constitutional right to early release from prison and prison

inmates are not a suspect class.” (R&R, at 19 (citations omitted).) Rational-basis review “requires

only that the [statute’s] classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.” Nordlinger v.

Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). The magistrate judge found a rational basis for § 2933.1's disparate

treatment of violent felons: the statute protected public peace, health, and safety by

“safeguard[ing] the public from certain violent or dangerous offenders.” (R&R, at 19.) Petitioner

does not object to the R&R’s conclusion that § 2933.1 has a rational basis.

The magistrate judge further analyzed petitioner’s claim that similarly situated inmates

(i.e., other violent felons subject to the 15% release credit cap of § 2933.1) signed § 2934 waivers

and earned halftime credits. The magistrate judge concluded that petitioner’s claim failed because

petitioner “failed to provide an example of a similarly situated inmate who ha[d] been given dayfor-day credits.” (R&R, at 21.) Although petitioner submitted LSS forms for other inmates

receiving halftime credits, the magistrate judge reviewed these forms and found only one such

inmate who might be similarly situated to petitioner: Thomas Joseph Lynch, who was convicted of

a kidnapping (i.e., a violent felony) committed on May 2, 1995 (after § 2933.1 became effective). 

Lynch’s LSS was insufficient to establish an equal protection violation because petitioner included

no explanation or argument why Lynch and petitioner were similarly situated. Petitioner did not

satisfy his burden of proof merely by providing Lynch’s LSS.

In his objections, petitioner asserts his “main contention” is CDCR’s issuance of § 2934

waivers to inmates who do not need such a waiver to obtain halftime credits under Penal Code §

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17 As discussed supra, the purpose of the § 2934 waiver is limited to making prisoners who

committed their crimes before 1983 eligible for halftime work credits under § 2933. Without the

waiver, these prisoners would be eligible for good conduct and worktime credits for only a third of

their sentence. Cal. Penal Code § 2931. 

18 Similarly, the phrase “CREDITS AUTO RE-VESTED PER PC 2934" is legally meaningless

when it appears on the LSS of a prisoner convicted for an offense committed after 1982. Respondent

claims this phrase “is merely an indication that these inmates are eligible for the [halftime] credits.”

(Memo. ISO Answer, at 7.) The CDCR’s reference to § 2934 is inexplicable when applied to inmates

who committed post-1982 offenses, but such a reference does not establish an equal protection

violation on its own. 

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2933.17 (Objections, at 16-17.) For purposes of an equal-protection claim, however, petitioner’s

contention is too broad. When the underlying offense was committed after 1982, the § 2934

waiver has no legal effect.18 Therefore, whether a prisoner convicted of a post-1982 crime signs a

§ 2934 waiver, the result is the same: the prisoner is eligible for halftime work release credits

under § 2933, unless the crime is a “violent felony” as defined by Penal Code § 667.5(c) and was

committed after § 2933.1 became effective on September 21, 1994. Section 2933.1's disparate

treatment of violent felons survives rational-basis scrutiny, for the reasons stated by the magistrate

judge and summarized supra. 

If, however, the CDCR is allowing violent felons to sign § 2934 waivers and obtain

halftime credits despite being convicted of crimes committed after § 2933.1 became effective, then

petitioner may be able show that he is treated differently. See McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176,

1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (differential treatment is a required element of an equal protection claim). 

Such prisoners are similarly situated to petitioner because they are all subject to the 15% release

credits cap of § 2933.1. In his objections, petitioner submits a declaration from Mr. Lynch, the

inmate who, according to the magistrate judge, appeared to be similarly situated to petitioner. Mr.

Lynch represents, under penalty of perjury, that he signed a § 2934 waiver and received halftime

credits under § 2933. (Lynch Decla. ¶ 10.) Mr. Lynch’s LSS supports his representation, for it

includes a notation that his credits were “auto vested” under Penal Code § 2934. (Am. Pet, Exhibit

C, at 49.) Because Mr. Lynch was convicted of a kidnapping that took place on May 2, 1995 (see

id.), he should have been subject to the 15% release credits cap of § 2933.1. The LSS forms of

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19 Clemans was convicted of second-degree murder, a violent felony, committed on October

1, 1995 and was sentenced to twenty-eight years. (Objections, Exhibit A, at 1.) Under § 2933.1,

Clemans is entitled to 1,533 days of credit (28 years * 365 days/year * 0.15). However, Clemans’s

June 28, 2005 LSS reflects a balance of 1,481 release credits, plus 53 days of Penal Code § 4019

credit, plus 5 days of post-sentence credit, for a total of 1,539 awarded credits. Therefore, Clemans’s

awarded credits seem to exceed (albeit by a small number) the credits for which he was statutorily

eligible.

20 Woerner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a violent felony, committed in September

1995 and was sentenced to thirteen years. (Objections, Exhibit A, at 5.) Rounding to the nearest

whole number, under § 2933.1, Woerner is entitled to 712 days of credit (13 years * 365 days/year *

0.15). However, Woerner’s June 28, 2005 LSS reflects that petitioner was assessed 1,081 credits (i.e., the sum of the numbers in the “Assess” column of the credit balance section of Woerner’s LSS).

When combined with the 113 days of Penal Code § 4019 credit and 30 days of post-sentence credit,

Woerner was apparently awarded 1,224 credits. Therefore, Woerner’s awarded credits exceed the

credits for which he was statutorily eligible.

21 The LSS statements of Stacy Blackburn and Michael Spencer do not support petitioner’s

equal-protection argument because both prisoners were convicted of offenses not enumerated as

violent felonies in Penal Code § 667.5(c). 

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Charles Clemans19 and Richard Woerner20, both submitted with petitioner’s objections, seem to

lend support to petitioner’s argument of differential treatment because each violent felon was

awarded release credits in excess of 15% of his sentence21. Despite signing multiple IWTIP

waivers, petitioner was denied worktime credits beyond the 15% statutory ceiling. 

Although respondent did not reply to petitioner’s objections, the Court finds that

supplemental briefing is necessary before adjudicating petitioner’s equal-protection claim on the

merits. A supplemental brief will enable respondent to reply to the Lynch declaration and

additional LSS documents in petitioner’s objections. This supplemental brief will also allow

respondent to provide legal arguments concerning petitioner’s equal-protection claim, in light of

this most recent evidence of differential treatment. Specifically, the supplemental brief shall

address the following issues:

(1) Whether petitioner was treated differently than similarly situated violent felons

when he was denied release credits beyond the 15% cap imposed by Penal Code §

2933.1.

(2) Whether petitioner has proven that he was denied “equal protection” of the laws

(even assuming that petitioner was treated differently from similarly situated

violent felons in the awarding of release credits);

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22 In addition, if respondent has ready access to the LSS documents of Lynch, Clemans, and

Woerner that petitioner submitted as exhibits with his objections, the Court directs respondent to

attach the best available copies of those documents as exhibits to the reply brief. Portions of the

copies submitted with petitioner’s objections are so faint as to be almost unreadable. 

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(3) Whether petitioner meets the standard for obtaining § 2254 habeas relief on his

equal-protection claim (even assuming that petitioner prevails on the merits of that

claim).22

In the interests of fairness and justice, the Court will allow petitioner to file a surreply. 

CONCLUSION

With respect to petitioner’s claims for due process and estoppel, the Court ADOPTS the

magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, REJECTS petitioner’s objections, and DENIES

WITH PREJUDICE the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

With respect to petitioner’s claim for equal protection, respondent SHALL FILE a reply

brief by October 22, 2007. Respondent’s reply brief SHALL NOT EXCEED fifteen (15) pages,

excluding exhibits. Petitioner SHALL FILE a surreply brief by November 19, 2007. Petitioner’s

surreply brief SHALL NOT EXCEED fifteen (15) pages, excluding exhibits. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2007

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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